

ATHENIAN IDEOLOGY IN DEMOSTHENES' DELIBERATIVE ORATORY: HAILING  
THE DĒMOS.

by

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF  
PHILOSOPHY

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May 2016

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Demosthenes' rhetorical use of Athenian ideology in his deliberative speeches from 351-341 BCE. I argue that during this period of crisis, which is usually narrated in terms of conflict with Macedonia, Demosthenes confronts an *internal* crisis within the Assembly. While Demosthenes' deliberative speeches have traditionally been defined as 'Philippic', this thesis argues that the speeches do not prioritise an 'Anti-Macedonian' agenda, but rather focus on confronting the corruption of the deliberative decision-making process. Through an attitude of apathy and neglect, the Athenians have created an environment for men such as Philip II to exploit and flourish in. For Demosthenes, their external problems are a direct product of this internal crisis, both of which are perpetuated by their failure to recognise how self-sabotaging practices undermine the *polis* from within. As he asserts in *On the Chersonese* and the *Third Philippic*, they cannot hope to deal with their external situation before they deal with their internal crisis. To address this, I argue that Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* interweaves criticism of the *dēmos* with the praise of Athens, using social memory and past exempla both to recall and prescribe didactically the attitudes central to Athenian identity. As such, I propose that the deliberative speeches do not confront a 'Macedonian Question', but a fundamentally Athenian one.

## DEDICATION

When his consultant told him he had only months left to live, my Grandad's immediate response was: 'that's not long enough, my Best Pal hasn't finished her PhD yet'. In our last conversation he told me to keep going and to never be defeated.

This thesis is dedicated to his memory, and of my beloved Nan.

*In memoriam*

Donald & Florence Bremner

17th March 1931 - 21st December 2012

1st September 1923 - 15th January 2015

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was funded by the College of Arts and Law at the University of Birmingham, and I offer my sincere thanks to the panel that awarded my scholarship.

I wish to thank my supervisor Dr Niall Livingstone, who from my undergraduate to my PhD has had the faith to let me run with ideas and the trust to follow wherever they led, and also to Dr Will Mack for taking on this role and seeing us over the finish line.

I would not have been able to complete this research without the support of my friends and family. I would like to thank St Giles Hospice for their bereavement support, and I owe many cups of tea to my fellow Birmingham PhD colleague and dear friend, Polly Stoker, who has supported me throughout my research.

I wish to thank my parents, Janet and Paul Wilkowski, for their constant support and for the many years that they surrendered their home to my scattered books. I also wish to thank my Grandparents who took every step of my education with me, from infants to the start of my PhD. Their unswerving belief that I could go beyond any expectations has driven me to complete this thesis and it is dedicated to their memory.

Finally, my inexpressible thanks go to Aaron, my bigger picture, who always provides me with perspective. My thanks to him, and for surrendering our own home to my scattered books, are beyond the scope of words.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

Names of journals are abbreviated as in *L'Année Philologique* and liste des périodiques Dépoullés.

<i>AIO</i>	<i>Attic Inscriptions Online</i>
BNJ	Brill's New Jaboby
BNP	Brill's New Pauly
<i>FGrH</i>	F. Jacoby <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> .
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
LSJ	H.G. Liddell, R. Scott and H.S. Jones (eds.) <i>Greek-English Lexicon, with a revised supplement</i> . Ninth Edition. Oxford. 1996.
OCT	Oxford Classical Text
<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i> . Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Pr.
<i>AncW</i>	<i>The Ancient world : a scholarly journal for the study of antiquity</i> . Chicago. University of Chicago Pr.
<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies</i> . London. University of London, Institute of Classical Studies.
<i>C&amp;M</i>	<i>Classica et Mediaevalia</i> : revue danoise de philologie et d'histoire. Copenhagen
<i>CA</i>	<i>Classical Antiquity</i> . Berkeley. University of California Pr.
<i>CFC(G)</i>	<i>Cuadernos de lología clásica</i> . Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos. Madrid. Universidad Complutense, Servicio de Publicaciones.
<i>CJ</i>	<i>The Classical Journal</i> . Ashland. Randolph-Macon College, Department of Classics, Classical Association of the Middle West and South.
<i>CPh</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i> : a journal devoted to research in classical antiquity. Chicago. University of Chicago Pr.
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i> . Oxford. Oxford University Pr.
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i> . Oxford. Oxford University Pr.
<i>G&amp;R</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i> . Oxford. Clarendon Pr.
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i> . Durham (N.C.). Duke University, Classics.



<i>Hermes</i>	Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie. Stuttgart. Steiner.
<i>Historia</i>	Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte = revue d'histoire ancienne. Stuttgart. Steiner.
<i>JHI</i>	<i>Journal of the History of Ideas</i> . Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Pr.
<i>JHS</i>	<i>The Journal of Hellenic Studies</i> . London. Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies.
<i>Klio</i>	Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte. Berlin. Akademie Verl.
<i>Kodai</i>	Journal of Ancient History. Tokyo. University of Tokyo, Department of History.
<i>Mnemosyne</i>	Bibliotheca Classica Batava. Leiden. Brill.
<i>PAPhS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society</i> . Philadelphia. American Philosophical Society.
<i>Philologus</i>	Zeitschrift für antike Literatur und ihre Rezeption. Berlin. Akademie Verl.
<i>Phoenix</i>	Journal of the Classical Association of Canada. Revue de la Société canadienne des études classiques. Toronto. University of Toronto Pr.
<i>REG</i>	Revue des études grecques. Paris. Les Belles Lettres.
<i>Rhetorica</i>	Journal of the history of rhetoric. Berkeley. University of California Pr.
<i>SH</i>	<i>Scripta Hierosolymitana</i> . Publications of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Magnes Pr.
<i>SO</i>	<i>Symbolae Osloenses</i> . Norwegian journal of Greek and Latin studies. Basingstoke. Taylor & Francis.
<i>TAPhA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i> . Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Pr.

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines Demosthenes' rhetorical use of Athenian ideology and identity in his deliberative speeches from 351-341 BCE. I argue that during this period of crisis, which is usually narrated in terms of conflict with Macedonia, Demosthenes confronts an *internal* identity crisis within the Assembly.<sup>1</sup> Through an attitude of apathy and neglect, the Athenians have created an environment for men such as Philip II to exploit and flourish in.<sup>2</sup> For Demosthenes, their external problems are a direct product of their internal crisis, both of which are perpetuated by their failure to recognise how self-sabotaging practices undermine their identity as Athenians. As he asserts in *On the Chersonese* and the *Third Philippic*, they cannot hope to deal with their external situation before they deal with their internal crisis.<sup>3</sup> To address this, Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* interweaves criticism of the *dēmos* with praise of Athens, using social memory and past exempla both to recall and prescribe didactically the attitudes and behaviour central to Athenian identity.

I believe Demosthenes' focus on this internal crisis has been overshadowed by approaches that view these speeches as primarily against Philip, and specifically in terms of an external conflict with Macedonian expansionism and the fall of democratic Athens. For example, Milns and Elis argue that, 'Eleven of Demosthenes' extant speeches are devoted to

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<sup>1</sup> Karvounis' 2000 study of the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs* are all grouped under the heading 'Warnung vor Philipp', situating the speeches within a conflict against Philip, and with Philip as Demosthenes' antagonist. Carlier 1990, which focuses on Demosthenes, titles Chapter Three 'Athènes et Démosthène avante Philippe', Chapter Four: 'La résistible ascension de Philippe de Macédoine.' This particular chapter title is remarkable because it implicitly compares Philip with Hitler: the title of Bertolt Brecht's 1941 play *Der aufhaltsame Aufstieg des Arturo Ui*, parodying the Nazis' rise to power, is translated into English as *The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui* but into French as *La résistible ascension d' Arturo Ui*; and since 'resistible rise', a reversal of the cliché 'irresistible rise', was not a standard expression in any of these languages before Brecht used it, 'La résistible ascension' arguably alludes to it.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this thesis when I refer to 'the Assembly', 'the Athenians' or 'the *dēmos*' I mean those present within the Assembly/ listening to the speeches/ making decisions based on the deliberative speeches. Specifically, I am referring to those whom Demosthenes is addressing in the context of the speech, not necessarily any wider readership outside of Athens. For more on the Assembly see Ober 1989: 132-8; Hansen 1987.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes 8.61, 9.53.

Philip, or more specifically attacks against him’, and how they are ‘an attempt to stimulate hostility against Philip’. Pearson views the speeches as, ‘a series of prosecutor’s speeches against the same defendant, Philip’, while Trevett remarks that, from the *First Philippic*, ‘all his surviving deliberative speeches are characterised by ancient critics as “Philippics”, that is, as speeches concerned with policy towards Philip.’ Kennedy states that, historically, ‘Demosthenes’ energies were directed against Macedon’, and Usher argues that the deliberative speeches are directed against Philip and that the *Third Philippic* builds up to the ‘final showdown with Philip.’ Likewise, Edwards states that when ‘Demosthenes began his crusade of opposition to Philip in the *Philippics* (the term is usually extended to cover the three *Olynthiacs*, *On the Peace*, and *On the Chersonese*) he dispensed with notions of honour and justice, and responded to Philip’s aggression by advocating opposition to him as the only possible course of action.’ I disagree with this in particular as my research demonstrates that Demosthenes’ arguments focus on Athenian identity, of which honour, justice and duty are integral. Edwards continues that to fight Philip, Demosthenes develops the ‘concept of a national character’, but I argue this national character is developed to confront an apathetic Assembly, as in Demosthenes’ view, the crisis is rooted in their failure to act in manner worthy of the Athenian past.<sup>4</sup>

In my opinion, to approach the deliberative speeches with this retrospective determinism is to apply to them a false teleology which over-determines the outcome of Chaeronea, and presumes that Demosthenes had a systematic plan against Philip from the *First Philippic* onwards.<sup>5</sup> This risks overlooking how Demosthenes’ appeal to send forces

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<sup>4</sup> Milns and Elis 1970: 2; 11. Pearson 1976: vii. Trevett 2011: 68. Kennedy 1963: 208. Usher 2010: 230-234. Edwards 1994: 45.

<sup>5</sup> Such as Goodwin 1901: 171 ‘No one can read the earlier orations of Demosthenes in light of later events without feeling the justice of his claim to sagacity’(see further discussion on *pronoia* in I.2 with Mader 2007b). Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that for and Demosthenes (and later Cicero) the ‘fall’ of Athenian democracy and the Late Republic were neither obvious nor inevitable outcomes. Defining literature as part of the ‘fall of Athens’ or belonging to the ‘Late Republic’, risks forgetting that contemporary writers would not have viewed themselves as ‘late’ at all.

against Philip always returns to condemning the Assembly's reluctance to act in the first place. What the speeches fight against is not Philip, but rather the self-destruction of Athens by its internal corruption: the corruption of *logos*, the gap between *logos* and *ergon*, and the refusal to recognise that their neglectful attitude undermines their very identity and thus their security.<sup>6</sup> This, I argue, is what resonates throughout the deliberative speeches rather than an 'anti-Macedonian' or 'Philippic' rhetoric.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, statements such as '*Philippic* I is the first act of the drama of Demosthenes and Philip' overlook the extent to which the drama is actually between Demosthenes and a broken Assembly.<sup>8</sup> Such approaches reveal a desire for a 'drama' which fits neatly into a grand historical narrative requiring, with hindsight, a smooth transition from 'Classical' to 'Hellenistic' Greece. By looking for one thing, they fail to see what else is occurring within the speeches, and the construction of this drama with Philip distracts scholarship from what I argue was the main event, a far more immediate and compelling one to Demosthenes and his contemporaries: the crisis within Athens itself.

### I.1 The Fallacy of a 'Philippic' model

This doctoral thesis grew out of an MA dissertation on Ciceronian invective in his *Philippics*. My initial plan was to define a 'Philippic' model of invective drawn from – what I then considered to be – the original Philippic writer: Demosthenes. In the course of my research, I became increasingly dissatisfied with the idea that such a paradigm, as set out in

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<sup>6</sup> Rather than the traditional view of a *logos/ergon* antithesis associated mainly with Thucydides (Parry 1957), I argue that Demosthenes views *logos* and *ergon* as necessary (not opposite) parts of effective decision-making. *Logos* without *ergon* is empty and vain; *ergon* without consideration is rash. Demosthenes does not want them to replace one with the other, but to use both effectively.

<sup>7</sup> Indeed, I argue that Philippic rhetoric is a Ciceronian creation that is applied retrospectively to Demosthenes. This has created an impression of Demosthenes, where people think they know him without the need to read his speeches: Carlier 1990: 7 'Parler de Démosthène: notait déjà un humoriste de l'Antiquité, est plus facile que parler d'Homère, car il n'est pas indispensable de lire son oeuvre'. Carlier is perhaps referring to pseudo-Lucian's comparison of Homer and Demosthenes in his *In Praise of Demosthenes*, but Carlier's comment that you do not have to have read Demosthenes is something quite different.

<sup>8</sup> Ellis and Milns 1970: 11.

Wooten's *Cicero's Philippics and their Demosthenic Model*, could be derived from Demosthenes' deliberative speeches.<sup>9</sup> I was increasingly drawn to the conclusion that 'Philippic' as a form of invective rhetoric is a Ciceronian construction. Backwards projection of Cicero's *Philippics* has played a role in fostering a false assumption that Demosthenes' *Philippics* are defined by an anti-Macedonian agenda in the same manner as Cicero's systematic attack on Antony.<sup>10</sup> Cicero's *Second Philippic* does indeed resonate strongly with Demosthenes' forensic speech *On the Crown*, delivered in 330, and it is the popularity of this speech that has been decisive in associating Demosthenes' deliberative corpus with Ciceronian 'Philippic' invective.<sup>11</sup> The *ad hominem* invective and character assassination in these two speeches is contrary to the norms of the Athenian Assembly, and hence it is no surprise that they are absent in Demosthenes' deliberative corpus. In spite of this, *On the Crown* is presented as a crystallisation of Demosthenes' speeches.<sup>12</sup> However, to approach the speeches before Chaeronea as if Demosthenes had the same foresight (*pronoia*) that he is able to claim retrospectively in *On the Crown*, presents a false impression that Demosthenes'

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<sup>9</sup> I argue that the influence of Wooten 1989 has promoted this misleading association, particular in his view that 'the best way to approach these [Cicero's speeches] would be to compare them with those of Demosthenes against Philip of Macedon' (Wooten 1989: ix). Wooten's priority is Cicero, and I argue he approaches Demosthenes with a Ciceronian lens. In suggesting that 'it is only through a penetration into their psyches that we can truly understand, and thus justify, the stands they took', this approach risks an anachronistic assumption that we can ever access the psyches of Classical orators. It also tries to make Demosthenes fit a Ciceronian model, which misses the different purposes of their speeches, and risks glossing over significant difference in the oratory of Democratic Athens and the Roman Republic.

<sup>10</sup> A case in point being the description of the Trevett 2011 translation of speeches 1-17 on the University of Texas Press website, 'the Philippic speeches later inspired the Roman orator Cicero in his own attacks against Mark Antony, and became one of Demosthenes' claims to fame throughout history.' This can be fairly said about *On the Crown*, but not of the deliberative speeches in this volume.

<sup>11</sup> Ramsey 2003: 17-18 notes that as early as June 60, Cicero had associated his Antonian speeches to Demosthenes' *Philippics* (*Atticus* 2.1.3), and that *On the Crown* bears the closest resemblance to Cicero's *Second Philippic*. Ramsey also adds that in *De optimo genere oratorum* 14 Cicero claims to have recently translated, or intends to produce a translation of Demosthenes' *On the Crown* and Aeschines' speech. Yunis 2007: 372 notes that 'at one time the speech [*On the Crown*] was considered one of the greatest literary and rhetorical masterpieces and determined how the fourth-century struggle between Greece and Macedonia was understood.' Swain 1996: 94 notes how *On the Crown* was a 'much loved oration' by the Second Sophistic.

<sup>12</sup> Such as Kennedy 1963: 224-227 who discusses Demosthenes' public speeches up to *On the Crown* before discussing the fall of Olynthus and the Peace of Philocrates. (See too Kennedy 1993: 74-5). As Kennedy can be considered a key introductory text for students approach Classical rhetoric, his presentation of Demosthenes is very influential and formative in scholarship.

career was dedicated to fighting Philip and risks an anachronistic misunderstanding of the speeches.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, it has created a version of ‘Demosthenes’ which is more the product of reception than a reflection of his deliberative speeches in their true historical context.

Indeed, this view arguably shaped Demosthenic reception, where a stereotyped idea of ‘Demosthenes’ became a part of the social memory of democratic Athens, crafted and transformed to suit the needs of the times. It was an idealised Demosthenes that Cicero emulated in his political swansongs and this idealised (and arguably Ciceronian) Demosthenes was emphasised further in Plutarch’s pairing of the two orators in his *Parallel Lives*.<sup>14</sup> The patriotic and ‘pure’ Demosthenes was standardised and emulated in the Second Sophistic, and in the Early Modern Period Demosthenes became the ideal defender of freedom and duty: Thomas Wilson used his translations to advise Elizabeth I on an alliance with the Netherlands to block Spanish expansionism.<sup>15</sup> With readers seeing their own milieu in the tropes of Classical Athens, it was Demosthenes who was Pickard-Cambridge’s ‘Hero of the Nation’ following the aggressive mobilisation and increasingly volatile climate of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, and Winston Churchill viewed Hitler as a new Philip.<sup>16</sup> The very idea of Demosthenes has become a product of cultural memory, epitomised in Carrier’s statement that speaking about Demosthenes is easier than talking about Homer,

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<sup>13</sup> Mader 2007b: 341 makes the key point that Demosthenes’ self-portrait in *On the Crown* is ‘with the benefit of hindsight’, and that *pronoia* is ‘by definition valourised only *ex eventu* and with historical hindsight...at the time of his political debut in the 350s no such claim was possible.’ However, I believe Mader’s additional caveat ‘(although he is demonstrably laying the groundwork)’ falls into this false teleology, and is a result of his view that *On the Crown* is the idealised summation of ‘the period of his anti-Macedonian agitation.’ (Mader 2007b: 340.) I agree with the retrospective rhetorical use of *pronoia* in *On the Crown*, but I do not agree that this informs our understanding of Demosthenes’ speeches before Chaeronea.

<sup>14</sup> Also Plutarch also frequently uses Cicero as a source, e.g. Cicero’s *Second Philippic* for his *Life of Antony*.

<sup>15</sup> Evoking the situation at Olynthus. Peltonen 2013: 108-11 notes that Wilson wrote ‘he that loues hys countrye, and desires to procure the welfare of it, let him reade Demosthenes, and he shall not want matter to doe hymselfe good’ (j<sup>r-v</sup>); Wilson’s translations of the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs* in 1570 show how ‘classical sources were seen as being directly relevant to the early modern world of politics and the extent to which they advocated liberty and wide civic participation.’

<sup>16</sup> Pickard-Cambridge 1914. Worthington 2013: 343-344. Richard 2009: 6 suggests that Churchill drew solace from the example of Demosthenes as a martyr of freedom.

because it is not necessary to read any of his works.<sup>17</sup> This is a fundamental problem as this stereotype maintains a specific and preconditioned image of Demosthenes, which places limits on the variable interpretations of the speeches, and overshadows how his arguments were independent of Philip. In removing the ‘Philippic’ lens, I argue that Demosthenes’ reputation as ‘the uncompromising defender of liberty’, should not be solely measured in terms of Philip, but in terms of his defence of democracy *within* Athens itself.<sup>18</sup> Removing this lens also saves Demosthenes from the obligation of being the ‘hero’ and enables a new perspective to understand his speeches as a discussion on Athenian democracy.

## I.2 A Third Wave: the middle path

In his discussion on the burden of the Athenian past in *On the Crown*, Yunis presents the two overarching trends that have dominated Demosthenic scholarship: the ‘Old Literary Model’ that upheld the post-classical heroic ‘Demosthenes’ with reverence, and the critical historical theorists, most notably George Cawkwell, who sought to re-evaluate Demosthenes’ historical reliability and the soundness of his policy.<sup>19</sup> Both approaches have their flaws: the students of rhetoric ‘simply perpetuated that old literary model whilst labelling Cawkwell an extremist’ and in ignoring his argument have ‘failed to perceive that the work of Cawkwell and other historians has rendered the old literary model of Demosthenic rhetoric obsolete.’<sup>20</sup> The

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<sup>17</sup> Carlier 1990: 7 noted above. The influence of Carlier 1990 should not be underestimated, Carlier was the most complete treatment of Demosthenes before the publications of Worthington 2000; 2013.

<sup>18</sup> One of the most recent descriptions of Demosthenes is Brun 2015: cover description ‘défenseur intransigent de la démocratie.’ Hernández-Muñoz 2013b also demonstrates this tendency to view Demosthenes fighting *Philip* in the defence of democracy by his title ‘Demóstenes vs. Filipo: la democracia en juego’ Demosthenes vs. Philip: democracy at stake.

<sup>19</sup> Yunis 2007: 374-6. The old literary model as seen in Pickard-Cambridge 1914, Clemenceau 1926, Jaeger 1938. For recent scholarship I add Carlier 1990, Karvounis 2000 and Wooten 2009. For the critical theorist Yunis lists Schäfer 1885-7, Beloch 1922. Cawkwell 1978, Ellis 1976, Griffith 1979. Yunis notes in particular that Cawkwell ‘completely reversed the traditional assessment of Demosthenes.’

<sup>20</sup> Yunis 2007: 377 citing Schindel 1987 and Carlier 1990. I particularly object to Carlier’s comment that you do not have to have read any of Demosthenes’ works to know him (1990: 7). This is an example of the assumptions that I wish to challenge in this thesis.

historians, however, in their focus on historical value and utility, fail to see how Demosthenes offers an ‘anti-utilitarian perspective on action...the expression of a way of life, an ideal way of life, that will not be abandoned or sacrificed.’<sup>21</sup>

I arrive at the same conclusion as Yunis, but from a different angle: both of these traditions, in my opinion, view Demosthenes’ speeches through the lens of conflict with Philip and thus continue the notion that Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches are fundamentally anti-Macedonian.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, I believe they hinder the nuances within Demosthenes’ rhetoric and miss his contribution to our understanding of Athenian identity, ideology, and the use of social memory in fourth-century Athens.<sup>23</sup>

Yunis offers a middle path, which responds to the complaints of the critical theorists without needing to challenge them.<sup>24</sup> His focus is not an evaluation of Demosthenes’ policy, but rather on his method of persuasion. Yunis accounts Demosthenes’ success to his decision to move outside of a success-oriented model of politics, to appeal to the Athenians’ sense of identity and ideology.<sup>25</sup> Demosthenes returned to the tropes of Homeric and tragic poetry that resonated with his mass audience, where actions were judged on their moral integrity rather than their actual outcome (essentially the means, not the end).<sup>26</sup> Rather than admitting fault in *On the Crown*, Demosthenes presents his advice as correct even in the hindsight of defeat,

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<sup>21</sup> Yunis 2007: 385, and Hampshire 1978.

<sup>22</sup> I believe one of the reasons my thesis draws the conclusions it does is because I approach Demosthenes outside of these traditional frameworks of scholarship.

<sup>23</sup> It is important to note the wide opinions on what constitutes ‘ideology’, as Eagleton 1994: 15 notes it ‘can mean, too vaguely “thought” or too narrowly, “false ideas which help to legitimate an unjust political power”. The term may be pejorative, as with Marx or Mannheim, positive as (sometimes) with Lenin, or neutral, as with Althusser.’ See further discussion on ideology at section I.3.

<sup>24</sup> Yunis specifically addresses Cawkwell 1969 who could not understand why the Athenians chose to endorse Demosthenes’ policy when it led to the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea.

<sup>25</sup> Todd 1993: 306 ‘Athenian public discourse rest on a success-oriented model of politics in which incompetence is criminal.’ In this I believe Demosthenes appeals to the virtues of Athenian ideology which transcend the realities of defeat.

<sup>26</sup> Yunis 2007: 380. Actions were ‘evaluated as admirable or contemptible, noble or base, good or bad, without regard to their success or failure on a scale of advantage or disadvantage. He adds that the models of Homeric and tragic poetry offered the advantage of being ‘well accepted and even cherished’ by the *dēmos*.



because it was the only honourable course of action: ‘the city could not have departed from that policy, if she had any regard for honour, or for our ancestors, or for the days that are to come.’<sup>27</sup> Reminding them too of their role at Marathon, Demosthenes used the ‘burden of the past’ to transcend practical realities and create ‘an emotionally resonant awareness of the rightness of action.’<sup>28</sup>

My approach takes this middle path, seeking neither to maintain Demosthenes as a literary hero nor to analyse his historical accuracy. I argue that the use of the Athenian past to define ‘a whole way of life’ resonates throughout Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches.<sup>29</sup> I develop this beyond Yunis’ argument, as I believe Demosthenes equates the practical concerns facing Athens with their failure to live up to their ancestral ideology.<sup>30</sup> In removing Philip as the target, I argue that the burden of the Athenian past plays a critical role in Demosthenes’ method to confront the corruption within the Assembly. Important to this approach is Steinbock’s research on how the ideological and emotive power of shared memories offers more than empty rhetorical phrases, or propaganda, but is a crucial factor in political decision-making.<sup>31</sup> I link Yunis’ approach to Steinbock’s assertion that references to the past by the orators were not attempts at historical accuracy, but rather sought to engage with the historical consciousness of the Athenian community where past events became symbols of national character.<sup>32</sup> I argue that Demosthenes uses the burden of the Athenian

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<sup>27</sup> Demosthenes 18.199.

<sup>28</sup> Yunis 2007: 384.

<sup>29</sup> Yunis 2007: 385.

<sup>30</sup> Whilst Yunis 2007: 389 argues that the burden of the past was used retrospectively, and ‘may have played no role at all in the formulation of the original policy,’ I suggest it did.

<sup>31</sup> Steinbock 2013: 4. Steinbock 2013: 2 notes that his central premise is that he deals with ‘social memory and not history per se.’

<sup>32</sup> Steinbock 2013: 2. Steinbock, like Yunis, addresses the complaints of the critical historians by offering a new approach to the old problem of understanding historical allusions in oratory. Steinbock 2013: 7 argues that ‘collective memories generally do not stand up to the scrutiny of professional historians’, but he argues that they are real in the sense that they remember community, and that remembering shapes ‘collective identity and determines their friends and enemies.’ On historical events becoming symbols of national character through memory see A. Assmann 2001: 6824.

past to engage with the collective self-understanding of the *dēmos*, using Athenian social memory as a persuasive technique to trigger cues within the *dēmos* that are generative, implicitly motivating them to reflect self-critically by reminding them of the ideology to which they subscribe, and how their current behaviour is antithetical to Athenian identity.

### I.3 Interpellation and the Assembly as a self-aware collective of Athenian Citizens

My approach presupposes the self-identification of the Assembly as *Athenian*, and can be illuminated using Althusserian ideas on interpellation. Louis Althusser argued that ‘ideology interpellates individuals as subjects,’ and that ‘there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subjects.’<sup>33</sup> To explain this Althusser asserts that ‘all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects.’<sup>34</sup> From this, he then states that ideology ‘transforms the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called *interpellation* or hailing.’<sup>35</sup> To demonstrate this, Althusser famously uses the example of a policeman in the street hailing, ‘Hey, you there!’ He continues that:

Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn around. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a *subject*. Why? Because he has recognised that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and that ‘it was *really him* who was hailed’ (and not someone else).<sup>36</sup>

Brady and Shirato define interpellation as ‘the process whereby power calls, addresses and categorises subjects’, and it is in this most essential form that I apply

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<sup>33</sup> Althusser 1977: 115.

<sup>34</sup> Althusser 1977: 117.

<sup>35</sup> Althusser 1977: 118.

<sup>36</sup> Althusser 1977: 118.

Althusser's theory of interpellation on my view of the Athenian Assembly as a collective of Athenian citizens. By considering oratory as an Ideological State Apparatus (as Morstein-Marx does for the Roman Republic<sup>37</sup>) and noting that oratory is the medium through which democracy functions as both *logos* and political *praxis*, my approach presupposes that by simply addressing the Assembly, Demosthenes takes part in the process of addressing and categorising which constructs his audience as Athenian citizens.

Specifically, when Demosthenes addresses the Assembly, in that interpellative moment, 'ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι', he *hails* the *dēmos* as – categorically – *Men of Athens*. This hail, however, only makes sense with a collective and prior understanding of what being 'men of Athens' means, and in accepting the hail – the Assembly becomes a constructed subject: a collective of Athenian citizens. This is not necessarily a passive process, as interpellation also involves understanding ideological discourse.<sup>38</sup> As such, my view of interpellation is not as authoritarian a process as Althusser suggests. I propose that, in practice, oratory hails its audience within a collective ideological framework of shared knowledge – knowledge of what it means to be an Athenian citizen in fourth-century Athens, and this is key to the interpellative process.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, I argue that this can be considered the same knowledge that Ober defines as 'democratic knowledge':

Athenian civic ideology was founded neither on a formal constitution, nor on a set of epistemological certainties, but rather on a socially and politically constructed truth regime that I call 'Democratic knowledge'. The practical functioning of democratic knowledge depended on the implicit willingness of the citizen-participants to accept

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<sup>37</sup> Morstein-Marx 2004: 16 views oratory as an ISA if one considers 'oratory in the *contro* as ideological discourse and acknowledge the force of Althusser's observation that individual subjects are produced by discourse and located thereby within ideology.'

<sup>38</sup> Močnik 2013: 311.

<sup>39</sup> Just as Wohl 1998: xxxiii argues that 'tragedy interpellated its audience as Athenian citizens.'

the truths they lived by as political artefacts rather than as absolutes denoted by a transcendent natural order.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, Athenian deliberative oratory rested on presuming the collective understanding of both speakers and addressees, which in turn informs the democratic decision-making process.<sup>41</sup> Hunt's definition of ideology likewise views 'a system of intellectual beliefs and emotional judgments', comprised from 'the opinions and principles which are common to the great majority', and is therefore far removed from the early Marxist sense of ideology as a means for the ruling classes 'to secure the consent of their subordinates to be ruled', in an oppressive manner.<sup>42</sup> Like Ober and Hunt, I take for granted that the Athenian Assembly functioned upon a system of collective knowledge, with established ideas regarding their ideology and identity, informed by their historical consciousness and carriers of social memory (via institutions such as the *epitaphioi logoi*, civic theatrical performances, historiography, philosophy and public monumental architecture).<sup>43</sup> In answer to her question 'what practically speaking, is the milieu and the means by which collective identity and values are shaped?', Kallet-Marx uses the example of Pericles' funeral oration as a unifier of different types of people, collected as Athenians, and in doing so asserts that:

A unified "*dēmos*" or "the Athenians" does not exist as a fact or reality, however; it has to be constructed, reconstructed and reinforced by rhetoric.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ober 1994: 103.

<sup>41</sup> Ober 1993: 106 'Athenian Assembly speakers based their arguments on democratic knowledge, which took for granted both a citizenry with a good grasp of past and present political practices and the validity of public opinion.' See too Ober 1989a 156-79; 177-82.

<sup>42</sup> Hunt 1998: 19- 20; Ober 1989: 38. Steinbock 2013: 14. Eagleton 1994: 13.

<sup>43</sup> Ober 2008: 197 notes 'As carriers of readily accessible informational content, public monuments may present spectators with a commonly available, relatively clear, and therefore "unitary" account of some aspect of shared culture or history.' Ober 2008: 202 continues that 'Democratic Athens stands out among the Greek poleis in its efforts to construct and improve inward facing public spaces.'

While it is impossible to say that all citizens in the Assembly would have read Thucydides or Isocrates, I believe we can postulate that those who had access to these thinkers arguably would have been politically active and present at debates on important issues, such as the decision to send aid to Olynthus. As such, I argue that there would have been an informed section of the *dēmos* present for the speeches discussed in this thesis.

<sup>44</sup> Kallet-Marx 1994: 326.

It is this collective awareness, which unites the Athenians as the *dēmos*, that I argue Demosthenes both presumes and engages with when he hails them in his speeches.

This framework emphasises that engagement with ideology is by definition implicit: as Althusser notes, ‘one of the effects of ideology is the practical *denegation* of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says ‘I am ideological’.<sup>45</sup> Likewise, Demosthenes does not need to be obviously ideological as ideology is never obvious – that in itself is the point, particularly if we consider ideology as non-historical, ‘ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to saying that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: *individuals are always-already subjects*.’<sup>46</sup> Consequently, all addresses to the *dēmos* engage within this ideological framework.

Indeed, in noting Althusser’s use of Pascal’s maxim ‘Kneel down, move your lips in prayer...you will believe’, ideology does not even require a belief in the ideology but it is rather a matter of habit and practice.<sup>47</sup> The simplicity of this hail of the *dēmos* may appear trivial, but as Rehmann observes this is ‘exactly what Althusser is trying to demonstrate. It is in this very obviousness, this self-evident reaction of all of us (namely, that when called we turn around), that the ideological subjection has its foundation.’<sup>48</sup>

That being said, while I argue that Demosthenes’ ideological engagement with the *dēmos* is not necessarily complex or deliberate, but simply the nature of being an Athenian orator in the fourth century, I do argue that his references engage with the collective knowledge of the Assembly, and arguably prescribe the *mores* of their ancestors in a didactic pedagogical manner. To this end, I maintain that Demosthenes uses the awareness and burden

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<sup>45</sup> Althusser 1977: 118.

<sup>46</sup> Althusser 1977: 119.

<sup>47</sup> Althusser 1977: 114.

<sup>48</sup> Rehmann 2013: 156.

of the Athenian past to remind the Assembly of the behaviours that define Athenian ideology, as a means to explain and resolve their current crisis. As such, interpellations to the *dēmos* as Athenians are a matter of consciousness reflecting upon itself, and I argue that Demosthenes' rhetoric relies upon the subjection, self-identification, self-narratives and collective consciousness of the *dēmos* as *Athenian*.<sup>49</sup>

#### I.4 The Idea of Athens: Epitaphic and Thucydidean Parallels

This thesis, therefore, draws upon intertextual parallels from historiography and oratory, which form an integral part of the intellectual tradition of Demosthenes' Athens. Indeed, in drawing such parallels, we can view Demosthenes' speeches as part of the wider intellectual conversations on Athenian identity, and in doing so reveal nuances in his oratory that have previously been unavailable due to an overwhelming focus on these speeches as 'Philippic'.

Consequently, the idea of Athens, what constitutes Athenian identity, and how the Athenians view themselves (and wish to be perceived), is in my opinion, integral to Demosthenes' argument throughout these speeches. Through his use of social memory, which 'creates collective identity by giving individuals a shared image of their past, providing them with an explanation of the present and a vision of the future', I propose that Demosthenes presents a specific version of Athenian identity to confront the Assembly with the realities of their internal identity crisis.<sup>50</sup> By reminding them of their past actions during the Persian and Corinthian War, Demosthenes reasserts the behaviour expected of Athenians

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<sup>49</sup> On consciousness and reflection Brady and Schirato 2011: 117 make links to Nietzsche 1887 (1956).

<sup>50</sup> Steinbock 2013: 7. Steinbock 2013: 8n22 supports his argument with A. Assmann 2001: 6824 on how social memory is also known as 'cultural memory' or 'believed history' or 'intentional history'; Fentress and Wickham 1992: 25 define it as an 'expression of collective experience'; Gehrke 2001: 286 uses 'intentional history'; Misztal 2003: 158 'a group's representation of its past...that enacts and gives substance to that group's identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future.'

by Athenians, and juxtaposes their current state to their virtuous past actions.<sup>51</sup> Demosthenes' persuasion relies on their collective memory to urge his fellow-citizens to recognise their moral degeneration and equates their external problems with their failure to act in manner worthy of their past.<sup>52</sup> While Demosthenes' use of social memory rests on what Gehrke defines as the 'interdependence between the Athenians' historical experience and their resultant self-image', it also relies on using the emotive response that memories of past events trigger, as a method of persuasion.<sup>53</sup>

In this regard, I propose that there are parallels between the praise and didactic functions of the funeral oration (*epitaphios logos*) and Demosthenes' own balance of praise and blame to support his persuasion with the emotive power of their ancestral identity.<sup>54</sup> In particular, my argument develops from Loraux's research on how the *epitaphioi logoi* praise:

an imaginary, or at least ideal, city...in this sense, and in this sense only, the oration may be called ideological, since it expresses what the city wants to be in its own eyes rather than describing what it is in reality. It has been said that "at all times...the *Polis* is at once a reality and an ideal."<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Loraux 1986: 86 speaks of how the *epitaphios logos* preserves 'the *athanatos mnēmē* (immortal memory) of the city', which I view as linked to their immutable ideology, untouchable and essentially unchanging, despite specific political situations and contexts.

<sup>52</sup> Steinbock 2013: 30: for the Attic orators, social memory 'provides a pool of collective experience for the perception and analysis of present realities, but it also serves as a repository of symbols and metaphors.' This builds upon Ober 1989: 40 who writes that 'communication between the members of a society, especially in the context of political decision making, will make use of symbols (metaphors, signs) which refer to and derive from ideology...thought and perception, and therefore language, are symbolic and metaphoric; thus, communication is based on complex and intertwined symbolic references and cross-references.'

<sup>53</sup> Gehrke 2003: 22 in Steinbock 2013: 20. Steinbock 2013: 38 remarks that to view oratorical references to the past as rhetorical commonplaces 'ignores that the memories of these events were deeply meaningful to the respective community.' Ober 1989: 44 argues that rhetorical *topoi* were 'familiar but certainly not empty of content. Indeed, *topoi* were reiterated precisely because of their symbolic value' and their power to influence an audience.

<sup>54</sup> Steinbock 2016: 51 notes the didactic function of the use of the past in the *epitaphioi logoi*.

<sup>55</sup> Loraux 1986: 251 citing Ehrenberg 1937: 158. Loraux 1986: 42 views the *epitaphios logos* as 'a way of conceiving of Athenian history between the fragmented time of battle and the paradigmatic timelessness of the citizen' valour. It is a discourse on "democracy", the geometric locus of *arête*, forever protected from conflicts and tensions...it is a political genre in which, governed by civic laws, the *logos* becomes in turn a civic norm for speaking of Athens. From *epitaphios* to *epitaphios*, a certain idea that the city wishes to have of itself emerges, beyond the needs of the present.'

I argue that Demosthenes utilises a relationship between the past/ideal and current Athens in his deliberative oratory by presenting both of these images to the Assembly: their current state and their full potential. Demosthenes' proposals are essentially to act in a manner worthy of the city and approach their deliberations in the same manner as their ancestors. Such reminders of their past behaviour presents an impression of an eternal aspect of Athenian honour – it can always be emulated and achieved, and Athenians are reminded of this annually in the institution of the *epitaphios logos*, which presents an eternal and immutable form of Athenian ideology as a consistent reminder to the Athenians of their own expectations. As Loraux remarks:

the funeral oration wants to be the political expression of the city as a whole, and to ensure the cohesion of Athenians against others, it must first proclaim it to the Athenians themselves. Is it not the peculiarity of the epideictic oration, which was always bound up with traditional values, to “strengthen a disposition to action by increasing adhesion to the values that it exalts?”<sup>56</sup>

I argue that Demosthenes' rhetoric likewise takes on this peculiarity (perhaps unconsciously) and through his *parrhēsia* he provokes the Assembly to shake off their detrimental attitudes and be inspired to act in a manner worthy of their past. Just as the *epitaphioi logoi* function as ‘the most official of lessons’, and offer a coherent reality on ‘the unchanging lesson that they had to draw from the city’s shifting affairs’, I argue that Demosthenes' arguments throughout these speeches use an awareness of the past, and the expectations of Athenian identity, to safely criticise the current Assembly via their collective awareness of their ancestral deeds, and thus didactically instructs the Assembly to conform to these civic norms.<sup>57</sup> This, again,

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<sup>56</sup> Loraux 1986: 253, citing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1970: 66-67.

<sup>57</sup> Loraux 1986: 144; 189. Steinbock 2013: 51 notes in the funeral oration ‘the praise of past and recent Athenian achievements... was normative, and all Athenians were encouraged to emulate their example.’ Clarke 2008: 312 comments on oratory’s ‘symbiotic relationship with the “official tradition” of the *dēmos* both influencing and being determined by it.’ Cf. also Thomas 1989: 202, cited by Clarke that ‘the vision of Athenian history presented in



is not necessarily explicit as Brady and Schirato observe with Judith Butler, ‘norms are usually implied rather than explicitly articulated; they are neither rules nor laws,’ and are discernible ‘most clearly and dramatically in the effects that they produce.’<sup>58</sup>

Equally informative for the deliberative speeches are the parallels that can be drawn between Demosthenes’ opinions on rhetoric and Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*. While such parallels potentially suggest that Demosthenes was an informed reader of Thucydides, and that the *History* may have been formative to his oratory, such a discussion is not the priority of this current research.<sup>59</sup> Thus my approach does not analyse whether Demosthenes consciously modelled his rhetoric on Thucydides, but rather considers the *History* as an informative part of the wider collective intellectual milieu of fourth-century Athens, which informs the Assembly’s ‘democratic knowledge’. In particular, the *History* is important for understanding the role of the advisor in democratic Athens, and in understanding Demosthenes’ similar, yet different, approach to the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric in mass decision-making.

Nevertheless, Demosthenes’ association with Pericles was already noted in antiquity, and most recently Yunis and Mader have suggested Demosthenes consciously modelled his deliberative oratory on:

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oratory must express what orators and *dēmos* know’. Hunt 2010: 20 notes that because the *epitaphioi logoi* ‘aim to appeal to a mass audience, they allow us to discern the guiding ideals of Athenian policy.’

<sup>58</sup> Brady and Schirato 2011: 105, with reference to Butler 2004: 41.

<sup>59</sup> Edwards 1994:36 notes that Demosthenes ‘made an extensive study of prose literature, including Thucydides, Plato and the orators.’ Hornblower 2011: 295 observes a resonance between Demosthenes and Thucydides particularly between the *Third Philippic* 9.30 and the Melian Dialogue. I argue that Demosthenes’ speeches demonstrate what Fromentin and Gotteland 2015: 15 describe as the ‘second moment in the reception of Thucydides in antiquity [...] when his *presence* becomes an *influence*, when his history moved from being a work of *reference* to being a *model* worthy of *imitation*.’ While they are referring to a later period in history, I think Demosthenes’ use of Thucydides demonstrates an understanding of the *History* beyond just reference, but as formative and influential on his own idea developments.

the civic rhetoric of (the Thucydidean) Pericles, whose special ability was not just to persuade the assembly but to instruct them as well, and that instruction (*didaxis*) is also a defining feature in Demosthenes' symbouleutic project.<sup>60</sup>

Demosthenes particularly draws on Pericles as the ideal adviser to defend his criticism of the *dēmos* with the 'canonical virtues' of Pericles as an honest, incorruptible patriot.<sup>61</sup> I propose that Demosthenes appears to draw parallels with 'Periclean' virtues to give his advice a sense of authority, and to temper the criticism of his blunt *parrhēsia*.<sup>62</sup> While there is an element that all advisors would have sounded 'Periclean', Demosthenes' awareness of Thucydides throughout the corpus appears as more than just a coincidence or *topoi* of advice.<sup>63</sup>

Furthermore, Demosthenes' criticisms of the *dēmos* also draw parallels to Thucydidean complaints at popular rhetoric in the Mytilenean debate. Thucydides presents the problems of demagogues and an indecisive malleable Assembly, where the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric displayed by both Cleon and Diodotus equates to an Assembly that is both suspicious of, but ultimately helpless to, the deception of others. As Hesk notes, Thucydides favours neither of them, but rather reveals the counter-productive and dwindling state of decision-making in a post-Periclean democratic constitution that lacks strong and virtuous leadership.<sup>64</sup> Democratic deliberation and effective action is, therefore, at the mercy of its

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<sup>60</sup> Mader 2007: 155, citing Yunis 1996: 59-86; Wooten 1983: 20, 170; Carlier 1990: 240; Banfi 2003: 207-8. For the association of Demosthenes and Thucydides in antiquity: Plutarch *Demosthenes* 6.5, 9.2; Zosimus of Ascalon claimed Demosthenes could recite Thucydides in his *Life of Demosthenes* 2:523 [trans. Müller 1858.] Yunis 1996: 257 notes in particular that to counteract his blunt instructions to the *dēmos* Demosthenes 'uses Thucydidean, Platonic and even Aristophanic ideas.'

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Thucydides 2.60.5 'And yet if you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe, is second to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the ability to expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an honest one.' Mader 2007: 10; Yunis 2001: 204.

<sup>62</sup> Mader 2007: 165 notes in *On the Peace* 11-12 that Demosthenes uses Periclean rhetoric in his assertion that 'if he is outstanding in any respect, it is in virtue of his democratic disposition and public spirit.'

<sup>63</sup> Hesk 1999: 183. Mader 2007: 155 notes that this 'risks attenuating the close intellectual affiliation between Demosthenes and Thucydides, and by extension also that between the *rhētors* and the Thucydidean Pericles.' Mader 2007: 159 also argues that Demosthenes uses Pericles' *pronoia* to 'project himself as *symbolos* who combines clear-sighted *pronoia* with fearless criticism of the *dēmos*.' I argue that this is to validate his own arguments, but this sense of *pronoia* is only applicable to the post-peace speeches.

<sup>64</sup> Hesk 2000: 248-255.

citizens and their moral unreliability results in an unstable constitution. Demosthenes' complaints at a corrupt Assembly that refuses to acknowledge the dangers of basing their decisions on rhetorical flattery resonate with Thucydides' criticism of democratic deliberation. Demosthenes' warnings about their errors in judgement mirror the same decision-making errors which Thucydides presents as instrumental to the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. Moreover, his purpose of writing resonates with Thucydides in the potential parallel of the Corinthian war, which Demosthenes uses as a lesson on what the Athenians could achieve when they act in a 'manner worthy of the city.'<sup>65</sup>

However, Thucydides suggests that Athenian democracy was dependent on individuals such as Pericles, without whom the deliberative-process became a dystopia, and for the notoriously multifaceted Thucydides, Pericles was a tragic hero with an unrealistic vision of Athens.<sup>66</sup> For Demosthenes, the problem is not with the democratic-process itself, but the degeneration of its citizens: the corruption of *logos* is not an inherent fault of the democratic system, but occurs through the deliberate manipulation of citizens to act in a manner that neglects their civic duties. It is not that a post-Periclean democratic system cannot function without a Pericles-figure, but that the *dēmos* fails to deliberate effectively as a collective. Indeed, it is their failure to recognise that deliberation is a two-way process that rests on the cooperation of individual *rhētors* and the *dēmos*, as he asserts in *On the Chersonese*, which prevents the *polis* taking effective and informed action.

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<sup>65</sup> Munn 2006: 201-202, Thucydides 'was prepared to provide instruction to a democratic council, and to instruct its members on the limits of their abilities to judge the future for the benefit of a democratic state...Thucydides' *ktēma es aiei* was conceived as a possession for democracy.'

<sup>66</sup> Hesk 2000: 32 notes that just as Thucydides constructs the ideal in Pericles, he likewise "deconstructs" the ideal in Alcibiades where 'in his account of Alcibiades' ruse, the historian narrates an unmasking of the way in which national stereotypes are reproduced and given authority. In book 5.45 Alcibiades was fearful that the Spartan delegates would be successful in persuading the Assembly against an Argive alliance: His plan was to drive a wedge between the Spartans and Nicias, and to attack them in the assembly for having no sincerity in their intentions and for never saying the same thing twice. Thucydides 5.45.

Thus, while Demosthenes' speeches appear to have parallels to the concerns addressed in Thucydides' *History*, Demosthenes, in my opinion, differs crucially in that the *polis* does not rest on any certain indispensable individual to lead it, but rather requires its individual citizens to uphold Periclean/Athenian virtues to maintain the integrity of their deliberative process. Both Mader and Harding observe this 'Periclean' aspect in Demosthenes' own self-fashioning, noting that the image of Pericles is 'most conspicuous' in Demosthenes' presentation of himself as an advisor, and how 'Demosthenes chose to play the role of the adviser (σύμβουλος).' <sup>67</sup>

I conclude this thesis with a proposal that Demosthenes' speeches function as a mirror to the Assembly to confront the reality of their current situation. Throughout the speeches, I maintain that Demosthenes consistently calls on the Athenians to reflect self-critically on their current behaviour, which is juxtaposed with their ancestral Athenian reputation. <sup>68</sup> Whilst Hartog's two-way mirror in Herodotus serves as a means to define and understand both self and other (and self via other), I maintain that Demosthenes' rhetoric of reflection functions *within* Athens as a means to understand the causes of their current crisis, and particularly the divergence between the current Assembly and their ancestral ideology. By confronting the *dēmos* in such a manner I argue that Demosthenes weaves his criticism of their current behaviour with their idealised past, to motivate them to change. <sup>69</sup> As such, this is a crisis of self, not other.

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<sup>67</sup> Mader 2007: 155. Harding 1987: 36.

<sup>68</sup> In this I am deliberately evoking Hartog's *Mirror of Herodotus*, but asserting something fundamentally different. To my knowledge, Demosthenes' speeches are yet to be described as a mirror. Reference to Demosthenes' actual physical mirror which he practiced in front of are evident in antiquity: Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* 11.3.68.2 'idiosque Demosthenes grande quoddam intuens speculum componere'; Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 11.1; Apuleius *Apologia* 15. Frontisi-Ducroux and Vernant 1997: 78 in *Dan l'Oeil du miroir* comment on how Demosthenes' mirror was exceptional for its size (Le miroir de Démosthène, miroir masculine et professionnel, est exceptionnel aussi par sa taille.)

<sup>69</sup> Hartog 1988: 212-4. Hartog's mirror focused on perceiving the Scythians through inversion and the rhetoric of the 'other' where 'the principle of inversion is thus a means of communicating otherness, by making it easy to comprehend... the inversion is a fiction which "shows how it is" and makes it possible to understand: it is one of the figures of rhetoric which help to elaborate a representation of the world.'

## I.5 Additional Key Scholarship

The work of Ian Worthington is, in my opinion, unparalleled in Demosthenic scholarship and has been invaluable in developing my understanding of the historical and political context of the fourth century.<sup>70</sup> Prior to his 2013 biography on Demosthenes (the first in English for nearly a century), the most detailed treatment of Demosthenes in one volume was Carlier 1990.<sup>71</sup> MacDowell's *Demosthenes the Orator* likewise presents a thorough account of the Demosthenic corpus and Mader's series of articles over last two decades provide a fresh and insightful approach to the Demosthenic corpus, and have been informative to my own arguments on Demosthenes' use of praise and blame, speech-act logic and his frustration at an apathetic Assembly.<sup>72</sup>

Roisman's work on the rhetoric of conspiracy informs my argument that Demosthenes equates the crisis in Northern Greece (of lost Athenian possessions) with the corruption of the deliberative process, through the damaging practices of self-serving *rhētors* working to undermine the *polis*.<sup>73</sup> However, Roisman's argument focuses primarily on Demosthenes' forensic speeches as he argues that 'Demosthenes does not privilege the rhetoric of conspiracy by, or with Philip in his deliberative speeches.'<sup>74</sup> This thesis demonstrates that the deliberative speeches do engage with the rhetoric of conspiracy to both explain their current internal crisis, and in Demosthenes' self-presentation as the dutiful

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<sup>70</sup> Most notably Worthington 2013; 2014; 2007; 2000 and 1994.

<sup>71</sup> As noted by Gagarin 2011: 7. As argued above, I have reservations about Carlier's opinion on Demosthenes.

<sup>72</sup> Mader 2003; 2004; 2006; 2007. I do however, disagree with Mader 2007b in his assertion that there were 'exemplary moments of self-constitution in the Philippic cycle where Demosthenes, in the thick of things, constructs an ideal version of himself in order to mediate and legitimate his strenuous anti-Macedonian line' which he views as 'suggestively externalising the need for the kind of *pronoia* that Demosthenes claims to embody' which are on the 'trajectory leading up to the *Crown* speech.' (Mader 2007b: 341) This is from the assumption that Demosthenes' focus was anti-Macedonian and that the earlier speeches provide evidence that his claim to *pronoia* in *On the Crown* was justified and 'impressive'. As argued above, I view this as a false teleology.

<sup>73</sup> I argue that Demosthenes insinuates the concept of enemies within conspiring against Athens as early as the *First Philippic* in 351.

<sup>74</sup> Roisman 2006: 124.

citizen who exposes collaborators working to undermine the *polis* from within the Assembly itself.

Likewise, as mentioned above, the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric is important for understanding Demosthenes' argument that the corruption of *logos* undermines the deliberative process. My arguments build on Hesk's work on deception in Athens and how Demosthenes engages in the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric to define his own honest *parrhēsia* in comparison to the deceptive manipulation of self-serving *rhētors*.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, in his *parrhēsia*, Demosthenes assimilates his advice with civic duty, using the constitutional value of *isēgoria* to assert his own definition of Athenian identity. This is of imperative importance for the speeches discussed in this thesis, given that *isēgoria* was 'for Herodotus the very symbol of democracy, or, to be more precise, the most suitable word to describe the Cleisthenean constitution.'<sup>76</sup> In the *epitaphioi logoi* too, Athenian autochthony and the equality of birth is equated with democratic equality through *isēgoria* and *isōnomia*.<sup>77</sup> Whilst Hansen equates *parrhēsia* as 'free speech' and associates *isēgoria* with *eleutheria* (freedom/ liberty)<sup>78</sup>, Balot and Monoson note the dangers (both legal and reputational) of engaging with *parrhēsia*, with Balot noting its use by the Attic orators to stress their patriotism and sincerity, and to generate a form of democratic civic courage.<sup>79</sup> Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* could be taken as a

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<sup>75</sup> Hesk 2000: 208 notes how 'forensic orators frequently represent themselves as innocent of various procedures associated with rhetorical training and preparation.' Hesk 1999: 218 observes that for Aristotle the difference between the sophist and the *rhētors* lay not in a 'difference in faculty' (*dunamis*) but in moral purpose (*Prohairēsis*).<sup>75</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1355b18-21.

<sup>76</sup> Loraux 1981: 223. Loraux continues that 'it is in defending *isēgoria* that Protagoras shows himself to be a theorist of democracy.'

<sup>77</sup> Forsdyke 2012: 136-7 uses the examples of Pericles' funeral oration in Thucydides and Plato's *Menexenus* to demonstrate this association: 'an equation enhanced rhetorically by the rhyming (in Greek) of the two central concepts: *ισογομία* and *ισονομία*.'

<sup>78</sup> Hansen 1991: 400; 83-85.

<sup>79</sup> Hansen 1991: 400; 83-85. Monoson 2000: 51-63 discusses the citizen *parrhēsiastēs*. Balot 2004: 234 observes the risks 'resulted in the orators' development of a discourse on civic courage – a virtue that, they claimed, enabled them to steer an honourable course in public life.' As such, the Orators, 'rationally justified free speech by linking it to other values, institutions, and practices of the democracy.' This is particularly evident in Chapter 2.3 *Third Olynthiac*. For more on free speech and *parrhēsia*, see Sluiter and Rosen 2004: 7 'the *parrhēsiast* must necessarily believe in the truth of what he is saying, or at least in the fact that to the best of his knowledge what he is saying is true.' They cite Demosthenes 11.17 as an example, 'it is not possible to turn away *parrhēsia* from making clear the

form of the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric itself, differentiating his *logos* to popular rhetoric, which he argues corrupts the Assembly's decision-making process.

Demosthenes' rhetoric of deception also further demonstrates his use of Athenian collective memory in his persuasion, as references to deception build upon 'shared ideological presuppositions.'<sup>80</sup>

Unless otherwise stated I have used Trevett's 2011 translations of Demosthenes' speeches, at times informed by Vince's 1954 revised Loeb translation. The Greek text is the Butcher 1903 Oxford Classical Text, however, to differentiate between the manuscript variations in the *Third Philippic* I have followed the Loeb practice of putting the additional Greek into square brackets, as the OCT's practice of using a decreased font size is not practical in a footnote format.<sup>81</sup> My analysis of the Greek is informed by Wooten's commentary on the *First Philippic*, Karvounis' German commentary on Demosthenes 1-4, Milns and Ellis' analysis on Demosthenes 1-5, and Sandys 1910 and 1920 which, despite the date, is in my opinion still the most informative and accessible commentary for the deliberative corpus.<sup>82</sup>

## I.6. Methodology

I take a chronological approach both in the thesis structure, and in my analysis of the individual speeches, to examine the development of Demosthenes' arguments sequentially across the deliberative corpus in the context of unfolding events. I believe this approach of situating the speeches firmly within their historical, social and political context is crucial for understanding the development and continuity of Demosthenes' arguments from 351-341,

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truth, since it depends on the truth.' See also Wallace 2004: 221: '*isēgoria*, 'equal speech' in public assemblies, was complemented by *parrhēsia*, open and candid speech in private and public life.'

<sup>80</sup> Kremmydas 2013: 53.

<sup>81</sup> This is explained further in the discussion of manuscript 'S' in the introduction of Chapter 4.3.

<sup>82</sup> Wooten 2009; Karvounis 2000; Milns and Ellis 1969; Sandys 1914 and 1924.

and how these on-the-spot reactions are informed by his previous (often failed) arguments.<sup>83</sup> My analysis is not primarily concerned with the debate over the publication of the corpus, but rather the immediacy of the context in which they were delivered to the Assembly.<sup>84</sup> I view the speeches as representative (although not necessarily verbatim) of what Demosthenes delivered to the Assembly, which includes the practical reality that they could be unrevised preparatory drafts or revised accounts after delivery for Demosthenes' own personal records.<sup>85</sup> This view that the texts reflect the actual delivered speech is also suggested by Dionysius' comment on his emotional reaction when reading the speeches, and how much more extraordinary it must have been to have heard it delivered.<sup>86</sup>

Each chapter and speech is introduced with a discussion on the historical context and the relevant debates in scholarship, before my commentary-style analysis of each speech. I have structured my analysis with the traditional divides of oratory (proemium, narrative, argument (proof) and epilogue), however, it is important to note that these are by no means arbitrary and should not be viewed as definite. Indeed, in his analysis of the *Olynthiacs*, MacGregor emphasised that 'no attempt has been made to discriminate formally between narrative (διήγησις) and proof (πίστις) since the two are everywhere merged in each other.'<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> This time-frame is important for understanding that Demosthenes' speeches do not form a grand systematic plan (such as Cicero's systematic attack in the space of one year), but are spread across a decade and react to events.

<sup>84</sup> Trevett 1996: 425 argues that previous views that the deliberative speeches were revised and circulated after delivery [Blass 1893: 49; Kennedy 1963: 204-6; Worthington 1991: 425-8], are ill founded. Trevett argues that there is no reliable evidence to support these views, and rejects the reference of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Century BC biographer Hermippos by Plutarch (11.4) that Demosthenes' contemporary Aision commented on the effect of reading the speeches, because as a sole example it does not constitute proof, especially as it does not suggest any deliberate mass circulation. Trevett rather views the speeches as unrevised drafts. Yunis 1996: 243, conversely, uses Hermippos as evidence that Demosthenes circulated his speeches himself. I, however, do not view the speeches as intentional 'political pamphlets', nor political fiction.

<sup>85</sup> Thomas 2002: 180-1 notes with regard to *epideictic* speeches that the 'there is little indication that the written and spoken versions of performances might differ fundamentally in style', and that written versions show the characteristics suitable for delivery. A sense of similarity could be supported by Plutarch *Demosthenes* 8, which presents a methodical Demosthenes who practiced/ worked on his speeches the point that he was mocked for smelling like candle oil. Simultaneously, however, we must acknowledge the possible unreliability of late anecdotes of Demosthenes' life.

<sup>86</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Demosthenes* 22. Hunter 2003: 218

<sup>87</sup> MacGregor 1950: xiv.



In my opinion, the divisions of speech are more a product of theory than practice, and as MacDowell observes, ‘some of Demosthenes’ speeches do adopt this arrangement, but not all; it is clear that he did not regard it as a requirement.’<sup>88</sup> As such, I have used these divisions for the purposes of presentation and structure, while acknowledging that ‘even in the fourth century, speeches that divide neatly into four parts are fewer than those that do not.’<sup>89</sup> Indeed, for speeches 8 and 9, I found that my analysis resisted this framework, and that such divisions were particularly unhelpful to present these lengthy speeches and Demosthenes’ repeated and layered argumentation. In this regard, and following my chronological approach, I have prioritised the immediate historical context of the speeches over a focus on rhetorical theory.

Part One examines the Pre-Peace of Philocrates speeches: the *First Philippic* (Chapter One) and the *Olynthiacs* (Chapter Two). Following a discussion on the Peace of Philocrates, its aftermath and *On the Peace*, Part Two examines the Post-Peace speeches. These maintain that the deterioration of Athens’ external situation is a direct product of their failure to address their internal crisis.

Chapter One examines the *First Philippic* and what I consider to be Demosthenes’ core arguments for the corpus. I argue that his proposals, and his method of juxtaposing praise of their past actions/ Athenian virtues with critical *parrhēsia* on their present apathy/corruption, are maintained throughout the corpus.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> MacDowell 2009: 5.

<sup>89</sup> de Brauw 2010: 190.

<sup>90</sup> I maintain that these proposals are more than just the *topoi* of deliberative rhetoric, but a consistent policy maintained by Demosthenes throughout the period between the *First Philippic* in 351 and the *Third Philippic* in 341.

Chapter Two analyses the three *Olynthiac* speeches, which reiterate and develop the proposals and methods of the *First Philippic* in the context of the *kairos* (opportunity) presented by Olynthus.<sup>91</sup>

Chapter Three examines *On the Peace* and Demosthenes' view of the crises facing Athens after the Peace of Philocrates. Demosthenes argues that events have now vindicated his previous proposals and, accordingly, I argue that he maintains his original arguments with increased conviction.

Chapter Four focuses on Demosthenes Post-Peace speeches: the *Second Philippic*, *On the Chersonese*, and the *Third Philippic*, where Demosthenes continues to confront the internal crisis he challenged in the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs*.<sup>92</sup>

This thesis concludes by drawing together the main themes of Demosthenes' speeches, which centre on asserting a specific version of Athenian identity to confront the internal crisis. C.1 examines Demosthenes' assertion that the corruption of the Assembly created a hostile and counter-productive environment where democratic functions became essentially paralysed. C.2 concludes how Demosthenes addresses this corruption through social memory and collective self-awareness of the Assembly as a means to persuade them to enact his proposals which become an enactment of their civic duty and idealised identity.

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<sup>91</sup> Chapter 2.1 *First Olynthiac*, Chapter 2.2 *Second Olynthiac*, Chapter 2.3 *Third Olynthiac*.

<sup>92</sup> Chapter 4.1 *Second Philippic*, Chapter 4.2 *On the Chersonese*, Chapter 4.3 *The Third Philippic*. I do not include the *Fourth Philippic* in my analysis as I contests its authenticity. I argue that its use of repetition and less forceful arguments than those in the *Third Philippic* suggests it aimed to emulate Demosthenes' arguments. Worthington 1991: 426 argues that the *Fourth Philippic* may have been delivered by Demosthenes but not revised for written publication as he argues the first three were.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE *FIRST PHILIPPIC*

This chapter establishes my prime argument that Demosthenes is primarily concerned with confronting an internal crisis within the Athenian Assembly and, consequently, the conceptualisation of the deliberative corpus as principally ‘anti-Macedonian’ is unhelpful. I maintain that the arguments established in the *First Philippic* are the foundations for his speeches over the next decade, being repeated almost verbatim in the *Third Philippic*.<sup>93</sup> Thus instead of viewing the *First Philippic* as ‘a prelude to that decade of struggle’ against Philip, my approach asserts that Demosthenes’ struggle is primarily against internal corruption within the Assembly, and the external issues with Philip are actually a product of this internal crisis.<sup>94</sup>

In my opinion, Demosthenes consistently implores the Athenians to see how their current situation is a direct result of their own apathy and neglect, especially when held up against the ideological exempla of their past actions and ancestors. Rather than attacking Philip, Demosthenes diminishes the image of Philip’s power as it is based upon lost *Athenian* possessions. This diminishment is used not as a form of invective against Philip, but as a device to shame the Athenians and shift the focus from Philip to their own culpability. Indeed, Demosthenes uses examples from the past to confront the Assembly with their exemplary ancestors, both as a means to explain their current situation (their lack of action), and to remind the Athenians of what can be done when they choose to act. This alternative ‘reality’ asserts that challenging Philip is both a realistic aim, and their duty as the inheritors

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<sup>93</sup> Worthington 2013: 116 argues that viewing the *First Philippic* as setting a ‘trend for his later speeches’ results in a ‘misleading impression not only of the speech’s importance but also of when and why Demosthenes focused exclusively on Philip is generated’, however, this complaint is based on viewpoints such as Harding 2006: 244 that Demosthenes became ‘a one-policy politician’ [against Philip] with the *First Philippic*, and this is not a viewpoint I share but contradict.

<sup>94</sup> Badian 2000: 33. Worthington 2013: 116 notes this is because ‘throughout history, Demosthenes has been best remembered for his opposition to Philip. Because of this, a great deal of importance has been attached to the *First Philippic*.’

of the Athenian past.<sup>95</sup> As such the speech rebukes the *dēmos* so as to force them to reflect self-critically on their current attitude, and confront the neglectful corruption within the Assembly.<sup>96</sup> Demosthenes asserts that by simply acting on the situation they will resolve their internal and external issues, and in this approach I differ from Pearson that, ‘the *First Philippic* is to change the attitude of the Assembly towards Philip’, because I argue that Demosthenes maintains the greatest threat to Athens is not Philip, but the self-sabotaging practices within the Assembly.<sup>97</sup> I also question Karvounis’ point that Demosthenes had neither to refute nor defend a certain point, which is why there is neither a positive nor a negative argument in this speech:

Die Diskussion über Philipp hatte rein präventiven Charakter, obwohl Athen seit dem Vorfall mit Amphipolis theoretisch Krieg gegen Philipp führte. Aufgrund des Diskussionsthemas hatte Demosthenes weder einen bestimmten Punkt zu widerlegen noch einen anderen zu verteidigen; deshalb gibt es in dieser Rede weder eine positive noch einer negative Beweisführung.<sup>98</sup>

As I argue below, Demosthenes states in the proemium that he is taking a new direction from other speakers, thus creating a new and consistent argument *against* the apathy of the Assembly and the consequences of their negligence.

### Date

The date of the *First Philippic*, much like the ordering of the three *Olynthiac* orations, is still a matter of debate, but general consensus dates it to 351.<sup>99</sup> This is based largely on Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Letter To Ammaeus* where he provides dates for the Demosthenic corpus,

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<sup>95</sup> Yunis 2006 analyses this concept with regard to *On the Crown*.

<sup>96</sup> Which I argue includes the corruption of *logos* by the abuse of rhetoric, their misguided priorities, and the gap between *logos* and *ergon*.

<sup>97</sup> Pearson 1976: 125.

<sup>98</sup> Karvounis 2002: 233.

<sup>99</sup> Trevett 2011: 69; MacDowell 2009: 211-113; Worthington 2013: 117; Badian 2000:11.

and Blass' systematic approach, which remains the basis of most scholarship.<sup>100</sup> Blass dates the speech to the second half of 351 making reference to Philip's Thracian campaign, but adds how the dating for the *First Philippic* was contested in antiquity. Indeed in Blass' own time Dionysius' view that the speech was split in two, was proven inadmissible.<sup>101</sup> While some scholars are sceptical of Dionysius' dates, Badian argues that Sealey's 1955 survey proves that they are reliable where we can test them.<sup>102</sup> I assume a date of 351, based on Demosthenes' reference to Philip's 'sudden campaigns from his own land to Thermopylae and the Chersonese and Olynthus'.<sup>103</sup> This would date the speech to after Philip's victory at Crocus field in 352 when the Athenians stopped his continued march south at Thermopylae, but before Philip took Heraion Teichos, which was after he returned to Pella.<sup>104</sup> Moreover, the rumours of Philip's death/ illness at 4.10-11 would arguably put it after the siege of Methone in 355 where Philip took an arrow to the eye.<sup>105</sup> Furthermore, I propose that we can rule out a *terminus ante quem* of 349/8 because the level of concern for Olynthus is certainly not at the stage of *Olynthiacs* where the threat against them has intensified.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus *To Ammeaus* 1.4. Blass 1877: 261-265.

<sup>101</sup> Blass 1877: 262, 'Die erste philippische Rede fällt in die zweite Hälfte des attischen Jahres 351, indem hier auf Philipps Erkrankung auf seinem Thrakischen Feldzuge angespielt wird während dort der Redner von diesem Feldzüge noch nichts weiss' and 'fand schon im Alterthum Widerspruch, und ist in neuerer Zeit zur Genüge geprüft und als unzulässig erwiesen worden.' Milns and Ellis 1970: 13 are suspicious of Dionysius' dates because of his suggestion that this speech was split in two.

<sup>102</sup> Those who reject Dionysius: Lane-Fox 1996: 198 suggests 350 and objects to using Dionysius as a reliable source for any Demosthenic dates. MacDowell 2009: 211 argues that due to errors in Dionysius' dating of *Against Meidias* 'we should hesitate before accepting others', but comes to the same date as 351. Conversely see Badian 2000: 11 with reference to Sealey 1955. Badian also emphasises that it was the influence of Jaeger that saw an acceptance of Dionysius' dates in German scholarship. Previously it had been influenced by Schwartz 1893's 'untenable' argument for 349, which had only been successful due to the 'author's eminence'. Badian 2000:34 continues that Sealey effectively 'demolished Schwartz'.

<sup>103</sup> Demosthenes 4.17. Trevett 2011: 69 'the suggestion that the reference [4.17] is to the campaign of 349/8, and has been interpolated into a speech of 352/1, is now rightly rejected.'

<sup>104</sup> Worthington 2013: 114 notes that Philip returned to Pella after the Athenians blocked him passing at Thermopylae, he then joined a coalition of Byzantium, Perinthus and Amadocus to attack Cersebleptes at Heraion Teichos.

<sup>105</sup> Worthington 2014: 43.

<sup>106</sup> Trevett 2011: 28 notes that 'since he mentions Olynthus only in passing, some less serious incident than outright war was evidently involved.'

## Historical Context

In dating the speech to 351, its context is rooted in the Social War and Philip's successful Thracian campaign, which consolidated Macedonian power in the Thracian gulf - notably at the expense of Athenian interests.<sup>107</sup> Following Philip's capture of Amphipolis in 357, the Athenians declared war on Macedonia, but the subsequent loss of more Athenian possessions in the north Aegean clearly resonate in Demosthenes' urgent call for a change of attitude and action in the speech.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, as the Second Athenian Confederacy increasingly returned to the habits of the fifth-century Delian League, the pressures to recover these possessions (particularly Amphipolis) resulted in the revolt of dissatisfied Athenian allies culminating in the Social War 357-355.<sup>109</sup> Athens' defeat was emphatic, their naval supremacy severely wounded and their finances depleted. In short, 'Athens after the Social War was a very different city.'<sup>110</sup>

The specific context in which Demosthenes addresses the Assembly is part of an ongoing debate over how to deal with the loss of Amphipolis, the loss of their possessions and the increased presence of Macedonia in areas of Athenian interest. Rather than promoting

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<sup>107</sup> Worthington 2014: 40 notes in 357 'merely two years after becoming king, Philip had unified Macedonia, centralised Pella, and secured his kingdom's borders from incursions.' Worthington 2014: 42-3 continues that following his capture of Amphipolis in 357, Philip 'almost immediately' captured Pydna, and then seized Potidaea for the Olynthians. Philip then claimed Crenides and founded it as Philippi, and in winter 355 he besieged Methone, the Athenian hold in the north Aegean. Despite Philip's injury, the city was captured and levelled. Hammond 1994: 30 notes how 'Capture by violent and sustained assault was an innovation in warfare on the Greek mainland.'

<sup>108</sup> Cartledge 2016:197 notes how from 368 'Athens displayed an almost monomaniacal passion to regain control over its original foundation of Amphipolis.' I argue that the loss of Amphipolis was significant to Athenian timber supplies. As Bissa 2009:123 states, the importance of Amphipolis is illustrated by the reaction to its loss at Thucydides 4.108, 'The loss of Amphipolis brought great fear to the Athenians, since the *polis* was particularly helpful to them for the conveyance of shipbuilding timber and revenue.'

<sup>109</sup> Worthington 2013: 65 remarks the allies had 'resented Athens' heavy-handed treatment of them. In 356 Chios, Rhodes and Cos, with the support of Byzantium...revolted, thereby instigating the Social war.' Cartledge 2016: 197-8 argues that one of the reasons for the Social War was Athens' obsession to recover Amphipolis 'thereby placing an intolerable burden on allies for whom the restitution of Amphipolis to Athens was far from a pressing immediate priority.' For more on the Social War and the decline of the Second Athenian Confederacy see Cawkwell 1962c: 34-49; Cawkwell 1981: 40-54; Badian 1995: 94-95.

<sup>110</sup> Worthington 2013: 66. Hammond 1994: 35 remarks that 'in summer 355 Athens was reduced to impotence.' Worthington 2013: 67 notes how in Demosthenes 10.37 the orator stated how the annual revenues were only 137 talents contrasted to the thousands in 431. Hunt 2010: 34 notes 'Athens' annual revenues were only 45 talents per year after the Social War'.

an anti-Macedonian agenda, however, I argue that the speech focuses on the Athenians themselves, and the need to resolve their internal shortcomings. Indeed, the speech suggests that their external issues are the result of apathy and a neglect of duty, which provided Philip with an environment to flourish in and exploit.

## Analysis

### Proemium

The proemium focuses on asserting Demosthenes' aim to demonstrate how an attitude of apathy with regard to their military expeditions is the root of their declining fortunes.<sup>111</sup>

Demosthenes begins, however, by justifying his right to speak,

If some new matter were the topic of discussion, men of Athens, I would have waited until most of the regular speakers had given their opinion, and if anything they said pleased me, I would have kept quiet; only if it did not would I have ventured to state my own opinion.<sup>112</sup>

In this Demosthenes justifies his presumption of taking the *bēma* when convention of the Assembly dictated that the elder citizens speak first.<sup>113</sup> With his apology Demosthenes appeals to the *ēthos* of the Assembly to listen with goodwill, and justifies his action by

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<sup>111</sup> In Athens' defence, this was probably not apathy, but the result of the Social War 357-355 and as Usher 1999: 189-190 states the 'virtual disintegration of the Second Athenian Confederacy...it was not the time for grandiose schemes propelled by dominant personalities.' One could, however, counter this with Demosthenes' argument later that the attitude towards military provisions, in comparison to the Dionysia, demonstrates neglect and misplaced priorities.

<sup>112</sup> Demosthenes 4.1 εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινος πράγματος προυτίθετ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λέγειν, ἐπισχῶν ἂν ἕως οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνώμην ἀπερήναντο, εἰ μὲν ἤρεσκε τί μοι τῶν ὑπὸ τούτων ῥηθέντων, ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἤγον, εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἂν καὶ τὸς ἐπειρώμην ἃ γινώσκω λέγειν.

<sup>113</sup> Aeschines 3.2 observes 'the laws enforced which Solon enacted to secure orderly conduct on the part of public speakers; for then it would be permitted to the oldest citizen, as the law prescribes, to come forward to the platform first, with dignity, and, uninterrupted by shouting and tumult, out of his experience to advise for the good of the state and it would then be permitted to all other citizens who wished, one by one in turn, in order of age, to express their opinion on every question.' The reference to Solon also authenticates the importance of the convention. De Bakker 2010: 398 argues that Demosthenes 'refers to the platform to secure goodwill for himself, underlining his modesty with the "I would not have mounted the *bēma* if I was not forced to" *topos*.' Whilst this is a *topos*, I argue that Demosthenes develops the conventional apology to emphasise the necessity of his advice.

indicating that, ‘but since we are dealing with matters that these men have often addressed on previous occasions, I think that I can reasonably be forgiven for standing up to speak first.’<sup>114</sup> This both signifies how is this an ongoing unresolved issue despite previous debates, and that Demosthenes presents his advice as a new alternative to previous speakers.<sup>115</sup> It is precisely this new advice, from a younger speaker who has yet to prove himself in the Assembly, which renders the proemium necessary: according to Aristotle, the Assembly was usually aware of the facts of a debate and, as such, proemia were not required unless the speaker lacked significance in himself, his opponents or his evidence.<sup>116</sup> The proemium is therefore necessary to give Demosthenes’ advice and position authority and protection (particularly when his proposals may not be popular).<sup>117</sup>

Secondly, Demosthenes qualifies his right to speak (*isēgoria*) by continuing that this long-standing issue has remained unresolved due to a lack of good advice,

For if they had given the necessary advice in the past, there would be no need for you to be deliberating now.<sup>118</sup>

Thus, this is not a new problem, but one that has been exacerbated by their failure to provide good advice. Demosthenes presents himself as a new option and his solution involves

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<sup>114</sup> Demosthenes 4.1. ἐπειδὴ δ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήκασιν οὗτοι πρότερον συμβαίνει καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖν, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν. As he develops his *parrhēsia* over the speeches, Demosthenes will stress the consequences of the Assembly denying its advisers their goodwill (*eunoia*).

<sup>115</sup> Wooten 2008: 37 notes how Demosthenes ‘calls to attention that his advice will be very different to what the audience has heard before’. See Carlier 1990: 111.

<sup>116</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 3.14.12. (1415b) notes, ‘Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except for the orator's own sake, or on account of his adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too little importance to the question according to his idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance of the subject.’ Yunis 1996: 248-9 observes how Demosthenes’ practice corresponds with Aristotle’s comments, and notes how ‘nearly all of them are based on the same model of democratic deliberation’.

<sup>117</sup> Karvounis 2002: 236 argues the proemium serves as a kind of protection, noting that one could not out of the blue stand and scathingly criticise the Assembly, ‘Das Prooimion ist eine Art Absicherung, denn man konnte nicht aus heiterem Himmel aufstehen und beginnen, das politische Verhalten einer ganzen Stadt heftig zu kritisieren... Das verschafft ihm die nötige Absicherung, das Volk öffentlich und direkt kritisieren zu können.’

<sup>118</sup> Demosthenes 4.1 εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέονθ’ οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλευέσθαι.



addressing this bad advice and the internal malfunctions in the deliberative decision-making process.

Thus, rather than attacking Philip (as is traditionally expected of a ‘Philippic’ oration) Demosthenes focuses on the Assembly itself, weaving a delicate balance between rebuking their current behaviour and presenting hope in the power of an active Athens that offers and follows good advice. This begins with his derisive yet positive analysis on the situation,

First, men of Athens, you must not despair at the present situation, even if it seems dreadful. For its worst aspect in the past holds out our best hope for the future.<sup>119</sup>

This worst aspect being their lack of action to prevent these events,

What am I referring to? To the fact, men of Athens, that our situation has deteriorated so badly while you have been doing none of the things you needed to do.<sup>120</sup>

Demosthenes shames the Assembly for their lack of action and neglect of duty, but balances this with how their best hope is that, if they act, all will be resolved. Behind this too is the accusation that, because Athens has done nothing, the current crisis is self-inflicted. This establishes a theme of inactivity (which develops into a gap between words and deeds) that is ubiquitous in the speeches.

This also, however, puts the situation firmly in Athenian control; this has happened not due to any talent or skill on Philip’s part, but what their lack of action has enabled.

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<sup>119</sup> Demosthenes 4.2. *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀθυμητέον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν, οὐδ’ εἰ πάνυ φαύλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ. ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ χειρίστον αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει.* Wooten 2008: 45 notes emphasis is placed on *οὐκ ἀθυμητέον* by the apostrophe, ‘allowing these two words to linger’. Demosthenes will repeat this complaint almost verbatim in the *Third Philippic* 9.5.

<sup>120</sup> Demosthenes 4.2. *τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ὅτι οὐδέν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματ’ ἔχει.* Karvounis 2002: 240-1 notes references to their poor state of affairs becomes a common aspect of Demosthenes’ style. He argues that rather than reacting merely to past events (the loss of Amphipolis, Potidaea, Methone and Pydna and Philip’s victory at Crocus Field) and more recent events such as Philip’s Thracian Campaign and attacks on Athenian allies and merchant ships, that Demosthenes detects the ‘problem’ of Philip in its entire extent, that is, not related to any specific incident, but considering for the first time the developing situation, ‘Demosthenes erfaßt das „Problem“ Philipp in seinem ganzen Umfang, das heißt, er bezieht sich nicht auf eine bestimmte Begebenheit sondern betrachtet zum ersten Mal die Situation in ihrer Entwicklung.’ While I agree (and further discussion on lost possessions is discussed later in this chapter), this focus on Philip risks over- looking Demosthenes’ internal complaints at the corruption of the Assembly, discussed throughout this thesis.

Demosthenes calls the Athenians to reflect self-critically on their own behaviour. In this regard while Pearson argues that ‘the first task Demosthenes sets himself in the *First Philippic* is to change the attitude of the Assembly towards Philip’, I rather view the speech as calling firstly for a change of attitude towards *themselves*: their attitudes towards deliberation, action and their duty. In this I follow Yunis and his idea of “taming democracy”, where the orators want to create ‘in the minds of the audience an enlightened-self-understanding that actually dispels conflict and realises the politically harmonious community.’<sup>121</sup> I argue that this is reinforced further by a contemptuous reassurance of hope:

For if our situation were so poor when you had been doing all that you should, there would be no hope of improving matters.<sup>122</sup>

This reproach underlines that if the Athenians had been pro-actively acting against Philip, and Macedonia still was in a powerful position, then there would be nothing more they could do. As Erasmus noted on this passage, ‘carelessness could be corrected’, and I argue that Demosthenes asserts that the problem facing Athens is not Philip, but Athens itself.<sup>123</sup> The speech seeks to nullify the Macedonian threat by emphasising that the current predicament can be resolved by Athens simply acting on the situation. Subsequently the speech is a dynamic call to change their attitude and act. To this end, Demosthenes creates what I call a ‘silver-lining’ effect, a backhanded compliment of sorts, achieved by balancing his criticism of the situation with the hope that this worst aspect – their lack of action – provides them with the simple means to rectify the situation.

This balance method has been perceived by scholarship but is usually associated with a focus on Philip or the later *Philippic* orations: Mader examines the use praise and blame in

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<sup>121</sup> Pearson 1976: 123; Yunis 1996: 28.

<sup>122</sup> Demosthenes 4.2. ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ’ ἃ προσῆκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐλπίς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω γενέσθαι. Wooten 2008: 46: notes that Demosthenes’ choice of εἶχεν over εἶναι, where εἶχεν plus an adverb seems to indicate a situation that is dynamic, that is in the process of changing or at least that is capable of being changed.’

<sup>123</sup> Erasmus, *Ecclesiastes* 3, LB v 1062/ASD v-5 288.

the *Second Philippic* with a specific focus on Demosthenes' use of the voice of Philip, but I believe the method of praise and blame is evident as early as the *First Philippic*. Wooten too observes a mixture of optimism and pessimism and Karvounis detects a use of 'Motivation' and 'Danger', but Karvounis in particular views the *First Philippic* as being concerned with external issues only considers this assertion of Athenian negligence in terms of *foreign* affairs and the Macedonian Question.<sup>124</sup> In contrast, I seek to examine how Demosthenes' use of praise and blame engages with a deeper and more immediate internal crisis within the Assembly itself.

### Narrative

Demosthenes continues this balance between rebuking their lack of action and presenting hope in the situation, by reminding the Assembly of their past actions. To this end, Demosthenes narrates the current situation by juxtaposing their current neglectful/ apathetic behaviour to their past reputation.

The first instance of this occurs when Demosthenes makes reference to their role in the Corinthian war 395-386 against Sparta, and in aid of Thebes in the 370s:

Next, you must consider, whether you hear it from others or remember it from personal knowledge, how powerful the Spartans once were, not long ago, and how well and appropriately you acted, in keeping with the reputation of the city, and endured war against them for the sake of justice.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Mader 2004. Wooten 2008: 46-7 observes how the bad/good aspects of the situation are stated three times respectively in 4.2. See too Karvounis 2002: 246.

<sup>125</sup> Demosthenes 4.3. *ἔπειτ' ἐνθυμητέον καὶ παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούουσι καὶ τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτοῖς ἀναμιμνησκομένοις, ἡλικίην ποτ' ἐχόντων δύναμιν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐξ οὗ χρόνος οὐ πολὺς, ὡς καλῶς καὶ προσηκόντως οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ὑμεῖς ἐπράξατε τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλ' ὑπεμείναθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους πόλεμον.* Isocrates' *Plataicus* 14.17 refers to the Corinthian War, through the voice of the Plateans to remind the Athenians that they acted 'on behalf of those deprived of their autonomy.' On the Corinthian War see Trevett 2011: 71. Hammond 1994: 483-84. Wooten 2008 uses Xenophon's *Hellenica* 5.4.34041.

The purpose of this statement is two-fold. Firstly, by reminding the Athenians of their worthy past actions, Demosthenes invites the comparison of their current neglectful behaviour and their past reputation. Indeed, considering Ober's remarks that the *rhētors* 'freely railed against their fellow Athenians' failure to live up to the high political ideals and elevated standards of international conduct putatively established by their ancestors', their lack of action to address Philip demonstrates how they are acting in a manner contrary to their reputation.<sup>126</sup> Unlike the Athenians of the past, they are actually *avoiding* war and hardship.<sup>127</sup>

Moreover, keeping in mind Althusser's theory of interpellation, and Steinbock's work on the power of collective shared memories within the collective historical consciousness of the *dēmos*, by addressing the Assembly Demosthenes inescapably engages with Athens' social memory to remind the *dēmos* of the behaviour expected of Athenian citizens. As such, by reminding the Athenians of their previous achievements, where enduring war for the sake of justice is part of their inherited duty, Demosthenes uses their ancestral actions here as a means to both reproach and instruct the current Assembly.<sup>128</sup> By using their awareness of this collective past, this approach, in my opinion, draws parallels with the didactic function of the *epitaphios logos* that uses the Athenian past to prescribe the behaviour expected from the living generation of Athenians.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> As Ober 2001: 252.

<sup>127</sup> Thucydides describes Athenians as being the first to help, particularly to maintain their own empire. Herodotus 8.114 gives an account of the Athenians rejecting an offer which would have secured their safety at the expense of the other Greeks.

<sup>128</sup> Mader 2004: 59 notes how 'the motif of selfless Athenians, ever ready to place the larger Panhellenic interests over their own, is a standard component in Athenian self-presentation and propaganda.' Goldhill 1986 likewise observes 'the strong sense of being an Athenian citizen with its obligations and duties, privileges and honours, is a complex system of ideological strategies, a complex self-projection, that goes far beyond mere patriotism. It is to this sense of being an Athenian citizen that tragedy returns.' The duty of an Athenian citizen is also a predominant theme in Euripidean tragedy, as seen in Theseus' praise of democracy in *Suppliant Women*.

<sup>129</sup> Such as Plato *Menexenus* 246b 'let us remember them, therefore, and let each man among us urge their descendants, as we would in time of war, not to break ranks with our forefathers, not to give way to cowardice and turn tail.' As noted in the introduction, Steinbock 2016: 51 observes how 'the praise of past and recent Athenian achievements was not an end in itself but fulfilled a didactic function: the ἀρετή displayed by the

Indeed, Demosthenes also tells the Assembly why he reminds them of this episode of their past:

Why do I mention this? To make you see, men of Athens, and understand that nothing frightens you when you are on your guard, but that if you are contemptuous, nothing is as you might wish, using as my examples the Spartan's strength then, and this man's arrogance now, which alarms us because we fail to attend to any of the things that we should.<sup>130</sup>

Furthermore by noting that oratory calls on the audience to make a judgement, such references to the past invite comparison. Yet, while Karvounis notes that Demosthenes positions Athens' confrontation with Philip as part of the traditional struggle for supremacy in the Greek world, I go further to assert that Demosthenes does not define Philip merely to assert he is their enemy, but to remind the Athenians of the expected behaviour towards these traditional foes.<sup>131</sup> By reminding the Athenians of how they acted in a manner 'in keeping with the reputation of their city', and that they defeated the Spartans 'by applying your intelligence to the situation,' he asserts that the Assembly has the ability to deal with Philip if they apply the same 'intelligence' to the current situation.<sup>132</sup>

Thus by recalling their actions in the Corinthian War, Demosthenes reminds the Assembly of what can be achieved when they choose to act, and reduces Philip to the product of their inaction.<sup>133</sup> In making the Assembly reflect and compare their current and past

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fallen and their ancestors was normative, and all Athenians were encouraged to emulate their example.' Loraux 1986: 144 sees the *epitaphios logos* as 'the most official of lessons'.

<sup>130</sup> Demosthenes 4.3. τίνας οὖν εἵνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ἴν' ἴδητ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεάσησθε, ὅτι οὐδὲν οὔτε φυλαττομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστὶν φοβερόν, οὔτ', ἂν ὀλιγορήτε, τοιοῦτον οἶον ἂν ὑμεῖς βούλοισθε, παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἧς ἐκρατεῖτ' ἐκ τοῦ προσέχειν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τῇ νῦν ὕβρει τοῦτου, δι' ἣν ταραττόμεθ' ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν φροντίζειν ὧν ἐχρήην.

<sup>131</sup> Karvounis 2002: 246 'Athens Auseinandersetzung mit Philip wird vielmehr als ein weiterer Teil des traditionellen Kampfes um die Vormachtstellung in der griechischen Welt aufgefaßt.'

<sup>132</sup> Demosthenes 4.3.

<sup>133</sup> Demosthenes 4.3. Vince translates this as 'we ignore every call of duty'. Philip here is referred to by the demonstrative pronoun τοῦτου. I concur with Wooten 2008: 53 that this is contemptuous.

conduct, Demosthenes' approach generates a sense of shame and embarrassment, arguably to provoke a reaction in the Assembly to change this.<sup>134</sup> Demosthenes implores the Athenians to realise their external issues are a result of their current contemptuous attitude.<sup>135</sup> Moreover, as Wooten notes, 'καὶ θεάσησθε' indicates how 'Demosthenes wants his audience not only to perceive the facts that he is relating but to contemplate them and their significance.'<sup>136</sup> The significance, however, is much more nuanced than this, and functioning like a mirror, Demosthenes uses their past actions to present an image of their ideal conduct, which is contrasted to the unflattering reflection of their current behaviour. Consequently, the arguments in the narrative assert that the worst aspect of their situation – their failure to act in a manner worthy of the city and their past – is simultaneously their best hope.

Having reminded the Athenians of their past actions and established that they are failing to apply their intelligence to the situation, Demosthenes proceeds to make the task of confronting Philip possible. Demosthenes shifts the focus away from Philip's strength to stress Athenian culpability: the Athenians, in their failure to perform their duties, have enabled Philip's ascendancy, and so Demosthenes seeks to understand Philip's success by examining its origins.<sup>137</sup> Thus, with regard to Philip's forces, Demosthenes states that the Northern *ethnē* are more inclined to be pro-Athenian than pro-Macedonian.

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<sup>134</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric*. 3.7.7 notes that shame causes embarrassment to the listener. Wooten 2008: 49. Wooten 2008: 48 notes how Quintilian 6.5.7-8 praises Demosthenes' good judgement 'by pointing out to his audience that it is still possible to improve the situation that has been created by their negligence. Then, rather than openly attacking their lack of energy in defending their own interests, he praises the courageous policy of their ancestors. This, according to Quintilian, makes them favourably disposed to the speaker and the price that they feel in Athens' heroic past causes them to repent of their own un-heroic behaviour.'

<sup>135</sup> This is also emphasised in the second clause of the antithesis between their actions and their negligence, as Wooten 2008: 50-51 notes, 'Demosthenes emphasises this clause because it contains what he sees as the real problem in Athens', that is their lack of action to improve matter.'

<sup>136</sup> Wooten 2008: 50 notes that θεάομαι is 'much more dynamic than εἶδω'.

<sup>137</sup> Here I disagree with Wooten 2008:45 assessment that in 4.2-7 Demosthenes encourages the Athenians to action by the example of 'Philip himself, who overcame formidable foes by taking vigorous action.' As my argument shall demonstrate, Philip's power is used to shame the Athenians by presenting Philip's expansion as the consequence of their lack of action.

Accordingly, Demosthenes states,

And if any of you, men of Athens, thinks that Philip is hard to wage war against, considering the size of the force at his disposal and our city's loss of all its possessions, he is quite correct. But let him consider this. Once, men of Athens, Pydna, Potidaea and Methone and the whole surrounding region were on good terms with us, and many of the peoples that are now on his side were autonomous and free (αὐτονομούμενα καὶ ἐλεύθερ') and preferred to be on good terms with us more than with him.<sup>138</sup>

This presents the idea that Philip's power is not all it seems, because it is built upon Athenian allies, which likewise drives Demosthenes' urgency to recover them,

Furthermore, men of Athens, you will deprive Philip of his greatest financial resource. What is this? The fact that he wages war against you from your own allies, by plundering those who sail the sea.<sup>139</sup>

Philip is therefore only powerful because he plunders their merchant ships from bases that were Athenian or Athenian allies. Thus, Philip has been transformed from someone who is hard to wage war against, to someone who has seized Athenian allies, and as such appears a product of Athenian neglect and his own opportunism. From this perspective, Demosthenes

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<sup>138</sup> Demosthenes 4.4 εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυσπολέμητον οἶεται τὸν Φίλιππον εἶναι, σκοπῶν τό τε πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ τὰ χωρία πάντ' ἀπολωλέναι τῇ πόλει, ὀρθῶς μὲν οἶεται, λογισάσθω μέντοι τοῦθ', ὅτι εἶχομέν ποθ' ἡμεῖς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτειδαίαν καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μετ' ἐκείνου νῦν ὄντων ἔθνων αὐτονομούμενα κάλυθερ' ὑπῆρχε, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἐβούλετ' ἔχειν οἰκείως ἢ 'κείνῳ.

Worthington 2013: 92 notes that the fall of Methone in 354 gave Philip control of the entire Macedonian coast, and fully removed Athenian influence from the Chalcidic area. For siege of Methone: Diodorus 16.31.4, 35.5-6; Justin 7.6.13-14. On these individual places see Hansen 2004: 720, 806, 819, 838. It is my argument that the common link between Amphipolis, Potidaea, Methone and Pydna is the Athenian need – even since the sixth-century – of safeguarding timber for the Athenian Navy. Borza 1987: 32 notes that the finest ship building timber was Macedonian, and continued that 'it was clear to the ancient lumbermen as to modern, that water transport was preferable.' Here we return to the possession so frequently mentioned by Demosthenes in that not only was Amphipolis established on the Mouth of the Strymon River, but that 'the river Haliacmon was an easy overland route to Pydna and Methone', (Borza 1987: 38). These places, therefore, were all key to Athenian resources to timber

<sup>139</sup> Demosthenes 4.34. καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου πόρων ἀφαιρήσεσθε. ἔστι δ' οὗτος τίς; ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν πολεμῆ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλεοντάς τὴν θάλατταν.

presents the Assembly with the hope that if they shake off their apathy, and act like they did in the Corinthian Wars, they can reclaim their possessions and resolve the current crisis.

Demosthenes' narrative then shifts to a focus on the loss of these possessions, which is key to motivating the Athenians through shame to recover what has been lost. Having made his point (whether accurately or not) that most of Philip's Northern allies are pro-Athenian in sentiment, Demosthenes reinforces the idea that Philip's success was possible though their lack of influence in the North,

But if Philip had at that time decided that it would be difficult for him to wage war on the Athenians, since they had such strong outposts in his own territory, whereas he was without allies, he would not have achieved any of the things he has, nor would he have acquired so much power.<sup>140</sup>

This is important to note for various reasons. Firstly, this continues the notion that Philip is strong through Athenian strength, not his own. Demosthenes takes the image of Philip as a distinctive military power, and weakens this by giving his strength Athenian origins, again repeating the motif that Philip's power is only apparent. Demosthenes tells the Athenians not to be fooled into thinking Philip's ascendancy is permanent, nor that his allies are real:

Do not imagine that he has fixed the present situation immutably, as if he were a god. Rather, someone hates and fears him, men of Athens, and envies him, even from among those who seem to be on very good terms with him; one must suppose that his supporters have the same feelings as any other people would. All those feelings are now repressed, since they have no outlet because of your slowness and apathy – of which, I say, you must immediately rid yourselves.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Demosthenes 4.5. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ Φίλιππος τότε ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, ὡς χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν ἐστὶν Ἀθηναίοις ἔχουσι τοσαῦτ' ἐπιτειχίσματα τῆς αὐτοῦ χώρας ἔρημον ὄντα συμμάχων, οὐδὲν ἂν ὧν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν οὐδὲ τοσαύτην ἐκτήσατ' ἂν δύναμιν.

<sup>141</sup> Demosthenes 4.8. μὴ γὰρ ὡς θεῶ νομίζετ' ἐκείνῳ τὰ παρόντα πεπηγέσθαι πράγματ' ἀθάνατα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισεῖ τις ἐκεῖνον καὶ δέδιεν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ φθονεῖ, καὶ τῶν πάντων νῦν δοκούντων οἰκείως ἔχειν· καὶ ἅπανθ'



Everything, therefore, is really in Athens' favour. Demosthenes argues that support for Philip is failing and this would have been recognised sooner if Athens had not become stagnant.<sup>142</sup> If they do indeed 'get a grip' on themselves and re-establish their authority, their natural allies would declare themselves and the crisis could be averted. By focusing on Athenian apathy and neglect, Demosthenes shifts the focus from Philip's apparent power onto the culpability of the Athenians. This shift of focus both acknowledges the severity of the situation but diminishes Philip to a product of Athenians mistakes and neglect, focusing on the agency of the Athenians to rectify the situation.

Moreover, Demosthenes makes it clear that Philip took these possessions when the Athenians were occupied elsewhere, for:

He knew very well, men of Athens, that all of these places lie in the open as the prizes of war, and that it is natural for those who are present to take the possessions of those who are absent, and for those who are willing to toil and face danger to get the possessions of those who are negligent.<sup>143</sup>

This adds a dishonourable aspect to Philip's character, and a sense of injustice to motivate the speech.<sup>144</sup> Philip's opportunistic seizure of Amphipolis suggests that he would not have been

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ὅσα περ κἂν ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις ἔνι, ταῦτα κἂν τοῖς μετ' ἐκείνου χρή νομίζεω ἐνεῖναι. κατέπτηχε μέντοι πάντα ταῦτα νῦν, οὐκ ἔχοντ' ἀποστροφὴν διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν βραδυτῆτα καὶ ῥαθυμίαν·

<sup>142</sup> This was inaccurate but it is not of immediate importance here if Demosthenes was lying or not; it serves Demosthenes' interests to make the Athenians believe they stand a chance against Philip, and subsequently he has no reason to tell the 'truth'. Indeed, how far Demosthenes was aware of Philip's power we cannot ascertain, and such questions always risk a retrospective hindsight that cannot be applied. I am inclined to argue that the Athenians would not have envisaged Philip achieving the power he would by 341 in the *Third Philippic*, nor that Demosthenes would have believed he would still be dealing with this issues a decade later.

<sup>143</sup> Demosthenes 4.5. ἀλλ' εἶδεν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο καλῶς ἐκείνος, ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἅπαντα τὰ χωρὶ ἄθλα τοῦ πολέμου κείμεν' ἐν μέσῳ, φύσει δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς παροῦσι τὰ τῶν ἀπόντων, καὶ τοῖς ἐθέλουσι πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν τὰ τῶν ἀμελούντων. Demosthenes is referring to the Social War. Usher 1999:218 argues that Demosthenes uses 'an old Thucydidean dictum' citing 4.61.6, 1.76.2, 5.105.2 to equate this to the law of the strong dominating the weak. In contrast, I read this passage as Demosthenes' censure of Athenian neglect, not a comment on Athenian weakness. As argued above, Demosthenes suggests Philip's power is only apparent and is actually based on Athenian strength.

<sup>144</sup> This deceptive nature is developed further in the *Second Olynthiac* 2.8-10 where Demosthenes reminds the Athenians that they lost Potidaea through Philip's deceptive diplomacy, and that Philip – being powerful through deception – like all other thieves 'in time are found out and fall apart'. Also attested to in Diodorus 16.8.5.

successful if the Athenians had not been distracted with the Social War. This also offers an alternative scenario: that Philip would not have been able to achieve these successes if the Athenians had actively attempted to prevent him. Thus neither blame nor credit is attributed to Philip, but rather Demosthenes emphasises the Athenians' neglect of their responsibility to protect their allies/ interests. Through their apathy and neglect they have failed to do this and caused the situation they now deliberate over themselves.<sup>145</sup>

It is also important to consider how Demosthenes has shifted from referring to these places as both autonomous and free allied *poleis* at 4.4, to 'possessions' of Athens.<sup>146</sup> In this sense Athens' own metaphorical international *oikos* – both real and imagined – is threatened by Philip's very real expansion, which has unbalanced Athens' sphere of influence.<sup>147</sup> By asserting that the allies/possessions 'are willing to ally themselves to and obey anyone whom they see to be well prepared and willing to do what is needed' – essentially the State that offers protection – the role of Athens as protector in the fourth century is still evident in this league of autonomous allies as it was in the fifth century by virtue of its naval supremacy.<sup>148</sup> The loss of these allies/possessions, however, signifies that their reputation alone is no longer sufficient to maintain this position in Greece if they choose apathy over pro-active interest. In

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<sup>145</sup> Karvounis 2002: 234 remarks on the ring composition of the speech and how Demosthenes denounces the negligence of the Athenians, and at the same time draws an image of Philip's aggressiveness, power, tactics and its strengths and weaknesses, and returns to this at the end of the speech: 'Die §2-12 sind eine Art Einleitung; Demosthenes prangert die Nachlässigkeit der Athener an, und zugleich zeichnet er ein Philipp-Bild: er stellt Philipps Aggressivität, Macht, Taktik sowie seine Stärken und Schwächen dar... in den §§35-46 nimmt er wieder auf die Nachlässigkeit/ Unentschlossenheit der Athener und auf Philipps aggressives Vorgehen Bezug.' However, Karvounis' argument suggests these are independent albeit simultaneous arguments. Conversely, I argue that the comments on Athenian negligence and Philip's aggression are not separate issues but one: that Demosthenes' purpose in describing Philip *is* to denounce the neglect of the Athenians, and shame them into acknowledging their responsibility for the current crisis and the loss of Athenian possessions.

<sup>146</sup> In the *Third Olynthiac* Demosthenes notes that their ancestors ruled the Greeks as 'willing subjects'; with this in mind Demosthenes could be referring to the places in the context of the goodwill associated with the new non-coercive hegemony of the Second Athenian Confederacy.

<sup>147</sup> This sense of the goodwill of the allies can be considered indicative of the attitude towards the Second Athenian Confederacy: Athens swore to a non-coercive hegemony of free and willing allies in contrast to its coercive attitude to the Delian League which was no longer tolerated.

<sup>148</sup> Demosthenes 4.6. καὶ γὰρ συμμαχεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις ἐθέλουσιν ἅπαντες, οὐς ἂν ὀρωσι παρεσκευασμένους καὶ πράττειν ἐθέλοντας ἅ χρηί. Hunt 2010: 175 notes that in the fifth century, 'Athens' allies were islands and coastal cities...its sphere of influence was based on its naval dominance of the Aegean...no other Greek state could contest Athenian naval dominance.'

practice, this has resulted in a sense of *Realpolitik* amongst their allies towards Macedonia, and in this new power dynamic the Athenians – as they currently behave – cannot compete with Philip.<sup>149</sup> The Athenians have lost their allies, not through any power of Philip but because the Athenians are no longer viewed by their allies as the preeminent power in the North Aegean. And by observing Philip’s audacity in capitalising on their apathy, Demosthenes asserts that this was only possible in the first place because Athenian lack of action presented Philip with this opportunity.<sup>150</sup> He calls them to see how Philip’s insolence has been fed by Athenian apathy:

You see the situation, men of Athens: how insolent that man is, who does not even allow you to choose between taking action and living quietly, but threatens and makes arrogant speeches (so it is reported) and is unable to be content with possession of places that he has already conquered, but is always bringing something more under his power, and surrounds us on all sides as if with nets, while we sit and wait.<sup>151</sup>

Demosthenes presents Philip as insatiable, demonstrating *pleonexia* (greed), but which also potentially suggest *akrasia* in Philip’s expansionism, as he is in opposition to Aristotle’s ideal *polis* which knows its own limitations.<sup>152</sup> As observed by Rochnik, Aristotle’s theory maintains that,

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<sup>149</sup> In the sense that their allies will side with the party that most benefit their interests/ the stronger party. Steinbock 2015: 33 notes how ‘many historical studies of fourth-century Greece [Mosley 1971; Hamilton 1979; Cartledge 1987; Buckler 2003; Buckler and Beck 2008] apply these principles of *Realpolitik* to explain the reasons for the various shifts in diplomatic policies and military alliances that took place in this volatile century.’ Steinbock objects to the prevalence of Realism in this approach to history.

<sup>150</sup> Philip is presented in the speeches as someone who always seizes his *kairos*, and is even held up as an exemplum when Demosthenes’ implores the Assembly to seize the *kairos* of Olynthus.

<sup>151</sup> Demosthenes 4.9. ὁρᾶτε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ πρᾶγμα, οἳ προελήλυθεν ἀσελγείας ἄνθρωπος, ὃς οὐδ’ αἴρεσιν ὑμῖν δίδωσι τοῦ πράττειν ἢ ἀγειν ἡσυχίαν, ἀλλ’ ἀπειλεῖ καὶ λόγους ὑπερηφάνους, ὡς φασι, λέγει, καὶ οὐχ οἷός ἐστιν ἔχων ἅ κατέστραπται μένειν ἐπὶ τούτων, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ τι προσπεριβάλλεται, καὶ κύκλῳ πανταχῆ μέλλοντας ἡμᾶς καὶ καθημένους περιστοιχίζεται.

<sup>152</sup> Aristotle *Politics* 7 1326b on how the ideal *polis* is complete in respect to itself and its citizens, ‘in extent and magnitude the land ought to be of a size that will enable the inhabitants to live a life of liberal and at the same time temperate leisure.’ This, of course, is ironic for the Athenians and their polite fiction that their confederacy is not imperialistic in nature.

Expansionist or globalising regimes reflect ontological confusion: they wrongly elevate the category of quantity over that of substance...as a consequence they are doomed to catastrophe.<sup>153</sup>

Likewise, Philip, in his reckless absorption of these city-states, is presented as having demonstrated his lack of understanding and the instability of his power. However, the most concerning point for the Athenians is that they have enabled this through their lack of action, the implication being that none of this would have been possible if the Athenians had acted to prevent it. The notion of being surrounded by nets is a powerful and evocative image of the hunter and the hunted, presenting a clear image of Philip hunting Athens: the helpless sitting target. This aims to provoke action, and it is with a tone of exasperation that Demosthenes questions the lengths to which they will endure shame before they recognise the situation they are sleepwalking into:

When, men of Athens, when will you do what is needed? What are you waiting for? For some necessity to arise, by Zeus? What, then, should be call the present developments? For, I believe the strongest necessity for free men is shame at their situation.<sup>154</sup>

They have lost their possessions and political position through their own apathy, and they have lost them to a Macedonian:

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<sup>153</sup> Roochnik 2013: 211.

<sup>154</sup> Demosthenes 4.10. πότε οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πόθ' ἂν χρὴ πράξετε; ἐπειδὴν τί γένηται; ἐπειδὴν νῆ Δί' ἀνάγκη τις ἦ. νῦν δὲ τί χρὴ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἡγεῖσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μεγίστην ἀνάγκην τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσχύνην εἶναι. This shame (αἰσχύνην) is compounded by Demosthenes' earlier reference to the ancestors' actions. Loraux 1981: 26 associates this passage with the assertion of Athenian uniqueness and the character of the city in the *epitaphioi logoi*.

Or, tell me, do you wish to go around asking each other, “is there any news?” What could be graver news than that a Macedonian is waging war on Athens and is in control of the affairs of Greece?<sup>155</sup>

Demosthenes’ accusation is that Athens enabled this by lack of action and these possessions have been lost through Athenian neglect and essentially gifted to Philip. MacDowell considered this to be ‘one of Demosthenes’ most brilliant passages, full of life and provocation...the reference to free men hints that at present the Athenians are conducting themselves like slaves’.<sup>156</sup> Demosthenes takes his antagonistic approach, together with the diminishing of Philip, to provoke the Athenians into action. Demosthenes presents, as Worthington remarks, a ‘memorable passage of imaginary dialogue’<sup>157</sup> to maintain that Philip is a product of their own apathy,

“Is Philip dead?” “No, by Zeus, but he is sick.” What difference does it make to you? Even if something were to happen to him, you would soon create another Philip, if this is how you apply yourselves to the situation, since even he has not prospered by reason of his own strength as much as because of our neglect.<sup>158</sup>

In depicting the details of Philip’s accident as incidental, I argue that Demosthenes maintains that this situation is not just about understanding Philip as a threat, but recognising that Philip is a threat because of their own mistakes. Demosthenes does not engage with any ‘Philippic’ invective, but prioritises understanding that Philip’s expansion is the consequence of Athens’

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<sup>155</sup> Demosthenes 4.10. ἡ βούλεσθ’, εἰπέ μοι, περιόντες αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ‘λέγεται τι καινόν;’ γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τι καινότερον ἢ Μακεδῶν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίους καταπολεμῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διοικῶν; We see this image most strikingly in Demosthenes’ *Third Philippic*. Conversely, Karvounis 2002: 243 maintains that whilst Philip commits *Hybris*, in the speech it is unmistakable that Philip is not a barbarian: ‘Trotz des letzten Satzes, Philipp steuere die Angelegenheiten der Griechen, ist unverkennbar, daß Philipp noch kein barbaros ist. Er begeht zwar *Hybris*...aber das macht ihn noch lange nicht zu einem barbaros’.

<sup>156</sup> MacDowell 2009: 216.

<sup>157</sup> Worthington 2013: 120.

<sup>158</sup> Demosthenes 4.11. “τέθνηκε Φίλιππος;” “οὐ μὰ Δί’, ἀλλ’ ἀσθενεῖ.” τί δ’ ὑμῖν διαφέρει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτός τι πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε, ἄνπερ οὕτω προσέχητε τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ῥώμην τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξεται, ὅσον παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν.

failure to perform its duty of maintaining its possessions abroad.<sup>159</sup> In neglecting their foreign policy, Athens created a political vacuum that any audacious, ambitious, and opportunist power would seek to exploit. The problem, therefore, is not about Philip, but about this culture of neglect within Athens. As such, Demosthenes focuses on Athenian apathy and, while recognising that fear of Philip is rational, he asserts that to a significant extent Philip is the consequence of Athenian negligence, and his acquisition of Athenian possessions is a product of their mistakes.

Karvounis argues that the line of argument of 4.11 is understandable as Demosthenes could not emphasise unilaterally the danger and power of Philip, and states that any military or political leaders would have done the same and that the idea of the inferiority of the opponent is one of the most legitimate arguments of warfare.<sup>160</sup> Karvounis goes on to argue that the idea of Philip's inferiority does not necessarily require that Demosthenes believed it and he stresses that Demosthenes did not underestimate Philip, but simply wanted to assert two facts: Athenian carelessness created Philip, and secondly Philip is not invincible.<sup>161</sup>

While in principle I agree with both of these arguments, I am thoughtful that such approaches attempt to rationalise Demosthenes' argument with the retrospective hindsight of Philip's eventual victory. Karvounis' approach presumes that Demosthenes' argument was a manipulation of the truth, reflecting a trend in the scholarship to either defend or accuse Demosthenes of underestimating the threat of Philip. Rather, I propose that instead of looking for a motive to understand Demosthenes' assertion here we could take him at his word, that he genuinely sought to assert that Philip was a product of their mistakes and that the situation was rectifiable.

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<sup>159</sup> Karvounis 2002: 237 'Daran kann kein Zweifel bestehen. Der Aufstieg Makedoniens lag sicher nicht an Athens Nachlässigkeit.' Demosthenes' rhetoric in the speech, however, seeks to affirm Athenian culpability.

<sup>160</sup> Karvounis 2002: 237.

<sup>161</sup> Karvounis 2002: 237 An diesem Punkt müssen wir zwei Dinge voneinander unterscheiden: die Vorstellung von der Inferiorität Philipps setzt nicht unbedingt voraus, daß Demosthenes glaubte, daß „Philipp bzw. Makedonien eine Macht geringeren Ranges sei“

Indeed, I argue that Demosthenes' approach draws a parallel to an Athenian tradition of ascribing enemies' success to Athenian errors: just as Pericles attributed Spartan success to Athenian mistakes, Demosthenes asserts that the Athenians have enabled Philip's success by their lack of action.<sup>162</sup> From 4.3-11 Demosthenes presents how the Athenians have not applied their intelligence to this current situation (as their ancestors did in the Corinthian War), and that as a result Philip appears successful and powerful because he has obtained Pydna, Methone, Potidaea and Amphipolis through Athenian negligence, and not his own strength.

Moreover, the notion of Macedonians controlling Greece, for the Athenians, is contemptible and by adding the need to 'punish that man', Demosthenes introduces the need for retribution.<sup>163</sup> In presenting, as MacDowell notes, the 'paradoxes of a Macedonian defeating Athenians and the Athenians creating a Macedonian victor,' I argue that Demosthenes necessitates the need to put Philip in his place and reset the balance of power.<sup>164</sup> This, simultaneously, calls the Athenians to seize their own position, but is dependent on the Athenians choosing to act. If they continue in this vein, then it will only serve to exacerbate the situation:

But as you are now, even if the opportunity were to present itself, you would be unable to take Amphipolis, since you are disunited in your preparations and your resolve.<sup>165</sup>

Demosthenes asserts that it is therefore imperative that they listen to his advice. By acknowledge they enabled Philip to exploit their lack of action, and how his power is essentially Athenian, then rectifying the situation is not as daunting a task as originally

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<sup>162</sup> Thucydides 1.144 'I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies' designs.' Thucydides also blames internal dissension 2.65.12. Similar remarks are made by Plato *Menexenus* 243d.

<sup>163</sup> Demosthenes 4.7.

<sup>164</sup> MacDowell 2009: 216.

<sup>165</sup> Demosthenes 4.12. ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε, οὐδὲ δίδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δύναισθ' ἄν, ἀπηρημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις.

envisaged: as Demosthenes said in the proemium, their worst aspect is their best hope. This is all a manageable reality *if* they chose to act:

If, men of Athens, you too are prepared to adopt such a resolve now, since indeed you were not previously, and each of you is willing to drop all pretence and take action wherever it is needed and wherever he may be able to benefit the city, those with money by paying taxes, those in the prime of life by going on campaign, in short if you are simply willing to get a grip on yourselves, and stop each hoping that you can get away with doing nothing, while your neighbour does everything on your behalf, you will recover what is yours, god willing and will regain what has been negligently lost, and will punish that man.<sup>166</sup>

Demosthenes' rhetoric is driven with the urgency to act swiftly, and implores the Assembly to recover and regain what has been lost, both in their physical possessions but also with regard to their reputation: given that their declining reputation caused their allies to align themselves with Philip, to recover their previous resolve will both address this and restore Athens' reputation as an effective power in Northern Greece.

### Argument

Having stated that Athens is unprepared and has shirked its duty to the point that they have lost their reputation, standing, and valuable possessions (potentially causing an economical/ecological crisis) to a Macedonian upstart, Demosthenes changes direction with the speech:

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<sup>166</sup> Demosthenes 4.7. ἄν τοίνυν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον, καὶ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν, οὗ δεῖ καὶ δύναιτ' ἂν παρασχεῖν αὐτὸν χρησίμον τῇ πόλει, πᾶσαν ἀφείς τὴν εἰρωνεῖαν ἔτοιμος πράττειν ὑπάρξει, ὁ μὲν χρήματ' ἔχων εισφέρειν, ὁ δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ στρατεύεσθαι, συνελόντι δ' ἀπλῶς, ἂν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι, καὶ παύσησθ' αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἕκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πάνθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν, καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν κομιεῖσθ', ἂν θεὸς θέλη, καὶ τὰ κατερραθυμημένα πάλιν ἀναλήψεσθε, κἀκεῖνον τιμωρήσεσθε.



I shall now stop urging you all to be ready and willing to do your duty, since you acknowledge it and are persuaded to do so.<sup>167</sup>

Demosthenes moves from admonishing the Assembly, presupposing their willingness to do their duty, to take a more prescriptive and didactic approach. His insightful account of Athens' problems justifies his claim in the proemium that he is in an authoritative position to present a solution:

The kind of force that, in my view, would rid us of the serious troubles we have, and its size, and the sources of money for it, and the other steps that I think would lead to the creation of the most effective force as quickly as possible – these I shall attempt to tell you, Men of Athens. In doing so, I make the following request of you.<sup>168</sup>

Moreover, he urges them to think carefully, not rashly, about the long-term benefits:

Make your decision only after you have heard all that I have to say; do not prejudge the matter...It is not those who say “quickly” and “tomorrow” who best address our needs – sending a relief force now will not allow us to prevent what has already happened.<sup>169</sup>

As stated in the proemium, Demosthenes justified his right to speak based on the failure of previous speakers to offer adequate advice, and insinuates here that the Assembly has been choosing the quickest easy option, avoiding the real matter at hand: their apathy. The crux of the problem is Athens itself and the solution requires a change of attitude, which includes

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<sup>167</sup> Demosthenes 4.13. ὡς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντας ὑπάρχειν ἅπαντας ἐτοίμως, ὡς ἐγνωκότων ὑμῶν καὶ πεπεισμένων, παύομαι λέγων·

<sup>168</sup> Demosthenes 4.13. τὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς παρασκευῆς ἣν ἀπαλλάξαι ἂν τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων ἡμᾶς οἶομαι, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὅσον, καὶ πόρους οὐστίνας χρημάτων, καὶ τὰλλ' ὡς ἂν μοι βέλτιστα καὶ τάχιστα δοκεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι, καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι λέγειν, δεηθεῖς ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοσοῦτον. Demosthenes' refers particularly to the best advice/ advisor in *On the Peace*, discussed in Chapter Three p. 157. The avoidance of rash decisions also has parallels to the Mytilenean debate at Thucydides 3.36-50.

<sup>169</sup> Demosthenes 4.13-4. ἐπειδὴν ἅπαντ' ἀκούσητε, κρίνατε, μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε ... οὐ γὰρ οἱ “ταχὺ” καὶ “τῆμερον” εἰπόντες μάλιστα εἰς δέον λέγουσιν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὰ γ' ἤδη γεγενημένα τῇ νυνὶ βοήθεια κωλύσαι δυνηθείμεν).

scrutinising their decision-making process. To this end, before he offers his proposals, he presents the Assembly with what they ought to listen to, and defines the good citizen/adviser,

Rather, it is whoever can show what kind of force, of what size and funded from what sources will be able to resist until we bring the war to an end or we defeat the enemy.

Only in this way will we put an end to the harm we are suffering.<sup>170</sup>

Essentially, the speaker who will propose forceful action and who considers defeat to Philip an inconceivable option. Demosthenes modestly asserts himself as this good adviser, as a speaker of truth whose intentions are to the benefit of the *polis*:

I believe that I can tell you what needs to be done, but I will not stand in the way of anyone else who has advice to offer. This is the extent of the promise I make, events will give the proof, and you shall be the judges.<sup>171</sup>

Philip's actions and movement in northern Greece/ Thrace require a swift response and a powerful message of intent from the Athenians, and this required men such as Eubulus to recognise that the Festival Fund Commission no longer served, but indeed hindered, Athenian interests.<sup>172</sup> The purpose of the force Demosthenes proposes (discussed below) is to send a message of intent and give pause to Philip:

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<sup>170</sup> Demosthenes 4.15. ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν δείξῃ τις πορισθεῖσα παρασκευὴ καὶ πόση καὶ πόθεν διαμεῖναι δυνήσεται, ἕως ἂν ἡ διαλυσώμεθα πεισθέντες τὸν πόλεμον ἢ περιγενώμεθα τῶν ἐχθρῶν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι τοῦ λοιποῦ πάσχοιμεν ἂν κακῶς. Vince translates the final sentence here as 'for that is how we shall avoid trouble in the future'. I follow Trevett's translation as I believe it focuses on the Athenians recognising the *current* harm and stresses the immediacy of this crisis, rather than just warning of future troubles, and reflects the urgency to act which drives this speech, and the *Olynthiacs*.

<sup>171</sup> Demosthenes 4.15. οἶμαι τοίνυν ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχειν, μὴ καλύων εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐπαγγέλλεται τι. ἡ μὲν οὖν ὑπόσχεσις οὕτω μεγάλη, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἤδη τὸν ἔλεγχον δώσει· κριταὶ δ' ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθε. It is not until *On the Peace* that events will offer the proof to his arguments.

<sup>172</sup> Sinclair 1988: 46 notes that Eubulus established the FFC and 'carried a law that all annual surpluses be automatically paid into the festival or Theoric fund.' Demosthenes was once an ally of Eubulus and of his policy that sought coordinate and consolidate Athenian economic revenues, but Demosthenes broke away when he differed in opinion on the best way to deal with Macedonia. See Worthington 2013: 89-91; Cawkwell 1963.

Its purpose is either to keep him quiet out of fear, in the knowledge that you are prepared – for he will know it, since there are those of us – yes, there are, more than there should be – who report everything to him.<sup>173</sup>

While Demosthenes established in the proemium that *rhētors* offering bad advice have led to their current situation, this is the first instance we have of the concept of an enemy within: of traitors within Athens reporting to Philip, actively attempting to undermine the *polis* and act in Macedonian interests.<sup>174</sup> This stresses why it was necessary for Demosthenes to speak first, and is important in underpinning his own *ethos* as one whose ends are synonymous with the *polis*, and whose persuasion is to be trusted and heeded.<sup>175</sup>

To this end Demosthenes' proposals are more substantial than just a relief force, but an Athenian statement of intent:

First of all, men of Athens, I say that you should prepare fifty triremes. Then you must be resolved, if the need should arise, to embark and sail on them in person. In addition, you should make ready horse-transporting triremes and enough supply ships for half the cavalrymen.<sup>176</sup>

This rapid response is necessary to make Philip and their lost allies realise that the Athenians are prepared to remove their lethargy and act:

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<sup>173</sup> Demosthenes 4.18. ἴν' ἢ διὰ τὸν φόβον εἰδῶς εὐτρεπεῖς ὑμᾶς (εἴσεται γὰρ ἀκριβῶς· εἰσι γὰρ, εἰσὶν οἱ πάντ' ἐξαγγέλλοντες ἐκείνῳ παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πλείους τοῦ δέοντος) ἡσυχίαν ἔχη,

<sup>174</sup> We see this developed further in the *First Olynthiac* 1.6 where Demosthenes tells the Assembly that the Olynthians are aware of what happened to the Amphipolitans and the Pydnans that betrayed their city (that Philip killed them) thus warning not only of the concept of the enemy within but also ominously that the same might happen in Athens, and to the traitors that Philip will not spare them. I believe this demonstrates early indications of Roisman's rhetoric of conspiracy, which is discussed later in the thesis.

<sup>175</sup> In his speech *Against Leptines* 20.13 Demosthenes asserts that the actions of the *polis* has demonstrated its *ethos* is honest (*apseudes*) and good (*chreston*), as noted by Herman 2006: 11.

<sup>176</sup> Demosthenes 4.16. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τριήρεις πενήκοντα παρασκευάσασθαι φημι δεῖν, εἴτ' αὐτοὺς οὕτω τὰς γνώμας ἔχειν ὥς, ἐάν τι δέη, πλευστέον εἰς ταύτας αὐτοῖς ἐμβᾶσιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοῖς ἡμίσεσι τῶν ἰππέων ἰππαγωγὸς τριήρεις καὶ πλοῖ' ἱκανὰ εὐτρεπίσαι κελεύω. Trevett notes that Demosthenes is proposing a 'substantial rapid response force' with each trireme having a crew of about 200 'the number of those involved could be in excess of 9,000. The regular number of Athenian cavalry was 1,000.' Trevett 2011:75n16.

These, in my view, are needed to counter his sudden campaigns from his own land to Thermopylae and the Chersonese and Olynthus and anywhere else he wishes. For we must plant the expectation in his mind that you will shake off your excessive lethargy and hurry out, as you did to Euboea and on a previous occasion, it is said, to Haliartus and recently to Thermopylae.<sup>177</sup>

This call to action would demonstrate the real power of an active Athens, and should Philip ‘despise it’ then they can act to regain their possessions against no resistance ‘since there will be nothing to prevent your sailing against his territory if he should give you the opportunity.’<sup>178</sup>

Yet, Demosthenes does not just call the Athenians to act, but to reflect critically on their own practices and to purge themselves of those flaws which have led them to their current predicament:

None of your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries for me, nor these paper forces, but one that will belong to the city and that whether you elect one man or many or this man or that as its general they will follow and obey him. I also urge you to provide supplies for it.<sup>179</sup>

Demosthenes here proposes three fundamental things: the need to act, the need for an Athenian core, and the need to financially support it. Firstly, Demosthenes tells the assembly

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<sup>177</sup> Demosthenes 4.17. ταῦτα μὲν οἶμαι δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας εἰς Πύλας καὶ Χερρόνησον καὶ Ὀlynthον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται· δεῖ γὰρ ἐκεῖνῳ τοῦτ’ ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ παραστῆσαι, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἐκ τῆς ἀμελείας ταύτης τῆς ἄγαν, ὥσπερ εἰς Εὐβοίαν καὶ πρότερόν ποτέ φασιν εἰς Ἀλίαρτον καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα πρῶν εἰς Πύλας, ἴσως ἂν ὀρμήσαιτε·

This passage provides important indicators for the dating of this speech. Trevett 2011:75 ‘Philip marched on Thermopylae after his victory over the Phocian army in 352...and threatened the Chersonese by his campaign in Thrace in autumn of that year...His military threat to Olynthus, which is distinct from and predates the outbreak of war occurred probably in early 351’. The reference to Euboea is for their involvement in 357. ‘The coalition that fought the Spartans at Haliartus in Boeotia during the Corinthian war in 395, and its occupation of Thermopylae in 352 to prevent Philip marching against Phocis.’

<sup>178</sup> Demosthenes 4.18.

<sup>179</sup> Demosthenes 4.19: μὴ μοι μυρίους μηδὲ δισμυρίους ξένους, μηδὲ τὰς ἐπιστολιμαίους ταύτας δυνάμεις, ἀλλ’ ἢ τῆς πόλεως ἔσται, κἂν ὑμεῖς ἓνα κἂν πλείους κἂν τὸν δεῖνα κἂν ὄντινῶν χειροτονήσῃτε στρατηγόν, τούτῳ πείσεται καὶ ἀκολουθήσει. καὶ τροφήν ταύτη πορίσαι κελεύω.

to not speak of numberless (μυρίους) forces of foreign mercenaries that gain nothing from Athenian success, nor of phantom forces that are spoken of but that are never actualised. In this talk of ‘paper forces’, Demosthenes highlights another problem of the Assembly: the rejection of deliberation without action, of making statements of intent but never following through. Building on this, Demosthenes urges the Assembly to avoid their previous mistakes of talking big but failing to deliver,

I shall show you, dealing with each of these points separately. I am talking about mercenaries – and please be aware of the attitude that has often harmed you before: you think that everything is on too small a scale and so in your decrees you choose the most grandiose options, but when it comes to action, you fail to take even the small measures. Instead you should take small measures, and provide for them, and then add to them if they seem inadequate.<sup>180</sup>

Karvounis argues that the Athenians’ carelessness made their actions (when they occurred) ineffective, however, he follows this remark by noting how, ‘while this is a fact, Demosthenes’ sharp criticism is still surprising.’<sup>181</sup> I believe this surprise is symptomatic of approaching the speeches as directed primarily *against* Philip. From the perspective of my thesis, however, it is not a surprise as I assert Demosthenes’ priority in the corpus is to criticise and rehabilitate a broken Assembly. I maintain that Demosthenes urges them to act, to do at least something and to do it well, which potentially reflects the collective awareness of the Homeric ideal of ‘μύθων τε ῥητῆρ’ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.’<sup>182</sup> Demosthenes

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<sup>180</sup> Demosthenes 4.20. ἐγὼ φράσω, καθ’ ἕκαστον τούτων διεξιὼν χωρὶς. ξένους μὲν λέγω—καὶ ὅπως μὴ ποιήσεθ’ ὁ πολλάκις ὑμᾶς ἔβλαψεν· πάντ’ ἐλάττω νομίζοντες εἶναι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ τὰ μέγιστ’ ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν αἰρούμενοι, ἐπὶ τῷ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὰ μικρὰ ποιεῖτε· ἀλλὰ τὰ μικρὰ ποιήσαντες καὶ πορίσαντες τούτοις προστίθετε, ἂν ἐλάττω φαίνηται. Both Trevett and Vince translate this as ‘I shall tell you’, but I read ἐγὼ φράσω with connotations of showing and pointing out (‘I shall show’) which just ‘tell’ does not fully convey in English. Demosthenes is not just telling an account, he is aiming to instruct and guide.

<sup>181</sup> As Karvounis 2002: 235 ‘Die Nachlässigkeit der Bürgerschaft bewirkte eine entsprechende Trägheit des „Staatsapparats“, was wiederum zur Folge hatte, daß alle athenischen Eingriffe ineffektiv blieben.’ ‘Dies war zwar eine Tatsache, Demosthenes’ scharfe Kritik erscheint aber trotzdem sehr überraschend.’

<sup>182</sup> *Iliad* 9.443 Phoenix says he raised Achilles to be a man who was ‘both a speaker of words and doer of deeds’ (translation my own).

detects the perilous gap between *logos* and *ergon*, as currently Athens is all words and no action, and thus not an effective power to be reckoned with.<sup>183</sup> As Demosthenes goes on to argue, ‘You will be voting to wage war on Philip not only by your decrees and letters but also by your actions.’<sup>184</sup> In refusing to translate their decrees into action, they fail to complete any of their endeavours, and make Philip’s position stronger.<sup>185</sup> Demosthenes’ speech is aimed at changing this internal attitude.

Secondly, in asking for a force that *belongs to the city* (ἡ τῆς πόλεως ἔσται)

Demosthenes insists that the force must be Athenian at its core:

What I propose is that there be two thousand soldiers in all, of whom five hundred should be Athenian, of whatever age you decide, and that they should campaign for a set period, not for a long time as they do now but for as long as you think appropriate, taking turns; the rest should be mercenaries. There should also be two hundred cavalrymen, of whom at least fifty should be Athenian, serving on the same basis as the infantry, and horse-transportation ships for them.<sup>186</sup>

The emphasis that this should be an Athenian effort and not delegated to the allies demonstrates the necessity for an emphatic change in attitude, to display Athenian strength and intent to regain their position and their possessions. Demosthenes calls for a force that is accountable to Athens and whose interests are perfectly aligned with the *polis*. This can only be achieved when the Athenians act themselves, and as MacDowell observes, ‘the point

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<sup>183</sup> It is the Athenians’ empty speeches that make their allies die of fear at 4.45. I maintain that there is not a *logos/ergon* antithesis, but rather each is a necessary part of a whole. Both elements are vital to the effective and efficient functioning of the *polis*. Further references on the gap between *logos* and *ergon* are made at 4.45, 2.11, 3.14, 6.4, 8.22.

<sup>184</sup> Demosthenes 4.30. ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις.

<sup>185</sup> Demosthenes asserts in *Second Olynthiac* 2.12 that because of behaviour like this, the more they make speeches the more people distrust them.

<sup>186</sup> Demosthenes 4.21. λέγω δὴ τοὺς πάντας στρατιώτας δισχιλίους, τούτων δ’ Ἀθηναίους φημί δεῖν εἶναι πεντακοσίους, ἐξ ἧς ἂν τινος ἡμῖν ἡλικίας καλῶς ἔχειν δοκῆ, χρόνον τακτὸν στρατευομένους, μὴ μακρὸν τοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἂν δοκῆ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀλλήλοις τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ξένους εἶναι κελεύω. καὶ μετὰ τούτων ἰππέας διακοσίους, καὶ τούτων πενήκοντ’ Ἀθηναίους τοῦλάχιστον, ὥσπερ τοὺς πεζοὺς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον στρατευομένους· καὶ ἵππαγωγούς τούτοις.

which throughout is emphasised above all others is that the citizens of Athens should be prepared to serve in person in the army or navy.<sup>187</sup> Demosthenes stresses this by a specific reference to the taxiarchs and hipparchs:

Shouldn't the taxiarch be chosen from among you, men of Athens, and the hipparch, and shouldn't the office holders be from among you, if the force is to be truly Athenian? But your hipparch has to sail to Lemnos, whilst it is Menelaus who commands the cavalry that is fighting for the city's possessions. I do not mean any criticism of the individual, but the man, whoever it is, should have been elected by you.<sup>188</sup>

This contributes to Demosthenes' overarching argument that they must shake off their apathy and be *seen* to act in their own interests. Further in the speech, Demosthenes makes the argument for why the Athenians need a rapid response force:

The reason why I say that citizens should participate and sail with the force is that in the past, I am told, the city supported a mercenary force at Corinth, led by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and certain others, and you yourselves joined in the campaign. And I know from what I have heard that these mercenaries, drawn up alongside you against the Spartans, and you alongside them, were victorious. But ever since your mercenaries have campaigned on their own, they have defeated our friends and allies while our enemies have grown stronger than they should. They give a passing glance to the war that the city is waging and then sail off to Artabazus and

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<sup>187</sup> MacDowell 2009: 213.

<sup>188</sup> Demosthenes 4.27. οὐ γὰρ ἐχρῆν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταξιάρχους παρ' ὑμῶν, ἵππαρχον παρ' ὑμῶν, ἄρχοντας οἰκείους εἶναι, ἴν' ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς τῆς πόλεως ἡ δύναμις; ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν Λήμνον τὸν παρ' ὑμῶν ἵππαρχον δεῖ πλεῖν, τῶν δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κτημάτων ἀγωνιζομένων Μενέλαον ἵππαρχεῖν. καὶ οὐ τὸν ἄνδρα μεμφόμενος ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἔδει κεχειροτονημένον εἶναι τοῦτον, ὅστις ἂν ἦ. Bugh 1988:160 observes that Demosthenes' comments reveal how 'mercenaries are a dominant element in fourth-century warfare...[and serve as] an acknowledgement that the cavalry was no more eager to perform military service abroad than were the hoplites...not only are the cavalry officers not really engaged in military duties (no doubt exaggerated), but that the cavalry in Attika was being commanded by a mercenary hipparch.'

anywhere else instead, and the general follows them. And this is reasonable enough, since it is impossible for someone who does not provide pay to exercise command.<sup>189</sup>

This presents the situation as understandable: that a force serves its own agenda when it is not supported financially by the *polis* but must fund itself through its own activities. With a fundamentally Athenian force in terms of personnel, it would not have a separate agenda but one that served the same interests and ends as the *polis*. This also reinforces the point that they cannot expect to have authoritative command and loyalty if they do not provide pay. Instead, they must change their current damaging practices:

What then do I propose? That you prevent the general and his troops from making excuses by providing them with pay and by stationing your own soldiers alongside them, like supervisors of his actions, because the way we handle things at present is laughable.<sup>190</sup>

This suggests that way the Athenians conduct themselves at present is a shambles, and Demosthenes reinforces his right to make these assertions by explaining the necessary funds for his proposals, thus demonstrating his own knowledge, which legitimises his character and argument:

As for the money, the maintenance – subsistence only – of this force will cost little more than ninety talents: for ten fast ships, forty talents, at twenty minas per ship per month; for two thousand soldiers, at the same amount again, with each soldier

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<sup>189</sup> Demosthenes 4.24. πολίτας δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ συμπλεῖν διὰ ταῦτα κελεύω, ὅτι καὶ πρότερόν ποτ' ἀκούω ξενικὸν τρέφειν ἐν Κορίνθῳ τὴν πόλιν, οὗ Πολύστρατος ἠγεῖτο καὶ Ἰφικράτης καὶ Χαβρίας καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, καὶ αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς συστρατεύεσθαι· καὶ οἷδ' ἀκούων ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίους παραταττόμενοι μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐνίκων οὗτοι οἱ ξένοι καὶ ὑμεῖς μετ' ἐκείνων. ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικά ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασι. καὶ παρακύψαντ' ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ πανταχοῖ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα, ὃ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ, εἰκότως· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.

<sup>190</sup> Demosthenes 4.25. τί οὖν κελεύω; τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, μισθὸν πορίσαντας καὶ στρατιώτας οἰκείους ὥσπερ ἐλόπτας τῶν στρατηγουμένων παρακαταστήσαντας· ἐπεὶ νῦν γε γέλωσ ἔσθ' ὡς χρώμεθα τοῖς πράγμασιν. Karvounis 2002: 234 remarks on Demosthenes' incessant criticism on their foreign policy: 'Während der gesamten Rede kritisiert Demosthenes unaufhörlich das nachlässige Verhalten der Athener in bezug auf ihre Außenpolitik.'



receiving ten drachmas a month for maintenance; and for the two hundred cavalrymen, if each receives thirty drachmas a month, twelve talents. If anyone thinks that this is scant provision...he is wrong. I am sure if this proposal is accepted the army itself will make good the rest from the war, without wronging any of the Greeks or our allies, and as a result will receive full pay.<sup>191</sup>

These proposals all contribute to Demosthenes' assertion that Athens must be in control of its own foreign policy, and he provides no means for excuse or grounds for wasting precious time in debating blame, which has been their current practice:

How then will this state of affairs be brought to an end? As soon as you, men of Athens, appoint the same men to be both soldiers and witnesses of the general's conduct and, once they have returned home, judges at the examinations into the conduct of the magistrates, so that you not only hear about your affairs but also observe them in person.<sup>192</sup>

This insinuates that currently the Assembly has been deliberating over matters which they themselves have no direct involvement in, but debate on hearsay, demonstrating similar complaints raised by Thucydides both in the Mytilenean Debate, and in his attack at 1.20.1 upon the reliability of knowledge that is based on what you hear without analysing it vigorously (*abasanistos*).<sup>193</sup> The preference for making their deductions based on that which

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<sup>191</sup> Demosthenes 4.28-9 ἔστι μὲν ἢ τροφή, σιτηρέσιον μόνον, τῆ δυνάμει ταύτῃ τάλαντ' ἐνενήκοντα καὶ μικρόν τι πρὸς, δέκα μὲν ναυσὶ ταχείαις τετταράκοντα τάλαντα, εἴκοσιν εἰς τὴν ναῦν μναῖ τοῦ μηνὸς ἐκάστου, στρατιώταις δὲ δισχιλίους τοσαῦθ' ἕτερα, ἵνα δέκα τοῦ μηνὸς ὁ στρατιώτης δραχμὰς σιτηρέσιον λαμβάνῃ, τοῖς δ' ἵππεῦσι διακοσίους οὔσιν, ἐὰν τριάκοντα δραχμὰς ἕκαστος λαμβάνῃ τοῦ μηνός, δώδεκα τάλαντα. εἰ δέ τις οἶεται μικρὰν ἀφορμὴν εἶναι ... οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκεν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδα σαφῶς ὅτι, τοῦτ' ἂν γένηται, προσποριεῖ τὰ λοιπ' αὐτὸ τὸ στράτευμ' ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέμου, οὐδένα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀδικοῦν οὐδὲ τῶν συμμάχων, ὥστ' ἔχειν μισθὸν ἐντελῆ. Unfortunately the document regarding the financial resources does not survive.

<sup>192</sup> Demosthenes 4.47. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα παύσεται; ὅταν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποδείξετε στρατιώτας καὶ μάρτυρας τῶν στρατηγουμένων καὶ δικαστὰς οἰκαδ' ἐλθόντας τῶν εὐθυνῶν, ὥστε μὴ ἀκούειν μόνον ὑμᾶς τὰ ὑμέτερον αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρόντας ὄραν.

<sup>193</sup> Thucydides' Cleon at 3.38 complains 'as for the past, you rely not so much on the facts which you have seen with your own eyes as on what you have heard about them in some clever piece of verbal criticism.' Ober 1993: 105 remarks on Thucydides 1.20 that "the many" are equally credulous when it comes to affairs unobscured by the passage of time', citing 1.20.3 on how 'such is the degree of carelessness among *hoi polloi* in the search for truth (*aletheia*) and their preference for ready-made accounts.'

has been seen rather than heard is attested to by Hartog and Benveniste, in the definition of a *histor* as a witness of what has been seen: tracing the notion back to Indo-European origins the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* rules that ‘if now, two men are in dispute [in litigation], one saying “I saw myself” and the other saying “I heard for myself,” the one who says “I saw myself” is the one whom we must believe.’<sup>194</sup> Heraclitus likewise states that trustworthy knowledge is necessitated on what is seen, and Aristotle states that sight is the best sense in achieving understanding.<sup>195</sup> Likewise here, by only acting on the reports of others (who may not even be Athenian) the Assembly has only a futile hope of solving their current crisis because they undermine their decision-making process by acting on inferior forms of knowledge.<sup>196</sup>

In highlighting this lack of efficiency and effectiveness, Demosthenes again calls the Athenians to self-reflect and recognise the laughable (γέλως) state of their military organisation:

If anyone were to ask you, “Are you at peace, Athenians?” you would say, “By Zeus, we are not; we are at war with Philip.”<sup>197</sup>

Demosthenes is at pains to make the Athenians see the reality of their current selves, which is so far removed from their ideals. A striking instance of this is in the actual size of the Athenian fleet, which is indicative of the realities of Athens’ decline:

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<sup>194</sup> Benveniste 1969: 173, Hartog 1988: 261.

<sup>195</sup> Polybius *Histories* 11. 27 remarks that Heraclitus claimed that, ‘the eyes are a more accurate witness than the ears’ ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ὄτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες. (Fragment 22 B 101a). Aristotle *Metaphysics* 980a25 states how ‘All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking to all other senses.’ πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. σημεῖον δ’ ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι’ αὐτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἴνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὄρᾶν αἰρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων.

<sup>196</sup> As Ober 1996: 149 notes one central holding of Athenian ideology was ‘a belief in the superior wisdom of decisions made collectively by large bodies of citizens.’

<sup>197</sup> Demosthenes 4.25. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιστό τις ὑμᾶς· “εἰρήνην ἄγετ’, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι;” “μὰ Δί’ οὐχ ἡμεῖς γ’,” εἶποιτ’ ἄν, “ἀλλὰ Φιλίππῳ πολεμοῦμεν.”

The reasons for a force of this size, men of Athens, is that we cannot now provide one that is capable of meeting him [Philip] in battle but must act as raiders and must wage this kind of war at first.<sup>198</sup>

This acknowledgment that the Athenians cannot match Philip is a complete inversion of Athenian naval supremacy, which characterised fifth-century Athens, and turns their defining thalassocracy on its head.<sup>199</sup> It presents a distorted inversion of the Athens portrayed by the Spartan King Archidamus, whose speech in Thucydides acknowledged that they could not match the Athenian Naval fleet.<sup>200</sup> However, Demosthenes asserts that if the Athenians act and do what they are historically known to do, then they can turn their current situation around and prevail. This is the same hope that Demosthenes presented in the proemium, that their worst aspect is their best hope, but only *if* they change. Subsequently, Demosthenes' call for action develops beyond a call for specific military action, into reclaiming the character and spirit of Athens.<sup>201</sup>

Demosthenes' argument then focuses on the need to bring back some substance to the Athenians. The following sections of the speech all ruminate on Demosthenes' assertion that

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<sup>198</sup> Demosthenes 4.23 τοςάυτην μέν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔνι νῦν ἡμῖν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνῳ παραταξομένην, ἀλλὰ ληστεύειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ πολέμου χρῆσθαι τὴν πρώτην. As Karvounis 2002: 250 notes, Demosthenes' plan requires flexibility and willingness among the citizens, the lack of which Demosthenes denounced throughout the speech. On the small size of the proposed force Pritchett 1974: 69 notes that 'All Demosthenic commentators have been at a loss to understand how the young orator offered his plan as an improvement over the existing state of affairs', referring to the large army sent to Kerkyea, and in 358/7 to Euboea. I argue that Demosthenes' point is evident in at 4.19-20 on how lately grandiose plans do not come to fruition. See too Ober 1978: 119-130

<sup>199</sup> Hunt 2010: 175 notes 'by the age of Demosthenes, no city enjoyed uncontested land superiority. Although Athens' navy was usually stronger than that of any other state, the resurgence of piracy and the outcome of the Social War made its decline obvious.' For more on Athenian thalassocracy and naval supremacy see Cawkwell 1984.

<sup>200</sup> Archidamus on facing Athens: they 'have the widest experience of the sea and who are extremely well equipped in all other directions, very wealthy both as individuals and as a state, with ships and cavalry and hoplites, with a population larger than that of any other place in Hellas, and then too, with numbers of allies who pay tribute to them. How, then can we irresponsibly start a war with such people? ... Our navy? It is inferior to theirs, and if we are to give proper attention to it and build it up to their strength, that will take time.' Thucydides 1.80.

<sup>201</sup> My argument on the spirit of the Athenians could be considered old fashioned, however, I do not argue this from a position of admiration for Athens or to make comments on my own milieu as scholarship in the early twentieth century did. Rather, I argue that Demosthenes holds them to and inspires them with the model of their ancestral virtues and ideology.

Athens' current predicament, and any apparent power Philip has, is a result of neglected duties and the reality that they are currently inferior to the standards they (should) hold themselves to. Demosthenes directly tackles the areas of Athenian incompetence at performing their duties beyond face-value:

Have you not elected from among yourselves ten taxiarchs and generals and phylarchs and two hipparchs? What do these men do? Except for whichever individual commander you dispatch to war, the rest marshal your ceremonial processions alongside the priests. Just like the makers of figurines, you elect taxiarchs and phylarchs for the marketplace not for war.<sup>202</sup>

They are seen to have elected these officials, but beyond the ceremonial performance of their role, they are basically redundant. Demosthenes' accusation is that the Athenians like to be *seen* as in control, but he explicitly informs them that they are merely putting on appearances and do not function as they should. The same complaint is raised at 4.34 where their priorities are again called into question:

Why is it, men of Athens, that the festivals of the Panathenaea and the Dionysia always take place at the appointed time, whether experts or amateurs are selected to administer them, when as much money is spent on them as on any single naval expedition, and they involve as much bustle and preparation as any other occasion I know of, whereas your naval expeditions all miss their opportunities – the ones to Methone, to Pagasae, and to Potidaea?<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Demosthenes. 4.26. οὐκ ἐχειροτονεῖτε δ' ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν δέκα ταξιάρχους καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ φυλάρχους καὶ ἰπάρχους δύο; τί οὖν οὗτοι ποιοῦσι; πλὴν ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, ὃν ἂν ἐκπέμψῃτ' ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ λοιποὶ τὰς πομπὰς πέμπουσιν ὑμῖν μετὰ τῶν ἱεροποιῶν· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλάττοντες τοὺς πηλίνους, εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν χειροτονεῖτε τοὺς ταξιάρχους καὶ τοὺς φυλάρχους, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον.

<sup>203</sup> Demosthenes 4.35. καίτοι τί δήποτ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζετε τὴν μὲν τῶν Παναθηναίων ἑορτὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν Διονυσίων ἀεὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος χρόνου γίνεσθαι, ἂν τε δεινοὶ λάχωσιν ἂν τ' ἰδιῶται οἱ τούτων ἑκατέρων ἐπιμελούμενοι, εἰς ἃ τοσαῦτ' ἀναλίσκεται χρήματα, ὅσ' οὐδ' εἰς ἓνα τῶν ἀποστόλων, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὄχλον καὶ παρασκευὴν ὅσην οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τι τῶν ἀπάντων ἔχει, τοὺς δ' ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καιρῶν, τὸν εἰς Μεθώνην, τὸν εἰς Παγασάς, τὸν εἰς Ποτειδαίαν;

This reinforces his point that their priorities are wrong; it would not be tolerated if a chorus went unfunded without specialists, but their military preparations are permitted to be neglected. This is exacerbated by how festivals are regulated by law:

The reason is that the festivals are all regulated by law, and each of you knows far in advance who will be the chorus-master or the gymnasiarch of the tribe, and what he must do and when, and what he should receive from whom, and nothing is overlooked or left unclear out of neglect. But none of our military preparations are organized, or kept up to date, or properly defined.<sup>204</sup>

This lack of anticipation and legislation towards expeditions, at least in comparison to the festivals, also draws an ironic foil to their attitudes towards generals in the courts:

As it is, things are so shameful that each general is tried by you two or three times on a capital charge, but none of them dares to engage even once in a life-and-death struggle with the enemy. Instead they prefer the death of kidnappers and clothes-stealers to a fitting end, since a criminal dies after he is tried, but a general dies fighting the enemy.<sup>205</sup>

If the generals are under the constant threat of impeachment (where failure equates to the charge of treason) when they are so ill-supported, then the aim to promote Athenian success

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<sup>204</sup> Demosthenes 4.36. ὅτι ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἅπαντα νόμῳ τέτακται, καὶ πρόοιδεν ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ τίς χορηγὸς ἢ γυμνασίαρχος τῆς φυλῆς, πότε καὶ παρὰ τοῦ καὶ τί λαβόντα τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, οὐδὲν ἀνεξέταστον οὐδ' ἀόριστον ἐν τούτοις ἡμέληται· ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆ τούτου παρασκευῆ ἄτακτα, ἀδιόρθωτα, ἀόρισθ' ἅπαντα. Hornblower 1991: 245 remarks this is 'too fantastic to be true as it stands. But it *is* clearly true that the Athenian system was poorly suited to a war in which the initiative lay in hands other than Athens' own.'

<sup>205</sup> Demosthenes 4.47. νῦν δ' εἰς τοῦθ' ἦκει τὰ πράγματα· αἰσχύνῃς ὥστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἕκαστος δις καὶ τρις κρίνεται παρ' ὑμῖν περὶ θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἅπαξ αὐτῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι περὶ θανάτου τολμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λωποδυτῶν θάνατον μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται τοῦ προσήκοντος· κακούργου μὲν γὰρ ἔστι κριθέντ' ἀποθανεῖν, στρατηγοῦ δὲ μαχόμενον τοῖς πολεμίοις. Trevett 2011: 58 notes that 'general and politicians were particularly liable to impeachment (*eisangelia*) on charge of treason; often such prosecutions were prompted by frustration at their lack of success rather than any real evidence or corruption. See Pritchett 1997: 2. Hansen 1975; Hamel 1998:122-157.' See further discussion on the treatment of Diopeithes in *On the Chersonese* in Chapter 4.2 p. 223. See MacDowell 1978: 148-149 for more on punishment for kidnapping and clothes-stealing.

is futile. Moreover, this lack of preparation and proper regulation creates an inconsistent, haphazard approach:

As a result, as soon as we receive some news, we appoint trierarchs, and make exchanges of property for them, and looking into the provision of money, and after this we decide to embark the metics and the slaves who live apart from their masters, then ourselves, then we change the crew again.<sup>206</sup>

This not only creates a panicked, unanticipated, indecisive nature to Athenian policy-making (and a vulnerability that is being exploited), but also shows the necessity of Demosthenes' earlier call for an Athenian core to the forces, and his call for competency.

This comparison of their attitude towards festivals and expeditions also presents a call for expediency to avoid neglecting opportunities:

During all this delay [on money and who should go] we lose the object of our expedition before we have begun. We spend time for action on preparation, but opportunities offered by circumstance do not wait on our slowness and dissimulation.<sup>207</sup>

By comparing the efficiency towards the festivals to their apathetic attitude to military preparations, Demosthenes brings back the reality of their lost possessions and their all-too-late efforts to save Potidaea and Methone.<sup>208</sup>

Consequently, Demosthenes asserts that it is their attitude towards military expeditions, not Philip, that has unequivocally damaged Athens, and that deliberation alone is not sufficient if it is not qualified by action. Neither is it sufficient for the Athenians to only

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<sup>206</sup> Demosthenes 4.36. τοιγαροῦν ἅμ' ἀκηκόαμέν τι καὶ τριηράρχους καθίσταμεν καὶ τούτοις ἀντιδόσεις ποιούμεθα καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐμβαίνειν τοὺς μετοίκους ἔδοξε καὶ τοὺς χωρὶς οἰκοῦντας, εἴτ' αὐτοὺς πάλιν, εἴτ' ἀντεμβιβάζειν.

<sup>207</sup> Demosthenes 4.37. εἴτ' ἐν ὄσῳ ταῦτα μέλλεται, προαπόλωλε τὸ ἐφ' ὃ ἂν ἐκπλέωμεν· τὸν γὰρ τοῦ πράττειν χρόνον εἰς τὸ παρασκευάζεσθαι ἀναλίσκομεν, οἱ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ μένουσι καιροὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν βραδυτήτα καὶ εἰρωνείαν.

<sup>208</sup> Demosthenes 4.35.

pay attention to their forces when something happens, and Demosthenes highlights the need to ‘learn this lesson – that those who wage war properly must anticipate events rather than follow them.’<sup>209</sup> Again, unlike the well-anticipated preparations for the Dionysia or Panathenaea, the military expeditions appear reactive rather than proactive, and woefully ill-informed:

It seems to me, men of Athens, that your deliberation about the war and our general armaments would be improved if you were to bear in mind the nature of the place against which you are waging war, and observe that Philip often achieves his aims by getting a head start on us, by means of the winds and the seasons of the year; and that he launches his attacks after waiting for the Etesian winds or for winter, whenever we are unable to get there.<sup>210</sup>

Consequently:

We need to bear these things in mind [that Philip anticipates and utilises the Etesian winds] and to wage war not by means of relief forces – since if we do we will be too late for everything – but by means of a permanent standing force.<sup>211</sup>

The fact that Philip can anticipate and use the seasons to his own strategic advantage presents an uncomfortable comparison to the Assembly. The Athenians, whose reputation is built on naval supremacy and tactical excellence, are now not only ineffective in this regard but are being out-manoeuvred by a Macedonian: Philip seizes his *kairos*, he utilises the natural

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<sup>209</sup> Demosthenes 4.38-39. Demosthenes then refers to his own role as he continues, ‘just as one would expect a general to lead his army, so those who deliberate should lead events, so that all their decisions lead to action and they are not forced to chase after events.’ This challenge to their state of affairs reflects his comments at the opening of the speech that he seeks to propose a new approach to the situation.

<sup>210</sup> Demosthenes 4.31. δοκεῖτε δέ μοι πολὺ βέλτιον ἂν περὶ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ ὅλης τῆς παρασκευῆς βουλευσασθαι, εἰ τὸν τόπον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς χώρας, πρὸς ἣν πολεμεῖτε, ἐνθυμηθεῖητε, καὶ λογίσαισθ’ ὅτι τοῖς πνεύμασι καὶ ταῖς ὥραις τοῦ ἔτους τὰ πολλὰ προλαμβάνων διαπράττεται Φίλιππος, καὶ φυλάξας τοὺς ἐτησίας ἢ τὸν χειμῶν’ ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἢ νῖκ’ ἂν ἡμεῖς μὴ δυναίμεθ’ ἐκεῖσ’ ἀφικέσθαι. On the Etesian winds Wooten 2008: 93 notes, ‘in the summer the Etesian winds often blow from the northwest, thus making it difficult to sail from south to north. Philip takes advantage of these situations.’

<sup>211</sup> Demosthenes 4.32. δεῖ τοίνυν ταῦτ’ ἐνθυμουμένους μὴ βοηθείαις πολεμεῖν (ὑστεριοῦμεν γὰρ ἀπάντων), ἀλλὰ παρασκευῇ συνεχεῖ καὶ δυνάμει.

environment to best suit his ends, he anticipates and pre-empts occasions and is successful in his endeavours. Just as Demosthenes used the Corinthian War to emphasises their current apathy and its effects, here Philip's initiative demonstrates the behaviour traditionally associated with Athens, and indeed Philip's actions could be viewed as Athenian behaviour turned on Athens itself. But of greater concern for Demosthenes is that this situation is not one born of necessity, but by a lack of action; the Athenians have the capabilities and the resources to act but squander them, displaying hopeless incompetence:

But you, men of Athens, who possess greater force than anyone else – triremes, hoplites, cavalry, revenues – never have yet, to the present day, used any of them as you should, but instead you wage war on Philip in the same way that a foreigner boxes. For when one of them is struck on the other side, his hands go to that place: he has neither the knowledge nor the will to put up his guard or watch for the next blow.<sup>212</sup>

Athenian actions are *reactions*, and therefore there is 'no plan to turn the war to your advantage.'<sup>213</sup> Moreover, the degrading assimilation of the Athenians with a barbarian boxer is a damning assessment of their internal corruption, as Trevett notes, 'Demosthenes both assumes that foreigners would be unfamiliar with the Greek sport of boxing and reflects the Greek prejudice that foreigners were by nature inferior to Greeks.'<sup>214</sup> Consequently, their lack of attention to military matters results in Athens repeatedly being one step behind:

It is the same with you. If you hear that Philip is in the Chersonese, you vote to send a relief force there, and likewise if you hear that he is at Thermopylae. And if you hear

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<sup>212</sup> Demosthenes 4.40. ὑμεῖς δ' ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πλείστην δύναμιν ἀπάντων ἔχοντες, τριήρεις, ὀπίτας, ἰππέας, χρημάτων πρόσοδον, τούτων μὲν μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδενὶ πάποτ' εἰς δέον τι κέχρησθε, οὐδὲν δ' ἀπολείπετε, ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι πυκτεῦουσιν, οὕτω πολεμεῖν Φιλίππῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ὁ πληγεῖς αἰεὶ τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται, κἂν ἐτέρωσε πατάξης, ἐκεῖσ' εἰσὶν αἱ χεῖρες· προβάλλεσθαι δ' ἢ βλέπειν ἐναντίον οὔτ' οἶδεν οὔτ' ἐθέλει.

<sup>213</sup> Demosthenes 4.41.

<sup>214</sup> Trevett 2011: 84 n 57. Worthington 2013: 120 calls this 'too little, too late'.



that he is somewhere else, you run up and down at his heels and are at his command; you have no plan to turn the war to your advantage, and fail to anticipate any eventuality until you learn that it has happened or is happening.<sup>215</sup>

The Athenians are currently in Philip's pocket so to speak. These two instances make the Athenians look ridiculous and emphasise how far removed the Athenians are from their reputation, which creates an 'unexpected reversal of roles.'<sup>216</sup> The Athenians know how to conduct war and how to be the effective force that gained and maintained their empire. Currently, they act like they do not know what they are doing; they lack effectiveness and will, and by being constantly on the catch-up the situation risks becoming a 'damage-limitation' process. This attitude cannot sustain an effective war effort, nor hope to hold on to their remaining possessions.

Having also established that their elected military officials are like clay men of the agora, supported by paper forces, their lack of anticipation is but another defect in their ineptitude. Once more it returns to the Assembly and the need for a drastic change of attitude:

Just as one would expect a general to lead his army, so those who deliberate should lead events, so that all their decisions lead to action and they are not forced to chase after events.<sup>217</sup>

The responsibility lies unequivocally with the Assembly. It is from this sense of self-inflicted shame that Demosthenes presents the idea that Philip is a form of divine punishment:

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<sup>215</sup> Demosthenes 4.41. καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἂν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ πύθησθε Φίλιππον, ἐκεῖσε βοηθεῖν ψηφίζεσθε, ἂν ἐν Πύλαις, ἐκεῖσε, ἂν ἄλλοθί που, συμπαραθεῖτ' ἄνω κάτω, καὶ στρατηγεῖσθ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου, βεβούλευσθε δ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῖ συμφέρον περὶ τοῦ πολέμου, οὐδὲ πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων προορᾶτ' οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν ἡ γεγενημένον ἢ γιγνόμενον τι πύθησθε.

<sup>216</sup> Worthington 2013: 120.

<sup>217</sup> Demosthenes 4.39. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ τῶν στρατευμάτων ἀξιώσει τις ἂν τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς βουλευομένους, ἵν' ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ, ταῦτα πράττηται καὶ μὴ τὰ συμβάντ' ἀναγκάζωνται διώκειν.

It seems to me, men of Athens, that some god is ashamed at what is being done in the name of our city and is putting this restlessness in Philip.<sup>218</sup>

This works on two levels: firstly the Athenians are behaving in a manner which is deserving of punishment, and secondly any belief that Philip's power is from his own initiative is rejected: this time he is a vehicle of divine justice, powerful only by the grace of the gods with the end to punish Athens. Once more, it is only through Athenian negligence and lack of action that Philip has 'reached such a pitch of arrogance that he has already sent letters like this to the Euboeans.'<sup>219</sup>

### Epilogue: the abuse of rhetoric

Having established the practicalities of his call for action and the realities of their military regression, Demosthenes closes to focus on the root of the problem – Athens itself:

Most of what has been read out, men of Athens, is true – would that it were not – though it is perhaps unpleasant to hear. If everything a speaker passes over, in order not to cause distress, is also passed over by events, it would be right to speak with a view to pleasing the audience. But since pleasant speeches – if they are inappropriate – lead to disastrous consequences, it is shameful to deceive ourselves and, by putting off everything that is disagreeable, be too late in all that we do.<sup>220</sup>

Such anxieties on the danger of flattering rhetoric reflects how Demosthenes engages with the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric, which asserts how 'deceit is *peculiarly* unacceptable in a

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<sup>218</sup> Demosthenes 4.42. δοκεῖ δέ μοι θεῶν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς γιγνομένοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως αἰσχυρόμενος τὴν φιλοπραγμοσύνην ταύτην ἐμβαλεῖν Φιλίππῳ.

<sup>219</sup> Demosthenes 4.37. ὁ δ' εἰς τοῦθ' ὕβρεως ἐλήλυθεν ὥστ' ἐπιστέλλειν Εὐβοεῦσιν ἤδη τοιαύτας ἐπιστολάς. The letter has not survived.

<sup>220</sup> Demosthenes 4.38. τούτων, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν ἀνεγνωσμένων ἀληθῆ μὲν ἐστι τὰ πολλά, ὡς οὐκ ἔδει, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἠδέ' ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, ὅσ' ἂν τις ὑπερβῆ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα μὴ λυπήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πράγμαθ' ὑπερβήσεται, δεῖ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν· εἰ δ' ἡ τῶν λόγων χάρις, ἂν ἧ μὴ προσήκουσα, ἔργῳ ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρὸν ἐστι φενακίζειν ἑαυτούς, καὶ ἅπαντ' ἀναβαλλομένους ἃ ἂν ἧ δυσχερῆ πάντων ὑστερεῖν τῶν ἔργων.

democratic system because that system is ‘logocentric’.<sup>221</sup> Defining his own rhetoric here as true, Demosthenes contrasts himself to other *rhētors* who speak with a view to pleasing the audience, but which has caused the problems they now experience. Moreover, Demosthenes’ anxieties on the danger of pleasing speech is reflective of the wider concerns in fifth and fourth century Athens on the harmful effects of oratory: in his Mytilenean Debate (3.36-49) Thucydides ‘presents with devastating clarity the harm that can ensue when public discourse becomes distorted by self-seeking leaders under the pressure of war or national crises.’<sup>222</sup> Indeed, this constant potential for the abuse of rhetoric poses a fundamental problem within Democratic Athens where oratory is the medium through which its decision-making process functions.<sup>223</sup> Demosthenes’ comments here assert that while oratorical debate is essential, the Assembly must always be aware of the dangers of manipulation. Yunis’ remarks on the proemium particularly resonate here that:

Demosthenes portrays the Assembly as the scene of competition between himself, the good *rhētor* who could save the *polis*, and his rivals, the bad *rhētors*, who would inevitably harm it.<sup>224</sup>

As discussed above, Demosthenes has sought to define himself as the antithesis of those speakers, as a speaker of truth for the sake of duty over popularity. He returns to this again in his epilogue:

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<sup>221</sup> Hesk 2000: 166. While Hesk is referring to *On the Crown* 18.282 I believe Demosthenes shows the same sentiment here. Hesk 2000: 209 notes the ‘rhetoric of anti-rhetoric’ was used by Valesio 1980 to analyse Shakespearean speeches. See Ober 1989: 316-317 on the role of the orator as protector of the *dēmos*.

<sup>222</sup> Cohen 2004: 31.

<sup>223</sup> Cohen 2004: 32 adds that, through Diodotus’ speech, Thucydides shows that he is ‘well aware that a self-governing political community (unlike a tyranny) has no other choice but to employ persuasive discourse because the *logos* (word, speech, argument, discourse, reason) is the *only* medium by which human beings can wisely govern a well-ordered political community.’

<sup>224</sup> Yunis 1996: 279. I argue this develops over the speeches, particularly after *On the Peace*.

I have never tried to win your favour by saying anything that I did not believe to be to your advantage, and now I have shared everything I know with you candidly, holding nothing back.<sup>225</sup>

Thus rather than resorting to popular rhetoric to gain their favour, Demosthenes asserts that that an orator's duty is to use *logos* for the benefit of the *polis*, and that if he cannot simultaneously offer the best advice and please them, he must prioritise the welfare of the city over his own popularity:

One man on his own can never, never I say do everything that you wish: but he can make promises and speeches and blame this man or that and as a result, your affairs lie in ruins. For when our general is leading wretched unpaid mercenaries, and these men here are smoothly lying to you about what Philip is doing, and you are voting at random on the basis of whatever you hear, what can you expect?<sup>226</sup>

This also insinuates again the notion of traitors within Athens deliberately manipulating the Assembly, especially following Roisman's argument that conspiracy does 'like to operate in contexts that emphasise formal rules of conduct...because rules and regulations give their victims a false sense of security.'<sup>227</sup> Demosthenes' assertion that the Assembly is being lied to insinuates the presence of internal conspirators manipulating the deliberative process

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<sup>225</sup> Demosthenes 4.51. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐτ' ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὦ, νῦν θ' ἂ γιγνώσκω πάνθ' ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαρρησίασμαι. See too 4.29, 'I am willing to join the expedition myself as a volunteer and suffer any punishment if this [his financial assessment] is not the case'.

<sup>226</sup> Demosthenes 4.46. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν' ἄνδρα δυνηθῆναί ποτε ταῦθ' ὑμῖν πρᾶξι πάνθ' ὅσα βούλεσθε· ὑποσχέσθαι μέντοι καὶ φῆσαι καὶ τὸν δεῖν' αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ τὸν δεῖν' ἔστι, τὰ δὲ πράγματ' ἐκ τούτων ἀπόλωλεν· ὅταν γὰρ ἡγῆται μὲν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἀθλίων ἀπομίσθων ξένων, οἱ δ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν ἐκεῖνος πράξει πρὸς ὑμᾶς ψευδόμενοι ῥαδίως ἐνθάδ' ὧσιν, ὑμεῖς δ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἀκούσῃθ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχητε ψηφίζησθε, τί καὶ χρὴ προσδοκᾶν; I believe this first sentence also refers to how an orator can only do so much without the goodwill of the audience, as he will comment on years later in his funeral oration 60.14. This complaint is most emphatically presented at 8.75 with the example of Timotheus discussed in Chapter 4.2 pp. 267-9.

<sup>227</sup> Roisman 2006: 5.

undetected.<sup>228</sup> The consequence of such malignant persuasion is that the Assembly does not give the necessary support to those waging a very real war.

Moreover, in revealing this deception within the Assembly, Demosthenes implies that these other *rhētors* were violating the symbolic *nomoi* which prohibited deception of the *dēmos*.<sup>229</sup> Whilst traditionally accusations of deception assert the wisdom of the *dēmos*, ‘the people do not make mistakes, they are deceived by conniving politicians’, Demosthenes’ criticism does not absolve the Assembly from its duty to be above rhetorical flattery, and to recognise such blatant deception.<sup>230</sup> This deception has enabled the Athenians to ignore the reality of their external situation, and perpetuates the crisis as they fail to recognise how their internal corruption has created the conditions in which Philip has flourished. Recognising this deception is thus imperative to resolving the situation in northern Greece, as Demosthenes states:

But if we put aside such behaviour and recognise that he is our enemy and is depriving us of our possessions and has for a long time been insulting us, everything we ever hoped someone would do for us is found to have been done against us, and that the future is in our own hands.<sup>231</sup>

Demosthenes continues more emphatically:

... if we are not now willing to wage war on him there we shall perhaps be compelled to do so here – if we recognise these things, we will have recognised what is needed

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<sup>228</sup> In later speeches, Demosthenes develops this into traitors working for Philip, but at this stage Demosthenes just criticises the detrimental effect of people seeking popularity. Particularly from *On the Peace*.

<sup>229</sup> Hesk 2000: 51 notes how Herodotus 6.136 account of Xanthippus’ charge against Miltiades for ‘deceit of the Athenians’ provides potential evidence of ‘legislation which specifically prohibited “deception” of the Athenian *dēmos* by an individual in the early fifth century’. Hesk continues that, despite Hansen 1975: 69 classifying this as *eisangelia* (impeachment), Rhodes 1979: 104-5 advocates caution in systematising legislation at such an early point in Athenian legal history. See Chapter 3 for further discussion on accusations of deception of the *dēmos* in *On the Peace*.

<sup>230</sup> Hesk 2000: 55. Hesk also refers to Ober 1989: 163-5 to note the assumption that the collective *dēmos* is wiser than the individual.

<sup>231</sup> Demosthenes 4.50. ἀλλ’ ἂν ἀφέντες ταῦτ’ ἐκεῖν’ εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι ἐχθρὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ’ ἡμᾶς ἀποστερεῖ καὶ χρόνον πολλὸν ὕβρισε, καὶ ἅπανθ’ ὅσα πάποτ’ ἠλπισαμέν τινα πράξειν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καθ’ ἡμῶν εὐρηται, καὶ τὰ λοιπ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἐστί,

and will have rid ourselves of empty rhetoric. What we need to do is not to contemplate what may possibly happen but to realise that the future will be miserable unless you attend to your obligations and are willing to do your duty.<sup>232</sup>

Demosthenes comes full-circle to the proemium where he implored the Assembly to shake off their apathy, see the situation and act.<sup>233</sup> Demosthenes has consistently held up a mirror to the Assembly, calling them to reflect and see the reality not only of the crisis in the North and their lost possessions, but this internal crisis which has mutated into their external issues.

Demosthenes presents that the only comprehensible answer to their situation is that they have rejected their true nature and Athenian virtues. Their self-awareness has been shrouded by rhetorical flattery and deception, and the reference to ‘empty rhetoric’ raises the abuse of *logos* within the Assembly. Already Demosthenes has criticised their paper forces and speeches that are not followed up with effective action. Demosthenes develops this beyond just condemning the deliberate manipulation of *logos* and the abuse of words, into a rejection of empty rhetoric that has no other end than to flatter and demonstrate skill, and has no use to the *polis* except self-aggrandisement of the speaker and his audience. Empty rhetoric is but one aspect of the abuse of rhetoric, as the smooth lies of the *rhētor* unequivocally damages Athens from within. In this metadiscourse Demosthenes clearly engages with the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric in asking the Assembly to recognise the lies and deception of other *rhētors*, whilst asserting his own sincere and dutiful *logos*.<sup>234</sup> Demosthenes implores the Assembly to break beyond this empty rhetoric to see the crisis at hand:

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<sup>232</sup> Demosthenes 4.50. *κἄν μὴ νῦν ἐθέλωμεν ἐκεῖ πολεμεῖν αὐτῶ, ἐνθάδ’ ἴσως ἀναγκασθῶμεθα τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἂν ταῦτ’ εἰδῶμεν, καὶ τὰ δεόντ’ ἐσόμεθ’ ἐγνωκότες καὶ λόγων ματαίων ἀπηλλαγμένοι· οὐ γὰρ ἅττα ποτ’ ἔσται δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι φαῦλα, ἐὰν μὴ προσέχητε τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν ἐθέλητε, εὖ εἰδέναι.*

<sup>233</sup> See previous comment above on Karvounis 2002: 234 and ring composition.

<sup>234</sup> Hesk 1999: 203 states that the ‘rhetoric of anti-rhetoric is meta-discursive and self-conscious’. Hesk 2000: 240 notes how Demosthenes affirms his anxiety on deception in *On the False Embassy* 19.184 ‘for in a political system based on speeches, how can it be safely administered if the speeches are not true?’

I am amazed if none of you, men of Athens, is concerned or angry when he considers that when the war began our object was to punish Philip, but now that it is coming to an end, it is to avoid suffering harm at his hands. Yet it is clear that he will not stand still, unless he is stopped. Should we just wait for this to happen? Or, if you dispatch empty ships and hopes inspired by so-and-so, do you suppose that everything would be all right?<sup>235</sup>

Demosthenes states that this naïve attitude and Athenian apathy has only one *telos* at present: further losses and inevitable defeat. But while Demosthenes has presented an insatiable nature to Philip as an unstoppable menace, he has also made it clear that Philip is not a threat because of his own merits but rather is a product of their negligence. As such, he can be checked *if* they act:

Shall we not embark? Shall we not go out now, even if we did not do so previously, with at least a part of our own forces? Shall we not sail against his territory? “Where shall we find anchorage?” some may ask. The war itself, men of Athens, will find out the rotten parts of his affairs, if we set to work. But if we sit at home, listening to speakers abuse and blame each other, I fear that we will never achieve any of the things that we need to do.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> Demosthenes 4.43. θαυμάζω δ' ἔγωγε, εἰ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν μήτ' ἐνθυμεῖται μήτ' ὀργίζεται, ὄρων, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένην περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον, τὴν δὲ τελευτὴν οὖσαν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γ' οὐ στήσεται, δῆλον, εἰ μὴ τις κωλύσει. εἶτα τοῦτ' ἀναμενοῦμεν; καὶ τριήρεις κενὰς καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῦ δαίμονος ἐλπίδας ἂν ἀποστείλιτε, πάντ' ἔχειν οἴεσθε καλῶς; Could we also say that the hopes, like the ships, are empty? This is also a continuation of the same argument that they are now looking at damage limitation if they do not act, rather than victory. Demosthenes also condenses multiple complaints together: role reversal, acting on hearsay, and a lack of action in the face of Philip's *pleonexia*.

<sup>236</sup> Demosthenes 4.44. οὐκ ἐμβησόμεθα; οὐκ ἔξιμεν αὐτοὶ μέρος γέ τι στρατιωτῶν οἰκείων νῦν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πρότερον; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου πλευσόμεθα; “ποῖ οὖν προσορμιούμεθα;” ἤρετό τις. εὐρήσει τὰ σαθρά, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν ἐκείνου πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ὁ πόλεμος, ἂν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἂν μέντοι καθώμεθ' οἴκοι, λοιδορουμένων ἀκούοντες καὶ αἰτιωμένων ἀλλήλους τῶν λεγόντων, οὐδέποτε' οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μὴ γένηται τῶν δεόντων. Usher 1999: 220 argues that at 4.40-44 ‘Demosthenes’ ability to excite quickly changing emotions...could scarcely find better illustration than in this passage.’

This potentially unwelcome advice is tempered by Demosthenes' use of *hemeis* which implicitly includes *himself* among the Athenians who are flattered or fail to act.

Demosthenes' solution, and he closes the speech is to break out of this destructive cycle of debates and give voice to the hard truths they, as a collective, need to address:

Just as I know that it is in your interest to hear the best advice, so I wish I knew that the giving of advice would benefit the man who composed the best speech – I would be much happier if that were the case. As it is although the consequences for me are unclear, nevertheless I choose to speak in the firm conviction that you will benefit from agreeing to this policy – so long as you put it into practice. May what will benefit all win out.<sup>237</sup>

Thus, the purpose of this speech is not just to urge the Athenians to war, but to examine themselves, to recognise and stop their self-damaging practices both in regards to their attitudes towards their military preparations and the abuse of rhetoric. Rectifying these shortcomings and seizing the moment is the solution:

For, I believe, wherever a part or even all of the city's forces are dispatched, the gods are kindly and fortune fights on our side; but wherever you send out a general and an empty decree and hopes from the speaker's platform you achieve nothing that you should, while your enemies laugh at such expeditions, and your allies die of fear.<sup>238</sup>

Consistently, Demosthenes is not talking about Philip as the problem, but rather focuses on the Athenians: on Athenian identity, Athenian reputation and the need for the Assembly to

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<sup>237</sup> Demosthenes 4.51. ἐβουλόμην δ' ἄν, ὅσπερ ὅτι ὑμῖν συμφέρεи τὰ βέλτιστ' ἀκούειν οἶδα, οὕτως εἰδέναι συνοῖσον καὶ τῷ τὰ βέλτιστ' εἰπόντι· πολλῶ γὰρ ἂν ἥδιον εἶχον. νῦν δ' ἐπ' ἀδήλοισι οὔσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων ἔμαντῶ γενησομένοις, ὅμως ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν ὑμῖν, ἂν πράξετε, ταῦτα πεπεισθαι λέγειν αἰροῦμαι. νικῶν δ' ὅ τι πᾶσιν μέλλει συνοίσειν. Demosthenes utilises the rhetoric of sincerity, and dutiful citizen. Usher 1999: 220 remarks, 'Demosthenes' advice has been uncompromising to the end, and the admirable for his nervous realisation that it could ruin him.' For more on civic courage and *parrhēsia* see discussion in Chapter 2.3 on the *Third Olynthiac* pp. 142-4.

<sup>238</sup> Demosthenes 4.45. ὅποι μὲν γὰρ ἂν, οἴμαι, μέρος τι τῆς πόλεως συναποσταλῆ, κἂν μὴ πᾶσα, καὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν εὐμενὲς καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης συναγωνίζεται· ὅποι δ' ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμνητε, οὐδὲν ὑμῖν τῶν δεόντων γίγνεται, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθναῖσι τῷ δέει τοιοῦτους ἀποστόλους.



start living up to their own expectations.<sup>239</sup> The speech has an intense tone, evident through both the frequent use of the apostrophe ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, and the use of *antilogia*, which demonstrates the urgent need for action but also, in my opinion, the need for realisation.<sup>240</sup> It was not mere scaremongering when Demosthenes asserted that ‘if we are not willing to wage war on him there we shall perhaps be compelled to do so here.’<sup>241</sup> But the speech looks to the reasons behind this, and Demosthenes clearly states that Athenian lack of action is the cause of their problems, not Philip himself. Thus, I believe that using the labels ‘anti-Macedonian’ or ‘Philippic’ to define the deliberative corpus from 351, is misleading and unhelpful. The reality, as Demosthenes presents it, is that Athens in its current state is far from its projected ideology: it is not preeminent on the seas, and is trapped in its own rhetoric. Compared to the proactive attitude he recalls from the Corinthian Wars, the current Athenians’ lack of awareness makes them disturbingly vulnerable – ‘we go around, some of us saying that Philip is working with the Spartans to ruin Thebes and is overturning constitutions, others claiming that he has sent ambassadors to the King, or that he is fortifying cities in Illyria, or just fabricating speeches on their own.’<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> I believe Demosthenes’ focus on a corrupt Assembly is often overshadowed by a predominant focus on the wider conflict with Philip, for example Karvounis 2002: 234 in his summary of the key points of the speech asserts, In der gesamten Rede, der längsten seiner bisherigen Demegorien, stellet Demosthenes drei Punkte in den Vordergrund: 1. die insuffizienten „Bemühungen“ der Athener in der Frage „Philipp“. 2. die große Gefahr, die Philipp für Athen darstellt, und 3. einen militärischen Plan, durch den die von Philipp ausgehende Bedrohung abgewehrt werden soll.’ Trans: ‘Throughout the speech ... Demosthenes asserted three key points: 1. The insufficient "efforts" of the Athenians in the "Philip" question. 2. The great danger posed by Philip to Athens, and 3. a military plan by which the danger emanating from the threat of Philip could be blocked.’ In my opinion this neglects to note the focus on the internal crisis within Athens itself, which has enabled Philip to be an issue.

<sup>240</sup> Wooten 2008: 43 notes ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι ‘like many other figures in this highly patterned speech, gives it a very intense tone.’ For linguistic analysis of rhetorical device that drive urgency, see Wooten 2008:43. In particular he remarks upon the use of apostrophe and rhetorical question and epanadiplosis ‘to indicate change of tone (§10)’, and apostrophe to ‘introduce a summary conclusion (§ 9,27,30,33,38). He also notes Lausberg’s comments on the use of *αἰτολογία*, and Dickey 1996: 196 on how apostrophes “tend to mark key points, divisions, or emotional moment in the speech.”

<sup>241</sup> Demosthenes 4.49.

<sup>242</sup> Demosthenes 4.48. ἡμῶν δ’ οἱ μὲν περιόντες μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φασὶ Φίλιππον πράττειν τὴν Θηβαίων κατάλυσιν καὶ τὰς πολιτείας διασπᾶν, οἱ δ’ ὡς πρέσβεις πέπομφεν ὡς βασιλέα, οἱ δ’ ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς πόλεις τειχίζειν, οἱ δὲ λόγους πλάττοντες ἕκαστος περιερχόμεθα.

Unfortunately for Demosthenes, the Assembly rejected his proposals.<sup>243</sup> One could deduce that perhaps the threat of Philip was not a great concern, and whilst Demosthenes does not exaggerate the crisis that faced Athens at this time, in *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* in 351, Demosthenes' concern over Persia demonstrates they were considered as much of a threat as Philip. Thus the loss of possessions listed in the *First Philippic* can be considered indicative of a general decline in Athenian foreign policy: that their internal complacency has resulted in an external decline and the loss of their influence in Greece.<sup>244</sup>

The problem, for Demosthenes, is Athens' internal incompetence that has resulted in the decline of its external affairs and the loss of Athenian influence in the North Aegean, and thus his complaint is against the *dēmos* and the Assembly. Demosthenes does not attack Philip personally because it does not serve the purpose of making the Athenians act, and arguably the speech is more concerned with removing the apathy and bad practices within Athens itself, which has caused their external problems. As MacDowell observes 'Demosthenes' task, therefore, was not to persuade the citizens that Athens was worth fighting for, but that there was a need to fight for it.'<sup>245</sup> I would extend this further and argue that, for Demosthenes, the fight for Athens begins within Athens itself. What Demosthenes presents as particularly frightening here is not Philip's actions, but rather how the Athenians do not have a grip on the situation, all resulting from their lack of initiative and lack of action, which is rooted in the corruption of the deliberative decision-making process. As such, Demosthenes' rhetoric is not driven by the crisis of Philip, but by this internal crisis that has caused their external issues. This crisis within Athens is arguably exemplified by

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<sup>243</sup> Hammond 1994: 59 argues that 'one reason was certainly that the expense was out of proportion to what could be achieved.'

<sup>244</sup> As noted above, despite Demosthenes' assertions of neglect and apathy, we cannot ignore the effect the Social War had on Athens, and Philip's own excellence.

<sup>245</sup> MacDowell 2009: 211.

their rejection of his proposals, as they perpetuate a circle of rejecting well-intentioned advice.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE *OLYNTHIACS*

The *Olynthiacs* are a set of three orations delivered around 339/8 as part of the debates discussing a call for aid from Olynthus, following Philip's invasion of Chalcidice. In this regard, the context and crisis of the *Olynthiacs* is still very much that of the *First Philippic* and the loss of Athenian influence in the north Aegean, and between 351 and 349 relations between Athens and Philip had gradually deteriorated. The continued loss of their possessions and influence in the north Aegean and Thermaic Gulf is particularly important in view of the strategic position of Olynthus upon the Chalcidic peninsular, and the opportunity it presented to Athens to act in their own interests against Philip, and perform their duty in providing aid to their allies, Olynthus.<sup>246</sup> The *kairos* of Olynthus served as an opportune moment not only to seize the initiative and demonstrate Athenian power, but also to reconsider their rejection of Demosthenes' proposals, and indeed for Demosthenes to return to his failed arguments from the *First Philippic*.

Throughout the speeches, Demosthenes continues to assert Athenian culpability for enabling Philip's increasing formidability, whilst simultaneously diminishing Philip's power as built on deception and Athenian neglect. For Demosthenes, the biggest issue facing Athens is their own self-sabotaging behaviour and thus, as he asserted in the *First Philippic*, the 'problem' of Philip is easily resolved by the Athenians acting on the situation. Indeed, the real problem is not Philip but the Assembly, and the *kairos* of Olynthus provides the Athenians with the opportunity to redeem themselves, to change their attitude and act with

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<sup>246</sup> It is important to note that fourth-century Athens could not afford to intervene as their fifth-century counterparts did in the Delian League. In the Second Athenian Confederacy, Athens swore to a non-coercive hegemony of free and willing allies in contrast to its coercive attitude to the Delian League of the fifth century, which was no longer tolerated. The contrast is epitomised by the Grain-Tax Law 374/3 of Agyrrihos which Sorg 2015: 69 argues 'sought to rebrand Athenian imperialism...[that] the turn to imperial consensus as an alternative to coercion was a necessary, rather than simply ornamental aspect of imperial policy during the Second Athenian League.'

conviction. There is also the insinuation that their failure to act on the issues in the north earlier has enabled Philip to be in a position to attack Olynthus, and thus it is their duty to contain Macedonian expansion – which they permitted to overrun Chalcidice. The purpose of these speeches is to force the Assembly to reflect on Demosthenes' *parrhēsia*, see their past errors, and act accordingly.

### Historical Context

Olynthus, as the head of the Chalcidic League, was a powerful and influential *polis* and a strategically important barrier between Philip and the rest of Greece.<sup>247</sup> Relations between Philip and Olynthus had not always been hostile, however, by 349 Olynthus was the final *polis* left on the Chalcidice peninsula that had not fallen under Macedonian control.<sup>248</sup> During this time Philip had extended Macedonian influence eastwards, creating the first Macedonian colony of Philippi.<sup>249</sup> From here Philip then extended his control across the Thermaic Gulf, not only extending his sphere of influence at Athenian expense but also significantly improving the Macedonian economy with access to the gold and silver mines of the area, which produced 1000 talents annually.<sup>250</sup> This was in stark contrast to the state of the Athenian finances.<sup>251</sup> Yet, following Philip's unexpected defeat by Onomarchus of Phocis

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<sup>247</sup> Tiverios 2008: 49 notes how Olynthus was originally settled on two hills (the southern one being Bottianian which was destroyed by the Persians in 479) and was resettled on the northern hill becoming 'a city of the Greeks of Chalcidice.' He states at 17n75 that in the first half of the fourth century, a presence of *koinon* predominated the region, under the leadership of Olynthus. For more on the fall of Olynthus see Cawkwell 1962 which assesses the soundness of Demosthenes' policy from a purely military stand point. See too Worthington 2014: 132-144; Psoma 2011: 113-136.

<sup>248</sup> In 357 Philip had sought an alliance with the Olynthians and presented them the city of Potidaea, an Athenian cleruchy, in 356. Diodorus 16.8.5.

<sup>249</sup> This was originally an answer to a call for aid from Crenides of Thrace, which turned into the strategically brilliant coup of Philippi. Diodorus 16.8.6-7. Worthington 2013: 67; Hammond and Griffith 1979 (2): 358-361; Borza 1990.

<sup>250</sup> On economic growth see Worthington 2013:67. The fall of Methone fully removed Athenian influence from the area. For the siege of Methone see Diodorus 16.31.4, 35.5-6; Justin 7.6.13-14; Worthington 2008; 2013.

<sup>251</sup> Diodorus 16.8.6; Worthington 2013:68; Montgomery 1983:9. Sinclair 1988: 46 remarks 'in the fourth century, the absence of imperial revenues which in the 430s had brought in some 600 talents each year meant that Athens was plagued by weakness in financial measures.'

in 353, Olynthus sought an alliance with the Athenians instead.<sup>252</sup> The other powers at play in the area also took advantage of Philip's defeat, with the Athenians persuading Cersebleptes of Thrace to recognise their control of the Chersonese and their claim to Amphipolis.<sup>253</sup> Moreover, in addition to breaking their treaty with Philip the Olynthians also gave residence to Philip's two brothers (incidentally rival claimants to the Macedonian throne).<sup>254</sup> This decision proved costly: following his emphatic victory over Onomarchus at the Battle of Crocus Field, Philip sought to reassert his power and demanded the surrender of his half-brothers. The Olynthians refused and Philip invaded Chalcidice in summer 349, despite their retraction of an alliance with Athens.<sup>255</sup> Thus from an Athenian standpoint, whilst there was certainly no love lost between the two states through the loss of Potidaea, it served no interest to see Olynthus fall as it would give Philip unprecedented power in the North and direct access to Greece.<sup>256</sup>

### Kairos

By the fourth century, *kairos* was generally regarded as the 'opportune' moment as opposed to *chronos* (linear time), Aristotle using *kairos* in his *Rhetoric* to discuss how friends are formed by those who have done them benefit, doing so at 'opportune times', ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, but also to describe how people are 'always looking for an opportunity'.<sup>257</sup> Moreover, with regard to Demosthenes' rhetorical use of the past discussed

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<sup>252</sup> See Diodorus 16.35.2 for Philip's defeat.

<sup>253</sup> Worthington 2013:93.

<sup>254</sup> Ellis 1973.

<sup>255</sup> Worthington 2014: 59. Gabriel 2010: 149 uses Justin 8.3.10 to support the suggestion that the presence of his two half-brothers in Olynthus caused Philip concern. See too Cawkwell 1962.

<sup>256</sup> At 1.25 Demosthenes states Olynthus is key to whether Philip can challenge Athens in Attica.

<sup>257</sup> Aristotle *Rhetoric* 2.4.5; 2.5.8 being the opportunity to seek revenge: ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν. In the *Metaphysics* 1.985b, Aristotle notes that the Pythagoreans applied mathematics to understanding the nature of things, including *opportunity* (ἔτερον δὲ καιρός), which he later questions at 1.990a 'because when they make out that Opinion and Opportunity (δόξα καὶ καιρός) are in such and such a region, and a little above or below them Injustice and Separation or Mixture...is the number which we must understand each of these abstractions to be the same number which is present in the sensible universe, or another kind of number?' and returns to again at

in this thesis, Isocrates' *Panegyricus* notes how *kairos* is crucial in understanding both the right time to speak and how to use speech: 'For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right sentiments about them in each instance...is the peculiar gift of the wise.'<sup>258</sup> But beyond understanding the opportune moment to speak, my reading of *kairos* in Demosthenes' speeches also refers to idea of a distinct moment, the moment to act.<sup>259</sup> Indeed, *kairos* is not merely a moment of chance or accident, but a moment of advantageous balance; it is not just any opportunity, but *the* opportunity.<sup>260</sup>

*Kairos* resonates throughout the *Olynthiacs*, occurring 21 times across the three speeches, arguably because Demosthenes' argument rests on asserting how the situation is a result of Athens' failure to act, and the urgent need to seize the opportunity to change their situation.<sup>261</sup> In failing to seize their earlier *kairos* moments, the Athenians failed to prevent Philip's expansion, neglected their duties and possessions, and impiously rejected the good

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13.1078b. More generally, Sipiora 2002: 5 notes that in fifth-century literature *kairos* had evolved into the "best opportunity". Observing its various meanings, Sipiora 2002: 1 notes how *kairos* was a 'fundamental notion in ancient Greece' which carried a number of meanings in classical rhetorical theory and history including but not limited to: symmetry, propriety, occasion, due measure, fitness, tact, decorum, convenience, proportion, fruit, profit and wise moderation.' Sipiora adds that Race 1981 discusses 'nearly a dozen different meanings of *kairos* in Greek drama alone.' Smith 2002: 48-9 observes the difference between *chronos* and *kairos* in terms of time and qualitative time, noting that for Aristotle at *Physics* 4.2.219b *chronos* is defined as 'the number of motion with respect to the before and after.' Thus 'time, so conceived, furnishes an essential grid upon which the processes of nature and of the historical order can be plotted and to that extend understood.'

<sup>258</sup> Isocrates *Panegyricus* 9. αἱ μὲν γὰρ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι κοινὰ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν, τὸ δ' ἐν καιρῷ ταύταις καταχρησασθαι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ ἐκάστης ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἰδίον ἐστίν.

<sup>259</sup> Frost Benedikt 2002: 227 notes that *kairos* 'begins with an effort to recognise opportunity making one sensitive to the critical character of moments that require decision. The decision concern the right moment signifies understanding concerning *this* moment as distinct from others, concerning *this* moment as the culmination of a series of events.' On the importance of *kairos* in rhetorical theory Sipiora 2002: 3 notes how '*kairos* became a truly dominant concept, particularly in its pre-Isocratean and Pre-Aristotelian influences...*kairos* was the cornerstone of rhetoric in the Golden Age of Greece.' For more on rhetorical theory and *kairos* see Rostagni 2002; Kinneavy 2002.

<sup>260</sup> Such as the steersman in Plato's *Laws* 709b knows how to recognise and use the best opportunity to his advantage. Frost Benedikt 2002: 229 notes that Plato 'distinguishes *kairos* from chance and argued that, by developing karic skill for recognising one opportunity as more significant than another, people become less subject to chance alone.'

<sup>261</sup> References to *kairos*: 1.2, 1.4, 1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 1.20, 1.24.2, 1.24.6, 1.24.9, 2.2, 2.4, 2.8, 2.23, 2.30, 3.3, 3.5.6, 3.5.8, 3.6, 3.7, 3.16, 3.35. This builds on references in the *First Philippic*: 4.12, 4.19, 4.33, 4.35, 4.37.4, 4.37.7.

favour of Fortune. Moreover, taking *kairos* as an opportune moment that may not recur, Demosthenes underlines his argument that action is required immediately before the opportunity is lost and events take away their autonomy to act.<sup>262</sup> For Demosthenes, to ignore the *kairos* of Olynthus would end their chances of ever regaining their presence in the north Aegean and would inflict irrevocable damage to Athens' reputation.<sup>263</sup>

### On the Speeches

Following the *Philippics*, the *Olynthiacs* are arguably the most frequently discussed of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches, however, I believe it is imperative that they are read *with* the *Philippics* (and *after* Demosthenes 4) as they are fundamental to the development of Demosthenes' arguments in the later speeches.<sup>264</sup> In particular, I argue that for Demosthenes these three speeches come to represent the danger of the Assembly's attitude towards *parrhēsia*, its rejection of good advice, and the neglect of their civic duty.<sup>265</sup>

It is important to note that Demosthenes did not envisage three *Olynthiacs* or indeed a series of *Philippics*, in the manner that Cicero systematically attacks Mark Antony, but rather each speech is an on-the-spot reaction to events and develops as events unfold. For Demosthenes, the problems facing Athens are still those he highlighted in the *First Philippic*, and thus the *Olynthiacs* reinforce his arguments of 351.<sup>266</sup> Therefore, while MacDowell notes that the *Olynthiacs* only concentrate on 'general arguments', instead of the specific proposals in the *First Philippic*, I propose that the need for specifics are unnecessary as the

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<sup>262</sup> Frost Benedikt 2002: 226 notes how *kairos* 'makes opportunities that might not recur, moments of decision.'

<sup>263</sup> This too is reflected in the lack of references to *kairos* following the Peace of Philocrates, compared to the 27 references to *kairos* in its forms in the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs*, it only occurs 7 times in the post-peace speeches: 5.13; 6.18; 8.34; 8.42; 8.60; 9.13; 9.38.

<sup>264</sup> Thus to focus only on Demosthenes' *Philippic* speeches (4,6, 9, 10, 11) misses crucial developments in the argument. Hernández-Muñoz 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015 has been working new critical editions of the *Philippics 1-4* and as of 2015 published a critical edition the *First Olynthiac* (2015b). Even though it takes them out of the chronological context, the decision to now include the *Olynthiacs* into the project is most encouraging.

<sup>265</sup> A more detailed discussion of *parrhēsia* will be discussed Chapter 2.3 when Demosthenes returns to address the Theoric fund, as this is arguably the most dangerous of his suggestions and epitomises the risks involved with *parrhēsia*.

<sup>266</sup> This is why I believe it is imperative to approach them in chronological order.



*Olynthiacs* are built upon his earlier proposals and must be analysed with that speech in mind.<sup>267</sup>

The three speeches are generally discussed as a unit and treated thematically. Both MacDowell (M) and Worthington (W) summarise the *Olynthiacs* in terms of four main themes:

- 1) M: the situation at Olynthus/W: the situation at Olynthus.
- 2) M: the character of Philip and the easiness of defeating him/W: Philip's character and the Athenians' ability to defeat him.
- 3) M: the provision of money to pay for the expedition/ W: funding for military assistance.
- 4) M: the need for the Athenians to overcome their dilatoriness and disorganisation/ W: the need for the Athenians to pull themselves together and fight.<sup>268</sup>

While I agree that the speeches do correspond to this thematic breakdown, my analysis examines the sequential development of Demosthenes' arguments, demonstrating the progression of his arguments from the *First Philippic* against the Assembly. In particular I aim to emphasise the continuity of Demosthenes' call for the Assembly to shake off its apathy – to act in person; to fund their military activities; to demonstrate the conviction of their words with action – and his use of Philip/ the Athenian past as a means to shame and praise the Assembly and provoke a reaction.

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<sup>267</sup> MacDowell 2009: 230.

<sup>268</sup> MacDowell 2009: 230; Worthington 2014: 133. On treating the speeches as a unit Blass 1983 309. Worthington 2013: 134 n 20 lists Schaefer 1886: 126-152; Blass 1877: 268-81; Pickard-Cambridge 1914: 193, 227; Jaeger 1938: 127-144; Pearson 1976: 120-121, 127-135; Carlier 1990: 121-126; Sealey 1993: 137-143; Usher 1999: 220-226; Lehmann 2004 111-119; MacDowell 2009: 229-239; Tuplin 1998: 276-320; Yunis 1996: 257-268; Wooten 1983. Latest treatment is evident in Brun 2015.

## Dates and Order

The dates and ordering of the *Olynthiacs* are still a matter under debate. It is generally agreed that we can date them to 349/8, whether that is relying on Dionysius *To Ammaeus* or deducing this via historical events such as the Euboean expedition of that winter.<sup>269</sup> In contrast, the ordering of the speeches is still a point of contention. In antiquity Dionysius orders the speeches 3-2-1, which is largely rejected on the grounds that the third shows an increased sense of urgency and boldness with regard to the Theoric fund.<sup>270</sup> Consensus places the *Third Olynthiac* as third, but the ordering of the first two is still unsettled. The traditional order follows Libanius' *Hypotheses* to the speeches which orders them 1-2-3. My analysis follows this order, as does Worthington who approaches speeches 1 and 2 together and then moves to the third after an explanation of the wider historical context. MacDowell likewise maintains an order of 1-2-3 stating that 'there is no compelling reason to regard the traditional sequence as incorrect', and Usher argues that the vociferation of *kairos* at 1.2 links the *First Olynthiac* to the *First Philippic*.<sup>271</sup>

Alternatively, others advocate an order of 2-1-3, based on references to the Theoric fund in 1 and 3, and to Philip's relations with Thessaly.<sup>272</sup> Ellis and Milns reason that, 'the II-I-III order allows for the increasing urgency of the situation...through the orator's increasing willingness to risk unpopularity by suggesting reform of the laws' and that 'there can be little

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<sup>269</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *To Ammaeus* 1.4. Cawkwell 1962 notes that 'since we lack the means to test the accuracy of Dionysius' dates for Demosthenes there will always be the temptation to reject them as worthless.' Conversely Lane-Fox 1997: 197 rejects the use of Dionysius' arguments, but comes to the same date by Euboea, 'Olynthiac 3, the last of the trio, is agreed to belong in 349/8, perhaps early 348 but certainly not before the Euboean crisis of spring 348'. MacDowell 2009: 238; Worthington 2014:133 uses both reasons.

<sup>270</sup> Worthington 2013: 133 n13 detects a 'rising boldness' in the *Third Olynthiac*. Trevett 2011: 30 comes to the same conclusion because 'its tone is markedly more pessimistic'.

<sup>271</sup> MacDowell 2009: 238. Usher 1999: 221. Usher argues this adds 'a further reason to those summarised by Vince (Loeb 1.203) for believing the traditional order of the *Olynthiacs* to be correct.' Usher 1999: 221 n 177.

<sup>272</sup> 2-1-3: Ellis and Milns 1970: 36-37; Ellis 1966: 297-301; Lane-Fox 1997:197.

doubt, unless the text is to be distorted, that this order II.11 followed by I.22 – is the natural one.<sup>273</sup>

Tuplin, however, rejects Ellis and Milns' argument as 'worthless and...is only more seductive on the assumption that information about foreign events is always accurate and that things always get worse'.<sup>274</sup> As Worthington notes, 'absolute certainty is impossible', and MacDowell offers a compromise between the two standpoints by suggesting that they may not have all been delivered due to constraints, but were prepared by Demosthenes 'in the hope of getting opportunities to deliver them'.<sup>275</sup>

From my own 1-2-3 preference, I argue that the lack of reference to the Theoric fund in the *Second Olynthiac* does not determine that it must have been first in the order.<sup>276</sup>

Demosthenes may have chosen to take a different direction with the second speech, given the lack of success in the first, and the unpopularity and risks involved with threatening the Theoric fund. His return to the Theoric fund in the *Third Olynthiac* could possibly be read as a return to his original convictions, which had only been strengthened by unfolding events.

Indeed, Tuplin makes an interesting suggestion that:

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<sup>273</sup> Developing from Ellis 1967: 110-11; Ellis and Milns 1970: 37-38. This is with specific reference to the Theoric fund mentioned at 1.19, and then at 3.10-13. They also argue that the change in the Thessalian situation determines II-I-III: ...[2.11] makes it apparent that the Thessalians have just voted to demand back Pagasae, and to discuss the question of Philip's continuing occupation of Magnesia, whereas in 1.22, it is stated that (a) 'they have voted to demand Pagasae back from him' and (b) 'have stopped him fortifying Magnesia' and further, be it at this stage only a rumour, (c) will 'no longer grant him the enjoyment of the revenues of their harbours and markets.'

<sup>274</sup> Tuplin 1998: 278. On the basis that Ellis's argument depends on the  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  in 2.11, and a 'more extreme picture in I than II' with regard to Thessaly's rejection of Philip.

<sup>275</sup> Worthington 2014:133; MacDowell 2009: 238. With regard to the delivery of these speeches, as discussed in the introduction, I regard the texts as reflecting what was delivered by Demosthenes on the day.

<sup>276</sup> Indeed, Karvounis 2002: 230-1 argues at the other end of the spectrum, that repetition denoted success: that the repeated arguments (not necessarily just on *theōrika*) in the *Second Olynthiac*, pointed out that it had impressed particularly in the Assembly (Die Tatsache, daß Demosthenes weder in der II noch in der II Olynthischen Rede dieses Argument wiederholt, weist darauf hin, daß es die in der Ekklesia Versammelten besonderes beeindruckt hatte.) However, I do not agree with this as Demosthenes' great complaint is at the hostility of the Assembly and their lack of *eunoia*.

the whole point is that the three speeches can – so far as definable external circumstances are concerned – be exactly contemporary and afford an example of the same situation being rhetorically addressed three times and in three different ways.’<sup>277</sup>

I take this even further in my analysis and maintain that each of these speeches emphasises specific arguments from the *First Philippic*, and that the speeches become reflections, reaffirmations and developments of his original argument that the problem facing Athens is, first and foremost, an internal one. In this regard I go beyond Karvounis who links the *First Philippic* and the *First Olynthiac* only in so far as they both refer to the danger and weaknesses of Philip.<sup>278</sup>

By removing the ‘Philippic’ lens, my analysis observes the *internal* crisis within Athens as the ἀρχή of the Macedonian Question; consequently, I propose a link between the two speech from the standpoint of Demosthenes’ arguments *against* the Assembly’s current attitudes. As such, I argue that, for Demosthenes, the situation at Olynthus is exactly what he forewarned in the *First Philippic* if the Assembly failed to shake off its apathy. In the *Olynthiacs*, as the Assembly continues to ignore his advice, Demosthenes repeatedly attempts to make the Athenians snap out of their apathy and act in manner that is worthy of the city and their ancestors. In practice this involves *performing* their duties, recognising *parrhēsia* and acting upon it, thus bridging the gap between *logos* and *ergon* which has rendered them ineffective to date.

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<sup>277</sup> Tuplin 1998: 280.

<sup>278</sup> Karvounis 2002: 31.

## CHAPTER 2.1 THE *FIRST OLYNTHIAC*

### Proemium and Narrative 1.1-13

The proemium and narrative focuses on the *kairos* that Olynthus presents, and the need for the Assembly to listen to the correct advice: to recognise what is in their best interests and act upon it.<sup>279</sup> Demosthenes begins by establishing not just the purpose of *this* speech, but defines the purpose of speech as that which is most beneficial to the *polis*:

You would, I expect, men of Athens, accept it as the equivalent of a large amount of money, if it could be made clear to you what will prove our best policy in the matters now under discussion.<sup>280</sup>

This is achieved through listening to good advice, which first requires recognising good advice, and the intentions of the speaker. However, as Demosthenes insinuates at the end of the *First Philippic*, the Assembly is hostile to receiving unwelcome advice. This unwillingness to give a fair hearing to good advice has contributed significantly to their current problems:

Since this is the case, you should listen attentively to those who wish to offer you advice. If a speaker comes forward with a useful proposal already prepared, you should listen to his advice and accept it. In addition I regard it as a sign of your good fortune that it may occur to some speakers to say much that is needed on the spur of the moment, so that from all that is said you will easily be able to choose what is to your advantage.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> As noted above, I define *kairos* as more than just a moment or time (*chronos*) but as the opportune moment to act, a golden moment. Sipiora 2002: 5 notes that ‘in fifth-century literature, *kairos* evolves to represent “the best opportunity”.’ Demosthenes’ *kairos* generates the urgency to act in a particular way at a particular time to make the best use of a situation.

<sup>280</sup> Demosthenes 1.1. ἀντι πολλῶν ἄν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρημάτων ὑμᾶς ἐλέσθαι νομίζω, εἰ φανερόν γένοιτο τὸ μέλλον συνοίσειν τῇ πόλει περὶ ὧν νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε.

<sup>281</sup> Demosthenes 1.1. ὅτε τοίνυν τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, προσήκει προθύμως ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν βουλομένων συμβουλευεῖν: οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἐσκεμμένος ἦκει τις, τοῦτ’ ἂν ἀκούσαντες λάβοιτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς

Whilst this can be considered standard proem material about heeding good advice, the key point here is that Demosthenes' argument centres on confronting an Assembly that rejects advice. It also suggests that the issues Demosthenes described in the *First Philippic* have not been addressed and his call for them to listen to useful advice, and accept it, implies that they still do not progress beyond deliberation.

Accordingly, Demosthenes defines his own speech as being precisely that which 'will benefit the city', and stresses the urgency of the situation at Olynthus by making the *kairos* take voice and shout out to the Athenians to seize it and act in their own interests:

The present situation (*parōn kairos*), men of Athens, all but takes voice and says that you must take control of the Olynthians' affairs, if indeed you are concerned about their preservation – though I find it difficult to describe our attitude towards them.<sup>282</sup>

Or, indeed, about their own preservation. Demosthenes presents a powerful image in his use of prosopopoeia on the *kairos*, which directly calls on the Assembly to listen, and that only the situation itself can articulate their current situation.<sup>283</sup> Demosthenes proclaims his argument at their selective hearing by making the Pnyx resound with the immediacy of the *kairos*, which is all the more persuasive as it is 'placed immediately after remarks upon the

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ὕμετέρας τύχης ὑπολαμβάνω πολλὰ τῶν δεόντων ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμ' ἐνίοις ἂν ἐπελθεῖν εἰπεῖν, ὅστ' ἐξ ἀπάντων ῥαδίαν τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν αἶρεσιν γενέσθαι. Vince's translation goes so far as to say that 'you are bound to give an eager hearing to all how offer advice' On the logic behind the wisdom of mass-deliberation Ober 1989: 163 notes that 'faith was grounded in the assumption that the collective wisdom of a large group was inherently greater than the wisdom of any of its parts. This conviction is one of the central egalitarian tenets of Athenian political ideology.'

<sup>282</sup> Demosthenes 1.2. ὁ μὲν οὖν παρῶν καιρός, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφίεις ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῖν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε· ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι δοκοῦμεν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς αὐτά. His use of *kairos* correlates with how '*kairos* has an ontological "physical and metaphysical" dimension of its own,' Frost Benedikt 2002: 227; Smith 1986: 5. Tuplin 1998: 283 notes that this image is 'ambiguous between metaphor and simile'. Usher 2004: 58 states this is reminiscent of Lysippus' statue of the divine *kairos*. Sandys 1924: 127 observes similar personification in Sophocles *Elektra* 75; Plato *Protagoras* 361a; Thucydides 2.43.2.

<sup>283</sup> As Smith 2011: 12 notes, 'προσοποποιία, "the putting of speeches into the mouths [faces] of characters"... is the ancient term nearest in meaning to personification.' Quintilian remarks upon Demosthenes' use of prosopopoeia here in his *Orators' Education* 12.10.24. Stafford 1998: 24 observes that Demosthenes' *kairos* was cited in discussions by Alexander Rhetor in *De Figuris* (Spengel III, 19.14-20), and in Apsines of Gadara's *Ars Rhetorica*. Stafford 1998: 24 notes that the 'most extensive analysis of the term comes in Aelius Theon's *Progymnasmata*, ed. Spengel, *Rhet. Graec.* II, 115.11-28.' Dilts and Kennedy 1997: 197 notes that Apsines definition 'regards prosopopoeia as primarily the personification of an abstraction.'

necessity of listening to all possible speakers.<sup>284</sup> To this end, Demosthenes proposes immediate responsive action:

In my opinion, you should vote for an immediate relief force, and make preparations as quickly as possible to send help from here, to avoid suffering a recurrence of what happened previously, and should send an embassy to announce these decisions and observe what is happening.<sup>285</sup>

### Narrative

As in the *First Philippic*, the narrative turns to address the situation of Philip and Olynthus, but in a manner that calls the Athenians to see the situation (via Demosthenes' lens) for what it 'really' is: that Philip's perceived power is a product of Athens' failure to act, and thus swift *Athenian* action will correct this. Demosthenes then moves to focus on the growing reputation of Athens as a city that, unlike Macedonia, consistently fails to seize its *kairos*. Demosthenes makes it clear that they cannot afford to maintain these attitudes now that the situation has developed essentially into a fight between freedom and tyranny.

Demosthenes maintains that, as in the *First Philippic*, the situation has occurred because Philip has exploited their shortcomings:

My particular fear is that, since he is a rogue and a clever manipulator of events, sometimes making concessions, whenever it is in his interests, sometimes making threats, which might reasonably be regarded as credible, sometimes slandering us

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<sup>284</sup> Tuplin 1998: 283. He continues, 'for it is clearly to the assembly speakers (perhaps especially those who speak ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα) that καιρός is being assimilated.'

<sup>285</sup> Demosthenes 1.2. ἔστι δὴ τά γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ψηφίσασθαι μὲν ἤδη τὴν βοήθειαν, καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι τὴν ταχίστην ὅπως ἐνθένδε βοηθήσετε (καὶ μὴ πάθῃτε ταῦτόν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον), πρεσβεΐαν δὲ πέμπειν, ἥτις ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ καὶ παρέσται τοῖς πράγμασιν·

I disagree the assertions of Karvounis 2002: 316-7 that despite this statement on a lack of consensus, it can be assumed with reasonable certainty ('obwohl man mit ziemlicher Sicherheit davon ausgehen kann') that he and the majority of those assembled were mostly there to agree to send an auxiliary corps to Olynthians. He continues that one should not imagine that Demosthenes was talking to an audience that did not intend to help the Chalcidians, 'an sollte sich also nicht vorstellen, daß Demosthenes etwa vor einem Publikum redete, das gar nicht daran dachte, den Chalkidiern zu helfen', as this again is just conjecture. I am dubious, as they did not listen to the proposals in the *First Philippic*.

and our failure to intervene, he may turn around and snatch some advantage from this whole situation.<sup>286</sup>

But from this negative observation that Philip has exploited their ‘failure to intervene’, Demosthenes presents a paradox (like in the *First Philippic*), and turns the worst aspect of the situation to their advantage:

However, men of Athens, one might say that the hardest thing about Philip to fight against is the best for you: that he, as an individual, controls everything, both what is public and what is secret, and is simultaneously general and ruler and paymaster, and is present everywhere with his army.<sup>287</sup>

Effectively, the benefits of Philip’s autocratic decision-making have clearly had an impact when compared to the Athenians who paralyse their own decision-making process by empty rhetoric that never amounts to action. But, Demosthenes turns the apparent benefit of Philip’s control into a weakness: it has revealed Philip’s tyrannical nature and, by their past actions, the Athenians *should* know how to act against such tyrants. Demosthenes states that events have now enlightened the Chalcidians:

For the Olynthians now see clearly that they are fighting not for glory over the division of land but to prevent the destruction and enslavement of their country.<sup>288</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> Demosthenes 1.3. ὡς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος, μὴ πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος πράγμασι χρῆσθαι, τὰ μὲν εἰκὼν, ἡνίκ’ ἂν τύχη, τὰ δ’ ἀπειλῶν (ἀξιόπιστος δ’ ἂν εἰκότως φαίνοιτο), τὰ δ’ ἡμᾶς διαβάλλον καὶ τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, τὰ δ’ ἡμᾶς διαβάλλον καὶ τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, τρέψηται καὶ παρασπάσηται τὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων.

<sup>287</sup> Demosthenes 1.4. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπεικῶς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ’ ὁ δυσμαχώτατόν ἐστι τῶν Φιλίππου πραγμάτων, καὶ βέλτιστον ὑμῖν· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκείνον ἐν’ ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτων καὶ ἅμα στρατηγὸν καὶ δεσπότην καὶ ταμίαν, καὶ πανταχοῦ αὐτὸν παρεῖναι τῷ στρατεύματι. Sandys 1924: 129 notes ἐπεικῶς modifies the force of βέλτιστον in the paradox. Sandys remarks that ‘after alarming the people by showing the strength of their adversaries, the orator turns off skilfully to a topic of encouragement.’ This, I view as Demosthenes’ method of praise and blame.

<sup>288</sup> Demosthenes 1.5. δῆλον γάρ ἐστι τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις ὅτι νῦν οὐ περὶ δόξης οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ μέρους χώρας πολεμοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος. Sandys 1924: 130 notes that δῆλον- ὅτι is an iambic trimeter. He argues they are hardly exceptions to Aristotle’s rule in *Rhetoric* 3.8.3. I think it could be adding tragic connotations to his account of the Olynthians.



Despite their earlier beliefs, the Olynthians have learnt through first-hand observation what the outcome of the situation will be, and this too echoes Demosthenes' complaint in the *First Philippic* of the damage caused by basing decisions on second-hand information, which results in a misunderstanding of the situation and erroneous decision-making. Seeing the reality of Philip's expansion from the Olynthians' perspective, Demosthenes asserts that the issue of their lack of action has developed beyond Philip merely becoming powerful enough to threaten Athenian interests, but into a fundamental dichotomy of freedom versus tyranny:

They know how he treated those Amphipolitans who handed their city to him, and those Pydnans who let him into their city. Free states, I believe, have no trust in tyranny, especially if they share a common border with it.<sup>289</sup>

Demosthenes' dichotomy works on several levels: democracy versus tyranny; willing allies versus coerced subjects; freedom versus slavery. This works to Athens' advantage, as a show of Athenian strength could sway their former allies to return to them; as Demosthenes argues at the end of the speech: 'it must be supposed that the Paeonians and the Illyrians and, in general, all these people would rather be free and autonomous than slaves.'<sup>290</sup> Again, this demonstrates that Philip's power is not as secure as some perceive ('On which account, it often seems more difficult to preserve one's wealth than it was to acquire it') but also adds a sense of shame if the Athenians fail to fulfil their traditional duty to protect the Greeks against tyrants.<sup>291</sup>

In making these observations, Demosthenes appears to emulate Thucydides' Pericles in reminding the Assembly of the careful and rational process they ought to adopt in their

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<sup>289</sup> Demosthenes 1.6 ἴσασιν ἅ τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς παραδόντας αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν καὶ Πυδναίων τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους· καὶ ὅλως ἄπιστον, οἶμαι, ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τυραννίς, ἄλλως τε κἂν ὄμορον χώραν ἔχωσι.

<sup>290</sup> Demosthenes 1.23. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Παίονα καὶ τὸν Ἰλλυριὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς τούτους ἅπαντας ἠγεῖσθαι χρὴ αὐτονόμους ἢ διὸν ἂν καὶ ἐλευθέρους ἢ δούλους εἶναι.

<sup>291</sup> Demosthenes 1.23. διόπερ πολλάκις δοκεῖ τὸ φυλάξαι τὰ γαθὰ τοῦ κτήσασθαι χαλεπώτερον εἶναι. Similar attitudes towards shame and duty can be seen in Hyperides 4.33-4, 6.5.

decision-making.<sup>292</sup> Indeed, for Demosthenes, their failure act efficiently and prevent the loss of their possessions has created an environment for threats such as Philip to develop. In recognising the damage done to the Amphipolitans and Pydnans, which can arguably be viewed as extensions of Athens, Demosthenes calls the Athenians to change their attitudes and respond to Olynthus' call for aid:

And so, men of Athens, if you acknowledge these facts and keep in mind everything else that you should, I urge you to be resolute and aroused to action and to apply yourselves to the war as never before, willingly contributing money and going on campaign in person and neglecting nothing. For there is no excuse left for you to refuse to do what is needed.<sup>293</sup>

Demosthenes not only implies that they still avoid action, but stresses that the *kairos* of Olynthus presents the Athenians with a second chance, and legitimate excuse to act in their own interests in the North and right the balance of power that they enabled Philip to disrupt:

Now what everyone was chattering about recently – that we must induce the Olynthians to go to war with Philip – has come about of its own accord and in a way that may prove most advantageous to you. For if they had been persuaded by you to go to war, they would be unreliable allies and might only partially acknowledge that they were at war; but since they hate him on account of their own grievances, their

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<sup>292</sup> Herman 2006: 143 notes that Demosthenes 1.4-5 'reveals an impeccable reasoning process, essentially the one so memorably embodied in Pericles' Funeral Oration (Thucydides 2.40.2-3.) Whilst Herman argues Demosthenes 'presupposes that the members of the audience will weigh every circumstance carefully and observe motivations and opportunities without prejudice, rather than acting on impulse...that they will search for the facts, rather than seizing upon whatever strikes them first.' I maintain that Demosthenes makes this allusion to emphasise that the Assembly does *not* act in this manner, which is why they suffer misfortunes in their foreign and domestic affairs.

<sup>293</sup> Demosthenes 1.6. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγνωκότας ὑμᾶς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τᾶλλ' ἃ προσήκει πάντ' ἐνθυμουμένους φημί δεῖν ἐθελῆσαι καὶ παροξυνθῆναι καὶ τῷ πολέμῳ προσέχειν εἴπερ ποτὲ καὶ νῦν, χρήματ' εἰσφέροντας προθύμως καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐξιόντας καὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείποντας. οὐδὲ γὰρ λόγος οὐδὲ σκῆψις ἔθ' ὑμῖν τοῦ μὴ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἐθέλειν ὑπολείπεται. Sandys 1924: 132 remarks on the contrast between λόγος and σκῆψις.

hatred of him will probably be assured because of what they fear and of what they have suffered.<sup>294</sup>

The advantageous nature of the *kairos* may be emphasised by a subtle reference to Thucydides when the Sicilians remarked negatively on how the Athenians, ‘stir up war by the offer of alliance’.<sup>295</sup> This current *kairos* has brought war about without the Athenians reverting to the behaviour that led to the Sicilian Expedition. Demosthenes’ complaint, however, is that they fail to recognise the *kairos* because they refuse to acknowledge his advice. This is essentially a repetition of his call for funded Athenian forces in the *First Philippic*. The necessity to act has only intensified through their lack of action, as in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes reproached the Assembly for consistently failing to seize upon any opportunity to rectify the situation in the North and the correlating increased power of Philip through their own allies.<sup>296</sup>

The purpose of the *First Olynthiac*, in my opinion, is to make the Athenians realise that this current *kairos* gives them the chance to rectify their past errors. Indeed, Demosthenes directly asserts this: ‘You must not pass up such an opportunity, men of Athens, when it has fallen into your lap, nor suffer the same fate as you have suffered many times already.’<sup>297</sup> As such, there is no excuse to not seize this *kairos*, and thus the rejection of

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<sup>294</sup> Demosthenes 1.7. νυνὶ γάρ, ὃ πάντες ἐθρύλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους ἐκπολεμῶσαι δεῖν Φιλίππῳ, γέγονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ’ ὡς ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ταῦτ’ ἂν ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἴσως· ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐκ τῶν μέχρι τοῦ ταῦτ’ ἂν ἐγνωκότες ἦσαν ἴσως· ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐγκλημάτων μισοῦσι, βεβαίαν εἰκὸς τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτοῦς ὑπὲρ ὧν φοβοῦνται καὶ πεπόνθασιν ἔχειν. Sandys 1924: 132 notes use of ἐκπολεμῶσαι at Thucydides 6.77.2. I propose Demosthenes may have used this reference to make a deliberate parallel.

<sup>295</sup> Thucydides 6.77.2.

<sup>296</sup> Demosthenes 4.37.

<sup>297</sup> Demosthenes 1.8 οὐ δεῖ δὴ τοιοῦτον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παραπεπτωκότα καιρὸν ἀφεῖναι, οὐδὲ παθεῖν ταῦτον ὅπερ ἤδη πολλάκις πρότερον πεπόνθατε. Sandys 1924: 133 compares this to Thucydides 4.23.3: σκοποῦντες καιρὸν εἴ τις παραπέσει ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας σῶσαι, when the Peloponnesians were watching for any opportunity that might present itself of rescuing their men.

Demosthenes proposals equates to deliberately choosing to ignore the lessons of recent events.<sup>298</sup>

From this point Demosthenes returns to his method of balancing rebukes and hopes from the *First Philippic*, and weaves his criticism of squandered opportunities, and the consequences, with the new opportunity to change this. Having established they have been handed a golden opportunity, and implored them not ‘to suffer the same fate’ by either not acting, or acting upon the wrong advice, Demosthenes presents further examples of how their attitudes have exacerbated the situation. Recalling Amphipolis’ call for aid when, ‘the Amphipolitans Hierax and Stratocles were here on this very platform urging us to sail and take possession of their city’<sup>299</sup>, Demosthenes suggests that if the Athenians had ‘shown the same concern for our interests as we had for the security of the Euboeans, we would have held on to Amphipolis then and would have avoided all our subsequent troubles.’<sup>300</sup> For Demosthenes, the Athenians should have been interested in their own interests in the North instead of prioritising the expedition to Euboea that (retrospectively) proved costly. Moreover, in indicating that the ambassadors spoke on the *bēma*, ‘Demosthenes underlines his point that the response to the Amphipolitan ambassadors was inadequate. A better response is to be made this time...to prevent Philip from conquering the place [Olynthus].’<sup>301</sup> While Demosthenes will claim in *On the Peace* that he had advised against intervening in

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<sup>298</sup> Ober 1989: 316 notes, ‘one important function the orator fulfilled was to protect the masses – the term *prostates tou dēμου*, “he who stands before the people,” meant not only one who stood first in the eyes of people but who physically stood before the people in order to address them, but one who interposes himself between the people and dangers that threatened them.’

<sup>299</sup> Demosthenes 1.8. ...παρήσαν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν Ἰέραξ καὶ Στρατοκλιῆς ἐπὶ τουτὶ τὸ βῆμα, κελεύοντες ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν.

<sup>300</sup> Demosthenes 1.8 (εἰ γάρ...) τὴν αὐτὴν παρειχόμεθ’ ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν ἤνπερ ὑπὲρ τῆς Εὐβοέων σωτηρίας, εἶχετ’ ἂν Ἀμφίπολιν τότε καὶ πάντων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἂν ἦτ’ ἀπηλλαγμένοι πραγμάτων. Sandys 1924: 134 notes the decree attesting to Hierax and Stratocles is still extant: *CIH* n. 2008.

<sup>301</sup> De Bakker 2012: 398. The *bēma* was viewed as an official place of solemnity. See earlier references to the *bēma* at 4.1, 4.45 and 6.30 on the *bēma* and their misuse of it.

Euboea, here he already stresses the value of his advice, and how ignoring him has exacerbated their current problems:

Again, when it was announced that Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and the other places – I do not wish to waste time talking about them individually<sup>302</sup> - were being besieged, if we had energetically dispatched an appropriate relief force to the first of these, we would now be dealing with a more tractable and much weaker Philip.<sup>303</sup>

Demosthenes reiterates his previous argument that Athens created its own enemy by not acting, thus enabling Philip's power and influence to grow. It is therefore the Athenians, not Philip, who are responsible, and specifically their current attitudes:

But as things are, men of Athens, we always abandon any opportunity that presents itself through the hope that the future will turn well of its own accord and as a result we have made Philip stronger and more powerful than any previous king of Macedonia.<sup>304</sup>

It is this throw-away attitude that has made the situation at Olynthus possible, and the Philip of today is the product of Athens' consistent failure to address their apathetic attitude.<sup>305</sup>

However, this damning assessment of their consistent failure and detrimental practices is immediately mitigated by the hope of the current *kairos*, 'but now indeed in the case of Olynthus, as great an opportunity has come to us of its own accord as any of those previous

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<sup>302</sup> This paralipic phrase presents these places, both as a mass of Athenian failures, but also to stress the urgency of the situation. This also highlights the significance of the loss of Amphipolis, which proved a turning point both for the deterioration of Athenian interests in the North and the rise of Philip's position.

<sup>303</sup> Demosthenes 1.9. και πάλιν ἡνίκα Πύδνα, Ποτειδαία, Μεθώνη, Παγασαί, τᾶλλα, ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἕκαστα λέγων διατρίβω, πολιορκούμεν' ἀπηγγέλλετο, εἰ τότε τούτων ἐνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμῳ καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοῖ, ῥάονι καὶ πολὺ ταπεινότερῳ νῦν ἂν ἐχρώμεθα τῷ Φιλίππῳ. Clarke 2008: 252 notes that the failure at Euboea 'is part of a list of fourth-century examples – Pydna (357), Potidaea (356), Methone (354) and Pagasae (352) – designed to demonstrate that quick action in the past might have averted trouble with Philip now.' One could compare this to Demosthenes 5.5.

<sup>304</sup> Demosthenes 1.9. νῦν δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὸν αἰεὶ προϊέμενοι, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντ' αὐτόματ' οἴομενοι σχήσειν καλῶς, ἠὺξήσαμεν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φίλιππον ἡμεῖς καὶ κατεστήσαμεν τηλικούτον ἡλικὸς οὐδεὶς πῶ βασιλεὺς γέγονεν Μακεδονίας. This can be compared to Demosthenes 3.9 where he repeats this sentiment: 'For I imagine we are all well aware that this is how things will turn out, if we discard the present opportunity.'

<sup>305</sup> Sandys 1924: 135 notes προϊέμενοι 'neglecting', is a favourite word with Demosthenes.

ones.<sup>306</sup> As Philip is a problem of their own making, it is within the power of the Athenians to rectify the situation in this *kairic* window of opportunity. Moreover, this *kairos* could be taken as a sign of divine support, undeserving as they are:

And it seems to me at any rate, men of Athens, that if someone were appointed to give a fair appraisal of your treatment at the hands of the gods, although many things are not as they should be, he would nevertheless be very grateful to them, and with good reason. For the fact that we have suffered many reverses in the war might rightly be attributed to our carelessness, whereas the fact that we did not suffer these reverses long ago, and that to counterbalance them an alliance has been presented to us, if we are willing to take advantage of it, I would regard it as a beneficial result of their goodwill.<sup>307</sup>

It is imperative for the Assembly to recognise that Athenian complacency and apathy, as asserted in the *First Philippic*, is at the centre of their problems, and that ‘in public affairs, those who misuse their opportunities forget what benefit they have received from the gods.’<sup>308</sup> The importance of seizing this *kairos* is emphasised further by the alternative scenario:

But if we also abandon these men, men of Athens, and he then captures Olynthus, will someone tell me what is to prevent him marching wherever he wishes? Does any of you observe or reflect on the means by which Philip, who was weak, has become

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<sup>306</sup> Demosthenes 1.9. νυνὶ δὴ καιρὸς ἤκει τις, οὗτος ὁ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων, αὐτόματος τῇ πόλει, ὃς οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐλάττων τῶν προτέρων ἐκείνων.

<sup>307</sup> Demosthenes 1.10. καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τις ἂν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δίκαιος λογιστὴς τῶν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν ὑπηργμένων καταστάς, καίπερ οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡς δεῖ πολλῶν, ὅμως μεγάλην ἂν ἔχειν αὐτοῖς χάριν, εἰκότως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πόλλ’ ἀπολωλεκέναι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀμελείας ἂν τις θεῖη δικάως, τὸ δὲ μήτε πάλαι τοῦτο πεπονθέναι πεφηνέναι τέ τιν’ ἡμῖν συμμαχίαν τούτων ἀντίρροπον, ἂν βουλώμεθα χρῆσθαι, τῆς παρ’ ἐκείνων εὐνοίας εὐεργέτημ’ ἂν ἔγωγε θείην. This returns to the motif in the *First Philippic*, that they are currently acting in a manner inferior to their ancestors, who did do their duty.

<sup>308</sup> Demosthenes 1.11.

strong? First, he took Amphipolis, then Pydna, and then Potidaea, next Methone, and then he attacked Thessaly, and after that, Pherae, Pagasae, and Magnesia.<sup>309</sup>

By reminding the Athenians of what they have already lost (squandered even) to Philip, Demosthenes leaves them to deduce the inevitable consequences of doing nothing. Moreover, this returns to his previous argument that Philip is powerful through taking Athenian allies, and this *kairos* presents the Athenians with the opportunity to ‘wipe away the dishonour of your past conduct’.<sup>310</sup> In observing the nature of *kairic* time as marking an opportunity that ‘might not recur’, *kairos* emphasises the urgency to act, but to do so they must correct their current behaviour, and ‘give full thought for the future’, informed by their past errors.<sup>311</sup>

### Argument

The purpose of telling the Athenians this, Demosthenes argues, is to become self-aware, reflect and change:

But why, it might be asked, are you telling us this now? My purpose is to make you understand, men of Athens, both the harm done by our continual neglect of our affairs, one after the other, and Philip’s habitual meddlesomeness, which prevents him from being content with what he has achieved and remaining at peace.<sup>312</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> Demosthenes 1.12-13. εἰ δὲ προησόμεθ’, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, εἴτ’ Ὀλυμπον ἐκεῖνος καταστρέφεται, φρασάτω τις ἔμοι τί τὸ κωλύον ἔτ’ αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται. ἄρα λογίζεται τις ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρεῖ τὸν τρόπον δι’ ὃν μέγας γέγονεν ἀσθενής ὢν τὸ κατ’ ἀρχᾶς Φίλιππος, τὸ πρῶτον Ἀμφίπολιν λαβὼν, μετὰ ταῦτα Πύδναν, πάλιν Ποτειδαίαν, Μεθώνην αὐθις, εἴτα Θετταλίας ἐπέβη· μετὰ ταῦτα Φεράς, Παγασάς, Μαγνησίαν.

<sup>310</sup> Demosthenes 1.11. ἵνα ταῦτ’ ἐπανορθωσάμενοι τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἀδοξίαν ἀποτριψώμεθα.

<sup>311</sup> Demosthenes 1.11. Frost Benedikt 2002: 226 notes how *kairos* is ‘interpretive, situational’ as opposed to *chronos*-time, which is ‘absolute, universal and objective.’ Karvounis 2002: 319 likewise argues that Demosthenes’ idea of *kairos* gains a special importance because of the opportunity offered Athens the chance to finally halt Philip’s expansion, and restore Athenian order in the North.

<sup>312</sup> Demosthenes 1.14. τί οὖν, ἄν τις εἴποι, ταῦτα λέγεις ἡμῖν νῦν; ἵνα γνῶτ’, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ αἴσθησθ’ ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ τὸ προῖεσθαι καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀεί τι τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἀλυσιτελέες, καὶ τὴν φιλοπραγμοσύνην ἣ χρήται καὶ συζῆ Φίλιππος, ὅφ’ ἤς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἀγαπήσας τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἡσυχίαν σχήσει.

By acknowledging this, the Assembly may then listen to other advisers but ‘choose whichever you think is advantageous and take control of the situation while the opportunity is here.’<sup>313</sup> The speech focuses on recognising the consequences of the Assembly’s habit of listening to what it wants and its attitude towards popular rhetoric and its rejections of *parrhēsia*. The results of their neglect and apathy is exacerbated by Philip’s nature and his, ‘habitual meddlesomeness.’ In repeating Philip’s insatiable *akrasia*, Demosthenes presents the inevitable outcome if the Assembly refuses to change its attitude towards, not Philip, but its own behaviour: ‘by the gods, who of you is so foolish as to be unaware that the war will move from there to here, if we neglect it?’<sup>314</sup> It is thus imperative that the Assembly reprioritises its attitude towards foreign expeditions, and in particular to listening to good advice.

As I have suggested for the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes’ focus is first and foremost aimed at the crisis within the Assembly itself, and not exactly ‘Philippic’. This is stressed further when Demosthenes develops his remarks on the role of the adviser in the proemium:

Perhaps it will be said that criticism is easy and open to all but that the duty of the adviser is to reveal what should be done in the present situation. I am well aware, men of Athens, that you are often angry not at those who are at fault but at the most recent speakers about the political situation, if anything turns out contrary to your expectation.<sup>315</sup>

<sup>313</sup> Demosthenes 1.20. ὧν ἔλεσθ’ ὅστις ὑμῖν συμφέρειν δοκεῖ· καὶ ἔως ἐστὶ καιρὸς, ἀντιλάβεσθε τῶν πραγμάτων.

<sup>314</sup> Demosthenes 1.15. πρὸς θεῶν, τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν πόλεμον δεῦρ’ ἤζοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν;

<sup>315</sup> Demosthenes 1.16. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν ἴσως φήσαι τις ἂν ῥάδιον καὶ παντὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν παρόντων ὅτι δεῖ πράττειν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοῦτ’ εἶναι συμβούλου. ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ’ ὅτι πολλάκις ὑμεῖς οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν ὀργῇ ποιεῖσθε, ἂν τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβῆ· For more on the Assembly’s anger towards advisors see discussion at 1.19 and 3.11. Ober 1989: 318 presents this passage as an example of how ‘the political orator must give the best possible advice, and he must not allow anything, even fear of a possible negative reaction to his comments by the Assembly, to stand in the way of his oratorical service to the state.’ Demosthenes may also be asserting his own role as *sumboulos*, following Ober 1989: 317 that ‘the advisory role of the political orators is reflected in the term *sumboulos*, which politicians use of themselves and of “good orators” in general.’



Demosthenes affirms that the Assembly cannot recognise who is to blame, and chooses the easiest target over the more uncomfortable task of recognising their own errors. Moreover, Demosthenes asserts his own position as a speaker of unpopular truths by asserting:

But I certainly do not think that out of concern for one's personal safety one should refrain from saying what is to your advantage.<sup>316</sup>

In this manner Demosthenes rhetorically adds an aspect of sincerity to his advice (characteristic of *parrhēsia*), as he advises the Assembly to his own detriment, which continues his earlier argument that to reject his advice is to act against their interests.<sup>317</sup> The danger of pleasant speeches presents a very real crisis for Athens, both internally and externally, as they fail to take effective action. Their problem is their preference for the easy option over what is right but difficult:

I fear, men of Athens, that, like those who thoughtlessly borrow at high rates of interests and prosper for a short while but later lose even their principle, so we may be seen to have paid a high price for our neglect and, in our constant search to do what brings pleasure, may later be forced to do many hard things against our will, and our very homeland may be at risk.<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> Demosthenes 1.16. οὐ μὴν οἶμαι δεῖν τὴν ἰδίαν ἀσφάλειαν σκοποῦνθ' ὑποστείλασθαι περὶ ὧν ὑμῖν συμφέρειν ἡγοῦμαι.

<sup>317</sup> Later in *On the Peace* (pp. 169-171) Demosthenes will use events, such as the outcome of the Euboean Expedition, to validate his earlier arguments. Whilst this can be considered a *topos*, in the wider context of Athenian losses in the North Aegean arguably drives the urgency of Demosthenes' argument.

<sup>318</sup> Demosthenes 1.15. δέδοικ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι ῥαδίως ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις [τόκοις] μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς [ἂν] ἐπὶ πολλῷ φανῶμεν ἐρραθυμηκότες, καὶ ἅπαντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ζητοῦντες πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ ὧν οὐκ ἐβουλόμεθ' ὕστερον εἰς ἀνάγκην ἔλθωμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύσωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ. I propose that Demosthenes presents a similar moral judgment as Prodicus' contest of Virtue and Vice in Xenophon *Memoirs of Socrates* 2.1.21-34, which arguably would have been known by the audience, as Thomas 2003: 169 notes was it was 'both performed numerous times and written down'.

It is imperative that the Assembly recognises the dangers of their blissfully ignorant condition, and instead realise the severity of the situation.<sup>319</sup> Thus, Demosthenes proposes immediate action:

I say that you should relieve the situation in two ways: both by rescuing the cities of the Olynthians and sending the soldiers to do so, and by ravaging his territory with triremes and other soldiers. If you neglect either of these, I fear that the campaign may be in vain.<sup>320</sup>

Demosthenes' proposals, like those of the *First Philippic*, focus on the need for Athenian action supported by Athenian funding. His call for them to act with conviction, recalls his previous entreaty not to produce paper forces or only do the minimum necessary.<sup>321</sup> The action Demosthenes calls for reveals and confronts their misplaced priorities, which are exemplified in the Theoric fund itself:

As for provision of money, you have money, men of Athens, you have more than anyone else: this money you receive in the form you wish. If we hand it over to those who are on campaign, you will need no further source of money. But if you do not, you will need a further source, or rather, you will be in need of the whole amount.<sup>322</sup>

Demosthenes' points on the *theōrika* are essentially the same as his points in the *First Philippic*: the efficient funding and regulation of festivals, when compared to military provisions, is indicative of their misplaced priorities. In this regard Demosthenes sets himself apart from men such as Leptines, whom he criticised for threatening the *eisphora*, because

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<sup>319</sup> Demosthenes 3.18 will go on to argue that they must choose that which is right over what is pleasant when they cannot have both.

<sup>320</sup> Demosthenes 1.17. φημι δὴ διχῆ βοηθητέον εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν, τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις σώζειν καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν, καὶ τῷ τὴν ἐκείνου χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριήρεσι καὶ στρατιώταις ἑτέροις· εἰ δὲ θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγορήσετε, ὀκνῶ μὴ μάταιος ἡμῖν ἢ στρατεία γένηται.

<sup>321</sup> Demosthenes 4.45.

<sup>322</sup> Demosthenes 1.19. περὶ δὲ χρημάτων πόρου, ἔστιν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χρήμαθ' ὑμῖν, ἔστιν ὅσ' οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων [στρατιωτικά]· ταῦτα δ' ὑμεῖς οὕτως ὡς βούλεσθε λαμβάνετε. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τοῖς στρατευομένοις ἀποδώσετε, οὐδενὸς ὑμῖν προσδεῖ πόρου. εἰ δὲ μή, προσδεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἅπαντος ἐνδεῖ τοῦ πόρου.

Leptines failed to understand the systems that were fundamental to Athens.<sup>323</sup> Demosthenes, in contrast, understands the institutions and offers advice that is in the best interest of the *polis*. Currently, however, the best advice is hindered by an attitude that prioritises protection of the Theoric fund over, and at the expense of, their military. This is emphasised by Demosthenes' additional remarks:

“What is this?” someone may say, “Do you propose that this money be transferred to the military fund?” No, by God, I do not propose that.’<sup>324</sup>

The need to deny this demonstrates Demosthenes' awareness of the risks in addressing the Theoric fund, as it was protected by law; even suggesting a redistribution of its funds risked prosecution.<sup>325</sup> Moreover, rhetorically, the danger in suggesting a redistribution of funds is emblematic of Demosthenes' argument that the Assembly is hostile to good advice, demonstrating the counter-productive attitude in the Assembly, where protecting *theōrika* is prioritised over the civic duty to respect *parrhēsia*: the best advice thus requires the self-sacrifice of the speaker. Despite this, Demosthenes states that Athens has the money required to address their external issues (in the Theoric fund), but refuses to use it to the most advantageous ends:

But I do believe that soldiers must be provided, and that there should be a military fund, and a single system for receiving pay and for performing one's duty, whereas

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<sup>323</sup> Hesk 2000: 49-50 observes how in *Against Leptines* ‘Demosthenes attacks the character of Leptines and the nature of his proposals in terms of an incompatibility between dishonest behaviour and normative civic identity.’ Kremmydas 2013: 77 notes in *Against Leptines* 20.98 Demosthenes uses an anti-deception *topos* to cancel out any such *topoi* used against him by Leptines, he ‘takes the opportunity to dispel any doubts about his *ethos* and pre-empt his opponent's attack by implying that he is the real deceiver’.

<sup>324</sup> Demosthenes 1.19. ‘τί οὖν;’ ἄν τις εἴποι, ‘σὺ γράφεις ταῦτ’ εἶναι στρατιωτικά;’ μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

<sup>325</sup> Hansen 235-6 notes a law forbade (on pain of death) any proposal to move funds from the Theoric fund, and is attested to in Libanius' *Hypothesis* to Demosthenes' *First Olynthiac*. In Demosthenes *Against Neaera* 59.3-8 Theomnestrus recounts how Stephanus of Eroeadae indicted Apollodorus of Acharnae in 348 for ‘unconstitutional’ proposals on the Theoric fund.

you think that somehow you should receive this money for attending festivals in the same way as you do now, without any trouble.<sup>326</sup>

In this Demosthenes clearly evokes his complaint in the *First Philippic* on the attitudes towards financing the festivals and their military expeditions and the absurd prioritisation of their pleasures over their security. This is emphasised by his closing remark on the damage farmers will suffer if the war comes to Attica: a worse fate is in store if Philip invades Attica, than a missed trip to the theatre.<sup>327</sup>

### Epilogue: Hope and *Kairos*.

Having established the opportunity Olynthus presents, the necessity to avoid past mistakes and the means to do this, Demosthenes concludes the speech with a renewed sense of hope: this *kairos* is a second chance and he urges them to seize it, warning ominously of the dire consequences if they do not.

Firstly, Demosthenes offers hope to the Athenians by demonstrating that Philip's power is shaking:

His present situation is not one of readiness, even though it appears to be and a careless observer might so describe it,<sup>328</sup> nor is it as satisfactory as it could be, nor would he ever have started this war if he thought that he would actually have to fight, but he expected that as soon as he attacked he would carry off everything. But

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<sup>326</sup> Demosthenes 1.20. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἠγοῦμαι στρατιώτας δεῖν κατασκευασθῆναι [καὶ ταῦτ' εἶναι στρατιωτικὰ] καὶ μίαν σύνταξιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ τε λαμβάνειν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα, ὑμεῖς δ' οὕτω πως ἄνευ πραγμάτων λαμβάνειν εἰς τὰς ἑορτάς.

<sup>327</sup> Demosthenes 1.27 'I think the damage the farmers among you would suffer would exceed all you have spent on the previous war in its entirety. But if war comes, how much damage must you suppose they will suffer?' This echoes the *First Philippic* and how their attitude means they fail to anticipate (or indeed recognise) the very real dangers facing them.

<sup>328</sup> This again refers back to my point pp. 56-7 that Demosthenes is critical of how the Assembly relies on the fallible reports of others at 4.47.

he was mistaken. This indeed is the first thing that has turned out contrary to his plan, and it rattles him and causes him distress.<sup>329</sup>

Demosthenes continues his argument from the *First Philippic* that Philip's power is built upon Athenian allies and the product of their failure to protect their interests. Moreover, the Assembly fails to acknowledge this because they still rely on second-hand hearsay. Philip's power cannot hold, if the Athenians recognise this and capitalise on it with swift action. Moreover the prospect of challenging Philip is further emphasised as a realistic and necessary endeavour through the resistance at Thessaly:

And then there is the situation at Thessaly. The Thessalians are always naturally untrustworthy to everybody as you know, and are behaving towards him exactly as they have in the past. For indeed, they have voted to demand that he return Pagasae to them, and they have prevented him from fortifying Magnesia. And I have heard some people say that they will no longer even allow him to derive profit from their harbours or marketplaces...if he is deprived of these funds he will be hard pressed to provide supplies for his mercenaries.<sup>330</sup>

Not only does the attitude of the Thessalians provide an example for the Athenians to emulate, but together with the new hostile attitude of the Olynthians, highlights that the *kairos* to check Philip is at hand, as the cities of the North are turning against him, indeed they 'are not accustomed to take orders from anybody, and the fellow is said to be overbearing.'<sup>331</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> Demosthenes 1.21. οὔτε γάρ, ὡς δοκεῖ καὶ φήσεί τις ἂν μὴ σκοπῶν ἀκριβῶς, εὐτρεπῶς οὐδ' ὡς ἂν κάλλιστ' αὐτῷ τὰ παρόντ' ἔχει, οὔτ' ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμόν ποτε τοῦτον ἐκεῖνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾤθη δεήσει αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιῶν ἅπαντα τότε ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματ' ἀναιρήσεσθαι, κῆτα διέψευσται. τοῦτο δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ταραττεῖ παρὰ γνώμην γεγονὸς καὶ πολλὴν ἀθυμίαν αὐτῷ παρέχει.

<sup>330</sup> Demosthenes 1.21-2. εἶτα τὰ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἄπιστα μὲν ἦν δήπου φύσει καὶ ἀεὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, κομιδῇ δ', ὥσπερ ἦν, καὶ ἔστι νῦν τοῦτῳ. καὶ γὰρ Παγασᾶς ἀπαιτεῖν αὐτόν εἰσιν ἐψηφισμένοι, καὶ Μαγνησίαν κεκωλύκασιν τειχίζειν. ἤκουον δ' ἔγωγέ τινων, ὡς οὐδὲ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς ἔτι δώσοιεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι... εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀποστερήσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν κομιδῇ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς τοῖς ξένοις αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.

<sup>331</sup> Demosthenes 1.23. γὰρ ἀήθεις τοῦ κατακούειν τινός εἰσι, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὑβριστής, ὡς φασιν.

Furthermore, in highlighting how ‘undeserved success leads the foolish to make poor judgements,’ Demosthenes reduces the threat of Philip as his power is not only based on Athenian allies, but also on deception and intimidation.<sup>332</sup> As such, Demosthenes presents the *kairos* of Olynthus as the means to halt Philip’s rise and regain their lost possessions and reputation:

Therefore, men of Athens, you ought to consider his *akairia* as your opportunity, and readily share the burdens, and send ambassadors for whatever else is needed, and campaign in person and spur on everyone else.<sup>333</sup>

While Trevett translates τὴν ἀκαιρίαν as ‘his difficulty’, *akairia* can be considered both a time of trouble, but also the opposite of *kairos*: a lack of opportunity. It is this latter sense of *akaria* that I believe Demosthenes invokes here, as he deliberately considers Philip’s *akairia* – his want of opportunity – as Athens’ *kairos*. Therefore, more than just considering Philip’s difficult circumstances, Demosthenes calls on the Assembly to note this loss of *kairos* as their own opportunity to seize the moment and act on Philip’s loss of momentum. It is this *kairos* at Olynthus which is crucial in stopping – and reversing – Macedonian influence in Northern Greece, and it is this transferal of *kairos* in Athens’ favour that drives the urgency of Demosthenes’ speech: in stressing the immediacy of the current situation, and the need to campaign in person (as he called for in the *First Philippic*), Demosthenes emphasises how the allies need to see that Athens is prepared to act in its own interests. Consequently, the shame of not seizing this moment would be intolerable:

Consider: if Philip were to seize such an opportunity against us, and war were to come against our land, how readily do you think that he would attack us? Are you not

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<sup>332</sup> Demosthenes 1.23. τὸ γὰρ εὖ πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀφορμὴ τοῦ κακῶς φρονεῖν τοῖς ἀνοήτοις γίγνεται. This deception is emphasised further in the *Second Olynthiac* with reference to Hesk 2000 and Kremmydas 2013.

<sup>333</sup> Demosthenes 1.24. δεῖ τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἀκαιρίαν τὴν ἐκείνου καιρὸν ὑμέτερον νομίσαντας ἐτοίμως συνάρασθαι τὰ πράγματα, καὶ πρεσβευομένους ἐφ’ ἃ δεῖ καὶ στρατευομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ παροξύνοντας τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας,

then ashamed if you will not dare, when you have the chance, to do to him the very things that he would do to you, if he could?<sup>334</sup>

Knowing from earlier references to Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea and Methone that this is exactly what Philip *has* done, Demosthenes presents the uncomfortable role-reversal of Athens and Philip. Moreover, the shame of failing to prevent war coming to Attica, when they have the opportunity to prevent it, should inspire them to act. Aside from the damage that will be done to Attic farm holds, Demosthenes notes how ‘there is also the insult and the shame that you would feel at the situation – for decent men, there is no greater punishment.’<sup>335</sup> In this manner, Demosthenes turns his proposals into simply performing their civic duty, and the only honourable course of action, ‘since you all know this, you all must help push war away from here to there.’<sup>336</sup> Acting in any other way is dishonourable and their attitude of complacency has not only exacerbated the problem of Macedonian expansion in the north Aegean, but has also undermined their reputation as Athenians, as Christ notes, the ‘Athenians preferred to regard good citizenship as voluntary and the rational choice for free citizens rather than as an imposition upon them.’<sup>337</sup> If they do not choose to act now, they could be forced into a situation where their autonomy is taken from them.

Furthermore, Demosthenes reaffirms the need to be worthy of their ancestors, stating that all must help, the wealthy by financial contribution, and others by serving, particularly ‘those in their prime, so that, by acquiring experience of war in Philip’s territory, they may

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<sup>334</sup> Demosthenes 1.24. λογίζομένους, εἰ Φίλιππος λάβοι καθ’ ἡμῶν τοιοῦτον καιρὸν καὶ πόλεμος γένοιτο πρὸς τῆ χώρα, πῶς ἂν αὐτὸν οἴεσθ’ ἐτοίμως ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν; εἴτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε, εἰ μὴδ’ ἂ πάθοιτ’ ἄν, εἰ δύναιτ’ ἐκεῖνος, ταῦτα ποιῆσαι καιρὸν ἔχοντες οὐ τολμήσετε; This arguably develops Demosthenes’ statement at 4.10 that shame should be good enough cause to act on their situation.

<sup>335</sup> Demosthenes 1.27. καὶ πρόσσεθ’ ἡ ὕβρις καὶ ἔθ’ ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσχὴν, οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττων ζημίας τοῖς γε σώφροσιν.

<sup>336</sup> Demosthenes 1.28. πάντα δὴ ταῦτα δεῖ συνιδόντας ἅπαντας βοηθεῖν καὶ ἀπωθεῖν ἐκεῖσε τὸν πόλεμον. I believe we can view this in the same manner that Yunis notes the success of *On the Crown* and how it was due to Demosthenes presenting his advice as the only honourable path in that given situation.

<sup>337</sup> Christ 2006: 207.

become fearsome guardians of their own land and keep it inviolate'.<sup>338</sup> This is also a reminder that their failure to defend their own interests *in person* has been a major contributing factor to Philip's success and their deteriorating situation. The *First Olynthiac*, like the *First Philippic*, is primarily concerned with shaking the Athenians out of their apathy, and persuading them to reflect self-critically on how their external problems of Macedonian expansion are a result of their own internal failure to deliberate and act in their best interests. Thus the only solution to their deteriorating fortunes is to change their internal attitudes and accept his *parrhēsia* and prioritise defending their interests.

Demosthenes leaves the Assembly with no doubt on the importance of their decision on whether to support Olynthus, stating clearly that, 'you should not forget that now is the moment that will decide whether you are to wage war there or he is to do so here'.<sup>339</sup> However, Demosthenes' argument that the Assembly habitually heeds bad advice demonstrates that others in the Assembly advocate a different view, which he characterises as illogical and irresponsible:

It would be the height of absurdity if, when he can, he should fail to do the very thing he now rants about doing, at the risk of seeming foolish.<sup>340</sup>

This again insinuates that the Assembly is not applying its logic/wisdom to the matters under discussion. Conceding to their self-interest, Demosthenes finally appeals to their instinct for

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<sup>338</sup> Demosthenes 1.28. τοὺς δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, ἵνα τὴν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἐμπειρίαν ἐν τῇ Φιλίππου χώρα κτησάμενοι φοβεροὶ φύλακες τῆς οἰκείας ἀκεραίου γένωνται.

<sup>339</sup> Demosthenes 1.25. μηδὲ τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς λανθανέτω, ὅτι νῦν αἴρεσίς ἐστιν ὑμῖν πότερ' ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖ χρὴ πολεμεῖν ἢ παρ' ὑμῖν ἐκεῖνον. Usher 1999: 221 notes how 'the vivid description of Philip's hyperactivity (*philopragmosyne*) in *Philippic I* is now appended its logical conclusion.'

<sup>340</sup> Demosthenes 1.26. Demosthenes also remarks that the Thebans would probably help Philip against Athens, and the Phocians are 'unable to defend their own territory' without Athenian help. Karvounis 2002: 321 considers it vitally important that Demosthenes for the first time in words understood that Philip will stop at nothing and soon Attica would fall: 'Trotzdem sollte man dem Argument besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenken, weil Demosthenes hier zum ersten Mal den Gedanken in Worte faßt, daß Philipp vor nichts Halt machen und bald auch Attika überfallen würde.' I fear this overdetermines the role of Philip (which Demosthenes diminished in the *First Philippic*) and overlooks his argument that the greatest threat to Athens is their apathetic attitude. Philip's rise has not caused their misfortunes, but rather they have enabled Philip's rise by their neglect and apathy, and it is their attitude which will determine Attica's safety.



self-preservation, calling on the wealthy to help push war away, ‘so that in spending a little of their wealth for the sake of the many things that they possess in their prosperity, they may enjoy the rest without fear’.<sup>341</sup>

Demosthenes finishes, as he started, on the responsibility of the speaker. Having already presented himself as the unappreciated honest adviser, he concludes that if the *rhētors* will not speak in Athens’ interests, they ought to act in the best interest of the *polis* just to cover their own backs; just as the wealthy and those in their prime must push the war away so too must the ‘public speakers, so that that their political conduct may stand up to scrutiny, since you will judge their actions according to how events turn out.’<sup>342</sup>

But the call to duty under sufferance returns to the fundamental problem that the Athenians, in their apathy, lack of action, and failure to do their duty to the polis, have created their own crisis. In their rejection of honest advice, manipulated by self-serving *rhētors*, the Assembly has become deluded, complaining of the declining interests but refusing to acknowledge their own culpability in Philip’s expansion. Demosthenes is didactic in prescribing what they must do, reinforcing his previous proposals and asserting that the Assembly must recognise good advice and act on it. Thus transcending above his more critical remarks is his assertion that the worst aspect of the situation offers their best hope: that their lack of action has caused their problems but action can rectify this. The focus of this speech, therefore is on the opportunity to do what they ought to have done in 351- to man and fund their military expeditions. In asserting this continuity from the *First Philippic* to the *First Olynthiac* I differ from Karvounis’ argument that the former lacked a concrete reason for mobilising the military, which the *First Olynthiac* has. I argue that, if this were the case,

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<sup>341</sup> Demosthenes 1.28. ἴν’ ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν ὧν καλῶς ποιῶντες ἔχουσι μικρ’ ἀναλίσκοντες τὰλοιπὰ καρπῶνται ἀδεῶς.

<sup>342</sup> Demosthenes 1.28. τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ἴν’ αἱ τῶν πεπολιτευμένων αὐτοῖς εὐθυναὶ ῥάδιαί γένωνται, ὡς ὅποι’ ἄτ’ ἂν ὑμᾶς περιστῆ τὰ πράγματα, τοιοῦτοι κριταὶ καὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθε.

the Athenians would surely have approved his proposals. The lack of success of the *First Olynthiac*, in my opinion, gives weight to Demosthenes' argument on the apathy of the Assembly itself and their failure to recognise the situation. It also could reflect the wider reality that the Athenians did not recognise Philip as a threat.<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Karvounis 2002: 319.

## CHAPTER 2.2 THE *SECOND OLYNTHIAC*

Following the failure of the *First Olynthiac* to persuade the Assembly to endorse his proposals, Demosthenes swiftly delivered the *Second Olynthiac* to persuade them to reconsider sending aid to Olynthus.<sup>344</sup> Demosthenes reaffirms his arguments on the *kairos* of the crisis at Olynthus, and the need for the Athenians to act on it. However, there is no mention of the Theoric fund, which perhaps demonstrates how Demosthenes adapts his argument to avoid this unpopular suggestion.<sup>345</sup>

The defining feature of this speech is its focus on diminishing the power of Philip, and there is indeed a shift in the texture of the speech where Philip takes ‘more of the centre stage.’<sup>346</sup> As Trevett notes, ‘the bulk of the speech is devoted to belittling Philip and seeking to persuade the Athenians that he is far from invincible.’<sup>347</sup> My approach demonstrates that this increased focus on Philip in the *Second Olynthiac* is a development from – and continuation of – Demosthenes’ approach in the *First Philippic* that asserted how Philip’s power is a product of their own apathy, and as such is within their own power to address – if they choose to. Demosthenes diminishes the character of Philip and the Macedonians, not with an end to incite hatred for Philip per se, but rather to both shame and motivate the Athenians to act. This situation, according to Demosthenes, is that Macedonian expansion is the result of continual Athenian mistakes, and arguably, their failure to act on his [Demosthenes’] proposals. The speech maintains that the reason they cannot address the

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<sup>344</sup> Worthington 2013: 136 suggests that this was a matter of days, and suggests that the swift follow up could demonstrate that Demosthenes may have contributed to the confusion on what to do. Ryder 2000: 55 agrees that it followed closely, and suggests that the speech may have been delivered at the same debate as the *First Olynthiac*.

<sup>345</sup> That is, adapts it knowing the unpopularity of touching the Theoric fund. Here I disagree with Milns and Ellis 1970:38 that the lack of reference to the Theoric fund determines an order of 2-1-3, on the assumption that Demosthenes must have not had the idea to use the fund yet. Indeed, I argue that reference in the *First Philippic* to the prioritisation of funds for festivals over expeditions demonstrates that these thoughts were already present in Demosthenes’ speeches since 351.

<sup>346</sup> Worthington 2013: 136. Usher 1999: 223 ‘the king himself is to be the leading topic.’

<sup>347</sup> Trevett 2011: 41.

crisis in the north Aegean properly, is that they refuse to acknowledge their own responsibility and change their attitude. As Demosthenes asserted in the *First Philippic*, the worst aspect of their situation (their supine attitude) holds their best hope for the future (that if they act, Philip can be checked).<sup>348</sup> The speech aims to make the Assembly deliberate effectively to decide what is in their best interests *and* act on it:

You must put aside such conduct and even now recover your self-control, and join together in deliberating, speaking, and taking action for the common good. To sum up, I propose that you should all contribute equitably according to your means; you should all go on campaign in turn until everyone has served; you should give a hearing to all who come forward to speak; and you should choose the best proposals that you hear, rather than whatever this man or that should say.<sup>349</sup>

Demosthenes also develops the sense of shame that they have let the situation deteriorate to this point, and have enabled Philip to prosper by their apathy and lack of action.

The structure of the speech alternates between urging the Athenians to action, and diminishing Philip/Macedonia. Demosthenes weaves the immediacy of the situation and the culpability of the Athenians for the present situation (2.1-4) with the weakness of Philip based on his deceptive actions (2.5-7). Thus, Demosthenes argues that the Assembly must seize the *kairos*, act swiftly, and not repeat their past mistakes (2.8-13).

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<sup>348</sup> Demosthenes 4.2.

<sup>349</sup> Demosthenes 2.30-31. δεῖ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπανέντας καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἔτι καὶ νῦν γενομένους κοινὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὸ πράττειν ποιῆσαι... λέγω δὴ κεφάλαιον πάντας εἰσφέρειν ἀφ' ὅσων ἕκαστος ἔχει τὸ ἴσον· πάντας ἐξιέναι κατὰ μέρος, ἕως ἂν ἅπαντες στρατεύσησθε· πᾶσι τοῖς παρισῶσι λόγον διδόναι, καὶ τὰ Νβέλτισθ' ὧν ἂν ἀκούσῃθ' αἰρεῖσθαι, μὴ ἂν ὁ δεῖν' ἢ ὁ δεῖν' εἴπη.

## Analysis

### Proemium

Demosthenes opens the proemium by continuing the balance of hope and shame from the previous speech, by viewing the resistance of the smaller cities against Philip as a sign of divine benevolence:

On many occasions, it seems to me, men of Athens, the gods have clearly revealed their goodwill to the city, and not least in the present situation. For the appearance of people who will wage war on Philip, whose territory borders on his and who have a considerable force and, most important of all, whose attitude towards the war is such that they regard their agreement with him as untrustworthy and leading to the destruction of their country – this situation seems to have come about by some miraculous and altogether divine benefaction.<sup>350</sup>

Demosthenes regards this turn of events as evidence that the situation sits definitely in Athens' favour. Consequently, to not seize this current *kairos* would not only be shameful, but an impious insult:

We, men of Athens, must now avoid giving the impression that we treat ourselves worse than the present situation treats us, since it would be shameful – indeed most shameful – to be seen to have given up not only the cities and places that we once controlled but also the allies and the opportunities that Fortune has provided.<sup>351</sup>

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<sup>350</sup> Demosthenes 2.1. ἐπὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἰδεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δοκεῖ μοι τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐνοίαν φανεράν γιγνομένην τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἥκιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασι· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς πολεμήσοντα Φιλίππου γεγενῆσθαι καὶ χώραν ὄμορον καὶ δύναμιν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον πάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ὥστε τὰς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαλλαγὰς πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἶτα τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος νομίζειν ἀνάστασιν, δαιμονία τι καὶ θεῖα παντάπασιν ἔοικεν εὐεργεσίᾳ. Previous references to divine favour at Demosthenes 4.45 and 1.8 suggest that Philip is potentially a form of divine punishment, and that the *kairos* of Olynthus is a god-given opportunity.

<sup>351</sup> Demosthenes 2.2. δεῖ τοίνυν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπεῖν αὐτούς, ὅπως μὴ χεῖρους περὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι δόξομεν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ὡς ἔστι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων, μὴ μόνον πόλεων καὶ τόπων ὧν ἤμεν ποτε κύριοι φαίνεσθαι προῖεμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης παρασκευασθέντων συμμάχων καὶ καιρῶν.

## Narrative

In presenting the *kairos* as god-given, Demosthenes equates the rejection of the opportunity as a form of impiety in their rejection of divine Fortune.<sup>352</sup> But rather than persuading the Athenians by a call to duty, Demosthenes castigates the Assembly for their errors, returning to his method in the *First Philippic* of asserting Athenian culpability:

It is in my opinion a mistake, men of Athens, to seek to persuade you to do your duty by recounting Philip's strength to you. Why? Because all the facts that one might mention seem to me to bring credit to him but to be blunders on our part.<sup>353</sup>

Indeed, this draws a parallel to the Athenian tradition of denying credit to Athenian enemies. A narrative of Philip's success is in fact a catalogue of Athenian errors, and thus not due to any particular skill on Philip's part:

The more he has achieved beyond what he deserves, the more amazing he seems to everybody; but as for you the worse your handling of the situation, the greater the shame you have incurred.<sup>354</sup>

Demosthenes' *paralipsis*, 'these matters, then, I'll leave to one side', emphasises that the Athenians (should) already be ashamed.<sup>355</sup> Instead, Demosthenes focuses on asserting that Philip's power is fragile:

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<sup>352</sup> Compare Lycurgus 1.146 for use of the gods 'rest assured, men of Athens, that each of you now while voting in secret will make his attitude clear to the gods.' Carey 2000: 30 observes this reference for the rhetoric of fear in forensic oratory. I argue, Demosthenes also could be referring to the rejection of his proposals in the *First Olynthiac* and the lack of action in their response to the Olynthians call for aid against Philip.

<sup>353</sup> Demosthenes 2.3. τὸ μὲν οὖν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν Φιλίππου ῥώμην διεξιέναι καὶ διὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων προτρέπειν τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς, οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμαι. διὰ τί; ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ πάνθ' ὅσ' ἂν εἴποι τις ὑπὲρ τούτων, ἐκεῖνῳ μὲν ἔχειν φιλοτιμίαν, ἡμῖν δ' οὐχὶ καλῶς πεπραῆσθαι. Demosthenes repeats this at 3.17. This is reminiscent of Pericles' complaint against Spartan success Thucydides 1.144 'I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies' designs.' Thucydides also blames internal dissension 2.65.12. This also occurs in Plato's *epitaphios logos*, *Menexenus* 243d 'we were not destroyed by others, but were rather the agents of our own destruction.'

<sup>354</sup> Demosthenes 2.3. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὅσῳ πλείον' ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν πεποίηκε τὴν αὐτοῦ, τοσοῦτῳ θαυμαστότερος παρὰ πᾶσι νομίζεται· ὑμεῖς δ' ὅσῳ χεῖρον ἢ προσήκε κέχρησθε τοῖς πράγμασι, τοσοῦτῳ πλείον' αἰσχύνην ὠφλήκατε.

<sup>355</sup> Demosthenes 2.4 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν παραλείψω. Especially as Demosthenes asserted this in the *First Olynthiac* only days previously.

For indeed, men of Athens, if one were to examine the matter carefully, one would see that Philip's rise to greatness is due to us, not him.<sup>356</sup>

This is a direct continuation of the *First Olynthiac*, 'we have made Philip stronger and more powerful than any previous king of Macedonia.'<sup>357</sup> As such, recounting Philip's unjust 'rise' is not to invoke fear, but to bolster the Athenians to action out of shame at their culpability. Demosthenes develops this shame into their failure to act against an unworthy opponent, by highlighting Philip's flaws, stating that it serves the benefit of the *polis*:

To call him a liar and a perjurer without showing what he has done might be called empty abuse, and rightly so. But to recount all his actions so far, and to convict him on all of these counts, fortunately only requires a short speech. It also serves, I think, two useful purposes: both to make him appear worthless – which he is – and to show those who are overly impressed by Philip and think him invincible, that all the sources of his previous duplicitous rise to greatness are now gone and that his affairs have come to a dead end.<sup>358</sup>

To demonstrate this Demosthenes focuses on highlighting the deceptive nature of Philip, and states that Philip's rise would indeed be great and worthy of fear, 'if I saw that he had risen to power as a result of acting with justice.'<sup>359</sup> But Demosthenes, through his 'observation and examination' (which is contrasted by the Assembly's habit of acting on the words of others) affirms Philip to be a 'liar and a perjurer' who only bettered the Athenians because of their

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<sup>356</sup> Demosthenes 2.4. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μετ' ἀληθείας τις, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σκοποῖτο, ἐνθένδ' ἂν αὐτὸν ἴδοι μέγαν γεγενημένον, οὐχὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ. Compare to 1.9. As noted in Chapter One, I differ from Karvounis 2002: 237 who argues it is questionable whether Demosthenes actually believed this, 'Ob Demosthenes wirklich an Athens „Beitrag“ zu Philipps Erstarkung glaubte, ist fraglich.'

<sup>357</sup> Demosthenes 1.9.

<sup>358</sup> Demosthenes 2.5. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπίορκον κάπιστον καλεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ πεπραγμένα δεικνύναι λοιδορίαν εἶναί τις ἂν φήσειε κενὴν δικαίως· τὸ δὲ πάνθ' ὅσα πάποτ' ἔπραξε διεξιόντα ἐφ' ἅπασιν τούτοις ἐλέγχειν, καὶ βραχέος λόγου συμβαίνει δεῖσθαι, καὶ δυοῖν ἔνεχ' ἠγοῦμαι συμφέρειν εἰρηῆσθαι, τοῦ τ' ἐκεῖνον, ὅπερ καὶ ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχει, φαῦλον φαίνεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ὑπερεκπεπληγμένους ὡς ἄμαχόν τινα τὸν Φίλιππον ἰδεῖν ὅτι πάντα διεξελήλυθεν οἷς πρότερον παρακρουόμενος μέγας ἠῤῥήθη, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἦκει τὴν τελευταίην τὰ πράγματα' αὐτῷ.

<sup>359</sup> Demosthenes 2.6. εἰ τὰ δίκαια πράττονθ' ἐώρων ἠῤῥημένον·

innocence, ‘by saying that he would hand over Amphipolis to us and by devising that once much talked about secret.’<sup>360</sup> Likewise, Philip’s success against Olynthus and Thessaly centred on deceiving their citizens:

And subsequently he won the friendship of the Olynthians by seizing Potidaea, which belonged to you, and did his former allies an injustice handing it over, and now finally he has won over the Thessalians by promising that he will give them Magnesia and by undertaking to conduct the war against Phocis on their behalf.<sup>361</sup>

Demosthenes asserts that Philip manipulated his way to power by deception:

In short, there is no associate of his whom he has not cheated, since it is by deceiving and winning over all of those who are ignorant of him, one after another, that he has grown in power.<sup>362</sup>

In noting these deceptive methods, Demosthenes asserts the fragility of Macedonia expansion because its power is built on immoral foundations, as opposed to the openness prized by Athenian ideology which ‘prohibited deception of the *dēmos*.’<sup>363</sup>

Despite its appearances, this power, being fictitious and based on deception, is insecure as it relies on Philip maintaining his deception:

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<sup>360</sup> Demosthenes 2.6. τῷ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν φάσκειν παραδώσειν καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενόν ποτ’ ἀπόρητον ἐκεῖνο κατασκευάσαι. Compare with 4.47, 1.5. The ‘secret’ is in reference to the Athenians offering to give Philip Pydna in exchange for Amphipolis (Theopompus *FGH* 115 f.30). de Ste Croix 1963, however, argues that this would have been impossible in a democracy where secret negotiations such as this would have been impossible. I, however, agree with Trevett 2011: 45 that ‘it is likely that Theopompus is broadly correct.’

<sup>361</sup> Demosthenes 2.7. τούτῳ προσαγαγόμενον, τὴν δ’ Ὀλυνθίων φιλίαν μετὰ ταῦτα τῷ Ποτειδαίαν οἶσαν ὑμετέραν ἐξελεῖν καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρότερον συμμάχους [ὑμᾶς] ἀδικῆσαι, παραδοῦναι δ’ ἐκείνοις, Θετταλοὺς δὲ νῦν τὰ τελευταῖα τῷ Μαγνησίαν παραδώσειν ὑποσχέσθαι καὶ τὸν Φωκικὸν πόλεμον πολεμήσειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀναδέξασθαι.

<sup>362</sup> Demosthenes 2.7. ὅλως δ’ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὄντιν’ οὐ πεφενάκις ἐκεῖνος τῶν αὐτῶ χρησαμένων· τὴν γὰρ ἐκάστων ἄνοιαν αἰεὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτὸν ἐξαπατῶν καὶ προσλαμβάνων οὕτως ἠὲ ζήθη.

<sup>363</sup> Kremmydas 2013: 51, Hesk 2000. Kremmydas 2013: 51 uses Demosthenes 20.135 as an example of how the Athenians ‘prescribed the death penalty for anyone convicted of deceiving the people through false promises.’ The implication here (and later in *On the Peace* and *On the Chersonese* 8.61) is that those advocating Philip’s lies are guilty of this.



And so, just as it was through these people that he has reached this high-point, when each of them thought that he would do something to their advantage, so it is through these same people that he is bound to be destroyed, when it has been demonstrated that all his actions were for his own benefit.<sup>364</sup>

As in the *First Olynthiac*, where Demosthenes argued the Olynthians were fighting for their very freedom, here too the Olynthians no longer willingly comply with Philip now that they see his true intentions:

This is the critical pass, men of Athens, to which Philip's affairs have come. Or else, let someone come forward and show me, or rather show you, that I am not telling the truth, that those whom he deceived at the start will trust him in the future, or that those whom he has wrongly enslaved would not now be glad to be freed.<sup>365</sup>

In revealing Philip's deceptive methods, Demosthenes presents Philip's rise as one based on deception, and with this duplicity exposed, Athens must seize the *kairos* of the current political climate in the North Aegean to turn Philip's expansion back. In losing the trust of the northern cities, Philip faces a struggle to maintain his alliances or stable support, and in noting how, 'concepts of deceit and dissimulation were important negative elements of Athens' developing democratic ideology', I suggest that Demosthenes uses the Assembly's long-standing awareness of the negative connotations of deception to support his practical and ethical point on Philip's perceived strength.<sup>366</sup>

Moreover the purpose of diminishing Philip has developed from the *First Philippic*, where Demosthenes emphasised that it was Athenian neglect and not any particular skill on

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<sup>364</sup> Demosthenes 2.8. ὥσπερ οὖν διὰ τούτων ἤρθη μέγας, ἥνιχ' ἕκαστοι συμφέρον αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῖς ᾄοντό τι πράξειν, οὕτως ὀφείλει διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ καθαιρεθῆναι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ πάνθ' εἶνεχ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιῶν ἐξελέληγεται.

<sup>365</sup> Demosthenes 2.8. καιροῦ μὲν δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τοῦτο πάρεστι Φιλίππῳ τὰ πράγματα· ἢ παρελθόν τις ἐμοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὑμῖν δειξάτω, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ ὡς οἱ τὰ πρῶτ' ἐξηπατημένοι τὰ λοιπὰ πιστεύσουσιν, ἢ ὡς οἱ παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀξίαν δεδουλωμένοι [Θετταλοῖ] νῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐλεύθεροι γένοιεντ' ἄσμενοι.

<sup>366</sup> Hesk 2000: 39. While this refers to an earlier period and the development of democratic ideology, I believe it is relevant here in understanding the rhetorical impact of asserting Philip's deception.

Philip's part. In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes again reminds the Assembly of their neglectful culpability, but he now augments this with the additional reminder of past actions and their moral obligation to prevent the enslavement of fellow Greeks:

But I am amazed at this: that in the past you rose up against the Spartans in the cause of justice for the Greeks and refused many opportunities to make large private gains, but instead spent your own money by raising taxes and were the first to risk your lives on campaign, so that the majority of Greeks should get justice, whereas now you shrink from marching out and put off paying taxes, even to protect your own possessions! Indeed I am amazed, that you, who have often rescued the other Greeks, both collectively and individually, now sit about, even when you have been deprived of your own property.<sup>367</sup>

Moreover, this new awareness of the Olynthians' augments Demosthenes' own complaint that the Athenians still fail to recognise the intentions of Philip and the intentions of the speakers offering advice in the Athenian Assembly. In affirming that Philip no longer has the power to deceive the Olynthians, Demosthenes attempts to break the illusion of Philip's power that has a hold over the Athenians.

Demosthenes argues that Philip has maintained this until now because the Athenians failed to acknowledge the reality of the situation. With Philip's deception revealed, Demosthenes maintains that Macedonian *Realpolitik* cannot endure now that these *poleis* have turned against Philip:

For whenever affairs are organised in a spirit of goodwill, and all the participants in a war share a common interest, then men are willing to work together and endure

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<sup>367</sup> Demosthenes 2.24. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο θαυμάζω, εἰ Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ποτ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δικαίων ἀντήρατε, καὶ πόλλ' ἰδίᾳ πλεονεκτῆσαι πολλάκις ὑμῖν ἐξὸν οὐκ ἠθελήσατε, ἀλλ' ἴν' οἱ ἄλλοι τύχῳσι τῶν δικαίων, τὰ ὑμέτερον αὐτῶν ἀνηλίσκετ' εἰσφέροντες καὶ προκινδυνεύετε στρατευόμενοι, νυνὶ δ' ὀκνεῖτ' ἐξιέναι καὶ μέλλετ' εἰσφέρειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν κτημάτων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους σεσώκατε πολλάκις πάντα καὶ καθ' ἓν αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει, τὰ δ' ὑμέτερον αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες κήθησθε.

setbacks and stand fast; but whenever someone like Philip grows strong as a result of greed and villainy, the first excuse and a small stumble overturns and destroys everything.<sup>368</sup>

In this regard, the Macedonian *Realpolitik* threatening Athens cannot endure, as the allies will return to Athens. Moreover, in using ‘the first excuse’ ἡ πρώτη πρόφασις, Demosthenes applies connotations of sickness and disease to Philip where *prophasis* ‘often refers to an external or contributing cause of a disease’ in the Hippocratic corpus.<sup>369</sup> *Prophasis* also has connotations of disaster/impending doom, such as at the start of the Plague in Thucydides, where people with no *prophasis* died suddenly.<sup>370</sup> Demosthenes develops this further in the *Third Philippic* as Philip’s interventionist ‘help’ is likened to visiting the sick by ἐπισκευομένοι: Demosthenes insinuates Philip preys upon the internal sickness of cities, having instigated the internal corruption himself.<sup>371</sup> Through this medical metaphor, Demosthenes warns the Assembly that Philip is an external exciting cause, ‘the first excuse’ which triggers *stasis*, and recognising this is imperative for the health of the *polis*. From this, Demosthenes creates a sense of urgency to act, especially now that Philip’s *true nature* has been revealed and he is vulnerable:

It is impossible, quite impossible, men of Athens, that a criminal and a perjurer and a liar should acquire power that is securely based; rather, such things last for a moment or

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<sup>368</sup> Demosthenes 2.9. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὑπ’ εὐνοίας τὰ πράγματα συστή και πᾶσι ταῦτα συμφέρη τοῖς μετέχουσι τοῦ πολέμου, και συμπονεῖν και φέρειν τὰς συμφορὰς και μένειν ἐθέλουσιν ἄνθρωποι: ὅταν δ’ ἐκ πλεονεξίας και πονηρίας τις ὥσπερ οὗτος ἰσχύσῃ, ἡ πρώτη πρόφασις και μικρὸν πταῖσμα ἅπαντ’ ἀνεχαίτισε και διέλυσεν. Usher 1999: 223 argues Demosthenes adapts the ‘old deliberative theme of justice (*dikaion*), using its obverse. Linked to it through the idea of goodwill (*eunoia*) is the companion theme of interest (*sympheron*).’ On a collective spirit of goodwill, I argue we can also detect a comparison of Athens’ own attitude to the goodwill they claimed to maintain in the Second Athenian Confederacy.

<sup>369</sup> Das 2015: 110. The LSJ entry for *prophasis* note its use ‘as a medical t.t, external existing cause’ with further examples in Hp. *Eph* 3.2, *Epid.* 3.3, 3.17, *Acut.* (*Sp*) 6. Das observes Deichgräber 1933: 1; Wooten 1979: 157; Tuplin 1998: 285n11 as also asserting this medical resonance of *prophasis*. Pearson 1952: 205-223 however rejects this. Das 2015: 111 suggests that this may also be an imitation of ‘the lexicon of his literary idol, Thucydides.’

<sup>370</sup> Thucydides 2.49.2. Demosthenes could be using the memorable context of the Plague to augment his own rhetoric, and this could also support the argument that Thucydides’ *History* had a formative influence (even subconsciously) on Demosthenes. For *prophasis* in Thucydides see Kirkwood 1952: 37-61.

<sup>371</sup> For Demosthenes 9.12 and use of ἐπισκευομένοι to describe Philip with connotations of visiting the sick/visit of sympathy, see discussion in Chapter 4.3 at p. 292.

a short time, and flourish on the basis of hopes if they are lucky, but in time are found out and fall apart.<sup>372</sup>

Hope (*elpis*), the last item in Pandora's jar, is considered *ambivalent* by Hesiod: it can include both positive and negative expectations, and to identify hope is implicitly to acknowledge that it is *only* a hope and may not come to be.<sup>373</sup> Demosthenes asserts that Philip's hopes (and those who advocate them in Athens) are futile as they are deceptions, doomed to failure because they are hollow:

Just as the lower parts of a house, I believe, or of a ship or similar structure must be the strongest, so the beginning and basic conception of any action must be true and just.

But this is now impossible in the case of Philip's actions.<sup>374</sup>

By reducing Philip as a threat, Demosthenes repeats his assertion that challenging Philip is both manageable and their duty. To permit Philip to exploit further the vacuum created by Athens' lack of intervention would compound their shame.<sup>375</sup> As such Demosthenes stresses the *kairos* of the situation and the need to act urgently, now that Philip's weakness has been exposed: 'this is a critical pass, men of Athens.'<sup>376</sup> From this, Demosthenes reasserts his call for action from the *First Olynthiac*, to help the Olynthians quickly:

I say that we should help the Olynthians, and I support the best and quickest way of doing so that anyone might propose; we should send an embassy to the Thessalians to

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<sup>372</sup> Demosthenes 2.10. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικοῦντα κάπορκοῦντα καὶ ψευδόμενον δύναμιν βεβαίαν κτήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἰς μὲν ἅπαξ καὶ βραχὴν χρόνον ἀντέχει, καὶ σφόδρα γ' ἦνθησ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἂν τύχη, τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ φωρᾶται καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ καταρρεῖ. Also attested to in Diodorus 16.8.5.

<sup>373</sup> Hesiod *Works and Days* 96.

<sup>374</sup> Demosthenes 2.10. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκίας, οἶμαι, καὶ πλοίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ κάτωθεν ἰσχυρότατ' εἶναι δεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀληθεῖς καὶ δικαίας εἶναι προσήκει. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔνι νῦν ἐν τοῖς πεπραγμένοις Φιλίππῳ.

<sup>375</sup> Again, parallels can be drawn to the *topos* of the *epitaphios logos* where the ancestors ordered the surviving Athenians not to dishonour them, such as Plato *Menexenus* 246b and Thucydides 2.43.

<sup>376</sup> Demosthenes 2.8.

inform some of them about these matters and to spur on the rest, since they have now voted to demand the return of Pagasae and to open negotiations about Magnesia.<sup>377</sup>

Demosthenes wants to take advantage of the disillusionment against Philip to swing momentum back to Athens, but to truly capitalise on shattering the perception of a powerful Philip, the Athenians must be *seen* to have dropped the previous attitude which enabled Philip to become an issue in the first place:

You should see to it, men of Athens, that our ambassadors not only make speeches but are also able to demonstrate some achievement on our part – that we have marched out in a manner worthy of our city and are engaged in action, since all speech, if it is not accompanied by action, seems vain and empty.<sup>378</sup>

In this Demosthenes reaffirms his argument in the *First Philippic*: it is essential that the Athenians are seen to act in their own interests, as their failure to do so caused their allies to look to Philip. Furthermore, it is crucial that the Athenians act in a manner ‘worthy of the city’ as their failure to do so has undermined their reputation. In particular, Demosthenes returns to the discrepancy between their words and deeds, noting the damage inflicted on the *polis* because of their failure to complete *logos* with its qualifying *ergon*. Rather than defining Athenian wisdom, Athens’ empty *logos* demonstrates the Assembly’s habit of undermining itself.<sup>379</sup> Their *logos* is ineffective and generates distrust rather than hope, ‘for the more we are ready to make speeches, the more everyone distrusts them.’<sup>380</sup>

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<sup>377</sup> Demosthenes 2.11. φημι δὴ δεῖν ἡμᾶς τοῖς μὲν Ὀλυνθίοις βοηθεῖν, καὶ ὅπως τις λέγει κάλλιστα καὶ τάχιστα, οὕτως ἀρέσκει μοι· πρὸς δὲ Θετταλοὺς πρεσβείαν πέμπειν, ἢ τοὺς μὲν διδάξει ταῦτα, τοὺς δὲ παροξυνεῖ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἰσιν ἐψηφισμένοι Παγασὰς ἀπαιτεῖν καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιεῖσθαι.

<sup>378</sup> Demosthenes 2.12. σκοπεῖσθε μέντοι τοῦτ’, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅπως μὴ λόγους ἐροῦσιν μόνον οἱ παρ’ ἡμῶν πρέσβεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργον τι δεικνύειν ἕξουσιν ἐξεληλυθότων ὑμῶν ἀξίως τῆς πόλεως καὶ ὄντων ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὡς ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπῆ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν, μάλιστα δ’ ὁ παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως.

<sup>379</sup> This develops into a form of speech-act logic, discussed in Chapter 4.2 *On the Chersonese* pp. 238-240.

<sup>380</sup> Demosthenes 2.12. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἐτοιμότερα αὐτῶ δοκοῦμεν χρῆσθαι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπιστοῦσι πάντες αὐτῶ.

## Argument

To address this, Demosthenes promotes his own proposals as the means to rehabilitate

Athens' reputation:

You must demonstrate that your conduct has undergone a substantial change for the better – by raising taxes, and campaigning, and doing everything energetically – if you want people to pay attention to you.<sup>381</sup>

As in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes asserts that it is in Athens' power to change the situation, if they shake off their apathy and do their duty, especially now that the situation has escalated beyond protecting their interests to protecting the wider Greek world.<sup>382</sup> Moreover, it again relies upon the willingness of the Athenians to recognise this and change their attitudes:

And if you are willing to do these things as you should, men of Athens, not only will Philip's alliances be shown to be weak and unreliable but his very kingdom and power will be proved to be in a parlous state.<sup>383</sup>

To balance the criticism that the Athenians need to make their conduct 'worthy of the city' (2.12) – which implies that it currently is not – Demosthenes reverts to making the task easier, by diminishing the power of the Macedonian forces. Demosthenes asserts that:

For on the whole, the power and empire of Macedonia has some value as a supplementary force, as was the case at the time of Timotheus' campaign against

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<sup>381</sup> Demosthenes 2.13. πολλήν δὴ τὴν μετάστασιν καὶ μεγάλην δεικτέον τὴν μεταβολήν, εἰσφέροντας, ἐξιόντας, ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας ἐτοίμως, εἴπερ τις ὑμῖν προσέξει τὸν νοῦν.

<sup>382</sup> Hunt 2010: 80 notes that *On the Navy Boards* 14.6-7 makes the distinction between war against the Greeks (a milder kind) and against the barbarians, where Demosthenes states that 'even when wronged by them [fellow Greeks], it would not be honourable to exact such a penalty from the wrong-doers as to leave them under the heel of the barbarians.' I think this can be applied to Demosthenes' attitude towards Olynthus and Macedonia, despite the bad feeling over the loss of Potidaea.

<sup>383</sup> Demosthenes 2.13. κἂν ταῦτ' ἐθελήσῃθ' ὡς προσήκει καὶ δὴ περαίνειν, οὐ μόνον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ συμμαχικὰ ἀσθενῶς καὶ ἀπίστως ἔχοντα φανήσεται Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως κακῶς ἔχοντ' ἐξελεγχθήσεται.

Olynthus; and again it proved to be of some use in combination with the Olynthians against Potidaea.<sup>384</sup>

Indeed, Demosthenes' praise of the Macedonian forces occurs in reference to how Perdiccas II assisted the Athenians against Chalcidice in 354/3, when it was working with Athens, and towards Athenian ends.<sup>385</sup> Likewise, it was successful when it worked *with* the Olynthians to Olynthian ends. But on considering the Macedonian force itself, however, 'on its own it is weak and riddled with deficiencies', and Demosthenes adds that Philip's Foot Companions, the πεζέταιροι, who 'have a reputation of being wonderful and disciplined fighters...are no better than anyone else.'<sup>386</sup> Moreover, despite how it appears, Philip's expansionism demonstrates a dangerous *hybris*, at odds with the nature of the Macedonians:

All the things that one might suppose would make him great – his wars and expeditions – have in fact made his kingdom less secure than it naturally is. For you should not suppose, men of Athens, that Philip and his subjects take pleasure in the same things. Rather, he strives for glory, and chooses to be active and take risks, and to suffer whatever may befall, preferring the glory of achieving more than any previous Macedonian king to a life of security.<sup>387</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> Demosthenes 2.14. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν μὲν προσθήκῃ μερίς ἐστὶ τις οὐ μικρά, οἷον ὑπῆρξέ ποθ' ὑμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους· πάλιν αὖ πρὸς Ποτειδαίαν Ὀλυνθίους ἐφάνη τι τοῦτο συναμφοτέρων·

<sup>385</sup> Trevett 2011: 47n10 suggests Demosthenes is referring to the 364/3 campaign against the Chalcidic League, supported by Neos *Timotheus* 1.2; Polyaeus *Stratagems* 3.10.7, 14.

<sup>386</sup> Demosthenes 2.14. αὐτὴ δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀσθενὴς καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ μεστή. Demosthenes 2.17. πεζέταιροι δόξαν μὲν ἔχουσιν ὡς εἰσὶ θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκριμένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου... οὐδένων εἰσὶν βελτίους. In my opinion, this is a misrepresentation of the Macedonian force under Philip. As Gabriel 2010: 54 notes, 'Philip's creation of the first competent corps of Macedonian infantry was not only an achievement of military genius, but also an experiment in social engineering,' and views the *pezhetairoi* as 'a truly national and democratic institution... Philip transformed the power of the traditional Macedonian monarchy by changing the nature of social relationships... by reorienting them away from tribal and local concerns and toward new *national* aspirations.' For the purpose of this thesis, however, I am concerned with Demosthenes' effect in diminishing the image of Philip and Macedonia as an effective force.

<sup>387</sup> Demosthenes 2.15. καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἅπασι τούτοις, οἷς ἂν τις μέγαν αὐτὸν ἠγήσαιτο, τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ταῖς στρατείαις, ἔτ' ἐπισημωτέρων ἢ ὑπῆρχε φύσει κατασκευάκεν αὐτῷ. μὴ γὰρ οἶεσθ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς αὐτοῖς Φίλιππον τε χαίρειν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν δόξης ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐζήλωκε, καὶ προήρηται πρᾶττων καὶ κινδυνεύων, ἂν συμβῆ τι, παθεῖν, τὴν τοῦ διαπράξασθαι ταῦθ' ἂ μηδεὶς πόποτ' ἄλλος Μακεδόνων

While Philip's interference in Athens' sphere of influence threatens their interests, Demosthenes also presents Philip, like the Persians before him, as extending beyond his reach.<sup>388</sup> This tyrannical aspect of Philip is also emphasised in Demosthenes' description of the suffering of Macedonian people:

But his subjects do not share in the glory of his achievements; instead, they are always being pounded by this to-and-fro campaigning, and are distressed and endure constant hardships, and are not allowed to spend time at their work or on their private affairs.<sup>389</sup>

Moreover, Demosthenes recalls the trusted first-hand account of his informer – 'someone who has been in that country, and who is incapable of lying,'<sup>390</sup> to further emphasise that Philip is a tyrant:

For, he says, any of them who are experienced in war and battle are removed by Philip out of jealousy, since he wishes to give the impression that every achievement is his alone – in addition to everything else, he reports that Philip's jealousy is unsurpassable.<sup>391</sup>

Thus, this superlative nature of Philip's jealousy associates the Macedonian king with the excessive *hybris* characteristic of tyrants, arguably making Philip's fall from grace inevitable

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βασιλεὺς δόξαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀσφαλῶς ἡρημένος· Again, Demosthenes' account does not portray the reality of Philip and Macedonia. See in general all of Worthington 2014 and Hammond 1972; 1994.

<sup>388</sup> Hunt 2010: 81 notes how 'Demosthenes often represents Macedonia as a new Persia, an intrinsically hostile, barbarian state threatening Greece.' Asirvatham 2010: 108 notes that 'Like Persia, Macedonia – despite its kings' philhellenism – was not known as a place of indigenous culture (although it had a number of Greek intellectuals in residence, most famously Euripides). It was known, however, as a place of wealth, which for Greeks (as for us at times) was easily associated with corruption.' This also has relevance to the discussions in Chapter 4.1 pp. 200-209 and the *Second Philippic* on the association of Philip and the memory of the Persian Wars.

<sup>389</sup> Demosthenes 2.16 τοῖς δὲ τῆς μὲν φιλοτιμίας τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων οὐ μέτεστι, κοπτόμενοι δ' αἰεὶ ταῖς στρατείαις ταύταις ταῖς ἄνω κάτω λυποῦνται καὶ συνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦσιν, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις οὐτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίοις ἐώμενοι διατρίβειν.

<sup>390</sup> Demosthenes 2.17. τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ γεγενημένων τινὸς ἤκουον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδαμῶς οἴου τε ψεῦδεσθαι.

<sup>391</sup> Demosthenes 2.18. εἰ μὲν γάρ τις ἀνὴρ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷος ἔμπειρος πολέμου καὶ ἀγώνων, τούτους μὲν φιλοτιμία πάντας ἀποθεῖν αὐτὸν ἔφη, βουλόμενον πάνθ' αὐτοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι τᾶργα (πρὸς γὰρ αὐτὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀνυπερβλήτων εἶναι).



given the past precedents of tyrants' failure to subdue Athenians.<sup>392</sup> Continuing to report his informer's first-hand account, Demosthenes' narrative describes how:

If anyone is sober or generally upright, and is unable to tolerate the constant loose living and drunkenness and lewd dancing, such a man is pushed aside and treated as a nobody. The rest of his company are brigands and flatterers and men whose drunken dancing is so vile that I shrink from describing it to you...those men whom everyone drove away from here for being far more disgusting than conjurers, that public slave Callias and men of this stamp, pantomime actors of the ridiculous and poets of shameful songs, which they compose for their associates in order to raise a laugh – these are the men he loves to keep to himself.<sup>393</sup>

In using stereotypes of the Macedonian court, Demosthenes asserts that, 'such things, men of Athens, even if they seem relatively unimportant, provide a thoughtful observer with clear proof of his disgusting nature', a nature which has been obscured by Philip's success to date

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<sup>392</sup> Most notably accounted in Herodotus' *Histories*, and part of the the *topoi* of Athenian's self-definition transmitted in social memory.

<sup>393</sup> Demosthenes 2.18-19. εἰ δέ τις σώφρων ἢ δίκαιος ἄλλως, τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν ἀκρασίαν τοῦ βίου καὶ μέθην καὶ κορδακισμοὺς οὐ δυνάμενος φέρειν, παρεῶσθαι καὶ ἐν οὐδενὸς εἶναι μέρει τὸν τοιοῦτον. λοιποὺς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι ληστὰς καὶ κόλακας καὶ τοιοῦτους ἀνθρώπους οἷους μεθυσθέντας ὀρχεῖσθαι τοιαῦθ' οἷ' ἐγὼ νῦν ὀκνῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὀνομάσαι ... οὗς ἐνθένδε πάντες ἀπήλαυνον ὡς πολλὰ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν ἀσελγεστέρους ὄντας, Καλλίαν ἐκεῖνον τὸν δημόσιον καὶ τοιοῦτους ἀνθρώπους, μίμους γελοίων καὶ ποιητὰς αἰσχυρῶν ἄσμάτων, ὧν εἰς τοὺς συνόντας ποιοῦσιν εἵνεκα τοῦ γελασθῆναι, τούτους ἀγαπᾶ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει. Demosthenes' account on the Macedonian court is similar to the account of his contemporary Theopompus of Chios in his *Philippic History*. BNJ *FGrH* 115 F 224 Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 4.116G-7C on Theopompus' account of Philip and his companions: that they were the worst money managers 'of all mankind...none of them could be trusted to live in an upright fashion or to make their households. He [Philip] himself was to blame because he was greedy and extravagant' doing 'everything rashly.' The companions were chosen 'not for excellence but rather if one among the Greeks or Barbarians was a *lastauros* (hairy beast) or a loathsome person or brazen in his character.' This continues at BNJ *FGrH* F225b Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 6.260 D-1A 'they loved drunkenness...thieving...murdering...swearing false oaths...cheating...desirous of what they lack.' This criticism can also be applied to Demosthenes' reference to Philip's *pleonexia* at 9.27. Polybius in his *Histories* 8.91.4 notes how Theopompus argued Philip 'was by nature passionately eager for drinking unmixed wine...he frequently appeared drunk to his friends.' However, he rebuked Theopompus' criticism as falsehoods against Philip (BNJ 115 T16). Trevett 2011: 41 also makes this link to Theopompus' criticism of heavy drinking with *FGrH* 115 fr. 27 and 282.

as ‘success is good at concealing such disgraces.’<sup>394</sup> As in the *First Philippic* Demosthenes concedes that on appearances Philip looks successful:

If any of you, men of Athens, sees Philip’s successes and concludes that he is a formidable enemy, he is thinking like a sensible man.<sup>395</sup>

But behind appearances, Demosthenes has demonstrated that Philip’s power is built upon deception, rotten at its core, and thus vulnerable. In remembering his assertion in the *proemium* that the Athenians’ current *kairos* is a sign of divine favour, Demosthenes bets his stake on Athens’ past reputation over Philip’s present luck:

Fortune is a vital element – rather it is everything – in all human affairs. Nevertheless, if I were given the choice, I would personally choose the fortune of our city, so long as you are willing to do your duty in person, even in a limited degree, rather than his, since I observe that you have many more avenues than he has for gaining the favour of the gods.<sup>396</sup>

As in the previous two speeches, this makes the task of challenging Macedonia manageable, but also shameful to avoid, as due to his tyrannical nature, ‘in my opinion, men of Athens, Philip will be exposed quite soon, if the gods are willing and if you desire it.’<sup>397</sup> But Demosthenes’ additional caveat, ‘so long as you are willing to do your duty in person’, also reminds the Assembly that any outcome is dependent on their change of attitude. Not only does this recall the specific proposals of the *First Philippic* to serve in person, but again shifts the focus away from Philip as a formidable enemy onto the Athenians’ agency to act on the

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<sup>394</sup> Demosthenes 2.20. καίτοι ταῦτα, καὶ εἰ μικρά τις ἡγεῖται, μεγάλ’, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δείγματα τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ἐστὶ τοῖς εὖ φρονουῦσιν...αἱ γὰρ εὐπραξίαι δειναὶ συγκρύψαι τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ὀνειδῆ·

<sup>395</sup> Demosthenes 2.22. εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν Φίλιππον εὐτυχοῦνθ’ ὀρῶν ταύτη φοβερὸν προσπολεμῆσαι νομίζει, σώφρονος μὲν ἀνθρώπου λογισμῶ χρηταί·

<sup>396</sup> Demosthenes 2.22. μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ὅλον ἢ τύχη παρὰ πάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε, εἴ τις αἴρεσίν μοι δοίη, τὴν τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως τύχην ἂν ἐλοίμην, ἐθελόντων ἂ προσήκει ποιεῖν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ μικρόν, ἢ τὴν ἐκείνου· πολὺ γὰρ πλείους ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸ τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐνοίαν ἔχειν ὀρῶ ὑμῖν ἐνούσας ἢ ’κείνῳ.

<sup>397</sup> Demosthenes 2.21. δοκεῖ δ’ ἔμοιγ’, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεῖξιν οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν, ἂν οἱ τε θεοὶ θέλωσι καὶ ὑμεῖς βούλησθε.

situation. This point, which Demosthenes has emphasised since the *First Philippic*, is key: it relies on the Athenians shaking off their apathy and, now with the crisis at Olynthus, seizing the *kairos* to act.

Thus, the direction of this ‘Fortune’ rests on how the Athenians react, and the remainder of the speech is directed at addressing the Assembly’s attitude directly. Bluntly, Demosthenes criticises their idle lack of action:

And yet we seem to sit around and do nothing. But an idler cannot call on his friends to act on his behalf, still less on the gods.<sup>398</sup>

This could refer to their failure to act on his last two speeches, but also their own responsibility for the problems they are facing. Demosthenes compares Philip’s pro-active attitude to their own apathy, to logically explain the situation:

Indeed, it is no wonder Philip, who goes on campaign and engages in hard work and attends to everything, who leaves aside no opportunity or season, gets the better of us who delay and take votes and hold enquires. Nor do I find this surprising. Indeed, the opposite would have been amazing: if we, who do none of the things that those who are at war must do, were to get the better of one who does everything.<sup>399</sup>

As in the *First Philippic*, the reversal of roles of Macedonia and Athens demonstrates how the crisis is a result of Athens’ failure to act in manner worthy of the city. It is this inversion of their national character which Demosthenes sees as responsible for the present situation as:

I am amazed at this: that in the past you rose up against the Spartans in the cause of justice for the Greeks, and refused many opportunities to make large private gains, but

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<sup>398</sup> Demosthenes 2.23. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, καθήμεθ' οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες· οὐκ ἔνι δ' αὐτὸν ἀργοῦντ' οὐδὲ τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτάττειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τι ποιεῖν, μή τί γε δὴ τοῖς θεοῖς.

<sup>399</sup> Demosthenes 2.23. οὐ δὴ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, εἰ στρατευόμενος καὶ πονῶν ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς καὶ παρῶν ἐφ' ἅπασιν καὶ μήτε καιρὸν μήθ' ὥραν παραλείπων ἡμῶν μελλόντων καὶ ψηφίζομένων καὶ πυνθανομένων περιγίγνεται. οὐδὲ θαυμάζω τοῦτ' ἐγώ· τούναντίον γὰρ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστόν, εἰ μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ὦν τοῖς πολεμοῦσι προσήκει τοῦ πάντα ποιῶντος περιῆμεν.

instead spent your own money by raising taxes and were the first to risk your lives on campaign, so that the majority of the Greeks should get justice, whereas now you shrink from marching out and put off paying taxes, even to protect your own possessions! Indeed, I am amazed that you, who have often rescued the other Greeks, both collectively and individually, now sit about, even when you have been deprived of your own property.<sup>400</sup>

By doing precisely the opposite of their ancestors, Demosthenes uses the past to assert that the current Athenians have created this crisis. It is their refusal to recognise this that is the crux of their problems:

These things amaze me, but it amazes me even more, men of Athens, that none of you are able to reckon how long you have been at war with Philip and what you have been doing during the period. Surely you realise that you have spent the whole time procrastinating, hoping others will act, blaming each other, holding trials, hoping again, doing pretty much the same as you are doing now.<sup>401</sup>

Demosthenes condemns their futile hope that their problems will resolve themselves, and asserts that this attitude is the cause of their misfortunes. By not recognising the damage caused by their lack of action, they fail to see that any hope of regaining their possessions is impossible if they refuse to change their attitude towards deliberation, and act against Philip's expansion.

By blaming each other, the Athenians fail to recognise that the time for deliberation is past, and

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<sup>400</sup> Demosthenes 2.24 (as noted above). ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο θαυμάζω, εἰ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν ποτ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δικαίων ἀντήρατε, καὶ πόλλ' ἰδίᾳ πλεονεκτῆσαι πολλάκις ὑμῖν ἐξὸν οὐκ ἠθελήσατε, ἀλλ' ἴν' οἱ ἄλλοι τύχωσι τῶν δικαίων, τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἀνηλίσκετ' εἰσφέροντες καὶ προουκινδυνεύετε στρατευόμενοι, νυνὶ δ' ὀκνεῖτ' ἐξέναι καὶ μέλλετ' εἰσφέρειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν κτημάτων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους σεσώκατε πολλάκις πάντα καὶ καθ' ἓν αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει, τὰ δ' ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες κάθησθε. This also prepares us for Demosthenes' elaborate comparison of the present Athenians to their fifth century ancestors, although again we must not presume that Demosthenes had a third *Olynthiac* in mind at this point.

<sup>401</sup> Demosthenes 2.25. ταῦτα θαυμάζω, κᾶτι πρὸς τοῦτοισι, εἰ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δύναται λογίσασθαι πόσον πολεμεῖτε χρόνον Φιλίππῳ, καὶ τί ποιοῦντων ὑμῶν ὁ χρόνος διελήλυθεν οὗτος. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ', ὅτι μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐτέρους τινὰς ἐλπίζόντων πράξειν, αἰτιωμένων ἀλλήλους, κρινόντων, πάλιν ἐλπίζόντων, σχεδὸν ταῦθ' ἅπερ νυνὶ ποιοῦντων, ἅπασ ὁ χρόνος διελήλυθεν.

how constant deliberation enables them to avoid acting on the crisis in the north Aegean. Their habit of blaming each other becomes a substitute for action, and Demosthenes cites as an example their attitude towards their generals:

Why, men of Athens, do you suppose that all the generals that you dispatch avoid this war, and find private ones? The reason is that in the war against Philip, the prizes for which the war is being fought belong to you – if Amphipolis is captured, it will immediately revert to you – but the risks belong exclusively to your commanders, and there is no pay available to them. Elsewhere, however, the dangers are fewer, and there are profits to be made by the commanders and their troops.<sup>402</sup>

This appears to be a continuation of Demosthenes' argument in the *First Philippic*, that the lack of funding for military expeditions has had a negative impact upon their current situation.<sup>403</sup>

Then, as now, Demosthenes observes the damage inflicted by their present attitude:

But you, when you notice the disastrous state of your affairs, put the commanders on trial; but then, when you allow them to speak, you hear about these constraints and let them go.<sup>404</sup>

The fact that the Athenians do not change their policy, and refuse to learn from their mistakes, results in continued deliberation where the 'collective interest suffers.'<sup>405</sup> I propose that it is this

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<sup>402</sup> Demosthenes 2.28. τίνας γὰρ εἶνεκ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζετε τοῦτον μὲν φεύγειν τὸν πόλεμον πάντας ὅσους ἂν ἐκπέμψητε στρατηγούς, ἰδίου δ' εὐρίσκειν πολέμους, εἰ δεῖ τι τῶν ὄντων καὶ περὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν εἰπεῖν; ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ θλά' ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ πόλεμος ὑμέτερα (Ἀμφίπολις γ' ἂν ληφθῆ, παραχρῆμ' ὑμεῖς κομεισθε), οἱ δὲ κίνδυνοι τῶν ἐφεστηκότων ἴδιοι, μισθὸς δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖ δὲ κίνδυνοι μὲν ἐλάττους, τὰ δὲ λήμματα τῶν ἐφεστηκότων καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

<sup>403</sup> See Demosthenes 4.35-6.

<sup>404</sup> Demosthenes 2.29. ὑμεῖς δ', ὅταν μὲν εἰς τὰ πράγματα' ἀποβλέψητε φαύλως ἔχοντα, τοὺς ἐφεστηκότας κρίνετε, ὅταν δὲ δόντες λόγον τὰς ἀνάγκας ἀκούσητε ταύτας, ἀφίετε.

<sup>405</sup> Demosthenes 2.29: the result is that you dispute and quarrel with each other – some have one opinion, others another, and our collective interest suffers' περίεστι τοῖνυν ὑμῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐρίζειν καὶ διεστάναι, τοῖς μὲν ταῦτα πεπεισμένοι, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα, τὰ κοινὰ δ' ἔχειν φαύλως. One could compare this preservation of personal interest to Praxagora's comments in Aristophanes *Assembly Women* 205-7 'You each look out for a way to gain a personal profit for yourself, while the public interest gets kicked around.' Christ 2006: 33 notes the selfishness of the second citizen (the cynical Athenian) is 'fully consistent with that attributed to the Athenians at large by Praxagora.'

internal breakdown of their affairs, rather than a policy specifically *against* Philip, that Demosthenes has been addressing. Indeed, I suggest that asserting this correlation between the Assembly's attitude and their declining situation and Philip's rise has been Demosthenes' priority in the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs* so far. For Demosthenes, the Athenians need to acknowledge and tackle this, because there is no hope to improve matters if they do not change their attitude:

Are you so senseless, men of Athens, that you hope to improve our city's situation by following the very same policies that led to its decline?<sup>406</sup>

Again, Demosthenes associates the futile promises of the other *rhētors* with their continued decline, noting that their situation has only deteriorated further since the *First Philippic* to a point that:

But in our case, as a result of the war, we no longer have any of our previous possessions to defend, we must reacquire them. This is now the task that we face.<sup>407</sup>

Despite this physical evidence of the inevitable outcome for Athens if they do not act, the Assembly not long previously had rejected the *First Olynthiac*. Accordingly, Demosthenes calls on the Athenians to learn from both these recent mistakes, and also by the example set by their ancestors – who, as he reminded them, ‘rose up against the Spartans in the cause of justice for the Greeks.’<sup>408</sup>

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<sup>406</sup> Demosthenes 2.26. εἴθ' οὕτως ἀγνωμόνως ἔχετε', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥστε δι' ὧν ἐκ χρηστῶν φαῦλα τὰ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως γέγονεν, διὰ τούτων ἐλπίζετε τῶν αὐτῶν πράξεων ἐκ φαύλων αὐτὰ χρηστὰ γενήσεσθαι; This is also a continuation of his points in the *First Olynthiac* 1.14-15, ‘my purpose is to make you understand...the harm done by our continual neglect of affairs...we refuse to apply ourselves robustly to any situation, how can matters be expected to end? ...our homeland may be at risk.’

<sup>407</sup> Demosthenes 2.26. νῦν δ' ὅ τι μὲν φυλάξομεν, οὐδέν ἐσθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου λοιπὸν τῶν πρότερον, κτήσασθαι δὲ δεῖ. αὐτῶν οὖν ἡμῶν ἔργον τοῦτ' ἤδη.

<sup>408</sup> Demosthenes 2.24.

## Epilogue

Demosthenes concludes the speech by reasserting his proposals and calling the Athenians to shake off their current attitude:

You must put such conduct aside and even now recover your self-control, and join together in deliberating, speaking, and taking action for the common good.<sup>409</sup>

Demosthenes asserts with no uncertainty that they cannot serve the common good if they do not complete their *logos* with *ergon*. He also calls them to act democratically, reasserting the need for the Athenians to all do their part:

If you grant some citizens the right to give orders as if in a tyranny, compel others to serve as trierarchs, to pay the wealth-tax, and to campaign, and to allow others still to do nothing but vote against them and make no other contribution to the collective effort, you will fail to accomplish any of the things you need to in a timely fashion.<sup>410</sup>

In this way, Demosthenes calls the Assembly to recognise these errors and make them realise that their interests (and reputation) are at stake if they refuse to act:

I say in summary, that you should all contribute equitably according to your means; you should all go on campaign in turn until everyone has served; you should give a hearing to all who come forward to speak; and you should choose the best proposals you hear, rather than whatever this man or that should say.<sup>411</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> Demosthenes 2.30. δεῖ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπανέντας καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἔτι καὶ νῦν γενομένους κοινὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὸ πράττειν ποιῆσαι.

<sup>410</sup> Demosthenes 2.30. εἰ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὥσπερ ἐκ τυραννίδος ὑμῶν ἐπιτάττειν ἀποδώσετε, τοῖς δ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι τρηραρχεῖν, εἰσφέρειν, στρατεύεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ψηφίζεσθαι κατὰ τούτων μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ μὴδ' ὀτιοῦν συμπονεῖν, οὐχὶ γενήσεται τῶν δεόντων ἡμῖν οὐδὲν ἐν καιρῷ. As Ober 1989: 320 notes, 'When the political orator blamed the people, he typically did so by appealing to egalitarian principles. He took the position of reminding his audience of the pristine democratic code of thought and behaviour from which they had strayed.'

<sup>411</sup> Demosthenes 2.31. λέγω δὴ κεφάλαιον, πάντας εἰσφέρειν ἀφ' ὅσων ἕκαστος ἔχει τὸ ἴσον· πάντας ἐξιέναι κατὰ μέρος, ἕως ἂν ἅπαντες στρατεύσῃσθε· πᾶσι τοῖς παρῖοῦσι λόγον δίδοναι, καὶ τὰ βέλτισθ' ὧν ἂν ἀκούσῃθ' αἰρεῖσθαι, μὴ ἂν ὁ δεῖν' ἢ ὁ δεῖν' εἴπη.

Moreover, Demosthenes assimilates his own proposals to the definition of the ideal citizen, a ‘selfless civic benefactor...one who puts his capacities, talents and resources freely at the disposal of the *polis*’, and emphasises how their neglect of their civic duty has led to the external issues against Macedonian expansion, and their failure to halt it.<sup>412</sup> As in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes ask the Athenians to act, in person, and fund their forces, demonstrating a new commitment and conviction of their words by their actions.

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<sup>412</sup> Gray 2015: 60 notes that in this passage Demosthenes ‘closely associated egalitarian civic organisation with each citizen having the opportunity and duty to participate in politics and war, and to make an equal financial contribution according to his means’.



## CHAPTER 2.3 THE *THIRD OLYNTHIAC*

The *Second Olynthiac* was only a partial success as the Assembly moved Demosthenes' proposals, but not in their entirety. In the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes recounts the events after the *Second Olynthiac* and how following Philip's Thracian campaign and the siege of Heraion Teichos, the Athenians voted to 'launch forty triremes and man them with those up to forty-five years old and to levy a wealth-tax of sixty talents.'<sup>413</sup> But, it was nearly a year later, after the Eleusinian Mysteries, that Charidemus was dispatched 'with ten empty ships and five talents of silver', which was somewhat short of what had been proposed and voted for.<sup>414</sup> Moreover, Demosthenes notes that, 'when it was announced that Philip was sick or dead...you thought that you no longer needed to send a relief force and disbanded the expedition.'<sup>415</sup> By not capitalising on the weakness of Philip, and failing to follow through on their ratified proposals, the Athenians lost the initiative Philip returned to Chalcidice with a strengthened resolve.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that Demosthenes' account was delivered to persuade the Athenians, and by flagging up their errors, he was slightly unjust in his assessment of Athenian action. Philochorus and Diodorus tell us that initially Chares set out for Olynthus with 2000 Thracian cavalry and thirty triremes.<sup>416</sup> By the time they arrived at Olynthus, Philip had left for Thessaly to deal with the expelled tyrant of Pherae, Peitholaus,

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<sup>413</sup> Demosthenes 3.4. Lane-Fox 1997:197 dates the siege at November 351 suggesting that Philip campaigned against Arybbas of Epirus early 351 before moving east to Heraion Teichos, citing Errington 1975: 41-50 based on Diodorus' account. Hammond 1937 uses Demosthenes 3.4 to suggest November 352.

<sup>414</sup> Demosthenes 3.5. Trevett 2011: 57 notes that 'An "empty" ship was one for which the commander rather than the city was responsible for finding rowers.' I argue this demonstrated the Assembly's failure to man their forces with *Athenians* as Demosthenes had proposed, and which he viewed as critical in demonstrating their changed attitude and commitment to defending their interests. See too Gabrielson 1994: 108.

<sup>415</sup> Demosthenes 3.5. ὡς γὰρ ἠγγέλθη Φίλιππος ἀσθενῶν ἢ τεθνεώς ... οὐκέτι καιρὸν οὐδένα τοῦ βοηθεῖν νομίσαντες ἀφεῖτ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ἀπόστολον.

<sup>416</sup> Pearson 1976: 121 states that Philochorus 'recorded three separate efforts by the Athenians to save Olynthus, all unsuccessful...and early commentators found it convenient to believe that each of these efforts were the result of one of the speeches.' Pearson refers to Dionysius *Letter to Ammaeus* 9-10; Philochorus, *FGrH* 328, F.49-51.

and then returned to Pella for the winter of 349.<sup>417</sup> The Athenians, therefore, returned home. Philip resumed his Chalcidic campaign in the spring, which generated another appeal for help from Olynthus. The Athenians sent Charidemus, who was based in the Chersonese, with 18 triremes, 4000 peltasts, and 150 cavalry to join the Olynthian army ‘of 1000 cavalry and 10000 infantry.’<sup>418</sup> This joint force actually recaptured some Pallene cities, and attacked Bottiaea, but despite their efforts recorded by Philochorus and Diodorus, Philip dominated the Chalcidic peninsular, taking Mecyberna by late spring/ early summer 348.<sup>419</sup> Following this, the Olynthians appealed again to Athenians for aid, and the subsequent debate sets the context for the *Third Olynthiac*.

For Demosthenes, their ‘half-a-job’ attitude towards Chares’ expedition force epitomised their apathetic approach to the situation as a whole. This was exacerbated by their failure to capitalise on Philip’s injury as they returned home, hoping the situation was resolved.<sup>420</sup> Accordingly, the *Third Olynthiac* returns to confronting the Assembly’s attitude: ‘you must also know, men of Athens, that a decree is worthless if it is not accompanied by the will to carry out the decision with enthusiasm.’<sup>421</sup> Demosthenes forcefully reiterates his complaints from the previous three speeches, and his frustration that they have let the situation deteriorate by refusing to heed his advice. In keeping with the conventions of the Assembly, Demosthenes does not criticise individuals directly but delivers his denunciation to the *dēmos* as a whole.<sup>422</sup> This is most striking in his scathing comparison of fifth and

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<sup>417</sup> Worthington 2013: 138. Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 49. Diodorus 16.52.9.

<sup>418</sup> Worthington 2013: 138-9. Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 50. Diodorus 16.52.9.

<sup>419</sup> Worthington 2013: 139. Diodorus 16.53.2. Mecyberna was Olynthus’ port.

<sup>420</sup> Compare with Demosthenes 2.25.

<sup>421</sup> Demosthenes 3.14. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνό γ’ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν δεῖ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ψήφισμ’ οὐδενὸς ἄξιόν ἐστιν, ἂν μὴ προσγένηται τὸ ποιεῖν ἐθέλειν τὰ γε δόξαντα προθύμως ὑμᾶς.

<sup>422</sup> Gray 2015: 178 argues Dem. 3.30-6 is an example of mass denunciation ‘with the potential to be rallying rather than divisive’, as it criticised ‘the *dēmos* as a whole for failing short of its own generic, uncontroversial ideals of probity, intelligence, courage, or self-sacrifice, in ways which could be made good through collective effort.’ See too Thucydides 3.38.4.

fourth century Athens, which develops his assertion from the *First Philippic* that the current Athenians no longer reflect defining Athenian values. Demosthenes emphasises this through his interweaving use of praise and blame to contrast their current practices to their fifth-century ancestors. In his reference to the past, Demosthenes calls the Assembly to recognise that their failure to maintain the virtues of the ancestors has caused the current crisis.<sup>423</sup> This atavism is not a nostalgic reminiscence in an Hesiodic degenerative view of the *polis*, but rather an assertion of the fundamental qualities that are associated with the Athenian past.<sup>424</sup> The comparison's effectiveness lies in 'its simplicity, picking up on the 'shared' knowledge of certain key figures and events'.<sup>425</sup> By making the Assembly see the discrepancy between their current reflections and their ancestral exempla, Demosthenes' proposals became performing Athenian democratic values to recover their past greatness and security.

By the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes no longer argues that the Athenians need to understand the situation, he has explained it enough times for them to comprehend. Rather, he pointedly suggests that they understand the situation, but their apathy and self-gratification prevails over reason and duty, provoking them to prove him wrong.

Demosthenes also returns to the Theoric fund, and while some such as Eubulus saw an expedition to a potentially dead Philip a waste of money and resources, for Demosthenes, this epitomised the apathy and avoidance of action which had caused their problems in the first place.<sup>426</sup> Moreover, the promise of action was no longer sufficient for their allies, who were now dubious of Athenian promises, especially now that Athens had failed to enact their voted proposals and capitalise on Philip's injury. Athens was now in a position where it could

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<sup>423</sup> Demosthenes 3.28-9.

<sup>424</sup> Karvounis 2002: 238 says something similar with regard to the *First Philippic*, and how the reader gets the impression that a sleeping giant is among the Athenians, whose awakening alone would be sufficient to defeat their enemies: 'Der Leser bekommt den Eindruck, daß es sich bei den Athenern um einen schlafenden Riesen handelt, dessen Erwachen allein ausreichen würde, um seine Feinde zu bezwingen.'

<sup>425</sup> Clarke 2008: 256.

<sup>426</sup> On Eubulus' economic reforms see earlier discussion of Demosthenes 4.15, p. 49.

not retaliate against Philip and they were ‘reduced to defending themselves and their allies.’<sup>427</sup>

The speech aims to make the Athenians enact their original proposals before it is too late. To this end, Demosthenes returns to his arguments in the previous speeches that the Athenians need to act, in person and fund their expedition, and recognise what is expected of them as Athenians:

So, men of Athens, you should examine what is possible in our situation, and how you will be able to go on campaign and receive pay. Prudent and honourable men do not neglect their military responsibilities for want of money or taking the resulting criticism lightly; nor, after taking up arms against the Corinthians or Megarians, do they permit Philip to enslave Greek cities for want of subsistence money for those who are on campaign.<sup>428</sup>

Indeed, by focusing on: οὐ τοι σωφρόνων οὐδὲ γενναίων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων, and noting the positive connotations of *sōphrōn* and *gennaios*, Demosthenes represents the current Athenians as falling far short of the behaviour expected of ‘prudent (*sōphrōn*) and honourable (*gennaios*) men’, expressing the current crisis as more a crisis of Athenian identity than one brought about by Philip.

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<sup>427</sup> Trevett 2011: 53. As argued at the start of this chapter, the dating of the *Olynthiacs* are hard to exactly determine, but we can definitely date this speech to after the Thracian campaign, and scholarly consensus agrees that the increased daring and solemn tone of the speeches suggests that Philip’s siege at Olynthus had progressed. Worthington 2013: 139 notes that Demosthenes’ claims at 3.1 were overstated, but the situation ‘was in fact grim.’

<sup>428</sup> Demosthenes 3.20. ὁρᾶτ’ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦθ’ οὕτως, ὅπως καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδέχεται καὶ δυνήσεσθ’ ἐξιέναι καὶ μισθὸν ἔξετε. οὐ τοι σωφρόνων οὐδὲ γενναίων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐλλείποντάς τι δι’ ἔνδειαν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ πολέμου εὐχερῶς τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ὀνειδῆ φέρειν, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ μὲν Κορινθίους καὶ Μεγαρέας ἀρπάσαντας τὰ ὅπλα πορεύεσθαι, Φίλιππον δ’ ἔαν πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι δι’ ἀπορίαν ἐφοδίων τοῖς στρατευομένοις.

## Analysis

### Proemium

Demosthenes' proemium establishes that the deterioration of events are a direct consequence of the Assembly's attitude, and in particular the decline of the deliberative process:

For the speeches deal with how to punish Philip, but our situation has deteriorated so badly that we are reduced to examining how to prevent him from harming us first. As a result, I believe that those who deliver speeches of this nature are simply mistaken and have set before you an untrue basis for deliberation.<sup>429</sup>

While on the one hand they seek to punish Philip, on the other they do not recognise that their failure to deliberate effectively – and on the correct issues – has resulted in the need to safeguard themselves from further harm. As such, their failure to recognise their own flaws and culpability implies that they cannot – in this present state – resolve this crisis as they cannot deliberate effectively. It is the reluctance of the Assembly to reflect self-critically and acknowledge this, and their refusal to listen, that Demosthenes addresses in the proemium:

The present situation, more than any previous one, requires much thought and deliberation, but I do not consider it particularly difficult to advise you on what to do in our current circumstances. I am, however, at a loss, men of Athens, as to the manner in which I should speak to you about them. For I am convinced both from personal experience and what I have heard, that we have lost control of the situation more because of our unwillingness to do our duty than from any lack of intelligence on our part.<sup>430</sup>

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<sup>429</sup> Demosthenes 3.1. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ τοῦ τιμωρῆσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματ' εἰς τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥσθ' ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθ' αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς σκέψασθαι δέον. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἢ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, περὶ ἧς βουλευέσθε, οὐχὶ τὴν οὖσαν παριστάντες ὑμῖν ἀμαρτάνειν.

<sup>430</sup> Demosthenes 3.3. ὁ μὲν οὖν παρῶν καιρὸς, εἴπερ ποτέ, πολλῆς φροντίδος καὶ βουλῆς δεῖται· ἐγὼ δ' οὐχ ὅ τι χρὴ περὶ τῶν παρόντων συμβουλεύσαι χαλεπώτατον ἠγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖν' ἀπορῶ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον, ὃ ἄνδρες

Indeed, the Athenians have failed to heed his assertions since the *First Philippic* that the worst aspect of the situation (their lack of action) presents their best hope. Their failure to act leaves them in a paralysis: ‘but before we have made a sound beginning, I think that it is pointless to say anything about the end.’<sup>431</sup> In stating this, Demosthenes asserts that they still do not move beyond words to action. This discrepancy between *logos* and *ergon* is a central theme throughout the speeches and contributes significantly to their current situation, as noted above ‘a decree is worthless’ if it is not qualified with the will to enact the decision with enthusiasm.<sup>432</sup>

### Narrative

In this regard, the Athenians are still behaving as if ‘paper forces’ are sufficient, and have failed to learn that:

If decrees alone had the power either to compel you to do your duty or to accomplish the goals for which they were proposed, you would not find yourselves voting for many things but accomplishing few if any of them, nor would Philip have been insulting you for such a long time, since, to judge by your decrees at any rate, he would long ago have been punished.<sup>433</sup>

Moreover, the allies have lost faith in Athenian *logos*: their words alone are no longer sufficient due to their failure to follow through with actions, which has been perceived as weakness by their allies and enemies alike. As Demosthenes stated in the *First Philippic*, the

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Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν. πέπεισμαι γὰρ ἐξ ὧν παρῶν καὶ ἀκούων σύνοῖδα, τὰ πλείω τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμᾶς ἐκπεφευγένοι τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἢ τῷ μὴ συνιέναι.

<sup>431</sup> Demosthenes 3.2 πρὶν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ὑποθέσθαι, μάταιον ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ὄντινούν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον. This is repeated with greater vitriol in the *Third Philippic* 9.5 ‘you have not been defeated: you have not even been aroused!’ This is also another *topoi* of the *epitaphioi logoi*, to not be defeated by an enemy, but by their own errors, or in this case, by doing nothing.

<sup>432</sup> Demosthenes 3.14.

<sup>433</sup> Demosthenes 3.14. εἰ γὰρ αὐτάρκη τὰ ψηφίσματα ἦν ἢ ὑμᾶς ἀναγκάζειν ἃ προσήκει πράττειν ἢ περὶ ὧν γραφεῖν διαπράξασθαι, οὔτ’ ἂν ὑμεῖς πολλὰ ψηφίζομενοι μικρά, μᾶλλον δ’ οὐδὲν ἐπράττετε τούτων, οὔτε Φίλιππος τοσοῦτον ὑβρίζει χρόνον· πάλαι γὰρ ἂν εἵνεκά γε ψηφισμάτων ἐδεδόκει δίκην. Cf. 4.19: at p.51 on paper forces (ἐπιστολιμαίους), and p. 71 on 4.45 ‘whether you send out a general and an empty decree and hopes from the speaker’s platform, you achieve nothing that you should...and your allies die of fear.’

Athenians are experiencing difficulties because while they debate about issues, they do not do what is necessary to address them: they only fulfil one half of the ideal of *logos* and *ergon*.<sup>434</sup> Here in the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes implores the Athenians to realise that, ‘for although action comes after speaking and voting in time, it precedes them in effectiveness and is more powerful than them.’<sup>435</sup> Thus, it is imperative to convince the Athenians to act in their best interests, which essentially is to act itself:

Action then, is what you must add, since you have the other things [speeches] already. You have men who can tell you your duty, men of Athens, and you are yourselves the smartest of people at understanding what has been said; and you will be able to act now, if you do what is right.<sup>436</sup>

This is the same sentiment as in the *Second Olynthiac* where Demosthenes asserted that ‘all speech, if it is not accompanied by action, seems vain and empty.’<sup>437</sup> To this end, the *Third Olynthiac* seeks to address how and why the Assembly refuses to bridge this gap and recognise the best advice. Demosthenes, therefore, requests that they listen with goodwill (*eunoia*):

I ask you, if I speak freely, to bear with me and to see whether I am telling the truth and am aiming to bring about some improvement in the future, since you see that it is as a result of the speeches that certain men address to you in the Assembly in order to gain your approval that our affairs have reached an utterly wretched state.<sup>438</sup>

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<sup>434</sup> Cf. Demosthenes 4.20.

<sup>435</sup> Demosthenes 3.15. τὸ γὰρ πράττειν τοῦ λέγειν καὶ χειροτονεῖν ὕστερον ὄν τῆ τάξει, πρότερον τῆ δυνάμει καὶ κρεῖττον ἔστιν.

<sup>436</sup> Demosthenes 3.15. τοῦτ’ οὖν δεῖ προσεῖναι, τὰ δ’ ἄλλ’ ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τὰ δέοντα παρ’ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυνάμενοι, καὶ γινῶναι πάντων ὑμεῖς ὀξύτατοι τὰ ρηθέντα, καὶ πράξει δὲ δυνήσεσθε νῦν, εἴαν ὀρθῶς ποιῆτε. While the Greek says ‘this’, referring to action, I follow Trevett’s translation here and his choice to emphasise that it is ‘action’ that Demosthenes is discussing in this section of the speech.

<sup>437</sup> Demosthenes 2.12.

<sup>438</sup> Demosthenes 3.3. ἀξιῶ δ’ ὑμᾶς, ἂν μετὰ παρρησίας ποιῶμαι τοὺς λόγους, ὑπομένειν, τοῦτο θεωροῦντας, εἰ τᾶληθῆ λέγω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἵνα τὰ λοιπὰ βελτίω γένηται· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν ἐνίους εἰς πᾶν προελήλυθε μοχθηρίας τὰ παρόντα.

Demosthenes utilises his *parrhēsia* to invoke the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric to portray himself as a speaker of truth (giving himself a moral authority from which to make this assessment of their wretched state), which consequently fashions any opponent as a ‘master of lies’.<sup>439</sup> By appealing to their *ethos* to generate a sense of *eunoia* Demosthenes not only attempts to neutralise the hostility of the Assembly against his *parrhēsia*, but uses the practice common in forensic oratory to make the audience ‘feel that they have been wronged personally’, by the other *rhētors*.<sup>440</sup>

As in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes asserts that the Assembly cannot hope to function when it is corrupted from within. This sets the foundations for his condemnation of the misuse of rhetoric and their attitude towards advice-givers in sections 11-13 of this speech.<sup>441</sup> Yet even here it is clear that, unlike the proud reputation of Athenian *logos*, the Assembly is manipulated and undermined by its own desire for rhetorical flare and flattery. Indeed, their current situation has deteriorated because they would rather listen to flattering pleasing speeches, than the hard truths Demosthenes has been advocating. Instead, they have been manipulated by men who sought popularity over serving the collective ends of the *polis*. Demosthenes has consistently positioned himself in opposition to these speakers, as a speaker of hard truths, who is not self-seeking but speaks even to the detriment of his own popularity for the sake of the *polis*.<sup>442</sup>

Demosthenes suggests that the Assembly has undermined its own decision by failing to enact the proposals of the *Second Olynthiac*, and that the promise of Athenian manned and

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<sup>439</sup> Hesk 2000: 238-9 on the moments where meta-discourse between rhetoric and representation find ‘expression in rhetoric itself... The democratic orator can be seen to represent himself as a “master of truth” through the antagonistic theorisation of the opponent as a master of lies.’

<sup>440</sup> Carey 2000: 29. Carey 2000: 28 also notes that ‘an important component in the establishment of goodwill is the neutralisation of any hostility against the speaker.’ This is also noted in the discussion of the proemium *First Philippic* pp 30-1. The need to generate *eunoia* intensifies in speeches 8 and 9, discussed in Chapter 4.

<sup>441</sup> This is regarding the Theoric fund and is discussed later in this chapter at pp 97; 238; 256.

<sup>442</sup> This develops fully in Demosthenes 5, *On the Peace*. I believe Demosthenes evokes the traditional wise advisors: a wise Nestor or a Phoenix, beseeching the Athenians to be men of both words and deeds, to be the men they can and ought to be.



funded action, instead, turned into a delayed despatch of ‘Charidemus with ten empty ships and five talents of silver.’ As such, the Athenians did exactly what Demosthenes criticised in the *First Philippic*.<sup>443</sup> Moreover, following rumours of Philip’s injury/death, ‘you thought you no longer needed to send a relief force and disbanded the expedition,’ and in disbanding the relief force, the Athenians failed to seize their *kairos*:

But this was the moment of opportunity: if on that occasion we had enthusiastically sent a relief force there, as we had voted, Philip even if he survived, would not now be bothering us.<sup>444</sup>

For Demosthenes, in refusing to seize the *kairos*, the Assembly failed to nullify Philip, and his return to Olynthus demonstrates the consequences of their consistent failure to commit to their *logos*. By saying one thing, but doing another, the Athenians allowed Philip to flourish, as noted above, to judge by their decrees, Philip would have been punished a long time ago.<sup>445</sup> Demosthenes asserts it is imperative that they address this discrepancy between *logos* and *ergon*: ‘Action, then is what you must add’, which builds Demosthenes’ amazement at the end of the *Second Olynthiac* that the Athenians would go to war for others, but not in defence of their own possessions.<sup>446</sup> In particular, Demosthenes highlights how they still fail to act despite the fact that, ‘we no longer have any of our previous possessions to defend, but must acquire them.’<sup>447</sup>

This now has a greater effect due to their increased losses and the deteriorated crisis at Olynthus. Having once more shirked their duty by making the minimum effort and hoping it

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<sup>443</sup> Demosthenes 4.43 ‘It is clear that he [Philip] will not stand still, unless he is stopped. Should we just wait for this to happen? Or, if you were to dispatch empty ships and hopes inspired by so and so, do you suppose that everything would be all right?’

<sup>444</sup> Demosthenes 3.5. ἦν δ’ οὗτος ὁ καιρὸς αὐτός· εἰ γὰρ τότε ἐκεῖσ’ ἐβοηθήσαμεν, ὥσπερ ἐνηφισάμεθα, προθύμως, οὐκ ἂν ἠνώγλει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ Φίλιππος σωθεῖς.

<sup>445</sup> Demosthenes 3.14. cf. 1.9 ‘if we had energetically dispatched an appropriate relief force...we would now be dealing with a more tractable and much weaker Philip.’

<sup>446</sup> cf. Demosthenes 2.24-5.

<sup>447</sup> Demosthenes 2.26.

will suffice, this lack of action has had a devastating effect.<sup>448</sup> Demosthenes targets this idle attitude, asserting that it is this which ultimately sealed both the fate of Olynthus and their hopes of regaining what they have lost, as he stated in the proemium, ‘I am convinced that it is enough for us to secure as our primary goal the protection of our allies.’<sup>449</sup>

Demosthenes aims to ensure they ‘make use of this opportunity’, by reminding them of their past actions:

What was done at that time cannot be undone. But now a further opportunity for war has come, and this is why I have reminded you of that occasion, so that you do not suffer the same fate as before.<sup>450</sup>

Demosthenes again asserts that the Athenians need to recognise that if they still ‘fail to send help “at full strength to the best of your ability”’, they ‘will have been acting in every respect to Philip’s advantage.’<sup>451</sup> This formulaic language also reminds the Athenians that by failing to send sufficient aid, they are breaching their moral obligation to their allies.<sup>452</sup> It is therefore imperative that the Athenians realise that not to send aid will bring further dishonour onto Athens:

What remains then for us to do, men of Athens, but to send help resolutely and enthusiastically? I see no other option. For apart from the shame that would envelop us, if we were to surrender our interests, the danger in doing so would in my opinion be considerable.<sup>453</sup>

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<sup>448</sup> Demosthenes warned about idlers at 2.23.

<sup>449</sup> Demosthenes 3.1. This echoes his comments at 4.20 that the Assembly should take small measures and provide for them.

<sup>450</sup> Demosthenes 3.6. τὰ μὲν δὴ τότε πραχθέντ’ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι· νῦν δ’ ἑτέρου πολέμου καιρὸς ἦκει τις, δι’ ὃν καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐμνήσθη, ἵνα μὴ ταῦτ’ ἀθήητε. This is reminiscent of his question in the previous speech 2.26 ‘are you so senseless, men of Athens, that you hope to improve our city’s situation by following the same policies that led to its decline?’

<sup>451</sup> Demosthenes 3.6. Sandys 1910 notes how παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν is formulaic of treaties between allies.

<sup>452</sup> This moral obligation is emphasised in *On the Chersonese*.

<sup>453</sup> Demosthenes 3.8. τί οὖν ὑπόλοιπον, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πλὴν βοηθεῖν ἐρρωμένως καὶ προθύμως; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐχ ὀρῶ· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς περιστάσης ἂν ἡμᾶς αἰσχύνῃς, εἰ καθυφείμεθά τι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐδὲ τὸν φόβον, ὧ ἄνδρες

This sense of shame is a continuation of his previous argument in the *Second Olynthiac* that ‘it would be shameful – indeed most shameful – to be seen to have given up the cities and places that we once controlled but also the allies and the opportunities that Fortune has provided.’<sup>454</sup> By failing to act in a manner worthy of the city, Demosthenes highlights the reality of the dangers Athens has left themselves open to, as ‘there is nothing to stop Philip, after he has subdued what is before him from turning against us here.’<sup>455</sup> This is not only a repetition of his warning in the *First Olynthiac* of ‘who will prevent him from marching here?’, but it reinforces the shame and damage they have inflicted on their own reputation and sense of identity.<sup>456</sup>

As such, Demosthenes affirms that to not act is to accept these inevitable consequences, ‘for I imagine that we are all well aware that this is how things will turn out, if we discard the present opportunity’, presenting the unthinkable scenario that they end up in the same position as the Olynthians, and asserting that:

If any of you wishes to put off doing their duty until that time, then he is choosing to see suffering close at hand when he could be hearing of it happening elsewhere, and wishes to be forced to look for people who will help him when he could now be helping others.<sup>457</sup>

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Ἀθηναῖοι, μικρὸν ὀρῶ τὸν τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα. This is reminiscent of 1.11 and Demosthenes’ call to ‘wipe away the dishonour’ incurred by their past conduct.

<sup>454</sup> Demosthenes 2.2. ὡς ἔστι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων, μὴ μόνον πόλεων καὶ τόπων ὧν ἤμην ποτε κύριοι φαίνεσθαι προϊεμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης παρασκευασθέντων συμμάχων καὶ καιρῶν. See discussion in Chapter 2.2 pp. 108. On Fortune see Demosthenes 1.1 p. 84; 2.2 p. 108; 2.22 p. 121.

<sup>455</sup> Demosthenes 3.8. μηδενὸς δ’ ἐμποδῶν ὄντος Φιλίππῳ τὰ παρόντα καταστρεψαμένῳ πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἐπικλῖναι τὰ πράγματα.

<sup>456</sup> Demosthenes 1.25. cf. Demosthenes 2.3 ‘the worse your handling of the situation, the greater shame you have incurred’. See too 1.14-15 and 2.26.

<sup>457</sup> Demosthenes 3.9. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τις ὑμῶν εἰς τοῦτ’ ἀναβάλλεται ποιήσειν τὰ δέοντα, ἰδεῖν ἐγγύθεν βούλεται τὰ δεινά, ἔξδὸν ἀκούειν ἄλλοθι γιγνόμενα, καὶ βοηθοὺς ἑαυτῷ ζητεῖν, ἔξδὸν νῦν ἑτέροις αὐτὸν βοηθεῖν.

By asserting categorically the certain dangerous consequences of their inaction, Demosthenes presents a dichotomy between what they can logically deduce and how they currently choose to act.

Emblematic of these misguided priorities and is the laws governing the Theoric fund. Demosthenes returns to his arguments in the *First Olynthiac* against the Theoric fund, but this time calls for the laws protecting it to be repealed:

I am referring directly to the laws relating to the Theoric fund and to certain laws relating to those who go on campaign.<sup>458</sup>

Demosthenes makes it clear that these laws are indicative of the self-sabotaging practices that enable the Assembly to put off its duty, and contributes to the shambolic state he described in the *First Philippic*:

Some of these laws distribute military funds as Theoric payments to those who stay at home; others let those who shirk military service get off scot-free and make even those who wish to do their duty more despondent.<sup>459</sup>

Demosthenes shrewdly does not call for the fund itself to be used, but rather states that, ‘you should appoint lawmakers. Use these lawmakers not to pass a law – you have enough of them – but to repeal those laws that are presently harming your interests’.<sup>460</sup> As such, Demosthenes protects himself from prosecution. But nevertheless, even suggesting that the *nomothetai* (law-givers) should do this is risky and demonstrates the essence of Demosthenes’ *parrhēsia* as honest selfless advice as ‘the *parrhēsiastes* says something that is dangerous to himself

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<sup>458</sup> Demosthenes 3.11. λέγω τοὺς περὶ τῶν θεωρικῶν, σαφῶς οὕτως, καὶ τοὺς περὶ τῶν στρατευομένων ἐνίους. Cawkwell 1962:134 argues that Demosthenes was despondent to the mercenary force deployed after the *Second Olynthiac*, and ‘this would also explain why in the *Third Olynthiac* he has ceased to demand mere εἰσφοραί: he now saw that only a regular war-fund would make possible an expedition of the sort he demanded.’ Cf. arguments at Demosthenes 1.19-20.

<sup>459</sup> Demosthenes 3.11. ὧν οἱ μὲν τὰ στρατιωτικὰ τοῖς οἴκοι μένουσι διανέμουσι θεωρικά, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἀτακτοῦντας ἀθώους καθιστᾶσιν, εἴτα καὶ τοὺς τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν βουλομένους ἀθυμοτέρους ποιοῦσιν. cf Demosthenes 4.25.

<sup>460</sup> Demosthenes 3.10. νομοθέτας καθίσατε. ἐν δὲ τούτοις τοῖς νομοθέταις μὴ θῆσθε νόμον μηδένα (εἰσὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἱκανοί), ἀλλὰ τοὺς εἰς τὸ παρὸν βλάπτοντας ὑμᾶς λύσατε. Worthington 2013: 141 observes this risk and also notes how Pickard-Cambridge 1914: 203-204 observed the ‘considerable courage’ in making this unpopular suggestion.

and thus involves risk.<sup>461</sup> Indeed, the legal and reputational dangers of engaging with *parrhēsia* developed it into a form of democratic civic courage, and displayed a ‘willingness to run risks in order to speak freely [indicating] their sincerity and patriotism.’<sup>462</sup>

For Demosthenes the risk was necessary as the Assembly could only function when ‘they have repealed these laws and made it safe to offer the best advice.’<sup>463</sup> Indeed, Demosthenes asserts the hostility of the Assembly has now intimidated its dutiful citizens to silence:

Until that is done, do not expect anyone to be willing to give you the best advice and then be destroyed by you. You will not find anyone, especially when the only likely result is that whoever speaks and makes these proposals will be unjustly punished and, far from improving the situation, will make people even more afraid to give good advice than they are already.<sup>464</sup>

Moreover, the risk of this unpopular proposal was necessary to help heal the corruption of the deliberative process, which prevented them receiving the best (if not pleasant) advice. Such attitudes and the laws protecting them are the cause of their current misfortunes, and as such Demosthenes wished them to remove such payments,

which are like the foods that doctors prescribe: they neither build strength nor allow the patient to die. In the same way, these sums that you distribute among yourselves

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<sup>461</sup> Foucault 2001: 13. See further discussion in this thesis pp. 144; 166; 300.

<sup>462</sup> Balot 2004: 247. Balot adds ‘in the hands of the Orators, a novel conception of civic courage enabled speakers to become the “real men” of their day.’ See introduction for earlier discussion. On free speech Hansen 1991: 400; 83-85. Monoson 2000: 51-63

<sup>463</sup> Demosthenes 3.11. This self-sabotage by misplaced priorities refers back to the shambolic state of affairs described at 4.25.

<sup>464</sup> Demosthenes 3.12. πρὶν δὲ ταῦτα προῖξαι, μὴ σκοπεῖτε τίς εἰπὼν τὰ βέλτισθ’ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν ἀπολέσθαι βουλήσεται· οὐ γὰρ εὐρήσετε, ἄλλως τε καὶ τούτου μόνου περιγίγνεσθαι μέλλοντος, παθεῖν ἀδίκως τι κακὸν τὸν ταῦτ’ εἰπόντα καὶ γράψαντα, μηδὲν δ’ ὠφελῆσαι τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν μᾶλλον ἔτ’ ἢ νῦν τὸ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν φοβερώτερον ποιῆσαι.

are not large enough to have any lasting benefit, nor would renouncing them allow you to do anything else, but they serve to make each of you more idle.<sup>465</sup>

Thus, for Demosthenes, the laws protecting the Theoric fund are damaging to the wellbeing of the *polis* itself because it keeps it in an apathetic state. It also demonstrates how the Assembly is at odds with receiving the best advice, and how its own desires and ‘each man’s wishes, I believe, contribute greatly to such proposals [addressing the laws protecting theorika], and that is why it is the easiest thing in the world to deceive oneself.’<sup>466</sup> It is this self-deception which poses the greatest danger to the Athenians and it is only by recognising this that the Assembly can break the vicious self-harming cycle and act in its own interest. Only then, can the Assembly make informed decisions and act efficiently with the necessary funds: ‘when you have repealed these laws and made it safe to offer the best advice, only then should you look to someone to propose the measures that you all know to be beneficial.’<sup>467</sup>

Therefore, the call to repeal the laws protecting the Theoric fund had larger ramifications than just the redistribution of money for military purposes, but epitomised the Assembly’s corrupted inversion of its defining values. They cannot recognise friend from foe and citizens are intimidated to silence, afraid to offer advice:

For it is not right that those who at that time passed laws that damaged the whole city should be popular for having done so, whereas anyone who now gives the best advice,

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<sup>465</sup> Demosthenes 3.33. ἂν τοῖς [ἀσθενοῦσι] παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν σιτίοις [διδόμενοις] ἔοικε. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖν’ οὐτ’ ἰσχὸν ἐντίθησιν οὐτ’ ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἐξ· καὶ ταῦθ’ ἂν νέμεσθε νῦν ὑμεῖς, οὔτε τοσαῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὥστ’ ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν τινὰ διαρκῆ, οὐτ’ ἀπογόνοντας ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐξ, ἀλλ’ ἔστι ταῦτα τὴν ἐκάστου ῥαθυμίαν ὑμῶν ἐπαυξάνοντα. On this medical reference Das 2015: 118 notes that ‘the comparison of the dole’s effect to a diet is interesting, for diet (i.e. regimen) was the cornerstone of Hippocratic therapeutics because it was considered safe and less painful than surgery or cauterization.’ She suggests that perhaps Demosthenes was calling for more radical treatment to the Assembly’s ailments.

<sup>466</sup> Demosthenes 3.19. ἀλλ’, οἴμαι, μέγα τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὑπάρχει λόγους ἢ παρ’ ἐκάστου βούλησις, διόπερ ῥᾶστον ἀπάντων ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἐξαπατῆσαι·

<sup>467</sup> Demosthenes 3.11. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ταῦτα λύσητε καὶ τὴν τοῦ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν ὁδὸν παράσχητ’ ἀσφαλῆ, τηνικαῦτα τὸν γράψονθ’ ἂ πάντες ἴσθ’ ὅτι συμφέροι ζητεῖτε This self-sabotage by misplaced priorities refers back to the shambolic state of affairs described at 4.25.

which will result in all of us faring better, should be punished with your hatred for doing so.<sup>468</sup>

Moreover, Demosthenes could be reflecting a wider concern here about advisers' treatment when they address the Assembly; a parallel can be drawn to the Thucydidean Diodotus' complaint at the injustice within the Assembly that 'we can be held account for the advice we give, while you are not accountable for the way in which you receive it.'<sup>469</sup> While Demosthenes does not directly refer to the Assembly's lack of accountability in their decision making (and their hostility to honest advice), his repeated assertions of Athenian culpability suggests that their deteriorated situation is a consequence of their unaccountability: the Assembly is no longer immune to the fallout when they reject good advice. One of the consequences of this is that, as things are, advisers are reluctant to speak out. Thus:

Before you set this matter right, men of Athens, you should certainly not suppose that anyone is so prominent as to be able to break these laws with impunity, or so foolish as to throw himself into obvious trouble.<sup>470</sup>

Indeed, I argue that Demosthenes presents the Assembly as being at a stalemate that is simultaneously a destructive spiral: they attack advisers, they therefore intimidate them into silence, they do not receive the necessary advice but only hear flattery.

Moreover, in highlighting that speakers are aware of these dangers, and the 'obvious trouble' *parrhēsia* currently involves, Demosthenes reminds them of his own courage and

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<sup>468</sup> Demosthenes 3.13. οὐ γάρ ἐστι δίκαιον, τὴν μὲν χάριν, ἣ πᾶσαν ἔβλαπτε τὴν πόλιν, τοῖς τότε θεῖσιν ὑπάρχειν, τὴν δ' ἀπέχθειαν, δι' ἧς ἂν ἅπαντες ἄμεινον πράξαιμεν, τῷ νῦν τὰ βέλτιστ' εἰπόντι ζημίαν γενέσθαι. Ober 1989: 319 states the advisor role was a "structural element" which 'required that the public speaker be willing to oppose the will of the *dēmos*.' Demosthenes' assertion here either suggests that this was not the case, or supports my argument that Demosthenes attacks the Assembly for forgetting its own conventions.

<sup>469</sup> Thucydides 3.42

<sup>470</sup> Demosthenes 3.13. πρὶν δὲ ταῦτ' εὐτρεπίσαι, μηδαμῶς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδέν' ἀξιοῦτε τηλικούτον εἶναι παρ' ὑμῖν ὥστε τοὺς νόμους τούτους παραβάντα μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, μηδ' οὕτως ἀνόητον ὥστ' εἰς προὔπτον κακὸν αὐτὸν ἐμβαλεῖν.

adds a sincere and authentic force to his rhetoric.<sup>471</sup> From this perspective, the repeal of the laws protecting the Theoric fund is imperative to make the Assembly safe since, as stated above, even challenging the protective laws is a radical suggestion, and in doing so Demosthenes offers to sacrifice himself in order to perform his duty to speak truthfully in the best interests of the *polis*.<sup>472</sup> Indeed, Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* correlates with the necessity of shame noted within modern democracies as a means to reinforce shared moral values, which would suggest that Demosthenes' courage in confronting the Assembly is part of his role as the dutiful democratic adviser.<sup>473</sup>

Balancing the potential backlash of criticising the Assembly, Demosthenes uses his *parrhēsia* to demonstrate both his own virtue, and the utilitarian aspect of his advice:

I have chosen to say these things not with the senseless aim of making myself an object of hatred to some of you. For I am not so foolish or perverse as to wish to be hated, when I do not think that I am doing any good. But I judge it to be the mark of a good citizen to put the safety of the community before his own popularity as a speaker.<sup>474</sup>

Quiroga suggests that for Demosthenes '*parrhēsia* was not an uncomplicated virtue, but a demanding duty for the orator that involved risking the speaker's status on behalf of the

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<sup>471</sup> Worthington 2013: 141 adds that 'there is no question that his recommendation was a courageous one and that he must have known it would be unpopular.'

<sup>472</sup> Worthington 2013: 139 proposes that Demosthenes created the special committee to repeal the laws governing the Theoric fund so as to increase funding for military operations because of the deteriorated situation with Philip. Tuplin 1998: 290 likewise cites the proposals regarding the Theoric fund as evidence for an advanced stage of the siege at Olynthus, due to the lengths Demosthenes will go to now the situation has deteriorated.

<sup>473</sup> Etzioni 2001, as noted by Tarnopolsky 2010: 4-5. This correlates with Ober 1989: 320 'when the political orator blames the people...he took the position of reminding the audience of the pristine democratic code of thought and behaviour from which they had strayed.'

<sup>474</sup> Demosthenes 3.21. καὶ ταῦτ' οὐχ ἵν' ἀπέχθωμαί τισιν ὑμῶν, τὴν ἄλλως προήρημαι λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἄφρων οὐδ' ἀτυχῆς εἰμ' ἐγὼ ὥστ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι βούλεσθαι μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν νομίζων· ἀλλὰ δικαίου πολίτου κρίνω τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων σωτηρίαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν χάριτος αἰρεῖσθαι. This is similar to 1.16 'I do not think out of concern for one's personal safety one should refrain from saying what is to your advantage.'



common good.<sup>475</sup> Not only does it pardon his criticism unapologetically, as his duty as a *rhētor* and citizen, it also defines this duty and contrasts his own advice against the rhetorical flattery he denounces. As Foucault notes:

Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his audience (regardless of the rhetorician's own opinion concerning what he says) ... the *parrhēsiastes* acts on other people's minds by showing them as directly as possible what he actually believes.<sup>476</sup>

Demosthenes removes any possible hints of deception by assimilating himself with his advice and the best interests of Athens. Moreover, Demosthenes suggests that the Assembly's hostility towards *parrhēsia* is a part of their wider failure to recognise their own responsibility:

But, by the gods, after we have neglected everything and all but helped him in his preparations, are we not to inquire who was responsible for this state of affairs? For we shall not admit that we are responsible – that I know for certain.<sup>477</sup>

In particular, this returns to Demosthenes' complaint that the Athenians ignore their culpability for the situation, resulting from their preference for avoiding effort.<sup>478</sup> It also again evokes his previous assertions that Athens' problems are a result of the Assembly choosing the easy option over the virtuous one, and Demosthenes makes it clear that because of their failure to act, they can no longer delude themselves that they can have the best of both worlds:

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<sup>475</sup> Quiroga 2015: 293. Quiroga likewise observes that in his *Declamations*, Libanius uses *parrhēsia* in contexts analogous to Demosthenes' usage (*Decl.* 3.2, 4.2, 15.39, 34.2, 50.8).

<sup>476</sup> Foucault 1983 (2001): 12.

<sup>477</sup> Demosthenes 3.17. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν πάντ' ἔασαντες καὶ μόνον οὐχὶ συγκατασκευάσαντες αὐτῷ, τότε τοὺς αἰτίους οἵτινες τούτων ζητήσομεν; οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὶ γ' αἴτιοι φήσομεν εἶναι, σαφῶς οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγώ. General denial is discussed: 3.16-20. I think this can be considered a continuation from 1.15 'our constant search to do what brings pleasure'.

<sup>478</sup> See Demosthenes 2.25.

To make a choice, however, when serious matters are under discussion, it is not so easy, but one must choose what is best over what is pleasant, if one cannot have both.<sup>479</sup>

Again, Demosthenes advocates arguments that are both unpopular and uncomfortable, but necessary, as to maintain their current attitude would be to walk straight into disaster since ‘what each man wishes, this he also believes to be true, although the facts are often not so.’<sup>480</sup> To this end, they must do as he said in the *First Olynthiac* and ‘listen attentively to those who wish to offer you advice’, but to make the distinction between good advice and flattery.<sup>481</sup>

### Argument: Use of the Past

Remembering Demosthenes’ assertion that he is speaking for the benefit of the *polis*, and not his own popularity, Demosthenes reminds the audience of their fifth century advisers:

For, I have heard, as perhaps you have too, that the public speakers in the time of our ancestors – men whom all the speakers praise, even though they do not imitate them at all – adopted this manner of political conduct: the famous Aristides, Nicias, my namesake, and Pericles.<sup>482</sup>

Demosthenes’ subtle echoes of Periclean ideals transforms ‘imperceptibly into self-authorisation’, and with this overt reference ‘the Periclean paradigm serves additionally to validate his own rhetorical line and persona in the adversarial assembly contests.’<sup>483</sup> By

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<sup>479</sup> Demosthenes 3.18. ἐλέσθαι δ’ ὅταν περὶ πραγμάτων προτεθῆ σκοπεῖν, οὐκέθ’ ὁμοίως εὐπορον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὰ βέλτιστ’ ἀντὶ τῶν ἡδέων, ἂν μὴ συναμφοτέρ’ ἔξῃ, λαμβάνειν.

<sup>480</sup> Demosthenes 3.19. ὁ γὰρ βούλεται, τοῦθ’ ἕκαστος καὶ οἶεται, τὰ δὲ πράγματα πολλάκις οὐχ οὕτω πέφυκεν.

<sup>481</sup> Demosthenes 1.1.

<sup>482</sup> Demosthenes 3.21. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν λέγοντας ἀκούω, ὥσπερ ἴσως καὶ ὑμεῖς, οὓς ἐπαινοῦσι μὲν οἱ παριόντες ἅπαντες, μιμοῦνται δ’ οὐ πάνυ, τούτῳ τῷ ἔθει καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς πολιτείας χρῆσθαι, τὸν Ἀριστείδην ἐκεῖνον, τὸν Νικίαν, τὸν ὁμώνυμον ἑμαυτῶ, τὸν Περικλέα. Trevett 2011:62 n31 notes that ‘it is possibly to see why Demosthenes chose three of the four to demonstrate his argument: Aristides was famously upright’ and Nicias challenged the Sicilian expedition. See also MacDowell 2009: 237 n 93.

<sup>483</sup> Mader 2007: 157. Mader is speaking in general on the Periclean influence, but I think this can be applied specifically here.

reminding the Assembly of ‘our ancestors, whom the speakers of the day neither indulged nor loved, as these men now do you’, Demosthenes contrasts the fifth and fourth century Athenians to remind the Assembly of the behaviour expected of them.<sup>484</sup> Demosthenes asserts how:

In public they created buildings and objects of beauty of such kind and size – temples and the offerings in them – that none of their descendants could surpass them. In private they were so restrained and true to the nature of their constitution that if any of you knows which is the house of Aristides or of Miltiades or of the distinguished men of that time, he sees that it is no grander than that of its neighbour. For they did not conduct the affairs of the city to their own profit, but each of them thought it right to make the commonwealth more prosperous. Because they managed the affairs of Greece honestly, and matters relating to the gods piously, and their own affairs in a spirit of equality, they rightly enjoyed great fortune.<sup>485</sup>

Demosthenes summaries these men as embodying true Athenian democratic values of honesty (πιστῶς), piety (εὐσεβῶς) and by conducting their matters in this way, they enjoyed good fortune εὐδαιμονίαν. In stark contrast, he turns to the Athenians of the present day, ‘how do we fare nowadays, under the leadership of these men who are now deemed admirable?’<sup>486</sup> His *apophasis* ‘I pass over other matters – though I have much that I could say’<sup>487</sup> presents an ominous start to his appraisal of their own (lack of) achievements, noting with sardonic irony:

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<sup>484</sup> Demosthenes 3.24. ἐκεῖνοι τοίνυν, οἷς οὐκ ἐχαρίζονθ' οἱ λέγοντες οὐδ' ἐφίλουν αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς οὗτοι νῦν.

<sup>485</sup> Demosthenes 3.25-6. δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοίνυν οἰκοδομήματα καὶ κάλλη τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα κατεσκεύασαν ἡμῖν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἀναθημάτων, ὥστε μηδενὶ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ὑπερβολὴν λελεῖσθαι· ἰδίᾳ δ' οὕτω σῶφρονες ἦσαν καὶ σφόδρ' ἐν τῷ τῆς πολιτείας ἡθει μένοντες, ὥστε τὴν Ἀριστείδου καὶ τὴν Μιλτιάδου καὶ τῶν τότε λαμπρῶν οἰκίαν εἴ τις ἄρ' οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅποια ποτ' ἐστίν, ὅρᾳ τῆς τοῦ γείτονος οὐδὲν σεμνοτέραν οὔσαν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς περιουσίαν ἐπράττετ' αὐτοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν αὖξιν ἕκαστος ᾤετο δεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰ μὲν Ἑλληνικὰ πιστῶς, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβῶς, τὰ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἴσως διοικεῖν μεγάλην εικότως ἐκτήσαντ' εὐδαιμονίαν.

<sup>486</sup> Demosthenes 3.27. νυνὶ δὲ πῶς ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῶν χρηστῶν τούτων τὰ πράγματ' ἔχει;

<sup>487</sup> Demosthenes 3.27. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σιωπῶ, πόλλ' ἂν ἔχων εἰπεῖν

But you all see how much freedom we have to act, since the Spartans have been ruined, the Thebans are preoccupied, and none of the others is sufficiently prominent to rival us for supremacy, but when we should both keep a firm grip on our own possessions and arbitrate over the rights of others, we have been deprived of our own territory, and have spent more than fifteen hundred talents in vain.<sup>488</sup>

Demosthenes particularly focuses on their costly and futile attempts to recapture Amphipolis, and how in such failures, Demosthenes asserts that ‘we have trained a great enemy against ourselves.’<sup>489</sup> Demosthenes’ rhetoric suggests that such disasters are the result of their failure to maintain the standards set by their ancestors, who gained their (now lost) possessions in more difficult circumstances. Indeed, in comparison to their fifth-century counterparts, the Assembly is more concerned with popularity than duty:

But ever since the appearance of these politicians who ask you “What do you want? What shall I propose? What favour can I do you?” the affairs of the city have been pledged in exchange for immediate gratification and this is the result: all their affairs prosper, while yours are in a shameful state.<sup>490</sup>

This corruption of oratory in the Assembly has resulted in a malfunction where individuals prevail at the expense of the *polis*. Demosthenes’ criticism is directed at both those who manipulate the *polis* for their own ends, and at the *dēmos* for indulging their own desire for rhetoric over the needs of the *polis*. These elements of corruption and debilitating flattery, as

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<sup>488</sup> Demosthenes 3.27-8. ἀλλ’ ὅσης ἅπαντες ὄρατ’ ἐρημίας ἐπειλημμένοι, [καί] Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἀπολωλότων, Θηβαίων δ’ ἀσχόλων ὄντων, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἀξιόχρεω περὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἡμῖν ἀντιτάξασθαι, ἐξὸν δ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ’ αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς ἔχειν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δίκαια βραβεύειν, ἀπεστερήμεθα μὲν χώρας οἰκείας, πλείω δ’ ἢ χίλια καὶ πεντακόσια τάλαντ’ ἀνηλώκαμεν εἰς οὐδὲν δέον. Montiglio 2000: 133 views this as an instance of *aposiopesis*, which aside from Demosthenes’ use, is very rare in Athenian oratory. Montiglio notes how except for two instances (*On the Crown* 22 and *Against Aristogiton* 1.79) Demosthenes uses *aposiopesis* to ‘break off his speech only when it might risk being *blasphemos* in the specific sense of “ill-omened”. Other examples are *Against Leptines* 115, *On the Crown* 195, *For the people of Megalopolis* 18.

<sup>489</sup> Demosthenes 3.28. ἐχθρὸν δ’ ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τηλικούτον ἠσκῆκαμεν.

<sup>490</sup> Demosthenes 3.22. ἐξ οὗ δ’ οἱ διερωτῶντες ὑμᾶς οὗτοι πεφῆνασι ρήτορες ‘τί βούλεσθε; τί γράψω; τί ὑμῖν χαρίσωμαι;’ προπέποιται τῆς παραντίκα χάριτος τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, καὶ τοιαυτὶ συμβαίνει, καὶ τὰ μὲν τούτων πάντα καλῶς ἔχει, τὰ δ’ ὑμέτερ’ αἰσχυρῶς.

I have argued above, have created a vicious cycle of inactivity causing a political paralysis, which the Athenians refuse to acknowledge. Their current losses are in direct contrast to the behaviour of their ancestors, whose past successes were ‘connected to their refusal to be flattered by public speakers.’<sup>491</sup> Furthermore, in Panhellenic affairs, unlike the current Athenians who have lost both their interest and the Social War, the ancestors,

ruled the Greeks as willing subjects for forty-five years, carried up more than ten thousand talents to the Acropolis, and had the king who possesses this land [Macedonia] as their subject, which is the proper relationship between a foreigner and Greeks.<sup>492</sup>

This latter point highlights the inversion of these clearly defined roles, which as Demosthenes argued in the *First Philippic*, have become both blurred and inverted.<sup>493</sup> Demosthenes also reminds us of his earlier arguments that their force must be *Athenian* by noting how the ancestors were respected for ‘fighting in person both on land and at sea, and alone among men left behind glorious achievements that are beyond the reach of envy.’<sup>494</sup> This again suggests that the current practices of relying on under-funded mercenaries is one of the reasons for their lack of success.

Moreover, with regard to their domestic affairs, Demosthenes scoffs at any suggestion that Athens is in a better position now than then, arguing they mask reality. He asks

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<sup>491</sup> Clarke 2008: 277.

<sup>492</sup> Demosthenes 3.24. πέντε μὲν καὶ τετταράκοντ’ ἔτη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἤρξαν ἐκόντων, πλείω δ’ ἢ μύρια τάλαντ’ εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀνήγαγον, ὑπῆκουε δ’ ὁ ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἔχων αὐτοῖς βασιλεύς, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ προσήκον βάρβαρον Ἑλλησι. Hunt 2010: 81 notes how ‘any reference to Philip as a *barbaros* served the purpose of arousing feelings of antipathy and outrage against the outsider.’

However, the Macedonian Kings were not subjects but did have alliances with Athens, usually to the end of securing both Athenian Timber in the North and access to trade routes for the Macedonians during Athens’ thalassocracy particularly in the fifth century (460s-440s). Trevett 2011: 63 n 34 lists Arrian *Anabasis* 7.9.4, Cargill 1981:85-87 and Harding 2006:232 to demonstrate that Amyntas (Philip’s father) was a contribution paying member of the Second Athenian Confederacy.

<sup>493</sup> Such as the visual metaphor of the Athenians surrounded as if by nets pp. 42-3 in the *First Philippic*.

<sup>494</sup> Demosthenes 3.24. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ καλὰ καὶ πεζῇ καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες [...] αὐτοὶ στρατευόμενοι, μόνοι δ’ ἀνθρώπων κρείττω τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις δόξαν τῶν φθονούντων κατέλιπον. Cf. 4.16 on the call for an Athenian core to the proposed force.

rhetorically, ‘What improvement can you name? The battlements we plaster, the roads we repair, the fountains, and similar rubbish?’<sup>495</sup> Instead, he scrutinises the politicians in charge of its maintenance, commanding the Assembly to:

Look at the politicians who are responsible for these things. Some of them were beggars and are now rich; others were obscure and are now prominent. Some have built private houses that are grander than our public buildings. The more our city has declined, the more these men have flourished.<sup>496</sup>

Not only does this present these men in opposition to the ancestors, but in observing the correlation between their personal rise and the city’s declining fortunes, Demosthenes attributes blame and shame to these men for parasitically draining the life out of the *polis*. The correlation of the rise of individuals to the decline of the *polis* unequivocally presents how the current Assembly no longer upholds the democratic values which are fundamental to Athenian ideology. Demosthenes, in idealising the merits and achievements of the ancestors, makes their current crisis a result of their degenerative progression away from such virtues:

What is the reason for this? Why is it that everything was fine in the past, but is in a wretched state now? Because then the people had the courage to act and campaign in person, and were the masters of the politicians, and controlled all good things, and each of the others was content to receive a share of honour or office or any other benefit from the hands of the people.<sup>497</sup>

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<sup>495</sup> Demosthenes 3.29. καὶ τί ἂν εἰπεῖν τις ἔχοι; τὰς ἐπάλλξεις ἅς κονιῶμεν, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἅς ἐπισκευάζομεν, καὶ κρήνας, καὶ λήρους;

<sup>496</sup> Demosthenes 3.29. ἀποβλέψατε δὴ πρὸς τοὺς ταῦτα πολιτευομένους, ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πτωχῶν πλούσιοι γεγόνασιν, οἱ δ’ ἐξ ἀδόξων ἔντιμοι, ἔνιοι δὲ τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας τῶν δημοσίων οἰκοδομημάτων σεμνοτέρας εἰσὶ κατεσκευασμένοι, ὅσῳ δὲ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐλάττω γέγονεν, τοσούτῳ τὰ τούτων ηὔξηται.

<sup>497</sup> Demosthenes 3.30. τί δὴ τὸ πάντων αἴτιον τούτων, καὶ τί δὴ ποθ’ ἅπαντ’ εἶχε καλῶς τότε, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς; ὅτι τότε μὲν πράττειν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι τολμῶν αὐτὸς ὁ δῆμος δεσπότης τῶν πολιτευομένων ἦν καὶ κύριος αὐτὸς ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγαπητὸν ἦν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστῳ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τινοῦ μεταλαβεῖν.

By using the moral authority of the ancestors, Demosthenes asserts that the inversion and rejection of Athenian identity and democratic values is at the heart of Athens problems, and makes his unpopular and controversial proposals into a return to the virtuous civic behaviour of their idealised ancestors.<sup>498</sup> Indeed, when Demosthenes asks, ‘Or does someone wish to come forward and tell me how Philip has grown strong other than through our own actions?’ Demosthenes affirms that the external crisis is of their own making, and is a product of their internal failure to live up to their own ideals.<sup>499</sup> But as he has asserted since the *First Philippic*, their culpability offers their best solution if they acknowledge their mistakes, accept good advice and act. As such, Demosthenes’ denunciation aims to provoke the Athenians to reflect self-critically and inspire them to action.

This is emphatic in Demosthenes’ assessment of the current Assembly, in his assertion that the *polis* is physically emasculated by the men who ought to serve it:

Now the opposite is the case: the politicians control all the good things, and everything is done through them, and you the people are **hamstrung**. Deprived of money and allies, you now play the part of a servant and an extra, content if these men give you a share of the Theoric Fund, or dispatch the procession at the Boëdromia, and, **bravest of all**, you thank them for your own possessions! They have confined you to the city, and entice you with these baits and tame you, turning you into docile pets.<sup>500</sup>

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<sup>498</sup> Demosthenes’ criticism is directed at the *dēmos* as a whole. Gray 2015: 176 argues that at 3.23-6 Demosthenes ‘offers a vague, uncontroversial account of past Athenian heroism, comparable to Thucydides’ Pericles, to give an uncontroversial veneer to controversial foreign-policy proposals.’ I think this refers particularly to the laws protecting the Theoric fund. See too Gray 2015: 178 as quoted at p. 129.

<sup>499</sup> Demosthenes 3.28. ἢ φρασάτω τις ἐμοὶ παρελθῶν, πόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἰσχυρὸς γέγονεν ἢ παρ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν Φίλιππος.

<sup>500</sup> Demosthenes 3.31. νῦν δὲ τοῦναντίον κύριοι μὲν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα πράττεται, ὑμεῖς δ’ ὁ δῆμος, **ἐκνευροισμένοι** καὶ περιηρημένοι χρήματα, συμμάχους, ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης μέρει γεγέννησθε, ἀγαπῶντες ἐὰν μεταδιδῶσι θεωρικῶν ὑμῖν ἢ Βοηδρόμια πέμψωσιν οὔτοι, καὶ **τὸ πάντων ἀνδρειότατον**, τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν χάριν προσοφείλετε. οἱ δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει καθείρξαντες ὑμᾶς ἐπάγουσ’ ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ τιθασεύουσι χειροῖθεις αὐτοῖς ποιοῦντες.

This is particularly interesting if we observe that ἐκνευρίζω is a neologism. Das observes that together with the noun νεῦρον (which she states is ‘used of the penis’), the verb ἐκνευρίζω becomes literally "to remove the testicles" or "to castrate." In using the participle form ἐκνευρισμένοι, Demosthenes presents a vivid metaphor that the Assembly has permitted itself to be castrated and emasculated.<sup>501</sup> Moreover, *hupērētes* is more specific than ‘servant’, it can also mean specifically the servant that follows and assists a hoplite master, and as such Demosthenes is arguably commenting on how their citizen identity is being undermined by their current deliberative practices.<sup>502</sup> Together with this vivid metaphor of emasculation, Demosthenes stresses that is their own behaviour that threatens their civic Athenian identity, and as Das observes, insinuates:

That they have become tame animals, whose agency has been completely removed by a cage of political complacency. The latter not only reinforces the image of the Athenians as caged animals (Pl. *Plt.* 264a), but it also suggests emasculation, for *τιθασεύω* is also used of the subservient/docile wife.<sup>503</sup>

More so than being the opposite of their ancestors, they are now the opposite of concepts of ‘Athenian’, ‘Man’ and ‘Free’. Thus, the immediate concern facing Athens is this internal corruption, the prime crisis, which has created the opportunities that Philip has taken advantage of, thus creating a chain of crises outside of Athens. Emasculated and ‘othered’ as they are, the Assembly cannot rely on the nuances of their past reputation to safeguard their interests.<sup>504</sup> This relegation of the Athenian citizen to hoplite servant and docile pet reflects

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<sup>501</sup> Das 2015: 116. Das translates ἐκνευρισμένοι ‘hamstrung’ as specifically ‘robbed of nerve and sinew’, and καὶ τὸ πάντων ἀνδρειότατον, τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν χάριν προσοφείλετε as ‘your manliness reaches its climax when...’ She also notes that Aeschines mocks this neologism in *Against Ctesiphon* (3.166). For more on medical language in Demosthenes see Das 2015. Das 2015: 116. Pl. Com. 173. 19; Galen 8.442.

<sup>502</sup> The LSJ entry for ὑπηρέτες notes that at Athens the term referred to ‘the servant who attended each man-at-arms (ὀπλίης) to carry his baggage, rations, and shield,’ citing the example of Thucydides 3.17.

<sup>503</sup> Xenophon. *Oik.* 7.10 cited by Das 2015: 117.

<sup>504</sup> On the concept of the Greeks’ (and particularly the Athenians’) process of defining themselves via others and polarisation see Cartledge 2002 which is dedicated to a series of oppositions.



their current crisis, and demonstrates how the *polis* is a product of its citizens. As Ober observes, in a constitution that is a ‘city of words’ the corruption of speeches created a corruption of *mores*.<sup>505</sup> Moreover, just as Thucydides’ Pericles ‘distinguishes between the constitution (*politeia*)...and the practice (*epitēdeusis*) and spirit (*tropoi*) of Athens’ and how ‘the notion of the constitution is gradually contaminated, not to say destroyed’, Demosthenes too maintains that the *polis* is dependent on its citizens to maintain its health/strength.<sup>506</sup>

Subsequently, the current external situation is a direct result of this attitude, which Demosthenes claims has been manipulated by self-serving *rhētors* who prioritise their own popularity over their duty to deliver *parrhēsia*. This intensifies the despair of Demosthenes’ inquiry at the lengths they will endure before they act:

What occasion or opportunity, men of Athens, do you seek that will be better than the present one? When will you do your duty, if not now? Has this man not taken all our territories? If he becomes master of this land [Olynthus], shall we not suffer the utmost ignominy? Are those people, whom we promised to support if they were to go to war, not now at war with him? Is he not our enemy? Does he not possess what is ours? Is he not a foreigner? Can anyone find words to describe him?<sup>507</sup>

Demosthenes’ hypophora to the Assembly on what it will take for them to act is immediately resolved with his rhetorical questions about Philip. From this perspective, by understanding that Philip (for Demosthenes) is all of these things, the Assembly is invited to ask the same questions of themselves – when will they act if they will not seize this moment against a man who is enemy, barbarian and in possession of what is Athenian? Just as Yunis argues that in

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<sup>505</sup> Ober 1998:276.

<sup>506</sup> Loraux 1981: 221. Thucydides 2.41.2.

<sup>507</sup> Demosthenes 3.16. τίνα γὰρ χρόνον ἢ τίνα καιρόν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ παρόντος βελτίω ζητεῖτε; ἢ πόθ’ ἂν δεῖ πράξετ’, εἰ μὴ νῦν; οὐχ ἅπαντα μὲν ἡμῶν προεἶληφε τὰ χωρὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ καὶ ταύτης κύριος τῆς χώρας γενήσεται, πάντων αἰσχίστα πεισόμεθα; οὐχ οὕς, εἰ πολεμήσαιεν, ἐτοιμῶς σώσειν ὑπισχνούμεθα, οὗτοι νῦν πολεμοῦσιν; οὐκ ἐχθρός; οὐκ ἔχων τὰ ἡμέτερα; οὐ βάρβαρος; οὐχ ὅ τι ἂν εἴποι τις;

*On the Crown* Demosthenes defends his policies as the only honourable course of action given the burden of the Athenian past, here I argue that Demosthenes' rhetorical framing makes it almost impossible for the Athenians not to act *and also* maintain their honour. Having made their options essentially limited, Demosthenes presents his proposals as the chance to readdress the situation in the North:

If then, even now, you abandon these habits and are willing to go on campaign and to act in a way that is worthy of yourselves, and to use these domestic surpluses as a starting point for external success, perhaps, men of Athens, perhaps you may acquire some great and lasting benefit.<sup>508</sup>

Indeed, in returning to the Theoric Fund, Demosthenes again poses the hypothetical question 'Do you mean military pay?', but in this instance he emphatically confirms that he does indeed mean redirecting these funds.<sup>509</sup> Moreover he asserts this should be done as part of the fundamentals of their democracy:

Yes I do, and I mean the same system for everyone, men of Athens, in order that each man, in taking his share of public funds should play whatever role the city requires.<sup>510</sup>

Demosthenes calls on the Assembly to in act in an egalitarian manner stating that his proposals have 'brought order to the city, with a uniform system for receiving pay, going on campaign, serving as jurors, and doing what is appropriate to each man's age and to our situation.'<sup>511</sup> Consequently, in calling for each citizen to do 'his patriotic duty as he should', I argue that, for Demosthenes, the problems facing Athens are a direct product of

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<sup>508</sup> Demosthenes 3.33. ἐὰν οὖν ἀλλὰ νῦν γ' ἔτι ἀπαλλαγέντες τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν ἐθελήσητε στρατεύεσθαι τε καὶ πράττειν ἀξίως ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῖς περιουσίαις ταῖς οἴκοι ταύταις ἀφορμαῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ἀγαθῶν χρῆσθαι, ἴσως ἂν, ἴσως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα κτήσασθ' ἀγαθὸν.

<sup>509</sup> Demosthenes 3.34. οὐκοῦν σὺ μισθοφορὰν λέγεις;

<sup>510</sup> Demosthenes 3.34. καὶ παραχρῆμά γε τὴν αὐτὴν σύνταξιν ἀπάντων, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵνα τῶν κοινῶν ἕκαστος τὸ μέρος λαμβάνων, ὅτου δέοιθ' ἡ πόλις, τοῦθ' ὑπάρχοι.

<sup>511</sup> Demosthenes 3.35 εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγον τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ λαβεῖν, τοῦ στρατεύεσθαι, τοῦ δικάζειν, τοῦ ποιεῖν τοῦθ' ὅ τι καθ' ἡλικίαν ἕκαστος ἔχει καὶ ὅτου καιρὸς εἶη, τάξιν ποιήσας. Ober 1989: 144 regards this passage as evidence that Demosthenes' proposals attempted to 'prevent citizens from falling into shameful (*aischron*) conditions because of need.'

their internal decline and corrupted attitude.<sup>512</sup> This is evident most clearly in his substantially altered attitude towards addressing the Theoric Fund from the *First Olynthiac*, which arguably reflects the deterioration of the situation at Olynthus. As he demonstrably asserts:

I emphatically deny that money should be taken from those who are active and distributed to those who do nothing, or that you should be idle and have leisure and not know what to do, or that you should learn that so-and-so's mercenaries have won a victory – which is what happens now.<sup>513</sup>

Therefore, rather than being polemically targeted at Philip, I maintain that the speech's priority is this internal crisis, and that it is didactic in its efforts to inform and instruct the Assembly internally, so it can then resolve the consequent external crisis. Demosthenes' proposals offer clarity, having 'eliminated the existing confusion, and brought order to the city', by explaining the situation via their own collective awareness of how Athenians should act.<sup>514</sup> I argue that Demosthenes presupposes a collective self-understanding of Athenian identity embedded in the psyche of the *dēmos*, to inspire a reaction and to motivate a change of attitude.<sup>515</sup> The power of Athenian ideology resonates in Demosthenes' assertion that given their past actions, which are essentially institutionally idealised in Athenian social memory, their belief in the ideal of freedom is more powerful than the military force of Macedonia, as it was against Persia.<sup>516</sup> But this is, again, dependent on the Athenians shaking off their apathy and their denial:

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<sup>512</sup> Demosthenes 3.34. ὥσπερ ἐστὶ δίκαιον ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος.

<sup>513</sup> Demosthenes 3.35. οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μηδὲν ἐγὼ ποιούσι τὰ τῶν ποιούντων εἶπον ὡς δεῖ νέμειν, οὐδ' αὐτοὺς μὲν ἀργεῖν καὶ σχολάζειν καὶ ἀπορεῖν, ὅτι δ' οἱ τοῦ δεινῆς νικῶσι ξένοι, ταῦτα πυνθάνεσθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ νυνὶ γίγνεται.

<sup>514</sup> Demosthenes 3.35.

<sup>515</sup> It is important to note the Athenians were surrounded by projections of Athenian identity in their public buildings, in the transmission of social memory through tragedy and comedy, in the annual *epitaphios logos* and in historiography. Steinbock 2013: 4 notes 'landmarks, monuments, and inscriptions, forming the Athenian *cadre matériel* functioned as material reminders of crucial events', which informed social memory.

<sup>516</sup> As Loraux 1981:26 notes, 'the authors of the *epitaphioi [logoi]* proclaim the unique character of the city: *monoi tōn anthrōpon*, the Athenians are "unique among men" in all their exploits', citing Thucydides 2.40.2 and 5, 41.3.

I am not blaming anyone who is doing his duty on your behalf, but I do urge you to do for yourselves the things for which you honour others, and not withdraw from a position of virtue that was left to you, men of Athens, by your ancestors, who acquired it undergoing many glorious dangers.<sup>517</sup>

I believe that Demosthenes' comments here draw parallels with the *epitaphioi logoi* and Periclean rhetoric, where he too called for the Athenians to act in a manner worthy of their ancestors:

Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, had no such power as we have; what little they had they forsook: not by good fortune but by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they drove the Barbarian away and raised us to our present height of greatness. We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies to the utmost, that we may hand down our empire unimpaired to posterity.<sup>518</sup>

By assimilating himself with these ideals, Demosthenes uses the voice of the ancestors to call the Athenians to regain their honour and act against those threatening them, that is, to make the Athenians seize this *kairos* of Olynthus before it is too late. To do this they must bridge the gap between *logos* and *ergon*, by addressing the corruption of the Assembly, and the prevalence of flattering rhetoric and their hostility to *parrhēsia*. This inversion of their priorities is epitomised, as noted above, in the Theoric fund and the laws protecting it, and the removal of such laws are not only imperative for the effort against Philip, but to change the attitude of the Athenians, which is the malignant cause within.<sup>519</sup>

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Lysias 2. 18, 20, 24. Plato *Menexenus* 245c5. Demosthenes 4.10. This also echoes Herodotus' account at 6.101-105 of Demaratos telling Xerxes the Hellenes (especially the Spartans), fight believing in their ideology and that respect of the law is more powerful than Persian numbers.

<sup>517</sup> Demosthenes 3.36. καὶ οὐχὶ μέμφομαι τὸν ποιούντ' αὐτῶν ἀξιῶ πράττειν ταῦτ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέρους τιμᾶτε, καὶ μὴ παραχωρεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς τάξεως, ἣν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τῆς ἀρετῆς μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν κινδύνων κτησάμενοι κατέλιπον.

<sup>518</sup> Thucydides 1.144.

<sup>519</sup> It is interesting to note that at the Assembly of 19<sup>th</sup> Elaphebolion 346 on the Peace of Philocrates, even Eubulus (who was commissioner of the Theoric fund from 354-350) will go on to propose that the Athenians 'convert the Theoric fund... into the military fund, in order to meet the needs for the war', Efstathiou 2004: 401.

## Conclusion

This call for change has been the consistent aim of all the *Olynthiacs*, and each speech has reinforced and developed Demosthenes' assertions in the *First Philippic* that they must shake off their apathy, act, in person, and fund their initiatives. Their refusal to do so, and to consistently ignore Demosthenes' advice, has resulted in the neglect of their possessions and allies and the decline of their reputation.<sup>520</sup> Thus, rather than viewing the *Olynthiacs* as 'an attempt to stimulate hostility against Philip', I argue that Demosthenes' policy is to stimulate Athenian self-reflection and a change in attitude.<sup>521</sup> As he later argues in *On the Chersonese* and the *Third Philippic*, it is impossible for the Athenians to deal with any external threats if they do not firstly resolve their own internal crisis.<sup>522</sup>

Having called on the Assembly to 'wipe away the dishonour you have incurred from your past conduct' in the *First Olynthiac*, Demosthenes also prescribes their ancestral actions as examples to emulate and follow.<sup>523</sup> Through his use of the Athenian past, Demosthenes augments his rhetoric with the collective awareness of the honour of these ancestral actions and, in evoking these social memories, I argue that Demosthenes uses the past to motivate the current Athenians to act in a manner worthy of their ancestors. Therefore, as discussed in the introduction, to view these speeches as primarily anti-Macedonian and as a drama between Demosthenes and Philip, arguably overshadows the more immediate concerns Demosthenes addresses within the Assembly itself, and that resolving the internal corruption that prevents effective decision-making is paramount to regaining an Athenian presence in Northern Greece.

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<sup>520</sup> Assertions that Athenian neglect that has helped Philip occur at 3.6; 1.8; 1.9; 2.3; 2.4. At 3.17-18 Demosthenes uses the example of how deserters are to blame for defeat to explain the situation within the Assembly, the deserters being those who accept bad advice and choose to not act.

<sup>521</sup> Carey 2000: 34.

<sup>522</sup> Demosthenes 8.61 and 9.53.

<sup>523</sup> Demosthenes 1.11.

## CHAPTER THREE

### *ON THE PEACE*

In *On the Peace*, Demosthenes constructs the new situation for Athens following their failure to capitalise on the *kairos* in the pre-peace speeches.<sup>524</sup> I argue that *On the Peace* can be considered a watershed moment in the deliberative corpus, where a clear contrast is apparent between the pre-peace speeches, which forewarned the Athenians of the consequences of their detrimental attitude, and the post-peace speeches where Demosthenes is able to claim that events have validated his previous arguments.

A brief overview of the events between the *Third Olynthiac* and *On the Peace* in 346 is necessary to understand Demosthenes' arguments in the next four speeches: that Macedonian expansion and the deteriorated relationship between Philip and Athens is a result of the Assembly's decision to follow false promises, and their failure to act on Demosthenes' earlier advice. In particular, it is important to observe how the Peace signifies the deteriorated state of Athenian power, which is epitomised in the surrender of Athenian rights to Amphipolis despite decades of attempts to regain the colony since its seizure by Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war.<sup>525</sup>

#### The Fall of Olynthus

In the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes used Philip's return to Chalcidice as evidence that Athens was in a much weaker position, and whilst some of Demosthenes' claims were 'overstated', nonetheless the 'situation was in fact grim.'<sup>526</sup> Yet despite Demosthenes' failure to persuade the Athenians to revoke the laws protecting the Theoric Fund, they did eventually

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<sup>524</sup> For the purpose of this half of the thesis, I refer to Demosthenes 4,1,2,3 as 'pre-peace speeches', and Demosthenes 5,6,8,9 as 'post-peace speeches'.

<sup>525</sup> As Lazardis 2003:17 notes: Amphipolis was granted to Athens in the Peace of Nicias, however, the Amphipolitans 'showed no desire to return to their mother-city' and considered themselves independent.

<sup>526</sup> Worthington 2013: 139.

send aid to Olynthus.<sup>527</sup> Philochorus reports that the Athenians were delayed by the Etesian winds, by which time Philip had attacked Olynthus who, as Demosthenes asserts in *On the Chersonese*, were betrayed from within by Euthykrates and Lasthenes. Their betrayal is consistent with Demosthenes' own warnings against enemies within Athens, and likewise was 'consistent with the king's [Philip's] use of bribes.'<sup>528</sup> Archaeological finds at Olynthus include engraved sling-bullets and spear heads with ΦΙΛΙΠΠΙΟΥ, which Worthington notes were used to test 'the determination of the defenders'.<sup>529</sup> The devastation of *poleis* was characteristic of Philip's Chalcidic campaign, and Pliny describes Philip as 'a blood-red meteor, which fell to earth'.<sup>530</sup> When Olynthus fell in 348, Philip ordered it to be razed, and its inhabitants enslaved.<sup>531</sup> Moreover, Philip now held many Athenian prisoners of war.<sup>532</sup>

Concurrent to the crisis at Olynthus was the ongoing Third Sacred War between Phocis and Thebes. Philip had marched back into Greece triumphant following his victory over the Phocians at Crocus Field in 352, having his men wear laurel-wreaths as defenders of Apollo. The Athenians, however, had marched to block his passage through Thermopylae (as

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<sup>527</sup> Worthington 2013:141.

<sup>528</sup> Worthington 2013: 142.

<sup>529</sup> Worthington 2013: 142. Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 49. See too Cawkwell 1962: 131. Kosmidou and Malamidou 2004:136 note how 'the power that emanated from the "mystic" archaism of past scripts escalated the vivifying power of words' and from this perspective the engraved legends were more than humouristic: 'Ethnic or personal badges and their bearers could embody the individual or cities themselves as if they have delivered the strike in close combat.' Kosmidou and Malamidou 2004: 136 note how further finds at Amphipolis, Torone and Olynthus demonstrate Philip's generals engaged their bullets, with ΚΑΕΟΒ/ΟΥΛΟΥ believed to refer to one of Philip's generals at the sieges of 348 and (if the same general) at Amphipolis in 357. Inscribed sling bullets were discovered on the Acropolis at Argilos which was attacked by Philip in 357: Personal Communication Prof. Jacques Perrault, Université de Montréal June 2014. I was part of the 2014 excavation team (working on the seventh century BCE stoa). This find was unpublished at the time of writing this thesis.

<sup>530</sup> Pliny, *Natural History* 2.27, Worthington 2013: 142 cites Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 50-51 and 156; Diodorus 16.53.2-03, 55.1. Gabriel 2010: 155 argues that Demosthenes claim at 9.26 that the wholesale destruction of Chalcidice is false, asserting that Stageria was the only site destroyed in this manner, early in Philip's campaign as 'an example of psychological warfare.' He argues that due to its natural resources it made more sense to annex Chalcidice than to destroy it. But he does concede that Olynthus was destroyed 'brick by brick', and this is attested to in Cawkwell 1978: 82. Indeed, due to its lack of occupation following the siege of Philip, Olynthus is one of the best-preserved Hippodamian plans in Greece. Zosia Archibald is currently conducting a five-year project at Olynthus (started in 2014), which will include a field survey of the whole urban area.

<sup>531</sup> Diodorus 16.53.3.

<sup>532</sup> Trevett 2011: 88.

Demosthenes praised them for doing in the *First Philippic*), and Philip could not pass into Central Greece. However, as MacDowell notes, the central Greek states were exhausted by the Sacred War between Thebes and Phocis, and following the eventual fall of Olynthus, the Athenians also wanted to secure the return of their citizens who were now Macedonian prisoners of war.<sup>533</sup> Due to Philip's military strength and now undisputed presence in Greece, 'the expectation was that he, not the Amphictyonic Council, would settle the war.'<sup>534</sup>

Just prior to this in the summer of 348 Philip sent Ctesiphon back to Athens with a request for both peace and an alliance, following Athens' grievance that their citizen was captured during the Olympian truce.<sup>535</sup> As Worthington notes, we cannot be certain of Philip's motives, but the Athenians' blocking of his passage at Thermopylae arguably motivated Philip's decision, especially since the capture of Olynthus made the Athenians dubious of Philip and they sent embassies across Greece to 'join Athens in war against Philip.'<sup>536</sup>

Moreover, Philip risked alienating the Athenians if he intervened further in the Sacred War by sending aid to Thebes following the invasion of Boeotia by the Phocians in 347.<sup>537</sup> Yet, to not send aid risked a Theban-Athenian alliance, thus Philip sent 'a few soldiers' to Thebes in 346.<sup>538</sup> Phocis appealed to Athens and Sparta who both responded: the Athenians sent Chares to 'establish garrisons along the coastline of the Propontis and North Aegean',

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<sup>533</sup> MacDowell 2009: 314. Trevett 2011: 88.

<sup>534</sup> Worthington 2013: 155.

<sup>535</sup> Worthington 2013: 148, cites Aeschines 2.12-17. MacDowell 2000: 314-5. Thus, even before the fall of Olynthus Philip sought Peace with Athens, but events at Olynthus took priority.

<sup>536</sup> Worthington 2013: 150, Demosthenes 19.304. It is important to note that Demosthenes did not take part in this, which further supports my argument that his agenda is not primarily 'anti-Macedonian'. Worthington 2013: 150 suggest this was because he did not want to be determined by the success or failure of the embassies, and perhaps returned to logography. Efstathiou 2004: 388 notes 'there are several incidents which created the momentum which led to Philip's proposal for peace', citing the mission of Aristodemos to release Iatrokles and Eueratos, son of Strombichos, and the 'capture and ransoming of Phrynon, and lastly the mission of Ktesiphon to take the ransom money and bringing back proposals of peace and goodwill by Philip.'

<sup>537</sup> Worthington 2013: 153.

<sup>538</sup> Diodorus 16.58.2-3.



and troops to Halus in Thessaly as a means to ‘distract him [Philip] from central Greek affairs.’<sup>539</sup> At the same time, the Athenians sent out a second embassy to the Greeks to determine if peace with Philip was in their collective interests.<sup>540</sup> The Athenians also sent an embassy to Pella to release the prisoners of Olynthus, and it was at the subsequent negotiation of the release of these prisoners that Philip once more sought a peace agreement with the Athenians.<sup>541</sup>

### The Peace of Philocrates

The main sources for our understanding of the peace are the forensic speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes on the embassy to Pella, which by their nature are not all together reliable testimonies.<sup>542</sup> Yet as Yunis notes, while it is important to remember that speeches are shaped towards political ends, that ‘does not mean they have *no* value as historical sources’.<sup>543</sup>

Using Speech 19 Ryder states that, contrary to their agreement, the Phocians refused to hand over the strategic cities that controlled Thermopylae in return for Athenian support in the Sacred War. Following their failure to keep hold of Thermopylae, the Athenians sent an initial embassy to Pella to negotiate peace in February 346.<sup>544</sup> Ryder suggests the delay was caused by Athenian reluctance to ‘concede that Philip had got the upper hand’, and that in the peace ‘they were not going to recover lost possessions.’<sup>545</sup> Philip wanted a ‘bilateral treaty’ which consisted of Athens, Macedonia and their respective allies with ‘the stipulation that

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<sup>539</sup> Worthington 2013: 163.

<sup>540</sup> Worthington 2013: 163. Cawkwell 1960: 416-438.

<sup>541</sup> MacDowell 2009: 314-5. Worthington 2013: 163.

<sup>542</sup> Demosthenes 19 and Aeschines 2. Worthington 2013: 156 goes as far to state ‘a definitive account of the events of 346 is impossible’.

<sup>543</sup> Yunis 1996: 239.

<sup>544</sup> Ryder 2000: 60. Demosthenes 19.163.

<sup>545</sup> Ryder 2000: 59.

each party was to recognise only the others current allies.<sup>546</sup> The significance of this was that the Athenians would finally give up their claims to Amphipolis, as well as enabling Philip to complete his plans against Cersobleptes in Thrace, much to the discomfort of the Athenians.<sup>547</sup>

Demosthenes appears to shift opinion on the peace, initially proposing crowns for the envoys, but accuses Aeschines of bribery in exchange for Amphipolis at the Assembly on Elaphebolion 8.<sup>548</sup> In his later forensic speech, Demosthenes maintains that he urged the Assembly to ponder and consider Philip's peace terms.<sup>549</sup>

The Assembly met on 18 and 19 Elaphebolion to discuss the peace where Philocrates proposed they accept Philip's terms.<sup>550</sup> However, the Athenians raised their concerns over both the Phocians and Cersobleptes, and in particular, the declining state of Athenian affairs. A fragment of Theopompus suggests Philocrates warned:

This is not the time to engage in contentious rivalry...many grave dangers surround us. For we know that the Boeotians and the Megarians are at enmity with us, the Peloponnesians are courting some of the Thebans and others the Spartans, the Chians and the Rhodians, and their allies are hostile to our state, and they are negotiating with Philip for his friendship.<sup>551</sup>

The Athenian allies requested a common peace (*koinē eirēnē*) with Philip, that anyone could join for three months. Despite both Aeschines and Demosthenes accepting this, Parmenion, Antipater and Eurylochus made it clear to Demosthenes after the first day that Philip would

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<sup>546</sup> Worthington 2013: 166. See too Ryder 2000: 62-63.

<sup>547</sup> Philip left for Thrace the day the envoys went home. Aeschines 2.82; Ryder 2000: 62. Worthington 2013: 166.

<sup>548</sup> Demosthenes 19.254. Worthington 2013: 167.

<sup>549</sup> Worthington 2013: 167. Sealey 1993: 143-157.

<sup>550</sup> Worthington 2013: 167 states this was due to the Dionysia being on the 9<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>551</sup> Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 164. Worthington 2013: 168 notes Harding 2006 disputes the authenticity of this fragment.

never agree to these terms.<sup>552</sup> Thus on Elaphebolion 19 Demosthenes proposed that the Assembly agree with Philocrates' and Philip's terms, which 'meant abandoning Cersebleptes, Phocis, and Halus', and Amphipolis.<sup>553</sup> By the time the Athenians reached Pella to swear the Peace with Philip, he had already defeated Cersebleptes at Heraion Oros, further cementing his position in Thrace.<sup>554</sup>

On Skirophorion 15 the embassy reported to the Boule, and an Assembly was held on the 16<sup>th</sup>. Philocrates and Aeschines presented Philip's promise to end the Sacred War, to 'besiege Thebes, restore Thespieae and Plataea, and give them back Oropus.'<sup>555</sup> Demosthenes, in contrast, urged caution and proposed 'a fleet to be deployed to the north coast of Euboea to prevent Philip taking control of Thermopylae.'<sup>556</sup> He was unsuccessful, and the Peace of Philocrates was ratified by the Assembly.

### The Fallout

As Trevett observes, by 343 the peace had become unpopular in Athens and, in particular, the 'insistence that only those allies of Athens who were members of the Second Athenian Confederacy' could be included.<sup>557</sup> This enabled Philip to attack Cersobleptes and Halus without breaching the peace, and such influence in the area was certainly a threat to Athenian interests in the Chersonese/Black Sea region. Moreover, Philip's unobstructed access to Thermopylae was symbolic of Athenian impotence in the North Aegean, and the outcome of

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<sup>552</sup> Aeschines 3.71-72, Demosthenes 19.174, 278. Worthington 2013: 169.

<sup>553</sup> Worthington 2013: 169-170. Efstathiou 2004: 401 remarks how Eubulus' speech also put forward a 'simple choice before the Assembly: it must either start at once the preparations for war, go to the Piraeus immediately or simply had to vote for Philocrates' motion.'

<sup>554</sup> Aeschines 2.89-92. Worthington 2013: 171. At Pella, Philip agreed to Demosthenes' demand for the overdue release of the Athenian prisoners before the Panathenaea, as noted by Worthington 2013: 173.

<sup>555</sup> Worthington 2013: 175. Demosthenes 19.18-22, 34-35, 58.

<sup>556</sup> Worthington 2013: 175.

<sup>557</sup> Trevett 2011: 89. Worthington 2013: 176 notes the discontent of the Athenians.

the Sacred War was a disappointment as ‘they still naively supposed Philip would crush Thebes and the state of Phocis would escape unscathed.’<sup>558</sup>

As Yunis notes, the peace was an ‘utter failure... far from being settled, the problem of how to respond to Macedonian expansion was exacerbated.’<sup>559</sup> In *On the Peace*, Demosthenes differentiates himself from those who promoted (false) hopes in the peace, and given his alleged humiliation at Pella which was capitalised upon by his rival Aeschines, together with insults of him as a ‘water-drinker’ by Philocrates, it is unsurprising that in *On the Peace* Demosthenes affirms his validity as a speaker and advice-giver.<sup>560</sup> Certainly, Demosthenes reinforces the opinions within *On the Peace* on the responsibility of citizens (in this particular case ambassadors) to speak the truth unequivocally, and the corruption of other speakers later in 343 in *On the Dishonest Embassy*:

For what else should envoys be held accountable if not their speeches? Envoys are not in charge of triremes, territory, soldiers, or citadels... but of words and time... For there is no greater crime someone could commit against you than to speak false words. For how could people whose government is based on speeches govern themselves securely unless the speeches are true? And if someone is bribed to speak in support of policies that favour the enemy, how does that not also put you at risk? ... The politicians who offer the best policy must defeat and overcome those who oppose them out of ignorance or corruption.<sup>561</sup>

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<sup>558</sup> Worthington 2013: 176.

<sup>559</sup> Yunis 2005: 115.

<sup>560</sup> Aeschines 2.34-5 states that Demosthenes became literally lost for words in front of Philip, but as Worthington 2013: 165 notes we should treat this with scepticism given the context of the false embassy trial. Demosthenes refers to these criticisms at 19.23-24, 44-46. One could argue that Demosthenes begins to settle personal scores with political ends.

<sup>561</sup> Demosthenes 19.183-185. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου δεῖ δίκην παρὰ πρέσβειων ἢ λόγων λαμβάνειν; εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ πρέσβεις οὐ τριήρων οὐδὲ τόπων οὐδ' ὀπλιτῶν οὐδ' ἀκροπόλεων κύριοι ... ἀλλὰ λόγων καὶ χρόνων ... οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μείζον ἂν ὑμᾶς ἀδικήσειέ τις, ἢ ψευδῆ λέγων. οἷς γὰρ ἐστ' ἐν λόγοις ἢ πολιτεία, πῶς, ἂν οὗτοι μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὄσιν, ἀσφαλῶς ἔστι πολιτεύεσθαι; ἐὰν δὲ διη καὶ πρὸς ἅ τοις ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει δῶρά τις λαμβάνων λέγη, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ κινδυνεύετε; ... εἴτα κρατῆσαι καὶ περιγενέσθαι δεῖ τοὺς τὰ βέλτιστα λέγοντας τῶν ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ διὰ μοχθηρίαν

## Dating

Dionysius of Halicarnassus dates this speech to the autumn of 346, which is generally agreed to be correct.<sup>562</sup> The specific context for this speech comes, as Trevett notes, from ‘the transfer of two of the twenty-four seats on the council of the Delphic Amphictyony from Phocis to Philip.’<sup>563</sup> The prospect of accepting both Philip’s position on the Amphictyonic Council and presidency over the Pythian Games was arguably intolerable for the Athenians, especially given that ‘in the fourth century the status of Delphi was international ground... as Geneva often is today’, and a place of arbitration.<sup>564</sup> The Assembly gathered to contest this, and in his response Demosthenes equates this to chasing the shadow of a donkey.<sup>565</sup> Demosthenes asserts that defiance ‘was not in Athens’ best interest’, but that it would prove futile and costly.<sup>566</sup> For Demosthenes, their attitude is indicative of the Assembly’s complete ignorance of the situation and how it came about.

## On the Speech

Some scholars do not view *On the Peace* as having the same passion and conviction as the other ‘Philippic’ speeches, if we must use such a term. Usher remarks that *On the Peace* is small scale and subdued in tone, noting an absence of ‘focused criticism.’<sup>567</sup> I argue there *is* focused criticism in the speech, however, it is not focused *on Philip* and subsequently it is overlooked. Pearson likewise notes that Demosthenes ‘is much less aggressive than in

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ἀντιλεγόντων. Hesk 2000: 164 sees this passage as ‘an emblem of Athenian democracy’s confrontation with the problem of deceptive communication.’

<sup>562</sup> Trevett 2011: 88.

<sup>563</sup> Trevett 2011: 90.

<sup>564</sup> Buckler and Beck 2008: 214. Cartledge 2002: 50 discusses how presiding over the games was important for Philip asserting his Greek-ness and that ‘he celebrated the quadrennial Pythian Games with especial magnificence.’

<sup>565</sup> MacDowell 2009: 327 in contrast does not believe the speech was delivered as part of the debate, or was possibly delivered at a later meeting.

<sup>566</sup> Worthington 2013: 183.

<sup>567</sup> Usher 2010: 232; Usher 1999: 231.

the *Olynthiacs*. He is less optimistic, more cautious, more willing to recognise difficulties...Demosthenes makes his points soberly and briefly'; Sandys calls the speech 'studiously moderate and dispassionate' and Milns comment that 'the speech is 'somewhat less fiery and assertive and more defensive'.<sup>568</sup> Whilst this is always ultimately subjective, I believe these opinions are indicative of a general dismissal of the speech because it does not fit the 'Philippic' stereotype expected by scholarship. Indeed, assertions that in *On the Peace*: 'caution and cool-headed reason were more important than fiery anti-Philip passions,' are built on the assumption that 'anti-Philip passions' dominated the speeches prior to this which, as I have demonstrated, is not necessarily the case.<sup>569</sup> It also suggests that the speech has a cool temperate tone, but as this chapter demonstrates, Demosthenes' criticism of the Assembly is full of passionate (yet reasoned) indignation at the Athenians for ignoring his advice.

I seek to readdress what I believe to be a general undervaluing of *On the Peace*, which is reflected in the brief treatment the speech gets in comparison to the *Philippics* and the *Olynthiacs*.<sup>570</sup> Refreshingly, Worthington remarks on this underestimation, asserting that *On the Peace* 'was a turning point in the emergence of the orator to the centre-stage in Athenian politics, preparing the way for the influence Demosthenes would wield after Philippic 2.'<sup>571</sup> My analysis likewise seeks to assert the importance of *On the Peace* and, in contrast to Usher et al listed above, I personally view this speech as indignantly vibrant. Indeed, while Demosthenes calls for reason on Philip's position at Delphi, he does not refrain from his continued admonishment of the Assembly. The speech presents the serious

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<sup>568</sup> Pearson 1976: 138; Sandys 1913: 99; Milns 2000: 211.

<sup>569</sup> Milns 2000: 221 n31. I argue that this overlooks how Demosthenes is still addressing the Assembly, and thus it does not lack impact, passion nor gumption because Demosthenes has not been arguing solely against Philip.

<sup>570</sup> Such an example is MacDowell's remarkably brief treatment of the speech 2009: 327-8.

<sup>571</sup> Worthington 1995: *On Usher 1993*. Jaeger 1938: 157 too asserts: *On the Peace* was 'the most important document to [Demosthenes'] political position at this difficult time.'

ramifications of ignoring *parrhēsia*, and the situation Athens now finds itself in as a direct result of ignoring Demosthenes' warnings of what would happen if they did not shake off their apathetic attitude.

Demosthenes' continued focus is on how the Assembly still ignores good advice and permits themselves to be persuaded by people acting in self-interest. In particular, Demosthenes presents himself as a dutiful *parrhēsiastes*, whose advice has been both consistent and justified by events, compared to those who are motivated by self-profit.<sup>572</sup>

The second half of the speech aims at making the Athenians recognise the danger of breaking the peace, and not to risk more than what has already been conceded merely over Philip presiding at Delphi.<sup>573</sup> Demosthenes' aim is to make the Athenians acknowledge how internal persuasion and the peddling of false hopes has resulted in this less than desirable position: Philip, through Athenian apathy, has become the glue that can unite Athens' enemies in the name of Sacred War. Through failing to seize previous *kairos*-moments to stop Philip, nor addressing any of the problems Demosthenes attested to in the previous four speeches, the Athenians must now co-exist with Macedonian influence in Greece. The speech focuses on asserting how and why the Athenians must tread carefully, act sensibly and in a manner worthy of the city. Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* again presents uncomfortable truths to make the Athenians recognise their culpability and prevent further self-sabotage.

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<sup>572</sup> Such examples are his stance on Euboea: 'you all realised that the men who had then persuaded you of that course of action were worthless and that what I had said was best'; how others 'were offering such hopes and deceiving you with promises... I did not deceive you and was not silent'. Demosthenes 5.5, 5.10. At 5.12 Demosthenes asserts: 'I judge and calculate matters without being paid to do so, and no one can point to any profit that attaches to my political actions and speeches.'

<sup>573</sup> Emphasis that Athens has already surrendered/neglected/ thrown away their possessions to Philip is evident in Demosthenes' repeated use of προῖημι— at 5.1, 5.3, 5.10, 5.13, 5.15 (previously used at 1.9, 1.12, 1.14, 2.2, 3.9). LSJ s.v. definition 'II. *give up, deliver, betray* one to his enemy, Hdt.1.159, 3.137; χρήματα μὲν σφι π. *offering to give them* . . . , Id.1.24, cf. Ar.Nu.1214; τὰς ναῦς π. τινί Th.8.32: with an inf. added, γυνῆκα . . . π. ἀπάγεσθαι Hdt.2.115:—Pass., *to be given or thrown away*, εἰ ταῦτα προεῖτ' ἀκονίττει D.18.200; καιροὶ προεῖνται Id.19.8, cf. 25.10'. I believe this emphasis on what Athens has surrendered/neglected/abandoned and how they cannot afford to abandon anything else (including the Greeks) becomes characteristic of the post-peace speeches: 6.8, 6.10, 6.17, 6.30, 6.35, 8.49.3, 8.49.7, 8.50, 8.56, 9.1, 9.4, 9.65, 9.73.

## Analysis

### Proemium

Demosthenes' proemium returns to his complaint against the empty and useless rhetoric he witnesses in the Assembly, as 'it is pointless to make fine speeches about everything that has been squandered but also because there is absolutely no agreement about where our future interests lies.'<sup>574</sup> Demosthenes builds upon his previous argument that speeches must serve a purpose of improving the situation and lead towards proposed action, rather than circular complaints:

Deliberation is inherently difficult and irksome, but you, men of Athens, have made it considerably harder. For all other people are in the habit of deliberating before they act, but you do so afterwards!<sup>575</sup>

As in the *First Philippic*, the Assembly still reacts to events rather than anticipating them, and consequently do not act as they ought.<sup>576</sup> Instead of benefiting the *polis*, the values of *isēgoria* and *isōnomia* are being abused and hinder genuine political agency. It is the corruption of these values by self-serving politicians that has undermined Athens from within, and compromised its power and position, and their ability to deliberate effectively. Demosthenes' appraisal of the Assembly also engages with Thucydidean concepts on deliberation: Demosthenes' Assembly are at odds with Pericles' praise of the Athenians as

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<sup>574</sup> Demosthenes 5.1.

<sup>575</sup> Demosthenes 5.2. δυσκόλου δ' ὄντος φύσει καὶ χαλεποῦ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι, ἔτι πολλῷ χαλεπώτερον ὑμεῖς αὐτὸ πεποιήκατ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰώθασι χρῆσθαι τῷ βουλευέσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα. Sandys 1913: 84 remarks that the ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι has been placed at the end (like 6.9) to 'emphasise the expression of pain and reproach.' Sandys also notes that ὑμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα rings with 'bitter disappointment' with none of the 'satirical scorn' applied to Cleon in Lucian: §2 'Κλέων Προμηθεὺς ἔστι μετὰ τὰ πράγματα. The text Sandys refers to is *To One Who Said 'You're a Prometheus in Words'*, and Lucian's comment 'Cleon's a Prometheus after the event', is introduced as a quotation from a comic poet (possibly Eupolis). This is from the fragment *Comica adespota* F461 and from further examples cited in Olson 2007 and 2014, it is possible that Προμηθεὺς μετὰ τὰ πράγματα 'wise after the event' could have been a proverbial expression in the fifth century, and Demosthenes could be making a side reference to it here.

<sup>576</sup> Demosthenes 4.40 asserted that the Athenians act like a foreigner boxes. They are at odds with the values and behaviour which characterises Athenian identity.



being able to take risks whilst simultaneously estimating them before hand, and he evokes the Mytilenean Debate in the dangers of acting rashly without consideration.<sup>577</sup>

Firstly, in noting this flaw in their decision-making, Demosthenes asserts how the problem facing Athens is (still) the Assembly itself; more specifically, their attitude towards speakers and their failure to move beyond deliberation:

As a result, for as long as I can remember, anyone who criticises those things that might lead you into trouble wins a good reputation and is thought to speak well, but the actual situation which you are deliberating gets away from you.<sup>578</sup>

As he argued in the *Third Olynthiac*, without a definitive course of action the speeches are worthless, and only benefit the speaker's reputation.<sup>579</sup> These men trick the Assembly into believing they are dealing with the situation, when in reality (Demosthenes' version of it) they are ensnared by their desire for displays of rhetoric and flattery, thus consistently neglecting the actual issue at hand. Their current complaining likewise follows the same pattern that they come to things far too late. The Athenians could have prevented Philip's rise to power (that enabled this honour at Delphi), if they had acted on Demosthenes' advice.<sup>580</sup> Now, however, they deliberate on the audacity of Philip when the opportunities to prevent his rise have long passed.

As in the previous speeches, however, Demosthenes offers the Athenians hope that they can rectify some of the self-inflicted damage if they act accordingly:

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<sup>577</sup> Thucydides 2.40; 3.36-50. Such an example suggests Demosthenes was potentially influenced by and derived ideals from his knowledge of Thucydides. At the end of *On the Peace* Demosthenes calls on the Athenians to avoid rash decisions on popular opinion, which again evokes Thucydides' analysis of post-Periclean deliberation.

<sup>578</sup> Demosthenes 5.2. ἐκ δὲ τούτου συμβαίνει παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ὃν οἶδ' ἐγώ, τὸν μὲν οἷς ἂν ἀμάρτητ' ἐπιτιμῶντ' εὐδοκιμεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν, τὰ δὲ πράγματα καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλευέσθ' ἐκφεύγειν ὑμᾶς.

<sup>579</sup> Demosthenes 3.19.

<sup>580</sup> Demosthenes has already frequently claimed that Philip was a self-made problem: 4.4, 4.11, 1.9, 2.3, 2.3-4, 3.3-5, 3.17.

Nevertheless, although this is so [i.e. their bad practices], I stand before you convinced that if you are willing to listen, without making a disturbance or showing ill will, as is appropriate for those who are deliberating on behalf of the city about matters of great importance, I will be able to speak and to advise you how the present situation may be improved and how what has been squandered may be regained.<sup>581</sup>

But again, this is contingent on the Athenians recognising their mistakes and learning from them. To this end, Demosthenes seeks to make the Athenians see the real situation at hand; the reality of both their own attitudes and how rhetoric used to manipulate them to the detriment of the *polis*.

### Narrative

To assert this, and affirm his own consistency, Demosthenes recalls his previous advice which with hindsight develops a sense of authenticity and generates a rhetoric of sincerity and truth.<sup>582</sup> At the end of the *Third Olynthiac*, Demosthenes defined his proposals with the atavistic ideals of Athenian identity; now Demosthenes asserts his Athenianness in his oratorical narratives: in his recollections of Euboea, Neoptolemus, and the embassy to Philip, Demosthenes reminds the Athenians how they were persuaded to act against their interests, but also provides a lesson in the consequences of their hostile reception of honest frank advice.

Firstly, Demosthenes reminds them of the Euboean fiasco:

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<sup>581</sup> Demosthenes 5.3. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων οἶομαι καὶ πεπεικῶς ἑμαυτὸν ἀνέστηκα, ἂν ἐθελήσητε τοῦ θορυβεῖν καὶ φιλονικεῖν ἀποστάντες ἀκούειν, ὡς ὑπὲρ πόλεως βουλευομένοις καὶ τηλικούτων πραγμάτων προσήκει, ἔξειν καὶ λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν δι' ὧν καὶ τὰ παρόντ' ἔσται βελτίω καὶ τὰ προειμένα σωθήσεται.

<sup>582</sup> Val Alpen, Bal and Smith 2008: 2 on the rhetoric of sincerity, observe how in postmodern irony the 'authentic' and the 'sincere' are valorised 'over political intelligence and rhetorical sophistication.'

First, men of Athens, at a time when affairs in Euboea were in disarray, and certain people were trying to persuade you to help Plutarchus and undertake an inglorious and costly war, I was the first, indeed the only one to come forward and oppose it.<sup>583</sup>

Both Worthington and Trevett suggest that Demosthenes probably argued intervention in Euboea would distract the Athenians from their responsibilities in the North at Olynthus, but Demosthenes was ultimately ignored stating: ‘I was virtually torn apart by those who were trying to persuade you, for the sake of small profits to commit many errors.’<sup>584</sup> Demosthenes again notes the dangers for speakers in addressing an Assembly hostile towards honest advice. Moreover, in asserting how he was the only man to oppose the momentum to intervene in Euboea, further parallels can be drawn with Thucydides’ *History* and with the *epitaphioi logoi* that Athenian failures are a result of *Athenian* mistakes, and in this particular instance, the error of pandering to the whim of the people and popularist rhetoric.<sup>585</sup>

Indeed, the decision to intervene in Euboea demonstrates both their failure to recognise/ prioritise their issues and their misguided judgements, and that in being persuaded by popularist rhetoric they have inflicted costly errors upon themselves. This is exacerbated by the insinuation of internal manipulation if we follow Worthington’s suggestion that ‘Philip may even have been backing Callias to divert Athenian attention from his siege of

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<sup>583</sup>Demosthenes 5.5. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρῶτον μὲν, ἡνίκ’ ἔπειθόν τινες ὑμᾶς, τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ πραγμάτων ταραττομένων, βοηθεῖν Πλουτάρχῳ καὶ πόλεμον καὶ ἄδοξον καὶ δαπανηρὸν ἄρασθαι, πρῶτος καὶ μόνος παρελθὼν ἀντεῖπον. For more on the expedition to Euboea see Worthington 2013: 144-146. The Athenians sent forces to Euboea fearing that Callias’ alliance with Philip would threaten Athenian interest in the area. Their general, Phocion, was expelled by Plutarchus when he arrived at Eretria. Moreover, the Athenians ‘committed a strategic error by recalling Phocion ... Plutarchus took advantage of the new commander’s unfamiliarity with the island to attack him, capturing all the Athenian troops.’ Athens, who had entered Euboea to send aid, ended up paying a ransom of fifty talents for their men, and Euboea declared its independence. Worthington 2013: 145.

<sup>584</sup> Demosthenes 5.5 καὶ μόνον οὐ διεσπᾶσθην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ μικροῖς λήμμασι πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλ’ ὑμᾶς ἀμαρτάνειν πεισάντων. Worthington 2013: 145; Trevett 2011: 92.

<sup>585</sup> Thucydides 1.144. 2.65.12: ‘in the end it was only because they had destroyed themselves by their own internal strife that finally they were forced to surrender.’ See too Plato *Menexenus* 243d.

Olynthus.<sup>586</sup> Thus, with the Euboean fiasco, Demosthenes develops his opening criticism that the Assembly complains after events, when their mistakes cannot be rectified:

And a short time later, when we had incurred a further burden of shame (αἰσχύνην), and had suffered such things as no men have ever suffered at the hands of those whom they had helped, you all realised that the men who had then persuaded you of that course of action were worthless and that what I had said was best.<sup>587</sup>

This realisation comes too late, but now serves as a reminder of the dangers of the misuse of rhetoric, the dangers of an Assembly that is ensnared by its own vices, and the dangers of not listening to Demosthenes' advice.

The second example refers to the Assembly's faith in the actor Neoptolemus instead of Demosthenes:

Again, men of Athens, when I saw that Neoptolemus the actor was free to go about as he pleased, shielded by his profession,<sup>588</sup> and was doing the greatest harm to our city and was managing and controlling your affairs for the benefit of Philip, I came forward and addressed you not out of any private enmity or maliciousness, as had become clear from subsequent events.<sup>589</sup>

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<sup>586</sup> Worthington 2013: 144. Ryder 2000: 56. This could also be evidence to support Roisman 2006's rhetoric of conspiracy within the deliberative speeches.

<sup>587</sup> Demosthenes 5.5. καὶ χρόνου βραχέος διελθόντος, μετὰ τοῦ προσοφλεῖν αἰσχύνην καὶ παθεῖν οἷα τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων οὐδένας πρόποτε πεπόνθασ' ὑπὸ τούτων οἷς ἐβοήθησαν, πάντες ὑμεῖς ἔγνωτε τὴν τε τῶν τότε ταῦτα πεισάντων κακίαν καὶ τὰ βέλτιστ' εἰρηκότ' ἐμέ.

Sandys 1913: 88 notes ἔγνωτε after παθεῖν is 'of learning by sad experience', as in Hesiod *Works and Days* 218: 'παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω.' The shame Demosthenes refers to is the ransom Athens paid to release citizens imprisoned during the expedition.

<sup>588</sup> Trevett 2011: 92n8 notes how 'the tragic actor Neoptolemus of Scyros had a successful career at Athens and enjoyed the favour of Philip, with whom he advocated that Athens make peace. As an actor, he was evidently free to travel without arousing suspicion.'

<sup>589</sup> Demosthenes 5.6. πάλιν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατιδὼν Νεοπτόλεμον τὸν ὑποκριτὴν τῷ μὲν τῆς τέχνης προσχήματι τυγχάνοντ' ἀδείας, κακὰ δ' ἐργαζόμενον τὰ μέγιστα τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν διοικοῦντα Φιλίππῳ καὶ πρυτανεύοντα, παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς, οὐδεμιᾶς ἰδίας οὔτ' ἔχθρας οὔτε συκοφαντίας ἔνεκα, ὡς ἐκ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ' ἔργων γέγονεν δῆλον.

As an actor Neoptolemus would have the ability to deceive an audience by his acting talents, and as Hesk notes, this is a frequent attack of Demosthenes' against Aeschines.<sup>590</sup> But Aeschines too warns of the danger of an opponent professionally wielding and 'harnessing a *technē* of speech and performance'.<sup>591</sup> Thus Neoptolemus epitomises the dangers of expert rhetoric compared to Demosthenes' *parrhēsia*, and the Athenians' naïve self-indulgent attitude in Assembly deliberations.<sup>592</sup> Indeed, in the case of Neoptolemus, Demosthenes condemns the *dēmos* for treating the serious deliberations within the Assembly as an extended Dionysia, detached from the reality and impact of their decisions:

In that case, the people I criticise are not those who spoke on Neoptolemus' behalf, since not a single person did so, but you! For even if you had been watching tragedies in the Theatre of Dionysus, rather than a debate about the safety of the city, you would not have listened to him with so much favour or to me with so much hostility.<sup>593</sup>

This complaint also presents a parallel to Cleon's complaints in Thucydides' Mytilenean debate against the Assembly goers:

The blame is yours, for stupidly instituting these competitive displays. You have become regular speech-goers (θεαταὶ τῶν λόγων)... victims of your own pleasure in

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<sup>590</sup> Hesk 2000:207: Demosthenes 18.129, 209, 232, 261-2, 308.

<sup>591</sup> Hesk 2000: 207: Aeschines 2.56. This suspicion is similar to that associated with Sophists and professional manipulation of rhetoric.

<sup>592</sup> In criticising Neoptolemus' *deinotēs legein*, Demosthenes also defends his own advice, which as Hesk 1999: 210 notes is another *topos* of the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric: 'In these instances [documented by Ober 1989-187-91] the speaker draws a contrast between a rhetorical activism which is deceitful and harmful to the *polis*, and the honest beneficial activism which (of course) he has always adhered to.'

<sup>593</sup> Demosthenes 5.7 καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐντούτοις αἰτιάσομαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ Νεοπτολέμου λέγοντας (οὐδὲ εἷς γὰρ ἦν), ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς• εἰ γὰρ ἐν Διονύσου τραγῳδοὺς ἐθεᾶσθε, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων ἦν ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνου πρὸς χάριν οὔτ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἀπέχθειαν ἠκούσατε.

He will return to this criticism at *On the Chersonese* 8.77 p.270.

listening, and are more like an audience sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament discussing matters of state.<sup>594</sup>

Such anxieties about the Assembly's attitude towards deliberative oratorical performances are also evident at the opening of Aristophanes' *Archarnians* and the ambiguity on whether Dikaeopolis is at the theatre of the Pnyx.<sup>595</sup> This wider concern of the Assembly's attitude towards deliberative performance is crucial to understanding how such attitudes have had a negative impact upon the democratic decision-making process, and have arguably created the internal crisis that has enabled the Macedonian ascendancy at Athenian expense. The categorical problem facing the Athenians is one of self-sabotage, demonstrated in this long-standing issue that they do not conduct their deliberations responsibly, but indulgently become ensnared by their own rhetoric; as noted in the proemium, they have made deliberation considerably harder than it already inherently is.

Thus, Demosthenes recounts these past events to demonstrate the Assembly's errors in judgement, and the real consequences of rejecting good advice, and as he says at 5.7 quoted above, it is not Neoptolemus but the Assembly that Demosthenes holds responsible. Thus of greater concern for Demosthenes is not how people will act in Philip's interests within Athens (as serious as that is), but that the Assembly permitted this by refusing to listen to honest advice, preferring the sophisticated persuasive performance of an actor. This itself demonstrates the delusion of the Assembly, as *parrhēsia* 'was a practice of opening and revealing one's true beliefs', as opposed to the Sophistic reputation for hiding self-interest behind flattering rhetoric.<sup>596</sup> This internal confusion not only stresses again the Assembly's *mundus perversus* in their gullibility, but Demosthenes' complaint that their thoughtlessness,

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<sup>594</sup> Thucydides 3.38.4-7.

<sup>595</sup> Aristophanes *Acharnians* 15-30: 'Oh they'll get here all right at the last minute, falling over each other, pushing and shoving for front row seats.' Hesk 2000: 260. Goldhill 1991:186. Slater 2002: 45-47 suggests Dikaeopolis is both a 'theatrical and political spectator.'

<sup>596</sup> Saxonhouse 2006: 88.

caused by manipulation and their desire for flattery, has mutated crucial deliberation into a spectacle.<sup>597</sup> Thus the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric against Neoptolemus and his supporters is actually meta-metadiscursive against the Assembly for their utter failure to recognise the deception. The Athenians are persuaded to act against their own interests, and to be hostile to those acting *in* their best interests, when they ought to be masters of *logos* and too virtuous to be deceived.<sup>598</sup>

Unlike in the previous speeches, however, Demosthenes can now demonstrate the outcome of not listening to him:

And yet I think you all now recognise this at least, that after he had arrived at that time in the enemy's country, wishing (so he said) to bring a sum of money that was owed to him there back here to pay for the performance of a liturgy, and after he had made extensive use of the argument that it was terrible for anyone to criticise those who were bringing wealth from Macedonia to Athens, when the peace provided him with immunity from prosecution, he turned the visible assets that he had acquired here into cash and went off to Philip.<sup>599</sup>

Again it is not the disloyalty of Neoptolemus nor Philip's scheming that Demosthenes criticises here, but the naïve gullibility of the Assembly and their manipulation by traitors within Athens.<sup>600</sup> Demosthenes' complaints at their contrasting attitude towards himself and Neoptolemus resonates particularly with Thucydides' assertion that following the death of

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<sup>597</sup> Hesk 1999: 214 notes how at Thucydides 3.38.7 Cleon criticises the Assembly for listening to speeches as 'sophistic displays rather than deciding on national and international policy.' Cartledge 2002: 197 notes Plato's contempt for 'theatrocracy' in *Laws* 701a.

<sup>598</sup> Further examples of Demosthenes' complaint at the hostility of the Assembly include: 4.38, 4.51, 1.16, 3.4, 3.12-13, 3.21-22, 3.32, 5.2, 5.5-6, 6.34, 8.31-14, 8.64, 8.69-71, 9.2, 9.54-55.

<sup>599</sup> Demosthenes 5.8. *καίτοι τοῦτό γ' ὑμᾶς οἶμαι νῦν ἅπαντας ἠσθησθαι, ὅτι τὴν τότε ἄφιξιν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ποιησάμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ τάκεϊ χρήματ' ὀφειλόμεν, ὡς ἔφη, κομίσας δεῦρο λητουργεῖν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ πλείστῳ χρησάμενος, ὡς δεινὸν εἶ τις ἐγκαλεῖ τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐνθάδε τὰς εὐπορίας ἄγουσιν, ἐπειδὴ διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀδείας ἔτυχεν, ἦν ἐνθάδ' ἐκέκτητ' οὐσίαν φανεράν, ταύτην ἐξαργυρίσας πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀπάγων οἴχεται.*

<sup>600</sup> Guth 2015: 345 notes on Demosthenes 19.320 that Philip and his ambassadors take care to 'leave the actual business of lying to the Greek traitors.' Demosthenes' criticism again focuses on the internal traitors.

Pericles, Athenian leaders followed policies which ‘when successful, only brought credit and advantage to the individuals, and when they failed, the whole war potential of the state was impaired.’<sup>601</sup> As Thucydides remarks, this was due to the nature of Pericles, who ‘could respect the liberty of the people and at the same time keep them in check.’<sup>602</sup> Demosthenes in a similarly Periclean manner attempts to instruct the Assembly, to make it clear how their misguided decisions are responsible for Philip’s position in the power politics of Greece. Thus in these two examples, Demosthenes has vindicated his own arguments, stating that, ‘these two predictions that I made prove that my speeches were right and just and truthful.’<sup>603</sup> Demosthenes’ final example recounts his own actions on the second Athenian embassy to Philip in 346: ‘Third, men of Athens... relates to the occasion when we ambassadors had returned after accepting the oaths relating to the peace.’<sup>604</sup> Specifically, Demosthenes refers to the terms of the peace which have been proven vain:

At that time some men were promised that Thespieae and Plataea would be restored, and that Philip would preserve the Phocians, if he got control of them, and would disperse the city of Thebes into villages, and that Oropus would be given to us, and that Euboea would be surrendered in return for Amphipolis, and were offering such hopes and deceiving you with promises, by which you were induced, neither to your advantage nor perhaps to your credit, to abandon the Phocians.<sup>605</sup>

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<sup>601</sup> Thucydides 2.65.

<sup>602</sup> Thucydides 2.65.

<sup>603</sup> Demosthenes 5.9. δύο μὲν δὴ ταῦθ’ ὧν προεῖπον ἐγὼ μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς γεγενημένοις λόγοις ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως, οἷά περ ἦν, ἀποφανθένθ’ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ· Vince’s translation reads: ‘there, then, you have two of my warnings, bearing testimony to the value of my earlier speeches, and uttered by me honestly and in strict conformity with the facts.’ I believe a parallel can be drawn to Thucydides’ description of Pericles at 2.65 who likewise ‘never sought power from any wrong motive, he was under no necessity of flattering them... he was able to speak angrily to them and to contradict them.’

<sup>604</sup> Demosthenes 5.9. τὸ τρίτον δ’, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ... ἤνικα τοὺς ὄρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπειληφότες ἤκομεν οἱ πρέσβεις,

<sup>605</sup> Demosthenes 5.10. τότε Θεσπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιᾶς ὑπισχνουμένων οἰκισθῆσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται κύριος, σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὐβοίαν ἀντ’ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοθῆσθαι, καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φανακισμούς, οἷς ὑπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὔτε συμφόρως οὔτ’ ἴσως καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας,



As with Neoptolemus, Demosthenes make the serious accusation the Assembly was deceived by false hopes, which were utilised for personal gain at the expense of the *polis*.<sup>606</sup>

Demosthenes contrasts this with his consistent and dutiful *parrhēsia*:

But I shall show that I did not deceive you and was not silent about any of these matters but declared to you, as I am sure you remember, that I neither knew nor expected that any of these things would happen, and that I thought the speaker was talking nonsense.<sup>607</sup>

Demosthenes, in keeping with the previous four speeches, contrasts himself to these other *rhētors* who, unlike Demosthenes and their ancestors, put their self-interests before that of Athens. Demosthenes utilises the rhetoric of conspiracy to both condemn his opponents and to promote his own honesty, as Roisman notes, even the most intelligent and skilled plotter cannot fool the detector ‘who is able, often uniquely able, to identify them, uncover their schemes, and if time and other factors permit, frustrate their plans.’<sup>608</sup> The Assembly, according to Demosthenes, made this impossible in their rejection of his warnings, and are as culpable for the peace as much as the men that peddled these false hopes.

Moreover, rather than the general argument against the treatment of speakers we have seen in the previous speeches, *On the Peace* functions as a defence of Demosthenes’ advice, in a forensic manner.<sup>609</sup> Singling himself out, he explains to the Assembly why he unlike others could see both the situation and what was required of the Athenians:

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<sup>606</sup> As Hesk 2000: 52 notes by the fourth century ‘the specific charge of “deceiving the people” was associated with making false or unfulfilled promises.’

<sup>607</sup> Demosthenes 5.10. οὐδὲν τούτων οὔτ’ ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προειπῶν ὑμῖν, ὡς οἶδ’ ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτ’ οὔτ’ οἶδα οὔτε προσδοκῶ, νομίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρεῖν.

<sup>608</sup> Roisman 2006: 5. Roisman is not referring to Demosthenes in his comment, but I think it can be applied here.

<sup>609</sup> The traditional divisions of oratory are not always useful, as practice came before the theory (cf. Carey 2000: 33: ‘the neat divisions in classical rhetoric are the product of schematisation by theorists rather than oratorical practice’). Steinbock 2013: 38: the ‘often overly schematic studies ignore that classical rhetoric, which stemmed from an analysis of oratorical praxis, ought to be regarded as a secondary phenomenon.’ Perlman 1961: 150 ‘a clear example of putting the cart before the horse.’

If I have been more successful than others in predicting the future in all these matters, I do not attribute this to my cleverness or to any talent I might boast of, nor do I claim any other reason for my special understanding and perception than these two. First, men of Athens, is good luck, which I observe, is more powerful than any human cleverness or wisdom.<sup>610</sup>

As we saw in the *Olynthiacs*, Fortune was both the vital element to all human affairs, and Fortune granted the Athenians *kairos*, which suggested a benevolence from the gods.<sup>611</sup> Here, Demosthenes presents himself as a recipient of Fortune, which potentially suggests he is fortunate due to his own unique conduct and divine benevolence. This would be supported by Demosthenes' second point, that his foresight is a result of his honesty: 'the second is that I judge and calculate matters without being paid to do so, and no one can point to any profit that attaches to my political actions and speeches. As a result, our advantage is revealed to me directly from the facts themselves.'<sup>612</sup> Because he is not a "bought man", Demosthenes implies he is motivated solely by what benefits the *polis*. Demosthenes has been steadily establishing himself and his proposals as a microcosm of Athenian values.<sup>613</sup> Here Demosthenes seems to be echoing, perhaps even deliberately, Thucydides' description of a Periclean inflection of virtue:

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<sup>610</sup> Demosthenes 5.11. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἄπανθ', ὅσα φαίνομαι βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων προορῶν, οὐδ' εἰς μίαν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε δεινότητ' οὔτ' ἀλαζονείαν ἐπανοίσω, οὐδὲ προσποιήσομαι δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο γινώσκειν καὶ προαισθάνεσθαι πλὴν δι' ἃ ἂν ὑμῖν εἴπω, δύο· ἐν μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' εὐτυχίαν, ἣν συμπάσης ἐγὼ τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὔσης δεινότητος καὶ σοφίας ὁρῶ κρατοῦσαν·

<sup>611</sup> Demosthenes 2.22; 2.2; 3.27. Demosthenes could also be tempering any connotations of arrogance in lauding himself, by appearing modest rather than boastful.

<sup>612</sup> Demosthenes 5.12. ἕτερον δέ, προῖκα τὰ πράγματα κρίνω καὶ λογίζομαι, καὶ οὐδὲν λῆμμ' ἂν οὐδεὶς ἔχοι πρὸς οἷς ἐγὼ πεπολίτευμαι καὶ λέγω δεῖξαι προσηρημένον. ὀρθὸν οὖν, ὅ τι ἂν ποτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὑπάρχη τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ συμφέρον φαίνεται μοι. Demosthenes will use the same argument in *On the Crown* 18.247 where Guth 2015: 344 remarks on the similarity to his stance in *On the False Embassy* on being above bribery 19.139-41; consistently 'Demosthenes bases his personal victory on the claim that he did not accept bribes from Philip and that he continued to counsel the Athenians in good faith.'

<sup>613</sup> As Christ 2006: 15 notes 'Athenian civic ideology engaged with the problem of self-interest by portraying the relationship between the citizen and city as a mutually beneficial one.'

So far as I am concerned, if you are angry with me you are angry with one who has, I think, at least as much ability as anyone else to see what ought to be done and to explain what he sees, one who loves his city, and one who is above being influenced by money. A man who has knowledge but lacks the power clearly to express it is no better off than if he never had any ideas. A man who has both these qualities, but lacks patriotism, could scarcely speak for his own people as he should. And even if he is patriotic as well, but not able to resist a bribe, then this one fault will expose everything to the risk of being bought and sold.<sup>614</sup>

This anger provoked through dutiful *parrhēsia* is also attested to in Plato's *Apology* where Socrates' advice is unwelcome: 'I dare say, though, that you will get angry, like people who are awakened from their doze', further supporting the wider view of the Athenians (this time in a forensic context from a philosophical perspective) as hostile to frank dutiful *parrhēsia*.<sup>615</sup>

Demosthenes further develops his account of their internal issues by asserting how corruption and bribery has exacerbated the Assembly's already corrupted state:

But whenever you add money to either side, as if to a pair of scales, it drops down and drags judgement with it, and whoever does so will no longer offer a straight (ὀρθόν) or sound opinion about any matter.<sup>616</sup>

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<sup>614</sup> Thucydides 2.60.5-6. καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε ὃς οὐδενὸς ἦσσαν οἶομαι εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείστων. ὃ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη: ὃ τε ἔχων ἀμφοτέρω, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύσνους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι: προσόντος δὲ καὶ τοῦδε, χρήμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ζύμπαντα τούτου ἐνὸς ἂν παλοῖτο. Ellis and Milns 1970: 86 note Demosthenes' similarities to Pericles here. Sandys likewise links ὀρθόν in Demosthenes 5.11 to Thucydides 2.61. I argue that there is potentially a combination at play here: (i) that we, as readers of Classics, are reminded of Pericles, (ii) that Demosthenes potentially wanted to remind the Assembly of Pericles, (iii) that Demosthenes could be drawing on Thucydides' Pericles as a model for his own advice.

<sup>615</sup> Plato *Apology* 31a.

<sup>616</sup> Demosthenes 5.11. ὅταν δ' ἐπὶ θάτερ' ὥσπερ εἰς τρυτάνην ἀργύριον προσενέγκῃς, οἴχεται φέρον καὶ καθεῖλκυκε τὸν λογισμὸν ἐφ' αὐτό, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὑγιῶς ὁ τοῦτο ποιήσας περὶ οὐδενὸς λογίσαιτο. Sandys 1913: 95 notes that 'the notion seems to be that the interests of Athens are in one of the scales and the politician's judgment in the other; if a bribe is thrown into the later, it pulls down the judgment with it.' Similar fateful scales can be seen in *Iliad* 8.69 and the judgment of Zeus and at 22.209, and with a comic twist in Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1398.

This also reiterates his remarks in the *Third Olynthiac* that the current citizens are far removed from the virtuous *mores* of the ideal ancestors, and it is this parasitic corruption within the Assembly that has damaged the *polis*. Within an Assembly that refuses to acknowledge this, Demosthenes' *parrhēsia*, whilst validated by events, cannot compete against such bribery and corruption if the Assembly gives in to its vices. Thus whilst validating his own worth, Demosthenes stresses how the problem is still, fundamentally, the Assembly. Moreover, aside from commenting on how Philip would always renege on his promises at 5.10, the speech is directed against *Athenian* politicians for making the Assembly believe in delusional hopes, and at the *Assembly* for its counterproductive attitude.

### Argument

Having firmly established the Assembly's culpability for their grievances, Demosthenes presents the real implications of the Peace of Philocrates and why they cannot afford to break it. To achieve this, Demosthenes returns to the themes of previous four speeches: how their lack of action, repeatedly warned about in the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs*, which now enables Philip to be in a position that can unite Athens' enemies. Thus, the horrific consequence of the Peace is not the surrender of Amphipolis on top of possessions already lost through neglect, but that their enemies now have justifiable grounds to launch a coalition Sacred War if the Athenians breach the Peace.

Now then, I say that one condition should hold, that if anyone wishes to provide allies or financial contributions or anything else for our city, he should do so without breaking the existing peace – not because the peace is wonderful or worthy of you but

because, whatever its character, it would be better for us that it had never been made than that we should break it now that it has been made.<sup>617</sup>

To explain this, Demosthenes firstly addresses their weakened position following the loss of their possessions, both before and as a result of the Peace: ‘for we have squandered many things, the possession of which would have made war easier and safer for us than it is now.’<sup>618</sup> And because of these losses, they are more vulnerable to their enemies, who are now united under Philip’s influence at Delphi:

Second, men of Athens, we must see that we do not provide these people who have come together and now claim to be Amphictyons with the need or excuse for a common war against us.<sup>619</sup>

The ramifications of the Peace are that States that previously would have been disinclined to attack individually (by their own political agendas or power plays), now have a common ground which trumps individual agendas. The Peace has thus fundamentally changed the balance of power within Greece:

For if war should break out between Philip and us over Amphipolis or some similar private grievance in which the Thessalians and Argives and Thebans are not involved, I do not imagine that any of these would go to war with us.<sup>620</sup>

Demosthenes particularly singles out their great rival Thebes, noting how:

Least of all – and let no one interrupt me before he hears what I have to say – the Thebans, not because they are well disposed to us or because they would not wish to

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<sup>617</sup> Demosthenes 5.13. ἐν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν φημι δεῖν, ὅπως, εἴτε συμμάχους εἴτε σύνταξιν εἴτ’ ἄλλο τι βούλεται τις κατασκευάζειν τῇ πόλει, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν εἰρήνην μὴ λύων τοῦτο ποιήσει, οὐχ ὡς θαυμαστὴν οὐδ’ ὡς ἀξίαν οὖσαν ὑμῶν· ἀλλ’ ὅποια τίς ποτ’ ἐστὶν αὕτη, μὴ γενέσθαι μᾶλλον εἶχε τοῖς πράγμασι καιρὸν ἢ γεγεννημένη νῦν δι’ ἡμᾶς λυθῆναι·

<sup>618</sup> Demosthenes 5.13. πολλὰ γὰρ προείμεθα, ὧν ὑπαρχόντων τότε ἂν ἢ νῦν ἀσφαλέστερος καὶ ῥάων ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ πόλεμος.

<sup>619</sup> Demosthenes 5.14. δεύτερον δ’, ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ προαξόμεθ’, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας νῦν εἶναι εἰς ἀνάγκην καὶ πρόφασιν κοινού πολέμου πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

<sup>620</sup> Demosthenes 5.14. ἐγὼ γάρ, εἰ γένοιθ’ ἡμῖν πρὸς Φίλιππον πάλιν πόλεμος δι’ Ἀμφίπολιν ἢ τι τοιοῦτ’ ἐγκλημ’ ἴδιον, οὐ μὴ μετέχουσι Θετταλοὶ μηδ’ Ἀργεῖοι μηδὲ Θηβαῖοι, οὐκ ἂν ἡμῖν οἴομαι τούτων οὐδένας πολεμῆσαι,

do Philip a favour but because they know perfectly well – however much they are described as stupid – that if war should break out between them and you, they will incur all the loses, but someone else will reap the benefits.<sup>621</sup>

Athens' previous position ensured a balance of the status quo, providing a reassurance that:

No individual is so well disposed towards either us or the Thebans as to wish either of us both to be safe and to dominate others, rather, they would all wish us to be safe for their own sake, but none of them wishes either of us to defeat the other and thereby become their masters.<sup>622</sup>

This reassurance that 'they will not therefore give themselves up to this, unless war is jointly declared and has a common cause', was now gone due to the political vacuum left by the Athenians in the North and Philip's successful Chalcidic and Thracian campaigns.<sup>623</sup> Thus his new position on the Amphictyonic council has changed the game:

What then do I find a frightening prospect, and what is it that you must guard against?

It is that the coming war may offer everybody a common pretext and a shared ground of complaint against us.'<sup>624</sup>

This is a very real threat. Athens' neglect of her affairs since the *First Philippic*, capitalised on by Philip, has resulted in making her more vulnerable to attack than ever. Athens has not

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<sup>621</sup> Demosthenes 5.15. καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα (καὶ μοι μὴ θορυβήσῃ μηδεὶς πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι) Θηβαίους, οὐχ ὡς ἡδέως ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν, οὐδ' ὡς οὐκ ἂν χαρίζοντο Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλ' ἴσασι βλάβος, εἰ καὶ πάνυ φησὶ τις αὐτοὺς ἀναισθητοῦς εἶναι, ὅτι, εἰ γενήσεται πόλεμος πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοῖς, τὰ μὲν κακὰ πάνθ' ἔξουσιν αὐτοῖς, τοῖς δ' ἀγαθοῖς ἐφεδρεύων ἕτερος καθεδεῖται. Trevett 2011: 96 notes that Demosthenes is presumably envisaging a war on land where the Thebans would suffer most, which would be to Philip's benefit. Demosthenes' view of Thebes is developed further in the *Second Philippic* Chapter 4.1 at p. 206.

<sup>622</sup> Demosthenes 5.17. οὐκ ἄχρι τῆς ἴσης ἕκαστός ἐστιν εὖνους οὐθ' ἡμῖν οὔτε Θηβαίοις, σὼς τ' εἶναι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ σὼς μὲν εἶναι πάντες ἂν βούλοινθ' ἔνεχ' αὐτῶν, κρατήσαντας δὲ τοὺς ἐτέρους δεσπότας ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ εἷς.

<sup>623</sup> Demosthenes 5.15. οὐκ οὐκ προοίοντ' ἂν αὐτοὺς εἰς τοῦτο, μὴ κοινῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς αἰτίας οὐσης τοῦ πολέμου.

<sup>624</sup> Demosthenes 5.17. τί οὖν ἡγοῦμαι φοβερὸν καὶ τί φυλάξασθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς; μὴ κοινήν πρόφασιν καὶ κοινὸν ἔγκλημ' ὁ μέλλον πόλεμος πρὸς ἅπαντας λάβῃ.

only shown itself incompetent to prevent Philip, but Macedonia is now the glue to unite their enemies against them.

To make the Athenians realise the danger of this new political climate, Demosthenes lists those with grievances against Athens, noting in particular how ‘the Argives and Messenians and Megalopolitans...are going to be hostile to us because of our embassy to Sparta’; the Thebans, as Athens accepted refugees from Boeotia; the Thessalians, for Athens harbouring the Phocians; and Philip ‘because we are trying to prevent him joining the Amphictyony.’<sup>625</sup>

My fear is that all of these, each angry about their own individual grievances, may launch a joint war against us, using the decrees of the Amphictyons as a pretext, and as a result may be drawn in beyond what is to their own advantage, just as happened in the case of Phocis.<sup>626</sup>

Thus, by not dealing with their apathy and lack of action, Athens has both diminished its reputation and permitted Philip to grow, enabling unforeseen consequences: their disjointed enemies can now achieve their individual aims, under the leadership of Philip.<sup>627</sup>

Demosthenes asserts it was the same with the Thessalians and their desire for the Pylaea and Delphi:

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<sup>625</sup> Demosthenes 5.18-19. Trevett 2011: 96-97 notes this embassy to Sparta is not recorded elsewhere. He also notes the Plataean refugees were granted Athenian citizenship which angered the Thebans, and Philip was angry at their attempt to block him receiving the two seats that had belonged to Phocis on the Amphictyonic council.

<sup>626</sup> Demosthenes 5.19. φοβοῦμαι μὴ πάντες περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἕκαστος ὀργιζόμενος κοινὸν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ἀγάγωσι τὸν πόλεμον, τὰ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων δόγματα προστησάμενοι, εἴτ’ ἐπισπασθῶσιν ἕκαστοι πέρα τοῦ συμφέροντος ἑαυτοῖς [ἡμῖν πολεμῆσαι], ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ Φωκείας.

<sup>627</sup> Demosthenes 5.20-22 notes that this even involved them conceding power to Philip: the Thebans ‘were unable to prevent Philip from passing through and seizing the pass or from coming at the last minute and taking for himself the glory of their own labours. [21]...in terms of honour and reputation, the result has brought great shame on them. For if Philip had not passed through, they knew that they would have gained nothing.’ For the Thebans: [22] ‘since they wished to capture Orchomenus and Coroneia but were unable to do so, they put up with them all.

It was their desire for these that induced them to collaborate in what was done. You will find that each party was induced by private concerns to do much that it did not wish to do. This, is what we must guard against.<sup>628</sup>

Furthermore, Philip's particular acquirement of Thermopylae epitomised the extent of Athens' decline. Praised in the *First Philippic* for their swift response in blocking Philip's pass through the Hot Gates following Crocus Field, the Athenians now endure Philip's unrestricted access to Greece. Through their neglect and apathy, Philip has succeeded in achieving his priority, access to Greece:

And yet some dare to assert that Philip did not in fact wish to hand over Orchomenus and Coroneia to the Thebans but was forced to do so. Let them think so. I know that these things were of less concern to him than his wish to take the pass of Thermopylae and the glory of claiming responsibility for bringing the war to an end and the presidency of the Pythian festival – these were what he aimed for.<sup>629</sup>

## Epilogue

Whilst all of this serves as a severe lesson in ignoring Demosthenes' advice, it also reminds the Athenians what the Peace has already cost them, and the practicality that it is not worth justifying war against them over an indignity. They can, however, redeem themselves by recognising how their attitudes and decisions led to this decline in power. Having already asserted that it would have been better never to make the peace than to break it now, the Athenians must live with the consequences of their decisions without further exacerbating their situation:

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<sup>628</sup> Demosthenes 5.23. τῷ δὲ τούτων γλίχεσθαι τάδε συγκατέπραξαν. τῶν τοίνυν ἰδίων ἔνεχ' εὐρήσεθ' ἕκαστον πολλὰ προηγμένον ὧν οὐδὲν ἐβούλετο πρᾶξαι. τοῦτο μέντοι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν φυλακτέον ἡμῖν.

<sup>629</sup> Demosthenes 5.22. Φίλιππον τοίνυν τινὲς μὲν δῆπου τολμῶσι λέγειν ὡς οὐδ' ἐβούλετο Θηβαίοις Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Κορώνειαν παραδοῦναι, ἀλλ' ἠναγκάσθη· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις μὲν ἐρρῶσθαι λέγω, ἐκεῖνο δ' οἶδ', ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον γε ταῦτ' ἔμελεν αὐτῷ ἢ τὰς παρόδους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ δοκεῖν δι' αὐτὸν κρίσιν εἰληφέναι, καὶ τὰ Πύθια θεῖναι δι' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτ' ἦν ὧν μάλιστα ἐγλίχετο.



Must we then do as we are told, for fear of these consequences? Is this what you are telling us to do? Far from it. Rather, I think that we should not act in any way that is unworthy of ourselves, or so as to bring about war, but should let everyone see that we are sensible and that what we say is just. That is what I think we should do.<sup>630</sup>

By not acting on Demosthenes' previous speeches, the unpleasant reality is that the Athenians can no longer afford to act as they please, and complaining after the event serves no other purpose than to further demonstrate their ignorance of the situation. As Demosthenes warned in the *Olynthiacs* and the *First Philippic*, that the gap between *logos* and *ergon* has not only made their 'allies die of fear', but has significantly damaged their reputation.<sup>631</sup> To this end, he calls the Athenians to think of the bigger picture and note how:

It would therefore be foolish and quite shocking for us, who are acting in this way towards each party individually about our own vital interests, to go to war now against all of them over the shadow at Delphi.<sup>632</sup>

The P.Berol.inv.21188 papyrus from Hermoupolis preserves a commentary on this final part of *On the Peace*, stating that Didymus considered πρὸς πάντας περὶ τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾶς νυνὶ πολεμῆσαι an adaptation on the proverbial saying 'to fight for an ass' shadow', i.e. not worth fighting over.<sup>633</sup> I believe Demosthenes plays on this to criticise their pointless deliberations, and to emphasise the need to address their own culpability rather than bemoan

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<sup>630</sup> Demosthenes 5.24. "τὰ κελευόμεν' ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ ποιεῖν ταῦτα φοβουμένους; καὶ σὺ ταῦτα κελεύεις;" πολλοῦ γε καὶ δέω. ἀλλ' ὡς οὔτε πράζομεν οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οὔτ' ἔσται πόλεμος, νυνὶ δὲ δόξομεν πᾶσιν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγειν, τοῦτ' οἶμαι δεῖν ποιεῖν.

<sup>631</sup> Demosthenes 4.45.

<sup>632</sup> Demosthenes 5.25. οὐκοῦν εὐθηεὶς καὶ κομιδῆ σχέτλιον, πρὸς ἐκάστους καθ' ἕν' οὕτω προσενηνεγμένους περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτων, πρὸς πάντας περὶ τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾶς νυνὶ πολεμῆσαι.

<sup>633</sup> Gibson 2002: 172-3, 'the standard aetiology of the expression is found' in Pseudo-Plutarch *Moralia* 848a-b. The fable (which others associate with Aesop) is of a young man and an owner of an ass fighting over its shadow, resulting in the loss of the ass altogether. This proverbial expression was current during the fifth-century, the poet Archippus wrote a comedy *Shadow of an Ass* (ὄνου σκιά), and the expression is found at Aristophanes *Wasps* 191 Φιλοκλέων: περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς, and at Plato *Phaedrus* 260c: μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιούμενος.

that which cannot be changed.<sup>634</sup> Moreover, I think Demosthenes seeks to shame their failure to act in defence of Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea, Methone and Olynthus (that is, in defence of their interests), and yet they will risk war over Delphi to satisfy their vain pride. Instead, Demosthenes calls the Athenians to consider what they have already conceded:

Those who rashly think that we should expose ourselves to any danger whatsoever, and who do not foresee the nature of such a war, I would invite to consider the following. We allow the Thebans to keep Oropus: if anyone should ask us why we do so, insisting that we tell the truth, we should reply “in order to avoid war.” [25] And now we have ceded Amphipolis to Philip in accordance with the treaty, and we allow the Cardians to be treated as separate from the other inhabitants of the Chersonese, and the Carian to seize the islands – Chios, Cos and Rhodes – and the Byzantines to detain ships, clearly believing that the tranquillity resulting from peace benefits us more than aggression and contentiousness about these issues.<sup>635</sup>

Demosthenes shames them for their passive appeasement, and presents the illogical attitude of ‘those who rashly think that we should expose ourselves to danger whatsoever, and who do not foresee the nature of such a war’, and who risk provoking war – not to recover Amphipolis – but over an indignity. Demosthenes’ invitation to consider these events is likewise a reminder that they chose *not* to contest these losses, and of course the unmentioned failure to prevent the fall of Olynthus which was the topic of his *Olynthiacs*. That orators now spout outrage and enthusiasm to contest the indignity of Philip presiding over the Pythian

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<sup>634</sup> Gibson 2002: 174 notes that modern scholars tend to side with Weil 1912, who interprets Demosthenes as commenting on the worthlessness of participating in the Amphictyonic Council.

<sup>635</sup> Demosthenes 5.24-5. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς θρασέως ὀτιοῦν οἰομένους ὑπομεῖναι δεῖν καὶ μὴ προορωμένους τὸν πόλεμον, ἐκεῖνα βούλομαι λογίσασθαι. ἡμεῖς Θεβαίους ἐῶμεν ἔχειν Ὀρωπόν· καὶ εἴ τις ἔροιθ’ ἡμᾶς, κελεύσας εἰπεῖν τάληθῆ, διὰ τί; ἵνα μὴ πολεμῶμεν, φαῖμεν ἄν. καὶ Φιλίππῳ νυνὶ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας Ἀμφιπόλεως παρακεχωρήκαμεν, καὶ Καρδιανούς ἐῶμεν ἔξω Χερρονησιτῶν τῶν ἄλλων τετάχθαι, καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατὰγειν τὰ πλοῖα, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡσυχίαν πλείονων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι νομίζοντες ἢ τὸ προσκρούειν καὶ φιλονικεῖν περὶ τούτων. Trevett 2011: 99 notes that ‘the Carian’ is Idrieus, who succeeded his sister Artemisia as satrap and was a native Carian, not Persian.

Games just further demonstrates Demosthenes' argument that the Assembly's priorities are warped. Demosthenes' disbelief is the same as in the *First Philippic*, where the Dionysia was always conducted efficiently, and yet their military preparations were on-the-spot reactionary efforts. So too now, the Assembly's misunderstanding of the situation and their role in it, shows their ignorance of the true price of their apathy, and of a Peace they cannot afford to transgress.

However, as stated in the proemium, Demosthenes believes there is hope and that this is rooted in the agency of the Athenians themselves if they are 'willing to listen.'<sup>636</sup> Thus, he closes the speech by appealing to the Assembly to remember its civic duty – 'we should not act in any way that is unworthy of ourselves' – and, evoking the *Olynthiacs*, to act in a manner worthy of the city and their identity as Athenian citizens.<sup>637</sup> Building on his previous speeches, where Demosthenes attributed their past successes to the virtues of their ancestors, likewise here in asking the Athenians to be *seen* as 'sensible' and 'just', he implores the Athenians to think rationally, to recover their equilibrium, and to demonstrate their characteristic wisdom. To act against Philip over a formality would cause catastrophic damage to their already tarnished reputation, demonstrating rash ignorance and a disregard for what they have already conceded to the Peace. Recalling their past mistakes, such as Euboea and Neoptolemus, and the danger of theatricality in deliberative oratory, Demosthenes entreats the Assembly to learn from past mistakes and to ignore the rash advice of populist *rhētors*.

To conclude, this speech demonstrates how Demosthenes focuses fundamentally on the corruption of the Assembly and the impossible task of advising a hostile *dēmos*. Their

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<sup>636</sup> Demosthenes 5.3. 'I stand before you convinced that if you are willing to listen, without making a disturbance or showing ill will, as is appropriate for those who are deliberating on behalf of their city about matters of such importance, I will be able to speak and to advise you on how the present situation may be improved'.

<sup>637</sup> Demosthenes 5.24. As quoted in full on p. 185.

refusal to acknowledge his assertion since the *First Philippic*, that their situation will only deteriorate if they do not shake of their apathy, has not only been vindicated by events, but stands as a testament to his own sincerity. Thus, reinforced by these events, Demosthenes condemns the Assembly for following the advice of self-serving *rhētors*, and their refusal to acknowledge their internal flaws and the dangers of empty rhetoric, which has only served to exacerbate their external problems. Their current deliberations further demonstrate their ignorance of the situation and its causes, and Demosthenes ties their delusion directly to their current problems. As he will go on to argue in the following speeches, the Athenians cannot hope to deal with their external issues without addressing this internal delusion and those maintaining it by manipulating the Assembly. As Demosthenes has asserted since the *First Philippic*, this is first and foremost an internal crisis and can only be mitigated by the Assembly recognising the self-inflicted damage caused by this internal corruption. Thus, *On the Peace* categorically affirms that they must learn the lessons from the Peace: to recognise the intentions of speakers, to listen to honest advice, and to act in a manner worthy of Athens.<sup>638</sup>

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<sup>638</sup> Sandys 1913: xxiv notes that that the speech was successful.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE POST-PEACE SPEECHES

‘It would have been better had we never made the peace at all’

This chapter examines how the next three speeches (Demosthenes 6, 8, 9) continue and develop Demosthenes’ original arguments in the pre-Peace speeches, calling the Athenians to reflect self-critically and act. As demonstrated in the previous chapter in *On the Peace*, Demosthenes’ arguments have now been vindicated and validated by events, and consequently the speeches appear to ring with greater conviction.<sup>639</sup> But as established in *On the Peace*, the significant change in the post-Peace speeches is the need to avoid provoking war against Athens. To this end, criticism of Philip shifts from merely diminishing him as an unworthy opponent, to making it unequivocal that Macedonia, not Athens, has breached the terms of the peace, thus safeguarding the Athenians from a sacred coalition.<sup>640</sup>

Demosthenes asserts in *On the Chersonese* and the *Third Philippic* that the Athenians cannot hope to deal with external issues before they resolve their internal crisis.<sup>641</sup> Thus his argument centres on making the Athenians realise that Macedonian expansionism is a product of Athenian apathy, and addresses this with his blunt *parrhēsia*. Continuing the careful balance of praise and blame from the pre-Peace speeches, Demosthenes uses social memory and Athens’ past reputation to prescribe the values that define Athenian identity. As such, I maintain that Demosthenes prioritises resolving Athens’ internal crisis over any potential ‘anti-Macedonian’ agenda. Indeed, the speeches, in my opinion, maintain a direct

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<sup>639</sup> Mader 2004: 64 comments that ‘Yesterday’s warnings, duly vindicated by events, give cogency to Demosthenes’ predictions about tomorrow.’

<sup>640</sup> As established in *On the Peace*, Philip was now in a position that he could unite Athens’ enemies against them in the name of Sacred War if they breached the peace.

<sup>641</sup> Indeed, their actions against Diopeithes and against their own interests presents a damning assessment of their lack of realisation, a woeful misreading of the situation, and a continued rejection of Demosthenes’ advice.

continuation of his arguments in the *First Philippic*: that their problems are self-inflicted through their misguided attitudes and lack of action, and thus can only be resolved by acknowledging their flaws and resolving to change.<sup>642</sup> As such, the speeches focus on promoting a return to Athenian values, and that practicing core Athenian virtues will see their ideology manifest itself against their external and internal enemies.

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<sup>642</sup> Again I believe Usher 1999: 233 has overlooked this in his assertion that ‘the speech is directed at two enemies, not one.’ This is written under the pretence that Philip was the sole enemy, and this new ‘dual character’ is ‘not only a contribution... to the debate on Philip’s complaint, but a foretaste of Demosthenes’ personal crusade against “philippizers”.’ This gives the insinuation that these internal enemies are secondary to Philip, and the ‘personal crusade’ is a new angle of attack. As this thesis has demonstrated, Demosthenes’ consistent core arguments have focused on the internal corruption within the Assembly since the *First Philippic*, and the crisis with Philip is a by-product of this internal crisis. And rather than adding the internal traitors to his arguments, this thesis has shown that Demosthenes’ argument focuses on resolving their internal crisis before they can hope to deal with their external issues, which he will explicitly state in *On the Chersonese* and the *Third Philippic*.

## CHAPTER 4.1 THE *SECOND PHILIPPIC*

The *Second Philippic* continues Demosthenes' warnings since the *First Philippic* of their damaging behaviour in the Assembly, but his post-peace rhetoric channels this into demonstrating the damage caused by their apathetic attitude, and the deception within the Assembly. Demosthenes' complaint is that the Assembly cannot differentiate between good advice and flattery, and do not (or will not) recognise that they have repeatedly been persuaded to act against their own interests. It is the Athenians who have inflicted untold damage upon themselves, not Philip despite his aggressive expansionism. For Demosthenes the problem, as in the *First Philippic*, is rooted in the corruption of their decision-making processes which is blinded by flattery, and easy gratification. In the *Second Philippic*, Demosthenes continues to vindicate himself to an Assembly that ignored good advice and shunned those brave enough to speak unwelcome truths.<sup>643</sup> Trevett observes that the speech takes on a 'chauvinistic' tone, which I believe reflects both Demosthenes' sense of vindication following the fallout from the Peace of Philocrates, but also Trevett's point that Demosthenes seeks to highlight how Athens is the only state concerned for Greece as a whole. But rather than being purely 'chauvinistic', I argue that Demosthenes' emphasis on Athens' unique position within Greece is central to his ongoing argument that they must recognise their responsibility in both enabling Macedonian expansion and change the attitudes which permitted this to happen.<sup>644</sup>

A defining feature of this speech is Demosthenes' narrative method of past exempla and the use of Persian War rhetoric and Herodotean ideals of Athenianness to strengthen the

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<sup>643</sup> Again asserting *parrhēsia* as a form of civic courage (Balot 2004). See earlier reference p. 140 in Chapter 2.3 *Third Olynthiac*.

<sup>644</sup> Again, I must emphasise that I am referring to Demosthenes' rhetorical arguments and the narrative of the situation in Greece that he creates in the speeches, and not any historical reality of the causes of Macedonian Expansion. As noted earlier in the thesis, I view the expansion of the Macedonian Kingdom under Philip as the result of his own unique character and the reforms he put in place.

impact of his argument that the current Athenians no longer embody Athenian ideological values.<sup>645</sup> Demosthenes uses the social memory of this conflict to define the natures of all involved in the current crisis and to remind the Athenians of their own role in Panhellenic affairs. Whilst this defines Philip in the role of external aggressor and the Thebans as inevitable Medizers, it also serves to remind the Athenians of the behaviour expected of them as the traditional defenders of Greek liberty.<sup>646</sup> Demosthenes applies these nuances to the current situation to denounce those within Athens who sought (and still seek) to persuade the Athenians to negotiate with Philip, and calls the Assembly to hold these men accountable and to reject them and their damaging practices.

### Historical Context

The *Second Philippic* was delivered in 344/3 to persuade the Assembly to reject the proposed changes to the Peace of Philocrates.<sup>647</sup> Various sources refer to diplomatic actions occurring at this time: *On Halonnesus* in 343/2 refers to an embassy involving Python of Byzantium ‘from Philip to Athens that offered to negotiate changes to the Peace of Philocrates.’<sup>648</sup> Didymus refers to an embassy from Philip that coincided with the Persians’ embassy for help on their Egyptian campaign, attested to by Philochorus, and Diodorus and Libanius cite the ‘Philippic Histories’ (presumably Theopompus’) remarking on an embassy to Athens of

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<sup>645</sup> Particularly the ideals of Marathon, which became the ‘cornerstone of their identity’ and had a ‘prescriptive force for future conduct.’ Steinbock 2013: 53-54; Gehrke 2001: 302; Jung 2006: 130 n.11.

<sup>646</sup> Steinbock 2013: 36 notes ‘the Thebans generally occupied an overwhelmingly negative place in Athenian historical consciousness due to their alliance with Xerxes...[nevertheless, Athens]... did not entirely forget Theban aid for the Athenian democrats in 404/3.’

<sup>647</sup> Trevett 2011: 100 notes that consensus of opinion accepts Dionysius’ date of 344/3 (*Letter to Ammaeus* 10), following an embassy ‘from the Peloponnese’.

<sup>648</sup> Trevett 2011: 102.



‘Macedonians, Messenians, and Argives’, and Philip’s letter to the Athenians complains that they had ignored representatives sent from ‘the whole alliance.’<sup>649</sup>

Prior to the *Second Philippic*, Athens had attempted to block Philip’s influence in the Peloponnese (as suggested by Demosthenes reference to his own ambassadorial role to the Messenians at 6.26). For reasons that are debated, Philip sent Python of Byzantium to Athens in 344/3 to renegotiate the Peace of Philocrates to a common peace.<sup>650</sup> If put into effect it would involve each *polis* swearing the mandatory oath to Philip and each other and subsequently Athens’ allies ‘would no longer be bound to Athens.’<sup>651</sup> Such changes would only further shift the balance of power out of Athens’ favour, particularly when Philip’s expanding sphere of influence grew closer to the Chersonese and Hellespont region.<sup>652</sup>

The *Second Philippic* however, does not comment directly on the revisions of the Peace, and Demosthenes’ lack of comment on the revisions can be considered a reply in and of itself, ‘Philip’s offer was not even worth discussing.’<sup>653</sup> I argue that Demosthenes’ lack of comment demonstrates that his priority is to make the Athenians realise how Philip is a product of their own lack of action, and the pressing need to change their attitudes before it is

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<sup>649</sup> Trevett 2011: 100-1 citing Didymus Col.8.8; Philochorus *FGH* 328 fr. 157; Diodorus 16.44; Demosthenes 12.18. MacDowell 2009: 239 concurs.

<sup>650</sup> The allied *synedrion* had originally wanted a common peace in 346. Worthington 2013: 193 suggests Python may have been sent in response to Artaxerxes III Orchus seeking Athenian support and to block any potential Greek-Persian alliance. MacDowell 2009: 329 conversely argues that ‘there is no particular reason why it should make any reference to Persia.’

<sup>651</sup> Worthington 2013: 193-4 argues that peace was not necessarily in Athens’ best interest ‘the proposed change from a bilateral peace to a common peace would weaken the Athenians’ hegemony of their confederacy.’

<sup>652</sup> Worthington 2013: 199: considers this as Demosthenes ‘closing the door’ on any peaceful resolution with Macedonia, just one aspect of a growing Anti-Macedonian sentiment within Athens at the time. On Philip’s growing influence see Worthington 2013: 215.

<sup>653</sup> Trevett 2011: 103. MacDowell 2009: 331-332 suggests that this was due to Demosthenes being unaware of Python’s suggestions, and so he did not prepare a direct response. Worthington 2013: 195 suggests that due to its abrupt ending, the surviving speech is a draft written in advance of Python’s speech, with the intention of extemporising a response. Worthington also alternatively suggests that Demosthenes ‘wanted to rouse the people against Philip’, leaving specific details to Hegesippus, however, I contest the presumption that the speech’s purpose is primarily anti-Philip. But the precedence for this team work is noted by Trevett 1996: 431 from Aeschines 3.72 that during the Peace negotiations Demosthenes prepared the way for Philocrates’ proposals, and thus just because Demosthenes does not ‘explicitly introduce a motion does not imply that the speeches were not delivered in support of one.’

too late. The speech serves to remind the citizens that the Peace has not been to Athens' interests, and their agreement to it was a result of deception, and manipulation by traitors working within Athens bribed by Philip. The speech seeks to make the Athenians realise, firstly, how Philip's actions rather than his words declare his destructive intentions towards Athens. Secondly, anyone who attempts to convince the Assembly otherwise (who incidentally are the same men who deceived the *polis* with false hopes that Philip would be true to his word) misguides the Assembly, violating Athenian values and undermines their identity. Demosthenes juxtaposes Athenian ideology with the reality of the present, to force the Assembly to recognise themselves, and their real (internal) enemies. As he concludes, 'if you had not been deceived then, there would be no danger to our city, since surely Philip would never have been able to attack Attica'.<sup>654</sup>

### Analysis

#### Proemium

Demosthenes opens by asserting two facts: that, it is indisputable that Philip has breached the peace, and secondly, that due to the gap between Athenian *logos* and *ergon*, Athens' apathetic attitude is its own worst enemy:

Whenever, men of Athens, we discuss Philip's actions and his violent breaches of the peace, I always observe that the speeches on our side are manifestly just and considerate, and those who accuse Philip seem always to say what needs to be said,

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<sup>654</sup> Demosthenes 6.36. He continues '...either with a fleet, by defeating you at sea, or with an army, by marching through Thermopylae and Phocis, but either he would be acting justly and keeping quiet, upholding the peace, or he would immediately find himself in a war similar to the one which led him at that time to desire peace.' 6.36 in full, εἰ γὰρ μὴ παρεκρούσθητε τόθ' ὑμεῖς, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν τῇ πόλει πρᾶγμα· οὔτε γὰρ ναυσὶ δῆπου κρατήσας εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἦλθεν ἂν ποτε στόλῳ Φίλιππος, οὔτε πεζῇ βαδίζων ὑπὲρ τὰς Πύλας καὶ Φωκέας, ἀλλ' ἢ τὰ δίκαι' ἂν ἐποίει καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγων ἤσυχίαν εἶχεν, ἢ παραχρῆμ' ἂν ἦν ἐν ὁμοίῳ πολέμῳ δι' ὃν τότε τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπεθύμησεν.

but virtually no necessary action is taken, which would make the speeches worth hearing.<sup>655</sup>

This returns to Demosthenes' complaint at empty rhetoric and how speeches *ad infinitum* without qualifying action are worthless and detrimental to progress.<sup>656</sup> It is a new development, however, that Philip takes such a predominant position so early in the speech. Immediately after this opening remark, Demosthenes states that:

Our entire situation has already reached the point that the more fully and clearly Philip is convicted of breaking the peace with you and of plotting against all of Greece, the more difficult it is to advise you what to do.<sup>657</sup>

This continues the correlation between Philip's rise and the deteriorating situation within the Assembly, but also demonstrates the difficulty in advising the *dēmos*, which is the only means to resolve their deteriorating situation. The assertion of Philip's intentions against Greece serves the purpose of criticising the Athenians on their blinkered reality, and the difficulties they make for themselves. Here as in the previous speeches, Demosthenes attests to the difficulties in persuading the Assembly to take action in their own interests, particularly when it involves acknowledging unwelcome truths about their own responsibilities. Again, Demosthenes asserts that, 'the blame belongs to all of us, men of Athens' (αἴτιον δὲ τούτων, ὅτι πάντας, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι), because the Assembly is hostile to good advice:

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<sup>655</sup> Demosthenes 6.1. ὅταν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγοι γίνωνται περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος πράττει καὶ βιάζεται παρὰ τὴν εἰρήνην, αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγους καὶ δικαίους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ὀρῶ φαινομένους, καὶ λέγειν μὲν ἅπαντας αἰεὶ τὰ δεόντα δοκοῦντας τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας Φίλιππου, γιγνόμενον δ' οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῶν δεόντων, οὐδ' ὧν εἴνεκα ταῦτ' ἀκούειν ἄξιον·

MacDowell 2009: 329 observes that 'by 344 this [*logos* and *ergon*] was a familiar theme, but it is handled more elaborately here than elsewhere.'

<sup>656</sup> As noted earlier at Demosthenes 4.50, 2.12. See further discussion at Demosthenes 8.23 p.239.

<sup>657</sup> Demosthenes 6.2. ἀλλ' εἰς τοῦτ' ἤδη προηγήμενα τυγχάνει πάντα τὰ πράγματα τῇ πόλει, ὥσθ' ὅσῳ τις ἂν μᾶλλον καὶ φανερώτερον ἐξελέγχι Φίλιππον καὶ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήνην παραβαίνοντα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐπιβουλεύοντα, τοσοῦτ' αὖ τί χρεὶ ποιεῖν συμβουλευσαί χαλεπώτερον.

At a time when those who are greedy and ambitious should be punished by deeds and actions, not by words, first we speakers shrink from making proposals and offering advice, fearing we will incur your enmity.<sup>658</sup>

This evokes his complaint in the *Third Olynthiac* that advisers risk the wrath of the Assembly in their *parrhēsia*, but those who harm the *polis* are protected. In this Demosthenes also reflects the wider concerns of the breakdown of the deliberative process we see discussed by Thucydides – particularly consequences of generating a hostile environment for honest advisers.<sup>659</sup> This is especially prominent if we compare the fettered speech of Persia in Aeschylus’ *Persians* to the freedom of *parrhēsia* in Athens, as Saxonhouse notes:

The overthrow of Persian tyranny is marked by the unfettering of the tongue.

Despotism restrains while the free city of Athens releases speech; it is the free city of the unfettered tongue that resists, with forces way outnumbered, the men of the Persian army whose tongues speak neither of truth nor of freedom. The pride of the Athenians in their practice of *parrhēsia* issues boldly from the lips of Aeschylus’ Persian chorus. The glory of Athens lies in this freedom.<sup>660</sup>

In their hostility to *parrhēsia*, Demosthenes explains how Athenian misfortunes are the result of rejecting the values that assured Athenian victory. Moreover, as in *On the Peace*, the Athenians will speak at length on their injustices, but will not bridge the gap between their words and actions:

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<sup>658</sup> Demosthenes 6.3. τοὺς πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦντας ἔργῳ κωλύειν καὶ πράξεσιν, οὐχὶ λόγοις δέον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡμεῖς οἱ παριόντες τούτων μὲν ἀφέσταμεν καὶ γράφειν καὶ συμβουλεῦειν, τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπέχθειαν ὀκνοῦντες.

<sup>659</sup> One could compare Thucydides 3.4 and Diodotus’ complaint that the Assembly’s (or rather Cleon’s) attitude ‘does the city no good; her counsellors will be afraid to speak and she will be deprived of their services.’

<sup>660</sup> Saxonhouse 2006: 89 on Aeschylus *Persians* 584-94. This is also relevant later in the speech when Demosthenes’ specifically refers to the Persian Wars.

But we go on about how terrible his behaviour is and the like; then you who sit there are better prepared than Philip to make and listen to speeches that are just, but you are utterly idle when it comes to preventing him from carrying out his current plans.<sup>661</sup>

This highlights two crucial flaws Demosthenes has addressed in all of the speeches: that the Athenians are deficient because of the gap between their words and deeds, and subsequently, they are fundamentally at odds with their ideology and reputation as pre-eminently intelligent active defenders of Greece.<sup>662</sup>

Consequently, Demosthenes deduces their situation as predictable:

The result is inevitable, I suppose, and perhaps even reasonable – each of you surpasses the other in the things that you spend time on and that you take seriously – he in action and you in words.<sup>663</sup>

Thus, their failure to translate *logos* into *ergon* has been to the detriment of the *polis*. Nor does the situation at hand call for a choice of words or action, but the need to recognise the damage caused by an Assembly that indulges itself with speeches and has forgotten its own civic responsibility to listen wisely *and* act.<sup>664</sup> Isocrates too comments on attitudes towards oratory at the end of the *Panathenaicus* where he praises those in the audience who can differentiate between discourses that,

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<sup>661</sup> Demosthenes 6.3. οἷα ποιεῖ δ', ὡς δεινά, καὶ τοιαῦτα διεξερχόμεθα· ἔπειθ' ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι, ὡς μὲν ἂν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους καὶ λέγοντος ἄλλου συνείητε, ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκευάσθε, ὡς δὲ κωλύσαιτ' ἂν ἐκεῖνον πράττειν ταῦτ' ἐφ' ὧν ἔστι νῦν, παντελῶς ἀργῶς ἔχετε. Guth 2015: 342 argues that Philip's 'ignorance of the art of speaking is part of his characterisation as a typical barbarian king', which will develop more fully later in *On the False Embassy* to silencing Philip as a 'barbarian monarch lacking the capacity for persuasive speech' Guth 2015: 341.

<sup>662</sup> Pericles calls Athens 'an education for Greece.' Thucydides 2.41.1; Plato *Protagoras* 319b 'City Hall of Wisdom of Hellas.'

<sup>663</sup> Demosthenes 6.4. συμβαίνει δὴ πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαῖον, οἴμαι, καὶ ἴσως εἰκός· ἐν οἷς ἑκάτεροι διατρίβετε καὶ περὶ ἅ σπουδάσετε, ταῦτ' ἄμεινον ἑκατέρους ἔχει, ἐκείνῳ μὲν αἱ πράξεις, ὑμῖν δ' οἱ λόγοι.

<sup>664</sup> This again recalls his complaints at *On the Peace* 5.7 pp. 172-3 that they treat deliberation in the Assembly like the Theatre of Dionysius.

aim at the truth (*tēs alētheias stochazomenous*) rather than those that seek to deceive the opinions (*doxas*) of the audience, and those that rebuke and admonish wrongdoers more than those delivered to please or delight.<sup>665</sup>

In doing so Isocrates, as Livingstone notes, creates the impression that there are fundamentally two types of *logoi*, good and bad, and defines his own ‘Isocratean Voice’ as the former which is morally superior.<sup>666</sup> In the same manner, I believe Demosthenes utilises the same dichotomy between his own benevolent *logos* against the malignant *logos* of others, and he repeatedly calls the Assembly to recognise this.<sup>667</sup> Unfortunately, the insinuation remains that the Athenians do not take their words seriously, but rather have paralysed themselves with empty rhetorical flattery. Thus, if the Athenians are all about words compared to Philip, they fail here too. Exacerbating this is their apathetic attitude rendering them ‘utterly idle’.<sup>668</sup> Now, like in the Pre-Peace Speeches, Demosthenes focuses attention away from the image of an insuppressibly powerful Philip, onto the agency of the Athenians: ‘If, even now, you are content to speak with more justice than he, it is easy for you to do so, and no additional effort is required from you.’<sup>669</sup>

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<sup>665</sup> Isocrates *Panathenaicus* 12.271.

<sup>666</sup> Livingstone 1998: 273.

<sup>667</sup> Again evoking the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric.

<sup>668</sup> Philip is not unscathed here either, as Demosthenes presents the Macedonian King as likewise only half of an ideal at the other end of the *logos/praxis* spectrum. This lack of *logos*, however, is not surprising when describing others and non-Greeks. Of course, this is from Demosthenes’ perspective, who has no need to be truthful in his account of Philip. Archaeological evidence at Pella and Vergina demonstrate that the Macedonian capitals were far from the backwaters: Pella was built on a Hippodamian plan with a carefully designed water-supply and drainage system and was a centre of the arts: Euripides and Zeuxis were visiting artists to the Macedonian court. Vergina’s Royal Tombs contained items of exceptional work – such as the chryselephantine biers, the facade of Philip’s tomb of the hunt, and the abduction scene in the tomb of Persephone – probably by Nikomachos mid-4<sup>th</sup> century, (See Hammond 1994: 40-44; Andronikos 1984. Drougou and Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2008). Archaeological discoveries at the Upper Macedonian site of Ainali have also demonstrated that ‘it is no longer possible to support the erroneous and anachronistic view – unfortunately once widely held – that Upper Macedonia was socially and culturally isolated.’ Karamitrou-Mentesidi 1996: 82. An understanding of Macedonian sophistication equalling that of established Greek *poleis* is now gaining increasing recognition in classical scholarship, most recently in Brun 2015: 10-11.

<sup>669</sup> Demosthenes 6.4. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν λέγειν δικαιότερ’ ὑμῖν ἐξαρκεῖ, ῥᾶδιον, καὶ πόνος οὐδεὶς πρόσεστι τῷ πράγματι.

As such, Demosthenes offers a solution to the deficiencies of the Assembly by noting the flaws in deliberation:

But if we must examine how to correct the present situation, and to prevent matters going even further without our noticing them, and the establishment against us of a massive and irresistible power, we must change our previous manner of deliberation, and all of us, speakers and audience, must choose those policies that are the best and will save us, instead of those that are easiest and most agreeable.<sup>670</sup>

Demosthenes asserts that this external crisis, the now undisputed power and position of Macedonia in Greece, is a result of the vices of the Assembly, who still choose that which is pleasing and easy over that which is necessary.<sup>671</sup>

### Narrative

The narrative focuses on establishing how Philip is their enemy, and reminds the Athenians of their historic role and duty to resist tyrannical powers. Firstly, the need for an urgent change of attitude is reflected in Demosthenes' shift in opinion on Philip from the *First Philippic*. Whilst in 351 Demosthenes asserted that anyone who judged Philip as formidable was not acknowledging Athens' role in enabling Macedonian expansion, now, as a result of their lack of action and the Peace of Philocrates, the danger of Philip's power cannot be denied:

First, men of Athens, if anyone is confident when he sees how great Philip is and how much he controls, and thinks that this carries no danger to our city, and that these preparations of his are not all directed at us, I am amazed and wish to ask all of you to

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<sup>670</sup> Demosthenes 6.5. εἰ δ' ὅπως τὰ παρόντ' ἐπανορθωθήσεται δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ προελθόντ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω λήσει πάνθ' ἡμᾶς, μηδ' ἐπιστήσεται μέγεθος δυνάμεως πρὸς ἣν οὐδ' ἀντᾶραι δυνησόμεθα, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος ὅσπερ πρότερον τοῦ βουλευέσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἅπασιν καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὑμῖν τὰ βέλτιστα καὶ τὰ σώσοντα τῶν ῥάστων καὶ τῶν ἡδίστων προαιρετέον.

<sup>671</sup> See earlier reference to Prodicus' Virtue and Vice in Chapter 2.1 p.96 at Demosthenes 1.15.

listen briefly to the reasons why I expect the opposite result and judge Philip to be our enemy, so that you may be persuaded by me, if you think I show better foresight.<sup>672</sup>

Their current pattern of behaviour has enabled Philip to rise as a formidable enemy and Demosthenes asserts that anyone who denies this as either naïve, short-sighted, or in Philip's pay.<sup>673</sup> This resonates specifically with Aeschines' position that they should accept Philip's proposed amendments, following the corruption that led to the Peace of Philocrates:

For my part, men of Athens, I reckon as follows. Which places did Philip first get control of after making the peace? Thermopylae and Phocis. Well then, how did he treat them? He chose to act in the Thebans' interests instead of ours. Why did he do this? I think that he examined his options with a view to his greed and to bringing everything under his control, not to peace or quite or justice.<sup>674</sup>

As discussed in the previous chapter, this is exactly the opposite of what Athens had been promised would happen. Not only has Philip demonstrated that his true intentions speak through his actions not his words, but his actions are geared against Athenian interests.<sup>675</sup>

Moreover, Philip's motives of *hybris* (ὕβρις) and *pleonexia* (πλεονεξία) should trigger alarm in the Assembly as they 'are exactly the same motives that the Athenians traditionally

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<sup>672</sup> Demosthenes 6.6. πρῶτον μὲν, εἴ τις, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, θαρρεῖ, ὁρῶν ἡλικὸς ἤδη καὶ ὄσων κύριός ἐστι Φίλιππος, καὶ μηδέν' οἶεται κίνδυνον φέρειν τοῦτο τῇ πόλει μηδ' ἐφ' ὑμᾶς πάντα παρασκευάζεσθαι, θαυμάζω, καὶ δεηθῆναι πάντων ὁμοίως ὑμῶν βούλομαι τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἀκοῦσαί μου διὰ βραχέων, δι' οὓς τάναντι' ἐμοὶ παρέστηκε προσδοκᾶν καὶ δι' ὧν ἐχθρὸν ἡγοῦμαι Φίλιππον· ἴν', ἐὰν μὲν ἐγὼ δοκῶ βέλτιον προορᾶν, ἐμοὶ πεισθῆτε, cf. 4.4-6.

<sup>673</sup> As Usher 1999: 233 observes, the use of *echthros* instead of *polemios* to describe Philip 'implies that the conduct of outright war was not necessary for enmity to be affirmed.'

<sup>674</sup> Demosthenes 6.7. ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λογίζομαι· τίνων ὁ Φίλιππος κύριος πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν εἰρήνην κατέστη; πυλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι πραγμάτων. τί οὖν; πῶς τούτοις ἐχρήσατο; ἂ Ἰθηβαίοις συμφέροι καὶ οὐχ ἂ τῇ πόλει, πράττειν προείλετο. τί δῆποτε; ὅτι πρὸς πλεονεξίαν, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸ πάνθ' ὑφ' αὐτῷ ποιήσασθαι τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐξετάζων, καὶ οὐχὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην οὐδ' ἡσυχίαν οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδέν. Demosthenes repeats this point on Thermopylae and Phocis at the end of the speech 6.35. Worthington 2013: 194 notes that Aeschines was in favour of Philip's changes, according to Demosthenes 18.136.

<sup>675</sup> This is also reminiscent of Demosthenes' assertion in the *Olynthiacs* that Philip deceived the Olynthians and Potideans.



ascribed to the Persian King.<sup>676</sup> Accordingly, anyone who continues to promote Philip's promises both deceives the *polis*, but also surrenders Athens to Philip, in a shameful manner at odds with their past stance against tyranny.<sup>677</sup>

As such, Demosthenes returns to his method of interweaving praise and criticism, which overarches the speech: the proemium criticised the Athenians, blaming them for Philip's rise and their current position. Demosthenes in turn praises their national identity as both a solution to their crisis, but also a reminder of how far removed they are from these exempla. Through the lens of Philip, Demosthenes states that:

He saw correctly that our city and our national character are such that nothing he could offer or do would induce us to abandon any of the other Greeks to him for our own benefit, but that you would take account of justice, shun the infamy associated with betrayal, make all necessary plans, and resist him, if he tried to do anything of this kind, just as if you were at war.<sup>678</sup>

While τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ἡμετέροις can mean 'our character' or 'our customs', in the context of this passage Demosthenes is arguably implying a sense of 'national character', as Trevett's translation follows. Thus, just as Demosthenes evoked their behaviour in the Corinthian War in the *First Philippic* to remind the Athenians of what they could achieve when they acted with conviction, Demosthenes evokes the idealised image of Athens as incorruptible to remind them of their duty.<sup>679</sup> The irony (and arguably the point) is that due to traitors in Philip's pay, the Assembly has allegedly been manipulated to endorse false hopes and act

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<sup>676</sup> Steinbock 2013: 143: cf. Lysias 2.12 on Darius' *πλεονεξία*, 2.29 on Xerxes' *hybris*; Herodotus 7.8, 7.16; Aeschylus *Persians* 807-8, 816-22 where Darius' ghost comments on Xerxes' *hybris*.

<sup>677</sup> Steinbock 2013: 143 notes that Demosthenes' reference to *hybris* and *pleonexia* prepares the Assembly for further assimilation of Philip and Xerxes.

<sup>678</sup> Demosthenes 6.8. εἶδε τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τῆ μὲν ἡμετέρα πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ἡμετέροις οὐδὲν ἂν ἐνδείξαιτο τοσοῦτον οὐδὲ ποιήσαιεν, ὑφ' οὗ πεισθέντες ὑμεῖς τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκ' ὠφελείας τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς Ἑλλήνων ἐκεῖνον προοῖσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ δικαίου λόγον ποιούμενοι, καὶ τὴν προσοῦσαν ἀδοξίαν τῷ πράγματι φεύγοντες, καὶ πάνθ' ἃ προσήκει προορώμενοι, ὁμοίως ἐναντιώσεσθε, ἂν τι τοιοῦτ' ἐπιχειρῆ πρᾶττειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ πολεμοῦντες τύχοιτε.

<sup>679</sup> And how they must, therefore, act against tyranny.

against its best interests. Demosthenes asserts that, in reality, they have abandoned the other Greeks, such as the Phocians and, as attested to in the *First Philippic* and the *Olynthiacs*, surrendered the interest in the North, all to Philip's advantage.

By presenting this from the (imagined) perspective of Philip, Demosthenes does not directly criticise the Assembly, but softens his *parrhēsia* with 'a psychological element' by utilising Philip's voice to present a traditional and ideological view of Athens from an outsiders' (and enemy) perspective.<sup>680</sup> Noting that their enemies expect them to act against them, this is an interesting alternative and development from Demosthenes' earlier use of outside perspectives of Athens' allies, who no longer have faith in Athens' words that are not translated into action.<sup>681</sup> As I have argued (particularly in the *Third Olynthiac*) the point of talking about Athenian ideology has been to compare and contrast their current behaviour to their ideal identity, and here 'the flattering reference to Athenian traditions of independence carries a sting in its tail and really shows up the shortcomings of the present audience.'<sup>682</sup>

Demosthenes develops this evaluation of Athenian character by reference to Philip's attitude to the other Greeks compared to Athens:

For these developments show that he judges you to be the only people who will not abandon the common rights of the Greeks in return for any profit and will not trade your good will towards the Greeks for any benefit or advantage. He naturally took this

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<sup>680</sup> Worthington 2013: 194. Usher 1999: 233 likewise notes that 'no speech illustrates his command of [psychological insight] more tellingly than the *Second Philippic*.' Mader 2004: 57 calls this a 'psychological trick' to confront the Athenians with their own behaviour. Guth 2015: 345-6 observes in *On the False Embassy* 19.320 Demosthenes utilises Philip's voice and 're-enacts Philip's decision to stay silent as an imaginary inner monologue' to discredit the lies of the Macedonians/Athenian traitors, and how at 19.324 'Philip's actions are explained by reference to his inner thoughts.' She notes that when Philip does 'speak', Demosthenes 'highlights his own ingenuity in "forcing" Philip to "betray" himself to the *dēmos*.' Guth 2015: 334-35 notes more generally that both Demosthenes and Aeschines use Philip's rhetorical skill 'as a foil to articulate their own views of political leadership.'

<sup>681</sup> Demosthenes 2.12, 'For the more we are ready to make speeches, the more everyone distrusts them.'

<sup>682</sup> Mader 2004: 62. Mader also draw attention to Demosthenes 3.21029, and 9.36-45 for how he 'roundly castigates the Athenians for failing to live up to their historical legacy.' Usher 1999:233 also notes that 'this deliberately idealised view of Athenian patriotism makes political reality, when it is introduced, all the more stark and shocking.' However, Usher and Mader do not acknowledge that Demosthenes is not just using the past to contrast, but prescribes it for the present.

view of you, and the opposite view of the Argives and Thebans, in the light not only of present circumstances but also of past history.<sup>683</sup>

Again, Demosthenes' praise that Philip 'is paying you the highest compliment, men of Athens' is ironic as 'what in Philip's mouth sounds like a glowing tribute becomes from the *rhētor*'s perspective an ironic catalogue of Athenian failure.'<sup>684</sup> As this thesis has demonstrated, the purpose of this criticism is to make the Assembly ashamed of their current practices, and to stress that, given the assimilation of Athenian enemies as Philip's allies, the Assembly cannot trust those who suggest there is nothing to fear from Philip.

However, Demosthenes also uses this device to inspire hope, and to remind the Athenians of the power of their ideology:

For he finds it recorded, I think, and hears it said that your ancestors, when they had the chance to rule the rest of Greece on condition that they obey the King, not only rejected this proposal, when Alexander, the ancestor of these people came as a herald on this matter, but chose to abandon their land and endured suffering anything at all, and subsequently did things that everyone longs to tell but no one has been able to recount worthily, which is why I too will omit them, and rightly so – for their deeds are greater than anyone could do justice to in words.<sup>685</sup>

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<sup>683</sup> Demosthenes 6.10. κέρρισθε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἔργων μόνοι τῶν πάντων μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι, μηδ' ἀνταλλάξασθαι μηδεμιᾶς χάριτος μηδ' ὠφελείας τὴν εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας εὖνοιαν. καὶ ταῦτ' εἰκότως καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν οὕτως ὑπέιληφε καὶ κατ' Ἀργείων καὶ Θηβαίων ὡς ἑτέρως, οὐ μόνον εἰς τὰ παρόνθ' ὁρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτων λογιζόμενος. Steinbock 2013: 144 notes that Dem. 6.9-10 are very similar to Prologue 16.

<sup>684</sup> Demosthenes 6.9. ὁ καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι καθ' ὑμῶν ἐγκώμιον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. Mader 2004: 61.

<sup>685</sup> Demosthenes 6.11. εὕρισκει γὰρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἀκούει τοὺς μὲν ὑμετέρους προγόνους, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρχειν Ἑλλήνων ὥστ' αὐτοὺς ὑπακούειν βασιλεῖ, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀνασχομένους τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ἠνίκ' ἦλθεν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ τούτων πρόγονος περὶ τούτων κῆρυξ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν προελομένους καὶ παθεῖν ὅτιοῦν ὑπομείναντας, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πράξαντας ταῦθ' ἅ πάντες ἀεὶ γλίσχονται λέγειν, ἀξίως δ' οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖν δεδύνηται, διόπερ κἀγὼ παραλείψω, δικαίως (ἔστι γὰρ μείζω τὰ κείνων ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι), One could also compare Isocrates' *Plataicus* 14.57 where the Plataeans use a similar argument that their ancestors alone of the other Greeks aided Athens when they abandoned their land.

Holding up their ancestral past, Demosthenes engages in what Gehrke defines as ‘intentional history’ using ‘the interdependence between the Athenians’ historical experience and their resultant-self-image’ to define Athenian identity.<sup>686</sup> In addition, by asserting that words cannot recount the deeds of the Athenians in a worthy manner, Demosthenes’ assertion draws a parallel with the epitaphic *topos* that valorised the Athenians’ actions in the Persian Wars as beyond the scope of the orators’ ability with words.<sup>687</sup>

The naming of Alexander is also important to note here; unlike Lysias, Isocrates, and Demosthenes himself later in *On the Crown*, the *Second Philippic* makes the point of naming the messenger as Ἀλέξανδρος, and asserting his Macedonian decent. As Steinbock notes, in the context of this speech, by emphasising that Philip’s ancestor was closely associated with Xerxes, Demosthenes ‘provided another suggestive argument for his analogy between the current situation and the past.’<sup>688</sup> The episode Demosthenes alludes to is also narrated by Herodotus, including an account of the Athenian rebuke to Alexander in 479:

We ourselves are already well aware that the forces of the Mede are many times our own...Nevertheless, we shall defend ourselves however we can in our devotion to freedom. So do not attempt to seduce us into an agreement with the barbarian, since we shall not be persuaded. Report back to Mardonios that the Athenians say: “As long as the sun continues on the same course as it now travels, we shall never come to an agreement with Xerxes. As for you, Alexandros, in the future, do not appear before

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<sup>686</sup> Gehrke 2003:22. Steinbock 2013: 20 n 83 states that ‘Gehrke’s “intentional history” coincides in many ways with [his] concept of social memory...intentional history would then be a history in a group’s own understanding’ of their identity.

<sup>687</sup> Steinbock 2013: 50 observes that the *epitaphioi logoi* we have access to ‘usually begin with a short *captatio benevolentiae* expressing the speaker’s nearly impossible task to do justice to the deeds of the fallen.’ Such examples can be seen at Lysias 2.1. Demosthenes 60.1. Thucydides 2.35.2.

<sup>688</sup> Steinbock 2013: 145.

the Athenians with speeches such as this one, nor pretend to be doing us a favour while encouraging us to commit deeds that violate all tradition.”<sup>689</sup>

Like Demosthenes, Herodotus also emphasises the Athenians’ disappointment that others could have considered that they would act contrary to their disposition, ‘namely, that there is no amount of gold anywhere on earth so great, nor any country that surpasses others so much in beauty and fertility, that we would accept it as a reward for medizing and enslaving Hellas’.<sup>690</sup>

Moreover, in their rejection of Alexander’s attempts at persuasion, the Athenians also demonstrate their awareness of deceptive flattery. We can infer the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric against the attempt to ‘deceive’ the Greeks into acting against their traditions, as Alexander’s persuasion had devious connotations of sophistry, suggesting a lack of commitment to the *dēmos* that is expected of a *proxenos*.<sup>691</sup> This, when teamed with the rhetoric of conspiracy, develops into an attempt to persuade the *polis* to act against its own interests, which translates directly into Demosthenes’ ongoing complaint against current *rhētors*.<sup>692</sup>

Furthermore, in choosing to recount this specific episode, Demosthenes relies on the collective historical consciousness of the *dēmos* to identify with this memory and imbue his persuasion with the atavistic nuances of the Persian Wars.<sup>693</sup> Indeed, noting the frequency of the Athenians’ rejection of Alexander in Athenian public discourse (Lysias 2.33; Isocrates *Panegyricus* 4.94-96; Demosthenes 18.202-4; Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 71), Steinbock deduces that ‘the rejection of the Persian offer was an essential part of the commemorated history of the Persian Wars and was thus quite familiar to Demosthenes’ audience.’<sup>694</sup> We

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<sup>689</sup> Herodotus 8.143.1-3.

<sup>690</sup> Herodotus 8.144.1.

<sup>691</sup> Hesk 2000: 216 notes that accusations of sophistry were ‘perceived as lacking an ideal priority of commitment to the *dēmos*.’

<sup>692</sup> In particular *On the Peace*.

<sup>693</sup> MacDowell 2009: 330 notes Demosthenes compares the threat of Philip to ‘the king of Persia long ago.’

<sup>694</sup> Steinbock 2013: 144. See too Nouhaid 1982: 190-3.

can presume, then, that his contemporary audience were aware that their ancestral counterparts were not seduced by flattery, but were affronted at the very notion of shirking their duty out of apathy or personal gain. Those Athenians, moreover, would not tolerate to be ruled, but if the current Assembly chooses cooperation with Philip, they accept Macedonian hegemony under the guise of peace.

Through these ancestral paradigms, Demosthenes subtly invites comparison between the current Assembly and their glorified ancestors, while asserting that peace with Philip is fundamentally opposed to Athens' ancestral reputation, a reputation which has been formative in defining Athenian identity itself.<sup>695</sup> Indeed, while there has been a 'chronological confusion' with regard to remembering whether this encounter took place before or after the battle of Salamis, the message was a simple one: 'what counted was the Athenians' resolve not to succumb to the barbarian invader and their willingness to sacrifice their city for the sake of Greek liberty.'<sup>696</sup>As Hartog notes, the description of the non-Greeks through Herodotus' mirror is also 'held up to the Greeks themselves', and in the same manner Demosthenes' representations of others and their own past selves functions as a mirror to not only define the Athenians, but to prescribe their past attitudes to resolve their current deficiencies.<sup>697</sup>

Moreover, Demosthenes holds up this epoch-defining moment in their history to define all the protagonists of this current conflict by their past actions. Having noted the rejection of Alexander's shameful proposal, Demosthenes remarks asserted Athenian integrity:

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<sup>695</sup> Mader 2004: 62 notes that 'ancestral paradigms have always had a powerful appeal to tradition-conscious Greeks and are regularly invoked by Demosthenes as points of moral and political reference.'

<sup>696</sup> Steinbock 2013: 145. While Nouhaud 1982: 191 argues that placing the episode before Salamis (and thus before the destruction of Athens) adds a greater sense of sacrifice, Steinbock argues the difference in chronological order is not necessarily a manipulation but a product how shared community memories are formed; memories are simplified as historical circumstances fade, and such events become more symbolic than purely historical. Steinbock 2013:145.

<sup>697</sup> Hartog 1988: xxiii.

Whereas the Thebans' ancestors campaigned with the foreigner (*barbarous*), and the Argives did not resist. He knows, therefore, that each of these cities will be content with their private advantage and will not look to the common good of Greece.<sup>698</sup>

The theme of Thebes' medizing was 'deeply rooted in Athenian historical consciousness,' as Isocrates' *Plataicus* also indicates, 'what orator could be skilled enough to denounce the crimes committed by the Thebans?' who 'in the past betrayed the whole of Greece.'<sup>699</sup>

The *Panegyricus* equally recalls how traditionally their ancestors 'condemned many to death for medizing', thus any notions of negotiating peace with Philip, friend of Thebes, in this context would be tantamount to treason.<sup>700</sup> Demosthenes uses the memory of the Persian Wars and Thebes medizing to add an aspect of historical determinism to their current conflict. Philip, who has already been described as demonstrating *hybris* and *pleonexia*, is further assimilated to the aggressive expansionist persona of Xerxes.<sup>701</sup> Thebes is still the Anti-Athens, where 'they fall short on the very criteria on which the Athenians are extolled...[a move which] brings out the quasi-panegyric function of the symmetrical opposition.'<sup>702</sup>

In contrast, Demosthenes asserts that Philip's expectations of Athens are that:

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<sup>698</sup> Demosthenes 6.11-12. τοὺς δὲ Θηβαίων καὶ Ἀργείων προγόνους τοὺς μὲν συστρατεύσαντας τῷ βαρβάρῳ (Joined the Barbarian), τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐναντιωθέντας. οἶδεν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους ἰδίᾳ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν ἀγαπήσοντας, οὐχ ὅτι συνοίσει κοινῇ τοῖς Ἕλλησι σκευομένους.

<sup>699</sup> Steinbock 2013: 101 notes how during the fourth century the knoweldge 'that Thebes sided with Xerxes during his invasion was deeply rooted in Athenian historical consciousness. Even more than one hundred years after the Persian Wars, Athenian orators such as Isocrates, Demosthenes and Apollodorus alluded to Theban medizing quite frequently. In all of these fourth-century allusions, Thebes' medism was presented as an undisputed historical fact.' Cf. Demosthenes 14.33-34 where he argues that they will not medize out of shame but will attempt to redeem themselves (Steinbock 2013: 142); Isocrates *Plataicus* 14.4; 14.30.

<sup>700</sup> Isocrates *Panegyricus* 4.157.

<sup>701</sup> Steinbock 2013: 143 notes assimilation of ὕβρις and πλεονεξία with the Persian Kings in Lysias' funeral oration 2.21; 39, Herodotus 7.8; 7.16 and Aeschylus' *Persae* 807-8; 816-22.

<sup>702</sup> Mader 2004: 60.

He reckons that if he were to choose you, he could be choosing friends on the principle of justice, but if he were to side with them, he would have accomplices in his own greed.<sup>703</sup>

Thus, despite the corruption Demosthenes rebuked in the proemium, the reference to their ancestral reputation serves as a reminder for the current Athenians to remember what is expected of them, given their national character (see 6.8-11 above). As Steinbock notes, ‘Demosthenes’ description of Athens’ ἠθος reflects the fundamental principles of Athenian ideology and self-image which resulted to a large extent from the heroic experiences of the Persian Wars as seen and perpetuated in the funeral speeches.’<sup>704</sup> As such, I argue that Demosthenes’ persuasion rests on reminding the Athenians of this self-image, preserved in their cultural memory, and that by reflecting self-critically the Athenians can rectify their attitude towards both their deliberation and their foreign policies.

Moreover, while Mader argues that this idealistic presentation of Athens is ‘from Demosthenes’ perspective only a nostalgic ideal’, I rather view Demosthenes as presenting this as a present-day necessity, particularly if you consider Steinbock’s point that ‘the act of remembering is a dynamic mental process that takes place in the present.’<sup>705</sup> I propose that Demosthenes engages with the retrospective knowledge of the past to assert his own authority to assess Athens’ current state of affairs, using what Schacter defines as hindsight bias: the ‘tendency to see an outcome as inevitable in retrospect.’<sup>706</sup> Similar to the idea of consistency bias where we ‘reconstruct the past to make it consistent with what we know in the present’, hindsight bias is pronounced when ‘after-the-fact’ explanations are used to

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<sup>703</sup> Demosthenes 6.12. ἡγεῖτ’ οὖν, εἰ μὲν ὑμᾶς ἔλοιτο, φίλους ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαίοις αἰρήσεσθαι, εἰ δ’ ἐκείνοις προσθεῖτο, συνεργοὺς ἔξεν τῆς αὐτοῦ πλεονεξίας. Steinbock 2013: 31 considers this section (6.7-12) as an example of how ‘people in leadership positions often utilise the symbolic capital derived from their community’s collective memory to garner support for particular policies.’

<sup>704</sup> Steinbock 2013: 144.

<sup>705</sup> Mader 2004: 61. Steinbock 2013: 11.

<sup>706</sup> Schacter 2001: 146.



‘specify a deterministic cause of the outcome’.<sup>707</sup> Using the knowledge of the outcomes of the Persian Wars, Demosthenes arguably uses the reputations of those involved (substituting Macedonia for Persia) as a means to both define the present crisis with hindsight bias and forecast the outcome.<sup>708</sup> This outcome is determined, as in the pre-Peace speeches, not on Philip but on the Athenians themselves, particularly if we recall his remark in the *Second Olynthiac*:

Are you so senseless, men of Athens, that you hope to improve our city’s situation by following the very same policies that led to its decline?<sup>709</sup>

Here too, by reminding the Athenians of the policies that led to their ancestral glory, Demosthenes uses the past to prescribe behaviour for the present. Moreover, it maintains that, then as now, the power to stop the rising presence of Macedonian influence in Greece lies with the *Athenians* and rests on the Assembly *choosing* to act on the situation and on their own political agency. Following this logic, if the Athenians heed Demosthenes and choose to act in their own interests, they can emulate their ancestors and halt the new Persia. If not, then Xerxes’ vision will become realised by Philip. From this perspective, Demosthenes’ reference to their ancestral past is not a nostalgic fantasy, but a means to present an informed appraisal of the current political situation, an alternative to the populist rhetoric of corrupted *rhētors* and the Assembly’s own misplaced priorities.

Furthermore, in addition to giving authority to his arguments, Demosthenes’ reference to their ancestral reputation also reminds the Athenians of the qualities they are *expected* to

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<sup>707</sup> Schacter 2001: 146.

<sup>708</sup> Here I am applying Schacter 2001: 146 ideas on ‘hindsight bias’ to Demosthenes. This is also in agreement with my arguments on using the past to apply determinism on the present.

<sup>709</sup> Demosthenes 2.26. εἴθ’ οὕτως ἀγνωμόνως ἔχετε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥστε δι’ ὧν ἐκ χρηστῶν φαῦλα τὰ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως γέγονεν, διὰ τούτων ἐλπίζετε τῶν αὐτῶν πράξεων ἐκ φαύλων αὐτὰ χρηστὰ γενήσεσθαι; This is also a continuation of his points in the *First Olynthiac* 1.14-15, ‘My purpose is to make you understand...the harm done by our continual neglect of affairs...we refuse to apply ourselves robustly to any situation, how can matters be expected to end? ...our homeland may be at risk.’

emulate to be worthy of their inheritance – something they were annually reminded of in the *epitaphioi logoi*.<sup>710</sup> As Steinbock notes with reference to Lysias 2:

In the eyes of the Athenians, Athens' role as champion of the Greeks [προστάτης τῶν Ἑλλήνων] involved not only the defence of Greece against barbarian invaders but also the protection of the weak against the unjust oppression of overbearing Greek Powers.<sup>711</sup>

As discussed in Chapter Two, Demosthenes recurrently appealed to the *dēmos* to be 'worthy' of the city, and the *Olynthiacs* were all delivered in direct response to the neglect of this role: the progressive loss of their possessions in the North Aegean *and* their failure to protect their fellow Greeks. In a post-Peace-of-Philocrates world, such an awareness of their failure to safeguard both these possessions and their former allies would arguably have not been lost on Demosthenes' Athenians. Thus, by calling the Assembly to 'recognise their ideal selves in the reflections of 'Philip''<sup>712</sup> Demosthenes continues his method from the pre-Peace speeches of juxtaposing praise of the idealised Athens with criticism of their current apathy.

### Argument

The remainder of the speech focuses on asserting that Philip's aims are opposed to Greek autonomy, because such autonomy directly opposes his nature as a tyrant. Demosthenes refutes any argument that might be raised in Philip's defence, affirming that Philip is not the champion of the oppressed but rather represents the antithesis of freedom and self-determination:

“But, by Zeus,” someone might say, pretending to know all about the matter, “he acted at that time not out of greed or for the reason that you allege but because the

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<sup>710</sup> Plato *Menexenus* 247b-c ‘Disregard our advice – play the coward – and you will not be welcome at all.’

<sup>711</sup> Steinbock 2013: 54 on Lysias 2.47

<sup>712</sup> Mader 2004: 63.

Theban's claim was more just than yours." But this is the one claim that he cannot now make. How could he, who is ordering the Spartans to leave Messenia alone, claim that he previously handed over Orchomenus and Coroneia to the Thebans on the grounds that their claim was just?<sup>713</sup>

Contrasting this 'truth' to those that offer false hopes in Philip's promises, Demosthenes asserts that Philip's promises are delusions to achieve his own insatiable ends:

But he is not intending to help the Messenians and Argives against the Spartans – he is actually sending them mercenaries and money and is expected in person with a large army. He is destroying the Spartans, the existing enemies of the Thebans, while at the same time rescuing the Phocians, whom he previously ruined? Who could believe that?<sup>714</sup>

Like his assertion in the *Olynthiacs* that disillusionment came all too late for the Chalcidic cities, Demosthenes' purpose is to shatter any illusions that Philip's intentions are anything other than Macedonian expansion, and inevitably are directed against Athens itself:

But from his present conduct it is clear that he did those things deliberately; and from his every action, if one looks at them correctly, it is evident that he is directing all his efforts against our city.<sup>715</sup>

This last point in particular reinforces his earlier assertion that Philip's intentions can only be read through his actions, not his words:

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<sup>713</sup> Demosthenes 6.13. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δί', εἴποι τις ἂν ὡς πάντα ταῦτ' εἰδώς, οὐ πλεονεξίας ἔνεκ' οὐδ' ὧν ἐγὼ κατηγορῶ τότε ταῦτ' ἔπραξεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ δικαιότερα τοὺς Θηβαίους ἢ ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον καὶ μόνον πάντων τῶν λόγων οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ νῦν εἰπεῖν· ὁ γὰρ Μεσσήνην Λακεδαιμονίους ἀφιέναι κελεύων, πῶς ἂν Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Κορώνειαν τότε Θηβαίοις παραδοῦς τῷ δίκαια νομίζεῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι πεποιηκέναι σκῆψαιτο;

<sup>714</sup> Demosthenes 6.15. τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀργείοις ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους συλλαμβάνειν οὐ μέλλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένους εἰσπέμπει καὶ χρήματ' ἀποστέλλει καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχων αὐτὸς ἐστὶ προσδόκιμος. τοὺς μὲν ὄντας ἐχθροὺς Θηβαίων Λακεδαιμονίους ἀναρεῖ, οὓς δ' ἀπώλεσεν αὐτὸς πρότερον Φωκέας νῦν σώζει; καὶ τίς ἂν ταῦτα πιστεύσειεν; Trevett 2011: 107 notes Philip did not campaign in person for either city.

<sup>715</sup> Demosthenes 6.16. ἀλλ' ἀφ' ὧν νῦν ποιεῖ, κάκεῖν' ἐκ προαιρέσεως δῆλός ἐστι ποιήσας, ἐκ πάντων δ', ἂν τις ὀρθῶς θεωρῆ, πάνθ' ἃ πραγματεύεται κατὰ τῆς πόλεως συντάττων.

And this is, now at least, in a sense inevitable. Think about it: he wishes to rule and regards you as his only rival in this. He has been acting unjustly for a long time now and is himself fully conscious of doing so, since his secure control of everything else depends on his keeping hold of your possessions. He thinks that if he were to abandon Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would not even be safe at home.<sup>716</sup>

This reminder of their lost possessions, especially Amphipolis, seeks to provoke the Athenians to action by reminding them of what their apathy and the Peace has already cost.<sup>717</sup> Consequently, any promises Philip makes to Athens (or hopes offered by individuals within) ought to be treated with the same contempt. Demosthenes presents this as natural and logical, which is further emphasised by using Philip's lens:

He is therefore deliberately plotting against you and knows that you are aware of this. He believes you are intelligent, and that you justifiably hate him, and is spurred on by the expectation that he will suffer some reverse at your hands, if you seize the opportunity to do so, unless he anticipates you by acting first.<sup>718</sup>

To act contrary to this is un-Athenian, which has been Demosthenes' complaint since the *First Philippic* that the whole crisis has originated from an internal crisis within Athens itself. As noted above, the criticism is that they have not employed their intelligence on the matter: they have squandered many opportunities, and have shamefully been pre-empted by Philip on most occasions.<sup>719</sup>

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<sup>716</sup> Demosthenes 6.17. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τρόπον τιν' αὐτῷ νῦν γε δὴ συμβαίνει. λογίζεσθε γάρ. ἄρχειν βούλεται, τούτου δ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς μόνους ὑπέληφεν ὑμᾶς. ἀδικεῖ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον, καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς ἄριστα σύννοιδεν αὐτῷ· οἷς γὰρ οὐσιν ὑμετέροις ἔχει, τούτοις πάντα ἄλλ' ἀσφαλῶς κέκτηται· εἰ γὰρ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ Ποτειδαίαν προεῖτο, οὐδ' ἂν οἴκοι μένειν βεβαίως ἠγεῖται.

<sup>717</sup> Usher 1999: 233 also remarks that 'this deliberately idealised view of Athenian patriotism makes political reality, when it is introduced, all the more stark and shocking.'

<sup>718</sup> Demosthenes 6.18. ἀμφοτέρ' οὖν οἶδε, καὶ αὐτὸν ὑμῖν ἐπιβουλεύοντα καὶ ὑμᾶς αἰσθανομένους· εὖ φρονεῖν δ' ὑμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνων, δικαίως αὐτὸν μισεῖν νομίζει, καὶ παρώξυνται, πείσεσθαι τι προσδοκῶν, ἂν καιρὸν λάβητε, ἂν μὴ φθάση ποιήσας πρότερος.

<sup>719</sup> This is a continuation of Demosthenes' comparison in the *First Philippic* 4.40 between Philip, who anticipates and acts, and the Assembly who reacted like a barbarian who does not know how to box: just reacting and never seizing the initiative.

For these reason, he is alert; he stands against you; he courts certain people – the Thebans and those of the Peloponnesians who agree with them – who he thinks will be satisfied with the present situation because of their greed, and will foresee none of the consequences because of their stupidity. And yet to even moderately thoughtful men there are clear signs to be seen.<sup>720</sup>

‘Philip’ credits the Athenians with intelligence they do not deserve, as Demosthenes’ comment on the naïve stupidity of the Thebans is directed at the Assembly.

This theme of indirect criticism permeates the *Second Philippic*, and the rest of the speech centres on Demosthenes recounting his embassy to the Messenians, to indirectly advise the Assembly on the consequences of ignoring his advice:

I had occasion to talk about these indications to the Messenians and Argives, but they are perhaps better related to you. “How much irritation, Messenians”, I said, “do you suppose the Olynthians felt when they heard anyone say anything against Philip at the time when he had ceded to them Anthemous, a place to which all previous Macedonian kings had laid claim, and was giving them Potidaea and driving out the Athenian settlers from there, and had incurred our hatred while giving them the land to enjoy? So you suppose that they expected to suffer such things, or would have believed anyone who told them that they would?”<sup>721</sup>

Hindsight enables Demosthenes to exploit emotively the dramatic irony of Olynthus: the naivety of the Olynthians is compounded by the anxiety of foreboding anticipation that the

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<sup>720</sup> Demosthenes 6.19. διὰ ταῦτ’ ἐγρήγορεν, ἐφέστηκεν, ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει θεραπεύει τινάς, Θηβαίους καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς ταῦτὰ βουλομένους τούτοις, οὓς διὰ μὲν πλεονεξίαν τὰ παρόντ’ ἀγαπήσειν οἴεται, διὰ δὲ σκαιότητα τρόπων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ’ οὐδὲν προόψεσθαι. καίτοι σωφρονοῦσι γε καὶ μετρίως ἐναργῆ παραδείγματα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

<sup>721</sup> Demosthenes 6.19-20. ἂ καὶ πρὸς Μεσσηνίους καὶ πρὸς Ἀργεῖους ἔμοιγ’ εἰπεῖν συνέβη, βέλτιον δ’ ἴσως καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔστιν εἰρησθαι. πῶς γὰρ οἴεσθ’, ἔφην, ‘ὧ ἄνδρες Μεσσηνιοὶ, δυσχερῶς ἀκούειν Ὀλυνθίους, εἰ τίς τι λέγοι κατὰ Φιλίππου κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, ὅτ’ Ἀνθεμοῦντα μὲν αὐτοῖς ἀφίει, ἧς πάντες οἱ πρότερον Μακεδονίας βασιλεῖς ἀντεποιούντο, Ποτειδαίαν δ’ ἐδίδου τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀποίκους ἐκβάλλον, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἔχθραν τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἀνήρητο, τὴν χώραν δ’ ἐκείνοις ἐδεδώκει καρποῦσθαι, ἄρα προσδοκᾶν αὐτοὺς τοιαῦτα πείσεσθαι, ἢ λέγοντος ἄν τις πιστεῦσαι οἴεσθε;

Messenians too, are being deceived by Macedonian pretences. This anxiety is intensified by the realisation that it is the Athenians, not the Messenians, who are walking blindly into Philip's trap. Demosthenes continues:

Despite all of this, I said, "after enjoying other people's land for a short time, they have now been deprived by him for a long time of their own land, and have been shamefully exiled, and have been not only defeated but also betrayed by each other and sold. Becoming too closely associated with tyrants is dangerous for constitutionally governed states."<sup>722</sup>

Via advising the Messenians, Demosthenes returns to his affirmation in the *Olynthiacs* on the polar oppositions of tyranny and democracy, which fits the binary opposition that has developed over the speeches between not only Athens and Macedonia, but also between himself and Philip's supporters within Athens.<sup>723</sup>

The losses Olynthus suffered by becoming too close to a tyrant, resonate with Demosthenes' own warnings in the *First Philippic* and the *Olynthiacs* of Athenian losses and the inevitable situation they would find themselves in if they refused to shake off their apathy. Thus, despite how Demosthenes' warning addresses the Messenians, recalling: 'you, I said, watch Philip dispensing gifts and promises, yet if you are prudent, you should pray that you do not find yourselves being tricked and deceived by him', it is in fact the Athenians who are perilously close to following the same destructive path.<sup>724</sup> Moreover, by ascribing the fall of Olynthus to a 'lack of foresight and refusal even to hear a warning voice, Demosthenes subtly asserts the need for the kind of advice he himself offered (first to the

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<sup>722</sup> Demosthenes 6.21. ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἔφην ἐγώ, 'μικρὸν χρόνον τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν καρπώσάμενοι πολλὴν τῆς αὐτῶν ὑπ' ἐκείνου στέρονται, αἰσχρῶς ἐκπεσόντες, οὐ κρατηθέντες μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προδοθέντες ὑπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ πραθέντες· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλεῖς ταῖς πολιτείαις αἱ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους αὐται λίαν ὀμιλῖαι.

<sup>723</sup> Demosthenes 1.6.

<sup>724</sup> Demosthenes 6.23. ὑμεῖς δ', ἔφην ἐγώ, δίδόντα μὲν καὶ ὑπισχνούμενον θεωρεῖτε Φίλιππον, ἐξηπατηκότα δ' ἤδη καὶ παρακεκρουμένον ἀπεύχεσθε, εἰ σωφρονεῖτε δὴ, ἰδεῖν. I have adapted Trevett's translation here to be one sentence as in the original Greek.

Messenians, now at Athens)'.<sup>725</sup> In noting that the Messenians ignored his advice, it perpetuates a 'cycle of folly', which serves as a warning to 'Demosthenes' present audience, not to put themselves at risk by listening to orators who put the pleasure of the moment above future advantage.'<sup>726</sup> As in the previous speeches, Demosthenes implores the Assembly to recognise the internal corruption, and instead trust in his didactic *parrhēsia*. Still self-citing his address to the Messenians, Demosthenes recalls his warning that:

There is one safeguard with which all right-thinking people are naturally endowed, and which is a benefit and a source of salvation for everybody, but particularly for democracies dealing with tyrants. What is this? Mistrust. Guard it; hold onto it, if you keep it, you will avoid disaster.<sup>727</sup>

In repeating his advice to the (now defeated) Messenians, Demosthenes provides a living example of the consequences of ignoring his advice. Furthermore, by self-citing his Messenian address, Demosthenes indirectly calls the Athenians to recognise that tyranny and democracy are diametrically opposed and cannot exist in peace:

What do you seek?" I said. "Freedom? Then do you not see that Philip's very titles are inimical to this? Every king and tyrant is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of the law. You should be on your guard," I said, "lest, in seeking to escape war, you find yourselves saddled with a master."<sup>728</sup>

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<sup>725</sup> Mader 2004: 64.

<sup>726</sup> Mader 2004: 65.

<sup>727</sup> Demosthenes 6.24. ἔν δέ τι κοινὸν ἢ φύσις τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἐν αὐτῇ κέκτηται φυλακτήριον, ὃ πᾶσι μὲν ἐστ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ σωτήριον, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς πλήθεσι πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ἀπιστία. ταύτην φυλάττετε, ταύτης ἀντέχεσθε· ἂν ταύτην σφύζητε, οὐδὲν μὴ δεινὸν πάθητε.

<sup>728</sup> Demosthenes 6.25. τί ζητεῖτ'; ἔφην. 'ἐλευθερίαν; εἴτ' οὐχ ὁρᾶτε Φίλιππον ἀλλοτριωτάτας ταύτη καὶ τὰς προσηγορίας ἔχοντα; βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἅπας ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐναντίος. οὐ φυλάξεσθ' ὅπως,' ἔφην, 'μὴ πολέμου ζητοῦντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι δεσπότην εὕρητε;' Again, this evokes his remark in the *First Olynthiac* 1.6.

In this regard, Demosthenes also evokes Solon's rejection of tyranny as the antithesis of 'the rule of laws which apply equally to all member of the community.'<sup>729</sup> In reminding the 'Messenians' how the respect for *nomos* differentiated the Greeks from the barbarians (then, Persians, now Macedonians), Demosthenes likewise reminds the Athenians to not forget the irreconcilable ends of tyranny and democracy.

Moreover, that the Messenians ignored Demosthenes and chose to 'act against what they know to be their own interests', was 'not strange' and to be expected of other Greeks.<sup>730</sup> The Athenians, however, have no such excuse:

But you, who are intelligent and listen to us speakers telling you how you are being plotted against and ensnared, if you do not act promptly, will find, I think, that without realising it, you have submitted to everything – so much stronger are immediate gratification and idleness than any consideration of future benefit.<sup>731</sup>

Thus, having been co-judge and observer of Demosthenes' critical assessment of the Thebans, Argives, Messenians and Olynthians, the Assembly cannot avoid assessing (indeed, confronting) their own behaviour. At the root of it all is the need to address the corruption within the deliberative decision making process, evoking his plea from the beginning of the speech (and echoing *On the Peace*) that:

If we examine how to correct the present situation, and to prevent matters going even further without our noticing them, we must change our previous manner of

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<sup>729</sup> Leopold 1981: 228 notes that Solon's apology for not becoming a tyrant (32ff West) was based on his view that tyranny was lawless and was dedicated to the pursuit of power at the expense of the community. See too Herodotus 7.104 on Demaratos telling Xerxes that the Greeks (Spartans) are inspired to fight because their respect of *nomoi*.

<sup>730</sup> Demosthenes 6.27. 'Now, it is not strange that the Messenians and some of the other Peloponnesians are acting against what they know to be in their interest.' και ου τουτ' εστ' ατοπον, ει Μεσσηνιοι και Πελοποννησιων τινες παρ' α τῶ λογισμῶ βέλτισθ' ὀρωσι τι πράξουσιν

<sup>731</sup> Demosthenes 6.27. ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς οἱ και συνιέντες αὐτοῖ και τῶν λεγόντων ἀκούοντες ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύεσθε, ὡς περιστοιχίζεσθε, ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν ἤδη ποιῆσαι λήσεθ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, πάνθ' ὑπομείναντες· οὕτως ἡ παρατυχ' ἡδονῆ και ῥασιτώνη μείζον ισχύει τοῦ ποθ' ὕστερον συνοίσειν μέλλοντος. This also evokes the image from the *First Philippic* 4.9 that Athens is being hunted and surrounded with nets p. 42.



deliberation, and all of us, speakers and audience, must choose those policies that are best and will save us, instead of those that are easiest and most agreeable.<sup>732</sup>

For Demosthenes, since the *First Philippic*, it is precisely this internal corruption of the deliberative process, their idleness and apathy, that has caused their external problems. As has become increasingly apparent, Demosthenes' battle has not necessarily been with Philip – but with the Athenian *dēmos* itself, and that advising the Assembly becomes particularly difficult when they are determined to ignore reason, and consistently undermine the values which defined their identity as the inheritors of the Athenian past.

### Epilogue

To this end, the speech concludes in a prescriptive tone towards resolving the issues within Athens. Demosthenes states in no uncertain terms that Attica would not be in danger if the Peace had not been passed:

If you had not been deceived then, there would be no danger to our city, since surely Philip would never be able to attack Attica either with a fleet, by defeating you at sea, or with an army, by marching through Thermopylae and Phocis, but either he would be acting justly and keeping quiet, upholding the peace, or he would immediately find himself in a war similar to the one which led him at the time to desire peace.<sup>733</sup>

As he stated in the proemium, the Assembly must dispense with endless deliberations, and instead invoke their anger – not at Philip – but against ‘those men who conveyed the promises, on the strength of which you were persuaded to make the peace,’ for as

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<sup>732</sup> Demosthenes 6.5. εἰ δ' ὅπως τὰ παρόντ' ἐπανορθώσεται δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ προελθόντ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω λήσει πάνθ' ἡμᾶς, μηδ' ἐπιστήσεται μέγεθος δυνάμεως πρὸς ἣν οὐδ' ἀντᾶραι δυνησόμεθα, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος ὅσπερ πρότερον τοῦ βουλευέσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἅπασι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὑμῖν τὰ βέλτιστα καὶ τὰ σώσοντα τῶν ῥάστων καὶ τῶν ἡδίστων προαιρετέον.

<sup>733</sup> Demosthenes 6.36. εἰ γὰρ μὴ παρεκρούσθητε τόθ' ὑμεῖς, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν τῇ πόλει πρᾶγμα· οὔτε γὰρ ναυσὶ δῆπου κρατήσας εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἦλθεν ἂν ποτε στόλω Φίλιππος, οὔτε πεζῇ βαδίζων ὑπὲρ τὰς Πύλας καὶ Φωκέας, ἀλλ' ἢ τὰ δίκαι' ἂν ἐποίει καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγων ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν, ἢ παραχρῆμ' ἂν ἦν ἐν ὁμοίῳ πολέμῳ δι' ὃν τότε τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπεθύμησεν.

Demosthenes had feared, ‘what was said then was quite contrary to these actions of his.’<sup>734</sup>

These men have essentially granted Philip the gateway into Central Greece, and this must be read with Demosthenes’ assertion in *On the Peace* that it would have been better for Athens had the peace never been made, and Demosthenes focuses on this bad advice as he closes the speech:

And again, there are those who should be summoned. Who? Those who spoke on the occasion of making the peace when I, on my return from the later embassy relating to the oaths, saw that the city was being deceived by false hopes and warned and protested and tried to prevent the loss of Thermopylae and of the Phocians.<sup>735</sup>

And as he stated in *On the Peace*, Demosthenes again makes reference to the promises made, particularly that Philip would ‘give you Euboea and Oropus in return for Amphipolis,’ that proved hollow.<sup>736</sup> Demosthenes aims to take the Assembly out of its blissfully ignorant zone and confront these harsh realities, that they are being deceived by these men, who as Athenians are treacherous, and more deserving of anger than Philip himself.<sup>737</sup> By insinuating the presence of internal traitors, Demosthenes develops the rhetoric of conspiracy and of conspirators manipulating the apathetic attitude of the Assembly.<sup>738</sup> It is because of this manipulation that, aware of their losses, the Assembly chooses to listen to these men:

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<sup>734</sup> Demosthenes 6.28 τοὺς ἐνεγκόντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ’ αἷς ἐπείσθητε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην, καλεῖν· Demosthenes 6.29. ἀλλ’ ἦν πολὺ τούτων ἀφεστηκότα τὰ τότε λεγόμενα. It is important to acknowledge that Demosthenes originally supported Philocrates’ motion, however, for the purpose of this thesis I am focusing on Demosthenes’ presentation of himself to the Assembly.

<sup>735</sup> Demosthenes 6.29. καὶ πάλιν γ’ ἐτέρους καλεῖν. τίνας; τοὺς ὅτ’ ἐγὼ γεγονυίας ἤδη τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπὸ τῆς ὑστέρας ἤκων πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρκους, αἰσθόμενος φενακιζομένην τὴν πόλιν, προὔλεγον καὶ διεμαρτυρόμην καὶ οὐκ εἶων προέσθαι Πύλας οὐδὲ Φωκέας,

<sup>736</sup> Demosthenes 6.30. Εὐβοίαν δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὀρωπὸν ἀντ’ Ἀμφιπόλεως ὑμῖν ἀποδώσει· cf. 5.10.

<sup>737</sup> Demosthenes also develops this political conflict into personal animosity ‘they said that I drink water, and so am naturally an intractable and disagreeable fellow, whereas Philip would answer your prayers.’ 6.30. λέγοντας ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ὕδωρ πίνων εἰκότως δύστροπος καὶ δύσκολός εἰμί τις ἄνθρωπος, Φίλιππος δ’, ἅπερ εὐξαισθ’ ἂν ὑμεῖς. Trevett 2011: 111 observes that Demosthenes 19.46 tells us this remark was made by Philocrates.

<sup>738</sup> See earlier references to Roisman 2006.

I know you recall all these claims being made from the speaker's platform, although you are not good at remembering those who injure you.<sup>739</sup>

This remark still stings with the personal injustice felt throughout *On the Peace*, and is but a further example of Demosthenes' repeated complaint that the Athenians do not recognise actions that damage the *polis*, and that they are quickly beguiled to forgive. By drawing attention to the *bēma*, Demosthenes reminds the Athenians of their responsibilities to heed the best (not the most flattering) advice, and that public deliberation is civic duty in practice. Consequently, the repetitive nature of their behaviour shows not only a failure to learn from all their mistakes, which the *Olynthiacs* increasingly tried to address, but also that this failure to recognise the situation and the intentions behind advice is central to their problems. Only Philip and his puppets gain from the Assembly's short memory and ignorance, despite the immediate gratification that the *dēmos* feels in their pointless rhetoric. Moreover, their ignorance has future repercussions:

And, most shameful of all, you voted on the basis of these hopes that this same peace should apply to him and our descendants too, so completely were you led on.<sup>740</sup>

The damage and shame is compounded by the insinuation that the Athenians have sold out themselves out, and future generations, on false hopes, leaving an inheritance of impending subjugation and disaster, as opposed to the inheritance left to them by their ancestors.<sup>741</sup> This confirms, once again, that Demosthenes' focus in the speech is on the un-Athenian behaviour of the Assembly. Their ignorance appears so complete that they will refuse to listen until the truth is before their eyes:

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<sup>739</sup> Demosthenes 6.30. ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντ' ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος ἐνταῦθα μνημονεύει οἷδ' ὅτι ῥηθέντα, καίπερ ὄντες οὐ δεινοὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μεμνήσθαι. This refers back to 6.27.

<sup>740</sup> Demosthenes 6.31. καὶ τὸ πάντων αἰσχιστον, καὶ τοῖς ἐγγόνοις πρὸς τὰς ἐλπίδας τὴν αὐτὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι ταύτην ἐψηφίσασθε· οὕτω τελέως ὑπήχθητε.

<sup>741</sup> This again can be read with Plato's *Menexenus* 247b-c 'Disregard our advice – play the coward – and you will not be welcome at all.'

When you can no longer ignore what is happening, and when you no longer hear that these activities are directed against you from me or from someone else, but all see it for yourselves and know it for a fact, then I think you will be angry and resentful.<sup>742</sup>

Demosthenes' consistent refrain since 351 has been to ask the Athenians: when will you do your duty? When will you stop ignoring what is happening? Will you deny reality until war comes here to Attica? When will you do that which is right over that which is easy? When will you recognise those aiding you and those harming you?

In addition, whilst bribery and enemies within were merely hinted at in the *First Philippic*, the *Second Philippic* concludes with no uncertainty that bribery and corruption has enabled this situation, and yet still the Assembly cannot recognise those acting out of bribery and those who are loyal Athenians:

I am afraid that, since the ambassadors are silent about those matters for which they know they were bribed, your anger may be directed against those of us who are trying to repair some of the damage caused by their actions.<sup>743</sup>

And as with the previous speeches, Demosthenes mitigates this criticism with hope, which lies in shaking off their apathy and reclaiming their traditional intelligence. Whilst he asserts that he fears trouble 'is already all too close at hand', if they listen then they can redeem themselves and the situation:

While the trouble is still in the future and is only gathering, and we are still listening to each other, I want each of you – even though you know the answer perfectly well – nevertheless to remind yourselves who it was that persuaded you to abandon the

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<sup>742</sup> Demosthenes 6.33. ὅταν οὖν μηκέθ' ὑμῖν ἀμελεῖν ἐξουσία γίγνηται τῶν συμβαινόντων, μηδ' ἀκούηθ' ὅτι ταῦτ' ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἔστιν ἔμοῦ μηδὲ τοῦ δεῖνος, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ πάντες ὁρᾶτε καὶ εὖ εἰδῆτε, ὀργίλους καὶ τραχεῖς ὑμᾶς ἔσεσθαι νομίζω.

<sup>743</sup> Demosthenes 6.34. φοβοῦμαι δὴ μή, τῶν πρέσβων σεσιωπηκότων ἐφ' οἷς αὐτοῖς συνίσασι δεδωροδοκηκότες, τοῖς ἐπανορθοῦν τι περὶ τῶν διὰ τούτους ἀπολωλότων τῆ παρ' ὑμῶν ὀργῆ περιπεσεῖν συμβῆ.

Phocians and Thermopylae, the possession of which gives Philip control of the roads to Attica and the Peloponnese.<sup>744</sup>

This is key, because as already discussed above, Philip would not have been in a position to threaten Attica had he not been granted the gateway into Greece by the Peace. Thus, this apparent ‘external’ crisis is actually one that has been created by the crisis within Athens itself. Moreover, by attributing culpability to the *rhētors*’ sustained deception regarding the Peace, Demosthenes continues his method of denying Philip credit for his achievements, and by asserting that this is a self-inflicted problem. Demosthenes asserts that this deception, has caused you to be deliberating not about your rights or your overseas interest but about the inhabitants of our land and about a war against Attica, which will hurt each of you, when it arrives, but was started on that day.<sup>745</sup>

Ominously, it is also a war that Demosthenes forewarned would come to Attica in the *Olynthiacs*, if they did not seize the *kairos* of Olynthus, further demonstrating the damage caused by the Assembly’s inability to recognise and follow good advice.

Usher considers this a development in Demosthenes’ rhetoric against Philip: ‘thus the speech is directed at two enemies, not one... a foretaste of Demosthenes’ personal crusade against ‘Philippizers.’<sup>746</sup> However, I believe that these two enemies have always been present; as this thesis has demonstrated, Demosthenes’ speeches have all been directed against the corruption *within* Athens, and not merely others as ‘Philippizers’, because their transgressions surpass just helping Philip. Furthermore, I argue that Demosthenes’ complaints have consistently been directed against an apathetic Assembly that indulges in empty,

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<sup>744</sup> Demosthenes 6.35. ἕως οὖν ἔτι μέλλει καὶ συνίσταται τὰ πράγματα καὶ κατακούομεν ἀλλήλων, ἕκαστον ὑμῶν καίπερ ἀκριβῶς εἰδὸθ’ ὅμως ἐπαναμνήσαι βούλομαι, τίς ὁ Φωκέας πείσας καὶ Πύλας προέσθαι, ὧν καταστάς ἐκεῖνος κύριος τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον κύριος γέγονεν,

<sup>745</sup> Demosthenes 6.35. καὶ πεποίηχ’ ὑμῖν μὴ περὶ τῶν δικαίων μηδ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἔξω πραγμάτων εἶναι τὴν βουλήν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὴν Ἀττικὴν πολέμου, ὅς λυπήσει μὲν ἕκαστον, ἐπειδὴν παρῆ, γέγονεν δ’ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ.

<sup>746</sup> Usher 1999:233.

flattering rhetoric, and against those that manipulate this to their own ends. Philippizers, in my opinion, are thus the upgraded version of the original self-serving *rhētors* criticised in the Pre-Peace speeches.

Indeed, as Demosthenes concludes the speech, he states unequivocally that it is the corruption within the Assembly that is responsible for their current misfortunes:

If you had not been deceived then, there would be no danger to our city, since surely Philip would never have been able to attack Attica either with a fleet, by defeating you at sea, or with an army, by marching through Thermopylae and Phocis.<sup>747</sup>

The focus, therefore, is not an anti-Macedonian rhetoric, but the need to challenge the corrupted attitudes within the Assembly. Moreover, in having evoked their ancestral history, Demosthenes has not only dramatized ‘the crisis the Athenians preferred to deny’, but has presented the Assembly with the only acceptable response, remembering Herodotus’ assertion that the Athenians ‘chose that Hellas should survive in freedom’.<sup>748</sup>

To summarise, Demosthenes asserts that the Athenians should be intelligent enough to recognise Philip’s actions and intentions for what they really are, and live up to their own reputation. Just as in the *Olynthiacs*, Demosthenes holds their idealised past up as an exemplum, to make the Assembly to reflect upon itself and recognise the juxtaposition between its past reputation and their current practices, to ‘push the Athenian audience from denial towards realism and self-awareness’.<sup>749</sup> This ideology, however, is not just an unachievable nostalgic ideal, but within Athens’ potential if they shake of their apathy and take the necessary steps in preventing the decline of their fortunes. Demosthenes does not just

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<sup>747</sup> Demosthenes 9.36. εἰ γὰρ μὴ παρεκρούσθητε τόθ’ ὑμεῖς, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν τῇ πόλει πρᾶγμα· οὔτε γὰρ ναυσὶ δῆπου κρατήσας εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἦλθεν ἂν ποτε στόλῳ Φίλιππος, οὔτε πεζῇ βαδίζων ὑπὲρ τὰς Πύλας καὶ Φωκέας,

<sup>748</sup> Mader 2004: 67. Herodotus 7.139.5. The fact that the Athenians could also kill with impunity anyone who sought to overthrow the *dēmos* is attested to the decree of Eucrates, *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 320, and the stele found at the Athenian Agora (Early III c. BC foundations) (Ag. I 6524), depicts a man being crowned by the personification of *dēmos*. (Lambert *AIO*).

<sup>749</sup> Mader 2004: 57. By ideological virtues I also include *isēgoria* and the respect for *parrhēsia* in their decision-making.

recount the past in his historical allusions, but actively promotes the virtues which were ‘an integral part of the negotiation and manifestation of the Athenians’ shared image of the past.’<sup>750</sup> Demosthenes presents the logical hope that if the Athenians emulate the attitudes of the ancestors, they can overcome Philip in the same manner they did the Persians, but only *if* they act in a manner worthy of their ancestral past. Demosthenes, again, makes the task of challenging Philip necessary and manageable: even though Philip is now an undeniable threat like Xerxes, he also takes on the Great King’s flaws and weaknesses, and can be challenged if the Athenians act in a manner worthy of the city. To continue the pretence that the peace exists, and that they can ignore his expansion, would be to compromise their very identity as Athenians and the reputation inherited from their ancestors, the men of Marathon.

Demosthenes aims to motivate the Assembly to change its damaging practices advocated by apathy, greed and immediate gratification, by reflecting self-critically on their own behaviour and recognise good advice from rhetorical flattery, and reject those men who have sold out the city to Philip.

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<sup>750</sup> Steinbock 2013: 99. Steinbock argues that with regard to historical allusions the orator ‘is neither a mere mouthpiece of one particular tradition nor a propagandist manipulator of the ignorant masses. Instead...he participated and operated within a complex net of remembrances and beliefs, comprising a variety of different memory communities and carriers of social memory.’

## CHAPTER 4.2 ON THE CHERSONESE

‘The struggle will be for our very existence’<sup>751</sup>

### Date and Historical Context

*On the Chersonese* is dated to Spring 341, following Philip’s campaign in Thrace.<sup>752</sup> After 343 and following the *Second Philippic*, Philip’s expansion became more aggressive; he invaded Epirus and insulted the Athenians by offering them the island of Halonnesus, touching a raw nerve on Athenian lost possessions.<sup>753</sup> In the speeches *On Halonnesus* and *On the Crown*, Demosthenes (and Hegesippus) attest to Philip bribing Antiphon to burn the Piraeus in 343, just one example of a general decline in relations between Athens and Philip.<sup>754</sup>

The Chersonese was the Thracian peninsular of the Hellespont and was of crucial importance for the Athenians’ access to the Balkan region, particularly for their importation of grain.<sup>755</sup> During the negotiations of the Peace of Philocrates, the Athenians had sought and

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<sup>751</sup> Demosthenes 8.61.

<sup>752</sup> Dionysius *Letter to Ammaeus* 1.10. Worthington 2013: 216 citing Sealey 1955: 101-110. MacDowell 2009: 347. This concurs with Blass 1893: 368 who dates it to spring, stating that Philip was in the eleventh month of his Thracian campaign ‘Sie fällt nach Dionysios in das Jahr und zwar haben wir die zweite Hälfte des Jahres, genauer etwa März 341, anzunehmen, da Philipp zur Zeit im elften Monate in Thrakien zu Felde lag’. This was around the same time as the *Third Philippic*.

<sup>753</sup> Worthington 2013: 210. As Plutarch *Demosthenes* 9.6. remarks, Demosthenes replied scathingly that the Athenians were not to take, but take *back* their possession *from* Philip.’

<sup>754</sup> Worthington 2013: 212-3 observes Aeschines successfully defended Antiphon, but Demosthenes went to the Aeropagus, who found Antiphon guilty. In BNJ *FGrH* 115 F 224 Athenaeus recounts Theopompus’ criticism of the Macedonian companions that they ‘lived in a profligate manner very akin to that of pirates’, which Shrimpton 1991: 155 views as a ‘scarcely disguised denunciation of Macedonian piracy against Athens.’ See too Buckler 2000: 140-43.

<sup>755</sup> Trevett 2011: 129. Gabriel 2010: 190 notes how the Athenians settled the peninsula in the sixth century BCE and founded twelve cities there, and despite it changing hands, by 357 it was again under Athenian control. Sears 2013: i ‘Thrace was vitally important for Athens thanks to its natural resources and access to strategic waterways, which were essential to a maritime empire’.

Moreno 2007: 144 argues the history of the Black Sea as a source for grain from Athens has ‘long suffered from overemphasis in literary evidence.’



failed to secure Cersebleptes of Thrace as part of the original agreement.<sup>756</sup> In 342, Philip resumed his Thracian campaign and deposed Cersebleptes, installed garrisons, a tithe tax, and a *strategos* of Thrace.<sup>757</sup> Philip's power was now unprecedented, 'the Macedonian kingdom was now more than double its size at his accession in 359', a disturbing prospect for the Athenians, who were likewise alarmed at his involvement in Euboea.<sup>758</sup> In response the Athenians strengthened their 'hold on the Chersonese by sending further settlers.'<sup>759</sup>

The direct context of this speech is the debate following a letter of complaint from Philip to the Assembly about Diopieithes, the Athenian general sent with the cleruchs to the Chersonese in 343/2. Philip's allies Cardia, Crobyle and Tiristasis accused Diopieithes of attacking them and of aggressive piracy, which they claimed breached the Peace of Philocrates.<sup>760</sup> In the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes criticised the Assembly for not financially supporting its generals, warning that it forced them to find provisions by alternative means. Diopieithes was no exception, and he found 'pay for his mercenaries by demanding "benevolences" (*eunoiai*) from merchant ships, piratical raids by sea, the ravaging of Thracian land, and the holding of prisoners to ransom.'<sup>761</sup>

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<sup>756</sup> Following the departure of the Athenian embassy Philip immediately campaigned to Thrace, defeating Cersebleptes at Heraion Oros who was then restored as a subject ally/ vassal. Cawkwell 1978: 44; Worthington 2013: 171.

<sup>757</sup> Diodorus 16.71.2; 17. 62.5 Hammond 1994: 122 notes Diodorus is the only perfunctory account of Philip's War with Thrace. See Worthington 2013: 214-5; Badian 1983: 51-71.

<sup>758</sup> Gabriel 2010: 187 who also notes that civil strife broke out in Euboea between pro-Macedonian and pro-Athenian factions. Worthington 2013: 215 notes that during his Thracian campaign Philip sent Hipponicus, Parmenion and Eurylochus to Euboea to help the pro-Macedonian group set up tyrants in Eretria, Porthmus and Oreus. See Cawkwell 1963: 202-3.

<sup>759</sup> Hammond 1994: 127. Worthington 2013: 214 notes the Athenians sent Diopieithes with more cleruchs to retain their presence in that vital area.

<sup>760</sup> Gabriel 2010: 187 adds that Diopieithes tortured Philip's envoy who had been sent to petition for relief of the captives, before demanding a ransom for him too. Worthington 2008: 126 states that from Philip's perspective 'at the very least Diopieithes ought to have been recalled to stand trial, for his acts were in clear breach of diplomatic protocol.'

<sup>761</sup> Philochorus *FGrH* 328 f 158, cited by Hammond 1994: 127.

Philip's letter 'demanded Dioppeithes' removal and ominously warned the people that he would protect the Cardians if the Athenians continued to condone Dioppeithes' actions.'<sup>762</sup> This speech is Demosthenes' reply to the Assembly, which rings with incredulous anger at the Assembly for the popular opinion to recall, punish, and replace Dioppeithes who was only guilty of acting in Athenian interests without sufficient funding.<sup>763</sup> It is significantly longer than any of the previous speeches, which suggests it may have been subject to revision and extended to include what Demosthenes retrospectively wanted to say.<sup>764</sup> Due to the relentless criticism, this speech appears as an unremitting tirade, that only ends when Demosthenes has exhausted his complaints. Indeed, all the previous complaints at the Assembly's internal corruption, their lack of priorities, the gap between their words and deeds, their delusion, their neglect and their apathy are all nuances of the one assertion that it is an internal crisis, which has undermined the *polis* from within and left it vulnerable to Philip. Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* admonishes the Assembly for attacking their own general, instead of taking note of Philip's actions in the last ten months, and how they should be debating on the best means to protect the places now at risk. Demosthenes is emphatic that:

It would be shameful, by Zeus and all the gods, and unworthy of you and of what the city has and of your ancestor's achievements, to sacrifice all the other Greeks into slavery for the sake of your own indolence, and I at any rate would rather die than advocate this course.<sup>765</sup>

Demosthenes' proposals are simple: they should oppose their enemies (internal and external), and not their defender. If they maintain that Philip's actions have not breached the peace,

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<sup>762</sup> Worthington 2013: 216.

<sup>763</sup> Worthington 2008: 126 notes that the Assembly was also 'misled' by Hegesippus who argued Philip was 'operating outside of Thrace and hence in an area to which he had no right.'

<sup>764</sup> MacDowell 2009: 347 suggests the text we have is a revision, and he links it to the *Fourth Philippic*.

<sup>765</sup> Demosthenes 8.49. αἰσχρὸν μὲν νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ πάντας θεοὺς καὶ ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνοις, τῆς ἰδίας ἔνεκα ῥαθυμίας τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας Ἕλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι, καὶ ἔγωγ' αὐτὸς μὲν τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι βουλοίμην·

then they hypocritically hold Diopeithes to a double standard. Their attitude towards Diopeithes is symptomatic of their attitudes in deliberation, and the crisis as a whole. The central aim of the speech, therefore, is to shame the Assembly into realising their counter-productive attitudes and recognise their real enemies, and do what he asked in the *First Philippic*: support their forces, act and do their duty.

### Analysis

Demosthenes opens the speech with the *proem* topos of addressing the nature of oratory, returning to his complaint on the shortcomings of the Assembly:

Every speaker, men of Athens, ought to speak neither out of enmity nor to curry favour but to declare what he thinks is the best policy, especially in view of the great public interest of matters you are discussing.<sup>766</sup>

Demosthenes, however, asserts this appears to be the case:

But since there are some who are being induced to speak either out of rivalry or from some other reason, you the majority, men of Athens must discount everything else, and vote and act in accordance with what you judge to be the interest of the city.<sup>767</sup>

Demosthenes affirms the duty of the *dēmos* to recognise and act upon the best policy, and how currently their decisions are flawed because of *rhētors* who serve their own agendas and how individuals dominate the sovereignty of the *dēmos*.<sup>768</sup> Thus, Demosthenes appeals to the Assembly to act in the manner expected of the Athenian *dēmos*: that the majority acts in the

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<sup>766</sup> Demosthenes 8.1. ἔδει μὲν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς λέγοντας ἅπαντας μήτε πρὸς ἔχθραν ποιῆσθαι λόγον μηδένα μήτε πρὸς χάριν, ἀλλ' ὃ βέλτιστον ἕκαστος ἠγεῖτο, τοῦτ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεγάλων ὑμῶν βουλευομένων. At 8.69 Demosthenes develop this into his definition of the good citizen.

<sup>767</sup> Demosthenes 8.1. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιοι τὰ μὲν φιλονικία, τὰ δ' ἠτινιδήποτ' αἰτία προάγονται λέγειν, ὑμᾶς, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς πολλοὺς δεῖ πάντα τᾶλλ' ἀφελόντας, ἃ τῇ πόλει νομίζετε συμφέρειν, ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν.

<sup>768</sup> Indeed I argue that the present crisis, for Demosthenes, is their failure to perform their civic duty. As Finley 1981: 32 notes, Athens' success rested on 'widespread political responsibility' between *rhētors* and *dēmos*, cited in Yunis 1996: 27.

best interests of the *polis* not to the personal ends of individuals. This appeal in itself, however, highlights the reality that the majority do not listen responsibly

Demosthenes states that their deliberation has focused on punishing the wrong person, indicative of their failure to understand the situation objectively. Recalling his complaint against the Assembly in *On the Peace* and the *Second Philippic* that ‘advisors’ have weakened Athens by their deception, Demosthenes asserts that the Assembly chooses to blame others rather than acknowledging their internal problems; thus, the immediate issue for Athens is not an offended Philip, but their own attitudes.

Indeed, Demosthenes states that rather than express their fears at Philip, the Assembly has exhausted its complaints at Diopeithes:

The trouble we face relates to events in the Chersonese and the campaign that Philip has been conducting for more than ten months in Thrace, but most of the speeches that have been made deal with what Diopeithes is doing and is going to do. Yet I think that you already have the power to investigate whatever accusations have been directed against any of these men – whom you can punish according to the laws whenever you want, either now or later – and there is absolutely no need for me or anyone else to speak at length about them.<sup>769</sup>

Demosthenes criticises the Assembly’s habit of indulging debates on subjects they are comfortable with, and which allows them to consistently avoid dealing with the real issues at hand. Instead they should recognise and discuss the threat to their interests:

But all the places that an established enemy of our city, who is in the Hellespontine region accompanied by a large military force, is trying to seize before we can stop

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<sup>769</sup> Demosthenes 8.2. ἡ μὲν οὖν σπουδὴ περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ πραγμάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς στρατείας, ἦν ἐνδέκατον μῆνα τουτονὶ Φίλιππος ἐν Θράκῃ ποιεῖται· τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ πλεῖστοι περὶ ὧν Διοπείθης πράττει καὶ μέλλει ποιεῖν εἰρηναίαι. ἐγὼ δ’ ὅσα μὲν τις αἰτιάται τινα τούτων, οὓς κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐφ’ ὑμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βούλησθε, κολάζειν, κἂν ἤδη δοκῆ κἂν ἐπισχοῦσιν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοπεῖν ἐγχεῖν ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ δεῖ περὶ τούτων οὔτ’ ἔμ’ οὔτ’ ἄλλον οὐδέν’ ἰσχυρίζεσθαι.

him, and which, if we are too late, we will no longer be able to save – about these I think it is profitable for us to deliberate and make our preparations as soon as possible and not run away from them as a result of these irrelevant and rancorous accusations.<sup>770</sup>

Demosthenes asserts that the accusations against Diopeithes are a distraction from confronting the reality of their situation, and only further aids Philip to seize more areas of Athenian interest. His comment ‘if we are too late’ is also reminiscent of his urgent appeals to seize the *kairos* and act in the *Olynthiacs*, and the *First Philippic*.

This echoing of the past reminds the Athenians of his previous advice, the consequences they have suffered by ignoring him, and to avoid repeating these mistakes. Indeed, in light of the actions of Philip in Thrace and towards Cersebleptes, Demosthenes is angered at the accusations that he is a warmonger:

I am amazed by many of the things that are regularly said to you, men of Athens, but I was astonished most of all at what I recently heard someone say in the Council, that any advisor must advise you either to wage war openly or keep the peace.<sup>771</sup>

As Demosthenes already demonstrated in the *Second Philippic*, Philip has broken the Peace, and that rather than acknowledging this certain *rhētors* look to attack Demosthenes and continue to deceive the Assembly with the farce of Peace, allowing Philip to act unchecked:

The fact is, if Philip keeps quiet and neither possesses anything of ours in breach of the peace nor organises everybody against us there is no further need for speeches: all

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<sup>770</sup> Demosthenes 8.3. ὅσα δ' ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων τῇ πόλει καὶ δυνάμει πολλῇ περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον ὧν πειρᾶται προλαβεῖν, κἂν ἅπαξ ὑστερήσωμεν, οὐκέθ' ἔξομεν σῶσαι, περὶ τούτων δ' οἶομαι τὴν ταχίστην συμφέρειν καὶ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ μὴ τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων θορύβοις καὶ ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποδρᾶναι.

<sup>771</sup> Demosthenes 8.4. πολλὰ δὲ θαυμάζων τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι παρ' ὑμῖν, οὐδενὸς ἦττον, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τεθαύμακα, ὃ καὶ πρόην τινὸς ἤκουσ' εἰπόντος ἐν τῇ βουλῇ, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ τὸν συμβουλευόντα ἢ πολεμεῖν ἀπλῶς ἢ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν συμβουλεύειν.

we have to do is keep the peace, and on your side I see that you are quite ready to do so.<sup>772</sup>

Demosthenes presents how, in an ideal world where Philip is not agitating against Athens, of course the peace would be maintained, and Diopieithes too would not have had cause to raid or attack Cardia.<sup>773</sup> But this is not the case. Demosthenes's irony builds upon previous evidence that Philip's actions (such as his treatment of Phocis, and seizing of Thermopylae) are directed against Athenian interests, and to maintain the fallacy of the peace is tantamount to surrendering Athens and Greece.

As such, *On the Chersonese* functions as a defence speech for Diopieithes, and Demosthenes continues to assert how internal corruption within the Assembly and their lack of action has enabled Philip's expansion. The reference to 'everybody against us' reminds the Athenians of their vulnerable position following the Peace of Philocrates (attested to in *On the Peace* and the *Second Philippic*) that Philip can unite their enemies in a coalition if they break the Peace. To blame Diopieithes risks admitting as such, and maintaining the fallacy of the Peace is thus self-sabotaging, especially when it is Philip (for Demosthenes) who has broken the Peace. For Demosthenes, the sting in the tail is that the Athenians choose to cling to this comforting fallacy instead of accepting reality.<sup>774</sup>

And so Demosthenes confronts the Assembly with his blunt *parrhēsia*:

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<sup>772</sup> Demosthenes 8.5. ἴεστι δέ,† εἰ μὲν ἡσυχίαν Φίλιππος ἄγει καὶ μήτε τῶν ἡμετέρων ἔχει παρὰ τὴν εἰρήνην μηδὲν μήτε συσκευάζεται πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, οὐκέτι δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς εἰρήνην ἀκτέον, καὶ τὰ γ' ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἔτοιμ' ὑπάρχονθ' ὀρῶ.

<sup>773</sup> Demosthenes appears to evoke Pericles again at Thucydides 2.61 'If one has a free choice and can live undisturbed, it is sheer folly to go to war. But suppose the choice was forced upon one – submission and immediate slavery or danger with the hope of survival: then I prefer the man who stands up to danger than the one who runs away from it.'

<sup>774</sup> Demosthenes conveniently ignores how he successfully persuaded the Assembly to reject Philip's invitation to join him on a mission against the pirates of the Aegean, prior to his campaign against Epirus in 343 Worthington 2013: 211. Cawkwell 1963: 200 notes that 'Demosthenes has so much to say on [the breaches of the Peace of Philocrates] and on which there is so little satisfactory evidence. In every speech which he delivered after 346 he referred, in greater or less detail, to breaches...and this instance on Philip's ἀδικία may mislead us' if you are using Demosthenes as an historical source (which this thesis is not). Hammond 1994: 128 likewise notes the Athenians were arguable provoking Philip when their ally Thasos permitted pirates to use their harbour, which was in breach of the Peace.

It is evident that from the start, before the departure of Diopieithes and the cleruchs whom they now accuse of having caused war, Philip has illegally seized many of our possessions, about which you complain in these decrees that remain in force, and continues to seize the possessions of Greeks and foreigners alike, and is mobilising against us, what do they mean by saying that we must either wage war or remain at peace?<sup>775</sup>

Demosthenes highlights their absurdity and affirms they should be protecting Diopieithes who was acting *in* Athens' interests, rather than condemning him to appease Philip and his supporters. Indeed, nothing has changed since the *First Philippic*, and through their refusal to accept unpleasant truths and change, Philip is now in an undisputed position of power. Quite simply:

We have no choice in the matter: all that is left for us is to take the most just and necessary course of action, which these men are happy to pass over.<sup>776</sup>

Demosthenes' criticism also includes the sinister element that some *rhētors* pass over these realities, and do so because they work for Philip. Demosthenes' persuasion rests on his assertion that there is only one honourable course of action for the Athenians now:

What is this action? To oppose the man who has started war against us – unless indeed, by Zeus, they claim that so long as Philip keeps away from Attica and Piraeus, he is neither wronging the city nor waging war on it!<sup>777</sup>

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<sup>775</sup> Demosthenes 8.6. φαίνεται δ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὁ Φίλιππος, πρὶν Διοπείθην ἐκπλεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς κληρούχους, οὓς νῦν αἰτιῶνται πεποιηκέναι τὸν πόλεμον, πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀδίκως εἰληφώς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ψηφίσμαθ' ὑμέτερον ἐγκαλοῦντα κύρια ταυτί, πάντα δὲ τὸν χρόνον συνεχῶς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων λαμβάνων καὶ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς συσκευαζόμενος, τί τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὡς πολεμεῖν ἢ ἄγειν εἰρήνην δεῖ; Demosthenes reaffirms this at 8.39.

<sup>776</sup> Demosthenes 8.7. οὐ γὰρ αἴρεσις ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλ' ὑπολείπεται τὸ δικαιοτάτον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότατον τῶν ἔργων, ὃ ὑπερβαίνουσιν ἐκόντες οὗτοι.

<sup>777</sup> Demosthenes 8.7. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ἀμύνεσθαι τὸν πρότερον πολεμοῦνθ' ἡμῖν. πλὴν εἰ τοῦτο λέγουσι νῆ Δί', ὡς, ἂν ἀπέχηται τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς Φίλιππος, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ τὴν πόλιν οὔτε ποιεῖ πόλεμον. This will eventually build into Demosthenes' defence in *On the Crown* that his proposals were the only honourable option, as discussed in Yunis 2007 on the burden of the Athenian past.

Demosthenes presents it as ridiculous to not acknowledge Philip's actions in Thrace and Euboea as aggressive, as Athens' logical course of action is to actively defend itself against aggressors. Thus, anyone who advocates peace with Philip is deceiving the *polis*. It also asserts that Athenian interests are beyond Attica, and to not recognise Philip's actions as breaches of the Peace epitomises the Assembly's attitude of neglect and apathy which has resulted in the erosion of their influence in Northern Greece.<sup>778</sup> Demosthenes asserts that the Athenians face the same situation now in the Chersonese as they did in the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs*, and that their duty is to support Diopeithes and recognise Philip's actions as the true breach of the peace:

But if they [other orators] define justice in these terms and consider this to be peace, you can presumably all see that what they are saying is impious, intolerable and dangerous to you.<sup>779</sup>

It is important to observe that these classical *topoi* of invective (impiety, intolerableness and danger) are all directed at the *rhētors*: it is the enemies within that Demosthenes asserts as most dangerous here, not Philip. Demosthenes' priority is to confront these *rhētors* and expose the practices which enable them to deceive and manipulate the *dēmos* with no personal repercussions. Demosthenes presents this as all the more incredulous when one considers the double standards between Philip (and his collaborators) and Diopeithes:

Moreover, their statements are logically inconsistent with the allegations that they direct against Diopeithes. Why on earth should we give Philip license to do whatever

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<sup>778</sup> Which had a detrimental effect upon Athens' access to resources in the region, in particular upon access to Timber.

<sup>779</sup> Demosthenes 8.8. εἰ δ' ἐκ τούτων τὰ δίκαια τίθενται καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ταύτην ὀρίζονται, ὅτι μὲν δῆπουθεν οὐθ' ὄσι' οὐτ' ἀνεκτὰ λέγουσιν οὐθ' ὑμῖν ἀσφαλῆ, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἅπασιν.



he wants so long as he keeps away from Attica, but not permit Diopeithes even to help the Thracians without our claiming that he is waging war?<sup>780</sup>

Demosthenes does not deny the aggression of Diopeithes, but rather defends his actions (again evoking a forensic speech) as firmly in Athenian interests. Indeed, if blame is going to be assigned, it should be on the Assembly for failing to provide their generals with the necessary resources to perform their duty.<sup>781</sup> By encouraging the punishment of Diopeithes, the Assembly undermines Athenian security:

Observe how they [the *rhētors*] are simply directing the city towards the same behaviour that caused the present disaster.<sup>782</sup>

Demosthenes makes this even clearer by repeating the same complaints from the *First Philippic* that Philip acts whilst the Athenians merely react:

For you know, I suppose, that the most important way in which Philip has got control of everything is by being the first to take action. He has a standing army always with him and knows in advance what he wishes to do, and strikes suddenly against whomever he chooses; whereas we, whenever we hear that something is happening, are thrown into confusion and only then start to make our preparations.<sup>783</sup>

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<sup>780</sup> Demosthenes 8.8. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐναντία συμβαίνει ταῖς κατηγορίας ὡς Διοπείθους κατηγοροῦσι καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτούς. τί γὰρ δήποτε τῶ μὲν Φιλίπῳ πάντα τὰλλα ποιεῖν ἐξουσίαν δώσομεν, ἂν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀπέχῃται, τῶ Διοπείθει δ' οὐδὲ βοηθεῖν τοῖς Θραξίν ἐξέσται, ἢ πόλεμον ποιεῖν αὐτὸν φήσομεν;

<sup>781</sup> Demosthenes will emphasise this at 8.24-6. Compare to Demosthenes 4.35-6 and his argument that their attitude towards their generals, and the lack of funding, contributed significantly to their problems.

<sup>782</sup> Demosthenes 8.10. σκοπεῖθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἢ καθιστᾶσι τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δι' οὗ τὰ [παρόντα] πράγμαθ' ἅπαντ' ἀπολώλεκεν. Cf. 1.14-15, 2.26, 2.28-9.

<sup>783</sup> Demosthenes 8.11. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ' ὅτι οὐδενὶ τῶν πάντων πλέον κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος, ἢ τῶ πρότερος πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι γίνεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔχων δύναμιν συνεστηκυῖαν αἰεὶ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ προειδῶς ἂ βούλεται πράξει, ἐξαίφνης ἐφ' οὗς ἂν αὐτῷ δόξη πάρεστιν· ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴν πυθώμεθα τι γιγνόμενον, τηνικαῦτα θορυβούμεθα καὶ παρασκευαζόμεθα. This point is particularly reminiscent of Demosthenes' claims in the *First Philippic* at 4.37 and 4.40 discussed p. 63 that the Athenians' attitude was like a barbarian trying to box, never pre-empting, never anticipating, but always one step behind.

It also returns to the uncomfortable role reversal of Philip and Athens. Now, like then, the Athenians are too late and continue to shame themselves. The problems of 351 have still not been resolved:

The result, it seems to me, is that he gets possession of any place he is attacking with great ease, whereas we are too late, and all our expenditure is in vain, and we make a show of our hostility and of our desire to hinder him, but in acting too late we succeed only in incurring shame.<sup>784</sup>

As Trevett notes, ‘the Athenians look foolish in the eyes of the other Greeks’, and as I argued in the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs*, Demosthenes urged the Athenians to redeem their reputation in front of the wider Greek community.<sup>785</sup> This involved action, and as discussed in the *Second Philippic*, the gap between their words and actions insinuated that they were Athenians in name, but not in practice. Demosthenes returns to emphasising this gap by comparing the Athenian decrees to Macedonian action:

Please realise, men of Athens, that even now the rest is just words and pretexts, but that Philip’s actions and preparations have this [designs against Athens] as their aim – that while you remain at home and our city has no force abroad, he can make all his arrangements completely unhindered.<sup>786</sup>

The Assembly has enabled the situation to deteriorate by using *just* words and, in contrast, Philip’s actions (which speak truer than his words) are more effective than Athenian actions *or* words. Philip’s deception and actions have effectively deceived Athens, who have paralysed themselves by their inability to move from *logos* to *ergon*. Demosthenes’

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<sup>784</sup> Demosthenes 8.12. εἶτ’, οἶμαι, συμβαίνει τῷ μὲν ἐφ’ ἂν ἔλθῃ, ταῦτ’ ἔχειν κατὰ πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν, ἡμῖν δ’ ὑστερίζειν, καὶ ὅς’ ἂν δαπανήσωμεν, ἅπαντα μάρτην ἀνηλωκένοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἔχθραν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι κωλύειν ἐνδεδειχθαι, ὑστερίζοντας δὲ τῶν ἔργων αἰσχύνῃν προσοφλισκάνειν.

<sup>785</sup> Trevett 2011: 13. Cf. Demosthenes 4.45 and how their allies ‘died of shame.’

<sup>786</sup> Demosthenes 8.13. μὴ τοίνυν ἀγνοεῖτ’, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι καὶ τὰ νῦν τᾶλλα μὲν ἐστὶ λόγοι ταῦτα καὶ προφάσεις, πράττεται δὲ καὶ κατασκευάζεται τοῦτο, ὅπως ὑμῶν μὲν οἴκοι μενόντων, ἔξω δὲ μηδεμίᾳς οὔσης τῆ πόλει δυνάμεως, μετὰ πλείστης ἡσυχίας ἅπανθ’ ὅσα βούλεται Φίλιππος διοικῆσεται.

complaint is that, given their reputation for intelligence (as noted by ‘Philip’ in *Second Philippic*), the Athenians should know better. Indeed, there is a dissonance between their words and their actions:

But in our speeches we praise those who speak worthily of the city, whereas in our actions we join with their opponents.<sup>787</sup>

Not only does this evoke his request in the *Second Olynthiac* that they march out ‘in a manner worthy of our city...since all speech, if it is not accompanied by action, seems vain and empty’, but asserts that Athens is increasingly destabilised at its core by consistently undermining itself; they say one thing, but do another.<sup>788</sup>

To stress this illogical approach, Demosthenes calls the Assembly to, ‘first see what is going on at present’ (θεωρεῖτε γὰρ τὸ παρὸν πρῶτον, ὃ γίγνεται<sup>789</sup>), and gives an account of the current situation via an eyewitness account:

Philip is currently spending his time with a large force in Thrace and is summoning many reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly, according to eyewitnesses. If he waits for the Etesian winds, marches against Byzantium and lays siege to it, do you suppose that the Byzantines will continue with the same folly that they show now and will decide neither to call for your help nor to help themselves?...if we are unable to put to sea from here, and there is no help at hand there, nothing will prevent their destruction.<sup>790</sup>

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<sup>787</sup> Demosthenes 8.22. ἐν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις τοὺς τῆς πόλεως λέγοντας ἄξι’ ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς ἐναντιούμενοις τούτοις συναγωνιζόμεθα.

<sup>788</sup> Demosthenes 2.11. This evokes his earlier statement at 3.14 that judging by their decrees Philip should have been punished a long time ago.

<sup>789</sup> Demosthenes 8.13.

<sup>790</sup> Demosthenes 8.14-15. νυνὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἐκεῖνος ἔχων ἐν Θράκῃ διατρίβει, καὶ μεταπέμπεται πολλήν, ὥς φασιν οἱ παρόντες, ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας καὶ Θεσσαλίας. ἐὰν οὖν περιμείνας τοὺς ἐτησίας ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον ἐλθὼν πολιορκῇ, πρῶτον μὲν οἴεσθε τοὺς Βυζαντίους μενεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνοίας τῆς αὐτῆς ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ οὔτε παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς οὔτε βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς ἀξιόσιν; ... οὐκοῦν ἡμῶν μὲν μὴ δυναμένων ἐνθένδ’ ἀναπλεῦσαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπαρχούσης ἐτοίμου βοηθείας, οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλέναι κωλύσει.

Thus, in their enthusiasm to call Diopeithes to account, they have neglected to note ‘what is going on at present’, and how Philip’s position in Thrace threatens both the Chersonese and ultimately Byzantium, which despite its own ‘evil spirit,’ ‘must nevertheless be saved, since it is in our city’s interest.’<sup>791</sup> In particular, this is about Athens’ access to the Black Sea region, and how ‘Byzantium’s site on the Bosphorus meant that whoever possessed it would be able to control the grain from the Black Sea on which Athens depended.’<sup>792</sup> Macedonian control of the area would force the Athenians to look elsewhere for supplies in an ever-shrinking network of influence, an endeavour which previously led to the disastrous Sicilian Expedition in the need to find resources for timber, following the loss of Amphipolis. The Athenians, in turning a blind eye to Philip’s actions are repeating the same patterns of self-destruction from both the Peloponnesian War, from the pre-Peace speeches and their loss of control over northern timber, and now their grain route in the Hellespont.

To this end, Demosthenes argues that Diopeithes’ actions are necessary to defend and safeguard Athenian interests. To punish him, or to recall him, or to disband his force would leave their vital interests undefended.<sup>793</sup> Indeed, disbanding Diopeithes’ force amounts to surrendering the Chersonese to Philip:

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<sup>791</sup> Demosthenes 8.16. “But, by Zeus, those people are possessed by an evil spirit and are exceedingly foolish.” True indeed, but they must nevertheless be saved, since it is in our city’s interest.’ νῆ Δία, κακοδαίμονῶσι γὰρ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἀνοΐα. πάνυ γε, ἀλλ’ ὅμως αὐτοὺς δεῖ σῶς εἶναι· συμφέρει γὰρ τῇ πόλει.

<sup>792</sup> Trevett 2011: 136. Usher 1999: 217-8 notes the danger Philip posed to the Athenian corn route provided Demosthenes with a ‘momentous theme’ in the *First Philippic*.

<sup>793</sup> Demosthenes 8.17 ‘If the army that has already been formed remains in existence, it will be able both to assist that place [The Chersonese] and to damage some of his interests. But if it is ever disbanded, what will we do if he attacks the Chersonese? “We will put Diopeithes on trial, by Zeus.” And how will that help? “We can provide a relief force ourselves from here.” What if we are prevented by the winds? “By Zeus, he will not attack.” But who will guarantee this?’ ἂν μὲν τοίνυν ἦ τὸ συνεστηκὸς στράτευμα, καὶ τῇ χώρᾳ βοηθῆσαι δυνήσεται καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου τι κακῶς ποιῆσαι· εἰ δ’ ἅπαξ διαλυθήσεται, τί ποιήσομεν, ἂν ἐπὶ Χερρόνησον ἴη; ‘κρινοῦμεν Διοπέιθη νῆ Δία.’ καὶ τί τὰ πράγματα ἔσται βελτίω; ‘ἀλλ’ ἐνθένδ’ ἂν βοηθήσαιμεν αὐτοί.’ ἂν δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων μὴ δυνώμεθα; ‘ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’ οὐχ ἤξει.’ καὶ τίς ἐγγυητής ἐστι τούτου;

Are you aware, men of Athens, and do you take account of the coming season, which some people think will force you to abandon the Hellespont and surrender it to Philip?<sup>794</sup>

In surrendering the Chersonese the Athenians also risk opening a path of destruction to Attica. As Demosthenes asserted in the *Second Philippic*, the Assembly had already been persuaded to give up the areas which controlled Thermopylae, giving Philip unhindered access to central Greece. Likewise here:

What if he leaves Thrace and attacks neither the Chersonese nor Byzantium but (this too is something you should consider) advances against Chalcis and Megara, just as he recently did against Oreus: is it better to resist him here and allow war to enter Attica, or to cause difficulties for him over there? The latter, I think.<sup>795</sup>

This comment, that they ought to resist there rather than let war come to Attica, is the same warning Demosthenes delivered throughout the *Olynthiacs*. It also asserts the immediate danger facing the Athenians, and that they ought not to be discussing punishing one of their own but defending their own interests. There is also the implication that by prosecuting Diopieithes they accept culpability for breaching the peace and thus are jeopardising their own safety.<sup>796</sup> Demosthenes asserts that they all know this and should act accordingly:

Since we all know this and base our deliberations on it, we must not, by Zeus, disparage or attempt to disband the force that Diopieithes is trying to organise for the

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<sup>794</sup> Demosthenes 8.18. ἄρ' ὁρᾶτε καὶ λογίζεσθε', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἐπιούσαν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους, εἰς ἣν ἔρημόν τινας οἶονται δεῖν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ὑμῶν ποιῆσαι καὶ παραδοῦναι Φιλίππῳ; This reference to the Etesian winds also ties back to his complaint in the *First Philippic* that the Athenians do not anticipate things, while Philip uses things such as the winds to his advantage.

<sup>795</sup> Demosthenes 8.18. τί δ', ἂν ἀπελθὼν ἐκ Θράκης καὶ μηδὲ προσελθὼν Χερρονήσῳ μηδὲ Βυζαντίῳ (καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα λογίζεσθε) ἐπὶ Χαλκίδα καὶ Μέγαρ' ἤκη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὄνπερ ἐπ' Ὀρεὸν πρόην, πότερον κρεῖττον ἐνθάδ' αὐτὸν ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ προσελθεῖν τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς τὴν Ἀττικὴν εἶσαι, ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐκεῖ τιν' ἀσχολίαν αὐτῷ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶομαι τοῦτο.

<sup>796</sup> Remembering that in *On the Peace*, Demosthenes asserted it would have been safer to have not made the peace in the first place, than to risk breaching it now.

city, but must prepare a further force ourselves, supplying him with money and in other respects joining the struggle as friends.<sup>797</sup>

Thus, whereas previously Demosthenes urged the Assembly to send an Athenian force, funded and manned by Athenians, he now takes what was advocated in *First Philippic* and the *Olynthiacs* to an extreme. His incredulity is increased by the notion that the Athenians finally have a general who acts in the city's interests, and yet they choose to renounce him, for indeed:

If someone were to ask Philip, "Tell me, would you rather that these soldiers whom Diopeithes now commands, however poor they are," (I do not dispute it) "succeed and be held in high regard by the Athenians and be increased in number, and that the city of Athens joins in the struggle, or that they be disbanded and destroyed, as a result of slanders and accusations that certain men have brought against them?" I think he would choose the latter option.<sup>798</sup>

Rather than attacking Philip, Demosthenes focuses on how the city has been ruined by their own poor decision making, which has enabled Philip to exploit their weaknesses. The Athenians, more so than ever before, would be jeopardising their interests to Philip's advantage:

But aren't some of us here doing the very things that Philip would pray to the gods that we do. And do you still ask how the affairs of our city have been totally ruined?<sup>799</sup>

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<sup>797</sup> Demosthenes 8.19. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἅπαντας εἰδότας καὶ λογιζομένους χρή, οὐ μὰ Δί' οὐχ ἦν Διοπείθης πειρᾶται τῇ πόλει δύναμιν παρασκευάζειν, ταύτην βασκαίνειν καὶ διαλύσαι πειρᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν αὐτοὺς προσπαρασκευάζειν καὶ συνευποροῦντας ἐκείνων χρημάτων καὶ τᾶλλ' οἰκείως συναγωνιζομένους.

<sup>798</sup> Demosthenes 8.20. εἰ γὰρ τις ἔροιτο Φίλιππον, 'εἰπέ μοι, πότερ' ἂν βούλοιο τούτους τοὺς στρατιώτας οὓς Διοπείθης νῦν ἔχει, τοὺς ὅποιουστινασοῦν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγω) εὐθeneῖν καὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις εὐδοξεῖν καὶ πλείους γίνεσθαι τῆς πόλεως συναγωνιζομένης, ἢ διαβαλλόντων τινῶν καὶ κατηγορούντων διασπασθῆναι καὶ διαφθαρήναι;' ταῦτ' ἂν οἶμαι φήσειεν.

<sup>799</sup> Demosthenes 8.20. εἴθ' ἂ Φίλιππος ἂν εὐξαιτο τοῖς θεοῖς, ταῦθ' ἡμῶν τινες ἐνθάδε πράττουσιν; εἴτ' ἔτι ζητεῖτε πόθεν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀπόλωλεν ἅπαντα;

Blame, therefore, is directed squarely at the Assembly for their continued failure to recognise the intentions of speakers. The lack of awareness of their own culpability has been a consistent theme throughout the corpus, and their continued rejection of Demosthenes' advice has not only exacerbated the situation, but intensified the need for the Assembly to reflect self-critically.

To make the Athenians recognise this, Demosthenes shifts tactic in the speech, presenting a 'candid appraisal' of the situation, and how to address it:

I wish to provide a candid appraisal of our city's present predicament and to examine what we are currently doing to address it. We are not willing to raise taxes [*eisphora*], or to campaign in person, or to keep our hands off public funds [Theoric fund] nor do we provide Diopieithes with financial contributions, or approve of the provisions he makes for himself, but we disparage him and investigate the source of his funds and his intentions and the like.<sup>800</sup>

The criticism is sharpened by the insinuation that, had they done this at the first time of asking, they would not be in their current predicament. Moreover, in listing his rejected suggestions, Demosthenes demonstrates the impossible task of advising an Assembly that refuses to do what is necessary, but moans when his ominous predictions come to fruition.<sup>801</sup> Instead the Assembly wastes time debating the best means to punish Diopieithes, whose actions were predetermined by the Assembly's own neglect of its military provisions. In highlighting their illogical attitude to Diopieithes compared to Philip, Demosthenes observes how the Assembly has deluded itself with what Mader asserts is 'speech-act logic', where:

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<sup>800</sup> Demosthenes 8.22. βούλομαι τοίνυν [ὑμᾶς] μετὰ παρηρησίας ἐξετάσαι τὰ παρόντα πράγματα τῆ πόλει, καὶ σκέψασθαι τί ποιοῦμεν αὐτοὶ νῦν καὶ ὅπως χρώμεθ' αὐτοῖς. ἡμεῖς οὔτε χρήματ' εἰσφέρειν βουλόμεθα, οὔτ' αὐτοὶ στρατεύεσθαι, οὔτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀπέχεσθαι δυνάμεθα, οὔτε τὰς συντάξεις Διοπείθει δίδομεν, οὔθ' ὅς' ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πορίσῃται ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ βασκαίνομεν καὶ σκοποῦμεν πόθεν, καὶ τί μέλλει ποιεῖν, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαυτὰ.

<sup>801</sup> Meaning that if they refused to use the Theoric fund, or fund their expeditions at all, their generals will be forced to seek their funds by less than desirable means.

Prosecuting Diopeithes at home palpably substitutes for prosecuting the war abroad; to declare him guilty symmetrically reaffirms the fiction that Philip is not really at war and that intervention in the north is therefore unnecessary.<sup>802</sup>

Consequently, in ‘one stroke and by perfectly consistent internal logic they purge misgivings, justify continued indifference (ῥαθυμία), and perpetuate feel-good [attitudes] through the illusion of meaningful action.’<sup>803</sup> Accordingly their continued debate over Diopeithes ‘is parodied by Demosthenes as a psychological escape hatch and a displacement of pressing policy issues...[which] perpetuates the spiral of make-believe’, which as I have argued throughout this thesis, has been Demosthenes’ intention to reveal and reverse.<sup>804</sup>

In light of this, his complaint at empty rhetoric has more serious ramifications. Previously Demosthenes’ complaint was that speeches without action were worthless, their lack of action creating their deteriorating situation. Now, with the realisation that they deliberately debate to *avoid* action, Demosthenes has nothing to say if his words will never be heeded and translated into action:

You are accustomed on each occasion to ask the speaker, “What are we to do?” but I want to ask you “What are we to say?” For if you will not raise taxes, or campaign in person, or keep away from public money, or provide allowances, or let him provide for himself, and refuse to take care of your own affairs, I have nothing to say.<sup>805</sup>

This paralysis is obscured by their continued debate, which hoodwinks the Assembly into believing that they are dealing with the situation, strengthening Demosthenes’ presentation of

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<sup>802</sup> Mader 2006: 379. This is emphasised further at 8.33.

<sup>803</sup> Mader 2006: 379.

<sup>804</sup> Mader 2006:379.

<sup>805</sup> Demosthenes 8.23. ὑμεῖς μὲν τοίνυν εἰώθαθ’ ἐκάστοτε τὸν παριόντ’ ἐρωτᾶν, τί οὖν χρῆ ποιεῖν; ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμᾶς ἐρωτῆσαι βούλομαι, τί οὖν χρῆ λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ μήτ’ εἰσοίσετε, μήτ’ αὐτοὶ στρατεύσεσθε, μήτε τῶν κοινῶν ἀφέξεσθε, μήτε τὰς συντάξεις δώσετε, μήθ’ ὅσ’ ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πορίσῃται ἐάσετε, μήτε τὰ ὑμέτερ’ αὐτῶν πράττειν ἐθελήσετε, οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.



their speech-act delusion.<sup>806</sup> For Demosthenes, the Assembly's attitude towards speech has corrupted the function of deliberation into a method to avoid action, and displaces their anxieties onto an issue they are more comfortable with (prosecuting Diopeithes). While this is not a reflection of historical reality, Demosthenes portrays the Assembly as self-delusional, and that their internal deliberations maintain an illusion that they are acting on the external situation. As such, Demosthenes' complaint is not directed against Philip, but at the apparent obliviousness to their self-deception and the deception of other *rhētors*:

They wish to turn the anger that you reasonably feel if you suffer any reverse in the war against those who are giving you the best advice, in order that you may put them on trial rather than resisting Philip, and that they themselves may act as the accusers of these men, rather than pay the penalty for their own actions.<sup>807</sup>

Thus, Demosthenes emphasises his impossible position:

You already give so much freedom to those who wish to blame and slander that you listen to them accusing someone in advance for things that they say he is going to say – what can anyone say to you?<sup>808</sup>

The Assembly is presented as being beyond advice, and as such it is this crisis that Demosthenes prioritises as fundamental, and it is this internal crisis – in my opinion – that the speeches address as a means to deal with the issue of Macedonian interference in Greece.

Invoking his civic *parrhēsia* – Demosthenes directs his speech at highlighting the dangers of such attitudes: ‘Some of you need to be told what the consequence of this can be. I will speak

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<sup>806</sup> Whilst Ober 1996: 151 argues from Austinian speech-act theory that speech in fourth-century Athens was ‘not only descriptive, but also performative’, I believe the speech-act logic within this speech demonstrates a corruption of this performative aspect.

<sup>807</sup> Demosthenes 8.57. ὅτι τὴν ὀργὴν ἣν εἰκός ἐστι γενέσθαι παρ’ ὑμῶν, ἂν τι λυπῆσθε τῷ πολέμῳ, εἰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγοντας τὰ βέλτιστα τρέψαι βούλονται, ἵνα τούτους κρίνητε, μὴ Φίλιππον ἀμύνησθε, καὶ κατηγορῶσιν αὐτοῖς, μὴ δίκην δῶσιν ὧν ποιῶσι νῦν.

<sup>808</sup> Demosthenes 8.23. οἱ γὰρ ἤδη τοσαύτην ἐξουσίαν τοῖς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ διαβάλλειν βουλομένοις διδόντες, ὥστε καὶ περὶ ὧν φασὶ μέλλειν αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων προκατηγορούντων ἀκροᾶσθαι, —τί ἂν τις λέγοι;

candidly; I can do nothing else'.<sup>809</sup> Unequivocally, it is only by addressing the corruption of rhetorical deliberation – not inciting hatred of Philip – that the situation can be resolved.

Having presented this damning reflection to the Assembly, Demosthenes returns to his arguments in the *First Philippic* to explain the consequences of not financially supporting their generals:

All your generals who have ever set sail – and if I am wrong, I condemn myself to suffer any punishment at all – take money from the Chians and the Erythraeans and anyone else they can (I mean those who live in Asia) ... Now too it is quite clear that all these cities will give Diopieithes money, since he has an army. How else do you suppose that one who has received nothing from you, and has no other source of funds with which to pay wages, can supply his troops? From the sky? No: he lives off what he collects and begs and borrows.<sup>810</sup>

It is their lack of provision that has caused any of the ‘wrong doing’, and places culpability for Diopieithes’ actions on the Assembly itself. This emphasises the pointlessness of attacking Diopieithes as it is an admission of their own guilt, neglect, and shame. Moreover, by taking these actions, the Assembly announces to the Panhellenic community that they will scapegoat their own generals rather than face Philip (or indeed are pro-Philip and are betraying the *polis* itself).

Those who accuse him before you are simply announcing to everyone that they should not give him anything, on the ground that he will be punished for what he is going to do, though he has not done or achieved anything. This is the meaning of their

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<sup>809</sup> Demosthenes 8.24. ὅ τι τοίνυν δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἐνίους μαθεῖν ὑμῶν δεῖ. λέξω δὲ μετὰ παρρησίας· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ’ ἂν ἄλλως δυναίμην.

<sup>810</sup> Demosthenes 8.24 and 26. πάντες ὅσοι πρόποτ’ ἐκτεπελεύκασι παρ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγοί (ἢ γὰρ πάσχειν ὅτιοῦν τιμῶμαι) καὶ παρὰ Χίων καὶ παρ’ Ἐρυθραίων καὶ παρ’ ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι δύνωνται, τούτων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκοῦντων λέγω, χρήματα λαμβάνουσιν ... καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τῷ Διοπιείθει στρατεύμ’ ἔχοντι σαφῶς ἐστὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι δώσουσι χρήματα πάντες οὗτοι· πόθεν γὰρ οἴεσθ’ ἄλλοθεν τὸν μῆτε λαβόντα παρ’ ὑμῶν μηδὲν μῆτ’ αὐτὸν ἔχονθ’ ὀπόθεν μισθοδοτήσει, στρατιώτας τρέφειν; ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ; οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ὧν ἀγείρει καὶ προσαιτεῖ καὶ δανείζεται, ἀπὸ τούτων διάγει.

statements that “he is planning a siege” or “he is sacrificing the Greeks.” Do any of these men care for the Greeks who live in Asia? If they do, they obviously care more for other people than they do for their own country! <sup>811</sup>

For Demosthenes, the sad reality is that the Athenians are more comfortable attacking within their own courts than fighting their real enemies.

The reason for this is as follows – and by the gods, please allow me to speak freely for your benefit! Some public speakers have prepared you to be fearsome and severe in your Assembly meetings, but lax and contemptible in your preparations for war. If you are told that the man who is responsible is one whom you know you can arrest from among your own number, you agree and are willing to do so; but if you are told that he is one whom you can punish only after you have defeated him in war, you do not know what to do, I think, and your bewilderment makes you angry. <sup>812</sup>

Their attitude towards Diopieithes epitomises these misguided priorities and the corruption of the Assembly; they would rather find a scapegoat than comprehend that their version of reality is a fallacy:

And yet, terrible though it is, that some of these men are behaving like this, this is not the really terrible thing. Rather, you who sit here are already so disposed that if someone were to come forward and say that it is Diopieithes who is responsible for all

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<sup>811</sup> Demosthenes 8.27. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄλλο ποιῶσιν οἱ κατηγοροῦντες ἐν ὑμῖν ἢ προλέγουσιν ἅπασι μὴδ' ὅτι οὖν ἐκείνῳ διδόναι, ὡς καὶ τοῦ μελλῆσαι δώσοντι δίκην, μὴ τι ποιήσαντί γ' ἢ καταπραξαμένῳ. τοῦτ' εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι: 'μέλλει πολιορκεῖν,' 'τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκδίδωσιν.' μέλει γάρ τινι τούτων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκούντων Ἑλλήνων; ἀμείνους μὲντ' εἶεν τῶν ἄλλων ἢ τῆς πατρίδος κήδεσθαι.

<sup>812</sup> Demosthenes 8.32. αἴτιον δὲ τούτων (καὶ μοι πρὸς θεῶν, ὅταν εἴνεκα τοῦ βελτίστου λέγω, ἔστω παρρησία)· παρεσκευάκασιν ὑμᾶς τῶν πολιτευομένων ἔνιοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις φοβεροὺς καὶ χαλεπούς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς ταῖς τοῦ πολέμου ῥαθύμους καὶ εὐκαταφρονήτους. ἂν μὲν οὖν τὸν αἴτιον εἴπη τις ὃν ἴσθ' ὅτι λήψεσθε παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, φατὲ καὶ βούλεσθε· ἂν δὲ τοιοῦτον λέγη τις, ὃν κρατήσαντας τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἄλλως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν κολάσαι, οὐκ ἔχειτ', οἶμαι, τί ποιήσετε, ἐξελεγχόμενοι δ' ἄχθεσθε. Roisman 2004: 265 discusses this passage as but one example of the challenges for speakers, and how speaking in public with the *thorubos* 'could be an intimidating experience that called upon a man to overcome the fear of addressing an active audience', noting too Isocrates 5.81; 12.9-10; *Letters* 8.7 and Plato *Republic* 492b-c; 493 a-d. See also Too 1995: 75-98.

our troubles, or Chares, or Aristophon or whichever citizen one might care to mention, you immediately agree and cry out that he is speaking the truth.<sup>813</sup>

This contrasts to the actual truth, which they do not want to hear:

But if someone should come forward and tell the truth, that “you are deluded, Athenians: it is Philip who is responsible for all these evil circumstances, since if he were keeping quiet, our city would be in no trouble,” you are unable to refute this claim, but you seem to be distressed, as if you think that something of yours is being destroyed.<sup>814</sup>

And what are being destroyed or lost (ἀπολλύνται τι) are the very illusions they use to protect their fallacies, as Sandys has well remarked: “they not only lose an illusion [i.e., that Philip is not at war] which is an excuse for inaction; but are also deprived of a convenient scape-goat [i.e. in the person of the much maligned Diopeithes]”.<sup>815</sup>

Demosthenes’ purpose again is to assert that this is a self-inflicted crisis, a result of the exact attitudes they display here, in their refusal to act on the situation to the extreme of attacking their own general for acting in Athens’ interests. This is the level of twisted delusion the Assembly’s perception of reality has reached. The Assembly is no longer rational, and refuses to learn the consequences of choosing the easy option which Demosthenes has warned of since the *First Philippic*. Moreover, this is completely at odds with the ideals of an Athenian Assembly:

Contrary to your present practice, men of Athens, the public speakers should all have trained you to be mild and considerate in the Assembly, since it is there that you

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<sup>813</sup> Demosthenes 8.30. καὶ τὸ μὲν τούτων τινὰς εἶναι τοιούτους, δεινὸν ὃν οὐ δεινὸν ἐστίν· ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι οὕτως ἤδη διάκεισθε, ὥστ’ ἂν μὲν τις εἶπη παρελθὼν ὅτι Διοπείθης ἐστὶ τῶν κακῶν πάντων αἴτιος, ἢ Χάρης ἢ Ἀριστοφῶν ἢ ὃν ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν εἶπη τις, εὐθέως φατὲ καὶ θορυβεῖθ’ ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγει·

<sup>814</sup> Demosthenes 8.31. ἂν δὲ παρελθὼν λέγῃ τις τάληθῆ, ὅτι ‘ληρεῖτ’, Ἀθηναῖοι· πάντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τούτων Φίλιππος ἐστ’ αἴτιος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἦγεν ἡσυχίαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πρᾶγμα τῇ πόλει, ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀληθῆ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔχειτ’ ἀντιλέγειν, ἄχθεσθαι δὲ μοι δοκεῖτε καὶ ὡσπερ ἀπολλύναι τι νομίζειν.

<sup>815</sup> Sandys 1900: 162, cited by Mader 2006: 378.

discuss your rights and those of your allies, but to show yourselves fearsome and severe in your preparations for war, since there the struggle is against your enemies and rivals.<sup>816</sup>

This is the cause of all their problems and, as in the previous speeches, Demosthenes aims to confront the Assembly to ‘change their attitude, instead of making things easy for Philip and disheartening their allies by their perversity.’<sup>817</sup> Demosthenes makes it clear that they cannot function effectively, when they are at odds with the definition of Athenian identity. Thus, Demosthenes confronts the corruption of the deliberative process, by both the *rhētors* and the *dēmos*:

Instead, acting as demagogues towards you and currying favour with you to an excessive degree they have made it so that in meetings of the Assembly, you are spoiled and easily flattered, listening to everything with an ear to your own pleasure, but your public affairs have come to the point that you are in deadly danger.<sup>818</sup>

That is, aside from the opportunities that they have squandered ‘through indolence’ over the years to avoid this danger. Using the example of their failure at Euboea, Demosthenes rhetorically manipulates a Panhellenic voice to rebuke the Assembly:

Come now, by Zeus, if the Greeks were to ask you to give an account of the opportunities you have squandered due to your indolence, and they were to ask of you “Athenians, do you not send us ambassadors on every occasion, and say that we must guard ourselves against the fellow, and the like?” – and we must agree and admit that this is what we do – “Then, you most useless of people, when that man had been

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<sup>816</sup> Demosthenes 8.33. ἐχρῆν γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦναντίον ἢ νῦν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολιτευομένους ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις πρᾶους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ὑμᾶς ἐθίζειν εἶναι (πρὸς γὰρ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἐν ταύταις ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια), ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς ταῖς τοῦ πολέμου φοβεροὺς καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐπιδεικνύναι· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἐκεῖνός ἐσθ’ ἀγών.

<sup>817</sup> Pearson 1976: 146.

<sup>818</sup> Demosthenes 8.34. νῦν δὲ δημαγωγοῦντες ὑμᾶς καὶ χαριζόμενοι καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν οὕτω διατεθήκασιν, ὥστ’ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τρυφᾶν καὶ κολακεύεσθαι πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκούοντας, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἤδη κινδυνεύειν.

absent for ten months and was prevented by disease and winter and wars from returning home, you failed to liberate Euboea or recover any of your own possessions.<sup>819</sup>

Indeed, they are a far cry from their ancestors in their superlative uselessness, as once more they have failed to recover their possessions despite the lessons of the recent past. In complete antithesis to the actions of their ancestors attested to in the *Second Philippic*, Demosthenes asserts that they have shamefully permitted Philip's actions:

You have evidently given way before him and have made it clear that you will not stir yourselves one whit more, even if he dies ten times over.<sup>820</sup>

Demosthenes' rhetoric rings with indignant humiliation at how they have subjected themselves on the Panhellenic stage and asserts that their actions (or lack of them) speak louder than any excuses they can make, and has tarnished their projected ideals and reputation.

From this damning assessment, Demosthenes moves to assert the role of the dutiful adviser, reminding the audience that the core purpose of the speech is to confront the attitudes of the Assembly:

There are some men who think that they confute a speaker when they ask him, "So, what must we do?" To them I give this most just and truthful answer: you must stop behaving as you do.<sup>821</sup>

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<sup>819</sup> Demosthenes 8.34-6. φέρε γὰρ πρὸς Διός, εἰ λόγον ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτήσειαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὧν νυνὶ παρείκατε καιρῶν διὰ ῥαθυμίαν, καὶ ἔροινθ' ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πέμπεθ' ὡς ἡμᾶς ἐκάστοτε πρέσβεις, καὶ λέγεθ' ὡς ἐπιβουλεύει Φίλιππος ἡμῖν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, καὶ ὡς φυλάττεσθαι δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαυτὰ; ἀνάγκη φάσκειν καὶ ὁμολογεῖν· ποιοῦμεν γὰρ ταῦτα. 'εἴτ', ὃ πάντων ἀνθρώπων φαυλότατοι, δέκα μῆνας ἀπογενομένου τάνθρωπου καὶ νόσῳ καὶ χειμῶνι καὶ πολέμοις ἀποληφθέντος ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἴκαδε, οὔτε τὴν Εὐβοίαν ἠλευθερώσατε, οὔτε τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἐκομίσασθε. This is in reference to when Philip was ill. This failure again repeats the same complaints in the *First Philippic* and the *Olynthiacs* that they neglected their possessions and consistently failed to seize their *kairos*, particularly the recovery of Amphipolis at 4.12.

<sup>820</sup> Demosthenes 8.37. ἀφέστατε δῆλον ὅτι αὐτῷ, καὶ φανερὸν πεποιήκατε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν δεκάκις ἀποθάνη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον κινήσεσθε.

<sup>821</sup> Demosthenes 8.38. εἰσὶ τοίνυν τινὲς οἱ τότε ἐξελέγγειν τὸν παριόντ' οἴονται, ἐπειδὴν ἐρωτήσωσι 'τί οὖν χρή ποιεῖν;' οἷς ἐγὼ μὲν τὸ δικαιοτάτον καὶ ἀληθέστατον τοῦτ' ἀποκρινούμαι, ταῦτα μὴ ποιεῖν ἂ νυνὶ ποιεῖτε.

From this point, the speech takes on a didactic tone, where Demosthenes states that he will methodically approach their issues: ‘But I will also address each point in detail and hope that they may be eager to act as they are to ask questions.’<sup>822</sup> Not even attempting to disguise his derisive sarcasm, Demosthenes criticises those who are quick to hypocritically ask for action – those who are content to substitute actions with speech-act logic, which gives an illusion of competency – yet have no intention to move to act, as they refuse to see the action necessary, or indeed that they have no intention to act as they are Philip’s agent.<sup>823</sup>

To this end, Demosthenes proposes a course of action:

First, men of Athens, you must fully acknowledge that Philip is at war with our city and has broken the peace – and please stop accusing each other about this – and is malignly hostile to the entire city down to its very foundation.<sup>824</sup>

Demosthenes reinforces his argument from the *Second Philippic* that they must stop this delusion. Moreover, this reference to their foundation and their democracy and autochthonous roots builds upon his most recent argument in the *Second Philippic* (but present in the *Olynthiacs*) that Philip as a monarch/tyrant is in opposition to, and cannot co-exist peacefully, with any democratic constitution.<sup>825</sup> Recognising this is key to curbing the indecisiveness within the Assembly, and he calls on them to *know* this as fact, and act accordingly. By adding that both Philip’s animosity, and this advice, are directed at all Athenians, ‘including those who most think that they are doing him a favour,’ Demosthenes

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<sup>822</sup> Demosthenes 8.38. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀκριβῶς ἐρῶ. καὶ ὅπως, ὡς περ ἐρωτῶσι προθύμως, οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖν ἐθελήσουσιν.

<sup>823</sup> Parallels can again be drawn to Thucydides’ Mytilenean debate at 3.38.4 when Cleon argues that ‘you have become regular speech-goers, and as for action, you merely listen to accounts of it.

<sup>824</sup> Demosthenes 8.39. πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο παρ’ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαίως γινῶναι, ὅτι τῇ πόλει Φίλιππος πολεμεῖ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην λέλυκεν (καὶ παύσασθε περὶ τούτου κατηγοροῦντες ἀλλήλων) καὶ κακόνους μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὅλη τῇ πόλει καὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐδάφει.

<sup>825</sup> See Demosthenes 6.23-5.

reaffirms the fundamental issue of internal traitors working for Philip and the damage they cause for the entire *polis*.<sup>826</sup>

To emphasise this, Demosthenes returns to his device of narrating past events as moral lessons, using the fate of the Olynthian traitors who had been working for Philip within:

And if they do not believe me, let them consider the Olynthians Euthyrates and Lasthenes, who seemed to be on terms of intimacy with him, but who, after they betrayed their city, suffered a worse fate than anyone.<sup>827</sup>

Presented with these traitors, Demosthenes reminds the Assembly that Philip uses these internal enemies because it is Athens' very constitution – that the ancestors had fought so hard to uphold and defend – that is a tyrant's greatest opposition: 'but it is against our constitution that he is most at war, and towards its overthrow his plots and policies are directed.'<sup>828</sup> That is, because traitors manipulating the Assembly within Athens undermine the qualities of democracy, the power of the many advised by the best speakers in keeping with the ideals of *isēgoria* and *isōnomia*. Their democracy is both their greatest defence and strength and thus it is logical for Philip to target the Athenians:

And in a sense it is reasonable for him to do so. For he is well aware that even if he gets control of everything else, he will be unable to possess anything securely, so long as you are a democracy.<sup>829</sup>

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<sup>826</sup> Demosthenes 8.40 'And, I should add, to all its inhabitants, including those who most thing that the are doing him a favour.' προσθήσω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα οἰομένοις αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι.

<sup>827</sup> Demosthenes 8.40. (εἰ δὲ μή, σκεψάσθων Εὐθυκράτη καὶ Λασθένη τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους, οἱ δοκοῦντες οἰκειότατ' αὐτῷ διακεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τὴν πόλιν προὔδοσαν, πάντων κάκιστ' ἀπολώλασιν).

<sup>828</sup> Demosthenes 8.40. οὐδενὶ μέντοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πολεμεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιβουλεύει, καὶ σκοπεῖ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἐν τῶν πάντων, ἢ πῶς ταύτην καταλύσει

<sup>829</sup> Demosthenes 8.41. οἶδεν γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν πάντων τῶν ἄλλων γένηται κύριος, οὐδὲν ἔστ' αὐτῷ βεβαίως ἔχειν, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς δημοκρατήσθε.



Moreover, their nature as a democracy leaves them as the last hope and refuge for those Greeks who wish to hold on to ideals of freedom, returning to Demosthenes' assertion in the *Olynthiacs* and *Second Philippic* that it is their duty as Athenians to protect the rest of the Greeks. Indeed, Demosthenes is calling them to do that which they avoided in 348/9, namely their duty:

You are not yourselves well suited to acquire or possess an empire. Rather, you are good at preventing another from taking places, and at recovering them from one who has got hold of them, and at generally obstructing those who wish to rule, and at liberating people.<sup>830</sup>

In evoking their role as protector, Demosthenes not only uses the memory of the Persian Wars to apply nuances of Persian tyranny onto Macedonian expansion (as in the *Second Philippic*), but makes this scenario fundamentally Athenian, and that it is Athens' duty to act in every possible way against those who threaten the Greeks.<sup>831</sup>

As such, Demosthenes asserts that they understand the nature of the conflict:

First, you must understand that he is an inveterate enemy of our constitution. If you are not fully convinced of this, you will not be willing to treat the situation seriously. Second, you must recognise clearly that all his policies and machinations are directed against our city, and that whenever anyone resists him, he does so on our behalf.<sup>832</sup>

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<sup>830</sup> Demosthenes 8.42. ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες, ἀλλ' ἕτερον λαβεῖν κωλύσαι καὶ ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι δεινοί, καὶ ὄλωσ' ἐνοχλῆσαι τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελέσθαι ἔτοιμοι.

<sup>831</sup> All of this is an optimistic view of the Delian League and Second Naval Confederacy, and also conveniently ignores the revolts of the Social War which caused many of their recent economic problems. Demosthenes is selective in his memories, which is an inevitable element of cultural memory, but a conscious decision on Demosthenes' part. This is also a part of the same mental logic that shifted from the fifth century Imperialist Delian League to the 'willing alliances' of Second Athenian Confederacy in justifying their imperial endeavours.

<sup>832</sup> Demosthenes 8.43. πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ, ἐχθρὸν ὑπεληφέναι τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἀδιάλλακτον ἐκείνον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο πεισθήσεσθε ταῖς ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἐθελήσεθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων σπουδάζειν· δεύτερον δ' εἰδέναι σαφῶς ὅτι πάνθ' ὅσα πραγματεύεται καὶ κατασκευάζεται νῦν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν παρασκευάζεται, καὶ ὅπου τις ἐκείνον ἀμύνεται, ἐνταῦθ' ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀμύνεται.

Diopieithes, therefore, is the hero not the villain, and it is imperative that the Assembly understands this. Demosthenes has transformed Diopieithes from a rogue general into the defender of what is left of the Greek world. Diopieithes' force, in contrast to Philip's aggressive intentions, is there to protect and safeguard Athens, and Greece. To recall or disband it is tantamount to abandoning not only their own interests but the freedom of Greece itself. Moreover, his use of Persian War rhetoric, presents the forbidding alternative reality had the Athenians acted like now in previous wars and not maintained Greek liberty.<sup>833</sup> The Athenians thus have a moral obligation to act, and accordingly, it is imperative that Demosthenes shatters the fallacies that permits the Assembly to attack Diopieithes and protect Philip, which leaves them vulnerable to attack. Demosthenes asserts that there is only one way to view Philip's activities in Thrace – that they are driven towards seizing Athenian possessions:

For there is no one so naïve as to suppose that Philip has a positive desire for the evils of Thrace...or that seizing these places is the reason why he endures toil and winters and the utmost dangers, or to suppose that he has no desire for Athens' harbours and docks and triremes and silver works and vast revenues, but will allow you to keep these, and is spending the winter in the pit for the sake of millet and wheat in the rain pits of Thrace. On the contrary, all his activities in Thrace and elsewhere are directed towards getting control of our possessions.<sup>834</sup>

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<sup>833</sup> The consistency of this argument goes back as early as *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* where Demosthenes asserted the Athens ought to undertake action and be 'the champions of freedom for all.' Demosthenes 15.30.

<sup>834</sup> Demosthenes 8.44-5. οὐ γὰρ οὕτω γ' εὐήθης οὐδεὶς ὃς ὑπολαμβάνει τὸν Φίλιππον τῶν μὲν ἐν Θράκῃ κακῶν ... τούτων μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ταῦτα λαβεῖν καὶ πόνους καὶ χειμῶνας καὶ τοὺς ἐσχάτους κινδύνους ὑπομένειν, τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τριήρων καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀργυρείων καὶ τοσοῦτων προσόδων οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἐάσειν ἔχειν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν μελινῶν καὶ τῶν ὀλυρῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς Θρακίαις σιροῖς ἐν τῷ βαράθρῳ χειμάζειν. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κάκειν' ὑπὲρ τοῦ τούτων γενέσθαι κύριος καὶ ἅλλα πάντα πραγματεύεται.

The loss of possessions was already a sore topic for Demosthenes, as attested to in the *First Philippic* and the *Olynthiacs*. Further allusions to the *First Philippic* can be seen in his call to shake off their negligent attitude and raise their taxes:

What then should sensible people do? They should understand and acknowledge the situation, and put aside this excessive and incurable negligence of ours, and should raise taxes and require our allies to do so too, and their policies and actions should be directed towards ensuring that this army that has been raised remains together, in order that, just as Philip has a force prepared to mistreat and enslave all of Greece, so you may have a force ready to save and provide assistance to everybody.<sup>835</sup>

Demosthenes once more calls the Athenians to action; the same actions he has been calling for since the *First Philippic* – to shake off their apathy, act in a manner worthy of the city and reclaim their Athenian reputation. Demosthenes calls for the Assembly to enthusiastically support Diopithes instead of making him a scapegoat as a means to avoid facing the reality of the situation in the Chersonese.<sup>836</sup> Moreover, they have a moral obligation to recognise this and to act effectively. They also need to act efficiently and professionally, since:

For you can never achieve anything that you need to by sending relief forces. Instead, we must equip a force, and provide supplies for it and financial officers and public clerks, and take measures to ensure that the money is very closely guarded. Once we have done this, we should hold these men responsible for the money, and the general responsible for his actions. If you take these measures, and are truly willing to pursue this policy, you will either force Philip to keep the peace as he should and to remain

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<sup>835</sup> Demosthenes 8.46. τί οὖν εὖ φρονούντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν; εἰδὼτας ταῦτα κατέγνωκότας τὴν μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ἀνήκεστον ταύτην ῥαθυμίαν ἀποθέσθαι, χρήματα δ' εἰσφέρειν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἀξιοῦν, καὶ ὅπως τὸ συνεστηκὸς τοῦτο συμμενεῖ στρατεύμ' ὄραν καὶ πράττειν, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἔτοιμον ἔχει δύναμιν τὴν ἀδικήσουσαν καὶ καταδουλωσομένην ἅπαντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, οὕτω τὴν σώσουσαν ὑμεῖς καὶ βοηθήσουσαν ἅπασιν ἔτοιμον ἔχητε.

<sup>836</sup> Again, action against Diopithes is a form of speech-act logic, which substitutes external military action with an in-house prosecution.

in his own territory – which would be the most beneficial outcome – or you will be waging war against him on an equal footing.<sup>837</sup>

This is the same observation Demosthenes made in the *First Philippic*, that their military endeavours would have more success if they were regulated with the same competence and care as their flawlessly planned Dionysia or Panathenaea. As in 351, Demosthenes calls the Assembly to shake off their apathy and take the hard but right course of action:

If anyone thinks that these plans involve great expense and much toil and trouble, he is absolutely right; but if he reckons what will happen to the city if it refuses to take these measures, he will find that it is in our interest for us to do our duty with enthusiasm.<sup>838</sup>

Moreover, if the prospect of hardships to come was not motivation enough, the shame alone should inspire the Athenians to action. Demosthenes warns that Assembly that their shame will be all the worse if they do nothing to prevent their own destruction, but rather happily embrace the prospect of subjugation by their ignorant apathy, and misdirected blame:

It would be shameful, by Zeus and all the gods, and unworthy of you and of what the city has and of your ancestors' achievements, to sacrifice all the other Greeks into slavery for the sake of your own indolence, and I at any rate would rather die than advocate this course.<sup>839</sup>

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<sup>837</sup> Demosthenes 8.47. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι βοηθείαις χρωμένους οὐδέποτε' οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων πράξει, ἀλλὰ κατασκευάσαντας δεῖ δύναμιν, καὶ τροφήν ταύτη πορίσαντας καὶ ταμίας καὶ δημοσίους, καὶ ὅπως ἔνι τῶν χρημάτων φυλακὴν ἀκριβεστάτην γενέσθαι, οὕτω ποιήσαντας, τὸν μὲν τῶν χρημάτων λόγον παρὰ τούτων λαμβάνειν, τὸν δὲ τῶν ἔργων παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. κἂν οὕτω ποιήσητε καὶ ταῦτ' ἐθελήσηθ' ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἄγειν εἰρήνην δικαίαν καὶ μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον ἀναγκάσετε, οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτ' ἀγαθόν, ἢ πολεμήσειτ' ἐξ ἴσου.

<sup>838</sup> Demosthenes 8.48. Εἰ δέ τω δοκεῖ ταῦτα καὶ δαπάνης μεγάλης καὶ πόνων πολλῶν καὶ πραγματείας εἶναι, καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐὰν λογίσηται τὰ τῆ πόλει μετὰ ταῦτα γενησόμενα, ἂν ταῦτα μὴ θέλη, εὐρήσει λυσιτελοῦν τὸ ἐκόντας ποιεῖν τὰ δέοντα.

<sup>839</sup> Demosthenes 8.49. αἰσχρὸν μὲν νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ πάντας θεοὺς καὶ ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῆ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνους, τῆς ἰδίας ἔνεκα ῥαθυμίας τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας Ἑλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι, καὶ ἔγωγ' αὐτοὺς μὲν τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἂν ἢ ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι βουλοίμην. Demosthenes may have been referring back to this point when he remarks in his funeral oration over Chaeronea that they died 'preferring to die nobly than live and see Greece suffer misfortune.' 60.1. Demosthenes also appears similar to Pericles at Thucydides 1.144 on the

This is damning and the most forceful of his denunciations yet. Demosthenes also affirms his own position here not only as a patriot, but as someone who would rather die than shame himself in betraying his *polis*. Indeed, Demosthenes implies that to prosecute Diopeithes and appease Philip would be to sacrifice the ideals of freedom fundamental to Athenian ideology, and would amount to renouncing their very identity as Athenians.<sup>840</sup>

Moreover, what Demosthenes has been warning of since the *First Philippic* has not only come to pass, confirming his worst expectations, but it has deteriorated beyond the conceivable. The Athenians by their lack of action have become the antithesis of themselves. It is with scathing contempt that Demosthenes rounds off this formidable statement:

Nevertheless, if someone else speaks and persuades you otherwise, so be it: do not resist, throw everything away.<sup>841</sup>

This, despite its irony, nevertheless reminds the audience that Demosthenes respects the values of the Assembly and *isēgoria*. He will not corrupt the sanctity of these conventions, but he will not silently witness the corruption he has warned of since the *First Philippic*, that enables men to persuade the Assembly to embrace its own doom under the fallacy of peaceful security. It also reminds the Athenians that they have the power to decide their own fate, and stresses the importance of making them understand both the reality of the situation, and their own counter-productive practices. As Roisman remarks on the general criticism of the *thorubos* and the battle between speaker and audience:

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glory won by the ancestors, ‘we must live up to the standard they set: we must resist our enemies in any and every way.’

<sup>840</sup> As attested to in the *Second Philippic* pp.203-4, and the connection to Herodotus 8.143-144.

<sup>841</sup> Demosthenes 8.49. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἴ τις ἄλλος λέγει καὶ ὑμᾶς πείθει, ἔστω, μὴ ἀμύνεσθε, ἅπαντα πρόεσθε.

Behind these unflattering depictions of the people stood an acknowledgement of the power of the crowd to intimidate a speaker or to move him to seek popular approval at the expense of advocating sound, but unpopular, policy.<sup>842</sup>

It is precisely this intimidation that Demosthenes has refused to bend to, and consistently argued against. Demosthenes' criticism is all to the end of making the Athenians acknowledge these hard truths and the need to act:

But if no one takes that view, but on the contrary we all already know that the more places we allow him to control, the more dangerous and the stronger an enemy we will have, where can we retreat to? Why do we delay? When, men of Athens, will we be willing to do our duty?<sup>843</sup>

Both Worthington and MacDowell argue that Demosthenes transforms his political argument into the moral obligation of Athens' Panhellenic duty.<sup>844</sup> This thesis, however, has argued that Demosthenes has been asserting this moral obligation in the majority of the speeches. In particular, I believe this clearly evokes the *Olynthiacs* where Demosthenes asserted that honourable men would not permit Philip to 'enslave Greek cities for want of subsistence money', and likewise repeatedly asked what the Athenians would endure before they would do their duty.<sup>845</sup>

In this manner, Demosthenes creates a claustrophobic atmosphere where the Athenians have nowhere to retreat to, and no prospect of hope if they do not proactively defend themselves. The Athenians have gone from a position where they could punish Philip in Macedonia, to keeping him from Chalcidice, from Central Greece, from Attica, to

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<sup>842</sup> Roisman 2004: 265. Roisman's 'unflattering depictions' refer to Plato *Republic* 6.492c; Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.7.1, 5.

<sup>843</sup> Demosthenes 8.50. εἰ δὲ μηδενὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖ, τὸναντίον δὲ πρόϊσμεν ἅπαντες, ὅτι ὅσῳ ἂν πλειόνων ἐάσωμεν ἐκεῖνον γενέσθαι κύριον, τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπωτέρῳ καὶ ἰσχυροτέρῳ χρησόμεθ' ἐχθρῷ, ποῖ ἀναδυόμεθα; ἢ τί μέλλομεν; ἢ πότ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἐθελήσομεν;

<sup>844</sup> Worthington 2013: 217; MacDowell 2009: 348.

<sup>845</sup> Demosthenes 3.20.

defending Attica, to retreating from Attica itself. This is all the more shameful as they have thus far been compelled into these realities:

But if we are speaking of the compulsion placed on a free man, that has already arrived, and indeed has long passed us by; and we can only pray never to suffer that of a slave. How do they differ? For a free man, the greatest compulsion is a sense of shame at what is happening – I do not think that anyone could imagine any greater compulsion than that – but for a slave it consists of blows and outrages to the body. May that never happen to us! Indeed, one should not even talk about it.<sup>846</sup>

Again, Demosthenes states that the power to decide this lies with the Assembly. His own purpose has been to show them who they are and what they ought to be, where the speech serves as a mirror reflecting the polarisations on which the Athenians define themselves, and how at odds they currently are. They are acting like willing slaves, and by giving voice to the unbearable notion of a subjugated Athens, Demosthenes aims to provoke them to action as ‘the desire to avoid humiliation was an important motivating factor in the “shame culture” of ancient Greece...the prospect of the Athenians suffering enslavement is so terrible that it should not even be spoken.’<sup>847</sup>

Thus, in uttering this unspeakable horror, Demosthenes affirms that they should not distract themselves from the real problems at hand by prosecuting Diopeithes. Indeed, they should reinforce him as quickly as possible. But this is hindered by the Assembly’s hostility towards Demosthenes’ *parrhēsia*, which is exploited by ‘Philippizers’ who capitalise on the Assembly’s appetite for flattery and reassuring rhetoric.<sup>848</sup> Enforcing his view with paralipsis,

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<sup>846</sup> Demosthenes 8.51. ἀλλ’ ἦν μὲν ἂν τις ἐλευθέρων ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκην εἶποι, οὐ μόνον ἤδη πάρεστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι παρελήλυθε, τὴν δὲ τῶν δούλων ἀπεύχεσθαι δήπου μὴ γενέσθαι δεῖ. διαφέρει δὲ τίς, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ μεγίστη ἀνάγκη ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν γιγνομένων αἰσχύνη, καὶ μείζω ταύτης οὐκ οἶδ’ ἦντιν’ ἂν εἴποιμεν· δούλῳ δὲ πλιγαὶ καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος αἰκισμός, ἃ μῆτε γένοιτο οὔτε λέγειν ἄξιον.

<sup>847</sup> Trevett 2011: 144.

<sup>848</sup> Worthington 2013: 217.

Demosthenes emphasises one simple truth, that these men consistently stop the Athenians taking action that would affect Philip's expansionist plans:

I would gladly tell you about all the rest and show how certain men are ruining you by their policies, but I shall pass over other matters and say only this: that whenever any matter relating to Philip arises, someone immediately stands up and says how fine it is to keep the peace, and how difficult it is to maintain a large military force, and that certain people wish to plunder public funds, and other remarks of this kind, and as a result, they put you off and give him the time to act as he wishes.<sup>849</sup>

Thus, the arguments to punish Diopeithes are to Philip's advantage, and aim to keep the Assembly inactive. By listening to these *rhētors*, Demosthenes asserts that,

in consequence, you are idle and do nothing at the right time – and I fear that you may later come to realise how much this has cost you – whilst they secure favours from Philip and payment for their services.<sup>850</sup>

If they continue to permit this manipulation, then they maintain a façade of peace that has not only exacerbated this self-inflicted crisis, but condemns the Athenians and the Greeks as a whole to Macedonian hegemony. For Demosthenes, because of this manipulation, and their preference for an easy life, the Assembly is incapable of realising the cost of their attitude, asserting that, 'the real difficulty, you should realise, is not what we may have to spend to ensure our safety, but what we will suffer if we do not take these actions.'<sup>851</sup>

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<sup>849</sup> Demosthenes 8.52. πάντα τοίνυν τᾶλλ' εἰπὼν ἂν ἠδέωσ, καὶ δεῖξας ὄν τρόπον ὑμᾶς ἔνιοι καταπολιτεύονται, τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' ἐάσω· ἀλλ' ἐπειδάν τι τῶν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐμπέσῃ, εὐθύς ἀναστάς τις λέγει τὸ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τρέφειν δύναμιν μεγάλην ὡς χαλεπὸν, καὶ 'διαρπάζειν τινὲς τὰ χρήματα βούλονται,' καὶ τοιούτους λόγους, ἐξ ὧν ἀναβάλλουσι μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἡσυχίαν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ἐκείνῳ πράττειν ὅ τι βούλεται.

<sup>850</sup> Demosthenes 8.53. ἐκ δὲ τούτων περιγίγνεται, ὑμῖν μὲν ἡ σχολὴ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἤδη ποιεῖν, ἃ δέδοιχ' ὅπως μήποθ' ἠγγήσεσθ' ἐπὶ πολλῶν γεγενῆσθαι, τούτοις δ' αἱ χάριτες καὶ ὁ μισθὸς ὁ τούτων. This again evokes the arguments from Demosthenes 2.26 on idlers.

<sup>851</sup> Demosthenes 8.54. νομίζειν δ' εἶναι χαλεπὰ οὐχ ὅσ' ἂν εἰς σωτηρίαν δαπανῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἃ πεισόμεθα, ἂν ταῦτα μὴ' θέλωμεν ποιεῖν·



To this end, Demosthenes continues that they ought to protect their funds by guarding it, rather than shirking what needs to be done, stating, in short, that ‘refusing to do your duty’ is a poor excuse to save money.<sup>852</sup> Demosthenes directly attacks their habit of shirking their duty when it involves uncomfortable effort, which is why attacking Diopeithes is an attractive prospect because he is the easy target, and an outlet for their action. Demosthenes also evokes his previous arguments on the prioritisation of the Theoric fund for enjoyable institutions such as the Dionysia, over their external expeditions, and the laughingstock they are making of themselves as they advance Philip’s expansion at their own cost:

Because you have despised these advantages and allowed them to be carried off, Philip is wealthy and powerful and an object of fear to all, Greeks and foreigners, whereas you are abandoned and brought low, glorying in abundant goods for sale in the marketplace, but a laughing stock when it comes to making appropriate preparations.<sup>853</sup>

Consequently, Demosthenes asserts that the real difficulty facing Athens is their own attitude, and their refusal to reflect on their own culpability. In their refusal to spend money, so as to prioritise their comforts, they have compromised their own safety and gradually permitted the loss of their own possessions and the freedom of the Greeks. Demosthenes’ *parrhēsia* takes on a ringing rebuke at the Assembly’s ridiculous priorities:

I am also angry, men of Athens, that some of you are distressed at the prospect of public money being seized, when you have the power to guard it and to punish those

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<sup>852</sup> Demosthenes 8.54. ‘and you should prevent the money being stolen by announcing the establishment of a guard to ensure its safety, not by refusing to do your duty.’ και τὸ ‘διαρπασθήσεται τὰ χρήματα’ τῷ φυλακῆν εἰπεῖν δι’ ἧς σωθήσεται κωλύειν, οὐχὶ τῷ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀφεστάναι.

<sup>853</sup> Demosthenes 8.67. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τούτων ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ ἔαν ταῦτα φέρεσθαι ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, ὑμεῖς δ’ ἔρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί, τῇ τῶν ὀνίων ἀφθονία λαμπροί, τῇ δ’ ὧν προσήκε παρασκευῇ καταγέλαστοι. Compare to 4.25 and 4.35-37 where Demosthenes states they are a laughing stock, and like clay men sold in the Agora p. 55; 59.

who break the law, but are not distressed that Philip is seizing all of Greece city by city as he is doing, and moreover, his actions are directed against you.<sup>854</sup>

This provides further confirmation of my argument that Demosthenes' criticisms are not directed against Philip, but are against the Assembly and their refusal to see their own detrimental behaviour. Indeed, Philip's actions are as expected of a tyrant, whereas the Assembly is at complete odds with their reputation.<sup>855</sup> Demosthenes' stance has not altered since the *First Philippic* in the necessity to make the Assembly reflect on both their current behaviour, and what their identity demands they should do. By urging them to do their inherited duty, Demosthenes is simply asking them to *be* Athenian, to see the situation for what it really is and defend their own interests, noting, like Pericles, that self-interest cannot be separated from the *polis*, but true prosperity comes via the prosperity of the *polis* itself.<sup>856</sup>

Building on his assertion of anger, Demosthenes directly confronts the bribery within the Assembly; in a leading list of rhetorical questions, he wonders what could possibly cause the Athenians to be not be alarmed at Philip's actions in Thrace, but instead accuse men such as himself and Diopeithes who defend Athens' interests:

What possible reason is there, men of Athens, why none of these men will admit that Philip is at war, when he is so openly campaigning and acting illegally, but they

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<sup>854</sup> Demosthenes 8.55. καίτοι ἔγωγ' ἀγανακτῶ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τὰ μὲν χρήματα λυπεῖ τινὰς ὑμῶν εἰ διαρπασθήσεται, ἃ καὶ φυλάττειν καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐφ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶ, τὴν δ' Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν οὕτωςι Φίλιππος ἐφεξῆς ἀρπάζων οὐ λυπεῖ, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἀρπάζων. Demosthenes could possibly also be evoking Solon again, and his criticism of the aristocratic leaders, 'It is the citizens themselves who by their foolishness and subservience to money are willing to destroy a great city, and the mind of the people's leaders is unjust; they are certain to suffer much pain as a result of their great arrogance. For they do not know how to restrain excess or to conduct in an orderly and peaceful manner the festivities of the banquet that are at hand ... they grow wealthy, yielding to unjust deeds' (Solon, fr. 4 W, trans. Gerber 1999), as cited by Balot 2013: 183.

<sup>855</sup> Again, to reiterate, I am presenting Demosthenes' argument, not factual reality of whether Philip was a tyrant or if his actions were aggressive or predictable.

<sup>856</sup> On Thucydides 2.60, whilst Ober 1998:89 states Pericles 'staunchly reasserts the priority of unified public interests of the state over the diverse private interests of each individual Athenian' Christ 2006: 30n47 asserts that 'he does so by appealing to individual self-interest.'

accuse those of us who are advising you to stand firm and not abandon these places of planning to go to war?<sup>857</sup>

When Demosthenes hypophorically answers his own question (“Let me explain” ἐγὼ διδάξω), he clarifies this as a deliberate displacement of anger:

They wish to turn the anger that you reasonably feel if you suffer any reverse in the war against those who are giving you the best advice, in order that you may put them on trial rather than resisting Philip, and that they themselves may act as the accusers of these men, rather than pay the penalty for their own actions.<sup>858</sup>

Demosthenes is clearly engaging with the rhetoric of conspiracy by insinuating that the conspirators within Athens are deflecting blame as a means to present themselves as the upholders of order and peace, whilst being the instigators of Athens’ ruin. Moreover, in revealing this deception, systematic bribery, and the Assembly’s own vices, Demosthenes’ argument fits Roisman’s definition of the rhetoric of conspiracy as:

by offering an alternative to chaos and an explanation for a perceived injustice, conspiracy scenarios help both individuals and groups to reaffirm their value systems, identify the danger or the culprit, and thus offer hope of stopping the wrong or punishing the wrongdoers.<sup>859</sup>

I contend that this is particularly apt for Demosthenes’ purpose to change the attitude of the Assembly. Demosthenes also presents the *mundus perversus* of the Assembly from the *First Philippic*, where logic has become back-to-front, since defending yourself and your interests

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<sup>857</sup> Demosthenes 8.56. Τί ποτ’ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ τὸν μὲν οὕτω φανερώς στρατεύοντα, ἀδικοῦντα, πόλεις καταλαμβάνοντα, μηδένα τούτων πάποτ’ εἰπεῖν ὡς πόλεμον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν μηδὲ προΐεσθαι ταῦτα συμβουλευόντας, τούτους τὸν πόλεμον ποιήσειν αἰτιᾶσθαι;

<sup>858</sup> Demosthenes 8.57. ὅτι τὴν ὀργὴν ἣν εἰκός ἐστι γενέσθαι παρ’ ὑμῶν, ἂν τι λυπῆσθε τῷ πολέμῳ, εἰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγοντας τὰ βέλτιστα τρέψαι βούλονται, ἵνα τούτους κρίνητε, μὴ Φίλιππον ἀμύνησθε, καὶ κατηγορῶσιν αὐτοῖ, μὴ δίκην δῶσιν ὧν ποιοῦσι νῦν.

<sup>859</sup> Roisman 2006: 7.

is represented as provocative and warmongering, particularly when Demosthenes asserts categorically that:

I know for certain that, without any Athenian having yet made a proposal of war, Philip holds many of our possessions and has now sent help to Cardia. If we are willing to pretend that he is not waging war on us, he would be an utter fool to refute us.<sup>860</sup>

The men working for Philip are hiding in plain sight, while men such as Demosthenes are maligned, which emphasises again how the Assembly has created a hostile environment for the good citizen who attempts to give unwelcome, but true, advice. Demosthenes is arguably referring to his own consistently ignored, yet sincere and trustworthy, advice and in asserting the beneficial quality of his own advice he differentiates himself from those *rhētors* that engage in harmful rhetoric.

Demosthenes also uses the past to vindicate his points, presenting a sense of inevitability as he did in the *Second Philippic*:

But when he marches against us, what shall we say then? He will deny that he is at war, as he did to the people of Oreus when his soldiers were in their territory, as he did before that to the Pheraeas even as he attacked their walls, and as he did at the outset to the Olynthians, until he was in their territory with an army! At that point shall we say that those who are telling you to defend yourselves are warmongers? The only remaining option is slavery – nothing else is possible if we do not defend ourselves and are not allowed to live at peace.<sup>861</sup>

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<sup>860</sup> Demosthenes 8.58. ἐγὼ δ' οἶδ' ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὐ γράψαντος Ἀθηναίων οὐδενός πο πόλεμον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ Φίλιππος ἔχει τῶν τῆς πόλεως καὶ νῦν εἰς Καρδίαν πέπομφε βοήθειαν. εἰ μέντοι βουλόμεθ' ἡμεῖς μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι πολεμεῖν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν, ἀνοητότατος πάντων ἂν εἴη τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ τοῦτ' ἐξελέγχοι.

<sup>861</sup> Demosthenes 8.69. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς ἴη, τί φήσομεν; ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολεμεῖν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' Ὠρεΐταις, τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, οὐδὲ Φεραίοις πρότερον, πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη προσβάλλων αὐτῶν, οὐδ' Ὀλυνθίοις ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἕως ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ τὸ στράτευμα παρῆν ἔχων. ἢ καὶ τότε τοὺς ἀμύνεσθαι κελεύοντας πόλεμον ποιεῖν φήσομεν; οὐκοῦν ὑπόλοιπον δουλεῦειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ μήτ' ἀμύνεσθαι μήτ' ἄγειν ἡσυχίαν ἔασθαι.

Demosthenes presents this as a polarised scenario, success or failure, freedom or slavery, truth or deception, Demosthenes or the enemies within. Indeed, it is not Philip that brings Athens' destruction, but the Assembly itself if it continues in the same attitude. The fate of Athens ultimately lies with the Assembly, as it did in the *First Philippic*, if they choose to shake off their apathy and act. To remind them of what is expected of them, Demosthenes again returns to their wider reputation:

Indeed, you do not face the same danger as others do, since Philip's aim is not to subject your city but to destroy it utterly. He is well aware that you will not willingly be slaves, nor, if you are willing, would you know how to do so, since you are accustomed to rule, but you will be able to cause more trouble for him, if you take the opportunity to do so, than any other people can.<sup>862</sup>

As in the *Second Philippic*, where Demosthenes used Philip's voice to describe the Athenians, here too he utilises Philip's external perspective to remind the Assembly of the standards to which they are held. Just as Thucydides' Archidamus viewed the Athenians as having 'too much pride to become the slaves of their own land, or to shrink back from warfare as though they were inexperienced in it', as far as Athens' current adversaries are concerned, Athenians are not willing to be slaves.<sup>863</sup>

The implication here, however, is that Demosthenes views the Assembly as willingly subjugating themselves to Philip's wishes. Moreover, it suggests that their behaviour is consequently in direct conflict with their past reputation and heritage – an image of Athens that is (apparently) respected by even their enemies. Therefore, to act contrary to Demosthenes' advice arguably compromises this heritage, and their identity as Athenians. I

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<sup>862</sup> Demosthenes 8.60. καὶ μὴν οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἴσων ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔσθ' ὁ κίνδυνος· οὐ γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν ποιήσασθαι βούλεται Φίλιππος, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀνελεῖν. οἶδεν γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δουλεύειν μὲν ὑμεῖς οὐτ' ἐθελήσετε, οὐτ' ἂν ἐθελήσητε, ἐπιστήσεσθε (ἄρχειν γὰρ εἰώθατε), πράγματα δ' αὐτῷ παρασχεῖν, ἂν καιρὸν λάβητε, πλείω τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων δυνήσεσθε.

<sup>863</sup> Thucydides 1.81.

argue this correlates with Yunis' arguments that the burden of the Athenian past is instrumental in defending Demosthenes' policy in *On the Crown*, and that Demosthenes drives his rhetoric here by presenting resistance as the only honourable and *Athenian* course of action. This, however, is not solely about acting *against* Philip; fundamentally I argue that the burden of Athens' past reputation confronts the Assembly with their own decision-making practices and the need to address the crisis within Athens itself. Consequently, the decision as to whether to heed Demosthenes or not has transformed into a fight for the very existence of Athens' reputation as a democracy that champions the freedom of Hellas, both realistically and ideologically.

In this intensely charged critical rhetoric, Demosthenes builds to the climax of the speech, which is reserved, not for Philip, but the enemies within Athens:

And so you should recognise that the struggle will be for our very existence, and should hate and crucify to death those who have sold themselves to him. For it is impossible, impossible I say to defeat your enemies outside the city until you have punished your enemies in the city itself.<sup>864</sup>

Noting the specific call for execution by *apotumpanismos*, which Todd states was reserved for slaves, traitors and foreigners, Demosthenes asserts that these traitors have revoked their

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<sup>864</sup> Demosthenes 8.61. ὡς οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐσχάτων ὄντος τοῦ ἀγῶνος, οὕτω προσήκει γινώσκειν, καὶ τοὺς πεπρακότας αὐτοὺς ἐκείνῳ μισεῖν ἀποτυμπανίσαι· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐχθρῶν κρατῆσαι, πρὶν ἂν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει κολάσῃτ' ἐχθροῦς.

Trevett translates ἀποτυμπανίσαι as cudgel but notes that Demosthenes 'refers to a gruesome form of capital punishment...used against traitors and slaves.' Todd 2000:42 notes that Demosthenes uses *apotumpanismos* in hypothetical instances in the late 340s, here, in *On the False Embassy* 19.137 'if only Philip had heard that those men had immediately been executed by *apotumpanismos*, and in the *Third Philippic* 9.61 wishing if only *apotumpanismos* had been the punishment for those who imprisoned the patriot Euphraeus. *Apotumpanismos* is a more severe form of execution compared to hemlock. As noted in Chapter 2.2, Demosthenes' assertion that Philip was powerful by deception likewise condemned those that advocated his false promises to the *dēmos*, and for Demosthenes, are guilty of deceiving the *polis*. Cf. Demosthenes 20.135. This also supports the point made by Ober 1989: 166 that an orator who uses 'the power of speech to deceive a mass audience into voting against its collective interests was obviously setting himself up as superior to the masses, a situation the *dēmos* must regard as anathema.'

protection of their citizenship by their betrayal of the *polis*.<sup>865</sup> Moreover, Demosthenes' assertion that they must tackle these internal enemies, and the internal crisis undermining Athens, qualifies my core argument that Demosthenes' speeches have consistently been addressing their internal crisis, of which Philip is a secondary product. The situation, since the *First Philippic*, has first and foremost been one of inner corruption and apathy that provided Philip with the vacuum to exploit and flourish in unchecked. Now, as then, if the Assembly refuses to change its attitudes, then they cannot hope to change their external circumstances.

As such, Demosthenes offers the Assembly hope by reminding them that their reputation still precedes them, and that it is against their nature to be subject to anyone other than the sovereignty of the *dēmos*.<sup>866</sup> The dutiful citizen would follow Demosthenes' example and choose death over betraying their Athenian identity.<sup>867</sup> For it is this very identity that poses the greatest threat to Philip, and why he treats them with contempt and *hybris*:

Why do you suppose that he is treating you with contempt – for this is exactly what I think he is doing? And why does he deceive others by doing them favours but threatens you outright?<sup>868</sup>

*Hybris*, as Trevett notes, was a serious offence under Athenian law, and is the behaviour typical of the powerfully rich towards the poor or the weak.<sup>869</sup> By asserting these roles,

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<sup>865</sup> Todd 2000: 42. Todd observes that citizens did suffer *apotumpanismos*, but this was reserved for treason, and where 'the person being executed is now marked as an outsider.' Todd 2000:43 does make the point that the uses of *apotumpanismos* or hemlock, or *apagoge* are not always clear cut and categorical, as Theramenes and Phocion were both instances where hemlock was used for traitors. There does appear the pattern, however, that *apotumpanismos* for a citizen equated to treason. Hesk 2000: 53 notes the retrospective punishment of politicians for deceiving the *polis* has precedent in Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.7.35 and [Aristotle] *Ath. Pol* 43.5, suggesting 'it was possible to make "preliminary complaints" (προβολαί) to the *ecclesia*' for deceiving the *dēmos*. For more on *apotumpanismos* see Forsdyke 2012b: 164 with n132.

<sup>866</sup> On sovereignty of the *dēmos* see Ober 1989a: 299-304.

<sup>867</sup> See too Herodotus 8.143.1-2 discussed in Chapter 4.1 pp. 203-5.

<sup>868</sup> Demosthenes 8.62. πόθεν οἴεσθε νῦν αὐτὸν ὑβρίζειν ὑμᾶς (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλ' ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ τοῦτο) καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, εἰ μὴδὲν ἄλλο, ἐξαπατᾶν, ὑμῖν δ' ἀπειλεῖν ἤδη;

<sup>869</sup> Trevett 2011: 147.

Demosthenes again evokes character tropes which presents Philip in the typical barbarian tyrant role, but Athens – currently the weaker party by its internal corruption – is now antithetically opposed to its own ideology. This image confronts the Assembly with the shocking reality of Athens if they continue to ignore Demosthenes' advice. Demosthenes upholds the unflattering reality of the Assembly to once more provoke them to reflect and change. He again reminds them of what they have lost, including 'how much you were tricked out of during the making of peace? Phocis, Thermopylae, the coast of Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium', all of which Philip gets away with:

Because only in your city are men allowed to speak on behalf of the enemy with impunity, and it is safe for a man who has received bribes to address you even though you have been deprived of what is yours.<sup>870</sup>

Demosthenes goads them further by contrasting the treatment of Athens and the other Greeks, noting that the other cities would not have tolerated speeches in Philip's favour had they not been bribed:

It would not have been safe to plead Philip's case in Olynthus, if the majority of Olynthians had not profited from the enjoyment of Potidaea. It would not have been safe to do so in Thessaly, if the majority of the Thessalians had not benefited from Philip expelling their tyrants and handing the Pylaea over to them. Nor was it safe to do so in Thebes, until he handed over Boeotia and destroyed Phocis. But at Athens, after Philip not only deprived you of Amphipolis and the territory of the Cardians but

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<sup>870</sup> Demosthenes 8.64. ὅτι ἐν μόνῃ τῶν πασῶν πόλεων τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἄδει' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λέγειν δέδοται, καὶ λαβόντα χρήματ' αὐτὸν ἀσφαλὲς ἐστὶ λέγειν παρ' ὑμῖν, κἂν ἀφηρημένοι τὰ ὑμέτερον αὐτῶν ἦτε. Cawkwell 1963: 201 notes that 'the plain truth is that the capture of Serrium, Doriscus and the other forts was in no sense a breach of the Peace of Philocrates. Demosthenes is just not truthful. It is noteworthy that these allegations are not made in the *Second Philippic* of 344.'



is also establishing Euboea as a fortress against you and is now advancing against Byzantium, it is safe to speak on his behalf.<sup>871</sup>

This internal corruption is the reason as to why Athens' fortunes have deteriorated, and it is this inversion of the Assembly that Demosthenes' speeches have all attempted to address. These men, just as described previously in the *Third Olynthiac*, have profited at Athens' expense:

Indeed, some of those who do so were once poor but are now rapidly becoming rich, and were once without name or reputation, whereas you suffer the reverse process: you used to have a good reputation but now are disreputable; you were rich but now are in need. For I think that the wealth of a city consists of its allies, and the trust and goodwill that it inspires – all of which you now lack.<sup>872</sup>

Thus, not only have Athenian fortunes dwindled in correlation to Philip's ascendancy, but more concerningly, Athens is essentially morally bankrupt. Philip is no longer just the opportunist of the *First Philippic* who could be nullified simply by Athenian action; Demosthenes now presents it as a tragic turn that in their refusal to listen to his advice the situation has deteriorated to the point that Philip even has supporters within Athens defending his interests. Demosthenes provokes the Assembly by presenting the irony of their current deliberations over recalling Diopieithes, stating in no uncertain terms that if they act again in Philip's interests they not only compound their shame, but in one movement they both condemn their *polis* and renounce their autonomy as free Athenians.

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<sup>871</sup> Demosthenes 8.5-66. οὐκ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς λέγειν ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ τὰ Φιλίππου μὴ σὺν εὖ πεπονθότων τῶν πολλῶν Ὀλυνθίων τῷ Ποτειδαίαν καρποῦσθαι· οὐκ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς λέγειν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τὰ Φιλίππου μὴ σὺν εὖ πεπονθότος τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ Θετταλῶν τῷ τοὺς τυράννους ἐκβαλεῖν Φιλίππον αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν Πυλαίαν ἀποδοῦναι· οὐκ ἦν ἐν Θήβαις ἀσφαλὲς, πρὶν τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἀπέδωκε καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ἀνεῖλεν. ἀλλ' Ἀθήνησιν, οὐ μόνον Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τὴν Καρδιανῶν χώραν ἀπεστερηκότος Φιλίππου, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάζοντος ὑμῖν ἐπιτείχισμα τὴν Εὐβοίαν καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον παριόντος, ἀσφαλὲς ἐστὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου.

<sup>872</sup> Demosthenes 8.66. καὶ γὰρ τοι τούτων μὲν ἐκ πτωχῶν ἐνιοὶ ταχὺ πλούσιοι γίνονται, καὶ ἐξ ἀνωνύμων καὶ ἀδόξων ἐνδοξοὶ καὶ γνώριμοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τούναντίον ἐκ μὲν ἐνδόξων ἄδοξοι, ἐκ δ' εὐπόρων ἄποροι· πόλεως γὰρ ἔγωγε πλοῦτον ἡγοῦμαι συμμάχους, πίστιν, εὖνοιαν, ὧν πάντων ἐσθ' ὑμεῖς ἄποροι. See pp. 145-150 on Demosthenes 3.21-31 for comparison of fourth and fifth century Athens.

To this end (and to affirm his own persona), Demosthenes defines the good citizen as one who acts according to Athenian values. Returning to his remarks in the proemium and the detrimental effects of currying favour, Demosthenes asserts that:

I am not arrogant or disgusting or shameless, and hope I may never become so, and I consider myself braver than the numerous men who participate so irresponsibly in public life. For, men of Athens, anyone who makes accusations, without regard to the city's interests, does not do these things out of bravery, but can be rash with impunity, since his safety is guaranteed by the fact that in speaking and taking part in public life he carries your favour.<sup>873</sup>

This double criticism directed at the *rhētors* and the Assembly, is contrasted with his own courageous position:

But anyone who opposes your wishes for the sake of what is best, and who always speaks not to gain favour but to give the best advice. and who chooses a policy that owes more to change than to calculation, yet accepts responsibility for both of these – it is this man who is brave, and a useful citizen, not those who have destroyed our city's greatest assets for the sake of short-lived popularity.<sup>874</sup>

Rather, the good citizen, as he has been demonstrating, embodies the values of the *polis*, and is almost a microcosm of the *polis* itself:

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<sup>873</sup> Demosthenes 8.68-9. ἐγὼ δὲ θρασὺς μὲν καὶ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀναιδὴς οὐτ' εἰμὶ μήτε γενοίμην, ἀνδρειότερον μὲντοι πολλῶν πάνυ τῶν ἰταμῶς πολιτευομένων ἀρ' ὑμῖν ἑμαυτὸν ἡγοῦμαι. ὅστις μὲν γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παριδὼν ἅ συνοίσει τῇ πόλει, κρίνει, δημεύει, δίδωσι, κατηγορεῖ, οὐδεμιᾶ ταυτ' ἀνδρεία ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐνέχυρον τῆς αὐτοῦ σωτηρίας τὸ πρὸς χάριν ὑμῖν λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀσφαλῶς θρασὺς ἐστίν·

<sup>874</sup> Demosthenes 8.69-70. ὅστις δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου πολλὰ τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐναντιοῦται βουλήμασι, καὶ μηδὲν λέγει πρὸς χάριν ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν προαιρεῖται ἐν ἧ πλειόνων ἢ τύχη κυρία γίγνεται ἢ οἱ λογισμοί, τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον ὑμῖν παρέχει, οὗτός ἐστ' ἀνδρείος, καὶ χρησίμος γε πολίτης ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐχ οἱ τῆς παρ' ἡμέραν χάριτος τὰ μέγιστα τῆς πόλεως ἀπολωλεκότες. I argue that this builds upon his own assertions in *On the Peace* where he contrasted his own advice to those who say whatever it takes to gain favour/ further themselves. Balot 2004: 247-8 singles out *On the Chersonese* to demonstrate how Athenian orators displayed courageous patriotism and sincerity by risking the dangers of free speech and *parrhēsia*. Balot 2004: 247 remarks on 8.68-70 that 'in the course of defending himself, Demosthenes formulates civic courage as the ability to speak freely even against the *dēmos*' inclinations.'

Nor do I think that I could be acting as a good citizen if I were to devise policies that will make me the first among you, but you the last among all people. Rather, the city must prosper through the policies proposed by its good citizens, and everyone must advocate what is best, not what is easiest.<sup>875</sup>

And in this sense Demosthenes utilises the Periclean model to affirm both his own position and his argument that they shake off their apathy and not take the easy option (which would be prosecuting Diopeithes) but do what is necessary, as Pericles asserted ‘be determined never to sacrifice the glory that is yours.’<sup>876</sup> Demosthenes has presented himself as the archetypal good citizen, like Pericles, and asserted that honourable truth and unpopularity is preferable to shameful delusion:

Instead, I would say that my conduct of public affairs has nothing in common with theirs; and that, although I perhaps could, as others can, make accusations and do favours and confiscate property and do the other things that these men do, I have never yet taken up any of these positions, nor have I been motivated by profit or ambition, but I continue to say things which make me a lesser man in many of your eyes, but will make you greater, if you are persuaded by me.<sup>877</sup>

Demosthenes does not remove himself from responsibility, but rather reminds the Assembly of its very purpose, and that the rejection of truth, through apathy and gratification, is the

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<sup>875</sup> Demosthenes 8.72. οὐδ’ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ δικαίου τοῦτ’ εἶναι πολίτου, τοιαῦτα πολιτεύμαθ’ εὐρίσκειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πρῶτος ὑμῶν ἔσομαι εὐθέως, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὕστατοι· ἀλλὰ συναυξάνεσθαι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν πολιτεύμασι, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ, μὴ τὸ ῥᾶστον ἅπαντας λέγειν· Compare 3.18 where Demosthenes argued one must choose what is right over what is pleasant if both is not an option.

<sup>876</sup> Thucydides 2.61, Pericles also offers hope at 2.62, ‘Remember, too, that freedom, if we preserve our freedom by our own efforts, will easily restore us to our old positions; but to submit to the will of others means to lose even what we still have. You must not fall below the standard of your fathers.’

<sup>877</sup> Demosthenes 8.71. ἀλλ’ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων πολιτευμάτων οὐδὲν πολιτεύομαι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενος ἂν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροι, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεύειν καὶ τᾶλλ’ ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι ποιεῖν, οὐδ’ ἐφ’ ἐν τούτων πώποτ’ ἐμαντὸν ἔταξα, οὐδὲ προήχθην οὐθ’ ὑπὸ κέρδους οὐθ’ ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ διαμένω λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πολλῶν ἐλάττων εἰμι παρ’ ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς δ’, εἰ πείσεσθέ μοι, μείζους ἂν εἴητε· One could draw a comparison to Pericles at Thucydides 2.60 ‘so far as you are concerned, if you are angry with me you are angry with one who has, I think, at least as much ability as anyone else to see what ought to be done and to explain what he sees, one who loves his city and who is above being influenced by money.’

greatest threat facing Athens. Reminding us of his *parrhēsia*, Demosthenes uses his own *ethōs* to stress the sincerity of his own advice, which again suggests a Periclean image.<sup>878</sup> But he also reminds us that there is only so much he himself can do; for Demosthenes' advice without the goodwill of the Assembly cannot solve their problems.<sup>879</sup> In this regard I argue that Demosthenes has gradually developed his deliberative oratory into a form of didactic.<sup>880</sup> He not only reproaches the Assembly and advises them to fix and heal the *polis*, but reminds them that democratic deliberation is a two-way process, as he goes on to state in his funeral oration for Chaeronea 'But to be persuasive a person's words require the goodwill of his audience.'<sup>881</sup> For his own part Demosthenes confronts accusations that he produces 'nothing but words, whereas what the city needs is deeds and action' by reminding the Assembly that his precise role is to present words that motivate *them* to take action, 'I think that the only action that is required of one who advises you is to say what is for the best.'<sup>882</sup>

To emphasise this Demosthenes returns to his method of past exempla, choosing the example of Timotheus the general who had secured possessions such as Potidaea, which the current Athenians have subsequently lost. Demosthenes uses the past to confront the current

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<sup>878</sup> Mader 2007: 156 remarks that Thucydides' comparison of 'the high-minded Pericles and his self-serving demagogic successors (2.65.8–10) provides a schema regularly invoked by Demosthenes to mark off and defend his own distinctive style and ideals against crowd-pleasing populist rivals'.

<sup>879</sup> Roisman 2004: 262 observes that, in his speeches against Aeschines, Demosthenes argues how 'the power of speech is unlike all other powers (*dunameis*)...can be broken when the audience opposes it (Dem. 19.340; cf. 18.277; 60.14).' I believe that Roisman's argument can be applied to Demosthenes' example of Timotheus, that 'this democratic view of public speaking describes the power of speech as weaker than, and dependent on, the people's power and their willingness to yield to it.' Roisman 2004: 262.

<sup>880</sup> See comments on Yunis 2007 in the Introduction p. 8.

<sup>881</sup> Demosthenes 60.14. Indeed Demosthenes could be referring back to these deliberative speeches and remarking on the failure of the Assembly's *eunoia* culminating in the defeat at Chaeronea.

<sup>882</sup> Demosthenes 8.73. 'In the past I have heard it said that I always say what is best but that I produce nothing but words, whereas what the city needs is deeds and action. I shall tell you frankly my attitude towards these complaints: I think that the only act that is required of one who advises you is to say what is for the best, and I think that I can easily show you that this is the case.' ἤδη τοίνυν τινὸς ἤκουσα τοιοῦτόν τι λέγοντος, ὡς ἄρ' ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ βέλτιστα, ἔστιν δ' οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ λόγοι τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ, δεῖ δ' ἔργων τῇ πόλει καὶ πράξεώς τινος. ἐγὼ δ' ὡς ἔχω περὶ τούτων, λέξω πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι. οὐδ' εἶναι νομίζω τοῦ συμβουλευόντος ὑμῖν ἔργον οὐδὲν πλὴν εἰπεῖν τὰ βέλτιστα. καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ῥαδίως οἶμαι δεῖξαι.

Assembly with the memory that when their ancestors heeded advice and took effective action, sparing nothing in defence of their interests, their security was assured:

You doubtless know that the famous Timotheus once made a speech before you saying that you should assist and go to the rescue of the Euboeans when the Thebans were trying to enslave them, and that he said something like this: “Tell me, when you have the Thebans on an island, are you deliberating about how to treat them and what to do? Will you not fill the sea, men of Athens, with triremes? Will you not leap to your feet and proceed to Piraeus? Will you not launch your ships?” Timotheus spoke these words, and you acted, but the success arose from these two things together: his words and your action.<sup>883</sup>

The alternative scenario is evident in Demosthenes’ present predicament:

If he had given the best possible advice, as he did, but you had remained idle and paid no attention, would any of the things that then benefitted the city have happened? They could not have. So too with what I say: you should seek action from yourselves, but the best advice from the man who steps up to speak.<sup>884</sup>

Demosthenes asserts how oratory functions within the Assembly, and unequivocally instructs the Athenians on how they ought to act, and why they have fallen so far. There is a corruption in the Greek here: †τὰ δὲ βέλτιστ’ ἐπιστήμη λέγειν†, however the overall sense of the passage is reasonably clear, following what Demosthenes has already been saying with

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<sup>883</sup> Demosthenes 8.74-5. ἴστε γὰρ δῆπου τοῦθ’ ὅτι Τιμόθεός ποτ’ ἐκεῖνος ἐν ὑμῖν ἐδημηγόρησεν ὡς δεῖ βοηθεῖν καὶ τοὺς Εὐβοέας σφῆζειν, ὅτε Θηβαῖοι κατεδουλοῦντ’ αὐτούς, καὶ λέγων εἶπεν οὕτω πως· ‘εἰπέ μοι, βουλευέσθε,’ ἔφη, ‘Θηβαίους ἔχοντες ἐν νήσῳ, τί χρήσεσθε καὶ τί δεῖ ποιεῖν; οὐκ ἐμπλήσετε τὴν θάλατταν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τριήρων; οὐκ ἀναστάντες ἤδη πορεύσεσθ’ εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ; οὐ καθέλξετε τὰς ναῦς;’ οὐκοῦν εἶπε μὲν ταῦθ’ ὁ Τιμόθεος, ἐποιήσατε δ’ ὑμεῖς· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τὸ πρῶγμ’ ἐπράχθη.

<sup>884</sup> Demosthenes 8.75. εἰ δ’ ὁ μὲν εἶπεν ὡς οἶόν τε [τὰ] ἄριστα, ὥσπερ εἶπεν, ὑμεῖς δ’ ἀπερραθυμήσατε καὶ μηδὲν ὑπηκούσατε, ἄρ’ ἂν ἦν γεγονός τι τῶν τότε συμβάντων τῇ πόλει; οὐχ οἶόν τε. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω καὶ περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ δεῖν’ εἶπῃ, τὰ μὲν ἔργα παρ’ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ζητεῖτε, †τὰ δὲ βέλτιστα ἐπιστήμη† λέγειν παρὰ τοῦ παριόντος. Vince’s Loeb translation gives, ‘for advice, the best that skill in speech can command.’ I read βέλτιστ’ ἐπιστήμη as understanding/a professional full knowledge, roundly meaning the best well-informed advice from whoever is in the best position to advise.

regard to words being the domain of the speaker, but that the Assembly must qualify these words with action. Moreover, by recalling Isocrates' complaint at his pupil Timotheus' failure as a politician due to his 'refusal to curry favour with the *dēmos*', Demosthenes likewise associates his *parrhēsia* with Timotheus' unswerving duty to telling the Assembly what they need (not what they want) to hear.<sup>885</sup>

Thus, the power of the *dēmos* comes with the responsibility of recognising the intentions of the speaker and to be motivated to necessary action as an entire unit. For Demosthenes, the current Assembly in its desire to do as little as possible is so different from Timotheus' Athens as to be unrecognisable, and the Assembly cannot understand this because they refuse to listen to Demosthenes' *parrhēsia*. Their reaction towards Diopieithes is thus a testament to their inability to reflect self-critically. This again demonstrates the vicious cycle which undermines Athens from within.

Demosthenes closes the speech with a set of proposals remarkably similar to his unsuccessful proposals from 351 to act, to fund, to support:

I wish to summarise my proposals and then step down. I say that we must raise money, keep together our existing force, correcting any fault that is detected but not disbanding the whole because of any details that are open to criticism; we must send out ambassadors in every direction to instruct, warn, and act; and in addition we must punish those who are taking bribes in connection with public affairs and show our utter hatred of them, so that those who are moderate and upright may be seen, by themselves and others, to have given the right advice.<sup>886</sup>

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<sup>885</sup> Isocrates 18.169-70, Sinclair 1988: 46.

<sup>886</sup> Demosthenes 8.76. ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ' ἂ λέγω φράσας καταβῆναι βούλομαι. χρήματ' εἰσφέρειν φημι δεῖν· τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν συνέχειν, ἐπανορθοῦντας εἴ τι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν, μὴ ὅσοις ἂν τις αἰτιάσῃται τὸ ὅλον καταλύοντας· πρέσβεις ἐκπέμπειν πανταχοῖ τοὺς διδάξοντας, νοουθετήσοντας, πράξοντας· παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι δωροδοκοῦντας κολάζειν καὶ μισεῖν πανταχοῦ, ἵν' οἱ μέτριοι καὶ δίκαιους αὐτοὺς παρέχοντες εὐβεβουλεύσθαι δοκῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς.

Demosthenes seeks to redeem their reputation both in the wider Greek world, and internally, and in this way seeks to safeguard the Assembly from the traitors within, but also enable good advice be both recognised and acted upon. Thus, in my opinion, the speech is not ‘Philippic’ in nature, but again prioritises addressing the detrimental attitude within the Assembly: ‘if you handle matters in this way and stop belittling everything, perhaps, perhaps even now our situation may improve.’<sup>887</sup>

Despite their lost possessions and their concessions to Philip, Demosthenes still presents the hope that the Assembly can turn this around, but this is reliant upon them recognising the reality of the situation and their own attitudes, and acknowledging his own *parrhēsia* that seeks to expose and expel their enemies, external and within, and to stop punishing those who act in their best interests. While Diopeithes is the subject of the debate, Demosthenes is arguably also referring to himself, and the vitriol we see in this speech against the internal corruption of the Assembly is far greater than anything we have seen directed against Philip.<sup>888</sup> Indeed, events by 341 have transpired in such a way that Demosthenes’ advice can now utilise the power of hindsight, and present an authoritative inevitability on the consequences of ignoring his proposals:

But if you remain in your seats, serious only about heckling or cheering, but shrinking back if anything needs to be done, I do not see how any speech will be able to save they city if you refuse to do your duty.<sup>889</sup>

And it is in this sense that the Assembly appears detached from reality, as if they are viewing a comedy or tragedy at the theatre for their enjoyment but which does not require serious

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<sup>887</sup> Demosthenes 8.77. ἂν οὕτω τοῖς πράγμασι χρῆσθε καὶ παύσησθ’ ὀλιγοροῦντες ἀπάντων, ἴσως ἂν, ἴσως καὶ νῦν ἔτι βελτίω γένοιτο.

<sup>888</sup> As Usher 1999: 239 remarks ‘Diopeithes has become subordinate to defining and dramatizing Philip’s designs and undermining, and even terrorising, his alleged Athenian supporters, the ‘philippizers’.’ I disagree however when he argues that these internal enemies ‘are no longer the main target’ in the *Third Philippic*.

<sup>889</sup> Demosthenes 8.77. εἰ μέντοι καθεδείσθε, ἄχρι τοῦ θορυβῆσαι καὶ ἐπαινέσαι σπουδάζοντες, ἐὰν δὲ δέη τι ποιεῖν ἀναδύομενοι, οὐχ ὁρῶ λόγον ὅστις ἄνευ τοῦ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς ἅ προσήκει δυνήσεται τὴν πόλιν σῶσαι.

consideration as it ultimately is not real.<sup>890</sup> Again, speech has been mutated into a spectacle, rather than a necessary process, and it is this corruption of *logos*, which paralyses the Assembly.<sup>891</sup> The severity of this cannot be underestimated in a constitution where *logos* is the medium through which democracy functioned. As such a crisis of oratory – a crisis of the deliberative process – creates political instability and a series of subsequent crises – Macedonian expansion being a product of this original crisis. I argue that what Demosthenes confronts in the speech is not Philip *per se* but this internal crisis, this ἀρχή. I argue that for Demosthenes, it is this self-deception and arrogant delusion that poses the most dangerous threat to Athens, and has created a hostile environment for constructive deliberation. As Mader summarises, Demosthenes attempts to confront:

Assemblymen flattered into ῥαθυμία by feel-good populist rhetoric (πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγειν), swelling with self-importance, quick to evade responsibility and apportion blame, prone to denial and wishful thinking, intolerant of criticism and reluctant to hear out opposing speakers, their attention span strictly limited, attracted by the abusive *agones* of rival orators, and resembling sensation-hungry theatregoers rather than concerned citizens.<sup>892</sup>

Demosthenes contrasts this current image to Athenian ideology, which I view as a metaphorical mirror. It is only in recognising this that the Athenians can hope to resolve their current situation, because as Demosthenes states (and will go on to state in the *Third Philippic*): it is only through resolving their internal crisis that they can hope to address Philip and their external concerns. Accordingly, they must break this pattern of destructive behaviour, and *support* not attack Diopeithes. It is thus essential that they scrutinise

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<sup>890</sup> See pp. 172-3 on the parallels between Demosthenes' criticism of the *dēmos* and Cleon's criticisms at Thucydides 3.38.

<sup>891</sup> Again, see earlier complaint of Demosthenes at 5.3-4 and 5.7.

<sup>892</sup> Mader 2007: 158.



themselves, accept culpability for their own neglectful attitudes, shake off their apathy and act in a manner that reflects, and is worthy of, their Athenian identity and ancestral past.

This long speech, as much as it warns about Philip's external threat, is fundamentally about Athens. For Demosthenes, something has gone very wrong at the core of Athenian politics that such an illogical state of events has come to pass. Subsequently, the only option is to shatter this fallacy which deceives the Assembly and force them to recognise the situation for what it really is, to recognise themselves for what they are, and change their damaging practices. Their greatest strength, and the only alternative to Macedonian subjugation, is to assume ownership of their ancestral ideology and be Athenian in both their attitude, their words and their actions. Demosthenes' speech calls on them to see this reality through their nonsensical attitude towards Dioppeithes. It is in his defence of Dioppeithes that Demosthenes makes this a defining moment for the Assembly to decide and define its own identity, and choose between a path of self-destruction or redemption.<sup>893</sup>

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<sup>893</sup> The speech was a success. Worthington 2008: 127 notes that 'Although they did not beat his opponents to death, they did not recall Dioppeithes, and did send a support force under Chares to the Chersonese.'

## CHAPTER 4.3 THE *THIRD PHILIPPIC*

### Date and Historical Context

Following *On the Chersonese* and Hegesippus' speech, the Assembly voted in favour of Demosthenes' proposals and did not recall Diopeithes.<sup>894</sup> However, Athenian interests were still at risk in the Hellespont region, and the direct context of the *Third Philippic* is to address the worsening situation, as Philip had now deployed Macedonian troops in assistance of Cardia, and was attacking Byzantium.<sup>895</sup> If Philip's expansion into Thrace engulfed the Hellespont and Byzantium, it 'would eliminate all Athenian influence in the north Aegean, imperil the vital grain route of Athens.'<sup>896</sup> Accordingly, the *Third Philippic* was delivered within a few months of *On the Chersonese* in 341, and shares many of the immediate concerns of the earlier speech which defended Diopeithes.<sup>897</sup>

Trevett argues that, 'a central purpose of this speech is to convince the Athenians that a state of undeclared war with Philip already exists.'<sup>898</sup> As this thesis has demonstrated, Demosthenes has been stressing this since the *Second Philippic*. While this speech does contain the fiercest criticism of Philip in the corpus, it is not, in my opinion, the fiercest invective of the collection of speeches, which is reserved for the traitorous *rhētors* within Athens itself. While Macedonian expansion is unmistakably a threat to Athenian interests, Demosthenes seeks to address the problems within the Assembly that enabled the

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<sup>894</sup> Worthington 2013: 220.

<sup>895</sup> Worthington 2013:220 notes that these troops were sent in May. As Buckler and Beck 2008: 239-40 remind us, however, Philip was well within his rights to defend his ally Cardia.

<sup>896</sup> Buckler and Beck 2008: 239. Gabriel 2010: 181-2 argues that 'the Athenian willingness to check Philip's moves in Ambracia with force, their rejection of his proposals on piracy and arbitration, and the brazen attempts by the anti-Macedonian faction in Athens to suborn Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese and elsewhere had finally convinced Philip that a rapprochement with Athens was now impossible.'

<sup>897</sup> Dionysius *Letter to Ammaeus* 1.10. dates the speech to 342/1, and scholarly consensus generally agrees with this date, which I put at 341. Worthington 2013:220; MacDowell 2009: 349 suggest summer 341; Usher 1999: 237 Sealey 1955: 101-110.

<sup>898</sup> Trevett 2011: 153.

“Macedonian Question” to even occur.<sup>899</sup> I argue that this speech serves as a culmination of Demosthenes’ arguments since the *First Philippic*: that the crisis facing Athens is self-inflicted and a product of the internal corruption of the Assembly. Despite being ten years after the *First Philippic*, the speech is remarkably similar, at times almost verbatim, to his arguments in 351 demonstrating that his opinions on the Assembly, and Philip, have been consistent.

Demosthenes builds upon his previous arguments that Athens needs to be seen by the Panhellenic community to be acting in its own, and Greece’s, interests. Moreover, he stresses the need to address the problem of Macedonian *Realpolitik* in the Aegean, where the balance of power has been unsettled by their own lack of action and Philip’s political and military presence (especially with his involvement with the Third Sacred War and his subsequent position on the Amphyctonic council). To achieve this, Demosthenes asserts it is paramount for the Athenians to recognise the corruption within the Assembly, to change their attitudes, and defend their interests in the Chersonese before they are lost to Philip.

With regard to the transmission of the speech, we have two versions of the *Third Philippic*, which are generally compiled together. This occurs because the tenth-century manuscript ‘S’ has omissions which are preserved in other manuscripts, but appear as additions in S’s margins.<sup>900</sup> MacDowell refers to this as a ‘notorious textual problem’, as manuscript S is the oldest of the medieval manuscripts and is generally considered the most reliable.<sup>901</sup> MacDowell suggests that these additional portions of text may have been removed by Demosthenes to make the speech shorter for delivery, and are not the later additions of

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<sup>899</sup> In this I disagree with Usher 1999: 239 where he argues that attacking Philippizers is ‘no longer the main target’ in the *Third Philippic* as it was in *On the Chersonese*.

<sup>900</sup> Pearson 1976: 150. To differentiate these versions, I have put the additional text in italics for the English translation, and enclosed the Greek within square brackets. It is important to note that I am not using the square brackets in the same way the Leiden conventions (to indicate restored text). Rather, I am following the practice in the Loeb edition (which uses the Teubner text).

<sup>901</sup> MacDowell 2009: 353. In my opinion this could be the product of a once prevailing attitude that ‘oldest is best’, and rather could be viewed from *recentiores, non deteriores*. Reynolds and Wilson 2013: 218-129.

another author.<sup>902</sup> Even with the omissions the speech, like *On the Chersonese*, is remarkably long, and shifts and jumps between different arguments throughout.<sup>903</sup> As Pearson notes, the speech is of ‘special interest’ for the ‘skill with which the various arguments are manipulated.’<sup>904</sup> Demosthenes does not remain with one method of attack for long, but moves through various positions, ‘strengthening each one in turn as he comes to it...each emotional outburst is carefully motivated by descriptive passages which precede it.’<sup>905</sup>

### Analysis

Demosthenes opens the speech by acknowledging that the consensus of opinion considers Philip is a problem:

Many speeches are made, men of Athens, at almost every meeting of the Assembly, about the wrongs that Philip has been doing, from the moment he concluded the Peace, not only against you but also against others, and I am sure that everyone would say – even if they do not act accordingly – that all our words and actions should have as their aim to put an end to his arrogance and make him pay the penalty.<sup>906</sup>

Demosthenes does not need to stress the problem of Philip, as it is self-evident, but the discrepancy between the Assembly’s many speeches and their lack of action is a

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<sup>902</sup> MacDowell 2009: 353

<sup>903</sup> The Assembly has a water clock (*klepsydra*) that timed the speech (See Hansen 1991: 200). It is due to these time restrictions that I believe these last two speeches in particular have been revised and augmented with either earlier drafted remarks that could not fit the time, or retrospective additions. Enos 2002: 82 notes how Isocrates *Antidosis* 320 is an example of the constraints of the water clock evolving into a rhetorical *topos*. Isocrates is a particularly interesting example because he circulated his speech in written form.

<sup>904</sup> Pearson 1979: 155.

<sup>905</sup> Pearson 1976: 155.

<sup>906</sup> Demosthenes 9.1. Πολλῶν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων γιγνομένων ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐκκλησίαν περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος, ἀφ’ οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικεῖ, καὶ πάντων οἶδ’ ὅτι φησάντων γ’ ἂν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ποιούσι τοῦτο, καὶ λέγειν δεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὅπως ἐκεῖνος παύσεται τῆς ὕβρεως καὶ δίκην δώσει, Edwards 1994: 41-2 considers the opening of the *Third Philippic* a ‘combination of Lysianic simplicity and Thucydidean complexity’, creating a balanced accessibility for the masses and the educated elite. Edwards also notes how Dionysius compared this to Thucydides’ style (*Thucydides* 53-4), and that compared to Demosthenes’ perfection, Isocrates and Plato both ‘highly accomplished practitioners of the middle style’ fell short (*Demosthenes* 15-16).

significant issue. He again addresses their illogical behaviour, and how they deliberate about the problem of Philip, and yet do not translate this into action. Thus Demosthenes, once again, establishes his core argument against the corruption within the Assembly: empty rhetoric, pointless speeches, and the damaging gap between their words and their actions. Demosthenes attributes their problems to their lack of action:

But I see that all our advantages have been so undermined and thrown away that – I fear it is ill-omened to say, but it is true – if all the regular speakers wished to speak, and you wished to vote, in such a way as to make your situation as bad as possible, I do not think that things could be any worse than they are now.<sup>907</sup>

Unequivocally, this is a self-inflicted crisis caused by their repeated failure to seize the *kairos* of each situation, and (of greater concern), their general attitude towards deliberation within the Assembly.<sup>908</sup> In asserting that they could not have behaved in a more self-damaging manner if they had tried, we are immediately reminded of their attempt to prosecute Diopeithes in the previous speech. In particular, since *On the Peace*, the *Second Philippic* and *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes has asserted that certain speakers are deliberately making the situation within Athens worse, to Philip's advantage. The Assembly, instead of recognising this and punishing the manipulative traitors, allows them to act in Philip's interests with impunity, demonstrating both the apathy of the Assembly, and the expert deception of these internal traitors.

The point of the speech, therefore, is not to repeat the grievances already exhausted by their deliberations, but to move from the safety of speeches to taking necessary action –

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<sup>907</sup> Demosthenes 9.1. εἰς τοῦθ' ὑπηγμένα πάντα τὰ πράγματα καὶ προειμέν' ὀρῶ, ὥστε—δέδοικα μὴ βλάσφημον μὲν εἶπεῖν, ἀληθὲς δ' ἦ—εἰ καὶ λέγειν ἅπαντες ἐβούλονθ' οἱ παριόντες καὶ χειροτονεῖν ὑμεῖς ἐξ ὧν ὡς φαυλότατ' ἔμελλε τὰ πράγμαθ' ἔξειν, οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι δύνασθαι χεῖρον ἢ νῦν διατεθῆναι.

<sup>908</sup> *Kairos* is stressed in both the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs*. Indeed the point of the *Olynthiacs* were the *kairos* moments, and in 4.43 Demosthenes argued how he was amazed that their original objective was to punish Philip but has become a situation of damage limitation. Demosthenes 9.1 likewise is about their desire to punish Philip which they have still yet to do.

essentially to bridge the gap between their *logos* and *ergon*, which has been Demosthenes' request since the *First Philippic*. The Assembly still does not function as it ought to, and any hope of challenging Philip and improving their situation is undermined at the core of Athenian decision-making. Thus, to deal with Philip involves confronting their internal issues first.<sup>909</sup> As Demosthenes suggested in *On the Chersonese*, the Assembly's speech-act delusion means their deliberations rarely progress beyond debate, and whilst they deceive themselves into believing such discussions are dealing with the situation (or take the easy in-house options such as prosecuting generals), their allies and enemies realise that their *logos* is empty.<sup>910</sup> Consequently, the gap between *logos* and *ergon* is direct result this attitude and causes a deficiency in their effectiveness.<sup>911</sup> It is this, not Philip, which is the root of the problem. The loss of possessions, the need to not break the peace, the threat to other Greek *poleis*, the destabilising of the balance of power, Philip's increased presence and influence over other enemies of Athens, are all a result of the Assembly's lack of action, and their refusal to see the situation for what it is. As Demosthenes will go on to state in his *epitaphios*:

For the beginning of all virtue is wisdom – indeed it is – and the end is courage: with one a person understands what should be done; with the other he carries it out.<sup>912</sup>

And it is precisely this lack of virtue, the absence of wisdom in their deliberations and the courage to act on their decisions that is at the root of the issues within Greece: as Demosthenes asserts at 9.36-39 the Greeks have lost the aspect of their spirit that enabled them to overcome adversaries, this being their incorruptibility. As such, I suggest Demosthenes' rhetoric – rather than being 'Philippic' – prioritises addressing the corruption

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<sup>909</sup> As Demosthenes asserted in *On the Chersonese* 8.61.

<sup>910</sup> Such anxieties are raised in *Third Olynthiac* 3.14 where Demosthenes asserts a decree with worthless without the will to execute it.

<sup>911</sup> Again, the parallel can be observed between Demosthenes and Thucydides' Pericles on how, for the Athenians, speech and action go hand in hand (Thucydides 2.40)

<sup>912</sup> Demosthenes 60.17. ἔστιν γάρ, ἔστιν ἀπάσης ἀρετῆς ἀρχὴ μὲν σύνεσις, πέρας δ' ἀνδρεία· καὶ τῆ μὲν δοκιμάζεται τί πρακτέον ἐστί, τῆ δὲ σφύζεται.

*within* the Assembly: their failure to reflect upon their own culpability, and how ‘it is not possible to defeat our city’s enemies until you punish those in the city itself ... many disasters arise from a willingness to listen to such men.’<sup>913</sup>

### The Problems of the Assembly

One of the recurring reasons why the Athenians cannot rectify their situation, but instead exacerbate their problems, is the misuse of rhetoric and speakers acting out of vice and self-interest:

There are no doubt many reasons for this, and matters did not reach their present state from one or two causes only. But most of all, if you examine the matter closely, you will find that it is due to those men who choose to curry favour rather than to give the best advice – some of whom, men of Athens, cherish the things that give them a good reputation and power, and take no thought for the future.<sup>914</sup>

This is only possible by the indulgent nature of the Assembly, and their need for gratification through flattery. For Demosthenes, they have forgotten their duty and the purpose of deliberative oratory itself. The speakers know this, and capitalise upon it to their own ends, which are in Philip’s favour and to the cost of Athens.

Demosthenes again engages with the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric to demonstrate both the ill-intentions of self-serving speakers who give bad advice, and the failure of the Assembly to recognise this. Demosthenes refers (we assume) to not only the attempted indictment of Diopeithes but the criticism he himself received as a warmonger:

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<sup>913</sup> Demosthenes 9.53-55.

<sup>914</sup> Demosthenes 9.2. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶν αἷτια τούτων, καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἐν οὐδὲ δὴ εἰς τοῦτο τὰ πράγματ’ ἀφίκται, μάλιστα δ’, ἄνπερ ἐξετάζητ’ ὀρθῶς, εὐρήσετε διὰ τοῦς χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν προαιρουμένους· ὧν τινες μὲν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ δύνανται, ταῦτα φυλάττοντες οὐδεμίαν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων πρόνοιαν ἔχουσιν.

others blame and slander those who participate in public life and do nothing other than cause the city to be preoccupied with punishing itself, whereas Philip is able to speak and act as he wishes.<sup>915</sup>

Demosthenes focuses on their current habits and how they have cultivated an environment where receiving effective advice and useful deliberation is impossible. The Assembly cannot recognise friend from foe, nor what is truly in their best interests. This criticism is a continuation of his arguments in *On the Chersonese* that, under the influence of these men, and through their own apathy, they have acted to Philip's advantage and manifested a cycle of self-harm with regard to their possessions and interests. Consequently, 'such policies are habitual to you and are the cause of your troubles.'<sup>916</sup>

The problem, therefore, is not Philip but themselves, and the solution to the crisis is to confront these unwelcome truths via Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* and, in recognise these damaging habits, change:

I ask you, men of Athens, not to be at all angry with me if I speak freely in telling the truth. Look at it like this: You believe so strongly that in other areas freedom of speech should be granted to all inhabitants of the city that you have allowed foreigners and slaves to share in it, and many slaves here can be seen saying whatever they like with greater freedom than is enjoyed by the citizens of some other states, but you have entirely banished freedom of speech when it comes to the giving of advice.<sup>917</sup>

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<sup>915</sup> Demosthenes 9.2. ἕτεροι δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὄντας αἰτιώμενοι καὶ διαβάλλοντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἢ ὅπως ἡ πόλις αὐτὴ παρ' αὐτῆς δίκην λήψεται καὶ περὶ τοῦτ' ἔσται, Φιλίππῳ δ' ἐξέσται καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ὅ τι βούλεται.

<sup>916</sup> Demosthenes 9.3. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι συνήθειαι μὲν εἰσιν ὑμῖν, αἴτια δὲ τῶν κακῶν. Supporting Trevett's choice of 'policies' as a translation for πολιτεῖαι, the LSJ notes that πολίτ-εία can be translated as a 'course of policy', referencing both this passage at 9.3 (the plural πολιτεῖαι), and Demosthenes 18.87 and 18.263.

<sup>917</sup> Demosthenes 9.3. ἀξιῶ δ' ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἂν τι τῶν ἀληθῶν μετὰ παρρησίας λέγω, μηδεμίαν μοι διὰ τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῶν ὀργὴν γενέσθαι. σκοπεῖτε γὰρ ὧδί: ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδώκατε, καὶ πολλοὺς ἂν τις οἰκέτας ἴδοι παρ' ἡμῖν μετὰ πλειονοῦς ἐξουσίας ὅ τι βούλονται λέγοντας ἢ πολίτας ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ



What is cause for concern here is that the Assembly has expelled *isēgoria* and *parrhēsia* from the centre of Athenian democracy, when each were ‘central, and at times synonymous qualities of democratic ideology.’<sup>918</sup> By denying these rights to well-intentioned good citizens, and by granting them to speakers who are self-serving – and worse – working to undermine the *polis* from within – Demosthenes’ Assembly not only demonstrates a major oversight, but acts in a manner fundamentally un-Athenian.<sup>919</sup> In this regard, Demosthenes is not merely commenting on the corruption of *logos* in the Assembly, but claims the right of *isēgoria* and develops this into the right to be heard. Whilst Trevett and MacDowell state there was ‘no absolute free speech in Athens’, Roisman conversely argues that for *parrhēsia*, ‘Athenian democracy permitted citizens to use frank speech in the cause of benefiting the state, guiding the people to the right course of action, and educating them to become better citizens.’<sup>920</sup>

I believe Demosthenes clearly presents this battle with a belligerent audience, reminiscent of his earlier arguments on the Theoric fund being emblematic of their misguided priorities and un-Athenian behaviour. But Demosthenes may also be highlighting his own *ethos*; building on Balot’s argument that the risks of *parrhēsia* demanded civic courage within democratic oratory. I argue that Demosthenes has consistently used his frankness and

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συμβουλευέειν παντάπασιν ἐξεληλάκατε. Sandys notes that the ending παντάπασιν ἐξεληλάκατε is ‘purposefully brief’ to contrast the absence of free speech in the Assembly compared to ‘its general diffusion elsewhere’. Sandys 1913: 194. Similarly see Isocrates 8.14 complaint ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὐσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία.

<sup>918</sup> Wallace 2004: 221; Balot 2004: 233 on the interplay of *parrhēsia* and *isēgoria*. See earlier discussion in Chapter 2.3 *Third Olynthiac* pp. 135; 140-4.

<sup>919</sup> We can compare Isocrates’ complaint in *On the Peace* 8.14 that freedom of speech opens the Assembly to abuse and, more worryingly, the *polis* does not recognise this happening: ‘I know it is dangerous to oppose your views and that even though we live in a democracy, there is still no freedom of speech (καὶ ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὐσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία,) except here in the Assembly for those who are foolish and do not care about you... what is most shocking is that you feel gratitude to them when they drag our faults out in front of the rest of Greece such as you never show to those who help you; instead you are hostile to those who rebuke or admonish you as you are to those who actively harm the city.’

<sup>920</sup> Trevett 2011: 156 notes there was no absolute free speech in Athens ‘and it is very unlikely that the foreigner and slaves had any legally defined rights in this area.’ See too MacDowell 2009: 126-9 on slander laws. Roisman 2004: 268, supported by Dover 1974: 23-4, discusses the constructive role of *parrhēsia*.

honesty in this rhetoric of courage ‘to strengthen the image ... [he]...projected.’<sup>921</sup>

Demosthenes has used his *parrhēsia* to demonstrate his sincerity, and in his increased censure of the Assembly here Demosthenes paradigmatically attempts ‘to persuade the *dēmos* against its own inclinations, to do what is best for the city, instead of gratifying fleeting desires for pleasure.’<sup>922</sup>

Given the Athenians’ consistent failure to take the road of virtue, Demosthenes’ *parrhēsia* also weaves his method of praise (for himself) and shame (of the Assembly), as Balot notes, ‘through the mechanisms of shame, free-speaking democratic citizens characteristically produce a uniquely democratic form of military courage.’<sup>923</sup> Throughout the speeches, and especially here, Demosthenes defends the value of *isēgoria* and the right to speak, but also maintains that not everyone should be heard and heeded. While there is a detrimental gap between their *logos* and their *ergon*, there is a necessary gap between the *right to speak* and the *right to be heard*. By continuing to listen to bad advice, rejecting good advisers and maintaining this self-deception, the Athenians act in direct contrast to their own intellectual reputation, which has been previously attested to by ‘Philip’ and the other Greeks in the *Second Philippic* and *On the Chersonese*.<sup>924</sup>

This hostile attitude towards truthful advice is a repeated grievance in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches: he complains over and over again that he cannot safely give advice, and even when he tries, they do not wish to listen. In this manner, he defends his own impossible position, having been made (allegedly) redundant by the attitude of the Assembly:

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<sup>921</sup> Balot 2004: 235, ‘the orators used the rhetoric of courage to strengthen the image of themselves which they projected’.

<sup>922</sup> Balot 2004: 238. Balot is speaking of orators in general, but I think this is particularly applicable here.

<sup>923</sup> Balot 2004: 255. Balot is specifically referring to the funeral oration here (60.26).

<sup>924</sup> That is the constructed ‘Philip’, through the psychological use of his voice by Demosthenes, and the opinions he projects via social memory of Athens’ ancestral reputation. This also correlates to Demosthenes’ earlier assertion at 3.19 that it is the easiest thing to deceive oneself. This is also recognisable through social memory displayed in *epitaphioi logoi*, drama and historiography.

The result is that in meetings of the Assembly, you are spoiled and easily flattered, and listen to everything with an ear to your own pleasure<sup>925</sup> but in your public policy and in the reality of the situation, you are already in deadly danger. If this is your disposition even now, there is nothing I can say to you.<sup>926</sup>

This self-indulgent nature of the Assembly is their greatest weakness, because it has devastatingly damaged the crucial relationship between the speaker and the audience that is paramount to Athenian democracy functioning effectively. The speaker can only offer advice, which is not enough without the goodwill of the Assembly.<sup>927</sup> Echoing his point on Timotheus at the close of *On the Chersonese*, where Demosthenes sought to defend his own political function as an unheeded advice giver, likewise here he asserts that there is nothing an orator can do if the Assembly chooses to reject *logos*.<sup>928</sup> Indeed it is their self-delusion, which Demosthenes highlighted in *On the Chersonese*, which poses the greatest danger to Athens, as their fallacy maintains an illusion of safety (almost that they are untouchable) as opposed to the deadly danger they now find themselves in.

The solution, Demosthenes argues, is for the Assembly to purge itself of such bad practices, and to act in its own best interests, shunning laziness and pleasure for what is right, hard: he calls the Assembly to complete their half of the deliberative deal. It is, therefore,

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<sup>925</sup> Claims we have also seen Demosthenes make at 4.38 and 3.22.

<sup>926</sup> Demosthenes 9.4. εἶθ' ὑμῖν συμβέβηκεν ἐκ τούτου ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τρυφᾶν καὶ κολακεύεσθαι πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκούουσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἤδη κινδυνεύειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν οὕτω διάκεισθε, οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω·

Trevett calls this deadly danger, but ἐσχάτων can also be translated as extreme/utmost, and so has a superlative nature too. Also Sandys 1922: 194 remarks that 'ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις - κινδυνεύειν' is repeated from Demosthenes 8.34. This too can be linked back to his earlier speeches where he argues that the Assembly treats deliberative oratory as if it is a theatrical performance for their enjoyment, which in my opinion blurs the line between deliberative and epideictic oratory. In contrast, their military efforts are neglected (in particular one can think of the *First Philippic*, where he compares their prioritisation of the festivals which are governed by legislation, over military expeditions which are always ad hoc).

<sup>927</sup> Persuading people (as opposed to informing or coercing them) is *always* easier if they are positively disposed towards you. Giving advice, especially unwelcome advice, is a special instance of this. See too Livingstone 2001: 91-101 commentary on Isocrates *Busiris* 1-4, on people who are resistant to advice, and how to deal with this rhetorically.

<sup>928</sup> See discussion at Demosthenes 8.74-5 pp. 267-9.

imperative to listen to Demosthenes' advice, particularly as he asserts himself as a speaker of truth (with the rhetoric of sincerity) and exemplifies the ideal citizen by providing genuine advice:

But if you wish to hear what is to your advantage, without any flattery, I am ready to speak. Even if our situation is desperate and much has been squandered, nevertheless it is still possible to set matters right, if you are willing to do what is needed.<sup>929</sup>

And here Demosthenes returns to his concept of hope, the same hope that he presented in the *First Philippic*, that the situation can be rectified simply by the Athenians shaking off their apathy and acting:

What I am about to say to you may be paradoxical, but it is the truth: the worst aspect of what has happened holds out the best hope for the future. What do I refer to? To the fact that your affairs are in a bad state even though you are doing none of the things, small or large, that you should be doing; for, if things were as they are, and you were doing all that you should, there would be no hope of improvement.<sup>930</sup>

This is almost a verbatim repetition of his argument at the beginning of the *First Philippic*:

For its worst aspect in the past holds out our best hope for the future. What am I referring to? To the fact, men of Athens, that our situation has deteriorated so badly while you have been doing none of the things you needed to do. For if our situation were so poor when you had been doing all that you should, there would be no hope of improving matters.<sup>931</sup>

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<sup>929</sup> Demosthenes 9.4 εἰ δ' ἂν συμφέροι χωρίς κολακείας ἐθελήσεται ἀκούειν, ἔτοιμος λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάνυ φαύλως τὰ πράγματα ἔχει καὶ πολλὰ προεῖται, ὁμῶς ἔστιν, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τὰ δεόντα ποιεῖν βούλησθε, ἔτι πάντα ταῦτ' ἐπανορθώσασθαι.

<sup>930</sup> Demosthenes 9.5. καὶ παράδοξον μὲν ἴσως ἔστιν ὃ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀληθὲς δέ· τὸ χεῖριστον ἐν τοῖς παρεληλυθόσι, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ὅτι οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγ' οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει, ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ' ἂν προσῆκε πραπτόντων οὕτω διέκειτο, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλπίς ἦν αὐτὰ γενέσθαι βελτίω.

<sup>931</sup> Demosthenes 4.2. Trevett 2011: 165. Sandys 1913:194 notes that the inclusion of καὶ παράδοξον μὲν is 'an apologetic phrase here used to introduce a remark (τὸ χεῖριστον – βελτίω) which on a former occasion was bluntly stated without any preliminary apology', this being in reference to 4.2. Usher 1999: 239 is almost disdainful of this

<i>First Philippic</i> 4.2 (351 BCE)	<i>Third Philippic</i> 9.5 (341 BCE)
ὁ γάρ ἐστι χεῖριστον αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ὅτι οὐδέν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματ' ἔχει· ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ' ἃ προσῆκε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλπίς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω γενέσθαι.	τὸ χεῖριστον ἐν τοῖς παρεληλυθόσι, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ὅτι οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγ' οὐδέν τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματ' ἔχει, ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ' ἃ προσῆκε πραττόντων οὕτω διέκειτο, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλπίς ἦν αὐτὰ γενέσθαι βελτίω.

Demosthenes reaffirms the same argument: that their worst aspect is their best hope for the future, because if they had been doing their best to defeat Philip then there would be no hope to change the situation. It is interesting that, considering the failure of the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes returns to this specific argument. As this thesis has demonstrated, Demosthenes' proposals to the Assembly and core argument has not altered since the *First Philippic*, but to return verbatim to his earliest assertion, that their worst aspect is their best hope, is significant. Perhaps he believed that he was in a better position than in 352/1, and, having developed his persona over the last ten years, he considered himself to be in a position to persuade them more effectively. It could also be the case that Demosthenes is making a poignant remark on his clarity of judgement and the validity of his unheeded advice in 351. Then as now, the Athenians have not acted but only engaged in empty rhetoric, and therefore simply acting on good advice will fundamentally alter the situation.

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in his remark that 'for someone seeking novelty of thought, this speech begins disappointingly, even reverting to sentiments expressed in the *First Philippic*.' I believe Usher fails to observe the crucial point: that Demosthenes stresses the continual sincerity of his original arguments.

As such, Demosthenes repeats his complaint about their idleness and negligence, but now the statement is supported by the reality that Philip capitalised on this, rather an ominous warning:

As it is Philip has got the better of your idleness and negligence, but he has not got the better of the city. You have not been defeated: you have not even been aroused.<sup>932</sup>

Despite their current behaviour, the city of Athens has not been defeated, and as we saw in *Second Philippic*, its reputation has weathered most of the damage their apathy has created, but it can only take them so far. But because of the current political context, Demosthenes' point generates a greater sense of anger and frustration at the Assembly than in 351.

Moreover, this assertion of an undefeated Athens has parallels with the rhetoric of the epitaphic tradition, and in particular, the *Menexenus* where Socrates comments on the Peloponnesian war:

We were not destroyed by others, but were rather the agents of our own destruction.

Defeat we ourselves have inflicted on ourselves, and have been that way overcome.

Where our enemies are concerned, we remain undefeated to this day.<sup>933</sup>

Thus 9.5 repeats a motif that affirms, as Thucydides' Pericles noted, that the Athenians were undone by their own mistakes, not their adversaries.<sup>934</sup> As Loraux notes, the funeral oration:

is organised quite naturally around the same themes as the epitaphs; the same

exultation of the eternal memory of valour; the same contrast between perishable life

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<sup>932</sup> Demosthenes 9.5.  $\nu\tilde{\nu}\nu$  δὲ τῆς ῥαθυμίας τῆς ὑμετέρας καὶ τῆς ἀμελίας κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος, τῆς πόλεως δ' οὐ κεκράτηκεν· οὐδ' ἦτησθ' ὑμεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κεκίνησθε.

<sup>933</sup> Plato, *Menexenus* 243d. Loraux 1986: 199 notes 'this interpretation is logical from an Athenocentric point of view.' In particular for Plato in how 'by praising the city for vanquishing itself, the *epitaphoi* must have attracted the irony of a philosopher for whom the most shameful defeat is that which one inflicts on itself.' Loraux also compares this to *Laws* 1.626<sup>e</sup>2-3.

<sup>934</sup> Thucydides 1.144, 'I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies' designs.' Thucydides also blames internal dissension 2.65.12.

and immoral courage; the same refusal to accept the possibility that Athens could ever be defeated.<sup>935</sup>

Thus, while Demosthenes shames the current Assembly, he also seeks to inspire them to action, and his rhetoric potentially triggers this memory of eternal valour in the collective historical awareness of his audience. The Athenians, however, are currently a distortion of this ideal (undefeated currently by apathy rather than courage), and while they are not defeated, they have nevertheless shamed and dishonoured their ancestral reputation. Indeed, this repetition of the *First Philippic* compounds their shame as they are in the same, but even worse, situation because they have done nothing. Moreover, they cannot even technically be defeated as that involves making some semblance of an effort at defence. They are currently passive in their attitude to the entire situation, and Demosthenes' statement should shame the Athenians into recognition and action. Just as in the *First Philippic*, hope and belief in the power of effective deliberation and action, and the accusation that their problems are a direct result of their apathetic behaviour, are central to Demosthenes' persuasive strategy in this speech. Demosthenes is paving the way for the Assembly to take action, if they finally recognise the situation and address their own internal crisis.

This provides further confirmation of the view that the principal purpose of the speeches has been to make the Athenians recognise who they are and what kind of situation they find themselves in; for it is only by shaking off their apathy, and acting in an 'Athenian' manner that they can turn the situation around. Over the last ten years, Demosthenes has presented these ideological virtues through references to the Athenian past and his use of social memory and the master narrative.<sup>936</sup> The most important aspect is to reaffirm and

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<sup>935</sup> Loraux 1981: 92, citing *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 943; *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 945; *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 945, 11. 11-12.

<sup>936</sup> On how predominant versions of the past from the 'master narrative of Athenian history' see Forsdyke 2005: 242. Steinbock 2013: 49n1 notes, 'it is important to stress that the term "master narrative" does not denote a fixed, official narrative. Rather, it stands for the sum of the converging versions of the Athenian past, which conveys self-image and were manifested and transmitted in many ways.' Thomas 1989: 208 refers to this as 'the official polis tradition.'

reclaim Athenian identity within the Assembly itself, and act in accordance with their own ideology. They are not yet defeated, as they have not even awoken to the situation, and but if they reflect and recognise their faults, they can turn the situation around.

Demosthenes' first step is to challenge those maintaining and manipulating this internal crisis, through self-serving actions that deliberately hinder good advice. In particular, Demosthenes challenges their preoccupation with 'punishing itself.'<sup>937</sup> Demosthenes seeks to stop the internal delusions by making it clear, as he has since *On the Peace*, that Philip, not Athens, has broken the peace. Anyone who suggests otherwise ought to be the object of their hostility, as it is these manipulating flatterers, peddling delusions, that are destroying the Assembly from within.

Demosthenes affirms that Philip is at war which, as the opening stated, is not anything new, nor what Demosthenes wants to spend his crucial and limited time speaking on. Rather, Demosthenes wishes to confront those that maintain the validity of the Peace and call his own advice warmongering.<sup>938</sup>

If we were all in agreement that Philip is at war with our city and is breaking the peace, anyone who comes forward to speak would need to advise us only how to resist him most securely and most easily. But in fact some men have such an absurd attitude that, at a time when Philip is seizing cities and possesses many places that belong to you and is wronging everybody, they tolerate certain people repeatedly saying in the Assembly that it is some of us who are making war; since this is the case we must be on our guard and must correct the situation.<sup>939</sup>

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<sup>937</sup> Demosthenes 9.2.

<sup>938</sup> This speech, therefore, is as much trying to remedy the Assembly and the situation, as it is a continuation of Demosthenes' defence of himself and his policies.

<sup>939</sup> Demosthenes 9.6. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ὁμολογοῦμεν Φίλιππον τῇ πόλει πολεμεῖν καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην παραβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἔδει τὸν παριόντα λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεῦειν ἢ ὅπως ἀσφαλέστατα καὶ ῥᾶστ' αὐτὸν ἀμυνόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δ' οὕτως ἀτόπως ἔνιοι διάκεινται, ὥστε πόλεις καταλαμβάνοντος ἐκείνου καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἔχοντος καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀδικούντος ἀνέχεσθαι τινῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις λεγόντων πολλακίς ὡς ἡμῶν τινὲς εἰσὶν οἱ ποιοῦντες τὸν πόλεμον, ἀνάγκη φυλάττεσθαι καὶ διορθοῦσθαι περὶ τούτου·



Reminiscent of *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes calls their arguments illogical, as they directly contradict the evidence of Philip's intentions though his actions.<sup>940</sup> He continues that 'there is a danger that anyone who proposes and advises that we defend ourselves will be accused of warmongering'.<sup>941</sup> Having already made this argument in *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes continues his defence and asserts that anyone who argues that Philip is not at war with Athens has evidently been bribed.

Moreover, the Athenians' refusal to see this evidence also evokes the observation in the *First Philippic* that they choose to believe what they hear from others, over what they can see themselves. Building too upon their speech-act delusion in their desire to prosecute Diopeithes, the Athenians appear to cling to comfortable delusion and reject Demosthenes' *parrhēsia*.

This illogical attitude of the Assembly is demonstrative of the *mundus perversus* Athens finds itself in, and Demosthenes again attempts to correct this by demonstrating the antithesis between Philip's actions, and the words that declare peace:

If, then, it is possible for our city to remain at peace, and if this is in our hands – to start from this point – I say that we must indeed keep the peace, and I think that anyone who agrees should make proposals and take action to that effect and not try to deceive us. Yet if someone who has weapons in his hands and a great army around him offers you the name of peace but by his actions is waging war, what is left to us to do but to defend ourselves?<sup>942</sup>

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<sup>940</sup> Cf. Demosthenes 8.56, 8.69.

<sup>941</sup> Demosthenes 9.7. ἔστι γὰρ δέος μήποθ' ὡς ἀμυνόμεθα γράψας τις καὶ συμβουλευσας εἰς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐμπέση τοῦ πεποικέναι τὸν πόλεμον.

<sup>942</sup> Demosthenes 9.8. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔξεστιν εἰρήνην ἄγειν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι τοῦτο, ἴν' ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξωμαι, φήμ' ἔγωγ' ἄγειν ἡμᾶς δεῖν, καὶ τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα γράφειν καὶ πράττειν καὶ μὴ φενακίζειν ἀξιώ· εἰ δ' ἕτερος τὰ ὄπλ' ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων καὶ δύναμιν πολλὴν περὶ αὐτὸν τοῦνομα μὲν τὸ τῆς εἰρήνης ὑμῖν προβάλλει, τοῖς δ' ἔργοις αὐτὸς τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου χρήται, τί λοιπὸν ἄλλο πλὴν ἀμύνεσθαι; Sandys 1913:197 points to an added emphasis on the antithesis here. By taking ἕτερος as Philip (as at Dem 5.17) τοῦνομα is separated by μὲν from τὸ τῆς εἰρήνης, as τοῖς ἔργοις is by αὐτὸς from τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου. Sandys also observes this contrast between τοῦνομα and τὰ ἔργα in Aeschines. 3.251. Compare Thucydides 2.61.1, 'if one has a free choice and can live undisturbed, it

His ironic closing remark ‘But if you wish to say that he is keeping the peace, as he claims, I have no quarrel’, again shows his contempt for the attitude of the Assembly, and refers back to his earlier comment that if they refuse to act, then his advice can only go so far.<sup>943</sup>

Demosthenes asserts that they can keep the peace if they choose to neglect their duty, but must acknowledge the truth that they must choose that which is necessary over what is pleasant, as they can no longer have both and hope to survive.<sup>944</sup> This again must be read with *On the Chersonese* in mind, where Demosthenes argued that ‘we have no choice in the matter now: all that is left to us is to take the most just and necessary course of action.’<sup>945</sup> To maintain the Peace on the evidence of what these men say, as opposed to the evidence before them, is both illogical and dangerous:

If anyone regards as peace a situation in which Philip, after he has captured every other place, will then attack us, first of all, he is insane; and second, what he describes is your being at peace with him, not his being at peace with you. This is what Philip has bought with all his lavish expenditure: that he is at war with you, but you are not at war with him!<sup>946</sup>

Demosthenes reaffirms his position that Athens has been manipulated by enemies within, who have been bribed by Philip. They have persuaded the Assembly to be blind to Philip’s true intentions, and indeed their own, and to act against Athenian interests. I believe that this

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is sheer folly to go to war. But suppose the choice was forced upon one – submission and immediate slavery or danger with the hope of survival: then I prefer the man who stands up to danger rather than the one who runs away from it.’

<sup>943</sup> Demosthenes 9.8 φάσκειν δ’ εἰρήνην ἄγειν εἰ βούλεσθε, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος, οὐ διαφέρομαι.

<sup>944</sup> Cf. Demosthenes 1.15.

<sup>945</sup> Demosthenes 8.7.

<sup>946</sup> Demosthenes 9.9. δέ τις ταύτην εἰρήνην ὑπολαμβάνει, ἐξ ἧς ἐκεῖνος πάντα τᾶλλα λαβὼν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς ἤξει, πρῶτον μὲν μαίνεται, ἔπειτ’ ἐκείνῳ παρ’ ὑμῶν, οὐχ ὑμῖν παρ’ ἐκείνου τὴν εἰρήνην λέγει· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν ἀναλισκομένων χρημάτων πάντων Φίλιππος ὠνεῖται, αὐτὸς μὲν πολεμεῖν ὑμῖν, ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖσθαι.

shows clear evidence of the rhetoric of conspiracy, and correlates with what Roisman defines as ‘local collaborators’.<sup>947</sup>

The crisis revolves around this deception within the Assembly and Demosthenes employs the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric against other speakers who hide their true intentions. However, his main direction is at the Assembly: *rhētors* are expected to some extent to be corrupt, hence a ‘frank and persistent treatment of the subject in a range of sources attests to the primacy of self-interest in Athenian understandings of human motivation and behaviour.’<sup>948</sup> The *dēmos*, in contrast, should be above this, but in their refusal to learn neither from past errors nor from the experiences of others, it is their failure to logically deduce what in turn will happen to themselves, that arguably causes Demosthenes great concern. He seeks, as ever, to bring clarity and realisation of the truth to an obstinate Assembly:

If we wait until he admits that he is at war with us, we will be utter fools. For even if he marches against Attica itself and Piraeus, he will not admit that he is doing so, to judge (τεκμαίρεσθαι) from his treatment of others.<sup>949</sup>

Demosthenes returns to the examples in *On the Chersonese* of Olynthus, and Phocis, Pherae, Thebes, Thessaly and Oreus, to remind the Athenians of his own previous arguments that Philip’s intentions have always been in his actions, not his words:

This is what he said to the Olynthians, when he was forty stades from their city: that there were two alternatives – either they should stop living in Olynthus or he should stop living in Macedonia – although for the whole time up until then he got angry and

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<sup>947</sup> Roisman 2006: 128. Roisman applies this later to 9.59-65 and Demosthenes ‘quasi-allegorical story’ of Euphraeus.

<sup>948</sup> Christ 2006: 15.

<sup>949</sup> Demosthenes 9.10. καὶ μὴν εἰ μέχρι τούτου περιμενοῦμεν, ἕως ἂν ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσῃ πολεμεῖν, πάντων ἐσμέν εὐηθέστατοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν αὐτὴν βαδίζῃ καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ, τοῦτ’ ἐρεῖ, εἴπερ οἷς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους πεποίηκε δεῖ τεκμαίρεσθαι. Sandys 1913:198 notes τεκμαίρεσθαι is ‘to judge from sure signs or proofs’, as seen in Isocrates 4.141.

sent ambassadors to defend himself, if anyone should accuse him of having any such intention.<sup>950</sup>

Demosthenes arguably uses the example of Olynthus to mirror their own current situation in receiving a letter of complaint from Philip against Diopieithes, and in the assertion that he has no ill-intentions towards Athens, despite the siege of Byzantium and his involvement in Cardia and Euboea.<sup>951</sup> Demosthenes continues:

And he marched to Phocis as if towards an ally, and was accompanied by Phocian ambassadors as he went, and most speakers here insisted that his arrival would not benefit the Thebans. [12] Moreover, he has recently seized and is now in possession of Pherae, after entering Thessaly as a friend and ally. And last, he offered these wretched men of Oreus the pretext that the troops had been sent as friendly observers. For he saw that they were suffering from factionalism and it is the duty of allies and true friends to assist in such situations.<sup>952</sup>

Demosthenes emphasises that Philip exploits internal dissension to his own advantage by the use of ἐπισκωψόμενος, which has connotations with visitation to the sick.<sup>953</sup> Building from his earlier association of Philip with *prophasis* in the *Second Olynthiac*, the added emphasis of visiting the sick on Philip's intervention suggests a direct link between Philip's

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<sup>950</sup> Demosthenes 9.11. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ὀλυνθίοις, τετταράκοντ' ἀπέχων τῆς πόλεως στάδια, εἶπεν ὅτι δεῖ δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ ἐκείνους ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ μὴ οἰκεῖν ἢ αὐτὸν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, πάντα τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον, εἴ τις αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασαί τι τοιοῦτον, ἀγανακτῶν καὶ πρέσβεις πέμπων τοὺς ἀπολογησομένους·

<sup>951</sup> It is prudent to acknowledge that 'despite the vociferous denials of some Athenian orators, Philip had every right to protect his Cardian allies from Athenian depredations.' Buckler and Beck 2008: 239-240.

<sup>952</sup> Demosthenes 9.11-12 καὶ πρέσβεις Φωκέων ἦσαν οἱ παρηκολούθουν αὐτῷ πορευομένῳ, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἤριζον οἱ πολλοὶ Θεβαίους οὐ λυσιτελήσειν τὴν ἐκείνου πάροδον. καὶ μὴν καὶ Φεράς πρόην ὡς φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐλθὼν ἔχει καταλαβὼν, καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα τοῖς τάλαιπώροις Ὠρεΐταις τουτοῖσι ἐπισκεψομένους ἔφη τοὺς στρατιώτας πεπομφέναι κατ' εὐνοίαν· πυνθάνεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ὡς νοσοῦσι καὶ στασιάζουσι, συμμάχων δ' εἶναι καὶ φίλων ἀληθινῶν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις καιροῖς παρεῖναι. On 'νοσοῦσι' Sandys 1913:199 observes that it is 'Often used of a state smitten with the troubles of faction... καὶ στασιάζουσιν is here added as in Plato *Rep.* 470c...[and] Eur. *Herc.* 34.' Sandys 1913:199 also comments on 9.12 that, 'the series of precedents quoted by Demosthenes to prove Philip's successive aggressions is strictly in chronological order; but each example gives still stronger proof of his treachery.'

<sup>953</sup> Sandys observes ἐπισκωψόμενος is 'one of the regular terms for visiting in sickness' seen in Isoc. 19.24,30; Xen *Cyrop.* v 4, 10, viii 2,5; *Mem.* iii 11,10.' Trevett's translation of friendly observers does convey this, whilst Vince 1954: 231 chooses to translate this as 'a visit of sympathy.'

involvement with these cities, and their internal instability.<sup>954</sup> Just as Isocrates observes how Greece ‘was filled and obsessed with war and revolutions and massacres and innumerable evils’, Demosthenes suggests that Philip malignantly provoked and manipulated internal dissension.<sup>955</sup> It seems plausible then, that this additional connotation of visiting the sick adds to the picture of Philip as one who preys on the weak, and exploits the internal dissension (created by his agents): in other words, the very internal sickness Demosthenes alluded to in the *Olynthiacs*.

In repeating these instances, Demosthenes reminds the Athenians of Philip’s deceitful nature, and warns them of the fate that awaits if they do not resolve their own internal corruption. Moreover, this again reinforces the rhetoric of conspiracy to undermine the Assembly from within:

Do you suppose that he chose to deceive these people, who would have done him no wrong, although they would have perhaps defended themselves from attack, rather than declare war on them, but that he will go to war with you only after declaring it, so long as you are willing to be deceived?<sup>956</sup>

This is the same point as he made in *On the Chersonese*, that Philip would have met resistance if he had not masked his intentions, under the guise of doing each of them a favour or giving them what they wanted. In that instance, it was to show that Philip knew that attempting to bribe the entire Athenian *polis* was futile based on their historical reputation, hence the reason that his approach to Athens is different (except for the enemies within). In

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<sup>954</sup> See earlier discussion at in Chapter 2.2 p. 114 on Demosthenes 2.9.

<sup>955</sup> Isocrates first letter 9.8. Gabriel 2010: 167 notes that Isocrates’ assessment ‘did not escape Philip’s notice, and he manipulated these circumstances to his advantage with great skill.’

<sup>956</sup> Demosthenes 9.13. εἴτ’ οἴεσθ’ αὐτόν, οἱ ἐποίησαν μὲν οὐδὲν ἄν κακόν, μὴ παθεῖν δ’ ἐφυλάξαντ’ ἂν ἴσως, τούτους μὲν ἐξαπατᾶν αἰρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ προλέγοντα βιάζεσθαι, ὑμῖν δ’ ἐκ προρρήσεως πολεμήσειν, καὶ ταῦθ’ ἕως ἂν ἐκόντες ἐξαπατᾶσθε;

this instance, it is to make the Assembly wake up to the reality of the corruption within their own system, and the conspiracy to undermine and sell out Athens:

Philip would be a complete fool if, when you make no complaint about the harm he is doing to you but instead blame some of your own citizens,<sup>957</sup> he were to put an end to your internal strife and rivalry, and announce that you should direct them against him instead, and deprive those who are in his pay of the argument by means of which they put you off: that Philip is not at war with the city.<sup>958</sup>

In this way, Demosthenes asserts that the Assembly cannot see the true enemy, nor recognise their own selves, and that the manipulation of this internal crisis all serves Philip's interests. Demosthenes' purpose is to make the Assembly see the illogical stance they have taken, which is at odds with their intellectual reputation. Demosthenes implores the Assembly to see reason, and that Philip's words, and the words of those in his pay, do not reflect his true intentions:

Yet Philip, from the start, as soon as the peace had been made, at a time when Diopieithes was not yet a general and those who are now in the Chersonese had not yet been sent out, set about seizing Serrium and Doriscus and expelling from Fort Serrium and the Sacred Mountain the troops whom your general had stationed there.<sup>959</sup>

As in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes asks the Assembly to prioritise what they can see happening over what they hear:

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<sup>957</sup> We can presume he is referring to Diopieithes.

<sup>958</sup> Demosthenes 9.14. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀβελτερώτατος εἴη πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ τῶν ἀδικουμένων ὑμῶν μηδὲν ἐγκαλοῦντων αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν τινὰς αἰτιωμένων, ἐκεῖνος ἐκλύσας τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριν ὑμῶν καὶ φιλονικίαν ἐφ' αὐτὸν προείποι τρέπεσθαι, καὶ τῶν παρ' ἑαυτοῦ μισθοφορούντων τοὺς λόγους ἀφέλοιτο, οἷς ἀναβάλλουσιν ὑμᾶς, λέγοντες ὡς ἐκεῖνός γ' οὐ πολεμεῖ τῇ πόλει.

<sup>959</sup> Demosthenes 9.15. ὁ τοίνυν Φίλιππος ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἄρτι τῆς εἰρήνης γεγονυίας, οὐπω Διοπείθους στρατηγοῦντος οὐδὲ τῶν ὄντων ἐν Χερρονήσῳ νῦν ἀπεσταλμένων, Σέρριον καὶ Δορίσκον ἐλάμβανε καὶ τοὺς ἐκ Σερρείου τείχους καὶ Ἰεροῦ ὄρους στρατιώτας ἐξέβαλλεν, οὓς ὁ ὑμέτερος στρατηγὸς κατέστησεν.

Is there anyone, by Zeus, in his right mind who would decide who was at peace with him and who at war by their words rather than by their actions? Of course not.<sup>960</sup>

This also returns to the uncomfortable inversion of the Athenians and their *mundus perversus*: Athenian *logos*, in the form of pointless deliberation, prevents effective action, whereas Philip's deceptive words enable his actions. Whilst there is a vast difference between Philip's words of peace and his actions, demonstrating a corruption of the virtuous ideal of aligning *logos* and *ergon*, they nevertheless work to the same end with devastating effect. But it is also precisely the insincerity of Philip's *logos* that can be his undoing, if the Athenians act, as sincere *logos* united with effective *ergon* will restore the Athenians to their previous effectiveness.

Moreover, it is the duty of the Athenians not only to recognise the discrepancy between Philip's speeches and his actions, but to act upon it:

In taking these actions, what was he doing? It was peace he had sworn! And let no one say, "what are these places?" or "How does this concern the city?" for whether these places were small, or whether any of them concerned you, are different matters. Piety and justice are equally important whether someone transgresses over a small or a large matter.<sup>961</sup>

Whilst this definitely shows the aggression of Philip, Demosthenes' purpose is to confront the Assembly and those that are deceiving them that the Peace of Philocrates still stands.<sup>962</sup> Furthermore, Demosthenes' call to uphold the Athenian virtues of piety and justice for all Greeks arguably could have resonated with the *dēmos*' awareness of the master narrative of

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<sup>960</sup> Demosthenes 9.15. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν, ὃ πρὸς τοῦ Διός, ὅστις εὖ φρονῶν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων τὸν ἄγοντ' εἰρήνην ἢ πολεμοῦνθ' ἑαυτῷ σκέψαιτ' ἄν; οὐδεὶς δῆπου.

<sup>961</sup> Demosthenes 9.16. καίτοι ταῦτα πράττων τί ἐποίει; εἰρήνην μὲν γὰρ ὠμωμόκει· καὶ μηδεὶς εἶπη· "τί δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἢ τί τούτων μέλει τῇ πόλει;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ μικρὰ ταῦτ' ἢ μηδὲν ὑμῖν αὐτῶν ἔμελεν, ἄλλος ἂν εἶη λόγος οὗτος· τὸ δ' εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἄν τ' ἐπὶ μικροῦ τις ἂν τ' ἐπὶ μείζονος παραβαίη, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν.

<sup>962</sup> In particular, we can identify Aeschines here, as Trevett 2011: 159 notes in Aeschines 3.82 he 'mocks their insignificance.'

Athenian ideology. Parallels to this appeal to piety and justice can be found in the *epitaphioi logoi* such as Lysias 2 ‘it was fitting for our ancestors to be single-minded in the fight for justice, because the origin of their life was just.’<sup>963</sup> Indeed, Lysias also states that the Persian King knew that if he attacked any of the Greeks, he would have to face the Athenians ‘because the Athenians would eagerly come to the rescue of those being wronged.’<sup>964</sup> Likewise, Plato’s *Menexenus* asserts an Athenian resolve to view the concerns of Greece as the concerns of Athens:

Our fathers and these men themselves, performed many fine deeds, for all the world to see...in the belief that freedom was worth fighting for, whether for the Greeks against Greeks or for Greece as a whole against barbarians.<sup>965</sup>

Indeed, Plato’s Socrates goes so far as to state that even when the Athenians felt wronged by the other Greeks and resolved to abandon them to their fate, Athens then ‘buckled and did help them...releasing them from slavery – with the result that they were free until they themselves once more enslaved each other.’<sup>966</sup> Athenians, therefore, had a reputation for upholding piety and justice, and I would go so far as to argue that Demosthenes’ audience would have been aware of this duty, perpetuated through their collective awareness of this identity through the transmission of social memory; ‘consequently, the Athenians are the only people who cannot idly stand by when an act of injustice is being committed.’<sup>967</sup>

Thus, I propose Demosthenes asserts this Panhellenic duty as their Athenian inheritance: to be a beacon of hope and a pious exemplar. These, as the *Second Philippic*

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<sup>963</sup> Lysias 2.17.

<sup>964</sup> Lysias 2.22.

<sup>965</sup> Plato *Menexenus* 239a-b.

<sup>966</sup> Plato *Menexenus* 244e-245a. This shall be expanded on later in the speech at 9.24-25 where Demosthenes presents examples of how the Athenians of old went to war to defend others interests, and again at 9.42 with the decree against Arthmius.

<sup>967</sup> Steinbock 2013: 55. I believe this can also be applied to the *Olynthiacs*, and the shame that they did idly stand by.



suggested, are the standards they are held to by their enemies, their allies and their ancestors, and thus what they should hold themselves to. As such, Demosthenes maintains a delicate balance between showing how the problem is bigger than Athens, and at the same time making it clear that Athens is at the centre of the conflict (as Philip's target), and the solution (as only Athens has the reputation that demonstrates their fitness to save the Greeks). In doing so, Demosthenes asserts that their own preservation is paramount, not just out of self-interest, as to act in any other manner is a rejection of their duty. Thus, to act in defence of the Greeks is imperative to their own security (as in *On the Peace*), but to maintain their very identity.<sup>968</sup> Moreover, in evoking the ideals of piety and justice, Demosthenes raises his rhetoric above mercenary numbers to the values of piety and justice which are of a higher order of *nomoi* that transcend the everyday *nomoi* of e.g. *theorika* preservation.<sup>969</sup> In risking their displeasure Demosthenes asserts that he answers to a higher *nomos* and a deeper duty, and that to transgress his duty to give honest advice would be worse than to transgress the *nomoi* protecting things such as the Theoric fund. By considering *parrhēsia* as a core duty of the Athenian adviser, Demosthenes is able to challenge the authority of the *dēmos* without putting himself up as a rival authority; ultimately his *parrhēsia* is not suppressible as he is honour-bound to speak.

Thus, by asserting that his speech is in defence of the sanctity of advice-giving, which is currently undermined by *themselves*, Demosthenes clarifies that whilst Philip is an undeniable threat, the bigger picture is their own internal corruption, and what else will be lost if they continue to not act on the situation and stand idly by. In the *First Philippic*, the

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<sup>968</sup> One could compare Pericles at Thucydides 2.61, 'You must remember that you are citizens of a great city and that you were brought up in a way of life suited to her greatness; you must therefore be willing to face the greatest disasters and be determined never to sacrifice the glory that is yours. We all look with distaste on people who arrogantly pretend to a reputation to which they are not entitled; but equally to be condemned are those who, through a lack of moral fibre, fail to live up to the reputation which is already theirs.'

<sup>969</sup> In terms of higher *nomoi*, I mean in the sense that Antigone regarded the duty to her *oikos* and honouring the dead as of higher order than obeying the laws of the king.

role of Philip could (according to Demosthenes) have been filled by anyone, but their own lack of action would have resulted in the same outcome. Over the last decade, however, it became increasingly apparent that the unique nature of Philip has exacerbated this crisis through both his own relentless qualities, but also his tyrannical deception and diplomatic trickery.<sup>970</sup> This includes his manipulation of internal strife working within Athens to manipulate the Assembly to Philip's will. Demosthenes' complaint is that despite all they have lost, the Assembly still does not take decisive action and he rhetorically calls the Assembly to confront the logic of his deductions:

Very well then, when he sends mercenaries into the Chersonese, which the King and all the Greeks have recognised as yours, and admits he is providing help and sends a letter for this effect, what is he doing?<sup>971</sup>

Demosthenes does not just call them to act in the interests of justice and piety (although they should), but to defend their own interests and not repeat the same mistakes that cost them their possessions in the north Aegean, leading up to and following the fall of Olynthus and the Peace of Philocrates. By evoking these past examples of Philip's actions, Demosthenes' arguments acquire a sense of inevitability:

He says that he is not at war. But I so completely disagree that, by these actions, he is keeping the peace with you, that I make this assertion: by seizing Megara for himself and establishing a tyranny in Euboea and now entering Thrace and intriguing in the Peloponnese and doing all that he is doing by force, he is in breach of the peace and is at war with you.<sup>972</sup>

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<sup>970</sup> This is, of course, according to Demosthenes' rhetoric.

<sup>971</sup> Demosthenes 9.16. φέρε δὴ νῦν, ἥνικ' εἰς Χερρόνησον, ἦν βασιλεὺς καὶ πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνας ὑμετέραν ἐγνώκασιν εἶναι, ξένους εἰσπέμπει καὶ βοηθεῖν ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ἐπιστέλλει ταῦτα, τί ποιεῖ;

<sup>972</sup> Demosthenes 9.17. φησὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολεμεῖν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτου δέω ταῦτα ποιοῦντ' ἐκεῖνον ἄγειν ὁμολογεῖν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήνην, ὥστε καὶ Μεγάρων ἀπτόμενον καὶ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ τυραννίδα κατασκευάζοντα καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Θράκην παριόντα καὶ τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ σκευωρούμενον καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα πράττει μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ποιοῦντα, λύειν φημί τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ πολεμεῖν ὑμῖν.

Demosthenes is direct and clear here, but also makes the situation almost overwhelming:

unless you will claim that even those who have set up siege engines are keeping the peace, until they bring them up to the city walls! But you will not say this, since anyone whose actions and preparations are aimed at seizing me is at war with me, even if he has not yet started throwing missiles or shooting at me.<sup>973</sup>

Demosthenes uses emotive and destructive war imagery to reinforce his point on the stark contrast between these destructive actions and Philip's hollow peaceful words, and the danger this poses to an Assembly that refuses to see reality, but chooses comfortable delusion.

Demosthenes continues his scare tactics by asking:

What dangers would you face, if war should break out, the loss of the Hellespont, your enemy gaining control of Megara and Euboea, the Peloponnesians going over to his side. Am I then supposed to say that the man who has set up this engine against our city is at peace with you?<sup>974</sup>

In this frank and terrifying prospect, Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* builds upon his assertions in *On the Chersonese* that the duty of the good citizen to say what is necessary despite its unpopularity, and likewise here, Demosthenes refuses to comfort the Assembly with lies, when the logical evidence before them says otherwise. Also, in listing the potential dangers, Demosthenes not only presents the scale of the crisis they face, and what they stand to lose to Philip in an increasingly small world, but repeats his recurrent question: what will they endure before they do their duty?

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<sup>973</sup> Demosthenes 9.17. εἰ μὴ καὶ τοὺς τὰ μηχανήματ' ἐφιστάντας εἰρήνην ἄγειν φήσετε, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ τοῖς τείχεσιν ἤδη προσαγάγωσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ φήσετε· ὁ γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἐγὼ ληφθεῖην, ταῦτα πράττων καὶ κατασκευαζόμενος, οὗτος ἐμοὶ πολεμεῖ, κἂν μήπω βάλλη μηδὲ τοξεύῃ. Sandys 1913:204 notes the opening with εἰ μὴ implies an afterthought. I suggest that the effect is to place an ironic emphasis on this very real prospect.

<sup>974</sup> Demosthenes 9.18. τίσιν οὖν ὑμεῖς κινδυνεύσαίτ' ἂν, εἴ τι γένοιτο; τῷ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀλλοτριωθῆναι, τῷ Μεγάρων καὶ τῆς Εὐβοίας τὸν πολεμῶνθ' ὑμῖν γενέσθαι κύριον, τῷ Πελοποννησίους τάκεινου φρονῆσαι. εἶτα τὸν τοῦτο τὸ μηχανήμ' ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἰστάντα, τοῦτον εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἐγὼ φῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς;

Demosthenes' hypophora is then resolved to reinforce the point that Philip is at war, and anyone that argues otherwise is lying:

Absolutely not! I define him as having been at war with us from the day he destroyed Phocis. And I say that if you are sensible, you will defend yourselves; but if you give him free rein, you will not be able to do this even when you wish to.<sup>975</sup>

Again, Demosthenes presents the same argument as was set out in the *First Philippic* and developed in the *Olynthiacs*: that if they continue to let Philip act unchecked, they will be in a situation which they can no longer control but only react to, even on Attic soil.

Moreover, having discredited the other *rhētors* as manipulators of rhetoric, Demosthenes fashions himself as the sole voice of reason. He is the only man who can see the situation for what it is, in an almost prophetic manner.<sup>976</sup> This gives Demosthenes' argument authority, and his logic the only path to success:

I see the situation so differently than your other advisors, men of Athens, that at this point I think you shouldn't be deliberating about even the Chersonese or Byzantium.<sup>977</sup>

The rhetoric of sincerity from his own perspective further emphasises his own persona as dutiful the *parrhēsiastes*, whose concerns are those of the *polis*:

I wish to tell you why the situation alarms me, in order that, if my assessment is correct, you may share it and take precautions for yourselves at least, even if you refuse to do so for the other Greeks.<sup>978</sup>

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<sup>975</sup> Demosthenes 9.19. πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἧς ἡμέρας ἀνεῖλε Φωκέας, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἔγωγ' αὐτὸν πολεμεῖν ὀρίζομαι. ὑμᾶς δ', ἐὰν ἀμύνησθ' ἤδη, σωφρονήσειν ρημί, ἐὰν δ' ἐάσητε, οὐδὲ τοῦθ' ὅταν βούλησθε δυνήσεσθαι ποιῆσαι.

<sup>976</sup> The concept of the seer is discussed by Flower 2008.

<sup>977</sup> Demosthenes 9.19. καὶ τοσοῦτόν γ' ἀφέστηκα τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν συμβουλευόντων, ὥστ' οὐδὲ δοκεῖ μοι περὶ Χερρονήσου νῦν σκοπεῖν οὐδὲ Βυζαντίου.

<sup>978</sup> Demosthenes 9.20. βούλομαι δ' εἰπεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐξ ὧν ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτω φοβοῦμαι, ἵν' εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς λογίζομαι, μετάσχητε τῶν λογισμῶν καὶ πρόνοιάν τιν' ὑμῶν γ' αὐτῶν εἰ μὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρα βούλεσθε. As previously noted at pp. 139-40, Foucault 1983 (2001): 12 argues the *parrhēsiastes* shows 'as directly as possible what he actually believes'.

As one whose personal interests are aligned with the welfare of the *polis*, what alarms Demosthenes should concern the Assembly too. And whilst he calls them to act in their own interests, he simultaneously shames them that the plight of Greece should be enough motivation to act, but either way he concedes to their sovereignty:

But if you think that I am talking nonsense and have been struck senseless, you should conclude that I am not in my right mind and pay no attention to me, either now or in the future.<sup>979</sup>

Building once more upon the example of Timotheus, discussed above, Demosthenes again asserts how it is the duty of the adviser to consistently attempt to advise the Assembly, even when they reject his truth. To this end, Demosthenes attempts to explain the nature of the situation to the Assembly, and begins with an apophasis:

That Philip has grown great from small and humble beginnings, and that the Greeks are distrustful and quarrelsome towards each other, and that it was much more surprising that he should have become so great from his previous condition than that now, when he has taken so many places already, he should be bringing the rest under his control as well, and all such topics that I could discuss, I shall leave to one side.<sup>980</sup>

This, in my opinion, serves to reverse the expected: as Demosthenes has said, Philip rising from nothing to greatness is more surprising than if he gained power from the position he is in now; perhaps Demosthenes presents the strange inversion of what is expected as a hope that what they dread, and logically deduce, may not come to pass, and returns to his point in the *Olynthiacs* that, like all thieves, Philip will be found out and his power will fall.

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<sup>979</sup> Demosthenes 9.20. ποιήσησθε, ἐὰν δὲ ληρεῖν καὶ τετυφῶσθαι δοκῶ, μήτε νῦν μήτ' αὖθις ὡς ὑγιαίνοντί μοι προσέχητε.

<sup>980</sup> Demosthenes 9.21. ὅτι μὲν δὴ μέγας ἐκ μικροῦ καὶ ταπεινοῦ τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς Φίλιππος ἠΰξηται, καὶ ἀπίστως καὶ στασιαστικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ ὅτι πολλῶ παραδοξότερον ἦν τοσοῦτον αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι ἢ νῦν, ὅθ' οὕτω πολλὰ προείληφε, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὑφ' αὐτῶ ποιήσασθαι, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτ' ἂν ἔχοιμι διεξελθεῖν, παραλείπω.

Moreover, though the apophasis continues the complaint from 9.5-6 that Philip has grown through seizing Athenian possessions, he was permitted to do so because the Assembly gave him free reign. The real issue is the corruption/ apathy/ delusion/self-destruction of the Assembly itself:

But I see that everyone, starting with you, has conceded to him the one thing that has been the cause of every single previous Greek war. What is this? It is the right to do what he wants, and to plunder and rob each of the Greeks in turn, and to attack and enslave their cities.<sup>981</sup>

The additional connotations of plundering and robbing, and to attacks and enslavement, are also reminiscent of the *First Philippic* where Philip's conduct was likened to ensnaring the Athenians as if with nets.<sup>982</sup> This also invokes shame on all the Greeks, but in particular Athens, for not acting when they could systematically see this occurring across the Greek world. In enabling Philip to flourish unchecked, Demosthenes further emphasises the guilt and shame by recalling their past reputation, to again compare and contrast their current attitude and behaviour:

And yet you were the leaders of Greece for seventy-three years, and the Spartans were leaders for twenty-nine. The Thebans also became quite powerful in recent times, after the battle of Leuctra. Nevertheless, men of Athens, the Greeks have never yet conceded to you or the Thebans or the Spartans the right to do whatever you wish – far from it.<sup>983</sup>

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<sup>981</sup> Demosthenes 9.22. ἀλλ' ὁρῶ συγκεχωρηκότας ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους, ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἀρξαμένους, αὐτῶ, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὸν ἄλλον ἅπαντα χρόνον πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γεγόνασιν οἱ Ἑλληνικοί. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο; τὸ ποιεῖν ὃ τι βούλεται, καὶ καθ' ἕν' οὕτως περικόπτειν καὶ λωποδυτεῖν τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ καταδουλοῦσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐπιόντα. There is also the irony that Demosthenes has already said this in the *Olynthiacs* to no avail when the situation was acute. Usher 1999: 240 argues that this is 'an extension of the Thucydidean idea that empires are the result of natural human opportunism in the face of passivity (1.76.2, 4.61.5, 5.105.2).'

<sup>982</sup> Cf. Demosthenes 4.9.

<sup>983</sup> Demosthenes 9.23. καίτοι προστάται μὲν ὑμεῖς ἑβδομήκοντ' ἔτη καὶ τρία τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐγένεσθε, προστάται δὲ τριάκονθ' ἐνὸς δέοντα Λακεδαιμόνιοι· ἴσχυσαν δέ τι καὶ Θηβαῖοι τουτουσὶ τοὺς τελευταίους χρόνους μετὰ τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχην. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐθ' ὑμῖν οὔτε Θηβαίοις οὔτε Λακεδαιμόνιοις οὐδεπόποτ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,

In this manner he reminds them, again, of their past reputation and the values of Athenian ideology, and how far removed their current behaviour is from these ideals, to the extent that they are now even unworthy of their old enemies. Demosthenes not only shames the Athenians, but he holds them to account by using the reputation of their ancestral exempla to define the values that led them to defend both their own interests and these values themselves:

But first, since you – or rather the Athenians of the time – were thought to be treating some people unfairly, everyone, even those who had no complaint to make of them, thought that they had to go to war with them in support of those who had been wronged. Again, after the Spartans had become the masters and attained the same supremacy as yours, when they tried to encroach and were disturbing the status quo beyond what was reasonable everyone declared war on them, even those who had no complaint against them.<sup>984</sup>

And it was this Panhellenic duty to maintain the balance of power/prevent injustice, that Demosthenes asserts is lost in the attitudes of the Greeks now:

What need is there to speak of the others? Both we and the Spartans, although at first we had virtually no wrongs to complain of at each other's hands, nevertheless felt driven to go to war because of the injustice that we saw others suffering.<sup>985</sup>

This is again reminiscent of *First Philippic* where he proposed:

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συνεχωρήθη τοῦθ' ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ποιεῖν ὃ τι βούλοισθε, οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ· Sandys 1913: 208 notes that the use of προστάται (προστάτης: one who stands before/in the front rank) for Athens and Sparta 'implies that their position was to a certain extent legitimate.' He compares this to Demosthenes' description of Thebes as only ἴσχυσαν: *became* powerful, thus in my opinion implying their strength, but not their position as leaders. This, for my own argument, would fit well with Demosthenes' presentation of Thebes as the natural defectors in the *Second Philippic* as discussed at pp. 206-7.

<sup>984</sup> Demosthenes 9.24. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὑμῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς τότε οὔσιν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπειδὴ τισιν οὐ μετρίως ἐδόκουν προσφέρεσθαι, πάντες ᾤοντο δεῖν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχοντες αὐτοῖς, μετὰ τῶν ἡδίκημένων πολεμεῖν· καὶ πάλιν Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρξασιν καὶ παρελθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν δυναστείαν ὑμῖν, ἐπειδὴ πλεονάζειν ἐπεχείρουν καὶ πέρα τοῦ μετρίου τὰ καθεστηκότ' ἐκίνουν, πάντες εἰς πόλεμον κατέστησαν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς.

<sup>985</sup> Demosthenes 9.25. καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους λέγειν; ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὃ τι ἡδικοῦμεθ' ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ὅμως ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικουμένους ἐωρῶμεν, πολεμεῖν ὀόμεθα δεῖν.

Next, you must consider...how well and appropriately you acted, in keeping with the reputation of the city, and endured war against them for the sake of justice.<sup>986</sup>

And this praise of the idealised virtuous behaviour of the ideological ancestors, then turns again into a rebuke of their current state:

And yet all the wrongs that were done by the Spartans in those thirty years, and by our ancestors in seventy, are fewer, men of Athens, than the wrongs that Philip has done to Greece in the fewer than thirteen years since he emerged from obscurity. Or rather, they are scarcely a fraction of them.<sup>987</sup>

Philip is an embodiment of their worst selves in the superlative; he exceeds all their collective wrongs together, which emphasises not only the necessity to act against Philip, but with the reminder of Philip's emergence from obscurity, Demosthenes reminds the Athenians that their apathy and lack of action has permitted Philip to become the greatest threat to Greek freedom. In this regard, they are again the antithesis of the projection of Athenian identity from the *epitaphioi logoi*:

In the eyes of the Athenians, Athens' role as champion of the Greeks [προστάτης τῶν Ἑλλήνων] involved not only the defence of Greece against barbarian invaders but also the protection of the weak against the unjust oppression of overbearing Greek Powers.<sup>988</sup>

Their lack of action against Philip – who in this short space of time has surpassed all of their respective evils – and their failure to even acknowledge this, but insist on peace, is a damning assessment of their own current character. Indeed, this list of Philip's wrongs could easily be a list of what the Athenians have neglected:

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<sup>986</sup> Demosthenes 4.3

<sup>987</sup> Demosthenes 9.25. καίτοι πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐξημάρτηται καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντ' ἐκείνοις ἔτεσι καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις προγόνοις ἐν τοῖς ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐλάττων' ἐστίν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὧν Φίλιππος ἐν τρισὶ καὶ δέκ' οὐχ ὅλοις ἔτεσιν, οἷς ἐπιπολάζει, ἠδίκηκε τοὺς Ἕλληνας, μᾶλλον δ' οὐδὲ μέρος τούτων ἐκεῖνα.

<sup>988</sup> Steinbock 2013: 54, based on Lysias 2.47.



I say nothing about Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia and the thirty-two cities of the coast of Thrace, all of which he destroyed with such cruelty that it would be hard for a visitor to tell whether they had ever been inhabited. I also pass over in silence the destruction of the Phocian nation, which was so populous. But what of Thessaly? Did he not remove their constitution and cities and established tetrarchies, so that they might be slaves not only by city but also by region?<sup>989</sup>

Not only does the polysyndeton in the recurrent use of *καὶ* emphasise the list of wrongs, but the use of apophasis also intensifies Philip's terrible actions. This serves the purpose of further criticising the Assembly for not attempting to stop Philip in their actions, and for still upholding a futile peace.<sup>990</sup>

Demosthenes develops this further:

Are not tyrants now in control of the cities of Euboea, an island that is close to both Thebes and Athens? Does he not expressly write in his letters: "I am at peace with those who wish to give heed to me"? Nor does he fail to put what he has written into effect. For he has set out against the Hellespont, previously he marches against Ambracia, he possesses a city as great as Elis in the Peloponnese, and he has recently plotted against Megara. Neither Greece nor the rest of the world can contain this man's greed.<sup>991</sup>

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<sup>989</sup> Demosthenes 9.26. Ὀλυνθον μὲν δὴ καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Ἀπολλωνίαν καὶ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα πόλεις ἐπὶ Θράκης ἔῶ, ἃς ἀπάσας οὕτως ὠμῶς ἀνήρηκεν ὥστε μὴδ' εἰ πώποτ' ᾤκηθησαν προσελθόντ' εἶναι ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν· καὶ τὸ Φωκέων ἔθνος τοσοῦτον ἀνηρημένον σιωπῶ. ἀλλὰ Θετταλία πῶς ἔχει, οὐχὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς πόλεις αὐτῶν παρήρηται καὶ τετραρχίας κατέστησεν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον κατὰ πόλεις ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἔθνη δουλεύουσιν; As discussed in Chapter Two pp. 157-8, the destruction of Olynthus is also attested to in Diodorus 16.53.3. Gabriel 2010: 155 considers this false, and that only Stageria was destroyed in such a manner.

<sup>990</sup> Both Hermogenes (iii 335) and Demetrius (ix 109) note Demosthenes' use of paralipsis here.

<sup>991</sup> Demosthenes 9.27. αἱ δ' ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ πόλεις οὐκ ἤδη τυραννοῦνται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν νήσῳ πλησίον Θηβῶν καὶ Ἀθηνῶν; οὐ διαρρήδην εἰς τὰς ἐπιστολάς γράφει "ἐμοὶ δ' ἐστὶν εἰρήνη πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούειν ἐμοῦ βουλομένους"; καὶ οὐ γράφει μὲν ταῦτα, τοῖς δ' ἔργοις οὐ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐφ' Ἑλλησποντον οἴχεται, πρότερον ἦκεν ἐπ' Ἀμβρακίαν, ἧλιν ἔχειτηλικαύτην πόλιν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, Μεγάρους ἐπεβούλευσε πρόην, οὐθ' ἢ Ἑλλὰς οὐθ' ἢ βάρβαρος τὴν πλεονεξίαν χωρεῖ τάνθρωπον.

On being at peace with those who give heed, 'ἐμοὶ δ' ἐστὶν εἰρήνη πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούειν ἐμοῦ βουλομένους' Sandys 1913: 210 notes that both ἐμοὶ and ἐμοῦ are 'emphatic and self-assertive', which in my opinion adds to the

Philip is now uniting his written *logos* and his *ergon* to devastating effect and is uncontainable and insatiable in his extreme *pleonexia*: οὐθ' ἢ Ἑλλὰς οὐθ' ἢ βάρβαρος τὴν πλεονεξίαν χωρεῖ τάνθρωπον. In asserting this, Demosthenes stresses the urgency of the situation, but also shames the Assembly for permitting such a man to be in this position, and act as he wishes. Demosthenes asserts that the Athenians cannot maintain the illusion of peace against such injustice, and indeed they must act against Philip as they did previously against the Persians and the Spartans.<sup>992</sup> Whilst Philip's vices have determined the scale of their external crisis, he would not have been in such a position had the Athenians not left a power vacuum to be exploited in the first place. As Demosthenes has argued since the *First Philippic*, this is a self-inflicted crisis, and all of their problems originate from the corruption within the Assembly:

We Greeks all see and hear these things happening, but we do not send ambassadors about them to each other and get angry; we are in such poor condition and are so entrenched in our separate cities that right up to the present day, we have been unable to take any advantageous or necessary step, or to unite, or to form an association of mutual aid and friendship. We overlook his growing power, and though each of us recognises that Philip profits from the opportunities that others squander, or so it seems to me, none of us deliberates or acts to save Greece.<sup>993</sup>

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aggressive expansionist nature of Philip which Demosthenes is utilising to prove that there is no longer a peace to maintain.

<sup>992</sup> Demosthenes has referred to such examples over the speeches.

<sup>993</sup> Demosthenes 9.28-9. καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἕλληνες ἅπαντες καὶ ἀκούοντες οὐ πέμπομεν πρέσβεις περὶ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀγανακτοῦμεν, οὕτω δὲ κακῶς διακείμεθα καὶ διορωρύγεθα κατὰ πόλεις ὥστ' ἄχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν συμφερόντων οὔτε τῶν δεόντων πρᾶξαι δυνάμεθα, οὐδὲ συστήναι, οὐδὲ κοινωνίαν βοηθείας καὶ φιλίας οὐδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μείζω γιγνόμενον τὸν ἄνθρωπον περιορῶμεν, τὸν χρόνον κερδᾶναι τοῦτον ὃν ἄλλος ἀπόλλυται ἕκαστος ἐγνωκῶς, ὡς γ' ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐχ ὅπως σωθήσεται τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σκοπῶν οὐδὲ πράττων,

The contrast between what they see and what they do is there to demonstrate the core problem. As a collective, they refuse to see what is happening, or the opportunity to act, because they have turned from hard virtues to self-satisfying vice.

However, maintaining his method of criticism and hope, Demosthenes suggests that these qualities of Philip's nature which make him so formidable, are simultaneously natural flaws to be exploited: Philip's *akrasia* and *pleonexia* risk destabilising the ever-expanding Macedonian kingdom, and underline the injustice of his actions towards Athens.<sup>994</sup> As noted in Chapter One, Aristotle's definition of the ideal *polis* maintains it should not stretch beyond a certain size, else it makes itself unstable.<sup>995</sup> Linking this with his views on *pleonexia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we could view Demosthenes' remarks on Philip's flaws as evidence that Macedonian expansion has destabilised its own power by an excessive greed which chases apparent goods.<sup>996</sup> Such a view on unstable expansion is also suggested by Herodotus' Cyrus, when he warns of the dangers of moving too far from Persia, the place that provided their strength.<sup>997</sup> Indeed, the flaws of *pleonexia* and greed resonate throughout both Herodotus and Thucydides where 'greed thus infected a central pillar of democratic process and destroyed the sense of civic trust on which Athenian vitality depended.'<sup>998</sup> If we assume

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<sup>994</sup> I am not arguing that this was the actual case, but rather I am presenting Demosthenes' argument.

<sup>995</sup> As noted in Chapter One pp. 42-3 on Aristotle *Politics* 7.1326b, and Roochnik 2013: 211.

<sup>996</sup> For a discussion on greed and injustice in classical Greece see Balot 2001. Balot 2001: 24 argues that in the *Ethics*, Aristotle discusses *pleonexia* as a means to discuss the virtue of justice, and *pleonexia*, the vice of excess 'accounts for the drive to get more in violation of communal canons of distributive fairness.' Curzer 1995: 215 discusses, with reference to Hobbes, the notion that *pleonexia* is not just greed for more, but a desire for that which is not rightfully yours, '*Pleonexia* is a desire for certain good not *qua* good, but rather *qua* more', where gain (*kerdos*) is a characteristic of *pleonexia*.'

<sup>997</sup> Herodotus 9.121.3. On the proposal to move out and find better land Herodotus states that 'Cyrus did not regard this as a wonderful proposal; he did tell them to carry it out, however, with the recommendation that as they did so they should prepare to be rulers no longer, but rather to become subjects under the rule of others. This was so, he said, because soft places tend to produce soft men; for the same land cannot yield both wonderful crops and men who are noble and courageous in war.' This can also be read with the *Airs, Waters, Places* from the Hippocratic corpus and the notion of environmental determinism, and the belief behaviours can be pre-determined by geographical conditioning. Cyrus' point is not that they should not leave Persia because it is their natural place, but that Persia, by its (tough) nature, has formed their (tough) nature. Of course what point Herodotus, the creator of the character Cyrus, is making is a matter of interpretation.

<sup>998</sup> Balot 2001: 166. For greed in Herodotus and Thucydides see Balot 2001: 99-179.

a fairly high level of exposure to ideas about greed and its consequences through oratory, drama, and social memory, the Assembly will have been primed to detect these loaded notions within Demosthenes' speech.

Demosthenes then takes this poor condition and emotively transforms it into a physical example – which psychologically makes the audience feel uncomfortable by making Philip, ‘like the periodic return or the sudden onset of a fever or some other evil, he visits even those who seem to have kept far away from him; not one of you is ignorant of this.’<sup>999</sup> This potentially psychologically discomfited the Assembly by the cognitive triggers of sickness, previously remarked upon in the *Olynthiacs*, where the weak passivity of the Athenians and their enemies within, is likened to a doctor that neither cures nor kills. Here too, Philip is a consuming fever, and will exploit their already weakened state.<sup>1000</sup>

This develops into the height of Demosthenes' criticism of Philip throughout the speeches, where he examines the levels of shame that the Greeks can endure:

You also know that all the wrongs the Greeks suffered at the hands of the Spartans or of ourselves were injustices committed by genuine Greeks at least, and one should treat this in the same way as if a legitimate son, after coming into a great fortune, manages it badly and unjustly: such a person deserves blame and censure for his actions, but it cannot be denied that he who was doing these things was an heir.<sup>1001</sup>

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<sup>999</sup> Demosthenes 9.29. ἐπεὶ, ὅτι γ' ὥσπερ περίοδος ἢ καταβολὴ πυρετοῦ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς κακοῦ καὶ τῷ πάνυ πόρρω δοκοῦντι νῦν ἀφεστάναι προσέρχεται, οὐδεις ἀγνοεῖ.

<sup>1000</sup> As argued at p. 292, Philip's involvement in other states internal affairs has been likened to visiting the sick. Regarding cognitive reactions, Devereaux 2015 discusses how, in Cicero's *Philippics*, the description of Antony being physically sick triggers a physical repulsive sensation within the physical bodies of the audience.

<sup>1001</sup> Demosthenes 9.30: αἱ μὴν κάκεινό γ' ἴστε, ὅτι ὅσα μὲν ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἔπασχον οἱ Ἕλληνας, ἀλλ' οὖν ὑπὸ γνησίων γ' ὄντων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡδικοῦντο, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἂν τις ὑπέλαβε τοῦθ', ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ υἱὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ πολλῇ γεγονῶς γνήσιος διώκει τι μὴ καλῶς μηδ' ὀρθῶς, κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτ' ἄξιον μέμμεως εἶναι καὶ κατηγορίας, ὡς δ' οὐ προσήκων ἢ ὡς οὐ κληρονόμος τούτων ὦν ταῦτ' ἐποίει, οὐκ ἐνεῖναι λέγειν. Trevett's translation reads 'it cannot be denied that despite his behaviour, he is still a kinsman and heir.' Sandys 1913: 213 observes κατηγορίας suggests such a person might be subject not just to 'censure' in a general sense but literally to prosecution if they attempted to exercise citizen rights after wasting their inheritance, and compares Aeschines' *Against Timarchus* 1.30 noting that 'among those who were not allowed to speak in public was any one ἢ τὰ πατρῶα κατεδηδοκῶς ἢ ὃ ἂν κληρονόμος γένηται. Hornblower 2011: 295 notes on Thucydidean themes that 'the justification of past Athenian (and Spartan) imperialist excesses... is remarkable: roughly, the line is, those offences

But if a slave or changeling wasted and spoiled what did not belong to him, by Herakles, how much more terrible and deserving of anger would everyone have said this was. And yet they do not take this attitude towards Philip and his actions – he who is not only not Greek and in no way related to the Greeks, nor even a foreigner from a land to which it is honourable to say that one belongs, but a wretched Macedonian, from a land from which in the past you could not have even bought a decent slave.<sup>1002</sup>

In this, Demosthenes denies Philip any rights to Greece or Greek identity. In fact the Greek is actually more violent than Trevett’s translation suggests if we take ἀπόλλυε as destroy utterly, and note the repetition of οὐδὲ (underlined above and below) which also intensifies the negative definition of Philip. But rather than attacking Philip, I argue the remark unequivocally shames the Greeks by the unworthy origins of the man who now subjugates them.<sup>1003</sup> It serves to compound the shame of the Athenians, that they are not only being overcome by an ‘other’ but the worst possible other, which magnifies Demosthenes’ criticism of the Assembly.<sup>1004</sup> While this passage is disdainful of Philip, for the Greeks their treatment by an inferior foreigner is an abomination, and Demosthenes is indignant at *them* for permitting such a man to shame them and dictate the terms of Greece. As Pearson notes, in forensic oratory such comparisons between tolerance and *hybris* are usually employed to

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were bad, but they were at least committed within the Greek family, not by outsiders. This is certainly a novel way to read such passages of Thucydides such as the *Melian Dialogue*.

<sup>1002</sup> Demosthenes 9.31 εἰ δέ γε δοῦλος ἢ ὑποβολιμαῖος τὰ μὴ προσήκοντ’ ἀπόλλυε (destroy utterly) καὶ ἐλυμαίνετο (outrage/maltreat), Ἡράκλεις ὅσῳ μᾶλλον δεινὸν καὶ ὀργῆς ἄξιον πάντες ἂν ἔφησαν εἶναι. ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου καὶ ὧν ἐκεῖνος πράττει νῦν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἕλληνας ὄντος οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνας, ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἢν πρότερον πρίασθαι. Hunt 2010: 81 notes that ‘Demosthenes here denies Philip any fictive kinship with the Greeks.’

Guth 2015: 333-348 argues for Philip’s rhetorical knowledge and how in the Peace of Philocrates the ambassadors in support of it ‘praised Philip’s speaking ability as part of his philhellenism.’

<sup>1003</sup> As Hunt 2010: 81 remarks, ‘For a Macedonian to defeat and rule Greek cities was a reversal of the natural and proper order of things, similar to a slave, the lowest person in the household, taking over the patrimony.’ Cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 2.9.9-10.

<sup>1004</sup> Demosthenes also uses rather uncharacteristic lowest-common-denominator abuse.

contrast the speaker with their adversaries, but here ‘the tolerance of the Greeks in the face of Philip’s *hybris* is not praiseworthy but shameful.’<sup>1005</sup> Demosthenes’ assertion that they have suffered at the hands of a ‘wretched Macedonian’, something their ancestors would neither have endured nor tolerated, shames the Assembly by questioning what they will endure before they will recognise the damage caused by their own attitudes.

As such, I argue that Demosthenes’ criticism of Philip is not an end in itself, but a means to an end: to shame the Athenians into acting in a manner worthy of the city. This has been consistent since the *First Philippic* and has only intensified since the Peace. For Demosthenes, it is imperative that the Assembly recognises their own culpability, and that they have passively granted Philip free reign in Greece by their lack of action:

How is this not the height of insolence? In addition to his destruction of the cities, does he not administer the Pythian festival, the shared competition of the Greeks, and, if he himself is absent, does he not send his slaves to preside at the games? *Is he not the master of Thermopylae and the entranceways into Greece, and does he not occupy these places with garrisons and mercenaries? Does he not have the right of pre-audience at the oracle, thrusting us aside together with the Thessalians and the Dorians and the other Amphictyons – a right that not even every Greek enjoys.*<sup>1006</sup>

Philip’s power is an insult to the Greeks, and Demosthenes’ accusations of impiety also rebuke the Greeks for entrusting the sacred administration of Delphi and the Amphictyonic council to the hands of a Macedonian. It is interesting to observe here Demosthenes’ change of attitude from *On the Peace* and Philip’s role at the Pythian festival, where he compared

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<sup>1005</sup> Pearson 1976: 152.

<sup>1006</sup> Demosthenes 9.32. καίτοι τί τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀπολείπει; οὐ πρὸς τῷ πόλεις ἀνηρηκέσθαι τίθησι μὲν τὰ Πύθια, τὸν κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀγῶνα, κἄν αὐτὸς μὴ παρῆ, τοὺς δούλους ἀγωνοθετήσοντας πέμπει; [κύριος δὲ Πυλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας παρόδων ἐστὶ, καὶ φρουραῖς καὶ ξένοις τοὺς τόπους τούτους κατέχει; ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν προμαντείαν τοῦ θεοῦ, παρώσας ἡμᾶς καὶ Θετταλοὺς καὶ Δωριέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀμφικτύονας, ἧς οὐδὲ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἅπανσι μέτεστι;] The English italics and the Greek enclosed within square brackets indicate the two versions of the text. As noted at the beginning of this subchapter, this occurs because the tenth-century manuscript ‘S’ has omissions which are preserved in other manuscripts, but appear as additions in S’s margins.

challenging Philip's right to organise that games to chasing the shadow of a donkey.

Demosthenes was telling the Athenians to pick their battles and be sensible in their actions, but the threat to Byzantium and the Chersonese has greater ramifications for the Athenians than their indignation. It is now imperative that they defend their vital interests, and their failure to acknowledge this is again indicative of the Athenians' misguided priorities. The reference to the games in the list of rhetorical questions accentuates Demosthenes' outrage at Philip's audacity, which as a whole is directed at the Assembly to shock them into seeing the situation at hand, and what they permit to happen by holding on to the peace:

Does he not write to the Thessalians telling them what form of political organisation to have? Is he not sending out mercenaries – some to Porthmus to expel the Eretrian people, others to Oreus to establish Philistides as tyrant?<sup>1007</sup>

Finally, Demosthenes resolves this question and affirms that it is the Greeks, not Philip, with whom he has the greatest complaint:

But even though they see these things, the Greeks put up with them. They seem to me to watch them happening in the same way as one might watch a hailstorm, each praying that it does not strike him, but none trying to avoid it.<sup>1008</sup>

This behaviour is at odds with Athenian ideology, especially in comparison to the ancestors who could not sit and endure the suffering of the other Greeks.<sup>1009</sup> It is this apathetic, not-my-problem attitude which Demosthenes has confronted throughout the speeches, and confronts again here:

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<sup>1007</sup> Demosthenes 9.33. γράφει δὲ Θετταλοῖς ὃν χρῆ τὸν τρόπον πολιτεύεσθαι; πέμπει δὲ ξένους τοὺς μὲν εἰς Πορθμόν, τὸν δῆμον ἐκβαλοῦντας τὸν Ἐρετριέων, τοὺς δ' ἐπ' Ὀρεόν, τύραννον Φιλιστίδην καταστήσοντας;

<sup>1008</sup> Demosthenes 9.33. ἀλλ' ὅμως ταῦθ' ὀρῶντες οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀνέχονται, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ τὴν χάλαζαν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι θεωρεῖν, εὐχόμενοι μὴ καθ' ἑαυτοῦς ἕκαστοι γενέσθαι, κωλύειν δ' οὐδεὶς ἐπιχειρῶν.

<sup>1009</sup> As at Lysias 2.21.

No one retaliates for his insults towards Greece, or even for the wrongs that he does to each individual. The worst is already here.<sup>1010</sup>

Intensifying not only what Philip has done, but the shameful endurance of the Greeks,

Demosthenes continues:

Has he not advanced against Corinthian Ambracia and Leucas? Has he not sworn to hand over Achaean Naupactus to the Aetolians? Has he not deprived the Thebans of Achinus? Is he not now marching against his allies the Byzantines?<sup>1011</sup>

From this, Demosthenes moves to their own possessions, which they have squandered since the *First Philippic*:

As for our own possessions – leave aside those of others – does he not hold Cardia, the greatest city in the Chersonese? This is how we are treated, yet we all delay, and are weak, and cast suspicious glances at our neighbours, distrusting each other, rather than the man who is wronging us all.<sup>1012</sup>

This is the same problem as we saw in *On the Chersonese*, that the Assembly will look to blame anyone else, except Philip. They will look for an easy scapegoat – one of their own – who they can easily deal with, thereby giving themselves a false impression of having taken action. In the face of all these individual events, the Athenians *still* permit themselves to be persuaded that Philip is not at war with Athens, and that men like Demosthenes are warmongers. To confront this, Demosthenes does not only compare the current Athenians to

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<sup>1010</sup> Demosthenes 9.34 οὐ μόνον δ' ἐφ' οἷς ἡ Ἑλλάς ὑβρίζεται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδεὶς ἀμύνεται, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἀδικεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη τοῦσχατόν ἐστιν.

<sup>1011</sup> Demosthenes 9.34. οὐ Κορινθίων ἐπ' Ἀμβρακίαν ἐλήλυθε καὶ Λευκάδα; οὐκ Ἀχαιῶν Ναύπακτον ὁμόμοκεν Αἰτωλοῖς παραδῶσειν; οὐχὶ Θεβαίων Ἐχίνον ἀφήρηται, καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζαντίους πορεύεται συμμάχους ὄντας;

<sup>1012</sup> Demosthenes 9.35. οὐχ ἡμῶν, ἐὼ τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ Χερρονήσου τὴν μεγίστην ἔχει πόλιν Καρδίαν; ταῦτα τοίνυν πάσχοντες ἅπαντες μέλλομεν καὶ μαλακίζομεθα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον βλέπομεν, ἀπιστοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐ τῶ πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικοῦντι. The manuscript tradition provides two readings: μαλακίζομεθα: weakened/softened (MSS), and μαλκίόμεν: lit. we are numb (lexicographer Harpocration). Both have connotations of fragility, but I am following Trevett and Vince with μαλακίζομεθα. With regard to πάσχοντες, to suffer as opposed to doing/ or to suffer at another's hands, when used without a limiting word it always refers to evil, being used for κακῶς or κακά, according to the Liddle and Scott Lexicon. Also, with ἅπαντες Demosthenes chooses the strengthened version of *pas pasa pan*, for added emphasis on the collective behaviour of the Greeks.



their own ideals, but also the Greeks collectively, suggesting that the Greeks of Demosthenes' time are weak. Such submission can be expected of those that medized in the past, but for the Athenians it is horrendously shameful to sacrifice their honour and reputation.

Moreover, by not presenting an example for the other Greeks to follow, they are not only acting in a manner at odds with their ideology, but have condemned both themselves and the Panhellenic community to Macedonian hegemony.<sup>1013</sup> Demosthenes urges them not to forget the immediate danger they are in, and the prospects they face:

but when he treats us collectively with such brutality, what do you suppose he will do when he becomes master of each of us separately?<sup>1014</sup>

Demosthenes' emphasis on ἅπασιν demonstrates that this is a Panhellenic problem, and that a problem for the rest of Greece is a problem for Athens. In particular, Demosthenes stresses that if Athens falls then there will be no hope left, as they are the only ones with the reputation (of both *nomos* and *phusis*) to withstand and galvanise the Greeks to challenge this new Persia. Indeed, Demosthenes' use of κύριος for Philip carries connotations of an extreme, absolute master, and given that κύριος was usually used for a male relative with

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<sup>1013</sup> Being an example for the Greeks (and living Athenians) is a *topos* of the *epitaphioi logoi*: Plato *Menexenus* 240c-e on Athens at Marathon 'They acted as guides and teachers to the rest of Greece, the lesson being that the power of the Persians was not irresistible, that all the numbers in the world, and all the wealth in the world, are no match for courage. For my part, therefore, I maintain that those men are not merely our fathers in a physical sense, but also fathered freedom both for us and for everybody in mainland Greece. That was the action to which the Greeks looked when they screwed up their courage to take their chance in the later battles for their freedom. They were pupils of the heroes of Marathon.'

Lysias 2.32-49, in particular 2.41, 'victorious in the sea battle, they showed everybody that it is better with few men to run the risks for the sake of freedom, rather than with many to be ruled for the sake of your own slavery.' At 2.46 Lysias notes that the Spartans took Athens' example to join the forces at Plataea.

Thucydides 2.41-43 'I declare that our city is an education to Greece...their [the dead ancestors] glory reminds eternal in men's minds, always there on the right occasion to stir others to speech or to action...in foreign lands also, not in any visible form but in people's hearts, their memory abides and grows. It is for you to try to be like them.'

See too discussion on links to Herodotus in Chapter 4.2 pp. 202-5 and the *Second Philippic*.

<sup>1014</sup> Demosthenes 9.35. καίτοι τὸν ἅπασιν ἀσελγῶς οὕτω χρώμενον τί οἴεσθε, ἐπειδὴν καθ' ἕν' ἡμῶν ἐκάστου κύριος γένηται, τί ποιήσεν;

authority over women in his family, Demosthenes could be alluding to the subjugation (and emasculation) of the Athenian citizenry to Philip.<sup>1015</sup> But crucially this is shamefully *self*-inflicted.

Essentially from 9.30 to at least 9.40, Demosthenes' purpose has been to shame the Greeks into action, and even the attack on Philip's nature was not necessarily directed against Philip, but served to make him an unworthy opponent, to shame the Greeks. We also have the sense (which has been developing since the *Second Philippic*) that Athens serves as a microcosm of the Greek virtues of freedom and justice, and this is essential to challenging their external foes and ensuring Panhellenic survival. Demosthenes' use of ancestral rhetoric asserts that Athenian lack of action is ominous for the all of the Greeks, as no one else has set a historical precedence for defending Greek freedom.<sup>1016</sup> The fundamental problem, therefore, is the collective lack of action from the Greeks, and in particular, the Athenians. Thus, Demosthenes presents the only explanation for the current situation as a moral decline within Athens:

What is the explanation for this state of affairs? It is not without reason or just cause that the Greeks were so enthusiastic for liberty in the past, but for slavery now. There was something then, there really was, men of Athens, in the spirit of the people, which is now absent, which overcame the wealth of Persia and led Greece to freedom, and was undefeated in battle on sea and land – but now it has been lost, ruining everything and turning Greece upside down.<sup>1017</sup>

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<sup>1015</sup> See earlier discussion 3.31 and emasculation of the Assembly in Chapter 2.3 pp.150-51.

<sup>1016</sup> As we have seen in examples from the *Menexenus*, and Lysias' funeral speech, if we substitute the Great King for Philip.

<sup>1017</sup> Demosthenes 9.36. τί οὖν αἴτιον τουτωνί; οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου καὶ δικαίας αἰτίας οὔτε τόθ' οὕτως εἶχον ἐτοιμίως πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν οἱ Ἕλληνες οὔτε νῦν πρὸς τὸ δουλεύειν. ἦν τι τότ', ἦν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν διανοίαις, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθέραν ἦγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ οὔτε ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἠττάτο, νῦν δ' ἀπολωλὸς ἅπαντα λελύμανται καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκε πάντα τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα. The dichotomy is emphasised by the polysyndeton of καὶ.

Trevett translates πολλῶν διανοίαις as spirit of the people, which also can be: the thoughts of the many, and could be representative of idea of the collective wisdom of the *dēmos*. Sandys 1913: 217 suggests that the

Demosthenes returns to the clear comparison (and extreme dichotomy) between their current selves and the ancestors he remarked upon in the *Third Olynthiac*.<sup>1018</sup> Now, Demosthenes makes this applicable to all the Greeks, and attributes their current problems to their deficiency in virtues:

What was this thing? It was the fact that everyone hated any person who took money from those who were seeking to dominate or destroy Greece: it was most dreadful to be convicted of taking bribes, and such a man was punished with the severest penalty.<sup>1019</sup>

The point of the speech therefore, is to highlight this contrast and make the Athenians realise that nothing will be resolved until they recognise their own corruptions and change their attitude.<sup>1020</sup> Demosthenes again identifies this as the cause (the ἀρχή but also the αἴτιον, or αἰτία) of all their problems, and presents a return to their ancestral ideology as the means to remedy it:

Neither the crucial opportunity in each situation – an opportunity that fortune often grants even to the careless against the attentive *and those who shrink from deeds against those who fulfil their duties* – nor the mutual concord that existed, nor the distrust of tyrants and barbarians, nor in brief any such thing could be bought from the politicians and generals.<sup>1021</sup>

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‘personification of the unconquerable principle which “overcame the wealth of Persia and maintained the freedom of Greece,” rises to a higher level than that of ordinary prose, noting too that ‘οὔτε ... μάχης ... ἤτῳ [is] a poetic phrase, parallel to ἐκράτησε πλούτου.’

<sup>1018</sup> Demosthenes 3.23.

<sup>1019</sup> Demosthenes 9.37. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο; [οὐδὲν ποικίλον οὐδὲ σοφόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι] τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἄρχων βουλομένων ἢ διαφθεῖρουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα χρήματα λαμβάνοντας ἅπαντες ἐμίσησαν, καὶ χαλεπώτατον ἦν τὸ δωροδοκοῦν ἐλεγχθῆναι, καὶ τιμωρία μεγίστη τοῦτον ἐκόλαζον [καὶ παραίτησις οὐδεμί’ ἦν οὐδὲ συγγνώμη].

<sup>1020</sup> I therefore disagree with Kennedy 1993: 74 who argues that 9.36-40 demonstrates ‘a battle for Athens, decadent and fond of flattery, is fought out between Demosthenes the unpopular patriot (2) and Philip the violent foreign king’, as I argue in the introduction, the battle is between Demosthenes and the Athenian Assembly itself.

<sup>1021</sup> Demosthenes 9.38. τὸν οὖν καιρὸν ἐκάστου τῶν πραγμάτων, ὃν ἡ τύχη καὶ τοῖς ἀμελοῦσι κατὰ τῶν προσεχόντων [καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν ἐθέλουσι ποιεῖν κατὰ τῶν πάνθ’ ἃ προσήκει πραττόντων] πολλάκις παρασκευάζει, οὐκ ἦν πρῆσθαι παρὰ τῶν λεγόντων οὐδὲ τῶν στρατηγούντων, οὐδὲ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμόνοιαν, οὐδὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀπιστίαν, οὐδ’ ὅλως τοιοῦτον οὐδέν.

It is therefore imperative to recover their moral compass, as their hope rests in reclaiming this past virtue, and demonstrating the strength they showed against their past foes. However, their situation cannot improve if they maintain their current attitude:

But now all these things are exported as if from the market place, and in exchange we import things that cause Greece's sickness and ruin. What are these? Envy of anyone who has taken a bribe; laughter, if he admits it; *pity, for those who are convicted*, hatred of anyone who rebukes this conduct; and everything else relating to the taking of bribes.<sup>1022</sup>

In referencing their ancestral past Demosthenes asserts that, through moral corruption, they are now an inversion of their ideal selves. In using the past to draw the comparison between their current vices and their ancestral virtue, Demosthenes offers an explanation as to why the Athenians are experiencing a deterioration in their external issues: the decline of the morals of the *polis*. Whilst the ancestors are idealised as incorruptible defenders of piety, justice, and liberty, the current Athenians are unworthy of their heritage as descendants of the victors of Marathon, as they have sold their honour for personal gain.<sup>1023</sup>

Moreover, this bribery and corruption serves no ultimate purpose; they might have wealth, but they are morally bankrupt:

Now we possess triremes and men and money and abundant military equipment, and whatever else serves to demonstrate the strength of a city, in far greater quantities

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<sup>1022</sup> Demosthenes 9.39. νῦν δ' ἄπανθ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἐκπέπραται ταῦτα, ἀντεισῆκται δ' ἀντὶ τούτων ὕφ' ὧν ἀπόλωλε καὶ νενόσηκεν ἡ Ἑλλάς. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τίς; ζῆλος, εἴ τις εἴληφε τι γέλωσ, ἂν ὁμολογήῃ [συγγνώμη τοῖς ἐλεγχόμενοις] μῖσος, ἂν τούτοις τις ἐπιτιμᾷ· τᾶλλα πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐκ τοῦ δωροδοκεῖν ἤρτηται. Demosthenes uses ἀπόλωλε again: to kill/utterly destroy. Sandys 1913: 218 notes that together ἀπόλωλε καὶ νενόσηκεν it reads: ruined and diseased, which I think emphasises the moral decline. (Italics are the additions in the longer manuscript.)

<sup>1023</sup> As Steinbock 2013: 53 notes, the history of Marathon became symbolic for 'the Athenians fighting alone on behalf of all the Greeks.' This is reminiscent of the *Olynthiacs*, where Demosthenes suggested they had squandered their inheritance – which had been won by many hard efforts – out of apathy and greed. Moreover, the *epitaphioi logoi* forbid the survivors to dishonour them and lose what was gained by their ancestors' efforts.

than we did then, but these are rendered useless, ineffectual, and unprofitable by those who are selling us out.<sup>1024</sup>

This is also a repetition of the *First Philippic* 4.36 where Demosthenes stated their military preparations were: ἄτακτα, ἀδιόρθωτα, ἀόρισθ' ἅπαντα 'everything is ill-arranged, ill-managed, ill-defined.'<sup>1025</sup> This was initially a consequence of their deficient sense of priorities and apathy; it is now exacerbated in the *Third Philippic* by internal corruption instigated by local collaborators working for Philip/ in Philip's pay.<sup>1026</sup> It is this corruption within that will render everything else useless and futile, as their situation will only deteriorate further if they continue to permit Philip's continued expansion at Athenian expense. Moreover, it again makes the point that Athens' problem is not Philip, but the enemies within who are selling the Athenians out, and the Assembly itself for permitting their own vices and rhetorical gratification to cloud their judgement.

It is this internal immorality (perhaps even amorality through their self-delusion) which desperately needs addressing, that 'this is the case at present you see for yourselves, I presume, and have no need of me as a further witness.'<sup>1027</sup> As such they should not be debating on the best means to maintain the peace, nor criticising men such as Diopeithes or indeed Demosthenes himself as aggressors. Demosthenes' assertion that they do not need to hear more on the situation, stresses the irony that they refuse to see this, and the urgency to remind them of their duty as Athenians. But this assertion could likewise be a rhetorical device to assert an impression that "you know about the present... but I know about the past".

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<sup>1024</sup> Demosthenes 9.40 ἐπεὶ τρήρεις γε καὶ σωμάτων πλῆθος καὶ χρημάτων πρόσοδοι καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κατασκευῆς ἀφθονία, καὶ τᾶλλ' οἷς ἂν τις ἰσχύειν τὰς πόλεις κρίνοι, νῦν ἅπασι καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω ἐστὶ τῶν τότε πολλῶ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἄχρηστα, ἄπρακτα, ἀνόνητα ὑπὸ τῶν πωλούντων γίνονται.

<sup>1025</sup> Trans. Vince 1954: 91. I believe this mirrors the pattern of the Greek in a stricter manner than Trevett's translation: 'but none of our military preparations are organized, kept up to date, or properly defined.'

<sup>1026</sup> Again, I believe the *Third Philippic* resounds with examples of the rhetoric of conspiracy which could usefully be added to Roisman's 2006 account.

<sup>1027</sup> Demosthenes 9.41. ὅτι δ' οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει, τὰ μὲν νῦν ὁρᾶτε δήπου καὶ οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ προσδεῖσθε μάρτυρος·

In this way, Demosthenes presents himself as spokesperson for the ancestral past, and by association shares the virtues of the Athenians in former times. Demosthenes speaks through the ancestors, functioning as a messenger to rebuke their unworthy successors:

Yet in previous times the opposite was the case, as I shall show not in my own words but from a document of your ancestors that they inscribed on a bronze pillar and deposited on the Acropolis – *not because it would be useful to them, since even without it they had a strong sense of duty, but to leave you reminders and examples of how seriously such offences should be treated.*<sup>1028</sup>

Presenting the physical presence of these lost virtues, Demosthenes recalls their attitude towards Arthmius<sup>1029</sup>:

It reads: “Arthmius the son of Pythonax of Zeleia is to be an outlaw and enemy of the Athenian people and its allies, himself and his descendants.” After is written the explanation: “because he brought gold from the Medes into the Peloponnese.”<sup>1030</sup>

Demosthenes barrages the Athenians with reasons to be ashamed. Not only do they, unlike their ancestors, require a visual incentive to do their duty, but worse still, rather than heeding these reminders, they do exactly the opposite, praising and honouring men who commit these offences. Demosthenes again attributes their failure to act like their ancestors as the explanation for the decline of Athens and Philip’s position of power, because if Athens had

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<sup>1028</sup> Demosthenes 9.41. τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄνωθεν χρόνοις ὅτι τὰναντί’ εἶχεν ἐγὼ δηλώσω, οὐ λόγους ἐμαυτοῦ λέγων, ἀλλὰ γράμματα τῶν προγόνων τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀκείνοι κατέθεντ’ εἰς στήλην χαλκῆν γράμμαντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν [οὐχ ἴν’ αὐτοῖς ἢ χρήσιμα (καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων τῶν γραμμάτων τὰ δέοντ’ ἐφρόνουσιν), ἀλλ’ ἴν’ ὑμεῖς ἔχηθ’ ὑπομνήματα καὶ παραδείγματα, ὡς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων σπουδάζειν προσήκει.

<sup>1029</sup> Trevett 2011: 168 states that ‘The decree outlawing Arthmius of Zeleia, a city in north western Asia Minor, is referred to in several texts of the period (Dem 19.27; Aes 3.258; Din 2.24-25.) Meiggs 1972: 508-512 discusses the decree in detail, and suggests that it dates to the early 460s, and may have been proposed by the leading politician and general Cimon.’ MacDowell 2009: 352 notes that Demosthenes used the example of Arthmius in *On the False Embassy* 19.270-2. Mack 2015: 94 n12. Milns 2000: 22 n43, notes how Arthmius became a *topos* in the Attic orators.

<sup>1030</sup> Demosthenes 9.42. “Ἀρθμῖος” φησὶ “Πυθῶνακτος Ζελεΐτης ἄτιμος καὶ πολέμιος τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτοῦ καὶ γένος.” εἶθ’ ἡ αἰτία γέγραπται, δι’ ἣν ταῦτ’ ἐγένετο: “ὅτι τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ἐκ Μήδων εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἤγαγε.”

acted in a manner worthy of the city, Olynthus would not have fallen to Philip, nor would they have conceded their possessions.<sup>1031</sup> The condemnation of the current Athenians is all the stronger as it is delivered via the ancestors, and may be compared with the *prosopopeia* of the Athenians' forefathers in the *Menexenus*, where their voice is used to tell the living that they will not be welcome among their forefathers after death, if they have shamed the honour of the *polis*.<sup>1032</sup>

Demosthenes reminds the Assembly that the ancestors acted against a man who committed corruption and bribery (on orders), when his actions were not directed against themselves, but did so on principle to uphold what was right.<sup>1033</sup> Here again Demosthenes uses the ancestors' actions, and this time their tangible inscribed words (ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ γράμματα 9.42) as a moral lesson:

Consider, by the gods, what was the purpose and resolve of the Athenians of that time in taking this action. They wrote that a man of Zeleia, Arthmius, a slave of the king (for Zeleia is in Asia), because in the service of his master he had brought money to the Peloponnese – not to Athens – should be declared their and their allies' enemy, himself and his descendants, and that they should be outlaws.<sup>1034</sup>

Demosthenes holds the actions of the ancestors, who were resolute in both their words and their deeds, against the apathy of the current Assembly and calls them to recognise their enemies, with specific distinction:

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<sup>1031</sup> This is speaking from Demosthenes' projection of the situation. I personally am of the opinion that Philip would have succeeded regardless because of his military reforms and his own personal ability.

<sup>1032</sup> Plato *Menexenus* 247c.

<sup>1033</sup> This evokes his argument of the *First Philippic* 4.3 that Athens acted 'for the sake of justice' during the Corinthian War against Sparta and their defence of Thebes when the Spartans also invaded Boeotia.

<sup>1034</sup> Demosthenes 9.43. λογίζεσθε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, τίς ἦν ποθ' ἡ διάνοια τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῶν τότε ταῦτα ποιοούντων, ἢ τί τὸ ἀξίωμα. ἐκεῖνοι Ζελείτην τινά, Ἄρθμιον, δοῦλον βασιλέως (ἢ γὰρ Ζελεία ἐστὶ τῆς Ἀσίας), ὅτι τῷ δεσπότη διακονῶν χρυσίον ἤγαγεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον, οὐκ Ἀθήναζε, ἐχθρὸν αὐτῶν ἀνέγραψαν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτῶν καὶ γένος, καὶ ἀτίμους.

And this is not the form of outlawry that people commonly speak of – for what would it matter to a Zeleian to be forbidden to participate in Athenian public life? *But that is not what it means*; rather, it is written in the laws of homicide, with regard to cases where prosecutions for homicide may not be brought, *but one may kill without pollution*: “and let the outlaw be killed.” This law means that anyone who has killed such a man shall be free from pollution.<sup>1035</sup>

Rather than just shaming the Assembly, Demosthenes prescribes that this attitude should be held by the Assembly now against their internal enemies. The fiercest criticism is not directed against Philip, but against these internal traitors:

These men thus thought it their duty to ensure the safety of all of Greece. For they would not have been concerned if someone was bribing and corrupting other people in the Peloponnese, unless they held this opinion; they sought to punish and take vengeance on those whom they detected, and thus they posted their names on a pillar. As a result, it is not surprising that the Greeks inspired fear in the foreigner, rather than the other way around. But this is not the case now, since you do not have the same attitude either towards such offences or towards others.<sup>1036</sup>

This is key to their current situation and what Demosthenes has been arguing consistently since the *First Philippic*: the Assembly, in an attitude of apathy and self-interest has neglected (indeed, forgotten) their duty as Athenians, and in failing to act in a manner worthy

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<sup>1035</sup> Demosthenes 9.44. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οὐχ ἦν οὕτως τις ἂν φήσειεν ἀτιμίαν· τί γὰρ τῷ Ζελεΐτῃ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινῶν εἰ μὴ μεθέξειν ἔμελλεν; ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς φονικοῖς γέγραπται νόμοις, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν μὴ διδῶ δίκας φόνου δικάσασθαι, [ἀλλ' εὐαγὲς ἢ τὸ ἀποκτείνειν,] “καὶ ἄτιμος” φησὶ “τεθνάτω.” τοῦτο δὴ λέγει, καθαρὸν τὸν τοῦτων τιν' ἀποκτείναντ' εἶναι. On homicide law see MacDowell 1978: 109-122. Trevett 2011: 168 notes: pollution (*miasma*) was ‘thought by some to spread from killer to the community at large unless he was brought to justice, but a justifiable homicide did not give rise to it.’ See also Parker 1983: 104-43 on pollution and Gagarin 2002: 109-10; 1997: 22-3.

<sup>1036</sup> Demosthenes 9.45 οὐκοῦν ἐνόμιζον ἐκεῖνοι τῆς πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελητέον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ἔμελεν εἴ τις ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινὰς ὠνεῖται καὶ διαφθείρει, μὴ τοῦθ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· ἐκόλαζον δ' οὕτω καὶ ἐτιμωροῦνθ' οὐς αἰσθόιντο, ὥστε καὶ στηλίτας ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τοῦτων εἰκότως τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦν τῷ βαρβάρῳ φοβερά, οὐχ ὁ βάρβαρος τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχεθ' ὑμεῖς οὔτε πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτ' οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλα.



of the city, they have failed to offer the same protection as their ancestors did to the Greeks, nor to Athens' own interests. Their problems are not the product of Philip, but of their internal crisis of corruption through the rejection of core values that constitute Athenian identity. As such Philip has been given no reason to fear the Athenians by their actions, nor have the allies been given any reason to hope the Athenians will act; they have only been saved the worst as of yet because of the power of their ancestral reputation and the understanding of Athenian ideology in the wider social memory of fourth-century Greece. This, however, is fragile if not backed up by actions, and their own façade (as attested to in the *Second Philippic* and *On the Chersonese* is) is beginning to slip.<sup>1037</sup> Thus their problems all come back to their lack of action and that this whole situation is self-inflicted.

This loss of Athenian spirit has been the core theme of the speech(es). He finishes this account of the Athenians' decree by focusing on their current attitude:

‘What then is your attitude? *You know for yourselves – what need is there to criticise you over every detail? And all the other Greeks have a similar attitude and are no better than you. As a result, I assert that the present situation requires great energy and good counsel. What is my advice? Do you ask me to speak? And do you promise not to be angry with me?*<sup>1038</sup>

In asking these ironic questions Demosthenes emphasises that the problem with the Assembly is precisely that they reject unflattering truths, and *still* choose comforting deception. Demosthenes too contrasts how wars were once fought against the Spartans in the open, but now cities are undone from within:

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<sup>1037</sup> Again, a self-inflicted crisis is a common trope when explaining defeats, cf. Plato *Menexenus* 243d, ‘we were not destroyed by others, but were rather the agents of our own destruction.’

<sup>1038</sup> Demosthenes 9.45-6. ἀλλὰ πῶς; [ἴστ' αὐτοί· τί γὰρ δεῖ περὶ πάντων ὑμῶν κατηγορεῖν; παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ οὐδὲν βέλτιον ὑμῶν ἅπαντες οἱ λοιποὶ Ἕλληνας· διόπερ φήμ' ἔγωγε καὶ σπουδῆς πολλῆς καὶ βουλῆς ἀγαθῆς τὰ παρόντα πράγματα προσδεῖσθαι. τίνος;] εἶπω κελεύετε; καὶ οὐκ ὀργιεῖσθε;

So old fashioned were they, or rather so like true citizens, that they did not buy anything from anybody, but war was fought according to custom and in the open. [49] Now, however, I dare say you see how most places are destroyed by traitors and how nothing results from the drawing up of armies in pitched battle.<sup>1039</sup>

Drawing the focus away from Philip's military strength as he did in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes' gaze turns inwards in asserting that success is now determined by the actions of traitors within the *polis*, and therefore, they are – whether they chose to recognise it or not – having war waged upon them both externally against their interests in the North and in the Black Sea region, and internally by those working in Philip's interest. As argued previously, Athens' enemies are hiding in plain sight within the Assembly and unrecognisable to the (blissfully) ignorant Assembly. Demosthenes stresses, 'in addition to these advantages, he attacks those who are sick from internal dissension', as now cities are destroyed by traitors manipulating internal crises.<sup>1040</sup> This continues the motif that the *polis* is sick and associated Demosthenes' diagnosis of Athens from the *Third Olynthiac* with the earlier assertion that Philip visits those already sick and malignantly preys upon internal dissension. Moreover:

No one is willing to go out to defend their territory on account of their mutual mistrust, and so he sets up his siege engines and lays siege to them – to say nothing of the fact that he makes no distinction between summer and winter and that there is no off season, when he leaves off fighting.<sup>1041</sup>

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<sup>1039</sup> Demosthenes 9.49. οὕτω δ' ἀρχαίως εἶχον, μᾶλλον δὲ πολιτικῶς, ὥστ' οὐδὲ χρημάτων ὠνεῖσθαι παρ' οὐδενός οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἶναι νόμιμόν τινα καὶ προφανῆ τὸν πόλεμον. νυνὶ δ' ὄρατε μὲν δήπου τὰ πλεῖστα τοὺς προδότας ἀπολωλεκότας, οὐδὲν δ' ἐκ παρατάξεως οὐδὲ μάχης γιγνόμενον·

<sup>1040</sup> Demosthenes 9.50. ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις πρὸς νοσοῦντας ἐν αὐτοῖς προσπέσει.

<sup>1041</sup> Demosthenes 9.50. ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις πρὸς νοσοῦντας ἐν αὐτοῖς προσπέσει καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας δι' ἀπιστίαν ἐξίη, μηχανήματ' ἐπιστήσας πολιορκεῖ. καὶ σιωπῶν θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἐξαιρετος ὥρα τις ἣν διαλείπει.

In contrast to Philip's initiative, and ability to utilise the seasons, Demosthenes presents the Athenians' irrational judgement of *choosing* not to defend themselves but instead considering the recall their general on the spot. Demosthenes' purpose is to shake the Assembly out of its delusion, to realise the folly of the Peace, and the imperative need to change their attitude within the Assembly.<sup>1042</sup>

In full knowledge of these factors and taking due account of them, we must all prevent war from approaching our land, and must avoid being thrown to ground through contemplation of the simplicity of our previous war against the Spartans. Instead, we must defend ourselves from as great a distance as possible, by our actions and by our preparations, and be on watch in case he stirs from his home, and must avoid grappling with him in a decisive engagement.<sup>1043</sup>

Such actions and preparations are long overdue, and will not come any time soon if the Assembly maintains the same attitude towards Philip, towards truthful advice, and their duty. Demosthenes implores them, as he has since the *First Philippic*, to act in defence of their own interests, as trying to uphold a peace that is one-sided is not only dangerously naïve, but tantamount to suicide.<sup>1044</sup>

We have many natural advantages, men of Athens, for waging war – so long as we are willing to do our duty: the nature of his territory, much of which can be ravaged

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<sup>1042</sup> The purpose of this thesis is to view this according to Demosthenes, but for an account (and appreciation) of the reality of Philip's strength and military prowess, see Worthington 2014.

<sup>1043</sup> Demosthenes 9.51. ταῦτα μέντοι πάντας εἰδότας καὶ λογιζομένους οὐ δεῖ προσέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον εἰς τὴν χώραν, οὐδ' εἰς τὴν εὐήθειαν τὴν τοῦ τότε πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους πολέμου βλέποντας ἐκτραχηλισθῆναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ πλείστου φυλάττεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, ὅπως οἴκοθεν μὴ κινήσεται σκοποῦντας, οὐχὶ συμπλακέντας διαγωνίζεσθαι.

<sup>1044</sup> Indeed he warned throughout the *Olynthiacs*, that war shall come to Attica if they do not change their attitude and practices.

and damaged, and a host of others, but he is better suited than we are to the fighting of battles.<sup>1045</sup>

Again, it comes back to this same repeated argument from the start of the speech, and from the *First Philippic* and *Olynthiacs*, that they can do something about their situation, but only if they choose to do their duty. This concession that Philip's forces are better suited to fighting battles also demonstrates the deterioration of their situation. This is not scaremongering, but a very real fact that Philip's pro-active attitude and relentless campaigning constitutes a serious threat. But, it is one of their own creation, and thus they can halt Philip if they take the war to him before it is too late. To achieve this they must remove the traitors from their decision-making process.

We must not only acknowledge this, and resist him through acts of war, but we must also make it our policy and be resolved to detest those who speak to you on his behalf, keeping in mind that it is not possible to defeat our city's enemies until you punish those within the city itself who are their servants.<sup>1046</sup>

They must act, in short, as the ancestors did in the case of Arthmius, and acknowledge that their external issues are a direct result of their internal crisis, and that they cannot deal with the external threat until the internal one is resolved. This is also a repetition of his affirmation from *On the Chersonese* that 'it is impossible, impossible I say, to defeat your enemies outside the city until you have punished your enemies in the city itself.'<sup>1047</sup> This has been Demosthenes' consistent stance throughout all the speeches: that they must deal, not only with the traitors within, but more importantly with their identity crisis which has caused the

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<sup>1045</sup> Demosthenes 9.52. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον πολλὰ φύσει πλεονεκτήμαθ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἂν περ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ποιεῖν ἐθέλωμεν ἃ δεῖ, ἢ φύσις τῆς ἐκείνου χώρας, ἣς ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν ἔστιν πολλὴν καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, ἄλλα μυρία· εἰς δ' ἀγῶν' ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐκείνος ἦσκηται.

<sup>1046</sup> Demosthenes 9.53. Οὐ μόνον δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα γινώσκειν, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκείνον ἀμύνεσθαι τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τοὺς παρ' ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μισῆσαι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι οὐκ ἔνεστι τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἐχθρῶν κρατῆσαι, πρὶν ἂν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει κολάσηθ' ὑπηρετοῦντας ἐκείνοις.

<sup>1047</sup> Demosthenes 8.61 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐχθρῶν κρατῆσαι, πρὶν ἂν τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει κολάσητ' ἐχθρούς.

corruption of the Assembly and all subsequent crises. Without resolving these internal issues, they will never challenge anyone, let alone Philip.

To emphasise this Demosthenes asserts that they are gripped by an internal madness:

But this, by Zeus and the other gods, is something that you will be unable to do, since you have reached such a state of foolishness or madness or I do not know what to call it – I have often come to fear that some demon is driving our affairs – that out of a spirit of quarrelsomeness or envy, or for a joke, or for any other reason that might occur to you, you urge hired men to speak, some of whom would not even deny that they are hired, and you laugh if anyone attacks them.<sup>1048</sup>

Demosthenes' priority is to address the inversion of the Assembly, which is both sick and afflicted with delusional madness. With οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, Demosthenes demonstrates that the Athenians' behaviour is so at odds with their identity that they are beyond comprehension and expression, adding to the dramatic effect when their situation *does* get worse:

And this is not the really terrible thing, terrible though it is. For you have also permitted these men to participate in public life with more security than you give to those who speak in your interest.<sup>1049</sup>

Repeating his complaint that we saw most recently in *On the Chersonese* 8.30-31 (but also strongly asserted in *On the Peace* and the *Second Philippic*), Demosthenes argues that they have allowed these men to participate and thrive in the Assembly to the detriment of others who attempt to speak in the best interest of Athens. Indeed, it is their refusal to recognise the intentions of speakers, and their hostility towards speakers such as Demosthenes, all with a view to maintaining their comforts, that has proven to be their downfall.

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<sup>1048</sup> Demosthenes 9.54. ὁ μὰ τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς οὐ δυνήσεσθ' ὑμεῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τοῦτ' ἀφίχθε μωρίας ἢ παρανοίας ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω (πολλάκις γὰρ ἔμοιγ' ἐπελήλυθε καὶ τοῦτο φοβεῖσθαι, μή τι δαιμόνιον τὰ πράγματ' ἐλαύνῃ), ὥστε λοιδορίας, φθόνου, σκώμματος, ἥστινος ἂν τύχηθ' ἔνεκ' αἰτίας ἀνθρώπους μισθωτοῦς, ὧν οὐδ' ἂν ἀρνηθεῖεν ἔνιοι ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, λέγειν κελεύετε, καὶ γελάτε, ἂν τισὶ λοιδορηθῶσιν.

<sup>1049</sup> Demosthenes 9.55. καὶ οὐχί πω τοῦτο δεινόν, καίπερ ὄν δεινόν· ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ πλείονος ἀσφαλείας πολιτεύεσθαι δεδώκατε τοῦτοις ἢ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγουσιν.

In my opinion, the problem Demosthenes addresses is unequivocally an internal one, and in their failure to address these issues, and their continual dismissal of Demosthenes' own advice (most clearly expressed in *On the Peace*), they continue to suffer time and again. Here too he says 'But observe how many disasters arise from a willingness to listen to such men. I shall tell you about events that will be familiar to you all.'<sup>1050</sup>

To this end, Demosthenes returns to narrating examples of recent events to validate (and vindicate) his own arguments. Not only does he demonstrate a pattern of decline across Greece, but calls the Assembly to logically deduce what will happen at Athens:

Of those who took part in public life at Olynthus, some supported Philip and served him in all things, whereas others desired what was best for their city and acted to prevent the enslavement of their fellow-citizens. Which of these destroyed their native land? Which of them betrayed the cavalry, leading to the destruction of Olynthus? It was the men who supported Philip, who, while the city was still in existence, slandered and brought malicious prosecutions against those who were offering the best advice, as a result of which the Olynthian people were persuaded to exile Apollonides.'<sup>1051</sup>

Demosthenes uses Olynthus as an example of what is happening within Athens itself, and what will be their fate too if they do not address the corruption within. Moreover, he is again defining his own role against those of his opponents, and the failure of the Assembly to listen, thus warning of the dangers of ignoring the wise and well-intentioned advisor.

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<sup>1050</sup> Demosthenes 9.55. καίτοι θεάσασθ' ὅσας συμφορὰς παρασκευάζει τὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἐθέλειν ἀκροᾶσθαι. λέξω δ' ἔργ' ἅ πάντες εἴσεσθε.

<sup>1051</sup> Demosthenes 9.56. ἦσαν ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τινὲς μὲν Φιλίππου καὶ πάνθ' ὑπηρετοῦντες ἐκεῖνῳ, τινὲς δ' οἱ τοῦ βελτίστου καὶ ὅπως μὴ δουλεύσουσιν οἱ πολῖται πράττοντες. πότεροι δὴ τὴν πατρίδ' ἐξώλεσαν; ἢ πότεροι τοὺς ἰπέας προῦδσαν, ὧν προδοθέντων Ὀλυνθος ἀπώλετο; οἱ τὰ Φιλίππου φρονοῦντες, καὶ ὅτ' ἦν ἡ πόλις τοὺς τὰ βέλτιστα λέγοντας συκοφαντοῦντες καὶ διαβάλλοντες οὕτως, ὥστε τὸν γ' Ἀπολλωνίδην καὶ ἐκβαλεῖν ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων ἐπέισθη. Apollodorus [Dem.] *Against Neaera* 59.91 notes that Apollonides was going to be granted Athenian citizenship. Trevett 2011: 171 notes that 'Apollonides was the leader of the pro-Athenian party at Olynthus.'

Furthermore, the Athenians had a duty to prevent the fall of Olynthus and failed, which had wider repercussions for the Greek world. In enabling Philip to grow and Olynthus to fall, Athens created a greater problem for Greece, and he notes how this ‘habit of mind’ had a chain effect of evils. Demosthenes presents Eretria as evidence:

Nor is it that case that this habit of mind cause all sorts of evils only for these people and had no effect anywhere else. On the contrary, in Eretria, after Plutarchus and his mercenaries had been expelled, and the people held both the city and Porthmus, some of them wished to side with you and others with Philip. The wretched and unfortunate Eretrians listened to the latter for the most part, and were finally persuaded to exile those who were speaking in their interests.<sup>1052</sup>

This last point resonates with Demosthenes’ complaint that the Athenians have been persuaded to reject both him and his advice, and they are (allegedly) too easily satisfied by mere rhetoric and thus fail to examine the intentions which lie beneath it.<sup>1053</sup> Any doubts on the outcomes of such internal corruption are removed by the fate of Eretria’s harbour Porthmus, and their delusion that Philip was an ally:

For in fact their ally Philip, after sending Hipponicus with a thousand mercenaries, demolished the walls of Porthmus and set up three men as tyrants...since then he has twice already exiled from the territory of Eretria people who wanted to be saved, *first by sending the mercenaries under Eurylochus, and then by sending those under Parmenion.*<sup>1054</sup>

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<sup>1052</sup> Demosthenes 9.57. οὐ τοίνυν παρὰ τούτοις μόνον τὸ ἔθος τοῦτο πάντα κάκ’ εἰργάσατο, ἄλλοθι δ’ οὐδαμοῦ· ἀλλ’ ἐν Ἐρετρία, ἐπειδὴ ἀπαλλαγέντος Πλουτάρχου καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ δῆμος εἶχε τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸν Πορθμόν, οἱ μὲν ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἤγον τὰ πράγματα, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ Φίλιππον. ἀκούοντες δὲ τούτων τὰ πολλά, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πάνθ’ οἱ ταλαιπῶροι καὶ δυστυχεῖς Ἐρετριεῖς τελευτώντες ἐπέισθησαν τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐκβάλλειν.

<sup>1053</sup> Cf. Roisman 2004: 263 ‘the notion of the *dēmos*’ moral superiority is implied even in the frequent claim that it had been misled by clever speakers who took advantage of the natural simplicity, goodness and magnanimity of the people, which blinded them from seeing other’s evil intentions.’

<sup>1054</sup> Demosthenes 9.58. καὶ γὰρ τοι πέμψας Ἰππόνικον ὁ σύμμαχος αὐτοῖς Φίλιππος καὶ ξένους χιλίους, τὰ τεῖχη περιεῖλε τοῦ Πορθμοῦ καὶ τρεῖς κατέστησε τυράννους ... καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἐξελέλακεν ἐκ τῆς χώρας δις ἤδη βουλομένους σφάζεσθαι, [τότε μὲν πέμψας τοὺς μετ’ Εὐρυλόχου ξένους, πάλιν δὲ τοὺς μετὰ Παρμενίου].

Likewise, in Athens, the delusion that Philip is their ally has only one outcome, but the gratifying flattery of self-serving *rhētors* has persuaded the Assembly to neglect their affairs, and in heeding these men they left Athens dangerously vulnerable, as the loss of their possessions has demonstrated.

To emphasise how it is internal corruption and the rejection of virtuous honest advisers which most threatens Athens, Demosthenes returns to his use of past exempla to didactically advise the present Assembly. Whilst Timotheus served to remind the Assembly of their own deliberative responsibilities in *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes uses the patriot Euphraeus to show the consequences of rejecting his well-intentioned advice, whilst demonstrating hope that he believes the Athenians can still change.<sup>1055</sup>

What need is there to speak at length? At Oreus Philistides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas and Agapaeus acted for Philip; these men now possess the city, as everyone knew they would, but a man named Euphraeus, who once lived here among us, acted to try and ensure that they would be free and slaves to nobody.<sup>1056</sup>

[60] This man – and much could be said about the other ways in which he was insulted and treated with contempt by the people – in the year before the city fell charged Philistides and his supporters with treason, since he saw what they were up to. But many men banded together, with Philip as paymaster and controller, and took Euphraeus off to prison, claiming that he was throwing the city into disorder.<sup>1057</sup>

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<sup>1055</sup> Due to its importance in Demosthenes' argument and his own self-fashioning I shall quote the passage in full. For a detailed discussion of the political significance of Euphraeus see Trampedach 1994: 93-7.

<sup>1056</sup> Demosthenes 9.59. καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; ἀλλ' ἐν Ὀρεῶν Φιλιστίδης μὲν ἔπραττε Φιλίππῳ καὶ Μένιππος καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Θόας καὶ Ἀγαπαῖος, οἵπερ νῦν ἔχουσι τὴν πόλιν (καὶ ταῦτ' ἤδεσαν ἅπαντες), Εὐφραῖος δὲ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ποτ' ἐνθάδ' οἰκήσας, ὅπως ἐλεύθεροι καὶ μηδενὸς δοῦλοι ἔσονται. Sandys 1913:234 notes that 'καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; is a 'formula of transition, giving prominence to one fact out of many.' On 'ἀλλ' ἐν Ὀρεῶν Φιλιστίδης μὲν ἔπραττε Φιλίππῳ' Sandys 1913: 234 also notes a comparison to Thucydides 5.76.3, 4.106.2 and 8.5.3.

<sup>1057</sup> Demosthenes 9.60. οὗτος τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' ὡς ὑβρίζετο καὶ προὔπηλακίζεθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, πόλλ' ἂν εἴη λέγειν· ἐνιαυτῶ δὲ πρότερον τῆς ἀλώσεως ἐνέδειξεν ὡς προδότην τὸν Φιλιστίδην καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ, αἰσθόμενος ἅ πρᾶττουσιν. συστραφέντες δ' ἄνθρωποι πολλοὶ καὶ χορηγὸν ἔχοντες Φίλιππον καὶ πρυτανευόμενοι ἀπάγουσι τὸν



[61] When they saw this, the people of Oreus, instead of helping the one and cudgelling the others to death, did not get angry with them, but said that Euphraeus deserved his suffering, and were glad about it. Later one party began to act in perfect freedom to ensure that the city would be seized, and started to arrange the deed; and any member of the majority who noticed what was happening kept silent and was intimidated, recalling what kinds of things Euphraeus had suffered. They were in such a wretched condition that no one dared speak out, as such an evil drew near, until their enemies had equipped themselves and approached the city walls. At that point some resisted, but others turned traitor.<sup>1058</sup>

Likewise, Demosthenes states that certain *rhētors* can speak with impunity within Athens, and his advice has been the victim of hostile rejection, and he himself accused of warmongering. He also insinuates here that the Assembly are cowards if they continue to refute his truths when all the evidence supports his assertion that the Peace is a farce.

Demosthenes continues:

After the city was captured in this shameful and evil way, the one group has been ruling it as tyrants, after exiling some and killing others of the men who at that time had been prepared to protect them and to do all manner of harm to Euphraeus, while the admirable Euphraeus killed himself, thereby demonstrating that he had resisted Philip, acting with justice and honesty, on behalf of his fellow citizens.<sup>1059</sup>

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Εὐφραῖον εἰς τὸ δεσποτήριον, ὡς συνταράττοντα τὴν πόλιν. Sandys 1913: 235 observes how ἀπάγουσι ‘summarily arrest’ is ‘another term of Attic law (Meier and Schömann l.c.), here applied to a lawless action.’

<sup>1058</sup> Demosthenes 9.59-61. ὁρῶν δὲ ταῦθ’ ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ὀρειτῶν, ἀντι τοῦ τῷ μὲν βοηθεῖν, τοὺς δ’ ἀποτυμπανίσαι, τοῖς μὲν οὐκ ὠργίζετο, τὸν δ’ ἐπιτήδειον ταῦτα παθεῖν ἔφη καὶ ἐπέχαιρεν. μετὰ ταῦθ’ οἱ μὲν ἐπ’ ἐξουσίας ὀπόσης ἐβούλοντ’ ἔπραττον ὅπως ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται, καὶ κατεσκευάζοντο τὴν πρᾶξιν· τῶν δὲ πολλῶν εἴ τις αἴσθοιτο, ἐσίγα καὶ κατεπέπληκτο, τὸν Εὐφραῖον οἷ’ ἔπαθε μεμνημένοι. οὕτω δ’ ἀθλίως διέκειντο, ὥστ’ οὐ πρότερον ἐτόλμησεν οὐδεὶς τοιοῦτου κακοῦ προσιόντος ῥῆξαι φωνήν, πρὶν διασκευασάμενοι πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη προσήεσαν οἱ πολέμιοι· τῆνικαῦτα δ’ οἱ μὲν ἡμύνοντο, οἱ δὲ προὔδιδον. On *apotumpanismos* as hypothetical brutal punishment, see Todd 2000: 42, and discussion in Chapter 4.2 on Demosthenes 8.61 p. 261.

<sup>1059</sup> Demosthenes 9.62. τῆς πόλεως δ’ οὕτως ἀλούσης αἰσχυρῶς καὶ κακῶς οἱ μὲν ἄρχουσι καὶ τυραννοῦσι, τοὺς τότε σώζοντας ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν Εὐφραῖον ἐτοίμους ὄτιοῦν ποιεῖν ὄντας τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλόντες, τοὺς δ’

Given his earlier references to justice and honesty, Demosthenes may be using Euphraeus to narrate his own treatment by the Assembly. Euphraeus serves as a warning for the Athenians if they continue to ignore advice, but also smears Demosthenes' opponents as Philip's collaborators.<sup>1060</sup> It is, therefore, in his and Athens' best interests to speak the truth and suffer, rather than to corrupt his and their honour.<sup>1061</sup> The suicide of Euphraeus mirrors Demosthenes' own statement that 'in any event it would be better to die ten thousand times than to do anything out of flattery for Philip, *or to abandon any of those who speak in your interests.*'<sup>1062</sup> The villain in this is not primarily Philip, but rather the enemies within who enable his success, and the shame is directed at the cowardice of the people. In this Demosthenes' method again has parallels to the *epitaphic* tradition, which praises the courage of the fallen and 'admonishes them [the audience] to emulate the courage of the dead.'<sup>1063</sup>

All of these episodes have been to the end of exposing the reality of the situation to the Assembly, and the damage caused by rejecting the best advice:

Perhaps you are wondering what possible reason induced the people of Olynthus and Eretria and Oreus to pay more attention to those who were speaking in Philip's interests than to those who were speaking in their own. This is the case with you too: those who advocate the best policy are not always able to win your favour, even if they want to, since they are obliged to examine affairs of state and how to provide

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ἀποκτείναντες, ὁ δ' Εὐφραῖος ἐκεῖνος ἀπέσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνθειστήκει Φιλίππῳ. Sandys 1913: 236 observes on ἔργῳ μαρτυρήσας ὅτι καὶ δικαίως καὶ καθαρῶς that it is 'from pure and disinterested motives'.

<sup>1060</sup> Roisman 2006: 128 'Demosthenes' aims in this quasi-allegorical story are to cast himself as a patriotic democrat and malign those who opposite confronting Philip as the king's intentional or unwitting collaborators in pandering to their audience.'

<sup>1061</sup> Parallels can be drawn again to the *epitaphic* tradition. See Lysias 2.33 'they decided that freedom accompanied by bravery and poverty and exile was better than the enslavement of their fatherland with wealth and shame.'

<sup>1062</sup> Demosthenes 9.65. τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον ἢ κολακεῖα τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίππου [καὶ προέσθαι τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λεγόντων τινάς]. Cf. Lysias 2.62 'They preferred death with freedom to life with slavery.'

<sup>1063</sup> Christ 2006: 126. He notes, 'the *epitaphioi* bestow praise on the war dead for *not* turning away from danger (Thucydides 2.40.4), *not* playing the coward (2.42.4); *not* being too fond of life (Lysias 2.250).'

security; whereas the others are collaborating with Philip through the very things by which they win your favour.<sup>1064</sup>

Thus, in his reference to Oreus, Demosthenes has created a cascade of analogies: if Oreus is like Athens, then the *polis*, and Euphraeus' Athenian counterpart Demosthenes, are similarly in danger.<sup>1065</sup> The internal corruption of the Assembly and their manipulation by the flattering rhetoric of self-serving *rhētors* has been a consistent focus in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches. With Euphraeus in mind, Demosthenes compares his own *parrhēsia* to the advice of his opponents with his key complaint against popular rhetoric and its practitioners, but also the weakness of the Assembly for indulging them. Demosthenes does not just use the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric to discredit these *rhētors*, but condemns the Assembly for being persuaded by flattery to endorse the wrong policy. Demosthenes attempts to motivate the Assembly into action by accusing Oreus of surrender as it was the masses that endorsed these popular proposals:

One group said what would make themselves popular; the other said what would lead to safety. But many things, including the last, were approved by the majority not so much as a favour or out of ignorance but out of resignation, since they believed that they were being utterly defeated. This, by Zeus and Apollo, is just what I fear may happen to you, if when you consider the matter, you conclude there is nothing left for you to do. I pray, men of Athens, that our affairs never reach that state!<sup>1066</sup>

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<sup>1064</sup> Demosthenes 9.63. τί οὖν ποτ' αἴτιον, θαυμάζετε ἴσως, τὸ καὶ τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους καὶ τοὺς Ἐρετριέας καὶ τοὺς Ὠρεΐτας ἡδὶον πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου λέγοντας ἔχειν ἢ τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν; ὅπερ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου λέγουσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἔνεστιν ἐνίοτε πρὸς χάριν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα ἄναγκη σκοπεῖν ὅπως σωθήσεται· οἱ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷς χαρίζονται Φιλίππῳ συμπράττουσιν. Usher 1999: 241 calls this a 'chilling parallel', between Athens and Oreus.

<sup>1065</sup> Which, again, following Balot 2004 would suggest that his *parrhēsia* is a form of civic courage.

<sup>1066</sup> Demosthenes 9.64-5. οἱ μὲν ἐφ' οἷς χαριοῦνται, ταῦτ' ἔλεγον, οἱ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἔμελλον σωθήσεσθαι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα οὐχ οὕτως οὔτε πρὸς χάριν οὔτε δι' ἀγνοίαν οἱ πολλοὶ προσίεντο, ἀλλ' ὑποκατακλινομένοι, ἐπειδὴ τοῖς ὅλοις ἠττᾶσθαι ἐνόμιζον. ὃ νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω δέδοικ' ἐγὼ μὴ πάθηθ' ὑμεῖς, ἐπειδὴν εἰδῆτ' ἐκλογιζόμενοι μηδὲν ὑμῖν ἐνόν. καίτοι μὴ γένοιτο μὲν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ πράγματα ἐν τούτῳ. Demosthenes' reference to their resignation also draws its own parallel to the epitaphic tradition where the Athenian ancestors, in contrast, were never resigned to barbarian subjugation, such as Lysias 2.23, the Ancestors 'were ashamed that the

Thus, like Demosthenes' earlier self-citation of his address to the Messenians, recalling the events at Oreus functions as a didactic cautionary tale, and appeals to the Assembly to recognise the parallels of their own situation and follow Demosthenes' honest *parrhēsia*.

Indeed, in this torrential speech Demosthenes seeks any strategy to make the Athenians drop their pretence of peace: if serving their own best interests, or doing their moral duty, or shaming them into action was not enough to change their attitudes, he then shatters any futile hopes that anything can be gained from betraying the *polis*:

It is a fine return that the majority at Oreus have received, for entrusting themselves to the friendship of Philip and exiling Euphraeus! [66] Equally fine is the return for the people of Eretria, who drove away your ambassadors and entrusted themselves to Clitarchus: now they are slaves, subject to whippings and killings! How nobly did Philip spare the Olynthians who elected Lasthenes cavalry commander and exiled Apollonides! [67] It was folly and wickedness to cherish such hopes, as it is for those who follow bad advice and are utterly unwilling to do their duty, but pay attention to those who speak in their enemies' interests, to imagine that the city they inhabit is so great that it cannot suffer any disaster at all.<sup>1067</sup>

Directly challenging those in Athens supporting Philip, Demosthenes reveals in these examples how the fallacy of a benevolent Philip will backfire on the traitors as much as the *polis* itself, as they have been deceived as much as they have misled the Assembly.<sup>1068</sup>

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barbarians were within their territory, and so did not stay to learn whether any allies would help them', but went to the fight.

<sup>1067</sup> Demosthenes 9.65-7. καλήν γ' οἱ πολλοὶ νῦν ἀπειλήφασιν Ὀρειτῶν χάριν, ὅτι τοῖς Φιλίππου φίλοις ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτούς, τὸν δ' Εὐφραῖον ἐώθουν· καλήν γ' ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἐρετριέων, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ὑμετέρους πρέσβεις ἀπήλασε, Κλειτάρχῳ δ' ἐνέδωκεν αὐτόν· δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ σφαττόμενοι. καλῶς Ὀλυνθίων ἐφείσατο τῶν τὸν μὲν Λασθένην ἵππαρχον χειροτονησάντων, τὸν δ' Ἀπολλωνίδην ἐκβαλόντων. μωρία καὶ κακία τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐλπίζειν, καὶ κακῶς βουλευομένους καὶ μηδὲν ὧν προσήκει ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντας, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λεγόντων ἀκροωμένους, τηλικαύτην ἠγεῖσθαι πόλιν οἰκεῖν τὸ μέγεθος ὥστε <μηδέν>, μηδ' ἂν ὀπιούν ἤ, δεινὸν πείσεσθαι.

<sup>1068</sup> Demosthenes 9.56-7 can be read with 8.40 in mind where Demosthenes presented the fate of Lasthenes and Euthycrates, who sold out Olynthus.

Moreover, he reminds them yet again that things can only deteriorate if they continue to follow bad advice and refuse to do their duty. Indeed, his remarks that they believe themselves untouchable, is not a critical reflection on democracy but rather that the *polis* can only function as a democracy when its citizens embody the values and virtues (such as *isegoria* and *parrhēsia*) to preserve it. As argued in the *Second Philippic*, the *polis* relies on its citizens to maintain the virtues which underpin democratic institutions. Essentially, Demosthenes calls on the Athenians to *be* Athenian (in words and deeds), for the sake of Athens itself.

Given what has happened elsewhere, it would be negligent and naïve to be surprised if what happened at Olynthus and Oreus happened in Athens:

This at any rate is shameful, to say after the event: “who would have thought that such things could happen? We should have done this thing or that, and not the other.” The Olynthians could tell you many things now: if they had known them at the time, they would not have been destroyed. There are many things too that the people of Oreus could tell you, and the Phocians, and the people of every city that has been destroyed.<sup>1069</sup>

And it is in light of this knowledge that Demosthenes presents his hope that Athens will not suffer the same fate as these places, but this is dependent upon them acting upon his advice, and shaking off their apathy and detrimental practices within the Assembly. Their fate will be determined, not by Philip, but within their own Assembly, and they will be defeated, not by Philip, but by their own errors.<sup>1070</sup> Demosthenes returns to his ‘*kairos* rhetoric’, now is the time to act, before it is too late:

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<sup>1069</sup> Demosthenes 9.68. καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γ’ αἰσχρόν, ὕστερόν ποτ’ εἶπειν “τίς γὰρ ἂν ᾗθη ταῦτα γενέσθαι; νῆ τὸν Δί’, ἔδει γὰρ τὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ποιῆσαι.” πόλλ’ ἂν εἶπειν ἔχοιεν Ὀλύνθιοι νῦν, ἃ τότε εἰ προείδοντο, οὐκ ἂν ἀπώλοντο· πόλλ’ ἂν Ὀρεῖται, πολλὰ Φοκεῖς, πολλὰ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἕκαστοι.

<sup>1070</sup> Again, parallels can be drawn to the *epitaphioi logoi* at *Menexenus* 243d; Thucydides 2.65.12.

But what good is this to them now? While the boat can still be saved, whether it is large or a small one, that is the time for the sailor and the steersmen and everyone on board to be energetic, and to be on their guard to prevent anyone, wittingly or unwittingly, from capsizing it. Once the sea overwhelms it, their effort is useless.<sup>1071</sup>

Thus now:

In the same way, what are we to do, men of Athens, while we are still safe and have a very great city, with many assets and an excellent reputation? ...By Zeus, I will tell you, and I shall propose a resolution on which you will be able to vote, if you so desire.<sup>1072</sup>

Repeating his proposals from the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes recommends:

First, I say, we must defend ourselves and make our preparations in person, with triremes and money and troops. Even if everyone else submits to be enslaved, we at least must fight for liberty!<sup>1073</sup>

Demosthenes uses provocative and emotive language, aims to shame the Assembly into action, and repeats his call for the Athenians to man and fund their military expeditions. He continues

After making these preparations in person and in the open let us then call upon others, and send out ambassadors to instruct people in every direction – *to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, and to the King, since it is in his interests not to allow this man to overturn everything* – so that you succeed in persuading them you will have people

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<sup>1071</sup> Demosthenes 9.69. ἀλλὰ τί τούτων ὄφελος αὐτοῖς; ἕως ἂν σώζῃται τὸ σκάφος, ἂν τε μείζον ἂν τ' ἔλαττον ἦ, τότε χρὴ καὶ ναύτην καὶ κυβερνήτην καὶ πάντ' ἄνδρ' ἐξῆς προθύμους εἶναι, καὶ ὅπως μὴθ' ἐκὼν μὴτ' ἄκων μηδεὶς ἀνατρέψει, τοῦτο σκοπεῖσθαι· ἐπειδὴν δ' ἡ θάλαττα ὑπέρσχη, μάταιος ἢ σπουδὴ.

<sup>1072</sup> Demosthenes 9.70. καὶ ἡμεῖς τοίνυν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἕως ἐσμὲν σῶοι, πόλιν μεγίστην ἔχοντες, ἀφορμὰς πλείστας, ἀξίωμα κάλλιστον, τί ποιῶμεν; ... ἐγὼ νῆ Δί' ἐρῶ, καὶ γράψω δέ, ὥστ' ἂν βούλησθε χειροτονήσετε. Usher 1999: 241 n 235 argues that this 'parable is a simile converted into a story. This one may be the first in Greek oratory.' The analogy of a ship is also used by Plato at *Republic* 488a-e to describe the dangers of rejecting those with true knowledge/expertise for those who display rhetorical skill in winning and subduing.

<sup>1073</sup> Demosthenes 9.70. αὐτοὶ πρῶτον ἀμυνόμενοι καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι, τρήρεσι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ στρατιώταις λέγω· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντες δήπου δουλεύειν συγχωρήσωσιν οἱ ἄλλοι, ἡμῖν γ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνιστέον·

to share both the risks and the costs, if you need anything; and even if you do not succeed, you may at any rate delay his plans.<sup>1074</sup>

Again, as in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes calls on the Athenians to be seen by the wider community to be acting in their own best interests. In this manner he again refers to the master narrative and Persian War rhetoric where he calls on the Athenians to once more be a beacon to galvanise the Greeks. Demosthenes calls the Assembly to reclaim both their reputation and their traditional role in Greece, by addressing the balance of power and the dominance of Philip's *Realpolitik* caused by their own apathy. The only way to victory is through first acknowledging they are at war and not walking blindly into slavery, and secondly to emulate their previous actions.

Moreover, the embassies that Demosthenes had undertaken have proven to be effective and have shown that Philip can be checked, if his agents are not able to manipulate the internal dissension that, in Demosthenes' opinion, destabilises the *polis* and enables Philip's success, and that 'as a result of which we forced Philip to stop and prevented him from attacking Ambracia or invading the Peloponnese.'<sup>1075</sup> It is not inevitable that Athens will fall like the other States, but abandoning the Chersonese and by attacking those who advocate defence will not facilitate this. What is inevitable, however, is their undoing if they refuse to acknowledge the reality that Philip is at war with them, and if they maintain this damaging apathetic attitude. If they do not deal with their internal issues, reject the traitors, and reclaim their identity by doing their duty, bridging the gap between their words and their actions, Athens will fall. Demosthenes beseeches them to see the reality of the situation, as he sees it, and to make their policies, both foreign and domestic, address this reality.

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<sup>1074</sup> Demosthenes 9.71. ταῦτα δὴ πάντ' αὐτοὶ παρεσκευασμένοι καὶ ποιήσαντες φανερὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἤδη παρακαλῶμεν, καὶ τοὺς ταῦτα διδάξοντας ἐκπέμπωμεν πρέσβεις πανταχοῦ, εἰς Πελοπόννησον, εἰς Ῥόδον, εἰς Χίον, ὡς βασιλέα λέγω (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἐκείνῳ συμφερόντων ἀφέστηκε τὸ μὴ τοῦτον ἐᾶσαι πάντα καταστρέψασθαι), ἵν' ἐὰν μὲν πείσητε, κοινωνοὺς ἔχητε καὶ τῶν κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἀναλωμάτων, ἂν τι δέη, εἰ δὲ μή, χρόνους γ' ἐμποιῆτε τοῖς πράγμασιν.

<sup>1075</sup> Demosthenes 9.72.

As I have argued since in the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes holds a mirror up to the Athenians, to reflect their current behaviours, to see the façade they delude themselves with and instead act in a manner worthy of the city. To this end, they must make an *Athenian* effort, as he has stressed since the *First Philippic*, not delegated to others, but a new resolve to act efficiently in their own best interests. It is a task that only they can perform, but they must *choose* to do it:<sup>1076</sup>

I do not urge you to summon others, when you are unwilling to take any necessary steps yourselves, since it would be foolish to claim to care for other people's affairs when you neglect your own.<sup>1077</sup>

Demosthenes implores them to act with sincerity and conviction, and this is essentially the same argument from the *First Philippic*: that they have caused their current situation by an attitude of neglect. In 351, by not acting the Athenians lost areas of vital interest, Amphipolis, Potidaea, Methone, and Pydna. With the hindsight of 341, they only went on to lose more. Nevertheless, Athens' situation is crucially different in certain key respects: Philip's position is now undisputed in Greece, the Athenians conceded Amphipolis in the Peace of Philocrates, and their ally Olynthus was emphatically defeated. It is no longer the case that Athens merely created a political vacuum for any opportunist power to take advantage of – they have witnessed what has happened when a proactive military genius acts with purpose and conviction. Indeed, the confidence of the *First Philippic*, the reassurance that Athens could correct the situation by simply acting, has now been replaced with a sombre finality, that 'the Athenians must learn from the fates of other and wake up to the deadly threat of Philip.'<sup>1078</sup>

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<sup>1076</sup> Noting again that the *epitaphioi logoi* assert that true Athenians are never compelled to do their duty by anything other than their honour. They are virtuous by the volition of their actions.

<sup>1077</sup> Demosthenes 9.73. οὐ μέντοι λέγω μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἐθέλοντας ποιεῖν, τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ εὐήθεις τὰ οἰκεῖ' αὐτοῖς προιεμένους τῶν ἀλλοτρίων φάσκειν κήδεσθαι.

<sup>1078</sup> Trevett 2011: 154.



Despite the change of circumstances, I maintain that Demosthenes' first priority in the speeches since the *First Philippic* has been to confront the neglect he notes here in 9.73 – and not a systematic policy against Philip. This constant focus on addressing Athens' internal crisis indeed culminates in his scathing 'wretched Macedonian' attack; the purpose of which was to shame the Greeks, not merely insult Philip. As discussed in the introduction, scholars have understood the purpose of the speeches in a very different way, i.e. as a policy against Philip. I instead argue that Demosthenes views Philip as a product of their internal corruption and apathy – a secondary crisis which cannot be resolved until they acknowledge their internal issues. They must, therefore, safeguard the Chersonese immediately. Having told them it would be foolish to claim to care for others interests when they have neglected their own, he likewise states he is not telling them to:

Overlook your present predicament and worry about what others will do in the future. That is not what I urge. But I do say that you should send funds to those who are in the Chersonese and should do whatever else they ask, and make your own preparations, and summon, gather, inform, and warn the other Greeks: this is the duty of a city with as great a reputation as ours.<sup>1079</sup>

Demosthenes' argument to send funds dovetails with his arguments in *On the Chersonese* that they should be supporting Diopieithes rather than potentially indicting him; his call to make preparations also returns to his constant request to do so since the *First Philippic*. And in asserting their duty, and their ancestral reputation, Demosthenes makes a rejection of his proposals a rejection of their Athenian heritage, stating that, 'it is up to you to act: your ancestors won this prize, having faced many great dangers in doing so, and bequeathed it do

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<sup>1079</sup> Demosthenes 9.73. καὶ τὰ παρόντα περιορῶντας ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων τοὺς ἄλλους φοβεῖν. οὐ λέγω ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ χρήματ' ἀποστέλλειν φημί δεῖν καὶ τᾶλλ' ὅσ' ἀξιοῦσι ποιεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ παρασκευάζεσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἑλληνας συγκαλεῖν, συνάγειν, διδάσκειν, νοουθετεῖν· ταῦτ' ἐστὶ πόλεως ἀξίωμ' ἐχούσης ἡλικὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει.

you.<sup>1080</sup> As argued earlier, they cannot rely on others to act as the Chalcideans and Megarians ‘will be content if they are saved themselves.’<sup>1081</sup> The other Greeks, as history has shown, have a tendency to bow to vice and power; Demosthenes presents the Athenians with a simple choice, between duty or neglect, between virtue or vice, freedom and slavery, and action or apathy:

But if every one of you sits around following his own desires and trying to avoid having to do anything himself, first he will never find anyone who will take action, and then I fear that we may be forced to take every kind of undesirable measure, all at the same time.<sup>1082</sup>

Demosthenes’ message has been consistent: if they continue to refuse to act war will be thrust upon them. And it will be all the more shameful as they will be forced to act, rather than doing their duty of their own volition, which should be the instinctive motivation of each Athenian citizen. The purpose of the speech – of all the speeches – is to drive the message home that they must shake off their apathy, and act as (according to Athenian ideology) only Athenians can. If they do not do this, then there is no hope that anyone else will, and there is no hope for their democracy to survive.

Demosthenes’ conclusion is brief and simple:

This then is my speech; these are my proposals. If they are put into effect, I believe that even now our fortunes may be restored...whatever you decide – all you gods! – may it be to our advantage!<sup>1083</sup>

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<sup>1080</sup> Demosthenes 9.74.

<sup>1081</sup> Demosthenes 9.74. This comment on the Megarians would suggest that Demosthenes’ proxeny decree *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 231 (discussed in Lambert 2012: 249-272) is later than this speech.

<sup>1082</sup> Demosthenes 9.75. εἰ δ’ ὁ βούλεται ζητῶν ἕκαστος καθεδεῖται, καὶ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτὸς ποιήσει σκοπῶν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲ μή ποθ’ εὐρη τοὺς ποιήσοντας, ἔπειτα δέδοιχ’ ὅπως μὴ πάνθ’ ἅμ’ ὅσ’ οὐ βουλόμεθα ποιεῖν ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη γενήσεται.

<sup>1083</sup> Demosthenes 9.76. ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα λέγω, ταῦτα γράφω· καὶ οἶμαι καὶ νῦν ἔτ’ ἐπανορθοθῆναι ἂν τὰ πράγματα τούτων γιγνομένων... ὅ τι δ’ ὑμῖν δόξει, τοῦτ’, ὧ πάντες θεοί, συνενέγκοι.

Demosthenes' hope rests on the power of Athenian ideology, and that in acting in a manner worthy of the city by upholding the virtues which underpin Athenian identity, they will resolve the internal corruption which currently paralyses their decision-making process making them vulnerable to any external threat.

### Conclusion

I maintain that, despite the vastly altered political landscape in 341, certain aspects of what I have defined as Demosthenes' core arguments (e.g. to act with conviction, the rejection of *parrhēsia*) have not fundamentally altered since the *First Philippic*. Demosthenes prime argument has been to repeatedly assert that Athens' current misfortunes are a direct result of their failure to act effectively to stop Macedonian expansion at the cost of their own interests. I argue that Demosthenes attributes this failure to an internal crisis within the Assembly: a corruption of their decision-making processes caused by self-serving *rhētors* and by the Assembly's own attitude towards advice. As Demosthenes asserted in *On the Chersonese*, the Athenians cannot hope to resolve their external issues, without resolving their internal crisis, which Demosthenes has consistently presented as resulting from a loss of core Athenian values.

As I have shown, attacks upon Philip's character initially diminished him as a threat, and later became devices to criticise the behaviour of the Greeks, and in particular the Athenians. In neglecting the virtues which defined their identity, Demosthenes insists that the Athenians lost that which made them resistant to the external threats of Persia and of Macedonia. It is against the shame of being subjugated by Philip that Demosthenes directs his indignation, and his anger is reserved for the enemies within Athens, and the Assembly for acting in a manner so antithetical to Athenian ideology.

It is this corruption of their internal decision-making process, this internal crisis, which Demosthenes prioritises in the speech: to make the Athenians reflect self-critically

recognise their damaging behaviour and act in their best interests. Now, as in the *First Philippic*, their problems can still be dealt with if the Athenians shake off their apathy and choose to act. Their decision to repeatedly squander any and all opportunities demonstrates both a lack of priorities and their failure to listen to Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs*, despite the vindication of his arguments by subsequent events.

His condemnation of those who stood by and allowed the mistreatment of the democratic patriot Euphraeus, likewise serves as a condemnation of those who treat Demosthenes' *parrhēsia* with hostility. As in *On the Chersonese*, Demosthenes asserts that the greatest threat to Athens is its own self-sabotaging attitude, and that it is imperative that the Athenians recognise their own accountability for Macedonian expansion into Greece, and act in a manner worthy of their ideology. Rather than accepting the gradual erosion of their interests, Demosthenes acts in a manner similar to the *epitaphioi logoi*, reminding the Assembly that – as Athenian citizens – they have a duty to act in the defence of Greek freedom, and that to not act against those who advocate peace with Philip would inflict irrevocable damage on the *polis*.<sup>1084</sup>

Over the last decade, Demosthenes' proposals have remained unchanged: he calls the Athenians to act, in person, and to fund their expeditions, thus demonstrating the strength of their convictions to the rest of the Greek world. Demosthenes holds the same mirror to the Assembly as he did in 351, calling on the Assembly to reflect self-critically on the damage caused by their refusal to acknowledge their own culpability. Now, however, unlike in 351,

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<sup>1084</sup> Such as Lysias 2.33 the ancestors 'decided that freedom accompanied by bravery and poverty and exile was better than the enslavement of their fatherland with wealth and shame.' Lysias 2.62, 'they preferred death with freedom to life with slavery.' Plato *Menexenus* 246d, 'for the person who brings shame on his own family, we think, life is not worth living; such a person has no friend – neither among mankind nor among the gods, neither on earth nor under the earth when he is dead.' Thucydides 2.43, 'So and such they were, these men – worthy of their city. We who remain behind may hope to be spared their fate, but must resolve to keep the same daring spirit against the foe.'

the Athenians were in a physical and emotional position to finally accept his *parrhēsia* and act.<sup>1085</sup>

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<sup>1085</sup> Worthington 2008: 127 notes ‘Demosthenes’ speeches [8 and 9] were wildly successful in the now emotionally charged atmosphere in which the Athenians were living.’ Usher 1999: 237 notes their success ‘sets them apart from most of the deliberative oratory that he had hitherto addressed to the Athenians.’

## CONCLUSION

### THE MIRROR OF DEMOSTHENES

Truth is like poetry, and most people fucking hate poetry.<sup>1086</sup>

Periods of crisis are often characterised by accusations of hostility towards inconvenient truth, particularly when it involves hard truths characteristic of *parrhēsia*.<sup>1087</sup> Despite *parrhēsia* being valued ideologically in the self-image of the Athenian *dēmos*, in practice it often asserted unwelcome and uncomfortable realities. As Isocrates notes in *To Nicocles* while people praised the moralising poetry of Hesiod, Theognis and Phocylides, in practice it was the last thing they would choose to hear.<sup>1088</sup> In *The Big Short*, Dr Michael Burry looked where the banking establishment had conveniently turned a blind eye, and was ridiculed for his (accurate) assessment that there was a bubble in the housing market, and that a crash was inevitable. Despite operating in a flawed system which was undermining itself from within, the ‘big banks’ of America rejected any notion that their comfortable and seemingly indestructible world was in fact a ticking time-bomb created by their own corruption. Despite the fact that Dr Burry presented irrefutable figures, his truth was resented and rejected by an arrogant banking system that did not, could not, or would not acknowledge the reality of the situation, despite their own ability to see the logic of his deductions.

It is arguably an aspect of human nature to avoid the honest truth, both of ourselves and our situation, especially if it is a truth we would rather avoid, as Demosthenes notes, ‘it is

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<sup>1086</sup> This phrase was overheard in a Washington DC bar by Michael Lewis, the writer of the book *The Big Short* published in 2010 and now a film (2015), which centred on the housing bubble of the mid 2000s and the refusal of the banks to acknowledge the inevitable crash, nor their own part in it.

<sup>1087</sup> Janis 1972 notes an aspect of groupthink is the collective decision to ignore arguments or truths which the group does not want to hear. Janis argued that this led to political fiascos, such as the Bay of Pigs during the Kennedy administration. For elements of groupthink in Thucydides see Turner 2015.

<sup>1088</sup> Isocrates *To Nicocles* 43.

the easiest thing to deceive oneself.’<sup>1089</sup> The history of the Classical, indeed the Western world, repeatedly attests to our natural defence mechanism to avoid the truth, even to the point of self-destruction.<sup>1090</sup> The bankers, and the Assembly, would rather ignore Burry’s truth/ Demosthenes’ *parrhēsia* to maintain their comforting and self-perpetuating fallacies, than accept the hard truths to save (or at least salvage) their respective situations. But to acknowledge the ‘truth’ of a situation requires the courage to reflect self-critically, the ability to admit culpability, and the willingness to change attitudes.

It is this courage which Demosthenes calls for in the deliberative speeches. As this thesis has demonstrated, the deliberative corpus demonstrates his consistent attempts to make the Assembly recognise the severity of their situation, and the damage they have inflicted upon themselves (and Greece) by their hostility to honest advice. Demosthenes does not have a prophetic foresight (*pronoia*) in 351 that they will one-day fight at Chaeronea in 338, but he asserts the inevitable self-destruction of Athens if the Assembly refuses to acknowledge the corruption of *logos* and its damaging effect on the democratic process. Demosthenes presents an impression that the Assembly simply did not want to listen to his *parrhēsia*, which is ironic considering that Demosthenes is regarded as a supreme example of a politician who held consistent sway over the Assembly, and yet in his speeches he repeatedly affirms his frustrations at an Assembly that rejects his advice.<sup>1091</sup>

I argue that Demosthenes’ rhetoric sought to shake the Athenians out of a state of denial, to make them recognise their problems as self-inflicted, and to shatter the illusions with which the *dēmos* deceived itself. This, of course, is a portrayal of the Assembly *according* to Demosthenes. In reality the Assembly may have simply not liked his proposals,

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<sup>1089</sup> Demosthenes 3.19.

<sup>1090</sup> This could lead into discussion on what is *truth*, what is *reality*, but these are not immediately relevant for this thesis.

<sup>1091</sup> Herman 2006: 56 remarks that Demosthenes, with Pericles, was a ‘supreme’ example of politicians who managed ‘consistently to hold sway over the Assembly for significant periods of time.’

which challenged the economically conscious reforms of Eubulus, and chose a different path. Indeed, some scholars such as Cawkwell would argue that Demosthenes' policies were seriously flawed, but it is not the purpose of this thesis to determine the soundness of Demosthenes' policies. Rather I maintain that, contrary to the opinion that the speeches are defined by an anti-Macedonian invective or 'Philippic' rhetoric, the speeches confront an internal Athenian crisis, and that it is not a 'Macedonian Question' at the heart of the speeches, but a fundamentally *Athenian* one. I argue that Demosthenes consistently asserts that first and foremost the Athenians must address their internal corruption: as he maintained from the *First Philippic* to the *Third Philippic*, their attitude of apathy and idleness generated a political vacuum that was seized upon and exploited by Philip, which in turn created an environment for Philip to flourish in at Athenian expense. Their external issues were, therefore, self-inflicted and the result of an internal crisis within the Athenian Assembly itself, and consequently analysis of the speeches should focus on this aspect rather than defining the speeches as primarily anti-Macedonian.<sup>1092</sup>

Focusing on this aspect of the deliberative speeches, my analysis shows that Demosthenes' speeches augment the anxieties raised in fifth and fourth century Athens on the dangers of rhetoric and the corruption of the decision-making process.<sup>1093</sup> Demosthenes' appeals to the Assembly demonstrate the dangers of the *dēmos*' self-indulgent appetite for flattering displays of rhetoric, and their hostility towards honest advisers, which perpetuated a vicious cycle of self-destruction. Emblematic of this was the Theoric Fund, where the Assembly created a stalemate that was simultaneously a destructive spiral: it was illegal to threaten the fund, and yet the defence of the fund defended the misplaced priorities that

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<sup>1092</sup> It is worth noting that Classicists (as opposed to Ancient Historians) have tended to paint a rather negative picture of Philip and his ambitions, and it is refreshing that recent publications such as Worthington 2014 and Brun 2015: 10-11 have begun to redress the balance.

<sup>1093</sup> As demonstrated in references to Thucydides, Aristophanes, Isocrates and Plato at relevant points throughout this thesis.



damaged Athenian interests. As Demosthenes reminds them ‘you should not suppose that anyone is so prominent as to be able to break these laws with impunity, or so foolish as to throw himself into trouble.’<sup>1094</sup> Demosthenes’ call for the repeal of the laws protecting this fund highlighted that one of the reasons the Athenians could not rectify their situation, but exacerbated their problems, was their failure to recognise these counter-productive practices. Demosthenes attributes this to the abuse of rhetoric, and the way self-serving *rhētors* persuaded the *dēmos* to pursue apparent, but false, goods. As Demosthenes noted in the *Third Olynthiac*, the manipulation of *logos* turned the Assembly into docile pets, emasculated by the men who ought to serve them.<sup>1095</sup> But Demosthenes’ criticism is also directed at the *dēmos*, for failing to see through rhetorical flattery.<sup>1096</sup> Thus, in Demosthenes’ damning words in *On the Chersonese*:

You are spoiled and easily flattered, listening to everything with an ear to your own pleasure, but your public affairs have come to the point that you are in deadly danger.<sup>1097</sup>

Consequently, the current external crisis (of possessions lost to effective Macedonian expansion) is a direct result of this attitude, manipulated by self-serving *rhētors*. I suggest that through his references to the past and his method of juxtaposing criticism of their current behaviour with praise of their ancestors (and thus their potential as their successors), Demosthenes’ priority has been to confront this internal crisis of their decision-making process. Indeed, within a constitution that functions primarily through oratory, a crisis within oratory is a political crisis, and is arguably the ἀρχή, the origin of all subsequent crises – including Macedonian expansion under Philip.

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<sup>1094</sup> Demosthenes 3.13.

<sup>1095</sup> Demosthenes 3.31.

<sup>1096</sup> Demosthenes 5.4 asserted that with regard to the case of Neoptolemus, ‘the people I criticise are not those who spoke on Neoptolemus’ behalf ... but you!’

<sup>1097</sup> Demosthenes 8.34.

Demosthenes' consistent purpose, therefore, was to make the Athenians self-reflect and change their attitudes. As such, I propose the speeches function as a mirror to the Assembly, firstly to reflect their current flaws to make the Assembly aware of this unflattering reality, and secondly to hold up their ancestral ideology as a reminder of what can be achieved when they act in a manner worthy of the city and its past.<sup>1098</sup> Increasingly Demosthenes asserted that, if the *dēmos* would not be motivated by duty, then they must acknowledge the evidence of their deteriorating misfortunes as Philip increased his influence in Greece at their expense. But as he asserted in *On the Chersonese* and the *Third Philippic*, they could only confront their external enemies after first addressing their internal ones, which required them to acknowledge their own culpability, and act swiftly upon his *parrhēsia*.

### C.1 The Corruption of the Assembly and the Misuse of Rhetoric.

Fundamental throughout the speeches are Demosthenes' repeated complaints at the corruption within, and manipulation of, the Assembly. Demosthenes maintains that the misuse of rhetoric and oratory has paralysed their decision-making process and hinders any hope of effective deliberation and action. In their rejection of his *parrhēsia* in favour of flattering traitors, Demosthenes deplors their failure and unwillingness to recognise the true intentions of speakers, which time and again resulted in the endorsement of flawed policies.<sup>1099</sup> Demosthenes consistently criticised the Assembly's preference for flattery over

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<sup>1098</sup> As discussed in the introduction it is important to clarify that at no point does Demosthenes refer to a mirror, and this is a phrase coined by myself, influenced by (but different to) Hartog's title *The Mirror of Herodotus*. References to Demosthenes' own use of a physical mirror is noted by Plutarch *Demosthenes* 11, cf. Quintilian 11.3.68. Bartsch 2006: 22 refers briefly to Apuleius' account of Demosthenes' mirror. Whilst this is different to my meaning, it nevertheless demonstrates an ancient tradition which associated Demosthenes' rhetoric with self-consciousness (naturally with his speech-impediment) but thus also with self-awareness and self-criticism.

<sup>1099</sup> This is the portrayal of the Assembly *according* to Demosthenes. In reality, the Assembly may have just not liked his proposals, which challenged the economically conscious reforms of Eubulus and chose a different path. Also, some scholars such as Cawkwell would argue that Demosthenes' policies were seriously flawed, but it is not the purpose of this thesis to determine the soundness of Demosthenes' policies.

truth and their indulgence of rhetorical sycophancy which created a dangerous environment of blissful ignorance, and a hostile climate for the *rhētors* such as Demosthenes, who advocated unpopular policies that were nevertheless in the best interest of the *polis*. Demosthenes asserts that the greatest problem facing the Athenians, greater than Philip, was the Assembly itself. Consistently, Demosthenes criticised the *dēmos*' desire for instant gratification in preference to performing their duty, stressing how their avoidance of this duty resulted in a fundamental gap between their words and actions. Their failure to complete *logos* with effective *ergon* consistently undermined their reputation, and the allies no longer had faith in Athenian *logos*, 'since all speech, if it is not accompanied by action, seems vain and empty.'<sup>1100</sup> In its extremes, the Assembly's refusal to be 'men of words and deeds' developed into speech-act logic, where constant deliberation created the illusion of acting on the situation in the Chersonese. In this way, the Assembly avoided taking necessary action to defend their interests in the region by turning Diopeithes into a scapegoat who could be dealt with in-house. For Demosthenes, this speech-act logic epitomised the corruption within the Assembly and how the misuse of rhetoric had turned *logos* into the tool of self-destruction.

For Demosthenes, the Assembly was responsible for its own mutation from the centre of Greek wisdom and intelligence into a degenerate self-harming *mundus perversus*, where advice could not be given or heard. These complaints were resolutely directed at the Assembly and the *dēmos* itself, but Demosthenes also attacks the manipulation of the *dēmos* by self-serving *rhētors*: unequivocally enemies within. The misuse of rhetoric, and the manipulation of the Assembly, is consistently criticised throughout the speeches, where the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric defines such men as the antithesis of Demosthenes' own didactic rhetoric of sincerity. As the *dēmos* fails to recognise this manipulation, preferring to listen to

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<sup>1100</sup> Demosthenes 2.12. Demosthenes calls for the Ambassadors to demonstrate Athenian conviction to restore faith in Athenian *logos*.

flattery than to heed unwelcome truths, Demosthenes weaves the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric with the rhetoric of conspiracy to demonstrate that their rhetorical manipulation is part of a larger conspiracy where these local collaborators exploit their weaknesses and vices for their own ends, at the direct expense of Athens itself.

This criticism of the Assembly is not unique to Demosthenes but, as has been seen throughout this thesis, is apparent across genres. In particular, this thesis has demonstrated that Demosthenes may well have acquired a sophisticated reading of Thucydides at an early date, and a digested appropriation of ideas from his *History*, particularly in his comments on the flaws of the Assembly in post-Periclean Athens in the Mytilenean Debate. Thucydides presents the problems of demagogues and an indecisive malleable Assembly, and as Hesk observes, the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric displayed by both Cleon and Diodotus projects an image of an Assembly that is both suspicious of deceitful speech, and ultimately helpless in the face of it. Thucydides favours neither of them, but rather they reveal the counter-productive and dwindling state of decision-making in the post-Periclean democratic constitution when it lacks strong and virtuous leadership. Democratic deliberation and effective action is, therefore, at the mercy of its citizens and their moral unreliability results in an unstable constitution.

Hesk also observes this in Aristophanes' *Knights*, where the personified Dēmos is corrupted both by others and (perhaps more worryingly) by himself; he admits to knowingly following bad advice because he enjoys gorging on displays of rhetoric.<sup>1101</sup> Indeed Demosthenes' complaint that the Assembly treats the Pnyx as if it is the theatre, and wastes precious time treating oratory as a spectator experience, draws parallels to Cleon's complaints in the Mytilenean debate and to Aristophanes' *Acharnians*: Dicaeopolis appears

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<sup>1101</sup> Hesk 2000: 257 notes how in Agoracritus we see 'the dystopian nightmare (as Thucydides would see it) of a post-Periclean demagogue who actually does manage to achieve total supremacy and control of the dēmos through flattering rhetoric, gratification of his audience.'

to be at the theatre when he is actually at the Pnyx.<sup>1102</sup> For Demosthenes, this attitude demonstrates how the Assembly paralyses the decision-making process by its obsession with rhetorical experience but, in contrast to Thucydides, Demosthenes does not see this as a flaw in the democratic institution, but as the failure of its citizens to act in a manner worthy of the city.

Moreover, I argue that Demosthenes resists the division made by Ober on attitudes towards advising the Assembly between the elitist writers (such as Thucydides) and the orators.<sup>1103</sup> Rather, in refusing to tell the Assembly what it wants to hear, Demosthenes merges this anti-rhetorical stance of Thucydides and Isocrates in his role as protector of the people, and demonstrates that it is possible to criticise the *dēmos* without being anti-democratic.<sup>1104</sup> Indeed, I argue that Demosthenes upholds rather than rejects the deliberative process, and it is in this regard that he essentially differs from Thucydides and Plato, because he does not reject Athenian democracy as an intrinsically flawed system, but instead emphasises the essential position of democratic deliberation within Athenian ideology.<sup>1105</sup> In this Demosthenes agrees with the claim of the Persian aristocrat Otanes in Herodotus, that democracy by its nature should uphold *nomoi* and avoid corruption.<sup>1106</sup> The problem for Demosthenes, as this thesis has demonstrated, is not the concept but the execution, which has

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<sup>1102</sup> Hesk 2000: 258-260.

<sup>1103</sup> Ober 1989: 315, 'Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, and Isocrates all condemn demagogues as mere crown pleasers who said only what the people wanted to hear. Elitist writers, of course, typically considered mass-decision making to be foolish, and the populace anything but wise. Therefore, they castigated the political orators...for failing to oppose the will of the mass, and for saying what everyone wanted to hear rather than what was good and salutary for the state.'

<sup>1104</sup> As Ober 1989: 317 notes, 'the protective role of the political orators merged with an advisory function.' Indeed, this thesis shows how Demosthenes uses the concerns within these elite writers to *defend* democratic deliberation from the corrupt *rhētors*.

<sup>1105</sup> Of course, Demosthenes is simultaneously noting the importance of his own position, but his praise of democracy is one that emphasises interdependency. The system itself does not need an individual such as Pericles, but rather a *dēmos* of citizens that uphold the values of Athens in the manner of men such as Pericles, and himself.

<sup>1106</sup> Herodotus 3.80-82. Herodotus puts this comment on democracy into the mouth of a Persian, an outside perspective, much like Demosthenes' use of the voice of Philip in the *Second Philippic* discussed in Chapter 4.1.

been corrupted by self-serving *rhētors* and the Assembly's hostility to *parrhēsia*.<sup>1107</sup> In consistently calling on the Assembly to recognise this internal crisis and its effects, Demosthenes asserts that it is only by changing their attitudes in deliberative debates that they can make effective decisions and thus efficiently confront their external challenges.

## C.2 An Athenian reflection: Athenian Ideology and the use of the Athenian Past

Having shown the Athenians their current reflection in his criticism of the Assembly, Demosthenes' mirror also functions to display Athens' ancestral past as a means to both criticise and praise the current citizens of Athens. As Clarke notes, Demosthenes participates in a general 'decline theory', as attested to in his frequent use of the recent past to inspire the current Assembly.<sup>1108</sup> In his rhetorical use of the past, I argue that Demosthenes reminds the Athenians of their past actions not in a nostalgic capacity, but in a didactic manner to prescribe their past actions to rectify their current situation. Prominent references to the Corinthian War serve to remind the Athenians of what they can achieve when they take action, and likewise their role in the Persian Wars serves to remind the Athenians of their *μονομαχία*, their past reputation of defending the liberty of the Greeks, and of rejecting bribes, along with the individual exempla of virtuous leaders, such as Pericles. All of Demosthenes' allusions to the distant and recent past serve the end of instructing the *polis* on the errors of their current behaviour, and how to change. Examples from the more recent past, such as recounting the Fall of Olynthus or the Euboean expedition not only serve to vindicate Demosthenes' arguments, but confront the Assembly with the consequences of their actions.

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<sup>1107</sup> One could argue that Thucydides likewise does not reject the concept of the ideal Assembly, but he does criticise democracy for its reliance on individuals such as Pericles. As Ober 1998: 82-3 notes 'there is an association to be made between an innate "general Athenian" capacity to err, and the innate genius of Athens' two most prominent statesmen [Themistocles and Pericles]. By implication, as long as the inherently error-prone Athenians follow the advice and accept the leadership of inherently insightful men, all will be well. But absent wise leadership, the Athenians will be liable to fall into error.'

<sup>1108</sup> Clarke 2008: 252-3.

Moreover, when compared to their fifth-century counterparts, these reminders demonstrate their complete failure to do their duty as hailed men of Athens, and their neglect of the responsibilities they inherited from these ancestors. This is most pointedly articulated in the *Second Olynthiac*, where Demosthenes compares and contrasts fifth century leaders with the prominent men of the fourth century, to highlight the virtues of their former leaders and show how personal vice and self-interest have had a direct effect on the *polis* itself.

Demosthenes uses the idea of Athens as a device to praise and criticise the Assembly: to remind the Athenians of their past actions and values and thus make them ashamed of their current practices, thereby inspiring them to change their damaging attitudes. All of these references to the past use Athenian social and collective memory as a means both to define their ideology and to prescribe it in the present, employing the *topoi* of historical events which over time ‘had become symbols of national character.’<sup>1109</sup>

As discussed in the introduction, the importance of social memory and ideology cannot be underestimated in understanding Demosthenes’ method in these deliberative speeches. Following Yunis’ approach to Demosthenes and the burden of the Athenian past in *On the Crown*, I have developed this to view the use of the ‘Athenian past’ as a method evident throughout Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches. This thesis also contributes to the work of Loraux and Steinbock on the power of the idea of Athens, how it is transmitted, and the importance of social memory and collective historical consciousness to fourth-century persuasion and deliberative decision-making.

The arguments in this thesis are distinctive in my assertion that, first, the speeches should not be defined as ‘Anti-Macedonian’ or as ‘Philippic invective’, as I believe these terms are misleading and suggest that the speeches were dedicated to attacking Philip. In my opinion, Demosthenes prioritises confronting the crisis within the Assembly, which prevents

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<sup>1109</sup> A. Assmann 2001: 6824.

them from taking any effective action against any adversary. Secondly, in removing the ‘Philippic’ lens, we can see that Demosthenes uses the past, and the audience’s social memory and collective awareness of the past, as a mirror to make the Athenians reflect on their own behaviour and culpability. Drawing parallels to the *epitaphioi logoi*, I suggest that Demosthenes hails the Assembly as ‘men of Athens’ and didactically approaches the Assembly to acknowledge their failure to act in a manner worthy of their ancestors, to which he attributes their current problems. In reminding the Athenians of certain elements of their past, Demosthenes prescribes the exempla of the ancestors – using the ideological power of Athens – as the solution to their internal and external crises. These virtues are epitomised in the proposals that he consistently advocated since the *First Philippic*: to act, with conviction, by acting *in person* and by financially supporting their proposals. Moreover, I believe this thesis has shown that familiar *epideictic* material, particularly the complex ideas about Athenian identity recorded in *epitaphioi logoi*, have didactic parallels in the context of deliberative oratory.

I argue that study of the rhetorical strategy of Demosthenes in these speeches contributes to our understanding of the wider nuances of both Athenian historical consciousness, and notions of the ‘idea of Athens’, and how these are used both in a persuasive and a didactic capacity. As discussed in the introduction, scholarship on the deliberative speeches have focused specifically upon the conflict with Philip and, as such, it is rare to find scholars who use these speeches to discuss these topics as they are predominantly used to discuss Demosthenes’ anti-Macedonian policy and his role in the fall of Classical Athens.<sup>1110</sup> This is reflected in how Demosthenes’ contribution to, for example, the rhetoric of conspiracy, has focused mainly on his forensic speeches and the later

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<sup>1110</sup> The exceptions being Steinbock and Mader.



deliberative speeches.<sup>1111</sup> This thesis has shown that Demosthenes' speeches have an important place in discussions on Athenian uses of the past and social memory, building in particular on Steinbock's research on social memory in the Attic Orators to:

move beyond the purely intertextual modes of interpretation and develop a more nuanced appreciation of the conditions of origin and the ideological aspects of these works.<sup>1112</sup>

Steinbock draws attention to the important relationship between ideology and social memory, and how 'a group's mental framework originates from its historical experience...ideological frameworks, [to] determine both the perception of the present and the recollection of the past.'<sup>1113</sup> As has been seen, there is an interesting example of this in Demosthenes' use of Philip's voice in the *Second Philippic*, where his view of Athens not only reminds the Assembly of how they are expected to act, but is also used to define the current conflict, augmenting Demosthenes' narrative with the historical weight of the past.<sup>1114</sup> Moreover, Demosthenes' recurrent use of pointed references to the Athenian past should be seen in the light of modern studies that have shown that the psychology of remembering involves encoding perceptions into long-term memory so that 'people, places, dates and distinctive characteristics of events can serve as cues for later retrieval.'<sup>1115</sup>

Demosthenes also uses references to the Persian Wars, and Periclean ideals, to layer his own advice with the ideological tropes of the 'Master Narrative' of Athens.<sup>1116</sup> I have shown how Demosthenes used the past deeds which provided a basis for Athenian identity,

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<sup>1111</sup> Most notably the Embassy Speeches, *On the Crown*, *Against Meidias* and *Against Stephanus*. The *Second Philippic* is only commented on because of its direct reference to the Persian War.

<sup>1112</sup> Steinbock 2013: 7. Some of the most prominent discussions of this aspect of social memory are Assmann 2001, 2012, Clarke 2008 and Gehrke 2001.

<sup>1113</sup> Steinbock 2013: 14.

<sup>1114</sup> Again, we can see here Yunis' idea of the burden of the Athenian past dictating Demosthenes' rhetoric.

<sup>1115</sup> Steinbock 2013: 10-11, Schacter 2001: 26-33.

<sup>1116</sup> See previous references to Forsdyke 2005: 242, Steinbock 2013: 49 n1 in Chapter 4.3 pp.287 fn 936.

episodes which were valorised in the funeral orations, to evoke similar emotions and responses in his deliberative oratory. Remembering that each speech sought specific action on his advice, which often called upon the Assembly to live up to these historical archetypes, Demosthenes presumed a level of historical consciousness that depended on the shared memory of these identity-defining events.<sup>1117</sup> In his references to the Persian and Corinthian Wars, Demosthenes likewise uses historical consciousness to remind the audience of the role they are expected to play. Furthermore, my argument that Demosthenes focuses on confronting the corruption of the deliberative decision-making process within the Assembly is also supported by the lack of reference to the overthrow of the Pisistratid tyranny, which Demosthenes refers to on several occasions elsewhere, and would be a more obvious choice if his focus was on Philip and tyrannicide.<sup>1118</sup>

Further research could explore similarities between the rhetoric of Demosthenes' own funeral oration and his methods of asserting Athenian ideology in the deliberative speeches analysed here, as perhaps an accumulation and vindication of his arguments since 351. It would also be interesting to pursue intertextualities with contemporary and earlier accounts in the funeral orations, historiography (Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon), and philosophy (Plato and Isocrates) to understand the wider significance of such cues in Athenian historical consciousness.<sup>1119</sup> A natural extension of this thesis could also examine the reception of the 'idea' of Demosthenes beyond the Classical period to understand how the power of an idea or an ideal, imagined or otherwise, can transcend the reality of defeat, charting the process

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<sup>1117</sup> Steinbock 2013: 54 observes how the Persian Wars, and in particular, the Battle of Marathon, became a 'cornerstone of [Athenian] identity', had 'a prescriptive force for future conduct.' Gehrke 2001: 302.

<sup>1118</sup> Clarke 2008: 255 notes that 'one might have expected that the theme of tyrannicide would prove even more dominant than is the case, given its exemplary force in the rhetoric of opposition to Philip. However, the *Philippics* themselves are devoid of references to the model tyrannicide.' For references to Pisistratid tyranny see *Against Leptines* 18; 68-70; *On the Treaty with Alexander* 3.

<sup>1119</sup> Hunt 1998: 19-25 on ideology. Also, whilst I acknowledge the difference between them, I place Isocrates with Plato here for convenience.

whereby the ultimately defeated Demosthenes came to be fashioned as the hero of democracy.<sup>1120</sup>

This thesis offers a Demosthenes liberated from the limiting assumptions of an ‘anti-Macedonian’ lens or any ‘Philippic’ expectations. By focusing on Demosthenes’ internal gaze on the Athenian Assembly, this new approach demonstrates Demosthenes’ contribution to our understanding of the political dynamics of the Assembly in fourth-century Athens, the role of advisers and the rhetoric of advice, and his contribution to the wider concerns of the corruption of the deliberative process in Athens as displayed in other genres, such as Thucydidean historiography and Isocratean wisdom. Moreover, my approach opens up the possible parallels that can be drawn between the *epitaphioi logoi* and Demosthenes’ own didactic approach in his deliberative oratory, and highlights the crucial importance of social memory and the influence of collective historical consciousness in Athenian persuasion.

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<sup>1120</sup> The association of Demosthenes with Athenian democracy was made explicit when the Athenians raised his statue when democracy made its brief reappearance, as noted by Plutarch *Demosthenes* 30.5.

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