



UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

**THE EXISTENCE AND CAUSES OF SOCIAL
EXCLUSION ON PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING ESTATES
IN SOUTH KOREA: THE UNIVERSALISM OF THE
UNDESERVING POOR**

By

TAE SUK KANG

A thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Centre for Urban and Regional Studies
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences
College of Life and Environmental Sciences
The University of Birmingham
September 2014

**UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM**

University of Birmingham Research Archive

e-theses repository

This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.

ABSTRACT

Since the 1980s, areas of public rental housing in South Korea have emerged as one of the targets of housing policy. The Korean government has developed public rental housing policy with the goal of contributing to social integration through providing the poor with decent and affordable accommodations. However, since the 2000s, there has been a growing concern that public rental housing estates have become stigmatised and isolated from the outside at a local level. The phenomenon of ‘conflict’ between public rental housing estates and local people not living on public rental housing estates has been debated under the term ‘social exclusion’ not only by Korean academia but also the government. This research maintains that a specific type of public rental housing estate is labelled as the neighbourhood for the undeserving poor by non-residents of the estates, who refuse to socialise with the estate residents. Drawing on available models to explain the social downgrading of neighbourhoods, this study concludes that social exclusion on public rental housing estates in South Korea is caused by a combination of the ‘concentration effect’ on the estates and the Korean welfare state oriented towards the principle of selectivity through ‘targeting’ in social provisioning.

For Seon-joo

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In writing this thesis, I have accumulated enormous debts to many people and organisations in the UK and South Korea. First of all, special thanks are due to Dr. Peter Lee and Dr. Adam Ramadan, my supervisors. Without their incomparable support and advice, this thesis would not have been completed.

I am also grateful to Dr. Sung-won Lee, Dr. Jun-hyeong Bak, Dr. Myung-seop Lee, Dr. Ji-hong Park and Dr. Eun-hwa Jang who contributed to enabling me to complete this thesis. I also thank Dr. Hee-kyong Kim, Dr. Mee-youn Jin and Professor Seong-kyu Ha, whose insightful comments widened my perspective. My gratitude goes to Ms. Helen Hancock, whose suggestions for the language in this thesis were of such great help. I would also like to thank Tae-woo Kim, Chun-woo Jung, Young-han Kim and Kyu-chul Kim. I appreciated the prayers and encouragement of Fr. Jacob Choi and Fr. Paul Kim.

My thanks should go to a number of the people who participated in this study. They were so generous with their time for the researcher. I am also grateful to Huck Seol. My fieldwork for this study would have been nearly impossible without his help and support.

I thank the South Korean government, which supported my research. My gratitude also goes to everyone at MOLIT. I also feel grateful to my family. My mother, my late father, my grandmother, my parents-in-law, my sister, my brothers-in-law and my niece gave me excellent encouragement. Finally, I want to say to my beloved two daughters, Hyunjin and Min-young, ‘Thank you, I love you’.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	ix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background of the research	1
1.2 Research objectives and questions	7
1.3 Structure of the thesis	13
CHAPTER 2 SOCIAL EXCLUSION	15
2.1 Introduction	15
2.2 Origin of social exclusion.....	16
2.3 Definition of social exclusion.....	22
2.4 Measurement of social exclusion	31
2.5 Policies to combat social exclusion	37
2.6 Social exclusion and space	40
2.7 Conclusion.....	47
CHAPTER 3 SOCIAL HOUSING ESTATES	47
3.1 Introduction	48
3.2 The historical evolution of social housing in Western welfare states	49
3.2.1 Key features of social housing	49
3.2.2 Social housing and the welfare state	50
3.3 The development of social housing	53
3.3.1 First phase: temporary provision.....	53
3.3.2 Second phase: universal provision	54

3.4 The decline of social housing	66
3.4.1 First phase: return.....	66
3.4.2 Second phase: crisis	67
3.5 Models explaining the decline of post-WWII mass social housing estates.....	73
3.5.1 Key features of post-WWII mass social housing estates	73
3.5.2 Explanatory factors for the decline	76
3.6 Conclusion.....	83
 CHAPTER 4 PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING IN THE SOUTH KOREAN WELFARE STATE.....	85
4.1 Introduction	85
4.2 South Korea as a welfare state.....	86
4.2.1 The formation of a state (1945-1960)	86
4.2.2 An authoritarian and developmental state (1960-1987).....	87
4.2.3 The democratic transition and legacies of a developmental state (1987-1997)	91
4.2.4 The economic crisis and the welfare state in transition (1997 onwards)	93
4.2.5 Excluded people in the historical evolution of the Korean welfare state.....	100
4.3 Public rental housing in the Korean welfare state	105
4.3.1 Spatial changes in modern Korea.....	105
4.3.2 Housing policy and housing situation in modern Korea	110
4.3.3 PRH in the developmental welfare state	116
4.3.4 PRH in the transformation of the developmental welfare state	119
4.3.5 Physical, institutional and demographic features of PRH.....	121
4.4 Conclusion.....	127
 CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY	129
5.1 Introduction	129
5.2 Research strategy.....	130
5.2.1 Philosophical considerations	130
5.2.2 Mixed methods research.....	132

5.2.3 Methodological framework	133
5.3 The 2011 Korean Housing Survey of households living in PRH.....	139
5.3.1 An introduction to the 2011 KHS	139
5.3.2 Advantages and limitations of using the 2011 KHS data set	141
5.3.3 Analytical strategy.....	145
5.4 The case studies	149
5.4.1 The selection of cases.....	150
5.4.2 Data collection.....	153
5.4.3 Analytical strategy.....	167
5.4.4 Ethical considerations	168
5.5 Conclusion.....	171
 CHAPTER 6 THE 2011 KOREAN HOUSING SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING	172
6.1 Introduction	172
6.2 Physical characteristics of PRH.....	173
6.2.1 Regional distribution and year of construction	173
6.2.2 Building style	175
6.2.3 Residential satisfaction and physical conditions	177
6.3 Demographic characteristics of PRH	184
6.3.1 Tenure trajectory	184
6.3.2 Age and duration of residence.....	185
6.3.3 Household size and existence of spouse	189
6.3.4 Socio-economic features	192
6.4 Institutional characteristics of PRH.....	198
6.4.1 Letting	198
6.4.2 Delivery of management	202
6.4.3 Maintenance	203
6.5 Conclusion.....	206

CHAPTER 7 THE CASE STUDIES 207

7.1 Introduction	207
7.2 The Junggye 9 PRHE	208
7.2.1 An outline of the Junggye 9 PRHE	208
7.2.2 Characteristics of the Junggye 9 PRHE	209
7.2.3 Results on the Junggye 9 PRHE.....	219
7.3 The Suseo 1 PRHE	235
7.3.1 An outline of the Suseo 1 PRHE.....	236
7.3.2 Characteristics of the Suseo 1 PRHE	237
7.3.3 Results on the Suseo 1 PRHE	246
7.4 Conclusion.....	263

CHAPTER 8 SOCIAL EXCLUSION ON PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING
ESTATES IN SOUTH KOREA..... 264

8.1 Introduction	264
8.2 Applicability of the term social exclusion	266
8.2.1 Social exclusion in the Korean welfare state	266
8.2.2 PRH in the Korean welfare state and social exclusion.....	268
8.3 Existence of social exclusion on PRHEs	271
8.3.1 The potential existence of social exclusion on PRHEs from the 2011 KHS	271
8.3.2 The existence of social exclusion on PR estates from the case studies.....	279
8.4 Characteristics of PR estates	290
8.4.1 Overall characteristics verified by the 2011 KHS.....	290
8.4.2 Distinctive characteristics verified by the case studies	293
8.5 Causal factors of social exclusion on PR estates	297
8.5.1 Concentration and problematic behaviour	297
8.5.2 Restrictive allocation rules	300
8.5.3 Inapplicability of physical process to explain social exclusion on PRHEs..	302
8.6 Suggestions for enabling PRHEs to contribute to social integration	304
8.6.1 Enhancing the level of decommodification in the Korean welfare state.....	304
8.6.2 Reducing the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged groups .	305

8.6.3 Controlling social problems on PRHEs	306
8.7 Conclusion	308
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS	309
9.1 Introduction	309
9.2 The main conclusions on the research topics	310
9.3 Implications of the thesis	313
9.4 Future research	315
APPENDIX 1: Topic guides for case studies.....	318
APPENDIX 2: Information sheet and consent form for case study.....	320
APPENDIX 3: Disadvantages of residing in PRH in the 2011 KHS.....	323
BIBLIOGRAPHY	324

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Three paradigms of social exclusion	27
Table 2.2 Conceptional framework of social exclusion	30
Table 3.1 Three types of welfare state regimes	51
Table 3.2 Three types of social housing in Western countries	52
Table 4.1 Core components and welfare regimes.....	90
Table 4.2 Evolution of the Korean welfare state	99
Table 4.3 Percentage of female householders, 1980-2010	104
Table 4.4 Change of population share in the capital region, 1960-2010.....	106
Table 4.5 Housing stock and housing supply ratio, 1960-2010	113
Table 4.6 Households by tenure, 1970-2010.....	115
Table 4.7 Housing size and the number of rooms by household size in the NMHS	120
Table 4.8 Regional distribution of PRH	123
Table 4.9 Classification of PRH according to the RMHW	124
Table 5.1 Strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research	133
Table 5.2 The number of households in the 2011 KHS	141
Table 5.3 The 2011 KHS questionnaire	142
Table 5.4 Indicators of social exclusion on PRHE and the characteristics of PRHE...	147
Table 5.5 The basic features of two PRHEs.....	153
Table 5.6 Advantages and disadvantage of each source of data	154
Table 5.7 Distribution of interviewees	156
Table 5.8 Demographic profiles of focus group participants as PRHE residents	160
Table 5.9 Number of interviews conducted with private estate residents	162
Table 5.10 The framework composed of central themes.....	168
Table 6.1 The tenures of the previous housing of PRH households in the 2011 KHS.	185
Table 6.2 Average household size in the 2011 KHS	190
Table 6.3 Percentage of householders unemployed in the 2011 KHS	193
Table 6.4 Percentage of households with disabled members in the 2011 KHS	195
Table 6.5 Percentage of households receiving national benefits in the 2011 KHS.....	197
Table 6.6 Rents on PRH in the 2011 KHS	200
Table 6.7 Management type of PRH in the 2011 KHS	202
Table 7.1 Rents on the Junggye estate.....	212
Table 7.2 Maintenance fees on the Junggye estate.....	218
Table 7.3 Rate of forming tenant committees in KOHOM-managed PRHEs.....	224
Table 7.4 Rents on the Suseo estate	241
Table 7.5 Maintenance fees on the Suseo estate	246
Table 8.1 Lack of participation indicated in the 2011 KHS	276
Table 8.2 The official poverty thresholds by average monthly income	296

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Three perspectives for the literature review	8
Figure 2.1 The changing relations between state, market, and civil society	21
Figure 2.2 The cycle of labelling and social exclusion on social housing estates.....	43
Figure 2.3 The cycle of reversing social exclusion on social housing estates.....	46
Figure 3.1 The dualist and unitary models of rental housing	56
Figure 3.2 Change from popular estates to stigmatised estates	78
Figure 4.1 GDP per capita, 1950-2010.....	87
Figure 4.2 Unemployment rate, 1990-2012.....	94
Figure 4.3 Gini coefficient, 1990-2012	94
Figure 4.4 The trend of expenditure in government budgets, 1970-2006	96
Figure 4.5 Industrial population structure, 1910-2010.....	101
Figure 4.6 Number of students, 1910-2010.....	102
Figure 4.7 Spatial changes of major cities in Korea.....	106
Figure 4.8 Changes in the urban areas of Seoul (1920-1990)	108
Figure 4.9 <i>Gangnam</i> which was transformed from green-field site to new city centre	109
Figure 4.10 Land and housing price rates, and related measures taken by the government, 1967-2006.....	110
Figure 4.11 Housing types in modern Korea.....	114
Figure 5.1 Nine mixed-method designs.....	134
Figure 5.2 The methodological framework	137
Figure 5.3 Map of Seoul and locations of the case-study PRHEs.....	152
Figure 6.1 Regional distribution of PRH in the 2011 KHS	173
Figure 6.2 Construction year of PRH in the 2011 KHS	174
Figure 6.3 Apartment type of PRH.....	175
Figure 6.4 Housing size of PRH in the 2011 KHS	177
Figure 6.5 Satisfaction with PRH in the 2011 KHS	179
Figure 6.6 Overall dissatisfaction with PRH in the 2011 KHS	180
Figure 6.7 Satisfaction with the PRHE environments in the 2011 KHS	181
Figure 6.8 Overall dissatisfaction with the PRHE environments in the 2011 KHS	182
Figure 6.9 Physical conditions of PRH in the 2011 KHS	183
Figure 6.10 Median age of PRH householders in the 2011 KHS	186
Figure 6.11 Gender of PRH householders in the 2011 KHS	187
Figure 6.12 Average duration of residence for PRH households in the 2011 KHS	189
Figure 6.13 Size of households in Korea 1980 – 2010.....	190
Figure 6.14 PR household size in the 2011 KHS	191
Figure 6.15 Gender of PRH householders without a spouse in the 2011 KHS	192
Figure 6.16 Educational levels of PRH householders in the 2011 KHS	194
Figure 6.17 Distribution of monthly income in deciles in the 2011 KHS	196

Figure 6.18 Average waiting time of PRH in the 2011 KHS	201
Figure 6.19 Management type of PRH in the 2011 KHS	203
Figure 6.20 Satisfaction with maintenance services in the 2011 KHS.....	204
Figure 6.21 Overall satisfaction with maintenance services in the 2011 KHS	205
Figure 7.1 The layout of the Junggye estate	209
Figure 7.2 Areas between blocks in the Junggye estate	210
Figure 7.3 The layout of Junggye estate dwellings by size	211
Figure 7.4 Breakdown by age of householders on the Junggye estate	213
Figure 7.5 Breakdown by duration of residence of households on the Junggye estate	214
Figure 7.6 Size of households on the Junggye estate	214
Figure 7.7 Breakdown by eligibility of households on the Junggye estate	215
Figure 7.8 The process of selecting residents to reside in PR	217
Figure 7.9 The process of moving onto the Junggye estate (participant A11).....	223
Figure 7.10 The boundary wall with the closed gate.....	227
Figure 7.11 The overview around the Junggye estate	230
Figure 7.12 Several residents' daytime drinking in front of the nursery.....	234
Figure 7.13 The layout of the Suseo estate.....	237
Figure 7.14 Areas between the blocks in the Suseo estate	239
Figure 7.15 The inside and outside views of a unit in one block of the Suseo estate ..	240
Figure 7.16 Breakdown by age of householders on the Suseo estate.....	242
Figure 7.17 Breakdown by duration of residence of households on the Suseo estate..	243
Figure 7.18 Size of households on the Suseo estate	243
Figure 7.19 Breakdown of households by eligibility on the Suseo estate	244
Figure 7.20 Trends in housing prices for Private Estate A and Private Estate 1	249
Figure 7.21 The process of moving onto the Suseo estate (participant B12).....	251
Figure 7.22 Average number of pupils per class in the primary school near the Suseo estate	253
Figure 7.23 Each section of Private Estate 1 boundary wall	255
Figure 7.24 The overview around the Suseo estate	258
Figure 7.25 Car damaged by the suicide of a resident on the Suseo estate	261
Figure 8.1 An analytical framework for answering the research questions	265
Figure 8.2 Disadvantages of residing in PRH in the 2011 KHS	273
Figure 8.3 Alienation from the outside: RN in the 2011 KHS	278
Figure 8.4 The mechanism of viewing the PRHE residents negatively by non-residents	286
Figure 8.5 The process of decline and the concentration of marginalised people	298
Figure 9.1 The connection between macro-factors and social exclusion on PR estates	314

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIAM	Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne
CR	<i>Chonsei</i> Rental-housing
CSG	Contribution Sociale Généralisée [Universal Social Contribution]
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DJP	Democratic Justice Party
DSS	Department of Social Security
EC	European Commission
EITC	Earned Income Tax Credit
EPB	Economic Planning Board
EU	European Union
50R	Fifty-year Rental-housing
5R	Five-year Rental-housing
HLM	Habitation à Loyer Modéré [Housing at a Moderate Rent]
HSSD	Housing Subscription Saving Deposit
IAI	Industrial Accident Insurance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMD	Index of Multiple Deprivation
KHS	Korean Housing Survey
KLDC	Korea Land Development Corporation
KNSO	Korea National Statistical Office
KNHC	Korean National Housing Corporation
KOCER	Korea Center for City and Environment
KOHOM	Korea Housing Management Corporation
30R	Thirty-year Rental-housing (<i>Kukmin</i> (people) Rental Housing)
LH	Korea Land and Housing Corporation
MCST	Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
MLSG	Minimum Living Standard Guarantee
MLTM	Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
MOLIT	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
MR	<i>Maeip</i> (purchase) Rental-housing

MUD	Moral Underclass Discourse
MW	Ministry of Health and Welfare
NGII	National Geographic Information Institute
NHF	National Housing Fund
NHI	National Health Insurance
NLIC	National Law Information Centre
NMHS	National Minimum Housing Standards
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODPM	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
PAP	Public Assistance Programme
PCPP	Presidential Commission on Policy Planning
PR	Permanent Rental-housing
PRH	Public Rental Housing
PRHE	Public Rental Housing Estates
QUAN (or quan)	Quantitative research
QUAL (or qual)	Qualitative research
RED	Redistributionist Discourse
RHS	Rules on Housing Supply
RHCPA	Rental Housing Construction Promotion Act
RMHW	Road Map for Housing Welfare
RMI	Revenu minimumd'insertion [Minimum Integration Income]
SDI	Seoul Development Institute
SHSDA	Suseo Housing Site Development Area
SEU	Social Exclusion Unit
SID	Social Integrationist Discourse
STKB	Special Taskforce of Kukjung Briefing
10R	Ten-year Rental-housing
20R	Twenty-year Rental-housing (long term <i>Chonsei</i> Rental Housing)
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States (of America)
UN	United Nations

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the research

In South Korea, there is an old maxim that ‘a good neighbour is better than a distant cousin’. The term neighbour needs two conceptual elements: home and nearness. ‘Dwelling in nearness’ (Casey 1997) entails face-to-face contact and reciprocal relationship, which produce neighbourhood (Kearns and Parkinson 2001: 2103). Sharing residential space has been believed to bring about strong interpersonal intimacy and commitment among residents who have been together for a long time in South Korea (MCST 2013). This belief relies on two legacies: agricultural tradition which placed heavy emphasis on reciprocity in a neighbourhood for a good crop; and Confucianism, which strongly stressed social harmony, requiring people to place the needs of the nation or the society above themselves (White and Goodman 1998). However, the influx of Western civilisation since the liberation from Japan in 1945, and the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation that started in the late 1960s have brought about a change in the belief that neighbourhoods lead to nearness. Similarly to the West in the nineteenth century, rapid industrialisation and urban growth led to a concentration of large numbers of people from the countryside needing to be housed near their work. It meant the formation of a neighbourhood which was not based on those legacies. In this neighbourhood, close relationships among residents could not be always guaranteed.

Relationships can be defined as interdependence between social units sharing solidarity (Jenson 1998). This is very closely related with the notion of social integration, which can be replaced by other similar concepts such as ‘social insertion’ (Silver 1994), ‘social capital’ (Putnam 2000) and ‘social cohesion’ (Berger-Schmitt and Noll 2000). These terms are understood as the mirror concept of ‘social exclusion’ (De Haan 2000). According to Silver’s (1994) solidarity paradigm, social exclusion occurs when the social bond between the individual and society breaks down. The notion of a social bond can be understood as tying individuals together and leading them to behave in accordance with the collective interest (Van Oorschot and Komter 1998). Consequently, some neighbourhoods can be seen to be an important factor in the causation and entrenchment of social exclusion (Massey and Denton 1993; Madanipour 1998)

This research deals with social exclusion in residential space in South Korea. In particular, it pays attention to the neighbourhood of Public Rental Housing Estate (PRHE) – the so-called social housing estate, which was developed by the state to provide people on low incomes with affordable and decent housing in the process of industrialisation and urbanisation. One example of such social exclusion has repeatedly been referred to in South Korean academia, and this was reported on TV a few years ago (Kim 2004; Ha and Seo 2006; Ha 2008). The residents of privately owned apartments in one neighbourhood in Seoul stretched loops of barbed wire across a road in order to close it up. The road was used for children in Public Rental Housing (PRH) to go to school; and it took them past the private housing estate. Since they did not want PRH residents to pass their estate, and so they set up barbed wire. This phenomenon has been discussed under the term social exclusion not only by academia but also by the

South Korean government from the early-2000s. Ironically, the government developed PRH policy with the goal that it would contribute to social integration via providing low-income households with decent and affordable accommodations (MLTM 2010).

In Western societies dominated by the laissez-faire idea that state intervention should be minimized and the market should play a key role, housing policy has have the characteristics of economic policy rather than social policy (Harloe 1995). However, two major problems have tended to require the state to intervene positively to address them and to justify state provision. One is a lack of housing stock, in that the number of households exceeds the number of dwellings; and the other is the existence of marginalised people who cannot afford the selling price or rent of decent accommodation. In addition, the emergence of the welfare states based on Keynesian economics after World War 2 (WWII) led to more attention to these housing problems. There were differences in the responses made to these problems. In Western Europe, the construction of social housing – the so-called post-WWII mass housing estates – was the solution (Musterd et al. 2009); whereas the US focused more on rent subsidies and the transformation of private housing into public housing, rather than building it (MLTM 2010). However, these policy provisions tend to change according to the broader environment that a state encounters, because housing policy has a variety of contexts, such as demographic change, the economic situation, social change, the political situation and the wider structure of the welfare state (Malpass and Murie 1999). For example, after the Conservative government was elected in the UK in 1979, its manifesto for housing policy emphasised privatisation, represented by the ‘Right to Buy’, or stock transfer, and financial deregulation, with the purpose of enabling the

private sector and building societies to take a more active role. These movements have been supported by the social downgrading of post-WWII housing estates; that is, the estates have been stigmatised by mass unemployment, racial tensions and environmental concerns about open spaces and building quality (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). Furthermore, since the popularity of the term social exclusion in the 1990s, social housing estates have been the leitmotif of social exclusion at the local level (Somerville 1998).

There is a widespread agreement in South Korea that the recognition of housing problems as ones requiring government provision goes back to the first five-year economic development plan established in 1962. However, this intervention could be considered minimal rather than welfarist, because the public sector did not supply social housing. Instead it supplied new dwellings for sale through the market system, just as private enterprises did (Ha 2004). This tendency lasted until the late 1970s, during which time South Korea experienced rapid industrialisation and urban growth just as Western countries had done in the nineteenth century. Some 500,000 people migrated from the countryside every year and flocked into urban areas, especially Seoul, in search of work and shelter; and the towns found they lacked sufficient dwellings for the new concentration of low-income workers (Jang 2004). Housing demand exceeded housing stock; and rising demand was combined with speculation: land prices increased by 20-30 per cent every year between 1975 and 1979 and this figure reached around 49 per cent (almost 150 per cent for Seoul) in 1978 (STKB 2007). To tackle these problems, the government announced the Comprehensive Anti-Real Estate Speculation Measure, the so-called ‘8.8 Measures’, on 8th August 1978. In order to regulate real

estate speculation and stabilise land prices, it introduced the requirement that land transactions should have government approval, introduced standard taxes on the value of real estate, and increased capital gains tax. It is generally accepted that state intervention in housing problems started from that time (Ha 2004). However, state intervention focused primarily on controlling the price of housing and increasing the stock of housing rather than on formulating housing policy to directly target the poor, as happens in a welfare state. The main motivating factor in South Korean housing policy, whatever the official goals declared, was fundamentally the earning of profit from new housing development, which resulted in the marginalised being considered as of no importance in the housing market (Kwon 1989: 34). The housing market remained stable after the 8.8 Measures. In addition, the low oil price, low interest rates and a low exchange rate promoted investment and exports, which led to an economic boom never experienced before. However, this economic performance gave rise to other issues. First of all, idle money from the economic boom flowed into the real estate market, contributing to a sharp increase in housing and land prices; and as the movement for democracy began to heat up, demands for equity in the distribution of economic benefits and for the introduction of welfare benefits were heard at all levels of society (Nam 2005). What is more, a few heads of marginalised households who could not afford accommodation for their families committed suicide as a result of their plight, and some poor tenants whose run-down housing was cleared for redevelopment put up a fierce struggle (Ha 2004). In order to stabilise the housing market and to provide those on low incomes with affordable housing, the Korean government established the Two Million Housing Construction Plan in 1989, following the 1984 enactment of the Rental Housing Construction Promotion Act. According to this plan, 0.25 million housing units

were to be allocated to Permanent Rental-housing that directly targeted low-income households and this was the true first PRH in South Korea (Ha 2004). The total stock of rental dwellings, as of 2009, is over 1.3 million, and this was achieved through implementing several plans including the One Million *Kukmin* (people) Rental Housing project. In 2008, the Korean government established a housing supply plan (2009-2018) to construct a total of 1.5 million housing units, including 0.8 million units of PRH. This was implemented because of the low level of PRH stock – 7 per cent of total housing, as of 2007 (MLTM 2011) – compared to that of advanced countries: 11.5 percent on average in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries; and 13 per cent on average in the European Union (EU) countries. The target was to raise the proportion of PRH units to 12 per cent by 2018.


The focus of these plans has been on building a large amount of housing at a low cost in a short period rather than considering the needs and living conditions of the people who are to live in the new developments. Because inner city areas are very expensive, with land at a premium, construction has been carried out mainly by building large-scale PRHEs on the outskirts of cities. However, construction of PRHEs has brought about a spatial concentration of low-income resident in what have gradually been recognised as stigmatised areas since the early 2000s (MLTM 2011), like those in the West. It is now feared that PRHEs will not only accelerate their neighbourhoods' degeneration, but will also have negative effects on the implementation of rental housing policy. Therefore, this research is designed to deal critically with this phenomenon under the conceptual framework of social exclusion, and to deal with the consequent impact on the promotion of public rental housing policy in South Korea. Recently, studies related to social

exclusion on PRHEs have accumulated in South Korea. However, under the assumed premise that social exclusion on PRHEs exists, the focus of most studies is on sketching out social exclusion on these estates and emphasising ‘social mix’ as an alternative. Social mix is a policy for housing intended to achieve a blended and balanced population composed of varying social and economic characteristics, seeking a diversity of neighbourhoods in terms of the mix of tenure types, housing types and income levels. In addition, the discourse on tackling social exclusion has paid more attention to new development of PRHEs than to the existing PRHEs, where this problem is evident. Due to the reality of a stock level of rental housing that is still low compared to levels in the West and a high number of poor households queuing up to move onto PRHEs, taking measures to tackle social exclusion on existing PRHEs has been considered to be of less interest than increasing the stock of rental housing. So another point of this study is the pursuit of responses to the problems of the PRHEs. Consequently, this study’s focus is on examining the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs and suggesting responses to it. In order to approach the focus, this study sets out three perspectives: ‘social exclusion’, ‘social housing estates’ and ‘South Korean context’ (see Figure 1.1). The literature review will be carried out on the basis of these perspectives.

1.2 Research objectives and questions

The achievement of the policy goal of PRHE developments by the South Korean government – that is, their contribution to social integration through providing marginalised poor people with decent and affordable housing – has been doubted as discussed above.

Figure 1.1 Three perspectives for the literature review



Thus, this research aims to examine how living on PRHEs in South Korea impacts on residents in terms of social exclusion, paying attention to the phenomenon of conflict at a local level between PRHEs and non-residents of PRHEs. Towards this aim, four research objectives were developed.

Bryman (2012) suggests the following six types of stimulus for choosing a research area: personal interest/experience; the theory already developed in the area; the research literature; puzzling features; related new developments in society; and related social problems. Before starting to carry out this research, the researcher worked for the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs in Korea (MLTM, now the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, MOLIT), which is responsible for the following areas of policy: territorial and urban development; housing and land supply; and transport and logistics (MOLIT 2013). The researcher's interest in PRH goes back to his experience in the planning and delivery of PRH in the Ministry. Whilst working in these

areas, the researcher repeatedly witnessed serious objections to the development of PRHEs from local residents. They consistently objected to the concentration of disadvantaged groups, including benefit recipients and disabled people, and pointed to the likely downgrading of their property values as one cause of objections. The Korean government's policy goal in constructing large-scale PRHEs has been to contribute to social integration as noted above. However, paradoxically, the development of PRHEs has caused strong opposition at a local level. It is personal experience of this phenomenon, and a desire to investigate it, that motivates this study.

The research area was narrowed down to give a tighter focus after the existing literature was reviewed. At this point, it is evident that the phenomenon of 'conflict' at a local level between PRHEs and non-residents of PRHEs has been debated under the term 'social exclusion' within South Korean academia since the early 2000s (Kim 2004; Seo et al. 2004; Jin 2005; Ha and Seo 2006b; Rho 2006; Ha 2008; Park et al. 2009). However, as the concept of social exclusion had originated in, and been developed in, Western countries, and as it was a relatively new concept in South Korean housing policy, it was necessary to review the existing Western literature dealing with social exclusion. The notion of social exclusion is very elusive, and its meaning has been adopted differently in each country's policy rhetoric over time (Silver 1994; Lee and Murie 1998; De Haan 2000; Levitas 2005), which will be explained in Chapter 2. Consequently, social exclusion has a variety of definitions, as suggested by Silver's (1994: 540) three major paradigms: breakdown of social bonds, according to the solidarity paradigm; discrimination, according to the specialisation paradigm; and inequality, according to the monopoly paradigm. With regard to social exclusion linked

to public housing estates, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, ‘the cycle of labelling and exclusion’ suggested by Taylor (1998: 821) explains the social exclusion of public housing as part of relations between public housing residents, who accept and internalise negative images of their estate, and outsiders living in non-public housing including members of the media, politicians and professionals, who give the estates a bad image and reinforce a sense of failure. This model of the relationship between the two parties suggests that social exclusion of public housing estate residents can be explored through the solidarity paradigm, where exclusion is described as a breakdown of social relations between public housing estate residents, who are insiders within their estates, and non-residents who are outsiders and can be seen to be members of mainstream society. This theoretical framework corresponded with the research aim of exploring the phenomenon of conflict between PRHE residents and non-residents of PRHEs. Thus, these literature reviews led to the identification of a specific research topic: the verification of the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs on the basis of these theoretical considerations, and in the context of the Korean welfare state regime, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. With regard to this, as this study employs the measures of social exclusion used by Buchardt et al. (2002), which focus on the four key activities of consumption, production, political engagement and social interaction, the 2011 Korean Housing Survey (KHS) data set, including the socio-economic features of sampled residents from all kinds of PRHEs in South Korea, plays an important role in verifying the existence of social exclusion later.

The next stage was to identify whether social exclusion was concentrated on specific kinds of PRHEs. There are various kinds of PRH – 50-year rental, *Kukmin* rental, long-

term *Chonsei*, 10-year rental and 5-year rental housing – according to the period for which homes are to be used as rental units in South Korea. PRHEs are generally large-scale developments of one of these kinds of PRH. Each PRH is targeted at a different income bracket, and PRH with a longer rental period is provided for lower-income households including a combination of priority groups such as lone parents and the disabled. In order to discover any tendency towards social exclusion being concentrated in specific kinds of PRH, measurement of social exclusion using the 2011 KHS data set is carried out. On the one hand, another stimulus for this research topic was the existing South Korean research literature relating to social exclusion on PRHEs, which has tended to regard all kinds of PRHEs as the same and to investigate them without paying attention to the kinds of dwellings they contain (Kim 2004; Ha and Seo 2006; Park et al. 2009).

Following on from this, a desire to explain the causes of this phenomenon was guided by the existing literature that explains the decline of post-WWII mass housing estates in Europe that contain social rented dwellings, and this will be reviewed in Chapter 3. Drawing on the arguments of Van Beckhoven et al. (2009), the social downgrading of social housing estates in European countries is explained from three main theoretical perspectives, along with macro-factors such as globalisation and economic crisis: physical considerations, such as the decay of housing stock; behavioural considerations, such as the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged groups; and institutional (or managerial) considerations. Meanwhile, in the existing Korean research literature, greater emphasis has been placed on describing the social exclusion found on PRHEs and explaining the consequences of this (see Kim 2004; Ha and Seo 2006; Park et al.

2009) mainly from the perspective of the concentration of low-income households. This prompted the researcher to be more curious about the causes of social exclusion on PRHEs, and to examine them on the basis of the three theoretical perspectives described above.

Lastly, as argued by Taylor (1998: 821), the cycle of exclusion on PRHEs should be reversed towards integration. Consequently, exploring the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs as the main research objectives needed to be linked with responses for integrating socially excluded PRHEs. Identifying the responses through this research was closely concerned with the researcher's personal situation. The reason is that the researcher will return to the Ministry where he has worked and he was inspired to investigate this topic after completing the thesis.

Against this background, four research objectives were formulated:

- To explore the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs in South Korea
- To look at the characteristics of PRHEs where there is social exclusion
- To identify the causal factors leading to social exclusion on PRHEs
- To explore responses for integrating socially excluded PRHEs

These research objectives are addressed through the following research questions:

Q1. Does the phenomenon of social exclusion exist on PRHEs in South Korea?

Q2. What are the characteristics of PRHEs where social exclusion exists?

Q3. What exogenous or endogenous factors cause social exclusion on PRHEs?

Q4. What is needed to enable PRHEs to contribute to social integration?

1.3 Structure of the thesis

The background, research objectives and questions of this thesis have now been explained, and the rest of the thesis consists of eight chapters.

Chapter 2 reviews one of the key concepts of this study, social exclusion, examining its origins, its definitions, its measurement, the development of policies to combat it, and the connection between social exclusion and space in the West

Chapter 3 deals with another key concept of this study, social housing estates. As well as providing information on the historical evolution of social housing underpinning the development of welfare state regimes in the West, it traces the decline of post-WWII social housing estates, and presents the key features of this. And then, it explores explanatory factors relating to the causes of social exclusion on social housing estates.

Chapter 4 looks at PRH in the South Korean welfare state in order to find out if theories relating to social exclusion and social exclusion on social housing estates in the West can be applied to Korean PRHEs, along with taking into consideration the development of the Korean welfare regime.

Chapter 5 provides a methodology for this research. It sets out a mixed methods approach as the research strategy; explains the framework for mixed methods research; and introduces secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set as a quantitative approach and the case studies of two PRHEs in South Korea as a qualitative one.

Chapters 6 and 7 present the results of a secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set and the two case studies, according to the theoretical framework of the research derived from the literature reviews.

Chapter 8 sets out to answer the research questions in relation to the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs by combining the results of a secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set and those of the two case studies.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. It addresses the research questions, summarising the main findings of the thesis, and suggests some implications that arise from these. It then proposes future research areas, with consideration of the limitations of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

SOCIAL EXCLUSION

2.1 Introduction

The discussion of social exclusion has increasingly spread across many global regions as well as European countries (Jenson 1998; Popay et al. 2008). As new social risks such as fragmented labour markets, long-term unemployment and a growing gap between the highest and lowest household incomes have emerged under the influence of globalisation, the concept of social exclusion has emerged as a framework for analysing their impacts (Room 1995). This chapter aims to understand the evolution of the use of the concept of social exclusion, prior to exploring social exclusion on PRHEs in South Korea. The first section begins with a discussion of the origins of social exclusion, focusing on the history and ‘triggers’ of this term in Western society. The second section examines the definition of social exclusion in order to clear up some of the confusion around the concept. The next section deals with how social exclusion is measured in order to map degrees of disadvantage in society and to demonstrate the processes and the causes of the phenomenon. The fourth section outlines several governments’ anti-exclusion policies. The last section looks at the spatiality of social exclusion, taking into consideration that this thesis is to explore social exclusion on PRHEs in South Korea.

2.2 Origin of social exclusion

The use of the term social exclusion can be traced to the book *Les exclus: Un Français sur dix*, which was published in 1974 by René Lenoir, who was Secretary of State for Social Action in the Chirac government in France (Silver 1994; Lee and Murie 1998; Rho 2006). To replace the term ‘poverty’, originated in the UK, the term ‘social exclusion’ was used to incorporate broader categories of inequality, conceived as a deficiency of ‘solidarity’ (Silver 1994: 537). After Lenoir’s claim (1974) that about 10 per cent of the French population was excluded, such as the poor, the handicapped, the suicidal, the aged, abused children and substance abusers, the term social exclusion was used ideologically when some people were observed to be excluded in the process of economic recovery from the oil crisis in the 1970s. The term gained popularity in the 1980s, which was a period of economic crisis and restructuring (De Haan 2000). In France at that time, opposition parties censured the Socialist government for persistent unemployment, coining the term ‘the new poverty’. In response to the opposition’s emphasis on the new poverty, the government took to speaking of social exclusion (Silver 1994). Since the term social exclusion is vague enough to enable political acceptability, it may be viewed as a useful way of keeping redistribution off the political agenda in symbolic politics (Silver 1994; Lee and Murie 1998). In the French context, the issue of exclusion was expanded to become a spatial problem after a series of violent incidents in deprived outer-city housing estates during the 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, the issues of integration of immigrants, youth problems, and economic exclusion were associated, in a geographical sense, with the residents of deprived areas, who were described as ‘excluded’ (Silver 1994).

The term social exclusion, starting in France, has spread to other European countries, and the EU has been committed to combating social exclusion throughout the past two decades. Combating social exclusion is written into the Maastricht Treaty and into the objectives of the Structural Funds. Thus, the change in terminology in the European anti-poverty programmes was explicit: while poverty was a central concept in both the first (1975-80) and the second (1986-89) programmes, the third programme (1990-94) was concerned with the integration of the ‘least privileged’ and social exclusion, which had become the fashionable term when this programme started (Room 1995; De Haan 2000).

Why did this new term, instead of the term poverty, become dominant in analysing social inequalities? The reasons can be identified with the changing relations between state, market and civil society, which were caused by two triggers: globalisation and integration as an active response to it. Globalisation, which has strengthened the interdependence of the world’s economy via the circulation of information, money, people, and goods across national boundaries, has required economic structural changes in response to the need to source labour for manufacturing at the lowest possible price, regardless of factory locations (Gottdiener and Budd 2005). At the same time, the ongoing integration of Western European countries, for example with the formation of the EU, has developed to cope with emerging industrial economies outside Europe (Allen 1998). However, an emphasis on raising competitiveness beyond the communal border can mean less interest in raising individual countries’ competence and security within it. Globalisation and ever-closer union can be indicated as fundamental triggers influencing the three societal systems of state, market and civil society. Globalisation is

characterised by the reduction of barriers to international transactions and a decline in national ownership of major corporations. The geographic entity of the nation-state was important to the initial development of Western capitalism because it provided a large region with a single currency and removed obstacles to commerce (Kotz 2001). Thus, the state was a fundamental factor in the formation of the market necessary for capitalist development. However, the current form of globalisation lies in breaking down and restructuring pyramids of regulations to establish a more liberal market place. This trend is transforming the characteristics of the state from social to entrepreneurial, leading to a change from the welfare state based on Keynesianism. This trend is not limited to Western countries, East Asian countries including South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan where economic growth has traditionally been greatly emphasised and instead welfare has been heavily dependent on family or self-reliance, have also advanced deregulation and marketisation under the influence of globalisation intensified by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (Ronald and Doling 2012). On the one hand, the significance of transnational processes such as the formation of the EU has contributed to a change in the state's roles, because this trend pays more attention to communal responses to challenges from outside the region than to each state's individual reactions. The individual state's involvement has been reduced to a lower level, and economic performance on the basis of a more liberal market has been emphasised. This changing role of the state has been portrayed as a trend in social expenditure reduction (Tanzi 2002). The tendency towards spending reductions and marketisation has affected social inequalities, so the possibility of marginalised people who are dependent on a state welfare system finding themselves in difficulties has increased and the risk of social exclusion has also risen.

Globalisation has also been characterised by manufacturing abroad, in order to source labour in a way that facilitates the growth, scope and efficiency of financial capital (Gottdiener and Budd 2005). These attributes of globalisation have led to structural changes in the market: a more fragmented labour market; a decline in manufacturing and a rise in the service sector; increasing long-term unemployment; male joblessness and the feminisation of an increasingly casualised work force; a growing gap between the highest and lowest household incomes; and increasing disparities in educational and skill levels (Parkinson 1998; Madanipour et al. 1998; Barry 2002). Ongoing integration is usually defined as an increase in transnational economic interactions and resource flows, thus leading to a qualitative shift in relations between national economies and between nation-states (Kotz 2001). This movement toward homogenisation in response to globalisation has compelled national economies to adjust prices, products, technologies, and human resources more rapidly and extensively than their regulatory systems allow (Regini 2000). Consequently, globalisation and associated regional integration have caused severe economic restructuring. This structural change in the economic environment and the push for a more liberal market have led to a fragmented labour market and thus hampered the transfer of unemployed workers from the manufacturing sector to new jobs in the service sector. Those losing out in this system run a high risk of social exclusion.


Globalisation can also refer to the transnational circulation of ideas, popular culture and beliefs because it increases contacts with the larger world (Gottdiener and Budd 2005). Subsequently citizens in individual countries come to experience an expansion of their horizons and to share various ideas and aspects of culture. Civil society is generally

defined as the ‘space of uncoerced human association’ and also the ‘set of relational networks’ utilised for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology (Walzer 1990: 1). Globalisation leads to the growth of civil societies from three perspectives: globalisation raises people’s awareness of how others live, spreads ideas about the factors that constrain them, and disseminates various alternatives to past practices, which are likely to be expressed via civil society organisations; globalisation can expand political space for civil society organisations whose concerns are individualism, freedom and equal rights; and globalisation invites international actors to actively promote and strengthen the emergence of national civil societies (Brown et al. 2000: 13-5). Consequently, globalisation results in enlightened citizens; thus, civil society organisations are likely to be responsive to the concerns of impoverished and marginalised groups that would have been excluded before by questioning state sovereignty (Park and Lee 2004). There is no doubt that the ongoing integration process is transporting people at all levels of society to new possibilities of cosmopolitan citizenship. Thus, regional integration can promote the emergence of transnational civil society; moreover, it can challenge old beliefs and expectations at national level and provoke intense discussion of new social problems such as social exclusion.

Consequently, globalisation and associated regional integration have brought about a change in the three societal systems: state, market and civil society. It can be concluded that a highly-contested concept like social exclusion has emerged within the changing processes of the three societal systems. Transnational interaction and deregulation for competition have caused a transformation from the welfare state to an entrepreneurial state, which has resulted in the reduction of state provision. The formation of business-

friendly markets caused by globalisation, and the trend towards economic integration has encroached on the realm that the state previously dominated. And the transnational circulation of thoughts and culture, and a focus on the set of relational networks have led to the growth of civil society as a systemic actor, which has resulted in the expansion of the realm as discussed above. This debate is illustrated in Figure 2.1

Figure 2.1 The changing relations between state, market, and civil society



However, some countries such as the UK and the US stepped back from the discourse of social exclusion. These two countries, influenced by an Anglo-Saxon liberalism, were unfamiliar with this term because the term ‘discrimination’ was the familiar one in these countries (Silver 1994). Poverty was also a term closely associated with the liberal vision of a society seen by the relevant intellectual and political elites as a mass of atomised individuals engaged in competition within the market place, and where some succeeded at the expense of others (Room 1995: 6). However, in the UK, the launch of the New Labour government and the establishment of an interdepartmental Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) in 1997 provided the momentum to tackle the issue of social exclusion. The SEU suggested three approaches to social exclusion in its initial report:

‘new deals’ for the unemployed, lone parents and the disabled, together with actions to address failing schools, crime and public health; new funding programmes and a round of area-based regeneration schemes to support the regeneration of poor neighbourhoods; and joined-up approaches such as 18 cross-cutting ‘policy action teams’ to ensure coherence (Percy-Smith 2000). Meanwhile, the US is still focusing on the discourse of an ‘underclass’ rather than one of social exclusion, staying with an Anglo-American liberalism, so that in relation to inner city problems the term social exclusion has rarely been mentioned in political rhetoric (Silver 1994).

Overall, social exclusion is a complex and politicized term that has been differently adopted in different countries’ policy rhetoric over time, and it is often used interchangeably with other terms such as poverty and underclass.

2.3 Definition of social exclusion

The notion of social integration needs to be understood prior to the definition of social exclusion, as it is the mirror concept of social exclusion (De Haan 2000; Shim 2001). The concept of social integration is very closely associated with other, similar concepts, such as ‘social cohesion’, ‘social capital’ and ‘social insertion’. In the traditional view of Durkheim’s thought¹, these terms are applied with respect to relationships between social units such as individuals, groups, organisations and institutions, and can be

¹ According to Jenson (1998: 8), ‘Durkheim identified in the complex division of labour (that is, diversity) of modernity the roots of interdependence, out of which shared principles and expectations could be fostered by well-functioning institutions such as formal state law and markets’.

defined as interdependence between social units sharing loyalty and solidarity (Jenson 1998). According to Berger-Schmitt and Noll (2000), social cohesion tries to heal rifts such as discrimination and inequality, and it seeks to intensify social capital, enhancing such phenomena as solidarity and dedication to community.

In particular, with regard to the concept of solidarity, this was formulated by Durkheim and Weber (Silver 1994; Van Oorschot and Komter 1998). Durkheim classified it into two types: the mechanical and the organic, which refer to social relations from a macro-point of view by perceiving them as characteristic of broader societies (ibid). Mechanical solidarity is defined as ‘the likeness of consciences’ and causes people to recognise and accept each other as members of the same society; whereas organic solidarity is defined as ‘the division of social labour’ and leads people to become mutually dependent on each other for their life opportunities (Durkheim 1969[1893]: 226; Van Oorschot and Komter 1998). Weber analyses solidarity at the micro-level by characterising it as social relations between individuals. Similarly to Durkheim’s identification of solidarity, Weber presents two types, ‘communal relationship’ and ‘associative relationship’ contrasted with Tönnies’s (1955[1887]) *gemeinschaft und gesellschaft* (community and society), which correspond to mechanical and organic solidarity respectively (Weber, quoted in Van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 7). Communal relationship is related to fellow feeling, which makes individuals feel they are members of the same group on an affective, emotional and traditional basis, whereas associative relationship is derived from a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement aiming at a certain material or non-material utility (Van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 7). According to Van Oorschot and Komter, solidarity is a

characteristic of social relations, not only from a macro-point of view but also from a micro-point of view. Durkheim's mechanical solidarity at the macro-level and Weber's communal relationship at the micro-level refer to a culturally and emphatically based bond, which is related to a feeling of 'we are one' and is called 'shared identity', while Durkheim's organic solidarity and Weber's associative relationship refer to a structurally based bond, which is related to a perception of 'we need each other' and is called 'shared utility' (*ibid*: 8). The following discussion on the concept of social exclusion will be based on these understandings.

It was arguably Max Weber who made the initial attempt at defining a form of social exclusion by addressing the concept of 'social closure', which is understood to be one group's attempt to sacrifice other groups in order to enjoy and maintain its own privileged status; but his insight did not evolve into theory (Burchardt et al. 2002). Through the exploration of the origin of social exclusion, it became clear that the conceptualisation of this term needed to be linked with political approaches to it, and that it would perhaps be best to start from a notion of it as the opposite of social integration, mirroring the perceived importance of being part of society, i.e. of being 'included'. Silver (1994) first introduced this kind of analysis, suggesting three perspectives on social exclusion as the basis for paradigms² derived from Thomas Kuhn's viewpoint. Silver drew attention to what she described as the three paradigms of social exclusion: 'solidarity', 'specialisation' and 'monopoly', underpinned respectively by republicanism, liberalism and social democracy. She further stressed the variety of

² Thomas Kuhn (1996: 175) describes a paradigm in two difference senses. The first sense is as an 'entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community'. The other is one element in that constellation that is 'the sort of concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science'.

definitions given to social exclusion and integration, and noted that the concept came with ‘theoretical and ideological baggage’ (De Haan 2000: 27).

The solidarity paradigm is based on French revolutionary history and republican thought; and exclusion occurs when the social bond between the individual and society breaks down. Social order is recognized to be external, moral and normative, not based on the interests of individuals, groups or classes. Communion with the people, such as a national consensus, collective conscience, or general will, binds individuals to the larger society, so interaction across cultural or moral boundaries between groups is paid a great deal of attention in the ordering of the world. Social exclusion is thus identified as the process of an individual being isolated from this order, and the inverse of exclusion is ‘integration’ for which the process is called ‘insertion’. Consequently, this paradigm points to morality or culture as a source of integration, and it focuses attention on a lack of social integration.

In Anglo-American liberalism, social exclusion indicates something rather different, and this tradition is characterised as the specialisation paradigm. This perspective considers social exclusion as a consequence of social differentiation, the economic division of labour and the separation of spheres. Unlike the solidarity paradigm, here the social order is considered as networks of voluntary exchange between autonomous individuals with their own interests and motivation. Social structures consist of separate, competing and sometimes unequal spheres on the basis of exchange and interdependence, so integration is considered as a voluntary alliance between social groups with their various interests and wishes. This liberal model lays heavy emphasis

on the contractual exchange of rights and obligations and the separation of spheres as a source of integration. Thus, when some activities in the social sphere are transacted inadequately, an unreasonable norm is applied to the particular sphere; or when there is obstruction of the transaction between spheres, exclusion occurs in the form of ‘discrimination’. In addition, since the liberal model is founded on individual voluntary decision-making, this paradigm concentrates on the cross-cutting, cumulative personal characteristics of excluded individuals, which are often generalised into the idea of an underclass because they exist outside mainstream society, formulating particular culture and values (Murray 1990; Levitas 1998).

The monopoly paradigm described in Silver’s (1994) work is particularly influential in social democracies such as Sweden and Denmark. Exclusion is considered as a consequence of the formation of a group monopoly. Social order is viewed as coercive, and as being imposed through a set of hierarchical power relations; and exclusion is attributed to the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the interests of the included. In the delimited social entities created by social closure, insiders create a bond of common interests between them and enjoy a monopoly over scarce resources. Outsiders are the excluded, and they struggle to have equal membership and full participation in the community extended to them. The concept of monopoly is quite close to the notion of social closure by Weber and social membership is emphasised as a source of integration (Parkin 1979). Inequalities caused by group monopoly emerge in the form of exclusion. Since these symptoms are evident in a fragmented labour market, exclusion is interpreted as the new poverty that a casualised workforce experiences. Furthermore, monopoly pays attention to identifying the characteristics of outsiders,

which can be interpreted as creating an underclass. The three paradigms described above are summarised in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Three paradigms of social exclusion

	Solidarity	Specialisation	Monopoly
Concept of integration	Group solidarity/ Cultural boundaries	Specialisation/Separate sphere/Interdependence	Monopoly/Social closure
Source of integration	Morality or culture	Exchange	Citizenship rights
Ideology	Republicanism	Liberalism	Social democracy
Discourse	Exclusion	Discrimination Underclass	New poverty Inequality Underclass

Source: adapted from a table in Silver (1994: 540)

From a UK perspective, and in line with Silver's (1994) paradigms, Levitas (2005) also explored the different meanings of social exclusion and how these have shaped current government thinking and policy development on social exclusion (Lee and Murie 1998). In particular, she viewed social exclusion as 'abnormal' because it divides society into two groups – the excluded and the included – and devalues the excluded (Percy-Smith 2000). Levitas (2005: 7) has presented three different approaches to social exclusion which resonate with Silver's earlier work:

- A 'social integrationist' discourse (SID), where the emphasis is on the significance of paid work and employment for social inclusion.

- A ‘redistributionist’ discourse (RED), where the emphasis is on poverty and lack of full citizenship rights as the main causes of exclusion.
- A ‘moral underclass’ discourse (MUD), where the main concern is with the morality and behaviour of the excluded themselves.

According to the first approach, people who are socially excluded are those who are excluded from the labour market: the jobless and casualised workers. In order to enhance social integration, paid work and an entrance to the labour market are considered vital. For example, the Labour government’s employment initiatives in the UK in the late 1990s, such as the New Deal³, were informed by an integrationist approach (Watt and Jacobs 2000). The second approach attributes social exclusion to poverty and emphasises the need to reduce the level of poverty to combat social exclusion; nevertheless, social exclusion is a multidimensional concept embracing poverty. Poverty refers to material deprivation; whereas social exclusion extends deprivation into the economic, social and political spheres. However, the disadvantages tend to be overlapping, and which of the multidimensional disadvantages are central is dependent on the context (De Haan 2000). Subsequently, social exclusion takes on different meanings across countries, depending on relative context. There may be social exclusion not only in developing countries but also in developed countries. On the other hand, if resources for a person or group are absent or in short supply, this causes deprivation and may cause a reduction of the right to participate in political or economic activities (Townsend 1979). Consequently, under this approach social exclusion may be

³ According to Beaudry (2002: 8-9), ‘The new deals promised eventual reform of welfare assistance for all benefit recipients. There are four new deals, each for a different group facing particular unemployment challenges. They are a New Deal for Young People, a New Deal for the Long-term Unemployed, a New Deal for Lone Parents and a New Deal for the Disabled’.

interpreted as an absence of citizenship. Levitas's final approach identifies the irresponsibility or immorality of a person or group as the main cause of social exclusion and draws on the narrative of the underclass. The term underclass was coined by Myrdal in relation to the emergence of structural unemployment in the US, and it focused on the section of society that was isolated and outside the mainstream (Lee and Murie 1998). Members of the underclass, or the socially excluded, are seen as having developed their own lifestyle and culture, leading to a separation from the mainstream. According to Murray (1990), the underclass is dependent on welfare and does not have the same culture and values as other sections of society. Potential juvenile delinquents, the jobless and single mothers are presented as typical members of the underclass. These various approaches indicate that the socially excluded could be variously recognized, meaning that the concept has been used differently, depending on social and political contexts.

Consequently, social exclusion is a theoretical concept, not reality itself, and offers a way of looking at society (De Haan 2000). Many things have been discussed under this concept: disadvantage in social, economic or political activity pertaining to individuals, households, spatial areas or population groups; the social, economic and institutional processes through which disadvantage comes about; and the outcomes or consequences for individuals, groups or communities (Percy-Smith 2000: 3). However, many literatures have placed emphasis on some distinct characteristic of the term social exclusion, particularly from the term poverty. Firstly, the concept focuses on social relations between individuals and society, individuals and groups, and groups and groups (Gordon et al. 2007). More broadly, social exclusion has been defined as the

process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society within which they live (European Foundation, quoted in De Haan 2000: 25-6). Secondly, social exclusion implies the existence of a clear agency doing the excluding, although self-imposed or voluntary exclusion may happen (Burchardt et al.'s 1999). Outsiders in the mainstream society such as the media, professionals, and politicians prevent some individuals or groups from having access to scarce resources or stigmatise them to discourage them from participating in social activities (Taylor 1998). Lastly, social exclusion is the dynamic process of being shut out from various systems in the society and it puts characteristics along a continuum, rather than setting them as an absolute condition of being excluded, particularly through the transmission of poverty from generation to generation (Walker and Walker 1997; Silver and Miller 2003). Overall, social exclusion is relational, multidimensional or socio-economic, agential and dynamic-processual (Silver and Miller 2003; Seo 2005). Berghman's (1995) framework shows these conceptual characteristics of social exclusion, as presented in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Conceptional framework of social exclusion

	Static outcome	Dynamic process
Income	Poverty	Impoverishment
Multidimensional	Deprivation	Social exclusion

Source: adapted from a table in Berghman (1995: 21)

In fact, there has been criticism that social exclusion is simply a change in the terminology of poverty (Kennedy 2005). The polarised formulation of inclusion and exclusion has also been criticised because of implicit assumptions that only the included

own power, and that dualist discourses can themselves be structures of control in some circumstances (Jackson 1999). However, throughout the Oil Shock of the 1970s and the rapid changes in the economic environment as a result of globalisation and industrial and corporate restructuring, unemployment began to rise and new social problems such as casualised workforces, widening gaps in income levels, increasing disparities in educational and skill levels, poor housing, bad health and family breakdown clearly emerged despite Western welfare states expecting absolute material deprivation to disappear through the sustained economic growth and basic social assistance they intended to produce. In this context, it can be argued that the concept of poverty did not contribute to a holistic understanding of those new and broadening disadvantages. The concept of social exclusion has brought with it a number of characteristics that were not usually referred to in definitions of poverty and, paradoxically, reinforced the understanding of poverty as capability deprivation (Sen 1997). In addition, the framework of social exclusion tends not to focus on bounded groups, but to emphasise social relations and the processes through which people are being deprived (De Haan 2000).

2.4 Measurement of social exclusion

As the discussion of social exclusion has deepened, the focus has moved away from working definitions to targeting how policy tools can be developed to tackle this growing social problem (Moon 2004). In order that governments can respond to social exclusion, they first need to identify which citizens exist in conditions of social

exclusion, and how serious the social exclusion situations are. In other words: how can social exclusion be measured? And how do we develop indicators which act as proxies for the condition of social exclusion? The measurement of social exclusion can be derived from developing both nominal and operational definitions of the concept, leading to clarification of the meaning of social exclusion; and this will identify groups or individuals who are at risk of social exclusion, and spatial areas which exhibit certain characteristics which are correlated with disadvantage and social exclusion (Percy-Smith 2000: 11-2). Furthermore, the development of indicators helps to suggest which policies are more effective and which are necessary in order to establish a baseline against which progress can be measured. Since the notion of social exclusion is very resistant to efforts to conceptualise it, it is extremely difficult to operationalise the concept and to measure it scientifically (Silver and Miller 2003). Yet, within Europe, there have been significant efforts to measure social exclusion. Most measurements can be divided into two categories: one has attempted to analyse particular cases in relation to social exclusion, such as lone parents, minorities, underage pregnant girls, and the homeless; and the other has attempted to capture social exclusion comprehensively through the development of indicators (Moon 2004). Approaches focused on particular cases help us to direct attention toward specific problematic situations related to particular groups, individuals and geographical areas (Seo 2005). By contrast, comprehensive approaches analyse overall levels of social exclusion in a society by using indicators that act as proxies for the condition of social exclusion. This type of framework pays more attentions to the various dimensions and processes of social exclusion, and it also helps us to identify groups or individuals who are more likely to

be at risk of social exclusion, or geographical areas which have characteristics of social exclusion (Percy-Smith 2000).

Within Europe, there have been significant initiatives to measure social exclusion on the basis of each approach mentioned above. In relation to particular case-focused approaches, key examples can be found in the UK. In the first report of the interdepartmental SEU set up by the government in 1997, the SEU defined it as focused on outcomes: “Social exclusion is a shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown” (SEU 1997: 2). Also, in the first annual report on poverty and social exclusion published by the Department of Social Security (DSS), the key features of poverty and social exclusion are basically consistent with this approach (DSS 1999: 24-6). Here, the key features of social exclusion are given as:

- lack of opportunities to work
- lack of opportunities to acquire education and skills
- childhood deprivation
- disrupted families
- barriers to older people living active, fulfilling and healthy lives
- inequalities in health
- poor housing
- poor neighbourhoods
- fear of crime

- disadvantaged groups

In addition, the Social Protection Committee, with a remit from the EU, established a first set of 18 quantitative indicators of social exclusion and poverty (EC 2006). This set was organized in two tiers of 10 primary and eight secondary indicators⁴, without distinction by dimension. In 2008, these indicators were streamlined to produce 14 indicators, without division into primary and secondary, after the most important indicators for describing poverty and social exclusion had been re-focused, and a few indicators had been judged redundant (EC 2008). Member states were encouraged to make their own third level of indicators that are appropriate for each country's situation in their national action plans (Atkinson et al. 2004).

Approaches to capturing exclusion's comprehensive characteristics aside from income and unemployment have been advanced significantly by several scholars. Paugam's (1995) analysis of the inequalities presented by the risk of social exclusion among the working population (18 to 64 years of age) is an example of this type of approach. He proposed to study the correlation between precarious employment (stable job not under threat, stable job under threat, unstable job, unemployed less than two years, and unemployed more than two years) and economic and social dimensions of deprivation such as instability of conjugal relationship, decline in income, and decline in social life

4 Primary indicators (10): at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfer, inequality of income distribution, persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate (60% median), relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap, regional cohesion, long-term unemployment rate, people living in jobless households, early school leavers not in education or training, life expectancy at birth, self-defined health status by income level (EC 2006). Secondary indicators (8): dispersion around the risk of poverty threshold, at-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a moment in time, at-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfer, Gini coefficient, persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate (50% median), long term unemployment share, people with low educational attainment (Atkinson et al. 2004: 7-8)

(inadequate social and family life, inadequate support network and low levels of participation in social activities). Another example of this type of analysis is presented by Burchardt et al. (2002). Offering a simple working definition of social exclusion – ‘an individual is socially excluded if he or she does not participate in key activities of the society in which he or she lives’ (*ibid*: 30-1) – they identified four dimension of social exclusion in terms of key activities in which it is important that citizens participate. These dimensions are as follows:

- Consumption: the capacity to purchase goods and services⁵
- Production: participation in economically or socially valuable activities
- Political engagement: involvement in local or national decision making
- Social interaction: integration with family, friends, and community

In a similar way, a comprehensive measure of social exclusion was adopted by Percy-Smith (2000: 9), who suggested a total of seven dimensions. In this framework, she attempted to incorporate aspects that other initiatives did not identify, such as neighbourhood, individual, spatial and group, with the existing accepted dimensions, such as economic, social and political. These different dimensions are relevant to the places in which social exclusion happens and to the people experiencing social exclusion. These dimensions are as follows:

- Economic dimension: long-term unemployment, casualization and job insecurity,

⁵ Burchardt et al. (1999) included a fifth dimension, saving activity, which was measured by housing tenure, savings, and pension entitlements. In 2002, they came to regard this as a subset of the consumption dimension.

workless households, and income poverty

- Social dimension: breakdown of traditional households, unwanted teenage pregnancies, homelessness, crime, and disaffected youth
- Political dimension: disempowerment, lack of political rights, low registration of voters, low voter turnout, low levels of community activity, alienation/lack of confidence in political processes, and social disturbance/disorder
- Neighbourhood dimension: environmental degradation, decaying housing stock, withdrawal of local services, and collapse of support networks
- Individual dimension: mental and physical ill health, educational underachievement/low skills, and loss of self-esteem/confidence
- Spatial dimension: concentration/marginalization of vulnerable groups
- Group dimension: concentration of the above characteristics in particular groups
 - the elderly, the disabled, and ethnic minorities

Considering that the concept of social exclusion is characterised as multidimensional, a comprehensive approach is more relevant than a particular case-focused approach. However, there are large overlaps between the dimensions and each dimension is typically mutually reinforcing. This complexity and relativity of social exclusion makes it difficult to distinguish between dimensions and to develop selected indicators corresponding with particular dimensions. It requires a working definition of social exclusion to be constructed and the collection of data demonstrating the way in which different aspects of exclusion work together to reinforce each other and to exacerbate situations. In relation to the development of indicators, Robinson and Oppenheim (1998: 5-6) suggest the following criteria:

- They should be easily understood by the public and congruent with their concerns.
- They should be relatively easy to quantify.
- They should follow international conventions.
- They should have a ‘dynamic’ dimension.
- They should be capable of being operationalised at the local area level.

2.5 Policies to combat social exclusion

A discussion on how social exclusion is defined or measured is required in the development of policies to combat social exclusion. What issues are to be addressed and which groups, or areas, are to be targeted to tackle social exclusion are important for the development of government policy on preventing and responding to social exclusion. The definition of social exclusion has an influence on determining the scope and depth of the policy. In relation to establishing and implementing policy, emphasising the multidimensionality of social exclusion indicates the need to integrate sectoral approaches, and the need for an emphasis on the relational features of social exclusion concentrated in the social process (De Haan 2000). The measurement of social exclusion leads governments to identify policy target groups or areas which act a barometer of the effectiveness of policy in combating social exclusion (Burchardt et al. 2002: 42). In addition, the debate on government interventions on behalf of excluded people is influenced by the kind of welfare state the debate is related to. Since the oil crisis in the 1970s, welfare reform has been discussed in the context of economic

liberalism in Western societies, which began with the advent of centre-left and third-way governments. Reforms of the welfare state have evolved in the direction of a reduction of reliance on public welfare provision. This direction was particularly exemplified under the Blair government in the UK and the Rocard government in France. In New Labour's third Way (Giddens 1998), a core of reforms was introduced to encourage an 'entrepreneurial culture' and 'conditional entitlement', with welfare policies emphasising a strong link between rights and responsibilities (Dwyer 2004). In France, a reduction of the fiscal reliance on social insurance contributions was central to a welfare state reform stressing 'national solidarity' (Béland 2007). In this context, the framework of social exclusion has been utilised in preaching a need to reform the traditional welfare state and promoting specific policies in both countries.

The model of anti-exclusion policies was introduced under the French Rocard government with an emphasis on insertion. Notable examples are the *Revenu minimum d'insertion* (RMI) [Minimum Integration Income] of 1988 and the *Contribution sociale généralisée* (CSG) [Universal Social Contribution] of 1991 (Béland 2007). RMI is composed of two programmes: one is to provide benefits for marginalised people who do not earn a statutory minimum income; and the other is the so-called *contrat d'insertion* that specifies a trajectory for beneficiaries to follow to become productive members of society, whether through work, volunteering, studying, family reunification, or the like (Shim 2001; Silver and Miller 2003). The main objective of the RMI is not only to provide the long-term unemployed with modest financial support but also to encourage them to reintegrate into the labour market. The CSG is the first social policy measure designed to bring about a partial shift from

contribution-financing to tax-financing levied on all incomes. In order to promote job creation and reduce social exclusion, the French government offered targeted reductions in social insurance contributions affecting low-paid workers (Béland 2007). This meant a partial shift from social insurance and occupational solidarity to universal social assistance rights and national solidarity. Thus, French policies focus on a multidimensional perspective on social exclusion and on active intervention for social insertion.

In the UK, the most symbolic measure taken to combat social exclusion was the formation of the SEU. Following its establishment in December 1997, the SEU produced reports on socially excluded groups and related areas, including school truants, people sleeping on the streets, teenage pregnancy, 16-18-year-olds not in education, employment or training, access to resources and neighbourhood renewal (Benn 2000; Popay et al. 2008). In 2006, the SEU was abolished, and replaced by a Social Exclusion Task Force within the Cabinet Office; however, this task force was abolished in 2010. Under the New Labour government, the core of welfare reform was ‘a principle of conditionality’ (Dwyer 2004). In this context, some notable measures to combat social exclusion were implemented. The first one provided various new deals for the young, the long-term unemployed, lone-parents and disabled people; and these strengthened the link between work and benefit entitlement, for example making compulsory attendance at work, training and work-focused interviews. The second was the Job Centre Plus initiative under which anyone claiming working age benefits must agree to take part in a work-focused interview with an assigned advisor as a condition of benefit eligibility (Dwyer 2004: 9). The last one was the New Opportunities for Skilled Jobs initiative

announced as part of Job Centre Plus (Blair 2002). With these initiatives, the British government's discourse about social exclusion can be seen as based on a strong balance between rights and responsibilities when compared with the French debate on social exclusion, because the RMI in France is more symbolic than prescriptive and is distinct from the workfare model the Blair government adopted from the Clinton government (Béland 2007). In addition, there is no apparent emphasis on the idea of social solidarity under the British debate on social exclusion, because social exclusion justifies conditional entitlement on the basis of personal responsibility.

There is a question about the consistency and sustainability of these policies, because initiatives taken under them have been supported rhetorically, by political justification, as described in the examples from both France and the UK, and the concept of social exclusion itself has been widely debated. Nevertheless, the main point is that the building of such policies needs to start with a holistic view, and therefore requires solutions across departmental boundaries. Tackling social exclusion is not just about improved outcomes for those suffering social exclusion, but also needs to reverse long established exclusionary processes.

2.6 Social exclusion and space

The spatiality of social exclusion has been argued by many scholars (Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Room 1995; Madanipour 1998). Much of the argument in the literature deals with the confinement of marginalised poor people to specific space,

particularly residential places. In fact, the spatial dimension of social exclusion is rooted in social deprivation and increased dependency within America's poor black neighbourhoods under the discourse of the so-called 'concentration effect' (Lee and Murie 1998: 11). As discussed in previous parts, the main factor driving social exclusion is a lack of resources, which is particularly caused by unemployment. Such lack discourages individuals and households from participating actively in the social process, and furthermore from having more options and access to many of the markets and services vital to human development and the pursuit of a decent lifestyle (Madanipour 1998; Somerville 1998). As space is the place where these different forms of access are made possible or denied, as the argument by Madanipour (1998: 80) emphasises, people with little choice are increasingly concentrated in specific places.

Living in places with concentrations of marginalised people has negative effects on the lives of people living within them, as a broad consensus (Atkinson and Kintrea 2001). Poor people living in deprived areas are perceived to experience worse outcomes than democratically and economically identical people elsewhere (Berube 2005). This has been dealt with under the discourse of the so-called 'neighbourhood effect'. This effect can be explained by two approaches: internal and external (Galster 2007). The internal approach attributes the cause of negative outcomes in deprived areas to internal social interrelationships: ghetto culture emphasising short-term goals and deviant norms; a lack of role-models occasioned by the absence of a successful middle class; and the development of forms of social capital stressing constraint rather than enablement (Atkinson and Kintrea 2001). Meanwhile, the external approach turns its attention to larger factors that are external to the neighbourhood: a lack of community resources;


poor neighbourhood environment; and de-industrialisation (Lupton and Tunstall 2008).

The consequence of the neighbourhood effect explained by the two mechanisms has been framed as constraint on the life chances of people living in the neighbourhood over and above their own personal characteristics such as job, education and health, and the visibility of anti-social behaviour in this area such as litter, physical decay, visible aggression and crime (Somerville 1998; Galster 2007). Consequently, specific neighbourhoods and localities are highly likely to be open to social exclusion as places as a result of the concentration effect, followed by the neighbourhood effect (Kearns and Parkinson 2001).

The spatiality of social exclusion, in particular in European cities has long been discussed in terms of large social housing estates (Madanipour et al. 1998; Murie et al. 2003; Musterd et al. 2009). As the massive social housing estates that were developed by the emergence of welfare states based on Keynesian economics after WWII have become more tightly linked to low-income and often migrant households, these areas have become places of social exclusion producing scenes of riot and social unrest. These estates have three broadly common features: dwellings in multi-family apartment blocks; open and green living environments; and location far from the city centre (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009: 20). The pattern of decline on such estates is as follows: vacant flats occupied by those with least choice; lack of resources for the strengthening of social activity such as successful schools, public services and role-models; reinforcement of deviant norms and restrictive social networks; social decay, such as low school achievement and unemployment, vandalism and crime; physical decay caused by low structural quality and fewer funds for maintenance; stigma and reputation;

and the moving-out of people with human and financial resources and the moving-in of more marginalised people (Kristensen 1995; Atkinson and Kintrea 2001). This destructive process eventually leads to social exclusion on social housing estates. Corresponding to the process taking place in social housing estates, Taylor (1998: 821) suggests the existence of ‘the cycle of labelling and exclusion’ as shown in Figure 2.2. People with least choice move onto social housing estates as a last resort, they accept and internalise a negative image, and outsiders such as the media, politicians and professionals reinforce and magnify this, so that those who have any choice leave and are replaced by those people who have least choice. As the cycle is repeated, the estate becomes more stigmatised and its residents become socially excluded from participating in key activities in their surrounding neighbourhood, experiencing discrimination from the mainstream and inequality. Consequently, it shows the connection between social exclusion and social housing estates, revealing increasing segregation of these estates from the rest of society.

Figure 2.2 The cycle of labelling and social exclusion on social housing estates



Source: adapted from a figure in Taylor (1998: 821)

Although the indicators of social exclusion were sketched out in previous sections, indicators related to the spatiality of social exclusion need to be reviewed. The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) suggested by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) in 2004 can be cited as an example in order to measure deprivation in each of the 8,145 wards in England (Levitas et al. 2007: 51). The IMD presents indicators which are categorised into seven domains: income, employment, health and disability, education and skills, barriers to housing and services, crime and living environment. Although most indicators of social exclusion are similar to these, those formulated by the IMD include the indicator of living environment deprivation, with two sub-domains related to spatiality: ‘indoors’ living environment, such as housing quality; and ‘outdoors’ living environment, such as air quality and the level of road traffic accidents (*ibid*: 137). The indicators developed by Kristensen (1995: 153-5), which were to measure social exclusion on Danish housing estates, should also be noted. Given the limitations of the statistics of exclusion, he suggests the following additional batteries of indicators, along with local statistics developed by Danish housing corporations, such as the breaking of house-rules, vandalism, complaints from tenants, ‘moonlight’ moves, arrears of rent and loss caused by vacant flats:


- clublife and activities
- satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the estate
- noise and other nuisances on the estate
- evaluation of reputation
- wish to move (and if so, to where)

More attention needs to be paid to policy responses to combat social exclusion on social housing estates. Several responses have been put forward as measures to do this: the restoration of community spirit through reinforcement of social networks among residents (Chanan 2000); application of market rules and changing the landlord in order to break up a concentration of poverty and encourage a more diverse population (Hirschman, quoted in Taylor 1998); the expansion of job opportunities (SEU 2001); and partnership and community involvement such as the growth of tenant involvement in management (Hastings et al. 1996). These responses can be classified as two strategies: place-based strategies to improve the neighbourhood; and people-based strategies to expand opportunity (Berube 2005; Ferrari 2012). A blending of these strategies to transform the neighbourhood can be also an alternative for addressing social exclusion. With regard to this, Taylor (1998: 825-6) suggests the cycle of reversing social exclusion puts emphasis on the development of confidence and capacity on the estate itself for regenerating the problematic estate, suggesting the circuit of ‘reversing exclusion’ as shown in Figure 2.3. A key point of the circuit is to empower residents through social investment and transformation of local services and political culture.

Unlike the above approaches to seek solutions for regeneration under the implied assumption that demographic composition of neighbourhoods is already given, policies to regenerate deprived and excluded neighbourhoods, in particular social housing estates, by transforming their demographic composition have been adopted; for example, ‘Mixed Communities Initiative’ in the UK and the HOPE VI⁶ programme in the US

⁶ HOPE VI stands for Homeownership Opportunities for People Everywhere.

Figure 2.3 The cycle of reversing social exclusion on social housing estates



Source: adapted from a figure in Taylor (1998: 825)

(Popkin et al. 2004; Berube 2005). This is to create mixed communities through changes in housing types, tenures and income levels within deprived neighbourhoods in order to attract new, better-off residents. As the neighbourhood effect is explained by internal social interrelationships between residents, as discussed above, these social mixing policies can be used as a tool for regeneration of social housing estates (Berube 2005). However, since larger structural forces are also pointed out as another mechanism to explain the effect, a social mix housing policy has a tendency to overlook these aspects. In other words, the solution is to decrease the ratio of marginalised poor people, rather than to address more fundamental inequalities, displacing existing residents living in some social housing (Lupton and Tunstall 2008). This unilinear step to pursue social integration by encouraging regeneration through mixed communities can offer a social justice dilemma because it comes at the expense of some of the poor

(Lupton and Tunstall 2008; Ferrari 2012). It is noted that this approach can contribute to improving the statistics of deprived neighbourhoods through relocation of low-income households and an influx of middle-income households, but it cannot assure the societal goal of enhancement of relationships between social units. In addition, as the neighbourhood effect is also explained by larger factors that are external to the neighbourhood, efforts should be made to identify more fundamental problems and tackle them as well as creating a mix of different households.

2.7 Conclusion

Drawing on the literature on the term social exclusion, this chapter has outlined the five issues of social exclusion: origins, focusing on the history and triggers of this term; definition, to clear up some confusion around the concept; measurement, to map its degree in a society; policies, to combat social exclusion; and the concept's relationship with space. Although there has been criticism that the term can lead to an illusion of 'one size fits all' (Jackson 1999), this chapter has identified that this theoretical concept has contributed to a holistic understanding of new and broadening disadvantages in the contemporary world represented by globalisation and neo-liberalism. Furthermore, it has confirmed that the problem of social exclusion has become embedded in specific neighbourhoods, in particular on the social housing estates that are the spatial focus of this research, stimulating the exploration of social housing estates. Starting from this foundation, the next chapter will deal with the context of social housing estates and the process of their decline.

CHAPTER 3

SOCIAL HOUSING ESTATES

3.1 Introduction

Most problems related to housing in a capitalist society are very closely linked with poverty, because the poor are usually ill-housed and it is those who have sufficient income who live in adequate housing with safe and secure surroundings (Hawtin and Kettle 2000). People who are excluded from the labour market and have the lowest incomes are given least choice in housing. As a result, those with least choice tend to graduate toward the rental sectors rather than owner-occupation; moreover, because of the limited and inadequate nature of much of the accommodation, and lack of security of tenure in the private rented sector, they are increasingly concentrated in the social rented sector as a last resort (Lee and Murie 1998: 37-8). Because of this concentration effect as noted in the previous chapter, social housing estates, particularly Western Europe, have played an important role in the causation of social exclusion.

This chapter begins with an exploration of the historical evolution of social housing, which is housing provision within the context of welfare states in Western countries. By looking at it, this chapter will attempt to explore the process of social housing being a last resort for marginalised people. After that, explanatory factors for the social downgrading of social housing estates, which lead to social exclusion, will be presented.

3.2 The historical evolution of social housing in Western welfare states

Before looking at the history of social housing in the West, the definition of social housing needs to be identified because social housing is referred to differently from country to country: council housing in the UK; HLM (habitation à loyer modéré; ‘housing at a moderate rent’) in France; common-good housing (gemeinnütziger) in Germany and Sweden; general housing in Denmark; subsidised-finance housing in Finland; social-interest housing or officially protected housing in Spain; and public rental housing in the US, as in South Korea. In addition, given that the concentration of deprivation in the social rented sector is more noticeable rather than that in the private rented sector, the identification of key features which differentiate social housing from private housing can be a starting point for exploring social exclusion on social housing estates.

3.2.1 Key features of social housing

Scanlon and Whitehead (2007: 8) suggest five definitive manifestations of social housing in Europe: ownership by non-profit organisations and local authorities; the construction of dwellings by the public sector; rents below market level; relevant funding and/or subsidy streams; and provision aimed at those who cannot fulfil their own housing needs. However, it is very difficult to argue that these factors are absolute criteria because of significant exceptions from country to country; for example, housing can be owned by private organisations, as happens in Denmark, and there are examples of owner-occupied social housing in Spain, Greece and the Netherlands (Oxley 2000).

However, many commentators refer to two common aspects of social housing: subsidy from public fund; and specific social housing allocation policy (Harloe 1985; Emms 1990; Oxley 1995; Oxley 2000). Haffner and Oxley (1999: 148) propose that a housing subsidy involves ‘action initiated by government which reduces the relative cost of producing or consuming housing by fiscal financial incentives such as a grant, housing allowance, a sub-market interest rate or reduced total loan costs, and non-fiscal financial incentives such as all types of rent regulations resulting in rent levels below market rent’. The other key feature that distinguishes social housing from private housing is that access to social housing in most countries is limited by social considerations. Namely, social housing is allocated not by market principles, on the basis of ability to pay and individual choice, but by the housing needs of the vulnerable. The most usual criterion for judging housing need in most Western countries is the income level of households wishing to live in social housing, with the exception of some countries such as the UK, Denmark and Sweden, although in practice allocation is on the basis of priority housing need (Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). Consequently, it is subsidy and social housing allocation by state intervention that distinguish social housing from private housing.

3.2.2 Social housing and the welfare state

The fact that social housing is a notion requiring state intervention leads us to the idea that the historical evolution of social housing can be aligned with that of the welfare state. Although the classification of welfare states in Western countries has been attempted by many scholars (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965; Titmuss 1974; Furniss and

Tilton 1977; Therborn 1986; George and Wilding 1990), Esping-Anderson's (1990) welfare state regime, which classified welfare states by the two criteria of decommodification and stratification, has been recognized as a modern classic. Decommodification is about the extent to which a service is to be provided as a social right and to which a person is to be provided with a livelihood without reliance on the market. Meanwhile, stratification is related to the ordering of social relations by social policy (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22-4). The lower decommodification is, and the more distinct stratification is, the nearer the type of welfare state regime comes to the liberal. The reverse is what happens when the social democratic and the middle level falls under the corporatist influence. These types of welfare state regime, in the light of Esping-Anderson's (1990) work, can be described as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Three types of welfare state regimes

	The Liberal Regime	The Conservative-Corporatist Regime	The Social Democratic Regime
Decommodification	Low	→	High
Stratification	Strict (class dualism)	→	None (egalitarianism)

Source: Esping-Anderson (1990)

Perhaps the most important contribution made to the relationship between social housing and welfare state regimes was by Harloe (1995). He categorises three different types of social housing according to the periods in Western Europe and the US: the years around World War 1 (WWI); the later 1920s and 1930s; the period after WWII,

and the years since the mid-1970s; and he linked each period with the birth, growth and decline of the welfare state. This is provided in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Three types of social housing in Western countries

	Workers' Cooperative model	Mass Model	Residual Model
Concept	Self-help programme for organised working class	Large-scale programme for the general public	Small scale programme for the poor
Period of development	The years around before WWI	The years around after WWI The years after WWII to the mid-1970s	The late 1920s and 1930s The years since the mid-1970s
Type of welfare-state regime	Corporatist	Social democratic	Liberal
Examples of countries	The Netherlands and Denmark in the above period	Most Western European countries in the above period	The US The UK since the 1970s

Source: Harloe (1995)

The workers' cooperative model is a type of self-help and mutual aid based on a strong tradition of rural-based producer cooperatives which emerged in the nineteenth century, when industrialisation and urbanisation were more widespread; and it faded away in the second half of the century. Seeing the years around the 1930s as the time of the emergence of the welfare capitalist regime, Harloe (1995: 7) describes the period immediately after WWII as being dominated by the mass model, one of two main models he suggests, which embraced a broad range of income groups; and the years since the mid-1970s as the period of the residual model, which is limited to the least well off, for whom the market would not provide satisfactory or affordable housing.

This perspective is grounded in the idea that a change in the welfare state is driven by economic-political circumstances and housing reflects the wider restructuring of the welfare state. Given the long-held belief in the West that housing is a subject for commodification, and thus social housing is a residual form of provision which is not competing with the private market, it is hard to say that social housing leads to a structural change of the welfare state. However, as Malpass (2008: 16) points out, housing has ‘facilitated a restructuring of welfare, but has not driven the process’, and there is no denying that housing provision and the welfare state are very closely connected to each other. The next two sections will deal with the development and decline of social housing in the West respectively, drawing on Harloe’s (1995) two main models. This will contribute to find out a process that contemporary many social housing estates become areas of social exclusion.

3.3 The development of social housing

3.3.1 First phase: temporary provision

The first emergence of the mass model was in the years around after WWI, and it was related to the exigencies of war. The debt-state caused by huge public expenditure, massive inflation and rapid currency depreciation undermined the liberal economic order that had existed before the war and increased the role of the state in the direction of the economy through controls. As high levels of inflation and currency deflation occurred, with severe shortages of food, raw materials, and housing throughout the

wartime, the ‘respectable’ working class who had lost purchasing power became closer to the dangerous class. In addition, the Bolshevik revolution followed by the Third International and the formation of the Soviet Union brought the fear of social revolution to capitalist countries, and social democratic parties supported by the ‘respectable’ working class were incorporated into established political institutions. As a result, the first major programmes of subsidised social housing were not for the poorest sections of the population, but were mainly for the skilled workers and the lower middle class, and demobilised soldiers. However, there was still opposition to state-subsidised housing by those who had benefited from the pre-war *laissez-fair* economy. In the case of the US, although it adopted a policy of providing government housing for key war workers for a short time, the situation was different from that of European countries. Housing provisions by the state were recognized to be foreign to the US and there was no severe housing shortage in the US at that time, unlike in many European countries (Harloe 1995: 84). So, the first mass programmes promoting state-subsidised social housing were organised in European countries. With the recession gathering pace from the mid-1920s, Western governments turned back from subsidised programmes and returned to the normality of pre-war days that had relied on a market. Social housing at this time was a temporary expedient as ‘insurance against revolution’ (Harloe 1995: 109).

3.3.2 Second phase: universal provision

The years after 1945 saw a major development of the mass model of social housing with the establishment of a new order within capitalism. Once free of the depression of the 1930s and the destruction of WWII, the advanced capitalist countries concentrated on


reconstruction and experienced the longest period of economic growth, up until the mid-1970s. Drastic amounts of public and private investment were made available for housing and infrastructure in this time, which led to an increase in employment and real income. The fundamental factor leading to extensive provision by the state was the destruction caused during WWII. Along with the severe damage of infrastructure, such as railways, ports and waterways, housing shortages exacerbated by the destruction of the war required more persistent and extensive initiatives from governments. The experiences of the war, along with the economic collapse of the 1930s which led to ‘Fordist’, ‘Keynesian’ and ‘mixed economy’ regimes, led to a closer relationship between the market and the state (Harloe 1995). Although US politics still had a tendency to emphasise right wing policies at that time, and the concept of welfare capitalism or welfare was very limited, in Europe left wing parties entered coalition governments and centre and right wing parties accepted significant state intervention in the economy and society. Consequently, these social, economic and political changes brought large-scale and persistent social housing programmes to most Western European countries, which was different from the mass model of social housing after WWI which had been initiated as a temporary expedient.

Two models


The mass model of social housing has varied from country to country depending on each country’s economic and political contexts. However, as shown in Figure 3.1, Kemeny (1995) suggests that two polar models of rental housing can be used to identify and simplify the various mass models of social housing in Europe. These

Figure 3.1 The dualist and unitary models of rental housing

1. The dualist model



2. The unitary model



Source: adapted from a figure in UN (2009: 16)

models are divided according to policy strategy concerning the cost of renting: suppression or encouragement. One is the dualist model that suppresses the cost of renting in order to segregate from rental for profit; the other is the unitary or integrated model that encourages the cost of renting in order to compete with rental for profit. In the former, there is no competition between the non-profit and profit rental sectors because of the application of strict means-testing to non-profit renting and the

imposition of state control over non-profit providers (Kemeny 1995; UN 2009). In the latter, there is direct competition between non-profit and profit-oriented providers, with protection of the newly established non-profit organisations and then the beginning of a prolonged but increasingly tangible reduction and phasing out of both subsidies and regulation (Kemeny 1995, 2006). Kemeny uses non-profit renting and profit-renting instead of social renting and private renting, because he prefers to classify social housing and private housing by whether providers, irrespective of their identity, seek to cover only their costs or more than their costs rather than by who provide the dwellings (Hoekstra 2009). In principle, social rental in the unitary model can be realised by profit-oriented providers in competition with non-profit providers.

Dualist model

Mass programmes of social housing based on the dualist model were found mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries with economic liberalism and an ideology of privatism, such as the UK and Ireland. In these societies state provision in markets is believed to undermine fair competition, so government involvement is intended not to supplant the market but to complement it. Consequently, the welfare services that the government provides are intended as a social safety-net for people who are unable to secure those services in the market. Subsidy and regulation by the state tend to concentrate on non-profit providers, so access to social rental housing with rent that is lower as a result of state support and control is limited to households with low incomes who have failed to secure private rental housing because of its high rent (Hoekstra 2009). In relation to this, the dualist models encourage households in general to purchase houses because social

housing is restricted to poor households and private rental housing is too expensive to rent and offers less security for tenants, both of which considerations push households in general towards being homeowners. Consequently, social rental housing tends to be reserved mainly for the poorest sections of the population with a certain degree of stigma attached to it, and the home ownership rate in dualist models tends to be relatively high (*ibid*).

A typical example of a country using the dualist model is the UK. The mass programme of social housing based on this model in this country was implemented after WWII. From the outbreak of WWII on, there was a severe shrinkage and deterioration of housing stock, and priority was given to repairing and increasing housing. In addition, there was burgeoning popular demand for social reform that gained strength from the summer of 1940, resulting in a massive election victory for the Labour Party in July 1945 (Addison 1975; Malpass and Murie 1999). The period from the end of WWII in 1945 to the beginning of the oil crisis in 1979 saw a high level of house building. While in the 20 years between the wars local authorities in the UK built just over 1.3 million dwellings, in the 20 years after 1945 they built over 2.9 million dwellings (Malpass and Murie 1999: 53). As a result, the total stock of social housing increased from 12 per cent of a total of housing stock in 1945 to 31 per cent in 1979 (Malpass and Murie 1999: 59). However, since the mid-1970s high interest rates, depressed production, high unemployment and falling tax revenues following the oil crisis have added to government borrowing and indebtedness in Western countries (Harloe 1995). Consequently, the period of Conservative government between 1979 and 1997 referred to as ‘Thatcherism’ led to changes in social housing policy, such as the ‘Right to Buy’

property built as social housing, and social housing entered a new phase of residualisation.

In the golden age of social housing in the UK, the main provider of council housing was a non-profit provider such as a local authority, although housing associations emerged as providers in 1960s when public funds were channelled toward them. From before WWII, central government had used the subsidy system to increase or decrease local authority house building and to direct output towards either general need or slum clearance, and the same process continued after 1945 (Malpass and Murie 1999). However, there were criticisms that the rent levels of council housing, despite government subsidy, were relatively high and obstructed the poorer household's access to council housing. From the mid-1950s, central government began to consider more effective policies designed to channel subsidies to the lower-paid sections of the working class, and 'realistic rents' were attempted through amendments to the Housing Subsidies Act (Malpass and Murie 1999: 65). According to this, local authorities should contribute to the Housing Revenue Account, and local authorities were given the flexibility to set the rent levels of council housing according to the income levels of tenants. The realistic rent meant full-cost rents for better-off, who could afford to pay for them, and lower rents for the needy as a result of rent rebates. This mechanism led to subsidy redistribution from better-off tenants to worse-off tenants and encouraged some tenants to buy their council houses or move on to owner-occupation, in line with the dual model described above that sought to contribute to raising rates of homeownership.

Access to and qualification for social housing depends on local authorities' discretion, and technically everyone is eligible, regardless of household income (Malpass and Murie 1999; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). However, under the Housing Act local authorities must give preference to people living in poor housing with problems such as insanitary conditions or overcrowding and who cannot afford to buy or move to decent housing. Thus, in practice allocation is on the basis of priority, according to need and income (Whitehead and Scanlon 2007: 19). There is another point about the development of council housing in this period that should be noted. Central government urged local authorities to economise by building smaller homes at a higher density, in order to maintain a high output in public sector housing despite rising costs and balance of payment difficulties (Malpass and Murie 1999). In response to this requirement, high-rise blocks of flats were produced using the industrialised building systems that emerged as a means of obtaining higher density from the mid-1950s on. Although high-rise housing was expensive to construct, central government encouraged this form of building in order to increase the capacity of council housing, and local authorities built these dwellings up to the mid-1960s. However, high-rise housing did not survive beyond the 1970s because of the complex technical, physical and social problems it brought – problems such as physical decay, vandalism and housing segregation (Harloe 1995).

Consequently, social housing in the years from WWII to the mid-1970s in the UK was owned and managed by the public sector, such as local authorities, and was separated from the private rental market. Subsidy and regulation by central government enabled the rent levels of social housing to be lower than those of the unsubsidised and

unregulated private market. In addition, allocation of social housing depended not on housing demand but on housing need, so that the underprivileged sections of the population who were living in insanitary or overcrowded housing and had difficulty in securing decent homes were given a high priority in the allocation of social housing. However, tenants under this dualist model tended very much to be treated as vulnerable clients rather than as self-determining customers, and a bureaucratised, paternalistic system of distributing homes using means-testing was apt to appear (Kemeny 2006: 3). As a result, with the passage of time, the features of this model of housing contributed to forming negative images of social housing.

Unitary model

Mass models of social housing based on the unitary model were found mainly in countries influenced by the social market theory developed in Germany, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, as well as Germany (Kemeny 1995; Hoekstra 2009). The idea of the social market as an alternative to the extremes of *laissez-faire* followed the economic and social unrest during the Weimar Republic and the Nazi command economy that emerged in the 1930s. According to this theory, markets should be constructed in such a way as to incorporate important social goals (Willgerodt and Peacock 1989; Barry 1993). In theory, intervention in markets is necessary and even desirable, but it aims to create a truly competitive market (Harloe 1995; Hoekstra 2009). The state provision in such a system is not to encourage a profit-driven market and then construct a social safety-net to take care of its casualties, but to actively take part in the construction and continual maintenance of markets, so an important part of this strategy

is to encourage non-profit forms of social organisation to compete with profit-oriented forms in such a way that ‘fat’ is ‘marbled’ into the ‘meat’ (Kemeny 1995: 15). Under this market system social housing policies are geared toward direct competition between the profit-oriented and non-profit rental sectors. As a result, universal rent regulation regimes are imposed by the government, eligibility for accommodation, subsidies and rent levels are little different between the public rental and private rental sectors. That is, non-profit renting is accessible to the general run of households as well as to disadvantaged households in the unitary market, and the government may grant subsidies to the non-profit or profit-oriented rental providers, provided that certain criteria are fulfilled for housing quality, security of tenure and sometimes rent levels (Kemeny 2006; Hoekstra 2009). The choice between dwellings owned by profit-seeking landlords and those owned by non-profit ones is entirely dependent on the preferences and demands of applicants. In addition, the home ownership rate in the unitary model tends to be relatively low by contrast to the dualist model. This trend can be explained by the so-called maturation process, which refers to the growing gap between the outstanding debt-per-dwelling on existing housing stock and the average debt-per-dwelling on new stock which is built, acquired or renovated, as a result of inflation in construction costs (Kemeny 1995: 41). As a result of maturation, the real value of the debt on existing housing stock continues to decrease; and there is no incentive for non-profit providers to increase rent levels because of the rising value of their older dwellings and the lack of a need to make a profit. By contrast, the private rental sector and the private landlord with older dwellings benefit from maturation through raising rent levels or sale prices to reflect current inflated value.

An example of a country using the unitary model is the Netherlands. In particular, this country has the highest social housing percentage of total housing stock in Europe: the Netherlands 35 per cent, Austria 25 per cent, Denmark 21 per cent, Sweden 20 per cent, the UK 21 per cent, and Germany 6 per cent (Czischke and Pittini 2007; Whitehead and Scanlon 2007). Therefore, examining social housing in the Netherlands will contribute to understanding the mass model of social housing based on the unitary model. To reduce the housing shortage during WWII, the state reversed the pre-war policy of minimal state involvement in housing and was eager to promote the production of new housing (Hoekstra 2003). Subsidies were provided for both non-profit organisations, such as housing associations and local authorities, and profit-orientated organisations; and social housing catered not only for those on lower incomes but also for median income households (Smith and Oxley 1997; Hoekstra 2003). In addition, the state limited autonomy with respect to pricing by both public and private landlords, and it determined the initial rent levels of new rented dwellings built with the help of subsidies. Furthermore it dictated the development of rents in the existing rental housing stock of both the public sector and the private sector through the trend in rent policy (Hoekstra 2003: 63). Housing production on the basis of this system rose to an unprecedented level after the 1960s compared with the rest of Europe (Boelhouwer 2002). Throughout this period, social housing provided the largest proportion of output, coinciding with a vigorous build-up of the welfare state. In this process, up to the early 1950s, local authorities accounted for the most substantial share of social housing output; but from the early 1960s, housing associations started to be the major social housing builders, due to the pre-war legacy of private initiative in social housing; and by the 1970s these associations provided 85 per cent of social housing output after measures were taken to

prioritize association building and eliminate local authority activity (Harloe 1995). In relation to the private sector, directly subsidised ‘premium’ housing for rental and sale emerged as the major form of construction, accounting for around 45 per cent of housing output from the mid-1960s (*ibid*). However, the economic recession that followed the 1973 oil shortage inflicted losses upon the Dutch welfare state as it did on other Western welfare states. Nonetheless, the transition towards an expansion of market influences, with a curtailing of state involvement such as a reduction in subsidies, began later and occurred more slowly in the Netherlands than elsewhere, because this country had built up a welfare state based on egalitarianism and a strong belief in the state’s role (Harloe 1995; Boelhouwer 2002). The emphasis on public intervention lasted until the late 1980s, which provided the mass model of social housing based on the unitary model, especially featuring a uniform non-profit sector (housing associations) as the owner-provider and dominating force in the rental market. However, the dropping of government loans for new dwellings in 1989 and the abolition of subsidies for social housing construction in 1995 have changed the role of the state in housing from direct governance to indirect governance. This policy in turn has led to a change in the status and character of social housing in the Netherlands, as in Elsinga et al.’s (2008: 35) suggestion that the rental sector would become a last resort and the unitary model would be dismantled by stealth.

Relationship with the welfare state

In relation to Esping-Anderson’s (1990) welfare state regime, the typical mass model of social housing is seen to be associated with the social-democratic welfare state regime.

The period from after WWII to the mid-1970s saw state intervention expanded the most it had ever been in Western history. As the welfare states existing at that time in most Western countries decommodified housing via price regulation and the supply of social housing through subsidies, the levels of decommodification were very high in relation to housing (Hoekstra 2003). Stratification, the second criterion in determining a welfare state regime as regarded housing policy, varied greatly. However, to tackle severe and extensive housing shortages after WWII, states strove to supply massive amounts of housing via the public and the private sectors. This trend came near to pursuing loose stratification, in that most Western countries tried to increase the general public's opportunity to access affordable and decent housing, but, as noted above, their approaches were different. In the case of the UK, there was segregation between the private rental market and the public rental market – the dualist model – which led to the distinction between higher income households, who lived in decent privately rented housing or their own home, and lower income households, who lived in less decent privately rented housing or social housing. By contrast, the Netherlands adopted the unitary model, which led to competition between the private rental market and the public rental market, and it pursued a mix of higher income and lower households. Unitary model countries like the Netherlands can be represented as having an apparent social-democratic welfare regime compared with the dualist model countries like the UK.

3.4 The decline of social housing

3.4.1 First phase: return

The residual model of social housing, in contrast to the mass model, is characterised by a small-scale programme for the poor. The first emergence of the residual model was in the late 1920s and 1930s, and it was influenced by a tendency towards the return of a normal pre-war economic order, and to the principles of the market. As noted previously, after WWI, most Western European governments implemented the first mass programmes of state-subsidised social housing with rent controls. However, the mass model of social housing in this period was a temporary expedient as ‘insurance against revolution’ (Harloe 1995: 109). So, as the peril of revolution disappeared and a short, intensive post-war boom collapsed, most governments adopted deflationary economic policies and the withdrawal of housing and other state programmes from the mid-1920s. As a result, by comparison with the 1920s, the 1930s and the Depression may be presented as the period during which a residual role evolved for social housing (Harloe 1995). The 1930s in Western history may be considered as a transition period from a market-favoured society to a state-favoured society. Although the belief that the state could be a fence sitter on the functioning of the economy died out, the growth of state economic intervention was still a reluctant response. So, social housing policies and practices were confined to more limited roles. Furthermore, as the need for work rather than the need for housing was a dominant issue at this time, social housing was limited to a social role. Thus, by a comparison with the previous decade, social housing was no longer targeted at broad sections of the working class, and was justified as being

for a more or less substantial proportion of the poorer households. Social housing provision was linked to slum clearance and the rehousing of the urban poor – the so-called sanitary policy which aimed to ensure the economic and social health of the city (ibid: 204-5). However, there was a limit to the degree to which the housing needs of households at the bottom level could be tackled via social housing because of the significant number of the poorer households. Moreover, as the assertion that enhanced housing production by the private sector would free up cheaper dwellings for lower income households – the so-called ‘filtering effect’ – was based on little or no evidence, social housing provision became increasingly residual (ibid). To summarise, the 1930s saw a much more restrictive and residual model of social housing targeted at the economically and socially marginalised urban poor.

3.4.2 Second phase: crisis

The successive recessions that followed the 1973 oil shortage prevented social democratic governments from maintaining their policy line – economic growth, full employment and the welfare state – which gave way to an era of right-wing political dominance. These trends toward a neo-liberal politics led to deeper reductions in public expenditure and social welfare, thus housing, which was once a key area of welfare capitalism, along with health, education and pensions, was labelled as a ‘wobbly pillar’ under the welfare state, according to Torgersen’s (1987) arresting metaphor. Since the mid-1970s, the return to a version of the residual model of social housing provision, targeted at the new urban poor, who are generally outside the labour market and excluded from private market provision, has become increasingly obvious in Western

countries (Harloe 1995). As a result, residual social housing tends to accommodate the politically, socially and economically marginalised, and to become a stigmatised form of housing provision. The residualisation of social housing has been accelerated through policies of locking into long-lasting financial commitments to social housing, and privatisation, which aims to reduce the sector by transferring its ownership and moving it from the non-market to the market sector, either through home ownership or private renting. However, the process and degree of the residualisation of social housing have not progressed equally in all Western countries. Just as each country developed its own version of a welfare state and social housing, the transformation of social housing under neo-liberalism has also varied from country to country. The most typical residual model of social housing today is found mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries with an emphasis on economic liberalism and privatism, such as the US and the UK.

The residualisation of social housing in the US

The history of social housing in America has been one of a residualised form for all except the earliest years of its existence after WWII (Harloe 1995: 7). Until the 1930s, the advocacy of what was generally regarded as a socialist policy was discouraged because it was almost equal to communist ideas, and this resulted in an absence of social housing in the US, where public responsibility for housing matters was never seen as the preserve of state or local government. The first legislation for public housing – a version of social housing in the US – was passed in 1937. The main purposes of the 1937 Housing Act could be summarised in three core conceptions: the elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing conditions; decent, safe and sanitary housing for families;

and the reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of business activity; but it was the first two purposes which characterised the post war-development of public housing (Harloe 1995). The emphasis on slum clearance and helping low-income households via the setting of low levels of income for eligibility created the basis for a residual system of public housing from the start. Unlike European social housing after WWI, US public housing hardly received widespread support from political circles or the general public, because there was a tendency to regard it as ‘undiluted socialism’, and there was also an idea that government should assist poor households to find accommodation on the private market (*ibid*). Consequently, US public housing became increasingly fixed as part of a residual programme targeted at marginalised households.

After WWII, in order to tackle the housing shortage caused by veterans’ return from the War and the influx of war workers into the cities, a massive public housing programme was embodied in the 1949 Housing Act. However, the programme became used as a means of removing socially and racially undesirable groups from downtown areas and those areas were instead filled with prestige projects like luxury apartments (Wright 1983). In addition, the Korean War and McCarthyism contributed to a false dawn with this act and its programme for public housing in terms of securing resources. Consequently, the 1949 Act, unlike European social housing, led to the subsequent failures of public housing, redefining its role as residual housing for the marginal urban poor who generally needed to be rehoused from the slums with strict income restrictions for eligibility and limits on costs and standards (Harloe 1995). Throughout the period of President Kennedy and once in the period of his successor, President Johnson, the administration tried to increase public housing output. However, this effort did not

received unwavering acceptance from political groups and the general public. In addition, the growth of home ownership, together with continuing private rental housing construction, accelerated the residualisation of public housing. Therefore, US public housing became a form of highly stigmatised ghetto housing for the group within the poverty population which had the lowest income of all - black single mothers – and was identified as housing of last resort for the marginalised urban poor. After the late 1970s, the decline of post-war welfare states and the emphasis on private markets thwarted housing provision, especially via privatisation, and efforts were made to curtail federal government spending on public housing. In relation to the privatisation of US public housing, it was the HOPE VI programme launched in 1992 that was to replace severely distressed public housing occupied by poor households with redesigned mixed-income housing, and to provide housing vouchers to enable some of the original residents to rent apartments on the private market (Popkin et al. 2004). Unlike European ways of transferring ownership of social housing from the public sector to the private sector, this programme was based on the redevelopment of public housing with the involvement of the federal government. Although this programme was claimed to contribute to physical improvements, with residents' relocation to better housing in safer neighbourhoods, and the revitalisation of neighbourhoods surrounded by public housing developments, this programme was criticised for causing a fall in of the number of affordable houses for low income households and the expulsion of original residents from public housing (Holin et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2007). Thus, the demolition of public housing in favour of mixed income housing development led to a reduction of residential spaces for the poorest; and simply moving these people from their original living area to another poor living area was a poor representation of the relocation process. In conclusion, the

history of public housing in the US has been one of a residual model of social housing provision under the influence of an emphasis on economic liberalism and home ownership.

The residualisation of social housing in the UK

Another typical residual model of social housing is found in the UK social housing after the mid-1970s. The UK developed a mass model of social housing on the basis of a dualist rental model from after WWII until the mid-1970s. However, in the dualist model the supply of social rental housing is created mainly by the public sector at lower-than-market rents because the government separates the social rental sector from the private rental sector and uses it as a kind of safety net (Hoekstra 2009). In addition, dualist models encourage households in general to purchase houses, as presented above. In the period since the mid-1970s, there has been a common pattern of deep cuts in new investment and privatisation of the social housing stock under neo-liberalism, emphasising a reduction of the government's political and financial responsibility for welfare provision (Harloe 1995). This transition brought the UK's social housing, based on the dualist model, to a swift and far-reaching shift back toward the residual model of social housing. Under a manifesto for 'Homes of Our own', 'The Sale of Council Houses', and 'Reviving the Private Rented Sector', privatisation epitomised by the 'Right to Buy' transferred some two million council houses to owner-occupation in order to reduce the financial deficit, and more than 50 local authorities using 'large-scale voluntary stock transfer' transferred their total housing stock to housing associations as the focus of an anti-municipal approach (Malpass and Murie 1999: 79).

Although the New Labour government which designated this as the ‘third way’ (Giddens 1998) replaced the Conservative government in 1997, Labour accepted that private housing was now the dominant form of tenure, emphasising a reduction in reliance on public welfare provision. Since the 1980s, provision has become more tightly constrained, and new lettings have been focussed on those in the greatest need, with little attention paid to increasing the building of social housing, although there was a notable scheme by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in 2007 that aimed at three million houses by 2020, including half a million social dwellings (DCLG 2007; Hills 2007). As a result, the composition of tenants in social housing has changed, with tenants much more likely to have low incomes and not to be in employment, as they would have been in the past, and as those in other tenures are. In 2006, 70 per cent of social tenants had incomes within the poorest two-fifths of the overall income distribution (Hills 2007: 6).

Consequently, deep cuts in new investment and the privatisation of the social housing stock under neo-liberalism have accelerated an immensely swift and far reaching shift back toward the residual model of social housing in Western countries. Thus those people excluded from the general encouragement of private rental and home ownership, and who are the politically, socially and economically marginalised are left to social housing, which becomes an increasingly residualised form.

3.5 Models explaining the decline of post-WWII mass social housing estates

As sketched out in the previous section, mass model of social housing developed under the social democratic welfare state regime after WWII, in particular European cities, has experienced the process of the residualisation under neo-liberalism since the mid-1970s. Although the progress and degree of the residualisation of social housing have not progressed equally in all European countries; for example, in the mass model of social housing based on the dualist model such as that of the UK, it has progressed more deeply, and the decline of social housing is to be found in a large number of European cities (Musterd et al. 2009). The aim of this section is to find out the key features of post-WWII mass social housing estates and the existing theories explaining the decline of the estates in relation to the features. These theories taken together ultimately explain social exclusion on social housing estates and are closely associated with the spatiality of social exclusion as discussed in Chapter 2.

3.5.1 Key features of post-WWII mass social housing estates

The principal development of mass housing estates was realised after WWII, with the advent of the Keynesian welfare state in Western Europe. Post-war mass housing projects were welcomed during the 1960s and 1970s with the construction of hundreds of tower blocks leading to over 45 million dwellings in estates comprising over 2,500 units (Hall et al. 2005). These housing estates were originally built on the basis of the

ideas of the CIAM (Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne) and Le Corbusier⁷, with the idea of creating pleasant, spacious, green, light places in which to live (Dekker and Van Kempen 2005: 20). These ideas were based on the separation of functions, so residential areas were intended to contribute only to providing accommodation for those working in the city, without being integrated with industrial buildings, as had been the case in many mixed urban areas of the late nineteenth century (Rowlands et al. 2009: 8). As a result of this modernist view, high-rise principles were embraced wholeheartedly by architects, city builders and politicians as the new solution for housing problems in European countries (*ibid*).

Although an estate in one country was distinguishable from an estate in another country, some generalisations could be made about post-WWII estates. First, from a physical aspect, they were characterised by industrialised buildings in multi-family large blocks and often high-rise towers, which were usually located in green-field sites outside the urban centre (Power 1997; Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). In particular, concrete played a significant role as the building medium, producing an impression of being long lasting (Power 1997). The trend towards industrial buildings and separate high-rise developments with green public spaces and peripheral locations found favour because of hoped-for savings and a desire for a separation of functions according to the principles of CIAM and Le Corbusier (Power 1997; Dekker and Van Kempen 2005).

⁷ CIAM was an organisation founded in 1928 by a group of 28 European architects organized by Le Corbusier, Hélène de Mandrot and Sigfried Giedion, and disbanded in 1959. This organisation was responsible for a series of events and congresses arranged around the world by the most prominent architects of the time, with the objective of spreading the principles of the Modern Movement focusing on all the main domains of architecture such as landscape, urbanism, industrial design, and many others (Wikipedia 2012).

Second, from a demographic aspect, the post-WWII mass housing estates characterised by a concentration of affordable social dwellings were initially built for low-to-middle income households in multiple family groups, leading to a popularity among the households who moved to many of these newly built estates (Dekker and Van Kempen 2005; Musterd et al. 2009). The first residents in many estates were young households and newly formed families with young children, and low-skilled industrial workers with lower educational levels inhabited these estates because industrialisation was booming at that time, and significant dwellings were needed to house these employees and their families (Murie et al. 2003; Dekker and Van Kempen 2005). However, it is obvious that the initial demographic characteristics could not last through the passage of time when consideration is given to a series of ‘life cycle’ stages⁸, as is indicated by Murie et al. (2003). Therefore, the demographic structure of the estates needs to be examined in combination with the factor of ‘time’, paying attention to the time when these estates were transformed into troubled estates.

Lastly, from an institutional or managerial aspect, government funding was an inevitable factor in building mass housing estates, and it was justified by the devastation of WWII, which left an enormous housing shortage and a belief in extensive responsibility on the part of government following the hardships of war (Dunleavy 1981; Power 1997; Musterd et al. 2009). Within this approach, the housing allocation rules play an important role because the accessibility of social housing is determined by them. This has led to increasingly similar demographic composition of the population in many

⁸ They mention the stages as follows: an initial phase with younger families; a phase with greater overcrowding and adult households; and a phase of declining population and economic activity, and there is the additional suggestion of a further phase of sharing of accommodation as sons and daughters find it difficult to obtain independent accommodations (Murie et al. 2003: 28-9)

post-WWII housing estates by focusing on low incomes; thus, the estates have been recognised as concentrated enclaves of poor people (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). In addition, control of the estates in aspects such as caretaking, repairs, maintenance, and the settings and collection of rents and fees needs to be identified in relation to the administration of large social housing estates. Control structures for the estates were significantly influenced by the characteristics and preferences of landlords, as in private rented housing. Local authorities, non-profit housing associations and private sector corporations emerged as social housing providers, as was discussed in a previous section about the dualist model and the unitary model of social housing. In the case of countries with a dualist model, such as the UK and Ireland, local authorities took responsibility for controlling the estates; whereas in countries with a unitary model, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany, non-profit housing associations and often private sector corporations were the main controllers of the estates.

3.5.2 Explanatory factors for the decline

Macro-factors


With the reduction in the rate of economic growth triggered by the oil crisis of the early 1970s, the post-war paradigm characterised by the terms ‘modernism’ and ‘fordism’ was undermined by a new paradigm embodied in the terms ‘post-modernism’ and ‘post-fordism’ (Harvey 1989; Soja 1989; Amin 1994; Hall and Rowlands 2005). The emphasis of the latter was on defining features such as the decline of manufacturing industry and its replacement by a knowledge-based economy, the fragmentation of work

conditions and consumption, and geographical fragmentation (*ibid*). The paradigm shift was associated with changes in the wider environment, and one of the most prominent of these was globalisation as was mentioned in a previous chapter. Globalisation has seriously affected both the national and international social, economic and political areas. Globalisation has many features, such as the global integration of economic activities, the global movement of capital, international migration of people and the spread of changing values and norms through various parts of the world (Marcuse and Van Kempen, quoted in Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). At the same time, demographic change, such as an increasing number of small households and minority group movements, and the transformation of the welfare state into the entrepreneurial state, are among the other changes that have taken place (*ibid*). These other changes are strongly linked with globalisation and its characteristic of reducing barriers to international and regional interaction. The paradigm shift and changes in the wider environment have led to the transformation of specific characteristics of social housing estates at the area level. Against these macro-backgrounds, some popular social housing estates have degenerated into stigmatised estates on the edge of more mainstream residential areas by the following three micro-factors, as shown in Figure 3.2.

Three micro-factors

As the strong influence of industrial building methods and high-rise development based on Modernism and Fordism has disappeared, with emerging trends moving away from the mass industrial system, and diversity resulting from fragmentation, the uniform and oversized design concept of mass housing estates has become obsolescent. Furthermore,

Figure 3.2 Change from popular estates to stigmatised estates



as the concrete used as the main building material showed signs of early decay and ‘spalling’, as a result of corrosion through unexpected chemical reactions, the properties physically increasingly deteriorated (Power 1997; Hall et al. 2005). In addition, many other signs of physical obsolescence, such as collective dwellings making residents feel overwhelmed, the clear separation from the surrounding areas evoking the image of a ghetto, and unsafe and anonymous communal spaces allowing strangers to access the estates easily, have made the properties unpopular and stigmatised (Power 1997; Dekker and Van Kempen 2005; Hall et al. 2005). This approach, first suggested by Newman (1972), is based on the environmental deterministic position that the quality of housing stock or the design of an estate are crucial factors in the decline of a neighbourhood (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). The initial remedy programmes developed over the late 1970s and early 1980s were targeted at tackling these physical problems. Among the physical solutions, the most drastic was the demolition of buildings such as the blowing up of the entire Pruitt-Igoe estate in the US and the partial blowing up and remodelling of the Minguettes estate in France (Power 1997; Hall et al. 2005). However, this approach has been criticised for offering limited explanation, because every estate with physical similarities has not shown the same trajectory, and the reputation of estates has tended to persist after their housing stock has been upgraded (Hastings and Dean 2003; Kennett and Forrest 2003).

Regions, cities and neighbourhoods dominated by the post-war paradigm have been undermined by the dramatic economic, social and political changes implied in the terms globalisation and ‘postism’. These have brought about changes in social and economic variables such as the number and composition of households, the relative cost of

housing, and public policies (Van Kempen et al. 2005). In relation to Western European post-WWII estates in particular, the status of social housing estates on the housing market has become less favourable with the influx of less prosperous household, such as the unemployed or casualised workers, people claiming benefits, lone-parent households, and people who exhibit anti-social behaviour (Dekker and Van Kempen 2005; Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). As the attraction of an estate decreases and the original population leaves, newcomers with the less choice replace them, leading to undermining the social cohesion⁹ of the estates (Temkin and Rohe 1996; Temkin and Rohe 1998; Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). Consequently, a breakdown of social relationships caused by an influx of newcomers weakens social control, which leads to an increase in social disorder such as vandalism and crime all of which transforms the estates into stigmatised areas. Another mechanism used to explain this process places the characteristics of these newcomers at the centre of the debate. Behavioural problems and cultural distinctiveness of disadvantaged people who have moved onto the estates have ghettoised and stigmatised these areas (Hastings 2004). The debate is understood as a function of the spatial concentration of the ‘undeserving poor’, and it is argued that they can be distinguished from the mainstream not only by their relative poverty but also by their deviant behaviours (Murray, quoted in ibid: 236). Although this approach does not deny that changes in social and economic variables are important in explaining neighbourhood decline, it pays more attention to problematic residents’ attitudes and propensities, leading to the introduction of a behavioural model as a reaction to the ecological model (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). The discourse of solution based on this

⁹ At a micro-level, it is concerned with the interaction between residents on estates and the extent to which their lives can exist first in harmony and second with a growing level of synergy and assimilation (Dekker and Rowlands, 2005: 108-109). However, it should be distinguished from cohesion as closure and hostility, such as that expressed in the growth of gated communities (Blandy and Lister, 2003)

theory has focused on the terms of ‘community’, ‘partnership’, ‘network’ and ‘involvement’. Thus, the role of residents has been emphasised over other factors. As residents have been placed at the centre of the problem, supporting them and involving them in any rehabilitation programmes has been regarded as the most important strategy for regeneration of the estates (Power 1997; Hastings 2004). However, this approach has been criticised for its overemphasis on social cohesion, which may merely be the result of the composition of a population and the excessive elevation of residents who may be peripheral outsiders to the powerful position of decision makers (Grigsby 1986; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Taylor 1998; Van Beckhoven et al. 2009).

As welfare states informed by Keynesian economic principles and broad political support for full employment have been transformed into entrepreneurial states, mainly due to the successive recessions that followed the 1973 oil shortage, austerity programmes that lock into long-lasting financial arrangements for social housing and into the transference of ownership from non-market sectors to market sectors have become dominant in Western countries. In particular, as there were ‘hidden costs’ (Power 1997: 58) in maintaining and managing mass social housing estates located in peripheral areas and made out of less flexible and heavier material than traditional buildings, the reduction of central government’s funding has led to weaker and less intensive control of social housing by the state (Power 1997; Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). A lack of investment in environmental improvement may increasingly cause estates to deteriorate and become stigmatised areas in which a growing number of those people with the least choice find cheap housing. Furthermore, in this explanatory process, the so-called institutional or managerial approach (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009),

the role of the landlord as a ‘front liner’(Power 1997: 128) or ‘gatekeeper’(Van Beckhoven et al. 2009: 36) has been emphasised in analysing the causes of deprived mass housing estates. Landlords as gatekeepers are associated with allocation rules and procedures which decide who will be the next inhabitants of a vacant dwelling. A homogeneous socio-economic profile of the populations of estates has been created by allocating the dwellings mainly to relatively low-income households or ethnic minority households, which has produced the image of ghettoised areas. Therefore, solutions based on this theory boil down to an increase of government funding and a change of landlord. As long as the ‘long-running consensus that the rich would subsidise the poor in return for social peace’ is not renewed (Münchau, quoted in Power 1997: 6), this solution continues to have a low priority in times of austerity. The role of landlord has moved from local authorities to non-profit bodies, to profit-seeking organisations, and to tenants themselves, in order to raise the level of control on the estates (Hastings 2004). However, the application of market rules to the estates may increase residence costs, leading to the crowding out of existing poor households; and mixed tenures for more diverse populations do not spontaneously guarantee a mixed community (Hastings 2004; Van Beckhoven et al. 2009).

Relationship with social exclusion on social housing estates

Consequently, the factors discussed above – macro-factors such as globalisation, demographic changes and the transformation of the welfare state, physical obsolescence, the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged people, and ineffective institution or management – interact and affect each other, which leads to the

problematic estate with a stigmatised image. As discussed in Chapter 2, social exclusion on social housing estates is evidenced by the concentration effect followed by the neighbourhood effect. The confinement of marginalised poor people to social housing estate can be explained by exclusion from the labour market caused by globalisation and the emergence of the entrepreneurial state as a response, social housing's physical decay allowing more vulnerable people to access to the estate, or strict allocation rules oriented towards socio-economically disadvantaged groups. Thus, explanatory factors for the decline of post-WWII social housing estates are equivalent to causal factors of social exclusion on the estates. However, there seems to be a little difference in the application of the theoretical frameworks to practice: to explain social exclusion by the concentration effect and the neighbourhood effect can be seen to focus on examining the existence and process of social exclusion on social housing estates; meanwhile explanatory factors for the decline of post-WWII social housing estates can be seen to focus on identifying causal factors of social exclusion on social housing estates.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the context of social housing estates and models explaining their social downgrading in the West through a review of the relevant literature. It has identified that the development and decline of social housing has been closely associated with changes in the nature of welfare state regimes, according to changes in the wider environment such as war, socio-economic restructuring, and globalisation. Furthermore, it has shown that many social housing estates constructed using the new

model of industrial mass production under social democratic welfare regimes after WWII, particularly in European cities, have currently become stigmatised and socially excluded places in the transformation of the state from social to entrepreneurial characteristics. In this process of decline, micro-factors including physical obsolescence, a concentration of disadvantaged people and ineffective institutions or management have been identified as playing a key role in the causation of social exclusion on social housing estates. On the basis of these reviews, the next chapter will explore changes in the nature of the South Korean welfare state and the role of Public Rental Housing (PRH) in these changes, particularly bearing in mind the relationship with social exclusion.

CHAPTER 4

PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING IN THE SOUTH KOREAN WELFARE STATE

4.1 Introduction

As discussed so far, the concept of social exclusion originated from the West and can be variously understood according to each country's ideological orientation (see Table 2.1). These ideological roots have mainly focused on welfare state regimes, particularly suggested by Esping-Anderson (1990). Following on from this, Harloe (1995) presented the close relationship between the evolution of social housing and changes of welfare state regimes in the West (see Table 3.2). Therefore, this chapter will look at Public Rental Housing (PRH) in the South Korean welfare state. In order to explore social exclusion in modern South Korea, it will focus on the welfare regime in place since 1945, when South Korea was liberated from Japan. It will also explore changes and features in PRH in modern South Korea, taking into consideration the welfare regime type, housing policy and housing situation, in order to find out if the theories that have been reviewed and that relate to social exclusion on social housing estates in the West can be applied to Public Rental Housing Estates (PRHEs). This will contribute to examining the applicability of social exclusion in South Korea and to understanding how PRHEs fit within the frameworks relating to the spatiality of social exclusion.

4.2 South Korea as a welfare state

4.2.1 The formation of a state (1945-1960)


The end of WWII brought liberation from Japanese colonial rule (1910-45) and the establishment of two separate governments on the Korean Peninsula in 1948: the Republic of Korea (i.e. South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (i.e. North Korea). The Korean War (1950-53) left South Korea one of the world's least-developed countries (MCST 2013). As a hegemonic ideology for justifying his regime's authoritarianism, Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea (1948-60), entrenched anti-communism with US aid. Meanwhile Ilsung Kim, the first premier of North Korea (1948-94) adhered to anti-Americanism and received Soviet and Chinese aid (Kwon 1999; Holliday 2000). The newly formed state of South Korea was in no condition to secure universal basic welfare for its citizen at that time. However, in this phase, it is Confucianism, built up in Korea from the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910) onwards, to which important attention needs to be paid. Confucianism has been criticised for its preoccupation with tradition and its stress on a highly closed social structure which despises commercial and industrial pursuits. However at the same time its fundamental underpinnings – that is, heavy emphasis on education, strong family relationship, benevolent paternalism, social harmony and discipline, and a strong work ethic – were perceived as positive (White and Goodman 1998). As Korean society had been immersed in Confucianism over five hundred years, the formation of the modern Korean welfare state took place under its influence.

4.2.2 An authoritarian and developmental state (1960-1987)

The first democratic government in South Korea (hereafter, Korea), which was established after the 1960 Revolution, lasted only ten months because of a military coup d'état led by General Park Chung-hee in 1961. After that, Koreans were governed by authoritarian regimes until 1987. General-turned-President Park's administration (1963-79) launched plans for economic development, with exports being given top priority and resources being concentrated on rapid industrialisation. As a result, GDP per capita more than tripled between 1963 and 1979 (see Figure 4.1) and the slogan 'legitimacy through performance' became the trademark of the Park government (Kwon 1999: 41).

Figure 4.1 GDP per capita, 1950-2010

(Geary-Khamis dollar¹⁰ at 1990 prices)



Source: Maddison (2013)

¹⁰ The Geary-Khamis dollar—also known as the international dollar—is a sophisticated aggregation method of calculating purchasing power parity (PPP). It facilitates comparing countries with one another. The statistical definition can be found at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/icp/ipc7.htm.htm> (Lin 2010: 5).

Park's assassination in 1979 was not followed by a transition to democracy. General Chun Doo-hwan staged an intra-military coup d'état in December 1979. Chun placed his supporters in all key government posts, suppressing vehement challenges from a restive civil society, such as that of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in May 1980. Chun became the president in 1980. He also sought legitimisation through economic performance, emphasising economic stabilisation rather than the economic development that his predecessor had pursued (Kwon 1999). Koreans were once more under the rule of an authoritarian government until the democratic transition in 1987.

Ironically, the Korean economy, between the 1970s and the 1980s, was an object of astonishment to Western countries; in the 1990s, it came to be known as one of the four little 'tigers' or 'dragons' among East Asian economies, together with Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (Vogel 1991; White and Goodman 1998; Holliday 2000). Explanation of the economic success of these countries concentrated on the developmental role of the state¹¹, with a heavy emphasis on education and the Confucian culture¹² (White and Goodman 1998). This led to efforts to shape a distinctive welfare state in this region by social policy analysts: a 'Confucian welfare state' (Jones 1993), a 'Japan-focused East Asian welfare regime' (Goodman and Peng 1996), an 'East Asian welfare model' (Kwon 1997), or a 'hybrid conservative and liberal welfare regime' (Esping-Andersen 1997). Bearing in mind White and Goodman's (1998: 14) point that 'it is misleading to think in terms of one homogeneous,

¹¹ The developmental role of the state is characterised as the identification and support of successful industries, the building up of a strong – but small – high-calibre bureaucracy, the avoidance of 'waste' in terms of capital, and of 'paper entrepreneurship', and the development of overarching bodies in relation to the bureaucracy, the politicians and business (White and Goodman 1998: 20).

¹² It is described as strong family relations, benevolent paternalism, social harmony and discipline, respect for tradition, and a strong work ethic, along with an emphasis on education (White and Goodman 1998: 8).

overarching “East Asian welfare model” common to these economically successful countries, some characteristics can be captured by the notion of ‘productivist welfare capitalism’ coined by Holliday (2000): a combination of Johnson’s (1982) developmental state and Esping-Anderson’s (1990) welfare typology (Kim 2008). Holliday (2000: 708) added social policy’s subordination to other policy objectives to Esping-Anderson’s (1990: 29) three criteria – the quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between state, market, and family – used to identify three clusters of regime types: liberal, conservative, and social democratic. That is, the sphere of welfare capitalism, according to Esping-Anderson, is arbitrary restricted in those capitalist states strongly enough affected by their social policy to be identifiable as welfare states, which results in excluding capitalist states subordinating social policy to other policy objectives: the five states of East Asia such as Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan can be placed in the productivist world of welfare capitalism, where a growth-oriented state and subordination of all aspects of state policy, including social policy, to economic/industrial objectives are typical features (Holliday 2000: 708-9). The differences between the existing welfare regimes and productivist one are provided in Table 4.1.

Under both the Park and the Chun governments, all other policy including social policy was subordinated to economic objectives, as Holliday indicates. Furthermore, elite policy-making by institutes and bureaucratic mechanisms – for example the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Economic Planning Board (EPB) – set economic growth as the fundamental goal, and set out a consistent strategy to accomplish it, such as the ‘plans for economic development’. In order to achieve this goal as soon as

Table 4.1 Core components and welfare regimes

	Social policy	Social rights	Stratification effects	State-market-family relationship
Liberal	Neither privileged nor subordinate	Minimal	Equality of poverty for minority; market-differentiated welfare for majority	Market provision encouraged
Conservative-corporatist	Neither privileged nor subordinate	High	Existing status differentials preserved	Family protected
Social democratic	Privileged	Maximum	Universal benefits graduated according to accustomed earnings	Market crowded out; family socialized
Productivist	Subordinate to economy	Minimal; extension linked to productive activity	Reinforcement of productive elements	Premised on overriding growth objectives

Source: adapted from a table in Holliday (2000: 709)

possible, the strategy of opting for big business – the so-called *Chaebol* – as the spearhead of economic growth was used. Under the *Chaebol* system, which dated back to the Park government, the state prompted private firms to follow performance targets through the so-called central guidance agencies such as the Bank of Korea and EPB. It allocated substantial financial resources including low-interest capital to them and allowed them to enter new markets or compound their monopoly status (Kwon 1999; Kang 2000). As national resources were used for developmental purpose under state direction, the state used social policies to facilitate that goal. Thus, welfare relied heavily on the family and all welfare programmes except the Public Assistance Programme (PAP), such as the Industrial Accident Insurance (IAI) and the National Health Insurance (NHI), covered only those who have paid into them (Holliday 2000). The Korean welfare state played a role as a regulator, with the state making statutory

rules to bring about certain forms of social welfare but without a financial commitment (Goodman et al. 1997; Kwon 1999; Holliday 2000). From 1960 to before the 1987 democratic transition, the state was in the productivist world of welfare capitalism.

4.2.3 The democratic transition and legacies of a developmental state (1987-1997)

The torturing to death of a university student by the police and the president's condemnation of constitutional revision and introduction of direct presidential elections provoked nationwide demonstrations and became direct motives for the June Uprising in 1987, and provided the momentum for Korea's democratic transition. Eventually, the presidential candidate of the governing party, Rho Tae-woo, who was also a former military general and key member of the military coup in 1979, declared an eight-point democratisation package, including a constitutional revision for direct election of the president and the restoration of basic human rights (Kwon 1999; Kim 2010). From then on, the nature of Korean politics changed from the politics of legitimisation to those of democratisation. However, in the 1987 presidential election General-turned-candidate Rho, who greatly profited from a split in the opposition, succeeded President Chun.

Capitalist democracies are conventionally believed to have a supportive influence on the development of welfare states because political democracy is viewed as a powerful means of forcing political elites and ruling-class political representatives to undertake welfare programmes (Offe 1987). Since democratisation in 1987, Korean political actors have had to face up to the basic principles of democracy – competition, participation, and civil and political liberties (Saxer 2002) – and to demonstrate

sensitivity to demands from various sections of society. Under authoritarian governments, social welfare programmes had been introduced arbitrarily by the presidents as evidence of the legitimacy of their regimes, indeed, in the run-up to the 1987 presidential election, all four of the leading candidates made similar promises for a National Pension Programme (NPP) and the expansion of the NHI¹³. The NPP was introduced in 1988; and the NHI covered the whole population by 1989, under the Rho government (Yang 2008). However, President Rho was unable to free himself from the legacies of the earlier authoritarianism, especially the policy paradigm that prioritised economic policy over social policy and elements of the politics of legitimisation (Choi and Ham 2001; Kang 2003). In addition, the newly introduced NPP, like the welfare programmes introduced by the authoritarian regimes, was mainly financed by contributions from employers and employees, and the state's financial commitment was limited (Kwon 1999). Consequently, although the welfare regime under President Rho extended some social rights, it was still an extension of the developmental/productivist welfare regime.

The 1992 presidential election saw Kim Young-sam become Korea's first civilian president in 30 years. The Kim government (1993-98) had two missions: to improve an economy that in 1992 had recorded the slowest growth in twelve years, and to eliminate anticompetitive and antidemocratic features of the developmental state – especially collusion between the state and the *Chaebol* (Saxer 2002; Kang 2003). With regard to social policy, in 1995 the Kim government brought in National Employment Insurance (NEI) and set up the National Welfare Task Force (The Hankyoreh-Shinmun 1995;

¹³ Its coverage had grown to around 51 per cent of the population in 1987 from around 10 per cent in 1978

Yang 2008). However, the reform efforts to break down collusion between the state and the *Chaebol* were thwarted by dilemmas: the *Chaebol* was both the target of reform and still an important source of revitalising the Korean economy; and there was also a moral scar – that is, Kim's aids were identified to be deeply involved in arranging bank loans for one conglomerate in the investigation into its bankruptcy (Kang 2000). Consequently, the Kim government failed to eliminate negative legacies of the developmental state and to establish a new paradigm beyond the existing developmental/productivist welfare regime.

4.2.4 The economic crisis and the welfare state in transition (1997 onwards)

The Asian economic crisis that started with the fall of the Thai currency in 1997 forced Korea to get an international bailout from the IMF to stabilise its currency and to avoid defaulting on its foreign debts. This crisis was caused by a combination of the opening-up of markets, as a response to globalisation, and the careless business expansion of the *Chaebol* (Kang 2003; Kwon and Yi 2008). The crisis produced an unprecedented increase in the unemployment rate as demonstrated in Figure 4.2, and there was a sharp decrease in GNP per capita (see Figure 4.1) for the first time since the industrialisation. At the same time, non-standard employment such as temporary work and part-time work increased: in 1993, they accounted for around 25 per cent of total employment; in 1999, for around 30 per cent; and in 2005, for around 37 per cent (Lee 2011b). As shown in Figure 4.3, before the crisis, Korea's Gini coefficient measuring income disparity showed stability. But, it gradually worsened after the crisis, and the ratio of the upper 20 per cent to the lower 20 per cent showed similar trends (see also Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.2 Unemployment rate, 1990-2012





Figure 4.3 Gini coefficient, 1990-2012




Source: Korea National Statistical Office, www.kostat.go.kr.

Rising unemployment, increasing casualised employment, and growing income disparity characterised this time of economic hardship for Korean society. These unprecedentedly severe conditions brought about a change of political leadership in the presidential election of 1997. Kim Dae-jung, long-time opposition leader, took office as president (1998-2003) and a centre-left government was established for the first time in the modern politics of Korea. This government produced strong support for social policy reform from progressive civic groups, labour unions and marginalised groups, and generated a shift to corporatist decision-making by organising a tripartite committee, the Employees-Employers-Government Committee, to form a social consensus for reform (Kwon and Holliday 2007). Furthermore, under the banner of ‘productive welfare’, which placed emphasis on welfare that could contribute to the rise of economic productivity rather than benefit-focused welfare (Maeil-Kyungje 1999), this government pursued change in welfare programmes; an extension of the NPP, the merger of social health insurance societies under NHI reform, and the introduction of the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG) replacing the PAP, which had strict means-testing and excluded individuals aged between 18 and 65 from cash benefits. Now, by contrast, regardless of age or the ability to work, cash benefits were guaranteed to those whose assessed income was below the specified minimum cost of living, and these were accompanied by a range of workfare and training programmes (Kwon and Holliday 2007; Kwon and Yi 2008; Yang 2008). It is worth noting that the construction of PRH by the public sector was resumed under the name of *Kukmin* (people) Rental Housing. The construction of the true first wave of public sector PRH, which had been introduced in 1989, had stopped in 1993 because of a failure to allocate the required budget (Kim et al. 2007; MLTM 2010).

Rho Moo-hyun, a candidate of the governing party and human rights lawyer, was elected President in 2002. This government (2003-08) maintained the policy stance of the previous government, adapting the ideological orientation of Kim's 'productive welfare' under the banner of 'participatory welfare' (Kim 2009b; Baek 2011). It continued to expand the coverage and benefit levels of the existing welfare programmes along with the introduction of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for poor working people, which produced a sharp increase of social expenditure in the government budget compared with that of the previous governments as shown in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 The trend of expenditure in government budgets, 1970-2006



Source: adapted from a figure in PCPP (2006: 9)

It is also remarkable that this government's provision of PRH through a construction plan for one million *Kukmin* Rental Housing and the introduction of new kinds of PRH

such as *Maeip* (purchase) Rental-housing¹⁴ and *Chonsei* Rental-housing¹⁵, was more positive than the initiatives of any other government, and was influenced by the sharp increase in housing prices and rent since 2000. At a later point in its term of office, this government tried to change the welfare paradigm by presenting a vision of an advanced welfare state – the so-called Social Vision 2030 – using a view of social investment¹⁶ that emphasised public spending in support of human capital and social services (PCPP 2006).

However, this vision was not fulfilled, because Rho's party has lost the 2008 presidential election to the conservative Lee Myung-bak, a former big business leader and mayor of Seoul. The Lee government (2008-13) was expected to retreat from due to its political stance, and was critiqued from various sides: ‘Welfare fell a slave to economic performance’ (Cho 2011: 24), ‘The Korean welfare state lost its way’ (Lee 2012: 173), ‘The active welfare newly-advocated by the government is elusive to understand’ (Choi 2010: 16), and ‘Welfare was capitalised through its marketisation’ (Joo 2008: 113). Others have been more positive: ‘The trend of welfare expansion under the Lee government seems to show continuity rather than transition’ (Kim and Nam 2011: 148) and ‘‘workfare’ and ‘private-initiative welfare’, which are the key parts of the Lee administration’s ‘active welfare’, are significantly related to the Kim and Rho administrations’ neo-liberal welfare policy’ (Kim 2011: 127). It is hard to assert that there was a retrenchment in social policy under the Lee government considering that

¹⁴ A dwelling purchased by the government and offered as PRH.

¹⁵ A dwelling that is rented out by the government on a 2-year rental contract with only a deposit, and is referred to as PRH.

¹⁶ This concept originated with Giddens's discourse on a third way that focuses on the transfer from significant amounts of social expenditure to expenditure on human capital, rather than deregulation and a reduction of social expenditure which is the neo-liberal way (Baek 2011: 93).

welfare programmes initiated by the previous governments, such as the MLSG and EITC, were maintained without significant changes, and the path of welfare expansion was guaranteed by a five-year (2011-15) national fiscal management plan established by the Lee government in 2011. Thus, the Lee government's 'active welfare' intrinsically pursued welfare-to-work, as the previous progressive governments had done, although it was criticised as providing 'nominal or passive welfare' (Choi 2010: 29) or 'quantitative welfare expansion and systematic retrenchment' (Kim and Kim 2012: 117).

Park Geun-hye, who is from the governing party and the daughter of the late President Park Chung-hee, was elected as Korea's first woman president in 2012. Park had already promised the establishment of a Korean type of welfare state before being elected, which emphasised welfare that would be universal and tailor-made according people's life-cycle (Park 2010). She also set out a programme of free universal public child care, basic pensions¹⁷, and free medical services for four critical diseases as main electoral pledges (Kukmin-Ilbo 2012). Accordingly, this government (2013-18) is expected to be pro-welfare (Huh 2013; Yang 2013).

The characteristics of the Korean welfare state after the economic crisis can be summarised in the debate over whether Korea has moved beyond the status of a developmental welfare state or not. According to negative views, the expansion of the Korean welfare state after the crisis is an undeniable fact; but it is interpreted as a major effort to enhance industrial competitiveness and economic performance (Kwon 2002; Kwon and Holliday 2007; Kwon 2009). Thus, the argument goes that there has been

¹⁷ This suggests extension of coverage and increasing the amount of pension from the existing basic old-age pension.

little change in policy orientation and that social policy plays an instrumental role in economic development. Meanwhile, there are arguments that the productivist welfare regime in Korea has been dismantled by globalisation and neo-liberal responses, an emphasis on the inter-dependence of social policy and economic policy, democratic consolidation and the rise of powerful pro-welfare civic groups, and the emergence of new social risks such as income polarisation, working poverty, and an ageing society. According to the factors focused on, the Korean welfare state has been explained as a neo-liberal state (Cho 2002, 2009), a conservative-corporative state (Nam 2002), or a hybrid state with liberal and conservative characteristics (Kim 2002).

Consequently, all those explanations can be seen as arising from the fact that Korea is a welfare state in transition, and furthermore efforts are being made to seek a new direction for the Korean welfare state. The Korean welfare state looks rather different depending upon the time at which it is viewed as summarised in Table 4.2

Table 4.2 Evolution of the Korean welfare state


	1945-1960	1960-1987	1987-1997	1997 onwards
Characteristics	State in formation	Developmental state	Legacies of developmental state	Welfare state in transition
Interest	State settlement	Economic development Legitimation	Liquidation of authoritarian legacies Globalisation	Economic restructuring Harmony between social and economic concerns
Social risk	Poverty	Poverty Societal mobilization	Societal mobilization Socio-economic inequality	Socio-economic inequality Ageing society

4.2.5 Excluded people in the historical evolution of the Korean welfare state

According to Silver's (1994) paradigm of social exclusion, each paradigm was incubated in a specific ideology such as republicanism, liberalism, and social democracy, which can also be connected to Esping-Anderson's (1990) types of welfare-state regimes – conservative-corporatist, liberal, and social democratic. In the case of Korea, Confucianism played an important role as a specific ideology for a long time following the establishment of the Joseon dynasty in 1392, as discussed above. Under the Joseon dynasty, which was dominated by Confucianism, learning was highly valued, while commerce and manufacturing were disdained, and the dynasty had a highly closed social structure, which was comprised of four classes: scholars, farmers, artisans and merchants. Education was the preserve of the upper class and served as the means of becoming a government official (MCST 2013). From the late nineteenth century the traditional four classes started to breakdown under the influence of reformist movements led by progressive scholars and the influx of Western culture. However, the dynasty maintained its royal authority, and a closed-door policy continued until the country was forcibly annexed by Japan in 1910. As Japanese policy positioned Korea as a rice-producing colony, this, along with a traditional heavy reliance on agriculture, caused the social structure to change to one of landlords and peasants under a gradual breakdown of the traditional four classes (Heo 2012; MCST 2013). Consequently, before the industrialisation that began in the late 1960s, the poorest section of the population mainly consisted of peasant farmers, who became one of the most obvious groups excluded from the mainstream society.

However, rapid industrialisation followed by urbanisation facilitated social mobility in modern Korea. Education and occupation are the two crucial elements to understanding social stratification in modern Korea (Yang 1999). As the industrial structure changed from primary industries (agriculture and fishing) to secondary ones (mining and manufacturing) by the 1980s, and to tertiary ones (services) more recently, as shown in Figure 4.5, the composition of the poorest section of the population changed to include lower-waged workers in primary and secondary industries (NGII 2010).

Figure 4.5 Industrial population structure, 1910-2010




Source: adapted from a figure in Heo (2012: 473)

In this process, education was used to obtain a good occupation by the general populace, filling the vacuum in the socio-economic structure that the Japanese had left. As education in traditional Korean society had been considered the preserve of the upper classes, there was an enormous demand for education by the general populace, as shown

in Figure 4.6. As a result, people with high levels of education obtained white-collar, professional, or administrative positions guaranteeing good payment and social standing, and this group accounted for one of the strata of modern Korean society – the middle class (Yang 1999). Meanwhile, people without this educational background were pushed into blue-collar positions, thus being positioned in the lower classes.

Figure 4.6 Number of students, 1910-2010



Source: adapted from a figure in Heo (2012: 488)

Under the productivist welfare state, which emphasised economic performance, people without the skills and knowledge appropriate for industrialised society could not help but sink into low-paid work, finally being excluded from the labour market. These people, from the perspective of social policy, were subjects not for criticism but for protection by the state, as the deserving poor, who can be seen as the powerless victims of circumstance (Green 1990). However, people without well-paid jobs and scholastic

achievements were not seen as citizens who might have a good standard of conduct and a sense of responsibility. On the contrary, there was a tendency in Korean society, against this background, for these people to be considered as the undeserving poor.

Until the 1990s, when developmentalism was still prevalent in Korea, overcoming poverty was the over-riding priority, not only for the state but also for Koreans themselves. Throughout the 1987 democratisation, which resulted in the dismantlement of the authoritarian regime based on developmentalism, and the 1997 economic crisis, Korean society faced new social risks, including unemployment, income disparity, and working poverty, which went beyond the traditional risk of poverty. The Korean welfare state, which was just getting out of a developmental position, has arrived at a stage where it must turn its attention to those suffering multidimensional disadvantages beyond a lack of material resources. Indeed, the term social exclusion was part of the debates that started in the early 2000s in academic circles about social welfare policy (Moon 2010), and the term emerged at government level too. In order to deal with socio-economic inequality under the policy goal of social integration, the Rho government in 2003 set up a presidential committee on social integration, which was motivated by the previous government's experiences¹⁸ and especially by the SEU in the UK (Presidential Transition Committee 2003). Socially excluded people targeted by the committee included traditionally excluded groups, like the poor, the disabled, women, and those who had become excluded more recently, like casualised workers, foreign workers, multi-cultural families resulting from immigrants arriving for jobs or marriage, and North Korean refugees (Choi 2010). Disability is considered a barrier to inclusion,

¹⁸ The Kim government established the Presidential Planning Bureau for Improvement of the Quality of Life for the purpose of planning and coordinating welfare policy (Chun 2001)

so disabled people are acknowledged to be marginalised and excluded from mainstream society (Alcock 1993; Kitchin 1998; Lee and Murie 1998). The committee also indicated that the number of disabled people in Korea was about 1.5 million, and they were excluded in all spheres of life such as education, employment, and transport. Recently, the OECD (2014) highlighted the low participation of women in the labour market, even though they tend to have high graduation rates, as one of the difficulties to be overcome in Korea's efforts for growth. Confucianism's emphasis on the role of women as the main carers within the family has held a special place in Korea's culture. As Confucianism has to some extent been used to explain modern Korea's economic success, women's human rights and social and political freedom have still only been given cursory attention. Furthermore, in Korea, the percentage of females who become householders because of divorce or the death of their spouse is continuously increasing (see Table 4.3), and studies on poverty and social exclusion among lone mothers show that this group too is continuously growing (see Park 2003; Yoo and Kwak 2007; Noh and Kim 2008; Kim 2012).

Table 4.3 Percentage of female householders, 1980-2010

1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
14.7	15.7	15.7	16.6	18.5	21.9	25.9

Source: Korea National Statistical Office, www.kostat.go.kr.

Since the start of the 2000s, new types of disadvantaged groups have gained attention, along with sharply increased numbers of temporary and part-time workers, particularly those who come from outside Korea: foreign workers who are needed because of local job seekers' reluctance to do heavy labouring jobs (Seol 2004); immigrant females who

are sought by older unmarried males, especially those living in rural areas and not finding a spouse, and foreign men dreaming of a better life (Park 2013); and North Korean refugees fleeing political persecution and economic hardship in their homeland (Song and Shin 2012). The increasing influx of these immigrants is rapidly transforming Korean society from a mono-cultural one to a multi-cultural one. Consequently, there is a growing need for the above groups, who may be situated in the lower class, to be discussed as vulnerable groups exposed to social exclusion in contemporary Korean society.


Thus, it has been identified through this section that the paradigm of social exclusion can be applied to Korean society. The next section will deal with evolution of public rental housing in the Korean welfare state along with an exploration of the development of housing policy in modern Korea, in order to examine the application of the reviewed theories relating to social exclusion on social housing estates.

4.3 Public rental housing in the Korean welfare state

4.3.1 Spatial changes in modern Korea

The development of housing policy in modern Korea was motivated by rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, which began in the late 1960s. As the regional development strategy of moving investment priorities from the rice-producing agricultural industry to manufacturing industry began, this led to the growth of cities and population concentration in urban areas, as shown in Figure 4.7 (NGII 2010: 173).

Figure 4.7 Spatial changes of major cities in Korea



Source: adapted from a figure in Lee et al., quoted in NGII (2010: 365)

This settlement pattern was concentrated in the *Sudogwon*¹⁹ (the capital region of Korea) including Seoul (the capital city) as shown in Table 4.4. Consequently, there have always been great demand for housing, sometimes combined with speculative demand, and massive housing units have been constructed in the capital region.

Table 4.4 Change of population share in the capital region, 1960-2010

(1000 persons, %)


Areal Units	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
The capital region (A+B)	5,194 (20.8)	8,730 (28.3)	13,298 (35.5)	18,578 (42.8)	21,354 (46.3)	23,836 (49.1)
Seoul (A)	2,445 (9.8)	5,433 (17.6)	8,364 (22.3)	10,613 (24.4)	9,898 (21.4)	9,794 (20.2)
Incheon and Gyeonggi-do (B)	2,749 (11.0)	3,297 (10.7)	4,934 (13.2)	7,974 (18.4)	11,459 (24.9)	14,042 (28.9)
Nation	24,989 (100)	30,882 (100)	37,436 (100)	43,411 (100)	46,136 (100)	48,580 (100)

Source: Korea National Statistical Office, www.kostat.go.kr

¹⁹ Sudogwon consists of Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi-do.

In particular, the establishment of housing policy by the Korean government has been based on changes in the housing market and housing needs in Seoul. Seoul has been the capital city since the Joseon Dynasty was founded on the Korean Peninsula in 1392. Until the forced annexation of Korea by the Japanese in 1910, the geographic boundary of Seoul was the north side of the *Han* (meaning big or one of Chinese dynasties) River, and what is now the south of Seoul was not included. During the Japanese colonial period, areas of Seoul were extended to below the *Han* River for the first time, and these were the south-west areas of Seoul. These areas created a factory district on the edge of Seoul, leading to an influx of people seeking jobs, and this area continued to grow as the Korean Peninsula was used as a logistics base for Japan during WWII (Ahn 2010). However, despite this extension of Seoul, the part of the city north of the *Han* River was still considered to be the city centre, and this structure was maintained until the 1960s as shown in Figure 4.8. It was after the Greater Seoul Urban Master Plan was implemented in 1963 that changes occurred in Seoul. The city experienced a growth phase from the 1960s on, with rapid population growth and an unprecedented expansion of its area (Lee, Min et al. 2011). The population of Seoul exceeded two million in 1960, which led to a serious housing shortage along with typical urban problems, including the spread of poor housing, traffic congestion and poor refuse disposal (*ibid*). As a response to these problems, the Master Plan was established, featuring an expansion of the city area from 268.35 square kilometres to 613.04 square kilometres, with the intention of accommodating a population of five million (Ahn 2010). As a result, land south of the *Han* River began to be included in the city area and it was planned to use this as residential land, mainly in order to solve the housing shortage in Seoul. Until the mid-1970s, the name of *Gangnam*, indicating land south of the *Han* River, did not appear,

Figure 4.8 Changes in the urban areas of Seoul (1920-1990)



Source: adapted from a figure in Ahn (2010: 77)


and instead the term *Namseoul* (Southern Seoul) was sometimes used, because the centre of Seoul was to the north of the river.

However, since the mid-1970s, drastic changes have occurred to the south of the *Han* River. The *Han* Riverside Development Plan²⁰ was established in 1968 and subsequent development projects were implemented on land south of the *Han* River, leading to a rapid expansion of urban areas there. In addition, facilities attracting a concentration of population, including public institutions, a coach station and schools, were mandatorily moved to land south of the *Han* River and development restrictions on land north of the *Han* River were introduced (Ahn 2010). Changes in administrative districts also

²⁰ The main point of this plan was to build up the banks on either side of the *Han* River and to secure filled-in ground through these embankments. The banks were developed as roads and the filled-in ground was used for residential properties. In addition, this led to the building of 27 bridges and Tube Line No.2, linking areas to the north of the *Han* River with areas to the south (Lee, Min et al. 2011).

occurred in the southern parts of Seoul: *Gangnam-gu* (district) was established in 1975 and was followed by *Gangseo-gu* in 1977 and *Gangdong-gu* in 1979 (SDI 2007; Ahn 2010). The new districts all had the word *Gang* (river) in their names, which meant that the geographical criterion for areas being part of the city of Seoul was a link to the *Han* River, moving away from the previous perception that the southern boundary of Seoul was the north side of the *Han* River (Ahn 2010: 86). Moreover, from that time on, the term *Gangnam* began to be generally used, which ironically led to the coining of the word *Gangbuk* for areas north of the *Han* River, which had, by themselves, represented Seoul for more than 600 years. In the ten years after the late 1970s, all building of national importance was concentrated in *Gangnam*, and the development of *Gangnam* reached its peak in 1988 when facilities for the Seoul Olympics were concentrated there. As a result of this momentum, *Gangnam* was finally established as the new city-centre of Seoul, and the north part of Seoul lost its position as the city-centre, and became known as *Gangbuk*. Now, *Gangbuk* stands for a run-down city area in need of development, having lost everything except its historical identity. Meanwhile *Gangnam* is truly the centre of modern Seoul, as shown in the photographs in Figure 4.9.

Figure 4.9 *Gangnam* which was transformed from green-field site to new city centre




Source: adapted from photographs in Ahn (2010)

4.3.2 Housing policy and housing situation in modern Korea

So, it was under the tendency of a centralising population shift towards the capital region that housing policies were developed. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, starting in the late 1960s, brought about a massive migration toward urban areas, leading to a particularly severe housing shortage in the capital region, including Seoul. The development of housing policy has been closely related to fluctuation in housing prices along with land prices, as shown in Figure 4.10 (STKB 2007).

Figure 4.10 Land and housing price rates, and related measures taken by the government, 1967-2006



Note: housing prices were surveyed from 1986. Boxes in white indicate stabilising measures, while boxes in grey indicate revitalising measures.

Source: adapted from a figure in STKB (2007:15)

In the 1970s, since spending on housing had become a low priority for a government placing heavy emphasis on economic performance, the government relied mainly on

direct market interventions such as a price ceiling system, a land transaction permit system and heavy taxes on capital gains (Park 2007). From the 1980s on, as the economy showed unprecedented growth, the government started to focus on policies to increase housing stock, such as the Two Million Housing Construction Plan, which included five new town projects.²¹ Since then, according to fluctuation in housing prices and the economic situation, housing supply policies have been implemented in combination with demand control (MLTM 2011). This intensive volume of housing supplied by state-coordinated mass construction programmes was encouraged to reinforce economic growth, with construction and development becoming drivers of industrial and commercial activities, and to offset the underdevelopment of citizenship rights and public welfare services by enhancing the asset base of family-centred welfare provision (Ronald and Doling 2010: 233-4). Under the developmental welfare regime, housing was largely commodified rather than decommodified, and increasing housing property ownership became an important objective in housing policy. In fact, within the Western welfare system housing has largely been ignored, underestimating the significance of its non-shelter functions (Malpass 2008). However, to East Asian countries including Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, which experienced housing price increases during an era of rapid economic growth, it was a very efficient strategy to adopt property-based welfare in which the family and private housing assets were cultivated as the main resources for the provision of social security (Ronald and Doling 2012: 942). Consequently, owner-occupied homes functioned as the rationale combining asset-based welfare and self-reliance, and were recognised as an important potential reserve to rely on in the productivist welfare regime (Groves et al. 2007).

²¹ The new towns are located within a radius of 20 km from the centre of Seoul. Their sizes ranged from 5 km² to 20 km² and their target population from 170,000 to 390,000 (Park 2007: 88)

However, as the authoritarian government based on developmentalism was dismantled by the 1987 democratisation, and as, through the 1997 economic crisis, positive housing equity was no longer assured and the inequality in housing ownership was aggravated, the government started to turn its attention to the construction of PRH, particularly for low-income households (NGII 2012: MLTM 2011). Permanent Rental-housing as social housing in the true sense was introduced in 1989, and after the economic crisis, One Million *Kukmin* (people) Construction Plan was established in 2002 and various kinds of PRH programmes, such as Ten-year Rental-housing, *Maeip* (purchase) Rental-housing, *Chonsei* Rental-housing and Twenty-year Rental-housing were launched.

Under the development of the above housing policies, the national housing stock increased from 3.5 million in 1960 to 14.7 million in 2010, and the national ratio of housing supply increased from 83.8 per cent in 1960 to 102.6 per cent in 2010, as shown in Table 4.5. The rapid increase in housing stock after 1980 was achieved by the strategy of large-scale planned housing estates, which were developed through the ‘public development’²² (Ha 2010). Land developed by the procedure was usually sold to private house builders at lower than market price because the price of land in the project was determined by government valuation rather than the market (Park 2007). Public development was undertaken with the use of less expensive green-field sites, and the development of new towns near Seoul. The estates were composed mainly of high-rise apartment blocks to supply the masses in a short time. Housing in modern Korea can generally be classified as one of five types: detached house; detached house with

²² Public developers such as the KNHC and the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) first acquired all the land in the project area, using compulsory purchase powers if necessary, on the basis of related promotion acts; drew up a comprehensive land use plan; installed various infrastructures; and undertook other engineering works (Park 2007: 85)

Table 4.5 Housing stock and housing supply ratio, 1960-2010

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Household²³ (‘000) (A)	4,135	5,197	7,470	10,223	11,928	14,312
Housing stock (‘000) (B)	3,464	4,359	5,318	7,374	11,472	14,677
Housing supply ratio (B/A)	83.8%	78.2%	71.2%	72.4%	96.2%	102.6%

Source: Korea National Statistical Office, www.kostat.go.kr

multiple dwellings²⁴; multiplex house²⁵; row house²⁶; and apartment²⁷, as shown in Figure 4.11. Traditionally, Koreans lived in single detached houses made of brick or wood; but, because of the fast urbanisation process, leading to an increase in nuclear family living and in the number of households, and the government policy to resolve the housing shortage in a short time, construction of large-scale apartment complexes has become widespread (NGII 2010). As a result, by 2010, as many as 58 per cent of all housing units were apartment types, whereas approximately 93 per cent of housing stock was single-story detached dwellings in 1975 (MLTM 2010). Unlike high-rise apartment blocks in the West which have sometimes produced scenes of riot and social unrest, Korean apartments have largely been bought and sold by the relatively well-off, rather than rented to the urban poor (Gelézeau 2007). Under the circumstance of housing shortage in larger cities, allocations of newly constructed apartments for sale were made by a lottery which only those with contractual savings could join (MLTM 2011). Consequently, the lottery-contracts meant a windfall gain caused by the gap between the market price and the initial sale price (Park 2007; Gelézeau 2007).

²³ It excludes non-family-related households and one-person households.

²⁴ House with three or fewer storeys and a total net floor space of 660m² or less.

²⁵ Multi-family house with four or fewer storeys and a total net floor space of 660m² or less per block.

²⁶ Multi-family house with four or fewer storeys and a total net floor space of over 660m² per block.

²⁷ Multi-family house with five or more storeys.

Figure 4.11 Housing types in modern Korea

Detached house



Detached house with multiple dwellings



Apartment



Row house



Multiplex house



Source: MLTM (2012a)

In addition, large-scale apartment estates have been relatively self-contained with their own stores, playgrounds, and so on, and set among wide avenues designed to facilitate

automotive transport (Oppenheim 2009: 140). Korean apartments have mostly become owner-occupied dwellings for the upper and middle classes (Gelézeau 2007; NGII 2010), and they been intensively constructed in Seoul, in particular in *Gangnam*, which was transformed from a green-field site to became the new city centre (see Figure 4.9).

In spite of the massive housing supply, as newly constructed housing in multi-family units, including apartments, has been accessible for those with the capital to participate, the ratio of home-ownership has decreased from 71.7 percent in 1970 to 49.9 percent in 1990, after which it rose slightly to 54.2 per cent in 2000 and in 2010, as shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Households by tenure, 1970-2010

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Owner-occupied ('000)	3,966 (71.7%)	4,672 (58.6%)	5,667 (49.9%)	7,753 (54.2%)	9,390 (54.2%)
Chonsei rental ('000)	1,457 (26.1%)	1,904 (23.9%)	3,157 (27.8%)	4,040 (28.2%)	3,766 (21.7%)
Monthly rental ('000)	not available	1,231 (15.5%)	2,173 (19.1%)	1,803 (12.6%)	3,490 (20.1%)
Others²⁸ ('000)	123 (2.2%)	162 (2.0%)	358 (3.1%)	716 (5.0%)	694 (4.0%)

Source: Korea National Statistical Office, www.kostat.go.kr

Koreans who have had difficulties raising funds for buying housing have relied on tenures such as *Chonsei*²⁹, which is lump-sum rent that tenants may eventually recover

²⁸ Others included *Sagulse* and rent-free: *Sagulse* refers to one payment of the total monthly rent for a certain period, deducting it every month; and a typical example of rent-free is for people to live off their relatives.

and tends to be regarded as a savings mechanism, and monthly rent. In particular, the *Chonsei* system has generally been recognised as a way of saving key money for people who wish to be owners (Gelézeau 2007). Consequently, although public perceptions of housing ownership have been encouraged, with expectations of property gains caused by soaring housing prices, the better-off with capital have purchased most of the newly constructed units with the purpose of investment, whereas lower-income households have become excluded from the owner-occupied housing market. Against the above background, the next section will deal with the evolution of PRH policy within a change in the modern Korean welfare state.

4.3.3 PRH in the developmental welfare state

As discussed above (see Section 4.2), by the 1990s, the Korean welfare state had been immersed in developmentalism/productivism for many years, and during those years, as argued by Groves et al. (2007), housing in the Korean welfare state had been a marginal element. Housing provision had not been for those in most need of housing: for example, the Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC), established in 1962 as a state-run but self-financing enterprise to build public housing, constructed more homes for sale than for letting (Ha and Seo 2006a; Park 2007). As in the traditional Western capitalist regimes, housing had traditionally been considered a market commodity, and social housing provision had not become a central concern of the welfare state. As a result, there had been few public rental housing policies for

²⁹ This is a traditional rental agreement in Korea, where the tenant pays a lump sum deposit to the landlord in lieu of rent for two years; the entire deposit, excluding any interest earned, is returned when the household moves out at the end and its amount normally ranges from 30 per cent to 70 per cent of the housing unit's market price (Park 2007: 77). Consequently, Korean housing tenures are classified into owner-occupied, *Chonsei* rental, monthly rental and others.

vulnerable people on low incomes. Instead, the construction of public or private housing for sale, contributing to increasing property ownership, had been the major goal of Korean housing policy (Ha and Seo 2006a; Kim et al. 2007).

As public rental housing policies were developed under a developmental/productivist welfare state regime, they were designed to revitalise the housing market and the national economy, or to obtain legitimacy for the regime (Ha 2004; Park 2007). Five-year Rental-housing (5R) and Permanent Rental-housing (PR) were representative examples conceived against this background. The 5R, which was the first social housing in Korea, and which was to be used as rental units for five years and after that could be sold, was introduced on the basis of the 1984 Rental Housing Construction Promotion Act (RHCPA). The RHCPA had to function against a background of fluctuations in housing prices and in land prices. The Comprehensive Anti-Real Estate Speculation Measures, including a land transaction permit system and heavy taxes on capital gains, which had been enforced in 1978 to stabilise property prices that had risen sharply due to industrialisation and urbanisation, had been relaxed by the early 1980 economic recession (MLTM 2011). The government also attempted to revitalise the national economy through the construction of housing. As a result, most 5R was constructed by private builders with loans from the National Housing Fund (NHF)³⁰ or the purchase of land prepared by the ‘public development’. As 5R was also ultimately to be sold, it was difficult to consider it as social housing from social considerations (Ha 2004).

³⁰ The fund was established in 1981 by the government in order to raise and supply funds to support people who did not have homes. The funds are raised by the issue of bonds, fiscal loans, housing deposits, etc. The fund had risen to a total of around £ 19 billion, as of 2010 (MLTM 2011)

On the one hand, PR, introduced in 1989, could be assessed as social housing in the true sense, because it was permanently to be used as rental units for extremely poor households, such as the recipients of PAP (Ha 2004; Kim, Jin et al. 2007; Park 2007; MLTM 2010). However, the introduction was triggered by the housing market showing signs of instability and threatening the economic performance of the developmental state. In addition, since the democratisation in 1987, some of the poorest people, who had migrated to Seoul in the 1970s and settled in shanty towns well away from the city centre, had vehemently protested against redevelopment projects of the government with developmental legacies (Kim and Ha 1998; STKB 2007; Ha 2004; Lee 2011a). In some extreme cases, people even committed suicide due to housing problems. In response, the governments could be seen to be designing PR programme in order to obtain legitimacy and security for their regime, just as the first model of mass social housing in the West was a temporary expedient devised as insurance against revolution, as discussed in Chapter 2. The PR programme was stopped in 1992 because of the financial burden that it caused. In practical terms, its small net floor space (hereafter, housing size), locations far from inner city living areas, and a monthly rent that was still be unaffordable (Kim et al. 2007; Park 2007), meant PR was only a temporary expedient resulting from the legacy of the developmental/productivist welfare regime. Although Fifty-year Rental-housing (50R) to replace PR was introduced in 1992, the initial plan to build 100,000 units of 50R was soon reduced to 30,000 units, because of budget cuts.

4.3.4 PRH in the transformation of the developmental welfare state

Since the 2000s, the Korean developmental welfare state has entered a phase of transformation. In 2002, the Kim government finally declared a One Million *Kukmin* (people) Rental Housing Construction Plan (2003-12). This was to a large extent caused by sharply increasing *Chonsei* rent and the high conversion rates of tenancies from *Chonsei* to monthly rental, which was increasingly favoured by landlords looking for a stable income flow after the financial crisis in 1997 (Park 2007). The two types of *Kukmin* Rental Housing period were merged in a 30-year type and this was designated as being for low-income households with a monthly income of less than 70 per cent of that of the average urban household, with some consideration given to prioritising vulnerable groups, including benefit recipients, lone parents, the disabled, and North Korean refugees (MLTM 2010). The implementation of the One Million *Kukmin* Rental Housing project was followed by the inauguration of the Rho government in 2003, and was institutionally supported by the passing of an act granting special measures for the construction of *Kukmin* Rental Housing (Thirty-year Rental-housing, 30R) in 2004. In addition, Ten-year Rental-housing (10R) constructed by the private sector was introduced, which was supported by financial assistance through the NHF where a below-the-market rate of interest was provided (MLTM 2010). The government also introduced two types of PRH on the basis of the transfer of existing private rental housing to PRH: *Maeip* (purchase) Rental-housing (MR) is initially private rental housing that the government purchases and then transfers to PRH; *Chonsei* Rental-housing (CR) is intrinsically private housing, but the government rents it under *Chonsei* and provides it as PRH for that period. The government was committed to raising the

stock of PRH from approximately 3 per cent of total housing as of 2003 to 20 per cent in 2017. The National Minimum Housing Standards (NMHS) introduced in 2000 passed into law in the Housing Act of 2003. The NMHS covers housing size, the number of bedrooms by household size, as shown in Table 4.7, and also the provision of basic amenities such as a water closet, a shower or bath and a modern kitchen (MLTM 2011). This move to reduce the number of people living below the NMHS contributed to more emphasis on policies such as PRH provision and the redevelopment of areas of substandard housing (Kim et al. 2007). Consequently, social mobilisation, globalisation, the economic crisis and neo-liberalism have led to the transformation of the developmental welfare state regime and to a growing socio-economic inequality that has resulted in the growth of social housing in the sphere of housing provision.

Table 4.7 Housing size and the number of rooms by household size in the NMHS

Household size	Household composition	Composition of rooms	Housing size (m²)
1	One person household	1 + K	14
2	Couple	1 + DK	26
3	Couple + one child	2 + DK	36
4	Couple + two children	3 + DK	43
5	Couple + three children	3 + DK	46
6	Grandparents + Couple + two children	4 + DK	55

Note: the number indicates the number of bedrooms in a set of rental rooms; K indicates kitchen; and DK indicates dining kitchen

Source: adapted from a figure in MLTM (2011:226)

Since the conservative opposition party came to power in 2008, conservative governments have paid renewed attention to increasing home ownership, indicating the problems of PRH, such as the rent still being unaffordable to those in the lower-income bracket, the locations far away from the city centre, and the concentration of disadvantaged people (MLTM 2011). However, the government has decided to construct PR again, which had been stopped after 1992, and has introduced new types of PRH such as long-term *Chonsei* Rental Housing (Twenty-year Rental-housing, 20R) and PRH built on railway sites or disused public land because of its location in the city centre – the so-called *Hangbok* (happiness) housing. Consequently, PRH is still forming an important part of housing provision in the Korean welfare state in transition.

4.3.5 Physical, institutional and demographic features of PRH

Physical features

From a physical point of view, although some PRH such as MR and CR, which has not been supplied in the form of estates, has housing types of detached house with multiple dwellings, multiplex house or row house (see Figure 4.11), most of PRH such as PR, 50R, 30R, 20R, 10R and 5R has been supplied in the form of estates with high-rise apartments, just as post-WWII social housing estates in the West were composed of such high-rise blocks; but the row house type has been rarely supplied (MLTM 2010). The reason for having the apartment type of housing was that this was a very effective form of construction for providing more PRH, given the lack of land available for development (Ha and Seo 2006a; MLTM 2010). However, this building style was not

confined to PRH. As discussed above, construction of high-rise apartments on land prepared by public development has been a unique characteristic of urban housing renewal projects in Korea. The public development has been undertaken with the use of less expensive green-field sites, in particular the development in the *Sudogwon* (the capital region). As PRH has been constructed on land developed by the public development procedure, a significant proportion of PRH stock has been distributed in the *Sudogwon*, as shown in Table 4.8. In particular, PRH targeted at the lower-income bracket such as PR, 50R and 30R has been concentrated in the capital region. However, this type of provision in PRH has had some drawbacks, such as nimbyism from people living around areas where it has been proposed to concentrate disadvantaged people, locations far away from the city centre where urban sprawl and (re) development projects have transformed many green areas into urban areas, and rents that are still unaffordable to the lower-income bracket (MLTM 2010).

Institutional features

From an institutional point of view, the kinds of PRH are stratified according to the income levels of households, as shown in Table 4.9, by the Korean government's Road Map for Housing Welfare (RMHW). In addition, it is notable that people who are perceived as the 'disreputable' or 'undeserving' classes in the West, such as benefit recipients, lone parents and people displaced from urban redevelopment projects (Henderson and Karn 1984), have priority access to PRH. In European countries, in particular the UK, these class factors have functioned as more informal criteria in the allocation of social housing, leading to discrimination between one class of applicant

Table 4.8 Regional distribution of PRH

(unit, %)

Region	PR	50R	30R	10R	5R	Others³¹
Total	223,602 (100)	105,688 (100)	389,938 (100)	72,097 (100)	96,679 (100)	120,011 (100)
<i>Sudogwon</i>	74,016 (33.1)	79,569 (75.3)	156,742 (40.2)	7,414 (10.3)	8,300 (8.6)	67,347 (56.1)
<i>Busan</i>	26,296 (11.8)	1,838 (1.7)	9,703 (2.5)	434 (0.6)	1,582 (1.6)	8,211 (6.8)
<i>Daegu</i>	29,020 (13.0)	5,256 (5.0)	18,043 (4.6)	648 (0.9)	2,969 (3.1)	7,320 (6.1)
<i>Gwangju</i>	22,840 (10.2)	2,987 (2.8)	41,758 (10.7)	1,416 (2.0)	7,612 (7.9)	5,357 (4.5)
<i>Daejeon</i>	20,180 (9.0)	2,544 (2.4)	14,671 (3.8)	123 (0.2)	5,276 (5.5)	4,273 (3.6)
<i>Ulsan</i>	2,362 (1.1)	648 (0.6)	5,857 (1.5)	156 (0.2)	711 (0.7)	2,355 (2.0)
<i>Gangwon - do</i>	7,233 (3.2)	2,256 (2.1)	21,402 (5.5)	8,471 (11.7)	8,301 (8.6)	4,056 (3.4)
<i>Chungcheong buk - do</i>	6,139 (2.7)	2,071 (2.0)	18,609 (4.8)	3,670 (5.1)	9,161 (9.5)	4,242 (3.5)
<i>Chungcheong nam-do</i>	4,691 (2.1)	1,405 (1.3)	17,173 (4.4)	6,976 (9.7)	6,829 (7.1)	2,204 (1.8)
<i>Jeollabuk - do</i>	12,438 (5.6)	2,853 (2.7)	27,979 (7.2)	7,826 (10.9)	12,399 (12.8)	4,727 (3.9)
<i>Jeollanam - do</i>	5,001 (2.2)	476 (0.5)	14,009 (3.6)	23,412 (32.5)	20,308 (21.0)	507 (0.4)
<i>Gyeongsang buk - do</i>	7,045 (3.2)	1,720 (1.6)	16,537 (4.2)	550 (0.8)	1,697 (1.8)	2,023 (1.7)
<i>Gyeongsang nam-do</i>	4,845 (2.2)	1,375 (1.3)	22,174 (5.7)	9,855 (13.7)	10,806 (11.2)	5,309 (4.4)
<i>Jeju special self-governing - do</i>	1,496 (0.7)	690 (0.7)	5,281 (1.4)	1,146 (1.6)	728 (0.8)	2,080 (1.7)

Source: adapted from a table in MLTM (2012a)

³¹ Others includes 20R, MR and CR

Table 4.9 Classification of PRH according to the RMHW

Income level	Features	Kinds of PRH	Eligibility	Housing size
Decile 1 ³²	Groups incapable of paying rent	PR MR,CR 50R	Benefit recipients Lone parents Disabled people People displaced from urban redevelopment projects Veterans and certified patriots North Korean refugees	Less than 60m ²
Decile 2-4	Groups incapable of owning their own homes	30R 20R	Households with an income equal to or less than 50%, 70%, or 100% of the average urban household income (Some groups with eligibility for the above PRH are given priority)	Less than 85m ²
Decile 5-6	Groups capable of owning their own homes with government support	5R 10R 20R	Households with Housing Subscription Saving Deposit ³³ (HSSD) (In the case of 20R, households with an income equal to or less than 150%, or 180% of the average urban household income, and some groups with eligibility for the above PRH are given priority)	Less than 149m ²
Decile 7-10	Groups capable of owning their own homes	-	-	-

Source: adapted from a table in Kim et al. (2007: 39) and MLTM (2010)

³² The decile is based on monthly income distribution. According to the 2011 KHS, Decile 1 is £410.10 and under, Decile 2 ranges from £410.11 to £601.12, Decile 3 from £601.13 to £893.26, Decile 4 from £893.27 to £1,179.78, Decile 5 from £1,179.79 to £1,471.91, Decile 6 from £1,472.92 to £1,769.66, Decile 7 from £1,769.67 to £1,960.67, Decile 8 from £1,960.68 to 2,376.40, Decile 9 from 2,376.41 to £2,971.91, and Decile 10 is £2,971.92 and over. One pound was equivalent to around 1780.20 won at the time the survey was carried out.

³³ If there is a big demand, tenants are chosen according to the total amount of money saved, and the period of time during which they have not owned a home (Ha 2008: 353)

and another in terms of housing type locations and quality (Henderson and Karn 1984). Meanwhile, these class factors in the Korean PRH allocation processes have been established as formal criteria, making PRH even more a welfare tenure.

Another institutional feature can be explained by Kemeny's (1995) terminology (see Figure 3.1). Corresponding to Kemeny's dualist model of rental housing, where there is segregation between non-profit and profit-oriented providers, rental housing supplied by non-profit providers tends to be reserved mainly for the poorest section of the population, with strict means-testing and non-profit rents. In Korea, all kinds of PRH except 5R and 10R have been provided by state-run enterprises, including the KHNC (now, the Korea Land and Housing Corporation, the LH³⁴), and have been allocated to eligible tenants below a specific income level with some combination of priority groups. In addition, initial rent levels and rent increases have been controlled by the state, preventing the recouping of costs through rents, in order to provide affordable housing for those households in the greatest need of housing (MLTM 2010). Although 5R and 10R have been provided by private builders, their initial rent levels have been controlled by the state because they have been constructed with loans from the NHF or on purchased land prepared by 'public development'. Meanwhile, rental housing provided by the private sector without public assistance has not been regulated except for time limits and caps on rent increases, which are applied to all kinds of PRH (MLTM 2010). Although PRH has been provided by both the public and private sectors, it has been separated from private rental housing in terms of eligibility and rent levels. Consequently, PRH in Korea can be classified as a dualist model.

³⁴ The LH was established in October 2009 by combining the KNHC and the KLDC

Demographic features

As presented in institutional features of PRH, income criteria play an important role in the accessibility of PRH and the poor section of the population with some socio-economic disadvantages, including benefit recipients, the disabled and lone parents, is given priority in allocating PRH (see Table 4.9). As a result, Public Rental Housing Estates (PRHEs) composed of apartments are not the places for the upper and middle classes, unlike the owner-occupied apartment estates that emerged in the development of housing in modern Korea. In other words, PRHEs are institutionalised residential space for excluded people in the historical evolution of the Korean state, as presented. In particular, PRHEs can be seen to be the latest collective occupation of a location by vulnerable and poor groups. In the Japanese colonial period, the first poor villages were formed by peasant farmers who had their land seized for colonial exploitation and were moved to urban areas. These people's dwellings were made by digging holes into hillsides or into river banks (Kang 1987; Ha 2004). The second formation of poor housing settlements for the poor followed the liberation in 1945, which led to the return of oversea Koreans, and the Korean War in 1950, which brought large-scale displacement. These people became squatters who settled on vacant public lands around city centres and resided in *Panjagip* (houses built of waste timber, tin sheets and stone) (Jung 1989; Ha 2004). The third type of poor residential area was formed in the process of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation from the late 1960s. The massive movement of the population from rural areas toward urban areas resulted in shanty towns known as

Dal (the moon) *Dongnei* (neighbourhood)³⁵. The urban poor earned a living as day labourers, and were exposed to chronic poverty and unemployment (Ha 2004). The clearance of *Dal Dongnei* by urban and housing renewal projects in the mid-1980s caused a fourth instalment of poor settlements, in places such as disused industrial and agricultural buildings, and even vinyl greenhouses (Ha 2004; Lee 2011a). In addition, the 1997 economic crisis led to the emergence of *Zzonkbang* (doshouses) for people who had lost their jobs and become homeless (Lee 2011a). People living in these poor housing areas have eventually become target groups for PRH, in particular PR and 50R (see Table 4.9).

Consequently, the above features of PRH, which are summarised as multi-family apartment blocks permitting more people to live collectively, strictly regulated by the state for the purpose of providing vulnerable and poor people with affordable housing and development as residential space to accommodate the urban squatters of modern Korea who have been living in poor housing, allow the use of theories explaining social exclusion on social housing estates in the West: in particular, physical, behavioural and institutional models to explain the decline of neighbourhoods.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the development of PRH in the context of the evolution of the Korean welfare state. Since the 2000s, in particular, as the traditional developmental

³⁵ The reason is that neighbourhoods located in the hills or small mountains away from the centre of Seoul have a good view of the moon (Ha 2004)

welfare state has undergone transformation, Korea society has now arrived at the stage where it is turning its attention to multidimensional disadvantage – that is, social exclusion – instead of the problem of poverty. The growth of PRH also began in the period when the developmental welfare state was beginning to enter a phase of dismantlement, and PRHEs could be perceived as the latest institutionalised residential space for marginalised poor people. The key features of PRH, which are multi-family apartment blocks, strict allocation rules oriented towards socio-economically disadvantaged groups, and a residential position as a last resort for those groups in modern Korea, are the reasons for the applicability of models explaining the social downgrading of post-WWII social housing estates in the West.

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

This research is concerned with the question of whether PRHEs are an important factor in the causation and entrenchment of social exclusion in Korea. With this purpose, the previous chapters reviewed the literature on social exclusion and social housing estates in the Western countries, and presented the debates on social exclusion and the development of housing policy regarding PRH in the context of Korea. This chapter explains the methodological basis for this thesis which arises from the literature reviews. This study is to examine how living on PRHEs in South Korea impacts on residents in terms of social exclusion, paying attention to the existence and causes of social exclusion at a local level. In order to explore this, the study employs a mixed methods approach: secondary analysis of the 2011 Korean Housing Survey (KHS) of households living in PRH conducted by the Korean government provides the contextual quantitative element; and two case studies undertaken by the researcher represent the in-depth qualitative element. With this methodological framework, this chapter explains the philosophical considerations, data collection, data analysis and the selection of cases, and it also argues why and how these methods were chosen.

5.2 Research strategy

5.2.1 Philosophical considerations

Methods of social research are closely linked with different visions of how the social world should be studied (Creswell 2009; Grix 2010; Bryman 2012). These visions consist of ontological considerations relating to the question of what is the nature of the social world and epistemological considerations relating to the question of what is regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Grix 2010; Bryman 2012). Some scholars have referred to these ideas as a ‘paradigm’ (Kuhn 1970) or ‘worldview’ (Creswell 2009). Ontology is typically represented by two philosophical positions – objectivism and constructionism: the former is an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors; the latter is an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being created by social actors (Bryman 2012: 33). Epistemology is also traditionally represented by two philosophical positions – positivism and interpretivism. Positivism is an epistemological position advocating that the social world can and should be studied according to the principles of the natural sciences, including phenomenism³⁶, deductivism and inductivism, value free definitions, and refusal of normative statements. Interpretivism is a term given to a contrasting epistemology to that of positivism, and it arises from the view that there are differences between people and the objects of study in the natural sciences, and that social scientists need to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (*ibid*: 27-30).

³⁶Only phenomena and hence knowledge confirmed by the senses can genuinely be warranted as knowledge (Bryman 2012: 28)

Consequently, these philosophical considerations have influences on the conduct of social research along with theory, values and practical considerations (*ibid*: 39).

This research was motivated by a desire to explore the phenomenon of conflict at a local level between PRHEs and non-residents of PRHEs under the heading of social exclusion. This concept is understood, unlike poverty, as relational, multidimensional, and dynamic or processual (Berghman 1995; Silver and Miller 2003; Seo 2005). In particular, as argued by Taylor (1998), social exclusion on public housing estates is created by two main social actors: public housing residents who accept and internalise negative images on their estate and outsiders who give the estate a bad image and reinforce a sense of failure. For these reasons, the ontological position of this study is more closely related to constructivism than to objectivism. The research aims to identify the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs in Korea, paying attention to PRHE residents as insiders, and to outsiders including neighbouring non-PRHE residents. Consequently, this research attempts to identify the circumstances surrounding social exclusion on PRHEs and an understanding of the norms and values that operate in this particular cultural context and create social exclusion (Jennings 1983). From the perspective that this study attempts to describe and explain social exclusion on PRHEs, it can be argued that the philosophical perspective underpinning the research is associated with the epistemological position presented above as positivism. However, Henderson (1993: 1) put emphasis on the epistemological balance between *explanations* of human behaviour as positivism and the *understanding* of human behaviour as interpretivism. Weber (1947[1924]) also believed that sociology as a science aims at an interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at an

explanation of cause and effects. His definition contributed to developing complementary accounts of both explanation and understanding (Namkoong 2010). In this respect, this study is accomplished with Weberian considerations, and an explanation of social exclusion on PRHEs is undertaken with reference to an interpretive understanding of social exclusion on PRHEs, which resulted in the choice of mixed methods for the research.

5.2.2 Mixed methods research

Although some purists (e.g. Lincoln and Guba 1985; Schrag 1992; Schwandt 2000; Maxwell and Delancy 2004) have contended that qualitative and quantitative research paradigms are incompatible, there have been numerous attempts to combine quantitative and qualitative research in the social sciences since the early 1980s, and many writers argue that the two can be combined within an overall research project, and that combined research will be successful (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Bryman 2012). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 14) state that, ‘the goal of mixed methods research is not to replace either of these approaches but rather to draw from the strengths and minimize the weakness of in both single research studies and across studies’, along with the strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research as provided in the Table 5.1. Moreover, this study’s philosophical considerations follow constructionism from the perspective of ontology and Weberian consideration, advocating complementary accounts of both positivism and interpretivism from the perspective of epistemology. Consequently, against this background, this research employs mixed methods.

Table 5.1 Strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Words, pictures, and narrative can be used to add meaning to numbers. • Numbers can be used to add precision to words, pictures, and narratives. • Can provide stronger evidence for a conclusion through convergence and corroboration of findings. • Can be used to increase the generalisability of the results. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be difficult for a single researcher to carry out mixed research. • Researcher has to learn about multiple method and approaches and understand how to mix. • Methodological purists contend that one should always work within single paradigm • More expensive and time consuming

Source: adapted from a figure in Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 21)

5.2.3 Methodological framework

The methodological framework of this study is defined by the choice of mixed methods research. Mixed methods research can be classified as one of two major types: mixed-model design, which mixes qualitative and quantitative approaches within or across the stages of the research process; and mixed-method design, which is the inclusion of a quantitative phase and a qualitative phase in a research study (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 20). The difference between the two mixed methods research designs is whether they are carried out simultaneously or not in the process of answering research questions. The mixing in mixed-model designs takes places across the stages of the research process – for example, qualitative research objectives → collect qualitative data → perform quantitative analysis. Mixed-method designs, however, are similar to conducting a quantitative mini-study and a qualitative mini-study in one overall research study (ibid: 20-1). Mixed-method designs are classified

into nine types according to two criteria: the priority decision – whether one wants to operate largely within one dominant approach or not; and the sequence decision – whether one wants to conduct the phases concurrently or sequentially (Morgan 1998; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Bryman 2012). Figure 5.1 shows those designs.

Figure 5.1 Nine mixed-method designs

		Sequence Decision	
		Concurrent	Sequential
Priority Decision	Equal Status	1) QUAL + QUAN	2) QUAL → QUAN 3) QUAN → QUAL
	Dominant Status	4) QUAL + quan 5) QUAN + qual	6) QUAL → quan 7) qual → QUAN 8) QUAN → qual 9) quan → QUAL

Note: ‘qual’ and ‘quan’ stand for qualitative and quantitative; capitals and lower case indicate priority; → indicates sequence; + indicates concurrence.

Source: adapted from a figure in Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 22)

This research was designed on the basis of type 9) from among the types illustrated in Figure 5.1. The study is rooted in the ontological considerations that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being created by social actors, and do not have an existence that is independent or separate from the actors. In fact, the existing literature also views social exclusion on public housing estates as a phenomenon of conflict between public housing estate residents and people not living on PRHEs (Somerville 1998; Taylor 1998; Ha and Seo 2006b; Park et al. 2009). Consequently, this study’s objectives of exploring the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs are more

associated with qualitative ones. In addition, this research's epistemological perspective follows the Weberian view that an interpretive understanding of social action is needed in order to arrive at causal explanation. The priority has been placed on qualitative research.


The need to explain and describe social exclusion on PRHEs accurately leads to the choice of quantitative research as the other pole to this study. The quantitative element relies on the 2011 Korean Housing Survey (KHS) of public rental housing conducted by the Korean government. Although more will be said later about the 2011 KHS, it was the first survey to focus exclusively on PRH households, and it was conducted on a large scale in order to investigate overall residential conditions in PRH, satisfaction with living in PRH, and the socio-economic backgrounds of PRH households across the country, through face-to-face structured interviews. The survey is highly relevant to the research as questions relating to the statistics of social exclusion are included in the survey and social exclusion is cited as one of the disadvantages living in PRH as discussed in Chapter 2. Questions included income; education level; employment; age; disability; involvement in community activity or decision-making; and relationships with neighbours, allowing measurement of social exclusion according to Buchardt et al. (2002) and an approach using Silver's (1994) solidarity paradigm of social exclusion.

In addition, the physical conditions of PRH, the socio-economic characteristics of PRH households, and the institutional (or managerial) characteristics of PRH were investigated. There has been discussion above of the way in which the social downgrading of post-WWII social housing estates in the West is explained by the

physical obsolescence of housing stock, the concentration of disadvantaged groups, and institutional (or managerial) factors. As meaningful data regarding the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs were collected on the basis of a large-scale survey, the use of the 2011 KHS data set was expected to contribute to addressing the research questions, although the limitations of this as secondary data were predicted: these were lack of familiarity with the data and absence of important variables explaining social exclusion. However, the 2011 KHS data set provided a means of assessing the level of income inequality and relative deprivation levels as a proxy for social exclusion across different parts of the PRHE system in Korea and this complemented qualitative primary data obtained through the case studies.

Based on the ‘quan → QUAL’ design as type 9) in Figure 5.1, the methodological framework of this research is provided in Figure 5.2. As the first phase, a quantitative approach using the 2011 KHS data set begins by analysing the overall characteristics of Korean PRH from the physical, demographical and institutional (or managerial) perspectives, considering theories for the decline of post-WWII social housing estates in the West. Then, in order to examine the existence or otherwise of social exclusion on PRHEs, this data set is used to shed light on two main theories reviewed in Chapter 2: relational characteristics of the term social exclusion (Silver 1994; Gordon et al. 2007), which is explained as erosion of social relationship between individuals and society; and measurement of social exclusion according to Buchardt et al. (2002), which consists of four key activities covering consumption, production, political engagement and social interaction. After that, the study demonstrates the physical, demographic and institutional (or managerial) characteristics of PRHEs where social exclusion is

Figure 5.2 The methodological framework



identified in the previous analysis, and what characteristics are concentrated on these PRHEs, with consideration of the factors that explained the social downgrading of post-WWII social housing estates in the West.

The second phase involves the two case studies with qualitative methods, which are the dominant approach in this study. An important preparatory step for these case studies is the selection of the cases, which depends on the measurement criteria for social exclusion. The main unit of analysis in this study is a PRHE that demonstrates social exclusion, that is, a PRHE with households showing typical symptoms of social exclusion – as measured by four dimensions (Buchardt et al. 2002) used in the first phase – in the 2011 KHS data set. This study has two critical cases – that is, two PRHEs – on the basis of strategic choice in order to contribute to the generalisability and raise the possibility of direct replication (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2009). A good case study requires various sources (Yin 2009). In order to answer research questions therefore in addition to interviews and observation, documents, archival records and physical artefacts are collected.

The existence of social exclusion on two PRHE in the second phase is elaborated from Taylor's (1998) cycle of labelling explaining the spatiality of social exclusion in social housing estates, on the basis of the solidarity paradigm of social exclusion. This study then demonstrates the physical, demographic and institutional (or managerial) characteristics of the two PRHEs as a preliminary step to establishing the causes of social exclusion on them. Taken together with the causes of social exclusion on PRHEs in the first phase, the quantitative analysis using the 2011 KHS data suggests particular

characteristics of PRHEs that are related to factors that explain the social downgrading of post-WWII social housing estates in the West. However, it is limited to identifying more valid factors to explain the social downgrading of PRHEs in Korea. The case studies shed light on the specific causes of social exclusion on PRHEs. Eventually, on the basis of the findings generated by this study, responses for integrating socially excluded PRHEs are explored.

5.3 The 2011 Korean Housing Survey of households living in PRH

5.3.1 An introduction to the 2011 KHS

The KHS that began in 2006 is conducted annually by the MLTM (now, MOLIT) according to the Housing Act, and is separate from the Population and Housing Census, which is carried out every five years (MLTM 2012). The purpose of this survey is to investigate residence, residential environments, household characteristics and other current conditions of residence in Korea. Each alternate year, either overall households or particular households are the objects of this survey. That is, overall households are surveyed in even years; and particular households in odd years (MLTM 2012; NLIC 2014). The data are collected by face-to-face structured interviews and gathered by social research organisations in order to ensure their high quality. The 2011 KHS focused on households living in PRH as particular households, and was carried out across the country between July and November in 2011. This was the first large-scale survey focusing on PRH households (MLTM 2012). It had two main objectives: to

investigate actual residential conditions, satisfaction with living in PRH and the socio-economic characteristics of PRH households; and to contribute to drawing up effective PRH policies through the generation of high-quality data to be analysed for the government and researchers (ibid).

A target sample of 45,000 PRH households was selected from the population of households living in around 1 million PRH units as of May 2011. The sampling stratified the population by two criteria – that is, the type of PRH including PR, 50R, 30R, 20R, 10R, 5R, MR and CR, and regions, including seven metropolitan cities³⁷, eight *dos* (provinces)³⁸ and one special self-governing – *do*³⁹ – and selected a systematic sample from each of the resulting strata (ibid). In the case of PRH in the form of an estate such as PR, 50R, 30R, 20R, 10R and 5R, classifying the population by a criterion of estate type was added (ibid). A total of 45,742 households were surveyed, but the researcher excluded households living in PRH not in the form of an estate such as MR and CR (5,846 households) because the research focus is social exclusion on PRH estates. As a result, the number of sample in this secondary analysis is 39,896 households living in PRH including PR, 50R, 30R, 20R, 10R and 5R as presented in Table 5.2; theses were distributed across 952 estates.

The survey consisted of eight main sections with a total of fifty-five questions. This is provided in Table 5.3 and the data was gathered by social research organisations to produce a high quality.

³⁷Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon and Ulsan.

³⁸Gyeonggi – *do*, Gangwon –*do*, Chungcheongbuk – *do*, Chungcheongbuk – *do*, Chungcheongbuk –*do*, Jeollabuk – *do*, Jeollanam – *do*, Gyeongsangbuk – *do* and Gyeongsangnam – *do*.

³⁹Jeju special self-governing – *do*.

Table 5.2 The number of households in the 2011 KHS

	PR	50R	30R	20R	10R	5R	TOTAL
Households surveyed	10,275	5,405	13,607	459	4,895	5,795	39,896
Stratified sample	10,050	5,460	12,780	460	4,380	5,820	38,950
Population	223,602	105,688	389,938	15,574	72,097	96,679	903,578

Source: MLTM (2012a)

5.3.2 Advantages and limitations of using the 2011 KHS data set

The advantages of using secondary analysis such as the 2011 KHS analysis are listed by Bryman (2012: 311-5):

- *High-quality data.* Many of the data sets that are employed most frequently for secondary analysis are of extremely high quality especially in three aspects – those are, the rigorous sampling procedure, the samples to cover the nation or at least a wide variety of regions of the nation and data generation by highly experienced researchers.
- *Reanalysis may offer new interpretations.* Data can be analysed in so many different ways that it is very unusual for the range of possible analyses to be exhausted. Secondary analysts with variables of interests, theoretical ideas and methods of quantitative data analysis different from those of the original researchers can envisage new interpretations of the data.

Table 5.3 The 2011 KHS questionnaire

section	Sub-section	Contents
	Pre-section	Basic facts such as kind of PRH and managerial type
1.Residence and residential environments	Residential history	2 questions including one on period of residence
	Housing conditions	7 questions including ones on housing size and housing facilities
	Living conditions	5 questions including ones on housing satisfaction and satisfaction with environments
2.Circumstances of inhabitation	Moving-in	5 questions including one on waiting time and eligibility
	Satisfaction	3 questions including one on advantages and disadvantages of living in PRH
	Leaving	2 questions including one on expected hardship of facing leaving
	PRH policies	3 questions including one on suggestions for PRH policies
3.Neighbourships and community participation	4 questions including ones on the necessity for tenant committee, the existence of conflicts between residents, and the experience of participating in community activity	
4.Management	2 questions including one on satisfaction with management services	
5.Welfare service	Experience of, and necessity for, services such as jobs, education and residence	
6.Future plans	5 questions including ones on plans for moving out and purchasing housing in the future	
7.Households	Social characteristics	3 questions including ones on size and constitution of household
	Economic characteristics	5 questions including ones on income, assets, liabilities and recipients of national benefits
	Costs of residence	5 questions including ones on rent and utility bills
8.Householders	3 questions including education level and occupation of householder	

- *Cost and time.* Students in particular may lack the financial resources and the time to conduct very extensive research. So, secondary analysis offers the prospect of having access to good-quality data for a tiny fraction of the resources involved.
- *The wider obligations of the social researchers.* The public must expect that the data that they participate in generating should be mined to its fullest extent.

However, the limitations of carrying out secondary analysis had to be recognised because this was survey data that has been collected for the government's policy purposes. First of all, the fact that the researcher had not been involved in the collection of these data nor in the design of this survey could be associated with general limitations of secondary analysis including lack of familiarity with data, complexity of the data, no control over data quality and absence of key variables (Bryman 2012; 315-6). It was necessary to spend quite a lot of time becoming familiar with the structure of the 2011 KHS data set. This survey was carried out by the government primarily to investigate residence conditions, housing satisfaction and the socio-economic characteristics of households. Thus, additional resources needed to be expended in re-analysing the data to examine the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs. Secondly, the 2011 KHS was cross-sectional, so it lacked a time dimension which could display the dynamic characteristics of social exclusion. However, cross-sectional design enables a researcher to obtain results relatively quickly and is a most satisfactory way of obtaining descriptive information (De Vaus, 2001: 176). The characteristics of PRH households and PRH in relation to the existence and causes of social exclusion could therefore be described more generally by the survey. Finally, given that the use and

analysis of official data has been a highly controversial topic for many years, because of unease about the reliability and validity of official data (Bryman 2012), another limitation of using this data could be the fact that the 2011 KHS was conducted by an agency of the state – that is, MLTM. The researcher worked at the Ministry before starting this research and will return to the Ministry after completing it, so these personal circumstances and entrenchment of his could create the belief that the survey had great reliability and validity, thus elevating its potential in his mind and detracting from objectivity and ethics of the research (England 1994; Sultana 2007). Although these data were produced by social research organisations that were relatively independent of the state, the researcher tried to bear in mind it whilst carrying out this research that these official data has become an object of research interest rather than a potential source of data for many years, and that all social measurement is prone to error (Bryman 2012: 324).

Consequently, the attention to these limitations of the 2011 KHS data also forced the researcher to choose type of ‘quan → QUAL’ from among the nine mixed-method designs presented above (see Figure 5.1). So, a qualitative approach via case studies conducted by the researcher was the dominant one and a quantitative phase with an analysis of the 2011 KHS data set was carried out to inform the qualitative phase. However, following the arguments of Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), the findings identified by this mixed methods approach was to be integrated in order to answer the research questions for this study and furthermore to define the limitations of this study in relation to future research.

5.3.3 Analytical strategy

According to the typical steps of a quantitative phase, the process of devising measurements of the concepts in which a researcher is interested follows after the selection of a research design – the so-called operationalisation leading to indicators that can stand for the concept (Bryman 2012: 164). This study's focus was to identify the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs. In order to investigate these issues, two main concepts – social exclusion and the characteristics of a PRHE – had to be defined operationally, and these have to some extent been presented in the previous section (see Figure 5.2). It is the solidarity paradigm of social exclusion by Silver (1994), the concentration effect and the neighbourhood effect discussed by various scholars (Kristensen 1995; Somerville 1998; Taylor 1998; Atkinson and Kintrea 2001), and Burchardt et al.'s (2002) measurement of social exclusion that provided this research with a framework within which this phenomenon could be understood and the findings interpreted. Therefore, the researcher's operational definition of social exclusion on a PRHE for this study was as follows:

Social exclusion refers to stigmatisation and the visibility of anti-social behaviour at a local level that affect relationships between individuals and societies. It is tied to a particular residential space, where residents recognise or accept stigmatisation from surrounding areas. Meanwhile people outside the residential space give the residents stereotypes and reinforce them. As a result, this leads to alienation from the outside and a lack of social, economic and political participation by the residents.

In order to examine the connection between social exclusion and PRHEs, this research also defined the characteristics of a PRHE in three aspects: physical, demographic, and institutional or managerial (hereafter, institutional). In particular, it was based on three main theoretical approaches provided by Van Beckhoven et al. (2009) in order to explain the social downgrading of social housing estates in European countries: physical obsolescence, the concentration of disadvantaged newcomers, and ineffective institution or management. Thus, this study formulated characteristics of a PRHE as follows:

The characteristics of a PRHE are divided into categories according to three features: physical (e.g. structural quality and design of dwellings) and living conditions; demographic (e.g. socio-economic status); and institutional (e.g. allocation rules, management style and maintenance)

These two definitions were used as frameworks not only for analysing the 2011 KHS data set but also for primary data collected from the two case studies. Table 5.4 summarises the operationalisation of social exclusion on a PRHE and the characteristics of a PRHE respectively into indicators available in the 2011 KHS data set. The potential existence of social exclusion on PRHEs could be measured against each of the three dimensions. Although any one dimension was likely to be sufficient⁴⁰ for identifying the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs, on the dimension of ‘Lack of social, economic and political participation of residents’, participation in all three categories was regarded as necessary for not being socially excluded in this study, in order to stress the interactions between the types of participation and consider the multi-dimensional

⁴⁰ Lack of participation in any one dimension is sufficient for social exclusion (Burchardt et al. 2002: 31).

Table 5.4 Indicators of social exclusion on PRHE and the characteristics of PRHE

Concept	Dimension	Indicator	Related research questions
Social exclusion on a PRHE	1. Stigmatisation and anti-social behaviour	Stigmatisation and residents' lack of the sense of norms as a disadvantage of living in PRH	
	2.1 Lack of social participation 2.2 Lack of economic participation 2.3 Lack of political participation	2.1 No participation in community activities 2.2 household income under national average monthly household income, and unemployed householder or householder with lower-level schooling (i.e. middle school graduation or under) 2.3 Unnecessariness of tenant committee	1. Existence of social exclusion on PRHEs
	3. Alienation from the outside	Dissatisfaction with relationships with neighbours	
Characteristics of a PRHE	1. Physical feature	Year of construction, building style, satisfaction with dwellings, satisfaction with living conditions, and satisfaction with physical conditions	
	2. Demographic feature	Tenure trajectory, duration of residence, households' size and income, householders' age, gender, employment and education level, whether or not receiving benefits, whether or not there is a disabled family member	2. Characteristics of socially excluded PRHEs 3. Causes of social exclusion on PRHEs
	3. Institutional feature	Letting conditions(i.e. eligibility of residents, accommodation fees, time on waiting list), type of management (i.e. direct management by a landlord or not), and satisfaction with maintenance	

aspects of social exclusion⁴¹. Therefore, this was different from measurement of social exclusion by Burchardt et al. (2002). Eventually, social exclusion on a PRHE was measured on the following dimensions: stigmatisation and anti-social behaviour; lack of social, economic and political participation; and alienation from the outside.⁴² This measurement led to identifying whether social exclusion was concentrated in estates composed of particular kinds of PRH. Furthermore, by looking at estates composed of particular kinds of PRH where social exclusion was noticeable from physical, demographic and institutional aspects, whether the cause of social exclusion on PRHEs in Korea were related to physical, behavioural or institutional characteristics could be established.

However, this survey was carried out at a one point in time, and was the one targeting PRH households. Only to relying on the 2011 KHS analysis to answer the research questions was less than perfect. Thus, to overcome the weakness of this analysis and seek stronger evidence for a conclusion, another research strategy was needed, and this will be presented in the next section. This strategy was to be case studies using a qualitative approach.

⁴¹ There were also practical reasons for considering lack of all three types of participation as necessary for social exclusion in this study, because social exclusion is measured in two other dimensions and each type of participation has a smaller number of indicators than those given to each type of participation by Burchardt et al. (2002: 34)

⁴²To be exact, this dimension should have been measured by responses from non-PRHE residents. But this survey was conducted only among PRH residents, so the researcher was forced to choose dissatisfaction with relationships with neighbours, which was available in the 2011 KHS as an indicator.

5.4 The case studies

According to Yin (2009: 18), the case study enables researchers to understand a real-life phenomenon in depth because it is an empirical inquiry into a contemporary phenomenon set within its real-world context. In addition, case studies are useful when research question is either descriptive – ‘What is going on?’ – or explanatory – ‘Why is it going on?’ (De Vaus 2001; Yin 2012). This study sought an empirically accurate description of the factual circumstances surrounding social exclusion on PRHEs and an understanding of the norms and values operating in the cultural context that encouraged social exclusion on PRHEs. Although case studies can rely not only on qualitative but also on quantitative one – or even a mix of the two, the case-study design often favours the collection of data in natural settings such as participant-observation and unstructured interviewing because these techniques for collecting data tend to be appropriate for the detailed and intensive analysis of a case (Bryman 2012; Yin 2012). Accordingly, given that this study was trying to address research questions by taking advantage of mixed methods research (see Table 5.1), the case study relying on qualitative evidence offered the opportunity to understand the dynamics and experience of social exclusion on PRHEs. Furthermore, it was helpful in overcoming the main limitation of the 2011 KHS – that is, its lack of a time dimension – because most case studies incorporate a time dimension by retrospective or prospective design (De Vaus 2001: 227). As this study collected information relating to an extended period for use on one occasion through interviews with PRHE residents, neighbouring non-PRHE residents, PRHE management office staff, community welfare centre staff and local government front-line officials who had been involved in the PRHEs for a significant period of time, the

time dimension was obtained retrospectively. Although this ex-post approach suffered from the obvious problems associated with loss of evidence and reconstruction of the past in the light of the present, the other sources of evidence such as documentation, observation and physical artefacts could be expected to reduce them (De Vaus 2001: 228).

5.4.1 The selection of cases

For many years, the status of the case study as a scientific research strategy has been questioned (De Vaus 2001; Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2009). The conventional wisdom argued against case study research can be summarised as follows: it offers little basis for scientific generalisation; there is an absence of theoretical knowledge; it is appropriate only for generating hypotheses; it has a bias toward verification; and it is difficult to summarise (Diamond 1996; Hill et al. 2000). However, this conventional wisdom arguably represents misunderstanding or prejudice that overlooks the facts that proof is difficult to establish in social science and that these problems also exist in other research strategies such as experiment and survey, although they may be encountered less frequently in those strategies than in the case study (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2009). Bryman (2012: 69) argues that question marks over the status of the case study as a scientific framework depends greatly on how far a researcher feels that the objections listed above are relevant to the evaluation of the case study.


From this point of view, an emphasis in this research was whether this study's findings could be generalised to a wider population beyond the cases studied – that is, the issue

of external validity. Although the case study has been criticised as offering a poor basis for generalisation, it is necessary to consider two different types of generalisation. The theoretical (or analytical) generalisation that case studies strive for is associated with expanding and generalising theories; whereas the statistical generalisation that experiments strive for is associated with enumerating frequencies (De Vaus 2001; Yin 2009). Accordingly, the external validity of case studies depends on the strategic selection of cases rather than the statistical selection of cases (De Vaus 2001; Flyvbjerg 2006). For a strategic choice of cases for this study, the researcher first used the results of the 2011 KHS analysis. The results of analysing the 2011 KHS regarding the existence of social exclusion, which will be discussed further in Chapter 8, showed that among PRH households the proportion of PR households experiencing all the dimensions of social exclusion tended to be particularly high.

As PR households were identified as having a higher possibility of experiencing social exclusion, the researcher decided to take a PRHE composed of PR as the unit of analysis. In order to produce a critical case, which is represented as being useful in testing a well-developed theory and understanding the circumstances in which the hypothesis will be challenged or extended (Yin 2009; Bryman 2012), PR households experiencing the three dimensions of social exclusion simultaneously in the 2011 KHS data set were investigated. The number of those households was 114, and they were distributed across 29 estates. As multiple candidates were qualified to serve in case studies, additional criteria for selecting the final two PRHEs were required, considering the logic of replication – that is, to see whether the findings of each case were consistent with each other, and thus also to contribute to the external validity of this study.

Historically, the first PRHE comprised of PR in Korea was the Junggye 9 PRHE in Seoul. Household living on this estate were among the 114 households experiencing the three dimensions of social exclusion simultaneously. With symbolic and historic considerations from the first, this research decided the Junggye 9 PRHE would be one case. The other case was selected by considering the fact that the Junggye 9 PRHE was located in *Gangbuk* area located to the north of the *Han River*, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. As presented in Chapter 4, The *Gangbuk* area is recognised as a traditional but rundown region, whereas the *Gangnam* area, the south of the River, is known to Koreans as a modern and affluent area. *Gangnam* is a brand new space resulting from the developments of the 1970s and 1980s (Ahn 2010). In order to reflect these trajectories between two areas, this research decided the Suseo 1 PRHE which has one of the 114 households meeting three dimensions of social exclusion at the same time and is located in *Gangnam*. The basic features of two PRHEs are summarised in Table 5.5.

Figure 5.3 Map of Seoul and locations of the case-study PRHEs



Source: adapted from a figure in SDI (2007)

Table 5.5 The basic features of two PRHEs

Key features	Junggye 9 PRHE	Suseo 1 PRHE
Location and kind of PRH	Nowon-gu in Gangbuk area PR	Gangnam-gu in Gangnam area PR
Year of construction and scale	Aug.1992 62,190 m ²	Nov.1992 53,897 m ²
Blocks and dwellings	11 blocks of 15 storeys 2,634	14 blocks of 15 storeys 2,565
Residents	5,861	4,090
Eligibility	Lower-income households including national benefit recipients, lone parents and the disabled	As for the Junggye 9 PRHE
Landlord and manager	LH Korea Housing Management Corporation (KOHOM)	As for the Junggye 9 PRHE

5.4.2 Data collection

The next step was to plan to collect data for the case studies. The most common sources of data or evidence for case study designs are documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artefacts (Yin 2009). Table 5.6 shows the advantages and disadvantages of each of the sources of data to be used in this study (ibid: 102). As this study chose the case study as a qualitative research strategy, data collection techniques mainly relied on semi-structured interviewing via focus groups and one-to-one interview, and observation. Accordingly, interviews and observations were the most important sources of data for this research. However, good research is highly dependent on the quality of the data collection, so the use of as many sources as possible and the triangulation of these are highly dependent

Table 5.6 Advantages and disadvantage of each source of data

Source of data	Advantages	Disadvantages
Documentation or archival records	Can be reviewed repeatedly Not created as a result of the case study Exact information Broad coverage	Can be difficult to find Biased selectivity Reflects bias of author May be deliberately withheld
Interviews	Focus directly on case study topics Provide perceived causal inferences and explanations	Bias due to poorly articulated questions Response bias Inaccuracies due to poor recall Interviewee offers what interviewer wants to hear
Direct observations	Cover events in real time Cover context of 'case'	Time-consuming and costly Broad coverage difficult without a team of observers (selectivity) Events may proceed differently
Physical artefacts	Insights into cultural features Insights into technical operations	Selectivity Problems with availability

on the quality of the data collection, so the use of as many sources as possible and the triangulation of these are highly recommended (Patton 2002; Yin 2009; Bryman 2012). Other sources of data such as documentation, archival records and physical artifacts were therefore deployed. In addition, photographs were used in order to illustrate some sources of data such as observations and physical artefacts. In order to organise and document the data collected, the researcher created an electronic database for each case. The following sections will explain each data collection in detail.

Documentation and archival records

Documentation such as administrative documents, formal studies and news articles came from the websites of related research institutes, the mass media and the

management corporation of the two PRHEs (i.e. KOHOM). In particular, data from KOHOM, which offered basic information on the two case-study estates and their residents, were very useful. In fact, KOHOM is the public management corporation and affiliated company of LH, which is the public corporation that developed two estates and currently runs them as landlord. So, careful contact was needed lest the researcher's position as a government official should produce biased or incomplete data. Archival records such as statistical data, maps and charts came mainly from government websites. Collecting various documents and archival records was helpful for corroborating information and preparing fieldwork for interviewing and observation.

Interviews

One-to-one interviews and focus groups as semi-structured interviewing were employed in this study. One of the most important advantages of qualitative interviewing is to deal with participants' own views, which can make explanations from it authentic (Schutt 2011). Other advantages include the possibility for the researcher of following up interviewees' replies; the availability of rich, detailed answers; and the possibility of re-interviewing interviewees (Bryman 2012). Accordingly, qualitative interviewing was appropriate to extract information about the complex and dynamic circumstances surrounding social exclusion on PRHEs. The choice of focus group method besides individual interviews was recommended by the researcher's supervisors. First of all, the recommendation is based on the fact that one of important elements in the focus group is interaction in the group to produce the data before conducting focus group interviews (Morgan 1996; Bryman 2012). Besides, it can contribute to producing concentrated

amounts of data on precisely the topic of interest (Morgan 1996: 13). During two field visits in 2013 – the first was undertaken between 2nd and 16th March and the second between 11th and 25th November, 9 focus groups and 30 individual interviews were conducted. The focus group method was applied to PRHE residents and neighbouring private estate residents, whereas one-to-one interviewing was mainly applied to PRHE management office staff, welfare centre staff in the PRHEs, local government front-line officials and experts. Ultimately, a total of 69 respondents was interviewed for case studies. Except two experts, 32 persons relating to the Junggye 9 PRHE participated in the study and there were 35 participants relating to the Suseo 1 PRHE. This is shown in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 Distribution of interviewees

Case	PRHE	Private estate	Management office	Welfare centre	Front-line office	Sub-total	Expert	Total
Junggye 9 PRHE	14 (3 focus groups and 2 individual interviews)	14 (1 focus group and 4 individual interviews)	1	1	2	32		
Suseo 1 PRHE	17 (3 focus groups and 2 individual interviews)	13 (2 focus groups and 4 individual interviews)	2	1	2	35	2	69

Note: private estate residents include private estate management office staff; 3 members of staff in private estates adjacent to Junggye 9 PRHE; 1 member of staff in a private estate adjacent to the Suseo 1 PRHE.

Before the first field trip for conducting interviews, the researcher went through two important preparatory steps. One of preparatory steps was the pilot interviewing for testing the validity and clarity of interview guides and looking for some sense of direction along with checking the time taken by the interviewing. Two pilot interviews

were carried out in January 2013: one was an individual interview with a Korean government official who was studying at the University of Birmingham and was the director in a division relating to PRH in the same ministry as the researcher; the other was a focus group composed of Korean people with experience of living near PRHEs in Korea. It was realised through these pilot interviews that the series of questions was more or less structured and composed of technical unfamiliar words to participants. Furthermore, the researcher had a tendency to control the interviewing process himself, despite the fact that the interviewer should be the moderator, especially in a focus group, and should help those involved through their discussions (Morgan 1996: 48). Although the pilot interviews with other types of people, such as PRHE residents, management office staff and welfare centre staff were not carried out because of the geographical limitation of living abroad, the researcher's supervisors gave him a great deal of help in elaborating topic guides in an easy-to-understand manner and streamlining these guides. After the pilot interviews, the topic guides for the interviews with PRHE residents, private estate residents, PRHE management office staff, welfare centre staff, local government front-line officials and experts were each finalised through several revisions and supervisions (see Appendix 1).

The other was to plan the sampling method and recruit participants. As already discussed, the case study pursues theoretical generalisation, not the statistical generalisation achieved by using representative random samples (De Vaus 2001; Yin 2009). Furthermore, in the qualitative approach adopted by this study there was a need to sample in systematic way, so that those sampled were relevant to the research questions to be answered (Bryman 2012: 418). Accordingly, purposive sampling as a

non-probability form of sampling was used to select PRHE residents and neighbouring non-PRHE residents as important potential participants, because the aim of the research was to identify the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs in Korea, paying attention to PRHE residents as *insiders* and neighbouring non-PRHE residents as *outsiders*. PRHE management office staff and welfare centre staff who worked for PRHE residents were also selected as key potential participants and furthermore, staff from Dong office (the local government front-line office), who were responsible for the distribution of national benefits to some PRHE dwellers, were added.

In order to recruit participants other than PRHE residents and neighbouring private estate residents, at first, the researcher contacted the heads of each organisation by phone to invite them to support this research. The information sheet and the consent form (see Appendix 2) were sent to them by email. Some difficulties in accessing them were anticipated because they were believed to be busy and the researcher was a stranger to them. Fortunately, most of them willingly accepted the invitation. However, the researcher's position as a government official contributed to ease of access to them, because they tended to show more interest when introducing his career as a MLTM official rather than the researcher. However, emphasis on his positionality as a government official often put the researcher in a position, where those being researched became suspicious and hesitated to state something because they were stating it to a government official who dealt with policies influencing their institutional, social, and political realities. So, when contacting them, in order to avoid potential bias caused by the assumption that their responses would immediately be used by the government, the researcher emphasised the fact that this study was being carried out from the point of

view of a researcher rather than from that of a government official, reminding them that the fieldwork was a dialogical process which was structured by the researcher and the participants (England 1994: 80).

There was little information on PRHE resident and neighbouring private estate residents. As a consequence, snowball sampling was employed because this is useful when trying to sample hard-to-reach or hard-to-identify populations for which there is an absence of a sampling frame and furthermore, networks of individuals are the focus of attention (Schutt 2011; Bryman 2012). The heads of two PRHE management offices were selected as informants who might refer the researcher to some residents. The heads in both PRHEs accepted the request and proposed some residents according to eligibility for PRH which was the criterion suggested by the researcher – that is, benefit recipients, the disabled, single parents and residents who had lost entitlement to benefits but were still living on the estates – with the aim of getting closer to the population of a PRHE. As a result, when the researcher arrived at each PRHE, some residents were introduced by the heads and the residents proposed other participants with the similar eligibility to theirs, leading to focus groups according to eligibility. In order to minimise the bias from introduction by the heads, the researcher asked the residents whether they wanted to participate or not, along with a detailed explanation about this research. Furthermore, other residents were recruited only by the interaction between the researcher and those being introduced by the heads but re-checked by the researcher in terms of their willingness and reliability in participation. Table 5.8 shows basic demographic profiles of the focus group. Focus group participants had similar backgrounds in terms of age, gender, occupation and school level. Although it might be seen that this resulted from

Table 5.8 Demographic profiles of focus group participants as PRHE residents

Junggye 9 PRHE					Suseo 1 PRHE				
Participant	Age	Gender	Occupation	Schooling level	Participant	Age	Gender	Occupation	Schooling level
A11	65	Female	Unemployed	Middle school	B11	76	Female	Unemployed	Primary school
A12	72	Female	Unemployed	Middle school	B12	79	Female	Unemployed	Primary school
A13	60	Female	Unemployed	Primary school	B13	77	Female	Unemployed	Primary school
A14	62	Female	Unemployed	Middle school	B14	75	Female	Unemployed	Primary school
A15	60	Male	Unemployed	High school	B25	65	Male	Unemployed	High school
A36	54	Female	Unemployed	Primary school	B26	64	Male	Unemployed	Primary school
A37	46	Female	Unemployed	High school	B27	74	Male	Unemployed	Primary school
A48	65	Female	Unemployed	High school	B38	57	Male	Employed	High school
A49	56	Female	Unemployed	Middle school	B49	69	Female	Part-time	High school
A410	58	Female	Unemployed	Middle school	B410	71	Female	Unemployed	Middle school
A411	67	Female	Part-time	Middle school	B411	57	Female	Unemployed	Middle school
A412	56	Female	Unemployed	Middle school	B412	68	Female	Unemployed	Middle school
					B413	67	Female	Unemployed	Middle school
					B414	49	Female	Unemployed	Middle school
					B415	70	Female	Unemployed	Middle school

Note: Each digit under ‘participant’ indicates information, including PRHE, eligibility and numbering of participant: A and B stand for the Junggye 9 PRHE and the Suseo 1 PRHE respectively; the second digit denotes eligibility –1, 2, 3 and 4 stand for benefit recipients, the disabled, single parents and residents who had lost eligibility for benefits but were still living on the estate; the remaining digit denotes numbering of participants.

the limitation of the snowball sampling employed by this study, and furthermore caused doubt about reliability and validity from the participants, this was a reflection of the reality about those living in PRHEs. According to the 2011 KHS, PR, which was the

type of housing in the two PRHEs for the case studies, was generally occupied by elderly female householders with unemployment and lower schooling, which will be presented in Chapter 6, where we shall see how the demographic characteristics of the two PRHE showed were similar.

There were significant difficulties in recruiting neighbouring private estate residents for a comparison with the PRHE residents. Contact was attempted with staff of the private estate management offices: that is, at a total of four offices, having identified two private estates located near each PRHE on the map (see Figures 7.1 and 7.13). However, it was extremely difficult to obtain their contact information, such as email and phone numbers, and even when some staff were contacted, they refused to introduce any residents to the researcher because this was not totally related to the work of the management office. So the researcher decided to contact them in person during the field trip and to conduct individual interviews if the recruitment of private estate residents for focus groups became difficult. Unfortunately, when the researcher visited the private estate management offices, all the staff whom the researcher met refused to make referrals to any residents. In order to demonstrate the researcher's credibility, his career as a government official was mentioned when he was introduced, and his research information sheet was handed out. However, the researcher felt that the position as a government official made them reluctant to refer him to their residents because their residents would have to talk about the neighbouring PRHE in front of a government official. After recognising this, the researcher made efforts to explain that this study was being carried out from the perspective of a researcher rather than a government official, but he failed to recruit any private estate residents via private management office staff.

After repeated attempts and failures, the researcher finally conducted focus groups and individual interviews with residents whom he himself met when he visited a private management office or who were introduced by an acquaintance of the researcher and who in turn introduced other residents. This work is summarised in Table 5.9. The researcher failed to recruit focus group participants living in Private Estate 2 adjacent to the Junggye 9 PRHE; but he did succeed in having an in-depth interview with a representative of the Private Estate 2 residents. In addition, one-to-one interviews with staff from the private estate management offices contributed to identifying outsiders' views on PRHEs and their residents.

Table 5.9 Number of interviews conducted with private estate residents

	Junggye 9 PRHE		Suseo 1 PRHE	
	Private Estate 1	Private Estate 2	Private Estate 1	Private Estate 2
Focus group	1(10females)	-	1(5 females)	1(4 females)
Individual interview	1 (male)	3 (2 females+1 male)	1(male)	3(2 males+1 female)

Note: figures in parentheses indicate the number and gender of focus group participants.

Following the above procedures, the first fieldwork was carried out in March 2013. A total of 52 persons took part in the research: seven focus groups and 16 in-depth individual interviews; six focus groups for the residents of the two PRHEs and one focus group for private estate residents living adjacent to the Junggye 9 PRHE; three individual interviews with two members of staff from PRHE management offices, two individual interviews for members of staff of welfare centres in the two PRHEs; four individual interviews with private estate residents and private estate management staff;

four individual interviews for the staff of local government front-line offices having jurisdiction over the areas including the two PRHEs; and two individual interviews with experts. The interviews were conducted at venues and times to suit the participants; offices, community rooms and sometimes a café were used; and the interviews were conducted regardless of how early it was in the morning, how late in the evening, or whether it was the weekend. All interviews except for one with a private estate resident were recorded, with the participants' consent, and field notes were taken at the same time. Individual interviews with PRHE management office staff, welfare centre staff, local government front-line officials and experts were conducted smoothly because the researcher obtained their consent to the interviews by phone or email before the field trip. As soon as the researcher arrived in Korea, he made calls to fix interview dates, times and places, and carried out interviews according to these schedules. Meanwhile, it took some time and effort to organise focus groups for PRHE residents. The heads of the two PRHE management offices introduced some residents whom they considered eligible when the researcher visited their PRHE. Most of these people were resident-representatives of the blocks they were living in. The researcher explained the background to the study, the detailed purpose of the interviews, and how the interviews would eventually be used by distributing participant information sheets and consent forms to them, along with requests for suggestions of other participants. In this process, the researcher made efforts to emphasise two points: one was to disabuse them of the idea that this study was part of government research, due to his position as a government official; the other was to get them to suggest and help recruit other participants with relatively long duration of residence, because the quantitative analysis on the 2011 KHS lacked a time dimension. The meetings of focus groups recruited via

this procedure mostly lasted for approximately one and one and half hours. To be a good moderator, the researcher made efforts to be a good listener rather than a good controller when discussion was taking place. The focus groups for private estate residents were not easy to conduct as described above. Through repeated attempts and failures, the researcher finally managed to meet some residents by chance and through the help of an acquaintance. When the researcher once again asked the head of the management office on the private estate near the Junggye 9 PRHE for referrals to his residents, someone who looked like a resident was listening to the conversation, and this person asked, what the research was about and why the researcher wanted to interview residents. This resident finally decided to participate in the research, provided the researcher did not record the interview electronically. The interview was recorded in the field notes and consisted of frank responses about PRHE residents. It was later found out that the resident was a representative of the private estate residents, and so the researcher asked this person to refer him to some residents, but the participant resolutely refused to do this. A focus group for other private estate residents living near the Junggye 9 PRHE was conducted with the help of the researcher's acquaintance. This person introduced the researcher to one person with experience of living on the private estate. This person, having a network of contacts among current private estate residents proposed other participants, so the researcher held a focus group composed of 10 persons. As a result, in terms of interviews with private estate residents, three individual interviews and one focus group were conducted in the case of the Junggye 9 PRHE in the first fieldwork period.

The second fieldwork was carried out in November 2013. After returning to the UK, the researcher reviewed and summarised all the interview records as well as making seven focus-group and 16 individual interview transcripts for further analysis⁴³. When analysing interviews, the researcher identified to some extent the existence of and causes of social exclusion on the PRHEs. In order to reassure himself on some potential conclusions, and to find out PRHE residents' opinions on them, the researcher realised the necessity of supplementary interviews. In addition, the researcher still had to conduct interviews with private estate residents living near the Suseo 1 PRHE, as he did not carry these out on the first field trip. Before flying back to Korea, the researcher contacted staff in the PRHE management offices again saying that he wanted to have individual interviews with some residents who took part in the focus groups because most of them did not give him any personal contact information. As a result, some residents were contacted by some members of staff and some were contacted by the researcher after arriving at the PRHE; but all of the residents to be re-interviewed were selected by the researcher. The most important private estate resident recruitment was done with the help of the researcher's acquaintance, making use of the experience of the first fieldwork trip. In particular, through the researcher's acquaintance, some private estate residents were made known before the researcher left the UK, and the researcher contacted these people as soon as he arrived in Korea, which led to two focus groups organised via them. In addition, 14 individual interviews were carried out: six re-interviews of PRHE residents; four impromptu walking or standing interviews with PRHE residents, in order to obtain new evidence; and four interviews with private management office staff and private estate residents. Through the second fieldwork, the

⁴³After consultation with the researcher's supervisors and academic advisors, transcripts were written down in Korean in order to catch meanings, intentions and nuance of verbal evidences more exactly. However, significant pieces of evidence that were inserted into thesis were done in English.

researcher finally conducted focus groups for private estate residents and had a chance to talk with some PRHE residents, which meant the researcher was able to reach some potential conclusions.

Observations and physical artefacts

During the period of the two field trips to the case-study PRHEs, observation also served as another source of evidence. In particular, as the research topic was fundamentally associated with neighbourhoods on public rental housing estates, observation was very useful in providing additional information about the research topic.

This has been described as follows:

Observations of a neighbourhood or of an organisational unit add new dimensions for understanding either the context or the phenomenon being studied. The observations can be so valuable that you may even consider taking photographs at the case study site (Yin 2009: 110).

Observations, which were accompanied by field notes and photographs, formed one of efforts to witness what PRHE residents did in particular, the routines, patterns of interactions in their everyday lives from a perspective of social exclusion in residential spaces (Darlington and Scott 2002). Neighbouring private estates were also objects of observations, not only in order to compare them with the PRHEs, particularly from the physical perspective, but also to get evidence illustrating the relationship between private estates and PRHEs. Thus, the researcher was able to verify the behaviours of PRHE resident and the events that many participants mentioned with his own eyes. In

addition, meaningful physical artefacts that gave the researcher insights into the relationships between PRHE residents and neighbouring private estate residents were identified. So, observations and physical artefacts played a significant role as sources of evidence.

5.4.3 Analytical strategy

Data deriving from interviews and observations were analysed on the basis of the methodological framework (see Figure 5.2). In particular, a thematic approach using operationalised versions of two concepts presented in the 2011 KHS analysis – that is, social exclusion on PRHEs and the characteristics of PRHEs – was taken in this analysis. Thematic analysis can be referred to the search for themes, which are abstract constructs that link not only expressions found in texts but also expressions found in images, sounds, and objects, in order to involve the fundamental concepts we are trying to describe – in fact, themes are referred to as ‘categories’, ‘codes’ or ‘labels’ and expressions are referred to as ‘incidents’, ‘segments’, ‘thematic units’ or ‘data-bits’ by some writers (Ryan and Bernard 2003: 87). No matter what they are called, it is most important that they be associated with the research questions or research focus (Bryman 2012). For a thematic approach on the basis of the research focus, the definitions of social exclusion on PRHEs and the characteristics of PRHEs and theories and models relating to the spatiality of social exclusion played a significant role as source of themes. In fact, although themes generally come from empirical data, the researcher’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomena also provided another source of themes (Strauss 1987; Ryan and Bernard 2003; Maxwell 2012). With this understanding, the

researcher established themes as shown in Table 5.10. After constructing the central themes using a theoretical approach, the researcher went through the process of familiarisation with the data – for example with the transcriptions of interviews. During this process, the researcher used Nvivo and Excel to help the researcher to look for emerging and relevant themes. This naturally led the researcher to decide which themes were important for this study. As a final stage, the researcher linked themes into theoretical models to explain the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs and the causes of social downgrading of PRHEs. Ultimately, this thematic analysis contributed to providing this research with epistemological considerations of interpretivism with qualitative data.

Table 5.10 The framework composed of central themes

Research focus	Central theme
Existence of social exclusion on PRHEs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evaluation of reputation of a PRHE ▪ Participation in society by PRHE residents ▪ Social relationship with PRHE resident and non-residents of a PRHE ▪ Desire to leave a PRHE
Causes of social exclusion on PRHEs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with a PRHE ▪ Concentration of disadvantaged groups ▪ Anti-social behaviour by PRHE residents ▪ Institutional factors such as allocation rules and maintenance

5.4.4 Ethical considerations

All social research involves some ethical considerations. This research involved such issues as informed consent, avoidance of harm to participants, privacy and

confidentiality (De Vaus 2001; McMillan and Weyers 2007; Bryman 2012). A full university ethical review was conducted before commencing fieldwork. Consideration was given to protecting PRHE residents' right to participate only following informed consent, and their right to confidentiality, anonymity and an absence of harm from both psychological and physical perspectives. Furthermore, in giving their opinions and feelings on PRHEs and their residents, neighbouring private estate residents, management office staff, welfare centre staff and local government front-line officials who were recruited for this study were also entitled to confidentiality, requests for their consent, and assurances of safety from both psychological and physical perspectives.

The next paragraph explains these ethical considerations in detail.

First of all, before information was collected, a process of introducing and explaining the study took place. The researcher explained the purpose of the study, the reasons for selecting people to be invited, the voluntary nature of participation, the procedure to be followed and the time the process would take; and he gave assurances of confidentiality, anonymity and avoidance of possible discomfort from the outcomes of the study to all participants before starting interviewing, using the participant information sheet (Faden et al. 1986; McMillan and Weyers 2007). In addition, consent forms, especially including approval of the use of electronic audio recording and interview comments, were filled in and signed by the interviewees. With regard to this, all participants provided the researcher with their written consent forms, but one participant's consent form was obtained on the condition that interviewing would not be recorded electronically. The participant, as a neighbouring private estate resident, seemed to feel

uncomfortable in speaking PRHE residents and did not want interview to be electronically recorded.

Except in the case of the participant, all interviews were recorded not only through field notes but also electronically. Israel and Hay (2006: 96) argue that social science research is generally more likely to involve psychological distress, discomfort, social disadvantage and invasion of privacy or infringement or rights than physical injury. In view of this, the researcher endeavoured to maintain the confidentiality of records and the identities of individuals. Furthermore, it was up to participants to decide whether they would give the researcher basic information on items such as age, occupation, education level and marital status. In the event, the researcher obtained basic information from PRHE residents (see Table 5.8). However, the researcher could not access to information from neighbouring private estate residents other than their gender and addresses (see Table 5.9). As with the participant who did not want to be recorded electronically, the researcher observed that most residents of neighbouring private estates tended to feel uncomfortable about saying what they had to say about the adjacent PRHEs and their residents, and said that they would never have participated in this research without the request of the person who had referred them. Another step taken to avoid harm to participants was to ensure that they had the right to decline to take part in the study and to terminate participation at any time before the completing of the thesis, without adverse consequences. As to the confidentiality of collected data, the information participants provided was kept strictly secret and only the researcher had access to the data. Electronic data were kept in encrypted files and paper-based data in a secure, locked location. Finally, respondents were assured that their identity would be

protected by the promise of anonymity. In particular, the confidentiality of focus group interviews was safeguarded by requiring members of the group to keep confidential the other members' identities. Furthermore, when findings were reported in any printed format, including the thesis, participants' identities were protected and were not to be identified or identifiable.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the research strategy regarding philosophical considerations, mixed methods research and the research's methodological framework. It has been argued that mixed methods research was chosen for accurate explanation of the factual circumstances surrounding social exclusion on PRHEs and the interpretive understanding of social exclusion on PRHEs. The secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set was chosen for a quantitative approach as the first method, but the second priority; the case studies were chosen for a qualitative approach as the second one, but first priority. The analytical strategy of using the 2011 KHS data set has been explained with the limitations of using this data set, and the two-case studies – the Junggye 9 PRHE and the Suseo 1 PRHE – has been presented with explanations of the selection of critical cases and thematic analysis of the data collected through interviewing and observation, along with ethical considerations. The following chapters will present the results of secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set, and of the case studies.

CHAPTER 6

THE 2011 KOREAN HOUSING SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING

6.1 Introduction


It is the aim of this chapter to explore the characteristics of PRHEs in Korea on the basis of the 2011 KHS data set, according to three perspectives derived from explanatory factors for social downgrading of social housing estates in the West. As reviewed in Chapter 3, the social downgrading of social housing estates in the West has resulted from three main factors: physical obsolescence; a concentration of disadvantaged groups; and allocation rules giving priority to the disadvantaged, or a lack of control over, or investment in, the composition of the estates (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). This chapter will look at the characteristics of PRHEs from three perspectives: physical, demographic and institutional. Consequently, it draws on indicators of the characteristics of a PRH available in the 2011 KHS data set, which also include indicators of the social exclusion of a PRHE, because these indicators are made up of various items from among the indicators of characteristics of a PRHE (see Table 5.4).

6.2 Physical characteristics of PRH

6.2.1 Regional distribution and year of construction


Around significant proportion of public rental housing was located in *Sudogwon* (the capital region of Korea) as of 2011 (see Table 4.8). The distribution of PRH is very closely linked to that of the population. As discussed in Chapter 4, the progress of industrialisation and urbanisation that began in the late 1960s in Korea led to the growth of cities and population concentration in the capital region, with its unprecedented economic growth (see Figure 4.7 and Table 4.4). According to the 2011 KHS data set, PRH samples of this survey were extracted by stratified systematic sampling were intensively distributed in *Sudogwon*, as shown in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 Regional distribution of PRH in the 2011 KHS



In relation to construction year of PRH, as a PR programme, as the first PRH in a true sense, was launched in 1989, and 88.4 per cent of PRH has been built since 1990 (see Figure 6.2). In the 1990s, prominent kinds of PRH were PR and 50R. However, after 2000, 30R and 5R were the prominent kind of buildings, and construction of PR disappeared. This corresponded with the development of a PRH programme by the Korean government as discussed in Chapter 4. Financial subsidies for PR construction (85 per cent of construction cost) from the government stopped in 1992 due to budgeting pressure, and 50R, which was designed to replace PR, was scarcely built after the late 1990s because of heavy financial burden (MLTM 2010). Since then, as 30R was newly designed by the Kim government in 1998 and the plan to build one million 30R units between 2003 and 2012 was implemented by the succeeding Rho government, 30R has been the predominant kind of PRH built. In addition, 5R, constructed by private companies with loans from the NHF, has emerged as the dominant kind of PRH (Ha 2008).

Figure 6.2 Construction year of PRH in the 2011 KHS



6.2.2 Building style

All PRH was built using industrial methods, with concrete and concrete panels as the main medium. As Power (1997) indicates, these building methods enabled replication on a large scale, leading to the mass supply of PRH in a short time and to a decrease in unit costs as each block was added. However, this form of housing unit also has some unattractive aspects such as quick transformation from its early gleaming white, and staining and streaking caused by rain and air pollution caused (*ibid*)

Another outstanding feature of PRH is a particular type of housing unit. All PRH units on estates take the form of flats in high-rise buildings (5⁺ storeys, normally called ‘apartments’ in Korea, Figure 6.3) or rarely in low-rise buildings (4⁻ storeys, normally called ‘row houses’ in Korea, Figure 4.11).

Figure 6.3 Apartment type of PRH




Source: Author's visit, 2013

According to the 2011 KHS data set, 99.5 per cent of PRH units were apartments and the remainder were row houses. Apartment living is very popular, regardless of tenure, in contemporary Korea and more than half of all housing units are apartments as of 2010 (see Chapter 4). As urbanisation accelerated after the late 1960s, leading to an increase in nuclear family living and in the number of households, apartment units have become the easiest type of housing unit to satisfy mass demand in a short time, and the convenience of apartment living and the asset base of family centred welfare in era of developmentalism brought an apartment boom to the Korean housing market (NGII 2010; Ronald and Doling 2012). Reflecting changes in the type of residential dwelling and the popular perception of mass housing, most PRH units have been built as apartments. On the other hand, as people in Korea prefer to reside in apartment estates composed of similar sized units (NGII 2010; MLTM 2012b), with the same type of tenure, communities based on residential areas of apartments are claimed to be closed and exclusive (Jun 2009). People have been not been interested in getting along with people living outside their apartment estates, and they have tended to think that it is desirable for similar income groups to live in the same neighbourhood (Ha 2008).

Housing size is directly linked with the market price of dwellings, and ultimately dictates the degree of comfort of residences. In PRH, differences in housing size dictate the rents to be paid. According to the 2011 KHS, PR, 50R and 30R almost all have housing size equal to or less than 60 m², as shown in Figure 6.4. On the other hand, among 20R, 10R and 5R, a considerable proportion of each unit had larger housing sizes between 60.01 m² and 149 m², though some of these dwellings had housing size equal to or less than 60 m².

Figure 6.4 Housing size of PRH in the 2011 KHS



These results corresponded to the classification of PRH by the Road Map for Housing Welfare (RMHW) (see Table 4.9). That is, the smallest, cheapest and longest-term rental units, such as PR or 50R, are targeted at the lowest-income bracket; the next smallest and cheapest and longest-term rental units of 30R are targeted at the next lowest-income bracket, and the other kinds of PRH, such as 20R, 10R and 5R, are designed for other low-income households who do not own houses but have saved a certain amount of Housing Subscription Saving Deposit (HSSD). PRH with smaller housing sizes, such as PR and 50R, has accommodated the lowest-income households.

6.2.3 Residential satisfaction and physical conditions

The quality of housing stock and the design of an estate are considered to be important factors for explaining the decline of a neighbourhood (Power 1997; Van Beckhoven et


al. 2009). The physical deterioration of large housing estates may lead to letting difficulties, which can cause a concentration of households with least choice, creating the image of a last resort for vulnerable people (Power 1997; Taylor 1998)

The 2011 KHS captured satisfaction levels with PRH and PRHE environments under the item ‘living conditions’ (see Table 5.3), and in addition, it questioned households about the physical conditions of PRH. Consequently, analysing the survey results contributed to helping the researcher explore the quality of PRH and the design of estates. Firstly, regarding satisfaction with the housing itself, the survey investigated various items such as housing size, the number, size and layout of rooms, ventilation and amount of daylight, heating, soundproofing and state of repair, as shown in Figure 6.5. PR and 50R were mainly designed as small, low-rent units of accommodation, and households living in these kinds of PRH showed dissatisfaction regarding the size of their accommodation, and the number, size and layout of the rooms, though scarcely any difference was noticeable in other items related to their homes. Interestingly, the item of soundproofing related to noises from outside and between floors, came lowest on the scale, regardless of the kind of PRH.

When questioned about overall satisfaction with PRH itself, more than 80 per cent of interviewees living in each kind of PRH answered that they were very satisfied or mostly satisfied. In particular, satisfaction with 20R, which began to be constructed from the mid-2000s, was the highest, with 94.8 per cent of households living in 20R saying they were satisfied or mostly satisfied. On the other hand, households living in 50R showed the highest dissatisfaction, with 16.6 per cent of them answering that they


Figure 6.5 Satisfaction with PRH in the 2011 KHS

(4-level scale: 1 very dissatisfied, 2 a little dissatisfied, 3 mostly satisfied, 4 very satisfied)



were very dissatisfied or a little dissatisfied, followed by PR households, of whom 15.8 per cent reported that they were dissatisfied, as shown in Figure 6.6. This trend can be explained by linking with the construction year of PRH, as shown in Figure 6.2. Construction of PR, 50R, 10R and 5R started in the late 1980s or the early 1990s; and 30R and 20R were public rental housing programmes started in the late 1990s and the mid-2000s respectively.


Figure 6.6 Overall dissatisfaction with PRH in the 2011 KHS



With regard to satisfaction with the environments of PRHEs, the survey also investigated a variety of items such as accessibility to markets (M), medical facilities (MF), cultural facilities (CF), public transport (PT), parking facilities (PF), and commuting time (CT), education (E), security (S), noise (N), cleanliness (C), relationships with neighbours (RN), privacy (P), safety from disaster (SD), condition of facilities in PRHE (CP) and external appearance of blocks (EB), as shown in Figure 6.7. As discussed in Chapter 3, a majority of post-WWII large-scale housing estates in the West were located in green-field sites separated from the city, in the hope of saving money and avoiding many urban restrictions (Power 1997: 57). Subsequently, these locations caused problems of accessibility leading to feelings of isolation (Dekker and Van Kempen 2005: 20). As shown in survey items related to accessibility, such as M,

Figure 6.7 Satisfaction with the PRHE environments in the 2011 KHS

(4-level scale: 1 very dissatisfied, 2 a little dissatisfied, 3 mostly satisfied, 4 very satisfied)




MF, CF, PT and CT, the PR and 50R, aimed at people in the lowest-income bracket, got higher scores than the other kinds of PRH. From their inception, estates composed of PR or 50R were developed away from city centres, on the fringes of cities, as in Western countries. However, the urban sprawl that developed from the late 1960s, and continuous (re)development projects have transformed green areas into urban areas (see Figures 4.7 and 4.9).

Regarding environmental items such as security, noise, cleanliness, relationships with neighbours, privacy, condition of facilities in PRHE and exterior appearance of blocks,

other kinds of PRH except PR and 50R had higher points relatively. In addition, in terms of overall satisfaction with the environment of PRHEs, households living in PR and 50R tended to express high dissatisfaction with households of 10R and 5R as shown in Figure 6.8.


Figure 6.8 Overall dissatisfaction with the PRHE environments in the 2011 KHS



The survey questioned households living in PRH about physical conditions inside, such as floors, walls and ceilings, water supply and drains, kitchen and bathroom furnishings, including sinks, taps, toilets, showers and bathtubs, electricity and lightening, damp penetration, and windows and doors, as illustrated in Figure 6.9. Physical conditions in 30R and 20R in all items except damp penetration were assessed to be good. It is the case that 30R and 20R went into production later than other kinds of PRH, and these results can be considered as related to that.

Figure 6.9 Physical conditions of PRH in the 2011 KHS

(4-level scale: 1 very bad, 2 not very good, 3 mostly good, 4 very good)



To summarise the results analysed so far regarding the physical characteristics of PRH, around 40 per cent of the total PRH units were located in the capital region, and PR and 50R, were constructed from the late 1980s on, followed by 5R, 10R, 30R and 20R. Most PRH was built with industrial methods reminiscent of the high-rise buildings provided for mass housing the 1960s and 1970s in the West. Longer-term public rental units had relatively small sized housing; but households living in PR and 50R tended to show lower levels of satisfaction with their houses and with their PRHE, except as regarded accessibility. In terms of the physical conditions of PRH, 30R and 20R, which were constructed later than other kinds of PRH, were seen as good. However, levels of dissatisfaction with PRH and PRHE environments are generally low so the physical factors such as structure quality and design of dwellings, and living conditions are less of an explanation of the decline.

6.3 Demographic characteristics of PRH

6.3.1 Tenure trajectory

According to the 2011 KHS, around 90 per cent of households living in PRH resided in rented housing before living in PRH. Moreover, around 90 per cent of those households rented their accommodation from the private sector. Consequently, most PRH households have experienced living in PRH for the first time in their lives. With regard to the experience of having their own house, 80 per cent of households never had owned their houses in their lives⁴⁴. Considering that the ratio of home ownership in Korea was approximately in the mid-50 per cent in recent decades (see Table 4.6), the ratio of PRH household with no experience of home ownership was relatively high.

The 2011 KHS investigated the tenures of the previous housing, and it was found that the longer term PRH households, especially PR households, tended to have had more experience of living in housing with marginalised tenures such as *Sagulse*, daily rent and rent-free, as shown in Table 6.1. With regard to tenure of PRH, there were different forms of this, such as *Chonsei*, monthly rent with deposit, monthly rent without deposit, *Sagulse*⁴⁵, daily rent, and rent-free. It was found that 86.7 per cent of PRH households had a type of monthly rent with deposit, whilst 12.2 per cent of them had *Chonsei* tenancies, followed by monthly rent without deposit tenancies and rent-free tenancies. The lowest type of tenure was *Sagulse*.

⁴⁴ When applying for PRH, applicants should not own their own homes. And if PRH households do own homes, they have to move out of PRH.

⁴⁵ One payment of the total monthly rent for a certain period, deducting it every month

Table 6.1 The tenures of the previous housing of PRH households in the 2011 KHS

(% of surveyed households according to kind of PRH)

PRH households	Rent-free	Daily rent	Sagulse	Monthly rent	Chonsei	Owner-occupied
PR	10.4	0.2	18.9	49.9	16.2	4.4
50R	6.8	0.1	5.1	40.8	40.2	6.9
30R	9.3	0.1	6.4	45.4	32.0	6.8
20R	2.5	0.0	0.0	7.7	88.6	1.1
10R	8.1	0.0	1.9	18.0	47.3	24.7
5R	8.4	0.0	1.6	19.6	47.2	23.1

6.3.2 Age and duration of residence

The demographic structure of the estates needed to be examined in relation to the factor of time. In post-WWII large-scale housing estates in the West, some of the problems are associated with an overrepresentation of the elderly or an ageing cohort of residents (Murie et al. 2003; Dekker and Van Kempen 2005). In this respect, Murie et al. state:


“The lack of opportunity (or desire) to move may mean that estates move through a series of ‘life cycle’ stages: an initial phase with younger family; a phase with greater overcrowding and adult households; and a phase of declining population and economic activity..... Later phases maybe associated with sharing of accommodation as sons and daughters find it difficult to obtain independent accommodation.” (2003: 28-9)

According to the 2011 KHS, the median age of PRH householders was 52 years, which was higher than that of householders as a whole (49 years) according to the 2010

Census. In addition, 25.9 per cent of all householders in the country were female; meanwhile, 32.9 per cent of PRH householders were females. Consequently, the elderly, or women, who are believed to be relatively vulnerable in terms of economic activity, tended to be overrepresented among PRH householders compared to the gender and age of householders as a whole.


Looking at the age of householders in relation to the different kinds of PRH, some significant results emerged. As shown in Figure 6.10, the age of householders living in PR and 50R – housing targeted at people in the lowest-income bracket – exceeded not only that of all householders in the 2010 Census but also that of all PRH householders in the 2011 KHS. Thus the elderly can be considered to be overrepresented on PRHEs composed of PR or of 50R, compared to PRHEs composed of other kinds of PRH.

Figure 6.10 Median age of PRH householders in the 2011 KHS



With regard to the gender of PRH householders in all the kinds of PRH, interesting results were found, as shown in Figure 6.11. Namely, female householders made up a significant proportion of households living in PR or 50R. In particular, more than 50 per cent of PR householders were female. Consequently, the elderly or women, who had a high possibility of being excluded from the labour market, accounted for a quite a significant proportion of the householders living in PR or 50R.

Figure 6.11 Gender of PRH householders in the 2011 KHS




In addition, the result of analysing age of PRH householders according to working age (19-60) was that the heads of household referred to as being of working age took up 86.3 per cent of 20R households, 84.3 per cent of 10R households, 83.6 per cent of 5R, 70.9 per cent of 30R, 61.3 per cent of 50R and 37.2 per cent of PR. Particularly, householders who were no longer of working age were more than 60 years old in all

PRH households except PR households. In PR households, there were two non-working age groups of householders; one was more than 60 year old group; and the other was a less than 19-year-old group, though this was a very small ratio (0.02 per cent).

Analysing duration of residence for PRH households is very meaningful with regard to the ‘life-cycle stage’ proposed by Murie et al. (2003). A long stay in PRH may mean entering into an environment of ageing citizens and declining economic activity, with a lack of opportunity to move out. Investigation of the average duration of residence in relation to the different kinds of PRH shows that the overall average duration of residence was around six years. However, as shown in Figure 6.12, there was a significant difference depending on the kind of PRH. Households living in PR and 50R tended to stay longer than households living in other kinds of PRH. In particular, duration of residence for households living in PR was the longest, at around 12 years. Linking duration of residence with age of householders, households living in PR or 50R were led by the older heads and stayed for longer periods compared to households living in other kinds of PRH. Thus, these results can be explained as a life cycle stage caused by a lack of opportunity. These people initially moved into the estates of PR or 50R as younger families, but with almost no chance or hope of moving out voluntarily or involuntarily; they grew old in their accommodations. Moreover, these results are highly likely to be reinforced by the PRH policy discussed in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.9), where kinds of PRH are stratified according to the income levels of households and PRH with lower rent is allocated to eligible tenants below a specific income level with other social disadvantages. Thus, the households in PR or 50R may stay longer in the units designed for them unless they take an obvious opportunity to improve their life.


Figure 6.12 Average duration of residence for PRH households in the 2011 KHS



6.3.3 Household size and existence of spouse

According to the 2010 Census, the average household size in Korea was 2.69 persons (KNSO 2011). Before 1990, the predominant type of household was five-person or more, or four-person household. However, in 2010, the two-person or one-person household became the main type, as shown in Figure 6.13. With regard to the average household size for those living in PRH, on the basis of the 2011 KHS, this was 2.63 persons, which was similar to that for Korea as a whole. However, the average household size in relation to the different kinds of PRH showed significant differences, as seen in Table 6.2. In PR households or 50R households, the household size was well below or nearly equivalent to the overall average household size; but the other kinds of PRH households, such as those in 30R, 20R, 10R and 5R had a higher average size than the one for Korea as a whole.

Figure 6.13 Size of households in Korea 1980 – 2010



Source: Korea National Statistical Office, www.kostat.go.kr

Table 6.2 Average household size in the 2011 KHS


(persons)

PR	50R	30R	20R	10R	5R
1.84	2.65	2.76	4.04	3.20	3.10

This trend can be explained by PRH policy within which the longer term PRH for lower-income households is designed with smaller housing size (see Table 4.9). In addition, considering that the average age of householders living in PR or 50R and the duration of residence for PR or 50R households were higher than those for other kinds of PRH households, households living in PR or 50R can be interpreted as being composed of elderly people excluded from the labour force without children to support.


In particular, PR households presented this typical feature (see Figure 6.14). So, these households can be considered as being in ‘a phase of declining population and economic activity’ after moving through ‘a phase with greater overcrowding and adult households’, according to the life-cycle stages suggested by Murie et al. (2003: 28).

Figure 6.14 PR household size in the 2011 KHS



In addition, PR and 50R households showed a difference from those in other kinds of PRH in terms of marital status. Of PR households, 74.8 per cent had no spouse, and this was the case for 40.6 per cent of 50R householders, whereas the numbers of householders with no spouse for other kinds of PRH were 37.6 per cent for 30R, 8.5 per cent for 20R, 18.9 per cent for 10R, and 21.0 per cent for 5R. Looking at the gender of PRH householders without a spouse, the ratio of female householders was high in all PRH except 20R households, as shown in Figure 6.15. It was found that those female householders supported their family themselves, as single parents or single households.

Figure 6.15 Gender of PRH householders without a spouse in the 2011 KHS



6.3.4 Socio-economic features

Problematic estates have been disproportionately occupied by those with the least choice, and the inhabitants of these estates may be expected to experience the effects of derogatory labelling, leading to social exclusion (Taylor 1998; Murie et al. 2003). This has usually meant the lowest incomes and greatest benefit dependency, revealing increasing polarisation between these estates and the rest of society in terms of unemployment, economic inactivity, and low school achievement (*ibid*).

Unemployment

Analysis of unemployment of PRH householders in the 2011 KHS showed that the situation in PR households was very significant – with 79.6 per cent of the householders

being unemployed. The percentage of 50R and 30R householders who were unemployed was also relatively high compared to that of householders living in 20R, 10R or 5R, as shown in Table 6.3. These results could be expected according to allocation rules for PRH (see Table 4.9). In particular, since PR has been allocated to eligible tenants below a specific income level with some marginalised features such as being in receipt of benefits and having a disability, the high unemployment ratio of PR householders in the 2011 KHS was acceptable.

Table 6.3 Percentage of householders unemployed in the 2011 KHS

PR	50R	30R	20R	10R	5R
79.6	39.1	32.8	16.1	16.9	16.2


Furthermore, analysis of the occupations of PRH householders who answered that they were employed showed that 75.3 per cent of householders living in PR were in low-skilled work such as manual labour on construction sites. The percentage of low-skilled workers among employed 50R and 30R householders – 46.5 per cent and 41.5 per cent respectively – was relatively high compared to that among employed householders living in 20R, 10R and 5R – 13.3 per cent, 25.1 per cent and 30.8 per cent respectively. This result shows a similar tendency to that of unemployed householders living in the different kinds of PRH.

Educational level

Since the development of Korea into an industrialised country in the twentieth century, education has grown explosively, and almost all of the quantitative growth in the areas

of student population, schools and school staff has been led by the needs of an increasing population (NGII 2010: 313). According to the 2010 Census, 35.0 per cent of the population of Korea had been educated to the point where they completed high school, and 27.7 per cent of the population had completed college or studied to a higher level (KNSO 2011). The proportion of those only completing primary school or not even that was 25.1 per cent; and 12.1 per cent of the population had been educated to the point where they completed middle school. With regard to the education level of PRH householders, Figure 6.16 shows that householders living in PR had the lowest educational level among all PRH householders.

Figure 6.16 Educational levels of PRH householders in the 2011 KHS



Around 80 per cent of PR householders had only completed middle school or below that level; and around 60 per cent of them had only completed primary school or below that

level; while, the proportion of householders who had completed high school or were educated to a higher level was only around 19 per cent. Householders living in 50R or 30R also had relatively low education levels compared to the levels achieved by householders living in other kinds of PRH, that is, 44.2 per cent of 50R householders and 32 per cent of 30R householders had been educated to the end of middle school or below, respectively. This result showed a trend similar to that of the unemployment rate for householders and the percentage of low-skilled workers among employed householders living in the various kinds of PRH. Thus, householders living in PR and 50R showed the highest rate of unemployment and the lowest level of education.

Disability

One of the key groups most likely to be regarded as excluded from economic activity is the disabled. According to the 2011 KHS, 38.7 per cent of PR households had more than one member with a disability, as shown below (Table 6.4). This result was also understandable since PR allocation rules give priority to marginalised groups, including disabled people (see Table 4.9). Households living in 50R or 30R also had a relatively high number of disabled household members compared to households living in other kinds of PRH.


Table 6.4 Percentage of households with disabled members in the 2011 KHS

PR	50R	30R	20R	10R	5R
38.7	13.1	13.2	9.2	4.1	4.9

Monthly income and benefit dependency

Households living in PR with the trend shown in unemployment, low-skilled work, low-educational level and disability had the lowest median monthly income and the highest benefit ratio among PRH households, according to the 2011 KHS. The income, after paying tax, for PR households was 500,000 won (£280.88), that of 50R households was 1,500,000 won (£842.60), and that for 30R households was 1,600,000 won (£898.78). Meanwhile, the median incomes for those living in 20R, 10R or 5R were 2,800,000 won (£1,572.86), 2,500,000 won (£1,404.34) and 2,500,000 won (£1,404.34) respectively⁴⁶. Looking at the distribution of income according to type of PRH household, on the basis of deciles, as presented in an earlier section, groups in the decile 1-2, which is the lowest-income bracket, were the most likely to reside in PR, as shown in Figure 6.17.

Figure 6.17 Distribution of monthly income in deciles in the 2011 KHS



⁴⁶ The national average monthly income per household in South Korea in 2011 was 3,638,424 won (£2,043.83) and that of PRH households was 1,696,600 won (£953.04)

With regard to benefit dependency, households living in PR included the highest group receiving national benefits, as shown in Table 6.5. That is, 80.9 per cent of PR households were in receipt of national benefits, and households living in 50R or 30R also had a relatively high proportion of people on national benefits, compared to households living in other kinds of PRH - 44.1 per cent of 50R households and 32.1 per cent of 30R households.

Table 6.5 Percentage of households receiving national benefits in the 2011 KHS

PR	50R	30R	20R	10R	5R
80.9	44.1	32.1	10.9	14.4	15.5

To summarise the results analysed so far regarding the demographic characteristics of PRH, 80 per cent of households living in PRH had never owned their own home in their lives. The median age of PRH householders was 52 years, which was higher than the median age of all householders in Korea according to the 2010 Census. In addition, the percentage of female householders on PRHEs was relatively high compared to the national percentage. With regard to average duration of tenure and household size, there were significant differences among the kinds of PRH. Namely, households living in PR and 50R mainly had longer tenancies and smaller household sizes than households living in 30R, 20R, 10R and 5R. When it came to older PRH householders, estates composed of PR or 50R could be in a phase of declining population and economic activity in terms of their life-cycle stage. Furthermore, analysis of the socio-economic features of households dependent on the various kinds of PRH showed explicit differences between households living in PR or 50R and households living in 20R, 10R

or 5R. The former had higher unemployment, higher levels of employment in low-skilled work, and lower educational levels than the latter. Consequently, the concentration of disadvantaged people was very noticeable in longer term PRH, in particular PR. The concentration could be caused and reinforced by PRH policy where PRH with guaranteed lower rent and longer residence is allocated to tenants below a specific income level, who also have some disadvantages (see Chapter 4).

6.4 Institutional characteristics of PRH

6.4.1 Letting

With regard to the rules governing allocation for PRH, these are included in the Rules on Housing Supply (RHS), which are set by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport according to the Housing Act; and PRH providers choose their tenants according to the RHS (see Table 4.9). PRH such as 20R, 10R, and 5R is basically supplied to householders who do not have their own home and who have HSSD. Householders who can apply for 30R do not have their own home and have an average monthly household income lower than the national average. However, a fixed quantity of the types of PRH mentioned so far is allocated to special groups, such as the disabled, veterans or certified patriots, households with three or more children, newlyweds, and so on, for social purposes. PR is supplied to those groups who are most likely to be vulnerable in Korean society, such as benefit recipients, lone parents, the disabled, people displaced from urban redevelopment project, North Korean refugees, and so on.

When looking at the 2011 KHS to investigate which types of residents depended on which kinds of PRH, the predominant type of resident on PR was found to be a recipient of basic national benefits. The number of PR households entitled to a dwelling on this basis was 74.6 per cent. Other types of residents were subscribers with HSSD but without their own home, the disabled, veterans or certified patriots, North Korean refugees and so on. In the case of 30R, householders who did not have their own home and had a lower monthly household income than the national average made up 78.9 per cent of 30R households, and other types were discovered to be the disabled, newlyweds, veterans or certified patriots, households with three or more children, and so on. Of 20R households, 62.1 per cent were found to be subscribers with HSSD but without their own home and these were the dominant type of resident. Other types were newlyweds, people aged 65 and over, households with three or more children, the disabled, veterans or certified patriots, and so on. In the cases of 50R, 10R, and 5R, the predominant type of household had HSSD but did not have their own home, and other types of resident were ones whose need to reside in PRH was acknowledged by the government, such as newlyweds, veterans or certified patriots, and so on. Consequently, when considering the predominant resident types among each PRH, PRHEs composed of PR are highly likely to the marginalised poor section of the population in Korea, corresponding to demographic features of PR households discussed above.

With regard to the rent payable, residents had different forms of tenure depending on the kind of PRH. Households living in PR, 50R or 30R mainly paid monthly rent, whereas in 20R most households had a form of *Chonsei* and in 10R or 5R, households mainly had a form of monthly rent with a deposit, or *Chonsei*. Table 6.6 shows median

amounts of rent depending on different forms of tenure based on different kinds of PRH. PR and 50R, which are designed for lower-income people, had relatively low rents compared to other kinds of PRH such as 30R, 20R, 10R and 5R.


Table 6.6 Rents on PRH in the 2011 KHS

Tenure & Rent PRH \ Chonsei	Monthly rent with deposit			Monthly rent without deposit
	only deposit	monthly rent	deposit	only monthly rent
PR	7,000,000 won (£3,933)	40,000 won (£22)	2,000,000 won (£1,124)	60,000 won (£34)
50R	30,000,000 won (£16,854)	130,000 won (£73)	12,000,000 won (£6,742)	110,000 won (£62)
30R	64,000,000 won (£35,955)	110,000 won (£62)	17,000,000 won (£9,551)	110,000 won (£62)
20R	110,000,000 won (£61,798)	240,000 won (£135)	40,000,000 won (£22,472)	-
10R	52,000,000 won (£29,213)	130,000 won (£73)	47,000,000 won (£26,404)	210,000 won (£118)
5R	44,700,000 won (£25,112)	150,000 won (£84)	40,000,000 won (£22,472)	210,000 won (£118)

When there are vacancies in PRH, the providers circulate details to potential residents on the basis of the allocation rules. According to the work of Power (1997), letting difficulties caused by physical deterioration in post-WWII social housing estates can lead to more tendency being accepted by vulnerable households, which in turn may produce seriously negative images of the estates. In an indirect attempt to estimate letting difficulties in PRH, analysis was carried out of the average waiting time for a PRH tenancy after application was made. If the waiting time was long, this might mean that there were excessive demands for a PRH tenancy, and there was relatively little

likelihood that letting difficulties would occur. Figure 6.18 shows the average waiting time, depending on the kinds of PRH, according to the 2011 KHS. The average time PRH households waited for a tenancy was 9.8 months. It should be noted that the waiting time for PR or 50R households was higher than the overall one, and moreover was much higher than that for 30R, 20R or 5R households. So, it could be estimated that the demand for PR or 50R was greater than that for other kinds of PRH. Thus, it could be assumed that the possibility of letting difficulties, through which physical obsolescence on social housing estates in the West has been channelled into social downgrading, was relatively lower in PR or 50R estates than that in other kinds of PRH estates.

Figure 6.18 Average waiting time of PRH in the 2011 KHS



6.4.2 Delivery of management

The delivery of PRH management can be classified into two types. One is a type of direct management by the PRH provider as landlord; and the other is a type of indirect management by a third party. PRH in Korea is defined as housing provided by the public sector or the private sector with governmental support in the form of, for example, financial subsidy, land, or loans from the NHF. PRH providers as landlords can be local governments, public corporations or private construction companies. Third parties put in charge of the management by PRH providers can also be classified into two types of organisation: public management corporations and private management companies. According to the 2011 KHS, 78.6 per cent of PRH was managed by third parties; meanwhile, the remainder was directly managed by PRH providers, as shown in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7 Management type of PRH in the 2011 KHS


(%)

Indirect management by third parties	Direct management by PRH providers
78.6	21.4

Management by third parties in the social rented sector, in particular non-profit housing associations, is expected to contribute to adapting housing services to the preferences of the households in an entrepreneurial manner (Priemus et al. 1999; Oxley 2000). However, it has been also argued that ineffective supervision and control on non-profit organisations can affect future investment levels and affordability in the social rented

sector (Boelhouwer 1999). Figure 6.19 shows types of management delivery in relation to the different kinds of PRH in the 2011 KHS, with a tendency for higher proportion of indirect management in the case of relatively longer term PRH such as PR, 50R, 30R and 20R. However, with only these results, it is not possible to identify whether the type of management delivery influences maintenance quality which can lead to social exclusion on social housing estates. The next section, which deals with satisfaction with maintenance services in PRH, may contribute some clues as to the answer to this question.

Figure 6.19 Management type of PRH in the 2011 KHS




6.4.3 Maintenance

The 2011 KHS questioned households living in PRH about maintenance services, for example about the kindness of staff (KS), cooperation with residents' organisations

(CO), managements' ability to control residents' behaviour (MB), acceptance of rises in maintenance fee (AM), quality of maintenance in relation to maintenance fees (QM), transparent administration (TA), efforts to reduce maintenance fees (MF), caretaking (C), cleaning and environmental maintenance (CE), control of anti-social behaviour (CA), repair results (RR), speed of repair call-outs (SR), and overall satisfaction with maintenance services. On a four-level scale, on which the higher the level, the higher the satisfaction with an item, as shown in Figure 6.20, a different tendency was presented for each item. Although 30R had a tendency to show higher satisfaction in many items, it was hard to discover meaningful results among other kinds of PRH.

Figure 6.20 Satisfaction with maintenance services in the 2011 KHS


(4-level scale: 1 very dissatisfied, 2 a little dissatisfied, 3 mostly satisfied, 4 very satisfied)



Consequently, the researcher paid attention to the item of overall satisfaction with maintenance services in order to find out the general tendency. These are provided in Figure 6.21.

Figure 6.21 Overall satisfaction with maintenance services in the 2011 KHS

(4-level scale: 1 very dissatisfied, 2 a little dissatisfied, 3 mostly satisfied, 4 very satisfied)



Except for 30R, the level of overall satisfaction is so similar that maintenance quality is less of explanation of the decline on PRHEs. In particular, PR or 50R estate with the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged people and the oldest construction year did not show themselves to be any different from estates composed of other kinds of PRH in terms of satisfaction with maintenance services. Furthermore, The satisfaction level for 10R, which had a tendency of direct management, was higher than that for 20R with indirect management (see Figure 6.19) but lower than that for 30R with a tendency towards indirect management. Thus, it is very hard to argue that the type of management delivery influences maintenance quality.

To summarise the results analysed so far regarding the institutional characteristics of PRH, all PRH was let to householders without their own home. However, PR was occupied mainly by benefit recipients, leading to a higher possibility of demonstrating a concentration of the marginalised section of the population of Korea. Although rent was different depending on types of tenure, PR and 50R, which were targeted at people in the lowest-income bracket, had cheaper rents. With regard to maintenance, difference in overall satisfaction level among PRH types was not noticeable. As a result, the role of maintenance in the causation of the decline of PRHEs was identified not to be important, and the type of management delivery was also not an influential factor in maintenance quality.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has identified the physical, demographic and institutional characteristics of PRH or PRHEs through the 2011 KHS data set. As a result, it was shown that some of these features might explain the social downgrading of social housing estates, as indicated in the literature – apartment blocks built with industrial methods, households with socio-economic disadvantages and allocation rules oriented towards them. In particular, PRH with longer-term rental period such PR and 50R had those characteristics embedded in them.

CHAPTER 7

THE CASE STUDIES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at two case-study Public Rental Estates (PRHEs) composed of Permanent Rental-housing (PR): the Junggye 9 PRHE and the Suseo 1 PRHE in Seoul. As the second phase of our exploration of social exclusion on PRHEs, the focus is on establishing evidence relating to the existence and causes of social exclusion using a qualitative approach.

With this purpose in mind, exploration of each case-study estate begins with an outline of the estate. The physical, demographic and institutional characteristics of the estate are then presented on the basis of the theoretical framework (see Figure 3.2) to explain the social decline of social housing estates. Finally, the results of interviews with PRHE residents, private estate residents living near the PRHE, management office staff, community welfare centre staff and local government front-line officials, and observations of the PRHE will be presented on the basis of the thematic approach formulated in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.10).

7.2 The Junggye 9 PRHE

7.2.1 An outline of the Junggye 9 PRHE

The Junggye 9 PRHE is located in *Nowon-gu*, which is one of the 25 *gus* of Seoul Metropolitan City, as shown in Figure 5.3. *Nowon-gu* is known as a district with many PRHEs, very much like *Gangseo-gu* and *Gangnam-gu* (MW and KOCER 2003; Kim 2007). The Junggye 9 PRHE is situated in the traditional but run-down *Gangbuk* area, with a relatively inferior environment and conditions compared to the *Gangnam* area (the location of case study 2) (see Chapter 3). The estate was constructed in 1992 by the Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC) – now, the Korean Land and Housing Corporation (LH). It is managed not by the LH as the landlord and PRH provider, but by the Korea Housing Management Corporation (KOHOM) as a third party, which is a public management corporation and affiliated company of LH (KOHOM 2013b).


The estate was built using industrialised methods and incorporated concrete and concrete panels, similar to post-WWII social housing estates in the West. It is commonly called the 9-Estate by local people, as the number of each block in the estate starts with 9, such as the 901 block, the 902 block, and so on. It covers 62,190m² and the total housing floor size is 110,301.36 m². It consists of 2,634 PRH units, where a total of 5,861 persons reside as of March 2013. It is adjacent to private estates composed of apartments similar to the estate's building style, and there are public facilities around the estate, including a police station, schools, a supermarket and a metro station.

7.2.2 Characteristics of the Junggye 9 PRHE

Physical characteristics


As shown in Figure 7.1, when walking along the main access road located in the southwest of the estate, one passes a building with stores, a community building for residents, and a building with management offices and a welfare centre. A high school for girls is situated on the other side of the main access road and two private estates composed of apartments similar to those on the estate but with larger sized dwellings are situated adjacent to the Junggye estate. Private Estate 1 is located to the north west of the Junggye estate, across the road; and according to interviewees, the Junggye estate residents often go through this private estate as a shortcut to reach the major supermarket adjacent to the private estate.

Figure 7.1 The layout of the Junggye estate



Private Estate 2 is completely adjacent to the Junggye estate, sharing a boundary wall with it. According to participants in this research, residents of Private Estate 2 often used to come into the Junggye estate through the gate on the boundary wall to use the stores in the Junggye estate, and the Junggye estate residents often used to go through this private estate via the gate as well. However, the gate is currently closed, so that the residents of both the private and the public estate cannot access or move through the other estate. The estate is entirely composed of PR and has 11 high-rise blocks, and the dwellings in each start with the number nine. Each block has fifteen storeys and a little faded grey colour that reflects the fact that it is around 20 years since the Junggye estate was constructed. Spaces between blocks are used for car parking, and there were rubbish bins for food garbage and general waste in particular places, as shown in Figure 7.2. Each block has its own main entrance. When entering the blocks, there are two elevators and mail boxes, and stairs can be accessed at the corner. Access to each unit is via a door, and on each floor these are lined up along the side of the corridor.

Figure 7.2 Areas between blocks in the Junggye estate




Source: Author's visit, 2013

The Junggye estate has two types of housing, according to size, and these are 31.32 m^2 and 26.37 m^2 . There are 1,164 units of the former size and 1,470 units of the latter size.

The layout of dwellings depends on the size and is shown in Figure 7.3. The researcher asked some participants for access to their units in order to see the dwellings residents actually inhabit, however all of them refused the researcher's request, saying '*Neomu nuchuheseo, whyebu saramegye boyeojugiga silsseonida*' (In Korean: It is so humble, I do not want to show how I am living in it to the outsider).

Figure 7.3 The layout of Junggye estate dwellings by size



Source: www.kohom.kr

According to the National Minimum Housing Standards (NMHS), housing in the Junggye estate is of a size suitable for accommodating one or two people⁴⁷ (see Table 4.7).

⁴⁷ According to the 2010 Census, the average living space per person in Korea was found to be 25.7 m^2 : 17.2 m^2 in 1995; 20.2 m^2 in 2000; 22.8 m^2 ; and 25.0 m^2 in 2005.

Demographic characteristics

The Junggye estate is composed of PRH to be used permanently as public rental units. Consequently, households eligible to move onto the estate can continue to reside there through renewing their tenancy every two years, unless they have their own home. (MLTM 2010). Occupancy on the estate is secured by monthly rent with a deposit (KOHOM 2013c). However, if their incomes exceed the official poverty threshold, which is the criterion for entitlement to national benefit recipient, according to a means-testing, they have to pay an increased deposit and rent in order to continue to stay on the estate: households on national benefits pay around 25 per cent less than other households in terms of their deposit; and as much as around 40 per cent less than other households in terms of monthly rent (see Table 7.1). Therefore, price subsidies were provided for lower income groups.

Table 7.1 Rents on the Junggye estate

Housing size	Household on national benefits		Other household	
	Deposit	Monthly rent	Deposit	Monthly rent
26.37 m²	2,230,000 won (£1,356 ⁴⁸)	44,430 won (£27)	8,781,000 won (£5,338)	108,930 won (£66)
31.32 m²	2,648,000 won (£1,610)	52,770 won (£32)	10,429,000 won (£6,340)	125,820 won (£76)


Source: KOHOM (2013e)

According to the 2011 KHS, the median age of householders living in PR was the highest (66 years) amongst all tenants living in PRH (see Figure 6.10). The age of

⁴⁸ One pound was equivalent to approximately 1,645 won in March 2013.

householders living on the Junggye estate was also very high; around 56 per cent of householders on the estate are aged 60 years or older as of March 2013 (see Figure 7.4). The elderly tended to be overrepresented on the Junggye estate.


Figure 7.4 Breakdown by age of householders on the Junggye estate



Source: KOHOM (2013e)

With regard to the gender of householders, around 58 per cent of a total of 2,634 households were female headed households. The duration of residence on the Junggye estate also corresponded with the results of the analysis of the KHS (see Figure 6.12). According to the 2011 KHS, households living in PR had the longest residence among PRH households, at around 12 years. As shown in Figure 7.5, approximately 62 per cent of households had lived on the estate for 20 years or more. Furthermore, around 75 per cent of the total number of households had inhabited the Junggye estate for 10 years or more.


Figure 7.5 Breakdown by duration of residence of households on the Junggye estate



Source: KOHOM (2013e)

Household size on the estate also accorded with the analysis of the KHS (see Table 6.2), with around 53 per cent of households consisting of two people or fewer, as shown in Figure 7.6.

Figure 7.6 Size of households on the Junggye estate



Source: KOHOM (2013e)

Consequently, households living on the Junggye estate could be characterised as headed by ageing householders, having a long duration of residence, and consisting of only one or two people. This result can be a consequence of the combination of PRH policy, within which PR has been designed for accommodating one or two persons (see Tables 4.7 and 4.9), and phase of declining population and economic activity, as described by Murie et al. (2003: 28-9), where residents might initially move onto the Junggye estate as a young family, but as time passes their children became adults and leave the estate, so that finally only the ageing parents, particularly single parents, are left on the estate, and these are people without economic activity.

With regard to the types of inhabitants on the Junggye estate, Figure 7.7 shows a breakdown of households according to eligibility for PR. The largest group of households, at approximately 50.3 per cent, consisted of those that had lost their entitlement to national benefits but have stayed on the estate (LNS).

Figure 7.7 Breakdown by eligibility of households on the Junggye estate



Source: KOHOM (2013e)


The next largest group consisted of households that were national benefit recipients (NBR) at approximately 46.6 per cent of total households. Households of veterans or certified patriots (VP) made up the third group, at approximately 1.5 per cent, followed by households of single-parents (SP) and households with a child householder and no carer or parent (CH). There were no households who had moved onto the Junggye estate through the eligibility of a disabled householder, but the number of households having a disabled person as a household member was approximately a third of all households (KOHOM 2013e). Consequently, this composition could be caused by PR allocation rules which resulted in a higher proportion of vulnerable people being accommodated. Although the largest proportion of households consisted of tenants who had lost their entitlement to national benefits, they were still people living in poverty (*ibid*). Thus, it was found that key groups most likely to be regarded as excluded in the literature, such as the unemployed, lone parents, and the disabled, were concentrated on the Junggye estate.

Institutional characteristics

The Junggye estate is managed by KOHOM, which manages a total of around 260,000 PRH dwellings distributed over around 300 estates in the country, and it has three main functions: letting, maintenance and supports for the welfare of its residents, such as promotion of resident communities and the improvement of residential environments (KOHOM 2013a). The Junggye estate management office, which is a branch of KOHOM, has responsibility for the estate. A total of 14 staff, including the chief manager, were working at this branch at the time field work was carried out in March

2013. However, in order to reduce operating costs the caretaking and cleaning of the estate was carried out by 18 contract employees; therefore, a total of 32 people were responsible for the management of the estate. With regard to letting, a main role of this branch was to issue contracts to applicants selected to reside on the Junggye estate, as described below.

Figure 7.8 The process of selecting residents to reside in PR



Source: KOHOM (2013a)

According to the Junggye estate management office, a total of 100 waiting list tenants were waiting to reside on the estate (KOHOM 2013e). Consequently, there were no vacancies and no letting problems on the estate. This situation corresponded with the average waiting time for PRH as described in the previous chapter, which drew on information in the 2011 KHS (see Figure 6.18). Namely, PR had the longest waiting times of all kinds of PRH (around 14 months), which was estimated to be caused by excessive demands for housing.

With regard to maintenance on the estate, each member in the Junggye estate management office was responsible for the maintenance of each block. (KOHOM 2013c). Areas related to maintenance were: measures taken to prevent the deterioration of blocks and facilities, such as decorating, painting, electrical work, and the repair of elevators; landscape gardening; and fire-protection and safety checks (KOHOM 2013c). This maintenance was covered by maintenance fees collected by the office from each household every month. The fees depended on housing size as shown below.

Table 7.2 Maintenance fees on the Junggye estate

Housing size	The monthly average maintenance fee
26.37 m²	22,440 won (£14)
31.32 m²	22,870 won (£14)

Source: KOHOM (2013e)

In order to support the residential welfare of residents, two storeys of the three-storey management office building were occupied rent-free by the *Nowon* Senior Welfare Centre. According to the policy of KOHOM, the office also ran some programmes for more vulnerable households in the estate such as ‘Home Doctor’, which means that the staff visit these households regularly to deal with any complaints they may have about their accommodation and to give advice and help about housing in the same way as a doctor would give help about health, and ‘One Company to One Estate’, which connects companies looking to make charitable donations with residents in need of help and support (KOHOM 2013a). Consequently, there is only a low possibility of letting difficulties, through which physical obsolescence on social housing estates has been channelled into the social downgrading in the West, and maintenance work is carried out that includes welfare support for residents as well as general building maintenance.

7.2.3 Results on the Junggye 9 PRHE

This section describes the results of interviews with participants and observations during the fieldwork on the Junggye estate in 2013. As noted in Chapter 5, this information was the result of conversations with 32 participants, including Junggye estate residents, management office staff, welfare centre staff, front-line officials of *Nowon-gu*, and residents of the private estates adjacent to the Junggye estate, through focus groups and individual interviews. It is participants' experiences and thoughts related to the Junggye estate and its residents that are important here. These results are presented on the basis of the framework with a thematic approach, according to the research focus (see Table 5.10).

1) Research focus one: the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs

Reputation

The declining process of social housing estates includes stigma and reputation as a primary outcome and driver (Kristensen 1995; Atkinson and Kintrea 2001). In particular, Kristensen (1995: 155) suggests evaluation of reputation as one of the indicators to measure problematic estates with social exclusion. Most of the research participants who lived on the Junggye estate believed that they were poorly regarded by local residents outside the estate. One participant even described the estate as '*Geogi Dongnei*' (In Korean; a neighbourhood for beggars). Many participants felt stigmatised enough to hide from third parties that they lived on the Junggye estate. Thus, they

recognized the stigma of living on the estate, and it had given them a tendency to hide where they lived. For example, some participants revealed that when coming back to their home, including by bus or taxi, they got off at a point that was well away from their estate and walked home, so that their address would not be revealed to others:

When I meet someone who does not know me, I never say that I reside on the Junggye estate ... I walk down to the Junggye estate after getting off the bus in front of other private estates, because other people look down on the people of the Junggye estate. The estate has been described as a ‘Geogi Dongnei’ by local people who live outside the Junggye estate ... Children who have lived on the estate in their childhood, as they have grown up, they have pestered their parents to move out, saying that living on the estate shamed them (A13, benefit recipient, hereafter see Table 5.8).

It is a very sensitive matter to speak of ... I feel that there is exclusion by other people. For example, when Junggye 2-Dong and Junggye 3-Dong were merged into one, there were enormous objections from people living in Junggye 2-Dong, although there were no objections from the people living in Junggye 3-Dong. They did not want to merge with the Junggye 3-Dong where PRHEs were located, although the Junggye 2-Dong residents did not speak openly of this ... I think that invisible distancing or reluctance toward PRHE residents influences their objections (Member of the local government front-line office staff).

According to Taylor (1998), a bad image of a social housing estate is given and reinforced by outsiders who do not live in the estate (see Figure 2.2). One of the key groups of outsiders in this study is people living in private estates adjacent to a PRHE: in the case of the Junggye estate, Private Estate 1 and 2 residents (see Figure 7.1). Resident participants who lived on the private estates had a strong tendency to identify the Junggye estate residents as the ‘undeserving poor’, which is the way some poor

people are criticised by liberal intellectuals such as Murray and Jencks because of their welfare dependency (Green 1990; Arneson 1997). They thought that the Junggye estate residents had given up on life by depending on national benefits rather than trying to support themselves, and they stated that the estate residents tended to consider the welfare benefits provided by tax-payers like them as being in the natural order of things:

It seems wrong to support everything just because they live in public rental housing ... For example, I saw that a sash window onto the veranda was installed free of charge for each dwelling in the Junggye estate... Geu dde Nanun jungmal Yulbadasseoyo (at that time, I was really pissed off in Korean). Where on earth did the money for the installation come from? The taxes we paid must be being used for that installation. Whilst, some residents did not want it. So I asked them the reason, and they replied that having to move their furniture for themselves, temporarily, for the installation, would be very troublesome ... It is selfishness ... I was angry at their taking welfare benefits for granted ... I felt that the taxes I paid went down the drain. I have acquaintances living on the Junggye estate. However, I cannot speak frankly with them for fear that my unguarded comments will offend them (Resident 6 of Private Estate 1 participants).

The welfare dependency of the Junggye estate residents was also indicated by the welfare centre staff whose office was located on the estate. One member of the welfare centre staff said that some residents had a tendency to take welfare services and charity goods for granted, as if these services or goods were theirs of right:

Most people living on the Junggye estate are national benefit recipients, and this leads them to have a strong tendency to think that the state should naturally support them. As a result, when they feel they are not getting enough support, or that support is being unequally distributed, they tend to show resentment (Member of the community welfare centre staff on the Junggye estate).

Participation in the society by the estate residents

As presented in the demographic characteristics of the Junggye estate, households on the estate were identified as being represented by elderly householders aged 60 years and older, and marginalised groups, including national benefit recipients (see Figures 7.4 and 7.7). It was very difficult to find out about economic participation by the estate residents. The management office staff also described this situation, explaining that the estate was designed to accommodate the poor. In addition, the head of the local government front-line office, responsible for the distribution of national benefits, said that the residents who were not benefit recipients were in an economic hardship:

As this permanent rental housing estate accommodates economically disadvantaged people, many residents live from hand to mouth. Moreover, the estate accommodates quite a few vulnerable people, including the physically or mentally disabled and elderly people living on their own, some of whom have dementia (Head of the Junggye estate management office).


When I meet some residents on the estate, they often say that they are grateful for the state's offering them their dwellings with a cheaper rent compared to that of private rented housing. They also call for a rise in the cost-of-living allowance, mentioning individual difficulties including their health problems ... I think that there are a lot of difficulties for people who do not qualify for national benefits, even though they have some kind of income ... They continue to ask for support and help, due to their difficulties (Head of the local government front-line office).

On the other hand, the process of being a national benefit recipient and residing on the estate was captured by one participant's explanation:

As I had a sick husband, I had to take on the role of householder. It was very difficult for me to afford the medicines and treatments for my husband, the rent and the utility bills, which made me very stressed and pressured. Whilst I was in this situation, someone told me about national benefits, and that if I were selected to receive national benefits, the state would help with the cost of living and offer an apartment. So, I applied for national benefits and subsequently lived on the estate (A11, benefit recipient).

The research conducted an individual interview with the participant in second fieldwork to hear the PRHE resident's detailed life story. This is provided in Figure 7.9, which contributed to exploring the dynamics of social exclusion.

Figure 7.9 The process of moving onto the Junggye estate (participant A11)



Analysis of tenant involvement in tenant committees was carried out as a lack of involvement in local decision-making, which is an indicator of social exclusion according to some scholars (Burchardt et al. 2002; Percy-Smith 2000). The research investigated whether a tenant committee is formed and whether a tenant committee plays a role in collecting opinions from residents and coordinating their interests or in delivering residents' agreed opinions to the provider or the manager and negotiating with them. However, on the estate, no committee had been organised for several years. The head of the management office indicated tensions between the existing residents and newcomers, lack of residents' involvement, and lack of attachment to the estate as the reasons. Indeed, among all the PRHEs managed by KOHOM, PRHEs composed of PR such as the Junggye estate had the lowest rate of forming tenant committees, as shown in Table 7.3 (MLTM 2010).

Table 7.3 Rate of forming tenant committees in KOHOM-managed PRHEs

PRHE	Number of PRHE	Tenant committee formation	
		formed	Non-formed
PR estate	126	37(29%)	89(71%)
50R estate	41	19(46%)	22(54%)
30R estate	204	96(47%)	108(53%)
5R estate	76	63(83%)	13(17%)

Source: MLTM (2010)

Social relationship with non-residents

This research engaged with the idea of Silver's (1994) 'solidarity' paradigm, which explains social exclusion in terms of the breakdown of the social bonds between individuals and society. Consequently, this study pays attention to social relationship between PRHE residents and mainstream society represented by management office staff, welfare centre staff, local government front-line office staff and private estate residents as non-residents.

Social relationships in societies, groups or individuals can be identified with two types of solidarity, a feeling of 'we are one' (i.e. shared identity) and a perception of 'we need each other' (i.e. shared utility) (see Chapter 2). Social bonds with non-residents of the Junggye estate, in particular neighbouring private estate residents, could not be expected because the residents were described as poor people lack of a good standard of conduct that is one aspect of deservingness indicated by classic liberals (Arneson 1997):

I am unhappy about living near the Junggye estate, and the value of my property seems to be lower due to the estate. Children living on the Junggye estate seem to be raised without the interest and care of their families. On one occasion, there was a shocking scene in which four girls and boys were sleeping together in the senior residents' hall of our management office, which is located near the boundary wall between our estate and the Junggye estate. They were caught in the morning, and all of them were found to live on the Junggye estate, with most of them having been raised by single parents or grandparents ... If I had lived near another private estate, I would not have experienced this event. Drunken people are often seen in the daytime on the Junggye estate ... Public rental housing provided by the state seems not to be helpful in enhancing residents' efforts at self-support (Private Estate 2 resident).

There is a lack of the sense of public order required for community life. Some residents, especially those who have some mental problems, seem to lack respect for the facilities on the estate, and sometimes some parts of the facilities or buildings are damaged intentionally, or in a fit of temper, by these people. In addition, the dumping of rubbish, including empty bottles, milk cartons and even household furniture, has not been eradicated, despite continual requests for cooperation and efforts to control it (Head of the Junggye estate management office).

Furthermore, the fact that private estates residents were reluctant to socialise with the Junggye estate was identified through interviews and physical artefacts. Many participants living in private estates were very concerned about their children making friends with Junggye estate children when they all went to the same school:

There were quite a few children from the Junggye estate in my children's primary school, although it was fortunate that there were also many children from our estate. When sometimes my children told me that they wanted to go to the Junggye estate to play with children living there, I dissuaded them from going, asking them to bring their friends to our house instead ... Very often, the parents of the Junggye estate children were absent, so it was very difficult to expect good childcare ... I used to treat the Junggye estate children more kindly than other children when they came to our house, believing that it would help my children not to be bullied by problem children living on the Junggye estate (Resident 3 of Private Estate 1 participants).

As another source of reluctance, there was the boundary wall between the Junggye estate and Private Estate 2 (see Figure 7.1). The wall had a gate which in the past had permitted residents from the two estates to come and go freely between the two estates. However, the gate was locked by residents of the Junggye estate and bricked over by residents of Private Estate 2, as shown in the photograph reproduced in Figure 7.10.

Figure 7.10 The boundary wall with the closed gate

<The gate viewed from Private Estate 2>



<The gate viewed from the Junggye estate>



Source: Author's visit, 2013

How the gate was closed was identified through interviews with a representative of Private Estate 2 residents and the Junggye estate resident who locked the gate on the wall:

The boundary wall is located between our estate and the Junggye estate. In the past there was a gate in the wall. So our residents used to go through the gate to use the stores on the Junggye estate, and the Junggye estate residents also used to enter our estate through the gate as a short cut to the bus station. Currently, the gate is blocked ... There was a case where some of the Junggye estate residents came onto our estate through the gate and tried to get themselves hit by our residents' cars, intentionally, for compensation ... So given these circumstances, our residents would have preferred the gate to be blocked ... In the meantime, the gate was locked ... So, our residents thought this was better than before. Although it is a little inconvenient not to be able to use the stores on the Junggye estate any more, I think the closure of the gate has been good for our residents (Private Estate 2 resident).

When the gate was open, in the past, Private Estate 2 residents often used to shop in the stores on our estate because Private Estate 2 does not have its own stores. Then, some of Private Estate 2 residents suggested that some people living on our estate had come through the gate onto their estate and stolen scrap metal ... So our residents, including me, were very offended by their behavior and attitudes ... I, as a representative of residents living in the block near the boundary wall, locked the gate. To be brutally honest, they were viewing the Junggye estate as a neighbourhood for beggars. Although I still have the key of the gate, I have no intention of opening the gate at all ... In short, they disrespected our residents because we live on a permanent rental housing estate for disadvantaged people (Junggye estate resident).

Desire to leave the estate

Kristensen (1995: 155) suggests that the desire to move from a dwelling is a significant indicator of social exclusion on problematic housing estates. Taylor (1998) also argued that residents with more choices leave socially excluded estates. Most participants living on the Junggye estate said that they would like to leave the estate if they were better off, although they were currently protected from anxiety about having to move if the rent increased, which was the case with the private dwellings where they had lived before. The reasons for leaving the estate were focused on problematic acts by some residents:

After being selected as a waiting list tenant, I visited the estate in advance of moving in, in order to check what the place would be like for me and my children. This was around 10 years ago. At that time, I was very shocked at seeing drunken residents sleeping during the daytime in front of the small convenience store located on this PRHE. The store was selling them alcohol. I felt very worried at the thought of raising my children in this environment. I really did not want to be a resident of the estate, but I had no choice, due to my economic circumstances ... If any households, especially those with children, consider moving into the estate, I would like to say them not to reside here because residential conditions for raising their children are not good. A single-parent like me, with whom I am friendly, in the estate, also told me that she gives the same advice to people considering moving onto the estate (A37, single parent).

I am very concerned about residential circumstances. A blind person lives completely alone next door to me. One day he knocked on the door of his flat all night, saying he was hungry. So I entered his flat, I was very surprised and frightened to see that the floor of his room was covered in cigarette ash ... If I am better off, I will leave the estate immediately (A11, benefit recipient).

2) Research focus two: the causes of social exclusion on PRHEs

Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the estate

As presented in the physical characteristics of the Junggye estate, the estate consisted of multi-family large apartment blocks. This style is one of key features discovered in post-WWII social housing estates in the West (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009). However, differently from the estates in European cities, the Junggye estate is currently located in urban site as shown in Figure 7.11. Although it was originally developed in green-field sites outside the urban centre, urban sprawl caused by continuous urbanisation and (re)development projects have transformed the green-field sites into urban areas (MLTM 2010).

Figure 7.11 The overview around the Junggye estate



Source: map.google.uk

In addition, since the apartment-block type is the preferred and dominant building style in modern Korea (see Chapter 6), the Junggye estate residents showed satisfaction with the estate's physical aspects. Some participants – who had experience living in underground dwellings with little sunshine and fresh air, or lived in shanty towns with inferior living conditions such as poor electricity, insufficient water, poor heating and access difficulties – were particularly satisfied:

It is approximately 20 years since our Junggye estate was built, so our blocks are still serviceable (A12, benefit recipient).

I'm 100 times happier living in the Junggye estate with this type of apartment than I was living in an underground dwelling before. Furthermore, I'm relieved that I don't have to worry about moving out, because nobody here tells me to move out, unlike the landlord of my private rented housing, who asked me to pay more rent or move out when my tenancy expired (A13, benefit recipient).

Currently I feel comfortable living in the estate, as I am not asked to pay more rent, or if I can't, to move out (A11, benefit recipient)

However, as presented in the above quote, this satisfaction was highly likely to be influenced by a sense of relief from a concern about the landlords of private houses asking them to pay more rent or move out when an agreed tenancy finished. Namely, those with little choice decided to reside on the Junggye estate. However, satisfaction with the estate's physical aspects got lost because of problematic behaviour by some residents as presented in previous sections.

Concentration of disadvantaged groups

Stigmatisation of localities or neighbourhoods is caused by concentration of the socio-economically disadvantaged groups (Atkinson and Kintrea 2001; Hastings 2004). This could apply to the Junggye estate. As presented in the demographic characteristics of the Junggye estate, dwellings on the estate were occupied by lower-income groups, benefit recipients and lone parents (see Figure 7.7). Furthermore, significant numbers of the households had overlapping problems of disability and old ages:

To take care of residents is a very important part of the management of the estate, as there are socially alienated people, including the disabled and elderly people living on their own, on the estate (Head of the Junggye estate management office)

I would like to leave the estate if only I had enough money. The estate should have been filled partly with ordinary people. As problematic and disadvantaged people are concentrated on the Junggye estate, other people look down on Junggye estate residents ... (A15, benefit recipient with a small physical disability).

The Junggye estate seems to accommodate many problem people, including single parents, the psychologically disturbed and ex-convicts ... The Junggye estate residents seem to act rough and tough (Resident 4 of Private Estate 1 participants).

Anti-social behaviour by the estate residents

Along with the concentration of marginalised people, social exclusion on social housing estates can be explained by the visibility of anti-social behaviour such as litter, vandalism, and visible crimes (Somerville 1998; Kearns and Parkinson 2001). An

increased share of anti-social behaviour in deprived areas is explained by existence of deviant norms and absence of successful role-models (see Chapter 2).

As already presented in previous sections, particularly in regard to reputation, social relationship with non-residents of a PRHE and desire to leave a PRHE, anti-social behaviour in the Junggye estate such as throwing rubbish, drinking during the daytime in public spaces on the estate, noise, juvenile delinquency and urinating or defecating in a corner of the stairs in the block were mentioned by all kinds of participants:


Areas surrounding this welfare centre, which is near a small park on the estate, are popular places for drinking. The weather gets warm and these places are littered with empty alcohol bottles discarded by some residents. One day we thought of putting up eaves on the roof, in order to create a shady area in preparation for summer. But this plan was immediately withdrawn because the shade-giving eaves, contrary to the original intention, had a high possibility of making these areas better ones for drinking... On summer evenings, scenes of juvenile drinking are often witnessed (Member of the community welfare centre staff on the Junggye estate)

My children sometimes used to say to me that the Junggye estate children tended to be foul-mouthed ... to act like bullies. ... When I pass through the Junggye estate, I often see that some residents are drinking in the street from the morning on... It does look bad ... (Resident 4 of private estate 1 participants).

In particular, with regard to the above quote by community welfare centre staff, the researcher witnessed some residents drinking in the daytime before the entrance to the nursery run by the welfare centre as shown in Figure 7.12, even though it was early spring in Korea when the researcher visited the estate. When the researcher said it to the management office staff, the staff told the researcher that it would be useless to ask

them to stop drinking, and they would get angry with the staff, saying that it was a frequent scene to be witnessed.

Figure 7.12 Several residents' daytime drinking in front of the nursery



Source: Author's visit, 2013

However, a few participants indicated that anti-social behaviour was repeatedly conducted by some residents but misunderstood as being done by the majority of residents.

Problematic acts are repeatedly done by some residents ... Since those acts are seen very often, outsiders think as if the majority of residents on the estate do them ... There is an invisible wall between the PR estate residents and the people outside the estate (Head of the Junggye estate management office)

Institutional factors

The reason why the Junggye estate accommodated the vulnerable households was that the estate was composed of PR. According to PRH policy, PR with the cheapest rent has

to be allocated to eligible tenants below a specific income level with some combination of priority groups including lone parents, the disabled and urban squatters (see Table 4.9). As a result, people with little choice were concentrated in the Junggye estate. An increased share of lower-income groups, the benefit recipients, the lone-parent and the disabled contributed to reinforcing residualisation of the Junggye estate, as argued by Priemus et al. (1999). With regard to maintenance by the management office, most participants living on the Junggye estate did not indicate low maintenance quality as a problem with the estate because they had a tendency to be satisfied with physical aspects of the estate as already presented. Although one resident complained that the management staff did not make forceful enough efforts to control residents committing problematic acts, the participant along with other respondents also emphasised the concentration of marginalised people as the fundamental problem in the estate.

7.3 The Suseo 1 PRHE

As explained in Chapter 5, this research set up two case studies in order to see whether results of each case were consistent with each other, and thus also to contribute to the external validity of this study (Yin 2009). In summary, the Suseo estate revealed significant similarities in the experience and level of social exclusion compared to with the Junggye estate on the basis of the thematic framework adopted for analysis (see Table 5.10).

7.3.1 An outline of the Suseo 1 PRHE

Work began on the Suseo estate, which is located in *Gangnam-gu*, in 1990, when *Gangnam* was commonly recognised as the brand new city-centre of Seoul, replacing the northern part of Seoul. At that time, the estate, along with other private and public estates, was part of the Suseo Housing Site Development Area (SHSDA), which was designated by the government in 1989 and was 406,075 pyeong (approximately 1,340,048 m²) in extent (Maeil-Kyungje 1989). When the SHSDA was developed, it was considered to be the last major housing site in *Gangnam* and thus attracted much public attention (Kyunghyang-Shinmun 1990).


The Suseo estate, like the Junggye estate, was developed by the KNHC (now LH). This public sector developer completed the estate in 1992, and currently the estate is also managed by KOHOM. The estate occupies 53,897 m² and the total housing floor size is 109,749 m². The estate was also built by industrialised methods with the use of concrete and concrete panels as the main medium, just like the Junggye estate. The estate consisted of 2,565 PRH units, with a total of 4,090 residents as of March 2013. The Suseo estate is also called the 1-Estate by local people, since number of each block on the estate starts with 1, such as the 101 block, the 102 block, and so on, just as blocks on the Junggye estate begin with 9.

7.3.2 Characteristics of the Suseo 1 PRHE

Physical characteristics

The Suseo estate is situated in the upper left hand corner of Figure 7.13 and is surrounded by roads, giving something of the sense of a cul-de-sac.

Figure 7.13 The layout of the Suseo estate



After getting off at the metro station in front of Private Estate 1, one has to walk into the inside of this area for quite a few minutes in order to reach the estate. When walking

along the main access road, you can see the main gate of Private Estate 1 and the back gate of Private Estate 2. Both private estates are composed of apartment blocks similar to those on the Suseo estate, but with larger dwelling sizes. Private Estate 1 is adjacent to the estate, across a boundary wall, as shown in Figure 7.13. According to the estate participants in this research, some residents used to go through Private Estate 1 to reach the metro station, as a short cut, when the left side of the boundary wall did not exist. The wall was extended to the left by Private estate 1 residents. Furthermore, the middle section of the wall was said to have been made higher and reinforced by wire looped along the top. Once the researcher actually saw the wall, it seemed to be impossible to enter Private Estate 1 across it. The main access road passes the front of a building with stores, and then it ends at the main entrance to the Suseo estate, and there is a building with the management office and welfare centre just beside it.

The Suseo estate, known as the 1-Estate, consists of 14 high-rise blocks numbered from 101 to 114, and each block has fifteen storeys. The layout inside the estate is basically very similar to that of the Junggye estate, since the same PRH provider, the KNHC, developed both estates. The areas between the blocks are used for a community building, car parking and a playground, and there are rubbish bins for food waste and general waste in various places, as shown in Figure 7.14. Structurally, the inside of each block was little different from the Junggye estate. That is, the visitor entering the block via its main entrance can see two elevators. Taking the elevator and getting off at one of the floors, the visitor can see the doors of the housing units lined up along the corridor. The estate has the same two types of housing size – 31.32 m^2 and 26.37 m^2 – as the Junggye estate, and the layout of the dwellings, depending on the size, is the same as well (see

Figure 7.14 Areas between the blocks in the Suseo estate




Source: Author's visit, 2013

Figure 7.3). However, although on the Junggye estate the number of larger units (1,164) is slightly lower than the number of smaller units (1,470), on the estate the number of larger units (866 units) is approximate half of the number of smaller units (1,699). Furthermore, the number of residents per unit on the estate (1.69) is lower than the number of residents per unit on the Junggye estate (2.22). According to the NMHS (see Table 4.7), housing sizes on the estate are also suitable for accommodating one or two persons. However, comparing the number of residents per unit on the Junggye estate with the number per unit on the estate, the estate can be considered to be less dense than the Junggye estate. The researcher asked some participants to allow him to visit their units in order to see where they actually lived. However, they refused, just like those on the Junggye estate. The researcher managed to visit one unit of the 31.32 m^2 size because this was a unit being refurbished for a new resident to move in soon under the

agreement by management office staff. Figure 7.15 shows pictures that the researcher took when visiting the unit.

Figure 7.15 The inside and outside views of a unit in one block of the Suseo estate



Source: Author's visit, 2013

Demographic characteristics

Like the Junggye estate, the Suseo estate consists of housing to be used permanently as public rental dwellings. Consequently, households that are eligible to move onto the estate belong to economically or socially disadvantaged groups such as benefit recipients, lone parents and the disabled, and these people can continue to inhabit the estate by renewing their tenancy every second year unless they own a home of their own. Tenants had to pay a deposit and monthly rent on the basis of a two-year tenancy period, and the amount depended on housing size and eligibility, as it did for those of the Junggye estate (see Tables 7.4 and 7.1). However, households receiving national

benefits received a discount of as much as 22 per cent off the standard deposit and as much around 41 per cent off the standard monthly rent. This was similar to the situation on the Junggye estate, because both estates followed government criteria in setting deposits and monthly rents for PR (MLTM 2010).

Table 7.4 Rents on the Suseo estate

Housing size	Household on national benefits		Other household	
	Deposit	Monthly rent	Deposit	Monthly rent
26.37 m²	2,230,000 won (£1,356)	45,750 won (£28)	10,255,000 won (£6,234)	111,300 won (£68)
31.32 m²	2,648,000 won (£1,610)	54,350 won (£33)	12,180,000 won (£7,404)	132,190 won (£80)


Source: KOHOM (2013f)

However, when it came to households not receiving national benefits, there was a significant difference between the two estates (see Table 7.1), in that rents on the estate were around 10 per cent higher than those on the Junggye estate. Deposits for households not receiving national benefits were calculated according to the construction costs of the estate, so the difference between the two estates was caused by a difference in construction costs. These construction costs could be classified into two types: building costs; and land development costs (MLTM 2010). As the Suseo estate was developed in *Gangnam*, an area with higher property values than *Gangbuk*, where the Junggye estate was situated, the construction costs of the estate, especially the land development costs, were higher than those of the Junggye estate. Consequently, there was a difference between the two estates in the deposit required from households, except for households on national benefits. The reason why there was no difference between the two estates regarding the deposit paid by households on national benefits

was that both estates were located in Seoul; and the same deposit per 1m² of housing size is applied to households on national benefits living on any PR estate developed in Seoul.

Looking at the average age of householders living on the Suseo estate, householders aged 60 years and older made up approximately 51 per cent of the total as of March 2013, as shown in Figure 7. Consequently, the elderly tended to be overrepresented on the estate, as they were on the Junggye estate (see Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.16 Breakdown by age of householders on the Suseo estate




Source: KOHOM (2013f)

With regard to the gender of householders, 1,543 households among a total of 2,565 had female householders. That is, around 60 per cent of households living on the estate were headed by women. Looking at duration of residence on the estate, approximately 63 per cent of total households had been on the estate for 20 years or more, as shown in Figure 7.17. Furthermore, around 79 per cent had a length of stay that was 10 years or more. In


addition, records showed that approximately 60 per cent of all households on the estate consisted of 2 people or fewer, as shown in Figure 7.18. Consequently, households living on the estate tended to be characterised as ageing households, long-term residents, and one- or two-person households, as those of the Junggye estate could.

Figure 7.17 Breakdown by duration of residence of households on the Suseo estate



Source: KOHOM (2013f)


Figure 7.18 Size of households on the Suseo estate



Source: KOHOM (2013f)

With regard to the types of inhabitant on the estate, Figure 7.19 shows a breakdown by eligibility for PR. The largest group of households, at approximately 52.8 per cent, were those that had lost their eligibility for national benefits but have stayed on the estate (LNS). The next largest group was households that were national benefit recipients (NBR), at approximately 38.4 per cent of the total. Households with a disabled member (DA) made up the third group, representing approximately 6.1 per cent, followed by the households of veterans or certified patriots (VP), households of single parents (SP), households of North Korean refugees (NK) and households living with parents over 65 years old and supporting them (OP), in that order. In addition, according to the Suseo estate management office, the number of households having a disabled person as a household member was approximately 14.9 per cent of total households, and the number of elderly people living alone was approximately 10.0 per cent of all households (KOHOM 2013f). Consequently, the Suseo estate, like the Junggye estate, had key groups of people most likely to be regarded as excluded in the literature, such as the unemployed, lone parents, and the disabled.

Figure 7.19 Breakdown of households by eligibility on the Suseo estate



Source: KOHOM (2013f)

Institutional characteristics

The Suseo estate is also managed by KOHOM, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of LH, like the Junggye estate. When the researcher visited the office, a total of 14 staff including the chief manager worked at this branch, like the Junggye estate. As with the Junggye estate, caretaking of the estate was carried out by 15 contract employees in order to reduce operating costs; thus, a total of 28 people were responsible for the management of the estate. With regard to letting, a main role of this branch was to issue contracts to applicants selected to reside on the estate, as the Junggye estate management office had done (see Figure 7.8). According to the Suseo estate management, a total of 90 waiting list tenants were waiting to reside on the estate. Consequently, as on the Junggye estate, there were no vacancies and few letting problems on the estate.

With regard to maintenance, there were staff members in the Suseo estate management office who were responsible for the maintenance of each block in the estate, as there were on the Junggye estate. The process of maintenance services was not different from that in the Junggye estate (see Section 7.2.2). This maintenance was covered by maintenance fees collected by the office from each household every month, and as for the Junggye estate, there was a scale of fees, as shown in Table 7.5. In addition, parts of the management office building were occupied rent-free by the Suseomyounghwa Community Welfare Centre, which functioned in the same way as the *Nowon* Welfare Centre on the Junggye estate. The office also ran programs such as the ‘Home Doctor’ and ‘One Company to One Estate’, just as the Junggye estate management office did.

Table 7.5 Maintenance fees on the Suseo estate

Housing size	The monthly average maintenance fee
26.37 m²	21,524 won (£13)
31.32 m²	23,963 won (£15)

Source: KOHOM (2013f)

7.3.3 Results on the Suseo 1 PRHE

This section recounts what has been heard from participants and what the researcher observed during fieldwork on the Suseo estate in 2013. This information was obtained from conversations with 35 participants, including the Suseo estate residents, management office staff, welfare centre staff, front-line officials of *Gangnam-gu*, and residents of private estates adjacent to the Suseo estate, through focus groups and individual interviews. These results are also presented on the basis of a framework using a thematic approach, according to the research focus (see Table 5.10).

1) Research focus one: the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs

Reputation

In the focus group undertaken on the Suseo estate, most participants living on the estate talked about their reputation among local residents outside the estate. In particular, one participant described the Suseo estate residents as ‘*Younggu*’ (‘permanent’ in Korean, but also the name of a famous character who was a fool in Korean comedy)⁴⁹:

⁴⁹ So, this word is a kind of a metaphor for an abnormal person.

The researcher! Don't you know 'Younggu', 'Younggu'? ... The official name of the estate is the Suseo Permanent Rental Housing Estate, isn't it? People outside the estate recognise us abnormal persons as 'Younggu'. They recognise the Suseo estate as a residential space for the disabled and beggars. (B410, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate, hereafter see Table 5.8).

Indeed, explanations of the image of the estate relying on private estate residents living adjacent to the estate were not good. They had a strong tendency to recognise the Suseo estate resident as the undeserving poor lacking of a good standard of conduct and with strong welfare dependency:

At first, I tried to understand them and not to be prejudiced against them, thinking that they were vulnerable and filled with a sense of inferiority. But their frequent aggressive behaviours now make me feel unpleasant and irritated (Resident 4 of Private Estate 2 participants).

They quarrel a lot and too often drink on the streets (Resident 1 of Private Estate 2 participants).

It is good to give needy people support, including PRH and benefits. But these make them idle and dependent, leading to some senseless acts, including shouting and cursing ... It seems to be all the more likely that needy people exhibit these behaviours because they live isolated from society (Resident 2 of Private Estate 2 participants).

Because of this reputation, participants living on the Suseo estate revealed that they concealed the fact that they lived on the estate as the Junggye estate resident participants did. When someone asked where they lived, they just told him or her that they lived in Suseo in *Gangnam*, without mentioning that they lived in the estate:

I never say that I reside on the Suseo estate. Instead I just say that I live in Suseo in Gangnam (B410, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate).

When I say that I live in Suseo in Gangnam, people tell me that I live in a rich area (B411, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate).

Gangnam is truly the centre of modern Seoul, meanwhile *Gangbuk*, where the Junggye estate is located, stands for a run-down city in need of development (see Chapter 5). To most participants living in private estates, the fact that the estate is situated in their neighbourhood seemed to make them frustrated although they also showed a strong attachment to *Gangnam*:

The price of housing in this area is relatively low compared to that in other Gangnam-gu areas, despite a good residential environment. There is nothing to explain this except the existence of the Suseo estate (Resident 2 of Private Estate 2 residents)


I wanted to live in the Gangnam area but could not afford a dwelling because of their high prices ... Then, an estate agent introduced me to this neighbourhood saying that I could live in the Gangnam area in lower priced housing (Resident 4 of Private Estate 1 participants).

This is considered as a poor and excluded area of Gangnam-gu due to the existence of the estate ... It's called Suseo Island (Resident 5 of private estate 1 participants).

The above quotes demonstrated that they resolutely attributed the undervaluing of their property to their location adjacent to the Suseo estate. In order to look at these residents' arguments that their properties were undervalued due to their position adjacent to the

estate, the research investigated the trend in house prices over the last ten years for one private estate (hereafter, Private Estate A) which was about a half mile away from the Suseo estate, across the road, and in the same district as Private Estate 1 and Private Estate 2; thus, residents on this Private Estate could use some of the same facilities such as a metro station, a supermarket and hospitals with residents on Private estate 1 and Private Estate 2. Private Estate A consisted of high-rise blocks similar to those of Private Estate 1 and Private Estate 2, and was built in 1993 – one year after Private Estate 1 was built. The research discovered that there were units with the same housing size on both Private Estate A, away from the Suseo estate, and on Private Estate 1, and the researcher compared the trend in their average sales prices for the last ten years, on the basis of housing price information supplied by the previous official provider⁵⁰. As shown below, housing prices in Private Estate A tended to be higher than those in Private Estate 1, which had been adjacent to the estate for the last decade.

Figure 7.20 Trends in housing prices for Private Estate A and Private Estate 1



Source: nland.kbstar.com

⁵⁰ The official provider that investigated trends in housing prices was the Kookmin Bank until 2012, and then it was changed to the Korea Appraisal Board.

The price gap between the two estates was approximately 33 million won (£18,000). However, since housing prices are generally influenced by other hedonic variables factors such as access to schools, shops, scenic views and house appearance, it is hard to assert that the property value gap between Private Estate 1, which is adjacent to the Suseo estate, and Private Estate A was caused by proximity to PRHE.

Participation in society by the estate residents


As presented in the demographic characteristics of the Suseo estate, households on the estate were identified to be represented by elderly householders aged 60 years and older, and marginalised groups including national benefit recipients and disabled (see Figures 7.16 and 7.19). It was also very difficult to find out economic participation from the estate residents, like the Junggye estate. The management staff and the welfare centre staff admitted that the residents were not only in economic hardship but also highly dependent on welfare services:

The estate accommodates mainly national benefit recipients, the disabled, single parents and North Korean refugees. Most of them were living in economic hardship, which resulted in them moving onto the Suseo estate (Head of the Suseo estate management office).

The Suseo estate residents are highly dependent on welfare services, which they seem to consider as their divine right. For example, the number of charity donations is influenced by economic fluctuations. The economic recession has led to a decrease in charity goods, which means fewer people can receive them. If, as a result, some residents are excluded from a distribution of charity goods, they will complain very strongly. (Member of the welfare centre staff).

Furthermore, through an individual interview with a person who participated in the focus group, the researcher was able to hear her detailed life story, as shown in Figure 7.21. She was a benefit recipient and was struggling against cancer, living with her unemployed son.

Figure 7.21 The process of moving onto the Suseo estate (participant B12)



On the one hand, the research investigated whether the tenant committee was formed on the estate or not in order to explore the residents' participation in an activity with a political perspective. However, like the Junggye estate, no committee had been organised for several years and any committee formed had not lasted for long. Similar reasons including tensions between the existing residents and newcomers, lack of residents' involvement, and a lack of attachment to the estate were indicated by the management office staff.

Social relationship with non-residents

Given that private estate residents viewed the Suseo estate as the factor leading to the undervaluing of their property, it seemed to be unlike that a feeling of ‘we are one’ between the Suseo estate residents and private estate residents could be expected. Indeed, some participant living on private estate even described the Suseo estate resident as senseless people criticising their behaviour:

They are senseless people ... It is impossible for us and them to communicate with each other (Resident 1 of Private Estate 1 participants).

It is not bad to provide them with dwellings and make them live together because they are poor, but problematic behaviours by some PRHE residents make us feel irritated and unpleasant. It finally forces us to be firmly resolved not to socialise with them (Resident 5 of Private Estate 2 participants).

In addition, participants with children who went to the primary school near the estate stated explicitly that they were seriously considering moving to other *Gangnam* areas without PRHEs in order to send their children to a school that had no PRHE children. Some participants with children who went to the primary school near the estate said they would move out when their children were in one of the upper grades of primary school⁵¹ because their children would go to the middle school near the estate if they did not move. Considering that from the level of middle school, school performance became much more important in relation to university entrance and their children’s


⁵¹ Under the Korean school system, there are six years of primary school and three years each for middle and high school.

puberty would normally start, they believed that they had better move out in order to avoid their children mixing with PRHE children:

Many parents move out when their children reach an upper grade of primary school because they do not want their children to go to the middle school near the estate. When children reach the age to attend middle school, they generally enter puberty and are less easily controlled by their parents ... So, if they go to middle school with ill-cared-for PRHE children from broken homes, such as those headed by lone parents or grandparents who have been given custody, they can be adversely affected by PRHE children (Resident 2 of Private Estate 1 participants).

Actually, the primary school near the Suseo estate, which opened in 1994 with a total of 43 classes, now has a total of 16 classes, and the average number of pupils per class in the upper grades such as the fifth and sixth grades is much lower than that in *Gangnam-gu*, as shown in Figure 7.22 (Joongang-Ilbo 2002; MOE and KERIS 2013). In addition, there was a report in one newspaper that some parents living in private estates near the Suseo estate had transferred their children from a primary school with many Suseo estate children to other schools (Joongang-Ilbo 2002).

Figure 7.22 Average number of pupils per class in the primary school near the Suseo estate



One piece of evidence demonstrating a lack of social bonds between the private estate and the Suseo estate residents was the boundary wall between the Suseo estate and Private Estate 1. Interestingly, as had been found out on the Junggye estate (see Figure 7.10), there was a specified boundary wall between the two estates, as shown in Figure 7.23.

At first, we could go through Private Estate 1 to reach the metro station. But they blocked the way and set up a new section of the boundary wall. They did it because they disrespected us because we are disadvantaged (B25, benefit recipient).

According to participants living on the Suseo estate, the left side of the boundary scarcely existed at first, so the Suseo estate residents used to go through Private Estate 1 in order to reach the metro station. However, they said that Private Estate 1 residents erected the left wing of the boundary wall because they were reluctant for the Suseo estate residents enter their estate, which meant that the Suseo estate residents had to go around the wall to reach the metro station. In addition, the middle section of the boundary wall adjacent to the Suseo estate was said to be higher and reinforced by wire looped along the top to keep the Suseo estate residents from jumping over the wall. The researcher asked this participants living on Private Estate 1. They have been known that this wall was reinforced to prevent strangers, particularly the Suseo estate residents, from entering the private estate:

At first, moving into the estate, I did not understand the reinforced wall. Whilst, some neighbours said to me that you would understand it soon ... After often witnessing problematic behaviour by some of the Suseo estate residents, I finally could understand it and felt its usefulness ... they were bad people (Resident 3 of Private Estate 1 participants)

Figure 7.23 Each section of Private Estate 1 boundary wall

(The boundary wall with a main entrance, the right side shown in Figure 7.13)



(The boundary wall adjacent to the Suseo estate, the middle side shown in Figure 7.13)



(The boundary wall near the metro station, the left side shown in Figure 7.13)



Source: Author's visit, 2013

Participants working in organisations related to the Suseo estate residents, including the management office and the local government front-line office, mentioned difficulty in the relationship with the residents, revealing their understanding of the residents:

Many residents seem to have a kind of inferiority complex. The official name of this estate is the Suseo Permanent Rental Housing Estate, isn't it? But residents do not like to use this official name because it gives people the image of a concentration of the disadvantaged. So, we do not use this official name to the outside world (Member of the Suseo estate management office staff).

As the estate has brought a number of disadvantaged people together in one place, charity goods or support need to be fairly distributed among residents. Otherwise, there will be a lot of complaints from the residents. They tend to take charity goods or support for granted, rather than to appreciate them (Head of the local government front-line office).

Desire to leave the estate

Most of participants said that they would like to leave the estate if they were better off. One female participant who was a single parent confessed that living on the Suseo estate had disappointed her except for the cheapness of the accommodation, in particular indicating dissatisfaction with her neighbours living on the Suseo estate. One male participant who was also a single parent explained a similar dissatisfaction in detail:

I am dissatisfied with the neighbours living on the estate ... I am very disappointed with living on the estate from all aspects. The only reason why I reside on the estate putting up with unpleasant conditions is the cheap rent of this PRH. I would like to

leave the estate if I were better off. The fact that the estate was located in Gangnam made deciding to live here an easy decision, because I thought that its location would be very helpful for raising my children. However, after moving onto the estate, I realised that I should have been more careful in my decision at that time (B414, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate and single parent).

I waited for around four years to move onto the estate. I thought that I would save money, because the rent and maintenance fee are very cheap ... But things never happened the way I expected them to. My earnings as a taxi driver stay the same, whereas the cost of living is going up. There are many problematic people on the estate who shout noisily in wet weather, throw bottles on the ground in their blocks after drinking, or make noises through the floor. I believe that there is nobody staying the estate because of its good residential conditions. Cheap rent makes people continue to live in the estate, despite having some dissatisfaction (B38, single parent).

The reason why they wanted to leave the estate was problematic acts by some residents, as had been the case with the Junggye estate.

2) Research focus two: the causes of social exclusion on PRHEs

Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the estate

At first, since transport and facilities, including markets, hospitals and schools, were incomplete in the period immediately after completion of the SHSDA, this area was seen as having fallen behind as a residential area, despite its location in *Gangnam* (Cowalknews 2000). However, there are currently many facilities around the estate,

including schools, office buildings, hospitals, supermarkets and metro stations as a result of continuous development projects (MLTM 2010), as shown in Figure 7.24.

Figure 7.24 The overview around the Suseo estate



Source: map.google.uk

Consequently, they were satisfied with the environment of the estate. However, with regard to their units, some participants mentioned their small size (see Figures 7.3 and 7.15).

This is better than my previous dwelling because it is an apartment. But the size is small ... The smaller of the two rooms is only suitable for storage ... Really small (B49, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate).

As I have physical disabilities, I feel uncomfortable from the moment I enter my block ... The bathroom is really small (B25, disabled male).

Nevertheless, many participants showed satisfaction with the physical aspects of the estate and no Suseo estate participants mentioned physical obsolescence. However, this satisfaction was highly likely to be influenced by being free of the anxiety caused by high rents and poor housing:

The rent of privately rented housing was very high, and this forced me to move from a low-rent house to one with a much lower rent. The situation of living without a husband was very stressful for me and my children ... Before moving onto the Suseo estate, I and my children lived in my sister's house (B49, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate).

To be honest, we could not find any dwelling in Seoul with the deposit and rent that we pay for this PRH on the Suseo estate (B412, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate).

That's right. Given our circumstances, we have to comfort ourselves with the thought that living on the Suseo estate is a great relief for us (B410, resident who lost benefit qualification but was still living on the estate).

Concentration of disadvantaged group

As presented in the demographic characteristics of the Suseo estate, dwellings on the estate were occupied by benefit recipients, the disabled and lone parents (see Figure 7.19). This concentration was leading to stigmatisation of the estate:

Private estate residents living near the Suseo estate tend to keep their distance from the Suseo estate residents. The fact that vulnerable residents, including elderly people living alone, the disabled and alcoholics, live here causes private estate residents to have this tendency ... Our residents come to this office by the long way round rather than going through the private estate as a short cut because the private estate residents are reluctant for our residents to enter their estate (Member of the Suseo estate management office staff).

People recognise the Suseo estate as a place for the poor and the physically or mentally disabled ... This kind of recognition means that they do not rate our residents as equals (Head of the Suseo estate management office staff).

Anti-social behaviour by the estate residents

The reason why residents want to leave the Suseo estate if they are better off, even though they have some satisfaction with living on it, and the reason why non-residents of the estates, including private estate residents, have a strong tendency to recognise the Suseo estate residents as undeserving poor were the anti-social behaviour by some of the estate residents:

Problematic behaviour, such as making a noise and dumping rubbish or household goods from their units, are exhibited mainly by drunken residents or mentally disabled residents, who are not the majority of the Suseo estate residents (Head of the Suseo estate management office).

In summer, the disabled often drink around the store building on the estate. But they don't just drink. They frequently provoke passers-by into a quarrel without reason ... for example, by cursing them (Member of the welfare centre staff).

When I next move house, I will not live anywhere near a PRHE (Resident 3 of Private Estate 2 participants).

During the period of his visit to the Suseo estate, the researcher discovered the car relating to some residents' anti-social behaviour. The car had a big dent in its bonnet and a broken windscreen, as shown in Figure 7.25

Figure 7.25 Car damaged by the suicide of a resident on the Suseo estate



Source: Author's visit, 2013

According to the management office, the broken car was the outcome of a resident believed to have mental problems committing suicide; the resident, aged 47, killed himself by throwing himself out of his unit, located in twelfth floor, and this had left a big dent in the car:

There are also some suicides committed by problematic residents ... It was aftermath of a suicide a few days ago, when one resident jumped from his own unit (Member of the Suseo estate management office staff).

Institutional factors

The Suseo estate, being composed of PR also had the same allocation rules as the Junggye estate. Consequently, vulnerable people with little choice were concentrated in the estate. In addition, maintenance quality also was not noticeable because the resident had a tendency to be satisfied with physical aspects of the estate and their dwellings were last resorts to them.

Difference with the case of the Junggye estate

As presented so far, the results for the Suseo estate have had significant similarities with those in the Junggye estate: households with least choices became PRHE residents as a last resort; both estates have a reputation and suffer from stigma; the stigmatisation is caused and reinforced by the concentration of marginalised poor people and anti-social behaviour by some residents. The social downgrading of two case-study estates composed of PR is closely related with PRH policy within which kinds of PRH are stratified according to the income levels of households and PRH with lowest rent such PR is allocated to eligible tenants below a specific income level and other social disadvantages. Consequently, the two cases demonstrated the residualisation of the social housing sector.

However, there was a difference between two estates. In particular, the attitude towards the Suseo estate by neighbouring private estate residents was more critical than that towards the Junggye estate by their neighbouring private estate residents. This was associated with the geographical criteria of *Gangnam* and *Gangbuk*. *Gangnam*, where

the Suseo estate is located, is a brand new space and recognised as a modern and affluent one, whereas *Gangbuk*, where the Junggye estate is located, is recognised as a traditional but run-down region. As a result, *Gangnam* is recognised as an area of high property value by many Koreans (NGII 2010). In addition, in the process of developing the area, many prestigious schools were relocated to this area, which led to the influx of parents with high enthusiasm for their children (Ahn 2010). Indeed, many participants living on private estates near the Suseo estate argued that the estate, with the concentration of disadvantaged people, brought down their property value and lowered the prestige of the schools. Consequently, they had a stronger tendency to recognise the Suseo estate residents as the undeserving poor than private estate residents living near the Junggye estate.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented results in relation to the existence and causes of social exclusion on Public Rental Housing Estates in Korea through case studies of two estates: Junggye and Suseo. Both case-study estates were identified to have deteriorated socially at a local level because non-residents of PRHEs identified PRHEs and the two estates in particular as places for marginalised people and those with anti-social behaviour. Consequently, this chapter has identified that PRHEs, particularly comprising of PR, are highly likely to be residualised. Based on the results of the 2011 KHS analysis and the two case studies, the next chapter will seek to answer the research questions.

CHAPTER 8


SOCIAL EXCLUSION ON PUBLIC RENTAL HOUSING ESTATES IN SOUTH KOREA

8.1 Introduction

As presented in Chapter 1, this research was motivated by a desire to explore the phenomenon of ‘conflict’ at a local level between Public Rental Housing Estates (PRHEs) and non-residents of PRHEs, focusing on the isolation that PRHE residents experience as a product of stigmatisation resulting from the association between physical identification of PRHE and the residualisation of this form of housing. This issue has been widely debated within academic and government circles in Korea in terms of social exclusion (Kim 2004; Ha 2008; MLTM 2010). This has precipitated a discussion about the policy goal of PRHE development – its contribution to social integration through providing the poor with decent and affordable accommodation. The research had four objectives: exploring the existence of social exclusion on PRHE; looking at the characteristics of PRHEs where there was social exclusion; identifying the causal factors leading to social exclusion on PRHEs; and exploring responses for integrating socially excluded PRHEs. To answer the research questions associated with these objectives (see p.13) secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set and the two case-studies (i.e. the Junggye estate and the Suseo estate) were undertaken as a mixed

method approach, using an analytical framework derived from the literature reviews as shown in Figure 8.1 (see also Figure 3.2 and 5.2). The secondary analysis was expected to contribute to identifying the potential existence of social exclusion on PRHEs and the characteristics of socially excluded PRHEs, and to discovering explanatory factors of social exclusion on PRHEs. Meanwhile, the case studies were expected to confirm the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs and the characteristics of socially excluded PRHEs, and to find out more valid explanatory factors of social exclusion on PRHEs.

Figure 8.1 An analytical framework for answering the research questions



As discussed in the previous chapters (see Chapters 2 and 3), the ideological roots of social exclusion were embedded in welfare regimes and the social downgrading of social housing estates was identified to be closely related with changes in welfare

regimes. However, the term social exclusion and its spatiality are problematic as they develop out of Western literature. As a result, this chapter begins with examining the applicability of the term in the Korean welfare state regime and its associated Public Rental Housing (PRH). After that, it examines the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs, which is explained by theories related to the concept and measurement of social exclusion and the relationship between social exclusion and space, particularly drawing on the concept of solidarity, the measurement of individuals' participation in society and the cycle of labelling on PRHEs, as discussed in Chapter 2. Prior to identifying the causes of social exclusion on PRHEs, this chapter examines the characteristics of PRHEs with which social exclusion is associated in the literature (Van Beckhoven et al. 2009), which include a range of physical, demographic and institutional causes associated with the collapse of the Fordist model of production and consumption that underpinned post-war (WWII) mass housing estates. This process was discussed in Chapter 3. The chapter then identifies causal factors embedded in the characteristics of socially excluded PRHEs. Drawing on the above findings, it finally presents suggestions for enabling PRHEs to contribute to social integration.

8.2 Applicability of the term social exclusion

8.2.1 Social exclusion in the Korean welfare state

Following the liberation from Japan in 1945, modern Korea placed heavy emphasis on economic performance as a developmental welfare state seeking poverty eradication.

This developmentalism was driven by elite policy-making by institutes and bureaucratic mechanisms under authoritarian regimes. As a result, the state, dominated by authoritarian leaderships has been the strongest societal actor in modern Korea. The preoccupation with economic efficiency and growth led to rapid industrialisation, making Korea one of the four Asian Tigers, and was also used to legitimate authoritarian regimes. According to the notion of a productivist welfare regime suggested by Holliday (2000), social rights in this regime become minimal although they are sometimes extended in connection with productive activity (see Table 4.1). Indeed, the Korean developmental welfare state played a mainly regulatory role with no social or personal service provision, and all national resources were used for economic developmental purpose (see Section 4.2.2). Given the lack of effort by the state to shape the distribution of, and access to, goods and resources, welfare became heavily reliant on the family, in line with Confucianism, which places emphasis on strong family relationships (White and Goodman 1998; Kwon 1999). As social goods and rights were minimal, it is not legitimate to talk of social exclusion in Korean society during the period when the state was immersed in the productivist world of welfare capitalism.

A change in the developmental/productivist welfare regime started after the 1987 democratisation process. This led to the dismantlement of the authoritarian government, although Korean society remained under a developmental welfare regime until the 1990s because of transition arrangements and the traditional policy paradigm that prioritised economic growth over human welfare. This was firmly maintained by the military-turned-civilian government; the subsequent civilian government failed to eliminate the negative legacies of the developmental welfare regime such as collusion

between the state and the *Chaebol* (see Section 4.2.3). Globalisation, the 1997 economic crisis and the neo-liberal policies selected as responses to these produced unprecedented social risks beyond the traditional risk of poverty, and these included: a sharp rise in unemployment, a rise in casualised employment, increased family breakdown and homelessness and growing income polarisation (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3; Lee 2011b). As a result, Korea has been confronted with the welfare state in transition, in particular towards dismantlement of the developmental welfare regime (see Section 4.2.4). Considering that the term social exclusion emerged from the welfare transition (globalisation and neo-liberalism) and has been understood as multiple disadvantages replacing the term poverty (see Section 2.2 and 2.3), social exclusion is more relevant for understanding the interaction of the welfare state and the economy across space in the context of Korea in the 21st century.

8.2.2 PRH in the Korean welfare state and social exclusion

The previous section identified the applicability of the term social exclusion in Korean society in the framework of a welfare regime. As this research focuses on the space PRHE in Korea, the applicability of the term social exclusion in the framework of PRH needs to be examined. As discussed in Chapter 3, the development and decline of social housing has been associated with changes in welfare regimes (see Table 3.2). In particular, the residualisation of social housing occurred in regimes where the level of decommodification was low (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). This section examines the applicability of the term social exclusion in the space PRHE by looking at PRH provision in the Korean welfare state (see Figure 3.2).

As modern Korea had become entrenched in a developmental welfare regime by the 1990s, social policy had been subordinated to the economy and the acquisition of services and products had relied on the state-coordinated market. Housing also had been largely commodified and housing provision had been designed to reinforce economic growth, as in other East Asian countries based on developmentalism (see Section 4.3.2). In particular, the strategy to put property development and ownership in a much more significant position was very useful to offset the underdevelopment of social rights and public welfare services because housing prices increased continuously during an era of rapid growth. As the property-based welfare state was cultivated, mass housing units (high-rise apartments) for sale were constructed through the process of the public development. Consequently, apartment dwellings became the popular and unique housing type in the Korean property owning welfare state (Gelézeau 2007). Under the circumstance that property ownership became the major goal of Korean housing policy, social housing provision could not become a central concern (see Section 4.3.3). Indeed, there were few public rental housing programmes for vulnerable households on low incomes. Five-year Rental-housing (5R), introduced in 1984, which was the first social housing in Korea, was designed to be used as rental units for five years and after that be sold, and Permanent Rental-housing (PR), introduced in 1989 (after the 1987 democratisation), which was assessed as social housing in the true sense but ceased in 1992 because of austerity measures. As a result, the decommunification of housing scarcely existed in this period when Korea was immersed in a developmental welfare regime.

Although PRH provisions such as PR programme launched in the late 1980s, it was following the 1997 economic crisis that the Korean welfare state started to decommodify housing. The crisis, followed by economic restructuring, produced vulnerable households who lost their property ownerships or become unable to pay rent because of bankruptcy and unemployment (Lee 2011a). As private housing assets have become limited in their function as the main resources for the provision of social security, the Korean government has developed various kinds of PRH programmes such as 10R, MR, CR, 20R and Hangbok (happiness) housing following the implementation of One Million *Kukmin* (people) Rental Housing Construction Plan in 2002 (see Section 4.3.4). However, these PRH provisions have been carried out on the basis that they are legacies of the developmental welfare regime: most PRH has been constructed as high-rise apartments on land prepared by the process of the public development, in order to increase housing stock in a short time; and as the PRH construction goal has been to provide vulnerable and poor people with decent and affordable housing, PRH provision has achieved the principle of ‘targeting’ through means-testing (MLTM 2010). Thus PRH in Korea has been stratified according to the income levels of households, giving priority to disadvantaged groups such as benefit recipients, lone parents, tenants from clearance areas and new types of vulnerable groups including North Korean refugees (see Table 4.9). Although the decommodification of housing has proceeded since the 2000s, when the Korean welfare state entered its phase of transition, access to PRH has not reached the level of universalism where dwellings are open to all citizens without income limit. This finally allows us to see that PRH provision in Korea is based on a residual model that caters for the vulnerable and poor.

Consequently, PRHEs in Korea are characterised as high-rise apartment blocks, and as residential spaces for the lower classes that have restrictive allocation rules (see Section 4.3.5). As presented in Figure 3.2, the process of the decline post-WWII mass housing estates, which has led to social exclusion, has been explained by deterioration of multi-family housing blocks, the concentration of disadvantaged groups and ineffective institutional factors. Therefore, PRHEs in Korea may be also exposed to social exclusion. The next section will identify this by combining the results of a secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set with those of the two case studies.

8.3 Existence of social exclusion on PRHEs

8.3.1 The potential existence of social exclusion on PRHEs from the 2011 KHS


Although the 2011 KHS was carried out by the government for policy purposes, some data contributed to identifying the potential existence of social exclusion on PRHEs. In order to identify this, the study defined two concepts operationally – the *social exclusion* and the *characteristics* of a PRHE (see Section 5.3.3). The operationalised definition of the social exclusion of a PRHE has three dimensions (see Table 5.4): i) stigmatisation and anti-social behaviour derived from the ‘concentration effect’ and the ‘neighbourhood effect’ described by some scholars (Kristensen 1995; Somerville 1998; Taylor 1998; Atkinson and Kintrea 2001; Galster 2007; Lupton and Tunstall 2008) (see Section 2.6); ii) a lack of social, economic and political participation derived from Burchardt et al.’s (2002) measurement of social exclusion (see Section 2.4); and iii)

alienation from the outside derived from the solidarity paradigm of social exclusion (Silver 1994; Gordon et al. 2007) (see Section 2.3). In order to measure these three dimensions, indicators available in the 2011 KHS data set were selected according to each dimension (see Table 5.4). Drawing on this measurement, the following sections seek to identify the potential existence of social exclusion on PRHEs.


Stigmatisation and anti-social behaviour

Problematic neighbourhoods and localities open to social exclusion are characterised as being stigmatised and having visible anti-social behaviour (Somerville 1998; Kearns and Parkinson 2001) (see Chapter 2). These are evidenced by the concentration of marginalised poor people and deviance (see Section 2.6). With regard to this, the 2011 KHS investigated the disadvantages of residing in PRH among PRH households. The participants selected two disadvantages in order of priority from among fourteen disadvantages which were suggested in the questionnaire (see Appendix 3). Looking at disadvantages selected as the first priority, participants selected the item of ‘there are no disadvantages’ the most, irrespective of the kind of PRH (see Figure 8.2). This corresponded with low levels of dissatisfaction with PRH and the environments of PRHEs (Figure 6.6 and 6.8). The second most selected item was ‘high rent and maintenance fees’ except for PR and 5R households. This trend is understandable because rent and maintenance fees are sensitive matters for all tenants, regardless of the kind of rental housing – PRH or private rental housing. More attention needs to be paid to items of ‘yimdaejutake geojuja raneun jubyonue an joenun siseon’ (Stigmatisation of living in PRH in Korean) and ‘yiuteu gonggonjilseoehusikyi bujoekghaeseo’ (Lack of a


Figure 8.2 Disadvantages of residing in PRH in the 2011 KHS




20R households



10R households



5R households



sense of norms by residents in Korean). Consequently, the two items functioning as proxy indicators of social exclusion capturing the dimensions of stigmatisation and anti-social behaviour respectively on PRHEs could be used (see Table 5.4). As shown in Figure 8.2, both items are noticeably selected in PR, 50R and 30R households; in particular, they are conspicuously selected in PR and 50R households. Thus, if social exclusion exists on PRHEs, the PRHEs are highly likely to be estates composed of PR, 50R or 30R.

A lack of social, economic and political participation

Many scholars and organisations have developed indicators that measure social exclusion at local, national, and international level (Paugam 1995; Kristensen 1995; DSS 1999; Percy-Smith 2000; Burchardt et al. 2002) (see Section 2.4). In particular, measurement of social exclusion by four key activities developed by Burchardt et al. (2002: 30-1) was very useful for capturing exclusion's multidimensionality aside from income and unemployment.

Drawing on Burchardt et al.'s (2002) work, a further proxy measure of social exclusion on PRHEs was developed representing a lack of social, economic and political participation as the next dimension of social exclusion on PRHEs. The dimension was measured by indicators available in the 2011 KHS data set: *community activities* as a measure of social participation; *income, employment and schooling level* as a measure of economic participation; and *tenant committee* as a measure of political participation (see Table 5.4). The results are provided in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 Lack of participation indicated in the 2011 KHS

(% of surveyed households according to kind of PRH)

PRH households	Lack of social participation(A)	Lack of economic participation (B)	Lack of political participation (C)	A and B and C
PR households	87.4	92.0	49.8	33.7
50R households	89.9	54.0	31.0	21.8
30R households	93.3	43.7	28.7	16.4
20R households	85.7	18.3	12.1	4.6
10R households	90.9	19.8	34.0	8.0
5R households	87.5	22.3	25.1	8.3

The 2011 KHS investigated whether participants had participated in community activities on their estate. This item was used as an indicator to measure a lack of social participation (see Table 5.4). The proportion of respondents with no experience of participating in community activities on their estate amounted to around 90 per cent, regardless of type of PRH. In relation to a lack of economic participation, the 2011 KHS investigated average monthly household income, householder's employment and householder's schooling level. In case where household income was under national average household income, and a householder was unemployed and had finished schooling at middle school or below, this study regarded those households as households experiencing a lack of economic participation (see also Table 5.4). The proportion of respondents with an income under the national average monthly household income, and with unemployed householder who had finished schooling at middle school or below, was highest for PR households, followed by 50R households. The 2011 KHS also asked participants whether the tenant committee was a necessary organisation. This item was used as an indicator to measure a lack of political

participation (see also Table 5.4). The proportion of respondents answering that the tenant committee was unnecessary was also highest for PR households. Furthermore, this research investigated the ratio of households that showed a lack of all three categories of participation in order to stress the interactions between the types of participation and consider the multidimensional aspects of social exclusion. As a result, amongst PRH households the proportion of PR households experiencing a lack of all three categories of participation was significantly high (33.7 %). Thus, if social exclusion exists on PRHEs, the PRHEs are highly likely to be estates composed of Permanent Rental-housing (PR).


Alienation from the outside

The notion of social integration is the mirror concept of social exclusion (De Haan 2000; Shim 2001). The concept of social integration can be defined as interdependence between social units sharing solidarity (Jenson 1998). In Weber's classic writings, solidarity is defined as a communal and associative relationship (Weber, quoted in Van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 7), contrasted with Tönnies's (1955[1887]) *gemeinschaft und gesellschaft* (community and society) (see Section 2.3). Therefore, social exclusion can be understood as breakdown of social relationships (Silver 1994). Socially excluded people or groups can experience the process of segregation or alienation from the outside – that is from the mainstream society (Boelhouwer 1999).

Relationships with neighbours (available in the 2011 KHS data set; see Table 5.4) were used as a proxy indicator for alienation from the outside). Figure 8.3 shows the

percentgae of households in the 2011 KHS that were satisfied with the ‘relationships with neighbours (RN)’; this was used here to signal wider (dis)satisfaction with the PRHE environments (see also Figure 6.7). It is noticeable that PR households had significantly higher dissatisfaction than other householders, signalling a higher exposure to the process of social exclusion on PR estates because dissatisfaction with relationship with neighbours can precipitate a feeling of ‘we are different’, which is contrary to the concept of solidarity (Van Oorschot and Komter 1998).

Figure 8.3 Alienation from the outside: RN in the 2011 KHS



Ultimately, in all the dimensions of social exclusion on PRHEs, the PRHE composed of PR is the estate that has highest potential for the existence of such social exclusion, ahead of any other PRHE such as 50R, 30R, 20R, 10R or 5R estates. However, since

this result came from secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set and the KHS was a one-off survey that lacked a time dimension, the existence of social exclusion on PR estates will be confirmed by the results of the case studies of two PR estates.

8.3.2 The existence of social exclusion on PR estates from the case studies

Case selection in this study was based on the results of a secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set in order to pursue theoretical generalisation as discussed in Chapter 5: the ratio of Permanent Rental-housing (PR) households experiencing all the dimensions of social exclusion of a PRHE tended to be the highest ratio among all PRH households, so a PR estate was selected to be a case (see Figure 8.2, Table 8.1 and Figure 8.3); and two PR estates (i.e. the Junggye estate and the Suseo estate) were selected among the estates having PR households experiencing all the dimensions of social exclusion of a PRHE simultaneously in the 2011 KHS data set. The case studies were expected to confirm the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs and the characteristics of socially excluded PRHEs, and to find out more valid explanatory factors of social exclusion on PRHEs.

To verify social exclusion on PR estates on the basis of the two case-study results presented in Chapter 7, this study relies mainly on Taylor's (1998) work (see Figure 2.2). According to her, social housing estates with social exclusion experience the cycle of labelling, which is a circular movement through the stages of 'people moving onto social housing estates as a last resort', 'residents accepting the estate's negative image', 'the estate's negative image among outsiders', and 'replacement by people with least choice.' (1998: 821). This destructive process can be referred to as giving shape to the

‘concentration effect’ and the ‘neighbourhood effect’ (Kristensen 1995; Somerville 1998; Taylor 1998; Atkinson and Kintrea 2001; Galster 2007; Lupton and Tunstall 2008), which are represented by stigmatisation and anti-social behaviour (see Section 2.6). Additionally, this section attempts to confirm the existence of social exclusion on PR estates by looking at social relationships between PR estate residents and non-residents on a basis of the concept of solidarity (see Section 2.3).

PR estate as a last resort

The ‘cycle of labelling’ leading to social exclusion on social housing estates begins with moving-in of people who have least choice (see Figure 2.2). They who are not able to have options and access to the private housing market choose social housing as a last resort. The case studies of the two PR estates demonstrated that the residents chose the PR estates because of their economic hardship. All PR estate resident participants explained that economic hardship had forced them to move from housing with low rent to housing with even lower rent – and much poorer conditions – resulting in a situation where they had little choice in the rental housing market (see Figures 7.9 and 7.21 which are illustrative of these processes of moving onto the estates). This led to a kind of relief from the fear of losing their home due to a rent increase, and from living in poor housing that included shanties. However, they soon identified that those with least choice like them had been concentrated on the estates consisting of PR.

As discussed above (see Section 8.2.2), Public Rental Housing Estates (PRHEs) have been developed for collective occupation of a location by vulnerable and poor groups

excluded from the industrialisation process based on developmentalism and economic restructuring processes since the 1997 economic crisis in modern Korea. In particular PRHEs composed of PR have been positioned as a last tenure and an institutional place for people. These people are those who cannot help being involved in low-paid work and settling in shanty towns because of a lack of skill and knowledge appropriate for the era of industrialisation, and who can belong to new groups of poor resulting from the 1997 economic crisis. Indeed, some of the estate resident participants moved onto the estates from shanty towns known as *Dal Dongnei*, and some residents decided to live on the estate because of aggravated economic hardship following the economic crisis (see Table 5.8, Figure 7.9, Figure 7.21 and the second quote on p.257).

Residents accepting PR estate's negative image

As people with least choice are concentrated in specific places, these places are positioned as deprived and stigmatised neighbourhoods (Madanipour 1998). Both case-study estates had a reputation and were stigmatised: '*Geogi Dongnei*' (neighbourhood for beggars in Korean) on the Junggye estate; and '*Younggu*' (a metaphor for an abnormal person) on the Suseo estate (see Sections 7.2.3 and 7.3.3). The estates were recognised as places occupied by poor and vulnerable people, and as a result, many resident participants had a tendency to hide from third parties that they lived on the estates (see the first quote on p.220 and the first and second quotes in p.248). It was interesting to note that the residents felt uncomfortable about these expressions but did not deny that the image existed when it came up in interviews with them.

According to Taylor (1998), people who move into social housing as a last resort lose confidence and accept a sense of failure. Confidence means belief in oneself and in one's ability to succeed (Cobuild 2006); but the residents living in the two case-study estates were far from having this belief because of their socio-economic status. Both estates could be characterised as having ageing householders, long-stay residents, and one- or two-person households, which could be linked with 'a phase of declining population and economic activity' described by Murie et al. (2003: 28-9). The majority of the residents whom the researcher met on the two estates had no full-time jobs and lived off national benefits, temporary part-time jobs or, in a few cases, allowances from their sons or daughters. In addition, around 22 per cent of the participants had completed up to high school level: 48 per cent had completed up to middle school level; and approximately 30 per cent had only completed up to primary school level. According to the 2010 Census, around 35 per cent of the population of Korea had been educated to the point where they completed high school (KNSO 2011). Given the average age of the participants was around 64 years old, there were low prospects for improved socio-economic status. These results were quite similar to those produced by analysis of the results of the 2011 KHS, where around 80 per cent of PR householders had only been educated to middle school level or below, and the median age of PR householders was 66 years (see Figures 6.10 and 6.16).

Indeed, some residents' life stories illustrated this (see Figures 7.9 and 7.21); two residents, for example, came up to Seoul from rural areas but those without the skill and knowledge sought by industrialised society became labourers. They eventually became PR estate residents and benefit recipients because of continuous economic hardship

although they had once managed to get along with the help of healthy husband or hard work. They have lived alone or with an unemployed son as a benefit recipient for more than twenty years on the estates. In the case of one resident with a job – the person who had graduated from high school but had no special skill and became a taxi driver – he, as a single parent, decided to live on the estate with the intention of saving money because the PR rent and maintenance fees were very cheap, but the reality was not in accordance with his expectation. His earnings as a taxi driver had remained stationary while living costs continued to go up. As a result, his wish to save money and support his children well was still not being realised. He had lived on the estate for more than ten years (see the second quote on p.257).

Taylor (1998) argues that residents not only accept a sense of failure but also internalise it. The majority of participants whom the researcher met concealed their address from people outside (as presented in Chapter 7), evidence of them trying to distance themselves from the estate and of being ashamed of living on the estate.

PR estate's negative image among outsiders

Although the outsiders referred to in Taylor's (1998) work were non-residents such as professionals, politicians and the media, this research focused on non-residents of a PRHE such as neighbouring private estate residents, PRHE management office staff, community welfare centre staff and local government front-line officials because they had more opportunities to meet, see, hear and talk with PRHE residents in their everyday lives than the kinds of outsiders referred to by Taylor.

To a varying degree, outsiders were giving the estates negative images, which can be summarised as (see Sections 7.2.3 and 7.3.3):


- concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged people such as benefit recipients, the disabled and lone parents
- dependency on national benefits and charity goods distributed by community welfare centres
- anti-social behaviour such as repeated day time drinking in public space, juvenile delinquency and, in extreme cases, suicide

In particular, participants living on private estates adjacent to the PR estates were giving more negative images (see a quote on p.225 and the second quote on p.254). Other outsiders such as the management office staff, community welfare centre staff and local government front-line officials showed a tendency to limit the problems to a few residents. However, the private estate residents had a tendency to consider most PR estate residents as problematic people (see the private estate residents' quotes on p.232, p.233, p.247 and p.252). They magnified those negative images, as in the argument by Taylor (1998), and demonstrated a strong tendency to recognise the residents as the undeserving poor without a good standard of conduct and a sense of responsibility. This tendency can be explained by a tradition in Korean society. As Korean society has been influenced by Confucianism which values academic pursuits and despises commercial and industrial pursuits (White and Goodman 1998), education has been seen as the symbol of the upper class and, since industrialisation, has been the step for obtaining well-paid jobs (see Chapter 4). Also, Confucianism emphasises the value of the family

(MCST 2013). Moreover, the Korean developmental welfare state, based on Confucianism with heavy reliance on the welfare role of the family, has used all national resources for economic efficiency and growth. Thus the state has subordinated social policies to economic policies, which has led to the low level of decommodification. Housing investment has also been carried out for economic growth and has been unbalanced. Many public or private apartment blocks were constructed for sale, emphasising property ownership; and Five-year Rental-housing (5R), which can be viewed as the first Public Rental Housing in modern Korea, was created with the intention that it would be sold after five years. Although various types of PRH such as PR, 30R, 20R and 10R have been developed under a change in the nature of the Korean welfare state since the late 1980s, the PRH has been recognised as a programme not for the general public but for the poor.

Accordingly, households that are characterised as having low-level schooling and unemployment, and moreover live on PRHEs are more likely to be considered as groups who have not responded to the developmental process of modern Korea. Indeed, residents of the two case-study estates who could be characterised as having low-level schooling and being unemployed have not been recognised as the powerless victims of circumstance by the non-residents who are the mainstream members of society, at least at a local level. In addition, the visibility of repeated anti-social behaviour by some of the estate residents, and their welfare dependency has caused negative views outside the estates. This mechanism is provided in Figure 8.4.

Figure 8.4 The mechanism of viewing the PRHE residents negatively by non-residents



Replacement by people with least choice

The cycle of labelling is completed by an influx of people with fewest choices into vacancies caused by the moving out of some residents with choice (see Figure 2.2). As this cycle is repeated, social housing estates become more stigmatised and socially excluded. As presented in Table 4.9, eligibility for PR is given to benefit recipients, lone parents, disabled people, and people displaced from urban redevelopment project. Thus, even though some residents may leave PR estates for reasons such as becoming able to purchase property, finding other rental dwellings at a lower rent or in a better environments, or death, they will be replaced by other vulnerable groups with similar or even more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, according to the allocation rules. Therefore, in the case where some vacant units occur in PR estates, people with least choice will move into these vacancies as a last resort, and the cycle of labelling will be repeated, as in the argument by Taylor (1998). However, according to the case-study

results, PR estate residents' disadvantaged circumstances reduced their ability to exercise choice and leave the estate even though they recognised the negative image of outsiders and were frustrated by repeated anti-social behaviour on the estates. As a result, vacancies did not often occur on PR estates. As shown in the average duration of residence on each case-study estate, more than 60 per cent of all households on each estate had been there for 20 years or more (see Figures 7.5 and Figure 7.17). The households were highly likely to have lived on the estate from its opening, given that both case-study estates were built in 1992. Some residents explained that they could not afford a dwelling with the same conditions and location as those of the estates with the same deposit and rent that they paid for their homes on the PR estates (see the second quote on p.231 and the third quote on p.259). Moreover, they could only get low-paid work, due to a lack of skill and low-level schooling, or they lived as benefit recipients (see Table 5.8), or they were elderly people (see Figures 7.4 and 7.16).

Social relationships between PR estate residents and non-residents

This study pays attention to two categories of social relationship between PR estate residents and non-residents: one is social relationships between PR estate residents and estate management office staff, community welfare centre staff and local government front-line officials; the other is social relationships between PR estate residents and private estate residents living near the estates. According to Weber's communal and associative relations (see section 2.3), contrasted with Tönnies's (1955[1887]) *gemeinschaft und gesellschaft* (community and society), the former social relationships are associative relationships – a feeling of 'we need each other' (i.e. shared utility). The

reason for this is that the residents are dependent on management services from the management office, welfare services from the welfare centre and national benefits from the front-line office. Consequently, a more significant point is whether communal relationships, which refer to a feeling of ‘we are one’ (i.e. shared identity), are also formed between them. In interviews with management office staff and welfare centre staff on both estates, these people admitted that PRHE residents are vulnerable people who need help and support, but they also criticised PRHE residents’ behavioural problems and a taken-for-granted attitude to welfare services, and some of them showed tendency to see them as the undeserving poor who lack the sense of public order required for community life (see the second quote on p.221 and the first quote on p.226). Although the researcher was not able to cover all types of relationships with residents, because these varied according to each member of staff working at the management office, the welfare centre and the front-line office, the results of interviews with people who had responsible positions in each organisation did not show the formation of a communal relationship between PRHE residents and these non-residents.

The other type of relationship is that between PR estate residents and private estate residents living near the estates. With regard to associative relationships, there were few areas involving adjustment of interests or agreement between PR estate residents and private estate residents because there was no utility which was of interest to both groups, contrary to the relationships between PRHE residents and management office staff, community welfare centre staff and front-line officials. Exceptional evidence pointing to a kind of associative relationship between them was found on the Junggye estate, but it showed that this relationship had broken down. It was the closed gate in the boundary

wall between the estate and Private Estate 2 that demonstrated a trace of associative relationship and its breakdown. When the gate was open, the Junggye estate residents had been able to enter the private estate through the gate for a short cut to the bus stations, and the private estate residents had been able to use the stores on the Junggye estate, because their estate did not have any, through the gate. Thus, the gate helped to form a perception that ‘we need each other’. However, as shown in Figure 7.10, now, the gate had been locked by the Junggye estate residents and blocked with red blocks by the private estate residents. On the other hand, a communal relationship, as another type, was also the source of negative feelings between PR estate residents and private estate residents. The PR estate residents believed that the people on the surrounding private estates disrespected them because they lived on the PR estate with a concentration of the socio-economically disadvantaged. The higher and reinforced sections of the boundary wall in the case of the Suseo estate were thought to result from private estate residents’ disrespect toward the PR estate residents. Furthermore, some private estate residents were seriously considering moving out to areas without PRHEs. Consequently, PR estate residents and private estate residents treated each other according to feelings of ‘we are different.’ Therefore, except for the associative relationship between PR estate residents and their management office staff, welfare centre staff and front-line officials, there was little in the way of social relationships at least between the PR estate residents and the non-residents whom the researcher selected and interviewed for this research.

Ultimately, as the cycle of labelling and the erosion of social relationships between PR estate residents and non-residents were identified through the case studies, social exclusion on the PR estates was confirmed.

8.4 Characteristics of PR estates

This section discusses the characteristics of socially excluded PRHEs that are the subject of the second research question in this study. As presented in Chapter 5, investigating these characteristics is a pre-phase to identifying explanatory factors for social exclusion on PRHEs (see Figure 5.2). For this, this research operationally defined the characteristics of a PRHE in three aspects – that is, physical, demographic and institutional – drawing on the theoretical approaches provided by Van Beckhoven et al. (2009) in order to explain the social downgrading of post-WWII mass housing estates (see Section 5.3.3). As PRHES composed of Permanent Rental-housing (PR) were identified to be socially excluded from the outside at a local level in the previous section, this section seeks to examine the characteristics of PR estates on the basis of the results of a secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set and those of the two case studies.

8.4.1 Overall characteristics verified by the 2011 KHS

Physical characteristics

According to the 2011 KHS, all PR units were in multi-family apartment blocks; furthermore, 99.5 per cent of all PRH units were apartments and the remainder were row houses (see Section 6.2.2). However, this was not unique to PRH. Actually, as many as 58 per cent of all housing units in Korea were apartment types, as of 2010 (MLTM 2011). This building style has been encouraged by the Korean governments in order to increase housing stock in a short time in the rapid process of urbanisation,

given that nearly 65.3 per cent of Korea consists of mountains and forests and the amount of land available is small (MLTM 2010). As a result, multi-family apartment blocks are currently positioned as the preferred and dominant building style in Korean society (Ha 2010; MLTM 2012b). Although PR has been built as an apartment type against this background, it has the smallest housing size among PRH (see Figure 6.4). As PR has been targeted at the lowest-income bracket, it has the smallest housing size in order to realise the cheapest rent (Table 4.9 and Figure 6.4). The oldest PRH units were the PR units, because the other kinds of PRH have been built intensively since the 1990s (see Figure 6.2). However, green-field sites around PR estates have been changed into urban areas by rapid urbanisation and continuous (re)development projects, which has led to better accessibility for PR estate residents than for other PRH estate residents (see Figure 4.7).

Demographic characteristics

PR households do seem to enter a phase of declining population and economic activity according to the life-cycle stages suggested by Murie et al. (2003: 28-9). That is, households living in PR had the oldest heads, the longest residence, the highest unemployment, the lowest-level schooling, the highest proportion of people on disability, the lowest income and the highest proportion of people on national benefits of all the kinds of PRH households (see Figure 6.10, Figure 6.12, Table 6.3, Figure 6.16, Table 6.4, Figure 6.17 and Table 6.5). As a result, the PR estates composed of high-rise apartment blocks are residential space for the lower classes, unlike private apartment estates for the upper and middle classes who seek to cultivate housing as their main

asset beyond its shelter function under the property owning welfare state (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.5).

Institutional characteristics

The above demographic characteristics of PR estates have been reinforced by PRH policy, within which PRH is stratified according to the income levels of households and PRH with the lowest rent, such as PR, is allocated to eligible tenants below a specific income level with other social disadvantages (see Table 4.9). There is an imbalance as a result of the allocation rules stipulated by the central government. Households with eligibility for PRH are in principle those with low incomes who do not own their own homes. But, applicants for PR are more concentrated in the vulnerable groups than applicants for other kinds of PRH. These vulnerable groups include benefit recipients, lone parents, the disabled, North Korean refugees, and so on and they are given priority when PR is allocated. Around 75 per cent of PR households were in PR due to their eligibility as national benefit recipients, according to the 2011 KHS (see Section 6.4.1).

On the one hand, with regard to other institutional factors such as letting, delivery of management and maintenance, PR had the longest waiting time as vacancy levels and turnover were low. Thus, it was less possible for letting difficulties to occur, compared to other PRH (see Figure 6.18). It was letting difficulties that created the connection between the physical obsolescence of social housing estates and the estates' social decline in the West (Power 1997). In order to tackle letting difficulties resulting from physical decay on social housing estates, more vulnerable groups were accepted and

allowed to move onto the estates. As a result, the estates become unpopular and stigmatised places leading to social exclusion (see Section 3.5.2). Consequently, the small likelihood of letting difficulties on PR estates in Korea makes the application of physical processes to explain social exclusion on PR estates difficult. In addition, the level of satisfaction with maintenance and the way management is delivered on PR estates were not distinctive, compared to other PRH (see Figures 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21). These factors provide less of explanation of social exclusion on PR estates.

8.4.2 Distinctive characteristics verified by the case studies

The characteristics of the two case-study PRHEs generally corresponded to those verified by the 2011 KHS: multi-family apartment blocks; concentration of disadvantaged groups caused by the strict allocation rules; long duration of residence; and little letting difficulty because of the existence of waiting lists (see Sections 7.2.2 and 7.3.2). However, two distinctive characteristics need to be pointed out.

Physical (dis)satisfaction

Post-WWII social housing estates in the West were located in green-field sites separated from the city, in the hope of saving money, avoiding many urban restrictions and supplying many dwellings at one time (Power 1997: 57). But, these locations caused problems of accessibility leading to feelings of isolation (Dekker and Van Kempen 2005: 20). Unlike those estates, the two case-study estates in Korea were located in urban areas with various facilities and transport (see Figure 7.11 and 7.24). In fact, as

discussed above, PR households were highly satisfied with accessibility compared to other PRH households in the 2011 KHS because green-field sites around the PRHEs had been changed into urban areas by rapid urbanisation and continuous (re)development projects (see Figure 4.7). In addition, the apartment type is the preferred and dominant building style (HA 2010; MLTM 2012b). Many resident participants showed satisfaction with the location and building style (although some residents did complain about the small size of PR units), despite the fact that the average size of PR household was the smallest amongst the average household sizes of PRH (see Table 6.2 and Figure 7.3). This also signals another issue concerning size and assumptions about the relationships, roles and lifestyle of older households in PR such as entertaining, having family and friends staying over and so on. In the UK debate on smaller household sizes to meet changes in the demographic profile of households following the Barker review of planning and housing, one contributor to a parliamentary select committee observed that:

“We are in danger of developing too many monolithic one and two bedroom apartments on the assumption that households will be smaller. Households will still have friends and where they have been divorced and have families, they will want their kids to stay over” (House of Commons 2006: Ev 11).

However, this satisfaction with some physical aspects was more likely to be influenced by a sense of relief from a concern about the landlords of private houses asking them to pay more rent or move out when an agreed tenancy finished. Those with least choice decided to reside on the estates to avoid that pressure. Moreover, most participants

would like to move out of these estates if they were better off because of the estates' negative image, which forces them to conceal their address, and the repeated anti-social behaviour by some residents. Consequently, physical considerations were less of issue for residents.

Relief from the pressure of living in private rental housing and a tendency to accept physical consideration as less important contributed to residents' longer stay on PRHEs. In particular, some residents who lost their entitlement to national benefits continued to live on the estate which resulted, ironically, in them paying increased deposit and rents, as will be discussed in the following section.

People who lost their entitlement to national benefits but still stayed on the estates

Around half of all households in both estates had lost their benefit entitlement but remained on the estates (see Figures 7.7 and 7.19). Since they were not qualified to continue to receive benefits, they were arguably still vulnerable. They were regarded as the so-called 'cha sangwi gechung' (the near poor in Korean), and although they just about rose above the poverty threshold, they were still in economic hardship and some of them continued to ask for re-entitlement to benefits to be considered (see the second quote on p.222).

At first, these residents moved onto the estates as benefit recipients, but their income exceeded the official poverty thresholds established by the government (see Table 8.2)

Table 8.2 The official poverty thresholds by average monthly income

	1 person household	2 person household	3 person household	4 person household	5 person household	6 person household
2010	£282	£497	£621	£763	£904	£1,050
2011	£298	£507	£656	£805	£954	£1,103
2012	£310	£527	£682	£837	£991	£1,146
2013	£320	£545	£705	£865	£1,025	£1,185
2014	£338	£575	£744	£912	£1,081	£1,250

Note: in the case of a 4 person household living in a PR unit with 26.37m² on two estates, rent is around 8 per cent of the poverty threshold, as of 2011.

Source: Health and Welfare Statistics, stat.mw.go.kr.

after their residence on the estates began, which led to them losing their entitlement. However, they could continue to stay, according to the rules, whereby people losing their entitlement can continue to reside on PRHE by paying a small increase in deposit and rent if they do not own their own houses (MTLM 2010; and see Table 7.1). According to the secondary of the 2011 KHS data set, PR estate residents were characterised by features such as unemployment, low-level schooling, disability and low-income, regardless of their eligibility for PR (see Table 6.3, Figure 6.16, Table 6.4 and Figure 6.17). Furthermore, the ‘cha sangwi gechung’ households in Korea, whose number was 7.3 per cent of all household as of 2006, had socio-economically disadvantaged characteristics such as female heads, being elderly, being single parents, being poorly educated, being unemployed and being in casualised employment (Kim 2009a: 109). Consequently, those who lost their entitlement to national benefits but still have stayed on the PR estates were also the marginalised poor, and were overrepresented on the estates.


8.5 Causal factors of social exclusion on PR estates

The framework for exploring the characteristics of PRHEs was derived from the main factors explaining the social downgrading of social housing estates in the West: physical obsolescence; a concentration of disadvantaged newcomers; and institutional factors such as allocation rules giving priority to the disadvantaged and maintenance quality (see Figure 3.2). Thus, the previous section examined the characteristics of PR estates on which social exclusion had been verified as existing, from the physical, demographic and institutional perspectives. Consequently, the causal factors of social exclusion on PR estates were mainly embedded in the demographic and institutional aspects, in particular the concentration of marginalised poor people and allocation rules oriented toward the disadvantaged, according to the results of secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set and the case studies of the two PRHEs. The following sections explain how each factor leads to social exclusion on PR estates, in a comparison with the theoretical process reviewed in the literature.

8.5.1 Concentration and problematic behaviour

According to scholars (Kristensen 1995; Somerville 1998; Atkinson and Kintrea 2001 Galster 2007; Lupton and Tunstall 2008), the spatiality of social exclusion is realised by the process illustrated in Figure 8.5 (left-hand side: Theoretical process). Because of the concentration of people whose behaviour differs from the norms of the mainstream as an internal factor, and poor neighbourhood environment as an external factor, an

Figure 8.5 The process of decline and the concentration of marginalised people



increase in anti-social behaviour occurs, leading to negative reputation and a stigma (see Section 2.6). Finally the neighbourhood is socially excluded from the outside.

Although the concentration of marginalised poor people and deviance resulting in anti-social behaviour were potentially identified to exist on PR estates through the secondary analysis of 2011 KHS data set (see Sections 8.3.1 and 8.4.1), the two case-study estates composed of PR showed the declining process whereby those factors led to social exclusion on the PR estates, as illustrated in Figure 8.5 (right-hand side: Process in this study). The PR estate residents, characterised as benefit recipients, lone parents, the

disabled, poorly educated people, low-income people and the aged, were recognised as the undeserving poor by outsiders at the local level, particularly neighbouring private estate residents, who criticised their welfare dependency and anti-social behaviour. Some evidence such as daytime drinking in open space by some residents and a car damaged by one resident's suicide were witnessed by the researcher (see Figures 7.12 and 7.25).

Most participants including the PR estate residents and non-residents showed a tendency to attribute the visibility of anti-social behaviour to the influx of vulnerable people. As the estates have been occupied by people with underprivileged characteristics, such as benefit recipients, the unemployed, the poorly educated, the physically or psychologically disabled and single parents, social interaction at this level was testified to contribute to the occurrence of problematic behaviour by the participants (see 2) in Section 7.2.3 and 2) in Section 7.3.3). Meanwhile, the case-study estate environments surrounded by many facilities such as welfare centres, metro stations, schools, hospitals and supermarkets, was difficult to point to as an external factor explaining anti-social behaviour on the PR estates (see Figures 7.11 and 7.24). Consequently, outsiders showed their reluctance to interact with PR residents; in particular, private estate residents reinforced the boundary wall between their estates and the PR estates; and some private estate parents transferred their children from the school attended by PR estate children to another school. Meanwhile, the PR estate residents' responses were to conceal their address.

8.5.2 Restrictive allocation rules

The immediate reason why marginalised poor resident were concentrated on PR estates is that PR is allocated to eligible tenants below a specific income level with some combination of priority groups, including lone parents, the disabled and urban squatters (MLTM 2010; Andrews et al. 2011; MLTM 2011). According to a breakdown of households according to eligibility for the two case-study estates composed of PR, national benefit recipients and those who had lost their benefit entitlement but still stayed on the estates accounted for the majority of households on both estate: approximately 97 per cent on the Junggye estate; and approximately 91 per cent on the Suseo estate (see Figures 7.7 and 7.19). Those who lost their entitlement to national benefits but still stayed on the PR estates were also the marginalised poor, known as the ‘cha sangwi gechung’ (the near poor in Korean) (see Section 8.4.2). Other kinds of eligible tenants were also key groups of people most likely to be regarded as excluded in the literature, such as single parents and the disabled. The analysis results of the 2011 KHS has also shown that the predominant type of resident on PR estates was a recipient of national benefits (see Section 6.4.1).

According to Kemeny’s (1995) dualist model of rental housing where there is segregation between non-profit and profit-oriented providers (see Figure 3.1), rental housing supplied by non-profit providers tends to be reserved mainly for the poorest section of the population, with strict means-testing and non-profit rents, and to be stigmatised and residualised. The rental housing system in Korea was based on a dualist model. Most PRH was established by public providers such as local governments and

public corporations (see Section 4.3.4). As initial rent levels in PRH should not exceed the ones set by government criteria, and rent increases are limited by caps, indexation to the residential cost/price index, and fluctuation in the rate of *Chonsei* prices, PRH tends to have lower rents compared to private rental housing, where there is little rent control (MLTM 2010). In these circumstances, socio-economically disadvantaged households that are not able to rent or buy a dwelling on the market have no choice but to rely on PR estates like the Junggye estate or the Suseo estate as a last resort.

The reason that PR has these restrictive allocation rules is closely related to a change in the nature of the Korean welfare state triggered by the 1987 democratisation movement (see Chapter 4). PR was launched in 1989 (MLTM 2010). Since the 1945 liberation, Korea had placed heavy emphasis on economic performance as a developmental welfare state, and poverty had been an overriding concern. As a result, individual welfare levels were heavily dependent on the family (White and Goodman 1998). However, the 1987 democratisation process dismantled the authoritarian regimes and made political actors sensitive to demands from various sections of society. As a result, redevelopment projects to clear and demolish shanty towns starting from the mid-1980s provoked the strong resistance of the urban poor living in the towns, which led to the shaping of a PR programme. Under the legacies of developmentalism, which emphasised economic efficiency, PR had been established for the poorest section of the population. As time has passed, PR programme gradually came to include various socially disadvantaged groups such as the disabled and lone parents (MLTM 2010). Under developmentalism, disabled people could not help being excluded from the labour market, and becoming excluded group in modern Korea (Presidential Transition

Committee 2003). Under Confucianism, which places great emphasis on perfect family arrangements, lone parenthood has been considered as a social problem in Korean society. Furthermore, as the role of females in Korea traditionally has been limited to that of the main carers within the family by Confucianism, single mothers have experienced increasing economic hardship, compared to single fathers (Yoo and Kwak 2007). As North Korean refugees have recently had eligibility for PR, PR estates have reinforced themselves as the place for accommodating vulnerable groups in modern Korea.

Consequently, social exclusion on PR estates has been caused by the concentration of marginalised poor people followed by problematic behaviour as an endogenous factor and strict allocation rules oriented toward those people as an exogenous factor. The next section will discuss the application of the criterion of physical obsolescence, which is another factor to explain the social downgrading of social housing estates.

8.5.3 Inapplicability of physical process to explain social exclusion on PRHEs

According to Power (1997), the decline of post-WWII social housing estates is caused by the physical obsolescence of social housing estates characterised as high-rise apartment blocks with concrete and concrete panels as the main building medium. This leads to letting problems, which are followed by the acceptance of more vulnerable people, thus creating the image of a ghetto (Newman 1972; Power 1997; Van Beckhoven et al. 2009).

As discussed in Section 8.4, PR estates also consisted of high-rise apartment blocks that were built by industrial methods, and were built before other kinds of PRHEs. Furthermore, PR was designed as the smallest housing size to cater for smaller household sizes in order to realise the cheapest rent (see Table 4.9 and Figure 6.4). Some participants living on the two case-study estates complained about PR physical conditions including small housing size (see 2) in Section 7.3.3). However, some physical features were valued: the estates were currently located in urban areas not green-field sites; and they were designed as apartments, which is preferred and prevalent in modern Korea – although some residents' satisfaction with these features was in doubt because it was likely to be influenced by a sense of relief to be freed from the fear of losing their home due to a rent increase, and from the fear of living in poor housing (see 2) in Section 7.2.3 and 2) in Section 7.3.3). In addition, levels of dissatisfaction with PRH and PRHE environments as a whole were low, and there were no distinctions in terms of satisfaction between the different PRH types in the 2011 KHS (see Figures 6.6 and 6.8). Moreover, according to the physical processes that explain social exclusion on mass housing estates in the West, physical obsolescence has led to letting difficulties, which have led to more acceptances of the disadvantaged to avoid vacancies. Physical deterioration has been channelled into the social decline of the estates through letting difficulties. However, according to the 2011 KHS data set, among PRH households it was PR households that had spent the longest time waiting to reside in their housing, showing little likelihood that letting difficulties would occur (see Figure 6.18), and the case studies confirmed that there were few letting problems on either estates, as shown in the existence of waiting lists: a total of 100 waiting list tenants on the Junggye estate; and a total of 90 waiting list tenants on the Suseo estate.

Consequently, an explanation of social exclusion on PR estates drawing on physical process could not be applied in Korea, and physical obsolescence was not a valid explanatory factor for social exclusion on PR estates.

8.6 Suggestions for enabling PRHEs to contribute to social integration

The research identified that PRHEs in Korea, in particular those composed of PR, play an important role in the causation of social exclusion, thus failing to meet the government goal of PRHE developments – that is, contribution to social integration through providing marginalised poor people with decent and affordable housing. Drawing on these findings, this section discusses the question: what is needed to enable PRHEs to contribute to social integration? As discussed so far, social exclusion on PRHEs has been identified in the process of looking at the Korean welfare state regime, PRH policy in the regime, and the information generated by micro-level investigation on PRHEs through the 2011 KHS data set analysis and the case-studies, on the basis of an analytical framework for answering the research questions (see Figure 8.1). This section provides the following three suggestions derived from the process.

8.6.1 Enhancing the level of decommodification in the Korean welfare state

Housing in modern Korea had been commodified for a long time in a welfare regime that emphasised economic performance and the welfare roles of the family and private housing assets. Decommodified housing – that is, PRH – has been provided under a

welfare regime in which an authoritarian government has been dismantled and the developmentalism has been in transformation. However, as the initial PRH programmes including PR were designed only for people with socio-economic disadvantages under the influence of developmentalism, other new kinds of PRH since 2000, such as 30R, 20R, 10R, have been stratified according to the income levels of households (see Table 4.9). Thus social policies such as the PRH programme have often given priority to economic considerations and PRH has been recognised as a last resort for marginalised poor people. Indeed, participants as non-residents of PRHEs in this study, such as neighbouring private estate residents, PRHE management office staff, community welfare centre staff and local government front-line officials, who could be referred to as mainstream members of Korean society, viewed the PRHEs as places for the vulnerable and lower classes. They argued that welfare provision such the PRH programme had discouraged PRHE residents' work efforts and increased the residents' dependence on the state, criticising PRHE residents for relying on the welfare state. Given this attitude, social policies such as the PRH programme are destined to remain as residualised ones. Therefore, in order to enable PRHEs to contribute to social integration, the direction taken by the Korean welfare state in transition need to be towards universalism by enhancing the decommodification level of products or services.

8.6.2 Reducing the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged groups

This research showed that the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged groups into PRHEs, which was followed by anti-social behaviour and stigmatisation on the estates, led to social exclusion on PRHEs. The concentration has been reinforced by

restrictive allocation rules. These rules have been promoted by PRH provisions based on the principle of targeting, which has been selected and maintained by the traditional developmental welfare regime with a low level of decommodification. As a result, Korea has its targeted rules highly oriented towards marginalised poor groups, like the US, where income criteria play an important role in the accessibility of social housing. In order to reduce the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged groups, introduction of less restrictive allocation rules such as occurs in the UK based on the dualist model, where households who are in actual housing need can access social housing, or open allocation rules such as occur in the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden based on the unitary model, where the dwellings are open to all citizens without income limit and only allocated according to the order of the waiting system, can thus be considered (see Section 3.3.2). This can be related to the introduction of a social mix housing policy because households with varying social and economic characteristics can be eligible to reside on PRHEs, contributing to creating blended neighbourhoods. However, if the introduction leads to displacing existing residents living on some PRHEs, a social justice dilemma that diversity of PRHEs is achieved at the expense of such poor households can occur (see Section 2.6).

8.6.3 Controlling social problems on PRHEs

Even where the decommodification level is enhanced and PRH allocation rules are redesigned in the Korean welfare state, the isolation of PRHEs will continue unless social problems on PRHEs such as strong welfare dependency and anti-social behaviour are curbed. One of the effective ways to decrease welfare dependency can be to offer the

poor jobs rather than cash (see Section 2.6). Since many residents on PRHEs have been excluded from the labour market, significant efforts by policy agencies are required to include them in the labour market. However, if the skills training for employment and jobs offered by the agencies is concentrated on low-paid skill and temporary work, the recipients are highly likely to fall into hardship again. Offering jobs is fundamentally a strategy that can be applied to those with physical abilities. However, as revealed in the results of this study, PRHEs have been occupied by significant numbers of aged and disabled people. Work cannot be an answer for those people.

Curbing anti-social behaviour on PRHEs can be approached in two ways: efforts made by residents themselves and interventions by non-residents. As presented in the two case-study estates, tenant committees on both estates had not been organised for a long time. Moreover, this situation was not limited to the two case-study estates (see Table 7.3). The formation of tenant committees and anti-social behaviour control by them will contribute to lowering resistance from tenants committing anti-social acts and making tenants recognise themselves not as the object but as the main agent of change. Reinforced roles for PRHE managers can be also suggested. Considering that PRHEs have a weak eviction system, the system is highly likely to be badly used by some residents committing problem acts repeatedly. The discretionary actions of managers linked to an eviction system can be useful in reducing anti-social behaviour on PRHEs. However, eviction should be restricted because residents are the people with least choice.

8.7 Conclusion

This chapter has showed that PRHEs has been socially excluded from the outside, within the transformation of a developmental welfare regime placing emphasis on overcoming poverty and PRH provisions based on the principle of targeting. In particular, through a secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set and the two case studies, it has identified that PRHEs composed of PR have been socially excluded at the local level by two micro-explanatory factors – that is, a concentration of marginalised poor people as an endogenous factor and strict allocation rules oriented towards those people as an exogenous factor. However, physical process as an explanation for social exclusion on post-WWII housing estates was not a valid model in Korea. Finally, drawing on these findings, this research provided three suggestions to enable PRHEs to contribute to social integration: enhancing the level of decommodification in the Korean welfare state; reducing the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged groups; and controlling social problems on PRHEs. The next chapter will debate some implications derived from the above findings, proposing areas for further research.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Introduction

This study set out to explore the phenomenon of ‘conflict’ that occurs between Public Rental Housing Estates (PRHEs) and non-residents of PRHEs at a local level, as this phenomenon is contrary to the government goal of social integration that PRHE represents as a mechanism for providing the marginalised poor with decent and affordable housing (see Section 1.1). As social integration is a mirror concept to that of social exclusion, the main research objective was the exploration of the existence and causes of social exclusion on PRHEs (see Section 1.2) and the thesis sought to understand how living on PRHEs impacts on residents: could government policies that are designed to integrate the poorest citizens in Korea also prove exclusionary? Analysis of secondary data from the 2011 Korean Housing Survey (KHS) and two in-depth case studies of PRHEs comprised of Public Rental-housing (PR) in Seoul (the Junggye estate and the Suseo estate) provided the evidence base to deliver the research objectives. This chapter summarises the main conclusions of the research and identifies a number of implications arising from them. Finally, areas for further research are identified as well as some of the limitations of this study.

9.2 The main conclusions on the research topics

This thesis has dealt with the following four research questions:

Q1. Does the phenomenon of social exclusion exist on PRHEs in South Korea?

Q2. What are the characteristics of PRHEs where social exclusion exists?

Q3. What exogenous or endogenous factors cause social exclusion on PRHEs?

Q4. What is needed to enable PRHEs to contribute to social integration?

The Korean developmental welfare state (1960-1987) subordinated social policy and emphasised economic growth and development of infrastructure. Housing was largely commodified and an important objective in housing policy was the expansion of property ownership. As housing asset-based welfare was promoted, PRH provision, particularly the PR programme, was initiated as a temporary expedient for socio-economically disadvantaged people. Under the legacies of developmentalism, other kinds of PRH have been strictly stratified according to the income levels of households on a basis of the principle of targeting. As PRHEs have been developed in a way that concentrates the poorest and most vulnerable sections of Korean society, the estates have been highly exposed to processes of social exclusion. This has resulted in a failure to integrate PRHE estates and their residents within wider society, as evidenced by stigmatisation and anti-social behaviour on PRHEs, a lack of participation in society by

PRHE residents and alienation from the outside. In particular, evidence from the two case-study PRHEs comprised of PR pointed to poor reputation such as *Geogi Dongnei* (neighbourhood for beggars) and *Younggu* (a metaphor for an abnormal person), and demonstrated that Taylor's (1998) cycle of labelling was found on the estates at the local level. Furthermore, non-residents of PRHEs particularly private estate residents living adjacent to the PR estates, demonstrated a refusal to socialise with the estate residents, for example by reinforcing a boundary wall and preventing their children from mixing with the estate children, in contrast to the concept of social integration represented by the communal (i.e. shared identity) and associative (i.e. shared utility) relationships.

After identifying the existence of social exclusion on PR estates, the physical, demographic and institutional characteristics of the PR estates were examined drawing on the main theoretical approaches to explain the social downgrading of post-WWII mass housing estates. PR estates were characterised as high-rise residential spaces for the underprivileged such as benefit recipients, the poorly educated, lone parents and the disabled, with strict allocation rules based on means-testing for these lower classes, unlike the situation on private apartment estates for the upper and middle classes who sought to cultivate housing as a main assets in addition to its shelter function under the property owning welfare state.

Consequently, the causal factors of social exclusion on PR estates were embedded in demographic and institutional processes leading to the concentration of marginalised poor people and concomitant stigmatisation and increased visibility of anti-social

behaviour. The concentration has been essentially reinforced by strict allocation rules with means-testing oriented towards socio-economically disadvantaged groups. Physical obsolescence or poor physical conditions on PRHEs were less explanatory of social exclusion, as dissatisfaction with physical conditions barely registered in the survey data and was even less of an issue in the case studies, and there were few letting difficulties which have been demonstrated as the connection between physical obsolescence and the social downgrading of social housing estates in the West. PR estates have been socially excluded from the outside at the local level by a concentration of marginalised poor people as an endogenous factor and by strict allocation rules oriented towards those people as an exogenous factor.

The research triangulated secondary and primary data (2011 KHS data set analysis and the case-studies) framed within an analysis of the Korean welfare state and PRH policy in identifying three major suggestions to enhance the social integration objectives of PRHEs: enhancing the level of decommodification in the Korean welfare state out of the legacies of developmentalism where welfare relied on the family and on private housing assets; reducing the concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged groups by introducing less restrictive allocation rules out of PRH provision based on the principle of targeting; and controlling social problems on PRHEs by including PRHE residents in the labour market and reinforcing tenant involvement in the management of the estate.


9.3 Implications of the thesis

The implications arising from the main conclusions of the research topics are organised around theoretical, policy and practice considerations.

Firstly, the existing models explaining the decline of post-WWII mass housing estates in the West, which used physical, behavioural, institutional approaches, and offered a theoretical framework to this study, lack clarity in suggesting which factors have the greatest influence over time. Unless there is a clear idea which process is the most important one, there will be no clear idea how to stop or reverse the social downgrading of neighbourhoods. The thesis identified where the starting points for the social downgrading, which led to social exclusion, on social housing estates could be found within the Korean context; that is, the concentration of marginalised poor people which had been motivated by restrictive allocation rules. Furthermore, this research shed light on the linking process between micro-causal and macro-causal factors, which has not been sufficiently dealt with in the existing theories. The two micro-factors (i.e. the concentration of marginalised poor people and restrictive allocation rules) were connected to macro-factors such as globalisation, economic crisis and welfare state regime change (see Figure 9.1).

Secondly, since East Asian countries based on property owning welfare regimes saw the biggest drop in property value in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Asian governments such as Japan, Taiwan and Singapore have reduced the state promotion of home ownership although disengagement is different from country to country,

Figure 9.1 The connection between macro-factors and social exclusion on PR estates



according to their reliance on owner-occupied housing markets (Ronald and Doling 2012). In addition, as globalisation characterised by the reduction of barriers to internal transaction has been intensified, the markets in individual countries have influenced each other, and become sensitive to global economic fluctuation (Kotz 2001). Under these circumstances, it is difficult for housing property to fulfil a function as the main resource to offset underdeveloped social-security. Consequently, housing services need to be developed as a resource of day-to-day living rather than as a means of expanding families' assets. The more accessible social provision such as a PRH programme is to the entire population, the less excluded even high-income groups are from such provision. This can contribute to promoting social interaction among all sections of the population, leading to reinforcement of solidarity in Korean society. The neo-liberalisation promoted by intensified globalisation emphasises deregulation and increased commodification and marketisation and reduces the opportunities for a truly

transformative housing policy that can socially integrate sections of Korean society and increase solidarity.

Finally, this study found that physical obsolescence on housing estates was not a valid factor to explain social exclusion on PRHEs in Korea. High-rise social rented apartment blocks in the West tend to be strongly recognised as unpopular (Madanipour et al. 1998; Oppenheim 2009), but such blocks in contemporary Korea are a preferred and popular building type, including for upper- and middle classes (Gelézeau 2007). The case studies showed that PRHE residents were satisfied with the estates' physical aspects; in particular because these estates, with their monolithic and small size housing for one-or two-person households, are located in urban sites with sufficient services and transport facilities. Thus, physical process as a means of explaining social exclusion on PRHEs was not wholly applicable. Consequently, planners and developers concerned with the (re)development of PRHEs should consider the location of estates, the strong preference for apartment dwellings, and the need for greater diversity of dwelling size.

9.4 Future research

Limitations

There are a number of limitations in terms of research strategy and reliance on Western theories regarding social exclusion and its spatiality.

With regard to research strategy, the limitation is the fact that this research used the data set created by the 2011 KHS, which was carried out by the government for policy purposes unrelated to this research's objective. Moreover, it was a one-off survey and lacked a time dimension. To argue that the dynamic concept of social exclusion exists on PRHEs by relying only on secondary analysis of the 2011 KHS data set was bound to be restrictive. This research tried to offset the shortcoming through the case studies, but it was not easy to investigate each PRHE resident participant's exclusion process because of the short time available for fieldwork according to the funding organisation's rules.

With regard to reliance on the Western literature, the limitation is the fact that the term social exclusion and the spatiality of social exclusion are problematic as they have developed within the Western context. As a result, the research did not reach a level at which it could formulate the concept of social exclusion and suggest distinctive models to explain social exclusion on PRHEs in the Korean context, although it contributed to confirming the existence of social exclusion on PRHEs and finding out which models were more valid for explaining it. However, understanding of these limitations can play an important role when future research is being devised.

Future research

The thesis has shown that PRHEs have not contributed to social integration in Korean society; and that PRHEs' failure to contribute to social integration has been caused by a combination of the 'concentration effect' on the estates and the commodified welfare

regime. However, in order to understand the spatiality of social exclusion in Korean society as wholly, there should in future be research strategies and developments within the Korean context beyond the limitations of this research.

First, a research strategy to enable analysis of the social life of excluded people needs to be selected, such as one based on ethnography and participant observation. Second, structural cognitive information – a so-called ‘mental map’ (Purchase et al. 2007: 185) – will be able to contribute to understanding this research area better, and this can be created by drawing on this study’s experience and findings. Third, through these methods, future research should focus on social exclusion and its dynamic process as it is embedded in Korean context. For this, it is necessary to explore social exclusion among people with marginalised characteristics similar to those of these PR residents – for example, people who are on the PR estate waiting lists and live somewhere other than a PR estate. Are they also experiencing social exclusion from the outside, as PR residents are? If they say ‘yes’, the exploration of their exclusion processes can contribute to illustrating the dynamics of social exclusion and formulating a concept of social exclusion embedded in the Korean context. Fourth, in order to explore Korean models to explain social exclusion on PRHEs, other types of PRHEs such as 50R estates and 30R estates, which were possible sites for the existence of social exclusion in the 2011 KHS data set analysis, need to be investigated. Finally, exploring the reason why some PR estate residents commit problem acts will be able to by one future research area. This can contribute to identifying whether these acts are affected by the culture that develops on the estates or not, and to exploring the growing gap between perceptions of the undeserving and deserving in Korea.

APPENDIX 1: Topic guides for case studies

PRHE residents (focus group)	Private estate residents (focus group)
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Why did you move onto this PRHE?2. What do you think about living on a PRHE? Especially compared with the non-PRHE areas you lived in before?3. What do you think of the local area and the people surrounding your estate?4. How do you think the estate is perceived from the outside?5. What factors of the PRHE influence perceptions from the outside?	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. When and why did you move onto the estate?2. Could you explain your neighbourhood?<ol style="list-style-type: none">2-1. Who are your close neighbours?3. What do think of your neighbourhood?4. Do you know that your estate is adjacent to a PRHE?<ol style="list-style-type: none">4-1. What are the differences between the PRHE and your estate?4-2. Have you interacted with PRHE residents via your children, with friends living on the PRHE, or through community activities?5. Do you have any special images of the PRHE?<ol style="list-style-type: none">5-1. Why do you have those images?

	PRHE management office staff	Community welfare centre staff	Front-line local government official	Experts
Common	<p>1. What organisation do you work for?</p> <p>2. What do you do in the organisation and what's your position?</p> <p>3. What relation does your work have with the everyday life of the PRHE?</p> <p>4. What do you think are the migratory characteristics of people who live on the PRHE? Or what kind of people do you think live on PRHEs?</p>			
Individual	<p>1. Can you give basic information about the estate and the characteristics of residents that you are involved with?</p> <p>2. Is there any difference between PRHE residents and people living outside the PRHE?</p> <p>3. Is there any difference in interactions between PRHE residents and interactions between people living outside the PRHE? If there is, why do you think this is the case?</p> <p>4. Is there any special thing you would like to mention about managing a PRHE and its residents? If there is, what is it?</p>	<p>1. Can you give basic information about the estate and the characteristics of residents that you are involved with?</p> <p>2. Is there any difference between PRHE residents and people living outside the PRHE?</p> <p>3. Is there any difference in interactions between PRHE residents and people living outside the PRHE? If there is, why do you think this is the case?</p> <p>4. Is there any special thing you would like to mention about involving PRHE residents in community activities? If there is, what is it?</p>	<p>1. Can you give basic information about the estate and the characteristics of residents that you are involved with?</p> <p>2. Is there any difference between PRHE residents and people living outside the PRHE?</p> <p>3. Is there anything special that is important in dealing with PRHE residents?</p> <p>4. Do you know of anything special about the relationship between PRHE residents and local people?</p>	<p>1. Have you ever heard the term 'social exclusion'?</p> <p>2. Do you think that the phenomenon of social exclusion exists on PRHEs? If so, How serious is it? What are its characteristics? Why do you think like that?</p> <p>3. If so, what factors on the PRHE do you think contribute to forming stigmatised or socially excluded images of the PRHE?</p> <p>4. What initiatives do you think can most contribute to changing this phenomenon? Do you know anything about policies that would deal with it?</p>

APPENDIX 2: Information sheet and consent form for case study

1. Information sheet

Project title: social exclusion on public rental housing estates in South Korea
(This project, as a part of the student's PhD, will be undertaken by Tae Suk Kang, PhD student at the University of Birmingham, UK)

1. What is the purpose of the project?

This project seeks to understand public rental housing estates (PRHE) in South Korea in relation to so-called social exclusion, which has been broadly defined as the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially kept from full participation in the community in which they live. The overall aim of the project is to investigate how life on a PRHE in South Korea impacts on residents in terms of social interaction.

2. Why have you been chosen?

I would like to have a conversation with people who have been lived on, or outside but near, a PRHE, or have been involved in the everyday life of a PRHE, in order to carry out this project. I obtained your name and position via the PRHE manager. I would like to interview approximately 25 people about this theme.

3. What will happen to you if you take part?

Your involvement in the study would be to take part in an interview where we can discuss your experiences as a resident on a PRHE, or as a professional involved in the everyday life of a PRHE. I am particularly interested to explore: what influences these experiences and thoughts; what your specific experiences are in relation to social interaction on a PRHE; and what factors forms social exclusion on a PRHE. The interview will last for around one and half hours and I will record the interview with your permission. The recordings will be written up and you will be offered a copy of the transcript, encrypted and sent via email, which you may request to keep. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Your real name will be assigned a pseudonym according to your wishes. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep. You will also be asked to sign a consent form and provided with a copy of this. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw from the study at any time without a given reason, and your data will be destroyed if you choose to withdraw.

4. If you want to take part, what will happen next?

If you decide you want to take part in this study, you can contact me, Tae Suk Kang. You can contact me by text or phone on [REDACTED] or by email on [REDACTED]. I will explain what the research is about, what will be involved in the interview process and can also answer any questions you might have. You can decide if you want to go ahead with the interview and then we can arrange a suitable time and location. The location will be both safe

and confidential, and may be in a private room at your office building or any other place that is convenient for you. In the case of a focus group interview, the meeting time and location may be adjusted for the convenience of all group members and you will be consulted about this.

5. Will your taking part in this study be kept confidential?

All information that is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. The only contact information required will be either a mobile telephone number or email address. The data storage and retention follows the Code of Practice for Research of the University of Birmingham (http://www.as.bham.ac.uk/legislation/docs/COP_Research.pdf) and guidance from the UK Research Councils. The data shall normally be preserved and accessible for ten years following the completion of the research, and during this time it will be kept confidential and anonymous. Your name and any contact details will not be recorded on the interview transcripts. In addition, any details which potentially could identify you will also be removed or changed. My academic supervisors will have access to the anonymised transcripts of your interview, but I will be the only person to have access to the original recordings of the interview, your consent form and any of your contact details. Your participation in this study will not be discussed with other interviewees. Your name will be changed in the research and I will ensure that your contribution remains entirely confidential and anonymous.

6. If you become a member of a focus group, what will be considered additionally?

In the case of focus group interview, participants will be aware of who else has participated in the study and participants may be identifiable through their responses to interview questions. Therefore, in order that you may acknowledge that confidentiality cannot be guaranteed within the group, and that extracts from the interview may be used in the PhD thesis, an additional signature can be requested on the consent form.


7. What will happen to the results of the research study?

The results of the study will be used in my PhD thesis. The material may be presented at academic and professional conferences and in academic journals. Anonymity and confidentiality will still be in place in all cases. Findings from this study will contribute to developing a better understanding of Korean PRHEs.

8. Contact for further information

Tae Suk Kang, Research Room Tel: [REDACTED] in GEES building, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, the University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK. Mobile [REDACTED] Email: [REDACTED]
You may also contact the faculty members supervising the project: Prof. Jon Coaffee (Tel. [REDACTED], [REDACTED]) and Dr. Peter Lee (Tel. [REDACTED], [REDACTED]) at the University of Birmingham.

2. Consent form



APPENDIX 3: Disadvantages of residing in PRH in the 2011 KHS

First priority

	Accessib ility	Stigmati sation	Lack of a sense of norms	Poor educatio n environ ment	High rent and manage ment fee	High living cost	Small housing size	Large housing size	Poor facilities	Difficult y in getting welfare services	Poor environme nt such as noise and rubbish	Poor repair	Etc.	No disadva ntages
PR	1.5(11)	10.0(4)	16.5(2)	2.1(9)	15.6(3)	5.7(7)	8.2(5)	0.4(13)	1.7(10)	0.4(13)	7.1(6)	2.8(8)	1.2(12)	26.7(1)
50R	2.7(9)	10.8(4)	9.0(5)	0.9(12)	19.8(2)	3.1(8)	14.8(3)	0.4(13)	2.2(10)	0.2(14)	7.2(6)	3.5(7)	1.6(11)	23.9(1)
30R	5.6(7)	9.0(3)	7.5(5)	1.6(11)	13.5(2)	3.5(9)	6.0(6)	0.2(14)	1.5(12)	0.4(13)	8.1(4)	4.0(8)	2.6(10)	36.5(1)
20R	8.7(5)	3.7(8)	2.0(11)	4.1(7)	12.0(2)	3.5(9)	2.2(10)	0.4(14)	1.3(12)	0.7(13)	11.3(3)	9.2(4)	6.8(6)	34.2(1)
10R	5.8(7)	7.3(5)	6.5(6)	3.2(10)	13.3(2)	3.8(9)	2.8(11)	0.4(14)	4.5(8)	0.9(12)	8.8(3)	8.6(4)	3.8(9)	30.4(1)
5R	6.8(6)	7.7(5)	4.8(8)	3.5(9)	9.7(4)	1.9(12)	3.0(10)	0.2(14)	5.3(7)	0.4(13)	9.8(3)	11.8(2)	2.3(11)	32.8(1)

Second priority

	Accessib ility	Stigmati sation	Lack of a sense of norms	Poor educatio n environ ment	High rent and manage ment fee	High living cost	Small housing size	Large housing size	Poor facilities	Difficult y in getting welfare services	Poor environme nt such as noise and rubbish	Poor repair	Etc.	No disadva ntages
PR	1.2(11)	10.1(4)	17.0(1)	3.5(8)	10.6(3)	13.1(2)	9.7(5)	0.8(12)	6.7(6)	1.8(10)	17.0(1)	5.9(7)	2.6(9)	0.0(13)
50R	1.9(10)	7.5(5)	13.1(3)	2.0(9)	10.2(4)	7.4(6)	13.8(2)	1.2(12)	6.9(7)	1.5(11)	14.6(1)	13.8(2)	6.1(8)	0.0(13)
30R	2.8(11)	8.7(7)	12.0(4)	3.6(10)	12.2(3)	12.5(1)	9.2(6)	1.0(13)	5.7(9)	2.0(12)	12.3(2)	10.3(5)	7.7(8)	0.0(14)
20R	6.0(6)	4.5(7)	4.0(8)	14.0(1)	7.0(5)	13.5(2)	3.5(9)	2.0(11)	4.5(7)	2.5(10)	14.0(1)	12.0(4)	12.5(3)	0.0(12)
10R	2.7(10)	6.3(7)	8.5(6)	4.7(9)	10.6(4)	8.7(5)	4.7(9)	1.9(12)	12.1(2)	2.2(11)	11.6(3)	18.0(1)	5.6(8)	2.2(11)
5R	2.4(11)	7.3(6)	10.0(4)	5.5(8)	8.9(5)	6.1(7)	4.6(10)	0.9(14)	12.6(2)	2.0(12)	11.6(3)	21.8(1)	4.9(9)	1.6(13)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Addison, P. (1975). *The road to 1945: British politics and the Second World War.* London: Jonathan Cape.
- Ahn, C. (2010). 'The Birth of Gangbuk in the Process of Making the Gangnam', *The Journal of Seoul Studies*, 41: 63-97. [in Korean]
- Alcock, P. (1993). *Understanding poverty.* London: Macmillan
- Allen, J. (1998). 'Europe of the neighbourhoods: class, citizenship and welfare regimes', in A. Madanipour, G. Cars and J. Allen (eds), *Social Exclusion in European cities: process, experiences and responses.* London: Jessica Kingsley.
- Amin, A. (1994). *Post-Fordism: a reader.* Oxford: Blackwell.
- Andrews, D., Sánchez, A. C. and Johansson, Å. (2011). 'Housing Markets and Structural Policies in OECD Countries', OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 836, OECD Publishing.
- Arneson, R. J. (1997). 'Egalitarianism and the undeserving poor', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 5(4): 327-350.
- Atkinson, A. B., Marlier, E. and Nolan, B. (2004). 'Indicators and targets for social inclusion in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(1): 47-75.
- Atkinson, R. and Kintrea, K. (2001). 'Disentangling Area Effects: Evidence from deprived and Non-deprived Neighbourhood', *Urban Studies*, 38(12): 2227-98.
- Baek, D. (2011). 'The Changes and Effects of Social Policy after the IMF Economic Crisis in Korea - Focusing on the Kim Dae Jung and Rho Moo Hyun Governments', *Discourse 201*, 14(1): 83-120. [in Korean]
- Barry, B. (2002). 'Social exclusion, Social Isolation, and the Distribution of Income', in J. Hills, J. Le Grand and D. Piachaud (eds), *Understanding Social Exclusion.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barry, N. (1993). 'The social market economy', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 10(2): 1-25.

- Beaudry, R. (2002). 'Workfare and Welfare: Britain's New Deal', Working Paper Series #2, CCGES/CCEAE 2002, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Béland, D. (2007). 'The social exclusion discourse: ideas and policy change', *Policy and Politics*, 35(1): 123-39.
- Benn, M. (2000). 'New Labour and social exclusion', *The Political Quarterly* 71(3): 309-18.
- Berger-Schmitt, R. and Noll, H.-H. (2000). 'Conceptual Framework and Structure of a European System of Social Indicators', EuReporting Working Paper No. 9, ZUMA, Mannheim.
- Berghman, J. (1995). 'Social exclusion in Europe: policy context and analytical framework', in G. Room (eds), *Beyond the Threshold: The Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Berube, A. (2005). *Mixed communities in England: A US perspective on evidence and policy prospects*. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Blair, T. (2002). 'Speech on welfare reform', *The Guardian*, 10 June.
- Boelhouwer, P. (1999). 'International comparison of social housing management in Western Europe', *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 14(3): 225-240.
- Boelhouwer, P. (2002). 'Trends in Dutch housing policy and the shifting position of the social rented sector', *Urban Studies*, 39(2): 219-35.
- Brown, L. D., Khagram, S., Moore, M. H. and Frumkin, P. (2000). 'Globalization, NGOs and multi-sectoral relations', The Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations and The Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper, No.1.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social research methods* (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burchardt, T., Le Grand, J. and Piachaud, D. (2002). 'Degrees of exclusion: developing a dynamic, multidimensional measure', in J. Hills, J. Le Grand and D. Piachaud (eds), *Understanding Social Exclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burchardt, T., Le Grand, J. and Piachaud, D. (1999). 'Social exclusion in Britain 1991—1995', *Social Policy & Administration*, 33(3): 227-44.

- Chanan, G. (2000). 'Community Responses to Social Exclusion', in J. Percy-Smith (eds), *Policy Responses to Social Exclusion towards inclusion*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Casey, E. (1997). *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
- Cho, H. (2011). 'Welfare fell a slave to economic performance', *Hwanghae Review*, 73: 24-43. [in Korean]
- Cho, Y. (2002). 'Theory and Practice of Neo-liberal Welfare Policy', *Phenomenon and Recognition*, 26(3): 95-118. [in Korean]
- Cho, Y. (2009). 'Seeking New Issues in The Debate on Charateristics of the Korean Welfare State', in M. Chung (eds), *Debates on the charateristics of the Korean Welfare State regime II*. Seoul: Human & Welfare Books. [in Korean]
- Choi, J-S. (2010). 'Issues and Tasks of Social Welfare Policy at President Lee Myung-bak Administration: 'business friendly conservative right wing' to 'low class friendly center-pragmatism', *Korea Journal of Social Welfare Research* 25: 1-29. [in Korean]
- Choi, S. and Ham, W. (2001). 'An Analysis on the Change of Social Welfare Policy in Korean Political Regimes: Focused on the Regime's Instrumental Means and Social Needs', *Jeonbuk Journal of Public Administration*, 15(1): 45-64. [in Korean]
- Chun, Y. (2001). 'The Kim Dae Jung Government's Welfare Policy Reforms and Duty of Risk Management', *Korea Institute of Public Administration*, 10(2): 79-102. [in Korean]
- Cobuild, C. (2006). *Advanced learner's english dictionary*. Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers.,
- Cowalknews. (2000). *Visit the new poor village in Seoul - Suseo Permanent Rental Housing Estate*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.cowalknews.co.kr/news/articlePrint.html?idxno=2362> (accessed 2 Feburary 2013, in Korean).
- Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage .

- Czischke, D. and Pittini, A. (2007). *Housing Europe 2007-Review of Social, co-operative and public housing in the 27 EU member states*. Brussels: the CECODHAS European Social Housing Observatory.
- Darlington, Y. and Scott, D. (2002). *Qualitative research in practice: Stories from the field*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- DCLG (2007). *Homes for the future: more affordable, more sustainable*. London: The Stationery Office.
- De Haan, A. (2000). 'Social exclusion: Enriching the understanding of deprivation', *Studies in Social and Political Thought*, 2: 22-40.
- Dekker, K. and Van Kempen, R. (2005). 'Large housing estates in Europe: a contemporary overview', in R. Van Kempen, S. Hall and I. Tosics (eds), *Restructuring large housing estates in Europe*. Bristol: The Policy Press.
- De Vaus, D. A. (2001). *Research design in social research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Diamond, J. (1996). 'The roots of radicalism', *The New York Review of Books*, 14: 4-6.
- DSS (1999). *Opportunity for all: Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion*. London: The Stationery Office.
- Dunleavy, P. (1981). *The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain, 1945-1975: a study of corporate power and professional influence in the welfare state*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1966[1893]). *The division of labor in society*. Translated by George Simpson. New York: Free Press.
- Dwyer, P. (2004). 'Creeping conditionality in the UK: from welfare rights to conditional entitlements?', *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 28(2): 261–83.
- England, Kim. V. L. (1994). 'Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research', *The Professional Geographer*, 46(1): 80-9.
- Elsinga, M., Haffner, M. and Oxley, M. (2008). 'Threats to the Dutch unitary rental market', *European Journal of Housing Policy*, 8(1): 21-37.
- Emms, P. (1990) *Social Housing: A European dilemma?* Bristol: School for Advanced Urban Studies, University of Bristol.

- Esping-Andersen, G. (1997). 'Hybrid or unique?: The Japanese welfare state between Europe and America', *Journal of European social policy*, 7(3): 179-89.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- European Commission (2006). *Portfolio of Overarching Indicators and Streamlined Social Inclusion, Pensions, and Health Portfolios*. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Commission (2008). 'Social inclusion indicators'. [Online] Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=756&langId=en> (accessed 8 March 2012).
- Faden, R. R., Beauchamp, T. L. and King, N. M. (1986). *A history and theory of informed consent*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Ferrari, E. (2012). 'Competing ideas of social justice and space: Locating critiques of housing renewal in theory and in practice', *International Journal of Housing Policy*, 12(3): 263-80.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). 'Five misunderstandings about case-study research', *Qualitative inquiry*, 12(2): 219-45.
- Fitzpatrick, S. and Stephens, M. (2007). 'An international review of homelessness and social housing policy', Centre for Housing Policy, University of York.
- Furniss, N. and Tilton, T. A. (1977). *The case for the welfare state: from social security to social equality*. Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press.
- Galster, G. (2007). 'Neighbourhood social mix as a goal of housing policy: a theoretical analysis', *European Journal of Housing Policy*, 7(1): 19-43.
- Gelézeau, V. (2007) *The Republic of Apartments (Apartment Gonhwagook)*. Seoul: Humanitas. [in Korean]
- George, V. & Wilding, P. (1976). *Ideology and Social Welfare*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Giddens, A. (1998). *The third way: the renewal of social democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Goodman, R. and Peng, I. (1996). 'The East Asian welfare states: Peripatetic learning, adaptive change, and nation-building', in G. Esping-Anderson (eds), *Welfare states in transition: National adaptations in global economies*. London: Sage.
- Goodman, R., White, G. and Kwon, H. (1997). 'East Asian social policy: a model to emulate?', in M. May, E. Brunsdon and G. Craig (eds), *Social Policy Review 9*. London: Social Policy Association.
- Gordon, D., Adelman, L., Ashworth, K., Bradshaw, J., Levitas, R., Middleton, S., Pantazis, C., Patsios, D., Payne, S., Townsend, P. and Williams, J. (2000). *Poverty and social exclusion in Britain*. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
- Gottdiener, M. and Budd, L. (2005). *Key concepts in urban studies*. London: Sage Publications.
- Green, D.G. (1990). 'Forward', in C. Murray, *The Emerging British Underclass*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Grigsby, W., Baratz, G., Galster, G. and MacLennan, D. (1987). 'The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Change and Decline', *Progress in Planning*, 28: 1-76.
- Grix, J. (2010). *The foundations of research*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Groves, R., Murie, A. and Watson, C. (2007). 'Four worlds of Welfare and Housing', in R. Groves, A. Murie and C. Watson (eds), *Housing and the new welfare state: Perspectives from East Asia and Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Haffner, M. E. A. and Oxley, M. J. (1999). 'Housing subsidies: Definitions and comparisons', *Housing Studies*, 14(2): 145-62.
- Ha, S.-K. (2004). *Housing Policy and Practice in Korea*. Seoul: Pakyoungsa. [in Korean]
- Ha, S.-K. (2010). 'Housing, social capital and community development in Seoul', *Cities*, 27: 2535-42.
- Ha, S.-K. (2008). 'Social housing estates and sustainable community development in South Korea', *Habitat International*, 32(3): 349-63.
- Ha, S.-K. and Seo J. N. (2006a). *Public Housing and Community Sustainability in Korea*. Macao: International Federation for Housing and Planning Spring Conference 2006.

- Ha, S.-K. and Seo J. N. (2006b). 'Public Rental Housing and Social Exclusion', *Housing Studies Review*, 14(3): 159-81. [in Korean]
- Hall, S., Murie, A. and Knorr-Siedow, T. (2005). 'Large housing estates in their historical context', in R. Van Kempen, S. Hall and I. Tosics (eds), *Restructuring large housing estates in Europe*. Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Hall, S. and Rowlands, R. (2005). 'Place making and large estates: theory and practice', in R. Van Kempen, S. Hall and I. Tosics (eds), *Restructuring large housing estates in Europe*. Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Hankyoreh-Shinmun. Newspaper . 'National Welfare Task Force propose a blueprint for the 21 centry-national welfare', 30 December 1995.
- Harloe, M. (1985). *Private rented housing in the United States and Europe*. London and Sydney: Croom Helm.
- Harloe, M. (1995). *The People's Home: Social Rented Housing in Europe and America*. Oxford UK and Cambridge USA: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (1989). *The condition of postmodernity: An enquiry into the conditions of cultural change*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hastings, A. (2004). 'Stigma and social housing estates: Beyond pathological explanations', *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 19(3): 233-54.
- Hastings, A. and Dean, J. (2003). 'Challenging images: tackling stigma through estate regeneration', *Policy and Politics*, 31(2): 171-84.
- Hastings, A., McArthur, A. and McGregor, A. (1996). *Less than Equal? Community Organisations and Estate Regeneration Partnerships*. Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Hawtin, M. and Kettle, J. (2000). 'Housing and social exclusion', in J. Percy-Smith (eds), *Policy Responses to Social Exclusion towards inclusion*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Henderson, D. K. (1993). *Interpretation and explanation in the human sciences*. Albany NY: SUNY Press.
- Henderson, J. and Karn, V. (1984). 'Race, class and the allocation of public housing in Britain', *Urban Studies* 21(2): 115-28.

- Heo, S. (2012). 'Korea's liberation in 1945 and its economic development', *The Study of Korea's Independence Movement*, 43: 463-509. [in Korean]
- Hills, J. (2007). 'Ends and Means: The Future Roles of Social Housing in England', CASEreport 34, CASE, London.
- Hill, S., Abercrombie, N. and Turner, B. (2000). *The Penguin dictionary of sociology* (5th ed.). London: Penguin.
- Hoekstra, J. (2003). 'Housing and the welfare state in the Netherlands: an application of Esping-Andersen's typology', *Housing, Theory and Society*, 20(2): 58-71.
- Hoekstra, J. (2009). 'Two types of rental system? An exploratory empirical test of Kemeny's rental system typology', *Urban Studies*, 46(1): 45-62.
- Holin, M. J., Buron, L., Locke, G., and Cortes, A. (2003). *Interim assessment of the HOPE VI program Cross-site report*. Prepared by Abt Associates for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- Holliday, I. (2000). 'Productivist welfare capitalism: Social policy in East Asia', *Political studies*, 48(4): 706-23.
- House of Commons (2006). *Affordability and the Supply of Housing: Session 2005-06*. London: The Stationery Office.
- Huh, Y. (2013). 'Vison and Policy Task of the Social Welfare Policies of the Park Geun-hye Government', in papers presented at the conference of the Korean Association for Local Government Studies, the Korean Association for Local Government Studies. [in Korean]
- Israel, M. and Hay, I. (2006). *Research ethics for social scientists*. London: Sage.
- Jackson, C. (1999). 'Social Exclusion and Gender: Does One Size Fit All?', *European Journal of Development Research*, 11(1): 125-46.
- Jang, S. (2004). 'The development of Korean capitalism and real-estate speculation after liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945', *Historical Criticism*, 66: 55-78. [in Korean]
- Jennings, B. (1983). 'Interpretive social science and policy analysis', in D. Callahan and B. Jennings (eds), *Ethics, the social sciences, and policy analysis*. London: Springer.

- Jenson, J. (1998). 'Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research', CPRN Study No. F|03. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc.
- Jin, M. (2005). 'A Study of Social Exclusion in the Housing Poverty Class: Focusing on the Residents of the Permanent Rental Apartment Complex in Pyonghwa-dong, Jeonju', *Regional Studies*, 13(3): 87-112. [in Korean]
- Jin, M. (2011). 'Transitional Changes and Future Policy Direction of Rental Housing System in Cross-national Comparative Context', *The Korean Spatial Planning Review*, 71: 87-113. [in Korean]
- Johnson, C. (1982). *MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy: 1925-1975*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Johnson, R. B. and Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). 'Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come', *Educational researcher*, 33(7): 14-26.
- Jones, C. (1993). 'The pacific challenge: Confucian Welfare states', in C. Jones (eds), *New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Joo, E. (2008). 'A New Era in Korean welfare development: Proliferation of Welfare Markets', *Seosuk Collection of Writings on Social Science*, 1(2): 113-33. [in Korean]
- Joongang-Ilbo. Newspaper. 'An alien zone in Gangnam', Suseo Primary School: Friends are leaving', 26August 2002. [in Korean]
- Jun, S. (2009). *Crazy in an Apartment: Housing Sociology in Modern Korea*. Seoul: Esoope. [in Korean]
- Kang, C. S. E. (2000). 'Segyehwa reform of the South Korean developmental state', in S.S. Kim (eds), *Korea's globalisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kang, C. S. E. (2003). 'The developmental state and democratic consolidation in South Korea', in S.S. Kim (eds), *Korea's Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kang, M. (1987). *Study of the Life History of The Poor People in the Japanese Colonial Period*. Seoul: Chanjak-Kwa-Bipyongsa. [in Korean]
- Kearns, A. and Parkinson, M. (2001). 'The Significance of Neighbourhood', *Urban Studies*, 38(12): 2103-10.

- Kemeny, J. (1995). *From Public Housing to the Social Market: Rental policy strategies in comparative perspective*. London: Routledge.
- Kemeny, J. (2006). 'Corporatism and housing regimes', *Housing, Theory and Society*, 23(01): 1-18.
- Kennedy, P. (2005). 'Social policy, social exclusion and commodity fetishism', *Capital and Class*, 29(1): 91-114.
- Kennett, P. and Forrest, R. (2003). 'From Planned Communities to Deregulated Spaces: Social and Tenurial Change in High Quality State Housing', *Housing Studies*, 18(1): 47-63.
- Kim, D. (2010). 'The Struggle between Security and Democracy: An Alternative Explanation of the Democratization of South Korea', *Pacific Focus*, 25(1): 89-111. [in Korean]
- Kim, H.-K. and Ha, S.-K. (1998). *Theories of Redevelopment on Poor Housing*. Seoul: Nanam. [in Korean]
- Kim, J. (2012). 'Impoverishment of Underprivileged Divorcees: Their Social Exclusion Experience in family and labor market', *Korean Journal of Family Social Work*, 38: 62-102. [in Korean]
- Kim, J., Jin, M., Choi, J., Ha, S.-K., and Choi, J. (2007). *Public Housing Policy Roadmap (2008-2017) Future Direction and Policy Agenda for Sustainable Housing Assistance Scheme*. Seongnam: Housing and Urban Research Institute. [in Korean]
- Kim, K-s (2009a). 'Understanding the Near Poor in Korea', *Korean Journal of Social Welfare Research*, 22: 83-109.
- Kim, M. (2007). *A Study on formation of the Placeness of Public Rental Housing: Focusing on Jung-gae 9th Apartment Complex*, Master's. University of Seoul. [in Korean]
- Kim, S. (2011). 'Social-welfare Policy of Lee Myung-Bak Administration: A Retreat of Social-welfare Policy?', *Contemporary Politics*, 4(1): 127-52. [in Korean]
- Kim, W. (2004). 'A study of the social exclusion of public rental housing residents focusing on the social exclusion through residential segregation', *Urban Research*, 9:87-114. [in Korean]

- Kim, W. and Nam, W. (2011). 'The development of social policy under Lee Myung-bak government - Is Korean welfare expansion at end?', *The Journal of Asiatic Studies* 54(1): 119-52. [in Korean]
- Kim, Y. M. (2002). 'Social Welfare Policy of The Kim Dae-jung government - beyond neo-liberalism', in Y.M. Kim (eds), *Debates on the characteristics of the Korean Welfare State regime I*. Seoul: Human & Welfare Books. [in Korean]
- Kim, Y. M. (2008). 'Beyond East Asian welfare productivism in South Korea', *Policy & Politics*, 36(1): 109-25.
- Kim, Y. S. (2009b). 'The Assessment of the Social Welfare Policies in Rho Moo-hyun Government: Focusing on the formation of the institutional and political bases', *Economy and Society*, 82: 161-85.
- Kitchin, R. (1998). "Out of Place", 'Knowing One's Place': Space, power and the exclusion of disabled people', *Disability and Society*, 13(3): 343-56.
- KNSO (2011) . *The results of 2010 Population and Housing Census* . Daejeon: KNSO. [in Korean]
- KOHOM. (2013a). *About KOHOM - The main business*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.kohom.co.kr/web/mainComm/HM003001001.do> (accessed 9 June 2014, in Korean).
- KOHOM. (2013b). *About KOHOM - The purpose of establishment and History*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.kohom.co.kr/web/mainComm/HM005002.do> (accessed 9 June 2014, in Korean).
- KOHOM. (2013c). *About the Junggye 9 apartment*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.kohom.co.kr/moffice/0109003/index.do> (accessed 9 June 2014, in Korean).
- KOHOM. (2013d). *About the Suseo apartment*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.kohom.co.kr/moffice/0101001/index.do> (accessed 9 June 2014, in Korean).
- KOHOM (2013e). *The status of the Junggye 9 estate*. Seoul: KOHOM. [in Korean]
- KOHOM (2013f). *The status of the Suseo 1 estate*. Seoul: KOHOM. [in Korean]

- Kotz, D. (2001). 'The State, Globalisation and Phases of Capitalist Development', in R. Albritton, I. Makoto, R. Westra and A. Zuege (eds), *Phases of Capitalist Development: Booms, Crises and Globalisations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kristensen, H. (1995). 'Social exclusion and spatial stress: the connections', in G. Room (eds), *Beyond the threshold: The measurement and analysis of social exclusion*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1970). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Kukmin-Ibo. Newpaper. 'Comparison between the main electoral pledges of Moon Jae-in and Park Geun-hye, candidates : education and welfare', 30November 2012. [in Korean]
- Kwon, H.-j. (1997). 'Beyond European welfare regimes: comparative perspectives on East Asian welfare systems', *Journal of social policy*, 26(4): 467-84.
- Kwon, H.-j. (1999). *The welfare state in Korea: The politics of legitimization*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Kwon, H.-j. (2002). 'Welfare reform and future challenges in the Republic of Korea: Beyond the developmental welfare state?', *International Social Security Review*, 55(4): 23-38.
- Kwon, S. and Holliday, I. (2007). 'The Korean welfare state: a paradox of expansion in an era of globalisation and economic crisis', *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 16(3): 242-48.
- Kwon, H.-j. and Yi, I. (2008). *Development Strategies, Welfare Regime and Poverty Reduction in the Republic of Korea*. Background paper for UNRISD Report on Combating Poverty and Inequality.
- Kwon, T. (1989). *The age of consciousness-raising for distribution*, Seoul: Na-nam.
- Kyunghyang-Shinmun. Newspaper. 'The last great housing site attracting public attention', 10th November 1990. [in Korean]
- Lee, E.-J (2011a). *A study of the social exclusion experience of people living in a poor housing area*, Master's. Chung-ang University. [in Korean]

- Lee, P. and Murie, A. (1998). *Social Exclusion Review, A Report to The Scottish Office*. Edinburgh: The Stationery Office.
- Lee, S. S.-y. (2011b). 'Labour market risks in de-industrializing East Asian economies: the cases of Korea, Japan and Taiwan', in G.-J. Hwang (eds), *New Welfare States in East Asia: Global Challenges and Restructuring*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Lee, T. (2012). 'Four years under the Lee Myung-bak government the Korean Welfare State lost its way', in forum papers on assessment of 4-year Lee Myung-bak government and future task, Democracy Policy Institution and Thinktank Network. [in Korean]
- Lee, Y., Min Y., Kim, B. and Park, J. (2011). *The city is history*. Seoul: Booksea. [in Korean]
- Levitas, R. (2005). *The inclusive society?: social exclusion and New Labour* (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Levitas, R., Pantazis, C., Fahmy, E., Gordon, D., Lloyd, E., & Patsios, D. (2007). *The multi-dimensional analysis of social exclusion*. Department of Sociology and School for Social Policy, Townsend Centre for the International Study of Poverty and Bristol Institute for Public Affairs, University of Bristol.
- Lin, J. Y. (2010). 'New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development', Policy Research Working Paper 5197, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Lupton, R. and Tunstall, R. (2008). 'Neighbourhood regeneration through mixed communities: a 'social justice dilemma'?', *Journal of Education Policy*, 23(2): 105-17.
- Maddison, A. (2013). *Madison Project Database*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm> (accessed 17 March 2014).
- Maeil-Kyungje. Newspaper. 'Forming 860 ten thousand pyeong as Housing sites by 1992', 11 October 1989. [in Korean]

Maeil-Kyungje. Newspaper. 'Productive Welfare, adopted as a new catchphrase of the government', 9 June 1999. [in Korean]

Madanipour, A. (1998). 'Social exclusion and space', in A. Madanipour, G. Cars and J. Allen (eds), *Social Exclusion in European cities: process, experiences and responses*. London: Jessica Kingsley.

Madanipour, A., Cars, G. and Allen, J. (1998). 'Introduction', in A. Madanipour, G. Cars and J. Allen (eds), *Social Exclusion in European cities: process, experiences and responses*. London: Jessica Kingsley.

Malpass, P. (2008). 'Housing and the New Welfare State: Wobbly Pillar or Cornerstone?', *Housing Studies*, 23(1): 1-19.

Malpass, P. and Murie, A. (1999). *Housing policy and practice*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (1992). *Policy networks in British government*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Massey, D.S. and Denton, N.A. (1993). *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maxwell, J. A. (2012). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach*. London: Sage.

Maxwell, S. E. and Delancy, H. D. (2004). *Designing experiments and analyzing data: A model comparison perspective*. New York: Psychology Press.

McMillan, K. and Weyers, J. (2007). *How to write dissertations and project reports* (2nd ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education.

MCST (2013). *Facts about Korea*. Seoul: MCST.

Mkandawire, T. (2005). 'Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction', Social Policy and Development Programme Paper 23, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

MLTM (2010). *Rental Housing Handbook*. Gyeonggi - do: MLTM [in Korean]

MLTM (2011). *Housing Handbook*. Gyeonggi - do: MLTM. [in Korean]

MLTM (2012a). *The 2011 Korean Housing Survey : Survey of Households living on Rental Housing*. Gyeonggi - do: MLTM. [in Korean]

MLTM (2012b). *The 2012 Korean Housing Survey*. Gyeonggi - do: MLTM [in Korean]

MLTM (2012c). *The results of the 2011 Korean Housing Survey of Households living on Public Rental Housing*. [Online] Available at:
http://www.molit.go.kr/USR/NEWS/m_71/dtl.jsp?id=95071311 (accessed 29 January 2014). [in Korean]

MOE and KERIS (2013). *School Information Service*. [Online] Available at:

http://www.schoolinfo.go.kr/index.jsp?HG_CD=B100000765 (accessed 2 January, 2014). [in Korean]

MOLIT (2013). *Main Policy of MOLIT*. [Online] Available at:

http://english.molit.go.kr/USR/sectoral/m_29477/lst.jsp?STATE=T (accessed 6 January 2014). [in Korean]

Morgan, D. L. (1996). *Focus groups as qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Morgan, D. L. (1998). 'Practical strategies for combining qualitative and quantitative methods: Applications to health research', *Qualitative health research*, 8(3): 362-76.

Moon, J.-Y. (2010). 'A Cross-national Study of Social Exclusion - with Special References to Korea and European Countries', *Korean Journal of Social Welfare Research*, 62(2): 87-107. [in Korean]

Murie, A., Knorr-Siedow, T. and Van Kempen, R. (2003). 'Large housing estates in Europe: general developments and theoretical backgrounds', RESTATE Report No. 1, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University.

Murray, C. (1990). *The emerging British underclass*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Musterd, S., Van Kempen, R., and Rowlands, R. (2009). 'Mass Housing Estates on Different Tracks: An Introduction to the Book', in S. Musterd, S., R. Van Kempen and R. Rowlands (eds), *Mass housing in Europe Multiple Faces of Development, Change and Response*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

MW and KOCER (2003). *Seeking for solutions to support social inclusion of resident living on public rental housing*. Seoul: MW and KOCER. [in Korean]

- Nam, C. (2002). 'The Nature of the Korean Welfare System : Searching for Some Empirical Bases', *Journal of Critical Social Welfare*, 11: 163-202. [in Korean]
- Nam, D. (2005). *Comprehensive Evaluation of the Performance of the Housing Policy in Korea*, PhD. Konkuk University. [in Korean]
- Namkoong, K. (2010). *Research Methods for Public Administration* (4th ed.). Pa-ju: Bobmunsa. [in Korean]
- Newman, O. (1972). *Defensible space: Crime prevention through urban design*. New York: Macmillan.
- NGII (2010). *The Geography of Korea*. Gyeonggi - do: NGII.[in Korean]
- NLIC (2014). *The Housing Act*. [Online] Available at:
<http://www.law.go.kr/lsc.do?menuId=0&p1=&subMenu=1&nwYn=1&query=%EC%A3%BC%ED%83%9D%EB%B2%95&x=17&y=17#liBgcolor4>
 (accessed 30 January 2014). [in Korean]
- Noh, H. J. and Kim K. S. (2008). 'A Longitudinal Study on Poverty and Social Exclusion of Female-headed Households Who Experienced Marital Disruption', *Korean social security studies*, 24(4): 167-96.
- Offe, C. (1987). 'Democracy against the welfare state? Structural foundations of neoconservative political opportunities', *Political Theory*, 15(4): 501-37.
- OECD (2014). *Economic Policy Reform: Going for Growth Interim Report*. OECD Publishing.
- Oppenheim, R. (2009). 'Ap'at'ŭ Konghwaguk 아파트공화국 [On the Republic of Apartments]', *East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International Journal*, 3(1): 137-145.
- Oxley, M. (1995). 'Private and social rented housing in Europe: Distinctions, comparisons and resource allocation 1', *Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research*, 12(2): 59-72.
- Oxley, M. (2000). *The future of social housing: Learning from Europe*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.

- Park, G. (2010). *Public hearing for complete revision of 'Framework Act on Social Protection*. Seoul: Office of Legislator Park Geun-hye. [in Korean]
- Park, G. and Lee, T. (2004). 'Relationship between globalisation and corporation - civil society', in academic conference papers of Korean Sociological Association, Korean Sociological Association. [in Korean]
- Park, J. (2003). 'The Poverty and Socio-economic Characteristics of Female-headed Households', *Health and Social Science*, 13: 81-112. [in Korean]
- Park, K.-M, Song, M.-G. and Lee, K.-J. (2009). 'An Empirical Study on Social Exclusion against Public Rental Apartment: A Case Study of Yong-In Dong-Baek Area', *Urban Management Studies*, 22(3): 107-31. [in Korean]
- Park, K.-T. (2013). 'Married Immigrant Women's Life Relational Spaces', *Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers*, 19(2): 203-22. [in Korean]
- Parkin, F. (1979). *Marxism and class theory: a bourgeois critique*. Cambridge: Tavistock
- Parkinson, M. (1998). *Combating social exclusion: lessons from area-based programmes in Europe*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Paugam, S. (1995). 'The spiral of precariousness: a multidimensional approach to the process of social disqualification in France', in G. Room (eds), *Beyond the threshold: The measurement and analysis of social exclusion*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- PCPP (2006). *Social Vision 2030*. Seoul: Arent. [in Korean]
- Percy-Smith, J. (2000). 'Introduction: the contours of social exclusion', in J. Percy-Smith (eds), *Policy Responses to Social Exclusion towards inclusion*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Popay, J., Escorel, S., Hernández, M., Johnston, H., Mathieson, J., & Rispel, L. (2008). *Understanding and tackling social exclusion: Final report to the WHO Commission on social determinants of health*. Geneva: WHO.

- Popkin, S. J., Katz, B., Cunningham, M., Brown, K. D., Gustafson, J. and Turner, M. (2004). A decade of Hope VI: Research findings and policy challenges. Washington, DC: Urban Institute and Brookings Institution.
- Power, A. (1997). *Estates on the Edge: The social consequences of mass housing in Northern Europe*, London: Macmillan.
- Presidential Transition Committee (2003). *The National Inclusion and Realization of Gender Equality*. Prepared by a task force team for the national inclusion and realisation of gender equality in Presidential Transition Committee. [in Korean]
- Priemus, H., Dieleman, F. and Clapham, D. (1999). 'Current developments in social housing management', *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 14(3): 211-23.
- Purchase, H., Hoggan, E. and Gorg, C. (2007). 'How Important is the "Mental Map"? - An Empirical Investigation of a Dynamic Graph Layout Algorithm', Proceedings of 14th International Symposium on Graph Drawing (GD' 06): 184-95
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Regini, M. (2000). 'Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses of European Economies to Globalisation', *Politics and Society*, 28(1): 5-33.
- Rho, B. (2006). *Social Exclusion in disadvantaged areas*. Seoul: Downsam. [in Korean]
- Robinson, P. and Oppenheim, C. (1998). *Social exclusion indicators: A submission to the Social Exclusion Unit*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Ronald, R. and Doling, J. (2010). 'Shifting East Asian approaches to home ownership and the housing welfare pillar', *European Journal of Housing Policy*, 10(3): 233-54.
- Ronald, R. and Doling, J. (2012). 'Testing home ownership as the cornerstone of welfare: lessons from East Asia for the West', *Housing Studies*, 27(7): 940-61.
- Room, G. (1995). 'Poverty and social exclusion: the new European agenda for policy and research', in G. Room (eds), *Beyond the threshold: The measurement and analysis of social exclusion*. Bristol: Policy Press.

- Ryan, G. W. and Bernard, H. R. (2003). 'Techniques to identify themes', *Field methods*, 15(1): 85-109.
- Saxer, C. J. (2002). *From Transition to Power Alternation: Democracy in South Korea, 1987-1997*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Schrag, F. (1992). 'In defense of positivist research paradigms', *Educational researcher*, 21(5): 5-8.
- Schutt, R. K. (2011). *Investigating the social world: The process and practice of research*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
- Schwandt, T. A. (2000). 'Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretivism, hermeneutics, and social constructionism', in N. K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds), *Handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- SDI (2007). *Thematic Maps of Seoul 2007*. Pa-ju: Bobmunsa.
- Sen, A. (1997). *Social Exclusion: A Critical Assessment of the Concept and Its Relevance*, Paper prepared for the Asian Development Bank (processed).
- Seo, B. (2005). 'Study on measuring social exclusion in South Korea', in academic conference papers of Korean Academy of Social Welfare, Korean Academy of Social Welfare. [in Korean]
- Seo, S., Kim, J., Chung, K. and Seol, K. (2004). *Planning Strategies for Social Mix in National Rental Housing Estates*, Seongnam: Housing and Urban Research Institute. [in Korean]
- Seol, D. (2004). 'Backgrounds to the Issue of Foreign Workers', *Silcheon munhak*, 74: 220-30. [in Korean]
- SEU (1997). *Social Exclusion Unit: Purpose, work priorities and working methods*. London: Cabinet Office.
- SEU (2001). *Preventing Social Exclusion*. London: Cabinet Office.
- Shim, C. (2001). 'Significance of 'Social Exclusion' and its Consideration of Welfare Policy on the case of France in the Comparative Perspective', *Korean Journal of Social Welfare*, 44: 178-208. [in Korean]

- Silver, H. (1994). 'Social exclusion and social solidarity: three paradigms', *International Labour Review*, 133: 531-78.
- Silver, H. and Miller, S. M. (2003). 'Social Exclusion The European Approach to Social Disadvantage', *Indicators*, 2(2): 1-17.
- Smith, J. and Oxley, M. (1997). 'Housing investment and social housing: European comparisons', *Housing Studies*, 12(4): 489-507.
- Soja, E. W. (1989). *Postmodern geographies: The reassertion of space in critical social theory*. London: Verso Books.
- Somerville, P. (1998). 'Explanations of social exclusion: where does housing fit in?', *Housing Studies*, 13(6): 761-80.
- Song, E. H. and Shin, E. S. (2012). 'North Korean Defectors and Social Integration', *The Journal of Global Politics*, 5(2): 7-30.
- STKB (2007). *40 years of real estate in the Republic of Korea*. Seoul: Hansmedia.
- Strauss, A. L. (1987). *Qualitative analysis for social scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sultana, F. (2007). 'Reflexivity, positionality and participatory ethics: Negotiating fieldwork dilemmas in international research', *An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*, 6(3): 374-85.
- Tanzi, V. (2002). 'Globalization and the future of social protection', *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 49(1): 116-27.
- Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (1998). *Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Taylor, M. (1998). 'Combating the Social Exclusion of Housing Estates', *Housing Studies*, 13(6): 819-32.
- Temkin, K. and Rohe, W. M. (1996). 'Neighbourhood change and urban policy', *Journal of planning Education and Research*, 15(3): 159-70.
- Temkin, K. and Rohe, W. M. (1998). 'Social capital and neighbourhood stability: An empirical investigation', *Housing Policy Debate*, 9(1): 61-88.

- Therborn, G. (1986). 'Karl Marx Returning', *International Political Science Review*, 7(2): 131-64.
- Titmuss, R. M. (1974). *Social policy*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Tönnies, F. (1955[1887]). *Community and association*. Translated by C. P. Loomis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Torgersen, U. (1987). 'Housing: the wobbly pillar under the welfare state', in B. Turner, J. Kemmny and L. J. Lundqvist (eds), *Between State and Market: Housing in the Post-industrial Era*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
- Townsend, P. (1979). *Poverty in the UK*. London: Penguin
- UN (2009). *Financing Affordable Social Housing in Europe*. Nairobi: Un-habitat.
- Van Beckhoven, E., G. Bolt and Van Kempen R. (2009). 'Theories of Neighbourhood Change and Decline: Their Significance for Post-WWII Large Housing Estates in European City', in S. Musterd, S., R. Van Kempen and R. Rowlands (eds), *Mass housing in Europe Multiple Faces of Development, Change and Response*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Van Oorschot, W. and Komter, A. (1998). 'What is it that ties...? Theoretical perspectives on social bond', *Sociale Wetenschappen*, 41(3): 5-24.
- Vogel, E. F. (1991). *The four little dragons: The spread of industrialization in East Asia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Walker, A. and Walker, C. (1997) *Britain divided: The growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s*. London: CPAG.
- Walzer, M. (1990). *The civil society argument*. Gunnar Myrdal Lecture: University of Stockholm
- Watt, P. and K. Jacobs (2000). 'Discourses of social exclusion: An analysis of bringing Britain together: A national strategy for neighbourhood renewal', *Housing, Theory and Society*, 17(1): 14-26.
- Weber, M. (1947[1924]). *The theory of social and economic organization*. Translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons. New York: Free Press.

- White, G. and Goodman, R. (1998). 'Welfare orientalism and the search for an East Asian welfare model', in R. Goodman, G. White and H.-j. Kwon, *The East Asian welfare model: Welfare orientalism and the state: Welfare Orientalism and the State*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Whitehead, C. and Scanlon, K. J. (2007). *Social housing in Europe*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Wikipedia (2012). *Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne*. [Online] Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congr%C3%A8s_International_d%27Architecture_Moderne (accessed 10 April 2012).
- Wilensky, H. L. and Lebeaux, C. N. (1965). Industrial society and social welfare. New York: Free Press.
- Willgerodt, H. and A. Peacock (1989). 'German liberalism and economic revival', in A. Peacock and H. Willgerodt (ed.), *Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution*. London: Macmillan.
- Wilson, W. J. (1987). *The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wright, G. (1983). *Building the dream: A social history of housing in America*. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
- Yang, C. (1999). 'Changes of Social Stratification in South Korea ', *Korean Society*, 2: 5-31. [in Korean]
- Yang, J.-j. (2008). '60 Years of Korean Welfare Policy: Necessity of formation and transformation of developmentalist welfare regime', *Korean Journal of Public Administration*, 42(2): 327-49. [in Korean]
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Yin, R. K. (2012). *Applications of case study research* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Yoo, H.-s. and Kwak H.-k. (2007). 'A study on Social Exclusion of Single Mother Families in Permanent Rental Housing', *Korean Journal of Social Welfare Studies*, 34: 245-72. [in Korean]