Political economy of sovereign wealth fund: the case of China

Stitsart, Pana (2015). Political economy of sovereign wealth fund: the case of China. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

Preview

Stitsart15PhD.pdf
PDF
Download (1MB)

Abstract

The dissertation investigates the development and evolution of the investment patterns of the two Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)--China Investment Corporation (CIC) and State Administration of Foreign Exchange Investment Company (SIC). The dissertation demonstrates that the IPE literature on SWF is divided between realists, mercantilists and financial economists. Through my research, I advance three related set of propositions. First, I argue that because China opted to develop two SWFs, each with its own distinct institutional and operational background, one drawing on Central bank reserves (SIC), the other evolved as a swap arrangement from foreign reserve (CIC), the two funds saw each other as competitors. Second, the dissertation shows that competition over rate of return ensured that the funds would prioritize commercial interests over the political goals to the Chinese state. Third, and irrespective of the above, I show that paradoxically, political and economic controls proved useful for the Chinese state to support China’s fledgling SOEs and SOCBs in order to sustain fast economic growth. With regard to CIC’s global operations, the State Council cleverly used the fund’s connection and capital capacity to access wider range of international business opportunities, gain management knowhow, technology transfers, raw materials and energy resources.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

Supervisor(s):