

**INTERNATIONAL AND WORLD SOCIETY:
TOWARD AN ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY OF LEGITIMATE
SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEMS**

by

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Abstract: This dissertation seeks to contribute an English School theory of legitimate supranational systems to the literature. It places the legitimacy question of such systems around the School's key concepts of international and world society, and examines the three different interrelationships of these concepts as proposed by the School within the context of the European Union. In the empirical section, a critical moment in the history of European integration, the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty (2002-3), is analyzed with a view to determining which particular interrelationship best fits our theoretical frameworks. It concludes by suggesting that while the moralistic perspective within the English School is superior to the culturalist and communitarian alternatives; even this does not offer a full scheme to understand the process of building legitimate supranational systems. The main problem, the study contends, is the omission of the state in the School's theoretical framework, and, to that end, Neo-Weberian approaches into the nature of the state need to be injected into the English School account for a thorough picture of how and why a supranational system becomes legitimate to its members. Through this Neo-Weberian link, the thesis achieves its purpose of formulating a more coherent English School approach to legitimate supranational systems.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an inquiry into the question of legitimate supranationalism in the arrangement of an international system. The argument is structured around the English School's discussion of the subject. Several decades ago, supranationalism might not have been an urgent topic to deal with for International Relations scholars. Even if it was a novel subject to consider, it was deemed only to be a theoretical possibility in a world organized into states - to this one must add a dominant trend toward state-centric theorizing in the field. Both are changing in today's world. Supranationalism has become a very practical reality in the shape, for instance, of the European Union and not just a theoretical case. Furthermore, a greater questioning of state-centric theorizing within the scholarly community has already gained currency. It is against the coincidence of these two developments that this study seeks to inquire into the question of legitimate supranational systems by drawing on what the English School, hitherto seen as an unlikely candidate in this particular field, had offered.

The English School (ES henceforth) has been contributing to the field of International Relations since the mid-1950s. It originated primarily from the discussions of the research group known as the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics that met regularly between the years 1954-1985. Those who took part in these meetings were convinced that International Relations theories available at the time were inadequate for a variety of reasons, and committed themselves to developing a new approach that addressed these inadequacies. This new approach has been structured around a tripartite scheme of international system, international society and world society, and a set of questions centered around these three concepts. Today, the legacy of this novel attempt

divides IR scholars. To some, it has turned into a fundamentally flawed attempt that failed to put forward a clear-cut argument or concepts that can be taken up with any degree of precision (Jones 1981; Hall 2001). To others, however, the ES literature cannot so easily be dismissed if only because the issues the master figures of the School put forward have resurfaced in current debates in international theory (Buzan 2001; Dunne 2001; Little 2000). Indeed, a legitimate supranational system, the focus of this study, is one significant issue among them.

The primary audience of the study will be those who have a specific interest in the ES theory and in International Relations theory more broadly. Yet the structure of the study is such that it will be equally interesting to another audience: students of European integration. In my attempt to examine the legitimacy of a supranational political arrangement, I turn to the European Union (EU) where we can observe the set of questions associated with the issue in starkest terms. At the moment, the twenty-eight member bloc is undergoing a process of soul-searching. It has been experimenting with its institutional arrangements with a view to overcoming severe economic crises and struggling to keep especially the Eurozone member countries' economies on track. Just recently, the Union's transformation process has suffered from two successive political setbacks. The first came in 2005 when French and Dutch voters rejected an important instrument, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, that would re-organize an enlarging Union. Disappointed by the French and Dutch rejection, European leaders were later able to table the Treaty of Lisbon and hoped to carry on through this new instrument. Yet Lisbon turned into another setback upon the "no" vote of the Irish people in the year 2008. Finally, following a second Irish referendum, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into effect on 1 December 2009. It has thus been and continues to be testing times for the Union as a

number of member states still combat severe economic hardships. As I will argue later, it is possible to speculate these processes with reference to the key ES concepts of international and world society. My main question in the study is when a supranational system becomes legitimate to its members. Of course, a set of secondary questions will emerge from here such as under what circumstances and to whom it will be more legitimate. Just why will it be legitimate for the members of a community to go beyond the state in their political arrangement and form supranational structures?

Bringing in the ES theory is a wise move here since the current debate on the issue is shallow. It is confined to one or two particular concepts, and lacks any historical dimension or any of the much broader issues involved in such a question. Whereas the ES offers the tools to consider the same subject at a much greater depth and with a significant degree of sophistication, especially once one engages those works of the School produced by others than arguably the most widely-read and the most state-centric member Hedley Bull. To be specific, there are three lines of responses to these questions within the ES discussion, and I will follow these lines as they mirror in the European Union to determine which particular one(s) holds for a fresh look at the question of supranationalism. To proceed, however, two key ES concepts need to be introduced first, international society and world society, as the discussion emulates primarily from the dynamic between them. One of the main contributions of this study is indeed here: it examines the question of legitimate supranational authority by placing the world / international society dilemma at the center of the analysis.

In the broader literature, there have been two main lines of inquiry into the concept of legitimacy. The first has been an empirical one – this line approaches legitimacy as something to be studied with reference to the beliefs of the members of a political system

toward that system they are subject to. The second line of inquiry has been a normative one – this line studies legitimacy with reference to a number of ethical considerations and asks what justifies a particular political system. Within the terms of this study, these two different lines of inquiry correspond to the following questions. From the empirical direction; why do the members of a supranational system believe it is a legitimate one? From the normative direction; what justifies a supranational system as opposed to the alternatives? A lot has been offered on this subject to this day. The responses of the members of the ES came both from the empirical and the normative pools. At times, the different responses coming from the different members of the School stood in tension with each other. Of course the chief reason for this is that their views on the prior relationship between international and world society differed. By resorting to this core literature, it is possible to seize a missed opportunity to speculate anew about legitimacy in a way that integrates the important concepts of international and world society.

In simple terms, international society refers to the realm of states and denotes the institutionalized, rule-based dealings among them. World society refers to our common humanity, that which unites us all beyond states or any other political entity. It is something more primordial to any political arrangement of the world (Bull 1995). Several pressing questions stand at the intersection of these two concepts. A particularly complicated one is if these state and beyond-the-state dimensions of our world undermine, reinforce or presuppose one another. Many dilemmas that directly pertain to the question of legitimate supranational authority emerge as one inquires deeper into this issue. And they emerged for the members of the ES as well. In the end, their analysis turned into a confusing one. The various individuals we group together under the name the “English School” produced differing accounts, and some of them have shifted their positions on

several aspects of the subject over time such that their research seemed to lose coherence. My purpose in this study will be to form a coherent whole out of this literature. To do so, I will start by taking the dynamic between these two concepts as it has been framed originally by the four towering figures of the School: Martin Wight, Adam Watson, Hedley Bull and Raymond John Vincent.

The four ES figures that I have selected for this study have laid out three different perspectives on why supranational authority would be legitimate or not. Part of the reason why they could not form a united front is the prior definitional issue around the notion of world society itself. An initial working definition of world society could be agreed in the ES –it denoted our common human existence that bonded us beyond states or any other political system. However, different members of the School later on assigned different usages to world society which served to complicate the overall discussion. For Wight and Watson, world society could mean a particular group of humans who identified themselves with the same culture rather than entire humanity. Sure we all shared a common human bond but some among us shared an additional bond – a common culture. In international affairs, a common culture meant something special. Throughout history, a common culture reinforced international society. Indeed, advanced international societies, that is those that have formed intense institutionalized dealings among their members, did not flourish in the absence of a common culture. Even further, Wight (1977) and Watson (1992) suggested, where the dealings among a group of communities were underwritten by a common culture, they could more easily agree supranational principles and evolve toward universal empires.

Watson's (2007) engagement with this issue did not remain confined to the theme of culture. Towards the later stages of his research, he added a moral dimension to it, and

thus the entirety of his research program renders two readings possible. These two different readings, rather than contradicting one another, focus on different aspects of the same phenomenon of organizing the mutual involvement of a number of political communities. At this later stage, Watson also approached world society as the recipient of our moral concerns such as human rights or women's rights. On this occasion, he posed the question from the other way round – that is if international society reinforced world society when interpreted in moral terms. This discussion of Watson's (1992; 1997; 2007) is structured around the theme of hegemony and it delivered some very interesting insights into this notion as we deal with it in the literature. Indeed, Watson delivered some other interesting tools for the analysis of international affairs to which I will turn later in the study. Suffice to note at this point that Watson concluded this discussion by arguing that a hegemonic international society was necessary for the facilitation of our moral objectives focusing on world society.

For Bull and Vincent, world society did not necessarily reinforce international society. On the contrary, it potentially undermined international society which made possible a viable order in the world. From their perspective, what holds different communities together is a common desire for order which can best be maintained through the rules and institutions of the society of states. What is beyond-the-state cannot be accommodated under these circumstances. With these concerns in mind, Bull (1995) and Vincent (1974) interpreted world society as a potentially dangerous notion. The ES thus offered three different perspectives on the question of how international and world society would affect one another: a culturalist perspective associated with Wight and Watson, a moralistic perspective associated again with the later works of Watson and a communitarian perspective associated with Bull and Vincent. The culturalist perspective

assumed that world society in the form of a culture was necessary for international society; the moralistic perspective assumed that a hegemonic international society was necessary for world society and the communitarian perspective assumed that world society was a possible danger on international society. These perspectives in turn shaped individual ES members' perspectives on the question of a legitimate supranational system as Chapter 2 explicates.

What should all of this mean in relation to our main question, that of when, why and for whom a supranational system would be legitimate or not? The concepts of international and world society will subsequently form the background against which to pursue the three approaches within the ES theory on the question of a legitimate supranational system. Therefore, it is important first to explore these two concepts in detail to be able to proceed to the main question of legitimacy. In Chapter 1, I analyze the three perspectives within the ES theory on the relationship between international society and world society as laid out by the four leading figures of the School.

Of course the inquiry is not confined to those four only. There exists a much broader literature on legitimacy, and what I propose to do here is to incorporate those newer contributions for a full discussion of my main question. As Chapter 1 will demonstrate, the original ES discussion was sketchy at best and is in need of further clarification. In order to be able to exact responses to our inquiry into the dynamics of a legitimate supranational system, we will need to go beyond what the leading figures had to offer. In my attempt to do so, I will undertake an analysis of a particularly critical moment in the history of European integration: The Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003), and seek to identify from the debate held there which ES concepts and perspectives are vindicated or not.

The structure of the study is as follows. In Chapter 1, I introduce the key English School concepts of international society and world society, and the three perspectives in the School on the relationship between them. This is a particularly crucial chapter since grasping these three perspectives is the key to the rest of the study. I also discuss in this chapter if the English School is still worth our attention today. Not everybody is convinced that it is. The School, they contend, has become an obsolete piece of literature that no longer requires serious engagement if it ever did (Jones 1981; Hall 2001). I argue to the contrary, and demonstrate in this chapter the ongoing relevance of the questions the founding figures of the School contemplated.

Chapter 2 presents a detailed account of the concept of legitimacy. From Wight (1977) and Watson's (1992) culturalist standpoint, legitimacy in international affairs is closely related to the lack or presence of a common culture at the world society level. It is their contention that wherever culturally-similar communities attempt to regulate their mutual involvement, they do so on the basis of more supranational principles. Wight and Watson, who are primarily historians, advance this claim by comparative analyses of historical international systems. This kind of culturalist dynamic in political processes would of course bear on the further development and especially enlargement of today's European Union, and culture was indeed a subject discussed during the Convention that gathered to draft a Constitutional Treaty for the Union. Yet culturalism was not that significant a matter during the Convention as Wight and Watson would have expected. As I argue later in the study, these two figures within the English School have a rather strict view on the subject of culture that is becoming more and more inclusive. For their part, Bull and Vincent already have a more inclusive notion of culture and their communitarian perspective of legitimacy takes more issue with international order than culture. For them,

the system of states remains the most legitimate system as it can provide for both order and justice at the same time. Their compelling argument, however, collapses in a number of respects since the institutional arrangements and the benefits of the European Union to its member states eliminate the potential dangers of beyond-the-state systems much discussed in the communitarian perspective. A different kind of order and a different kind of justice are not impossible as the subsequent chapters will demonstrate. Chapter 3 finally turns to Watson's moralistic perspective of legitimacy which establishes a direct relationship between power, morality and legitimacy. Watson is a dissenting figure in International Relations theory and he theorizes for the most time with the set of concepts that he himself developed. I first introduce in this chapter Watson's framework of theorizing and proceed with the specific concept of legitimacy he proposes. Watson equates power with moral leadership and believes that more supranational systems could be more legitimate from a moralistic point of departure in terms of ensuring the rights and liberties of individuals. And, because such systems can become more morally-loaded, they can become more legitimate as well. Pursuing this line of thinking to its very end has led Watson to overlook differences in state and nation formation in different parts of the world and resulted in a weakness in his argument. Still, the bulk of it is a very convincing one and forms the basis of my own conclusions in this study.

Chapter 3 explains the methodological procedure of the project. In this chapter, I first start with the discussion of where the English School stands in terms of its scientific persuasion. For some, the School's argument is too complex to be placed under one scientific tradition (Little 1995). From their view, the different aspects or elements of the English School's writings align with different traditions such as positivism or interpretivism. My reading places the English School within the interpretive tradition and I

explain in Chapter 3 why it is so. I further explain in this section why I chose the Convention on the Future of Europe for my empirical inquiry and seek to demonstrate why a discursive approach is the best in attempting to work within an English School framework. That the School does not employ a particular methodology has been one of the chief points of criticism directed against it. The critics have complained that the School has put forward a series of concepts but offered no clue as to how they can be studied in empirical terms (Finnemore 2001). While it might be the case that the most influential figures of the School did not single out or specify a particular methodological approach, they certainly did hint at a discursive one as Chapter 3 demonstrates.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 consider respectively the case for each one of the English School approaches to the question of a legitimate supranational system. As noted above, there are three specific lines of thinking within the English School on this subject: a culturalist line, a moralistic line and a communitarian one. These three chapters evaluate each one of them against the debate held at the Convention on the Future of Europe. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the culturalist perspective associated with Wight and Watson. I find here that the culturalist argument within the English School has a fundamental inability to understand the notions of nations and nationalism, and operates with an almost impossibly universalist or purified notion of culture. I turn here especially to the works of Duara (2004; 2001; 1998) who demonstrates how much difficulty culturalist approaches have been encountering in the age of nation-states. Cultures, or civilizations in broader terms, have to constitute a very complex relationship with nation-states and this relationship is not as smooth or as linear as presumed in the culturalist English School account. European nation-states are not an exception to this, and the relationship between the European nation-state and European culture is just one of the challenges to the English

School discussion as this chapter explains. Chapter 5, meanwhile, finds that Bull and Vincent for their part remain overly suspicious regarding the prospects for a beyond-the-state system. While insisting to focus on the potential dangers such as excessive concentration of power in one hand, they overlook the actual benefits of supranational systems to their members as the case of the European Union clearly evinces. Neither a too sterile culturalism nor a too cautious communitarianism matches in the end to the debate at the European Convention for drafting a Constitutional Treaty. These two approaches then offer limited utility in seeking a fresh perspective on the legitimacy of supranational systems.

Leaving behind the culturalist and the communitarian arguments, Chapter 6 turns to the moralistic one delivered by Watson which best meets the actual European conversation held during the process of drafting the Union's Constitutional Treaty. I find that the European dialogue supplies plentiful evidence to support Watson's moralistic interpretation of the formation of supranational systems, and demonstrates that this superior moral quality also provides for its legitimacy. It would be premature, however, to suggest instantly that the most convincing argument regarding the formation of legitimate supranational systems is Watson's moralistic one. For Watson's arguments do not hold under all the circumstances that they are supposed to hold in the actual cases that I examined. While the European experience with legitimate supranational systems does seem to fulfill Watson's expectations, some other parts of the world where the conditions seem equally ripe defy those similar expectations. The state of affairs in the Middle East constitutes the primary case that defies Watson's theoretical presuppositions. I contend that the chief reason for this mismatch between the theory and the practice in parts of the world other than Europe is Watson's inability to come to terms with the notions of nations and

nationalism. It has indeed been demonstrated that different trajectories of state and nation formation in different parts of the world matter when it comes to understanding why some groups of states find it easier than others to form legitimate supranational systems (Hinnebusch 2011). Chapter 7, in the light of the empirical findings from the previous chapters, offers my own assessment on the question of a legitimate supranational system. It is in this chapter that I propose to integrate into the English School analysis a theoretically-grounded notion of the “state”.

I diagnosed throughout the inquiry that the lack of a firmly established notion of the state has undermined the potential contribution of the English School to the literature on supranational systems. By contemplating the role of the state in the theoretical puzzle, it becomes possible to explain why English School arguments hold in some cases of supranational systems and not in others. Of course, the English School is not alone within the International Relations literature in terms of its omission of the nature of states. There exists a broader tendency to overlook the possibility that different types of states can produce different types of international systems. Consequently, there emerges the possibility that only certain types of states can come together to form supranational systems. I engage this possibility throughout the study and consider the prospects for supranational systems in parts of the world other than Europe. At the final stage of the analysis, I introduce Neo-Weberian and Neo-Gramscian approaches, the two contributions in the literature that do deal with states in the international system. Following a comparison between the two; I conclude that we can approach the question of legitimate supranational systems in a novel way by combining a Neo-Weberian notion of the state with an English School notion of international systems. This synthesis enables us to understand why particular systems evolve more easily toward supranational systems while others do not.

The question of legitimacy, meanwhile, can be re-conceptualized with reference to the Neo-Weberian state and to the characteristics of a moralistic international system as outlined by the English School.

CHAPTER 1: INTERNATIONAL AND WORLD SOCIETY: THE THREE PERSPECTIVES IN THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

International Relations Theory is rediscovering the English School today. The ES' original contributors, most of whom were members of the research group known as the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985), have all left the scene now but the topics and concepts they discussed are resurfacing in the discipline. The timing of the growing attention ES research receives is no coincidence. Members of the ES sought to demonstrate that relations between states were marked by a societal pattern of shared rules and institutions which the dominant power politics approach obscured in their view. They developed the concept of international society to capture these patterns. Renewed interest in ES scholarship comes at a time when this societal dimension of inter-state conduct it had highlighted is becoming the prevailing subject of international theory (Buzan 2010, 2004; Clark 2009, 2003; Cochran 2009; Donnelly 2006b).

Of course, the ES approach has its weaknesses. Yet its members deserve credit for underscoring a previously overlooked facet of international politics and putting forward a concept like international society early on, but their broader conceptual framework of international system, international society and world society remains very much contested (Williams 2005; Suzuki 2005). Skeptics as well as sympathizers of the School agree that its tripartite scheme needs to be developed further because there are ambiguities in it surrounding (i) the individual concepts (especially world society) (ii) the dynamic between the related concepts (international system - international society; international society – world society) and (iii) the standing of all three of the concepts vis-à-vis each other. Buzan (2004), a leading figure in ES studies, revised the entire scheme in his attempt to address some of these issues. His study is currently the most comprehensive treatment of the

question marks emerging from the ES theory. The present study intends to offer an equally comprehensive inquiry into another concept within the English School theory, that of legitimate supranational authority, by reformulating the original discussion of it by the School within the context of the European Union (EU).

Only a few authors have taken notice of the ES theory in the field of integration studies so far (Diez and Whitman 2002). ES scholarship and integration research remain fairly isolated from each other which is regrettable since there is a remarkable degree of overlap between the two research programs. It will be more obvious in the coming chapters how concepts from the ES underlie the very process of shaping the future course of integration in the EU for instance. The ES offers valuable insights into the development as well as enlargement of EU-style polities from a historical point of view. What the ES has to contribute here is particularly noteworthy in the sense that it tells us how the dilemmas involved in such a task have been resolved in history. These insights should be interesting to students of the EU as well as to all who are researching international politics. Thus, one of the goals of this study is to mitigate the isolation between the ES and supranational integration research, and to contribute a historically-informed analysis of the latter.

In this chapter, I start the discussion by focusing on the two key ES concepts of international society and world society. A thorough examination of these two concepts, and the relationship between them, is necessary at this stage as my main concern, that of a legitimate supranational system, originates from here. Particular interpretations of the relationship between international and world society shape subsequent interpretations on the possibility of a legitimate supranational system in the ES. I will then undertake a reading of the “Debate on the Future of Europe” held between 2002 - 2003 through the lenses of these different positions within the ES. I also consult the British Committee’s

convener Herbert Butterfield, and Charles Anthony Woodward Manning, one of the earliest contributors to the School, where appropriate. The bulk of the literature generated by these figures dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, and it is from this core literature that very interesting insights into the subject of a legitimate supranational system emerge. A good deal of secondary literature on the ES has been coming out today as more scholars are currently re-visiting this core (Buzan 2010, 2004; Clark 2009, 2003). The focus in this study remains on these four central ES figures – Wight, Watson, Bull and Vincent – who have originated the issues to which we are returning now. Certainly, recent work too is of much interest and I engage these as necessary as the study proceeds.

In simple terms, world society is what lies beyond the states' domain of international society; individuals and non-state actors. The dynamic between international and world society is in the first instance the dynamic between the state and beyond-the-state domains of international politics. However, it assumes a more complex character when a third variable, international order, is brought into the equation. Actually, the international / world society question divided the members of the ES. It is possible to point to three ES perspectives in this regard. The first perspective associated with Wight and Watson sees world society as a *prerequisite* for international society and the second one associated with Bull and Vincent sees world society as a potentially *destructive* force on international society (Buzan 2001). The third perspective associated also with Watson (2007b) sees a hegemonic international society as a prerequisite for world society. Below is an introduction to these concepts and then a review of some of the main criticisms directed toward the School's work, including perhaps the harshest one that suggests the ES be removed from the literature (Jones 1981). The rationale for not removing but, to the contrary, further developing the ES is available in this section as well. It then proceeds to

an overview of the three perspectives, and explains in its final section how the development of the EU intersects with the ES theory.

I. The Conceptual Toolkit of the English School: International System, International Society and World Society

The foundations of ES scholarship have been laid down by Manning (1975) and Wight (1991).¹ In his reflections on the academic study of International Relations, Manning (1975) specified a tripartite subject matter of two inter-state orders, the diplomatic and the legal, and a social order among the peoples of the world. Later on, Wight (1991) structured the subject in the form of “three traditions”, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism, associated with Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian thinking respectively. Drawing on the three traditions, Bull (1995) defined the precise terms of the School’s argument and set its conceptual toolkit in the form of international system, international society and world society - corresponding respectively to Manning’s (1975) diplomatic, legal and social orders and to Wight’s (1991) three traditions of Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism. This Bullian wrap-up of the School’s framework is a widely accepted one - though it has been subject to debate even within the British Committee itself where he discussed it several times (Vigazzi 2005). As Wight himself wrote, the three traditions tend to blend into another. Each coincides with the other two in a number of ways (Wight 1991). In this respect, it may be hard to draw such one-to-one correspondence between the three traditions and the three elements of international system, international society and world society as in the Bullian method of organizing the subject. Yet Bull’s move had to do more with style than substance. Bull had his own particular style of arranging his subject in which he maintained such separations for convenience during the research

¹ Most of Wight’s research has been published post-humously. The date 1991 refers to the publication date of Wight’s research conducted back in the 1950s and 1960s.

process (there will be more on research design in the ES in Chapter 3). And it is indeed convenient for us here to take this Bullian scheme and work with it.

Accordingly, two or more states form an international system when they have “sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave - at least in some measure - as parts of a whole” (Bull 1995, p.9). The key to the formation of an international society is common rules, values and institutions:

A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and certain common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions (Bull 1995, p.13; emphasis in original).

The nature of the common rules and values also mattered in Bull’s understanding of international society. On this basis, Bull introduced two different types of international societies: pluralist and solidarist. Bull attached pluralism and solidarism to positive law and Grotian / natural law traditions respectively. A pluralist international society is founded upon rules of a procedural nature while a solidarist one incorporates moral values. Pluralism places the rights of states at the center and chief among its rules is non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Solidarism places greater emphasis on the rights of individuals and overrides the rule of non-intervention to uphold these rights where necessary. Whereas pluralism takes an a-moral approach to international politics, solidarism seeks to improve it through the promotion of moral principles derived out of natural law (Bull 1966a). Pluralism and solidarism will be central to the discussion when we turn to Bull and Vincent’s perspective on the relationship between world society and international society.

World society primarily refers to “a nascent society of all mankind” (Manning 1975, p.177) which is “fundamental, primordial and morally prior” (Bull 1995, p.21) to states. World society in this primary sense of all mankind has been an emotionally-loaded category for the ES. Despite being morally prior to states, world society remains subservient to them until there is “not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interests and values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built” (Bull 1995, p.269). Manning (1975) uses very strong terms in various places to express his resentment toward this subservient status of world society.

However, alternative forms of political organization under which world society could take precedence over states did not appeal to ES scholars either. Wight (1991) identified two alternatives in his review of the Kantian literature, the origin of world society thinking. The first is to abolish states and institute a world government responsible for the needs of humankind as a whole. The second is to promote the ideological homogeneity of all states around liberal cosmopolitan principles. Kant (1970) established this second alternative as a substitute for world government (p.105). Its absence could be made up for if the constitution of each state enshrined the principles of freedom and equality of all humans (pp.99-100). Neither option seemed realistic to the ES. Writing back in the Cold War years, Wight (1991, p.46), questioned how common principles could be promoted in a world so deeply divided in ideological terms. Vincent asked how states could ever be persuaded to surrender their sovereignty to a world government (Vincent 1981, pp. 97-8), which is not necessarily a desirable institution as it means the excessive concentration of power in one governing authority (Bull 1995, p.245).

Apart from its primary meaning of entire humanity, world society takes on other meanings across the ES literature. Buzan identifies three to be specific. In Wight and Watson's usage, world society refers to a common culture among a particular group of humans (Buzan 2001, p.477). In Vincent's usage, world society also refers to the "macro-dimension of human social organization" (Buzan 2004, p.63) including states, non-state actors, individuals and institutions in social life. Finally, world society comes to refer indiscriminately to anything not connected with states, thus becoming a "dustbin category" in Buzan's (2001, p.477) words. Vincent's (1981, p.97) putting together of "General Motors, the Roman Catholic Church, holidaymakers going abroad, and international telephone calls" all under world society illustrates this indiscriminate usage.

While retaining its primary meaning of all mankind, the ES' world society starts to lose focus as these other usages pile up. Students of the ES continue to discuss how to give world society, flagged as the most problematic concept in the theory, a clearer focus. Several other aspects of the ES theory are under discussion as well. Among them is the position of the three elements of international system, international society and world society vis-à-vis each other. Jackson (1990, p.269) suggests that the three elements stand in a dialectical relationship with international society as a synthesis of international system and world society. For Little (2000), the three elements highlight different dimensions of international politics and the School maintains a separate interest in all three at the same time without intending a synthesis. Accordingly, the three elements correspond to the ES' interest in the subjects of power, order and justice (Linklater 1990). There is evidence to support both interpretations from the School's work. In fact, a third interpretation is also possible and that is to see world society as an end point for it all. Vincent's (1986) later work conveys this sense strongly.

Particular distinctions within the three elements have generated further debates. International system / international society is one of them. The most pressing issue here is how to classify relations between states on the system / society score which do not share a common culture but otherwise meet the criteria in Bull's definition of society. Attempts to classify relations between European states and the Ottoman Empire are the origin of this question. Watson (2007 [1987]: pp.28-9) concedes the difficulty of determining what has been called "the Ottoman problem" (Wæver 2002, p.103) in the ES. As we will see below, he even invented a new category to deal with it.² A further difficulty in the theory is the thin line between solidarism and world society. Both solidarism and world society draw on common philosophical foundations and aspire to the institutionalization of similar humanistic ideals in the world (Buzan 2004, pp. 21-22). It is especially hard to establish a boundary between solidarist international society and world society organized through the ideological homogeneity of states. There is indeed a frequent conflation of the two in ES texts. Another issue of course is the relationship between international and world society, and I turn to the three perspectives in the ES on this below. However, there is a prior question that needs to be tackled before that. Is the ES theory worth the attention it has been receiving in recent years in the first place? For some, the answer to this question is a clear "no". The section below argues "yes".

II. Is the English School Worth the Attention?

Not all are convinced that the ES deserves the attention it has been receiving for a while now. For some, the School's argument is fraught with so many tensions that it is beyond repair. Jones doubts that the ES has a clear argument in the first place. In his view, the

² See also James, A. 1993. System or Society? *Review of International Studies*, vol.19, no.3, pp.69-88 for more on the international system / society distinction.

concept of international society is a pointless one, and the School has overlooked issues that really matter for the discipline in pursuit of this concept. The way the members of the ES conducted their research does not satisfy Jones either. ES scholars were keen on re-reading and debating classical texts; many themes in their research program can be traced back to them. To Jones, what the ES ends up offering upon revisiting the classics is more or less a collection of ideas from the past on a trivial subject, international society, whereas social science needs to address contemporary issues and problems as well. Ultimately, what needs to be done with the School, as far as Jones is concerned, is to close it (Jones 1981). Hall (2001) is even more critical of the ES than Jones is. He labels the ES as the “English patient” (p.931), and calls for an acknowledgment that it “cannot be closed, or indeed re-invented, for, as a cohesive approach to the study of international relations, it no longer exists” (p.942). From Hall’s (2001) point of view, attempts to resuscitate the ES are simply unwarranted as there never was such a “School” in the proper sense of the term in the first place.

Looking at the subject from a different angle, what makes the ES worthy of further engagement is precisely the presence of so many tensions within it. Indeed, the ES’ three-tiered approach is not flawless but this is why it is exciting to keep investigating. It might be desirable for social science to address practical problems in the world as Jones requires, and the less problem-oriented ES theory does not seem to meet this requirement in an immediate sense. In a much deeper sense, however, the ES departs from a fundamental problem: how is it possible for so many different states, peoples and cultures in the world to co-exist, or “what makes the world hang together?” as Ruggie (1998, p.855) puts it. In any case, its problem-solving ability, or lack of it, need not constitute a ground for doing away with the ES. Scholars are still debating the purpose of social science today. There are

different viewpoints on what the function of social science theories are and on whether or not problem-solving needs to be listed as one of these functions. As Chapter 3 discusses in detail, the ES for its part was attracted to a conception of social science that aims to understand, not necessarily solve, problems. To return to Jones' criticism of the ES in this respect; this can only be taken up in the context of a broader debate about the purpose of the social sciences rather than in a debate specifically about the ES.

Perhaps Jones' (1981) harshest piece of criticism against the ES is his dismissal of the concept of international society, which focuses on shared rules and institutions among states, as a meaningless one. It is possible to treat "rules and institutions" as pretty straightforward matters yet especially the "institutions" part is more abstract in the ES than it sounds at first. "Institutions" do not necessarily refer to physically-existing bodies like the United Nations but to things we are not used to thinking as institutions like war and the balance of power (see Bull 1995, Part 2 for the full list of institutions of international society). Jones' dismissal of international society is essentially consistent with his request that the concepts of the ES be more concrete and more readily applicable to practical issues. Once again, however, there is a need to consider international society in a deeper sense in order to appreciate its significance. If the ES is an inquiry into the question of "what makes the world hang together", to borrow Ruggie's (1998, p.855) phrase once again, then the shared rules and institutions among states make up that vital piece of the theory which explicates how the world actually does so. The difficulty of relating the notion of international society to the day-to-day practice of international affairs should not diminish its importance. In fact, far from being meaningless, international society can serve as a "master concept" of International Relations as Dunne (2001, p.70) suggests.

International society is therefore a valuable concept that should not be dismissed so easily. Furthermore, the ES' contribution to the field should not be assessed through this particular concept only as is frequently the case. International society did indeed occupy a central place in the ES literature and received more systematic attention from the members of the School than the other two elements of international system, which focuses on the strategic dimension of relations among states, and world society, which focuses on what lies beyond states. That said, however, it would be a mistake to equate the ES with international society. "It is an oversimplification to suggest", as Little (2000, p.398) warns, "that the English School is synonymous with the study of international society". Bull (1995, p.49) himself once warned against theorizing at the expense of international system and world society as he thought that "it is always erroneous to interpret international events as if international society were the sole or the dominant element". Just how well Bull, or indeed the ES as a whole, theorized international system and world society is another matter; the point is that the ES cannot be regarded simply as a theory of international society. It is a much broader theory based on a tripartite scheme of international system, international society and world society. Indeed, legitimacy too is an important concept in this picture and I will be taking it up in detail in this study. It is this broader scheme that makes the ES particularly exciting.

For Wæver, there is something "unsettling" about this scheme caused by the co-presence of the three elements of international system, international society and world society. The three elements, highlighting the three contradictory realities at work in international affairs, come together to produce a theory underwritten by a creative tension. Through its three elements, the ES is able to offer an "open-ended framework" which "never closes in on itself" (Wæver 1999). As such, it does not deserve the label "English

patient” (Hall 2001, p.942). Far from being so, the ES is a very dynamic approach that well deserves the attention it has been receiving. In this study, I seek to benefit from this dynamism with a view to offering a fresh perspective on the question of building a legitimate supranational system inspired by ES thinking.

The relationship between international and world society, the subject of this chapter, too merits attention – not only because it structures perspectives on legitimacy but also because it “take[s] us to the heart of of the problem of how English School ideas can be deployed in the post-Cold War international order” (Hurrell 2001, p.490). Since the 1990s, the role of cultural forces and the institutional structure of world politics have been among the most heatedly-debated themes in international theory. Are we becoming more and more similar in cultural terms in a rapidly globalizing world, and if so, is the system of states still relevant for us? (Hurrell 2001, pp.491-3). Could the EU evince that it no longer is? Or could there be certain pitfalls in attempts to move beyond states such as the legitimacy of beyond-the-state arrangements? The ES’ international / world society dynamic revolves around these important questions, and indeed they become urgent at a time when we are experimenting with supranational structures.

States vs. beyond-the-state, and the legitimacy of it all, is an inherently complicated subject. In some ways, it is understandable that the members of the ES could not come up with easy answers. Arguably, however, they made it all the more difficult for themselves by posing their questions on an unmanageably large scale: the entire globe. By focusing on Europe, I will be able to work on a regional, thus more manageable, scale. Furthermore, Europe is the place where we can observe supranationalism in its thickest form, and determine its real-life use. Indeed, this seems to be the only practical way. Therefore, the European Union is an ideal subject matter for this study. First, however, let us take a closer

look at the three perspectives within the ES on the relationship between international society and world society.

III. International and World Society: the Three Perspectives in the English School

The prior elusiveness of the world society concept explains why there is not one but three perspectives in the ES on how it relates to international society. Several meanings associated with world society are all present in these three perspectives and shape subsequent considerations for ES scholars. I consider each perspective in more detail below.

Perspective I: World society (a shared culture) as a prerequisite for international society:

Manning (1975) contributed to the formation of the “world society (in the form of a shared culture) as a *prerequisite* for international society” (Buzan 2001, p.477; emphasis in original) perspective in the ES. Manning’s discussion of the world / international society dynamic opens with a confusing remark in which he places world society “within, beneath, alongside, behind and transcending” international society (p.177). That a shared culture is required “beneath” international society, to act as a support structure, is established in the overall discussion. Wight (1977, p.175) puts this point in more explicit terms when he argues that the formation of an international society “presupposes both regularity of diplomatic intercourse and homogeneity of culture: it is the political articulation of a macro-culture”. Wight’s understanding of culture strongly incorporates religious values which are in turn reflected in his understanding of international society. The ES’ “Ottoman problem” starts presenting itself at this juncture. Wight was reluctant to recognize the Ottomans as a member of European international society. A devout Christian himself,

Wight reserved membership in this society for states historically belonging to the European / Christian civilization (Wight 1977, pp.118-9; 1991, p.9, p.290). Yet the intensifying institutional arrangements between Ottomans and Europeans from the nineteenth century onwards seem to fit the ES' own description of international society more so than international system.

Watson (1992) came up with a category in between international system and international society to address this issue; "interstate society" or "secondary system". An interstate society is formed between those states which satisfy the conditions in Bull's (looser) definition of international society but do not enjoy the supportive role of a common culture at the world society level. The case of European states and the Ottomans is the chief example of an interstate society. Europe is a single unit with a common cultural heritage, a "grande république" for Watson (1992). Ottomans have not been part of this common process. As with other interstate societies, Europe and the Ottomans have had to negotiate an inter-civilizational code of conduct to regulate their relations (Watson 1992).

Watson's interstate society category is important to this study because he views EU enlargement toward one candidate country, Turkey, under this category as well. For Watson, the EU is becoming a "slightly enlarged grande république" (1997, p.37) and Turkey's membership is posing "the problem of how to bring in communities that do not share some or all of the cultural values" of the EU as members (2007a, p.4). These remarks should conclude this section as they most succinctly reformulate the "world society as a *prerequisite* for international society" perspective in the ES in a supranational integration context.

Perspective II: World society as destructive of international society: Bull and Vincent discussed the relationship between world and international society around the issues of international order, justice and human rights. A guiding question for them was whether an effective order and principles of justice / human rights could obtain at the same time in the world. A pluralist international society is seen to deliver more on the order side and a solidarist international society is seen to deliver more on the justice / human rights side within the terms of this question. Both Bull and Vincent have shifted their views away from pluralism at the later stages of their studies toward solidarism and world society. Their works contain contradictions as a result of this shift. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the theme that world society (as humankind) can be destructive of international society persistently.

Order refers to a “pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of social life” (Bull 1995, p.4). In the international system, it is sustained through some basic rules of coexistence among states. Justice has many meanings all of which come from the moral sphere. Bull thought that elementary goals could be agreed more easily but moral principles could always prove controversial in different cultural settings. Pushing potentially controversial moral principles in international affairs, Bull feared, could end up damaging the rules of coexistence among states. The foundations of international order would have been destroyed as a result. In a sense, order is prior to justice since there can be no justice of any kind unless some elementary goals are sustained in the first place (Bull 1995, pp.74-94). By pushing its universal moral code, solidarism was “imposing upon international society a strain which it cannot bear” (Bull 1966a, p. 70). Pluralism could perhaps accommodate some limited conceptions of justice and

maintain order in the world at the same time. Bull (1995) advocated pluralism on this ground in his preliminary reflections on the subject.

By the early 1980s, however, pluralism had disappointed Bull. He called into question the stability of the pluralist arrangement amid increasing demands for a new economic order by developing countries. Moreover, the revival of the Cold War evinced that even the basic rules of coexistence were under dispute (Wheeler and Dunne 1996, pp.97-8). In his last work, *Justice in International Relations*, Bull exhibited great interest in solidarism / world society ideas and called on all states to work for the promotion of human rights and justice around the world (Bull 2000 [1984], pp. 220-2).

Vincent (1986) issued a similar call at around the same time with Bull. In the face of growing socioeconomic problems in the world, Vincent urged for a new international initiative that would guarantee the “basic rights” of life and nutrition for all individuals (p.125). Previously, Vincent (1974, p.302) had thought that the internationalization of individuals’ rights could “prejudice the establishment of a sound legal order between states” as these rights were subject to different interpretations. Pluralism’s central rule of non-intervention essentially functions to preserve these different interpretations. It allows each state to administer its own interpretation inside its own borders (Vincent 1992, p.261). But the basic rights initiative would be workable because the rights to life and nutrition should not be controversial in any cultural setting. Vincent later on argued that the rule of non-intervention needs to be modified to take account of basic rights. In its modified form, non-intervention ceases to apply to those states which fail to meet the basic rights of their citizens (Vincent and Wilson 1993, pp.125-6).

Vincent’s basic rights scheme is an attempt to reconcile pluralist and solidarist interpretations of international society (Gonzalez-Pelaez and Buzan 2003, pp.322-3). It is a

humble scheme because a more expansive list of human rights overburdens international society with moral issues. As Bull (2000 [1984], p.221) put it, the burden of moral subjects could be “subversive of coexistence among states on which the whole fabric of world order in our times depends”. Given that alternative orders such as the ideological homogeneity of all states or the institution of a world government are neither achievable nor desirable, Bull and Vincent saw it necessary to shield the only practicable arrangement of international society from world society ideals. These considerations can be summarized as the “world society as *destructive* of international society” perspective in the ES.

Perspective III: Hegemonic international society as a prerequisite for world society: This perspective represents the culmination of Watson’s long-held view that much of Westphalian IR has in fact been non-Westphalian. Hegemony repudiates the Westphalian institution of independence for him. His contention is that independence was exercised in the middle area of a notional pendulum of independence, hegemony, dominion and empire throughout history. These terms indicate increasing degrees of central authority in the functioning of international society. States subject their independence to further restrictions as international society functions nearer the empire end of the pendulum (Watson 1992, 1997). The “hegemonic international society as a prerequisite for world society” perspective in the ES also emerges from the pendulum as Watson (2007b) marks hegemony as the point in the pendulum at which international society can start dealing with moral issues pertaining to world society (as humankind more so than a common culture this time).

It is not just the degree of central authority that increases toward the empire end of the pendulum. What also increases is its moral load. At the independence end, international

society simply regulates the mutual involvement of states. Hegemony is where a “diplomacy of justice”, a term Watson (2007b, p.85) borrows from Vincent, can be conducted in international society. Interventions to promote moral values are a routine practice under the diplomacy of justice. They are in today’s post-Westphalian core-periphery order as Watson labels it whereby Western countries led by the United States frequently intervene in developing ones to promote human rights. Of course, interests play an important role in these interventions. However, also involved here is a heightened sense of moral responsibility for the peoples of the periphery which can only be put into practice as the pendulum operates at hegemony and beyond (Watson 2007b, pp.82-90).

The background to this line of reasoning is Watson’s moralistic interpretation of the notion of power. For Watson, power and morality are inextricably linked in international affairs. The more powerful a state becomes, the more moral responsibility it assumes for what goes on outside of its own borders. Indeed, in the “hierarchy of [moral] responsibility”, great powers carry the heaviest weight on their shoulders (Watson 1982, p.208). Hegemonic systems, managed by powerful states each sharing a moral obligation toward human beings abroad, are therefore necessary from a world society standpoint. Watson’s analysis contributes the “hegemonic international society as a prerequisite for world society” perspective to the ES. Table I below summarizes all three perspectives in the School:

| Perspectives in the English School on the relationship between international and world society | English School member(s) associated with the perspective | Main considerations associated with the perspective |
|---|---|--|
| | | |

| | | |
|---|------------------|---|
| World society as a prerequisite for international society | Wight and Watson | International society needs the supportive role of world society in the form of a shared culture |
| World society as destructive of international society | Bull and Vincent | World society can distort the order maintained through international society, the only viable form of order |
| Hegemonic international society as a prerequisite for world society | Watson | World society cannot be discussed unless there is a hegemonic international society |

Table I: the three English School perspectives on the relationship between international and world society

These ES concepts can best be observed at a regional level rather than the global level the School's founding fathers concerned themselves with. Concepts like international / world society and legitimacy will be more obvious in a smaller regional context and thus more amenable for empirical analysis. The EU is a particularly good candidate in this respect. Its member states form the most advanced international society in the world at present (Diez and Whitman 2002, p.56; Buzan 2001, p.485). Moreover, the EU is the only region with the most visible beyond-the-state institutions of world society. In Bull's (1984b, p. 120) words, modern Europe is the only place where world society has a "foundation in the will or consent of political communities". Indeed, the goal of "an ever closer union among the

peoples of Europe” (Treaty on European Union 1992) might be a reflection of this will - but just how close? And, more importantly, how legitimate? This study seeks to provide an answer to this question by deploying an English School perspective on it. In the next chapter, I introduce this very concept of legitimacy.

CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY IN THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

This chapter examines the concept of legitimacy as found in the English School literature. Only recently have there been systematic attempts to chart out what the ES had to say on this. Clark's (2007, 2003) works are especially noteworthy in this respect. Clark seeks to explain the processes through which the principles of international legitimacy are formed and sheds light on the role of world society actors as part of this process. My objective is to try and deploy the ES as a theory of building a legitimate supranational system by drawing on the merits of the different strands of thinking within it. At the center of the inquiry lies the inherently complicated question of the relationship between international society and world society – the subject of the previous chapter. In pursuit of this objective, I turn to the EU in chapters 4,5 and 6 and analyze the Debate on the Future of Europe (2002-3). It is essential that we consider the relationship between international and world society in an attempt to theorize supranational integration since many of the challenges involved in this task originate from it. It is a prior question that lurks behind the process of building a supranational system. The ES tried to explore this prior question in much detail and its discussion forms the background to this study however underdeveloped it may be.

Indeed for many, the ES will look like an odd candidate for analyzing supranationalism. After all, it is a theory whose basic focus is co-existence among sovereign states and looks obsolete for studying something like the novel project of European integration that can be characterized as anything but Bull's *Anarchical Society*. Yet a meeting between the ES theory and integration studies will be a worthwhile enterprise. To begin with, the School's research is not all that outdated for researching the

EU, at least for those who do not observe a radical departure from the past practices of state sovereignty under the current functioning of the Union. A classical international society framework, a more solidarist one than Bull sees possible, whereby states cooperate on the basis of common norms and institutions can address the EU. Even if the individual sovereignties of member states were to erode fully in the future, the end result would be one giant European state while the institution of sovereignty will have remained intact (Bull 1979, p.142; Jackson 1999, p.452). Viewed in this light, the development of the EU signals a quantitative shift in the international system that can readily be accommodated by resorting to existing theories, including the ES.

For others, the EU has already uniquely transformed the institution of sovereignty, on a qualitative basis that renders the Union space unintelligible except in post-sovereign terms (Wallace 1999). Remembering the skeptical attitude toward the likelihood as well as the desirability of a post-sovereign polity taken especially by Bull and Vincent, this argument presents more of a challenge to the ES. However, the extent to which the EU represents such a transformation has been subject to debate. Sørensen (1999, pp.602-4) maintains that the EU exhibits both sovereign and post-sovereign characteristics at the same time; sovereign statehood continues to be the constitutive principle of the EU and members retain a corpus of sovereign rights while sharing or relinquishing others. It is not certain what the future entails for the EU according to Sørensen. The introduction of more supranational authority is not an inevitable development as the Union may just as well revert back to a scheme of interstate cooperation or proceed in an unforeseen manner.

It is precisely the co-existence of state and beyond-the-state arrangements in the EU that makes encounters with the ES worthwhile. In ES terms, the EU system is a coincidence of world and international society structures and Sørensen's convincing

observation on its future shape boils down to the relationship between the two societies. Can the goal of “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (Treaty on European Union 1992) be accomplished in an EU of states? If so, would it enjoy the legitimacy of its members? The challenges awaiting the states and the peoples of the EU in this task have been explicated in the ES literature, and such is the convergence between the two research programs.

What is more to the point is that both sides stand to benefit from this convergence. By connecting the analysis of the EU to a set of broader questions like those raised by the ES, we can avoid a “*sui generis* mentality” which if prevails can isolate EU research (Diez and Whitman 2002, p.44). Wight and Watson’s perspective on European history is especially useful in this respect. Hegemony, a salient feature particularly of European international relations, has always kept the exercise of sovereignty under discipline for them. Sovereignty, curbed in the past as much with hegemonic control as with supranational authority, has thus never been entertained in an absolute manner in Europe or elsewhere (Watson 1992). From this standpoint, the EU ceases to be an unprecedented experiment and becomes one specific format in Europe’s long tradition of restricting sovereignty. The ES, and Watson’s (1992) comprehensive study of previous instances of supranationalism in particular, makes available the intrinsically valuable tools for a comparative historical analysis of the EU. Indeed, such an analysis is necessary since the current debate on the subject is conducted on rather narrow terms, and it is time for new openings and approaches. This study aims at contributing one by bringing in the ES. What kind of a theory of legitimate supranationalism can we construct by benefiting from the ES?

First comes the key concept: legitimacy. There are two main lines of inquiry into the concept of legitimacy in the literature. The *normative* line of inquiry poses questions about what justifies a given political system and what the sources of the “right to rule” are. Most typically associated with the normative account is the theory of the social contract originating in the writings of thinkers like Hobbes, Locke and Kant (Simons 1999, p.740). The *empirical* line of inquiry associated mainly with Weber examines legitimacy through the beliefs and attitudes of the individuals toward the government they are subject to (Clark 2003, p.79). Legitimacy has usually been discussed with reference to the state from both lines although this need not be the case. These are questions that can be raised in relation to a wider range of structures like colonial administrations, empires and of course supranational systems. For instance, from the normative point of view, what justifies the European Union? On the empirical side, what is the legitimacy of the Union through the attitudes and beliefs of those subject to its rule?

The highest level of speculation about legitimacy is the international system. In the context of the international system, the primary normative question becomes “what justifies the system of states”. *The Anarchical Society* (1995) by Bull is perhaps one of the most influential treatises dedicated to the task of justifying the system of states and an “implicit defense” (p.309) of it on the grounds that it offers the best possible solution for order and justice to obtain at the same time. Though not all ES inquiry into legitimacy comes under the normative tradition. Watson’s (1992, 1997, 2007) writings on the subject are integrated into his analysis of international systems from independence to empire and fall mostly under the empirical tradition. In Wight’s (1977) writings is an all together different approach to legitimacy centered around the constitutive principles of and membership in international society. Our review of the ES’ understanding of legitimacy

starts with his account followed by those of Bull, Vincent and Watson respectively. It was only appropriate that the previous chapter outlined the three perspectives within the ES on the relationship between international and world society. In this chapter we will be able to see that these perspectives in turn shape ES members' perspectives on the question of legitimacy.

I. Wight on Legitimacy: First Principles and Rightful Membership in International Society

For Wight (1977), legitimacy in international affairs indicates “first principles” that “prevail (or are at least proclaimed) *within* a majority of the states that form international society, as well as in the relations *between* them” (p.153; emphases in original). As it applies *within* a majority of states, legitimacy indicates principles about the nature of the right to rule. Initially, the prevailing principle of legitimacy in international society was the dynastic principle based on the prescriptive rights of rulers. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, the dynastic principle gave way to the contractual or popular principle based on the rights of peoples (pp.153; 158-9). As it applies *between* states, legitimacy indicates principles about “how sovereignty may be transferred, and how state succession is to be regulated when large states break up into smaller, or several states come into one” (p.153). The connection of Wight’s discussion of legitimacy to the current European debate is obvious here. Indeed, the European debate is chiefly about negotiating sovereign rights between states.

In fact, for the ES as a whole, the principles of legitimacy in international society are a primary concern. In one sense, ES theory is a theory of the historical evolution of these principles; from the religion-based legitimacy of medieval Europe to the dynastic and later on popular legitimacy of the Westphalian system (Wight 1977); from the

universalization of the popular principle along with several other aspects of the European system of states starting in the early twentieth century (Bull and Watson 1984) to the emergence of human rights as a new principle of legitimacy toward the end of the same century (Vincent 1986) and finally to the consolidation of the human rights principle in a post-Westphalian system of hegemonic interventionism from the developed core into the developing periphery today (Watson 2007). While the ES has put these great transformations at the center of the analysis, the processes that underlie them have not been adequately theorized.³ For instance, how exactly has the human rights principle come to establish itself in our day, except that it did? Some early thoughts on the processes of transformation appear in Manning's work (1975) yet these are not connected enough to add up to a coherent framework of analysis. A more sustained effort in this direction is the legitimacy – practice nexus developed by Watson that will be discussed below.

Apart from the formal issues of state succession and the like, Wight (1977, p.153) relates legitimacy to the “collective judgment of international society about rightful membership in the family of nations”. It appears that Wight's intention is to keep legitimacy as a formal notion even when including the “collective judgment of international society about rightful membership” component to his definition. However, Wight's analysis inevitably takes on a cultural dimension through this component. More specifically, Wight's conception of legitimacy stands to the views of Edmund Burke who Halliday (1992) identifies as among the most important exponents of the “international society as homogeneity” viewpoint.

³ Perhaps, the best theorized part in this narrative is the transition from a European international society to a universal international society covered in the volume edited by Bull and Watson (1984). Although this volume is strong in terms of its explication of the processes of change, it is at the same time marked by a significant Eurocentric bias; its core argument is that a universal international society has emerged through the “admission” of non-European states into European international society.

The background assumption to Wight's account of legitimacy is that international society is founded upon a shared culture, or that world society in the form of a shared culture is a precondition for international society (Buzan 2001, p.477). As formulated by Wight (1966, p.97) himself, international society "presupposes an international social consciousness, a world-wide community-sentiment". Wight brings in the ideas of Burke as he elaborates how this international social consciousness ties in with legitimacy in international society. In Burke's doctrine, Wight (1966) notes, the sources of legitimacy that underlie the social and political framework of European international society are located in the Christian religion and prescription (tradition). There exists a stable core unaltered by historical circumstances for Wight and legitimacy in international society can change from time to time but stays within the confines of this core (p.99) – that is a world society shaped by European - Christian culture.

What we are able to obtain from Wight's discussion of legitimacy for our purposes is a culturalist theory of supranationalism. For Wight, a common culture facilitates supranational integration. As he (1977, p.43) notes, "the political expression of a single culture has mostly been a universal empire" in the course of history. Certainly, Wight would interpret the current shape of the EU in this fashion. Wight's culturalist interpretation of supranationalism has been further developed by Watson as I explain below. This culturalist interpretation will serve as one of the perspectives when trying to build a theory of legitimate supranationalism later in the study. I will try to determine from the European debate itself what culture may have to do with it. I now turn to Bull and Vincent for a view of international society with a focus on diversity, and for a normative inquiry into the legitimacy of the system of states.

II. Bull and Vincent on Legitimacy: Between Liberal Communitarianism and Cosmopolitanism

Why is it that the system of states justified? From a moral point of view, what makes the division of humanity into these entities called states acceptable against any alternative form of political organization? Bull and Vincent build their case for the system of states in respect of what they see as its ability to provide for order and justice simultaneously, and to allow room for diversity in the meantime when a pluralist stance is taken in the arrangement of the rules and institutions of the society of states. Rengger (1992, p.355) notes that the ES' position on this issue aligns with liberal communitarian thinking.⁴ Communitarian thinkers stress that the division of the world into states has not been the outcome of some random or arbitrary process. It has rather been a process whereby each nation has attained representation of its distinctive identity in the world (Miller 1994, pp.138-141). What is more to the point is that the state is designed to serve the nation as expressed in the hypothetical social contract governing the relations between the two parties (Brown 1994, p.167). There is therefore nothing regrettable about this situation. The logical conclusion to this line of reasoning is offered by Bull and Vincent; that there be a pluralist international society with a view to respecting the terms of all social contracts around the world.

It is not that Bull and Vincent are against the items on the solidarist agenda like the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world in principle. However, they doubt that all the ideas espoused in this solidarist program have universal reach. Bull (1979b, p.155) for instance asks if “an Amazon tribesman [has] (as Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says he has), a right to “reasonable limitation of

⁴ Rengger's (1992) article focuses on Bull, Wight and Watson although the inclusion of Vincent could have better established the link to communitarianism since Vincent (1986) often approvingly quotes prominent individuals in this tradition such as Michael Walzer.

working hours and periodic holidays with pay?”. Bull further stresses that there are as varied social and economic systems in international society as there are diverse views on human rights in response to what he sees as misperceptions that the Western lifestyle is admired all around the world (Bull 1979a, pp.154-5). It is the diversity of socioeconomic arrangements and of perspectives on moral issues around the world which leads Bull to first defend the states system against the alternative of a world government, and second the pluralist doctrine of international society against the solidarist. What makes possible order in the world is the “coexistence of different social systems” (Bull 1984a, p.189) whereas a world government takes away the liberties of individual nations to manage their own systems as they wish (Bull 1995, pp.244-5). Besides, there is no support for the idea of a world government in the post-colonial world where only the independent state meant the termination of Western domination (Bull 1979a, pp.152-3). If anything protects the nations of the post-colonial world from being dominated by the West again, it is their sovereign rights (Bull, 1984a, p.186). In making the case for upholding the sovereign rights of states, Bull does so with an emphasis on the rights of peoples. At present, sovereign rights are held by states that are no longer ruled by hereditary rulers but states that

“...are popular or nation-states, or at least purport to be; the principle that the paramount rights are those of peoples, that international society is a society not merely of states but of nations, is one that complicates the rule of sovereign rights of states, but it is also one that makes it ultimately more irresistible” (Bull 1984a, p.186).

A world government is thus undesirable when analyzed from the perspective of the rights of peoples. The solidarist doctrine of international society is as questionable as a world government for Bull. It is above all “unworkable” given how hard it is to forge a consensus on moral issues like human rights or justice (Bull 1966, p.70). A pluralist international

society appears to him as a means to provide for both order and justice, and to accommodate the diversity of international society at the same time.

Vincent is equally sensitive to the issue of diverse perspectives on moral issues in international society. He (1986, Chapter 3, pp.37-60) undertakes a systematic study of the question of cultural relativism in the formulation and application of human rights and finds that ideas about what these rights are vary in different parts of the world from Africa to China. After examining these different interpretations, Vincent like Bull arrives at the conclusion that the best political framework under which diversity can be entertained is a pluralist international society. Vincent (1992) derives this conclusion from a broader study of the question of rights in international politics at three levels of analysis: the individual in a universal community of mankind; the state in international society and non-state actors in world society (p.253). As he asks why a state would have rights after all, Vincent evokes the theory of the social contract. States have rights only because they express the will of the governed as expressed therein (p.258) and a pluralist international society is a mechanism to preserve these individual social contracts (p.261). Vincent adds that what the principle of non-intervention is designed for in essence is to protect the “right of all (self-determining) nations to be different” (p.261). Needless to say, Vincent does not hold the principle of non-intervention to be an absolute principle. There are justifiable exceptions to the rule of non-intervention on humanitarian grounds for Vincent (1974, 1990). However, when interventions are undertaken with a view to promoting something like democracy, these should rather be called “legitimism” according to him and legitimism is just unmanageable for international society. Instead, there needs to be a presumption that each system is legitimate in its own right and the principle of non-intervention needs to be upheld with the exceptions withstanding (Vincent 1986, p.341).

Both Bull and Vincent have in the later stages of their works embraced more cosmopolitan calls for greater justice in the world even though their reservations to the idea of a world government stayed. As I noted in Chapter 1, Bull considered how greater socioeconomic equality could be achieved in the world in *Justice in International Relations* (1984b). Vincent (1986) started searching for a set of norms around which all cultures could unite. Thus, he championed the idea of “basic rights” for all humans as proposed by Henry Shue; a “basic right” is a right “not to be treated outrageously” and consists of the rights to subsistence and to life (1986, p.125). These basic rights should not be offensive to any culture and can be taken as a baseline to set a minimum standard of legitimacy in all the countries in the world. Vincent’s basic rights scheme can be construed as an attempt to refashion the non-intervention principle so as to find a compromise between pluralist and solidarist interpretations of international society (Gonzalez-Pelaez and Buzan 2003, pp.322-3). If basic rights were adopted as the defining criteria for legitimacy in international society, the principle of non-intervention could apply to those states which observe them and not to others (Vincent and Wilson 1993, pp.125-6). Still, the state, worthy of protection under the non-intervention principle or not, is the entity that Bull and Vincent believe enjoys the greatest degree of legitimacy, and the system of states is thus justified from a normative point of view from their perspective. The reason why they are reluctant toward beyond-the-state systems lies here. What we can obtain from Bull and Vincent’s discussion of legitimacy for the purposes of this study is what I will call a “communitarian” theory of legitimacy that is not necessarily in favor of supranationalism. The communitarian theory of legitimacy will be considered against the culturalist one delivered first by Wight and then developed further by Watson. Of course, Watson contributes a third approach – the moralistic one that needs to be integrated into the

analysis. Watson is a dissenting figure in International Relations theory who has developed his own research concepts and framework – the so-called “pendulum” as I noted in Chapter 1. Below, I present the main tenets of Watson’s (1992) pendulum framework and then turn to his view of the concept of legitimacy.

III. Watson on Legitimacy: Beliefs, Cultural Values and Practical Realities

Watson (1992) developed the pendulum concept with a view to challenging Westphalian International Relations theory, which from his perspective is “hopelessly overcharged with rhetoric, and obscures many of the issues we need to examine” (p. 13). His main target in this remark is the treatment independent statehood receives in the literature. In Watson’s view, the discussion of statehood has become so emotional that it is blocking any possible discussion of non-state forms of political organization. Like Wight before him, Watson is keen to study these alternative forms and calls for a broadening of the discipline’s subject matter to include all cases where “a number of diverse communities of people, or political entities, are sufficiently involved with another” (p.13).

A second call from Watson (1992, 1997) is a revised notion of independence that questions if it is an actually achievable condition in the first place. The history of Europe in particular has already convinced Watson that independence is not always a positive condition; the two disastrous wars the continent went through illustrates in sharpest terms the dangers of an international system whose members exercise unrestricted independence (1997, p.xii, p.121). However, international systems do not allow for such unrestricted independence to continue for any prolonged period of time. Watson’s (1992) pendulum concept assumes that measures introduced to regulate the mutual involvement of communities or entities will eventually impose, and re-impose where necessary, certain

limits on their freedoms. This is why Watson proposes to deal with independence as a matter of gradation rather than as an absolute condition. Even though independence might be a status recognized for all the members of an international system in theory, the ability of all members to enjoy this status has always been restricted in practice throughout history. The four points of independence, hegemony, dominion and empire in Watson's pendulum indicate the degree to which these restrictions extend.

Independence and empire, the two end points of the pendulum, refer to international systems with lowest and highest degrees of regulation respectively. External as well as internal affairs of the member communities can be regulated in the pendulum. Watson (1992) divides the pendulum into two parts on this basis; independence and hegemony make up the independences part and dominion and empire make up the imperial part of the pendulum. At the independence end, member communities can arrange their external affairs such as alliances or treaty obligations on a voluntary basis while "some power or authority is able to 'lay down the law' about the operation of the system" at hegemony (p.15). After hegemony, the pendulum reaches its imperial part and the two points in this part contain varying degrees of supranational authority. At the empire end lies the "direct administration of different communities from an imperial center" (p.16) which controls their external and internal affairs at the same time. Dominion establishes looser control over the subject communities than empire. At this point of the pendulum, "an imperial authority to some extent determines the internal government of other communities" but they nevertheless maintain a separate identity from that authority and manage some of their affairs themselves (p.15).

The key concept of "legitimacy" originates from the details of the pendulum analogy. Before proceeding to these two, however, it is necessary to clarify a number of

terminological issues in this whole scheme. First; independence, hegemony, dominion, empire or pendulum are not terms that replace the ES' scheme of international system, international society and world society. Watson (1992) does not abandon these in any way. Perhaps, the best characterization of what he does is what Deibert (1997, p.182) calls "therapeutic re-description" or the task of "describing old things in new ways in the hope of reconstituting human experience and side-stepping the old vocabulary that was getting in the way". Watson tries to re-describe independence *in* international society. "Empire" does not refer to an actual empire, say the Roman Empire (although the way he reaches these conclusions incorporates research on actual empires as well) - it is a metaphor that represents an extreme form of authority as it applies in international society. Second; "international systems", a term Watson frequently employs as he discusses the pendulum, does not stand for that in the international system / international society distinction of the ES where "system" denotes the strategic dimension of relations between states (see Chapter 1). At times, Watson refers to the pendulum as a "theory of systems" too. Either way, Watson is using "system" in the more general sense of the term, as he tries to point to the possible methods of organizing independence in international society, rather than in the ES-specific sense.

Independence is not merely organized but also continually re-organized as no given political community, Watson (1992) contends, stays at one particular point of the pendulum indefinitely. Each constantly moves across the four-point spectrum of systems, like the swings of a pendulum, in response to various pressures for change. Still, there are two factors that can establish a specific point as a stable one. The first factor is the avoidance of the pendulum's end points of indepenence and empire. These two points represent insufficient and excessive regulation of the mutual involvement of political

communities respectively, and they are both unsustainable. Watson points out that there is a “propensity to hegemony” (p.313) characterizing the independences part of the pendulum and a “propensity to autonomy” (p.124) characterizing the imperial part. If a system approaches either end, these two propensities move it toward the pendulum’s middle area of hegemony or dominion. The second factor is whether or not that particular point offers a suitable combination of legitimacy and material advantage for all the individual communities and their rulers involved. A stable system needs to uphold the balance of material advantage for its members and be legitimate for them at the same time. As Watson summarizes it, a stable point in the pendulum for a given community is the one that entails “the optimum mix of legitimacy and advantage, modified by the pull on our pendulum away from the extremes [of independence and empire]” (p.131).

Legitimacy in the context of Watson’s pendulum analogy refers to “the degree of independence and supranational authority (the position in the spectrum) and the rules and institutions which the members publicly recognize as binding” (Watson 1997, p.149). Put differently, it is an indication of whether a given community will be in the independences or the imperial part of the pendulum. Still to consider is why a community would recognize the rules and institutions in one part of the pendulum as opposed to those in the other, except in cases where the rules and institutions are imposed by force. In other words, what exactly makes the independences part of the pendulum more legitimate than the imperial part and vice versa? The answer to this is in fact very simple: a particular part of the pendulum is legitimate because it is believed to be so. Behind this simple answer lies a very complex line of inquiry into the concept of legitimacy, the empirical line associated with Weber. Watson (1992), departing from a Weberian starting point, arrives at world

society understood in the form of a common culture at the end of his discussion of legitimacy.

For Weber (1978), beliefs have “a powerful, often a decisive, causal influence” on the actions of individuals (p.14). Political action is no exception to this general framework; beliefs have a decisive influence when considering individual action in a political system too. Every political system, if it is to be a lasting one, requires recognition from its members of its binding quality. Such recognition, Weber notes, can be granted by the members for, prudential, habitual or legal reasons (p.31). While a legitimate political system also enjoys recognition due to a *belief* held by its members in its binding quality, and stays legitimate to the extent that it can reproduce this belief (p.213).

Here, the literature maintains a distinction between “output” and “input” legitimacy. The concept of “output legitimacy” connects the legitimacy of a political system to its performance, that is whether or not that system delivers for its members. Whereas “input legitimacy” refers to demands and support that its members put into a system (Easton 1965). Weber’s (1978) “legitimacy-as-beliefs” concerns the input side of legitimacy and it has been a very influential and a controversial account at the same time. It directly clashes with the universalist viewpoint on the subject which maintains that a system cannot be legitimate without also being recognized in respect of a number of criteria by non-members as such (Stilman 1974, p.35). Legitimacy, an essentially philosophical concept, turns into an empirical one in Weber’s hands as he links it, in a circular fashion, to beliefs. A system becomes legitimate simply when its members believe that it is in the Weberian scheme, and this leaves no room for judging an individual system against universal principles like justice (Grafstein 1981, pp.456-7). Beliefs, furthermore,

are often shaped by the culture of a society. Studying legitimacy from a Weberian standpoint therefore becomes studying particular cultures too (Clark 2003, pp.79-80).

Watson has not contributed much to the universal vs. particular debate on legitimacy. His pendulum analogy incorporates a Weberian understanding of legitimacy whereby culturally-shaped beliefs have a strong role in determining where a political community is likely to be on the independence – empire scale. It has been so in the past;

“The dominant culture in a society of states shaped the conscious response of its members, the methods which they used to cope with the network of interests and pressures that held them together. More especially, the cultural framework helped to prescribe the position along our spectrum which seemed legitimate and proper to the communities concerned, and to which the society tended to gravitate” (Watson 1992, p.122).

Watson’s quote not only helps us understand his place in the broader literature on legitimacy but also provides a synopsis of the connection between world society, legitimacy and international society from his perspective. Watson (1992) establishes legitimacy as one of the determinants of a stable system, and subsequently relates it to a set of culturally-shaped beliefs held at the world society level. Based on these beliefs, that is based on legitimacy, the management of the affairs of political communities shift toward the corresponding points in the pendulum. For instance, Watson (1992) discerns that what “seemed legitimate and proper to the communities” in the Indian system was independence, imperial management in the Chinese (p.130) and hegemony in the Sumerians as articulated in their religion (p.28). In each case, the degree of independence enjoyed by the individual communities tended to coincide with the respective point in the pendulum. Essentially, most of what Watson discusses up to this point is an affirmation of the “world society as a shared culture is a prerequisite for international society” perspective in the ES. World society acts as a support structure that conditions the shape of

international society through its belief on how much independence or supranational authority along the pendulum is acceptable.

But Watson (1992) goes much further than supplying a re-affirmation of an ES perspective on the relationship between international and world society that we already knew. As the argument progresses, he also mentions a “network of interests and pressures” in addition to culture when discussing where a stable point is in the pendulum for a given community (p.122). Interests and pressures matter once we remember that this point is where there exists an “optimum mix of legitimacy and advantage” (p.131). Watson sets the initial terms of his argument in the form of an “inevitable tension between the desire for order and the desire for independence”. On the one hand, less independence can bring more order which in turn brings more “peace and prosperity”. More independence, on the other hand, can be desirable although this might come at the expense of economic and military security (p.14). Advancing in either direction in the pendulum therefore has a cost. This is to say that a world society in the form of a common culture can indeed be a prerequisite for international society, and culture can prescribe a particular position in the pendulum as the most legitimate one, but that there is also a price for being there. Hence, Watson is forced to conclude that the most acceptable / stable point of the pendulum is one which offers an *optimum* mix of legitimacy and advantage – it is not possible to have it all at the same time. At what stage, in the process of searching for an optimum mix, do the costs of a culturally-prescribed position in the pendulum become so unbearable that the particular polity starts losing legitimacy? We will be able to determine this question when analyzing the Debate on the Future of Europe (2002-2003).

A different set of questions emerging from an alternative reading of the pendulum - through international society instead of world society - connects us to Watson’s (2007b)

“hegemonic international society as a prerequisite for world society” perspective. Is a legitimacy / advantage mix of any kind possible unless international society moves towards hegemony and beyond in the pendulum to begin with? Watson presents movement across the pendulum in the form of a dilemma: peace and prosperity with less independence vs. economic and military insecurity with more independence. Put differently, one is better off in material terms to be less independent (Watson 1992). Furthermore, moral questions like human rights pertaining to world society can be dealt with more effectively when the members of international society are less independent (Watson 2007b). Nevertheless, “the desire for independence” (Watson 1992, p.14) can weigh heavier at one point than the promise of peace, prosperity and a strong system of human rights available towards the empire point of the pendulum. Just when the desire for independence weighs heavier is what we will seek to identify in our analysis. In view of the need to maintain an optimum mix of legitimacy and advantage, is there a point at which individuals get enough of peace and prosperity so to speak and demand more independence?

It can be argued that Watson sets a false dilemma because it is possible to be prosperous, secure and independent all at the same time. We may not need to sacrifice one for the other at all times. Other aspects of his theory can be challenged as well. But we are not concerned with the pendulum as such in this study. For us, the pendulum matters to the extent that it offers a new route to considering the question of a legitimate supranational system. What we can obtain from Watson’s pendulum for the purposes of our study is first a further development of the culturalist theory of supranationalism originally proposed by Wight, a moralistic theory of supranationalism through his discussion of hegemony, and a set of other concepts and dilemmas while studying the subject of a legitimate supranational system.

Hence, following Watson's line of thinking, we now assume that there is an optimum mix for the EU as well. In trying to formulate a coherent theory of supranationalism out of this entire literature, I will consider all three of the culturalist, moralistic and communitarian perspectives on legitimacy in the ES against the actual debate held on this issue during the Convention on the Future of Europe. Who, on what grounds does consider more supranational authority in the EU legitimate? This will be the principal question I will be posing. Obviously, a set of secondary questions and points for consideration will emerge from here. For instance;

- (i) are international society actors more willing to accept more supranational authority than world society actors or is it vice versa?
- (ii) depending on the answer, which perspective(s) on the relationship between international and world society in the ES is vindicated?
- (iii) does the debate prove that world society is indeed seen as a destructive force on international society as Bull and Vincent argue?
- (iv) do the members of the European system consider more supranational authority legitimate from a culturalist standpoint as Wight and Watson argue?

This is of course not an exhaustive list of the questions that will be posed during the study. Many more exciting questions will come along as I proceed to the empirical part. These questions will pave the way for presenting a more critical approach to the question of a legitimate supranational system as I will try to establish what good comes out of it, for whom and why. What, in other words, is the real-life purchase of supranationalism? Before starting to explore these questions in detail, let us also consider briefly what others had to

say on the question of a legitimate supranational system. The section below offers a review of contributions to the subject made by those other than the members of the ES. In this section, I will also argue what the “value-added” of the ES to this literature can be.

IV: Legitimate Supranational Systems: the Broader Literature

Within the broader literature, the main referent for theorizing legitimate supranational systems has been, and very much continues to be, the European Community / Union. More often than not, these theoretical schemes treat the Union as a unique entity and attempt to discover “the nature of the beast” (Risse-Kappen 1996) to use a popular phrase. Various new terms have been coined such as “multi-level governance” or “multiperspectival polity” (Ruggie 1993) and many others to describe its structure. So much so, Shore (2006, p.717) contends, that coming up with “complex epithets and neologisms that purport to capture the EU’s elusive yet evolving political system has become a minor industry” within the scholarly community.

In recent years, the relative isolation of research on European integration from the broader literature has been coming under criticism. Efforts to broaden the sphere of the discussion with insights from theories of International Relations and other disciplines are underway. Albert (2002), for instance, tries to shed light on our understanding of the EU through Luhmann’s systems theory of society. In another attempt to overcome the insularity of European integration studies, Shore (2006) brings in Foucault’s (1991) notion of “governmentality” into the debate and analyzes the development of the Union as a self-reinforcing process of continuing growth and expansion. “Words like ‘sui generis’, ‘unique’, ‘unprecedented’, and ‘unfinished’ serve to mystify the EU”, and studying past

and contemporary forms of political organization can help de-mystify it (Shore 2006, p.717).

Herein lies what I previously referred to as the “value-added” of the ES in this debate. What the literature suffers from is indeed a tendency to theorize the formation and development of supranational systems mainly from the EU. It consequently lacks any historical-depth or a comparative dimension, and this is something that can be addressed by utilizing the macro-historical approach presented by the English School. Diez and Whitman (2002) even suggest that the legitimacy question of the EU can be interpreted chiefly as a quest for resolving the tension between the School’s very concepts of world and international society. The current debate on the legitimacy of the EU revolves around the suggestion that it is at a “crisis”. Within the terms employed in this debate, “legitimacy” is almost synonymous with “democracy”, and the “legitimacy crisis” of the EU refers to how gigantic an entity it has become without, however, being equally democratic and offering the citizens enough opportunities to participate in the decision-making processes. The European Convention gathered to address above all this question of “how to bring the Union closer to its citizens”, and how to make it more democratic. I will review the various views on the “legitimacy crisis” of the EU in the next chapters, however, it is not in this day-to-day sense of the word legitimacy understood as “democracy” or “citizens’ participation” that we are concerned in this study. It is rather as legitimacy as a first-order concept – that which centers around the question of international vs. world society to whose centrality Diez and Whitman (2002) allude.

An additional point needs to be made at this stage. If the main referent for theorizing the legitimacy of supranational systems has been the European Union and not much else, that is because the concept itself is an underdeveloped one in the broader

International Relations literature. And the chief reason for this is the domination of state-centric thinking in the discipline. As Clark notes, a group of scholars have studied international legitimacy from different directions and came to a basic understanding of it as “essentially about agreement and consensus in the international system”, often viewing this agreement as a source of stability (2003, p.84). This understanding of legitimacy is not one that is amenable to considering legitimacy outside the context of states. In this sense, it is only apposite that it was Wight to have initiated “an alternative, and distinct, tradition in thinking about international legitimacy” (Clark 2003, p.84) since Wight, and especially Watson, were the ones who also dealt with non-state centered forms of international affairs. It is within this alternative tradition that this study seeks to approach supranational systems. In the next chapter, I outline the methodological procedure of the study and deal with some of the questions around the methodology of the English School.

CHAPTER 3: ANALYZING LEGITIMACY: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The English School has received a significant amount of criticism on the methodology front. After putting forward concepts like international society, critics argue, it failed to discuss how to operate with them in empirical terms. One critic, Copeland (2003), argues that there is not a clearly discernible methodological direction in the ES literature except for some occasional hints. It is indeed difficult to find a straightforward discussion of what methodology can be used in the ES. However, this difficulty does not mean that the ES concluded with a methodological vacuum. The present chapter tries to demonstrate how a discursive approach is the most suitable methodology for working with concepts from the ES.

The ES has been associated with other methodological tools as well. For instance, Little (1995, 2000) associates the School's international system, international society and world society elements with the tools of positivism, interpretivism and critical theory respectively. Little advances this claim in the context of a broader discussion on the social scientific orientation of the ES. His position is that the ES combines all the major social science traditions. I will take up this issue briefly in the first section of the chapter. If the ES admits of tools from so many different traditions in the social sciences, is it justified to conduct the empirical part of this study with one tool only? The second section demonstrates the School's discursive approach, and the final section relates the ES framework for the analysis of a legitimate supranational system to the EU.

I: Positivism, Interpretivism and Critical Theory: Where does the English School Stand?

The tenets of positivist, interpretivist and critical theories are well-known and need no full rehearsal here. For present purposes, a brief overview will be sufficient. Essential to the positivist tradition is the assumption of the unity of the natural and social sciences. Just as there are universally applicable laws that govern natural phenomena, there are similar laws that govern social phenomena and social science seeks to discover them. In contrast, the Weberian interpretivist tradition insists on the distinctiveness of social phenomena as it involves humans who attach subjective meanings to their actions. Consequently, social science cannot identify universally applicable laws but tries to understand these meanings humans attach to their actions in their particular historical contexts (Ruggie 1998, pp.859-860). The tradition referred to as critical theory has a specific and a general meaning. In a specific sense, the term refers to a number of intellectuals based at the Institute of Social Research founded in the German city of Frankfurt in 1929 who tried to rework Marx. A shortcut term for the research program of this group of intellectuals, carried forward by Jürgen Habermas today, is the “Frankfurt School” or “Critical Theory” with a capital “c” and “t” (Bohman 2005).

In a general sense, critical theory refers to all those theories, including the Frankfurt School, which depart from the belief that the modernity ideal of progress has not delivered (Brown 1994b, p.214). Critical theorists attempt to address this situation by studying the means for “creating an alternative world” (Cox 1981, p.128) out of the one that failed us either through the “reconstruction” of modernity as in the Frankfurt School or through its “deconstruction” as in post-modernism (Brown 1994b, p.218). The overarching theme in critical theory is emancipation for humans from that which they need to be emancipated from, be it women from gendered systems, the oppressed from their oppressors or even entire humankind from the grip of states. From a critical theory perspective, social science

is concerned with actual practice for achieving emancipatory goals (Spegele 2002, pp.381-4) rather than general laws or subjective meanings in the social world.

There are different readings of where the ES fits in this sketch of theories. As mentioned above, Little (1995, 2000) takes the view that the ES embodies all three traditions of inquiry and connects each element with one tradition. Accordingly, international system, international society and world society correspond to positivist, interpretivist and critical social science. Little offers specific examples of these connections as well. For instance, he (1995, p.16) finds that the ES' understanding of international system is "identical" to Waltz's power-based formulation and relates especially the solidarist output of the ES to "a profound concern about the potential for human emancipation" that aligns with the literature generated by critical theorists (2000, p.414). Linklater (1990) holds a similar interpretation of the School's social science. He links the three elements of the ES to the subjects of power, order and emancipation.

A second reading places the ES within the interpretive tradition only (Dunne 1995, 1998; Suganami 2003, 2005). From this standpoint, the three elements all constitute Weberian ideal-types (Suganami 2005, p.42; Finnemore 2001, p.512) rather than correspond to positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. Dunne (1998, p.187) maintains that the members of the ES rejected the main premises of positivism such as the search for universal laws that govern human conduct. Instead, Dunne suggests, they were interested in human action in its cultural context and in those conflicting meanings different actors assigned to the same situation in international affairs. An example of Dunne's suggestion would be Butterfield's (1951) advice to historians of war to administer "sympathetic infiltration" (p.12) into the mindset of the defeated party as there is always a "terrible predicament" (p.10) in human conflict. Wight (1991, p.258) makes a similar point when he

suggests that theorizing international affairs requires a “sympathetic perception of political actors, their principles and their circumstances”. These pieces of advice fit an interpretive approach to conflict. A strong concern with the human predicament, Jackson observes, permeates the international system category of the ES and it is what distinguishes its understanding of system from Waltz. According to Jackson, we need to read the ideas and beliefs held by statesmen when we read the “international system” category of the ES (Jackson, 1995, pp.111-2). Such a humanistic conception of the international system is indeed visible in Bull’s (1966b) “classical approach” essay. Bull attacked the research methods of positivism as something “to be deplored” (p.371) in this famous essay and called instead for the use of what he labeled the “classical approach” characterized by an “explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment” with roots in philosophy, history and law (p.361). For Hoffman (1986, p.182), the “classical approach” attests strongly to Bull’s attraction to Weberian social science.

There is no similar piece to assess the ES’ perspective on critical theory as the one Bull (1966b) delivered on positivism. Still, there are several articles by Bull reviewing books written under the critical theory tradition that hint at his viewpoint. In one of them, Bull (1972a) criticizes those scholars who “draw up “static utopias” or blueprints of a better world that are not accompanied by any account of the means by which the world is to be changed so as to conform to them” (p.584) and regards the reviewed work as a work of “radical global salvationism” (p.586).

Bull is able to easily dismiss a critical theory perspective as these remarks indicate since the ES sees the relationship between theory and practice differently than the critical theorists do. The relationship between theory and practice is linked to the broader purpose of theorizing in the critical theory tradition. Theorizing is not an activity conducted for its

own sake, it tries to generate knowledge for putting in place the objectives defined in the emancipatory agenda. In other words, theory and practice unite into one as reflected in the concept of “praxis” in this tradition (Bohman 2005). For the ES, theorizing does not necessarily serve broader practical purposes. As Bull (1980, p.487) puts it, theory-building is a profession whose business is “after all, with thinking, not with doing”. The ES follows the Grotian tradition on this issue which assumes that theory *follows* practice in international affairs. Watson (1992) is at pains to emphasize the point. Theory only tells in hindsight how practice developed in this perspective, it does not identify certain goals in advance that practice should conform to. Kingsbury cites this as one of the distinguishing characteristics of Grotianism. According to Kingsbury (1996, p.56), the Grotian view represents “the *via media* between contemporary moral skepticism [in positivism] and emancipatory or prescriptivist approaches”.

In order to illustrate the contrast between the different standpoints on the theory / practice nexus, Jackson brings in Ryle’s distinction between “knowing that”, “knowing why” and “knowing how” forms of theorizing associated with history, philosophy and practice respectively (quoted in Jackson 1987, p.520). The Grotian tradition, and the ES, according to this scheme is a form of “knowing that” or “knowing why” theory as opposed to the “knowing how” of critical theory.

A consensus exists on the link between the ES’ international society element and interpretivism. Yet Little’s (2000, p.395) claim that international system and world society are implicitly linked to positivism and critical theory in the ES is not supported by all. Some of Bull’s comments about positivism border on hostility. In view of such dislike of this tradition, it is difficult to see how the School could have intended its international system element to be studied with it, though it is not difficult to connect solidarism and

world society with critical theory. ES members do indeed deal with the same themes taken up by critical theorists in their discussions of solidarism / world society. However, the ES does not always align with critical theory positions such as on the purpose of social science. Bull (1972b, p.260) in fact issued some equally hostile comments on critical theory, saying that its practice-oriented theorizing is “potentially at least, a menacing development” for a social science whose purpose is to understand. And it is through discourse that social science can understand according to the ES. As mentioned earlier, the School does not state this in explicit terms. Below, I will try to pursue the leads in ES writings that point in this direction.

II: A Discursive Approach to the Analysis of English School Concepts

As Epp (1998) maintains, the role of language is central to the ES account of international affairs. Its interest in language differs from that of Habermas who focuses on the emancipatory uses of language. The ES, as Epp notes, takes issue with language within an interpretive quest for understanding (pp.49-50). In other words, the ES is not concerned with the potentially transformative role of what is unspoken as in emancipatory approaches but with the meaning of what is actually spoken as in interpretive approaches. The ES’ reflections on language bears striking similarities to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics in particular (Epp 1998).

Shapcott (1994) summarizes hermeneutics as the “study of the relationship between meaning, interpretation and understanding” (p.70). Hermeneutics’ main premise is that to understand in the social world is to interpret, and language is the medium through which actors express their interpretations (pp.71-3). The researcher’s task here is to undertake a “recollection” of meaning the relevant actors attribute to the particular subject under

consideration in their linguistic expressions (Epp 1998, p.60). Of course, individuals do not assign a certain meaning to a given subject in an isolated fashion. It is the *social* world that we are dealing with whose participants interact and communicate with each other. They establish shared meanings in the course of a process of dialogue (Shapcott 1994, pp.74-6). Thereby, the researcher's task becomes the recollection of these shared meanings prevailing in a "dialogical community" (Shapcott 1994, p.80).

ES scholars construe international society as one such "dialogical community" whose primary conversers are the diplomats. An obvious case in point is Watson's (1982) presentation of diplomacy as a "dialogue between states". Watson (1982) explains diplomacy through his *raison de système* (1982) concept. In simple terms, *raison de système* is "the belief that it pays to make the [international] system work" (Watson 1992, p.14). It is a belief shared by all states and the chief subject of the diplomatic dialogue among them. States continually discuss through their officials the means to "ensure that the fabric of the system itself is preserved and its continuity maintained" (Watson 1982, p.208). Hegemony too is a dialogue for Watson (1992, p.15) with those states subject to it and even moral issues can be agreed in international society through a process of discussion. States can gather to determine what for instance distributive justice means in the context of international society (Watson 2007c). At the later stages of his research, Vincent (1992) believed that a similar dialogue among states could furnish shared meanings about human rights.

Certainly, the ES was aware that the language used in these communicative processes among states was very important. Bull underscores this point when he says that

...there is more to communication than the exchange of messages; messages have to be understood and interpreted. They have to convey moods and intentions as well as information. Their meaning depends on their context: the persons who send them and receive them, the circumstances in which they are

sent, the previous history of exchanges on the subject. The significance of a message may lie in what it omits as well as what it includes, in the choice of one phrase rather than another in conveying an idea (Bull 1995, pp.172-3).

Wight (1966, pp.96-7) had already stated the importance of the linguistic dimension of relations between states as he announced that international society requires “an international social consciousness manifested in the solidarities of language”. These brief remarks do indeed demonstrate that the ES accorded a central place to the element of language in international affairs. Epp (1998, p.51) identifies language as an ontological agent in itself in Gadamer’s approach. Language has ontological significance in the ES approach too. To see more clearly how this is so, we need to turn to Manning who offers the most extensive treatment of the subject in the ES.

Manning’s discussion of language in international affairs is integrated into his discussion of the nature of the social world. For Manning (1975), the social world “has its very being in the fact of being imagined, being conceived of, in the mind and imagination of men” (p.5). Entities like the nation or the state are “reified abstractions” that do not have an objective physical existence but enjoy merely a “notional” existence, in the consciousness of individuals who act and behave *as if* the nation or the state really exist (p.23). International society is one such abstraction that exists in notional terms (p.43), and whose rules and institutions make sense only in its particular context as with any such abstraction. For example, the idea of sovereignty has no meaning when taken out of the context of international law (p.103). In other words, there is not a grand scheme of nature which makes international law binding, it becomes binding because it is believed to be binding (pp.104-6).

International law is therefore a social practice to Manning (1975). It is a game of “let’s-play-international-law” and it owes its binding character to the “make-believe”

quality that keeps all such games going (p.107). All the players in the international law game share the basic conviction that it is a game worth playing. Even though they might have differences on the specifics, the participants are on the whole inclined to stay in and abide by the game (pp.108-111). Likewise, the game of “let’s-play-sovereign-states” goes on because the states in international society carry it on (p.132). Both these games will continue to be binding so long as their participants share the common purpose of playing them (pp.108-110).

Manning’s (1975) frequent references to the role of language come against the backdrop of this kind of interpretation of the social world. Language acquires significance in the context of “language games” that attend to social life for Manning. To take the concepts of state and nation again; Manning suggests that it does not matter what these really mean. What matters is what people mean by them within the scope of the “language games” that they play (pp.11-2). Every order of life has its own particular language games (p.99). That is to say that “let’s-play-international-law” has its own language games, and the nation or the state have theirs. The social order among the peoples of the world, or world society, has a place in the array of language games too. World society is incorporated into the linguistic practices of the participants in the social order and matters to the extent that it remains part of these practices (pp.67-8). “Linguistic conventions” are thus a key to understanding the social world (p.101) according to Manning and “linguistic analysis” has to be one of the methods used in International Relations (p.212).

After reviewing Manning, a response to Finnemore’s (2001, p.509) question of “how do you know an international society (or international system or world society) when you see one?” becomes possible: you look at the relevant “language games” (Manning 1975), present for instance in the “rhetoric of the leaders of states” (Bull 1995, p.23).

Manning also makes it clear that the ES takes a discursive approach to the analysis of society. As Diez and Whitman (2002, p.48) point out, his discussion lends strong support to their thesis that “any society [international or world] is discursively created and upheld”. This section should settle in broader terms the methodological questions emerging from the ES theory as well. Let us now try to see how the ES methodology can be operationalized for assembling a new approach to the process of building a legitimate supranational polity.

III. Debating the Legitimacy of the European Union

If legitimacy can only be examined in the context of “language games” (Manning 1975), where to find such games relevant to this study? I turn to the institutional reform process of the EU for this purpose: the European Convention (February 2002 – July 2003) that met under the chairmanship of former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing with the task of preparing a “Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (CT henceforth). It took the form of a broader debate on the future of Europe and concluded with a 265-page document subsequently taken up at the next Inter-Governmental Conference. The CT was to be an ill-fated document in the end; it had to be abandoned after French and Dutch voters rejected its final version in 2005. Efforts to reform the EU have continued since then. EU leaders have agreed a new deal in December 2007 for reforming the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), which entered into force in December 2009 after being ratified by all member states. In June 2008, Lisbon too was defeated once by a referendum held in the Republic of Ireland (European Union 2008a; European Union 2008b; Irish Times 2008). Following a second successful referendum in Ireland, the Treaty of Lisbon did finally come into effect and the Union now

functions under this instrument. For my purposes, I focus on the initial steps of the reform effort, the Convention, for an ES-reading of the relevant “language games”.

A question may arise as to what justifies the selection of the Convention for the study. There are several good reasons for this. An immediate one comes from Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung’s (1998) analysis of “polity-ideas” about what a legitimate European political order is. The notion of “polity-ideas” originates from a Weberian line of inquiry into legitimacy and it fits this study very well. “Polity-ideas” denote “convictions about the rightfulness of governance shared by actors in the political system” (Jachtenfuchs *et al.* 1998, p.413). Of course, in an EU of so many different actors, they vary widely. Indeed, polity-ideas are by nature ideas that can never be fixed (Jachtenfuchs *et al.* 1998). However, they become especially pronounced in decision-making contexts (Jachtenfuchs *et al.* 1998, p.414).

The European Convention was an important decision-making context that would stake out a future shape for the EU, and its significance to the study lies mostly here although not only here. Such ideas about a political order “are usually mobilized in periods when the existing order is no longer unproblematic and taken for granted” (Jachtenfuchs *et al.* 1998, p.416). This was exactly the rationale behind the launching of the European Convention. A very important reason why the European order could no longer be taken for granted was the largest round of enlargement that was soon to be completed. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made this point forcefully when he regarded enlargement and the European constitution as “two sides of the same coin” (quoted in Hirsch 2005, p.288).

Enlargement was thus a major impetus for the reform process and indeed among the most heatedly-debated topics at the European Convention. It was certainly not the only

topic. The European Convention was a debate on the future of Europe covering a wide range of topics with contributions from a variety of actors on the European scene. Representatives of EU institutions (European Parliament, European Commission); representatives of the heads of state / government of the member and thirteen candidate countries and of the national parliaments of the member and candidate countries all participated in the Convention. All the then candidate states of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and finally Turkey which, at the moment, is still in the process of conducting accession negotiations with the EU, had a chance to present their visions of Europe at the Convention. Also present were the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the European Ombudsman and the European social partners. With the discussion documents circulated among the participants, the speeches delivered by the different representatives, the minutes of plenary sessions and the draft CT itself, entries to the European Convention well exceed a thousand (European Union 2003).

In many ways, the Convention broke with the rather secretive tradition of decision-making in the EU in that it was very transparent. Its plenary sessions were open to all those interested, all of its records were made available to the public (Whitman 2005; König and Slapin 2006) and the debate on the CT politicized the European populace in a fashion never seen in the previous history of integration (Burca 2006, p.211).

Just where to find world society actors, that is those actors in international affairs that are not necessarily affiliated with states, was a question that troubled the members of the ES. Bull in particular posed this question repeatedly. He saw in the end that world society had no obvious channel through which to express itself in an international system dominated by states. As a result, it was at best a muted voice (Bull 1995). Indeed, one can

easily spot international society. Its members are states which have flags, anthems, seats at organizations like the United Nations and a whole host of other symbols that represent them. World society, however, is less easy to spot when compared to international society. This was even more so back in the 1960s and 1970s when Bull was conducting his research.

The presence of the social partners and the Economic and Social Committee at the Convention are noteworthy for our purposes in this regard. It was through their presence at the Convention that world society officially became part of a political process and had a voice in shaping the future of Europe. The Economic and Social Committee defines itself as “a bridge between Europe and organized civil society” and its organizational structure does indeed reflect this (Economic and Social Committee 2008, p.2). In more precise terms, the Committee is “organized civil society’s European level institutional forum for consultation, representation and information, and where it can express its views” (Economic and Social Committee 2008, p.3). Its members are representatives of various European interest groups. Likewise, the social partners at the Convention were representatives of a number of interest groups with a pan-European presence. These two Convention participants then provide an answer to the question of just where to find world society – not as a muted voice but as a force that can, at least potentially, affect political outcomes.

The Debate on the future of Europe / the European Convention serves the study well in several respects then; its timing is ripe for analyzing “polity ideas” (Jachtenfuchs *et al.* 1998) which are mobilized when actors believe that the status quo no longer works; it is well-documented and accessible; it is pan-European in composition and, finally, its set-up satisfies especially Bull’s quest for a visible world society.

Certainly, a random reading of the CT or the debate held at the European Convention will not yield results geared toward a consideration of the subject of legitimate supranational authority. A structure to the reading is necessary so that what is relevant to this question can be extracted from the material. For this purpose, my strategy will be to rely on ideal-types or more broadly on research through the use of ideal-types. In simple terms, ideal-types are

the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints (Weber 1949; p.90; emphases in original).

Hence, ideal-types are concepts that deliberately exaggerate one particular aspect of a given phenomenon. They are not intended as accurate representations of the subject under investigation but simply “pretend to represent reality” during the process of conducting research as Lindbekk (1992, p.290) says. Although they are not completely detached from reality either, that is they are not made up. Ideal-types simply inflate aspects of the particular subject under consideration. No concrete instance can correspond fully to its ideal-typical presentation. It can only approach the ideal version and no more (Gerring and Barresi 2003, p.214).

What, then, is the use of these inflated concepts? Ideal-types constitute part of a broader strategy of conducting research. Where they come in is for comparative purposes during the research process. In the course of the research enterprise, the subject under examination is compared to its ideal-typical proposition in order to see the degree to which it approaches that form. Once this step is complete, the next step is to identify the reasons for the divergences between the ideal-type and the concrete case at hand. Identifying more

and more of these reasons will help develop a better understanding of the particular issue we are interested in (Lopreato and Alston 1970, pp.88-92).

Put differently, the ideal-typical mode of research involves creating a “utopia” as Weber (1949, p.90) who developed it suggested and working backwards from that utopia toward what exists on the ground. Kaplan took an interest in the further details of how Weber operationalized this research method in his own work. Each ideal-type placed a one-sided emphasis on one aspect of a given subject. However, the social world was so complex that every given subject had many other aspects to it. If he theorized with the use of one single ideal-type, his findings would be too narrow. Kaplan notes that Weber himself was aware of this risk when proposing ideal-typical research. That is why he produced dichotomies. After constructing an ideal-type, Weber usually went on to introducing an additional ideal-type or types, an opposite or contrasting one where possible, that would place a one-sided emphasis on another aspect of the very same subject. The additional ideal-type(s) would overcome the one-sidedness of the first (Kaplan 1968). In this fashion, Weberian research could bring together what Reinhard Bendix described as “conflicting imperatives” or those “interdependent but contradictory goals, priorities, or motivations that underlie many social and political relationships” (Bendix quoted in Gould 1999, p.439). The set up of Weber’s research thus contained “fundamental components that are mutually reinforcing *and* in tension with each other” (Gould 1999, p.441; emphasis in original).

Upon reviewing the fundamentals of ideal-typical research, what emerges is that the subject that this study is interested in, the question of building a legitimate supranational system, is already set in this format by the ES. Each one of the three approaches in the ES essentially places a one-sided emphasis on one particular aspect of this question. One

perspective takes a culturalist position and argues that the key to building a legitimate supranational polity is a common culture; the other takes an a-cultural view and argues, from a more communitarian standpoint, that a supranational polity cannot provide for justice and order at the same time, and yet another takes a moralistic view and argues that a supranational polity will be legitimate for upholding our broader moral goals. Taken together, the three perspectives form a pattern similar to Weber's own design of ideal-typical research projects: a number of propositions each of which highlights one dimension of a subject. In many ways, the ES' three perspectives collectively produce a set of "conflicting imperatives" or "interdependent but contradictory goals, priorities, or motivations" (Bendix quoted in Gould 1999, p.439) as they apply in international affairs.

In other words, the theoretical input the ES makes available for this study is already structured along the lines of ideal-typical research. What remains to be done is to read the empirical material, the debate held at the European Convention, in this spirit for a fresh view of on the subject of legitimacy. This will entail reading the empirical material backwards from the three ES "utopias" (Weber 1949, p.90) about a legitimate supranational system - a culturalist "utopia" associated with Wight and Watson, a moralistic one associated with Watson and a communitarian one associated with Bull and Vincent - and then determining the degree to which the European debate deviates from or approaches them. Hence, the task becomes identifying which one of the three discourses prevailed during the conversation on Europe's future and who tried to make use of them for what purposes.

One issue that still needs to be resolved is that international society and world society may not be mentioned as such in these empirical sources. We are interested in this because we also want to know who favors more supranational authority or not. For

deploying an ES-reading of any document, there surely will be a need to translate it into the language of international and world society first. International society and world society refer respectively to state and non-state aspects of international affairs in the ES. By observing this distinction, it is possible to translate the selected material into the language of the ES. I will distinguish international and world society by matching European actors' references to two sets of ideas and institutions connected with the state and non-state aspects of EU politics. The intergovernmentalist view of European integration, the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the veto powers states hold are some of those ideas and institutions that represent international society as it applies in the EU. World society is represented in the ideas of a common European culture, value system, history, people or identity. In institutional terms, world society is represented, among others, in the European Parliament, transnational networks and Union citizenship alongside member state citizenship for all (Diez and Whitman 2002, pp.52-3).

Words are important in whatever form they may appear - so much so that the members of the Convention literally fought a "war of words" over the inclusion or exclusion of particular ones right at the very beginning of their task when they were trying to agree the Preamble of the draft CT. From the moment it was first circulated, the Preamble of the draft CT made a powerful statement. It noted that the peoples of Europe were determined to forge "a common destiny" for themselves and to "unite ever more closely", and the final version of the Preamble justified this determination by resorting to the shared "cultural, religious and humanist inheritance" of the continent (Draft Constitutional Treaty 2003). In between, several proposals for amendment were submitted regarding this notion of a "common destiny" and the sources that justified it. In fact, some were opposed to the very idea of a "common destiny". Others who did not necessarily

oppose the idea still wanted the text to make it clear that such a destiny can only be forged under a federal structure. Yet others insisted that the Christian religion be acknowledged as one of the most important sources of Europe's unity, and demanded that whatever destiny is to be forged, Christianity be referred to explicitly in the text (Proposed Amendments to the Preamble 2003).

Even the battle over the Preamble can serve as a useful example to show how to interpret the material with the ES' three perspectives on the process of building a legitimate supranational system. These are also the three "utopias" or ideal-types (Weber 1949, p.90) the School created about it. As in the character of ideal-typical research design, each utopia stands in an oppositional relationship to the others. On the one hand stands the notion of the forging of a common destiny for the peoples of Europe. On the other stand the member states of the EU which may or may not allow this to happen. The culturalist and the communitarian undermine the other from within – an ever closer union among peoples vs. a union of member states. What we need to do now is to identify from the Convention documents what is left on the ground after all utopias destroy one another in terms of the question of how to build a supranational polity in a legitimate way. The next chapter turns to the "culturalist utopia" about the possibility of building a legitimate supranational system associated with Wight and Watson, after a brief overview of what changes the CT would have introduced into the functioning of the European Union.

CHAPTER 4: TOWARD AN ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY OF LEGITIMATE SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEMS: CONSIDERING THE CASE FOR THE CULTURALIST APPROACH

The previous chapters offered an overview of the English School theory and introduced the key concepts within the theory that are necessary for considering the main question of this study – that of when a supranational system becomes legitimate to its members. I reviewed the concepts of international and world society alongside the three perspectives on the relationship between them; the School’s understanding of legitimacy and explicated the link between international / world society and supranational legitimacy in chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 explained the methodological procedure of the study and identified the Debate on the Future of Europe (2002 - 3) as a particularly apposite moment in the history of European integration for examining the question of legitimate supranational systems.

Chapter 4 takes us to the second and empirical part of the study where the actual analysis of our central question starts. When and under what conditions does a supranational political system become legitimate to those who are subject to it? Our review of the English School literature yielded three perspectives, three Weberian ideal-types or “utopias”, on this. The first associated with Martin Wight and Adam Watson of the School approached legitimate supranational systems primarily through the existence of a common culture at the world society level. Wight and Watson looked back into history to support what I labeled the “culturalist utopia” for the purposes of this study. As they studied past systems, Wight and Watson saw that supranationalism became easier where there was a common culture. In the later stages of his work, Watson added a moral dimension to his thinking. This time he approached legitimate supranational systems through our moral objectives focusing on world society. In this moralistic line of thinking, especially in his

latest work *Hegemony and History*, Watson argued that there was a moral impetus behind the formation of supranational arrangements. Bull and Vincent too reasoned on moral issues when they approached the question of legitimate supranational systems. Their overall conclusion, what we may call the “communitarian utopia”, was that the society of states was the best possible arrangement for order and justice to be obtained at the same time.

Comparing these three utopias to the actual debate held at the Debate on the Future of Europe is the task of chapters 4, 5 and 6. I start with the “culturalist utopia” in this chapter and continue with the communitarian and moralistic utopias respectively. To be able to proceed with this task, it will be necessary first to identify what changes the Constitutional Treaty (CT) proposed to introduce in the European Union system, particularly with respect to our chief question of the injection of more supranational authority in it. The CT is divided into four main parts. Part I deals with the principles, objectives and institutional provisions of the Union while the European Charter of Fundamental Rights constitutes the second part of the CT. Part III concerns the functioning of the Union and the fourth and final part regulates such details as entry into force and future revisions. It was signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome by the 25 heads of state and government of the member states, and as we now know failed to enter into force (European Union 2010a). Obviously, a great deal of all of what is in it is quite complicated and technical in nature. My focus here will be on those non-technical or non-legalistic aspects of the document within an International Relations framework, more specifically within the English School framework set out in the previous chapters. Before embarking on this task, let us briefly see below what main changes the CT would have introduced into the functioning of the European Union.

Perhaps it is best to start by stressing that the CT created a much more visible Union above all by making qualified majority voting more or less the norm, and unanimity voting the exception in the decision-making process. It introduced a new system of qualified majority voting which replaced unanimity in 20 existing areas of action, and created 20 new areas also to be determined with qualified majority. The three-pillar structure of the Union was abolished and a single legal personality was recognized for it. This brought the two formerly intergovernmental pillars of Common Foreign and Security policy and Justice and Home Affairs under the supranational pillar (European Union 2010a). The merger of the pillars is significant in that it means the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice obtain powers they previously did not have; and the recognition of a single legal personality for the Union means that it can enter into international agreements on its own or even become a member of international bodies. These are all very significant steps in terms of accentuating the public face and presence of the Union. Indeed, the CT also introduced a number of symbols to mark its public presence such as a European flag, an anthem and a day, May 9th, to be celebrated as Europe day. New posts and institutions were also created. As we shall see, not to the liking of all discussants at the Convention, the CT created the posts of a permanent President of the European Council and a Union Minister of Foreign Affairs. A European Public Prosecutor's Office was also set up to deal with cross-border cases.

If all of this sounds too novel; then it might be worth underlining that the CT retains some 90 per cent of the pre-existing practices of the European Union (Church and Phinnemore 2006, p.10). Only about a third of the articles in the CT are new while the remaining articles are based on the previous treaties of the Union (Church and Phinnemore 2006, p.28). The CT did not radically alter the European Union but proposed significant

changes in the relative power its existing institutions enjoyed. The European Parliament, for instance, emerged out of the CT as a “winner” in that it became a co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in most areas of legislation and gained additional powers, most significantly with regard to the budget of the Union (Church and Phinnemore 2006, p.104). National parliaments too came into the picture in a quite visible way, and their role was recognized in a protocol attached to the CT. A number of mechanisms were introduced to involve them in the decision-making process and for them to voice their disapproval of proposed EU legislation where that is the case. A strong emphasis is placed throughout the CT to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which stipulate that the Union can only act when it is necessary for it to do so. The application of these principles too was regulated in a protocol attached to the main document. For the first time, the prospect of a member state wishing to leave the Union was considered; and the CT regulated how a state could voluntarily terminate its membership.

Many read the CT as a compromise between the more supranationalist vision of a European Union and the more intergovernmentalist one (Wessels 2005; Kim 2005). From this perspective, even the name of the document reflects this compromise - it is neither a constitution in the way supranationalists would want it to be nor a treaty in the way intergovernmentalists would want but a “constitutional treaty” (Wessels 2005, pp.14-5). Indeed, there were many proposals for amendment from both sides for it to be referred the other way round. A particularly Euro-skeptical member of the European parliament, Timothy Kirkhope from Britain, for instance, proposed to amend on every single instance where the presidency draft referred to the prospective document as the “Constitution” – replacing it with “Constitutional Treaty”. While others with a more favorable attitude toward European integration were pleased with the use of the term “Constitution”.

Interpreted in broad terms, there are “points at which the European Union and its institutions gain: symbolically, structurally and through changes in decision making. However, many of these apparent gains are either limited or simply carried over” from previous arrangements as Church and Phinnemore (2006, p.129) note. And these gains are balanced through the strengthening of the role of the member states. In the end, the document that emerged is a “carefully contrived compromise between the positions of the supranational ‘federalists’ and the ‘intergovernmentalists’ while at the same time acting as a bridge between the large and the smaller member states” (Evert and Keohane 2003, p.19). As we shall see, the question of large vs. small member states has been a persistent theme during the Convention and indeed throughout the history of the European Union. Follesdal and Dobson (2004, p.181) note that the CT tries to find a balance between the positions of small and large member states by over-representing the former in the European Parliament and by disproportionately weighing their votes in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers. In this way, the document seeks to prevent both “secessionist and centralizing tendencies” in the decision-making process (Follesday and Dobson 2002, p.176).

Following the rejection of the CT by French and Dutch voters, the Union continued its reform drive with the Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force on 1 December 2009. Lisbon preserves many of the institutional and voting arrangements in the CT. It streamlines the working procedures of the EU and extends qualified majority voting to forty policy areas, most notably to the areas of freedom, security and justice, which were previously decided unanimously. Furthermore, it removes national vetoes in a number of policy areas. The Commission, while getting smaller, obtains new powers just like the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Although not attached to the

document like it was to the CT, the Charter of Fundamental Rights gets a reference in Lisbon through which it becomes binding. It creates a new High Representative for the Union in Foreign Policy Affairs, however, preserves the intergovernmental decision-making procedures in defense, security and foreign policies. Like the CT, Lisbon introduces certain balancing acts between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. National parliaments and member states can resort to several methods to halt EU legislation when they feel that it is adversely affecting their vital interests (Duff 2008; European Union 2008c; BBC News 2011).

Essentially, the Treaty of Lisbon keeps the main substance of the CT. It is more significant in terms of what it leaves out. Unlike the CT, Lisbon does not contain symbols reminiscent of a single European state such as a flag and an anthem. It also emphasizes the social dimension of Europe more than the CT. There are certain brakes to the free movement of persons which were introduced on the initiative of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, member states will be able to block relevant EU legislation if they consider that the proposed piece of legislation is putting too much pressure on their social security systems. On France's initiative, free and undistorted competition ceases to be an objective of the EU internal market. However, this does not negatively affect the Commission's competences in the area of competition policy (Euractiv 2009; Duff 2008; BBC News 2008).

Following the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in France, the French foreign and European ministers declared in a joint statement that this shows how "France is still keen on preserving the European ambition of the founding fathers of the Treaty of Rome and that it is hoping to find itself in the leading role for Europe" (ConsulFrance-Atlanta 2008). Elsewhere in Europe, reaction to the treaty was mixed. For the strongly pro-EU, Lisbon

was a major achievement in the integration of Europe. The Portuguese president of the European Council regarded the Treaty as “a European victory” (Portuguese Presidency 2007). For the EU-skeptics, the Treaty was another step in the “slicing away [of] sovereignty, treaty by treaty” (Economist 2007). A great deal of reaction against the Treaty of Lisbon focused on just how similar it was to the CT. For many, the Treaty of Lisbon was a constitution under a different name only. A British columnist explained that this was no surprise because “the plan to create a European state never dies. As in a bad sequel movie we discover that the monster so comprehensively destroyed at the end of the film has miraculously regenerated itself” (Portillo 2007). Indeed, the former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who chaired the European Convention that drafted the CT himself said that: “The proposed institutional reforms, the only ones which mattered to the drafting convention, are all to be found in the Treaty of Lisbon”, adding that the text simply removed particular phrases in order “above all to head off any threat of referenda by avoiding any form of constitutional vocabulary” (Russell 2007).

Vocubularly is not the only factor that affected outcomes during the reform process of the Union. A totally different kind of document would have emerged had the Convention been presided over by someone other than the former French President Vallery Giscard D’estaing according to some scholars. It was through the “art of political manipulation”, perfected by D’estaing, that the Convention could come up with an agreement in the end in Tsebelis’ (2007) analysis. For D’estaing not only imposed strict time limits on the submission of amendment proposals but also exercised strong agenda control mechanisms to modify these proposals (Tsebellis 2007, p.157). Furthermore, he limited the number amendments that could be proposed and declared that only the “most enriching” ones would be taken into consideration (Tsebelis 2007, p.161). In Magnette and

Kalypo's (2004) view, D'estaing ruled the Convention with an "iron fist" (p.398), and made sure by balancing different amendment proposals against one another that the final version was least removed from the original presidency version (pp.397-8).

Irrespective of the influence D'estaing might have exercised during the Convention, the draft CT is certainly a complex document that can be read in a number of ways. Like other texts of its stature, there exists an element of constructive ambiguity in it to address all the different parties concerned. Let us now proceed with the task of this chapter – that of the culturalist "utopia" found in the English School regarding the formation of legitimate supranational systems advanced by Watson and Wight, and see how much room there is for a culturalist understanding of the discussion. The documents I analyzed have been downloaded from the official web site of the European Convention, live at the time of writing, available on: <http://european-convention.europa.eu/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN>. The entries at the Convention web site had different names, as seen below, and their page numbers differed from one to over 100. My linguistic abilities enabled me to analyze only English-language documents, however, this should not constitute any bias in the analysis since English language translations were provided for an overwhelming majority of the non-English entries. In total, I analyzed 1300 documents, the breakdown of which based on the names given by the Convention Secretariat is as follows:

| DOCUMENT NAME | NUMBER OF ENTRIES |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Contributions | 281 |
| Discussion Circles | 57 |
| Documents | 158 |
| Proposed Amendments to Part III | 76 |

| | |
|----------------------------------|------|
| Proposed Amendments to Part I | 79 |
| Related and Presidency Documents | 11 |
| Speeches | 190 |
| Working Groups | 448 |
| Total | 1300 |

Table II: Name and number of document entries to the European Convention website

A Culturalist Reading of the Debate on the Future of Europe

For the culturalist “utopia” in the English School to hold, we should find that the participants at the European Convention were willing to accept more supranational authority, and the rules and institutions that represent it, as preconditioned under a common cultural framework. They should identify themselves with a common European culture or consider themselves as forming a European world society, and this should enable them to more easily agree to the very idea of a supranational arrangement and its specific shape than would be the case in a multicultural setting. Was this the case at the European Convention? I will consider this by focusing on Watson and Wight, the two proponents of the culturalist utopia. These two figures suggest essentially the same things but the details of how they relate to the concept of legitimacy vary. In Watson (1992), culture and legitimacy meet in the pendulum analogy while in Wight (1997) they do so through “first principles” and “rightful membership” in international society. The arguments of each figure thus merit individual attention. The discussion starts with Watson.

Culture and legitimacy: a Watsonian reading: What faces us immediately in this task is the complexity of the term “common culture”. It is a difficult term in itself, and the members of the ES have not specified it too well either. As Buzan (2010, p.2) notes, Wight’s usage of the term was vague. It ranged from a deep or historical sense of culture shared by all to a basic understanding shared mainly among the elites and not necessarily the broader public. This variety is present in Watson’s usage as well. He talks of a “diplomatic culture” frequently which would again be an elite level concept. In a quote from Butterfield, he hints at the possibility of a common culture being created by hegemons. In a 1965 paper to the British Committee, Butterfield writes that in the formation of states systems, the

startling fact is the importance of an earlier stage of political hegemony – a political hegemony which may even have been responsible for the spread of the common culture. It looks as though (in the conditions of the past at least) a states system can only be achieved by a tremendous conscious effort of reassembly after a political hegemony has broken down (quoted in Watson 1992, p.5).

Watson pursues this line of thinking in his analysis especially in relation to ancient systems. However, in most cases, he uses the term “common culture” to refer to preexisting cultural rather than contrived bonds. Ultimately, his usage is in the sense of civilization whose members try to achieve what we may call a “better life”. Even if they are politically independent from one another, they are still not

absolutely separate entities but behave as parts of a whole. In such cases, each sovereign and individual state has not achieved its civilization and its standard of living, and the needs and aspirations of its people, in isolation, but has only been able to do so within the wider society (Watson 1982, p.16).

He provides this definition primarily out of the experience of Europe, and there is a higher referent in this – that of the unifying influence of Christendom. Watson refers

in connection with this point to the traditions of medieval Latin Christendom, and its legacy of unity (Watson 1982, p.17).

There is no objective way of knowing if the Europeans still identify themselves with the unifying traditions of Latin Christendom. What we can do, however, is to determine the extent to which that tradition forms part of the “language games” (Manning 1975) they play. As I explained in Chapter 3 on the methodology of the study as well as of the English School, language is central to understanding social phenomena. In the social world, things matter so long as they figure in the relevant linguistic structures. At the European Convention, there was indeed talk of such European unity in two main forms: European unity as a *normative ideal* and European unity as a *practical necessity* in a globalizing world. This chapter deals with the former since the culturalist utopia in the ES on the formation of supranational systems is based on that. I will deal with the practical necessity discourse in the following chapters.

By *normative ideal*, I mean the justification of European unity through the concept of world society. The idea that Europe is or needs to be united through world society finds strong expression in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty. It refers to the common heritage and values of Europe leading on to the sharing of a common destiny. After citing the shared “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”, it reads that the “peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions, and united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny” (Preamble of the Draft Constitutional Treaty 2003). The Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union also refers to these common values and notes that Europe remains “conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage” (p.47).

Values are important to the European construction as well. They are mentioned as common to the Member States and Article 2 of the CT specifies them as respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These common values are cited throughout the text and their importance was frequently emphasized during the Convention. One Convention delegate in fact went on to define Europe as a “school of thought and shared values” more so than a geographical region (Szajer 2002).

The exact wording of the Preamble of the CT was shaped following the receipt of numerous amendment proposals. A great majority of them requested a reference to the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe or to Christianity. However, these requests were rejected amid much secularist opposition. Other amendment proposals came from those who found the Preamble too much or not supranational enough. Hain, representing the UK, was one of those who found it too supranational with too much emphasis on the peoples. He started by replacing the word “Preamble” with “Proclamation”, suggesting that the latter term better fit an intergovernmental setting. In his proposed “Proclamation”, it was not the peoples of Europe to unite ever more closely but the states of Europe that are “resolved to set the relations between their peoples on a new foundation laid down by the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union” (Hain 2002, p.7).

As I noted earlier, referring to the document as Constitution vs. Constitutional Treaty also became an issue during the Convention. The presidency referred to it as a “Constitution” while Hain and several others kept changing it to “Constitutional Treaty” with a view to emphasizing that it is being concluded between states. Paciotti (2002), representing the European Parliament, prepared an

alternative Preamble based on previous European Parliament decisions and resolutions. Here, the balance shifts toward the supranational ideal and based on their common values, Europeans try to create “a solid basis for the construction of the future Europe, *with the prospect of federal-style development*” (p.5; emphasis in original). In Paciotti’s proposal, the document is neither a Constitution, nor a Constitutional Treaty, but a “Constitution and Treaty” at the same time. As Paciotti explains, this is with a view to reflecting the dual nature of the Union as a Union of States and as a Union of Peoples (p.6). I will take up the theme of the dual nature of the European Union in this chapter when considering Wight’s (1977) notion of international legitimacy defined as “first principles”.

Paciotti’s (2002) proposal and similar ones would convey an even stronger sense of world society although the final and accepted version of the document does not fall short of doing so either. It constructs a strong “we” narrative with the use of powerful notions like the forging of a common destiny (Bogdany 2005) and the “we” is a historical, cultural world society in the Watsonian sense. Other contributions to the Convention convey this sense as well. Chairman d’Estaing (Introductory Speech 2002, p.15), for instance, speaks of a “continent at peace, freed of its barriers and obstacles, where history and geography are finally reconciled, allowing all the states of Europe to build their future together after following their separate ways to West and East”. This quote hints at the geographical scope of the world society discourse as well. It covers the central and eastern part of Europe toward where enlargement is described as the “reunification” of the continent. Dehaene, the Vice-President of the Convention, puts this in no uncertain terms when

he says that this particular enlargement is “no less than the reunification of Europe” (2003, p.2).

Candidate states themselves from the central and eastern part of Europe describe EU membership in similar terms. To take one example, Kuneva (2002), representing the Bulgarian government, describes membership as the country’s “chance to reassume [our] rightful place in an extended family of European nations”. This “reunification” discourse did not include candidate country Turkey. In fact, d’Estaing declared at one point that Turkey’s membership would spell “the end of Europe” (BBC News, 2002). I will take up the question of Turkey’s membership later in the chapter under Wight’s (1977) notion of legitimacy understood as “rightful membership” in international society.

The theme of European unity was thus quite conspicuous at the Convention and found a secure place in the final version of the text. Perhaps even more conspicuous than this theme was the diversity of Europe and the presence of so many national and regional cultures within its boundaries. Some of the newly acceding states were especially more vocal about this subject and wanted to be assured that the Union would be respectful of the diverse traditions of its members. A Latvian MP for example noted that wherever and whenever EU membership was discussed in Latvia, the chief topic of conversation became how it would impact on the national identity of Latvia and if Latvia would be able to stay in as a Baltic country with its own traditions. The National Debate on the Future of Latvia in Europe showed that the Latvians did not want to pay the “high cost sacrificing one of the basic riches of today’s EU, our cultural and linguistic diversity” (Birzniece, 2002). A Slovenian participant emphasized the importance of nation states as “a

basis of identity of each European nation, a basic element of European architecture and common European identity”, adding that “the basic sources of individual entities have to be protected from weakening and merging” (Nahtigal 2002, p.3) under the EU. It was not only national identities that demanded separate recognition in the broader European construction but also regional ones. As Lungo (2003, p.479) points out, there has been “an increasing autonomistic, micro-regionalization of Europe” in recent years. The Convention debate indeed supports this conclusion. The representatives of regions, especially those with legislative powers, were equally vocal in their demands for the Union to respect them.

The final text seeks to establish a balance between unity and diversity in Europe. The Preamble speaks not just of a united Europe but one that is “united in its diversity” and Article IV – 1 moves to establish “United in Diversity” as the official motto of the Union. The Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, which constitutes Part II of the CT, states that the Union

contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common [European] values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organization of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels.

The CT tries to maintain this balance in various articles, and the need to do so is a new development within the EU as d’Estaing explains:

During the first decades of the union of Europe, when national identities were still strong – to the point of fuelling bloody confrontations in order to protect or extend them, and when only a small and relatively homogenous Europe was involved – the only concern was to further European integration. Since the 1990s, we have witnessed the growth of another need: the need for compatibility between the desire to be part of a strong European Union, and to remain solidly rooted in national, political, social and cultural life (Inaugural Speech 2002, p.7).

Many students of the EU have pointed to diversity as a factor standing in the way of deeper integration. The Europeans do not have that much in common in fact. They speak different languages, they have very different traditions and even a sense of shared history is weak among them as history serves as a divisive concept. No common European *demos* or identity exists, it is claimed, and this is an obstacle to the building of a much more integrated polity (Dehousse 2006; Walker 2005; Mayer and Palmowski 2004; Strath 2002). Many in the Convention took that it did exist but in a precarious form. One mentioned the existence of a “nascent pan-European identity” that needed to be developed further (Zieleniec 2002). A great majority of the other delegates at the Convention agreed that there was a need to develop this identity. “Citizenship” and the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a binding document into the CT were the most frequently made suggestions in this respect. Together, they could help “build a genuine community of values while at the same time guaranteeing the blossoming of national and regional cultures” (Economic and Social Committee 2002, p.4). A similar point is advanced by Attalides, representing the Cypriot government. He notes that “cohesion in Europe can be enhanced both through wider familiarity with other languages and cultures, and through the development of common principles and values” (Attalides 2002, p.3).

If the terms identity, culture or values seem to blur into one another in the preceding paragraph, that is because that has been the case since the adoption of the “Declaration on European Identity” in 1973 at the European Community Copenhagen Summit as Kraus explains. From 1973 onwards, European identity has been swinging between the commonality of values as providing for unity and the diversity of cultures as a normative principle (Kraus 2004, p.46). According to the Declaration, what makes the European identity original and dynamic is that it is based on the

diversity of cultures within the framework of a common civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interest in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a united Europe (Declaration on European Identity 1973).

This statement echoes Watson's views on the formation of a polity like the EU. It is the attainment of common aspirations underlined by the presence of a common culture. And he too considers diversity within a civilization as a normative principle. It is a source of strength according to him. He noted that the "dynamic culture and civilization of Europe owes its vigor to diversity rather than to sameness" (Watson 1997, p.37). The thing, however, is that the drive toward sameness does not stop. The European Commission especially funds numerous culture-building programs and initiatives with a view to fostering a sense of common European-ness. The Constitutional Treaty itself is an attempt to do so in many ways. But we also know that it was rejected. What, then, are we to make of all this in terms of culturalist utopia in the English School? Is it that Europe is to build an ever closer union under the matrix of its common civilization; or is it that the pre-Constitutional Treaty shape of it the final optimum mix that it can strike and even a common culture cannot take it further down the pendulum toward empire? To be able to deal with these questions, I would like to turn to the particular tradition of history-writing that influenced Watson and then deal with some of its weaknesses. The concepts of nations and nationalism come to the forefront in this respect.

Watson's (1992) research has not received too much attention in the broader literature. It is a challenge to the prevailing theories in the discipline which place an "obsessive emphasis on the independence of states" (Buzan 1992, p.708), and this is perhaps why it has not generated too much interest. Its usefulness has been questioned by those who did take an interest in it. Donnelly (2006a) suggests that Watson's (1992, p.131)

historically applicable optimum mix of legitimacy plus advantage minus the pull and push of the pendulum formula amounts to “a metaphysical principle with pseudo-mathematical airs” with little use for analytical purposes. At first, this sounds like a fair characterization of what Watson is saying. However, as Buzan and Little warn, it is wrong to interpret from the pendulum that “Watson subscribes to a mechanistic view of history, with states participating in endless and unchanging cycles of behavior” (Buzan and Little 2007, p.xii).

Watson, who is primarily a historian, has been influenced by a particular tradition of history-writing associated with Arnold Toynbee. A great influence on Wight as well, Toynbee believed that history could only be told in the form of grand narratives. Even if no two events in history are exactly the same, they are still comparable enough to be subsumed under such a narrative because human phenomena are “philosophically contemporary” (in Hall 2003, pp.394-5). Butterfield too was attracted to this conception and believed that what is “philosophically contemporary” can be used to draw up “the ‘diagram of forces’ of the international system without asserting that such forces were a natural or perpetual force of international affairs” (quoted in Hall 2002, p.732). Watson’s “optimum mix” is also based on this “philosophically contemporary” assumption, and the pendulum is intended to “help[s] us to make a guess as to what is today, what may be tomorrow, the optimum mix for us” (Watson 1992, p.324).

Civilizations are the primary units of analysis in this kind of history-writing. According to Toynbee, nations did not have their own histories as such – each nation’s history was grounded in a broader civilization (Marthel 2004, p.347). For Toynbee, civilizations “were the largest social unit in space and time of which one could say that other social units were parts” (Navari 2000, p.291). Nations’ histories could thus be studied under the particular civilization they belonged to. Yet Toynbee was not really keen on the

histories of individual nations. In fact, he believed that focusing on nations was too narrow an understanding of history – it was the broader civilization(s) that required attention (McNeill 1988). Those who reviewed Toynbee’s work actually concluded that he had a certain degree of aloofness toward the concepts of nations and nationalism. At times, he would cite them among the causes of the breakdown of civilizations. Geyl concludes that the idea of national independence “inspires him with distrust, national ambitions he rejects. He does not really do justice to the historical reality of national life, of national desire for self-preservation or even for expansion” (Geyl 1948, p.121). In particular, Geyl argues, Toynbee had very little appreciation of the differences within the Western civilization itself. All he did in his description of the Western civilization was to “belittle the national factor instead of accurately defining its relationship to the larger whole, he is all the time coming into conflict with his own impossibly universalist system” (Geyl 1948, p.123).

Toynbee was a controversial figure and his work generated intense debate. It is beyond the scope of this study to take up these issues. However, what I would like to point to is a similar belittlement of the national factor by Watson in his analysis. Watson too treats nations as part of civilizations. When he discusses the emergence of nations and nationalism in Europe, he speaks of them as the break-down of the *grande republique* of Europe into individual units. He finds this artificial and speaks about those states that pursue nationalistic goals in Europe as having been “irresponsible to anything outside themselves”, while at the same time dropping *raison d’etat* in favor of “*passion d’etat*” (Watson 1997, p.19). Of course, one can take any view on nations and nationalism. Watson is somewhat disbelieving in them it might be noted. However, he should still have looked into their impact more thoroughly and analyze what they might mean in relation to his pendulum system. Equating nationalism with irresponsibility toward international society

and not considering it much further is unsatisfactory. Watson was not an “impossible universalist” as Geyl (1948) says of Toynbee – but he was a universalist of the more idealistic or even romantic type particularly when he reflected on Europe.

Leaving his romanticism aside, Watson’s lack of serious engagement with nationalism is all the more unsatisfactory for our purposes when we realize that the concept is antithetical to the very idea of world society and thus a serious challenge to the culturalist utopia in the English School. According to Kraus, the chief issue the EU is facing today in terms of its further development is the inability to transcend nationalism – it has only reproduced it in a new setting. In this new setting, the discourses and the institutional workings all

imply a more or less continuous reproduction of national structures. In the context of EU politics, this means basically that political interests are legitimized on the grounds of entrenched cultural identities, as long as these identities are those of nation-states (Kraus 2004, p.51).

To consider the issue from the other way round, that of how Europe is legitimized in different nation-states; Marcussen *et al.* (1999) find that prior national identities which are quite stable over time are the key. The legitimacy of any new political order, such as the European Union, depends on the degree to which it resembles those prior identities. Indeed, one the chief reasons why the French rejected the Constitutional Treaty in May 2005 was their belief that it was a threat to the so-called “social Europe”. In general, the French do not have a united opinion on European affairs. Furthermore, European issues have low electoral salience in France. However, the one exception to this is when Europe is seen to affect France’s social protection system. It unites otherwise divided groups and stands out as a very important issue of concern in the country (Evans 2007). For the French, the CT was eroding “social Europe” and introducing Anglo-Saxon liberalism in its

place. These fears were successfully exploited by the “no” campaigners there. In the period leading up to the referendum, the opposition campaign was able to link the Bolkestein Directive which proposed to open the services in the internal market to the free movement of persons to the much detested neo-liberal taste of the CT. Voters were subsequently urged to say no to “Bolkestein’s Europe” (Brouard and Tiberj 2006, p.262). Meanwhile, France was invaded by posters of a “Polish plumber” who became an iconic figure depicting how the French would lose their jobs to the nationals of new member countries in the post-CT EU (Gilbert 2005; Schmidt 2007).

The reasons of the French “no” are telling in respect of our Watsonian (1992) system in that they demonstrate the significance of the “material advantage” component of it. They also demonstrate that cultural prescriptions for a united Europe are constrained by considerations of perceived material advantage. The French people’s fear of a “Polish plumber” overtaking their jobs illustrates this point. It reminds us that the people compete over economic resources. As Kaufmann from the European Parliament states, enlargement could bring mass unemployment in the newly acceding states and this in turn would constitute an important issue for the entire membership. Even before enlargement has actually taken place, Kaufmann observes, calls for a renationalization of particular EU competences and nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-European sentiments are on the rise (Kaufman 2002). Kaufmann’s remarks feed back into the material aspects of the European enterprise and point to how they trigger responses that stand at odds with the notion of world society which is never construed in materialistic terms in the ES.

If the lack of an engagement with nations and nationalism was one of the weaknesses in Watson’s theory, then another is his overstatement of the case for a common European culture or world society. These two weaknesses are interrelated in a way;

Watson is rather uninterested in the pervasive impact nations and nationalism have had on the world scene. Smith (1992) issues a reminder here and points to how regular waves of nationalism have been sweeping across different parts of the world since the beginning of the 19th - century. And the difficulties between a European culture and national ones arise as the nation “defines and legitimates politics in cultural terms, because the nation is a political community only in so far as it embodies a common culture and a common social will” (Smith 1992, p.62). However, these difficulties need not mean that these two identities will clash. It depends on how we define the nation:

If we hold to a Romantic doctrine and view the nation as a seamless, organic cultural unit, then the contradiction becomes acute. If, on the other hand, we accept a more voluntaristic and pluralistic conception and regard the nation as a rational association of common laws and a culture within a defined territory, then the contradiction is minimized (Smith 1992, p.56).

From my perspective, Watson (as well as Wight) is doing the opposite of what Smith is suggesting; that is he is holding to a Romantic doctrine and viewing *Europe* as a seamless, organic cultural unit rather than accepting a more voluntaristic and pluralistic interpretation of it. That is why he has difficulty coming to an understanding of nations and overstates the case for a European world society. There emerges from the debate held at the European Convention a need to relax Watson’s assumptions about the overall integrative function of a world society. Indeed, there was enough talk of European unity underscored by a European world society at the European Convention. Yet there was also avoidance of taking it to its logical conclusions when it came to specific policy areas. For instance, the participants at the European Convention agreed universally to building a stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union. At the same time, a great majority of them vehemently opposed the creation of the post of a minister of foreign affairs for Europe or to some of the other practical arrangements intended to that end. The nation-

state and its perceived interests were the key reasons advanced for opposing these steps. As French parliamentarian Badinter noted, this ideal of European unity “disappears when the question of the institutions and powers of the Union is raised: The cleavages here are a measure of the political stakes: considerable” (Badinter, 2002, p.5). The more dominant approach to European integration at the Convention was the “practical necessity” variety – around issues which nation-states cannot handle on their own such as cross-border crime or illegal immigration.

Why, then, are the Europeans talking about a common culture or a civilization if the talk collapses when it comes to institutions and power? Europeans are not the only ones doing so as Duara (1998, 2001) demonstrates. Duara builds his arguments from his study of the discourses of pan-Asianism which he argues has emerged as a response to European imperialism, and finds that there is a complex duality between the concepts of nation and civilization in the age of nation-states. Nations often move between national and transnational conceptions of civilization. At times, civilization is nationalized and becomes a self-conscious ideology that “needs to both transcend and serve the territorial nation” (Duara 2001, p.107). A case in point is the development of a Buddhist civilization as a narrative strategy by Sri Lankan intellectuals in their state-building efforts in which they became the leader of it (Duara 2001, p.107). Another is the similar development of the discourse of an Asian civilization by Japan for its own national consumption during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as Japan tried to secure itself a place in the world dominated by European imperialism (Duara 1998, p.668). At other times, nations appeal to a transnational conception of civilization as part of a “yearning for a transcendent spiritual purpose” (Duara 2001, p.99). Grounding their existence in this higher or transnational concept “enables nations to found their sovereignty in a certain timelessness” (Duara 2001,

p.107). An example here could be the discourse of “European France” developed during the 1980s (Marcussen *et. al* 1999, p.621). Duara notes that all almost nation-states are experimenting with one or another way of re-defining themselves in a globalizing world. They are seeking to “patch together creative, workable identities from older regional or non-territorial ideologies and networks” (Duara 1998, p.668) in response to the capitalist globalization of the world that has rendered territorial nationalism increasingly insecure.

The Middle East offers another example where we can find discourses of a pan-Arab or pan-Islamist civilization. In that region, Halliday observes, these discourses have been used to serve state interests. Pan-Arabism, for instance, was advanced by Syria and Egypt while pan-Islamism was primarily utilized by Saudi Arabia with a view not only to protecting itself from rival states but also as a response to opposition movements (Halliday 2009). In the Arab world, the trans-national discourses of pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism have not had a mobilizing impact since that requires a material framework in which those can be entertained. Hinnebusch notes that the Middle East occupies in the global core-periphery relationship an unfavorable position and discourses of an anti-imperialist nationalism dominate the scene. From the outset, Hinnebusch (2009, p.224) argues, the Middle East “regional system faced a gap between the material realities of state fragmentation and economic dependence and the transstate Arab and Islamic identities”. As a result, the basis to make identity a common framework for action has never been achieved (Hinnebusch 2009).

As examples from some of the other parts of the world show; culture or civilization can be contested concepts and not inevitable ones as in the hands of Watson (and Wight). Strath (2002) demonstrates how it is used in European Community / Union politics. In that context, according to Strath, “[T]he idea of Europe became, historically and sociologically,

a political idea and a mobilizing metaphor” especially at the end of the Cold War (Strath 2002, p.391). It is of course traceable across history since the Middle Ages although in our times it has been “expressing contrived notions of unity... and even takes on the proportion of an ideology” (Strath 2002, p.387). The discourse about Central and Eastern European states’ “return to Europe” can also be considered along this line. In his study, Neumann (1998) convincingly shows how these particular states formed themselves into a “Central and Eastern Europe” and pursued their membership bid as part of a successful identity politics of emphasizing their artificial separation from the Western part of the continent (Neumann 1998). Sjursen’s (2002) study meanwhile points to how this discourse was reciprocated by the existing members.

Even in Europe which occupies a central place in the culturalist utopia, then, culture is not a given. As the empirical studies some of which were cited above lay out, there can be a “politics” of it. From Duara’s work in the context of Asia; we can get the sense that the civilizational discourse comes as a solution to something – for instance to the problem of state-creation as in the case of Sri Lanka or a struggle for identity-building as in the case of Japan. The case of the Middle East demonstrates that global core - periphery relations matter to the salience of cultural or civilizational discourses. In Watson’s (1992) pendulum analogy, however, culture or civilization become unproblematic concepts that he expects to legitimize further supranationalization where uni-cultural communities exist. The Middle East in particular constitutes a challenge to his ideas. Why, we might ask, a legitimate supranational system along the lines of Europe does not emerge given that there is quite a thick world society there? The only universal empire we can find in that context is the Ottoman, however, many would doubt that it was a legitimate one. Two points need to be stressed here. One is that Watson’s (1992) pendulum theory is built primarily from

ancient systems and Europe. It largely ignores other places or eras. That is partly why he does not have an understanding of nations or nationalism. Halliday notes that there is in the broader ES history-writing a lack of appreciation of the differences between modern and pre-modern times – as part of a tendency of what he labels “ahistorical continuism” (Halliday 2009, p.19).

Of course we know that the particular style of history-writing in the ES stands to Toynbee, and the assumption in his writing that all human phenomena are philosophically comparable to be subsumed under a grand narrative. Yet this assumption does not grant enough room to consider the impact of revolutionary transformations in the conduct of human phenomena. In Watson, the tendency for an ahistorical continuism presents itself in the way he reflects the traditions of Latin Christendom onto contemporary Europe - overlooking along the way the revolutionary transformations that took place such as the secularization of international affairs and the emergence of revolutionary ideas (or ideologies) like nationalism. Another point that needs to be stressed is that Watson, and indeed the ES as a whole, has shown little interest in the economic dimension of international affairs. As Hinnebusch (2009) emphasizes in his analysis of the Middle East within the ES framework; there is good reason to synthesize Neo-Gramscian and ES ideas for a better understanding of cases like the Middle East. Indeed, Watson’s ideas on hegemony bear striking similarities to Neo-Gramscian literature and I will turn to this in Chapter 6. It suffices to note here that when we consider the different histories of state and nation formation in say Asia or the different positions of places like the Middle East in the broader international political economic framework of the world; Watson’s culturalist ideas emanating mainly from Europe hit certain limits.

To turn to culture again; we may note that there is a tension in the argument in this respect as well. At first, Watson (1992) states that cultures prescribe communities' preferred positions in the pendulum. Later on comes the idea that there is a constant to and fro movement across different points of the pendulum but these two propositions may in fact crash. Cultures, at least in the broader sense of civilization in which Watson employs the term, are relatively stable. They do not change so rapidly or easily. If cultural prescriptions are the key to determining a community's position in the pendulum, then we should find less movement across it. Even if we are to expect a constant movement, then that should not be between the two extreme ends of it. It should rather take place between points that are close to one another and the move should not be farthest to the culturally prescribed point. Watson could state of course that when the movement is between the two extreme points of the pendulum, outside pressures are the key to the explanation. He would remind that the pendulum is about striking the optimum mix of cultural prescriptions, material advantage and the avoidance of the two extreme points of independence and empire. If the pendulum swings too far from its culturally-preferred point, then it is due to the influence of the other factors in it. This, however, does not lead us too much in the way of making use of Watson's theory. Albert (2002, p.308) notes that those who criticize Luhmann's theory of systems suggest that his is a theory of "Hegelian proportions whose only standards of validity are the ones it posits itself". This can be said of Watson's theory as well. Coupled with his general tendency of not referencing his studies very well; one is not so sure as to what to do with the pendulum theory except to test it against itself.

As I will argue in Chapter 6, the main strength of Watson's research is to challenge our assumptions about independence and the equality of states. When we went ahead and tested it on the culture front; the main weakness that emerged was that Watson reified

especially European culture and failed to develop an understanding of nations and nationalism except to consider them as being irresponsible toward international society. There is a sense in which his arguments about a common culture correspond to the discussion held at the European Convention albeit not to the extent that he suggests. The idea of a Europe uniting more closely is mostly pronounced by the representatives of states at the Convention (both members and candidates). This is undermined by the Convention members' speeches about the preponderance of national cultures emphasized in particular by the members of national parliaments. In this respect, there seems to be a need to relax Watson's assumptions about culture / civilization.

What is especially worthy of re-consideration is Watson's (1992) suggestion that members of different civilizations can only conduct their relations on the basis of an inter-civilizational contract. The practical implications of this suggestion are far from clear. How exactly is an inter-civilizational contract different from an intra-civilizational one in terms of the institutional workings and shared practices of international society? It appears to me that Watson puts forward this idea but falls short of substantiating it. His primary case in connection with this point is European - Ottoman / Turkish relations. In more recent literature, the Watsonian notion of "inter-state society" can correspond to the notion of "liminality" that comes from anthropology (Rumelili 2003). Liminals are those that constitute neither the self nor the other for a given community. They are partly self partly other as Rumelili notes (p.216). Turkey has been occupying a liminal position with respect to the European community although this is not a fixed status. Indeed, its liminal status has been shifting over the years. It has moved away from being a non-European to "a possible European" especially when it became an official candidate for membership in 1999. Rumelili (p.226) expects that this move away from liminality is set to gain ground as the

discourse of Europe as a multicultural space deepens. Watson's treatment of this issue is too rigid – he does not allow room for shifts in identity positions whereas Rumelili (2003) forcefully demonstrates how they indeed may. The section below will enable us to consider this issue further as part of Wight's "rightful membership" account of international legitimacy.

Another theme again from anthropology has been used by Neumann (2011) to challenge the English School's account of how "others" joined (European) international society. The members of the School have been rightfully criticized for presenting this as a unidirectional process whereby non-European states accept the terms laid down by the European states to gain recognition as members of international society (Bull and Watson 1984). Halliday (2009) who was in general skeptical about the School's work observed that the School overlooked how violent European expansion overseas has been and how painful it has been to those that have been expanded upon. Indeed, in his comparison of the ES' account of Chinese entry into international society with that of Chinese historians themselves; Callahan (2010) highlights how difficult it has been to the Chinese. In Chinese historiography, the period of European expansion into China is referred to as the "Century of National Humiliation (1839-1949)" (Callahan 2010, p.312). In his assessment, meanwhile, Watson (1984, p.31) describes the same period "as the most impressive overseas achievement" of international society. In his contribution, Neumann (2011) criticizes another aspect of the standard ES account – that of the assumption that Europe itself has not been affected by any of its expansion into other territories. His study focuses on the relations between Europe and Russia, and suggests in that context that to the members of the ES, the expansion of international society is a "process whereby one party imposes its order on the other, with little or no residue and without being itself changed by

the experience” (p.469). How, Neumann subsequently asks, “to explain that Russia is still, some five hundred years after international society may be said to congeal, in its outer rim, regardless of its traditional Christianity?” (p.469).

For Neumann (2011), the answer to this question lies in the anthropological concept of “narrative sociabilities” which assumes that when two parties interact, they both bring in their particular memories. This is because social action is based either consciously or unconsciously “on stuff that happened in the past (activated by mnemonic techniques)” and “the memories of previous systems are by necessity relevant for any entry into a new one” (p.471). In broader terms, Neumann (2011) makes the case that entry into international society is a *relational* process, and argues that if the aspirant for entry once constituted the center of a suzerain system such was the case with Russia, it may quite conceivably never adjust to a different type of system due to its particular narrative sociability.

I would like to suggest that the framework Neumann (2011) builds regarding European - Russian relations can apply to European (Union) - Turkish relations as well. Indeed, just like Russia, Turkey once constituted the center of a suzerain system and it has been suggested especially in recent years that there has been a revival of interest in this former position among the Turkish policymakers as part of a policy of “neo-Ottomanism” (Trifkovic, 2012). For Neumann (2011, p.484), there is a possibility that so long as a polity (Russia in his case) “cherishes memories of a former position at the center of a suzerain system, it will remain in the outer tier of international society”. In their contribution, Duzgit and Suvarierol (2011) have interviewed several European Commission officials, including those that interact on a regular basis with Turkish officials as part of the accession process, regarding Turkey’s membership prospects. Duzgit and Suvarierol (2011) find that Commission officials consider Turkish officials too nationalistic and

believe that they have a fundamental problem with the idea of sharing sovereignty. Grabbe has observed a similar issue in the relations between the UK and the Union. Accordingly, the experience of the UK shows that countries with an imperial past do find it difficult to share their sovereignty (Grabbe 2004, p.6). Unlike the UK, there is in Turkish identity discourse a fear of dismemberment by European powers such that it happened at the end of World War I as Rumelili (2004, p.45) points out. Turkey's memories of European powers are thus bitter, and sharing sovereignty with them in particular might be the issue here. I do not have enough space to offer a detailed consideration of how Turks' and Europeans' "narrative sociabilities" can be impacting upon the membership of Turkey into the EU, however, Neumann's (2011) framework offers a significant alternative to the culturalist thinking in the ES. Watson's approach to the question of Turkey's EU membership is quite simple: Turkey cannot join the EU simply because it comes from a different culture. The particular history of antagonism between the two parties, the memories they both bring in when they interact and Turkey's own reluctance to share sovereign rights with the Union all constitute obstacles along the way. It is, as Neumann (2011) points out, a *relational process* and the "responses of the other" also matter as demonstrated by Rumelili (2004). The culturalist line of thinking within the ES is ignorant of these aspects of the process that the more recent literature has shown.

Culture and legitimacy: a Wightian reading: As noted earlier, Wight (1977, p.153) defines legitimacy as the "collective judgment of international society about rightful membership of the family of the nations, how sovereignty may be transferred, and how state succession is to be regulated when large states break up into smaller, or several states come into one". Legitimacy also refers to the "first principles" that prevail within and between a majority

of states in international society. Both of these are underwritten by a culturalist undercurrent. As I explained in Chapter 2, Wight's views on legitimacy are especially shaped by Burke who was one of the exponents of the "international society as homogeneity" viewpoint. Let us start by analyzing the "rightful membership" aspect of the definition on this basis. For Wight's views to hold, we should find that the discussants at the European Convention reserve rightful membership only to those states that they consider culturally-similar to themselves. Does the debate at the European Convention indeed vindicate this?

Union membership is regulated under Article 1(2) and Article 57 of the final draft of the CT. Article 1(2) states that the Union "shall be open to all European states which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together". Article 57 specifies what these values are, and outlines the procedure for application and admission for membership. An earlier version of Article 1(2) read that the Union "shall be open to all European states whose *peoples* share the same values, respect them and are committed to promoting them together" (emphasis added). States replaced "peoples" in the final version as demanded by the majority of amendment proposals. This replacement was necessary, the proponents argued, in order to make it clear that it is "states" that join the Union. Some of the other proposals for amendment requested a reference to the Copenhagen criteria for membership or the inclusion that at least part of the physical territory of an applicant state lie in Europe (The Secretariat of the European Convention 2003a, pp.12-4; 2003b, pp.4-5).

Enlargement was in fact the whole point of the Convention. It was primarily gathered to design new rules and institutions for an enlarging European Union to ensure that the sheer increase in numbers would not paralyze the decision-making processes. Our focus in this section of the study is of course on the admission of new members and the

Convention participants did indeed offer their specific views on this as well. Article 1(2) takes an obviously normative approach to the question of enlargement. It stipulates that those who share European values can seek to join in. These values as specified under Article 2 are “respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”. What is less specific from the article is what a “European” state is. It was the Earl of Stockton, a member of the European Parliament from the United Kingdom, who requested an amendment that at least part of an applicant state lie physically in Europe but did not specify further the geographic frame of reference for this. On this basis, that is the lack of a clear geographical criterion, Bruton, representing Ireland, suggested that Europe’s boundaries are to be taken as democracy and human rights. This led him to further suggest that there could thus be no “agreed philosophical or conceptual basis” for rejecting Turkey’s application or that of Russia if they were to apply should they demonstrate their commitment to these values. The real question, Bruton believes, is “if the people of Turkey or Russia, as distinct from the elites of these countries, ‘feel’ themselves to be Europeans, or feel an emotional allegiance to any viable concept of ‘Europe’”. Allegiance, Bruton goes on to say, implies a historical sense of being together and a willingness to make sacrifices for a common political goal in the future. He doubts that this is the case with many applicants or prospective applicants (Bruton 2002a, p.9).

Bruton’s views on enlargement or rightful membership can be read in two ways – it is exclusionary in one sense as it refers to a historical sense of being together but also inclusionary in the sense that he opens the way to all those that are willing to make sacrifices for a common political project. As against Bruton comes Katiforis who both represents the Greek government and serves as a member of the Convention presidency. Katiforis (2002) believes that

Europe is by its nature a great historical project. The purpose of Europe is Europe itself. It is the restitution of the union European space and peoples within their historical borders. These borders include Russia and Turkey and the Near East and the northern coast of Africa..... The new Member States will not be a burden but the greatest of challenges, our greatest opportunity. They open to us the possibility of a reassignment of capital and work which will cure us from unemployment and put them on the road for development equal to our own. The new Member States will become the launching pad for the final move which will make Europe a leading power of humanity, as our Continent had been for many thousands of years and as it can so become again.

Here we find quite a large geographical point of reference coupled with a grandiose economic and political vision for Europe. For some, meanwhile, enlargement is first and foremost economic. Jacobs, a European social partner, makes this clear when he discusses enlargement and warns that “ the functioning of the Single Market, which is at the very heart of the EU, must not be impaired under any circumstances” (2002, p.4). Commissioners Barnier and Vitorino (2002a, 2002b) remain chiefly concerned with the internal market as well. They explain that while enlargement aims at promoting peace, solidarity and economic development in Europe; the Single Market needs to constitute the central task of the Union once enlargement is completed. For Severin (2002), speaking on behalf of the Romanian parliament, enlargement is about a “transfer of prosperity, or better a transfer of the means needed in order to produce prosperity” in the “sick part of Europe”. The financial implications of curing this “sick part” of Europe are a concern to many as it impacts among others upon the distribution of structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy. In relation to the latter; Bonde (2002, p.26) from the European parliament claims that “[N]oone in the EU is prepared to pay millions of Polish farmers, intensifying agricultural production for even more storage to be financed by European taxpayers”. We noted earlier that the entry into the Union of the states of Central and Eastern Europe was characterized as their “return to” or as the “reunification” of Europe.

Bonde's remarks remind that there are serious material concerns that need to be addressed. In fact, there is opposition to this characterization as well. It comes from Heathcoat-Amory (2003, p.2), from the UK Parliament, who believes that Europe is united already under the Council of Europe.

As the different quotes from the Convention members illustrate, it appears that there are a number of paths to "rightful membership" in the EU – some culturalist and others more materialistic. The culturalist point of view has generated a mountain of discussion surrounding the membership of Turkey in particular. Mayer and Palmowski (2004) argue for instance that the Ottomans / Turks have been the historical "other" of Europe and this bears on Turkey's current membership prospects. Likewise, Neumann and Welsh (1991, p.346) point to a "logic of culture" that is adversely impacting on the membership of Turkey. As noted above, the president of the European Convention himself declared that Turkey's membership would spell the end of the European Union. This is of course quite a headline-grabbing way of putting it, and I would like to suggest that it is only one way of considering the question. There is indeed opposition to Turkey's membership on culturalist grounds. Such opposition is independent of the criteria required for membership. It persists even if Turkey were able to fulfill all the criteria required for membership.

However, this is only one of the perspectives that we find on Turkey's membership. Indeed, there is also support for admitting that particular country into the EU. It is often the case in the culturalist arguments toward rejecting Turkey that "culture" is used synonymously with "religion". Borrell, representing the Spanish Parliament at the Convention, suggests that this might be because in some member states of the Union, "political and religious arguments are still being mixed, and the EU is tried to be

assimilated with the destruction of their Catholic identity or the imposition of abortion, divorce and euthanasia”. Borrell goes on to suggest that these countries advance their Christian identities as a “defense - real or mental - against the increase of cultural diversity and the migratory fluxes that are a consequence of the success of a united Europe”. It is “dangerous”, Borrell argues, to exclude “a great country with a Muslim background like Turkey” based on such a defense (2003, p.3).

There exist of course other viewpoints that do not necessarily reject Turkey’s membership but propose to offer it a different sort of membership – usually referred to as a privileged partnership or a special partnership. The European People’s Party (popularly known as the Christian Democrats) has been keen to emphasize this kind of membership as an important “offer for those countries which are on the way to a membership in the EU, but also to those who can or will not become members in foreseeable time” (European People’s Party Convention Group 2003a, p.23). This might at a first glance seem to vindicate certain viewpoints in the culturalist utopia – that a different set of relations apply between those states where the perceived cultural differences are great (Watson 1992) or that rightful membership is only reserved for those that are considered within the same cultural matrix. However, the Convention debate shows that this is not necessarily so since the idea of a different form of membership is raised in relation to those who cannot fulfill the obligations of membership or indeed those who cannot accept the Constitutional Treaty. This idea is put forward by a number of Convention members arguing that the

Constitution makes a greater imposition on Member States, and some might not be able or willing to make the leap. That being so it makes sense to permit a Member State to choose a looser partnership in preference to full membership. Such a category of privileged partnership would allow for the nexus of (mostly economic) relationships that had built up with the Union during the period of membership to be conserved in a functional form (Duff *et al.* 2003, p.8).

Here we find a notion of “rightful membership” that is linked to the ability of a state to meet the (new) requirements of membership. It is an a-cultural notion and challenges Wight’s perspective which confines that concept to culturalist / civilizational terms. At this stage it can be useful to point to two different notions of civilization. One construes civilization as a universal or universalizing process whereas the other treats it as exclusive or national. In this second and more restrictive usage, civilization ceases to be a universalizing process and turns into an “achieved fact” (Duara 2001, p.123). Where civilization is taken as a universal or universalizing process, it has the potential to eliminate or reconcile self-other distinctions. There is less room for such a reconciliation where civilization is used in the more restrictive sense (Duara 2004). This has become all the more so as nation-states have become the “sovereign agencies of global competitiveness” and the universalizing ideal lost ground as a consequence (Duara 2004, p.3). The culturalist utopia in the English School employs the term of civilization in this more restrictive sense and this usage appears in the debate at the European Convention as well. What also appears is the more universalizing sense of the term as appears in Katiforis’ (2002) remarks noted above. The very act of offering membership to a particularly debated candidate state like Turkey can be considered in the light of this universalizing perception of civilization.

A broader point to be made here is that there are many different European Union-s. As Neumann (1998, p.414) maintains, “Europe’s states all stand in some kind of relation to the European Union, be that as core member, member, honorary economic member, almost-member, or whatever”. And there are different paths to “rightful membership” in these different unions. In fact, one of the most convincing arguments to this end was advanced by Wæver using Watson’s discussion of imperial systems. The EU constitutes an

imperial center in this analysis and exercises varying degrees of influence in its sphere (Wæver 1996a). A pre-existing cultural core can be found in such an imperial system but there also exists the possibility, as recognized by Watson as well, that “perceived common interests will often lead to the improvisation of the rules even in the absence of a common culture that contains them” (Bull and Watson 1984, pp.434-5). Rightful membership can thus be predicated upon perceived common interests, a common ability to fulfill certain obligations (like those incurred by the Constitutional Treaty) or upon a common “allegiance” toward a common political goal as Bruton (2002a) suggested. In this respect, we might need to relax the cultural underpinnings of Wight’s (1977) “rightful membership” account of legitimacy as well. As I brought up in my criticism of Watson, there is in Wight too a romanticization and idealization of European culture upon which he bases his arguments. But their views on culture are increasingly challenged these days. As Buzan (2010) points out, it is becoming increasingly difficult today to maintain that there are sharp distinctions between cultures. What is gaining currency are “syncretist” accounts that focus on the transmissions between cultures while the ES’ “vanguardist” account that puts Europe at the center is losing ground. It is ironically Toynbee that set the syncretist account into action according to the editors of the journal *Reappraisals* who note that

Toynbee’s global vision of the history of all the peoples, cultures and religions of the world moves us beyond our self-centeredness and our numberless parochialisms and overspecializations. It is this sense of the global history of humanity that propels us past even our most substantial criticism of his work... In our time many weighty factors equip us to think freshly about world history and to draw Toynbee from his day into ours. We need only mention global migration, war and revolution, world markets and manufacture, famine, global communications, the nuclear threat and the global ecology (quoted in Marthel 2004, p.345).

Global issues and how Europe could respond to them were indeed dominant topics of discussion at the European Convention as well. I observed in my reading of the European

Convention that culturalist issues receded to the background of the conversation against the perceived challenges of globalization and Europe's desire to tackle them with the participation of new member states. In this sense, the rightful membership debate held at the Convention does not lend itself to an exclusively culturalist perspective as in Wight's.

Still to consider is the second aspect of Wight's (1977) notion of legitimacy, that is legitimacy understood as "first principles" that prevail or at least are claimed to prevail within and between a majority of the states in international society. A first principle can state for instance that "members of international society will be *democratic* states" or *nation-states* or *communist* states and the like. In our case, the first principle stipulates that the members are European states that respect the values of the Union and are willing to promote them (Article 1(2), Draft Constitutional Treaty 2003). It will be noticed that the two components of Wight's definition of legitimacy, rightful membership and first principles, inevitably blur into one another. Rightful membership ultimately requires acceptance of the first principles. Although this is not exactly what I would like to consider in this section. It is rather the frequently emphasized concept at the European Convention that the Union has a "dual legitimacy" – that is it is a union of states and peoples. Could this mean that there has been a modification of the first principle that the Union is a union of European states?

When it came to drafting certain articles of the text, the inclusion of the "peoples" in particular generated debates. As we saw above, a great majority of the amendment proposals to Article 1(2) requested the deletion of "peoples" with a view to emphasizing that it is states that join the Union. Not all were principled objections to the idea that the Union is for both states and peoples. It was in some cases a statement of the obvious for we know that "peoples x" cannot seek to join the Union. Only states can and the amendment

requests were more of a technical nature. In other cases, it was a principled objection. As a matter of fact, the participants at the European Convention kept offering amendment proposals centered around the terms citizens, nations, peoples and states of Europe. Some preferred “citizens” over peoples. Szajer, representing the Hungarian parliament, noted that the use of the term “citizens” over peoples was especially important in Central and Eastern Europe since statehood does not coincide in all places with the peoples there. In his preferred terminology, there exists a triple legitimacy that includes the citizens, nations and states of Europe (Szajer 2003, p.124). Others like the representative of the Czech parliament opposed “peoples”. For peoples implies diversity while “citizens” in its stead is preferable to mark the birth of a new political community created by the CT based on European citizenship (Zieleniec 2003, p. 95). Yet others are skeptical toward the inclusion of “states” since they, as the European People’s Party Group argues, may someday withdraw their support from the Union. In their preferred version, the legitimacy of the Union stems from the prospective Constitution as agreed by both the citizens and the states of Europe (European People’s Party 2003b, p.2).

In a narrow sense, the dual legitimacy concept attempts to address the presumed democratic deficit of the European Union. It creates avenues for the peoples to participate in the integration process through such new institutions as Union citizenship or the newly recognized “citizens’ initiative” whereby at least one million citizens from a significant number of members can urge the Commission to take action in a particular field of activity. (Articles 8 and 46 (4) of the Draft Constitutional Treaty 2003). In a broader sense; it has implications upon our English School terms of international and world society. Indeed, the battle over the inclusion or exclusion of certain words reflects efforts to organize the first principle of the European Union away from or closer to states. “Peoples” represents a

rather primordial view of world society – one that is not linked to (nation) states. The emphasis on peoples ultimately represents an attempt to organize the Union beyond states and it was emphasized especially by those with a more favorable attitude toward European integration. It was also evident in the Preamble of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. The Preamble started with a quote from Thucydides about democracy with which all at the Convention could identify and stressed in its first paragraph this primordial European world society. All of this was too much for one particular member of the Convention, Hololei, representing the Estonian government. “What rubbish!” he said of the Preamble, adding that

the Convention may produce a text that is as beautiful as Shakespeare’s in style or contains as much faith as St. Augustine’s confessions, it will nevertheless have to be endorsed by the national governments at the intergovernmental conference, thereafter by the national parliaments, and more generally by the people of our countries. Especially please note that the populations of each and every member state will have to be pleased with the outcome, not the mythical “people of Europe”. Thus in my opinion it is inevitable that we only maintain our ambitions but a healthy dose of realism as well (Hololei 2003).

At the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference, both the quote from Thucydides and this first paragraph were deleted as if to prove Hololei right. The new Preamble agreed at the Conference started with the names of the signatory states and emphasized in particular the founding treaties of the Community / Union in addition to the *acquis* (Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004). At the end of the day, that is in the hands of the heads of state and government present at the Intergovernmental Conference, the influence of the peoples seemed to decline right at the outset. The sense of dual legitimacy seemed to favor the states and the treaties they signed up to. It is thus best not to interpret the dual legitimacy discourse that persisted at the European Convention as a fundamental

modification of the first principle in the European Union but as an expression of the contested nature of the project.

In his recent study of the relationship between international legitimacy and world society, Clark (2007) concludes that it is no longer possible to treat international and world society as either separate or oppositional societies as is the sense in the earliest ES literature. Upon an examination of a number of case studies, Clark (2007, p.32) mentions that there has been a “degree of merger” between them. From Clark’s (2007) perspective, it is now possible to think of world and international society as interdependent societies that cooperate in the process of formulating principles of international legitimacy. To a certain degree, we could accept this argument. It is becoming more difficult indeed to maintain a sharp analytical distinction between these two societies. After all, the representatives of each can sit together in a common setting like the European Convention and formulate together certain principles that will apply in a future Europe. However, in an exclusively international society setting, like the Intergovernmental Conference, these principles can be modified at will as indeed the heads of state and government there toned down the world society discourses that were contained in the Convention draft. That world society and its representation remained subservient to international society was in particular a concern for Bull to whom I turn in the next chapter after offering some concluding remarks on the culturalist perspective.

Conclusions

I considered the culturalist utopia in the formation of legitimate supranational polities advanced by Watson and Wight in this chapter. One weakness I identified in this particular literature was that it failed to develop an understanding of the concepts of nations or

nationalism. It contained a romanticized view of European culture especially, and assumed away the presence of individual nations there whereas the debate held at the European Convention reminded their presence strongly. We can turn to Bonde from the European Parliament who put the point most sarcastically but forcefully at the same time. In a vote about competition rules in the Parliament, Bonde suggested, “most German MEPs voted more in favor of Volkswagen than in accordance with their political groups” (2002, p.43).

A second point I made was that the notion of civilization entertained in the culturalist utopia was coming under increased scrutiny. In the culturalist utopia, civilization not only became an exclusivist concept that ignored its universalizing dimension but also overlooked the complex relationships that exist between nation and civilization. Indeed, the very idea of the enlargement of the European Union toward particular countries could be seen as an example of the universalizing sense of civilization in motion. The culturalist utopia, to offer a final remark, inflates the case for culture. Indeed, we have also seen that the “world society as a prerequisite for international society” perspective also came under challenge during the Convention. Instead of a shared *culture*, the Convention participants underscored shared *values* as required for the further development of the European Union.

It becomes easier to maintain a distinction between culture and values when we resort to Vincent’s (1982) distinction between *society* and *community*. Accordingly, society “is a less demanding arrangement than community requiring merely the overlap of separate interests and not a unity of sentiment or of principle” (pp.76-7). Society, in Vincent’s view, is tied to common interests whereas community is tied to common will (p.80). There also exists the possibility for Vincent that “common obligations might emerge from the business of looking after common interests” (p.82). Common moral obligations too can

emanate from this process of protecting common interests (p.83). Bull (1995, p. 15) observed that historical international societies have all been founded on a common culture or elements of it since a common culture brings easier communication together with easier consensus on common rules and interests. On the other hand, Bull's understanding of culture has always been less rigid and he ended up emphasizing the role of common interests more, backing his argument by suggesting that conflicts of interests may not be eliminated even under the umbrella of a common culture. For him (1980, p.184), cultures could be transferred to unwilling parties too and practice would make culture perfect so to speak since common rules would be improvised in the absence of a prior common culture that would in the long-run become the basis of a new common culture. In other words, the existence of pre-existing cultural similarities need not limit the prospects for an enterprise like the European Union to further integrate. Common values, or common (moral) obligations that arise during the process of building the Union can be sufficient for creating a legitimate supranational arrangement. My reading of the Debate on the Future of Europe vindicates Bull and Vincent, more so than Watson and Wight, on this particular point. The inflated role Wight and Watson assign to pre-existing cultural similarities does not compare well to the actual conversation held by the participants of the Debate on the future shape of an enlarging Union.

What should the conclusions of this chapter imply vis-à-vis the overall question of this study, that is the formation of legitimate supranational systems? This chapter equipped us with two key findings. What emerged first and foremost was the importance of nations or nation-states that the ES' culturalist utopia overlooks. The perceived interests of the member states constituted the most serious stumbling block to increasing the powers of the supranational organs of the European Union during the Convention. Second, it undermined

the culturalist utopia's unyielding perspective on the role of a shared culture in the formation of more integrated international societies. That is this chapter essentially undermined the "world society as a prerequisite for international society" perspective found within the English School that was explicated in detail in Chapter 1. This study's quest for a fresh approach to legitimate supranationalism will thus be more cognizant of the significance of nations and states less geared toward culturalism. Many have argued that in the case of Bull and Vincent, the argument is already biased toward states. Let us now proceed to considering the debate held at the European Convention against their views.

CHAPTER 5: TOWARD AN ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY OF LEGITIMATE SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEMS: CONSIDERING THE CASE FOR THE COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH

The previous chapter considered the case for the culturalist utopia in the formation of supranational systems associated with Wight and Watson in the English School. It is the task of this chapter to consider the communitarian one associated with Bull and Vincent. This particular utopia in the English School argues that the system of states is the best system under which order and justice can be obtained at the same time and entertains a communitarian view of legitimacy. Our concept of world society is viewed skeptically in this line of thinking— world society at least potentially poses a threat to a viable order. If the communitarian utopia is to hold, then we should find that the speakers at the European Convention showed reluctance toward the introduction of more supranational authority into the functioning of the European Union on communitarian grounds. We should also find that they felt undermined by the rules, institutions or actors representing world society in the Union. Let us try and determine now if that was the case.

Bull himself was not keen on studying European developments and doubtful that a major transformation of the system of states would take place there. The goal, he argued, was simply to create a “United States of Europe” (1979a, p.142). For him, the building of this united Europe was the result of the favorable security environment maintained by states, and he especially emphasized the role of the United States in providing that environment for the continent. For him, the European Community was a “concert of states” held together by common interests (1982, p.163). Both Bull and Vincent took issue with ideas put forward for transcending the state, and they both observed that these ideas only emerged in the Western world. Vincent tied this to the traditions of individualism and

universalism in the West. He further noted that in the Western tradition, the rights of individuals were accorded a primal status and a belief existed that these rights could only be enjoyed properly against the state (Vincent 1992, p.262). Likewise, Bull pointed to a Western tradition of individualism that originates calls for transcending the state. In distinction, the non-Western world guarded the state in order to counter the influence of the West in Bull's analysis (1979a, pp.152-3). Still, he was suspicious that the state could be transcended even in the West. In a remark to stress how deeply entrenched states have become, Bull suggested that trends "making against the states system may be strengthened by being recognized and dramatized, but only so far; there are certain realities which will persist whatever attitude we take up towards them" (1995, p.266). The communitarian line of thinking in the ES was thus quite assertive about the system of states and doubtful over the prospects for it to be transcended.

A number of scholars have made observations in the European context that would ostensibly support Bull on this point. For instance, Brown (1994, p.182) maintains that the development of EU-level decision-making structures is undermining states and this is causing dislocation among the European populace. Likewise, Wæver (1996b, p.114) suggests that the transfer of powers to the EU-level is causing (neo-) nationalism in Western Europe especially as nations try to re-gain control over their states. He points at the same time to another trend whereby there has been a questioning of the continent's troubled past, and integration has been adopted as the solution for avoiding a repetition of history. Integration is thus the expression of a "will to center" that has been building up in Europe since the end of World War II (Wæver 1996a, p.248). Indeed, the European integration project brings out different responses. Laffan (1996, p.92) notes that it "generates pressures for a renewed assertion of national identities, offers a frame for

asserting new or submerged identities, and is also bound up in the search for an overarching European identity”. Watson (1992) would construe these differing responses as the tension between the desire for order and that for independence along the pendulum. There is in Watson’s work an implicit preference for order – understood as less independence for the members of international society. Bull and Vincent for their part prefer independence with a view above all to respecting the diversity of socioeconomic and cultural arrangements in a pluralist international society.

For Williams (2002), the diversity argument in the ES is a compelling one although it needs to be strengthened so as to amount to a defense of diversity from an ethical stance (pp.737-8). Williams suggests that what is not contained in Bull’s work especially is a concern with diversity from an ethical standpoint but a conservative concern that going beyond pluralism will lead to disorder (pp.744-5). The “progressive cause” has as a result of this particularly weak aspect of pluralism been associated with solidarism in the ES in Williams’ (2005, p.19) view. A lot has been written on the subject of pluralist and solidarist international society. Bull’s own position between solidarism and pluralism shifted yet the debate between the advocates of the two perspectives that took place after him in the 1990s has been carried out in very sharp terms. Dunne (2005, p.166) writes of a “pluralist / solidarist divide” characterizing this particular decade of the ES theory.

For Buzan (2004), the pluralist / solidarist debate has not been a very productive one. It has been confined to the subject of human rights, and proceeded in such a manner that pluralism and solidarism appeared to be almost mutually exclusive versions of international society (p.46). Buzan’s solution for moving the debate forward is to treat pluralism and solidarism as forming a spectrum of international societies on the basis of the thickness of shared norms (p.59). In his attempt to move the debate forward, Dunne

also deals with the question of culture in the ES. By combining Wight's (1977) rightful membership account of legitimacy with a constructivist approach to the formation of states' interests and identities, Dunne (2001) arrives at what he calls the "legitivist" interpretation of international society. In this enterprise, Dunne reworks the main elements of international society so as to remove shared culture as one of them. Accordingly, Dunne (p.71) re-defines the elements of international society as "recognized member communities + common interests + norms". This revised definition enables him to treat shared culture in a "give and take" fashion. Having eliminated culture as a requirement, Dunne goes on to subsume pluralist and solidarist types of international societies under legitimist international society. It follows from here that there is no longer a need to determine whether international society is pluralist or solidarist; it is instead legitimist and what remains to be seen is in which direction it will proceed. A legitimist international society can proceed in a pluralist manner and set the only criterion for recognition as a member of international society as counting as a state (p.90). Alternatively, it can proceed in a solidarist manner and set more stringent criteria for recognition such as respect for human rights and democracy (p.76).

Let us consider for a moment form before substance. Attentive students of the ES will have already noticed that dichotomies along the lines of pluralism / solidarism are abound in the School's writings. And they are created often by Bull. It was Bull who created these two terms in *The Grotian Conception of International Society* (1966) and subsequently set the terms of the debate. Pluralism / solidarism is not the only one; Bull also created the international system / international society distinction and later on built another one in the form of order / justice. Setting these dichotomies is Bull's particular style of scholarship, and the way they are set usually generates a lot of controversy. It

almost invites a posture of side-taking in favor of one of the concepts. Why did he keep proposing these sets of concepts? My perspective on this is that Bull undertook to form ideal-typical concepts to construct a (new) discipline of International Relations as part of his involvement with the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. It is this entrepreneurial Bull that captures the attention of Edkins and Zehfuss (2005) in their quest to de-construct the academic study of International Relations. For this purpose, they complete a Derridean reading of *The Anarchical Society* which certainly is as they say an attempt to build International Relations. In line with the mission of the Committee, Bull was essentially seeking to establish a distinctive field of study which required the formation of concepts and topics that attend to them. Many of the controversies generated by Bull's concepts can I believe be attributed to his ideal-typical research design. As Wilson (2003, p.165) notes, it is the nature of ideal-typical research design to invite a sense of taking "sides". However, the intention is rather to stimulate further analysis of a particular subject. This is the method under which Wight (1991) created his three traditions and Watson (1992) devised his pendulum metaphor. Bull applied the same when creating his concepts. Pluralism and solidarism are already, in my view, intended by Bull to be read as forming a spectrum of societies. Weinert too shares this view. According to Weinert (2011, p.33), the distinction between pluralism and solidarism has been set so sharply by the ES scholars since "concepts without distinction lack analytical leverage".

To turn to substance; Williams' (2003; 2005) suggestion that the pluralists in the ES have not put forward an ethical defense of diversity is not entirely convincing. It is obvious that Bull had a particular concern with order and argued for its preservation. However, this need not mean that his subsequent arguments in favor of pluralism are built with a conservative view to defending a static order. To the contrary, Bull analyzed at great

length the prospects for just change in international affairs. He exhibited a genuine concern with the predicament of developing countries especially and considered how their demands for a more equitable world could be accommodated. Bull and Vincent were among the first to systematically address questions like justice or racial equality and how these impacted on the relations between states. For Brown (1997, p.281), the ES constitutes a “major source of international political theory” with its focus on these and similar questions. In his study, Weinert (2011) demonstrates through the concept of “human security” how the ES’ pluralism too contains a deeply ethical concern with the well-being of humans through the creation of strong and democratic states. For Thomas, the ES has always “brought into the fore the question of the other – those communities, states, or peoples outside a given historical international society” in particular. Thomas further suggests that there is an “inherent preference for dissent” in the ES (Thomas 2000, p.825). While Thomas might be pushing the argument too far, there certainly was a great deal of sympathy toward unheard voices on the part of Bull, Vincent as well as the other members of the School. The point to be emphasized here is that the pluralists within the ES took up issues that are too unsettling for the conservative International Relations scholar. That they could not come up with too radical answers is perhaps because of the intrinsic difficulty of trying to solve the

fundamental moral dilemma of reconciling the universal with the particular and of resolving the tension between the pluralism and diversity that is such a fundamental characteristic of human life and the moral need to forge an overlapping consensus around which both the rights of individual human beings can be protected and the interests humankind as a whole can be safeguarded (Hurrell 1998, p.36).

For sure, these dilemmas exist within Europe as well. Such topics like abortion, euthanasia or the insertion of a reference to Christianity in the CT did generate controversy at the

European Convention. Is it possible, for instance, to force abortion in a country where it is not allowed in the name of women's rights? Dunne's (2001) legitimist international society could if it were to proceed in a homogenizing or solidarist fashion. As a matter of fact, Dunne's contribution to this subject does little more than rephrasing the debate while the core questions remain intact. The question of culture too remains largely intact in his argument since the formulation "recognized member communities + common interests + norms" (p.71) cannot evade culturalist considerations. "Recognition" incorporates the question of culture through the backdoor as we have seen in the previous chapters. Still to consider is the difficulty much emphasized by Bull and Vincent of recognizing common norms of a substantive nature across cultures. It was this difficulty in particular that often led the members of the British Committee into a "normative cul-de-sac" (Cochran 2009, p.203).

The way out of the cul-de-sac has been "middle-ground ethics" developed under Bull's intellectual leadership of the British Committee. Middle-ground ethics is more hopeful from the Christian pessimist moral skepticism of Butterfield and Wight and "tries to find a workable balance between ideas of the good and the actualities of real-world politics" (Cochran 2009, p.204). Watson contributed to this notion as well. Middle-ground ethics is not only about what is "right" when it is between states, it also includes what is "reasonable" due to the nature of the international system. It is in his words "what is right and reasonable between states" (Watson 2007, p.45). We can consider the European Convention as a setting to determine what is right and reasonable for current and future member states of the European Union. Others have likened it to a Habermasian "ideal speech situation" or a Rawlsian "original position" aimed at constructing a new normative order for Europe (Dobson and Follesdal 2004). That new normative order, Eleftheriadis

(2007) argues, is no longer one that can be understood in Bullian terms. It is rather the establishment of Kant's Perpetual Peace. Eleftheriadis (2007) notes that in the school of thought associated with Bull and others, the organizing principle of international politics is seen as sovereign statehood and the chief goal is the preservation of peace. Whereas in the EU, the founding treaties require that all member states be democracies; that they respect their mutual obligations to one another and to the institutions of the Union; and that they extend certain rights and freedoms to the citizens of other member states. The European Commission is endowed with the task of enforcing all these obligations. The EU system hence meets all the criteria for a perpetual peace. It is a "regional union of republics that respect each other and each other's citizens for the purposes of liberal peace" (p.12). Eleftheriadis argues that in this current shape, the EU has ceased to be intelligible in a classical Bullian sense of international society.

Eleftheriadis is not the only one who claims that the EU at this stage no longer fits Bull's framework. Diez *et al.* (2011) advance their argument from an institutional perspective and suggest that all five of the institutions Bull (1995) listed as the primary institutions of international society have either changed or disappeared in what they refer to as the European Regional International Society. Accordingly, the balance of power has become the *pooling of sovereignty* among the member states; international law has become the *EU acquis*; diplomacy became *multi-managerialism*; war became *pacific democracy* and finally great power management became *member state coalitions*. Not only has there been a modification of the five institutions but a more fundamental change has occurred according to this argument. Bull concerned himself with *international* order but it is in the nature of the EU to dispose of the very notion international. Even more, the preservation of states is no longer the chief concern; that has rather become the preservation of peace. In

these respects, the authors emphasize the transformative nature of the EU and question the applicability of a Bullian scheme to it.

It needs to be stressed that Eleftheriadis' (2007) reading of Bull is somewhat limited. Eleftheriadis places Bull as a "Realist" scholar on the basis of the centrality of sovereign statehood in his work. This might indeed be the case yet the reasoning behind it is much more complex than it is in classical Realism. It is not possible to discuss the issue of why Bull cannot be considered as a contributor to Realism any further here. Suffice to note that Bull did not deny the possibility of a Grotian or Kantian solidarist arrangement like the EU being established. He noted that "[i]f in the twentieth century the attempt to apply the solidarist formula has proved premature, this does not mean that the conditions will never obtain in which it could be made to work" (Bull 1995, p.232).

If Eleftheriadis' reading of Bull can be considered a limited one; that by Diez (2011) and his colleagues is not convincing. Their contribution fails to demonstrate forcefully how far the institutions Bull (1995) has listed have been transformed in the regional European system. One might ask what kind of a qualitative difference there exists between diplomacy and multi-managerialism or indeed what fundamental difference there is between international law and the EU *acquis*. Perhaps what merits separate attention is the argument that war became pacific democracy *within* the European regional society. I should state that the original listing of war as an institution of international society by Bull is not without problems. The occurrence of war rather implies to me the breakdown of the other four institutions of international society. Leaving Bull's (1995, pp.178-93) own reasoning for considering war as an institution of international society aside; accepting the argument that the institution of war has been replaced with that of pacific democracy requires that it applies consistently as a principle not only within but also *outside* the EU or

Europe. Otherwise, we can only speak of a partial transformation. For Hansen (2002), there exists a Eurocentric bias in much of the literature on European integration that overlooks the wars fought by member states in their former colonial possessions as well as elsewhere. This is because “peace” has been constructed as an identity category for the Europeans which results in a tendency to neglect these cases. However, Hansen stresses (p.487) that there is “no way around the fact that several member states have been regularly engaged in armed conflicts, and that European integration apparently has been equipped with no structural component able to prevent this”. Indeed, in the absence of such structural constraints, it is difficult to agree to the pacific democracy argument.

With these new institutions, Diez *et al.* (2011, p.117) argue that the European order “transforms politics to such an extent that it should better be called a multiperspectival society, confounding Bull’s expectation that the European integration will either lead to a European state or falter” (Diez *et. al* 2011, p.117). I argue that we need to consider Bull’s broader arguments about Europe before being this dismissive of him. Bull did indeed think that the goal of European integration was to create one big European state. However, he also considered whether or not the developments in Europe could be construed as the emergence of an alternative to the system of states. The answer was negative. For him to recognize an alternative to the system of states, sovereignty would have to disappear. He labeled this as a “neo-medieval form of universal political order” which could emerge if

modern states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authorities, and on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable (Bull 1995, p.246).

Certainly, Bull’s neo-medieval order is similar to the “multiperspectival society” first proposed by Ruggie (1993). This concept emerges from Ruggie’s essay on the

transformation of the single-perspectival modern territorial form of politics into the multi-perspectival postmodern form. The chief example is the European Community whereby it is becoming more and more difficult to imagine the practice of international and to an important degree domestic politics “from a starting point of twelve separate, single, fixed viewpoints”. There is instead claimed to be a “collective existence” of the Europeans (p.172) with overlapping layers of authority and an inclusive form of territoriality. This is almost identical to what Bull calls the presence of “overlapping authority and multiple loyalty” (1995, p.245) found in a neo-medieval system. Given the parallels between Ruggie’s multiperspectival society and Bull’s neo-medieval one; it is curious that Diez *et al.* (2011) do not quote the latter in their contribution. One reason for this can be that they turn to Ruggie’s concepts as part of their claim of the obsolescence of war and the pacific democratization of Europe. Whereas Bull discredited arguments as to the impossibility of war between (Western) European states as “wishful thinking” (1982, p.163), and argued that a neo-medieval system would contain more violence and insecurity than the states system (1995, p.246). In their argument, however, multiperspectivity translates into a general norm of cooperation instead of power politics. Meanwhile for Bull, one of the goals of European integration is in fact to enhance Europe’s capacity for power politics in the world (1995, p.256). The respective assumptions about the possibility of peace between the two perspectives thus differ significantly.

Bull’s prediction that one of the objectives of European integration is to enhance Europe’s standing in the world is not misplaced. It is perhaps not from a power politics perspective but a desire to compete in a globalizing world is certainly present and has been stated numerous times at the Convention. That still leaves us to consider why he was so aloof to the European project. Was he a pessimist by nature? An unyielding skeptic or

maybe as some would say a Realist? We cannot know for sure of course but one thing that can be said is that Bull was methodical. He required demonstrable criteria before submitting to an argument. That war has become obsolete in Europe would convince him only if structural constraints against it were in place. To speak of a neo-medieval system in Europe would mean that we no longer know whether sovereignty lied with member states or with the community. Furthermore, we would need to establish if “national governments within the ‘community’ had the right, and, in terms of the force and human loyalties at their command, the capacity, to secede” (Bull 1995, p.256).

The question of where sovereignty lies has been answered in no uncertain terms by de Vallera, the representative of the Portuguese government at the Convention. De Vallera underlined in his contribution that the Union can only assume those powers given to it by the member states and this principle cannot even be discussed (de Vallera 2002). Many other speakers at the Convention have stressed this as well. The question of secession was taken up for the first time at the European Convention. It was regulated under Article 59 of the draft CT and states that any member can voluntary withdraw from the Union in accordance with its constitutional requirements. Its inclusion was not without objection. Some objections were of a technical nature; maintaining that withdrawal from the Union was already possible under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1967). Others were principled objections to the very idea of withdrawal. Meyer, representing the German parliament, for instance argued that a withdrawal clause is

incompatible with a European Constitution and with the integration objective shared by all Member States of “creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. It would, moreover, contradict the idea of a Union which is based on the solidarity of citizens and States if individual Member States could decide to withdraw so easily (Meyer 2003, p.45).

A similar point was made by the delegates of the Dutch government to the Convention and others. As against this came the view that the inclusion of this article was essential with a view to reminding the voluntary nature of the project. In the words of Rupel (2003), the Slovenian Foreign Minister, regulating withdrawal underscores that integration is a “process based on the free decision of countries and their citizens to join, voluntarily, the building of a common European home”.

For others, withdrawal is not an issue as such as long as trade links with the Union are maintained afterwards (Kirkhope 2003). What the different statements from the different participants at the Convention implies is that the question of secession relates to how deeply one identifies with that common European home. For Laffan this has become a very fundamental issue in today’s Europe as the Union has evolved from a functional organization into a “part-formed polity” (1996, p.82). In the course of becoming so; its member states each adjusted their national and European identities. In the case of Germany and Italy, there has been a strong identification with Europe. Germany in particular sought to Europeanize its self-construction to distance itself from its past (Marcussen *et al.* 1999, p.624). France, meanwhile, maintained a stronger sense of its own French national identity and pursued at the same time the supranational ambition (Laffan 1996, pp.86-7). In the UK, attitudes toward Europe have remained quite stable since the end of World War II – Europe is a “friendly other” (Marcussen *et al.* 1999, p.625) when viewed from the island.

The discussion held at the European Convention does indeed fit these findings. That it is the German delegate to question the withdrawal clause or that it is the UK delegates who seek to preempt the assignment of more powers to the Union is no accident. What the discussion also confirms is the argument made by Marcussen *et al.* (1999) that national identities become Europeanized at different degrees and this impacts upon the

perceived legitimacy of the integration project. Furthermore, they also find that the legitimacy accorded to a new political order is dependent upon how much it resembles prior visions of a legitimate order. It is of course not possible to approximate the Union to the particular political vision of each and every member state. Overarching sources of legitimacy are thus required. In the initial stages of the European project, that overarching source was assumed to be a “permissive consensus” toward its building. It was in these early stages construed as more of a technocratic project that demanded not much from the ordinary individual. In normative terms, its legitimacy was attributed to its rule-governed nature (Smismans 2004, p.123). As integration got deeper and deeper, however, this presumed “permissive consensus” could no longer be taken for granted. The Union was becoming more and more visible in the ordinary citizen’s daily life, and new sources of justification for an increasingly visible body seemed necessary. The role of ideas or identities started to receive greater attention at a time when the talk of a “permissive consensus” had given way to a much resented “democratic deficit” of the EU starting in the 1990s.

Eriksen and Fossum (2004) identify three options for the future in their analysis of how to legitimate the enlarged Union of our day. The first is to scale it down to a free market agreement in which case its legitimacy would emanate from its capacity to deliver. The second is to foster a common European identity and build the Union around it. In this case, the cultural community called Europe would provide for its legitimacy. The third option is to turn the EU into a post-national rights-based community which would be built around “principles and rights that are uniquely European and normatively uncontroversial” (p.447). For some, the EU is already that – a post-national or post-Westphalian community (Diez *et al.* 2011). Others have contested this assertion on the basis of how the EU operates

self and other distinctions in its relations with the outside that do indeed fit a Westphalian framework (Rumelili 2004). For the communitarian perspective in the ES, the problem is that there are no normatively uncontroversial principles even in a relatively more homogenous setting like Europe. Westphalian borders allow each community to entertain its own set of principles and that is why they are favored in the communitarian position.

What I obtained from my reading of the European Convention is a mixed picture that vindicates neither the post-national argument nor the Bullian one thoroughly. A post-national EU is claimed to have moved “beyond the hard boundaries and centralized sovereignty characteristics of the Westphalian, or “modern” state toward permeable boundaries and layered sovereignty” (Buzan and Diez 1999, p.56). This is true but only with respect to certain policy areas and not others. As D’Estaing explains, it has been clear from the Convention that members do not want Union involvement in the internal organization of member states, schools and higher education, public services, healthcare and pension systems, culture, local environmental protection and regional planning and military commitments to possible external missions. In addition, they want a stronger application of the principle of subsidiarity (D’Estaing 2002c). As many delegates at the Convention stressed, these policy areas are sensitive ones for each member state and they are not so permeable. What is also possible to conclude from the Convention debate is that the Union’s move beyond boundaries is causing weariness for the members. Bonde expressed this weariness in a rather sarcastic way. He put into question a compulsory EU regulation requiring that a strawberry be more than 23 millimeters in diameter to be sold on the markets by noting that in the “Northern part of the Nordic countries, God has arranged it so that strawberries are not the same size as in the countries in the center of the EU” (Bonde 2002, p.58). This sort of excessive regulation by the Union was why there

has been a much heavy emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity and calls for a re-nationalization of specific Union competences at the Convention. Other calls have been issued for sunset clauses to be introduced on all EU legislation. The final shape of the CT, according to Church and Phinnemore (2006, p.93), “bears all the marks of a treaty between somewhat suspicious member states”.

An additional point of consideration in relation to the national vs. post-national question is raised by the Swedish delegate at the Convention, and this regards people’s attachment in emotional or mental terms to the state. Kvist (2002, p.2) notes, in his rejection of the idea of common diplomatic missions of the Union in third countries, that “citizens, when having a problem abroad, normally want to meet representatives from their own country or responsible to their own State”. All of this is to suggest that the post-nationalization argument needs to be qualified. It is possible to speak of a partial post-nationalization indeed although the national element remains strong in particular fields of activity.

If the Convention debate presents important counter-arguments to the post-nationalism assertion; it does also put into doubt several points in the communitarian position within the ES. What is worth noting is that the discussion renders strong support to the desire or the need to maintain diversity within individual states as maintained by Bull and Vincent. It becomes clear after a careful reading of the European Convention debate that Europe is more diverse it looks from the outside. The statements of the delegates speak to the difficulty of approximating many diverse traditions especially under policy areas outlined by D’Estaing above. In this respect, the communitarian position in the ES seems to be justified. Where it is not justified is the potentially destructive potential of world society over the order maintained by states in international society. My

interpretation of the European construction is that it has opened up a new transnational space of politics. This space has its own rules, institutions and dynamics – it is another “anarchical society”. Each individual actor, state or non-state, enters into a different relationship with this space. For many, it creates new opportunities. For instance, Emilio Gabaglio, European Social Partner at the Convention representing the European Trade Union Confederation, is strongly in favor of it. Throughout the Convention, Gabaglio pushed for the creation of a Europe-wide system of industrial relations and recognition of transnational trade union rights and a set of associated rights all across the Union. Other social partners at the Convention pushed for the rights and interests of the groups that they represent. Member state representatives who also happened to be the representatives of regional governments in their home countries struggled for the Committee of Regions to be given greater rights and powers in the EU institutional architecture. Of course, not all of these demands were obtained. But what all of this is to suggest is that we can imagine an institutional setting whereby an empowered world society can exist and engage in political contestation for its own interests and rights. One of the problems in the ES literature is that world society is construed either in culturalist terms or as the recipient of our moral concerns. It is not, however, viewed in material terms. What we have here at the Convention are representatives of transnational economic interest groups participating alongside states in the construction of a new system for Europe.

Governance approaches to European integration emphasize this point especially. In particular, the governance literature stresses the multilevel nature of the EU system which contains several centers of authority and a mixture of territorial and non-territorial or transnational principles of organization. A hybrid system such as this creates cleavages which straddle national boundaries and multiple channels through which actors can pursue

their interests and expectations. If interests and expectations cannot be met through national channels, there are opportunities for achieving them through supranational channels (Egeberg 2006a, pp.17-26; 2006b, p.12). These opportunities are not confined to non-governmental or individual actors but extend to governmental agencies as well. Different units within national governmental systems can advance their goals by forming alliances with EU institutions (Sandoltz 1996, p.413). It is essentially in the nature of the system that encourages actors, including governmental actors, to operate transnationally to further their agendas (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004, pp.104-5). These arguments support the point that I am trying to make – that a beyond-the-state space can benefit and not necessarily undermine its members. In their contribution, Menond and Weatherhill (2008) demonstrate how the EU enhances the legitimacy of its member states themselves by enabling them to deal with problems they otherwise cannot. In addition, the EU puts in place “structures that restrain their corruptive capacity to inflict harm” (Menond and Weatherhill 2008, p.398). In these ways, Menond and Weatherill (2008) note that the EU “rescues” its member states. In the next chapter, I will consider an additional aspect of all of this and ask if these opportunities are all dependent on the hegemonic management of the EU system in a way that would support Watson’s ideas.

There was at the Convention almost universal support for the creation of a rights-based and rule-governed transnational space. With a rights-based transnational space I mean the recognition of a greater set of rights for the actors involved themselves. The much supported ideas of European Union citizenship or the binding Charter of Fundamental rights are the chief examples of this. These and other instruments, the Constitutional Treaty itself in the first place, are supported to make sure that the transnational space is itself rule-governed. The Charter of Fundamental Rights was agreed

earlier in 2000. At around that time, Germany especially was concerned with the creation of an instrument that guaranteed fundamental rights as the Union kept gaining more powers (Church and Phinnemore 2006, p.85). Oleksy (2002) from the Polish parliament makes this point as well when he notes that while he favors the extension of the competences of the Union, the “weakest link” in all of this, that is the European citizen, needs to be protected at the same.

During the Convention, what remained to be decided was whether the Charter would be binding or not. With the exception of the UK, the other delegates at the Convention did indeed favor a binding Charter. The position of the Dutch government was hesitant as well. Its representatives stated that they could only agree to the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights “provided that this does not thereby become substantive EU law which could result in direct claims by citizens against their government” (Vries *et al.* 2002, p.68). In a way, this quote verifies Bull and Vincent’s assertion that world society can be a potentially destructive force on international society. As the representatives of the Dutch government express here, they do feel possibly threatened by the creation of too many rights through the Charter. The objection of the UK was along similar lines as well. However, what needs to be stressed is that there was overall a great degree of support at the Convention for the incorporation of the Charter. It is beyond the scope of this study to deal with this in detail but an additional aspect for consideration in this respect is the issue of governments vs. national parliaments and other actors involved in the system. Bruton (2002b), from the Irish parliament, raises this issue when he notes that the decision-making mechanisms for Europe should not give too much power to status quo oriented majority governments at the expense of parliamentary opposition. Should that be the case, Europe’s

ruling parties will have been equipped with a “weapon in intergovernmental bargaining”, Bruton remarks.

There was strong support as well at the Convention for the Union, after obtaining its single legal personality as agreed, to accede to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. We should also notice that this is an attempt to avoid the concentration of too much power in one hand – the EU. Both Bull and Vincent argued throughout that a world government posed just that danger. All these legal instruments, the Charter, the Constitutional Treaty or the Strasbourg Court, are intended to constrain the EU. Curiously, neither ES figure acknowledged the possibility that a central authority can be constrained as well. What we have here is a type of social contract – not between a state and its citizens but among different state and non-state actors that seeks to prevent the potential abuse of powers by a central authority. Vincent in particular dealt extensively with the idea of a social contract. He concluded that states were legitimate because they served citizens and the terms of their relationship were regulated in a social contract. However, he need not have restricted the argument to states. We can imagine the European Convention as a gathering to draw up a social contract and the resulting system as a legitimate one from a normative point of view since it is aimed at serving the citizens of the European Union.

The debate held at the European Convention offers evidence that a beyond-the-state order can be constructed in a non-destructive fashion. Of course, there were limits to it. Above, I listed the particular policy areas that the discussants at the Convention were reluctant to transnationalize. To a certain extent, the communitarian perspective in the ES is justified in arguing that it is the system of states under which both order and subjective notions of justice can obtain at the same time. Social welfare systems can be one example. “Welfare” is a subjective condition and there are different traditions of social welfare

across different parts of the EU. This was stressed many times at the Convention and the discussants did agree that welfare was among the areas that would not lend itself to supranational management. Yet what the communitarian perspective in the ES misses is that certain beyond-the-state arrangements can benefit the participants rather than threaten them. The chief example in this respect would be the Single Market and the various rights and freedoms associated with it. It is true that there are tensions involved in this process. As one of the French representatives at the Convention stated, there is a dialectical process involved in the building of the Union whereby the institutions of the Union want more powers, and the member states want to keep theirs (Badinter 2002, p.12). A well-known Euroskeptic at the Convention suggested that Union institutions' demands for more powers are only natural since you cannot "criticize a lion for eating meat" (Bonde 2002, p.31). Bull would most likely agree with this statement as he was utterly suspicious of any centralization of authority. Still, we know from the European Convention that it is possible to create a rule-based transnational polity in which the central authorities' powers can be regulated and legally sanctioned in case of a possible breach.

Why reject such a deal then? In the previous chapter, we looked at the reasons for the French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. Let us take a look here at the reasons for the "no" result in the Netherlands. For the "no" voters there, the institutional arrangements in the CT were a primary concern. The "double majority" procedure in the CT, a decision-making procedure which requires approval from fifty five per cent of member states representing sixty five per cent of the Union's population, increased the voting powers of the larger member states of the EU. Although this was balanced by other arrangements in favor the smaller members, voters in the Netherlands were worried that their interests would be swallowed under the new arrangements. These fears came at a time when there

was already anger in the Netherlands that France and Germany were able to disobey some of the monetary rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (1996) of the EU. Loss of sovereign rights and the perceived inability to protect Dutch interests in the post-CT EU appear to be the most significant reasons for the “no” result in the Netherlands. These worries were compounded by the possibility of the membership of Turkey which, with its population only second to Germany, would attain significant voting powers upon joining the EU. Workers from Turkey were a concern to the Dutch as well. If the Polish plumber symbolized the fear of job losses to the French, the Turkish worker symbolized the same to the Dutch during the referendum campaign. Even worse, a mass influx of Turkish workers into the EU was seen as a threat to the Western culture (Gilbert 2005; Aarts and van der Kolk 2006; Best 2005).

Actually, both before and after the referendum, the Dutch on the whole supported the EU. However, there was a general weariness toward the shape the EU has taken and the Netherlands’ role in it. Europe was proceeding too fast, taking in too many countries and the Netherlands was benefiting disproportionately from it. A survey published during the referendum campaign claimed that, for about two decades, the Dutch were the highest per capita contributors to the EU budget. This survey got significant press coverage and was widely debated across the Netherlands in the period before the referendum. Together with the perception that the Euro made life more expensive, the Dutch felt that the EU was costing them too much but not benefiting them enough in return (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006; Best 2005). In June 2005, the Dutch voted down the CT since they believed the EU was unfair to them. The reasons for the Dutch rejection of the CT include concerns like equality between member states that will be central in the next chapter and indeed in the final one.

Conclusions

To conclude this chapter, I shall note that the debate held at the European Convention provides little evidence to the *world society as potentially destructive of international society* perspective or what I also labeled the “communitarian utopia” in the English School. As Chapter 1 explained in detail, this particular perspective is centered around the question of order and justice in international affairs, and asserts that the system of states is the best possible arrangement for the both of them to be entertained at the same time. Order, Vincent (1974, p.341) notes, is a “conservative principle” that “seeks to conserve sovereign states”. Bull’s notion of order, from Vincent’s perspective, is again a conservative one but not for the sake of conservatism. Vincent notes that Bull’s “iconoclastic, dismissive, tough-minded, ruthless” conception of order is conservative because Bull believed that “authority must reside somewhere if order is to obtain anywhere” (Vincent 1988, p.210). The challenge the European construction poses to Bull’s position is that it shows how a great degree of authority can reside in Brussels. The whole point of the European Convention that I analyzed in this study was to negotiate the fundamental principles of this Brussels-centered order. Bull’s “ruthless” conception of order faces difficulty accommodating this structure as it upsets the way he juxtaposes the two concepts of order and justice. As Bull (1995) sets his argument, he places the goal of justice toward humans (or world society) into a different kind of system – a world government which he suspects could easily become illiberal or despotic even.

Bull’s ideas on justice, especially during the time he was delivering the *Hague Lectures*, were “humane, large-minded, constructive and optimistic” according to Vincent (1988, p.210). Still, all this optimism in the latest stages of his work was targeting the

system of states, and Bull hoped in this period that states themselves would work harder toward maintaining justice throughout the world. What the European system demonstrates is that justice toward humans need not be associated with the presence of a world government. Bull's (1995) argument suggests that we can either have the system of states and focus primarily on justice between states; or have the alternative of a world government and focus on justice for humans. Justice toward humans and the system of states are held to be mutually exclusive in this line of thinking. Indeed, justice toward humans is construed as a potential threat to the system of states.

The discussion at the European Convention, however, proved otherwise. As I mentioned above, there has been strong support at the Convention for the protection of the rights of European citizens and the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitutional Treaty. Far from constituting a potential threat, the rights and freedoms of European citizens have been treated as an indispensable part of the new European order. Member states became active participants in the maintenance of these rights as they undertook to bound themselves with the Charter of Fundamental Rights when applying Union legislation. In other words, the sense of mutual exclusivity between the system of states and justice toward world society as put forward by Bull did not exist during the Convention. In this respect, this chapter significantly weakened the *world society as a potential threat to international society* perspective in the English School. It is thus time for the communitarian position to be more at peace with this concept of world society, and treat it in a less anxious manner.

Nevertheless, the communitarian perspective cannot be cast aside so easily as the departure question of its inquiry remains forcefully in place: is there a more legitimate alternative to the system of states? To put the question in terms more specific to this study;

is the European Union a more legitimate alternative to the system of states on the continent? As I explained in Chapter 2, the communitarian perspective pursues a normative line of inquiry into the concept of legitimacy and asks what justifies the system of states. The answer lies in the proposed inferiority of alternative systems to offer order and justice at the same time. Is the European Union system superior in this respect and thus more legitimate in normative terms than the system of states? In the empirical line of inquiry to legitimacy pursued by Watson, beliefs are the key to answering this question of legitimacy affirmatively. The EU is legitimate to the extent that its members believe it to be legitimate. Either answer is conditioned by one's definition of order and justice in the normative line of inquiry pursued by Bull and Vincent. Bull's definition of order is a pretty straightforward one. It is a "pattern that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values" (Bull 1995, pp.3-4). It is an objective concept for him whereas justice belongs to the realm of subjective concepts. This definition of order, however, is problematic for it "does not allow for differences over the basic goals of a society" (Edkins and Zehfuss 2005, p.470). Put differently, order too can be a subjective concept once we acknowledge that different societies may have different basic goals. In his contribution, Schouenborg (2011) notes that Bull's list of basic goals is based on the experience of modern Western societies whereas there have existed throughout history basic goals of other societies that deviate from those recognized by Bull. In our case, different members may have different basic goals from their membership within the European Union. Ultimately, their answers to the legitimacy of the Union would differ as well. This is why Symons proposes the concept of "legitimacy nexus" in his analysis of the legitimacy of international organizations. Accordingly, the legitimacy of

international organizations is a matter of degree, and not an absolute value, for all the parties concerned (Symons 2011).

Such variations or gradations are not allowed from a Bullian standpoint. Based on his notions of order and justice, Bull was certain that the system of states stood out from among the alternatives in terms of its legitimacy. To remind an earlier quote, Bull was vehement when he suggested that trends “making against the states system may be strengthened by being recognized and dramatized, but only so far; there are certain realities which will persist whatever attitude we take up towards them” (1995, p.266).

I believe that Bull makes a strong case here rather than simply being vehement. At the time of writing, the European Union is in such disarray financially with the Eurozone economies facing a debt crisis and several of its members requiring bailout packages to avoid bankruptcy. The financial crisis has taken its political as well. As European leaders seek ways to rescue the faltering economy, the British Prime Minister Cameron has already promised to hold a referendum on Union membership should he be re-elected since “disillusionment” with the EU was “at an all-time-high” from his point of view (BBC News 2013). In the face of such “disillusionment”, where Cameron seeks comfort in is the state. This was a point frequently underlined at the European Convention as well. Where the Union is perceived to fail, it is the state that is expected to come to the rescue. Instead of trying to perfect the alternatives, we rush back to the state. By resorting to a number of different surveys, Fligstein *et al.* (2012, p.111) find that most Europeans are inclined to look at things from a nationalist perspective first, and only some issues will create a European perspective. Fligstein *et al.* (2012, p. 116) also study the rise of far and extreme right parties across Europe in recent years that have adopted an ethno-nationalistic rhetoric. These parties have successfully pushed in a number of member states for stricter

immigration laws, and their rise “may signal the emergence of a new dimension of politics in Europe”. This kind of backlash toward the nation-state is just one aspect of the persistent reality that Bull tries to point to, and it is a very valid point that we have to address as we try to come up with alternative approaches to the construction of legitimate supranational systems.

What, then, do the findings of this chapter contribute to this study’s overall objective of delivering a new perspective on legitimate supranational systems? First, this chapter furnished the inquiry with a key finding regarding the concept of world society. Unlike the communitarian perspective within the English School presumes, world society does not necessarily constitute a threat to international society. Furthermore, world society need not be such a muted voice in international affairs. On the contrary, there can be systems like the European Union whereby an empowered world society participates in the political process together with the representatives of international society. A second point that has to be stressed is that this chapter demonstrates that the advancement of justice for world society need not happen at the expense of the system of states. To put it differently, a world government is not the only political form under which justice toward world society can be realized. As in the European Union, member states and supranational bodies such as the European Court of Justice can uphold justice for world society.

Finally, it emerges from this chapter that we cannot build a theory of legitimate supranational systems at the expense of the system of states either. This is not simply because the system of states is a persistent reality as Bull insists. It is also because supranational integration efforts in different parts of the world have not proceeded as far as they have in Europe for a variety of reasons. A comparative approach to integration suggests that different types of states or regional systems of states can yield rather different

outcomes in terms of the formation of legitimate supranational systems. In the next chapter, I turn to Watson's moralistic perspective on the creation of supranational systems and further the discussion of this comparative dimension that was alluded to in the previous chapter as well.

CHAPTER 6: TOWARD AN ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY OF LEGITIMATE SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEMS: CONSIDERING THE CASE FOR THE MORALISTIC APPROACH

The previous two chapters examined respectively the cases for the culturalist and the communitarian utopias in the English School regarding the formation of legitimate supranational systems. So far the conclusions we have obtained are that the culturalist utopia overstates the case for culture while the communitarian one understates the opportunities made available by such systems. It is the task of this chapter to consider the moralistic utopia associated with Watson and determine how much of a contribution it can make to our pursuit of a theory of legitimate supranationalism.

Watson's moralistic utopia assumes that a hegemonic international society is a prerequisite for world society. An increasingly more hegemonic international society more effectively delivers our moral objectives focusing on world society, and accrues its legitimacy through this superior moralistic quality. It facilitates not just the advancement of human rights or justice but also the maintenance of peace. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the moralistic utopia emerges out of Watson's broader views on hegemony, independence and hierarchy in international affairs. A significant influence on Watson's thinking on this subject is his personal experience. In particular, his interest in the question of dependency developed during the years he spent in the British diplomatic service. Referring to his assignments in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, Watson (2007b, p.5) writes that he observed first-hand how some states would not be able to survive without external assistance. This is when Watson started questioning the official Westphalian version of an international relations conducted by fully independent states. Watson subsequently dedicated his

energies to delivering the non-Westphalian version with a persistent emphasis on dependency and hegemony, and the moral dimension of it all.

Of course the question of dependency has been taken up most extensively by theories inspired by Marx. Watson stands out in the literature in that he was among the first scholars to deal with this subject from a non-Marxist point of view. However, his case has not generated great enthusiasm in the scholarly community. Although his *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States* (1982) received several reviews in major scholarly journals, *The Evolution of International Society* (1992) has not generated much interest beyond ES circles. References to his work can be found in a limited number of other works such as Hobbson and Sharman (2005) and Wendt and Friedheim (1995). With some recent contributions from scholars like Osiander (2001), Stirk (2012) and Lake (2009), the themes Watson took up early on in his research are regaining attention. Osiander, just like Watson, argues that the conventional account of international affairs is a diluted one as a result of our “fixation on the concept of sovereignty” (2001, p.251) originating back in the 19th - century. He further argues that nation-state oriented historiography causes this fixation; and seeks to demonstrate in his detailed examination of the Treaty of Westphalia that the notion of “sovereignty” we derive from this text does not in fact exist in it.

Along the lines of Osiander, Stirk notes that the notion of “sovereign equality” conventionally derived from the Treaty of Westphalia is a mistaken one. Stirk’s analysis demonstrates that the members of the European system considered themselves to be in a hierarchical relationship well until the late nineteenth century. The rise of the notion of sovereignty came much later, coinciding with the emergence of nationalism (Stirk 2012). Focusing on more contemporary events, Lake (2009) states that hierarchy, rather than anarchy, is what characterizes the international system. Under a condition of hierarchy,

some states give up control over their economic and security policies to other states. In empirical terms, Lake proposes to look at the military presence of a foreign country on the territory of a “sovereign” state, the number of alliances it has, its ability to exercise control over its exchange rate regime and trade dependence to determine the extent of hierarchical relationships. Lake’s (2009) contribution is important in that he establishes specific criteria to the analysis of hierarchy – something Watson does not necessarily offer.

The works of Krasner in particular significantly overlap with those of Watson. Krasner (2001) characterizes the Westphalian sovereign state model as “organized hypocrisy” which occurs when “norms are decoupled from actions. Actors say one thing and do another” (p.19). Accordingly, states declare that they respect each other’s sovereignty but violate it in practice through four means: conventions, contracting, coercion and imposition (p.18). For Krasner (2004), violating their sovereignty and establishing new institutions such as trusteeships or shared sovereignty can be the only way to deal with failed states in the future. Watson would concur with Krasner on this and some of the other points that he makes. Where he would differ is the reason why “organized hypocrisy” occurs. According to Krasner (2001), organized hypocrisy is inevitable in the international environment since it contains rules that are mutually inconsistent such as universal human rights and the rule of non-intervention (p.19). A further reason is that there exists no authority to adjudicate which particular rule should take precedence. Finally, Krasner suggests, states in the international environment are motivated by the consequences of their actions rather than becoming norm-followers (p.42). Watson’s set of reasons are quite different than Krasner’s and they are reflected in his *raison de système* (1982) concept that I will discuss in the final chapter. In his attempt to develop an English School theory of hegemony, Clark (2009, p.208) suggests that

although Watson is that member of the School who has dealt most extensively with the subject; there is nothing so English School about what he says and that Watson's notion of hegemony can be placed next to most Realist accounts. From the perspective of this study, Watson's discussion of hegemony may indeed bear a narrow definitional similarity to Realist accounts but the broader framework within which he grounds this concept is rather different. It is this broader framework wherein the significance of Watson's work lies. Buzan and Little stress this in their introduction to the re-issue of *The Evolution* by noting that

Watson's framework does not just offer a major alternative to realism, but also challenges the general linkage between anarchy and international society in much of the English School writing. In effect, Watson extends the idea of international society away from the assumption of anarchy and into the spectrum of his pendulum theory. By moving international society into the hegemony part of the spectrum, and possibly beyond, Watson exposes the tension in post-1945 international society arising from the fact that the principle of legitimacy lies with sovereignty and nationalism, but much of the practice is hegemonic (Buzan and Little 2009, p.xxvi).

Indeed, his research interests started to diverge at one point from the work of the other members of the School. In a 1972-letter to the British Committee's architect Butterfield, Watson, a onetime chairman, wrote that he kept considering "the non-vital interests of states and dynasties and communities, that militate against *raison d'etat*..." and that he would pursue his own independent inquiry into those interests (Watson 2007b, p.4). Perhaps it is best to label Watson as the "dissident chairman", following Dunne's (1998, p.13) labeling of non-member Carr as a "dissident voice" in the ES "which can always be heard but is never in complete harmony with the conversation conducted by the leading

players”.⁵ Let us now turn to the question of how far the debate held at the European Convention confirms the dissident chairman’s views.

I. Is It All About Hegemony?

For Watson, the faith of Europe has historically depended on France and Germany. The contemporary European Community for him can be considered as a continuation of this historical trend – it is a joint Franco-German hegemony for Watson until further supranational institutions are developed (1997, p.41). Watson argues that the end of World War II provided the impetus for its formation in that European states realized how catastrophic a system of independent states can be. In addition, and from the negative sense, the War also demonstrated that there were advantages to a Hitler-style economic integration of the continent from Watson’s point of view (1997, pp.32-4). Thus built, the European Community exhibits “an unmistakable family resemblance” to Watson (1997, p. 23) to the Holy Roman Empire that serves “to order and balance fragmented institutions and multiple loyalties” (1997, p.35).

For Hirsch (2005), the timing of the Constitutional Treaty in particular provides evidence for hegemonic management of the European system by France and Germany. Upon reviewing evolutionist, functionalist and hegemonic approaches to the European constitution-building process, Hirsch finds that the most plausible explanation for understanding why and especially at that specific point in time the Union sought to draft a constitution is “hegemony preservation” by the two countries. Evolutionist approaches presume a pre-existing people and a constitution serves to mobilize them into a new political community. This, Hirsch believes, is not the case with the EU since there is no

⁵ For the mountain of controversy generated by Dunne’s labeling of E. H. Carr as a dissident ES member, see especially articles in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2000, vol.35, no.2

such people (pp.269-73). Functionalist theories meanwhile assume that a constitution is called when a given political system is either deadlocked or needs reform. Although this might be a convincing argument, Hirsch suggests that all the necessary arrangements for reform could have been undertaken by instruments other than a constitution or indeed a conventional debate (pp.274-5). This leaves Hirsch to conclude that the drive toward a European constitution can best be explained as an attempt to preserve Franco-German hegemony in the face of enlargement. It is initiated by “threatened political power holders who seek to entrench their worldviews and policy preferences against the growing influence of alternative worldviews, policy preferences and interests” (p.282). To support this thesis, Hirsch points to the proposed voting arrangements in the CT that disproportionately benefit the larger members of the Union. In short, Hirsch argues, the drafting of the CT needs to be construed as a “preventive measure that allows powerful stakeholders within the EU to enjoy the geopolitical and macroeconomic benefits of enlargement” without having to face the uncertainties and potential pitfalls of the process (p.292).

The broader literature emphasizes that such leadership by one or more countries is indeed a prerequisite for regional integration. We can call this the need for a “benign hegemon”. Where such hegemonic leadership is missing, the cases of regional integration are few as well. Allison (2004) takes a look at Central Asia where Russia cannot assume the role of a benign hegemon. Instead, it intimidates the other states in the region so that they seek to counter-balance Russian influence through the United States. Whereas German leadership in Europe has been “largely gentle rather than imposing” (Mattli 2011, p.18).

The relationship between the potential hegemons themselves also matters. Webber (2001) examines the case of East Asia where Sino-Japanese relations are still beset by a number of problems, and their post-World War II dealings have not been transformed in the way the Franco-German one has. As against this perspective comes the argument from Diez *et al.* that while a Franco-German partnership has indeed been important to the process of integrating Europe, and that there is recognition discursively of the role of certain member states as great powers; something is still different than the classical image we have of dominance by more powerful states. This is in the sense that these more powerful states do not seek to establish spheres of influence in the European Union or seek to maintain a balance of power. Instead, they pool their sovereign rights, avert conflict with each other and resort to the Commission or the European Court of Justice when disputes arise among them. Furthermore, they take part in member state coalitions with some of the smaller member states over specific policy issues. In these respects, the European Union may not have instituted a system of equality for all member states but has traveled far along that road (Diez *et al.* 2011, pp.132-3).

If Hirsch (2005) speaks of a “thick” version and Diez *et al.* (2011) speak of a “thin” version of it – what remains is that hegemony, or the ability of someone to “lay down the law” (Watson 1992, p.15), exists. It need not be, indeed it cannot be, “dictatorial fiat” but a process of dialogue between the holders and recipients of hegemonic influence (Watson 1992, p.15). Globally, development aid has become the primary mechanism through which the developed West exercises a collective hegemony over the developing world according to Watson in what he characterizes as a “post-Westphalian aid / donor order” (Watson 2007). In the EU, the main issue has been the institutions and representation / voting rights in them. Traditionally, Magnette and Nicolaïdis note (2004b), the smaller member states of

the Union have favored the European Commission against the European Council. For the Commission is considered to be their voice. Indeed, throughout the Convention, they favored the strengthening of the role of the Commission and the maintenance of the “one-commissioner-per-member-state” principle as against proposals for disproportionate representation of member states at the Commission. For instance Puwak, representing the Romanian parliament, put the Commission as an “independent institution which ensures equality between the current and the new Member States, the rich and the poor, the northern or the southern ones” (Puwak 2002, p.4). Furthermore, they insisted on preserving the rotating presidency system of the Union over proposals put forward by the larger member states for a permanent presidency. In the end, a permanent presidency for the European Council was indeed created as proposed by France and Germany. A Belgian speaker at the Convention protested against this suggesting that the new post amounted to a “minor intergovernmental coup d’etat by certain member states” (Gucht 2003, p.3). The creation of new institutions, such as a Congress for the Peoples for Europe the majority of whose members would come from national parliaments as proposed by France, was something they strongly opposed on the grounds that any new institutions would disturb the delicate institutional balance of the Union. In connection with this point, the Benelux countries issued the “Memorandum of the Benelux: a balanced institutional framework for an enlarged, more effective and more transparent Union” (2002) in which they registered their opposition to the possible creation of new institutions which would curtail the role of the Commission. Enhanced cooperation, a mechanism in which the willing member states can pursue further schemes in specific policy areas, was an additional proposal that they disliked. This, they thought, would create multiple Europes in which the less-able members would be left behind. A Maltese representative suggested that if enhanced cooperation

were to be accepted, the principle of solidarity had to be adopted as well as a “constitutional counterbalance” to protect those member states that cannot participate in the particular cooperative scheme (Frendo 2003, p.2). In the words of Nahtigal, representing the Slovenian government, the entire legitimacy of the Union is related to its ability to institute the equality of member states (Nahtigal 2002). From the perspective of Lopes, of the Portuguese government, equality among member states is so fundamental a principle that its absence can constitute a threat to the future of the Union (Lopes 2003).

“Equality” has thus been a constant theme at the European Convention. In theory, of course, all member states of the European Union are already equals. In practice, however, the debate implicitly assumes that they are not. This is the gap that Watson keeps referring to between the theory and practice of international affairs. In logical terms, two options would exist to address this. One would be to formalize inequality and arrange the rules and institutions of international society accordingly. The other option which applies in this case in particular would be for those states that fear unequal treatment in the EU to refrain from or drop out of membership. In a way, the first option is somewhat already reflected in the institutional arrangements proposed by the CT. The document provides for the overrepresentation of smaller member states in the European Parliament and their votes are disproportionately weighted in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers (Follesdal and Dobson 2004, p.181).

The broader point that is to be made here is that the debate confirms a number of themes that Watson put forward. Of particular significance is what he (1992, p.14) calls an “inevitable tension between the desire for order and the desire for independence” where order represents peace and prosperity. According to Mattli, 18 out of 21 membership applications to the EU were made out of a “desire for order” in Watsonian terms. In each

case, the applicants were motivated by the “assumption or belief that the benefit of integration, namely increased national prosperity, is worth the cost in terms of diminished national policymaking autonomy and power” (Mattli 2000, p.150). In further support to Watson’s ideas, the participants at the European Convention were reluctant to organize Europe too close to the empire end point of our Watsonian pendulum. The word “federalism” could be said to connote this sense of the empire end point of the pendulum and it was included in an early proposal from the Presidency. It read that the members would “administer certain competences on a federal basis” (Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty 2002, Article 1). “Federal basis” was later on deleted amid a significant number of amendment proposals and replaced in the final version of the document with the “community way” (Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 2003, Article 1). President D’Estaing explains why the word federal was deleted in the following way:

The idea of creating a single European federal state which would ultimately swallow the identity of Member States, which some people supported at the beginning of our work, was gradually abandoned as inappropriate to the structure of the new Europe. Similarly, the watering down of Europe in a Confederation comprising only unshared, individual interests, by depriving it of the means of action it needs, was rejected almost unanimously. In the final analysis, we have recognized the dual nature of the European system (D’Estaing 2003, p.10).

If a federal Europe was undesirable, one that could help member states deal with the pressures generated by globalization in particular was very much desirable. In Chapter 4, I called this *integration as a practical necessity* in the face of global or transnational challenges. The debate held at the European Convention shows that this is where supranational authority is most legitimate for the participants. “The overriding purpose of European integration”, Tiilikainen (2002, p.2) from the Finnish government notes, “is to

increase the Member States' ability to respond to the challenges presented by the changing structures of world economy and politics". The aftermath of the 9 / 11 events are in particular difficult for any single member state to cope on its own according to the Lithuanian speaker Martikonis (2002). Speaking for the Dutch government, van Mierlo (2002) suggests that the EU needs to provide a "common answer to challenges that the member states cannot address individually" such as globalization and cross-border crime. Not just the representatives of states but what we can consider for our purposes world society actors also advance globalization as a legitimate reason for enhancing Europe's capabilities. From the perspective of de Rossa (2002) from the European parliament, the EU "needs to have the competence to protect the peoples of Europe from the transnational corporations". European Social Partner representing the European Confederation of Industrialists, Jacobs (2002), maintains that the most important task for the EU is to create a business-friendly environment in which companies and businesses can compete in a global economy. Gabaglio (2002a, p.3), representing the European Trade Union Confederation, says that they support further integration to the extent that "Europe makes a difference" for the workers in an age of globalization. According to Katiforis (2002b), the citizens of Europe want a stronger Union as well since they observe that "there is not the slightest hope of resistance against the giants" in the world.

Watson's arguments make more sense as we go through the debate. Indeed, what we have at the European Convention are actors that want to be stronger in the face of globalization but are incapable of doing so on their own, on the one hand, and want to preserve their sovereign rights so far as possible on the other. At the end of the day, what they can agree is indeed the *optimum mix* of all this as Watson (1992) suggests is historically the case. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, the outcome of the Convention

has been construed as a “carefully contrived compromise between the positions of the supranational ‘federalists’ and the ‘intergovernmentalists’ while at the same time acting as a bridge between the large and the smaller member states” (Evert and Keohane 2003, p.19). In the words of two Maltese parliament representatives,

The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe presented by the Praesidium to the Convention, does push somewhat towards a federalist direction. At the same time, it allows for enough subsidiarity and leaves a big enough role for the National Parliaments of the member states, so that the Europe defined in the future by this Constitutional Treaty could appropriately be considered as a Federation of Sovereign Nation States” (Vella and Sant 2003, p.2).

The outcome of the Convention can thus be said to fit this historical trend of striking the optimum mix of a different number of considerations as identified by Watson (1992). Of course, the optimum mix is that of legitimacy and material advantage. The Union can enable its members in material terms to compete better in a globalizing world. Still, this is not sufficient in itself to make it legitimate. Watson assumes that a common culture would make the acceptance of supranationalism easier. However, as we have seen in Chapter 4, this is not necessarily the case. The debate at the European Convention suggests that it is “equality” once again, rather than culture, that would make the acceptance of supranational authority easier. At his opening speech delivered at the Convention, Prodi (2002) described Europe as a “union of minorities” in which no state can impose on others. As against this, Bonde (2002, p.19) argued that soon, with the decision-making mechanisms introduced by the CT, the smaller member states would “find themselves photocopying the decisions made by the avant-garde countries”.

A lot of bargaining went on at the Convention over the institutional arrangements and voting arrangements to prevent just this sense of imposition by the strong. In April 2002, small and medium-sized member states formed the “Friends of the Community

Method” (Magnetite and Nicolaidis 2004b) in which the Commission takes the leading role in decision-making. Here, what we see is that the smaller member states favor the introduction of more supranational authority, especially the strengthening of the Commission, with a view to leveling the field with the large and more influential member states. This is an interesting addendum that we can contribute from our analysis of the European Convention to Watson’s arguments. It may not be culture, or the desire for more peace and prosperity, that legitimates supranational institutions. It is instead the desire to be on par with the more powerful. In some cases, it is the only way to act as an “independent” state. The Irish representative puts this in starkest terms. Bruton (2002a, p.6) notes that “[c]ulturally and psychologically, full commitment to European Union membership has been liberating for Ireland” in that only afterwards could they overcome their *de facto* dependence on the UK even if they gained their independence in 1921. Still, Ireland could only break with the sterling in 1979 when it joined the European Monetary System which Bruton says is a “practical example of how full European Union membership gave us the opportunity to enhance the political independence we had gained in 1921”. Likewise, Carter and Scott (1998, p.443) point out that one of the slogans of the nationalist party in Scotland is “independence in Europe”.

Watson (2007, p.87) would allude to a famous Irish fairy tale and respond to Bruton that “real and total independence” is a “crock of fairy gold at the end of the Westphalian rainbow”. Of course, this is a different facet of the issue. The point I am trying to make is that membership in an organization like the European Union can be legitimate for some because they seek to become “equals” with the more powerful in a hopefully fair system of rules and institutions. It is another means to striving for equality. For Watson (1997, p.119), irrespective of what some may hope to achieve, the European system is a suzerain

one in which “the smaller and weaker political entities formally or tacitly recognize the overlordship of an imperial power or concert” that exercises a combination of coercion and consent. Some recent developments especially can provide examples of this kind of overlordship in the EU for instance regarding the finances of Greece. Both Krasner (2004) and Donnelly (2006b) list control over the finances of a “sovereign” state as one of the mechanisms of the hierarchical management of the international system. Krasner (2004) cites as an example the nineteenth century control system over the budget of the Ottoman Empire by a concert of European states. Today, Greece may be facing a similar situation. Its finance minister has just rejected angrily a German proposal for the imposition of an EU budget overseer in Athens saying that the proposal forces them to choose between “financial assistance” and “national dignity” (Spiegel and Hope 2012). Greece has subsequently agreed to a tough bailout plan by the IMF, European Central Bank and the European Commission that sets up a permanent EU economic monitoring mission for Athens and requires it to make amendments to its constitution to prioritize debt repayment over the funding of public services (BBC News 2012).

Why should assistance become a matter of “national dignity” as the Greek finance minister puts it? After all, it is much needed cash to save the Greek economy from default or even bankruptcy. From another direction, we need to ask how independent a country is Greece now given that it even has to amend its constitution? The answers to these issues are where Watson invites us to question our assumptions about independence. Indeed, we seem to value it for its own sake even when we may be on the brink of bankruptcy and refuse instantly needed help on emotional grounds. Instead, Watson pushes us to consider the benefits of the hegemonic management of the international system. We might ask for instance what options Greece has if there is absolutely no assistance from the outside to

sort its finances? In this respect, Watson suggests, we need not resent hegemony. If there is a risk in it, he argues, it is not that hegemonic powers “will do too much, but rather that they will do too little” (1997, p.128).

One objection that can be raised to these arguments is that not all hegemonic powers may be liberal ones. Watson equates hegemonic power with moral leadership and championship of liberal values around the world although this need not always be the case. There might be illiberal hegemonic powers not necessarily acting in the fashion Watson expects. Another point for consideration is the absence of hegemony under conditions that Watson holds favorable such as material advantage and cultural similarities. I have in mind again the Middle East in particular. As Hinnebusch (2011) notes, the Middle Eastern states not only share cultural similarities but also two legitimating ideologies, pan-Arabism and Islamism, for a Europe-style integration project. However, all efforts toward this end have so far failed there. The only exception is a brief Egyptian hegemony but this depended according to Hinnebusch on a “temporary coincidence during the decade 1956-1967 of bipolarity at the global level (disunity in the core) combined with regional Egyptian hegemony overcoming anarchy at the regional level” (p.230).

In order to explain the absence of legitimate hegemonies in that region, Hinnebusch (2011) considers the place of the Middle East in the broader world economic structure, the social forces that operate in regional affairs and the different paths toward state formation in individual Middle Eastern countries. In terms of its place in the broader world economy, the Middle East occupies a peripheral role while many of the states in the region are already “low legitimacy states” due to a combination of historical factors (p.224). The ideologies of pan-Arabism or Islamism affect the different states of the region differently as well. While the Syrian culture for instance strongly incorporates the former ideology,

Jordan, a state created by Britain with a view to constructing a buffer between Palestine and the wider Arab world, does not embrace this ideology (p.226). Overall, Hinnebusch finds that, the Middle East is a “fragmented, economically peripheralized system of weak states suffering from identity deficits” (p.240). Combined with the absence of a state or group of states that can sustain a material basis for a regional hegemony or an enterprenural economic class interested in developing a regional free market, Hinnebusch (2011) concludes that the prospects for regional integration are weak in the Middle East.

Ayoob (1999) lists additional conditions for the success of such regional integration projects. To instigate this, there needs to be “pivotal powers” (p.249) and the acknowledgement as legitimate by the other members of the region of this hierarchical situation. A certain degree of aspiration by all the members to build and sustain a successful regional community is also required. For these to be possible, however, Ayoob notes that two background conditions need to be satisfied. One is that there needs to be agreement as to the scope of the region – all participants must refer to the same geographical space. The other is the prior elimination of negative security factors in the region or perceptions of enmity among the members (p.249). Indeed, not only these but “external intervention and undue extraregional influence” also need to be eliminated. Based on these criteria, Ayoob argues that regional societies are not very likely to emerge outside of Western Europe and North America, and possibly in South America and Asia with India acting as the regional hegemon (p.259).

It is these broader structural issues raised by Ayoob (1999) and Hinnebusch (2011) that are missing in Watson’s discussion of legitimate hegemonic systems. He expects for the most part for a common culture to legitimize hegemony although the Middle East in particular demonstrates the weakness of this argument. In fact, other non-cases of

supranationalism in culturally similar parts of the world challenge Watson too. For Webber (2001, p.342), the EU stands out as the only instance “whose member states have adopted and implemented common or coordinated policies in a number of significant issue-areas and sustained them over a fairly long period of time”. In Bernstein’s (2004, p.15) analysis, accepting restrictions to sovereignty “may only be an option for the most secure states or where historical circumstances have made such shifts possible or desirable – and Europe may be alone in this regard”. Within Europe, Haas (1967) argues, the rise or decline of national consciousness as well as socioeconomic similarities among the six founding members of the European Community are the key to understanding supranational integration. It was not culture but the “converging economic goals, embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic and industrial life of modern Europe provided the crucial impetus” to integration according to Haas (1967, p.322). Haas then compares the case of Europe with Latin America where national consciousness ran high and ideological disputes still continued. Furthermore, Latin America occupied a dependent position in the global economic system. Haas (1967) subsequently concludes that structural differences in socioeconomic systems, the presence of ideological or nationalistic passions and a situation of dependency do hinder the prospects for a Europe-style project there.

The originality of Watson’s work should still be underlined despite some of its weaknesses. He exposes a perennial tension in the conduct of international affairs whereby a norm of “equality” constantly clashes with a practice of “hegemony”. The debate at the European Convention exposes this tension as well so much so that the smaller members tie the entire legitimacy of the European project to equality. The doctrine of equality, Wight states, is “morally superior” to one that places some states above the rest. For that reason hegemony has never been acknowledged in theory (Wight 1978, p.45). While the fact of it

is rendered “tolerable by the desirability of order” (Watson 1992, p.14). That is why some at the European Convention agreed to institutions and voting arrangements that disproportionately benefited the larger member states. A stronger and more effective Union that would cope better in a globalizing world made such arrangements more bearable. What we still need to consider is our key concept of world society in all of this. From Watson’s perspective, it is under more hegemonic systems that our moral objectives focusing on world society can best be achieved. A hegemonic international society is the *prerequisite* for world society from this standpoint. Let us try to determine below how far the debate at the European Convention supports this assertion.

II. Is a Hegemonic International Society a Prerequisite for World Society?

In the previous chapters we have seen that world society was construed in the English School either as a prerequisite for international society or as potentially destructive of it. The third perspective associated with Watson considers a hegemonic international society, understood in moralistic terms, as a prerequisite for world society. That is because further toward the empire point of the pendulum, a “diplomacy of justice” (Watson 2007b, p.85) can be conducted and moral issues can be dealt with more effectively. This perspective emerges out of Watson’s overall moralistic notion of hegemony. A moralistic discourse did indeed present itself at the European Convention regarding both the Union’s relations with the outside world and the (desired) nature of the Union itself. It was reflected for instance in calls for a stronger mandate to be given to the Union in the field of humanitarian aid and development cooperation with third countries. It was also registered in the documents contributed to the Convention by the Working Group on External Relations. The Working Group noted that the EU “has a responsibility. And the rest of the world deserves someone

like us to play a role” in providing development and humanitarian aid around the world (Nielsen 2002, p.3). In another contribution Yilmaz (2002), representing Turkey, further stressed the Union’s responsibilities in these fields and added that it could “offer hope and inspiration to millions of people beyond the European continent” with its distinctive tradition of social equality. Europe’s “responsibility”, according to the Hungarian speaker Gottfried, is not only in the provision of development and humanitarian assistance. It extends to the management of globalization. More specifically, Gottfried (2002) believes that Europe has a “special mission” to “humanize the processes of globalization” and give them a “moral dimension, ethical substance”.

Europe itself needs to be a space where such moralistic goals take precedence from the perspective of the participants at the European Convention. In the words of three Spanish speakers, it must become “an instrument of solidarity that transcends frontiers and bridges the gaps between different generations and countries, so making the cohesion of society and the eradication of poverty top priorities” (Garrido *et al.* 2002, p.6). Combating poverty, promoting social equality, sustainable development and human rights have been consistently emphasized at the Convention as the objectives that a deepening Union needs to realize. They made their way into Article 2 of the final draft of the CT which lists respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights as the values that the Union is founded upon. These values, Article 2 continues to read, are common to the Member States of the Union “in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination”. So there is indeed a sense in which a more hegemonic international society regulates more intensely our moralistic concerns toward world society. We may consider the question of asylum and refugees in this respect. The status of asylum-seekers and refugees is at the cutting-edge of the concept of world society. It was

agreed at the European Convention that the Union needed a common asylum policy and this has been one of the policy areas whose decision-making mechanism shifted from unanimity to majority voting. In other words, it became less intergovernmental and more supranational.

Not all of the reasoning behind this decision was moralistic – a common regulation system was deemed necessary in order to handle some of the practical outcomes of accepting refugees into a space with no internal borders. In addition, especially the smaller member states demanded Union action in this field as they thought it was beyond their capacity to manage a possibly large number of asylum-seekers and refugees on their own. However, a moralistic reasoning was present too. Meyer (2002a, p.2), representing the German parliament, noted that a gradual shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting was required in the field of asylum policy with a view to upholding “Europe’s humanitarian responsibility to afford persecuted people protection and refuge”. Similarly, Gabaglio (2002a, p.11) argued that shifting asylum into a Union competence was necessary in order to prevent racism across Europe. Several other members at the Convention proposed that fighting racism and xenophobia be listed separately as a competence of the Union.

We have seen earlier that more supranational authority was favored where individual nation-states failed to manage particular challenges such as cross-border crime or terrorism on their own. Here, we see that it is also favored where the nation-states cannot deliver certain moralistic objectives like the eradication of racism. A more supranational system is seen as a “corrective” so to speak against the moral faultlines of the system of states. In this respect, it is possible to support Watson’s assertion that a more hegemonic international society can better deliver the moral outcomes we desire toward

world society. The development of the European community offers us a chance to observe what Watson (2007, p.85) calls the ascendancy of a “diplomacy of justice” as a group of states advance from the independence to the empire of the pendulum. A justice-centered diplomacy focuses on moral issues such as human rights and a more expansive set of rights comes under consideration as the process intensifies. In more recent literature, the concept of “reflexive denationalization” (Zürn 2004) can correspond to Watson’s “diplomacy of justice” – which Watson himself does not elaborate in any detail. “Reflexive denationalization” is a result of two prior and related processes: societal denationalization and political denationalization. Societal denationalization denotes a process whereby “the boundaries of social transactions increasingly transcend national borders” (Zürn 2004, pp.265-6). As a result, more and more international institutions are created to manage transnational problems which denotes a process of “political denationalization” that occurs at the expense of the nation-state. Both of these processes result finally in “reflexive denationalization” whereby “borders lose their normative dignity, and increasingly universalistic political concepts are developed” (Zürn 2004, p.266).

A similar trend can be observed in Europe. The founding treaties of the European community did not incorporate human rights principles in a significant way. For instance, the Treaty of Rome (1957) was more focused on economic integration. Subsequent treaties, however, have placed a stronger emphasis on moral principles (Thomas 2006). In many respects, the Charter of Fundamental Rights exemplifies this. Although it only applies when a Union law is being implemented, the Charter adds to the set of social rights in the EU (Hendrickx 2006). It shifts the bearer of a significant number of rights from EU citizens to non-citizens resident in the EU, including refugees and asylum seekers (Guild 2005). Moreover, the limited legal effect it has in theory can be overcome in practice with

the case law of the European Court of Justice. So far, the Court has tended to interpret Union law in a supranationalist manner and the Charter will have a deeper impact on the policies of member states than originally anticipated if the Court continues to do so (Barry 2004; Hendrickx 2006). The Treaty of Lisbon is also significant in this respect as it enlarges the grounds for referring cases to the European Court of Justice (Duff 2008). As the EU member states continue to conduct a “diplomacy of justice”, additional rights and protection mechanisms can be placed on the agenda in the future.

World society actors themselves seem to concur with this “diplomacy of justice” with respect to the enforcement of social rights especially. Gabaglio again can be quoted in connection with this point. After criticizing the EU for excessive regulation in certain policy fields, Gabaglio (2002b) notes that he can “condone no aspersions of excess when it comes to Social Europe”. For him, the Union needs to be given enough competences in order to construct “an area of greater freedom, security, and rights for all, including immigrants”. It was especially for the creation and enforcement of rights that the participants at the European Convention favored more supranational authority. That was why there was strong support for the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and for the EU as an institution to recognize the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Some of the 138 organizations that took part in the civil society contact group of the Convention not only supported both these human rights protection instruments but also asked that the Charter be strengthened in a number of directions (The Convention Secretariat 2002). It was furthermore suggested that the Union become involved in protecting minority rights. Szajer (2003b), representing the Hungarian parliament, proposed that an advisory body called the Committee of National and Ethnic Minorities be established to protect minorities across the Union. From the perspective of

the Romanian speaker Severin (2002b), what citizens expect is prosperity, security and freedom, and “[i]f a United Europe can provide more freedom to citizens than nation states, therein lies the reason why we need Europe”. For Aznar (2002, p.3), Europe needs to integrate even further “as a means at the service of the most positive values of European culture: fundamental rights for everyone – without discrimination, pluralistic democracies, shared prosperity and economic competition”.

Severin’s as well as Aznar’s remarks echo Watson in that they do emphasize the moral benefits of a more hegemonic system in terms of providing freedom for individuals. It enables or empowers them in material terms as well. Let us consider the case of NGOs as representatives of our concept of world society. Mahoney (2005) establishes a direct link between the increasing power of the European Commission and the increase in NGO activity within the EU. Following each defining moment in the course of European integration such as the Single European Act (1987) or the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), Mahoney finds that the number of NGOs increased in Europe (pp.457-8). The European Commission involves these groups through direct funding and the Consultative Committee system whereby their opinions are heard when a legislative proposal is being drafted (pp.446-8). To be involved in the consultative process, organizations need to be registered in the Commission’s CONECCS database which requires a number of criteria to be satisfied such as the need to be present in at least three member states (Curtin 2003, pp.59-60). The Union’s involvement with NGOs extends to the candidate countries as well. For instance, Hicks explores how the Union shaped the environmental movement in Central and Eastern European states from 1999 onwards through agenda-setting, funding and creating new institutions. It created a lobbying infrastructure for environmental organizations in these countries to monitor the transposition of the EU’s environmental

acquis. NGOs in Poland and the Czech Republic were technically assisted by a Dutch organization named *Milieukontakt Oost-Europa* and financed by the EU to push for stronger environmental activism in their respective countries (Hicks 2004, pp.223-6).

What these studies demonstrate lends strong support to Watson's thesis that it is a hegemonic international society that enables world society. Through financial and technical support, the EU helps otherwise incapable organizations to pursue particular agendas such as environmental protection. Watson's perspective on NGOs was that they form an essential part of the hegemonic management of international society. He thought that they lend themselves to the exercise of hegemony by acting as proxies of intervention on behalf of the powerful core (Watson 2007, pp.82-90). This is a pattern that can characterize the situation of civil society in the EU as well. Especially in the case of candidate countries, Hicks (2004) notes, the result of EU-promoted NGO-activism has been to sideline issues that are not on Brussels' agenda. An additional result Hicks mentions has been to turn local organizations in Central and Eastern Europe dependent on the EU in terms of funds and the like. Within the EU itself, the role of the Commission in providing funding to particular organizations and not to others; and in picking up itself which organizations can join the Consultative Committee system raises similar outcomes. All of this fits particularly well with Watson's discussions about the role of a hegemonic international society in empowering world society and how that world society itself becomes a tool to perpetuate this situation.

One particular development that does not resonate well with Watson's ideas is how increasingly discriminatory the EU has become toward the outside world. A compelling case can be made in connection with this point by resorting to Walters' (2002) study. Although this study has a different focus than to show the rather discriminatory practices

the EU employs toward the non-EU world; it offers good examples to support that argument through the governance of the Schengen area. Walters quotes a decision of the Schengen Executive Committee on how to speed up security checks at the EU's airports. The decision reads that "international flight passengers will undergo checks on entry and departure, the thoroughness of which will vary depending on their nationality" (quoted in Walters 2002, p.106). Another decision regarding the Schengen area taken by the Council of the European Union recommends that one solution to speeding up security checks

would be to provide checkpoints specifically for persons covered by Community law, so that these travelers, who are generally subject only to minimum checks, are not delayed on account of having to go to the same counter as third-country nationals who must undergo thorough and lengthy checks (quoted in Walters 2002, pp.106-7).

What these decisions implicitly assume is that some travelers are more likely to be engaged in criminal activity depending on their "nationality", and they must undergo stricter security procedures than EU nationals as a result. It is possible in fact to argue the opposite since visa-free travel and less strict security checks would make it easier for EU nationals to conduct criminal activity within the borders of the EU. This is but one forceful illustration of how discriminatory the EU has become toward the non-EU; and this kind of discrimination sits uneasy with the notion of world society. For Rudolph, there is a universal trend in this direction as states and societies attempt to cope with globalization. As they give up more of their sovereign powers to the economic pressures generated by globalization, they seek to reinforce them by establishing tougher measures in the field of migration. Borders have a symbolic function for people and a desire to guard them is becoming increasingly visible in a global age (Rudolph 2005). Of course what Rudolph discusses is that very fundamental question of international vs. world society raised by the

English School, and we are approaching the final stages of our study that considered a particular aspect of this question.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I considered the case for the moralistic utopia in the ES associated with Watson which assumed that a hegemonic international society was a prerequisite for world society. I concluded from my reading of the debate at the European Convention that there is indeed evidence of this. The speakers at the Convention did favor the introduction of more supranational authority in the EU with a view to creating and enforcing more rights for European citizens. A moralistic case for supranationalism was made by the Convention participants and it was also reflected in the outcome of the Convention that introduced an even stronger human rights framework in the EU. The debate also verified Watson's ideas that there exists a constant gap between the theory and practice of international politics, and that inequality characterizes the relations between states. This was evident especially during discussions of the institutional arrangements for the future Europe. The outcome reflected largely Franco-German proposals to the resentment of the smaller member states. One of the most dominant themes at the Convention was the issue of "equality" between member states and we have seen that the smaller member states favored more supranational authority for this purpose. They favored a stronger Commission which they hoped would act to level the playing field for all the member states. Can we thus consider supranationalism as a means to achieving equality? I will be turning to this issue in the final chapter. While the debate at the European Convention provided support to several points Watson made; some reservations still needed to be made. These reservations appeared when we looked at some of the other parts of the world like the Middle East and

why no similar supranational efforts did not take place in those places. Watson's discussion of the formation of supranational polities overlooks some broader structural questions like dependency in the world economic system and the different historical trajectories of state formation. Nevertheless, the moralistic utopia associated with Watson does indeed emerge strongly out of our comparative reading of all ES perspectives regarding the formation of a legitimate supranational system; and I now turn to my final chapter in which I will offer an overall assessment.

CHAPTER 7: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON LEGITIMATE SUPRANATIONAL SYSTEMS

Our quest for a new theory of legitimate supranational systems comes to a conclusion in this final chapter. The preceding chapters considered respectively the three lines of thinking within the English School regarding the formation of such systems. I called them three “ideal-types” or “utopias” - the culturalist utopia, the communitarian utopia and the moralistic utopia – that were shaped by prior assumptions about the relationship between the School’s concepts of international society and world society. I subsequently tested each utopia against the debate held at the Convention on the Future of Europe and identified its particular strengths and weaknesses. What follows is my contribution to the subject equipped with the findings from each empirical chapter. First, I shall offer an assessment of the three utopias in the English School based on how each compared to the debate the European Union actors held. Second, I shall consider the implications of this assessment on the construction of legitimate supranational systems. And finally, I shall conclude by establishing what the study has to contribute to the broader literature.

I suggest in this concluding section that International Relations theory should more thoroughly engage the state. It was this particular entity that was the “missing link” throughout the inquiry. There emerged several shortcomings of English School concepts as I attempted to observe them in parts of the world other than Europe. What I subsequently diagnosed to be the problem was the existence of only a superficial notion of the state in the theory. Although there was acknowledgment, especially in the arguments of Watson, that it was misleading to treat all states as if they were the same in terms of their capabilities in the international system; no discussion followed as to what this should

imply for our theories. If we cannot treat all states as if they were the same, then it should follow from here that we cannot apply similar theoretical frameworks to the relations between these different groups of states. It is from this point that I depart in the final stage of the analysis to introduce Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Weberian accounts of the state, and close the argument by suggesting that a fresh theory of legitimate supranational systems can be obtained via a combination of Neo-Weberian and English School concepts.

I. Assessing the Three Utopias in the English School: What Does the European Debate Reveal?

This study set out to determine which particular utopia within the English School would emerge the strongest out of an analysis of the debate on the future of the European Union. In this final step of the study; we can conclude that the moralistic utopia associated with Adam Watson appears as the strongest one. It has to be stressed that Watson's moralistic utopia does have its own weaknesses. However, it is still this particular utopia that best meets the conversation held by the participants at the European Convention. The weakest utopia, meanwhile, is the culturalist utopia within the School. This particular utopia has been constructed primarily around European history by the English School, yet contemporary Europe does not lend itself easily to that rather romanticized vision set in it. As for the communitarian utopia associated with Bull and Vincent; we are able to conclude that it is upset in a number of ways although neither as strongly as the culturalist utopia nor as weakly as the moralistic one. Let us consider below in more detail why each utopia emerged the way it did out of the European debate.

The culturalist utopia in the ES emerged the most weakened one for several reasons. To begin with, the European debate revealed that the Europeans themselves entertain not too strong a sense of cultural community. At the European Convention, the

dominant line of conversation regarding culture was how in fact different Europeans were from one another and wanted to preserve or even guard these differences. Two issues need to be raised here. One is the sense in which the culturalist utopia employs the term “culture”. In Wight and Watson’s usage, culture is deployed in a broad / historical sense aligning closely with the notion of a common “civilization” built up across hundreds of years. It is this deep historical sense of culture that Watson especially reflects onto contemporary Europe but this appears only weakly at the actual debate. The second, and related, issue is the absence in the culturalist utopia of a serious engagement with the notions of nations and nationalism. These two notions stand as the antithesis of that very notion of world society, and a culturalist interpretation of world society is not helpful in terms of de-limiting the concepts of nations and world society. Indeed, a nation too “defines and legitimates politics in cultural terms, because the nation is a political community only in so far as it embodies a common culture and a common social will” (Smith 1992, p.62). Given that both world society and nations legitimate politics in cultural terms, how are we then to distinguish between these two? More to the point, how are we to explain the emergence of individual nations out of a common cultural matrix? We cannot explain it within the boundaries of the culturalist utopia in the ES since if we were to take it to its logical conclusion, we would have to dispense with the concept of nations all together. However, the debate held at the European Convention does show that European nations matter to their members. The perceived interests of their nations may matter even more. As Crum (2004) mentions, the intense bargaining over national interests toward the later stages of the Convention cast a shadow over the initially more harmonious tone of the discussion. When it came to agreeing the institutions and voting arrangements for the new Union, the “convention spirit” (Crum 2004, p.9) that had existed earlier disappeared.

It is because Watson in particular does not deal with nations properly; he not only overstates the case for European cultural unity but also remains overly optimistic about the unifying role of a common culture in general. Watson still holds Europe to be a single republic – often referring to it as the “*grande republique*” of Europe – and he overlooks along the way how revolutionary changes have brought about individual nations that legitimate themselves in cultural terms as well. As the work of Duara (2004; 2001; 1998) demonstrates, the emergence of nation-states has transformed the way we could think of broader cultural or civilizational entities such as “Europe” or “Asia”. The culturalists within the ES have remained aloof to this and this constitutes a significant weakness in their argument.

An additional weakness that we can mention with respect to Watson’s work is the non-cases of legitimate supranational integration in parts of the world that are culturally-homogenous. In previous chapters, I dealt with the Middle East and Latin America for instance. From a Watsonian standpoint, we would need to see at least less-independent systems along the pendulum in these regions. This is because “membership of the same culture” supposedly “condition[s] the behavior of political entities to another, and imposes significant though uncoded limits on their independence” (Watson 1997, p.99). At least in the Middle East, there is what Halliday (2009, p.15) calls a “low salience of sovereignty” and this could on the surface vindicate a Watsonian perspective. Yet that “low salience of sovereignty” in the Middle East is not in the positive sense Watson uses it. Rather, it is a “function of the disputed character of the political and social regimes within each state and the uses made of this, and the dangers believed to be posed to them, by neighboring states” (Halliday 2009, pp.16-7). This particular depiction of the affairs of the Middle East also invites a questioning of how much of an international society exists in the

region, as security dilemmas and a constant perception of threats from neighboring states impede the sense of international society we ordinarily have in mind. Ultimately, it puts into the doubt the ability of a culturally-understood world society to sustain international society as presumed in the ES' culturalist utopia.

The broader literature on the formation of legitimate supranational entities emphasizes historical paths to state formation, the rise and fall of nationalism; dependency in the global economic structures; the role of ideologies; security issues and socioeconomic similarities more so than a common culture. It is these that are missing in Watson's work. For him, it is all about how one "hegemonial or imperial power supplants another" (Watson 1992, p.16) and merely mentions the striking of an optimum mix of legitimacy and material advantage for these cycles of hegemony. Yet it is as if this balancing act operates in a vacuum isolated from say a condition of dependency as in the case of the Middle East. Furthermore, we are not sure how much time needs to elapse before one hegemonial or imperial power will supplant another. An answer he would give to the place of the Middle East across the pendulum would be to suggest that it would shift closer to the empire point eventually since all systems are assumed to shift constantly across the pendulum – although to me this seems prophesizing rather than analyzing. The strength of Watson's work lies not in his culturalist but moralistic utopia to which I shall turn at the end of this chapter. Now let us conclude the case for the communitarian utopia associated with Bull and Vincent.

The communitarian utopia in the ES emerged less destroyed than the culturalist utopia out of my analysis of the European Convention. If coming to terms with the notions of nations and nationalism was a particular weakness in the culturalist utopia; a thorough awareness of these two forces came out as one of the strengths of the communitarian front.

In the culturalist utopia, the break-up of culturally-similar political entities into individual units called nations is treated almost as an “accident”. Indeed, we can interpret Watson’s (1992) pendulum as that account of how unicultural political entities weaken and strengthen their degree of integration across time – it is almost a technical issue for him with little regard for how these entities may have become more and more individuated along the way.

In the communitarian utopia, there are no such “accidents”. Bull and Vincent construe the emergence of nations as the results of social contracts that need to be respected. They are, furthermore, aware that in some parts of the world “nation-states” matter more so than in others. In previous chapters, we have dealt with some other parts of the world like Latin America or the Middle East where several structural and ideational factors resulted in a weaker willingness or ability to organize politics beyond-the-state. Bull especially was aware of such different attitudes toward nation-states under different conditions. One problem in the communitarian argument is that not all “social contracts” around the world are worth the name. The more recently independent part of the world in particular is beset under problems of poor governance, human rights abuses and poverty. A very Watsonian argument in connection with this point is to make these states less independent under a system of (moralistic) hegemony. A very Bullian argument, meanwhile, is to strengthen their systems of governance without necessarily making them less independent. Herein lies the main sticking point in the solidarist-pluralist debate indeed.

The European debate is not that useful in resolving this point since even acquiring candidate status for Union membership requires fulfilling a stringent set of criteria of good governance. Still, if we are to interpret the solidarist – pluralist debate as one between the

universal vs. the particular; the conversation yields a strong preference for the universalization of *rights*. This preference does not simply result from supporting rights as such. It emerges as a necessity at the same time in a common borderless space. As a Romanian representative at the Convention explains, European Union citizenship is required within that space to ensure that when in a host state, a citizen enjoys the same set of freedoms as in his or her country of origin (Severin 2002b). The Charter of Fundamental Rights commanded strong support at the Convention precisely for this reason. This is what the communitarian utopia has difficulty acknowledging. True, it might be difficult to agree to a more expansive set of rights when many different actors come together. However, they may end up having to do so as perhaps dictated by their increasing mutual involvement.

Bull (1995) did not entirely reject the possibility of the construction of a system along the lines of today's European Union. It was indeed possible for him although his loyalties still lied with the system of states. Toward the very end of *The Anarchical Society*, he did admit to defending that system in implicit terms. What the European case shows is that world society need not necessarily have a destructive impact on international society or compromise international order. It is possible to construct a beyond-the-state order which can sustain itself and create new opportunities for its members that an inter-state order cannot. That order has its own interests that are separate from those of nation-states – it is a “denationalized process of economic integration” as Lindseth (2001, p. 163) calls it or supranational “economic patriotism” as Rosamond (2012) puts it. Furthermore, it is possible to constitutionalize this new order with a set of rules and institutions such that an extensive concentration of power at one center, a prospect Bull in particular warned against, can be prevented. The European architecture has delicate rules and institutions to safeguard against possible abuses of power. It is because both Bull and Vincent emphasize

only the potential dangers - and not the actual benefits – of supranational arrangements that the communitarian utopia emerges weakened out of the European Convention.

This leaves us with the moralistic utopia associated with Watson that emerged the least destroyed out of my analysis of the European Convention for a fresh theory of legitimate supranational systems. The reason this particular utopia emerged the least upset one is its better conceptualization of the relationship between the concepts of international and world society – that prior relationship conditioning the broader question of the legitimacy of supranational systems. The culturalist utopia held limited ground in this respect. A culturally-understood world society did not necessarily mean that a more supranational system became legitimate to its members. Neither did the communitarian utopia fare well since world society was not construed as a potential threat on international society. In my reading of the European debate, the utopia that emerged the strongest was the moralistic one which holds that a *hegemonic international society is a prerequisite for world society*. The European debate further verifies some of the other themes in Watson's work. I now turn to a detailed consideration of the overlaps between the research of Watson and the debate at the European Convention.

II. A Watsonian Reading of the European Convention

A very first issue where Watsonian ideas intersect with the conversation held by the European actors is “equality” among the members of the European Union. At the European Convention, “equality” led right on to that notion of “legitimacy” that we have been pursuing since the beginning of this study. The literature on the legitimacy of the European Union specifically revolves around a number of recurrent themes as Burca's contribution identifies. These themes are Union citizenship, democracy, subsidiarity, openness and

transparency (Burca 1996). To these we might add an output-oriented approach that ties the legitimacy of the EU to its ability to deliver for its members. These notions of legitimacy as democracy or transparency are secondary notions. As I mentioned early on, this study is interested in a first-order notion of legitimacy from an International Relations theory point of view. That first-order sense of legitimacy turned out to be “legitimacy-as-equality” among the member states of the Union – big and small, new and old, rich or poor. In fact, the entire legitimacy of the project was tied to its ability to maintain equality. Perhaps it is not surprising that this link was emphasized more strongly by those who felt less equal. Yet it was also emphasized by the more “avant-garde” members of the Union in the words of one Convention participant (Bonde 2002, p.19). They were keen to emphasize that they had no intention of exerting inequality. Why is it that out of all the possible list of subjects, “equality” came to dominate the debate at the European Convention?

Mainstream International Relations theory takes no issue with the subject of equality. Neither does much of the classical English School theory – all states are presumed to be sovereign equals and that is that. In distinction, it is a central question to Watson and Wight has put it forward as well. That “states are sufficiently alike to be treated as members of the same set is more than a fallacy. It is a myth which influences our concept of international reality and distorts our judgment” according to Watson (1997, p.69). Watson goes on from here to discussing in particular those states that cannot manage an independent statehood on their own without external assistance. For our purposes, this observation by Watson means that not all EU member / candidate states can be treated alike. Indeed, a tiny Malta or Luxembourg cannot be considered in the same set with say a gigantic Germany. The debate at the European Convention clearly establishes this need to differentiate between different member states as their expectations from or capabilities in

the Union differ significantly. That truly does disturb our judgment of the EU and prevailing theories of EU integration specifically suffer from this fallacy that Watson raises.

One such theory, neo-functionalism, expected that members' loyalties would shift over time to the new European center. Another, intergovernmentalism, expected no such shifts to take place at all. In their contribution, Marcussen *et al.* (1999) refute the arguments raised by both theories. Only the case of France seems to fit the neo-functionalist expectation while the case of again France and Germany refutes the intergovernmentalist expectation (Marcussen *et al.* 1999, pp.627). The contribution by Walker (1998) focuses on a different weakness in integration theory. The current shape of EU integration can best be characterized as "differentiated integration" as Walker rightfully points out. Some member states do not or cannot for technical reasons participate in schemes such as the Eurozone or the Schengen agreement. As Walker (1998) suggests, this current trend toward "differentiated integration" cannot be explained by resorting to prevailing theories of EU integration. This inability to account for "differentiated integration" also results partly from the fallacy that Watson mentions and has affected theorizing about EU integration as well. It has assumed that members' loyalties would uniformly shift to this new center called the European Union but this has not occurred. What has instead occurred is that there have been degrees of identification with the Union across different policy areas by different member states as well as by the non-state members of the system. A particularly suitable framework for understanding this state of affairs is Watson's (1992) description of imperial systems in which the power or influence of the center spreads in radial terms across the system. As he puts it, the members of a political system "do not all stand in the same relationship to each other, or to an imperial

power. There are many gradations” (Watson 1992, p.16). This approach allows for the possibility of a regression in the process as well. In Watsonian terms, there is a constant movement across the pendulum such that an imperial system can loosen its grip over the members. Haas (1967, pp.327-8) himself has admitted that when he first started dealing with the question of unification in Europe, he built too deterministic a theory that did not foresee such a possibility. At a time when we are discussing the possible exit of Greece from the Eurozone, our theories should allow for a flexible and not deterministic process indeed. This flexibility is one of the strengths of Watson’s approach.

Based on all of what we have discussed so far, the only possible conclusion regarding this persistent idea of legitimacy-as-equality, to turn to it again, is that it is an oxymoron. It is simply inconceivable that all the member states be considered equals and we have noted in Chapter 5 that there is indeed discursive acknowledgement of this situation. How, then, do we reconcile an ideational aspiration for equality with a practical condition of inequality? Kingsbury’s (1998) answer to this seems to be to simply stop aspiring for equality and be satisfied to live in a world of *sovereign un-equals*. Kingsbury places sovereignty as a way of dealing with inequality which he suggests is the only plausible means of doing so (p.600). This is because inequality is bound to be a perennial condition, and it is sovereignty that can “moderate existing inequalities of power between states, and provide a shield for weak states and weak institutions. These inequalities would be more pronounced if ... sovereignty were to be discarded” (p.618). Kingsbury’s argument resonates well within a possible Bullian line of inquiry into this subject.

Hjorth (2011) advances a less Bullian line. Hjorth first dissects the notion of “equality” and identifies the senses in which it is used. Accordingly, we employ the term equality either in the sense of a normative rule or of a pragmatic rule. Furthermore, we

employ a naturalist concept of equality and a constructivist one. In the former, we hold that states are natural equals in international society while in the latter we assume that equality is constructed through mutual recognition (p.2588). Neither sense in the end enables Hjorth to break the link between sovereignty and equality. In an attempt to do so, he resorts to Rawls' (1999) concept of the "equality of peoples". By placing this Rawlsian concept at the center, Hjorth (2011) seeks to work equality through peoples rather than through states.

From my perspective, Kingsbury's (1998) argument that sovereignty works to the advantage to the weak is indeed convincing. However, the remainder of the argument is status quo oriented or even defeatist in some ways. It does not allow any room for change. He is right in pointing out that sovereignty is likely to remain as the organizing principle of world politics since it is "self-enforcing, self-perpetuating, and reinforced to some degree by cognitive entrenchment" (p.614). Yet we do not have to resign to this self-perpetuating cycle. If we did, a system like the European Union could not have even flourished.

Hjorth's (2011) argument, meanwhile, provides a useful opening to the question but the weakness is that it is workable more in theory than in practice. That is because we may seek to establish a system of equality for the peoples, however, access to those peoples is still possible through states. Indeed, this is why the pluralists in the English School propose to strengthen states that are the "gatekeepers" so to speak to the peoples. It could be argued that accessing the peoples is easier in a place like the EU where there is less sovereignty. This version of the argument, however, would require that the peoples themselves constitute one monolithic bloc with a collective interest in instituting equality. The debate held at the European Convention does not support this – the peoples do not form a single entity and they are not necessarily interested in one another's equality. They do compete over the economic resources that the Union has to offer to them. In the previous chapters,

we have seen for instance how an iconic “Polish plumber” came to represent fears that enlargement would result in a loss of jobs in the existing member states. Likewise, many participants at the Convention insisted on keeping the regulation of labor markets as a member state competence. Teufel (2002), representing the German parliament, was among the many who stressed this point emphasizing that each member state’s labor market had different needs. What this tells us is that the ideal of equality for the peoples collapses when it comes to material issues. Peoples themselves compete over material resources and the way they try to do so is through the member states primarily if not exclusively. In fact, this is one of the reasons why the moralistic utopia emerged the strongest out of the European Convention. It is a hegemonic international society that enables the peoples. A system like the EU offers chances to pursue interests through non-state channels as well but there is limited room for doing so outside the EU. In this respect, Hjorth’s (2011) argument that we can break the link between sovereignty and equality by focusing on the peoples is not entirely convincing as long as the peoples are organized into states and they compete among themselves for limited material resources. We are thus still left with the question of how to reconcile a *de facto* situation of inequality, both in political and in material terms, with that much-pronounced aspiration for equality.

Watson’s approach to this question is to separate the theory (or legitimacy) and the practice of international society. As he puts it, practice “outruns” the theory since theories are based on beliefs and long-standing traditions. Practice, in distinction, is based on material advantage and expediency and can change more quickly. An example Watson gives is the practical erosion of the principle of non-intervention – it has been commonplace by now to intervene in the domestic affairs of states on humanitarian grounds in particular. Hence, the theory of international society upholds the principles of

non-intervention just as it does the sovereign equality of its members while its practice is interventionist (Watson 1998). With the passage of time, Watson expects theory to correspond closer to reality. Legitimacy “shifts imperceptibly over time, to come closer to long-established realities. Time and familiarity legitimize practice” in his (1992, p.130) words. If we pursue this argument, we might expect in the near future a formal norm of intervention or the institutionalization of inequality.

Krasner (2004) has already proposed to do the latter as a response to the predicament of failed states. In his view, trusteeships can be established to govern failed states with the participation of officials from international institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF. As I noted earlier, Krasner (2001, p. 19) labels sovereign statehood as “organized hypocrisy” which occurs when “norms are decoupled from actions”. States declare their respect for one another’s sovereignty but violate it in practice. From his point of view, “organized hypocrisy” occurs because— some states are more powerful than others and there is no central authority to prevent violations of sovereignty. Furthermore, the international system has conflicting norms such as non-intervention and respect for human rights and there is once again no authority to adjudicate which specific norm should apply (Krasner 2001, p.19). In other words, “organized hypocrisy” results from the anarchical nature of the international system.

Krasner’s analysis is a structural one that more or less suggests “organized hypocrisy” occurs because it *can* occur. Watson’s, meanwhile, is a very “English School” analysis if one may say so. It is based on the concept of “*raison de système*” which is “the *belief* that it pays to make the system work” (Watson 1992, p.14; emphasis added) and it incurs responsibilities on all states to “ensure that the fabric of the system itself is preserved and its continuity maintained” (Watson 1982, p.208). Because all states share

this notion of *raison de système*, the agreed upon rules and institutions of international society, a working arrangement that is worth preserving, are unchallenged in theory. However, they are not necessarily observed in practice. In Chapter 3, we have seen how Manning put forward the games analogy in his explanation of what keeps international society going. It is in Manning's words a game all of whose participants are inclined to stay in even though they might have differences over the specific rules. Nevertheless, they all share a basic commitment to stay in the game and keep it going (Manning 1975, pp.108-111). We could quote Katiforis, the Greek speaker at the European Convention, with a view to demonstrating how this commitment presented itself at the European Convention on the very much debated subject of the external policy of the Union:

The European citizen would worry less if he saw that what the Union does not achieve could be achieved by the nation state. But he sees that there is not the slightest hope of resistance against the giants that surround us in the modern world. We do not have to choose between a European external policy and national foreign policy, we have to choose between a European external policy and the non-existence of external policy (Katiforis 2002).

It is indeed this willingness to keep the game going in Manning's framework or *raison de système* in Watson's. It is also why what Jackson (1987) calls the "quasi-states" of post-colonial Africa receive all the ceremonies associated with statehood without meeting most of the material conditions for being a state in the proper sense. For Jackson, the de-colonization movement introduced a new practice in international society of ignoring the shortcomings of all the states that emerged from colonial rule. This movement also illustrates how practice shapes theory in international society. The de-colonization process is the process of the evolution of the law of state recognition from its stringent beginnings into a looser shape. The late 19th and early 20th - century insistence that states meet some "standards of civilization" to be recognized as a member of international

society was eventually dropped. Less demanding criteria were introduced since this was the only way for the newly de-colonized states to count as states. As they did not fit the law's definition of a state, the law gradually fit them, becoming looser and looser until the 1960s when more or less the only criterion became legal independence (pp.530-2). Afterwards, they were to be considered as sovereign equals in international society. This equal status itself is one of the ways in which we legitimize international society. In Franck's (1988, p.731) words, it is the "legitimization through symbolism" of international society and the "equality of participation is itself the symbolic representation of a confluence between sovereignty and interdependence that holds together the 'community' of states".

The status of equality is thus one of the ways in which we seek to legitimize international society. In practical terms, however, it does not exist. It is but one example of how the theory and practice of international affairs differ. *Legitimacy-as-equality*, that notion of legitimacy that emerged the strongest from the European Convention, attests to how conflicting our expectations and priorities are from the international system or in this case from the European Union. Indeed, we are aware of our disparities yet still insist on receiving equal treatment. We do want a stronger European Union, but object at the same time to the rules and institutions that would provide for that. These tensions or contradictions apply equally toward the non-EU world. It is what we called earlier a "diplomacy of justice" (Watson 2007) or a process of "reflexive denationalization" (Zürn 2004) that takes hold as social transactions increasingly take place beyond national borders.

Reflexive denationalization implies that our moral objectives increasingly include those beyond our own borders. Yet at the same time; we seek to reinforce those very

national borders. In Chapter 6, I took a look at the case of EU airports and pointed to those discriminatory practices toward non-EU citizens that start right at the point of entry into the territory of the Union. Our concepts are not immune to these tensions either. Let us take “nationalism” and how authorities from the EU Commission use it in their discussions of Turkey’s membership bid as one example. The Commission authorities criticize Turkey for being too nationalistic and for having too strong an attachment to their sovereignty as Duzgit and Suvarierol (2011) identify. To them, these two concepts of nationalism and sovereignty carry almost a derogatory meaning in a Europe that has supposedly transcended them. Yet the same authorities demonstrate what Duzgit and Suvarierol label “Euro-nationalism” (p.478) when discussing the membership of Turkey. Whereas their own discourses are “critical of sovereignty and nationalism when it comes to Turkey, they are protective of European sovereignty and interests in their own discourses on Turkey without framing them as nationalistic” (Duzgit and Suvarierol 2011, p.478).

It is these sorts of contradictions that Watson places a strong emphasis in his theory. He does note that our behavior along the pendulum is an attempt to solve the contradiction between our desire for independence on the one hand, and our desire for order (understood as peace and prosperity) on the other (Watson 1992). It is this tension that the debate at the European Convention vindicates the most. Theoretical approaches to European integration are marked by an assumption that integration is a harmonious process either through the functional integration of specific policy areas or through intergovernmental bargaining. The reason for this lack of a broader focus is a tendency to theorize EU integration from EU integration itself. One of the advantages of bringing in the English School theory into this subject has been the ability to put the process into a broader macro-historical perspective. In Chapter 1, I quoted Wæver (1999) who said about

the English School that its scheme is “unsettling” and marked by a “creative tension” due to the presence of several contradictory realities at work in international affairs. The Convention debate tells that EU integration itself is “unsettling” and marked by a “creative tension” in which the participants constantly seek ways to resolve their contradictory expectations. And Watson’s (1992) pendulum scheme is weak in terms of its culturalist aspects but definitely strong otherwise in terms of accounting for the European integration process. If one addendum to it can be made; that would be why more supranational authority would be more legitimate to the members of a system for a reason other than attaining more peace and more prosperity. From the debate at the European Convention, we can conclude that more supranational authority becomes legitimate to those who wish to become more equal with the leading actors. This is the case with the smaller member states of the Union who want the Commission in particular to be strengthened in the hope that a strong and impartial Commission will level the playing field for them. Compare this with the proposal of the UK representative who wanted the Commission to be downgraded to a “research center producing no more than proposals, suggesting arrangements and not imposing regulations and directives” (Amory 2002, p.6). In distinction, the smaller member states were firmly behind proposals throughout the Convention for the Commission to be given greater powers. It is of course yet another contradiction that they seek to become less independent (subject to more restrictions by the Commission) with a view to becoming more equal with the other member states.

At this stage of the analysis, supranationalism appears to me as one of the means through which we try to manage our conflicting priorities in an increasingly more complex world. One of the dominant themes at the European Convention beside equality was globalization and how Europe could cope with this. Responding to the challenges of

globalization was one of the strongest reasons cited for the introduction of more supranational authority into the system. The desire to handle globalization, on the one hand, and the desire to maintain equality between the member states on the other can in fact be proposed as the synopsis of the debate at the European Convention. It was above all about ordering these two objectives. The outcome was a balanced one. The overall supranational element of the polity was indeed reinforced in the final version of the Constitutional Treaty. As against this, the intergovernmental element was reinforced such that the final arrangement was a delicate balance as I mentioned earlier. This is the strength of Watson's (1992) approach – it is his finding that the legitimacy of any particular system is based on how it manages to reconcile what I called in Chapter 3 those “conflicting priorities” of political life.

In a way, Watson emerged both the strongest and the weakest out of my analysis of the European Convention. The European debate vindicates such fundamental elements in his theory that Watson emerged strongly out of our analysis. His culturalist arguments, however, were not vindicated in any visible way and the non-cases of supranational integration among culturally-similar entities elsewhere around the world also weakened his ideas. This results from Watson's lack of a serious discussion of broader structural issues that affect the prospects for such integration. It has been suggested that combining Neo-Gramscian and English School accounts can be helpful in this respect where of course the concept of hegemony takes the center stage (Clark 2011). Let us now take a more closer look at these arguments, and try to determine what good, if any, can come out of such a combination. Below, I will not only examine the Neo-Gramscian case against the English School but also turn later on to the Neo-Weberian. This section will take us to the final part

in which the necessity to deal more thoroughly with the state in our theories of the international will be established.

The English School and the Neo-Gramscian School share similar views on hegemony and they are marked off in the broader literature by their emphasis on the *ideational* or consensual aspects of hegemony rather than on the *material* only. In Realism, hegemony refers to the assertion of supremacy by a state over others through economic and military power. The literature on complex interdependence examines, along with economic and military power, a state's willingness to act as a hegemon. This body of work also looks at the ideational and consensual aspects of hegemony on the part of those who are subject to it (Joseph 2008). Still, the interdependence school is rooted in the power tradition. In distinction, when we look at the English School and the Neo-Gramscians, the ideational comes to the fore. Cox (1996), the pioneer of Neo-Gramscian theory, speaks of hegemony as something "inscribed in the mind" (p.245) or "a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states" (p.55). Likewise, in his discussion of the imperial system between the decolonized states and the developed world, Watson notes that "in most cases, then, an imperial system takes its place in the minds of the rulers and the elites of developing countries" (Watson 1968, p.34).

The particularly strong emphasis on the ideational aspect of hegemony unites the ES and the Neo-Gramscians, and distinguishes them from most other contributions to the literature on hegemony. This is not to say that either one of them ignores the material aspect. Unless there is a material basis for it, ideas cannot in and of themselves create a hegemonic order. However, the material alone cannot mean hegemony either. In hegemonic structures, Cox states, "the power basis of the structure tends to recede into the background of consciousness" (Cox 1981, p.137). What eventually takes over is the

consensual dynamic. As Watson says, hegemony cannot be “dictatorial fiat”. It is rather a dialogue between those who exercise it and those who are subject to it, together with a feeling of expediency on both parts (Watson 1992, p.15). Often, hegemony also cultivates a social basis for itself through the replication of the culture, lifestyle habits and the technological achievements of the hegemonic state(s) in other parts of the world. A global civil society too plays a role in this all-pervasive phenomenon (Cox 1983, pp.171-2). Even if it may not secure active consent from all, hegemony still secures acquiescence through these from the perspective of both of these schools.

If the pendulum is the main framework of analysis in Watson’s account of IR, then “historical structures” are that in Cox’s (1981). Cox defines a historical structure as a “particular configuration of thought patterns, material conditions and human institutions which has a certain coherence among its elements” (p.135). Within a historical structure, Cox identifies three types of forces, each of which affects and is affected by the other two: material capabilities, ideas and institutions. Material capabilities refer to natural and industrial resources, technology and the like. As for ideas, Cox lists two types: intersubjective meanings and collective images of social order. The first, intersubjective meanings, are “shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior”. The second, collective images of social order, are not necessarily shared by all. These images concern the “nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations” as Cox puts it and there may be conflicting ones held by different individuals and groups. Finally, institutions, serve as a means to perpetuate the existing configuration of ideas and material conditions. Already, they represent the existing power relations and try to promote those types of collective images of social order that are necessary to sustain these relations (p.136).

Having defined a historical structure in this way, Cox (1981) then turns to three areas where we can observe this structure: forms of state, social forces created by production processes and world orders which are those forces pertaining to the question of war and peace among states. Again, these three areas are related to one another. For instance, when the bourgeoisie emerged as a new social force in the 19th - century, it led to the emergence of a new form of state which then led to a new type of world order (p.138). Hegemony enters the discussion at this stage as Cox contemplates what brings about a stable world order. This, Cox believes, can be explained when we define hegemony as

“a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (i.e. not just as the overt instruments of a particular state’s dominance)” (Cox 1981, p.139).

In other words, hegemony is not simply about material power. It requires, in Cox’s own words, a “fit between power, ideas and institutions” (Cox 1981, p.140). There are also mechanisms which help maintain it. Internationalization is a key term here. Cox suggests that a hegemonic order is sustained by the internationalization of the state, the internationalization of production processes and the creation of an international social class (Cox 1981, pp.144-9). International organizations are also part of this hegemony-maintaining mechanism; they co-opt potential opponents of the system and subsume them within the hegemonial structure (Cox 1983, pp.172-3). Ideas - institutions - material factors, the ways in which these three fit and social forces (shaped by production relations) are thus the main items in Cox’s treatment of hegemony. As and when all of these conditions hang together as necessary, a hegemonic order will flourish along with the various mechanisms required to sustain it.

If Cox's of hegemony presupposes a "consensual, value-based, understanding-based, in short, intersubjective, view of the world order", (Joseph 2008, p.111), the same can certainly be said for that of the ES. These intersubjective understandings, one type of idea found in Cox's (1981) historical structures, permeate all aspects of that particular order (Bieler and Morton 2001). One example of an intersubjective understanding Cox (1981) gives is the idea that we will be organized into states. In the ES, Wight refers to these understandings as the legitimacy of international society or "first principles" which prevail (or are at least proclaimed) *within* a majority of states that form international society as well as in the relations *between* them" (Wight 1977, p.153; emphases in original). Watson refers to them as the "constitutional legitimacy" of international society as agreed upon by its members (Watson (2007 [1998], p.54). That members of international society will be (nation) states is again an example of these first principles. Intersubjective understandings, first principles, or constitutional legitimacy, however we may want to refer to them, are so deeply rooted that they penetrate all subsequent aspects of a given order for both Schools. This notion of the intersubjectivity of orders is therefore another common element in ES and Neo-Gramscian thinking.

Collective images of social order, another type of idea within historical structures, are not necessarily shared by all. There may be different, even clashing, collective images around the world. Here, Cox's example is justice (Cox 1981). For Watson, and indeed for the entire ES, managing these differing conceptions of justice and similar ideals is a major subject. How to agree justice in the world when "even simple charity is no easy matter" (Watson 1968, p.62) is a question posed throughout the School's work. This is certainly an interesting question although what is more interesting for the purpose of this study is to observe the correspondence between the two literatures in terms of how they approach the

social world. Notice how both the neo-Gramscian and ES accounts are centered around three similar axes of it: two types of ideas (intersubjective understandings / first principles and collective images of social order / justice), material factors and institutions. A further common axis that should be noted is what the ES literature calls “world society” and what the Neo-Gramscian literature calls “social forces”. There is a strong resemblance between social forces and world society. Both point to those loyalties held by individuals that transcend state boundaries, and occupy an important place in each School.

The question still is, either from a Neo-Gramscian or an English School standpoint, as Hinnebusch (2011) poses, why some states do not acquiesce and instead rebel against hegemony? In other words, why does it become legitimate in some cases and not in others? It is this question that the synthesis of ideational and structuralist accounts answers the best - theories inspired by Marxist structuralism including Neo-Gramscianism are “over-determinant” (p.214) about the role of the system while ideational theories ignore key structural concepts such as imperialism, the core-periphery system and dependency (p.213). A suitable synthesis of these two can advance our understanding of this question in Hinnebusch’s (2011) view. In a recent contribution, Diez (2012) suggested that we can analyze the EU in a similar fashion by looking at its particular shape at any time through the formation of “historic blocs” within it in a Neo-Gramscian sense. To turn to Watson, most certainly, his pendulum scheme would be strengthened if it did incorporate insights from international political economy, particularly regarding the non-cases of culturally-conditioned advances further toward the empire point of the pendulum.

There is another reason why this particular synthesis would be useful according to Clark (2011) and that is the overall negative image of hegemony that the Neo-Gramscian account leaves us with. Indeed, while Cox (1999, p.12) speaks of the “problem

hegemony”, Watson especially as we know emphasizes its positive aspects. If the afterthought to hegemony is moral obligation to Watson, it is the creation of an emancipatory counter-hegemonic order in Neo-Gramscian thinking. As he moves forward with his attempt to re-work a Neo-Gramscian hegemony in an English School direction, Clark (2011) proposes to list hegemony as one of the primary institutions of international society understood under the English School’s sociological approach to institutions as established practices. Recognizing hegemony as an institution of international society does not require us to modify the assumption of anarchy. To put it differently, international society can be both hegemonial and anarchical at the same time (Clark 2011).

From a Watsonian point of view specifically; deciding if hegemony and anarchy can occur at the same time is not an issue as such. My understanding of Watson’s research is that he is trying to propose that anarchy has never existed in the first place. What Watson is saying is that when we speak “international”, we speak “hegemony” that exists only minimally at the independences end of the pendulum and maximally at the empire end. Thus, there remains no need to consider if hegemony and anarchy are mutually exclusive. I believe that Watson also holds hegemony to be an institution of international society indeed. What Clark suggests is that by stipulating that hegemony is an ever-present force, Watson misses the point that it can as well be a “*distinctive* political arrangement, and subject to its own unique political demands and dynamics” (Clark 2009, p.208; emphasis in original). Clark himself develops these possible distinctive types of hegemonies on two axes: the composition of hegemony (singular or collective) and the recipients of hegemony (inclusive of all of international society or coalitional received only by a section of it). He then cross-categorizes them into singular / coalitional, singular / inclusive and collective / coalitional and collective / inclusive types of hegemonies. These distinctive types of

hegemonies are legitimated differently as well. In some, input legitimacy will matter more while in others output legitimacy will be more important. A collective hegemony from Clark's perspective will be the one that best balances the input and output forms of legitimacy (Clark 2011, Chapter 3).

It is true that "hegemony" has become a catch-all phrase in Watson's usage and such phrases may end up explaining nothing in specific in the course of explaining everything. If we were to go ahead and try to identify *distinctive* types of hegemonies from Watson's work, we can do so on the basis of two criteria: culture and acceptance. As I have been emphasizing since the beginning of the study, Watson distinguishes between hegemonies that become legitimate more easily due to the presence of a common culture and those that are not. The other criterion for distinction is if the recipients accept hegemony openly. In this respect, Watson puts forward the concept of suzerain systems which originates in Wight's (1977) work. In these systems, the members are "in general agreement that there *ought to be* a suzerain authority" while in non-suzerain systems there is only tacit acceptance or acquiescence (Watson 1992, p.15; emphasis added). Thus, we can identify cultural / a-cultural and explicit / tacit types of hegemonies in Watson's work. In the previous chapters, we have noted already that the culture side of the argument was not too strong. Watson, to emphasize once again, overstates the case for culture. Easton, whose analysis of political systems is close to Watson's, cautions against such an overstatement as well. For him, the role of culture in political systems is to prevent certain demands from ever arising. Indeed, something perfectly acceptable in one cultural setting can be unimaginable in others. Culture thus functions to set limits on what can or cannot be demanded from the system. It is not, however, a prerequisite for its formation (Easton 1965, pp.101-3). It is more useful in my view as well to revise the notion of culture in the

English School in the direction proposed by Easton. In this sense, all cases of hegemony will be cultural but differ in terms of the type of acceptance they receive. In other words, we will need to determine if they are suzerain or non-suzerain systems.

The case of the EU better fits a suzerain system in which there is a belief that there should be a center. Wæver (1996a p.248) has called this a “will to center” in Europe that emerged following the end of the Second World War. The declining legitimacy of the nation-state at that particular point in time contributed to this will. This line of reasoning into the necessity of a center was present at the European Convention as well. In the words of Bruton (2002c), representing Ireland, the Union “came about because some visionary people saw that nationalism, and the idolatry of the nation state, had given us two world wars”. The only option for the future, according to Bruton (2002a, p.7), is to continue with the process of EU integration since only “by coming together in the European Union we can ensure that humanity, and the values which make us, as individuals, truly human, prevail over global forces that will otherwise overwhelm us”. I believe that the moralistic utopia associated with Watson is reflected quite well in Bruton’s words. It is further evidence that hegemony can be a desirable situation unlike the Neo-Gramscian literature allows. This is one of the strengths of Watson’s notion of hegemony over Marxist accounts. In some of his discussions; Watson comes tantalizingly close to Marxist arguments so much so that one wonders if he is a Marxist scholar under English School disguise. The answer is that he is not for a variety of reasons that I cannot discuss here; but above all the difference lies in his emphasis on the potential benefits of hegemony. It can be a desirable system as the overall European debate or the individual contributions by Bruton vindicate.

Yet we had quoted the same Bruton (2002a) earlier in Chapter 6 where he himself employed quite a nationalistic discourse about Ireland's membership in the Union. Indeed, it was "liberating" for Ireland according to him to become a member of the Union since only then could the country overcome its practical dependence on the United Kingdom. Through its membership in the Union, Bruton notes that Ireland has become a country that can influence the outcome of something like World Trade Organization talks. In the same speech, Bruton defends the perceived interests of Ireland in quite strong terms in relation to proposed institutional arrangements of the EU:

Ireland should be wary of any strengthening of the role of the Council, particularly in an enlarged Union, because of the risk that a small "directom" of big countries might emerge within such a Council, ostensibly in the interests of efficiency, but with the practical effect of diminishing the role of the other States. A strong role for the Commission is the best guarantee of the interests of smaller states (Bruton 2002a, pp.21-2).

This is yet another demonstration of how much difficulty we are having trying to reconcile our loyalties – in Bruton's case to Ireland, its independence, interests and position within the Union on the one hand, and to the European Union, on the other. It could be argued that independence is a particularly sensitive subject for the Irish representative for historical reasons. However, Bruton's conflicted remarks do not constitute an exception to the Convention discussion. Many other representatives spoke along similar lines during the gathering. The integration process itself entails resolving certain contradictions in a technical or practical sense. Consider for instance the common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the question of the mutual recognition of criminal decisions among member states. In a common borderless space, it only makes sense that criminal convictions are recognized mutually. It would be odd for a criminal conviction to be recognized in member states A, B, and C but not in D. The question of

mutual recognition was debated a lot at the Convention indeed. However, it was also met with a good deal of resistance by a significant number of the deputies. Vries, speaking for the Dutch government, acknowledged that a solution to this possible oddity was necessary albeit mutual recognition was not the way forward from her perspective. Because, she suggested, “it is desirable that the Member States retain their own identity. The criminal justice system constitutes a central element of each society and is to a large extent determined by the political system (Vries 2003, p.3). Vries’ is only one line of objection into the undesirability of the principle of mutual recognition.

A fundamental objection, the Praesidium of the Convention finds, to furthering integration in judicial issues is the lack of trust among the member states. They fear, for example, that they might be forced to extradite their own citizens to another member state (Cover Note from Praesidium 2002). Tajani, representing the Italian parliament, maintains in connection with the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice that it cannot be embarked upon without determining what the rights of individuals are. The main problem as Tajani identifies is that “in a federation of national states, the fundamental rights of citizens which should be recognized in the Fundamental Charter of the Union must first be recognized in the constitutions of each individual state” (Tajani 2002, p.3). That, however, is not the case in the EU as different national legal systems have different traditions on individual rights. In the end, these two sets of considerations, that is the need to strengthen integration in the field of rights and justice and to maintain the diverse traditions of the member states, were reconciled through the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. As one German deputy put it:

The Charter incorporates, in one single text, in chapters on human dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens' rights and justice, a balanced and up-to-date catalogue of specific rights, general freedoms, values and principles. At

the same time, it reaffirms the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the unique European social model (Meyer 2002b, p.18).

Let us compare these remarks with the much debated “middle-ground-ethics” (Cochran 2009) of the English School which makes “state consensus the crucial determinant of ethical possibility” (Cochran 2009, p.205). For Cochran (2009), this closes off the possibility of a more maximal ethics. Bull in particular has come under the spotlight of criticism in connection with this point within the English School. Williams claims that Bull is an impossible empiricist in his discussion of ethical possibilities in international society; and “in line with his empiricism, wants a version of ethics that is like a yard stick, which can be held up against any set of circumstances to enable definitive answers” (Williams 2010, p.193). Watson, especially in his earlier writings, too is very close to Bull on the prospects for an expansive ethics in international society. Prudence is the guiding principle of ethics in international society where even charity is a complicated issue when it applies between states according to Watson. Ethics in international society is “what is right and reasonable” between states (Watson 2007, p.45), not what might be right according to some natural law standard. Bull was overly cautious about attempts to push the ethical boundaries of international society beyond the consensus reached by its member states. As Cochran (2009) demonstrates through several of Watson’s papers written for presentation at the British Committee, he believed that diplomats and the diplomatic dialogue among states could push these boundaries. Still, it is through state consensus that the ethical principles of international society are formed.

I believe that the School’s argument on this point is not misplaced. Even in the European Union where those non-state spaces of politics are abound, the ethical possibilities are drawn on the basis of what is “right and reasonable” among the member

states as reflected primarily in The Charter of Fundamental Rights. It not only respects the different constitutional traditions of the member states in the field of fundamental rights but also establishes a set of additional rights emanating from European Union citizenship. These additional rights are certainly a practical necessity in a system that affords that many freedoms to its members. They are intended above all to ensure that individuals do not face discriminatory practices when exercising their freedom to move to and reside in the territory of another member state. We can criticize Bull (1995) here for suggesting that international society is amenable only to notions of inter-state justice and not to justice for humans. As the case of the European Union shows, it can be hospitable also to notions of human justice as enshrined in the Charter. It was in fact the states themselves (primarily Germany) that pushed for the drafting of the Fundamental Rights Charter or a similar legal instrument that would not only empower the citizens of the Union but also delimit the powers of the Union itself.

Watson's moralistic utopia once again emerges strongly here. It is a more hegemonic international society, one that is further toward the empire point of the pendulum, in which the rights of individuals or our moral objectives focusing on world society can best be dealt with. This zone of the pendulum is where the boundaries between the domestic and the international are highly blurred. Above all, addressing individuals' rights across these blurred boundaries becomes a practical imperative arising out of the intense mutual involvement of the members of the system. This line of thinking is the unique contribution that Watson makes to the relationship between those key concepts of international and world society as well as to the question of legitimacy that arises out of this particular relationship.

My overall conclusion will be to suggest that we proceed with Watsonian ideas in our quest for a fresh theory of supranationalism. However, prior to that, there still remains a need to finding a suitable theoretical framework for incorporating the state into the discussion. I identified earlier that the lack of a theoretical discussion of the state weakens the ES' arguments. It is because the state is not addressed properly that some of the concepts put forward by the School cannot be applied in certain settings. Below, I turn to Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Weberian concepts for the purpose of finding a workable notion of the state. I chose these two schools in particular since they do fit my quest for a systemic theory of the state. Only a few other schools within the literature even take notice of the state to begin with. Obviously, constructivism springs to mind in this respect which does question the nature of this entity called the state. Yet constructivism is more of a theory of *state identities* and not a full systemic theory of the state which is what I am seeking. The section below thus turns to Gramscian and Weberian accounts, and argues that the Weberian especially serves this study's purpose of approaching supranationalism in an original fashion.

III. Comparing the English School with Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Weberian Approaches

In this study, I sought to contribute to the debate on the formation of legitimate supranational systems. It was clear from the outset that the available theoretical approaches to European integration were marked by a tendency of self-referential theorizing. According to Hansen (2002, pp.486-7), there is another "tendency within a good portion of the literature to treat European integration as a good thing in and of itself, something to defend, identify with, even celebrate". There indeed exists a self-congratulatory undercurrent in especially some of the more recent writings on European integration. The

European Union is presented to have transcended all those implicitly undesirable things like “sovereignty”, “nationalism” or “hegemony”; and to have risen above the conditions that characterize the politics of the rest of the world in this triumphalist style of writing. “Normative Power Europe”, a phrase first coined by Manners (2002) and has been cascading across the literature, can be considered as one example of this inclination. As against this “Normative Power” stands others who are not deemed “European” enough to join in. In his contribution, Tekin explores how these others are constructed in European, more specifically French, discourse with respect to Turkey. As she demonstrates, the French employ much derogatory discourses toward Turkey in which the French themselves are positively self-represented as “Europeans” and the Turks are left out as “non-Europeans” (Tekin 2010). Europe in this particular discourse becomes a self-loaded category of the “good” or the “better”.

Given this specifically biased nature of the literature, it was in order to venture into the broader field of International Relations theory to further analyze the subject of supranational integration. There will be immediate objections to the selection of the English School in particular if one is of the opinion that integration theory is self-congratulatory or Eurocentric. The English School has been criticized for being perhaps the most Eurocentric theory on the menu. Callahan (2010, p.308) goes even further to suggest that it is the national theory of the United Kingdom, and an attempt to maintain UK / European supremacy around the world. As he puts it, the School emerged in the 1960s as an “old boy’s club, while international society reproduces a class-based hierarchy of the world whereby England and Europe are the aristocracy”. It is true that the members of the English School, Wight and Watson especially, hold an idealized view of Europe. The continent occupies a unique position from their standpoints.

Still, the point that I am trying to make in this thesis is different. What the European Convention debate reveals is the continuity, not the transcendence as those Eurocentric approaches are keen to demonstrate, of many of the familiar dilemmas of international affairs. It is this misdirected attempt to present the European Union as a unique construction that the English School theory helps dispel. It enables us to ground what is seemingly unique in the solid ground of international theory equipped with a strong sense of history. It puts EU integration into historical perspective, and makes it into one of the particular ways in which humankind organizes itself in political terms. From city-states to nation states, history is replete with the attempts of political communities to manage most effectively their mutual involvement; and the EU is another example of this continuing attempt to that end. In this sense, it was a liberating moment to encounter the English School theory as I searched for an alternative framework for reflecting on the subject of supranational integration. In particular, Watson's revisionist approach enables a theoretical exorcism, and challenges us to think international affairs, including supranational systems, in terms we are not accustomed to.

Certainly, in spite of its strengths, the English School theory has many weaknesses. Its elusive concept of world society, and this concept's relationship to the hallmark concept of international society, has been identified as one of the main problems. The purpose of my inquiry was twofold. The first was to test this rather loose end of the English School theory itself. The case of the European Union was uniquely well-placed to that end as both of those concepts of international and world society were available there in most visible terms. The second purpose was of course to contribute to the question of legitimate supranational systems. That prior relationship between international and world society shaped the answers to the legitimacy question in a significant way. In the end, my

conclusion was that Watson's moralistic utopia emerged the least destroyed perspective in the English School on this issue. The culturalist and the communitarian utopias were less of a match to the European Convention debate. What made extended supranational authority legitimate in broad terms was that it helped us deliver moral objectives toward world society more effectively.

There were of course other reasons. For the smaller member states especially, supranationalism was legitimate to the extent that it leveled the playing field among the member states and enabled them to become more "equal" with the larger ones. To the larger member states, meanwhile, supranational arrangements were legitimate to the extent that they were balanced by a strengthening of the intergovernmental ones. What made the resulting arrangements legitimate in the end was how the intergovernmental and the supranational were balanced. From the perspective of world society actors, supranational arrangements were celebrated as they further empowered their rights and opportunities. Sub-national actors, representatives of local governments or regions especially with legislative powers, as well favored more supranational authority as a way of strengthening their own positions against central governments in their respective countries.

There was at the Convention a number of different notions of legitimacy. These included legitimacy as transparency, openness, accountability or democratic participation. I left these second-order senses of the notion of legitimacy aside as my goal was to contribute a first-order version – in the sense of "first principles" in Wightian (1977) or "constitutional legitimacy" in Watsonian (1998) terms. Two overarching notions of legitimacy emerged from the European Convention in this sense: *legitimacy-as-equality* and *dual legitimacy*. Legitimacy-as-equality held that the EU would be legitimate to the extent that it provided for the equality of its member states. Dual legitimacy held that the

EU would be legitimate to the extent that it remained as a Union of both the states *and* of the peoples of Europe.

In Chapter 4, I considered the notion of dual legitimacy in more detail and suggested that this too was one reflection of the contested nature of the project. To some Convention participants, the emphasis needed to have been on the peoples or the citizens. To others, the emphasis needed to be on the states. The overall emphasis, however, was that it needed to be for them both. As a matter of fact, legitimacy-as-equality and dual legitimacy revolve around similar considerations. “Dual legitimacy” connotes the belief that excessive centralization of power at the expense of nation states needs to be avoided. In the words of the Greek speaker Ioakimidis (2002), dual legitimacy registers the point that the goal of European integration is to create a “European Polity” and not a “European super-state” (p.26). It underscores further that this polity “coexists with nation states, *within a novel federation system*” (p.36; emphasis in original). Put differently, dual legitimacy represents the idea that the empire end point of our Watsonian (1992) pendulum is to be avoided while legitimacy-as-equality represents the desired quality of *international society* right before the empire point. It is this that Buzan and Little point to when they reflect on the originality of Watson’s work. To quote them:

By moving international society into the hegemony part of the spectrum, and possibly beyond, Watson exposes the tension in post-1945 international society arising from the fact that the principle of legitimacy lies with sovereignty and nationalism, but much of the practice is hegemonic (Buzan and Little 2009, p.xxvi).

What this is to suggest is that we can still be in the territory of our good old international society rather than in post-sovereign or post-modern territory as variously referred to in the literature on European integration. Watson relieves us of the self-imposed requirement to consider international society with one theory; and supranationalism or the

European Union with another. Supranationalism can thus be treated as one of the ways in which we seek to order our different priorities such as independence, peace, prosperity or welfare.

The debate at the European Convention was not particularly interesting or engaging especially when the keyword to look out for was “legitimacy”. It kept revolving around these two notions of legitimacy as equality and as dual legitimacy. We could substitute “equality” for “legitimacy” where Watson (1992, p.323) suggested that “legitimacy is the lubricating oil of international societies”. At the European Convention, “equality” was the desired lubricating oil of the new European Union that was being agreed. This point was emphasized so insistently as if to remind one of Wight’s (1966, p.27) dictum that the international is the “realm of recurrence and repetition”. For Wight (1966, p.20), the reason for this cyclical pattern is the “moral poverty due to the prejudice imposed by states”. Consequently, the international realm is not amenable to a consideration of normative issues and remains concerned with survival.

Jackson (1990) has critically engaged this Wightian assertion in his contribution. Accordingly, Jackson finds that Wight does not problematize states and assumes that “good life” goes on within them and these states are entitled for survival in the international system (p.262). What Jackson proposes to do is to transport this concept of “good life” onto the international too. In his view, both international and domestic theory can be taken as theories of good life instead of treating the former merely as a theory of survival. In a more recent contribution, Neyer (2010) has suggested a version of this argument that is developed out of the experience of the European Union. Neyer proposes to move the “legitimacy” question of the European Union away from democracy and toward the idea of “transnational justice” which can be applied in all political spaces, state

as well as non-state. Once conceived in these terms, the legitimacy of the Union can be related to its contribution to transnational justice. In more specific terms, its legitimacy can be tied to how it “promotes the cause of justice by providing an effective remedy to horizontal and vertical power asymmetries, and to the arbitrariness of untamed anarchy” (Neyer 2010, p.918).

From my perspective, Watson’s theory or what I called his moralistic utopia does precisely what Jackson (1990) and Neyer (2010) are talking about. What this utopia claims in a nutshell is that it is this “good life” or “transnational justice” that a more and more hegemonic international society facilitates or seeks to facilitate. What the debate at the European Convention confirms is above all this – that we seek to reconcile or balance our conflicted priorities while entertaining the benefits of this “good life” at the same time.

It is on the basis of this idea of the “good life” that I would like to further my pursuit for a novel theory of supranational systems. The assumption that a “good life” can, and indeed does as in the case of the European Union, take place beyond borders raises significant issues for International Relations theory. Mainstream International Relations theory affords no room for a consideration of the existence, or lack thereof, of the concept of good life outside the boundaries of states. Its concern is primarily what goes on *between* states. In his much-debated essay, Wight (1960) subscribed to this position as well and argued that the international was not amenable to normative considerations along the lines of a good life. Wight’s position is not far from the communitarian vision either. In the broader literature, Rawls (1999) put in no uncertain terms that the international sphere does not submit to normative ideals since those require the preexistence of a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage as in a domestic society. The perspective of the communitarian wing within the English School fits this Rawlsian argument, and reserves the ideal of a good life,

if it is to thrive, to the boundaries of individual states. It actually appears that there is no suitable theoretical framework within conventional International Relations literature to analyze the presence of an EU-like scheme, which does work for the mutual advantage of its members and incorporates both the state and beyond-the-state levels of international politics.

The paucity of International Relations theory in dealing with beyond-the-state phenomena perhaps accounts for the tendency toward self-referential theorizing with respect to the European Union. This particular style of theorizing has its own limitations as suggested earlier in that it imposes a bias to construe the unfolding of the Union as a unique development. Revisiting the history of Europe itself, meanwhile, will suggest otherwise. The Concert of Europe system of the 19th - century, for instance, did resemble today's Union. For Kann (1960, p.335), the Concert was "a system of international politics according to supra-national and supra-party principles" designed to offer peace and stability for the continent. According to Elrod (1976, pp.168-70), it was the first instance of states foregoing interests in order not to be placed outside the moral community of Europe, and was a system that was capable of convincing states to observe limits in their actions for the collective maintenance of a peaceful European order. Watson (1992, p.240) discussed this system too. He noted that the Concert of Europe was the nearest the continent came to "legitimized hegemonial authority" with restraints imposed upon the external as well as upon on a more moderate scale on the internal actions of its member states. If not in form, then, the Concert of Europe system and the European Union do share similarities in substance. It is this kind of historical / comparative thinking that can free us of the limitations of self-referential theorizing and enable speculation of the forces that led to a supranational Concert of Europe system back in the 19th - century, or indeed to a

supranational European Union at present. Only then can we arrive at a systemic theory of supranational systems instead of particular theories of a supranational system called the European Union. Still, are we equipped with the kind of theoretical tools to deliver fully the systemic version?

I already hinted above that International Relations theory is parsimonious in this respect. The issue here is not the formation of a solidarist international society in which the member states become increasingly homogenous in terms of their internal constitution. Neither is it the formation of a world government in which the member states cease to exist and a universal authority regulates all matters. It is rather something in between these two alternatives in which a transnational space of politics emerges that is governed both by the member states and a number of new institutions such as the European Commission or the European Court of Justice. For Brown (1994a, p.182), as novel as this may all seem, the structure of the EU is in fact a source of tension for it is “[n]either fish nor fowl”, and the inhabitants no longer know who governs them. Brown’s point is essentially where this inquiry started, that is it is the same tension re-framed here in English School terms as that between international society and world society. In order to conclude the inquiry, I will focus on how in theoretical terms we can approach such a complex entity. For this purpose, I will first visit more recent approaches in the literature inspired by Marx and by Weber respectively that do shed light on the European Union. These two particular traditions have been selected since they both offer systemic explanations of the process of EU integration of the kind that I am interested in. In addition, they both deal with the state in their analyses. As explained earlier, “forms of state” are a key concept in the Neo-Gramscian literature and particular forms of states affect questions of war and peace in international affairs. In the Neo-Weberian literature, states are taken as autonomous actors whose

conduct can produce different outcomes in the relations between states. Following a review of the two literatures, I finally return to Watson below and argue that his theory provides the key to developing a fresh notion of supranationalism.

Of particular significance within the literature inspired by Marx is of course the Neo-Gramscian contribution. Here, I would like to focus especially on the so-called “Amsterdam Project” or the “Amsterdam School” whose contributors seek to apply Neo-Gramscian ideas to the process of European integration. For the Amsterdam School’s van Apeldoorn (2004), the main concept to be considered is “transnational” rather than “international” relations. Transnational relations are “social relations across and beyond national borders” (p.161) which link individuals’ lives, including even those who may not be in direct contact with another. For instance, a member of the international banking community based in London and another based in Hong Kong may not necessarily know each other, but they are still connected by virtue of their common participation in this particular community (p.162). For the Amsterdam School, international relations have always been about capitalist social relations while these relations have always, at least partially, been transnational as well. Meanwhile, transnational class formation is the chief facilitator of these relations (van Apeldoorn 2004). It is transnational class struggle that has shaped the process of European integration according to the Amsterdam School (Bieler 2002, 2005). For Bieler (2005, p.521), European integration is an open-ended historical development and constitutes “part of a structural change of the international system” through transnational class formation. Its social purpose is neo-liberal globalization, and the process is to continue as long as groups opposing EU integration fail to counter this hegemonic undertaking as far as the Amsterdam School is concerned (Bieler 2002, p.577).

Marxist or Neo-Gramscian literature thus proposes a concept of the international that transcends, even rejects, any sharp distinction between the international and the domestic. The international is simultaneously present within the domestic and indeed re-shapes the domestic. Not just the international but the transnational is crucial for the Amsterdam School in particular which explains European integration through the formation of transnational capitalist classes. Earlier, I discussed the similarities between the Neo-Gramscian and English School perspectives on hegemony, and suggested that the main difference lies in an emancipatory approach to the concept found in the former and a moralistic approach found in the latter, especially in the works of Watson. In this Chapter, I will take this comparison further with reference specifically to Neo-Gramscian approaches to European integration overviewed here. However, still to consider are accounts inspired by Weber.

In recent years, Neo-Weberian historical sociologists have been on the offensive espousing their theses on the development of the international system. For them, any separation between the domestic and the international is only a product of the modern era corresponding with the emergence of the system of states (Spruyt 1998, p.345). Neo-Weberian historical sociology seeks to trace historical change and rejects any reified notion of particular systems such as the current system of states. The sources of historical change are multi-causal in the Neo-Weberian understanding as different and multiple sources of power constantly interact to produce change. Neither there exists a single notion of space or a separation between the domestic and the international – space is interpenetrated for this approach (Hobson 1998a). The state, in the Neo-Weberian perspective, is construed as an autonomous variable and taken as a “Janus-faced and adaptive agency within a multi-power and multi-spatial social universe” (Hobson 1998a, p. 312).

There have been calls from influential figures in International Relations theory such as Fred Halliday for a closer association with Neo-Weberian historical sociology; and Andrew Linklater, for instance, utilized concepts from this School in his attempt to develop a critical theory of international affairs. Of particular significance to International Relations theory, it has been suggested, would be Neo-Weberianism's interest in system change and its promise in overcoming a-historical and reified notions of the state (Hobson 1998a, pp.296-7). The works of Michael Mann in particular have been revisited by those within the Neo-Weberian tradition keen on producing international theory. The English School's Adam Watson benefited from Mann's studies as well. According to Watson, volume I of the *The Sources of Social Power* (1986) by Mann is an "exceptionally thoughtful sociological study of the ancient systems (Watson 1992, p.327). In this piece, Mann, says Watson,

arrives at conclusions, coming from another angle, which closely accord with those which I had tentatively reached. For like myself he is clearly interested not only in the generation of power but in how it operated, its radial nature, its limitations and the shifts and compromises which it made, and therefore in the characteristics and functioning of the systems of states, some more imperially organized than others (Watson 1992, p.10).

The correspondence between the two bodies of work is not one-sided. Mann's research is not specifically geared toward international affairs although it can very well serve that end. What he does discuss regarding the international, Hobson (2005) notes following an overall review of Mann's writings, aligns with the English School framework. Mann (1986, p.1) defined the objective of his studies as an attempt to produce a "history and theory of power in human societies" and the notion of power he in the end comes up with is similar to Watson's as he himself states. In more precise terms, there are four sources of social power according to Mann which are ideological, economic, military and political.

Societies, which are “constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” are to be understood in terms of the interrelationships among these four sources of social power (Mann 1986, p.2). Each particular source of power gives rise to its own organizations or institutions, and at any given time one of these organizational forms comes to dominate over the others and shapes the remaining elements of social life. However, there will constantly be a re-organization among the sources of power and this is how the historical process continues (Mann 1986, pp.28-30). The domination of the economic, in particular, is the key to understanding the unification of Europe at this moment in time from Mann’s (1993) perspective. It is the capitalistic organization of power that has homogenized Europe in a geopolitically secure environment in the post-War period. There is also a historical trend underwriting this European process of integration for Mann. Throughout history, not a single political entity has provided for all the functions of social life such as macroeconomic planning or militarism until the state has emerged. In Europe, what is happening is the re-emergence of this historical trend whereby different political entities are again providing for different aspects of social life (Mann 1993, pp.137-139).

Neo-Weberian approaches thus put forward the suggestion that the international and the domestic penetrate one another to constitute a multispatial sphere, and outcomes in this sphere are the result of multicausal factors. Neo-Gramscians, and the members of the Amsterdam School in particular, would subscribe to the idea of multispatiality which is to suggest in simple terms that the domestic and the international are co-constitutive. However, there is less of a congruence between the two schools of thought when it comes to multicausality. The Neo-Gramscian approach, and indeed its Marxist heritage, are reductionist even if they purport to advance a multicausal analysis. They are reductionist in

the sense that class relations are the dominant causal factor in their final analysis. As Hobson (1998b, p.357) argues, each one of Cox's categories is, in itself, defined in the end in class terms. The Amsterdam School is not much different in this respect. Their approach to the formation and enlargement of the European Union is based on the building up of a transnational capitalist class across member and candidate countries. Of course, there is much to be gained from an analysis of the impact of class relations or of a broader economic model like capitalism in an attempt to understand the formation of supranational systems. However, an analysis based solely on this is inadequate to attend to a subject that does indeed require a multicausal framework. Besides, a class-centered perspective does not answer the question why the European experience has not been replicated in any significant way elsewhere around the globe.

As mentioned earlier, it has been suggested that the lack of a coherent discussion of international economic issues in the English School literature could be addressed by supplementing it with concepts from the Neo-Gramscian School (Clark 2011). Following our dissatisfaction with the reductionism of the Neo-Gramscian account, the question that now needs to be posed is if this juxtaposition still desirable. After all, our search was for a theory that enabled an understanding of international economic affairs. However, resorting to the Neo-Gramscian School, and indeed to the Amsterdam School, left us with one that is *economistic* instead. Moreover, both Schools leave us with the expectation that there will be emancipatory outcomes from the spread of capitalism globally, or from the further development of the European Union along the wishes of transnational capitalist classes within it. However, no specific criteria are set as to when or under what conditions such outcomes will emerge. One is thus left wondering how a counter-hegemonic project will succeed or how the argument would proceed if it were to never emerge. This takes us back

to the main difference between emancipatory and moralistic approaches to hegemony advanced by Neo-Gramscians and by the English School's Watson respectively. The crucial question to speculate here is if hegemony necessarily leads to a counter-hegemony in an emancipatory fashion, or can it become a vehicle for a "good life" in a moralistic fashion.

My reading of the European Convention confirms the latter, that is the moralistic, approach. Of course, many objections were raised in relation to particular policies or powers of the Union yet the existence as well as the utility of the organization itself were not called into question. Chapter 6 already examined the strengths of the moralistic approach in detail. It is the moralistic approach that construes the relationship between international society and world society in strongest terms, and challenges assumptions about the nature of relations between "independent" states with a view to presenting a different story of international relations. I would like to take up at this moment the question of how we tend to treat in theoretical terms the notion of conflicting or opposing forces in international affairs. What is striking is that there exists a marked inclination to associate these forces with a Marxist framework. Is it the case, however, that contradictions lend themselves only to a Marxist reading? I should suggest that the English School offers a major alternative to Marxism in this sense. The three elements of international system, international society and world society, to begin with, connote this sense of oppositional co-existence, and Watson (1992) in particular takes this a step further into the domain of supranational systems through the pendulum analogy.

It becomes possible through this analogy to interpret contradictory forces in a way that does not necessarily gravitate toward emancipatory outcomes. Instead, we can make our peace with these forces and order them to work for our benefit. It is true that

contradictions arise – such as a much desired yearning for “equality” and the fact that the practice of international affairs is conducted on unequal terms. Nevertheless, we do find a way to carry on with the business of statehood or with that of being a member of the European Union. Earlier, I explained why in the end states do carry on with a contradictory system through the “*raison de systeme*” (Watson 1982) concept, and this concept tells us why contradictions can be accommodated without necessarily unleashing emancipatory outcomes.

Conclusion: the Neo-Weberian State Meets the English School of International Relations

My inquiry thus ends with a call for a “dissident” theory of supranationalism, based on the work of the dissident member of the English School, Adam Watson. Yet this will be a qualified call since a major weakness in Watson’s work is still to be addressed. Throughout the inquiry, I kept questioning the non-cases of the formation of legitimate supranational systems under conditions that Watson would have expected them to take place. A particularly important case was the Middle East. The reason why Watson’s framework does not apply in some cases where it should have is because of his lack of a theory of the state. That a theory of the state was required for an understanding of supranational systems was one of the conclusions that I reached at the end of Chapter 5 when analyzing the contributions of Bull and Vincent. These two figures were aware that certain forms of governance such as supranationalism were not equally appealing all around the world. For instance, recently independent states were more keen on this new status of independence which represented the end of Western domination to them (Bull 1979a, pp.152-3). Both Bull and Vincent suggested that a Western tradition of individualism contributed there to

the idea of transcending the state while the non-Western world viewed the state as a vehicle to combat the influence of the West (Vincent 1992, p.262; Bull 1979a, pp.152-3). Still, none of them took this discussion further into a systematic analysis of the role of states in the formation of different types of international systems. Neither does broader International Relations theory fare well in this respect. Particularly under the influence of Neo-Realism, International Relations theory has overlooked the notion of “different states”, and assumed that all states act as similar units under the imposing requirements of the international system.

For his part, Watson was very well aware that not all states were the same. Indeed, he was one of the chief opponents of the assumption that all states can be treated as if they were the same. The chief distinction between states from his standpoint is between those states that can and cannot manage an independent statehood. However, the implications of this chief difference, if any, to his pendulum metaphor are not exacted. Why is it that a “good life” can be achieved under an increasingly more hegemonic system in Europe, and not, say, in the Middle East or Africa? Why, to put it differently, is the “international” so resilient to change in some places and not in others? What persistently emerged throughout the analysis is that something other than the presence of a common culture should matter to the pendulum to be able to answer these questions, and that it seems are indeed those differences between states that Watson is so eager to emphasize himself.

My proposed solution to address this weakness in Watson’s work is to incorporate into it a sociology of state from familiar territory – that is from Neo-Weberian historical sociology. As Hobson (1998a, p.295) notes, Neo-Weberian analyses allow room for the state and state / society relations in the analysis of international affairs. So do Marxist analyses yet there exists once again the problem of economic determinism found in this

literature. For Weberians, Mann (1986, p.12) maintains, the economic cannot be the ultimate determinant of societies as in Marxism since they are too complex for uni-causal analysis. As mentioned earlier, Mann (1986) proposes to analyze societies through the interplay of four sources of power: ideological, economic, military and political. Of course, these different sources of power do not float freely. What matters is the maintenance of a “socio-spatial capacity for organization” (Mann 1986, p.3) of these sources of power. What seems to be plaguing most of the developing world is the rather weak capacity of its states to organize these sources of power in a meaningful way for a variety of reasons. In distinction, the states of Europe have been significantly more successful than their counterparts in the developing world in terms of their capacity for organizing various sources of power into strong and effective states. It is possible to construe the European Union as a nearly continent-wide extension of this capacity for socio-spatial organization with some sources of power more effectively organized than others. For instance, the ideological, which in Mann’s usage is largely equal to culture, and the military sources of power have less of a reach. The economic, meanwhile, has nearly universal reach. Different member states may have different aspirations regarding a particular source of power as well. The degree of supranational authority acceptable to the French, for instance, is higher than it is in some of the other member states. Actually, the French were disappointed that there was not enough degree of supranational authority in the Constitutional Treaty regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. On this front, the Treaty failed to satisfy the French vision of a “Grande Europe”, a super power on the world scene, led by France (Grossman 2007, p.985). The United Kingdom, and several other member states, on the other hand, have vehemently opposed the idea of

further supranationalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy throughout the Convention.

What was indeed missing in Watson's pendulum framework was this very notion that different states or groups of states have a different capacity to organize themselves in certain ways. As the development of the European Union demonstrates, the strong states of Europe have exhibited a greater sociospatial capacity for organizing various sources of power in a beyond-the-state fashion. Still, many of the dilemmas of international affairs persist there as well. I have attempted an English School inquiry into understanding this state of affairs, and would like to conclude by proposing the main contours of this theory of legitimate supranational systems as follows.

A fresh theory of legitimate supranationalism should be centered around a problematization of the concept of "equality". Indeed, from whichever direction we approached the concept of legitimacy at the European Convention, it ended up with equality. We could not escape this sense of legitimacy tied to equality. I should propose after my reading of the European Convention that supranational systems appear as one of the ways in which we seek to cope with a perennial condition of (in)equality, and they become legitimate to the extent that they maintain this principle. Suzerainty is a second concept around which we should re-order our thinking about supranational systems. Suzerainty is the *belief* that there needs to be a center and there is open acknowledgment of its desirability. It is the belief that there needs to be a strong European Union that dominated the Convention in an increasingly globalizing world. Yet this belief was induced less by a culturalist line of reasoning and more by structural reasons in the international system. As it was often put at the Convention, a strong Union was the only means through which the members could cope with the "giants" in the world. In a way, this

is also bound up with that insistent concept of equality – this time with a view to being on equal terms with the non-EU powers in the world rather than equality within the EU itself. Suzerainty directly challenges the usually negative or resentful treatment that the notion of hegemony receives. As Watson emphasizes persistently, however, it can be a desirable situation.

It thus becomes a question of how we reconcile the resulting dilemma: how do we remain equals in a suzerain system? It is my contention that the key to understanding how we sustain legitimate supranational systems lies in the way in which we seek to answer this question. It becomes a question of how we address our fundamental desire for equality, with that for the desire, or indeed an openly acknowledged need, for a center. Bruton, the Irish speaker at the Convention, succinctly summarizes the answer around the concept of subsidiarity which stipulates that the European Union can act only when it is necessary for it to do so. As he puts it, he feels that “a lot of the elaborate structuration of subsidiarity in the EU is an attempt to avoid admitting that there are some questions in life, and in politics, to which there are no satisfactory answers, in this world at least” (Bruton 2002b).

Of course, it is in this world that we need to come up with creative responses to this question. At the end of this inquiry, we arrived at dichotomous concepts that seem to stand at odds with one another: equality vs. hegemony; nation-states vs. supranational systems, and a notion of legitimacy that lurks behind all of them which insists for the most part to remain linked to the former concepts of equality and nation-states. The legitimacy of the latter concepts of hegemony and supranational systems requires us to cope with the contradiction arising between our ideals and practical imperatives. Watson wrote in a 1976-paper for the British Committee that each state system at any given time had a general legitimizing principle, “limited by certain others. The general principle is one of

right. The limiting principles are those of expediency rather than right: they overrule the general principle at the margins” (quoted in Cochran 2009, p.217). If the general legitimizing principle of our particular system is equality, the expedient thing for the members of the Union has been to establish a strong center with supranational powers. Its legitimacy will remain tied to how much or how far the principle of equality will be overruled by the desire to maintain a powerful European Union. This clash between the ideal vs. the expedient things to do should be the starting point for re-shaping our thinking about legitimate supranational systems.

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