Ashton, Natalie Alana (2013). The best candidate for an epistemic contextualist response to scepticism: methodological contexualism. University of Birmingham. M.Phil.
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Abstract
In this thesis I promote Michael Williams’s methodological contextualism as the best candidate for a contextualist response to scepticism. Often when people talk about contextualist responses to scepticism they think of a particular branch of contextualism, a group of semantic theses. In the first two sections I explain how this semantic contextualist view is thought to amount to a response to scepticism, and consider how well the most popular form – attributor semantic contextualism – fares against a number of objections. I highlight two features of attributor Contextualism as the source of these problems.
In sections 3 and 4 I explain the alternative inferential contextualism which Williams offers, and the other features of his methodological contextualism response to scepticism. I show that his view avoids the objections raised against the more popular attributor view because it doesn’t have the two features I highlight as problematic. As it stands, Williams’s methodological view does not offer a complete response to scepticism, but I suggest two additions which can be made to it to remedy this. In section 5 I conclude that Williams’s view, with my suggested addition, offers the best way forward for those wanting to respond to the sceptic in a contextualist manner.
Type of Work: | Thesis (Masters by Research > M.Phil.) | ||||||
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Award Type: | Masters by Research > M.Phil. | ||||||
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College/Faculty: | Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Arts & Law | ||||||
School or Department: | Department of Philosophy, Theology and Religion | ||||||
Funders: | None/not applicable | ||||||
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) | ||||||
URI: | http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/4114 |
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