TO WHAT EXTENT CAN BRITISH NEWSREEL COVERAGE OF THE KOREAN WAR BE CONSIDERED PROPAGANDIST IN NATURE?

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A Thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham

For the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

School of History and Cultures

University of Birmingham

March 2012

ABSTRACT

Throughout history ‘myth’ has developed from events on the battlefield, often, the creation and circulation of ‘propagandist interpretations’ has been deliberately pursued by belligerents. Nonetheless, definitive clarifications of how and why mythologies develop remain difficult to establish. Theorists have however provided a theoretical model facilitating examination of the ideologies encoded within texts.

This thesis suggests social communication remains ‘self-gratifying’ to the encoder and decoder and will explore how and why ideological interpretations of events, forwarded by those who circulate information, may be considered propagandist in nature within the historical context of the Korean War.

Significant quantities of audio-visual material provided a valuable sample of media coverage which constructed the ‘reality’ of events for the cinema industry’s target audience of predominantly working class patrons. This reality defined the United Nations only military clash with aggressive communism, during a period of significant international tension. This study will focus upon diplomatic activity, the military situation and British aspects of the conflict between mid-1950 and late January 1951; illustrating how audio-visual material sought to insulate a section of British society against the ideologies of Soviet sponsored communism. Thus the Cold War was fought on the cinema screen in addition to the battlefield.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Professor J.A.S. Grenville

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The assistance of the following is gratefully acknowledged: special thanks to Dr Gavin Schaffer, Senior Lecturer in British History at the University of Birmingham for his direct supervision, patience, support and encouragement throughout, particularly concerning the expansion of my academic horizons. Thank you must also go to the staff of the University of Birmingham's Post Graduate Department, Learning Support Service, Library and relevant university and external archives for their friendly, supportive and efficient service. Finally, thanks to my family and friends who have endured my repeated absence over the duration of this study.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation

IRD - Information Research Department

MAD - Mutually Assured Distribution

MOI - Ministry Of Information

NKPA - North Korean People's Republic

POW - Prisoner Of War

ROK - Republic of Korea (often used to describe the armed forces)

UN - United Nations

UNC - United Nations Command

US/USA - United States of America

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

During the twentieth century nations and individuals alike faced no greater challenge than the experience of warfare. Given the frequency, geographic diversity and increasingly industrial nature of those experiences, perhaps the greatest challenge to face mankind during this period was how, in future, to avert the outbreak of all-consuming warfare. The rise of polarised political ideologies, following the traumatic experiences of the First World War, served to increase the probability of conflict. For the progressive Western liberal democracies, neither ideological absolute maintained particular appeal while both often provoked revulsion amongst Western leaders. Nazi Germany, although conservative and anti-communist, was militaristic and expansive in temperament. The Soviet Union was viewed with similar suspicion due to its revolutionary doctrines, despite being a necessary ally in the fight against Fascism from 1941 to 1945. Thus, with the final defeat of National Socialism in 1945, the likelihood of a clash between the liberal democracies and the world's surviving totalitarian power bloc became increasingly likely. Indeed, significant political personalities in the West began warning of such tensions prior to the fall of the Third Reich and were aware of the increased dangers following the advent of nuclear weapons.

Thus mankind had reached the apex of total war, as by 1949 the world's leading and competing superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, possessed the power to effectively end civilisation. The ideological alliance system which emerged from 1945 saw the competing political entities experience friction in two main geographic regions: Central

Europe and the Far East.[1] The Berlin air lift became one of the best known examples of increased tensions in the immediate post war era, as did the establishment of communism on mainland China by 1949.[2]

The advent of atomic weapons changed the nature of warfare as total victory or irrecoverable defeat were no longer viable conclusions to pursue, particularly as a nuclear power, or one supporting an ideological satellite on the verge of defeat, may unleash its atomic arsenal to stave off capitulation. Thus the doctrine of 'mutually assured destruction' [MAD], entered the political vocabulary of the Cold War era.[3] This nihilistic concept can trace its origins to the doctrine of limited war, one that had been thrashed out on the hills of the Korean Peninsula between 1950 and 1953 in the world's first major post-war conflict.

Initially the communist North had pursued a swift conclusion to the fighting through a mechanised drive into South Korea. Total victory was later courted by American military and political leaders, culminating in MacArthur's drive to the Yaul River in late 1950. However, both sides eventually learnt that pursuit of total war aims may draw in larger powers and increase the risk of escalating toward nuclear confrontation in the event of general war between the USA and the Soviet Union. Despite a great deal of sabre rattling by the United States, regarding the deployment of atomic weapons on the battlefield and against mainland China, it is testament to American reserve that 'the bomb' was never deployed, during the

[1] Although Africa and the oil rich Middle East can also be considered significant zones of ideological competition.
[2] For a reliable exploration of the events of the immediate post Second World War period see, J.L. Gaddis, *The Cold War* (London, 2005), pp. 1-68.
[3] See P.M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day* (Manchester, 2003), p. 251.

most dire periods of fighting, where the military situation was bleak and American casualties significant. However, this reserve may have been rooted in the desire to avoid antagonising the UN assembly, or domestic and international public opinion; particularly as the opinion of America's allies was entirely opposed to an escalation of hostilities.[4]

Thus the 'total war' taking place inside Korea developed, through strategic necessity, into the new concept of 'limited war'. The moderate aims of this untried concept were effectively pursued by General Ridgway approximately seven months into the conflict. The transition to a limited war was a difficult one for all parties. America was riding high on victory in the Second World War, anti-communist hysteria at home and a desire to repel aggression in Korea, whilst Asiatic communism had become merged with triumphant nationalism. These factors encouraged both sides to initially flirt with total war objectives. As the war stagnated upon static lines, the threat of escalation receded gradually and the status-quo of pre 1950 began to return around the 38th parallel, the concept of limited war became entrenched in the world's military-political psyche.

However, this transition presented Western authorities with significant difficulties beyond the military and international political spheres. The nature of authoritarian communist regimes allowed central control of media output by the authorities. The majority of press activity was directed by the party, thus the media behaved as a mouth piece of state. Ideological divergence would bring severe punishment, thus ensuring the media did not

[4] The sentiment which existed amongst America's allies was well known at the time and discussed by J.M. Hightower in his article for the Associated Press on 26 March 1951. This article, amongst other dispatches from the Korean War can be found in N. Lande, *Dispatches from the Front: a History of the American War Correspondent* (Oxford, 1996), p. 281.

contradict or challenge the official line. Such a structure led Taylor to conclude that the totalitarian bloc began the Cold War power struggle with an advantage.[5]

However, the output of the press, operating within a liberal democracy cannot legitimately be centrally directed by state authorities. The exception to this would be during war time, where official censorship can be legally introduced and enforced. The first and second global wars thus required democratic authorities to introduce such codes of practice to govern the media, as a formal declaration of war existed. However, unlike these conflicts, the clash in Korea initially was not defined as 'war' but as a 'police action'. This theoretically allowed both sides to engage in battle, without needing to pursue the total objectives of a full scale conflict and thus helped prevent the escalation of the fighting and further ensured the two superpowers remained theoretically, officially and legally at peace.

The blurred distinction between official theoretical peace and practical war caused significant problems between Western authorities and media corporations. Full official censorship could not legitimately be introduced in the absence of a formal declaration of war, although the severity of the circumstances, particularly following Chinese intervention of November 1950, necessitated some form of regulation, as the media could and often unintentionally did, behave irresponsibly; in this respect the totalitarian bloc enjoyed an initial advantage controlling media output.

[5] Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind,* p. 253.

Furthermore, one must additionally sympathise with Western media professionals who naturally resented any interference with their professional methods and output by official agency. However, under such volatile circumstances 'normal' and unofficial peace-time methods of influencing the democratic media may well have been insufficient to ensure authorities maintained sufficient control over the situation required to avoid a disaster, either politically, militarily or domestically amongst public opinion; a crisis within one or more of these spheres could well have undermined Britain's international political position and presented the communist bloc with an exploitable advantage.

In order to safeguard against such a scenario, following the secession of hostilities with Nazi Germany, British authorities retained parts of the war-time media management system,[6] possibly through anticipation of increased tensions with the Soviet Union. The existence of the informal D-Notice Committee was perhaps the most significant. In addition, Jenks' illuminating work suggests that experienced gained during the Second World War kept early Cold War journalism "tightly self-disciplined"; thus negating the need for stringent official control.[7] The scholar furthermore argues that journalists did not feel compelled to challenge the ideologies of hegemonic groups, simply through acceptance of the 'common sense consensus', which many concurred with consciously or not.[8]

Amongst other informative comments, particularly concerning a brief evaluation of current literature on British Cold War propaganda activities,[9] Jenks discussed the activities of

[6] J. Jenks, *British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War* (2006, Edinburgh), p. 17.
[7] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 2.
[8] Ibid., p. 1.
[9] Ibid., p. 5.

the officially sponsored Information Research Department [IRD], which gathered factual information and subsequently fed it into the mainstream media for propagandist purposes.[10] As "The full power of the information state was turned towards exposing and attacking Soviet Russia in every way possible",[11] Jenks details that a decade of vetting BBC staff for communist sympathies, undertaken by MI5 from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, had ensured few Soviet sympathisers graduated into, or remained in the ranks.[12] Despite Jenks' claim that most vetting occurred spontaneously and was implemented organically within media corporations, the evidence of limited official vetting, to some extent, detracts from Hoggart's "high conspiracy theory", concerning the process of media recruitment.[13]

However, it is important to remind ourselves that Hoggart, first writing in 1976, arrived during a period when Cold War tensions remained a considerable factor in global politics, thus the work of the Glasgow Media Group did not enjoy the transparency of archive material which is accessible after sufficient time has elapsed. Furthermore the scholarly body was at the forefront of research and thus encountered the initial reaction which often accompanies ground-breaking and thus often controversial research.[14] Moreover, it remains important to recall that Stuart Hall and Hoggart studied the generic process affecting the communication process and 'text construction' and therefore could not be expected to account for every detail of phenomenal historical circumstances.

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[10] The most illuminating comments concerning IRD activity can be found on the following pages. Jenks, *British Propaganda,* pp. 62-67.
[11] Ibid., p. 27.
[12] Ibid., p. 47.
[13] The 'High conspiracy theory' suggests that the media is influenced by government in a less direct and more subtle manner including the control of the process by which media organisations recruit employees, which in turn would help keep the agenda tightly controlled. R. Hoggart, *Bad News* (London, 1976), p. xi.
[14] So much is evident from the defence contained within Hoggart's forward, which describes some media hostility to the groups work and findings. See, Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. ix-xiii.

Finally, Jenks' most valuable comment concerns the structure of early Cold War propaganda. Speed and factual accuracy were the cornerstones of such material,[15] which thus confirms the importance of news based audio-visual material to our topic of discussion, as both factors remain indispensable to the mediums of social communication, for its economic viability in the private business sphere. Thus the reader can begin to understand how the requirements of media industries and priorities of state remained similar, whilst maintaining their independence from one another. Therefore Jenks' efforts have begun to explore how the official boundary of state-media interaction became blurred in response to the threats posed during the early stages of the Cold War.

The work of Stuart Hall remains indispensable to a topic of discussion such as this, particularly as the scholar helps unravel the complexities of the process by which media texts are produced, are susceptible to an ideological interpretation/manipulation and suggests appropriate methods by which to study them. To briefly summarise the working method: an in-depth content analysis of audio-visual media texts from a selected time frame shall be undertaken, which, following the application of both Hall's theoretical model and Jenks' interpretations (amongst others), will allow a reader to chart the extent to which news texts may be considered propagandist in nature and if so, what influenced the process responsible for their creation. This will allow us to gain further understanding of how the early stages of the Cold War were reported to mass Western audiences.[16]

[15] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 100.
[16] However, we shall say little of the effect this coverage had on popular opinion as to chart the dynamics of such a complex entity would require a study much more vast in scope than found here.

Much debate exists concerning the compatibility of the Western media-state system with the values of democracy. This issue shall be briefly elaborated upon further into our discussion, however, for now the debate may be outlined in general terms. Some may argue that the process by which media content was influenced was incompatible with democratic values, as the end product, produced consciously or not, involved the manipulation of the mass audiences and thus constituted an example of social control. This interpretation, grounded in Marxist theory, maintains a multitude of merits, as it assists us to chart how power in a democratic society is transmitted, transferred, replicated and thus maintained. However, others may adopt a more practical approach in order to reconcile the friction between significant, yet theoretical, values and specific practical circumstance.

Whilst it remains of fundamental importance to the maintenance of democracy to remain vigilant towards any attempted misuse of the state-media relationship, in order to prevent significant trespass, citizens must nonetheless remain aware of the value of this relationship in the safeguarding of shared social values. This remains a particularly significant issue as the media, predominantly organically, help to direct public opinion concerning how authorities respond or may have responded to threatening circumstances. Extraordinary circumstance can necessitate the implementation of measures which under typical circumstances would have been considered undesirable, yet remained implemented whilst a threat persisted.[17] Both perspectives shall be employed in order to determine the extent, if any, to which British newsreel coverage of the Korean conflict may be considered

[17] Jenks makes this distinction when he records that the D-Notice Committee continued to function into the 1960s, albeit in a modified form, as the international climate evolved. Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 54.

propagandist in nature and how events were portrayed to the domestic audience, when the fragile post-war peace met one of its most significant challenges in the summer of 1950.

As the international situation deteriorated in the period preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, British authorities began to develop methods of exerting influence over the corporate media. This witnessed the Ministry of Information [MOI] along with the established British Board of Film Censors [BBFC] develop a closer relationship with the domestic media. For a robust exploration of the period see James Chapman's, *The British at War: Cinemas, State and Propaganda 1939-1945.*[18] It is here the reader finds the factual basis of Jenks' claim that the British media of the early Cold War remained "disciplined" based on this experience.[19]

However, Taylor concluded that the cinema apparatus, as a method of conveying officially sponsored information within the democracies, was less well developed, systematised and centralised, when compared to totalitarian societies.[20] Naturally the reader would expect this when compared against autocratic state-media systems. However, given the multitude of factors which made cinema and later television a 'vehicle' through which desirable or undesirable ideology could be conducted, it should come as no surprise that,

[18] J. Chapman, *The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945* (London, 1998).
[19] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 2.
[20] Found in Chapman, *British at War,* pp. 4-5.

during periods of emergency, military and political authorities seek to influence media content.[21]

The popularity of the cinema, along with radio, as a means of mass entertainment was undeniable, as were the economic benefits of possessing the means of communication in a society whose ethos was centred on recreation and material consumption. Newsreel companies maintained a monopoly over public access to the moving image and thus were courted by advertisers and authorities alike. This may also be applied to the development of television as the new medium afforded an increased ability to communicate with the viewer.

However, it is this curious mix of entertainment and economy which led Hoggart to state that the audio-visual media inherited the majority of its values from the populist end of the press.[22] A similar conclusion may be drawn from *Power without Responsibility* by J Curran and J Seaton.[23] This in itself, helps effect the composition of audience demographics and has led Hoggart[24] and Stuart Hood,[25] amongst others, to develop criteria for the categorisation of viewers and target audiences, which is often, but not entirely, based on economic and educational characteristics. Thus we shall assume the majority of the cinema

[21] Indeed, the Foreign Office funded a newsreel camera trip to record allied naval manoeuvres following the signing of the Brussels Pact in 1949. Given the availability of funding we can assume there had been some preconceived advantage to including such material in cinema newsreels. Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 16.
[22] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. x.
[23] J. Curran, and J. Seaton, *Power without Responsibility; The Press, Broadcasting, and New Media in Britain* (London, 2003).
[24] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. 3.
[25] S. Hood, *Behind the Screens, the Structure of British Television*, (London, 1994).

newsreel audience belonged to soci-economic 'Category C'.[26] Thus it can reasonably assumed that the majority of those who viewed cinema newsreels covering the Korean War had significantly reduced access to the languages of power within a Western society, principally education and financial affluence. Therefore, the reader may assume that newsreel companies often produced features consciously tailored for consumption by such an audience in order to retain their entertainment value and as a result financial profitability.[27]

This may help to explain, beyond limitations of available production resources and the limited running time of features, why few, if any, newsreels contained information which would have explained to a 'Category C' decoder the logic underpinning Britain's position beyond claims that North Korean aggression was a challenge to freedom. In addition, the consideration of the target audiences mental parameters may help us to understand why coverage assumed such a notably moral tone, thus permitting the viewer to absorb information based on a well-entrenched mental framework of simplistic social values; right versus wrong. In addition the newsreel coverage expressed a strong sense of the decoder's participation in and responsibility toward a collectivised cause based on the moral aspect of defensive collective security against communist sponsored aggression.

Such phraseology may have been a conscious attempt to ease the integration of information into the viewer's mental 'map of meaning' which thus would have aided a

[26] Hoggart's research clearly identifies the 'Category C' viewer as the prime consumer of texts produced by the more populist end of the media spectrum. Hoggart, *Bad News*, pp. 2-4.
[27] Furthermore, it is possible to consider the cultural behaviour of this audience bracket to reflect the social ethos of the 'Category C' viewer which, particularly in the immediate post-war period may be described as supporting a 'work hard-play hard' mentality, which mixed demanding physical labour with 'stimulating' recreational activity; the highly emotive aspect of this culture can additionally be considered a defining factor of the 'Category C' decoder.

successful transfer of ideology.[28] Therefore, the early stage of the coverage of the Korean conflict exhibits high levels of simplified moral encoding within media texts, which occurred from a media consideration of audience bracket and populist media values of speed (and occasionally content values more akin to sensationalism), which resulted in over simplification of the issue at hand. This becomes particularly noticeable when readers consider that the class element of the ideological conflict was essentially ignored by newsreel coverage, as inclusion would have exposed audiences to oppositional ideologies within the Cold War context. It is here that one may perceive the texts to exert the 'feel' of a public information campaign, similar to those found in war-time, which implored the viewer to positive action and also conveyed an in-group/out-group mentality commonly associated with the fundamental principles of deliberate persuasion and the unconscious process of social-political communication alike.[29] However, as well shall see, much of this 'feel' was created by the complex and multifaceted factors which helped shape media content in a commercial democracy as described by media theorists.

It is now necessary to define our terms. Much scholarly effort underpins the on-going quest to offer an all-encompassing definition of the term propaganda and how to define an object that maintains propagandist qualities. To some the term simply means 'biased communication', although this may appear too simplistic given the intricacies of the process involved. To others like Hoggart, who consider this term too loaded, the term "artificially shaped" suffices to encompass the often unconscious influences that 'the fact' is subjected to

[28] See the chapter of this thesis which discusses the theory underpinning the study of mass media in a democracy.
[29]N.J. O'Shaughnessy's ideas on this will be discussed in more detail later, within the main body of the thesis.

during the process through which it journeys.[30] Jenks considers the role of the propagandist text one of "exploiting (often factual) information", although this assumes a more conscious and deliberate process underpinning a texts creation and circulation.[31]

O'Shaughnessy who suggests there exists a lack of consensus amongst scholars concerning the definition, considers the term to remain "open ended", due to the volume of "historical baggage" associated with it, which leads Western culture to interpret 'propaganda/propagandising' as a negative entity.[32] In addition, O'Shaughnessy perceives the phenomenon as a purely social one.[33] Furthermore the scholar suggests that a propagandist text or symbol is often defined primarily by its emotive significance; this remains a valid point as emotional manipulation can often be the swiftest route to persuasion and remains a common feature of texts orientated towards persuasion.[34] Again however, this assumes a more direct and deliberate approach underpinning the matter.

Whilst something that exhibits propagandist qualities will often demonstrate many of these characteristics, including 'intent' manifest within production, advocacy and appeal to reason (or not),[35] the term 'social phenomenon' comes closest to helping us define propaganda. Social actions are spawned of human nature, whilst human nature remains the product of both a conscious and unconscious psychological process and responses, orientated

[30] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. ix.
[31] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 4.
[32]N.J. O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Manchester, 2004), p. 13.
[33] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 13-36.
[34]Although we must recall that emotive appeal is often a feature within or a form of entertainment.
[35] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 14.

towards survival. Therefore, to engage in the act of communicating/propagandising may be a product of conscious or unconscious impulses; thus propaganda must be defined in relation to both psychology and human nature, as the majority of the encoding/decoding process, which underpins social communication, takes place within the human mind, or as Hall may term it, the imagination.[36] Indeed, the only physical evidence scholars may acquire of this predominantly mental transfer of ideology is manifest within symbolic texts and the social response to any message they may contain. Thus Hall's suggestion that detailed content analysis of media texts and the observation of social response should feature heavily within the researcher's activities is well founded.

The scholarly opinions offered above encompass much merit and are worthy of intense consideration by those who seek to expand their understanding of how the Western media functions. However, some disparity exists, arising from the extent scholars consider the creation and circulation of, what may be considered, propagandist texts to be a deliberate/conscious act undertaken by both the media and officialdom, as one interested party, to some extent, remained aware of the requirements of the other. Whilst few within the consensual academic majority consider the media deliberately and malignly dominated by hegemonic authorities,[37] some including Shaw and Jenks, describe direct intervention, in the form of censorship, as a more common occurrence, during phenomenal circumstances, than others such as Hall and Hoggart. This may be the product of equally valid, yet contrasting approaches to the topic. Shaw and Jenks detail the interaction of state and media during the

[36] Hall's theoretical model will be considered in greater detail within the next chapter.
[37] However, Gramsci's understanding of hegemony would consider the mass media and society as saturated with the concept to such a degree that the domination of individuals and society conscious can be considered fundamental, illustrated by the limited pace at which society changes, or in relation to this topic, the limited and ideologically distorted depiction of oppositional ideologies and events. See, M.W. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (London, 2004), pp. 4-5.

time of specific and intense crisis referred to as the early stages of the Cold War, based on archival access to files singularly related to this period.

In contrast, Hall and Hoggart's approach examines the process by which news is constructed in general and accordingly offer an explanation which correctly perceived little official influence over the media during daily practice in 'normal' circumstances, where the negotiated resolution of friction between competing social power blocs, no matter how severe the crisis between unions and authorities for example, does not heighten the risks of nuclear confrontation and thus reduces the need for official interference with media output. Media theorists therefore, consider the conscious and unconscious thoughts and actions of media professionals as central to the process, where Shaw and Jenks consider this the backbone of the process, only with increased official influence involved.

Naturally the theoretical explanations of Hall and Hoggart's approach contain much that underpins day to day media activity in times of conflict, although it perhaps lacks some of the more specific details recorded by Shaw and Jenks. These studies contain much that is relevant to the understanding and exploration of the question posed here. Therefore, a careful integration of the two may assist us to form an approximate understanding of the extent to which newsreel material may be considered propagandist in nature and if so, offer analytical speculation as to why this may be the case. Naturally, any conclusions drawn from this thesis

and the media texts it analyses, may be considered relative to the individual, given the individualistic nature of the transferee and interpretation of ideology.[38]

Despite the merits manifest within the studies described above, the reader remains lacking a definition that accurately describes the 'nature' of propaganda and the 'nature' of the process responsible for its production, including an accommodation of both the 'deliberate' and 'unconscious' shaping of the ideologies contained within a text, whilst equally accounting for the role of the 'replicator' within the communication/propagandising process. In essence our definition of propaganda must encompass both the deliberate and unconscious nature of how material orientated towards a particular perception is constructed and circulated. This maintains particular significance as a propagandist text, produced deliberately or not, relies on the media for transmission; social communication, and the act of propagandising consciously or not, is therefore best defined by its nature- instinctively 'self-gratifying' and a product of the survival instinct, as discussed below.

In the natural world the best adapted will rise to dominance, something to which human-kind remains no exception. The adaption of a human is based upon personal abilities and/or fortune of circumstance, whether created by one's own efforts or inherited. However, whilst the species evolves, the animalistic nature persists and unfortunately often manifests its-self in our more negative behaviours including violence and self-gratifying behaviours. Never is this nature more apparent than when our survival is threatened. On occasion survival (including the maintenance of one's own interests), may rest upon the ability to convince

[38] A more detailed explanation of the theoretical approach to ideological communication can be found in Chapter Two of this thesis.

another of the merits of adopting a perception, or course of action, one would benefit from and thus advocate.[39] Human nature becomes defined and motivated by survival, and the nature of social communication, itself a tool of survival for a social being, can be defined with the same term; 'instinctively selfish'. The competition which arises from such natural circumstance breeds an increased climate of 'winners and losers', or to borrow Hall's term, "social relationships of dominance and subservience". Therefore, the more competitive the climate the more likely the less well adapted individual/group will suffer hardship and subservience; a process which leads to the development of hegemony of an individual or group as identified by Gramsci and noted above.

'Selfish' instincts are the fundamental unconscious psychological outlook required for individual survival in extremes or prosperity and progression in 'normal' circumstance. Whilst many individuals are rightly generous and considerate, the vast majority would fall short of giving to their considerable detriment, especially should this detriment result in a decline in their personal prospects of survival or comfort depending upon circumstance. Whilst those who transgress this boundary may well be considered to be responding to personal and therefore self-gratifying motives, gaining as much self-gratification from their actions as may benefit another; this includes love or loyalty to another, an ideological cause, maintenance of a personal self-image or fulfilment of a social-emotional contract (a friendship or parental responsibility).

[39] Indeed it is possible to identify the development of collectivised interest politics from this natural process.

Furthermore, when threatened, or simply responding to a problematic scenario, an individual may be required, consciously or not, to behave in an increased self-centred manner, whereas some will behave in such a manner more regularly, with less justification, as determined by their psychological nature. For example, advertising remains consistently self-gratifying in nature, as it seeks economic survival/prosperity for its creator and those who circulate it; in this scenario, both producer and the medium of circulation benefit. A clash of interests may lead to conflict. Disagreements between two parties, whether of significant or insignificant importance, will be resolved through a process of aggression, negotiation or outside intervention.[40] Nations behave in a similar manner; albeit on a larger scale, yet nonetheless seek increased or maintenance of their prosperity and if necessary, survival.

Thus the reader has established the fundamental nature of individuals who constitute a society. Such social groupings respond in a similar way to many circumstances. Extreme occurrences, such as conflict, will breed greater levels of 'selfishness', where as a more relaxed climate may allow the interest groupings to co-exist or even assist one another, although assistance rendered would never be allowed to exceed beyond too greater degree of 'selflessness', thus jeopardising prosperity/security of the parent interest grouping.

To employ a crude analogy; in the natural world the animal seeks to attract a mate, the effect is progressive, survival and replication of the species, social standing and/or social interaction. The action undertaken to achieve this is often based on propagandist

[40] N.J. O'Shaughnessy considers advocacy to underpin the Western legal system. O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*.

communication, through the implementation of a number of communication techniques, some factually based, such as physical prowess, others fictitious or alluded to through display. Regardless of how positive and beneficial the result may be, the process remains fundamentally self-gratifying in nature, as the propagandist seeks to gain by influencing the perception of another. So it is with competing individuals, competing groups within society, and competing nations, albeit a more complex practise. The effect of such activities may be positive or negative in result, but are nonetheless underpinned by 'self-gratifying' motives to one degree or another.

It is the intention to encourage the reader, for the purpose of definition, to relinquish any moral connotations associated with 'propaganda', due to the "historical baggage" associated with the term.[41] O'Shaughnessy's claim that propaganda is a social phenomenon is correct. Social-communication bestows some benefit upon the party which invested the resources (time, thought, or finance), in encouraging others, consciously or not, to subscribe to their ideological perception. Thus it has been established that propagandising is an activity we all participate in on a daily basis in all aspects of our lives, private, public and political; it is a fundamental instinct rooted in survival and personal gratification, grounded on a desire or necessity, conscious or unconscious, to sway the perception of another.[42] Described simplistically, an individual may gain little, other than an unimportant influence over the perceptions and behaviour of another human being, from advocating the merits/shortcomings

[41] This remains similar to Casey's definition, which aims to explore propaganda through its "neutral, scholarly definition". S. Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion 1950-1953* (New York, 1980), p. 5.

[42] Casey's definition of propaganda focuses upon the deliberate nature of propagandising and the attempt to alter perceptions and behaviour. However, although this remains entirely valid, the scholar has perhaps neglected the unconscious aspect of propagandising, which is a key feature of Hall and Hoggart's theoretical approach; thus an amalgamation of the two may benefit our understanding considerably.

of a restaurant to a friend, yet nonetheless propagandise in its favour, or against it, during conversation; such is the nature of social-communication, as communication translates to power over perceptions and behaviour weather intend or not.

However, the definition of communication/propagandising as a self-centred behaviour extends to include those who simply replicate and circulate the ideology of others, and in the course of such activity, not only replicate or create ideologies and influence perception, through the construction of a 'new reality', but ensure their personal or group gratification/survival by doing so. Thus the medium of transmission, the mass media, actively participate in propagandising, not simply through conscious ideological loyalties, but also in a considerably unconscious manner rooted in the necessity of economic prosperity and survival. Media survival is ensured by continued and uninhibited communication. Considerable ideological deviance, through personal commitment or accident, may invite economic penalties to the individual responsible, thus effecting their survival/prosperity, as the leaders of the social group, the individual represents, may be affronted by content, or may be mindful of how other socially significant groups may be affronted thus inducing self-censorship, particularly during periods of heightened domestic or international tension. Again such activity is clearly instigated by the self-gratifying survival instinct as is the pursuit of populist media values, which seek economic prosperity.

Thus personal survival may well ensure considerable conformity to the ideologies of hegemonic institutions, regardless of how sympathetic a media professional may be to oppositional ideologies (if at all). Should the professional adopt an unsympathetic stance to the non-hegemonic ideology, evidently the text will remain ideologically concurrent with that

held be elite groups. Thus the reader has identified the psychological process by which media theorists suggest media texts become 'balanced', or in Hoggart's terms, where the battle between a media employee's professional desire to maintain 'objectivity', often grounded upon higher principles, must reconcile themselves with external influences and considerations;[43] personal economic prosperity and thus survival in a society where elite opinion requires consideration. The media professional, knowingly or not, is thus caught between two competing interest, the media-economy and elite opinion; both of which must be 'balanced' to ensure economic survival.[44]

Given the difficulties associated with the measurement of the propaganda/propagandising phenomenon and its impact, the employment of the term 'nature' is not only necessary, but also beneficial. To analyse the nature of something is to identify common factor(s) which constitute its personality, underpin and motivate its behaviour and thus provide us with 'a rule of thumb' by which an observer may measure current behaviour. As identified previously, self-gratification, fulfilling the social-survival instincts of a social animal, remains the base motivating factor underpinning most, possibly all, social communication, to one degree or another. Thus the scholar may only attempt to measure and understand this phenomenon to a 'degree' or an 'extent', based upon a generic assessment of its nature, hence the phraseology utilised here. Therefore, when assessing if a text may be considered propagandist in nature, the scholar may evaluate the extent by considering; can the material be considered self-gratifying, to whom and why? A simple hypothesis suggests that texts will primarily gratify media economic interests, but nonetheless appear mindful/gratifying of hegemonic ideologies, to a considerable degree, due to the peculiarities

[43] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. xii.
[44] Ibid., pp. ix-xvi.

of the encoding/decoding process, the filtration process and cohabitation grounded upon a shared social-survival instinct and desire for individual/group prosperity.

On occasion one may pursue such goals deliberately; however, natural instincts will often render the process entirely subconscious, particularly in more challenging scenarios. Nevertheless, every act of communication undertaken gratifies the instigator in some manner; thus communication is fundamentally propagandist in nature as it seeks ideological gratification which potentially leads to the receiver to act in a manner which benefits the instigator. Given that this process can be conscious or sub-conscious, the boundary separating naturally occurring communication and propagandising, that is communication with a degree of conscious intent, becomes blurred, as all communication remains gratifying to the instigator; the only difference being whether or not the gratification was sought sub-consciously or consciously.

This interpretation not only accounts for the intentional ideological gratification sought by hegemonic authorities who release texts to the media in the form of speeches and official press releases, thus engaging in propagandist activity through the legitimate democratic act of rhetorical persuasion, but also accounts for the role of the often subconscious acts undertaken by the media who, intentionally or not, circulate existing and create new ‘substitute realities’. Thus both organs may be considered creators and circulators of ideologically persuasive texts, as suggested by media theorists, and therefore equally engaged in propagandist behaviour through conscious and/or sub-conscious pursuit of ideological or economic individual or group gratification dictated by both conscious and un-conscious impulses found within human nature.

Survival in this individualistic yet social environment is often dependent upon communication. The Cold War era may be defined as a period of intense competition between two incompatible and thus competing ideologies, both of whom responded to the challenge of survival with equal vigour and a barrage of media texts and information that were 'self-gratifying' and therefore propagandist in nature. This becomes particularly poignant when the reader considers that in the context of propaganda, the term 'selfish' encompasses the intentional or unintentional effect of encouraging individuals or groups to believe what those with access to the means of distribution would rather they believed and thus to transform this belief into action, including informing on suspected ideological dissidents or fighting for a cause on the Korean Peninsula; actions designed to ensure the survival of the given ideological power bloc.

In order to further our understanding of how media material may be considered an active factor within the Cold War struggle, we shall attempt to answer the following questions: what, if any, content renders the source propagandist in nature and if so whom may have benefitted from the 'message'? Can the source material be considered representative of events? Was any information included/excluded and why may have this come about? Was there a target audience and how were they targeted? What factors may have led the sources to assume any of the characteristics described above?

Practical considerations require an unorthodox structure and on-going review of the relevant literature throughout this thesis. However, it is important to record that the pool of

scholarly effort documenting the Korean conflict is increasing steadily from humble origins. D. Rees, B. Catchpole, A. Farrar-Hockley and M. Hastings all offer considerable, informative and thought provoking general accounts of events whilst more specifically C. MacDonald, A. Salmon, R. Spurr, P.D. Chinnery and P. Paik Sun Yup, offer highly informative accounts of specific events or aspects of the conflict. A useful yet dated review of existing material and related archives, constructed by L.H. Brune in 1996, covers in detail specific aspects of the conflict and what has been said. In particular, a useful starting point is two remarks contained within Brune's work concerning state-media interaction during the period. These include that it remains "unclear how far government manipulated public opinion" and that issues concerning "news management remained a murky area".[45]

In addition, works concerning aspects of the conflict related to the media remain few in number. Tony Shaw investigated the relationship between the British media and hegemonic authorities during the Cold War,[46] including Korea[47] and the Suez action of 1956.[48] The scholar's significant contribution includes an analysis of the British cinema industry during the early Cold War, which demonstrated that the domestic media adopted a predominantly conservative stance during the ideological struggle and that the industry helped audiences establish a primary interpretation of the conflict by providing a "dominant frame of reference".[49] In essence, the cinema reinforced official attitudes towards the global

[45] MacDonald, C., 'Great Britain and the Korean War', in L.H. Brune, (ed.), *The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research* (Westport USA, 1996), p. 105- 106.
[46] T. Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus* (London, 2001).
[47] T. Shaw, 'The Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the Korean War, 1950-1953', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 2 (34) (1999), pp. 263-281.
[48] T. Shaw, *Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis* (London, 2009).
[49] Shaw, *British Cinema,* p. 196.

political situation.[50] The focus of this work is centred upon the cinema industry as a whole and makes limited, yet accurate, references to newsreel output. Of the specific details provided, Shaw considers the newsreels to have been predisposed towards anti-communism and to have contributed to the anti-Soviet consensus of the period.[51] Furthermore, Shaw suggests that this medium was prone to being subjective and a conveyor of misinformation.[52] Regarding newsreel coverage, the scholar states that by the time of the Korean conflict Gaumont-British News had abandoned all impartiality and had deepened its commitment to the promotion of the well-entrenched anti-communist consensus.[53] The necessity for this micro study is vindicated as Shaw states that theoretical analysis has not been employed[54] something which is in contrast to the research undertaken in this thesis. Finally, Shaw understandably often focused upon headline grabbing events of the Korean conflict. This phenomenological approach does not necessarily convey the substance of the day to day events and the coverage they received and in so doing does not fully explore the sedimentary build-up of ideologies which is considered a key part of the process of social communication by theoretical scholars. This study seeks to increase the interdisciplinary nature of this field of historiography by further integrating theoretical analysis and military aspects into the wider academic coverage. Thus a micro study facilitates a deeper understanding of how audio-visual media contributed to the formation and sustainment of ideological consensus amongst audiences during the period.

Perhaps Shaw's most notable contribution was to shed light upon the 'machinery of manipulation' which is a prime contributor to the sculpting of ideologies contained within

[50]Ibid., p. 195.
[51] Ibid., pp. 32-33.
[52] Ibid., pp. 32-33.
[53] Ibid., p. 33.
[54] Ibid., p. 4.

media output. The scholar suggests that during the Suez crisis, Atlee relied upon a cocktail of methods in order to influence the media and create "a consensus favourable to war". Such techniques included the "dubious" use of censorship powers employed during the Second World War, the manipulation of the Downing Street press lobby and personal contact.[55] The bureaucratic apparatus of manipulation, centred at Downing Street,[56] included the Information Research Department set up in 1947 which enjoyed close links to the Foreign Office news department[57] and was responsible for feeding non-attributable information to the media via lobby journalists amongst others channels. Shaw considers the lobby journalists, of 1956, at the time of the Suez action to have been "self-disciplined and subservient" regarding the ideological content of media material and reliant on official channels for the acquisition of information respectively.[58] Additional cogs in the machine of distortion included the influence of the 'Russia committee' concerning the coordination of information policy from July 1950,[59] which sought to create a pro war consensus, albeit support for a limited war,[60] which illustrates attempts at mass-psychology management on behalf of authorities. Indigenous structures designed to govern media content were also created amongst media organisations, these included the British Board of Film Censors which enjoyed a positive relationship with Whitehall during the period.[61]

Of particular interest is Shaw's identification of personal and professional relationships amongst political authorities, bureaucratic agencies and media institutions which serves to illustrate that a select group of people enjoyed access to mass audiences

[55] Shaw, *Eden, Suez and the Mass Media*, p. 15.
[56] Ibid., p. 16.
[57] Shaw, 'The Information Research Department', p. 246.
[58] Shaw, *Eden, Suez and the Mass Media,* pp. 18-19.
[59] Shaw, 'The Information Research Department', p. 267.
[60] Ibid., p. 266.
[61] Shaw, *British Cinema,* pp. 32-33.

throughout the period in question. For instance, the IRD was headed by Ralph Murray who had served with the Political Warfare Executive during the Second World War.[62] Furthermore, the head of the BBC's foreign broadcasting was a former member of the Russia committee.[63] Finally, Shaw states that the Conservative party maintained close links with the Gaumont-British News and British Movietone newsreel companies.[64] Such interaction, proximity and experience help explain why Shaw considers experienced gained during the Second World War to maintain a particular significance to the understanding of mass media behaviour during the early Cold War.[65]

The more general works elaborate little on any comments related to our discussion. Of notable significance is Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, Smith's consideration of the BBC television newsreel coverage of the conflict, which remains highly informative, although devoid of remarks alluding to propaganda or the propagandist value of media material. Ronnie Noble's book (1955)[66] and Reginald Thompson's *Cry Korea* (1951) C may be considered contrasting, yet significant accounts, detailing the experience of media professionals operating in Korea and the impression made by the war. Noble in particular describes an event which he considered allowed the communist side an opportunity to gain a "propaganda initiative", illustrating that media personnel were indeed aware of such considerations.[67]

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[62] Shaw, 'The Information Research Department', p. 264.
[63] Ibid., p. 268.
[64] Shaw, *British Cinema,* pp. 32-33.
[65] Ibid., p. 195.
[66] R. Noble, *Shoot First: Assignments of a Newsreel Cameraman* (London, 1955).
[67] Noble, *Shoot First,* p. 212.

Finally, Taylor's general account of the history of propaganda remains an essential starting point, offering a brief, yet concise consideration of propaganda, as does O'Shaughnessy in *Politics and Propaganda*. Finally, it may be significant that in the book of a seasoned media veteran discussing how the twentieth century was reported, published in 2010, John Simpson neglects to discuss the Korean War. This may be considered testament to how a gap remains within the historical field, particularly concerning the British experience, as few, including Shaw, Jenks and to a lesser degree Casey have explored.

The peculiarities concerning the chronology of the conflict and the audio-visual material has led this thesis to assume something of an unorthodox structure, particularly as the discussion focuses, in detail, upon newsreel coverage between 25 June 1950 and February 1951. The benefit of predominantly following this chronological sequence is that an attentive reader will be able to focus in detail, upon a specific aspect of interest within the time-frame. Nevertheless, it has remained necessary to approach the subject thematically in the final chapter. The inescapable result of such a focus however has rendered the vast majority of the conflict and its coverage unaccounted for, as the period from March 1951 to the conclusion of hostilities on 27 July 1953, although less dramatic in nature, would nonetheless remain significant to this question and any study detailing the evolution of conflict coverage in the post-war world.

The introduction has detailed the secondary sources which assist the reader to become acquainted with the period in question and has defined the terminology of

propaganda/propagandising and communication. Furthermore the reader has become acquainted with a brief exploration of the audience demographics such features were tailored toward.

The second chapter will arm the reader with an understanding of the theoretical tools which have been developed by scholars and are required to undertake an investigation such as this.

Chapter Three focuses upon the newsreel coverage of the United Nations in the first two weeks following the outbreak of hostilities. This section, detailing a period of intense international activity and anxiety, illustrates how the conflict was contextualised both politically and ideologically within the audio-visual news media of the day and how the feature was simplistically framed in moral terms.

More substantial in length, Chapter Four discusses the period when combat footage became available to newsreels as UNC attempted to blunt the North Korean mechanised spearheads. This section considers coverage charting the steady withdrawal of UNC to the Pusan perimeter, the landings at Inchon and the advance into North Korea. Of particular interest is how the audio-visual media behaved within the context of defeats and later successes.

Chapter Five, Crisis, evaluates the output of the newsreel media during a period where UNC had become overstretched and was engaged by significant Chinese forces. However, prior to this the reader is invited to explore and consider the peculiarities of the state-military-media system, which although never static in nature, shaped coverage throughout the conflict. This section is perhaps most relevant to this study, as the demands of the historical scenario placed considerable pressure upon media organs and Western authorities alike.

Finally, the reader will encounter a shorter thematic section detailing how specifically British interests were presented by the newsreels. Again this is particularly significant, to this study, as the portrayal of military assets from a media professional's parent nation required individuals and companies to remain mindful of the impact coverage may have had upon a domestic audience that was likely to have been emotionally engaged with events on a personal level to some degree; which thus had a significantly more potent potential to effect popular opinion toward the conflict and Britain's involvement.

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO MEDIA ANALYSIS

The exploration of the theoretical model outlined below does not seek to be all encompassing or a definitive account of the analytical tools which will aid discussion. It does however seek to offer the reader, a general introduction to the theories, which will aid our understanding of social communication, the news media and persuasion heuristics, in relation to this thesis. Before exploring the model itself, it may be prudent to consider its merits and shortcomings. To its credit, the theory offers a generic model of mass communication, which has formed the foundation of much scholarly efforts since its conception in the early 1970s. However, it is claimed the model is best suited to aid the analysis of news and current affairs media,[68] thus limiting its original scope, in addition to rendering the model well suited for employment in a thesis such as this.

Additionally the theory aids further research as any media 'text' can be evaluated in this way, as an 'ideology' can become manifest within texts covering any subject, for example in advertising, religion or politics. In relation to this thesis, the model may not be universally applicable, as the process of 'political communication', in the context of military conflict, is not directly referred to by Hall.[69] However, the theory remains valid as a conflict setting would perhaps increase the likelihood of ideological texts being produced and circulated, particularly during an ideological conflict such as the Cold War.

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[68] D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011

[69] Hall's research focused upon media treatment of crime, class and violence.

Perhaps the most significant criticism of the theory concerns how we identify the 'preferred meaning' of a text and if we, 'the consumer', place it there ourselves.[70] The solution to this issue may well rest in questioning the motives of those who produce media texts, employing historiography to assess the political climate in which the text was conceived, whilst attempting to identify the professional or political ideologies which may have exerted influence over the process of text construction. Finally, the period in which the model was first conceived is of importance as the Marxist approach was well established in academia by this time, reflecting the growing interest in the history of 'ordinary people', in relation to social class and class relations of power.[71] Thus Hall's theoretical approach evidently embodies elements of the Marxist approach, as he sought to create a model, which would explain how dominant ideologies are communicated in a democratic society, where the state-media relationship is markedly different to that of a totalitarian system, yet produces media products, which appear to transmit 'a messages' to an audience.

The theory originated from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, once based at the University of Birmingham. The work of Stuart Hall, amongst others, combined Sociology, Psychology, semiotics and elements of the Marxist approach to history, to create a theoretical model, which aids our understanding of 'political communication'. In essence, Hall argues the transfer of ideology, itself defined as a mental concept, based on the imagined relationship a person feels towards their real condition of existence,[72] is dependent on a

[70] D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011
[71] A. Green, and K. Troup, *The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in the Twentieth Century History and Theory* (Manchester, 1999), p. 33.
[72] M.C. Heck, 'The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages', in S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (ed.), *Culture, Media, Language (London, 1980),* p.122.

process information becomes encoded and decoded.[73] The viewer of a news text represents the decoder or receiver of the message, with the news media fulfilling the role of encoder or sender of the message, whilst the 'text' and the 'message' being communicated, is reduced to a series of 'signs'.

Hall interprets this process to facilitate 'reality construction' and 'maintenance', where positions of 'dominance and subservience' are produced and reproduced in society and made to appear 'natural', as the product of "common sense".[74] Therefore, Hall views the mass media as a key "vehicle" for the creation and circulation of ideologies, held by the elite institutions of a democratic society,[75] who exert some indirect/informal influence over the production process.

The roots of this theoretical model are evident in Marxist theory, concerning the imposition of structures on men, via the unconscious.[76] M.C Heck, drawing on the theories of L Althusser, elaborates, suggesting the discourse of ideology takes place in the subconscious.[77] We may interpret this to indicate that the encoding and potential deciphering of 'signs', takes place without the knowledge of either party and could be considered an ideologically neutral act. However, as we shall see, the 'ideological innocence' of a text is doubted by Hall, particularly when considering the effect of the encoding process, where a

[73] S. Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', in S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (ed.), *Culture, Media, Language (London, 1980),* pp.128-138.
[74] D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011
[75] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', p.136.
[76] Heck, 'The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages', pp. 122-123.
[77] Ibid., pp.122-123.

text becomes organised by those adhering to a 'professional code' of practise,[78] who seek economic survival within a competitive environment.

The professional code in which the Western media operate is considered by Hoggart to maintain a "commitment to impartiality and balance", where the "essential truth" of the story remains largely unaffected.[79] However, Hoggart also acknowledges the existence of conflict between the pressures of the production process and this professional ethos, which effects the development of ideologies which become manifest within the body of a given media text. Thus the notion of media 'objectivity' becomes essentially one of 'balance' between communicating the 'essential truth', whilst ensuring that the nature of the text remains sufficiently conservative to avoid sanctions from the hegemonic elites, which naturally wish to restrict the exposure of information which may provoke the decoder to approach the 'crisis point', as described by Hall.

This is based on the assumption that media professionals make conscious decisions within this context, although Hall acknowledged that subconscious "cultural bias is inevitable".[80] This subconscious bias may well become exaggerated when the parent ideology of the media professional is engaged in conflict with a culturally incompatible opponent; thus we can predict that a conflict such as this, taking place in Korea, between two incompatible political cultures, may well experience less well balanced coverage in the media than if the belligerents had not been so acutely culturally polarised. Therefore, the coverage may well be expected to maintain high levels of organically occurring subconscious cultural bias, prior to

[78] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', p. 136.
[79] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. 39.
[80] Ibid., p. 17.

any conscious bias implemented on behalf of the media professionals involved or informal pressure by hegemonic elites.

Within the professional ethos of mass media institutions, there exists a criterion by which the newsworthiness of a story is defined. The Glasgow Media Group consider such criteria "routine" within the production process, incorporating a consideration of what may hold a viewer's attention and interest, yet nonetheless assign to such values a significance concerning the production of the ideological content of a text.[81] Such an ethos constitutes one of Hoggart's four filters, which the Glasgow Media Group identified as exerting great influence over the media, their thinking and decision making process, all of which help ensure, although never totally, that media products will help support the social status-quo and will only irregularly and limitedly challenge the hegemonic perception of events; this is achieved through a process of reality construction and definition, aided by the media's ability to set the agenda of audience awareness, understanding and debate.[82]

Veron qualifies that due to the subconscious nature of the transmission process, ideologies constitute a set of rules, which determine the organisation of concepts in a particular persons mind,[83] and that such a mental system functions due to the employment of a code, which those communicating are largely unaware of.[84] 'Signs' therefore, can only be correctly decoded by a sub-conscious, which had previously been 'primed' to receive them through possession of a similar code. This process is based on 'socialisation' and is rooted in

[81] Ibid., p. 11.
[82] Ibid., pp. x-xii.
[83] Heck, 'The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages', p. 123.
[84] Ibid., p. 123.

the existence of a shared cultural value system amongst those communicating, which incorporates history, language and culture amongst other elements, forming the basis of Hall's and Hoggart's observations.

Veron considers this code to be the mental medium underpinning all acts of social communication, its organisation and levels of significance.[85] Thus we can see the process of social communication becoming ideological in nature as a 'socialised' mind, that is one primed to receive and decode structured information, is susceptible to manipulation, if the sender were to organise the content of a 'text' in a way, deliberately or not, which supported a preferred ideology. The potential for ideologies to be organised, transferred and received in this manner, directed Heck to state that, "Social communication is susceptible to an ideological reading"[86] and Hall to claim, that the media is rendered a conveyer of ideologies.[87]

Clearly, should ideology permeate the textual material being encoded and decoded, which Hall argues is the case, as the concept of a neutral text is flawed by the very nature of the communication process,[88] the power of influence would rest with the sender, not the receiver, particularly if the latter consume the textual product en mass; although Hall by no means considers the receiver passive or powerless in the process. This justifies the Marxist approach toward the subject some academics uphold and legitimises the study of social

[85] Ibid., p. 123.
[86] Ibid., p. 124.
[87] S. Hall, 'Introduction to Media Studies at the Centre', in S. Hall, D. Dobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (ed.), *Culture, Media, Language* (London, 1980), pp. 117-118.
[88] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', pp. 132.

communication, past or present, as it constitutes a method of "soft social control",[89] as the process may influence public opinion and thus political action.

Therefore, the phenomenon known as 'political communication' remains a significant area for academic study, as the process can be considered unique to a democratic society, as the phenomenon is intrinsically linked to the Western style of government, with its inherent ideas of freedom and democratic values; coercion is not a valid option in a democracy, but persuasion remains so.[90] However, the question remains as to what extent this process contributes to the maintenance of a democratic value system or is indeed at odds with it, as Noam Chomsky has suggested.[91] Such issues become increasingly significant to this study when we consider the remarks of Professor Phillip Taylor, who describes the Cold War "as an atmosphere where propaganda could only flourish".[92]

M. C. Heck considers 'codification' to be a process by which information is selected and organised into combinations, which constitute the structure of a message.[93] Furthermore the scholar suggests that only by understanding the semantic rules of codification can we begin to penetrate to the core of a message.[94] Thus a scholar wishing to investigate the underlying ideology of a text, would have to undertake close content analysis of media texts, by applying the theoretical methodology described here; an approach advocated by Hall.[95]

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[89] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 49.
[90] Ibid., p.51.
[91] N. Chomsky, *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* (New York, 2002).
[92] Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind,* p. 251.
[93] M.C. Heck, 'The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages', p. 124.
[94] Ibid., p. 124.
[95] D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011

For the purpose of this study, the audio-visual material of the newsreels will be analysed in relation to this theoretical standpoint , allowing us to investigate the structure and 'signs', in a scholarly and objective manner.

The concept of 'signs' encompasses word meaning and is described as fundamental to the process, as the 'sign' will often have a dominant literal meaning (denotation), and possibly an additional meaning ascribed by sub-groups.[96] Furthermore 'signs', in this case words and images, also have associated meanings (connotations), which Hall suggests are interwoven with the literal meaning.[97] Heck offers the example 'pig'. The word signifies an animal, universally understood, although in certain social sub groups the 'signifier' may take on a different meaning, including policeman or male chauvinist. Additionally, the 'sign' 'pig' also implies bacon as an associated word.[98] This subconscious process illustrates that the decoder is not rendered passive and is equally important to Hall's model, as their degree of association with the signs will vary based upon their personal mental 'map of meaning', which will help the decoder to assign a significance value to a received sign or code.

Clearly those wishing to publicise an ideology, a particular perception of a given situation, event, or philosophy to a mass audience, via a medium of mass social communication, would have to be mindful of 'signs' selected when organising a text, as the association of words and images alike could easily be interpreted in different ways by individual decoders based on their 'personal maps of meaning'. Thus, the difficult nature of

[96] S. Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse* (Centre for Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1973), pp. 11-13.
[97] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', p. 133.
[98] Heck, 'The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages', p. 124.

'deliberate' ideological encoding becomes apparent as the process becomes increasingly complex in view of the mass audience response to the texts they are exposed to.

The phenomenon of war is likely to encourage the employment of 'deliberate' encoding due to the high stakes involved. Historically speaking, the Cold War saw two geo-political ideologies rise to the forefront, Capitalism in the west and communism in the east, both seeking to secure and expand the boundaries of their respective ideological influence, domestically and internationally. Therefore, the selection and reception of 'signs', selected during the encoding process, to publicise a desired view of an event by either of the ideological poles, were of the utmost importance if the dominant ideology was to avoid what Hall terms the 'crisis point', where a 'dominant' or 'negotiated' communication process between coder and consumer, becomes an 'oppositional reading'; a scenario, which could lead to the hegemony of the parent ideology, the society in which the media operate, being challenged or rejected by decoders.

However, the process of text construction undertaken by the mass media assumes a less deliberate and direct nature and thus requires a more complex treatment when attempting to decipher any message a text may contain. Hall suggests that the production of media text is governed by 'professional codes of practice', which operate within and reaffirm the ideologies of the dominant power structures of society.[99] These codes of professional conduct, along with other influences, help shape the ideological message contained within the

[99] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*, p. 17.

media 'product'. Additionally, he describes three types of audience response to media texts based on their pre-existing mapping of norms and values.[100]

The decoder may agree with the ideologies contained within a text, which is termed a 'dominant' discourse. However, should the decoder not be sympathetic to the texts ideological standpoint,[101] they may adopt a 'negotiated' position, where they agree with some aspects of the ideology and disagree with others. Additionally, an 'oppositional' stance may be adopted where the conclusions of the dominant ideology are challenged by the decoder, thus rejecting the dominant ideology of the society. Additionally, Hall measures the extent of the receivers 'consumption' of such ideological messages by assessing their social actions;[102] the decoder's behaviour thus becomes a point of reference, illustrating the extent of consumption.

During the early Cold War, the BBC allowed communists and communism a voice in British society, albeit based on a ratio which mirrored the size of the communist voting electorate. A memo, dated 1950, serves testament to the informal pressure being exerted on such institutions to reconsider their policy towards the non-preferred ideology.[103] It is here that we see the importance of the media, in what Hall terms 'the politics of signification - the struggle in discourse', between the dominant ideology and what it felt the masses of receivers in British society, should be exposed to regarding competing ideologies.

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[100] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', p. 134.
[101] Hall gives the ideology of opposing social class as one possible cause of this friction. S. Hall, 'Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems', in S. Hall, D. Dobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (ed.), *Culture, Media, Language (London, 1980),* p. 20.
[102] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', p. 128.
[103] BBC Written Archives Centre, T32/112, TV Talks, the Cold War, 1950.

A number of points relating to the production of news and current affairs programmes, described by Hall, maintain a particular significance to our discussion. Firstly the 'stylisation' of coding is significant, as the development of the genre of news reporting, a format which is repetitive in nature, allows a greater degree of familiarity to develop between encoder and decoder. This, according to Hall's model, aides the encoding/decoding process, as the decoder will find the encoding style easily recognisable due to a developing familiarity based on repeated exposure.[104] This is significant as the twice weekly newsreels consistently adhered to the same formatted style throughout their coverage of the Korean War and is also recognisable in the repeated use of stylised symbols, which make up the content of news reports.

Secondly, this allows for a significant degree of 'habitualisation' to occur, where an historical reality, for instance the outbreak of war, which had previously been 'Naturalised' firstly by its conversion to the 'symbolic' and 'mythical' by the media, to occupy the background of a news feature, thus allowing new specific segments of information, which act in support of the increasingly habitual message to take centre stage.[105] Thus the original message is ever present in the background, whilst additional items of news information are superimposed over it, creating an appearance of freshness and originality. This is what Hall terms the 'sedimentary' process,[106] where repeated exposure encourages the decoder to accept the "artificially shaped" interpretation as "common sense".[107]

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[104] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse,* pp. 5-6.
[105] Ibid., pp. 6-10.
[106] Ibid., p. 10.
[107] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. x.

Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, Hall suggests that the visual sign is less likely to cause the decoder to miss-interpret the message forwarded by the material, compared to a linguistic one, as the visual symbol is 'universal'.[108] We may interpret this to mean that visual images are of particular significance to the encoding/decoding process as they offer the least problematic and most widely 'readable' method of conveying a message to an audience. The visual image thus becomes the lowest common denominator of the political communication process, as it is accessible to the majority of decoders, by transcending language barriers. Thus the cinema and television newsreels analysed for this thesis, theoretically constitute the most widely accessible coverage of events in Korea, particularly if we exclude the practical qualification of television ownership, the cost of a cinema ticket and social habits, which naturally reduce public exposure to the message and thus create a target audience of more limited scale and restricted demographics.[109]

In summary, Hall regards the process of political communication and its inherent transfer of ideology to be both subconscious and conscious in nature. The process is facilitated by the existence of a shared cultural code based on 'socialisation'; this includes shared moral values and language amongst other elements including the existence of professional codes of practice, which govern the working practice of the encoder. Audience agreement with and/or acceptance of the dominant ideologies perception of an event is achieved by the influences such factors exert over the encoding of news material. The 'story' is compressed into the 'symbolic', with all inherent connotations and stylisation, by the

[108] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*, pp. 11-12.
[109] Such qualifications are barely applicable today as television ownership is taken for granted by the majority in Western societies.

nature of news production and creates 'myth', which portrays the event in a manner predominantly compatible with the dominant ideologies perception. This view of the event is then subjected to a process of repetition, within media features, which may lead to the 'sedimentation' of the 'dominant reading', in the mind of the viewer, as the message is continuously replicated and reinforced by the continuation of the item, as a news feature, based on its topical value, public interest and its value as entertainment.

This process renders the likelihood of a successful encoding/decoding exchange, all the more probable, as the levels of familiarity are increased between the two parties. Over time the inherent message becomes 'normalised' and entrenched in the popular mind-set, as 'common sense'. The decoder is free to object to the view of events he/she is presented with, but is nonetheless contradicting the now seemingly consensually established ideological standpoint and is thus subjected to the pressures, of becoming an outsider, in relation to the larger group. Therefore the media becomes the creator and maintainer of the hegemonic ideology, as it possesses the 'means of production' and transmission required to promote and establish one view, whilst excluding the views of rival power blocs, which may be incompatible with those held by those who meet media access qualifications.[110] Thus we have established the theoretical background of our discussion concerning how the Cold War was encoded by the media and the extent to which British cinema newsreels of the Korean War period can be considered propagandist in nature.

[110]M.N. Marger, 'The Mass Media as a Power Institution', in M.E. Olsen and M.N. Marger (ed.), *Power in Modern Societies* (Oxford, 1993), p.240.

CHAPTER THREE

COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS JUNE TO JULY 1950

The North Korean invasion of the Southern Republic began on the 24 June 1950. The following day British Movietone News recorded footage covering the meeting of the Security Council at the United Nations headquarters near Lake Success,[111] where proceedings appear to have been conducted in haste, albeit during a well-attended assembly. This material contextualised events in Korea as having always been a UN problem and visually stressed the solidarity of the organisations members by the raising of national flags. Throughout the ten minutes of footage, delegates from the United States and additional 'friendly powers' were depicted addressing the Security Council. Coverage also included South Korea's complaint of foreign aggression.

The sudden and unexpected nature of the North Korean 'Blitzkrieg' and the response of the international community would inevitably be deemed newsworthy, as events conformed to criteria employed by media professionals who selected features to be included in news coverage. Brian Dutton and Denis McShane identified numerous criteria, many of which remain applicable to the coverage of the Korean scenario.[112] The 'unexpected' nature of the invasion rendered the conflict an attractive feature for the newsreels which operated within the context of the cinema entertainment industry. The sensationalist value of the narrative would shock and entertain; thus generating revenue. In addition, the 'threshold' or

[111] See Primary source index for British Movietone News, 25/06/1950.
[112] Dutton and McShane, *In the Media*, http://www.rssmediastudies.co.uk 02/10/2011.

scale of the event would also render the invasion newsworthy, as would the involvement of ‘elite nations’ and socially significant ‘personalities’. The ‘meaningfulness’ or ‘familiarity’ of the event would further encourage media coverage, particularly as the decoder would have been familiar with ‘conflict’ due to the proximity of the Second World War and more recently, increased friction with global communism.

Furthermore, ‘cultural proximity’ and the ‘threat to the community’ in this case, the threat to the democratic community, aided the ‘unambiguity’ of coverage. Unambiguity refers to the clarity of the ‘message’ contained within audio-visual news coverage; in essence the coverage must only offer the decoder a limited number of interpretive ‘meanings’. That is to say, the viewer is offered little other information than that which may encourage an interpretation of the material which conforms to the ‘common sense’ ideological interpretation of events, held by social elites, who maintain influence in Western society and thus media content, based on access criteria. Therefore media theorists would argue that the coverage became ‘systematically distorted’ as its ‘balance’ of interpretation would have been based upon the ideological outlook of those with influence over production, both media professionals and other parties, and further filtered by the criteria governing how news-media organisations select features in order to ensure economic prosperity.

Upon more detailed examination of the material, the reader may identify certain elements of distortion, affecting how the viewer interpreted the feature. The reader may record the absence of dissenting opinion, from that held by the United States or her allies, regarding either oppositional or neutral views. As the material was recorded in the United States, it is logical to conclude that the camera crew were American staff employed by an

American based company. This would render the organisation and subsequently its employees, vulnerable to pressure exerted by the virulent anti-communist movement, championed by Senator McCarthy.[113] Clearly, such professionals would have no desire to jeopardise their livelihoods by representing oppositional ideologies, even if grounded on a professional desire to maintain objectivity or balance. Thus one may suggest that the existence of the anti-communist movement in the united states facilitated in curbing media objectivity/balance from the outset of the war and thus effected the ideological content of the coverage British audiences were exposed to.[114]

However, additional explanations may be offered in that the media, indulged in self-censorship, having taken its cue from the increasingly anti-communist stance adopted by the US Government from 1947 onwards or that media professionals shared the ideology in dominance and did not wish to publicise an oppositional ideology. The latter point, based on an understanding of media theory, suggests that media professionals shared a value code with the parent society and therefore would not seek to challenge this,[115] nor circulate information that would encourage viewers to adopt an oppositional reading. Thus the reader has encountered an example of how a media text may become ideologically distorted and thus appear propagandist in nature, by simply replicating the ideology of the society it operates within, as suggested by Hall and Hoggart.

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[113] S. Casey states that the McCarthy witch hunts for political subversives scarred the American political land scape in the run up to the Korean War. Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 15.

[114] This assumption is based on Smith's remarks concerning the pooling arrangements between the British newsreel companies and their American counterparts concerning shared access to material. H. Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, vol. 8, No. 3 (1988), p. 228.

[115] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. x

Furthermore, it is possible that no dissenting voices were heard inside the UN as the Soviet Union had boycotted proceeding at this time in protest of communist Chinas exclusion from representation at the body.[116] Thus, in the absence of a Soviet delegate, the resolution was passed by nine votes to zero, with Yugoslavia abstaining.[117] Thus there was little decent for the media to report. This rendered the coverage, to a limited degree objective, concerning the presentation of 'facts'; although one should remain mindful that such information cannot be considered ideologically deviant in relation to dominant Western values and was thus not difficult to include in news products.

David Rees suggests the Soviet boycott was an attempt to invalidate the international legal authority of the UN and the resolution it produced.[118] The newsreel coverage, via direct speech and connative association, counteracted this by emphasising the legality and solidarity of the United Nations in the face of the crisis. The proceedings and personalities concerned maintained an image of dignity and formality, which lends credibility to the legal righteousness of the sanctioned actions. Additionally, by asserting that Korea had historically always been a UN problem, it was implied that the body was again responsible for acting to resolve the current issue.

Finally, by illustrating the collective identity and unity of the United Nations the audience were offered a visual representation of the Security Council's international validity. The 'message' generated by the sequence, offered the viewer reassurance and confidence that

[116] The Soviet Union had boycotted the UN since January 1950. D. Rees*, Korea: the Limited War* (London, 1964), p. 21.
[117] Rees*, Korea: The Limited War,* pp. 21-22.
[118] Ibid., p. 21.

their nation was acting in the interests of the international community, within a legitimate legal framework and additionally not isolated or making an isolated stand. Of course such a 'message' may be perceived as a natural bi-product of newsreels simply recording events, which maintained some validity, as the Security Council passed the resolution in a speedy and near unanimous manner. However, the application of political communications theory would suggest that the recipient of this message would have confronted 'systematically distorted communication'; as the influences which shaped production gradually moulded the feature into a text, which affirmed and replicated the hegemonic ideology, resulting in the decoder becoming galvanised with legal and moral validity of the Western cause.

Such sentiment was echoed again by Gaumont-British News on the 3 July1950.[119] The moral and legal validity of the UN cause was once again stressed and the UN promoted as the "voice of the world". However, additional elements had become entwined with the coverage, as the Soviet Union was branded with the responsibility for having instigated the conflict, with the empty Soviet chair at the Security Council described as "silent" and "sinister". Thus at a time when communism was feared to be making its bid for world domination, responsibility for the conflict was placed at the feet of Stalin by the Western media. This theme continued to be entwined with coverage of UN meetings, as on the 27 September 1950 Gaumont-British News screened footage, which illustrated delegates inspecting a Russian built PPSH sub-machine gun.[120] The Soviet Union did indeed arm and train the North Korean People's Army [NKPA] post 1945, but to what extent this was conceived as a defensive or offensive measure, remains open to interpretation.

[119] See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 03/07/1950.
[120] See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 27/09/1950.

However, during mid-1950, the West concluded that the latter interpretation was befitting. Space prohibits a full discussion concerning responsibility for the outbreak of the war, but is perhaps best summed up by Russell Spurr, who suggested that less is known about the origins of the Korean War than about events, which led Alexander the Great to invade Persia.[121] Such a statement may easily be applied to the Korean scenario as the political-military situation in the region is evidently an on-going issue and thus, perhaps colours interpretation and the release of documentation necessary for historians, to ground their findings on. However, the consensus amongst scholars appears to be if the Soviet Union did not instigate the invasion of South Korea, then Moscow was indeed aware of it prior to the commencement of hostilities.

Regardless, coverage evidently adhered to the common 'media values', which governed/govern the process of content selection, i.e. the criteria by which the media discriminate between the volume of events and what is newsworthy. McShane identified five core values which govern this process, including "conflict", "danger to the community" and "scandal".[122] The focus on the submachine gun and its origin provided 'scandal' and thus intrigue, whereas 'conflict' both within the UN and globally, coupled with the 'danger to the community' or in this case, danger to the democratic community, illustrated by the juxtaposition of voters and soldiers, guaranteed this feature would be included in the final version of the text.

[121] R. Spurr, *Enter the Dragon, China's Undeclared War against the US in Korea, 1950-51* (New York, 1998), pp. 49-50.
[122] http://www.rssmediastudies.co.uk 01/10/2011

Additional newsreel features are relevant to our discussion concerning responsibility for the war. On the 21 August 1950,[123] Sir Gladwyn Jebb was shown speaking to the UN, where he charged the Soviet Union with responsibility and dubbed the United States the "world policeman". Following a diatribe concerning the Soviet outlook of state infallibility and its indoctrination of youth, one may have expected to see a Soviet rebuttal, in the interests of media objectivity professionalism and balance. However, none was forthcoming, with similar applicable to a Pathe News feature the following day[124] and additionally a Gaumont-British News feature of 21 August 1950.[125] Thus the reader may consider the sequences propagandist in nature, as the stance of the opposing ideology was entirely excluded from the features. Thus we have encountered an example of propaganda as described by O'Shaughnessy, that the denial of a message through censorship, or any other means regardless of how unintentional they may be, constitutes propagandist behaviour.[126]

In addition, the American representative was presented as having dominated proceedings, which can readily be interpreted as an aspect of propaganda as O'Shaughnessy describes, as the political dominance of a symbol is a crucial feature of political power.[127] In this case the observer sees the representatives of the dominant ideology, the USA and Britain, firmly controlling the symbol of international opinion: the UN assembly.

The Gaumont-British News feature of 21 August 1950 featured an address made by American diplomat Warren Austin, who starkly stated that the Soviet Union was indeed

[123] See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 21/08/1950.
[124] See primary source index for Pathe News, 22/08/1950.
[125] See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 31/08/1950.
[126] O'Shaughnessy*, Politics and Propaganda,* pp. 119-120.
[127] Ibid., p. 107.

responsible for North Korean aggression and dubbed Moscow as the proprietor of "a big lie". Such sentiment was again echoed by Bevin in a speech to the UN. This address featured by Pathe News,[128] offered the viewer a synthesised version of the key points. Bevin, although he appeared idealistic,[129] boldly stated that Moscow maintained expansionist designs and had no intention of honouring its pledges. Thus the newsreel openly conveyed British and American foreign policy to the viewer as a bi-product of news reporting, which confirms Hall's conclusion that mass media function as ideological replicators.

Statesmen were clearly aware that their rhetoric would be conveyed to audiences by news hungry media, which in its self maintains a propaganda value, but is perhaps best described as advocacy and replication.[130] Such activity is found as much in peace time as in periods of conflict as officials regularly address audiences. However, when such transparent lobbying of public opinion is combined with the propagandist technique of censorship, resulting in the effective exclusion of oppositional rhetoric, as previously identified, one may clearly perceive the propaganda value of such an initiative, as the decoder was prohibited access to information, which challenged the ideological position of his/her parent society.

Therefore, the reader can readily identify the propagandist significance of news material such as the Pathe News feature of 21/08/1950, where the re-seated Soviet delegate to the UN, was shown speaking with the absence of accompanying audio or subtitled translation, in his native tongue or English. Significantly, the newsreels may not have

[128] See primary source index for Pathe News, UN22958. Unfortunately no date is given for the production or screening of this feature by the online archive.
[129] O'Shaughnessy describes utopian idealism as a prominent rhetorical technique. O'Shaughnessy*, Politics and Propaganda*, p. 4.
[130] Ibid., pp. 5, 67-70.

possessed the technological resources required to translate, especially when in a competitive climate, where the swift production of news was closely linked to economic fortunes. In contrast, one can identify no mechanical reason why the representative could not have been portrayed speaking in his native language, when this service could be offered to other representatives. Thus, via a process of deduction, one can perceive that ideology which conflicted with that already in dominance was prevented from reaching an audience of any nationality, by the process of censoring the audio element of newsreel coverage. This may have been due to technical restraints, media organisations adopting self-censorship, or by informal prohibition requested by D-Notice.

The work of Jenks supports the latter claim, as the scholar suggests that oppositional ideology was steadily excluded from the mainstream Western media as the West increasingly adopted an anti-Soviet stance in the post war era, which was openly acknowledged in Britain by 1948.[131] In contrast however, media theory suggests that censorship would likely have been unnecessary as 'media values' would have organically excluded oppositional ideology through identification with the hegemonic values of democracy and thus resorted to self-censorship.[132] Finally the speaker from the East maintained little 'cultural proximity' to the Western audience and was perhaps not considered newsworthy, despite participating in a cultural activity advocated by Western values; participation at the United Nations. Therefore, we may argue that the viewer was presented with a feature which facilitated a limited and

[131] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 6.
[132] E.S. Herman, and N. Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London, 1994), p. xii.

ideologically 'safe' number of interpretive meanings. The newsreel editors thus conformed to their suggested role as "gate keepers" of socially significant information.[133]

A Gaumont-British News feature of 17 July 1950,[134] maintained a thought provoking significance, as it illustrated the removal of a conscientious objector from the UN assembly. It is logical to assume that the individual had no right to interrupt the proceedings, made clear by the gentle but firm manner in which he was removed. The viewer of this sequence was directly informed by the commentator of the individual's opinion and the treatment he then received as he was ejected. However, this short sequence maintained a symbolic significance and constitutes a readily identifiable example of a coded sign, as the inherent connotative associations reach far beyond what is directly illustrated within the news item.

In essence, the nonconformist individual represents an oppositional ideology. This social group, naturally opposed to conflict with the Soviet Union, would thus have been in direct contradiction with the hegemonic ideology held by the UN, which had legally sanctioned armed resistance to aggression. The delegates shown in the footage therefore represented the ideology in dominance, which rejected the ideology of the lesser sub-group.

Therefore, when an audience witnessed the ejection of the individual, they witnessed a symbolic rejection of an oppositional ideology, the existence of which was brought to the attention of the audience in a negative manner. The message conveyed by this sequence was thus: those who did not subscribe to the hegemonic interpretation were to be cast aside by

[133] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p.12.
[134] See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 17/08/1950.

their parent society. Such a message therefore contained a visual representation of how ideological dissenters were to be treated; "gently but firmly". Thus the reader has encountered a visual example of how communist sympathisers, 'fellow travellers' or pacifists were perceived and treated by hegemonic institutions. The treatment the individual received can in no way be interpreted as heavy handed, but does visually clarify a process documented by Jenks, who suggests that those who maintained a belief system, which was unwelcomed by the ideology in dominance, were in one fashion or another dissuaded or excluded from publicising their beliefs within the mainstream media during the Cold War battle for "dominance in persuasion and information".[135] Nevertheless, the most likely explanation for the inclusion of this sequence remains that it depicted a drama unfolding at a rather mundane yet official location; thus ideology can become unintentionally manifest within news-entertainment, as Hall and Hoggart's filtration process ensures coverage will remain sympathetic to the hegemonic ideological order.

Again, the rhetoric of dissent was excluded from coverage as the opinions of the ideological opposition present at the UN were not conveyed to the decoder. However, Westerners who deviated from the dominant ideology stance were perceived as well-meaning victims of Soviet manipulation.[136] Therefore the material demonstrated the desired response sanctioned by hegemonic authorities, who advocated the restrained rejection of those considered ideologically unreliable. The decoder therefore, was encouraged to respond in a similar manner; which O'Shaughnessy would consider an element generic to propaganda and

[135] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 3.
[136] Jenks records events surrounding the communist sponsored World Peace Conference to be held in Sheffield during the conflict and how the event was covered by the domestic press. Ibid., pp. 118-123.

manifest in separating out disruptive activists from the majority (marginalisation).[137] Therefore the newsworthy, 'unusual' and dramatic event, which clearly adhered to media selection criteria, coupled with the shared ideological values held by media and elite institutions, combined to present the decoder with little alternative but to internalise the meaning of the feature in a manner compatible with elite ideology, particularly as the audio-visual medium is considered to facilitate fewer misunderstandings, during the communicative process, as suggested by Hall.[138] Such a response to an ideological challenge thus became 'naturalised' and 'common sense', which effectively demonstrates how mass media replicated elite ideologies during the early stages of the Korean conflict, as described by Hall.

The second element, which had become interwoven with coverage of UN activity, was the plight of South Korea, both politically and regarding humanitarian issues. The Gaumont-British News feature of 29 June 1950[139] depicted South Korean civilians voting. This short sequence was immediately juxtaposed against images of Soviet troops. Although the soldiers were shown smiling, probably due to the pragmatic necessity of employing footage taken at the end of the Second World War, the message is clear; peaceful South Korean democracy being challenged by Soviet backed authoritarian-military rule.

The humanitarian aspect of the developing crisis was first illustrated to British audiences by Pathe News on the 3 July 1950.[140] Immediately following a 'shot' of the empty Soviet chair at the UN, fleeing Korean civilians were depicted. The imagery itself had been

[137] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 156.
[138] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*, p. 11.
[139] See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 29/06/1950.
[140] See primary source index for Pathe News, 03/07/1950.

clearly sanitised so as not to distress or depress the cinema audience in accordance with regulatory guidelines and economic considerations, but was however accompanied by commentary, which stated; "the old tragic story of war, women and children flee before the invader." Although sympathetically and emotively worded, the commentary unintentionally helped to make an emotive case in support of UN intervention.

Thus, the reader has identified an example of how the audience was persuaded to support UN intervention, based on emotive appeal. Whilst one finds it hard to morally object to intervention, it is noteworthy that the audio-visual news media included material, which can be interpreted as having contained an ideological message, which in turn wholly supported the hegemonic ideology of the West, thus rendering it to a considerable extent propagandist in nature; despite the reason for the inclusion of the feature remaining entirely grounded upon the entertainment and thus economic value of emotive news narratives.

Clearly the emotive impact of civilian plight would have proven irresistible to the press and newsreels as the 'human angle' assists in attracting and maintaining the attention of the decoder. Therefore the inclusion of such coverage, from the earliest possible moment, cannot be considered surprising, particularly as conflict often generates large numbers of displaced persons. The Korean War proved no exception to this, with many UNC personnel finding the plight of the civilian population particularly traumatic.[141] The reader may therefore deem the coverage to have maintained elements of objectivity, albeit presented

[141] A. Salmon, *To the Last Round: The Epic British Stand on the Imjin River, Korea 1951* (London, 2009), p. 92.

within a heavily selected and 'artificially shaped' narrative, constructed by a process which is governed by both practical and, as Chomsky would suggest, 'ideological filters'.[142]

Practical filters, beyond guidelines detailing the boundaries of taste regarding the visual depiction of human suffering, would have had little impact upon coverage of this aspect of conflict, as the vast numbers of refugees would have provided camera teams with ample opportunity to find desirable imagery. However, ideological filters were clearly influential in the production of this feature as made evident by the editing and juxtaposition of imagery. Therefore we may assume that the shared ideology of a society, as described by Hoggart,[143] had unconsciously or not permeated the audio-visual text. In addition and of note is the structure of the text, which although conveyed a 'common-sense' approach to the matter, did not appear natural; indeed, to a modern viewer the association between the oppositional ideology and civilian suffering appears bluntly obvious.

However, modern audiences are said to have become more cynical as levels of education increase,[144] thus the reader must refrain from allowing hindsight from colouring interpretation; particularly as the audience of 1950 would have demographically consisted of category 'C' and to a lesser extent category 'B'.[145] Decoders within this 'target audience' would therefore have been the recipients of a less privileged education may thus may have

[142] Herman, and Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent,* p. xiv
[143] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. x
[144] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 119.
[145] Hoggart measures the socio-economic standing of decoders via the application of three categories A, B and C, with A, representing the socially more fortunate, B, the skilled manual and C, unskilled manual and non-workers. Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. 3.

been less willing or able to challenge the ideologies of hegemonic institutions and elites evidently manifest within the audio-visual material.

In summary, the coverage of United Nations activity, which began less than twenty four hours after the invasion of South Korea, presented the viewer with a depiction of event, which may be considered accurate and informative as news items, as features often contained accurate 'facts'; albeit ones selected in accordance with economically self-gratifying 'news values'. However, the sequences contained the 'message' that the UN cause was legally and morally just and that the Soviet Union was responsible for instigating the conflict, whilst exhibiting elements, which interwove political ideology with emotive imagery and commentary.

An objective mind finds it difficult to conclude that the footage referred to above contains any element of deception or falsehood beyond topical areas such as the extent of Soviet collusion in instigating the invasion, which remain open to historical debate and interpretation. However, one can readily identify the propagandist value of the material, as oppositional ideology was wholly excluded and the features were enthused with coding, which promoted the virtue of one ideology and the villainy of another. Such ideology was likely to have been conveyed as the text offered the decoder little material that may have suggested otherwise and have led to an oppositional or negotiated reading as described by Hall.[146] Therefore, the news features exhibit some indicators of having been produced under an active censorship system, the kind one would expect to find in the media coverage of a total war.

[146] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*, p. 137.

However, given that official domestic censorship was not formally introduced during the Cold War or the Korean crisis in Britain, although the newsreels remained "technically subject to censorship",[147] one should seek further explanation. The exception to this, is that the United States introduced official military censorship, administered inside Korea from 22 December 1950 and although this was directed at stemming the flow of sensitive operational information that would aid the enemy or embarrass the UN, the audio-visual material undergoing scrutiny here was 'shot' prior to the implementation of this policy.[148] Therefore, the material confirmed the role of the mass media as a replicator of elite hegemonic ideology, whilst in addition demonstrating that the impartiality of news was indeed a myth, evident when scholars subject the reality such features constructed and circulated to close analysis.[149]

Linda Risso, writing in 2011 suggested "a complex interplay between national security concerns, trans-Atlantic relations and intelligence and information sharing" existed during the early Cold War.[150] The scholar argues that the United States advocated collective, international based action concerning the propaganda effort against the Soviet Union, whereas Britain, along with some European partners, wished to keep such departments operating on a national basis.[151] In addition, Risso describes the difference between methods when dealing with subversive elements, as Britain was intent on monitoring such

[147] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 52.
[148] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* pp. 158, 160.
[149] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', p. 137.
[150] L. Risso, 'A Difficult Compromise: British and American Plans for a Common Anti-Communist Propaganda Response in Western Europe, 1948-1958', *Intelligence and National Security,* 2, 3 (26) (2011), p. 354.
[151] Risso, 'A Difficult Compromise', pp. 337-338 and 346-347.

individuals/groups, but was none the less reluctant to interfere with them physically lest it disrupt her more subtle propaganda efforts.[152]

Although historiography records that the United States and Britain adopted an increasingly anti-communist, yet non identical stance during the initial post war period,[153] other factors of a less official nature undoubtedly had an impact. Richard Hoggart suggested that the ideological atmosphere of a society often permeates the media material it produces.[154] Thus the development of anti-communism in the private sphere may well have contributed to the bias we have identified in the coverage. Naturally, large companies, media elites included, would likely have harboured an intense distrust of communism based on economic philosophy and likely welcomed the change in official opinions.

Therefore the materials support of dominant Western ideology may well have been instigated deliberately by media bosses or employees. Additionally, editors may well have practiced self-censorship based on experience of previous wars.[155] Finally, there may well have been an element of class consciousness, as cinema audiences were perceived as comprising of the less well educated echelons of society. Therefore the material may have been structured in a specific way to take into consideration the composition of the target audience, as such audience demographics would have been perceived to lack the cognitive capacity with which to reason out argument and counter argument. Indeed, this is hinted at by

[152] Ibid., p. 350.
[153] See Jenks, *British Propaganda*.
[154] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. x
[155] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 2.

Jenks, who suggests British authorities held cinema newsreels in low regard.[156] Of course such a hypothesis would require testing over a wider range of media products than found within this study. Regardless of the origin of the overt bias, the material would certainly have caused no consternation to official sensibilities should such a process have influenced media content.

Following the Gaumont-British News feature of 27 September 1950, coverage of UN diplomatic activity lessened from newsreels. The UN debate had maintained the focus of the West during the first weeks of the conflict, as the US sought to establish a legal international framework to support intervention and in addition had provided newsreel companies with an accessible source of topical and entertaining audio-visual news footage. Although such features detailing diplomatic manoeuvring were kept short, probably out of consideration of the newsreels place within an entertainment industry, the sequences were, from a Western viewpoint, ideologically watertight. However, as the conflict developed and greater numbers of hastily deployed American troops began to arrive in theatre, naturally, public and media attention began to shift towards the battlefront as footage of allied air and ground units in action, became increasingly available. Despite this shift, the theme of Soviet complicity in North Korean aggression did not fade away, but simply evolved and was further illustrated by additional events, as shall be discussed below, which will analyse coverage of the period documenting the withdrawals, the sweeping UN advance and the build-up to China's unforeseen intervention of October 1950.

[156] Ibid., p. 16.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MILITARY SITUATION JULY TO OCTOBER 1950

It remains particularly problematic to determine on which side of the Atlantic, much of the audio-visual material, documenting the early war period of the conflict originated. As the United Nations headquarters were located in the USA and the vast majority of ground troops to arrive in Korea, in the first weeks, were American, it may be prudent to assume that the majority, if not all, initial footage was of American origin. This assessment is based on the work of Howard Smith, who suggests that British cinema newsreels relied almost entirely upon American affiliated material.[157] Therefore the reader may assume that most of the material was produced under the American media-state system, which prior to adopting official, in theatre, censorship on 22 December 1950, operated an informal system;[158] although material may have been subject to additional editing once it reached Britain. Thus, we can safely assume that British audiences often 'consumed' news products, which contained foreign hegemonic ideology, as the news material would have been produced in what Hoggart described as the ideological atmosphere of a society.[159]

The ideological atmosphere of American society, during this period, had in some quarters become radicalised against world communism, which was perceived as expansive, particularly following the loss of China.[160] Therefore, it cannot be considered too bold to

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[157] Although undoubtedly accurate, Smith was a BBC employee and thus may have emphasised this point in order to elevate the prestige of the corporation. Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 228.
[158] Casey*, Selling the Korean War,* p.158.
[159] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. x
[160] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* pp. 23-24.

assume that elite opinion in the United States fluctuated between officially moderate anti-communist, as evident in the policies of the Truman administration and unofficially virulently anti-communism amongst elements of the republican right.[161] Thus media products consumed by British audiences would most likely have absorbed elements of this ideological climate, as texts would have passed through the "guided market system" described by Noam Chomsky,[162] prior to the American introduction of official censorship in late December 1950.

United States ground troops were first illustrated in action on 20 July 1950,[163] which contextualised the fighting in Korea within the wider Cold War struggle and portrayed the distribution of military aid, under the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid scheme, being unloaded in foreign ports. Political contextualisation was further achieved and became evident in the language employed by the commentary as UN troops were described as "beating back Red bandits seeking to engulf the Republic".[164] A similar example may be found in an earlier Gaumont-British News release of 29 June 1950, which described "a top brass" meeting "to discuss strategy for stemming the Red flood, before the East becomes a sea of communism menacing world peace",[165] with a further prominent example featured on 3 August 1950, which referred to mobilisation and stated, "to fight the Red hordes that want to enslave the free world".[166]

[161] Unfortunately space prohibits a full explanation of the American domestic political climate. A highly detailed account can be found in Casey, *Selling the Korean War.*
[162] Herman, and Chomsky*, Manufacturing Consent,* p. xii.
[163] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 20/07/1950.
[164] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 17/07/1950.
[165] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 29/07/1950.
[166] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 03/08/1950.

Phraseology such as this, encountered on a regular basis within audio-visual news material of the early war period, although created by media artistic licence, clearly reflected the prevailing attitude of American foreign policy and the ideological mind-set of the society during the early 1950s. Furthermore, this theme evidently portrayed the enemy in a negative manner, which remains a common occurrence in war time propaganda. O'Shaughnessy's analysis interprets such elements, as interconnecting with other sub-themes of propaganda. By portraying an adversary in negative terms the material promoted connotations which benefitted the cause of the hegemonic ideology.[167] Firstly, by defining the enemy as representing 'bad', the material defines its own parent ideology as representing 'good', which was presented in a quasi-religious manner to the audience, as phrases which contained "righteous" and "zeal" appeared in news features.[168] Additionally, this distinction illustrated the lack of shared cultural values between opponents, which was once more expressed in terms of 'right' and 'wrong'. Although further discussion is necessary, an additional point is relevant here, as by categorising the conflict in stark terms of 'good verses bad'; the 'wrong' party becomes dehumanised, which assisted the decoder to overcome moral considerations concerning the application of certain weapon types.[169]

Finally, this value-centric portrayal, shared elements with the justification of the UN cause, discussed above, as the resolution became the instrument by which perpetrators of aggression were to be defeated and punished for their moral infractions. A newsreel of 17 July 1950,[170] contained images of US wounded; the soldiers were described as "victims" of

[167] See Chapter Four, O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* pp. 110-140.
[168] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 20/07/1950.
[169] Napalm was at the centre of this debate, the use of which often unsettled British officials. For details see, A. Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume 2, An Honourable Discharge* (London, 1995), p. 130.
[170] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 17/08/1950.

"Red" tank actions that in turn, were described as "hordes with superior equipment". The word "victims" highlighted the moral validity of the UN cause and implied the necessity of punishment, whereas "Red" and "hordes" can be considered an aspect of 'dehumanisation'.[171] One would expect to find such phrases in the propagandist coverage of a total war. However, populist media values may well have underpinned much of the startling, emotive and arousing phraseology encountered here.

Nevertheless it is necessary that readers remain mindful of Hoggart's suggestion that the ideological atmosphere of the society in which 'news' is produced can often affect the ideological content of media text and thus be considered a distorting factor within Hall's encoding/decoding model.[172] Such distorting influences were evidently manifest within the features, as the decoder, was presented with little evidence to facilitate an 'oppositional' or 'negotiated' reading of the text. In this respect the sequences were rendered propagandist, as the decoder was presented with textual contours, which afforded a limited number of interpretations, all of which encouraged support for the ideology in dominance. The possibility remains that the media was simply replicating information received from official sources; something which Hall considers a distortive factor in the process of social communication.[173] In addition, Jenks' evaluation that experience gained during the Second World War kept early Cold War journalism "tightly self-disciplined",[174] implying that propagandist elements were the product of media organisations reverting back to previous and well ingrained war-time practice remains equally applicable.

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[171] See Chapter Four, O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* pp. 110-140.
[172] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. x
[173] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*.
[174] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 2.

Of particular interest is the depiction of the military situation, which can be perceived as having maintained a high level of accuracy. The enemy was described as enjoying "superior equipment", a statement, when compared against the historical record, exhibited strong indications of clarity on the newsreels behalf. Historical accounts indicate the first US troops to see combat lacked the necessary equipment to mount an adequate defence against the mechanised spearheads of the NKPA. The T-34/85 tanks, supplied to North Korea, by the Soviet Union, which helped construct the NKPA forces post Second World War,[175] outclassed the American infantry's primary anti-tank weapon at the start of the war.[176] In addition such circumstance offered the under strength and vastly outnumbered US units little option but to undertake fighting withdrawals.[177] The odds facing UN forces were also reported by the newsreels,[178] as was the necessity of fighting delaying actions until stronger units could be deployed.[179]

Perhaps most significantly, the newsreel of 20 July employed the word "retreat" when describing the military situation. This journalistic clarity provides evidence to suggest that the negative opinion, concerning the quality of newsreel journalism, held by British officials,[180] was not particularly well founded. Nevertheless, sensationalist and populist media values often effected the construction of a text. Indeed, the boundaries created by self-censorship which would ordinarily serve to limit the media's ability to pursue populist media values, during this initial phase of the war, were considered comparatively weak and lead some

[175] B. Catchpole*, The Korean War 1950-1953* (London 2000), p. 11.
[176] M. Hastings, *The Korean War* (London, 2000), p. 4.
[177] Hastings, *The Korean War,* pp. 1-10.
[178] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 24/07/1950.
[179] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 20/07/1950.
[180] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 16.

American Generals to complain that a culture of 'disaster journalism' existed amongst reporters.[181]

The criticism of journalists for practising "disaster" reporting was often well founded. This culture however was not rooted in 'ideological subversion', as one of MacArthur's aids would later claim,[182] but was manifest within the criteria which governed how media organisations differentiated between newsworthy and non-news worthy events. As discussed, such criteria often results in significant media attention being lavished upon 'negative' and therefore emotive events. Thus the reader may sympathise with Hoggart's remark that the audio-visual news inherited its values from the populist end of the press spectrum.[183] Therefore, the viewer confronted encoded signs, which had become ideologically distorted, but also highly symbolic, due to economic necessity of the industry which necessitated the employment of compact signs, which remained heavily dependent upon 'connative' value to convey narratives and meaning.[184]

Despite the often foreboding nature of coverage concerning the military situation, such features often maintained a positive propaganda value to the Western hegemonic ideology. Although the features reflected negatively upon the United States government, demonstrating a failure to perceive the threat to democratic Korea and neglect of the now retreating armed forces, the sequences conveyed the message, that the West was taken by surprise and was not militaristic in nature, as the power bloc had obviously been unprepared

[181] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 4.
[182] Ibid., p.149.
[183] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. x
[184] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*.

for the invasion, which had been premeditated by the communist bloc. Historiography validates the claim that the invasion took the West by surprise, although to what extent this was the product of strategic and intelligence blundering on behalf of the administration, remains open to debate.[185] Regardless, the audience was presented with further evidence to develop and support the ideological position adopted by American and British policy. Public consternation at such failings would have increased support for rearmament and increased defence spending, as fear of being caught off guard again by Soviet sponsored aggression in Western Europe fuelled such sentiment.[186]

The often negative depiction of events helped circulate understanding and subsequently a valid excuse, appertaining to why UN forces were suffering defeats, as ill-prepared troops could hardly have been expected to mount an offensive, against a well-trained, well-equipped and "fanatical"[187] enemy. The extent to which the decoder internalised the 'meaning' of these texts remains inescapably difficult to quantify and evaluate. It remains possible that we may have allocated the meaning ourselves.[188] However, it remains probable that the texts successfully impressed upon the decoder, through a combination of practical factors and ideological influences, inherent to the encoding process, a sense of danger and necessity of action; two sentiments which reflect the stance of the hegemonic elites on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

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[185] The United States defined Korea along with Formosa to be outside its defensive perimeter. Casey*, Selling the Korean War,* p. 24.
[186] Increased defence spending became accepted with little debate in Britain due to this very reason. For details see, C. MacDonald, *Britain and the Korean War* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 23-24.
[187] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 24/07/1950.
[188] D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/06/2011.

By 1 August 1950, troops of the United Nations Command [UNC] had withdrawn into the Pusan perimeter and began to mount a defence of this strategically important port town. During the preceding four weeks of fighting, the Allies had suffered notable loss.[189] Three newsreels of Gaumont-British News featured images of wounded and dead American soldiers.[190] Of these, two illustrated men wounded in action whilst predominantly focused on the walking wounded and livelier stretcher cases. Severely injured causalities and images of specific wounds were markedly absent from the footage. Thus, the emphasis remained on evacuation and highlighted that despite their injuries, troops remained in good spirits.

Similarly, a sequence reporting the disembarkation of stretcher cases from a hospital plane in California appeared on 3 August 1950.[191] A Gaumont-British News feature of 20 July portrayed the internment of American dead in Korea with a similar Pathe News presentation of the same date,[192] illustrating a coffin being lowered into an open grave, a cross at its head, with American soldiers and Korean civilians in attendance of the small ceremony.

Naturally, one would not expect the domestic audience to be exposed to the full horrors of war; as such imagery would be considered distressing and disheartening for 'home front' moral. Such material may be employed to support Jenks' claim that the media drew upon experience gained during previous wars. Thus, the reader encounters no surprise here,

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[189] Task force Smith had suffered one hundred and fifty five casualties alone during the action at Osan. Hastings, *The Korean War,* p. 9.
[190] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 17/07/1950, 20/07/1950 and 24/07/1950.
[191] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 03/08/1950.
[192] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 20/07/1950.

as the curbing of sensationalism may be considered an integral part of reporting narratives which involve injury or death; as the fulfilment of populist media values, in any context, would have been expected to maintain boundaries of acceptable decency, whether enforced by regulation or not.

Additionally, it remains doubtful that cinema organisations would opt to screen disturbing footage to their audience, when taking into consideration their business and economic interests. However, what was unexpected was the frequency of coverage documenting allied casualties, during the first five weeks of fighting. The four features discussed here, constitute a symbolic portrayal of the human cost of the war and therefore maintained a fair degree of clarity; although sanitised, it remains significant that images of the wounded and dead appeared in features destined for screening in the entertainment context of the cinema industry. This again serves as evidence to refute the argument that cinema newsreels were of poor journalistic quality, even should such coverage have been included for its emotive/shock value.

The heavily selected, yet to an extent, objective nature of the material was further indicated by a report, which stated, that General William F. Dean had been posted "missing" when "directing operations north of Taejon".[193] Once again, one may interpret this as accurate and informative news, when compared with historical record,[194] albeit the newsreels neglected to inform their audience of overall casualty statistics, unlike some written press reports, which often released such statistics alongside estimated enemy losses, often to the

[193] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 27/07/1950.
[194] For full details of the circumstances surrounding Deans capture see, Catchpole, *The Korean War,* pp. 21-22.

displeasure of UNC, despite an obvious attempt on behalf of the press to offer balanced coverage.[195]

However media theorists may suggest that the inclusion of such footage was the result of the newsreels adhering to a common and often habitual process by which the news media select material for inclusion in broadcasts.[196] As recorded previously, Hoggart suggests the news media regularly display a preference for a populist style of reporting,[197] often based upon the emotive and attention holding value of an event. Naturally the causalities incurred during late summer 1950 would have rated highly amongst media criteria and thus provides an explanation why such narratives appeared with such frequency in newsreel coverage. Thus, the newsreels were drawn to cover the wounded and the fatalities due to the emotive significance of this aspect of warfare. Furthermore, the reader may assume that the boundaries of taste and decency prevented camera teams covering events in graphic detail, which therefore sanitised coverage and provided sequences with a degree of balance. This may serve as evidence to confirm why official opinion of the period held the journalistic quality of newsreels in low regard,[198] as populist and sensationalist.

Sequences depicting Allied setbacks and casualties did maintain strong elements of selected accuracy although this was counterbalanced by elements, which maintained a propagandist value. By sanitising injuries the material prevented an audience from

[195] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 50.
[196] Hoggart*, Bad News*, pp. ix-xiii
[197] Ibid., p. x.
[198] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 16.

encountering the full horror of the conflict; a statement supported by Casey.[199] In addition, this denied decoders information necessary for the development of an oppositional reading. Nonetheless, the inclusion of such features exposed the regular cinema attendee to sufficient information, regarding the military situation and casualties, to develop an oppositional reading, due to the process of sedimentation described by Hall.[200] Nevertheless, this sedimentary process, by which such a reading may develop, may be perceived counterbalanced by the regular inclusion of sequences expressing the moral validity of the UN cause. Thus, one sedimentary process counterbalanced another, in effect, neutralising the formation of an oppositional reading; as ideological conformity concerning validity of the cause and the curbing of sensationalism equated to texts obtaining propagandist significance.

The portrayal of the deceased conveyed a sense of respectful calm as in one feature the casket was interned with simple, yet warm, ceremony demonstrating that the sacrifice was justified by the grateful expressions of participating South Korean civilians. The sequence therefore encouraged the viewer to generalise that all UNC casualties were treated accordingly, which was highly improbable, given the speed and fluidity at which the front lines shifted during this phase of the war. Similar comfort was offered to families of the wounded, as the coverage encouraged them to believe that all soldiers received good medical care and although injured, remained cheerful. However despite the increasing quality of medical care available as the war progressed,[201] it remains doubtful that during the initial phase of fighting, efficient and well organised care could have been implemented,

[199] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 366.
[200] Hall, '*Encoding and Decoding,* p. 10.
[201] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* pp. 160-164.

considering the shortages endured by UNC.[202] The coverage therefore maintained a propaganda value, despite elements of clarity, as the viewer was emotively persuaded to adopt a partially mythical construction of reality concerning casualty treatment.

The above paragraph indicates that coverage of emotively taxing aspects of the conflict was toned down by the newsreels. The possible management of emotion was likewise evident in the coverage of defeats and setbacks, described to the audience with a veneer of positivism. Two examples offer the reader a representative sample with which to become acquainted with this theme. One feature suggested it would not be long until "we hear the reassuring, situation in hand",[203] whilst another states that, "although Taejon has fallen, artillery denies the Reds any peace".[204] These remarks may be perceived as offering the viewer a positive outcome, which was either on the horizon, or could not be substantiated, as the camera could not see the effects of the artillery fire upon the enemy; thus rendering both features to contain propagandist elements, as they encourage the decoder, to adopt a reading based on hypothetical scenarios. Despite the propagandist value of such coverage, the inherent messages and regulation of emotion can be considered a product of the newsreels 'instilling balance' within texts. Media professionals, mindful of the dangers to business should they depress the viewer with emotive entertainment beyond a tolerable level, will seek to redress the balance of content; in this case with hypothetical positives.

[202] Indeed, early media reports of many "snafus" caused some friction between UNC and journalists. See Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* pp. 50-51.
[203] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 20/07/1950.
[204] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 27/07/1950.

Furthermore, by redressing the balance, the newsreels had consciously, or not, taken into account the interests of officialdom,[205] as the equalisation of the decoder's emotional response prevented the newsreels from being accused of offering a too pessimistic view of events to an audience who could potentially incorporate such sentiment into an oppositional framework. The consideration of elite opinion and the desire to avoid invoking censorship produced balanced audio-visual coverage and thus benefitted both media and hegemonic elites alike. Therefore media professionals and hegemonic authorities can be perceived as having engaged in propagandist behaviour, consciously or not, as this amalgamation of interests helped ensure the prosperity and survival of both groups and therefore may be perceived as facilitating the creation and circulation of material that was to an extent propagandist in nature, as such texts offered some degree of ideological influence over the decoder, whose reality was structured by the combined interests of those who met media access qualification.

Further 'balance' and emotive manipulation is evident when we consider how immediately following the depiction of wounded personnel, the viewer was presented with a sequence portraying men enlisting at an army recruiting station.[206] The news item therefore appealed to the audience emotively, as others were volunteering to 'do their bit' and defend democracy. In essence male members of the audience were encouraged to do similar. We can assume this sequence, amongst others that contained similar depictions, appealed to selflessness, which O'Shaughnessy describes as maintaining a powerful influence within propaganda.[207] Although this feature exhibits strong signs of having been recorded in the United States, the message would not have been lost on a British audience, as similar

[205] Marger, 'The Mass Media as a Power Institution', p. 241.
[206] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 03/08/1950.
[207] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 113.

sequences illustrated Canadians[208] and Australians,[209] volunteering to fight aggression. Such sentiment was further encouraged by commentary including phrases such as, "men and machines from across the free world heading across the pacific to aid America's gallant stand against the Red tide of communism".

The newsreels therefore, embarked upon a campaign of recruitment, whether as a result of direction from higher authority due to Britain's military manpower shortages of the period,[210] or as a bi-product of simply reporting topical news, deemed worthy of inclusion due to the narratives relation to the newsworthy event; Korea. Regardless, the male viewer became subject to social pressure to enlist, by what the reader may consider an example of a wartime recruiting campaign, which arose from either/or; media professionals anticipating the needs of hegemonic institutions, based on a shared ideological perception, the simple replication of material provided by the military, or a pursuit of media values which ensured economic prosperity in a competitive climate by reporting topical news. Therefore, the reader may again consider the creation and circulation of media texts which, consciously or not, supported the interests of the two hegemonic institutions propagandist in nature, as they encouraged decoders to adopt a perception and an action, which would benefit hegemonic authority; enlisting for military service.

[208] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 14/08/1950.
[209] The crew of an Australian fighting ship were illustrated taking on stores whilst the audience were simultaneously informed, by the commentator, that they "volunteered to help the cause of freedom". Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 21/08/1950.
[210] A. Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume 1, A Distant Obligation* (London, 1990), p. 110.

The defence of the Pusan perimeter covered by a Gaumont- British News feature of 10 August 1950,[211] illustrated UN soldiers disembarking from a troop ship and digging fortifications. The military situation was described as a "desperate struggle to maintain a foothold" and as "a fight against time as the UN holds only one tenth of South Korea". This accurate depiction of the military situation calls into question the claim made by UNC that reporters often adhered to the 'disaster school of journalism'. The coverage included no negative prediction for the future of the UN in Korea, but did convey the reality of the situation to the audience, thus rendering its journalism to some degree accurate.

One may well interpret this as an example of the military attempting to pressure the media into excluding embarrassing details, which may have been perceived as tarnishing their image, or as scaremongering. However, Truman's first remark to the press at the outset of the conflict, instructed the press; "don't make it alarmist".[212] Thus the military may have been reprimanding the media for releasing details, which were disconcerting to public opinion and prompted demand for tougher action against communism, which would therefore have made it increasingly difficult to keep the conflict localised and possibly provoked full scale war with the Soviet Union. Regardless, readers are able to understand the stance adopted by UNC, as the media may not have been aware of, or elected not to report, that although hard-pressed, the perimeter was holding firm and UNC enjoyed the advantage of being close to its main supply base, something which the NKPA did not, thus conveying a military advantage upon UNC.[213] Therefore, to some degree, the reader can assume that the media allowed its economic consideration, which was expressed by focusing upon selective and sensational events, on occasion caused the newsreels to forfeit 'balance' within coverage.

[211] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 10/08/1950.
[212] Casey*, Selling the Korean War,* p. 20.
[213] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 36.

Thus, we may identify that 'balance' on some occasions, was the influence that provided newsreels with elements which rendered material susceptible to an ideological and therefore propagandist reading. This retains particular significance in the context of newsreels, which regularly detailed negative events yet concluded with a hypothetic positive. Sensationalism thus equated to anti-propaganda and thus facilitated the possible build-up of oppositional ideologies amongst decoders, whereas 'balance' equated to propaganda, as such positive and redeeming remarks enthused texts with ideology compatible with the interests of hegemonic institutions.

As the NKPA offensive began to lose momentum around Pusan, UNC launched its first offensive of the war. This was reported in the newsreels on 14 August 1950 and illustrated US troops advancing past a burning village, as the commentary stated they possessed "adequate weapons" and "artillery fire, which they deserve".[214] Again the feature may be perceived as an adequate assessment of the military situation, as UNC forces were beginning to enjoy better supply, but does however break impartiality by employing the phrase "which they deserve". The commentary therefore had taken sides, by labelling the troops as deserving and thus connectively implying their moral superiority. O'Shaughnessy claims that propaganda myths often focus on the superiority of a tribe or race.[215] This is not to suggest that the material undergoing investigation here, conveyed race propaganda of the National Socialist style, but did unquestionably promote the ideology that UNC forces and the Western world were morally superior to the communist East, as the reader shall explore further when examining coverage of communist atrocities.

[214] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 14/08/1950.
[215] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 95.

In addition, the sequence once again broke impartiality through pursuit of a good narrative, when the commentary interpreted the NKPA's thoughts, by stating, "Reds must realise the growing might of the UN force". Although the communist commanders had undoubtedly recognised the rapidly increasing strength of UNC forces, the report maintained pretence of being capable of reading the thoughts of the NKPA, thus presenting the hypothetical as factual news. Should media professionals have allowed ideological loyalty/patriotism to colour their analysis, one can readily perceive the motivation underpinning the choice of words, as the democratic world had been unable to undertake an offensive prior to this and now had positive news to convey. Nevertheless, such sentiment would not appear out of place within a wartime public information campaign, instigated in house, or by external authority. However, it is most credible that the shared ideological atmosphere of Anglo-American society, as described by Hoggart,[216] combined with the informal British campaign to deny oppositional ideology access to the mainstream media,[217] weighted media material favourably toward the UN cause. Such leanings were illustrated by the final line of audio script, which stated, "confidence that forces of freedom will continue their drive back to the 38th Parallel", although the West had released no such information relating to future military or political objectives.

A further Gaumont-British News feature of 24 August 1950, reported the loss of a UNC airstrip,[218] described as "a setback" and "a sad loss for American air supremacy". Additionally the feature illustrated the American flag flying and stated, "It will fly again" over the airfield. The withdrawal was directly linked by the commentary to the Bataan action of the Second World War, symbolically encouraging feelings of heroic nostalgia within the

[216] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. x
[217] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, pp. 28, 47, 56.
[218] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 24/08/1950.

decoder. Thus troops fighting in Korea were associated with the heroism of the defence of Bataan. Therefore, the feature may be perceived as adopting a propagandist technique of linking current events with past events, where the heroism of today's soldier was mirrored against the bravery of past soldiers, who fought for a morally just cause. However, in this instance, Bataan represented retreat followed by return and victory which maintained greater significance, as General MacArthur was and remained commander of the forces involved. Nevertheless, the propagandist benefits arose as a bi-product of the media creating a 'good story' around current events.

However, viewers were thus assured of future victory by the symbolic employment of history, as a coded sign. M.C. Heck considers symbolism, often rooted in the associate value of language/image, to be fundamental to the process of social communication, in agreement with Hall's theoretical approach.[219] The reference to Bataan and its symbolic value can indeed be assigned an ideological value, representing future victory. However the process by which the encoded symbol became manifest within the media text becomes apparent when we consider professional media working practice. A key consideration of news/entertainment is 'impact' upon the audience, something which defines the genre and therefore exerts great influence over the encoding process. In this instance, impact, meaning and relevance of events in Korea, were exaggerated by the Bataan reference. The employment of the historical sign thus aided the decoder in understanding the significance of events in relation to a familiar previous event, which was likely well understood by war-time generations. Thus the sign assisted in the transfer of past ideologies into the present and therefore attached the ideological value of events of 1942 to that of 1950, based on a media necessity of ensuring newsreels had an impact upon their patrons. Thus from a media perspective, Bataan was a

[219] Heck, 'The Ideological Dimension of Media Message', pp. 122-127.

near perfect historic reference, as it maintained suitable dramatization to ensure impact upon the audience, whilst offering 'balance' in the form of a known (i.e. past-tense) positive outcome, which rendered the text ideologically comparable with dominant elites and therefore rendered the sequence propagandist in nature, as its inherent signs appealed to a significant volume of the decoder's 'maps of meanings', to ensure successful deciphering of the encoded message; which alluded to future victory despite current setbacks.

Communist forces were described as "elusive", with ambushes and sniper fire reported to be a common feature of the fighting. Additionally a sequence illustrating troops skirmishing was presented, as was an image of a captured communist flag. The combat footage appears authentic, but evidently heavily edited and compressed into a narrative. Hall describes the way in which an event is turned into a text as being a 'moment' of critical importance, to the process, by which ideology is transferred to the decoder. The main ideological element of this feature was manifest in the label selected to describe the enemies of the free world. Opposing forces were not described as the North Korean People's Army, but were defined as "the Red Army". Such terminology again defines the conflict in ideological terms, as the force is implied to be the army of international communism. The term 'Red Army' was familiar to most, as the Soviet armed forces that defeated National Socialism on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945, thus the term implies that the UNC was engaged in direct conflict with the Soviet Union. We may assume this to have been an example of unfortunate word choice, on behalf of the newsreel producers, particularly as Western leaders held no desire to see the conflict expand in scope,[220] although the terminology did match the line adopted by Western governments, who quietly, ultimately perceived Soviet Russia as responsible for North Korean aggression, as previously identified.

[220] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 7.

As Hall suggested and we have demonstrated, history may evolve into an ideologically 'loaded' symbol, if employed to bestow meaning upon a current event. The employment of the phrase "Red Army" demonstrated a further dimension to the value of history in the encoding process, as the associative value of the semantics can be identified as having undergone a transgression over a short period of time. As little as five years previously the associative value of the term had been positive; the Soviet Union and the Red Army had been gallant allies of the West.[221] Therefore the value of history, in ideological terms, had changed from virtuous to villainy. However, to contextualise the transition of the term "Red Army", one may conclude that during the Second World War, the Soviet Union was deemed villain and later hero, as Stalin had signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and before long, had been compelled to fight Hitler, following operation Barbarossa in 1941. Therefore, the simplistic 'black and white' employment of the phrase "Red Army" may be perceived as having been assigned a connotative value by the dominant ideologies, to suit circumstance. Thus the sedimentary establishment of anti-Soviet Cold War consensus, described by Jenks, clearly encouraged the viewer to 'read' encoded audio-visual material in a manner compatible with the perceptions of hegemonic elites.

The issue of Soviet responsibility was again raised at the UN Security Council meeting shown by Gaumont-British News on the 31 August 1950.[222] Immediately following this sequence, a wheelchair bound American soldier presented an account of a communist atrocity. The soldier was not noticeably wounded and his testimony was described as an "eye witness account". The significance of this sequence becomes evident when we observe that it

[221] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* pp. 27-29.
[222] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 31/08/1950.

was screened immediately preceding a speech made by Warren Austin to the UN, where blame was attached to the Soviet Union for instigating the conflict. Therefore, the sympathy and moral outrage inspired by the atrocity sequence may be perceived as having galvanised audience sentiment, thus rendering them increasingly receptive to the anti-Soviet message, portrayed in the following sequence. The message therefore, blamed Soviet Russia for the treatment received by UN POWs. The coding of the feature and the ideological apparent message may have occurred spontaneously, as a natural product of reporting two newsworthy events. However, the ideological climate of America and Britain during this period of tense international activity, as their armed forces were becoming increasingly embroiled in the Korean 'police action', indicates that readers have most likely encountered an element of deliberate encoding, as the 'message' helped solidify public consensus with the UN response to the crisis. The appalling events, which undoubtedly befell the unfortunate survivor, had thus been employed for political purposes, by media professionals, who through the arrangement of sequences, supported their nations cause in wartime, whilst fulfilling the aims of their industry by reporting extraordinary and highly emotive events in accordance with populist press values.

Following the Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, UN forces began their advance northwards and uncovered evidence of communist atrocities against prisoners and South Korean civilians. A review of the historical field indicates that pro-South Korean forces did on occasion commit crimes against POWs, but such acts were isolated, uncommon and spontaneous. Indeed British troops prevented South Korean security forces executing communist prisoners on more than one occasion.[223] In contrast, evidence suggests that brutality, war crimes and crimes against humanity existed as "common practice" inside the

[223] See, Salmon, *To the Last Round,* pp. 95-98.

NKPA, as described by Catchpole.[224] This statement implies that brutality was institutionalised within the NKPA. Phillip Chinnery, historian for the National Ex-Prisoner of War Association, produced work detailing the experiences of UNC prisoners of war between 1950 -1953.[225] This remains one of the most informative and authoritative accounts of the Korean War, from a human perspective, as the author details atrocities including the torture and murder of both servicemen and civilians.[226]

Thus, scholars are provided with historical evidence, which confirms the factual basis of news reports on the subject of NKPA breaches of human rights. A report featured by Gaumont-British News on 31 August 1950,[227] was justified in stating this to be "a vicious war against a vicious foe"; the feature then identified Private Roy Mannering by name. The soldier was shown sitting on a stretcher supporting a black eye, whilst the commentary stated that twenty-six bounded POWs, out of the twenty-nine captured, were subsequently executed. Private Mannering continued by identifying one of the guards who had participated in the atrocity. The young NKPA soldier, was shown, wearing his UNC POW identification tag and as having received medical attention. The captive was seated next to the injured Private Mannering, who repeatedly prodded the Korean with his finger whilst described as maintaining a "righteous rage". As the sequence closed the fate of either soldier was not alluded to.

[224] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 21.
[225] P.D. Chinnery, *Korean Atrocity: Forgotten War Crimes, 1950-1953* (Yorkshire, 2000).
[226] Chinnery, *Korean Atrocity,* pp. 1-35.
[227] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 31/08/1950.

Reporters and editors alike would have considered such events newsworthy as sensationalism, in this case moral-outrage, would have suited the newsreel companies, operating in the context of the entertainment industry. Nevertheless, boundaries of taste and decency had to be upheld, therefore explaining why images of the victims may have been excluded from the coverage. The nature of the fighting and the technical limitations of equipment may have prevented footage of the aftermath from being captured. Nonetheless these sequences, although heavily edited and compressed into short narratives, were heavily rooted in factual accuracy. Both features however exhibit elements of distortion, which maintained a propagandist benefit to the hegemonic ideology. Clearly, the narrative of events fit precisely into the media 'frame' of 'good versus evil' and 'hero verses villain' as described by O'Shaughnessy[228]. However, in this case, the villain was directly defined to the audience. One would expect the NKPA to have been held responsible, as the soldier was presented wearing the uniform of North Korea's military. However, the massacre was made the responsibility of NKPA ideology; communism, as the feature claimed North Korean troops were "unfeeling, brutalised foes" and "brutalised by Red training", implying that communism and therefore Soviet ideology commonly sanctioned such action.

Academically, one can readily unearth historical evidence of state sponsored brutality within the Soviet Union, particularly during the Stalinist era,[229] but as Jenks has identified, the British Information Research Department [IRD],[230] regularly fed material of a propagandist nature into the mainstream British media, which helped solidify the perception

[228] O'Shaughnessy suggests that enemies are necessary in propaganda as they channel the emotion of 'hate' into motivated action. This is not to say the hate inspiring events were fabricated, but that once undertaken, they can be employed to emotively drive social action; in this case to fight communist expansion in Korea. O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, pp. 123-127.
[229] A. Applebaum*, Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps* (London, 2003).
[230]Jenks, *British Propaganda*, pp. 62-113.

of Western virtue and Soviet interagency, in the early post-war period.[231] Therefore, the media narrative of illegal NKPA abuses, neatly fed into a well-established 'frame', portraying the evils of communist ideology, which had long been established in the West and thus rendered elements of the coverage propagandist in nature, despite their factual accuracy concerning the illegal killing of UNC service personnel.

Two final points are relevant to our discussion of the feature. Initially, the reader may note the uncommon reference to an allied soldier by name, as throughout the coverage of the Korean War, only names of significant personalities appeared in features. Hence, there must remain an underlying reason why this particular soldier was identified. Such an irregular occurrence may be perceived as the result of news crews conducting an interview with an individual, something which had been a regular thorn in the side of military media relations, particularly when UNC suffered defeats during the early part of the war. UNC often complained that reporters interviewed soldiers who had recently participated in an action, possibly witnessed their comrades' fall and were thus understandably disenchanted. This therefore, led to the production of reports that portrayed UNC and the war in a negative manner.[232] However, the propagandist value manifest within personal identification lent the report additional credibility and led the viewer to personally and emotively identify with the victim; two factors, which would have unwittingly increased an audience's likelihood of decoding the message in accordance with the preferred ideological reading of the text and conformed to media selection criteria.

[231] Ibid., p. 7.
[232] Casey*, Selling the Korean War,* pp. 50-51.

Secondly, the depiction of the captured NKPA soldier, adorned with his POW identification tag, visually highlighted the difference of cultural morality, which separated the opposing forces, as UNC adhered to the formal rules which governed conflict. Therefore, the decoder was reminded of the morality underpinning the UN cause. Thus the circulation of this symbolic text encouraged decoders to adopt perceptions which were rewarding to hegemonic authorities and media companies alike, in relation to ideological conformity and economic prosperity respectively.

Additionally the humane treatment of prisoners by Western soldiers has been well documented, as has the often brutal nature of the South Korean regime.[233] One should remain conscious that Korea had endured an extended period of brutal rule under the Japanese during the Second World War,[234] and had thus been isolated from Western influence for a considerable time, consequently leaving the culture of brutality unchallenged. The existence of such a culture was confirmed by General P. Sun Yup in his memoirs, as he "regretted the lack of concern our government (South Korean Government) and the ROK (Republic of Korea) army displayed for the people of Korea."[235] Therefore, one may consider the two Korean states of the period to have jointly suffered from a lack of consideration for humanity and that it was not instilled purely following the influx of communist doctrine at the end of the Second World War; although Yup described Soviet troops to have suffered from poor discipline upon their arrival in 1945,[236] which likely contributed to an already pitiless climate.

[233]Salmon, *To the Last Round,* pp. 95-97.
[234] Ibid., p. 96.
[235] General P. Sun Yup, *From Pusan to Panmunjom* (Virginia, 2000), p. 137.
[236] General P. Sun Yup's account of this maintains some authority, as he lived in the North and migrated south as communism became established. Sun Yup, *Pusan to Panmunjom*, p. 82.

The chronological detour manifest in the above three paragraphs should not interrupt our rhythm. The battles surrounding the Pusan perimeter, between early August and the breakout by UNC, on 16 September 1950, merit further discussion. US Army units were illustrated in action within two features.[237] The situation facing UNC was described as defensive and symbolically illustrated by imagery of US tanks in action. The first feature exhibited tanks shelling a distant ridge, along with heavy machine gun fire. The commentary described the events as a "tank battle"; the reader may however assume this to be an example of artistic licence, introduced by the newsreel, as the imagery may be considered comparatively mundane when measured against the description offered by the audio commentary. Nonetheless, the reader must consider the practicalities of recording a tank battle as one possible explanation for the absence of material detailing such a clash. During this period, NKPA forces were committed to the capture of Pusan, thus rendering a small scale clash of armour a viable possibility.

The reader is also reminded of comments made by the war reporter Reginald Thompson, who documented an example of how rumour and hearsay may have artificially shaped certain coverage. Thompson, overheard military and media personnel discussing and writing a dramatic account of a night attack. However, Thompson claims the attack was fictitious, as he had been present at the supposed location, during the apparent battle. Indeed, the author suggests that such inaccuracies occurred frequently.[238] This is not to argue that military or media personnel intentionally fabricated narratives of dramatic events, but rather to demonstrate how misinterpretation of insignificant events could well have been exaggerated by confused or excitable soldiers and reporters alike. Indeed, one would not

[237] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 14/09/1950 and 18/09/1950.
[238] R. Thompson, *Cry Korea: The Korean War, a Reporter's Notebook* (London, 2009), pp. 152-154.

expect an audience to be presented with entirely accurate material, on every occasion, due to the 'fog' and chaos of war. However, when the reader contrasts the episode reported by Thompson, to the one concerning the fate of General Dean, which maintained greater levels of factuality, we may identify significant differences between the accuracy of reports emerging from Korea.

The newsreel of 18 September 1950, described the fighting around Pusan as "bitter" and that American tanks had formed "a ridge of steel". Additionally, the "Reds" were said to have made no recent progress, whilst well-armed UNC riflemen were depicted occupying defences. Shots of armour, artillery and military transport were likewise included and visually demonstrated the build-up of war material UNC was experiencing at this time. Thus, the viewer was visually reassured that the situation in Korea had improved. Therefore, the reader may consider this report to maintain some, heavily symbolic, factual accuracy concerning events. The two features emphasised that the USA had borne the majority of the wars burden thus far as Howard Smith suggests Pathe newsreels also elected to emphasise the issue.[239] Yet again, one may consider this to be an accurate representation, as American soldiers made up the vast majority of UNC's forces. Of particular interest here, is whether this emphasis on America's commitment, which was prominent in coverage, developed organically based on entertaining yet factual reporting, or by the process of filtration, described by Chomsky, or alternatively, inserted in a more direct manner, in the USA or Britain, by a media who were sensitive to the needs of significant institutions.

[239] Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 230.

The initial explanation suggests that media editors simply conveyed the 'essential truth' of events, which became enthused with sensational phraseology through artistic licence. However the viewer was presented with no clue to identify which side of the Atlantic the features were produced. Thus, we shall consider the propagandist value inherent in publicising that America carried the burden of the war, to each government respectively, beyond the obvious benefit to the media 'entrepreneurs of news'. Firstly, the United States required allies to become more directly involved to validate the UN resolution authorising collective action, as the authority of the international body was maintained by consensus. Furthermore, the Truman administration desired to appease public opinion, which felt increasingly resentful toward the international community, as casualty figures began to rise amongst American servicemen.[240] In a similar vein, Britain, although reluctant to become drawn into the Korean 'police action',[241] was determined to support United States policy, grounded to a large degree on the fear of Soviet expansion in Western Europe.[242] The British viewer was therefore, encouraged to support the commitment Britain was beginning to make toward Korea, via an emotive appeal to guilt. Therefore, the connative value of both sequences demonstrates that regardless of which nations media-state system produced them, they conveyed a message, if successfully decoded, which was mutually supportive of the policies of both governments and thus may be considered propagandist as they directed public perception and set the agenda for debate amongst decoders in a manner concurrent with the hegemonic ideology.

[240] See Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 3.
[241] Hastings, *The Korean War*, p. 92.
[242]Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume 1*, pp. 32-33, 351.

On 7 September 1950, British Movietone News released footage of President Truman delivering a speech.[243] The president informed the audience that liberty was at stake and linked the basic freedoms enjoyed by the West to the conflict in Korea. Truman continued by stating that America did not desire war with China and that his nation was re-arming in order to secure peace only. The sequence also contained rhetoric, related to the concept of 'just war'. Here the reader has encountered the classic media-state relationship, where the two social institutions interact in a mutually beneficial manner, as the Government desired to publish its message, which the media then conveyed to audiences as a newsworthy item, thus maintaining its economic role as a seller of socially significant information, whilst replicating the ideology in dominance as described by Hall. Therefore, the ideological content of the speech, although self-gratifying and propagandist in nature, must be interpreted as overt rhetorical lobbying on behalf of an ideological position, in this case, that the American lead UN 'police action' was legally and morally valid. This may be considered an example of the "symbiotic relationship" which exists between elite institutions and mass media,[244] which facilitated the circulation of America's hegemonic ideology to audiences around the free world. However, much of the coverage of events in Korea was produced by a more complicated media and state relationship than the example evident here.

In the weeks preceding the Inchon landing, the newsreels contained two further points worthy of exploration. Firstly, the accuracy of UNC artillery, directed by light aircraft flying 'spotter' sorties was emphasised.[245] The coverage was an accurate depiction of events; as such spotter units flew regularly and were held in high esteem by the military and journalists

[243] Primary source index for British Movietone News, 07/09/1950.
[244] Marger, 'The Mass Media', p. 241.
[245] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 18/04/1950.

alike, as described by Catchpole.[246] The propagandist value of such coverage publicised the military might possessed by UNC and therefore conveyed a sense of security, borne of strength, to the viewer. Additionally, written reports which appeared in the press of the day, listed the tally of targets spotter units were responsible for neutralising. The specifics, including 1,045 villages housing enemy troops and 1,302 troop concentrations, may well have been difficult to verify and as a result been subject to exaggeration or inaccuracy, particularly when compared against more easily quantifiable statistics such as the six bridges and eight locomotives such units were accredited with destroying.[247]

Thompson, described United States Air Force 'kill statistics' as unreliable[248] and when we consider the similar role of the forward air 'spotter', one should perhaps view the statistical record with similar caution. The chaos of the battlefield is a problematic and challenging environment and as a result, inaccuracy may be considered unavoidable. Additionally, human nature may have helped exaggerate statistics. However, regardless of causalities, such statistics may be interpreted as having maintained a positive propaganda value and therefore helped maintain military and civilian morale, as they demonstrated the military prowess and therefore security of the West, which the attentive viewer, during the autumn of 1950, probably desired following nearly two and a half months of set-backs in Korea.[249] Therefore, the news media can be perceived as having replicated the ideology held by Tokyo headquarters, likely as a bi-product of having relied upon official military press releases as a primary and 'objective' source of information; such practice is considered common by media theorists, who suggest "government actions" and "credibility" coupled

[246] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* pp. 185-188.
[247] Ibid., pp. 186-187.
[248] Thompson, *Cry Korea*, pp. 132-133.
[249] Additionally, coverage focusing upon technical aspects of warfare, focuses the attention of the decoder away from the human aspect, which is often measured in cost.

with a common media policy of following the "path of least resistance", often combine to dominate media coverage of significant events,[250] thus rendering narratives enthused with ideology.

Finally, Gaumont-British News screened a sequence depicting a high level meeting, in New York, between Great Britain, the United States and France.[251] The feature emphasised links between events unfolding in Korea and the security of Western Europe, in a manner similar to Attlee's speech, detailing the "distant fire" as justification for intervention.[252] This example, illustrates how the media replicated hegemonic ideology, as the feature was obviously inspired by official opinion, but not created or organised by officialdom. However, of utmost interest to our discussion was the verbal referral to the participants as "the big three" which demonstrated to the audience that the cannon of power had shifted since the Second World War, where the Soviet Union, not France, had comprised the third member. Thus the reader can perceive this as an example of the process documented by Jenks, who suggested the British public was steadily weaned away from the view of Russia being a 'friendly' allied power, during the early post war period. Therefore, this feature neatly fitted into the anti-Soviet 'frame', which had become manifest, within the British media for a number of years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.[253] The phrase had likely been re-coined by journalists, seeking to report news in a snappy and memorable manner, as many would have recalled the phrase from the previous conflict, thus rendering any propaganda

[250] Marger, 'The Mass Media', p. 241.
[251] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 18/09/1950.
[252] MacDonald, 'Great Britain and the Korean War', pp. 99-102.
[253] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 7.

value maintained by the speech to have been the product of how entertainment-news was packaged and delivered.[254]

However, the connative associations of this phrase may have led the decoder to recall the historical context in which the phrase was initially conceived. The Allies had been engaged in a battle against tyranny and 'closed ranks' in order to overcome the challenge presented by the Axis powers. The development of the Cold War was interpreted and framed in a similar manner, as the need for proactive collective security had become a key feature of Western policy, in order for democracy to insulate its self against authoritarianism. Therefore, this example of social communication was clearly susceptible to, as Hall would describe it, an ideological reading,[255] as the feature linked the current struggle to a past conflict, where totalitarianism had been overcome. On the contrary, this sequence may have encouraged the more thoughtful viewer to consider why the West had allied its self with the now discredited Soviet Union to fight Nazi Germany, thus drawing attention to the change of tone, regarding coverage of Russia since the days of 1941;[256] although the practicality of the alliance was probably evident to most given the circumstances Britain faced during 1940-1941. Nevertheless the reader has encountered a feature which demonstrated, in a manner similar to the preceding two sequences, that a narrow range of society enjoyed access to the newsreel media. The personalities and statistics discussed all represented the values and

[254] "The distinction between news and entertainment is not considered to be a sharp one." O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 53.
[255] Heck, 'The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages', p.124.
[256] Coverage of the wartime Anglo-Soviet Alliance, from 1941, can be viewed as sympathetic to the Soviet cause, something which began to change following ominous Russian moves against British interests in the immediate post war period. See Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 39.

ideology of elite Western institutions, which matched the access "qualifications' required influencing media content.[257]

On 15 September 1950, MacArthur dramatically altered the course of the war with an amphibious assault on the port of Inchon, near the southern capital of Seoul. Coverage appeared in the newsreels on 25 September 1950 and described the operation in dynamic terms. Cheerful looking soldiers "swarmed ashore", coupled with images of Marines scaling the sea wall. The road to Seoul was reportedly "open" and UNC casualties, described as "unavoidable", were depicted being evacuated. Casualties were said "not to have been in vain" and shots of refugees were shown, along with burning NKPA armour, POWs and fatalities. UNC was described as "soon to capture Seoul", and the "beginning of victory" was additionally announced. Troops and tanks were shown advancing, as a large blast demonstrated NKPA resistance, one suspects that the camera man was fortunate to escape injury judging by the proximity of the explosion. This feature demonstrates that newsreel crews were taking substantial risks, when shooting footage as indeed by 14 January 1951; thirteen reporters had been killed in Korea.[258] This risk was necessitated by the economic need to acquire a 'scoop' to encourage and maintain viewer interest. The feature also indicates the time lag between footage being 'captured' and its release to the general public. In this instance the delay was ten days. Thus when we consider the practical limitations faced by the newsreel media; from 'shooting', clearance by military censors (post December 1950), transportation to either side of the Atlantic, editing, distribution and screening, we can determine that the newsreel media operated at a significant disadvantage when producing up to date news swiftly. However, this was compensated by the monopoly newsreel companies

[257] Marger, 'The Mass Media', p. 240.
[258] Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, p. 124.

maintained over the moving image and provides further explanation why camera teams exposed themselves to such risk.[259]

In addition, the reader may perceive the material as having maintained a fair degree of openness regarding casualties, sustained by UNC, as the images of wounded carried to evacuation, although connectively assuring the viewer of a positive outcome, did acknowledge their "inevitability"; even though the viewer was quickly reassured that the sacrifice was not in vain. The negative aspects of the strategically significant, well-conceived and executed operation were thus afforded a degree of coverage and serve as testament to media openness, despite the connotations leading towards a less distressing conclusion, thus producing a less damaging effect on public morale. One may therefore perceive the newsreels instilling balance within coverage, as the value-driven tendency to focus upon negative events was counterbalanced against the validity of the cause. Furthermore, despite having been condensed into a narrative, comprising of multiple signs and symbols, the feature did accurately represent the military situation. UNC was indeed advancing in the face of NKPA resistance, toward the strategically valuable prize of Seoul and had inflicted casualties upon the enemy as represented by the burning T-34/85 and the captured and deceased NKPA.

However, an anomaly may be noted relating to the depiction of enemy dead and the absence of allied fatalities in the field. The sequence described earlier illustrating the burial of UN personnel, killed in action, contrasts sharply with the inclusion of unburied NKPA left lying in the open. Therefore, the reader may assume that newsreels did not exclude the deceased through consideration of taste or decency, but rather on the less objective and more

[259] Domestic television was very much in its infancy in 1950.

selective implications to public opinion and morale. In essence, portrayal of Allied fatalities would have been considered detrimental to public morale and unsettled public consensus concerning the conflict. By contrast, images of enemy fatalities would ensure a positive effect, on an audience, as such footage simultaneously illustrated victory and revenge. In this manner, the deceased can be perceived as having maintained a propagandist value, which is evident within the audio-visual material, regardless of the specifics of the process which shaped its structure. However, it should be emphasised that the deceased only feature irregularly which in itself, may be considered propagandist in effect, as the decoder was not exposed to the full horrors of warfare due to the intervention of regulatory guidelines and were thus rendered less likely to challenge the ideology in dominance.

The newsreel recording of "MacArthur's greatest victory", screened on 2 October 1950,[260] illustrated South Korean civilians cheering UNC forces as they advanced, wounded troops airlifted out and NKPA prisoners described as "glad to be out of the war" and "safe in UN hands". The two remarks demonstrate how easily and subtly the newsreels could break any notion of 'objectivity' and intentionally or not, adopt a more propagandist stance. The latter phrase, concerning the safety of POWs, infers that the UN had in effect rescued these men from the North Korean regime and thus communist ideology. Given the nature of the North Korean regime, this may well maintain an element of truth. However, the phrase and its connative interpretation, fit neatly into the anti-communist frame, referred to previously, thus affording the comments propagandist value.

[260] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 02/10/1950.

An additional interpretation may consider the feature to visually and verbally demonstrate, to the world, that UNC behaved in a far more civilised manner toward prisoners than the NKPA.[261] The propagandist value of such a message would have again highlighted the moral superiority of the UN and become a weapon in the battle for opinion, which both ideological spheres engaged in throughout the Cold War, as described by Taylor, who suggests a global struggle for ideological alliances was taking place.[262] The first phrase, "glad to be out of the war" illustrated an act of interpretation, on behalf of the audio-overlay, which informed the audience that NKPA units had not simply broken militarily but also psychologically. However accurate, critical observers are again presented with an example of the commentary allowing the dramatized-hypothetical to permeate coverage, therefore leading the viewer to assume that a lack of enemy resolve translated into impending victory. Nevertheless, during this phase of the war, UNC had indeed maintained a "relentless tempo"[263] as it approached the 38th Parallel, when described by the newsreels as achieving "victory in South Korea",[264] which remained accurate but nonetheless avoided addressing the question of how victory over, or in, North Korea was to be achieved- if at all.

The advance into North Korea, which resulted in the steady decline of cohesion between UN units,[265] exposed the true extent of communist atrocities towards civilians and UNC soldiers alike. Gaumont-British News featured imagery of a massacre perpetrated by the NKPA and described the scene as "Belsen all over again". The crimes were described as

[261] Despite the often difficult circumstances, UNC treated its prisoners in a more humane manner than the NKPA; something that historiography has demonstrated via the citation of numerous examples.
[262] P.M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy* (Edinburgh, 1999), p. 225.
[263] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 12/10/1950.
[264] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 12/10/1950.
[265] Catchpole, *The Korean War*, p. 65.

inspired by “Kremlin propaganda”. The sequence began by showing allied units advancing and troops inspecting portraits of Stalin and other communist dignitaries, which one would expect to find in a political system dominated by a cult of personality. Refugees were depicted climbing on to trains to return to homes “the reds drove them out of”. Finally, a civilian, having informed communist authorities of his fellow villager’s political opinions was beaten by an angry mob; UNC troops were depicted rescuing the man, depositing him aboard a tank, as the angry mob continued to bay for his blood. This sequence was accompanied by the two ‘snappy’ phrases; “once a communist always a communist” and “traitor swaps country’s independence for a pair of jackboots”.

The sequence contained an ideological message and as a result it may be considered propagandist in nature. The message implied that communism constituted a negative entity which was achieved by linking the political philosophy, to the practical deeds of those who represented it, by illustrating its leaders and their followers alongside examples of human suffering, such as the displacement of refugees and the existence of a police state, which relied on informants to betray their neighbours in order to facilitate mass murder. When compared against the historical record one can readily find evidence to validate such associations, as brutality was a common feature of such state systems. However, the manner in which the atrocity was depicted, regarding the direct link made to Nazism, infers that the viewer had witnessed an act of industrialised genocide, which may be considered an over exaggeration or sensationalism, instigated by the newsreel producers. This is not to deny the appalling nature of the crimes, but is intended to re-clarify them, as mass political purges and furthermore highlight a number of propagandist elements contained within the feature, which arose from media sensationalism. Initially this description helped the audience link events in a distant Korea to those the viewer would undoubtedly have recalled from the Second World

War; the Holocaust, which is a technique, employed by media organisations to assist the viewer to identify with events and thus potentially aid the clarity of decoding, which Hall argues is not assured.[266]

Furthermore, the emotive feature induced pity, fear and hate amongst viewers. Such a response assisted in the maintenance of a dominant reading, on behalf of the decoder, particularly as O'Shaughnessy describes hate as a potent or dominant factor in propaganda.[267] Furthermore, communist ideology and leaders were directly linked to these crimes as the audience was presented with portraits symbolising their authority and ultimate responsibility for the behaviour of their subordinates. Moreover the brutality of the communist world was then juxtaposed against Western ideals of humanity, as the village informant was illustrated being rescued from understandably vengeful Koreans. This sequence was unlikely to have been staged, as the participants appear natural, however, this accurate news item, which subtly illustrated the point, via connative association, was transformed into an overtly propagandist piece following the remarks made by the commentary. Thus the audience were encouraged to 'hate' and fear communism due to the influence of media selection criteria and a connative link to past crimes against humanity, which although to some degree maintained elements of accuracy, had evidently become sensationalised within the text. The newsreel treatment of such events may allow us to further understand Jenks' claim that British officials held the medium in low regard and deemed it poor quality journalism.[268] However despite examples demonstrating a 'low brow' treatment of events, such sentiment may have contained elements of anti-Americanism due to the reliance of newsreel companies on American material. Regardless, such coverage did little to encourage decent amongst

[266] Hall, 'Encoding/decoding', p.135.
[267] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 163.
[268] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 16.

Western decoders in relation to the hegemonic perceptions of the era and was thus self-gratifying to the institutions which fulfilled media access criteria.

The coverage of events between 19 October and 9 November 1950 illustrated UNC units, including British troops advancing past burnt-out NKPA armour and smoking ruins. Again, emphasis was placed upon the priority treatment of the wounded. Clearly such features, would have reassured an audience that British service personnel in Korea, should they become a casualty, would be well cared for. This maintained a positive propagandist side effect; although such features accurately informed an audience that casualties occurred, the treatment they received would have calmly reassured the viewer and helped prevent or quell the sedimentary build-up of oppositional ideological readings, to intervention in Korea; the reason being that although troops lives were at risk; itself justified by the morality of the cause, as discussed, authorities maintained a vested interest in their care should they become wounded. This assisted in alleviating concerns regarding sending men to war, held at the time amongst female members of the populace, as recorded by mass observation and detailed by Catchpole.[269] Furthermore, such coverage may have been included on a regular basis, in accordance with the news selection value of "familiarity",[270] as the audience would have expected to see causalities receiving care. Thus, the coverage confirmed expectation and maintained "cultural proximity"[271] to the values of the dominant Western culture, that the wellbeing of the individual is significant.

[269] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 264.
[270] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. x.
[271] Ibid., pp. ix-xiii.

During this period, the meeting between President Truman and General MacArthur at Wake Island was reported.[272]The feature contained little of significance and moreover no evidence of journalistic analysis. The commentary merely stated that Truman visited MacArthur to "thank him for services to world peace." This meeting has been interpreted as Truman attempting to re-assert his presidential authority over an increasingly out-spoken military commander.[273] Again, we do not have sufficient space to explore in thorough detail the implications of this event, although further study may wish to investigate how this event was reported within the spectrum of the American or British press.

Importantly this short sequence enables us to chart the time difference between the 'shooting' of an event and its publication as a news feature. The meeting took place on 15 October 1950 and the news clip is recorded by the archive as having been completed or released for public consumption on 19 October. Therefore, the time difference separating image 'capture' and feature release was approximately four days. Clearly Wake Island is not as distant from the United States as Korea, thus reducing transportation time. The reader can however safely assume that material taken at Wake Island would be less sensitive than footage shot in Korea, as the meeting was held behind closed doors, and therefore required less scrutiny by media editors practicing self-censorship, which again reduced production time. Thus one must remain alert when analysing audio-visual news material, as features may comprise of sub-sequences produced inside different time-frames, consequently disordering the chronological clarity of reports. In this example, the newsreel of 19 October contained a sub-feature illustrating the meeting of 15 October and a further sub-feature reporting the final stages of UNC's capture of Seoul between 24 and 27 September 1950. We may conclude that

[272] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 19/10/1950.
[273] Rees, *Korea: the Limited War*, pp. 115-122.

newsreels may have contained material covering events of up to three weeks prior to release, depending on the transportation time. In summary, the newsreel coverage of the early period of the war, which saw UNC withdraw to Pusan and later sweep north following the Inchon landings, evidently contained material which may be perceived as propagandist in nature as little would have provoked the decoder to challenge the established 'common sense consensus' of anti-communism.

Through the application of media theory and historiography the reader has begun to identify and explore the 'message' and how it was constructed. Western ideology was illustrated supreme, as Eastern ideals became increasingly suspect, particularly as political murder was associated with National Socialist genocide. Furthermore, the validity of UN action was repeatedly asserted and supported by evidence from Korea, which featured in the newsreels due to the peculiarities of media selection criteria, the ideological climate of Western society and media-state interdependence at the national level.[274] Finally, the reader can conclude that both media and state interest in events, one based on economics, the other on politics and policy, helped 'set the agenda' for the domestic audience. It is the product of this interaction which ensured that the decoder would be subject to receiving "systematically distorted" and therefore, to a notable degree, self-gratifying communications throughout the first six months of hostilities.

[274] Marger, 'The Mass Media', p. 241.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTERLUDE: EVENTS OF EARLY OCTOBER 1950 AND THE STATE-MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP

During early October 1950, the newsreels reported victories as UNC advanced. The total unification of Korea appeared a possibility as NKPA resistance slackened following the defence of Seoul. On 7 November Tokyo HQ announced victory,[275] as the infamous phrase "home by Christmas" began to be uttered.[276] However, on 27 October Chinese forces had struck second ROK corps, which stunted the UN advance and mauled an American regiment.[277] The following two week lull in Chinese operations, from 2 November, saw UNC undertake the "end the war offensive", by pushing on to the Yalu River and the border with Manchuria, thus bringing the war to a decisive conclusion. However, on 25 November Chinese forces initiated their second phase offensive and attacked the hastily advancing units of UNC. It was around this period that the actions of the media and more significantly General MacArthur became increasingly confused. In order to develop a thorough understanding of the coverage of the period of crisis which surrounded Chinese intervention, it is necessary for us to review the state-media-military system of interaction, from the outbreak of the conflict. This will provide us with an understanding of how the censorship system initially functioned and evolved as the war developed, whilst increasing our understanding of the influences which helped shape newsreel coverage. The exploration will predominantly draw upon the work of Casey, who investigated how the Korean War was sold to the American public. As audio-visual material 'consumed' by British audiences was often

[275] Thompson, *Cry Korea*, p. 245.
[276] Ibid., p. 275.
[277] C. Malkasian*, The Korean War 1950-1953* (Oxford, 2001), p. 32.

of American origin,[278] it is necessary for us to briefly examine the American media-state-military system.

Almost immediately following his appointment as UNC commander, General MacArthur, from his Tokyo Headquarters, had publicised his disregard for formal and official censorship. This was said to have been "Abhorrent" to the General, "as it is to all believers in freedom of the news and a true democratic society."[279] Thus no compulsory system was introduced; correspondents were permitted to travel freely inside Korea and report what they witnessed. Instead the press were asked to practice voluntary restraint, in order to exclude details which may have endangered the security of UN forces or vilified them unnecessarily.[280] As Casey records, the emphasis was now very much on the individual, as the media were expected to adhere to a self-imposed code.[281] In addition one may assume that a system which lacked formal boundaries may have proved disorientating to less experienced reporters, who unlike their more seasoned colleagues, may have been unsure as to what was deemed acceptable or not. Therefore, the reader may reasonably assume that the formal code practiced during the Second World War essentially removed the responsibility from journalists and in some respects detracts from Jenks' argument that the early post war British media was tightly self-policed due to experience gained in the Second World War.[282] One may therefore consider similar to be applicable to the American media. Clearly any serving correspondent would have gained experience with the practice of self-censorship and boundaries, but the final responsibility was nevertheless removed from them by the

[278] Audio-visual material was often of American origin. Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 228.
[279] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 45.
[280] Ibid., p. 45.
[281] Ibid., p. 46.
[282] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 2.

censorship code.[283] Thus reporters who were under pressure from their editors to make a 'scoop', may have found themselves in an undesirable situation; between the military 'rock' and the editorial 'hard-place', as it would have been problematic to keep both parties content, given their opposing interests, as Taylor suggests that the military wish to restrict the flow of information, where the media require it for economic survival.[284] Therefore, it is not difficult to ascertain how and why many journalists, intentionally or not, enraged Tokyo Head Quarters from the outbreak of the war and disregarded security procedures.[285]

However, MacArthur's rejection of censorship maintained darker undertones. During the Second World War the general had developed a reputation for attempts at press control, censoring criticism and often making journalists reliant on his official and often uninformative communiqués for war news.[286] This system developed during the post war years and employed a number of "carrot and stick" methods,[287] which helped guide journalists in an informal manner. Those who favoured MacArthur in their correspondence and towed the official line were often rewarded with inside information or a place amongst "the palace guard" in the midst of the Generals court, as did selected wire service chiefs.[288] However those who affronted the General's ego or covered developments unfavourably often became recipients of low key harassment. Such methods included being branded a security risk, denial of entry or expulsion, derogatory letters to employers and raids on accommodation.[289] Casey states that once MacArthur had issued his voluntary censorship

[283]Chapman, *The British at War*, p. 16.
[284]As made evident by an analysis of military-media interaction during the Falklands campaign. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, pp. 278-279.
[285] Casey, *Selling the Korean War, p. 8.*
[286] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 46.
[287] Ibid., p. 48.
[288] Ibid., p. 48.
[289] Ibid., p. 48.

code, at the beginning of the war, it was made plain to journalists that they must cooperate and tow the official line or face sanctions.[290] Such a system did not endear MacArthur to members of the media; indeed press-military friction was a key feature of the war, as made evident by Casey's research. The media perspective is well expressed by Thompson's *Cry Korea,* which suggests a genuine dislike existed amongst journalist toward MacArthur and found some things "profoundly disturbing" about the General and the campaign.[291] Furthermore the reporter, who was an ex-British Army intelligence officer, records that subtle restrictions began to be applied to reporters' travel,[292] that their private thoughts went out by mail for fear of being expelled,[293] and that a number of reporters felt the burden and left.[294]

However, we must maintain our objectivity and consider the climate MacArthur and his staff operated in. MacArthur now presided over a territory which had only recently been liberated from authoritarian rule, he would therefore have to set an example of the superiority of democracy, indeed as Casey has suggested, he seized the opportunity of the Korean War to illustrate the moral ascendancy of democracy over the totalitarian communist world.[295] Additionally, it was most probable MacArthur was aware of the hypocritical nature of a democracy introducing formal censorship in peace time, as the war was officially defined as a 'police action'. Thus at a time when the boundaries between war and peace became blurred, it would seem only natural that so could the boundaries between media-military-state interaction. Furthermore, Casey illustrates that Tokyo did not initially have the resources

[290] Ibid., p. 48.
[291] Thompson, *Cry Korea,* p. 106.
[292] Ibid., p. 123.
[293] Ibid., p. 106.
[294] Ibid., p. 106.
[295] Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, p. 46.

available to introduce a formal code during the early phase of the conflict.[296] The influx of reporters, which quickly reached two hundred by late July 1950, would have been difficult to provide for even though they were often experienced members of the press.[297] Finally, the military criticism that journalists subscribed to the 'disaster school of journalism' were not unfounded. Many reporters, based on a professional ethos, covered events from the front line, which rendered much of their copy negative in nature as interviews with battle shocked troops were inevitably pessimistic.[298]

This micro picture, objective as it may have been, perhaps disregarded the macro view of the military situation as seen at Head Quarters. The initial defeats and withdrawals were an unpleasant yet necessary bi-product of committing under strength and ill equipped forces in order to stem the communist assault.[299] Therefore, during the first six months of the conflict, the reader can identify some evidence to suggest that an informal system was necessary, due to practical considerations, whilst additionally remaining aware that the informal system, championed by MacArthur, was not as transparent or benign as perhaps he considered it to be. Additionally, the reader must consider that as Commander in Chief of UN forces, General MacArthur was wise to consider the positive effect on civilian and military morale that his official communiqués were intended to have,[300] although it is difficult to deny that this positivism also helped obscure negative events, which may have publically discredited his image, something which he was inclined to cultivate. However, the gulf between more objective yet heavily selected micro reporting on behalf of reporters and the

[296] Ibid., p. 47.
[297] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 45.
[298] Ibid., pp. 48-50.
[299] Ibid., pp. 48-50.
[300] Ibid., p. 50.

macro consideration of strategy and morale emanating from Tokyo resulted in the development of a widening credibility gap as Casey argues.[301]

As the war progressed it is evident that the subtle informal restrictions began to increase. The methods practiced by the military became more 'underhand' as new vague clauses concerning 'unwarranted criticism' appeared as MacArthur charged the media with psychologically aiding the enemy, which increasingly prompted the press to request the introduction of official censorship.[302] During this time various editors began to suspect that MacArthur was employing the ambiguity of the informal system to cover bad news,[303] which would have tarnished his public image and provided a motive for his resistance to the introduction of formal censorship with defined boundaries. The media-military friction, described by Casey and Thompson, would only increase as UNC suffered a shock defeat as China embarked upon an officially undeclared yet subtly forewarned attack.[304]

As MacArthur's "End the war offensive" ran into trouble in the face of China's second phase offensive between 25 November and 9 December 1950, the military, political and media crisis intensified. As UNC units began the "big bug-out", chaotic, costly and demoralising fighting withdrawals took place, which saw names including the Chongchon River, Chosin Reservoir, Koto-ri and Hell Fire Valley passed into military history. One can logically argue that during this period Washington was rapidly losing control of the situation as UNC was in full retreat and large units were threatened with encirclement and destruction.

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[301] Ibid., p. 50.
[302] Ibid., pp. 53-57.
[303] Ibid., p. 57.
[304] China had put out subtle warnings through the Indian delegation. MacDonald, *Britain and the Korean War*, p. 32.

Furthermore their commander in Tokyo was not only reporting alarming warnings of annihilation, but was in addition calling for escalation of the war with China via bombing and blockade, thus publically questioning Truman's policy for conducing the war, but also seeking to extricate himself of blame for the unfolding crisis. To add to this list of woes, the press were lacking efficient and effective guidelines of how to report the crisis. In effect, the media were officially free to report on events which adhered to existing media selection criteria. The most prominent example being the necessity of reporting negative news, which encouraged the viewer to emote and therefore provided an entertainment value to news coverage; something which led O'Shaughnessy to argue that the distinction between news and entertainment was not a sharp one".[305] As Casey suggests, Truman would find "crafting an information campaign in such an environment no easy task".[306]

MacArthur's communiqués to Washington deeply troubled the administration, indeed the General had been a concern since the beginning of the war.[307] However, the "political undertones" he was including, with his polarised pessimistic/ optimistic reports, initiated the last phase of the battle over policy.[308] MacArthur lobbied Truman to take "some positive action", on 2/3 December, to prevent the destruction of UNC forces, which referred to escalation of the conflict with China. Aside from his disquiet over his Generals attempt to make, rather than implement policy[309] and the possibility of conducting a 'Dunkirk style' evacuation of Korea, Truman was upset by MacArthur's public attempts to avoid criticism for the calamity UNC now faced.[310] The instability now evident in Tokyo, undoubtedly

[305] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 53.
[306] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 128.
[307] Ibid., p. 44.
[308] Rees, *Korea: The Limited War,* p. 160.
[309] Ibid., pp. 174-176.
[310] Ibid., p. 161.

contributed to Truman's alarmist remark concerning "active consideration" of employing the atomic bomb, which prompted a media frenzy,[311] a visit from Prime Minister Attlee and damaged Truman's attempts to symbolically make no public fuss over developments,[312] whilst rendering fifty per cent of Americans expecting the commencement of a third world war.[313]

During this period, military officials were instructed to refrain from comment,[314] although front line reporters conveyed a sense of crisis.[315] Casey suggests that some media adopted self-censorship and refrained from attacking Truman, whilst others were less restrained.[316] Truman issued an order designed to restrain theatre commanders from commenting publically, without clearance from Washington.[317] However, the most revealing evidence of the sentiment maintained between Tokyo and the media can be accredited to an outburst by General Willoughby, who described journalists as "the rag pickers of modern literature" and accused them of "calculated treason and subversion", whilst offering "aid and comfort to the enemy".[318] When coupled with MacArthur's attempts to re-write history by describing the 'End the war offensive' as a spoiling attack aimed at disrupting the Chinese offensive,[319] despite the well documented intelligence failures,[320] the reader may clearly perceive that MacArthur and his staff were exceptionally sensitive to criticism, thus explaining the General's resistance to formal and established censorship boundaries, as

[311] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 132.
[312] Ibid., p.129.
[313] Rees, *Korea: The Limited War*, p. 172.
[314] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* pp. 135-136.
[315] Ibid., pp. 135-136.
[316] Ibid., p. 143.
[317] Ibid., p. 141.
[318] Rees, *Korea: The Limited War,* p. 175.
[319] Ibid, p. 174.
[320] J. Prados, 'In the Dark and out of Luck', *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History,* 1 (21) (2008), p. 83.

discussed above. Such events only furthered the position maintained by the media that Tokyo had attempted to control coverage, which subsequently expanded the credibility gap further.[321]

Following the tightening of restrictions, examples exist to demonstrate how correspondents could still behave irresponsibly, as typified by United Press during the retreat.[322] Other examples include the military having to prevent the press from reporting on the situation facing X Corps, their fighting withdrawal and subsequent evacuation by sea, in the interests of operational security. Additionally, friction emerged over coverage of a missing UNC unit of approximately seven hundred men. The media wished to follow this story; however the military considered it distressing for the families concerned.[323] One military official claimed that the attack from "the typewriter in the rear" was often worse than the enemy, and that the media followed a "misguided market" that bad news sold.[324] The official concerned, had thus identified media selection criteria as the cause of some friction, as economic need to focus upon emotive negatives propelled coverage toward greater sensationalism. One can sympathise with both parties, although such incidents once more highlight the ill feeling which separated military and media, particularly as Casey suggests the US public had been able to follow US defeat in "graphic detail".[325]

The reader must now consider how this system effected the production of newsreels. It is necessary to employ a combination of evidence and augment it with informed and logical

[321] Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, p. 145.
[322] Ibid., p. 150.
[323] Ibid., p. 147.
[324] Ibid., p. 149.
[325] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 146.

speculation, in order to chart the influences audio-visual news material was subjected to between 'shooting' in Korea and arrival on the cinema screen in Britain. The footage often illustrated the proximity with which correspondents operated to the front lines, demonstrating the freedom of movement they enjoyed under MacArthur's unpopular system, which allowed reporters to pursue their journalistic instincts and audience attention, despite the subtle methods of obstructions described by Thompson.[326] The practicalities of filming an army in retreat, particularly during the early phase of the war and the lesser, yet significant difficulties, of reporting on an advancing military force cannot be overlooked.[327] In addition the lack of communication facilities provided for the media would undoubtedly have affected newsreel crews, though perhaps not to the same extent as other varieties of journalists, who were bound to the written word and its speedy transmission half way around the globe.[328] Thus the reader may surmise that newsreel crews operating inside Korea under the voluntary system of censorship, benefited from unrestricted movements beyond those practical under the circumstances, as made evident by their diversity of content, but may have been subject to subtle obstruction by the military.

Furthermore, it is conceivable that such teams engaged in self-censorship, 'shooting' selectively, in accordance with Hoggart's theory detailing how media professionals share the ideological atmosphere of their parent society.[329] In addition, Howard Smith has illustrated how BBC camera teams were issued with suggested narratives to cover by editors in the UK.[330] Such instructions would have been primarily based on media concern for securing

[326] Thompson, *Cry Korea,* p.123.
[327] The military situation remained particularly fluid for much of the initial period of the conflict.
[328] Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, p. 52.
[329] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. x.
[330] Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', pp. 239-240.

material, which would prove stimulating to viewers and adhered to implicit industry criteria governing media content, but may also have been influenced by their personal ideological opinions, adding a further layer of 'distortion' to the material. However, editors would have been well aware of restrictions sanctioned by the D-Notice Committee described by Jenks,[331] which provided opportunity for military and government officials to informally influence media content. The same may be said of the Ministry of Information, particularly as the newsreels were "technically subject to censorship, but remained free for so long as they towed the line".[332] Finally, many camera teams and editors alike may have drawn on experience gained during the Second World War, which would have rendered them familiar with war time media practice and its inherent responsibilities. Such a claim becomes validated when considering that the BBC dispatched the veterans Cyril Page and Ronnie Noble to Korea[333] and that the Associated and United Press also committed their veterans.[334] Therefore, reason is provided to explain why and how some of the audio-visual material, discussed with in this thesis, can be considered, to a fair degree, propagandist in nature, as the "distortion" can indeed be considered systematic as Hall suggests.

As Casey has illustrated the implementation of the informal system was delegated by Washington to the theatre commander in Tokyo in accordance with traditional practice.[335] It is conceivable that under the informal system audio-visual news footage was not screened either in Korea or Tokyo prior to its departure by air to the USA or Great Britain. However, when accounting for the subtle and potentially more sinister aspects of the system as described above, it is also conceivable that material was screened, or camera crews were

[331] Jenks*, British Propaganda*, pp. 52-54.
[332] Ibid., p. 52.
[333] See, Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War'.
[334] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 45.
[335] Ibid., p. 164.

informally pressurised into avoiding controversy. This is particularly significant when considering the value placed upon the image by those who have studied and produced propaganda. Joseph Goebbels held the 'optik' element of propaganda in high regard.[336] Indeed, O'Shaughnessy claims the image remains long after the argument is forgotten,[337] which although referred to in the context of rhetorical persuasion, remains valid in relation to our discussion as audio-visual material combines both elements. Furthermore, Casey describes how visual and written material was subject to different levels of restraint and that the visual elements were more heavily censored, leading the scholar to claim that the US public received a "sterilised view" of the war.[338] Such opinions all substantiate Hall's consideration of the image, which he suggests gives rise to fewer misunderstandings, during the decoding process, which in itself increases the chance of successful decoding and thereafter renders the image highly significant to the transfer of ideology [339]. In addition, the informal code adopted by Tokyo, coupled with the pre-conflict method of low key intimidation, may have disorientated veteran reporters who were accustomed to formal procedures, boundaries and guidelines. This may assist in explaining why seasoned journalists often succumbed to the pressure and vacated Korea, as described by Thompson, who harboured an intense mistrust of the MacArthur system.[340]

One may suggest that such mistrust may well have been justified as the adoption of a regulated formal code with defined boundaries would have been more compatible with democracy as it would have maintained greater transparency, thus reducing the scope for

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[336] A. Smith Serrano, *German Propaganda in Military Decline 1943-1945* (Durham, 1999), p. 40.
[337] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 72.
[338] Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, p. 62.
[339] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*, p. 11.
[340] Thompson, *Cry Korea,* p.106.

abuse, which an informal system afforded.[341] Finally, by delegating the establishment and enforcement of censorship to theatre commanders, civilian agency can be perceived as relinquishing its direct authority over the system. The logic underpinning this delegation is clear; as it allowed the well placed military to attend to matters concerning security and as a positive bi-product and prevented civilian administration from being accused of direct interference with media output. Additionally, regarding the Korean scenario, this may well be perceived as a mistake, as regulated censorship, that was accountable to civilian agency would have reduced the military-media friction, which was evident in many forms, as demonstrated by Casey, Rees and Thompson amongst others. Indeed a climate where media professionals were requesting guidance from authorities, thus illustrating how reporters were unsure of how to operate within the code,[342] was likely to have had less effect on newsreels than other media, as the time difference, inherent in transportation and the varying stages of the production process, would have afforded this media time, to consider and refine their final content. Despite the final stages of editing and production described, as an intense affair, by cameraman John Turner an employee of Gaumont-British News during the final period but was not however directly involved in covering Korea;[343] something which press journalists did not enjoy, as they were often under pressure to achieve 'scoops' and best their competitors.[344]

The time gap caused by the distance involved in transporting audio-visual material from Korea, whilst aiding media self-censorship, despite being detrimental to newsreel

[341] Established boundaries may have helped prevent the MacArthur system from crossing the boundaries between necessary censorship on security grounds into the realms of personal image management, as is evident in numerous criticisms of the General's system.
[342] Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, pp. 55-56.
[343] J. Turner, *Filming History: The Memoirs of John Turner Newsreel Cameraman* (London, 2001), p. 8.
[344] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 52.

economic viability, benefited the military and politicians alike. Taylor, when discussing the Falklands conflict, which shares a number of geographic and technological similarities with the Korean conflict,[345] suggests that 'late news is no news' and is thus detrimental to the media, yet nevertheless remains positive for military authorities for the same reason.[346] Thus, during the Korean War, the military were fortunate in that by the time negative news reached an audience; the events covered were out-dated, therefore reducing any negative effects on public morale. Upon arrival in the US and now external to the MacArthur system, the material would have been subjected to an additional round of ideological filtration on behalf of media professionals, as part of the process described by Hoggart and Chomsky. The production and editing process would therefore be undertaken within a society where the ravages of McCarthyism were apparent and 'witch hunts' were common.[347] Officials of state, alongside media employees, would most likely have desired to avoid becoming subject to one of the senators attacks and as a result undertaken precautions to avoid appearing sympathetic to communism. This process is evident within the newsreels, as the commentary frequently employed memorable 'one liner's', referring to communism in derogatory terms, which in itself has been described as a method of propaganda.[348] However, the inclusion of such rhetorical devices, which also adhered to the media disposition as a swift, compact and increasingly disposable entertainment product, may well have been the result of personal ideological bias conveyed to the audience by media employees and is accounted for within

[345] From Taylor's analysis it may be determined that the Falklands campaign presented similar problems for journalists as Korea. The geographic isolation of the war zone is evident, as was the reliance of the media on military communications technology, which naturally afforded the latter a significant degree of influence. Additional comparisons of interest include how reporters began to identify with the perils facing service personnel through shared proximity to the conflict and are thus likely to practice self-censorship through understanding. See Taylor*, Munitions of the Mind*, pp. 276-280.
[346] Ibid., p. 278.
[347] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 351.
[348] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 131.

Hall's theoretical model.[349] Furthermore, such professionals may have drawn on experience gained during the Second World War and subsequently edited imagery accordingly, based on an understanding of how visual material was considered to be particularly sensitive; thus self-censorship, founded upon the existence of a shared ideological outlook, "sterilised" the view of the war, presented to the American public, as suggested by Casey.

As Smith suggests, many of the private newsreel companies relied heavily upon their affiliates in the United States for footage, as did the BBC in the early stages of the conflict.[350] This confirms Taylor's suggestion that Britain viewed the Cold War primarily "through American filters".[351] Although Taylor's remark appears to refer to the wider ideological conflict between the two superpowers, it remains highly applicable to our discussion, as the British public 'consumed' audio-visual news material shaped by ideological filters operating on the other side of the Atlantic. This remained the case until the BBC's television newsreel camera team reached Korea in October 1950.[352] However, the British cinema patron would have been presented with audio-visual news material, which had in effect been filtered twice, as once the features reached the UK, in a semi-complete or complete state, the distortive process inherent in the production of media material described by Hall, would again come into effect. Indeed, further study may wish to separate and analyse which features arrived in Britain complete and which were finalised domestically, the accent of the commentator being the most prominent, although by no means entirely reliable indicator.

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[349] Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding', pp. 2-3.
[350] See, Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 228.
[351] Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, p. 259.
[352] Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 230.

Upon arrival in Britain, audio-visual material progressed through the editing process of the newsreel companies, who circulated it in its current state, or should the working time-frame allow made alterations including editing and re-dubbing the audio accompaniment. Indeed, Smith suggests that newsreel companies often had to fashion their features out of a limited range of identical footage, which pressured editors and producers to create sequences which appeared non-reliant on shared imagery.[353] In addition to this economic consideration, based on the requirement to inform and to an extent entertain the audience, the newsreel employees involved in this process would most likely have practised self-censorship. As the material had been previously filtered by the system operating in the US, British editors who were familiar with the process of war time censorship,[354] and operated within personal ideological parameters, would have experienced less cause for concern, as the content of the footage would have previously been 'screened' for information, which may have contributed to the formation of an oppositional ideological framework discussed by Hall.[355] However, it is probable that such professionals remained vigilant for aspects of the coverage likely to cause concern specifically amongst the British audience or official sensibilities; in particular the depiction of British service personnel and their exposure to danger, the treatment of British wounded and material considered alarming to public opinion. The depiction of British service men and women will be explored later, although at present it will suffice to suggest that the British media were aware of the significance of news features in relation to public opinion, through personal experience and shared ideological views, which resulted in the implementation of self-censorship.

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[353] Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', pp. 228-229.
[354] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 2.
[355] Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding'.

However, scholars have identified additional influences beyond the personal implementation of self-censorship. Jenks details the existence of the D-Notice Committee, described as an informal body, which comprised of serving government, military and media representatives.[356] This committee, established in 1944 and remained active until 1954, appeared highly organised, met regularly, recorded minutes and was staffed by 'active', rather than retired officials. Such circumstance may lead one to argue that the body exhibited strong signs of a nature, more formal than informal, thus substantiating the claim made previously, that as the boundaries between war and peace became blurred, during the Korean 'police action', so legitimately could the boundaries between informal/formal state-media interaction. Of course, the evidence remains circumstantial, with further investigation into the committees work required to ascertain the substance of such an interpretation. However, such a process, when compared against the historical context, may be interpreted as a democracy adjusting to the new post war global climate of tension with the Soviet Union, which due to the nature of the Stalinist regime remained a menacing and ill-understood entity.[357] The committee would undoubtedly have been aware of the need to consider any decisions made, regarding the censorship of information, in relation to issues surrounding democracy. Clearly there was a balance to be struck between the denial of sensitive information and the principles which govern a democratic society and the global climate of the period. Britain appears to have maintained this balance, illustrated by an example of how the authorities responded to the ideologically incompatible stance of the communist domestic newspaper *The Daily Worker*, which although not banned, as during total war, was nonetheless gently

[356] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, pp. 13, 52-54.
[357] Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, p. 250.

excluded from access to the information contained within the D-Notices, issued by the committee, to inform the media of which information was to be excluded from circulation.[358]

The committee also maintained the power to exercise censorship over the newsreels, which as Jenks records, remained free if they adhered to the official line.[359] Additionally the scholar suggests the government could easily influence the newsreels through the Central Office of Information.[360] Thus it may be suggested that where organic acts of self-censorship or informal appeals may have failed to consider all perspectives, there remained official safeguards to prevent the release of sensitive material into the public domain. Furthermore, both the British media and the D-Notice Committee operated within an ideological climate of anti-communism, which although less dramatized than the American experience, had developed steadily following the conclusion of the Second World War and was prominently championed by Winston Churchill and his "iron curtain" remark.[361] Again space prohibits a full discussion of the ideological climate; however, it remains sufficient to suggest that Hoggart's description of a society's ideological atmosphere is applicable to the period in question. To offer a brief summary of these ideological conditions it must be considered that following the Second World War, where the Soviet Union had been allied with Britain and often much admired for her sacrifices, the slow disintegration of relations in the post war era, presented British authorities with an image problem; how to turn public opinion which favoured Russia, toward a stance which mistrusted and rejected her ideological position.[362] This requirement led to the development of an anti-communist frame, within the domestic

[358] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* pp. 53-56.
[359] Ibid., p. 52.
[360] Ibid., p. 16.
[361] Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind,* p. 250.
[362] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 28.

media, which steadily publicised "Western virtue and Soviet intransience's",[363] and became well established within the national mind-set, which in a sedimentary manner, gradually became a common sense consensus. The Korean crisis was thus integrated easily within the established anti-communist media 'frame'[364] which had developed over the preceding years and thus simplified coverage of the Korean conflict as it fitted neatly into an established and recognisable media format.[365] In light of this, we may question if the British public was able to follow the defeats of late 1950 in the same "graphic detail" which Casey suggests the American public were able to do, or if they were presented with a "sterilised" depiction of the war as Casey also suggests the US public witnessed, given much of the audio-visual material originated from the united states, but was also subject to influence under the British media system.

The informal system operated by General MacArthur may be considered to have been an appeal, directed at the media, to share the ideological atmosphere of the West, by the practice of self-censorship and the denial or self-restraint of the journalist pursuit of entertainment value, which as identified often focused upon the shocking and negative, some examples of which i.e. a retreat by UNC, would have directly contrasted with the interests of the military. However, media values did not always clash with military or official interests as the media's desire to maintain "balance" regarding the composition of reports, often resulted in the viewer being presented with a negative, followed by a positive. Evidently this often had a propagandist impact as by concluding with a positive, the emotive response of the

[363] Ibid., p. 6.
[364] The 'frame' is a well-established tool of journalism and benefits the transfer of ideology inherent in Hall's encoding/decoding process, as they are simplistic, allow information to be condensed, easily recognisable and familiar to the decoder; thus rendering them useful tools in the process of social communication and propaganda alike.
[365] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 5.

viewer, to the preceding negative, which may have provoked concern or fear, was thus redressed. Thus, an example has been encountered of how media criteria may render coverage to exhibit signs of a propaganda campaign where the emotive response of the decoder would have been regulated for fear of causing panic and/or exposure to information which may have facilitated the sedimentary build-up of an oppositional ideology.

CHAPTER SIX

CRISIS: LATE OCTOBER 1950 TO THE END OF JANUARY 1951

Notably, in a feature of 9 November 1950,[366] covering the period of China's limited First Phase Offensive,[367] which resulted in the UNC advance being checked for a short period,[368] Gaumont-British News released a feature stressing the might and success of UNC arms and in addition illustrated the ruins of the northern capital of Pyongyang, whilst UNC units advanced past cheering civilians. Prior to 27 October, when China engaged the UN for the first time, this would have constituted an accurate, if glamorised, depiction of events. However, due to the natural delay in the audio-visual news production process it may well have proved impossible to include visual coverage of the altered military situation, due to footage having departed Korea prior to the commencement of the Chinese attack. Should this have been the case, the audio commentary which was added at a later date, provided an ideal opportunity to make reference to the new situation, which was passed by.

It is of particular interest that the familiar Gaumont-British introductory sequence, generic to all newsreel features produced by the company, altered its wording for this single feature. The new introductory phrase now addressed the audience with "Gaumont-British

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[366] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 09/11/1950.

[367] Debate surrounds the reason underpinning the sudden Chinese disengagement of early November. Reasons include that China wished to avoid full scale war with the West, through fear of the Western response or lack of resources, and intended the First Phase Offensive as a warning. Opposing interpretations argue that Chinese units suffered great loss to allied air and ground fire power and were thus forced to withdraw in order to re-organise, something which is difficult for any force, which lacks radio communication capabilities.

[368] Following the initial shock of China's surprise offensive, the UNC prepared to resume the offensive to finish the war. Catchpole, *The Korean War*, pp. 73-79.

News, presenting the truth to the free peoples of the world". Such an effort to confirm the objective validity of past, present or future coverage, appears clumsy to the attentive viewer and was most likely an over enthusiastic attempt, on behalf of the newsreels, to 'do their bit' during the crisis. Nonetheless, such a remark can readily be considered propagandist in nature and intent. Such an interpretation is supported by the opening of the subsequent newsreel which had reverted to its original terminology, which thus rendered the brief change a significant anomaly.

Chinese intervention was first hinted at in a Gaumont-British newsreel of 13 November 1950,[369] seventeen days after initial contact was made with UNC forces on 27 October. The viewer's first visual introduction to the new enemy emanated on 27 November, when a small number of Chinese prisoners of war were shown and described as wearing the uniform of the "Chinese Red Army". UNC transportation was depicted as bogged down in muddy conditions although advances continued to be stressed, as the UNC "Conquers" approached the Manchurian border. This coverage appears to report the period between the communist First and Second Phase Offensives, i.e. between the 2 and 25 of November, a period where UNC had resumed the advance.[370] Thus coverage, to a significant degree, remained selective yet objective concerning events at the front.

However, of particular interest is the manner in which China was introduced into the narrative of the conflict. Aside from the organic propaganda value of reporting the capture of Chinese POWs, which visually illustrated the superiority of Western arms, the captured men

[369] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 13/11/1950.
[370] Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume 1,* pp. 315-316.

were described in relation to the political philosophy they represented and not simply their nationality. Thus the sequence implied that a conspiracy of world communism existed, as diverse national bodies constituted an international political collective, which therefore contextualised events in Korea, as part of communisms bid for world domination and thus promoted an associative fear, as was common during this period, that the third world war had begun or was indeed imminent.[371] Additionally, the entrance of China into the war fitted neatly into the well-established anti-communist frame which existed in Britain and added to the established consensus of anti-communist sentiment already in existence.[372] It remains possible to consider this features inherent message to be propagandist in nature, as it intensified the fear of communism and thus emotively encouraged the decoder to support the military confrontation of the ideology on the battlefield in Korea. However, the message was likely to have been produced as a bi-product of media sensationalism, a feature commonly associated with newsreels, as noted by Smith.[373]

On 7 December the newsreels acknowledged the full scale intervention of China and reported from the UN on "Chinese communist aggression" and described the Chinese representative as "listening carefully".[374] Again the definition of the Chinese position was based on political outlook, rather than nationality.[375] Furthermore, having described the Chinese delegates as "listening carefully", the sequence conveyed the message that the West

[371]Callum MacDonald suggests three in five Britain's feared the outbreak of World War Three. C. MacDonald, 'Great Britain and the Korean War', p. 104.
[372] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 7.
[373] Smith documents that the BBC, when considering the format for their own television newsreels, wished to avoid employing the voice of phoney uplift, common to the newsreels. Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 227.
[374]Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 07/12/1950.
[375] Naturally Chinese interests would have been threatened should UNC have maintained a presence on the Manchurian border. This reached a climax on 24 October when MacArthur removed the restrictions prohibiting non-Korean UNC units to operate near the border. Spurr, *Enter the Dragon,* p. xvii.

dominated the assembly and thus maintained control over the symbolic forum of international opinion, which according to O'Shaughnessy, maintains a propagandist value beneficial to the ideology in dominance.[376] It remains a truism that the UN was indeed dominated by the USA, which despite encountering opposition from her allies often prevailed.[377]

However, the historical record indicates that the Chinese delegation, although uncompromising and uncooperative, did speak at the UN, the rhetoric of which failed to appear in the newsreels in any form, in a manner similar to that discussed in chapter one. Thus one may reasonably conclude that although technical inhibitors may have prevented the Chinese ideological position being presented to the audience, it is apparent that the newsreels chose not to challenge the Cold War anti-communist consensus. This presents us with evidence to support Jenks' claim, that the British media did not challenge the 'common sense' consensus of Western society, due to personal agreement with the ideological atmosphere rather than in response to official pressure.[378]

This issue becomes increasingly complex, when considering the newsreel's depiction of the South Korean delegate addressing the UN, where he assertively held China responsible for embarking upon an act of aggression. The rhetoric of the emissary was conveyed to the viewer, which presented the newsreels with few technical inhibitors as he spoke in English. However, one may also suggest that the content of the speech was allowed to reach the audience as it was ideologically compatible with that of the dominant ideology and serves as

[376] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 107.
[377] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 100.
[378] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 1.

a further example of Jenks' suggestion that the media maintained little desire to challenge the consensus[379] and often undertook initiatives at their own discretion.

The suggestion that media organisations often undertook self-censorship or potentially propagandist initiatives at their own discretion becomes increasingly relevant at this stage in the Korean conflict, as the crisis UNC now faced was considered far greater than that of June-July 1950.[380] The newsreel of 7 December, described UNC having to fight desperately whilst "outnumbered", "against the odds" and against an "overwhelming onslaught", which "halted the allied advance".[381] This depiction, which likely arose from a consideration of the economic benefits of sensationalism, also helped 'explain' the allied reversal as a set-back which appeared natural in the context of such battlefield circumstance. The situation was thus explained in relation to China's strength, as opposed to allied shortcomings or deficiencies, which have since been identified.[382] However, the reversal itself was described as a 'stalled advance'. Thus the sequence maintained an inherent propaganda value, as the reversal of fortune, which culminated in a retreat, was acknowledged and defined by its semantic opposite, i.e. by the word "advance", used in a negative context by the addition of the word 'stalled', which itself implied a temporary halt. The employment of such selective terminology may be explained by the practice of media self-censorship and a desire not to alarm public opinion and maintain a balance within reports whilst forestalling official criticism or sanctions for deviancy.[383] Perhaps the most effective explanation remains the simplest, that during a time when UNC had been achieving victories,

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[379] Ibid., p. 1.
[380] Casey sites a comment made by Truman to that effect. Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 128.
[381] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 07/12/1050.
[382] Malkasian, *The Korean War,* p. 32.
[383] Jenks, *British Propaganda,* p. 2.

it would appear only natural, to a media commentator, that the advance would resume in the future, although the propagandist value of describing such negative events to the public in such a rhetorically guarded manner cannot be ignored. However, media theory may interpret the slightly more positive depiction of a stalled advance, as an example of newsreels adhering to the media value of 'balance' regarding the composition of features.[384]

Two Gaumont-British News sequences of 11 December 1950 remain particularly significant.[385] The first depicted the crew of a US aircraft carrier, engaged in a snowball fight on the flight deck, which was jovially described as "a Cold War of their own". Stationary aircraft appeared in the background, covered to protect them from the harsh climate, yet described as "ready for an emergency". This sequence conveyed a sense of relaxed humour, and encouraged the viewer to adopt the ideology that all was well in Korea. This is particularly evident in the relaxed nature of the crew, the abundance of grounded aircraft and most prominently how they were described as "ready for an emergency". One may interpret this sequence as propagandist in nature as, at a time when the Chinese Second Phase Offensive was well under way, the imagery and commentary offered the viewer no clue to understanding the reality of the developing emergency. Thus, the sequence can be considered near devoid of objectivity, beyond the activities of the carrier crew. Additionally, this feature may have sought to subtly explain the crisis by illustrating that adverse flying conditions were hampering allied air power and preventing them from assisting the troops, should the viewer have been aware of the true reality from other news sources. Therefore, the viewer encountered an ideological interpretation of events, which would have had less detrimental effect on public morale than contrasting interpretations. Thus, the decoder was invited to

[384] http://www.rsmediastudies.co.uk 20/09/2011
[385] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 11/12/1950.

share a fantasy,[386] as he/she encountered "systematically distorted communication", which attempted to construct a reality which was fundamentally misleading regarding the nature of events, as described in Hall's theoretical approach.[387]

Given that the sequence interpreted events in the best possible light and thus calmed public anxieties, whilst not directly referring to any military setback, it remains reasonable to assume that the newsreel media 'played it safe' and engaged in self-censorship, as previously encountered. However, alternative footage may have been unavailable due to the military situation,[388] or the introduction of informal emergency restrictions in the USA or Britain. The latter interpretation remains speculative, but when one considers that the crisis was extraordinarily dangerous to global stability and peace,[389] one can readily understand why authorities may have informally influenced the process at some stage, perhaps through the D-Notice Committee, which resulted in the public being presented with a carrier crew snowball fight, which maintained a significant degree of propagandist value. However, the most probable explanation remains that the newsreels engaged in self-censorship, through ideological sympathy with the authorities and responded to informal appeals for the restraint of the media during the crisis as detailed below. Most strikingly, this feature did not adhere to any of the media selection criteria one may expect. There was no 'balance of composition', or 'unexpectedness' and the 'event' may be considered well below any 'threshold of scale' which renders an event newsworthy. Indeed "cultural proximity" remains the only applicable

[386] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 7.
[387] Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding', p. 1.
[388] The disruption of the front lines would most probably have interfered with media output, as many reporters operated well forward with the troops.
[389] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 115.

value, in the sense that an air of relaxation was established through the depiction of an activity familiar to the decoder.[390]

Evidence to support the claim, that the media responded to informal official lobbying to restrain press coverage during the crisis, can be found later within the same newsreel. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was shown delivering a speech to the American press club, where he stressed the responsibilities of the press in a democratic society. Attlee suggested the democratic press must assist audiences to "Make the right judgment"; he then contrasted this against the role of the media in a totalitarian society.[391] Thus Attlee highlighted the difference separating persuasion from coercion, which distinguished the democratic world from the oppressed and the free press from the state controlled. The viewer was thus presented with a working example of the relationship between state and media in a liberal democracy, as the official was illustrated attempting to informally persuade the media to assist the West's cause by behaving in a "responsible" manner when covering events in Korea.

O'Shaughnessy would consider such a speech an example of overt propaganda as the orator was openly seeking to persuade his audience of the merits of his cause.[392] Such lobbying may legitimately include rhetorically persuasive techniques such as flattery and appeal to higher ideals, as evident in Attlee's diatribe, where the Prime Minister described the role of the press as "vital" and immediately linked his audience's role to higher democratic principles including the rule of law, the maintenance of the Western way of life and the

[390] http://www.rsmediastudies.co.uk 20/09/2011
[391] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 11/12/1950.
[392] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* pp. 65-70.

defence of peace. Having educated his audience regarding their station and responsibilities, Attlee proceeded to announce that he regretted the necessity of defence preparations due to the current world situation and that the military situation in Korea had deteriorated due to the intervention of China. The unity of Britain and the strength of the 'special relationship' were also proclaimed,[393] as the newsreel screened images, towards the end of the speech, of UNC.

This feature is of great significance to our discussion as it demonstrated how the government of a democracy could influence media content in an informal manner, which in turn, helps explain how and why much of the media text examined can be interpreted through the prism of ideology and thus considered propagandist in nature. Evidently, the newsreel, which depicted the snowball fight amongst deckhands, may be perceived as the audio-visual media response to Attlee's plea, insofar as it contained little that would alarm public opinion and furthermore may well be perceived as an example of the media behaving "responsibly". Of course, it is necessary to define "responsible" behaviour as news coverage that was ideologically compatible with the official line, or failing that, coverage that was not excessively ideologically disruptive to societal opinion, concerning the war. However, Attlee's motivation becomes apparent with an examination of the historical context in which the speech was conceived and delivered.

As the military situation worsened[394] and MacArthur's reports became increasingly pessimistic,[395] President Truman came under increased pressure to find a solution to a

[393]MacDonald, *Britain and the Korean War,* p. 46.
[394] Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War*: *Volume 1*, p. 357.
[395] Rees, *Korea: The Limited War*, pp. 160-161.

conflict that was, to a considerable extent, unpopular in America.[396] This climaxed when the president remarked that the use of atomic weapons was under "active consideration", which 'scoop hungry' journalists interpreted in an exaggerated manner.[397] British ministers, who had received word via what Hockley described as "news tapes",[398] began to demand Attlee's intervention.[399] The Prime Minister hastily proceeded to Washington for a series of regular formal and informal meetings with the president and his close advisors,[400] which gave rise to the myth that the visit prevented the US from using the atomic bomb.[401] The emotion surrounding the crisis is symbolised by the reaction of some diplomats at the UN, who with tears in their eyes, truly anticipated the start of a third world war.[402] However, Attlee soon discovered the US had no intention of deploying 'the bomb', which probably led him to conclude that the media had acted irresponsibly and had further sensationalised the crisis, thus distressing the public and politicians alike. Furthermore, as the Truman-Attlee meetings continued, "morale and information" were discussed and placed eighth on the meeting's agenda on 4 December 1950.[403] Thus both the US and Britain had officially begun to consider how best to respond to the developing situation of undeclared war with China, having experienced the disruptive potential of an irresponsible and un-restrained press, which had contributed to the panic surrounding the reversal of fortune in Korea, through the pursuit

[396] Hastings, *The Korean War*, p. 222.
[397] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* pp. 131-134.
[398] Given the short time gap separating the President's remarks and the British reaction, this could well have been provided by Britain's ability to monitor foreign media broadcasts. Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume 1,* p. 356.
[399] Ibid., p. 356.
[400]For an itinerary of the Truman-Attlee and staff meetings, see http://www.trumanlibrary.org (The President's Day) 20/09/2011.
[401] Catchpole, *Korean War,* p. 267.
[402] Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War*: *Volume 1*, p. 356.
[403] http://www.trumanlibrary.org 20/09/2011

of media selection criteria including "conflict" and "danger to the community" as described by McShane.[404]

The concluding feature of the sequence covering Attlee's speech illustrated UNC units in action and praised General MacArthur. This may be considered a rather unsubtle example of patriotic news coverage, but again, serves to illustrate that a positive media response, to informal lobbying, occurred in the wake of Attlee's address. However, it is necessary to question what effect Attlee's request had upon media coverage of the crisis, which lasted into the New Year. Certainly only Pathe referred to the international reaction to the A-bomb remark,[405] although to what degree of sensationalism or objectivity remained impossible to ascertain for this research. However, it is significant that a further sequence, in the feature of 11 December, entitled "The Big Retreat South", illustrated that the newsreels may have refrained from 'atomic sensationalism', but were not prepared to completely sacrifice selection criteria concerning coverage of the military situation.

Historically, governments and armies have been reluctant to acknowledge battlefield reversals, which were detrimental to their public image and also, in modern theoretical terms, afforded decoders the opportunity to access information which, if read from an oppositional stance, may contribute to the sedimentary formation of an oppositional ideology to that of the hegemonic ideological position.[406] Thus the use of the word "Retreat", in the title of this sequence, is significant as it demonstrated that the newsreels were unwilling to engage in self-censorship, as to censor sensationalism was to deny the newsreel media the ability to

[404] http://www.rsmediastudies.co.uk 20/09/2011
[405] Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 230.
[406] Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding'.

shock their audience through emotive negativity, thus reducing the 'thrill' an attentive audience may have experienced when exposed to distressing events within the new-entertainment context. In conclusion the coverage of the A-bomb remark lacked the media value of 'balance' and thus constituted an example of unrestrained sensationalism.

By contrast however, the features of the fifteenth and eighteenth of December, despite visually illustrating the retreat of UNC and the climatic conditions endured by those at the front, the coverage may well be perceived as having evolved a more subtle propagandist nature. This is particularly evident as the coverage began to place more emphasis upon elements which could have adversely affected public opinion, attitudes and behaviours. Initially, the withdrawal of UNC, described by Thompson as a "flight"[407] and later by historians as exhibiting the characteristics of a retreat,[408] was described in the newsreel as an "orderly withdrawal".[409] Such inaccurate terminology can be considered non-alarmist and may have been an attempt by the newsreels to avoid provoking additional hysteria, as witnessed following Truman's A-bomb remark. Thus, the media may consciously have wished to avoid sensationalist reporting, based on a consideration of professional practice and ethics. Additionally, this may constitute an example of the media having relied upon official press releases of UNC, the "horrible inaccuracy" of which, described by Thompson, was said to have "angered all ranks".[410] However, a further interpretation is that the newsreels had evidently, to a degree, responded to Attlee's appeal and deliberately selected phraseology that

[407] Thompson, *Cry Korea,* p. 287.
[408] Hastings, *The Korean War,* p, 172.
[409] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 15/12/1950
[410] Thompson was referring in this instance to General Walker's release of 29 November 1950. Thompson, *Cry Korea,* p. 294.

would not unsettle an already shaken public, whose disenchantment with the war had increased following the intervention of China.[411]

Further evidence to support this claim is identifiable in the depiction of UNC troops. Although UNC was said to be facing "overwhelming hordes of Chinese", soldiers were shown in good spirits and smiling, which was verbally confirmed by the audio commentary. The cold was described as the "worst enemy", which played down the severity of the Chinese intervention, but may also be considered a subtle way of objectively illustrating the hardships facing UNC personnel, without causing too greater concern amongst viewers, particularly as troops were depicted enjoying good morale. A further interpretation may consider this depiction of events propagandist in nature as, by accrediting the cold as the "worst enemy", other factors were blamed for the depth of the crisis beyond the actions of the Chinese. Additionally, it is notable to remember how during the initial setbacks of June, July and August 1950, many press reports featured battle shocked and disillusioned soldiers, which concerned military authorities and remained markedly absent from the audio-visual narratives of events during the November crisis.

Throughout this period the descriptive vocabulary employed by the newsreels, can frequently be considered more explicit than the imagery they accompanied. Technical restraints may have contributed to the necessity of this, as could the guidelines concerning the depiction of harrowing events. However, one may consider this to support Casey's claim that the image was subject to greater self and/or informal censorship,[412] based on the significance

[411]MacDonald, *Britain and the Korean War,* p. 42.
[412] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 62.

of the image in the process of 'political communication'. Coverage of the battles around the Chosin Reservoir, famously endured by the United States Marines and a unit of Royal Marine Commandos, witnessed the employment of phrases during coverage, including "cut off", "nightmare", and "surrounded on all sides". Additionally, Chinese forces were defined as "mighty", whilst hardships endured by the troops were described; at the same time turbulent music accompanied the report. Historiography confirms the approximate accuracy of such reports and confirms the difficulties facing many UNC units.[413] However, numerous elements of the sequence of 18 December can be interpreted as having maintained a propaganda value, in spite of the elements of media selective objectivity identified.

UNC troops were depicted having adopted an orphaned boy, its self not an uncommon practice during the Korean War.[414] Such a depiction conveys a sense of compassion and humanity upon UNC personnel, which although commonly witnessed,[415] maintained a positive propagandist "hearts and minds" message, as described by Taylor, who suggested that the Cold War was indeed a battle for the hearts and minds of the world between the two competing ideologies.[416] Furthermore, the now familiar depiction of the evacuation of wounded was included. Even though coverage was often accurate concerning this topic, as the sequence depicting air evacuation from a frozen airstrip remains testament to,[417] participants shown in good spirits encouraged the decoder to generalise that all casualties, were treated in a similar manner. However, the historical record contains evidence to the

[413] For a full description of the retreat see *Hastings*, *The Korean War,* pp. 150-229.
[414] Salmon, *To the Last Round,* p. 94.
[415] Ibid., pp. 96-98.
[416] Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century,* p. 227.
[417] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* pp. 88-91.

contrary, as practical circumstance on occasion necessitated the abandonment of wounded during the withdrawal.[418]

In addition, UNC supply and morale were illustrated positively, the latter of which may be considered an over estimation, as by early January morale was said to have reached its lowest ebb.[419] Finally, a number of remarks imply that the newsreel media had taken it upon themselves to support United Nations efforts in Korea by directly addressing the domestic audience. The fighting resolve of the troops was stressed, as was their appreciation of what was "at stake", regarding the battle between the liberal democratic and the autocratic way of life. The decoder was further encouraged to be mindful of the debt, owed to those making sacrifices in Korea, which as casualty figures reached some 13,000 by the end of the crisis period,[420] were considerable indeed. Additionally, the viewer was questioned as to their contribution, confirming that the newsreel media had awoken to their responsibilities in times of conflict. This address contains an element of propaganda described by O'Shaughnessy, who suggests that an appeal to selflessness, in any circumstance, maintains a powerful emotive appeal.[421]

The climatic conditions faced by UNC were illustrated and provided a backdrop to a sequence depicting a truck convoy moving southwards.[422] Multiple trucks were shown in good working order; however a fleeting shot of a burnt-out truck also appeared as the vehicles passed. Significant this is the first imagery of destroyed UNC equipment the viewer

[418] Ibid, pp. 89-90.
[419] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 159.
[420] Malkasian, *The Korean War*, p. 36.
[421] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda,* p. 113.
[422] Primary source index for British-Gaumont News, 25/12/1950.

had been presented with since coverage of the conflict began during the summer. Hall suggests the viewer is not confronted with the physical manifestation of the topic contained within audio-visual material, but rather with messages concerning the particular topic.[423] Thus, regarding this audio-visual news item, the viewer was not confronted with war, but received messages about war. Therefore, the coverage of the retreat presented the decoder with a message, in this case, one which encouraged the viewer to believe, that although a small proportion of military equipment was lost, the majority was saved. To a significant degree this remains true, as many units were able to salvage their equipment,[424] however, losses were often much greater than the generalisation implied by this sequence.[425]

In addition, the sequence cognitively dispelled the fear that a 'Korean Dunkirk' style evacuation was imminent. Such sentiment remained common during the crisis amongst civil and military authorities, as indeed, most adults on either side of the Atlantic, though particularly in Britain, would have been familiar with the withdrawal of 1940, where the British Expeditionary Force were required to abandon much of their war materials. Thus, by encouraging the public mind to develop a generalisation, that the UNC retreat was orderly and had safeguarded much of its equipment, the viewer was encouraged to develop a less sensationalist and distressing perception of events. Therefore, the coverage of the truck convoy was indeed accurate, to a significant degree, although the message about war and the generalised view of events it encouraged the decoder to develop can be considered propagandist in nature. Thus, the reader has encountered an example of how the knowledge of history or an awareness of past events, possessed by the decoder, may assist with the

[423] Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding', p. 8.
[424] The final evacuation of X Corps proceeded in good order. Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 93.
[425] Ibid., p. 90.

conveyance of ideology, within audio-visual texts, as described by Hall,[426] as events in Korea were depicted as non-comparable to the disastrous situation of 1940. Thus, one may suggest that the newsreels had restrained their sensationalist tendencies and begun to develop the value of composite "balance", as the decoder was presented with positive news albeit, in the context of a negative, but less sensationalist "orderly withdrawal".

The seaborne evacuation, of UNC units from the North-East of Korea, was also covered in the feature of 25 December as their "ordeal" was said to be over, having been "trapped on all sides". The phraseology, yet again, may well be considered accurately explicit, although it retained some degree of, in this case justifiable, sensationalism.[427] It is possible to identify an increasingly common trend within newsreel coverage, as the reports concerning negative events were often concluded with a positive. In this case the "ordeal", the initial negative event, was described as "over" and therefore in the past tense. This may be the product of circumstance surrounding the production of the report, as the saga may have concluded by the time the footage reached the editorial and studio production phase. However, one may also interpret this as a method of alleviating audience anxiety, whilst maintaining selectivised and sensationalist objectivity, through covering a negative development in the context of a positive conclusion. It is important to consider this as an attempt, by newsreel companies, to maintain a balance between self-censorship and official gratification, whilst pursuing their own interests regarding news-entertainment.

[426] Hall, 'Encoding and Decoding'.
[427] Military history has described the battles in the North-East in detail, which can justifiably allow one to conclude that the engagements were of a particularly difficult nature. See Hastings, *The Korean War,* pp. 173-193.

A further interpretation may consider this to constitute an example of 'perception management', as to follow a 'negative' with a 'positive' assisted in alleviating the anxiety of an audience and thus regulated their emotional response to adverse situations. This cannot necessarily be considered a malign undertaking, as the regulation of emotion prevents panic and thus encourages the decoder to make progress by following a course of action determined by higher authority and designed to rectify the situation, whilst being aware of the perils of the moment. Thus, the psychological basis of the familiar propaganda slogan of the Second World War; "keep calm and carry on", has been established. This offers a fitting summary of some elements of the message contained within newsreel coverage concerning events in Korea. In this respect, there is an expansion of the readers understanding of Jenks' suggestion that the British media of the immediate post war era remained tightly "self-disciplined" due to experience of total war; a war in which the regulation of public attitudes and morale was pursued.[428] Therefore, Jenks' explanation may be applicable beyond the realms of self-censorship and into the territories of a perception management campaign, undertaken through personal initiative, amongst media professionals, or instigated by informal interaction with higher authority. Thus there is logical reason to suggest, that as the military and political crisis intensified, following china's escalation of the conflict and the misfortune of UNC, so did the state-media response. This is particularly applicable to the features of the fifteenth and eighteenth of December, as following the depiction and description of the adverse military situation, the positive aspects of UNC morale and the adequacy of supply was stressed to the audience, as the features both concluded with positive remarks, following an initially unsettled opening. One final point is relevant as the "Keep calm and carry on" psychological outlook and approach to adverse events may simply be an aspect of Britain's ideological atmosphere, in essence part of the national psyche. However, media theory would suggest

[428] Numerous slogans from the Second World War era indicate this, with perhaps "Keep calm and carry on" being one of the most renowned.

that such ‘regulation’ was the organic bi-product of the media implementing ‘balance’ within coverage.

The feature of 25 December additionally depicted a UNC solider treating the frost bite injury of a Chinese prisoner. The unfortunate man’s foot, shown in some detail, appeared encased in a block of ice. The medical assistance he received was similarly presented in some lingering detail. This sequence remained the most explicit of wounds contained within the newsreel coverage, with no equivalent example discernible regarding injuries to UNC personnel. Practical factors aside, it would not have been difficult to locate and film a frost bitten UNC soldier, as the climatic conditions during the crisis were indeed severe.[429] It is however notable that no UNC personnel were depicted in this way, or similar, as previously identified regarding coverage of the wounded. Had such a sequence depicted UNC soldiers suffering in this manner, regulatory guidelines would undoubtedly have prevented its circulation. Failing that, cinema considerations, regarding audience entertainment, would likely have prohibited screening as the material could in no way be considered compatible with the entertainment industry ethos. Thus the reader is left to question the value of including such unsettling footage in newsreel coverage.

One explanation can be found in the treatment of UNC prisoners, by North Korean forces of several months previous. The feature again appealed to “hearts and minds” and thus international opinion, as it bestowed the qualities of ‘the good Samaritan’ and soldierly respect upon UNC. Therefore, by publicising such actions, undertaken by UNC members

[429] UNC soldiers often suffered from frostbite and other climate related medical conditions. Hastings, *The Korean War,* p. 181.

towards their adversary, the Chinese were thus pressured to reciprocate, through genuine sympathy for those UNC they captured, or through consideration of international opinion. Therefore, one interpretation suggests this was a propagandist move aimed at encouraging China to treat its acquired prisoners well, which accounts confirm was the case.[430] The propagandist value would have remained had evidence surfaced that China had mistreated prisoners, as domestic and international opinion would have been outraged; thus, conveying additional validity upon the UN cause and inspiring hatred towards the enemy, which in itself remains a powerful propagandist tool.[431] Furthermore, the sequence can be decoded as containing a message recording the existence of common humanity amongst the belligerents, something which O'Shaughnessy considers the antithesis of emotive propaganda,[432] which is designed to create a mind-set that "facilitates the act of killing".[433] Should this footage be considered propagandist, then it must be deemed positive propaganda, as it appeals in support of common humanity and made no attempt to dehumanise the enemy as was occasionally evident.[434]

Additionally, the propagandist value encouraged the viewer to sympathise with the enemy, and perceive the frost-bitten oriental as a victim of an uncaring system. Thus the feature reflected negatively upon the opposing ideology, via juxtaposition, as 'they' failed to equip their forces, to an adequate level, which the UNC had apparently achieved, as the Western soldier was not suffering from the cold. Furthermore, the footage conveyed a sense of virtue upon UNC conduct and thus juxtaposed this against the memory of communist atrocities previously committed. This fitted neatly into the well-established anti-communist

[430] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 88.
[431] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 123.
[432] O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda*, p. 129.
[433] Ibid., p. 129.
[434] Ibid., p. 129.

media frame. Thus O'Shaughnessy may consider this an example of the "villain" having tested the virtue of the "hero",[435] which the soldiers of UNC had overcome. Of the vast array of possible decoding, concerning the footage, the most prominent remains that the camera crew chose to record this event, as despite its gruesome nature, the narrative emits a feel-good factor grounded upon the warmth of common humanity, which may have cheered the audience during an inescapably bleak period of the war, particularly as other newsreel features contained examples of festive sentimentality.[436] Thus, an example of the extraordinary nature of the political communication process has been encountered, as multiple interpretations may be offered, when attempting to perform a content analysis, as advocated by Hall, which in turn leads us to question if we have allocated the meaning ourselves.[437] Features such as this embodied multiple criteria which made the feature attractive to newsreels. This included 'individualism', in this case an example of common humanity, a 'familiarity' based on what the viewer would expect to see insofar as UNC members behaving compassionately, something which could also be considered to maintain "cultural proximity" to Western values.

On 25 December Gaumont-British News presented Truman's speech which suggested a peaceful solution could be found. Thus, the US publically suggested it was willing to negotiate, something which China refused, as it held the military advantage at this time. Thus, the above reference to common humanity can be linked to the apparent softening of the position held by the US. However, during the Truman/Attlee talks, the US concluded that China would only understand and respond to strength;[438] something which the British

[435] Ibid., p. 132.
[436] Primary source index for British-Gaumont News, 25/12/1950.
[437] http://www.aber.co.uk 10/06/2011
[438] Rees, *Korea: The Limited War*, p. 169.

government failed to concur with,[439] but had little choice other than to accept given the necessity of maintaining the 'special relationship' and promoting greater US involvement in Europe and NATO.[440] Additionally, during the Anglo-American talks, those officials present discussed American, British and Asia public opinion, although Hockley's otherwise thorough work supplies the reader with no further details concerning the matter.[441]

Therefore, it remains conceivable that during the discussions the issue of public information was considered significant. This becomes particularly significant when the reader recalls that these meetings took place in the wake of the media hysteria surrounding the employment of the A-bomb. This circumstantial and therefore speculative evidence helps explain Catchpole's remark that the British public regarded the conflict marginally, despite it being Britain's third largest war of the century, due to a "paucity of information".[442] Therefore, one may expect coverage of the conflict to have lacked detail, particularly following the introduction of formal censorship, in Korea on 22 December 1950, which took until 26 December to become fully implemented.[443] The introduction of formalised and regulated censorship began a period, which Casey described as one of "double censorship"; journalists were required to operate with official guidelines in addition to MacArthur's informal system.[444] Initially the introduction was well received by the media, although it remained keen to establish its boundaries.[445]

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[439] Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume 1,* p. 360.
[440] Ibid., p. 365.
[441] Ibid., pp. 362-363.
[442] "Paucity" or lack of information may readily be equated to censorship and the denial of information. Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 263.
[443] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 158.
[444] Ibid., p. 172.
[445] Ibid., pp. 158-159.

It is testament to the dangers of media exaggeration and urgency with which reporters and editors pursued 'scoops', which could endanger military security,[446] that one hundred and eighty one stories were censored in the last six days of December.[447] Controversially however, the new system, which sparked a new round of 'cat and mouse' between military authorities and the media,[448] contained clauses that restricted coverage. Anything potentially harmful to UNC morale or that could cause embarrassment to the US or its allies, was to be prohibited.[449] This scenario prompted one accusation in the *New York Times* that the system was being used to "cover up military errors and defeats"; particularly as the word "retreat" was banned from use, to be replaced with more neutral phrases such as "withdrawal".[450] Thus, the reader has witnessed the commencement of the process where authorities began to formally assert control over media coverage or rather over some of the more detrimental media selection criteria which had governed coverage thus far.

It is logical to assume, that following the introduction of the formal system, newsreel coverage would become more heavily censored and thus help maintain a more favourable public perception of the war, as the viewer would have been denied information, which may have contributed to the formation of an oppositional ideology. However, in stark contrast to this interpretation, the Gaumont-British News feature of 15 January 1951[451] included the word "retreat", which testifies to the media's desire to remain independent. However, despite numerous examples of accuracy many features between December 1950 and January 1951 may be interpreted as conveying an ideological message.

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[446] Ibid., p. 153.
[447] Ibid., p. 158.
[448] Ibid., pp. 159-160.
[449] Ibid., p. 160.
[450] Ibid., p. 162.
[451] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 15/01/1951.

This phenomenon, inherent in all social communication, was partially evident in the Gaumont- British review of the year feature of 28 December. Aside from a brief referral to "the worsening world situation", which its self remained objective, if sensationalist, yet allowed the newsreels to circumvent negative news events in Korea, the feature stressed many positives, particularly that UNC "never lost command of the air", a technique, which as discussed previously, defines negative events via reference to a positive semantic opposite.

Therefore, the reader is provided with evidence to support Hall's claim that the transfer of ideology, itself the product of "systematic distortion", is intrinsically linked to semantics and the connotations word(s) provoke within the decoders map of meaning.[452] Thus, the propagandist, or conveyor of ideology, in this case most likely a media professional seeking to avoid antagonising the censors, whilst remaining objective and less-sensationalist, has chosen to refer to the adverse situation facing UNC, by describing the specific positive aspect of the campaign, as opposed to the more immense negative aspects. To offer an explanation: it can be considered less sensationalist and therefore more propagandist, to employ a phrase such as 'not winning' than to employ the word 'losing', as the connative association to the word 'winning', or even 'not winning' are less dramatic and negative than the conative associations to 'losing'. Thus, the possible negative effect upon audience morale would be reduced, pleasing officials whilst allowing the media to continue reporting events despite the need to be more aware of the phraseology selected when describing potentially ideologically disruptive events.

[452] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*.

The reader may interpret the military's lobbying of the media, to become less sensationalist when reporting events, particularly during adverse circumstance, as a method of informal censorship; as Tokyo was attempting to ensure that journalists selected their words more carefully, which therefore increased the potential of decoders interpreting media texts in an ideologically compatible manner; thus rendering much of the coverage propagandist in nature, without the need for more direct informal or formal intervention. However, the reader should not forfeit a sense of balance, as both military and media may be interpreted as having understandably, considering the tense circumstances, over-stepped acceptable boundaries. The media had clearly allowed sensationalism and potentially panic to distort coverage of Truman's remark concerning atomic weapons, which consequently became sensationalist. Alternatively the military, under the informal and later formal system, attempted to exert too greater an influence over media content, particularly as certain words were prohibited, including phrases that were open to duel or ambiguous interpretation which may have embarrassed UNC.[453] This ideological gulf, despite both parties operating within a "shared ideological atmosphere"[454] of anti-communism, is best illustrated when Tokyo suggested that UNC lines had been shortened for "tactical reasons", when units were actually engaged in a withdrawal in the face of Chinese pressure,[455] as depicted by the newsreel of 15/01/1951,[456] confirming Casey's remark that the credibility gap had become immense.[457]

As UNC withdrew, Russian built and often piloted Mig-15 fighter jets had increasingly challenged allied air supremacy,[458] which played a vital role in helping UNC

[453] See Casey, *Selling the Korean* War, p. 162.
[454] Hoggart, *Bad News*, p. x
[455] See Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p.62.
[456] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 15/01/1951.
[457] Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, p. 154.
[458] Catchpole, *The Korean War*, p. 90.

units escape what a Gaumont British newsreel dubbed the Chinese "avalanche".[459] A feature of 11 January 1951[460] featured a fifteen second clip illustrating Soviet built jets in Korea. The film was said to have been captured by UNC, whilst operating in North Korea, and depicted Mig fighters in formation in the air and on the ground. Such material was beneficial to the economic viability of the cinema newsreel industry, as it maintained intrigue coupled with a sensationalist and selective objective value as current affairs news. The footage would have been ideologically compatible with Western society and helped appeal to international opinion, that Soviet Russia was aiding international aggression, thus fitting well with the established anti-communist frame described by Jenks.[461] However, the material may be considered alarmist as it connectively suggested the possibility of escalation, or that UNC air supremacy had been significantly challenged. However, any concerns the audience may have experienced were quickly dispelled following gun camera footage, depicting UNC aircraft scoring a 'kill' against a Soviet aircraft. Thus the informative, yet potentially unsettling narrative, detailing a Soviet presence in Korea, was swiftly concluded with a reassuring UNC victory over the Communist aggressor and thus maintained a propagandist value, despite presenting an objective, yet generalised and entertaining narrative of the air war to the audience. Thus the sequence can be considered news worthy as it illustrated a "danger to the [Western] community", which McShane describes as a central criteria of news selection.[462]

The coverage concerning early and mid-January 1951 remained objective, to a degree, as communist forces were said to have attacked and later re-taken Seoul, whilst UNC was

[459] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 15/01/1951.
[460] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 11/01/1951.
[461] Jenks, *British Propaganda*, p. 7.
[462] http://www.rssmediastudies.co.uk 20/09/2011

now operating south of the 38th parallel.[463] Additionally, the emphasis on the good morale of the fighting troops and wounded continued as British tank crew were illustrated smiling[464] and wounded were described "looking forward to the joys of recovery".[465] Communist villainy continued to be stressed, with phrases including "[communists] threaten to engulf the entire Asiatic world" and that "[UNC] guns have a message of defiance". Objective reporting also remained a feature as, although sanitised and semi-sensationalised, losses in the form of wounded were acknowledged in a campaign which "cost many allied lives".[466] President Rhee of South Korea was said to have evacuated the capital for Pusan as UNC pulled back across the 38th parallel having initiated a "scorched earth policy".[467] The strength of Chinese forces was regularly described, particularly within audio commentary, which included phrases such as, "horde", "avalanche" and well-armed "juggernauts". This depiction of oriental communist strength contrasted sharply to the depiction of Korean civilians, throughout the coverage of the conflict, who in summary, were depicted as passive and in warm sympathetic human terms, as a "tragedy".

Unfortunately, there is minimal space for a full consideration of the coverage of the plight of civilians, who were covered predominantly in passive and sympathetic terms, but whose plight was given political significance, as many were, somewhat objectively, said to have voted with their feet and accompanied UNC southwards, as they had no desire to be "slaves to communism".[468] This can be perceived to have maintained a semi-objective and sensationalist yet propagandist value, particularly when considering that UNC could not

[463] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 15/01/1951.
[464] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 04/01/1951.
[465] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 18/01/1951.
[466] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 18/01/1951.
[467] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 15/01/1951.
[468] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 11/01/1951.

always accommodate civilians, the plight of whom was a notable feature of newsreels coverage in both private and BBC reports;[469] although UNC was always depicted enjoying positive interaction with civilians, something which was common yet not always the case.[470] Similarly, South Korean General Paik Sun Yup, expressed regret for the inability of the Republic of Korea forces (ROK), to extend much concern for the civilian plight,[471] which did not appear in graphic detail in audio-visual coverage. The depiction of civilians during the conflict remains worthy of further study, particularly as Catchpole claims that domestic public sentiment, in Britain was hardened to such emotive scenes, having witnessed coverage of refugees in post war Europe,[472] something which raises questions concerning the interaction between the media sensationalism of negative events and the impact they had upon a desensitised populous.

On 29 January, Gaumont-British News positively depicted ROK troops, in their own right, for the first time, albeit wearing American uniforms and equipment. Likewise the arrival of General Ridgeway was included as UNC soldiers constructed defences. The audio overlay included remarks such as "[the] days of withdrawal seem a thing of the past" and "war takes a better turn". The sequence concluded with the portrayal of anti-guerrilla operations, machine gun fire and a remark suggesting the allies were prepared for the worst.[473]

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[469] Smith's article details a number of features which found their way into the television newsreels. Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', pp. 233-234.

[470]Scholarship records numerous accounts of positive interaction between UNC personnel and the civilian populace. However, on occasion military necessity required the strafing of refugee columns by UNC air power, as communist forces, on occasion, employed them as cover in order to approach allied lines. Salmon, *To the Last Round*, pp. 92-94.

[471] Sun Yup, *Pusan to Panmunjom*, p. 137.

[472] Catchpole, *The Korean War*, p. 266.

[473] Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 29/01/1951.

This feature accurately marked the beginning of what can be termed 'stabilisation', a significant change, both in the tactics and strategy by which the war was to be fought and also in military media relations, which although never completely devoid of problems, began to create an improved working relationship, often due to the efforts of Ridgeway.[474] However, this change raises something of a paradox, as the military was now fighting a 'limited war' with more restrained goals, unlike during the previous six months of fighting, which can be considered more akin to a total war, with undefined yet more total objectives and sweeping manoeuvres resulting in the occupation of territory. Yet as war aims became more limited, based on a strategy of attrition, the introduction of formal censorship in December, the regulation of the media can be considered to have shared more in common with censorship measures adopted during a total war. Thus, when the war aims were more opportunistically total in nature, the regulation of media coverage by the US government remained informal in nature; whereas, as the war became more limited in nature, the regulations became more formal.

However, the reader should not attach too great a significance to this observation, as there was no master plan, only responses to individual circumstances, as censorship was introduced during a more total phase of the war; the crisis of November-December 1950, not the period of battlefield stabilisation of early 1951 onwards. Nevertheless, at this point one can perceive the US authorities, through the necessity of appointing a new commander following Walker's death, the introduction of censorship during crisis and media irresponsibility, in addition to the realisation of the necessity of adjusting to the tactical and

[474] Casey, *Selling the Korean War,* p. 166.

strategic demands of limited war, the US government steadily developed control over the situation. Although how this change affected the coverage of the war, received by the American and British audience, remains to be explored.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE DEPICTION OF BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH AT WAR IN KOREA

It is not possible to engage in further chronological exploration of the audio-visual media coverage of the period of attrition, stabilisation and tentative negotiation which followed until the ceasefire was signed on July 27 1953. Despite the gradual onset of static warfare, the military and political situation presented the media with a number of newsworthy events, which ensured that conflict in Korea would remain in the public eye, although to a lesser extent than during the initial seven months of hostilities.[475] However, Hastings suggests that by 1953 there remained little public interest in Korea,[476] nevertheless, newsworthy events included: General Ridgway's operations of early 1951, the communist fourth and fifth phase offensives, Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur on 11 April 1951, the loss of the British Gloucesters battalion on the Imjin River, the painfully slow negotiation process, unsubstantiated claims of UNC having undertaken germ warfare operations and the prisoner of war riots on Koje-do. However, it will prove illuminating to engage in a brief case study of how media coverage represented primarily British aspects of the conflict.

Newsreel representation conveyed a distinct sense of British and Commonwealth political unity at national level in support of American policy. Thus the newsreels accurately conveyed a sense of British policy to the domestic audience. Furthermore, British political leaders including, Attlee, Bevin and Churchill were depicted receiving popular support as

[475] Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 235.
[476] Hastings, *The Korean War,* p. 409.

they were shown enjoying the adulation of the public.[477] Naturally such socially significant personalities would receive media attention and the camera operator would not find it difficult to 'shoot' such a sequence at the entrance to a political hub such as Downing Street. Such imagery associated decision makers and thus policy with widespread popular support, thus validating the decision to support collective security operations in Korea. Nonetheless, it is important to recall that policy decisions of this period were taken with one eye on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the other on the events of Munich. Thus assertive action received much support across the social spectrum as evident in Catchpole's research into popular opinion.[478]

Coverage also included a portrayal of the determination and commitment at a more personal level amongst the domestic and commonwealth public. Canadians were depicted enlisting, with emphasis placed on Second World War veterans.[479] Similarly, Canadian air force personnel were shown saying their goodbyes to family members, who displayed little evidence of concern or sorrow. Under such circumstances one would expect to encounter a full range of emotive responses to men departing for war, thus the reader may interpret this as an example of media selectivism, which illustrated the process in a positive manner, something which became increasingly evident when combined with the anti-communist rhetoric.[480] Additionally the crew of an Australian fighting ship, which had reportedly 'volunteered for service', was depicted preparing to sail.[481]

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[477] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 03/07/195.
[478] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 264.
[479] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 14/08/1950.
[480] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 07/08/1950.
[481] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 21/08/1950.

The cumulative result of such coverage of subsidiary events closely connected to the primary news event, applied subtle pressure upon the viewer to follow their peers and join the war effort. This organically occurring bi-product of coverage would not have displeased political leaders as Britain's post war man-power shortages, additional foreign military commitments and the common unpopularity of recalling veterans in addition to conscription, a sensitive political issue,[482] to which subtle media pressure may well have provided a welcome method of encouraging volunteers or in helping persuade the public to accept official measures.

British support for the United States and later the UNC was included by the newsreels from the outset, both visually and verbally. The re-commissioning of HMS Warrior[483] and the loading of HMS Theseus[484] coupled with statements of solidarity towards the USA was enthused with inoffensive patriotism. Such sentiment was echoed on 31 July 1950,[485] where British troops, armour and aircraft were illustrated on parade whilst described as "rallying to aid American allies", whom thus far, had "borne the brunt of the fighting." The latter statement remained accurate as the American commitment was the largest of all UNC participants. However, given that Britain was keen to demonstrate its commitment to collective security and combating aggression, the audio-visual depiction of British troops at the front contrasts greatly with what viewers may have expected to see: British units in action.[486]

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[482] Catchpole, *The Korean War,* p. 265.
[483] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 24/08/1950.
[484] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 14/08/1950.
[485] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 31/07/1950.
[486] The depiction of active British troops did increase as they became more established in theatre, for example see primary source index Gaumont-British News, 09/11/1950.

The vast majority of coverage detailing the activities of British service personnel illustrated contented soldiers in rear areas drinking tea, opening mail,[487] or engaging in positive interaction with civilians. The latter example can be considered an exercise in 'hearts and minds' and thus propagandist in nature as the camera crew were most likely aware of the public relations value of the material they either spontaneously captured, as attractive and emotive news material, or were directed by their media superiors to seek for similar reason.[488] Understandably combat footage was not easy to acquire, thus news worthy sequences had to be sought elsewhere. Additionally and with specific regard to the private newsreel companies that were reliant on American stock, American camera crews may not have enjoyed sufficient time to reach the forward areas of British units and thus been forced by circumstance to 'shoot' in rear areas, whilst visiting allied contingents. Regardless, the coverage conveyed two separate messages, one of which becomes evident during interpretation of the material from an American perspective, the other following a reading from a British perspective.

Images of relaxed British troops, clearly at a distance from danger, would have demonstrated to an American audience that although their allies were present, there was still more they could do in the fight against totalitarian communism. This was particularly emphasised when considering that American troops were often shown in combat and exposed to danger. Thus the material adopted a symbolic representation of America's burden in the fighting, therefore encouraging American domestic opinion to pressure its allies for greater involvement.

[487] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 15/09/1950 and 25/09/1950.
[488] Howard Smith details how the BBC camera team was issued with instructions of desirable material by editors and producers prior to departing for Korea. Smith, 'The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War', p. 23.

Additionally, such reports may have inspired guilt amongst a British audience and persuaded them to support a greater commitment to Korea or adopt a more sympathetic view toward American policy. Finally, the British viewer, particularly those with relatives serving overseas, may have taken solace from viewing British troops enjoying home comforts and not exposed to the risks of combat, compared to other nationalities. Therefore, despite the verbal acknowledgment of risk, such footage contains little that would cause the viewer to contest the reality constructed by the sequence that British troops were not suffering too stringent hardship or risk. However, we must remain mindful that media 'angles', as described by Hoggart,[489] may have been responsible for the creation of this substitute reality, generated and encouraged by the desire on behalf of the media not to antagonise hegemonic societal authorities.

On occasion the dangers faced by British troops were indirectly demonstrated, albeit in a sterilised and selective manner. British 'K Force' was said to have been targeted by "fierce artillery" but was nonetheless "standing firm".[490] Furthermore, wounded personnel were illustrated smiling as they were stretchered off a transport aircraft. The men appeared well ordered and cared for with wounds well dressed, as bananas appeared prominently 'in shot'.[491] Evidently such footage encouraged the decoder to apply the treatment of the wounded depicted, to all soldiers. However, practical circumstance would often inhibit such care under battlefield conditions, thus the organic propaganda value of the feature becomes evident and was instigated by the nature of the "heavily selected interpretation of events"

[489] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. ix.
[490] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 18/09/1950.
[491] Bananas maintain a particular significance in the post war climate of rationing and shortages. Thus the limited availability of such fruit demonstrated that wounded service personnel enjoyed the best possible standard of care and to an extent luxury.

described by Hoggart,[492] which in turn allows the media to cover emotive newsworthy stories without antagonising authorities.

However, the sequence may simply have been captured and deemed newsworthy for another reason, concerning the ideological outlook of British society of the period. The post war world, although retaining rationing restrictions and austerity measures, experienced an elevation in the concern for social welfare. The rise of the socially responsible welfare state granted access to personal healthcare for the first time, thus in an age of increased value being placed on the welfare of the individual, in a war weary nation, the newsreels may have mirrored this in their coverage as it would have been ideologically compatible with and familiar to their audience. The care of the wounded thus became newsworthy and was embodied in the symbolic value of the rare fruit provided for the casualties aboard the flight, something which may have proved reassuring to the decoder when integrated with their personal 'map of meaning'[493] concerning the topic of wounded and the wider Korean conflict.

The great deal of emphasis placed upon the positive morale amongst British units by the newsreels was evident in the vast majority of features concerning British troops. Two prominent examples of this can be identified, with the first describing troops as "full of cheery optimism" whilst facing "a tough job ahead"[494] and the second depicting tank crew grinning during the crisis period of January 1951.[495] The existence of high morale, even in

[492] Hoggart, *Bad News,* p. x
[493] Hall, *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse.*
[494] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 11/09/1950.
[495] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 04/01/1951.

the face of adversity remained a key feature of coverage concerning British units. This is nowhere more evident than within coverage concerning the Gloucesters stand on the Imjin River of April 1951.

The epic last stand of the Gloucesters, by no means adequately covered here, has received close attention in A. Salmon *To The Last Round,* which may be considered the primary work detailing the event.[496] The thirty-six hour battle, which inflicted more British casualties sustained than any other clash of the post-war period, was not the first British experience of loss during the Korean War. One incident of note occurred during the 'big bug out', which saw a unit of Royal Marine Commandos ambushed with the loss of approximately one-third of their strength.[497] The newsreels do not appear to have covered this event, nor are particularly direct references to British losses common; casualties were either discussed via a focus on the positive treatment of wounded or in relation to "replacements".

However, the saga of "the Glorious Gloucesters", as they came to be known, would have been difficult to avoid featuring from a media perspective as the action made stimulating news, containing the basic elements of a good story. Nevertheless, media professionals would have clearly remained aware of the political and emotional sensitivity of the event and would thus have wished to avoid causing distress to the families' concerned or provoking official condemnation. Coverage therefore lacked the detail which would have offended either sensibilities and focused upon the heroism and gallantry of the troops involved. Some of the evident 'spin' was likely facilitated by the practice of media self-

[496] Salmon, *To the Last Round.*
[497] See Hastings, *The Korean War*, pp. 176-178.

censorship, although elements of repetition following the official UNC line are also evident. The newsreel feature of 24 May 1951,[498] described the "team of hero's" as saving the whole front from destruction, something now considered to be an over estimation by modern military historians, who feel a delaying action followed by a withdrawal would perhaps have served the situation better.[499] Whilst not detracting from the merits of the Gloucesters, it is necessary to recall that the loss of an allied unit, operating under American command presented the United States with a delicate public relations issue.[500] The allocation of a presidential unit citation and the accreditation of preventing the front from collapsing may be perceived as a response to such an issue.[501]

Such praise served to legitimise the losses involved, which although briefly referred to as a "high price" by the commentator, was to a considerable extent excluded from the coverage. Naturally one cannot expect to see particularly graphic images of wounded and dead; however, the limited number of Gloucesters who made a return to UNC lines immediately following the action was exaggerated by the numbers of British troops depicted on parade at the award ceremony. Of course, the one hundred and ninety survivors, of a pre-battle total of eight hundred and fifty,[502] may well have been sufficient to organically give such an impression; although the effect was nevertheless misleading. This may perhaps be employed to explain why domestic cinema audiences were said to have cheered newsreel

[498] Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 24/05/1951.
[499] General Ridgway's letter to his subordinate General Van Fleet of 7 May 1951, confirms that the commander did not feel it had been necessary for the Gloucestershire Regiment to engage in a last stand and that they should have been withdrawn when the situation became "grave". However, final responsibility for the "oversight" remains a contentious issue amongst interested parties. For details see Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume 1,* pp. 135-136.
[500] Ibid., pp. 135-136.
[501] Salmon, *To the Last Round*, p. 257.
[502] Ibid., p. 254.

reports of the Gloucesters action,[503] although this may present us with an example of an emotional and cultural response of a patriotic nation to such events.

The method of reporting evident in the above sequence appears as follows. The heavy cost was briefly stated, which can be interpreted as 'acknowledgment' of the negative event; the odds facing the Gloucesters were described, which shall be interpreted as the newsreel offering a 'reason' for the occurrence of the negative event; finally a positive ending was added, which shall be perceived as a 'nullification' or 'resolution' of the traumatic/distressing issue. Such an approach can be considered a healthy emotional response to a difficult series of events, however, by subtly minimising the negative aspects whilst focusing upon the heroism involved, the post event commemorations of UNC and swiftly concluding with positive progress instilled by the media, led the material to assume propagandist qualities as the regulation of emotion is clearly linked to opinion; something which is particularly significant when the scale of the audience will provoke a massed emotive response and thus effect public opinion on mass. Therefore the news media must proceed with caution when reporting significant and therefore sensitive events to an audience. Thus the reader has identified an aspect of the reasoning underpinning the claim made by Hoggart that the notion of 'objectivity' amongst media professionals can be considered mythical and that the media produce a "heavily selected interpretation of events".[504]

[503] Ibid., p. 255.
[504] Hoggart, *Bad News*, pp. ix – xiii.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The following conclusion is based upon the application of theoretical analysis and a consideration that all social communication remains inherently self-gratifying to the encoder and decoder alike and that social communication remains a tool of survival utilised by our species, the employment of which will become exaggerated in times of peril.

The complexities inherent to the study of historical social/political communication require scholars to consider and assess the value of many multifaceted factors when considering the potential propagandist value of audio-visual material. The debate therefore must continue regarding the definition of terms. Furthermore, the value of interdisciplinary study has been demonstrated, as the work of scholars from diverse academic fields has proven indispensable. In addition, this thesis has demonstrated the value of theoretical tools which facilitate increased understanding of the audio-visual medium and its value as a historical source, which in this instance, has provided scholars with further insight into the complexities of the Korean conflict and wider Cold War.

The difficulties of the working environment endured by media, military and political personnel, during the conflict, have been established. The sudden eruption of hostilities clearly impacted upon the production of news material circulated in Britain; particularly due to media reliance upon material of American origin, which was produced within a similar yet contrasting ideological atmosphere.

Whilst it remains challenging to precisely identify the influences which affected the process of encoding, this thesis has illustrated that British media texts may be perceived to have contained and transmitted ideologies favourable to Western hegemonic institutions between 1950 and 1951. This rendered coverage of the conflict, to a notable degree, propagandist in nature as audiences were seldom, if ever, exposed to information which would have encouraged them to challenge Britain's anti-communist consensus or participation in the UN response to North Korean aggression.

Aspects of coverage, which comply with scholarly definitions of propaganda/ propagandist activity, include the potential regulation of emotion, particularly in relation to battlefield reversals and the occurrence of British casualties. In addition the denial of sensitive information through censorship/self-censorship was evident when media material was compared against the historical record. Furthermore, diplomatic and military events were framed in an emotive and moral manner, which applied a justifiable, yet legitimising, veneer of moral validity to UN action. Additionally, the audience was subtly encouraged to imitate desirable behaviours including; the rejection of incompatible ideologies such as communism or pacifism, volunteering for military service and to express gratitude towards those already under arms. Such features were often enthused with an emotive appeal to patriotism, fear, guilt or selflessness. These examples may be interpreted as the media having undertaken a public service role within Western society, as such social actions would have indeed benefited the parent society; thus the Western media evidently remained tightly self-disciplined based on previous war-time experience as suggested by Shaw and Jenks.

The majority of the 'heavily selected narratives' and their inherent messages, clearly arose from the media pursuit of economic gratification. However, it remains plausible that media organisations often undertook propagandist activities of their own accord. Nonetheless, when contemplating the grave circumstances of the period, informal/formal input from the D-Notice Committee most likely occurred on occasion, particularly during the crisis period of late 1950 to early 1951.

Such a statement is justifiable, as news items fundamentally demonstrated a keen awareness of hegemonic sensibilities from the outset of the conflict and most significantly during times of military reversal. Despite the existence of openness within some reports, which often sprung from sensationalism, the 'balance', manifest within newsreel coverage, cannot be considered sufficient to contradict the conclusion that audio-visual coverage of the Korean conflict can be considered, to a significant degree, propagandist in nature. This finding further indicates the value of theoretical approaches to the study of human culture, including those forwarded by Gramsci and Hall amongst others, who sought/seek to study and explain the practical existence of hegemony within human social interaction.

PRIMARY SOURCE AUDIO-VISUAL NEWS MATERIAL ARCHIVES

British Film Institute http://www.bfi.org.uk

British Pathe http://www.britishpathe.com

British Universities Film and Video Council http://bufvc.ac.uk

ITN online archive http://www.itnsource.com

Movietone http://www.movietone.com

News Film online http://nfo.ac.uk

News Film online http://nfo.ac.uk

WRITTEN ARCHIVES

BBC Written Archive Centre http://bbc.co.uk/archive/written.shtml

NEWSPAPER ARCHIVES

British Newspaper Library: The Times http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk

ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian (1821-2003) and The Observer (1791-2003) http://www.proquest.com

PRIMARY SOURCE INDEX

WRITTEN PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL

BBC Written Archives (WAC)
T32/112, TV talks, the Cold War

AUDIO-VISUAL SOURCE MATERIAL

http://www.itnsource.com

GAUMONT-BRITISH NEWS AND FOX MOVIETONE

25/06/1950	Fox Movietone	X25065002
29/06/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411270037
03/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280004
03/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280029
06/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU4112800024
13/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280024
17/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280003
17/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280026
20/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280062
21/07/1950	Fox Movietone	X210775001
24/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280061
27/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280047
31/07/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411280020
03/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290011
07/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290049
10/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290046
11/08/1950	Fox Movietone	X14085001
14/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290056
14/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290056
14/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290057
14/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290057
14/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290001
17/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290009
21/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290022
21/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290024
21/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290004
24/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290032
24/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290033

24/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290035
28/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290015
28/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU4112900170
28/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290018
31/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290038
31/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290016
31/08/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411290042
04/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300020
04/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300019
07/09/1950	Fox Movietone	X07095001
07/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300021
11/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300027
11/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300024
14/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300011
15/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300029
18/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300012
18/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU41130007
18/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300041
18/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300040
18/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300045
18/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300003
25/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300032
27/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU411300009
27/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU4113000039
29/09/1950	Fox Movietone	X29095001
02/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010027
10/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010020
12/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010034
12/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010014
12/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010022
16/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010044
16/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010046
19/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010051
19/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010050
19/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010057
19/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010058
23/10/1957	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010055
23/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010062
26/10/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412010010
27/10/1950	Fox Movietone	X27105002
27/10/1950	Fox Movietone	X27105003
27/10/1950	Fox Movietone	X27105001
09/11/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU41220015
13/09/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412020036

17/11/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412020036
17/11/1950	Fox Movietone	X17115001
27/11/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412020010
27/11/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412020010
27/11/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412020050
04/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030025
07/12/1950	Fox Movietone	X07125001
07/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030046
11/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030043
11/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030041
15/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030006
15/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030003
15/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030013
18/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030012
21/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030050
25/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030035
25/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030033
25/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030052
27/12/1950	Fox Movietone	X27125001
28/12/1950	Gaumont-British News	BGU412030008
01/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040069
01/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040068
04/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040042
04/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040070
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15/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040040
15/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040051
18/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040073
22/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040061
29/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040029
29/01/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412040060
01/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050015
01/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050004
05/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050009
07/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050030
07/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050019
12/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050034
15/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050054
15/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050048
26/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050062
26/02/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412050063

05/03/1951	Gaumont-British News	Missing
14/03/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412060037
14/03/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412060038
19/03/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412060056
19/03/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412060008
02/04/1951	Gaumont-British News	Missing
05/04/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412070041
05/04/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412070042
05/04/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412070037
16/04/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412070011
21/05/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412080021
24/05/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412080046
31/05/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412080041
28/06/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412090024
02/07/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412100036
02.07/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412100038
12/07/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412100013
16/07/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412100018
23/07/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412100025
28/07/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412090055
17/09/151	Gaumont-British News	Missing
01/10/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412130008
15/10/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412130029
01/11/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412140091
15/11/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412140006
03/12/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412150004
03/12/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412150007
20/12/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412150044
24/12/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412150049
27/121951	Gaumont-British News	BGU4121500390
31/12/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412150046
31/12/1951	Gaumont-British News	BGU412150047
03/01/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412160025
04/02/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412170010
21/02/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412170061
25/02/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412170014
13/03/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412180013
20/03/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412180052
24/03/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412180041
24/03/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412180085
24/03/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412180114
27/03/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412180113
03/04/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412190074
03/04/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412190080

01/05/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412200002
19/05/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412200071
19/05/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412200072
26/05/1952	Fox Movietone	X26055201
02/06/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412210000
05/06/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412210043
16/06/1952	Fox Movietone	X16065202
16/06/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412210007
16/06/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412210083
19/06/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412210036
23/06/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412210077
18/07/1952	Fox Movietone	X18075201
24/07/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU4122220025
28/07/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU4122220050
01/08/1952	Fox Movietone	X01085201
11/08/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412230007
01/09/1952	Gaumont-British News	BGU412240008
01/01/1953	Gaumont-British News	BGU412280041
19/01 /1953	Gaumont-British News	BGU412280073
18/05/1952	Fox Movietone	X18055301
18/06/1953	Fox Movietone	X08065301

BRITISH PATHE

10/07/1950	UN2273E
10/07/1950	50/055
20/07/1950	50/058
27/07/1950	50/060
21/08/1950	50/067
22/08/1950	UN2280A
06/09/1950	UN2293A
12/10/1950	UN2293E
12/10/1950	UN2295E
04/12/1950	501097
August 1951	UN2385F
08/01/1951	51/003
28/01/1952	52/009
19/07/1951	51/058
06/08/1951	51/063
13/08/1951	51/065
16/08/1951	51/006
Missing	UN2295B
23/06/1952	52/051
22/09/1952	52/077

27/11/1952	52/096
Missing	UN2296C
Winter 1953	UN2527C
1953	UN2502B
February 1953	UN2503B
February 1953	UN2503D

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