

VOICES AND VISIONS OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM
RELATIONS IN POST- CIVIL WAR LEBANON; AN
OVERVIEW OF CAUSES, EFFECTS AND THE
QUESTION OF IDENTITY
2000-2008

by

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ABSTRACT

The status of Christian–Muslim relations (CMR), which are difficult to assess, has been ambiguous in contemporary Lebanon. Analysts, as well as individuals within Lebanese communities in Lebanon and within the diaspora have made conflicting claims. One major claim has been that CMR are better now than before the Lebanese Civil War because the civil war ended in 1991 and a reoccurrence has never materialized. Furthermore, the Ṭā'if agreement, a working document aimed at ending the civil war and promoting solid CMR, was signed by most of the major communities of Lebanon in 1991. For these reasons and more, Lebanese CMR were believed to have improved post-civil war. Nevertheless, this writer explored the veracity of this proposition. Through comprehensive quantitative and qualitative research, the poor state of CMR in contemporary Lebanon was revealed. In face-to-face interviews in Lebanon, field experts reflected on the weakened condition of CMR and the reasons for the same. University students participated in a survey to ascertain their feelings concerning CMR and the possible causes of problems within CMR. Focus was also placed on the role identity has had in CMR. These causes of CMR conflict and, at times, consensus were reviewed and compared for a clear understanding of the state of present-day CMR. Finally, based on an understanding of these factors, recommendations for improvement, further study, and the future of CMR were given.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to David, Marella, Laurice, George, Joseph and Nada and Mary Hajjar. Jesus said, “Let the children come to me. Don’t keep them away.” Then Jesus told His disciples that it was important to believe and trust in Him the way a child would. He took the children in His arms, put His hands on them, and blessed them (Mark 10:14).

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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, the status of Christian–Muslim relations (CMR) in post-civil war (1975-1991) Lebanon has been examined. Much opinion, misinformation, and rumor exist concerning CMR. Some important Lebanese observers have contended that CMR have improved and thus are peaceful and cordial. Many others have raised concerns about the condition of Lebanese CMR. Therefore, the question of whether Lebanon with its unique religious makeup (approximately 50% Christian and 50% Muslim) is a great example of interfaith co-existence or a living laboratory revealing that Christians and Muslims cannot live side by side in peace, has remained unanswered.

Analysts who believe that Lebanese CMR have improved in post-war Lebanon have buttressed their claim by noting that the civil war ended in 1991 and has not resumed. They have also pointed to various sociopolitical and religious interventions that, in their understanding, have resulted in dramatically improved Lebanese CMR since the end of the civil war. Even so, the evidence has not been unanimous. This thesis, therefore, was an attempt to answer the following major research questions:

1. How do mature Lebanese field experts and university students view CMR in post-civil war Lebanon?
2. What is the status or condition of CMR in post-war Lebanon according to these and other sources? Have CMR improved post-Lebanese Civil War?
3. Why are present-day Lebanese CMR in their present state? What causes can be identified, treated, or supported for the benefit of positive CMR?
4. How do the Lebanese understand their national identity? Do they share a common view of their race, ethnicity, history, and culture? Has this had an effect on CMR?

5. Could the civil war have been prevented altogether? What are the risks of another civil war?
6. Which community, Christian or Muslim, is working more effectively toward healthy CMR?

Research Themes

Once an accurate understanding of the status of Lebanese CMR were established, the religious, educational, geographic, economic, political, advocacy and communal identity reasons believed responsible for present-day CMR conditions were uncovered. As such, these were explored and became the themes of this research study. These themes were then separated and assigned to the 6 body chapters of this thesis. In addition, what could have been done to prevent the civil war and the possibility of its reoccurrence were examined.

In chapter 1, the question of whether religious diversity resulted in complementing or complicating Lebanese CMR was explored, including findings regarding religious differences and their impact on CMR. In chapter 2, because Lebanon is a small country with a long history, information concerning the roles of location, integration, and displacement of the Lebanese people was presented in terms of their effects on present-day CMR. Specifically, evidence concerning whether the Lebanese were currently highly integrated and living together harmoniously was examined.

Chapter 2 also includes information on the impact of economic problems on Lebanese CMR. During the centuries of Ottoman Turk rule, followed by a brief French mandate in the early 20th century, Lebanon often did not experience economic prosperity. Even after its independence in 1943, Lebanon enjoyed only a few decades when its economy flourished, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Thus, the question of whether economic problems had an impact on how Lebanese Christians and Muslims relate to one another was examined.

The effects of the Lebanese system of education on the quality of CMR have been explored in chapter 3. Also, because the form of government, agreements, past practice and political leadership all have roles in the well-being of any nation, the political reasons that have resulted in either improving or hindering positive Lebanese CMR have been explored in this chapter.

In chapters 4 and 5, questions concerning whether the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon have, or believe they have, a shared identity; whether the Lebanese have a shared consciousness of the major aspects of their identity; and what role, if any, identity has in present-day CMR have been examined. The views of Lebanese field experts and university student were compared and contrasted with Lebanese history and DNA studies to determine the consistency between what the Lebanese believe their identity is and the historic and scientific evidence concerning their identity.

An examination of which community, Christian or Muslim, has worked more effectively toward healthy inter-communal harmony has been presented in chapter 6. A discussion of what could have been done to prevent the Lebanese Civil War in the first place and the possibility of another civil war occurring have also been examined.

A summary of the research findings and general conclusions regarding the state of Lebanese CMR and the way in which they developed have been reiterated in the conclusion. Implications and questions for the future have also been briefly outlined.

Field Expert and University Student Thought

Comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analysis was completed using information gathered from 17 diversified CMR field expert respondents (see Appendices 1–18) representative of the various communities in Lebanon and from 288 university students. The students provided their information in the form of responses to a survey prepared specifically

for this research study. This research was conducted almost exclusively inside Lebanon from 2000 through 2006.

Justification of the Research Issue

This research was an inquiry into the well-being of Lebanon. In previous years, Lebanon had been labeled a failed state due to many factors, a major one being the poor relations between its Christians and Muslims. The devastating Lebanese Civil War (1975–1991) assumed Christian-versus-Muslim characteristics, which resulted in adversely affecting CMR. Because the Lebanese are inevitably dependent on one another, the existence, prosperity, and success of Lebanon has been contingent on its various communities living together peacefully, with healthy CMR. Thus, the status of CMR after the cessation of hostilities has been crucial to the very existence and functioning of Lebanon. Understanding the causes of discord could be the first step in conflict transformation.

From the previously stated major research questions, other queries were derived:

- Whether improved or not, why were CMR in their present condition?
- What were the risks if the Lebanese ignored this question? Do they do so at risk of a repeat of past conflicts?
- What influence did the status of CMR have on the current level of social functioning in Lebanon?
- What could the Lebanese and others learn from the present state of CMR?
- Are there positive aspects of present-day CMR that could be augmented to maintain this positive trend, or are there signs of discord that required urgent attention and intervention?

Various human service entities have been interested in the reasons for the condition of CMR, not least of which are the field expert respondents interviewed for this thesis, who

represent large portions of the communities in Lebanon. Other entities with demonstrated interests in the state of Lebanese CMR include United Nations programs and services and nongovernmental help organizations (NGOs). Indeed, from September 2009 to December 2011, several NGO programs announced ongoing and upcoming programming to assess and address the state of Lebanese CMR. Other organizations with demonstrated and ongoing interests in understanding and addressing CMR, are the Pontifical Institute for Arabic/Islamic Studies, CMR study centers, the U.S. Embassy in Awkar, Lebanon, Middle East studies programs and teacher education programs.

Aside from the small village where the author resided and worked, he was virtually an unknown foreigner in Lebanon with no prominent role in Lebanese CMR. When seeking to meet and interview prominent Lebanese field experts, the author simply shared with them that he wanted to discuss CMR. No further details were given. Despite being unknown in Lebanon and indicating the few specifics about what the author wished to discuss other than CMR, each of the 17 field expert respondents felt it important to meet with him, giving weight to the idea that this research was important. Indeed, each of these field experts from across the Lebanese religious spectrum met with the author either alone or semi-privately (e.g., security personnel, relatives, or translators) to discuss the factors affecting CMR. Each field expert did so for no obvious personal benefit; rather, as they each stated clearly, it was felt important to discuss Lebanese CMR. Separately, each respondent took time from their active, prominent roles to spend hours of time answering serious questions, the focus of which was CMR. Within Lebanon, this was the equivalent of meeting former British Prime Minister Tony Blair or former U.S. president Bill Clinton along with prominent standing senators, members of the House of Representatives, leaders, religious figures, and more. These Lebanese field experts represented large swaths of Lebanese society. Encouraging this type

of inquiry, according to most of these respondents, could result in stimulating and satisfying this renewed and developing interest of the Lebanese in promoting positive CMR.

The Vatican has also had a clear, demonstrated interest in encouraging healthy CMR. The late Pope John Paul II made CMR a major focus of his papacy and traveled throughout the Middle East, just a couple of years before his death, preaching Christian–Muslim coexistence. He visited Lebanon in 1997. In 2001, he was the first pope ever to enter and pray in a mosque, which he did in Syria. Since 1964, the Pontifical Institute for Arabic/Islamic Studies has been stationed in Rome. Inasmuch as this institute is involved in studying and promoting healthy CMR, the present research might be of value to the institute in understanding the various elements of CMR in Lebanon.

The United Nations has had peacekeeping forces stationed in Lebanon for decades, including up to the present. The U.N. presence has consisted mostly of soldiers who attempt to prevent potential conflict within Lebanon and at its borders and who provide humanitarian aid. Ms. Nada Chedid,¹ an executive secretary for a U.N. tribunal commissioner based in Lebanon, shared that the United Nations wants to add focus to inter-Lebanese community issues. Ms. Chedid stated that research and subsequent reports are of interest to the U.N. programs. Thus, this present-day research should be of interest as an update and reference to the condition of CMR and the reasons for the same in present-day Lebanon, for the U.N. programs assigned to Lebanon.

In addition, NGOs with a focus on interfaith coexistence should find the information contained in this thesis helpful. As recently as September 2009, Search for Common Ground started a project based on “active listening” and “teaching the teachers” (Mahdawi, 2009, p. 3). This project was designed to address and explore an aspect of Lebanese society that this

¹Nada Chedid, personal communication, August 11, 2007 (see Appendix 24).

author had identified and researched during which he found that the younger generation of Lebanese had significantly different views regarding CMR from those views espoused by the older generation. The question, then, was whether the parents and teachers of present-day Lebanese university students had instilled a culture of tolerance toward other religious communities or not. The author's research findings became the subject of a pilot program to instruct teachers and parents in how to monitor discussion of CMR and to reinforce active listening. An active coordinator of information about NGO programs regarding Lebanese communal relations and CMR is produced by the CRTD.A KNOWLEDGE organization of Lebanon.¹

Several new CMR-specific study centers and projects have emerged in Lebanon over the past decade or so due to an increasing interest in CMR at the university level, attracting both the Lebanese and foreigners. Just two examples are the University of Balamand (UB) Center for Christian-Muslim Studies and the long running Near Eastern School of Theology, both of which have indicated an orientation with CMR. In both institutions, CMR is taught to a diverse group of Lebanese and foreign students. Administration in both organizations have also reported that they have had difficulty finding Lebanese lecturers able to teach in an unbiased manner. They have suggested that newer, non-native Lebanese researchers, such as the author, may perhaps research and teach CMR in a more unbiased manner.

Literature Survey

This thesis was designed to be multidimensional in its areas of examination, necessitating a variety of surveyed sources. Most of the texts reviewed for this thesis were written in English or translated into English from Arabic and French. Some sources,

¹ Information about CRTD.KNOWLEDGE is available at knowledge@crttda.org.lb

however, were written only in Arabic; those have been listed toward the end of the literature review section.

The university student survey and study portion of this thesis was referenced to works by American University of Beirut (AUB) professors Halim Barakat, Hilal Khashan, and to a lesser extent Mohammed Faour. In Barakat's 1977 work, *Lebanon in Strife, Student Preludes to the Civil War*, he assessed the change in youth thought and movements, social class, family, and religion in relation to student politics. He also displayed data regarding student religious affiliation and views on government, politics, the Palestinian issue, and education levels of the students' families. Barakat also incorporated study of Bahraini and Kuwaiti student thought in the areas just mentioned. In Khashan's 1992 work, *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind*, he examined how the Lebanese view their own sect and compared loyalty to their sect with that to the state.

The present research differed in several areas from both Barakat's (1977) and Khashan's (1992) works. First, the present study constituted a newer assessment of contemporary Lebanon, incorporating changes that have occurred since Barakat's (1977) and Khashan's (1992) studies. Second, both Barakat's (1977) and Khashan's (1992) works were primarily quantitative and predominantly deductive. The present work was both qualitative and quantitative, deductive and inductive. The originality of the present work was its direct focus on CMR within present-day Lebanon.

Third, in the present research study, a unique set of eight CMR-specific questions were formulated (see Methodology and Appendix 19) and posed to the 17 field expert respondents directly in private face-to-face interviews. Additionally, a survey of over 40 CMR-related questions was administered to 288 university students (see Appendix 20). Neither Barakat (1977) nor Khashan (1992) held live interviews with CMR or related field

experts and, thus, could not compare and contrast the thought of such experts with the thought of university students.

Fourth, this current assessment of present-day Lebanese CMR also differed in that, unlike Barakat (1977) and Khashan (1992), the author could be regarded as more of a neutral outsider to the Middle East, given his status as a life-long native of the United States who was virtually unknown in Lebanon. Barakat, a Palestinian–Syrian national, and Khashan, a Lebanese national, might be seen as insiders.

Fifth, the present research differed from that of Barakat (1977) and Khashan (1992) in the manner Lebanese identity was treated. The two authors asked students how they identified themselves and then compared those data to national, social, and political thought. However, in the present study, the very problematic concept of Lebanese identity was analyzed in terms of three categories: race, ethnicity, and culture (Giddens, 2001; Macionis, 2003). This was done to provide a detailed understanding not only of Arabicity but also of Phoenicianism apropos to Lebanese CMR and identity. This treatment was virtually nonexistent in the other authors' works. In the present research, the different layers of identity were analyzed, defined, and clarified from sociological and religious points of view.

Last, the importance of nationalism and cultural conflict was also examined in the present research. This was accomplished, in part, through referencing the opposing viewpoints of Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (2006), Jerry Muller in "Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism" (2008), and Samuel Huntington in *A Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996).

The discussion of Arabicity in Lebanon in chapters 4 and 5 included references to Raghid El-Solh's *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation* (2004),

Adeed Dawisha's *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (2003), and Kais Firro's *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State Under the Mandate* (2003), inter alia. These works were mostly discussions of Arabism as a political phenomenon; whereas in examining Arabicity in Lebanon in the present study, the role of Arab identity was defined and the resulting challenges within Lebanese CMR were assessed. Also included were the viewpoints on Arab identity from the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Arab American Institute, both located in Washington D.C. In addition, Lebanese newspapers (*The Daily Star*; *An-Nahar*), magazines (*Monday Morning*), and journals (*Arab Studies Quarterly*, *Journal for the Study of Islam/Christian-Muslim Relations*) and several others were gleaned for perspectives on Arabism and CMR. By using these sources in combination with the data from the field experts' interviews and the university students' surveys, the sometime elusive definitions of the terms *Arab* and *Phoenician* apropos to Lebanese CMR in particular were clarified.

Regarding Phoenician history (chapter 4), known sources were referenced, including Kamal Salibi's *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Revisited* (1988), Wolfram von Soden's *The Ancient Orient* (1994), and Philip Hitti's *The Near East in History: A 5000 Year Story* (1961b) and *Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present* (1967). More recent sources, such as Bassam Khalifah's *The Rise and Fall of Christian Lebanon* (1997), Asher Kaufman's *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (2004), and Kais Firro's *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State Under the Mandate* (2003) were also referenced regarding the ambiguous Lebanese view of Phoenicianism.

To examine the present-day Lebanese–Phoenician identity enigma (chapter 5), the historical record of the Phoenicians was compared with the perceptions of present-day Lebanese and with evidence from genetic (DNA) testing. Dr. Peter Zalloua and Dr. Spencer

Wells conducted Phoenician DNA-genetic testing studies of the Lebanese in 2004 and 2006 (Zalloua & Wells, 2008). These studies, as well as Daniel Asade Chuckralla's racial anthropology and genetics study of 2004 (n.d), were referenced.

In reference to early Lebanese and Middle Eastern history, literature from known Lebanese scholars was cited, including Phillip Hitti's *History of the Arabs* (2002) and *Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present* (1967), Albert Hourani's *A History of the Arab Peoples* (1992), Kamal Salibi's *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (1988), and Leila Tarazi Fawaz's *An Occasion for War Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (1994). In addition to contemporary Lebanese newspapers, magazines, and Internet sources and newsletters, references to newer texts such as Robin Wright's *Dreams and Shadows, the Future of the Middle East* (2008) and Sandra Mackey's *Mirror of the Arab World, Lebanon in Conflict* (2008) were also included.

Views of Lebanese confessionalism and sectarianism were also explored. Referenced works again included Bassam Khalifah's *The Rise and Fall of Christian Lebanon*, which was more critical of the Maronites than of the Muslims from a sociopolitical point of view. Kamal Salibi in *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Revisited* (1998) was critical of previously accepted Lebanese history and of the confessionalism within it. Ussama Makdisi in *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (2000) explained the development of sectarianism during later Ottoman rule. Carole Dagher in *Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon's Post-War Challenge* (2001) was more empathetic of the Christian position within CMR.

The field experts who were interviewed for this thesis had also written articles and books and had given lectures regarding Lebanese CMR. This writer did not review their works until after the interviews were completed to ensure information gathering was

conducted in a fresh and unassuming process. The field expert respondents' works were mostly found in Lebanese sources such as the magazines, newspapers, and journals mentioned previously, as well as occasional papers and newsletters published in organizations such as The Arab Working Group on Christian Muslim Dialogue, The Center for Christian Muslim Studies at UB, inter alia.

Several Lebanese–Arabic texts were also referenced: *Co-existence in Christianity and Islam* (UNESCO, 2002), Faisal Abou Al Nasr's *Phobias of the Lebanese Christian: Articles and Debates* (2001), Mohammad Fadlallah's *In the Horizon of Christian–Muslim Dialogue* (1998), Bishop George Khodor and Dr. Mahmoud Ayoub's *Toward the Better Debate: Christian–Muslim Debates* (1997), and Dr. Tony Daou's *The Dictionary of the Twentieth Century: The White Face of Lebanon* (2005).

Because of the frequency and intensity of sociopolitical phenomena in Lebanon, the most recent texts on Lebanon were referenced to keep up with the various changes. These texts included David Hirst's *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (2010), Tim Llewellyn's *Spirit of the Phoenix: Beirut and the Story of Lebanon* (2010), Michael Young's *The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon's Life Struggle* (2010), Warwick Ball's *Out of Arabia; Phoenicians, Arabs and the Discovery of Europe* (2010), Barry Rubin's *Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis* (2009), Nubar Hovsepian's *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (2008), Sandra Mackey's *Mirror of the Arab World, Lebanon in Conflict* (2008), Robin Wright's *Dreams and Shadows the Future of the Middle East* (2008), Assaf Kfoury's *Inside Lebanon: Journey to a Shattered Land With Noam and Carol Chomsky* (2007), and Fawwaz Traboulsi's *A History of Modern Lebanon* (2007).

Several sources were also referenced in regards to proper methodology. These works included Earl Babbie's *The Practice of Social Research* (2001), Sakinah Salahu-Din's *Social*

Work Research: An Applied Approach (2003), and Denise Medico's *Introduction to Qualitative Analysis of In-Depth Interviews* (2005).

The Prelude and Causes of the Lebanese Civil War

The focus of this thesis was CMR in post-civil war Lebanon. However, the various historical and sociopolitical phenomena prior to the civil war must be reviewed to understand CMR after the civil war. Doing so might also result in determining the points at which CMR deteriorated or progressed.

The Lebanese Civil War began in April 1975 and, according to some experts, lasted until October 1990 when the new Lebanese government of the elected president Elias Hrawi was formed and agreed to amend the Lebanese constitution (Hanf, 2003). The amendments stemmed from the Ṭā'if Accord of 1989, the major working document developed to end the civil war (Hanf, 2003). Other experts identified either March or August 1991 as a more accurate end date for the war (Traboulsi, 2007), the former corresponding with the adoption of a war crimes amnesty law absolving the Lebanese for crimes committed during the civil war; the latter referring to the expulsion of Michel Aoun, who was then a renegade Christian general and leader and the short-term acting prime minister. Aoun set up a second government opposed to the official government of President Hrawi (Fisk, 2002).

During the war, Christians were said to be pitted against Muslims and the Lebanese against foreign forces, political and community groups (Friedman, 1995; Lesch, 2007). A number of analysts considered the Lebanese Civil War a stalemate while most considered the Christians the main losers (Salem, 2004). Therefore, wide resentment has existed among the Christians for their Muslim counterparts and has remained one of the issues that must be addressed in Christian–Muslim dialogue.

The Lebanese Civil War lasted 16-years wherein 130,000 to 200,000 Lebanese were killed; another 100,000 were left seriously injured or disabled (Rossi, 2008). The Lebanese economy was debilitated. Hundreds of thousands of Christians and Muslims were displaced (Dagher, 2001; Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004), the ramifications of which have been discussed in chapter 2. The country was occupied by Syrian, Israeli, and Palestinian forces, as well as Iranian military advisers. U.N. forces, as well as soldiers from the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and France, also intervened in Lebanon. Foreign intervention has been discussed in chapter 3. Eventually, most of the religious, political, and nationalist factions in the Middle East had some part in the war¹ (Fisk, 2002; Mackey, 2008).

Just one outcome of the war was the change of the Lebanese political system to render more power to the Muslim majority in Lebanon² (Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2008). An original cause of the Lebanese Civil War was the distribution of political power among the religious, political, and ethnic groups in the country in 1943 when it received its independence from France. Officially, Maronite Christians were recognized as the largest single group, followed by Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Greek Orthodox Christians, Greek Catholics, and Druzes. Upon independence, the most powerful Lebanese groups, the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, created an unwritten power-sharing formula called the National Pact. Among the requirements in the pact were the designations that the president had to be a Maronite; the prime minister, a Sunni; the speaker of the parliament, a Shia; and the deputy speaker, a Greek Orthodox (Khalifah, 1997; Traboulsi, 2007). Another stipulation of the pact stated that the 55-member assembly had to have a 6 to 5 membership ratio of Christians to Muslims, yet each group had to have enough power to veto the policies of any other group (Traboulsi,

¹ Judge Abbas Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

² Ibid.

2007). In time, a similar balance of power was replicated in the government bureaucracy, civil service, and the Lebanese army.

Because the National Pact established a distribution of power based on religious beliefs, or confessions, the government became known as a “confessional democracy.” Many political analysts praised this unique confessional democracy for combining democratic principles with power-sharing elements to placate the possible disruptive effects of having various Christian, Muslim, political, and ethnic groups all in one small country (Firro, 2003). The developers of the pact hoped that with this type of government, one religious sect would be prevented from threatening the interests of another, because all confessions would need to cooperate to put forth national policy. Also, because each group was afforded proportional representation in Parliament and in the cabinet prior to elections, no group should fear being blocked out from the government.

From the start, however, problems with confessional democracy existed. Rather than defusing religious differences, the National Pact has resulted in directing attention on them. Political power remained in the hands of the same elite families, also known as the Zuama, who had held power under the French, especially Maronite families who were well-represented in the upper class of colonial Lebanon¹ (Khalifah, 1997). Additionally, the pact did not include provisions to re-adjust the balance of power if the country experienced demographic changes, which it eventually did, in its Christian and Muslim percentages or if the support for political parties or leaders changed.

This majority power granted to the Christians became a major grievance of the Muslims for decades and was a significant cause in the breakdown of CMR. The Maronites were said to hoard political power and economic resources; thus, the confessional system

¹ Dr. Ibrahim Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

eventually revealed the flaws that resulted in conflict (Fisk, 2002; Joumblatt, 1982). Even though Muslims became the majority by the early 1960s, most of the formal political power remained in Christian hands. Still, the confessional system worked as long as Christian and Muslim factional leaders did not seek support from regional powers (which they eventually did) such as Israel, Syria, and others (see chapter 3). Any effort by one group to forge foreign alliances was bound to threaten the interests of another group and to undermine the delicate balance created in the National Pact.¹

Similar to other civil wars and conflict, history revealed signs that indicated a conflict was brewing. Even so, for some lay Lebanese, the civil war seemed suddenly thrust upon them without warning. However, some individuals detected causes of the civil war well in advance of actual armed hostilities. For example, Dr. Bassam Khalifah, Lebanese author, journalist, and former founder of the Lebanese Democratic Party, maintained that many Christian attitudes relied more on sentiment than logic;

The belief that the 1975–1990 civil war was the reason for the collapse of Christian power in Lebanon. Yet, it was Christian Lebanon itself that failed long before 1975, and the war was just a by-product of that failure. (1997, p.154)

On the other hand, some Lebanese, such as Bridgette Gabriel, author, journalist, and founder of the American Congress for Truth, blamed the high Muslim birthrate and the PLO presence in Lebanon for causing the civil war (2008). Khalifah and Gabriel, both Lebanese Christians, have also spent decades in the U.S. diaspora. Interestingly, Khalifah (1997) blamed the Lebanese Christians for the “fall” of Lebanon, while Gabriel (2008) blamed the Muslims and the PLO of Lebanon for the civil war.

Recent Historical Turning Points in CMR

¹ Ibid.; Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

In this section, the recent historical turning points in Lebanese history prior to the civil war have been presented. The very early history of turning points in CMR have been presented in part in chapter 5. These earlier, critical CMR flashpoints were reviewed for their effect on CMR in present-day Lebanon and in relationship to the reasons the Maronites maintain a separate identity. Although many explanations of the causes of the civil war existed, these certain historical events have been fairly well accepted as turning points in CMR that eventually resulted in civil war. However, few, if any, sources listed historical turning points regarding the psychosocial thoughts and reasons for Maronite separatism.

The Third Civil War of 1975 and the Stock Market Crash

The beginning of the Lebanese Civil War was a most devastating event in many regards, one of them being relations between Christians and Muslims. The spark that resulted in this major civil war was a Maronite Christian Phalange militia attack on a bus filled with Palestinian civilians in East Beirut on April 13, 1975 (Nassib, 1983). However, although often forgotten, another of the causes of that war was the stock market crash of 1975, which resulted in increased tensions and accusations of corruption in Lebanon. Before the stock market crash and the ensuing civil war, two to three Lebanese lira/pounds equaled one American dollar. Since that time, the value of the Lebanese currency has been devalued. As of 2011, almost 40 years later, 1,500 to 3,000 Lebanese lira equal one American dollar (Currency Converter, n.d.).

The first few years of the war focused on the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a Druze force led by Kamal Joumblatt, and the Lebanese Front, a Maronite force led by then-president Camille Chamoun (Joumblatt, 1982). As in the war of 1860, the powerful minority Druze party was pitted against the majority Maronite Christian party (Fawaz, 1994). Also, as was the case in 1860, each side enlisted help in the form of either local or foreign

intervention: The LNM joined with the PLO and other Muslims, and the Lebanese Front allied with Christian militias. The militias received many of their weapons by seizing them from the rapid breakdown of the Lebanese army (Khalaf, 2002). Thus, the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–1990 took on a Christian-versus-Druze/Muslim scenario, just as the war of 1860 had.

The LNM sought to abolish the National Pact. However, the Lebanese Front said it would consider the proposal only after the PLO had left Lebanon. Because the PLO was the chief military ally of the predominantly Muslim LNM, the LNM refused the Christian offer, engaging in several attacks on Christian forces instead (Lesch, 2007). Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad feared that if the Muslim LNM won the war, Israel might invade Lebanon, touching off a wider Arab–Israeli war. Therefore, in 1976, at the request of then-Lebanese president Suleiman Franjeh, Assad sent Syrian troops to Lebanon to intervene on the side of the Christian Lebanese Forces (Seale, 1995). The Syrian troops succeeded in imposing order, giving Lebanon a brief respite from war.

While the war was on hold, the PLO made several attacks on Israel from its bases in Lebanon. Israel responded by invading Lebanon in March 1978. The Israelis gave their support to Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite leader of one of the Christian factions. Gemayel consolidated his control over rival Christians and established a Christian mini-state. This shift in power prompted Syria to switch its alliance from the Christians to the National Liberal Party, a pre-dominantly Muslim and pro-Palestinian group that was well-armed (Lesch, 2007). The military conflict intensified in April 1981 between Israel and Syria. Many observers feared a full-scale Syrian–Israeli war, prompting the United States to negotiate a cease-fire among Israel, Syria, and the PLO. Israel withdrew in June but left a pro-Israel Christian militia headed by General Saad Haddad in control of the southern border area of

Lebanon (Friedman, 1995). A Christian general allied with Israel in occupying the Muslim majority Lebanese south, became a major point of contention for the Muslims. The civil war continued to be viewed as a Christian-versus-Muslim conflict, and CMR continued to deteriorate. Beirut was even divided into the Christian east sector and the Muslim west sector (Fisk, 2002).

The Israeli Invasion and Occupation of 1982

After the 1981 cease-fire, fighting declined drastically. However, in June 1982, Israel began an air attack and followed by a ground invasion of Lebanon, inflicting heavy damage on the PLO militias, many of whom fled the country as Israel closed in on Beirut (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984). With Israeli support, Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite Christian, was elected president in August. His election was decried by Muslims as Bashir Gemayel was seen as a fascist and a leader who wanted a Christian dominated Lebanon. Three weeks later, he was killed by a bomb. Many Western governments believed Syria was responsible for the assassination (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984). Partly in response, the Israeli-supported Christian Phalange militia massacred an estimated 800 to 1,500 Palestinian refugees in September (Ross, 2007). After a great international outcry, an Israeli commission reprimanded its leaders for failing to prevent the massacre (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984). The Christians and Muslims of Lebanon became increasingly wary of one another, their relationship worsening as they were increasingly divided politically, socially and geographically.

Bashir Gemayel was replaced by his older brother Amin, who concluded a peace treaty with Israel in May 1983. The treaty resulted in a violent backlash from Muslim, Druze, PLO, and some Christian forces. With Syrian support, they attacked the Phalange militia and Lebanese army, which had jointly occupied parts of the country (Fisk, 2002).

The Druze–PLO attack and the assassination of Bashir Gemayel raised concerns in Israel, France, and the United States that the Christians might be defeated. In mid-1983, the United States and France shelled the Druze–PLO force. By September, U.S. and French troops were stationed in Beirut. A month later, a truck bomb killed 241 U.S. and 58 French troops in their barracks, prompting the United States to shell Muslim forces in February 1984 (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984, p. 300). Rather than thwart the Muslims, however, this second United States intervention resulted in greater cooperation between the Druze and the increasingly powerful Shia militia, known as Amal (*Afwaj al-Muqawimah al-Lubnaniyya* or Lebanese Resistance Movement) (Lesch, 2007). Together, they drove the Christian forces from West Beirut, prompting the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in February. Remaining Western forces withdrew shortly thereafter (Ross, 2007). At that point, more than ever before, Lebanon was divided into Christian and Muslim areas (Harik, 1999).

The Israeli invasion of 1982, among other things, worsened CMR. Christians and Muslims fled their homes, many never returning. Thus, Christians and Muslims became increasingly segregated (Harik, 1999; see also chapters 2 and 3). Israel supported certain Muslim and Christian groups and pitted them against one another: Christians fought Christians. Muslims fought Muslims. Christians fought Muslims, and they argued viciously about who was more traitorous in allying with Israel (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

With the departure of U.S. troops and the defeat of the Israeli-backed Christian government, Syria pressured President Amin Gemayel to nullify the Lebanese–Israeli peace treaty (Seale, 1995). In March 1984, Syria compelled the Lebanese Christian and Muslim leaders to form a government of national reconciliation. Syrian attempts to impose order in Lebanon, while somewhat successful, were undermined by some of its other policies, especially regarding Iran. Iran sent Syria monetary support and weapons to buttress the Shiite

militias in southern Beirut (Seale, 1995). These militias, captivated by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, had grown in power and prestige as thousands of Shia refugees fled southern Lebanon for southern Beirut. Iran sent members of its Revolutionary Guard to train the Shias, who quickly became increasingly loyal to Iran and less to Syria (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). As a result, Syria had difficulty establishing a Syria allied government in Lebanon; and the Shia community became sharply divided concerning whom to support.. (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). For their part, in general, the Christians resented the Syrian presence in Lebanon and viewed Syrian policy and practice as favoring the Muslims at the expense of the Christians (Picard, 2002).

In the spring of 1988, fighting broke out between Hezbollah (some of whose leaders were interviewed for this assessment), the staunchly pro-Iranian Shia group, and the more secular Amal. To prevent the fighting from spreading, Syrian president Assad and U.S. secretary of state George Shultz met and formulated a political plan of reform in Lebanon. However, the plan fell apart when the Lebanese legislators could not agree on a new leader (Lesch, 2007). In October, General Michel Aoun, the interim prime minister (and an interviewee for this thesis) responded to the chaos by forming his own, pro-Christian cabinet and launching what he called a “war of liberation” against the Syrian occupiers (Khalaf, 2002). However, his troops first fought against his Christian rivals, many of whom feared Aoun’s war would rally all the Muslim militias in Lebanon against the Christians. This fear proved well-founded when, in August 1989, several Muslim groups supported by Syria formed an anti-Aoun coalition (Khalaf, 2002).

The Ta’if Accord of 1989

From September 30 to October 22, 1989, a number of the remaining members of the Lebanese parliament met in Ṭā’if, Saudi Arabia, to negotiate a proposal for political

transformation drawn up by the Arab League. The result was the National Reconciliation Charter, commonly known as the Tā'if Accord (see also chapter 3). In this agreement, the members recognized that Christians were no longer the majority population. Thus, the Christians and Muslims were to have equal representation in Parliament. The number of seats was also increased first from 99 to 108 and later to 128 (Mackey, 2008). The presidency remained a Maronite Christian post. However, due to Muslim critique of a Christian presidency, the Lebanese government formed after the Tā'if Accord amended the constitution to decrease the Christian president's authority increasing the Christian feeling that they had lost the war (Haddad, Y., 2007). In the agreement, the members also clearly defined Lebanon as an Arab nation and established the identity of the Lebanese people as Arabs. This was done with dismay by some Lebanese Christians, the Maronites in particular, but to the delight of Lebanese Muslims and some other Christian groups¹ (Dagher, 2001).

Aoun rejected these changes and launched a revolt in 1990. Syria, along with some Lebanese forces, quickly defeated Aoun's forces, thus ending the civil war in October of 1990. They then started disbanding Lebanese militias and collecting their weapons and rebuilding the official Lebanese army and implementing political reform (Fisk, 2002). To ensure political allegiance of Lebanon, Syria had earlier saw to the election of Elias Hrawi in 1989 as president and Rafiq al-Hariri as Prime Minister in 1992 (Fisk, 2002). Both men proved loyal and supportive of Syrian interests. Parliamentary elections took place in September 1992 despite a Christian boycott. Although the Syrian presence resulted in manipulated elections, the elections were basically peaceful and viewed positively by many outside observers (Khalaf, 2002). The Christians in particular felt they were being undermined as a community by Syrian policy in Lebanon (Khalaf, 2002).

¹ Dr. Nidal Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

More than 5 years after signing the Tā'if Accord, many improvements had been realized. The war had ended. Most Lebanese, except for one part of the southern population that continued to be at risk of Israeli attack, had enjoyed a near-forgotten peace since late 1990. The authority of the civil service had been reestablished. The army had become more united and was gaining strength. Economic conditions had stopped deteriorating, although a serious financial deficit and economic stagnation existed (Fisk, 2002; Mackey, 2008; see chapter 2).

After the war, Lebanon faced the challenge of reconstructing its economy and addressing the obvious Christian–Muslim, social, and economic inequalities that had existed before the war and had been subsequently exacerbated by it (Longuenesse, 2006; Salem, 2006; UNESCO, 2002). Lebanon had to contend with its new political system in which, although reformed, power was still allocated through confessional and ethnic quotas similar to those that resulted in the civil war. Christians and Muslims were more segregated than ever, including the younger generations who were much less integrated in schools (see chapter 2).

The Israelis were forced out of Lebanon in May 2000 by the Shiite militia of Hezbollah, which launched attacks that sapped the Israeli army (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005). In April 2005, Syrian troops in Lebanon were forced to withdraw under strong international pressure, led by the United States, after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 (Harris, 2006; Ziadeh, 2006). Shortly after Hariri's assassination, the Lebanese split into two major political camps, the March 8 camp and the March 14 camp. The former is backed mostly by Shiites, Maronites, and some Druze. The March 14 camp is composed mostly of Sunnis, Maronites, and Druze (Kfoury, 2007). Also in 2005, Aoun, the former general, returned from exile in France to Lebanon and signed an agreement of cooperation with Hezbollah. At that time (and arguably to date), this

agreement, signed by the largest Muslim and Christian parties in Lebanon could have been considered a major CMR breakthrough. However, in 2008, Aoun traveled to Syria and met with their leadership in a conciliatory gesture, which some Lebanese politicians labeled a “sell out.” (Young, 2010).

Methods for Assessing CMR in Contemporary Lebanon

As might be imagined, assessing complex relationships such as CMR in Lebanon could be challenging. The ideological, political, religious, and social networks and beliefs were fraught with shifting alliances. In addition, extra-, inter-, and intra-national actions had to be included, which were difficult to encapsulate and assess. A competent method to allow for these vacillations was the employment of a variety of means for assessing such relationships. Therefore, in this thesis, the status of CMR in post-war Lebanon was accomplished through conducting private, face-to-face interviews with mature field expert respondents representing all six of the major religious denominations in Lebanon and through administering a written questionnaire (Appendix 20) to a modest number of university students enrolled in the author’s classes. These students came from 146 Lebanese cities, towns, and villages, including all seven of the major cities in Lebanon (see Appendix 21). This methodology was not previously used to describe the state of CMR in present-day, post-civil war Lebanon. Although historical, ethnic, cultural, legislative and sociopolitical phenomena were taken into account, this thesis was centered on information gleaned during the author’s 7-years residency (2000–2007) in Lebanon. Such a methodology was, ipso facto, incomparable to other possible approaches.

As with other possible methodologies, this too was an appropriate means of evaluation. The methodology could have been focused on Lebanese legislation, for example, and its role in CMR. However, although legislation and agreements such as the Ta’if Accord

were reviewed and included in this thesis, it was not the focus. Legislation can be static, existing for years, even decades, with little change. CMR are an interactional, experiential, social condition and humanistic feeling, belief and state. As such, live interviews with native, communal representatives or field expert respondents were used to capture the direct mood, attitudes, and times of Christians and Muslims. CMR, which are both ongoing and historic, involved a wide spectrum of communities, religions, and involvement. In addition, information from the filed expert respondents could be compared and contrasted amongst them for conflict, consensus, and consistency. The information gleaned from these interviews could also be referenced to what these field expert respondents have written on CMR to determine conflict, consensus, and consistency of their views.

Through the administration of the questionnaire, information from a larger number of university students, the younger generation who will be living the future of Lebanon, could be obtained. Those students might retain elements of the conflicts, contradictions, and hopes of the past and future of Lebanon. Therefore, comparisons and contrasts could be made between the younger students' viewpoints of CMR and those of the more mature expert respondents. The questions asked during the interviews and on the questionnaire were intentionally specific yet wide-ranging, designed to capture as much quality data as possible. Confounding variables and possible biases have been reviewed at the end of this section.

Interviews

As indicated previously, one of the two primary research tools used to gather data for this research study was personal face-to-face interviews with 17 field experts. This form of research was conducted for several reasons. First, the interviews were rare opportunities to meet native field experts and speak directly with them concerning CMR. As the name suggests, CMR are a social phenomenon. Second, this research was identified as an effective

(but not the only) manner of data collection (Babbie, 2001). Third, this method of research was also chosen because

field research seems to provide measures with greater validity than do survey and experimental measurements, which are often criticized as superficial and not really valid. Being there is a powerful technique for gaining insights into the nature of human affairs and all their rich complexity. (Babbie, 2001, p. 299)

According to Babbie (2001),

Design and interviewing is interactive. That means each time you repeat the basic process of gathering of probation, analyzing it, winnowing it, and testing, you come closer to a clear and convincing model of the phenomenon your studying . . . the continuous nature of qualitative interviewing means the questioning is redesigned throughout the project.

Proper procedures based on *The Practice of Social Research* (Babbie, 2001, pp. 291-300) were followed in conducting the interviews. To start, open-ended questions were used rather than close-ended questions. Double-barreled questions were avoided (Babbie, 2010). Questions were also kept as short as possible (Babbie, 2001). The eight interview questions (IQ) were direct and clear in both written and spoken forms, formulated and phrased in a non-leading manner and care was taken avoid topics extraneous to CMR. The following is a complete list of the eight questions, along with the rationale/exegesis for each. In those questions in which the interviewees had to determine whether something had “not improved” or was “better” or “worse” than something else, the interviewees neatly defined those concepts in detailing the who, what, when, where, why, and how of the “worse” or “better.”

Interview Question (IQ) 1 stated, “Since the war in Lebanon ended (1991), would you say the relations between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are the same, better, or worse than they were before the war? What makes you feel that way?” This was a direct, non-leading question designed to get the interviews to focus on whether the state of CMR had improved or deteriorated in post-civil war Lebanon in comparison with CMR just prior to

the civil war without delving into CMR during the actual civil war. The data related to IQ1 have been discussed in chapter 2.

IQ2 stated, “If there is a divide or harmony between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon, what are the major causes of this? For example, are they of (a) political nature, (b) a theological nature, (c) an economic or social stratification nature (i.e., the rich vs. the poor), or (d) some other cause or reason?” This was a follow-up question designed to extract the respondents’ beliefs and opinions they expressed in answering IQ1 about the state of CMR in post-war Lebanon. The data for IQ2 have been discussed thematically in chapters 1, 2 and 3.

IQ3 stated, “When did you get involved in the issues of the Christians–Muslim relations in Lebanon? What have been the successes and challenges for you? Please feel free to elaborate on this.” Each respondent was either directly or officially involved in Lebanese CMR. This question was designed to capture a “snap shot” of the respondents’ experiences and work in CMR, including their successes and challenges. In answering this question, the respondents also had to reveal their relevance and suitability for participating in this assessment. Some of the data for IQ3 are available in the appendices.

IQ4 stated, “Do you consider the Lebanese people to be Arabs? Do you consider yourself as a Lebanese to be an Arab? Has this issue been a difficult one to resolve for Christians and Muslims? Why or why not?” The question of the Arab identity of Lebanon has been a major issue for the Lebanese since just prior to their independence. This interview question was designed to ascertain whether this question of Arab identity had been resolved or remained problematic. In answering the question, respondents also had to reflect on whether the Lebanese struggle with Arabism resulted in dividing the Lebanese along religious lines. The answers to this question were of paramount importance because they reflected Lebanese cultural, ethnic, and even racial identity. Interviewees also had to determine

whether, if this issue remained unresolved, it negatively affected related issues, namely CMR. Importantly, whether interviewees chose to be identified as members of the Arab people or not, their answers reflected the notion of “the other” and feelings of superiority of one group over the other. The data from IQ4 have been discussed in chapters 4 and 5.

IQ5 stated, “Is there a problem with radical or extremist religion (Christian and / or Muslim) in Lebanon and does it affect Christian–Muslim relations? If so, how?” From *The Clash of Civilizations* (Huntington, 1996) to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to as the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the ongoing Palestinian–Israeli conflict, much has been debated about radical, fundamentalist Islam. Implicitly, this notion of extremism is a Western one, particularly emanating from the United States as a partial strategy to justify some of its policies in the Middle East. Thus, IQ5 was designed to elicit from the Lebanese themselves whether or not radical Islam or Christianity exists in Lebanon and, if so, its impact on CMR. The data from IQ5 have been discussed in chapter 1.

IQ6 stated, “ Is there any community in Lebanon that you feel does more or less or a better or poorer job in working for positive Christian–Muslim relations? In other words, for example, could the Maronite community and/or the Shiite community and/or their leaders be doing more?” This question was designed to discover who was doing what with CMR in modern-day Lebanon. Implicitly, the question was posed to delve into whether or not enough was being done toward optimum CMR and to determine, if enough was not being done, what are the reasons/causes . By extension, in answering the question, interviewees had to evaluate which community could be doing more. The data from IQ6 have been discussed in chapter 6.

IQ7 stated, “Can you think of anything in the past that, if it had been done differently, would have prevented the Lebanese war of 1975-1991, reducing the conflict between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon?” This question was posed to determine what could have

been done to prevent the Lebanese Civil War and its subsequent negative consequences on CMR. The data from IQ7 have been discussed in chapter 6.

IQ8 stated, “Is the relationship between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon today so poor that it could cause another civil war?” IQ 8 was a “here and now” question designed to determine whether the current status was such that it could be the causal factor in the outbreak of another civil war. In essence, in answering this question, respondents had to reflect on whether history is doomed to repeat itself. The data from IQ8 have been discussed in chapter 6.

According to Babbie (2001), within competent qualitative interviews, the respondents must be willing to answer. In the case of the field expert respondents, they were extremely cooperative. The questions were designed accordingly. In addition, to ensure the clarity and accuracy of both the questions and the respondents’ answers, an interpreter was employed as needed during the interviews. Nearly all of the field expert respondents answered the questions spontaneously with no prior knowledge of the questions posed.

Babbie (2001) strongly believed that "the greatest advantage of the field research method is the presence of the observing, thinking researcher on the scene of action. Even tape recorders and cameras cannot capture all of the relevant aspects of social processes" (p. 295). He recommended that researchers write notes during the observation or very soon after the observation. In the present study, the field experts’ responses during the personal interviews were collected and documented meticulously through process recording, something this writer has done for decades as a clinical social worker and social researcher.

In terms of the possible weaknesses of qualitative field research, Babbie (2001) discussed the potential problem of reliability. This was potentially problematic because a second observer is unlikely to characterize an observation in the exact same way that the first

observer does. He also warned that researchers may have difficulties in "interpret[ing] the meaning of responses, opening the possibility of misunderstanding in researcher bias. There is also a danger that some respondents will get answers that are essentially irrelevant to the researcher's intent" (p. 291).

Survey

Surveys can be a particularly useful research tool to employ to describe the characteristics of a broader population. Surveys make large samples possible and rational. Often a large number cases are critical for both descriptive and explanatory analysis, especially wherever several variables must be analyzed simultaneously.(Babbie, 2001; Salahu-Din, 2003). Thus, according to Babbie (2001), "A carefully selected probability sample, in combination with a standardized questionnaire offers the possibility of making refined description assertions about the student body" (p. 240). Surveys can also be used to determine various sociopolitical happenings with "uncanny accuracy" (Babbie, 2001, p.268). Although researchers can examine documentation such as civil records to procure accurate data for many research topics, "no other method of observation can provide this general capability" (Babbie, 2001, p.268). Surveys are also flexible, and numerous questions may be asked. Researchers can also develop operational definitions from actual feedback (Babbie, 2001; Salahu-Din, 2003).

Standardized questionnaires also have an important strength in regard to measurements in general. Sometimes concepts can be quite ambiguous. For example, one person's religiosity as discussed in this thesis might be quite different from another's. In survey research, the researcher is required to ask exactly the same questions of all subjects. The researchers must also compute the same intent when respondents give a particular response (Babbie, 2001; Salahu-Din, 2003).

However, this is also one of the stated weaknesses of survey research. By designing questions that will be identical for all student participants, for example, the researcher may miss what is most appropriate for a number of respondents. Thus, sometimes surveys seem superficial in their coverage of complex topics (Babbie, 2001; Salah-Din, 2003) or may be inflexible and subject to artificiality because “they cannot measure social action” (Babbie, 2001, p.268).

For this present research, a comprehensive survey was designed to allow for a fairly sophisticated level of analysis (see Appendix 20). The survey was based in part on those completed by AUB professors Halim Barakat (1975) and Hilal Khashan (1992), which had not been administered in approximately 15 years. However, this survey instrument was also original in that it was designed to gather information specifically regarding CMR. Therefore, questions were generally multilevel in design rather than requiring simply yes, no, agree, or disagree responses. Each question was specifically formulated to elicit student feelings and interpretations regarding CMR. Even questions designed to yield demographic information served a double purpose in terms of identifying possible Lebanese identity issues. Thus, multilevel questions were created. To ensure student understanding of the survey items, the questions were written in simple English, the language of study at NDU. In taking the survey, students could not only read the questions printed on the survey form but also hear the questions read to them in English. Thus, the survey was administered in person rather than through mail or electronic survey sites. The findings of the survey were consistent and showed clear tendencies among the students.

The content of the survey items was also similar to the questions asked of the field expert respondents, with some exceptions. Specifically, these students had not physically experienced the civil war at all. Therefore, the question of whether CMR were better or

worse than in pre-war Lebanon was deemed inappropriate. However, the survey did include items regarding Lebanese identity, education, politics, religion, and other topics also asked of the field experts in their interviews. These items were designed to understand the students' beliefs and to determine whether there was conflict or consensus between the younger and older generations. Thus, given the reasonable assumption that a serious divergence of opinion might exist between the two generations, the impact of such differences on CMR might be ascertained.

Descriptive statistics were derived from the data gathered from survey. Specifically, frequencies, basic percentages, valid percentages, and cumulative percentages were calculated using Statistical Package for Social Sciences software. These statistics were compiled in the Office of Research at NDU with the assistance of the office director, Dr. Kamal Abou-Chedid.

Participants

Two groups of participants were selected for this research study. The first group consisted of 17 field experts chosen to participate in face-to-face interviews. The second group consisted of university students in Lebanon selected to complete the survey instrument. A total of 288 students completed the survey, which was administered to students during 2002, 2004, and 2006.

The Field Experts

The 17 experts were divided into two categories: (a) advocates and working group respondents and (b) sociopolitical respondents. Sixteen of the 17 respondents were native Lebanese. The one exception had lived in Lebanon for over 45 years. These field expert respondents were chosen from this research study because of their impressive backgrounds relevant to the main and subsidiary research questions (see Appendices 2-18). In sum, they

came from diverse religious backgrounds, encompassing the six largest religious communities and 95% of the Lebanese population. All 17 experts had also lived through the civil war, which greatly impacted CMR. All respondents had direct yet diversified roles in Lebanese CMR. They were CMR advocates and members of CMR working groups; they were scholars, writers, and political and religious leaders. Despite criticism at times from their own communities, they nevertheless continued their work and belief in addressing CMR issues. As with any group of respondents, there were potential biases to consider. Five potential sources of bias existed within this research study. First, a wealth of available literature revealed that a great deal of Christian–Muslim, intra-Christian, and intra-Muslim profiling and stereotyping had occurred along religious, political, geographic, and identity lines (Khashan, 1992; Faour, 1998; Makdisi, 2000; Hanf, 2003; Ziadeh, 2006; Mackey, 2008). Often, no matter how rational or unbiased a Christian or Muslim interfaith pledge might be, it could be dismissed as biased, depending on the individual’s faith. Therefore, the Lebanese might very well dismiss the field expert respondents’ testimonies and related information as biased and false.

Second, a sharper political divide developed between the March 8 and March 14 political camps after the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (Young, 2010). The March 8 camp is composed primarily of Shiites loyal to Hezbollah (the largest Muslim population in Lebanon), Maronite Christians (the largest Christian community in Lebanon) loyal to Aoun and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) party, in addition to smaller numbers of Sunni, Druze, and members of other Christian communities (Young, 2010). The Shiites in the March 8 camp were also thought to be strongly affiliated with Iran and, to a lesser degree, Syria. The March 14 camp is composed primarily of Sunni Muslims furious about the assassination of Hariri, which they blame on the Syrian government and

agents; the followers of warlord Walid Jumblatt's (who has switched loyalties between both groups) Progressive Socialist party (Lebanon's largest Druze community); and Christian community members of former Maronite warlord Samir Gea-Gea (Young, 2010). The March 14 camp was believed to be strongly allied to the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser extent, Israel (Young, 2010). Therefore, because Lebanese allegiances were nearly divided in half between these two camps, the Lebanese viewed one another as biased.

Third, the Lebanese people often feared speaking out, both publically and privately, against foreign powers and internal leaders. Indeed, several Lebanese figures, some of whom were interviewed for this thesis, were assassinated for speaking out too directly against foreign influence in Lebanon. Therefore, many Lebanese have learned to speak out cautiously, almost in code, in that they do not state directly who or what they are criticizing.

Fourth, the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon were also divided in regards to their national and ethnic identity. They have disagreed to the point of fighting battles over their perceived identity differences, which has left them both wary and fatigued, making it difficult to discuss identity in depth. Fifth, what the expert respondents reported was their perceptions of the condition of CMR, which might not be based on reality or fact.

Even so, these possible biases were minimal for the several reasons. All the respondents met with this writer privately and separately. With the exception of one, they did not know of the others' participation in the interview process. Their answers were not audio recorded and they knew this assessment was not going to be released in a public forum. Therefore, the respondents had little reason to exaggerate or to report inaccurately. Additionally, although to some extent this research was based on the perceptions of the field expert respondents, their perceptions were reality in and of themselves. These experts were

the movers and shakers of CMR in present-day Lebanon. Thus, their perceptions were indeed reality, although not the only reality.

Nearly all the respondents also shared that they were, on occasion, criticized by their own community members for being involved in CMR. This showed to some extent that the respondents believed in what they were doing and saying about CMR to the point that they persevered despite the criticism and skepticism.

Perhaps most important, however, was that the research revealed a complete or near complete unanimity among the respondents answers to the questions asked. For example, when asked about the present condition of CMR, whether it had improved or deteriorated, 16 of the 17 respondents were in complete agreement that CMR have not improved. Throughout this assessment, the corroboration and consistency among field expert responses was very high.

The Students

To diversify and include a broader side of Lebanese society, a more detailed quantitative survey was administered to a larger sample of younger university students to compare with the data gathered from the smaller sample of the more mature field experts. Student participants were selected from the predominantly Maronite student body of Notre Dame University (NDU) over the course of several years (2002, 2004, and 2006). NDU, located in the overwhelmingly Maronite Christian province of Jounieh, Lebanon, was founded by monks of the Maronite Marian Order. A total of 288 surveys were completed during that time. Some of these students were assigned to classes taught by this writer. The surveys were administered in person.

Students from NDU were selected to assess the degree to which Maronites have accepted the Arab identity of Lebanon and the Lebanese people, one of the foci of this thesis.

The available literature revealed that nearly all of the various Lebanese religious affiliations agree that Lebanon is an Arab country with an Arab identity among its people. What is much less established is the Christian view of this matter, specifically the Maronite view of Lebanese identity. Not a great deal of literature was found indicating that the Maronites were opposed to identifying themselves as Arabs in pre-war Lebanon and several agreements and interventions (see chapters 3 and 4) occurred in post-war Lebanon that were designed to bring the Maronites into the Arab identity fold and agreement. However, the question has remained as to whether the Maronite community leaders signing of the Ṭā'if agreement in 1991 and their reaffirmation at the Maronite Synod in 2003 reflected genuine or superficial agreement to the Arab identity of Lebanon and the Lebanese people.

Concerns about surveying this particular student body revolved around three issues. First was the near exclusion of Muslim respondents and the relatively small number of other Christians who participated. Second, a total of 288 students completed the survey, a modest number. Unlike the field expert respondents who felt no known obligation to respond to this writer's questions, the students might have felt obligated to do so because most of them, but not all, were assigned to classes in which the writer was the professor.

The number of students participating was affected by several factors. First, university permission had to be obtained to conduct the surveys. University officials at all levels, from department chairs to the university president, were reluctant to grant this permission. A stated rule at NDU and other Lebanese universities was "never talk about religion or politics with your students." This made gathering CMR information tedious. Because a number NDU faculty and students held anti-Muslim, anti-Arab sentiments, the university did not seem to want this highlighted through this research study. However, full permission was finally granted.

Even with the modest number of student respondents, however, the predominantly Maronite student sample could be considered inductively sound and representative of wider and diffuse Maronite thought. Specifically, the respondents represented all 26 cities and towns in Lebanon and dozens of villages throughout the country (see Appendix 21). In all, students came from 143 ancestral villages, 102 present residences, and 3 foreign countries (Greece, Turkey, and Italy). This was important because many Lebanese had historical or ancestral residences. Although they no longer lived in these historical residences, they retained the rights and sentiments of those communities and were registered to vote only in those areas, even if they had not lived there in ages. The Maronites, like the Lebanese in general, maintained the linguistic accents, food particularism, and sociopolitical thought of their ancestral or native villages (McKay, 2008). The Maronites were also diffused throughout Lebanon, unlike the other Lebanese religious sects, who remained in consolidated areas in Lebanon: the Sunnis in the north and along the northwest coastline, the Shiites in the south and the Bekaa Valley, and the Druze in the Shouf and Aley mountains of Central-East Lebanon (Dagher, 2001).

In addition, a general concern of the research was the comparison of the data from the field experts (a mix of Christians and Muslims) with the data from the predominantly Maronite Christian university student sample. A more even distribution in the student sample between Christians and Muslims might have seemed more appropriate. However, because one of the foci of this thesis was Maronite thought regarding identity and other CMR-related issues, NDU was an appropriate Maronite establishment in which to explore that focus. Aside from the important difference of faith, according to Lebanese researcher Muhammad Faour, Lebanese students are culturally and linguistically the same and held comparably similar views about family, society and more to one another (1998). Therefore, the comparison of

student data not only to the Christian but also to the Muslim field experts was valuable and representative.

Comparison of Field Experts' and University Students' Responses

In regards to the actual quantity of information contained in this thesis, both the field expert respondents and university students were utilized and represented at nearly the same level. However, in regards to academic and intellectual quality, the responses of the field experts were utilized much more for a few solid reasons. All but one of the experts were native Lebanese and all had lived through the Lebanese Civil War. They were also CMR experts and/or experts in closely related fields. For all intents and purposes, they were the intelligentsia of Lebanese CMR and, thus, more weight was given to their responses. On the other hand, the students' participation was beneficial to this thesis in that their answers could be compared and contrasted with those of the field experts to ascertain agreement and disparity between the younger and older generations.

Preparation of the Manuscript

In the preparation of this manuscript, University of Birmingham guidelines were followed in the structure and formatting of the text. The format for citations and reference list entries was based on the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (2010). One exception to those guidelines was the inclusion of footnotes to reference the field experts' interviews instead of using the APA citation format in text. This was done per the recommendation of this writer's supervisor to minimize in-text documentation redundancy. The reader may refer to the footnotes to find the appropriate appendices containing biographical information on the field experts and excerpts from their interviews.

CHAPTER 1: THEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, RADICAL RELIGIOSITY, AND CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS

In this chapter, the effects of basic religious differences between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon on their relationship have been presented. The information was gleaned in part from queries regarding religious differences and radicalism. Specifically, IQ2 and IQ5 have been addressed:

IQ2: Is there a divide or harmony between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon and what are the major causes of this? For example, are the causes of a political nature; a religious or theological nature; an economic, social stratification nature (i.e., the rich versus the poor); or (d) some other nature?

IQ5: Is there a problem with radical or extremist religion (Christian and/or Muslim) in Lebanon, and does it affect Christian–Muslim relations? If so how?

Seventeen field expert respondents replied to these queries (see Appendices 2–18).

The responses of 288 university students to two similar questions from the survey instrument have also been presented. In addition, other possible causes of CMR discord identified during the discussion on theology, religious differences, and radicalism have been noted. Although most of the experts corroborated one another's information, the students' responses were somewhat different. The possible reasons for these differences have also been explored.

Theology/Religion as a Cause of CMR Discord

That the civil war was caused by religious differences was soundly rejected by 14 of the 17 field expert respondents. The remaining three respondents reported religious differences as only a mild to moderate, but not a major, cause of the Lebanese Civil War. The concept of *religious differences* in this chapter simply refers to belonging to a different faith, as is the case between Christianity and Islam. These faiths have, of course, different precepts and practices, which have simply been referred to as the factor of religious differences. In

this study, this factor was assessed for causation. In other words, did the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon believe that their separate (though sometimes similar) manner of prayers, rituals, and beliefs was the cause of CMR discord?

Massouh¹ echoed the sentiments of his superior, UB President Elie Salem,² stating that the problems between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon had not resulted from differences in religion, theology, or social stratification. He noted that regardless of wealth, people in the same communities did not criticize their political leaders, who were usually rich and powerful, so that they would not be considered traitors to their communities or “carriers of Christian–Muslim dissent.” Such might be the charge if a Christian were to criticize a Muslim leader or a Muslim, a Christian leader. Halabi³ was more direct, stating unequivocally that

the war was not at any time a religious war . . . It was actually several wars within the same war. It was the Palestinians versus the Christians [Lebanese Christians opposed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, while the Muslims mostly supported their plight], the Palestinians versus the Lebanese, the Syrians versus the Palestinians, Iran versus Iraq, and Iran versus Syria.

He also stated that spiritual leaders did not believe that the civil war was a religious conflict either. Therefore, the discrepancies were more regional than confessional. Massouh, a CMR specialist and Greek Orthodox priest, genuinely disregarded religious differences as a cause for poor CMR. This might be due in part to the Orthodox Christians having close relationships with their Muslim counterparts based on their convergence in political issues and common Arab identity (Pacini, 1998). Halabi belonged to the Druze community, which considered itself neither Muslim nor Christian, and complained of persecution and marginalization in history (Firro, 2003). As such, Halabi could be quite sensitive and aware

¹ Fr. P. George Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

² Dr. Elie Adib Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

³ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

of religious differences as a cause of intercommunal tensions. Instead, he flatly declined them, which added credence to religious differences not being the main culprit within CMR.

However, pre- and postwar discrepancies were found concerning the role of religious differences in the Lebanese Civil War. In 1976, at the start of the war(s), studies from Kaslik University, a Christian university located in the dominantly Christian province of Jounieh, Lebanon, clearly showed that CMR problems were caused primarily by religious differences (Khashan, 1990). I. Mousawi¹ of Hezbollah described then Maronite priest Beshara Ra'i of Kaslik as a Christian radical who expressed clear enmity for Muslims. Thirty-five years later, I. Mousawi referred to the March 25, 2011, patriarchal inauguration speech of that same Beshara Ra'i. In that speech Beshara Ra'i spoke of religious similarities and unity not divisions between the Lebanese Christians and Muslims (Abu-Jawde, 2011).

The concept that Islam and Christianity are virtually the same faiths was expressed by some of the field experts. I. Mousawi² viewed the two religions as such, indicating there were no major differences between them. The leading Shiite religious figure, Muhammad Fadlallah Hussein, also went on record with a similar statement (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Hussein³ often invoked the Islamic adage "*min asl wahid*" ("from one origin") when referring to Muslims and Christians. Religiously, he felt both faiths were so similar that they were not and could not be a cause for CMR disunity. Thus, religious differences were not viewed as a major cause of either present CMR discord or the civil war. Because all three of these field expert sources belonged to the largest and very active Muslim community, the Shia, and held parallel positions with their Christian counterparts, religious differences as a CMR antagonist were diminished.

¹ Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

² Ibid.

³ MP Hussein Hussein, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

However, other sources suggested that “recurring fault-lines in Lebanon were variously between Christians and Muslims” (Khouri, 2008, p. 9). Author Dr. Omri Nir (as cited in Rubin, 2009) indicated that the idea of religious differences, however mild, being the cause of CMR discord might have originated from the Maronite population’s dismay regarding their decline in prominence. The Maronites had

continued to be dominant during the French mandate of Lebanon (1920–1946) and in independent Lebanon until the early 1980s. From the mid-1980s . . . a substantial change took place in the main roles when Shi’a and Sunnis became the new main actor[s]. (Nir as quoted in Rubin, 2009, p. 177)

The Maronites had a record of divergent socio-religious-political views compared with Muslims in general and with some Christian denominations as well (Barakat, 1993; Khalifa, 1997). This divergence has been reviewed throughout this thesis for its impact on CMR. Three of the 17 field expert respondents (Khalil, Gemayel, and Matar) believed that vague religious differences were a cause, albeit minor, of CMR discord. According to Khalil,¹ both Christians and Muslims had taught each other’s religion in a negative context, resulting in misconceptions and tension between the communities. Khalil was pleased that some imams were now teaching Christianity in a more positive manner but felt that Muslims still needed to improve the frequency and manner of teaching Christianity, noting that “many Muslims have still not yet been able to teach Christianity well.”

It was unclear whether Khalil² believed that religious differences were a minor or moderate cause of CMR discord, although he wanted to dispel the rumor that Muslims throughout Lebanon were persecuting Christians. He stated, “It cannot be said that Christians are oppressed by Muslim(s) since Lebanon has freedom of religion.” He also indicated that an even clearer distinction should be made in Lebanon between religion and the state than

¹ Fr. Samir Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Ibid.

currently exists. A double standard in the treatment of Christians and Muslims existed in their inclusion as religious categories: “Christians pay bills while the Muslims don’t.” In Lebanon, he explained, Christians must pay separate, personal fees for their affiliated churches and the schools; whereas the taxes for mosques and their partner schools were paid by the government. Khalil believed that if the church and school were affiliated, both should be taxed accordingly. Thus, if a Mosque and school were associated, they too should be billed within this context. He also admitted that Christian clergy sometimes declined government funds to avoid the supervision and scrutiny of the Lebanese government, which he described as inept and corrupt.

According to Khalil,¹ a full democracy was unsustainable in Lebanon because the people were not ready to elect the most qualified leaders because of strong sectarian considerations. He lamented the loss of good leaders in Lebanon and asked, “What good Christian leaders are around?” He also noted the somewhat antidemocratic Lebanese Christian mentality, which he perceived as a weakness. Lebanese Christians had continued to think in terms of community, either by area or by religion. Instead, they must be honest, more self-critical, and less biased toward their own community.

Gemayel² was one of the few respondents who clearly felt that theological and religious reasons were a cause, albeit a mild one, of CMR discord in Lebanon. He expressed concerns similar to Khalil in that, despite his personal pride in being a Christian, he believed ethnocentrism toward one’s sect damages intercommunal relations. Gemayel insisted that CMR had deteriorated because of repercussions from the improper intermingling of religion and politics. However, he also was the only respondent who felt CMR were better now than in prewar Lebanon. Gemayel, age 33 at the time, was the youngest and least experienced of

¹ Ibid.

² Pierre Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

the field experts, particularly in regards to CMR. This could be the explanation for his variance with other field experts in his belief that CMR had improved in postwar Lebanon. However, as an MP with a substantial Christian following and a member a politically prominent Lebanese family, Gemayel's views should be considered (Daou, 2001).

Matar¹ also acknowledged but did not blame the existence of religious differences:

There's no merging of the religions. They [Christianity and Islam] are different and so we leave it that way; yet as long as we don't develop the citizen as a whole and the government remains ineffective, these religious differences will become political differences and cause problems.

Interestingly, per the aspect of divergence just mentioned, these three field experts were Maronite Catholics, the largest Christian community in Lebanon. None of the Muslim respondents reported any religious differences as impediments to healthy CMR; nor did the remaining four Maronite, three Greek Orthodox, and two Greek Catholic respondents.

Salem² raised another religiously connected cause of poor CMR when he stated, "Islam is not as tolerant and open as it used to be in the past. The Christians are nervous because of this, and they are not united at all among themselves." Salem explained that when Islamic intolerance and Christian nervousness and disunity occur, "Everything gets worse." El Khazen³ concurred. Some of the field experts expressed diversified views; yet in regards to religion as a main cause for conflict, most were unified in their belief that, in and of themselves, religious differences were not a major source.

Nearly all of the field expert respondents, 14 of the 17, clearly denied that religious differences were the cause of conflict in Lebanon, which was surprising because the Lebanese Civil War has often been dubbed a Christian-Muslim war whose origin was based on religious rather than communal differences (Kerr, 1997). However, three of the field experts

¹ Souheil Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

² Dr. Eli Adib Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

³ MP Dr. Farid El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

believed that vague religious differences were a cause, albeit a minor one, of CMR discord. Of interest and perhaps not surprising, all three were Christian and Maronite Catholic, the largest Christian community in Lebanon. The Maronites had a history of contrasting socio-religio-political views from Muslims in general and from some Christian denominations as well (Grafton, 2003). This might be due to in part, according to then Maronite Patriarch Sfeir (as cited in Mroue, 2010), to the Christian worry of being a dwindling minority and potential victims despite Muslim attempts to reassure Christians that maintaining their presence and safety is “a common Islamic duty” (Hornby, 2010, p. 1). Writer Omar Nir concurred that the concern of religious differences, however mild, being the cause of CMR discord could be displaced and might actually originate from the Maronite population’s dismay regarding their decline in prominence and their experiencing the loss of being the majority since the Maronites had

continued to be dominant during the French mandate of Lebanon (1920–1946) and in independent Lebanon until the early 1980s. From the mid-1980s... a substantial change took place in the main roles when Shi’a and Sunnis became the new main actor. (as quoted in Rubin, 2009, p. 177).

Missing from the field experts responses were specific theological differences and criticisms. For example, Christian criticism of the Muslim view of Jesus as a prophet and thus not as God incarnate was never mentioned. In the view of many Western Christian clergy, the role of Jesus as simply a prophet and not God is unacceptable. As one contemporary example of this, the Reverend R. Albert Mohler, Jr., argued that Jesus Christ was not simply a hero or prophet; rather, “He is the incarnate Son of God. He is the second person of the Trinity. He is the Lord over all. Any minimization of that is a huge problem” (as quoted in Vu, 2008, p. 1). Mohler continued, “This is the God who very clearly identifies Himself and says, 'I am this and I am not anything else.' If you disagree about the identity of Jesus Christ, then you disagree about the identity of God" (as quoted in Vu, 2008, p. 1). This

high-profile Southern Baptist theologian was responding to a full-page letter endorsed by nearly 300 Christian leaders that appeared in a December issue of *The New York Times*. The letter was drafted by scholars at the Center for Faith and Culture at Yale Divinity School in response to an October letter signed by 138 Muslim scholars, clerics, and leaders that encouraged Muslims and Christians to work more closely for world peace. Although some other Western Christians disagreed with Mohler, including co-religionists and members of his Southern Baptist denomination (Medley, 2010), none of the field expert respondents referred to this or to any other religious differences as impediments to CMR.

In contrast to the field experts, student respondents overwhelmingly believed that tensions between the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon were caused by religious differences. Of 288 students surveyed, 226 responded to the item concerning whether religious differences were the major cause of CMR discord. Of those 226 responses, 33.3% indicated religious differences were the strongest factors in CMR discord (see Table 22.1). Another 34.9 % of the respondents felt religious differences were a significant cause of CMR discord. Sixty-two of the students surveyed did not respond to this item.

In a second item, students were asked to indicate whether religious differences were the major cause of the overall conflict in Lebanon, not just of CMR discord. The results suggested that the students understood the slight difference between the two questions. Of the 288 students surveyed, 226 chose to respond to this item. A total of 38.9% indicated religious differences were a major cause of the overall conflict in Lebanon, including 16.8% who indicated religious differences were the greatest cause (see Table 22.2). Of the 288 students surveyed, 88.9% identified themselves as Christians, with 57.6% identifying themselves specifically as Maronite Christians.

Thus, student responses were quite different from those of the field experts. Although the students seemed to believe that religious differences were a major cause of CMR discord specifically, they did not believe they were the major cause or problem of the Lebanese conflict overall. However, 15 of the 17 field experts stated that religious differences and religious fanaticism were not major causes of either Lebanese discord overall or of CMR specifically.

Religious Radicalism as a Cause of CMR Discord

Radicalism (2004) is defined in *Webster's New World College Dictionary* as "radical principles, ideals, methods, or practices." In addition, according to *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, radicalism (2010) is "the doctrines or practices of radicals." In an article published by *The Journal of Islamic Studies*, authors Sivan and Friedman (1991) stated that religious radicalism "encompasses both thought and action and that it entails the 'rejection' of all other nonindigenous values and cultures. Faced with the challenges of modernity, the religious radicals' response has been 'excessive' or 'extremist,'" (p. 554). These definitions were combined to represent the parameters of religious radicalism for this chapter. In addition, for the purpose of this thesis, radicalism was considered synonymous with the two other terms: religious extremism and fundamentalism.

Radical religiosity was also discussed with the field experts. Thirteen of the 17 field expert respondents did not identify radical religiosity in Lebanon as a contributing factor in CMR instability. They explained that this was because Lebanese of different faiths had been living together for centuries. Thus, religious diversity was known and expected. Four of the 17 field experts did assess radical religiosity as a moderate cause of CMR discord. Some of the experts considered Muslim or Islamic radicalism to be greater than Christian radicalism.

Others believed the opposite. However, the 17 field experts believed the more detrimental CMR fault lines lay elsewhere, not with religious differences and radicalism.

Salem¹ stated religious radicalism or extremism in contemporary Lebanon was difficult to measure. He reported growth in both Muslim and Christian fundamentalism but more so within Muslim communities. Habib² also stated that there were both radical Muslims and Christians, each group trying to dominate the country; the former group had been striving for a Muslim nation; the latter, for a Christian nation.

According to Sammak,³ radicalism had indeed affected CMR. A Sunni Muslim, Sammak had no qualms in reporting the existence of a larger number of Muslim fundamentalists than of Christian fundamentalists. Another issue was what Sammak described as some Muslims being inflexible in their relations with Christians, pointing out how the Prophet Muhammad himself, in the heart of what is today Saudi Arabia, invited the Christians of Najran into his mosque to pray with him. With this in mind, Sammak was baffled by the fact that in present-day Saudi Arabia, it was illegal to build any Christian churches. This, he felt, hurt CMR. Even though the field experts more than the students did not see religious differences as a problem, the Lebanese might do better by adhering to a more secular, rather than sectarian, view of society. However, recent polls showed ambivalence in Lebanese willingness to separate politics and religion, even though the people very often bemoaned the mix as a detriment to CMR and political function (Hodeib, 2010). He also indicated that Christian radicals were monitored and controlled more by the church, while much less control existed over Muslim radicals.

¹ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

² Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

³ Mohammed Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

Mouawad¹ concurred, acknowledging that Christian radicalism existed in Lebanon and posed a problem both to CMR and to Lebanon in general. However, Muslim radicalism posed a greater danger because of its larger following and the limited control exerted over it in comparison with Christian radicalism. Khalil,² who stated earlier that Lebanese ills were not particularly based on religious and theological reasons, also believed that radical Islam in Lebanon and elsewhere was harming CMR and that radical Islam was still a problem in Lebanon.

Massouh³ did not believe that religious radicalism was as significant a problem in Lebanon as in other countries. However, he mentioned that Hezbollah and the Qawaat Libnaneeyee (“Lebanese Forces,” a Christian party) were somewhat radical in their ideologies. This notion that both parties endorsed radical ideology was shared by Gemayel,⁴ although very few of the others agreed. Those experts who did agree did so to a much lesser extent.

In discussing religious radicalism, Franjeh⁵ explained that for a period of time during the civil war, both Christians and Muslims exercised religious extremism and radical schools of thought. However, the Lebanese realized postwar, that radicalism was a failure and did not meet their societal needs and goals. This belief has continued into present day Lebanon. During the war, Beirut was actually a model or laboratory for intolerance, violence, and anarchy.

¹ Fr. P. George Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

³ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

⁴ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

⁵ MP Samir Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

However, Franjeh¹ noted that some signs of interfaith harmony and consensus had begun appearing. Neither Muslims nor Christians wanted to entertain religious radicalism. As Franjeh remarked, “No one can impose the *chador* [i.e., be forced to wear the long, black Muslim robe] or a Christian state on Lebanon.” Other positive observations that pointed to unity included Lebanese youth working together and cooperating with one another in Beirut. He also observed young people in downtown working hard to be successful and being seemingly eager to unify. According to Franjeh, unity was the first factor of independence and subsequent success.

In terms of Muslim radicalism, Habib² and Khalil³ expressed their dislike for a relatively new term emerging in the Middle East, *Islamiyoun* (“Islamists”). Habib reported that Muslims had begun designating themselves as *Islamiyoun* rather than as *Muslimoun* (“Muslim”) or Arab. This new term often denoted radicalism, according to Habib, Salem,⁴ Khalil, and other expert respondents.

Salem⁵ noted that “more secular Muslims are becoming more fundamental because it’s a fashion, a mood of the times.” He gave as an example of such fundamentalism a female Muslim student at UB who used to shake his hand when she saw him but no longer did so, referring to the practice of some Muslims of the opposite sex to refrain from shaking hands because of the cleanliness taboos (Fadl, 2001; Maqsood, 2003).

Habib⁶ added that although the Lebanese were facing the challenge of radical Islam, radial Christianity was even worse. He noted that the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, whose 30-year tenure as patriarch ended in March 2011, was often in the position to influence and dictate

¹ Ibid.

² Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

³ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

⁴ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

political policy in Lebanon. This upset Habib, who described himself as being secular regarding the separation of religion and the state.

According to Khalil,¹ “Christian extremism is not violent, and violence is the question Islam has within, one, the Quran and, two, the Hadith.” Regarding Christianity, Khalil noted that the aim of all Christian texts was the betterment of people, helping them become more righteous: “Christ did not go against the Law of Moses but worked within it.” He continued that the Christian gospels did not stress strict accountability for sinners and that Christ’s mission was to promote forgiveness rather than condemnation. For Khalil, through Islam, “Muslims seek justice or punishment of the wrongdoers; in Christianity, Christians are to forgive and even love the wrongdoers.” Khalil believed this fundamental difference between Christianity and Islam resulted in Islam being more susceptible to radicalism or extremism. Both Halabi² and Sammak³ believed that there was a difference between Middle Eastern Christians and those from outside the area. People indigenous to the Middle East believed Middle Eastern Christians held the same sociopolitical views as Christian extremists in the West, particularly the United States. Because of this, indigenous Middle Eastern Christians were unfairly treated and erroneously begrudged. Thus, religious extremism did affect CMR in Lebanon. Halabi⁴ went on to explain that although Christians in Lebanon were not extremists, they appeared to be because of their anger over their dwindling numbers and weakening political power. The Christians were fearful and, thus, seemed to be extremists.

Khalil⁵ also indicated there was some extremism in Lebanon, with Shiites being more extreme than Christians and Sunnis. Such extremism was acceptable as long as it was kept

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

⁴ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

⁵ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

within the extremists' communities; but it was not acceptable when it was spread to other communities. He added, "Praying five times a day is good, but five prayers and jihad is no good." He recognized the debate over the exact definition of jihad but shared that if the word was connected to a deed, it became an extremist problem. Khalil explained that the radicalism that did exist invoked feelings of insecurity in Christians yet denied the existence of radical Christians in Lebanon, stating that Christians in Lebanon were not advocating for a Christian-only state.

Hajjar¹ believed that some Christian and Muslim radicalism existed in Lebanon, with the members in each group labeling those in the other, not themselves, as extremists. He indicated that as extremism spread, CMR was negatively impacted. He noted, for example, that when the Christians heard the fanatical anti-Christian speeches of Osama bin Laden, they became fearful of their very well-being. A few reports indicated that Christians were being forced to leave Lebanon due to Muslim persecution (Belt, 2009; Haddad, S. 2001a). However, all of the field experts dispelled these reports as false rumors.

Of note was the diffusion of response. Specifically, most of these respondents identified Muslims and Christians equally in regards to being religious radicals. Overall, a slightly higher number of references was made to Muslim radicals, with the Muslim respondents themselves also making this reference. There was also a reference to inter-Sunni/Shiite conflict being a form of religious radicalism that could affect CMR in the near future. Overall, however, the field experts clearly cited causes other than religious differences or radicalism as significant impediments to healthy CMR. These causes have been thoroughly reviewed in the upcoming chapters.

¹ Ghassan Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

Other Possible Causes of CMR Discord

Gemayel¹ identified three causes of extremism on both sides: poverty, oppression, and strong political causes. According to Ghazal,² a small number of radical Christians and Muslims exist because of poverty and lack of proper education, especially in the areas of religion and social sciences. Habib³ cited politics as the main deterrent to interfaith conviviality. N. Musawi,⁴ director of international affairs for Hezbollah, also stated the problems were political corruption and severe financial mismanagement of public funds, not people being excessive with religion. He argued that when individuals or communities followed their faith strictly, that did not mean they were radical. If someone was less a faithful Muslim or Christian, then that person was also less of a good citizen: “The more religious people are, or become, the more they will find common ground to meet.” I. Mousawi⁵ concurred with his superior.

N. Musawi⁶ also believed that the notion throughout Lebanon that one must be less religious and more secular to reconcile and be successful was being spread by misguided politicians. These politicians were serving their own interests when they advised their constituencies to be less religiously inclined. Again, I. Mousawi⁷ concurred, stating that little, if any, religious fanaticism was present in Lebanon. He categorized the bit of radicalism that did exist as being “politically based and inspired by foreign intervention.”

¹ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

² Bishop Selim Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004 and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

³ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

⁴ MP Nawaf Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

⁵ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

⁶ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

⁷ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

Sammak¹ believed that the cause of some radical Islamic beliefs and behavior was poor education and underdevelopment in poverty-stricken areas. As such, education and economic issues have been explored deeper in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. According to Aoun,² “Religious extremism of a minority of Muslims is a cause [of poor CMR], and they [extremists] even cause problems with other Muslims.” Aoun did not believe, however, that Lebanon had a major problem with religious extremism. As did nearly each interviewee, he believed that the problems in Lebanon were the result of politics, not religion. Salem³ identified social, demographic, and political reasons, with which Ghazal⁴ and Mouawad⁵ concurred.

According to Mouawad,⁶ democracy in Lebanon was being hurt by radicalism. With her affirmation that both forms of radicalism existed, Mouawad hoped that instead of radicalism, the Lebanese would choose to “have common values, beliefs and democracy . . . with its good institutions” (i.e., education, civil service, and so forth). However, with some rare optimism, Habib⁷ interjected that Muslims were becoming more moderate. Thus, radicals would be unable to destroy Lebanon and its democratic institutions.

Discussion and Conclusion

Nearly every expert respondent clearly denied that religious differences were the cause of conflict in Lebanon, which was surprising because the Lebanese Civil War had often been dubbed a Christian–Muslim war whose origin was based on religious rather than communal

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

² MP Gen. Michel Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

³ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

⁴ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004 and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

⁵ MP Nayla Najib Issa Khoury Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

differences (Kerr, 1997). Also indicative of this position was the lack of governmental legislation and calls from community leaders to create a separate Christian or Muslim state or to mandate or implement canon law or the Sharia. Thus, the notion that the Lebanese Civil War was based on religion was widely refuted.

However modestly, the findings from this diversified group of native Lebanese Christians and Muslims, who had lived together before, during, and after the civil war, could be referenced as a counter point to that of author Samuel Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996). In this book, Huntington blamed the current restless world on cultural differences and identified, in particular, Islam as an intolerant and violent religion. For their part, the field experts almost unanimously refuted this, matching the rebuttal put forth by Edward Said (2001) in his “Clash of Ignorance” and the premises put forth by Ussama Makdisi (2000) in *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*. Still, the occasional journalist (such as Lebanese national Bridgette Gabriel) or leader insisted it was a Muslim versus Christian war (Gabriel, 2006).

Some socioreligious factors did seem to have an influence on Lebanese conflict. The Christians seemed to fear that, as a numeric minority in Lebanon, they might become second-class citizens in a Muslim-dominated or Islamic state (Abu al Nasr, 2001; Dagher, 2001). The expert respondents also pointed out that the *zuama* invoked religious rallying cries to consolidate political support from their respective religious communities. Khalil¹, Sammak², and Massouh³ stated that Muslims and Christian instructors did not normally teach each other’s faiths properly, which could add to CMR discord. In addition, both the Christian and

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

³ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

Muslims of Lebanon decried former Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir's use of religious antagonism within CMR (Hatoum, 2006; Sfeir, 2009).

The students surveyed felt that religious differences and their relation to the conflict were much more of an issue than did the expert respondents. This reflected a divide between the two groups. The field expert respondents, who witnessed the anarchy of the civil war, did not reactively point to religious differences as a hindrance to their relationships. Yet the university students, who did not experience the horrors of the civil war, believed religion was a major cause of CMR discord. These students were also not members of CMR working groups, and none of them were religion majors—both of which could have accounted for some of the direct resentment between the faiths. Such glaring differences in attitudes and levels of tolerance between the older expert respondents and the university-aged students might be worrisome.

One possible cause for the students' views was identified by the Search for Common Ground, an NGO working on CMR and related issues in present-day Lebanon:

Religious pluralism is a defining feature of Lebanon: so much so it is enshrined in the country's political system, designed to give political representation to all communities. But with Lebanon's population divided across 18 recognized sects, the country's politics and society have historically been wrought with bitter ideological differences. These differences are often perpetuated by the prejudices parents pass on, intentionally or not, to their children. It is perhaps inevitable, then, that Lebanon's youngsters at times find themselves reinforcing the country's religious, socio-economic and political disputes with peers at school. (Mahdawi, 2009, p. 3)

However, the students did concur with the field experts in that religious differences were not the single major cause of CMR discord. Hence, if religious differences were contributing factors in CMR discord at all, they existed as a side bar to other sociopolitical phenomena or were entwined with such phenomena. Thus, a variety of sociopolitical issues and areas of Lebanese society, some of which were identified in this chapter, have been reviewed in the upcoming chapters to determine their impact on CMR.

CHAPTER 2: COMMUNAL DISPLACEMENT, EDUCATION, AND ECONOMIC THEMES IN CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS

Because religious differences and radicalism were not shown to be major causes of CMR discord in chapter 1, other aspects of Lebanese society were explored as possible fault lines or strengths. In this and the following chapters, the more serious causes of CMR discord have been delineated as identified by the field expert respondents and the university students and as found in the literature.

Analysis of the interviews with the field experts revealed challenges to Lebanese CMR within several formal societal areas: communal displacement, educational issues, the economy, identity issues, political practices, and foreign interference. The field expert respondents also placed some blame for these societal challenges on the Lebanese themselves. However, of the 288 university students (256 Christians, including 166 Maronite Christians) who responded to the survey, only 17.8% chose intra-Lebanese conflict as either the first (9.3%) or second (8.5%) major cause of Lebanese dysfunction (see Table 22.3). As shown in Table 22.3, student respondents also showed little self-acknowledgement or disgust regarding the Lebanese role in the collapse of Lebanon. The preponderance of literature reviewed throughout this thesis indicated that most authors blamed the various phenomena reviewed (i.e., religion, displacement, education, politics, etc.) for CMR discord, although a few authors, including Lebanese researcher of religion and politics Bassam Khalifah (1997), held the Lebanese people themselves responsible. Moreover, Khalifah (1997) assigned more culpability to the Maronite Christians than to the Muslims. Overall, however, the students surveyed and, more so, the field experts cited various societal factors for the disruption in CMR rather than the Lebanese people themselves, as was the case in the majority of literature reviewed. In this chapter, the societal areas of communal displacement, education, and the economy have been presented.

Communal Displacement

As indicated by several of the field experts and in the available literature, geographic displacement has continued to be an unresolved, serious detriment to healthy CMR in present-day Lebanon. According to the Global Internal Displacement Program (IDP) Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council (Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004), Lebanon underwent massive population displacement during the war years, 1975–1991. In the early years, the majority of the displaced were Muslim; in the later phases, the majority were Christian (Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004). Additionally, instead of occurring at a steady rate, the internal displacement of Christians and Muslims occurred in large waves throughout the conflict (Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004). Dagher (2001) stated that “for a total number of 847,000 displaced people (that is 171,000 families on an average scale of five members per family), 680,000 were Christian and 167,000 were Muslims” (p. 84). These statistics were supported and upheld by several sources and studies, including the Internal Displaced Monitoring Centre of Norway (Birkland & Karim, 2009) and the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2009) World Refugee Survey. Individuals were displaced not only from their respective dominant areas but also from integrated Christian and Muslim provinces, cities, and villages, as Sammak¹ reported.

In 1999, Judith Harik documented the failure of displaced Lebanese persons to return to their homes: “Failing such a timely action, whatever symbolic Christian–Muslim co-existence Lebanon formerly possessed might be finally drained by process of sectarian cantonization unleashed by the civil war” (p. 173). Thus, the large numbers of displaced persons from both singular and pluralistic areas coupled with a very low percentage of

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

returnees resulted in greatly diminished Christian–Muslim coexistence (Dagher, 2001; Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004).

Prior to the civil war, the Lebanese people experienced a more integrated, intercommunal existence. According to the field experts, particularly Sammak,¹ Halabi,² and Franjeh,³ although CMR were not perfect, Christians and Muslims lived in the same buildings within the same neighborhoods. They shopped at the same grocery stores and malls, did business, and attended schools with one another. This integrated intercommunal existence was also revealed in the literature; the civil war changed that for the worse (Harik, 1999; Strohmer, 2007).

Subsequently, some Christian-majority villages became Muslim-majority villages; and displaced persons showed little interest in returning to their villages and coexisting (Strohmer, 2007). Because of this, young people were prevented from interacting at the same level individuals of the older generations had interacted. This resulted in the heightening of the ignorance, prejudice, and discrimination some Christian and Muslim communities had for one another (Faour, 1998; Nizzameddin, 2007).

This writer observed numerous examples of this during his 7-year tenure at a Lebanese university. For instance, in a discussion on ethnicity during an introduction to a sociology course this writer taught in 2006, a Maronite Christian student (whose name was fully Arabic) insisted that Lebanese Christians were not Arabs. He stated loudly, “I can tell who is an Arab [Muslim] by smelling them,” and continued to insist on his ability to do so. Later, another professor concurred with the student’s statement and belief. He even shared a widely held

¹ Ibid.

² Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

³ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

belief that because Arab Muslims were not baptized as Christians were, they had a distinct, offensive body odor.

According to Sammak, a fundamental change occurred in the relationship between Christians and Muslims due to this displacement.¹ The Lebanese people were divided geographically, resulting in a more segregated population rather than the integrated one that existed before the war: “Now you have ghettos everywhere in Lebanon with very few mixed areas,” Sammak stated. He also discussed personal examples of the separation of the two groups, indicating the changes in the composition of the 14 families residing in his building from an almost equal number of Christians and Muslims to all being Muslim. He and Khalil² both discussed the demographic changes in Beirut, including the movement of Christians out of Hamra, the creation of separate shopping areas for Christians and Muslims, and the movement of Christians from West Beirut to East Beirut, respectively, and of Armenians to Aley, a central east province of Lebanon.

Some Lebanese, buttressed by the available data, contended a case could be made that the Christians of Lebanon suffered more than their Muslim counterparts suffered in regards to communal displacement, especially Maronites. El Khazen³ reported that 70% of displaced persons during the war were Christians. Places such as Dahieh and Haret Hreik that had been predominantly Christian became Muslim after the war, especially Shiite.⁴ A researcher at the Center for Muslim–Christian Understanding at Georgetown University indicated the percentage of displaced Christians due to the civil war was 81%; Muslims accounted for only 19% of displaced persons (Dagher, 2001). El Khazen⁵ and Dagher (2001) also pointed to

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

³ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

other areas of Lebanon, such as the Shouf Mountains, where large communities of Christians were displaced. Dagher (2001) noted that “the number of Christians displaced from the Shouf and its vicinity reached 331, 000” (p. 84). This resulted in part to the Christians feeling that they were the principal losers of the civil war (Lesch, 2007), although many sources reported it as a stalemate (Khalaf, 2002). The Christians have maintained resentment over this perceived loss, which is something that will need to be addressed within the Christian–Muslim dialogue.

Several field experts, including Khalil,¹ believed that the reduction in Christian–Muslim co-living, with resulting decreases in their daily interaction, was the most important postwar change affecting Lebanese unity. Prior to the war, CMR were better due to social living and community integration. Socialists and Communists worked together without prejudice in all Lebanese communities for Arab unity, according to Hajjar.² Just after the end of the war, Lebanese Christians’ and Muslims’ desires to unite dissipated because they were not nurtured. Coexistence was no longer as it had been.

Such changes resulted in a lack of social integration since the civil war. Sammak³ stated that by living together no longer as they had prior to the war, the Lebanese were depriving themselves of essential interaction, familiarity, conviviality, and harmony. Khalil⁴ echoed this sentiment, stating that the mentality of the people had been changed: “The people no longer know each other.”

Hajjar,⁵ Sammak,¹ Khalil² and other field experts also felt that Christians and Muslims no longer had much in common. They no longer shared various aspects of life, such as work

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

⁴ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

⁵ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

and school. Khalil suggested that displacement of the Christians and Muslims has particularly affected the youth of Lebanon whom he feels have neither good understanding of each other nor relationships with one another. Hajjar agreed and stated that Lebanese youth did not interact with one another as they should because they attended different schools on the basis of their religion.

Khalil³ itemized the various areas of discord among the different Lebanese communities. Discontentment among the Shiites was based on socioeconomics. Although Lebanese Shiites became much more involved and respected in society, the previously dominant religious communities were either envious or fearful of the increased power of the Shiite community. The discord between the Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities was not religious in nature but rather societal due to fallout from the war. Prior to the war, these two groups intermingled, living together and even intermarrying. This was true especially in Tripoli and to lesser extents in Sidon and Beirut, according to Khalil. After the war, little of this intermingling continued.

CMR were further worsened by “the ensuing violence, kidnappings, and lawlessness,” said El Khazen,⁴ that occurred during and after the civil war. These affected CMR negatively in two respects. The first was the geographic division of Lebanon into Christian and Muslim sections. The second was the development of strong confessionalism throughout the society, something that had existed to a much lesser degree before the war. As El Khazen and the field expert respondents maintained concerning this theme of communal displacement and the theological issues identified in chapter 1, separatism and confessionalism had increased significantly in postwar Lebanon. El Khazen believed that the lengthy, protracted civil war

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

³ Ibid.

⁴ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

developed this negative mindset or culture toward CMR and that had the war been brief, then these issues would be less entrenched in present-day Lebanese society.

Ghazal¹ stated that although intercommunal problems existed throughout the world, in Lebanon those problems had spiraled out of control from the war. He acknowledged that even though people around the world think differently, those differences that are sometimes expressed through their religious beliefs should not result in war and terrorism as they did in Lebanon. Ghazal believed that this “backward thinking” contributed in part to Lebanon becoming a third-world country, a notion increasingly acknowledged by the Lebanese people themselves. For Ghazal, communal displacement intensified Lebanese intolerance of each other’s differences, thus contributing to the status of Lebanon as a third-world country. According to Ghazal, in first-tier democratic nations, constituents and politicians work to resolve differences through discussion and voting. In third-world countries, people and politicians are impulsive, reacting emotionally and instinctively. In addition to the constant political bickering, corruption of civil administrators, external threats, and the deterioration of CMR, Lebanon also had major problems with its electrical and water services (El-Daher, 2011; Margane & Renck, 2011) and the state of its roads and highways, all contributing factors to third-world status (Giddens, 2001).

Sammak² also pointed out the dilemma wherein Lebanese Muslim sentiment concerning the separate status of Lebanon versus a wider, blended Arab Middle East softened much sooner than the Christians realized. Thus, the Christians had mistakenly believed that the Muslims did not support a separate Lebanon. This was clearly shown in 1982, according to Sammak, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon when CMR were perhaps at their worst

¹ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

stage. Dar Al Fatwa, an Islamic institution and media source, proclaimed Lebanon to be a homeland for Lebanese Muslims and Christians, a concept that was officially documented and accepted under the Tā'if Agreement of 1989.¹

The problem began, per Franjeh,² when people were separated, residentially and socially, by the war. Some of these people were still trying to recapture the past, continuing to live as they had during a short period in Lebanese history when Christians were the majority population and held positions of dominance throughout the government, civil service, and other areas of society. However, Franjeh also noted that the Lebanese people were always competing, desiring winners and losers.

Nearly all of the field experts agreed that, overall, CMR were worse than before the war and that communal displacement continued to be a major cause. Mentioning some positive notes, Sammak³ indicated that a few aspects of CMR had improved and that others had the potential to improve; however, Khalil⁴ believed that in comparison with the other countries in the Middle East, CMR in Lebanon were better.

The information shared here by the field expert respondents has been presented as valid in that it has stood the test of time. In terms of this research study, the research was begun nearly a decade ago, with the field experts reporting the challenges and interrelationship between communal displacement and CMR. They upheld their concerns intermittently throughout this research and warned that if communal displacement were not redressed, then healthy CMR would continue to wane. Their concern was not limited to the return of the displaced but included communal reconciliation as well, which often did not occur. For example, the 2006 Israeli invasion initially displaced “a million people, over a

¹ Ibid.

² Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

⁴ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

quarter of the population” (Mroue, 2011c, p. 3). Commenting on this and a slew of other displacements, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center and the Norwegian Refugee Council reported that

the lack of effective reconciliation or remedy for past human rights violations has stood in the way of people achieving durable solutions, and they do not trust that their situation will remain stable . . . Although many families have received financial support to repair or rebuild their war-damaged houses, many people are still afraid to return, preferring to stay in locations where they are among their own communities (Mroue, 2011c, p. 3)

Educational Issues

In 1999, Inati (1999) stated,

In trying to assess the causes of the most recent Lebanese civil war, some people place the blame, in part or in whole, on the Lebanese educational system. Their claim is that, by giving the various religious sects the ability to destroy the identity of the Lebanese and, hence, their integration, [thus] owing to the fact that certain religious sects taught in their schools’ materials contradictory to those taught by other religious sects [*sic*]. (p. 56).

Some of the interviewees, including Sammak¹ and N. Musawi,² suggested that the educational system in Lebanon had harmed CMR and needed to be overhauled. Mouawad³ suggested that the system did little to develop human beings holistically. She complained of the poor curriculum, inadequate teacher pay, and disrepair of school buildings. More important, she believed that the system continued to separate people on the basis of religion, thus failing to integrate Lebanese students and create unity. This belief was also espoused by Inati (1999). As a result of all this, many of the top students in Lebanon had migrated, creating what several individuals referred to as a “brain drain,” especially from the *madarris hookomiyye* (public or government schools). *Madarris khassa* (private schools) in Lebanon, especially Catholic schools, continued to have an important role in educating Lebanese youth.

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

² N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

³ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

The emphasis on religion rather than patriotic unity was echoed by Ghazal,¹ who suggested that the history books should be adjusted to promote patriotism and create unity in the country.

An important note here is that Lebanon still, as of this writing, has not adopted an official history book for its public schools. One of the main contentions has been that one Lebanese community will view a certain leader as a hero in Lebanese history but that others will view that same leader as a criminal (Abou Chedid, Nasser, & Van Blommestein, 2002; Adra, 2009; Hajjar, 2002; Inati, 1999). Indeed, the existing texts differed vastly from one another, even though they covered the same periods of history. According to these same sources, the civil war years in particular have been the most difficult to document to Lebanese satisfaction. In addition, Christian schools either have not included the teaching of Islam in their curricula or have taught Islam in a very negative light. Muslims have treated Christianity in the same way.

Sammak,² Ghazal,³ and most of the field experts cited the absence of instruction in communal coexistence, as well as funding for such instruction, as another inadequacy of the Lebanese educational system. N. Musawi⁴ reported that the Lebanese educational system was a problem because of its failure to address CMR and dialogue. This criticism was shared by Inati (1999):

One cannot but wonder whether there is a political effort to de-intellectualize the Lebanese, stripping them of the intellectual and linguistic superiority for which they have always been known in the region and turning them into laborers with strong bodies that can do the job and weak minds that can obey. (p. 68)

¹ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

³ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

⁴ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

Because Lebanon is a very small country, frequent interaction should be expected. However, the truth was that although Christian and Muslims had coexisted, they had not lived together, as stated by several interviewees (Hajjar, 2002). For example, according to Sammak,¹ Christian school enrollments before the war were 30% Muslim. During the war, Muslim enrollment dropped to 5%. After the civil war, the Christian–Muslim blend of students was reduced even more. The Shia community of Lebanon, for example, had been very much segregated for decades, being located in the Bekaa, southern Lebanon, and the slums of West Beirut. A combination of segregation, communal displacement, and poor education had resulted in stagnant CMR dialogue (Fadlallah, 1998).

According to each of the field experts and the available literature, little coexistence and interaction occurred among students (Abou-Chedid et al., 2002; Inati, 1999; Mahdawi, 2009; Najjar 2009). A popular saying among the expert respondents was this: “The young don’t know each other.” Matar² noted how both he (approximately 45 years ago) and present students could be educated up to the high school level with very little interaction with students of other faiths. Sammak³ cited a talk he gave at Kaslik University. At the end of his lecture regarding CMR, a student asked a question and then commented how much she liked Sammak’s speech. She stated, “This is the first time I talked to a Muslim.” This might sound like an exaggeration; but in reality, it might not be very far from the norm. Thus, it was typical that Lebanese children entered private schools and emerged 12 years later barely having met any children of other confessions and ignorant of the multifaceted history, geography, and particularity of their own country.

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

² Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

Much of the recent literature indicated that the lack of socioeducational interaction among Lebanese youth was damaging to healthy CMR and conviviality. Senior journalist Rami Khouri, an Arab American usually based in Lebanon, was the editor at large of *The Daily Star*, the largest English newspaper in the Middle East. He was also the director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB (Strohmer, 2007). According to Khouri (as cited in Strohmer, 2007),

It doesn't matter what the context is, whether it's business or education or tourism or sports or political engagement. The best antidote to misunderstandings, stereotypes and racist misperceptions is for people to meet each other. There's nothing that has as much impact as physically getting together, chatting, having a cup of coffee, or going to someone's house.

Another criticism was that Lebanese private schools, the numeric majority, were subject to little government monitoring and standards. Thus, officials of these schools had much freedom concerning curriculum and instruction before the Tā'if Agreement. Inati (1999) and Abou-Chedid et al. (2002) wrote that this lack of monitoring and freedom was actually a hindrance in creating an integrated community for Lebanese students and could be the precursor of conflict. Christians enrolled in French system schools more than did Muslim students, who usually were unable to afford the French system of private education. In those schools, students often received a closed Christian viewpoint. Thus, the Christians often felt superior to the Muslims, who developed feelings of resentment. Rather than reinforcing camaraderie or nationalism among the youth, this situation was divisive (Dagher, 2001; Inati, 1999; Ziadeh, 2006). Therefore, according to Inati (1999) and Mackey (2008), the questions of whether the educational system thwarted integration and the creation of a clear Lebanese identity through the lack of monitoring of educational programs must be addressed. Identity-specific issues have been discussed in chapter 5.

On the other hand, Mouawad¹ believed fewer restrictions and less government oversight should be required of private Catholic schools to provide appropriately flexible curricula and instruction. She also criticized the government authorization and sanction of 38 new religious universities since 1998 without proper accreditation.

Some of the field experts² and authors referenced believed that during the prewar years, the Lebanese system of education was imperfect and degenerative. However, they emphasized that the large communal displacement that emerged in postwar Lebanon resulted in great damage to Christian and Muslim student integration, which was reflected in the deterioration of CMR, especially among the youth.

For their part, the surveyed university students revealed a lack of confidence in the Lebanese education system. New university students were surveyed regarding the quality of Lebanese education compared with several other modalities. Of the 280 students surveyed, 78.6% ranked American university education as having the highest quality, followed by the French system (14.6%) and the British system (3.5%). Only four students (1.4%) ranked Lebanese education as having the highest quality (see Table 22.4). Thus, the students indicated their low level of confidence in the Lebanese system.

In the January 12, 2005, edition of *The Daily Star*, Ghazal reported on a new project aimed at correcting the quality gap between public and private schools, the Adopt-a-School program. Fifteen schools from the Bekaa region (the fertile western section of Lebanon) chosen based on need were to have their structure, curriculum, and instruction improved. The article reported that “54% of public school teachers have no university training” and that

¹ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

² Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005; Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004; Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendices 13, 2, and 12, respectively).

“39.4% of 12- to 15-year-old children drop out during the basic education cycle” (Ghazal, 2005, p. 4). UNICEF and the Bin Talal Foundation cosponsored the project to improve the overall quality of public education

A Lebanese NGO, Youth for Tolerance, began an interconfessional Lebanese student exchange program between two schools in March 2009, the Antonine Sisters School of Ghazir, attended by Christians, and the Ras Beirut International School of Beirut, attended by Muslims. This group also produced a documentary showing the interaction of three Muslim and three Christian students who were newly placed at the Antonine and Ras Beirut schools (Choukeir & Awad, 2011). The documentary revealed the high level of unfamiliarity students of different faiths had with one another and the “hidden biases and prejudice that the Muslim and Christian communities of Lebanon at large hold towards one another” (Abizeid, 2009, p. 3). The project clearly revealed that the effects of the civil war were still being felt two decades after its conclusion: The majority of the population had continued to live in communities segregated along religious and confessional lines; thus, most schools had remained segregated, attended by students from one religious community or another (Choukeir, 2011; Choukeir & Awad, 2011).

In terms of university education and CMR, Sammak¹ pointed out that at Kaslik University and in the surrounding neighborhood of the same name, located in the Jounieh province of Lebanon, Islam and Muslims were negatively represented, fueling the war. Indeed, according to the Kaslik studies of 1976, published just months after the start of the Lebanese Civil War,

The manifestation of negative or indifferent attitudes toward Muslim groups by the respondents is reinforced by many Maronite political writings which talk clamorously about the “backwardness” of Muslim thought . . . Islamic ethnic structure is

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

characterized by a destructive Bedouin outlook . . . The Maronite common man felt very different from the Moslem. He never liked him. (Khashan, 1990, p. 736)

Sammak¹ also noted that some positive improvements in CMR had been made. The predominantly Christian school of Antoura and the predominantly Muslim school of Mukassed were hosting each other's student bodies for entire days, with both groups reporting the experience as very positive. Muslim enrollment in Christian schools was up to 20%. At Kaslik University, several Muslim professors had been added; and many Muslim students had enrolled. New CMR institutions had been formed since the war, and the few previously existing ones had become more active. St. Joseph University, an early, prominent Jesuit university of French language instruction, opened the Center for Christian–Muslim Dialogue with mostly Maronite students. UB, a Greek Orthodox school, had added the Center for Christian–Muslim Studies. The Makassed Institute for Higher Education, with a mainly Sunni population, hosted the Center for Muslim–Christian Relations. Although the St. Joseph and Balamand centers were doing better than the Makassed center in terms of both work and advocacy, that was also starting to shift as Muslims became more involved.²

Sammak³ also noted that the various CMR committees to which he belonged, along with several Lebanese universities, had agreed and resolved that “Christianity should be taught at Muslim universities and institutions by Christians, and Islam should be taught at Christian universities by Muslims.” Finally, Sammak gave this writer a book he and several other advocates of CMR had written in Arabic, “the first book of its kind where Christians write about Christianity, Muslims write about Islam, and both write about dialogue.”⁴ This he

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

considered a positive change as they worked to get CMR back to normal. However, he noted that they still had a very long way to go.

However, Sammak's feelings of accomplishment were mixed with dismay. He noted that after the war, the government, especially the ministry of education, did not do its job, either failing to act or acting inappropriately toward CMR and reconciliation.¹ People were separated from each other, unfamiliar with each other and begrudging one another. According to Sammak, because the stereotypes the Lebanese had of one another could only be corrected through education and coexistence, the educational system in Lebanon had failed the Lebanese in a manner similar to the communal displacement caused by the civil war.

This sentiment was echoed by several other field experts, including Mouawad,² a member of parliament and wife of a former Lebanese president. Although political divisions existed, the main cause for the Christian–Muslim rift was—and still is—the lack of education concerning coexistence and harmonious CMR. Because the reintegration of the present and future Lebanese student bodies, concurrent with the reconstruction of the education system, will take time to implement, it will not be a quick fix to the CMR ills in Lebanon.

The field experts also mentioned concerns about identity issues, political practice, the political elite, the clergy, the Ta'if Agreement, the poor economy, and the striving for a Christian- or Muslim-dominated state, respectively. These societal aspects were major affronts to healthy CMR and have been covered in the next chapters.

Discussion and Analysis of Communal Displacement and Education Issues

Field experts, students, and various authors identified several societal areas as the fault for the worsening state of CMR. Thus far, communal displacement and the Lebanese system of education, and the divisions between the older generation and the youth begun in chapter 1

¹ Ibid.

² Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

have been discussed as significant areas of concern. As Aoun¹ stated, solid measures for building trust among all Lebanese communities must be employed to improve CMR and the divide between the older generation and the youth.

The older, religiously diverse field expert respondents who were interviewed lived before, during, and after the Lebanese Civil War. They had major engagements in the war and suffered its consequences. Yet, despite religious and other differences, they continued to feel closer to one another than the younger generation did. These older respondents discerned the causes and effects of the civil war and put them into a working perspective. They posed solutions to promote healthy CMR. One explanation for this, gleaned from the field experts and the literature review, was that the older generation lived together and developed positive familiarity with one another. They did not encounter wide communal displacement until after living together with a level of conviviality for many years. In addition, many of them experienced the very good economy in Lebanon from 1955 to 1975. Others were there for the very founding and independence of Lebanon in 1943.

The youth of Lebanon, however, were raised after major communal displacements. Thus, they were unfamiliar, if not hostile, with one another. These youth, whose ages place them during the last vestiges of the war, did not directly experience the previous glory of Lebanon. However, to their advantage, they also did not live during the horrific civil war years. Ironically, the student respondents, who were not witnesses to the war, appeared to hold much more animosity about the war and CMR than the older respondents did.

This was evident in the writer's personal example of such feelings that occurred in 2006. A 17-year-old female student inquired about the subject matter of this dissertation. When told the subject was CMR, she became red in the face, raised her arm close the writer's

¹ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

face, and exclaimed, “You don’t know what you’re talking about!” She criticized the fact that the writer had not experienced the Lebanese Civil War first hand and, thus, could not really understand it. What she failed to realize was that she had been about 6 months old when the war completely ended and, therefore, also had no firsthand experience with the Lebanese Civil War. Still, she held immense hostility about it within the Lebanese context.

Thus, the question has become where these students and young people were gathering their animosity for “the other” if they had not experienced the civil war itself. As mentioned in chapter 1, an NGO had begun working in Lebanon to address this very problem of the prejudices and hostilities the students’ hold toward individuals of different religions (Mahdawi, 2009).

On the other hand, the older CMR experts could be publicly feigning appreciation of their religious counterparts while privately expressing acrimony. Nadim Shehadi, a native Lebanese, was a former consultant to Lebanese politician Saad Hariri and the former director of the Lebanese Study Center based in England for 20 years. He shared that a another reason for the disparity between the older field experts and the youth could be that discussing the divisions between Christians and Muslims was less of a taboo for the youth than for the older generation.¹ Hence, the youth spoke more openly and sometimes more recklessly about these issues. However, this seemed unlikely because although the field experts participated in this research separately, not knowing about each other’s participation, nearly all of their information was consistent. Thus, they corroborated one another.

All of this resulted in a “twofold negative impact on CMR,” according to El Khazen:²

One was the geographic divide of Lebanon [between Christian and Muslim sections, a notion shared by most of the interviewees, such as Muhammad Sammak³] and the

¹ Nadim Shehadi, personal communication, June 21, 2011(see Appendix 24).

² El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

second was the strong confessionalism that developed [that didn't exist as intensely before the war] across political, social, and other phenomena.

In sum, the field experts agreed that at the very least, close proximity and social interaction provided a good opportunity for the Lebanese to know one another. However, in and of itself, proximity and/or the lack of the same was not the sole cause or cure of all CMR ills. Proximity was only one of the multicausal issues raised in this thesis.

Economic Strain and CMR

CMR were also negatively affected by the Lebanese economy. First, according to Matar,¹ although military operations ended in 1991, the war did not. The socioeconomic factors involved not only did not improve but also persisted. As a result, the Tā'if had never been implemented correctly because of continuing reorganization to consolidate power. Thus, Matar suggested that the Tā'if should be either modified or changed. Second, Khalil² noted that the large Christian diaspora was fearful of making financial investments in Lebanon if it was to become a Muslim-dominated country. Finally, the shrinking Christian communities and the lack of cohesiveness within them resulted in part of a worsening financial situation for Christians in particular. Many of the displaced, especially the Shiites now living on the outskirts of Baalbek and in the mixed communities of Beirut and its suburbs, existed in poverty or close to poverty levels (Dagher, 2001; Profile of Internal Displacement, 2004).

According to Massouh,³ “Lebanese society, CMR do not fit into the traditional sociological theories. Karl Marx would be wrong [that society was a class struggle between the capitalists and the working class].” He continued, “Even Ibn Khaldun, if he were alive today, he would be wrong,” speaking of the conflict and consensus in Lebanese society. Massouh rejected the “goodness of fit” model as well as other sociological theories for

¹ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

³ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

Lebanon, including those of Durkheim, Comte, and Weber, stating with some dismay and humor that “Lebanon [its community functioning] is unique, a special case. Its situation is like no other in the world.” Indeed, Middle East scholar Ussama Makdisi concurred, sharing that many of the theories put forth regarding the sectarianism in Lebanon were inaccurate (as stated in Hovsepian, 2008).

Halabi¹ admitted that “before the war, the Christians were rich and the Muslims poor” but that “after the war, both the Christians and Muslims became the same,” that is, economically strained. Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir also lamented, “I have been speaking to economists and they said the economy is deteriorating, employees are being laid off, hotels have few tourists and the Lebanese are emigrating in hundreds. This is unacceptable” (as quoted in Hatoum, 2006, p. 1). For Halabi,² in addition to the many other challenges facing Lebanon, “to top all of that off is a historical controversy between rich and poor.”

Mouawad³ also felt that the poor economy was negatively affecting CMR and Lebanese society as a whole. In 1997, an ad was run by the Lebanon Investment Development Authority that read, “The price of prosperity has already been paid” (Perthes, 1997, p. 16). This meant that the economic hard times of Lebanon should be behind her and the time for economic rejuvenation was now. Unfortunately, the economy only worsened. At the time of this interview, the debt of Lebanon was placed at \$35 billion (“Debt and Destruction,” 2006). Mouawad⁴ explained with sadness and disgust, “There is no more middle class” because “we’re not growing [producing] a society and a middle class; instead we’re growing poverty and ignorance.” In addition to political phenomena causing tensions,

¹ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

² Ibid.

³ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

⁴ Ibid.

Hajjar¹ offered that, “The [very weak] economy is also making the relations worse. Money in all its aspects, especially the lack of it, can make a loving brotherly relationship turn bad.”

Hajjar seemed certain that “if the Lebanese economy was good, then (CMR) would be better.”

He continued,

For example, when the economy is poor and let’s say some of the other community leaders see some Christians building houses and stores, they will point out these Christians with jealousy and say to their Muslim constituency, ‘Look, the Christians have money’ and then the tensions start.

AUB professor Judith Harik (1999) linked two of Hajjar’s points, poor economy and the ongoing decreased level of integration, as devastating CMR. Harik (1999) reported that the Lebanese people’s economic inability to return to their homes and the relaxed attitude toward the same had impeded integration and CMR. She wrote that this was “obviously a serious impediment for rapid Christian-Muslim integration simply because it prevents mountain folks from entering each other’s daily orbits where coexistence can take place” (Harik, 1999, p. 173).

Regarding economic/social stratification, Aoun² said, “The economy and religion are linked because development in Lebanon was selective, unfortunately,” and cited “the Shiite example, where the Shiite section [of Beirut] was called ‘the belt of misery’ and/or the ‘belt of the deprived.’” Aoun believed that “other countries” such as Israel, stating that they were “jealous of Lebanon’s democracy. Lebanon was great, economically, so good that we were giving international loans in Lebanese liras,” referring to just prior to the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War when two to three Lebanese liras equaled \$1. Today, 1,500 Lebanese liras equal \$1 (“Debt and Destruction,” 2006). This economic success of Lebanon, according

¹ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

² Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

to Aoun,¹ “was disturbing to certain high ranking international places [countries].” He continued, “Lebanon was the only country [in the oil rich Middle East and elsewhere] that had the least resources but had the highest GNP and so on.” He believed that the economic successes of Lebanon “were the real reasons” for the conflict in Lebanon and that the other causes discussed, although important, were the “pretexts” for the conflict. Aoun believed that “other countries” either conspired within, or were indifferent to, the conflict. Aoun did not wish to mention those countries by name; but the translator, Ms. Marie-Therese Obeid,² revealed a fairly common belief in Lebanon that countries such as the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others were envious of the economic success of Lebanon and/or solid CMR. For his part, as Khalil³ surmised, “The main problem is the economy, not religion or democracy, and unjust treatment between the confessional communities causes problems.”

The university students were asked how significant a detriment the poor economy in Lebanon was to CMR. Of the student sample, 256 (88.9%) of the 288 total respondents or were Christian, with 166 (57.6%) of them being Maronite Christian. Just 3.2% of the respondents strongly agreed that Lebanese CMR were predominantly negatively affected by economic difficulties; 30.2 % agreed that there was some negative impact on CMR due to economic reasons. However, 58.7% disagreed that economic problems were a cause of CMR discord (see Table 22.5).

Again, a pattern emerged: The Christian majority students seemed to believe that CMR was poor not because of economic reasons but rather because of innate religious differences as revealed from the student survey results given in chapter 1 (see also Tables 22.1 and 22.2). These findings also seemed to reflect the emerging pattern of disparity

¹ Ibid.

² Marie-Therese Obeid, personal communication, June 15,2006 (see Appendix 24).

³ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

between the experts' opinions, many of whom believed the economic problems were the cause of CMR discord, and the students' opinions, who declined economic problems as a major cause of CMR deterioration.

The students were also surveyed as to how significant a role the economy had in the overall well-being of Lebanon (not specifically within CMR as that was the issue in the previous query). A total of 288 students responded to this question; 256 (88.9%) of the respondents were Christian, with 166 (57.6%) being Maronite Christians. Of the respondents, 34.5% felt that economic difficulties were the overall biggest problem in Lebanon; and 25.2% of the respondents believed the economy was the second biggest problem in Lebanon. Combining the students' first and second choices, 59.7% of the respondents felt that economic problems were a major cause of the overall societal ills in Lebanon (see Table 22.6).

In their responses to this question, the students believed that the economic problems in Lebanon were a major cause of the difficulties in that country from an overall view of the problems in Lebanon. In contrast, the students felt the poor economy was not a major problem affecting CMR, as shown in their responses to the previous query. However, the field expert respondents believed that the poor Lebanese economy was the cause of both CMR discord and overall Lebanese ills to a moderate degree.

Discussion of Economic Issues

The historically poor economy of Lebanon certainly was a cause of a great deal of hardship, anger, and jealousy between the Lebanese "haves" and "have-nots" (Ziadeh, 2006). In many ways, according to Lewis (2004), "this was easily explained by the equally well-known fact that Christians were rich and Muslims were poor and that consequently Muslim

hostility to Christians . . . was socioeconomic in origin,” (p. 284). For example, Aoun¹ pointed out that a whole section of Beirut and the surrounding area was and has continued to be called the Shiite Belt of Misery because of its grinding poverty and lack of civil institutions. Because this section of Lebanon was recognized as economically “miserable” compared with other areas, this misery resulted in tension and hardship that negatively impacted CMR. The university students who clamored for jobs and resources also identified the poor Lebanese economy as a major source of discord overall but not of poor CMR specifically. Some of the respondents felt that a progressive form of socialism could be useful for Lebanon to adopt to combat poverty. The poor economy was another area in which the Lebanese experienced feelings of disappointment, inadequacy, despair, and frustration (Longuenesse, 2006; Salem, 2006; UNESCO, 2002). If the reader references twentieth-century American psychologist Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory, this becomes understandable: If individuals or groups of people cannot meet their most basic needs (at the bottom of the hierarchy triangle) such as food, shelter, and income, then they cannot proceed to higher levels of functioning and need satisfaction (at the top of the triangle) such as self-actualization and peak experiences (Hoy, 2010). In regards to CMR, this means that if everyday citizens are struggling at the bottom of the triangle hierarchy to meet their families’ basic needs, then they have much more difficulty in progressing up the triangle to higher levels of functioning and problem solving, in this case, toward healthy CMR. According to all of the experts interviewed and most of the student respondents, even if the Lebanese economy were to flourish, doing so unevenly between Christians and Muslims would not be helpful to CMR as evidenced by the civil war being fought over economic and resource inequality as much as over political and sectarian issues (Fisk, 2002; Mackey, 2008).

¹ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

Inversely, CMR conflict could be the cause of economic woes as well, as put forth by Lebanese MP Anwar el-Khalil: “Continuing antagonisms will seriously prejudice the economy” (as quoted in Salloum, 2006, p. 14).

Thus, what will become of Lebanese CMR has become the major challenge. The historically poor economy of Lebanon could continue to act as an aggravator of CMR tensions. When the research for this thesis began in 2002, the Lebanese economy was poor, with 1,500 Lebanese lira (pounds) equaling \$1 American. As of November 2011, there had been little improvement in the economy; and the lira-to-dollars ratio remained the same.

According to Lebanese Patriarch Beshara Rai, the poor Lebanese economy has resulted in both tense CMR and intra-Christian and intra-Muslim relations and has become a hindrance to dialogue (Mroue, 2011d, p.2). Lebanon’s economy is also inextricably related to its political stability. Standard and Poor was concerned that the Lebanese economy “is projected to decline to an annual average of 5.8 percent, between 2011 and 2013” and that “the Lebanese economy remains vulnerable to external shocks and adverse swings in investor sentiment. Political stability holds the key to continued economic growth in the short term” (Mroue, 2011, p.4). Two other areas cited as reasons for poor CMR, political practice and governance, have been reviewed in chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3: POLITICS, FOREIGN INTERVENTION, AND CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS

As discussed in chapter 1, the field experts did not view religious differences as a major obstacle to healthy CMR; but the university students viewed them as a moderately significant detriment. In chapter 2, education and communal displacement factors were deemed to play significant roles in CMR discord. As has been shown in chapter 3, all 17 of the field experts and a very high percentage of the university students found poor political practice and governance to be much more significant or severe causes of CMR deterioration. The field expert responses in this chapter originated from IQ1 and IQ2 previously given in both the introduction and the beginning of chapters 1 and 2. These questions concerned whether (a) CMR had improved or not post-civil war and why and (b) what the causes for the state of CMR were. The university students were asked the same questions through the survey instrument. In this chapter, inept and corrupt political practices, which were shown to figure quite prominently in CMR deterioration, have been reviewed.

The Working Group Experts

Politically speaking, Massouh¹ offered that “the Lebanese did not adequately address the causes of the war, many of which are the causes of the problems of the relations between the Christians and Muslims” and that there was “an absence of a competent government (that would address CMR issues) here in Lebanon.” Many Lebanese agreed with this assessment. For example, during an interview in February 2006, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah stated, concerning the Lebanese government and politicians, that “there is no doubt that giving a chance to major political forces to take part in decision making burdens them

¹ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

with larger political responsibilities and affects their decision making to a large extent” (as quoted in Wright, 2008, p. 158).

For Massouh,¹ the main reason CMR had deteriorated was “due to the corruption of Lebanese leaders and the administrators and commissioners.” MacKey (2008), one of the sources reviewed during the literature review, expounded on this matter:

On the surface Beirut was as luminous as ever . . . but beneath the surface . . . the underlying flaws widened. Decades of communal competition had gutted every institution necessary to the maintenance of social cohesion and political unity. Even the loyalties of the army and the police, those entrusted to enforce order and security of the state, were between contending communities and leaders. In April 1975, the “pearl of the east” crumbled. (p. 100)

Massouh² explained that the Lebanese government was designed to follow a unique proportional confessional appointment system whereby not only must the president be a Maronite Christian but the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the house, a Shiite Muslim. The civil service was also subject to the same type of appointment system, limiting constructive criticism due to confessional loyalties. Thus, a community could misunderstand the motivations of an outsider criticizing one of their own appointees, resulting in an inevitable fallout of intercommunal tensions. Unsurprisingly, office holders fell back on the virtually automatic support from their own confessional groupings whenever outsiders criticized them. Indeed, in addressing a crowd of female relatives and widows of assassinated Lebanese leaders, the Maronite patriarch had exclaimed, “Public institutions in Lebanon are hampered . . . everything from the presidency to the Cabinet and Parliament. Those you elected to take care of your best interests and to maintain your safety, we find them clashing every day” (as quoted in Hatoum, 2006, p. 1). Politicians routinely rallied their own

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

communities when under pressure from perceived outsiders. Accordingly, there was little incentive to correct problems of mismanagement or corruption.¹

Another reason CMR had worsened in postwar Lebanon, according to Massouh,² was the power struggles between various political groups both internal and external to Lebanon. For example, the claims of Hezbollah to promote a stricter Islam served potentially not only to increase the base of the party but also to please the majority Muslim population of the Middle East, along with the governments and political leadership throughout the Middle East, especially those in Iran. The problem, though, as Massouh saw it, was that by catering to non-Lebanese forces, groups such as Hezbollah instilled fear in other groups, such as Christians, who saw in a stronger Hezbollah the potential for imposition of *dhimmi* status (a “protected” but somewhat controversial condition) upon non-Muslims.³

Massouh⁴ was quick to point out that he was just as concerned and disappointed in the actions and intentions of all the other Lebanese communities as well. He found it unhelpful when nominally religious politicians took on religious roles to advance their political aims. He pointedly singled out the Maronites in this regard because they raised the specter of future persecution should they become a minority with no safeguards in Lebanon.

Massouh⁵ was skeptical regarding the stated goal of the Christian opposition to seek democratic policies and principles in Lebanon, believing that this goal was politically self-serving and disingenuous. At best, it was aimed at outside powers, such as the United States, in particular, and the West, in general. In actuality, according to Massouh, the group did not

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

want a democratically elected and deconfessionalized government in Lebanon because it was widely believed that elections would result in a Muslim majority.

When asked about the Syrian influence over Lebanon and its effect on CMR, Massouh¹ was clear that he felt the Syrian government had been unhelpful. Many Lebanese who had benefited from the Syrian presence (by employment and resources) wanted the Syrians to stay. However, others, especially the Christians, wanted the Syrians to leave so that they might be free to engage in nepotism and patronage.

As for the possible effects of the Lebanese–Israeli conflict on CMR, Massouh² stated that the Israeli government and its political ideology benefited from intercommunal conflict not only in Lebanon but also elsewhere, pointing out that due to the inflexibility of political Zionism and Israeli society, friendly relations with other religious communities was not easy. Thus, according to Massouh, the Israeli government often made the case that the Lebanese could not coexist due to their religious diversity. The Israeli government and its many spokespeople stated that the Christians of Lebanon could not get along with the Muslims because, in general, “no one can get along with Islam,” buttressing their case that it was not the Israelis but the Palestinians (95% of whom are Muslim) through Islam who were causing conflict. Thus, Massouh believed Israel could only benefit from religious conflicts in its northern neighbor.

Addressing the IQ2, Massouh³ was quick to state, as had been his superior, UB President Elie Salem,⁴ in an earlier interview, that the problem between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon was not theological, economic, or social in nature. He explained that peer pressure within a religious community could stifle criticism of the haves by the have-nots

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

within that same community. In Massouh's view, sociological theories as traditionally understood did not apply to the Lebanese situation: A Marxist analysis or even Ibn Khaldun's explanations did not match the way in which Lebanon was actually functioning communally. Similarly according to Massouh, Weber's, Comte's, and Durkheim's explanations did not fit the Lebanese societal situation either. He believed that the problems in Lebanon were complex and multilayered and thus difficult to reference with classical sociopolitical theories. As such, these problems were also difficult to treat and improve. Massouh felt that the struggles in Lebanese CMR had to do with a rigid and poor mentality of the Lebanese themselves, among many factors. This mentality, according to Massouh, was unique and, thus, was difficult to reference in terms of established sociopolitical theories and subsequent treatment.

Massouh¹ also saw a culprit in foreign intervention, especially that of Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian political, military and expansionist maneuvering in Lebanon. Senior Shiite cleric Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah concurred with Massouh's assertion by stating, "Most of [the Lebanese] problems were the result of foreign interference" (Mroue, 2007, p. 3).

Massouh,² like Sammak³ and Khalil⁴ (all of whom were active participants in CMR advocacy groups), stressed the failure of the Lebanese government in supporting CMR. Massouh admitted that the CMR center that he directed was bankrupt. The center had been formed with generous funding from Issam Fares, a Greek Orthodox billionaire and former Lebanese official. As such, Massouh expressed disappointment at the Lebanese government for not filling the funding gap for his center, which could have been a factor in his criticism of the poor record of government investment in CMR.

¹ Ibid.

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

³ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

⁴ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 200 (see Appendix 2).

Also like Salem and Bou Habib, Massouh's background was Greek Orthodoxy and included the added factor of being a priest,¹ which afforded Massouh not only some important experience but also, perhaps, biases. The Greek Orthodox community, for example, had a closer relationship to the Arab Muslim populations of Lebanon and the wider Middle East than other Christian groups (Khalaf, 2002). Massouh also offered equal criticism of both Christians and Muslims for harming CMR, which, although presented as being diplomatic, might speak more to his concerns of Greek Orthodox marginalization. According to Massouh² and others, the Greek Orthodox, the second largest Christian denomination in Lebanon, feared being caught in the middle of the growing Muslim population with the potential for radicalism on the one hand and an over emphasis on the needs of the larger Christian community in Lebanon, the Maronites, on the other (Abu Al Nasr, 2001). As such, his viewpoint that the blame for the downfall of CMR was split evenly between the two communities might also be an expression tailored to the plight of the Orthodox community as in few, if any, conflicts can the blame be equally divided among the parties involved.

Aside from the possibility of some mild biases, overall Massouh offered a thorough, in-depth, multifaceted understanding of the causal relationship between politics and CMR. Thus, his educated view on the role of politics in CMR should be taken seriously. As mentioned in the introduction and in previous chapters, Massouh is not only a native Lebanese but is also the director of a university Christian–Muslim relations center and a member of Christian–Muslim relations working groups in Lebanon. He has also written extensively on the subject in conjunction with other scholars of different faiths, with their views being corroborated.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

Halabi¹ clearly stated that CMR were worse than they were before the civil war. Whether they remained that way or would improve would be due to the way the Lebanese proceeded politically from this point. Halabi argued that “we [the Lebanese] are not complaining about the unity of the people but rather of political leadership.” A confessionalized system in which the access to medical services and education was divided based on religion was self-defeating. Instead, eligibility in society should be based on equality.

Halabi² reminded this researcher that Syrian intervention, which worsened chances for Lebanese reconciliation, ended with the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Thus, an opportunity existed for reconciliation, although there were still forces at work that Halabi characterized as “*farrīq tasud*,” an Arabic adage similar to the English phrase “divide and conquer.”

Similar to his colleagues, Halabi had an impressive CMR background. A native Lebanese, a court judge, and president of BBC Bank, Halabi has been working for a few CMR working groups in Lebanon for decades. Halabi also presented a unique point of view. He was a member of the Druze community, which constituted less than 6% of the Lebanese population, which was roughly 45% Christian and 55% Muslim (Daou, 2001). Thus, the Druze were a small minority in Lebanon. Halabi’s his wife and his son Marwan (at the time a university student) agreed with him during our interview at their home, that as Druze they did not consider themselves Muslims but rather Lebanese Arabs.³ As such, being neither Christian nor Muslim, the question emerged as to which voice Halabi used in contributing to CMR. Additionally, the Druze of Lebanon were known for frequently shifting political

¹ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

alliances, particularly one of their leaders, warlord Walid Jumblatt (Young 2010). In sum, with the Druze population being less than 6% percent of the country, a denial of being Muslim, and vacillating partisan politics, Halabi's views could be suspect. Thus, his recommendation that the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon avoid a population census and a subsequent democratic majority rule in Lebanon¹ might speak more to the desires of the Druze community specifically rather than the needs of the Lebanese in general. Yet the Druze community had a long history in Lebanon. They spearheaded the initial formation of Lebanon as a separate entity under their leader Emir Fakhreddine and were once the majority population and leadership of the Mount Lebanon province (Fawaz, 1994).

Halabi had also devoted much of his adult life to being a strong CMR advocate. He was referred to this writer as a reliable informant by then doctoral supervisor Jorgen Nielsen, PhD, of the Center for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. The information Halabi shared, though unbeknownst to him at the time, was direct corroboration of that produced by the other diverse field experts and university students. Additionally, despite their small numbers, the Druze vote and approval were often critical and highly sought to address Lebanese political conflict. Just as with the small Christian Armenian community of Lebanon, being included in the Lebanon census of 1932, which barely resulted in identifying the Christian population as the majority for government rule (Firro, 2003), the Druze had a pivotal role in CMR and Lebanese politics. Thus, as a leading member of the Druze and a respected CMR advocate, Halabi's views regarding politics and CMR appeared to be of value.

¹ Ibid.

As reviewed in chapter 2, for his part, Sammak¹ felt the separation of Christians and Muslims throughout Lebanese schools was the main cause of CMR discord. He also shared that poor political practice and governance had had very negative effects on CMR. He cited anger at the corruption in the government as a negative impact on CMR. The role of government in improving CMR had, thus, been effectively abandoned to private parties and institutions.

Sammak² also cited political wrangling publicized in the media as another cause of the demise of CMR. A journalist by trade, Sammak had an extensive work history in Lebanon. As an insider, he explained the role of the media in damaging CMR. Each community or confession had its own media outlets through which they launched campaigns via the airwaves to the detriment of the others, whether Christian or Muslim. Sammak stated that he and the various CMR committees agreed that this was a major detriment to CMR, and they had vowed to stop it and to create a better alternative.

As another sign of improved CMR in postwar Lebanon, Sammak explained that sectarian labels of radio stations were no longer allowed and that governing boards included both Christians and Muslims. Even religious programs had members of other religious communities represented on their boards.³ As an example, Sammak cited the predominantly Shiite Al-Manar (“the Lighthouse”), the television station of Hezbollah, as having Christians on its board. With a sense of pride, Sammak deemed this as important progress that the Lebanese media had made in supporting CMR.⁴

Unfortunately, such positive developments were fairly new and untested. They had yet to be evaluated for positive outcomes. A couple of years after the author’s interview with

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

Sammak, the media in Lebanon were still considered a divisive force. In an article in *The Daily Star*, Khouri (2008) noted that, even when the media distort the news for political purposes,

it usually does so at the behest of politicians. It is no secret that nearly all of the country's media outlets are either directly owned or indirectly manipulated by influential politicians and political parties Future Television, NBN and Al-Manar are owned by MP Saad Hariri, Speaker Nabih Berri and Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah's Hezbollah, respectively, while LBC continues to express the views of MP Samir Gea Gea's Lebanese Forces and Orange TV comes under the obvious sway of MP Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. The vast majority of viewers who choose to tune in to any of those channels do so knowing they will get the day's news complete with their favorite partisan spin. They have the country's politicians-cum-media moguls, not its journalists, to thank for that. (p. 9)

Sammak had participated in Christian Muslim working groups officially for decades (Abu Al Nasr, 2001). A native Lebanese, he was a very experienced news journalist and CMR activist in his late 70s. He was often invited onto Christian television and other communal-based shows and, according to him, had received criticism from the Muslim community for doing so.¹ He was considered a strong yet neutral advocate for solid Christian-Muslim relations. Sammak was also a known empathizer of the Christian situation in Lebanon and had a reputation of being nonsectarian to the point that he was openly willing to criticize the Muslim community generally and the Sunni community, of which he was a leading member, specifically.

Sammak had written extensively and passionately on CMR and, therefore, had gained the respect and appreciation of the various Lebanese communities (Fadlallah, 1998). As a journalist and media specialist, Sammak shared his knowledge of the political causes of CMR discord through this specific lens. However, because of his career as a sociopolitical journalist before, during, and after the civil war, he has been given exceptional exposure and insight. These, along with his education and personal skills, have resulted in his being

¹ Ibid.

perhaps the best-known and respected Christian–Muslim relations advocate in Lebanon and perhaps in all the Arab Middle East (UNESCO, 2002). Without Sammak’s information, the crucial aspect of the interrelationship between the media, politics, and CMR might have gone underreported in this thesis. Because of these credentials and more, Sammak was considered to be a reliable informant regarding Lebanese politics and CMR.

Khalil¹ offered that there was some improvement in Lebanese political expression in that in the Lebanese protests and demonstrations increasingly participants showed just the Lebanese flag as opposed to individual political party flags—except among the Hezbollah. Khalil saw the efforts of Hezbollah as being counterproductive to Lebanese unity by creating a state within a state and turning the Palestinian cause, which was nationalist, into something religious. Supporting the Palestinians, in Khalil’s mind, should be the work of the Lebanese state and its military, not the project of a particular faction such as Hezbollah. For Khalil, the basis of the problems in Lebanon was not religious; rather, their problems stemmed from a lack of respect for one another. He explained this to mean that the Lebanese “often do not respect one another; that they and some other countries, such as Syria, do not respect their national rights; and that members of the international community, such as Israel and the United States, do not respect Lebanon.” Examples of this included Lebanese independence and political decision making. Thus, it was difficult to secure the national and international rights of Lebanon because the lack of respect among the Lebanese was mimicked and exploited by outside actors such as Israel, Syria, and the United States, which seemed to have little respect for the idea of a truly independent Lebanon and its rights in the realm of political decision making.

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

Interestingly, although Khalil¹ felt religious differences were not the cause of CMR discord in Lebanon, he believed that the Islamic notion of *umma* (the wider, universal Muslim community) and the modern nation state were incompatible. That being said, Khalil stated that the problem was neither Islam nor Muslims, but rather Islamists. Indeed, as far back as 1988, Elizabeth Picard reported Christian fears of “the growing influence of Hezbollah and Islamic fundamentalism” (as quoted in Kerr, 1997, p466) It was often unclear whether Khalil believed that the major cause of discord between the Christians and Muslims was political or religious, noting that forms of Christianity as practiced in Lebanon were not strongly democratic, with near autocratic authority lying with priests and not with the laity. This was a reflection of patterns of patriarchy within Lebanese society as a whole and served to reinforce those patterns.

Acknowledging that Lebanon has a Muslim majority population, Khalil² expressed his concern that democracy itself could result in major problems, including constitutional changes. Such changes could result in the destruction of the pluralistic nature of the Lebanese state. The trend, Khalil said, was aggravated by Christian emigration from Lebanon, which exceeded that of Muslims.

Khalil³ introduced the subject of the long-standing worries of the Maronite Christians, which manifested themselves as a “siege mentality” (Mackey, 1991, p. 128) regarding the growing Lebanese Muslim community. This mentality, which Khalil did not completely support, had resulted in Christian visions of their future destruction in Lebanon. To counter this, Christians naturally tended to support “institutions that ensure their political superiority” (Mackey, 1991, p. 130), which was a major cause of Muslim disgruntlement and subsequent

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

conflict. Khalil's background also indicated some mild concerns, which have been discussed with those of El Khazen.

Because Ghazal¹ answered the interview questions in writing, the researcher used the services of the Office of Translation and Interpretation to translate his written responses.

This office was located at NDU in the village of Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon. In response to the first question, Ghazal answered,

Today, after the war experience in Lebanon and the violence and schisms that followed it, I see that the majority of the Lebanese have learned a lesson from the mistakes of the past and are willing to establish new grounds for coexistence without neglecting the hardships and obstacles placed in their way, whether internal resulting from political discord and the precedence of personal and confessional interests or external issues related to the crises in the Middle East and the problems of Palestine and Iraq. I am confident of the ability of the Lebanese people and their desire to continue this quest, stemming from the common will and the lessons they learned from the tragedies of the past.

During the interview, Ghazal shared that until the war, CMR were positive but that they were, in fact, worse now because of internal and external challenges such as those posed by Israel. Ghazal believed that the Lebanese were now ready to readdress some of their core difficulties, although the road to peaceful coexistence among the religious communities would not be smooth. For example, externally, the United States and France formulated a plan that all foreign forces (specifically Syrian) must leave Lebanon immediately and that all militias (specifically Hezbollah) must disarm immediately. This plan was later adopted by the United Nations as Resolution 1559. However, this plan divided the Lebanese public and the various political parties. In addition, Israeli jets continued to fly over Lebanese airspace, threatening to bomb Lebanon.²

¹ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15)

² Ibid.

On the other hand, internally, the Lebanese government decided to amend the constitution to extend the mandate of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which began in 2006, for another 3 years. Subsequently, Lebanese politicians and their constituencies were deeply divided between progovernment and antigovernment camps. The antigovernment camp was composed of groups such as the Qornet Shewan Gathering, made up primarily of Christians, and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, led by its politically vacillating leader Walid Jumblatt (Zeineddine, 2008). The more progovernment parties consisted mainly of Muslims, with a significant Christian minority following, and were referred to as the March 14 Movement.

A sample of how intense present internal and external pressures were dividing the Lebanese was summed up by the leading Shiite cleric in Lebanon, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. In a sermon during Friday prayers on January 14, 2005, Fadlallah implored, “The public should carefully examine political figures who aspire to get into political life for the sake of internal and external apparatuses” (Taan, 2005, p. 1). He warned that the Lebanese should not be “hypnotized by twisted ways in closed circles where people suffocate and remain distant from crucial issues for the sake of marginal ones” (Taan, 2005, p. 1). Fadlallah added, “Liberty and independence require a confrontation of external intervention and domestic chaos that confuse people, and thus they will lose the feeling of security” (Taan, 2005, p. 1). Regarding CMR, Fadlallah urged that “Muslim-Christian dialogue should start in schools.” In spite of these fierce tensions in present-day Lebanon, Ghazal¹ felt “very optimistic about the willingness of the Lebanese to work for coexistence. Christians and Muslims have a common desire for coexistence.”

¹ Ibid.

Ghazal¹ added that the *Zuama* (clan leaders), along with political families wielding inherited power, were also a problem, aggravated by the appearance of the PLO and Palestinian refugees on the scene. Ghazal identified the Palestinian factor as divisive for Lebanese society, with many of the Lebanese people either siding with the Palestinians or opposing them, thus greatly aggravating the already brewing intra-Lebanese discontent. Ghazal provided another interesting example of the Lebanese social divide, citing Lebanese hospitals, which were characterized as serving the French, Americans, or Muslims rather than being at the service of the entire Lebanese population.

Ghazal² also concluded that CMR were worse now than previously because of business and retail relationships between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon. Even though these relationships had existed for decades, they seemed to have had little effect in forging solid CMR and coexistence. Finally, he cited internal political behaviors and “external interference” as the main culprits in harming CMR.³

Ghazal, a Melchite bishop, had been assigned to minister parishioners in southern Lebanon for many years. As such, he was a keener witness to Israeli atrocities in the south and the role those had in the disruption of CMR. Although Ghazal’s partial emphasis on Israeli mischief could be seen as bias, without sharing his experiences within southern Lebanon, this important facet of CMR could have been overlooked. Although several other respondents such as Musawi,⁴ Mousawi,⁵ Matar,⁶ Massouh⁷ and more also pointed to Israeli behavior as a detriment to healthy CMR, few were as close to these phenomena as Bishop

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

⁵ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

⁶ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

⁷ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

Ghazal. He was considered a hero in one southern Muslim community for shielding one of their youth from a Christian mob. He reportedly was rued by the Israelis for uniting Christians and Muslims at a time when Israel occupied southern Lebanon.¹

Ghazal² checked his replies to this researcher with the Vatican beforehand and was pleased to report that his information had been approved for sharing with this researcher. As a senior member of the clergy, Ghazal might have been better equipped to discuss religious matters (as set forth in chapter 1) rather than political ones. However, Lebanon is a country in which politics and religion seem to interact daily and in which CMR are multifaceted and their demise multicausal, as this thesis has shown. Thus, given his years of CMR “ground work,” as he named it; the backing by the Vatican for his information; and the correlation this information had to the other respondents, Ghazal was considered a competent respondent in reference to the relationship between Lebanese political issues and CMR.

In response to IQ2, Bou Habib³ blamed both elite politicians and clergy for the sad postwar state of CMR. However, the major factor for him was clearly political, given his view that the content of the Tā’if Accords were more favorable toward cabinet powers as opposed to presidential authority. The Tā’if Accords, a document of understanding to which most Lebanese agreed and accepted, involved a major power-sharing formula for the Lebanese president, prime minister, speaker, and the Lebanese cabinet (Sakr, 2011a). Bou Habib angrily cited what he felt was poor behavior on the part of the Lebanese before, during, and after the civil war, insisting that politics and a poor economy were mainly at fault for the deteriorating state of CMR.⁴

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

⁴ Ibid.

El Khazen¹ addressed IQ1, regarding if CMR has improved post war or not, with some dismay. He cited his view that the history of Lebanon for a least a half century before the outbreak of the civil war was one of steadily and significantly improving CMR due to cooperation between the civil service, businesses, schools, and other parts of the public sector. He suggested that the history of Lebanon was largely one of Christian–Muslim harmony despite incidents such as the 1860 outbreak of Druze–Christian strife in the Mt. Lebanon region when thousands of Christians were massacred. According to El Khazen, it took only months after such instances of conflict for relations to become good again; there was no permanent damage done to CMR. In contrast, the Lebanese Civil War that broke out in 1975 was different in that its negative effects appeared more long lasting. El Khazen strongly believed that in the postwar period, Lebanese CMR were the worst they had ever been. Part of the problem was the appearance of the PLO in Lebanon and its strong support by Lebanese “leftists” and the lengthy nature of the war itself.

In response to IQ2 regarding the reasons for CMR deterioration, El Khazen² believed that politics, not religion, was the basic cause for the Christian–Muslim divide in Lebanon because presently Lebanese Christians and Muslims were less communicative intercommunally than they were before 1975. He expressed what he believed was both a positive and negative development in postwar Lebanon in that Muslims were now more politically involved, mobilizing for change. This, of course, had political implications for the Christians, especially since the Shiites did not mobilize politically during peacetime but during the fighting, which began in 1975. First, Amal emerged and then Hezbollah was

¹ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

² Ibid.

formed, the latter in direct opposition to the Sunnis with the formation of the Shiite Higher Council, founded by Moussa El-Sadr.¹

In addition, although El Khazen² said that religion was not the major cause for problems in Lebanese CMR, he noted that several Muslim majority countries had experienced increasing sectarian issues: “Today, Muslims all over the world are restless. Now every Christian–Muslim country has problems when 15 years ago there were no problems.” To illustrate, he cited the examples of Indonesia and Nigeria. Lebanon had not been immune to such developments. The question was whether the confessional structure of the Lebanese state was a positive or a negative for CMR. For El Khazen, it was not only the best structure but also the only viable structure for Lebanon. This notion, held by many of the Christian Lebanese communities and, as discussed by respondent Khalil³ and some of the other Christian respondents⁴⁵, included the belief that confessional sectarianism would be a form of protection for the Christians from the now larger Muslim–Shiite community. A concern of many Christian communities in Lebanon was that democratic elections would result in a Shiite plurality; thus, sectarianism and confessionalism were actually more appealing to them than democracy.⁶

El Khazen⁷ also believed that a great detriment to CMR in Lebanon lay within the relationship Lebanon had with neighboring Syria. He believed that if the Christians and Muslims were living harmoniously together, then the Syrian government would lose its stated

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

⁴ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

⁵ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

⁶ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁷ Ibid.

reason for having military troops in Lebanon. That reason was to prevent a Christian–Muslim civil war.

Despite this assertion, El Khazen¹ noted, as did Sammak,² that some progress had been made among some religious communities, especially among the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholics. He explained this improvement as a convergence of understanding of each other’s positions. He felt that these religious communities were now in political harmony and had developed a “greater ecumenical spirit,” which had resulted in more of a willingness to enter into dialogue with each other since the war. In addition, El Khazen noted that in the realm of CMR, it was usually the Christians who took the initiative in interreligious dialogue. In this, he was also in agreement with Sammak³ and a number of other Christian interviewees.

El Khazen, as was stated in the introduction, is a native Lebanese Maronite, a PhD in political science, and former dean of the political science department at AUB. As of 2011, he is a member of the Lebanese parliament and a leading member of FPM, which is headed by Michel Aoun, another respondent for this thesis. His concerns regarding Lebanese politics and CMR were very similar to those of Khalil, a native Egyptian who has lived the past 45 years in Lebanon. He is a Jesuit priest, professor of CMR at Lebanese and international universities, a member of CMR advocacy groups, and a prolific writer on the subject. Both El Khazen⁴ and Khalil⁵ shared similar concerns regarding foreign interference, confessionalism, sectarianism, and the increasing political power of the Muslims.

¹ Ibid.

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

³ Ibid.

⁴ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁵ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2006 (see Appendix 7).

However, ironically, although both El Khazen¹ and Khalil² identified the need for Lebanon to deconfessionalize and to become more democratic, they also did not want to see a majority-rule democratic system in place at present. As members of a shrinking population, they feared that a plurality vote would result in Muslim majority rule in Lebanon, something these and other Lebanese Christians were worried about, whether real or imagined in terms of their siege mentality mentioned earlier in the chapter. This duplicity did not seem to confound the importance of the views shared by El Khazen and Khalil. That Khalil grew up in Egypt, where the Christian fear of being marginalized has continued to exist (Michael, 2011), might have served to buttress his personal concern. As mentioned previously, Druze leader Halabi was also very wary of democratic majority rule in Lebanon. In fact, as previously stated in this chapter, an official census of the population of Lebanon had not been done since 1932 exactly because of the fear that the Lebanese had about subsequent calculations regarding distribution of power and resources (Firro, 2003).

As shown thus far in this thesis, CMR is an interactive process that is affected by a slew of sociopolitical factors. That Christians fear encroachment from Muslims should be stated and then addressed within a conflict resolution approach for the betterment of CMR (Abu Al Nasr, 2001). That these and other Christians hope for a more democratic rule in the future but have declined the same now may not be unreasonable given the communal tensions that existed.

Regarding the status of CMR in postwar Lebanon, Salem³ replied that they were not as good as in prewar times due to political and regional suspicions. He cited the various Lebanese groups “jockeying for power,” resulting in a pronounced deterioration in CMR. A

¹ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix I10).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2006 (see Appendix 7).

³ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

couple of years after this interview, Salem's concern about poor behavior and practice of Lebanese politicians was widely shared by others. For example, according to Sheikh Abdel-Amir Qabalan, vice president of the Higher Shiite Council, "Politics is disuniting the Lebanese instead of unifying them at a time when they need their unity and cooperation to preserve their country and themselves away from tight [narrow] political interests" (Haddad, R., 2008, p. 2). Salem¹ named another cause of poor CMR in citing his perception that Islam had grown increasingly intolerant. This, of course, resulted in raised anxiety levels among Christians, who were disunited. In this, he was in agreement with El Khazen.²

In addressing IQ2, and as noted in chapter 1, Salem³ ruled out religious reasons for worsening CMR in Lebanon, echoing similar statements by most of the interviewees, including Ghazal⁴ and Mouawad.⁵ Aside from poor political practice, Salem cited issues of identity (which have been reviewed in chapter 5) that stemmed from social and demographic concerns: Lebanese Christians simply did not feel themselves to be an integral part of the Middle East to the extent that Lebanese Muslims did.

Mouawad⁶ addressed IQ1 by saying that CMR in Lebanon not only were worse than in the 1960s and 1970s but also had not improved at all since the end of the war. Concurring with Sammak,⁷ N. Musawi,⁸ and Massouh,⁹ she explained that it was the behavior of Lebanese politicians and the government that had actually harmed CMR in almost every conceivable manner.

¹ Ibid.

² El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

³ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

⁴ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

⁵ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12)

⁸ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

⁹ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

Mouawad's¹ reply to IQ2 was similar to Sammak's² belief that there had been a "fundamental change" in CMR due to "new elements on the ground." However, differing from Sammak, she identified these "new elements" as being the increased political power obtained by the Shiite-Muslim community, a sentiment shared by El Khazen,³ Khalil,⁴ and a few of the other respondents. In particular, she mentioned the rise to power of Shiite political parties such as Hezbollah. What she termed Syrian "hegemony" in Lebanon had served to buttress both the emergence of Shiite domination in Lebanon and the decline in positive CMR.⁵ According to her, Syria had been the primary factor in increasing Shiite power vis-à-vis the other Lebanese communities so that the Shiites now held influential and pivotal positions in various public sectors, from the army to the civil service administration and beyond. Mouawad explained that due, in part, to this favoritism of the Shiite community by Syrian policy and government officials at work in both Syria and Lebanon, there was a resulting problem of retaining the Christian population of Lebanon. She noted that more Lebanese lived outside of Lebanon than in Lebanon and that the majority of those were Maronites. Years before this writer's interview with Mouawad, the Lebanese were already concerned about what she lamented. Indeed, this has continued to be a major concern of many of the Christian Lebanese. According to Ghattas (1999, p. 3),

Christians in Lebanon, a minority in their country as well as in the region, are generally defiant towards other religions, Islam in particular. Before the war, a census set the Christian population at 60 percent, but today it is thought to be no more than 40 percent of the total.

In completing this research, this writer uncovered a change in the previously held notion that the Lebanese Civil War was fought primarily between Christians and Muslims.

¹ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

³ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁴ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

⁵ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

The Lebanese admitted that the war did take on a Christian-versus-Muslim essence as it unfolded. According to the Kaslik studies of 1976 (a series of journal articles and papers published at the completely Christian Kaslik university at that time) conducted shortly after the civil war began, “No matter what the causes of the war are, it is between Muslims versus Christians . . . the Christians are fighting the Muslims to safeguard the remnants of their Christian culture in this small part of the Muslim East” (as quoted in Khashan, 1990, p. 738). Another of many examples occurred in 1999 when a South Lebanese Army militiaman exclaimed, “It was a clear war. We knew what was happening; Muslims killed Christians and Christians killed Muslims” (Ghattas, 1999, p. 1). However, 10 years later, it was clear via the testimony of each of the respondents except one that in no way was the Lebanese Civil War predominantly a Christian-versus-Muslim conflict. Instead, they deemed it a political conflict.

Mouawad¹ cited additional factors relating to the poor state of CMR in present-day Lebanon. However, it is important to note that Mouawad was speaking from the perspective of a general political and Maronite Christian view. Her assessments were focused more on the plight of the Christian Lebanese and less on the actual interrelationships of the Christian and Muslim communities.

Mouawad² stated that due to the poor behavior of current politicians and their corruption, most Lebanese were alienated from politics. It appeared that the corruption of Lebanese politicians and officials had changed little over the years. As Mouawad decried corrupt leaders in contemporary Lebanon, 10 years ago this same concern existed: “Corruption, never an alien phenomenon in Lebanon’s past, has been increasing with respect to sums of money involved. Kickbacks from public spending are counted in millions rather

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

than thousands,” (Perthes, 1997, p. 117). These assessments by Perthes (1997) and Mouawad were accepted and diffused throughout Lebanon. The citizenry and most major political and community leaders, including Hezbollah, had all bemoaned the mismanagement and absconding of funds by the civil service administration, particularly in the departments of electricity, water, education, tourism, and environment and in the Ministry of the Displaced.

Mouawad¹ then turned to what she termed “Syrian hegemony” and its “favoritism” of the Shiites in general and Hezbollah in particular. This favoritism had resulted in destabilizing the traditional dependence on the *Zuama* (clan leaders) to maintain a closeness and loyalty to a community or political leader in the hopes of obtaining services such as lower school tuition costs and resources, particularly employment. *Zuama* existed from family bloodlines or kin, history, or all three. In prominent families throughout Lebanon, a few of their members had been more or less *Zuama* for hundreds of years. Among these were the examples of the Jumblatts and Arslans of the Shouf and Aley region of Lebanon and the Frangiehs and Mouawads of the Zgharta village/district. Mouawad was, in fact, a member of *Zuama* herself. Her husband had been the president of Lebanon for 21 days before a Syrian agent allegedly assassinated him.

When employed at a Lebanese university as a student affairs officer, this writer was instructed by the university director to reduce the tuition of certain students because they were supporters of Shouf MP Walid Jumblatt. On the grand list of students who were being considered for financial aid and grants, dozens of the names had the initials of the local *Zuama* written next to them. Thus, Mouawad² saw the supplanting of the *Zuama* powers as disruptive to the Lebanese social order.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

However, this system was widely criticized by countless Lebanese and non-Lebanese, political analysts, and the like. According to many Lebanese analysts, it was in the best interests of Lebanon to do away with the family clan rule of communities and the government, no matter how difficult (Haddad, R., 2008). In this writer's interview with Massouh, the director of the UB Center for Christian–Muslim Understanding, Massouh¹ considered this phenomenon as perhaps being the major deterrent to cordial CMR.

During the course of the interview, Mouawad,² a Maronite, seemed to contradict herself regarding the interrelationship between the Zuama, politics, and CMR. She identified Zuama political practice as a problem yet also bemoaned the trumping of the Zuama practices by Syrian hegemony. She explained how prior to Syrian hegemony, she preferred the practice wherein Lebanese constituencies befriended and supported leaders of prominent Lebanese families to obtain jobs, resources, and so forth. This preferred practice of Mouawad was actually Zuama protocol. As stated previously, she was a recognized Zaima (singular feminine form of Zuama) in North Lebanon. In reality, Mouawad seemed to be sharing her disappointment that the Zuama of Lebanon had been subdued by foreign interference in Lebanon. The Zuama were a fact of Lebanon and, although Mouawad contradicted herself a bit on the topic, she did identify the Zuama as a problem for positive, healthy CMR. Mouawad seemed to be realistic here in that she called for an improvement in the way the Zuama conducted themselves but not for their eradication from the Lebanese political scene, which might not be probable given their entrenchment in the Lebanese political fabric.

Husseini,³ the main author of the Tā'if Agreement, found that the attitudes of individual Lebanese, as opposed to the images portrayed in the press, were expressive of a the

¹ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

² Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

³ Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

desire for peace. What stood in their way were the politicians, who were the main cause for worsening CMR in Lebanon. This writer got the distinct impression that Hussein was disappointed that CMR had not greatly improved since the Tā'if Agreement. Hussein is known throughout Lebanon and by international politicians and scholars who focus on the Middle East as “the godfather of the Tā'if Agreement.” Hussein believed strongly that Tā'if could still work even as he revealed some disappointment that Tā'if had not been implemented by the Syrians, who, according to most interpretations of Tā'if, should have withdrawn from Lebanon years earlier than they did (Ziadeh 2006). He also showed some disappointment about some Lebanese politicians rejecting the Tā'if from almost the beginning and never giving it a chance to work. He felt this was particularly true of Christian politicians.

Hussein's implicit disgust was evident and came to fruition on August 12, 2008, when the Lebanese Parliament finally convened after many months of political tumult. Hussein resigned from Parliament that very day, complaining that the rival political camps had “torn apart” (Mroue, 2008, p. 4) the Lebanese constitution and Tā'if Agreement.

Shortly after this writer's interview with Hussein, then U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman asked to meet with Hussein, doing so on at least two occasions (Sfeir, April 15, 2005 p.2) Since the interview with Hussein, the United States, France, and the United Nations have become particularly persistent in attempts to enforce Resolution 1559, which, among other aspects, includes a call for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Feltman inquired about the portion of Tā'if that also included a call for Syrian redeployment and withdrawal from Lebanon. Hussein's exact understanding of Tā'if was referenced in order for Feltman to understand whether Syria was in violation of the agreement. However, Hussein had not called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops and stressed that Lebanon should

have a good, strong relationship with Syria. In the interview with this writer, Hussein indicated his hope of seeing a Lebanon that has strong national principles to ensure national unity as well as Arab identity of Lebanon as called for in Tā'if.¹

N. Musawi² interpreted IQ1, which inquires if CMR have improved or not post war Lebanon, as implying that the Lebanese Civil War was clearly between Christians and Muslims, a notion he calmly yet seriously rejected. In fact, N. Musawi spoke of Lebanese wars, using the plural rather than the singular. He stated that their cause was political rather than religious. He noted that Christians fought Christians, citing the Maronite leaders Aoun and Gea-Gea, while Amal fought Hezbollah, both of which were Shiite entities. To call the conflicts that began in 1975 Christian versus Muslim was too simplistic. However, the outcome of the war had an effect on CMR because it resulted in the separation of the two religious groups in society in general and in education in particular. These insights by N. Musawi were similar to those of several other interviewees such as Sammak³ and Massouh⁴.

In addressing IQ2, Musawi⁵ believed the problem/cause was political and, more specifically, foreign interference. Musawi explained that foreign powers such as the United States and Israel continued to try to divide the Lebanese and other Arab people through their political and military maneuverings. He felt that the United States and Israel still used the “divide and conquer” policy throughout the Arab Middle East and the world and cited the examples of Palestine, where the Israelis wanted the Palestinians to fight and weaken each other, and of Iraq, where the United States was trying to implement the same tactic. He believed that Israeli and American policy was the force behind this agenda in Lebanon during

¹ Ibid.

² N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

⁴ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

⁵ Ibid.

its civil war and that these countries were still using that same policy decades later. A few years after this writer's interview with Musawi, foreign interference was still considered a major divisive factor among the Lebanese. An editorial in the leading English newspaper in Lebanon, *The Daily Star*, stated that (Aug. 4, 2008, p. 9) stated that

one reason that Lebanon gets so badly bruised in the international tug of war is that our own leaders fail to do the same [resist foreign interference]. Instead of setting down national priorities in the form of a party platform many factional leaders make a habit of taking cues from foreign sources.

Musawi¹ also complained that the Israeli model was terribly flawed, given that it was not based on dialogue with the Palestinians that was remotely evenhanded. Instead, it was based on racism with religious overtones. Therefore, it was up to the Lebanese to resist any effort by the Israelis to create a wedge between the various elements of Lebanese society.

Norman Finkelstein, an American scholar and university professor of political science at DePaul University at the time of this interview, visited Lebanon and appeared on its television station Al-Manar in 2002. Afterward, he wrote to this author, stating that he believed the philosophy of Hezbollah was a sound one in that it addressed "all of humanity,"² echoing Musawi. On Al-Mustaqbal ("The Future") television in March 2008, during another visit to Lebanon, Finkelstein stated, "I'm going to honor Hezbollah [for defending Lebanon against the Israeli invasion of 2006]; they showed courage; they showed discipline. I respect that" (Hezbollah, the Honour of Lebanon, 2008).

For Musawi,³ and for Hezbollah, the solution to the CMR woes in Lebanon could be found through dialogue to overcome "misguided politics" and efforts by politicians to use religion inappropriately. Part of the dialogue should involve an as yet nonexistent CMR curriculum in the educational system. Musawi's call for dialogue had been supported, at least

¹ Ibid.

² Norman Finkelstein, personal communication, March 27, 2008 (see Appendix 24).

³ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

publicly, by both the Christian and Muslim communities of Lebanon (Hashem, 2006b).

According to the Maronite Christian Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, “Our problems cannot be solved but through dialogue and discussion. This dialogue must be true in the heart and not only words in the mouth so that together we can face these problems” (Hatoum, 2006, p. 1).

N. Musawi¹ expanded his call for dialogue, citing its essential nature while bemoaning the fact that a gap between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon remained. He believed that Tā’if made it possible to overcome hindrances, allowing the Lebanese to progress quickly in this area. As a high-ranking representative of Hezbollah, Musawi had two main necessities for dialogue. The first related to the healing that was necessary due to the bad outcome of the civil war. The second related to unity not just in the “ghetto” called Lebanon but also throughout the world. N. Musawi’s concept of a ghetto forming was found in some of the more recent literature on Lebanese CMR in which the phrase “cultural ghettos” (Dagher, 2000) was sometimes used. The literature indicated that, overall, CMR were worse today than they were prior to the Lebanese civil wars. The strengths and possible biases of N. Musawi’s views have been combined and analyzed along with those of fellow Shiites Husseini and I. Mousawi following the latter’s remarks toward the end of the chapter.

According to Hajjar,² the strained relationships between the Christians and the Muslims of Lebanon were of a political rather than a religious nature because of the freedom to express one’s religion in modern Lebanon. Nonetheless, Hajjar added that political leaders introduced religion and theology into political issues for political ends. However, their doing so should not obscure the fact that the basic questions affecting CMR were political rather than religious. Thus, Hajjar was in agreement with respondent Massouh, citing Christian-versus-Christian and Shiite-versus-Shiite violence during the fighting.

¹ Ibid.

² Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

Gemayel¹ responded to IQ1 by suggesting that the compromise of 1943 that laid the foundations for the confessional system could have worked had it been allowed to stand without external interference. However, Gemayel stated that these good political intentions between earlier Lebanese Christian and Muslim leaders had been disrupted by transnational issues and problems, ranging from the Palestinian question to Nasserism and pan-Arabism. Under pan-Arabism, the Muslims of Lebanon and of the greater Middle East became enthralled with the notion of a greater Arab world and nation, which could result in blurring Lebanese nationalism and separatism.² Specifically, Gemayel flatly stated that Lebanese Christians were not Arab (a discussion covered in-depth in chapter 5) and, thus, Arab nationalist movements would favor the majority Muslim population of the Middle East. The result would be the upsetting of the close Christian–Muslim ratio of Lebanon.

Syria complicated matters by intervening in the post-1975 fighting, not to end the Lebanese war but for its own interests. Syrian forces came because of the request of then President Suleiman Frangieh and because of an Arab league mandate.³ With Muslim Lebanese adhering to Arab nationalist ideology, along with the Palestinian and Syrian presences, the Christians felt increasingly isolated before war broke out (as Massouh⁴ also noted). At that point, the Christians sought allies, a point also raised and shared by Frangieh.⁵ Gemayel’s grandfather, of the same name, was quoted prior to the civil war as saying, “We are ready to strike a deal with the devil itself,” a code word for Israel and its formidable military (Schiff & Ya’ari, 1984, p. 12). Therefore, it was the Gemayel clan, the dominant Christian militia and force in Lebanon at the time, who received military support from Israel.

¹ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

⁵ Frangieh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

This infuriated the Muslim population, Arab nationalists of Lebanon, and the rest of the Arab Middle East, as Gemayel¹ acknowledged.

Unlike most of the other interviewees, Gemayel² believed that CMR had improved after the fighting stopped because of Tā'if and UN Resolution 1559. Through these, the Lebanese were allowed to articulate common aims, especially after the Syrian withdrawal.

It is important to note that this writer's interview with Gemayel was conducted just 4 months after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, which was considered a major turning point in recent Lebanese history. It was the catalyst that ended the Syrian military presence in Lebanon after 30 years, with full withdrawal occurring on April 30, 2005 (Ziadeh, 2006). Prior to the Hariri assassination, the interviewees who opposed the Syrian presence in Lebanon spoke in codes regarding their disapproval, thereby avoiding stating their opinions directly. Gemayel had gone on record, as had his father Amin and his assassinated uncle Bashir (both former presidents of Lebanon), by making highly critical speeches concerning the role of Syria in Lebanon (Ziadeh 2006). Because this interview took place after the Syrian withdrawal and because of his record of criticizing the Syrian presence, Gemayel was unlike some of the other interviewees in that he overtly expressed his resentment of the Syrian role in Lebanon.

Responding to IQ2, Gemayel³ denied that the biggest problems with CMR were caused by religious differences, although certainly some of the lesser problems might have been. Rather, he asserted that Muslims, unlike Christians, were not able to separate politics and religion, thus causing intracommunal tension. This sentiment was shared by one other

¹ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

interviewee, El Khazen.¹ Gemayel believed that although Christians could adapt more easily to *Al-almaniyya* or “secularism,” the Muslims could not and did not want to adapt to it.

Despite his pride at being a Christian, Gemayel² preferred to think of himself as Lebanese and to speak of his compatriots as being Lebanese without any religious qualifier. Gemayel insisted that CMR had deteriorated in Lebanon because of the intermingling of religion and politics, obscuring the essentially political nature of the problem. Gemayel saw the Syrian role as negative with regard to CMR, explaining that Syria keyed in on Christian–Muslim discontent and supported and fomented the same through violence and propaganda. Comparing both Syrian and Israeli impacts on CMR of Lebanon, Gemayel contended that Syria was worse than Israel, which acted as a long-term weakening and destabilizing factor. However, Syria actually infiltrated Lebanon and became part of its sociopolitical fabric.

Gemayel was the only respondent who clearly felt that theological and religious reasons were a cause of CMR discord in Lebanon. Additionally, he was the only respondent who felt CMR were better now than in prewar Lebanon. Based on the viewpoints of all the other field expert respondents, these positions of Gemayel’s were the exception. This could be due in part to the fact that Gemayel was the youngest and perhaps least experienced of the field experts. In addition, although Gemayel belonged to a politically involved family, he was a newly elected member of parliament at the time of his interview. He also admitted and presented as not feeling fully comfortable with answering CMR-focused questions but wished instead to answer politically based ones.³

In addition, Gemayel’s Maronite Phalangist party and former militia had been accused of anti-Muslim bias for decades, especially during the Lebanese Civil War.

¹ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

² Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

³ Ibid.

His answers might have been an attempt to deflect some of the past blame assigned to his political party and to project a more optimistic tone. Even so, the Gemayel family, which boasted two past Lebanese presidents, members of parliament, and a huge Christian following, needed to have their Christian viewpoint included in CMR issues because of their important and influential presence in Lebanon. However, Gemayel's other viewpoints regarding CMR were similar to those of the more experienced field expert respondents regarding the effect of poor politics, communal displacement and other cause of CMR discord.

Aoun¹ contemplated IQ1 before responding with a degree of disappointment that the Lebanese had not progressed to the point of achieving real peace despite efforts toward better CMR. Aoun was quick to explain that, as the leader of Al-Tayyar, or the Free Patriotic Movement, he was working on CMR not from its political aspect but rather from a communitarian point of view, making the case that he believed in CMR from a humanistic rather than a political vantage point.

Aoun² stated that although CMR had worsened since the civil war, he and the FPM had been making gains. He proudly pointed to the agreement with Hezbollah that had been followed with engagement in dialogue with the Sunnis. These developments, Aoun explained, were not due to politicians and their agreements but to popular support for such actions. Aoun reported that he had been engaging the predominantly Sunni Muslim communities of Saida, Tripoli, and Akkar through recent visits to each. It was known that political tensions existed between Aoun and the leader of the largest Sunni Muslim party in Lebanon, headed by Saad Hariri, the son of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who was assassinated on February 14, 2006.

¹ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

² Ibid.

Saad Hariri's Al-Mustaqbal, or "Future Movement" party, had been in a political struggle with Aoun and the FPM for several months. This struggle not only existed at the time of this interview but also continued to exist as of late 2011. The Future Movement and its allies lost their majority in the Lebanese Parliament in January 2011 with Aoun's FPM and Hezbollah having the largest number.

An example of the tension between the two groups surfaced in the interview. Aoun produced and discussed an article that he stated had appeared in a Saudi Arabian newspaper a few days earlier in which he had been called "Hitler and Mussolini." Aoun¹ pointed out how the Future Movement, headed by the billionaire Hariri family, which also owned and published a Lebanese newspaper, had the resources and influence to publish such information in Lebanese newspapers. Saad Hariri had spent years living and working in Saudi Arabia; he had very close ties with Saudi Arabia. Aoun said he was unable to utilize the media as the Future Movement did, which also had a radio and television station, due to limited finances.

Even so, Aoun² was proud that his message was received "at the community, people level" rather than through the media. He stated that he was trying to unify the Lebanese as Lebanese rather than resorting to sectarianism, which had been the rule for 30 years. However, now Aoun could cite a local Lebanese comedy television show called "Bass Meit Watan," or "When the Nation Died," which lampooned the Hezbollah spiritual leader Hassan Nasrallah in June 2006. Initially, tens of thousands of Lebanese, mostly Shiite, took to the streets to protest this insult to their leader. Already experiencing heightened political and social tensions, Lebanon could have seen the protest spin out of control and into violence. Instead, asserted Aoun, the FPM and Hezbollah, which were the Christian and Muslim parties respectively, collaborated and prevented the protests from getting out of control. This

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

example, he explained, was a very recent incident that had been solved due to a buildup of trust.

Addressing IQ2, Aoun¹ stated that the causes of poor CMR were various, including political, theological, economic, and social stratification reasons, among others. Aoun, like the other respondents, felt that several sociopolitical factors had resulted in the poorer status of CMR. Unlike the other respondents, however, he considered religion as somewhat problematic and felt all the factors harming CMR held almost equal weight. Most if not all the respondents who pointed to several detriments to CMR, nonetheless put more emphasis on one or two predominant causes rather than equally diffusing the blame on several factors.

Aoun² addressed each possible cause of poor CMR. Regarding its possible political causes, Aoun pointed to regimes born of sectarianism that, ipso facto, had little reason to change the confessional system. However, the factor receiving prominent attention from Aoun was the Palestinian presence. This concept of the PLO presence in Lebanon being a catalyst was strongly supported by respondent El Khazen.³ Additionally, according to much of the literature regarding CMR,

the issues that divided them were the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon . . . The Christian Lebanese Front viewed the armed presence of Palestinians in Lebanon as a threat to its sovereignty. It also perceived the PLO as having tilted the delicate balance of power between the religious communities in Lebanon in favor of the Muslims, and it demanded the PLO's presence be curbed. (Deeb & Deeb, 1991, pp. 84-85)

To be sure, Lebanon held many attractions for the Palestinians, given the open nature of Lebanese society, including freedom of speech. Aoun⁴ felt that Lebanese open society resulted in others abusing it. Therefore, when tensions increased, some Arab countries did not

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁴ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

assist Lebanon during the war because they were “envious” or felt threatened by its freedoms. Thus, according to Aoun, a society that had been the “epitome” of CMR before the war was devastated due to external forces that were complicit in its destruction.

I. Mousawi¹ began his reply to IQ1 by stating that CMR in postwar Lebanon were worse than in prewar Lebanon. I. Mousawi believed that this was shameful, given the very nature of Lebanon where CMR “should and could be wonderful.” Similar to the statement of Nawaf Musawi, director of international relations for Hezbollah, I. Mousawi asserted that the fighting was not between Muslims on one side and Christians on the other, echoing comments from other respondent regarding Christian-versus-Christian and Shiite-versus-Shiite violence. He also added Shiite-versus-PLO violence, with the PLO being predominantly Sunni. However, he insisted that the violence was really “party versus party.”

Responding to IQ2, I. Mousawi² felt the main cause of community discord in Lebanon was the backwardness of political leaders and their practices. Of equal weight was the interference from actors external to Lebanon, such as Israel and the United States. The former was especially harmful in that it supplied small groups in Lebanon that would have had little support otherwise. Their attainment of military power gave them disproportionate influence, making them negative factors on the Lebanese scene.

Citing the Zuama as manipulators of religion for political purposes, I. Mousawi³ believed tensions were the result of politics rather than religion. In this, he agreed with Massouh.⁴ I. Mousawi singled out the “poor behavior” of the Maronites especially in this regard.

¹ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

Shiites N. Musawi¹ and I. Mousawi,² both of Hezbollah, gave very similar responses, while fellow Shiite Hussein, ³ who was not a Hezbollah affiliate, had a noticeably different reply to the query regarding CMR and politics. The former, whose party's military wing fought several fierce battles with Israel, subsequently blamed Israeli policy, its military, and the U.S. support of the same for fomenting intercommunal rivalries. Having faced the Israeli army and its now disbanded southern Lebanese militia, I. Mousawi and N. Musawi were exposed firsthand and were able to share how Israel had disrupted CMR in several villages (Fadlallah, 2001; Qassem, 2005). The latter, Hussein, was the chair of the Tā'if Agreement and, as such, lamented the point that this agreement had not been adhered to nor implemented properly. Hussein, a Tā'if Agreement expert, maintained and shared his position to date that lack of proper follow-up with the Tā'if Agreement had harmed CMR. All three of these Shiite officials shared important information from direct experience without unfounded bias.

Franjeh⁴ shared that the Lebanese "historical memory" was problematic, noting that people looked to their past to find something that made them different from each other, something that put them at odds with one another, and did not let go. He cited massacres and protracted identity-driven conflicts, such as the 1860 Druze massacres of the Christians, as examples of such a memory (Mackey, 1999). Because of such historical memories, the Lebanese had been unable to move away from conflict.

According to Matar,⁵ CMR problems were not the result of class or confession. Rather, the Lebanese people must have a government and state in which leaders care about all citizens being free and equal. If the government did not promote positive inter-communal

¹ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

² I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

³ Hussein, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

⁴ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

⁵ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

relations, the 18 different confessional communities in Lebanon should be mobilized wisely to do the job, forming a government that will create a melting pot and solve the CMR problem. Failure to do so could result in more political conflict.

The inadequacies and failures of Tā'if had also been harmful to CMR, according to both Matar¹ and Bou Habib.² The original aim of the Tā'if Agreement was to create a new sociopolitical conviviality among Christians and Muslims. Instead, the Zuama and Christian and Muslim civilians had remained distant rather than working together and the Zuama had exploited the people for their own interests and benefit. Matar³ distinguished between religious leaders, some of whom were constructive toward CMR, and political leaders who exploited the people.

In sum, all 17 field expert respondents expressed serious concern about the havoc wreaked on CMR because of Lebanese politics. Although this writer interviewed each field expert separately, there existed a unity and corroboration regarding poor political practice and CMR. The field experts, although religiously diversified, were known to have good relationships with one another. As such, this writer clearly sensed that these experts, who had interacted positively with one another before, during, and after the civil war, were disgusted that Lebanese politicians could not do the same for the sake of Lebanon and CMR. Unlike with the issues raised in chapters 1 (religious differences) and 2 (communal displacement and education), the respondents were unanimous and expressed a higher level of concern about the negative role of poor political practice. Many of the field experts made a point of emphasizing political practice over religious differences as a more potent cause of CMR problems. They did this, it seemed, to dispel what they believed was a misconception about

¹ Ibid.

² Bou Habib, personal communication (see Appendix 11).

³ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix H).

the civil war and CMR. The field experts yielded more information, intensity, and detail about the political causes for the downfall of CMR than about the other factors brought forth in this thesis thus far. The respondents identified corrupt and inept politicians, foreign interference, confessionalism, factionalism, and the self-interest of the Zuama to name a few of the impediments to healthy CMR. The native Lebanese field experts had lived before, during, and after the Lebanese Civil War and had personally witnessed the changes that occurred with CMR. Since its inception, Lebanon had followed a confessional system of governance. Therefore, the field experts had lived the political–confessional experience. Thus, their existence and views represented the reality, although not the only reality, of keen perceptions regarding what helped and/or hindered CMR. The field experts’ corroboration on the intense role of Lebanese politics should be considered an important indicator of an area that needs to be addressed to improve CMR.

The Students

Per the student survey, the extent to which the tensions between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon was caused by political differences was not at great variance with the expert respondents. Nearly 9 out of 10 of those who answered the question saw political differences at the root of CMR discord. The combined responses to the question of *strongly agree* and *agree* totaled 87.3% of the student responses, indicating that political differences were a major cause of CMR discord (see Table 22.7). As shown in chapter 1, students also chose religion as a major cause of CMR problems, with 68.3% believing religious differences were a major cause of discord (see Table 22.1). Here the students’ views were at great variance with the field experts’ views that religious differences were a minimal factor in CMR discord.

Students also believed that poor political behavior was a major detriment to Lebanon holistically, not just to CMR; two thirds (67.3%) of those surveyed responded that such behavior was either the most important or the second most important contributor to negative CMR within Lebanon (see Table 22.8). Based on the percentages of responses, the students felt that poor political practice had more of an impact on CMR specifically (87.3%) than on Lebanon holistically (67.1%). By contrast, other phenomena such as the economy (discussed in chapter 2) were not seen as significant causes of CMR discord among the students.

The data indicated that the students carefully read the questions and answered with subtle and not-so-subtle nuances, even though the questions that were posed appeared to be similar at first glance. In this instance, the student responses were indeed similar to the expert respondents on the same political query. Both sets of respondents converged in their feelings that poor political practice was a major cause of both CMR and overall Lebanese discord.

Foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon was viewed by nearly half of the students (48.5%) as the first or second greatest problem in the country (see Table 22.9). A common theme with most of the field experts and others in explaining the many societal struggles in Lebanon was that foreign intervention or foreign interference was the single most significant reason for its ills. Historians and the Lebanese themselves mentioned the Israeli invasions; the Syrian presence; the influence of the United States and Russian; and Iraqi, Iranian, PLO, and Libyan interference, to name but few.

Some Lebanese may find it surprising that students did not place foreign intervention at a higher level in precipitating the decline of Lebanon. Although 48.5% is nearly half of all the respondents, the Lebanese in general have stated, as has been reported in Western media, that foreign interference destroyed Lebanon (Fisk 2002). It may be that foreign intervention is so pervasive in Lebanon that it has become the baseline and seems normal. Additionally, it

is possible that some Lebanese hold themselves responsible for their own demise rather than foreign interference, as authors such as Salibi (1988) and Khalifah (1997) believed.

Perhaps the most persuasive reason the students did not place the same emphasis on foreign interference as did the field experts lies in their perceptions. For the young Lebanese, travel abroad and foreign businesses represent the best employment and advancement opportunities. Add to this the history of war and conflict in Lebanon and its poor economy and uncertain future and it becomes clearer why the students viewed foreign involvement in a more positive light than the older field experts did. Foreigners may offer the gift of a better life and future. This was buttressed by the student survey results, as shown in chapter 2 and in Appendix 22, which shows that students gave their highest preference to Western education, influence, and languages rather than to those of Lebanon.

In sum, the students reported that Lebanese political practices were a major cause of CMR problems and not an insignificant cause for Lebanon discord overall. These findings were consistent with those of the field experts. The finding shown in chapter 1 of the students believing that religious differences were a significant detriment to CMR was at great variance to that of the field experts who found religion to be a minimal factor. Just under half of the students saw foreign interference as a significant negative force in CMR, while all of the field experts found it to be a major impediment.

As mentioned in chapter 1, given their age, the students were not firsthand witnesses to the civil war and the fluctuations that occurred in CMR. They were less mature in terms of life experience and educational and psychosocial perspectives. Unlike many of the field expert respondents, the students interviewed were not CMR scholars, university professors, experienced politicians, or clergymen. As such, they might not have been able to produce the intellectualized and reliable responses that the field experts did. Still, their information was

valuable. After all, it was the university students and youth who led the call, through large protests, for an end to sectarianism. They were the ones trying to shape the political future of Lebanon (Dhumi, 2011; Meguerditchian, 2011; Sikimic, 2011). Additionally, the information shared by the students had a high percentage of agreement and corroboration amongst themselves, which could be a base for unity among them. Their information was representative of postwar present-day thought, which could be compared, contrasted, and assessed alongside the field expert respondents and the literature.

Summary and Conclusions: Political Causes of CMR Discord

Based on the information gleaned from this research, CMR were faced with real political obstacles, replete with double binds and ironies. To begin, all of the expert respondents except one insisted that Lebanese CMR were much worse than they had been in the 1960s and '70s, prior to the Lebanese Civil War. All of the field experts, in particular Massouh, Khalil, Hajjar, Husseini, Matar and Gemayel, and nearly all of the university students reported that a principal cause of this deterioration in CMR was poor political practices. Specifically, they revealed that various politicians jockeyed for power while losing track of the needs and desires of the people. This problem of jockeying for power was evidenced by several incidents in the past few years alone wherein Lebanese governments could not be formed for several months at a time. Without an official government in place, little could be done to improve CMR.

Most Lebanese also blamed many of their political leaders, often called Zuama, who wrongly riled and rallied their Christian or Muslim constituencies out of fear of the other. Based on the field expert reports, particularly Ghazal, Mouawad, and Matar, the Zuama impressed upon their constituencies the need for their support in order to have access to jobs; resources, such as lower school tuition costs for their children; the political process; and more.

A dichotomy here is that while most of the respondents decried Zuama practice, some were interested in keeping this in place, as stated by Mouawad, a political Zaima herself. The Arab Spring protests that spread throughout North Africa and the Arab Middle East came about, in large part, as an utter rejection of corrupt leaders remaining in power too long (Khouri, June 4, 2011 p. 6). These leaders are to the Arab Spring what the Zuama are to Lebanon. In fact, Lebanon had its own Arab Spring(s) well before the ones sweeping the area in 2011. The difference, however, was that the Lebanese Arab Springs were divided between the March 8 and March 14 movements and a few other movements. The Arab Spring protests have also exhibited more unanimity than those in Lebanon have. Although the Lebanese Arab Spring protests were large in number, they were split. Even so, that disgust that the Arab masses have for their dictators is the same that the Lebanese had for some of the Zuama and other dictators (Mroue, 2011c; Saab, 2011).

Based on the respondents' information, there was a nearly complete lack of government efficiency and strong political leadership. They pointed out that civil institutions such as the armed forces, the police, electrical services, and so on were riddled with corruption and inept management and that these did not help in improving CMR. Specifically, the respondents' stated and the student survey results showed that the Lebanese government had not put adequate resources into CMR advocacy. When pitted against weak Lebanese institutions and basic needs such as water, electricity, and security, CMR issues were all but forgotten. Indeed, the few present-day CMR working groups were all private.

On the other hand, the field experts as well as Lebanese and foreign political analysts praised the Lebanese governmental structure and system of elections. For example, most of the Arab Middle Eastern neighbors of Lebanon are kingdoms, emirates, dynasties, or false democracies (Bill & Springborg, 1994; Khater, 2004). Saudi Arabia is a kingdom controlled,

as the name indicates, by the Saud family. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been ruled by the Hussein family for over 50 years. King Hassan II of Morocco ruled for 38 years until his death in 1999, with his reign being followed by that of his son, King Mohammed VI. Countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Libya, though not officially kingdoms, have been ruled by the Assads, Mubaraks, and the Kaddafis, respectively, for over 30 years each and have been grooming their next of kin to succeed them (Gelvin, 2008; Rossi, 2008). This next of kin grooming has been disrupted by the Arab Spring protests that began across much of North Africa and the Arab Middle East in January 2011. These protests have been motivated in large part by the desire of the people for much more frequent leadership changes in their countries. In Lebanon, the president is elected by parliament every 6 years; parliamentary elections occur every 4 years. Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has had 19 separate presidencies; while the other countries mentioned previously have had as few as two or three top rulers (Daou, 2001; Smith, 2006).

Even so, as evidenced by the field expert and student responses and as revealed in the literature review, the Lebanese governmental structure and system of elections have been undermined by the political *Zuama* and other ruling classes, foreign interference, fraudulent elections, assassinations, and war (Firro, 2003; Khalaf, 2002). Rather than the rule of true democratic law and elections that can serve to buttress healthy CMR, Lebanon has continued to be ruled by the same petty dynasties and elite political clans (Haddad, R., 2008). Although Lebanon is not ruled by a king, it has been ruled by kingdom-like political families since its independence. Just some of these are the Gemayels, Jumblatts, Arslans, Harirris, Franjiehs, Karamis, and Berris (Firro, 2003; Khalifah, 1997). According to long-time Lebanese politician and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, “Lebanon is not a nation. It’s a bunch of tribes” (Zacharia, 2010, p. 4).

Several of the Christian respondents decried what they called the lack of democracy in Lebanon yet at the same time admitted that they did not want a democratic political system at this point, fearing that a plurality vote would certainly usher in more Muslim power and control over Lebanon (Sakr, January 16, 2010, p. 3). Also of concern was the fact that there were still a few Lebanese political parties that continued to hope for a preeminently Christian or Muslim state in Lebanon (Khalifah, 1997). As such, consolidating the Lebanese need for more democratic reforms with the hesitation of some Christian leadership and their constituencies to accept these reforms is a dilemma that will need to be resolved.

Additionally, as mentioned by Franjeh,¹ the Lebanese have a historical memory that results in their not being likely to forgive and forget past grievances, many of which involve murder and the destruction of property and livelihoods. Franjeh mentioned intra-Christian rivalries in his home district of Zgharta and Christian–Muslim rivalries throughout Lebanon as examples of this historical memory problem. Because so many intra-Lebanon conflicts have occurred, historical memory runs deep. Just some of these incidents that reverberate in present-day Lebanon as grievances are Muslim anger at Maronite assistance to Israel during the 1983 invasion of Lebanon; Druze massacres of Christians in the Shouf and Aley mountains in 1860 and during the civil war, 1975–1991; then Christian warlord Samir Gea-Gea’s alleged assassination of a Sunni politician from Tripoli, Rasheed Karami; and Christian Southern Lebanese Army members occupation of predominantly Muslim populated southern Lebanon, inter alia, in conjunction with Israel.

One of the most important causes of CMR discord identified by every field expert, as well as the university students, was foreign interference. Treachery by neighboring countries, such as Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, was strongly implicated. Outside the Middle

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix L).

East, the Lebanese pointed out that some of the superpowers such as the United States, Russia, and the European Union were jockeying for power and support in Lebanon, which results in a great deal of animosity, depending on countries from which the Christians or Muslims are accepting or declining support (Chomsky & Achcar, 2006; Hanf & Salam, 2003). Most of the respondents also pointed to the PLO presence in Lebanon as a major catalyst to CMR discord.

However, it is the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon themselves who leave themselves vulnerable to, or in need of, foreign intervention. For example, it is the Maronite population of Lebanon in particular that has sought Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory (which occurred in March 2005) and limited Syrian influence thereafter. There is a long record of the Maronite patriarchy's criticism of the Syrian presence and influence in Lebanon. The most recent Maronite patriarch, Beshara Rai, has a history of being extremely critical of Syrian influence in Lebanon.

Even so, Beshara Rai shocked Lebanese Christians and Muslims alike with his strong public support for the Syrian government (and its ally Hezbollah) while the it was being confronted by the Arab Spring (Dakroub, 2011c). Stunned by this, the Lebanese sought clarification but instead received a reaffirmation:

Defying March 14 Christian politicians' harsh criticisms, Maronite Patriarch Beshara Rai upheld his controversial statements on Syria and Hezbollah's weapons as his remarks again came under fire Sunday from a member of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri's parliamentary Future bloc. (Dakroub, 2011c, p. 1).

This demand for limiting Syrian and foreign influence in Lebanon and then its subsequent retraction has resulted in Christian-Muslim and inter-Christian confusion and tension. For example, the Shiites of Hezbollah and the so-called March 8th political group

now welcomed the patriarch's remarks; while the Sunnis of the Future Bloc Movement of the March 14th group now condemned them. The Lebanese must now to address this issue as well. Just as Ireland may always be influenced by the United Kingdom and Canada by the United States, so too Lebanon will continue to be greatly influenced by Syria and other foreign actors.

Massouh¹ and Ghazal² both stated that Lebanon often behaves like a third-world country in its reaction to diversity of opinion. That same diversity in first-world countries has not resulted in violence and civil war as it has in Lebanon. Each of the respondents mentioned how Lebanon, to different degrees, was once known as a symbol of healthy CMR; yet this is no longer the case, as stated by Aoun,³ Mouawad,⁴ and Franjieh.⁵ Conflict for Lebanon has often seemed to be just a comment or event away from renewed violence, as in the case of the dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a U.N. investigative team project into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Harri (Tensions in Lebanon, 2010). The March 8th group rejected Lebanese cooperation with the tribunal, while the March 14 political camp demanded it. Another example of conflict brinkmanship has been the frequent threats by Israel to attack Lebanon again(Hirst 2011).

As referenced by the field experts, the university students, and the literature, foreign interference and the divide-and-conquer practice have had negative roles in CMR and reconciliation. In particular, N. Musawi⁶ of Hezbollah felt the biggest threat to CMR in Lebanon was external intervention by the United States and Israel. He even predicted a large-

¹ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

² Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

³ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

⁴ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

⁵ Franjieh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

⁶ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

scale attack against Lebanon by Israel, supported by the United States, which came true just a few months later in the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. For decades, the Israelis have tried to forge a separate agreement with the Lebanese Maronite political parties. For its part, the United States have supported this—and the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1979 and 1982 as well—and offered to send Israel bunker busters and nuclear weapons to attack Lebanon during the 2006 invasion (Hovsepian, 2008). After the 2006 Israeli invasion, the United States has sent Lebanon military equipment to help it “fight terrorism” (Mozgovaya, 2010). Inasmuch as the United States considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, it is thus providing the Lebanese with weapons to fight against one another in what the field experts considered a foreign divide-and-conquer scheme. Herein lies a major obstacle to Lebanese CMR: foreign interference and its policy of splitting within. The question then becomes how Lebanon, with its layers of national fragility and particularly weak governance, will hope to manage internal CMR divisions as well as super power interference.

With all 17 field experts and nearly 90% of the university students identifying political dysfunction as a major cause of poor CMR, the issue here is if and when the Lebanese can revamp their political system and minimize poor political practice as one major step toward improving CMR. The political system had a major overhaul in 1991 when the Tāʿif Agreement was signed, a new Lebanese government was formed, all Lebanese participants in the civil war were granted amnesty, and parliamentary and other political representation were split evenly between Christians and Muslims. Even so, several of the respondents, such as principle Tāʿif architect Hussein¹, complained that CMR had also suffered because of improper implementation of the Tāʿif Agreement (Sakr, 2011a, p. 2). A small number, such as Bou Habib, believed the opposite, that the Tāʿif Agreement as implemented resulted in

¹ Hussein, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

stripping some of the Christian president's powers, which ultimately increased Christian resentment and thus CMR discord (Dagher, 2001). As such, with both supporters and opponents of the Ṭā'if Agreement, the question becomes whether it can still be a useful tool for healthy CMR or should be abandoned for a more acceptable formula. Although the Ṭā'if Agreement was signed toward the very end of the civil war, based on the field experts' reports and on the data from the student surveys, CMR has not improved in postwar Lebanon. Therefore, perhaps an updated, more suitable agreement is needed. Even though the revised Lebanese political and civil service system is actually more confessionally based in that it calls for exact proportional Christian and Muslim representation, 20 years later, according to the expert respondents, the data from the student surveys, and the literature, CMR have become worse than ever before (Strohmer, 2007).

Nearly all of the field experts decried political confessionality, although some, such as El Khazen¹ and Halabi,² felt it was the lesser evil, at least for the time being. This seems to indicate Lebanese ambivalence within the negatively fused, codependent relationship between the confessional system and CMR (Abu Al Nasr, 2001; Dagher, 2001; Khalifah, 1997). If religion to Karl Marx is "the opium of the masses" (Giddens, 2001, p.537), in comparison, for the Lebanese, confessionality is "the drug that weakens Lebanon's body" (Hodeib, 2010, p. 6).

The Lebanese may be in another double bind regarding confessionality/sectarianism. According to Middle East scholar Ussama Makdisi (2000), confessionality/sectarianism did not exist in Lebanon for centuries; it began as an outcome of the war between the Druze and Maronites of 1860. One hundred fifty years later, based on the data from the field experts and the university students, confessionality /sectarianism was a main factor that resulted in the

¹ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

² Halabi, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 4).

civil war and worsened CMR after the war. This presents a cyclic problem: War causes confessionalism and confessionalism causes war.

On the one hand confessionalism has not improved CMR; on the other hand, some Lebanese communities fear inequality without it. Beginning in December 2009 and continuing to the completion of this thesis in November 2011, Lebanese politicians made almost daily newspaper and television headlines calling for abolishing or revamping the confessional system. For example, in 2009, Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri called for “abolishing political sectarianism, while his demand drew renewed criticism from parliamentary majority figures” (Sakr, December 31, 2009, p. 1); however, Prime Minister Saad Hariri called only for some mild amendments (Sakr, January 16, 2010, p.2). For their parts, the Maronite Christian Phalange party and Metn district MP Sami Gemayel called for the establishment of a federal state as a guarantee of Christians’ equality in case political sectarianism were to be abolished. Gemayel exclaimed, “The abolition of political sectarianism would lead to the rule of the predominant religious sect,” referring to Muslims and adding that his Phalange Party “rejected the logic of [confrontation] that Speaker Nabih Berri adopted” (as quoted in Sakr, January 16, 2010, p. 2).

According to Middle East Scholar Ussama Makdisi, “The foundation of the concept of co-existence in modern Lebanon, therefore, depends on a notion that religious communities must be represented as political communities. Diversity makes Lebanon possible; it also immediately and effectively impedes any sense of secular Lebanese citizenship” (as quoted in Hovsepian, 2008, p. 24). Indeed, as of this writing in 2011, Lebanese identification cards still include a designation for the holder’s religious sect. Alas, regarding sectarianism and CMR, Makdisi concluded that there are several other factors either separate from religious identity

or intermingled with it that have resulted in the intercommunal demise of Lebanon and must be examined:

As a political culture it (sectarianism) promises national accord, but works against the very idea of a transcendent national identity. Without recognizing the historical, social, and political complexity of sectarianism, the secular criticism of it will continue to be . . . as impotent as it is misdirected. It will continue to miss the point of the intensity and proliferation of modern sectarian allegiances and antipathies. (as quoted in Hovsepian, 2008, p. 26)

(More information concerning identity issues has been included in chapters 4 and 5.)

Thus, it appears that the Lebanese cannot function with confessionalism and yet fear functioning without it. The Lebanese confessional democracy, formed to diminish sectarian tensions and enhance CMR, appears to have actually aggravated conflict and may need to be abandoned altogether and replaced (Khalaf, 2002; Khashan, 1990). Even so, the multiconfessional field experts are known to have healthy relationships with one another. Hence, the question both they and others are asking is why Lebanese politicians cannot do the same.

Unlike the issues raised in chapters 1 (religious differences) and 2 (communal displacement and education), a unanimous, perhaps even higher, level of concern was raised about the role poor political practice had within CMR. Therefore, through inductive reasoning, one may propose that intercommunal/CMR conflict resolution and advocacy need to be focused primarily on rehabilitating poor political practice and governance. With the lack of government involvement (reviewed in chapter 3) and the older CMR advocates aging and retiring, Lebanese CMR may be left in the hands of indifferent, even hostile, youth. The Lebanese, however, do not agree on how to proceed, the extent to which they should change the existing situation, or when to begin. As such, CMR will continue to hang in the balance.

CHAPTER 4: PHOENICIAN AND ARAB IDENTITIES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Christian and Muslim Lebanese have been in fundamental disagreement over the historicity of their country: the Christians by and large affirming it, and the Muslims denying it (Salibi, 1988, p. 3)

Differences of opinion and even conflict have developed directly related to Lebanese identity. Much of the identity uncertainty has been between, but not completely confined to, Phoenician and Arab identities. Therefore, in this chapter, background information regarding Phoenicianism and Arabism in the context of Lebanese identity has been provided. This thesis has been structured thematically and climatically, with the more serious causes of CMR dysfunction set out in the later chapters. As such, the purpose of chapter 4 has been to explain briefly the histories of these identities. The more recent sociopolitical ideologies apropos to Lebanese identity have also been reviewed, followed by a discussion concerning which identity is more justifiable or feasible. Then, in chapter 5, the field expert and university student data, as well as a literature review, regarding these identities and their major impact on CMR have been presented.

A Brief Understanding of the Phoenicians in History

The Phoenicians were skilled seafaring merchants who existed from the 12th century BC until the Greek occupation of 334 BC. The Phoenician people seemingly predated the Arab peoples. However, early Greek historians and travelers to Lebanon, such as Herodotus and Arian, believed that the Phoenicians were early ancestors of the Arabs (Ismail, 1972). Another theory of the Phoenicians indicated that they were early Arabs (Ball, 2010; Salibi, 1988).

The definition of the word *Phoenician* has not been completely clear. Some historians reported that Phoenician refers to the Arabs and is an Arabic term. More common has been the reported Greek origin of the word, which appeared in history for the first time in the 9th

century BC (Ball, 2010). The more accepted definition of the word came from the Greek *phoenix*, which means “red” and refers to the purple textile industry for which the ancient Lebanese were famous (Kaufman, 2004).

The ancient inhabitants of Lebanon, however, did not refer to themselves as Phoenicians. They called themselves Canaanites after the name of their land, Canaan (Ball, 2010). In the New Testament, the writers indicated that Jesus traveled to Tyre and Sidon, believed to be centers of Phoenician existence. There he cured “a Canaanite woman” (Mark 7:24–30 New American Bible [NAB]), leading historians to believe that Phoenicia was simply the Greek word for the land of Canaan (Kaufman, 2004).

Whether the Phoenicians considered themselves a single community or political system has remained unclear, but they did maintain “a clear sense of being a ‘people’” (Kaufman, 2004, p. 4). They formed several separate city-states, similar to those of the Greeks at the time, and referred to themselves by their city-state names (e.g., Sidonites, Tyrians, etc.; Firro, 2003; Hitti, 1961). The heartland of Phoenicia was mainly along the coast of Lebanon but included parts of Syria, Israel, and the Palestinian territories (Ball, 2010). In addition, the Phoenicians established colonies on the major islands in the Mediterranean basin of present-day Greece, Italy, France, and Spain and in North Africa in places such as Tunisia (Ball, 2010). Because of their series of colonies throughout the Mediterranean, all under one social and economic system, this area was considered a “Mediterranean civilization” (Kaufman, 2004, p. 3) for the first time in history.

In ancient times, the Greek historian Herodotus reported having spoken with the ancient Phoenicians and placed their origin in the Arabian Peninsula (Salibi, 1988). One theory of the Phoenicians was that they originated from the Aegean islands off the coast of Greece. They spread and briefly lived not just in Lebanon but also throughout the

Mediterranean basin and North Africa in the areas of Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia, Libya, Sicily, Southern Italy, Sardinia, and Malta (Gore, 2004; Salibi, 1988). The Muslims of Lebanon, in general, believe that the Phoenicians were ethnic and racial Arabs who migrated to Lebanon from the area of present-day Saudi Arabia and Yemen, principle origins of the Arabs. The Maronite Christians believe that the Phoenicians were a people distinct from the Arabs (Salibi, 1988)

The Phoenicians were the first established society to make widespread use of an alphabet, the Canaanite–Phoenician alphabet, generally thought to be the ancestor of nearly all modern Western alphabets (Hitti, 1961; Kaufman, 2004). This notion, however, has been doubted by some historians, such as the late Kamal Salibi in his text entitled *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (1988). Through their seafarer merchant trade, the Phoenicians spread the use of the alphabet to North Africa and Europe, where it was used by the Greeks, who later spread it to the Romans and Etruscans (Clodd, 2003). The Phoenicians were considered the very first overseas colonial empire in the world and the first Middle Eastern power to penetrate Europe. Their contact was basic and occurred over a very long period of time (Ball, 2010). However, their dreams of establishing an empire in Europe were not to be.

One of the greatest generals in history was probably the most famous military leader of Phoenicia, the Carthaginian named Hannibal:

But it must be emphasized that in confronting and overcoming Carthage, Rome, hitherto a local power, was thrust center stage: the beginning of Roman expansion had arrived as a direct response to the end of the Phoenician. When Hannibal was finally defeated by the Romans and had to flee for his life, he sailed back to the Phoenician homeland to Tyre where he was greeted as a hero. Almost symbolically Carthage's greatest man found his first refuge in the Phoenician mother country from which Dido had departed over six centuries before. (Ball, 2010, p. 31)

Despite some of the most dazzling military victories the world had seen, Hannibal was in the end totally defeated. With his defeat ended forever the possibility of the Phoenicians establishing an empire in Europe. Thus, the final stage of the Phoenicians' outward expansion ended in complete disaster, including the total destruction of their city, Carthage, at the end of the third Punic War in 146 BC (Ball, 2010).

The Lebanese were probably most proud of their ancient cedar trees being imported by the Israelite king, Solomon, to build the great Jewish temple of Israel (Hitti, 1961). The ancient Phoenician King Hiram cooperated with King Solomon in supplying the trees. This project was so meaningful and memorable to the Lebanese that their national flag is adorned with a cedar tree.

However, the varied Phoenician legacy has been challenging to pin down. This might at first be difficult to perceive in looking back over two and a half millennia of civilization that appears ancient, remote, and irrelevant. However, the rise of Rome, seen perhaps as the main root of European identity, was a response to the Phoenician challenges of the time (Warwick, 2010). On the other hand, with so few material remains of the Phoenicians, seeing the exact legacy they bequeathed to the world, if any, has remained difficult. Ludwig, writing in 1942, indicated the Phoenicians could be surmised as being merely "peddlers and swindlers"; he then launched into a full-scale panegyric of the Greeks as true instigators of civilization in the Mediterranean. After all, no paintings, no great temples, no cities littered with standing ruins existed for the Phoenicians. Western architects and craftsmen for over two millennia adhered very firmly to Greek and Roman architectural principles in constructing buildings; there was no hint of anything Phoenician. Thus, the Phoenician civilization has remained one of the haziest of all early civilizations.

Again in clear contrast, Firro (2003) expressed in his book, *Inventing Lebanon*, that the everyday societal functioning of the Phoenician territory continued to flourish under the new Greek and Roman civilizations as evidenced by the numerous artifacts that remained, including magnificent ruins in present-day Lebanon (2003). The Phoenician language, now extinct, was derived from the Canaanite group of Semitic languages, similar to Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic. The Phoenician–Canaanite language was later replaced by Greek and Aramaic. The Phoenician culture and religion, similar among the Phoenician city-states, was also subsequently replaced by Greek and Aramean cultures (Firro, 2003; von Soden, 1994).

Kaufman stated,

Following the Macedonian–Greek occupation in 334, the Phoenician civilization slowly declined and cleared the way for Greek and Roman domination The Phoenicians disappeared as a people, not because of a major trauma such as expulsion or plague, but rather by a slow process of adaptation to the new political reality. (2004, p.4)

As such, much of Phoenician history has remained unclear and elusive. According to Spencer Wells, a geneticist who conducted several DNA studies of the ancient Phoenicians in present-day Lebanon and the Mediterranean basin, the Phoenicians “were a slippery people. They came. They traded. They left. I guess that only adds to their mystery” (as quoted in Gore, 2004, p. 49).

The Phoenicians were at one time centered in Lebanon (but also existed in part of Palestine and Syria) and were a Semitic people. Add to this the exciting and advanced Phoenician civilization of its time and it becomes understandable that Lebanese Christians and Muslims recognize with pride their Phoenician roots. However, what those roots should mean to Lebanese identity today has been a major point of disagreement.

A Brief Understanding of the Arabs in History

In the ancient history of the Arab peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, some theological scholars have pointed to the Bible to track the origins of the Arabs. The prophet Abraham was said to have been born and raised in Ur of the Chaldeans, a village that still exists in present-day Iraq. Abraham was a Semitic nomad (Hitti, 1961) who later traveled throughout the Middle East before settling in Canaan, present-day Israel and Palestine. Somewhat controversial, said Yale Arabic professor Bassam Frangieh, has been the notion that the prophet Abraham was an Arab¹ and most theology historians understand that the Arabs trace their lineage directly to Abraham's first son, Ishmael (Hitti, 1961; Wigoder, 2005). Ishmael was said to have had 12 sons, one of whom was named Keder (Genesis 25:13; Wigoder, 2005) to whom the prophet Muhammad traced his lineage (Wigoder, 2005).

Although not well known by many Westerners and by some in the Lebanese Christian community, Arabs were mentioned in the Old Testament: Genesis 21:21; Ezekiel 27:7; 2 Chronicles 9:14, 17:11, 20:7, 21:6, 22:1; 1 Kings 10:15; Jeremiah 3:2, 25:24; and Isaiah 13:20, 14:21, 21:13, 60:17. In the Old Testament, the Book of Job, *Ayoub* in Arabic, was believed by some to be a Hebrew version of an earlier Arabic narrative² (Young, 1945) with Job's environment reportedly set in the northern Arabian Peninsula.

The Arabs were also mentioned in the New Testament. According to Acts 2:11 (NAB), "Cretans and Arabs . . . we hear them speaking in our tongues of the mighty acts of God." In Galatians 1:16–17 (NAB), Paul wrote, "I did not consult any man, nor did I go to Jerusalem to see those who were apostles before me, but went away to Arabia and returned again to Damascus" for a period of 3 years. According to Trimmingham (1990, p. 41), "Jesus must have been in close touch with Arabs; in his homeland of Galilee he would meet them every day."

¹ Bassem Frangieh, personal communication, November 16, 2008 (see Appendix 24).

² Bassem Frangieh, personal communication, April 6, 2008 (see Appendix 24).

These religiohistorical junctures have been referenced for a few reasons. First was to dispel the notions sometimes held by the Christians of Lebanon that (a) Arab means Muslim, (b) Arabic means Islam,¹ and (c) Arabs are somehow newcomers to the Middle East, unlike the Semitic Jews and Christians. Second, after the death of Jesus Christ but before the advent of Islam, small- to moderately-sized Arab Christian tribes and empires existed in the northwestern area of the Arabian Peninsula. Of note were the Ghassanids of Damascus and the eastern border of Syria and the Lakhmids in present-day northern Iraq (Salibi, 1988; Trimingham, 1990).

Based on the appearance of Muhammad in history and the ushering in, by name, of Islam in the 7th century AD, some Lebanese Christians and Muslims believed that the Arab people were late arrivals in the Middle East.² However, these religiohistorical junctures indicated the Arab people were an entity in the Middle East between the second millennia BCE and the 5th century BCE. These dates represented a stable reminder that Arabs or proto-Semitic Arabs as a people existed in the present-day modern Arab Middle East and North Africa before the advent of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Barakat, 1993; Hitti, 1961).

At its height, the Arab/Islamic Empire rivaled the great Roman Empire in its size and influence (Armstrong, 2002). The Arab/Islamic civilization was the source of Lebanese language and culture for the last 1,200 years. Islam was also found to be the fastest growing religion in the United States and Europe (Armstrong, 2002). Currently, 22 recognized Arab countries exist, sprawling across the Middle East and North African; and over one billion people have become followers of Islam worldwide (Smith 2006).

Even so, many Christians in present-day Lebanon, particularly the Maronites, have continued to equate Arab identity with Islam and Muslims, thus rejecting the Arab identity

¹ Mansour Eid, personal communication, June 21, 2004 (see Appendix 24).

² Sammak, personal communication, November 20, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

and embracing Phoenicianism as part of their own identity. The reasons for this have been discussed in detail in chapter 5 (Dagher, 2001; Hajjar, 2002). However, history and religion have been recognized as two of the main foundational factors within the concept of racial, ethnic, and cultural identity (Giddens, 2001; Macionis, 2003). Therefore, because of their Middle East history, religion, and ethnicity, one could conclude that the Maronites are Arabs as well.

Another major component of ethnic identity is language. The Arabic language, just as the religious history of the Arab people, was developed in the immediate vicinity of Lebanon (Hooker, 1999; “Near Eastern Languages and Culture,” 2003). Arabic is Semitic, belonging to the Afro-Asiatic group of languages (Bishop, 1998). As such, it is similar to Hebrew and Aramaic (Hitti, 1961). One origin of the Arabic language was found in the northern Aramaic-speaking region near the ancient city of Nabataea, which was located in the northwest of present-day Jordan and around the southeast area of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon (Bishop, 1998). These areas were just a few miles from one another and were adjacent to the border of present-day Lebanon. Indeed, a southern Lebanese village named Nabataea lay a few miles from the Jordanian border (Ellis, 1970). Arabic might have also developed in the area of present-day Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yemen; thus, the category was called Afro-Asiatic Semitic (Bishop, 1998). As Afro-Asiatic Semitic languages, the “Assyro-Babylonian, Aramaic, Hebrew, Phoenician, South Arabic, Ethiopic, and Arabic languages should be viewed as dialects developing out of one common tongue, the Ursemitisch” (Hitti, 1961, pp. 13–14). Interestingly, both Ethiopia, whose native language is Amharic, and Somalia, whose first language is Arabic, exist side by side and are homes to two of the largest remaining spoken Semitic languages (DeYoung, 1999).

The Arabs soon spread throughout the Middle East with Islam, the Arabic language, and advancements in many fields of study. For these reasons and more, it is understandable that many Lebanese may want to recognize themselves as Arab. However, the term Arab in the present has also assumed a negative connotation in the western world and, as shown later in this thesis, could have a role in the disavowal of Arab identity by some.

Discussed here and again in chapter 5 was the general Lebanese acceptance of Arabism, with the exception of many from the Maronite community. The reasons for this must be assessed further. Many questions concerning identity continue to exist, including whether the Maronites are rejecting Arab identity racially but accepting it ethnically and culturally, whether the Muslims accept Arabicity solely because of its relation to Islam, and whether the identity variance is solely between Christians and Muslims or if there are intra-Christian disparities as well.

Opposing Christian–Muslim Views of Identity

The Arabs have existed as both nomadic and sedentary cultivator communities since the time of Genesis (The Book of Genesis does not state when it was written. The date of authorship is likely between 1440 and 1400 B.C., between the time Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt and his death (Wigoder, 2005) They were arguably among the first civilizations in the world. Even so, the Maronites and some smaller groups of Christians in Lebanon have declined the Arab identity of Lebanon as well as its still-popular Arab nationalist ideology. Instead, they have proposed a separate, non-Arab identity of the Lebanese people and, thus, a separate Lebanese nationalist ideology (Grafton, 2003; Hollis & Shehadi, 1996; Khalifah, 1997; Shehadi & Mills, 1988). Inseparably intertwined with the Maronite Christian Lebanese non-Arab theory is the notion of Phoenicianism, which has been discussed in more detail in chapter 5, along with Arabism. The strong denial expressed by many indigenous and diaspora

Lebanese Maronites toward Arab identity was minimized and underrated throughout the available literature; the authors failed to capture the intense disavowal of Arabs, Arabism, Arabic, Muslims, and Islam that many Maronites express (Kaufman, 2004; Martin, 2009). The reasons for the Maronite declination of Arabicity, one of which is the perceived synonymity between Muslim and Arab (Yahya, 1985), have been detailed in Chapter 5.

Generally speaking, both the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon have agreed that the Phoenicians were the once great seafarers who inhabited the coastal areas of Lebanon. The major difference has been that the Muslims are skeptical of the Phoenician history of Lebanon as purported by the Maronites. Instead, they have considered the Phoenicians to be their early Arab or proto-Arab/Semitic ancestors (Kaufman, 2004; Salibi, 1988): “We are all from one family,” stated Husseini,¹ a Shiite, invoking a racial homogeneity among the Lebanese past and present. Sammak,² a Sunni Muslim, spoke of how many present-day Lebanese Christians are descendants from the Hashemite tribe of the prophet Muhammad and of the pre-Islamic Christians. Both Muslim, Husseini and Sammak believed that the Lebanese have a blended Arab ancestry that includes the Phoenicians. According to Halabi,³ a Druze, the Christian insistence that they are the only Lebanese from a separate, non-Arab race of the Phoenicians is both an illogical and divisive position. On the other hand, Christians, specifically the Maronites, believe they are a distinct group of non-Arab people altogether (Mahfouz, 2009). As such, the Maronites believe that they and not the Muslims are the descendants of the Phoenicians of Lebanon (Kaufman, 2004; Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988). As shown later in this thesis, this belief of the Christians appears to be a form of ethnocentrism, resented by Muslim and some Christian communities, which has negatively affected CMR.

¹ Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12)

³ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

Based on these two opposing viewpoints regarding identity, two important questions arose in this research concerning (a) which claim was more justifiable and feasible and (b) why this aspect of Lebanese identity has continued to be so important and to cause such acrimony among the present-day inhabitants of Lebanon. To understand this subject better, readers have been provided a more recent history of Lebanese sociopolitical thought in the following section regarding the various identity ideology options for Lebanon.

Lebanese Identity Theories and CMR

Lebanese nationalism is one of four main Lebanese identity ideologies, the other three being Syrian nationalism, Arab nationalism, and the newer ideology known as the *Islameoon* or the Islamist ideology for Lebanon.¹ Interestingly, the first three ideologies originated in Lebanon, mostly from Christians (Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988). Many Maronites have expressed their non-Arab identity and ideology through the Lebanese nationalist movement. A subset within Lebanese nationalism is Christian Lebanon or Christian nationalism (Khalifah, 1997).

Lebanese/Christian Nationalism and CMR

One of the schools of non-Arab Lebanese nationalism came from the sociopolitical thought of Christian Kamal Al Hajj (Grafton, 2003; Khalifah, 1997). Al Hajj proposed his argument through a critique of the validity of the other ideologies, the Syrian and Arab nationalist tracks, “postulate[ing] the existence of Lebanese Nationalism by successfully attacking the foundations of Arab and Syrian nationalisms” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 98). The bottom line, according to Al Hajj, was that “there can be no nationhood outside a physical territory which finds its most complete expression in the institutions of the state” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99). He supported his case with a number of points. First, he stated that

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7); Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

“the Arabs themselves could not agree on unity and their different economic systems made unity more difficult” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 98). Second, he mentioned that the different historical developments, such as “the Phoenician past of Lebanon, the Pharaonic heritage of Egypt, and so on” had “created [a] separate consciousness” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99). Third, Al Hajj employed geographic considerations, stating, “The mountains of Lebanon, the Nile in Egypt, and the desert in Saudi Arabia add to the separate developments of each of these nations” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99). He argued that “these factors are stronger . . . than the single factor of language, which provides a common denominator for the Arabs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf” (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99).

Al Hajj espoused Lebanese nationhood, indicating his willingness to “defend it at all costs” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 99). However, his arguments did not have the same weight intellectually as those of the Syrian and Arab nationalists because “he could not provide a comprehensive definition of Lebanese Nationalism and its origins and sources” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 98). Although Al Hajj used the premises of the Syrian and Arab nationalists against them in making his case for Lebanese nationalism, these same premises became the basis for refuting his notion of Lebanese nationalism.

Although some critics of Al Hajj’s theory of Lebanese nationalist identity felt his arguments lacked intellectual weight (Khalifah, 1997), this was not the case with renowned Lebanese-American historian Philip Hitti. Hitti developed a theory of Lebanese identity known as historical Lebanese nationalism in his book *Lebanon in History* (Hitti, 1967) which was upheld and referenced by the various Lebanese nationalist camps. Hitti (1967) explained that Lebanon, as a mostly separate entity, had existed for nearly 6,000 years (Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988). Hitti pointed to the unique geography and landscape of the country as a main factor in the formation of Lebanon and its people as a separate entity in the Arab Middle East

(Khalifah, 1997). The combination of “mountains touching the shores of the Mediterranean, its moderate climate and its position in the middle of a great international highway gave Lebanon what no other land had . . . [and thus] gave the country certain determining factors in its historic mission” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 101). To Hitti, Lebanon and its people were unique because of the mountains and coastline, “unique in not having a nomadic life, a desert or a Bedouin population” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 1010). Thus, Lebanon was not an Arab country per se but “basically a Mediterranean county similar to Greece or Italy” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 101).

Hitti intended his work for Western academic audiences rather than for use by advocates of the various battling ideologies in Lebanon (Khalifah, 1997). However, the Lebanese Christian nationalists saw Hitti’s work as a buttress to the Phoenician identity of Lebanon (see chapter 5) though Hitti also pointed out that ancient Phoenicia also included areas of Palestine and Syria. That fact, which no Lebanese nationalist was willing to accept, was used by Syrian and Arab nationalists to support their theories of Lebanese identity (Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988). In his lengthy book, Hitti was “sympathetic to Syrian history as well, a country now despised by Lebanese nationalists” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 102). Thus, separating Lebanon and Lebanese identity from a proto-Arab culture has been difficult.

Records trace the original inhabitants of Lebanon to be the Semitic Canaanites, known as Phoenicians, who incidentally also populated the coasts of modern Syria and Palestine. The Canaanite culture is at the very foundation of Hebrew culture of Palestine and the Aramean culture of Syria . . . these people entered the land of Syria–Lebanon–Palestine at a later stage, and borrowed heavily from the Canaanite culture. (Khalifah, 1997, p. 102)

Another criticism of Lebanese Christian nationalists was that they pick and choose what they use as part of their theory:

This ancient history was hardly taken up by the Lebanese nationalists, who could have bolstered their argument by making use of Phoenician heritage and

its links to present-day Lebanon. The Lebanese ideologues did not appreciate the lessons of the rise and fall of Phoenicia on the Lebanese coast, but looked instead to the symbolism of a distant Phoenician past that belonged to the imagination in order to irritate Syrian and Arab nationalists. In fact, the Phoenician scenario, superficially used by the Lebanese nationalists to argue for a separate Lebanese historical tradition, backfired as Arab and Syrian nationalists used this argument to brand Lebanese nationalists as a group of ultranationalist racists and isolationists. . . . The Lebanese nationalists used the Phoenician argument for propaganda purposes, but never took it seriously in view of their inarticulate response when confronted with criticisms of the other two schools of nationalism. (Khalifah, 1997, p. 102)

Salibi, a Lebanese Christian was called “the foremost living historian of Lebanon” by Albert Hourani (Salibi, 1988), another renowned Middle East and Lebanese historian, stated that Hitti never meant to portray the Lebanese people and their history as homogeneous and completely separate. Thus, Hitti had carefully titled his book *Lebanon in History* rather than using a title such as *The History of Lebanon* or *Lebanese History*. However, the Maronite Christians of Lebanon, along with others, espoused a separate, non-Arab, Christian Lebanese nationalism despite the discrepancy of the Maronites originating from inland Syria, the Orontes Mountains, whereas the Canaanites and Phoenicians were believed to exist along the coastlines of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine (Khalifah, 1997; Mackey, 2008; Salibi, 1988).

Another major subset or brand of non-Arab Lebanese nationalism/identity was the Phalangist nationalism of the Lebanese Kataeb (Brigades) party, or Phalanges Libanais. The Phalangists favored a non-Arab, predominate, pre-eminent Maronite Christian Lebanese nationalism (Khalifah, 1997; Mackey, 2008). In terms of Phalangist Lebanese nationalism or identity, according to Khalifah (1997),

the national pact spoke of an “Arab Face” for Lebanon while Muslims and Arab nationalists interpreted this as a declaration of Lebanon’s Arab identity. The Phalange saw this as a face, no more: at heart, Lebanon was Lebanese and not Arab, despite its Arabic language. They even argued that up to the 7th century and before the Arab conquest, Lebanon spoke Canaanite and Syriac. The Phalange claimed that Lebanon has a civilization that predates the Arabs, and it used other foreign languages as successfully as it uses Arabic. While the Phalanges accepted Lebanon’s membership in the League of Arab States and defend this membership as a source of recognition of

Lebanese sovereignty, they recognize the league for what it is—a forum for discussion, not a conduit for achieving pan-Arab unity. By the same token, they accepted Lebanon’s membership in the Islamic Countries Organization, where, on many occasions, the Lebanese delegate has been a Christian. On this front, the party considers any sort of unity with an Arab state as a threat to Lebanon’s unique character and Christian identity. (p. 108)

The Phalangist party founder, now deceased, was a pharmacist named Pierre Gemayel.

His grandson, also named Pierre Gemayel, was a member of the Lebanese parliament who was also interviewed for this assessment. He was assassinated in Lebanon shortly thereafter. Both Gemayels, their family, and the Phalange party argued that “the tiny size of the country is no excuse for neighboring countries to swallow it” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 108), whether geographically or ideologically.

Gemayel and the Phalangists became a powerful political force during the second half of the 20th century, especially during the Lebanese Civil War. Two brothers in the Gemayel family, Bashir (assassinated in 1982) and Amin, served as presidents of Lebanon. Their party believed that “Lebanon is bi-cultural” in that it is “neither Arab nor Western; it is both oriental and occidental” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 108). This resulted in a struggle for the Phalange party in that it “shaped its politics to advocate sectarian interests within Lebanon and a continuous anti-Arab policy at a time when Lebanese Muslims agreed wholeheartedly with the Palestinian cause” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 107), which was clearly identified with an Arab nationalist cause (Dawisha, 2003). Phalangist ideology had no Muslim or Druze following and very little Greek Orthodox support. In addition, not all Maronites were adherents to its philosophy. The Lebanese Christians, a slight majority population according to the only Lebanese census of 1932 and believed to be a minority from shortly afterward to date, believed that the better way to consolidate power was through a Christian nationalism.

The continued interest of the Maronites in this Lebanese nationalism resulted in tensions with Lebanese Muslims, who could not feel they had a place within this ideology as

it promoted, despite its name, preeminence for Christians and little else. The Muslims rejected this proposal for Lebanon, labeling it separatism and fascism.

Arab Nationalism and CMR

Another sociopolitical theory considered for the people of Lebanon was that of Arab nationalism, also called pan-Arabism. Under Arab nationalist theory, all the Arabic-speaking people of the Middle East and North Africa belonged to a greater Arab nation. This nation was artificially divided into separate states by meddling world colonial powers, such as Britain, France, and the United States, at the beginning of the 20th century (El-Solh, 2004; Togar, 2001). Perhaps the greatest Arab nationalist expression came from Sati Al Husri (Dawisha, 2003; El-Solh, 2004; Khalifah, 1997). Al Husri was of Syrian Muslim origin, although he was born in Yemen and lived much of his life in Ottoman Turkey. Another well-known Arab nationalist was Michel Aflaq, a Syrian who was originally Greek Orthodox by faith. Aflaq was employed as a teacher in Damascus. Both Al Husri and Aflaq were well-known Arab nationalist ideologues, although their theories were somewhat different (El-Solh, 2004).

Al Husri's Arab nationalist ideology was secular. Although an Arab Muslim himself, Al Husri clearly separated Arab nationalism from Islamic nationalism (Dawisha, 2003; El-Solh, 2004). His theory was based on a common "Arab civilization, its language and its history, and the shared outlook of the Arabs" (Khalifah, 1997, p. 89). His Arab nationalism centered on "the positive organic forces of language and history" and "culture" (Khalifah, 1997, p. 89). Al Husri believed that the Arabic language in particular molded the Arab people into a large, unified nation and that the deviation of the various colloquial Arabic dialects was a "divisive factor" (Khalifah, 1997, p. 89) in the aim of Arab nationalist unity. His theory of

Arab belonging and detractors of the same were best described in his own words (Dawisha, 2003, p. 72):

Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab people. Every individual belonging to one of these Arabic-speaking peoples is an Arab. And if he does not recognize this and he is not proud of his Arabism, then we must look for the reasons that have made him take this stand. It may be an expression of ignorance; in that case we must teach him the truth. It may spring from an indifference or false consciousness; in that case we must enlighten him and lead him to the right path. It may result from extreme egoism; in that case we must limit his egoism. But under no circumstances, should we say: “As long as he does not wish to be an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his Arabness, then he is not an Arab.” He is an Arab regardless of his own wishes. Whether ignorant, indifferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without consciousness or feeling, and perhaps even without conscience.

For Al Husri and many other Arab nationalist theorists, the people of all 22 Arabic-speaking countries were Arabs, from Iraq in the northern section of the Arab Middle East down to the southwestern area of Somalia in north central East Africa to Mauritania in the far northwest of Africa to the far eastern area of Yemen and all the countries in between. These were all considered Arab countries. Although Al Husri was a Muslim by faith, his nationalism was “emphatically secular and extricated from Islamic political thought, even though Islam is the religion of the overwhelming majority of the Arab people” (Dawisha, 2003, pp. 68–69). Thus, his theory “allow[ed] him to include the Arab Christians under the unifying roof of Arab nationalism” (Dawisha, 2003, p. 70). Al Husri expounded on his view of that nationalism and its inclusion of the Christians. According to Dawisha (2003, p. 70), he

pointedly argues that Christians are as proud of their Arab heritage as their Muslim brothers. This pride is evidenced by the struggle by the Arab Christian Orthodox against Greek control in the patriarchate of Antioch and that of the Eastern Uniates against the encroachment of Latin rites and customs. This message is purposely and purposefully stated: a Christian is as Arab as any Muslim.

For Al Husri, “The chief factors in the making of a nation are language, history and several minor elements,” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 87) but not necessarily religion.

On the other hand, Aflaq was an Arab nationalist Christian who “saw Islam as the best gift Arabism gave humanity” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 95). Although Aflaq’s philosophy was more nationalist than Islamic, he infused Islamic and Quranic philosophy into his theory. For Aflaq, Islam was “the strongest expression of the wholeness of the Arab nation as part of humanity” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 95).

Both Al Husri’s and Aflaq’s Arab nationalism included both Christians and Muslims and gave both groups prominent roles (Dawisha, 2003). However, unlike Al Husri, Aflaq’s Arabism included and referenced Islam and believed Islam. According to Khalifah (1997, p. 95), it

reflects the essence of the Arabs including Christian Arabs who will realize, when their nationalism is fully awakened and when they rediscover their true nature, that Islam is, for them, a national culture by which they must be saturated until they understand it to the point of guarding Islam as the most precious element of Arabic.

For Aflaq, Islam and Arab were synonymous. Muhammad was referred to as an “Arab prophet” and “Islam [was] viewed in an Arab context” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 95). Another difference between Al Husri’s and Aflaq’s theories was that Al Husri emphasized that all the Arabic-speaking countries belong to the greater Arab nation, while Aflaq put more emphasis on the Arabian Peninsula, including the Levant as the Arab nation, and a bit less on the North African Arabic-speaking countries (Dawisha, 2003; Khalifah, 1997).

Aflaq and another Syrian teacher, Sunni Muslim El-Solh al Din al-Bitar, were the main founders of the Arab Nationalist Baath (Resurrection) party (Dawisha 2003). Baath ideology was the political basis and the form of the current Syrian government. It was also the ideology of the Iraqi government until its overthrow during the U.S. invasion in 2003 (Rossi, 2008).

Arab nationalism was, and still is, an attractive ideology to both Muslims and Christians. The Lebanese Arab Christians with their pre- and post-Islamic history and pride

were able to identify with Arabicity. As for the Sunni Muslims, Islam and Arabism became virtually inseparable. The original Muslims were Arab, and the Quran was written in their language. The Arab empire and all its successes were a point of pride for the Sunni Muslims on Lebanon. The Sunni Arabs, the majority population of the Middle East, considered their affiliation with Arabism quite natural. Lebanese Druze, only 6% of the population, often embraced Arabism on ethnic, cultural, and linguistic bases, not religious ones, according to Druze respondent Halabi¹ and author Raghid El-Solh (2004). The inclusiveness of Arabism to the small Druze community was more acceptable to them than Islamic nationalism because the Druze did not consider themselves Muslim and were at odds with other Muslim groups throughout history. Even the Shiites, who normally had a religious and political allegiance to Iran, identified with being Arabs, albeit with some reservations (Saad-Gorayeb, 2002). The Maronites, who have been discussed in more detail in this chapter and in chapter 5, were divided about whether to accept Arab nationalism, preferring Christian nationalism and other ideologies. They were unsure what would become of their uniqueness and needs if they merged completely into Arabism.

Syrian Nationalism

Under a different brand of nationalism, only a handful of the 22 Arabic-speaking countries were considered one nation. This form of Arab nationalism was also known as Greater Syria nationalism, Syrian nationalism, or Levantine Arab nationalism. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party was founded on November 16, 1932, by Antoun Sa'ada, a Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christian who taught German at the AUB (Khalifah, 1997). According to Sa'ada, "Political unity is one of the main preconditions which give meaning to the socio-economic dimensions of a nation" (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 99). Like Arab nationalists

¹ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

Al Husri and Aflaq, Sa'ada believed that the boundaries drawn by England and France in the Middle East resulted in “artificial . . . entities” (Firro, 2003, p. 130). He proclaimed that “Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan” (Firro, 2003, p. 130) created a single nation. Because he and other Syrian nationalists felt the borders drawn for the Middle East were arbitrary, he also included in his Syrian nationalism parts of present-day Egypt (Sinai), Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, and the island of Cyprus (Dawisha, 2003; Khalifah, 1997). Different from Al Husri and Aflaq but in partial agreement with Hitti, Sa'ada stated that geographic area and the people within that area were the strongest factors in forming a nation. He defined the area that formed the greater Syrian nation as follows:

Syria is located in Western Asia. It lies on the Mediterranean and stretches from the gulf of Alexandria [Turkey] in the North, to the Arish Valley in Sinai [Egypt], in the South, i.e., a distance of four hundred miles approx. Its width is about the same and stretches from the Mediterranean to Iraq [the Arab-Persian Gulf]. (as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 79)

A good deal of literature existed in support of the notion that the countries mentioned do have the foundational makings of a single nation, namely language, history, ethnicity, culture, and family origins (Hitti, 1961). However, Sa'ada's theory of a greater Syrian nation did not include these aspects. Some theorists also pointed to the “procession of invaders” (Ellis, 1970, p. 257) in these countries that added to the diversity of these countries yet actually formed their basic identities. Sa'ada agreed that “this single geographic entity was able to dissolve the differences among its inhabitants ‘into one harmonious organic unity’” (in Khalifah, 1997, p. 81) of “ethnic fusion” (Khalifah, 1997, p. 84) but “argued that the most important element in the making of nations was geography” (Khalifah 1997, pp. 79–80).

Sa'ada's theory of greater Syria was criticized for its

exclusion of other Semitic and non-Semitic peoples—particularly the Arabs who gave Syria its modern tongue and main religion as well as a history and an outlook on life—leads inevitably to the conclusion that Sa'ada sacrificed his scientific skills for his political agenda. In excluding Arabs from the ethnic compound of Syria, he ignored

thirteen centuries of Arab culture in Syria and rendered them insignificant in his Syrian project. Sa'ada's hostility toward Arab nationalism and his deliberate exclusion of Arabs from the ethnic compound of Syria must be interpreted as an indication of his firm belief in the superiority of Syrians. (Khalifah, 1997, p. 85)

However, by the 1940s, as Arab nationalism became increasingly popular, Sa'ada began to change his theory as he deliberately attempted to become "more Arab" (Sa'ada, as quoted in Khalifah, 1997, p. 85) while he "continued to assert the superiority and priority of Syria and the Syrians to any Arab cause" (Khalifah, 1997, p. 85). Syrian nationalism was attractive to both Muslim and Christians (particularly the Greek Orthodox) but had diminished considerably in present day Lebanon. The attraction seemed to be the unity and the specialty of the Levantine peoples rather than the inclusion of North Africa and the Gulf.

Islamic Nationalism/the Umma

Another ideology or theory for Lebanese national identity was *Islameeoon*, or Islamist theory, Islamic nationalism, or the *umma*. Islamism was not popular among the Lebanese in general, the Christians in particular, or many Muslims. Al Husri, a Muslim, advocated for Arab nationalism completely separate from Islam, while Aflaq touted Arab nationalism with a clear understanding of the place of Islam within it (Khalifah, 1997). However, in present-day Lebanon, Hezbollah has also advocated for an Islamic state, despite retracting its desire for such an entity since 1996 and calling for it only if the Lebanese plurality finds it acceptable. Instead, since 1996, Hezbollah has referred to the Islamization of Lebanon as "a dream" (Trendle, 1996, p. 63; Saad Ghorayeb, 2002, p.36). In addition, two of the main founders of Islamic nationalism, Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyed Qutb (both of Egypt), believed that Christians can be reasonably included within this ideology (Abu-Rabi', 2004; Armstrong, 2002).

Although many Christians recognized that their identity and culture had their origins in Islamic civilization (Salibi, 1988), many people theorized that Arab nationalism, which was

put forth by several Christian theorists, was created to counter Islamic nationalism. However, some scholars pointed out that whether they acknowledge it or not, the Christians of Lebanon have been living within an Islamic civilization, and even under Islamic law to one degree or another, for centuries (Salibi, 1988). The Muslim communities of Lebanon had an affinity for this ideology, although the Sunni and Shiites differed on what its form should be. In some Islamist ideology, Christians were said to be welcome within an Islamic society (Saad-Gorayeb, 2002).

The Three Dominant Christian Communities and Their Views of Phoenicianism

Up to this point in this thesis, Lebanese Christian and Muslim thought have been reviewed, compared, and contrasted. One of the main differences between Christian and Muslim thought was their views on Phoenicianism. In this section, information to provide a deeper understanding of the three main Christian communities has been presented, followed by an inter-Christian comparison and contrast of Phoenicianism. This was done because in much of this thesis, Christian and Muslim viewpoints regarding several societal issues have been compared and contrasted. With different faiths, one might expect different responses. Yet, as mentioned in chapter 4, although inter-Christian differences regarding identity existed, the question as to why this was so remained.

The Maronites

The largest Christian group was the Maronites. The Maronite Church was named after a 4th- or 5th-century hermit named Maron, whose brief life was recorded by Theodorit of Cyrhus in his *Historia Religiosa XVI* (Parry & Hinnells, 1999). In the late 7th century, with the advent of Islam, John Maron left Syria for Lebanon because of inter-Christian and pagan rivalries and oppression. It must be emphasized that Maron and his followers did not leave Syria because of tension or persecution by the followers of the newly founded Islam. Rather,

they left because of Byzantine Christian and pagan oppression (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999) . Despite this, some Maronites of Lebanon have continued to state incorrectly that their ancestors left Syria for Lebanon because they were treated poorly by Muslims.

During the 7th century, the Muslim Arab rulers of Syria severely punished all contacts with their main enemy, Constantinople. The Maronite community, however, enjoyed good relations with the Muslim rulers of Damascus and proclaimed Maron their own bishop. After assuming the seat of Patriarch of Antioch, he instituted the Maronite patriarchy and established the Maronite monastic community, which became an official church. Maron's followers were believed to have developed the Monastery of Bet Maroun, a great Maronite monastery built in Syria Secunda in 425AD by the Roman Emperor Marcian (Parry & Hinnells, 1999).

The acrimonious and often violent relationship between the Maronites and the Byzantine Christians made life difficult for the Maronite community. Being considered “a wicked heresy” (Bin Talal, 1998, p. 67), the Maronites were cut off from the other Christian communities of Constantinople and thus developed independently. Eventually, they migrated to the high mountains of Lebanon, particularly after the destruction of Bet Maroun during the first half of the 10th century (Grafton, 2003; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).

During the 11th century, the Crusaders invaded the Middle East. Upon their arrival in northern Lebanon in 1099, the Franks received a warm welcome from the Maronites, who joined the Crusaders and gave up their monotheletism. However, some of the Maronites from the high mountains of Lebanon were hostile to the Maronite–Crusader alliance. Even so, the majority of Maronites, including their religious leaders and their administration, sided with the Crusaders. Thus, the ongoing and increasing relationship with the Latin church of Europe began (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999). This pro-Crusader response was a crucial

element both in Maronite and Lebanese history and in interfaith relations because it was the beginning of alliances with France and Europe and of the Western orientation of the Maronites.

After 1770, the Maronites formed the single largest community in Lebanon. Most of these believers were peasants who eventually revolted against the Druze and Maronite feudal lords. By 1860, the Druze population of Lebanon, an offshoot faith of Shia Islam and once a majority population in Lebanon, was engaged in a fierce, brutal battle with the Maronite community. That battle resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of thousands of Maronites (Bailey, 2003; Fawaz, 1994).

In 1932, the Maronites, free from the rule of the Ottoman Turks but under French mandate, still comprised the largest single community in Lebanon, according to the one and only official census taken to date (Firro, 2003). At that time, the Maronites were involved in Arab nationalism to various degrees and were also prominent in the revival of written Arabic (Bin Talal, 1998; Dawisha, 2003). In 1943, as the majority population and as active members in the development of Lebanon, the Maronites were offered the presidency of the country under an unwritten national pact. To this day, the office of president must be held by a Maronite (Firro, 2003).

The Maronites requested the assistance of the Syrian government and army in 1975 to help quell the Lebanese Civil War. In 1982, the Maronites sided with the Israeli army in its invasion of Lebanon to the great displeasure of the Syrian army, most of the Muslim community, and some of the other Christian communities in Lebanon (Fisk, 2002). The concern that the Maronites will again seek foreign intervention to overpower their fellow countrymen, as they did during the Crusades, has continued to reverberate in Lebanon.

Currently, the Maronite patriarchy has been divided into several dioceses in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and Sudan. The Maronite Church also exists in various North and South American countries, Canada, Europe, and Cyprus (Parry & Hinnells, 1999). Although the Maronites had an early Syriac origin, their church underwent a great deal of Latinization. Thus, even though the Maronite language for approximately 1,000 years has been Arabic, the Maronite liturgy is said both in Arabic and Syriac, a dialect of ancient Aramaic and the spoken language of Jesus Christ (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).

The official name of the Maronite Church is the Antiochian Syrian Maronite Church. The Maronites believe that their independent character as a church and a society is due in great part to their isolation in Mt. Lebanon. Thus, their identity has been strongly linked to that of Lebanon. When speaking with Maronites, one might get the impression that they feel Lebanon is their country alone. In fact, the Maronite church has played the major role in the creation of present-day Lebanon; and its followers hold several key positions, including the presidency (Mackey, 2008; Parry & Hinnells, 1999). Although Lebanese Christians, the Maronites have had a somewhat different history and experience than the other Christian groups, resulting in their belief that they are different. Subsequently, they have conducted themselves differently from a sociopolitical and communal standpoint.

The Greek Orthodox

The Greek Orthodox Christians of Lebanon and the Middle East have also been called Byzantine-rite Christians, Melchites, and Arab Orthodox. The Greek Orthodox of Lebanon are mostly indigenous Arabs, referred to as Greek because of the Greek origin of the early colonizers of the Levant (Bailey, 2003; Pacini, 1998). They comprise the second largest religious group in Lebanon. In terms of Lebanese identity, the Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christians have generally agreed that they are of indigenous Arab origin, with some

reservations and qualifications depending on where in Lebanon they live and the prevailing political sentiment of their region.

Followers of Greek Orthodoxy have traced their heritage to the earliest of Syriac origins. Thus, the Greek Orthodox community descended from the early Christians of Syria, which included Lebanon, and Egypt who accepted the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999). This council, the third of seven such ecumenical councils, insisted on the premise that Jesus Christ had two natures: human and divine. Despite their affirmations that they were not at odds with the resolutions of the council, the Maronites and the Copts of Egypt were considered by the Greek Orthodox Church to hold different views on the natures of Jesus Christ. These views were referred to as the “wicked heresies” (Bin Talal, 1998, p. 67).

The Melchite Greek Catholics

Melchite is the designation for the Chalcedonian Eastern Christian patriarchies of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The Melchites have traced their origins to early Syriac roots. Melchite Greek Catholics also descended from the main Greek Orthodox/Byzantine Church. The word Melchite, which means “the royalists” or “the king’s men” in Syriac and Arabic (Bin Talal, 1998; Pacini, 1998), was a derogatory term in the beginning, signifying those individuals who followed the Christianity of Emperor Justinian. During Justinian’s rule, the Melchites were the largest and most dominant group of Christians. The name referred to the Greek administration and religious leadership of the time, although the indigenous Melchites of the Middle East were of Arab ethnicity (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).

Beginning in 1054, a schism occurred between Rome and Constantinople. By 1516, a divide had also formed between Latin Roman Catholics and the Greek Orthodox of

Constantinople. By 1724, the ancient Melchite community was completely divided between the Eastern Orthodox patriarchy and the Melchite Catholics. The Orthodox patriarchy remained in Greek hands, while the Melchite Greek Catholic patriarchy remained in the hands of the indigenous Arab population. This division occurred when the Roman Church and the Byzantine Church split, with the Greek Orthodox Christians having their patriarch in Constantinople and the Melchite Greek Catholics pledging their loyalty to the pope in Rome (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).

The Melchites have been diffused throughout Lebanon, with concentrations in the central and southern parts of the country. Currently, the third largest Christian community, the Melchites were among the first to put forward an awakening and support for Arab nationalism. However, in recent years, much like the Maronites but to a lesser degree, they have denied affiliation with Arab ethnicity, race, and culture. Therefore, the Melchites have become a break-off of the current Greek Orthodox Church. Melchite church structure, design, and liturgy have remained nearly identical to those of the Greek Orthodox Church. Having fairly similar histories, especially prior to the schism/split, the Greek Orthodox and the Melchites, but not the Maronites, often hold similar sociopolitical and identity views. However, the Melchites are under the Roman Catholic papacy; and their hierarchy is composed predominantly of Middle Eastern Arab clergy.

Maronite Catholic Views of Phoenician Identity

Along with Petro Trad and Omar Daouk, Michel Chiha was considered one of the fathers of the Lebanese Constitution (Traboulsi, 2007). Through his ideas and actions, he had an important influence on the shaping of the country. Chiha was born in 1891 to a Christian family of Mekkiné, located in the Aley District in the Mt. Lebanon governorate. His father, Antoine, was a banker and founded the Pharaon and Chiha Bank in Beirut in 1876 (Daou,

2001). His mother belonged to a wealthy Melchite family in Beirut, the Pharaons. Chiha was of Iraqi ancestry and was originally Chaldean Catholic (Daou, 2001). Although not a Maronite himself, Chiha's Phoenician identity theory and sentiments were completely copacetic with large numbers of Maronites who believed in their Phoenician, not Arab, identity (Daou, 2001). Thus, his vast work on the Lebanese Constitution and his adherence to the concept of the Lebanese being Phoenician by identity represented a great deal of Maronite thought and sentiment. Chiha was a banker, politician, writer, journalist, and more important, a Lebanese thinker.

During the original interviews with the field expert respondents, the writer gathered information regarding both Arab identity and the alternative Phoenician identity. El Khazen,¹ the former director of the Department of Political Science at AUB, stated that the Lebanese are Phoenician, arguing that just because they speak Arabic does not mean they are Arabs. He noted that the Phoenicians existed prior to the Arabs. The Arabs, who came from Syria, invaded Phoenicia. Thus, the Lebanese were Phoenician, "particularly the Christians."

The former first lady of Lebanese president-elect Mouawad was a Maronite Catholic. She acknowledged that the question was difficult to answer because they agreed to the Arab identity in agreeing to the Tā'if Agreement. She noted that the history of the Lebanese clearly indicated they are "more so Arab than Phoenician . . . whether some like it or not," while she also acknowledged that the Lebanese are a mixture of several peoples, including Greeks, Arabs, and Phoenicians.²

Gemayel³ was interviewed in his office located in the Christian heartland of Dbayeh. Displayed in the office were several large, beautifully crafted wooden boat models, symbols

¹ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

² Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

³ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

of the seafaring trade of the ancient Phoenicians. Gemayel insisted that the Lebanese are “Phoenician by blood and Francophone by our culture.” When presented with the fact that some of the other Lebanese Christian and Muslim denominations consider themselves Arab, not Phoenician, Gemayel acknowledged that the Muslims are Arabs. However, the Christians, particularly the Maronites, are descendants of the Phoenicians and have adopted a Francophone culture.

Lebanese Greek Orthodox Views of Phoenician Identity

Gebran Ghassan Tueni was born September 15, 1957. He was a Lebanese politician, the former editor and publisher of *An-Nahar* (“*The Day*”), the most-read Lebanese newspaper in Beirut (Llewellyn, 2010). Tueni came from a family of journalists; *An-Nahar* was established by his grandfather, also named Gebran Tueni, in 1933 (Daou, 2001). His father, Ghassan Tueni, ran the newspaper for decades. His mother was the famous Francophone Lebanese poet and member of the Druze community Nadia Hamadeh Tueni. His uncle was the Druze telecommunications minister Marwan Hamadeh.

This writer briefly met Tueni when he gave a speech at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon, in the spring of 2005. During his speech, given in Arabic, Tueni decried the ongoing Syrian presence and influence in Lebanon.¹ Even though he lamented Syrian political influence over Lebanon, he was a Syrian Arab nationalist for most of his adult life and dismissed Lebanese proponents of Phoenicianism as “liars.” According to Tueni,

Some time ago, a wave of Pharaonism flooded Egypt trying to engulf it. Almost at the same time, another wave attempted to mark Lebanon with a Phoenician imprint. Those who preached these two sophisms were liars. Personally I declare that Lebanon, Syria and Egypt are Arab and they form the core of the Arab countries. We live and die for Arabism. (as quoted in Kaufman, 2004, p. 195)

¹ Gebran Ghassan Tueni, personal communication, May 15, 2005 (see Appendix 24).

Although Tueni agreed to be interviewed by this writer, soon after our brief meeting, he relocated to France for fear of assassination. Upon his return to Lebanon on December 12, 2005, he was assassinated in a car bomb explosion.

Three of the field respondents who were Greek Orthodox commented on the Phoenician identity. Massouh,¹ director for the Center for CMR at UB, stated that although it was possible that some of the Lebanese had descended from the Phoenicians, their “ethnicity and culture are not Phoenician . . . rather we are Arabs, even perhaps racially.” Salem,² president of UB and a former foreign minister, dismissed the notion that the Lebanese are non-Arab Phoenicians. He noted that the Lebanese should be proud the Phoenicians had been part of their country but believed the “cultural Arabness” was much stronger than any claim to Phoenician descent. He added that those who persisted in claiming Phoenician identity were doing so “only because they want to be different.” Bou Habib,³ who was secretary general for a regional Greek Orthodox community, argued that despite the lack of scientific evidence to support the premise of a Lebanese Phoenician identity, “some Maronites will continue to claim to be Phoenician.”

Melchite Greek Catholic Views of Phoenician Identity

Ghazal,⁴ a Melchite bishop and coordinator of CMR projects for South Lebanon, acknowledged his identity and that of the Lebanese as Arab: “I’m tired of this topic among the Lebanese. What do they think we are? Phoenician? That makes no real sense.” For Ghazal, the Phoenician identity for Lebanon was weak and ancient. An Arab identity was much clearer. Hajjar,⁵ a senior journalist for *An-Nahar*, concurred, noting that it was a

¹ Massouh, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

² Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

³ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

⁴ Ghazal, personal communication, October 10, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

⁵ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

minority of the Lebanese who had a problem with the Arab identity. He pointed to the Lebanese language, history, and geographical location (the Arab Middle East) to support his contention that the Lebanese are Arab.

Other Views of Phoenicianism

Salibi, a renowned Lebanese historian formerly of the AUB, and other historians in Lebanon have seriously questioned the validity of the Lebanese Christian belief in Phoenicianism. Salibi (1988) found the Phoenician identity of Lebanon weak at best. In his famous work, *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (1988), Salibi wrote about the Maronite view of Phoenicianism and, to a much lesser extent, the views of some Orthodox and Melchite Christians.

Concerning the Maronite Christian view of the Phoenicians, he wrote,

In the Christian Lebanese mythology that developed around the Phoenicians, these people were depicted as the Lebanese of old, and the progenitors of the modern Lebanese who were simply not Arabs, and who had inherited from their Phoenician forbears not only their historically attested mercantile character, but also their intellectual eminence. The Phoenicians, it was claimed were not only the people from whom the Greeks took their alphabet; they had actually been the original inventors of the alphabet—a claim which no serious scholar today would accept. For this reason, the Phoenicianists argued, the whole of human culture owed the Lebanese a great debt. (p. 173)

Thus, without a deep reference to supporting science, Phoenicianism was exposed, according to Salibi (1988): “By insisting upon praising the glories of their alleged *Liban lumineux*, the proponents of Phoenicianism actually did their idea a great disservice by exposing it to ridicule” (p. 174).

Salibi (1988) also attempted to minimize the Phoenician identity of Lebanon:

The longest inscription left in the Phoenician alphabet is found on the tomb of one of the kings of Byblos and consists of a series of curses hurled against anyone who disturbed the bones inside. In any case, if anyone had a claim to be a descendent of the ancient Phoenicians, it was the Sunnite Muslims of the coastal towns, who actually considered themselves to be Arabs rather than the Christians of the mountains, or anyone else. (p. 174)

He bolstered his case with the current beliefs of Lebanese Muslims and many Orthodox and Melchite Christians (but not the Maronites) regarding the Phoenicians through invoking the beliefs of the Syrian and Arab nationalists and of an ancient Greek historian:

The Syrian Nationalist Party of Antoun Saadeh took great interest in their history, but claimed their heritage for Syrian nationalism. The Arab nationalists considered them ancient Arabs who had originally arrived in coastal Syria from Arabia. To some extent, they were correct. When the Greek historian Herodotus visited Syria in the fifth century BC, he was told by the Phoenician elders of Tyre that their ancestors had originally arrived as immigrants from the Arabian shores of the Red Sea, and even specified the time of their arrival as being twenty-three centuries earlier. (1988, pp. 172–173)

Most Orthodox and Melchite Christians subscribed to Herodotus's notion that the Phoenicians were Arab-Semites of early history. The Maronites refuted this notion and criticized Herodotus as a dishonest and inept. Rather than being referred to as the "father of history," as he is often called, the Maronites considered Herodotus to be the "father of lies" (Salibi, 1988). However, other writers supported Herodotus' observations: "Writing of the conquests of Alexander the Great, the Greek historian Arian considered the inhabitants of the mountain country east of Tyre to have been Arabs even at that early date, which was in the 4th century BC" (Salibi, 1988, p. 177).

Some historical narratives of writers cast doubt on who the Phoenicians were and their relationship to the present-day Lebanese:

For the Maronite disciples of Chiha, the inconvenient facts that ancient Phoenicia included many city-states outside Lebanon's borders, that the Phoenicians spoke a Semitic tongue, and that the Maronites were immigrants from Syria became lost in romanticism and self-interest. The Maronites so eagerly embraced the myth of a Phoenician heritage because it clearly differentiated them culturally from the Arab Muslims of Lebanon. From this perspective, the Maronites, utilizing their privileged position in the French Mandate, promoted as the defining characteristic of Lebanese national identity the idea that Lebanon's soul was to be found in the Phoenician ruins in Byblos. (Mackey, 2008, p. 51)

Some Lebanese thinkers, such as author and university professor Bassam Khalifah, a Greek Orthodox Christian, believed that the case for Lebanese Phoenician identity should have been a solid one. However, because the theory was not analyzed, it was squandered in what Khalifah (1997) considered a lost opportunity:

The Lebanese nationalists failed to do their homework and in doing so, missed a crucial ancient link, which might have driven home their argument against Arab and Syrian Nationalists in Lebanon. The Lebanese ideologues did not appreciate the lessons of the rise and fall of Phoenicia on the Lebanese coast, but looked instead to the symbolism of a distant Phoenician past that belonged to the imagination in order to irritate Syrian and Arab Nationalists. In fact, the Phoenician scenario, superficially used by the Lebanese Nationalists to argue for a separate Lebanese historical tradition, backfired as Arab and Syrian Nationalists used this argument to brand Lebanese nationalists as a group of ultranationalist racists and isolationists . . . The Lebanese Nationalists used the Phoenician argument for propaganda purposes, but never took it seriously, in view of their inarticulate response when confronted with criticisms of the other two schools of nationalism. (p. 102)

Thus, in terms of the present research, there was a recurrent pattern, coming from the Maronites in particular, of believing that being Phoenician meant exclusion of Muslims and Arabs. For the Muslims, and to a lesser extent the Greek Orthodox and Melchite Greek Catholics, being Phoenician did not exclude being Arab.

Lebanese Identity Confusion

Lebanon, now more than ever, is considered one of the most politically divided nations in the world, to the point that it has been called a failed state, a nonentity, and an identity in search of a nation (Heisler, 2008; Mackey, 2008). In its most basic and simplest form, the discrepancy regarding the identity of Lebanon has been that the Muslim and Druze communities acknowledge their Arabism and recognize their Arab culture while the Christians do not (Barakat, 1993). In a closer look, however, one sees that the Greek Orthodox and other Eastern-rite Christians, for the most part, have acknowledged their Arabism (Mackey, 2008), as have the Shiites, Alawites, and the Druze, albeit “with some qualifications and reservations” (Barakat, 1993, p. 34).

However, many of the Maronite Christians, the largest Christian community in Lebanon, have declined Arabism and substituted for it the more obscure Phoenicianism and/or Syriac identity. (Syriac/Aramaean identity can be traced to the Assyrian Empire of the Middle East, which roughly existed after the Phoenicians and well prior to the Arab/Islamic. Though important, however, Syriac/Aramaen identities were not a focus of this thesis). Therefore, a good deal of tension has remained between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon regarding Arabism. In 2007, during a 3-day seminar, *The Horizons of Civil Society in the Arab Countries and the World Today*, held at NDU, President Fr. Walid Moussa exclaimed,

The crisis of identity has exhausted us in Lebanon. It was a burden and the reason behind many crises . . . conflict on identity takes a confessional form in Lebanon, Arabism is reduced to Islam, Phoenician identity is reduced to Christianity . . . There lies the core of the Lebanese problem (Moussa as quoted in Moussa & Al Khazen, 2007, p. 1).

An examination of the history of the Maronite community revealed little evidence for an other-than-Arab identity (Khalifah, 1997; Salibi, 1988). The Maronites have struggled to intellectualize their other-than-Arab and anti-Arab identity arguments. Although many Maronites in Lebanon insist they are Phoenician, according to their own traditions, they have traced their origins to Syria and then to the South Arabian Peninsula and Yemen, which is considered the area in which the Arabs originated (Hitti, 1961; Salibi, 1988). However, some modern Lebanese Maronite folklore indicated they trace directly to the Arabian Peninsula and the prophet Muhammad (Salibi, 1988).

Indeed, on numerous occasions, this writer was told by Lebanese Maronites (and others) of their Arab and even Muslim origin. For example, while employed as a full-time sociology lecturer at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon, between 1998 and 2006, this writer completed hundreds of observations regarding Arab identity. In sum, the Maronite students

mentioned, and at times recognized, their Arab, even Muslim, ancestry only to reverse themselves and decline Arab identity. Many pointed to a pre-Lebanon ancestry in the Arab lands of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria and to their Arabic language and culture yet maintained their other-than- Arab identity.

In support of the idea that many Lebanese Maronites and other Christians are of Arab and, in different cases, Muslim origin was Sammak,¹ a Sunni Muslim journalist and chairman of several Christian–Muslim working groups. Sammak shared the story of his attending the funeral of a Maronite Christian from Akoura (an overwhelmingly Maronite populated village). He observed the tradition of a relative or close friend of the deceased recounting aloud the family history (i.e., Samir, the son of Abdallah; Abdallah, the son of Hassan; etc.). Sammak was both surprised and pleased to hear that the deceased’s family history traced “back to the prophet Muhammad himself.” Indeed, the Maronites of Akoura could trace their lineage to northern Arabian and Yemeni tribes, suggesting not only an ethnic but also a racial tie to the Arab people (Salibi, 1988).

In the interview with Aoun, former Lebanese Army general, prime minister, leader of the FPM political party, and present member of the Lebanese Parliament, a similar revelation was found. In 1988, then president Amin Gemayel stepped down from office and appointed then general of the army Aoun interim prime minister of Lebanon. At that point, Gemayel and Aoun, both Maronites, had predominantly Maronite Christian constituencies and backing. Because Syria was considered an Arab nationalist entity, its full name translated as the Arab Republic of Syria, Aoun was seen as the epitome of anti-Syrian, anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and pro-Maronite forces (Mackey, 2008). After a bloody battle led by Aoun against Syrian and Lebanese proxy forces to compel Syria to leave Lebanese territory, Aoun was defeated and

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

expelled from Lebanon for 15 years. He returned on May 7, 2005. During the private interview at his residence, Aoun described the meaning and the historical origin of his family, revealing that his family name meant “aid” or “assistance” in Arabic. Speaking in Arabic, he shared that his family traced its origin to the prophet Muhammad, specifically to the Hashemite clan of the prophet Muhammad’s family.¹

Another revealing experience of just how complex Lebanese Maronite view can seem regarding Arabism was gleaned from an annual cultural event that this writer attends regularly, A Taste of Lebanon, held at Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Church in Waterbury, Connecticut, in the United States. The church serves a fairly large Lebanese community, composed mostly of second- and third-generation Lebanese Americans and a number of newer Lebanese immigrants. Although all members are of Lebanese origin, a strong cultural disparity has existed between the two generational groups, specifically in the areas of language, customs, and political ideology. Ironically, the newer Arabic-speaking Lebanese Maronite immigrants have espoused a clearly anti-Arab mentality, eventually winning over the majority of the church community while the Americanized Lebanese continue to identify themselves as Arabs. When expressed, this viewpoint may sound ironic, even misleading.

Despite myriad stories such as these, many Maronites have claimed an uninterrupted, pre-Islamic, pre-Arab lineage of Phoenician origin. Thus, they are a distinct and separate race and ethnicity from Arabism despite the fact that this Phoenician claim is suspect (Gore, 2004; Salibi, 1988): “The Arab nationalists considered them [the Phoenicians] ancient Arabs who arrived in coastal Syria from Arabia” (Salibi, 1998, p. 172). According to Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi (1988) a former professor of Middle Eastern History at AUB, they were correct in this to some extent.

¹ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

Because the disparity among the Lebanese regarding Arabism has continued to have a negative impact on Lebanon and the Lebanese diaspora, the word Arab itself must be clearly defined. The definition of Arab in the *Oxford Dictionary of Current English* (Soanes, Hawker, & Elliot, 2006, p. 39) is “a member of a Semitic people inhabiting much of the Middle East and North Africa.” Interestingly, this definition is racial yet does not mention the Arabic language. However, in the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* (“Arab,” 2004, p. 35), the term is defined as “1: a member of a Semitic people of the Arabian Peninsula in southwestern Asia. 2: a member of an Arabic speaking people.”

To understand the definition of Arab further, leaders and members of two Arab American advocacy groups were interviewed: Albert Mokhiber, former president of the American–Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee; Dr. James Zogby, head of the Arab American Institute, and several other members of the two groups. To start, The American–Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee is the largest grass roots Arab American organization in the United States (Wingfield, 2001). Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the organization also has offices in New York and California and has several chapters across the United States. The largest single-member group of the committee is the Lebanese, the vast majority being Christian and the majority of those being Maronite (Wingfield, 2001; Zogby, 2008). Several former presidents of the committee, including Mokhiber, were Americans of Lebanese Maronite Christian extraction. Zogby, a Lebanese Maronite Christian who heads the Arab American Institute, is also the brother of the well-known researcher and sociopolitical pollster John Zogby.

According to the longstanding definition created by the American–Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Arab is “a cultural and linguistic term. It refers to those who speak Arabic as their first language. Arabs are united by culture and by history. Arabs are

not a race” (Wingfield, 2001, p.1). According to this definition, supported by the individuals interviewed, the Maronites of Lebanon should be considered Arab by identity. For Zogby, the definition of Arab American and Arab might simply mean “Arab descent” (Zogby, 1997, p.11) It might even be more appropriate to say that “identifying as an Arab American implies making a voluntary association with the community of Arab Americans” (Zogby, 1997, p.11).

According to the Arab American Institute, the unfortunate result of this has been “that most persons of Arab descent in the U.S. still do not identify with or participate in Arab-American activities” (Zogby, 1997, ¶18). This attitude has had the effect of reducing the U.S. census of Arab Americans instead of assisting them with recognition and advocacy through the Arab American Institute and other organizations. In fact, in their interviews, Mokhiber, Zogby, and other members of the Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Arab American Institute revealed that a major problem for their organizations, aside from pressure from Jewish–American/Israeli advocacy groups, is the non-Arab position taken by Lebanese Maronites and, to a lesser degree in the U.S. diaspora, by the Melchites and Greek Catholics. While these organizations advocate for Arab Americans, the Lebanese Christians who make up 40% of the U.S. Arab American population either have not assisted or have hindered their advocacy work.

The Maronite denial versus the Muslim and other Lebanese acceptance of Arabism must be assessed further. Several questions emerged concerning this topic, including (a) whether the Maronites reject Arab identity racially but accept it ethnically and culturally and (b) whether the Muslims accept Arabicity solely because of its relation to Islam and the language of the Quran. The concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture were often misunderstood (Macionis 2003), resulting in additional questions, including (a) whether Christians accept Arab ethnic identity but disavow the same racially and (b) whether Christians and Muslims

accept Arabs and Phoenicians as biological but not as ethnic ancestors, as in the case of the Phoenicians. A fresh understanding of how the Lebanese view Arab and Phoenician identities must be undertaken to establish whether a disparity still exists and, if so, how CMR are affected by the same. In chapter 5, data collected from the field experts and the university students, as well as the literature, have been reviewed regarding these identities and their impact, if any, on CMR.

Chapter 5: Phoenician–Arab Identity Issues and Christian–Muslim Relations in Present-Day Lebanon

The Lebanese identity crisis has continued to be a critical link in the CMR issue.

According to Huntington (1996),

Identity wars constituted about half of all civil wars during the 1940s and 1950s but about three-quarters of civil wars during the following decades, and the intensity of rebellions involving ethnic groups tripled between the early 1950s and the late 1980s . . . Intense antagonisms and violent conflicts are pervasive between local Muslims and non-Muslim peoples. (pp. 254–255)

However, Said (2001) noted that

identity is not in itself a barrier to openness and connectedness; to the contrary, it is a prerequisite for them. The more we maintain identity the larger the scope for openness and connectedness becomes and the more consolidated diversity becomes. In the absence of that, openness becomes capitulation, exchange becomes tutelage, and interaction becomes defeat. (p. 34)

In this chapter, various aspects of identity have been explored. Responses from the field experts to IQ4 have been analyzed in the first section. Then, to understand the thinking of the younger Lebanese population, the student participants from NDU were asked to respond to similar questions pertaining to identity issues. Their data have been presented in the next sections. In addition, the issues of language and the possible relationship between name changes and identity have been explored, including a case study of the Atallah family.

As stated by Fr. Moussa:

The crisis of identity has exhausted us in Lebanon. It was a burden and the reason behind many crises . . . conflict on identity takes a confessional form in Lebanon, Arabism is reduced to Islam, Phoenician identity is reduced to Christianity...There lies the core of the Lebanese problem. (Fr. Walid Moussa as quoted in Moussa & Al Khazen, 2007, p. 13)

The question of whether the Phoenician identity of the Lebanese is based on science, consciousness, or both must also be addressed. As such, DNA studies conducted to ascertain the racial connection between modern-day Lebanese and the Phoenicians have been discussed in the next section, the results of which may be helpful in the Lebanese actualizing such an

identity. To conclude, a discussion and analysis of the Maronites' reasons for maintaining their belief in their Phoenician origins has been included.

Views of the Field Experts

To answer IQ4, the field experts had to consider the four different parts contained in the question: Do you consider the Lebanese people to be Arab? Do you consider yourself as a Lebanese to be an Arab? Has this been a difficult one to resolve for Christians and Muslims? Why or why not? To present the data from this question, the responses were divided between the advocates and working group field experts and the sociopolitical field experts. However, data from both groups were combined in the section on analysis. To aid the reader in understanding the emerging patterns in the data, the faith of each of the field expert has been reiterated.

The Advocates and Working Group Field Experts

The literature revealed that “from the outset as a political community, Lebanon was divided along two not only competing but opposing visions and ideologies: particularist (Lebanism) and universalist (Arabism)” (Hovsepian, 2008, p. 35). Particularism was supported mostly by Christians; universalism, mostly by Muslims. When Lebanon became a separate state, Lebanese Muslims first believed they were being severed from their Arab homeland. Muslims felt more Arab than did their Christian counterparts and had more of a sense of belonging with the Islamic Middle East.

Massouh,¹ a Greek Orthodox priest who strongly acknowledged his identity and that of the Lebanese as Arab, felt that, by definition, Arabism is not “radical”; it is not an extremist noninclusive ideology. He believed that Muslims and Christians have the choice of Arab identity. When discussing how some Lebanese, especially some Christians, deny Arab

¹ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

identity, Massouh stated that in disagreeing on Arabism, they are actually disagreeing with their own identity: They are refuting the Islamic civilization, even though they are a part of that civilization. This has resulted in them seeming to be somehow more superior. He also stated that such denial, which also hurts Arab unity, is beneficial to Israel. He explained that although he cannot say with certainty whether he has Arab, Phoenician, or Syrian blood, the Lebanese/Arabs can build a community because of their common history and language. Thus, he felt that developing a bond as the countries of the European Union have done is appropriate. Because the Greek Orthodox communities of Lebanon trace their lineage directly back to the pre-Islamic Arab Christians and modest empires (Trimingham, 1990), Massouh's stance on Arabism was understandable.

Halabi,¹ a Druze by faith, affirmed his identity and that of the Lebanese as Arab. He stated religion should not be mixed with their traditions. He then explained that the French had tried to turn Lebanese Christians into Europeans, even though doing so was not "accurate or appropriate."

According to Halabi,² in 1943, during the Lebanese independence pact, "the Christians accepted the Arabic face of Lebanon." This notion has been interpreted many different ways by the different Lebanese communities over the years. In general, to the Christians, this notion has meant that Lebanon is not truly or completely Arab (Khalifah, 1997, p. 208). For the Muslims, this same concept has meant that Lebanon is truly and fully Arab. Halabi pointed out that under the Tā'if Agreement, the Lebanese are considered Arab and Lebanon is a separate Arab country. These concepts should be helpful in unifying the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon and should please the Muslims. Thus, Christians and minority groups should be pleased that Lebanon is definitively a separate country. Halabi stated, as a Druze,

¹ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

² Ibid.

that he and his community choose the Arab identity for several reasons, one of which is as an alternative to Muslim identity.

In terms of the Synod of Lebanon, held at the Vatican in 1995, Halibi¹ stated that the pope “decreed an apostolic exhortation regarding Lebanon.” Halabi also pointed out that in their convention in 2004, the Maronites stated that they are Arab. Still, he believed that the “Christians made the idea of Arabism so when they change and deny it, what are they saying to us [is] that they’re unique/special.” The Druze are a small minority in Lebanon and the greater Middle East. As such, for the most part, they have opted for the inclusiveness of Arabicity under ethnic and cultural considerations (Barakat, 1977; El-Solh 2004).

Perhaps Halabi, who shares in chapter 6 his admiration for the post-Civil-War Maronite efforts of reconciliation and self-criticism, can work with the Druze community to show tolerance in the face of the Maronites different opinion of identity. If, as Halabi has maintained in his interview and writings, that pluralism and diversity should be respected in Lebanon then the Maronite belief of not being Arabs should also be accepted.

For Sammak² the Lebanese people, both Christians and Muslims, are in fact Arabs. He pointed out that many of the Christians trace their ancestry to the Arabian Peninsula (present-day Saudi Arabia and some of the peripheral countries). Sammak focused on the close relationship of the Lebanese as a people and pointed out that most family names exist throughout the Christian and Muslim communities of Lebanon and the greater Arab Middle East. An example of this interreligious, cross relationship of the Lebanese was that of Emir Shehab of Lebanon. Emir Shehab (also spelled Chehab), an early provincial leader, was born a Sunni Muslim and later in life converted to Maronite Christianity (Salibi, 1988). His relatives were also converts and thus a mix of Sunni Muslim, Druze, and Maronite Christians

¹ Ibid.

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

(Salibi, 1988). To bolster this point of Lebanese Arabism and close ethnic, even racial, interrelationships, Sammak¹ stated that the lineage of many Lebanese Christians can be traced to “the family of the prophet Muhammad himself, to the Hashemite family of the prophet Muhammad.”

Sammak² also made the case that the Christians of Lebanon and the greater Arab Middle East are actually more Arab [racially and ethnically] than the Muslims. After the coming of Islam, many foreigners from other countries came to Arabia for Hajj (an obligatory Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, the prophet Muhammad’s birthplace). Often, after their Hajj, these foreigners stayed and lived in the Middle East, including in Lebanon. These foreigners were Muslim but were not Arab. Instead, they were immigrants. Thus, because the Christians were originally from the Arab Middle East and had never left the area, “they [were] actually more Arab than many Muslims.”

When this writer mentioned to Sammak (and the other interviewees) that some Christians were forcefully denying their Arab identity, he stated that this is really a “reaction against being pro-Arab.”³ It was a completely human reaction of anger rather than an intellectual argument because of the lack of aid given the Lebanese by the Arab countries during the war. Sammak suggested that this was the main, although not the complete, explanation for many Christians, particularly the Maronites, denying their Arab identity. For Sunni Muslims such as Sammak and the overwhelming majority of the Arab Middle East, their identity is unquestionably Arab as evidenced by their history, Islam, language, and Sunni Arab Caliphate and dynasties (Dawisha, 2003).

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

However, Sammak's Sunni community whom he described in chapter 1 as having problems with radicalism, can reference and learn from Sammak's tolerance and acceptance of the Maronites refusal of Arabism. Sammak has demonstrated an admiration and affinity for Christians regardless of how they identify themselves. He has intellectualized the Maronites Arab denial stating it is "completely understandable" which can help promote acceptance of identity differences.

Khalil,¹ an Egyptian Jesuit Catholic priest, answered the question with a question: "What does Arab mean?" Khalil had been referred to this writer as both an Arab and an expert on Arab Christianity. In addition, this writer had heard Khalil describe his identity as Arab in his lectures. However, although Khalil acknowledged that he is considered an Arab by those who invite him to lecture, including the University of Birmingham and Georgetown University, on the day of the interview, he stated that "if it means even only 10% percent Muslim, then I am not an Arab." He went on to say that the Lebanese Christians are "not Arab racially, ethnically, and religiously."

Khalil² then discussed the differences between culture and religion. Culturally, he considered himself basically Arab, noting that others (besides the Arab Christians) are "more pure Arab." Khalil disliked the Arab belief that the Arab identity is both religion and culture, believing that to be inaccurate. He admitted that much of Islam exists within the Christian culture, although "not as a dogma." He stated that the Christians began the "Arab awakening" for two reasons: (a) "to liberate themselves from others" and (b) "not to be [considered purely] just Muslims." Khalil said that it would be better for Christians and Muslims to "think of it [Arab Christian identity] in terms of oriental culture because this is more inclusive." He also indicated that it is each individual's personal choice to be identified as

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Ibid.

Arab or not and that some do not identify themselves as Arab because the term is equated with antiquity and backwardness: “We want to be modern.”

In Khalil’s homeland of Egypt, where the Christians are a minority, serious concerns about CMR exist. In Lebanon, the Christians are also now considered a minority population; and CMR have been problematic as well. Given his personal history and dedicated study concerning the topic, it was understandable that Khalil was wary of Arabism being equated more directly with Islam and that he felt that the Christians were suffering from Muslim encroachment. Due to these reasons, Khalil, similar to much of the Maronite community, was uncertain of Arabism as a viable Lebanese Christian identity or only under very specific criteria.

Some of Khalil’s views on the Arab identity of Lebanon were similar to those of other interviewees, such as Ghassan Hajjar. Like Hajjar,¹ Khalil² disliked the synonymous use of Arab for Muslim. However, Hajjar, a Melchite Christian, believed that Lebanese Christians are Arab. The Melchites, unlike the other Christian groups of Lebanon, have boasted that they are almost completely Arab, including parishioners, clergy, and hierarchy (Parry & Hinnells, 1999). Thus, it was understandable that Hajjar acknowledged not only his identity, but also Lebanon’s as being Arab. The Melchites, a split off denomination from Greek Orthodoxy, have also maintained most of the Orthodox traditions, including Arab identity recognition. The Melchites, as fellow Lebanese Catholics to the Maronites, but who accept their Arab identity, can take a liaison role within Lebanese identity dialogue and reach an understanding or compromise toward a consensus.

¹ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

Ghazal,¹ also a Melchite by faith and a bishop, expressed disappointment that the issue of Lebanon and Arabism is still a point of contention: “If we want to form one nation, we should not say [solely], ‘I’m Maronite’ or ‘I’m Melchite’ or ‘I’m American.’” He believed that it does no harm to the Lebanese to say they are Arab, noting that the Lebanese “language, geography, economy, and education are Arab.” Ghazal expressed skepticism at the idea that the Lebanese are Phoenician rather than Arab, suggesting that being Phoenician is really related to the desire for Western approval. However, he did recognize the importance of multiculturalism in Lebanon, noting its resulting “richness in thought, ideology, and intelligentsia.” Ghazal also referred to Pope John Paul II’s statement that he quoted as “Lebanon’s multiculturalism is a message for unity and that the people [of Lebanon] should be unified.” At the face-to-face interview, Ghazal submitted this response, written in Arabic:

I find it useless to go back to mottoes and headlines that were tackled before, such as the question of roots and belonging. The present societies that are based on multiplicity do not tackle such questions that do not help in building a unified society. . . . We have suffered a lot because of the issue of identity . . . And these questions have only provoked more extremism and division. I believe that the diversity present in the Lebanese society is a source of human and cultural richness and what should bring the Lebanese together is the establishment of a common national identity that unites and does not divide and that forms a strong base for the building of a new Lebanon.

Ghazal expresses a dismay and disinterest in allowing identity preferences to continue to hinder Lebanese reconciliation. Also a fellow Catholic to the Maronites, Ghazal, although he identifies himself as being Arab, can encourage the Lebanese to accept diverse identity beliefs, such as those of the Maronites and not let this continue to plague positive dialogue and conflict resolution. As he stated above, Lebanese identity diversity is/should be “a source of human and cultural richness and what should bring the Lebanese together is the establishment of a common national identity that unites.”

¹ Ghazal, personal communication, October 10, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

Bou Habib,¹ a Greek Orthodox Christian, also wrote his answer in Arabic, stating, “We are all Arabs . . . Arabism is not exclusive to Muslims.” He acknowledged the varied backgrounds of the Lebanese people, with different religions and denominations. Still, he believed that the Christians are Arab, originating from the Arabian Peninsula prior to the emergence of Islam. He had no problem with some Christians referring to themselves as Aramaean Arab or Syriac Arab, citing “the Arab empires of the Ghassanid and Lakhmid” as examples of Christians being Arabs before Islam. Bou Habib concluded, “Some Muslims destroyed the Arab name and that’s why some Christians say they are not Arabs”; but he was certain that he as a Greek Orthodox, as well as the other Lebanese Christians and Muslims, are Arab.

In his role as an Arab Christian, Bou Habib can put forth his view that Arabism is an inclusive and diversified identity including Aramaean/Syriac Arabs which the Maronites also tend to relate. As such Bou Habib’s input could assist with an identity compromise that the Lebanese can accept and move on to other issues.

The Sociopolitical Respondents

The question of identity has not been confined to issues of religion. The politics of Lebanon and the region in general have had a tremendous impact on this continuing question. El Khazen² stated that the Arab identity of Lebanon is ideological, connected to the Syrian regime (Baath Party Greater Syria Arab nationalism), although he did not overtly name Syria at first. This type of coded, ambiguous talk in Lebanon has evolved from the people’s concern that they will be penalized by the Syrian government, whose military troops had been stationed in Lebanon for decades until their withdrawal on April 26, 2005.

¹ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

² El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

El Khazen¹ also mentioned that aside from Arab identity being linked to Syrian government ideology, it also encompasses being “pro-Arafat [Palestinian authority leader who died on November 11, 2004] and pro-Palestinian.” El Khazen related with dismay that to be Arab, one must be pro-Syrian and pro-Palestinian. He believed that the Arab identity issue is and should be of no concern because it is “irrelevant” to Lebanese matters. He noted that despite Lebanese Arabism being agreed upon in the Tā’if Agreement, the issue is still unresolved. A Maronite Christian, he reluctantly agreed that Lebanese Christians are Arab but did not seem comfortable directly answering whether he considered himself an Arab. At the time of the interview, El Khazen was chairman of the AUB Political Studies Department. He became a member of the Lebanese Parliament in June 2005, shortly after the interview. It was not surprising, then, that El Khazen placed more emphasis on political issues and less on social issues such as Arabism, ethnicity, and identity. A Maronite Christian, El Khazen displayed characteristic ambivalence and discomfort with Arab identity.

However, identity and nationalism are difficult concepts to define clearly according to Benedict Anderson, a renowned author on the topic (2006). Thus the Maronite ambivalence toward identity and nationalism should not be seen as an innate flaw but rather an understandable struggle with a sometimes obtuse construct. According to Tom Narin, a nationalism theorist:

Nationalism is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as ‘neurosis’ in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a similar built in capacity for descent into dementia, rooted in the dilemma of helplessness thrust upon most of the world (the equivalent of infantilism for societies) and largely incurable (as stated in Anderson, 2006, p. 5)

As Anderson also points out, it is difficult to break down the rigidity some people have about identity and nationalism, even if it is not based on solid social science (Anderson, 2006).

¹ Ibid.

With this in mind perhaps the Lebanese can accept rather than try to change the Maronite consciousness that they are Phoenicians and not Arabs.

Salem,¹ a Greek Orthodox, stated that the Lebanese do not have a clear or solid identity. He acknowledged his own identity as “politically Lebanese, culturally Arab, and religiously Orthodox” and that of Lebanon as Arab, with the qualification that the Lebanese are the higher functioning Arabs of the Middle East. He considered the Lebanese to be “more cosmopolitan and metropolitan” than other Arab peoples. Thus, some people from other Arab countries believe that the Lebanese, especially the Christians, are “not Arab enough” to which Salem countered that rather than becoming more Arab, the Arabs need to be “Lebanize[d].” Salem presents another nuanced acceptance of Lebanese Arabism that could make for a good starting point for identity discussion.

According to Mouawad,² it was well established that the Lebanese are Arabs. She noted that although Arab identity is a major point of interest and contention among the Lebanese, “for many years, Arabism did not show what it really is—a good history, enlightenment, and so on,” a sentiment shared by Salem.³ Mouawad indicated that Arabism is neither Christian nor Muslim; it is not a religion. Rather, it is “diverse and accepting.” Mouawad, a Maronite, has been a supporter of the Tā’if Agreement of 1989, which called for all Lebanese to acknowledge the Arab identity of Lebanon, and the Maronite Synod of 2003, which upheld Lebanese Arab identity. Additionally, Mouawad hailed from the Zghorta district of Lebanon, an area that has normally had good relations with the “Arab Republic” of Syria. For these reasons and more, Mouawad is a Maronite who recognizes the Arab identity of Lebanon.

¹ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

² Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

³ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

Given the diverse nature of Lebanon, the true definition of Arabism should fit its varied connotations within the Arab–Israeli conflict. Thus, the more one sympathizes with the Palestinian cause and rejects Israeli political designs, the more one is considered a true Arab. El Khazen¹ raised this same notion, although he minimized the importance of Arabism and considered it more of an inconsequential distraction, similar to the “rich versus the poor” philosophies of Marx and Durkheim (Giddens, 2001).

Regarding the Lebanese political model, Mouawad² repeated with pride that the Lebanese are unique, that they have their own specialty within the Arab world, another sentiment shared by nearly all the interviewees: “Lebanon is the only place where Christians are rulers also [along with Muslims], yet it was a great responsibility for the Lebanese Christians to share political decision making.” She also indicated that Lebanon is the sole democracy in the Arab world, although their democratic practice is not very good, referring to political favoritism, corruption, and patronage.

Mouawad³ opined that some Christian leaders and their communities should not have tried to isolate themselves from the Arab world or to be hostile to Arabism and that denying their Arab identity is an insult. She added that although extremist Christian radicals exist in Lebanon, they are smaller in number than Muslim extremists and can be more easily controlled. Thus, Christian extremists are not as dangerous as Muslim extremists are, a sentiment echoed by Khalil⁴ during his interview.

Similar to El Khazen, Mouawad⁵ took a political view of the Arab identity issue of Lebanon. This was not unusual because both were politicians by profession and discussed

¹ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

² Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7)

⁵ Ibid.

Arab identity in political terms of Arabicity. However, in contrast, Mouawad acknowledged the Arab identity of Lebanon clearly and directly, which was somewhat surprising because Mouawad was from the northern Lebanese villages of Zghorta and Ehden, where the inhabitants are overwhelmingly Maronite Christian and are bitterly divided between anti- and pro-Syrian political camps. According to Mouawad, the Maronites of this area and in the diaspora have a somewhat elitist view of their religious and ethnic origin, which they claim is either Phoenician, Syriac, or French but not Arab, thus making the Arabs feel the Lebanese Christians are ashamed or embarrassed to be Arab. As a Maronite, a woman and one of the very few elected to parliament, perhaps Mouawad's reasoning and comfort with Arabicity can make for interesting dialogue regarding identity among the Lebanese in general and her Maronite constituency.

Husseini,¹ a Shiite Muslim, is known as “the father of the Tā’if Agreement,” the second principle of which is a clear reconfirmation of the Arab identity of Lebanon. He stated that the source of the Lebanese contention concerning the issue of identity is fear based on the inappropriate handling of interpretations of the 1943 pact. Under the pact, the identity of Lebanon was partially explained as “an Arab face,” a concept interpreted differently by Christians and Muslims. The Christians believed the concept meant that Lebanon was less Arab, but the Muslims believed it meant that “Lebanon was fully Arab.” Regardless, Husseini believed that the Lebanese are *min usl wHad* (“from one origin”) and thus are Arabs. Husseini² traced his lineage to the prophet Muhammad's family of the Hashemite tribe. He also explained that Christians, Muslims, and Druze share the same family names and are, in fact, related to each other. Based on this interview and Husseini's other writings and statements, it was clear he felt that the unity of Lebanon and Arab identity go hand in hand

¹ Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

² Ibid.

(Hourani, 2004). During the interview, he produced both Arabic and English copies of the Tā'if Agreement. According to Point 2(B) of the agreement,

Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active member of the Arab League and is committed to its charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the non-aligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception. (p. 1)

Although referring often to religious history, Husseini¹ rarely used the terms Christian or Muslim. He explained that the Lebanese people are from one origin; they are one family. He noted that throughout history, although family members changed their religions for various political reasons or war, they could not change their relatedness. Thus, when the Lebanese people experienced a time in their history when many wars occurred, one result was that some of the people changed their religions. Despite this historical war phenomenon, however, the Lebanese remained ethnically, even racially, the same: “Christians, Muslims, and Druze all have similar family names between them and have relatives between each other. The Lebanese are one people, one family with the same race, history, and geography.” He also included in the Lebanese family the Armenians of Lebanon, despite their fairly recent historical presence there. Because they worked for Lebanese unity, they should be considered fully Lebanese.

In discussing Lebanese unity, Husseini² indicated he dislikes the term coexistence, believing the term *al-aish al-mushtarak* (“living together”) to be more appropriate. The former term has a negative connotation of “living side by side”; the latter is more harmonious and interactive. Husseini also referred to the Muslim creed, explaining that it is blasphemy for Muslims to differentiate among people of different religions. Christians, Muslims, and Jews are all “people of the book and people of God; any notion to the contrary is against

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

Islam.” Hussein¹ agreed that he and the Lebanese are Arabs. His view of Arabism contained clear elements of the universality in Islam in that he believes that Christians and Muslims are both people of the book in Islam. They have a similar Abrahamic faith scripture, or book, and are of the same racial, ethnic, and spiritual origins. For Hussein, the universality of Islam allows for the universality of Arabism; he appeared to be comfortable with both.

Despite the Tā’if Agreement that was supposed to settle the matter of Lebanese identity and other issues as well, resolving the Arabism issue in Lebanon has been difficult because of the numerous political and ideological conflicts among the people of Lebanon, according to N. Musawi,² a Shiite Muslim who recognizes himself and the Lebanese as Arab. He divided these conflicts into four ideologies. The first, Lebanon as part of Syria, was promoted by Antoine Saade, a Greek Orthodox Lebanese figure. The second, Lebanon as one Arab nation, was based on Lebanon being part of a larger Arab nation. The third, Lebanese nationalism, was promoted most notably by Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Kataeb (Phalangist Party). The fourth was Antiochian Lebanon as promoted by Boulos Naaman. These ideologies, which were well documented in the numerous texts about Lebanese history and politics (Khalifah, 1997), have continued to remain separate. Thus, many Lebanese parties and individuals have not fully acknowledged or accepted the Arabicity of Lebanon. Hussein’s position of oneness among the Lebanese regardless of religion may be helpful in dialogue regarding identity. Hussein can be an influential force with his Muslim constituency that accepts Arabicity but is irked by the Maronite disavowal of the same. As an example, N. Musawi³ cited the Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, known throughout Lebanon as vacillating between being outwardly anti-Arab and being coy about Arab identity

¹ Ibid.

² N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

³ Ibid.

(Dib, 2009). According to N. Musawi, Sfeir used the Arab aspect of “belonging” from the Tā’if definition but rarely admitted to his followers the “identity” aspect mentioned and agreed upon in the Tā’if Agreement.

N. Musawi¹ stated there are two dimensions opposing Tā’if that interact with each other: civilizationism and federalism. Although some people wish to adhere to the dimension of federalism, it is a political dimension: “Some churches don’t accept the political points of the Tā’if but rather want to maintain their own separate political agenda[s].” Thus, despite the resolution of the identity issue within Tā’if, for many Lebanese it has remained an unresolved issue. These individuals and forces have continued to follow their own ways of dealing with the identity issue. N. Musawi found this contradictory, noting that even “the pamphlets of the Church of Rome encourage the Lebanese Christians to merge to Lebanon’s Arab identification.” N. Musawi’s point was supported in the literature. According to *Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon's Post-War Challenge* (Dagher, 2001), the Maronites of Lebanon were counseled that Arabism should be “embraced fully” and that this “mission statement . . . was inspired from Pope John II’s exhortation to the Christians of Lebanon” (pp. 194–195). N. Musawi further noted that although some Lebanese consider the poor implementation of the Tā’if Agreement as reason for the continued problems with the issue of identity, the failures in adhering to the Tā’if should not change the fact that the Lebanese are all Arabs. He also blamed renunciation of Arab identity and the Tā’if Agreement on outside political influences, such as the United States, chosen by some of the Lebanese parties.

As mentioned previously, Hajjar,² a Melchite Catholic Christian, answered with certainty that the Lebanese are Arabs. He added, “However, in the Arab world, they intermix Arab with Muslim,” citing British Broadcast Corporation newscasters who often refer to the

¹ Ibid.

² Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

Arab world as the Islamic world, indicating that all Arabs are Muslim. This equating of Arab with Islam has remained one of the reasons the Christians discard the idea of an Arab identity in favor of a Phoenician identity; they are not Muslim. Other interviewees, such as Khalil,¹ shared this view. Hajjar, a long time journalist and present editor of the most read newspaper in Lebanon, *An-Nahar*, added that in present times, the term Arab has a very negative connotation in the western world, another reason some Lebanese Christians reject Arab identity.

Hajjar² stated that Arab Christians existed, even flourished, prior to Islam, referring to the Ghassanids, a Christian Arab dynasty in the eastern Roman Empire, and to the Lakhmids, a Christian community in present-day northern Iraq. This information was corroborated in the literature (Bailey, 2003). When this writer mentioned that most Greek Orthodox believe they are Arabs, he agreed, indicating it is more so the Maronites who do not believe they are Arabs.

Gemayel,³ a Maronite Christian, declined Arab identity for himself and for the Lebanese. Instead, he emphasized that they are Lebanese: “We know ourselves as a brotherhood of the Arabs but are not Arabs ourselves. We are not directly Arabs.” The use of the pronoun “we” raised more questions than it answered. Initially, Gemayel said that he was referring to the Lebanese. This writer then pointed out that the Tā’if Agreement, signed by both Lebanese Christians and Muslims, made it clear that the Lebanese identity is Arab. With some frustration, Gemayel again specified that he was referring to some Lebanese Maronite Christians from the Mt. Lebanon areas who do not believe that they are Arabs. Although Gemayel called this non-Arab identity a “Maronite Christian perspective,” he offered few

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 125, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

³ Gemayel, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

insights into what followers of this perspective actually profess except that they are neither Francophone nor European but Phoenician, which has been discussed at greater length later in this chapter. Gemayel was the youngest of all the field respondents (age 33 at the time of interview) and was considered less experienced, especially regarding CMR, than the others. Even so, Gemayel is a native Lebanese who comes from a line of past and present Lebanese Maronite politicians whose opinions are shared by their constituencies.

A Maronite Christian, Aoun,¹ stated, “Not everyone is originally [racially] Arab,” noting that some Christians may be Arab and some Muslims may not be. This concept was also shared by many of the interviewees, including Sammak.² Aoun listed the procession of empires and invaders that controlled Lebanon over the years, including the Phoenicians, Romans, and Greeks. Thus, Lebanon is a “synthesis and transition of cultures” from both East and West, which makes determining whether or not the Lebanese are racially Arab difficult. Instead, even though he could trace his family tree to the Hashemite tribe of the prophet Muhammad, an Arab, which fortified his belief in his own Arab identity, Aoun preferred to think of Lebanon and the Lebanese as “Mediterranean,” having “a heart for the West and a mind for the East.” What counted were the Lebanese tradition, history, and ethnicity absorbed from all cultures and “the good Lebanon exported to other cultures.” Still, despite mentioning several qualifications and historical scenarios, he did agree in general to his own Arabicity and to that of the Lebanese.

Aoun was one of the field experts who grew up in a mixed Christian–Muslim village. As stated by Rami Khouri, a renowned Christian Arab American journalist and academic stationed alternately in Lebanon and the United States (as cited in Strohmer 2007), those Lebanese who live and socialize together have a greater interconviviality and tend to agree

¹ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

more about political and identity issues that those who have not. This was buttressed when Aoun's predominantly Christian FPM party signed a major cooperative agreement with the Shiite party of Hezbollah in 2005, which has been maintained since.

Addressing Lebanese Arabism with slightly ambiguous answers, I. Mousawi,¹ a Shiite Muslim, stated that the Lebanese are Arabs. However, he considered the Lebanese people part of a larger universality, not confined to Arabism alone. When asked if he was referring to the Arabic term used in Islam, the *umma* or the universal nation, I. Mousawi agreed. He noted the significant influence of the ancient Persian Empire on Lebanese culture and identity and the Lebanese Shiites' affinity for Iran, a predominantly Shiite but non-Arab country. He also noted the amount of travel by the Shiites of Lebanon to Iran. In fact, one of his brothers resided in Iran. Thus, an identity limited to Arabism alone might undercut their ties to Iran. Although I. Mousawi confirmed that he and the Lebanese are Arab, he agreed that Arabism was made difficult only because of the political conflicts that occurred.

Samir Franjeh,² member of parliament, Christian envoy to the Muslim communities, and organizer of the March 14 movement, stated clearly that the Lebanese are Arabs. A Maronite Christian, Franjeh did nuance his answer, referring to different cultures and subtle identity differences among the Lebanese, particularly in the area of religion. He indicated that although at one time they were very close, Christians wanted a separate status from Lebanese Muslims at the beginning of the war, going so far as to make an alliance with Israel to accentuate this difference. However, he stated that the denial of Arabism does harm CMR because it suggests, among other concepts, an elitist attitude and identity of the Christians toward the Lebanese Muslims. Franjeh believed that as native Arabic speakers, the Lebanese qualify as Arabs.

¹ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

² Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

According to Franjeh,¹ Arab identity should be a unifying factor among Lebanese citizens. He found it absurd for Christians to form a separate, non-Arabic identity. He believed this separate identity is one of the main reasons for CMR discord, noting that in the 1950s and 1960s, a minimum of religious and social differences between Lebanese Christians and Muslims existed. Franjeh compared this to the Germans. During peace, there were no differences between being a German and being a German Jew. Thus, when societies lived together in basic peace and harmony, few people cared about their religious differences. Franjeh also challenged those Lebanese who deny Arabism to consider that their language is still Arabic. Because of his comfort level with Arab identity, Franjeh has often been employed as a Maronite liaison to the Muslim communities.

Differentiating themselves from Arabs has been problematic for Christians. However, Gemayel² and his family have attempted to navigate through the Christian nuances from their Muslim compatriots, even with the language issue. He spoke almost completely in colloquial Lebanese Arabic, with some occasional French expressions, during the interview. Using the Lebanese Arabic dialect in formal and semiformal settings instead of formal Arabic is an identity and political statement practice employed by the Gemayel family and other Lebanese, mostly Maronites, who do not believe they are Arab. To them, spoken Lebanese is actually not Arabic. At times, this contention has resulted in a good deal of acrimony between the believers in this non-Arab identity, the other Lebanese communities, and the predominantly Arab Muslim communities of the greater Middle East, nearly all of which subscribe to Arabicity.

¹ Ibid.

² Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

A Maronite Christian, Matar¹ felt both he and the Lebanese are Arabs. He believed that the term Arab had to be defined, however. If the term meant that the individuals spoke the Arabic language, then the Lebanese were Arabs. If, however, the term was used to mean Islam, “then the Lebanese have a different opinion on this,” noting as other respondents had done that Arabs and Christians existed prior to the emergence of Islam, as did “Arabic literature and poetry.” Thus, Arabism should not be limited to Islam. He suggested that “America and Europe are not thinking [differentiating] anymore about nationality,” even though the Lebanese are still stuck on the identity issue. He questioned, “What will we all benefit from when we’re still fighting over this?” As the director of international affairs for NDU, Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon, Matar’s comfort level with Arabicity has been an asset for him, as it should be for any international academic coordinator throughout the Arab world.

Analysis of the Respondents’ Answers Regarding Arabism and CMR

Of the 17 respondents, 15 clearly acknowledged the Arabicity of Lebanon. However, some of them did so with some qualifications and nuances, which seemed to be based on whether the respondents were viewing Arabism as racial, ethnic, or cultural. The field experts but not the university students (as shown in the next section) seemed to understand these classifications. As such, these subdivisions of identity, race, ethnicity, culture, and so forth have been thoroughly reviewed with the university student respondents (not the field experts, who in general already agreed on Arabism) later in this chapter.

Of the two respondents who did not acknowledge the Arab identity of the Lebanese, Khalil vacillated, making it difficult to determine whether he was affirming or declining Lebanese Arab identity. Gemayel was the one respondent who definitively denied Lebanese Arabism. Although he admitted that the Lebanese have an “Arab belonging,” as stated in the

¹ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

Tā'if Agreement, but denied in the same sentence of the Ta'if Agreement "Arab in identity."¹ He did, however, confine the non-Arab identity of the Lebanese to the "Maronites of Mt. Lebanon." Khalil and Gemayel were both Christians, the former a Jesuit priest and the latter a Maronite politician. Except for Gemayel, age 33, all the respondents were middle aged or elderly. As such, Gemayel's information was based on the least experience and academic background. Thus, his information was somewhat more suspect and divergent from the others.

Husseini,² a Shiite Muslim, believed that all the Lebanese are *min usl wahid*, a classical Arabic saying meaning "from one origin." With this phrase, he seemed to imply that all Lebanese have a similar racial heritage. Sammak,³ a Sunni Muslim, mentioned that many Christians can trace their bloodlines to the family of the prophet Muhammad. This notion of racial Arabism has not been accepted diffusely throughout both the Christian and Muslim communities, even though the idea has generated interest as evidenced by some of the literature and from DNA sampling (Chuckralla n.d.; Hitti, 1962; Zalloua & Wells, 2008). The Maronites of Lebanon and, to a much lesser extent, some of the other Christian groups, have continued to deny having an Arab identity (Bailey, 2003; Barakat, 1993). On the other hand, several Christian respondents, including Franjeh, Salem, and Massouh, accentuated the ethnic and cultural factors that define the Lebanese as Arab. Therefore, different opinions existed as to what factors comprise Arabism in Lebanon.

Field experts can and should play a major role in helping consolidate the contentious Lebanese identity issue because they are representative leaders of the various Lebanese communities. Besides, they are not in conflict about identity issues. Perhaps the Lebanese can

¹ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

² Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

apply these experts' rationale and acceptance of identity to diminish the conflict. However, the question remains as to where the discrepancy in the identity issue lies, if no major identity conflict exists among these experts.

The Students' Views on Lebanese Identity

The research thus far has revealed a divergence of views between the older generation field experts and the university students who participated in this dissertation study. In addition, a general polarity between the Maronite Christians, the Muslims, and the remaining Christian communities was found in their views of Lebanese identity. Ideally, then, the viewpoint of a younger generation of Maronites should also be assessed. Thus, this writer utilized his workplace at NDU, a Maronite-run university whose administration has attempted to follow the American system of education, to gather data for such an assessment. NDU is situated in the province of Jounieh, a predominantly Maronite stronghold located in the mountain village of Zouk Mosbeh. The student body is predominantly Maronite and overwhelmingly Christian.

Gathering these data was no easy task. To begin, each chairperson of the three different departments to which this writer reported seemed to have a staunch, perhaps racist, view of Arabicity and Muslims. Moreover, the dean of humanities often expressed contempt for Muslims and Islam. Despite these issues, permission was granted and data were collected from 288 Lebanese university students, spread diffusely throughout Lebanon and representing well over 100 different cities, towns, and villages (see Appendix 22). Questions from the student survey instrument (Appendix 20) were posed to the university students between the academic years of 2001–02 and 2004–05. The terms ethnicity, race, and culture were defined for the students, written in both English and Arabic.

Of these 288 students, 166 (57.6%) were Maronite Catholic, 46 (16%) were Greek Orthodox, 38 (13.2%) were Greek Roun Catholic, 22 (7.6%) were Druze, 6 (2.1%) were Armenian Christian, 6 (2.1%) classified themselves as Other, and 4 (1.4%) were Sunni Muslim. Thus, 88.9% of the respondents considered themselves Christian.

Ethnicity

A formal definition of ethnicity derived from sociologists Giddens (2001) and Macionis (2004) was referenced. In addition, a simpler definition was attached to the more formal definition to maximize student understanding of the question: Ethnicity means the shared national origin, religion, and language of a people; it is similarly stated as sharing the traditions, customs (rituals, way of doing things in daily life), and/or social views as a larger group of people (see Appendix 20).

Students were asked to rank order six ethnicity choices in terms of closeness to their opinion of the ethnicity of the Lebanese (1 = *closest to the Lebanese*; 6 = *farthest from the Lebanese*). Of the 256 students who responded to the question, only 92 (31.9%) indicated Lebanese ethnicity was Arab (see Table 22.10). Thus, based on the definitions of Arab and ethnicity presented earlier in this dissertation, even though Lebanese Christians and Muslims appear to be Arabs by ethnicity, two thirds of the student sample did not identify themselves, as their first choice, as being ethnic Arabs. Despite being Arabic speakers, readers, and writers; being geographically part of the Arab Middle East; and Lebanon being a member of the Arab League, two thirds of the respondents did not believe they were ethnic Arabs. Instead, survey results revealed that 120 (41.7%) of the respondents identified Phoenician as being closest to their ethnicity (see Table 22.11), while 28 (9.7%) identified French as being closest to their ethnicity (see Table 22.12). Interestingly, 120 (41.7%) of the respondents identified French as being the second closest to their ethnicity, nearly identical to the number

of respondents choosing Phoenician as closest to their ethnicity. Yet, in terms of the definition of ethnicity provided, no obvious aspects of Phoenician ethnicity (i.e., language, dress, etc.) exist in present-day Lebanon. Still, the students, unlike the field experts, chose near nonexistent Phoenician ethnicity as closest to their own.

Race

A person's race was defined as having the same biological traits and genetic characteristics as a larger group of people (i.e., the same biological makeup and bloodline). It could be stated as White or Black or as African, Asian, or European. The student participants were asked to identify the race of the Lebanese people by ranking the given choices from 1 to 7 (1 = *closest to the Lebanese race*; 7 = *farthest from the Lebanese race*). Students were also instructed that, if they believed the Lebanese people belonged to one single race, they should mark that choice as 1 and not rank any of the other choices. Of the 244 students who responded to this question, 88 (30.6%) ranked Arab as the ethnicity closest to the race of the Lebanese (see Table 22.13), with 78 (27.1%) identifying Arab as their second choice. More than half of the respondents (160, 55.6%) identified Phoenician as being closest to their race (see Table 22.14), with more than 65% percent of the predominantly Maronite respondents choosing Phoenician as their first choice of race.

Culture

Culture was defined as the customs, habits, skills, technology, arts, values, ideology, science, religion, and political behavior of a group of people in a specific period; a shared way of living (Giddens, 2001). Students were asked to identify the culture they believed was closest to that of the present-day Lebanese. Respondents ranked the choices from 1 to 7 (1 = *culture closest to the Lebanese*; 7 = *culture farthest from the Lebanese*). Only 92 respondents (31.9%) ranked Arab as being closest to their culture (see Table 22.15). Instead, 120 (41.7%)

of the respondents identified Phoenician as being closest to their culture (see Table 22.16), the same results as those for the question regarding ethnicity.

Overall Identity

Students were also asked to consider race, ethnicity, and culture together in selecting their choice for the overall identity of the Lebanese. Again, respondents ranked the choices from 1 to 7 (1 = *closest to the Lebanese*; 7 = *farthest from the Lebanese*). Of the students responding, 116 (40.3%) identified Arab as being closest to their combined racial, ethnic, and cultural identity (see Table 22.17). Students were then asked to answer the following question: Do you believe the Lebanese are Arabs? As shown in Table 22.18, of the 282 students responding, 174 (60.4%) indicated the Lebanese people are *not* Arabs.

Discussion

The results concerning identity were similar to those from surveys taken in 1977 by Halim Barakat, a sociologist at AUB, and in 1992 by Hilal Khashan, a political science professor at AUB. More than a quarter of a century after Barakat's findings and 16 years after Khashan's, the Maronites of Lebanon continued to reject an Arab identity, despite the Tā'if Agreement of 1989. Maronite leaders at the time signed Tā'if, still considered a working document for conflict resolution, even though it directly mentioned and recognized the Arab identity of Lebanon. In addition, early 20th-century Lebanese Christian thinkers, such as Yazigi and Antonios, were among the very first to develop the concept of an Arab renaissance and nationalism based predominantly on ethnicity (Salibi, 1988). Therefore, because identity is a major point of contention between the Christians and Muslims and among the Christians of Lebanon, the Maronites' rejection of Arabism has remained a deterrent to healthy CMR.

The denial of Arab ethnicity by the Maronites, appears to be unsound from a definitional standpoint. According to some of the field experts, Maronite ethnocentrism regarding Phoenician identity projects a belief of superiority that is unappreciated by the Muslim population. In terms of race, historians such as Hitti (1967) and Salibi (1988) described the racial makeup of the people of the Middle East as Arabs, proto-Arabs, and Semitic people with a similar racial makeup. A DNA study conducted by Zalloua (Gore, 2004), a Lebanese Christian, revealed that there is no significant racial difference between Lebanese Muslims and Christians and that their racial DNA is predominantly Arab or Araboid. Thus, the Phoenicians were transient and did not leave a genetic marker on the Lebanese, either Christians or Muslims (Gore, 2004). Yet despite no genetic trace of the Phoenicians within the Lebanese, over 50% of the student respondents claimed a Phoenician race.

With most of the evidence indicating an Arab racial identity, the Maronites have placed themselves in a precarious position by denying Arabicity. Given the procession of historical invaders of Lebanon (Ellis, 1970), a more tenable position for the Maronites is the rejection of the Arab race rather than the rejection of Arab ethnicity. Instead, the Maronites hold to both. Approximately one tenth of the student respondents believed that the ethnicity closest to their own is French. More significant is the fact that French was the second most frequent choice of the respondents (approximately 50%). This choice may be more understandable compared with the most frequent choice of the outdated Phoenician ethnicity of the Lebanese for several reasons. First, Lebanon was a French mandate for a few decades in the early 20th century. Second, France had a major engagement with Lebanon for a few centuries prior to their mandate and a major involvement in Lebanese affairs and culture. The Maronites, in particular, have had a centuries-old involvement with the French. Third, French

is still considered the second language of Lebanon, although English is rapidly emerging. In Lebanese schools, French is taught at all levels. The French language has also permeated the colloquial Arabic of the Lebanese, particularly that of the Maronites. In addition, many French-system schools exist within the educational system. Fourth, many Lebanese travel to France, some choosing to live there.

In terms of culture, per the definitions of Arab and culture, the Lebanese appear to be culturally Arabs, based on their food and drink, language and literature, and politics and customs. Indeed, their culturally Arab presentation is perhaps the most solid argument for Lebanese Arab identity. A revealing sign in Lebanon regarding Lebanese culture and Arab identity is a recently popular tee shirt imprinted with the saying, “Talk Arabic. Think Arabic. Feel Arabic. Live Lebanese” (Wright, 2008, p. 141). Even so, two thirds of the student respondents in this present study did not choose Arab as their first choice for their culture. More than 40% of the respondents chose Phoenician as the culture closest to their own, despite there being no Phoenician language, food, dress, gestures, customs, or social traits that exist with the present-day Lebanese.

That the Maronites claim to have an active Phoenician ethnicity and culture when the analysis shows a clearer Arab ethnicity has resulted in major discord within CMR. By stating that they are historically, ethnically, and racially different from the other Lebanese, the Maronites are explicitly saying they are separate, apart, and superior, enraging the other Lebanese. As such, the students’ expression that they are culturally Phoenician is based on the same background or reasons as their feelings about ethnicity. By conscience, they are Phoenician. This has been discussed in more detail in the conclusion.

The student participants were also asked the question about their overall identity to capture an overall sense of what the Lebanese Christians, most of whom are Maronites,

believe. They were specifically asked to consider the combination of race, ethnicity, and culture as a whole to illicit their beliefs. The question was also posed and analyzed to determine the consistency of their responses. The students were given the written definitions in both formal and semiformal forms and in both English and Arabic to ascertain their understanding of the question. This question, as well as the others, was then repeated once or twice in slightly different forms to ensure student answers were consistent rather than sporadic. The results were found to be consistent; but interestingly, they revealed that a slightly higher percentage of students (more than 40%) chose the Arab identity.

Another method used to check the reliability of student responses was through asking students to answer one direct yes/no question: Do you believe the Lebanese are Arabs? These results also appeared to be consistent. In the previous question regarding overall identity of the Lebanese, just more than 40% of the respondents claimed to have Arab identities. For this yes/no question, 60% of the student respondents denied overall Arab identity. Thus, the two questions resulted in the same response.

What is clear is that the students strongly believe they are Phoenicians. The reasons have to do with claiming an ancient glory as their own and distancing themselves from Arabism and Islam. These reasons have been discussed in greater detail in the conclusion of this chapter.

Language and CMR

The role of the Arabic language must be broached as well. According to Dagher (2001), “The Arabic language is the foundation of their identity and the expression of their specificity” (p. 19). Albert Hourani, a famous British Lebanese historian of the Middle East, started his most famous book, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, with the statement that Arabs are “more conscious of their language than any people in the world” (as quoted in

Barakat, 1993). According to Maalouf, a renowned French Lebanese historian, “Being Christian and having as a mother tongue the Arabic language, which is the sacred language of Islam, is one of the fundamental paradoxes that forged my identity” (as quoted in Dagher, 2001, p. 19).

Renowned Lebanese American poet and artist Khalil Gibran, a Maronite Christian from Bsharre, Lebanon, wrote and spoke of “the magic of the Arabic language” and called the Quran the “masterpiece” of the Arabic language (as quoted in Young, 1945, p. 49). He espoused a pride in the Arabic language, his native tongue. Gibran also referred to himself interchangeably as an Arab, a Syrian, and a Lebanese (Young, 1945). He became a main point person for pride among Arab communities throughout the world. In fact, in 2007, the Khalil Gibran Arabic International School opened in New York City. However, in present-day Lebanon, the community of Gibran’s birth village, Bsharre, has maintained one of the most virulent anti-Arab identities in Lebanon (Llewellyn, 2010 pp. 31-32)

In addition, Lebanese poet and journalist Said Akl, also a Maronite, has been insisting for more than a half a century that spoken Lebanese is not Arabic. He proposed and developed a Latin alphabet transliteration as an alternative to the Arabic alphabet (Daou 2001). This writer and Akl were both lecturers at NDU during the same period. Oddly enough, Akl taught journalism and poetry in Arabic and taught all his classes in what he reported to be Arabic. Even at NDU, whose atmosphere was one of an anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and non-Arabic language mentality, catalog and summer courses were listed as “formal Arabic” and “spoken Arabic, Lebanese dialect” but not as other-than-Arabic languages (*Summer Arabic Program*, 2011). Even so, Akl maintained that he was not an Arab and did not speak Arabic. He spoke Lebanese, which he did not consider to be Arabic.

Both of these Lebanese writers, Gibran and Akl, were well known, Gibran throughout the world and Akl in Lebanon and the Middle East. Gibran, who published mostly in English, considered spoken Lebanese to be spoken Arabic. Akl, who wrote mostly in Arabic and sometimes in French, did not consider his spoken language to be Arabic. Rather, he considered it a form of another unidentified language, at times said to be Phoenician or Syriac (Rabinovich, 1985).

At NDU, Mansour Eid, a full-time Arabic professor who was still the chairman of the Department of Social and Behavior Sciences as of May 2010, agreed to be interviewed for this present research. His office was adjacent to this writer's for several years, and he tutored this writer in Arabic for a short time. A Maronite Christian and known Arabic novelist, Eid¹ considered the question about spoken Lebanese not being considered Arabic not realistic, answering, "Of course, it is." He acknowledged that some Lebanese Maronites claim that spoken Lebanese is not spoken Arabic but that they do so for political and religious reasons: Some Maronites want distance from Islam and Muslims (Kaufman, 2004), whose holy book, the Quran, is written in Arabic.

It must be noted that seemingly no other community in Lebanon or the wider Arab Middle East makes the case that spoken Lebanese is not spoken Arabic. Only some Maronites and, to a lesser extent, some Greek Catholics or Melchites of Lebanon have argued this point. The Sunni, Shiites, Druze, Greek Orthodox, the majority of Greek Catholics, and other groups have all accepted spoken Lebanese as a form of colloquial Arabic. This other-than-Arabic claim by some Lebanese Maronites, the diaspora, and, to a lesser degree, some of the other Christians has not been analyzed well at all. No recognized scholar has written on the premise that spoken Lebanese is not Arabic, nor has any recognized scholar (with the

¹ Mansour Eid, personal communication, April 19, 2006 (see Appendix 24).

possible exception of Lebanese poet Said Akl) accepted the notion that spoken Lebanese is a language other than Arabic. Such facts, however, have not convinced some Lebanese Maronites from making such a case and from not settling with the idea that spoken Arabic contains different dialects and accents (Lebanese Language Center, 2004).¹

One of the arguments of some of the Maronites for the Lebanese not being Arab has been their understanding of *diglossia*. According to the *Concise Oxford Companion to the English Language*, originally published by Oxford University Press (McArthur, 1998, s.v. “disglossia”), diglossia is

a term in SOCIOLINGUISTICS for the use of two varieties of **language** for different purposes in the same community. The varieties are called H and L, the first being generally a standard variety used for “high” purposes and the second often a “low” spoken vernacular. In Egypt, classical ARABIC is H and local colloquial Arabic is L. The most important hallmark of **diglossia** is specialization, H being appropriate in one set of situations, L in another: reading a newspaper aloud in H, but discussing its contents in L.

Another term used for formal Arabic is Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), a spoken and written form of Arabic used frequently throughout Lebanon and the Arab Middle East (Graff, Buckwalter, Jin, & Maamouri, 2006). Spoken and taught in schools, MSA is used in formal speeches and public speeches given by indigenous Arab politicians and foreign diplomats speaking to the Arab world and in news broadcasts. The U.S. ambassadors to Lebanon between 2000 and 2007, David Sutherland and Vincent Battle, spoke in MSA when addressing issues and giving speeches in Lebanon. MSA is much the same in both its written and spoken forms, with the occasional exception of dropping extended word endings; the *taamarboota* or the final “at” pronunciation, usually feminine; the *nunation* or the “un,” “in,” and “an” sounds at the end of indefinite nouns; and so on (Brustad, Al-Batal, & Tūnisī, 1995). As such, MSA is widely understood in the Arab Middle East. However, MSA in its written and

¹ Marie-Therese Obeid, personal communication, January 11, 2009 (see Appendix 24).

spoken forms is nonetheless different from spoken Lebanese Arabic and, to varying degrees, from all other forms of spoken Arabic (Abboud & McCarus, 1983; Rice, Sa'id, & Rice, 1977).

Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronites, have “describe[d] themselves as ‘Lebanese Christians,’ a term that implies a non-Arab bloodline and the language they speak as ‘Lebanese’” (Mackey, 2008, p. 13). They have claimed that because spoken Lebanese is different from formal written and formal spoken Arabic, then it is not Arabic. Because of this, Maronites and other Lebanese Christians have claimed that colloquial Lebanese, is simply not Arabic. Linguistically speaking, however, this is a weak argument.¹ However, because all of the colloquial Arabic dialects deviate from MSA, spoken Lebanese Arabic is not the exception to the rule (Wise, 1987).² This is not unusual because Arabic is not the only language that is diglossic.

Debate has continued concerning which form of spoken Arabic is closest to MSA. Some individuals have stated it is Yemeni Arabic; others have said Iraqi, Syrian, or Saudi colloquial Arabic. Interestingly, the Syrian and Lebanese dialects of Arabic are virtually identical and have always been classified together as Levantine, Syrian, or Shami (Damascus) Arabic³ (Jaschke, 1987). Spoken Lebanese and Syrian Arabic are considered so similar that it is improper to call them different dialects. Instead, they are different accents.⁴ Even Maronites, who are critical of the idea that spoken Lebanese is Arabic, have admitted that spoken Syrian and Lebanese are virtually the same and are closer to one another than to any other third-party colloquial Arabic language or combination. This similarity between the

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, April 10, 2007 (see Appendix 13).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Eid, personal communication, June 19, 2006 (see Appendix 24); Obeid, personal communication, January 11, 2008 (see Appendix 24).

spoken Arabic of Lebanon and Syria to formal Arabic rather than to other dialects has been credited to two factors: (a) Lebanon being part of historical Syria, home of the first Arab/Islamic empire (the Umayyad), and (b) the geographical proximity of the two nations (Abdulhab, 2009; Salibi, 1988).

Some scholars have continued to believe that Levantine Arabic is closer to MSA than most other forms of spoken Arabic¹ (Rozovskaya, Sproat, & Benmamoun, 2006). Additionally, colloquial Lebanese has been considered much closer to MSA than some of the northern African dialects, such as Moroccan Arabic² (Rozovskaya et al., 2006). However, the notion of Moroccan Arabic, given its distance from MSA, and the various colloquial Arabic dialects has also been utilized as an argument by some Maronites who challenge that Lebanese Arabic is not Arabic. Specifically, they have stated that spoken Lebanese Arabic is very different from spoken Moroccan Arabic, which is very difficult to understand. Therefore, Lebanese Arabic is not Arabic.

This also appears to be a flawed argument and comparison. Moroccan Arabic is fairly well influenced by other languages, such as Berber, French, and Spanish. Many Levantine and Eastern Arabic speakers admit that they struggle to understand Moroccan Arabic and that it is even more divergent from MSA than the other Arabic dialects (Farha, 1975; Wayne, Sabongy, & Saad, 1990). Moroccans seem to be aware of this fact. This writer has spoken with Moroccans and observed that, when speaking Arabic, they often switch from their Moroccan dialect to MSA or Egyptian Arabic (a widely understood form of Arabic) to be understood by Levantine and Eastern Arabs (Wayne et al., 1990; Wise, 1987). Interestingly, in creating or expanding Arabic language and culture programs because of the great demand, officials of U.S. universities have often chosen Moroccan teachers whose Arabic dialect

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, April 10, 2007 (see Appendix 13).

² Ibid.

deviates far from formal Arabic (Wayne, 1990; Wise, 1987). Thus, even though spoken Lebanese Arabic is different from MSA and Moroccan Arabic, these differences do not seem to be adequate reasons to classify Lebanese Arabic as non-Arabic.

Also suspect is the argument of some Lebanese Christians that because they speak differently, they are non-Arabic speakers in comparison with Lebanese Muslims (Lebanese Language Center, 2004). Lebanese Christians, for the most part, speak the inter-Lebanese accent of their area and village¹ (Farnha, 1975). Therefore, although some Lebanese Maronites attempt to modify and re-categorize spoken Lebanese, as in the case of Said Akl, these attempts have been not only unsuccessful but also offensive to Lebanese Muslims and Christians. This has been particularly true for the Greek Orthodox, who cherish their native language from pre-Islamic Arabia to the Quran to the present as sacred.

Given the importance of language to the arguments concerning Lebanese identity, the student participants were asked whether they considered spoken Lebanese to be spoken Arabic. Just more than half the respondents (152; 52.8%) answered that spoken Lebanese is spoken Arabic (see Table 22.19), nearly the same results as those for the question of Arab identity. However, the percentage might have been greater had the respondents been asked if spoken Lebanese is the same as formal Arabic. As mentioned previously, differences exist between formal and spoken Arabic based on the concept of diglossia. Regardless, however, the questions remain as to whether 50% of the students or civilians in Britain or America (or any other country) would deny that they speak English and whether such denial would or should result in as much controversy.

The Name Change Theory

¹ Eid, personal communication, June 19, 2006 (see Appendix 24).

Names can indicate the ethnic identity of a person or a group of people. To determine whether the ethno-linguistic first names of the students deviated from those of their fathers, the university students were asked to give their fathers' first names and their own first names. Analyzing the differences between the fathers' and students' first names was a reliable way to evaluate the variations. For confidentiality purposes, students were not asked for their last or family names.

In terms of their fathers' names, of the 252 students who responded, 65.1% reported that their fathers had Arabic first names; 22.9% reported that their fathers had French first names; and 6.3% reported English names (see Table 22.20). In terms of the students' first names, Table 22.21 shows that the number of English and French first names increased. Of the 274 students who responded, only 51.1 % had Arabic names, a difference of 14% from one generation to the next. Thus, although most of the students' fathers' names were Arabic, with a few being French, the students' first names were mostly non-Arabic, most often English, even though Lebanon is an Arab country.

In and of itself, such a change may not be indicative of Maronite identity deviation. Yet, combined with the information presented in this thesis, the percentage of name changes in just one generation should be considered supporting documentation for that premise. The significance of such a change may be seen more clearly if one transposes that number on another culture (i.e., if half of the British had non-English names or if the French or Italians had nonnative names).

In addition, students not only had English–Arabic shared names but also spelled their names with the English spelling. In other words, names such as Paul and Joseph were not written in their respective Arabic translations, Boulos and Yusuf, but were spelled either in

English or in exact phonetic Arabic translations. These data were further confounded by the fact that many of the first names originated from languages such as Latin and Greek.

To illustrate the effect of the transient nature of Lebanese identity on name changes, a case study of the Atallah family was conducted. Jean and Therese Atallah, Maronite Christians, were born in the early 1930s. At that time, Lebanon was still a French mandate. As stated previously, Maronite Christians, in particular, had an affinity for French administration and for the French cultural influence on Lebanon. Both Jean and Therese were given French names by their parents (both of whom had Arabic names) to distinguish them as Christians.

Lebanon gained its independence from France in 1943, which seemed to correlate with a change in naming conventions. By 1954, Lebanon considered itself to be an Arab country and was a member of the Arab League. Among other cultural phenomena, Arabic literature began to flourish.¹ According to Jean and Therese Atallah, they decided to move away from French names and give their children Arabic names.² They had 10 children, 6 boys and 4 girls. Their first child, born in 1954, was named Nehme (meaning “gift from God” in Arabic). Nehme was followed by Nabil, Kamil, Fares, Mona, Eid, Toufik, Zeina, Bushr, and Aida—all Arabic names.

Nehme Atallah’s first child was born in 1982. In this year, the Lebanese Civil War was raging; the Arab identity of Lebanon was in question; and the Maronite Christians opposed the Palestinian cause, which they deemed an Arab problem. Nehme named his children Jean, Paul, and Anthony, spelling his first son’s name in French and the other two sons’ names in English. Additionally, Nehme stated that if he were to immigrate to the

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, April 6, 2007 (see Appendix 13).

² Therese Atallah, personal communication, September 29, 2008 (see Appendix 24).

United States, he would change the spelling of his last name to Atalia so it would appear to be Italian American rather than Arabic.¹

Thus, over the course of 50 years and four generations, the ethnic first names of the Atallah family changed significantly: Family members' first names changed from Arabic to French, from French back to Arabic, and then from Arabic to English in the present generation (see Appendix 23). The case of the Atallah family was just one example of the changing aspects inside Maronite Christian Lebanese identity. Inasmuch as names can indicate the identity of a person or a group of people, this information reflects the premise that the Lebanese Christian identity is sometimes unclear, even transient.

DNA Studies Concerning Phoenicianism

The February 1970 issue of *National Geographic* featured an article entitled, "Lebanon, Little Bible Land in the Crossfire of History," written by Lebanese American William Ellis. The article showed the problems the Lebanese had with identity 40 years ago, which were similar to the current identity dilemma. In most of Ellis's narrative, he seemed to be reporting about a country with a solid Arab identity; but also he stated, "The Lebanese I found cherish this heritage. Many speak of themselves not as Arabs or Moslems or Christians or even as Lebanese but with emphatic pride as Phoenicians" (1970, p. 257). Ellis shared that the Phoenicians were Semitic Arabs and that "as long as 4,000 years ago, people were coming into the country from other areas. At that time they came from somewhere on the Arabian Peninsula. They called themselves Canaanites; the Greeks called them Phoenicians" (1970, p. 257). He continued, "Could I then claim to be 'part Phoenician' . . . a heady thought indeed" (p. 258). In addition, Ellis interviewed a Lebanese soldier who spoke of "those of our people who feel that Arab unity must come before all else" (1970, p. 245). In the article, he

¹ Ibid.

discussed the points in history when the “procession of invaders [began]” (p. 257) in Lebanon, giving the impression that this little nation had a very complex identity. Thus, the article showed the decades of obtuseness concerning Lebanese identity on the part of the Lebanese themselves.

After such occurrences as the Tāʾif Agreement, which was to end Lebanese identity confusion, the Maronite affirmation of the Lebanese Arab identity in 2003 (Hourani, 2003), and so forth, the issues of Lebanese identity should have been resolved. Still, as the reader may have concluded from the field experts’ and students’ interviews and surveys, Lebanon has continued to have an ongoing identity crisis. Although a number people in present-day Lebanon are prepared to let the Phoenician identity issue rest, the Maronites have remained committed to their belief that they are Phoenician by ancestry. For many Lebanese in general, the issue of Phoenician identity has become a tiresome one.

Thus, few Lebanese showed interest in an October 2004 issue of *National Geographic*, 34 years after Ellis’s story on Lebanon first appeared in 1970. In the October 2004 issue, editors featured DNA samples taken from the Lebanese who lived along the coastline and in the ports, the areas believed to be where the Phoenicians once flourished. In his article, “Who Were the Phoenicians?” Gore (2004) stated that DNA tests were completed on ancient Phoenician remains and compared to the DNA of the present-day Lebanese coastal dwellers, particularly the fishermen. American geneticist Spencer Wells and Lebanese geneticist Peter Zalloua conducted the tests. According to the article, the scientists found that “most, but not all, samples indicate Middle Eastern or African origins” (Gore, 2004, p. 48).

Perhaps more significant, Gore (2004) reported that “modern Lebanese people share a genetic identity going back thousands of years” (p. 48). Somewhat astonishing were the

findings that the people who believed they were descendants of the seafaring Phoenicians showed no genetic relationship to them. Furthermore, the geneticists explained,

the Sea Peoples apparently had no significant genetic impact on populations in the Levant . . . the people living today along the coast where the Sea Peoples would have interbred have similar Y-chromosome patterns to those living inland. They are basically all one people. (Gore, 2004, p. 48)

Therefore, the people who were believed to be the seafaring Phoenicians apparently “didn’t seem to interbreed much. They seem to have stuck mostly to themselves,” (Gore, 2004, p. 49). According to Zalloua (as quoted in Gore, 2004, p. 48), a Lebanese Christian himself, the results were support for the belief that “both Muslim and Christian Lebanese populations share an ancient genetic heritage.” Zalloua continued, “Maybe now we can finally put some of our internal struggles to rest,” (as quoted in Gore, 2004, p. 49).

Based on the information they provided, the older Lebanese experts seemed to understand that Phoenician identity for Lebanon, especially contemporarily, is a weak claim. However, a major disparity was found between what the older Lebanese intellectuals understood about their Phoenician identity and what the younger, current generation of students understood. The findings of this study indicate that the students’ adherence to a present Phoenician identity racially, ethnically, and culturally is not based in solid fact.

Discussion

Putting the identity question into perspective, especially concerning the Maronites and the effect of identity on CMR must be accomplished prior to delving into the next issues affecting CMR: the causes and possible preventions of the Lebanese Civil War and the possibilities for such conflicts in the future (Chapter 6). Therefore, this section has been divided into three parts: First, the possible reasons for Maronite identity separatism have been given. Second, the effects of those issues on CMR have been examined. Third, a

psychosocial historical perspective of the Maronites has been included to understand their separatist position concerning identity.

Maronite Identity Separatism in Present-Day Lebanon

The field expert respondents and university students offered more emphasis and diverse viewpoints regarding Lebanese identity issues, perhaps more than any other in this thesis. This writer hoped to uncover and address several issues in this thesis. The first issue was whether, based on fact rather than on rumor, the Lebanese disagree on identity. The findings indicate that the Lebanese do have a major, contentious identity issue. Study findings also revealed that the Maronites are the primary group that oppose an Arab identity for themselves and for Lebanon. Furthermore, the Maronites do not seem to have a firm scientific argument for rejecting Arabism for Phoenicianism. However, nearly all of the field experts acknowledged their Arab identity; they were not completely adverse to the Maronite rejection of the same. It appears that with their level of conviviality, if the identity issue was left to them to solve, they would solve it amicably. Study findings also revealed a discrepancy between the views of the upper middle-aged and elderly respondents and the views of the younger university student respondents. The university students, who were predominantly Maronites, identified themselves as Phoenician. Thus, the issue of Arab identity has remained a significant point of contention between the Christians and Muslims and among the Christians themselves.

The Maronite denial is contradictory to the evidence that they are Arabs (Hourani, 1992; Matar, 2008; Pacini, 1998) and not the “rose among thorns” (the thorns being their Muslim and non-Maronite countrymen; Khalifah, 1997 p. 4) as Pope Leo X referred to them in the 16th century. During a historic visit to Lebanon, even Pope John Paul II questioned the more subtle and acceptable notion of pluralism of the people of Lebanon. Muslims pointed

out that the Pope asked the Maronites “to merge with their Arab identity.”¹ Furthermore, regarding Lebanese Christian Arab identity,

Pope John Paul II challenged the concept of “pluralism” by some Christian Maronites of Lebanon, that is, a source of basic differences with their Muslim counterparts. Although he acknowledged that “each specific culture is still characterized by the religious and profane contributions of different civilizations that followed each other on their soil,” he adopted the view that “in all nations and cultures where they disseminated, Christians don’t demarcate from other peoples, neither by their country, nor by their language nor by their habits . . . They conform to local customs in clothing, food and the daily existence, even as they reveal the extraordinary and truly paradoxical laws that regulate their way of life.” (Dagher, 2001, pp. 194–195)

Other Lebanese Christians, including the second largest Christian denomination in the country, the Greek Orthodox,

shared this view (of the pope) but they did not expect the Roman pontiff to call for the “re-Arabization” of his Catholic flocks in the Orient. They were pleased. Muslims were contented too, by the call for a greater solidarity with the Arab world (Dagher, 2001, p. 195)

They had previously been “disconcerted” (Dagher, 2001, p. 195) with the inactivity of the Vatican in addressing Catholic Christian Arabicity in Lebanon. Although the Maronites somehow knew prior to the Synod “that the Holy See intended to urge them to adopt a policy of harmony with their Arab environment, they were startled because they did not expect the Roman pontiff to be that categorical in the terms he used” (Dagher, 2001, p. 195).

One month after the pope’s synod and visit to Lebanon, the Papal Nuncio in Lebanon, Pablo Puente, revealed that “it was not easy for the pope to assert the Arabicity of Lebanon but when he made up his mind, he spoke it out” (Dagher, 2001, p. 195). Despite his fairly strong urging that the Maronites merge with their neighbors’ Arabness, as well as the urging of the other Lebanese Christian and Muslim communities, the pope’s call was met with Maronite skepticism. Indeed, just a few days before the pope’s arrival in Beirut, then Maronite Bishop Rai’ (later appointed patriarch on March 25, 2011) declared that not just he

¹ N. Musawi, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 16).

but Lebanese Christians in general (an inaccurate assumption) did “not agree on the content and the methods to achieve that goal” (Dagher, 2001, p. 195). Despite the jubilation the Muslims, Greek Orthodox, and other Christian communities of Lebanon felt as a result of the pope’s visit, the Maronites changed their stance regarding Arab identity very little.

During the years this writer spent researching the crisis of identity in present-day Lebanon, he found that, when confronted with the fact that the pope himself urged the Maronites to recognize their Arabicity, the Maronites replied that the pope needed to make those statements to appease the Muslims and other Christians of Lebanon; that he may not have truly meant what he said or that he doesn’t really grasp the issue. Although the pope’s urging might have had some impact on the Maronites, they nonetheless continued to assert that they are racially, ethnically, and culturally Phoenician, Syriac, Francophone, or European rather than Arab (Hajjar, 2002; Mrad, 2008). As has been shown, based on the information presented thus far, the Maronites have maintained their position, in part, due to their great pride in Phoenician identity association and to their attempts to avoid the negative associations attributed to Arabicity.

Prior to the civil war, Maronite Christians were a sectarian community invested in the creation of a very special, secular Lebanese nation distinct from the neighboring Middle Eastern countries. The drive of the Maronites was based upon a set of historical and perceived threats that were the basis for a communal identity that existed upon both the spiritual and physical levels. Religion was also the direct connection between the Maronites and Western allies, particularly with the Vatican and France. Additionally, the Islamic background of Arab nationalism only served to reinforce Maronite religious identity. Recognizing the need for a larger Lebanese identity extending beyond their own communal one, the Maronites constructed a national identity of ancestry from the Phoenicians. This was

a“Mediterranean” identity based shakily upon Phoenician merchants who did establish towns and small trading posts on Lebanese shores many centuries earlier. Maronites during the 19th and 20th centuries revived and glamorized this identity to serve as a unifying premise for all Lebanese. However, as stated this identity was problematic and its flaws detectable, even when restricted to only the Maronites, particularly considering the Syrian origin of St. Maron himself. Despite these problems, this Phoenician notion has proved resilient within the Maronite community simply because it presents a understanding somewhat grounded in historical fact upon which a nation distinct from Muslims, Arabs, or Western European history may be built.

Maronite Issues and Implications for CMR

The perceptions of Arabicity among the Lebanese have important implications for present-day Lebanon and its diaspora, one of the most important of which is its effect on CMR. When Lebanese Maronites deny an Arab identity, CMR is affected negatively. This occurs for several reasons. First, the field expert respondents, as well as the available literature, suggested that this denial of Arabism means the Maronites, formerly the largest and most powerful Lebanese community, consider themselves not only different but also superior (Cedarland, n.d.; Coalition of American Assyrians and Maronites, 2001). Thus, the Maronite belief comes across as bigoted ethnocentrism (Abu Al Nasr, 2001). By insisting that they are not Arabs, the Maronites offend the Muslims and other Christians, who actually feel loathed by the Maronites due in part to the extent to which the Maronites go to deny the very identity the other communities uphold. The perceived supremacy of the Maronite community over that of the Lebanese Muslims as arbiters of modern Western culture, particularly of coveted technologies and sciences, becomes fuel for the conflict. This is a dual perception employed by Maronites to portray themselves both as superior to Lebanese Muslims and as equal to the

Europeans and to perpetuate as proof within their minds of their Maronite uniqueness, their importance to Lebanese culture, and, most important, their unremitting isolation relative to other Lebanese communities.

The Muslims are especially indignant about this. They point out that some Maronites who deny Arabicity work in Arab/Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia (a pillar of Arab/Muslim identity), where they make fortunes and openly admit they are able to manage this handily because of their Arabic language and culture (Llewellyn, 2010). The Maronites admit to being treated as fellow Arabs in countries such as Saudi Arabia and to being considered part of the larger Arab family. Thus, the Maronites' willingness to utilize their Arabic skills for economic gain yet continue not only to decline but also to denounce Arab identity, culture, and even the language, is offensive to the Muslims of Lebanon. However, several of the field experts, though they identify as Arab, had little issue with the Maronite position. Sammak felt the Arab denial was "completely understandable" and that such a position should not be a problem for the Muslims.

However, it is not simply the denial of Arabicity by the Maronites that is harmful to CMR but the firmness with which they deny Arabicity. For example, the Christian envoy to the Muslim communities of Lebanon, Samir Franjeh,¹ stated,

At one time Christians tried to preserve a separate identity through the civil war. Then the Muslims reacted to the Christians wanting to be separate because we took them by surprise. The Christians made an alliance with Israel in order to define themselves as different.

The Muslims of Lebanon were infuriated with this alliance with Israel, formed in part to define the Maronites as different. Nearly all of the Lebanese Muslims supported the Palestinian plight in theory, and many did so through social welfare programs and military support. Because of the alliance with Israel, the Maronites, who were in power during the

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

civil war, fought against the Palestinians (Abi-Ebser, 2010; Smith, 2006). Knowing the injustices suffered by the Palestinians at the hands of the Israelis, the Muslims detested the Maronite cooperation with the Israelis (Dawisha, 2003). Thus, another reason for the Maronite rejection of Arabism and the goal of maintaining a separate identity was amplified within the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Nevertheless, the Lebanese Civil War ended two decades ago and so, part of the problem is the Muslim and other Christian communities inability to put this issue to rest, is as much of an issue. Bishop Ghazal and Fr. Moussa lamented the duration of the identity struggle and are accepting of the Maronite identity differentiation. Aside from race, ethnicity, and culture, Arab identity is also intertwined with Arab rights and Arab causes, principally the Palestinian cause (Abu-Rabi, 2004). Had the Maronites stayed neutral during the Lebanese Civil War, as the Greek Orthodox did for the most part,¹ the Muslims might have found this less offensive than the Maronites’ actively seeking and participating in the Israeli destruction of Lebanon. In the mid-20th century, Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Kataeb (Phalangist party) and the father of two Lebanese presidents, stated publicly that the Maronites of Lebanon were “ready to make a deal with the devil itself,” (as quoted in Nassib, 1983, p. 62), a clear reference to Israel, to maintain this separate, non-Arab identity, inter alia. The lengths to which the Maronites are willing to go and the manner in which they act to distance themselves from Arabism hurt CMR (Abi-Ebser, 2010; Matar, 2008). As Franjeh stated, the Maronites were willing to go to lengths for a separate identity. Yet twenty years after the Civil War ending and the Maronites holding to a separate identity has not caused a recurrence of war or conflict.

¹ Fr. Wehbe, personal communication, April 6, 2006 (see Appendix 24).

Another reason for the Maronites' denial is the connotations many of them have for the term Arab. They feel the word sums up notions of pre- and anti-modernity, backwardness, Bedouins, and the heresy of Islam—all characteristics with which they do not want to be associated. This writer held a teleconference with Lebanese Maronite Archbishop George Saad Abi-Younes on July 6, 2011. The Arab Spring was raging in Libya and elsewhere in the Middle East at the time. During the conference, the archbishop was asked about the Maronite uneasiness with being associated with Arab identity. The archbishop answered, “Do you see Gaddafi [referring to former Libyan president Moammar Gaddafi]? That’s what I mean. That’s why we don’t want to be Arabs. We’re not Arabs!” The archbishop went on to describe how Gaddafi’s unusual appearance, with his strange affect, wardrobe, and mannerisms, was an Arab embarrassment, something with which the Maronites did not want to be associated.

In the eyes of some Lebanese, Arabicity is a contrast to modernity (Karam, 2006a). Thus, because of the Maronites' separatism and history of leaning toward the West, as seen with the Crusaders, France, and presently the United States, they have separated themselves from an Arab identity. Instead, the Maronites prefer to promote the idea that Lebanon is modern and similar to America, France, and Britain, which they view as symbols of modernity. For 7 years, this writer resided in the Christian District of Jounieh Lebanon in the pre-dominantly Maronite Yesu Al Malik or “Christ the King” neighborhood of the village Zouk Mosbeh. When this writer first arrived and for many months later, many Maronites were anxious to show him the many fast food restaurants in Lebanon, including McDonald’s, Burger King, Subway, and Dunkin’ Donuts. They boasted about the American restaurants that existed in Lebanon in a clear attempt to show that their country was similar to America.

The Maronite denial of the use of the Arabic language, which is supported by very few scholarly sources, is also difficult for Lebanese Muslims and Christians to comprehend from sociological and academic perspectives. For the Muslims, Arabic is the language of the Quran and of God himself. As such, the Maronite disavowal of the language, rather than pride in it, is offensive (Dagher, 2001).

One quite surprising issue is that, to the Maronites, the word Arab means Muslim,¹ despite the existence of Arab Christians well before the emergence of Islam and the subsequent Arab embrace of that religion. Although the Western lay person seems to confuse the terms Arab and Muslim as being synonymous, the indigenous people of the Arab Middle East should know the difference and be willing to explain the nuance between Arab and Muslim. Thus, the Maronites should realize that the term is not synonymous with Muslim.

This denial of Arabism to avoid being labeled a Muslim is exacerbated in the diasporas as mentioned in the case of the Atallah family. For example, the official position of the U.S. Maronite Church for both the 2000 and 2010 national censuses was that Maronites should register as Syriacs, not as Arabs.² Indeed, this writer witnessed the urgings to register as Syriac in his own parish of Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Catholic Church in Waterbury, Connecticut, throughout the pre-census months of May and April 2010. There, as well as across the United States, Maronite community members state they are not Arab. Many Maronites change their family names to ensure they are not thought of as Muslim (see the

¹ Eid, personal communication, June 12, 2006 (see Appendix 24); Khalil, personal communication, February 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Msgr. Gregory Mansour, personal communication, April 6, 2010 (see Appendix 24).

section of Name Change Theory in chapter 4).¹ They distance themselves from Islam and Muslims in what appears to be an attempt to earn acceptance (Gabriel, 2006; Phares, 1997).

In response to the Maronite Eparchy Choir Bishop Joseph Kaddo's (2000) letter urging the Maronites to register as Syriac, the American Maronite Union went a step further.

In a letter dated April 11, 2000, union leadership wrote the following:

To all members of the Maronite community in the United States, as well as to all Lebanese Christians from Aramaic–Syriac descent. The Eparchy of the Saint Maron of Brooklyn issued a historical call to all of us to identify as "Syriac" in the ongoing US Census. We, as American Maronite Union, cannot but praise our spiritual leadership and our Church for this crucial move. This ethnic self-identification will finally allow us to emerge as a proud community, reconciled with its history and confident in its American future. The term Syriac (Syriani) is not Syrian! (Suri). Syriac is our historical identity; Syriac is our historical language which we still use partially in our services. But more importantly, in the current political and institutional frameworks, it will allow our community finally to distinguish itself from the Arab-American community (American Maronite Union, 2000a).

However, many of the Maronite parishioners "don't even know what Syriac is, but we are urging them to register that way."² On the other hand, Lebanese American Reverend Archimandrite Joseph Hagggar of St. Basil the Great Melkite Catholic Church in Rhode Island stated that his Arab parishioners register as Arab Americans and are supported in doing so.³

Regardless, based on the field experts' information and the available literature, the Lebanese want to de-confessionalize and secularize their society. This being said then the Maronites, who have a long history in Lebanon should be accepted for what their consciousness tells them about their identity.

Another issue, according to Mohammed Sammak,⁴ for the Lebanese Maronites' denial of Arabicity is out of disdain with several Arab countries in terms of their roles in the long

¹ Fr. Naji Kiwan, personal communication, April 6, 2010 (see Appendix 24).

² Ibid.

³ Rev. Archimandrite Joseph Hagggar, personal communication, April 18, 2010 (see Appendix 23).

⁴ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

Lebanese Civil War. These Christians feel these Arab countries failed to offer much assistance in defending the Lebanese during the long war. They believe these predominantly Muslim Arab countries of the Arab Middle East favored the Muslim militias and communities of Lebanon at the Christians' expense throughout the civil war. Those countries helped neither financially or militarily. They also did not aid in the production of an effective plan to end the conflict, according to Sammak.

Historical, Psychosocial Formations of Maronite Identity

Assessing the Maronites' reasoning of a separate identity is cumbersome for several reasons, one of which is the lack of intellectualizing their separate identity theory. An examination and evaluation of the Maronites through a historical psychosocial prism may be helpful in comprehending their preference of non-Arab status and their insistence upon with the more abstract Phoenician/Assyrian identity.

In the early centuries of Christianity, the Maronites were considered heretics. Their brand of Christianity was called "a wicked heresy" (Bin Talal, 1998, p.67). The Maronites were believed to have left the Orontes Valley of Syria for Lebanon because of Byzantine Christian, not Muslim, persecution (Mahfouz, 2009; Parry & Hinnells, 1999). Therefore, early on, the Maronites were considered separate and different from fellow Christians. Oddly enough, when the Muslim Arabs entered Syria (including Lebanon at that time), the Maronites welcomed their arrival because of the Maronites' feelings of oppression under the Byzantine Empire and because of their Arab and Aramean Arab ethnicity and culture, which were similar to those of the Muslim Arabs (Bin Talal, 1998; Trimmingham, 1990).

According to Franjeh,¹ the Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronites, have a historical memory. Although the average Lebanese people may not be consciously thinking

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

of the early history of the Christian–Muslim conflict, nonetheless, they know the conflict exists and subconsciously use it as a reason for the Maronite desire for identity separatism. For example, St. John of Damascus, a high official in the Umayyad Empire and a prominent and admired saint among the Middle Eastern Christians, wrote some very disparaging narratives about Islam and Muslims.¹ His negative view of Islam is known and is considered credible, thus negatively affecting CMR in present-day Lebanon and providing support for the Maronite insistence on a separate identity.

A few centuries later, Maronite support of the crusader invasion of the Arab Middle East again resulted in separating the Maronites from the other Arab and Muslim peoples of the Middle East. The Arab Middle East Empire was in decline at the time of the Crusader invasion (Madden, 2005). Most Maronites—certainly the religious hierarchy, leaders, and much of the civilian population—supported the crusaders in their invasion. Most other Christian denominations, as well as the Muslims, suffered at the hands of the Crusaders (Paine, 2006). Thus, Maronite support of the crusaders is another reason they may have developed their feelings of being separate and different (Bin Talal, 1998; Parry & Hinnells, 1999).

Since the initial Crusader invasion of the Middle East, many well-known Christian philosophers, including St. Thomas Aquinas, have belittled Islam as an illegitimate faith. According to St. Thomas, Islam was a violent religion that talked about sensual rewards and produced no miracles (Stangroom & Garvey, 2006). Therefore, according to St. Thomas and other Christian philosophers, Islam was irrelevant theologically at best and a wicked heresy at worst. Yet these junctures in history are centuries old and hopefully can be seen in that

¹ David Thomas, personal communication, February 10, 2009 (see Appendix 24).

context by the Maronites' Muslim counterparts as such as should the Maronites regarding century old Muslim polemics of Christians.

Beginning around the 17th century, the Maronites began developing what later became very close relations with France and the Vatican to the dismay of the other Christian communities and the Muslims (Baily, 2003; Pacini, 1998). As mentioned, early French explorers called the Maronites "a rose among thorns" and "anything but Arab" (Khalifah, 1997, p. 4). Napoleon himself stated that the Maronites were "French from time immemorial" (Khalifah, 1997, p. 4).

In 1860, the Maronites were massacred by Druze warlords and fighters in Lebanon. Inasmuch as the Druze believed in their own Arabicity and had the support of other Arab Muslim groups, this violence added fuel to the Maronite anti-Arab, pro-Phoenician identity choice. Directly following the Maronite massacres at the hands of the Druze, France increased its involvement in Lebanon, particularly with the Maronite Christians (Fawaz, 1994). Subsequently, protected by a powerful Western empire, the Maronites with their ideas of separatism began to focus on a religious and geographic area, Mt. Lebanon.

In the early 20th century, an Arab awakening resulted in an Arab nationalist movement (Abu-Rabi', 2004). Although many Arab Christians, including the Maronites, were founders of this movement, the Maronites soon began to reject Arab nationalism for Phoenicianism. During the presidency of Gamal Abdul-Nasser of Egypt, with his Arab nationalist philosophy, only the Maronites and perhaps a few others in the greater Middle East rejected this philosophy (Abu-Rabi', 2004). Thus, the Maronites' history of acting differently may be the reason they believe they are different from their fellow Lebanese and from the communities of the Arab Middle East.

The Maronites did not support some socio-political causes identified with the Arab Middle East. As Franjeh¹ stated, the Maronites wanted so desperately to forge a separate identity that they sided with the Israelis in their attacks against the Palestinians and even fought with Israel during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The Maronites, as well as other Christians, felt that the other predominantly Muslim Arab countries of the Middle East favored the Muslim militias and communities of Lebanon at their expense throughout the civil war (Harris, 2006). Yet for Sammak,² a Sunni Muslim, and others, the Christian disgust with the neighboring Arab countries and their continued refutation of Arabism was “completely understandable.”

Additionally, the Arabs lost several wars to Israel which greatly decreased enthusiasm for Arab Nationalism (Abu-Rabi‘, 2004). For the charismatic Maronites, being associated with Arab Nationalism is an association with a loser.

The Maronites have also claimed that they are fighting for their survival (Abu Al Nasr, 2001; Belt, 2009). Specifically, they point out that they are minorities in the Arab Muslim Middle East. Although they once were the majority population in Lebanon and held the most political power, they now feel that Muslims are encroaching upon them and making them a minority in a land that they believe is their own. They also fear, whether accurate or exaggerated, that radical Islam is intolerant, even violent, and that they will be marginalized and perhaps eradicated (Belt, 2009). They fear that one day they will be living under Islamic law (Grafton, 2003).

Conclusion

The field experts’ information and the data gleaned from the university students and the available literature have shown that the fallout from Maronite identity separatism and the

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

Muslim and other Christians' inability to accept the Maronites identity consciousness, is a main part the collateral reasons CMR has not improved in postwar Lebanon. These reasons are political, educational, economic, religious, and geographic. Politically speaking, because of separatism, a feeling of being besieged and foreign interest, the Maronites have sought Western help in the form of French, European, American, and even Israeli intervention rather than political assistance from neighboring Arab countries. This has resulted in political conflict with Lebanese Muslims (Laqueur & Ruben, 2008; Lewis, 2004). In regards to education, the Maronites have sought French and American educational systems and enlisted their children in them rather than in the Arabic/Lebanese system (Dagher, 2001). With the Muslims in general unable to do the same for financial reasons, the result was envy and neither the promotion of unity nor camaraderie with their Christian countrymen.

Economically, Lewis (2004) explained that separatism "was easily explained by the equally well-known fact that Christians were rich and Muslims were poor and that, consequently, Muslim hostility to Christians . . . was socioeconomic in origin," (p. 284). Religiously, Maronites have often sought the separation of church and state, whereas "for Muslims religion is not, as for Christians, concerned with one part of life, leaving the rest to the state . . . its ruling institution is Church and State in one," (Lewis, 2004, p. 285). The Maronites have tended to emigrate more than the Muslims have. They were also displaced geographically at a higher rate than other Lebanese during the long Lebanese Civil War (Dagher, 2001; Harik, 1999).

At one time, the Maronites were major progressives in the awakening of Arab identity and its renaissance. They made advances in Arabic literature and translation. They existed in the Arab Middle East before Islam as Arabs and proto-Semitic Arabs (Hitti, 1967; Salibi, 1988). However, although they were among the founders of Arab nationalism, to the

Maronites, Arab nationalism never seemed to succeed because it did not result in prosperity and productivity in Lebanon or in the Arab Middle East (Abu-Rabi‘, 2004).

For the Maronites, the Phoenicians have remained an ancient, enlightened, and exciting people. They represent an ancient pride, if not fantasy, no matter how weak the connection to the present-day Lebanese may be. To the Maronites, the Phoenicians traveled the Mediterranean, produced the alphabet, and founded the modern world. Thus, even though the Maronites currently live not only in Lebanon but also in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine and speak, read, and write Arabic, they have refused to relinquish their Phoenician identity in part because it is their way out of Arabicity and Islam.

Thus, the Maronite identity issue and the Muslim and other Christians inability to accept or resolve it, has continued to have an impact on Lebanese CMR, nationalism, and unity. Nationalism, expounded in various theories, is heavily dependent on a group of people who either share or agree to share a common race, ethnicity, culture, history, and language, among other aspects (Macionis, 2003; Salem, n.d.). Even though Lebanese Christians and Muslims are trying to solidify a continuously threatened sense of nationalism, the Maronites have in part contributed to the difficulty in reaching consensual nationalism because of their refusal to embrace any of these shared aspects. For their part, Muslim rigidity regarding the association of Arabism and Islamism left little room for consensus and has not alleviated the Maronite concern of what may come to pass if they merge their identity with Arabicity. Thus, Maronite acknowledgement or compromise regarding Arabism and the needed Muslim compromise and flexibility with the same, may be helpful in resolving this important aspect of CMR discord. As Aoun¹ stated, “We are a mixture of Arab, Greek, Phoenician, and other peoples; we are a mix, but we are still Lebanese.”

¹ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

CHAPTER 6: INTERFAITH ACTIVISM, PREVENTION, OR ANOTHER WAR

The question of which community, Christian or Muslim, is more engaged with quality and consistency in developing and maintaining healthy CMR has been examined in this chapter. In addition, because CMR deteriorated during the civil war, respondents were asked to theorize what could have prevented the civil war and whether another civil war could occur. To assess further the effect of the factors affecting CMR in present-day Lebanon, the following research questions were posed to the respondents. The rationale for each of these questions was explained in chapter 1 in the Methodology section:

IQ6. Is there any community in Lebanon that you feel does more or less or a better or poorer job working for positive Christian–Muslim relations? For example, could the Maronite community or the Shiite community and/or its leaders be doing more?

IQ7. Can you think of anything in the past that, if it had been done differently, would have prevented the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1991, reducing the conflict between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon?

IQ8. Is the relationship between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon today so poor that it could cause another civil war?

Fieldwork and Advocacy for Positive CMR

The field experts were specifically asked which community was more effective in their advocacy and fieldwork for positive CMR. Their answers ranged from (a) neither Christians nor Muslims working effectively to improve relations to (b) the Christians doing more to improve CMR to (c) the Muslims also doing their part but using different approaches to (d) the problems being caused not by either community but by the politicians and political parties out to bolster their power and position. Seventeen field experts responded to IQ6 in their interviews. Five spoke more about what the Christians were doing to improve CMR,

five gave credit for working toward CMR to both communities, and four indicated neither community was doing enough to make any real progress toward positive CMR. One discussed some of the specific efforts of the Muslim community in working toward the goal of positive CMR. Others talked more about the differences in the approaches of the two communities. Interestingly, however, six of the field experts identified politics and politicians or government as being the problem with improving CMR regardless of the efforts of the Christian and Muslim communities.

Neither Community

Massouh¹ believed no one was “working to their capacity” to improve relationships. He not only included the two communities but also reiterated his concern about the government and the educational system. As an example, he cited the poor funding for the Center for Study of Islam and Christianity at BU. The content of the Web site for the center revealed, as mentioned in chapter 3 (Political Causes of CMR Discord), confirmation of Massouh’s statement: The Web site was devoid of any programs and contained a plea for substantial funding (i.e., millions of dollars). Salem² echoed Massouh’s beliefs, noting that the country needed to reconcile at the national level because they could not “ignore this anymore.” Somewhat more cynical in responding, Matar³ said, “There is no party in Lebanon or area of Lebanon that [publicly] calls for conflict between the Christians and the Muslims; everyone calls for a good relationship, but some people lie.” He noted the calls by educators and politicians—including universities, schools, and political parties—to “establish good CMR” and believed that many institutions, including the media, and religious leaders agreed but that few of them, “especially the political media,” probed CMR deeply or suggested ways

¹ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

² Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

³ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

to progress. Hajjar¹ reiterated the idea that both the Christians and the Muslims were “all working at the same level” toward better CMR. However, he felt that level was “inadequate.” Most Christian and Muslim politicians and leaders, even community members, were content with the way things were. They did not desire improvement or stronger relations because they might “lose their individual and group power.”

Based on the field experts’ information, the nature of the university student’s replies, and the available literature, CMR do not appear to have improved in postwar Lebanon. This lack of improvement seemed to elicit an overall level of frustration and disgust from Massouh, Salem, Matar, and Hajjar and to give them reason to make blanket statements that the advocacy in both communities was equally incompetent. However, although most conflicts involve various participants and causes, few if any contain precise parity of blame. Perhaps these respondents were hasty in their responses but given their diversified and educated, first-hand knowledge and experience of CMR conflict, their insight holds merit. Here again is the respondents mentioned issues such as the media, politics, and CMR, reemphasizing the interaction between various societal issues and CMR.

Massouh works directly in the field of CMR advocacy. As such, he sees first hand which community is more proactive than the other in terms of interfaith dialogue. Therefore, his observations that neither community is pursuing communal relations to an optimal level should be taken seriously. Additionally, as Greek Orthodox, Massouh and Salem must have felt the “marginalization” of their proud community in Lebanese society and politics (“New Committee and New Goal,” 2011). The Greek Orthodox community has felt caught at times between the larger Muslim and Maronite communities to the point that their needs and interests are not given equal priority (Larkin, 2011; “New Committee and New Goal,” 2011).

¹ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

Therefore, having been marginalized by both communities, Massouh's and Salem's wanting a stronger commitment to equitable CMR advocacy makes sense.

Hajjar was a senior journalist at *An-Nahar*, the largest newspaper in Lebanon, at the start of this thesis. In early 2011, he became editor-in-chief of *An-Nahar*, a position he continues to hold as of the writing of this paper. As a newspaper editor (who has reported on numerous intercommunal issues) in war-torn Lebanon, he and all media staff have had to be extremely careful with what they publish lest they put themselves in real, not imagined, danger (Daou, 2001; Fisk, 2002). Thus, Hajjar (who also belongs to a marginalized Christian sect of Lebanon, the Melchites) may have been exercising diplomacy in assigning equal responsibility for CMR weaknesses. Yet, because of his position with *An-Nahar* and experience in his hometown, the historically mixed Christian–Muslim village of Mashgara, Hajjar brings real experience and understanding of CMR issues that should be considered.

The Christian Community

Other field experts believed that the Christians were working more effectively to improve CMR than their Muslim counterparts. Halabi¹ admired what the Christians had undertaken post-civil war, noting that they had been reflexive and self-critical of their behavior during the war. This was especially true of the Maronites. A Druze, Halabi noted that from 1983 to 1987, the Druze had been involved with “the war of the mountain.” This part of the war pitted the Druze and Christians of the Shouf and Aley districts of Mt. Lebanon against one another (Khalaf, 2002). Afterward, including during recent times, they wished to live in peace. Halabi then cited several positive examples of Christian–Muslim reconciliation, including the meeting between Patriarch Sfeir and Walid Jumblat in 2001, which he considered “a Druze and Maronite reconciliation the likes of which had not occurred since

¹ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

after the war of 1860.” A review of Lebanese history revealed that the war of 1860 particularly involved the Druze and Maronites in a major intercommunity war against one another. Thus, Halabi’s statement seemed to confirm Franjeh’s¹ response, that the Lebanese maintained a problematic memory in terms of their history and that grudges were held long term. In this case, the grudge dated to the war of 1860, if not earlier.

Halabi is a respected senior member of the Arab Committee for Christian–Muslim Dialogue in Lebanon. He has gone on record advocating for solid CMR. Even though his Druze community was involved in very violent wars against Maronite forces and the resulting grudges run deep, Halabi appeared interested and able to separate past conflict from present advocacy. His praise for Christian CMR efforts appeared bona fide, especially given the past and present acrimony these communities and their leadership have had for one another.

Also concurring that the Christians were doing more on different levels than the Muslims in working toward positive CMR was Khalil.² He noted that the church taught “that everyone is my brother, not [simply] cousin, friend, etc.” Therefore, in general, Christians had official documentation that Muslims could attain salvation and that was God’s will. There were no exclusions; Christianity was inclusive. Thus, Christians shared their services and institutions, such as schools, with the Muslims. On the other hand, because the teachings of Islam stated that heaven did not exist for Christians, the Muslims were exclusive and normally did not share with the Christians. Therefore, by the nature and philosophy of their faith, Christians were doing more to foster healthy CMR.

El Khazen and Ghazal concurred. According to Khazen,³ the Christians were always the ones initiating Christian–Muslim dialogue, referring to what he called “the pattern”: The

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

³ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

Maronites usually initiated the dialogue, followed by the Greek Orthodox Church and then by the Greek Catholics. Ghazal¹ cited the good work accomplished through CMR programs at BU (Greek Orthodox), St. Joseph's University (Maronite), the Al Mukassed Institute (Sunni), and the Church of St. Paul (Melchite Greek Catholic).

In acknowledgment of the Christian community being more involved in promoting positive CMR, Sammak² talked about his personal efforts to help in the CMR process when he attended a conference at the University of Malta in 1989. At that time, he had the opportunity to meet Pope John Paul II, along with other participants and scholars, some of whom were Lebanese. When it was Sammak's turn to meet the pope, he greeted the pontiff, announced his name, and asked, "What are you doing for Lebanon?" The pope seemed surprised by the question and hesitated before answering, "You will see what I'm going to do for Lebanon." Sammak felt that his direct question to the pope, in its own small way, helped to inspire the pontiff to hold the Vatican Synod for Lebanon. Only the second synod in more than 200 years, the meeting was convened in 1994.

Prior to the synod, Sammak³ spent a month at the Vatican in preparation. Although the pope barely remembered Sammak's name, he did remember his question. Sammak seemed proud that he was "one of the very first Muslims" ever to attend the pre-synod preparation meetings at the Vatican and to meet privately with the pope in his private quarters. In addition, the Vatican assigned him, along with then Maronite Bishop (now patriarch since March of 2011) Beshara Rai and Greek Orthodox Bishop George Khodr, to prepare a draft document for implementation at the synod. After the preparation work and the synod itself, Sammak reported that many of the Muslim communities of the Arab Middle East

¹ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

³ Ibid.

had criticized him harshly because of his close work with the Vatican and with Christians in general. The criticism from the Lebanese Muslim community had been mild or “controlled,” he stated. However, the non-Lebanese Muslims had been very critical and angry. He had even been called *kafer*, a “nonbeliever” in God, one of the worst insults in the Arab Middle East. This resentment of his work with the Vatican lasted until after the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. After those events, “the Muslim world realized that many Christians did not know what true Islam was,” he stated. His former Muslim critics then conceded that Sammak had been correct and that the Muslims should initiate dialogues with the Christians to explain “what Islam really is.” After years of being criticized by the larger Arab Muslim world, Sammak believed he was now better understood and was viewed as a visionary. Throughout this criticism, Sammak, a Sunni Muslim, maintained his admiration and advocacy of Lebanese Christians and called Lebanon “a Christian need.” He stated, “Lebanon would not be Lebanon without Christians.” Therefore, his recognition that the Christians were at the forefront of CMR efforts was a valid assessment.

Sammak¹ reiterated that the situation had now changed and that Muslims were also initiating dialogues to improve CMR, just as the Christians were doing. He reported that Qatar was funding the building of churches by its foreign Christian residents and that the king of Bahrain had donated land for the Christians to use in building churches. He also noted that Catholic churches now existed in Kuwait. All of these occurrences were also indicative of the positive notes Sammak had given in his response to IQ1.

Like Sammak and El Khazen, Gemayel² believed that the Lebanese Christians, rather than their Muslim counterparts, were more proactive in initiating and maintaining Christian–Muslim dialogue. He credited the Christians with thinking more about the problems and their

¹ Ibid.

² Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

solutions. As an example, he cited—albeit somewhat timidly—that it was the Christians who had realized that “federalism [wouldn’t] work.”

Thus, both Christian and Muslim field experts agreed that Christians have done more than their Muslim counterparts in initiating CMR dialogue. Of note in the respondents answers to IQ6 were the papal synod for Lebanon and the Christian–Muslim dialogue seminars.

Four of the six respondents are full active members in Lebanese CMR working groups, which suggests their observation that Christians were doing more was genuine although Christian efforts had begun to wane in recent years. With Christians and Muslims together recognizing and admiring Christian efforts, it is hoped that the Lebanese can peak the Christians’ interest in returning to their role of solid advocacy to increase chances for successful CMR dialogue.

Of note, however, is the dichotomy that exists in the Maronite community. In chapter 5, the Maronites were shown as seeking and holding a separate identity. At the same time, as shown in this chapter, they were seen as the most engaged in CMR dialogue. Thus, if the identity issue can be consolidated within renewed Christian-supported dialogue, CMR may benefit.

Both Christians and Muslims

Some of the field experts believed that both the Christian and the Muslim communities were working toward positive CMR at the same level. Bou Habib¹ noted the existence of a committee for dialogue in Lebanon, a group of Arabs working for Christian–Muslim propagation and dialogue. As mentioned, field experts such as Sammak, Halabi, and Ghazal are active members of this group. He also indicated other organizations exist that are working

¹ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

on CMR, including political parties with their “secular inclinations.” Mouawad¹ believed that no one person or community was doing any more or less to promote CMR than any other person or community. However, according to El Khazen,² although the Muslim community also initiated and maintained dialogue, they did so less frequently. Husseini³ indicated that everyone wanted the same goal, “a free and sovereign Lebanon and brotherly Christian–Muslim relations.” However, everyone had a different way to achieve those goals. Franjieh⁴ echoed Husseini’s sentiments, noting that Christians and Muslims “did not have the same approach[es] in time” to solidifying peaceful CMR. He explained that when the Christians were eager for dialogue, the Muslims did not seem to be as eager at the same time and vice versa: “When a community exits out of a war, then things are not finished [resolved] and not synchronized. There is not one group that is bad and one that is good.” As an example, he cited the fact that in 1983, the Shiites were moderate but the Christians were radical. Then it was the opposite.

Somewhat surprisingly since some respondents such as Bou Habib blamed “the elite,” Aoun⁵ stated that the elite were the ones working for positive CMR. The elite were not necessarily the rich, though. Rather, they were communities in which strong leadership existed, such as “the FPM, Hezbollah, and other organizations.” In those cases, better Christian–Muslim relations existed. Aoun, who had once gained an anti-Arab, anti-Muslim reputation during his campaign to drive the Syrian troops out of Lebanon in the late 80s and early 90s, is now seen by the Shiite community, through his agreement with Hezbollah, as a CMR advocate. This can be explained in part by the fact that Aoun was raised in a mixed

¹ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

² El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

³ Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

⁴ Franjieh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

⁵ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

Christian–Muslim suburb of Beirut, Haret Hreik, which is one of the key areas of intercommunal conviviality (Dagher, 2001; Khoury, as cited in Strohmer, 2007).

Franjeh¹ mentioned synchronicity as an essential aspect of dialogue. It appeared that when the Christians reached out to their Muslim compatriots for dialogue, the Muslims were hesitant. The reverse was also true: Muslims reached out to Christians, who on occasion were unresponsive. Obviously, both communities must be committed to dialogue in unison for it to be meaningful and successful.

The Muslim Community

Although most of the interviewees noted that either the Christians were working more toward CMR or the two communities were equally working toward that goal, Halabi² focused on some of the Shiites who were working toward CMR. He noted that Sheik Shamseddine, in particular, had made many efforts on behalf of CMR. Shamseddine, a Shiite Muslim cleric in Lebanon, commanded a large Shiite following. Halabi also mentioned that under former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the Sunni Muslims had been working positively toward CMR. The late Hariri, in his role as the Lebanese prime minister, had distributed loans and scholarships to Christian and Muslim students almost evenly, although a slightly higher percentage of the aid actually went to the Christians.

Ghazal³ also talked specifically about the Shiites, noting that they held an annual seminar, the *souwaal*, that was focused on interfaith dialogue. For his part, Ghazal was born, raised, and conducted much of his ministry in southern Lebanon with its high Shiite population. Like Hajjar, he too hailed from the mixed Christian–Muslim village of Masghara. Again, this shows the case made by the field experts and the available literature that proxy

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

² Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

³ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

and social interaction usually make for healthier CMR (UNESCO, 2002). As such, one can understand why Ghazal is perhaps more aware of Muslim advocacy in CMR than some of the other experts and is content to share his view. One problem has been that although many Lebanese live side by side, they have not lived together.

That the Muslim communities appear to be advocating dialogue more than they had in previous years is a positive sign. This newer, welcome interest comes at an important yet precarious time in the Middle East with the ongoing Arab Spring. Christian–Muslim tensions have since increased in Egypt and Iraq, along with concerns that the same can reoccur in Lebanon. As such, there is no time like the present for said dialogue, particularly since it is not yet known how the Arab Spring will affect CMR and the region.

Politics, Politicians, and Outside Influences

Several of the respondents—whether they believed both, either, or neither of the communities was working toward positive CMR—indicated that the underlying problem in achieving the goal was political, not religious. According to Bou Habib,¹ “Politics ruins everything; if you take away the politics, everything would be alright. . . . Every political party has a religious party or sect attached to it and politics ruins it [CMR and coexistence].” The politicians were not investing sincerely in CMR; rather, they were working only for their own or other agendas. Mouawad² concurred, noting that problems with CMR are “a weakness of . . . the political system and the way it functions.” This sentiment was shared by Massouh,³ Hussein,⁴ and I. Mousawi.⁵ Ghazal⁶ noted that, either by default or by design, the

¹ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 1).

² Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004, (see Appendix 18).

³ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

⁴ Hussein, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

⁵ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

⁶ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

Lebanese government had depreciated CMR. The government often hired less qualified people to fill positions based on the individuals' home regions and religion. Politicians were using such information and practices in their quests to attain and maintain their political power rather than working for the betterment of the Lebanese people and CMR.

Referencing his answer to IQ1, I. Mousawi¹ went even further: “Again, there is certainly not a religious problem,” he stated, his frustration evident. “It is poor leadership and foreign intervention that is causing Christian–Muslim discord.” In a similar vein, Husseini² cautioned that problems resulting from alliances that different Lebanese communities formed with “external forces” must also be avoided. He again identified the failure to implement the Ṭā’if Accord as having negatively affected CMR. He also noted that “Israel had and continues to try to hurt CMR,” citing the continuing occupation of Lebanon by Israel.

The assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was mentioned by several of the respondents. Hariri had been assassinated on February 14, 2005, less than 1 month before the interview with Franjeh. In talking about the assassination, Franjeh³ seemed hopeful: “We have reached a new period during these past few weeks,” he stated, hopeful that a Lebanese renaissance would occur very soon during this critical point in Lebanese history. Matar⁴ was also hopeful that the assassination would result in “stronger unity and interaction between Christians and Muslims.” He pointed out that whether people were supporters or detractors of Hariri was not of importance. What mattered was that they were “all against his murder, both Christians and Muslims.”

¹ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

² Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

³ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

⁴ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

Because IQ6 was essentially a hypothetical offer to examine whether Maronite and Shiite communities could be doing more to enhance CMR, N. Musawi¹ referenced both communities specifically in answering the question. Musawi felt that the Maronite leadership, parties, and community must do more to rectify the problems of Lebanon and CMR. He maintained this position because, by and large, the Maronites and their leaders were in charge of administering the affairs of Lebanon and had been for decades. He explained that the individuals who composed the 1943 agreement concerning Lebanese independence had been chosen only from the Maronite community. N. Musawi noted the tradition that only Maronites could hold the office of president in Lebanon. The president wielded so much power, controlling “the army, the judicial system, and more,” N. Musawi added, that the Maronite president had been turned into “a king-like leader.” Therefore, the Maronites from 1943 to the present were responsible for the consequences of their “poor leadership and policies.”

However, N. Musawi² indicated that not all Maronites were to blame. He stated it was “Maronite politics and politicians, not the intellectuals and elites that [were] causing a disruption to CMR.” In his opinion, the “intellectual Maronites” were preferable to the politicians. They were “better” for CMR and Lebanon overall.

N. Musawi³ was also concerned that the good message of the Maronite intelligentsia did not seem to reach members of the Maronite community in full. He recalled his recent attendance at meeting of the Maronite Patriarch Council held at an *as Safir* newspaper headquarters. There he saw Fr. Youssef Beshara and shared his sentiment that more needed to be done by Beshara and his community to ease tensions among the Lebanese communities.

¹ N. Musawi, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

N. Musawi¹ noted that the Lebanese Christians had given “a great contribution to Arab–Islamic civilization, Arabic literature, and the Arab awakening.” Because of this, he was somewhat puzzled about why some Christians denied Arabism. In the interview, he pointed out that, in his address, the pope had asked the Maronites and Christians in general “to continue to be and take part in the Arab civilization.” He wondered why some people still resisted this message when it came from such a high religious official.

Then N. Musawi² began to refer to the Shiite community. He noted, “Not all the Shiite leaders and communities are doing enough [or] the right thing toward CMR and reconciliation in Lebanon.” He did not believe at the time of this interview that the new Shiite appointees to the government of President Emile Lahoud in October 2004 were the best possible choices to help the overall recovery of Lebanon and reconciliation of its people. He revealed that Hezbollah was disappointed that none of its members had been selected for the new government. Additionally, without mentioning his name, Musawi seemed to be saying that Nabih Berri, the Lebanese Shiite Speaker of the House and leader of the Amal Party, was not acting like an efficient leader intent on helping all the Lebanese. Berri was widely considered a political hack who used extreme political patronage and favoritism to his benefit. It should also be noted that Hezbollah and Amal fought a vicious battle against one another in the mid-1980s. ³

In another aspect of politics and its effects on CMR, Hajjar⁴ postulated that focus on religious sects might be blurred if practices such as interfaith marriage were more acceptable in the country. Matar⁵ also called for liberalization in the area of marriage, including the

¹ Ibid.

² I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

⁵ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

implementation of civil marriage, noting that the “acceptance of civil marriage . . . would bring the Lebanese together, united.” According to both Hajjar and Matar, enacting civil marriage could result in the Lebanese becoming “a neutral people,”¹ religiously blended and tolerant, because they would not focus as much on someone’s religion. However, Hajjar also noted that neither party truly desired this to occur.

Using the common colloquial phrase “*ma fi aish*,” Gemayel² echoed the effects of the political problems in Lebanon. Referring to the weak Lebanese economy, which had resulted in few meaningful employment opportunities, he continued, “The people of Lebanon have this idea that there is no life in Lebanon.” Gemayel explained this as meaning that the Lebanese people were divided politically under an already corrupt political establishment and that they felt anxious about their financial capabilities, about providing for their families, and about the future. Mingled with the feeling that no (productive) life existed in Lebanon was the nationalist disunity of the Lebanese people in general and of the Christians and Muslims in particular.

Summary

In responding to IQ6, although most of the interviewees leaned toward the Christian community as being more involved in promoting positive CMR, they also acknowledged that Muslims were now working more toward CMR. As Halabi³ stated, using a fairly new adage among the Lebanese regarding CMR, “Lebanon without Christians is not Lebanon and it makes no sense for Lebanon. Lebanon without Muslims is not Lebanon.” Although the lay people of Lebanon seemed truly to want good relations and were willing to work for them, they often did not know how to accomplish that goal because of the interference brought on

¹ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

² Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

³ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

by multifaceted problems.¹ Notably, and in relation to chapters 1 and 2, the failure to make adequate progress toward positive CMR was placed more on politicians and political parties than on the Christian and Muslim communities. The politicians and their respective parties were more interested in increasing their own political clout rather than in improving CMR and handling the related needs of Lebanon.

Interestingly, of the suggestions given to improve the situation, at least two of the interviewees called for the implementation and acceptance of civil marriages. Through this institution, an increase in intermarriages of Christians and Muslims may occur. Thus, civil marriages may serve as one way to unite the two communities and neutralize the effects of Christian–Muslim division. On the other hand, Lebanon is a confessional, faith-based nation wherein civil marriage remains unrecognized and may remain so long term.

Additionally, synchronized Christian–Muslim commitment to dialogue is needed. As discussed previously, when one community is recognized as less invested in dialogue than the other, then the Lebanese should develop ways to return their would-be dialoguers gently back to the negotiating table. Given the multiple, complex, and long-term status of CMR discord, it is easy to be skeptical that such remedies will result in fast relief to CMR woes. This researcher understood that the respondents wanted to be positive about the future of CMR. Thus, they appeared to sound more idealistic than the facts warranted.

The Civil War: Past, Present, and Future

With IQ7 and IQ8, the field experts were essentially asked to look at both the past and the future. The respondents were asked to identify anything that, had it been done differently, might have prevented the Lebanese Civil War from occurring, thus reducing the conflict between Christians and Muslims (IQ7). They were then asked to comment on whether the

¹ Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

relationship between Christians and Muslims was currently so poor that another civil war was possible (IQ8). It was this author's intention that IQ7 be a restatement of IQ2 to test and retest the information provided by the experts to see if there was agreement among and between their responses. Analysis of the experts' responses to the two questions did indicate a high degree of corroboration.

As with the other research questions, the field experts were only slightly divided in their opinions. Fifteen of the 17 respondents believed prevention of the civil war could have been possible. Only two held that the civil war was essentially inevitable. However, the reasons for their opinions varied. Nine of the respondents commented more specifically on the causes of the civil war as well. In terms of the possibility of another civil war in the future because of the current state of CMR (IQ8), 14 of the 17 respondents believed that this would not happen. However, three of the field experts had different opinions: Two believed another civil war was conceivable. One was convinced that another civil war was not only possible but also probable.

The Past: The Possibility of Preventing the Previous Civil War

Fifteen of the respondents believed the civil war could have been prevented. All pointed to the influence of foreign powers, especially in terms of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and its effects on the political stability of Lebanon. Gemayel¹ specifically discussed U.N. Resolution 1559, which was a call for all foreign forces to be withdrawn from Lebanon and armed militias disbanded in Lebanon. Implementing this resolution would have meant that Palestinian militias and the Syrian forces would have been withdrawn from Lebanon and Hezbollah as the sole remaining Lebanese militia would have been disbanded. The United States, Great Britain, and France strongly advocated the implementation of Resolution 1559.

¹ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

However, a portion of the Lebanese people and other Arab countries saw the resolution as biased, focused solely on reducing Syrian influence in Lebanon. Thus, many Lebanese, mostly Muslims, believed the resolution to be a tool to meet the goals of Israel, a country still at war with Syria. According to Gemayel, however, “if U.N. Resolution 1559 had been implemented in 1975 [the start of the Lebanese Civil War], then there would have been no problem.” He also believed that had America and Russia stopped “playing” with Lebanon at the time the resolution was introduced, the civil war would not have occurred.

In a similar vein, El Khazen, Franjeh, and Salem blamed the Palestinian–Israeli conflict for resulting in the civil war. However, neither El Khazen nor Franjeh referenced U.N. Resolution 1559. According to Franjeh,¹ “The creation of Israel started a change in the whole Arab world.” He referenced the democracy that had existed to some extent in Egypt and Syria prior to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. With that conflict, however, “dictatorial regimes” replaced the vestiges of democracy. These regimes with their oppression have been a main cause of the present-day Arab Spring protests.

El Khazen² focused more on one of the major consequences of the conflict, the immigration of thousands of Palestinian refugees and the active presence of the “armed PLO.” He and Gemayel blamed the PLO and its behavior in Lebanon for causing the political problems that resulted in the disintegration of the Lebanese state. Had neither the refugees nor the PLO taken residence in Lebanon, the civil war would not have occurred. In general, the Maronite Christians, El Khazen being one, were in conflict with the Palestinians in Lebanon more than the Muslims were; the Muslims were mostly supportive. Thus, El Khazen (and the Maronites in general) tended to blame the Palestinians/PLO and their activities in

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

² El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

Lebanon for igniting the Lebanese Civil War and subsequent ills, which he stated in his book, *The Breakdown of the Lebanese State* (2000).

Salem¹ offered a slightly different scenario, stating that Israel should have “accepted its responsibilities.” In other words, Israel should have accepted the U.N. resolutions and given the Palestinians the right to return to Israel/Palestine. Had Israel done so, Salem believed, “the Palestinians would not have presented us with such a [difficult] political problem.” IQ7 seemed to elicit frustration and disappointment from Salem. He had tried several interventions—with little tangible success to show for them—during his tenure as foreign minister of Lebanon (1983–1989), the period that all of the interviewees considered the most difficult in Lebanon. However, he also suggested that if foreign intervention had been refused, the war would not have occurred.

I. Mousawi² concurred with the assessment of the other respondents that if the Lebanese had not allowed the involvement of foreign powers in their country, no civil war would have ensued. He specifically identified Israel and the United States as two such powers, indicating those governments did not have “Lebanon’s best wishes at heart.” He agreed with N. Musawi, indicating that although it was appealing to engage foreign powers in the solutions of the problems in Lebanon and elsewhere, doing so was taking “the easy way out.” He stated that when foreign powers become involved, they invariably “seem to support the least popular leaders and give them a disproportionate and unrepresentative amount of power.” I. Mousawi identified former President-Elect Bashir Gemayel of Lebanon, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Kings Abdullah Al Saud of Saudi Arabia and Abdullah Hussein of Jordan as the “least popular despotic leaders” in the Arab Middle East who nonetheless were supported by the United States and Israel. I. Mousawi’s statements in 2006 seem valid

¹ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

² I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

today. Major Arab Spring protests have emerged in all these countries, resulting in the ouster of the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, and others.

Khalil¹ also believed that had Israel not denied the Palestinians their rights and expelled them from what was Palestine, causing them to come to Lebanon eventually, the war might not have occurred. This thought was shared by some of the other interviewees, particularly El Khazen, but with a different outlook. While Khalil blamed Israel for creating and then not solving the Palestinian problem in Lebanon, El Khazen² blamed the behavior of the Palestinians and PLO for causing major problems in Lebanon. Khalil declared that “the reason why the Palestinians came [were expelled to and accepted by] to Lebanon was because Lebanon was too liberal and weak,” politically and militarily, especially compared to Israel. He added, “You must have a strong army, order and structure, but then you don’t [necessarily] have an open and liberal society.” Despite his belief that the civil war might not have occurred had it not been for Israel creating the Palestinian problem in Lebanon, Khalil asserted, “I have compassion for the suffering of the Palestinians and Arafat from Israel; I pray for them.”

Four of the respondents were less confident than the previously discussed interviewees. Still, these field experts felt that the civil war could possibly have been prevented. These respondents concentrated more on what should have been done in terms of the relationships between the various Christian and Muslim communities. Halabi³ focused on the mistakes made by both the Christians and the Muslims. Although he began by stating that “Maronite politics made the war,” he acknowledged that the Druze and Muslims also contributed to the eventual eruption of civil war. In addition, he discussed the ongoing

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

³ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

problems resulting from the war that were often ignored, specifically mentioning the changes in Lebanese demographics since the war that had resulted in a Muslim majority that, for the most part, was poor.

Halabi¹ also discussed the role of both Christian and Muslim leaders who incited their respective followers to move toward civil war rather than toward reconciliation. He recalled in a speech given on the eve of the civil war that a Maronite leader instilled fear in the people by stating, “If we [Christians] give in to the Muslims at this point, we will be destroyed.” Similarly, some Muslim leaders gave speeches just before the war, saying that if they (the Muslims) did not resist at that point, then they would be neutralized forever as a people. Both Halabi and Massouh² felt that had some of the Christian leadership not riled their respective communities with fear of annihilation, the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War and the worsening of CMR could have been prevented.

Massouh and Bou Habib discussed the role of the Greek Orthodox community in relation to the civil war. A member of the Greek Orthodox community, Massouh³ noted the lack of authority the community had in Lebanon despite being the largest Christian community (along with the Coptic Christians of Egypt) in the Arab Middle East. Because the Greek Orthodox community had been living with Arab Muslims “for centuries” though, they were in a better position than most to resolve the conflict. Adding emphasis to Massouh’s point, Gemayel⁴ noted that the Greek Orthodox existed in Syria, Palestine, and Jordan. He also stressed that because the Greek Orthodox referred to themselves as Arabs, they were “able to get along better with the Lebanese Muslims, Syrians, and Palestinians, all of whom played a role in the Lebanese Civil Wars.”

¹ Ibid.

² Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

Bou Habib¹ offered a different response. According to him, even if the Greek Orthodox community, rather than the Maronite community, had been the largest and thus the most influential Christian group in Lebanon, the civil war would still have occurred. He explained this was because “it is human nature to argue, disagree, and eventually get violent regarding different issues.” He suggested that even if Wadi Nasara (a predominantly Greek Orthodox community on the Syrian side of the Lebanese–Syrian border) had been included as part of Lebanon, thus making the Greek Orthodox a majority, things would not have changed. He also believed that even though the Greek Orthodox could identify closely with Arabism and the Arab language, “CMR would still have suffered.” Yet, in contrast to his negative reference to the Tā’if Accords in IQ1, he believed that now everyone was equal, noting in his written response to IQ7 that “the reasons for the conflicts remain[ed] the same . . . [but that] the situation [had] developed into conforming and dividing shares on all state levels.”

In thinking about the question, Sammak² identified four scenarios that might possibly have prevented the outbreak of the civil war and, specifically, the deterioration of CMR. The first was the Muslim community not becoming overly involved, particularly militarily, with the PLO. The second was the Christians realizing that the Muslims had come to believe in the independence of Lebanon above the notion of being part of the larger Arab Middle East. The third was the Lebanese government emphasizing coexistence and CMR within the educational institutions of the country. The fourth scenario concerned CMR in terms of more than just the civil war. According to Sammak, if the Christians and Muslims had continued to live together and had not lived separately for so many of the war years, the resulting major rift in CMR could have been lessened.

¹ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

² Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

The Past: Preventable Causes of the Civil War

In addressing IQ7, Khalil¹ revisited IQ1 instead, referencing what he called the “true” causes of Christian–Muslim discord (i.e., politics, theology, economy, and social stratification). He stated that if all of those causes had been addressed, the war could have been prevented. Ghazal² also stressed that there were many factors involved, including politics, economics, and religion. He believed that these factors, both internal and external, worked in combination to cause the civil war in Lebanon and the deterioration of CMR.

Husseini³ placed the blame for the civil war on external forces, specifically Israel and foreign intervention. He also noted that the war would not have occurred “had the politicians served the people, the state, and not themselves. There was too much bickering.” Mouawad⁴ concurred, stating that had the Lebanese people been united to do what had to be done to stop the buildup and onset of the war, the war would not have occurred. She also believed politics and foreign influences spurred the war but that the Lebanese, especially the politicians, “were also very much at fault for not doing the right thing,” which she identified as “putting the people’s interest first and not joining foreign forces against one another.”

The Lebanese political confessional system was blamed by Hajjar,⁵ who noted that with such a system, “there was no way to prevent this war.” He cited the resentment created among the rest of the Lebanese because only Maronite Christians could be considered for the presidency. As noted, Hajjar is a member of the Melchite Greek Catholic Christian community, which is smaller in number than both the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox. Although fellow Catholics with the Maronites and formerly with the Greek Orthodox before

¹ Khalil, personal communication, March 1, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

² Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

³ Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

⁴ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

⁵ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

the schism, the Melchites have felt disadvantaged within the Lebanese proportional confessional system, giving Hajjar reason to mention such concerns. He discussed the competency problems created as a result of the system that was “sectarian and confessional.” Because of a quota system within each Christian and Muslim community, often the individuals who were most competent to fill positions were not chosen. As an example, he suggested that even if there were a number of qualified Melchites for a job “but they need[ed] a Shiite Muslim, however under qualified, the Shiite” was selected. Bou Habib¹ concurred.

Only a few of the interviewees consider the Palestinian presence and its related problems to be the main cause of the civil war. One of them, Aoun, stated that “the repercussions of the armed clashes between the Palestinians and the Lebanese” was the cause of the war.² He believed that both sides, the Lebanese and the Palestinians, feared each other. El Khazen³ held the same views. Aoun,⁴ a former general of the Lebanese Army, reminded the author that “most of my battles were against them [the PLO].” In the early 1980s, after PLO leader Yasser Arafat was exiled to Tunisia as part of an evacuation agreement during the long invasion and occupation of Lebanon by Israel, Aoun had met with Arafat. Just prior to the meeting, Aoun recalled feeling that somehow he and Arafat were “opposing brothers who fought in a trench.” At their meeting, he recalled telling Arafat that the Lebanese wanted the Palestinians out of their country but that it was for their own good. In other words, Aoun wanted the Palestinians not only to leave Lebanon but also to return to their own land.

Also identifying the events that had taken place since 1943 that affected the peace of Lebanon, Matar⁵ focused on the Israel–Palestinian issues. The internal influence of these

¹ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

² Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

³ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁴ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

⁵ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

events had been problematic for Lebanon. In 1948, the country of Israel was formed and the Palestinians were expelled to Lebanon. Then, in 1967, the Arab–Israeli war occurred, wherein the Arabs were defeated. This affected Lebanon negatively because the PLO took up arms in Lebanon to defend themselves against the Israelis. All of this resulted in the war between the Lebanese and the Palestinians in 1975.

The Present: Preventing a Future Civil War

According to Matar,¹ future civil war could only be avoided by “the building of the state [solid civil institutions, law and order, and freedom]. He believed that had the Lebanese built such a state in the period after 1943, the civil war would not have occurred. In the present, however, the Lebanese were “caught now between Israel and Syria.” Thus, “the only guarantee to avoid future conflict [was] to develop strong government institutions that treat all citizens the same and dispense the same resources and services to all.” N. Musawi,² director of international affairs for Hezbollah, echoed these sentiments. Massouh³ also insisted that the Lebanese had not addressed the causes and outcomes of the war. He believed they were “in denial . . . trying to forget the war without addressing its root causes,” asserting that this was an immediate and major problem for the Lebanese.

Rather than answering IQ7 concerning what could have been done to prevent the civil war, Ghazal⁴ focused on what the Lebanese should do to prevent the recurrence of civil war. He specifically stressed that the Lebanese needed to be educated properly and to learn from their mistakes. As he continued, he identified six factors that were needed to rebuild Lebanon and admitted they were more ideals and goals rather than immediate solutions:

¹ Ibid.

² N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

³ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

⁴ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

1. Radicalism by both Christians and Muslims had to end.
2. Communication between both groups had to be the basis for building sound relations.
3. The clergy had to stop insulting one another in the speeches they gave in their respective churches and mosques.
4. The Lebanese had to educate themselves in the idea that they were all “one social, civil society that is related to one nation, not separate sects or *Ṭā'ifiyye* [confessions].”
5. Christians had to be dissuaded from leaving Lebanon. To do so, the Muslims had to respect Christians rather than “downgrade [their] minority state.”

He felt strongly that Christians would not feel they needed to leave Lebanon if this occurred. Ghazal also reminded this researcher that he was sharing an ideal goal here and not an easy, quick, or certain resolution to CMR conflict.

Ghazal's¹ final point was that preventing civil war was not the purview just of Christians or Muslims or politicians from either community. For Lebanon to rebuild and ensure such events did not occur again, everyone had to work toward the goal: “We are all called to make this happen.”

The Future: The Possibility of Another Civil War

According to a poll, even during and after the most recent attack by the Israeli Army and its invasion of Lebanon (July 12, 2006), which might have stirred up interreligious tensions there, the vast majority of the Lebanese people did not believe in the probability of another civil war (“Clerics Rule Out,” 2007, p. 3). This corresponded with the responses of the overwhelming majority of the field experts (14 of the 17 respondents), who had made

¹ Ibid.

their convictions known prior to the mentioned poll, and thus served to corroborate their beliefs that another civil war would not occur. Despite numerous forms of political tension and political strife, these field experts' insights have been proven valid and reliable because, to date in this millennium, civil war has not reoccurred. However, two of the other respondents felt that another war was possible; and the final respondent believed another war was a certainty.

Those who believed another war would not occur did not necessarily believe that the underlying problems resulting in the civil war had been resolved, however. Instead, they seemed more attuned to the feelings of the Lebanese people that war was not an answer. Several of the respondents voiced similar beliefs in their rejection of the possibility of war because the Lebanese people, in Massouh's words, had learned "that the war solved nothing at all."¹ According to Franjeh,² "It was a long, painful war; and people were hurt in all aspects of their lives. People lost their dignity and financial assets, and there was no consideration given for the other." Halabi³ stated that the Lebanese people had "paid a hard price for the war." This was echoed by Khalil,⁴ who indicated the Lebanese people, both Christians and Muslims, were "tired and disillusioned by the war." El Khazen⁵ concurred and, therefore, believed another civil war was highly improbable. Salem,⁶ Mouawad,⁷ and Husseini⁸ echoed these sentiments: The Lebanese people had suffered too much to allow themselves to be drawn into such a conflict again.

¹ Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

² Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

³ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

⁴ Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

⁵ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁶ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

⁷ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

⁸ Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004 (see Appendix 6).

Some of these field experts and others gave different reasons for the improbability of another civil war. Halabi¹ indicated another war was not possible because the Syrians, catalysts for CMR conflict, had left Lebanon. Khalil² believed that the Lebanese simply “want[ed] and need[ed] the normal life” and were more interested in contemporary issues, such as having adequate and meaningful employment and supporting their families. Gemayel³ concurred that the Lebanese people were more interested in their contemporary wants and needs, suggesting that “the Lebanese economy could never handle another war.” However, he also seemed more matter-of-fact in his belief, posing the question, “Who are we going to wage war with?” He explained that the Lebanese Civil War had been both all-inclusive and inconclusive, with no apparent winner or goal attainment. The Tā’if system was the reason Bou Habib⁴ espoused for not having another war. He explained that because all authorities had been defined in the Tā’if system, “every confession [had] its rights and share in the state.” Aoun⁵ again pointed to the FPM–Hezbollah agreement and its effect on coexistence in Lebanon, noting that the agreement “cover[ed] 80% of Lebanon’s problems and [was] supported by 70% of the Lebanese.” Thus, the agreement had resulted in reducing the chances of another civil war.

Other respondents, although stating that there would not be another war, did so more tentatively, often focusing on unresolved issues and the possibilities for future wars that were not of the same vein as the civil war. Sammak⁶ was concerned that because of the remaining “gap of misunderstanding” between Christians and Muslims, another war was slightly possible. He emphasized, as he had in his responses in chapter 2, that the young people had

¹ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

² Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005 (see Appendix 7).

³ Gemayel, personal communication, June 6, 2005 (see Appendix 8).

⁴ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

⁵ Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

⁶ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

not been educated to live together and thus were unfamiliar with one another, yet they were the future leaders of Lebanon. Sammak again lamented that although some comingling existed in private schools, Christians and Muslims continued to be separated in public schools. He also remarked on the low educational standards and overall quality of education afforded by Lebanese University (LU), the official public university. At LU, healthy CMR were neither encouraged nor promoted in the curriculum.

Matar¹ did not believe another Christian–Muslim war would occur in Lebanon, but he did not rule out another war completely, stating that it could be “a political war.” I. Mousawi² differentiated between another Lebanese Civil War, which he clearly believed would not occur, and a foreign power-inspired war, which he felt was a real and imminent possibility. Hajjar³ believed that CMR were so delicate and impressionable that the Lebanese were not the ones deciding whether to declare war or not. That decision was being made by foreigners: “Yes, weapons are gone [outlawed under the Tā’if Agreement], but foreigners can make problems.”

Two respondents, Ghazal and N. Musawi, asserted that another civil war was certainly possible. Ghazal⁴ believed war to be a possibility if the Lebanese did not learn from their mistakes and take steps to avoid them in the future: “If the Lebanese stay the same and use the same old methods of problem solving, of course, this could cause another war. If our foundation is not strong, we can return to our same old difficulties.” He referred to the commonalities between Christians and Muslims: common problems, common interests, and common wants and desires. According to him, “We both want good medical care and

¹ Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006 (see Appendix 9).

² I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

³ Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005 (see Appendix 14).

⁴ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

hospitals; we both want good schools for our children, so why should we fight over who is going to be the boss or the Zaim?”

N. Musawi¹ stated that the previous wars had not been wars between Christians and Muslims. Therefore, he predicted that if another war occurred, it would be because of American policy, which he stated was “to make and provoke several wars in Lebanon and the Middle East.” Such wars would be political, not religious, in nature. He repeated that American and Israeli policy was to “put your enemies into war against each other” and that “American foreign policy could cause another civil war under its client–patron relationship policy” and pointed to the “divide and conquer American schemes in Iraq and Palestine.”

To understand fully N. Musawi’s statements, one must realize that at the time of this interview, Lebanon and Syria had come under unprecedented political pressure from the United States and France, specifically in regards to U.N. Resolution 1559, which had been sponsored by those two countries. As stated in chapter 3, through this resolution, the United Nations in part demanded the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the dismantling of the military forces of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The author observed that U.N. Resolution 1559 had resulted in dividing the Christian Muslim communities of Lebanon. For example, in December 2004, two large demonstrations were held in Beirut, one (predominantly Christian) in support of the resolution and one (predominantly Muslim) in opposition to it. Other displays of disharmony regarding U.N. Resolution 1559 that were divided more along political lines also occurred.

Less than 3 weeks after the interview, N. Musawi’s prediction seemed accurate. On January 7, 2005, Israeli forces along the Lebanon–Israeli border shelled a truck occupied by Lebanese civilians inside Lebanese territory (Mroue, 2005a, p. 1). No deaths were reported.

¹ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

Two days later, on January 9, Hezbollah launched a “well-planned and unprecedented bomb attack, deep inside the Shebaa farms” (Mroue, 2005b, p.1), a small strip of farmland occupied by Israel and claimed by the Lebanese and Syrians as Lebanese territory. According to the report, the operation “in which an Israeli officer died and three others were wounded, marked the first time Hezbollah fighters [had] infiltrated deep inside the Shebaa farms to attack an Israeli target” (Mroue, 2005b, p.1). More significantly on July 12, 2006, Israel launched a major war against Lebanon, which lasted 34 days and caused major damage to the infrastructure and the people of Lebanon (Hovsepian, 2008).

In discussing the state of CMR and the possibility of another civil war, some of the respondents felt things were going well. According to Franjeh,¹ the Lebanese people had come to understand that society had to change, especially “the militias and attitude.” He felt this was occurring and that Lebanon was “the first good example on how to end a war.” Franjeh also pointed out that “Lebanon [had] succeeded in resolving its conflicts while Cyprus and Yugoslavia . . . [had] not.” Aoun² did not believe there would be another civil war in Lebanon anytime soon because the Lebanese people had “gone a long way” toward resolving their differences, which he believed would continue.

Others found that even though CMR were not what they should be—and in nearly each case, the experts felt they were worse—civil war was not a possibility. El Khazen³ was very clear that although his prognosis for CMR was very poor, the country was not at risk of another civil war. Bou Habib⁴ stated that another such war could not happen and that the situation could not get worse because “everything must be even (more fair and equitable) now and, if it is not, it must be made equal.”

¹ Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

² Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006 (see Appendix 17).

³ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

⁴ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

Several of the respondents talked about the issues still facing Lebanon, making passionate pleas to the Lebanese to work together to resolve their differences. Salem,¹ who conceded that CMR were much “worse” in present-day Lebanon, denied that present state of CMR could result in another war. He admitted, however, that unresolved issues remained: “We haven’t reconciled; we’re in denial and trying to ignore and forget [the unresolved problems].” Ghazal² asked his country to “get rid of favoritism and division.” He specifically entreated the Lebanese not to turn to outside forces, foreigners, to solve Lebanese problems. He insisted that the Lebanese must “work together . . . to get along, be intellectual, and use dialogue” and that “Christians and Muslims must work to unify one country, one nation with religious harmony, not for narrow personal or political gain, power or for the sake of being a Zaim.”

Sammak³ suggested that he could not envision “the Middle East or Lebanon without Christians.” He worried about the decreasing numbers of Christians and about their minority status, explaining that “Lebanon is a Christian need.” Thus, “if the Christians are being and feeling like minorities,” a sentiment echoed by some of the other Christian interviewees, “it [could be] very destructive for Lebanon.”

The theme of outside forces continued in Bou Habib’s ending comments. He focused on the Lebanese of the diaspora, “many of whom are Maronite,” who were falsely portraying themselves as “representing Lebanon.”⁴ Their actions, he believed, were “creating conflict in Lebanon,” albeit from abroad. Mouawad⁵ referred to outside forces that were “ruling the country,” referencing Syria. This was neither helpful nor acceptable. Even though she did

¹ Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004 (see Appendix 3).

² Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

³ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix K).

⁴ Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004 (see Appendix 11).

⁵ Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004 (see Appendix 18).

not think another war was imminent because the people “know that violence” cannot be used to resolve the issues, she acknowledged that “too much chaos and pressure” could result in another war.

Thus, concern for another conflict remains high. According to the Grand Mufti Mohammad Rashid Qabbani, the top Sunni religious authority in Lebanon, “The political situation in Lebanon stirs permanent worry among the Lebanese about the future and fate. Lebanon needs serious and effective work which reconciles political action and the citizens’ needs” (Dakroub, 2011b, p. 2). President Michel Sleiman summed up the Lebanese predicament and voiced fears about the future, noting that the leaders of Lebanon had failed to understand “the lessons of the Civil War” (Dakroub, 2011b, p. 1) and “lamented that the 1989 Arab-brokered Tā’if Accord that ended the war has not been fully implemented” (Dakroub, 2011b, p. 1).

In retrospect, N. Musawi’s¹ response to IQ8 was ominously insightful. Although he always seemed relaxed and confident with the way Hezbollah handled the hostile behavior of Israel toward Lebanon, he believed that another war initiated by Israel in Lebanon was imminent: “We know Israel and the U.S. are planning another war against Lebanon.” His prediction, similar to that of I. Mousawi’s, came true soon after this interview, which took place on June 22, 2006. Just 3 weeks later, on July 12, Israel unleashed a widespread attack on Lebanon, particularly in the south, dropping more than 4 million cluster bombs and flattening miles of infrastructure and thousands of residences throughout Lebanon (Hovsepian, 2008).

¹ I. Mousawi, personal communication, June 22, 2006 (see Appendix 5).

Discussion

In regard to which community in Lebanon, Christian or Muslim, is working harder for CMR (IQ6), almost all of the respondents agreed that the Christians until 2006 initiated and maintained CMR dialogue more so than their Muslim counterparts did. This might have been due in part to the Christians' decreased population and their feelings that the larger Muslim community is encroaching upon them. Interfaith and communal dialogue has been one of their interventions. However, most of the respondents also agreed that the Christians seemed to be retreating from their initiation and maintenance of such dialogue and that the Muslims seemed to have a renewed investment in the same. Sammak¹ believed the newer engagement in CMR dialogue was due to the September 11 attacks and subsequent developments because the Muslims feel Islam was receiving a very poor and inaccurate assessment. Therefore, interfaith and communal dialogue was one of their interventions as well. Thus, the challenge is for the Lebanese to synchronize CMR advocacy in time. Without synchronicity within CMR advocacy, a solid partnership cannot be formed (Karam, 2006b; Pakradouni, 2005).

Aside from synchronicity, the respondents felt that neither the Christians nor the Muslims adequately invested in CMR dialogue in the first place. Most of the respondents also agreed that rather than blaming one religious group over another, the Lebanese people need their government to invest in the reconciliation process. The lack of government interest in this process is the real problem with poor CMR and, according to the information put forth in this thesis, stems from at least two areas of concern: (a) the stated corruption and ineptness of successive Lebanese governments that did not invest in CMR and (b) the Lebanese people with their historical procession of invader and strong dislike of big and intrusive government into their affairs. One should also understand that all major Lebanese communities and

¹ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

factions started a historical *hiwar* or national “dialogue” in March 2006 (Hashem, 2006a), the prognosis of which was poor at best as of November 2010. In addition, since the very start of his tenure in February 2010 as president of Lebanon, Michelle Sleiman has continually called for a new *hiwar* but has not committed to a starting date (Dakroub, 2011b; Sakr, 2011b). Therefore, it seems critical that the various NGOs and private CMR advocacy groups of Lebanon (of which these field experts are major activists) continue their work toward healthy CMR due to the historical and current lack of government involvement.

Through personal interviews, the field experts who were part of the older generation in Lebanon, also concurred with this author’s research findings that revealed poor attitudes and a lack of engagement among the youth of Lebanon as other impediments to healthy CMR. As the older CMR field experts admit mistakes, engage in dialogue, and offer prescriptions for CMR improvement, the Lebanese youth have been indifferent, if not hostile, to interreligious relations. Thus, the course of action in Lebanon must be focused on improving and maintaining healthy CMR through the reengagement of the Lebanese government in CMR, the involvement of newer CMR advocates as the older advocates retire, and the education and preparation of Lebanese youth to establish rational, peaceful coexistence.

Regarding what could have been done differently to prevent the Lebanese Civil War and the deterioration of CMR in the first place (IQ7), the field experts offered various responses. Again, the Lebanese government and military were too weak, which resulted in the admittance of armed Palestinian fighters into Lebanon, a serious disruption to the previous semiharmonious CMR. Ghazal¹ stated that historically the Lebanese had demonstrated that they do not learn from their mistakes. Massouh² and Halabi¹ said the civil war could have

¹ Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004 (see Appendix 15).

² Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004 (see Appendix 2).

been prevented if political power had been evenly distributed among the Lebanese. Several of the respondents, including Franjeh,² N. Musawi,³ and Halabi believed that if there had been more economic equality, the civil war could have been avoided. Musawi and Halabi also mentioned the problem of political leaders, such as those from the Maronite community who riled their constituencies through provocative speeches. Sammak⁴ and several other respondents summarized the lead-up to the civil war as follows: The Christians did not believe that the Muslims were dedicated to a separate, independent Lebanon; while the Muslims did not fully understand that the Christians were indeed indigenous Lebanese and not outsiders. The Muslims erred in their support of the PLO militants attacking Israel from Lebanese soil, a sentiment supported by El Khazen,⁵ a political scientist. The respondents also agreed that if Israel had adequately addressed the Palestinian question, CMR tensions would have been eased greatly. Finally, most of the respondents felt that had the Tā'if Agreement been implemented years earlier, the civil war in Lebanon would have ended sooner or might even have been prevented.

An important observation must be made here between the results of IQ7 and those of IQ2. With IQ2, the field experts gave reasons for the deterioration of CMR. Nearly all of these reasons corresponded to their answers to IQ7, which was actually an inverse of IQ2. Specifically, IQ2 asked for the causes of CMR breakdown and the civil war in Lebanon; IQ7 asked for what could have prevented the same in the first place. Subsequently, for example, the respondents in answering IQ2 offered foreign interference as one of the causes of CMR conflict and also indicated that if the Lebanese had resisted foreign interference, the conflict

¹ Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

² Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005 (see Appendix 13).

³ N. Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004 (see Appendix 16).

⁴ Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004 (see Appendix 12).

⁵ El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004 (see Appendix 10).

might have been avoided in the first place. Thus, the reasons for the deterioration of CMR in the past corresponded to the causes of present. This finding indicated not only that the Lebanese did, in fact, recognize and understand the reasons for the demise of CMR, both pre- and post-civil war but also that addressing the causes of the civil war and what could have prevented it in the first place is a natural point of departure and focal point for conflict resolution and dialogue.

In answering IQ8, nearly every respondent, with the nuanced exception of Mouawad, believed there would not be another civil war in Lebanon. Their beliefs appear to be holding true, given the absence of major hostilities in the 21st century thus far. Indeed, tensions and circumstances from 2000 to 2010 were similar to those just before and during the civil war, including political assassinations; questionable elections; provocative, fiery speeches from political and community leaders; and several Israeli attacks on Lebanon. Added to these circumstances were superpower and local power (Israel, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) competition for influence in Lebanon (Rossi, 2008) and the Arab Spring protests of 2011, the outcomes of which and their effect on CMR have not yet been identified. Yet, despite all these and more, civil war in Lebanon has not reoccurred. This adds to the validity of the information gleaned from the expert respondents. Even though these fact-finding interviews were conducted a few years ago, the respondents' insistence that there would not be another civil war in Lebanon, despite their equal insistence that CMR were worse than ever before, adds credence to the field experts' knowledge and insight of their own people.

According to the respondents, the Lebanese want to move from the war to a normal life, including adequate employment and decent education. Thus, their exhaustion may have more to do with the prevention of another war than the Lebanese successfully completing a postwar debriefing and conflict resolution process. However, according to psychosocial

theory, relying on a secondary cause of resolution (i.e., Lebanese exhaustion from the war) rather than on the primary cause (i.e., poor CMR and related factors) is ineffective (Mednick, Higgins, & Kirschenbaum, 1975). Although it is impressive that another civil war has not broken out, the great concern is that the Lebanese have not resolved the aftermath of the war psychologically. The ingredients for another war remain in place.

Although the Lebanese may want to “let sleeping dogs lie,” as evidenced in the decree of amnesty issued by the government in 1991 for all who participated in the civil war (Fisk 2002), a gap continues to exist between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon. This is particularly true between the older generation and the newer, college-age generation. Therefore, the Lebanese should consider addressing the various issues presented in this chapter and in this thesis to obtain healthy CMR and to avoid further conflict.

CONCLUSION

We are what we think. All that we are arises with our thoughts. Speak or act with a pure mind and happiness will follow. The wind cannot overturn a mountain, like temptation cannot touch those who are awake, strong and humble. Fill yourself with desire. See the false as false, the truth as true. Look into your heart and follow your nature. Know these truths and you will find peace.

Virtue of Attitude

Siddhartha Gautama Buddha (563–479)

CMR are an interactional, experiential, social condition; they are humanistic feelings, beliefs, and states. The point of departure for this assessment was whether CMR in Lebanon have improved since the Lebanese Civil War. The belief was that CMR should be better and are better than prior to the outbreak of the civil war. The notions behind this belief were several, one being the absence of another civil war. Even so, the hypothesis of this thesis that CMR have not improved but have rather deteriorated in the post-civil war period was upheld. In direct questioning during face-to-face interviews in Lebanon, 16 of the 17 field expert respondents explained that CMR have not improved but have worsened in post-war Lebanon. As shown in each chapter of this thesis, the field experts supported their positions by explaining the causes and reasons for the decline of CMR. As seen in this thesis, the causes for the deterioration of CMR are multifaceted. The positions of the field experts were also buttressed by information gathered from the university student surveys and from the available literature.

The findings of the present research appeared to be time tested and consistent. For example, as of June 2010, according to the *Daily Star*, the leading English-language newspaper in the Middle East, professional public soccer games can no longer be held in Lebanon as they have been in the past (Lyon, 2010, p. 3). This change was due in large part to dysfunctional CMR within several contexts, including politics. According to Rahif Alameh, secretary general of the Lebanese Football Association, "Politics came into football

and destroyed it" (as quoted in Lyon, 2010, p. 3). He also dated the "death of football" to 2001, the year when the government intervened in a murky match-fixing scandal (as quoted in Lyon, 2010, p. 3). That was when "Lebanon's politico-religious leaders began treating the association as a pie to be carved up, just as they share power among Muslim and Christian communities" (Alameh as quoted in Lyon, 2010, p. 3). In addition, Lebanese scholars and politicians, such as Prime Minister Saad Hariri, have continued to point to the need to improve CMR in Lebanon ("Hariri Stresses Equal Shares," 2009).

A new phenomenon presented itself toward the end of this present research study that was a further indication of the deterioration of CMR. This phenomenon was a draft law put forth by the Lebanese minister of labor Boutros Harb (Dick, 2010). Harb drafted drafting a law making interfaith land sales illegal. Christians could not sell property or land to anyone except another Christian, and Muslims could only sell to other Muslims (Dick, 2010; Sakr, 2011a). Harb, a Christian, was especially concerned that Shiites were purchasing land to weaken the Christian presence, an allegation the Shiites denied (Dick, 2010; Sakr, 2011a). Thus, the suspicions the Muslims and Christians have of one another have remained high.

As detailed in chapter 3, several areas of societal function have resulted in damaging Lebanese CMR. Lebanese politicians have been chronically derelict in their duties to the state, often being extremely corrupt. The Lebanese system of confessionalism, designed to placate religious differences, has actually highlighted them and, thus, has not helped in fostering healthy CMR. These and other factors that have damaged and worsened CMR will be a major challenge to repair.

Four remedies were offered by the Lebanese participants in this research study. First, develop a different political system to avoid political patronage and to open political leadership positions, jobs, and resources beyond the political ruling class families. Second,

consider a more secular approach to politics and CMR. Third, institute a form of federalism. Fourth, institute civil marriage.

Another major factor in the disruption of healthy CMR has been foreign influence. As revealed by the field experts and indicated by the university student responses given in chapter 3, some foreign powers have acted like bullies toward the Lebanese, having their own national interests at heart rather than the interests of Lebanon. To diminish this problem, according to the information presented in this thesis, the Lebanese need to unify and to commit to managing and resisting negative foreign interference much more competently.

In addition, as shown in chapter 2, the Lebanese educational system has not been conducive to fostering an atmosphere and feelings of camaraderie among the youth. Four remedies to this situation were offered in this thesis. First, the monitoring of Lebanese private school curricula should be increased. Second, the educational gap between Christians and Muslims must be addressed. Third, the disparity in quality between public and private education must be minimized. Fourth, the art of healthy CMR should be taught in the school system.

Also noted in chapter 2, geographically speaking, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon historically have lived in somewhat segregated communities. This was exacerbated by the civil war, which resulted in the displacement and demarcation of Christians and Muslims to an even greater degree. The Lebanese Ministry of the Displaced must address and rectify this issue in a renewed and more effective manner.

The historical and ongoing economic problems in Lebanon have also resulted in a great deal of duress in CMR, as reviewed in chapter 2. For many years, the Christians were generally better off economically, bolstering major Muslim grievances that were factors in the Lebanese Civil War. The middle class in Lebanon has continued to shrink, resulting in

problems of social stratification (i.e., rich vs. poor). Because little is produced within the Lebanese economy, imports have remained at high levels and the national debt has continued to increase. The poor economy has also been blamed for the high rate of emigration, predominantly Christians, and the purported “brain drain” of would-be Lebanese talent. Because of the constancy of the poor state of the Lebanese economy, the Christians and Muslims must learn to improve their relationship in spite of economic difficulties.

An important finding from this research, explained in chapter 1 and throughout the thesis, was the discrepancy between the field expert respondents and the university students concerning religious differences as a major cause of CMR discord. The field expert respondents, who had witnessed the anarchy of the civil war, did not reactively point to religious differences as a hindrance to their relationship. The university students, who did not experience the horrors of the civil war, nevertheless believed religion was a major cause of CMR discord. This represents a glaring, worrisome difference in attitude and in level of tolerance between the older field expert respondents and the younger university students.

In addition, as shown in chapters 4 and 5, communal identity is one of the major hindrances to CMR. The Maronite Christians do not agree with their Muslim counterparts, or even other Christian counterparts, regarding the Arab and Phoenician identities of Lebanon. Thus, currently, the Lebanese do not have a unified or even firm sense of identity and self as a nation. Because ethnic nationalism continues to drive global politics and may do so for generations, the Lebanese must come to an acceptable level of identity consensus. Doing so will also constitute a major measure of improving CMR.

Whether a golden age when CMR were excellent ever existed in Lebanon is questionable. The evidence showed discontent was often brewing throughout long processions of sociopolitical problems. Thus, whether a failed state or a nonstate, Lebanon

presents an interesting paradox. In January 2009, *The New York Times* listed Lebanon as the number one tourism destination in the world, calling it “the best party place in the world” (July, n.d.). At the very same time, Israel was making serious threats about attacking Lebanon again; and intra-Lebanese politics were as divided and acrimonious as ever. Thus, it is hard to imagine that such a small country as Lebanon, wherein the various communities are so physically close to one another that cordial familiarity is assumed, has so much intercommunal distance and discontent.

Until the recent past, the Christians of Lebanon were generally more proactive in initiating interfaith dialogue. More recently, though, the Muslims have appeared keener on pursuing CMR advocacy. Thus, the problem is one of synchronicity. As discussed in chapter 6, the Christians’ and Muslims’ interests in fostering healthy CMR often have not coincided, a necessary occurrence for the success of such initiatives. To make matters worse, both camps, have failed to do enough to address CMR issues, according to the expert respondents and the poor state of CMR. This failure is also evidenced by the almost hostile attitude toward CMR found among the university students.

Somehow, although this country has suffered more chaos, turmoil, and violence than most of the other countries in the world, Lebanon has survived. Thus, CMR may weather the Lebanese storms under the sociological theory of functionalism. The functionalism perspective holds that “society is a complex system whose various parts work together to produce stability and solidarity” (Giddens, 2001, pp. 16–17). According to this perspective, it is crucial to “investigate the relationship between parts of society to each other and to society as a whole,” (Giddens, 2001, pp. 16–17). Apropos to Lebanon,

We can analyze the religious beliefs and customs of a society . . . by showing how they relate to other institutions within it,” and “moral consensus exists when most people in the society share the same values thereby contributing to the maintenance of social cohesion. (Giddens, 2001, p.16).

Perhaps, then, follow-up studies should be focused on the factors that hold this tiny country together. Additionally, future studies should include the issue of the Arab Spring and its possible effects on Lebanese CMR.

Although it is difficult to consider Lebanon to be a high-performing, functionalist society, a fusion, albeit a negative one, seems to exist among the Lebanese that keeps Lebanon intact despite all the pathology. Somehow Lebanon survives. As the field experts shared in chapter 6 and the literature revealed, despite all sorts of societal tensions, Lebanon has not had a recurrence of civil war. Perhaps Christianity and Islam “reaffirm people’s adherence to core social values, thereby contributing to the maintenance of social cohesion” (Giddens, 2001, p. 16). Thus, Lebanon does seem to be a functionalist society wherein somehow all the negatively fused and codependent aspects of CMR fit and hold together.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF FIELD EXPERT RESPONDENTS

MP Gen. Michel Aoun, personal communication, June 15, 2006

Dr. Nidal Bou Habib, personal communication, November 3, 2004

MP Dr. Farid El Khazen, personal communication, November 6, 2004

MP Samir Franjeh, personal communication, March 8, 2005

MP Pierre Gemayel, personal communication, June 15, 2006

Bishop Selim Ghazal, personal communications, October 10, 2004, and November 9, 2004

Ghassan Hajjar, personal communication, August 5, 2005

Judge Abbas Halabi, personal communication, May 26, 2005

MP Hussein Husseini, personal communication, December 2, 2004

Fr. Samir Khalil, personal communication, March 15, 2005

Fr. P. George Massouh, personal communication, October 12, 2004

Souheil Matar, personal communication, March 21, 2006

MP Nayla Najib Issa Khoury Mouawad, personal communication, November 17, 2004

Dr. Ibrahim Mousawi, personal communications, June 22, 2006, and March 25, 2011

MP Nawaf Musawi, personal communication, December 20, 2004

Dr. Elie Adib Salem, personal communication, July 11, 2004

Mohammed Sammak, personal communication, September 29, 2004

APPENDIX 2: FR. P. GEORGE MASSOUH

Interview: October 12, 2004

Faith: Greek Orthodox

Position: Director for the Center for CMR, University of Balamand

The interview took place at the UB Center for Christian–Muslim Study located in Deir El-Balamand, El-Koura, North Lebanon. Fr. P. George Massouh, the director of the center, spoke mostly in formal Arabic and occasionally in colloquial Arabic. A translator was utilized as needed during the interview.

Massouh preferred to be called *Abouna* or “Our Father.” This was interesting because the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics, the Maronite Catholics, and the other Catholic denominations in Lebanon refer to their priests as *Abouna*. On the other hand, the evangelical Christians and other Protestant denominations in Lebanon call their clergy *Asees* or “Reverend” and correct those who mistakenly call them *Abouna*. Muslims prefer to refer to Christian clerics as *Asees* and more often than not decline to call a priest of any denomination *Abouna*, as was the case with Nawaf Musawi, the director of International affairs for Hezbollah, during the interview with him on December 20, 2004.

During the interview, Massouh pointed out with pride that one of the successes of UB, to which he has contributed much, is its Center for Christian–Muslim Studies. Through the center, founded in 1995, one may earn a master’s degree in Christian–Muslim studies. Additionally, the center staff publishes a journal and articles and gives summer sessions in CMR where “Christians and Muslims from different countries come to study together—Lebanese, Jordanian, and Egyptians [etc.]” Some of the challenges Massouh spoke of included the need for more researchers and funding. Presently, he was the sole researcher. In his opinion, Christians usually took the initiative to do research; therefore, he wanted to see

Muslim participation in CMR and research. While he was pleased with the accomplishments of the center thus far, he described how, at the beginning when the center was first opened, many Christians were “very critical and negative” about such a center.

Massouh was quick to state that the problem between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon was “not theological at all” and that the conflict was “not between the rich and the poor, nor a problem of social stratification.” He explained himself:

The rich and poor of the same and even different communities will not criticize the usually rich and powerful political leader so as not to be accused of being a traitor of their own community or a carrier of Christian-Muslim dissent as in the case of a Christian criticizing a Muslim leader and vice versa.

He believed shared that religious radicalism was not as significant a problem in Lebanon as it was in other countries. However, he mentioned that “perhaps Hezbollah and the ‘Qawaat Libnaneeyee’ (Lebanese Forces, Christian party) are somewhat radical in their ideology.” He also believed that both communities had aspects of radicalism. Massouh believed that “no one is working to their capacity in improving CMR; neither the Christians nor the Muslims, nor the government or the education system.”

APPENDIX 3: DR. ELI ADIB SALEM

Interview: July 11, 2004 and August 2004

Faith: Greek Orthodox

Position: President of University of Balamand, former foreign minister of Lebanon

Dr. Eli Adib Salem was interviewed Salem on July 11, 2004, and again one month later. Salem had no knowledge of the questions that were posed to him prior to the interview. He answered all the questions asked in English.

Salem was selected for this assessment for several reasons. Salem is currently the president of the University of Balamand, owned and administered by the Greek Orthodox Church, having served previously as the former dean of the Political Studies Department at AUB. He has also written several articles and books on Lebanese intercommunity relations and politics. He was the foreign minister of Lebanon (1983-1989) during the height of the Lebanese Civil War. During his tenure as foreign minister, the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon was ongoing and the civil war was raging. Salem was also the former dean of the Political Studies Department at AUB.

He stated that his various careers and life experience in Lebanon have dictated that he be deeply involved in CMR of Lebanon. He added that he is a member of the Greek Orthodox community, which “usually” identifies itself more directly with Arabism than other Christian denominations of Lebanon (Hajjar, 2004); thus his involvement in CMR was somewhat more “natural” and “deliberate.” By this, he explained that the Greek Orthodox belief in Arabism has been appealing to the Muslims in general and that the Greek Orthodox found themselves residing in some mixed Muslim/Greek Orthodox villages wherein both groups “got to know each other.” Subsequently, Muslim and Greek Orthodox communities

“have lived together in peace for hundreds of years and [at times] their families have inter-married.”

Salem found himself hard pressed to measure and explain his successes with CMR during his years as foreign minister of Lebanon. Indeed, his tenure spanned the civil war years of Lebanon. He published a book on January 1, 1995, *Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon: The Troubled Years, 1982-1988*, the time period each of the interviewees characterized as the most difficult in Lebanese history. He did mention the positive Christian–Muslim student interaction at UB, which he has had a role in supporting. He also pointed out his involvement in the establishment of a Christian–Muslim studies center in the university.

According to Salem, “No community, neither the Christians nor the Muslims, are doing enough” for improving CMR. “Lebanon needs a national reconciliation, we don’t have this but that is what we need, a big national reconciliation. We can’t ignore this anymore.”

Perhaps because of the enmeshment of academics and politics, university affiliations are as, if not more, effective than political action per se in determining success or failure of CMR. They might certainly appear to be less threatening, as would the natural evolution of Greek Orthodox/Muslim communities.

APPENDIX 4: JUDGE ABBAS HALABI

Interview: May 26, 2005.

Faith: Druze

Position: Judge, bank director, chairman of The Arab Working Group for CMR

Abbas Halabi was interviewed at his home in Beirut. The meeting lasted 3 hours. He spoke English throughout the interview, although rather haltingly. Therefore, on occasion, he spoke in Arabic to express his point more fluently. Halabi was referred to this writer for inclusion in this research by both Dr. Jorgen Nielsen, professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Birmingham, and Marwan Halabi, the son of Judge Halabi. This writer knew of Marwan Halabi as a student at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon. Halabi is currently a judge in the Lebanese court system and director of the Bank of Beirut and the Arab Countries (BBAC) in Lebanon.

Halabi is a judge in Lebanese court system and is chairman of the Arab Working Group for CMR. (This writer witnessed him chairing a meeting of the group on April 20, 2005.) He is a senior member of a national Lebanese committee for CMR dialogue and belongs to The Lebanese Encounter for Dialogue committee. In addition, Halabi represented the Druze community of Lebanon to the Vatican during a Vatican initiative regarding CMR in the late 1990s.

During the interview, Halabi reported that his involvement in CMR advocacy started a bit before the Lebanese CIVIL WAR and continued somewhat during the war but that his main involvement occurred after war. He had an idea of how to maintain good relations with Christians. He began to visit, with other members of the Druze community, six or seven Christian neighborhoods and agreed to continue this practice. In 1989, he attended the Tā'if conference in Saudi Arabia, where he and others worked on national reconciliation. He

described how he and the other members, the Lebanese community, and the Arab world discussed what and where they had all gone wrong and what to do for the betterment of the future.

One of Halabi's precepts regarding CMR was "to view you as you are, not as I want you to be." However, he was more direct when addressing the possible causes of CMR discord and the civil war:

Let me tell you something. The war was not at any time a religious war, whether it was before, during or after the war. It was actually several wars within the same war. It was the Palestinians versus the Christians, the Palestinians versus the Lebanese, the Syrians versus the Palestinians, Iran versus Iraq, and Iran versus Syria.

He continued, stating, "During the war, no spiritual leader described it as a religious conflict."

He noted that "there are regional differences much more than confessional differences. In Lebanon, we want diversity and not division." He added, "We have a hope that Christians and Muslims can form one political bloc within the government, and for the Lebanese to talk more about a national bloc, not a separate Christian-Muslim bloc."

Concerning the premise that the Lebanese Civil War was actually several different (not religiously based) concurrent wars, Halabi added, "During the Lebanese Civil War, there was also Israel versus everyone." He also believed that "international situations at the time of the civil war allowed for the foreigners to exploit the relations between the Christians and the Muslims." It was an ominous sign, he explained, that at one time foreign interference was a cause for the civil war and that decades later the same problem existed. The civil war "ended with Muslim versus Muslim and Christian versus Christian, and every community was involved," he said. "There was Sunni versus Druze and Shiite versus Druze and Shiite versus Shiite." However, he did note a positive step in CMR development when "in 1990, the Christians and Muslims put down all their disagreements under the Tā'if Agreement."

Halabi stated that, in general, he has “a fear, somewhat, of extremism.” However, he added that the notion of extremism in the West, particularly in the United States, seemed to be skewed, noting that “the U.S. has Christian extremists.” He stated that religious extremism “affects CMR in Lebanon. For example, if the Muslims think that Middle East Christians are the same as the U.S. [fundamentalist] Christians, this causes major problems.” According to Halabi, indigenous Middle Eastern Christians were unfairly and erroneously begrudged: “The Christians of Lebanon are not extremists, but they appear that way because they are angry that they are becoming weaker [politically and numerically].” He added, “Lebanese Christians are in fear and that is why they seem to be extremists.”

He felt that for CMR to be positive at this point “we must remain 50–50 [Christian–Muslim] in population for a long time.” He explained this to mean that until the Lebanese stop worrying about religious percentages and political power and resources, it is best if the communities are equal in number so that there is no appearance of one group being stronger than the other.

H stated, “I admire what the Christians have done after the war. The Christians, especially Maronites, were self-critical of their behavior during the war.” He also shared, “The Muslims were also asked to do the same and now they are doing this.” Halabi, a Druze, noted that “the Druze from 1983 to 1987 were involved with the war of the mountain. Afterward and more recently the Druze now say, ‘Let’s live together in peace again.’” He cited several positive examples of CM reconciliation, mentioning how “Patriarch Sfeir and Walid Jumblat met and reconciled in 2001.” He considered this “a Druze and Maronite reconciliation, the likes of which has not occurred since after the war of 1860.”

H also shared that “the Shiites are also working well for CMR.” He expounded, “Sheik Shamseddine has made lots of efforts in CMR reconciliation.” (Shamseddine is a

Shiite Muslim cleric in Lebanon that commands a large Shiite following.) He also mentioned that the “Sunni Muslims under Hariri were good with positive CMR,” pointing out how the late Rafiq Hariri, in his role as Lebanese PM, had distributed loans and scholarships almost evenly to Christian and Muslims students, with a little higher percentage of the aid actually going to the Christians. Halabi summed up IQ6 with a fairly new adage among the Lebanese in regards to CMR: “Lebanon without Christians is not Lebanon and it makes no sense for Lebanon. Lebanon without Muslims is not Lebanon.”

APPENDIX 5: DR. IBRAHIM MOUSAWI

Interviews: June 22, 2006 and March 25, 2011

Faith: Shia

Position: Director of the Political Department of Al-Manar Television, Phd in Islamic Studies

Dr. Ibrahim Mousawi is a high-ranking member of Hezbollah. Because of his high degree of activity in that role and his mastery of English, he has also been interviewed often by individuals associated with the Western media. Indeed, during the most recent Israeli attack on Lebanon, beginning on July 12, 2006, this writer observed Mousawi being interviewed frequently on CNN. He is also a professor of politics and Islamic studies.

Mousawi and this writer were doctoral students in Islamic studies at the University of Birmingham Center for the Study of Islam until Mousawi completed his degree in 2007. They have also been in contact with each other on many occasions regarding CMR in contemporary Lebanon.

Regarding his involvement in CMR, Mousawi stated, “It has been a duty of mine, and all of ours [the people of Lebanon] for a very long time, both casually, in everyday life, and formerly, as a member of Hezbollah, to have a healthy relationship with everyone.” For his part, Mousawi was more than willing to refer the author to several Christian leaders and clergy for interviews and assistance: “There is no difference between Islam and Christianity.”

Responding to IQ5, Mousawi seemed aware that some in the West, particularly Great Britain and the United States, view Hezbollah as a radical Islamic terrorist organization. He believed that “the more faithful a Muslim or Christian is, then the more decent citizen one is.” He pondered,

Why is it that when people get closer to their faith they are considered fundamentalists or radical while Zionism, which is usually devoid and separate from religion and produced very violent behavior, is not considered radicalism? This makes no sense.

Then those who resist violent, destructive behavior from some Zionists, they are then considered radicals. It is not logical.

He stated his belief that little, if any, religious radicalism is present in Lebanon but categorized that bit of radicalism that he feels does exist as “politically based and inspired by foreign intervention.” However, he described then Maronite priest Beshara Ra’i as a Christian radical, who expressed clear enmity for Muslims.

In responding to IQ6, he offered with some frustration, “Again, there is certainly not a religious problem. It is poor leadership and foreign intervention that is causing Christian-Muslim discord.” Regarding who is doing more to facilitate good CMR, he stated, “Perhaps both communities should unite together and do more to address Lebanon’s problems. We [Hezbollah] have been working on this for a long time.”

APPENDIX 6: MP HUSSEIN HUSSEINI

Interview: December 2, 2004

Faith: Shia

Position: MP, former Speaker of the Parliament, Drafter of the Tā'if Accords and Co-Founder of Amal

The interview with Hussein Hussein lasted for over 2 hours. He spoke both in formal and colloquial Arabic. The questions were read to him in standard Arabic form, and his answers were translated when needed by his daughter-in-law Rima. Hussein, age 66, was elected to parliament in 1972, 1992, 1996, and 2004. He is presently MP for the Baalbek-Hermel district of Lebanon. He served as speaker of the Lebanese parliament from 1984 to 1992. Hussein is often called the “godfather” and “father” of the National Understanding Document, better known as the Tā'if Agreement. Hussein chaired the formulation of this agreement, signed in 1989, which was designed to end the Lebanese Civil War. Its major component was a power-sharing and reconciliation formula between the Christian and Muslim communities and leaders of Lebanon. The Tā'if Agreement has been considered perhaps the major force in ending the Lebanese Civil War.

It was because of Hussein's role in the Tā'if Agreement and his life-long involvement in Lebanese politics and CMR that he was considered a crucial informant for this assessment. He was also a cofounder of the Lebanese Shiite Amal (“hope”) movement of Lebanon in 1973. After the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr, in 1978, Hussein served as the president of Amal till 1980.

Hussein reported being “raised in a political family” whose members had “religious titles from a long time ago: people of the flame of the Prophet Muhammad. His great, great grandparents contributed to the formation of Lebanon, and “all have shared and served in

public office.” Therefore, in regards to CMR, he claimed a long historical heritage in which “my home and history have decreed that I work to elaborate on the Lebanese and Arab identities.” For Hussein, the Lebanese “have a good nation but this is not paralleled with good institutions and this has created a vacuum or inadequacy in the republic of Lebanon.”

He went on to summarize briefly the two main points of “the 1943 pact,” which resulted in the formation of an independent Lebanon: “One, that the Christians would no longer seek foreign intervention or alliances such as the Maronites had with France; and, two, the Muslims gave up the idea of being completely part of greater Syria and the Arab World.” He explained that this pact should have been sufficient for the unity of Lebanon but that “problems resulted from a horrible war and thus a more official constitution was needed, the Tā’if Agreement.” Tā’if “gave us a way to form solid Lebanese institutions in order to safeguard the Lebanese state and its sovereignty with Arab identity.” He continued that Tā’if “gave Lebanon a system of rule and a parliamentary system” and that “nothing should come into being if it doesn’t conform to the wishes of the people.” He also proudly pointed out that Tā’if divided the government leaders (president, prime minister and speaker) into three prime ministers with equal powers, regardless of the numerical ratio of the religious sects. Although “Tā’if has not been implemented” in its entirety, Hussein asserted optimistically that “it will be and it is the best prescription for Lebanon to deal with its relationship with Syria, the Palestinians, and Israel.” It was obvious that Hussein had great faith in the Tā’if Agreement and that he worked arduously in its development.

In Hussein’s opinion, “Everyone wants a free and sovereign Lebanon and brotherly Christian-Muslim relations; it’s only the expressions [methods of achievement] that are different.” He explained, “Repercussions from alliances with external forces [by the different Lebanese communities] must be avoided” and that “not implementing the Tā’if Accord” were

the failures that negatively impacted CMR. He believes that the lay people of Lebanon, Christian and Muslim, truly want good relations and are willing to work for it, “Yet at times, they don’t know how to proceed as the other problems I have been mentioning interfere.” He added, “Israel had and continues to try to hurt CMR and Israel still occupies Lebanon.”

He believes “there would not have been a civil war in Lebanon had it not been for external forces, Israel behavior and foreign intervention,” and, “had the politicians served the people, the state and not themselves. There was too much bickering.”

He was saddened at the thought of another civil war. “No, no, I can’t even think about another war,” he said. “I can’t even think of another war. We are the same people; there will not be another war.”

APPENDIX 7: FR. SAMIR KHALIL

Interview: March 15, 2005

Faith: Jesuit Catholic

Position: International scholar of CMR and professor/researcher in CMR at St. Joseph's University

This writer interviewed Father Samir Khalil on March 15, 2005, at the Center of Documentation of the Research of Arab Christianity, St. Joseph University, Lebanon. In addition to being a major participant at the center, he is a well-known scholar on Eastern Rite/Arab Christian theology and Middle Eastern CMR. Khalil, an Egyptian, grew up and lived among the much larger Muslim population in Egypt but has lived in Lebanon for over 40 years. He taught Islam in Egypt, an impressive accomplishment when one realizes that 90% of the population is Muslim. He has authored several articles and books on Arab Christianity and CMR and has lectured at Georgetown University, the University of Birmingham, and the Vatican, *inter alia*.

Prior to the interview, this writer e-mailed Khalil the questions that were asked for this assessment. He replied as follows: "Dear George, these questions are very interesting. They are very deep and thought provoking." During the interview, Khalil spoke almost entirely in English, although haltingly; his native language is Arabic. He stated he is more fluent in French.

Khalil felt that he was deeply and intimately part of a Muslim environment. Living with Muslims throughout his life has given him a camaraderie and understanding of Muslims that set the stage for his work in CMR. He stated, "I never suffered from Muslims, although in the late fifties there were some problems," alluding to the 1952 revolution in Egypt. In 1955, he entered the Jesuit Order after he finished his bachelor's degree. The austere lifestyle

in the Jesuit Seminary in Egypt is where “they impressed on us to love everyone, including Muslims.” He credited his monastic life with empowering him not only to accept but also to appreciate Muslims. For Khalil, this proved to be an early, invaluable aid in his interest and career of forging positive links within CMR.

Khalil credited his residencies with Muslims in helping him understand and respect Muslims and Islam and to work with them: “I lived with Muslims as much as I could.” He completed a doctorate in Islamic studies and has dialogued with Muslims sincerely, telling them, “I am looking for [the spiritual] truth with you.” His involvement with CMR also involved teaching in academic positions beginning in Egypt in 1962 and continuing with the teaching of religion and interfaith dialogue throughout his life. At the time of the interview, he was teaching Islam, Christianity, and CMR at St. Joseph University and throughout Lebanon.

However, because of his faith, Khalil has not considered conversion, even with his major study of Islam and major engagement with Muslims. Khalil’s faith “prevents conversion, while wanting to know Islam and understand it.” He and other Christians, when conducting interfaith dialogue with Muslims, “can have esteem for Muslims . . . but although Christians can have sympathy, feel, and seek the truth together, they must remind themselves [to be careful] of everything we do, but retain our distance, be critical.” He ended his answer to IQ3 by reporting an impressive CMR record, stating, “Since 1962 till now, I studied Islam.”

Khalil wanted to dispel the rumor that Muslims throughout Lebanon were persecuting Christians: “Lebanon has freedom of religion; we can’t say Christians are oppressed by Muslims. There is no religious oppression,” he said, sharing his preference for a country with a clear distinction between religion and the state. He believed that “a full democracy will not

work in Lebanon now and not for a long time. We can't simply place [i.e., fully adapt to] democracy in Lebanon. People are not ready to vote for the one best leader." However, Khalil also noted some improvements: "In the past Christians in Lebanon, in general taught Islam as a problem." He added that this problem "was also vice versa. Imams, not all of them, were teaching Christianity in a negative way; but now they are teaching Christianity better [i.e., in a more positive light]." He felt that Muslims still needed to improve in the frequency and manner of teaching Christianity and believed that "Muslims have not yet been able to teach Christianity well."

He did feel that there was a double standard concerning how Christians and Muslims were treated from a religious viewpoint. He complained, "If a church and a school are together [i.e., affiliated], then they should be filed [i.e., taxed] that way, the same as if a Mosque and school are together for bills." In Lebanon, Christians must pay separate fees for the church and the school, whereas preachers of Islam are paid by the government. He admitted, "Christian preachers are not paid by the government because the Christians [themselves] refuse; they do not want government control." He lamented that it was unfair that "Christians pay [their] bills [i.e., water, electricity, etc.] while the Muslims don't."

He also seemed to critique constructively what he perceived as a weakness in the Lebanese Christian mentality: "Democracy is something we're not sure of. We [Lebanese Christians] must be honest and think more neutral and not [just about our] community. The problem is we still think in terms of community either [by] area or religion." He lamented, "Lebanon today lost a lot of their good leaders; I ask what good Christian leaders are around?"

Regarding extremist or radical religious expression in Lebanon, Khalil stated,

A little bit in Lebanon of extreme religion, but not so much extreme Christians, not [many] Sunni extremist. There is a little bit extremist Shiite. If they [Shiites and other extremists] are extreme in their own religious community, then okay. But if it [i.e., their extremism] spreads to the other communities, then I disagree [i.e., disapprove].

He added, “Praying five times a day is good, but five prayers and jihad is no good.” He conceded that there was some debate over the exact definition of the term jihad, but shared that “if there is a connection between the word [jihad] and deed [i.e., acting out under the holy war definition of jihad], then this is a [an extremist] problem.”

On the other hand, he stated that “Christian extremism is not violent, and violence is the question Islam has it in: one, the Quran and two, the Hadith.” Regarding Christianity, Khalil offered, “If you take all the Christian texts, the aim is how to make people better [i.e., righteous]; Christ did not go against the Law of Moses but worked within it.” He continued, “The idea of justice [i.e., holding the sinner accountable] is not the idea of the gospel; you see, Christ came not to condemn but to cure.” For Khalil, through Islam, “Muslims seek justice or punishment of the wrongdoers; in Christianity, Christians are to forgive and even love the wrongdoers.” He believed this to be a fundamental difference between Christianity and Islam, which resulted in Islam being more susceptible to radicalism or extremism. He also mentioned that followers of Hezbollah were somewhat radical.

Khalil believed that “Christians are doing a little more than Muslims on different levels” in working toward positive CMR. SK offered, “Christians [in general] have official documents that say Muslims are able to reach salvation, that God wants this for all, no exclusions.” He continued, “Church teaching has this principle, that everyone is my brother, not [simply] cousin, friend, etc.” On the other hand, he noted

Islam says there is no heaven [for Christians]. There are two different approaches between Christianity and Islam. One is that Muslims are exclusive, and two, Christianity is inclusive. It [Christianity] basically says Muslims are going around the [less direct] way to salvation for Christ.

He also pointed out that “Christians are inclusive [in that] they share services such as their schools, with Muslims while the Muslims are exclusive and don’t [normally] do this.” For SK, Christians are doing more to foster healthy CMR.

Addressing whether something could have been done to prevent the Lebanese Civil War and strained CMR, Khalil revisited IQ1, referencing the possible causes of Christian–Muslim discord (politics, theology, economy, and social stratification): “All of these are true [causes of the war that, if addressed, could have prevented the civil war]: politics, the rich versus the poor and so on.” More specifically, he believed that had Israel not denied the Palestinians their rights and expelled them from what was Palestine, eventually to Lebanon, the war might not have occurred.: “The reason why the Palestinians came [were expelled to and accepted by] to Lebanon was because Lebanon was too liberal and weak” [politically and militarily]. He added, “You must have a strong army, order and structure, but then you don’t [necessarily] have an open and liberal society.” Despite his belief that the civil war might not have occurred had it not been for the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, he asserted, “I have compassion for the suffering of the Palestinians and Arafat from Israel; I pray for them.”

Khalil stated, “There will be no other wars because the Lebanese are tired and disillusioned by the war and they don’t want to repeat it, neither Christian nor Muslim.” He also mentioned that the Lebanese “very much want and need the normal life” and are interested in contemporary issues such as adequate employment, supporting their families, and so forth.

Although it may be true that, historically, Khalil’s position represents an extraordinary tolerance and openness while retaining religious differences, a Christian studying Islam while living in everyday interactions with Muslims represents a tremendous hope and promise for CMR. His continuing of his studies and his international reputation bespeaks a continued

respect for his field and beliefs. Further context is needed, however, to ascertain whether “studying Islam” will be sufficient to ensure continuing positive CMR.

APPENDIX 8: PIERRE GEMAYEL

Interview: June 6, 2005

Faith: Maronite Catholic

Position: MP, Minister of Industry

Gemayel, the son and nephew of two Lebanese presidents, was interviewed for this assessment in his political stronghold, an area of his mainly Christian constituency. His family has a long history of strong political involvement in Lebanon. Draped on large buildings in the area were a few very large murals of him and some of his family members. His grandfather, for whom he was named, was a national soccer player, a pharmacist, and the founder of the Kataeb, the once powerful Lebanese Phalange party. His uncle, Bashir Gemayel, was elected president of Lebanon in 1982, during the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and was known to cooperate with the Israeli government of then Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Gemayel's father, Amin Gemayel, was also elected president of Lebanon after Bashir was assassinated shortly after his election to the Lebanese presidency. Gemayel was a member of parliament at the time of this interview; and the following year (2006), he became the Minister of Industry for Lebanon. His family and political party, the Phalangists, have been major proponents of Lebanese/Christian Nationalism in Lebanon and strongly opposed Lebanon and the Lebanese being identified as Arab.

Gemayel, age 33 at the time of our interview, was not known to be a major participant in CMR nor an advocate for CMR in Lebanon. To the extent that he believed the author's interview was focused on religion per se, he seemed less interested in the topic. The more the interview was focused on the politics of CMR, the more focused and animated Gemayel became. However, he also displayed a level of discontent when he discussed politics, as did

the other interviewees. This was understandable because the events of the last year, prior to this interviews, were dizzying. These included the extension of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's mandate against the wishes of some Lebanese factions and international countries, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, subsequent street protests both in support and in opposition of the Syrian role in Lebanon, the departure of Syrian troops in late April 2005, vacillating political alliances, and additional assassinations. In addition, Lebanon faced Israeli threats, over flights, bombings, and a devastating invasion of the country by Israeli forces.

Gemayel felt his role in CMR had been a historical one, pointing to the over half a century of political involvement his family had had in Lebanon. He also mentioned the natural role that his Lebanese identity held within CMR. To be Lebanese meant to be Christian or Muslim; thus, a relationship by nature must exist. He stated, "Although I am proud of being a Christian, I don't like talking about sects." Instead, he offered his preference for referring to Lebanese without religious connotations. He insisted that CMR had deteriorated in Lebanon with "repercussions of [intermingled] religion and politics. The problem was of a political nature, but it appeared to be religious as well." He added that "politics was the bigger problem, rather than religion." He was the only respondent who clearly felt that theological and religious reasons were causes of CMR discord in Lebanon. Additionally, he was the only respondent who felt CMR were better than in prewar Lebanon.

Gemayel answered IQ5 with his belief that "there are three causes of extremism: One is poverty, two is oppression, and three is a strong political cause." These factors, he stated, "cause extremism on both sides." He identified Hezbollah as Muslim extremists and felt that this extremism could be neutralized and resolved by "merging them [i.e., their military wing] into the [official, national] Lebanese Army." He identified Samir Gea-Gea and his political

party, Al-Qouwat, as radical Christian. His solution to Hezbollah, the Qouwat, and other radical groups in Lebanon was to “merge them into the Lebanese government and understand their point of view and positions, break down what they believe is oppressing them and then solve those issues.”

He stated, “The people of Lebanon have this idea that there is no life in Lebanon,” or “*ma fi aish*,” a common colloquial phrase meaning that the Lebanese economy is very weak and thus meaningful employment opportunities are hard to come by. Additionally, it means that the Lebanese people are divided politically under an already-corrupt political establishment, leaving them feeling anxious about their financial capabilities, providing for their families, and the future. Also mingled with this feeling of “there is no life” in Lebanon is the nationalist disunity of its people in general and the Christians and Muslims in particular.

To address this problem, Gemayel credited the Christians with thinking more about the problems and their solutions. He stated, somewhat timidly, that it is the Christians who realize that “federalism won’t work, in my opinion.” He believed that it is the Lebanese Christians rather than their Muslim counterparts who are more pro-active in initiating and maintaining Christian-Muslim dialogue.

He also stated, “If UN Resolution 1559 had been implemented in 1975 [the start of the Lebanese Civil War], then there would have been no problem.” He also believed that “if America and Russia at the time stopped playing with Lebanon, and implemented 1559 back then, Lebanon would not have had a civil war.”

Gemayel seemed fairly certain that there would not be another Lebanese Civil War. He posed, “Who are we going to wage a war with?” explaining that the Lebanese Civil War was all-inclusive and inconclusive, claiming it had no apparent winner or goal attained. He asserted that the Lebanese have become very contemporary in their needs and desires, that

they very much want meaningful employment opportunities and income, and that “the Lebanese economy could never handle another war.”

Gemayel was serving as Minister of Industry when he was tragically assassinated on November 21, 2006. He was the third member of his family to be assassinated in 25 years. His uncle Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in 1982, also at the age 34; and his 1-year-old daughter was killed in a car bomb attack in 1980 that was initially supposed to target him.

Gemayel’s argument regarding CMR seemed somewhat simplistic and was based on past history rather than recent initiatives. Be that as it may, his representative Christian views and understanding of Lebanese CMR were of value in assessing the state of CMR.

APPENDIX 9: SOUHEIL MATAR

Interview: March 21, 2006.

Faith: Maronite Catholic

Position: Director of International Relations, Notre Dame University

The interview was conducted on March 21, 2006, at NDU in Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon. Matar is the chief counselor to the president of NDU, and the director of public relations for the university as well. He spoke in both colloquial and formal Arabic throughout our interview; a translator was utilized when needed. Much of Matar's work includes interaction with governments and other universities in the Arab Middle East, where he is well known and also well acquainted with some Arab government leaders.

Many of the administrators and faculty at NDU feel that Matar is a shrewd and surprisingly talented individual. They point to the fact that he ceased his formal education at the bachelor's level with a degree in Arabic literature from the Lebanese University and that he speaks neither French nor English like many other Lebanese do. Yet, even so, he is able to manage public (including international) relations for NDU quite handily. Matar is in his late 50s.

Matar shared that he was raised in a village that overwhelmingly consisted of Maronite Christians: "I grew up in a Maronite environment, and I never saw a Muslim or an Orthodox (Christian) until age 12." When he began to study at the Lebanese University, he met Muslims and began to work in the area of politics," adding "we should separate religion and the state." He elaborated: "Some people who call for a separation of religion and state are socialists, but I call for this from my humane [non-political] point of view." Matar believed that he had developed a keen understanding of Middle East communities and religion because he "studied Arabic literature which gave me contact with everything that is Arab . . . my

interest and success in literature drove me to acquire interest in the Islamic and Arabic civilization.” He felt that he was able to transcend many challenges of CMR because of his Arabic literature studies. He taught at various schools, teaching Druze, Sunnis, and Maronites. With pride, he noted that he never considered himself an outsider confined to just being a Maronite and stated about his Arabic studies that “this experience helped me and I use it now at NDU,” where “I actually find myself favoring the Muslim students at times because they are a minority here and I want them to feel comfortable.” He also stated, “That’s why when we hold conferences here at the university, I try very hard to have religious and community diversity.”

Indeed, the author observed that Muslim students seemed to admire and identify with Matar. At the branch campus of NDU in the small Shouf district where many of the students are Druze by faith, some students remarked to this writer in admiration about how Matar spoke highly grammatically correct, formal Arabic.

Regarding IQ2, Matar agreed that “religious differences exist, we acknowledge this,” he said, adding,

There’s no merging of the religious theology. They [Christianity and Islam] are different and so we leave it that way; as long as we don’t develop the citizen as a whole and the government, these religious differences will become a political difference and problem.

He also stated, “Yes, there is still a problem with confessional fanaticism in Lebanon, coming from the different wars that took place in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East,” Matar stated, “What is causing these problems is the Zionist presence.” He shared that “Israel has been detrimental to CMR in Lebanon and elsewhere.” He also believed that the Syrian government was not playing a constructive role in Lebanese CMR. Even so, he explained, “The Asaad [Syrian president] regime doesn’t believe in religious fanaticism and it has actually crushed Muslim radical organizations. America likes this. The Syrian Baathist

government is a secular government against radicalism.” He added, “In Lebanon, the Syrians came to help the Christians and are now leaving Lebanon with the Christians opposed to them.”

In response to IQ6, Matar said, “There is no party in Lebanon or area of Lebanon that [publicly] calls for conflict between the Christians and the Muslims; everyone calls for a good relationship but, some people lie.” He added, “Education, both universities and schools and all political parties call to establish good CMR.” He believed that many institutions including the media and religious leaders agree, “but few of these entities, especially the political media delve into this subject area (CMR) with any depth or way to proceed.” He suggested that “call[ing] for the implementation and acceptance of civil marriage, which would bring the Lebanese together, united.” He also made it clear that he felt that enacting the right for civil marriage in Lebanon would help unite the citizens wherein they would not focus so much on someone’s religion.

Matar also spoke about the murder of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. “It does not matter if we were with or against Hariri; however, we are all against his murder, both Christians and Muslims so the assassination could lead to a stronger unity and interaction between Christians and Muslims.”

He noted that “many events [had taken] place since 1943 until now” that affected the peace of Lebanon:

The internal influence of these events has been problematic for Lebanon. In 1948, this Israeli formation took place, and the Palestinians were expelled to Lebanon. Then, in 1967, the Arab-Israeli war occurred, wherein the Arabs were defeated. This reflected negatively in Lebanon, because then the PLO took up arms in Lebanon to defend themselves against the Israelis.

SM added, “This instigated war in 1975 between the Lebanese and the Palestinians.” He firmly believed that “the only situation that can avoid a future conflict in Lebanon is the

building of the state [solid civil institutions, law and order and freedom]. If we build the state, or had built the state since 1943, then we would not have had a war.” He continued, “We are caught now between Israel and Syria.” Matar believed that “the only guarantee to avoid future conflict is to develop strong government institutions that treats all citizens the same and dispenses the same resources and services to all.”

He did not believe there would be a future Christian-Muslim war in Lebanon: “Nor will it be for Christian-Muslim reasons,” he said. “Maybe a political war, but not Christian Muslim civil war, (that) will occur in the future.”

APPENDIX 10: MP DR. FARID EL KHAZEN

Interview: November 6, 2004.

Faith: Maronite Catholic

Position: MP, Former director of the Political Science Department at the American University of Beirut

El Khazen has a PhD in political science from Johns Hopkins University and, at the time of this interview, was a professor and chair of the Political Studies Department at AUB. He was also this writer's professor of political science in 1999 at AUB. El Khazen has written several articles and books regarding the Lebanese political situation. He was also a founding member of the Christian Opposition Gathering until June 2005 when he was elected a member of the Lebanese Parliament for the Kesrouan (mostly Christian) district of Lebanon. He won election as a member of the political party headed by Gen. Michel Aoun. El Khazen was re-elected to the same position in the early June 2009 Lebanese elections.

El Khazen was interviewed for this assessment on November 6, 2004. His family is a historically known Maronite family. He answered all the questions posed in English and had no prior knowledge of them.

He believed he plays an important role in CMR through his career as a university professor. He pointed out that his involvement in CMR is more "political" than religious or sociological. He added that the Lebanese "by nature have become political beings" and within the Lebanese model there is the CMR factor. For his part, El Khazen emphasized that he strongly supports the separation of church and state. With this desire, he has had a moderate involvement in topics directly related to CMR.

Although El Khazen stated that Lebanese ills were not based on religious and theological reasons, he seemed to contradict himself later. He reported, "Yes, radical Islam is

a problem” in Lebanon. This radicalism, he explained, “invokes the Christians to feeling insecure,” while on the other hand, he denied that radical Christianity exists in Lebanon and explained that “no Christians are advocating for a Christian [only] state.”

He stated, “It is always the Christians who initiate [CM] dialogue.” He added, “It is mostly the Maronites and then the [Greek] Orthodox and then the Greek Catholics.” This is the “pattern,” according to El Khazen. He also stated that the Muslim communities “less often” initiate and maintain Christian-Muslim dialogue.

El Khazen strongly believed that the Lebanese CIVIL WAR could have been prevented “had it not been for the presence of the armed PLO and the influx of Palestinian refugees.” He blamed the PLO and its behavior in Lebanon for causing “a major political problem and the breakdown of the state.”

Although he held a poor prognosis for CMR in Lebanon, he was clear to point out that it was not at risk of another civil war. He expressed that the Lebanese have learned from the civil war and its causes and thus another conflict was highly improbable.

APPENDIX 11: DR. NIDAL BOU HABIB

Interview: November 3, 2004

Faith: Greek Orthodox

Position: Secretary General for a regional Greek Orthodox community, PhD in Islamic studies

Bou Habib holds a PhD in Islamic Studies from Al-Azhar University, Egypt. His family has a long history of political involvement in Lebanon. He was interviewed for this assessment on Thursday November 3, 2004, and answered all the questions in both written and semiformal spoken Arabic; he had no prior knowledge of the questions. Translation was provided as needed by his son, Habib Bou Habib, a master's degree student at Kaslik University in Lebanon and a well-known artist.

Bou Habib wrote,

In Lebanon CMR are based on the compartmentalization of shares in all aspects of daily life, such as jobs, parliamentary seats, cabinet seats, etc. A common understanding between Christians and Muslims is an idealistic aim and consequently is imperfect. Therefore, we are either to coexist under the banner of the one nation or we are to section the nation; the latter suggestion does not carry much hope for life for either party.

He then discussed his answer by explaining that “as a member of the league of Christian Lebanese, which consists of Maronites, Protestants, Greek Catholics, and so on, I was also involved in CMR in that capacity.” He also believed that his role as a secretary general of the Greek Orthodox Church “has to do with relations with Muslims as well.” His doctoral degree has also contributed to his involvement and understanding of Islam.

Shortly into discussing his involvement with CMR in Lebanon, Bou Habib digressed to his feelings of disgust regarding the poor prognosis of CMR in contemporary Lebanon. He interrupted with “but there's too much confessionalism, too much. They [Christian and Muslim leaders] talk like everything is great but in truth and practice it stinks.” With dismay he added, “They are going to divide Lebanon, ruin Lebanon.”

He offered a slightly different view “with respect to radicalism. There are some radical Muslims as well as some radical Christians; each of these groups strives to rule the country. The former group strives for a Muslim nation while the latter strives for a Christian nation.” However, he cited politics as the main problem. He also added, “Yes, radical Islam is a problem we face, but there is also radical Christianity, which is even worse.” As an example, he pointed out that the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir is often in the position to influence and dictate political policy in Lebanon. Bou Habib was visibly upset as he described himself as someone who is “secular and there’s supposed to be a separation between the religion and the state.”

He expressed his dislike for a relatively new term emerging in the Middle East, “Islamiyoun,” or the “Islamicists.” He felt the Muslims had begun designating themselves as “Islamiyoun” as opposed to “Muslimoun” or “Arab” and so on. He also lamented, “Radical Christians are even worse” than radical Muslims and that there are “Protestants who are like Zionists,” referring to some Protestant denominations in the United States and elsewhere that refer to themselves as “Christian Zionists.” With some rare optimism, Bou Habib interjected, “The radicals are not strong enough to destroy Lebanon and its [democratic] institutions . . . Many Muslims are becoming more moderate.”

His written response to IQ6 was

There is a committee for dialogue in Lebanon; the Arab working group for Christian-Muslim dialogue that works for Christian-Muslim propagation. Aside from that, there are organizations that work on CMR; add that to the political parties that have secular inclinations.

He didn’t feel that either the Christians or the Muslims were doing more than the other toward CMR; both communities are working at the same level. He continued, “Politics ruins everything; if you take away the politics, everything would be alright . . . Every political party has a religious party or sect attached to it and politics ruins it” (CMR and coexistence). He

asserted, “There is really no religious problem; it’s politicians, they work for themselves, not for Christian-Muslim relations.”

Bou Habib offered that even if the Greek Orthodox community, rather than the Maronite community, were the largest and thus more influential Christian group of Lebanon, “There would still have been a war.” He explained, “It is human nature to argue, disagree, and eventually get violent regarding different issues. Even if Wadi Nasara were included [as part of Lebanon)], this would not have changed things.” He claimed, “Yes, the Greek Orthodox identifies with Arabism closely, and has a strong affinity to the Arab language, [but] CMR would still have suffered.” In contrast to his negative reference to the Tā’if Accords in IQ1, he believed, “After the Tā’if Accords, everyone is equal.” His written response to IQ7 stated, “The reasons for the conflicts remain the same, however after the implementation of the Tā’if Accords, the Muslims getting their share, the situation developed into conforming and dividing shares on all state levels.” For Bou Habib, the Lebanese Civil War was inevitable.

Regarding the possibility of another civil war caused by increasingly poor CMR, he wrote, “I do not see that happening, because the Tā’if system has defined all authorities, giving every confession its rights and share in the state.” He expounded on his answer verbally: “No, the war situation cannot happen like before and it cannot be worse. Everything must be even now and if it is not, it must be made equal.”

Bou Habib ended with some concerns, pointing out, “Some of the Lebanese in the diaspora, many of whom are Maronite, act like they are affiliated with and representing Lebanon, but that is false and they are [actually] creating conflict in Lebanon” (from abroad).

APPENDIX 12: MOHAMMED SAMMAK

Interview: September 29, 2004

Faith: Sunni Muslim

Position: Journalist, secretary general of three Arab CRM working groups, Muslim envoy to Christian communities

This writer met with Mohammed Sammak for the first of several interviews on September 29, 2004. All the interviews took place in his office in the Al Mustaqbal (“The Future”) television station office building. Sammak was selected for interview for several reasons. First, local English-language Lebanese magazines such as the *Monday Morning* weekly magazine, which discusses Lebanese political, social, and religious issues, had featured his columns on several occasions. Many of these dealt directly with the subject of CMR in Lebanon. Also, many of his articles and interviews were published in *An-Nahar (The Day)*, Lebanon’s leading newspaper. Sammak’s writings and interviews are also found in many books, such as Carole Dagger’s (2001) *Bringing Down the Walls*. Interviews with Sammak, wherein his encouraging words advocating for strong CMR can be found, also appear on the Internet.

At the time of this interview, Sammak was the secretary general of the Permanent Committee for Muslim Dialogue in Lebanon, a secretary general for the Permanent Committee for Christian–Muslim Dialogue for the Arab countries, and a secretary general for the Permanent Committee for Christian–Muslim Dialogue in Lebanon. He had a close relationship with one-time Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri for whom he had served as an official advisor and representative

Sammak reported that he was also very active in the Vatican’s second Christian Synod for Lebanon, spearheaded by the Maronite clerical hierarchy in 1994 (the first such synod

having been held in 1736). He had met and spoken with Pope John Paul II on several occasions and had been asked by the pope to participate in the Christian–Muslim dialogue presentations at the synod. Sammak was also a frequent speaker on Lebanese television, including Christian broadcast programs such as “Télé Lumière.”

Sammak was a gentleman in his late sixties. The ease with which he was willing to meet was a great asset for many reasons, not the least of which were the contact and accessibility challenges of Lebanon. He was also helpful in obtaining new interview referral sources.

Sammak reported being interested in CMR for many years. He had this interest early on, which he explained as a natural part of Lebanese life and society. Within the past 20 years, he had been directly and officially involved in CMR of Lebanon and the larger Arab Middle East. He was the official representative/counselor of the late Grand Mufti (Sunni Muslim) of Lebanese Sheikh Hassan Khaled. Specifically, he was Sheikh Khaled’s representative to the Maronite Church patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir. MS had also been a representative of the Sunni Muslim community of Lebanon to a six-member Arab League committee that met in Kuwait chaired by the Kuwaiti foreign minister. The committee was designed to assist the Lebanese in conflict resolution.

Sammak referred to this Arab League meeting because it demonstrated to him a vital understanding of CMR of Lebanon. This meeting lasted a few days; it was composed of high-level representatives of the various Lebanese confessional communities. Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir was present at the meeting, where representatives of the various confessional communities met separately with different delegations of the six-member committee of the Arab League. The Lebanese community representatives did not meet together, according to Sammak, but rather separately with the Arab League representatives. After a few days, the

meeting ended with the Kuwaiti foreign minister and Arab League members stating that the Lebanese community representatives' positions "were so far apart" that the meeting ended with the notion that it was inconclusive and a failure.

However, soon afterward, the Lebanese representatives found themselves together, for the first time, during a casual departure breakfast at a Kuwaiti hotel. At the breakfast, the Lebanese representatives began talking together. Sammak then proceeded to write a letter regarding possible points of agreement on a simple piece of paper and showed it to Patriarch Sfeir. Patriarch Sfeir stated that he approved of the letter's contents and simply handed it to another representative who stated the same. Shortly afterwards, the various representatives returned to Lebanon and appeared on local news television. Patriarch Sfeir began reading Sammak's letter of points. After sharing this recollection with the author, Sammak declared happily, "You see! Leave it to the Lebanese and we will find our way out" of conflict. He relished the fact that the Lebanese representatives, after a brief, informal breakfast, were able to come to certain resolutions while within the official Arab League meeting, apart from each other, little was accomplished. Later in 1993, there was a Lebanese summit meeting where a committee for Christian–Muslim dialogue was formed and for which Sammak has since been the secretary general. As a journalist, he found himself involved in many of the sociopolitical phenomena of Lebanon as well.

He stated, "Of course radicalism within religion affects CMR." He had no qualms in reporting that "there are a larger number of Muslim fundamentalists than Christian fundamentalists; Christian radicals are more controlled by the church, on the other hand, Muslim radicals, there is no control over them." He was not referring to the Western notion of radical Islamism in Lebanon; specifically, he did not refer to Hezbollah. He also did not refer to Shiite Hezbollah as radical Islamists. Instead, he mentioned the areas of "Akkar and

Tripoli,” where some radical Sunni Muslims “are rebelling against the larger Muslim church and need to be worked with” toward rational religiosity and CMR. He believed that the cause of some of the radical Islamic beliefs and behavior was poor education and underdevelopment in poverty-stricken areas.

Sammak described some Muslims as being inflexible in their relations with Christians, pointing out how the prophet Muhammad himself, in the heart of what is today’s Saudi Arabia, invited the Christians of Najran into his mosque to pray with him. With this in mind, Sammak was baffled by the fact that in present-day Saudi Arabia, it is illegal to build any Christian churches. He felt this hurts CMR.

In regard to CMR and dialogue in Lebanon, Sammak reported, “Almost all the initiatives have been taken by the church, Christians, and then, the Muslims respond; this isn’t good; the Muslims should also take initiatives for dialogue.” However, he was happy to report, “Now this is changing and Muslims are taking initiatives for CM dialogue.” He then shared a personal experience: In 1989, while attending a conference at the University of Malta, MS had the opportunity to meet Pope John Paul II, along with other participants and scholars, some of whom were Lebanese. When his turn came to meet the pope, he greeted the pontiff, announced his name and asked, “What are you doing for Lebanon?” Sammak felt that the pope was a bit taken by surprise. The pope hesitated and then reassuringly responded, “You will see what I’m going to do for Lebanon.”

Sammak felt that his direct question to the pope, in its own small way, helped to inspire the pontiff to hold the Vatican’s Synod for Lebanon. The Synod for Lebanon, only the second in more than 200 years, was held in 1994. Prior to the Synod, Sammak spent a month at the Vatican in preparation. The pope barely remembered MS’s name, but he did remember his question. Sammak seemed proud that he was “one of the very first Muslims” ever to

attend the pre-synod preparation meetings at the Vatican and also to have a “private meeting with the Pope in his private apartment.” The Vatican assigned Maronite Bishop Beshara Rai, Sammak, and Greek Orthodox Bishop George Khodr to prepare a draft document for implementation at the Synod.

After the preparation work and the synod itself, Sammak reported that many of the Muslim communities of the Arab Middle East criticized him harshly because of his close work with the Vatican and Christians in general. The Lebanese Muslim community’s criticism was mild or “controlled,” he stated. However, the non-Lebanese Muslims were very critical and angry. This resentment of his work with the Vatican lasted “for years, until after September 11” (2001, when attacks were made against the United States). He shared that he was even called “*Kafer*” or a “nonbeliever” in God (one of the worst insults in the Arab Middle East). Sammak recalled, “Then, after September 11, the Muslim world realized that many Christians did not know what true Islam was. Then they [previous Muslim critics] said, ‘you were right Mohammed; we should open dialogue and explain what Islam really is.’”

After years of being criticized by the larger Arab Muslim world, Sammak believed he had since been understood and viewed as a visionary. He reiterated, “Now it has changed” because “Muslims are now taking the initiative” for CMR along with the Christians for dialogue. He reported, “Now Qatar is giving money to [resident] foreign Christians to build churches” and “the king of Bahrain donated land [for Christians] to build churches.” He also noted, “Kuwait now has some Catholic churches.”

Sammak listed a few scenarios that might possibly have prevented the outbreak of the civil war and, specifically, the deterioration of CMR. One would have been the Muslim community not over involving themselves, particularly militarily, with the PLO. Second was if the Christians had only realized that the Muslims did, in fact, come around to truly believe

in the independence of Lebanon above the notion of being part of the larger Arab Middle East. Third was if only the Lebanese government had emphasized co-existence and CMR within Lebanon's educational institutions. Fourth, he stated that though it seemed impossible for the Christians and Muslims to remain living together during the war, had they not continued to live separately for so many of the war years, this could have lessened the major CMR rift that resulted.

In response to the possibility of another war, Sammak said, "No, not [another] war . . . Yet, there is still a gap of misunderstanding" between the Christians and the Muslims. He indicated that if this gap remained unfilled, it could lead to another war. He reemphasized, "The young are not educated for living together" and "they don't know each other, and yet they will be our future leaders." He lamented, "They are not studying together. Yes, they are [studying together] somewhat at private schools, but they are separated in the public schools." He mentioned, "LU [the official, public Lebanese University] has a low quality educational standard" and does not encourage or include promoting healthy CMR in the curriculum.

Sammak ended the interview with some compassionate, caring, thoughts. He stated that he "cannot figure the Middle East or Lebanon without Christians; the decreasing number of Christians in Lebanon and the Middle East worries me and it worries the Christians." He explained, "Lebanon is a Christian need" and thus "it is very destructive for Lebanon if the Christians are being and feeling like minorities," a sentiment echoed by some of the other Christian interviewees.

APPENDIX 13: MP SAMIR FRANJIEH

Interview: March 8, 2005

Faith: Maronite

Position: MP, Christian envoy to Muslim communities, an organizer of the March 14 movement

The interview was conducted on Tuesday, March 8, 2005. The date and time of the meeting was an important because that day some Lebanese opposition groups, headed by Hezbollah, held a massive demonstration in Beirut. This opposition group was protesting several political changes that were occurring in Lebanon at the time and came out en masse to show their support for the Syrian government and its presence in Lebanon. For his part, Franjeh was one of the members to spearhead the eventual withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, a major point of contention between the Christians and Muslims. Additionally, the evening before the interview, local Lebanese television reported that a meeting was held between Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Franjeh regarding the political situation in Lebanon. Franjeh had often been deployed by the Maronite community as a liaison to the Muslim communities of Lebanon.

Just 2 short months after our meeting, Franjeh was elected to the Lebanese Parliament. He came from a politically involved family in Lebanese history. His uncle, Suleiman Frangieh, was a former president of Lebanon. His nephew, Suleiman Frangieh, the grandson of former president Frangieh, was also a Lebanese MP.

The tense political atmosphere was due in part to Franjeh's belonging to the Qornet Shehwan [predominantly Christian] opposition movement of Lebanon. One week after the interview, he and the Qornet Shehwan were part of another huge demonstration held in

Beirut, which later became known as the March 14 Forces and the Cedar Revolution (as it was known in the West) opposition group.

Franjeh revealed that he began dialogue, stipulating that it was not Christian–Muslim religious dialogue, but dialogue between the Christians and Muslims fighting during the civil war in 1977. The Tā’if agreement was also an instance he considers the beginning of his formal work with CMR. He felt he was also involved with CMR in helping to found “The Lebanese National Congress for National Dialogue” a political movement/committee. Franjeh belongs to the Hiwar, (“dialogue”). This Lebanese National Congress produces documents wherein there is talk of compromise, dialogue, and so forth. He formed this group in the 1990s, which was a very difficult period in Lebanese history, and he was proud of the fact that now dialogue is ongoing and better than it had been. He said, “We worked on the war memory and reconciliation, not from the religious point of view, but a societal point of view.”

Franjeh seemed proud of having published The Beirut Declaration in June 2004. This was a comprehensive document designed to promote the unity of the Lebanese people along national, not particularly religious, lines: “We put in our political programs, opposition members and others to help purify our memories from the war.” One of the goals of the Beirut declaration was to “recognize our differences.” He mentioned that one of his precepts in his work on dialogue between Lebanese communities was “We can live together, both equal and different—we have different personalities, but we are equal.” In regards to his meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, the night before our interview, Franjeh said, “Nasrallah is a clever guy.” He explained this to mean that while he was trying to engage Hassan Nasrallah in joining his opposition group, Nasrallah would not commit either way to joining or opposing Franjeh’s dialogue.

Regarding Lebanese religious radicalism, he began, “Look, now, no, why? Because we tried it and it did not work [religious radicalism]” and that “we tried to be both Christian and Muslim extremists, but we finished the end of these two radical schools of thought.” He observed,

We imploded; both Muslims and Christians no longer want radicalism. It started with the Christians and then the Muslims became radical. No one can impose the Shadour (be forced to wear the long, black Muslim robe) or a Christian state on Lebanon.

With disappointment, he shared, “Lebanon was the first model; we were a good laboratory for violence, the first non-national war in the world, like Vietnam.” He recalled, “Beirut was a town of anarchy. Now it is the opposite, it is becoming a town of harmony and consensus. Now it is a popular choice to get along with one another.” SF continued, “I see young people downtown working hard and they know that they cannot succeed unless we unify. Unity is the first factor of independence.”

Regarding the community doing more to solidify peaceful CMR, SF remarked, “We don’t have the same approach in time.” He explained that when the Christians are eager for dialogue, the Muslims do not seem to be as eager at the same time and vice versa while their methods and approaches to dialogue are different. “When a community exits out of a war, then things are not finished and not synchronized — there is not one group that is bad and one that is good.” He added, “When the Shiites were moderate in 1983, the Christians were radical and then vice versa.” Franjeh was somewhat hopeful of a Lebanese renaissance occurring very soon, during this critical point in Lebanese history, a period that also saw the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri two months earlier of this interview in February 2005. Franjeh shared, “We are reaching a new period during these past few weeks.”

He offered a scenario that could have prevented the Lebanese Civil War: “Perhaps if the Palestinian and Israeli conflict did not exist. The creation of Israel started a change in the whole Arab world. There was some democracy in Egypt and Syria but then the Palestinian-Israeli conflict created dictatorial regimes.”

The question of whether Lebanon will have another civil war, Franjeh responded,

No, I do not think so. The people took [learned] lessons; it was a long, painful war and people were hurt in all aspects of their lives. People lost their dignity and financial assets and there was no consideration given for the other. So, the people understood that change in society had to come. They realized we must change the militias and attitude. This occurred somewhat. I think Lebanon is the first good example on how to end a war.

He also pointed out how “late last-century Lebanon succeeded in resolving its conflicts while Cyprus and Yugoslavia, even today, did not.”

Franjeh’s involvement in CMR is another instance of realism regarding differences and an honest effort to sustain dialogue. It is interesting to note that most who hold this position deny explicitly religious implications of this dialogue. Yet, they emphasize the political and overall good of society rather than that of any one faith.

APPENDIX 14: GHASSAN HAJJAR

Interview: August 5, 2005

Faith: Greek Catholic

Position: Editor for *Al-Nahar*, Lebanon's Leading Newspaper, Former Journalist of Community and Education Issues

Ghassan Hajjar, age 34, had been a journalist for the leading Arabic newspaper in Lebanon for the past 10 years. He covered education and Lebanese community/social issues. Information for this assessment was gathered from several informal meetings and phone calls with Hajjar in addition to the official interview, which was held on Wednesday, August 5, 2005. Hajjar spoke mostly in colloquial Arabic, although he used some formal Arabic as well. A translator was utilized as needed.

Hajjar reported that his work with CMR began in 1985–1986. He explained that at that time people were beginning to get expelled from their villages and so he started to get involved in politics and CMR to help fix this problem. Reflecting on his work for CMR, he explained that “challenges are always there, because certain types of problems will always be there (between Christians and Muslims). We have some differences . . . these will cause problems often.” He added that he is seen by members of Muslim communities as someone interested in forging positive CMR. He mentioned with pride that he was elected as the head of the student cabinet in a predominantly Muslim university (6 Christians and 300 Muslims), the University of Journalism.

Hajjar was dismayed that “work in CMR can be hard and some Christians say it is too hard and can't be done successfully. Some Muslims feel the same.” Yet he was proud of the fact that he had been working for the betterment of CMR, that it had been a main aspect of his life. He reflected proudly that his having lived, studied, and worked with Muslims made him

optimistic and that he “has no real worries” about CMR, “although sometimes we do not get along.”

He believed that “radicalism always existed in Lebanon with some groups being extremists while others are not.” He was concerned that “extremism is multiplying and each [Christians and Muslims] blames the other but the reality is they are both to blame.” He explained,

Extremist Islam is growing, so we Christians are afraid of that; we are becoming weak and thus we feel more threatened and thus we are becoming radical...When we hear Bin Laden talking about eradicating Christians, the Christians become afraid of what might happen to them.

Hajjar believed that the Christians and Muslims “are all working at the same level” toward better CMR but that this level was “inadequate.” He stated that most Christian and Muslim politicians and leaders, and even community members, are “satisfied with the status quo, and they don’t want improvement to become strong because they will lose their individual and group power.” He also postulated, “If intermarriage was more permissible in Lebanon for example, there would eventually be no religious differences between the Lebanese and they would become a neutral people [religiously blended and tolerant], but both parties do not want this.”

In regard to the prevention of the Lebanese Civil War, he stated, “No, in this kind of [political confessional] system, there was no way to prevent this war. For example, if only a Maronite Christian can be president” (then this causes resentment from the other Lebanese). He added, “The Lebanese system led people to be sectarian and confessional.” Then he stated,

Each Christian and Muslim community has a quota [percentage of government and civil service appointments] and they do not always choose the most competent leader or worker. If there are, let’s say, 10 competent Maronite candidates for a job, but they need a Shiite-Muslim, however underqualified the Shiite may be he will be chosen for the job.

When asked if he felt that CMR in Lebanon is so poor that another civil war could prevail, he answered directly, “Yes. We are at that point where we don’t decide if there will be war or not; foreigners do.” He explained that, “Yes, weapons are gone [outlawed under the Tā’if Agreement], but foreigners can make problems.”

APPENDIX 15: BISHOP SELIM GHAZAL

Interview: October 16, 2004; November 9, 2004

Faith: Melchite Catholic

Position: Coordinator of CMR Projects for South Lebanon,

Bishop Ghazal was well known in Lebanon for his work on CMR, especially in the south where he was stationed in the city of Sidon. For this reason and more, he was an excellent informant/case study of CMR in post-war Lebanon. At the age of 72, Ghazal was a *Moutran* or Bishop of the “Melchite” (king’s men) Greek Catholic Church of Lebanon. The term *Melchite* denotes the followers of the king’s religion, referring to the Byzantine emperor Constantine, the first emperor or king to embrace Christianity.

This writer first briefly encountered Ghazal in December 2002 at a meeting in Beirut to discuss the renovation of Mashghara, a war-torn village in Lebanon where Ghazal was born and raised. The village had a long history of nearly evenly split Christian–Muslim communities. The Christians of Mashghara were of the Greek Orthodox and Melchite Greek Catholic faiths, while the Muslim community was Shiite. During the long Israeli occupation of Lebanon, Mashghara was a hot spot for the resistance. Indeed, the military wing of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Syrian army were positioned in Mashghara; while just a couple of mountains over, in the southern Lebanese village of Jezzine, stood the Israeli armed forces and their Lebanese allies, the Southern Lebanese Army. Both sides were often engaged in battle, shelling one another from these two areas. At the entrance to Mashghara there was a large picture of a skull with satanic features, capped with the Israeli flag being crushed by a large fist. This picture represented Hezbollah’s victory by spearheading the Israeli withdrawal from nearly all of southern Lebanon. Ghazal’s birthplace, its significance during

the war, and his involvement in rebuilding it afterward encapsulated the fluctuations and contradictions of Lebanese CMR.

This writer met twice more with BG. The second meeting was held Monday, October 10, 2004 in Beirut and, although informal, lasted 2 hours. Using colloquial Arabic, Ghazal spoke informally about CMR in Lebanon. He pointed out proudly that his involvement in CMR was focused on *shaghl ardi* or “ground work” (social work). At this second meeting, he was given a copy of the questions asked of all interviewees. With keen interest, he stated he would write his answers to the questions and then meet with this writer again for a review of his answers. Given the sociopolitical tensions of Lebanon and the nature of the questions that had been designed to cut right into the often emotionally charged topic of CMR in Lebanon, Ghazal indicated that he needed to inform his superiors of the interview and confer with them regarding his responses. He conferred with a representative of the Vatican.

Subsequently, a third meeting was held with Ghazal on November 9, 2004, at the Melchite Greek Catholic patriarch’s monastic residence. Ghazal had completed all the questions in written Arabic and discussed his answers and other issues of CMR in semiformal Arabic. A translator accompanied this writer and provided translation when needed.

Ghazal talked about his role in a “1995 Synod in the Vatican,” where he gave a speech regarding CMR. He felt that this writer’s questions were “crucial and direct” regarding CMR. He explained that this was the first time he had ever been interviewed “by a Westerner so directly on Christian Muslim relations.”

His reputation as an advocate for healthy CMR was well known. For example, Fr. Ross Frye, an American priest residing in Lebanon and a coreligionist with Ghazal, shared that in the late nineteen eighties, in the southern city of Sidon, Ghazal had saved a Muslim youth’s life. A mob of Christians were intent on killing this Muslim youth, but Ghazal hid

the youth and resisted the Christian mob's advances, saving the youth's life. Because of this, and his groundwork in CMR in the south of Lebanon, Ghazal was highly regarded by the Muslim and Christian communities of the Sidon area and south Lebanon.

For his part, when asked about this occurrence, with humility, he simply stated yes while nodding his head slightly. When asked the date of the occurrence, he only stated "sometime in the eighties." Along with other projects and programs involving CMR, Ghazal reported that he has held several CMR youth conferences and seminars in Lebanon.

As of this writing, his work continues with a group of 20 Christian and 20 Muslim students in a program he is helping to coordinate at Lebanon's Saint Joseph University. This project involves teaching them to work for the Lebanese community by promoting peace in society for better CMR. Ghazal reported that even during the height of the Lebanese Civil War, he was coordinating a similar project; but at that time, his efforts were particularly hampered by Israel and by some Lebanese politicians and communities who begrudged, criticized, and minimized CMR and felt that productive CMR were impossible during the war.

In addition to his verbal responses, BG also submitted a written response to IQ3:

I started working with the young in the early 1960s through the different youth movements that I have established in the region of Sidon and the South. These movements included Muslims and Christians. In the beginning of the Lebanese War, I found myself, due to the aggravating political and security situations, especially after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, driven to work in the public arena by calling for an end to violence and helping the displaced people who had left their villages and homes. I was faced with many difficulties from the different factions, but the majority of the people were convinced of the necessity of putting an end to violence, supporting national unity and refusing the plans of division. This was reiterated towards the end of the war, when the Lebanese were convinced of the importance of coexistence and of moving towards dialogue as a means to solve conflicts and to build a Lebanon linked to the Arab World, all the while preserving its uniqueness based on the respect of freedoms and the protection of sovereignty and independence.

He added to the last portion of his written answer regarding the Arab world that “we [the Lebanese] don’t have to melt [completely merge] into the Arab world, but we do not have to be totally separated either.” He stated that he was he also criticized by some Christians for his belief regarding Lebanon’s “Arabism” and the Arab world, but that more recently his critics “realized I was correct.”

Ghazal reported that CMR programs at UB (Greek Orthodox), St. Joseph’s University (Maronite), the Al Mukassed Institute (Sunni), the church of St. Paul (Melchite Greek Catholic), and others were doing good work for CMR. Additionally, he stated, “The Shiites have an annual seminar called ‘*souwaal*’” that also deals with interfaith dialogue. Conversely, either by default or design, the Lebanese government, according to Ghazal, has depreciated CMR. “The government doesn’t often hire the most qualified people, since politicians simply hear where a person is from, what religion the person is, and then uses these factors in his fight for [political] power,” rather than for the betterment of the Lebanese people and CMR.

He stressed that there were many factors that both caused the civil war of Lebanon and the deterioration of CMR. These factors worked in combination and involved internal and external politics, economics, religion and so on. Rather than focus his answer on what could have prevented the war, he concentrated on what could be done to prevent the recurrence of war: proper education and learning from past mistakes.

Ghazal was concerned with the possibility of another civil war in Lebanon. He stated, “If the Lebanese stay the same and use the same old methods of problem solving, of course this could cause another war. If our foundation is not strong, we can return to our same old difficulties.” BG continued,

We have common problems and interests, both Christians and Muslims. We both want good medical care and hospitals, we both want good schools for our children so why should we fight over who is going to be the boss or the Zaim?

He pleaded:

I call on the Lebanese to get rid of favoritism and division and not to enlist foreigners or outside third parties to solve our problems; we should work together. Do not get help from the outside in order to subdue your brother [fellow Lebanese]. We need to get along, be intellectual and use dialogue. Christians and Muslims must work to unify one country, one nation with religious harmony, not for narrow personal or political gain, power or for the sake of being a Zaim.

In sum, BG listed six factors he feels are needed to rebuild Lebanon:

- [1.] Both Christians and Muslims must cease radicalism.
- [2.] Create good, sound relations based on communication.
- [3.] Stop the speeches in churches and mosques that insult one another.
- [4.] Work on educating ourselves on the notion that we are one social, civil society that is related to one nation, not separate sects or 'Ṭā'ifiyye' [confessions].
- [5.] We must encourage the Christians against leaving Lebanon; the Muslims must respect and not downgrade the minority state of the Christians. When Islam is open to Christianity, then Christians won't feel the need to emigrate.
- [6.] We are all called to make these things happen.

Ghazal believed, "There are some, a few specific groups, Christian and Muslim that are radical, but they are in the minority and exist due to poor, underdeveloped thinking and a lack of [proper] education, especially in religion and social sciences." A remedy to this would be "for religion to be taught to accept others; this will help." He experienced that some Lebanese are more receptive to CM coexistence and noted, "Those Christians and Muslims who lived together are more open and accepting of each other than those that did not live together." This concept could be applied to the *wathekat al-wifak* or document of understanding between the FPM and Hezbollah parties, which represent the largest Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon.

Ghazal also offered the author some information for further assessment and study, referrals, and names of people working on CMR in Lebanon.

APPENDIX 16: MP NAWAF MUSAWI

Interview: December 20, 2004

Faith: Shia

Position: Director of International Affairs for Hezbollah

Nawaf Musawi was interviewed on Monday, December 20, 2004. Just prior to the interview, a facilitation meeting was held at Hezbollah's nearby television media station, Al-Manar, with its political media director Dr. Ibrahim Mousawi. Mousawi as translator when necessary during the meeting with Musawi. Also present was Mr. Hassan Haidar, assistant secretary to Musawi. Mr. Haidar took copious notes of the interview. Musawi spoke mostly in formal Arabic and occasionally in semiformal Arabic, perhaps for the benefit of this writer. The interview lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes.

Hezbollah has been engaged in CMR for years. It is important to note that Hezbollah was formed just after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Assam, 2005). From that point forward, Hezbollah, much more than any other Lebanese group, has spearheaded the drive to expel the Israeli armed forces from Lebanon. Indeed, this was Musawi's main explanation, on behalf of Hezbollah, of the organization helping and promoting CMR and dialogue in Lebanon. By driving the Israeli armed forces from nearly all of Lebanese territory, Hezbollah thwarted the Israeli policy to "divide and conquer" Lebanese Christians and Muslims. According to Musawi, it was not only Hezbollah's expulsion of Israeli forces that bolstered CMR and Muslim and Arab pride throughout the world but also Hezbollah's absence of revenge against Lebanese "collaborators of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon."

This writer recalled numerous Lebanese Christian immigrants in the United States bemoaning that were Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah would "massacre Christians." This supposition was refuted as Musawi proudly announced that "we expelled

the Israelis and we did not harm any of the collaborators.” He added, “The only time that Israel was defeated with no negative consequences [without revenge being taken, as in other Lebanese conflicts] was [accomplished by] the Islamic forces” of Hezbollah. He added that in spite of Hezbollah and other Lebanese having “brothers and families killed by the Israelis and their collaborators, and despite discovering who the culprits [collaborators] were, we didn’t retaliate” against them. Musawi described this practice of not retaliating against the collaborators as being based on “our morals and upbringing, it was the right thing to do “and rejected a notion that this was done as political maneuver. His point here was that Hezbollah did not retaliate against these collaborator forces, neither Christian nor Muslim, which was a main testament to Hezbollah’s interest in supporting solid CMR.

Additionally, he explained that Hezbollah had two main, ongoing goals for CMR. One he explained as “dialogue should continue all the time even though we are realistic; we won’t feel immediate results . . . Yet this is our long term ongoing policy; we will continue dialogue because it is very important.” The second goal, he set out was “to have a unified front against Israel, and we have done this very successfully.”

Musawi stated that when an individual or community follows their faith strictly, “this is not radical.” He felt that “some politicians spread [the notion throughout Lebanon] that you must be less Muslim or less Christian” to reconcile and be successful. He believed this is misguided: “If you are less Muslim or less Christian, then you are less of a good citizen.” He declared, “The problem is that of political corruption, financial [absconding public funds] and not because people are being excessive with religion.” He believed that “the more religious people are, or become, the more they will find common ground to meet.” Musawi reiterated, “Some politicians wanted to use and achieve their political interests, their closed political interest, for personal gain instead of nurturing and encouraging religious diversity.”

Musawi felt the biggest threat to CMR in Lebanon was the external intervention from the U.S. and Israel. He even predicted a large scale attack by Israel, supported by the U.S. against Lebanon

It was also his feeling that the Maronite leadership, parties and community must do more to rectify the problems of Lebanon and CMR. He maintained this position because, by and large, it was the Maronites and their leaders who were in charge of administering the affairs of Lebanon for decades. He explained, “Those who made the 1943 [Lebanese independence formula] agreement were from the Maronite community only.” He continued, “By tradition, only a Maronite could be president of Lebanon” and added that “the president had too much power, thus turning the Maronite president into a king-like leader. He was in charge of the army, the judiciary system, and more.” Therefore, “It was their responsibility for the consequences; it was the key players, the Maronites of 1943 until now that presented poor leadership and policies.”

Musawi stated that he preferred the “intellectual Maronites; they are better” for CMR and Lebanon overall and that it is “Maronite politics and politicians, not the intellectuals and elites that are causing a disruption to CMR.” He was also concerned that the good message of the intellectual Maronite did not seem to reach many of the members of the Maronite community fully.

He was “recently invited to an ‘as Safir’ newspaper where a meeting of the Maronite Patriarch Council was taking place.” There he saw Fr. Youssef Beshara and shared his sentiment that more needs to be done by Beshara and his community to ease tensions among the Lebanese communities. Musawi also pointed out that “the pope has addressed them [the Maronites and Christians in general] to continue to be and take part in the Arab civilization,” and wondered why some still resist this message coming from such a high religious official.

He mentioned that the Lebanese Christians “gave a great contribution to Arab-Islamic civilization, Arabic literature and the Arab awakening,” so he was somewhat puzzled as to why some Christians deny Arabism.

He then asked, “How about the Shiite community? Not all the Shiite leaders and communities are doing enough [or] the right thing toward CMR and reconciliation in Lebanon.” He did not believe at the time of this interview that the new Shiite appointees to the government of President Emile Lahoud in October 2004 were the best possible choices to help the overall recovery of Lebanon and reconciliation of its people. Musawi revealed that Hezbollah was disappointed that none of its members were selected for the new government. Additionally, without mentioning his name, he seemed to be saying that Nabih Berri, the Lebanese Shiite Speaker of the House and leader of the Amal party, was not acting like an efficient leader intent on helping all the Lebanese.

Musawi reiterated that had the politicians who were in charge of administering Lebanon’s domestic and foreign affairs acted more responsibly, the “wars” of Lebanon would not have occurred. The politicians’ policy of seeking “foreign intervention” from Israel and the United States was a main cause of the wars. He acknowledged that the Palestinian issue did cause “a political problem for Lebanon,” a sentiment strongly emphasized in some of the author’s other interviews. However, he did not believe that the Palestinian issue was the main cause for the wars as some of the other interviewees strongly asserted.

APPENDIX 17: MP GEN. MICHEL AOUN

Interview: June 15, 2005

Faith: Maronite Catholic

Position: MP, former Army general, former Lebanese prime minister, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement

Aoun was interviewed for this assessment on Thursday, June 15, 2006, in the presence of his sister-in-law and aide, Mrs. Nouhad Aoun, and this writer's translator, who provided translation on an as needed basis during the interview. Aoun was a general in the Lebanese Army during much of the Lebanese Civil War and thus retained the title of general. He was appointed acting prime minister of Lebanon in 1988 by then departing Lebanese president Amin Gemayel.

The Lebanese Civil War was fought in large part over Lebanese identity issues (Musa, 2007). Aoun was known for his virulent anti-Syrian, anti-Arab stance and, as prime minister, led an unsuccessful war to drive Syrian forces and influence out of Lebanon. His forces also fought fiercely against other Lebanese groups, including a very violent, high-casualty war with Lebanese Christian warlord Samir Gea-Gea. Aoun was forced out of Lebanon by Syrian and Lebanese forces in 1991 and went into exile in France. He returned to Lebanon 14 years later on May 5, 2005. A few months after that, he was elected to the Lebanese Parliament. He has remained an MP and the leader of the Al-Tayyar organization, also known as the FPM.

In entering Aoun's compound/residence, this writer had to pass several check points, protected with concrete barriers and armed soldiers, and experienced two pat-down and metal-detecting wand searches. The security was very heavy because Aoun, like other Lebanese leaders, was considered at high risk of possible assassination. The political situation in contemporary Lebanon at the time of this interview was very sectarian and acrimonious. As

for Aoun, he was and remains at risk of harm from several different political foes, including the Syrian government, Palestinian factions, Israel, and various Lebanese factions. While waiting to enter Aoun's small library and family room, this writer was observed closely by an aide named Rafeh Wehbe, who stood nearby.

Aoun is known to have grown up in the Christian-Muslim neighborhood of Haret-Hreik, Beirut. The inhabitants were predominantly Maronites, Greek Catholic Christians, and Shiite Muslims at the time. Today, Haret Hreik is predominantly inhabited by Shiite Muslims. Thus, Aoun reported that his involvement in CMR was "early and natural." He believed that his having lived within a Muslim majority helped him form a professional and religiously balanced army in the late 1980s to 1991.

In regards to present-day CMR, he offered that "we [FPM] and the Muslims, particularly the Shiite Muslims, have mutual respect for one another and frankness in discussions." In regard to his agreement with Hezbollah, he reported speaking directly and frankly with them, rather than pandering to the Muslim communities and simply "telling them what they want to hear." He and the FPM were sincere in their discussions with Muslims, and the other parties to the discussions could perceive that sincerity. Christian-Muslim political dialogue must be "noncomplacent and direct, honest." Aoun gave as an example the story of a well-known bishop in Lebanon who pandered to the Shiite leadership of Iran; both the Muslim and Christian clerical leadership of Lebanon expressed publicly that they felt the bishop was fawning over the Iranian leadership and being insincere.

Therefore, according to Aoun, he has been able to work toward forging solid CMR and the resolution of Lebanon's many problems because he lived within a mixed Christian-Muslim community and dialogues naturally and sincerely with members of the Muslim

community. He was particularly proud of his paper of common understanding that he and the FPM signed with Hezbollah.

As to theological/religious causes, Aoun offered that “religious extremism of a minority of Muslims is a cause [of poor CMR] and they [extremists] even cause problems with other Muslims.” He did not believe that Lebanon had a major problem with religious extremism. He believed that Lebanon’s woes were caused by “political, not religious reasons.” He did not consider Hezbollah to be either religious extremists or terrorists. However, he conceded that there were some forms of religious extremism in Lebanon but that they were minimal. It was a larger problem in other, less liberal Middle Eastern and Muslim countries.

In regard to which community was doing more or less for CMR, somewhat surprisingly, Aoun reported, “It is the elite in each and every community that is trying hard.” By elite, he clarified, he did not necessarily mean the rich but rather “where there is strong [community] leadership, and then there are better Christian-Muslim relations, such as the FPM, Hezbollah, and other organizations.”

For him, it was “the repercussions of the armed clashes between the Palestinians and the Lebanese” that caused the war: “The Palestinians fear the Lebanese and the Lebanese fear the Palestinians.” He reminded that “most of my battles were against them [the PLO].” In the early 1980s, when PLO leader Yasser Arafat was exiled to Tunisia as part of an evacuation agreement during Israel’s long invasion and occupation of Lebanon, Aoun met with Arafat in Tunisia. Just prior to the meeting, Aoun recalled feeling that somehow he and Arafat were “opposing brothers who fought in a trench.” He said he told Arafat, “We want you out! But for your own good,” meaning that although he opposed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, he wanted the Palestinians to be returned to their own land.

Aoun did not believe there would be another civil war in Lebanon anytime soon because “now we have gone a long way [toward resolving differences],” which he believed would continue. He again pointed to the FPM–Hezbollah agreement as something that has helped coexistence in Lebanon, which has reduced the chances of another civil war. His belief that the present tensions would not lead to a civil war was consistent with that of nearly all the other interviewees. He concluded, “No, there is no sense (chance) of another civil war. We have gone a long way. The Hezbollah–FPM agreement has helped. It covers 80% of Lebanon’s problems and is supported by 70% of the Lebanese.”

APPENDIX 18: MP NAYLA NAJIB ISSA KHOURY MOUAWAD

Interview: November 17, 2004

Faith: Maronite Catholic

Position: MP, former first lady of Lebanese president-elect

This writer first met and interviewed MP Mouawad in 1994 in her hometown of Waterbury, Connecticut, in the United States. She was in Connecticut to help promote the René Mouawad Foundation, a charitable foundation, to the Lebanese community in Connecticut. The foundation was named after her late husband, René Mouawad, who after being elected and briefly serving as president of Lebanon, was assassinated when the car in which he was riding was destroyed in a bomb explosion.

On November 17, 2004, this writer met with Mouawad, who was the MP for Zgharta, located in the north of Lebanon. She was one of only three female members of Parliament. She answered the set of questions regarding CMR in post-war Lebanon in English and had no prior knowledge of the questions.

On a few occasions, she referred the writer to people whom she felt worked more directly in the field of CMR, including Samir Frangieh and Fr. Tarek Mitri, both of whom were known to engage in the interreligious/community relations. However, she suggested that by the very nature of Lebanon, the Lebanese (including, in particular, their political leaders, among which she counted herself) are political Christian and Muslim participants.

The author grasped this notion in 2000 at Yale University where he spent 2 full days with Palestinian MP Hanan Ashrawi. Ashrawi explained that the Palestinians and Lebanese, both Christians and Muslims, are “political beings” and within this existence there is CMR. Mouawad completely agreed, corroborating the enmeshment posited earlier. She also had important information to share about CMR, Arabism, and other elements of Lebanese society.

Mouawad acknowledged that Christian radicalism does exist in Lebanon and that “of course [it] poses a problem to CMR and to Lebanon too, in general.” She pointed out, however, that Muslim radicalism poses a greater danger as it has a larger following and it is less controlled than Christian radicalism. She added, “Radical Islam or Christianity hurts our Lebanese democracy; we are suffering from radical Islam in all the Middle East.” With her affirmation that both forms of radicalism exist, she hoped that instead of radicalism, the Lebanese “should have common values, beliefs and democracy that was Lebanon’s choice, [for] democracy and with this good institutions” (education, civil service, and so forth). Mouawad explained, “Foreign meddling has also harmed Christian-Muslim relations,” referring to both Syrian and, more so, Israeli policy in Lebanon, designed to promote radicalism and damage CMR.

Mouawad believed that “no community or person” in particular is doing more or less to promote for CMR, but rather that “it is a weakness of the system, the political system and the way it functions.” She believed that

if only the Lebanese people were united in what needed to be done [to stop the buildup and onset of the war] there would never have been a war here. It is the political interest of some and foreign interference that pushed this war but we as Lebanese [politicians] were also very much at fault for not doing the right thing.

What she meant by the “right thing” was Lebanese politicians “putting the people’s interest first and not joining foreign forces against one another.”

Mouawad did not think another war was imminent: “No, we learned our lesson,” she said, but added, “Well, it [a recurrence of war] depends on who’s ruling the country” (implicitly considering Syria as ruling Lebanon and being an unhelpful, unacceptable force). She returned then to her first statement: “No, the people suffered enough and know that

violence won't solve our problems," she said, referring both to the past and present. "But if there is too much chaos and pressure, it could cause another war.

APPENDIX 19: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Arabic

- 1- بما أن الحرب في لبنان قد انتهت (1991) هل تعتبر أن العلاقات بين مسيحيي لبنان ومسلميه ما زالت على ذاتها أم أصبحت أفضل أو أسوأ مما كانت عليه قبل الحرب؟ إلى ما تعزو ذلك؟
- 2- إذا كان هنالك قاسم بين المسيحيين والمسلمين، فما سبب هذا الانقسام؟ علي سبيل المثال، هل القاسم ذات:
 - a. طبيعة سياسية
 - b. طبيعة لاهوتية
 - c. طبيعة اقتصادية أو اجتماعية: الغني مقابل الفقير
 - d. أسباب أخرى.
- 4- متى بدأ اهتمامك بالمواضيع السياسية والدينية التي تواجه مسيحيي لبنان ومسلميه؟ أين تمكنت من النجاح ومتى واجهت تحديات؟ لا تتردد في تفصيل جوابك بناء على خبرتك.
- 5- هل اللبنانيون عرب؟ وما سبب النقاش الدائم حول هذا الموضوع؟
- 6- هل هنالك مشكلة تطرف ديني (مسيحي و/أو إسلامي) في لبنان وهل تؤثر على العلاقات المسيحية-الإسلامية؟ كيف؟
- 7- هل تعتقد أن هنالك فريق في لبنان يعمل أكثر أو أقل أو أحسن أو أسوأ على العلاقات المسيحية-الإسلامية؟ بمعنى آخر، هل يقوم المجتمع الماروني و/أو قاداته بجهد أكبر- على سبيل المثال؟ أو مثلاً المجتمع الشيعي؟
- 8- هل بإمكانك أن تحدد شيئاً من الماضي كان ليوثر على المنحى الذي اتخذته الحرب اللبنانية من 1975-1991 ولما كان أشعل النزاع بين مسيحيي لبنان ومسلميه لو تم التعاطي معه بطريقة مختلفة؟

English

1. Since the war in Lebanon has ended (1991) would you say the relations between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are the same, better or worse than they were before the war? What makes you feel that way?
2. If there is a divide between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon, what are the major causes of this divide? For example, is the divide mostly of
 - a. A political nature,
 - b. A theological nature,
 - c. An economic, social stratification nature: the riche vs. the poor, or

d. Some other causes\reasons.

3. When did you get involved in the politico-religious issues facing the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon? What have been the successes and challenges for you? Please feel free to elaborate on this, as you are the expert.

4. Are the Lebanese people Arabs and why has this issue been such a difficult one to resolve for the Lebanese?

5. Is there a problem with radical or extremist religion [Christian and / or Muslim?] in Lebanon and does it affect Christian-Muslim relations? If so how?

6. Is there any community in Lebanon that you feel does more or less, or a better or poorer job in working for Christian-Muslim relations. In other words, for example could the Maronite Community and/or its leaders be doing more? Or for example how about the Shiite Community?

7. Can you think of anything in the past, that if it was done differently, then there may not have been the Lebanese war of 1975-1991 and there would not have been a conflict between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon?

8. Is the relationship between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon today, so poor that it could cause another civil war?

APPENDIX 20: STUDENT SURVEY

The following survey was distributed to university students in Lebanon in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2006. The survey references (but does not replicate) part or parts of those completed by Dr. Halim Barakat, formerly of AUB, in 1975, and Dr. Hilal Khasan of the same in 1991. The following survey is original in that it was specifically designed to gather information regarding CMR and thought. A total of 288 surveys were completed.

**Notre Dame University
Lebanon**

Your First Name:

Your Middle Name/Father's 1st Name:

Your Age:

Male or Female (circle):

Today's Date:

How many years have you lived in Lebanon?

How many days, months or years have you lived outside Lebanon?

If you have lived outside of Lebanon, where did you live?

What area of Lebanon is your family originally from? (Circle one)

North Lebanon

South Lebanon

Central Lebanon

Western Lebanon

Other area (e.g., Syria, Palestine)_____

What is the name of your family's original village, town or city?

What is the name of the village, town or city that you live in now?

What is the name of the religious faith that you belong to? (circle one)

Maronite Catholic

Greek "Room" Orthodox

Protestant Christian

Greek "Room" Catholic

Sunni Muslim

Shiite Muslim

Druze

Other Religion (e.g., Coptic, Chaldean, etc.) _____

The Education Questions

**What system of education did you receive in elementary school from grades 1 to 5?
(Circle one)**

Arabic-Lebanese System

French-Lebanese System

American-Lebanese System

British-Lebanese System

Armenian-Lebanese System

Other

What system of education did you receive in Middle School, grades 6 to 8? (Circle one)

Arabic-Lebanese System

French System

American System

British System

Armenian System

Other

What system of education did you receive in High School, grades 9 to 12? (Circle one)

Arabic-Lebanese System

French System

American System

British System

Armenian System

Other

What systems of education have you received or are receiving at the University level? (Circle one)

Arabic-Lebanese System *French System*
American System *British System*
Armenian System *Other*

What system of education do you think is the best one overall in Lebanon? (Circle one)

Arabic-Lebanese System *French System*
American System *British System*
Armenian System *Other*

What year are you in at the University? (Circle one)

1st year (Freshman) *2nd year (Sophomore)*
3rd year (Junior) *4th year (Senior)*

What is your Major course of study?

What is your Minor course of study?

The Questions of Identity

What is your National identity? (Circle one)

Lebanese *Syrian* *Armenian*
Palestinian *Jordanian*
Other _____

Do you have a second Citizenship? (e.g., Canadian, French, American, etc.)

Yes *No*

If yes, what is your second citizenship? _____

Ethnicity means the shared national origin, religion and language of a people; it is similarity stated as sharing the traditions, customs (rituals, way of doing things in daily life), and/or social views as a larger group of people.

Number 1 to 6, 1 being the closest and 6 being the farthest from the ethnicity of the Lebanese

*Arab in general*_____ *French*_____ *Syrian*_____

*Phoenician*_____ *Iranian*_____ *Other*_____

Race is defined as a people having the same biological traits; the same genetic characteristics as a larger group of people. For example, the same biological makeup and bloodline. It can mean white or black or someone's race might be stated as African, Asian or European.

What race do you believe the Lebanese people belong to? Number 1 being the closest to or the same as the Lebanese race and 6 being the farthest from the Lebanese race:

*Arab*_____ *French*_____ *Phoenician*_____

*European in general*_____ *Greek*_____ *Persian*_____

*Other*_____

***If you believe the Lebanese people belong to one single race, then just mark number 1 on your choice and do not mark the others.**

Culture is defined as the customs habits, skills, technology, arts, values, ideology, science and religious and political behavior of a group of people in a specific time period. It is a shred way of living. What culture do you believe the Lebanese belong to today? Number 1 is the culture closest to the Lebanese, number 5 the farthest.

*Arab*_____ *French*_____ *Armenian*_____ *European in general*_____

*Persian (Iranian)*_____ *Other*_____

Combining race, ethnicity and culture; which one of the following is closest to the Lebanese identity overall? Number 1 being the closest, 5 being the farthest:

Arab ____ *French* ____ *Armenian* ____ *European in general* ____
Persian (Iranian) ____ *Other* ____

What do you consider to be the most important part to your identity? Number 1 being the most important part of your identity and 3 the least important part.

----- *Your religion*

----- *Your Lebanese nationality*

----- *Your political party and political beliefs*

----- *Other, write here* _____

The Questions of Language

What language do you speak the most in your daily life? Number 1 most spoken, number 3 least spoken.

Arabic ____ *English* ____ *French* ____ *Other* ____

What language do you speak most fluently or best? Number 1 most fluent, number 3 least fluent:

Arabic ____ *English* ____ *French* ____ *Other* ____

What language do you write most fluently or best? Number 1 most fluent, 3 least fluent:

Arabic ____ *English* ____ *French* ____ *Armenian* ____ *Other* ____

What is the official spoken language of Lebanon? (Circle one)

Arabic *Other*

Do you consider spoken Lebanese to be spoken Arabic?

Yes

No

Of the main languages spoken in Lebanon, which language do you prefer to speak or like the most? Number 1 the most, number 4 the least:

Arabic _____ *English* _____ *French* _____ *Armenian* _____ *Other* _____

Do you believe the Lebanese are Arabs?

Yes No

Political Questions and Christian Muslim Relations

1- In your opinion, the people of Iraq and Lebanon have

- a. A very similar and close historical relationship to one another*
- b. A slightly similar historical relationship to one another*
- c. No historical similarity to each-other*
- d. Completely opposite history and relationship to one another*

2- The U. S. invaded Iraq to stop the spread of radical/fundamentalist Islam

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Agree*
- c. Disagree*
- d. Strongly disagree*

3- The U.S. invaded Iraq to obtain its oil reserve

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Agree*
- c. Disagree*
- d. Strongly disagree*

4- The U.S. invaded Iraq to free the Iraqi people from the government of Saddam Hussein

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Agree*
- c. Disagree*
- d. Strongly disagree*

5- The U.S. invaded Iraq to stop Iraq from using/making weapons of Mass destruction:

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Agree*
- c. Disagree*
- d. Strongly disagree*

6- Do you believe the U.S. should invade another country?

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Agree*
- c. Disagree*
- d. Strongly disagree*

7- If yes, which country do you believe the U.S. should invade? _____

8- If the U.S. did invade the other country you stated, then which of the following outcomes would you want? Number it 1 to 4 with 4 being the most and 1 being the least.

____ *Defeat and expulsion of U.S. troops,*

____ *Government/regime change of the country*

____ *Weaken the religious population*

____ *Democratize the country*

9- The United Nations recently passed resolution 1559 regarding Lebanon. How do you feel about this resolution?

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Agree*
- c. Disagree*
- d. Strongly disagree*
- e. I don't know what resolution 1559 is about*

10- The tensions between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are caused by the religions differences

- a. *Strongly agree*
- b. *Agree*
- c. *Disagree*
- d. *Strongly disagree*

11- The tensions between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are caused by Lebanon's poor economy

- a. *Strongly agree*
- b. *Agree*
- c. *Disagree*
- d. *Strongly disagree*

12- The tensions between the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon are caused by the political differences

- a. *Strongly agree*
- b. *Agree*
- c. *Disagree*
- d. *Strongly disagree*

What part of Lebanon's society do you feel is the greatest challenge / problem to the Lebanese people? Number 1, greatest problem, number 5 least great problem?

- _____ *The Economic situation*
- _____ *The political system*
- _____ *Religious differences*
- _____ *Foreign influence in general*
- _____ *The relationships between the Lebanese people themselves* _____ *Other*

APPENDIX 21: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR STUDENT PARTICIPANTS

Table 21.1 *Religion*

	Religion	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Maronite Catholic	166	57.6	57.6	57.6
	Sunni Muslim	4	1.4	1.4	59.0
	Greek Room Orthodox	46	16.0	16.0	75.0
	Greek Room Catholic	38	13.2	13.2	88.3
	Druze	22	7.6	7.6	95.8
	Other Religion	6	2.1	2.1	97.9
	Armenian Christian	6	2.1	2.1	100.0
Total		288	100.0	100.0	

Table 21.2 Age

	Age (in years)	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	17	4	1.4	1.4	1.4
	18	42	14.6	15.2	16.7
	19	66	22.9	23.9	40.6
	20	52	18.1	18.8	59.4
	21	46	16.0	16.7	76.1
	22	32	11.1	11.6	87.7
	23	20	6.9	7.2	94.9
	24	4	1.4	1.4	96.4
	25	2	0.7	0.7	97.1
	27	4	1.4	1.4	98.6
	>27	4	1.4	1.4	100.0
Subtotal		276	95.8	100.0	
Missing		12	4.2		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.3 Gender

	Gender	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Male	130	45.1	48.9	48.9
	Female	136	47.2	51.1	100.0
Subtotal		266	92.4	100.0	
Missing		22	7.6		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.4 *University Grade Level*

	Level	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Freshman	30	10.4	10.6	10.6
	Sophomore	156	54.2	55.3	66.0
	Junior	44	15.3	15.6	81.6
	Senior	52	18.1	18.4	100.0
Subtotal		282	97.9	100.0	
Missing		6	2.1		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.5 *Major Area of Study*

	Area	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Computer science	18	6.3	6.5	6.5
	Business	80	27.8	28.8	36.3
	Engineering	32	11.1	11.5	46.8
	Health	10	3.5	3.6	50.4
	Hotel management	12	4.2	4.3	54.7
	Education	52	18.1	18.7	73.4
	Art	4	1.4	1.4	74.8
	Advertising and marketing	38	13.2	13.7	88.5
	Political science	10	3.5	3.6	92.1
	Interior design	2	0.7	0.7	92.8
	Business computing	16	5.6	5.8	98.6
	Mass communication	2	0.7	0.7	99.3
	Undeclared	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
Subtotal	Total	278	96.5	100.0	
Missing	System	10	3.5		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.6 *Years Lived in Lebanon*

	Years	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	3.00	2	0.7	0.7	0.7
	4.00	4	1.4	1.4	2.2
	6.00	2	0.7	0.7	2.9
	7.00	2	0.7	0.7	3.6
	8.00	4	1.4	1.4	5.0
	9.00	2	0.7	0.7	5.8
	10.00	4	1.4	1.4	7.2
	11.00	2	0.7	0.7	7.9
	12.00	4	1.4	1.4	9.4
	13.00	4	1.4	1.4	10.8
	15.00	10	3.5	3.6	14.4
	16.00	2	0.7	0.7	15.1
	17.00	4	1.4	1.4	16.5
	18.00	48	16.7	17.3	33.8
	19.00	54	18.8	19.4	53.2
	20.00	38	13.2	13.7	66.9
	21.00	40	13.9	14.4	81.3
	22.00	30	10.4	10.8	92.1
	23.00	12	4.2	4.3	96.4
	24.00	2	0.7	0.7	97.1
	25.00	4	1.4	1.4	98.6
	26.00	2	0.7	0.7	99.3
	36.00	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
Subtotal	Total	278	96.5	100.0	
Mission		10	3.5		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.7 *National Identity*

	Nationality	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Lebanese	282	97.9	97.9	97.9
	Armenian	4	1.4	1.4	99.3
	Other	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.8 *Dual Citizenship*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Yes	30	10.4	22.1	22.1
	No	106	36.8	77.9	100.0
Subtotal		136	47.2	100.0	
Missing		152	52.8		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.9 *Country of Dual Citizenship*

	Country	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	America	2	6.7	6.7	6.7
	Austaral	2	6.7	6.7	13.4
	Australia	2	6.6	6.6	20.0
	Canada	4	13.3	13.3	33.3
	Cypress	4	13.3	13.3	46.6
	France	2	6.7	6.7	53.3
	Ghana	4	13.3	13.3	66.6
	Greece	2	6.7	6.7	73.3
	Italy	2	6.7	6.7	80.0
	Jordan	2	6.7	6.7	86.7
	Mexico	2	6.7	6.7	93.4
	Tunisia	2	6.6	6.6	100.0
Total		30	100.0		

$n = 30$

Table 21.10 *Language Spoken: Arabic*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most spoken	278	56.9	60.7	60.7
	Spoken	10	28.5	30.4	91.1
Total		288	93.8	100.0	

Table 21.11 *Language Spoken: English*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most spoken	18	6.3	6.4	6.4
	Spoken	186	64.6	66.4	72.9
	Least spoken	76	26.4	27.1	100.0
Subtotal		280	97.2	100.0	
Missing		8	2.8		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.12 *Language Spoken: French*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most spoken	12	4.2	4.4	4.4
	Spoken	98	34.0	35.8	40.1
	Least spoken	164	56.9	59.9	100.0
Subtotal		274	95.1	100.0	
Missing		14	4.9		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.13 *Language Spoken: Other*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most spoken	4	1.4	11.1	11.1
	Spoken	12	4.2	33.3	44.4
	Least spoken	20	6.9	55.6	100.0
Subtotal		36	12.5	100.0	
Missing		252	87.5		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.14 *Fluency of Spoken Language: Arabic*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	58	20.1	21.0	21.0
	Fluent	154	53.5	55.8	76.8
	Least fluent	64	22.2	23.2	100.0
Subtotal		276	95.8	100.0	
Missing		12	4.2		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.15 *Fluency of Spoken Language: English*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	58	20.1	21.0	21.0
	Fluent	154	53.5	55.8	76.8
	Least fluent	64	22.2	23.2	100.0
Subtotal		276	95.8	100.0	
Missing		12	4.2		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.16 *Fluency of Spoken Language: French*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	42	14.6	15.7	15.7
	Fluent	80	27.8	29.9	45.5
	Least fluent	146	50.7	54.5	100.0
Subtotal		268	93.1	100.0	
Missing		20	6.9		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.17 *Fluency of Spoken Language: Other*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	8	2.8	16.7	16.7
	Fluent	4	1.4	8.3	25.0
	Least fluent	18	6.3	37.5	62.5
	4.0	18	6.3	37.5	100.0
Subtotal		48	16.7	100.0	
Missing		240	83.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.18 *Fluency of Written Language: Arabic*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	124	43.1	44.0	44.0
	Fluent	102	35.4	36.2	80.1
	Least fluent	56	19.4	19.9	100.0
Subtotal		282	97.9	100.0	
Missing		6	2.1		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.19 *Fluency of Written Language: English*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	158	54.9	56.0	56.0
	Fluent	92	31.9	32.6	88.7
	Least fluent	32	11.1	11.3	100.0
Subtotal		282	97.9	100.0	
Missing		6	2.1		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.20 *Fluency of Written Language: French*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	82	28.5	31.1	31.1
	Fluent	64	22.2	24.2	55.3
	Least fluent	118	41.0	44.7	100.0
Subtotal		264	91.7	100.0	
Missing		24	8.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.21 *Fluency of Written Language: Armenian*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	4	1.4	28.6	28.6
	Least fluent	6	2.1	42.9	71.4
	4.0	2	0.7	14.3	85.7
	5.0	2	0.7	14.3	100.0
Subtotal		14	4.9	100.0	
Missing		274	95.1		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.22 *Fluency of Written Language: Other*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Most fluent	2	0.7	5.3	5.3
	fluent	4	1.4	10.5	15.8
	Least fluent	18	6.3	47.4	63.2
	4.0	14	4.9	36.8	100.0
Subtotal		38	13.2	100.0	
Missing		250	86.8		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.23 *Preferred Spoken Language: Arabic*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1.00	120	41.7	45.5	45.5
	2.00	74	25.7	28.0	73.5
	3.00	52	18.1	19.7	93.2
	4.00	16	5.6	6.1	99.2
	5.00	2	0.7	0.8	100.0
Subtotal		264	91.7	100.0	
Missing		24	8.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.24 *Preferred Spoken Language: English*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1.00	140	48.6	51.9	51.9
	2.00	104	36.1	38.5	90.4
	3.00	24	8.3	8.9	99.3
	4.00	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
Subtotal		270	93.8	100.0	
Missing		18	6.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.25 *Preferred Spoken Language: French*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1.00	42	14.6	16.3	16.3
	2.00	74	25.7	28.7	45.0
	3.00	118	41.0	45.7	90.7
	4.00	24	8.3	9.3	100.0
Subtotal		258	89.6	100.0	
Missing		30	10.4		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.26 *Preferred Spoken Language: Armenian*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1.00	2	0.7	2.9	2.9
	2.00	2	0.7	2.9	5.9
	3.00	8	2.8	11.8	17.6
	4.00	52	18.1	76.5	94.1
	5.00	2	0.7	2.9	97.1
	6.00	2	0.7	2.9	100.0
Subtotal		68	23.6	100.0	
Missing		220	76.4		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.27 *Preferred Spoken Language: Other*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1.00	6	2.1	8.3	8.3
	2.00	8	2.8	11.1	19.4
	3.00	16	5.6	22.2	41.7
	4.00	40	13.9	55.6	97.2
	5.00	2	0.7	2.8	100.0
Subtotal		72	25.0	100.0	
Missing		216	75.0		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 21.28

ABROAD

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	52	36.1	36.1	36.1
7.00	1	.7	.7	36.8
12.00	1	.7	.7	37.5
1	6	4.2	4.2	41.7
1 month	12	8.3	8.3	50.0
1 week	5	3.5	3.5	53.5
10	2	1.4	1.4	54.9
10 days	3	2.1	2.1	56.9
11	1	.7	.7	57.6
13 days	1	.7	.7	58.3
14 days	1	.7	.7	59.0
15	1	.7	.7	59.7
15 days	1	.7	.7	60.4
16	2	1.4	1.4	61.8
18	2	1.4	1.4	63.2
19 days	1	.7	.7	63.9
2	7	4.9	4.9	68.7
2 weeks	1	.7	.7	69.4
2 months	7	4.9	4.9	74.3
2 weeks	2	1.4	1.4	75.7
21 days	1	.7	.7	76.4
3	4	2.8	2.8	79.2
3 days	1	.7	.7	79.9
3 months	4	2.8	2.8	82.6
4	3	2.1	2.1	84.7
5	4	2.8	2.8	87.5
5 month	1	.7	.7	88.2
6	3	2.1	2.1	90.3
6 months	2	1.4	1.4	91.7
7	2	1.4	1.4	93.1
7 days	1	.7	.7	93.7
7 months	1	.7	.7	94.4
8	1	.7	.7	95.1
8 months	1	.7	.7	95.8
9	2	1.4	1.4	97.2
9 hours	1	.7	.7	97.9
9 months	1	.7	.7	98.6
few mont	1	.7	.7	99.3
Few mont	1	.7	.7	100.0
Total	144	100.0	100.0	

Table 21.29

PLACE

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	60	41.7	41.7	41.7
AbuDhabi	1	.7	.7	42.4
Africa	2	1.4	1.4	43.7
Australi	3	2.1	2.1	45.8
Brazil	1	.7	.7	46.5
Ca,Cy,Tu	1	.7	.7	47.2
Canad,US	1	.7	.7	47.9
Canada	3	2.1	2.1	50.0
Cy,Bulga	1	.7	.7	50.7
Cy,Du,UK	1	.7	.7	51.4
Cyp,Fran	2	1.4	1.4	52.8
Cyp,Syri	1	.7	.7	53.5
Cyprus	5	3.5	3.5	56.9
Dubai	1	.7	.7	57.6
England	1	.7	.7	58.3
Europe	1	.7	.7	59.0
Fr,Abuda	1	.7	.7	59.7
Fr,Ca,US	1	.7	.7	60.4
Fr,Ge,Sa	1	.7	.7	61.1
Fra,Engl	1	.7	.7	61.8
Fra,Lond	1	.7	.7	62.5
France	7	4.9	4.9	67.4
french	1	.7	.7	68.1
FrLoNige	1	.7	.7	68.7
Germany	1	.7	.7	69.4
Ghana	1	.7	.7	70.1
Ghana Af	1	.7	.7	70.8
Greece	1	.7	.7	71.5
ind,moro	1	.7	.7	72.2
Italy	3	2.1	2.1	74.3
Jo,sa,au	1	.7	.7	75.0
jorcyira	1	.7	.7	75.7
Jord,Egy	1	.7	.7	76.4
Jordan	1	.7	.7	77.1
Kuwait	3	2.1	2.1	79.2
lond,dub	1	.7	.7	79.9
London	1	.7	.7	80.6
Medugorj	1	.7	.7	81.2
Oman	1	.7	.7	81.9
Paris	1	.7	.7	82.6
Qatar	1	.7	.7	83.3
Rhodes	1	.7	.7	84.0
Sa,du,fr	1	.7	.7	84.7
Saudi ar	5	3.5	3.5	88.2
Saudi Ar	1	.7	.7	88.9
Sydney	1	.7	.7	89.6
Syria	1	.7	.7	90.3
Turkey	4	2.8	2.8	93.1
UK	1	.7	.7	93.7
US	2	1.4	1.4	95.1
US&Afric	1	.7	.7	95.8
US,Cypru	1	.7	.7	96.5
USA	5	3.5	3.5	100.0
Total	144	100.0	100.0	

Table 21.30

FORIGIN

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	north lebanon	26	18.1	18.7	18.7
	central lebanon	72	50.0	51.8	70.5
	south lebanon	16	11.1	11.5	82.0
	western lebanon	12	8.3	8.6	90.6
	armenia	2	1.4	1.4	92.1
	other	11	7.6	7.9	100.0
	Total	139	96.5	100.0	
Missing	System	5	3.5		
Total		144	100.0		

FOTOWN

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid		5	3.5	3.5	3.5
	Abadiye	1	.7	.7	4.2
	Achkout	1	.7	.7	4.9
	Achrafie	3	2.1	2.1	6.9
	AinZhalt	1	.7	.7	7.6
	Aitanit	1	.7	.7	8.3
	Aito	1	.7	.7	9.0
	Ajaltoun	1	.7	.7	9.7
	Akkar	3	2.1	2.1	11.8
	Aley	2	1.4	1.4	13.2
	Almalsha	1	.7	.7	13.9
	Amyoun	1	.7	.7	14.6
	Anout	1	.7	.7	15.3
	Antelias	1	.7	.7	16.0
	Arjees	1	.7	.7	16.7
	Baakleen	1	.7	.7	17.4
	Baakline	1	.7	.7	18.1
	Baalbak	2	1.4	1.4	19.4
	Balloune	1	.7	.7	20.1
	Batroun	2	1.4	1.4	21.5
	Bchare	1	.7	.7	22.2
	Bchari	1	.7	.7	22.9
	Bechare	2	1.4	1.4	24.3
	Beirut	2	1.4	1.4	25.7
	Beit Mer	1	.7	.7	26.4
	Bekaa	3	2.1	2.1	28.5
	Betroun	1	.7	.7	29.2
	Beyrouth	1	.7	.7	29.9
	Bhamdoun	1	.7	.7	30.6
	Bourj-Ham	1	.7	.7	31.2
	Bsalim	1	.7	.7	31.9
	Chadra	1	.7	.7	32.6
	Chahtoul	1	.7	.7	33.3
	Chekka	1	.7	.7	34.0
	Chiyeh	1	.7	.7	34.7
	Chwit	1	.7	.7	35.4
	city	1	.7	.7	36.1
	City	1	.7	.7	36.8
	Damour	3	2.1	2.1	38.9

Table 21.31

FOTOWN

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Deiralqa	1	.7	.7	39.6
	Deirelah	2	1.4	1.4	41.0
	Dekwaneh	1	.7	.7	41.7
	dhourcho	1	.7	.7	42.4
	dhourelc	1	.7	.7	43.1
	Dikelmeh	1	.7	.7	43.7
	Faraya	1	.7	.7	44.4
	Garifeh	1	.7	.7	45.1
	Ghazir	2	1.4	1.4	46.5
	Ghousta	1	.7	.7	47.2
	Greece	1	.7	.7	47.9
	Hadath	1	.7	.7	48.6
	Hamat	1	.7	.7	49.3
	HarethHre	1	.7	.7	50.0
	Hrajel	2	1.4	1.4	51.4
	Istanbul	1	.7	.7	52.1
	Italy	1	.7	.7	52.8
	Jahliah	1	.7	.7	53.5
	jaleldib	1	.7	.7	54.2
	Jbeil	3	2.1	2.1	56.2
	Jdeideh	2	1.4	1.4	57.6
	jdeidelm	1	.7	.7	58.3
	Jdeita	1	.7	.7	59.0
	Jeita	1	.7	.7	59.7
	Joun	1	.7	.7	60.4
	Jounieh	3	2.1	2.1	62.5
	Jran	1	.7	.7	63.2
	Kartaba	1	.7	.7	63.9
	Kfarchim	1	.7	.7	64.6
	Kfarhoun	1	.7	.7	65.3
	Kfarmatt	1	.7	.7	66.0
	Kfarshla	1	.7	.7	66.7
	Khenchar	1	.7	.7	67.4
	Khenshar	1	.7	.7	68.1
	Klayaa	1	.7	.7	68.7
	Kobayat	1	.7	.7	69.4
	Koura	1	.7	.7	70.1
	Machghar	1	.7	.7	70.8
	Maghdouc	1	.7	.7	71.5
	Maknoui	1	.7	.7	72.2
	Mdawar	1	.7	.7	72.9
	Miziara	1	.7	.7	73.6
	Mraijeh	1	.7	.7	74.3
	Mreijeh	1	.7	.7	75.0
	Msaytbe	1	.7	.7	75.7
	Mtayleb	1	.7	.7	76.4
	Naameh	1	.7	.7	77.1
	Naccash	1	.7	.7	77.8
	Qana	1	.7	.7	78.5
	Rahbe	1	.7	.7	79.2
	Ras beir	1	.7	.7	79.9
	Rashayaf	1	.7	.7	80.6
	Roum	1	.7	.7	81.2

Table 21.32

FOTOWN

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Roumieh	1	.7	.7	81.9
SahelAlm	1	.7	.7	82.6
Saida	1	.7	.7	83.3
Sayda	1	.7	.7	84.0
Sheile	1	.7	.7	84.7
shouf	1	.7	.7	85.4
Shouf	8	5.6	5.6	91.0
Sour	1	.7	.7	91.7
Tabarja	2	1.4	1.4	93.1
Tannouri	1	.7	.7	93.7
Yahchouc	2	1.4	1.4	95.1
Zahle	2	1.4	1.4	96.5
Zgharta	1	.7	.7	97.2
Zouk Mik	3	2.1	2.1	99.3
Zouk Mos	1	.7	.7	100.0
Total	144	100.0	100.0	

TOWN

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Achkout	1	.7	.7	.7
Achrafie	1	.7	.7	1.4
Achrafie	7	4.9	4.9	6.3
Adma	1	.7	.7	6.9
Adonis	2	1.4	1.4	8.3
Ain Saad	1	.7	.7	9.0
Ainelrem	1	.7	.7	9.7
Ainelrih	1	.7	.7	10.4
Ajaltoun	3	2.1	2.1	12.5
Akkar	1	.7	.7	13.2
Amyoun	1	.7	.7	13.9
Anout	1	.7	.7	14.6
Antelias	2	1.4	1.4	16.0
Ashrafie	1	.7	.7	16.7
Awkar	2	1.4	1.4	18.1
Baabda	1	.7	.7	18.8
Baakleen	1	.7	.7	19.4
Bakaata	2	1.4	1.4	20.8
Balloune	3	2.1	2.1	22.9
Batroun	1	.7	.7	23.6
Bchari	1	.7	.7	24.3
Beirut	6	4.2	4.2	28.5
Bikfaya	1	.7	.7	29.2
Broumana	5	3.5	3.5	32.6
Bsalim	1	.7	.7	33.3
Choueifa	1	.7	.7	34.0
Cornetch	1	.7	.7	34.7
Cornetsh	1	.7	.7	35.4
Damour	1	.7	.7	36.1
Dekwaneh	3	2.1	2.1	38.2
Dikelmeh	1	.7	.7	38.9
Dora	1	.7	.7	39.6

Table 21.33

TOWN

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid El-Metn	1	.7	.7	40.3
Elissar	1	.7	.7	41.0
Fanar	4	2.8	2.8	43.7
Garifeh	1	.7	.7	44.4
Ghadir	1	.7	.7	45.1
Ghazir	4	2.8	2.8	47.9
Ghouma	1	.7	.7	48.6
Hamat	1	.7	.7	49.3
Hazmieh	1	.7	.7	50.0
HorchTab	1	.7	.7	50.7
Hrajel	1	.7	.7	51.4
jaleldib	1	.7	.7	52.1
Jaleldib	1	.7	.7	52.8
Jamhour	1	.7	.7	53.5
Jbeil	2	1.4	1.4	54.9
Jdeideh	2	1.4	1.4	56.2
Jeita	2	1.4	1.4	57.6
Jounieh	11	7.6	7.6	65.3
Jouretel	1	.7	.7	66.0
Keserwan	1	.7	.7	66.7
Kfarchim	1	.7	.7	67.4
Kfardebi	1	.7	.7	68.1
Khenchar	1	.7	.7	68.7
Klayaa	1	.7	.7	69.4
Mansouri	1	.7	.7	70.1
Naccache	1	.7	.7	70.8
Naccash	2	1.4	1.4	72.2
New-Shei	1	.7	.7	72.9
New shei	1	.7	.7	73.6
Rabieh	8	5.6	5.6	79.2
Rawda	1	.7	.7	79.9
Roum	1	.7	.7	80.6
Sahelalm	1	.7	.7	81.2
Shouf	5	3.5	3.5	84.7
Shwayfat	1	.7	.7	85.4
Tabarja	1	.7	.7	86.1
Zahle	1	.7	.7	86.8
Zalka	3	2.1	2.1	88.9
Zouk Mik	7	4.9	4.9	93.7
Zouk Mka	1	.7	.7	94.4
zouk Mos	1	.7	.7	95.1
Zouk Mos	7	4.9	4.9	100.0
Total	144	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX 22: DATA ON STUDENT RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS

These tables show the survey responses students gave concerning the various issues under investigation in this study. Unless noted, of the 288 total student responses, 256 (88.9%) were Christian, of which 166 (57.6%) were Maronite Christian.

Table 22.1 *Cause of Christian–Muslim Relations Problems: Religious Differences*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Strongly agree	42	14.6	33.3	33.3
	Agree	44	15.3	34.9	68.3
	Disagree	26	9.0	20.6	88.9
	Strongly disagree	14	4.9	11.1	100.0
Subtotal		126	43.8	100.0	
Missing		162	56.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.2 *Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Religion*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st greatest problem	38	13.2	16.8	16.8
	2nd greatest problem	50	17.4	22.1	38.9
	3rd greatest problem	50	17.4	22.1	61.1
	4th greatest problem	42	14.6	18.6	79.6
	5th greatest problem	44	15.3	19.5	99.1
	6th greatest problem	2	0.7	0.9	100.0
Subtotal		226	78.5	100.0	
Missing		62	21.5		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.3 *Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Inter-Lebanese Conflict*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st greatest problem	24	8.3	9.3	9.3
	2nd greatest problem	22	7.6	8.5	17.8
	3rd greatest problem	34	11.8	13.2	31.0
	4th greatest problem	68	23.6	26.4	57.4
	5th greatest problem	108	37.5	41.9	99.2
	6th greatest problem	2	0.7	0.8	100.0
Subtotal		258	89.6	100.0	
Missing		30	10.4		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.4 *Best System of Education*

	Educational system	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Arabic–Lebanese	4	1.4	1.4	1.4
	American	220	76.4	78.6	80.0
	Armenian	4	1.4	1.4	81.4
	French	40	13.9	14.3	95.7
	British	10	3.5	3.6	99.3
	Other	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
Subtotal		280	97.2	100.0	
Missing		8	2.8		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.5 *Cause of Christian–Muslim Relations Problems: Economy*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Strongly agree	4	1.4	3.2	3.2
	Agree	38	13.2	30.2	33.3
	Disagree	74	25.7	58.7	92.1
	Strongly disagree	10	3.5	7.9	100.0
Subtotal		126	43.8	100.0	
Missing		162	56.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.6 *Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Economy*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st greatest problem	96	33.3	34.5	34.5
	2nd greatest problem	70	24.3	25.2	59.7
	3rd greatest problem	62	21.5	22.3	82.0
	4th greatest problem	40	13.9	14.4	96.4
	5th greatest problem	10	3.5	3.6	100.0
Subtotal		278	96.5	100.0	
Missing		10	3.5		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.7 *Cause of Christian–Muslim Relationship Problems: Political Differences*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Strongly agree	50	17.4	39.7	39.7
	Agree	60	20.8	47.6	87.3
	Disagree	12	4.2	9.5	96.8
	Strongly disagree	4	1.4	3.2	100.0
Subtotal		126	43.8	100.0	
Missing		162	56.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.8 *Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Politics*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st greatest problem	102	35.4	37.2	37.2
	2nd greatest problem	82	28.5	29.9	67.2
	3rd greatest problem	60	20.8	21.9	89.1
	4th greatest problem	26	9.0	9.5	98.5
	5th greatest problem	4	1.4	1.5	100.0
Subtotal		272	95.1	100.0	
Missing		14	4.9		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.9 *Greatest Problem in Lebanon: Foreign Intervention*

	Response	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st greatest problem	100	34.7	37.3	37.3
	2nd greatest problem	30	10.4	11.2	48.5
	3rd greatest problem	40	13.9	14.9	63.4
	4th greatest problem	46	16.0	17.2	80.6
	5th greatest problem	50	17.4	18.7	99.3
	6th greatest problem	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
Subtotal		268	93.1	100.0	
Missing		20	6.9		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.10 *Ethnicity: Arab*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	92	31.9	34.6	34.6
	2nd	48	16.7	18.0	52.6
	3rd	60	20.8	22.6	75.2
	4th	42	14.6	15.8	91.0
	5th	4	1.4	1.5	92.5
	6th	20	6.9	7.5	100.0
Subtotal		266	92.4	100.0	
Missing		22	7.6		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.11 *Ethnicity: Phoenician*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	120	41.7	48.4	48.4
	2nd	42	14.6	16.9	65.3
	3rd	44	15.3	17.7	83.1
	4th	26	9.0	10.5	93.5
	5th	6	2.1	2.4	96.0
	6th	10	3.5	4.0	100.0
Subtotal		248	86.1	100.0	
Missing		40	13.9		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.12 *Ethnicity: French*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	120	41.7	48.4	48.4
	2nd	42	14.6	16.9	65.3
	3rd	44	15.3	17.7	83.1
	4th	26	9.0	10.5	93.5
	5th	6	2.1	2.4	96.0
	6th	10	3.5	4.0	100.0
Subtotal		248	86.1	100.0	
Missing		40	13.9		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.13 *Racial Identity: Arab*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	88	30.6	36.1	36.1
	2nd	78	27.0	32.0	68.0
	3rd	18	6.3	7.4	75.4
	4th	18	6.3	7.4	82.8
	5th	14	4.9	5.7	88.5
	6th	26	9.0	10.7	99.2
	7th	2	0.7	0.8	100.0
Subtotal		244	84.7	100.0	
Missing		44	15.3		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.14 *Racial Identity: Phoenician*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	160	55.6	66.7	66.7
	2nd	32	11.1	13.3	80.0
	3rd	26	9.0	10.8	90.8
	4th	8	2.8	3.3	94.2
	5th	12	4.2	5.0	99.2
	6th	2	0.7	0.8	100.0
Subtotal		240	83.3	100.0	
Missing		48	16.7		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.15 *Cultural Identity: Arab*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	92	31.9	37.4	37.4
	2nd	46	16.0	18.7	56.1
	3rd	50	17.4	20.3	76.4
	4th	30	10.4	12.2	88.6
	5th	20	6.9	8.1	96.7
	6th	8	2.8	3.3	100.0
Subtotal		246	85.4	100.0	
Missing		42	14.6		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.16 *Cultural Identity: Phoenician*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	120	41.7	48.4	48.4
	2nd	42	14.6	16.9	65.3
	3rd	44	15.3	17.7	83.1
	4th	26	9.0	10.5	93.5
	5th	6	2.1	2.4	96.0
	6th	10	3.5	4.0	100.0
Subtotal		248	86.1	100.0	
Missing		40	13.9		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.17 *Overall Racial, Ethnic, and Cultural Identity of the Lebanese: Arab*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	116	40.3	47.2	47.2
	2nd	36	12.5	14.6	61.8
	3rd	56	19.4	22.8	84.6
	4th	118	6.3	7.3	91.9
	5th	16	5.6	6.5	98.4
	6th	4	1.4	1.6	100.0
Subtotal		246	85.4	100.0	
Missing		42	14.6		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.18 *Lebanese Identity: Arab*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	1st	116	40.3	47.2	47.2
	2nd	36	12.5	14.6	61.8
	3rd	56	19.4	22.8	84.6
	4th	118	6.3	7.3	91.9
	5th	16	5.6	6.5	98.4
	6th	4	1.4	1.6	100.0
Subtotal		246	85.4	100.0	
Missing		42	14.6		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.19 *Spoken Lebanese Identified as Spoken Arabic*

	Choice	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	Yes	152	52.8	53.1	53.1
	No	134	46.5	46.9	100.0
Subtotal		286	99.3	100.0	
Missing		2	0.7		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.20 *Ethnicity of Fathers' First Names*

	Ethnicity	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	French	66	22.9	26.2	26.2
	English	16	5.6	6.3	32.5
	Arabic	164	56.9	65.1	97.6
	Armenian	4	1.4	1.6	99.2
	Other	2	0.7	0.8	100.0
Subtotal		252	87.5	100.0	
Missing		36	12.5		
Total		288	100.0		

Table 22.21 *Ethnicity of Students' First Names*

	Ethnicity	<i>f</i>	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Valid	French	94	32.6	34.3	34.4
	English	22	7.6	8.0	42.3
	Arabic	140	48.6	51.1	93.4
	Armenian	4	1.4	1.5	94.9
	Other	14	4.9	5.1	100.0
Subtotal		274	95.1	100.0	
Missing		14	4.9		
Total		288	100.0		

APPENDIX 23: ATALLAH FAMILY CASE STUDY

As can be seen in the following table, the ethnicity of the Atallah family names changed significantly from the first generation to the fourth generation, a span of just 50 years.

Generation	Children's names	Ethnicity of children's names
Great grandparents (Arabic names)	Boutros and Jamilie Hamawi (maternal side)	Therese (born in 1930s)
	Toufic and Latifi Atallah (paternal side)	French French
Grandparents (French names)	Jean and Therese Atallah	Nehme, Nabil, Kamil, Fares, Mona, Eid, Zeina, Bushra, Toufic and Aida Atallah (born from the 1950s to 1970s). Arabic
Parents (Arabic names)	Nehme and Nawal Atallah	Jean, Paul, and Anthony (born in the 1980s) English

APPENDIX 24: OTHER SOURCES OF PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS

Nadim Shehadi, personal communication, June 21, 2011.

Marie-Therese Obeid, January 11, 2009

Jorgen Nielsen, PhD

Norman Finkelstein PhD

B. Frangieh PhD, personal communications, April 6, 2008, and November 16, 2008

Bishop Gregory Mansour, personal communications, April 6, 2010, and November 16, 2010

N.Atallah, personal communication, September 29, 2008

Fr. Wehbe, personal communication, April 6, 2006

Mansour Eid PhD, Chair, Department of Social and Behavioral Science, Notre Dame University, Lebanon, personal communication, June 21, 2004

Gebran Ghassan Tueni, personal communication, May 15, 2005

Archbishop George Saad Abi-Younes, personal communication, July 6, 2011

Fr. Naji Kiwan, personal communications, April 6, 2010, and April 18, 2010

Rev. Archimandrite Joseph Hagggar, personal communication, April 18, 2010

Dave Thomas PhD, personal communication, February 10, 2009

Nada Chedid UNESCO, personal communication, August 11, 2007

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