Surgener, Kirk (2012). Neo-Kantian constructivism and metaethics. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.
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Surgener12PhD.pdf
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Abstract
Christine Korsgaard has attempted to defend a distinct approach to metaethics – Neo-Kantian Constructivism. Not only does she present a positive case for her own view, she also attacks existing metaethical positions and even the disctinctions that metaethics has traditionally relied on. This thesis is a sustained examination of this position. I consider whether Korsgaard can legitimately claim to be offering a metaethical position at all, providing her with some defence against the scepticism of some metaethicists. I also examine her attacks on traditional metaethical positions (in particular moral realism and expressivism). I argue that her attack on moral realism can be avoided if the realism on offer takes a particular form. In the case of expressivism I claim that Korsgaard’s attack, though not fully developed in her work, motivates an examination of contemporary hybrid-expressivist theories. I argue that these are, as of yet, no advance over their non-hybrid cousins. Finally I examine Korsgaard’s own position, attempting to make it clearer by combining her claims with a framework developed by Crispin Wright for judgement-dependent qualities. This gives Korsgaard her best chance of a distinctive metaethical position. Ultimately, though, the Neo-Kantian approach to morality fails.
Type of Work: | Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.) | ||||||
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Award Type: | Doctorates > Ph.D. | ||||||
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College/Faculty: | Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Arts & Law | ||||||
School or Department: | School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, Department of Philosophy | ||||||
Funders: | None/not applicable | ||||||
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
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URI: | http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/3298 |
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