

**UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM**

Centre for First World War Studies

**A Moonlight Massacre: The Night Operation on the
Passchendaele Ridge, 2nd December 1917**

by

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Appendices and Maps

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Appendix 1

**Second Army Infantry Orders of Battle
Divisions: II Corps & VIII Corps
November/December 1917 ¹**

1st Division (Regular): Major-General E.P. Strickland

1st Brigade: Brigadier-General C.J.C. Grant

1st Black Watch

1st Cameron Highlanders

10th Gloucester Regiment

8th Royal Berkshire Regiment

2nd Brigade: Brigadier-General G.C. Kemp

2nd Royal Sussex Regiment

1st LNL

1st Northamptonshire Regiment

2nd KRRC

3rd Brigade: Brigadier-General R.C.A. McCalmont

1st South Wales Borderers

1st Gloucestershire Regiment

2nd Welsh Regiment

2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers

Pioneers: 6th Welsh Regiment

8th Division (Regular): Major-General W.C.G. Heneker

23rd Brigade: Brigadier-General G.W. St. G. Grogan

2nd Devonshire Regiment

2nd West Yorkshire Regiment

2nd Cameronians

2nd Middlesex Regiment

¹ As relevant to the narrative.

24th Brigade: Lieutenant-Colonel H.R.C Stirling (Acting GOC 7 to 21 November)
Brigadier-General R. Haig (from 21 November)

1st Worcestershire Regiment

2nd East Lancashire Regiment

1st Sherwood Foresters

2nd Northamptonshire Regiment

25th Brigade: Brigadier-General C. Coffin VC

2nd Lincolnshire Regiment

2nd Royal Berkshire Regiment

1st Royal Irish Rifles

2nd Rifle Brigade

Pioneers: 22nd DLI

14th (Light) Division (New Army): Major-General V.A. Couper

41st Brigade: Brigadier-General P.C.B. Skinner

7th KRRC

7th Rifle Brigade

8th KRRC

8th Rifle Brigade

42nd Brigade: Brigadier-General G.N.B. Forster

5th Oxford & Bucks Light Infantry

5th KSLI

9th KRRC

9th Rifle Brigade

43rd Brigade: Brigadier-General R.S. Tempest

6th Somerset Light Infantry

6th DCLI

6th KOYI

10th DLI

Pioneers: 11th King's (Liverpool Regiment)

32nd Division (New Army): Major-General C.D. Shute

14th Brigade: Brigadier-General F.W. Lumsden VC

5/6th Royal Scots 1st Dorsetshire Regiment

2nd Manchester Regiment 15th HLI

96th Brigade: Brigadier-General A.C. Girdwood

2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 15th Lancashire Fusiliers

16th Lancashire Fusiliers 16th Northumberland Fusiliers

97th Brigade: Brigadier-General C. A. Blacklock

2nd KOYLI 11th Border Regiment

16th HLI 17th HLI

Pioneers: 17th Northumberland Fusiliers²

33rd Division (New Army): Major-General P.R. Wood (to 28 November)
Major-General R.J. Pinney (from 28 November)

19th Brigade: Brigadier-General C.R.G. Mayne

2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers 20th Royal Fusiliers

1st Cameronians 5/6th Cameronians

98th Brigade: Brigadier-General J.D. Heriot-Maitland

1/4th King's (Liverpool Regiment) 1/4th Suffolk Regiment

1st Middlesex Regiment 2nd A&SH

² Re-assigned GHQ Railway Construction troops on 15 November 1917.

100th Brigade: Brigadier-General A.W.F. Baird

1st Queens (Royal West Surrey) Regiment

2nd Worcestershire Regiment

16th KRRC

1/9th HLI

Pioneers: 18th Middlesex Regiment

35th (Bantam) Division (New Army): Major-General G. Franks

104th Brigade: Brigadier-General A.W. Sandilands

17th Lancashire Fusiliers

18th Lancashire Fusiliers

20th Lancashire Fusiliers

23rd Manchester Regiment

105th Brigade: Brigadier-General A.H. Marindin

15th Cheshire Regiment

16th Cheshire Regiment

14th Gloucestershire Regiment

15th Sherwood Foresters

106th Brigade: Brigadier-General J.H.W. Pollard

17th Royal Scots

18th HLI

19th DLI

4th North Staffordshire Regiment³

Pioneers: 19th Northumberland Fusiliers

³ Replaced 17th West Yorkshire on 15 November 1917.

Appendix 2

Infantry Orders of Battle: 25th Division & 38th Division

25th Division: 49th Infanterie-Brigade

Leibgarde Infanterie-Regiment (1.Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 115

Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2.Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 116

Infanterie-Leibregiment (3.Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117

38th Division: 83rd Infanterie-Brigade

Infanterie-Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) Nr. 94

6. Thüringisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 95

7. Thüringisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 96

Appendix 3

(a)

Copy No. ____

Second Army Order No. 14⁴

Reference: Attack map attached⁵

1. The offensive (Tenth Phase) will be resumed by the Second Army on “X” day at an hour that will be notified later.
2. The operation will be carried out by the II and VIII corps. The objective of each corps is shown in RED on the attached map.
3. For the purpose of this operation, the boundary between the II Corps and VIII Corps will be shown in BROWN on attached map. The II Corps will take over from the VIII Corps up to this boundary as soon as possible after the minor operations mentioned in para. 4 have taken place.
4. As a preliminary to the operation laid down for “X” day, the VIII Corps will capture the enemy’s posts situated on HILL 52 (V. 30. a) in conjunction with II Corps, who will at the same time capture VOX FARM (V. 30. a. 00. 75.). These minor operations will be undertaken as soon as possible, the date and details being arranged by the corps concerned.
5. (a) The artillery policy to be pursued previous to the attack on “X” day will be carried out in accordance with Artillery Instructions No. 28 already issued to all concerned.

(b) Details of the artillery for “X” day will be issued later,
6. The Army Report Centre will be at Lochre Chateau.
7. Acknowledge by wire.

??? Lt. Col.
for Major-General,
General Staff
Second Army
Issued at 1:30 p.m.

H.Q., Second Army
21st November, 1917

⁴ TNA WO/158/209: Second Army Operations Files.

⁵ See Map 4.

(b)

SECRET

Copy No. 1

Amendment to Second Army Operation Order No. 14⁶

1. Para. 4 is cancelled
2. Reference para. 3. The II Corps will take over from the VIII Corps up to the boundary shown on map issued with above order, on night of 24/25th November.
3. Acknowledge by wire.

HQ Second Army
22nd November 1917

??? Lt. Col
for General Staff
Second Army

Issued at 11-30 p.m.
Copies to recipients of Order No. 14.

(c)

SECRET

Copy No. 1
Second Army No. 1/2 (G).

Reference Second Army Order No. 14⁷

The operation of the II and VIII Corps will be carried out on night of D/E [1/2 December] day an hour to be notified later.

Acknowledge by wire

H.Q., Second Army
25 November 1917

??? Lt. Col.
for General Staff
Second Army

Issued at 11:00 p.m.

Copies to recipients of Order No. 14.

⁶ TNA WO/158/209: Second Army Operations Files.

⁷ Ibid.

Appendix 4

(a)

SECRET
Copy No. 23

21 November 1917

VIII Corps Order No. 52⁸

1. The offensive will be resumed by the VIII Corps in cooperation with II Corps at a date [,] which has been communicated to all concerned. Zero hour will be notified later.
2. The operation will be carried out by the 8th Division (VIII Corps) and the 32nd Division (II Corps). The main objective of each division is shown in RED on the attached map.
3. The machine-gun companies of 14th, 33rd, and 39th divisions will cooperate under orders to be issued later.
4. For the purpose of this operation the boundary between II Corps and VIII Corps will be shown in Brown on attached map. The II Corps are arranging to take the frontline up to this boundary from the VIII Corps on the night following the minor operation mentioned in the next paragraph.
5. As a preliminary to the main operation [,] the 8th Division, in cooperation with 32nd Division, will carry out a minor operation in square V. 30. a. with a view to reaching such a line as will deny to the enemy any observation of the forming up places in that square [,] which are to be used by the 32nd Division. Details of this operation, which will take place as soon as possible after the night of 23rd/24th November, will be arranged between divisions concerned and reported to corps headquarters.
6. (a) The artillery policy to be pursued previous to the main attack will be carried out in accordance with VIII Corps Artillery Instructions of today's date.

(b) Details of the artillery programme of the main attack will be issued later.

7. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE

C. F. Aspinall
BGGs
VIII Corps

Issued to Signals at midnight.

⁸ BL: VIII Corps War Diary, Hunter-Weston Papers, 48359, Vol. V.

(b)

SECRET
Copy No. 22

23rd November 1917

VIII Corps Order No. 54⁹

1. The minor operation referred to in para. 5 of VIII Corps Order No. 52, is cancelled.
2. Para. 3 of VIII Corps Order No. 52 is cancelled. The machine-gun companies of 33rd Division will give such assistance to the attack of 8th Division as the G.O.C. 8th Division may require.
3. The temporary boundary between VIII and II Corps for the purpose of this operation, as shown on the map issued with VIII Corps Order No, 52, will be amended north-east of TEALL COTTAGE and will be a straight line drawn from Teall Cottage (inclusive to VIII Corps), to the RACKET WOOD, W. 19. a.
4. The II Corps will take over the front up to this boundary from the VIII Corps on the night of 24/25th November. Any minor adjustment of the inter-divisional boundary between 8th Division and 33rd Division will be adjusted on or after the night 24/25th November, under arrangements between divisions concerned. The date on which this adjustment will be made will be reported to Corps headquarters.
5. By arrangement with the II Corps and VIII Corps will retain the following accommodation on MEETCHEELE Spur after that spur has been handed over to II Corps: -

1 Battalion H.Q. at MEETCHEELE
1 Battalion H.Q. & Aid Post at MOSSELMARKT
1 Brigade H.Q. on BELLEVUE Spur

The VIII Corps will also have use of the BELLEVUE - MEETCHEELE ROAD for pack transport, except between dusk and zero on the night of the attack: also the exclusive use of the two new tracks south of MEETCHEELE.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE

V.A. Jackson Major
for BGS VIII Corps

Issued to Signals at 4:30 p.m.

⁹ Ibid.

Appendix 5

(a)

SECRET.
Copy No. 6
II Corp Headquarters
22nd November 1917

II Corps Operation Order No. 167.¹⁰

Reference Map
Tiendenberg Sheet.
Scale 1/10,000

1. The Second Army is, with the II and VIII corps, resuming the offensive at an early date with a view to capturing the general line VENISON TRENCH (V.30.b.) – VOLT FARM (V.24.c.) – MALLET COPSE (V.23.d.) – VEAL COTTAGES (V.23.c.). The day of the attack and the hour of zero will be notified later.

2. A summary of information regarding the enemy forces and defences in front of II Corps is attached (not reproduced).

3. The II Corps will be on the left of the attack and will, with the 32nd Division, capture the approximate line:

V.24.d.6.2 – V.24.c.95.15 – V.24.a.25.00 – V.23.c.8.8 – V.22.d.9.2 – V.28.b.3.2 (see attached map; Scale 1/10000).

The 8th Division (VIII Corps) will be attacking on the right of 32nd Division.

4. The boundary line between corps for the operations will be a line drawn from TEALL COTTAGE (V.30.b.1.5.) to the SE of RACKET WOOD (W.19.a.1.0.) (see attached maps; Scale 1/10000).

5. A definite, distinct and complete unit will be detailed to capture and hold each known enemy strongpoint.

6. For the purpose of co-ordination in arranging the barrage tables, the divisional artilleries covering the II Corps front will be under the orders of GOCRA II Corps, who will issue the necessary instructions and barrage tables.

¹⁰ TNA WO/95/643: II Corps War Diary.

To each attacking infantry brigade there will be attached a RFA Battery Commander whose battery will, when required, be at the direct disposal of the brigadier.

7. Instructions regarding the artillery policy to be pursued previous to the attack are being issued separately.

8. II Corps Machine-gun Officer will prepare a machine gun scheme for making the best possible use, in co-operation with VIII Corps, of all machine guns available on the front of II Corps.

9. GOC 32nd Division will arrange for as many as practicable of the officers of each unit to meet (before the day of the attack) the officers of the units that will be operating on its flanks.

10. During the operations the usual cross attachment for liaison will be made: and in addition arrangements will be made for liaison parties from the right formation of the 32nd Division to meet similar parties from the 8th Division at fixed points to be agreed upon between the division commanders concerned.

11. Instructions are being issued separately as regards communication between infantry and aeroplanes, aeroplane to give warning of impending counter-attack, synchronization of watches and location of headquarters.

12. 32 Division will forward as early as practicable to II Corps Headquarters a detailed scheme showing how it is proposed to carry out the attack.

13. As a preliminary to the above-mentioned operation the VIII Corps is to capture the enemy's posts situated on HILL 52 (V.30.a.) and in conjunction with this attack the II Corps (32nd Division) will capture VOX FARM (V.30.a.05.75). The date for this minor operation is being communicated separately.

14. After the capture of the enemy's posts on HILL 52 and of VOX FARM the II Corps (32nd Division) will temporarily relieve the VIII Corps (8th Division) on the front between TEALL COTTAGE (inclusive) (V.30.b.1.5) and VOX FARM (exclusive) (V.30.a.05.75).

Instructions for this relief, which will be carried out as early as practicable after the capture of Hill 52, will be issued later.

15. ACKNOWLEDGE.

S. H. Wilson
BGGs

Issued at 1:45 p.m.

(b)

SECRET.
Copy No. 6
II Corps HQ
22 November 1917

II Corps Operation Order No. 168.¹¹

1. Paragraph 13 of II Corps Operation Order No. 167 of the 22 November is cancelled. The minor operation therein mentioned will not take place.
2. The jumping-off line for the main operation to be carried out by 32nd Division, will be approximately the present front line (shown in BLUE) on the map accompanying II Corps Operation Order No. 167).
3. The II Corps (32nd Division) will on the night of 24/25 November relieve the VIII Corps (8th Division) on a front between TEALL COTTAGE (inclusive) (V.30.b.1.5.) and VOX FARM (exclusive) (V.30.a.05.75).
4. All arrangements for relief will be made direct between divisions concerned; and 32nd Division will inform II Corps of the arrangements made and of the completion of the relief. Command will pass at 6:00 a.m. on 25th November.
5. Further instructions will be issued in regards the boundary line between divisions in the forward area after the completion of the relief.
6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

S. H. Wilson
BGGs

Issued at 11:55 p.m.
(Distribution overleaf)

¹¹ Ibid.

Appendix 6

Secret

8th Division No.G.97/1/4.

8th Division Instructions No. 1.¹²

1. The offensive will be resumed by VIII and II corps at a date which has been communicated to those directly concerned.
2. The operation will be carried out by the 25th Inf. Bde. in co-operation with the 32 Division (II Corps) on its left.
3. The objective, and the boundary between 8th and 32nd Division, are shown on the attached Map G. 31. The boundary line allots tactical responsibility for the BELLEVUE SPUR to the 32nd Division. It is understood, however, that certain rights such as sites for H.Q's. and lines of approach within 32nd Divisional area will be allotted to 8th Division. Exact details of these will be notified later.
4. (a) The 32nd Division are arranging to take over from the 8th Division for the purposes of this operation, the line as far east as TEALL COTTAGES (inclusive to 8th Division). This adjustment will take place on the night following the operation referred to in para. 5 below.

(b) On the night following this operation, it is probable that 8th Division will take over from 33rd Division as far south as the road from D. 6. b. central – E. 1. c. 4. 8. inclusive to 8th Division.
5. As soon as possible after night of 23rd/24th November, probably 24th/25th November, the 23 Inf. Bde. will, in co-operation with 32nd Division, secure a line V. 30. b. 16 - V. 30. a. 7. 7. - V. 30. a. 50. 75 - VOX FARM (exclusive to 8th Division). Details of this operation will be notified later.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

E. Beddington
Lieut.-Colonel
General Staff

22 November 1917.

¹² TNA WO/95/1677: 8th Division War Diary.

Appendix 7

SECRET

**32nd DIVISION OFFENSIVE INSTRUCTIONS No. 1
OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS**¹³

21st November 1917

1. Future Operations. The II Corps will continue operations at an early date to drive the enemy from the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE. The VIII Corps will operate on the right of II Corps.
2. Dividing Lines. The dividing line between the II and VIII corps for the operation is shown on the attached map.
3. 1st Phase. The first phase of the operations will be the capture of the RED LINE (vide attached map).¹⁴
4. Task of 32nd Divn. The capture of the RED LINE is the task of 32nd Division. The 8th Division, VIII Corps, will attack on the right of the 32nd Division. The 35th Division will be holding the line on the left of 32nd Division but will not assault.
5. Troops to be Employed. Cancel para 5 and substitute:¹⁵

The assault and capture of the RED LINE on the II Corps front has been entrusted to the 97th Infantry Brigade with two battalions of the 96th Infantry Brigade attached.

The attack will be carried out on a front of five battalions

¹³ TNA WO/95/2370: '32nd Division Offensive Instructions No. 1: Outline Plan of Operations', 21 November 1917, 32nd Division War Diary.

¹⁴ '*Map to 3 Brigades & CRA only'.

¹⁵ '32nd Division Instructions No. 1' was originally issued on 21 November with the following paragraph: 'Troops to be Employed. The assault and capture of the RED LINE on II Corps front has been entrusted to 97th Brigade. The attack will be carried out on a front of four battalions. Definite distinct units will be told off to capture garrisons and consolidate each known strongpoint and defended locality. Two battalions of either the 96th or 14th (probably 96th) Brigade will be holding the line at the time of the attack. Those two battalions will come under orders of the G.O.C. 97th Infantry Brigade on Y/Z night at an hour to be notified later, and will be available as a reserve and to cover the flanks of the attack and to assist in repelling counter-attacks'. Part 5 was amended on 24 November. See '32nd Div. No. G.S. 1499/15/3 Amendment No. 1 to 32nd Division Offensive Instructions No. 1', 24 November 1917, in TNA WO/95/2370: 32nd Division War Diary.

One battalion of the 96th Brigade will be held in reserve as a counter-counter-attacking force on the right flank in the vicinity of VIRILE FARM.

Definite and distinct units will be told off to capture, garrison and consolidate each known strongpoint and defended locality.

The two battalions of the 96th Infantry Brigade to take part in the attack will be holding the line on the night of the attack.

These two battalions will come under the orders of the G.O.C. 97th Infantry Brigade on Y/Z night at an hour to be notified later.

6. General Scheme of Attack. The capture of the RED LINE will be carried out by a night attack. The essence of the operation is surprise. In order to fulfill this condition the general plan of operation is as follows:

- a) The first line of strongpoints (General line V.24.c.2.0.) – VOID FARM (inclusive) – VEAL COTTAGES (inclusive) at (V.23.c.2.0.) will be rushed at zero hour without an artillery or machinegun barrage.
- b) At the hour which it is calculated the above line will be reached, the artillery will open fire on all known and suspected strongpoints and machinegun positions. Lying beyond the line mentioned in (a). This barrage will lift as the attacking troops form the final objective advance, and will be specially thick on the enemy's most likely lines of counter-attack (i.e. VENISON FARM – VERSE COTTAGE – VALUATION HOUSE – MALLET WOOD (exclusive) (vide para. 9)).
- c) The exact times at which the artillery will open fire and lift off strongpoints will be notified later. This will depend upon the orders received from II Corps, the plans of the Corps on our right, and the condition of the ground at the time of the attack.

7. Probable direction of enemy counter-attack. The most likely direction from which a strong enemy counter-attack may be expected is :

- a) From the low ground about W.19. central on the south side of RACKET WOOD and south of the marshy ground in W.24.d.
- b) From the low ground about HEIDENGOED COPSE, the attack coming from the north side of RACKET WOOD

and north of the marshy ground in V.24.d. and thence along the ridge via VALUATION HOUSES.

- c) A strong enemy attack is not to be expected from the area west of MALLET WOOD, as the condition of the ground would make such an attack very difficult for the enemy. Small local attacks are however to be guarded against in this latter area.

8. Probable artillery plan. As soon as the objective is reached the probable artillery plan will be:

- a) To form a protective barrage in front of the objective, which will be very thick on the enemy's most likely lines of counter-attack (vide para. 6).
- b) To search the areas where the enemy is likely to be assembling for counter-attack (vide para. 7).

9. Machine-guns. Machine-guns will be organized into:

- a) Close defence guns under orders of G.O.C. 97th Brigade. These will advance with the troops.
- b) Barrage gun under orders of the Corps M.G. Officer.
- c) At least two sections, and probably four sections of machine-guns will be allotted to the 97th Brigade for close defence of the captured line.
- d) The number of guns for barrage work is not yet known.

10. The task of these guns will be:

- (I) To form a protective barrage in front of the objective in the area whence an attack in force may be expected.
- (II) To maintain area concentrations on certain areas where the enemy is likely to be assembling for counter-attack or over which his counter-attacking troops are likely to pass. It is important that these selected areas should extend as far back as possible.
- (III) To keep under fire the defensive localities on the left flank of the attack, where snipers and machine-guns may be active and which are not included in the objective.

Detailed orders for machine-guns will be issued in due course.

11. Consolidation. All localities captured will be consolidated and all available machine and Lewis guns pushed up for the defence of the captured ground, the majority being advanced to the final objective.

Strongpoints will be constructed in the vicinity of Hill 52 – VOID FARM – VOLT FARM – MALLET COPSE – VEAL COTTAGES and enclosures at V.22.d.9.2. R.E. and Pioneers will be detailed for this duty. The number available will be notified later.

12. Routes. On the night of the attack the four assaulting battalions of the 97th brigade will move forward to the assembly position from WURST FARM (1 battalion), IRISH FARM (2 battalions), HILL TOP (1 battalion).

The routes at present available are MOUSE TRAP TRACK, No. 3 TRACK and the GRAVENSTAFEL Road.

It is hoped to get a fourth route constructed by the night of the attack, but this can not be relied on, as it must depend on the labour available.

It is essential that the times taken by units to get to our frontline from these camps should be known as accurately as possible. All brigades carrying out reliefs in the line prior to the attack will have the time taken by battalions to reach the frontline from the camps carefully checked, and report on the following morning to Divisional Headquarters.

13. Information as to the enemy's defences and dispositions was issued under 32nd Division No. G.I. 613.1/1 of 20th inst. (Issued only to three brigades, C.R.A. & 219th M.G. Coy.).

14. Headquarters.

- a) Brigade and Battalion headquarters will be selected by by the G.O.C. 97th Infantry Brigade after necessary reconnaissance. The advanced headquarters of the 97th Brigade will be in the neighbourhood of KRONPRINZ FARM and of the 14th Brigade at KANSAS. The Divisional Signal Officer will ensure that the buried cable reaches both these points.
- b) Divisional headquarters will be at the CANAL BANK C.25.d.0.0.

15. Detailed instructions will be issued later.

16. G.O.C. 97th Brigade will submit his plans based on these instructions as soon as possible.

17. ACKNOWLEDGE

A. E. McNamara

Lieut-Colonel
General Staff
32nd Division

Issued to:

14th Infantry Brigade
96th Infantry Brigade
97th Infantry Brigade
C.R.A., 32nd Division
C.R.E., 32nd Division
A & Q.
32nd Divl. Signal Coy.
A.D.M.S.
D.M.G.O.

Appendix 8

32nd Division Instructions No. 11

32nd Divn. No. G.S. 1499/15/22

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO G.O.C. BRIGADE IN DIVISIONAL SUPPORT [14th Infantry Brigade] and G.O.C. BRIGADE IN DIVISIONAL RESERVE (96th Infantry Brigade).¹⁶

A. Instructions to G.O.C. 14th Infantry Brigade

1. You will be in command of the brigade in divisional support (14th Infantry Brigade, less 14th Machine-gun Company on barrage fire work) during forthcoming operations.
2. Your Brigade will be disposed at Zero as under:

Adv. Brigade HQ. – KANSAS
No. 1 Battalion – BELLEVUE
No. 2 Battalion – WURST FARM
No. 3 Battalion – HILL TOP
No. 4 Battalion – IRISH FARM

14 T.M. Battery (less 4 guns) – BELLEVUE
2 guns – MEETCHEELE RIDGE
2 guns – In vicinity of YETTA HOUSES
3. The Divisional Commander does not wish to employ your Brigade in these operations unless the enemy should make such a determined counter-attack as to endanger our present line.
4. You will be responsible for the defence of the BELLEVUE RIDGE and MEETCHEELE RIDGE. Stokes Mortars will be established in defensive positions for this purpose. Dumps of 50 rounds of ammunition for each gun must be established with each gun.
5. Your battalions will be ready to move at a notice of ¼ hour from Zero onwards. The men should, however, get as much rest as possible.
6. In the event of your Battalion at BELLEVUE being ordered forward, you will at once replace it by the Battalion at WURST FARM, and replace this latter Battalion by the Battalion at HILL TOP.

¹⁶ TNA:WO/95/2370: 32nd Division War Diary.

7. You will keep in close touch with the general situation and with the 97th Infantry Brigade, and have a liaison officer at the 97th Brigade Headquarters. You should establish Brigade O.Ps. in the vicinity of BELLEVUE RIDGE and send frequent reports to Divisional Headquarters as to your view of the situation and all which comes to your knowledge. The Divisional Commander does not consider it necessary for you personally to go in front of the position of your Battalion at BELLEVUE.
8. Special instructions are attached (App. A) as to action of the two Stokes Mortars at YETTA HOUSES.¹⁷
9. The 14th Infantry Brigade will probably relieve the 97th Infantry Brigade in the line on the night of December 3/4th, but must be prepared to do so earlier if required.
10. All unit of the 14th Infantry Brigade moving forward must be supplied with 170 rounds of S.A.A. and 2 days rations.
11. In case of Brigadier General Blacklock D.S.O becoming a casualty you will be prepared to assume command of the operations.

B. Instructions to G.O.C. 96th Infantry Brigade

1. Your Brigade (less two battalions and machine-gun company) will be in divisional reserve during operations. Your Brigade at Zero will be disposed as:

Bde. HQ. – CANAL BANK

No. 1 Battalion – Attached 97th Infantry Brigade

No. 2 Battalion – Attached 97th Infantry Brigade

No. 3 Battalion – CANAL BANK

No. 4 Battalion – IRISH FARM

96th M.G. Coy. – Barrage fire/work

96th T.M. Battery – IRISH FARM

2. The units under your command will be ready to move at a maximum notice of 2 hours from Zero onwards.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE

A. E. McNamara

Lieutenant-Colonel
General Staff
32nd Division

30/11/17

¹⁷ See below.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS for the employment of TWO STOKES MORTARS of 14th Infantry Brigade¹⁸

1. It is possible that during the attack of the 97th Infantry Brigade, and after it has reached its objective that trouble will be experienced from snipers and machine-guns west of TOURNANT FARM, and from strongpoints about V.28.a.9.9. The enemy's battalion in the area V.22.c. and V.28.a. might also endeavour to counter-attack in spite of the condition of the ground.
2. To assist in meeting this eventuality, the 14th Infantry Brigade will place two Stokes Mortars and 50 rounds per gun at YETTA HOUSES by Zero. At Zero plus two hours the guns will move forward to the vicinity of TOURNANT FARM and the O.C. will report to the O.C. No. 5 Battalion [15th LF] of attacking force at his HQ at the pillbox at V.28.c.7.8.
3. The OC No. 5 Battalion will employ these guns if required:
 - a) To open a bombardment on any strongpoint, which is worrying the infantry. The strongpoint will be captured under cover of this bombardment and the objective extended to the left.
 - b) To repel any counter-attack in force.
4. Care will be taken by 14th Infantry Brigade that the movement of these guns to YETTA HOUSES will not meet or cross the march of the 97th Infantry Brigade to its assembly position. Instructions to this effect have already been issued to the GOC 14th Infantry Brigade.

¹⁸ TNA: WO/95/2370: 32nd Division War Diary.

Appendix 9

Secret

Copy No. 5

Headquarters
100th Infantry Bde

1st December 1917

100th Infantry Brigade Order No. 293¹⁹

1. The [8th] Division on our left is carrying out offensive operations tonight as explained verbally by the Brigadier General to commanding officers concerned.
2. The operation will be supported by artillery barrage and MG barrage commencing at Zero + 8.
3. At Zero + 8 an artillery barrage will be put down on the front of the 100th Infantry Bde and will be continued southward – Prior to Zero + 8 normal artillery fire will be carried out.
4. OC 16th KRRC will arrange for touch to be maintained with the 2nd Royal Berks[hire] Reg[imen]t on the left and will be ready to assist with supporting fire in the event of an enemy counter-attack. Special attention must be paid to the security of our left flank and front during the operations and until the chance of an enemy counter-attack has ceased. Headquarters 2nd Royal Berkshires will be at V.30.d.4.2.
5. The 2nd Worcestershire Reg[imen]t will similarly be ready to deal with an enemy counter-attack should one develop on our front during the operations.
6. All movement in our area is to be restricted to a minimum from Zero – 1 hour till the situation quiets down.
7. The hour of Zero will be notified later.
8. Acknowledge

G.O. Pillean [?] *Lieut.*
A/Bde Major
100th Inf. Bde.

Issued through Signals at 7.0 a.m.

¹⁹ TNA WO/95/2429: 100th Brigade War Diary.

Appendix 10

97th Brigade Operation Order No. 181²⁰

1. PRISM [97 Brigade] will establish itself on the line TEALL COTTAGE – HILL 52 – VOID FARM (inclusive) present frontline of PREFIX [11th Border Regiment] – VEALL COTT[AGES] – to enclosures at V.2.d.9.2.
2. PRINT [2nd KOYLI] will withdraw out of line at dusk.
3. PORT [16th NF] and PRAISE [16th HLI] will push forward on to HILL 52. PORT on right, PRAISE on left to VOID FARM inclusive.
4. PREFIX will consolidate their present holdings – reorganise and gain touch.
5. PRESS [17th HLI] will collect on its original tapes, reorganize, move to south of MALLET COPSE and envelope VEAL COTTAGE and VAT COTTAGE from the east in conjunction with Stokes mortars.
6. PONY [15th LF] will insure enclosures at V.22.a.9.2 are firmly consolidated, push out and join hands with PRESS.
7. PLAIN [14th Brigade] will move through PRISM and attack on the night 3rd/4th [December] after which PRISM will withdraw.
8. OCs must inform Brigadier their appropriate line early tomorrow.
9. The hour of Zero will be at 2 a.m. 3rd inst. a[t] which hour a protective machine-gun and artillery barrage will open clear of all objectives.
10. ACKNOWLEDGE. Issued at 3:50 p.m. 2/12/17

H. Wailes Capt.
for Brigade Major
PRISM

Copies to:

1. PRESS
2. PRAISE
3. PREFIX

²⁰ Original document hastily written in long hand. See TNA: WO/95/2370. 32nd Division War Diary.

4. PONY
5. PORT
6. PANAMA [???
7. PLAIN
8. PROCTOR [???
9. PILL [???
- 10 & 11. War Diary
12. BM
13. 25th Inf. Bde.
14. Staff Capt.

Appendix 11

97th Brigade Order No. 182²¹

1. Operation Order No. 181 is cancelled.
2. Back battalion will ensure that tomorrow, they are occupying before dawn, a position at least as far forward as the original tapeline. Having gained the tapeline, every endeavour will be made to launch forward as far in advance of the line as is possible.
3. Touch, if not already gained, will be established with units on the flanks the greatest care taken to preserve it once gained.
4. Companies & platoons will be reorganized.
5. Lewis Gun posts will be established in front of line taken up.
6. OC 97th MG Co. will post as many available guns of his own company & 8 guns of 96th MG Co. for close defence of the line.
7. Units will report to this headquarters as soon as this order has been carried out and give the following ??? ??? ??? give limits of battalions' boundaries, as much ground as possible in advance of this line will be.
8. 16th Batt. NF – TEALL COTTAGE inclusive to VIRILE [FARM]*
16th HLI – TEALL COTTAGE inclusive to VIRILE [FARM]*
11th Border Regiment – VIRILE FARM (enclosures) to V.29.b.1.5
17th HLI – V.29.1.5., V.29.a.3.3
15th LF – V.29.a.3.3 to TOURNANT FARM – area ???

*OC 16th Batt. (NF) will be responsible for division of frontage between those two units (i.e. 16th NF and 16th HLI). Battalions may find it necessary to extend their flanks. If it is found that the number of men collected in any unit are out of all proportion to length of line taken over, this will arranged between CO's concerned.
9. ACKNOWLEDGE

²¹ Original document hastily written in long hand. See TNA: WO/95/2370. 32nd Division War Diary.

Issued at 9:30 p.m.
2/12/17

Capt. for B. Major
97th Inf. Bde

Copies to:

1. PANAMA
2. PLAIN
3. PROSE
4. PREFIX
5. PORT
6. PRAISE
7. PRESS
8. PONY
9. PILL
10. Staff Capt.
11. War Diary
12. File

Appendix 12

Copy No. 11

97th Inf. Bde. Operation Order No. 183²²

- (1) The 97th Brigade will be relieved in the frontline on night of 3/4th December by 14th Brigade in accordance with attached table.
- (2) All other details of relief will be arranged by OC battalions concerned.
- (3) On completion of relief, the command of the line will pass from GOC 97th Brigade to GOC 14th Brigade.
- (4) Guides will be arranged for each relieving battalions as under: –

One per Batt. HQ }
One per Coy. HQ } To be under command of an officer
One per Platoon }

OC 17th HLI will be responsible for finding guides in the right portion from each of the following units: – 11th Border Regt., 16th HLI (less those attached to 16th NF) and 17th HLI.

- (5) Relief complete will be reported to this Headquarters by code words as under –

Relief complete	HOLES
Heavy shelling	DEEP
Slight shelling	SHALLOW

- (6) All are reminded that soup kitchens exist – 1 off MOUSETRAP TRACK B.17.b.9.7. & 1 off No. 6 track at B.23.a.6.7.
- (7) ACKNOWLEDGE

H. Wailes for B[rigade] M[ajor] 97th Infantry Brigade

Issued at 2 p.m. 3/12/17

²² Original document hastily written in long hand. See TNA: WO/95/2400, 97 Brigade War Diary.

Copies to:

1. 15th LF
2. 16th LF
3. 11th Border Regt.
4. 16th HLI
5. 17th HLI
6. 14th Inf. Bde
7. 96th Inf. Bde
8. 32nd Division
9. Brig.
10. Staff Captain
- 11 & 12. War Diary
- 13 fill

Appendix 13

Battalion Commanders' Remarks in Response to 25 Brigade Questionnaire G1/79

Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.H. Stirling (CO 2nd Royal Berkshire)

As regards the questions contained in your G1/79 I beg to report the following:

A. Barrage

1. Was effective as far as I can gather.
2. But there were many shorts.
3. Officers state that the barrage seemed to lift too quickly after the original beginning. All agree that the defensive barrage of artillery ??? ??? was excellent.

B. Assembly

1. The duckboards were raised too high above ground, so when the men got off where there were gaps, it was difficult to get on again.
2. A new tape should have been laid from the head of the duckboards, as the old one was hardly discoverable.

C. Enemy Fire

1. Enemy's barrage came down from our old frontline back to behind the PASSCHENDAELE – VINDICTIVE X roads. Probably field guns on the frontline and heavy stuff on both sides of the road.

D. Forming-up

1. 2 small tapes were all that could be desired.
2. Yes, but some of them were not securely fastened and had moved in the wind.

E. Equipment

1. I do not think overloading was noticed except in the mud and on the duckboards, but I think the carrying of spare stores [?] by the 3rd wave was a mistake as:
 - a. These never eventuated
 - b. The platoon would have been invaluable as a support but got it into its head that it was there to carry.

I consider a totally separate carrying party to go up when the barrage had moderated would be better.

2. No shortage.

I attribute the lack of complete success to lack of depth on my centre due to the easing off of to keep touch with the left. I should like to mention the great help given by Lt. Francis (Bde Int[elligence] Of[fice[r] in getting us on the tapes. I consider that the forming-up could only have been done in moonlight, but the attack would have gone better if it had been darker, as the Germans could not have located where are men were and I think, in this case, we could have held on to the [Southern] redoubt.²³

Lieutenant-Colonel N.M.S. Irwin (CO 2nd Lincolnshire)

Notes

a. (1) [Barrage]

1. Barrage when it came down was efficient.
2. One or two how [itzer] s were repeatedly firing short in S + T zones as far back as VINDICTIVE Crossroads.
3. Owing to advance being held up by MG fire from MGs on our side of the barrage line it is not possible to determine whether the pace of the barrage was suitable.

b. (2) [Assembly]

1. The continuation of the duckboard track No. 5 S [outh] was heartbreaking. There was not more than 20 yards length continuous + track was laid too high off the ground. It took an overloaded man over 3 ½ hours walk from WIELTJE to MOSSELMARKT instead of under 2 hours by road. Owing to the condition of the track, my battalion and the Berkshires were a little mixed up by the head of the track, otherwise the assembly was not worried much. Hostile fire caused an average of 10-15 casualties a company before assembly.

c. [Enemy Fire]

1. At about Zero + 9 fell around VINDICTIVE Crossroads westward.
2. It was his MG and rifle fire (rifle fire negligible), which stopped the advance. His MGs opened at Zero + 3 minutes.

²³ 'TNA: WO/95/1929: 'Appendix B', 5 December 1917, 2nd Royal Berkshire War Diary.

d. [Forming-up]

1. Yes, tapes were well laid + the direction.
2. Tapes were undoubtedly useful.

e. [Equipment]

1. For the attack the men were not overloaded, although the condition of Track No. 5 made the men dead tired before Zero.
2. There was a shortage of Lewis Gun magazines + I think it would be a good thing to distribute these drums throughout assaulting troops.²⁴

Lieutenant C. Anderson (Adjutant & Acting CO 2nd Rifle Brigade)

Headquarters 25th Infantry Brigade

Secret

In reply to your G1/79, herewith information as required: –

a. BARRAGE

1. Very efficient.
2. Not many shorts.
3. Pace was found suitable.

b. ASSEMBLY

1. Carried out with only slight interference from the enemy, although, from their subsequent action, the forming-up on the tapes was apparently observed by them.

c. ENEMY'S FIRE

1. No enemy barrage on our front or support lines. Searching fire from about Zero + 5 in rear of support line.
2. Machine-gun fire particularly deadly. Machine-guns firing low – about 2 feet from the ground.

d. FORMING-UP

1. Under the circumstances (i.e. Teall Cottage being in the hands of the enemy) the tapes were all that could be desired.
2. The direction tapes proved useful in the advance.

²⁴ TNA: WO/95/1730: 'Report on Action of the Battn. from 2:30 p.m. 1-12-17 – M.N. 2/3-12-17', 6 December 1917, 2nd Lincolnshire War Diary.

e. EQUIPMENT

1. The men were not overloaded in any case.
2. There was no shortage except for very lights.²⁵

²⁵ TNA: WO/95/1731: 'Report of the Part Played by the 2nd Battn. The Rifle Brigade in the Recent Operations at Passchendaele', 6 December 1917, 2nd Rifle Brigade War Diary.

Appendix 14

**GHQ Instructions for the Defence of the Flesquières
and Passchendaele Salients**²⁶

64

SECRET

General Sir H.S. Rawlinson, Bt., G.V.C.O, K.C.B., Commanding Second Army
General the Hon. Sir J.H.G Byng, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O., Commanding Third Army

O.A.D. 291/29

With reference to GHQ no. O.A.D. 291/29, dated the 6th December 1917, describing the policy to be pursued in the defensive organization of the British front, the following special instructions are issued as a guide to the manner of dealing with the FLESQUIÈRES and PASSCHENDAELE salients.

These salients are unsuitable to fight a decisive battle in. It is, however, desirable to retain possession of them if they are not attacked in great force; and in the event of attack in great force to use them to wear out and break up the enemy's advancing troops as much as possible before these can reach the battle zone of defence which will be sited approximately as [a] chord across the base of each salient.

In accordance with this policy the salient will be held firmly until the battle zone of defence behind each has been prepared. The defences of the salients will then be organized into advanced or 'outpost' zones, and as these defences become more complete, so the garrisons can be reduced to what is required for the purpose in view.

The whole area of each salient should be organized defensively, in advance of the battle zone, with an intermediate system as well as a forward system of defence; the object being to compel the enemy to fight for every yard of his advance to the battle zone.

For the defence of these salients, therefore, after the battle zone is ready for occupation, the ground should be held chiefly with machine-guns, supported by artillery, and aided with ample barbed wire obstacles skilfully placed and hidden. Selected machine-gun companies might be detailed for the defence of stated sectors, and kept permanently (with reliefs) for a definite purpose.

²⁶ TNA WO/158/209: Second Army Operations File.

In the same way each sector should be under a specially chosen officer for preparation and defence.

In certain few portions of the area counter-attack will be possible. These must be foreseen and arranged for. At other points surprise counter-attacks with machine-gun fire will be possible. All this requires a special garrison, and leaders imbued with the offensive spirit even though forced to act on the defensive.

(Sd). *L.E. Kiggell*
Lieut. -General
Chief of the General Staff

G.H.Q.

13th December 1917

Copies addressed personally to : -

General Sir H.S. Horne K.C.B., Commanding First Army

General Sir H. de la P. Gough, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Fifth Army

Appendix 15

Lieutenant-General Sir Alymer Hunter-Weston's Confidential Letter²⁷

Headquarters, VIII Corps
BEF December 19, 1917

I had an interesting interview this morning with Douglas Haig, the Commander-and-Chief, at the Army Commander's house. Douglas Haig came with 'Curly' Birch, his chief artillery advisor, and asked Rawlinson to get me to meet him at Cassel, so that he could get my views on the situation in my area.

I went there with Ward and Aspinall, my chief gunner and chief general staff officer respectively, taking with me maps showing (i) the dispositions of our artillery; (ii) the dispositions of the enemy's artillery; (iii) our communications; (iv) our defences as they exist, and as I propose; (v) statements showing the very slow rate of progress which our plank roads, light railways, etc., are making owing to the difficulties of communication and to the effects of the enemy shelling; and (vi) a statement showing the strengths of battalions in my divisions, all of which are weak, and some, alas, desperately weak.

The Commander-and-Chief arrived about noon, and I went up to Rawlinson's own study. Curly Birch and I were sent for shortly afterwards. After a pleasant word of greeting we plunged into business, and I produced a map showing the positions of our artillery and of the enemy's artillery. I pointed out to the chief (what I had pointed out to Curly Birch (his chief artillery officer) the day before here at my headquarters at Vogeltje) that our guns were in such a position that if the enemy made even a moderately successful attack the great majority of our guns must be lost. This gave him furiously to think.

I pointed out to him the seven-mile length of our communications from Ypres to Passchendaele, and the fact that these communications were under hostile shellfire throughout their length from both north and south; that the country has been so cut up by shellfire that with the exception of such of the German "pillboxes" as were still intact nothing remained but shell holes and mud, impassable to guns or any other vehicles, or even to men except along the plank roads, tramways or duckboards.

²⁷ BL: 48366: Letter to Lady Hunter-Weston dated 19 December 1917, Hunter-Weston Diary, Vol. XII. Document marginalia in Lieutenant-General Hunter-Weston's own hand noted: 'Secret. Sent by the hand of one of my own officers'.

I showed him that my front was an almost exact semi-circle of 1300 yards radius, exposed to enemy artillery fire at easy range from almost three-quarters of a circle – from northwest by east by south.

I told him that the position at Passchendaele approximated to the position of which he had bitter experience at Lombartzyde on the coast; the swamps and the valleys behind Passchendaele corresponding to the Nieuport Canal; the Bellevue Ridge and the main Broodseinde Ridge, along which alone access to Passchendaele is possible, corresponding to the bridges over the canal; and the salient about Passchendaele corresponding to the ground that used to be held by us north of the Nieuport Canal.

I showed him that if the enemy really concentrated heavy artillery fire on to those two spurs (our only corridors of approach) and at the same time put on heavy concentrations on to our far too crowded gun positions, while they pulverized the troops and machine-guns in the Passchendaele Salient with fire, they would be able to smash up our infantry and machine-guns in the Passchendaele Salient, and having gained the ground by artillery fire, it would remain for hostile infantry to advance and occupy the ground thus won by the guns. Our defence against this advance by the hostile infantry lies in the power of our artillery to stop any such advance.

I pointed out to him, therefore, that if we wished to continue to hold the Passchendaele Salient, we must have guns in sufficient quantities and in such positions that they could mow down any hostile attacks on the salient. This necessitates having our guns forward in such positions that they were within reach of a successful minor attack by the enemy, and, indeed must form a tempting bait to him.

I furthermore pointed out how the fact of holding the salient with such long and precarious communications necessitated an immense amount of labour, and showed that owing to the great distance the labour had to go over bad communications, in order to get to the forward part of the area, the amount of work that could be done by the men in that front area was very small, even when the hostile shelling permitted any work to be done at all.

After getting him to understand this position, and making him feel very uncomfortable about the position of these guns, which, indeed, we could very ill-afford to lose, I continued to say that if my opinion were asked (my opinion had not been asked, but I felt it important to make him know my opinion politely and firmly) I should unhesitatingly recommend that the preparation of a strong position on the Pilkem – Clapham Junction Ridge should be pushed on with as rapidly as possible; an outpost or front position being prepared well ahead of it; and that as soon as ever the main Pilkem – Clapham Junction position was ready for occupation, the garrison of the Passchendaele Salient should be

reduced to a negligible quantity, only sufficient to bluff the Boche, and to prevent him from coming on to take that high ground without developing some kind of attack; but that it should be clearly recognised that, as soon as the Boche did attack, that garrison, acting as a rearguard, would withdraw and leave the horrible Passchendaele Salient to the Boche. The advantage of holding it as a rearguard in that way was to delay the Boche, and prevent him getting the fine observation over our lines that he would obtain as soon as Passchendaele and the tops of the adjacent ridges, just southwest of it, were in his hands.

My words sank in, and the policy has been agreed to, which is a very good thing. But between the adoption of this policy and the possibility of having it properly carried out there is a great gulf fixed, for we are short of troops and labour. It will take a considerable time to make the Pilkem – Clapham Junction position strong, and until that main position with an outpost line in front of it is prepared, we must continue to hold Passchendaele fairly strongly, and to have a good number of guns much more forward than I would wish. If, therefore, the Boche were to attack the real strength in the immediate future, we stand a good chance of suffering loss both in men and materials. However, that cannot be helped. We must take the situation (which was none of my making) as it stands, and hope firstly: that he will not attack until we are ready, and secondly: that if he does attack now we shall be able to defeat him owing to the excellence of our artillery and the gallantry our men.

Appendix 16

Night Operation on the Passchendaele Ridge: The German Experience from Published Regimental Accounts ²⁸

A

25th Hessisches Division

Leibgarde-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 115: At Passchendaele ²⁹

6 November 1917 to 15 February 1918

(1) On 6 November the first elements of the 3rd *Garde Division* arrived in the rest area situated near the Dutch border in order to assume the duties of *Division Lokeren*. 25th *Division* was attached to *Gruppe Ypern*, whose zone, with three divisional sectors, extended northward to link with *Gruppe Wijtschate* whose front line extended north of Ypres from Becelaere to Passchendaele. Train after train rolled smoothly toward the new objective so organised that the strength of a full division always remained north of Lokeren. Once again, however, to relieve pressure on the rail system, mounted units were sent by route march.

(2) Regimental staff and *I* and *II* battalions formed the first element of the Regiment to be transferred. On the afternoon of 6 November they were loaded onto trains at the station at Moerbeke and arrived as soon as evening of that day, having passed through Ghent and Dienze, at the hub Waereghem, 12 km north of Courtrai. The machine-gun companies, field train and combat train elements followed by route march with a stopover at Drongen. The regimental staff quartered in Wielsbeke, *I Battalion* in Vive St Eloi and *II Battalion* in Vive St Bavon (Vive St Baaf); all three villages were just to the northwest of Waereghem. Damp, raw weather foretold of the approaching winter.

(3) The Regiment remained in these quarters for four days. Hardly had the *Garde-Füsiliere* arrived from Exaerde when the regiment, now fully closed [-up], moved to another sector further forward in the early morning hours of 11 November. Short rail movements brought the battalions through Iseghem, close by Roulers, to Rumbeke; from here, new quarters, situated slightly southward, were reached: regimental staff and the *Garde-Füsilier-Bataillon* in Den Hukker, *I Battalion* in Kaiphas and *III* in Den Aap. Cramped occupation of available billeting in groups of tiny Flemish hamlets was necessary. In this area, barely 9 km from the front lines near Passchendaele held by 44th *Reserve Division*, the 25th *Division* sat as *Eingreifdivisionen* in the northern *Abschnitt A*

²⁸ All times related below are Continental i.e., 1 hour ahead of British time.

²⁹ Victor von Frankenberg und Ludwigsdorff, *Das Leibgarde Infanterie Regiment (1. Grossherzoglich Hessisches Nr. 115) im Weltkrieg 1914-1918* (Stuttgart: Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1921), pp. 157-67.

of *Gruppe Ypren* and assumed thereby the duties of the *11th Division*; *Grenadier-Regiment 10* had departed the sector upon arrival of the Regiment.

(4) Attacks in this sector of *Fourth Army* front had continued since the battle of 4 October. The British threw themselves like wild bulls against an iron wall tenaciously held by defenders of the German U-boat bases. 26 and 30 October, as well as 6 and 10 November, were again days of hard battle. The weight of our opponents was beaten back again and again. Only minor adjustments of the front gave witness to the seesaw battle. The German lines held: in the final account because the tactical requirements for the defence reinforcement and relief were well managed by the leadership. Behind almost every division in the forward line stood a second as a counterattack force, behind these often yet another reserve.

(5) So it was also here. *Gruppe Staden* closed in to the right. In its left sector, *4th Division* was in positions, the *199th Division* behind them. Left, in *Abschnitt B*, the *11th Reserve Division* held the forward line; *11th Bavarian Division* was the attack division. In a gapless chain of divisions, the *25th Division*, in the second echelon, sat close behind the battlefield, ready to jump into the fight.

(6) This assignment was filled with arduous challenges. The leadership had to discover the various possibilities for deployment and organise and prepare the forces; it was left for units to determine and specify attack and assembly areas in the vicinity. The Division's infantry comprised three separate attack groups; while *IR117*, as *Gruppe Alice*, composed a forward echelon, the Regiment was detailed to Gros as *Gruppe Ernst Ludwig* with a field artillery battery, an engineer platoon, dispatch riders and medical personnel; its use foresaw frontal and flanking counter-attacks in its own as well as neighbouring sectors. Depending upon the tactical situation assembly areas, or, respectively, attack positions nearer the front were to be occupied on the issue of a code word.

(7) For two days, routes of advance and assigned areas were reconnoitered; the battalions accustomed themselves to a general orientation of the terrain. A counter-attack was, however, no longer required. Gradually, the enemy's reserve must have been drawn off to continue the battle elsewhere. An easing of the situation occurred. The front remained unquiet and fluid. With heavy artillery concentrations massing, the cratered fields of Flanders settled down for the winter.

(8) The strong German reserves remained at first in their sectors and were used for periodic relief of units in the forward line. Without the necessity of prolonged rail transport of fresh divisions, the opportunity was afforded, through frequent relief, to balance the high security coefficient of combat with the necessary recovery of the units.

(9) So began for the first time on 14 November, in the northern sector of *Gruppe Ypern*, the replacement of the *44th Reserve Division* with the *25th Division*. The Regiment was to take over the positions of *RIR206* on the left flank. Regiments *116* and *117* closed in to the north. The new rightmost divisions and *Gruppe* boundaries began at Mosselmarkt, wound from here in a northerly direction approximately parallel to the Roulers-Ypres railway line, and described southward a great arc around Roulers; the left divisions and *Gruppe* boundaries followed this general trace to approximately 3 to 4 km. The forward line of the entire Division sector enclosed the village of Passchendaele in an arc, which the British, at that time, possibly held with their *49th Division*;³⁰ it [the village] lay directly northwest of the Regiment's positions.

(10) [The Regiment's] basic organisation comprised one battalion as covering force, a second in the main battle area, the third in reserve, all, for the most part, closely stacked behind each other. The defence developed from a new point of view that realistic assessment of the Battle of Flanders had brought about. The concept of a covering force area [*Vorfeldzone*], which had already appeared in the positional warfare southeast of St Quentin at Neuville St Amand, had jelled here and been expanded to a defined battle zone. Major distinctions were made between the covering force and main battle areas. Weak sections of the foremost battalion, their firepower reinforced with light machine-guns, were to hold the covering force area against enemy reconnaissance and weak attacks while, in the event of serious fighting, they were to withdraw step-by-step to the so-called line of main resistance [*Hauptwiderstandslinie*] which, by manoeuvre combat from the main battle area, was to be held. Here too, only a portion of the fighting troops were committed: to the rear stood the remainder of the forces, formed as assault companies and, according to the situation, reinforced with elements from the main battle area, ready for automatic counterattack. Security details and *Nahtkommandos*³¹ remained, as before, excluded for specific defensive assignments.

³⁰ Passchendaele village was held by *33rd Division* (VIII Corps). *49th Division* was attached to the neighbouring II ANZAC Corps.

³¹ Seam Command or Detachment: A special command team established to control the peculiar difficulties encountered at the junction between two units.



German infantry: Flanders December 1917
(Source: Author's Collection)

(11) On the afternoon of 14 November the Regiment began movement from its attack position in order, within this tactical scheme, to relieve *RIR206*. The *I Battalion* reached, after barely 5 km march, the area of the sector reserve. Its four companies lay dispersed along the little Veldebach [Velde Brook], just south of the Moorslede-Roulers highway crossroad with the Ypres-Roulers railway line; here the regimental command post was also located. The *I [Battalion]* followed the *II*, which was meant to relieve the foremost positions.

(12) The *Garde-Füsiliere* assumed, as the trail, the main battle area positions. Deep darkness reigned and, with the unfamiliar terrain, made the relief difficult; heavy enemy barrages, with harassing fire reaching far into the rear of the advance, slowed movement. There was much scattering of units. In the end, it was possible to accomplish the relief and secure linkups on both flanks.

(13) The ground of the battle area presented a sad, and as with the badly shot up positions around Gheluvelt, affecting picture. Swamp and morass dominated the forward area and ran in broad swaths in front of and through the friendly positions. The sea, only 35 kilometres distant, pushed the ground water to the surface of the pockmarked earth. Also here, crater upon crater. Trenches or lines with any semblance of purpose or obvious continuity did not exist. Concrete shelter was as good as non-existent: the commander of the covering force area (*Kampftruppenkommandeur*) north of Moorslede could barely

find a concrete slab to shelter under for his command post. The companies lay grouped in the open along the Passchendaele-Moorslede road where, earlier, the gas and electric works for the 300-metre distant village had provided power and light; to their rear lay the joint railway station for both villages. Small, unit-level adjustments brought with them into the sector on the night of 16/17 November, a result of displacement of boundaries, the former palace of Passchendaele to the north and the cemetery of the brave young fighters from 1914.

(14) The crater field extended far into the hinterland, a tangle of impassable impregnable areas. This led to unfortunate consequences. All logistic and relief efforts were confined to the railway and the few roads that led here and there, but seldom in the desired direction. The enemy, of course, immediately covered these generously and, preferentially at night, with harassing fires and inflicted on us not inconsiderable losses. The positioning of our counter-attack companies in tactically advantageous positions also caused great difficulties. They lay, spread out, and farther back than the situation demanded. More often than not, they were forced to seek and occupy unfavourable terrain, which occurred naturally overall. Minor adjustments forward or backward within the framework of the new conduct of battle were generally permitted, as well as demanded.³²

(15) The artillery activity of the enemy remained extraordinarily lively; in varying intensities across the entire battle area as well as the rear, harassing fires of all calibres fell; often, individual barrages rose to tremendous intensity. In spite of this, communications channels functioned well; for the most part even the telephone connections to the *KTK* remained and relieved the brave runners, who required considerable time to deliver reports and orders.

(16) With one relief, the battalions remained in this sector six days. During the night of 20/21 November, the Division was again relieved by the *44th Division* and, for the same period [i.e., 6 days] again pulled back as counter-attack force. The old regimental quartering area shifted somewhat eastward; regimental staff and the *II Battalion* lay in Oekene, the *I Battalion* in the vicinity of Kaiphas-Den Hukker, the *Garde-Füsiliere* in and around Bergmolens. The *6th* and *7th* companies from Oekene later joined the machine-gun formations of all battalions, who had found quarters in Rumbek. As a result of this adjustment, the forward attack positions and assembly areas were correspondingly adjusted, reconnaissance of which became necessary.

(17) Major von Rettberg, severely ill with typhus, was on leave that commenced at the end of October. Unfortunately, his return to health took so long that he was unable to return to the Regiment, which owed its victories in so many fights and battles to his extraordinarily brilliant leadership. He was, at first, replaced by *Hauptmann* Appuhn,

³² See Chapter 1, fn. 70.

who turned over command on 19 November to Major von Westerhoven who, by Supreme Cabinet Order, had been named regimental commander; before the war he had been a general staff officer of 5th Division, most recently chief of the general staff of VII Reserve Korps.

(18) On the afternoon of 26 November, the leaders of RIR206 stood on the roads leading from Duivelshoeken to the west, preparing to guide the Regiment, fresh after a six day rest, into the old positions. With their machine-gun companies, the battalions took possession of the position in one night: I Battalion the covering force area, II the main battle area, the *Garde-Füsiliere Battalion* remained back in reserve. In the new regimental command post, moved back slightly during the sector occupation by RIR206 and now consisting only of wooden barracks, the sector turnover occurred in the early morning hours of 27 November.

(19) Seven difficult days followed. From innumerable gun tubes, the enemy, in his accustomed manner, shelled anything that even remotely seemed suitable for defence, quartering, advance, or assembly. His superiority in munitions ate, in heavy salvos, into the aching terrain. His heavy calibre guns reached well into the reserve zone. The winter days appeared to be too short for the enemy fliers: at night if there was moonlight, they dove to fly close to the earth, shot their machine-guns and dropped bombs on suspected positions. From the relief of opposing infantry the possibility of attacks in sector was assumed; for 28 November, heightened readiness was ordered. Two companies from the main battle area were moved to the rail embankment south of *Bakrats-Hof*, the reserves pushed forward to the railway spur. Indeed, these by-the-book precautions proved premature. Only some days later, in the night of 2 December, did pounding denial and destructive fires begin on both sides in overwhelming strength, descending across the Division from the north flank; firing that, after pauses, increased in the afternoon. Green, yellow, red and white flares burst in colourful, indecipherable series throughout the night, evidence of a bloody firefight. The right sector of the Division, in which IR117 was deployed, was attacked. The Regiment had to give up its I Battalion, which, on 30 November, had been pulled back into reserve; it was deployed and eked out two full days in the forward-most lines of the adjacent right sector.

(20) The heavy artillery activity of the enemy resulted in loss after loss. At the beginning of December, the entire II Battalion had barely 100 rifles (i.e., effective strength) available in the main battle area. Irrespective, every night, patrols went across the forward area toward the enemy, reconnoitered in minute detail the trafficability of the difficult terrain, and determined the enemy's foremost line began at the ruins of the church at Passchendaele. They lay, as did the entire area, on a high ridge and the British had here numerous advantages. He [the enemy] sat, without marshes, on dry ground, and the rubble of Passchendaele offered him welcome cover. The task organisation the II Battalion ordered for its infantry and machine-gun sections in the battle area was exemplary.

(21) On the night of 3/4 December the 16th Division moved into *Abschnitt A* of *Gruppe Ypern* to take over the positions. The regiment, relatively drained by the preceding difficult days, turned over, after successful relief, responsibility to *IR68* and pulled back under cover of darkness to the small village of Beythem on the Menin-Roulers highway and was conducted by escort platoons to the new divisional rest area, bordered westward through Kachtem, east through Ginste.

(22) Here, between Courtrai and Thourout the Division served as Army reserve and remained initially and then continued under the orders of the *Gruppe-Ypern* for Sector A. Eventually, the term 'Assault Division' was supplanted by the new term "Army Reserve". The Army was ceded authority over relief and combat employment. Duties remained much the same as before.

(23) In this framework, for quarters, the regiment was assigned Meulebeke and the hamlets near it for the staff and its *I* and *II* battalions and for the *Garde-Füsiliere [Battalion]* the northern part of Ingelmünster, seat of the corps staff. The report that a change of mission between defence divisions and the Army reserve was, in future, only to be every twelve days was met with joy. In this way, the well-being of the brave fighters of Flanders was improved.

(24) A shift of the rest area further southward became necessary on 6 December since the Division had been assigned the southern *Abschnitt C* of the *Gruppe*. The Regiment moved with the staff, *I [Battalion]* and *Gard-Füsiliere Battalion* to Hulste, the *II* to Lendeledede, and was positioned on both sides of the Courtrai-Brugge highway. Great care was taken here to reconnoiter and prepare assembly areas and attack positions, including those for [possible] deployment into the neighbouring *Gruppe Wijtschate* zone. The commanding general of the *Gardekorps* comprising *Gruppe Ypern*, Excellency³³ von Böckmann, an old Life Guardsman, inspected the regiment on 14 December at Hulste.

(25) With the passing of twelve rest days, the division was newly deployed, this time to the left flank of the leftmost *Abschnitt C* of the *Gruppe*. Eighteen days in position were to ensue. A detailed relief plan, this time developed beforehand, greatly reduced the pressure on units assigned to still difficult forward positions through efficient division of responsibilities. The fighting went over, in the end, to trench warfare again, and the first priority again became providing the basic needs of life for the deployed forces. Trench construction offered here the only possibility. Despite this, the leadership had not inconsiderable difficulty in countering the fighting troops' natural aversion to digging in. It was a natural obstacle that had to be overcome.

³³ General officers in the German Army above the lowest grade (*Generalmajor*) were addressed as 'Exzellenz', *Generalmajore* were addressed as 'Herr *Generalmajor*'.

(26) On 16 December the Regiment was led by escort platoons from Lendelede to Ledeghem: mounted formations route marched; the field trains remained in Hulste and Lendelede. From Ledeghem it was a short stretch to the northward-oriented sector of the 36th Reserve Division; in the hamlets Nachtegaal, Roodbaard, Klaskapperie and Rockuitkapel the battalions stood ready to, in the coming hours of darkness, relieve RIR5 in the northern sector of the division, with the *Garde-Füsiliere* in the covering force area, I Battalion in the main battle area, and II in reserve; regiments 117 and 116 closed in due course to the left, and RIR23 to the right.

(27) Two regimental front widths were north of Becelaere, the new sector stretched in an approximate 1,000 metre-wide strip from Keiberg on the right flank in almost west-east direction to the main road and railway line Menin-Roulers; two small streams, Heyle and Passchendaele creeks, ran through it; hedges and tree lines covered the ground. Characteristic of the terrain and for the entire sector was the absolute lack of regularity: every point could be observed by the enemy, who generally lay on higher terrain; even the reserves east of St Pieter were not spared from this. Therefore, any traffic, including runners, was restricted by day to the absolute minimum. The Flanders crater field was here also the first rule for the possibility of quartering; concrete structures were non-existent in this area of previous deepest penetration by the enemy. Only a few ‘Siegfried foxholes’ existed. Ground water complicated the construction of earthworks throughout.

(28) Here the Regiment set about imposing its expressed will of becoming master of a difficult situation. The tactical advances that, in the interim, had transformed organisation to successful defence came into good use in the occupation of the entire battle space. All forces in the area available to the commander of the covering force area, consisting of the covering force battalion, two companies of the main battle area battalion, one and a half machine-gun companies, and a mortar platoon, constituted a fighting squadron (*Kampfstaffel*). They deployed as a covering force company, three companies of the main line of resistance that bore the designations A, B and C and, from these elements, some were deployed in the defence line of the covering force area as well as *Nahtkommandos* in the sector of the right-neighbouring regiment and, finally, two counter-attack companies close behind the main line of resistance. Significant expansion of the covering force area with security and defence lines represented, above all, a new development. The depth here was over 1,200 metres. From Keiberg the main line of resistance was flagged to the rear for the artillery. The command post of the covering force area commander was located at Waterdamhoek.

(29) Some 4 km rearward lay the so-called ‘thrust squadron’, comprising the remaining two companies of the main battle area battalion and a half machine-gun company. Security details were deployed to the artillery positions running along the Spriethoek. The regimental command post was located along the Menin-Roulers highway. With two companies close by and two companies at Rockuitkapel, the reserve battalion stood at the disposal of the *Gruppe*.

(30) The question of relief in the context of the entire occupation and the new organisation was admirably solved: the *II Battalion* and *Garde-Füsiliere* relieved each other in two rotations between the forward position and reserve after six days; the *I Battalion* relieved, each time with two companies, twice after five and once after four days.

(31) The construction of the positions began; a comprehensive construction plan was, again, after a long absence, issued. The first stage consisted of wire obstacles that, at first, in the battle area consisted of a basic protective form. The expansion of shellproof structures ensued. Shell craters were connected and expanded into crater nests. The entire defence began again to take on an integrated character. The regimental engineer Depot *Glypskapelle* provided the necessary building materiel.

(32) The securing of the means of communication was assured through redundancy. A telephone net with four switches and a total of 43 connections ran throughout the area; a four-faceted light signal net of large light signal apparatuses supplemented this. In addition, the forward-most companies also possessed the ability to communicate with the covering force area commander via the new small 'Light Signal 16 Apparatus'. Should telephones or light signals fall victim to combat effects or unfavourable weather, runners with a seven-link reporting chain or carrier pigeons from four release points came into action.

(33) Signal points with flare pistols and hand-held flares constituted the liaison with the artillery; even the MG companies utilizing special base guns, taken from the practise of the artillery, were prepared to respond to alarms in security positions. There were also messenger dogs, though there had been bad experiences with these: a particularly painful one had occurred in the earlier fighting by shifting fire onto Lille.

(34) Enemy artillery activity confined itself at first to a moderate level; in the experiences of the last weeks and months, it was hoped this heralded decisive German fire superiority. Only in the beginning of December did it increase again. The enemy concentrated primarily on the bridges of the Heule and Passchendaele creeks, in the vicinity of Waterdamhoek, on crossroads, and the rearward areas. Keiberg also received heavy fire frequently, often 1,000 rounds in two hours. Casualties for the Regiment, which in this period in the lines amounted to 15 dead and 50 wounded, were not particularly high. More telling were the staggering losses due to illness – almost 100 in just a few days. The harsh winter stopped its advance and settled into the waterlogged crater field. Ground fog rose and settled into the lungs of the brave fighters who waited in increased readiness. Ice-cold nights gripped the open field, frost and snow showers alternated. Water froze, thawed and refroze into ice sheets. Above all, the fighting squadrons, engaged in sharp defence, suffered without protection against this weather. Often, the frozen [men] rose from damp corners of the field to respond to a complete re-organisation

of the forces overnight. And despite all obstacles here the offensive spirit also remained intact. Night after night the foremost battalion sent reconnaissance patrols forward against the enemy, gained control of the intervening ground, and brought back valuable intelligence. Especially noteworthy among the unshakeable leaders were *Vzfw.* Billeb of *5th Company*; *Leutnant* d.R. Goebel; *Unteroffiziere* Astheimer, Möser and Lehr; *Gefreiten* Dickel and Anderl of *9th Company*; as well as *Vzfw.* Gembe of the *11th Company*. When no patrols went forward, the MG companies directed their nightly harassing fire frontally against the enemy positions before Molenaarelsthoek and enfilading fires to the east of Zonnebeke and the Polygon Wood.

(35) So the year 1917 approached its end. On 23 December the Regiment sent a detail of 4 officers and 19 men to a parade for the Emperor [Kaiser Wilhelm II] in Deinze. Christmas and New Years' could only be celebrated by the rearward elements of the Regiment, the reserve, and the two counter-attack companies.

B

*Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 116: The Battle in Flanders: Passchendaele & Becelaere*³⁴

November - December 1917

(1) The *25th Division* began to relieve *3rd Garde Division* on 6 November. This was accomplished in a way that insured a full strength division was placed at Ghent. The transport trains took the Division to Aersele, Waereghem and Denterghem. Regimental transport and the machine-gun company, halting in Lederberg before proceeding to Ghent, traveled by foot.

(2) The Division moved forward to relieve *11th Division* on 11 November. The Regiment boarded a waiting train for Rumbeke without its transport. It then moved to Oekene and Cachtem where it relieved *IR38*. The transport was subsequently stored in Rumbeke. The Division was now a designated *Eingreifdivision* for the north sector of *Gruppe Ypern* which was situated between *Gruppe Staden* and *Gruppe Wijtschate*. It would defend positions from Passchendaele to Becelaere.

(3) By the close of October the English had attacked continuously at Passchendaele, Becelaere and Gheluvelt. Passchendaele village was lost during 6 and 10 of November. Further enemy attacks were imminent. The Regiment immediately sent forward an *Abteilung* to *Division Abschnitt A* in order to gather information [about the sector]. Preparations had to be made concerning approaches, defences and counter-attack

³⁴ Prof. Albert Hiss, *Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 116* (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1924).

positions. Code word '*Triarier Aufmarsch*' meant to go forward [from vicinity of De Ruiter] to open the front; '*Fridericus Rex*'³⁵ meant to stand [about Vierkavenhoek] in readiness from south of De Ruiter. 25th Division would advance in support of 44th Reserve Division on receipt of these orders.



British prisoners at IR116 HQ near Gheluveld 26 September 1917. The killed Tommy is probably from 4/5th Black Watch, 118 Brigade, 39th Division. (Source: Author's Collection)

(4) On 14 November IR116 moved into *Abschnitt B* to relieve RIR205. I Battalion was placed in reserve by Vierkavenhoek (later in Zilverberg and Le Cavalier), while the III became the *Bereitschaft* [support] unit at Magermeirie; II Battalion became fighting battalion in the frontline position, where it experienced heavy losses from artillery fire. A grenade killed *Leutnant* d.R. Baasch of 8th Company during the relief.

(5) The frontline was in the same location it had been in October 1914. Weeks of fighting in this place of devastation would occur again. The area was very similar, although there were fewer shelters, to the Gheluveld sector. The KTK found, after much searching, a concrete pillbox to use as HQ. Companies lay in shell holes and there was little room to

³⁵ The *Triarier Raum* was the reserve assembly area. *Fridericus Rex* was the codename for the support assembly area. These zones were established east of the *Flandern I* Line.

manoeuvre. In front of the *Hauptwiderstandslinie* stretched a strip of *Vorfeldzone* to be defended elastically. Beyond this was the enemy line. The Regiment, however, did not feel secure because it lacked men to defend the *Sicherungslinie* facing the enemy. Positions of the *Kampfbataillon* were echeloned as far as the *KTK*. The *Stosskompagnie* and *Nahtkommandos* were sent to the right and left flanks [of *IR115* and *IR117*], while machine-gun positions were hastily assigned.

(6) Two to three kilometres existed between the support and reserve battalion. The new method of defence provided for a tremendous amount of artillery fire support. Zones were now to be defended in place of trench lines; *Tiefengliederung* [distribution in depth] was the solution. The 2 to 3 kilometres distance was important to the *Meldewesen* [signals]. This became the building block to a very important report centre under the supervision of *Leutnant* d.R. Geck.

(7) The *KTK* was near the telephone centre, which failed to function due to weather conditions. Wireless, *Luftfunker* [aerial signalman] and light signals were subsequently utilized. Messenger dogs and many pigeons were also used, but the latter were not very reliable. *Ypern Siren* [?], bugle and flares provided connection with the artillery. This system was [more] efficient. The most reliable connection was through runners who communicated information mouth to mouth. Runners were particularly selected for their daring and excused duty from the immediate frontline. One of these (*Gef. May*) was indestructible and known as “*Kugelsicher*” [bulletproof]; he was totally reliable and nothing could bring him down. May was subsequently honoured with the award of Iron Cross I Class for his exploits during this period. It was extremely important to use code words, acronyms and cryptographic messages when communicating through the *Meldewesen*, because the enemy had developed a system to listen in.

(8) The fighting capacity of our infantry was limited during the first days in this position, because the regiment was under strength. The area to be defended was constricted, especially opposite the *Kolonnenhof* [Exert Farm]. An exchange of battalions was to occur in two days, but was impossible owing to severe weather conditions. The rain was so heavy that the right flank company was separated from the Regiment by a swamp. Enemy artillery was very close and bombarded the position continuously.

(9) The traditional *Sanitätspause* was maintained no matter where the English fought. There was a great deal of activity by enemy fliers who frequently strafed positions occupied by the Regiment. These airmen also dropped leaflets asking the men to get out of their shell holes [and surrender]. They thought we would give ourselves up. The English threw out leaflets near Gheluvelt announcing their tremendous successes in Flanders; this was the way our enemy perceived events on the battlefield.

(10) 20 November was the day the English attempted a breakthrough near Cambrai and *RIR208* relieved *IR116*. Following this, the regiment moved into quarters previously vacated six days earlier. The Division was once again designated *Eingreifdivision*. This peaceful period, lasting six days, was used to construct shelters, rest and train. On 26 November 25th Division relieved 44th Reserve Division as *Kampfdivision* in *Abschnitt A*. *IR116* replaced *RIR208* near Passchendaele. The positioning of battalions was identical to that of our first tour in this sector.

(11) Shell holes held by the infantry were rapidly filling up with water. The men were pressed for time in applying the new method of *Siegfried Unterschlupfe* [Siegfried Shelter], which worked very well. Eight to ten concave corrugated metal sheets were placed one after the other over a flat bottom, supported by steel posts and then covered with 1 metre of earth. This gave four to six infantrymen protection from shell splinters, rain and cold. Positioned near the remnants of hedges, bushes or buildings, they were difficult to locate, even from the air.

(12) Fighting now became more severe. An officer's patrol under *Leutnant* d.R. Bode, with eight men of 7th Company, reconnoitered as far as Passchendaele Church. The enemy infantry, however, remained very quiet. An increase in hostile artillery fire led to the realization that the enemy was preparing another attack. The *KTK* was bombarded again and again. *Weidenhof* [Horne Farm] and *Grenzhof* [Greenly Corner] were also shelled on a daily basis, while the *Bereitschaftbataillon* [BTK] was bombed from the air at Magermeirie.

(13) On 30 November, *I Battalion* relieved *III Battalion* in the frontline, the latter moving into reserve, *II* into support. Hostile artillery fire became more severe during this day and the next. *Leutnant* d.R. Wust, *Vzfw.* Rothermel, and four men of 3rd Company were killed by a direct hit.

(14) At approximately 3:00 a.m. on 2 December, the frontline sustained a surprisingly heavy bombardment. The English attacked out of the right swamp in four to five waves within a quarter of an hour. They overran the right wing of the Regiment, despite heavy resistance, near the boundary of *IR117* as far as the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*. Here a tremendous struggle ensued with our 2nd Company and 9th Company of *IR117*. Men hovered around *Führer Leutnant* d.R.³⁶ Schade and Fuchs. Both officers were killed and company resistance broke after bitter close-quarter fighting. The enemy was able to advance, despite fierce defensive fire, and drive-off the remainder of 2nd Company into the swampy low ground beyond. Following this, 4th Company and part of *Leib Kompagnie* from the *KTK* (*Leutnant* d.R. Albers) were put in to counter-attack. The remnants of *Leib Kompagnie*, along with five machine-guns, occupied Height 40. *IR117*,

³⁶ d.R. = *der Reserve*.

led by *Hauptmann* von Arnim [*Kampftruppenkommandeur* of *IR117*] closed the gap and resisted further attacks.

(15) *III Battalion* (in reserve) received orders to proceed to Magermeirie. *6th* and *8th* companies were rushed to Pottegemsgut, but were shelled on the way – 10 dead in *8th Company*. Their brave leader, *Leutnant* d.R. Meier, was killed while making his way to the *KTK* for orders, after which *Vzfw.* Schnieder took command of the companies. In the meantime, *4th* and *Leib* companies had arrived in place under *Leutnant* d.R. Hoffmann. *Leutnant* d.R. Plagge was one of the first to be wounded during the counter-attack, but *Vzfw.* Fischer and Krichbaum (*Leib Kompanie*) pushed on from trench to trench with hand grenades. Hard work was done and the line again in our possession at approximately 10:00 a.m. Enemy losses, dead and wounded, were great with twenty prisoners being left in our hands, but many good *Kamerads* on our side were missed.

(16) One the heroes of the day was *Leutnant* d.R. Gombel, who was leader of the *Ist MG Company*. He was killed by artillery fire during the fighting. *Vzfw.* Gumbrecht, although severely wounded, took over Gombel's position with a rifle until the struggle came to a victorious end. Heavy artillery and air fighting continued throughout the day. This caused many casualties. The losses of *3rd Company* were especially severe.

(17) Fighting died down after nightfall. The reserve battalion was called back to Zilverberg; *II Battalion* was sent forward to replace the battered *I Battalion*. Our fliers reported the enemy line to be heavily occupied at the start of the next day, although the expected attack failed to materialize. On 4 December the Regiment was relieved and marched to Emelgem, Cachtem and Ingelmunster. Twelve days of peace followed. Divisional tactics were changed at this time. *25th Division's* scheduled withdrawal to Army Reserve in Gruppe *Ypern's* southern sector was postponed due to continued training.

(18) The Regiment next moved to Lendelede and Winkle St Eloi, where accommodations were better. Focus was, after arrival, maintained on regimental business and companies continued to train. The long period of rest and re-organisation came to an end on 16 December. The *Hessisches Division* then relieved *36th Division* in *Abschnitt C*.

C

*Infanterie-Leibregiment Nr. 117: To Passchendaele*³⁷

8 November to 14 December 1917

(1) The relief of 3rd *Guard Division* commenced on 6 November. 25th *Division* was now attached to *Gruppe Ypern*. *Gruppe Wijtschate*, the line of which extended from Passchendaele to Becelaere, joined *Gruppe Ypern* in the south. The *II* and *III* battalions left from St Jills at 9:00 a.m., regimental staff and *I Battalion* departing from St Nicholas at 5:00 p.m. The Regiment detrained at Meulebeke and Wareghem during the night of 6 November. It was necessary to send the field kitchen and horses by train, in order to keep transport trains as unencumbered as possible; everyone else had to march. A rest stop was made at Ghent during the move forward.



St Nicholas October 1917: *Hauptmann von Arnim* (Commander *III Battalion*) followed by 9th *Company*, parades past the regimental staff of *IR117* (Source: Offenbacher, *Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117*)

(2) Attached to OHL reserve, the regimental staff, with *I* and *III* battalions, moved to Meulebeke, while *II Battalion* was dispatched to Oosttrosebeke. Training was again intensified. *Hauptmann von Arnim*³⁸ and *III Battalion* demonstrated a textbook scheme

³⁷ Hauptmann Kurt Offenbacher, *Die Geschichte des Infanterie-Leibregiments Grossherzogin (3. Grossherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117* (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1931).

³⁸ Hauptmann Achim Konstantin Rudolf von Arnim (1881-1940). Entered military service as *Fahnenjunker* (*1. Garde Regiment zu Fuß*) 1900; *Leutnant* 1901; *Kriegsakademie* 1908-11; *Oberleutnant* January 1910; Attached General Staff 1911-14; *Hauptmann* March 1914; Assigned General Staff March 1914-May 1916; Assigned (successively) to General Staff *Garde Korps*, *Second Army* and as 1st General Staff Officer

based on guidelines provided by AOK [Armeeoberkommando] Nr. 4³⁹ for the defence of the *Vorfeldzone* and *Hauptwiderstandslinie*. The Division was ordered, following the arrival of its last elements, to the forward area on 11 November.

(3) In the meantime, the English attempted a breakthrough. They were, except for some minor gains, unsuccessful. The German front held fast. Behind every division in the frontline was an *Eingreifdivision*. The Regiment moved forward as *Eingreifstaffel Alice*. Billets for HQ Staff and *III Battalion* were found in De Ruiter, *II Battalion* in Duivelshoeken and *I Battalion* in Zilverberg.

(4) In front was 44th Reserve Division occupying *Abschnitt A* [east of Passchendaele] of *Gruppe Ypern*. On the right was 199th Reserve Division of *Gruppe Staden*, with 4th Division behind. The 11th Division was holding the frontline on the left in *Abschnitt B*; behind it was 11th Bavarian Division. All future planning, intelligence and tactics were discussed with the *Eingreifgruppen*. At the code word ‘*Triarier Aufmarsch*’, the entire Regiment would move south of De Ruiter; or to the front, or to the neighbouring sector. At code word ‘*Fridericus Rex*’, the Regiment would proceed [from about Vierkavenhoek] to *Abschnitt A*. The Regiment was very busy during the next two days reconnoitering various routes and positions to be taken up for the task ahead. Plans were also in preparation to relieve 44th Reserve Division in *Abschnitt A*. This occurred during the night of 14/15 November.

(5) The *I Battalion* was deployed as *Kampfbataillon* across from the northern exit of Passchendaele; *II Battalion* was in the ready position east of the *Grensshof*, *III Battalion* in reserve. Companies of the *Kampfbataillon* were situated in muddy shell holes without any cover from the elements. The battlefield resembled Gheluvelt, but was actually worse. It was impossible to remain in one position because of the morass. There was, other than a ruined farmhouse, no shelter or place to establish a *KTK*. The *Vorfeldzonelinie* stretched in front of the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*. The *Sicherungslinie* protected the [garrison of the] *Vorfeldzone*, while the *Kampfbataillon* was organised in depth. The zone stretched all the way to the *Gefechtsstand* [command post] of the *KTK*, and connected to the position of the *BTK* – 2 kilometres deep as far as the *RTK*. Shelter found in the rear zone was slightly better, the remains of houses and un-splintered planks providing cover. The Siegfried housing protected the men from rain and cold. Machine-guns of all zones were divided and placed into platform positions to be ready for defense. The battle was no longer fought in linear trenches; zones would now be defended.

(Intelligence) 38th Division August 1914-May 1916; Company Commander *Hessisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr.115* May-July 1916; Wounded and hospitalized July-December 1916; Battalion Commander *Hessisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr.115* December 1916-January 1917; Commander *III Battalion, Hessisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 117* January 1917.

³⁹ Fourth Army HQ.

(6) Enemy artillery fire was very active and heavy. Nevertheless, communications remained intact thus saving the lives of many brave runners. At 7:45 a.m. on 15 November, the enemy increased his artillery bombardment to drumfire on the frontline; it appeared he was preparing another attack. Our artillery responded with destructive fire, which prevented any movement. At approximately 9:00 a.m., the artillery on both sides stopped. A *Sanitatspause* followed; removal of enemy wounded was then observed.

(7) The regimental commander deemed it necessary to relieve forward units after two days due to conditions in the frontline and continuous mortar fire. This movement would occur despite dangerous conditions on the roads. On the night of 16/17 November, the *II Battalion* moved to the front and became *Kampfbataillon*. *I Battalion* was placed in reserve, while *III Battalion* went to *Bereitschaftsraum* [on-call or secondary zone]. The *II Battalion* suffered heavy loss from enemy artillery fire when they wandered forward into the English safety line. On the evening of the eighteenth, the HQ of the *KTK* was heavily shelled. A direct hit killed the leader of *II Battalion* (*Hauptmann* d.R. Schott), who had fought bravely at Bouchavesnes and Gheluvelt. *Leutnant* d.R. Brandscheid was wounded. *Obsterleutnant* Offenbacher took charge. *III Battalion* relieved *II Battalion* in the frontline that night. *3rd Company* was also sent by the *Bereitschaftsbataillon* (*I Battalion*) as *Nachkompanie* to Kalve to be placed under command of the neighbouring regiment.

(8) The high command realised the health of *25th Division* was poor after six days [in the frontline]. The Regiment was relieved by *RIR205* (*44th Reserve Division*) in *Abschnitt Nord*. *44th Division* had the reputation of being unlikable and rowdy; they were the worst. The *Gefechstand* [command post] of the *KTK* again received a direct hit and the leader of the *3rd MG Company* (*Leutnant* d.R. Gerbracht) was killed. Casualties during the six days were 2 officers, 23 men killed, 4 officers, 81 men wounded. The regiment again reverted to *Eingreifgruppe Alice* and returned to previously occupied billets where time was spent repairing shelters.

(9) 26 November brought another change with *44th Reserve Division*. The Regiment moved into the old sector: *I Battalion* as *Kampfbataillon*, *II* as *Bereitschaft* and *III* as reserve. It would remain in the line for six days, with a change of battalions occurring in two days. Infantry units found the fighting to be heavy from the moment of arrival. The reason for this was a need to enlarge the *Vorfeldzone*, as the enemy was so close that lively exchanges between patrols were common. After a few nights the *Sicherungslinie* was enlarged by 300 metres. Trench and dugout construction was impossible due to steady rain that transformed the area into swampland.

(10) *III Battalion* replaced *II Battalion*, while it rained buckets [sic], during the unusually quiet night of 1/2 December. A few grenades were found lying about the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*; otherwise it was a dark and stormy night [sic].⁴⁰ Suddenly,

⁴⁰ The author is obviously mistaken about prevailing weather conditions.

around 3:00 a.m., a rushing, wild *abriegellungsfeuer* [box barrage] was fired beyond the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*. At the same time enemy storm troops rushed the *Sicherungslinie*. These were followed by very strong formations advancing to assault the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*.

(11) On the right, the *11th Company*, (under the leadership of *Leutnant* d.R. Huch) withstood the assault with 25 men and 4 light machine-guns (08/15). To the left of this position was a wide space where *10th Company* was positioned under *Leutnant* Keiper. They were sheltering a few English prisoners in their *Granatlöchern* [grenade holes]. Again on the left, separated by another space, *Leutnants* d.R. Ludewig and Shuhmacher and the rest of the *12th Company* were positioned. *Unteroffizier* Sudheimer and *Schutze* Ehrhardt were firing a light machine-gun, sometimes from the front and rear, to avoid being overrun. Further left, the next space was occupied in strength by the enemy. The rest of *9th Company* was in this area with *Vzfw.* Scherstuhl and 12 men. No one knew what happened to *Kompagnie Führer Leutnant* Fuchs. This small group was fully aware that the left wing of the Regiment, along with *2nd Company IR116*, was completely surrounded.

(12) At 3:45 a.m. *Leutnant* Fuchs' young orderly stumbled into *Hauptmann* von Arnim's HQ and breathlessly announced that the left sector of *9th Company* had been unexpectedly attacked. Fuchs had been shot in the heart at very close range. *Unteroffizier* Balz bashed in the assailant's head, only to be struck down at the same moment by a bullet in the stomach; it was the same everywhere.

(13) The English had broken in on a wide front. *Hauptmann* von Arnim immediately ordered a *zug* [section] of the *1st MG Company* to occupy the *Aufnahmestellung* (assembly area). He also grabbed sections of the *2nd* and *4th* companies to meet the attack in front. *Leutnants* d.R. Lange and Hein (*2nd Company*) were severely wounded. The companies moved toward the front as far as *Kapellenhof*. *Leutnant* Hoffmann (*4th Company*) followed behind. In the swampy *trichtergelände* [shell hole terrain] the exhausted men, loaded down with heavy packs and machine-guns, were stuck because of darkness and bad ground conditions. Only two groups eventually reached the breach. Further resistance was hopeless; defending the remaining ground was all that could be hoped for.

(14) The morning came, and with it, unbelievable behaviour by the English. Troops of *Sanitäts Komp. 45* assisted with bandaging and cared for our own and the enemy wounded. English stretcher-bearers also provided aid. Our *Sanitäts* helpers discovered there were approximately 150 English in the vicinity of the breach, and altogether about 600 between and behind their own position. There was no reaction, despite considerable local superiority, when *Gef. Speiz* (*9th Company*) led eight prisoners away.

(15) *Hauptmann* von Arnim now realised he only had 80 to 90 rifles, 10 machine-guns, with limited supplies of ammunition, available. The enemy, however, appeared to lack will to continue the struggle. He left *Vzfw. Woeste* (2nd *Company*) in charge as he raced to the rear to organise a systematic counter-attack.⁴¹ At 12:00 p.m. *Woeste* noticed the enemy being driven back by 4th *Company, IR116*. He seized this moment to order an all-out attack. Taking prisoners as the English hurriedly withdrew, the *Hauptwiderstandslinie* was reached and contact made with *Vzfw. Scherstuhl* and 9th *Company*.

(16) In the meantime, artillery fire from both sides continued. It was very difficult for companies to maintain a connection. *Gef. Becker* and *Sanität Matzer* acted as volunteer runners between units. Heavy fighting started again at 5:00 pm. It was especially severe for 12th *Company*. By sheer luck this unit had been issued new hand grenades and was thus well equipped to resist. Arrival of darkness also assisted the beleaguered men. *Stosstruppen* arrived at midnight and cleared the *Sicherungslinie* area without further loss. *I Battalion IR115* now arrived to relieve the regiment. On the night of 3/4 December 16th *Division* relieved the entire [25th] *Division, IR29* arriving in our sector to take over the line.

(17) Trains were waiting at *Beythem* to transport the regiment to new quarters. *I Battalion* went to *Meulebeke*, *II* to *Ginste* and *III* to *Marialoop*. Losses during the previous six days were: 1 officer (*Fuchs*) and 59 men killed, 2 officers (*Lange* and *Hein*) and 145 men wounded, 32 missing. The *Division* would remain an *Eingreifdivision* attached to *Gruppe Ypern* in *Abschnitt A* for the time being. On 8 December it was necessary to delay the projected move south. The *Division* was instead sent to *Abschnitt C*. Its task, however, remained the same. New quarters were taken up: regimental staff, *I* and *II* battalions to *Oyghem*, *III Battalion* to *Wielsbeke*.

⁴¹ *Arnim* was wounded as he made his way back. He subsequently earned, following a full recovery, the *Pour le Mérite* for outstanding leadership, distinguished military planning and successful operations on the Western Front during the spring offensive of March-April 1918. Professor of *Wehverfassung* (Military Science) *Technische Hochschule* Berlin following retirement from the army 1920; NSDAP and SA *Gruppenführer* 1932; promoted *Oberstleutnant* 1939; KIA near *Monchy Lagache* 24 May 1940.

38th Thüringian Division

D

*Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 94: The Second Time in Flanders*⁴²

10 November to 23 December 1917

(1) The most difficult Flanders terrain was found in new positions south of the Houthulst Forest. Capabilities of our weaponry were diminished for the first time on the Flanders front, while the regiment suffered from extreme wet, cold and swampy conditions in the forward area.

(2) *Vizefeldwebel (Vzfw)* Maier Eckhardt wrote an article for the *Patrouillen Zeitung* announcing the visit of the Grand Duke [Wilhelm Ernest of Saxe Weimar Eisenach] on the 24 November, in order to have explained to him the current situation of the [38th] Division. The Grand Duke first greeted all of the officers and then reviewed the Regiment. The view was the clearest experienced by the regiment since its arrival in the area, despite the fact that the day was cloudy. For the first time one could see the many fine parallel lines of the Flanders landscape. It was so clear that the poplar trees lining the road were also discernable. All the important points of the map could be observed. One could also view small towns and hamlets at a distance. With a telescope one could see at a greater distance, the busy railways in the English hinterland to the smallest detail. The landscape could be clearly viewed from the Kimmelberg in the SW, to the ruined cathedral at Ypres and the narrow church tower of Poperinghe.

(3) This *Patrouillen Zeitung* article described the third largest day of combat experienced by the Regiment in the World War. It took place on 2 December 1917 near Passchendaele: “As the Regiment left the line on 25 November there was hope for a period of rest following the Christmas holiday. For the third time, however, it was to be dispatched to the Houthulst Forest. A change of orders arrived that same day. The 38th Division was now to be sent to a new position. IR94 was quartered in Roulers on this day. The Division was put on alert for the frontline on the morning of the twenty-eighth. During the evening of 30 November it relieved the position south of Westroosebeke. It was clear to the Regiment that this would be the worst fighting so far encountered on the Flanders front”.

⁴² Alexander von Hartmann, *Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Verlag von Klasing & Co., 1921).

(4) The English desire to capture the Westroosebeke heights could only be achieved by frontal attack. The position had to be held at all costs. *III Battalion* relieved the frontline as planned on the night of 1 December. The will of the officers and men surmounted all difficulties as they moved forward, even though this swampy, muddy sector was unknown to the Regiment. Three Englishmen were captured and important disclosures made. Artillery fire was very heavy and continued into the night hours.

(5) Enemy artillery fire decreased during the early hours of 2 December. By 2:00 a.m., everything was eerily quiet over the entire area. This quietude was a bad omen. The men continued to make their rabbit holes as comfortable as possible, while maintaining good spirits and always being vigilant.


(6) Shortly before 2:00 a.m. an English patrol approached on the right of *2nd Company* and was shot down. The *Vorfeldzone* then reported that much activity and moving about could be seen in the enemy lines. At first this movement was believed to be only a relief in progress. Shortly before 3:00 a.m., it was realised by *9th Company* that an English assault on the *Vorfeldzonelinie* was imminent. Annihilation [artillery] fire was immediately called for.

(7) The English attack commenced at 2:20 a.m. The German defensive barrage commenced firing, while simultaneously the English drumfire bombarded our line. The English were very strong, attacking *IR94* with three battalions. The men in the outpost line opened strong fire with rifles and machine-guns. Artillery and *Minenwerfer* fire also inflicted great loss on the enemy. The English, nevertheless, constantly sent more men forward and broke through the *Vorfeldzonelinie* in two places. Thereafter, they reached the *Hauptwiderstandslinie* [east of Hill 52]. Like the opening of floodgates, the English came in on the right flank and in the centre of the *11th Company* holding the *Vorfeldzonelinie*. Fighting step by step, the Regiment had to give up the position, resisting with hand grenades and, in certain places, bloody hand-to-hand combat with the bayonet. The *9th Company* was sent forward and fought with continuous rifle and machine-gun fire.

(8) The attack was halted on the left wing [opposite Northern Redoubt and Teall Cottage], while the threat on the right wing forced a retirement to the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*. Like islands, the garrison of the *Vorfeldzonelinie* remained in groups and fought back. At 3:15 a.m. the English appeared before the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*, but well aimed fire forced them to retire. Five prisoners were captured during their retreat. They claimed to be intoxicated during interrogation.⁴³

⁴³ Accusations of intoxication among attacking British and Dominion troops was a common German assertion that was 'almost certainly not true'. See Nigel Cave, *Passchendaele: The Fight for the Village* (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), p. 108.

(9) Whilst 9th Company reoccupied the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*, 2nd Company immediately passed through to advance a further 20 metres and reoccupied the *Vorfeldzonelinie*. The Regiment had freed itself from danger of encirclement. Serious fighting occurred in the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*, as machine-gun fire from 3rd Company forced the enemy to retreat. 12th Company also demonstrated courageous resistance.



Defensive Battle by Passchendaele 2.12.17: ‘Engländernest’ denotes bight of ground secured during 16th NF’s late afternoon counter-attack. (Source: Hartmann, *Das Infanterie Regiment Grossherzog von Sachsen (5. Thüringisches) No. 94 im Weltkrieg*)

(10) On the right wing, the *Hauptwiderstandslinie* of the neighbouring regiment splintered under constant machine-gun fire. *Unteroffizier* Rohne remained like a cornerstone at his post and secured the position through flanking fire together with 1st Company against the advancing enemy. This brought the fighting to a standstill. The strong defence of the *KTK* and the 4th Company prevented further attacks from developing. Fighting ceased with the arrival of dawn.

(11) English medical personnel arrived around 9:00 a.m. Efforts to recover their dead and wounded were observed at many places before our line. 4th Company removed the

remaining English dead and wounded from the *Vorfeldzonelinie*. The sector of the neighbouring regiment was cleared of the remaining English with the assistance of 4th *Company* during the afternoon.

(12) At 5:00 p.m. the English [16th NF] attacked again in many waves in an attempt to capture the area on the right flank. A timely response with rifle and machine-gun fire prevented this. The *Vorfeldzonelinie* was again secure. Forty-six prisoners and 14 machine-guns were captured. Regimental losses in killed and wounded were 11 officers and 200 men. The men of 5th *Company* stood sadly before a stretcher on which was placed the body of their beloved *Leutnant* Junge, who had led them through many successful battles.

(13) On 3 December the *Heersbericht* [Army Bulletin] reported the fighting of 1/2 December: “Early yesterday, after violent drumfire during a moonlight night, the English with strong forces attacked our positions at and north of Passchendaele. Thüringian and Hessian troops threw back the enemy in a sharp counter-attack and made 60 prisoners”.

(14) On 11 December the commander of the *III Battalion* invited the companies to the *Kirchplatz* for a ceremony where they would be honoured for their bravery during the fighting on 2 December. The Divisional Commander [*General-Leutnant* Schultheis] awarded Iron Crosses. He thanked them with a very short address and congratulated the Regiment for its energy, strength and well-executed defence, where many English were killed and taken prisoner. He added that the enemy did not get what they wished to capture; *Höhenrücken – Passendale* [and] *Westroosebeke* still remained in our hands. All did their duty during this engagement.

(15) The Flanders Army was honoured by a visit from the Emperor following the end of the great battle (23 December). 50 select members of 38th *Division* (under the command of Major von Pfannenber) were awarded the Iron Cross II class at a ceremony attended by the All Highest.

E

*Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 95: The Fight in Flanders, winter 1917*⁴⁴

15 November to 19 December 1917

(1) The 38th *Division* was placed in *Fourth Army* reserve in Flanders. On 10 November orders were changed and it was designated as an *Eingreifdivision* attached to *Gruppe*

⁴⁴ Major A.D. Buttmann, *Kriegsgeschichte des Königlich Preussischen 6. Thüringischen Infanterie Regiment Nr. 95: 1914-1918* (Zeulenroda, Thüringen: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935). This translated section will, for narrative purposes, cover the period November 1917 to early February 1918.

Staden thus relieving 27th [Württemberg] Division. Front commanders immediately proceeded to Gits, and from there to Hazewind where they joined Grenadier Regiment Nr. 123 in *Eingreif Gruppe B* of Division 3. The 38th Division would remain attached to *Gruppe Staden* throughout the great Flanders battle. Special weapons were also issued during this time.



Thüringian soldiers at the 38th Division recruit depot March 1917
(Source: Author's Collection)

(2) The Regiment was in the rear of the Houthulst Forest – once a preserve of the King of the Belgians – now reduced to a sea of shell holes and mud. In addition, enormous fallen trees prevented movement. The Regiment would become familiar with this chaos of which there was more to come.

(3) Divisional relief began on 23 November. The exchange was complete by the twenty-fourth. The enemy, as always during reliefs, became very nervous and the Army Group expected a night attack. It was believed that the English would attempt a *handstreich* [raid] in an attempt to win a better position on drier ground. Companies were notified that the relief would be delayed, although nothing occurred during the evening. The Tommies calmed themselves down, but south, near Westroosebeke, there appeared to be a great deal of fighting. The relief was not complete until 25 November.

(4) It was believed that the Division would be given some rest, but there was to be disappointment. It next relieved 4th Division and became an *Eingreifdivision* attached to *Abschnitt B* of *Gruppe Staden* (*Garde Reserve Korps*). The first thing the Battalion did

was identify quarters in nearby towns; *I Battalion* went to Bevern, *II Battalion* to Ardone and *III Battalion* to Ardeppelhoek.

(5) Immediately the Regiment was situated it began preparations for the expected battle, but Tommy didn't come and the march was cancelled. The Regiment remained on alert and later the order came from [83rd *Infanterie*-] brigade for relief. No one, however, believed this, although everyone was in desperate need of rest. Constant wet and the bad positions [bivouacs] under open sky made the men sick. Swelling of the feet from dampness caused great suffering. The English suffered more from constant wet feet, because they wore laced boots and *Gamaschen* [puttees], which were unsuitable for the Flanders mud. The German issue [jack-] boot was much better in the prevailing conditions.

(6) On 30 November orders were given for the relief of the line between Passchendaele and Westroosebeke. On 1 December, the changeover with *IR357* was completed. The much fought over *Feldherrnhügel* [General's Hill] with the *Nordhof* [Void Farm] on the left wing, was the position of the Regiment. The battle area was the typical Flanders landscape, with many bushes and rows of trees and bullet-riddled farmhouses. This area went as far as the *Hauptwiderstandslinie* situated on a high ridge and offering good observation. Mud separated the opposing lines below the slope. The enemy had a difficult time in this inundated area and therefore would attempt to capture the heights. The English desire to reach the higher ground was demonstrated by the fact that they fired every calibre they had, in order to wear down the Regiment before their next attack.

(7) There was a light covering of snow on the landscape with a full moon lighting up the night sky, so one had to be careful. At around 11:00 p.m. on the evening of 1 December, not long after the Regiment made itself comfortable in the [new] position, the commander of 7th *Company* discovered approximately 30 to 40 English in front of the *Vorfeldzonelinie*. These were believed to be ration carriers who had lost their way and were immediately shot down.

(8) At 2:15 a.m. on 2 December, a strong twenty-man patrol was sighted in front of the *Vorfeldzonelinie* and easily dispersed. Suddenly, in the moonlight, an unbroken line of the enemy was discovered approaching the *Feldherrnhügel*. Shortly before 3:00 a.m. the enemy advanced through the deep mud. Abruptly, artillery fire, approaching the level of drumfire, bombarded the [divisional] hinterland where all of the light and heavy guns were located. Now there was work with heavy firing by our artillery, which hailed down shells on the enemy. The full moon gave our gunners the advantage because they could view rows and rows of the enemy and inflict many casualties. Despite all, the tough English came forward approximately 20 metres and threw themselves to the ground.

(9) The Regiment now experienced heavy grenade volleys that accounted for many machine-gunners, and supported by heavy artillery fire, the enemy advanced forward to breach the line. The brave defenders were unperturbed. In close fighting with their companions of the 6th and 7th companies, they continued resistance at the exhortation of their officers – *Leutnants*’ d.R. Rossgger, Dollinger, *Vzfw.* Scheler and *Vzfw.* Hess. Despite heavy losses [to the Regiment], no ground was lost. In front of the small *Abschnitt* of 7th *Company*, 90 to 100 dead were counted and the English had to retreat. The enemy on the right wing had an easier avenue of retreat due to drier ground conditions.

(10) On the right wing, the English approached the front of outpost line 4. The 8th *Company* fought hard – *Leutnant* d.R. Linck bleeding to death from wounds. A small group resisted from front and rear of the *Vorfeldzonelinie* and killed many of the enemy with light machine-gun fire. They [defenders] were eventually able to reach the safe area [behind].

(11) On the left wing, the English broke through to the *Hauptwiderstandslinie* and there they were very secure. On this spot heavy fighting occurred with bayonets and hand grenades. The enemy was too strong for the small, leaderless groups and it appeared they would conquer. At the last moment, *Leutnant* d.R. Rossgger realised the danger and gathered 15 soldiers armed with machine-guns. He delegated command to *Vzfw.* Scheler and *Vzfw.* Hess and threw himself and the 15 men against the storming Tommies. *Feldwebel-Leutnant* Frobe⁴⁵ (Commander of 5th *Company*) also realised the situation, and joined the fray with his best men. The fight was man against man and the enemy was stopped. Not a foot of ground was lost; the gap was closed and combat came to a standstill. In the middle of the captured line was a position occupied by three brave men of *IR95*, who prevented the enemy from approaching. These were *Leutnant* d. R. Vogt, *Gefreiter* Fiestner and *Gefreiter* Landwehrmann.

(12) *Oberstleutnant* von Selle (HQ in Westroosebeke) realised the critical situation at the *Feldherrnhügel*. At 8:30 a.m. he ordered *Leutnant* d.R. Martini – the most senior officer present – to attack from the left wing near the *Nordhof*, in order to push back the enemy breakthrough. The order was extremely difficult to execute because the enemy could spot any movement in the daylight. The task [approach] was only accomplished by having men crawl forward a few at a time. Martini, although delayed until the afternoon, was able to achieve this deployment. The enemy, unwilling to surrender his gains, proceeded to strengthen the newly captured positions.

(13) The enemy could redeem past failures if he captured the *Höhenrücken* of the *Feldherrnhügel*. Yes. If it wasn’t for the damned Germans – the Huns; they forgot that

⁴⁵ *Feldwebel-Leutnant* (Sergeant-Lieutenant) was a wartime rank culled from prior NCO’s (generally retired, but if active with at least six years service) who were deemed to have the qualifications to fulfill a Lieutenant’s rank, but without the qualifications to actually be promoted to Lieutenant.

we fight for the safety of our home and country. At 3:00 in the afternoon, *Leutnant* d.R. Martini, with *Leutnant* d.R. Klopple and *12th Company*, counter-attacked the enemy. Step by step, with heavy hand grenade fighting, they slowly but surely, as planned, won [secured] the flank.

(14) The [main] counter-attack began in broad daylight at 5:15 p.m. when *11th* and *12th* companies with two *Truppes* of *9th Company* attacked the enemy. At the same time, annihilation fire was called for and placed on the right positions. The Tommies resisted heavily at first. As the counter-attack continued they realised no further headway could be made and retreated with heavy loss. *Leutnant* d.R. Vogt and his two companions [still holding out in the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*] were liberated as the enemy fell back.

(15) The English gained not an inch of ground. They were thrown back to their position in the *sumpf* [mud]. The commanding heights remained in our hands. On the bodies of the English dead were discovered maps that revealed the enemy had attacked with five battalions; very few of these poor souls returned. In the *Vorfeldzone* lay hundreds of English dead. Our losses, however, were not few, but, thank God, more were wounded than dead. Captured booty consisted of 14 prisoners and eight Lewis Guns. On 2 December 1917 the Regiment again demonstrated, despite a lack of rest for months, great heroism. Through all this fighting it maintained its reputation with the high command.

(16) Through captured maps it was discovered that it was highly important for the English to reach the commanding heights in order to overlook the U-boat bases in the Brugge basin. The eastern slopes of the *Feldherrnhügel* protected the entire light and heavy artillery. It would have been a tremendous victory had the English succeeded. Such a success may have led to an early ending to the war. The *II Battalion*, which suffered the most losses and had endured the most fighting, was withdrawn into reserve that night and replaced by *I Battalion*. The enemy only concentrated on [the discharge of] artillery and machine-gun barrages.

(17) At 3:00 a.m. on 5 December, the regimental *Gefechtstand* received a direct hit and *Obersleutnant* von Selle was wounded, although he remained with his men. The Regiment was very much in need of rest. With subdued joy, the men received news of [imminent] relief. The regiment was relieved by *IR91* on the night of 7/8 December. The *I Battalion* went to Bevern, *II Battalion* to Ardone and *III Battalion* to Ardepplehoek. They next proceeded to *Roulers Nord* where they were quartered. The peace was short-lived. On the night of 12/13 December, they returned to the hard-fought *Feldherrnhügel* of 2 December. The troops were transported by light railway to Most. The Flanders battle seemed to be over. Fighting became less and less every day. Tommy, with masses of men and material, had gained nothing to speak of.

(18) On the night of 17/18 December, *Unteroffizier* Tappe and *Gefreiter* Glaser of *4th Company*, each took four men of *1st* and *2nd* companies, and on their own initiative, led a

patrol to take out and capture prisoners from an enemy post known as ‘*Engländernest*’. The post was found, to their surprise, to be unoccupied. As they proceeded further, there was no sign of the enemy. Leaving the mud, they reached the road about 500 metres from the *Vorfeldlinie*. This discovery led to the advance and consolidation of the area. On 18 December an Englishman came forward [to surrender]. His feet were black and swollen. He had trench foot like most of the Tommies who were constantly walking and standing in water.

The Days at Oostkamp

(19) The Regiment was relieved on 18/19 December. It proceeded to Oostkamp near Brugge, where the Christmas holiday was celebrated. The highlight of this period was a visit by the Emperor, who wanted to celebrate the holiday with his Regiment in the field. Celebrations and church services took place with the Duke in attendance. Training commenced at the end of the festive season. Another brigade relieved the Regiment [at Oostkamp] on 18 January 1918.

Trench War in Flanders, Winter 1917-1918

(20) The Regiment returned to Houthulst Forest, where it relieved *IR148*. The area was pleasantly familiar and it was an easy adjustment to dirt and mud after time spent at Oostkamp. Transported by light railway, the Regiment was quickly in Gits, and from there marched forward by foot. The weather was rainy and foggy. The front, however, became livelier as the weather improved. Fog remained until the afternoon, making it difficult and at the same time advantageous, for patrol work. The men mulled about in the *Vorfeldzone* looking to salvage things Tommy left behind.

(21) On 31 January, *Mus[ketier]* Boss, while moving about the *Vorfeldzone*, lost his way in the fog and found himself in front of an enemy post. He discerned this after overhearing loud talking by the Tommies. Boss returned for assistance to capture these English. Halfway back he encountered *Leutnant Vogt*, who was already aware of the situation and had decided to rush the post. He then returned with *Vzfw. Gunsch* and a few others. In no time they had nine Tommies, 1 heavy machine-gun, 1 Lewis gun, 13 ammunition boxes, tool chest, a few carbines and *Karten* [maps and charts]. This very small group returned, despite heavy enemy fire, at 2:00 p.m. with all their treasures to much applause from their comrades. Three NCOs and six men of 16th Northumberland Fusiliers⁴⁶ (96th Brigade, 32nd Division), which had relieved 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers of the same brigade, were made prisoner. For this feat, *Vzfw. Gunsch* and *Mus. Boss* were celebrated with speeches and awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class.

⁴⁶ This disagreeable *ad hoc* raid was 16th NF’s last engagement before being disbanded as a result of BEF reorganisation in February 1918. See Captain C.H. Cooke, *Historical Records of the 16th (Service) Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Council of the Newcastle and Gateshead Incorporated Chamber of Commerce, 1923), pp. 91-93.

(22) Everything remained quiet and clear. *Oberstleutnant* von Selle came forward with a light machine-gun [crew] and observed the unusual sight of one joyful, carefree man jumping over and across shell holes from the direction of the enemy line. At 300 yards the machine-gunners prepared to open fire, but the *Oberstleutnant* stopped them. It was a hot and happy *Mus. Boss*, who explained to his regimental commander that he wanted to go and get something to eat from Tommy: “Would you believe those fellows sleep at lunch? Here are corned beef, cakes, shaver and soap”. The regimental commander proceeded to reprimand Boss for his irresponsible behavior, despite his recent medal and previous achievements. Later, with great pride, he promoted Boss to *Unteroffizier* for bravery in the face of the enemy. Boss promised to be more responsible in the future. A few days later, however, he did something similar on another patrol... The Regiment was relieved by *IR357* in early February; this was the same unit relieved during the previous December.

F

*Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 96*⁴⁷

11 November to 17 December 1917

(1) The English were successful in their attacks between Langemarck and Hollebeke. Eighty-six [German] divisions were sent to the front during this fighting. Thanks to these [formations] the English were unable to reach the Flanders plain.

(2) The English, however, still hoped for a breakthrough by launching partial attacks. Our front positions suffered greatly from destructive fire. *Eingreifdivisionen* had difficulty in reaching the forward area; a change of tactics was necessary. A *Vorfeldzone* of 500 to 1,000 metres was established in front of the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*, which would be occupied by a thin line of machine-gun outposts. The *Vorfeldzonelinie* was to retire to the *Hauptwiderstandslinie* during a large-scale attack. This gave *Vorfeldkämpfers* enough time to await the arrival of the *Eingreifdivisionen*, which would then move forward. The scheme allowed for defensive elasticity against any attack.

(3) Constant rain caused difficulties for the German defenders. Trenches and concrete shelters failed to provide refuge from the wet due to the high water table. The whole area was a complete field of mud. Men were hungry, frozen and had no cover from artillery fire. This was the condition of *IR96* when it arrived at Deerlyk and St Louis. After re-

⁴⁷ A. Bolsche, *Sturmflut: Das Erleben des 7. Thür. Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 96 im Weltkrieg: Auf Grund der Kriegstagebücher und Regimentsaften bearbeitet* (Zeulenroda, Thüringen: Verlag Bernhard Sporn, 1935).

organisation a new order arrived stating that the [38th] Division would be transferred from *Gruppe Wytshaete* to the newly formed *Gruppe Staden*.

(4) 11 November found the battalions standing ready to be entrained from Swevegn. The train passed through Courtrai and Roulers to Gits. On arrival, there were no [destination] orders and the troops just stood about. Information was finally received directing the Regiment to proceed to quarters at Lichtervelde. On reaching this destination, however, there was no room because units already billeted there took up all available space. The decision was finally made that space would be shared with *IR120*. On 12 November further room had to be found after the arrival of *III Battalion*.

(5) The Regiment was in *Abschnitt 3* of *Gruppe Staden*. Deployed in this sector were *41st Division (Stellung Division)* and *38th Division (Eingreifdivision)*. *IR94* and *IR95* were quartered in Gits. The Division had to remain in constant readiness, therefore much needed machine-gun training was provided for the *Ersatzleute* [replacements]. Days were spent this way until 16 November when the order arrived to relieve *IR18. II Battalion* was to be *Bereitschafts [BTK] Battalion*; *I* and *III* battalions were designated forward and reserve battalions respectively. The Regiment then proceeded to the Houthulst Forest. After a quiet time, it received orders that it would be relieved by *IR18* on 24 November. The relief was complete by the following day. On 26 November an unexpected phone call was received ordering *38th Division* to move. It was again designated *Eingreifdivision* and would be deployed on the left wing of *Gruppe Staden* to replace *4th Division*. On arrival in Wynendaele billets were limited and unacceptable. Necessary arrangements were arranged after long discussions with the Town Major, for additional quarters to be provided in Roulers for the regimental staff. The regiment now experienced some order and peace, but it had to remain in readiness to return to *Gruppe Staden*. Arrangements were made with *IR14 (4th Division)* for a changeover every six days.

(6) On 30 November, *38th Division* relieved *199th Reserve Division* in *Abschnitt B*. It would remain there for six days. *IR96* replaced *IR114* SW of Westroosebeke. A small area was found on the commanding heights for the *BTK* and the *KTK*. SW of this spot stretched the large valley of the battle sector as far as the Paddebeek. This depression was very muddy and untraversable in some areas. In the middle was a strip of land that offered a firm footing southward as far as the Paddebeek. Organisation of the divisional sector was constrained by bad terrain conditions and the limited number of concrete shelters. Companies were echeloned in depth. In front was A Company, behind B, C and finally D.

(7) A wide *Abschnittsbesetzung* [occupied sector] of the firing line did not exist. Connection on the right was missing, while on the left there was at least eye contact. Mud prevented any large attacks from occurring, so companies were not placed in the line at full strength and often consisted of a *Kampfkompanie* of 25 to 30 men and a

Bereitschafts Kompanie of 30 to 40 men. It was so quiet that companies relieved themselves within the Battalion. The days spent in the line only drew heavy artillery fire. The Regiment experienced no infantry attack, but frontline machine-gunners were often called upon to assist neighbouring sectors.

(8) On 4 December officers and *Einweisungs Kommandos* [liaison party] of *IR15* (2nd *Garde Reserve Division*) introduced themselves. The *Garde Reserve Division* was to replace the 38th. First elements of *IR15* arrived to relieve the Regiment during the evening of 6 December. *I* and *III* battalions were relieved first; *II Battalion* followed twenty-four hours later. Battalions went to Gitsberg, Koolskamp and Eegem. The Regiment remained at these villages for six days after which it returned to the same sector, but not the same portion of the line. Instead it would be inserted into the more dangerous *Abschnitt B* on the left.

(9) On the night of 12/13 December *IR96* relieved *IR77*. On the thirteenth, Major Behrens took over command of the Regiment because *Oberstleutnant* von Hertell was due to proceed on leave. The left of *Abschnitt B* was the most dangerous portion of the divisional front, as it belonged to the half-circle around Passchendaele. Companies were distributed as follows: 9th *Company* to the *Vorfeldzonelinie*, 10th, 11th and 12th to the *Hauptwiderstandslinie*. The *KTK* established its main fighting position in the right battalion's sector by *Nordhof*. The Regiment was relieved, following a quiet time in the frontline, on 17 December.



German map overlay: Vicinity of Passchendaele and Vat Cottage Ridge (Source: MMP)

Appendix 17

**Casualties: KIA & DOW
30 November-10 December 1917⁴⁸**

25 Brigade (8th Division)

2nd Royal Berkshire

Surname	Initial	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ALLEN	JJ	11579	2ND BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
ASHLEY	AV	38488	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
BACKWAY	AP	38489	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
BARLOW	J	26065	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
BEST	FW	38499	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
BIRD	WG	15759	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
BISHOP	WE	14474	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
BURT	H	31408	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
CHILDS	CH	7873	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
COATES	F	27301	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE

⁴⁸ Commonwealth War Graves Commission. <<http://www.cwgc.org>> and Geoff's CWGC 1914-21 Search Engine <<http://www.hut-six.co.uk/cgi-bin/search14-21.php>>

COGGS	HJ	21800	C COY 2ND BN	02/12/1917	REGIMENT ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
COLLINS	F	11670	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
DICKER	C	18732	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
DOLLIN	HJ	38521	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
FISHER	EE	38531	B COY 2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
FITZGERALD	N	38214	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
GADSBY	D	38533	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
GERAGHTY	T	38270	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
GIDDINGS	F	2ND LT	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
HARWOOD	TJ	38547	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
HAYWARD	GH	9782	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
HEWETT	S	16426	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
HILL	EA	32863	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
HOLMAN	GA	38552	2ND BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
HOWARTH	H	37012	2ND BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT

JENKINS	H	37850	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
KING	HE	17843	2ND BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
KING	AS	38557	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
KIRKLAND	TM	37058	2ND BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
KNIGHT	S	36373	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
KNOTT	F	17129	2ND BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
LOCKE	N	38274	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
LUCAS	T	37862	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
LUFF	SC	39414	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
LUING	FJ	28821	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
PAGET	AW	37552	2ND BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
RAY	CE	38281	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
RUDKIN	EH	37867	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
RUMBLE	JW	7743	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
SIMPSON	R	38597	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
TAYLOR	F	36797	2ND BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL

TROUP	SH	LT	7TH BN ATTD 2ND BN	02/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL
TRUCKLE	TF	38269	2ND BN	02/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL
WAIT	HAV	LT	D COY 2ND BN	02/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL
WAKELY	FJ	38243	2ND BN	01/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL
WEBB	SE	15744	D COY 2ND BN	02/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL
WHITE	CA	38626	2ND BN	02/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL
WOOD	HFC	33056	2ND BN	02/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT ROYAL
WOOD	H	37483	2ND BN	02/12/1917	BERKSHIRE REGIMENT

Total: 3 officers and 46 ORs

2nd Lincolnshire Regiment

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
AIREY	A	32990	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
ALLSOP	GF	38012	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BAGWORTH	H	203894	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BAKER	JJ	40069	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BARRAN	M	202224	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BARROW	J	32867	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE

BARTLE	GS	1507	2ND BN	02/12/1917	REGIMENT LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BILLING	TW	38049	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BLACKBOURN	W	40708	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BOOTH	W	38456	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BRADLEY	J	18641	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BRAMMER	W	18533	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
BRICE	FW	13327	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
CARTER	E	18955	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
CHEESEMAN	WC	265052	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
CLARK	H	18337	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
COGGAN	HW	21357	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
COOPER	TH	12234	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
COWLIN	JL	8745	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
COWE	A	CAPT	ATTD 2ND BN LINCOLNSHIRE REGT	02/12/1917	RAMC
CROSSLEY	CI	40380	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
CULLUM	AH	24985	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
CURTIS	A	31711	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
DICKINSON	HJ	1544	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
DONNER	JW	R3/2505 9	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
DOYLEY	F	22585	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
EDWARDS	W	40242	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
FENWICK	TE	31932	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT

FENWICK	E	22917	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
FULLER	JH	8261	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
GLAZZARD	WT	32832	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
GRAY	JH	16279	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
GRIFFIN	BW	2ND LT	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
HALFORD	SH	40188	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
HARBY	WB	27025	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
HARRISON	R	38075	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
HICKSON	E	41608	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
HOLMES	A	40086	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
KIME	A	203889	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
LEATHERLAND	J	8357	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
LEES	CE	40582	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
NICHOLLS	CR	8583	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
ODLING	FS	27699	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
PARKER	RH	LT	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
PEARSON	G	13658	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
PEART	A	41548	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
PICARD	H	7755	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
SENTANCE	JA	22781	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
SMITH	FR	31272	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
WALKER	RH	20901	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
WILLSON	A	8471	2ND BN	01/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT

WRIGHT		WJ	203881	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
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Total: 3 officers and 49 ORs

2nd Rifle Brigade

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
BARNARD	HF	S/6701	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
BINGHAM	G	6201	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
BLYTH	ES	S/9473	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
BOTTOMLEY	T	S/28926	2ND BN	01/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
BROADLEY	J	S/30853	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
BROOKER	J	2ND LT	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
CARR	J	S/12735	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
COCKS	H	S/31983	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
COOPER	JH	S/19172	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
CRACK	J	S/29695	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
DAVIES	TCT	S/9620	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
DAY	WP	S/31377	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
DUDINSKY	J	S/32173	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
DUNNAGE	W	B/200434	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
EASEY	AE	B/200922	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
ELLIOTT	FR	S/26606	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
GRIMES	W	S/26825	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
HORNE	E	S/10498	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE

JACKSON	E	S/18125	2ND BN	01/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
JEFFERY	FE	S/32157	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
JOYCE	E	B/1136	2ND BN	01/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
KESTER	S	S/32299	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
LESTER	WT	S/33758	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
MACHIN	J	Z/2193	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
MITCHLEY	HC	2978	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
MOORE	A	B/1524	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
MORLEY	HA	S/27831	C COY 2ND BN	01/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
MORRISON	W	2ND LT	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
NORMAN	RJ	S/23516	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
PHILLIPS	WC	S/10504	2ND BN	01/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
POYNER	A	S/11052	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
PRYSE	JW	S/24279	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
RATLIFF	EF	CAPT	6TH BN ATTD 2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
ROWE	JH	S/17413	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
RULE	AE	B/200612	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
RUSHBROOK	A	P/935	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
RUSSELL	C	5426	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
SCRUTTON	HC	S/32427	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
STOTEN	HW	S/18211	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
TOWNSHEND	JS	9861	2ND BN	01/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
WASS	JA	S/4377	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE

WEBLEY	FJK	S/25854	2ND BN	02/12/1917	BRIGADE RIFLE BRIGADE
WOOD	GA	B/200900	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
WYATT	J	S/28568	2ND BN	02/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE

Total 3 officers and 41 ORs

1st Royal Irish Rifles

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ADAMS	JW	9554	1ST BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
BOULTON	D	47410	1ST BN	30/11/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
COBB	G	47422	1ST BN	30/11/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
CONDRON	M	3956	1ST BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
CONNOLLY	T	11377	1ST BN	30/11/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
CONROY	W	9074	1ST BN	30/11/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
DAY	J	5228	1ST BN	30/11/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
DUNN	H	7712	1ST BN	02/12/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
GILLIGAN	J	10664	1ST BN	01/12/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
GILMORE	P	9168	1ST BN	30/11/1917	ROYAL IRISH RIFLES
GLOVER	J	47300	1ST BN	30/11/1917	ROYAL

GOUGH	CFG	43844	1ST BN	01/12/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
GREEN	S	10646	1ST BN	01/12/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
HAWKINS	A	47421	1ST BN	30/11/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
HERKES	J	47430	1ST BN	01/12/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
HICKEY	J	4253	1ST BN	02/12/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
KAYE	E	L/7355	1ST BN	30/11/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
LENNARD	EW	2ND LT	4TH BN ATTD 1ST BN	30/11/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
MCLOUGHLIN	T	5675	1ST BN	30/11/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
PARRY	RW	42426	C COY 1ST BN	30/11/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
PEPLOE	W	42423	1ST BN	01/12/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
PITTMAN	EJ	43958	1ST BN	30/11/1917	IRISH RIFLES ROYAL
WILKIE	AB	2ND LT	1ST BN	30/11/1917	IRISH RIFLES

Total: 23 ORs

97 Brigade (32nd Division)

2nd KOYLI

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ASQUITH	GW	2ND LT	3RD BN ATTD 2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
ABBISS	RD	2ND LT	3RD BN ATTD 2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
ANDERTON	WT	42043	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
ARMITAGE	JT	33018	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
BAILEY	A	20356	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
BAKER	H	241927	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
BEDFORD	WH	21334	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
BERRY	S	34379	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY

CAIN	E	2ND LT	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
CAWDERY	J	10142	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
CHALLONER	A	241716	2ND/5TH BN	03/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
CHAPPLE	E	200920	2ND/4TH BN	01/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
CONNERTY	D	241515	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
COOKSEY⁴⁹	A	9280	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
CORCORAN	AT	2ND LT	3RD BN ATTD 2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
COURCOUX	JH	42342	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
COX	H	12777	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT

⁴⁹ Great uncle of Jon Cooksey (current editor of the Western Front Association's quarterly journal). See 'Editor's Introduction', *Stand To!* No. 81, December 2007-January 2008.

DAY	JR	235231	2ND BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
DEAKIN	JE	11053	A COY 2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
ELLIS	JN	2ND LT	3RD BN, ATTD 2ND BN	01/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
FORDE	HR	CAPT	D COY 2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
FORREST	W	35797	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
FORREST	R	8505	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
FURNISS	WT	45249	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
GIBBONS	W	240874	2ND/5TH BN	01/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
HAIGH	H	33423	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY

HANSON	W	29973	2ND BN	03/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
HEYWORTH	F	35708	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
HUTCHINSON	E	241895	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
KAYE	R	30941	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
LAKE	T	23052	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
MARSHALL	E	205025	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
MATTHEWS	F	25064	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
MAY	TA	14295	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
MCKEE	WA	23308	2ND BN	02/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
MOLLOY	E	32700	2ND BN	01/12/1917	KING'S

NAREY	J	201957	2ND BN	02/12/1917	OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
NEILANS	TR	24688	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
OSBORNE	E	34815	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
OWEN	WE	24560	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
PATTERSON	EJ	235309	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
PATTISON	AE	202009	2ND BN	03/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
PERRY	AS	235294	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
POOLE	H	200435	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
RAYNE	H	22852	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN

REANEY	J	28244	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
RUSHWORTH	A	30928	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
SHUFFLEBOTHAM	W	202474	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
SIMMONETT	WH	30972	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
SMITH	A	41278	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
STEVENSON	GT	3/3616	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
TURNER	C	235315	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
VASEY	A	42204	2ND BN	02/12/1917	YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN
WAGSTAFF	J	30256	2ND BN	02/12/1917	OWN YORKSHIRE

WALLACE	AE	23055	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE
WATSON	W	15386	2ND BN	03/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE
WEBB	F	9570	H COY 2ND BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE
WHOMERSLEY	H	35757	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE
WYATT	F	24653	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE
YATES	G	20883	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE
YERWORTH	GH	40022	2ND BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE

Total: 6 officers and 54 ORs

16th HLI

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ALEXANDER	J	CAPT	C COY 16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BARNSHAW	GH	39166	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BARRIE	J	27631	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BELL	DSD	32453	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BENNIE	WR	2ND LT	7TH BN ATTD 16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BROWN	T	42221	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BURNS	A	3375	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BURT	WJ	43078	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CAIRNS	H	350220	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CAMPBELL	W	43110	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CANNING	J	25924	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CHUDLEY	HJ	350181	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CLEWLOW	H	350154	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CONNELL	J	4979	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY

CRUICKSHANK	D	42223	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
DALLAS	WA	355403	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
DAVIDSON	GL	CAPT	4TH BN ATTD	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
EDGAR	W	3471	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
FERRIS	J	2ND LT	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
FORBES	W	14157	C COY 16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
FORBES	J	1390	C COY 16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
FRASER	J	34728	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
GILLESPIE	AM	26362	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
GRANT	JR	14165	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
HALLIDAY	F	12849	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
HART	H	31719	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
HATCHER	W	29418	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
HEPBURN	R	39185	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
JOHNSON	WJ	350179	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
KYNOCH	J	355414	16TH BN	01/12/1917	HIGHLAND

LEES	J	15002	16TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MARR	J	33395	A COY 16TH BN	03/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MARSHALL	A	355591	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MARTIN	PW	39147	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MCCARDLE	J	31009	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MCDOUGALL	D	13909	D COY 16TH BN	03/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MCDOWALL	J	39199	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MCGUIRE	J	30687	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MCINNES	RS	37881	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MCMILLAN	DE	42323	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MCVEY	W	32301	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MITCHELL	C	355456	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
MITCHELL	J	355594	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
PARENT	J	40757	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
PATTON	ES	43068	16TH BN	03/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT

PLUMB	S	350224	C COY 16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
RATTRAY	R	34119	C COY 16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
ROBERTSON	J	350202	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
RUSSELL	TL	25779	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SCOTT	A	33371	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SEMPLE	JH	37854	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SHARP	JM	355602	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SMALL	J	39191	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SMITH	R	30359	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
THOMSON	R	40073	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
THOMSON	LB	40912	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
THOMSON	A	29962	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
TILEY	AF	4310	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
TULLOCH	A	35663	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
WALLACE	R	43011	16TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT

WENZEL	J	30121	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
WESTGARTH	FW	41151	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
WHITFIELD	J	2ND LT	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
WOODWARD	AA	356355	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
WORLING	D	14974	16TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY

Total: 5 officers and 60 ORs

11th Border Regiment

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ANDERSON	R	13705	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
ASHCROFT	J	26005	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
ASHMAN	FW	28817	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BAILEY	CE	28814	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BAINBRIDGE	P	13680	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BAINBRIDGE	E	202684	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BAKER	WR	28818	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BARNES	H	32001	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BARTON	J	28916	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BENSON	I	CAPT	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BICKLEY	AG	28825	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT

BLAYLOCK	JJ	26291	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BOTTOM	WB	28771	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BRAMBLE	CJ	28636	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BRIDGE	RJ	27670	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BROADHURST	L	34511	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BROUGH	TM	202879	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BROWN	B	28923	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BROWN	GW	241761	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BURGESS	J	28765	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
BURGESS	EJ	25119	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
CADDLE	T	25588	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
CARMICHAEL	JR	260212	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
CRAKER	SE	33708	A COY 11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DALBY	JW	260219	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DALTON	W	28928	11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DALZELL	W	32643	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DAVIDSON	JJ	23777	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DAVIDSON	F	15372	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DELAHOY	GF	33344	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DEMELLWEEK	J	260216	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DOBSON	W	4296	D COY 11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
DOUGLAS	WJ	20963	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
EGGINTON	H	33536	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT

FERNYHOUGH	H	28623	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
FLETCHER	WP	260221	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
FRANCIS	HG	28274	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
GIBSON	T	13902	B COY 11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
GRAHAM	J	26902	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
GUNNING	WF	263073	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HANSON	JR	26480	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HARRIS	W	25083	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HAYWARD	J	33484	11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HENDERSON	J	23690	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HEPWOOD	H	28940	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HEYWOOD	F	33553	11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HOBLEY	AW	28847	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HODGSON	J	12969	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HODGSON	R	263076	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HOGG	RT	13746	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HOWE	W	32665	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HURLEY	H	26564	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
HYAM	J	28937	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
LAWS	EE	33424	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
LOWES	C	15396	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MACDONALD	D	17383	11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MACDUFF	WB	2ND LT	5TH BN ATTD	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT

MARSH	EA	28863	11TH BN 11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MARTIN	PM	CAPT	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MAYALL	H	28780	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MENDHAM	G	24764	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MERRYWEATHER	A	28953	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MOORE	RW	33754	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MORAN	J	26613	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
MULLARD	W	28629	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
OLIPHANT	T	28150	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
PARKIN	G	17444	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
PARRY	M	260254	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
PENNINGTON	A	35043	A COY 11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
POLLITT	E	11919	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
POWELL	JT	27808	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
POYSER	S	34247	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
RAVEN	J	13373	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
RICHARDSON	W	28152	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
RICHARDSON	RC	2ND LT	3RD BN ATTD 11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
RIDGWAY	WT	2ND LT	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
ROBSON	F	19666	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
RYAN	J	33401	A COY 11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
SAFFELL	E	22160	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT

SANDEMAN	AF	CAPT	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
SCHOLES	W	26929	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
SEEKINGS	H	28215	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
SHORT	L	8941	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
SMITH	WD	32664	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
STEELE	BIL	15553	11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
STEWARD	AS	28214	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
SWIFT	G	33144	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
THORNE	W	32467	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
TOLSON	J	202891	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
TRUSLER	W	32685	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
TYLDESLEY	E	34514	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
TYSON	W	13361	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
WALKER	T	22015	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
WALKER	C	30146	11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
WATSON	B	23985	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
WATT	JW	17322	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
WHITE	B	260263	11TH BN	03/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
WILSON	JT	242087	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
WOOD	EG	26292	11TH BN	02/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT

Total: 6 officers and 93 ORs

17th HLI

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ANKER	G	39161	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
ATKIN	E	37983	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BAYNE	E	41195	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BLACK	J	355619	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BOWMAN	W	5690	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CAMERON	M	2ND LT	6TH BN ATTD 17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CLEMENTS	J	42196	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CLINES	T	2064	17TH BN	01/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CLYNE	JC	353102	17TH BN	01/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CONNELL	W	29801	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CONNOR	D	42987	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CONSTABLE	J	2868	D COY 17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CORMACK	HS	3456	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CROSBIE	D	42018	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY

CULLEN	J	33796	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CUNNINGHAM	G	42929	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CUNNINGHAM	PN	2ND LT	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
DARGE	JF	23055	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
DEUCHARS	W	353104	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
DICK	J	42302	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
GOOCH	A	33429	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
GORDON	J	45008	17TH BN	01/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
GREER	W	42349	17TH BN	01/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
HANLEY	J	8720	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
HUNTER	R	43398	B COY 17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
JAMIESON	J	45004	17TH BN	01/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
KEIR	AD	41167	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
KELT	J	42988	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
KING	A	23943	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
KINLOCH	A	43328	A COY	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND

			17TH BN		LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
LAW	WW	41215	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
LEARY	O	42931	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
LUMSDEN	H	40895	17TH BN	01/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MASON	C	41242	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MCEWAN	A	39392	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MCKELLAR	A	27940	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MCLELLAN	J	42012	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MCNEILL	P	42921	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MCPHEE	C	42939	17TH BN	01/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MCWHIRTER	W	42122	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MEARNS	JM	356874	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MILLAR	J	43375	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MILLER	J	2ND LT	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MILLIGAN	RB	16146	C COY 17TH BN	01/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND
MORLAND	W	2ND LT	17TH BN	02/12/1917	LIGHT INFANTRY HIGHLAND

OGILVIE	JR	33662	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
OSBORNE	J	2ND LT	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
PHILIP	DS	355173	A COY 17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
RAMSAY	JS	42373	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
REID	RH	2ND LT	3RD BN ATTD 17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
ROBERTSON	DM	2685	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
ROBSON	W	42979	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SCULLION	R	41199	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SHENTON	AW	41251	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SIMPSON	T	42848	D COY 17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
SPENCE	EH	42128	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
THOMSON	F	38529	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
WALSH	J	39516	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
WILSON	J	42205	17TH BN	02/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT
WILSON	A	202497	17TH BN	03/12/1917	INFANTRY HIGHLAND LIGHT

WRIGHT	A	38513	17TH BN	02/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
YOUNG	J	32510	17TH BN	01/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY

Total: 6 officers and 56 ORs

15th Lancashire Fusiliers

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ARRIES	JM	235067	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
ASTIN	W	47692	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
BODEN	C	39804	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
BUCHAN	C	2ND LT	1ST BN ATTD 15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
CROPPER	JA	201126	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
EARNSHAW	W	305913	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
FARRINGTON	JE	2983	C COY 15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
GOSLING	GH	242824	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
GREEN	J	39816	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
HINCHEY	H	39659	15TH BN	01/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
HOLDEN	J	20036	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
HOPWOOD	H	27500	15TH BN	03/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
HOWARD	J	202075	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
ISHERWOOD	J	10199	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
LAYTHAM	JH	39707	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS

MATHEWS	S	32585	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
MONFRIES	A	32559	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
NOEL	TA	306729	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
ORMROD	F	12575	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
OWEN	JR	39611	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
PICKERING	CR	38156	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
ROBINSON	GT	47125	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
SCRIVENER	JS	2ND LT	8TH BN ATTD 15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
SIMPSON	J	40296	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
STEER	EA	32581	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
TUSHINGHAM	T	18162	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
WARBURTON	C	6053	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
WOOSTER	LE	235375	15TH BN	01/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
YATES	J	38412	15TH BN	02/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS

Total: 2 officers and 27 ORs

16th Northumberland Fusiliers

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
ATKINS	E	235328	16TH BN	01/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
BELL	R	16/1441	D COY 16TH BN	02/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
BREESE	AG	36818	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
CELLAMS	EG	52753	16TH BN	02/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS

COLE	E	37049	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
COLLINGS	FR	2ND LT	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
DEVLIN	T	24090	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
ELLERKER	WG	54445	16TH BN	30/11/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
FATHERLEY	RT	16/732	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
GRAINGER	A	39752	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
HOOD	T	16/767	16TH BN	02/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
JACKSON	J	34757	B COY 16TH BN	30/11/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
JAMES	W	24041	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
KIDD	RF	37035	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
LEYLAND	T	235448	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
LONG	FA	40409	16TH BN	02/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
NEWHAM	CT	36822	C COY 16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
NORMAN	A	366171	16TH BN	02/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
OLDALE	A	17512	16TH BN	02/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
PYLE	GA	25/533	16TH BN	30/11/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
SHEARER	JA	16/1043	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
SMITH	GB	31436	16TH BN	02/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
THOMPSON	W	27/1268	16TH BN	03/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
WIGHT	F	31912	16TH BN	30/11/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS

Total: 1 officer and 22 ORs

KIA or DOW 4-10 December

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment
DYKE	WH	38524	2ND BN	05/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
HODGSON	GW	10359	2ND BN POW	10/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
ROGERS	F	16308	2ND BN	04/12/1917	ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGIMENT
CONNELL	H	26499	2ND BN	07/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
GRANTHAM	A	40212	2ND BN	05/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
HOPPS	TJ	5510	2ND BN	05/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
TAYLOR	JR	31917	2ND BN	04/12/1917	LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT
DOVE	WE	S/4547	2ND BN	09/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
HIGGINBOTTOM	P	Z/738	2ND BN POW	05/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
HOLLOWAY	JH	S/26623	2ND BN	06/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
MACE	AE	S/30798	2ND BN	09/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
SHEPHERD	RWG	S/10061	2ND BN POW	07/12/1917	RIFLE BRIGADE
DIXON	J	241078	2ND BN	09/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
SURR	W	3/1141	2ND BN	10/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
WILSON	M	29334	2ND BN	04/12/1917	KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY
COUTTS	AG	36546	D COY 16TH BN	06/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
CROSS	FA	39174	16TH BN	06/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
SMART	EJ	350229	16TH BN	04/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
SMITH	H	3426	16TH BN	04/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
BENT	F	260268	11TH BN POW	05/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT

DENT	J	202882	11TH BN	04/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
KEMP	GH	28944	11TH BN	07/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
LOMAS	J	28951	11TH BN	09/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
NEWTON	TA	28956	B COY 11TH BN	08/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
REED	AJ	28869	11TH BN	08/12/1917	BORDER REGIMENT
FOSTER	J	13550	B COY 17TH BN	09/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
HALL	AW	202272	17TH BN	04/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
MAIR	AG	37916	17TH BN	10/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
MCFARLANE	HR	42952	17TH BN	04/12/1917	HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
ARMSTRONG	WE	38137	15TH BN	10/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
BULLEN	F	32533	15TH BN KIA	05/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
RATCLIFFE	C	11321	15TH BN	07/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
WELLS	WA	19733	D COY 15TH BN	05/12/1917	LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
BERESFORD	AE	4670	16TH BN	08/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
COATES	WW	40166	16TH BN	10/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
GRACE	CE	52754	16TH BN	09/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
LUSTGARTEN	M	47083	16TH BN	05/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
MURRAY	JW	27/1145	16TH BN	04/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
WALSH	A	36828	16TH BN KIA	06/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS
WINDROSS	C	41707	16TH BN	05/12/1917	NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS

Total: 40 ORs

RFA, RGA, MGC & RAMC

Surname	Initials	Service No.	Battalion	Date of Death	Regiment/Corps
EDMONDSON	N	116739	C BTY 161ST BDE	02/12/1917	ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY
HEALER	WE	152893	C BTY 161ST BDE	02/12/1917	ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY
HEALER	WE	152893	C BTY 161ST BDE	02/12/1917	ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY
WRIGHT	G	71569	109TH SIEGE BTY	02/12/1917	ROYAL GARRISON ARTILLERY
BANNISTER	W	64822	14TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
BARTON	W	7534	97TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
BAXTER	R	103168	218TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
BENNETT	JT	102782	218TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
BRAME	EG	86798	218TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
BURDOCK	AV	60306	96TH COY	03/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
BUTTERWORTH	W	108564	96TH COY	03/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
CLAY	F	103059	218TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
FIDLER	S	73038	14TH COY	30/11/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
FOWLER	J	97618	25TH COY	01/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)

GILROY	T	60464	14TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
HOLDEN	F	65345	96TH COY	03/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
JENKINS	HH	68529	96TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
KING	J	81885	218TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
KING	J	67924	218TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
KNOX	A	73022	14TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
MITCHELL	G	8273	14TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
NEAL	WG	7810	96TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
OSBORNE	FC	81720	97TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
PEARCE	W	89812	97TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
PEGRUM	W	47675	25TH COY	01/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
POTTER	JH	35931	96TH COY	03/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
PRICE	WJ	67929	218TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
RANDALL	HE	107569	219TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
ROCHE	C	36383	14TH COY	03/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS (INFANTRY)
ROTHWELL	H	2ND LT	14TH COY	02/12/1917	MACHINE GUN CORPS

SMEATON	H	64269	97TH COY	02/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
SMITH	E	107564	214TH COY	02/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
SOUTAR	W	7867	97TH COY	02/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
SUNDERLAND	W	27001	97TH COY	02/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
SUTTON	P	65294	97TH COY	02/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
TRIGG	JC	107565	219TH COY	02/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
WALTON	JR	106445	25TH COY	01/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
WILSON	CW	53997	25TH COY	01/12/1917	(INFANTRY) MACHINE GUN CORPS
BAKER	WH	457506	25TH FIELD AMBULANCE	02/12/1917	RAMC

Total: 1 officer and 38 ORs

Appendix 18

Official History Correspondence: General Cameron Shute⁵⁰

10th December 1930

My Dear Edmonds,

I have read through all the papers you sent and I now return them. I made notes only in "Third Army 1st - 3rd April 1918". As far as 32nd Division is concerned all that has been said is correct. Except for Alette we had little to do.

What I should like to have looked at are:

- (a) Action of 59th Brigade & 20th Div. when it captured Guillemont in Aug-Sept 16.
- (b) Action of R[oyal] Naval Div[ision] when I commanded it at the Battle of Beaumont Hamel & after – Oct 16 to February 17.
- (c) Action of 32nd Div. March-April 17 when I commanded it at the extreme British right before St Quentin.
- (d) Action of 19th Div. at Battle of Messines June 17 [,] where I was sent up to command it from a week before to 3 weeks after it.
- (e) Action of 32nd Div. July 17 to early 18 on the Yser – Very hard fighting.
- (f) Action of 32nd Div. at end of Passchendaele.
- (g) V Corps operations April 18 to November 11th 1918.

All these are rather big shows.


(4) As an appeal came with for any papers of interest [,] I am sending a return of casualties for 6 months which I had most carefully compiled day-by-day in 32nd Div. The preparation [?] of wounds from art[ille]ry fire ??? ??? rifle & MG fire make one think. I don't know of any similar return. Please don't lose it and return when done with it [,] as I have no copy.

Yours V[ery] Sincerely


Cameron Shute

⁵⁰ TNA: CAB/45/187 Postwar Official History Correspondence (Third Army 1918).


THIRD YPRES: THE ADVANCES JUNE - DECEMBER 1917




Map 1 Stages of the Third Battle of Ypres
 (Source: Gilbert, *British History Atlas*)




Map 2 Second Battle of Passchendaele (Source: Edmonds, *OH 1917 Vol. 2*)



Map 3 Passchendaele Salient
(Source: Boraston, *Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches*)



Map 4 Second Army Objective Map: The area between 'EXISTING LINE' and 'FORMING UP LINE' was to be secured in a preliminary operation (subsequently cancelled) scheduled for the night of 21/22 November (Source: LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers)




Map 5 Abstract: 8th Division MG Barrage Scheme
(Source: TNA: WO/95/1677)




Map 6 8th Division: Artillery Barrage Scheme
 (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677)



Map 7 32nd Division: MG Barrage Scheme
(Source: 32nd Division MG Map (TNA: WO/95/2370))




Map 8 32nd Division: Area Concentration Artillery Barrage Scheme (Source: TNA: WO/95/643)




Map 9 8th Division: Dispositions at Zero (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677)



Map 10 32nd Division: Dispositions at Zero (Source: TNA: WO/95/2370)



Map 11 8th Division: Dispositions at Dawn (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677)




Map 12 8th Division: Ultimate Position Reached (Source: TNA: WO/95/1677)



Map 13 8th Division: Situation Evening of 3 December (Source: WO/95/1677)



Map 15 Annotated Google Earth image of Passchendaele north vicinity and Vat Cottage Ridge



Map 16 Annotated Google Earth image of Westroosebeke and southern environs