Palmer, Luke Alexander Gordon (2011). Intrinsic naturalism: a type-F monist account of phenomenal consciousness. University of Birmingham. M.Phil.
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Palmer11MPhil.pdf
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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness which accords with both the science-friendly spirit of physicalism and the acknowledgement of panpsychism that phenomenal properties may be inextricably linked to entities, but with none of the problems associated with either type of model. Initially, physicalism and panpsychism are evaluated by the lights of their most serious problems, and solutions are offered to these problems from the point of view of a third kind of model: intrinsic naturalism, presented in the final chapter. This model holds consciousness to be among the battery of a functional system’s intrinsic (i.e. non-dispositional) properties. A definition is given, and defence made for the existence of these properties, and their compatibility with an otherwise physicalist ontology.
| Type of Work: | Thesis (Masters by Research > M.Phil.) | ||||||
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| Award Type: | Masters by Research > M.Phil. | ||||||
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| College/Faculty: | Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Arts & Law | ||||||
| School or Department: | School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion, Department of Philosophy | ||||||
| Funders: | None/not applicable | ||||||
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy |
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| URI: | http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/3084 |
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