

**ARMS TRADE
IN THE SHADOW OF PERSONAL INFLUENCE
German Style of War Business
in the Ottoman Market
(1876-1909)**

by

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ABSTRACT

The main question of this thesis originated from the following observation: during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909) - especially after the 1880s - the German armament firms (GAFs) obtained a monopoly position in the Ottoman military market and maintained their position for decades. Based upon this observation the question of this thesis is: How did the Germans manage to get this status and protect it for decades, in particular, in a quite competitive market, where the American, British, and the French firms had been dominant for years?

This thesis, which has fundamentally relied on multi-national archival research, does not seek the answer with reference to the ordinary theory of supply and demand but in the realm of the inter-personal relations and the personal influence of some influential personalities/statesmen who somehow intervened themselves into the war business from both sides (i.e. the Ottoman Empire and Germany).

In the line with this argument, the principal aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of the non-commercial factors of the arms trade on the GAFs' successful war business in the Ottoman military market. For that purpose throughout the dissertation the acts and doings of Bismarck; Kaiser Wilhelm II; Von der Goltz Pasha and the other German military advisors who were employed in the Ottoman Army; Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Ottoman bureaucrats/officers will be discussed within the context of their contribution to the German armament firms' successful war business in the Ottoman market.

*Doktora tezimi
Sevgili Anneme ve Babama
armağan ediyorum*

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Birmingham, September 2010
Naci Yorulmaz

NOTES ON USAGE

- 1) In this dissertation the modern Turkish spelling system has been used for Ottoman-Turkish words (names/terms) according to Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English Dictionary (İstanbul 1999).
- 2) Apart from the following exceptions, the Latin letters of the Ottoman/Turkish are pronounced almost the same as the English. The exceptions and their sounds are as follows:
 - Ş/ş sh
 - Ç/ç ch
 - İ/i i
 - I/ı like the *io* in *pension*
 - Ö/ö like the German ö
 - Ü/ü like the German ü
- 3) All modern Turkish place-names has been given in the modern Turkish spelling system, e.g.:
 - İstanbul not Constantinople/Istanbul; Haydarpaşa not Haidarpascha/Haidarpasha; Eskişehir not Eskischehir; İzmir not Smyrna; etc.
- 4) The following rates given in table have been used for the currency converter.

	1 Ottoman Lira (Circa 1892)	1 Silver <i>Kuruş</i> (Circa 1892)
Pound	0,9033	0,008804
Franc	22,7841	0,222067
Mark	18,4551	0,179874

Source: McCarthy 1982:155.

- 5) Dates in Hijri Calendar were converted into Gregorian dates by using the following web-page [www.ttk.gov.tr / Tarih Çevirme Kilavuzu](http://www.ttk.gov.tr/Tarih_Cevirme_Kilavuzu). The Ottoman documents used in this dissertation are listed in the footnote as follows:

Gregorian dates
┌───────────┐
BOA, Y.A.RES 40/36 (08.03.1306/12.11.1888)
└───────────┘
Hijri dates

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BDOW	British Documents on the Origins of the War
GAFs	German Armament Firms
GCMAs	German Civil and Military Advisers
GMAAs	German Military Advisers
GP	Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette.
HA, Krupp: FAH	Historisches Archiv-Krupp- Familie Archive Essen
HA, Krupp: WA	Historisches Archiv-Krupp – Werk Archiv Essen
MA, Freiburg	Military Archive, Freiburg
NA, London	National Archives, London
NA, London: ADM	Admiralty Office: National Archives, London
NA, London: FO	Foreign Office: National Archives, London
NA, London: GFM	German Foreign Ministry Microfilm: National Archives, London
NA, London: WO	War Office: National Archives, London
NARA	National Archives, College Park, Maryland
OL	Ottoman Lira
PA.AA.	Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes
SA, Oberndorf	Stadt-und Zeitungsarchiv Oberndorf/Neckar-Germany
WWI	World War I

BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
A.MKT.MHM.	Sadâret Mektûb-i Kalem-i Mühimme Odası
DH. MKT.	Dahiliye Nezâreti Mektûbi Kalemi
HR. SYS.	Hariciye Nezâreti Siyasî
HR.TO.	Hariciye Evrâkı
İ. ASK.	İrâde – ‘Askeri
İ. DH.	İrâde - Dahiliye
İ. HR	İrâde - Hariciye

İ. MMS	İrade - Meclîs-i Mahsûsa
MV.	Meclîs-i Vükelâ Mazbatası
Y. A. HUS.	Yıldız Perâkende Sadâret Hususi Mâ'rûzât Evrâkı
Y. A. RES.	Yıldız Perâkende Sadaret Resmi Mâ'rûzât Evrâkı
Y. EE.	Yıldız Esas ve Sadrazam Kâmil Paşa Evrâkı
Y. MRZ. D.	Yıldız Mâ'rûzât Defteri
Y. MTV.	Yıldız Mütenevvi Mâ'rûzât
Y. PRK. ASK.	Yıldız Perâkende 'Askeri Mâ'rûzât Evrâkı
Y. PRK. AZJ.	Yıldız Perâkende Arzuhaller ve Journaller
Y. PRK. BŞK.	Yıldız Perâkende Başkitâbet Dâiresi
Y. PRK. EŞA.	Yıldız Perâkende Elçilik ve Şehbenderlik Mâ'rûzâtı
Y. PRK. HH.	Yıldız Perâkende Hazine-i Hâssa Nezâreti Evrâkı
Y. PRK. HR.	Yıldız Perâkende Hariciye Nezâreti Mâ'rûzâtı
Y. PRK. KOM	Yıldız Perâkende Komisyonlar Mâ'rûzâtı
Y. PRK. ML.	Yıldız Perâkende Maliye Nezâreti Mâ'rûzâtı
Y. PRK. MM.	Yıldız Perâkende Mâbeyn Müşîriyeti
Y. PRK. MYD.	Yaverân ve Maiyet-i Seniye Erkân-ı Harbiye Dâiresi
Y. PRK. NMH.	Yıldız Perâkende Nâme-i Hümâyûnlar
Y. PRK. OMZ.	Yıldız Perâkende Orman, Ma'âdin, Ziraat Nezâreti Mâ'rûzâtı
Y. PRK. PT.	Yıldız Perâkende Posta ve Telgraf Nezâreti Mâ'rûzâtı
Y. PRK. SGE.	Yıldız Perâkende Mâbeyn Erkânı ve Saray Görevlileri
Y. PRK. SRN.	Yıldız Perâkende Ser-kurenâlık Evrâkı
Y. PRK. TKM.	Yıldız Perâkende Mâbeyn Mütercimliği
Y. PRK. UM.	Yıldız Perâkende Umum Vilâyetler Tahrîrâtı
Y. PRK. ZB.	Yıldız Perâkende Zabtiye Nezâreti Mâ'rûzâtı

INTRODUCTION

“We need to make the country economically dependent on us
in order to be able to control it politically later.”

*Friedrich Naumann*¹

Background and Scope of the Thesis

During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909), German armament firms (hereafter GAFs) gradually achieved a monopoly position in the Ottoman military market. The main determinants behind their success cannot be ascribed to the accepted market theory of supply and demand, but lie instead in a range of manipulative instruments that were built on foundations formed through close personal relations. Germany's success in the Ottoman arms trade was, basically, a dependent function of both a mutual political/economic interest within the two Empires and also the decisions made by their absolute rulers, one of whom (the Kaiser) needed markets and raw materials for his nation's industrial development, while the other (the Sultan) needed a strategic European partner as a bulwark against possible aggression.

From the perspective of the Sultan, who was forced to give up two-fifths of his Empire's entire territory and one-fifth of its population following the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Germany seemed to be the only European state that had neither colonial nor political interest in Ottoman territory. For Germany – under the leadership of Bismarck and then Kaiser Wilhelm II – the Ottoman Empire was of chiefly strategic importance. Only the Ottoman Empire could offer – in terms of Germany's desire to become a World Power (Weltmacht) – the strategic route that placed Germany ‘in a position to

¹ Naumann 1913:164: ‘*Wir müssen das Land wirtschaftlich von uns abhängig machen, um es später politisch “kontrollieren” zu können.*’ Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) was – as W. D. Smith pointed out – one of the prominent ‘academic imperialists’ and the leader of the German National-Social Association (1896-1903). Smith W. D. 1986:156; Zimmermann 1982: 690.

attack two of Britain's vulnerable points: India and Egypt'.² In addition it possessed abundant and rich resources of raw materials and provided a virgin market for Germany's finished industrial products.

The application of military diplomacy by means of a rapprochement strategy, which was strengthened by lucrative armaments contracts, proved to be one of the most useful and effective tools used by the Sultan to initiate and maintain a close relationship with Germany. In this respect, two wars and their multifarious consequences helped to shape and support the Sultan's starting points: The Franco-Prussian War in 1870/71 and the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877/78. The Ottoman army's severe defeat by Russia in 1877-78 paved the way for a modernisation project in the military field, where Germany had proven her superiority through the victory over France in 1870/71. So these two wars and the political and economic changes they wrought can be assumed to be the first solid explanation to provide justification for the Sultan's inclination towards Germany in general and towards the GAFs in particular.

Nevertheless, without neglecting the importance of political preferences and strategic considerations, this dissertation emphasises the impact of the personal intervention of the decision makers in the war business: German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898); Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859-1941); Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) and their ministers and also subordinate officials. This study uses the following particular expressions to determine the frame of the contexts and consequently to divide the chapters by subject in chronological order:

- The German Style of War Business
- The first wave of the German expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire

² McGarity 1968: 35.

- Businessmen in Uniform
- The second wave of the German expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire
- Domestic Contribution to the German Style of War Business: The Sultan and his Bureaucrats.

In the following paragraphs the interpretation of these expressions is briefly summarised.

The German Style of War Business

The GAFs, especially the Krupp and Mauser firms, obtained a monopoly in the Ottoman military market in the late 19th century and held this status for decades. The question naturally arises: how did the GAFs manage to achieve and retain this status in a highly competitive market, where maintaining such a position for a relatively long period was difficult? The Germans' success in the Ottoman Empire cannot be understood through an explanation based on the parameters of the widely-held market theory of supply and demand. The German war business in the Ottoman market during Abdülhamid II's reign shares striking similarities with – and provides a pattern for – today's arms trade operations. Based on this approach, the definition of the German Style of War Business refers to the distinctive importance of the application of some manipulative instruments – such as bribery, corruption and industrial espionage and also the creation of an influence network based on close personal and friendly relationships – in the arms trade marketplace. Because of the distinctive nature of the methods the Germans used to manipulate the Ottomans' armament purchasing processes, this dissertation discusses the Germans' success within the scope of this definition. While other countries' governments initially did not involve themselves

directly in the arms trade, the German Government – in pursuit of its foreign policy – aggressively involved itself in the competitive Ottoman market to manipulate the purchasing process in favour of the GAFs.

From the outset, the German state apparatus openly and strongly supported the GAFs' business endeavours in the Ottoman market. Bismarck, who did not initially support the German interests in the Ottoman rail road construction, did, however, give full patronage to the arms makers' efforts in the Ottoman military market. Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was the Krupp family's personal friend and at the same time had established a close personal friendship with Sultan Abdülhamid, strongly believed the arms trade was an inseparable part of the bilateral relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. The trading strategy used from the outset was described by Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, the German Ambassador in İstanbul between 1897 and 1912, as a German method [*Deutsche Methode*], which was applied both to military and non-military interests. In light of its success, the *Deutsche Methode* was lauded by amicable and encouraging speeches and acts performed by various German statesmen.³ Contrary to the other countries' imperious language regarding the domestic reforms related to the Ottoman Empire's non-Muslim subjects, the German Government – firstly Bismarck and then Kaiser Wilhelm II – used peaceful and amicable language. This encouraged the Sultan to continue his policy, which was mostly criticised by the European Great Powers. Britain, for instance, strongly suggested the re-introduction of a parliamentary system and sharply criticised the Sultan's domestic policy towards the non-Muslim subjects. Bismarck, on the other hand, expressed his admiration for the Sultan's decision to dissolve the parliament and advised a Turkification of the Empire. Without any doubt, statements of this kind

³ Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 23.09.1899, in: *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914: Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes*. (hereafter GP) 12-2 1924:583.

helped to establish and strengthen trust between the two Empires and eased the way for the German firms which enjoyed the Sultan's personal trust in Germany and the German firms.

Another significant feature of the German Style of War Business was the collaboration of the banks and the German civil and military diplomacy with the arms makers for the purpose of securing the Ottoman market for German-made armaments. Basically, one of the functions of German diplomacy at this juncture was to support and push the armament trade in the Ottoman market. The German banks' financial guarantees strengthened the financial state of the Ottoman Empire, which had to reschedule its debt payment, thus facilitating the purchasing process of the German war materials which were recommended and highly praised by German diplomats. The German military advisers, but especially Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Pasha (1843-1916) (hereafter Goltz Pasha) and also the Embassy were involved in the negotiations during the armament purchasing process and became a part of the war business using *sui generis* business follow-up techniques. Based on this approach, this dissertation discusses the just-mentioned argument under the title of 'Businessmen in Uniform'.

I define the whole process which was mostly manipulated by the German military advisers and was followed by large arms purchases from Germany as 'the fruits of the German Style of War Business'; nevertheless, I am aware that to be able to refer to a well-designed global strategy, a comparative study of the arms trade is of indispensable importance. If we take Chile as an example for comparison with the Ottoman experience, it can be shown to support a belief in the existence of a well-planned global strategy that can be defined as the German Style of War Business. Only three years after the first German military advisers were dispatched to the Ottoman Empire, one of Goltz Pasha's classmates at the Prussian *Kriegsakademie*, Captain Emil

Körner, was sent to Chile and hired to train the Chilean army.⁴ The sphere of influence Körner created and its impact on the success of GAFs in Chile was by and large the same as Goltz Pasha's in the Ottoman Empire. As an active lobbyist and commissioner, Körner was capable of manipulating the Chilean military purchasing process in favour of the GAFs, as his counterpart Goltz Pasha did in the Ottoman Empire.

As a result, the GAFs gained a monopoly position in both markets through the application of the same tools and methods. In fact, sending advisers abroad ushered in a new age in various fields, from international diplomacy to marketing strategies. Furthermore, the arms trade's encouraging effects on closer mutual economic-political relations occurred in both locations. The similarities are such that, to explain their thesis, scholars whose focus is German interests in Latin America, use almost the same language/concept and the same arguments as those who deal with German-Ottoman relations in the same period.⁵ Both groups of scholars agree that there was a complex and multidimensional interrelationship between the military advisers, arms makers and political actors, which can be discussed within the concept of the German Style of War Business.

The First Wave of the German Expansionist Strategy towards the Ottoman Empire (1880-1898)

This title is an attempt to describe German interests and influence in the Ottoman Empire within the concept of the three successive waves of the German expansionist

⁴ Herwig 1986: 111; Nunn 1970: 300.

⁵ Here are some selected scholarly works on the German military/economic influence on the South and Latin American countries: Rippy 1947; Rippy 1948; Brunn 1969; Forbes 1972; Schaefer 1974; Schiff 1959; Schiff 1967; Forbes 1978; Herwig 1986; Sater & Herwig 1999. Compare with the following works which deal with German-Ottoman relations: Jastrow 1917; Earl 1924; Blaisdell 1929; Bode 1941; Rathmann 1962; Griffiths 1966; McGarity 1968; Schölch 1975; Ortaylı 1981; Kössler 1981; Önsoy, 1982; Wallach, 1985; Trumpener 1996; Yasamee 1998; Schöllgen 2000; McMurray 2001; Franzke 2003; Akmeşe 2005; Gencer 2006; Türk 2006; McMeekin, 2010.

strategy towards the Ottoman Empire. However, the dissertation is restricted to the first and second waves, covering the periods 1880-1898 and 1898-1908. The last but not least powerful third wave (1909-1914), which followed the short ‘drawback’ which occurred after the Young Turks revolution and the consequences of the dethronement of Sultan Abdülhamid (1908-1909), dragged the Ottoman Empire into the First World War which ultimately brought about the end of the Empire.

The first wave of Germany’s expansionist strategy was initiated by the dispatch of German civil and military advisers (hereafter GCMAAs) to the Ottoman Empire at Abdülhamid’s request during Bismarck’s Chancellorship. Bismarck was a strategist who undoubtedly understood the multidimensional potential advantages of sending the GCMAAs to the Ottoman Empire. It was Bismarck who approved the sending of the GCMAAs and Goltz Pasha to İstanbul. On entering Ottoman service in 1883, Goltz Pasha was entrusted with the task of heading the German Military Advisers (hereafter GMAs) in 1885 and remained for twelve years. The GMAs deserve recognition as the dominant factor behind the first wave.

In this respect, the three most remarkable operations that fundamentally shaped bilateral relations during the first wave were the dispatch of the GCMAAs to Ottoman service in 1882; granting the *Deutsche Bank* exclusive rights to the Anatolian Railways project by *İrâde* (the Sultan’s Order) in October 1888; and the Kaiser’s first visit to the Sultan in 1889. It was during this period that – thanks to the obvious support and orientation of the GMAs – the Krupp company restarted its lucrative business with the Ottoman Empire, which had not placed any orders with Krupp since 1875. Krupp ended up holding the monopoly position as the artillery supplier to the Ottoman Army. During this period the GAFs utilised their ties with the GCMAAs and the Ottoman bureaucrats in a most effective way. Perhaps the best example of this co-operation was

Mauser's entrance into the Ottoman military market as a rifle supplier in 1886/87. Through the intervention and support of German civil and military diplomacy the owner and co-founder of the Mauser Rifle Company, Paul Mauser (1838-1914), signed the first and most profitable contract with the Ottoman Government in 1887, under the shadow of the Sultan's 'personal trust'. Following the first contract (for 500,000 rifles and 50,000 carbines) the Company achieved the monopoly position in supplying Ottoman infantry rifles, a rank it held for decades.

Businessmen in Uniform

Archival documents make it clear that the GMAs worked together with the GAFs in perfect cohesion and also intensively lobbied for the sake of their fatherland's armaments industry through their reports to the Ottoman Government. In the case of any decisive opposition against an order for German-made war materials, the GMAs appeared on the stage and supported their fellow-countrymen's interests. They submitted several reports to the Ottoman Government in which the German-made war materials were prioritised while the competitors' were mostly criticised. In fact, they worked as ardent lobbyists for the sake of the GAFs. Reform suggestion by a German artillery officer, Ristow Pasha, included an order for Krupp guns; a cavalry officer, Von Hobe, advised purchasing stallions from Germany; Kamphövener Pasha, an infantry officer, also wrote several reform suggestions pointing out the superiority of the Mauser rifles over the other, especially the Austrian Mannlicher rifles. But Goltz Pasha was the officer who most deserved to be called the 'Businessman in Uniform.' Thanks to his position in the Ottoman Army, Goltz Pasha particularly was provided by various reliable sources with confidential information related to the competitor companies' products submitted to the Yıldız Palace. He immediately disclosed the specific

technical information of rival companies to some GAFs in a secret way, which deserves to be regarded as industrial espionage.

German foreign policy makers regarded armament exports as one of the principal steps to be taken to achieve a successful economic-political penetration in the countries where economic, political, military- strategic interests had to be defended. For this purpose, the German military mission in general and Goltz Pasha in particular were the touchstones of Bismarck's well-planned expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire.

The Second Wave of the German Expansionist Strategy towards the Ottoman Empire (1898-1908)

During the formation of the first wave of the German expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire there were two dominant personalities who desired to shape Germany's foreign policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire: Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II. However, the second wave was totally designed by Kaiser Wilhelm II, who dismissed Bismarck in 1890 and became 'his own chancellor.' Through his second *Orientreise* in October 1898, which might be regarded as the beginning of the second expansionist wave towards the Ottoman Empire, the Kaiser publicly declared his intensified interest in the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, the second *Orientreise* gave him the most appropriate opportunity to publicise and to demonstrate his desire to be the unique architect of his Empire's foreign policy. Through speeches he delivered in several places during his journey (İstanbul-Haifa-Jaffa-Jerusalem-Damascus), Kaiser Wilhelm II openly declared his neutral position on some critical issues – especially on the Crete and Armenian questions – which the other European Powers used as an influential tool to create pressure on the Sultan.

Although Kaiser Wilhelm II sought to be seen as the sole architect of Germany's Ottoman policy – which provided German industrialists and businessmen with a variety of advantages – this thesis argues that he was a promoter and perhaps an aggressive facilitator of an expansionist strategy which was initially formulated and put into effect by Bismarck. However, Kaiser Wilhelm II's appearance on the international stage as a personal friend of the Sultan, who had been isolated by other European governments, fundamentally affected Ottoman-German relations.

The Kaiser's influential speeches relating to controversial issues and his friendly acts performed during this visit – taken together with the Sultan's generous hospitality and some special gifts he presented to his guests – had a deep impact on the economic and political relations of the two Empires. In particular, the Kaiser's Damascus speech, during his second *Orientreise* in 1898, expressed public support for Sultan Abdülhamid by Germany in just the way the Sultan would have wished for. Based on this personal trust however, the German companies exploited this declared friendship by using it as a stepping stone for their business interests in the Ottoman market. The GAFs were the most prominent group of industrialists to take advantage of being supported in their Ottoman businesses by the Kaiser when he declared himself a friend of the Sultan. In general, however, the German financial and commercial interests in the Ottoman market, which had emerged during the first wave of the expansionist strategy, were deepened and secured over the course of the second wave.

Domestic Contribution to the German Style of War Business: The Sultan and His Bureaucrats

The 'German Style of War Business' gains its very meaning in the arms makers' personal ties with the Ottoman bureaucrats, especially with some officials at the Yıldız Palace, from where the Sultan ruled the Empire during his entire reign between 1876

and 1909. However, this thesis asserts that there were two key domestic factors that facilitated the *Germanization* of the Ottoman military market: the Sultan and his bureaucrats.

The Sultan's personal inclination, which was naturally affected by his political decisions towards Germany and vice versa and consequently towards the GAFs, was a vital factor in any comparison with other nations' armament firms. In addition, because of the arms trade's magnitude, value and importance, governmental approval and the Sultan's *İrâde* were indispensable obligations during the ordering process, which meant that the Sultan's personal approach and inclinations played a crucial role. Although the Sultan's personal trust for Germany was well known, he tried at the same time to use his Empire's military market as a political arena in which the European Great Powers would fight with each other.

In addition to the Sultan's preference, however, Ottoman military and civil bureaucrats also had manipulative power over the arms purchasing process. Their personal ties with either the arms makers or arms makers' agents in İstanbul provided them an effective sphere of influence. So, over time the following definitions were used by the Germans for those Ottoman bureaucrats or officers who worked in favour of Germany and the GAFs: 'more German than Turkish'; 'a loyal friend'; 'a reliable informant'; '[an officer] who used his whole influence in order to make Germany unique supplier for the Ottoman arms orders'.

In general, this dissertation does not deal with the personalities of the Sultan or the Kaiser or with the Ottoman Empire's bureaucratic structure. The principal interest of this title is restricted to the approach towards Germany adopted by the Sultan and his bureaucrats and their intervention into the arms trade.

Aims and Objectives of the Thesis

The major aim of this dissertation is to discuss and indicate the main determinants of the arms trade between the Ottoman Empire and Germany during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909). It is not intended as a general study of German-Ottoman relations. While being aware that Germany's endeavours in the Ottoman Empire during the period under review are seen to be one of the perfect cases to evaluate 'the border between capitalism and imperialism',⁶ and also, as Luxemburg asserted, that the Ottoman Empire 'became the most important field of operations of German imperialism',⁷ this dissertation, as a document-based case study, is largely confined to a treatment of the impact of personal contacts on Germany's successful war business in the Ottoman market. Based on extensive multinational archival research⁸, this study aims to achieve the following objectives:

- To explore the direct or indirect contribution of the following non-commercial determinants to the German Style of War Business in the Ottoman market: Chancellor Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II and the GMAs employed in the Ottoman Army – especially Goltz Pasha.
- To indicate the correlation between the arms trade and foreign policy in the case of German-Ottoman relations during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909).
- To investigate the impact of personal relations on Germany's successful arms trade in the Ottoman military market.

⁶ McMurray 2001:7.

⁷ Luxemburg 1919: 41.

⁸ British National Archives (London-Kew Garden/UK); Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin/Germany); Bundesarchiv (Berlin/Germany); Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Freiburg/Germany); Stadt-und Zeitungsarchiv Oberndorf/Neckar (Oberndorf/Germany, where the Mauser Rifle Factory was located); Historisches Archiv Krupp (Essen/Germany); The National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland-USA); The Prime Minister Ottoman Archives-State Archive (İstanbul/Turkey).

- To demonstrate the effectiveness of the GMAs in Germany's political and economic ambitions in the Ottoman Empire.
- To introduce the importance of the arms trade in the shaping of Ottoman-German relations.
- To assess the impact of the changing foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire on the diversification of its trading partners.
- To evaluate the archival documents for the purpose of illuminating the motivation of both arms trade-dependent friendship and friendship-dependent arms trade.

Literature Review and Sources

In regard to late nineteenth century Ottoman-German relations, the literature mostly focuses on the Baghdad Railway construction and Kaiser Wilhelm II's second *Orientreise* in 1898. The arms trade, which actually started much before Kaiser Wilhelm's second *Orientreise*, and its multidimensional consequences, has been mostly neglected. Most of the works that also deal with the arms trade dimension are based on English and/or German archival material, while ignoring the Ottoman archival sources. However, there is one study which deals extensively with the Ottoman-German arms trade for the period under observation: the doctoral dissertation written by Fahri Türk. This study pays a good deal of attention to the German arms makers' trade activities in the Ottoman Empire for the period 1871-1914.⁹ In his dissertation, however, Türk uses only documents from German archives: *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* in Berlin, (hereafter PA.AA.) and the *Historisches Archiv Krupp* in Essen (hereafter HA, Krupp). In spite of the availability of the Ottoman archives during the time when his doctoral dissertation was prepared, Türk cites the limited availability of the

⁹ Türk 2006.

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (The Prime Minister Ottoman Archives-State Archive-BOA) as an excuse for not using Ottoman documents in his thesis. Despite some of his serious miscalculations regarding the cost of Krupp's military materials delivered to the Ottoman Empire¹⁰ and his confusion about the events pertaining to the reigns of the two sultans of the period; namely Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) and Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876), his book deserves to be mentioned here.¹¹

Jonathan Grant's well-researched study of the global arms trade for the period 1860-1914 devotes some treatment to the German armament firms' sales to the Ottoman Empire. His consideration of Germany's increasing influence and its relation to the arms trade is compatible with the present study's findings.¹² However, Grant's failure to include either Ottoman or German sources when analysing the German war business in the Ottoman market is a major shortcoming. For his study, Grant bases his conclusions on the German arms trade referring exclusively to documents from the British National Archives in London.

Apart from these studies which dealt directly with arms trade relations there is an enormous literature on Ottoman-German relations from the perspectives of both economic and political relations. However, the literature refers mostly to the limited context of German involvement in the Ottoman military modernisation process and the activities of the German military advisers, which are also covered in this thesis.

¹⁰ According to Türk's calculations, in 1873 the Ottoman Empire had paid 123,354,312 Marks for 834 guns while in 1905 the Empire paid 9,506,876 Marks for 668 guns. Türk 2006: 168.

¹¹ Under the title of '*Sultan Abdülhamid und die Familie Krupp*' Türk cites from Alfred Krupp's notes dating from on April 13, 1876 regarding a mutual-gift giving event that occurred between Alfred Krupp and the Ottoman Sultan. According to Türk this mutual gift giving occurred between Sultan Abdülhamid and Alfred Krupp. However, on the date that the document was written, Abdülhamid II was not the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, contrary to Türk's assertion, the mutual gift-exchange took place between Sultan Abdülaziz and Alfred Krupp and not between Abdülhamid II and A. Krupp. The date on the document which was cited by Türk is April 13, 1876, five months before Abdülhamid II's accession to the throne. Türk quotes from the following document: Alfred Krupp's Notes 13.04.1876, in: HA, Krupp: WA IXa 170. Türk 2006: 177-178. However during my research in the Krupp Archive in Essen I saw a document in which there was the exact same statement written by Krupp and quoted by Türk in his dissertation: *Prokura*, 20.04.1876, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 2M/78/15 (previously as WA IV.341).

¹² Grant 2007: 81-91.

Griffiths' doctoral dissertation (1966) about the reorganisation of the Ottoman Army for the years between 1880 and 1897 and also McGarity's doctoral thesis (1968) are among the first studies to deal with the foreign influence in the Ottoman Army for the period under consideration.¹³ Wallach's well-known and widely quoted work published in 1976, which also deals with the Ottoman military organisational reform process led by German instructors, is worthy of mention here.¹⁴ A noteworthy aspect of Wallach's study is its extensive use of original documents drawn from the German Foreign Office. Akmeşe's book and also Yasamee's article, which are based on Goltz Pasha's papers in the Military Archive Freiburg (MA, Freiburg), clarify Goltz Pasha's extensive influence on the Ottoman Army and also on the Ottoman military officers.¹⁵

Apart from those works, the following authors also deserve to be noted here: Jastrow, Earl, Blaisdell, Bode, Ortaylı, Kössler, Rathmann, Schöllgen, Schölch, Trumpener, McMurray, and Franzke.¹⁶ However, these authors' principal focus was generally the diplomatic and historical background of Ottoman-German relations in a broader sense in which the key point was the Baghdad Railway construction; they gave superficial attention to the GAFs' business activities in the Ottoman market. Almost all of them mention Krupp, Mauser and other prominent German companies and they point out the contribution to Germany's successful business of German military advisers – especially Goltz Pasha – but only a few of them provide authentic documents relating to the German war business in the Ottoman market.

Despite their extremely rich and descriptive documents, the Ottoman Archives in İstanbul have not been systematically exploited in previous studies. İlber Ortaylı, for

¹³ Griffiths 1966; McGarity 1968.

¹⁴ Wallach's book has been translated into Turkish in 1985 and the edition of 1985 is used in the present study.

¹⁵ Yasamee 1998; Akmeşe 2005.

¹⁶ Jastrow 1917; Earl 1924; Blaisdell 1929; Bode 1941; Schölch 1975; Ortaylı 1981; Kössler 1981; Rathmann 1962; Trumpener 1996; Schöllgen 2000; McMurray 2001; Franzke 2003.

instance, while asserting that the Ottoman archives had not been sufficiently utilized, makes reference only to a few Ottoman documents in his 1981 book dealing with Ottoman-German relations during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid. Even after nearly three decades, in the 10th edition of this book he has not added any new documents or information even though access to many archives today is not as difficult as it was in the 1980s.¹⁷ This insufficient interest in scholarly circles provoked me to deal with this topic by conducting research in the Ottoman archives. Therefore, in addition to the sources used in the above-mentioned studies, this dissertation intensively refers to the BOA's resources that provide crucial material, especially to illustrate how the Sultan and his bureaucrats as well as the German advisers employed in the Ottoman service were involved in the arms trade negotiation process. In addition, the Ottoman archives provide invaluable information on the operational details relating to the Ottoman-German arms trade: the cost of the arms purchasing; the negotiations; contract proposals; the Sultan's *İrâdes* regarding arms purchasing orders; the reports of the Ministry Council; the offers made by various suppliers; etc. Especially, the collection of the *Yıldız Evrakı*, which provided most of the documents used in this dissertation, is a fundamental bulk of sources on the period of the reign of Abdülhamid II.

The Stadt-und Zeitungsarchiv Oberndorf/Neckar in Oberndorf on the Neckar (hereafter SA, Oberndorf), where the Mauser rifle factory was located, provided me with rich and descriptive documents which shed light on the German Style of War Business in a broader sense. The letters of Goltz Pasha, Paul Mauser, Ragıp Bey (the

¹⁷ In this context it is essential to mention here that Ortaylı contradicts himself. In 1981, in the first edition of his book, he wrote: '*Esasen yabancı literatürde Türk-Alman ilişkileri üzerindeki çalışmalar hiç de küçümsenmeyecek sayıda olmasına rağmen, beni bu konuda araştırma yapmağa yönelten neden, bu çalışmaların çok büyük bölümünde Türkçe birincil ve ikincil kaynakların kullanılmamış olmasıdır.*' Ortaylı 1981: III; however, in the 10th edition of this book he writes: '*Bu çalışmaya başlarken bizim arşivlerimizin yanında Avrupa devletlerinin arşivlerini kullanmak gibi yöntemsel bir hedef; itiraf etmeliyim, bana konunun içeriğinden daha cazip görünmüştü. O zaman Türkiye tarihinin bazı safhalarını yabancı arşiv kaynaklarını kullanarak yazmak henüz yaygın bir yöntem değildi.*' Ortaylı 2008: 7. In this dissertation, however, the reference is made to the first edition of his book published in 1981.

Sultan's private secretary) and the agents of the Krupp and Mauser companies Huber Brothers (August and Joseph Huber) were the most important materials of the Archive in terms of my research topic. Apart from Wolfgang Seel's articles, in which he mentions a few of the archival documents without referring to the SA, Oberndorf, but rather to the private collection of Walter Schmid, the ex-Director of the *Waffenmuseum Oberndorf*, the documents relating to the Mauser company's Ottoman business discovered in the SA Oberndorf are used for the first time in this dissertation.¹⁸

Moreover, during my reading I noticed that a majority of the researchers, who referred to the documents of the PA.AA. in Berlin, were mostly inclined to use only the machine-written documents whereas the hand-written documents tended to be, due to palaeographic difficulties, mostly neglected. Conversely, I tried to transcribe these documents and I consequently determined both the importance of the arms trade for Germany's expansionist foreign policy and the significance of the Kaiser's and Goltz Pasha's direct intervention in the arms trade process.

The documents of The National Archives in London (hereafter NA, London) and also the documents of The National Archives in the Washington D.C. Area at College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA-Microfilm, College Park) highlighted how the British and American armament firms lost their previous reputation of trust by the Sultan. The earlier reflection of the political choice of Britain and the consequences of Germany's increasingly influential position in the Ottoman Empire could be observed in the Foreign Office Documents found in The NA, London. Apparently the reason why the American and British firms lost their previous strong position, especially in the field of small arms, was not related to the superiority/inferiority of the rifles. To the contrary, the main indicators, as I observe, were principally related to both

¹⁸ Seel 1993/1: 43-47.

governments' strong political pressure on the Ottoman Government concerning The Armenian Question and its political consequences.

During my research I also visited several libraries in Berlin, London and İstanbul. The *Staatsbibliothek* in Berlin was the most important and helpful library for this dissertation. The Special Collections of the University of Birmingham (Main Library); The British Library in London and the Library of *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi* (ISAM Library) in İstanbul were also among the places where I conducted research and took the opportunity to read some rare sources, like unpublished dissertations, memoires, newspapers and the like.

The online sources used for access to newspaper articles were *The [London] Times'* on-line archive, <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/>, and *The New York Times'* article-archive, www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html.

SECTION I: CREATING AN INFLUENCE NETWORK

CHAPTER I
THE FIRST WAVE OF THE GERMAN
EXPANSIONIST STRATEGY TOWARDS THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE WAR BUSINESS
(1880-1898)

“... and Caesar crossed the Rubicon”

Bismarck and His Ottoman Policy: First Step towards Peaceful Penetration

“The new Alexander will have to come from Germany or at least be German-inspired”
*Paul Dehn*¹

“The war of the future will be the economic war”
*Otto von Bismarck*²

Kaiser Wilhelm II's accession to the throne, in 1888, is widely accepted as a turning point for German economic and political influence in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, prior to his accession, the German ruling élites were standing almost completely behind Bismarck's line of vision and diplomacy in terms of the Ottoman policy. In 1876, Bismarck publicly declared his disinterest in the so-called 'Eastern Question' which was obviously shaped by the expectations of the consequences of the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses or by 'the premise that the Ottoman Empire was on the edge of her inevitable collapse'.³ Bismarck's well-known statement, which shows the framework of the Bismarckian foreign policy toward the East, namely the Ottoman Empire, is very illuminating for an understanding of the dimension of the massive change in the German foreign policy perspective during the course of time. On December 5, 1876, Bismarck delivered his famous speech concerning his Eastern policy. He said:

The policy which we pursue must be dictated solely by our own interests, and we will not permit ourselves to be influenced by any proposal whatsoever to pursue any other policy ... I do not therefore advise any active participation on the part of Germany, as I do not see for Germany any interest which would warrant our sacrificing – excuse the harshness of the expression – the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.⁴

¹ Cited in McMurray 2001: 39.

² Barker 1909: 30; see pages 36-37 below.

³ Illich 2007: 40.

⁴ Wallace 1922:289 and see also Kössler 1981:102: *'Ich werde zu irgendwelcher aktiven Beteiligung Deutschlands an diesen Dingen nicht raten, solange ich in dem Ganzen für Deutschland kein Interesse*

The quotation demonstrates that from the very beginning (December 5, 1876), German policy-makers – particularly Chancellor Bismarck – did not intend that Ottoman policy should supersede European policy.⁵ According to *The New York Times*, Bismarck’s belittling of the Ottoman Empire might have come from his realization that ‘Turkish intrigue was a dangerous business for European powers’.⁶ In his memoirs, Kaiser Wilhelm II also mentioned Bismarck’s ‘unfavourable opinion’ of the Ottoman Empire and ‘on the men in high position there [Abdülhamid II and his bureaucrats], and of conditions in that land’.⁷ However, the reality of what happened during his chancellorship was quite different, which was also clearly illuminated by İsmail Kemal Bey, the former Ottoman Governor-General of Tripoli and Beirut. In his memoirs, İsmail Kemal Bey claimed that ‘to extend German influence in the East became an essential part of the Bismarckian policy’.⁸ Furthermore Marschall von Bieberstein, the German Ambassador in İstanbul (1897 – 1912) also pointed out ‘when [Bismarck] addressed the speech [the statement given above], he diagnosed the real existing state and at the same time in the East he secured the role of “the honest broker”’.⁹

Despite some historians’ assertions concerning a general acceptance of Bismarck’s claim of disinterest in the Ottoman Empire ‘at face value’, the following pages of this chapter will propose a diversion from the common approach and will address the consistency of İsmail Kemal Bey’s assertion regarding Bismarck’s attitude.

sehen, welches auch nur –entschuldigen Sie die Derbheit des Ausdrucks –die gesunden Knochen eines einzigen pommerschen Musketiers wert wäre...’

⁵ Illich 2007: 130.

⁶ *The New York Times*: 25.09.1922.

⁷ Kaiser Wilhelm II published his memoir when he was in exile in Netherlands in 1922. The first German original title was ‘*Kaiser Wilhelm II. Ereignisse und Gestalten aus den Jahren 1878-1918*’. In the present dissertation, the English translation of the memoir has been used and given as Wilhelm II, the Kaiser 1922: 28.

⁸ The Memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey was edited and published by Sommerville Story in 1920. Quotation from this memoir will be as follows: ‘Story (ed.) 1920: 85’.

⁹ Marschall to Von Bülow 26.12.1907, in: NA, London: GFM 10/11. For more information about Bismarck’s Ottoman and eastern policy: Brandenburg 1933; Windelband 1942; Baykal 1943; Trumpener 1996; Hull 1985; Wallach 1985; Macfie 1989; Pflanze 1990; Kohut 1991; Cram 1999; Scherer 2001; Illich 2006.

In his memoir, İsmail Kemal Bey put the following very illuminating notes regarding Bismarck's position on Ottoman affairs:

Bismarck, nevertheless, continued to push his views concerning Turkey. In spite of his pretended disinterestedness, when it was decided to send German officers and officials to Turkey to help organise her army and the civil and financial administration, in answer to those who had doubts as to whether such arrangements might be agreeable to the other Powers, he replied that, when Prussia was on the best terms with Russia, the Turkish artillery was organised by Prussian officers. Insisting as he did upon keeping a hand on Turkey, and, above all, on Asia Minor.¹⁰

İsmail Kemal Bey believed that Bismarck considered that by sending civil and military advisers to the Ottoman Empire, Germany would reap much advantage. In the first place, as Kemal Bey asserted, Bismarck believed that, thanks to the German advisors sent to the Ottoman Empire, 'Germany would have at her command a number of officials who knew and had studied these regions, and these at some time or another might be able to render great service'.¹¹ In addition, Bismarck, when he ratified sending the mission to the Ottoman Empire, should have planned that a likely Russian threat could be only prevented by a friendship with the Ottoman Empire, whose Straits' fortification was provided by Krupp guns and whose infantry corps was educated by the German system and furnished with Mauser rifles.¹²

Abdülhamid II requested the first military advisers from Germany through his French military adviser Colonel Dreyseé on May 14, 1880, when Bismarck was still Chancellor of the German Empire.¹³ Nonetheless, because of British protests and some diplomatic problems, which had emerged subsequent to the chaos in the Balkans,

¹⁰ Story (ed.) 1920: 102.

¹¹ Story (ed.) 1920: 102.

¹² Mudra 1953:15; see also: Cram 1999: 117-130.

¹³ Griffiths 1966:47; see also: Kampen 1968; McGarity 1968; Schölch 1975; Beydilli 1979; Kössler 1981; Wallach 1985; Schöllgen 2000; Scherer 2001; Türk 2006; Grant 2007.

Bismarck had to postpone finalising Abdülhamid's request.¹⁴ Contrary to widely-held belief, which says that Bismarck did not look with favour on sending military advisers to the Ottoman Empire and postponed sending the officers to the Ottoman service, he supported the assignment of the German civil and military advisers in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ According to Reşid Bey's report, however, Bismarck's reservation was not over the military mission.¹⁶ On the contrary, as Prince von Hohenlohe also explained in his memoirs, Chancellor Bismarck wanted to send the mission to the Ottoman Empire, whereas the Crown Prince was doubtful about doing so.¹⁷ The point, where Bismarck thought that the Austrians' approval was necessary, was the Ottoman request to enter into the Triple Alliance.

However, on July 14, 1880, Sultan Abdülhamid sent the draft terms of appointment for the prospective German military and civil advisers, who would enter into Ottoman service.¹⁸ The twelve articles consisted of draft terms; nevertheless they could not remove Crown Prince Frederick III (1831-1888)'s doubts. As is stated in the memoir of Prince von Hohenlohe, Frederick III - the successor of Wilhelm I (1797-1888) - expressed his doubts whether the sending of military officers and civil servants to the Ottoman Empire should not now be postponed, for Bismarck thought that the officers might be made use of to lead or assist in the resistance of the Porte to the other European Great Powers.¹⁹ After mentioning his point of view, Frederick III had bidden Prince von Hohenlohe to communicate his doubts to Chancellor Bismarck. After the communication was made with Bismarck, Prince von Hohenlohe sent a report (dated

¹⁴ Griffiths 1966: 47-49; Wallach 1985: 29-30.

¹⁵ Yasamee, for instance, asserts that Bismarck warned the Ottoman envoys that there could be no question of the appointment of military advisors. Yasamee 1996: 80; Holborn 1926:22; see also: Ortaylı 1981: 59.

¹⁶ BOA, Y.EE.7/6 (02.01.1299/24.12.1881).

¹⁷ Curtius (ed.) 1907/II: 267-268.

¹⁸ *Projet des conditions d'engagement du personnel composant la mission militaire et civile allemande en Turquie*, 14.07.1880, in: PA.AA. R13233.

¹⁹ Curtius (ed.) 1907/II: 268.

July 16, 1880, nearly two months after the first step taken by the Sultan to invite military advisers from Germany on May 14, 1880). Prince von Hohenlohe wrote:

Your Imperial and Royal Highness was on my last visit to Potsdam graciously pleased to entrust to me communications to the Chancellor, which I hastened to convey, and concerning which I take the liberty of most humbly reporting. As to the doubts of your Imperial and Royal Highness with regard to the sending of officers and civil servants to Turkey, the Chancellor has come to the conclusion that he cannot share them. He considers the measure in various respects advantageous.²⁰

According to Bismarck, as Hohenlohe wrote, 'it might be useful to Germany to have the Turks as friends in as far as this might be to their [the Ottoman Empire's] advantage'.²¹ During his conversation with Prince von Hohenlohe, Bismarck pointed out the importance of increasing Germany's influence in Istanbul, as well. Prince von Hohenlohe summarised Bismarck's consideration that sending civil and military advisers to the Ottoman Empire was in various respects advantageous. Bismarck was of the opinion that the duties there discharged were very instructive to those employed and would give them the opportunity to show the extent of their capacity. Additionally Bismarck was very well aware of the undeclared and unrecorded duties of those employed in the Ottoman Empire. As Hohenlohe wrote, Bismarck said that 'It will furnish us with a number of reliable informants whom we could obtain in no other way'.²² As a matter of fact, Bismarck was not mistaken in his prediction. As will be illustrated in the next chapter, Bismarck's step taken to obtain reliable information regarding the Ottomans' political, economic and military state had been in the course of time, in all respects, a mission accomplished. Moreover, the German military missions, thanks to their intimate relations to the Ottoman officials and officers, provided a large

²⁰ Curtius (ed.) 1907/II: 268.

²¹ Curtius (ed.) 1907/II: 268.

²² Curtius (ed.) 1907/II: 268.

quantity of important information, especially concerning the military contracts by some high-ranking Ottoman officers.²³ Accordingly, Prince von Hohenlohe gave the following details:

[Bismarck said that] ... the consequences the arrangement may have for the Turks and its acceptability to the European Powers need not concern us. It is not our policy, he [Bismarck] says, to further either Turkish or European interests. A European interest is, to his mind, a fiction useful to all who want to use others, and can find persons who believe in the phrase. It might be useful to us to have the Turks as friends in as far as this might be to our advantage. The Turkish artillery had been trained by Prussian officers at a time when we were living on terms of the utmost cordiality with Russia, and we had thus acquired influence and useful connections in Turkey. If Chauvinism, Panslavism, and the anti-German elements in Russia should attack us, the attitude and the military efficiency of Turkey would not be indifferent to us. She could never be dangerous to us, but under certain circumstances her enemies might be ours.²⁴

It was more than a year after Prince von Hohenlohe conducted this interview with Bismarck that Abdülhamid II sent a special delegation to Berlin in December 1881,²⁵ consisting of Ali Nizami Pasha (1820 - 1893) and Reşid Bey (d.1888), Sultan Abdülhamid's private secretary [*Kâtib-i Husûsî-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî*].²⁶ During the visit, the Ottoman delegation decorated the Emperor Wilhelm I with a higher order, the *Nişân-ı İmtiyâz*, which had never before been conferred on a foreign sovereign. The Sultan's remarkable insistence gave Bismarck the opportunity to test and to realise the

²³ In 1908, seventeen years after Bismarck's statement, Marschall von Bieberstein described the new Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin Osman Nizami Pasha as a reliable informant for the German military mission and an officer who had used his whole influence in order to make Germany unique supplier for the Ottoman's arms order'. Emergence of this kind of justification was an obvious indicator to confirm Bismarck's prediction. Marschall to Bülow, 25.10.1908, in: PA.AA. R13746.

²⁴ Curtius (ed.) 1907/II: 267.

²⁵ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.5/40* (18.01.1299/10.12.1881); see also: Beydilli 1979; Yasamee 1996: 80. Furthermore, the travel expenses and the subsistence money of the Ottoman delegation had been deposited into the Ottoman Bank in İstanbul and was payable from Bank's branch in Berlin. BOA, *Y.A.HUS.169/24* (15.01.1299/07.12.1881).

²⁶ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.5/40* (18.01.1299/10.12.1881); See also: Yasamee 1996: 80; Hürmen (ed.) 2006/1: 55, 88; in his memoir, Bolayır adds that Reşid Bey had a very decisive influence on the Yıldız affairs. Özgül (ed.) 2007: 203.

project which he had shared with Prince von Hohenlohe on July 6, 1880.²⁷ The Ottoman mission was well received in Berlin and hosted for dinner by Kaiser Wilhelm I and Chancellor Bismarck.

Bismarck received Ali Nizami Pasha twice, on December 15 and 17. Two days after Ali Nizami's second audience, on December 19, Reşid Bey was also received by Chancellor Bismarck.²⁸ During all the audiences, Bismarck addressed almost the same issues in a similar way. As Bismarck's report regarding the meeting with the Ottoman delegates also demonstrates, the conversation and thesis which were discussed during the two audiences were a clear sign for a determined policy of the German Government based on a definite approach to the prevention of any simple threat against European peace. In both conversations, Bismarck's main aim was, as he wrote in his report, to keep the Ottoman Empire from any attempt that could affect European peace and, in addition to that, to confront the Ottomans' mistrust of all other powers except Germany.²⁹

However, there were many other points that were not mentioned in Bismarck's report and in fact they are of crucial significance to mention here to be able to determine the very first steps taken towards Germany's peaceful penetration into the Ottoman Empire. As has been stated, the Ottoman delegates, Ali Nizami Pasha and Reşid Bey, were individually received by Chancellor Bismarck.³⁰ Both submitted reports to the Sultan. However, Reşid Bey's - Sultan Abdülhamid's private secretary -

²⁷ Curtius (ed.) 1907/II: 267-268.

²⁸ Ali Nizami's report: BOA, Y.EE.7/5 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881); Reşid Bey's report: BOA, Y.EE.7/6 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881) and see also: *Aufzeichnung des Reichskanzlers Fürsten von Bismarck*, in: GP/ 3 1922: 403-404.

²⁹ Bismarck's report 22.12.1881, in: PA.AA. R13427.

³⁰ Bismarck's report 22.12.1881, in: PA.AA. R13427: '*Ich habe die beiden türkischen Würdenträger, jeden besonders empfangen, ihnen gegenüber aber dieselbe Sprache geführt, wie dies auch von Seiten des Grafen Hatzfeldt geschehen ist*'. See also: *Aufzeichnung des Reichskanzlers Fürsten von Bismarck*, in: GP/ 3 1922: 403-404.

report was more comprehensive and detailed.³¹ Most probably, because Bismarck was aware of Reşid Bey's closeness to the Sultan, he used – at least after a comparison with the Ali Nizami's report – more open language.³² According to the British Ambassador Sir William White, Reşid Bey was supposed to be particularly devoted to German interests. Furthermore Reşid Bey was 'extremely useful' to the German Ambassador Von Radowitz.³³

Reşid Bey had an audience of nearly two hours' duration. According to Reşid Bey's written report, Bismarck declared to him the statements below, which can be read as a strong sign of Bismarck's shifting away from his thesis of 'healthy bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer' declared five years earlier, in 1876. In fact it was a sharp change from the year of 1876 but a confirmation of the position taken in the summer of 1880. According to Reşid Bey, who was charged with submitting the Sultan's request on the German military and civil advisers, Bismarck responded with the following statements:

You should formally request these officials and then we will send them immediately ensuring they are to the degree possible selected from among the most able and reliable persons. As you should know, finding exceptionally able [*müsta'id*] people is rare, therefore to find the exceptionally gifted among them is very difficult. In every case, I hope and expect that the officials selected will meet with your kind to attract your Highness's satisfaction and approval. Because I will ensure that the servants we will select will be both loyal and reliable and will be distinguished among their peers in terms of their abilities and merit.³⁴

In his comprehensive eleven-page report, Reşid Bey demonstrated clearly Bismarck's dramatically changed approach to Ottoman affairs. During a conversation lasting two hours Bismarck had openly shared his thoughts about the British, Russian and French

³¹ BOA, Y. EE.7/6 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881).

³² BOA, Y.EE.7/5 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881).

³³ White to Salisbury 28.04.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3998.

³⁴ BOA, Y. EE.7/6 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): page 2; lines: 11-16 [hereafter: p: 2 (lines:11-16)]. See also Appendix 1.1.

governments and their interest in the Ottoman Empire and had given some advice to prevent foreign interference in Ottoman internal affairs. Meanwhile, he ventured to give some very sharp advice on one of the most critical and bitter issues of Abdülhamid's reign: namely the precarious balance between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire (*mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı*).³⁵ He concluded after offering a straightforward assessment in general summation about the contribution of these *mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı* to the Ottoman Empire. Reşid Bey's report highlights another impressive fact about Bismarck's suggestion of Turkification of the Ottoman Empire, which probably deserves to be seen as a recommendation for assimilation (*Türkler ile mezc olarak*) and even for positive discrimination (*her husûsda asıl Türkleri sâ'irlerine tercîh buyururlar*) against the non-Turk subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Concerning the importance of the German military mission – whose being sent was in question – and its possible contribution into the Ottoman army, Bismarck said:

Using these officials [German civil-military officials] you should endeavour to train yourselves clever (able) and loyal officers, who are to be found solely among the Turks. The interests of other religious sects [*mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı*] are entirely opposed to those of yours.³⁶ They seek their benefit at the expense of harm to the Turks. Their behaviour and actions up until now are sufficient to prove this fact. You ought to enhance the Turks' sway and power over the other religious sects [*mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı*] without any attention to the speeches and demonstrating of any other party³⁷ and not revealing any clue about your starting point, you should endeavour to increase the Turks' power, influence and prosperity, thereby strengthening and reinforcing their authority over the members of all other religious sects [*mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı*].³⁸

One of most crucial points to be derived from this statement is his view on the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, which seemingly held a special interest for him.

³⁵ According to Ali Nizami Pasha's report the *mezâhib-i sâ'ire* were Empire's Greek and Armenian subjects. Beydilli 1979: 490.

³⁶ By this expression [*mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı*] Bismarck meant most probably the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

³⁷ By this he probably meant European Foreign Powers other than Germany.

³⁸ BOA, Y.EE.7/6 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p.2 (lines: 16-18); p.3 (lines: 1-3). See also Appendix 1.2.

Through all these expressions, he might have been trying to win the Sultan's heart, which was broken when the Treaty of Berlin (1878) was followed by a series of European interventions in his Empire's internal affairs 'under the pretext of helping the Sultan's minority subjects' (i.e. *mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı*).³⁹ By refraining from interfering in Ottoman internal affairs in a way that Abdülhamid did not like, however, during the whole conversation Bismarck was drawing a picture in which the *mezâhib-i sâ'ire efrâdı* were portrayed as unreliable subjects of the Empire and only the Turks were trustworthy. He then began to give the Sultan some advice on how to deal with this issue:

... and not for a moment should his Imperial Highness remove himself from considering the concern of his Muslim and Turkish subjects, nor to recall his responsibility as their temporal and spiritual leaders as sovereign and Caliph but rather should he rule in consort with the Turks and strengthen the foundation of his reign with the [assistance of the] Turks.⁴⁰

Whilst the communication between Reşid Bey and Bismarck was taking place in this way, *The [London] Times*, without knowing what Bismarck told his guests, was sharing the following comments with its readers: 'Prince Bismarck may be relied upon not [to] suffer the peace of the world to be broken on behalf of shadowy Ottoman visions of an ecumenical caliphate. ... A fresh and complete system of administration for Armenia and for other districts of Asia Minor had been hoped for as a concession to the sagacious urgency of the British Embassy'. Additionally, the last sentence of the article was like a declaration of goodwill: 'Germany is welcome to the glory, and may calculate on the sincerest co-operation of Great Britain in winning it, if it has learnt the

³⁹ Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 191.

⁴⁰ BOA, Y.EE 7/6 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p. 2 (lines: 21-22). '... Zât-ı Şâhâne kendileri Müslümânların ve Türklerin halife ve pâdişâhı olduklarını nazar-ı hümâyûnlarından bir an bile dûr tutmayarak Türkler ile hükûmet etmeli ve Türkler ile bünyân-ı saltanatlarını te'yîd buyurmalıdırlar'. See also Appendix 1.2

secret not only of extorting decrees from the Porte for the benefit of its subjects, but of inducing the officers of the Porte to put them into action'.⁴¹

The following paragraph might be the most crucial part of the conversation; in it, Bismarck obviously shed light on his concept of rule. Reşid Bey appeared to be astonished to hear such a statement, and he felt himself obliged to express how many times Bismarck repeated it. Reşid Bey narrated that Bismarck told him:

For those reasons, you should not disregard any precautionary measures even for an instant. Namely, in the Sultan's Glorious Lands [*Memâlik-i Şâhâne*], there is a need for you to proclaim that Christian subjects are under His protectorate to counter the claims by external powers that they are protectors of those subjects. However, at the same time the Sultan should govern based on the principle of 'ruling with the lion's claw hidden in a silken glove'. (This expression is the direct translation from Excellency Bismarck's statement, which was repeated during the conversation by His Excellency Bismarck two or three times).⁴²

His advice to Reşid Bey was something akin to assimilation (*Türkler ile mezc olarak*) of the non-Muslim subjects through an administration which he described as 'rule with the lion's claw' (*arslan pençeli idâre*). The 'honest broker' of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) had continued to talk to Reşid Bey and had made the following suggestions and conclusions:

Thus, if one acts cautiously in this way, in a short time the influence and significance of the Christian subjects, namely the subjects other than Turks, would diminish [*zâ'il*] or possibly they might even merge entirely [*mezc*] with Turks and shortly afterwards be transformed [*kalb*] in the Turks. As a result of that, because the State will become a solely Turkish State, consequently, its [the State's] power will increase, and with minimal effort it will regain its reputation, its glory and its greatness that existed several centuries previously and will acquire these attributes multiplied several times.⁴³

⁴¹ *The [London] Times*: 16.12.1881: in PA.AA. R13427. On the bottom of the clipping from this newspaper the following short handwritten comment was written, most likely, by a German bureaucrat: 'We mind our own business'.

⁴² BOA, *Y.EE.7/6* (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p.3 (lines: 4-8). See also Appendix 1.3. The parenthesized comment of Reşid Bey was in his original submission to the Sultan.

⁴³ BOA, *Y.EE.7/6* (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p.3 (lines 9-12). See also Appendix 1.4.

Interestingly, the man who made these provocative and seemingly impulsive statements, which might have encouraged and excited the Turkish bureaucrat, had once given the following advice to Lord Beaconsfield:⁴⁴ ‘Do not quarrel with Russia. Let her take Constantinople, while you take Egypt—France will not prove inexorable. Besides, one might give her Syria or Tunis’.⁴⁵ However, in 1881, a completely different Bismarck came on the scene. On this occasion, Bismarck was giving practical advice to *Constantinople’s* bureaucrats and explaining to them how they could increase the prosperity of the Ottoman Empire and the preferred method to be followed to achieve that aim. He expressed the significance of increasing of the Empire’s foreign trade volume and agricultural output and also the construction of new railroads, etc. Bismarck added:

At the same time, you should not hold back from showing effort day and night without resting for the improvement of your country and from expanding the zone of its prosperities and contentment. You should strike to advance the level of education and increase trade and agricultural productivity. You should recourse to the necessity terms for enriching the country. You should open new roads and passes and should build rail lines throughout the country. You should also manage your forest and mining resources in the most advantageous and suitable manner.⁴⁶

Moreover, the advice offered in this conversation might have had a triggering effect on the peaceful penetration process of German economic and political influence into the Ottoman Empire. Bismarck was not unaware that the Ottoman Empire could not afford to realise all the investment proposals or to achieve in its general meaning all

⁴⁴ Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881).

⁴⁵ Rose gave this conversation based on the statement of Oppert, the correspondent of the *[London Times]* at Berlin. Rose 1916:98; According to Blowitz, Chancellor Bismarck said to Beaconsfield: ‘Why are you opposed to Russia? You might come to an understanding with her. It would be to the interest of both countries. Why do you not take Egypt? France would not bear you any ill-will on that account for very long. Besides, you could give her a compensation Tunis or Syria, for instance and then Europe would at last be free from this question of Turkey, which is constantly bringing her within an ace of a fresh war’. Beaconsfield did not reply, but I saw that my words had not fallen on a deaf ear’. Blowitz 1903: 148.

⁴⁶ BOA, *Y.EE.7/6* (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p.10 (lines 1-5), See also Appendix 1.5.

of the modernisation tasks that he mentioned during his talk by deploying only its own resources. In fact Bismarck, who had pursued an ‘open door’ policy in his foreign trade with the Far East,⁴⁷ probably tried through this conversation to open the door of the Ottoman market to German investors, traders and industrialists. For that reason Bismarck’s musing can be perceived as an indirect declaration of German economic interest in the Ottoman market. As Bismarck stated: ‘So long as domestic employees and companies exist that are able to achieve those goals you should prefer them. Otherwise, you can apply to well-intended and honest, and competent sources of foreign expertise among other nations with whom you are friends and allies’.⁴⁸ However, throughout the provisional process, the priority should be given to the Turks over the *mezâhib-i sâ’ire efrâdi*. Thus Bismarck concluded:

During the course of these [development] process, you ought, first and foremost, to prioritise your own true advantage (benefits) and make sure to agree and carry out all transactions and contracts in this manner. If His Imperial Majesty the Sultan efforts in this way and governs his glorious lands with a perfect fortitude, justice and prudence and also if he prefers the Turks over all others, notwithstanding takes into consideration his non-Turk subjects, his majestic country [*Memâlik-i Seniye*] will acquire wealth and abundance. Thus, in a short time his Glorious Lands’ riches and also the state’s revenue will increase and the power and strength of sultanate will also be elevated. In summary, the Ottoman state will become one of the most solid and powerful countries of Asia and Europe.⁴⁹

Bismarck reassured Reşid Bey: ‘If I had been honoured to be myself the adviser/minister to the His Imperial Majesty I would have encouraged and recommended him in this manner. And I would have dedicated my person and all my energies day and night to this basic principle and to the realisation of this goal [i.e., to increase of the Turks’ power and influence over the other religious sects as proposed in

⁴⁷ Wehler 1970: 128.

⁴⁸ BOA, *Y.EE.7/6* (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p.10 (lines, 5-7). See also Appendix 1.6.

⁴⁹ BOA, *Y.EE.7/6* (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p.10 (lines, 7-12). See also Appendix 1.7. Beydilli highlights the same theme through the document submitted by Ali Nizami Pasha. See: Beydilli 1979.

the second excerpt.]⁵⁰ In Blowitz's words, Bismarck 'spoke just as he thought'.⁵¹ Bismarck demonstrated his intimacy and his open-handedness in sharing his thoughts with the Ottoman bureaucrats. Apparently, Bismarck succeeded in making a good impression on his guests, who reported every single step taken in Berlin to Sultan Abdülhamid. Moreover, Bismarck's statement about the dissolution of the Ottoman parliament in 1878, one of the most pleasing comments Abdülhamid might desire to hear, was conveyed by Ali Nizami Pasha, with whom Bismarck shared his opinion: 'You acted very well with the dissolution of the parliament. Because, it would do more harm than good to a state, unless it does not consist of a single united nation [*millet-i vâhide*]:⁵² In every respect, however, this conversation might be accepted as a general declaration of German interest in the Ottoman Empire from the economic, political and military points of view and the termination or the declaration of the end of his 'disinterested' policy *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman Empire.⁵³

Consequently, as a first implementation of this indirectly declared interest, a military mission, called the *Kähler Mission*, was sent to İstanbul in 1882. Subsequent to the sending of military advisers, German arms makers started to co-operate closely with them.⁵⁴ Their influential position in the Ottoman army made the military advisers an indispensable resource of critical information for the German arms industry. They acted as if they were the intermediaries between the arms makers and the Ottoman army. In one respect, the German military advisers served as the connection between the demand

⁵⁰ BOA, Y.EE.7/6 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): p.3 (lines, 12-13): 'Ben Zât-ı Şahânenin vükelâsından bulunmak şerefine nâ'il olaydım kendilerini dâ'imâ böyle teşvîk ve terğîb eder ve kendim dahî rûz ü şeb bu fikr-i esâsîye hasr-ı vücûd ederek istihsâline sarf-ı mesâ'i eyler idim'.

⁵¹ Blowitz 1903: 146.

⁵² BOA, Y.EE.7/5 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881): 'Siz iyi ettiniz. Parleментoyu ber-tarâf eylediniz. Çünkü bir devlet millet-i vâhideden mürekkebe olmadıkça ona parleментo [faydadan] ziyâde mazarratı olur dedi'.

⁵³ Departing from the conversation given above it can be said that the claim mentioned also by McMurray, that Bismarck never read the correspondence sent to him from his ambassador in İstanbul, appears at least very speculative. McMurray 2001: 27. Yasamee asserts that the mission of Ali Nizami Pasha and Reşid Bey was a failure, however, in terms of the consequences of the communication given above the mission was not. Yasamee 1996: 80-81.

⁵⁴ See Chapter II: 95-123.

side and supply side of the arms trade. Thus, the armaments industry became the first harvester of the seed Bismarck had planted.

Basically Bismarck's attitude to arms trading with the Ottoman Empire, in terms of Germany's expansionist economic strategy, had been determined in the framework mentioned above. When Bismarck approved the first military mission sent to İstanbul in response to an insistent invitation from the Sultan, the first dominoes began to fall; in point of fact the dominoes were falling precisely the right way from Germany's point of view. By the time the final dominoes fell, the Ottoman Empire found itself entering World War I as one of Germany's brothers-in arms [*Waffenbrüderschaft*]. After pointing that out, it is emphasised that Bismarck's endeavour was to exploit Germany's economic strength and military reputation gained during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), on behalf of an expansionist foreign policy.

In this connection, rather than directly colonising by imperial military power, Bismarck saw the potential to penetrate overseas countries peacefully, generally through German-made products. According to one of the well-known German colonialists, Dr Carl Peters, who was named as 'the present President of the Society for German Colonisation' and received the first patent for a charter of colonial protection [*kolonialen Schutzbrief*] from Bismarck regarding the colonisation of German East Africa on February 27, 1885,⁵⁵ the overseas colonisation was another important determinant of the German Empire's economic expansion policy.⁵⁶ However, for Bismarck, the colonies were important in terms of being a potential *Absatzmarkt* (Sales Market) for German-made products rather than an imperialistic venture.⁵⁷ Wehler

⁵⁵ Peters 1918: 73-74. See the full 'Charter of Protection' in German in: Peters 1918: 74-75; Graudenz & Schindler 1988: 98; and for the English translation see: Pollard & Holmes 1972: 157-158.

⁵⁶ Peters 1912: 253.

⁵⁷ Bismarck addressed the following speech to the Reichstag on January 10 1885: 'Our colonies are at present important in my view first of all as markets for the products of our industry'. Pollard & Holmes 1972: 172.

contended that in Bismarck's overseas-centred foreign policy there was 'a remarkable continuity of both the ideas and the methods of free-trade commercial expansionism'.⁵⁸

Actually, in the beginning, Bismarck did not want to take part in the European colonisation race and he avoided disturbing the European balance of power as a late-comer. As a verbal declaration of his neutral position to the European concert, Bismarck once said: 'In Serbia I am an Austrian, in Bulgaria I am a Russian, in Egypt I am English'.⁵⁹ At the same time, he was aware of the recently-united empire's fragile geopolitical position. Establishment and maintenance of peaceful relations with neighbouring states, especially with France, became, therefore, a *sine qua non* for Germany's prosperity. For that reason, he was unwilling to spend the empire's restricted resources on a colonial adventure. As Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote in his memoir, 'the political interest of Bismarck was, in fact, concentrated essentially upon continental Europe'.⁶⁰ Wehler points out Bismarck were quite sincere when he assured the French ambassador De Courcel in September 1884 that 'the aim of German policy' was the expansion of free trade, and not 'the territorial expansion of German colonial possessions'.⁶¹ A letter from Bismarck to Bucher demonstrates that Bismarck did earlier prophesise the character of the future wars which would be the consequence of economic growth:⁶²

Up to the year 1866 we pursued a Prussia-German policy. From 1866 to 1870 we pursued a German-European policy. Since then we have pursued a world policy. ... The war of the future will be the economic war, the struggle for existence on the largest scale. May my successor

⁵⁸ Wehler 1970: 125.

⁵⁹ According to Hill, Bismarck's statement was quoted by Von Bülow. Hill 1917: 359.

⁶⁰ Wilhelm II, the Kaiser 1922: 8.

⁶¹ Wehler 1970: 127.

⁶² In one respect, Bismarck's prescience was attested by the outbreak of the First World War (WWI). The former United States Ambassador to Germany, David Jayne Hill put the following argument that overlaps with Bismarck's foresight: 'the extension of political control for economic reasons, the lust for markets, the quest for resources, the command of great waterways, supremacy on the sea –these are the driving and compelling forces that make imperialism a terror in the world.... Beyond dispute it was economic imperialism that caused the present war [WWI] and plunged all Europe into it'. Hill 1917: 357.

always bear this in mind and always take care that Germany will be prepared when this battle has to be fought.⁶³

In his mind, perhaps, Bismarck prioritised the needs of his country's industrialising economy, which were to develop markets to absorb the surplus inland-productions, and to serve as a source of raw materials for growing industry.⁶⁴ In Germany, especially after the Franco-Prussian War, one of the prominent industries with production surpluses was the armaments sector. Additionally, German policy-makers were aware of the export potential of the arms trade. As Sampson notes, 'by the early years of the century the arms trade had become the most international industry in the world, with a web of inter-connections between the continents'.⁶⁵ Hirst also earlier noticed the trans-national character of the arms trade. In his 1916 book, he emphasised the spirit of the war business:

Swords, like guns, torpedoes, or battleships, were made for profit. Turks, Spaniards, and Englishmen have fallen often enough by homemade weapons. The armaments tree has now grown until its leafy ramifications throw shadows over all the world. There is a market in the most barbarous countries for the most refined machinery of destruction. Thus, though the preparations for war are national, the trade is international. The most fashionable firms, Krupp, Creusot, Vickers, Armstrong, etc., sell very largely to foreign governments. They also co-operate from time to time for the purpose of stimulating the demand or raising prices.⁶⁶

It could be said that arms production and its exportation, which was dependent on the progress of the iron and steel industries, constituted one of the most significant components of a commercial expansionist strategy, which Bismarck left to his successors as a vision and as an integral part of the *Weltmacht* policy. At the same time the armaments industry was one of the key triggering factors leading the innovation of

⁶³ Barker 1909: 30.

⁶⁴ Cf. Wehler 1970.

⁶⁵ Sampson 1991: 58.

⁶⁶ Hirst 1916: 92.

and paving the way to economic expansion.⁶⁷ In fact, as will be mentioned below, Wilhelm II, after he forced Bismarck to resign in 1890, continued to apply his expansionist foreign/trade policy, but with a much militarised approach. However, Bismarck was also conscious of the importance of increased armaments for his country's security.⁶⁸

On February 6, 1888, Bismarck delivered a speech on the military bill, in which he claimed that an increase in armaments and the armed forces was the best guarantee for peace. In his speech, Bismarck asserted: 'That sounds paradoxical, but it is true. With the powerful machine which we are making of the German army no aggression will be attempted'.⁶⁹ That was, in point of fact, what the German arms makers desired to hear. As Bismarck said, this powerful reinforcement would have had a quieting effect on the German nation, and would have lessened – at least to some degree – the nervousness of German public opinion, the stock-market and the press.⁷⁰ In his speech, he clarified the necessity for armaments in a very enthusiastic way:

We are situated in the middle of Europe. We have at least three fronts of attack. ... God has placed us in a situation in which we are prevented by our neighbours from sinking into any sort of indolence or stagnation. He has set at our side the most war-like and the most restless of nations, the French; and he has permitted warlike inclinations, which in former centuries existed in no such degree, to grow strong in Russia. Thus we get a certain amount of spurring on both sides, and are forced into exertions which otherwise perhaps we should not make. The pikes in [the] European carp-pond prevent us from becoming carps, by letting us feel their prickles on both our flanks; they constrain us to exertions which perhaps we should not voluntarily make; they constrain us Germans also to a harmony among ourselves that is repugnant to our inmost nature: but for them, our tendency would rather be to separate.⁷¹

⁶⁷ See Trebilcock 1969; Trebilcock 1970; Gillis (ed.) 1989; Hacker 1994; Hacker 1997.

⁶⁸ Warner (ed.) 2008: 1957; see also: Manchester 1969: 175.

⁶⁹ Warner (ed.) 2008: 1957; see also: Manchester 1969: 175.

⁷⁰ Warner (ed.) 2008: 1956.

⁷¹ Warner (ed.) 2008: 1955.

Based on his strong belief in a united and militarily well-prepared nation, he encouraged his fellow-countrymen to discover new markets and new sources, which were vitally important to the rising economy and the country's industrial potential. In this way, the country gradually became more dependent on the success of informal and formal expansion,⁷² which could provide access to raw materials and new markets. Obviously, his armaments policy and his colonial approach lay almost on the same line. Bismarck did not tend to consider any significant costly step 'as long as the finances of the Reich have not been consolidated'. However, Bismarck was of the opinion that 'the state cannot administer colonies directly; it can do no more than give support to trading companies'.⁷³

According to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Bismarck did not intend to use 'the colonies as commercial objects, or objects for swapping purposes, other than to make them useful to the fatherland or utilise them as sources of raw materials'.⁷⁴ However, Bismarck established a close relationship with the arms makers, particularly with the Krupp family. As a follower of the idea of 'internationalism of profit', Krupp was a prominent supporter of economic expansionism, which was mainly formulated and applied by Bismarck as an imperial foreign policy and was put into practice by Krupp.⁷⁵ Therefore, most of Krupp's demands were in close conformity with the Bismarckian expansionist policy. For instance, in 1865 Krupp was in serious difficulties and needed several millions which the banks refused to lend. So Krupp went to Bismarck – in Menne's words, 'his patron Bismarck'⁷⁶ – to persuade him to extend his support and, eventually, to place an order. According to Menne, during the interview with Bismarck, Krupp pretended 'that he might have to permit foreign interests [the French banking

⁷² Wehler 1970: 122.

⁷³ Wehler 1970: 129.

⁷⁴ Wilhelm II, the Kaiser 1922: 7.

⁷⁵ Kössler 1981: 107-108.

⁷⁶ Menne 1938: 78.

firm of *Seillière*] to acquire control of his firm'. But the real state of affairs was something else. Menne gives the detail of this interview, quoting from Krupp's report:

He [Bismarck] was very upset over the matter and agreed to discuss it with the King and the Minister of War, but he stated that it would be hard to secure a decision without the approval of the Minister of Commerce. I treated the matter as a trifle and rubbed in the fact that if I availed myself of the offers of capital freely made to me in France, I might lose my future liberty of action, and the works pass under partial foreign control. I did not omit to say that I could sell out for 10 million, any day.⁷⁷

Consequently, the possibility of French influence on a well-known German industrial giant set Bismarck into action and he discussed this issue with Kaiser Wilhelm I on behalf of Krupp. After some deliberation, Wilhelm I placed a huge order for coastal defence and naval guns with a payment on account of 3,787,000 Marks for Krupp's work.⁷⁸ Again that was 1866, which was a depressing year for German industry, including Krupp. According to Menne, Krupp later applied to the Government, this time for a grant of more than 6 million Marks.⁷⁹ Later on, the company obtained a credit in millions from the state, in order to equip Prussia for a possible war against France, whereby it was supported by Chancellor Bismarck.⁸⁰

In the emergence of Krupp's and Mauser's exclusive position in the Ottoman market, the interrelationship mentioned by Epkenhans was of really crucial importance and this could not be regarded as a process started only with Wilhelm II, as often cited.⁸¹ In 1861, when Wilhelm I (1797-1888) was still Prince Regent [*Prinzregent*], he hinted that he would support Krupp against other German arms producers.⁸² Epkenhans, probably inspired by these examples, asserted: 'The best-known and most

⁷⁷ Cited in Menne 1938: 79.

⁷⁸ Menne 1938: 80: 1,250,000 Thalers (1 Thaler = 0.33 Marks).

⁷⁹ Menne 1938: 80: 2,000,000 Thalers.

⁸⁰ Bontrup & Zdrovomslaw 1988: 53.

⁸¹ Epkenhans 2000: 335.

⁸² Türk 2006: 160-163.

notorious case of military-industrial relations in Imperial Germany remains the relationship between the military and the firm of Krupp in Essen'.⁸³

In the years that followed, Bismarck continued to support the arms makers' business abroad, in addition to their domestic business. Although Bismarck did not officially support the project of the Anatolian Railway Concession [*La Société du Chemin de Fer Ottomane d'Anatolie*], when Alfred Kaulla and Georg von Siemens appealed to the German Foreign Office to support the company, he had taken an official stand in favour one of the German armaments companies.⁸⁴ As the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha (1845-1936), noted, before the agreement was signed between the Mauser company and the Ottoman Empire, he had several times turned to Bismarck to procure information and his thoughts about the Mauser products. According to Tevfik Pasha, Bismarck praised Mauser's rifles and vigorously recommended the company.⁸⁵ In addition, for instance in 1887, Bismarck appeared on the stage of diplomacy, by persuading the Ottoman Government to place a contract with the German Rottweil gunpowder factory.

The following statement from an archival document signed by Prince Bismarck himself on April 19, 1887, demonstrates his obvious interest and intervention in the war business, as a facilitator – or more accurately, patron – of his fellow-countrymen's companies' activities abroad. Throughout the two page letter, Prince Bismarck endeavoured to obtain an order from the Sultan. In his quasi-recommendation letter, Prince Bismarck referred to some technical features of the Rottweil powder, but in a very complimentary way:

⁸³ Epkenhans 2000: 335.

⁸⁴ Bode 1941: 2: Bismarck had declared through a note signed on September 2, 1888 that the German government would be remaining neutral on this matter. McMurray 2001: 22.

⁸⁵ BOA, Y.MTV.29/19 (13.01.1305/31.10.1887)

Rottweil gunpowder is the best for the Mauser rifle, for it possesses three significant traits: Bullet's power of transit, enhancement of accuracy of bullet's trajectory, and safe firing system, which prevents premature explosion of cartridge and removes the causes and effects bringing about the destruction of the rifle. For those reasons, this gunpowder is appropriate for the Mauser system rifles currently in the hands of our soldiers.⁸⁶

However, the very interesting fact was that one of the factories of the Rottweil Powder Company, later Vereinigte Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken AG (United Köln-Rottweiler Powder Factory) was built on one of Bismarck's estates.⁸⁷ According to Stern, the annual profit yielded from this estate was at first 10,900 Marks and by the late 1880s nearly double that.⁸⁸ Otto P. Pflanze, a well-known biographer of Bismarck, adds that the Chancellor's precondition for the leasing was that the needed fuel (*Sprengstoff*) had to be acquired in Sachsenwald.⁸⁹ Vagts claims further that Bismarck kept 'within bounds the State factory inspectors' demands for unduly strict safety measures just to protect the powder factory'.⁹⁰ Moritz Busch, in his diary which covered 25 years of official and private intercourse with Bismarck, gives detailed information about Bismarck's income earned by the Rottweiler lease:

Afterwards, at tea, we were joined by the Prince, who spoke on a variety of subjects, and particularly of his estates and their relatively poor returns. Apart from the mills, Varzin brought him in nothing. It was hardly possible to dispose of the grain, as the railway tariffs for foreign corn were too low. It was just the same with timber, which realised very little, owing to competition, and even the neighbourhood of Hamburg to the Sachsenwald was of little use to him at present.⁹¹

⁸⁶ BOA, *Y.PRK.E§A.6/61* (19.04.1887.): See Appendix 1.8.

⁸⁷ Vagts 1968: 216. Cf: Stern 1980: 298; Pflanze 1998: 587.

⁸⁸ Stern 1980: 298. Cf. Pflanze 1998: 587; Vagts 1968: 216-217.

⁸⁹ Pflanze 1998: 587.

⁹⁰ Vagts 1968: 217.

⁹¹ Busch 1898/ II: 158. The interview with Bismarck might have taken place on October 18, 1877.

After mentioning these poor returns, the Chancellor had spoken about the estate on the banks of the Elbe, where the Rottweiler Company had established one of its powder factories. Busch continued:

He then spoke about the powder factory which a Würtemberger had established on a piece of ground belonging to him on the banks of the Elbe, describing it and the manner in which it was worked. He said that the Würtemberger paid him an annual rent of 12,000 marks, and that after a certain number of years the factory would become his, the Prince's, property. The lessee was doing a very good business during the present war, as he was earning 150 per cent [profit per annum].⁹²

Although there is no document-based proof that, as Busch claimed, after a certain number of years the factory would in fact become Bismarck's property, his letter sent to Istanbul in favour of the Rottweiler powder still provides important proof of his intervention into the war business. Additionally, Isidor Löwe wrote that Bismarck's support facilitated the first Ottoman order being placed with Mauser.⁹³ Krupp also tried to gain Bismarck's support in winning Ottoman business. According to the *New York Times* dated November 1, 1887, Krupp tried to persuade Bismarck to lend his assistance. The observation published in the newspaper asserted that:

*Herr Krupp ... is prolonging his stay with the Chancellor. It is understood that among other things which have induced him to visit Prince Bismarck at the present time is certain business with reference to Turkey, whose Government, I am informed is indebted to Herr Krupp to the extent of a million sterling.*⁹⁴

In 1874, Krupp was in a difficult financial situation – there was a danger of it causing the company's inevitable demise (*der unvermeidliche Untergang*).⁹⁵ The firm was in urgent need of funds and he asked Bismarck, confidentially, whether the Prussian State Bank (could) advance him two million Thalers? As Manchester points out: 'In the past

⁹² Busch 1898/ II: 158.

⁹³ Seel 1981/1: 802.

⁹⁴ *The New York Times*: 01.11.1887.

⁹⁵ Klass 1953: 112-123; Lehmann 1976: 96.

the government had always been accommodating. Now he was rudely told that he would have to take out a private mortgage on his raw materials with the *Seehandlung Bankinstitut*.⁹⁶ In order to rescue the firm from the threat of collapse, a syndicate under the leadership of the Prussian State Bank (The *Seehandlung Bankinstitut*) was formed soon after to guarantee and issue a loan to Krupp of 10,000,000 Thalers at 5 per cent interest.⁹⁷ As Riesser pointed out, this transaction deserved special mention because it was the first time in Germany that 'the loan took the form of fractional bonds secured by blanket mortgage and provided for common representation of the holders of these bonds, which after that [became] the common form of such obligations'.⁹⁸ Thus, Bismarck and Wilhelm I demonstrated their support as benefactors during Krupp's difficult days.

It is important to recognise that the intense activities of the German arms makers in the Ottoman market started during Bismarck's chancellorship. The fact is that Krupp's emergence in the Ottoman market was not a contradiction of Bismarck's economic expansion strategy. On the contrary, the arms exports had many dimensions and Bismarck was aware of the importance and impact of arms exports on the formulation of foreign relations and even its contribution to Germany's macroeconomic condition.

Another example of Bismarck's support for arms exports was a contract signed between the Ottoman Government and the Mauser/Loewe Partnership in the spring of 1887 for 500,000 rifles and 100 million cartridges.⁹⁹ The contract, which entirely

⁹⁶ Manchester 1969: 121.

⁹⁷ Riesser 1911: 484; See also Gall 1995: 32, 50.

⁹⁸ Riesser 1911: 484; in fact, this transaction was one of the major earlier indicators of the existence of an alliance for the support of the armaments industry. According to Lehmann the loan was underwritten by financially strong parties of the bourgeoisie, senior officials and the military leaders, additionally the bond was guaranteed by a consortium of great banks. Lehmann 1976: 96.

⁹⁹ See also: Radolin to Caprivi, 06.02.1893, in: PA.AA. R13286. Although Paul Mauser and Isidor Loewe signed a joint contract, the name of Mauser was used as the supplier company in most of the

changed Mauser's fortunes and also contributed to the economic and social progress of the city of Oberndorf, where Mauser was located, emerged through Bismarck's intervention. A British report dated January 27, 1887 and dispatched to Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, gives some illuminating details about the contract manipulated by the German Chancellor. According to the report, the English Martini-Henry contract to supply 400,000 rifles to the Porte was nearly completed until Prince Bismarck interceded:

When the arrangement for this supply was nearly concluded, a letter was received from Prince Bismarck himself, in which he toughly recommended the Sultan, if he will going to rearm his troops, to do it with repeating rifle. The consequence was that an order was given to a German firm [Mauser] for 300,000 repeating rifles.¹⁰⁰

The anonymous author of the report offered to send the letter to Salisbury, if he wished. Then he addressed a question to Lord Salisbury: 'Do you think it worthwhile to inquire of Sir W[illiam] White [British Ambassador to İstanbul] whether this is the case?' Salisbury's answer was clear: 'Yes I think so. Merely for information, for outcome we can do nothing'.¹⁰¹ Subsequently a telegram was sent to White, asking him to investigate the accuracy of this 'rumour' and to report his position on the matter. On January 30, 1887, Sir William responded that a commission had been appointed to decide between Mauser rifle and the Henry-Martini rifle, adding that the Sultan strongly favoured the German firm. Sir William noted that he should have to remain neutral in this matter based on the fact that two British firms were about to compete. Afterwards, he added that there was no evidence of an English order having been nearly completed. However, in response to an order to investigate the accuracy of the

Ottoman archival documents which referred to the contracts signed with these companies. Although in 1896 the Mauser company became a part of The German Arms and Munitions Factories (*Deutsche Waffen-und-Munitionsfabriken A.G.*: known as DMW) in the present study 'the Mauser company' or 'Mauser' will generally refer to the mentioned partnership. See Chapter IV: 213-214.

¹⁰⁰ Unsigned to Salisbury 27.01.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/4002.

¹⁰¹ Salisbury's note on the same paper 28.01.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/4002.

existence of a letter from Prince Bismarck, he confirmed the letter and reported the following details regarding Bismarck's intervention: 'In this interval, a reference was made to Berlin as to whether the rifle offered was the same as the one in use in the German army, a satisfactory reply was received which may have led to the report of a letter from [Prince] Bismarck'.¹⁰²

Sir William concluded his telegram by referring to the impact of the German officers on Ottoman purchasing decisions and to their influence in the Ottoman Army and declared that the German military mission strongly supported the German pattern. It was the fact, since Goltz Pasha and Kamphövener Pasha were both present at the practical comparison test, after which the final decision was made in favour of the Mauser rifles.¹⁰³ These two German officers had taken a position in favour of Mauser.¹⁰⁴ In addition, the Sultan's inclination towards the German firms was not a rumour, but a fact. In this way, Mauser obtained this huge order. However, White asserted that the Ottoman Government had not chosen the German rifles because of the diplomatic intervention of the German Ambassador.

Sir William emphasised the importance of the Sultan's personal intervention and noted, 'The German Mauser Rifle contract was given and obtained by H.I.M [His Imperial Majesty]'s personal intervention – but how was this obtained – the public believe it was solely [underlined in the original] through the diplomatic intervention of the German Embassy – but I am assured £200,000 were spent as *Baksheesh* in the parties immediately concerned at the Palace [and] elsewhere'.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, it appears that the statement, which seems to exaggerate the amount of *Baksheesh* involved, was a self-defence statement aimed against the critics with regard to his

¹⁰² White to Foreign Office, 30.01.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/4002.

¹⁰³ See Mauser to the Waffenfabrik Oberndorf, 26.05.1893, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A7.

¹⁰⁴ BOA, *Y.A.RES.37/2* (01.05.1304/26.01.1887); BOA, *Y.A.RES.37/2* (05.05.1304/30.01.1887).

¹⁰⁵ White to Sir Julian [Pauncefote] 12.03.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/4022.

failure during the arms trade negotiations. Based on a document dated May 12, 1888, because of Sir William's lack of attention to the British commercial and financial interest in the Ottoman market, Colin L. Smith argued that Sir William was bitterly attacked by a British ammunitions maker from Birmingham, Mr. Kynoch. According to Smith, 'Mr. Kynoc[h] complained to the Foreign Office that White failed personally and domestically as an unfavourable comparison between him and the German ambassador who eagerly fostered his country's financial interests at the Porte and the Palace'.¹⁰⁶

Through Mauser's entrance to the Ottoman arms market the losers were not only the British firms; the reliable American firms, which 'were well known to [the] Turkish Government',¹⁰⁷ lost their market share in the Ottoman business as well. One day earlier, when Salisbury received the report on January 27, 1887, an instruction was sent by the Department of State in Washington to the US Legacy at İstanbul from the Secretary of State, Thomas F. Bayard to Pendleton King, the first secretary in the American Legation (1886-1890):

Union Metallic Cartridge Company and Winchester Repeating Arms Company are reputable American Houses well known to Turkish Government. You will lend all proper countenance to secure for them full opportunity to tender bids and obtain contracts on equal footing with any other competitors.¹⁰⁸

As a matter of fact, the motive behind Bayard's telegram was the same as that underlying Salisbury's correspondence: the rumour of an officially biased decision in

¹⁰⁶ Sanderson to Fergusson 12.05.1888, in: NA, London: FO 78/4095. (Cited in Smith C. L. 1957: 114); In addition, according to an Ottoman document Mr. *Kinok* [Kynoch] made an offer to the Ottoman Government for supply the cartridges which was actually cheaper than the Mauser company's demand. BOA, *Y.MTV*. 27/59 (26.11.1304/16.08.1887).

¹⁰⁷ Bayard to King: 26.01.1887, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/165.

¹⁰⁸ Bayard to King: 26.01.1887, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/165: On the following day on January 27, 1887 a second telegram, at the same line was sent to İstanbul: 'You may unofficially use proper good offices to secure for Winchester and Union Metallic Company's agents full opportunity to submit bids and obtain contracts on equal footing with any other competitors'. Bayard to King: 27.01.1887, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/165 See Appendix 1.9.

favour of German armaments companies. Bayard actually sent three telegrams concerning this issue. The first, quoted above, the second written, as Bayard said, 'in plain English'; the third, dated January 29, 1887, dealt with the issue in detail and pointed out the Sublime Porte's possible tendentiousness in favour of 'other companies'. The Secretary of State used even more blunt language in his third telegram:

Representations having been made to me that the agent, in Constantinople, of certain American houses of established repute, engaged in the manufacture of military supplies, encountered in the presentation of bids obstacles which, it is said, are not interposed in the case of competing contractors of other nationalities [...] Any obvious bar to open competition in disfavour of our producers and on behalf of those of another country, would suggest a discrimination which the Turkish Government cannot be supposed to intend.¹⁰⁹

The fact was that the Ottoman Empire's foreign policy under Sultan Abdülhamid's rule was based on the mantra 'trust Germany and distrust others', including the USA. Therefore, Bayard's conclusion about the existence of 'an obvious bar' created by the Ottoman Government was not improbable but, at the same time, was not provable. From all appearances, this contract became an international race which the German firm won. The foreign offices of the countries whose companies strove to procure the contract – Germany, Britain and the USA – were officially involved in the Ottoman war business. Significantly, neither Bayard nor Salisbury sent any quasi recommendation letter directly or indirectly to the Ottoman Government whereas Bismarck, who had won the Sultan's trust through the communication to Reşid Bey of December 1881, did.¹¹⁰ The diplomatic intervention of the British and American

¹⁰⁹ Bayard to King: 29.01.1887, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/165. See Appendix 1.10.

¹¹⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.6/61*: (19.04.1887).

ambassadors was not as influential as Bismarck's personal involvement.¹¹¹ Subsequently, Sir William White and Pendleton King and later on Solomon Hirsch excused their light in the war business as down to their role: touch the position of an Ambassador must be neutral.¹¹² Particularly in terms of war business, having this perspective and acting in this correct yet ineffective way might be these countries' Achilles heel, and Germany was well aware of that.

In this regard it is illuminating to cite a statement made by Mauser's business partner and the owner of Ludwig Loewe & Comp., Isidor Loewe, who had accompanied Paul Mauser during his stay in İstanbul and who had taken part in the negotiations with the Porte. As an eyewitness, Isidor Loewe also pointed out the importance of Prince Bismarck's intervention as a key component of the first successful business story of the German Mauser factory. 'At the end of the year 1886', wrote Loewe,

I went with Mr Mauser and Mr Alfred v. Kaulla to Constantinople in order to apply for an order for rifles and ammunition in common with the Mauser arms factory. ... And we succeeded through the very energetic and tireless support of the former Lord Chancellor [Prince Bismarck] and through the self-sacrificing support of General Baron von der Goltz Pasha to obtain an order of 500,000 rifles and 100 million cartridges.... This order is the basis of the great prosperity that the Mauser arms factory had.¹¹³

However, the Ottoman Empire could not finance this contract, which was estimated at around 2 Million OL (nearly 37 million Marks). Therefore, following this contract the Ottoman Empire had to apply to the German financial markets where two German banks declared their willingness to act as guarantors for the payment.¹¹⁴ As a

¹¹¹ King sent a long letter to Yıldız Palace regarding to the rifle and cartridges order. BOA, *Y.A:RES.* 36/17 (07.06.1304/01.02.1887).

¹¹² Hirsch to Blaine: 10.04.1890, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/50.

¹¹³ Seel 1981/1: 802.

¹¹⁴ BOA, *Y.PRK.HR.10/23* (13.04.1304/09.01.1887).

consequence of this application, German capital began to enter the Ottoman market and subsequently, in 1888, the Ottoman Government signed a loan agreement with the Deutsche Bank for 21 million Marks (1,135,000 OL).¹¹⁵ As Bode asserted, this agreement was the first shock which convulsed the monopoly position of the French-dominated ‘Banque Ottomane’ in the Ottoman financial market.¹¹⁶ As the following table clearly demonstrates, the arms purchase was the foremost motive behind this loan application. On November 12, 1888, the Ottoman bureaucrats prepared the following payment table based on the *Deutsche Bank* loan and its allocations.

Table 1.1: Allocation of the *Deutsche Bank* Loan in 1888 (in Ottoman Lira)

Miscellaneous Expenses*	Ministry of War **	Mauser Rifles	Krupp Guns	Germania Shipyard	Total
283,201.24	238,897.58	299,664.42	213,236.75	100,000	1,135,000
25%	21%	26%	19%	9%	100 %
46%		54%			100 %

* Weekly wages of Military Officers + other important military expenses

** Allocated for arrears of weekly wages of the Military Officers

Source: BOA, *Y.A.RES 40/36* (08.03.1306/12.11.1888)

Table 1.1 shows that more than half of the borrowed money (54%) was reserved for the war materials purchased from the German armament firms (Mauser, Krupp and the Germania Works in Kiel). Furthermore, the long-term opportunities of the financial involvement of the German banks in Ottoman financial affairs were rightly predicted by the German Ambassador in İstanbul. By this loan the French monopoly position as the financier of the Ottoman Government was overturned for the first time.¹¹⁷ Based on a report dated July 3, 1889, sent to Berlin by the German Embassy in İstanbul, Barth asserts that the Embassy predicted that within a few years ‘a golden age might well

¹¹⁵ BOA, *Y.A.RES.40/36* (07.03.1306/11.11.1888).

¹¹⁶ Bode 1941: 3.

¹¹⁷ Bode 1941: 3.

dawn for creditors of the Turkish State'.¹¹⁸ As the German diplomats correctly forecast, that marked the start of the process by which German capital interests began to rise in the Ottoman market (a 'golden age' for the German creditors had begun) while the others, especially the British capital and financial groups, began to lose their interests there.¹¹⁹ In addition to Bismarck's patronage and the German military mission's support and also the Sultan's obvious inclination, the German banks' financial support strengthened the German arms makers' position in the Ottoman market. Through this triple support, the German monopoly success in the Ottoman arms market became an inevitable result.

In addition to the size of the contract signed between the Ottoman Government and the Mauser company, its timing was also remarkable. The contract took place at a time when Russian-Austrian tensions over the 'Eastern Question' reached their zenith; rearming the Ottoman Army with the new German-made weapons was at the same time a political message to Russia.¹²⁰ According to Kössler, Bismarck, through his open support, intended to warn Russia that Germany was able to act against any Russian threat through solid and closer relations with the Sultan, sending military advisers and by providing weapons.¹²¹ As well, during the autumn and winter of 1887 Russo-German relations, as Smith stated, became increasingly strained.¹²²

Supplying weapons and appointing military advisers to the foreign state's army became fundamental elements in the building process in formulating international relations. Moreover, as Krupp director Carl Menshausen wrote to the Under-Secretary

¹¹⁸ Barth 1998: 117.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Pamuk 1987: 75-81.

¹²⁰ Cf. Yasamee 1996: 173-178.

¹²¹ Kössler 1981: 122. BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK.13/41. (06.04.1305/22.12.1887): '... Avusturya hükûmeti mühimmât-ı 'askeriyesini tezyîd için on iki milyon filorin tahsîsine karâr verdiği Viyana'dan vârid olan haberlerden anlaşılmakta olup Hükûmet-i Seniye'nin de tensikât-ı cedîde-i 'askeriyesi icâbınca sipâriş ettiği tüfenklerin bir an evvel elde edilmesi..'.
¹²² Smith, C. L. 1957: 93.

of German Foreign Affairs, Freiherrn von Richthofen, on January 18, 1898, a war materials order obtained from a foreign state was a reflection of the political power/influence situation (*eine politische Machtfrage*) or an outcome of a political commercial transaction (*Ergebnis eines politischen Handelsgeschäftes*).¹²³ This statement by Menshausen was an attempt to explain why Krupp so persistently demanded the special support of the German Embassies abroad (*der besonderen H[i]lfe der Kaiserlichen Vertretungen*). However, Kössler's expression, which argues that Bismarck's intervention had a political as well as an economic background, illustrates that Bismarck was previously aware of the importance of the arms trade as a political instrument which should be used by the German Ambassadors abroad as a political negotiation tool. To quote Kössler puts forward the view that: 'On January 14, 1887 Bismarck issued a directive to the German ambassadors concerning the eco-political aspect of Germany's Ottoman arms business, stating that the German diplomats should leverage their influence and support the German companies in obtaining [the armaments] orders in question'.¹²⁴

Furthermore, in August 1887 Bismarck was encouraging the Sublime Porte to take immediate military action against Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, following his announced annexation of East Rumelia. As the Ottoman Ambassador at Berlin, Tevfik Pasha, reported, Bismarck told him that

If the Ottoman Government sends troops to Eastern Rumelia in a short period of time, the Government could guarantee its right over [Eastern Rumelia]. And also through warding off [*def'i*] Prince Ferdinand from Bulgaria the Government could assure the public order [there]. If not, Russia would be compelled to occupy [Bulgaria].
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¹²³ Menshausen to Richthofen 18.01.1898, in: PA. AA. R13291: 'Wer den Auftrag erhält, ist eine politische Machtfrage oder das Ergebnis eines politischen Handelsgeschäftes'.

¹²⁴ Kössler 1981: 122-123.

¹²⁵ BOA, Y.EE.115/6 (24.08.1887): 'Saltanat-ı Seniye Rumili Şarkıye müddet-i kalîle zarfında 'asker sevk itse hem vilâyet-i mezkûre üzerindeki hukûkunu hem de Prens

However, Sultan Abdülhamid did not want to enter a war and so he did not send his army to Eastern Rumelia, but the Sublime Porte intensified its armaments policy.¹²⁶ Abdülhamid was, as Yasamee noted, adamant that he would not take military action against the Bulgarians, nor any other measure ‘which might lead to the use of force’. Yasamee gives the following quotation from a *İrâde* issued on the Bulgarian question:

If, in accordance with the advice of [Russia, Germany, and France] recourse is had to violent measures ... there is no knowing how the Imperial troops despatched to Eastern Rumelia will be received by the Bulgarians. If they are met with armed force, blood will flow and the efforts which we have made over two years to avoid such a state of affairs will go to waste.¹²⁷

Moreover, if Bismarck’s point of view on the Ottoman question and the link between the arms trade and its finance are considered, the banking house of Bleichröder, the prominent German banking house, must also be taken into account.¹²⁸ Until 1895 the only German bank in the syndicate which represented the German delegate in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and one of the three members of the Tobacco Regie¹²⁹ was the House of Bleichröder, a central institution which had a clear impact on Bismarck’s way of building Germany’s foreign trade policy. According to Stern, ‘the House of Bleichröder was selected as having the right to name the German delegate in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration’. However this selection was made with ‘the blessing of the German Foreign Office’.¹³⁰ Indeed, Gerson von Bleichröder (1822-1893), the Chancellor’s banker, or – as Europe knew him – Bismarck’s secret agent in foreign affairs, was one of the leading characters in Bismarck’s economic expansion

Ferdinand’in Bulgaristan’dan def‘iyle âsâyişi te‘mîn etmiş [olacak] ... aksi hâlde Rusya’yı emâret-i mezkûreyi işgâle mecbûr eyleyece[k]’. See also Yasamee 1996: 245-250.

¹²⁶ Menne 1938: 134-135.

¹²⁷ Cited in Yasamee 1996: 246.

¹²⁸ Cram 1999: 205-223.

¹²⁹ For more detailed information about the relations between Bismarck and Bleichröder see: Busch/ II 1898: 70-147; Stern 1980; Illich 2007: 141-143.

¹³⁰ Stern 1980: 419.

strategy towards the Ottoman Empire.¹³¹ Illich noted that ‘the expansion of German influence abroad must be seen within the context of Bleichröder’s participation in Ottoman affairs’.¹³² Stern has claimed that the foreign governments and bankers needed Bleichröder’s support, and he needed their business. He adds that Bleichröder ‘negotiated with the foreign governments; he formed alliances with or against other bankers or syndicates in other countries’.¹³³

Stern also confirmed that Bismarck was well aware that the German capital investment abroad was a source of power, influence and prestige for Germany.¹³⁴ A principal field was Ottoman railway construction, where most German capital was invested. However, another critical subject was the modernisation of the Ottoman army, which needed new weapons and also some structural changes; it also required foreign loans. For that reason, foreign capital became indispensable for the Ottoman Government. So procuring foreign loans and obtaining arms contracts from abroad became a new type of penetration of the provider country, especially for Bismarck’s, and later Wilhelm II’s, Germany.¹³⁵

As one of the prominent bankers in Ottoman financial circles, Bleichröder enjoyed a close relation with the German Foreign Office and naturally this was well known by the German arms firms, especially the house of Krupp which was identified ‘by the closest kind of connection with the centres of finance’.¹³⁶ In 1891, when Abdülhamid intended to buy some warships from French firms the Krupp company became irritated but struggled to prevent the Sultan finalising the contract with France.

¹³¹ Vagts indicates that Bismarck had chosen Bleichröder as his banker in 1862 on the advice of Frankfurt Rothschild. Vagts 1968: 219; Cf: Stern 1980: 304.

¹³² Illich 2007: 142.

¹³³ Stern 1980: 307.

¹³⁴ Stern 1980: 309.

¹³⁵ Fortna describes Abdülhamid’s reform in the military field as ‘costly but necessary’. He also correlates the Sultan’s military reform process with cultivation of Wilhelmine Germany. Fortna 2008:57.

¹³⁶ Howe 1916: 119.

As will be explored below, after Kaiser Wilhelm II's threatening interferences and provocative statements, Sultan Abdülhamid found himself in a difficult situation and he had to find a way to extricate himself.¹³⁷ However, the name of Bleichröder, whose influence in Ottoman financial circles was well known, had come on to the stage at the most proper time by Menshausen, Krupp's agent in İstanbul who became then the firm's director. Menshausen's tactic was interesting and it was as an effective instrument to manipulate the process. As an element of the German Style of War Business it was unique in its characteristics. Menshausen advised the Foreign Office that Bleichröder must refuse the new financial combination of the Ottoman Bank, which was ready to solve the financial problem of the contract for the warship ordered from France. If possible, Bleichröder should prevent the contract being finalised, so that the Sultan would be placed in a position in which he would be able to mention the financial difficulties as a pretext to the French Ambassador, if he again tried to pressure the Sultan with regard to the ships.¹³⁸

Although Bismarck occasionally involved himself in matters relating to the arms trade, his involvement was not as intense as Kaiser Wilhelm II's. His influence on the war business abroad, despite some few letters, was indirect; on the other hand his support was open and direct. As a matter of fact, in foreign countries – as in this case, the Ottoman Empire – the German arms makers colluded with the holders of German capital. Additionally, Bismarck's closeness to Bleichröder played a crucial role in his interest in German capital investment abroad. Furthermore, the exports of war materials had made an extraordinary contribution to Germany's total foreign trade. The increasing share of the arms trade in the total foreign trade had started as early as the

¹³⁷ See Chapter IV: 216-221.

¹³⁸ Menshausen to Geheimrat, 23.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

1880's.¹³⁹ The years after 1880 became a turning point for German interests in the Ottoman Empire. As Epkenhans pointed out, between 1888 and 1893 German exports to the Ottoman Empire rose by 350%¹⁴⁰ and the arms trade was the most remarkable part of the picture. Germany's statistical growth, however, coincided with her increasing political influence in the Ottoman Empire. *The [London] Times* noted on December 1881, when the Ottoman special mission was still in Berlin, that 'Germany has now in Constantinople that commanding political influence which England once possessed'.¹⁴¹ Moreover, Lord Amphill, British Ambassador in Berlin, reported that German-Ottoman relations had reached 'a state of real intimacy which has never before existed'.¹⁴²

The crucial part of the German war business had begun and flourished during the Bismarckian era. The influential military missions, under Kähler and later Goltz Pasha, were sent to the Ottoman Empire during his chancellorship. It was during these years that the major steps in the Ottoman military modernisation process had been taken. In the end, as the *Fortnightly Review* said, 'The good German officers were happy in the belief that they were regenerating Turkey, and in the receipt of handsome pay; the Turks imagine that they were gaining the friendship of Bismarck. All the parties were pleased and contented'.¹⁴³

However, compared to Bismarck's, the Kaiser's impact on the German arms makers' business abroad, especially in the Ottoman market, was even more impressive. His expansionist desires and acts, including his two *Orientreise*, which will be detailed below, and the German arms makers' successful business abroad obviously went hand

¹³⁹ Stern 1980: 405.

¹⁴⁰ Epkenhans 2003: 14.

¹⁴¹ *The [London] Times*: 15.12.1881

¹⁴² Windelband 1942: 320.

¹⁴³ Cited in: *The New York Times*: 08.11.1885.

in hand.¹⁴⁴ For that reason, a detailed focus on Kaiser Wilhelm's intervention in the war business based on his aggressive expansionist foreign policy, which was also affected by his personality, is essential.

Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Basis of his Ottoman Policy during the First Wave

The foundation of Germany's peaceful penetration strategy toward the Ottoman Empire was laid by Bismarck; however it was strengthened and aggressively broadened and finalised with a *Waffenbrüderschaft* (Brothers in Arms) by Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser made a concerted effort to extend German economic and political influence in the Ottoman Empire by using an aggressive imperialistic strategy.

Just like the position of Abdülhamid II in Ottoman foreign and domestic policy, the German Emperor – especially after he dismissed Bismarck from his post as Imperial Chancellor in the second year of his reign, in 1890 – became the most potent and active figure in the empire's domestic and foreign affairs. Smith asserted in his article, published in 1915, that even before Bismarck's dismissal from office, 'the old prince prophesied that the young emperor would someday be his own chancellor'.¹⁴⁵ Smith further argued that Kaiser Wilhelm's chancellors had been vice-chancellors and his secretaries of state for foreign affairs had been under-secretaries.¹⁴⁶ Interestingly, being called by some contemporaries 'his own foreign minister' was a point common to both heads of the states: Abdülhamid II and Wilhelm II. In 1882, the description of being 'his own foreign minister' had already been used for Abdülhamid II by a German

¹⁴⁴ For the concrete outcomes of the Kaiser's first visit to İstanbul see: Chapter I: 76-86 and for the second visit's outcomes see: Chapter IV: 190-197.

¹⁴⁵ Smith, M. 1915: 69; *Neue Freie Presse*: 20.10.1898.

¹⁴⁶ Smith, M. 1915: 69.

newspaper, *Berliner Tagesblatt*.¹⁴⁷ In short, Kaiser Wilhelm II gathered the power of decision-making, both in foreign and internal policy, under his authority and that was actually what Abdülhamid II did in his Empire.

According to some commentators, Wilhelm II's personality had a significant impact on his political choices and even on his decision-making processes. Although it is not the main purpose of this chapter to enter into an analysis of his character, nevertheless, since the Kaiser's personality played a crucial role in the shaping of Germany's eastward expansion policy, it would be illuminating to explore his character since some authors see it as a determinant factor that played an important role in shaping his foreign and domestic policies. Thomas A. Kohut, for instance, in his book *Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study of Leadership*, pays a good deal of attention to the Kaiser's personality and its impact on his concept of rule. The subtitles of the book's chapters themselves highlight the context of the book. The first chapter is headed 'The politicization of personality' and while the second part is 'The personalization of politics'. 'German politics' Kohut contends, 'influenced Wilhelm II's psychological development and came to be incorporated in his psyche. Of course every human being is shaped by the political and social forces of the day. In Wilhelm's case, the influence of those forces was not small but extensive'.¹⁴⁸ Another author who linked Kaiser Wilhelm's personality and his foreign policy is E.J. Passant who argues the Kaiser's character exercised a powerful influence on events. Additionally he describes it as 'vain, romantic, versatile, self-willed, rash in utterance, alternating between excessive self-confidence and nervous depression'.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ *Berliner Tagesblatt*, 02.01.1882, in: PA.AA. R13427: 'Es ist wohlbekannt, dass der Sultan seit langer Zeit in Wirklichkeit sein eigener Minister der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten geworden ist'.

¹⁴⁸ Kohut 1991: 122.

¹⁴⁹ Passant 1966: 101.

Furthermore, Prince von Bülow (1849-1929) who accompanied Kaiser Wilhelm during his second *Orientreise*, expressed the view that ‘Wilhelm II was not mentally deficient, but he was certainly superficial, hyper-sensitive to impressions, lacking in self-criticism and self-control, and hence, frequently at the mercy of rapidly-changing influences’.¹⁵⁰ Ellis Barker, one of the Wilhelm’s contemporaries, discussed the impact of his personality on determining German foreign policy saying that ‘the net result of Kaiser Wilhelm's unceasing activity during the 17 years of his reign seemed to be that Germany lost ground and prestige in foreign politics’.¹⁵¹ According to *The Outlook*, Prince Bismarck’s fall was the result of, and evidence of, the Kaiser’s intention to become his own Foreign Minister.¹⁵² Trumpener also describes the changed foreign politics after Bismarck’s forced retirement as ‘increasingly erratic and fumbling’.¹⁵³

As can be seen, almost all of the writers quoted above were of the opinion that Kaiser Wilhelm II tried to shape his Empire’s foreign policy in line with his own political vision and preferences. On the other hand it is crucial to note that the ground on which the Kaiser built his political structure was generally laid by Bismarck’s economic expansionist strategy. However, as much as some of the Kaiser’s speeches could be seen as expressions of a solely colonial expansionist desire, the major motivation behind his acts and deeds, in terms of foreign policy, might be seen as seeking economic benefits for German firms. Based on his Empire’s growing and varying industrial production capacity, particularly in the iron and steel industries, and its accumulation of capital, he encouraged companies and financiers to invest abroad, where they could find more marketing possibilities.

¹⁵⁰ Von Bülow 1931: 266.

¹⁵¹ Barker 1909: 282.

¹⁵² *The Outlook*, 05.08.1905, in: NA, London GFM 10/11.

¹⁵³ Trumpener 1996: 111; for more detailed discussion about the question of his personality and its impact on his ruling system see: Lerman 1997: 199-227; Hull 1982.

As a follower of Bismarck's idea of economic expansionism for Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Ottoman Empire was practically a virgin field where Germany's export-oriented economic expansionist strategy might successfully be put into practice.¹⁵⁴ As a part of his desire to become a world-emperor he tended to use every possible circumstance to sustain his Empire's foreign reputation as a *Weltmacht*.¹⁵⁵ A note by the US Ambassador in Istanbul, James B. Angell, dispatched in December 1897, demonstrates that Kaiser Wilhelm successfully applied this desire in his Ottoman policy. In his report, dealing with German influence in the Ottoman Empire, Angell wrote:

For the last two or three years the German Emperor has lost no opportunity to add to his prestige in Turkey. He [the Kaiser] apparently took pains to give no offense to the Sultan by any adverse criticisms in the time of the great disorders here. He has furnished some of his most accomplished officers to instruct and to guide the Turkish army.¹⁵⁶

However, Wilhelm's Ottoman approach was consistent with the application of Carl Peters' general explanation of the expansionist formulation.¹⁵⁷ In his economic and political expansion policy, Wilhelm II, seemed to conform to the leadership role envisaged by the colonialist Carl Peters:

These purely commercial questions certainly play a key role in politics, or so it was supposed. From a macro point of view, the head of state of a nation is no different than a managing director of a business [*Geschäftsführer*]. Even to just survive on this unpleasant planet, we have to eat and drink. So in other words, it is the first and

¹⁵⁴ In practice, Kaiser Wilhelm II followed the way what Bismarck shaped for the German foreign diplomacy. As Hans Delbrück justly asserted that 'everything that he [Kaiser Wilhelm II] undertook and strove after has its origins, is present in embryo, in the policy of Bismarck'. Cited in Fuller 1922: 3.

¹⁵⁵ However, Wehler asserts that Wilhelm II's world policy was based on the deliberate and calculated use of foreign policy as an instrument for achieving domestic political ends. Wehler 1991: 176-177.

¹⁵⁶ Angell to Sherman, 07.12.1897, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63.

¹⁵⁷ Carl Peters expressed the Kaiser's award of title Commissar [*Reichskommissar*] with pension rights [*Pensionsberechtigung*] and he narrated as follows: 'Im Mai 1894 ernannte mich der Kaiser zum etatsmäßigen Reichskommissar mit Pensionsberechtigung. Der verstorbene Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Moltke brachte mir persönlich die Urkunde in meine Wohnung in Berlin.... In ihr war gesagt, der Kaiser ernenne mich in der Erwartung, daß ich fortfahren werde, meinen Amtspflichten auch fernerhin mit gleichem Eifer und gleicher Treue nachzukommen wie bisher'. Peters 1918: 102.

foremost responsibility of the leader of the 'herd' to provide his herd with food and drink.¹⁵⁸

In the mind of the *Geschäftsführer* of the German Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Ottoman Empire was nothing more than a door which opened out into the region that could provide vital natural resources and a virgin market for the German *Volks*. To get a better picture of the emotional environment that prevailed at that time in the Germany of Wilhelm II, the statement of Chancellor von Caprivi seems to be remarkably apt. He noted, in December 1891, that Germany 'must export either goods or men'.¹⁵⁹ It was an earlier expression of what was theoretically formulated later by Friedrich Ratzel citing the necessity of a *Lebensraum*.¹⁶⁰

In contrast to Bismarck's policy of balance in Europe, Kaiser Wilhelm II opened the way for a Franco-Russian alliance against the German Empire which crystallised between 1892 and 1894. On January 18, 1896, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the unification and establishment of the German Empire, the Kaiser made a dinner speech (*Tischrede*) in the *Königlichen Schloß* in which he emphasised Germany's ambition to become a colonial empire with her citizens spread all over the world:

What our fathers hoped for, what the German youth dreamingly sang about and longed for, was their wishes for them, the two Kaisers together with the princes, to gain back and re-establish the German Reich. We may gratefully enjoy the benefits, and we should be happy on this particular day. With this, however, comes on us the serious duty to also retain what our ancestors and leaders have gained back for us. The German Reich has become a World Reich.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Peters 1912: 254.

¹⁵⁹ On December 10, 1891, Von Caprivi made the following speech: '*Wir müssen exportieren, entweder wir exportieren Waren oder wir exportieren Menschen. Mit dieser steigenden Bevölkerung ohne gleichmäßig zunehmende Industrie sind wir nicht in der Lage, weiterzuleben*'. Richberg 1983: 33.

¹⁶⁰ For a detailed study on the terms of *Lebensraum* see: Smith, W. D. 1980 and 1986.

¹⁶¹ Kaiser Wilhelm's speeches were edited and published by Johannes Penzler. Penzler (ed.) 1904/2: 9-10.

After these strongly provocative introductory remarks, the Kaiser told those in attendance that their duty was to help him to strengthen the Great German Empire (*dieses größere Deutsche Reich*), that included all Germans who were scattered across the globe.¹⁶²

On October 20, 1896, 10 months after the Kaiser's speech, *The [London] Times* published an article that confirmed the increased area acquired by Germany within 12 years, from 1884 to 1896:

Table 1.2: German Colonial Expansion, 1884-1896 (in square miles)

	1884	1896
Africa	0	920,920
The Pacific	0	102,150
Total	0	1,023,070

Source: *The [London] Times*: 20.10.1896

The table clearly demonstrates that Germany had spread its colonial influence enormously. Germany, which had almost no territories under her control in 1884, became – on the eve of the First World War – a colonial power that ruled over an area of more than one million square miles in extent. However, this great change in her overseas territory did not provide enough sources for a population which was rapidly growing and exceeded 60 million people by 1914. Another prominent colonialist, Friedrich Naumann, formulated the necessity for an expansionist strategy based on the fundamental economic requirements ‘bread and jobs’ (*Brot und Arbeit*), citing the fact that ‘the national agriculture could not provide enough production to sustain the whole

¹⁶² Penzler (ed.) 1904/2: 9-10.

population'.¹⁶³ Thus, Germany was becoming more and more dependent on importations of foreign grain.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, Naumann's concern mentioned above, which originated from the rapid growth of the population, was not a needless fright. In a contemporary article the gravity of the issue was described as a 'black necessity' that shaped the German expansionist policy.¹⁶⁵ It was asserted in the article: '... hence German statesmen, to find room for their surplus population and to extend German trade and provide for the mill and factory workers at home, must try to expand the German colonial empire'.¹⁶⁶ However, after appearing as a poor country – from a socio-economic point of view – at the beginning of the [nineteenth] century, Germany's condition changed dramatically. As Feis pointed out, 'by the end of the century the industrial organisation of a unified Germany had taken massive form. Its foreign commerce was rivalling that of the British. Its highly concentrated banking system was finding the means not only to finance the impulsion of industry at home, but also implant offshoots abroad'.¹⁶⁷

As the following figures indicate, in the year 1820, in the territory that formed the frontiers of the German Empire as it was composed in 1914,¹⁶⁸ there lived only 24,905,000 people but later, in the year 1871, when the German Empire was established, the population had reached 39,456,000. In 1888, Wilhelm II became the Kaiser of some 46,538,000 people. By 1898, at the time of his second *Orientreise* in Istanbul, the Kaiser was representing more than 52 million people.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ Naumann 1913: 144-145: 'Wir sind ein wachsendes Volk. Bald wird unsere Ziffer 60 Millionen betragen, bald 70 Millionen Menschen. Diese Millionen wollen Brot und Arbeit. Vom deutschen Acker allein werden wir nie wieder leben können'.

¹⁶⁴ Earle 1924: 183.

¹⁶⁵ 'Germany and her Future', in: NA, London: GFM 10/11: The document (the newspaper article) was undated and also the name of the newspaper was not given on the document.


¹⁶⁶ 'Germany and her Future', in: NA, London: GFM 10/11.

¹⁶⁷ Feis 1930: 60.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Helfferich 1913: 14.

¹⁶⁹ Maddison 2009; Cf. Helfferich 1913: 14.

Figure 1.1) Population Growth in Europe: 1820-1915 (000 at mid-year)



Source: Maddison 2009.

The rapid growth in Germany's population, especially from the 1870s, triggered fears of possible shortages in some crucial areas. Therefore Naumann's concept of '*Brot und Arbeit*' became more vital to German *Lebensinteresse*¹⁷⁰ -- at least this fact was used widely as an agitating issue in the hands of the supporters of a colonialist and expansionist policy. So it was likely that the young Kaiser Wilhelm II, as *der führende Kopf der Herde*, felt himself obliged to take into account the growing population, the vast industrial progress and the production surplus in formulating his foreign policy. Particularly, the growing shortage of raw materials forced him to take some crucial steps toward being a strong participant in the *Weltmarkt*, which carried, as Naumann dictated, an essential interest [*Lebensinteresse*] for the whole German people, but also for the special interests of industrial entrepreneurs, traders, and workers.¹⁷¹ This grave state was also well summarised in Howe's book published in 1919. Howe emphasised the dependency of Germany's industrial life on the outside world for raw materials:

¹⁷⁰ Naumann 1913: 144.

¹⁷¹ Naumann 1913: 144.

‘Any interruption of the source of supply [of raw materials] would weaken or destroy her [Germany’s] life’.¹⁷²

However, it emerged in Wilhelm II’s Germany that the domestic market was too small to absorb the surplus of industrial production, especially some of the different varieties of output of the iron and steel industries, which had made vast progress and had become the most important component of German economic growth. From railway construction to arms making, the iron and steel industries played a crucial role in Germany’s economic progress and the expansionist strategy based on it. A key motivation behind the aggressive expansionist policy was to increase their capacity. The following comparison table illustrates the vast growth in the sector between 1886 and 1910, and provide some figures that highlight Germany’s ability to ‘contend’ in the very competitive *Weltmarkt*.

Table 1.3: Steel Production by Major Producers, 1886-1910 (in 1000 tons)

	1886	1910	Growth (%)
United States	2,604.4	26,512.4	910.3
Germany	954.6	13,698.6	1,335.0
Great Britain	2,403.2	6,106.8	154.1
France	427.6	3,390.3	692.9
Russia	241.8	2,350.0	871.2
Belgium	164.0	1,449.5	783.6

Source: Helfferich 1913: 64

As seen in the table, by 1910 Germany had outdistanced Britain and her continental rivals with her output.¹⁷³ Through a rapid increase in steel production, Germany had become the second largest steel producer in the world, after the USA. Passant asserts that the German iron masters and metal manufacturers learned much from their British

¹⁷² Howe 1919: 6.

¹⁷³ Helfferich 1913: 64; According to Passant, in 1910 Germany’s steel output was 14,794,000 tons. Passant 1966: 107.

rivals. ‘They paid’, writes Passant, ‘careful attention to the problem of the location of their plants, and they appreciated the importance of concentration in their industry’.¹⁷⁴ As the next table clearly demonstrates, Germany’s pig-iron output outdistanced Britain in less than three decades.

Table 1.4: Pig-iron Production by Major Producers, 1887-1911 (in 1000 tons)

	1887	1911	Growth (%)
United States	6,520	24,028	268.5
Germany	4,024	15,574	287.6
Great Britain and Ireland	7,681	10,033	30.06
France	1,568	4,441	181.3
Russia	612	3,588	486.3
Belgium	758	2,106	178.8

Source: Helfferich 1913:124

Germany, which had produced only four million tons of pig-iron in 1887, achieved within 14 years an output of 15,574,000 tons, which made it the world’s second-largest pig-iron producer in 1911. In the hand of the export-oriented economic expansion strategists, iron and steel became the leading industry. The statistics quoted prove that in the key industries (additionally in mining, manufacture, agriculture and commerce) Germany’s progress was ‘stupendous’.¹⁷⁵ Among the outputs, railroads and war materials were the most prominent ‘German made’ productions of these industries; they were extensively exported. In fact, foreign markets were of vital significance for the sustainability of German industrial growth, which was termed by Naumann as a *Lebensinteresse*.¹⁷⁶

Departing from the context of the *Lebensinteresse*, the ‘travel to the East’ came on the scene like a journey of hope to find a new *Lebensraum* which would overcome

¹⁷⁴ Passant 1966: 107.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Pollard & Holmes 1972: 77.

¹⁷⁶ Naumann 1913: 144.

the mentioned shortages and risks in the event of a possibly inadequate demand for the manufactured goods. Germany's dependence on other countries for so much of its raw materials and some semi-finished goods put it in a precarious position.¹⁷⁷ The import requirements of Germany's growing industry and increasing population were enormous. Earle argued that the Ottoman Empire was rich in certain important raw materials such as minerals, fuels and lubricants as well as in textile production. Earle described the chrome, antimony, manganese, copper, emery, meerschaum, oil, cotton and silk, which constituted the Ottoman Empire's great natural wealth, as 'a lure to European traders and investors'.¹⁷⁸

Based on this expansionist motivation and the vast development of its industrial production, Germany increased her foreign trade dramatically. Germany imported raw materials and foodstuffs and exported a great variety of manufactured goods; finished industrial products especially held an increasingly important place in export growth. The table below indicates the dramatic increase in Germany's total foreign trade between 1860 and 1913.

Table 1.5: Germany's Foreign Trade, 1860-1913 (in British Pounds)

Years	Export	Import
1860	70,000,000	54,750,000
1872	124,600,000	173,250,000
1880	148,850,000	142,200,000
1890	170,500,000	213,650,000
1900	237,650,000	302,150,000
1910	373,735,000	446,705,000
1913	504,825,000	538,515,000

The values given in the table excluded re-exports and precious metals.
Source: Passant 1966: 112.

¹⁷⁷ Zucker 1919: 777; Moulton 1924: 2.

¹⁷⁸ Earle 1924: 183.

This remarkable increase in German foreign trade (from £124 million in 1860 to circa £1,050 million in 1913) went hand in hand with the political expansionist strategy. In fact, German policy-makers found a point of intersection of foreign policy motives and economic priorities. The iron and steel industry and the export of its production, especially war materials and railroads, was the first of five principal groups of German manufactured goods and became a very useful foreign policy instrument. The following table shows the five most important sectors of German manufactured goods and their percentage of total exports in 1913:

Table 1.6: Five principal manufactured goods in Germany and their percentage of exports in 1913

Manufactured goods	Per cent (%)
Iron products	15.8
Machinery	11.2
Textiles*	12.7
Chemicals and dyes	9.4
Leather and leather articles	5.4

*not including clothes

Source: Moulton 1924:2

Through export relations, the German bureaucrats abroad became more able to penetrate into the governmental decision-making processes and to lobby on behalf of their fellow-citizens' commercial interests. Not being self-sufficient in arms production and railroad construction rendered the Ottoman Empire more vulnerable to being evaluated in this context. The Germans, as distinct from other suppliers who invested in the Ottoman market, penetrated that market through a well-prepared strategic package in which economic motives were perfectly harmonised with the political concept. For that reason, it can be asserted that the economic activities of German companies, particularly arms makers, and the salient success they achieved in the Ottoman market, should not be considered only within a commercially-focused point of view. On the

contrary, in the mind of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the business actors were the commercial representatives of his *Weltmacht* policy in tandem with the experienced diplomatic personnel of the German Foreign Office –*Auswärtiges Amt*. For German foreign policy, economic strength – along with all its instruments such as capital, industry and trade – ranked highly among the determinant factors of an expansion policy. The German Ambassador to İstanbul Marschall von Bieberstein declared its importance in a very clear framework. According to him, German capital, industry and trade - as instruments of expansionist power - were protected by the German Government and they created political interest in the countries where they established their activities.¹⁷⁹

The German war business in the Ottoman market serves as an excellent case to observe the existence of the link between economic growth and the expansionist foreign policy. The interrelation mentioned was also formulated in a clear way by Prince von Bülow who maintained German foreign policy should follow the expansion of economic strength. In one of his speeches he noted that ‘as the German production (*deutsche Arbeit*) had conquered (*erobert*) further her dominant position on the world market, our foreign policy should follow the consequences of our current economic strength (*wirtschaftlichen Kräfte*)’.¹⁸⁰ In addition to Von Bülow’s consideration, which could be read as a pulling effect of German economic strength, German economic growth also had a driving effect on expansionist and aggressive foreign policy. Departing from this point of view, it is said that these ideas and compelling circumstances encouraged Kaiser Wilhelm II to pay two visits to the Ottoman Empire during Abdülhamid II’s reign.¹⁸¹ As a matter of fact, as will be seen below, these visits had both political and economic motivations and resulted in multidimensional

¹⁷⁹ Marschall to Von Bülow, 26.12.1907, in: NA, London: GFM 10/11.

¹⁸⁰ Penzler (ed.) 1907/1: 100.

¹⁸¹ The Kaiser paid three visits to İstanbul two of them were during the reign of Abdülhamid II in 1889 and 1898.

consequences. For that reason the Kaiser's two *Orientreise* must be dealt with in detail in this context.

Kaiser Wilhelm II's First Orientreise and its Multiple Consequences (1889)

Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Abdülhamid II in İstanbul in 1889, one year after his accession.¹⁸² The German Emperor and Empress remained there for five days, from 2-6 November, visiting all the principal sights.¹⁸³ As widely stated, the visit was planned as an add on trip following a family visit to Greece, where Wilhelm's Sister Sophie was married to Crown Prince Constantine. However according to one document – a telegram Abdülhamid II sent to the Kaiser on September, 4 1889 – the Sultan invited the Kaiser to İstanbul as his guest.¹⁸⁴ This telegram reveals the Kaiser had expressed his intention to visit İstanbul as early as September of the same year. Referring to the good relations with the Kaiser's father and his predecessors, Abdülhamid prefaced his expectation on future bilateral relations. In reply, the Kaiser expressed his gratitude upon the acceptance of his intention to visit İstanbul.¹⁸⁵ According to McMurray, Wilhelm's intention was 'to take a first-hand look at the Ottoman Empire's offerings'.¹⁸⁶

When the Kaiser visited İstanbul, Bismarck was still in charge of the Chancellorship and in fact was not in favour of the Emperor's visit. However, his arguments were based mainly on Germany's geopolitical position. As Kaiser Wilhelm narrated in his memoir, published in 1922, Bismarck, on his return from İstanbul in

¹⁸² BOA *Y.PRK.ASK.58/49* /07.03.1307/ 01.11.1889); White to Salisbury, 07.11.1889, in: NA, London: FO 78/4207; BOA, *Y.A.HUS.229/45* (07.01.1307/ 03.10.1889); Wilhelm II, *the Kaiser* 1922: 28.

¹⁸³ White to Salisbury, 07.11.1889, in: NA, London: FO 78/4207.

¹⁸⁴ BOA, *Y.PRK.NMH.4/42* (08.01.1307/04.09.1889).

¹⁸⁵ BOA, *Y.PRK.NMH.4/43* (9.01.1307/05.09.1889).

¹⁸⁶ McMurray 2001: 28.

1889, had inquired about the Kaiser's İstanbul impressions. 'In doing this', said the Kaiser,

... it struck me that Prince Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high position there, and of conditions in that land. I thought I might inspire him in part with essentially more favourable opinions, but my efforts were of little avail. Upon asking the Prince the reason why he held such an unfavourable opinion, he answered that Count Herbert [von Bismarck (1849-1904)] had reported very disapprovingly [*abfällig*] on Turkey. Prince Bismarck and Count Herbert were never favourably inclined toward Turkey and they never agreed with me in my Turkish policy the old policy of Frederick the Great.¹⁸⁷

Apparently, the statement made here by the Kaiser demonstrates a diversion from the tone of Bismarck's remarks in conversation with Reşid Bey in December 1881. The reason behind the Kaiser's statement might be his desire to be regarded as the unique architect of German Ottoman policy which had offered a large number of profitable opportunities for German industrialists and capitalists for decades. In fact, the fundamental differences between the Kaiser's approach to improving German - Ottoman relations and Bismarck's approach were only in their tone and in the style of expressing the strategy. Bismarck preferred the stealthy way whereas Kaiser Wilhelm II followed an ostentatious path. However, the general motivation behind both of the tactics was the same: achieving the success of the German expansionist policy. In this regard, it is initially important to recall that Bismarck – in spite of his 'pretended disinterestedness' – and the Kaiser were the creators of the first wave of the German expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire. As stated above, Bismarck's principal contribution to the formation of this wave was his decision to send civil and military advisers to assist the Ottoman Empire. The effectiveness and strength of this

¹⁸⁷ Wilhelm II, the Kaiser 1922: 28.

German expansionist wave towards the Golden Horn was fortified by Kaiser Wilhelm's first visit to İstanbul in 1889.

Although Bismarck was openly against the proclamation of the trip as a politically-oriented visit to the Sultan, the Kaiser's first visit became like a strong wind that accelerated and shaped the future form of the expansionist wave of German penetration of the Ottoman Empire. However, in a letter sent to the German Ambassador in Rome, Bismarck recounted how he struggled to explain and convince the other European states, particularly Russia, that the purpose of the Kaiser's visit was not political but based solely on a simple 'sightseeing desire'.¹⁸⁸ In fact the rumours of the Ottomans' entrance into the Triple Alliance perturbed the other European Powers greatly and Bismarck was anxious to convince them that the Ottoman Empire would stay out of the Triple Alliance.

On November 4, Count Herbert von Bismarck, Bismarck's oldest son, when he was in İstanbul, visited the British Ambassador, Sir William White, and, according to an Ottoman document, it was a rather lengthy visit [*uzunca bir ziyâret*].¹⁸⁹ Count Herbert's obvious purpose was to eliminate the rumour related to the purpose of the Kaiser's presence in the capital. Count Herbert is said to have assured Sir William that 'political questions were hardly touched upon between the two Sovereigns'.¹⁹⁰ However, the short visit of the Kaiser created an obvious rapprochement between the two Sovereigns. 'All accounts', said Sir William White, reporting on the Kaiser's visit to London, when the Kaiser was on his way to Berlin via Venice, 'concur in stating that the relations between their Imperial Majesties and the Sultan were throughout of a very

¹⁸⁸ Reichskanzler Bismarck to Solms-Sonnenwalde, 15.10.1889, in: GP/6 1922: 360: '*Bezüglich der bevorstehenden Kaiserreise nach dem Orient sagte ich, daß dem Besuch in Konstantinopel nur der Wunsch unserer Majestäten zugrunde läge, von Athen nicht heimzukehren, ohne Konstantinopel gesehen zu haben*'. Cf. Robolsky 1891: 29: According to Robolsky Bismarck looked at the Kaiser's trip as a junket [*Vergnügungsreise*].

¹⁸⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.PT.5/96 (10.03.1307/04.11.1889).

¹⁹⁰ White to Salisbury, 08.11.1889, in: NA, London: FO 78/4207.

cordial character and led to the foundation of intimate relations such as exist between allied Sovereigns'.¹⁹¹ However, according to a document dated November 8, 1889, Sir William White expressed his personal thoughts about the Kaiser's visit in the following words: 'The visit of His Majesty the Kaiser of the German Empire entailed your [the Sultan's] humble servant's gratitude and gladness'.¹⁹² Nevertheless, Bismarck was of the opinion that the establishment of friendly relations between the two leaders must not necessarily create the foundations of a formal political and military alliance. Therefore on October 15, 1889, he felt himself obliged to deny Germany had any political interest in the Black Sea and Mediterranean region:

Germany does not have any political interests in either the Black Sea or the Mediterranean, and thus attributing political motives to our majesties' visit to İstanbul is out of the question. Admittance of the Porte to the triple-alliance is not possible; we could not place the German nation with the burden of waging a war against Russia for the future of Baghdad.¹⁹³

As M. Smith clearly stressed, the keystone of Bismarck's entire foreign policy, from the unification of Germany to his dismissal from the Imperial Chancellorship in 1890, was the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia: 'As long as Russia was friendly, no dangerous coalition could be formed against united Germany'.¹⁹⁴ In the same way, *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express* quoted a comment from *The Berlin Post*. With reference to the newspaper article, the Kaiser's visit to İstanbul aimed 'neither at the inception nor at the conclusion of any political combinations, but it remains nevertheless an event of high importance because it will contribute to consolidate the international position of Turkey'.¹⁹⁵ However, as a matter of fact, the short visit became

¹⁹¹ White to Salisbury, 07.11.1889, in: NA, London: FO 78/4207.

¹⁹² BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.10/24* (14.03.1307(08.11.1889)).

¹⁹³ Reichskanzler Bismarck to Solms-Sonnenwalde, 15.10.1889, in: GP/6 1922: 360-361.

¹⁹⁴ Smith, M. 1915: 48.

¹⁹⁵ *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 03.11.1889, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/50.

an important and influential step that changed the German and Ottoman foreign policy parameters and determined the character of bilateral ties for many years.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, Marriott's following expression about the Kaiser's intention behind the visit is one of the most illuminating ways to determine the frame of the Kaiser's first visit to İstanbul:

It was precisely seven hundred years as the German colony of Constantinople reminded their sovereign, since a German emperor had first set foot in the imperial city. But Frederick Barbarossa had come sword in hand; the Emperor William came as the apostle of peace; as the harbinger of economic penetration; almost, as was observed at the time, in the guise of a commercial traveller.¹⁹⁷

Mainly because Wilhelm II was the first European monarch to visit İstanbul,¹⁹⁸ the Ottoman press attached great importance to the Emperor's presence in the capital and the newspapers showed very keen interest in the young Kaiser's visit.¹⁹⁹ One of the most important newspapers, *Sabah*, for instance, welcomed the Kaiser and Kaiserin on its front page, publishing a welcome notice in German and in Turkish under the pictures of the German royal couple.²⁰⁰ *Tercümân-ı Hakikât* published a translation of the German national anthem along with its original version in German as a sign of the Ottomans' sympathy towards the German Empire.²⁰¹ *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express* published a special edition on November 3, 1889 and gave details about the Kaiser's arrival and his first day in the city.²⁰²

Despite the Kaiser's first visit being short, from a long-term perspective its impact and political and economic outcomes were crucial. The possible long-term impact of the Kaiser's visit and the German influence in the Ottoman Empire generally

¹⁹⁶ The Kaiser stayed in İstanbul between the November 2nd and 6th of 1889. White to Salisbury, 07.11.1889, in: NA, London: FO 78/4207; BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.58/49* (07.03.1307/ 01.11.1889); BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.58/65* (13.03.1307/07.11.1889).

¹⁹⁷ Marriott 1917: 342.

¹⁹⁸ Kössler 1981: 124-125.

¹⁹⁹ The publications of the Newspaper *Sabah* about Kaiser's visits were studied in detail by Gözeller. Gözeller 2005.

²⁰⁰ Gözeller 2005: 99.

²⁰¹ Gözeller 2005: 27; BOA, *Y.PRK.SRN.2/68* (08.03.1307/02.11.1889): According to this document the Ottoman brass band played some German march during the Kaiser's parade.

²⁰² *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 03.11.1889, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/50.

was remarkably predicted by an article published in *Sabah* on November 12, 1889, which was verified over the course of time. It envisaged the twenty years following the visit would see a clash of German and French interests in the Ottoman Empire.²⁰³ While the Kaiser was in İstanbul, he received ‘a prime piece of real estate in Therapia’.²⁰⁴ This served as the German Ambassador’s summer residence, which was described by Pendleton King, the first secretary in the American Legation at İstanbul, as ‘a beautifully situated palace’.²⁰⁵

One remarkable but at the same time symbolic consequences of the visit was the permission extended by the Sultan to build a German church in Jerusalem.²⁰⁶ The foundation stone of this church, the Church of the Redeemer [*Erlöserkirche*], as the first German Protestant Church in Jerusalem, was laid in 1893, and later during his second *Orientreise* in 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II was himself present at the consecration of the new German church.²⁰⁷ After this visit, the closeness between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Abdülhamid II had clearly improved, as was earlier predicted.²⁰⁸ On November, 4, 1889, Kaiser Wilhelm II was decorated with an *Osmaniye Nişâni*.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, three days later he received an honorary title of ‘Ottoman Artillery Commander’ [*Grand maitre Honoraire Artillerie Ottomane*], which was basically a title created for him, in recognition of his contribution to the artillery purchasing process involving the German firm Krupp.²¹⁰ In short, as he wrote in a telegram to Prince Bismarck, the Kaiser seemed to be generally very pleased with the Sultan’s hospitality. *The Times* reported that on the Kaiser’s return voyage, on 7 November, Bismarck received the following

²⁰³ Gözeller 2005: 14.

²⁰⁴ McMurray 2001: 28.

²⁰⁵ King to Blaine, 24.12.1881, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/50.

²⁰⁶ Gözeller 2005: 31.

²⁰⁷ *The New York Times*: 31.01.1898.

²⁰⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.NMH.4/42* (08.01.1307/04.09.1889).

²⁰⁹ BOA, *Y.PRK.PT.5/95* (10.03.1307/04.11.1889).

²¹⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.PT.5/106*, (13.03.1307/07.11.1889).

telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm II: ‘After a stay which seems like a dream and which the magnificent hospitality of the Grand Seignior [Abdülhamid II] rendered paradisiacal, I am now passing the Dardanelles in beautiful weather’.²¹¹ In fact, the Kaiser sent several telegrams to Bismarck from the first day he arrived in İstanbul till his return to Berlin. For instance, at the time of his arrival he wrote to Bismarck: ‘At this moment I have arrived to İstanbul. The weather is very nice and the beauty of the landscape cannot be described’.²¹²

Apart from the here-mentioned symbolic expressions and the acquired benefits for Germany, the net result of the visit shows itself in foreign trade statistics. Before looking at the statistical outputs of the Kaiser’s first visit to İstanbul, it is essential to mention that the most important development towards improving trade relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire occurred when the Sultan granted the Deutsche Bank exclusive rights over the Anatolian Railways project on October 6, 1888 (before the visit occurred but there were several correspondences between the Kaiser and the Sultan).²¹³ This concession extended to the German group (*Deutsche Bank, Württembergische Vereinsbank, and Deutsche Vereinsbank*) thus representing a confirmation of the change of Germany’s attitude towards the Ottoman Empire and at the same time a confirmation of the changed orientation of the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire in terms of European relations. However, Shaw asserted that one of the leading motives of the Sultan behind this operation was to divert political and

²¹¹ *The [London] Times*: 08.11.1889.

²¹² Copy of the Kaiser’s telegram in Turkish: BOA, *Y.PRK.PT.5/82* (8.03.1307/02.11.1889): ‘İşbu dakikada Dersa’âdet’e muvâsalat eyledim. Havâ’ pek latîfdir. Manzara ta’rîf edilemeyecek derecede güzeldir’.

²¹³ Earle 1924: 29, 31. Cf. Helfferich 1923: 154; Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 227; McMurray 2001: 22; Gencer 2006: 104. Earle stated that the first arrival of the Oriental Railways at İstanbul was August 12 1888. According to him through the Oriental Railways the Ottoman capital was placed in direct communication with Vienna, Paris, Berlin, and London (via Calais).

imperial rivalries into economic ones.²¹⁴ In fact in 1888 the only railroads existing (the İzmir-Aydın, İzmir-Kasaba, Mersin-Adana and Bosphorus-İzmit lines) in Asia Minor were completely or, as Woods said, at least practically, in the hands of English capitalists.²¹⁵ Indeed, the German *Chargé d'affaires* at İstanbul pointed out although Abdülhamid was distrustful of British and French finance, the German financial undertakings in his empire might be welcomed by the Sultan.²¹⁶ As a matter of fact, the interest of British capital in the Anatolian Railway Company disappeared when the German syndicate bought out the British shareholding.²¹⁷ Subsequently the company became, as Jastrow described it, 'a purely German enterprise'.²¹⁸

Sultan Abdülhamid granted the Germans (headed by the *Deutsche Bank*) the right to buy the existing railroad from Haydarpaşa to İzmit and to build a new line from İzmit to Ankara in October 1888. The Sultan guaranteed the Ankara line a minimum annual revenue of 15,000 Francs per kilometre.²¹⁹ The concession was to last for 99 years and the duration of the construction was determined as three years.²²⁰ The construction of the first railway line (İzmit-Ankara) started in 1889 and it was completed in a relatively short time on December 31, 1892; naturally, this 'rapid completion of the Ankara section' was appreciated by the Sultan and his government.²²¹ Therefore a couple of months after the opening of the line, on February 15, 1893, Abdülhamid issued a new *İrâde*, which authorised the construction of a new line from Eskişehir to Konya, which in turn was opened in 1896.²²²

²¹⁴ Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 227.

²¹⁵ Woods 1917: 35; Earle 1924: 30.

²¹⁶ Smith, C. L. 1957: 123.

²¹⁷ Cf. 'Remarks applying to different British schemes for the construction of Turkish Railways in Asia' 02.07.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3999.

²¹⁸ Jastrow 1917: 82-83.

²¹⁹ O'Connor to Salisbury, 02.02.1899, in: NA London, FO 78/5000; Earle 1924: 31.

²²⁰ Gencer 2006: 103.

²²¹ *Statistiques du Service des Recettes (Du 1^{er} Janvier au 31 Décembre), Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d' Anatolie* 1892: 57, in: PA. AA. 13451.

²²² Earle 1924:33; Quataert 1977: 141; Pohl 1999: 100.

Woods suggested that German diplomacy influenced the Porte to forcibly dispossess the British company, and - as a consequence of that - the line was handed over to a German syndicate financed by the *Deutsche Bank*.²²³ The building of the railroad was financed by the sale of Ottoman bonds which were issued by the Government to the Anatolian Railway Company and guaranteed on a kilometric basis. Government income sources, like the agricultural taxes, were held in reserve for payment of these guarantees, through which the company was assured ‘a certain amount of gross revenue per kilometre of track laid and in use’.²²⁴ As the British Embassy reported in 1899, the Anatolian Railway (1,023 kilometres with a kilometric guarantee of 15,000 francs a year) became the most important of the railways built in the Ottoman Empire.²²⁵ The following table shows the opening dates of the German-made railway lines. It also can be read as an indicator of the German-origin Anatolian Railway Company’s increasing share of Ottoman railroad construction.

Table 1.7: The Length and Opening Dates of the Railways Laid by the Anatolian Railway Company

Lines	Kilometres	Opening Date
İzmit-Arifiye	41	June 1890
Arifiye-Eskişehir	182	June 1892
Eskişehir-Ankara	263	December 1892
Eskişehir-Alayurt-Kütahya	77	December 1894
Alayurt-Afyon	94	August 1895
Afyon-Konya	274	July 1896
Total	931	

Source: Pohl 1999:100.

The economic contribution of the German-built railways to the region’s economic outcomes had been published in the company’s periodical reports [*Statistiques du*

²²³ Woods 1917: 35.

²²⁴ Quataert 1977: 143.

²²⁵ O’Conor to Salisbury, 02.02.1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000.

Service des Recettes]. According to a report published on February 25, 1893, for instance, the tithes collected had increased by around 41% in three years. The following table, also published in the report, shows the increase in the amount of tithe collected by the Government from the cities through which the Anatolian Railway Company operated, namely Ankara, İzmit and Kütahya. The company was able to assert that the Ottoman Treasury had not been substantially burdened as a consequence of the kilometric guarantee.²²⁶

Table 1.8: Tithe paid (in Ottoman *Kuruş*)

	1890/91	1891/92	1892/93
Ankara	2,100,791	3,645,554	4,948,470
İzmit	3,321,612	4,471,783	3,923,136
Kütahya	7,599,371	10,834,047	11,471,869

Source: *Statistiques du Service des Recettes*, 1893: 57

Contrary to what the company asserted, while the guarantee system reduced the German investors' entrepreneurial risk, it was 'uneconomic' for the Ottoman Empire.²²⁷ Quataert suggests that the financial performance of the Anatolian Railway Company was poor and he additionally asserts that 'the railroad's major contribution, as the Government had intended, lay not in economic development but in added military strength'. According to him:

For these strategic and economic benefits, the Ottoman Empire paid a high price. The subsidy paid to the company from 1893 to 1909 totalled 3,500,000 Turkish pounds, which exceeded the total agricultural tax revenues from Ankara province during those years. Put another way, it equalled one-half of all revenues collected in Anatolia during a typical year in the mid-1890s.²²⁸

²²⁶ *Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie, Bureau du Contrôle Haidar Pacha, Statistiques du Service des Recettes* 1893: 57 (25.02.1893), in: PA.AA. 13451.

²²⁷ Barth 1998: 121.

²²⁸ Quataert 1977: 159.

Although the Anatolian Railway's impact on Ottoman domestic economic outcomes was described as 'limited,' its contribution to the total bilateral trade was remarkable. The following graph clearly illustrates that the years 1888-89 became a turning point in the bilateral trade relations between two countries. Nonetheless, in comparison with the statistics made available after the Kaiser's second visit in 1898, the years 1888/89 portended a bright future for German trade in the Ottoman market. After granting *Deutsche Bank* exclusive rights to the Anatolian Railways project, locomotives and wagons for Anatolian Railways were provided almost entirely by German firms: the rails, for example, came from Krupp, which started producing railroad materials in 1864,²²⁹ and from Krauss & Company; the locomotives were ordered from *J. A. Maffei*, the *Hannoversche Maschienebau-Actien Gesellschaft* and *Maschinenfabrik Esslingen*.²³⁰ The imported materials were transported by the '*Deutsche Levante Linie*' which was established on September 6, 1889; one year after the privileged rights for the Anatolian Railway were granted.²³¹ The *Deutsche Levante Linie* increased its number of ships (1890:4 Ships; 1898:15 Ships) and sailings (1891:24; 1898:61).²³²

Apparently it became a profitable enterprise for German investors. According to Abdülhamid's memoirs,²³³ the Sultan believed that the Germans deserved this benefit: 'Ultimately, it is just that the Germans have good profits, because after all they also run risks. But it's still up to us to receive the lion's share of the profits'.²³⁴ Parallel to the

²²⁹ HA, Krupp WA 4/757.

²³⁰ Gall 1995: 74.

²³¹ Önsoy 1982: 26.


²³² Önsoy 1982: 27-28.

²³³ Ali Vahbi Bey collected the memoirs/memorandum dictated by the Sultan and translated them into French and published in France under the title of '*Avant la débâcle de la Turquie: Pensées et Souvenirs de l'Ex-Sultan Abdul-Hamid*' when the Sultan was still alive in (ca.) 1913. Abdülhamid II dictated his memoirs, views and observations to his secretaries during his reign. As Karpas also has argued that Ali Vahbi's collection are to be the most reliable memorandum. Karpas 2001: 445. See also: Birinci 2005.

²³⁴ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 62: '*et en définitive, il est juste que les Allemands aient de bons bénéfices, car après tout ils ont aussi couru des risques. Mais c'est quand même à nous que revient la part du lion*

increase in the volume of maritime traffic between Germany and the Ottoman Empire the bilateral trade volume also increased dramatically as seen below in the figure.

Figure 1.2: Ottoman Trade with Germany 1878-1896 (in Marks)



Source: Birken, 1980:176.

Generally the immediate period after 1888 was the most remarkable in explaining the explosion of German influence in the Ottoman market, when economic influence in the Ottoman Empire increased significantly. Grant described 1889, the year of the Kaiser’s visit to İstanbul, as ‘a banner one for German arms sales to the Ottomans’.²³⁵ After the Kaiser’s first visit 1889 till 1910, Germany’s share in the Ottomans’ trade volume

sur les bénéfices! As it appears in his memoirs Abdülhamid had contentment in the progress of the railway construction its concrete economic outcomes. He detailed the positive contributions of the finished railroads to the regional macroeconomic indicators in a very optimistic way. He noted: ‘*D’après les rapports annuels, la prospérité des contrées, traversées par cette ligne, augmente de jour en jour; de plus, nous y avons trouvé des terrains excellents pour nos Monhadchirs [Muhâcir]. Le montant total produit par la dîme dans les vilayets traversés par la ligne de chemin de fer d’Anatolie s’élève à 500,000 livres turques. La garantie kilométrique que nous payons s’est, par contre, réduite à 150,000 livres turques. La circulation des passagers est, paraît-il, déjà fort considérable. ...*’ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 63.

²³⁵ Grant 2002: 24.

increased from 6 per cent to 21 per cent.²³⁶ Among other things, renewed customs and trade regulations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany, which came into effect on August 26, 1890, also positively affected the quantity of the total foreign trade.²³⁷ As the table below indicates, Ottoman exports to Germany rose from a value of 1,910,000 Marks to 25,900,000 Marks during the years 1880-1896 while German exports to the Ottoman Empire rose exponentially from 6,710,000 in 1880 to 28,000,000 Marks in 1896.

Table 1.9: Ottoman Trade with Germany, 1880-1897 (in Marks)

Year	Ottoman Export	Ottoman Import	Year	Ottoman Export	Ottoman Import
1880	1,910,000	6,710,000	1889	7,090,000	29,900,000
1881	1,620,000	8,060,000	1890	9,610,000	34,100,000
1882	1,290,000	6,020,000	1891	13,900,000	37,000,000
1883	2,250,000	7,020,000	1892	27,900,000	39,700,000
1884	2,710,000	8,260,000	1893	16,600,000	40,900,000
1885	3,610,000	7,900,000	1894	18,800,000	34,400,000
1886	2,190,000	9,150,000	1895	22,000,000	39,000,000
1887	3,210,000	12,000,000	1896	25,900,000	28,000,000
1888	2,360,000	11,700,000	1897	30,500,000	30,900,000

Source: Birken 1980: 176.

As a result of the Kaiser's first visit to İstanbul, the German military industrial establishment strengthened its position through massive new orders from the Ottoman Government. Especially, between the years 1885 and 1897, Germany gained a dominant position in both Ottoman military and naval orders. In this regard, the Kaiser's visit had a clear impact on the sustainability of this status. In fact, the Germans began to appear strongly in the Ottoman naval market where the French disappeared just after 1886 in what Grant described as 'the beginning of German hegemony in the Ottoman naval market'. Grant points further out that the Ottoman Navy had no

²³⁶ Birken 1980: 176.

²³⁷ BOA, *Y.A.RES.52/4* (08.01.1308/ 24.08.1890); Ortaylı 1981: 41; Önsoy 1982: 36.

German-built ships in 1877, but between 1886 and 1892 the German firms Schichau (5 boats in 1886) and Germania Works/Kiel (8 boats in 1887-92) produced 13 torpedo boats.²³⁸ Additionally, as stated earlier, Mauser/Loewe entered into the Ottoman market at the end of 1886 when the Ottoman Army decided to rearm its infantry with new faster-firing rifles. The order was placed with Mauser in the first month of 1887. The following tables (5-6) highlight the importance of war materials in the total Ottoman-German foreign trade volume.

Table 1.10: War Materials Exports from Germany to the Ottoman Empire 1888-1898 (in Marks)

Year	Rifles	Cartridges	Munitions*	Powder	Total
1888	2,269,839				2,269,839
1889	5,812,265	611,480			6,423,745
1890	6,341,111	2,515,648			8,856,759
1891	1,690,595	3,556,181		613,312	5,860,088
1892	8,703,228	1,392,125			10,095,413
1893	8,992,022	4,064,450			13,056,472
1894	2,447,800	3,463,940	69,190		5,980,930
1895	7,258,086	3,005,547	1,974,782		12,238,415
1896	2,762,744	1,605,113		56,854	4,367,857
1897		1,362,889	226,403		1,646,146
1898**	61,050	481,000	1,217,300	160,000	1,919,350

Source: *Deutsches Handels-Archiv*, 1898: 512.

**Geschütze mit Munition*, **First quarter of the year 1898.

Table 1.11: Export from Germany to the Ottoman Empire (selected items; in Marks)

	1895	1896	1897
1)War Materials	12,238,415	4,367,857	1,646,146
2)Eskisehir-Konya (Railroad)	5,374,023	2,979,947	344,295
3)Selanik-Dereagaç (Railroad)	214,400	-	-
4)Kasaba-Afyon-Karahisar (Railroad)	-	187,200	370,400
Total (1 +2+3+4)	17,826,838	7,535,004	2,360,841
War Materials/Total (%)	68.6	57.9	69.7

Source: *Deutsches Handels- Archiv* 1898: 512.

²³⁸ Grant 2002: 28.

The German arms trade's contribution to the German economy in terms of the Ottoman market might have made it more profitable than other business ventures. As Table 1.11 indicates, compared with the railroad construction materials, war materials made up more than half. The tables above demonstrate the significance of the arms trade within the entire foreign trade between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Working together with the German military mission the most prominent change in trade relations appeared in the war business. Kössler writes that 'Wilhelm II had a matching gift in the luggage; he gave the Sultan a Mauser rifle, to arouse in him the understanding that military security must be the main target of Turkey'.²³⁹ However, it was at the same time an official declaration of the Kaiser's support for the Mauser contract signed in 1887. The following points can be regarded as the main acquisitions of the German war industry gained during the period 1880-1898 including the year of the Kaiser's first visit to İstanbul.

- 1) Mauser rifles aggressively moved into the Ottoman war business supported by the Chancellor and the German military mission, particularly by Goltz Pasha.²⁴⁰
- 2) Krupp secured a monopoly position over artillery supplies in the Ottoman market.
- 3) As alternative navy suppliers apart from the longstanding predominance of British and French shipyards in the Ottoman naval orders, the German shipyards, especially *the Germania Work* and *Schichau*, came into prominence for the Ottomans' naval modernisation during this period.

²³⁹ Kössler 1981: 124.

²⁴⁰ See Chapter III: 139-170.

- 4) The new railroads opened a fruitful marketing field for the German iron and steel industry, most of which was at the same time involved in the armaments industry (1888-1898).

Arms sales and railways construction were naturally related to the growing financial interests of the German capitalists in the Ottoman market. As the financial sources of the Ottoman economy were not adequate to cover the cost of the ordered rifles, artilleries and ironclads or torpedo-boats, the German financial market and institutions became the new sustenance for the Ottoman Government. Between 1888 and 1914 German capital investment grew most remarkably, from about one per cent to 27 per cent of the total.²⁴¹ As Barth points out, from the late 1880s, the German capital group headed by *Deutsche Bank* became the major railway entrepreneur in the Ottoman Empire.²⁴² As a consequence, German capital interest began to appear increasingly in the Ottoman financial market. The following table shows the fluctuation in the nationality of the bondholders in the Ottoman converted debt in which the German capital interest increased.

Table 1.12: The Bondholders of the Ottoman Converted Debt, 1881-1898 (in Thousands of Ottoman Lira)

	1881		1898		Change in %
	Value in OL*	%	Value in OL*	%	
France	36,716	39.98	35,000	44.87	+ 4.89
Britain	26,618	28.99	8,500	10.89	-18.10
Ottoman Empire	7,281	7.93	5,000	6.41	-1.52
Belgium	6,612	7.20	14,000	17.94	+10.74
Netherlands	6,974	7.59	3,500	4.48	-3.11
Germany	4,320	4.75	9,500	12.17	+7.42
Italy	2,407	2.62	1,000	1.28	-1.34
Austria-Hungary	0,886	0,96	1,500	1.92	+0.96
Total	91,818	100	78,000	100	

Source: Morawitz 1902:258. *in Ottoman Lira (000)

²⁴¹ Quataert 1994: 774.

²⁴² Barth 1998: 116.

The armaments imported from Germany increased the Ottomans' dependence on German finance. Thus, in addition to their position in the arms market, the Germans acquired a noteworthy position in the Ottoman capital market. As seen in Table 1.12 between 1881 and 1898 the German share in Ottoman bonds increased dramatically (+7.42%) whereas the British share decreased sharply (-18.10%).

In summing up this period, it can be said that the existence of the war materials associated supply-demand relationship, which can be seen in the tables herein, offered clear proof of the emergence of mutual trust between the two governments. Mutual trust, which could be gained only by personal endeavour, was the principal foundation of the German Style of War Business, which can be described as a consistent combination of different acts by different actors (from Bismarck to Wilhelm II) at different times. Furthermore, based on the consistent combination, it can be said that Bismarck's critical conversation with Reşid Bey and the subsequent dispatch of German military advisers to İstanbul and, finally, the Kaiser's first visit to the Ottoman Capital produced the first wave of an expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER II
GERMAN MILITARY ADVISORS: BUSINESSMEN
IN UNIFORM

A Vital Link for the Export-Dependent Armaments Industry

“In the wake of Prussian soldiers went German traders and German financiers.”

*Sir John A. Marriott, 1917*¹

Remaining largely dependent on the foreign market was the pre-eminent feature of the German armament firms, and particularly for the Krupp and Mauser companies, during the period under consideration. The largest part of the war materials produced by Krupp and Mauser was exported. The only customers for their military production were naturally foreign governments. Strong links established for the domestic market with German bureaucrats were used as a springboard for foreign markets, where the profitability of sales was decidedly higher than in the domestic market. Over the course of time and alongside a domestic monopoly situation, as seen in the case of Krupp, the German armament firms built an unassailable monopoly power position in particular foreign market, for which the support of both the German and corresponding foreign government was an indispensable condition. In fact, achieving a monopoly in the domestic market became almost a precondition for gaining the same monopoly position in a foreign market. This was what Krupp had already achieved at an early stage.

The share of international market sales in the companies' total sales of produced materials (military or non-military production) gives a clear picture to determine their dependence on the decision-makers' foreign policy and the political relations with the importing countries. Based on this dependence, the German representatives abroad, namely the German civil and military advisers and also the ambassadors, who put the German expansionist policy into effect, became a decisive element in gaining monopoly power in foreign markets. Thus, the successful marketing strategies employed by Krupp and the other state-supported armaments firms were followed by

¹ Marriott 1917: 348.

orders for war materials obtained from abroad; the German Foreign Office considered such orders as political achievements and a reinforcement of ‘national prestige’.²

To assist in assessing the importance of the foreign market for the German arms industry, the following tables provide precious statistics. Table 2.1 shows that, in the case of Krupp, which *The New York Times* in 1884 called the world’s largest gun foundry³, export of war materials was the firm’s most determining operation. However, Krupp’s, Mauser’s and other prominent armament firms’ reputations were fundamentally based on their foreign sales. As Grant has pointed out, armament firms found exports basically essential for their viability.⁴ Epkenhans also pointed out that, in the foreign market, the armament companies ‘could try to make as much profit as possible so long as their prices were not undercut by other competitors’.⁵

Table 2.1: Sales of Krupp: Military Products 1875-1891 (in Marks)

Years	Domestic Sales	Per cent (%)	Foreign Sales	Per cent (%)
1875-76	3,992,495	20.2	15,765,405	79.0
1876-77	2,278,300	9.9	20,631,645	90.1
1877-78	7,531,075	27.6	19,737,190	72.4
1878-79	5,673,630	30.8	12,773,235	69.2
1879-80	1,100,765	15.8	5,853,705	84.2
1880-81	1,566,220	15.1	8,779,395	84.9
1881-82	1,878,320	16.4	9,585,840	83.6
1882-83	1,176,075	9.5	11,238,610	90.5
1883-84	1,986,715	19.9	7,983,865	80.1
1884-85	2,320,850	12.4	16,420,525	87.6
1885-86	3,841,505	15.4	21,128,235	84.6
1886-87	2,856,195	15.0	16,168,405	85.0
1887-88	2,430,095	12.1	17,676,690	87.9
1888-89	4,275,385	22.4	14,804,625	77.6
1889-90	2,759,550	18.4	12,267,580	81.6
1890-91	2,114,275	13.6	13,442,760	86.4

Source: Boelcke, 1970:

² Cf. Boelcke 1970: 20.

³ *The New York Times*: 03.03.1884.

⁴ Grant 2007: 5.

⁵ Epkenhans 2003: 20.

Table 2.1 highlights that exports were of vital importance for the Krupp factories' industrial and financial existence from the outset. A document from the Krupp archives indicates that 77% of the war materials produced in the Krupp factories between 1878/79 and 1891/92 were sold to foreign countries whereas only 23% was procured by the Prussian Government.⁶ The intensity of the exportation of the manufactured goods was not restricted only to war materials. As Table 2.2 indicates, the largest part of the non-military production was purchased by foreign countries.

Table 2.2: Sales of Krupp: Non-Military Products 1875-1891 (in Marks)

Years	Domestic Sales	Per cent (%)	Foreign Sales	Per cent (%)
1875-76	8,713,740	39.9	13,106,695	60.1
1876-77	8,238,840	44.9	10,130,220	55.1
1877-78	9,343,320	45.0	11,438,795	55.0
1878-79	11,296,145	56.5	8,688,170	43.5
1879-80	10,518,085	45.6	12,564,790	54.4
1880-81	10,846,390	35.9	19,400,675	64.1
1881-82	14,201,310	40.6	20,737,410	59.4
1882-83	16,313,670	48.5	17,298,635	50.5
1883-84	12,991,600	48.9	13,550,070	51.1
1884-85	12,213,495	51.3	11,604,670	48.7
1885-86	12,023,920	53.8	10,324,480	46.2
1886-87	10,084,085	43.5	13,072,770	56.5
1887-88	13,739,630	50.2	13,624,420	49.8
1888-89	17,761,975	61.7	11,048,480	38.3
1889-90	22,976,390	63.2	13,402,485	36.0
1890-91	24,968,025	62.0	15,329,660	38.0

Source: Boelcke 1970.

Although these tables indicate only Krupp's dependence on the foreign market, the general composition of the export dependency and the importance of the foreign market was, by and large, the same for all the armaments firms, and particular for the Mauser company. According to the statistics given below, in the period 1874-1914, Mauser sold 88% of all its manufactured rifles to foreign countries. 'It must be observed', says

⁶ HA, Krupp: FAH 3B/244.

H. Wolf, ‘that without orders from abroad, the Mauser factory would not have achieved such great importance.’⁷

Table 2.3: Mauser’s Total Sales (1874-1914)

Period	Domestic Sales (Pieces)	Domestic Sales (in Marks)	International Sales (Pieces)	International Sales (in Marks)	Total (Pieces)	Total (in Marks)
1874-1890	125,000	6,339,300	359,853	21,260,430	484,852	27,599,730
1890-1904	65,000		1,165,212		1,230,212	
1904-1906	134,000	10,732,000*	96,800	75,810,600*	1,463,012*	86,542,600*
1907-1914	179,950	8,318,095	215,037	13,091,305	394,987	21,409,403
Total	503,950	25,389,395	1,835,901	110,162,338	2,342,851	135,551,733

Source: H. Wolf, 1933: 51. *For the period 1890-1906: Ball 2006: 226.

The economic importance of arms exports and their contribution to the German economy was also clarified by Paul Mauser himself. In a letter to the Prussian Minister of War in February 1908, he indicated that ‘within the last 19 years his company produced 1,650,000 Mauser Rifles worth 96.5 million Marks and with the exception of the 290,000 rifles Model-98 delivered for the German Army (15,373,000 Marks) all the others were delivered to foreign countries that paid with foreign currency.’⁸

Germany’s international arms sales operation became almost a joint business conjoined with the State apparatus; the representatives of German foreign policy and the German arms makers abroad worked in perfect cohesion. In the agenda of the foreign policy-makers, armament exports became one of the main ways to achieve a successful penetration in countries where political, military and strategic, or economic, interests had to be defended. This fact shaped the frame of the area of responsibility of the German Military Advisers (GMAs) in the Ottoman Army. As will be demonstrated

⁷ H. Wolf 1933: 51. See also: *Herrn Geheimrat Kommerzienrat Paul Mauser aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstages gewidmet von der Redaktion des Schwarzwälder Boten* 1908: 19, in: SA, Oberndorf: XIV Ca 1/13.

⁸ Mauser to the Prussian Minister of War, in February 1908, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A6.

below, in terms of the arms trade it is said that there were no defined or predetermined areas of responsibility. Several archival documents highlight the fact that all GMAs were somehow involved in the war business and were responsible for the continuing success of the German name and prestige; those elements were principally represented by the German arms makers, as Kaiser Wilhelm II and Von Bülow once said.⁹ Accordingly, building close relationships with the armaments firms' agents abroad and supporting their interests in the Ottoman Empire became one of the GMAs' foremost diplomatic duties.

Over time, however, as will be detailed below, the GMAs also became reliable informants who furnished the German Government with critical and specific information that could not have been obtained from other sources.¹⁰ They also worked ardently with the Ottoman Government as lobbyists for the German armaments firms [GAFs]. Because of their positions, as either advisers or inspectors in the Ottoman Army, the GMAs had every opportunity to obtain confidential data and information which would, in some cases, force the armaments companies to reconsider and to reshape their marketing strategies. As a consequence, the GMAs became an indispensable part and additionally an effective instrument of the marketing strategy of the German war business. In particular, being dependent on the newest and the most reliable information about the market and the competitors forced the GAFs to establish good and close relations with the GMAs and to hold regular and detailed consultations with them. These links were an obvious form of life insurance for the GAFs' export-oriented marketing strategy and at the same time for Germany's export-oriented expansionist foreign policy. The accurate, timely and relevant information the GMAs

⁹ Von Bülow 1931: 576: 'Krupp had spread Germany's reputation and the renown of German work and industry over the world.'; Kaiser Wilhelm II's speech, on June 20, 1890, in: HA, Krupp FAH 3E/1: '*Die Kruppische Fabrik hat dem deutschen Arbeiter, der deutschen Industrie einen Weltruhm verschafft, wie keine andere Firma dies getan hat.*'

¹⁰ See the Figure 2.1: Chapter II: 94 and the Figure 2.2: Chapter II: 115 below.


provided to the GAFs strengthened their position in the negotiation process; the GAFs also became more successful in their marketing strategy. It can be seen, then, that the GMAs' most important contribution to the GAFs was the gathering of confidential information; in fact, such information became the lifeblood of the whole German war business and was related to a series of different issues. These included:

- The marketing strategies of competing countries and companies.
- Detailed information about the technical features and quality of rival products supplied to the Ottoman market.
- Competitors' marketing strategies and their personal connections with the Ottoman Government.
- Any modernisation or rearming decisions by the Ottoman Government.
- The process by which contracts were obtained, both by German and other firms.
- Ministerial discussions regarding possible new war materials orders.
- Identification of influential personalities and their characters, etc.¹¹

Since the Sultan was the final arbiter and the real decision-maker and administrator of the Ottoman arms-purchasing process, a flow of information from the Sultan to the GAFs was of vital importance. At this very point, the GMAs played a crucial role in ensuring and maintaining the critical information. Based on this fact and the above summary, the following figure is to be regarded as a simplified model explaining of the process of information flow to the GAFs through the GMAs.

¹¹ Cf. Benz 1976: 199-205. Seel 1981/1: 800: For instance, in 1886, when Paul Mauser was in İstanbul Goltz Pasha told him that 'Shewket [Mahmud Şevket Pasha] was the correct person [for your endeavour] but the others stand on the side of your competitors.

Figure 2.1: Information Flow via some of the GMAs to GAFs and the Government



Because of their position, the GMAs were in the midst of all stages of negotiation in the arms trade. Working together with the firms' agents to obtain important military orders from the Ottoman Empire facilitated the finalising process of the contract signing for the sake of the GAFs. There were clear signs of collaboration in the arms trade between civil and military diplomacy. Accordingly, if there was a great victory, as Krupp stated, it was because of the joint efforts of German civil and especially military diplomacy and German industry.¹² In 1900, Krupp mentioned the impact of the diplomatic interference on the success of Germany's war business in the Ottoman Empire.¹³ In fact, the German arms makers had professionally utilised their connections with the GMAs and also the GMAs' connections with the Ottoman bureaucrats to develop trade connections and obtain orders. Departing from that point of view, this chapter is dedicated to the contribution of the GMAs and their relation with the German arms makers.

¹² Krupp to von Bülow 18.02.1899, in: PA.AA. R13295.

¹³ Krupp's response, 20.02.1900, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/205.

The First German Military Mission in the Ottoman Empire (1882-1885)

German military diplomacy played an essential role in Germany's diplomatic efforts at the time of Berlin's peaceful penetration of the Ottoman Empire - namely during Bismarck's Chancellorship and Wilhelm II's early reign. Victory in the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71) had given the German Army an international reputation and at the same time provided an invaluable instrument for exports of German-made war materials. After that field victory, Germany acquired more influential world-wide victories in the fields of economics and politics, which was named by Bismarck in an explicit way as an 'economic war'. By the very nature of this 'economic war', military personnel and military diplomacy were involved as one of the principal means to achieve success. 'The war of the future' said Bismarck, 'will be the economic war, the struggle for existence on the largest scale.'¹⁴ What Bismarck might have meant by the 'future', came through the mass-production plants in the iron and steel industry, one of the most profitable products of which was war materials. Thus, as the case of the Ottoman Empire proved, the members of the German military mission struggled mostly for the sake of German industrial victory. Maybe because of their intervention into the business of war, they deserve to be called the vanguards of the 'German industrial army' in the economic war.

German military diplomacy in the late Ottoman Empire, which was established mainly through the hard work of Goltz Pasha under German official patronage, provided a profitable link between the Ottoman military decision-maker(s) and the German arms companies. As shown in Figure 2.1 above, the German military advisers were able to obtain important information either directly from Sultan Abdülhamid or

¹⁴ Barker 1909: 30. See also Chapter I: 36-37.

indirectly through some Ottoman officials and officers. In addition to their modernisation task in the Ottoman Army, the GMAs were also the most reliable sources for the GAFs, for which any bit of new information was of vital importance. In this manner, the German military mission became an indispensable part of the German Style of War Business. In fact, military diplomacy and war business were in a perfect collaboration and fed off each other. The methods and the tools for gathering information were the most prominent features of the German Style of War Business.

As was stated in the previous chapter, on July 14, 1880, Abdülhamid II notified Bismarck of his request for GCMAAs through a draft version of the terms of appointment for the prospective German military and civil advisers.¹⁵ The Sultan sent the draft terms of the contract in which he specified the officers' salary scales and the duration of their service.¹⁶ However, it was not an easy task to be imposed in a rushed manner. Although Bismarck enthusiastically supported the plan to dispatch the advisers requested by the Sultan to the Ottoman Empire, the final contract was not signed until 1882. The agreements concerning the advisers' status in the Ottoman and German armies were finalised on April 29, 1882 and only after that was the mission ready for departure to İstanbul.¹⁷

The Ottoman Government's initial request from Germany was – apart from the civil advisers - eight military officers. However, only four officers were employed in the Ottoman service.¹⁸ The group was headed by Staff Officer Otto A. J. Kähler (who served from 1882 to 1885 and entered Ottoman service as a Major-General). Another prominent figure was Kamphövener Pasha, who served in the Ottoman Army for 27 years between 1882 and 1909 as an infantry colonel. Despite his extended period of

¹⁵ See Chapter I: 24.

¹⁶ *Projet des conditions d'engagement du personnel composant la mission militaire et civile allemande en Turquie* 14.07.1880, in: PA.AA. R13233. See Appendix 2.1.

¹⁷ Wallach 1985: 33.

¹⁸ Hatzfeld to Hirschfeld, 03.02.1882, in: PA.AA. R13233.

service, his contribution to both sides was not as productive as might have been expected from someone serving such a long term. As Sultan Abdülhamid's first secretary, Tahsin Pasha, wrote in his memoir, Kamphövener Pasha's position was not functional but might provide a visual impact with the European Great Powers. Krupp's representative, Menshausen, defined him as 'not intelligent but discreet'.¹⁹ However he was promoted in 1895 to the rank of Marshall.²⁰ Another member of the group was Ristow Pasha, an artillery officer; he entered the Ottoman army in 1882 as a colonel and stayed in Ottoman service for nine years till his death in İstanbul in 1891. According to Henry Woods, a British naval officer in the Ottoman service, Ristow Pasha 'found so little to do that he spent much of his time in *Janni Bier Halle* in Pera, and attained the distinction of being known as *Berah Pasha*.'²¹ The fourth member of the group, Von Hobe (served between 1882 and 1894), was a cavalry officer and his rank was raised to colonel when he entered Ottoman service in 1882.²²

The contract between the Ottoman Government - represented by Gazi Osman Pasha, the Minister of War, and Said Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs - and Otto von Kähler, as the head of the German Military Mission, was finalised on May 30, 1882.²³ Kähler served in the German army as a lieutenant-colonel, while the other three officers were ranked as majors for their service to Germany. On entering Ottoman service, each of them was promoted one rank higher in advance.²⁴ Based on the first article of the contract, Kähler entered the Ottoman Army promoted to the rank of

¹⁹ Menshausen to Krupp 19.09.1891, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/217.

²⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.41/17* (02.11.1312/ 27.04.1895).

²¹ Cited in Grant 2007: 81-82.

²² Cram's doctoral dissertation is a well-documented and well-explained study in the field of German-Ottoman relations, in particular for the Bismarckian period. He gave a good attention to the civil and military advisers dispatching process to the Ottoman Empire and gives the detailed correspondences between the German governments regarding the sending process. Cram 1999: 124-132

²³ Kähler's Contract signed on 30.05.1882, in: MA, Freiburg: N.65/4. See Appendix 2.2.

²⁴ Griffiths 1966: 52.

Major-General (*Mirlivâ*) for which the *Îrâde* was issued on June 14, 1882.²⁵ His salary, which would be paid in gold at the end of each month, was determined as 30,000 francs annually.²⁶ The other benefits mentioned in the contract (Article IV) were: a liberal pension, a travelling allowance and incident and death benefits.²⁷ The names, ranks and salaries of these officers are listed in the Table 2.4 below:

Table 2.4: First Appointed German Military Mission (Kähler Mission) in 1882 and its Staff's Annual Salary

Name	Appointment	Salary in Francs	Salary in OL*	Duration of the first Contract
Kähler (Major-General)	Chief of the Group	30,000	1,316	3 Years
Kamphövener (Colonel)	Infantry	23,000	1,010	3 Years
Ristow (Colonel)	Artillery	23,000	1,010	3 Years
Von Hobe (Colonel)	Cavalry	23,000	1,010	3 Years

Source: Beydilli 1979:494; *Conversion of the Ottoman currency [about 1892]: (1 OL = 22.78 Francs) and (1 OL = 18.45 Marks.) see: McCarthy 1982:155.

The most important difference between the first draft of the contract, made by the Ottoman Government and sent to Berlin in July 1880, and the final one was the issue of salary.²⁸ The annual salaries proposed by the Sublime Porte were, in 1880, 20,000 Francs for each officer.²⁹ It would appear that one of the most crucial negotiations might have been in relation to this subject. As Wallach indicates, citing a document sent to the Foreign Office by the German Military Cabinet, there was a strong body of opinion and persistent claims that the Ottoman Government should pay the German officers at least 30,000 Francs annually.³⁰ In the end the amount sought by the German Military Cabinet was paid to the officers. Apparently the salary paid to them by the

²⁵ MA, Freiburg: N.65/5 (14.06.1882). See Appendix 2.3.

²⁶ MA, Freiburg: N.65/4 (30.05.1882). Cf. Griffiths 1966: 52.

²⁷ MA, Freiburg: N.65/4 (30.05.1882).

²⁸ 'Projet des conditions d'engagement du personnel composant la mission militaire et civile allemande en Turquie' 14.07.1880, in: PA.AA. R13233.

²⁹ 'Projet des conditions d'engagement du personnel composant la mission militaire et civile allemande en Turquie' 14.07.1880, in: PA.AA. R13233.

³⁰ Wallach 1985: 32; Cram 1999: 169.

Ottoman Empire was - by all manner of means - even higher than those officers who were of the same rank in their own country.³¹ As seen in Table 2.4., the salaries of the three officers - except Kähler - were 23,000 Francs (1,010 OL), whereas Kähler received annually 30,000 Francs (1,316 OL); in addition, they were given the right to obtain some other benefits like rations (*ta'yin*).³² As a result, the annual cost of these four officers to the Ottoman budget, apart from their rent, which was paid by the Sultan's privy purse, reached a total of 1,188,000 Francs (52,151 OL).³³

The big difference between the salaries paid to Ottoman officers and the Germans became a point of contention; unsurprisingly, the Ottoman officers were not unaware of this very inconvenient circumstance and, naturally, they were not pleased with this apparent inequality.³⁴ The following table highlights the dimension of the pay-gap.

Table 2.5: Salary of the Ottoman Officers (1902)

Rank	Annual Salary (in OL)
Marshal/General	960
Lieutenant-General	720
Major- General	480
Colonel	240
Lieutenant-Colonel	150
Major	120

Source: Calculation based on data given by Morawitz 1903:140.

In spite of this obvious difference, the German officers made demands for salary increases when the Sultan decided to renew their contracts.³⁵ As a matter of fact, before they entered the Ottoman service they were all in financial difficulties, so they did not want to pass up this opportunity. As Cram says 'none of them showed desire to return

³¹ Alkan 2007: 160.

³² MA, Freiburg: N.65/4 (30.05.1882); Cf: Wallach 1985: 33; Beydilli 1979: 494.

³³ BOA, *Y.PRK.HH.10/39* (24.05.1300/02.04.1883).

³⁴ Wallach 1985: 35, 58; Ortaylı 1981: 73-76; Morawitz 1903: 140-141.

³⁵ Wallach 1985: 49-51.

home'.³⁶ Each German officer, who was honoured with a bountiful salary package, prepared several subsequent studies and recommendations concerning their branch of appointment and each of them submitted reports to the Sultan within their first six months.³⁷ Ristow, for instance, submitted a report at the end of September 1882 regarding the current state of the Ottoman field artillery and made some recommendations about fortification of the Straits.³⁸ Kamphövener's proposal, which suggested establishing a school for the infantry, was welcomed by the High Commission.³⁹ On February 14, 1883, Von Hobe Pasha, as might be expected of a cavalry officer, submitted a *lâyiha* in which he suggested several changes to improve the Imperial stables.⁴⁰ As a matter of fact, the submitted reports were just an ascertainment of the facts, which were unknown just to these officers.

In addition, Kähler Pasha also offered a comprehensive programme.⁴¹ Griffiths asserts that Kähler Pasha, as the head of the adviser group, gave in his report 'a very comprehensive picture of the gaps which existed in the Ottoman military organisation at that time'.⁴² According to Griffiths, Kähler Pasha identified three essential obstructions that blocked the Ottomans' military progress: 'lack of money, poor organisation of the general administration and the corruptibility of the administrators.'⁴³ These three points were, however, among the generally-known and greatly-mentioned problems, of which the Sultan was also basically well aware.⁴⁴ Circumstances such as those existing in the Ottoman Army were the principal reasons why the Sultan forced himself to seek foreign assistance. An anonymous British military observer - most

³⁶ Cram 1999: 304.

³⁷ Griffiths 1966: 54; Cram 1999: 258-259.

³⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.14/5 (18.11.1299/01.10.1882).

³⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.KOM.4/2 (13.01.1300/24.11.1882).

⁴⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.HH.10/22 (06.04.1300/14.02.1883).

⁴¹ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.18/7 (03.07.1300/10.05.1883).

⁴² Griffiths 1966: 54-55.

⁴³ See for the Kähler's recommendations mentioned in his report: Griffiths 1966: 55-56. Cf. Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929:109-112.

⁴⁴ Wallach 1985: 41-42; Uyar & Erickson 2009: 205.

probably the British Military Attaché at İstanbul, Colonel Herbert Chermiside (1850 - 1929) - commented in *The [London] Times* for September 13, 1882, with disparaging remarks about the current Ottoman officials, describing them as the real obstacles preventing desired reforms. In the article he wrote:

All the organisation which had then been prepared for several years collapsed at once, simply because the existing officials could not take the trouble to use it. We see now, even in time of peace, that the paper organisation is not being carried out, and there is every reason to suppose that the same carelessness would occur in time of war. In fact, the Turkish army is at present neither on a peace nor a war footing [...].⁴⁵

In the meantime, Kähler Pasha's report and recommendations were handled in 'The High Inspection Commission of the Army' (*Teftîş-i Umûm-i 'Askeri Komisyon-u 'Alisi*), which was established in May 1880 under the presidency of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha.⁴⁶ The resulting discussion on it by the commission was submitted to the Sultan as a report. Sultan Abdülhamid also showed keen interest in the submitted proposals, intending – it would seem – to take immediate action. However, the realisation of the proposed reforms would have been too expensive and obviously the cost of such a plan was the fundamental obstacle which had to be overcome first and foremost. Kähler's report to the German Ambassador demonstrates as well that, according to Sultan Abdülhamid, lack of money was the most critical issue. Some prominent military figures, like Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, who was 'the best man the [Ottoman] Turks had', according to British Colonel Chermiside,⁴⁷ shared the same viewpoint on this aspect.⁴⁸ In a report dated November 9, 1883 signed by Josef Maria

⁴⁵ *The [London] Times*: 13.09.1882.

⁴⁶ Griffiths 1966: 44-45; *The [London] Times*: 13.09.1882; Akmeşe 2005:20; Uyar & Erickson 2009: 205.

⁴⁷ Chermiside to St. John, 29.01.1881, in: NA, London: FO 881/4378.

⁴⁸ For Kähler's report submitted to the German Ambassador see: Wallach 1985: 42; Gazi Ahmed Muhtar's approach to the reform projects see: Griffiths 1966: 46f.

von Radowitz (Von Radowitz) the German Ambassador to İstanbul from 1882 to 1892, described the empire's financial state as the Sultan's main concern.⁴⁹

In the years when the GMAs were generously employed with relatively high salaries in the Ottoman Army, the Government faced financial bankruptcy and the economy was in deep crisis. The war indemnity, which the Ottoman Empire had to pay to Russia as a result of the defeat in 1877/78, 'threatened catastrophe'.⁵⁰ As a result of this state of affairs, the Ottoman Empire lost its credibility in European capital markets.⁵¹ Sultan Abdülhamid was aware of his empire's difficult financial situation. In one of his later statements, he actually admitted the difficult situation his Empire was in. He said: 'The army which the 1877/78 War had decimated could not yet be rebuilt. The Treasury was empty. Military supplies and even the pay of officials could be met only with great difficulty. In the *vilâyets* (provinces) there were members of the Gendarmerie who could not be paid for 20 or 30 months'.⁵²

Based on this awareness, Sultan Abdülhamid's real hope, through the employment of Germans in Ottoman service, was to establish a closer relationship with Germany and further to be able to somehow attract the support of German capitalists and industrialists to invest in the Ottoman market, which meant, in fact, extending loans on reasonable terms.⁵³ The Sultan was hoping that the critical financial and political problems which the empire faced following the defeat of 1877/78 would be eliminated through German friendship. Consequently, the Sultan's strong belief proved to be that the military mission might be one of the most effective ways to achieve this

⁴⁹ Cram 1999: 298.

⁵⁰ Grant 2007: 80; M. R. Milgrim points out the war indemnity provided Russia with leverage to exert her own influence upon the Ottoman finance. Milgrim 1978: 521.

⁵¹ Kössler 1981: 120.

⁵² Cited in Griffiths 1966: 63.

⁵³ See also McMurray 2001: 26.

goal.⁵⁴ Hoping for this, he acted as if he were keenly interested in modernising the army. That might have been because he was well aware of the potential consequences of such a modernising process. Modernisation of the army would naturally involve many commercial contracts to buy rifles, guns and other military materials from abroad, for which a strong financial base was an indispensable condition. Perhaps the Sultan expected that the German arms companies would stimulate the country's capitalists to support the Ottoman Government to enable it to purchase the war materials it needed from German firms. From Sultan Abdülhamid's perspective, however, his empire's prime necessity was not a 'paper reform [which] would have done more harm than good,'⁵⁵ but of far greater importance was finding an honest source of money which would make the projected reform possible. 'Want of money' said *The [London] Times* writer, 'prevents the proper training of the men during peace and keeps them in a state of semi-starvation'.⁵⁶ He was not wrong.

Based on this outlook, Sultan Abdülhamid desired to attract the German capitalists' interest in his empire. In turn, both the modernisation of the army and railway construction could offer great opportunities to German financial investors who were particularly looking for a market to invest in for the long-term. During several conversations, Abdülhamid expressed his real intention in a very indirect way. He sent a letter to Kaiser Wilhelm II concerning Kähler Pasha's potentially important role in the development of bilateral relations.⁵⁷ The Sultan might have expected the German military mission to act as a mediator between him and Berlin. Colonel Herbert Chermiside, the British Military Attaché, was also aware that 'in Germany, both for political and military reasons it [wa]s wished to retain them [the Military Mission] in

⁵⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.NMH.2/47 (11.08.1300/18.05.1883).

⁵⁵ Griffiths 1966: 46f.

⁵⁶ *The [London] Times*: 13.09.1882.

⁵⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.NMH.2/47 (11.08.1300/18.05.1883).

Turkish employment'.⁵⁸ Most apparently however, neither Kähler Pasha nor the other three members of the mission had the ability to make an immediate analysis of the complex combination of Abdülhamid's *arrière-pensée* - ulterior motives - which were shaped by many different dynamics, including political, military and also economic elements. Perhaps that's why neither Kähler's nor the other three members' names are mentioned as being among the most influential personalities who made noteworthy contributions to the interests of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire during their service in the Ottoman Army.⁵⁹ However, this was definitely not the case for the late-comer among the German advisers: Goltz Pasha. The British Military Attaché Chermide also noticed Goltz's exceptional talents. In his memorandum, quoted above, he pointed out that: 'Increase of pay, rank, and service of decorations has been bestowed lavishly, but with one exception the officers have been mainly titular. The exception is Goltz Pasha, the able Prussian military writer...'⁶⁰

When Kähler Pasha died (of a carbuncle) on November 3, 1885, Goltz Pasha became mission head.⁶¹ From then onwards he used his considerable strengths and abilities in the execution of his duty, which Bismarck had clearly described in 1880, long before the first mission was despatched to İstanbul.⁶² During his service in the Ottoman Army, Goltz Pasha introduced the Mauser company to the competitive Ottoman rifle market at every opportunity, which stimulated the German financial

⁵⁸ Memorandum by Colonel Chermide, 25.05.1893, in: NA, London: FO 78/4479.

⁵⁹ Wallach asserted that in Goltz Pasha was of opinion that his fellow countrymen [Kähler, Kamphövener, and Ristow] were not created to serve in a foreign country. They were not suitable for foreign service. The training method or the other recommendation they offered, as Goltz Pasha pointed out, was just a copy of what was in Germany. Wallach 1985: 46; see also: Ortaylı 1981: 76.

⁶⁰ Memorandum by Colonel Chermide, 25.05.1893, in: NA, London: FO 78/4479. Actually he was not only an able military writer, he wrote also on political/economic issues like the Macedonian question or Baghdad Railway. See: Von der Goltz, C. F. 1903, 'Woran es in Makedonien gefehlt hat?', in: MA, Freiburg Nachlass von Von der Goltz, (hereafter MA, Freiburg: NL.737/16). The original paper was published in 1903/18 in: *Velhagen und Klasings Monatshefte*: 641-647; Von der Goltz, C. F. 1900/14, 'Die deutsche Bagdadbahn', in: *Velhagen und Klasings Monatshefte*: 697ff. cited in Schöllgen 2000:123. See also: Von der Goltz, C.F. 1897.

⁶¹ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 138; Wallach 1985: 51.

⁶² Curtius (ed.) 1907/ II: 268. See also Chapter I: 25.

institutions' operational interest in the Ottoman market. He then strongly lobbied within Ottoman military circles on behalf of Krupp; and intensely supported the *Bagdadbahn* project; at the same time, he tried to manipulate the Sultan in some political subjects like the Egyptian question in 1891.⁶³ In brief, he acted professionally within the concept of Germany's peaceful penetration strategy applied in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, he created a new elite perspective among the young Ottoman officers. They had been educated in the military academy formed mainly by Goltz Pasha's military and also inculcated political doctrines. Over the course of time he came to be known as 'the father of the Turkish Army'.⁶⁴

It is claimed that the military missions, in particular that of Goltz Pasha, performed significant service for their fatherland; service that was not restricted to the training of a potential military ally for future wars, but at the same time was aimed at producing an ally – one which was increasingly dependent on German finance and military equipment. Grunwald, the chief editor of the *Ottoman Lloyd*, gave a very interesting reason for Goltz's influential success: 'His biggest success here [in İstanbul] has certainly been acquired through his psychological sensitivity [*psychologisches Feingefühl*]'.⁶⁵ The long and short of it was that Goltz Pasha became a hero for everyone.

⁶³ Goltz to the Kaiser, 28.10.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

⁶⁴ *The New York Times*: 31.12.1916.

⁶⁵ Cited in Lorenz 1918: 206: 'Seine [Von der Goltz] größten Erfolge hat er hier sicherlich durch sein psychologisches Feingefühl erworben.'

Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Pasha (1843-1916): A Hero for Everyone

‘Büyük Goltz Paşa, ölüm seni bizden zamansız aldı.
Pek sevdiğin bu millet, sana ikinci vatan olan bu topraklar,
seni daha mesut ve zaferli günlerin arasında görmek isterdi.’
*Enver Paşa, 1916*⁶⁶

‘Garbın en kahraman soyundan gelerek
Şarkın en cengaver bir soyu arasında hizmetle ömrünü geçiren büyük kumandan...’
*Türk Yurdu, 1916*⁶⁷

A good deal of written research has been undertaken on the subject of the influence of the German military missions, especially the one headed by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Pasha (1843-1916), within the Ottoman Empire and especially in its army.⁶⁸ Although these works do not provide sufficient document-based proof with regards to his contributions to the German military industry during his service in the Ottoman Army, a broad consensus has emerged in the scholarly literature, which argues that the German military missions, and particularly the one under Goltz Pasha, played a crucial role in the Ottomans’ arms purchasing process, which was finalised in favour of German firms. However, to move from citing these references to providing document-based evidence regarding Goltz Pasha’s tangible contribution to Germany’s multi-dimensional success in the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to conduct an analysis with the help of authentic documents. In line with that point, an attempt will be made to bring to light Goltz Pasha’s general influence in the Ottoman Empire and in particular his manipulative interferences in the war business. The following pages will be based

⁶⁶ Kâzım Karabekir 2001: 279.

⁶⁷ Kâzım Karabekir 2001: 239.

⁶⁸ As many others, for instance, Griffiths also says -without giving any documentary proof- that Goltz Pasha was involved in the Mauser transaction. At the very same line Wallach, who has also pointed Goltz’s statement about the impact of the personal influence on the Ottoman decision making process, says that ‘in the obtaining of the arms contracts, Goltz Pasha’s influence was enormous.’ Cf.: Griffiths 1966: 69-70; McGarity 1968: 35-39; Swanson 1975: 367-385; Kössler 1981: 120-123; Wallach 1985:105; Yasamee 1998:91-128; Akmeşe 2005: 19-33; Türk 2006: 61-67 and 183-184; Grant 2007: 81-94.

mainly on Goltz's own letters, reports, *lâyihas* and telegrams written between 1886 and 1896, most of which have not been evaluated previously.

When Kähler Pasha was struggling with the above-mentioned organisational and also personal obstacles, a well-known military thinker and strategist, Goltz Pasha - recommended by Kähler Pasha himself as a personal friend⁶⁹ - came to İstanbul on June 15, 1883.⁷⁰ He received an audience with Abdülhamid II two days later.⁷¹ Afterwards he wrote to his wife, when he mentioned his initial impression of the Sultan: 'One gets the feeling very quickly that [he] is in the presence of a highly intelligent person'.⁷² Goltz's responsibility at the beginning of his contract was reorganisation of the Ottoman military schools: *General-Inspecteur des Militär-Bildungswesens*.⁷³ After a couple of days, as a document dated June 20, 1883, demonstrates, his contract was prepared and he started planning his programme for reforming the Ottoman military school.⁷⁴ Within a month, however, on July 24, 1883 he prepared a *lâyiha* and submitted it to the Sultan who forwarded it to a military commission to be investigated. According to the commission, Goltz Pasha advocated that first, there should be an increase in the military content of the courses taught in the schools; second, the time table of the courses should be revised; finally, as the commission summarised it, in his *lâyiha* Goltz Pasha dealt with the nutrition standards of the food served to the cadets.⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Cram 1999: 262.

⁷⁰ According to the writers of *Denkwürdigkeiten* Goltz arrived in İstanbul on June 15. Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929:108; however Wallach gave another arrival date: June 18. Besides, Grant claims incorrectly: 'later that same year [1882] Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz joined the mission.' Grant 2007: 81. See also: Ulus 1986:81-82.

⁷¹ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 108.

⁷² Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 108. 'Man gewinnt sehr schnell das Gefühl, einer hochintelligenten Persönlichkeit gegenüberzustehen.'

⁷³ Von der Goltz, C.F. 1897: 95.

⁷⁴ BOA, *İ.DH.888/70644* (14.08.1300/20.06.1883).

⁷⁵ BOA, *Y.PRK.KOM.4/13* (23.09.1300/28.07.1883).

Goltz Pasha was regarded as one of Germany's greatest strategists and military thinkers and also one of the most distinguished military writers of his time.⁷⁶ The *New York Times* in 1908 described him as 'without exception the highest military authority in Germany'.⁷⁷ In fact, his Europe-wide reputation was well known and remarked upon within Ottoman military circles.⁷⁸ His task was to reorganise the Ottoman military schools and to serve as an adviser to the Military Academy. Before he entered Ottoman service in 1883, he had been serving in the German Army as a major.⁷⁹ In his first two years in the Ottoman Army (1883-1885) he was subordinate to Kähler Pasha and his assignment was as adviser to the Military Academy with an annual salary of 26,000 Francs.⁸⁰ After Kähler Pasha's death in 1885, Goltz was appointed to head up the military mission and promoted to the rank of colonel.⁸¹ Subsequently his rank was raised to general in 1886; he stayed in Ottoman service until November 1, 1895,⁸² when he returned to (and later became commanding general of) the First Army Corps in Königsberg.⁸³ In the years leading up to the outbreak of World War I (WWI) Goltz Pasha was requested by the Sublime Porte to visit and inspect the Ottoman Army;⁸⁴ between 1909 and 1914 he received four such invitations.⁸⁵

However, by the termination of his service in 1895, Goltz Pasha's departure for Germany created an obvious gap in the Ottoman Empire with regards to the lobbying

⁷⁶ Yasamee 1998: 92; Foley 2005: 25-30; Uyar & Erickson 2009: 205.

⁷⁷ *The New York Times*: 19.07.1908.

⁷⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.8/23* (19.02.1301/20.12.1883).

⁷⁹ Griffiths 1966: 53.

⁸⁰ See also: 'Mekâtib-i 'askeriye için Almanya'dan celb olunan Baron Goltz için mukâvelenâme tanzîmi', in: BOA, *I.DH. 888/70644* (14.08.1300/20.06.1883); Griffiths 1966: 60; Beydilli 1979: 494.

⁸¹ Akmeşe 2005:21; McGarity gave the year of Kähler Pasha's death and Goltz's arrival incorrectly as 1883: 'The group was headed initially by a Colonel von Köhler [Kähler] who unfortunately died in 1883. He was replaced that year by Colonel Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz.' McGarity 1968: 36.

⁸² Wallach 1985: 70.

⁸³ Steinitz (ed.) 1927: 48. Goltz's contract was extended three times. See Wallach 1985: 53-68.

⁸⁴ BOA, *I.ASK.1327.R.23 Vesika No.26* (20.03.1327/11.04.1909); BOA, *MV.127/23* (29.04.1327/20.05.1909).

⁸⁵ Demirhan 1960: 130-200; Yasamee 1998: 112-123. Finally, on April 19, 1916 Goltz Pasha died in Baghdad just before the victory of *Kut-al-'Amara* where the British were surrounded and he was buried in the grounds of the German Consulate in İstanbul, where he had first come in 1883. Ulus 1986: 78; Kâzım Karabekir 2001: 280-281; Yasamee 1998: 122.

effort on behalf of the German armament firms. Apparently the only person able to fill the gap was Marschall von Bieberstein, the former de-facto German Foreign Minister who was appointed German Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1897. Goltz Pasha had worked very hard, as if he was the German Ambassador at the same time. However, as some of Goltz Pasha's letters sent to the Krupp company and to Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter (Von Kiderlen: later the Secretary of Foreign Affairs) in 1891 indicate, he was not pleased with Von Radowitz's lack of commitment to supporting the German arms makers' business endeavours in the Ottoman market. In 1891, for instance, when the Sultan seemed ready to place an order with French firms, Goltz Pasha, who saw the arms trade as an effective instrument for German foreign policy, suggested that Menshausen make a diplomatic push on the Ottoman Government.⁸⁶ His advice was clear: if you want to obtain the contract or prevent the Ottomans from ordering French guns you must prompt the diplomatic instruments based in Berlin. 'This is the right time for a diplomatic intervention', wrote Goltz Pasha before commenting on Von Radowitz's reservations:

Several conversations with the Ambassador have, however, convinced me that the same could hardly be expected from his side. Although he [Von Radowitz] said in his last conversation 'Let us see', I still believe that he will only take positive actions upon certain encouragements from Berlin. So I can only urge to stir up things there in Berlin.⁸⁷

The important information Goltz Pasha submitted to the German Foreign Office created a domino effect, which was brought to an end when the Kaiser himself intervened in the war business in a significant way: he threatened the Sultan with severance of political and economic relations.⁸⁸ Goltz's letter served the German political, military,

⁸⁶ *Abschrift*: Goltz to Menshausen, 01.08.1891, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3B/216.

⁸⁷ Goltz to Menshausen, 01.08.1891, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3B/216. See Appendix 2.4.

⁸⁸ Wilhelm II to the Reichskanzler 19.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13285. See Chapter IV: 217-218.

and also economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. He was well aware that as a military adviser his sphere of influence was limited; even so, he sought to interfere in political issues, which obviously annoyed the German Ambassador Von Radowitz. A letter written by a member of the German military mission - most probably Goltz Pasha – drew attention to the conflict of authority in İstanbul between the German Ambassador and the members of the German military mission.⁸⁹ According to the writer: ‘Von Radowitz, who was jealous (*eifersüchtig*) of his position as well as his reputation/prestige (*Ansehen*), gave the Sultan always to understand that even if he had the intention to use one of us to entrust his policy towards Germany, that he [Von Radowitz] was there for that purpose and that the Kaiser did not wish for anything to go through us [German military mission]’.⁹⁰ After stressing these points, the writer added: ‘Several of us, who were at the court of the Sultan as part of their position, had won the trust of the man who was otherwise unapproachable and became closer to him and established a personal contact. Those have been intentionally alienated from the Sultan by the ambassador so that they do not communicate anything political with him [the Sultan]’.⁹¹ In 1892, after ten years’ service as the Ambassador in İstanbul, Von Radowitz was appointed to Spain.

Goltz Pasha’s employment in the Ottoman Army was in a perfect harmony with the strategy anticipated by Bismarck. As he expected sending the military mission to the Ottoman Empire furnished the German Government with a number of ‘reliable informants whom they could obtain in no other way’.⁹² As a matter of fact, Bismarck was not mistaken in his conviction; Goltz Pasha at least realised almost everything that

⁸⁹ *Unnamed*, 21.12.1891, in: HA, Krupp FAH 3C/217: This document is a letter the sender of which proved to be one of the members of the German military mission in the Ottoman army. However, if we compare the wording-expressions, contents of this letter with Goltz Pasha’s other handwritten letters we may speculate that this letter also belonged to Goltz Pasha. See Appendix 2.5.

⁹⁰ *Unnamed*, 21.12.1891, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/217.

⁹¹ *Unnamed*, 21.12.1891, in: HA, Krupp FAH 3C/217.

⁹² Curtius (ed.) 1907/ II: 268.

Bismarck envisaged from the benefits of despatching the German officers to Ottoman service. In recognition of this, when Goltz Pasha presented in Berlin during his Ottoman service, he was received by Bismarck and asked about the military, economic and political state of the Ottoman Empire.⁹³ Within a relative short time the German mission headed by Goltz Pasha demonstrated the importance and usefulness of such a tool within the concept of a peaceful penetration strategy.

Sending military missions abroad subsequently became an essential instrument and the most prominent means of achieving a strategy of peaceful penetration. When Goltz entered Ottoman service one of his classmates at the *Prussian Kriegsakademie*, Emil Körner, was sent to Chile in 1885 on the recommendation of the Chief Staff of Prussian Army, Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1901), who served the Ottoman Army for four years (1835-1839), and Kaiser Wilhelm I.⁹⁴ Sending military advisers abroad provided Germany with the opportunity of placing ‘national military power into the framework of the international politics of the day’.⁹⁵

As his future acts proved, Goltz did not want to remain as a simple/ordinary member of the military mission whose responsibilities were somehow restricted to military education or modernisation of the Ottoman recruitment system, etc. It might be because he became aware that Abdülhamid’s military reform project was not as real as it was supposed to be. According to him, the Sultan’s real intention was to give the impression that the Ottoman military would be organised by the German reformers. Based on this thought, he wrote in a letter, using what the commentators have described as ‘gallows humour’ [*Galgenhumorstimmung*]: ‘Basically, we [German military

⁹³ BOA, *Y.PRK.MYD.6/34* (14.08.1304/08.05.1887): According to Goltz Pasha’s report sent from Berlin to the Sultan, he met Bismarck in a family dinner and was questioned in detail about the Ottoman Empire: ‘*Fahâmetlü Prens Bismark hazretleri lutfen beni bir familya ta ‘âmuna da ‘vet etti. Memâlik-i Şâhânelerinde cereyân eden kâffe-i ahvâle kesb-i vukûf eylemeye müşârun-ileyhinin pek ziyâde merâkı olduğundan bu bâbda benden bir çok ma ‘lûmât istedi.*’

⁹⁴ Herwig 1986: 111.

⁹⁵ Griffiths 1966: 58.

advisers] are nothing other than His Majesty's court jesters. My most serious competitor here is a court dwarf, who is a ventriloquist and can walk on his hands at the same time that he does somersaults. All of that I cannot do'.⁹⁶ Goltz Pasha's overwhelming desire was to be a 'German politician in uniform'.⁹⁷

As a matter of fact, Goltz Pasha desired to extend his sphere of influence from simple military adviser to being a consultant in various fields including the military procurement process and also on Ottoman internal and foreign policies, which were essentially shaped by Abdülhamid's own priorities.⁹⁸ Accordingly, he intervened in the negotiations on the Baghdad railway; he was a keen supporter of the project because he understood all too well the railroad's military as well as its commercial importance for the state. As Harrison pointed out, Goltz Pasha underlined the railway's strategic importance to the Ottoman Empire and to Germany.⁹⁹

Goltz Pasha gained his increasingly influential position mainly because Sultan Abdülhamid provided him with opportunities to express his thoughts about the specified critical issues when he was received in audience at the Yıldız Palace. In March 1887 Goltz, before his departure to Berlin, was received by the Sultan and ordered to discuss with Bismarck some foreign political issues of the Ottoman Empire, including Ottoman relations with Russia and Britain.¹⁰⁰ In addition to these exceptional

⁹⁶ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 134.

⁹⁷ The term of 'German politicians in uniform' is cited in Akmeşe 2005: 10.

⁹⁸ Cf. Wallach 1985: 42; Griffiths 1966: 54.

⁹⁹ Harrison 1904: 225: 'Goltz have pointed out the strategic importance of the railway to Turkey -how the line will shorten the route from Bombay to Europe by three and two-thirds days; how it will tend to strengthen Turkey inwardly, and inevitably make her, in an economic sense, more and more dependent on Germany; what a future there lies in store for Germans in Asia Minor; what a future when the 'second Suez Canal' is opened, and the way from Germany to India and East Asia thus liberated from English lines of connection.' In one of his letter sent to Pertev Pasha, Goltz Pasha indicated the importance of the railroad in terms of its military usage as follows: '*Aber sie wird sich ändern, sobald die türkische Armee schlagfertig ist, das syrische Bahnnetz den schnellen Transport eines starken Heeres nach der ägyptischen Grenze gestattet, und auf der anderen Seite die anatolische Bahn ihre Fortführung bis Bagdad erfahren hat.*' Goltz to Pertev, 18.12.1910, in: MA, Freiburg: NL.737/5. See also: Hallgarten 1963/2: 406.

¹⁰⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.6/34 (17.08.1304/11.05.1887).

positions, Goltz Pasha was attached by 1889 directly to the Imperial Military Household, whereas all other German officers were subject to the *Serasker*.¹⁰¹ This change provided Goltz with the unique right to address his reports directly to the Sultan. While there is no documentary proof of this, Abdülhamid might have noticed Goltz Pasha's critical position as an informant for the German Foreign Office and the GAFs.

Over time, Goltz Pasha established close relations with the Sultan's 'first circle men' at the Yıldız Palace and based on this relationship he built well-operated information net. He obtained crucial bits of information either from his 'very confidential sources' located at the Yıldız Palace, like one of the Sultan's important secretaries Ragıb Bey, who was encoded in some documents as 'Robert',¹⁰² or directly from the Sultan, who occasionally accorded him an audience at the Yıldız Palace. In addition to these sources from Yıldız Palace, Goltz Pasha, as an admired personality by the young Ottoman officers, could also gain crucial information or at least acquire some observations from his cadets in the Military Academy.

As is shown by the case of Pertev Pasha [who later adopted the surname Demirhan], a well-known admirer of Goltz Pasha and his biographer, even after he left for Germany, Goltz was able to receive detailed knowledge and intelligence from his former cadets.¹⁰³ The information gained and the critical observations made on different personalities and institutions were supplied by Goltz Pasha to the GAFs and also to German Foreign Office. As Figure 2.2 below indicates, the points about which information was provided by Goltz Pasha included: Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Foreign Office (Von Kiderlen), F. A. Krupp and his firm's management and Paul Mauser and

¹⁰¹ Grant 2002: 23.

¹⁰² In fact, at the very outset, Paul Mauser and August Huber determined a code-name schedule. The code of Robert was used for Ragıb Bey by Krupp's director Carl Menshausen. See Chapter V: 283.


¹⁰³ See the MA, Freiburg: NL.737/5 –NL.737/11. Cf. also: Demirhan 1960.

his company's management. Goltz Pasha's reports or letters were long and detailed. Additionally, as the authors of *Denkwürdigkeiten* asserted, Goltz Pasha prepared nearly 4,000 pages of instructions for the purpose of a military manual, from which it appears obvious that preparing reports, letters, *lâyihâs* and books might have occupied most of Goltz's time.¹⁰⁴ 'The honest Germans', noted the *New York Times* in 1885, 'sent in long, painstaking reports on every imaginable subject connected with financial, military, or Government matters.'¹⁰⁵ In fact, the comment published in the newspaper accurately reflects what Goltz Pasha had done. As previously mentioned, Goltz was in the middle of the information flow between Ottoman sources and Germany. Thanks to his privileged position in the Ottoman Army, he was able to gain access to information which was of importance for the GAFs, for which Goltz Pasha had generously provided some very confidential information. The following figure was mainly developed based on Goltz Pasha's correspondence or reports discovered in several archives. Most of them were related directly to armaments orders but at the same time in some of the writings there is information concerning the recent political circumstances at the Sublime Porte.

¹⁰⁴ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 114.

¹⁰⁵ *The New York Times*: 08.11.1885.

Figure 2.2: Goltz Pasha's Special Information Net



What facilitated this information flow was Goltz Pasha's personal relations with both sides, namely with the Ottoman officers/officials and Germany. In a very early phase of his service, he realised the impact of personal relations in finalising almost all issues in the Ottoman Empire. Especially, he noticed that the allocation of supplies for the Ottoman Army was not decided objectively but solely through personal influence.¹⁰⁶ According to Colonel Chermiside, being interested in supplies of military materials by German firms was one of the main handles for intrigue, which had been the accusation against Goltz Pasha.¹⁰⁷

After his first three years service in the Ottoman Army, Goltz Pasha intended to terminate his contract in 1886; to this end on January 28, 1886, he submitted to the Sultan notice of his intention to retire from the task of the *Mekâtib-i 'Askeriye Müfettiş-i Umûmisi*, offering the explanation that the cadets and the soldiers did not follow his orders.¹⁰⁸ At the time his contract was due to end, in May 1886, he did not want to

¹⁰⁶ Wallach 1985: 90.

¹⁰⁷ Memorandum by Colonel Chermiside, 25.05.1893, in: NA, London: FO 78/4479.

¹⁰⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.31/52* (22.04.1303/28.01.1886); Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 134.

extend it for another three years. However, the Sultan insistently tried to persuade him to remain in Ottoman service. According to the Austrian Military Attaché, Ritter von Manéga, Abdülhamid's secretary, Ragıb Bey, met Goltz Pasha almost every day in an effort to change his mind about remaining in Ottoman service.¹⁰⁹ Abdülhamid also appealed to Kaiser Wilhelm I to propose to Goltz Pasha that he should renew his contract.¹¹⁰ The Sultan's request was basically compatible with the German Government's expansion strategy and Goltz Pasha proved to be also one of the most capable persons to accomplish this mission. To serve his fatherland, Goltz must stay in the Ottomans' service. According to the Kaiser's approach, his lengthy stay in the Ottoman service was seen as the most desirable [*aller erwünschteste*] of all solutions.¹¹¹ Apparently, his lengthy stay in the Ottoman service – it lasted until October 1, 1889 was the result of an order given by Kaiser Wilhelm I on July 19, 1886.¹¹² In other words, he had no other choice but to stay in İstanbul. However, he did not disclose this fact and concealed it during his negotiations with the Sultan.¹¹³ With feigned reluctance about his continued service in the Ottoman Army, Goltz Pasha stipulated some conditions for staying. Abdülhamid II accepted them and on July 22, 1886 Goltz Pasha signed a new contract with the Ottoman Government.¹¹⁴ The German Kaiser, the Sultan, the German arms companies and also Goltz Pasha himself were pleased with this outcome.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum of Ritter von Manéga, 06.06.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237.

¹¹⁰ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 135.

¹¹¹ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 135; Rottenburg to *Unterstaatssekretär*, 06.06.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237.

¹¹² *Abschrift* of Kaiser Wilhelm I, 22.07.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237.

¹¹³ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 135; Griffiths 1966:70; Wallach 1985: 55-56.

¹¹⁴ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.33/62* (20.10.1303/22.07.1886); *Abschrift* of Kaiser Wilhelm I, 22.07.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237; Radowitz to Bismarck, 02.08.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237.

Significantly, the Government of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire also desired to see Goltz Pasha serving in the Ottoman Army.¹¹⁵ Goltz's extended contract was welcomed by Germany's Austro-Hungarian ally. In this regard, the Austrian Government had directly communicated with the German Chancellor Bismarck that Goltz Pasha's presence in İstanbul was of great importance for them.¹¹⁶ It appears that Goltz was 'an irreplaceable person'¹¹⁷ not only to the Ottoman Empire and Germany but also for the Austrians. During a conversation with the German Ambassador to Vienna, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Gustav Kálnoky, declared his gratitude to the Kaiser for his order to extend Goltz's contract. As the German Ambassador remarked, Goltz's presence in the Ottoman service was doubly desirable [*doppelt wünschenswert*], according to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. The essence of Count Kálnoky's argument was the looming possibility of good relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, which implied at the same time a friendship with France, who supplied the guns for the Ottomans' Mediterranean coastal defences.

In September 1886, Goltz also saw that a Russian-Ottoman alliance was not in the least improbable.¹¹⁸ As a matter of fact, at that time a draft version for a defensive alliance proposal between the Ottoman Empire, Russia and France was being prepared by the Ottoman Government.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Ottomans' disinclination to fortify the Bosphorus defences was, according to Count Kálnoky, proof in favour of his argument. However, the foreign minister was of the opinion that Goltz Pasha's presence in

¹¹⁵ Rottenburg to *Unterstaatssekretär*, 06.06.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237; Prince Reuss to Bismarck, 29.07.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237; for the Austrian interest in Goltz Pasha's contract's extension see also: Wallach 1985: 55-56.

¹¹⁶ Rottenburg to *Unterstaatssekretär*, 06.06.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237.

¹¹⁷ Demirhan 1960: 255: 'Goltz war nicht nur für uns [*The Ottoman Empire*], sondern auch für Deutschland unersetzlich.'

¹¹⁸ Yasamee 1996: 190.

¹¹⁹ Yasamee 1996: 188-195.

İstanbul could prevent these threatening developments.¹²⁰ Kálnoky was right. Goltz Pasha encouraged the Sultan to undertake a defensive armament in case of a possible Russian attack. Nonetheless, Kálnoky was not able to foresee that Goltz Pasha was in a position to not only prevent a possible Russian approach towards the Golden Horn, but was also able, at the same time, to lobby for the German rifle companies in the Ottoman market at the expense of the Austrian firm Mannlicher. As a matter of fact, one of Goltz Pasha's most obvious influences in the Ottoman Empire occurred through his intervention in the Mauser transactions, which were finalised at the expense of Austrian, American and British rifle suppliers.¹²¹ Goltz Pasha, whose efforts on behalf of the German industry effectively excluded the Austrians, tried to strengthen the political relations of his own country's ally with the Ottoman Empire after the extension of his contract in the Ottoman service. In June 1887, when he returned to İstanbul from a European tour, during which he was received by the Austrian Emperor and met the Austrian military and civil elite in Vienna, he praised the Austrian Army and the country itself in the following words: 'Austria is stronger than the other European states think; she is even stronger than her own estimation.'¹²²

Before turning our attention to Goltz Pasha's contribution to Mauser's entrance into the Ottoman market, it is essential to point out his influence on the new Recruitment Law of 1886/87, which paved the way for an increase in the size of the Ottoman Army and consequently an increase in the demand for war materials. Thanks to the new contract, Goltz Pasha widened his sphere of influence. In particular, through his appointment to lead the special Military Reform Commission, Goltz Pasha became

¹²⁰ Prince Reuss to Bismarck, 29.07.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237.

¹²¹ See Chapter III: 139-170.

¹²² BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.40/36 (29.09.1304/21.06.1887): '*Avusturya Devleti Avrupa'nın ve belki kendi hey'etinin zân ve kıyâsından ziyâde kuvvetli bir hâldedir.*'

exceptionally authorised to submit directly to the Sultan any relevant proposals.¹²³ This authorisation gave him the opportunity to convince the Sultan to lend his support to the Germanisation of the Ottoman Army and its equipment. Among Goltz Pasha's first achievements from his face-to-face communication with the Sultan could be mentioned the Sultan's approval for a modification of the existing conscription system that had been in use since 1869.¹²⁴ Goltz Pasha had wanted to make this change for a long time and 'after much hesitation and negotiation' the new law was approved by the Sultan on November 25, 1886.¹²⁵ Based on a draft submitted by Goltz Pasha in 1886, the new Recruiting Law extended the obligation of military service to all able-bodied Muslim males aged 20 and over and the term of military service remained at twenty years. Griffiths pointed out that despite the fact that the term of service was not changed, the time to be spent in each category was rearranged: three years in the active forces - *Nizâmiye*; six years in the active reserve - *İhtiyât*; nine years in the reserve - *Redif*; and two years in the territorial force - *Müstahfiz*.¹²⁶ Accordingly, the total number of peacetime ranks of the Ottoman Army would be raised to 850,000.¹²⁷

As Akmeşe has pointed out, Goltz Pasha was of opinion that the best way to achieve 'the full amalgamation of military and civilian life' was conscription.¹²⁸ Presumably, the geography-based new distribution of armies became one of the fundamentally important tools to realise the idea of 'militarisation of society' that Goltz Pasha advocated.¹²⁹ Thus, the distribution of the military forces according to districts occurred as another crucial change decided by the commission in 1887. By the district

¹²³ Radowitz to Bismarck, 02.08.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237; Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 138; Griffiths 1966:70-71; Wallach 1985:57.

¹²⁴ Griffiths 1966:72; Zürcher 1998: 437-449; Akmeşe 2005: 6, 23.

¹²⁵ Radowitz to Bismarck, 02.08.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237; Morawitz 1903:138.

¹²⁶ Griffiths 1966:75; however, the following authors give different information about the time to be spent in each category: Morawitz 1903:139; Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 245; Zürcher 1998: 440; Akmeşe 2005: 23.

¹²⁷ Yasamee 1996: 194.

¹²⁸ Akmeşe 2005: 22.

¹²⁹ Akmeşe 2005: 22.

division system spelled out in the new regulation, as Griffiths asserted, the commission had ‘slavishly followed’ the system that was based on European factors.¹³⁰ In 1891, Goltz proudly wrote that such an equally powerful regulation in the Ottoman military system had not been carried out since the reign of Sultan Mahmud II.¹³¹

In the meantime, the mobilisation plan of the forces recommended by the commission dictated a new strategy in terms of construction of new railroads and communication systems which would be mainly provided by German firms over the course of time.¹³² The utilisation of the railways, in particular the Baghdad railway, for military purposes was one of the most significant parts of Goltz Pasha’s plan for the modernisation of the Ottoman military system.¹³³ Regarded from this point of view, Goltz’s presence on the spot in Ottoman service became almost an indispensable manipulative factor for the development of German interests in the Ottoman Empire.

Interestingly, however, in February 1890 Goltz Pasha, who had suggested an increase of troops in 1886/87, submitted to the Sultan another *lâyihâ* and in this one he offered a new plan which recommended a reduction [*tenkihât*] of active –*Nizâmiye*-troops.¹³⁴ Goltz Pasha prepared this *lâyihâ* based on the *Îrâde* of the Sultan who ordered, at the end of 1889, a study of ways to reduce the active –*Nizâmiye* - forces for financial reasons.¹³⁵ Goltz Pasha began his *lâyihâ* with a complaint about the unpaid salaries of the Ottoman officers, and after a suggestion to reduce the number of active army personnel he offered an increase in the *Redif* army. In his *lâyihâ* he wrote:

¹³⁰ Griffiths 1966: 79.

¹³¹ Goltz to Von Kiderlen, 22.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763: ‘Eine gleich mächtige Maßnahme ist seit Sultan Mahmud Zeiten im türkischen Reiche nicht mehr durchgeführt worden, und es ist eine wesentliche Stärkung der türkischen Wehrkraft davon zu erwarten.’

¹³² For the mobilization plan and the distribution of the military forces suggested by the commission see Griffiths 1966: 76-83; see also Earle 1966: 83.

¹³³ Earle 1966: 83.


¹³⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.59/6 (07.07.1307/27.02.1890).

¹³⁵ Chermside Memorandum, 05.12.1889, in: NA, London: FO 195/1664 cited in Griffiths 1966: 87.

I certainly believe that it is also possible to increase the strength of the Army through a reduction in the military expenditures. The best and simplest way to achieve to this aim is, however, to reduce the number of the regular troops, whereas in the case of a war to increase of the number of the reserve army [*redif*].¹³⁶

The following figure, based on the table produced by the Ministry of the Army led by *Serasker Rıza Pasha*, illustrates how the total number of active troops changed between 1869 and 1904.¹³⁷

Figure 2.3: Change in Total Active *Nizâmiye* -Troops¹³⁸



Source: Rıza Pasha 1325/1909: *Mukâyese-Ekler*

After mentioning the shortages in some critical military materials, Goltz Pasha finished his suggestions with a proposal for an increase in military materials purchases which were to be financed through sources that would be provided by the reduction of troops. He indicated that ‘through the savings, which would be made through reducing

¹³⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.59/6 (07.07.1307/27.02.1890): ‘... mesârîf-i ‘askeriyenin tenkîsiyle berâber kuvve-i harbiyenin tezyîdi dahî mümkün olduğu i ‘tikâd-ı kuvvesindeyim. Bunun için en basit ve en a‘lâ çâre dahî silâh altında bulunmakta olan ‘asâkir-i muvazzafanın mikdârını tenkîs ve sefer zuhûrunda silâh altına da ‘vet olunacak ‘asâkir-i redîfenin mikdârını tezyîd etmektedir.’

¹³⁷ See also: Griffiths 1966: 88

¹³⁸ The total amount given in the list prepared by *Serasker Rıza Pasha* was consisted of the numbers of the following units: the officer corps; the civil service workers; the students; and the regular soldiers (*Efrâd-ı Şâhâne*). Rıza Pasha 1325/1909: *Mukâyese-Ekler*.

the number of troops, the weapons and the other military materials required can be purchased'.¹³⁹ Apparently the reform plans suggested by Goltz Pasha and by the other German advisers had in fact served very effectively to promote and advance German political and/or economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. In the meantime, the strong correlation between the military regulations and the arms procurement was also well known to Goltz Pasha. In the end, however, the number of troops was increased and consequently the needs of the army (military materials and other supplies) rose. After two years of the new regulations, an Ottoman officer (Hüseyin Tevfik Pasha) submitted to the Yıldız Palace a report pointing to the link between the increased troop numbers and needed rifles.¹⁴⁰ During the negotiations for the army regulations and the new rifle procurement, Goltz Pasha, the architect of the new regulations, sent off a letter to Berlin in 1886. In it, he clearly emphasised to the German Ministry of War the link between the new recruitment law and its potential to benefit German industry. In his correspondence, Goltz Pasha insistently requested an official confirmation about the similarity between the Mauser rifles which were being used in the German Army and those that would be used in the Ottoman Army. However Goltz's argumentation to pursue the Ministry was well formulated:

This *sui-generis* circumstance could on the one hand impede the interests of the German industry and on the other hand, jeopardize the much desired procurement of Mauser rifles (M82) by the Ottoman army, the number of troops of which were significantly increased after the new recruitment law.¹⁴¹

He believed that the prospect of an increased number of soldiers should whet the German arms makers' appetites. Along with his military abilities, Goltz Pasha gives

¹³⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.59/6 (07.07.1307/27.02.1890).

¹⁴⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.52/77 (04.04.1306/06.01.1889): '*Tensikât-ı cedîde iktizâsınca hükümet-i seniye'nin sekiz yüz bini [800,000] mütecâviz tüfenge ihtiyâcı olduğu hâlde elde isti'mâle sâlih ancak üç yüz- üç yüz elli bin [300-350,000] râddesinde tüfenk mevcûd olduğundan ikmâl-i noksân zımnında hiç olmaz ise beş yüz bin [500,000] râddesinde tüfenk lüzûm kat'î görülmekle...*'

¹⁴¹ Goltz to Schellendorf 13.12.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

every indication of possessing a clear and strategically astute commercial instinct. The Ottoman Government was not unaware of the consequences of the increased number of troops or the fortification of the Straits which were basically suggested by the German military advisers. In a report dated March 7, 1887, the issue was clearly indicated. According to this document, the reform suggestions of Goltz Pasha and the other advisers who had control over Ottoman military affairs, paved the way for the arming of the Ottoman soldiers and fortresses with German arms.¹⁴²

Being aware of this fact did not change the destiny of the Ottoman Empire in terms of being an open market for the GAFs. However, to be able to understand the above-given figure, it is of great importance to highlight four special operations in which Goltz's influence was decisive and direct. First, the fortification of the Straits with Krupp guns in 1885/86; second, the new recruitment system which increased the number of active troops; third, the contracts signed in 1886/87 with the Mauser company for 500,000 rifles and 50,000 carbines of which subsequent negotiations continued till 1896; fourth, the correspondence of 1891, in which Goltz demonstrated his multilateral skills in diplomacy and in the marketing of German-made war materials.¹⁴³ These operations exemplify perfectly the German Style of War Business, in which the non-commercial players' personal influence proved to be more crucial and effective than the commercial factors. The contacts between the German military advisers and the Ottoman bureaucrats and officers and their simultaneous cooperation with the GAFs paved the way for many lucrative contracts.

¹⁴² BOA, Y.PRK.TKM.10/20 (11.06.1304/07.04.1887): '*Devlet-i 'Aliye'nin umûr-ı 'askerîyesine tahakküm eden Almanya 'askerî me'mûrlarının nüfûzunun 'askerlerin teslîhi husûsuna da te'sîr [ettiği]*'.

¹⁴³ See Chapter IV: 216-222.

CHAPTER III
ORDERS AND CONTRACTS:
THE FIRST FRUITS OF CREATING AN
INFLUENCE NETWORK

Coastal Fortification with Krupp Guns in 1885/1886

When the German military mission arrived in İstanbul in 1882, the Ottoman military industry consisted of the five principal state-owned establishments all of which were located in İstanbul and administered by the Ministry of Imperial Ordnance (*Tophâne-i ‘Âmire Nezâreti*): *Tophâne-i ‘Amire* (Imperial Gun Factory); *Tüfenkhâne-i ‘Âmire* (Imperial Small-Arms Factory); *Baruthâne-i ‘Amire* (Imperial Powder Factory); *Kırkağaç Fişenkhânesi* (Cartridge Factory); *Zeytinburnu Fabrikâyi Humâyun* (Imperial Foundry).¹ During the period of consideration the manufacturing capabilities of these factories gradually declined. For example, in 1881 the *Tüfenkhâne-i ‘Âmire* was capable of producing (*ihzâr*) the following number of rifles within the given weekly period.

Table 3.1: Rifle Reproduction in *Tüfenkhâne-i ‘Âmire* in 1881

Number of Rifles	May 31 - June 07
306	Springfield rifles with fixed-bayonets (System-Snider)
181	Enfield rifles with fixed-bayonets (System- Snider)
200	Martini-Henry rifles with bayonet
50	Winchester rifles
Number of Rifles	July 03 - July 17
349	Springfield rifles with fixed-bayonets (System-Snider)
10	Enfield rifles with fixed-bayonets (System-Snider)
624	Martini-Henry rifles with fixed-bayonets
216	Martini-Henry rifles with bayonet

Sources: BOA, *YPRK.ASK. 7/31* (10.07.1298/08.06.1881) and BOA, *Y.PRK. ASK. 7/74* (20.08.1898/18.07.1881).

The reports of Captain Domville’s - the British Naval Attaché in İstanbul- shed light on the dramatic change in the Ottoman domestic production after the arrival of the Germans in 1882. According to him, [in 1888] Martini-Henry rifles were being made

¹ BOA, *Y.PRK. ASK. 7/74* (20.08.1898/18.07.1881). See also Şakir 1957: 60-62. Appendix 3.1.

[t]here at the rate of a hundred a week,² whereas [in 1890] less work appeared to be going on than at the time of his last visit and only ten Martini-Henry a week were being made.³ Moreover, in 1894, the situation of Ottoman domestic production became even worse. According to Captain Egerton, the new British Naval Attaché, ‘there was no work in hand in the small arms factory except making gauges and dies for the manufacture of Mauser rifles’.⁴ It seems the above-described state of rifle production was by and large the same for the other military production. According to Egerton, in 1894, in all of the above mentioned Imperial factories (i.e. *Tophâne-i ‘Amire*; *Tüfenkhâne-i ‘Âmire*; *Baruthâne-i ‘Amire*; *Kırkağaç Fişenkhânesi*; and *Zeytinburnu Fabrikâyı Humâyun*) there was either very little work or ‘no work had been done for years’.⁵ Obviously between 1881 and 1894, while the *Tophâne*-made military materials gradually disappeared, the German armaments firms (the GAFs) had begun to penetrate and reshape the Ottoman military market. As a matter of fact, a significant relationship between the increase in the German supply for the Ottoman Army and decrease in Ottoman domestic military production could be posited.

In 1885, when Goltz Pasha was assigned to head up the German military mission, the German armaments firms were barely active in the Ottoman market. The Krupp company had formerly established a monopoly position in Ottoman field artillery but after 1875 no new orders were awarded by the Ottoman Government. At that time, Krupp was represented in İstanbul by Otto Dingler, with whose service

² Captain W. Cecil H. Domville, ‘Turkish Fleet and Dockyards 1888’, in: NA, London: ADM 231/14:12. See also Grant 2002:25.

³ Captain W. Cecil H. Domville, ‘Turkish Fleet and Dockyards 1890’, in: NA, London: ADM 231/18:12. See also Grant 2002:25.

⁴ Captain G. Le C. Egerton, ‘Turkish Fleet and Dockyards 1894’, in: NA, London: ADM 231/24:17.

⁵ Captain G. Le C. Egerton, ‘Turkish Fleet and Dockyards 1894’, in: NA, London: ADM 231/24:16-17: *Tophâne* Arsenal-Gun factory: ‘Very little work is going on in the Gun Factory; 200 men are said to be employed, but I doubt it.’; Cartridge factory: ‘No work in cartridge factory has been done for years.’; Powder factory: ‘There was no work going on except some blasting powder for commercial purposes.’; *Karaağaç*: ‘Only 50 men are employed at present, the only work in hand being percussion fuzes and friction tubes.’ Cf. BOA, *Y.PRK. ASK. 7/74* (20.08.1898/18.07.1881) and BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK. 7/31* (10.07.1298/08.06.1881). See also: Appendix 3.1.

Krupp had never been satisfied.⁶ Krupp's Ottoman business began as early as 1861 when it sent a sample gun to Sultan Abdulaziz.⁷ Between 1861 and 1875 the Ottoman Empire purchased from Krupp 1,816 guns in a variety of calibres. However, as stated above, after 1875 the firm had to wait nineteen years to again start supplying guns to the Sublime Porte. Between 1875 and 1885 there were no orders made to Krupp. By the 1880s, however, when the German military mission entered Ottoman service, Krupp's good days resumed. The following table displays the list of Krupp guns purchased by the Ottoman Empire between 1861 and 1875.

Table 3.2: Ottoman Artillery Orders from the Krupp company (1861-1875)

Calibre	Year of Order										
	1861	1863	1864	1867	1868	1870	1871	1873	1874	1875	Total
7.85 cm, L/25			48		127	78	8	214	178	100	753
8.70 cm, L/24										100	100
9.15 cm, L/22	1	48	12	48		10	170	120	52		461
12 cm, L/24								120			120
15 cm, L/14								50			50
15 cm, L/26								230			230
21 cm, L/22								28			28
24 cm, L/22								50			50
26 cm, L/22								10			10
28 cm, L/22								12			12
35.5 cm L/22										1	1
Total	1	48	60	48	127	88	178	834	231	201	1,816

Source: *Verzeichnis der von der Gußstahlfabrik und vom Grusonwerk von 1847 bis 1912 gefertigten Kanonen*, in: HA, Krupp: 5a VII f. 862: 44-44a.

The war of 1877/78 resulted in the destruction of a large portion of the Ottoman artillery and it was determined that an investigation was required to provide a new calculation of the Ottomans' artillery needs. For this purpose, the Sultan issued an order in August 1881 to make an inventory of the existing war materials (including guns, rifles, ammunition, etc.) in the imperial arsenal and other store locations. Accordingly,

⁶ Letters and reports sent and received by Otto Dingler and Krupp between 1872 and 1873, in: HA, Krupp: FAH. 2/B 314a. and see also 'Entschiedenheit gegenüber der Dingerschen Taktik in Konstantinopel, 06.03.1881, ' in: HA, Krupp: FAH 2M 78/19: 'Ich (A. Krupp) glaube Dingler nicht. Ich glaube auch nicht, dass er [sozusagen] die 4000 [OL] Trinkgeld für den Schmuck gegeben hat auch nicht, dass ihm an unserem Interesse was gelegen sondern dass er, mit viel Gewandtheit und Routine für sein Interesse sich auf unsere Kosten durchfrisst.'

⁷ *Verzeichnis der von der Gußstahlfabrik und vom Grusonwerk von 1847 bis 1912 gefertigten Kanonen*, in: HA, Krupp: 5a VII f. 862: 44-44a.

the Ministry of Navy, the Ministry of Army and the Military Equipment Ministry (*Techizât-ı 'Askeriye Nezâreti*) submitted to the commission headed by Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha their reports listing the estimate of war materials. According to a report dated August 10, 1881, there was, along with other equipment, the following superfluity of war materials in the Imperial Arsenal of Ordnance and Artillery: 64 Krupp guns (5x12cm; 42x15cm; 12x24cm; 2x26cm; 3x28cm); 24 Armstrong guns (4x300lbs [pounds]; 4x250lbs; 9x150lbs; 3x115lbs; 1x40lbs; 3x12lbs); 1,464 muzzle-loading guns (1,001 of them were in good condition [*sâlim*]); 101 six-chambered guns-rifles of various calibres [*şeşhâneli top*]; 1,283,877 pieces of primer [*fünye*], etc.⁸ From this report it became apparent that a large armament procurement was not a priority for immediate action.

Subsequent to the German advisers' employment in the Ottoman service, however, new armaments orders came gradually on to the agenda of the Sublime Porte. Following the submission of the above-mentioned report, Otto Dingler, Krupp's İstanbul agent, on June 2, 1882, submitted to the Sultan a proposal to acquire different calibre ship-guns from Krupp. This proposal came just two days after Kähler's contract was signed, as if he had been waiting for the German military mission to enter Ottoman service.⁹ However, the Sublime Porte did not take any immediate action in the direction of placing an order. In November 1883, Krupp sent the Sultan another proposal, together with some pictures, of newly-developed coastal and field guns. This time the Sultan demonstrated a keen interest in the guns and issued an order to investigate the most appropriate action for acquiring modern and strong artillery.¹⁰ Nevertheless, no concrete action was taken till 1885.

⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.KOM 3/18* (20.09.1298/ 10.08.1881).

⁹ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.12/52* (15.07.1299/02.06.1882).

¹⁰ BOA, *Y.EE.106/18* (02.01.1301/03.11.1883): See also Chapter V: 256.

So some important steps had been taken that would open the Ottoman market to the German armament firms. In November 1883, the Ministry of Navy submitted a proposal concerning a demand for new armaments for some existing ironclads. The proposal offered to fit the existing armoured ships with 190 breech-loading Krupp-made ship-guns to replace the existing mounted muzzle-loading Armstrong guns. The following table prepared by the Ministry of the Navy submitted to the Military High Commission lists some of the Ottoman armoured vessels and the number and calibre of the Krupp guns it was recommended should be mounted on them.¹¹

Table 3.3: Ottoman Warships and the Krupp Orders (1883)

Name of the Ship	Number of order	Calibre cm.
<i>Nâm-ı celil Hazreti Pâdişâhiye mensub zırhlı Fırkateyn-i Humâyun [Hamâdiye]</i>	10	24
	2	17
Mesûdiye Âsâr-ı Tevfik Feth-i Bülend ‘Avnillah Mu‘in-i Zafer Mukaddime-i Hayr	12	26
	8	21
	4	21
	4	21
	4	21
	4	21
<i>Sefâin-i Sâire (Others)</i>	20	15
	20	12
	8	17
	4	21
	30	6 (pound)
	30	4 (pound)
	30	3 (pound)

Source: BOA, *Y.PRK KOM.4/32* (27.01.1301/28.11.1883)

However, the request for such a large quantity of new guns was not accepted as reasonable by the commission headed by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, who had even been to Essen in 1883 as a guest of Krupp.¹² According to the commission a further technical investigation was an indispensable step to avoid any inconvenient financial consequences. Further investigations recommended postponement of the negotiations

¹¹ BOA, *Y.PRK.KOM 4/32* (27.01.1301/28.11.1883).

¹² *Beziehungen zur Türkei*, 25.05. 1916, in: HA, Krupp: WA 7f -886.

and delay of any potential orders. Another decision made by the commission was to investigate the possibility of transforming the existing muzzle-loaders into breech-loaders, as an alternative to purchasing new guns. These decisions were not what the Krupp company wanted to hear. For a large order, however, Krupp had to wait for the period when Germans began serving in the Ottoman Army. In 1887, four years after the commission did not accept the first proposal submitted by the Ministry of the Navy, a new proposal was made suggesting that 66 guns should be ordered from the Krupp factory while 130 guns were to be obtained from the Imperial arsenal.¹³ It appeared that the Ottoman officers, free of any kind of pressure or external advice, were not ready to order military materials abroad, in particular from Germany. Presumably, based on their reports and the financial state of the empire, the Sultan also was in no hurry to place a large order for war materials.

However, following the arrival of the German advisers and under the new perception of increased threat due to Bulgaria's increasing armament orders or a possibly renewed Russian attack towards the Ottoman Empire, the way was paved for a change of heart. The method used by some German advisers was to create a 'tempting market'.¹⁴ According to the German artillery advisers the Russian threat constituted a neither unimportant nor unlikely threat against the Ottoman coastal defences.¹⁵ The Germans and their allies' (i.e. Austria-Hungary) desire proved to be a political conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The Eastern Rumelia Crisis further strengthened the threat, which had the capacity to trigger a widespread conflict in the region. Almost all the arguments put forward by the Germans related to a probable

¹³ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.49/104* (1305/1887).

¹⁴ Murphy used this expression for the tactics used by Nordenfelt, Garret, and Zaharoff, who were trying to sell to the Ottoman Empire some war/navy materials (torpedoes, submarines etc.). Murphy 1987: 116.

¹⁵ Erickson 2003: 13-14.

Russian attack, against which precaution could be provided only by a strong fortification of the Straits – with guns provided by Krupp.

Even so, the German Foreign Office worried about the possibility of a rapprochement between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. They were well aware what would be the consequences of such a development. To this end, Şakir Pasha had suggested an alliance with Russia.¹⁶ Based on this possible strategically important formation, it would become pointless to fortify the Straits. Germany and her ally (Austria-Hungary) therefore were of the opinion that Goltz Pasha's presence in İstanbul was of great importance for the project that would make the Ottoman Empire destined to a foment friendship with only Germany and her friends. It was basically what the Ottoman special commission had heard from Germany in 1881: *l'ami de nos Amis*,¹⁷ and Russia proved not to be a friend of Germany and the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Goltz Pasha continued to elaborate the concept of German-Austrian friendship versus Russian threat on many occasions. In 1887, for instance, when he returned from his Europe tour during which he was received by Kaiser Wilhelm I and Bismarck in Berlin, and also by the Austrian Emperor in Vienna, he submitted to the Sultan a report and again he framed the perception of the concept of friendship-threat.

To explain this concept he suggested establishing 'a supportive force' (*kuvve-i muzâhere*) which would be able to build 'a preventive rampart' (*sedd-i müimâna'ât*) against a possible Russian attack towards both the Ottoman territory and Bulgaria.¹⁸ It was an obvious repolarisation and it appeared that the German Government and her ally saw Goltz Pasha as the most likely person to be able to manage the repolarisation. Meanwhile, the creation of these alliances was obviously leading to 'seething mistrust'

¹⁶ According to the British Ambassador Sir William White, after reading Şakir Pasha's report the Sultan had told: 'I was not aware till now that Şakir Pasha had become so Russian in his views.' White to Salisbury 12.09.1890, in: NA, London: FO 78/4277; see also Yasamee 1996: 173.

¹⁷ Hatzfeld to the German Embassy- Vienna, 20.12.1881, in: PA.AA. R13427.

¹⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.40/36* (29.09.1304/21.06.1887).

between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ As Albertini pointed out, through the control of the army and the railway construction Germany had acquired a predominant position in the Ottoman Empire and it enabled ‘her to prevent the realization of Russian traditional aspirations’.²⁰

To this extent, on April 25, 1885, as Cram cited from a report of Otto Dingler - Krupp’s agent in İstanbul - ‘the Sultan doubled the order to 60 mortars (twenty each of 12, 15 and 21 cm calibre), added 2,400 shells and 3,000 percussion tubes for a total 922,600 Marks’.²¹ The first proposal of the contract and the prices for the mortars were, however, as follows: 10x12cm mortars: OL 3,632.40; 10x15cm mortars: OL 5,218.80; and 10x21cm mortars: OL 10,404.80.²² The negotiations continued from February to July 1885. Krupp’s agent, Menshausen, had come to İstanbul to sign the contract. He spent nearly three months in the capital.²³ According to an unsigned document dated July 17, 1885, Menshausen appealed to the German Ambassador Von Radowitz for help by pressuring the Ottoman Government to accelerate the process and threatened to leave İstanbul without finalising the contract.²⁴ After his threat however concrete steps were taken by the Ottoman Government and, as the following table shows, 457 Krupp-guns were ordered from Germany.

Table 3.4: Krupp Guns and their Prices (ordered in 1885)*

Calibre (cm)	Number of order	Price for each (OL)	Total
35.5	7	30,972	216,804
24	22	7,461	164,142
7.5	39	450	17,550
8.7	389	480	186,720
Total	457		585,216

Source: BOA, *I.MMS.80/3473* (12.10.1302/25.07.1885) *without 60 mortars

¹⁹ The term given between the inverted commas quoted in Murphy 1987: 116.

²⁰ Albertini 2005/III: 606.

²¹ Cram 1999: 331.

²² Dingler to Ali Saib Pasha 18.02.1885, in: HA, Krupp: WA 2/249.

²³ BOA, *I.MMS.80/3473* (04.10.1302/17.07.1885).

²⁴ BOA, *I.MMS.80/3473* (04.10.1302/17.07.1885).

According to the document, the initial amount of payment was 605,283 OL²⁵ which was according to Abdülhamid’s demand reduced by 50,000 OL through an agreement dated July 27, 1885.²⁶ However, the number of ordered 24 cm guns was increased from 12 to 22 in the final version of the contract.²⁷ As it turned out, ‘the insistence of Von der Goltz Pasha’,²⁸ who declared the fortification of the Straits to be one of his most favoured preventive plans, proved to be an influential factor in the finalisation of this large contract which was followed by another order in 1886.²⁹ Fortification of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles defences with Krupp guns was, as was asserted by the authors of *Denkwürdigkeiten*, one of ‘Goltz's special services to his fatherland’.³⁰

Table 3.5: Krupp Guns and their Prices (ordered in 1886)

Calibre	Number of orders	Price for each (OL)	Total
24	10	7,461	74,610
7.5	20	450	9,000
8.7	404	480	193,920
3.7*	4		
10.7*	2		
Total	440		277,530

Source: BOA, *I.MMS.82/3533* (07.04.1303/13.01.1886.) *These guns were ordered by the Ottoman Government in exchange of a price reduction by 20,000 OL , see in: BOA, *I.MMS. 82/3533* (13.04.1303/19.01.1886).

Apart from the mortars - as the following table indicates - the total number of the order reached was 891 guns (852 of them field guns). It was a magnificent comeback for the Krupp company after ten years of stagnation concerning the Ottoman business. ‘The magnitude of this sale’, says Grant, ‘can be appreciated when one considers that in the

²⁵ Schedule of the payment for the ordered Krupp guns, in: BOA, *I.MMS. 80/3473* (12.10.1302/25.07.1885) See the Appendix 2.6.

²⁶ BOA, *I.MMS.80/3473* (27.07.1885); BOA, *I.MMS. 80/3473* (27.08.1302/11.06.1885); BOA, *I.MMS. 80/3473* (19.10.1302/01.08.1885).

²⁷ BOA, *I.MMS.80/3473* (28.08.1302/11.07.1885).

²⁸ Grant 2002: 23.

²⁹ Kössler 1981: 121.

³⁰ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 140.

1877-78 war, there were 590 field guns among the army in Europe.’³¹ The British Military Attaché also shared with his government some information concerning the guns ordered by the Ottomans. However, the information he gave was not compatible with Krupp’s published list and also with a report submitted to the Sultan by Ali Saib Pasha, the *Serasker* (1886-1891).³²

Table 3.6: Ottoman Artillery (Guns and Mortars) ordered from the Krupp company

Calibre (cm)	Number given by the British Military Attaché*		Number given by the Krupp company**	Number reported by Ali Saib Pasha***
35.5	7	} 50 steel projectiles to be supplied with each gun.	7	7
24	35		32	32
12	20	} Mortars	20	
15	10		20	
25	20		20	
8.7	1,000	Field guns	793	793
7.5	100	Field guns (light)	59	59
Total	1,192		951	891

Sources: *Turkey: Coast Defences & c. in Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1889, in: NA, London: ADM 231/14: 30; ** For (1885+1886), in: *Verzeichnis der von der Gußstahlfabrik und vom Grusonwerk von 1847 bis 1912 gefertigten Kanonen*, in: HA, Krupp, 5a VII f. 862: 44a; and see also: *Bestellungen bei F.K. in den Jahren 1875-1887*, in: HA, Krupp, WA 4/749; *** without mortars, in: BOA, *Y.MTV.29/102* (25.04.1305/10.01.1888).

According to the *Mübâya‘ât-ı Mühimme Defteri*, the final agreement was signed on August 1, 1885, and was modified on January 30, 1886, with an order for other materials.³³ As was noted in the *Mübâya‘ât-ı Mühimme Defteri*, payment for the ordered artillery materials (guns and ammunition) was to have been completed within three years (by August 1888) and the total cost of the first contracts to the Ottoman Treasury amounted to 555,283 OL,³⁴ whereas together with the contracts signed on

³¹ Grant 2002: 23.

³² Ali Saib Pasha was the *Serasker* between 1886 and 1891. Şakir 1957: 93-94.

³³ BOA, *I.MMS.82/3533*; BOA, *Y.A.HUS 486/9: Mübâya‘ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:2).

³⁴ BOA, *Y.A.HUS486/9: Mübâya‘ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:1). See also: BOA, *Y.PRK.ML.7/29* (18.11.1304/08.08.1887).

January 30, 1886, and March 26, 1887, the total amount owing to Krupp reached 1,108,213.94 OL (20,446,547 Marks).³⁵

For the Ottoman Government payment was not easy to manage, especially when it was drawing on only the regular state sources. To meet the instalments, the *Meclîs-i Vükelâ* had decided to apply for financial support from the Ottoman Bank on August 6, 1885.³⁶ Even so, the financial difficulties faced by the Ottoman Empire forced the Sublime Porte to take steps to find other sources in both 1886 and 1887.³⁷ Even in 1888, the Ottoman Government was struggling to find a source to make the instalment payments. As a matter of fact, to find the proper source to finance the war material procurement became a matter of the Empire's honour. According to a document signed by Süreyya Pasha, 'in order to protect the state's honour' the advance payment intended for the mining contract in Bulgar-dağı in 1888 was instead dedicated to the payment of the German firm's claims.³⁸

As stated above, Krupp had sent a set of alluring pictures of the newly-developed guns to the Sultan in 1883. By employing that strategy, he proved to have anticipated that the Sultan would act decisively in favour of the German products. At the time, Abdülhamid was conscious of the inferior quality of the Ottoman-made artillery materials. In a dictated document, the Sultan poked fun at the products of the *Tophâne-i Âmire* with the following clear expression: 'As for our guns' shells, they are so far from reaching their targets among the enemy's army that it would seem they

³⁵ BOA, *Y.MTV.29/102* (25.04.1305/10.01.1888) See the Appendix 3.3; BOA, *Y.A.HUS 486/9: Mübâya'ât-ı Mühimme Defteri (HH 26363:2)*. Griffiths gave the total amount paid to the Krupp Company as 1,206,987 OL. Griffiths 1966: 69.

³⁶ BOA, *MV. 4/53* (24.10.1302/06.08.1885).

³⁷ BOA, *MV. 5/76* (15.01.1303/24.10.1885); BOA, *A.MKT.MHM 490/6* (19.07.1303/23.04.1886).

³⁸ BOA, *I.DH.1295.5.102347* (11.05.1305/25.01.1888).

were meant for no other purpose than setting off a firework show for the purpose of welcoming the enemy'.³⁹

Furthermore, Friedrich Alfred Krupp (1854-1902), who took over the leadership of the Krupp company after his father Alfred Krupp (1812-1887) died in 1887, also was in confident expectation that the German military mission would support German commercial interests in the Ottoman market. On this occasion, however, the procured contracts were the result of a joint effort of the GAFs and GMAs particularly Goltz Pasha, who was the most prominent figure in the operation.⁴⁰ Krupp's expectation was fulfilled. Fundamentally, Goltz Pasha struggled to persuade the Sultan to fortify the Straits against a possible Russian threat. Griffiths also asserted that Goltz was of the opinion that an enemy who could seize the Straits would not only occupy the capital, but 'split the Ottoman forces which were divided between Europe and Asia'.⁴¹ At first Abdülhamid II was not in favour of such an action which could, according to him, provoke the Russians. In fact, Abdülhamid II was against any possible initiative which could create greater uncertainty and instability in his empire's relationship with Russia. Some of Goltz's other suggestions, for instance manoeuvres and field exercises, were not realised and it was mainly because of the Sultan's perception of stability within the region.⁴²

Following Goltz Pasha's fortification strategy and related advice, however, the Ottoman Government, in 1885, ordered in total 517 artillery weapons, and that was followed by an order for 440 guns in 1886. Krupp's total artillery sales to the Ottoman Empire from 1861 onwards reached 2,773 pieces by the end of 1886. Goltz's contribution to the mentioned procurement process was clearly mentioned by the

³⁹ BOA, *Y.EE.106/18* (02.01.1301/03.11.1883). See also Chapter V: 256.

⁴⁰ Grant 2002: 23.

⁴¹ Griffiths 1966: 68.

⁴² Demirhan 1960: 17.

Denkwürdigkeiten's authors. According to them, 'His [Goltz's] incessant pressure [*unausgesetzten Drängen*] succeeded in 1885 to prompt the order of a number of heavy guns, the heaviest for the Dardanelles, at the firm of Friedrich Krupp in Essen'.⁴³

As the British Military Attaché rightly noticed, through the above-mentioned orders a great advance had been made 'in the remodelling of the defences of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus'.⁴⁴ The first coastal-guns ordered in 1885 were delivered to the Golden Horn in March 1886 and mounted on the several coasts and forts.⁴⁵ The largest guns and some of the 24 cm guns were mounted for the Bosphorus and Dardanelles defence.⁴⁶

Goltz Pasha's special service to his fatherland was not restricted to coastal defence. Even the German ship-building industry had taken advantage of Goltz's ability to pressure the Ottoman Government. Within the concept of the strategy of Straits defence, to which Goltz Pasha's contribution was well known, the Ottoman Government ordered several torpedo boats from the Germania yards.⁴⁷ The justification provided by the Ministry of Marine's Hasan Pasha to the Sultan for the torpedo boats order was compatible with Goltz Pasha's perspective of the Ottoman defence strategy. Hasan Pasha's formulation was based on the possible threat from Russia and Greece against the Ottoman coasts, through their growing naval forces. Accordingly, Hasan Pasha's *tezkire* informed the Sultan that, on October 20, 1886, an agreement was signed

⁴³ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 124.

⁴⁴ 'Turkey: Coast Defences &c. in Europe, Asia, and Africa 1889', in: NA, London: ADM 231/14: 30.

⁴⁵ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.31/82* (28.05.1303/04.03.1886).

⁴⁶ The pictures in Appendix 3.4 (a-c) illustrate the construction and armament of Fort *Macar-kale*, which had been completely remodelled according to design of General Bluhm Pasha, a former German officer and a member of commission to inspect the Dardanelles, with Krupp guns. See 'Turkey: Coast Defences &c. in Europe, Asia, and Africa 1889', in: NA, London: ADM 231/14: 46.

⁴⁷ Goltz & Förster (eds.) 1929: 124-140; see also: Hallgarten 1935: 128-129: '*Mission des preussischen Generals von der Goltz den sich die Türken in den achtziger Jahren zur Reorganisation ihres Heeres vom deutschen Kaiser erbeten hatten, hatte zugleich der Aufgabe gedient, den Türken die Kanonen des Hauses Krupp in Essen aufzunötigen.*'

between the Ottoman Empire and the Germania yard for the torpedo boats.⁴⁸ To this end, in addition to Krupp's monopoly achievement in the Ottoman market from 1885 onwards, Germany also gradually came to be a dominating force in Ottoman naval purchases.⁴⁹

In fact, during these years the four principal German companies (*Germania*, *Schichau*, *Vulcan*, and *Howaldtswerke AG*) competed with each other for the Ottoman torpedo-related orders (chaser and boats). On September 13, 1886, George Howaldt, the director of the *Howaldtswerke AG*, sent the Ottoman Government a proposal in which he offered a lower price than his competitors. According to Howaldt's proposal, Schichau had offered OL 257,000, whereas Germania's first offer was OL 227,000. Following Howaldt's offer of OL 198,500, the Germania company cut their price to OL 195,000 which was followed by Howaldt's last offer of OL 185,000.⁵⁰ In the end, the contract was obtained by Germania and the agreement for 12 vessels was signed between the parties on October 20, 1886.⁵¹ The total amount scheduled for payment was 260,600 OL (4,808,070 Marks) and the first instalment (20,000 OL) was to be paid on November 20, 1886.⁵² The ordered vessels and their features were as follows:⁵³

1 x Length 70 m Torpedo- Chaser
1 x Length 57 m Torpedo- Chaser
1 x Length 43 m Torpedo Boat
9 x Length 39 m Torpedo Boat

According to British Captain Kane, during the negotiation process, however, *Baksheesh* was demanded 'by everyone... from the Minister of Marine downwards'.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.35/60* (21.01.1304/20.10.1886).

⁴⁹ Grant 2002: 28.

⁵⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.35/22* (14.12.1303/13.09.1886).

⁵¹ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.35/60* (21.01.1304/20.10.1886).

⁵² BOA, *Y.A.HUS.486/9: Mübâya 'ât-ı Mühimme Defteri (HH 26363:6)*; see also: BOA, *A.MKT.MHM.492/35* (29.01.1304/28-10-1886); 'Present and Prospective Ship Building of Foreign Nations 1886 (Turkey)', in: NA, London: ADM 231/10: 18

⁵³ Captain Henry C. Kane, 'Turkish Fleet and Dockyards 1886', in: NA, London: ADM 231/10:10.

⁵⁴ Captain Henry C. Kane, 'Turkish Fleet and Dockyards 1886', in: NA, London: ADM 231/10:10.

The Mauser Operations (1886-1903): Professional Team Work

“[Mahmud] Şevket [Pasha] is the right man; the others are working for your competitors.”
- *Goltz Pasha’s advice to Paul Mauser in 1886*⁵⁵

“Since I knew from my childhood that the Turks always wage war
... so I thought, that this can be a country to we deliver!”
*Paul Mauser*⁵⁶

When the German military mission entered Ottoman service they saw in the Ottoman arsenal only British - and American - made rifles. In 1877 the Ottoman Army had 396,172 Snider, 339,160 Peabody-Martini, and 9,370 Winchester rifles.⁵⁷ In fact, in August 1873 the Ottoman Government had decided to place an order with the American Providence Tool Company for 600,000 repeater rifles in the British Martini-Henry rifle system, which were called Peabody-Martini rifles.⁵⁸ According to an 1881 enumeration (inventory) of the war materials, however, there were recorded in the Ottoman arsenals among the other war materials 67,974 Martini-Henry; 23,613 Snider and 7,201 Winchester rifles as surplus rifles stored as *Tophâne-i ‘Âmire* and *Harbiye Nezâret-i Celîlesi Fazlası*.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in 1887 the existing number of rifles was given as 450,000 Henry-Martini, which were described by Ottoman officials as obsolete and useless [*işe yaramaz*].⁶⁰ Apparently, the good old days for the American

⁵⁵ Seel 1981/1: 800: ‘[Mahmud] Schefket [Pasha] ist der richtige Mann, die anderen stehen auf Seiten Ihrer Konkurrenten.’

⁵⁶ ‘Weil ich von Jugend an gewußt habe, daß die Türken immer Krieg führen ... so habe ich gedacht, das kann ein Land sein, wohin wir liefern!’ Cited in Seel 1981/1: 800.

⁵⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.1/25 (22.04.1294 /24.06.05.1877).

⁵⁸ In October 1872, the initial order was 200,000 rifles. BOA, IMMS. 44/1827 (12.08.1289/ 15.10.1872) However, in May 1873 the order was increased to 500,000. BOA, LDH.667/46434 (23.03.1290/21.05.1873); finally, in August 1873 the Ottoman government had decided to order a further 100,000 rifles and thus, the final amount reached to 600,000. BOA, A.MKT.MHM.462/38 (01.07.1290/25.08.1873); According to Colonel Lennox, the British Military Attaché, 280, 000 of the ordered rifles were delivered on January 11, 1877. Colonel Lennox to Charge d’affaires / Constantinople, 13.02.1877, in: NA, London: WO 106/2.

⁵⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.KOM.3/18 (20.09.1298/10.08.1881): *Tophâne-i ‘Âmire fazlası + Tersâne-i ‘Âmire fazlası*. Cf. Chapter III: 127-129.

⁶⁰ BOA, Y.A.RES.36/17 (19.04.1304/15.01.1887): ‘Zîrâ elyevm ancak dört yüz elli bin [450,000] Martini tüfek bulunduğundan ve muhârebe vukû’u hâlinde muvâki’-i harbiyeye bu mikdârdan ziyâde sevk olunmak lâzım-ı der-kâr olduğundan ‘Asâkir-i Şâhâne yedine hiç bir işe yaramayan Şınayder [Snider] ve Vençester [Winchester] tüfenkleri verilmesi zarûrîdir eğer karşumuza çıkacak düşman

and British rifle companies in the Ottoman market had gone; stocks of new rifles would come from the new favourite ally: Germany.

On May 2, 1886, an important meeting took place in Frankfurt am Main involving three prominent German rifle producers: Paul Mauser, Ludwig Loewe and his brother Isidor met in the Frankfurter Hof.⁶¹ The agenda of the meeting was the news that the Ottoman Government intended to place a large rifle order (for 400,000 weapons of the Peabody-Martini system). The information about the Ottoman order was most probably provided by the Huber Brothers, who were at that time representing in İstanbul the British steel maker Continental Steel Works, based in Sheffield, whose owner, Joseph Jonas (1845-1921), was an industrialist born in Germany.⁶² Before Paul Mauser was furnished with this information, however, Jonas sent a letter to the Loewe company with regard to Huber's report about the Sultan's decision and asked whether they would be interested in the Ottoman business or not. Following this letter, Loewe invited Mauser to meet and negotiate in Frankfurt.⁶³ Thus, on May 2, 1886, they came together in the Frankfurter Hof.⁶⁴

During the meeting, as a suitable business policy, the possibility of obtaining a contract from the Ottoman Government was discussed, but instead of competing – as they had done until then – they agreed to a joint business arrangement. According to the proposal, if a contract was to come into existence, it would be signed under the name of Mauser. Based on this agreement, the entire contract was to be named under Mauser's company. However, in 1889, after they had obtained a contract, the Loewe company bought the shares belonging to Alfred Kaulla (1833-1899), the Director of the

askerinin elinde mükerrer atışlı tüfenk bulunacak olursa böyle Henri [Henry] Martini gibi gayri mükerrer ve gayri muntazam tüfenklerle mukâbele etmek mahâl olduğu derce-i vuzûhdadır.'

⁶¹ *Abschrift von der Versammlung*, 02.05.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A3. See the Appendix 3.5.

⁶² Seel 1993/1: 43-47.

⁶³ Paul Mauser's notebook is mentioned in: Seel 1993/1: 45.

⁶⁴ *Abschrift von der Versammlung*, 02.05.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A3.

Württembergische Vereinsbank at Stuttgart, and consequently Paul Mauser lost the majority shareholding in his own company.⁶⁵ According to this initial agreement, the price for a rifle without bayonet would be 60 Marks (325 *Kuruş*), including the freight cost and the 9% commission for the representative at İstanbul (Huber Brothers: August and Joseph Huber). As was determined at the conference, four weeks after the meeting Mauser would send a 9.5 mm rifle to the Ottoman Empire and then they would wait for an invitation from İstanbul.

After the *İrade* issued in November 1886 for the new recruitment regulation, Sultan Abdülhamid gave Goltz the directive to contact the German rifle makers: Paul Mauser from Oberndorf/Neckar and Isidor Loewe from Berlin. On November 5, 1886, however, Paul Mauser had already left for London on an unsuccessful mission to sell his newly-developed 9.5 mm calibre repeating rifle to the British Government.⁶⁶ On November 13, 1886, Alfred Kaulla sent a letter to London, expecting that Mauser was still there, suggesting that before going to İstanbul he should come to Berlin and discuss some crucial points with regard to the joint business in the Ottoman market.⁶⁷ At that time Kaulla was the director of the *Württembergischen Vereinsbank*, the largest shareholder of the Mauser company, but at the same time the Mauser company's Business Manager.⁶⁸

But Mauser was not in London on November 13, 1886. On hearing that the Ottoman Government had finally issued instructions for a trial test of the rifles, he had immediately left London for İstanbul on November 12 and travelled via Oberndorf to İstanbul, where he would gain the greatest achievements in the history of his company.

⁶⁵ Seel 1986: 37-38.

⁶⁶ Haßler & Bihl (eds.) 1938: 89.

⁶⁷ Kaulla to Mauser 13.11.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A3.

⁶⁸ Following the agreement of partnership signed on April 1 1884, the Bank took over the 1,666 shares, whereas Paul Mauser had the remaining 334. Speed et al. 1997: 27; Haßler & Bihl (eds.) 1938: 89; see also: Seel 1981/1: 802.

Furthermore, before Mauser and Loewe arrived there, an initial proposal and a telegram code also had been prepared and sent by Loewe to Kaulla.⁶⁹ After accomplishing the relevant correspondence between the two companies (Loewe and Mauser) and Alfred Kaulla, on November 22, 1886, Paul Mauser arrived in İstanbul and stayed there till February 15, 1887, after which he came back to Oberndorf on February 19, 1886.⁷⁰

One of the most interesting features of Mauser's first appearance on the stage of the Ottoman war business was the establishment of an encoded list of ciphered identifications and specifications. Within their first days in İstanbul, Paul Mauser and Isidor Loewe agreed with August Huber on a list of codes which included the all fundamental determinants of the negotiations and critical terms that the parties could use during the negotiation process.⁷¹ As the table below illustrates, almost all the related persons who would take part in the arms trade were encoded.

Table 3.7: Names and their Encrypted Codes (in November 1886)

Name	Code	Name	Code
Abdülhamid II	<i>Ernst</i>	Mauser	<i>Robert</i>
The Ottoman Ministry of War	<i>Franz</i>	Kaulla	<i>Vicco</i>
The Ottoman Ministry of Finance	<i>Carl</i>	Loewe	<i>Max</i>
Goltz Pasha	<i>Friedrich</i>	Huber	<i>Anton</i>
The Ottoman Ambassador /Berlin	<i>Paul</i>	Werndl	<i>Georg</i>
The German Ambassador /İstanbul	<i>Wilhelm</i>	Azarian	<i>Bruder</i>
The German Foreign Office	<i>Otto</i>	Menshausen	<i>Eduard</i>
Deutsche Bank	<i>Koch</i>	Schulhof	<i>Peter</i>
Bleichröder/ Berlin	<i>Julius</i>	Garbrecht	<i>Christoph</i>
The Imperial <i>İrade</i>	<i>Rechnung</i>	Kühn	<i>August</i>
Schriever, Lüttich	<i>Gustav</i>	Derviş Pasha	<i>Alfred</i>
J.C.Jul. Möller	<i>Agent</i>	Hobe Pasha	<i>Heinrich</i>

Source: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

It is a matter of record that, the names listed in the table included all the key determinants of the German Style of War Business engaged in the Ottoman market:

⁶⁹ Loewe to Kaulla 18.11.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

⁷⁰ Kaulla to Mauser, 22.11.1886, in: Oberndorf: M-A3; Seel 1993/1:45; Seel 1981/1: 802.

⁷¹ *Depeschen Schlüssel für Constantinopel zwischen Aug. Huber & C. Constantinopel einerseits und Ludw. Loewe & Co. Berlin und Waffenfabrik Mauser, Oberndorf anderseits*, [22-23] November 1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

Abdülhamid II (*Ernst*) was the final decision-maker and his *İrade* (*Rechnung* - invoice) was the most expected document by the German arms dealer; *Deutsche Bank* (*Koch*) and also Bismarck's reliable banker Bleichröder (*Julius*) were the important financial factors to finalise the purchasing process; Goltz Pasha (*Friedrich*) was the man who had smoothly oriented the German arms dealers in the Ottoman market; also Azarian the agent of the American rifle firms,⁷² although he was encrypted as *Bruder* - Brother, was definitely one of the most powerful competitors of Mauser (*Robert*) and his agent Huber (*Anton*); Derviş Pasha (*Alfred*), the head of the test commission, was another important figure who was described by the British Ambassador as 'a very corrupt and dangerous man';⁷³ the German Foreign Office (*Otto*), which proved to also be an influential and supportive instrument for the German firms' war business abroad was encoded as Otto, most probably after the first name of the factual leader of German foreign policy: Otto von Bismarck, who was also involved in his fellow citizens' war business in the Ottoman Empire at the very beginning of the negotiations.⁷⁴ In brief, the establishment of a secret language to be used between the agent (Huber) and the firms (Mauser and Loewe) emerged as an effective and protective marketing tool that was applied by its architects in their Ottoman business.

On his second day in İstanbul, Mauser met Goltz Pasha and Kamphövener Pasha. Through Goltz Pasha's mediation, Mauser was able to participate in the test, in which the Belgian-Mauser, Mannlicher, Martini-Henry, and Hotchkiss had also been trialled.⁷⁵ Paul Mauser wrote about his first day in İstanbul and the first test as follows:

I arrived on November 22 at 10 o'clock and was immediately led into the [Yıldız] palace where the negotiations soon began. Through the intervention [*Einwirken*] of the German officers, particularly Mr

⁷² See Chapter V: 282.

⁷³ White to Salisbury 14.01.1891, in: NA. London: FO 78/4342.


⁷⁴ See Chapter I: 50.

⁷⁵ Seel 1981/1: 800.

Goltz Pasha and Kamphövener, it was possible to immediately join in the tests.⁷⁶

As a matter of fact, Goltz's presence in İstanbul and - above all - his authority established among the Ottoman military circle provided to the German armaments firms a series of conveniences and opportunities that the others did not share.⁷⁷ However, Goltz Pasha was well aware of the impact of his influential position on the finalisation of the purchasing processes. In his memoir, he indicated that: 'I can claim that without my [intervention] the modernisation of the [Ottoman] Army with the German rifles would never have happened'.⁷⁸ Goltz was not wrong. As is illustrated through the following figure, Goltz Pasha as a non-commercial factor played a very determinant role in the process.

Figure 3.1: Mauser's Entrance into the Ottoman Market 1886/87



⁷⁶ Seel 1993/1: 45; see also: Häbler & Bihl (eds.) 1938: 90.

⁷⁷ King to Blaine, 24.12.1889, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/50; Memorandum by Colonel Chermiside, 25.05.1893, in: NA, London: FO 78/4479.

⁷⁸ Cited in Seel 1981/1: 800.

Test-shooting began on December 8, 1886. Goltz Pasha's influential position and assistance made an appearance during the very first test. On that day, Goltz Pasha gave Paul Mauser critical advice relating to the particulars of doing business in the Ottoman Empire: establish close relations with the right person. According to Goltz Pasha, the right person for Mauser's business interest in the Ottoman Empire was Mahmud Şevket Bey (later Pasha) who was also present at the test as an observer. 'Şevket is the right person' uttered Goltz Pasha to Mauser, adding 'the others are working for your competitors'.⁷⁹ Goltz's instincts and experience were not misdirected. During the negotiation Mahmud Şevket (later Pasha) and Goltz Pasha struggled for Mauser's supremacy – with a team spirit - against the *Serasker* Ali Saib Pasha, who was inclined to purchase the Austrian-made Mannlicher rifles.⁸⁰ Consequently, the Goltz-Mahmud collaboration worked well and the Mauser company was awarded the contract which was obviously one of the first triumphs that paved the way to the Germanisation of the Ottoman Army.

While the test was continuing, some German officers employed in the Ottoman service discussed whether it was permissible to sell to a foreign army a rifle which was initially developed only for the German army and was a state secret.⁸¹ However, according to Goltz, these discussions were not serving Germany but only aiding Mauser's competitors, who were claiming that the rifle tested in İstanbul was not identical to the rifle used in the German Army, which was a secret.⁸² In fact, the claims mentioned by the competitors created suspicion in Yıldız Palace about Mauser's reliability. However, this unfortunate circumstance for Mauser had fully proved the sagacity of Goltz's advice to Mauser given on the day of the test: 'Now everyone will

⁷⁹ Cited in Seel 1981/1: 800.

⁸⁰ See Chapter V: 274-276.

⁸¹ Seel 1981/1: 800

⁸² Goltz to Schellendorf 13.12.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

want to be your friends, but be very careful, and beware of doing business with any of them, even if they are Germans. You need no one'.⁸³ Furthermore, this event proved at the same time that Goltz Pasha was an exceptional German officer who was more aware than the other Germans of the political and economic consequences of obtaining such a large order. Therefore, Goltz Pasha took immediate action to get a written notification sent by the German Minister of War either to him or to Paul Mauser, that would declare that the rifle submitted to the Sultan was identical to the rifles used in the German Army.

With this declaration Goltz Pasha hoped to basically eliminate the suspicions that had arisen through the above-mentioned statements. In a letter dated December 13, 1886, five days after the first test took place, Goltz emphasised the significance of the expected notification from the Prussian Minister of War, Von Schellendorf. Goltz Pasha believed this peculiar circumstance could easily thwart the procurement process of the Mauser magazine-rifle. A contract was highly desired by the German industry, particularly after the significant increase in the size of the Ottoman Army which had been brought about by the new recruitment law, mostly engineered by Goltz himself.⁸⁴ Ultimately, the supportive notification from Berlin for the Mauser rifle arrived in İstanbul and following this declaration one of the most important obstacles had been eliminated. The Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, Tevfik Pasha, had communicated with the Prussian Minister of War and also with Bismarck, who gave the same information and praised the Mauser rifles.⁸⁵

Presumably, the rifle, which was submitted by Paul Mauser, was not the best rifle but it was definitely the best marketed rifle for which the following powerful

⁸³ Cited in Seel 1981/1: 800.

⁸⁴ Goltz to Schellendorf 13.12.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

⁸⁵ BOA, *Y.MTV.29/19* (13.01.1305/31.10.1887).

figures lobbied vigorously: German Chancellor Bismarck, Prussian Minister of War von Schellendorf, Goltz Pasha, Kamphövener Pasha, Abdülhamid's first secretary Süreyya Pasha, Mahmud Şevket Bey and Ragıb Bey who would be included in the team after the agreement was signed.⁸⁶

Goltz Pasha's relations with Mahmud Şevket Pasha and his influence on both the Mauser operation of 1887 and subsequent operations deserve further mention. As stated above, Goltz Pasha gave Paul Mauser reliable advice to establish good and close relations with Mahmud Şevket, who Goltz Pasha had already chosen as a trustworthy pupil and friend. Goltz Pasha wrote a paper in 1913 about Mahmud Şevket Pasha, where he noted Mahmud Şevket Pasha's contribution to Goltz's endeavours in the military commission against the Austrian firm Mannlicher, which was actually Mauser's only serious rival and was supported by the *Serasker*.⁸⁷

Finally, on February 6, 1887, the Sultan issued an Imperial *İrâde* approving the purchase of rifles from the Mauser company.⁸⁸ After long negotiation, on February 9, 1887, the contract for 500,000 rifles (M/1887: 9.5 mm) and 50,000 carbines (M/1887: 9.5x60 mm) was signed between the Ottoman Government and the Mauser/Loewe partnership.⁸⁹ On the day of the signing, the Ottoman Government prepared a proposal relating to the conditions of prices, delivery and payments.⁹⁰ Mauser and Loewe were to share the contractual obligations; nevertheless, as Ball notes, it turned out that Loewe's share eventually went to the Mauser company.⁹¹ At the outset of the negotiation, the unit price of the Mauser rifle (without bayonet) was 365 *Kuruş* but, later on, by intervention of the Sultan, Mauser made a 2 *kuruş*

⁸⁶ See Chapter V: 283-287.

⁸⁷ Von der Goltz, C. F. 1913: 32-46. See also: Swanson 1975: 372. For Mahmud Şevket Pasha's contribution and Pro-Mauser acts and speeches during the commission meeting see Chapter V: 274-276.

⁸⁸ *The [London] Times*: 07.02.1887.

⁸⁹ BOA, Y.A.HUS.486/9: *Mübâya'ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:7).

⁹⁰ BOA, Y.A.RES.37/2 (03.06.1304/27.02.1887).

⁹¹ Ball 2006: 359.

reduction in the unit price.⁹² The total value of this contract was 1,996,500 OL (36,835,425 Marks).⁹³

Four days later, the Sultan awarded Paul Mauser an Imperial Order of *Mecîdiye (Nişânı)* for his long-standing exceptional services, which were not actually defined or detailed in the document.⁹⁴ On February 15, 1887, Paul Mauser departed from İstanbul with a contract valued at nearly 37 million Marks.⁹⁵ As Grant has also noted, in placing this order the Ottoman Army became the first army to acquire the Mauser rifle in any significant quantity.⁹⁶

The contract included three important requirements which Paul Mauser defined as ‘big risks’ for him.⁹⁷ These three provisions obliged Mauser to inform the Ottoman Government of any rifle improvement patented by him during the contract period.⁹⁸ The second important condition of the Ottoman Empire was that if the German Army was to adopt a new rifle during the course of the Ottoman delivery, the Ottoman Empire had the right to demand Mauser to complete the contract with the new model.⁹⁹ The third critical provision was a restriction for the Mauser manufactory. Thus, during the time the company was producing for the Ottoman Army, it would not undertake orders from any other country.¹⁰⁰ These could be accepted as big risks for the Mauser company and advantages for the Ottoman

⁹² BOA, *Y.A.RES.37/2* (05.05.1304/30.01.1887): ‘[...] *Mösyö Mavzer ve şerîki âhiren taraf-ı eşrâf hazret-i padişâhîden vukû’ bulan teklif üzerine beher tüfenk için kararlaştırılan 365 kuruşdan ikişer kuruş tenzîline dahî muvaffâkiyet eylemeleriyle [...].*’ Grant gives the unit price of a single Mauser rifle as 362 kuruş. Grant 2007: 83.

⁹³ BOA, *Y.A.HUS.486/9:Mübâya‘ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:7): 36,835,425 Marks (1 OL= 18.45 Marks): 1,815,000 for rifles; OL 181,500 for carbines.

⁹⁴ BOA, *I.DH.1019/80376* (19.05.1304/13.02.1887).

⁹⁵ Seel 1993/1:45; Seel 1981/1: 802.

⁹⁶ Grant 2007: 83.

⁹⁷ Seel 1981/1: 801.

⁹⁸ Olson 1976: 37; Speed et al. 1997: 28.

⁹⁹ Olson 1976: 37.

¹⁰⁰ Speed et al. 1997: 28.

Empire.¹⁰¹ In 1890, the Ottoman Government took advantage of these conditions by demanding that Mauser halt the delivery of this model (cal. 9.5 mm.) and complete the contract with a new developed one (cal. 7.65 mm.).¹⁰²

Although nearly two weeks passed after the issue of the *Îrâde*, the Ottoman Government was unable to make the deposit payment to Paul Mauser; the terms were set at 20 per cent on the date of signing the contract and the remainder on delivery. According to *The [London] Times*, Herr Mauser was therefore very angry and threatening to leave İstanbul. A new Finance Minister came into office and cut short the negotiations in progress for a loan; the money needed was not to be had, so the contract could not be finalised because funds were lacking to pay the one-fifth deposit. However, at that juncture Abdülhamid's personal intervention took centre stage. The Sultan invited Paul Mauser and the German Ambassador, Von Radowitz, to dinner and a short delay was probably arranged then.¹⁰³ The only way to overcome the existing financial difficulty was foreign borrowing.¹⁰⁴ Apparently, when Mauser left İstanbul he had in his hand the contract and a medal given by the Sultan – but not the money that he had expected.¹⁰⁵

The contract to buy the rifles produced another headache for the Ottoman Government. In March 1887, being conditional on the previous decision, the Government had to find a factory to which the cartridge and powder order could be awarded. The contract in question would involve 150,000 chests of cartridges. This issue had been discussed in a commission established in the Ministry of War (*Seraskerlik*) in March 1887. The commission's first inclination was to give the contract to the Lorenz company which had a technical superiority over their

¹⁰¹ See also pages 159-160 below.

¹⁰² Olson 1976: 37.

¹⁰³ *The [London] Times*: 19.02.1887.

¹⁰⁴ BOA, *Y.A.RES.*37/2 (03.06.1304/27.02.1887).

¹⁰⁵ BOA, *İ.DH.1019/80376* (19.06.1304/13.02.1887).

competitors (Mauser/Loewe) and long-term experience in cartridge manufacturing.¹⁰⁶ However, even though they lacked any experience in this field, Mauser/Loewe also desired to obtain the contract to provide the required cartridges. On the day after the commission meeting, Kamphövener Pasha submitted to the *Serasker* a report in which he gave obvious support to the Mauser/Loewe partnership.¹⁰⁷

However, Serasker Ali Saib Pasha, by his appearance onto the stage, struggled to prevent the monopoly position of any single company. He intended to use his ministerial power as an insurmountable obstacle to any foreign attempt to monopolise the Ottoman market. Therefore, his defiance was based on a way that was consistent with his future arguments as well: on the criticism of the Government's inclination towards a certain company without undertaking any crucial comparative testing of the products. In his belief, there had to be sufficient opportunity for all to compete. During the cartridge purchasing negotiations in the *Meclîs-i Mahsûsa*, he opposed the purchase of the cartridges from the Mauser/Loewe companies, while the rifles and carbines were being ordered from them. Departing from this point, he recommended purchasing from another German firm, the Lorenz company (*Deutsche Metallpatronenfabrik Lorenz*).¹⁰⁸ His key argument against the Mauser/Loewe partnership was their lack of experience in cartridge production.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ BOA, MV.18/10 (17.06.1304/13.03.1887).

¹⁰⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.6/21 (18.06.1304/14.03.1887): 'Mavzer ve şürekâsı fabrikasının fişenk i 'mâl edebilecek bir hâlde bulunup bulunmadığından komisyon mukaddemâ hakkıyla şüphe etmiş idi. Şimdiki hâlde Almanya Harbiye Nâzırı mezkûr fabrikanın iktidârını tasdik etmiş olmakla mes'ele yalnız paraya münhasır kalmıştır. Mavzer ve şürekâsı fabrikasıyla Lorenz fabrikasının fiyatları beyninde büyük bir fark olmadığı hâlde barutunun zâhir olan evsâfî mes'elesine ve Almanya Harbiye nâzırının te'mînâtına binâ'en el-hâletü hâzihi taleb ettiği fiyatın daha ziyâde tenziline çalışılmak üzere Mösyö Mavzer ve şürekâsı fabrikası fişenklerinin iştirâsı taraflısı olduğumu 'arz eylerim.'

¹⁰⁸ BOA, Y.A.RES.37/34 (17.07.1304/ 11.04.1887): 'Devlet-i 'Aliye'nin bu fişenk mes'elesinde kaydi inhisâra girmeyip hangi fabrikanın matlûba muvâfık fişenk vereceğini bi't-tecrübe i'timâd hâsıl olur ise âna göre iktizâsının i'fâsı daha münâsib olacağından Mavzer ile Lorenz'den beşer sanduk fişenk celb olunarak tecârib-i fenniyelerinin icrâsıyla hangisinin rüchân ve ehveniyeti tebeyyün eder ise ânın mübâya'ası ...'

¹⁰⁹ BOA, Y.A.RES.37/34 (17.07.1304/ 11.04.1887): '...ve sûreti iş'âra nazaran Mösyö Mavzer ve şürekâsının şimdiye kadar tûfenge mahsûs fişenk kovarı i'mâl etmedikleri cihetle ilk tecrübeyi Devlet-i 'Aliye için yapacakları fişenklerde icrâ edeceklerine göre ve Lorenz fabrikasının ise Almanya'nın en

As Ali Saib Pasha argued, the truth was that Mauser/Loewe had no basic experience in producing cartridges, which was a big disadvantage for them against their major rivals, mainly the *Deutsche Metallpatronenfabrik Lorenz*.¹¹⁰ The offer made by Lorenz was, according to *Serasker* Ali Saib Pasha, acceptable from a technical point of view. Therefore, at first the commission decided to place an order with the Lorenz factory.¹¹¹ As Mauser was not capable of producing cartridges, he recommended Max von Duttenhofer, the director and owner of the Rottweil Powder Co. (hereafter Rottweil) to the Ottoman Government. The Rottweil factory had been working together with Mauser for a long time and was located in Rottweil, only 18 km away from Oberndorf – as Şakir Pasha reported, a mere 30-minute travel time from Mauser’s location in Oberndorf.¹¹²

Mauser/Loewe, as the government-supported arms makers, managed to turn their disadvantage to advantage by using an aggressive marketing strategy. A. Kaulla, as Mr Mauser’s company partner, submitted to the Sublime Porte a report defaming Lorenz as ‘an inferior cartridge maker’ (*Lorenz gibi ‘âdi bir kovancı*).¹¹³ While the *Meclîs-i Vükelâ* was discussing the issue, Isidor Loewe, Mauser’s business partner, did not stand idly by. With the support of A. Kaulla and the Mauser representative in İstanbul together with Max von Duttenhofer, he was trying to persuade Wilhelm Lorenz to give three-quarters of the contract to them (Duttenhofer and Loewe).¹¹⁴ Mauser, Loewe and Duttenhofer worked together against the Lorenz factory. However, as the best way to take a share of the Ottoman

eski fişenk fabrikalarından olmakla berâber gösterdiği şerâ’itin dahî inhisâr ve sâ’ire mahzûrundan sâlim ve teklîf eylediği fişenklerin nefâseti ve mükemmeliyet ve ehveniyeti fiyatça diğerine râcih görüldüğü izâh ve der-meyân olunmuşdur.’

¹¹⁰ Seel 1981/2: 977.

¹¹¹ BOA, *MV.18/10* (17.06.1304/13.03.1887).

¹¹² BOA, *Y.MTV.91/11* (18.08.1311/24.02.1894).

¹¹³ BOA, *Y.A.RES.39/50* (20.7.1304/14.04.1887).

¹¹⁴ Türk 2006: 107.

cartridge market, they insistently offered Lorenz a joint business venture. Aware of both their strong position in the market and their power in both the Berlin and İstanbul governments, Wilhelm Lorenz accepted their offer.¹¹⁵

Under this pressure, however, Lorenz was forced to sell his factory to Isidor Loewe in 1889, in consideration of the payment of 6,000,000 Marks.¹¹⁶ The ammunition delivery, which was started with Wilhelm Lorenz, continued after 1889 without him. Through this sale, Ali Saib Pasha's fears of monopolisation of the Ottoman military market became reality. Accordingly, on July 7, 1887, the final decision about the cartridges was read in the *Meclîs-i Vükelâ* and, consequently, the process of signing a contract between parties had been started.¹¹⁷ On July 11, 1887, the Ministers signed a protocol designed to finalise this exhausting process. In the protocol a note was made of the unification of the Lorenz factory by means of the Mauser/Loewe cooperation.¹¹⁸ Finally the contract was signed on September 20, 1887 (nine days after the official partnership was signed between the Mauser and the Rottweil companies) for 100 million cartridges with Mauser and his business partners (*Mavzer ve şürekâsı*). The total amount paid for the cartridges was 473,875 OL (nearly 9 million Marks), which was more than what Isidor Loewe had paid to buy out the Lorenz factory).¹¹⁹ As a matter of fact, since Abdülhamid did not allow the army to train with live ammunition¹²⁰, such a large cartridge procurement seems to be an extraordinary decision. As can be seen in Table 3.9c below, more than 60% of all the cartridges purchased between 1892 and 1904 were stored in the Imperial

¹¹⁵ Seel 1981/2: 966-977; Türk 2006: 118.

¹¹⁶ Türk 2006: 107.

¹¹⁷ BOA, MV.21/55 (15.10.1304/07.07.1887): '*Bâ-irâde-i seniye mübâya'ası takarrur eden Mavzer tüfenkleri için iştirâsı mutasavver olunan 150,000 sanduk fişengin Mösyö Mavzer ve şürekâsından mübâya'ası hakkında dâ'ire-i 'askeriyece kaleme alınan mazbata kırâ'at edildi.*'

¹¹⁸ BOA, YA.RES.38/23 (19.10.1304/11.07.1887).

¹¹⁹ BOA, YA.HUS.486/9: *Mübâya'ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:13).

¹²⁰ Uyar & Erickson 2009: 211.

Storehouse in *Gülhâne* for years.¹²¹ According to Goltz's report, sent to Paul Mauser, this fact - that the Ottoman Army rarely used live ammunition - had to be taken into consideration while marketing powder to the Ottoman Government.¹²²

Even while the cartridge supply was being organised, powder supply became another important matter of conflict among the competing firms. However, the German Government made a clear choice in favour of the Rottweil-Hamburg Powder Company. Bismarck intervened in the process and sent the Ottoman Empire an official letter written in support of the Rottweil company.¹²³ It changed the course of the whole process. Following Bismarck's letter, Von Radowitz also interfered in the marketing process. In all respects, Von Radowitz's letter, sent on April 21, 1887, also amounted to a recommendation for that firm: 'According to the information from very reliable source located in Berlin, the best powder for the ammunition used for the Mauser rifles is the powder produced by Mr Duttenhofer from Rottweil'.¹²⁴

However, Germany insistently continued to assert pressure on the matter of the powder until the Ottoman Government made a final decision. After it awarded the rifle order to the Mauser/Loewe companies, Goltz Pasha went to Germany following an audience at the Yıldız Palace with the Sultan on March 12, 1887.¹²⁵ During his stay in Berlin, he was received, as a reliable informant, by several important personalities, including Kaiser Wilhelm I and Bismarck. The Prussian Minister of War, Von Schellendorf, to whom, on December 13, 1886, Goltz Pasha had sent an influential

¹²¹ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.211/40* (01.11.1321/19.01.1904): see the Table 3.9c, page: 168.

¹²² Goltz to Mauser, 25.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹²³ BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.6/61* (19.04.1887.): See the Appendix 1.8; See Chapter I: 41-42.

¹²⁴ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.39/67* (27.07.1304/21.04.1887): '*Berlin'de en ziyâde me'zûniyet ve hükmü hâ'iz olan menâbi'den ahz eylediğim ma'lûmâta nazaran Mavzer usûlünde mükerrer atışlı tüfenklere mahsûs olan fişenlerde isti'mâl olunacak en ekmel barut Rotvayl'daki [Rottweil] Mösyö Duttenhofer'in [Max von Duttenhofer] i'mâl etmekte olduğu barut[dur].'*

¹²⁵ BOA, *Y.PRK.MYD.6/34* (14.08.1304/08.05.1887).

letter regarding Mauser's struggle for the Ottoman rifle contract,¹²⁶ also received Goltz Pasha and discussed with him the Ottoman military reform process. During the conversation the Minister asked for some information about the Sultan's purchasing decision for cartridges and powder. According to Goltz Pasha - as he wrote in his report that was submitted to the Sultan - Von Schellendorf was hoping that the decision would be made in favour of Mauser, Loewe and Duttonhofer. Goltz Pasha later recalled that the Minister put special emphasis on the qualification and competency in the matter of military equipment production of Mr Duttonhofer, the owner of the Rottweil Powder Company.¹²⁷ Presumably Goltz instructed the Minister with regard to the entire procurement process of which only the powder issue remained unresolved. It appears that supporting one of the GAFs' interests in the Ottoman market became a matter of State. However, this was the reality and the nature of the German Style of War Business. Menshausen, Krupp's influential agent (later to become the Director of the Krupp company) illustrates this in a very illuminating way. In a letter addressed to the *Unterstaatssekretär* Richthofen, Menshausen wrote: 'The question of who obtained the contract is a political question of power or a result of a political trading-business'.¹²⁸

However, contrary to what was written in the reports or letters praising the Rottweil powders as very advanced, Paul Mauser himself acknowledged that the tests were still continuing until November 1887 and basically he did not have a clear result confirming the efficiency (*Leistungsfähigkeit*) of the new powder produced in Rottweil. In his response to Goltz Pasha, Paul Mauser reported the results of the ongoing experiments: 'I will let the experiments taking place in Rottweil continue. Till

¹²⁶ Goltz to Schellendorf 13.12.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹²⁷ BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.6/34 (14.08.1304/08.05.1887): '... *bâ-husus Duttonhofer mühimmât meselelerinde ziyâdesiyle ehil ve erbâbdır.*'

¹²⁸ Menshausen to Richthofen 18.01.1898, in: PA. AA. R13291. See also Chapter I: 51-52.

this day I have heard of the report submitted to me that the performance of the new powder is not yet clear'.¹²⁹ Consequent to all the endeavours, the Ottoman Empire placed an order for the ammunition from the Lorenz company, which the Loewe company bought in 1889, with the powders from Rottweil and the rifles from the Mauser/Loewe co-operative. On September 11, 1887, the Loewe/Mauser partnership made an agreement with the Rottweil company to work in a close partnership.¹³⁰ In November 1887, when Goltz Pasha was informed of this partnership for the Ottoman market, he sent a letter to Paul Mauser and expressed his appreciation.¹³¹

While the powder issue was vociferously discussed in Ottoman military circles, a French firm also showed interest in the competition and sent powder samples to the Ottoman Empire to be tested. However, Goltz Pasha, as an open supporter of the German industrial interests, gathered confidential information about this French powder. As he wrote in a letter to Paul Mauser, he obtained the technical details of this powder from a reliable source (*aus sehr guter Quelle*). As has been stated above, Goltz Pasha played an essential role as mediator during the course of information flow from the Ottoman officers/officials to the German arms makers. His relations with the Ottoman officers and even with some bureaucrats gave him the opportunity to gain such critical information, which was obviously assumed to be secret. To all intents and purposes, Goltz's behaviour amounted to industrial espionage carried out for the sake of his fatherland's name and its industry.¹³² The last notification regarding the technical specification of the French powder Goltz Pasha noted that 'perhaps this message leaves you [Paul Mauser] in a position to

¹²⁹ Mauser to Goltz, 30.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹³⁰ Seel 1981/2: 977.

¹³¹ Goltz to Mauser, 25.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹³² See also Goltz Pasha's letter sent to Menshausen, Krupp's agent and later Director of the company: Goltz to Menshausen, 01.08.1891, in: HA, Krupp: FAH. 3B/216. See the Appendix 2.4.

determine to what extent a similar powder for our rifle has to be considered'.¹³³ In response, Mauser wrote: 'Your description for the French powder exactly matches with that I have now in my hand. I hope to write you on this matter even more'.¹³⁴

Compared with the fact that he wrote to Paul Mauser about the powder that 'as far as the chemical analysis has yet determined that the storage capacity of [this] powder is to be regarded as favourable'¹³⁵ one year later, he submitted to the Sultan a *layiha* in which he argued against the French powder's durability. Referring to documented [*mevsûk*] information from an (anonymous) competent person [*Erbâb-ı vukûfdan bir zât*], Goltz Pasha asserted that 'the French powder, the quality of which was exaggerated, was not as durable [*dayanıklı*] as desired'.¹³⁶

In addition to this kind of technical information Goltz Pasha brought Mauser up to date on other subjects including the payment status of the Ottoman Government for the rifles ordered and of some rumours circulated in Ottoman Government/military circles with regard to both the Mauser company itself and its products. In November 1887, for instance, when a rumour circulated in İstanbul saying that Paul Mauser would sell his company and give up his office, the Sultan instructed Goltz Pasha to ask Mauser if these rumours were true. For the purposes of verification, Goltz Pasha sent Mauser a telegram on November 23, 1887.¹³⁷ The following day, Mauser responded to Goltz's question decisively: 'The Mauser factory still exists and will definitely exist as till today. I am the head [of the

¹³³ Goltz to Mauser, 25.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8. See Appendix 3.7.

¹³⁴ Mauser to Goltz, 30.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8: '*Ihre Beschreibung über das französische Pulver, stimmt ganz genau mit dem mir inzwischen zu Gesicht gekommenen, und hoffe ich, Ihnen hierüber noch Näheres schreiben zu können.*'

¹³⁵ Goltz to Mauser, 25.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8: '*Soweit die chemische Untersuchungen dies bis jetzt hat feststellen können ist die Lagerungsfähigkeit des Pulvers als eine günstige zu betrachten*'

¹³⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.52/77 (29.04.1306/02.01.1889): '*Erbâb-ı vukûfdan bir zât tarafından ahz eylediğim ma'lûmat-ı mevsûkaya nazaran evsâf-ı fevka'l-âdesi kemâl-i mübâlâğa ile i'zâm edilen Fransız barutunun matlûb derecede dayanıklı olmadığı sûret-i kat'iyede tebeyyün etmiştir.*'

¹³⁷ Goltz to Mauser, 23.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

company] and I will be remaining on the top'.¹³⁸ However, one month later, on December 28, 1887, Isidor Loewe took over a major share of the Mauser company and consequently Paul Mauser lost his position as the major shareholder. Despite this takeover, the rifle contract remained under the name of Paul Mauser, as the firm's Executive Director.¹³⁹ The change did not affect Mauser's Ottoman business negatively.

However, the real challenge facing Paul Mauser was the Ottomans' inability to make payment on the contracted date. Mauser's agent, August Huber, therefore visited the Ottoman Ministry of Finance several times to seek payment.¹⁴⁰ For this purpose, Abdülhamid's private secretary, Ragıb Bey, sent a private letter to Paul Mauser and explained the reason for this default as the 'lack of money in the State Treasury' (*der Geldmangel, an welchem die kaiserliche Schatzkammer leidet*). In his letter, Ragıb Bey also tried to reassure Mauser: 'Currently the work is done with the best will to pay you as soon as possible in order to obtain your wonderful rifles earlier. Do not let yourself be discouraged, but continue to work with your usual energy.'¹⁴¹

As it turned out, only six months after the contract had been signed the Ottoman Government became able to pay the first instalment. The 'bearer of joyful tidings' for the Mauser company was Goltz Pasha. In a letter dated November 22, 1887, Goltz Pasha wrote that at least 100,000 OL (1,845,000 Marks) was ready for payment.¹⁴² However, three days later Goltz Pasha sent Paul Mauser another letter through which he expressed his regret that because of financial difficulties the

¹³⁸ Mauser to Goltz, 24.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8: '*Die Waffenfabrik Mauser besteht und wird bestehen wie bisher. Ich bin und bleibe an der Spitze derselben.*'

¹³⁹ Undated: *Abschrift*, Waffenfabrik Mauser, Oberndorf, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A6; *Haßler & Bihl (eds.) 1938: 91*

¹⁴⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.13/41* (27.10.1305/07.07.1888).

¹⁴¹ Ragıb to Mauser 17.10.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A3.

¹⁴² Goltz to Mauser, 22.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

Ottoman rifle orders could not be handled quickly; as a consequence, Goltz Pasha forewarned him that by accepting a delivery order from the Ottoman Government he could experience embarrassment from the payment point of view.¹⁴³ Nonetheless, in July 1888, Goltz received a letter from Mauser which referred to the payment problems.¹⁴⁴ It is a matter of record that during the course of the order-delivery process, similar problems occurred again and again.

After many debates, discussions and revisions, finally, in December 1887, the first manufactured rifles were ready for test-firing; consequently, on May 30, 1888, ‘the first railroad car loaded with 1,305 rifles began its journey’ towards the Harbour.¹⁴⁵ The first group (*kâfile*) of rifles arrived in İstanbul on June 17, 1888, transported by a ship called *Jupiter*.¹⁴⁶ By January 30, 1889, even though the rifles were still being manufactured and despite the 36,400 Mauser M/87 cal. 9.5 mm rifles already stored in the Imperial Arsenal (*Silah-hâne*), discussions in Ottoman military circles about the features of the Mauser rifle did not come to an end.¹⁴⁷ Even in November 1887, as Goltz Pasha reported to Paul Mauser, the Ottoman Military Commission was inclined to alter the contract to switch from the M/87:9.5mm model to the newly-developed, smaller-calibre rifle (M/87:8mm), which had actually failed during its test-firing.¹⁴⁸ The complaints most commonly articulated about the Mauser rifle related to its calibre and the powder used for it. Against these complaints, Goltz Pasha submitted to the Sultan several reports rejecting the claims and praising the

¹⁴³ Goltz to Mauser, 25.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁴⁴ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.13/41* (22.10.1305/02.07.1888).

¹⁴⁵ Speed et al. 1997: 29.

¹⁴⁶ BOA, *Y.MTV.34/11* (08.11.1305/17.07.1888).

¹⁴⁷ BOA, *Y.A.HUS.486/9: Mübâya‘ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:8); see also: BOA, *Y.MTV. 34/11* (08.11.1305/17.07.1888).

¹⁴⁸ Goltz to Mauser, 25.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8; for the outcomes of the test-firing and other experiments for the M/87:8mm; see also: Speed et al. 1997: 30.

M/87:9.5mm rifle.¹⁴⁹ In January 1889, in one of his reports, Goltz Pasha admitted that the decision in favour of the Mauser rifle was not made unanimously; however, he specifically reminded the Sultan that the contract decision was final and irreversible. After this reminder, he asserted that ‘I certainly guarantee that even until today there are no rifles superior to these [Mauser] rifles [M/87:9.5mm].’¹⁵⁰ While Goltz Pasha was struggling to orientate the Sultan to only the M/87:9.5mm, at the same time he was asking Paul Mauser provide him with the test results of the new Belgian Model/89:7.65mm.¹⁵¹

Serasker Ali Saib Pasha was, however, the foremost person who kept criticising the Mauser rifle and comparing it with the Austrian-Mannlicher rifle.¹⁵² As a consequence of these debates, which were based on several points of dissatisfaction with the Mauser rifles, and the news that Mauser had developed a new rifle (in a smaller-calibre of 7.65 mm) for the Belgium Government, in 1890 the Ottoman Government took advantage of the conditions mentioned above by demanding Mauser halt production of this model (cal. 9.5 mm.) and complete the contract with a newly developed Model (cal. 7.65 mm.).¹⁵³

Interestingly, the strategy of Paul Mauser and his agent, August Huber, was to keep the technical development of the M/87:9.5mm secret as long as possible. However, they were forced to change their strategy because of a letter sent by the Ottoman diplomat Caratheodory Pasha to the Ministry of War. The letter revealed that the Belgian Government had adopted a new model of Mauser M/89:7.65mm, which was first manufactured in the Fabrique Nationale plant in Belgium under Mauser’s

¹⁴⁹ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.52/77* (27.04.1306/31.12.1888); BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK. 52/77* (29.04.1306/02.01.1889); BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.52/77* (05.05.1306/07.01.1889).

¹⁵⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.52/77* (29.04.1306/02.01.1889): ‘...şimdiye kadar dahî bu tûfenge [*Mauser rifle cal. 9.5 mm*] fâik hiç bir silah mevcûd olmadığımı te’minen arz eylerim.’

¹⁵¹ Huber to Mauser 14.01.1889, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁵² BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.52/77* (06.05.1306/08.01.1889); BOA, *Y.PRK.MM.1/37* (19.09.1306/19.05.1889).

¹⁵³ Olson 1976: 53.

patent, and intended to offer this new model to the Ottoman Government. Being informed of this letter, August Huber suggested to Mauser that he take immediate action by sending one of the new model rifles produced in Oberndorf so that it could be seen by the Ottomans before the Belgian model arrived.¹⁵⁴ Consequently, the Mauser company reluctantly informed the Ottoman Government about the new model, which would later be adopted by the Ottoman Government.

This critical development served to prove Ali Saib's earlier justification for assuming that the Government had decided precipitously in favour of the Mauser company, even though the decision was reached essentially on the Sultan's own initiative. This was stated in a letter to Oberndorf sent by August Huber, who claimed to rely on 'reliable sources' in the Yıldız Palace. In his letter, dated December 8, 1892, Huber asserted that the Sultan had regretted making such a quick decision regarding the first Mauser order and also regretted doing so on his own initiative.¹⁵⁵ At the earlier stage of the contract, the Sultan looked on the contract given to Mauser 'as his own act and deed'.¹⁵⁶ Apparently, the Sultan's own initiative and inclinations, which were the basic factors in shaping both the Empire's foreign and defence procurement policies, proved to be a greater determinant than the Empire's military and economic priorities. As Mahmud Şevket said the Sultan's benevolence (*Wohllollen seiner Mejestät des Sultans*) was actually the principal factor behind the contracts being given to the Germans.¹⁵⁷

On July 21, 1890, the Ottoman Military Commission decided to stop the production of the Model 1887:9.5mm at the number of 220,000 rifles and 4,000

¹⁵⁴ Huber to Mauser 11.11.1889, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁵⁵ Huber to Mauser, 08.12.1892, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁵⁶ White to Salisbury, 28.11.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/4001; see also: Grant 2002: 24.

¹⁵⁷ Seel 1981/5:1418; see also Chapter III: 168.

cavalry carbines.¹⁵⁸ According to the *Mübâya'ât-ı Mühimme Defteri*, however, by March 12, 1891, the number of M/87:9.5 mm rifles delivered totalled 218,765 (through 177 delivery lots).¹⁵⁹ Together with one more group, the total number of rifles delivered reached 220,000.¹⁶⁰ The last group of carbines (M/87:9.5mm) arrived in İstanbul on February 12, 1891.¹⁶¹ After that, the company began supplying the new Model/90:7.65mm.¹⁶² Olson asserts that the new Model/90 was generally similar to the Belgian Model/89, which was officially adopted in Belgium on October 23, 1889.¹⁶³ Although the *Meclîs-i Vükelâ* tended to accept the conditions provided by the Mauser company with regards to modifications and to sign the agreement, the Sultan had waited till the last minute to issue the *İrâde*.¹⁶⁴ The Loewe company had determined on July 31, 1890 as the last day of notification.¹⁶⁵ Following the Sultan's approval, the amended contract was signed on August 6, 1890.¹⁶⁶

When the last group of long rifles (M/87:9.5mm) was sent to İstanbul on March 2, 1891, the Mauser factory had already begun manufacturing the new Model/90:7.65mm.¹⁶⁷ In January 1892, the daily production rate of the new model amounted to 300 units and it was contractually planned to increase the daily production to 500 pieces by July 1892.¹⁶⁸ Modification in a rifle model led to a subsequent revision in both cartridge and powder systems. Because of this change, the entire factory had to be re-equipped for manufacturing of Model/90. The Ottoman

¹⁵⁸ BOA, *Y.A.RES.51/29* (03.12.1307/21.07.1890).

¹⁵⁹ BOA, *Y.A.HUS.486/9: Mübâya'ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:12); see also: BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.52.93* (10.04.1308/22.12.1890)

¹⁶⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.MYD.16/92* (21.02.1313/13.08.1895).

¹⁶¹ BOA, *Y.A.HUS.486/9: Mübâya'ât-ı Mühimme Defteri* (HH 26363:12). Cf. Seel 1981/2:979.

¹⁶² Ball 2006: 237.

¹⁶³ Olson 1976: 53; Speed et al. 1997: 31.

¹⁶⁴ BOA, *Y.A.RES.51/29* (03.12.1307/21.07.1890).

¹⁶⁵ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.62/87* (12.12.1307/30.07.1890).

¹⁶⁶ Agreement signed by Paul Mauser and Rıza Pasha, the Ottoman Ministry of War 17.07.1893: Article 1, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8; see also: BOA, *Y.MTV.240/128* (23.11.1320/21.02.1903).

¹⁶⁷ Seel 1981/5: 1423.

¹⁶⁸ BOA, *Y.A.RES.51/29* (03.12.1307/21.07.1890); see also: Seel, 1981/3: 1164.

Empire had to contribute to cover some of the expenses involved in the re-equipment of the factory. The amount the Ottoman Government was also obliged to pay towards the cost of modifying the machines was 17,500 OL (322,875 Marks).¹⁶⁹

The changeover of the models and the increase in daily production caused Paul Mauser both administrative and manufacturing difficulties. Based on these technical hitches, Mauser wrote a letter to his İstanbul agent, August Huber, in November 1892, in which he defined the problems he faced. He also asked for Huber's opinion about the possibilities of finding an alternative way to moderate the conditions determined by the Ottoman Government.¹⁷⁰ Huber, in his response, stressed the importance of what had to be done so that the Ottomans would not realise that they (Mauser) were in breach of the modification request. He then wrote:

In response to your secret request whether successful results of the 9.50mm calibre-rifle tests could have disruptive implications/effects on possible subsequent orders of the rifles cal.7.65mm, we reply to you politely, that this could easily be possible. Because the Sultan takes great value in having the rifle cal.9.50mm enhanced with as many of the same good features/properties of the 7.65mm. Should this remotely be achieved, so then they could easily suspend any subsequent order. Because they will then say, we now have 550,000 new good rifles, which will for the time being be enough, especially since we cannot make any more financial sacrifices.¹⁷¹

In his letter, nonetheless, there was an important postscript pointing out the challenging situation: 'From Şakir Pasha we heard that a barrel of the Model/87:9.5 mm had broken up during the test-firing, that means relating to this issue [persuasion of the Sultan] there is a lot more to it than that.'¹⁷² Along with these notes, Huber suggested a course of action at the centre of which was to be found the key instruments of the German

¹⁶⁹ BOA, *Y.MTV.92/113* (27.09.1311/03.04.1894); BOA, *Y.A.RES.51/29* (03.12.1307/21.07.1890).

¹⁷⁰ Mauser to Huber, 30.11.1892, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁷¹ Huber to Mauser, 08.12.1892, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁷² See the postscript on page three of the letter in handwriting: '*von Shakir [Şakir] Pasha hörten wir, dass bei den Versuchen dorten mit dem 9 ½ ein Lauf gesprungen sei, dass scheint weithin, anzudeuten, dass die Sache doch nicht so leicht geht.*'

Style of War Business: having close personal relations with the influential officers/officials and exploiting their needs. In this instance, the officer targeted by Huber was one of Goltz Pasha's best cadets Mahmud Şevket, who was present at that time in Oberndorf.¹⁷³ In fact, as the British Military Attaché Chermside noted, Huber also understood very well 'how to manage the Turks by the judicious distribution of gratuities.'¹⁷⁴ Huber, as a competent dealer and persuader, suggested Paul Mauser adopt the following method:

It would be best for us to win over Colonel Mahmud Bey. Since we have not had the opportunity to associate with him for years, we do not know if this is possible and should therefore think hard, together with the there located Mr. Groneky [Director of the factory], as to how best you can get close to him. Mr. Mahmud Bey has been with you for so long now and has sacrificed so much, that we are inclined to assume that he would be prepared and expecting to earn something decent. Should you after your investigation [*Sondierung*] come to the conclusion that your findings are positive and useful, we consider it vital to reach an agreement with the named [Mahmud Şevket Bey], as it seems that the issue [agreement] cannot be reached without him.¹⁷⁵

At the end of his letter, Huber strongly emphasised the importance of acting carefully and with deliberation.¹⁷⁶ Huber proved to be one of the few people at this time who understood the influential power of *Baksheesh* and the need to use it as a facilitating factor in critical operations.¹⁷⁷ As an anonymous letter of an informant who might have been employed in the Ottoman service (he appeared to be an official servant in the Ottoman financial department and able to write in fluent German) also indicates, Huber

¹⁷³ Mahmud Şevket Pasha had been in Oberndorf since 1886 and stayed there until 1895.

¹⁷⁴ Precise of Colonel Chermside's Despatches No.19-21 and Memo of July 1 1890: in: NA, London: FO 78/4276.

¹⁷⁵ Huber to Mauser, 08.12.1892, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁷⁶ Huber to Mauser, 08.12.1892, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8: '*Seien Sie also nur sehr vorsichtig in der Sache und berichten Sie uns gelegentlich, was geschehen ist.*'

¹⁷⁷ In one of his letter sent to Mauser he described an Ottoman officer who was sent to Oberndorf to investigate the production process as follows: '*Genannter ist ein tüchtiger und im Verkehre angenehmer Offizier, deutschen Sprache in Wort und Schrift kundig.*' Huber to Mauser, 31.05.1904, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A5.

was usually inclined to offer money for the purpose of solving some critical issues and persuading people.¹⁷⁸

Baksheesh had become the most common tool in the way of being awarded a contract. The following statements, from a letter sent from Berlin to Paul Mauser, highlight how *Baksheesh* became an accepted part of the war business regarding the Ottoman market: ‘Of course, we are happy to cooperate to the necessary *Baksheesh* and the appropriate fee [*Honarar*].’¹⁷⁹ Presumably therefore, Huber’s statement in the first letter might also contain an implied suggestion for the judicious distribution of gratuities. He pointed out that the best way for Mauser to achieve its goal – to manipulate the Ottoman contract in favour of the factory – was to win Mahmud Şevket Pasha over to their interest. However, Huber meticulously forewarned Mauser that before taking any action, he must deliberate carefully and determine the most appropriate way to deal with Mahmud Şevket. Pointing that out, Huber emphasised Mahmud Şevket’s sacrifices which, according to him, had to be rewarded: ‘Mahmud Bey has been there [Oberndorf] for a long time and he also made some sacrifices so we are inclined to believe that he would probably deserve to earn something decent’.¹⁸⁰

Huber considered it was essential to reach an agreement with Mahmud Şevket [Bey]. We can offer no further documentary proof as to whether or not Mauser was able to reach an agreement with Mahmud Bey by an alternative route but we do know that in spite of Mauser and Huber’s struggle, the Sultan was determined to obtain the

¹⁷⁸ ‘*Sehr Vertraulich! Geheim: Der [Huber] hat mir paar Hundert Pfund angeboten, schlug ich zurück und sagte: dass ich draußen edele Freunde habe und was ich getan gilt für Sie. Die übrige überlasse ich Ihnen, lieber Freund. Nach dem Lesen bitte zu vernichten!!!*’ in: undated/anonymous writer SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁷⁹ Unnamed/from Berlin (Direction) to Mauser, 04.09.1890, in: SA, Oberndorf, MA-4: ‘*Zu den nötigen ‘Bakschichs’ und zu entsprechendem Honorar sind wir natürlich gerne bereit.*’

¹⁸⁰ Huber to Mauser, 08.12.1892, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8: ‘*Herr Mahmud Bey ist schon so lange jetzt bei Ihnen, hat auch dadurch manches Opfer gebracht, so dass wir geneigt sind, anzunehmen, dass es ihm wahrscheinlich Recht sein dürfte etwas Ordentliches zu verdienen.*’ According to Hallgarten, ‘despite his revolutionary Young Turk character, Mahmud Şevket [Pasha] was a most corrupt person [*eine höchst korrupte Persönlichkeit*].’ Hallgarten 1935: 278.

rifles as quickly as possible. Even at the end of July 1890, when he finally issued the imperial *İrâde*, he had particularly emphasised his desire to have the rifles in the fastest way but in any event earlier than the Bulgarians, who had ordered 67,000 rifles from the Austrian-Mannlicher firm.¹⁸¹ It appears that despite Huber's influential strategy suggestion and Mauser's insistent endeavours, the Sultan had not been convinced to wait. As Table 3.8 indicates, between July 2, 1891, and December 5, 1893, the Mauser factory had completed manufacturing the 280,000 (M/90:7.65) rifles contracted.¹⁸² According to *Serasker* Rıza Pasha's report delivery of the 280,000 M/90 rifles was accomplished on April 2, 1894.¹⁸³

The Ottoman Empire's desire to purchase the most recent military materials stimulated the arms makers' interest and gave a point of focus to their marketing attempts. Paul Mauser was well aware of this and inclined to exploit this feature. In fact, he was one of the most prominent arms makers who benefited from the Ottomans' 'vested interest in new improvements' in arms technology.¹⁸⁴ On April 30, 1893, before delivery of the M/90:7.65 mm rifles was completed, Paul Mauser travelled to İstanbul to present to his 'best customer', the Sultan, his newly-developed model, which had been ordered by the Spanish Government.¹⁸⁵ Following Mauser's visit, the Ottoman Government decided to place another order, this time for 200,000 rifles of the new model. Mahmud Şevket Pasha, as the head of the Ottoman purchasing and inspection commission arrived in Oberndorf on December 22, 1893, and defined the contract given as 'benevolent of the Sultan'.¹⁸⁶ However, the cost of the Sultan's *Wohllollen*

¹⁸¹ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.62/87* (12.12.1307/30.07.1890).

¹⁸² Seel 1981/3: 1164.

¹⁸³ BOA, *Y.MTV.92/113* (27.09.1311/03.04.1894).

¹⁸⁴ Speed at all. 1997: 31; Ball 2006: 363; Seel 1986: 44-48.

¹⁸⁵ Seel 1986: 46.

¹⁸⁶ H. Walter Schmid's note, in: SA, Oberndorf, 793.32/13.1 (Mauser Waffen, Abnahme-Kommission/Türkenzeit): '*Herr Oberst Mahmud Bey bezeichnete in seiner Rede diesen Auftrag als ein besonderes Zeichen des Wohlwollens Sr. Majesät des Sultans.*' See also: Seel 1981/5: 1418.

(benevolence) to the Ottoman Treasury was (along with the cartridge orders) nearly 1 million OL. As Table 3.8 shows, from 1887 to 1908 the Mauser company manufactured more than 900,000 rifles for the Ottoman Army.

Table 3.8: Mauser Rifles in the Ottoman Army (1886-1908)

Model	Manufacturing Period	Number	Price for Each* (in <i>Kuruş</i>)
M/87;9.5mm (1887)	11.03.1887/16.03.1891	220,000	373
M/87;9.5mm (carbine)	19.01.1890/29.12.1890	4,000	363
M/90;7.65mm (1890)	01.01.1891/05.12.1893	280,000	383.35
M/93;7.65mm (1893)	05.12.1893/16.03.1896	200,100	365
M/93;7.65mm (1893)	27.08.1896/21.09.1896	1,800	365
M/03;7.65mm (1903)	1903-1908	207,700	315
Total	1887-1908	913,600	

Sources: Seel 1981/5: 1423, 1582; * Rifles with Bayonet: BOA, *Y.MTV.240/128* (23.11.1320/21.02.1903). See Appendix 3.8 a-b.

These Mauser rifles were purchased at the cost of increasing the Ottomans' foreign debt and budget deficit. However from the military point of view, the impact of the procurement appeared to be limited. As Uyar & Erickson assert during the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 'only one out of 10 divisions that took part in the Greek War hurriedly armed themselves with these new rifles; all the others used the veteran Sniders and Martinis'.¹⁸⁷ Also Nevinson, who had been at the field during the War, asserted that the Ottoman soldiers 'were armed with Martini rifles of a cheap quality'.¹⁸⁸ The same unfortunate reality also occurred in a later war -during the Balkan Wars. 'On the last day's fighting', wrote M. H. Donohoe, the *Daily Chronicle's* correspondent with the Ottoman Army in the Balkan Wars, 'I came across instances of reserves ignorant of the manipulation of the mechanism of the Mauser rifle.' Donohoe added: 'Anatolians mostly use muzzle loaders, and had never seen a magazine rifle.'

¹⁸⁷ Uyar & Erickson 2009: 211.

¹⁸⁸ Nevinson 1898: 73.

Their weapons had to be loaded by their officers or better instructed comrades.’¹⁸⁹ In fact, as the following tables highlight, the imported rifles were substantially stored in the Imperial storehouses rather than being distributed to the troops: 58% of the M/90:7.65mm Mauser rifles, for instance, and 16% of the Model M/93:7.65 mm had not been distributed to the armies and were just stored in the depots, and more than 60% of the cartridges also remained in the Imperial Storehouse in *Gülhâne*. For the purpose of analysing the efficiency of the Ottoman procurement policy the following tables should be taken in to consideration.

Table 3.9a: Places to which the purchased Mauser Rifles were sent (M/90:7.65)

Date of dispatch	Place	Numbers of Rifles
12.03.1896	The Sultan’s Household	1
04.04.1892	Arsenal in the Sultan’s Household	10
03. 1895-02. 1896	Military School	20
02.1899-08.1899	The Third Army	116,000
	Others	25
[19.01.1904]	Imperial Storehouse in <i>Maçka</i>	163,944
	Total	280,000

Table 3.9b: Places to which the purchased Mauser Rifles were sent (M/93:7.65)

Date of dispatch	Place	Numbers of Rifles
12.03.1896	The Sultan’s Household	1
05.06.1896	Arsenal in the Sultan’s Household	1,350
06.02.1895-19.03.1895	Military School	20
27.02.1897-22.03.1897	The Second Army	89,000
28.04.1897	The Second Division	10,000
28.04.1897	The First Division	4,919
06.05.1897	Divisions in the Black Sea	
	Fortification	896
20.02.1899	<i>Hassa</i> Army: Redif Battalion	51,200
29.07.1903	<i>Hamidiye</i> Cavalry (1. & 2. Regiments)	1,200
	Others	7,569
[19.01.1904]	Imperial Storehouse in <i>Maçka</i>	33,345
	Total	199,500

¹⁸⁹ *The New York Times*: 04.11.1912.

Table 3.9c: Places to which the purchased cartridges were sent (M/90-93:7.65)

Date of dispatch	Place	Numbers
07.02.1897	The Second Army	11,232,000
02-03.1897	The Third Army (in Total)	42,902,400
20.02.1897	<i>Hassa</i> Army	15,360,000
	Others	10,866,922
[19.01.1904]	Imperial storehouse in <i>Gülhâne</i>	141,606,061
	Total	224,967,383

Source: BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.211/40* (01.11.1321/19.01.1904)

Mauser's lucrative business, conducted at the expense of Ottoman financial stability, had begun at the end of 1886 under Goltz Pasha's guidance and continued until Goltz Pasha's last days in the service of the Ottoman Army in 1895.¹⁹⁰ Whenever Goltz Pasha declared his intention to terminate his service in the Ottoman Army, the Germans, first and foremost, would argue against it. The main factor which made him so important – and indispensable – was his contribution to the German war business and Germany's influence on the Ottoman Army. This fact was clearly expressed by Prince von Radolin in 1893, when Goltz Pasha's last contract ended. In a letter to Chancellor Caprivi, Von Radolin expressed his opinion about the importance of Goltz's service in the Ottoman Army: '... for our influence in the Ottoman Army and for our further war materials delivery to Turkey [Goltz Pasha] is invaluable'.¹⁹¹ A document dated August 13, 1895, confirms Von Radolin's view very clearly. Revealing that between 1886 and 1895 the number of Mauser rifles supplied to the Ottoman Army totalled 625,650 and the number of cartridges reached 182,790,000 pieces.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Goltz Pasha stayed in the Ottoman service between June 1883 and November 1895.

¹⁹¹ Radolin to Caprivi 20.5.1893, in: PA.AA. R13240, cited in Kössler 1981: 180: 'Für unseren Einfluss auf die türkische Armee und unsere weiteren Waffenlieferungen an dieselbe von unschätzbarem Wert.'

¹⁹² BOA, *Y.PRK.MYD.16/92* (21.02.1313/13.08.1895).

During those years, the Mauser company became – after the Krupp company in artillery – the second German monopolistic (industrial) power for the Ottoman infantry rifles. Along with Krupp, Mauser became almost the sole supplier of military materials for the Ottoman Army. The exceptional power they established in the Ottoman market and the massive profits gained through the war business were directly attributable to teamwork, mostly led by Goltz Pasha. As a letter Paul Mauser sent to Goltz Pasha proves, Mauser recognised and acknowledged Goltz Pasha’s multidimensional and influential position with regards to the Sultan, and the way he tended to take the advantage by writing to the person who might be able to affect the decision of the ‘decision maker’, namely the Sultan. In his letter therefore he used semi-open language to explain his demand:

It is well known to me that your Excellency has regularly been the adviser to His Majesty the Sultan. I now think that I am doing nothing more than my duty if I asked you very humbly to make His Majesty the Sultan aware of the aforementioned communication [with regards to some modification of the Mauser rifles], at the next opportunity.¹⁹³

A copy of the letter was sent to Mr. Huber, who made several communication with Goltz Pasha and was told by him that ‘He [Goltz Pasha] would do what needed to be done.’¹⁹⁴ Accordingly, Goltz Pasha did not disappoint Mauser and submitted a report to the Sultan regarding his request.¹⁹⁵ As many other cases proved, Goltz Pasha guided his fellow-countrymen throughout and also after his service in the Ottoman Army and effectively contributed to their ‘energetic compulsion/attack on the [Yıldız] Palace’.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Mauser to Goltz, 26.11.1893, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁹⁴ Huber to Mauser, 09.12.1893, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8: ‘[Goltz Pasha] *sagte uns aber, dass er Nötiges veranlassen werde, ...*’

¹⁹⁵ Huber to Mauser, 04.01.1894, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8.

¹⁹⁶ Huber to Mauser 14.11.1893, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8: ‘*energischen Vorstoß im Palais*’; Goltz to Pertev Bey, 18.02.1900, in: MA, Freiburg NL.737/8: ‘*Die Lehren des Boerenkrieges sind recht beherzigenswert und auch für Sie in der Türkei Wichtigkeit. Zunächst bewährt sich das Mausergewehr vorzüglich.*’

Obviously he proved to be more influential than the Ambassadors in terms of supporting the German interests in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹⁷

In summary, the Mauser company's entry into the Ottoman market in late 1886 was a *sui-generis* operation supported by the German Government and the German military mission in the Ottoman service. In particular, the close relations between the German industrialists and the military personnel contributed to the success story of the GAFs. The Mauser Operation (1886-1895) was in fact an inter-operation of these two determinants. As Goltz Pasha wrote in his condolence letter for Paul Mauser, who died on May 29, 1913, he and Paul Mauser had worked together for the purpose of 'strengthening of the German name and German efficiency in the Orient'.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Huber to Mauser 14.11.1893, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8; *Notizen über Türkei*, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/217.

¹⁹⁸ Goltz's letter of condolence for Paul Mauser, in: SA, Oberndorf, *Worte am Grabe des Herrn Geheimen Kommerzienrats Dr. Ing. Paul v. Mauser* 1914: 13: 'Ich betraue mit ihnen aufrichtig den Tod meines um Vaterland und Heer so hochverdienten Freundes, mit dem ich im Orient vor 27 Jahren für Geltung des deutschen Namens und deutscher Tüchtigkeit eintrat und dessen Charakter ich damals kennen und schätzen lernte. Leider unmöglich, zukommen.'

**SECTION II: EXPANSION OF ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL RELATIONS**

CHAPTER IV
THE SECOND WAVE OF THE GERMAN
EXPANSIONIST STRATEGY TOWARDS THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1898-1909)

Kaiser Wilhelm II's Second Orientreise as a Multi-Dimensional Diplomacy (1898)

Eight years after Bismarck was forced to resign, the Kaiser paid another visit to Abdülhamid II in İstanbul, which was well-organised by the well-known British firm, Thomas Cook and Son.¹ The visit became more influential than the first one, against which Bismarck had openly declared his opposition.² In contrast to the first visit, paid nine years previously, in 1889,³ there was no sound of strong disaffection in the German governmental apparatus. This could probably be attributed to the fact that after Bismarck's dismissal, Kaiser Wilhelm II became – through his acts and deeds – his own Chancellor and Foreign Minister.⁴ Chancellor Prince von Hohenlohe, who was favourably inclined toward the Kaiser's Ottoman policy, publicly supported the Kaiser's second *Orientreise*. As the Kaiser stated in his memoir 'Hohenlohe hailed with much joy the [Kaiser's] trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem. He was pleased at the strengthening of [German] relations with Turkey and considered the plan for the Baghdad Railway arising from them as a great cultural work worthy of Germany.'⁵

The concept of the Kaiser's visit was also described by *The [London] Times*. Although, the newspaper used an exaggerated expression to report the Kaiser's visit to İstanbul, the meaning of the expression was not entirely in contradiction to the Kaiser's deeds and actions. *The [London] Times* reported: 'The youthful Kaiser, the modern representative of the temporal power of the Holy Roman Empire, is following the

¹ Henderson 1948: 59; according to a document, dated on October 08, 1898, the transport vehicles and animals, which were provided by 'Thomas Cook and Son' for the German bureaucrats and servants who accompanied Kaiser Wilhelm II during his trip, were obtained without paying any customs duty. BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 57/89 (18.05.1316/04.10.1898); BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK.57/95 (22.05.1316/08.10.1898).

² *Neue Freie Presse*: 20.10.1898.

³ According to Robolsky, Bismarck said openly in an interview that he was against the Kaiser's visit to İstanbul in 1889. Robolsky 1891: 29.

⁴ On October 19 1898, the Austrian *Neue Freie Presse* pointed out the differences between the first trip and the second one as follows: 'nine years ago Kaiser Wilhelm II was not yet his own chancellor.' *Neue Freie Presse*: 20.10.1898.

⁵ Wilhelm II, the Kaiser 1922: 90.

footsteps of Barbarossa, of Henry VI, and of Frederick II to the Holy Land, and the end of the 19th century is witnessing a pacific crusade.’⁶

Kaiser Wilhelm II began his second *Orientreise* on October 18, 1898, when he arrived in İstanbul.⁷ The planned arrival date was delayed because of adverse weather.⁸ As was the case during the first visit, the Ottoman press showed keen interest in the Kaiser’s second visit and asserted that it would further strengthen the friendly relations that existed between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. For instance, the newspaper *Sabah* published a special 176-page book dedicated to the visit. This edition gave detailed information about the Kaiser’s programme, observations and some anecdotes about the close friendship between the Sultan and Wilhelm II.⁹ In addition, the ‘unusual preparations’ made before the Kaiser’s arrival were widely reported by the European newspapers.¹⁰ Similarly, foreign diplomats were reporting the preparations for the visit to their Foreign Offices. The US Ambassador, James B. Angell, was one of those who reported on the approaching visit and the flurry of activity it had created in the capital city. He stated in his report that ‘unusual preparations are already going on to give great splendour and significance to the occasion’.¹¹ In addition, he expressed his thoughts about the possible consequences of the Kaiser’s visit – he believed the second *Orientreise* would doubtless strengthen the intimacy between Wilhelm II and the Sultan.¹²

⁶ *The [London] Times*: 18.10.1898.

⁷ BOA, *Y.PRK.AZJ.37/91* (01.06.1316/17.10.1898); BOA, *Y.PRK.SGE. 8/61* (02.06.1316/18.10.1898).

⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.145/36* (30.05.1316/16.10.1898): Because of the adverse weather conditions the *SMY Hohenzollern* had to wait at *Zante Island*.

⁹ *Sabah, Hatıra-i Seyahat: ‘Almanya İmparatoru Haşmetlü [Wilhelm] ve İmparatoriçe [Augusto Victoria] Hazerâtının Dersa‘âdet’i def‘at-i saniye olarak ziyaretleriyle Suriye seyahatlerine bir Hâtıra-i nâciz olmak üzere Sabah gazetesi tarafından kâri’în-i Osmaniyyeye hediye edilmiştir*, İstanbul 1316 [1898].

¹⁰ Richter 1997: 63-68.

¹¹ Angell to William R. Day, 25.07.1898, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/65.

¹² Angell to William R. Day, 25.07.1898, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/65.

On their first day in İstanbul, the Kaiser and the Kaiserin visited a German school, where they engaged in a long conversation with the teachers and children.¹³ *The New York Times* noted that Kaiser Wilhelm remarked that there were a large number of foreign children in attendance at the school and he said this demonstrated the ‘victorious force of *Germanism*’.¹⁴ During their İstanbul visits, they made several excursions,¹⁵ after which the Kaiser came to the conclusion that during the nine years since his last visit the decay of the Ottoman Empire had advanced rapidly.¹⁶ On all occasions, the Kaiser expressed his gratitude and pleasure with the Sultan. For his part, the Sultan tried hard to prove his sincerity through giving some special presents and calculated hospitality to the Kaiser and the Kaiserin. Wilhelm II, whom Naumann called ‘the Sultan of the Germans,’¹⁷ and the Kaiserin were impressed by the all preparations, all courteous welcomes, etc. shown during the *Orientreise*. *The New York Times* provided some interesting detail about the presents given to the German delegation:

Apart from the regular presents, the Sultan of Turkey gave a number of others. For instance, the coverlet on the Empress’s bed had the imperial crown and her monogram in the centre, embroidered with diamonds and pearls. On Her Majesty expressing admiration, the coverlet was immediately presented to her. Two magnificent Saxe vases adorned the salon of the Yıldız Kiosk, and the Sultan asked Baron von Bülow, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, if he admired them as products of his own country. Von Bülow shrewdly replied that he would like to have a similar pair, whereupon the Sultan ordered them to be placed with the German Minister’s baggage.¹⁸

¹³ BOA, Y.PRK.ZB.22/13 (03.06.1316/19.10.1898); BOA, Y.PRK.HH.30/69 (03.06.1316/19.10.1898); *The New York Times*: 20.10.1898.

¹⁴ *The New York Times*: 20.10.1898.

¹⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.145/73 (03.06.1316/19.10.1898): On October 19, the Kaiserin went to the Beylerbeyi Palace and Çamlıca with a sightseeing purpose.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*: 06.11.1898.

¹⁷ Naumann 1913:73: ‘*Der Sultan der Germanen imponiert dem Morgenländer mächtig*’.

¹⁸ *The New York Times*: 06.11.1898.

According to a document dated November 13, 1898, the transportation of the gifts presented to the Kaiser and the Kaiserin became something of a problem for which they requested specific help from the Ottoman Government.¹⁹ Apart from the presents given to the Kaiser and the Kaiserin the total cost of the Kaiser's visit to the Ottoman Empire was quite high. From new rooms specially built in the Yıldız Palace and the modernisation of the roads over which the Kaiser would travel through to the purchase of new clothes for the cadets in the Military School (which the Kaiser visited) and additionally the salaries for those who accompanied the Kaiser during his Jerusalem visit the total outlay amounted to 20,095.57 OL (370,763 Marks).²⁰

The most significant gift given to the Kaiser was Abdülhamid's permission to acquire a plot of land in Jerusalem, on Mount Zion, known as '*La Dormition de la Sainte Vierge*', 'as an expression of intimate friendship'.²¹ Through this meaningful present and the Kaiser's subsequent perceptive strategic steps in presenting the acquired ground to German Catholics, France lost her prestige as a protector at the Porte for the Catholic subjects in the Ottoman Empire. According to Sir William White, the British Ambassador at İstanbul, since Bismarck's time the German Government without in any way neglecting its Protestant establishments had been paying increasing attention to the German Roman Catholic ones in the Ottoman Empire. Sir William asserted that even 'Prince Bismarck was by no means disposed to allow France to claim [...] her protectorate of Roman Catholic interest but wished her to confine herself to the

¹⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.UM.44/42 (28.06.1316/13.11.1898).

²⁰ BOA, Y.MTV.188/146 (29.11.1316/10.04.1899).

²¹ Kaiser delivered the following speech at the date of takeover the *Dormition de la Sainte Vierge*, on October 31 1898: Penzler (ed.) 1904/2:123-124: '*Indem Ich mit tiefem Danke an Seine Majestät den Sultan das Terrain übernehme, hoffe Ich, daß diese Gabe, die der Ausdruck inniger Freundschaft und zugleich eingehenden Interesses für Meine deutschen Untertanen ist, nunmehr in der Hand des deutschen katholischen Palästina-Vereins zu einem Segen für meine katholischen Untertanen, speziell auch für die Bestrebungen im heiligen Lande werden möge. Ich, Wilhelm II., deutscher Kaiser und König von Preußen, übernehme hiermit nunmehr dieses Terrain.*' See also: Kushner 1999: 92. Cf. Hürmen (ed.) 2006/1: 159-167.

care of purely French interests'.²² As a consequence of this increased attention, Germany gained a crucial position with regards to Catholics – but especially the German Catholics – who lived throughout the Ottoman Empire. Over the years, French diplomats had tried to acquire this piece of land from the Sultan but were unable to secure possession.²³ But the Germans were successful. As a result, the Kaiser's strategic push to make a profound impression among the Catholics would deal a blow to French interests in the Ottoman Empire.²⁴

Prince von Bülow, in a report submitted to Kaiser Wilhelm II on June 4, 1898, clearly spelled out the probable consequences of the Germans acquiring the *Dormition*. According to him it might be generally useful to support anything that could demolish French prestige in the Levant; on the other hand, through this operation the prominent German antagonism against the French Catholics in the Orient could be kept alive [*wachhalten kann*].²⁵

In fact that antagonism was behind an unspoken cold war between the French and German interests in the Ottoman territorial area. Abdülhamid II was observing this struggle very cautiously; in 1898 he described French complaints and comments

²² White to Salisbury, 22.02.1888, in: NA, London: FO 78/4098.

²³ *The New York Times*: 06.11.1898; For the correlation between the *Orientreise* and the increasing German influence on the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire see also: GP/12-2 1924: 587-638.

²⁴ *Wilhelm II, the Kaiser* 1922:215-216. In Haifa, on October 26 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm, who wanted to improve his influence among the Catholic world especially among them who lived in the Ottoman Empire, at the first day of his arrival to Haifa, addressed to the Catholic delegation the following speech in which he ensured his protection over them: ' *In Erwiderung ergreife Ich gern die Gelegenheit, ein für allemal auszusprechen, daß die katholischen Untertanen wo und wann sie desselben bedürfen sollten, Meines Kaiserlichen Schutzes stets sicher sein werden.* Penzler (ed.) 1904/2: 117-118.

²⁵ Prince von Bülow to Kaiser Wilhelm II, 04.06.1898, in: GP/12-2 1924: 611: ' *Ich glaube einen solchen Versuch, dessen Erfolg freilich nicht unbedingt sicher ist, um deswillen in tiefster Ehrfurcht empfehlen zu dürfen, weil es im allgemeinen nützlich sein möchte, alles zu unterstützen, was einerseits dem französischen Prestige in der Levante Abbruch tun und andererseits den neuerdings mehr hervortretenden Antagonismus der Deutschen gegen die französischen Katholiken in Orientangelegenheiten wachhalten kann.*' The Kaiser remarked Von Bülow's statement with a marginalia 'Ja.' In addition, the idea of support of the German Catholics in Orient was formulated by Naumann as same as Von Bülow did. In order to support of the assertion that Naumann and Von Bülow and the other pro-expansionists analysed the events from the very similar, almost from the same perspective, Naumann's following words were of interesting: ' *Je mehr wir den deutschen Katholiken Stützpunkte geben, desto eher werden wir sie der französischen Bevormundung entziehen.*' Naumann 1913: 73.

regarding the Germans' increasing influence over the Catholic subjects of the Ottoman Empire in terms of 'indescribable arrogance'.²⁶

Having said that, Kaiser Wilhelm's Ottoman policy culminated in the idea of undermining French influence in the Empire. Apparently the foreign policy enunciated by Bismarck, which was formulated on the proposition of France's isolation, was reshaped and reformulated by the Kaiser for his Ottoman policy. Consequently, Wilhelm's present of the land [the Virgin's Abode] to the Catholics was regarded 'as a clever move' among contemporary observers.²⁷ By way of example, Field-Marshal Waldersee, who according to Menne was one of the Emperor's well-informed friends,²⁸ noted in his diary on November 11, 1898: 'It has a special significance because, through [the acquiring the *Dormition*] the patriotic feelings of the [German] Catholics will be stimulated and encouraged.'²⁹

Although the Kaiser proposed to create a profound and favourable impression among the Catholics as well as the Protestants, he was later strongly criticised by some religious commentators outside of Germany, especially following WWI and its consequences which sparked criticism of the friendship that existed between the Kaiser and the Sultan. For instance, Newell Dwight Hillis, a Congregationalist minister and the author of *The Influence of Christ in Modern Life* (1900) strongly criticised Kaiser Wilhelm's friendship with Sultan Abdülhamid. He wrote '... so the Kaiser took his train, lived in the Sultan's palace, signed this treaty, and hired the Sultan's knife and

²⁶ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 113-114: '*C'est une arrogance sans nom que celle de la presse française, qui pousse des hauts cris parce que j'ai fait cadeau au Kaiser de la 'Dormition' (à Jérusalem). ... Il est absolument allemands revient de droit au chef de l'Empire allemand. L'amour-propre français souffre à son droit séculaire de protectorat des Chrétiens*'.

²⁷ *The New York Times*: 06.11.1898.

²⁸ According to Menne, Field-Marshal Waldersee was 'the doubtless well-informed friend of the Emperor'. Menne 1938: 194.

²⁹ Meisner (ed.) 1922/II: 420.

club, just as the Chief Priest Annas chose Judas to be his representative upon whom he could load the responsibility for the murder of Jesus.’³⁰

Hillis’ approach, although it appears as an exaggerated statement, can be admitted as one of the samples of the international long-run reflection of the Kaiser’s friendship with the Sultan. In particular, the critics focused on the Kaiser’s position on ‘The Armenian Question’. According to the British annual report for the Ottoman Empire for 1907, the Kaiser visited Sultan Abdülhamid when he ‘was under the odium and cloud of the Armenian massacres’.³¹ In fact, the Kaiser’s visit was an obvious resistance against the European Concert line in terms of this issue. The annual report repeatedly asserted that he did not see his way clear to gainsaying the decision of the European Powers which showed their displeasure. Nonetheless, the Kaiser did not hesitate to show himself as the personal friend of the Sultan.³²

While the Kaiser was in İstanbul other European governments were strongly criticising the Sultan’s position on the Armenian question. They began to support anti-Ottoman organisations and movements within their borders, and strongly protested the policy taking place with respect to The Armenian Question, Wilhelm II’s supportive visit to the Ottoman Empire and his open declaration of neutrality on The Armenian Question and also on the Crete issue, was promptly recompensed by the Ottoman Empire. According to a document dated October 30, 1898, the Kaiser had noted that during a conversation with Nazım Pasha, the Governor of Damascus, he did not take into consideration the complaints of the Armenians, who visited the Kaiser when he was in Damascus.³³

³⁰ Hillis 1918: 17.

³¹ *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, (hereafter BDOW) BDOW 1928/5: 43.

³² BDOW 1928/5: 43.

³³ BOA, *Y.PRK.UM.44/6* (14.06.1316/30.10.1898).

Additionally, on an occasion of an official dinner, the Kaiser provocatively voiced his thought that there was a British hand behind the Armenian and Crete questions.³⁴ Interestingly, the Kaiser, who provoked the Ottoman Government somehow against the British position in Crete, had held a critical conversation with the British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Frank Lascelles, on February 1, 1898. According to Von Bülow's 'top secret' report, at the conclusion of a lengthy conversation Kaiser Wilhelm openly declared his position on the Crete question. The Kaiser remarked that it was all the same to him [*allerhöchst ihm gleichgültig sei*] what happened in Crete. This statement might have astonished the British Ambassador, since he replied 'So is it Your Majesty really the same?' The Kaiser's response was clear: '*Ja, ich mache mir nichts daraus*, if your fellows take Souda Bay [A bay on the northwest coast of Crete Island].'³⁵ Furthermore, Von Bülow pointed out in his final remarks to Hatzfeldt's report that the Kaiser authorised him to telegraph to Hatzfeldt secret information that he would not be against an English occupation of Crete in any form.³⁶ It is understood that when the Kaiser talked to the Ottoman officials about 'the British hand in the Crete question' he had already been well informed. Apparently, the Kaiser positioned himself as an honest mediator between the two sides, whereas he encouraged one to another.

However, all the expressions made by the Kaiser during his visit were welcomed by Abdülhamid II and appeared to prove that the Sultan had won the 'allegiance' of Germany in discouraging further concerted action by the other European Powers on behalf of the Armenian subjects.³⁷ At this time, the British annual report for the Ottoman Empire declared the real anxiousness of the European Powers. The report

³⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.UM.43/129 (10.06.1316/26.10.1898).

³⁵ Von Bülow to Hatzfeldt, 02.02.1898, in: GP/12-2 1924: 476.

³⁶ Von Bülow's final remarks to the Hatzfeldt's report dated on February 02 1898, in: GP/12-2 1924:477: '*Seine Majestät autorisierten mich endlich, an Hatzfeldt sehr geheim zu telegraphieren, er habe nichts dagegen, daß die Engländer in irgendeiner Form Kreta bzw. die Sudabai nähmen.*'

³⁷ Zeidner 1976: 475-476.

opined that ‘if the policy of Germany was neither humane nor creditable, it [Kaiser Wilhelm’s visit] was at all events positive and material. It secured them [Germany and Germans] the concession of the Baghdad Railway, a monopoly on all orders for military munitions for the Turkish Army, and a privileged position for all industrial and commercial patron’.³⁸ At the same time, Hillis’s account shows his irritation over the outcomes of the Kaiser’s visit and summarises the perceptions and thoughts commonly declared in Europe and the USA in terms of the motives behind the Kaiser’s second *Orientreise*:

Everyone knew that the Kaiser wanted to build a German railroad through to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf; this would give him an outlet for surplus goods to be sold in India. Serbia lay straight across the path, and he had to work out some scheme to attack Serbia. Then he needed the Sultan's friendship, and the end justified the means — and the end was the Baghdad Railroad. But the Turk tired of being the Kaiser's tool; he [the Kaiser] wanted more land.³⁹

Hillis was not alone in comparing the *Orientreise*’s religious image with the concrete outcomes. For instance, Harrison wrote: ‘But if in its spiritual aspect it left nothing abiding, from the secular standpoint it was entirely successful. Apart from the purely political value of such a coup de theatre economically much was achieved.’⁴⁰ However, in 1902, Ray S. Baker asserted that ‘the Kaiser’s visit was one of the epochs of recent Turkish history, the full effects of which are not yet appreciated by Westerners’.⁴¹

Despite all these predictable caustic approaches and comments, Kaiser Wilhelm II had begun his historical second *Orientreise* with a week’s stay at Yıldız Palace in İstanbul. After that the Kaiser’s party went to Haifa by sea and *Müşir* Mehmed Şakir Pasha was their host throughout the second stage of their journey from Haifa via Jaffa

³⁸ BDOW 1928/5: 43.

³⁹ Hillis 1918: 17.

⁴⁰ Harrison 1904: 221.

⁴¹ Baker 1902: 76.

to Jerusalem and from there to Damascus via Beirut.⁴² Interestingly, and maybe intentionally, the second stage of the *Orientreise*, started by the Kaiser's arrival at the port of Haifa on October 25, 1898,⁴³ marked the 30th anniversary of the first German Templar, George David Hardegg's arrival in Haifa in October 1868.⁴⁴ In addition it was the anniversary of the Lutheran Reformation of October 31. The month of October was in all respects a memorial date for the Templars of Haifa. After spending two days in Haifa, the Kaiser left via Jaffa, where he delivered a speech to the German colony about their important role in the improvement of Ottoman-German relations.⁴⁵ He arrived in Jerusalem on October 29, 1898.⁴⁶

The Kaiser and the accompanying committee's Jerusalem programme had been organised for the comfort and safety of the German delegation by the *Kudüs Mutasarrıfı* [Governor of Jerusalem], Tevfik Pasha [who later adopted the surname Biren], who obtained a first-class Prussian cross medal,⁴⁷ and Muhammed Servet Bey, the Chief of Police.⁴⁸ Giving details about the Jerusalem visit, *The New York Times* reported that 'no private persons were allowed to stand in the streets along the line of march-as the streets of Jerusalem are narrow – so as to guard against any possible attack, and the crossings were strongly guarded by police and soldiers, who also lined the streets on the route'.⁴⁹

⁴² BOA, Y.EE 81/3 (06.07.1316/20.11.1898): This document is a detailed twelve page Layiha submitted to the Sultan by *Müşir Şakir Pasha* himself to report the detail of the Kaiser's journey.

⁴³ Benner 2001: 274.

⁴⁴ For a detailed study on the German settlement in Ottoman Palestine: Yazbak 1999: 40-54. Yazbak committed that 'Kaiser Wilhelm's trip to the Holy Land at the end of the century was responsible for a brief upsurge, as it sparked enthusiastic reports about the Templars in the German press and a wave of sympathy back home.' Yazbak 1999:51. Cf. Carmel 1973.

⁴⁵ Penzler (ed.) 1904/2: 118.

⁴⁶ Richter 1997: 132.

⁴⁷ Hürmen (ed.) 2006/1: 41.

⁴⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.21/86 (11.06.1316/27.10.1898).

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*: 27.11.1898; According a report dated on November 14 1898, the thirteen suspects who was charged with a planning assassination against the German Kaiser were arrested by the local governor, were released from the prison just after Kaiser's leaving the city. BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.12/10 (29.06.1316/14.11.1898); additionally the Ottoman government was very generous at

Prince von Bülow, who included in his memoirs some important comments on the Kaiser's *Orientreise*, also provided more interesting details, especially about the Kaiser's enthusiasm for what he observed and experienced throughout his trip and also the international reactions to 'his enthusiasm for the Sublime Porte, the Koran, and the Sultan'.⁵⁰ Von Bülow wrote: 'The homage of the populace, the courteous welcomes of the municipalities, the conviction that he enjoyed the real friendship and respect of all Turks, nay; of all adherents of Islam all this produced such an effect on William II that almost every day he felt constrained to express his delight and gratitude to the Sultan by telegraph.'⁵¹ During the Kaiser's visit to Jerusalem, Von Bülow had the task, as he recorded, of drafting the telegrams 'owing to the need for a certain variety of phraseology'. Nevertheless he 'gradually exhausted the whole available stock of expressions and idioms in the French language for the ideas of appreciation, pleasure, and gratification.' A better picture of this remarkable side of the *Orientreise* can be gleaned from some interesting words written by Von Bülow:

Whenever the exclamation fell from His Majesty's lips, and it was a constant occurrence that 'that really was the finest experience we have yet had, Bülow, send the Sultan a telegram of thanks' I took up my pencil and flogged out a new variant. My friend Knesebeck said to me one day: 'You know those pamphlets for lovers, "The Model Letter-writer"; you ought to bring out a model letter-writer for polite correspondence with Sultans, for use during a Near East tour.'⁵²

the allocation for the spies to pretend any possible attack against the Kaiser: BOA, *DH.MKT.2122/41* (07.06.1316/ 23.10.1898); See more detailed security measures: Hürmen (ed.) 2006/1: 157-169.

⁵⁰ General Bernhard von Werder, German Ambassador in St Petersburg who was on good terms with Tsar Alexander and also a personal friend of the Russian family, sent a letter to Von Bülow in the spring of 1901. In his letter General von Werder wrote: 'He [the Tsar] could understand why Germany desired economic advantages in Turkey, but Kaiser Wil[helm]'s enthusiasm for the Sublime Porte, the Koran, and the Sultan, irritated the Tsar.' Von Bülow added that the Tsar remarked in Werder's presence: '*Je n'aime pas le Sultan, je le cède à l'Empereur d'Allemagne.*' Most probably, the Tsar was impressed by a letter the Kaiser sent him from Damascus on November 9, 1898, revealing that 'My personal feeling in leaving the holy city was that I felt profoundly ashamed before the Moslems and that if I had come there without any Religion at all I certainly would have turned Mahometan [Muslim]!' Von Bülow 1931: 542. See also: Goetz (ed.) 1920: 65.

⁵¹ Von Bülow 1931: 542.

⁵² Von Bülow 1931: 255-256; the telegraphs sent by the Kaiser to the Sultan were translated and submitted to the Sultan. BOA, *Y.PRK.NMH.7/94* (07.06.1316/23.10.1898).

From Jerusalem, the Kaiser and the Kaiserin went to Damascus, where Wilhelm II delivered a highly-influential speech, which undoubtedly became one of the best-known speeches made by him. At that time, Damascus was the centre of French influence in the Ottoman territory and from this stand-point also the speech was of importance. On November 8, 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II addressed his Damascus audience by saying: ‘Let me assure His Majesty the Sultan [Abdülhamid II] and the 300 millions of Muslims who, in whatever corner of the globe they may live, revere in him their *Khalif*, that the German Emperor will ever be their friend.’⁵³ While visiting the tomb of Saladin, Wilhelm II laid a crown/wreath on the tomb while expressing admiration for Saladin; a sketch of the item he laid (see below) was submitted to the Sultan.⁵⁴

Illustration 4.1: The Wreath laid by Kaiser Wilhelm II on the Tomb of Sultan Saladin (in 1898)



Source: BOA, *Y.EE.91/51* (1315/1898).

⁵³ Von Bülow 1931: 254: ‘*Möge der Sultan und mögen die 300 Millionen Mohammedaner, die, auf der Erde zersreut lebend, in ihm ihren Khalifen verehren, dessen versichert sein, daß zu allen Zeiten der deutsche Kaiser ihr Freund sein wird. Ich trinke auf das Wohl Seiner Majestät des Sultans Abdülhamid!*’ Penzler (ed.) 1904/2:127; Sabah 1316/1898: 171.

⁵⁴ BOA, *Y.EE.91/51* (1315/1898); see also: Gauss 1915: 129: ‘At Damascus, he [Kaiser Wilhelm II] likewise laid a wreath upon the tomb of Saladin.’

Kaiser Wilhelm's Damascus speech and his deeds resounded throughout the Muslim world. As a matter of fact, even nine years later Abdülhamid II recalled the speech with gratitude and he mentioned to the German Ambassador, Marschall von Bieberstein, the deep impression that the speech had left among all Muslims. According to Marschall von Bieberstein, Abdülhamid II told him that he [Abdülhamid II] could not thank Kaiser Wilhelm II enough for the speech he delivered in Damascus and for a speech he gave in Tangier/Morocco⁵⁵ in which he expressed Germany's concern over the need to protect a Muslim empire against foreign invasion and over the independence of Morocco.⁵⁶ The Sultan had stated that these two speeches would remain continuously in his memory and the memory of all Muslims.⁵⁷

In every respect, among other important political consequences and even among the emotional reflections of the *Orientreise*, the Kaiser's speech in Damascus and his declared admiration for the Sultan and his Empire ranked among Abdülhamid's most remarkable political acquisitions, the price of which had been paid in advance by the arms contracts and the railroad construction agreements signed with German firms. Arminius Vambéry, one of Abdülhamid's unofficial advisers, described the Kaiser's attitudes in a most striking way:

The Emperor William II admires the talent of the ruler in his friend,
which is its autocratic bearing he would like to imitate if it were

⁵⁵ Kaiser Wilhelm II had paid a visit to Tangier (Morocco) and delivered a speech there on March 31, 1905 which severely irritated the other European Great Powers. See: Penzler (ed.) 1904/3: 247- 249.

⁵⁶ Mortimer 1967: 440: Mortimer gives more detail about the interrelation between the trade and diplomacy in the case of Germany's attitude in the Agadir Crisis (the second Moroccan Crisis) in July 1911.

⁵⁷ Marschall to Auswärtiges Amt, 22.03.1907, in: PA.AA. R13775. Prince von Bülow wrote some more detail information about the Kaiser's Tangier visit: 'On March 31, 1905, His Majesty the Emperor, in pursuance of my advice, landed at Tangier, where he defended the independence and sovereignty of Morocco in unequivocal language.' Von Bülow 1917: 97. Howe made another explanation of the Kaiser's speeches and acts in the Muslim countries. He wrote: 'A successful attack upon the Moorish Government would injure German prestige with the Mohammedans, among whom Germany hoped for the new markets she deems of such vital importance. Loss of influence at Constantinople might mean the wrecking of Germany's Baghdad Railway project. It was for this reason that Germany refused to join Christendom in protecting the Armenians from massacre. Yet she was unable to stop Italy from driving the Turks out of Tripoli'. Howe 1916: 192.

possible; but he [Kaiser Wilhelm II] is clever enough to discount the reward for this admiration in various concessional privileges, & c. Well-paid appointments for German officers, consignments of arms, concessions for railway lines, manufactures...⁵⁸

In effect, the Kaiser's two *Reise nach Osten* (Travel to the East) prepared a profitable basis and 'a new and memorable starting-point' in the *Drang nach Osten* (Drive to the East) policy, which was framed within a peaceful penetration strategy.⁵⁹ As Von Bülow declared, it became a successful start to the cultivation of good relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, and Islam.⁶⁰ In fact, the Kaiser's Damascus speech was just one step of a determined programme.⁶¹ It was said that there was a *muhabbet* – affection – between the Kaiser and the Sultan; however the *Orientreise* and the speeches delivered during the trip provided an excellent opportunity for both sides to prove and improve this *muhabbet*.⁶²

During and after the second *Orientreise* the German entrepreneurs were highly successful in concluding some important agreements and also in extracting from the Ottoman Government promises for some new orders. As Prince von Bülow pointed out, '... the Baghdad Railway scheme was a result of the Emperor's journey to Palestine ... which was in every respect so successful'.⁶³ During the Kaiser's *Orientreise* the

⁵⁸ Vambéry 1904: 379.

⁵⁹ In 1898, *The [London] Times* published an informative article about the Kaiser's *Orientreise*. In this article sent from İstanbul on October 18, 1898, the importance of Kaiser's visit was pointed out as follows: 'The pacific crusade [the Kaiser's *Orientreise*] will be something more than a picturesque and romantic incident in modern history; it will mark a new and memorable starting-point in the *Drang nach Osten*' *The [London] Times*: 18.10.1898.

⁶⁰ Von Bülow 1917: 69.

⁶¹ Lindow 1934: 45-46: Lindow commented the Kaiser's speech as follows: 'Aus überquellendem Herzen gesprochen, stellen diese Worte doch ein gewisses politisches Programm dar und werden weithin als solches empfunden.'

⁶² Marschall von Bieberstein was right, when he wrote in 1898 about the Sultan's closeness to the Kaiser as follows: 'Man kann das russisch-türkische Verhältnis mit den Worten kennzeichnen: 'Der Sultan fürchtet Russland. [...] Man pflegt dem Satze 'Der Sultan fürchtet Russland' die Worte beizufügen 'und liebt Deutschland'. Wir können das akzeptieren. Vor allem hat der Sultan eine warme Freundschaft für Seine Majestät den Kaiser...' Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 24.05.1898, in: GP/12-2 1924: 564-565.

⁶³ Von Bülow 1917: 120.

German diplomats undertook aggressive diplomacy which was deservedly called, by Archibald J. Dunn, an ‘untiring German diplomacy’.⁶⁴

It was after the Kaiser’s trip that the railway project became a political instrument rather than an economically beneficial investment. So much so, as Barth revealed, that the board of *Deutsche Bank* intended to sell off the bank’s shares in the Ottoman railways to Russia on November 22, 1896, without first informing the German Government.⁶⁵ The board’s action appeared to confirm the view that the railway construction was not an indispensable investment for the German financier. The issue was not solely economic; the political image it created was as important as the project’s economic benefits. The *Deutsche Bank*’s intention did not materialise and it continued to play a role in the Ottoman railway business. In fact, that was the politicisation of an economic venture. As Barth asserts, the *Deutsche Bank*’s relative freedom in Ottoman affairs came to an end through Kaiser Wilhelm’s second *Orientreise*.⁶⁶

Thus, the *Orientreise* as a ‘romantic incident’ of an export-oriented expansionist strategy provided a guaranteed and facilitated *Absatzmarkt* for German products, especially those whose importation required governmental approval and obvious support.⁶⁷ For that reason the Kaiser’s trips, especially the second one, can properly be categorised as business trips.⁶⁸ According to the *Neue Freie Presse*, the Kaiser went to the Ottoman Empire – Germany’s best customer for war materials – as a business traveller promoting Germany’s economic advantage and his journey was just like a customer visit [*Kundenbesuch*].⁶⁹ Indeed, as Bode rightly asserted, on his second

⁶⁴ Dunn 1905: 54.

⁶⁵ Barth 1998: 121-122.

⁶⁶ Barth 1998: 122.

⁶⁷ Leishman to Hay, 17.06.1903, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/71.

⁶⁸ Kössler gives the following quotation from the French newspaper the ‘*Le Figaro*’ which supports the meaning of the expression given above: ‘*Der Deutsche Kaiser ist der rührigste und gewandteste Geschäftsreisende für das große Haus Deutschland.*’ Kössler 1981: 248.

⁶⁹ Benner 2001: 255.

Orientreise, Kaiser Wilhelm II – the ‘Managing Director of the German Empire’ (*Geschäftsführer*) within the context of Carl Peters’ above-given formulation – was personally interested in all aspects of the German economic expansion in the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁰

Alldeutsche Blätter, an important pro-colonialist paper, summarised the feasible targets of the Kaiser’s *Orientreise* in two points: political influence and economic benefits. The newspaper argued that the first success of the trip was to eliminate possible doubts entertained by the Sultan and his advisors about Germany’s posture on general Ottoman political affairs, about which the German Government had already declared their disinterest [*für politische Bestrebungen, welche den Bestand des türkischen Reiches gefährden*]. In fact, as the newspaper pointed out as well, even the mere elimination of any distrustfulness must be accepted as a rewarding success of the trip. The second successful outcome of the *Orientreise* was the mutual benefits for Germany and the Ottoman Empire based on the contributions to both states’ economic prosperity of German industry, trade and capital [*Großkapital*]. Therefore the newspaper suggested that the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire was desired in Germany.⁷¹ Naumann’s conception suggests a framework within which German capital should be invested [*Kapitalanlage*] he described it in a broader context – of a labour/working force [*arbeitende Kraft*] in the Ottoman Empire:

If the Germans want to support the Ottoman state, they must provide a working potential to her. This force is a capital investment and in broadest sense of the word: includes people, money, peasants, craftsmen, military personnel, civil servants, rails, banks, and machines. All these investments must, as the Kaiser [Wilhelm II] said in Bethlehem, be given freely with no expectation of immediate return, that is, with the full knowledge that they cannot pay off immediately. ... The end points of our work seem to be: Military reform, financial reform, and agricultural reform. The first point has

⁷⁰ Bode 1941: 4.

⁷¹ *Alldeutsche Blätter*: 16.07.1899.

already been done, much in the second but in the third as good as nothing.⁷²

In the meanwhile, the diplomats of the other nations were observing with suspicion the expanded influence of Germany and the deepening friendship between the two Empires. For instance, the US Ambassador, Angell, in his observation report in regard to Germany's thriving influence in the Ottoman Empire emphasised three main points, which are of importance to our further discussion of the consequences of the Kaiser's visit. First, he noted that Germany was the nation which enjoyed the highest favour in Istanbul. Second, he mentioned his predictions and also expressed a curiosity about the probable outcomes of the Kaiser's visit in these terms: 'Whether the German Sovereign is actuated by a desire to enlarge the commercial advantages of his people, or whether he has political aims in doing so much to secure the friendship of the Sultan, or whether, as is probable, he has both ends in view, time will disclose.' Finally, he pointed to Germany's emergence as the new influential nation in the Ottoman Empire. Angell noted: 'Certain it is that Germans are now in the ascendant here. German officers are employed to instruct the army, German professors are called to teach in the Imperial Medical College, German contractors have the best chance to furnish munitions to the Government.'⁷³ Everything Angell had listed fell within the concept that Naumann had formulated as the targets of German efforts in the Orient, as stated above.⁷⁴

To sum up, apart from everything that Kaiser Wilhelm said and did, his presence in the East, especially in Jerusalem, was a political stunt and part of a well-constructed diplomatic plan.⁷⁵ In fact, the plan was a part of a methodology which the

⁷² Naumann 1913: 162-163.

⁷³ Angell to Day, 25.07.1898, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/65.

⁷⁴ Naumann 1913: 162-163.

⁷⁵ Cf. Naumann 1913: 73.

German Foreign Office applied to the progress of relations with the Ottoman Empire. The German method [*die deutsche Methode*], as it was called by Marschall von Bieberstein, was later imitated by the other Great Powers.⁷⁶ Accordingly, thanks to the *die deutsche Methode*, the mutual friendship and the expressions of goodwill, the Ottoman door was opened wide for the exchange of German finished industrial products for Ottoman raw materials. The first outcomes of the Kaiser's visit, about which Angell was curious, appeared immediately (by 1898) in the economic indicators which went hand in hand with the political and military influence. The Kaiser's second *Orientreise* was however the most influential and multi-dimensional expansionist operation that started the process of gradual changes to the general picture of bilateral trade-based foreign relations. As previously stated, it was the second wave of the German expansionist strategy toward the Ottoman Empire after which Germany strengthened and broadened her influence in the Empire.

The Concrete Outcomes of the Kaiser's Second Orientreise: Some Critical Concessions

The second wave of Germany's expansionist policy towards the Ottoman Empire progressed the position achieved through the first wave by the German industrialists, traders, diplomats and politicians. However, as has been stated above, since the mutual trust and friendship between the two heads of state was the dominant determinant of this progress, the economic positions gained and strengthened through the Kaiser's visits were almost all in fields for which governmental approval was needed, such as

⁷⁶ Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 23.09.1899, in: GP/12-2 1924: 583: '*Der Sultan wird sich, wenn er heute freundliche Worte von einer Seite vernimmt, die ihm früher keine Demütigung erspart hat, erinnern, daß Deutschland ihm gegenüber stets die Grenzen internationaler Höflichkeit eingehalten hat, und daß es die deutsche Methode ist, welche andere Großmächte nachahmen, wenn sie sich in ihren Beziehungen zu der Türkei urbaner Formen befleißigen.*'

the purchase of military equipment (artillery, rifles and warships), the construction of railways and the laying of telegraph wires. Although Germany broadened her position in all of these sectors, the most significant progress was made by the German armament industry. It is asserted that the only market where the Germans held a monopoly position was the Ottoman arms market. Behind that achievement was the foundation of implementation of the German method [*die deutsche Methode*], which was based on good personal relations, and its application into what we have called the German Style of War Business.

It is important to recognise, as Osman Nuri noted, that the Germans began their trade journey in the Ottoman Empire from scratch;⁷⁷ their starting point had been formed by double-sided governmental support which was mostly determined on the basis of personal diplomacy on the part of the Kaiser and the Sultan.⁷⁸ When Wilhelm II was still in the Ottoman Empire and taking strong steps to reinforce his nation's position in the Ottoman market, *The [London] Times* reported to its readers: 'Political considerations incline the Turkish Government to grant facilities for the expansion of German commerce and financial enterprise; the Sultan regards the Kaiser as his only friend, and German applicants for valuable concessions are, as a rule, preferred to their competitors.'⁷⁹ The comment was accurate. This direct influence of high-ranking personalities on shaping bilateral relations makes the extraordinary jump in the foreign trade indicators shown below more comprehensible. The following table and figure clearly demonstrate how the foreign trade indicators between the two countries changed dramatically, especially after Wilhelm II's visits.

⁷⁷ Osman Nuri 1327/1911: 1052: '*[Almanlar] hiçden işe başlayarak şarkdaki ticaretlerini hayli ilerlettiler.*'

⁷⁸ Bode 1941: 4.

⁷⁹ *The [London] Times*: 18.10.1898.

Table 4.1: Ottoman Trade with Germany, 1895-1912 (in Marks)


Years	Export	Import	Years	Export	Import
1895	22,000,000	39,000,000	1904	43,500,000	75,300,000
1896	25,900,000	28,000,000	1905	51,600,000	71,000,000
1897	30,500,000	30,900,000	1906	55,100,000	68,500,000
1898*	<u>29,500,000</u>	<u>37,100,000</u>	1907	55,100,000	81,700,000
1899	28,900,000	32,600,000	1908	47,600,000	64,000,000
1900	30,200,000	34,300,000	1909	57,300,000	78,900,000
1901	30,100,000	37,500,000	1910	67,400,000	104,900,000
1902	36,600,000	43,300,000	1911	70,100,000	112,800,000
1903	37,600,000	50,200,000	1912	77,600,000	112,800,000

Source: Birken 1980:176.

*New orders placed during the Kaiser's visit (1898) are reflected in the trade statistics two or three years later. See the Figure 4.1 below.

As seen in Figure 4.1 below, the Kaiser's initial visit to İstanbul in 1889 marked the emergence of German commercial actors in the Ottoman market, whereas the next significant increase came just after the Kaiser's second *Orientreise*. The second visit was obviously more productive with respect to commercial aspects. On this point, deep investigation of the data behind this graph gives us a clearer picture. It is worth recalling that this sharp increase in the total trade volume was produced mostly by materials the importation of which required governmental approval and support. The companies in the iron and steel industry benefited most from these developments. The railroads built across Asia Minor, the war materials purchased from the German houses and the telegraph cable construction dramatically increased Germany's market share in the Ottoman Empire. Krupp, which enjoyed a monopoly on the provision of artillery for the Ottoman Army, was also the chief rail supplier for the construction of the Baghdad Railway.

Figure 4.1: Ottoman Trade with Germany, 1878-1913 (in Marks)



Source: Birken 1980: 176

The dramatic increase in the figure above emerged mainly through the concessions obtained by the German syndicate headed by the *Deutsche Bank*. Among the most important results of the Kaiser's second visit was the Baghdad Railway, one of the most discussed operations of the German expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire. The Baghdad Railway project deserves intense investigation, but as a detailed focus on it is not the chief purpose of this study, we will mention only briefly the process of the award of the concession to the Germans within the framework of the concrete consequences of the Kaiser's second *Orientreise*.⁸⁰ Prince von Bülow clearly

⁸⁰ As one of the most discussed titles related to the German-Ottoman relations, the Baghdad Railway was mostly studied in the context of German imperialist expansion policy and amongst the causes of the First World War. In fact, there is an extensive literature on the history of the Baghdad Railway. However the

illustrated the link between the *Orientreise* and the Baghdad Railway scheme in his memoirs. As he stated, the Baghdad Railway was a result of the Emperor's journey to Palestine. The railway project was described by Paul Rohrbach, the semi-official spokesman of German imperialism, as a political life insurance policy for Germany.⁸¹ In addition, Scherer asserted that the line between Eskişehir and Konya, which opened in 1896, was the first step of the Baghdad Railway.⁸² However, the fact was that the Baghdad Railway scheme existed at least as an idea and a favourite plan [*Lieblingsplan*] of Sultan Abdülhamid long before the first section reached Eskişehir. Numerous documents demonstrate that a rail line which would extend to Baghdad was one of Abdülhamid's long cherished plans.

Germany was never mentioned in the earlier negotiations – those that occurred before 1887 – whereas Russia, France and Britain were. The Germans entered the race for the Ottoman railway construction-contracts in 1888 and obtained their first concessions in 1889 (Anatolian Railway).⁸³ Nevertheless the Germans' participation in the competition – as an unexpected rival – devastated the balance of calculations made by the competitors, namely the French and British companies which had already invested in Ottoman lands. In 1887, before the German entrance to the game, Sir William White sent a report to Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, in which he wrote, 'Your Lordship will no doubt be glad to learn that W. Seefelder, the Representative of the İzmit-Haydarpaşa Railway Company at Constantinople, has

following are some of the foremost studies: Rohrbach 1915; Earle 1924; Holborn 1926; Butterfield 1932; Bode 1941; Henderson 1948; J. B. Wolf 1973; Mejcher 1975; Özyüksel 1988; Barth 1998; McMurray 2001:32; Gencer 2006.


⁸¹ Luxemburg 1919: 48.

⁸² Scherer 2001: 490.

⁸³ Barth 1998: 116.

succeeded in concluding a preliminary arrangement with the Ottoman Government for the construction of a railroad to Ankara and Diyarbakır and ultimately to Baghdad.’⁸⁴

**Map 4.1: Haydarpaşa -İzmit Railway with its Projected Extensions in Asia Minor
(Dated on February 04, 1885)**



Source: NA, London: FO 78/4264:10

Two years later, on December 24, 1889, Pendleton King sent a report entitled ‘German commerce and influence in Turkey’, pointing out that the rail line built by the German group from İzmit to Ankara ‘will be continued to Baghdad’.⁸⁵ Based on this it can be speculated that Abdülhamid’s idea of giving German capital and industry the concession/right to extend the existing railroad to the Persian Gulf evidently emerged during the Kaiser’s first visit to İstanbul in 1889, even though it was during the Kaiser’s second visit to the Sultan in 1898 that the Germanisation of the Ottoman-Baghdad railroad project became a real and concrete political outcome. The initial step

⁸⁴ White to Salisbury, 16.08.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3999. See Appendix 4.1.

⁸⁵ King to Blaine, 24.12.1889, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/50.

of the Baghdad railway was taken as early as 1888 when the *Deutsche Bank* was awarded the first railway concession by Abdülhamid II, who clearly harboured distrust of the British and French firms that were already active in Ottoman railroad construction. According to a telegram the Kaiser sent to the *Reichskanzler* on December 9, 1891, Abdülhamid requested Wilhelm's support [*Schutz*] for standing against the American, French and British intrigue with regard to obtaining railway contracts to implement his *Lieblingsplan* - the Baghdad Railway project.⁸⁶ A report Goltz Pasha sent to Kaiser Wilhelm II on October 28, 1891, supports this assertion. During an audience at the Yıldız Palace on October 25, 1891, the Sultan stated to Goltz Pasha that the extension of the railroad from Ankara to the Persian Gulf via Baghdad was his old favourite plan [*alter Lieblingsplan*], implementation of which would be of high military and political significance, as a way to transport the army in the defence of İstanbul and to draw traffic from India to the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁷ To quote Goltz Pasha's report, during the audience Abdülhamid's expectation of the construction of a railroad from İstanbul to the Persian Gulf:

Through the opening up of these lines, especially in the case of a war, I [Sultan Abdülhamid] will be able to utilize the whole of my armed forces from the Asian provinces, from which direction the enemies may come. At the same time [by opening up these lines], the commerce of India, which must then take the direction of Basra to Constantinople, will raise the welfare of my countries.⁸⁸

After seven years of his requests, in October 1898, when Kaiser Wilhelm II was still in İstanbul, Sultan Abdülhamid mentioned his intention to award to a German group the concession to build the new railroad, which would run Baghdad and the

⁸⁶ Wilhelm II to the Reichskanzler, 09.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

⁸⁷ Goltz to the Kaiser, 28.10.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

⁸⁸ Goltz to the Kaiser, 28.10.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763. See Appendix 4.2.

Persian Gulf.⁸⁹ The idea of a rail line that would connect Berlin to the Persian Gulf and would be realised by German capital and industry filled the Kaiser with enthusiasm. According to Friedrich Rosen, who accompanied the Kaiser during the trip and was later appointed by the Kaiser as consul in Jerusalem, the concession was a guest-gift of the Sultan [*Gastgeschenk des Sultans*] to Kaiser Wilhelm.⁹⁰ In fact, this *Gastgeschenk* was almost like Abdülhamid's hidden gift, which was left waiting for more than ten years, to be presented to the right person at the right time. However, the second *Orientreise* might have been the right time to present this gift to the right person: Abdülhamid's friend, Kaiser Wilhelm II.

News of the conversation and the award of the concession quickly spread over Europe through the newspaper correspondents, but in a mostly agitated way. For instance, the Austrian Newspaper *Neue Freie Presse* compared the possible achievement of the concession by the German firms with the military occupation of the Bay of Kiaochow by the German Admiral von Diederichs in 1898, by which, according to *The New York Times*, three of Europe's Great Powers – England, France and Russia – were directly threatened.⁹¹ 'It is a tremendous perspective', said the Austrian newspaper, 'with more enormous background than those which had been acquired through the occupation of Kiaochow.'⁹² So the *Orientreise* came to represent a new way of penetration and also occupation, which was more influential and greater in scale than those which had been applied for many years by the other imperialist European powers: peaceful penetration by means of the German Method [*die deutsche Methode*].

⁸⁹ Gencer 2006: 105; additionally Woods mentioned that he was of opinion that the Sultan made a verbal promise to the Kaiser regarding the Baghdad Railway as early as in 1898 during Kaiser's *Orientreise*. Woods 1917: 38.

⁹⁰ Cited in Gencer 2006: 105; Pohl 1999: 53-54; *The Neue Presse (Morgenblatt)*: 20.10.1898.

⁹¹ *The New York Times*: 02.01.1898.

⁹² *The Neue Presse (Morgenblatt)*: 20.10.1898.

As early as May 1899, an agreement to fund the Baghdad railway was signed between the *Deutsche Bank* and the Imperial Ottoman Bank.⁹³ The preliminary concession (*Vorkonzession*) was signed by Georg von Siemens, the Director of *Deutsche Bank* and President of the Anatolian Railway Company, on November 27, 1899.⁹⁴ For the concession, the *Deutsche Bank* deposited an advance of 200,000 OL in the Ottoman Treasury.⁹⁵ The Sultan approved the concession by the *Îrâde* issued on January 16, 1902, and the agreement was finally signed on March 5, 1903, between the Ottoman Government and the Director of the *Deutsche Bank*, Arthur von Gwinner, the successor of von Siemens who died on October 23, 1902.⁹⁶

On the day the *Îrâde* was issued, Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a letter to the Sultan in which he expressed his appreciation regarding the news given to him by the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin related to the concession awarded to the German group. The words he used in the letter were clearly meant to highlight his satisfaction:

I would most sincerely congratulate your Majesty the Sultan on your success in getting to be the establisher of such a beautiful and exalted order for public works. The day of January 06, 1902, on which his Majesty's *Îrâde*, with regards to the concession, was issued, will be forever remembered as the day of happiness [*yevm-i mes'ûd*] for the history of his Empire's progress.⁹⁷

Kaiser Wilhelm had every right to be pleased because, as the following table indicates, through the Sultan's *Îrâde*, the Baghdad Railway, which was principally demanded by the British companies at an earlier stage, fell into the hands of a German syndicate. It appeared to the Kaiser that it was a German victory gained, quite literally, at the expense of the British industrial and financial groups.

⁹³ McMurray 2001: 32; On July 16 1899, the news of the Baghdad railway concession was published by the German pro-colonialist newspaper *Alldeutsche Blätter* on the first page with the title '*Deutsche Arbeit in der Türkei*' *Alldeutsche Blätter*: 16.06.1899.

⁹⁴ Woods 1917: 38.

⁹⁵ Barth 1998: 122; McMurray 2001: 32.

⁹⁶ Woods 1917: 38; Gencer 2006: 106.

⁹⁷ BOA, *Y.EE.62/15* (06.10.1319/ 16.01.1902). See Appendix 4.3.

Table 4.2: Financial Participation of Foreign Financiers in the Baghdad Railway (1903)

Shareholders	Percentage (%)
<i>Deutsche Bank</i>	40
<i>Banque Impériale Ottomane</i>	30
<i>Anatolische Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft</i>	10
<i>Wiener Bankverein und Schweizerische Kreditanstalt</i>	7
<i>Banca Commerciale Italiana</i>	5

Source: Gall 1995: 78.

The position of the *Deutsche Bank* obtained through the Anatolian and Baghdad Railway concessions was both politically and economically significant. Therefore, the debates on the Baghdad Railway concession cemented the interrelationship between politics and the economy once more. Germany's involvement in the Baghdad Railway was a combination of private and public initiatives.⁹⁸ However, according to *The Standard* newspaper of August 23, 1899, over time the question of the Baghdad Railway Project became a political, rather than a commercial one.⁹⁹ Abdülhamid II was well aware of the principal rationale of the European States towards the Baghdad Railway construction. In 1900, the Sultan wrote in his diary: 'In spite of all the denials it is only too obvious that these large construction projects such as the rail line are undertaken not only for economic purposes, but they also have a political significance.'¹⁰⁰ It was no surprise, then, that the Ambassadors of the European States had shown keen interest in the Ottoman railway construction. Their endeavours were even more intense and powerful than those of the financial or constructional investors. Their aggressive involvement in the concurrence was described by Abdülhamid II as follows:

⁹⁸ McMurray 2001: 8.

⁹⁹ *The Standard*: 23.08.1899 cited in Schöllgen 2000: 131.

¹⁰⁰ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 60. '*En dépit de toutes les dénégations il n'est que trop évident que ces projets de construction de lignes ferrées sont faits non seulement en vue de buts économiques, mais qu'ils ont aussi une importance politique.*'

The competition for the Baghdad Rail line has become absolutely *grotesque* ... It is a great pleasure to be present to witness the spectacle. I can wish nothing more favourable than to witness all four of them devour one another. Whatever the outcome it is to our advantage!¹⁰¹

As a commercial/financial operation, the Baghdad Railway from its outset was inextricably and closely intertwined with the expansionist strategy of the German Foreign Office. But from that point of view the Baghdad Railway was not an exceptional case where the German Government in general intervened in commercial matters abroad. This intervention was a part of a strategy which we are calling - in broad terms - the German Style of War Business. The complex intertwining of foreign trade and investment with foreign policy and also military strategy became the main characteristics of the German style of doing business - in particular with the Ottoman Empire - during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Without question, the Kaiser's visits to the Ottoman Empire - especially the second one - were the first events in which this method [*die deutsche Methode*] was applied. Pointing to this interrelation between the political and economic questions, Marschall von Bieberstein said in 1907 that 'the economic interests are so much in the forefront of international life, that any attempt to separate them from the political questions would be necessarily in vain'.¹⁰²

Another noteworthy concrete outcome of the second *Orientreise* was the right given to the German Anatolian Railway Company to build a harbour, quay and bonded warehouses at Haydarpaşa, site of the Anatolian Railway Company's terminus on the Bosphorus. The convention for the concession was signed on March 23, 1899, by Zihni Pasha, Minister of Commerce and Public Works, and Dr Zander, Chairman of the

¹⁰¹Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 60: '*La concurrence pour la ligne de Bagdad devient absolument grotesque. ... C'est un vrai plaisir d'assister à ce spectacle Je ne demande pas mieux que de les voir toutes les quatre s'entre-dévorer. Tant mieux pour nous.*'

¹⁰²Marschall to Von Bülow, 26.12.1907, in: NA, London: GFM 10/11.

Anatolian Railway Company,¹⁰³ under the name of '*Société du Port de Haidar Pacha*.'¹⁰⁴ However, both the Anatolian Railway Company and the *Société du Port de Haidar Pacha* meant in practice the *Deutsche Bank*, which acted as the chief financier of these two projects.¹⁰⁵ This concession giving the right to the Germans irritated both the French and British interest in İstanbul and it was opposed especially strongly by the French Government in the interest of the French Quay Company.¹⁰⁶

According to a report the British Ambassador at İstanbul, Sir Nicholas O'Connor, submitted to Lord Salisbury on February 8, 1899, the French company claimed a monopoly right to build '*quais, docks, et entrepôts*' in the port of Constantinople. O'Connor also wrote that the French Ambassador, Constans, energetically protested against the Haydarpaşa Harbour concession in as much as it was in direct opposition to the privileges and rights already accorded to the French Government.¹⁰⁷ In fact, the Germans had already been guaranteed the concession through high-ranking interference - namely Kaiser Wilhelm's direct request - during the Kaiser's second visit and therefore efforts performed by French Ambassador Constans or other ambassadors would not be as effective as the Kaiser's endeavour, which facilitated the decision-making process in favour of Germans.¹⁰⁸ The Kaiser's

¹⁰³ An unnamed newspaper cutting dated March 24 1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000.

¹⁰⁴ Pohl 1999:104: The board of directors of the *Société* were: Karl Schrader (Railway Director and the member of the German *Reichstag*), Arthur von Gwinner (*Deutsche Bank*), Max Steinthal (*Deutsche Bank*), Kurt Zander (*Anatolian Railway Company*), and Eduard Huguenin (*Anatolian Railway Company*).

¹⁰⁵ Richter 1997: 119-122.

¹⁰⁶ O'Connor to Salisbury, 08.02.1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000; British Ambassador O'Connor paid a visit to the German Ambassador on March 11, 1899 and spoke to him on this subject. During the conversation, as O'Connor reported, Marschall von Bieberstein assured him positively that the potential rates would be excluded and that no lower or different rates would be accorded to German than to British goods arriving at Haydarpaşa by whatever route they came. O'Connor to Salisbury 11.03.1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000.

¹⁰⁷ O'Connor to Salisbury, 08.02.1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000. See also: BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.32/27* (01.11.1316/13.03.1899).

¹⁰⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.58/8* (14.07.1316/28.11.1898); BOA, *Y.PRK.HR.26/71* (22.07.1316/06.12.1898); BOA, *Y.PRK.HR.26/78* (06.08.1316/28.12.1898); however, according to the document dated June 17 1899, and referred to the Turkish newspaper '*Servet*', French Ambassador Constans' action had born fruits and that the French Quay Company had succeeded in obtaining favourable modifications in their

good relations with Abdülhamid prompted the Sultan to grant him precious concessions. Apparently, in the words of a young Ottoman officer, who was interviewed by *The New York Herald's* correspondent in 1908, 'German amity was onerous'.¹⁰⁹

From the commercial and technical points of view, this concession provided many significant advantages to Germany.¹¹⁰ It was also important for the British in terms of their commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire. In his report, O'Connor summarised the possible contributions of the Port of Haydarpaşa concession to Germany's economic advantages gained already through the Anatolian Railway.¹¹¹ O'Connor voiced his opinion that the principal importance of the concession lay in the increased power of control it gave the Germans over Asia Minor's export and import traffic. The export trade in Asia was, according to O'Connor, already largely controlled by the German-operated Anatolian Railway Company. The British Ambassador emphasised that: 'The German hold on the trade passing along the Sea of Marmara will thus be fortified, and if, in addition to this, Germany obtains an outlet at Smyrna [İzmir], she will be in a position to exercise an overwhelming influence over the entire carrying trade of Asia Minor.'¹¹²

Philipp Holzmann, a German construction company based in Frankfurt/Main enjoying close connections to the *Deutsche Bank*,¹¹³ obtained the Haydarpaşa Harbour contract as one of its first international ventures.¹¹⁴ It began construction in September 1900 and finished in April 1903. By then, the Haydarpaşa Harbour had a 600-metre

cahier de charges as an offset to the privileges acquired by the Anatolian Railway Company. O'Connor to Salisbury 17.06.1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000.

¹⁰⁹ *The New York Herald*: 26.10.1908.

¹¹⁰ Siemens to Thielen, 01.07.1893, in: PA.AA. R13451.

¹¹¹ O'Connor to Salisbury, 08.02.1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000.

¹¹² O'Connor to Salisbury, 08.02.1899, in: NA, London: FO 78/5000.

¹¹³ Gall 1995: 74.

¹¹⁴ Pohl 1999: 104; Özyüksel 1988: 129-130.

breakwater with a lighthouse at its end; large quays, warehouses, granaries and cranes were also provided. The new port handled 6 per cent of the Ottomans' trade and received about two-thirds of rail-shipped wheat.¹¹⁵ The harbour, and later the railway station at Haydarpaşa, as the start point of the Baghdad Railway– designed by Hellmuth Cuno and built by the German firm Philipp Holzmann in 1905 – made a remarkable contribution to the growth of German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁶ The construction of the Haydarpaşa harbour and railway station and their connection to the Persian Gulf through the German-made Baghdad Railway occupied an important place in Marschall von Bieberstein's vision of the future [*Zukunftsbild*]. Lindow cited the following statement written by Marschall in a report dated 1899:

The port of Haydarpaşa, which was mostly supplied by German goods carried on German ships; the railway line from there to Baghdad, [for whose construction] a German company uses only German materials is at the same time – for both goods and people - the shortest way from the heart of Germany to her East Asian possessions [*Besitzungen*]. So that the previous view, which [identified with] the famous dictum that the whole East was not worth of a single Pomeranian grenadier, is in contradiction with the present events and is just an interesting historical memory, but no longer a current reality.¹¹⁷

In addition to railway construction, the installation of telegraph lines arose as another investment area for German entrepreneurs. German cable companies had demonstrated their interest in the Ottoman telegraph network during and after Kaiser Wilhelm's *Orientreise*.¹¹⁸ England was the dominant supplier of the Ottomans' telegraph requirements until 1899. As a result of energetic intervention by the Kaiser – he made a direct request to the Sultan to provide the concession rights to German firms – the

¹¹⁵ Henderson 1948:59, 62; Quataert 1977: 149.

¹¹⁶ See for detail: Pohl 1999: 96-108.

¹¹⁷ Lindow 1934: 48.

¹¹⁸ Richter 1997: 113-118.

concession for a telegraph cable line from Berlin to İstanbul via Bucharest and Constanta was given to German companies.¹¹⁹

Among the early attempts made by German capitalists following the Kaiser's second presence in Ottoman territory, the establishment of the *German-Palestine Bank* (GPB), deserves mention. The bank was founded in 1899 by *Bankhaus von der Heydt & Co*; to promote trade between Germany and Palestine and the bank's branches.¹²⁰ The GPB took over the assets and premises of *Deutsche Palästina und Orient-Gesellschaft* (Limited) in Jerusalem with a capital of 5,000,000 Marks.¹²¹ The GPB opened branches in Jaffa and Jerusalem and an agency in Gaza. According to Tschoegl, in the following years the GPB opened more branches in Haifa, Beirut, Damascus, Tripoli and Alexandretta and agencies in Nazareth and Nablus. However, Riesser asserted that in 1911 the GPB had just four branches – in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Beirut and Hamburg.¹²² The GPB continued to operate till 1914, when it was absorbed by the *Deutsche Orient Bank*.¹²³ German banks spread all around the Ottoman Empire. The German traders, who used to work with the Austrian Bank in their Ottoman businesses, began to use the German banks established in the Ottoman Empire more and more. Not surprisingly, this was of great importance for German capital investment in the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁴ The German capitalists' interest in the Ottoman market gradually increased over time. In 1913, after the French, the Germans became the second largest holders of Ottoman bonds (with a market share of 20.1%), while the previous largest holder, Britain, was pushed down to the level of 6.9%.

¹¹⁹ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.58/8* (14.07.1316/28.11.1898); BOA, *Y.A.HUS.390/88* (16.06.1316/01.11.1898); Osman Nuri 1327/1911: 1050-1051.

¹²⁰ Riesser 1911: 454; Tschoegl 2004: 252; Cf: *Die Post* 16.12.1898, in: PA.AA: R12456.

¹²¹ Riesser 1911: 454.

¹²² Riesser 1911: 454.

¹²³ Tschoegl 2004: 252.

¹²⁴ Osman Nuri 1327/1911: 1049-1050.

Table 4.3: The Bondholders of the Ottoman Converted Debt, 1898-1913 (in %)

	1898	1913	Change in %
France	44.9	49.5	+4.6
Britain	10.9	6.9	-4.0
Germany	12.2	20.1	+7.9
Belgium	17.9	11.0	-6.9
Netherlands	4.5	3.0	-1.5
Italy	1.3	1.0	-0.3
Austria-Hungary	1.9	1.3	-0.6
Ottoman Empire	6.4	7.2	+0.8
Total	100	100	

Source: Schölch 1975: 440.

The concentration of German capital investment also should be emphasised. According to Pamuk, German capital investment - outside the public debt – was concentrated on Ottoman railroad construction. He asserts that by 1914 more than 80% of German direct investment in the Ottoman Empire had been placed in railroad construction. According to the author, at the same time only 40% of British direct investment and 60% of French direct investment had gone into railroads.¹²⁵ Moreover, the concessions for the most valuable minerals of the Ottoman Empire had been secured by the German banks (*Deutsche Bank, Disconto Gesellschaft, Darmstaedter Bank, Dresdner, and National Bank*) for their metallurgical subsidiaries in several places in Germany.¹²⁶

The close political relationship between the two heads of state, namely the Kaiser and the Sultan, promoted German investment in the Ottoman Empire – and the more they drew close the more contracts Germany obtained. As a result of the Kaiser's visits, the Germans considerably increased their sphere of influence compared to the other nations. Knowing that, Ambassador Marschall von Bieberstein and the other German civil servants in İstanbul acted in a more obvious way to support their countrymen's business entrepreneurship in the Ottoman Empire. One of the most noticeable examples of this kind

¹²⁵ Pamuk 1987: 79.

¹²⁶ Newbold 1916: 87.

of support emerged at the expense of the British investor Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and his attempt to win a concession for electric lighting at İzmir. According to a report in *The Standard* of June 7, 1899, his application for the concession was rejected because of opposition from a German company which had been trying to obtain it for nine years.¹²⁷ However, six days later Ashmead-Bartlett sent the Editor of *The Standard* a letter which corrected some points given in the report; his letter also drew attention to the strangeness of the concession award process:

First, I did not ask for the electric concessions of Smyrna [İzmir] and Salonika. I was offered and promised these concessions by the Turkish Government in November last. Three of these have now been completed. Second, the Smyrna Electric Lighting was not refused me by the Council of Ministers: but, in consequence of the severe pressure of the German Ambassador, [the] Minister asked me to give a guarantee against a possible claim for damages on the part of a German competitor. This I naturally declined to give and the *Mazbata* (final report) was, therefore, postponed. ... The German Ambassador made three personal visits to the Porte in opposition to my concession, and sent his first Dragoman every day both to the [Yıldız] Palace and the Porte. Ministers themselves assured me that my competitor's claim had no force in law, and that they wished to complete my lighting concession, but were afraid of the German Ambassador. I replied that the Sultan and not the German Ambassador was Sovereign of Turkey, and that there were other Ambassadors besides the German in Constantinople. The British and French Ambassador are supporting my rights; it remains to be seen with what results.¹²⁸

After recounting the process, Ashmead-Bartlett sharply criticised his government's Ottoman policy from the perspective of an investor: 'The whole business is an excellent illustration of what we have lost and what Germany has gained by our foolish anti-Turkish policy of the last six years.' He concluded his letter with a striking expression: 'The Germans are eating up everything in Turkey - a country which is by nature richer, safer, and far better worthy of the attention of British investors than China.'¹²⁹ Ashmead-Bartlett's letter was also published in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and it created a

¹²⁷ *The Standard*: 07.06.1899, in: PA.AA. R14148.

¹²⁸ *The Standard*: 13.07.1899, in: PA.AA. R14148.

¹²⁹ *The Standard*: 13.07.1899, in: PA.AA. R14148.

tremendous impression in the German colonisation-oriented newspaper *Alldeutsche Blätter*, which described Ashmead-Bartlett's statements as a *Jammer*. After quoting Ashmead-Bartlett's statement 'The Germans are eating up everything in Turkey' the *Alldeutsche Blätter* inveighed against his acute utterance: 'Hold up a minute, Mr Bartlett, we Germans are not English!'¹³⁰

Ashmead-Bartlett's case demonstrates that the businessmen and investors were aware much earlier of the shifting balance in Ottoman foreign policy and its fundamental and concrete consequences in many aspects of the bilateral relations than were the policy-makers. In the years that followed, Germany's relations with France and Britain did not improve; on the contrary, from 1890 onwards political friction among the European states increased steadily.¹³¹ As was apparent in the case of Ashmead-Bartlett, following the Germans' aggressive penetration into the Ottoman market the British and French Ambassadors had begun to act together against Germany. Ashmead-Bartlett noted that the British and French Ambassadors supported his rights against Germany.¹³²

Kaiser Wilhelm II and His Contribution to the German Style of War Business

Through the *Orientreise*, Kaiser Wilhelm had realised one of his major aims: to 'open a new market for German energy and initiative [*der deutschen Energie und der deutschen Tatkraft*]'.¹³³ One of the most prominent representatives of German energy

¹³⁰ *Alldeutsche Blätter*: 16. 07. 1899: 'Sir Ellis Aschmead Bartlett macht seinem Jammer ... in seinem Briefe an die 'Pall Mall Gazette' gar in dem Schrecken-rufe Luft: „Die Deutschen verschlucken einfach die ganze Türkei.' Gemach, Gemach, Herr Bartlett, wir Deutschen sind doch keine –Engländer!'

¹³¹ Trumpener 1996: 111; Menne 1938: 240.

¹³² *The Standard*: 13.07.1899, in: PA.AA. R14148.

¹³³ Kaiser Wilhelm II's speech on December 01,1898: 'Ich hoffe..., daß meine Reise dazu beigetragen hat, der deutschen Energie und der deutschen Tatkraft neue Absatzgebiete zu eröffnen, und daß es mir gelungen ist mitzuwirken die Beziehungen zwischen unseren beiden Völkern, dem türkischen und dem deutschen, zu befestigen.' Penzler (ed.) 1904/2: 127-128. Also, it is interesting to notice that the notion of 'German energy' was earlier conceptualized by *The [London] Times*. In an article sent from İstanbul on

and initiative abroad was unquestionably the armament industry, which played an important role in the expansion of German influence towards foreign countries. Essentially, Germany's aggressive expansionist foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire was correlated with an increase in armaments exports and a strengthening of the arms-makers' position in the German state.¹³⁴ Before moving on to the Kaiser's position in the German arms-makers' business strategy in the Ottoman market, it might be illuminating to focus on his relations with the arms makers, especially to the Krupp family. The expression, the 'German Style of War Business,' which is used as the title of this study, gains its very meaning from the arms-makers' personal connections with the German state apparatus and also in the government's contribution to their successful business abroad. Among these connections, Kaiser Wilhelm's friendship with Krupp, the leading industrialist of his time, was of the utmost significance.

The strong relationship between the Krupp family (The House of Krupp) and the Kaiser's family (The House of Hohenzollern) had a long and interesting history which went back to earlier times, when Wilhelm I was the King of Prussia. Manchester describes the closeness between Alfred Krupp and Wilhelm I (1797-1888) as an 'unbreakable link' and adds: 'Alfred wanted to make guns, Wilhelm wanted to buy them. It was a marriage of convenience, perhaps of necessity, and not even death could end it; each of Wilhelm's successors was bound to be allied with the senior Krupp of his generation.'¹³⁵ In July 1853, Prince Wilhelm demonstrated his satisfaction by awarding Alfred Krupp the Order of the Red Eagle Fourth Class, which was described

October 18 1898, the special correspondent asserted that 'nowhere has German commercial enterprise and energy gained greater triumphs than in Turkey. In the supply of war material to the Sultan Germany enjoys a practical monopoly; the Ottoman army receives its rifles from Mauser, its cannon from Krupp.' *The [London] Times*: 18.10.1898.

¹³⁴ Lehmann explains this arguments in a general meaning as follows: '*Je aggressiver die Zielsetzung des erstarkenden deutschen Imperialismus wurde, desto stärker wurden die Positionen der Rüstungsindustrie -und das ist ohne Zweifel nach 1900 der Fall-, um so stärker verwachsen sie mit dem Staat.*' Lehmann 1976: 96-97.

¹³⁵ Manchester 1969: 111.

by Showalter as ‘the first link in a chain which would bind the two dynasties for over a half century’.¹³⁶ Wilhelm II continued the friendship between the two dynasties. He was, as *The New York Times* argued, personally very fond of F.A. Krupp.¹³⁷ At the same time, Isabel V. Hull comments that Wilhelm II found F.A. Krupp ‘personally very attractive because his personality echoed parts of Wilhelm’s own’. Hull adds that ‘Krupp and Wilhelm shared an avid interest in technological progress and inventions of every sort’.¹³⁸

Wilhelm II frequently visited Krupp, spending nights with the Kaiserin at the *Villa Hügel* on the Krupp family estate in Essen. *The New York Times* asserted that the Kaiser never visited that part of Germany without seeing F.A. Krupp.¹³⁹ In this respect, Wilhelm II was a strong believer that the Krupp firm was of tremendous importance for Germany. He was of the opinion that the international reputation enjoyed by German workers and German industry was exclusively provided by the Krupp factory. On the death of F.A. Krupp in 1902, the Kaiser wrote to Bertha Krupp, daughter of F. A. Krupp, saying that the work of the Krupp family was ‘God given’.¹⁴⁰ Thus, thanks to his strategic contacts, the owner of the ‘God given’ factory, Mr Krupp, achieved a position almost like a sacrosanct personality in the German Empire. The unfortunate fate of J. Ludwig von Verdy, the Prussian War Minister (1889-1890), may throw light on the influence of the Krupp family on the German Government. On July 20, 1890, Von Verdy had notified the Kaiser that:

¹³⁶ Showalter 1975: 169.

¹³⁷ *The New York Times*: 23.11.1902.

¹³⁸ Hull 1982: 158.

¹³⁹ *The New York Times*: 23.11.1902; Hull puts forward that Wilhelm II saw Krupp on almost yearly. Hull 1982: 159.

¹⁴⁰ Owen has cited from: HA, Krupp: FAH IV E 782: Wilhelm II to Frä. Bertha Krupp of 12 December 1902. Owen described the Kaiser’s letter sent to Bertha Krupp ‘a superlative exposition of socio-political nostrum which the twentieth century was fast eroding.’ Owen 1978: 81.

The prices paid by the military authorities to the Krupp works up to now have been very high, precisely because the monopoly granted by the military authorities to the firm....The Krupp works have in this respect, in their relations with the Ministry of War, acted in their own business interests in the most extensive way, and the Army authorities are in a total state of dependence on them in the matter of price.¹⁴¹

Afterwards Von Verdy refused to purchase the artillery in question from the Krupp factory. As a possible consequence of this act, Von Verdy was removed from office.¹⁴² However, the relationship between the two personalities (Krupp and the Kaiser) was not based solely on friendship. Their shared interest was to expand their influence as widely as possible. Krupp was a prominent supporter of Germany's economic expansionism strategy, which was one of the major parts of the Kaiser's political vision. In one respect, the deeds of the Kaiser and Krupp might be described as different reflections of the same intention. In the Kaiser's opinion, Krupp's success in business abroad brought international prestige for Germany, in a way that had never been gained by other German firms. In a speech made in Essen, where the Krupp factory was located, the Kaiser praised the Krupp company as follows: 'The Krupp factory has provided the German workers, the German industry with a world-wide fame, as no other company has done so'.¹⁴³

With Bismarck's concept of economic war (see above), it can be said that there was an economic war in the *Weltmarkt* and Krupp was the most influential and successful fighter in the name of German industry and German *Unternehmungsgest* (go-ahead spirit). Moreover, it appears that Kaiser Wilhelm II saw Herr Krupp as the commander of the German business army fighting in the battle of commerce. Based on

¹⁴¹ Pollard & Holmes 1972: 84-85; See original in German: Boelcke 1970: 123-125.

¹⁴² Cf: Lehmann 1976: 95-96.

¹⁴³ *Ansprache des Kaisers an Krupp'sche Arbeiter gelegentlich seines Besuches in Essen*, 20.06.1890, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3E/1. The same point of the contribution of Krupp's work to the German reputation was argued by Prince Bülow as well. According to Bülow 'Krupp's concern had long ago surpassed the Schneider iron and machine works at Creusot, which were the pride of France. Krupp had spread Germany's reputation and the renown of German work and industry over the world.' Von Bülow 1931: 576.

this approach, the common belief in German governmental circles was that Krupp's authority must not be weakened by any possible commercial attack, even if the attack came from another German firm. In 1899, Kaiser Wilhelm clearly demonstrated his bias in favour of the Krupp company against another German company: Heinrich Ehrhardt's *Rheinische Metallwaren und Maschienefabrik*. Ehrhardt wanted to enter the Ottoman market in a fair competition for recoil guns previously at the disposal of Krupp. The Prussian Minister of War Heinrich von Gossler and Marschall von Bieberstein advised the Government that it should be neutral in this German-German competition on the Bosphorus. However, Wilhelm II was of a different opinion and made his position clear in a remark made in the margin of a written suggestion by Marschall, who proposed an equal balance between the German competitors, especially between Krupp and Ehrhardt.¹⁴⁴

Kaiser Wilhelm was unequivocal in his open support for the Krupp company. He commented on Marschall's report: 'No, the other company [Ehrhardt] must be sharply warned [*gehörig auf den Deckel kriegen*], and Krupp, under all circumstances, must be awarded with this order.'¹⁴⁵ Krupp, who did not hesitate to join with his most prominent –so far– rival, the French Schneider-Le Creusot or the British firm of Vickers, Sons & Maxim Limited,¹⁴⁶ just to be able to eliminate the *Düsseldorfer* firm, was well known as a close friend of the Kaiser.¹⁴⁷ At the same time, in 1908, Krupp, who was well aware that his 'power' was fed by the Kaiser's obvious support, protested to the German Ambassador to İstanbul about his support for the Ehrhardt company during the process of a new artillery order. In a remonstrative letter, which was sent

¹⁴⁴ Kössler 1981:254; Türk 2006:121-125.

¹⁴⁵ Marginalie Wilhelms II, 20.1.1899: '*Nein, die andere Firma muss eins gehörig auf den Deckel kriegen, und Krupp die Bestellung unter allen Umständen zugebilligt werden.*' Cited in Kössler 1981: 254.

¹⁴⁶ Director of Vickers, Sons & Maxim Limited to Brackenbury, 17.12.1900; 19.01.1901; and 05.02.1901, in: NA, London: WO 108/323.

¹⁴⁷ Benz 1976:201-202; Howe 1916: 119.

from the Krupp company to Von Schoen, *Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amts*, was reported the Ambassador's steps taken in favour of Ehrhardt. Based on information provided by Krupp's agent in İstanbul, the Krupp director strongly demonstrated his firm's discontent.

We cannot assume that such steps had been really taken by the imperial Ambassador [at İstanbul], because they [these steps] would be inconsistent with the repeatedly and verbally advised principles with regards to the attitude of the imperial representatives abroad in the case of the several German competitors' applications for orders in foreign markets. Still, the concern of our representatives as declared by them has become so great that we believe it justified to take the liberty of making this communication to your Excellency, and to ask to be informed after hearing from the Imperial Ambassador, so that we may hope to eliminate that anxiety.¹⁴⁸

Krupp's exclusive position at the top level of German politics and its concrete consequences in the Ottoman market were also reported by the British Military *Attaché*: Colonel Surtees. In a despatch, which G. Lowther afterward forwarded to Edward Grey, Colonel Surtees reported that the Ottoman Government had placed an order for more than 250,000 OL worth of field artillery ammunition with the German firm of Ehrhardt. The report, entitled 'Messrs Krupp – a Menace to England', also included the statements of Ehrhardt's representative in İstanbul. Colonel Surtees transmitted the agent's expressions along with his own conclusion as follows:

The endeavours of the German Emperor during the past ten years, have he [the Agent] says, been mainly devoted to helping Krupp. In Turkey the Emperor has repeatedly used his personal influence with the Sultan to help Krupp. ... Through such assistance Krupp has made enormous profits, compared to those of any other German trading firms. Their profits must have been over 1,000,000 OL per annum more than shown on their balance-sheets. The Emperor has always opposed Ehrhardt in Germany in order to give Krupp a

¹⁴⁸ Fa. Krupp to Von Schoen, 14.02.1908, in: PA.AA. R13306.

monopoly. Today Krupp has a complete monopoly of the trade in naval guns and mountings in Germany.¹⁴⁹

It was a fact that in the world's arms market, where German firms were struggling to sell their products, Krupp was supported by the Kaiser himself and his government. As Forbes quotes from a memorandum by the Councillor of the German Legation to Brazil, Von Kries, it had become the practice for German officials abroad, in all cases when Krupp competed with other German firms for foreign orders, to use official influence exclusively for Krupp.¹⁵⁰ The explanation made by Von Kries throws light on the Kaiser's comments stated above. Von Kries wrote in his memorandum that the exclusive support given to the Krupp company was 'because of the strong competition offered by France and England in the armaments business; the government's support was concentrated on the one German firm best fitted to meet this competition'.¹⁵¹

Krupp was well aware of the influence of the Kaiser's name on the successful outcome of securing business abroad: therefore, he did not hesitate to market his closeness with the Kaiser and also the Kaiser's influential friendship with Abdülhamid II in his Ottoman business. However, the other prominent armament firms also exploited the Kaiser's influence in the Ottoman market. Also, the Kaiser's significant *Orientreise* laid a profitable foundation for the trade activities of the German arms firms, activities that were attentively observed by their competitors. For example, the *Neue Wiener Journal*, located in Austria, one of Germany's foremost rivals in the

¹⁴⁹ Lowther to Grey, 28.12.1908, in: NA, London: FO 371/561; Surtees to Lowther, 18.12.1898, in: NA, London: FO 244/721.

¹⁵⁰ The agent of Ehrhardt Company requested through a letter sent to the German Chancellor an equal support on the Ottoman war business among the German suppliers.: 'Die von mir vertretene Fabrik bittet, dass ihr im Auslande das gleiche Wohlwollen und dieselbe Unparteiligkeit andern Unternehmungen gegenüber gewährt, wie sie dies im Interesse des Kriegsministeriums seitens letzterer Behörde im Inlande genießt.' Rittmeister a.D. Ehrhardt Werke to Bülow, April 1902, in: PA.AA. R13299; Forbes 1979: 343.

¹⁵¹ Von Kries, Memorandum 22.01.1903, cited in Forbes 1979:343. See also for the competition of two German arms makers in China market: Von Clear (Peking) to Kriegsminister (Berlin) 30.12.1905, in: PA.AA. R13304.

Ottoman small-arms market, published some ‘instructive stories’ [*lehrreiche Geschichtchen*] entitled ‘How does Kaiser Wilhelm support German Industry?’ The published information was about the Ottoman Government’s order for 100 million cartridges from The German Arms and Munitions Factories (*Deutsche Waffen-und-Munitionsfabriken* - DWM)¹⁵² in Karlsruhe provided by a careful observer, the president of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, Max Mauthner. Mauthner reported:¹⁵³

For quite some time, the supply of 100 million cartridges in readiness for the Turkish army was proposed. Several German and Austrian cartridge factories applied for the supply and...– at the last moment - the Karlsruher cartridge factory received the order despite having asked for a higher price. This happened in the following way: Emperor Wilhelm turned to the Sultan with his own handwritten letter making reference to the friendship of many years of Germany and Turkey. The prompt consequence of this intervention was the assigning of the cartridge supply to the Karlsruhe factory.¹⁵⁴

Mauthner was right. However, what he declared was not an exceptional case. As was emphasised above, personal relations and Abdülhamid’s changed position based on the Kaiser’s direct intervention were key influences in finalising the contract in favour of German industry. In fact, the Kaiser’s closeness to the Krupp family and the firm had led to speculation that he was one of ‘the large stockholders in Krupps’.¹⁵⁵ In 1915, Murray, for instance, pointed out the Kaiser’s relation to the firm as a shareholder: ‘Friedrich A. Krupp died in 1902, and left the works to his eldest daughter, Bertha. On July 1, 1903, the whole concern was floated as a company with a capital of £9,000,000,

¹⁵² The German Arms and Munitions Factories (*Deutsche Waffen-und-Munitionsfabriken-DMW*) was formed by the leadership of the Ludwig Loewe & Co. in November 1896. Consequently, the following factories and companies became a part of DMW: *Deutsche Metallpatronenfabrik*, Karlsruhe; Ludwig Loewe & Co. AG., Berlin; Rheinisch-Westfälischen Powder Co., Cologne; Rottweil-Hamburg Powder Co., Rottweil. Since the control of more than fifty per cent of the share of the Mauser company belonged to the Ludwig Loewe & Co., the Mauser company became also a part of DWM. Ball 2006: 8.

¹⁵³ This contract was obtained, as mentioned before, by Sultan Abdülhamid’s personal intervention. See: Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 24.05.1898, in: GP/12-2, 1924: 563.

¹⁵⁴ *Neue Wiener Journal* 15.01.1899, in: PA.AA. R13295.

¹⁵⁵ *The New York Times*: 04.03.1918.

the shares being held mainly by members of the Krupp family, though it is well known that Kaiser Wilhelm II, the friend of Friedrich Alfred, is one of the largest shareholders. But perhaps his Imperial Majesty regards himself and is regarded by the Krupps as one of the family.’¹⁵⁶

Another example of the Kaiser’s influence or rather his name’s impact on German success in the Ottoman arms market is given in Huber’s correspondence with Abdülhamid’s second secretary, İzzet Bey. In his letter, Huber gave some information about the recommended prices and quantities of the Krupp artilleries and Mauser rifles.¹⁵⁷ According to the documentation, dated 1900, Huber was suggesting a price of 3.00 OL (54. 90 Marks) for each rifle but under the condition of ordering a quantity of 200,000 rifles. After writing this offer in his letter, he sharply criticised those people who claimed the price he offered was too high, and informed the Sultan accordingly. Huber accused these people of being inexperienced and of being motivated by their own interests. He further claimed that the price he offered was an exceptional price that had never been offered to any other government. Huber knew how to affect İzzet and manipulate the purchasing process. Moreover, he tried to influence İzzet Bey through emphasising the connections between the Sultan and the Kaiser. Finally, he asserted: ‘[...] in order to know for certain, the Sultan could ask this issue directly to the Kaiser’.¹⁵⁸ Thus, in the hands of arms dealers at least, the names of the Kaiser and the Sultan became an integral part of the price-based controversy in the course of arms trade negotiations.

Apparently, the Kaiser was of opinion that Krupp’s trade activities in the Ottoman Empire were not solely about trade activity but were a multifaceted endeavour

¹⁵⁶ Murray, 1915: 81.

¹⁵⁷ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.168/128* (1318/1900).

¹⁵⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.168/128* (1318/1900).

which had to be supported from the political point of view and therefore could have political consequences. Whether Krupp obtained a contract or failed to win one would affect the Kaiser's political attitudes towards the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire. Correspondences of the year 1891 provide evidence that the success of the GAFs, especially Krupp, in the Ottoman market seemed to be one of the principal achievements of the Kaiser's expansionist strategy applied in the Ottoman Empire with the able assistance of Goltz Pasha.

As mentioned previously, Goltz was in the middle of the information flow from the Sultan to the GAFs and was also corresponding with Kaiser Wilhelm II. On October 28, 1891, three days after he was received by the Sultan, he sent the Kaiser a lengthy letter in which he touched on various critical issues communicated during his audience with the Sultan. One of the crucial subjects mentioned in the communication and found by Goltz Pasha to be worthy of reporting to the Kaiser was the Sultan's intention to order a warship and guns from French firms. Although the warship issue could be viewed from the Sultan's point of view as of personal but not political interest, Goltz asserted that such dealing could pave the way for a closer relationship between the French and the Sultan.¹⁵⁹ Goltz wrote that the most essential subject was, however, the ship-guns order from the French firm of Canet. He specifically called the Kaiser's attention to the point that through introducing the Canet system of ship-guns into the Ottoman market would 'perforate the Krupp's monopoly position' in the Ottoman market.¹⁶⁰

In one of his letters to Von Kiderlen, Goltz Pasha mentioned that Krupp's agent, Menshausen, was also informed of the Ottomans' purpose in placing an order for guns

¹⁵⁹ Goltz to the Kaiser, 28.10.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

¹⁶⁰ Goltz to the Kaiser, 28.10.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763: '*Auch ist es bedenklich, daß mit dem Schiffe Geschütze nach dem System Canets hier eingeführt werden und somit Krupps Monopol durchlöchert.*'

from the Canet company of France, one of Krupp's strong competitors, both by Goltz Pasha and by other 'confidential' sources.¹⁶¹ After being informed, however, Krupp took steps to prevent the Sultan from finalising the contract with France. Krupp immediately held a long conversation concerning the issue with the Kaiser, 'the friend of the Sultan'. After the conversation with Krupp, in which they discussed Sultan Abdülhamid's decision to give French firms – but not the Krupp company – a concession to arm Ottoman cruisers and an order for new artillery, the Kaiser sent a telegram to the Chancellor on November 19, 1891. In it, he detailed the conversation with Krupp and shared with the Chancellor the following information, which F.A. Krupp gave him:

After a lengthy conversation with Mr. Krupp, the latter pointed out how momentous was the Sultan's decision to grant France an order for some cruiser-ships and cannons. His secret information was originally based on the verbal consent of the Sultan – given to Admiral Duperré at an audience held this past summer, which I in my own way have regarded as binding. However, it [The Sultan's verbal consent] is most energetically pursued and exploited by the French Ambassador.¹⁶²

The Kaiser's obvious intention was to stimulate the Foreign Office to warn the German Ambassador at İstanbul. His telegram was immediately forwarded to the Foreign Office, which admonished the Ambassador (Von Radowitz) to work harder for Krupp's interests in the Ottoman Empire. According to Menne, Alfred Krupp looked on the German Ambassador in Constantinople as an unofficial representative of his firm.¹⁶³ In a letter sent to his board in Essen, Krupp used the following words: 'undoubtedly the Ambassador, who can easily discover our relations with the Emperor even if he does not already know of them, will give any necessary advice, indicate ways and means or

¹⁶¹ Goltz to Von Kiderlen, 10.11.1891, in: PA.AA.R13763.

¹⁶² Wilhelm II to the Reichskanzler 19.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13285 See Appendix 4.3.

¹⁶³ Menne 1938: 134.

act as intermediary himself.’¹⁶⁴ In fact, the Kaiser’s telegram was a directive issued to support Krupp’s interest in the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, the men who were on his target list were Von Radowitz, who was not as active as Krupp anticipated, and Abdülhamid II, who placed an order from the French firms instead of from Krupp and other German firms. The Kaiser continued with the following explicit directions, which were on the one hand a virtually threatening statement while on the other hand - in terms of demonstrating Krupp’s true valued position by the Kaiser - a proof of the Kaiser’s unique patronage for the Krupp company:

Mr Krupp sends once again a representative [Menshausen] to Constantinople, in order to make again an attempt [to persuade] the Sultan. It would be very useful for this purpose if Mr Radowitz acted the opposite way that Mr Cambon [Pierre Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador at İstanbul] has acted and gives his support to Mr Krupp’s last attempt. The ambassador [Von Radowitz] could point out among others to the Sultan that such a concession [given to] France, which would *ipso facto* damage the German industry, could not remain entirely without political consequences and would alienate [the German capitalists and industrialists] here.¹⁶⁵

As the Kaiser wrote in his notification in the last week of November 1891, Krupp’s representative travelled to İstanbul and met the *Serasker* nine days after this conversation, on November 28, 1891.¹⁶⁶ While Menshausen was conducting a series of meetings during his stay in İstanbul, the Sultan instructed the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, to communicate with the Kaiser. Acting on the Sultan’s order, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha notified the German State Secretary, Marschall von Bieberstein, of his request for an audience with the Kaiser. According to a statement by Marschall von Bieberstein, who at that time was the State Secretary of Germany (*de facto* Foreign Minister), the agenda of the audience would be the construction of the

¹⁶⁴ Menne 1938: 134.

¹⁶⁵ Wilhelm II to the Reichskanzler 19.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13285. See Appendix 4.4.

¹⁶⁶ Gözeller 2005: 42.

Baghdad Railway.¹⁶⁷ As a matter of fact, this petition for an audience provided the Kaiser with an opportunity to state Krupp's request. Six days after submitting the petition, on December 9, 1891, the Kaiser received the Ottoman Ambassador. During the audience, among other subjects, the Kaiser clearly demonstrated that the arms trade was to be considered as an inseparable part of German foreign policy, which was shaped by his expansionist desire.

In effect, the Kaiser summarised, through this audience, the principal combination of the determinants of his Ottoman policy in a most effective manner. Wilhelm II, who was richly furnished with confidential information regarding the warships and ship-guns ordered from France by the Sublime Porte, apparently formulated his argumentations on the basis of the Ottomans' obvious dependency on its financial and political collaboration with Germany. As the following quotation from the Kaiser's telegram highlights, Kaiser Wilhelm used unambiguously menacing language to extort an order for the Krupp company. After communicating his thoughts on two main issues – the Baghdad Railway and Germany's financial and political support for it, and besides the assignment of two German civil and military doctors in the Ottoman service - Kaiser Wilhelm II came to the point and made the following conclusion:

[...] I called the Ambassador's attention confidentially to the point that it is currently not easy to persuade the German capitalists to open their wallets if he himself is worried. After that, I cannot conceal from the Ambassador that certain rumours are running around in the circles of the German industrialists and capitalists that Abdülhamid soon intends to turn away almost absent-mindedly from the proven German industry and contemplates entrusting the French with orders for ship construction and cannons.¹⁶⁸

Through these conclusions, the Kaiser demonstrated that he was well aware of the Sultan's decisions on the military orders, and that he preferred the French firms at the

¹⁶⁷ Marschall to the Kaiser, 03.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

¹⁶⁸ Wilhelm II to the Reichskanzler, 09.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763. See Appendix 4.5.

expense of harm to German interests in the Ottoman military market. The Kaiser continuously illustrated the possible consequences of such an order as follows:

Well, the ambassador could probably judge for himself, the horrible and upsetting impression made by this rumour/news on the German capitalists. If the Sultan, despite his satisfaction over many years with proven deliveries, and the progress of railroad construction undertaken by German industry, leaves the German interest behind the French interest, German capital would have no reason to take risks to accommodate the Sultan's private wishes or to opt to continue their efforts supporting his country's progress.¹⁶⁹

These statements amounted to a deliberate threat to the Sultan, because the result would be severance of political and economic relations. On hearing this obvious threat, the Ottoman Ambassador Ahmed Tevfik Pasha felt compelled to remind the Kaiser that the Sultan had already made a decision to award an order for cannons to Krupp and an order for ships to the German firms Vulcan and Schichau. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's expression was accepted by the Kaiser as a definite promise which had to be fulfilled over time. After having extorted promises in favour of the German military industry, Kaiser Wilhelm was proud of the result, as his own words demonstrate: '... it would be a great pleasure to me, if I could help again to secure some sales for our national industry'.¹⁷⁰ Through the Kaiser's effective intervention, the three major military companies (Krupp, Schichau and Vulcan) had been guaranteed new orders from the Ottoman Government, at least verbally. So it is also the fact in this case that the real and initial steps towards a successful war business were taken by Kaiser Wilhelm II himself, the dominant representative of the German Style of War Business.

On the day, following Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's audience, Von Kiderlen sent a letter to Goltz Pasha informing him of what had taken place. After warning him to treat the letter as highly confidential and to be destroyed after reading, he wrote that

¹⁶⁹ Wilhelm II to the Reichskanzler, 09.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

¹⁷⁰ Wilhelm II to the Reichskanzler, 09.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

the audience took place in a way that we wished; it is now only to be anticipated that [Ahmed] Tevfik Pasha (whose mentality was well known by you)¹⁷¹ would exactly report [to the Sultan] what he has been told [by the Kaiser]. Presumably, you are in a position through which you are able to control and correct his report, if you would be notified by the higher position [Yıldız Palace]. It would be very interesting to know the impression of Tevfik's report over there.¹⁷²

On December 16, 1891, Goltz Pasha was received by the Sultan at the Yıldız Palace.¹⁷³

During the audience they discussed a number of critical issues, including the Baghdad Railway, the military materials issue and Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's report. According to Menshausen, who met with Goltz Pasha immediately after the audience, the Sultan went to great pains with his excuse and clarified that nothing had happened yet [no order was placed].¹⁷⁴ Goltz Pasha also told Menshausen that the Sultan had declared to him that he would never change his policy, which was based on a pro-German perspective, over to France.¹⁷⁵ This meant that the Kaiser's latest push in the arms trade had worked excellently because, once again, the GAFs had strengthened their position and – most importantly for the Germans – Germany did not lose her best customer to French military industry.¹⁷⁶ As the Kaiser noted, he secured his industrialists' interest in the Ottoman market through his direct and aggressive intervention. Following the Sultan's promise for a placement of new orders from the GAFs, this temporary crisis had been resolved. This case also illustrates that Germany's friendship might be described as an arms-trade-dependent friendship. Nevertheless, it highlights Hirst's assertion that: 'To push the armament trade in [the Ottoman Empire] [was] one of the

¹⁷¹ Parenthesised in original.

¹⁷² Von Kiderlen to Goltz 10.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

¹⁷³ Goltz to Geheimrat 18.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

¹⁷⁴ Menshausen to Krupp, 20.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

¹⁷⁵ Goltz to Geheimrat 18.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763; Menshausen to Krupp, 20.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

¹⁷⁶ Goltz to Geheimrat 19.12.1891, in: PA.AA.13763; Goltz to Geheimrat, 22.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

functions of modern diplomacy.’¹⁷⁷ Germany was probably the first country to realise the importance of this ‘function’ and used it most effectively. Accordingly, the Sultan promised to place an order to Germany, whereas he did not cancel the order he gave to the French firms.¹⁷⁸

As a matter of fact, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s personal intervention to the war business helped to the German armament firms to maintain their monopoly position in the Ottoman military market for years. Furthermore, in 1899, when the Sultan sent some officers to Berlin to inspect the quick-fire 96cm Krupp guns, Kaiser Wilhelm II facilitated the procedures required in favour of them. Not surprisingly, the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, and the inspection commissars, Rıza Pasha and Miralay Hurşid Bey [later Pasha], were affected by the interest shown by the Kaiser and the German officers, to whom several Ottoman medals were granted in recognition of their assistance.¹⁷⁹ Ahmed Tevfik reported to the Sultan on the Kaiser’s facilitation with regards to the technical investigation of the Krupp cannons. As he wrote, after being received in an audience by His Majesty, Rıza Pasha and Colonel Hurşid Pasha were invited to banquet at the troops’ casino/dining hall in Potsdam. The following day, the two Ottoman officers completed the technical investigation and their examination of the quick-fire Krupp guns; they also obtained the necessary information about the guns’ technical features to be able to make a recommendation. In his report, Ambassador Ahmed Tevfik Pasha noted that ‘everything related to the artillery was thoroughly explained to the Ottoman officers in a way that nothing remained secret’.¹⁸⁰ However, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha particularly emphasised the Kaiser’s role as a

¹⁷⁷ Hirst 1916: 93-94.

¹⁷⁸ BOA, *Y.A.HUS.* 256/52 (12.07.1309/11.02.1892).

¹⁷⁹ BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.* 32/52 (07.01.1317/ 17.06.1899).

¹⁸⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.* 32/52 (07.01.1317/ 17.06.1899): ‘*Ertesi günü Ferik müşârün-ileyh ile Berlin’deki birinci hâssa alayında[ki] seri atışlı topu [Krupp topu] istediği gibi mu ‘âyene ve lâzım gelen ma ‘lûmât-i fenniyeyi dahî istihsâl etmiş ve bu bâbda hiç bir şey mektûm tutulmayarak topun kâffe-i teferru ‘âtı kendilerine birer birer îrâd kılınmıştır.*’

facilitator, which had enabled the Ottoman Pashas to obtain all the information they needed about the Krupp guns in consideration.

Based on the ‘consumer point of view’ explained above, the Kaiser’s likely intention was to achieve customer satisfaction by providing a high standard of hospitality. His intervention into the business with the Ottoman Empire served to promote the interests of the GAFs. At the same time, the Ottoman Government itself tried to take advantage of the Kaiser’s friendship with the Sultan in the course of their negotiation with Krupp and other German manufacturers. Naturally, both parties were acting to secure their perceived advantage. Ottoman documents indicate that the Ottoman Government also attempted to use this close relation to obtain several advantages, such as price reductions, guarantees of faster delivery for ordered war materials, and favourable terms on the issue of delayed payments.¹⁸¹ In this way, as one of the GAFs’ best customers, the Ottoman Government tried also play one supplier off against the others in an attempt to take advantage of the above listed benefits.¹⁸²

Moreover, during his second *Orientreise*, without giving Krupp any advance notice, Kaiser Wilhelm II promised a gift to the Sultan of a modern, quick-firing Krupp gun, one of the types that was being tested for Russia. His promise was transmitted to Essen as a command to begin to manufacture. In the following days, however, Krupp sent the Kaiser a letter in which he indicated that accomplishment of the task was not feasible [*nicht angängig*] for the following reasons:

On account of a number of issues, such as the calibre of bullet, the weight of the barrel, ammunition cases – limber cases – and cartridge,

¹⁸¹ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA.50/35 (28.03.1325/09.07.1907): ‘Cevâb-ı emr u fermân-ı hümayûn iktizây-i ‘âlîyince keyfiyeti imparator hazretlerine iblâğ olunmak üzere Hâriciye nâzırına beyân olundu. Müşârun-ileyh hazretlerinin zâti ... hazreti hilâfet penâhî ve Devlet-i ‘Âlîlerine der-kâr olan meveddet ve muhabbet-i samûmâneleri icâbınca arzûy-ı şâhâne vechile topların vakt ve zamanıyla teslîmi hakkında Kruppa evâmîr-i lâzîme irsâl edeceklerine şüphesi olmadığını ifâdeden sonra...’; see also: BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK.43/14 (21.03.1313/11.09.1895).

¹⁸² BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.166/70 (27.09.1318/18.01.1901).

and the internal layout of the barrel and placement of the cartridges, the powder type, the gauge, etc. are exactly as prescribed by the Russian artillery and produced by my factory and therefore are considered the exclusive right of the Russian artillery forces.¹⁸³

After saying that, Krupp made the Kaiser an alternative offer which he found acceptable. Consequently, on January 25, 1899, Krupp reported that the *Modellkanöchen* was sent to İstanbul.¹⁸⁴ Wilhelm's endeavour to bring the name of Krupp onto the Ottoman artillery agenda resulted in crucial promises made by Abdülhamid II. As *The New York Times* reported on January 17, 1899, an Imperial *Îrâde* was issued ordering 162 Krupp field guns and 30,000 shrapnel shells and this was, according to the newspaper, undoubtedly the outcome of the act of Kaiser Wilhelm II.¹⁸⁵ Immediately following an additional meeting with Abdülhamid II on October 21, for instance, Wilhelm II had gladly telegraphed to Essen that the Ottoman army's gun purchasing would be made solely with Krupp.¹⁸⁶ The Kaiser, who was successful in gaining the order for the German arms maker, was also successful in following up the work that he had arranged during his *Orientreise*. For the purposes of modernising and overhauling, the Ottoman ironclad *Âsâr-ı Teyfik* was sent first to Italy and then through the intermediation of Wilhelm II it was redirected to the Krupp-Germania yard in Kiel. It was the fruit of long and hard negotiations between the Ottoman Government and the Krupp company, and it is clear that, at the final stage, the Kaiser's direct involvement in the process played an important role. In addition to making these kinds of marketing contributions to Krupp's success, the Kaiser provided some resistance for Krupp against an attack made by one of the disappointed customers, the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, Kaiser Wilhelm II's cousin, who was also one

¹⁸³ Krupp to Kaiser Wilhelm II, 02.11.1898, in: PA.AA. R13295.

¹⁸⁴ Das Directorium-Krupp to Von Hohenlohe, 25.01.1899, in: PA.AA. R13295; BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.148/20 (09.11.1316/21.03.1899).

¹⁸⁵ *The New York Times*: 17.01.1899.

¹⁸⁶ Kössler 1981: 251.

of Krupp's most important customers. A letter the Kaiser sent to the Tsar indicates his almost infinite trust in the House of Krupp. In it, he praised the German arms maker while he accused the British and French companies of anger about 'the fact that German companies provided the Russian Government well and better than the French and British could do it'.¹⁸⁷

In addition to the Kaiser's involvement in the war business, he also tried to unify the three German yards to make them better able to compete in the Ottoman naval market against British interests.¹⁸⁸ When Sultan Abdülhamid II and his naval ministry wanted to modernise the Empire's navy, the Sultan invited Krupp's engineers in 1897 to investigate the state of the old battleships. The investigation was completed on November 29, 1897, and it recommended spending a small fortune. The amount in question was 3,400,000 OL (62,730,000 Marks), by which the armament firms were seduced.¹⁸⁹ For this massive order, Kaiser Wilhelm II recommended a unification of the three leading shipyards: Krupp-Germania, Schichau and Vulcan [*Vereinigung der drei großen deutschen Kriegsschiffsbauwerften*]. However, at the final stage it was not a successful attempt.¹⁹⁰ According to Grant, the reason behind the Kaiser's attempt was 'not to want German prestige to suffer by letting the Turkish business fall into British hands.'¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ Goetz (ed.)1920: 164-165.

¹⁸⁸ Krupp to Von Bülow, 18.02.1899, in: PA.AA. R13295: 'Der Gedanke einer Modernisierung der türkischen Flotte wurde im Mai 1897 zuerst vom Sultan ausgesprochen.'; See also: Grant 2006: 89-90.

¹⁸⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.134/105, (05.07.1315/30.11.1897): The investigated ships were: *Hamîdiye, Mesûdiye, Osmâniye, Azîziye, Mahmûdiye, Orhâniye, Âsâr-ı Teyfik, Feth-i Bülend, Mukaddime-i Hayriye, Avnûllah, Muîn-i Zafer, Cism-i Şevket, Âsâr-ı Şevket, İclâliye, Hıfz-ı Rahmân.*

¹⁹⁰ In his twelve page letter to Bülow, Krupp explained the reasons for the abolishing of the *Vereinigung* in a very great detail. F.A. Krupp to Von Bülow, 18.02.1899, in: PA.AA. R13295. Additionally the letter sent to Admiral Freiherrn v. Senden-Bibran by the Krupp company gives more detail about earlier stage of the negotiations on November 9, 1897: HA. Krupp: FAH. 3C/205.

¹⁹¹ Grant 2007: 89.

However, the contract for the modernisation of two war ships neither went to Germany nor to England, but to the Italian firm Ansaldo.¹⁹² Although this result was at first perceived as a defeat for German industry [*Mißerfolg der deutschen Industrie*], according to Krupp the net result was a triumph against the British [*ein Triumph*], for which ‘... German diplomacy and industry had fought hand in hand’.¹⁹³ Two battleships went to Italy to be overhauled and modernised, but Krupp did not give up the struggle for one of the ships (*Âsâr-ı Teyfik*). For the purpose of obtaining the contract, he took advantage of his friendship with the Kaiser to push the German Embassy in İstanbul in terms of lobbying for his firm. Obviously, it was not a simple price-offer which could be made during a regular supply-demand process, but Krupp’s attempt was a blatant disruption attack against a finished contract between Ansaldo and the Ottoman Naval Ministry.¹⁹⁴

The Kaiser’s second *Orientreise* appeared on the scene as a godsend for the Krupp/Germania yard. Following this visit, one of the ships sent to Italy, *Âsâr-ı Teyfik* was re-directed to the Krupp-Germania yard. It is particularly important to note that the motivation for this interesting operation was not as simple as Grant’s claim that: ‘... this was only because Ansaldo had been unable to complete the work in 1899’.¹⁹⁵ To the contrary, an extremely complicated interrelationship affected the whole decision-making process which resulted in a decision in favour of the Krupp-Germania yard. The Kaiser’s support and Abdülhamid’s personal trust in Krupp’s work might have been among the most crucial determinants of *Âsâr-ı Teyfik*’s journey from Genoa to Kiel. Additionally armaments for eight ironclads became another competition, in which

¹⁹² *The Daily News*: 21.06.1900, in: PA.AA. R13297.

¹⁹³ Krupp to Von Bülow, 18.02.1899, in: PA.AA. R13295.

¹⁹⁴ Krupp to Von Bülow, 18.02.1899, in: PA.AA. R13295: ‘*Die bereits ziemlich weit gediehenen Verhandlungen wurden damals auf Grund eines energischen von Eurer Exzellenz in dankenswerter Weise veranlassten Protestes der Botschaft wieder abgebrochen*’; Hallgarten 1963/1: 481.

¹⁹⁵ Grant 2002: 29.

the close personal relationship demonstrated its impact on the negotiation process, where the economic cost became less important than the possible political advantages of the contracts. A comment published in *The Daily News* on June 21, 1900, may summarise the process, which was finalised in favour of the Krupp company. 'Krupps are supported by the influence of the German Government and Embassy, the belief prevails that they will practically force the Turkish Government to reject the lower offer for the more valuable article.'¹⁹⁶ In addition to the modernisation of *Âsâr-ı Teyfik* and the armaments for eight ironclads, the Krupp company obtained a contract for two new torpedo boats which cost more than 220,000 OL.¹⁹⁷

Encouraging foreign trade for Krupp was, as Boelcke noted, one of Kaiser Wilhelm II's main contributions to Krupp's profits.¹⁹⁸ However, as has been mentioned earlier, supporting the arms makers' business in the foreign markets was almost a tradition of the Kaiser's family, who proved to be well aware of the fact that the increase in production capacity of the German armament firms was closely related to their foreign sales.¹⁹⁹ In fact, as the German arms firms' Ottoman business clearly indicated there was a strong correlation between the German armament firms' successful war business and both the Kaiser's and the other State apparatus' obvious and generous patronage.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ *The Daily News*: 21.06.1900, in: PA.AA. R13297.

¹⁹⁷ BOA, Y.MTV.235/79 (13.07.1320/16.10.1902): The actual cost was 200, 000 in British Pounds (222,222 OL = 4,100,000 Marks).

¹⁹⁸ Boelcke 1970: 102.

¹⁹⁹ See Chapter IV: 208 above.

²⁰⁰ See also Moulton 1924: 1.

**SECTION III: DOMESTIC FACTORS AND
THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE GERMAN
STYLE OF WAR BUSINESS**

CHAPTER V
SULTAN ABDÜLHAMİD II AND HIS
BUREAUCRATS (1876-1909)

Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Arms Trade in the Shadow of Personal Trust

“Your Majesty [Sultan Abdülhamid II] is not only Sultan of Turkey but Caliph of the Mussulmans. Your office is now the highest and the most important in the world, for every Mussulman State is oppressed, and the Powers of Europe are joined in a league with the Oppresser. It is not competent to the Caliph to become the vassal of the European Powers for the oppression of Mussulmans.”
*Foreign Affairs Committees of England, 1879*¹

“Sultan Abdülhamid never forgave us for our intervention in Egypt.”
*J. Holland Rose, 1915*²

Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) became the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire in 1876 and ruled as the thirty-fourth Sultan for thirty-three years, until he was deposed in 1909.³ During these three decades, the Empire was faced with territorial occupation by successive European states from Britain (Cyprus 1878, Egypt 1882), France (Tunis 1881) to Austria-Hungary (Bosnia 1878). These attacks changed the Empire’s domestic and foreign policy priorities decisively. Defending the Empire against foreign invasion and protecting Ottoman territory became the chief aims of Sultan Abdülhamid’s governing agenda. During his reign, therefore, the following defence policy instruments served as the cornerstones of a comprehensive military reform programme and decisively shaped Abdülhamid’s military-based foreign policy:

- Outside assistance to modernise the army.
- Importation of war materials.
- Sending military officers to Europe for training.
- Reforming the military school with the assistance of foreigners.

¹ Foreign Affairs Committees of England, *Proposed Annexation of Turkey: To His Imperial Majesty the Sultan [Abdülhamid II]*. The Address of the Undersigned Foreign Affairs Committees of England; 16.02.1879: Diplomatic fly-sheets Vol. II. No. 87: 84-86, in: University of Birmingham, Special Collection, r DS, 757, 6. Report Nr. 24, page 86.

² Rose 1915: 99.

³ The son of Sultan Abdulmecid I (1823-1861) and the nephew of Sultan Abdülaziz (1830-1876) Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918), succeeded his brother Murad V (1840-1904) as the 34th Sultan of the Ottoman Empire from August 31, 1876 until April 27, 1909.

- Railway construction for military purposes, financed largely by foreign capital.⁴

At the beginning of his reign, Abdülhamid II faced serious external difficulties. The first vital challenge was the Russian-Turkish War in 1877/78 that caused the Empire to lose two-fifths of its extensive territories and one-fifth of its population.⁵ ‘In common with earlier losses in Europe’, indicates Quataert, ‘these provinces possessed the most advanced agriculture, commerce and industry in the Empire.’⁶ Because of the defeat, the Ottoman Empire also lost the substantial state revenues that were allocated for the amortization and interest on the debt for the war indemnity.⁷

However, as Griffiths argued, ultimately the Empire’s defeat in the 1877/78 war did not reflect the real potential of the Ottoman Army.⁸ Its military equipment was not significantly inferior to the Russians.⁹ On the contrary, the Ottoman Army had a technological-qualitative advantage over the Russians.¹⁰ The Ottoman artillery was equipped with breech-loading steel Krupp cannons, which were superior to the Russians’ bronze pieces.¹¹ John Savile, at the British Legation in Belgian, reported from Colonel Nicaise the

⁴ Railways had played a crucial role in deploying the soldiers to the frontiers where the operation occurred. McGarity argued that the Prussian army during the Prussian-Franco war had based their military planning, which was Moltke’s concept, upon the utilization of railroads. McGarity 1968: 23. Goltz Pasha indicated the importance of the railroad in 1910 as follows: ‘*Aber sie wird sich ändern, sobald die türkische Armee schlagfertig ist, das syrische Bahnnetz den schnellen Transport eines starken Heeres nach der ägyptischen Grenze gestattet, und auf der anderen Seite die anatolische Bahn ihre Fortführung bis Bagdad erfahren hat*’ in: MA, Freiburg: NL.737/5 (18.12.1910).

⁵ Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 191; Karal 1988: 76-79; Gencer 2006: 72.

⁶ Quataert 1994: 768.

⁷ The War indemnity was fixed firstly at 1,410,000,000 rubbles (300,000,000 Ottoman Lira (OL)). Later on, after long negotiations in 1881, the amount was reduced to 34,000,000 OL with annual payments of 350,000 OL. Griffiths 1966: 37-38; Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 191; Karal 1988: 422-424; Akmeşe 2005: 19; Karal 1988: 423.

⁸ Griffiths 1966: 34.

⁹ Grant says: ‘Moreover the Ottoman import strategy yielded a significant qualitative advantage for the Turks over the Russian in this war. ... Yet, when war came in 1877, the Turks undoubtedly held the advantage in quality of arms.’ Grant 2002: 16.

¹⁰ Henderson 1948: 58; Yasamee 1996: 45; Grant 2002: 9, 16.

¹¹ In 1873, 500 cannons were ordered from Krupp and it arrived to the Ottoman Arsenal in 1876/77. See: BOA, A.MKT.MHM.448/62 (28.11.1289/27.01.1873); BOA, A.MKT.MHM.460/18 (06.05.1290/02.06.1873); BOA, I.DAH.47883 (23.05.1291/08.07.1874). The cost of this order was amount 18 million Marks. BOA, Y.EE.29/107 (1294/1877). According to the document, dated October

Director General of the Belgian Artillery¹² that Alfred Krupp told him that he had received a telegram from one of his agents who was with Osman Pasha (later Gazi Osman Pasha) at Pleven saying that the Krupp ‘guns not only carried further than the Russian ones, but the precision of their fire was quite remarkable while the destructive power of the shells was double that of the ordinary shells’.¹³ The Ottoman infantry had obtained American Remington breech-loading arms, and just before the war the Empire ordered 600,000 American-made Martini-Peabody arms. By July 1877, 442,240 the ordered rifles had arrived in İstanbul.¹⁴ The general appearance of the Ottoman infantry and artillery was, according to Captain Herbert, who present in the Ottoman Army during the war, was as follows:

The clothing [of the Ottoman infantry] was of a good make and material, except the boots; these were execrable....The equipment consisted of a Martini-Peabody rifle and sword-bayonet. ... The armament is a heavy sword, Winchester repeating carbine, and revolver. Lances are carried only by regiments belonging to the Guards. Some regiments had still (in 1877) the Circassian sword...The horses were bad, and their supply was insufficient....The equipment [of the Artillery] consists of cavalry sword and revolver. The guns were of modern Krupp manufacture. The horses left much to be desired, as regards both quality and numbers; often the live-stock of a battery was incomplete. There are six guns to the battery. The ammunition carts, of which there should be six to the battery, were often deficient.¹⁵

However, the organisation and training of the Ottoman soldiers were not as efficient as their weapons. As Shaw indicated, in the years of the war, the Ottoman officer corps had still not

02, 1876, in the end of the purchasing process, the officers who had engaged in the process were rewarded with some prizes and medals. BOA, *I.DH.720/50255* (13.09.1293/02.10.1876).

¹² According to Menne, Colonel Nicaise had once endeavoured to find employment for his brother-in law Brialmont, in the Krupp company in Essen. Menne 1938: 229.

¹³ Savile to Earl of Derby, 11.08.1877, in: NA, London: WO 106/2.

¹⁴ Grant 2002:15. According to Rose, the Ottoman Army had in hand 300,000 American-Winchester rifles, and bought 200,000 more early in the war. See: Rose 1915: 191. Türk argues quoting from Seel's article that the Ottoman Army equipped with 310,000 Martini-Peabody arms, 323,000 Snider arms, and 39,000 Winchester rifles. Türk 2006:135. See also: Colonel Lennox to Charge d'affaires/Constantinople, 13.02.1877, in: NA, London: WO 106/2.

¹⁵ Herbert 1895: 23-24.

completely developed, and some political rivalries were appearing among the officer corps.¹⁶ Following this early difficult situation, in 1878, Great Britain occupied Cyprus and Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina; France occupied Tunis in 1881; and Great Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, a development Marriott described as ‘the final blow to a traditional friendship [between the Ottoman Empire and Britain]’.¹⁷ Afterwards, an independent Bulgaria was established under Russian protectorate, and later on in 1886, Bulgaria annexed East Rumelia. Yasamee is especially revealing concerning the general picture of the empire’s vulnerability to foreign attack: ‘It could not ensure the actual defence of an Empire which stretched across three continents, and which faced the possibility of attack by five of the six Great Powers, four of the five Balkan states, and various minor powers in Asia and North Africa.’¹⁸

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as Grant also indicates, the Ottoman Empire was self-sufficient in arms production but by the middle years of the century the Empire could not escape the consequences of the technological innovations abroad in armaments and remained dependent on foreign arms suppliers.¹⁹ This dependence on outside assistance was to continue until the Empire’s last days.

When the Sultan realised the major inferiorities in the field of military organisation, in the training of soldiers,²⁰ and in the development of new technology in the weapons industry,

¹⁶ Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 182; Herbert 1895: 24.

¹⁷ Marriott 1917: 348.

¹⁸ Yasamee 1996: 45. Griffiths highlighted also the vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire to the outside attack based on the location of the Empire’s capital city İstanbul as follows: ‘The Ottoman Empire, with its large land and sea mass, and with its capital city located so near the traditional penetration routes of enemy armies, was extremely vulnerable. Its defence problems were great.’ Griffiths 1966: 5.

¹⁹ Grant illuminates an essential point of the Ottoman military technological state, particularly after the Crimean War (1853/56). He claimed that after the Crimean War, the Empire moved closer to total dependency on Western imports to modernise their forces. Grant 2002: 16. For the previous centuries of the state the Ottoman military power and warfare see: Murphey 1983; Özden 1987; Finkel 1988; Elena 1992; Murphey 1999; Agoston 2005; Aksan 2007.

²⁰ Rose claimed that the Ottoman Empire was lacking in brain-power among the chief leaders and organisers. Rose 1915: 221.

he decided, as his predecessor had,²¹ to invite military advisers from Europe to assist in military reform and modernisation of existing equipment, and rearmament with modern weapons and technology. As has been pointed out, Sultan Abdülhamid preferred the Germans for his military reform and modernisation project.²² This was in large part because of the reputation the German arms makers had gained during the Franco- Prussian War in 1870/71 (especially the Krupp cannons) and also the Sultan's preference which was basically not an extraordinary or a unique phenomenon for this period. In fact, the Sultan was, in Schiff's description, sharing 'the worldwide respect for German military success.'²³ The Prussian military system became, to quote Sater & Herwig, 'the envy of, and the model for, much of the world', especially after the Franco-Prussian War.²⁴

On the other hand, Germany had not indicated any colonial interest in the Ottoman territorial land, in comparison with Britain, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia.²⁵ For her own economic and political interests in the East, Germany favoured a militarily and economically strong Ottoman Empire.²⁶ Nevertheless, it is not accurate to say that the

²¹ The Ottoman Army passed through several stages of modernization where the models were European states. Because of this fact, the modernisation was influenced directly by the European advisors and assistance. According to McGarity, direct influence of Europe on the modernization of the Ottoman Army began as early as 1718 following the Treaty of Passarowitz. He argued that the mission under the leadership of *Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed* was sent to Paris in order to learn western techniques from which the Ottoman Army might have profited. McGarity 1968: 10.

²² See Chapter II: 95-105.

²³ Schiff 1972: 437.

²⁴ Sater & Herwig 1999: 7.

²⁵ See: Holborn 1926; Ortaylı 1981; Önsöy 1982; Wallach 1985; Yasamee 1996; Soy 2004. The official approach of Germany to the Ottoman territory policy was as the Freiherr von Rotenhan's following statement: '*Weder Deutschland noch Sie [der Botschafter in London Grafen von Hatzfeldt] persönlich dürfen Vorschläge wegen Landverteilung im Mittelmeer machen. Wir wollen dort nichts haben, [...]*' Rotenhan to Hatzfeld, 05.08.1895, in: GP/10 1924: 21; Marschall von Bieberstein's following statement is also of importance to understand the way the Germans propagandized: '*Deutschland wünscht, daß die Türkei militärisch und auch sonst erstarke, daß seine Unabhängigkeit und Ansehen vor jeder Gefahr sichergestellt werden und daß sie wieder einen Platz unter den Großmächten einnehme. Das ist die Politik, die Deutschland schon seit langem verfolgt und die sie auch weiterverfolgen wird.*' MA, Freiburg: NL.737/16.

²⁶ As the following passage from *Alldeutsche Blätter* shows, the importance of the Ottoman Empire and the position of the Sultan for the German interest was mentioning several times in the public opinion. '*Uns Deutschen kommt es darauf an, die Herrschaft des Sultans und der Türkei zu kräftigen, weil für Deutschland die Existenz des türkischen Reiches erwünscht ist.*' *Alldeutsche Blätter*: 16.07.1899: 235. During the Ottoman bureaucrats visit to Berlin; Bismarck mentioned the German position as follows:

German public had never expressed any colonial interest in the Ottoman territory. On the contrary, some nationalistic pressure groups and some segments of German society were strongly publicising the idea of colonisation of the Orient and becoming an influential and powerful part of international affairs as a world power - *Weltmacht*. The Ottoman lands were one of the most attractive places for them.²⁷ Newspapers and periodicals, such as the *Alldeutsche Blätter*, were driving the idea of colonisation of the Orient.²⁸ In fact, as Pears summarised in a most revealing way, German interest in the Ottoman territory had a relatively deep-rooted tradition. ‘German writers and thinkers’ wrote Pears,

...had long hoped to find a place in the sun for their country in the Turkish Empire. ... In 1846, List proposed the construction of a railway to Baghdad. In 1848, Roscher claimed that the heritage of the Turkish ‘sick man’ ought to fall to Germany. In 1886, a German Oriental scholar, Sprenger, described Babylonia as ‘the most ruminative field for colonisation’ and as ‘the only country not yet occupied by great Powers’. Many German writers advocated the establishment of a Protectorate in Asia Minor. Dr. Seton Watson has traced the growth of the idea in Germany of domination over all the territories between Berlin and Baghdad, and has shown how Germany’s thinkers gave the nation a conception of a world policy that would aim at such a result.²⁹

After unification in 1871, Germany’s impressive industrial expansion and solid military strength had been a remarkable development, which had an ineluctable effect on the shift in the European balance of power.³⁰ Because of its growing production supply and rising capital, the new industrialised eager German economy raised the first signal of the clash of interests to come. As an ‘active foreign policy maker,’ Abdülhamid was also observing the

‘İmparator hazretlerinin ve hükümetimizin ve bil-hassa benim aha’ssi emelimiz Devlet-i ‘Aliyenin tamamıyla bekâsıdır.’ BOA, Y.EE.7/6 (02.02.1299/24.12.1881).

²⁷ For Germany, the Ottoman Empire and her territory appeared both as profitable market for the German goods, and raw material resources for her rapid growing industry. See: 1891; Osman Nuri 1327/1911; Rohrbach 1915; Jäckh 1916; Helfferich 1921; Holborn 1926; Rathmann 1962; J. B. Wolf 1973; Kössler 1981; Ortaylı 1981; Önsoy 1982.

²⁸ *Alldeutsche Blätter*: 08.12.1895: 223.

²⁹ Pears 1917: 154.

³⁰ See Chapter I: 61-70.

European power-struggle and trying to take advantage of it.³¹ According to Marriott, Abdülhamid ‘was one of the shrewdest diplomatists that ever ruled the Ottoman Empire’.³² Abdülhamid realised that with Germany’s emergence on the scene as another European Great Power, any possible clash of interest in the Ottoman territory made him less vulnerable to foreign interference. Germany’s growing industrial production fascinated many countries, including the Ottoman Empire. Its fascination focused particularly on the output of the iron and steel industry, where arms materials were one of the most noteworthy products. It was during this period under consideration that Germany had become gradually one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of war materials especially in the field of guns and rifles. Initially, the Sultan’s decision in selecting Germany over the other European Powers seems to have been only an endeavour to keep up with the changing times. As Sater & Herwig argue, at that time several governments turned to Germany for military help and weapons.³³

In addition to highlighting Germany’s solid reputation for military success and its policy in support of Ottoman territorial integrity, we also emphasize the Sultan’s personal justifications and actions as an authoritarian ruler, in favour of the Germans for the modernisation task. We would argue that Sultan Abdülhamid’s personal preferences might assist to clarify the fundamental emergence of Germany in the Ottoman military modernisation process. The next paragraphs demonstrate the Sultan’s personal conviction about the Germans and his description of the German state, firstly by quoting from his

³¹ Hale 2000: 19; Osmanoglu 1984: 55. Yasamee’s assessment of Abdülhamid’s interest in foreign affairs has indicated some consequences of such a view: ‘He was an assiduous student of the European press, questioned foreign visitors closely on their domestic politics, and showed an impressive willingness to listen to better- qualified advisers, even when he disagreed with their views. He deliberately exposed himself to a wide range of information and opinions.’ Yasamee 1996: 43. Referring to Abdülhamid’s interest in foreign policy, Ray S. Baker said: ‘In his early years he is said to have been a good deal of a reader, and sometimes surprises his foreign visitors by his knowledge of affairs in other lands. Not long ago he talked with an American visitor about President Roosevelt, showing himself informed to an unusual degree as to American politics.’ Baker 1902: 76.

³² Marriott 1917: 342.

³³ Sater & Herwig 1999: 7.

political memoirs, edited by Ali Vahbi Bey.³⁴ Besides, examining archival documentation could highlight some important decisions made directly by the Sultan in favour of German companies rather than other European or American firms. This method makes the way clearer to establish the motivations behind the Sultan's favouring the German arms firms and the origins of the energetic and successful German penetration into the Ottoman arms market.

Germany's emergence onto the international stage as a new industrial power was one of the most striking developments in the world on the eve of Abdülhamid II's succession to the throne. As a matter of fact, even before he came to power he might have harboured an inclination towards a German-friendly foreign policy. When he was still a prince in 1867 he travelled to Europe with his uncle, Sultan Abdülaziz, giving him an opportunity to observe the European countries for the first time.³⁵ Goltz Pasha informed the Kaiser that Abdülhamid told him that during his tour across Europe he had been positively impressed by the German State.³⁶ Along the same lines, Graf von Hatzfeld, the German Ambassador at İstanbul from 1881 to 1885, noted that 'since he [Sultan Abdülhamid] ascended the throne, he is determined in the idea of more and more rapprochement with Germany and her friends'.³⁷ This approach was also mentioned by the British Military Attaché, Colonel Chermside. In a memorandum dated May 25, 1893, he wrote that 'the Sultan ... ever since 1878 has looked to Germany as a military model as well as a dominant but disinterested military power to be conciliated in every way'.³⁸

There might also be personal justifications behind the Sultan's inclination towards Germany, along with the political aspirations. As a matter of fact, Abdülhamid's opinion about the Germans and Germany was initially very positive. From his point of view, the

³⁴ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913.

³⁵ For a detail study of Sultan Abdülaziz's visit to Europe in 1867, see: Upton-Ward 1999.

³⁶ Goltz to the Kaiser, 28.10.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

³⁷ Hatzfeld to the Botschafter Wien, 20.12.1881, in: PA.AA. R13247.

³⁸ Memorandum by Colonel Chermside, 25.05.1893, in: NA, London: FO 78/4479.

German people were a strong nation that would never accept being protected by another state.³⁹ According to Goltz Pasha, the Sultan articulated that ‘the German people [*Volk*] were, among all of the European peoples, the one whose features most inspired him’.⁴⁰ In Abdülhamid’s view, the Germans had similar characteristics to the Ottoman Turks and he considered the Germans genuinely closer to the Ottomans: brave, more honest, and hospitable.⁴¹ Abdülhamid believed that tranquillity, cautiousness and patience were common characteristics of the two nations and that the Germans acted, as did the Ottomans, with deliberation and took action only gradually when the time was right. Additionally, the Germans were, according to him, loyal and honest, hardworking and unwavering people.⁴²

Moreover, according to Sultan Abdülhamid, the Turks were called ‘the Germans of the Orient’ [*les Allemandes de l’Orient*] like the Greeks were named as ‘the French of the Levant’ [*Français du Levant*]⁴³ and he further claimed that both countries, the Ottoman Empire and Germany, had similar histories and had both squandered their potential.⁴⁴ Sultan Abdülhamid’s good opinion of Germany and the Germans was also noticed by one of the members of the German Military Mission in İstanbul, Von Stempel. According to him, the Sultan’s first circle advisers and secretaries were conscious of Abdülhamid’s strong consideration [*felsenfest überzeugt*] of the German discipline.⁴⁵

³⁹ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 114: ‘*Si les Français font remarquer qu’ils ont eu le protectorat de tous les Chrétiens et de toutes les institutions chrétiennes dans le Levant depuis le temps de leur roi François I. jusqu’à nos jours, ils doivent bien se dire qu’un peuple aussi puissant que le peuple allemand ne saurait accepter la protection d’une autre nation, encore moins celle de la France.*’

⁴⁰ Goltz to the Kaiser, 28.10.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

⁴¹ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913:208: ‘*Il est assez exact, en effet, qu’il existe une certaine analogie de caractère entre nous et les Allemands...Le courage et l’honnêteté, la courtoisie et l’hospitalité règnent chez nous, aussi bien qu’en Allemagne.*’

⁴² Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 208.

⁴³ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 207.

⁴⁴ This type of explanation had been used on the eve the First World War in order to manipulate the Turkish public opinion. Yusuf Akçuraoğlu, for instance, had used the similar argumentation in one of his influential speeches to encourage the Ottoman public to ally with Germany. See: Akçuraoğlu 1914: 24. Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 208: ‘*Et l’histoire même des deux peuples a beaucoup d’analogie. ... Les Allemands, aussi bien que nous autres Osmanlis, ont gaspillé ainsi beaucoup de leurs forces.*’

⁴⁵ Stempel to the *Kriegsministerium* 14.07.1907, in: PA.AA. R13306.

However, the Sultan also knew that his closeness to Germany annoyed France very much. He wrote that he had good reasons for adopting that position. According to the Sultan, the Kaiser's personality alone was enough to attract his sympathy for the Germans.⁴⁶ However, the Sultan expressed his belief that, compared to the French, the Germans were more sympathetic, more obstinate, and had a deeper understanding of what they did and also that they did not waste their time by playing politics as the French did.⁴⁷ Even while making all these positive statements, the Sultan criticised Germany's foreign policy as 'an incompetent policy that allows England to establish its supremacy over France'.⁴⁸ He was also critical of Germany's earlier colonial policy of giving priority to the colonies which, according to the Sultan, 'never gave a result'. Instead of doing that, Abdülhamid suggested, 'Germany must deliberately spread its influence to the Persian Gulf,' which was more favourable for both Germany and for the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹ Although Abdülhamid defined Germany as 'an honest ally in restraining the other European countries' imperialist ambitions',⁵⁰ he was well aware that Germany was a country that had achieved success in her expansionist policy toward the East, in a peaceful way.⁵¹ On the other hand, the Sultan was of opinion that Germany had to be restricted in her possible colonial interest in the Ottoman territory.⁵²

⁴⁶ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913:109: '*Les Français sont très vexés de voir que je donne la préférence aux Allemands. J'ai de bonnes raisons pour le faire!*' *Le Kaiser seul aurait suffi pour attirer toute ma sympathie vers les Allemands. Voilà un homme que l'on ne saurait s'empêcher d'aimer, en qui l'on peut avoir confiance. C'est un homme vraiment digne d'admiration, et à quelle hauteur n'at-il pas su porter son pays!*

⁴⁷ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 110.

⁴⁸ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 154.

⁴⁹ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 124-125: '*Au lieu de disperser dans le monde entier le superflu de sa force et d'acquérir des colonies qui jamais ne donneront aucun résultat, l'Allemagne aurait dû étendre délibérément son influence jusqu'au Golfe Persique. Le Allemands y auraient trouvé leur avantage et nous également.*'

⁵⁰ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 147-148: '*Allah soit loué de ce que nous ayons trouvé une compensation dans l'Allemagne. Notre 'honnête courtier' peut nous servir à les tenir tous en échec.*'

⁵¹ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 128: '*... et pourtant l'Allemagne a réussi à triompher sans coup férir, de toutes les autres nations dans le Levant.*'

⁵² Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 117: '*Il est vraiment grand temps d'enrayer un peu l'influence allemande ... Mon Ambassadeur à Berlin m'informe que le Kaiser projette la création d'une sphère d'influence allemande en Asie Mineure.*'

According to the Sultan's memoirs, Germany constituted the right choice that could contribute to his empire's survival in the European power struggle. For that reason, he had availed himself of every opportunity to influence Germany and to obtain and maintain her support and friendship. For this purpose probably, he had transferred his personal capital investments from French banks to German banks. As he stated in his memoirs, because he did not trust the banks in İstanbul, which were 'still far from being at the desired level', he had invested his personal saving abroad. In fact, he found it more reasonable to invest in a safe place abroad rather than keep it in İstanbul as an uncertain investment.⁵³ The 'safe places' where the Sultan invested his money were the *German Reichsbank* and *Deutsche Bank*.⁵⁴ According to a report written by Von Radowitz, German Ambassador at İstanbul, the Sultan wanted to transfer his deposits, which he had made privately for his children's benefit, from a French bank to the German Reichsbank. The amount transferred was more than 400,000 OL (7,376,000 Marks).⁵⁵ In a document dated July 16, 1887, Sultan Abdülhamid summarized the conditions of the process of transferring and/or depositing his private savings to the German banks; the savings consisted of German, English and French Treasury bonds and also his newly-purchased

⁵³ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 217: '*J'ai, en effect, plusieurs millions bien placés à l'étranger; n'y sont-ils pas mieux gérés que dans nos banques de Constantinople, qui sont encore loin d'être à la hauteur voulue?...Il est, en tout cas, plus raisonnable de placer mon argent d'une façon sûre à l'étranger, plutôt que de garder ici en des placements incertains.*' See also: Osmanoğlu 1984: 175-180; Karal 1988: 420.

⁵⁴ During my research in the *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (PA.AA), I encountered the following index note: Transferring of the Sultan's deposit from England to America, at the same time as a reserve for the Treasury. (*Angebliche Überweisung von Depots des Sultans von England nach Amerika, gleichzeitig als Reserve für die Staatskasse*). Unfortunately, in the file there was no documentation relating to the money deposited in the American banks. See: PA. AA, R13939. Moreover, this transaction had been reported in *The New York Times*, dated on May 8, 1909. The Newspaper reported the transaction with the following words: 'The Parliamentary Commission, which is taking an inventory of the contents of the imperial palace at Yıldız [...] has learned that Abdülhamid deposited, during recent months, considerable sums of money in New York banks through a confidential agent. The amounts thus sent to America and the names of the institutions holding them are, however, strictly withheld.' *The New York Times*: 08.05.1909.

⁵⁵ According to the document, for instance Sultan Abdülhamid placed the following shares in *Reichsbank*: on 07.07.1886: 960.000 Marks; on 30.09.1886: 48,500 Marks; on 06.01.1887: 42,000 Marks; on 13.07.1887: 38,500 Marks; on 27.09.1887: 51,000 Marks; on 30.12.1887: 40,200 Marks; on 22.03.1888: 52,700 Marks and on 26.06.1886 40,000. See more detail: PA.AA. R13939-R13340.

German state bonds which were obtained in exchange for the accrued interest payments from previous treasury transactions.⁵⁶

His decision to transfer his money from France to Germany may have been a sign of a change in Ottoman foreign policy, which had been shaped mostly by Abdülhamid's personal inclination. In this context, Tahsin Pasha's words may provide an insight into the intention of the Sultan's decision concerning capital investments abroad. According to Tahsin Pasha, the Sultan believed that money could buy every conscience, or at least could moderate some hearts and win them over probably for the sake of interests.⁵⁷ In the end, a great deal of the Sultan's savings would remain in German hands, as a sign of his trust, until his days of exile in Salonika.⁵⁸

A proper understanding of Sultan Abdülhamid's ruling system may give us further insight to be able to perceive the complete picture of the successful German war business in the Ottoman market.⁵⁹ In fact, the ruling system played a decisively important role, particularly in the arms trade. Grant's following expression gives an extensive perspective in understanding the impact of the ruling system on the arms trade process: 'With the importer states, the arms procurement process resided at the intersection of business, politics and foreign policy. Here the regime type played a determining role in how the arms trade interacted with the buyer country. ... Variations existed among autocratic states, depending on whether the autocrat personally intervened in the procurement

⁵⁶ BOA, Y.EE.4/35 (24.10.1304/16.07.1887): '*Zâtıma mahsûs ve kendi malım olan Almanya ve İngiliz ve Fransız konsolidelerim ile bunların bugüne kadar işlemiş olan faiz kuponları bedeliyle mübâya'a olunan diğer Almanya konsolidelerim cümlesini emâneten hıfz etmek üzere Almanya Devleti fahmime bankasına tevd'i ve teslim eylemiş olduğumdan işbu konsolidelerimin mecmû'u ve bunların bâ' dema işleyecek faizlerinden istihsâl olunacak mebâliğ hakkında mezkûr bankaca hal'en ve istikbâlen icrâsı lâzım gelen muâmeleyi ber vechi âti ta'yin ederim.*'

⁵⁷ Tahsin Paşa 1931: 42.

⁵⁸ Osmanoğlu 1984: 159-164.

⁵⁹ Yasamee indicates: 'In intention at least, Abdülhamid II was a realist in foreign affairs: he judged international relations in terms of power, and assessed power chiefly in military terms'. Yasamee 1996: 41.

process.’⁶⁰ Obviously, Abdülhamid II was an autocrat sultan who directly intervened in the arms trade.

Abdülhamid II, as a successor of Mahmud II (reg. 1808-1839), followed his way of centralising state authority. Griffiths presented the idea that Mahmud II’s centralising of state authority was a pre-condition for success in his army’s modernisation drive. According to Griffiths, without first ‘achieving’ a centralisation of authority in the empire, a modern military organisation would have been impossible.⁶¹ Centralisation of authority was therefore the first thing that Abdülhamid II tried to achieve. During the course of his reign, however, his personality became central to his system of shaping policy and administration. According to Sultan Abdülhamid’s first secretary, Tahsin Pasha, the Sultan gathered control over all administrative, military, political, religious and social affairs at the Yıldız Palace, where he established his centralised autocratic administration.⁶² In reality, the Sultan’s state organisation with regard to the administration of government and offices, as Baker described in 1902, was ‘reorganised like great business enterprises, with numerous departments and bureaus, each supreme in its own sphere, consulting the sovereign only in the greater affairs of State policy’.⁶³

As part of this process, Abdülhamid set up a military commission system that gave him the opportunity to achieve power over the military administration.⁶⁴ As his future activities would prove, his desire was to be informed of even the smallest detail in military-related subjects. For that reason, it is not surprising to perceive him as an authority figure, involving himself in almost every military affair, especially the purchase of war materials. This interference derived from the fact that he considered and managed

⁶⁰ Grant 2007: 9.

⁶¹ Griffiths 1966: 17; The British foreign policy makers described Abdülhamid’s governance as follows: ‘Sultan Abdülhamid II has laboured throughout his long reign to concentrate all authority into his own hands.’ In: BDOW 1932/5:5.

⁶² Tahsin Paşa 1931: 30.

⁶³ Baker 1902: 67.

⁶⁴ Griffiths 1966: 43; Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 245; Erickson 2003: 11.

the arms trade as an instrument of his foreign policy. As Erickson also pointed out, the Sultan took a personal interest in military reform and was responsible for many of the developments.⁶⁵

Because the final decision for the purchase of war materials definitely depended on the Sultan's *İrâde* the war business was unquestionably interrelated with the political environment and the strategies being followed as part of the Empire's foreign affairs, which was practically in the hands of the Sultan. He understood that the perception of the Empire abroad, from the point of political strength or weakness, could be balanced with large armaments orders from abroad. Based on this strategy, the arms trade and some political issues emerged from the same agenda. This was a fact that was well known to those people who had reliable contacts within the Yıldız Palace. Krupp's agent, August Huber, was among those who could gather vital information from the Palace. Thanks to his length of service and business activities related to the Palace, he proved to be one of the people who were well informed of the Ottoman war business and its nature. According to Huber – based on his former experiences [*alter Erfahrungen*] – Abdülhamid's principal motivation in the arms trade was shaped by some 'political ulterior motive' [*ein politischer Hintergedanke*].⁶⁶

The Sultan's response to an American claim for indemnity for American properties damaged during the Armenian uprisings in 1895-1896 was one of the remarkable cases that supported Huber's assertion of existing *politischer Hintergedanke*. During the Armenian uprising in some towns in Eastern and Central Anatolia in the 1890s, the Ottoman military intervened in the insurrections and used military force to terminate these uprisings. In doing so, however, some American colleges and the houses of some American missionaries were severely damaged. The damage occurred mostly in the towns

⁶⁵ Erickson 2003: 11.

⁶⁶ Huber to DWM (*Auszug aus Hubers Schreiben*), 29.10.1907, in: PA.AA. R13306.

of Harput, Maraş and Merzifon. Apart from a college in Merzifon, the Ottoman Government paid indemnity for other colleges and the properties of the American missionaries; the American Government claimed the Ottoman Government was responsible and demanded it pay a total of \$90,000.⁶⁷ Despite the fact that the Americans had officially demanded this amount several times, starting in 1895 and continuing till 1901, the Ottoman Government did not accept responsibility and rejected the claims for indemnity.⁶⁸ That did not make the Americans happy. According to Reed, the US Ambassador Angell, in a telegram to Washington D.C. on December 18, 1897, suggested that the American fleet be sent to İstanbul to ‘rattle the Sultan’s windows’ and also that ‘the fleet seize the port of İzmir and collect Turkish customs until the indemnity claim was paid’.⁶⁹ Angell was strongly convinced that the Sultan would pay no attention to the claim unless it was backed by war vessels.⁷⁰

On September 23, 1899, the American Ambassador at İstanbul at that time, Oscar Straus, submitted to the Secretary of State, John Hay, a report regarding the indemnity negotiations.⁷¹ His report began with a statement about negotiations with the Ottoman bureaucrats for guns purchases from the *Pneumatic Torpedo and Construction Company of New York* rather than the indemnity issue. According to Straus, the negotiations ‘were promptly resumed under the cover of which, it had been frequently stated by the Sultan’s

⁶⁷ Oscar S. Straus stated that indemnity claim was as Ottoman Lira 18,478 or 19,209 which was equally \$90,000: Straus to Hay, 23.09.1899, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63; See also BOA, *HR.SYS.2833/64* (24.04.1900): The amount for the indemnity for the loss of the houses and properties was according to this document 20,000 OL, whereas according to the document dated on 19.12.1900, it was £19,000, in: BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.37/18* (12.09.1318/03.01.1901).

⁶⁸ Olney to Department of State 17.10.1896, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/167; See also: BOA, *HR.SYS.2832/80* (08.10.1896); *The New York Times*: 30.03.1896; Erhan stressed that the American College in Merzifon was damaged as well during the Army’s intervention however the Ottoman Government made the payment (500 OL) for the damaged American College in Merzifon in 1893 to the United States Legation in İstanbul. Erhan 2000: 331. See for detail approach to the political activity of the American Missionary in terms of the indemnity claim in the Ottoman Empire: Reed 1972: 230-245.

⁶⁹ Reed 1972: 240; additionally according to a document the rumour of sending the American fleet to the Ottoman harbour had been as early as in 1896. BOA, *Y.A.HUS.343/84* (28.08.1313/ 14.01.1896).

⁷⁰ Reed 1972: 240.

⁷¹ Straus to Hay, 23.09.1899, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63.

secretary and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the indemnity claims would be paid'. After mentioning the fate of the contracts, which was conveyed to him by the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, he observed that, at the very point of their being approved by the Sultan, the contracts were suddenly dropped. Straus gave the following details about his 'unofficial conferences' with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom Straus expressed his demand of an audience with the Sultan. 'I told the Minister', wrote Straus,

the matter of the guns did not concern me, nor my Government, our demand was for indemnity for losses sustained by our citizens, that payment had been promised last December and my Government had patiently waited for the Sultan to make his promise good. If His Majesty wished to screen the payment under other transactions that was not our concern and could not be regarded as a valid reason to defer payment.⁷²

However, in September 1899, the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed him that the Sultan would receive him in audience on Friday after the ceremony of *Selamlık*.⁷³ On that day he had an audience of more than an hour's duration, of which he gave the following summary in his report:

He [Abdülhamid II] opened the conversation by saying ... the *Îrâde* for the purchase of a war ship in America had been sent to the Minister of Marine and with the making of the contract the American claims would be paid, or literally translated, 'Wiped out', and that he would request me not to discuss with him this matter further, as it is arranged for. Knowing the Sultan's temperament and his horror of this question, I did not directly go further into the subject, but brought the conversation around to it several times, by asking what answer I should give my Government as to when these claims would be 'wiped out' and when the *Îrâde* for the rebuilding of the Harpoot School buildings would be given. He replied as soon as the contract for the ship was concluded, which would be done shortly.⁷⁴

On one hand the Sultan was determined not to concede the indemnity claim while on the other hand he declared that he intended to buy a new cruiser from an American firm. From

⁷² Straus to Hay, 23.09.1899, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63.

⁷³ *Selamlık*: The public procession of the Sultan to a mosque for the congregational prayer on Friday.

⁷⁴ Straus to Hay, 23.09.1899, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63.

the financial point of view, the indemnity was more reliable than the cruiser. Naturally, the Sultan's priority was his Empire's image in the international political arena and again he was ready to sacrifice his Empire's weak economic resources for the sake of its external image.

Without question, the Empire's financial state was not good and the Sultan knew this. According to Straus, actually the Ottoman Empire was not able even to pay the salaries of civil and military officials; they were from nine to twelve months in arrears. Additionally he wrote that nearly all of the tangible sources of revenue had been conceded or pledged for advance loans. After adding some more examples and reasons why any expectation of an earlier payment from the Ottoman Government for the indemnity claim was not realistic, Straus wrote: 'We have the Sultan's promise made and repeatedly confirmed. But when? I am unable to answer. It will require time, patience and tactful pressure, or the other extreme. The other extreme, the show of force, which too often, by untoward circumstances, leads to the most serious consequences, I certainly would not recommend.'⁷⁵ Straus saw that 'by pushing the [indemnity] matter further, nothing would be gained, except to aggravate [Abdülhamid] and perhaps bring about a rupture'.⁷⁶ It seems that Sultan Abdülhamid achieved his aim; at least he was successful in postponing the indemnity payment to a later date, at which time its political consequences would not be as destructive as an earlier payment. The negotiations for the contract to purchase a cruiser from Cramp of Philadelphia proceeded till the end of 1900, but the contract was not signed.

The tactic applied by the Sultan was, however, evident. Through the inclusion of the cruiser order he managed to transform the Americans' demand for indemnity into a part of a package, which provided him with time to postpone and maybe to liquidate the

⁷⁵ Straus to Hay, 23.09.1899, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63.

⁷⁶ Straus to Hay, 23.09.1899, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63.

indemnity payment. The Sultan's tactic did not go unnoticed by Oscar Straus. On October 7, 1899, Straus sent a telegraph in which he noted that 'The Sultan requests me to telegraph the President of Cramp's shipbuilding, Philadelphia, to come here with drawings, and if possible a model, to negotiate purchasing a cruiser. ... [The] Sultan seems in earnest to make contract and thereby liquidate at the same time the indemnity claims.'⁷⁷

By these methods, the Sultan managed to postpone paying the indemnity until 1901, without any contract given to the Cramp company. In fact, the negotiations, the mutual visits of technical delegations, the production of drawings and models, etc., took a long time and during the course of the process it became clear that the Sultan had played well for time.⁷⁸ While it took time to finalise the contract and make the payment, a provisional contract was finally signed in December 1900, which included the indemnity payment.⁷⁹ The American Legation was tired of waiting for a final agreement and to this end, Lloyd C. Griscom, the American Chargé d'Affaires, sent a letter to Tahsin Pasha, the Sultan's first secretary, in January 1901:

The signing of the Contract for the purchase by the Imperial Ottoman Government of a cruiser from Messrs. Cramp of Philadelphia, the price of which includes the sum of £19,000 which Messrs Cramp are to deliver to the United States Government to cover the damages suffered by American citizens during the troubles of 1895, has been for the fourth or fifth time postponed.... I would ask that Your Excellency obtain the necessary Imperial *Îrâde* inviting the Minister of Marine to immediately sign the said contract.⁸⁰

Through this operation, Sultan Abdülhamid also showed his strategy of sacrificing his Empire's economic interests in order to avert possible political pressure, which could further damage his Empire's international prestige. Since paying the indemnity could be

⁷⁷ Hill to Straus, 09.10.1899, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/168.

⁷⁸ Akyıldız gives also some example about the Sultan's tactics playing for time. Akyıldız 2004:180-181.

⁷⁹ BOA, *Y.PRK.HR.29/42* (08.08.1318/01.12.1900): '*Amerika tebaası tazminatı [...] bu gemi bedeline dâhil[dir].*'

⁸⁰ BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.37/18* (12.09.1318/03.01.1901).

perceived as acknowledgement of blame for the loss of the Americans' properties, through a late payment he intended to reduce the negative effects of such an appearance.

In June 1901, the problem of indemnity was solved by 'the show of force' in favour of the Americans. According to Erhan, an American cruiser was sent to the harbour in İzmir with orders to sustain pressure on the Ottoman Government until the payment was made.⁸¹ However, from the war business point of view, these kinds of long-range problems – putting the Sultan under pressure by playing the Armenian card, etc., actually damaged the image of the United States and her armament firms. As a result, the American arms makers' existence in the Ottoman market became barely perceptible. Their long-lived reputation in the Ottoman Empire, gained over many years, and all these kinds of political interventions caused a gradual divergence from the American products and served utterly to promote the interest of Germany who appeared absolutely disinterested in Ottoman internal affairs and, in some cases, willing to lend support to the measures taken by the Ottoman Government.⁸²

This was not a unique case, where the Sultan played the military contracts card for a political purpose. It was argued that by signing a contract with an Italian firm to rebuild the ironclad *Mesûdiye*, Abdülhamid II hoped to satisfy Italian claims for damages arising from property destroyed during the same Armenian uprisings in 1895-1896.⁸³ In addition to that, the Ottomans' order for eight large armoured vessels, which was placed with Krupp's Germania yard in Kiel, was also regarded as a reward, in acknowledgment of Germany's threat to blockade Greece during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897.⁸⁴ Another example to understand how Abdülhamid tried to use military contracts to gain some political support was reported by Goltz Pasha. According to him, by placing an order with a French firm for

⁸¹ Erhan 2000: 331.

⁸² See also Chapter III: 178-180.

⁸³ Grant 2007:90. As Menne pointed out 'political action and business reaction frequently followed each other with suspicious promptness'. Menne 1938: 242.

⁸⁴ Menne 1938: 242.

a warship and some ship-guns in 1891, the Sultan intended to win France's support in the issue of the British evacuation of Egypt.⁸⁵ As C. L. Smith clearly demonstrated, the Sultan achieved his goal. Without referring to the armament negotiations between the Porte and France, Colin L. Smith wrote: 'France ... appeared to be the Power most likely to support the Sultan in the stand he was taking about Egypt'.⁸⁶

On the other side of the ledger, the expensive war materials orders caused an increase in the Empire's budget deficit. As the following document – a statement dictated by the Sultan – demonstrates, even the simple feeling of an implication about the Empire's financial and military weaknesses was enough to anger him and was viewed as an excuse for not placing a war materials order. As can be perceived in this quotation from the document, he was decisively aware of the Empire's deficiency in the field of the domestic war materials production.

The enemies have surrounded us on all four sides. As for our guns' shells, they are so far from reaching their targets among the enemy's army that it would seem they were meant for no other purpose than setting off a firework show for the purpose of welcoming the enemy. While it was necessary to find a remedy either by purchasing [from abroad] or – if it is possible - by producing in the factories here, despite the urgency of this matter there is [as yet] no [project] that has been proposed to the Council of Ministers [*Meclis-i Vükelâ*]. This must be considered by the Council. So, what do your acts mean? Who gave you this right? Who appointed you to this [task]? Alongside my astonishment about the return of the drawings [of the Krupp guns] with the hint [i.e., excuse] that such plans are beyond our means and that the State is poor and the treasury is empty, the thought that you [the sender] would have the effrontery to send such a [negative] report never even occurred to me in the wildest of my dreams.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Goltz to Von Kiderlen, 22.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763: '*Räumung des Landes*'; see also: Smith, C. L. 1957: 148-157.

⁸⁶ Smith, C.L. 1957: 149.

⁸⁷ BOA, Y.EE.106/18 (02.01.1301/03.11.1883): '*Cevânib-i erba 'amızı düşman ihate etmiş, bizim toplarımızın güllesine gelince düşmanların ordularına vâsıl olmak şöyle dursun havâî fişenki atılır gibi âdeta onları istikbâl için burada şenlik edercesine kullanmaktan başka bir şeye yaramayacağı bedihîdir. ... Yani nedir sizin yaptığımız? Ne hakkınız vardır? Sizi bu hizmete kim memur etti? Devlet fakirdir maliyede bir para yoktur gibi sözleri ima eder yollarda cevabla resimlerin iadesi taaccüble beraber böyle bir tezkerenin vürûdu asla hatr-u hayale gelmez idi.*' See the Appendix 5.1.

The great cost of the military lay in the maintenance of the regular forces, the purchase of weapons from abroad, the building of fortifications and the stocking of war reserves.⁸⁸ Accordingly, Sultan Abdülhamid turned increasingly to foreign borrowing to finance the ordered war materials and the increased number of troops. Germany was the most prominent place from which the borrowed money flowed. According to Griffiths and based on a British report, between 1890 and 1896 the Ottoman Government borrowed 27,014,906 lira. After repayment of earlier loans totalling 18,339,700 lira, the payment of the debt of more than 3,000,000 lira to the German arms firms left about 6,000,000 lira.⁸⁹

In spite of that grim reality, the Sultan did not refrain from making one after another order from the German armaments firms. One of the most conspicuous reasons might be, as mentioned earlier, his confidence in the existence of a positive correlation between the arms trade and the external image of his Empire. Probably, in his view, the consequential effects of the Ottoman military expenditure abroad served as a demonstration of the financial strength of the Empire.⁹⁰ He had not been too restrictive in arms imports in spite of the financial shortages that persisted from the first years of his reign until his dethronement in 1909. He refused to accept the Empire's financial embarrassments as an excuse for not modernising his army. On one hand, through importations from abroad he struggled to give a strong impression that the Empire was still alive and well. From a careful examination of a report written by Alexander W. Terrell, American Ambassador to İstanbul (1893-1897) on the eve of the Greek-Ottoman

⁸⁸ Griffiths 1966: 155.

⁸⁹ Griffiths 1966: 135.

⁹⁰ Ottoman arms import was widely reported by the British, Russian, Bulgarian, Greek newspapers. For instance the British Times [BOA, *Y.PRK.TKM.12/35* (16.11.1305/25.07.1888)] reported that the state bonds (*Tahvilat*) were held in the state treasury as a reserve for the payment of the ordered Krupp cannons and Mauser rifles, in spite of marketing the state's block of shares on the market. In a Bulgarian newspaper [BOA, *Y.A.HUS.523/39* (06.08.1326/03.09.1908)] it was reported that the Ottoman Empire had purchased war materials from the Krupp company. According to this newspaper, the intention of the Ottoman Empire was to attack into Bulgarian territory; and the Russian newspaper [BOA, *Y.PRK.TKM.10/20* (11.05.1324/03.07.1906)] reported on the Ottomans financial state and her military expenditures and military policy.

War, it can be determined that Sultan Abdülhamid had been successful in his intention of giving the above-mentioned strong impression. Terrell reported the following information to his head office, to the State Secretary, John Sherman:

I have obtained more accurate data from two of my colleagues regarding the small arms purchased and already delivered from Germany. Turkey now has 1,000,000 stand Mauser rifles, with ammunition and accoutrements complete. This may be of interest to the Department. This 'Sick man' if confronted with only one power, would certainly prove the most vigorous invalid of modern times.⁹¹

A similar statement was also made by Goltz Pasha, who probably knew the strengths and weaknesses of the Ottoman Army better than other foreign observers.⁹² The 'Sick man', wrote Goltz Pasha, 'still possesses a rich quota of vital force; he must not be diagnosed according to external symptoms such as those we are familiar with.' As a well-known military strategist, Goltz Pasha added that 'Often in the past the weak have been oppressed by the strong; but there can be no doubt that the means for salvation are forthcoming. It is only a question of making good use of them.'⁹³ Placing orders for military materials as an image management tool was expensive but it proved to be cheaper than costly wars. As a matter of fact, the Sultan's intention to solicit the armament firms' interest in the Ottoman market could provide the Ottoman Empire with a reputation of being able and determined to modernise its Army, thus ensuring that it would be regarded either as a strong ally or an enemy who should be avoided. Furthermore, Sultan Abdülhamid had rejected the idea that a reduction in military expenditure might benefit the economy.⁹⁴ The Sultan even used the indemnity of the War

⁹¹ Terrell to Sherman, 28.05.1897, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/63.

⁹² Von der Goltz, C.F. 1897: 1152-1162.

⁹³ Von der Goltz, C. F. 1898: 26.

⁹⁴ Yasamee 1993: 21.

of 1897, in which the German military strategy proved to be applied, to buy new weapons and ammunition for the army from Germany.⁹⁵

All the while there was closely-contested competition among the European and American arms producers to win orders from the economically and militarily emaciated Ottoman Empire. As a careful observer, Abdülhamid II was well aware of the arms makers' and their governments' fierce competition. In fact, a simple cruiser order, for instance, could become an important topic of the correspondences of the various Foreign Offices.⁹⁶ Accordingly, the Sultan attempted to turn his Empire's fatal weakness in military technology into a political strength. His probable intention was to use the Empire's weak point as a potential bargaining tool in the marketing race, particularly in some political questions.

One of the fiercest contests for Ottoman military contracts occurred between the French and German companies.⁹⁷ Following defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, France also lost her reputation of being a model army. Consequently, France steadily lost her status as the Ottomans' chief arms supplier, military adviser and even modernisation model.⁹⁸ In this way, France lost one of her major arms markets to her traditional rival, Germany. This meant that the reorganisation and rearmament of the army had become an excellent tool in the hands of Sultan Abdülhamid, to keep the European powers divided. Abdülhamid was certainly aware of this competition and maybe because of that, in his memoirs, he

⁹⁵ Memorandum of Colonel Ponsonby 07.07.1898, in: NA London: FO 195/2016 cited in Griffiths 1966: 143.

⁹⁶ Von Kiderlen to Bülow, 02.08.1907, in: PA.AA. R13306: Italian endeavour to be awarded with an order for a cruiser became easily a matter of diplomatically debate.

⁹⁷ German Ambassador Marschall von Bieberstein described the French action in this competition by writing a report to *Reichskanzler* Von Hohenlohe in 1898 as follows: '*Ihr [die Franzosen] nächstes Ziel ist beim Sultan Mißtrauen gegen uns zu erwecken, sie schreckt aber auch nicht vor dem Versuche zurück, uns gegen den Sultan mißtrauisch zu machen.*' Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 06.08.1898, in: GP/12-2 1924:566-567.

⁹⁸ The military reform of Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) was based obviously on the French influence. The young officers were mostly sent to France for military training, and French was the second language for students in the military schools. The dominant state of French, both as a language and system remained until the day, when Abdülhamid II established the new friendship with Germany. See: Shaw 1965; Griffiths 1966:14-17; McGarity 1968: 10-14.

persistently and particularly compared Germany with France. In 1901, Sultan Abdülhamid wrote:

Unfortunately, our relationship with France does not go well. France appeared to be very angry and they do not forget the Kaiser's visit with us. During the last centuries, we turned our attention completely to France. Turkish-French friendship starts after the speech of Louis XIV to brave Ottomans that they cannot collaborate with any other European state. We are doubtlessly thankful to French Officers that they reformed the army and especially artillery. During the later years, there were always some French Officers in our army and especially the Crimean War generated a kind of brotherhood between the soldiers of the two nations. The last century of our history could be called even 'French century'. During the reforms carried out by my grand predecessor Abdülaziz and sainted father Abdulmecid; the French people inspired it all. Until these years, France had had a clear influence on our army, schools, and language completely. France had built the first railways. Observing Germans now as being settled in the Ministries as the advisers or military trainers becomes obviously painful for these sensitive people. They do not accept the rising influence of Germany.⁹⁹

Although French capital investments in the Ottoman Empire told a different story from Abdülhamid's expression, he was generally right. France had increased her share of foreign capital investment in the Ottoman Empire from year to year. As a consequence of that, by 1898 French investors held at least 50 per cent of the total Ottoman debt.¹⁰⁰ But during the course of German emergence in the Ottoman market, France began to lose her influence, particularly in the government-supported fields of trade and investment, most particularly in the military-based trade. This grim reality was reported to Berlin, a bit ironically, by the German Embassy: 'In Paris everyone is very nervous about our position here [in İstanbul].'¹⁰¹ However, the whole of the Ottoman foreign

⁹⁹ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913:126-128. However, later on, according to *The New York Times*, Abdülhamid had mentioned his regret about his displacement of the French by the Germans. The Article had shared the following passages with its reader: 'in what purported to be a translation of Abdülhamid's private memoirs, published in Germany in 1913, the monarch ascribed to 'Fate, which drives men to do things in the wrong way,' the responsibility for his displacement of the French by the Germans.' *The New York Times*: 12.02.1918.

¹⁰⁰ Fulton 1996: 14.

¹⁰¹ Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 24.05.1898, in: GP/12-2 1924: 564: '*In Paris ist man längst nervös über unsere hiesige Stellung*'.

trade picture had not changed dramatically during this period. German investors' capital interest in the Ottoman market was not as high as the French investors'.¹⁰² Still, in the 1890s Germany's trade with the Empire was well behind that of Britain, Austria and France.¹⁰³

However, the Sultan's personal trust in Germany and its remarkable and concrete outcomes can easily be followed through the armaments purchasing process. According to Marschall von Bieberstein,¹⁰⁴ the Sultan told him during an audience that 'it was a settled principle of his [*feststehendes Prinzip bei ihm*] to order war materials from Germany and he would never forsake that [principle]'.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, on some occasions Abdülhamid expressed obvious admiration for the German products. According to Alexander W. Terrell, when he was received by the Sultan at the Yıldız Palace on October 19, 1894, the Sultan had described the Mauser rifles as 'the best rifle' even though the Ambassador had brought an old American Ferguson rifle as a gift to be presented to the Sultan.¹⁰⁶ In fact, during his entire reign, Sultan Abdülhamid was the best customer of the German arms makers, especially Krupp and Mauser. In one of his letters to Von Einem, the Prussian War Minister, Paul Mauser admitted that: 'I can only thank his Majesty the Sultan [Abdülhamid] for his gracious attitude and personal trust to me and my company for the delivery of more than 900,000 rifles over the past 20 years.'¹⁰⁷ Mauser was right to express his gratitude to the Sultan, whose 'benevolence' was actually the main factor behind the contracts given to the

¹⁰² Holborn 1926: 76; see also: Krauss 1901; Aybar 1939; Henderson 1948; Önsöy 1982; Pamuk 1987.

¹⁰³ Hale 2000: 31. See also; Eldem 1970; Birken 1980; Pamuk 1987; Pamuk 1995.

¹⁰⁴ He preferred being called as he wrote in the following report as 'Freiherr von Marschall': '... *Er nennt mich fortwährend: 'Freiherr von Bieberstein' oder 'Baron Bieberstein', während kein Deutscher mich anders nennt als 'Freiherr von Marschall'.* ' Marschall to Von Bülow, 26.07.1907, in: PA.AA. R13745.

¹⁰⁵ Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 06.08.1898, in: GP/12-2 1924: 567: '*Als ich dann im entscheidenden Moment den Sultan bitten ließ, der deutschen Industrie sein Vertrauen zu erhalten, ließ er mir umgehend sagen: 'es sei feststehendes Prinzip bei ihm [Sultan Abdülhamid], Kriegsmaterial in Deutschland zu bestellen, und er werde davon nicht abgehen.'*

¹⁰⁶ Terrell to Gresham, 20.10.1894, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/56 cited in Sander & Fişek 2007: 125-126.

¹⁰⁷ Mauser to Von Einem 16.12.1907, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A6.

Germans.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, as has been stated above, the Sultan looked on the arms trade and the signing of crucial contracts as ‘his own act and deed’ and had ‘a settled principle’ in favour of the German firms. The Sultan personally intervened in the arms trade and was instrumental in the decisions to place crucial military orders with German firms, even though some of his Ministers were of a different view.¹⁰⁹ Through his acts and deeds he came to be known as the best customer of the German armaments firms.¹¹⁰

Through the Sultan’s support, German firms gradually came to dominate the Ottoman military market. It is therefore appropriate to mention here a document dated September 11, 1895, to illustrate further Abdülhamid’s personal consideration about the German arms companies, especially Krupp and Mauser: ‘While it is evident that His Imperial Sovereign [Sultan Abdülhamid] could buy the firearms [*esliha*] from anywhere he wants and even if required [he could also purchase] from American factories, however, because of his trust in [*i’timâd*] and favour for [*teveccühât*] the Krupp and Mauser factories [these factories] will be preferred.’¹¹¹ Moreover, Marschall von Bieberstein, in one of his reports submitted to the German Foreign Office, referred to the Sultan’s intention to place an order for coastal guns (24 cm) by adding the following interesting comment: ‘...The Sultan talked about the subjects related to the military, troop training, etc., and he expressed that he intended to place an order for 24 cm coastal guns (of course with Krupp).’¹¹² The parenthetical expression, given in quotation marks in the original document, may demonstrate Marschall von Bieberstein’s confidence about the Sultan’s open inclination towards the Krupp factory

¹⁰⁸ See Chapter III: 160.

¹⁰⁹ BOA, *Y.MTV.281/21* (07.10.1323/05.12.1905).

¹¹⁰ Menne 1938: 191.

¹¹¹ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.43/14* (21.03.1313/11.09.1895). See the Appendix 5.2.

¹¹² Marschall to Auswärtiges Amt, 06.04.1907, in: PA. AA. R13775: ‘*Sodann sprach der Sultan von militärischen Dingen, Truppenausbildung u.s.w. und äußerte, er beabsichtige 24 cm Festungsgeschütze zu bestellen ‘selbstverständlich bei Krupp’.*’ Quotation mark is in original.

specifically and towards the GAFs generally. A letter sent to Krupp by Paul Horn,¹¹³ a German civil adviser in the Ottoman service, whose status American Ambassador King defined as ‘a very important position,’¹¹⁴ gives another indication of the Sultan’s personal trust in Germany and its positive impact on the GAFs’ position in the Ottoman market in a very explicit way. According to Horn ‘if perchance there was still no danger for the German position acquired in the Ottoman Empire, it was exclusively indebted to the Sultan’s *engouement*/ infatuation with Germany’.¹¹⁵

The Sultan, who intervened directly in price negotiations,¹¹⁶ payment procedures¹¹⁷ and delivery processes¹¹⁸ for the ordered guns, rifles or gunboats from abroad, lent his personal support almost exclusively to German firms. A report Marschall von Bieberstein sent to Von Hohenlohe, demonstrates the Sultan had used his own initiative in the arms trade in favour of German arms manufacturers: ‘On his own initiative’, wrote Marschall von Bieberstein, ‘the Sultan increased the amount of the cartridges order - from 100 million to 200 million units with a purchase price of approximately 20,000,000 Marks - he will order 250,000 new rifles from us [...]’.¹¹⁹ In fact, the aforementioned expressions such as ‘his own act; his own deed; or his own

¹¹³ Paul Horn was the consultant and under-secretary of the Minister of Public Works (*Nafia Nezareti Müsteşarı*). He entered the Ottoman service in April 1885 and stayed in the Ottoman Empire for ten years. See: BOA, *IDH.938/74290* (09.07.1302/24.04.1885); BOA, *Y.PRK.NMH.6/53* (05.11.1312/30.04.1895); see also: Kırmızı 1998: 43-44.

¹¹⁴ King to the Secretary of State, 24.12.1889, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/50.

¹¹⁵ Horn to Krupp 09.08.1891, in: HA. FAH 3B/216: ‘*Dass trotzdem noch keine Gefahr vorhanden für unseren hiesigen Besitzstand, ist ausschließlich dem engouement des Sultans für Deutschland zu danken, das hoffentlich auch in Zukunft durch Presserzeugnisse keinen Abbruch erleidet.*’

¹¹⁶ BOA, *Y.A.RES.36/17* (14.05.1304/08.02.1887): The Sultan tried to learn both the Mauser rifle’s real price (*fiyat-ı hakikîlerini*) and also the price offered to the other governments; in the other documents we see that the Sultan found the price offered by Mauser very high and ordered to the Ottoman ambassador to Berlin to re-negotiate the terms. BOA, *Y.A.RES.51/29* (03.12.1307/21.07.1890).

¹¹⁷ BOA, *Y.PRK.BŞK.12/14* (28.04.1304/24.01.1887).

¹¹⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.EŞA.50/35* (25.03.1325/08.05.1907): ‘*Cevâb-ı emr u fermân-ı hümayûn iktizây-i ‘âlîyince keyfiyeti imparator hazretlerine iblâğ olunmak üzere Hariciye nâzırına beyân olundu. Müşârun-ileyh hazretlerinin zati ... hazreti hilâfet penâhi ve Devlet-i ‘Âlîlerine der-kâr olan meveddet ve muhabbet-i samîmâneleri icâbınca arzûy-ı şâhâne vechile topların vakt ve zamânıyla teslîmi hakkında Kruppa evâmîr-i lâzîme irsâl edeceklerine şüphesi olmadığını ifâdeden sonra...*’ See the Appendix 5.3. See also: BOA, *Y.A.HUS.498/60* (17.11.1323/13.01.1906).

¹¹⁹ Marschall to Von Hohenlohe, 24.05.1898, in: GP/12-2, 1924: 563: ‘*Aus eigener Initiative hat der Sultan die Lieferung von Patronen von 100 Millionen auf 200 Millionen Stück – mit einem Kaufpreis von zirka 20,000,000 Mark- erhöht; er wird 250,000 neue Gewehre bei uns bestellen, [...].*’

initiative' do simultaneously refer to Sultan Abdülhamid's authority in the Ottoman arms trade.

Since the Sultan's open inclination towards Germany and the GAFs - in particular Krupp and Mauser - was well known at that time, there was no other way than exploiting the financial weakness of the Empire. Apparently, France, which lost its former dominant position to Germany, was quite late in realising the strong position its rival had achieved in the Ottoman market and the methods it had used to achieve it. In 1904, the Ottoman Government had to turn to Paris to obtain French support to sign a new debt arrangement and to put the Ottoman state bond on the French market. Ernest Constans, the French Ambassador to İstanbul, however, imposed some preconditions for the requested approval: guns and destroyers must be ordered from a French firm, Schneider's Le Creusot, a prominent rival of the Krupp company.¹²⁰ Because of this condition, the Ottoman Government was constrained to purchase four destroyers from Schneider's Le Creusot.¹²¹ Subsequently, in 1905, a loan agreement for 60 million Francs was signed between the two parties. According to the agreement, 20 million Francs should be used to pay for French industrial goods. 'Ultimately,' says Fulton, 'Schneider ... delivered ships worth about 13,500,000 Francs.'¹²² Langensiepen & Güleriyüz asserted that the reason for this order was to create a diplomatic and financial balance between the Great Powers.¹²³ However, the true motivation behind the placing of this order was not to look out for a balanced policy, as Langensiepen & Güleriyüz suggest; on the contrary, the justification behind the French order proved to be French

¹²⁰ Fulton 1996: 155; Howe pointed out that the German embassy also used the same method to secure some Ottoman armaments order. Howe 1916: 104.

¹²¹ BOA, *Y.MRZ.D.12578* (26.09.1322/04.12.1904).

¹²² Fulton 1996: 155.

¹²³ Langensiepen & Güleriyüz 2000: 181.

financial extortion.¹²⁴ As a consequence of this operation the German arms makers and their agents in İstanbul were anxious about the possible orders.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, the German influence penetrated into the Ottoman market was not as superficial as the French might have expected.

Constans' belated personal attempt to regain political and military strength and influence in the Ottoman Empire on behalf of French interests was shaped mostly by economic considerations. But Germany and her businessmen had realised much earlier than the French that the road to success in the Ottoman Empire was in the intertwined features of politics and economics. Paul Graf Wolff Metternich, the German Ambassador in London (1903-1912 and later in İstanbul 1915-1916), alluded to doing business in the Middle East, specifically in the Ottoman Empire, reflecting the reality in a revealing manner: 'The foreign influence in the Middle East is of an economic or political nature. In general, both are intertwined. Who even has the strongest political influence, will most likely receive concessions and its merchants will be favoured.'¹²⁶ Thanks to the gained personal trust of the Sultan, most of the lucrative concessions and contracts, for which several countries were competing, were given to the Germans without any difficulty.

However, towards the end of Sultan Abdülhamid's reign, the Germans came to realise that 'the German influence is not as strong as it was before'. The truth of this statement could be attributed to another crucial development, of which the newspapers

¹²⁴ BOA, Y.MRZ.D.13014 (14.02.1323/20.04.1905): '..hükümet-i seniyece Löfervor fabrikasına sipârişi mukarrer olan koşumlardan ma'da Fransadan mübâyâ'a edilecek levâzım-ı bahriye için Kruzör fabrikasına hakkı rüchân verilip fakat mezkûr fabrika projektör i'mâl etmediği takdirde işbu âlât için diğêr bir Fransız fabrikasına mürâca'at olunması husûsâtından ibâret bulunmuş ve bundan başka bir yolda tesviye-i maslahâtü kâbil olmayacağı sefir-i müşârun-ileyh tarafından kat'iyen ifâde olunduğu Hariciye Nezaretinden iş'âr olunmuş olduğu gibi.'

¹²⁵ Huber to Mauser, 27.05.1905, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A5; Huber to Mauser, 03.06.1905, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A5.

¹²⁶ *Aufzeichnung des Botschafters in London Grafen von Metternich*, 14.08.1908, in: GP/25: 606-607: 'Der fremde Einfluß im Orient ist wirtschaftlicher oder politischer Natur. In der Regel ist beides miteinander verwoben. Wer den stärksten politischen Einfluß besitzt, erhält am ehesten Konzessionen und seine kaufmännischen Unternehmungen werden begünstigt.'

were aware, the rising power of the Young Turks. The following passage from an article published in *Deutsche Zeitung* on July 9, 1907, confirms that the Germans were making preparations for a possible replacement of Abdülhamid II. In fact, the German policy makers saw no reason not to be ‘on equally good terms with the Young Turks as with Sultan Abdülhamid’.¹²⁷ However, according to the article, ‘based on human calculations, the fate [was] not far off, when Abdülhamid’s line to life will be cut.’ Based on this calculation, the newspaper assumed ‘one may not expect much from him because of his illness, his administrative acumen and reluctance to any reforms’.¹²⁸ The newspaper’s calculation was based on a high expectation of a power-shift in the imperial sovereignty after which the Young Turks would become the most powerful party in the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁹ The newspaper’s estimation was right; however its calculation was wrong. On April 27, 1909, Sultan Abdülhamid was deposed by the Young Turks and he died on February 10, 1918—eleven years after this article was published.

The Ottoman Bureaucrats: Personal Ties with the Arms Makers

In his book *The Political Economy of War*, Francis Wrigley Hirst defined the nature of the arms trade in a most explicit way. He defined the governments as ‘the only customers of the [armament] firms’ and the ministers and subordinate officials of the governments as the authorities who ‘have no interest in [the] economy, and have even

¹²⁷ Von Bülow 1917: 69.

¹²⁸ *Deutsche Zeitung*: 09.07.1907, in: PA.AA. R13745: ‘Nach menschlichem Ermessen ist die Parze nicht mehr fern, die den Lebensfaden Abdülhamids abschneiden wird. Daher darf man von ihm –zumal im Hinblick auf seine Krankheit, seinen Geschäftssinn und Widerwillen gegen jeglichen Reform- nicht viel mehr erwarten. Dagegen ist der überwiegende Teil des türkischen Volkes durchaus zukunftsfröh und deutschfreundlich gesinnt.’

¹²⁹ *Deutsche Zeitung*: 09.07.1907, in : PA.AA. R13745: ‘Hier also, insbesondere bei den Jung Türken, die nach erfolgtem Thronwechsel höchst wahrscheinlich die maßgebende Partei bilden werden, muss eine weitschauende Diplomatie sowie die von ihr geleitete Presse die Überzeugung stärken, daß das deutsche Volk der natürliche Verbündete und Freund des Osmanenreichs ist.’

been [known to] yield to bribery'. Based on this assessment, Hirst further asserted that 'the ordinary theory of supply and demand cannot be applied rigorously to the armament trade'.¹³⁰ Presumably, if Hirst could have had the opportunity to examine the late nineteenth century Ottoman case in terms of inapplicability of the ordinary market theory to the arms trade, he would have realised how correct his assertion was. However, the Germans' success relied on a multiple-stage information flow between the source of decisions, namely Abdülhamid II, and the GAFs, whereas the Ottoman bureaucrats, as the sources of information, were situated at the second stage right under the decision-maker: the Sultan.¹³¹ During Sultan Abdülhamid's reign, some ministers and subordinate officials of the Ottoman Government were directly involved in the arms trade and tried to influence the purchasing process in favour of the Germans by using two basic methods: Submitting *lâyihâs*/reports to the Sultan for the purpose of influencing armament policy, which was followed by a recommendation for the GAFs, and by direct sharing of some crucial information with the GAFs and the German civil and military advisers.

The *lâyihâs* submitted to the Sultan suggesting an increase in importing war materials helped to stimulate the growth of German influence in the Ottoman military market. However, the necessity to increase armaments was basically shaped by the new perception of a war threat, on which the German military mission's impact was obvious.¹³² 'Since the demand for armaments is greatest during the war', wrote Hirst, 'war is the ultimate aim of private armament firms; or, if not the actual aim, it is their *raison d'être*, the end and purpose for which they exist.'¹³³ Similarly, if war was not anticipated at some time then either the threat of war or information about other states'

¹³⁰ Hirst 1916: 92-93.

¹³¹ See the Figure 2.1: Chapter II: 94.

¹³² See Chapter III: 130-132.

¹³³ Hirst 1916: 94.

procurements could be instrumental in creating a new market for manufactured war materials. That was, in fact, what had happened in the case of the Ottoman arms purchasing process during the period of Abdülhamid's reign. The threat of war probability forced the Ottoman authorities to maintain a close watch on the armament policies being adopted by other nations, especially those countries from which a possible attack seemed most likely: Russia and the Balkan states (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Rumania). As an example, Ottoman military officials, in a report dated October 19, 1886, argued that the Ottoman Government should take into consideration that the Russians and Greeks were strengthening their naval forces. The consequent suggestion made in the report was to take immediate action to finalise the purchasing process for the torpedo boats ordered from the Germania yards.¹³⁴

All the while, political instability in the Balkans and rumours of a European war loomed large in debates.¹³⁵ The Ottomans' arms-import priorities were shaped by the technological innovations of the European arms industry and the perceptions of a new threat to peace.¹³⁶ The potential for war seemed to result in a conviction in Ottoman

¹³⁴ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK.12/14 (20.01.1304/19.10.1886).

¹³⁵ BOA, Y.A.RES.36/17 (01.05.1304/26.01.1887): '*Avrupa'nın her tarafında tedârikât-ı 'askeriye bir sûreti fevka'-î 'âde de icrâ olunmaktadır. Mesâ'il-i siyâsiye-i hâzıra nazaran ez-zaman içinde dehşetli muhârebeler zuhûr edeceği Avrupa parlamentolarında irâd olunan nutuklardan ve matbû'ât münderecâtından anlaşılmalıdır. Devlet-i 'Aliye bunlara karşı tedâriksiz bulunmamak için şimdiden bir dakika bile fevt etmeksizin tedârikât-ı lâzime-i harbiyeye ciddî ve hakîkî bir sûretle mübâsere etmek lâzım gelir.*' See also page: 288 below; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK.13/41 (23.01.1305/11.10.1887): '*Sipâriş edilmiş olan mükerrer atışlı Mavzer tüfenklerinin politikaca görülen ahvâlden dolayı bir an evvel elde edilmesi lüzûmundan ...*'; BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK.13/41 (06.04.1305/22.12.1887): '*... Avusturya hükûmeti mühimmât-ı 'askeriyesini tezyîd için 12 milyon filorin tahsîsine karar verdiği Viyana'dan vârid olan haberlerden anlaşılmalıdır olup hükûmet-i seniyenin de tensikât-ı cedîdeyi 'askeriyyesi icâbınca sipâriş ettiği tüfenklerin bir an evvel elde edilmesi...*'; BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.7/34 (20.11.1305/29.07.1888): in this document, the Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna reported the military budget of the Austria. BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.7/137 (29.12.1305/06.09.1888): Major Ahmed Tevfik Pasha reported the political and military state of Italy; BOA, Y.A.RES.41/42 (28.06.1308/12.03.1888): '*Avrupa'nın her tarafında zuhûr edebilecek vukû'âta karşı devletlerce tedârikâta devâm olunmakta olduğu cihetle Devlet-i 'Aliyeye dahî mübâya'at-ı 'askeriye ve sâ'ire için lâ-akall iki buçuk milyon lira kadar bir meblâğın şimdiden tedârik olunması...*'

¹³⁶ BOA, Y.A.RES.37/2 (05.05.1304/30.01.1887): '*işbu mazbatada dahî Mavzer tüfenginin sıhhat endahî ve hedef isâbeti ve mekanizmasının mükemmeliyeti ve evsâfi sâ'ire-i makbuliyeti ber-tafsîl-i 'arz ve beyân olunduğuna ve Avrupa devletleri umûmen mükerrer atışlı esliha tedârikine teşebbüs etmiş ve Sırbîye hükûmeti dahî bu tüfenklerden mübâya'a etmek üzere olup Bulgaristan gibi küçük bir emâret bile 60-70,000 adet mükerrer atışlı Mavzer tüfengi mübâya'asını taht-ı karâra almış olduğu cihetle Devlet-i*

military circle that ‘whoever wins the armament race may very well win the war’.¹³⁷ On that basis they felt compelled to follow very closely the armaments strategies of their potential enemies.¹³⁸ One of the most debated sources of threat was the increased armaments for Bulgaria, whose friendship was also of enormous importance for the Krupp company and Germany.¹³⁹ Actually, the following years justified the officials’ predictions about the Bulgarian war preparations. At the end of 1894, it was reported that two tugboats of the Danube Steam Shipping Company (*Donau-Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft*) were transporting war materials produced by the Krupp factory to Bulgaria.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, a document dated January 20, 1898, demonstrates that Bulgarian officials visited the Krupp factory for the purpose of placing new gun orders.¹⁴¹

A decade later, on August 10, 1903, the Ottoman Government signed an agreement with the Krupp company for 186 guns (31 batteries),¹⁴² which was reported by *The New York Times* as ‘Turkish war preparations’ with Bulgaria.¹⁴³ Furthermore, on December 1, 1903, Hurşid Pasha, who was officially sent to Germany to inspect the cannons ordered from the Krupp company, submitted a report to the Ottoman Minister of War informing him that the Krupp factory had provided the Bulgarian Army with

‘Aliyenin silâh yüzünden hüddâ-nekerde ileride bir büyük vehâmete dûçâr olmaması için mezkûr tüfenlerin lüzûm-ı mubâyâ‘ası mertebe-i vücûb [...]’ see also: BOA, Y.PRK.TKM.13/44 (14.01.1306/20.09.1888).

¹³⁷ Cited in Werner 1939: 16.

¹³⁸ BOA, Y.MTV.89/67 (08.07.1311/15.01.1894): ‘Bükreş’den çekilen bir telgraf-nâmede bundan akdem ‘Steyr’ nâm esliha fabrikasına Romanya hükûmeti tarafından sipâriş kılınmış olan yüz bin adet Mannlicher tüfenginden bukra yetmiş bini teslim olunmuş olup küsûrâtının dahî karîben teslim ve it‘a kılınacağı bildirilmiş ...’; BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.62/87 (13.11.1307/01.07.1890): ‘... ancak bunların [the ordered Mauser rifles] teslimi için gösterilen müddet pek uzun olup hâlbuki Bulgarların şu bâkiye vakt zarfında Avusturya’dan 61,000 tüfengi [Mannlicher rifles] celb etmek üzere olmalarıyla mezkûr Mavzer tüfenlerinin bir an evvel elde edilmesi matlûb ve mültezem olduğundan...’ see also: BOA, Y.A.HUS.498/83 (22.11.1323/18.01.1906).

¹³⁹ *Abschrift*, 21.03.1895, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/71.

¹⁴⁰ BOA, HR.SYS.218/121 (02.06.1312/02.12.1894).

¹⁴¹ *Abschrift*, 20.01.1898, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/224.

¹⁴² BOA, Y.MTV.295/159 (29.01.1325/14.03.1907).

¹⁴³ *The New York Times*: 25.08.1903.

26,304 pieces of shrapnel, and a French company had sold them 15,430 pieces.¹⁴⁴ Presumably, Hurşid Pasha obtained this information directly from the Krupp company, as part of its strategy to encourage the Ottomans to place orders for more guns and related materials than Bulgaria had placed.

It was a sound marketing strategy designed to ensure that the more war materials the Bulgarians bought from Krupp the more the Ottoman Empire would order. That was a natural instinct of an arms maker: If he could persuade one government to increase its armaments then more orders could be secured from others.¹⁴⁵ In February 1905, a year after Hurşid Pasha submitted his report, important information reached the Ottoman Government: the Bulgarian Government had placed an order valued at 4.5 million Francs (ca. 197,541 OL) with the Krupp company and 2,200,000 Francs of the total amount had been paid in advance.¹⁴⁶ According to the ‘Report on Changes in Foreign Armies during 1905’ published by the British War Office, the Bulgarian Artillery was composed of 7,874 men (the peace strength) and 602 field guns (486 Krupp field guns and mountain guns; 54 Krupp 7.5 cm quick-firing field guns; 54 howitzers; and eight Le Creusot 7.5 cm. quick-firing field guns),¹⁴⁷ whereas the Ottoman artillery consisted of 40,000 men (the approximate peace strength) and 1,650 field guns, almost all of which were made by Krupp.¹⁴⁸

The Ottomans’ immediate reaction to the Bulgarian artillery orders was followed by the European press. *The [London] Times*, for instance, reported the Ottoman reaction: ‘The recent purchase of quick-firing guns by Bulgaria has created a deep impression at Yıldız Kiosk, and it has been decided considerably to augment the Ottoman artillery. To this end negotiations have been opened with a financial group

¹⁴⁴ BOA, *Y.MTV.253/82* (11.09.1321/01.12.1903).

¹⁴⁵ Hirst 1916: 96.

¹⁴⁶ BOA, *Y.A.HUS.484/11* (02.12.1322/07.02.1905).

¹⁴⁷ Report on Changes in Foreign Armies during 1905, in: NA, London: WO/106-6182: 11.

¹⁴⁸ Report on Changes in Foreign Armies during 1905, in: NA, London: WO/106-6182: 21.

represented by the Ottoman Bank, for a loan of 3,000,000 OL, for the purchase of new armaments ... The project causes much concern in German circles, and attempts are being made to obtain an order for arms for German firms.¹⁴⁹ The Sublime Porte then accelerated the negotiation taking place for a new guns order from the Krupp company; consequently – on April 6, 1905 – the Ottoman Government signed a new agreement with Krupp for 546 guns (91 batteries). The total cost of these guns amounted to 1,967,634.37 OL (more than 36 million Marks).¹⁵⁰

According to a protocol prepared by a member of the Military Commission, and considered when it assembled on December 5, 1905, the artillery emplaced in Rumelia amounted to 848 guns, whereas the Bulgarian Army already had 972 guns, which meant that in the case of a war against Bulgaria the Ottoman Army would be in a difficult situation. Based on this comparison, the commission suggested – after praising the Krupp guns – more gun orders from an appropriate firm.¹⁵¹ Another comprehensive comparison of the number of guns ordered by both the Ottoman and Bulgarian Governments was made by the sub-Ministry of *Techizât-ı Askeriye* in 1907.¹⁵² According to this report, until August 1907 the total number of the guns ordered recently by the Ottoman Government amounted to 732, whereas Bulgaria's contracts amounted to 324 guns. In short, this report reflected the conviction widely held in Ottoman military circles that 'whoever wins the armament race may very well win the war'.¹⁵³ But numerical superiority in armaments did not necessarily translate into superiority on the battlefield. The Balkan Wars demonstrated that this conviction

¹⁴⁹ *The [London] Times*: 21.12.1904.

¹⁵⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.227/135 (30.01.1323/06.04.1905); see also for table for the instalment payment: BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.207/4 (04.01.1324/28.02.1906).

¹⁵¹ BOA, Y.MTV.281/21 (07.10.1323/05.12.1905): The commission described the Krupp quick-firing guns as follows: '*Krupp fabrikasından celbi mukarrer bulunan ve Avrupada en müterakkî hükûmet-i askeriyeden ekseriyesinin bile henüz elde etmeye muvaffik olmadıkları efvâh-ı nâriyeden serî atışlı toplar...*'

¹⁵² BOA, Y.MTV.295/159 (29.01.1325/14.03.1907).

¹⁵³ Werner 1939: 16.

misled the Ottoman decision-makers. The Ottoman Army was defeated by the Bulgarian Army in 1912 during the First Balkan War.¹⁵⁴

During the reign of Abdülhamid II, the power of every European State was determined by its military-naval strength. As a consequence of this determination, the Ottoman military officers followed the military technological developments and armament strategies of the European States either through translated books, newspapers articles or reports written by Ottoman officers who had been sent to Europe, e.g., Austria, Germany, France, England and Spain. The articles and books translated by the Translation Office in the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Ali Tercüme Odası*) were investigated in detail by Ottoman bureaucrats and afterwards discussed in the *Meclis-i Vükelâ*.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, the purchasing commissioners abroad and the inspection commissioners in İstanbul submitted a number of reports (*lâyiha*) and comparative statements about the new military technology developed by the European arms producers. As is pointed out below, in most of these reports when war materials were compared the verdict was in favour of the German-made war materials. The reason for that was mostly based on the great success of the Prussian-German Army in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). In fact this kind of argumentation played a decisive role in the Ottoman bureaucrats/officers' decision in support of the German style of military reform in Abdülhamid's military modernisation plan. As an outcome of this war, France was replaced as the foremost military power in Europe and the position as leader in military technology and strategy passed to Germany.¹⁵⁶ The Ottoman officers and bureaucrats, who propagandised about the superiority of the German war materials, used this war and its political consequences as a significant example. The German victory over

¹⁵⁴ See: Erickson 2003.

¹⁵⁵ BOA, *Y.PRK.TKM.10/38* (26.07.1304/20.04.1887).

¹⁵⁶ McGarity 1968: 24.

France was portrayed as clear evidence of Germany's military strength and the quality of the German weapons used in this war.¹⁵⁷

Essentially, all the reports related to the reorganisation and rearmament of the army were systematically submitted to the Sultan but they merely represented a simple bureaucratic confirmation of the Sultan's well-known inclination towards Germany. The archival documents relating the rearmament of the Ottoman ironclad *Âsâr-ı Tevfik* with Krupp guns give illuminating examples of this situation. According to a document dated December 07, 1899, Sultan Abdülhamid had particularly preferred the Krupp company to the Armstrong company in armouring the *Âsâr-ı Tevfik*.¹⁵⁸ Halil Pasha (1862-1917), who was the naval officer responsible for the inspection of the restoration process of the ironclad in Geneva,¹⁵⁹ argued that the Sultan's personal preference for the Krupp company was, from a technical point of view, very appropriate. Accordingly he defined the Sultan's decision to arm the Ottoman ironclads with Krupp guns as 'a decision which is a result of an inspiration of God (*ilhâm-ı rabbânî*)'.¹⁶⁰

As a matter of fact, the Sultan did not usually attach much importance to reports which were unfavourable to German-made war production,¹⁶¹ and sometimes he became very angry with officials who did not pay enough attention to offers made by German arms companies, particularly the Krupp or Mauser companies.¹⁶² As a result, the reports were typically and unsurprisingly cast in favour of Germans because the officials understood the Sultan's inclination towards Germany. The Sultan's control over the purchasing process and his orientation towards Germany during the ordering

¹⁵⁷ BOA, Y.A.RES.36/17 (01.05.1304/26.01.1887).

¹⁵⁸ BOA, Y.PRK.OMZ.2/43. (03.08.1317/ 07.12.1899).

¹⁵⁹ Halil İbrahim Pasha was appointed to the Ministry of Navy on January 12, 1910 after the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Bal 2003: 145.

¹⁶⁰ BOA, Y.PRK.OMZ.2/43. (03.08.1317/ 07.12.1899): '*Âsâr-ı Tevfik Firkateyn-i Hümayûnlarının Krupp toplarıyla techîzini emr u fermân-ı kerâmet-beyân-ı zillu 'l-lahîlerinin şeref-sünûh ve südüür buyurulmasındaki hikmetin sırf ilhâm-ı rabbânîden münba'is olduğu sâbit olup..'*

¹⁶¹ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.52/77 (06.05.1306/08.01.1889).

¹⁶² BOA, Y.EE.106/18 (02.01.1301/03.11.1883), see page: 249 above.

process was, as mentioned earlier, very conspicuous. He almost gladly accepted reports or statements which were prepared in favour of German suppliers.

The following view, elaborated by Grant, makes Halil Pasha's report and expressions all the more interesting. Grant asserts that in the 1910s Halil Pasha 'had pro-British sympathies' and had 'entered into secret and unauthorised negotiations with Armstrong for the purchase of two dreadnoughts'. In fact, Halil Pasha's action was unexpected at that time, when he submitted to the Sultan the report in which he described as 'a wonder work' (*Kerâmet*) the Sultan's decision about the arming of *Âsâr-ı Tevfik* with Krupp guns but not with Armstrong. However, the Young Turk revolution brought a change in some political affairs and also in the attitude and approach of the officers. Halil Pasha, who was in 1899 an obvious opponent of arming the ironclad with Armstrong guns, was now fighting in 1910 with 'the ardent pro-German war minister', Mahmud Şevket Pasha, to buy warships from Armstrong. Grant asserts that when Halil came forward with his plans, Mahmud Şevket Pasha feared that the failure of the Germans to supply warships would be regarded as a personal defeat for him. Consequently the Grand Vizier, who was said to be 'very anti-English,'¹⁶³ forced Halil to resign on May 29, 1910.¹⁶⁴

It has been observed that the written reports by the Ottoman commissions, relating to the German-made rifles and cannons, or the military organisation or equipment, and new techniques developed by the German manufacturers, had been influenced by the civil or military bureaucrats' personal opinions, which could be easily altered and/or manipulated by some gift giving or *Baksheesh*. However, *Baksheesh*, as a dealing instrument, was prevalent before and during the reign of Abdülhamid II – as

¹⁶³ Lowther to Grey, 31.05.1910, in: NA, London: FO 78/371-1000.

¹⁶⁴ According to Sir G. Lowther the reasons for his resignation were not clear, but it seemed probable that his fall was occasioned by intrigues of the German and American competitors, combined with those of the rival English firms of Palmer and Fairfield. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 31.05.1910, in: NA, London: FO 78/371-1000; see also Grant 2007: 176-177.

well as after. Abdülhamid himself complained about corrupt officers, and especially about the penchant of high ranking-officials to accept bribes.¹⁶⁵ In fact, the Ottoman Empire was not an exceptional case. As Grant pointed out, the armament companies ‘offered the native officers, off the record, a share in the armaments contracts through the payment of commissions or other financial blandishments.’¹⁶⁶

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, even the Sultan himself mentioned corruption in his memoirs as a matter that gave rise to a reduction in the Empire’s credibility among foreign investors.¹⁶⁷ As Arthur von Gwinner expressed in a self-explanatory letter, *Baksheesh* was almost a common feature of doing business in the Ottoman Empire in those days. Gwinner was a member of the Board of Managing Directors of the *Deutsche Bank* (1894-1919) and - as Fay described him - ‘an active promoter of the Baghdad Railway’.¹⁶⁸ According to Gwinner, £120,000 had to be paid as *Baksheesh* for the concession of the Baghdad Railway Company. He stated in a letter dated November 7, 1930, just a year before he died: ‘Indeed it is known to all who ever had to do with Turkey that it was even impossible to pass a donkey charged with gold for the Treasury into Stambul [İstanbul] without paying *Baksheesh* - a way of the Sultan’s of paying his ministers and officials.’¹⁶⁹ The German firms’ profitable war business in the Ottoman market was always conducted with *Baksheesh*. In September 1906, the *Leipziger Neuesten Nachrichten* published a particular article about *Baksheesh* in the Ottoman war business. As the title of the article (*Politische Übersicht:*

¹⁶⁵ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 21-23; 74-75.

¹⁶⁶ Grant 2007:14; Hallgarten gives also the international character of the Baksheesh in arms trade: ‘*Nach der Größe der Bestellung richtete sich dann das Bakschisch. Schlaue Füchse wie der König Nikita von Montenegro oder- denn die Provenienz macht hier keinen Unterschied- auch der Zar von Bulgarien konnten auf diese Weise Vermögen erwerben.*’ Hallgarten 1963/2: 137.

¹⁶⁷ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 75: ‘*Il n'est pas étonnant que l'Europe ait une mauvaise opinion de nous, quand elle voit nos premiers dignitaires s'associer à des personnages aussi suspects pour gagner un bakchich. Il est naturel que le monde commercial et industriel de l'étranger, si convenable et si digne, perde confiance en nous!*’.

¹⁶⁸ Fay 1932: 240.

¹⁶⁹ Quoted Fay 1932: 240-241.

Eine Bakschischgeschichte) exposed as well, in the end *Baksheesh* came to be regarded as a political instrument which the Germans used effectively – with varying political consequences. The article argued that ‘It is a well-known fact that in İstanbul business could be run effectively through *Baksheesh*.’¹⁷⁰

In the same vein, bribing the officials who were involved into the awarding process of the arms contracts seems to have been a typical feature of the war business during that period. As some similar cases indicate, corruption was an inevitable by-product of the strong emergence of the German manufacturers into the world arms market. There was a direct correlation between the strong position of the GAFs and the methods they employed to persuade the officials who could manipulate the decision-making process of armament purchases. The American Ambassador to İstanbul, Leishman, who noticed this interrelation, reported the detail with a very obvious statement: ‘I am creditably informed that Krupp’s sales here during the past 30 or 40 years amount to over 20 millions of pounds, and it is quite safe to assume that at least five to 10 per cent of this amount has been distributed among certain officials in the shape of *Baksheesh*.’¹⁷¹ As Scott generalised, ‘bribery was not accidental or occasional, but essential and systematic in every field of commerce.’¹⁷² Because of its importance, Sampson’s illuminating explanation is worth quoting:

The great majority of orders were from governments, where the decision could well depend on one or two individuals, whose support was therefore essential. The advantage of buying one warship or gun, as opposed to another, was often uncertain, and arguments could thus easily be swayed. The orders were often very large, so that a single decision was more critical for an arms company. And the sales were usually conducted in secrecy for reasons of national security. Moreover, as the commission increased, officials might well favour

¹⁷⁰ *Leipziger Neuesten Nachrichten*, 14.09.1906, in: PA.AA. R13305: ‘Daß man in Konstantinopel mit ‘Bakschisch’ kräftig arbeitet, ist eine bekannte Tatsache.’

¹⁷¹ Leishman to Hay, 17.07.1903, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M46/72.

¹⁷² Scott 1962: 81. Cited in Sampson 1991: 52.

bigger orders, beyond the capacity or needs of their country, to ensure that their share would be greater.¹⁷³

Based on this scenario, it can be said that the process of modernising and rearming the Ottoman Army with German-made war materials might not be solely a military-oriented and economically-sound process. On the contrary, it was in many aspects a multidimensional process, where the personal influence and attitudes of the officials and officers played a decisive role. Although Marschall von Bieberstein expressed the view that the Ottoman statesmen had no impact on the Sultan's many decisions,¹⁷⁴ the following expressions from his report confirm that at least the decisions relating to the arms trade must be excluded from other types of decisions made solely by the Sultan. In this respect, this documentation also provides some more evidence about how the system worked and how the Germans became the Ottomans' chief arms suppliers. Responding to an information request relating to Osman Nizami Pasha, the newly-appointed Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin in 1908¹⁷⁵, Marschall von Bieberstein, wrote the following complimentary expressions referring to his contribution to the German arms supply to the Ottoman Army:

He [Osman Nizami] has always proven his pro-German sentiments by his actions. During my residency here [Istanbul] for eleven years he has been a loyal friend and adviser of our military reformers and he has been a reliable informant for the German military mission. He has used his whole influence in order to make Germany the unique supplier for all Turkish arms orders. ... Osman Nizami is a Turkish patriot, but in his mind throughout [*in seiner ganzen Geistesrichtung*] he is more German than Turkish.¹⁷⁶ He deserves therefore my full trust.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Sampson 1991: 53.

¹⁷⁴ Lindow 1934: 26.

¹⁷⁵ Osman Nizami Pasha was the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin between 1908 and 1915.

¹⁷⁶ The very interesting point is here the expression of 'being more German than Turks.' Since the American advisor Bucknam Pasha used the same justification for his pupil Rauf Pasha as follows: 'Rauf ... is far more an American in his idea than a Turk.' *The New York Times*: 11.05.1913. It seems that some of the Ottoman officers who occupied very important positions in the Ottoman Army were in their idea 'far more others than Turk'.

¹⁷⁷ Marschall to Von Bülow, 25.10.1908, in: PA.AA. R13746.

The *Deutschen Zeitung* newspaper, reporting in 1907, endorsed Marschall von Bieberstein's conclusion about the contribution of the Ottomans to Germany's political and economic progress in the Ottoman Empire. The article indicated that thanks to the active support of the pro-German Grand Vizier, Halil Rifat Pasha – who had been rewarded with the Black Eagle medal by Kaiser Wilhelm II for '[his] services and friendship' – German influence in the Ottoman Empire had gradually risen.¹⁷⁸ The following report written by Ahmed Rifat Bey, the son of Halil Rifat Pasha, gives us another revealing glimpse of the importance of the bureaucratic contribution to German success in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Rifat Bey, who was also educated in Germany, sent the German Ambassador an article published in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on July 9, 1907, entitled '*Deutschlands Einfluss auf die Türkei muß wieder steigen*' (Germany's influence on Turkey must rise again) and declared that:

I request your Highness to be allowed to submit the enclosed newspaper clippings. They were sent to me from a friend, who – as can be derived from the content – seeks for the improvement and strengthening of the German-Turkish relations. The latter was the chief aim of my deceased father, who regarded it the highest luck to have contributed to its realization as the Grand Vizier. May both our nations be destined for a blessed future!¹⁷⁹

Ahmed Rifat Bey proved to be only one example among many students who trained in Germany and in later years became 'a German's apostle' in the Ottoman Empire. The appeal of Germany and her military model was obviously strongest among the younger

¹⁷⁸ *Deutsche Zeitung*, 09.07.1907, in: PA.AA. R13745: '*Die deutschen Fortschritte wurden tatkräftig unterstützt durch den deutschfreundlichen Großwesir Halil Rifat Pasha, den Wilhelm II. für seine Verdienste mit dem Schwarzen Adlerorden auszeichnete.*' However, Giesl described Halil Rifat Pasha as an uneducated and inferior man. '*Der Sultan hatte den 80 jährigen Großvezier Halil Rifat Pascha, einen ganz ungebildeten und inferioren Mann, [...] zu diesem Amte berufen.*' Steinitz (ed.) 1927: 25. Nevertheless, Giesl was obviously wrong about Halil Pasha's age. Because Halil Pasha was not at his eighties when he became Grand Vizier, but he was 68 years old and when he died in 1901, he was still at the age of 74. See: Birol 2003: 278-280.

¹⁷⁹ Ahmed Rifat Bey's letter, 11.08.1907, in: PA.AA. R13745.

officers. But admiration for the German system was obvious as well in the upper ranks, who trained in the War Academy or who had been in Germany for some reason. Over time these students became loyal representatives of German culture in the Ottoman Empire. Besides cultural transfer, these cadets made a significant contribution to building up of political and economic links between the two Empires. In reports prepared for the Government, they passionately complimented the German style of military organisation and strategy.

Among these cadets there were three future war ministers (later Pashas), Ali Rıza, Mahmud Şevket, and Ahmed İzzet.¹⁸⁰ Over the course of time these students proved to be loyal representatives and an inseparable part of the German penetration strategy towards the Ottoman Empire. However, the impact these officers had on the decision-making process seems to have been restricted during Abdülhamid's reign; in the long-term they acted as life insurance for the German penetration strategy towards the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸¹ As mentioned above, although Abdülhamid was a personal supporter of Germany, when he lost power after the Young Turk revolution, Germany and the German arms makers in a long-term perspective did not lose their marketing power, as had been predicted. On the contrary, the Young Turk revolution brought German-trained officers into key command positions.¹⁸² 'As long as the Army remained in power in Turkish policy', wrote Wangenheim proudly, 'Germany will remain in a preferred position against the countries with which it's competing.'¹⁸³ Wangenheim's evaluation was correct and historical events supported his statement. The German advisors, in particular, Goltz Pasha, were successful in creating a Pro-German young officers group in the Ottoman Army. Based on this fact, Wangenheim

¹⁸⁰ Yasamee 1998: 94-95.

¹⁸¹ Marschall to Von Bülow, 03.09.1908, in: GP/25 1924: 614-615.

¹⁸² Yasamee 1998: 109-110.

¹⁸³ Wangenheim to Von Hollweg, 28.08.1912 cited in Türk 2006: 82.

further added as late as in 1912 that ‘The majority of the Turkish officers still believe in the absolute superiority of our military capabilities.’¹⁸⁴ In fact, even before the revolution they had already begun playing their important role as pro-German officers in the Empire’s military reorganisation and rearmament policies.

What follows are some more examples that demonstrate the impact of the German-trained officers in creating a pan-German climate in the Ottoman’s ruling circles. Ahmet İzzet Pasha, for instance, one of the foremost of Goltz Pasha’s cadets, graduated from the Ottoman War Academy in 1887 and in 1891-1894 received advanced military training in Germany.¹⁸⁵ After his return to İstanbul, thanks to his German knowledge he became one of the leading friends of the German military advisors in the capital. In 1898 he visited Germany again. On his return to İstanbul, he prepared a report setting out his observations about Germany’s military system and its organisational skills. He mentioned in the report that he had been invited as an observer to infantry and cavalry manoeuvres in Berlin. According to him, the main characteristic of German soldiers was their discipline and obedience to their commanders. He recounted a conversation with Count Alfred von Waldersee, who had a lengthy background in the artillery and cavalry and was a well-known cavalry commander¹⁸⁶ and, as Menne called him, a ‘doubtless well-informed friend of the Emperor’.¹⁸⁷ İzzet also gave some detailed information about manoeuvres in which he took part.¹⁸⁸

Although Ahmed İzzet did not comment explicitly in favour of the Mauser rifles or the Krupp guns, his report might be regarded as a statement of a manifest admiration of the German military system. Unquestionably, these kinds of conclusions facilitated the strengthening of German influence in the Ottoman Army. Ahmed İzzet,

¹⁸⁴ Wangenheim to Von Hollweg, 28.08.1912 cited in Türk 2006: 82.

¹⁸⁵ Akmeşe 2005: 25.

¹⁸⁶ Brose 2001:13, 41.

¹⁸⁷ Menne 1938: 194.

¹⁸⁸ BOA, *Y.PRK.MYD.21/15* (21.12.1315/11.05.1898): See the Appendix 5.4 (a-c).

in coordination with Goltz Pasha and Mahmud Şevket Pasha, altered the education system for general staff officers, introduced model troop regiments, erected training areas for officers, worked on transportation and mobilisation schemes, and arranged manoeuvres.¹⁸⁹ These developments were based on his experiences during his stay in Germany. The German arms makers took advantage of Germany's increasing influence in the Ottoman Army to gradually gain more contracts from the Ottoman Government.

Mahmud Şevket Pasha was one of the pro-German officers and he was well known for having a particular impact on the arms-purchasing process.¹⁹⁰ The entrance of the Mauser rifle into the Ottoman Army was an illustrative example of Mahmud Şevket's pro-German attitude. In the last days of 1886, when the Mauser company was struggling to enter the Ottoman market, Mahmud Şevket Pasha proved his pro-German sentiments by his vigorous advocacy on behalf of the German-made rifles. *Serasker* Ali Saib Pasha opposed the German offer and was obviously inclined to recommend the Austrian-made Mannlicher rifles, whereas Mahmud Şevket and the Germans were against him.¹⁹¹ In the commission, while the German advisers, including Goltz Pasha, were observing the discussion just as 'spectators and technical advisers', Mahmud Şevket Pasha – the youngest member of the commission¹⁹² – entered onto the stage representing the German interests and criticised the approach put forward by the *Serasker*.¹⁹³ Goltz Pasha used the following words in explaining Mahmud Şevket's important contribution to the Germanisation of the Ottoman military market:

¹⁸⁹ Swanson 1975: 374.

¹⁹⁰ See also: Chapter III: 163-165.

¹⁹¹ Von der Goltz, C. F. 1913: 34: '*Nach endlosem Hin und Her sollte eine unter dem Vorsitz des Kriegsministers Ali Saib versammelte Kommission die Entscheidung fällen. Die Stimmung darin war Deutschland keineswegs geneigt. Die Konkurrenten hatten alle Minen springen lassen; der Kriegsminister selbst war gegen das deutsche Angebot, und diese Tatsache auch bekannt.*'

¹⁹² Swanson 1975: 372.

¹⁹³ Von der Goltz, C. F. 1913: 34.

At first, nobody dared to speak against him [Ali Saib Pasha] and a deep silence followed. After a short pause, the youngest of all members, Mahmoud Schewket [Mahmud Şevket Pasha], started talking and objected to the Minister in a quiet but very impressive way. His remarkable intelligence/memory helped him immensely at this. He repeated sentence by sentence the news articles as quoted and proved the superficiality of these press attacks and briefly yet effectively went over the comparison of the competing rifles. It was a brilliant speech of irresistible logic at the end of which the speaker accepted with great warmth the attacked weapon factory and its directors [and] *Kommerzienrath* Mauser. He finished with a very particular [expression]: "*Vallâhi doğru söylüyorum!*" - "By God, I speak the truth! The general impression was enormous. All eyes turned to the young, otherwise taciturn officer, from whom no such vigorous and energetic speech was expected [but at the same time] no one did expect [from him] such a venture. [...]"¹⁹⁴

Despite the apparent unwillingness of the *Serasker*, the commission decided at this time in favour of the Mauser rifles. Consequently, in 1887, the Goltz-Mahmud collaboration worked well and the Mauser company was awarded the contract – one of the first triumphs that paved the way for the Germanisation of the Ottoman military market. In the years that followed, Mauser obtained a virtual monopoly in the Ottoman small-arms market, as Krupp had in artillery and naval guns. Monopolisation of the Ottoman military market by the GAFs could be perceived as a first step towards Germanisation of the army. The Germanisation of the Ottoman Army, which led eventually to the ‘Brothers in Arms’ concept of the First World War, started with the Germanisation of the Ottoman arms market. At this point, Mahmud Şevket Pasha’s statement, made on the eve of the First World War, becomes very illuminating. In a conversation with Cemal Pasha, Mahmud Şevket, who often corresponded with Goltz Pasha after Goltz’s departure for Germany¹⁹⁵ once said: ‘Now we cannot salvage ourselves from the German style of war [application] [*Alman harb usûlü*]. For over 30 years since the German teachers have been found in our army, our officer corps has been completely trained according to the German method, in short, our army produced

¹⁹⁴ Von der Goltz, C. F. 1913: 35.

¹⁹⁵ Goltz to Mahmud Şevket Pasha, 30.09.1911, in: MA, Freiburg: NL.737/10.

a familiarity with the spirit of German instruction and discipline. Now it is not possible to change.’¹⁹⁶

The fact admitted by Mahmud Şevket Pasha was also valid for the Ottoman arms purchases, especially for the artillery. On April 6, 1905, the Ottoman Government had signed a new contract with the Krupp company for 558 guns, for which the Ottoman Government had to pay 1,967,634.37 OL (36,302,854 Marks).¹⁹⁷ According to Grant, through this contract the Germans ‘achieved their greatest sale.’¹⁹⁸ By 1906 the Germans became almost the only artillery supplier to the Ottoman Army. The military commission investigated the competing systems (French/Canet and German/Ehrhardt) and visited the factories where they were being made, and came to a solid conclusion that the Krupp guns were perfect.¹⁹⁹ After writing favourably of the Krupp products, the commission – led by Hurşid Pasha – used a similar explanation to Mahmud Şevket’s above-given statement, which might demonstrate the Germans’ monopoly position in the Ottoman military market. The commission pointed out that for a half-century the Ottoman artillery unit had been armed with the Krupp guns and in that time it had developed a familiarity with the Krupp weaponry; any change in the system, from the commission’s point of view, might cause a disaster in a possible war.²⁰⁰ As Mahmud Şevket said, ‘Now it is not possible to change.’²⁰¹

Apart from the abovementioned high-ranking military officers, there were the Sultan’s secretaries, advisers and some other officials at the Yıldız Palace who also had

¹⁹⁶ Martı (ed.) 1996: 73.

¹⁹⁷ BOA, *Y.PRK.ASK.227/13* (30.01.1323/06.04.1905): ‘93 *Batarya sahra topu esmâni olarak*’

¹⁹⁸ Grant 2002: 26.

¹⁹⁹ BOA, *Y.MTV.285/100* (27.01.1324/23.03.1906).

²⁰⁰ BOA, *Y.MTV.285/100* (27.01.1324/23.03.1906).

²⁰¹ Martı (ed.) 1996: 73.

a clear influence on the arms trade.²⁰² The Yıldız officials, particularly the Sultan's secretaries, who were selected by the Sultan without reference to the Grand Vizier or the Council of Ministers, were the most influential officials among the others.²⁰³ As Goltz wrote, 'The *Başkâtibs* [Chief Scribes] of the Sultan have in reality more influence on state affairs than the Grand Vizier' [and they] were 'best able to discover the snares and pitfalls which lurk under the surface, and this makes [them] indispensable.'²⁰⁴ According to Sir William White, 'Every Ministerial report [was] criticised and openly attacked by these persons before the Sultan, and as they [were] much nearer his presence than his Ministers they [had] greater facilities in working on his imagination or prejudices.'²⁰⁵ Their influence on Ottoman administrative affairs was also noted by *The Times of India*. On August 10, 1908, the newspaper published the following comment: 'All real power was vested in the Sultan and his secretaries and under-secretaries.'²⁰⁶

The contention that secretaries became the centre of the politics was not wrong if we consider the most remarkable figures among the Sultan's secretaries, the second secretary İzzet Bey, who was also called 'Arab İzzet', 'İzzet Holo', and 'İzzet Al 'Âbid'.²⁰⁷ Some foreign observers identified him, after Sultan Abdülhamid himself, as the most interesting personality in the Ottoman Empire. He was also described as 'the avatar of the Hamidian system',²⁰⁸ the 'Machiavelli of Turkey',²⁰⁹ and 'the mouthpiece

²⁰² For more information about the *Mâbeyn* see: Hürmen (ed.) 2006/1: 53-59; Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 213-214; The chief scribes of the Sultan were: Küçük Sait Pasha (1876-1878); Ali Fuat Bey (1878-1881); Süreyya Pasha (1881-1894); Tahsin Pasha (1894-1909).

²⁰³ See for more information about the importance of *Mâbeyn* and Yıldız administration during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid: Akyıldız 2004: 167-173.

²⁰⁴ Von der Goltz, C. F. 1898: 14. See also: Akyıldız 2004:180.

²⁰⁵ White to Salisbury, 28.06.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3998.

²⁰⁶ *The Times of India*: 10.08.1908, in: PA.AA. R13745.

²⁰⁷ İzzet Bey was a most influential figure during the reign of Abdülhamid II. Therefore, by declaration of the constitution, İzzet escaped from İstanbul to Europe. See: Farah 1997.

²⁰⁸ BDOW 1928/5: 8; Kamphövener Pasha, who also held an office at *Mâbeyn*, described İzzet Bey as follows: 'Der Sultan sei in den Händen eines verworfenen Menschen, des İzzet Bey, der ihn ganz leite, und durch den alle Geschäfte gehen.' GP/12-1 1924: 17 (28.06.1896).

of the Sultan'.²¹⁰ As Farah points out, İzzet Bey was the Sultan's most trusted confidant during the 15 years of his service in Yıldız Palace.²¹¹ In fact, he acted as the Sultan's chief of advisers.²¹² Sultan Abdülhamid made him a member of all commissions concerned with controlling and accounting for financial outlays; in particular, as a critical member of the financial reform commission. Through these positions he was able to exert a most visible influence on the empire's financial affairs, including the armament orders and their financing through foreign loans.²¹³ So establishing and maintaining a close and good connection with İzzet Bey meant having an excellent conduit to the Sultan and the opportunity to have an effect on him. The Germans, better than most nations, recognised the necessity for this close relationship; to quote from an official report written by the German Ambassador to İstanbul: 'Because of his influence on the Baghdad railroad project, İzzet [Bey] is for us an indispensable man.'²¹⁴

Furthermore, Marschall von Bieberstein described the information given by İzzet Bey as 'the most confidential' (*höchst vertraulich*).²¹⁵ Mr Huber, the representative of Krupp and Mauser in İstanbul, corresponded directly with İzzet Bey. In one of his informative letters to İzzet Bey, he mentioned some information about the recommended prices and quantities of the cannons and rifles ordered from Krupp and Mauser.²¹⁶ Despite the key position held by İzzet Bey at the Yıldız Palace, we were

²⁰⁹ *The New York Times* called him as 'Machiavelli of Turkey' and gave the following interpretation in 1915, seven years after his escape from İstanbul: 'In 1908, on the eve of the revolution he became a Sheik- to save his soul, he said. Then he joined the Young Turks to save his body. He finally escaped from the country in order, as he again declared, to keep body and soul together. He is reported to be very wealthy with money on deposit in London and New York. He undoubtedly visited London incognito half a dozen years ago and is said also to have been seen in New York.' *The New York Times*: 06.01.1915.

²¹⁰ Currie to Salisbury 16.04.1896, in: NA, London: FO 78/4706.

²¹¹ Farah 1997: 194.

²¹² Shaw & Shaw 1977/II: 214.

²¹³ Farah 1997:198; Kössler 1981: 272.

²¹⁴ Cited in Boelcke 1970:147-148.

²¹⁵ Marschall to the Auswärtiges Amt, 11.10.1902, in: GP/14 1924: 421.

²¹⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.168/128 (1318/1900).

unable to find any document that proved his direct intervention in the war business which concluded in favour of the Germans. However, Kössler asserts that the French armaments firms gave İzzet Bey more *Baksheesh* than the Germans did.²¹⁷

That being said, the manipulative power of corrupt officials to change the balance of the arms trade in favour of the GAFs was undeniable. It is equally certain that some writers have overstated the role played by *Baksheesh* traffic in the development and maintenance of relations between the German military mission and the Ottoman officials.²¹⁸ In fact, the offering of bribes to Ottoman officers in order to open up the Ottoman market to the German arms industry and to guarantee business success might not have been of concern to the German military missions. On the contrary, the arms makers had their own ways of doing this. Besides, the arms makers had more than one way to manipulate the Ottoman officers. Those might include a warm and friendly reception and generous hospitality during a visit, or giving some small token gifts. Such simple instruments served as a profound method of influence.²¹⁹ The host-companies were aware that the first key to success in business in the Ottoman market might lie in the hands of these officers. Therefore, the arms makers

²¹⁷ Kössler 1981: 274-275.

²¹⁸ Mutluçağ 1968: 34-41; Ortaylı 1981:64-66; Türk 2006:73. Mutluçağ and Ortaylı both referred to the same documents, which accuse Goltz Pasha of direct involvement in the *Baksheesh* traffic. BOA, Y.EE.15/212 (28.08.1307/20.03.1890). However, these documents that were produced and submitted to Artin [Dadyan] Pasha, by a well-known French novelist Théodore Cahu (was also known as Theo Critt) who had claimed that he captured some secret letters/reports of Goltz Pasha sent to Bismarck and General Waldersee appear to me fabricated documents. According to one of these quasi-captured documents, which might be sent to Bismarck, Goltz Pasha had paid (bribed) three Ottoman officers based on a direction given by Bismarck. Mutluçağ gave the following transcription, which was also quoted by Türk: 'Bu pašaları sizde [Bismarck] tanırırsınız, emirleriniz üzere şimdiye değin kararlaştırılan paraları kendilerine iki defa vermiş olduğumu biliyorsunuz. İşte bu ödemeler tekrarlandığı takdirde, yukarıda adlarını açıkladığım kişilerin geniş ve önemli yardımlarını göreceğimize eminim.' In fact these documents were among those reports of the Sultan's informers (*Jurnaller*) some of which were saved and submitted later to the Prime Minister Ottoman Archives-State Archive by Asaf Tuğay who was the writer of the books called 'İbret: Abdülhamid'e verilen Jurnaller ve Jurnalciler' Tuğay 1962; and 'Saray dedikoduları ve bazı mâruzat' Tuğay 1963. It is important, also, to mention here that -as it was also pointed out by Artin Pasha- Théodore Cahu was expecting some gift made by Sultan Abdülhamid on these reports and secret information that was submitted by him. (... kendilerinin de [Théodore Cahu] ihsan-ı celil tacdarilerine nail olacağı ümidinde bulunduğunu ima etti). BOA, Y.EE.15/212 (28.08.1307/20.03.1890). See the Appendix 5.5.

²¹⁹ Sater & Herwig 1999: 134-136.

concentrated assiduously on hospitality during visits by Ottoman military purchasing commissions to their factories and their cities, especially in Oberndorf/Neckar and in Essen.

As the Krupp company had already settled into the Ottoman market and held the monopoly position in the Ottoman artillery supply since 1870s, most efforts by the German military advisers and their Ottoman connections were dedicated to a successful penetration of the Mauser rifles into the Ottoman small-arms market. Therefore, the case of the Mauser company in the Ottoman market was more comprehensive and capable of evaluation in terms of the impact of personal influence.²²⁰ After obtaining his first major order in 1887, Mauser started to establish more personal relations with some Ottoman officials, as the Krupp company had been doing since its first days in the Ottoman business.²²¹

The Sultan's secretaries were usually the foremost persons to be aware of the Sultan's inclination towards German-made weapons. For this reason, the reports and doings of Abdülhamid's private secretaries, and other secretaries should be subjected to more careful study. For instance, Süreyya Pasha's justifications and arguments cited below indicate the characteristic of this kind of report. The arguments in the report are based on roughly three points which defended the German style of military organisation and armament strategy. As will be seen in the following pages, it was a real local defence – insider marketing of German-made military materials. In this respect, the report underlined the possibility of war in Europe and the political changes which would follow. Based on this approach, in the *lâyiha* it was asserted that the reorganisation of the Ottoman Army and a new rearmament policy were essential:

²²⁰ See Chapter III: 139-170.

²²¹ BOA, *HR.TO.30/11* (02.08.1285/18.11.1868); BOA, *HR.TO.30/9* (11 .06.1285//29.09.1868).

Across Europe the procurement of armaments is being carried out in an excessive way. According to the speeches given in the European parliaments and the contents of the newspapers, in respect of the current political development it is obvious that dreadful wars that will take place are not far. In order not to be unprepared, *Devlet-i 'Ali* [the Ottoman Empire] needs to begin an immediate procurement of the war materials.²²²

The second point of this report addressed the actual state of the Ottoman Army and the weapons in the army's possession. As can be detected throughout the document, the writer's expressions were very negative regarding the existing weapons, which were provided by non-German companies, e.g., Henry-Martini, Snider and Winchester. According to the *tezkiye* the Ottoman Army's first and foremost need was to ensure that every soldier sent into battle had a rifle; this would involve arms purchases, to comply with the reforms introduced by Goltz Pasha, who had recommended changes in the recruitment system and an increase in the number of troops.²²³ 'Since there are [in the hands of the Army] only 450,000 Martini rifles', wrote Süreyya Pasha, 'in the case of war breaking out more rifle supply will be inevitable.' According to him, 'there would be no other alternative way than providing the soldiers with the useless Snider and Winchester rifles.'²²⁴ To avoid this unsuitable situation, he suggested buying 550,000 new rifles and giving financial preference to spending on these rifles over any other expenses.

After a sharp critique of the rifles made by non-German firms, the third argument in the document concerned Germany's reputation as a military power and the quality of the rifles produced in Germany. According to the *lâyiha*, German military superiority in comparison with the other countries was undisputed:

²²² BOA, *Y.A.RES.36/17* (19.04.1304/15.01.1887). See the Appendix 5.6a.

²²³ See Chapter II: 120-123.

²²⁴ BOA, *Y.A.RES.36/17* (19.04.1304/15.01.1887).

Germany is regarded by authorities from everywhere as a superior one to all other states in terms of military affairs and military supplies. After five-ten year experiences, Germany has adopted the Mauser repeating-rifles for the preparation for an unprecedented war with France and distribute these rifles with the numbers of 500,000 to her soldiers with the intention of equipping its whole army with these rifles. According to news appeared in the newspapers, however, the French Government, which is in the process of getting machines from America for the purpose of manufacturing the repeating-rifles, is in fear and rush due to Germany having the Mauser rifles.²²⁵

Interestingly, Süreyya Pasha, in the following pages, was advocating the Mauser rifles while he sharply abused the other companies' representatives. Through these statements, the Sultan's bureaucrats reduced the burden borne by Mauser and his agent in marketing their rifles. The following statements, which were written and submitted in report format to the Sultan one month before the contract was given to the Mauser company, were earlier and determined signs of the final decision made in favour of the Mauser rifle. Süreyya Pasha, firstly, accused Azarian [*alias Bruder*]²²⁶ the representative of an American factory in İstanbul, of engaging in several intrigues that were, according to Süreyya, well-known to everyone in İstanbul, and then he claimed further:

The same person [Azarian] who is the partner of an American commissioner, Mr. Hartley, submitted an offer made by Hartley to the Ministry of War saying that he [Hartley] could provide rifles the same as Mauser's or maybe better than Mauser's rifle for only 345 *Kuruş*. As a matter of fact, this [man] Hartley ... was not a [armaments] producer but a simple commissioner, who has damaged the [Ottoman] state [treasury] at one time.²²⁷

According to Süreyya Pasha, based on the patent right owned by Mauser, Azarian's statement – asserting that Hartley was able to produce the same rifle as Mauser – was definitely wrong and not to be accepted. However, thanks to – among other factors –

²²⁵ BOA, *Y.A.RES.36/17* (19.04.1304/15.01.1887).

²²⁶ See Chapter III: 142 – 143.

²²⁷ BOA, *Y.A.RES.36/17* (19.04.1304/15.01.1887). See the Appendix 5.6.b.

Süreyya Pasha's strong arguments and lobbying on behalf of *Mösyö* Mauser, who met with Abdülhamid on November 17, 1886, just a month before this *lâyiha* was submitted to the Sultan,²²⁸ the Government placed an order for 500,000 rifles and 50,000 carbines with the Mauser company on February 9, 1887.²²⁹

Another prominent figure at the Yıldız Palace was Ragıb Bey, who definitely deserves special mention here. Ragıb Bey, or 'Robert' as Menshausen called him, was one of the key personalities who made the information flow possible from the Sultan to the GAFs and vice versa.²³⁰ Although Ragıb wrote in one of his *tezkires* submitted to the Sultan that 'until today I have never worked for/served anyone other than *Efendimiz* [Abdülhamid II] and God willing [*inşâ'Allah*] henceforth I will never act dishonestly by serving for someone else [*namussuzluğuna irtikâb etmem*]',²³¹ his service to the Germans was remarkable and - as is indicated below - was praised by the Germans several times. Ragıb Bey was, as Sir William White described him, 'an active and enterprising Turk whom the Sultan liked'. He became very rich, especially from his enterprises in the mining industry which provided him a good deal of revenue apart from the commissions he earned through his participation in several contracts.²³² Abdülhamid noted in his memoirs that Ragıb Bey also made some extraordinary speculative profits in the South African gold market on behalf of the Sultan.²³³ At this time, the Sultan had set Ragıb Bey the task of dissuading Goltz Pasha from his decision to leave Ottoman service. According to the Austrian military attaché in İstanbul, Joseph

²²⁸ Grant 2007: 83.

²²⁹ See also the Chapter III: 147.

²³⁰ Menshausen to Krupp, 20.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

²³¹ BOA, Y.EE.14/195 (29.11.1318/20.03.1901): '*Bugüne kadar ben efendimizden [Sultan Abdülhamid] başka kimseye hizmet etmedim ve inşallah şimdiden sonrada hizmet etmek namussuzluğuna irtikâb etmem.*'

²³² White to Salisbury, 28.06.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3998; BOA, Y.EE.136/119 (02.11.1316/14.03.1899), see also: Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913: 55: '*... des minerais sont amenés sur les marchés mondiaux, tels par exemple les minerais de chromite de mon chambellan Raghîb Bey.*'

²³³ Ali Vahbi Bey (ed.) 1913:79-80: '*Le secrétaire de ma cassette Raghîb-Bey a fait pour moi des spéculations extraordinairement heureuses et le produit récent de nos spéculations sur les mines d'or Sud-Africaines a été fort considérable.*'

von Manéga, Ragıb Bey met with Goltz Pasha almost every day trying to change his mind about remaining in Ottoman service.²³⁴

In foreign diplomatic circles Ragıb Bey was infamously known as a person who took every opportunity to fill his own pockets²³⁵ and as a person who was extremely corrupt.²³⁶ During the course of time, as the German firms came to realise his power and influence in the Yıldız Palace, and also his enterprising character, they tried to establish friendly relationships with him. Ragıb reciprocated and began corresponding directly with Paul Mauser, who introduced his newly-developed rifles to the Ottoman Government in November 1886. To provide an accurate insight into the dimension of personal ties in the war business, the following words of Ragıb Bey, written in a letter to Paul Mauser, are very telling: ‘Please accept my apology that I have not written to you until now. But be assured that I always remember you. It is unnecessary to say that I have the greatest respect for you. Your heart [kindness] has bound me and I hope you believe the words of a man with whom you interacted for months.’²³⁷ What Ragıb meant by ‘having interacted for months’ is not clear from this letter, but it can be assumed that during the negotiations they built up a close friendship, through which Paul Mauser could obtain crucial information about the Sultan’s concerns related to the rifles that were being tested. Based on their closeness, however, as Sir William White wrote, it was generally believed that Ragıb received gratuities from the Mauser company.²³⁸

²³⁴ Memorandum of Ritter von Manéga, 06.06.1886, in: PA.AA. R13237.

²³⁵ White to Salisbury, 24.06.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3998.

²³⁶ White to Salisbury, 28.06.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3998.

²³⁷ Ragıb to Mauser 17.10.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A3: ‘*Entschuldigen Sie mich, bitte, daß ich Ihnen bis jetzt nicht geschrieben habe. Aber seien Sie versichert, daß ich stets Ihrer gedenke. Es ist überflüssig Ihnen zu schreiben, daß ich die größte Hochachtung für Sie hege.- Ihr Herz hat mich Ihnen verbunden und ich hoffe Sie glauben dem Wort eines Mannes mit dem Sie monatelang verkehrt haben.*’

²³⁸ White to Salisbury, 28.06.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3998.

Krupp's agent, Menshausen, described Ragıb Bey as 'the only friend of the Triple Alliance'²³⁹ and the Krupp firm at the Yıldız Palace.²⁴⁰ As documents written over several months in 1891 show, Ragıb Bey intervened in the negotiations in favour of the German interests. In fact, as both Goltz Pasha and Menshausen also admitted, Ragıb's contribution to the German war business in the Ottoman market was much more essential than the contribution of the German Ambassador, Von Radowitz.²⁴¹ Therefore, the expression used by Marschall von Bieberstein for Osman Nizami could also apply to Ragıb Bey. Ragıb demonstrated by his pro-German sentiments by his actions that he deserved to be called 'more German than Turkish'. Like the other pro-German officials, he also used 'his whole influence in order to make Germany the unique supplier for all Turkish arms orders'.²⁴² So much so that, according to Menshausen's letter to Krupp, if they wanted to accomplish a desired result through Ragıb Bey's intervention, the support of the German Ambassador was indispensable. An Ottoman bureaucrat was fighting to ensure things went Germany's way, whereas their Ambassador was disregarding the importance of obtaining – or losing – armaments contracts.²⁴³ As Menshausen noted, Von Radowitz's disinterest in Krupp's interests could endanger the full support of Ragıb Bey, who was 'the only influential contact of the Krupp company at the Yıldız Palace'.²⁴⁴

The Germans understood that information about the Sultan's approach, intentions and decisions could best be obtained with Ragıb Bey's help. On the day following Goltz's audience with the Sultan on December 16, 1891, when Goltz Pasha

²³⁹ Most probably, Menshausen meant with this term the three prominent German arms factories: The Mauser AG., Oberndorf; Ludwig Loewe & Co., Berlin; and Deutsche Metallpatronenfabrik, Karlsruhe.

²⁴⁰ *Notizen über Türkei*, undated Document, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/2/217.

²⁴¹ Cf. Goltz to Menshausen, 01.08.1891, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3B/216; *Abschrift*: 21.12.1891, in: HA, Krupp FAH 3C/217; Goltz to Geheimrat 10.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763; *Notizen über Türkei*, undated Document, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/217.

²⁴² Cf. Marschall von Bieberstein's statements about Osman Nizami Pasha: Chapter V: 270-271.

²⁴³ Menshausen to Geheimrath, 23.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

²⁴⁴ *Notizen über Türkei*, undated Document, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3C/217.

relayed the Kaiser's trenchant statement regarding the Sultan's intention to place an order with French gun and ship makers at the expense of the Krupp company, Menshausen paid a visit to Ragıb Bey in his private residence. Menshausen's aim was simple: to get reliable information about the Sultan's reactions to the Kaiser's severe statement and to discover the nature of any possible guns or ship orders. As expected, Ragıb gave detailed information concerning what Menshausen had asked him about.²⁴⁵ Based on the information Ragıb Bey provided, Menshausen noted the Sultan's first reaction about what he had heard from Goltz Pasha as follows:

... put his [Goltz Pasha's] information to the Sultan in the greatest embarrassment and was the impression of what is heard, the same certainly very great. He [Sultan Abdülhamid] tried to apologize to all directions, he [the Sultan] said that so far nothing had happened ... Under no circumstances he would move politically to the French (*geçmeyeceğim*).²⁴⁶

At the same time, Ragıb Bey was also Goltz Pasha's source of information.²⁴⁷ The expression Goltz Pasha used was similar to Menshausen's. In his report, dated December 23, 1891, Goltz Pasha used these words to explain Sultan Abdülhamid's feelings after hearing the Kaiser's response: '... the Sultan was embarrassed during the audience itself, and helpless in the next two days'.²⁴⁸

The Sultan had established a strong spy system,²⁴⁹ so becoming aware of his secretaries' doings proved to be not very difficult. It was even speculated that he might have used his secretaries' personal relations with certain countries and their companies as manipulative instruments for his own purposes. According to Menshausen's letter,

²⁴⁵ Menshausen to Krupp, 20.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

²⁴⁶ Menshausen to Krupp, 20.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763. See the Appendix 5.7.

²⁴⁷ Goltz to Geheimrat, 10.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

²⁴⁸ Goltz to Geheimrat, 23.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

²⁴⁹ According to Baker Sultan Abdülhamid's spy system worked as follows: 'When an official is appointed, it is matter of course that a spy is appointed to watch him, and it is more than likely that if the place be one of especial importance a second spy is there to watch the first, and perhaps a third and fourth to report on the doings of all others.' Baker 1902: 68.

Sultan Abdülhamid was well aware of Ragıb’s doings in favour of Germany. ‘It is also important to mention’ wrote Menshausen: ‘... the Sultan told Robert [Ragıb Bey] that everyone around him was for the French and worked for their interest, while he alone was operating for German interest. Robert [Ragıb Bey] responded with great dexterity that he was not working for Germany but for Turkey and that he was, in fact, standing alone with this.’²⁵⁰

In short, Ragıb Bey and the other Palace officials played an effective role during the arms trade negotiation and purchasing process. According to Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, who was the Commander of the First Army Corps in 1908, all money for the purpose of bribery had gone to Palace officials who had assisted the penetration of the German-made war materials into the Ottoman military market.²⁵¹ In this respect, however, their penchant for accepting bribes and also their critical positions, which had facilitated the information flow from the Sultan to the GAFs, was expertly exploited by the Germans.

The Ottoman Inspection and Control Commission in Germany: Inspectors or Friends?

Following the agreement signed on February 9, 1887 between the Ottoman Government and the Mauser company for 500,000 rifles and 50,000 carbines, the first group of the commission – consisting of six officers – arrived at Oberndorf, where Mauser had its headquarters, on March 11, 1887.²⁵² Paul Mauser met the Ottoman delegation at the Stuttgart train station and they travelled together on another train to Oberndorf, where he hosted a lavish dinner for them. The local newspaper,

²⁵⁰ Menshausen to Krupp, 20.12.1891, in: PA.AA. R13763.

²⁵¹ Lowther to Grey, 08.12.1908, in: NA, London: FO 371/560.

²⁵² *Schwarzwälder Bote*, 13.03.1887:414, in: SA, Oberndorf: Z59: Tevfik Pasha; İzzet Pasha; Mahmud Şevket [Pasha]; Hasan Sabri Bey; Tahir Bey; Ahmed Effendi. See the Appendix 5.8.

Schwarzwälder Bote, which published several accounts of the commission members' stay in Oberndorf, welcomed them: 'May the gentlemen from the far off Golden Horn be well in our little town of Schwarzwald and may their task benefit our region.'²⁵³ Following this first group another 13 officers plus a child aged 13, a relative of one of the commission members, came to Oberndorf on September 9, 1887.²⁵⁴ The first group was headed by Tevfik Pasha, who was later replaced by Mahmud Şevket Pasha.²⁵⁵

As has been stated, the Ottoman Army became the first Army to be equipped with the Mauser rifle in large numbers.²⁵⁶ The contract was for about 37 million Marks, which represented a really good start for the factory. However, Mauser had many reasons to expect further lucrative orders from the Ottoman Empire. The existence of the German Military Mission and its patronage should have guaranteed the sustainability of the orders. Based on this possibility, Paul Mauser realised that the Ottoman Empire could be a steady and loyal customer, whose satisfaction was of vital importance to him. With that in mind, in March 1887 Mauser commissioned the construction of a special residence and headquarters for the Ottoman officers; called the *Türkenbau* (Turkish Building), it was located near the factory site.²⁵⁷ The *Türkenbau* was another clear demonstration of the German perspective in the war business with the Ottoman Empire. It also enabled Mauser to strengthen his customers' loyalty and permanency. Although another country's flags sometime waved on the roof of the *Türkenbau*, the Ottomans – whose number fluctuated between 20 and 30 and who had initially resided at the Hotel Post/Oberndorf – knew that there was a Turkish-named

²⁵³ *Schwarzwälder Bote*, 13.03.1887: 414, in: SA, Oberndorf: Z59.

²⁵⁴ *Schwarzwälder Bote*, 14.09.1887: 1606, in: SA, Oberndorf: Z60.


²⁵⁵ Undated note, in: SA, Oberndorf: 793.32/13.1 (Mauser Waffen, Abnahme-Kommission/Türkenzeit).

²⁵⁶ Grant 2007: 83; see also Chapter III: 147-149.

²⁵⁷ See the Appendix 5.9.

residence in Oberndorf where they could stay as long as they needed to.²⁵⁸ Knowing that was naturally a strategic advantage for Mauser's likelihood of winning future contracts. The *Türkenbau* enabled the Ottomans to stay much longer during the manufacturing process, for which careful investigation was needed. Later on, 30 young volunteer workers/cadets who went to Oberndorf in March 1895 to be trained in the Mauser factory, also resided in the *Türkenbau*.²⁵⁹

Illustration 5.1: *Türkenbau* in Oberndorf am Neckar built in 1887



Source: SA, Oberndorf: 793.32/13.1 Mauser Werke/Türkenzeit

Schmid writes that 'The Turkish officers and volunteers have quickly acclimated in Oberndorf and took an active part in the daily life of the town, and so the festivities in Oberndorf took on a colourful character.'²⁶⁰ In fact, over time, some of the Ottoman officers started families in Oberndorf and had children born there while others

²⁵⁸ As the photo in Appendix 5.10 indicates during the stay of the Brazilian commission in Oberndorf, they also used the *Türkenbau* as their residence.

²⁵⁹ H. Walter Schmid's note, in: SA, Oberndorf: 793.32/13.1 (Mauser Waffen, Abnahme-Kommission/Türkenzeit); see the Appendix 5.11 (the Ottoman Young Volunteers).

²⁶⁰ H. Walter Schmid's note, in: SA, Oberndorf: 793.32/13.1 (Mauser Waffen, Abnahme-Kommission/Türkenzeit).

died and were buried there.²⁶¹ For instance, İbrahim Bey, who arrived in Oberndorf on September 9, 1887, in the second group of the first committee, died on September 3, 1888, and was buried in Oberndorf.²⁶²

Illustration 5.2: Playing Cards in the Pavillion Rosenberg/Oberndorf am Neckar (circa 1893)



Shown from left to right: Ottoman Major Azmi; standing: Ottoman Colonel Zeki; Magistrate (*Amtsrichter*) Jahn; Magistrate Abek; Secretary Schmidheini.
Source: SA, Oberndorf:793.32/13.1 Mauser Werke/Türkenzeit.

The first commission inspected the manufacturing and delivery process of the following Models: M/1887: cal. 9.50 mm; M/1890: cal.7.65 mm; M/1893: cal.7.65 mm. They stayed in Oberndorf for nearly 10 years and supervised the delivery of 550 railway wagon-loads of rifles on their way to İstanbul.²⁶³ According to Seel, the last three members of the first commission left Oberndorf on May 15, 1897. Two of them were among the first group that had arrived on March 11, 1887. On June 2, 1897,

²⁶¹ Hüseyin Hüsnü Bey married an Oberndorfer woman and they had children, one of them (Leyla) died of lung and intestinal catarrh at her age three and was buried in Oberndorfer cemetery. See also: 'The Registry of Death dated on February 18, 1889', in: SA, Oberndorf.

²⁶² During my research stay in Oberndorf I have visited the cemetery and seen a gravestone on which the following epitaph was engraved: 'Allah is the eternal Creator. Dying in a foreign country is without a doubt the greatest misfortune.' See also: 'The Registry of Death dated on September 03, 1888, in: SA, Oberndorf.

²⁶³ Seel 1981/5: 1423.

Hüseyin Hüsni Bey left as the last Ottoman officer of the first commission to Oberndorf.²⁶⁴ After five years, on April 23, 1903, another Commission led by Hüseyin Tevfik came to Oberndorf to inspect and supervise the manufacturing process of 200,000 newly-ordered rifles (M/1903: cal. 7.65mm).²⁶⁵

During the Ottoman officers' stay in Oberndorf, Paul Mauser and the town's notable figures – who realised the importance of the Ottoman orders to Oberndorf's economic life – developed close relations with them. As Illustration 5.2 demonstrates, the duration of the officers' stay in Oberndorf enabled them to develop personal ties with Mauser and also with the local elites. Abdülhamid's accession to the throne and also his birthday were formally recognised and celebrated in Oberndorf, and the Ottoman officers joined in the celebrations to mark those events. In 1894 for instance, according to Şakir Pasha's report, in honour of the anniversary of Sultan Abdülhamid's accession to the throne, the Mauser company organised a firing-competition.²⁶⁶

The Germans realised that the Ottoman military market was not just lucrative but also highly competitive. To ensure success, they employed every known marketing strategy and instrument. They transformed every relevant event or occasion into an opportunity designed for the purpose of winning potential or existing customers' hearts. Making donations to worthy causes was another marketing tool the Germans used to gain Ottoman public support. In 1893, for instance, through the mediation of the Ottoman delegation in Oberndorf, the Mauser factory workers donated 250 OL (4,612 Marks) to the Ottoman *Dar-ül 'aceze* [Poorhouse]²⁶⁷ and later on, as the *Sabah*

²⁶⁴ SeeI 1981/5: 1423.

²⁶⁵ SeeI 1981/7: 1722.

²⁶⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.15/50 (10.04.1312/11.10.1894).

²⁶⁷ BOA, DH.MKT.2057/51 (13.08.1310/02.03.1893).

newspaper reported, the workers gave 472 OL (8,708 Marks) to help the victims of the 1894 İstanbul earthquake.²⁶⁸

The methods used by the Mauser company had already been in use by Krupp for many years. Krupp developed, as Sater & Herwig wrote, ‘a complex protocol [to] cultivate potential customers’.²⁶⁹ These kinds of marketing instruments used by Mauser acquired vogue among the German arms makers during that time. In fact, there is no significant difference between the German arms marketing strategy applied to the Ottoman Empire and to South and Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or Chile, or even other Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, etc.²⁷⁰ However, based on my research, we can assume that the Ottoman arms market was one of the first markets where this type of German strategy was applied. According to Sater & Herwig, Krupp – as stated – developed a complex protocol to attract potential customers from South America. In the case of selling to the Chilean Army, Sater & Herwig gives the following detailed information about the protocol, which was used beneficially by Krupp as a simple marketing strategy to gain customers:

The company [Krupp] wined and dined foreign officers and local military attachés...Krupp literally rolled out the red carpet for those foreigners, ...who came to Germany to pick up orders. These buyers received the best of treatment: tours of the Rhine, the Harz Mountains, and Berlin. Chilean officers visited Krupp’s mansion, the Villa Hügel at Essen-Bredeney, where they dined on Chilean national dishes and consumed its wine. On such occasions, Chilean flags were flown on the grounds of the mansion and were placed at each setting in the dining hall.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ Gözeller 2005:59; see also: Sater & Herwig 1999: 134.

²⁶⁹ Sater & Herwig 1999: 134.

²⁷⁰ Relating the GAFs business activities in the South and Latin American Countries: Schiff 1959; Brunn 1969; Schiff 1972; Schäfer 1974; Sater & Herwig 1999. Visiting of the Krupp factory became a chief part of every official visit to Germany. Iranian Shah, for example, paid a visit to Krupp factory in Essen after being in Berlin. BOA, *Y.A.HUS.226/34* (15.10.1306/14.06.1889). See also for the Moroccan delegation’s visit to the Krupp factory in Essen: *Schwarzwälder Bote*: 21.02.1889.

²⁷¹ Sater & Herwig 1999: 134. See also: Kössler 1981.

The Ottoman purchasing commissions or visiting delegations were always welcomed as guests of honour. In the same way that the officers in Oberndorf became close friends with their hosts, the Ottoman officers who stayed in the Villa Hügel in Essen instantly became good friends with Herr Krupp and his family. For instance, Sabit Pasha, who visited Germany in 1879, 1885, 1888 and 1891,²⁷² was one of the prominent figures who became a ‘personal friend’ of F.A. Krupp and his family. Therefore the exchange of photographs between F.A. Krupp and Sabit Pasha also deserves mention. After receiving the photos, Sabit Pasha wrote a letter of thanks to Herr Krupp for the dispatch.²⁷³ The dates on which the photo exchange took place were the critical dates for newly-decided contracts with the Krupp company. In one letter sent to F.A. Krupp in December 1885, months after the Ottomans had placed a large order with the Krupp factory, Sabit Pasha expressed his pleasure at being Herr Krupp’s ‘personal friend’, and he continued:

The warm welcomes with which you have received me both in 1879 as well as today have filled me with sincere appreciation... I feel and remember your kindness especially at the thought that I will have to reside at my current location for a long time to receive the delivery of the currently manufactured large number of guns.As a faint sign of my gratitude and admiration please kindly accept the enclosed two photographs of me. The bigger one with frames I ask you to kindly hang in your office, as I send it less as a luxury but rather as a sign of sincere friendship.²⁷⁴

This was the same Sabit Pasha who had been sent to France as the head of a purchasing commission to inspect the French gun factories in order to get reliable information

²⁷² BOA, Y.MTV.35/44 (17.01.1306/23.09.1888); BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.70/37 (27.11.1308/04.07.1891). In 1885, Krupp’s representative Otto Dingler sent a telegraph reporting the Sabit Pasha’s visit to Essen. ‘Ali Saib Pascha mir eben mitgetheilt dass Sabit Pascha in wenigen tagen nach Essen reisen wird.’ Dingler to Krupp, 26.09.1885, in: HA Krupp: WA-2/248.

²⁷³ Sabit Pasha to Krupp, 21.05.1889, HA Krupp: FAH-3-B/227. Additionally, in the Krupp Family Archive I have seen an interesting index-remark for a letter sent from İstanbul to Herr Krupp, which makes Sabit Pasha’s position in Krupp family more remarkable. According to the index Sadi Bey sent F. A. Krupp a gift of a real Turkistan-carpet. Interestingly was noted in the index that this little issue should not to come to the Sabit Pasha’s attention. (*Teilt mit, daß einige Turkistan-Teppiche an F.A.K. von Sadi Bey gesandt wurden. Diese kleine Angelegenheit soll nicht zur Kenntnis Sabit Pashas gelangen.*) Otto Reil to A. Krupp, 27.02.1886, in: HA, Krupp: WA 4/2277.

²⁷⁴ Sabit Pasha to Krupp, 27.12.1885, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3B/227.

about the French firms' comparative prices and the quality of their product. While he was in France carrying out his assigned tasks, he telegraphed Ali Saib Pasha with a report on his negotiations and inspections in the French artillery factories in Paris and Le Havre. Ali Saib Pasha informed the Sultan about Sabit Pasha's message, which included a claim that Canet's factory did not have a polygon for firing-tests.²⁷⁵ However, it appears that Sabit Pasha and his delegation did not consider it worthwhile to wait for the results of Mr Canet's experiments. This lack of esteem regarding Canet's production should not be regarded as having been based on technical failure. Evidently, the purchasing commission was conscious of the Sultan's preference for Krupp productions instead of any French-made artillery. It is more probable, then, that based on this awareness, Sabit Pasha and his companions were keen to go to Essen to see Sabit Pasha's 'very close friend' (*liebster freund*) F.A. Krupp and his products.²⁷⁶ This short French visit and its consequences were reported to Carl Menshausen by Goltz Pasha. According to him, the major reason why Sabit Pasha cut his French visit short was his consciousness of the superiority of the German-made cannons. As the following passage indicates, Goltz Pasha also wrote:

Although the same alleged that Sabit Pasha himself reported to the War Minister saying that he left France during the first visit only because Canet did not have a polygon, not because they did not have any heavy (for the program-suitable) guns, it appeared to me however that even he [Sabit Pasha] reached the conclusion that France could for the time being not compete with Germany in the field of gun production.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.ASK.70/37 (27.07.1308/08.03.1891): 'Ferik Sabit Pasha tarafından bukra alınan telgraf-nâmede Kail (Caill factory) ve Havre'deki Kanet'in (Canet) fabrikalarını gezdikleri ve Kail fabrikasının eski küçük toplarını görmüşlerse de bu fabrikanın tecrübe için poligonu bulunmadığı ve Kanetin fabrikasına sipariş edilmiş olan topların bitmek üzere olduklarını müşâhede etmişlerse de bu fabrikadaki poligonun tülû yüzelli [150] metreden ibaret olması hasebiyle büyük tecrübe için kâfi olmadığı ve Japonya için otuz iki santimetrelik hazırlanmış olan bir topun ancak onbeş gün sonra icrâ olunacak tecrübesinde bulunmaları ifâde olunmuş ise de bu hâlde bizce arzû olunan tecrübeleri yapabilemeyeceği cihetle orada kalmanın bir fâ'ideyi müfîd olmayacağı beyân olunmuş olduğunu kalkup Essen şehrine gitmeleri için bâ-telgraf-nâme muşârun-ileyh cevâb-ı 'âcize tesdîr kılındığı rehn-i 'âlî buyurulmak üzere 'arz ve beyâna ibtidâr olundu.'

²⁷⁶ Sabit Pasha to A. Krupp, 27.11.1889, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3 B/227.

²⁷⁷ Goltz to Menshausen, 01.08.1891, in: HA, Krupp: FAH 3 B/216.

Although the Ottoman purchasing commission did not consider it worthwhile to wait for the firing results at Mr Canet’s factory, taking place for another customer (Japan), Canet’s factory was, according *The New York Times*, ‘a formidable continental rival of the Krupp factory’.²⁷⁸ The newspaper gave some further information about the factory’s site and premises, According to the newspaper account:

... the factory occupied a large plot of land ... which affords space for the future extension of the works, on the west by the company’s old machinery and shipbuilding workshops. ... Connected with the factory, but nearly four miles from the town, is the proving ground, which is known as the Hoc. Here are four firing platforms situated on the seashore and used for high-angle firing. Above the platforms runs an overhead travelling crane, which can raise and carry a weight of eight tons, and the whole ground is covered with a network of railways, for which a specially massive plant of engines and trucks has been built. ...there is no better found or more convenient proving ground in the world than the Hoc.²⁷⁹

Furthermore, the newspaper gave the following table to compare the technical details of the productions of the main artillery suppliers in respect of the countries.

Table 5.1: The Technical Comparison of the World’s Major Contenders/Gun Producers, (1889)

	France*	British	German	Russian	United States
Weight of gun/pounds	9,532	11,200	9,048	9,114	10,192
Lengthy of gun/inches	212	192	176	140	196
Weight of projectile/pounds	88	100	112	86	100
Weight of charge/pounds	42	42	33	18	50
Muzzle velocity/feet per second	2,165	1,920	1,624	1,463	2,105
Muzzle energy/foot per tons	2,841	2,556	2,055	1,276	3,072
Muzzle penetration of iron/inches	12.3	12.1	11.0	8.4	13.4

Source: *The New York Times*: 27.10.1889. *The Canet factory in France.

From the perspective of Sabit Pasha and other Ottoman officers, the technical features were not the first priority when it came to making decisions regarding the arms trade. However, Sabit Pasha’s report, which apparently contradicted *The New York Times*’ comment, was to be accepted as a reflection of the personal justification of an officer who had established a close connection with the German gun maker, Krupp.

²⁷⁸ *The New York Times*: 27.10. 1889.

²⁷⁹ *The New York Times*: 27.10. 1889.

Sabit Pasha paid another visit to Essen in 1902, during which he fell ill and was treated in Germany.²⁸⁰ During this treatment, F.A. Krupp did not let him alone and additionally covered the entire cost of his treatment, which was paid back by the Ottoman Government in the years following his death in Germany.²⁸¹

The German Style of War Businesses was shaped mainly by personal influences which were deliberately developed through personal justification which naturally could be manipulated by personal satisfaction or dissatisfaction. As has been already noted, Goltz, who was well aware of this fact, intimated that the allocation of supplies for the Ottoman Army was not decided objectively but purely through personal influence.²⁸² Without calculating the impact of this fact into Germany's record in the Ottoman military market, no explanation can be found for its success in doing business.

Last Episode in the Arms Trade: Power Shift and its Consequences (1908-1909)

“The old regime had not only deprived us of our liberty but also of what is equally important - British friendship. [...] Long live the great British nation!”
*Talat Pasha (London, 22 July 1909)*²⁸³

“Now we cannot salvage ourselves from the German style of war [application] .. Now it is not possible to change”
*Mahmud Şevket Pasha (1911-12)*²⁸⁴

On July 24, 1908, Abdülhamid II proclaimed the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1876, which had been suspended by the Sultan himself in 1878. In fact, proclamation of the Constitution was a forced consequence of several rebellious uprisings in the Third Army and in some Ottoman Balkan cities organised in protest against Sultan

²⁸⁰ BOA, *DH.MKT.2578/36* (11.10.1319/21.01.1902); BOA, *DH.MKT.2587/30* (03.11.1319/11.02.1902).

²⁸¹ BOA, *DH.MKT.854/61* (09.03.1322/24.05.1904): According to these documents, the Ottoman Government paid back to Krupp the cost of his entire treatment, which had been earlier covered by the Krupp company.

²⁸² See Chapter II: 114-115.

²⁸³ *The [London] Times*: 23.07.1909, in: PA.AA. R13564: Talat Pasha's speech at the luncheon at the House of Commons on July 22, 1909.

²⁸⁴ Martı (ed.) 1996:73.

Abdülhamid's ruling system.²⁸⁵ However, when the Constitution was declared in 1908, the Germans became anxious about the position they had held since the 1880s, when Bismarck congratulated and praised the Sultan's decision to abolish the Parliament based on the ethnic diversity of Ottoman society.²⁸⁶

Because Germany enjoyed the support of the Sultan and his close bureaucrats at the Yıldız Palace, the attack made against the Yıldız authority seemed at the same time to be mounted against the many personal ties with Germany and the GAFs in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, a blow for the Sultan and the Yıldız Palace came to be regarded at the same time as a strong blow to Germany's influence in the Ottoman Empire. The Germans' successful entrepreneurship in the Ottoman Empire was reliant on Governmental support and guarantees. The strong foundation of the German penetration into the Ottoman market notwithstanding, the position seemed vulnerable to any shift in the balance of power within the Empire. In 1907, for instance, an article based on an interview with an 'anti-Abdülhamid official in İstanbul', published in an Indian newspaper that was characterised by the German Ambassador to Simla as pro-British, indicates this fragility of the Germans' influence in the Ottoman Empire with quite remarkable expressions:

As to the fate of the present Yıldız gang there will be a clean sweep of them. Many will be killed like dogs, others expelled from the Empire, and within twenty-four hours there will not be a German official in the country ... England has but to lift her little finger and we would expel every German from Constantinople tomorrow and install her in her old position.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ For more detail see Ahmad 1969; Quataert 1979; Akşin 1986; Hanioglu 1995; Kansu 1997; Kayalı 1997; Hanioglu 2001.

²⁸⁶ See Chapter I: 34.

²⁸⁷ *The Amrita Bazar Patrika*: 16.08.1907, in: PA.AA. R13745. According to the report sent by Von Keller to Von Bülow, a very similar statement was also published in the *Indian Daily Telegraph*. As Von Keller reported to Von Bülow an Ottoman official remarked to the correspondent of the *Indian Daily Telegraph* in İstanbul. See: Von Keller to Von Bülow, 22.08.1907, in: PA.AA. R13745.

The Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, Baron Beyens, reached a similar conclusion: ‘The fall of absolutism at Constantinople was in itself a serious blow to German influence there, which was based upon Abdülhamid II’s friendship.’²⁸⁸ As mentioned above, Germany and her successful war business in the Ottoman market was indebted to Sultan Abdülhamid for his support. A statement Huber made in 1909 was therefore not a groundless claim: ‘The monopoly, which we conquered [*eroberten*] together with you [Paul Mauser] after severe fighting in 1886 and which we were able to hold it for 23 years, had [now] been broken.’²⁸⁹ The main reason was, as Marriott mentioned, because ‘everything depended upon the personal friendship of Sultan Abdülhamid, and upon the stability of his throne.’²⁹⁰

However, it is not accurate to suggest that German influence was ended by this power shift. The Germans had cultivated very profoundly, in other words, invested wisely; they reaped the benefits even after the power shift. Contrary to general expectations, since the leading staff of the new ruling class was educated and trained under the German military system and doctrines, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) [*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*] continued to be in a close relationship with Germany and purchased large quantities of German-made rifles and guns. German military advisers remained in the Ottoman service. To that end, Von Kiderlen sent a telegraph to Von Bülow informing him of current circumstances in İstanbul after the Sultan’s dethronement: ‘It is stated in the press and, as I understand from a report sent to me from the Imperial ambassador in Vienna, also commonly believed that the Young Turk movement is pro-English and anti-German. This is a grave mistake (*irrtum*).’²⁹¹ Von Kiderlen was correct in his conclusion. The actual state was as reported to his

²⁸⁸ Beyens 1916: 242.

²⁸⁹ Huber to Mauser 10.11.1909, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A6.

²⁹⁰ Marriott 1917: 359.

²⁹¹ Von Kiderlen to Von Bülow, 20.08.1908, in: PA.AA. R13745.

government by the German Ambassador to İstanbul, Wangenheim, who said that: ‘The power which controls the army in Turkey will be supreme. As long as we control the army, no anti-German government can long remain in power.’²⁹² Developments which followed suggested Wangenheim was right. So it was quite a premature justification that was made by both Pears and *The Times of India* newspaper in August 1908: ‘It is, of course, no longer true that Turkey looks on Germany with a friendly eye. Young Turkey is enthusiastic for the Western Powers and especially for England. Germany’s influence for the present has suffered a quite remarkable eclipse.’²⁹³

The commentator was greatly affected by Sultan Abdülhamid’s loss of power, which had – the writer contended – a strong link with the German multidimensional support. ‘The collapse of the Camarilla’, noted the writer, ‘brings down the whole edifice of German designs in the Near and Middle East like a pack of cards ... The foundations of German influence have been swept away. It is not Marschall von Bieberstein, who so long dominated the Ambassador at Constantinople, who is hailed as the patron of the new regime, but Sir Gerald Lowther, the British representative.’²⁹⁴ However, two years later – in July 1910 – Sir Gerald admitted the impetuosity of the testimonies as follows:

Two years have now elapsed since the constitutional regime was introduced into this country and it may not be without interest to examine how the new system of Government has affected the relations of Turkey with the most important Powers represented here.[...] The early days of the Constitution were marked by considerable enthusiasm for Great Britain and France, the former owing to the fact that we stood before the world as the representatives par excellence of constitutional government and because we had been the stoutest opponents of the hated Hamidian regime, the French because it was in their country that prominent Young Turks, like Ahmed Rıza, [...] had found a refuge and a congenial atmosphere for developing their plans [...]. In the initial stages of the constitutional government Germany, thanks to her very intimate connection with

²⁹² Cited in Okyar 1983: 68.

²⁹³ Pears 1908: 591.

²⁹⁴ *The Times of India*, 10.08.1908, in: PA.AA. R13745.

Abdülhamid, was looked upon with some suspicion by the civilian elements of population, but the administration of the army, which has necessarily been the backbone of the movement, and on which it must continue to rely, is as deep as ever. A very large number of Turkish officers have been educated in Germany, and the military organisation of that country appeals warmly to them. [...] The Turks think, rightly or wrongly, that Germany has at any rate in the near future no political designs in this country and that her aspirations are purely commercial [...].²⁹⁵

The German arms industry, and especially the Krupp company, had obviously been apprehensive about their future business. After the Young Turks came to power in 1908, there was initial discord between the new regime and the previous favourite German arms companies, Mauser and Krupp, which had prospered thanks to the support of Abdülhamid and the palace officials. Mahmud Muhtar Pasha told the British Ambassador, Lowther, on December 8, 1908, that the new Ottoman Government had called on Huber to supply it with 'a list of names of all those who under the old regime had taken bribes in return for orders, and implied that unless this list was forthcoming no further orders would be given to Krupp'.²⁹⁶ If what Mahmud Muhtar Pasha told the Ambassador was true, it appears that the exchange Muhtar Pasha mentioned might have taken place because Krupp had regained its old position sooner than expected.²⁹⁷

As a matter of fact, the new regime found itself in a predetermined format of relationships between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. These relationships were shaped principally by officers who were educated in Germany or within a format of a German way of military thinking established in the Ottoman Army particularly by Goltz Pasha. Thanks to the Ottoman bureaucrats and the officers educated in the German system, Sultan Abdülhamid's dethronement did not change the German position in the Ottoman war business as much as expected. The main reason was that

²⁹⁵ Lowther to Grey, 30.07.1910, in: BDOW 1933/9: 180-183: Giving some information about the German attitude in Japan, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Claude MacDonald, pointed out the German influence on the Ottoman officers as follows: 'Germany was to his knowledge active in Turkey; many of the Army Officers who formed the Young Turk Party had been educated in Germany and were German in sympathy.'

²⁹⁶ Lowther to Grey, 08.12.1908, in: NA, London: FO 371/560.

²⁹⁷ For Krupp's sales to the Ottoman Empire after 1908, see: Türk 2006: 190-192.

the new military rulers were, in effect, cadets of the Germans. As a matter of interest, the younger generation of Ottoman officers who had trained in the German system were known as ‘the Germans’ apostles’.²⁹⁸ One of the most telling statements concerning the continuity of German influence in the Ottoman military administration and in the war business was made in 1908 by Marschall von Bieberstein, who said: ‘Today, the War Minister, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of War, Chief of General Staff, the commanders of the Guards Corps and other important commands are in the hands of the officers who have served in Germany.’²⁹⁹

The linkage which gave Krupp the opportunity to hold a monopoly position in the Ottoman market was broken when Abdülhamid II was deposed. Ehrhardt, Krupp’s most prominent rival from his own country, Germany, became the new favourite supplier for the Ottoman Army. According to Ehrhardt’s agent in İstanbul, as reported by the British Military Attaché, Surtees, ‘as his firm is in sympathy with the ‘Constitutional Party’ in Germany, he has received the goodwill of the members of the ‘Young Turkish’ party – who have been delighted to place orders independently and without having their hands tied by the receipt of orders from the Palace, to give the business to [the] Krupp [company]’.³⁰⁰ In fact, the most cogent reason was not just their political stance; the price Ehrhardt offered for the war materials was also much cheaper than the others.³⁰¹ So although Krupp lost its position for a while, by every account Germany remained the winner.

²⁹⁸ The other clear example for the German style of war business is the modernization process of the Chilean Army. Sater & Herwig used the word of ‘apostle’ in the following way: ‘Still, Berlin had another ace in the hole: ‘the younger generation of Chilean officers trained in the German system’ had become the Reich’s apostles. Welczek honestly believed that ‘German military training had changed the [Chilean] national character’ [...] Sater & Herwig 1999: 149-150. See also: Yasamee 1998: 110.

²⁹⁹ Marschall to Von Bülow, 03.09.1908, in: GP/25 1924:615.

³⁰⁰ Surtees to Lowther 18.12.1908, in: NA, London: FO 244/721.

³⁰¹ The prices asked were as follows: Armstrong: 319,000 OL; Krupp: 300,200 OL; Schneider: 299,000OL; Ehrhardt: 277,500 OL. Colonel Surtees to Sir G. Lowther, 03.12.1908, in: NA, London: FO 371/560.

CONCLUSION

Germany's unparalleled success in the Ottoman Empire before World War I (WWI) has been widely discussed among historians, but in the particular context of the Baghdad Railway and its financing by the *Deutsche Bank*. By pursuing a limited agenda, scholars who have examined the relationships forged between the Ottoman Empire and Germany during Sultan Abdülhamid's reign (r. 1876-1909), have not paid sufficient attention to the Ottoman Empire's arms purchases from Germany; moreover, they have almost entirely neglected the impact of personal relations and personal influence on the arms trade. Both the link between personal influence and the German armament firms' (GAFs) success in the Ottoman Empire and the arms trade's importance in the formation of bilateral relations have been largely disregarded in the literature. However, as this dissertation demonstrated, the arms trade itself was one of the most powerful determinants that shaped the German-Ottoman rapprochement in the late nineteenth century which ended up with a *Waffenbrüderschaft* in WWI.

By the start of the nineteenth century, as an agrarian economy, the Ottoman Empire had been integrated into the world economy to a significant degree. As a result, the Ottoman foreign trade volume increased more than tenfold between 1820 and 1914.¹ The European countries, especially Britain and France, were the most important partners in the Ottoman foreign trade during that time. During the 1870s there was almost no German interest in the Ottoman market. However, that was not true for Germany's arms manufacturers and especially for the Krupp company. Krupp's discovery of the Ottoman market in the late 1860s opened a financial and commercial gateway for other German investors. In 1869, when Krupp opened a representative

¹ Pamuk 2005: 112.

agency in İstanbul, the Ottoman army had already acquired 284 large-calibre Krupp guns.² By the end of the 1870s, Krupp's cumulative sales to the Ottoman Empire amounted to 1,816 guns. Through large-scale gun sales to the Ottoman Government, Krupp introduced a new and profitable market to other German industrialists and capitalists, who would later finance the arms trade by lending money to the Ottoman Government. Both the Empire's financial state and its continual armaments purchases from Germany offered great opportunities for the German banks, especially for the *Deutsche Bank*, which had a close relationship with the Krupp company. After a while, the *Deutsche Bank* held the top spot as the financier for the Ottomans' arms imports from Germany. As a matter of fact, the *Deutsche Bank* was intimately related with the Krupp company.³

Based on archival research in four countries, this dissertation specifically examined the German armament firms' (especially Krupp and Mauser) successful war business in the Ottoman market during Abdülhamid II's reign and tried to find the proper answer to the question: how the German firms obtained the monopoly position and held this status for decades? Before starting to write up this thesis the answer was initially searched in comparing the technical features of war materials purchased by the Ottoman Government and the price demanded by the armament firms. However archival documents clearly demonstrate that these two vital factors (technical features and the cost) did not play as crucial role as had been expected. Despite the fact that the German rifles (Mauser) or guns (Krupp) were not necessarily superior to the French, American, British or Austrian products and in addition to that - in some cases - German war materials were more expensive than the others, the German firms were preferred by the Ottoman Government for decades during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid. The

² *Deutsches Handelsarchiv, Reichsamt des Inneren*, Jg.1898, Bd.2: 512.

³ Howe 1916: 94.

archival documents – especially handwritten letters or reports of several influential personalities including Kaiser Wilhelm II, Goltz Pasha, Paul Mauser, F. Alfred Krupp and some Ottoman bureaucrats and also some of German military and civil advisors employed in the Ottoman service – highlight the motivation behind the Ottoman inclination towards the German armament firms and their exceptional success in the Ottoman military market. These documents clearly demonstrate that in terms of being awarded lucrative contracts by the Ottoman Government, personal influence, which was created by close personal relationship, and also some political consideration of both governments were much more decisive than the technical features and the cost of the war materials that were submitted by the German firms. In fact the Ottoman Empire was an instructive example of the interrelationship between political, military, business, and ‘a good measure of personal interest’.

One of the main contentions of this dissertation is that arms exports had a decisive impact in stimulating and strengthening the German political, economic and military based expansionist mechanisms. The interrelationship between political, financial and military players would be simultaneously realised during the finalisation of an armaments contract. In the hands of Germany, as the exporting country, arms sales proved to be a ‘multi-purpose tool’ to be used in both domestic socio-economic policy and foreign policy, particularly military-based foreign policy. Based on this strategy, the German Government supported the arms makers’ export-oriented production. The present study, therefore, argues that the German armament firms’ success in the international arms trade was a common and natural combined outcome of

three principal interests of German expansionist policy: economic/industrial, military, and political interests.⁴

In this respect, German foreign diplomacy openly facilitated and diplomatically supported the arms makers' business activities in foreign markets. Obviously, the German Government provided significant political and financial support for companies exporting military materials. As Boelcke has asserted, war business activities triggered foreign policy actions, and vice versa. Indeed, the government projects and foreign policy objectives pursued frequently reflected such a strong commitment to economic concerns that their priorities were virtually indistinguishable from those pursued by the German arms makers.⁵

The multidimensional impact of obtaining a foreign contract was well known and well understood by the German policy makers. Based on this awareness, the German Government did not hesitate to support publicly both the domestic and international activities of the armament firms. Over the course of time it had been noticed by the German policy makers that Germany's aggressive expansionist strategy could utilise the German arms makers' successful business activities abroad as an influential tool to penetrate the foreign military decision-makers' circle and also by extension to gain a controlling position within foreign military markets. According to archival records, the German arms makers' marketing strategy in the Ottoman market – even though it was dependent on governmental support – was unquestionably well conceived. For that reason, unlike most of the other German entrepreneurs, investors and traders who had already invested in the Ottoman Empire, the profits of the war

⁴ Von Bülow 1917: 69: 'These relations were not of a sentimental nature, for the continued existence of Turkey served our interests from the industrial, military and political points of view.'

⁵ Boelcke 1970: 19.

business never disappointed the arms-makers and their representatives in İstanbul.⁶ In fact, the Germans had an absolute advantage only in the war business but not in other business activities.

The political considerations and manoeuvres of German statesmen served as crucial components of a comprehensive expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire that proved more productive than the arms makers' own unsupported marketing endeavours. From Chancellor Bismarck to Kaiser Wilhelm II and also from Goltz Pasha, the leading figure of the German military mission employed in the Ottoman service, to the German Foreign Office, the German Government actively supported business activities of the German armament firms in the Ottoman market within the concept of expansionist peaceful penetration strategy.

The effective tool of this strategy was the German military mission. Military advisors serving in the Ottoman Army were instrumental in achieving the concrete outcome of this strategy which was the 'virtual monopoly' of the German armament firms in the Ottoman military market. In this dissertation the German experience in the Ottoman Empire – reorganizing the army and holding a monopoly in the market – is regarded as the beginning of the age of peaceful penetration and in this regard, Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Goltz Pasha proved to be among the leading figures of this age.

Based on comprehensive archival research, this dissertation has demonstrated that the birth of German successful war business took place in and then quickly flourished in the Bismarckian era. It was during these years that major steps were taken to monopolize the Ottoman military market. As a matter of fact, Bismarck gave open

⁶ According to Quataert the net profits of the German-dominated Anatolian Railway Company disappointed its investors. Quataert points out that 'The financial performance of the Anatolian Railway Company was poor'. He further adds: 'For the German financier, investor and government, however, the less than spectacular profits were a disappointment'. Quataert 1977: 158.

patronage to the German arms makers and their business in the Ottoman military market. Bismarck's recommendations in favour of German war materials and his open patronage to the German arms industry gave to the German firms an insurmountable advantage against their competitors.

However, in spite of Bismarck's massive contribution to Germany's increasingly influential position in the Ottoman Empire, his policy towards the Ottoman Empire has been widely discussed by scholars under the shadow of his famous speech of 1876, in which he gave his opinion that Ottoman affairs were 'not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier'. In fact, this speech has cast a suspicion on Bismarck's Ottoman policy. This approach, nevertheless, –based solely upon Bismarck's speech – underestimates the importance of Bismarck's strategic and crucial steps - in terms of German expansionist strategy – that were taken during his late Chancellorship. It was at this time that Germany began to send military advisors to the Ottoman Empire, starting in 1882 and continuing until he was dismissed by Kaiser Wilhelm II from office in 1890.

Contrary to common belief, which argues that Bismarck was not interested in a friendship with the Ottoman Empire, Bismarck tried to make the Sultan believe that Germany was a friend and supporter of the Sultan and his policy which was at the time attracting sharp criticism from other European Great Powers. As the two Ottoman reports, both dated on December 24, 1881, in which Bismarck's conversations with the Ottoman delegation, which had been sent by Sultan Abdülhamid II to obtain a commitment on the military advisors and to investigate the possibility of an alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire,⁷ clearly express Bismarck was definitely not indifferent towards the Ottoman affairs nor was he disinterested in the Sultan's

⁷ Griffiths 1966:50.

friendship. This conversation of 1881 might be therefore regarded as the definitive beginning of the change in Germany's foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. In fact, during the conversation with the Ottoman delegation (led by Ali Nizami Pasha and Reshid Bey), Bismarck had taken a significant step by offering them some very forceful advice. In this regard of particular significance are the advice in which he categorized the Sultan's Muslim/Turk Ottoman subjects as reliable and the Non-Muslim/Non-Turk (*mezahib-i sa'ire efradi*) subjects as unreliable and also his suggestion on governing these Non-Muslim subjects 'with lion's claw hidden in a silken glove', were - in view of the Ottoman Empire's multi-ethnic and multi-religious character - very remarkable. In addition to that, his congratulations to the Sultan upon his decision to dissolve the parliament proved to be one of the approving statements that the Sultan was hoping to hear from a European politician at that time. By making these suggestions and by sending his congratulations Bismarck gave support to his strategic efforts that aimed to win the Sultan's trust and also friendship. As has been indicated in this dissertation the Sultan's friendship was the most crucial factor that could open the doors of the Empire's most critical markets to the German financiers and industrialists, especially to the German armament firms.

Dispatching German military advisers to the Ottoman Army also stimulated the German arms manufacturers' marketing efforts or, put another way, reduced their marketing costs. From the military point of view, the military advisers had limited impact in the first years of their service in the Ottoman Army, but they worked and lobbied intensively for the profit of their fellow-countrymen's business interests. The members of the German Military Mission in İstanbul established an operative link between the Ottoman military decision-makers and the German arms makers. During the course of their presence in Ottoman service, the military advisers became an

indispensable part of, and an additional effective instrument of, Germany's expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire. During the period under consideration, the advisers' effectiveness – in terms of creating political, economic and military control over a foreign country – was so effective that it became a model for other governments. Moreover, because of the multi-dimensional effectiveness and also the global potential of application of this strategy - sending military mission abroad to reorganize foreign armies - the Ottoman experience could be regarded as a pilot project which was applied as a crucial part of a peaceful penetration strategy in other states , *i.e.*, Peru, Venezuela, Chile, etc.

This study specifically emphasized the crucial role played by Goltz Pasha, the pre-eminent figure among the German military advisers, who devoted most of his efforts to establishing a German sphere of influence on behalf of the German arms makers. He was the key figure in promoting the close links that were created between the military advisers and the arms makers. His information net provided him with excellent opportunities to manipulate the process of the armaments contracts. The lucrative contracts signed with Krupp in 1885 and Mauser's entrance into and rapid monopolisation of the Ottoman market for infantry rifles in 1886 were among the results of Goltz Pasha's direct personal intervention into the negotiation process. He was, in the strictest sense, a 'businessman in uniform', who was at the centre of the negotiations that took place for armament orders.

The case of Mauser's entrance into the Ottoman market was a very enlightening case to be able to frame the personal influence and its impact on the gaining of military contracts. From very outset both in 1886, when Paul Mauser was first informed about the Ottoman proposal to order new rifles from abroad, and during the peak period of Ottoman orders – especially in the late 1890s- the individuals and their sphere of

influence were more persuasive than the technical features of the products. The correspondence between Mauser company and Goltz Pasha and also between the company's official agent in Istanbul, August Huber and Paul Mauser give us plenty of evidence that the Germans used both the German military advisors' position and the friendship occurred between the Sultan and the Kaiser for the sake of their war business.

Superiority of the German method in terms of war business in foreign countries over the others relied on governmental support. The whole picture, however, that indicates the German success (especially Krupp's monopoly position) in the Ottoman military market cannot be defined without taking into consideration the personal friendship between the Kaiser and the Krupp family. Based on several unpublished archival documents, this dissertation has indicated that Kaiser Wilhelm II's direct intervention in the German war business strengthened the German armament firms' position in the Ottoman market gained during the years of Bismarck's chancellorship. During and after his two personal visits to the Sultan (in 1889 and 1898), Kaiser Wilhelm II also established a close political and also personal relationship with Sultan Abdülhamid II. Wilhelm II's friendship with the Sultan also provided the German entrepreneurs - in particular the arms makers - with otherwise inaccessible advantages, in comparison with their competitors.

In addition to emphasize the impact of the German state apparatus and German military advisors in successful war business, this dissertation has also clarified the domestic contribution to the German armament firms' successful business in the Ottoman military market. Based on comparative archival research, especially in Turkey and Germany, this dissertation has pointed out that both Sultan Abdülhamid's and some of his corrupt bureaucrats' and officers' personal involvement into the war business and

its impact on strengthening of German position in the Ottoman military market was very conspicuous. Especially the letters and reports of these bureaucrats have clarified their crucial role during the finalizing of arms contracts. These highly significant documents also indicate the method the Germans used to manipulate the Ottoman officers during and also after the negotiation process. According to these documents some of the Ottoman officers, who were sent to Germany to inspect and to observe the production and delivery process of the war materials for a while, established a close personal relationship with German arms makers, *i.e.*, Paul Mauser and F.A. Krupp, and also with some local people of the cities where the factories were located, *i.e.*, Oberndorf and Essen. In addition to that, some of the Ottoman officers got married there and started families with their German spouses while others died there after a long stay in Germany. Based upon these facts, this dissertation has argued that such a personal - close relationship may explain as well the question, why the final decision with regard to armament contracts – in particular for rifles and guns – were generally made in favour of the German companies, even though the German arms makers' offers had not been economically and/or militarily advantageous to the Empire?

The German arms makers' presence and their experiences in the Ottoman market paved the way for a fruitful financial and commercial involvement by other German investors. As Howerth pointed out, 'armies and navies were the effective instruments for opening doors to business enterprise'.⁸ In fact, Sultan Abdülhamid's intention from the start of his reign to modernise the Ottoman Army opened doors for the German armaments companies and as a consequence of that for the German capitalists who would provide the necessary financial support. Therefore the German armament firms, especially the Krupp and Mauser companies, deserve to be named as

⁸ Howerth 1906: 71.

the pioneers of the German expansionist strategy towards the Ottoman Empire and also the commercial agents that also delivered German political and economic interests in the Ottoman market. Based on this approach, this dissertation has argued that in terms of Germany's increasing influence in the Ottoman Empire during the late 19th century the triggering factor was the arms trade that emerged in the shadow of personal influence.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES I: DOCUMENTS AND PHOTOS

Appendix 1.1: BOA. Y.EE. 7/6 (02.01.1299/24.12.1881)

اولی کونہ علی تقویٰ ...
و حریفاً خاکبای شہانہ عرصہ انجمنیہ نگار ایدیم تقویٰ ایلدیر
المایا حکومتیہ طبیب جو قلمی ملکی و عسکری مامور لودنہ تحت الیدیم بو مامور لری رسماً طلب ایکن لہا علی
قدہ الامکانہ مستقیم و مستقیم اولودنہ اولودنہ اولودنہ انتخاب ایدرک ایسی ایدرک فوضہ العادہ مستقیم
بک نادر اولدیفنی یوزکن بناؤ علیہ استعداد جوشدہ فوضہ العادہ لری بولودنہ یک کوچدر ہر حالہ انتخاب
ایدہ جکمن مامور لری صفت سنی جالب لہوچہ صورتہ بولہ جقلمی ایسندہ ہم جوکم انتخاب ایدہ جکمن
مأمور لری ہر حالہ یک مستقیم و صادرہ اولدیفنی و استعداد و لیاقتی دخی افراندی بیانہ مناسبتہ
کریک مستقیم و صادرہ مأمور لری بشیریکہ سے ایدیک

Appendix 1.2: BOA. Y.EE. 7/6 (02.01.1299/24.12.1881)

بک نادر اولدیفنی ...
ایدہ جکمن مامور لری صفت سنی جالب لہوچہ صورتہ بولہ جقلمی ایسندہ ہم جوکم انتخاب ایدہ جکمن
مأمور لری ہر حالہ یک مستقیم و صادرہ اولدیفنی و استعداد و لیاقتی دخی افراندی بیانہ مناسبتہ
بولہ جقلمی تائبہ ایدیم بو مامور لری ایلد کڈوکر مستقیم و صادرہ مأمور لری بشیریکہ سے ایدیک
بونیڈہ آجودہ نگارہ بولورکن مذاہب سارہ افراندیک ناضہ سرتک منافعتہ کلیاً مفایرہ
آندر مستقیم ترکرت مضرتہ آرا لری و سدیہ قدر واضع اولدہ حکمتی بونی آبانہ کافیدر هیچ

بک نادر اولدیفنی ...
بطلت سوزلریہ و تائبیہ باجودہ فقط اسہ حکمانگدودہ دخی سرستہ ویرمیرک ترکرت فون و تقویٰ
زیادہ اچک و رفاه و ترقوی زیادہ بشیریکہ سے ایدوب مذاہب سارہ افراندی اوزندہ جاکلمی تائبہ
و حکیم الملکی و ذامہ شہانہ کڈوری سلطانن و ترکرت خیفہ و یادشہ اولدیفنی نظر ہایرندہ برآہ
کریک ایلدہ و ترکرت ایلدہ غناہ سلطانن تائبہ جو ملیدر لری بواج تائبہ

Appendix 1.3: BOA. Y.EE. 7/6 (02.01.1299/24.12.1881)

و حکیم الملکی و ذامہ شہانہ کڈوری سلطانن و ترکرت خیفہ و یادشہ اولدیفنی نظر ہایرندہ برآہ
بیم دور طوبیہ دور ترکرت ایلدہ حکومت ایلدہ و ترکرت ایلدہ بنیادہ سلطانن تائبہ جو ملیدر لری بواج تائبہ
ایشیا طیبی دخی ایلدہ برافعالیدر لری یعنی ممالک شہانہ لرنڈہ خراجتارک حاکمی ارعاسدہ بولناندہ
برطانیہ اجابہ فارسو خراجتارک دخی حایہ ارعاسدہ بولنای فقط بر طرفہ دخی «حیدرہ معمول
الدیوانہ ایلدہ سوزہ ارسلان خیم سلیم اولدہ حکومت ایلدیر لری» (بوقصیر برنسہ سارہ خراجتارک آنا
کلامدہ ایکی اوج دخی استعمال ایلدیکری تبصیر حریفاً ترجمیدہ) برنسہ سارہ کلامدہ دوام ایدرک
کریک اولدیفنی اسہ یک آندہ بر زمانہ طرفہ خراجتارک یعنی ترک اولدیفنی

Appendix 1.4: BOA. Y.EE. 7/6 (02.01.1299/24.12.1881)

الديوانه ايلم سور استلايه
 كالمدره ايكي اوج وضع استعمال ايلديكوي تصديق حرفيا ترجميد (يرنه بسار نه ملاسه)
 ديديكيم (اشه بوضوتم مبرانه هركت اولو- اسم يك آنه بر زمانه كطرفه خريجانك يعنى ترك اوليا
 نفوز والقيتري نائل اولو- بلكه كلياً تركلد ايله مزيج اولو- وراز مدت دهها حكره تركلد قلب اولو-
 دولت دهن مستفلا بر ترك دولتي اولو- فخره فوق ترابيد ايلد واز همت ايله ايكي اوج عهر مفديكي
 وشرف وعظمتي بكيده وبقايج قات زياده اولو- كه ايلد به ذلله شاهانه نك وكلا سنده بولميه
 و شرف ايلد كندولري دانما بويول تويوه و ترجميد ايلد وكنيم دهن روز و شب بونكدر استلايه

Appendix 1.5: BOA. Y.EE. 7/6 (02.01.1299/24.12.1881)

مالي بدير ملكه هر دورلو فشارات وشرقيات كازيه نك او كه كجكم سعي ايتلبد بر طرفه دهن روز و شب
 ايراز غيبتنه كيد و طوره به رده ملكزي اصلاح ايدوب دائره رفاه وسعار خاككزي توسيع ايتليكز
 معارف ايلد و ايتلبد تجارت و زراعتي ترقي ايتلبد مملكتي نكبه ايتلبد ايجوه وسائط لازمه مراجعت
 ايتلبد طرفه و معارفى نكبه و هر طرفه سند و دفتر انت ايتلبد اورما و معارفى كماليه اداره
 ايتلبد بوي در عهده ايدوب كندى تبعه كندره آمدند و سر كند بولند خج آندى ترجميد ايلد بولند
 ايتلبد اولو طاهر اضراري مباح ارباب ناموس و ضيفواه اجنبى مضمانه مراجعت
 سند الهية آل-ره

Appendix 1.6: BOA. Y.EE. 7/6 (02.01.1299/24.12.1881)

معرفي ايلد و ايتلبد تجارت
 ايتلبد طرفه و معارفى نكبه و هر طرفه سند و دفتر انت ايتلبد اورما و معارفى كماليه اداره
 ايتلبد بوي در عهده ايدوب كندى تبعه كندره آمدند و سر كند بولند خج آندى ترجميد ايلد بولند
 ايتلبد اولو طاهر اضراري مباح ارباب ناموس و ضيفواه اجنبى مضمانه مراجعت
 نقد بده دوست و بنوكند اولو طاهر اضراري مباح ارباب ناموس و ضيفواه اجنبى مضمانه مراجعت
 ايدوب بوليكز بويولده اولو طاهر اضراري مباح ارباب ناموس و ضيفواه اجنبى مضمانه مراجعت
 مفاد و كالا كوره عهده و اجرا ايتلبد بويولده اولو طاهر اضراري مباح ارباب ناموس و ضيفواه اجنبى مضمانه مراجعت
 مفاد و كالا كوره عهده و اجرا ايتلبد بويولده اولو طاهر اضراري مباح ارباب ناموس و ضيفواه اجنبى مضمانه مراجعت
 مفاد و كالا كوره عهده و اجرا ايتلبد بويولده اولو طاهر اضراري مباح ارباب ناموس و ضيفواه اجنبى مضمانه مراجعت

Appendix 1.9: Bayard to King: 27.01.1887, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/165

Telegram. Cipher.	Department of State, Washington, January 26, 1887.
King, Charge, Constantinople.	
<p>Union Metallic Cartridge Company and Winchester Repeating Arms Company are reputable American houses well known to Turkish Government. You will lend all proper countenance to secure for them full opportunity to tender bids and obtain contracts on equal footing with any other competitors.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Bayard.</p>	

Appendix 1.10: Bayard to King: 29.01.1887, in: NARA-Microfilm, College Park: M77/165

No 185.	Department of State, Washington, January 29, 1887.
Pendleton King, Esq c, c, c.	
Sir,	
<p>Representations having been made to me that the Agent, in Constantinople, of certain American houses of established repute, engaged in the manufacture of military supplies, encountered in the presentation of bids obstacles which, it is said, are not interposed in the case of competing contractors of other nationalities, I sent you, on the 25th ultimo, a cipher telegram of which the following is a translation:</p> <p>"Union Metallic Cartridge Company and Winchester Repeating Arms Company are reputable American houses well known to Turkish Government. You will lend all proper countenance to secure for them full opportunity to tender bids and obtain contracts on</p>	

Appendix 2.1: Projet des conditions d'engagement du personnel composant la mission militaire et civile allemande en Turquie 14.07.1880.

↳ Auswärtiges Amt. ↳
Copie.

Projet
des conditions d'engagement du
personnel composant la
mission militaire et civile allemande
en Turquie.

Art. I

Les officiers recevront chacun, en dehors des
rations du grade dans l'armée Ottomane
un traitement annuel de vingt mille
Lira (20000) payable à la fin de

les droits y adhérents, excepté qu'il ne leur sera
payé de salaire de la part du Gouvernement
Allemand pendant le temps de leur service auprès
du Gouvernement Ottoman.

Art. XII. et dernier.

Le présent contrat entrera en vigueur à
l'égard de chaque fonctionnaire ou officier à partir
du jour de leur signature respective à Constantinople.

Fait en triple expédition au Palais S. de
Yıldız le 14 Juillet 1880.

Appendix 2.2: Otto von Kähler's Contract signed on 30.05.1882, in: MA, Freiburg: N.65/4

Monsieur Kähler au service du Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman ne sera changé à l'égard de sa qualité de sujet allemand ni à sa qualité d'officier allemand. Il conservera tous les droits y adhérents, excepté qu'il ne lui sera payé de salaire de la part du gouvernement allemand pendant la durée de son service auprès du Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman.

المانيا نابيتندنه حيقيرجقن مثلا المانيا حانه اولرين صفتا عكبره نه وضع ختلن كامبوت بواكتفرع حقوقه شخصيه كاملا محافظه ايديه جلدر شوقدر كه سرطنته نه حوتق بولديني بديج المانيا دولتي طرفنده معاسه ورتبه جلدر


Article 10.
Le présent contrat entiera en vigueur à l'égard de Monsieur Kähler à partir du 1^{er} juin (16^{er} S.) de la présente année.

ادتي ماده ائومقادله نامه احكامن نه حاكمه جزايه فرملي ابتدائنده مومن ابره حقدنه مرغلي ومقبول اولم حقدنه


Fait en triple expédition à Constantinople le 30 mai 1882. n. S.

ائومقادله نامه اوج نسخ اولم فرملي بولملي حقدنه عقد و تنظيم اولمده

Kähler Yharzi Osman Said



Appendix 2.3: *Irâde* for Otto von Kähler's Promotion to Major-General
(*Mirliva*)



Appendix 2.4: Goltz to Menshausen, 01.08.1891 (Abschrift), in: HA, Krupp
FAH 3B/216

Somit kenne also auch ein diplomatisches Eingreifen noch zur rechten Zeit. Mehrere Unterredungen mit dem Herrn Bot - schafter hieselbat haben mich jedoch zu der Ueberzeugung ge - bracht, dass dasselbe von seiner Seite kaum zu erwarten sein werde. Er scheint anzunehmen, dass der Sultan sich Montebello gegenüber bereits durch bestimmte Versprechen gebunden habe, ein Eingreifen also nur zu einem Misserfolg führen könne, dem er sich nicht aussetzen möchte. Obschon er die letzte Con - versation mit einem "nun wir wollen mal sehen" endete, glaube ich doch, dass er sich nur auf eine ganz bestimmte Ermuthigung von Berlin aus zu positiven Schritten wird bewegen lassen. Ich kann also nur anheingeben, dort - in Berlin - recht emsig zu schä - ren.

Sicher ist, dass die französische Parthei aufs Heusigste nach irgend einem Erfolge strebt. Es wird dabei, unter direk - ter Bethheiligung und Unterstützung der französischen Regierung alles nur irgend Erdenkliche angeboten.

Wie Sie wissen, hat Mauser eine sehr zweckmäßige Umände - rung des Henry-Martin-Gewehrs in ein kleinkalibriges Gewehr vorgeschlagen, welches die Patrone des Mauser'schen Fackotla - ders $1/20$ feuert. Er berechnet die Umwandlung auf Mk. 18.

Hau-

Heute erfahre ich, dass von Seiten der Franzosen gleichfalls ein abgeändertes Modell vorgelegt worden ist, das sich als eine ganz einfache Copie der Mauser'schen Erfindung darstellt, aber für welches nur 12 1/2 francs also fast nur 50 % des deutschen Preises gefordert werden. Die Absicht, den deutschen Vorschlag auf irgend eine Art zu stören, liegt hier klar zu Tage; auch kann der niedrige Preis ernsthaft nur angeboten werden, wenn die französischen Staatsfabriken die Ausführung zum Selbstko - stenpreise, oder gar mit Schaden, übernehmen.

Um so mehr ist es wünschenswerth, dass Herr von Radovitz von Berlin aus ganz bestimmt zum Vorgehen ermächtigt und ein wenig angeregt wird.

Herrn Geheimrath Krupp werde ich morgen auf sein Schrei - ben in gleichem Sinne antworten.

Mit bestem Gruss Ihr ergebenster
gez: Frh.v.d.Goltz.

Appendix 3.1: BOA, Y.PRK. ASK. 7/74 (20.08.1898/18.07.1881)

اعمالوت

مصارف	مبلغ	مجموعه
تعمیرات	۹۶۶	۹۶۶
تعمیرات	۹۱۶	۹۱۶
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۹۱۰	۹۱۰
تعمیرات	۹۶۰	۹۶۰
تعمیرات	۹۴۰	۹۴۰
تعمیرات	۹۶۰	۹۶۰
تعمیرات	۷۰	۷۰
تعمیرات	۹۵۰	۹۵۰
تعمیرات	۱۵۰	۱۵۰
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۱۰	۱۰
تعمیرات	۹	۹
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۱۵	۱۵
تعمیرات	۱۵	۱۵
تعمیرات	۱	۱
تعمیرات	۸	۸


اعمالوت

مصارف	مبلغ	مجموعه
تعمیرات	۹۶۰	۹۶۰
تعمیرات	۷۰	۷۰
تعمیرات	۹۶۰	۹۶۰
تعمیرات	۹۴۰	۹۴۰
تعمیرات	۹۶۰	۹۶۰
تعمیرات	۷۰	۷۰
تعمیرات	۱۵۰	۱۵۰
تعمیرات	۹۵۰	۹۵۰
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۱۵	۱۵
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۱۵	۱۵
تعمیرات	۱۵	۱۵
تعمیرات	۹	۹
تعمیرات	۹	۹
تعمیرات	۹	۹


اعمالوت

مصارف	مبلغ	مجموعه
تعمیرات	۷۰	۷۰
تعمیرات	۱۵۰	۱۵۰
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۹۹۰	۹۹۰
تعمیرات	۹۶۰	۹۶۰
تعمیرات	۹۶۰	۹۶۰
تعمیرات	۹۰۰	۹۰۰
تعمیرات	۷۰	۷۰
تعمیرات	۹۵۰	۹۵۰
تعمیرات	۱۵۰	۱۵۰
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۱۰	۱۰
تعمیرات	۱۵	۱۵
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰
تعمیرات	۹۰	۹۰


**Appendix 3.4.a: Fort *Macar-Kalesi* and its Armament with Krupp Guns 2x28cm)
(Looking towards Fort *Anadolu-Kavađı*)**



Appendix 3.4.b: Fort *Macar-Kalesi* and Fortification with Krupp Guns (8x15 cm)



Appendix 3.4.c: Fort *Anadolu-Kavađı* and its Armament with Krupp Guns



**Source: Turkey-Coast Defences & c. in Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1889,
in: NA, London: ADM 231/14**

Appendix 3.5: First page of the *Abschrift von der Versammlung*, 02.05.1886, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A3.

Abschrift.

Verhandlung zu Frankfurt a. M., Frankfurter Hof, am 2.
 Anwesend: Herr Paul Kaiser
 „ Ludwig Loebe
 „ J. Loebe jr.


Herr Loebe tritt in der Verhandlung erklärt für die
 seiner Firma, daß das Geschäft, welches zur Liefer-
 soll, so lange vorz., in dem Falle einer Einigung zwischen
 Firmen nicht zu Stande kommt, an die Firma Loebe
 anerkannt wird.

Herr Ludwig Loebe ergänzt die von der Firma
 Waffenfabrik Kaiser gemachten Mitteilungen da-
 sich ihm einen Auftrag der Türkischen Regierung
 vorläufig 40-50 000 und demnach ca. 400 000 Stück
 Gewehr für Kartini, Peabody, Ministerium gewährt.

Herr Kaiser erklärt ebenfalls der Firma
 seiner Firma, daß seine Firma sofort nach erfolgter
 Negotiationen

1. Regiergewehr für 9 1/2 mm Kaliber mit 400
 und demnach eine Quantität von ca. 400 000 Stück
 nach Constantinogel abzugeben wird. Inge-
 der Waffenfabrik Kaiser plant nun im Regier-
 für Kartini, Peabody, Kaliber fertigen und
 ca. 4. Wochen eine Lieferung der Firma

**Appendix 3. 6: The Sultan's *Berât* (Imperial Privileges) for awarding Paul Mauser with a *Liyâkat Madalyası* (Order of Merit)
20.03.1312/20.09.1894**



Source: SA, Oberndorf.

Appendix 3.7: Goltz to Paul Mauser, 25.11.1887, in: SA, Oberndorf: M-A8

Das französische Pulver besteht aus Nitrocellulose
 „Das französische Pulver besteht aus Nitrocellulose
 sollte mit sehr feinem Pulverstaub mit 10-12%
 feiner Nitrocellulose. Die Pulverstaubmenge beträgt 10-12%
 Die Herstellung kann erfolgen, indem man
 das Nitrocellulose Pulver mit Alkohol und Acetyl oder
 Acetyl-esteren vermischt und kocht, die Lösung
 auf eine Glasplatte streift u. vor dem völligen
 Trocknen verpresst.
 Das französische Pulver besteht für gewöhnlich aus
 kleineren kleinen quadratischen Körnern ca 2 mm groß
 gelblich gefärbt, welche mit der Zeit in Folge von Dampf-
 trocknung eine bräunliche bis dunkelbraune
 Färbung annehmen.“

Ho. v. Goltz
 Goltz
 Oberndorf

Appendix 3.8a: The Mauser Rifles



**Nr.1: M/87:9.5mm (1887); Nr.2: M/93:7.65mm (1893); Nr. 3: M/03:7.65mm (1903)
 Source: Ball 2006: 359-363.**

Appendix 3.8b: The Mauser Magazine Rifle and Carbine M/04: 7.65mm (1904)



Source: SA, Oberndorf

Appendix 4.1: White to Salisbury, 16.08.1887, in: NA, London: FO 78/3999

16th August 1887.

My Lord,

Your Lordship will no doubt be glad to learn that Mr. Seefeldt the Representative of the Ismid-Kaid Pasha Railway Company at Constantinople has succeeded in concluding a preliminary arrangement with the Ottoman Government for the construction of a Railway to Angora and Diarbakir and ultimately to Baghdad. -

I am not acquainted with the details of this arrangement which

des Hofraths Mann und Spanier der Ausscheidung von Japan zu halten.
 Leider besteht das jetzige Ministerium aus der unersündlichen
 Welle, daß fünf Minister abtreten sind, nämlich der für den
 Dienst Herr, der Kriegsminister Kato Herr, welcher der
 noch früher der Vizepräsident von Herzog commandirt und dort für die
 hat, der Admiralin. Minister Herr, der Außenminister
 Herr und der Marineminister Herr. Dieser
 Hauptbestand bildet bei etlichen unvorsichtigen, unklaren
 man beschaffen bei den Vizepräsidenten einen fruchtbareren Boden
 für die Verwirklichung und gibt den Vorbedingungen von
 Militärischen Vorrichtungen einen beträchtlichen Anknüpfungspunkt.
 Dem Kriegsminister selbst ist Herr Majestät gnädigen
 Herr ausgereicht, und der Herr wird geben, Herr Majestät
 einen allunterthänigsten Dank zu sagen zu lassen.
 In tiefster Gefürchtung
 Herr Kaiserliche und Königl. Majestät
 allunterthänigster
 Herr Hof. v. d. Goltz,
 Generalmajor gen.

Appendix 4.3: The Kaiser's letter to the Sultan (translated)
BOA, Y.EE.62/15 (16.01.1902)

بلورسره
باش کتابت داری

جانبداری المجران حقه یادگیری آلیا امیرالموری عقیده
وارد اولاً توافقاً ترجمه

اما طوری شد و درین قریه ده بغداد و اوراد و بصره کورقوی ساحله تقدیمی امتیازیه طرف ارض
ملکانه لرزه نگور شد و در قریه ایینه اعلا قطعیه اجا جورلینی نزد شاه لرزه کت سفید شاه
کاد و خطوبه استجا ایدم بیلم کوزل بیلم عالی با امر نافک موسی اولمه موقفین اجا
طوبه ذات حقه یادگیری عهدیم الطبع بینه بیطانه ایدم امتیاز نگورن اعصای حقه کی
اراه نینه ملوکانه لرزه شرف اصدا جورلینی و سولطان قاری مالک وسیع شاه لرزه تاریخ
تفاتح الی الابد خاطر کریمه بیلم صعود اولم بقده دیگر طرفه ذاته حقه یادگیری بو اقصای
احا جور مقه آگاهه اباب حنا یفک ناموسی واقعه حقه کی اعتماد و امنیت شاه لرزه
بی دلیل نوقته ابراهیم اول قوری جرم بودند طوبه ذات حقیقینه ملوکانه لرزه ایضاً شکرانه
لازمه ده عهدیم ایتم که کذبینه بیلم بی وظیفه همه تودیع جوریلو الماده اباب ضعی اعتماد
شاه لرزه ابانه یاقته ایچ بکلورده انه سار الله جنابه قادر ملوکانه ذات حقه یادگیری
عم طوبه احا جورده بر خطک یا کذا الکاله اولدنیق ادران ایلمه قالدیه بیغ صادق
ملوکانه لرزه فاه و سعادت و مالک شاه لرزه معورتی حقه کی از روی پدرا نه حکله ایتم
است برتین اولاً بو تسبب علیج ترات حاله العالمی اتقه ف المله موفده هرگز

بیتام

Appendix 4.4: Wilhelm II to Reichskanzler, 19.11.1891, in: PA.AA. R13285

Legation
 19. November 1891. 12. 11. 1891.
 Berlin. 1. 2. 8. 3. 11.
 für d. Königl. Hof. des Fürst. Reichthums
 (Breslau. Oberst.)

Eröffnungsing

Kauf längerer Verhaftung
 mit Herrn Krüpp hat E. H. H.
 darauf aufmerksam gemacht,
 wie folgenschwer das Verbot
 schädlich sei, Sachverhalt Kaiser
 Thron ist können zu bewil-
 ligen. Kauf seinen gesunden
 Informationen beweist dies auf
 einer natürlichen Sprache des
 Verbot des Königl. Da-
 her: mancher bei d. H.

in dieser Weise ab-
 möglichem gemacht.
 aber König der für
 Hofmeister hat das
 Sie verfolgt und
 Herr Krüpp sich
 wieder einen Vor-
 schauungsal, um
 einen Versuch beim
 zu machen. Ist in
 diesem Versuch sehr
 sein, man Herr so
 in ähnlicher Weise,
 ändern das Gehalt
 Herr Krüpp's letzte

nicht genug seiner politischen
 Folgen bleiben können und
 dies sehr bescheiden werden.

Wilhelm F. R.


Appendix 4.5: Wilhelm II to Reichskanzler, 09.12.1891, in: PA.AA.R 13763

Herr Krüpp mit großem Entfallen
 in Bedacht worden werden. Gint.
 ist selbst die Änderung, der bot.
 letzten sind mit fester Lu,
 indigene auf seinen Zügen
 ist dem Lander, er werden
 und sofort umgeändert seinen
 kann mitteln. Es werden alle,
 sind ebenfalls an Rückfragen über
 Entwurf für die fester, die


Mir sollte es eine große
 Freude sein, wenn ich
 ein solches Interesse
 wieder zu einem gesunden
 Erfolg gelangen sollte.

Wilhelm F. R.

Appendix 4.6: Fa. Krupp to Von Schoen, 14.02.1908, in: PA.AA. R13306.



Appendix 5.1: BOA, Y.EE.106/18 (02.01.1301/03.11.1883)



Appendix 5.2: BOA, Y.EE.106/18 (02.01.1301/03.11.1883)

بر طوع و امر و فرمانه هیه من بویه که از منکلیه میر عبداییدیک زاده ملاسمان حضرت جلالتا شریفاً خارجاً
 مامورین حضرتده دئمی المعمار اولده بزوفلات معارف آتات مکاتبات لری در خارجاً مذکورہ بہ اولده اعتماد و کجور
 جمع خارجاً بمقتضی اولوب سوری دتبه کورد لرو الطاف و نوزلات نیتہ نائل اولدق لری ملک برید جریک بیعتک
 سبالحال باز نیتہ ناجیمتہ لودیه خارجاً حضرتده بربر لره ارادہ لسا ایلدیک مہجتہ نتر ادرهقی و سلطانیتہ
 ناہدی کوراییدرہ دایمایدی ارفا خارجاً حضرتده ہی اسلم مہجم مہسابت بیعتک دیکلر لیدہ مجرد فریقہ
 دوازدہ خارجاً لری اولده اعتماد نیتہ نوزلات مہسابت لری ایشو خارجاً لریک نر جمع ایدر لری بسا مسکتہ نبع
 ایدرک مہجم ندر لریک لعلب و استغفار حضرتک باز ناخبر ایسی لری با ل طرف تفہیم ایدی .


Appendix 5.3: BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA.50/35 (25.03.1325/08.05.1907).

بر لیه سفارت نیتہ لرندہ شیفہ


جواب امر و فرمانه هیه من بویه اقتضای علی بنجہ کیفیت امیر اطوہ حضرت لریہ ابلاغ اولدوق
 اولدہ خارجہ ناظرینہ بیام اولندی متا الی حضرت لریک ذات مطاسمات حضرت
 خلقیتہی و دولت علیہ لریہ در کلا اولده مودت و محبت صمیمانہ لری ایجاب نیتہ آزوی
 تالہانہ و جملہ طویلرک وقت و زمانیلہ تالی می مقصدہ قروہ او امر لازمہ سال
 ایدہ جملک لریہ تبرسی اولدیقنی افادہ و نہ صکرہ بغداد شمد و خیرہ تأمینات آنجہ سی

Appendix 5.4: Ahmet İzzet Pasha's Drawings of German Army's Manoeuvres
BOA, Y.PRK.MYD.21/15 (21.12.1315/11.05.1898).


a) Bölük Saf Harb Nizâmı



b) Bölük Saf Harb Nizâmı Mızraklı Süvâri Birliđi



c) Resmi Geçiti Müte'âkib Harb-i Sađır Manevrasına Geçiş



Appendix 5.5: BOA, Y.EE.15/212 (28.08.1307/20.03.1890).

ده بوزده
 اعلیٰ
 استوار افانده و تبلیغاتک نه دره راه اولدنی و بی اساسی جیقیننی حالک لوردی صلیبی
 مضرکی داعی اولدنی مکرر و فطرت مرقوم قاهره جانده و افاده ایلیم و لوردی مرقوم مع الفهم
 طوغری اولدنی و حق بونک قونظمده لوردی اوردنه قشتمک اعلا سنه حاضر اولدنی سولدی افانده
 مذکور نند و قاقوقده جناب مارشالده قریه قولا سورلنی تقدیرم کندوشان ده بالطبع لطف
 و احسانه جلیل تاجداریم نائل اولدنی اصرار اولدنی ایما استی
 و امانه جلیل تاجداریم نائل اولدنی اصرار اولدنی ایما استی
 مرقوم افانده و تبلیغاتک مرقومده قریه قولا اولدنی حالک عدنا نظارته سفی اسوه حیات
 و مامونه (البونک) حرکات مکررده سنک دیکر برغونسی عد اولدیلور جناب قهرانه پادشاه
 دریا نوال و پادشاه محمد علی پاشا اقدیمده سنک دوشمنی گواچیمه اینه
 مرقوم قاهره که بازار ایزی ایشای ایزم حال پادشاه عودت اتمه مجبور اولدنی سولدی معرفت
 قونک
 آری
 مارشال
 ۸۲

Appendix 5.6.a: BOA, Y.A.RES.36/17 (19.04.1304/15.01.1887)

بدر کمالی
 بائکات ایزی

اورومانیک هر طرفده ندرکات عکبر بر صورت خود اعلانه اجرا اولدنده در سالی سابقه فخره نظر از زمانه خود و هتلی بحار ایزر
 ظهور ایزرکی اورومانیکی ایزر اولدانه نظارنده و طبعات ندر جانده اکلده در دولت علیه بونده قانده ایزر
 بولجا خوده سد بونه برقیه خوده اتمکونه ندرکات لازمه هرید هرید و حقیقی بر صورتده با سرتانیک لازمه کاورنده کانه
 عکبر ایزر برقیسی دان مای دولت علیه ندرکات خسیقات هییده عکبر ایزرکی بولجا خوده هرید بر سوده اولدنده عکبر ساها ندرکات عدینه
 صادی تفصیل بولجا خوده زبیر البوم ایزر در سالی ایزرکی مای تفصیلی بولجا خوده و بحار و قوعی ایزرکی مواقع هرید بولجا خوده
 زبیر عکبر سوده و خود لوردی در کار اولدنده عکبر ساها بینه ایزر بولجا خوده سنا ایزر و بولجا خوده تفصیلی و بولجا خوده ایزر
 تفصیلی و خود ایزر عکبر ایزرکی ایزرکی تفصیلی بولجا خوده اولدنده بولجا خوده ایزرکی ایزرکی غیر مکرر و غیر تفصیلی


روصل اوسمه و علامه برده
شخص معلومك بوزده اجده ايدكي انزفله اوقات

انصه كى وقتله اجده ايدكي صين در سايله سركى اولينى حمله هم معلوم اولونه امريقاها هر ملا مده برى
موسو ماوزر ن تظكى كى بلكه انده دهها اخلا بر تظكى مع قضا طوره و المورده تسليم الركنه اوزره اوج بوز فرقه سبه
مردسه دره هكه زر باب سركى بوز فرقه بر طرف كنده اند بر سه اوسه هالوكه بوهان ملا بوقارده بايد اولينى
دو در دولتى وقتله اضرا ايدنه عادي بر فرقه سوكى اولونه خار بفرقه طور دكلدر دعا و زر ن تظكى كى تظكى دى بوز
رضى اخلا سايله قبول اولونه طبعى اوسه زر موسو ماوزر اخر اكر ده كى اولونه تظكى انصاري السه و اخر عا
يهد مده امريقا رضى وضع ارضه اعجمه اوليه بر تظكى عجا امريقا ده عماله الما با دولتى موافقه انجمنى ملك
بوز ما كده اهدا ايدكي قضا سايله بارده سبه هانبا ارضه زانراين سركى مرتبه اجده اوقا صول خريلا اوزر
مع قضا طوره دكانه هانج طرفه عا نه اولونه اوزره فرانس بوز ايد اوج بوز التسه به مردسه اهلونه و طبعى العا
دها زباده در هونم و تبه باب سركى بر تظكى اونه تظكى و سبفر طره هانج اهدا ده بگر مى مردسه زباده
دصرف اخبار اجمه اولينى اوزه سركى بوز فرقه مره قبه نيه ايدر نا ايدم هان تظكى اسبوكى موسو ماوزر بوز ايد
داچرسه و هونم ادهالده ماوزر بفرقه دولته مره عقد مفاو به بگره هلى بونم دولته علم سوه رده انده تظكى سايله
موسو ماوزر ايدم تظكى مفاو به بگره هلى بونم دولته علم سوه رده انده تظكى سايله

Appendix 5.7: Menshausen to Krupp, 20.12.1891, in: PA.AA.R13763


agte, werthen seine Mitteln
den Taktan in die größte Welt
ganheit und war der Einzige
ab Gesetzen, auf demselben zu
falls ein sehr großer. Er suchte
auf nach allen Leistungen zu
schuldigem, indem er sagte, da
ja bis jetzt noch nicht gefas
pi und er im Übrigen ja
auf nur einen einen Befehl
auf verbunden fühlte. Keiner
worden er politisch zu den Franz
"besuchen (getrocknetjeim).
Klagen (Gefühler), Gesetzen und
Kationen sei er kein Exkin
Leistungen eingezogen und es
auf wie vor bei Deutschland
bleiben. Obgleich der Taktan
über nicht Lustimmittel, außer
to pfund ab dort dem Gewer
le ob wegen der Fabrikation
ausflohen Jährlich in der Form
an Franzosen auf Arbeit ge
piffe zuzugew gewandt sein. In
Fenoxal benutzte die, immer
Taktan zu sagen, dass es in
Berlin

**Appendix 5.8: First Ottoman Commission in front of the *Türkenbau*
(Oberndorf am Neckar (1887))**



**Source: SA, Oberndorf, 793.32/13.1 Mauser Werke/Türkenzeit
(Mahmud Şevket Pasha: on the second left)**

**Appendix 5.9: *Türkenbau* and the Mauser Factory in Oberndorf am Neckar
(Oberes Werk Mauser circa in 1906)**




Source: *Stadtmuseum & Waffenmuseum in Oberndorf am Neckar*

Appendix 5.10: *Türkenbau* under the Brazilian Flag



Source: SA, Oberndorf 793.32/13.1

**Appendix 5.11: The Ottoman Trainees in front of the *Türkenbau* (March 1895)
(Oberndorf am Neckar)**



Source: SA, Oberndorf 793.32/13.1

APPENDICES II: LIST OF *DRAMATIS PERSONAE*

Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter (1852-1912)	From 1910 to 1912 he served as Foreign Secretary and head of the German Foreign Office. He established a close relationship and often corresponded with Goltz Pasha, who provided him with crucial information related to the Ottoman Empire's political, economic and military affairs. Especially his correspondences with Goltz Pasha with regards to the war business illuminate the political consequences of the arms trade in the Ottoman military market.
Ali Nizami Pasha (1820-1893)	Ali Nizami Pasha was educated in the Ottoman military college in İstanbul. He was promoted rapidly and, in 1294/1877 eventually became the director of the <i>Mekteb-i Mulkiye</i> and <i>Mekteb-i Sultaniye</i> and afterwards, in 1297/1880 appointed to The High Inspection Commission of the Army' (<i>Tefîş-i Umûm-i 'Askeri Komisyon-u 'Alisi</i>).
Ali Saib Pasha (d. 1891)	Ali Saib Pasha was educated in the Ottoman military college in İstanbul. He was appointed the <i>Serasker</i> (Minister of War) between the years of 1886 and 1891.
Carl Menshausen (1847-1909)	He was one of the very close friends of Friedrich Alfred Krupp. In addition to his personal closeness to the owner of the company he also was a member of board of the Managing Directors of the Krupp company between the years of 1893 to 1905. His main area of responsibility was leading and organizing of the company's transactions with the foreign governments. He had paid therefore several visits to the Ottoman Empire, France, North Africa and China etc.
Carl Peters (1856-1918)	One of Germany's most prominent colonial rulers in 19 th century. He was named as 'the present President of the Society for German Colonisation'. In 1885, he received the first patent for a charter of colonial protection [<i>kolonialen Schutzbrief</i>] from Bismarck regarding the colonisation of German East Africa.
Ernest Constans (1833 – 1913)	Constans was French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire between the years of 1898 and 1909.
Friedrich Alfred Krupp (1854-1902)	F. A. Krupp was a prominent figure of German steel industry. He was the son of Alfred Krupp (1812-1887) who was known as 'the Cannon King'. After his father's death in 1887, Friedrich Alfred took over the leadership of the Krupp company.
Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919)	He was one of the prominent 'academic imperialists' and the leader of the German National-Social Association (1896-1903). He was also known as a German liberal politician and at the same time as a Protestant priest.

Georg von Siemens (1839 - 1901)	Co-founder and director of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> (1870–1900). He was one of the most prominent figures of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> 's successful transactions in the Ottoman Empire.
Gerson von Bleichröder (1822- 1893)	The eldest son of Samuel Bleichröder founder of the banking house of S. Bleichröder in Berlin. He was known as Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's private banker and also often called the German Rothschild.
Halil Rifat Pasha (1820-1901)	He was the Ottoman grand vizier from 1895 until his death in 1901. He was known as a pro-German Grand Vizier. He was awarded the Black Eagle medal by Kaiser Wilhelm II.
İzzet Bey (İzzet Pasha Al-Abid) (1854-1924)	Born in Damascus in 1854, İzzet Bey was well known as <i>Arab İzzet</i> . He occupied a very influential position in Yıldız Palace where Sultan Abdülhamid established his centralised autocratic administration. He joined the Yıldız Palace in 1895 as the Sultan's second secretary –especially for Arabic correspondence. He remained in this position until the year 1908. İzzet Bey was undoubtedly one of the most prominent figures of the Sultan's autocratic ruling system and proved to be one of the most trusted confidants of the Sultan.
Joseph Maria Friedrich von Radowitz (1839-1912)	German Foreign Secretary and head of the German Foreign Office (1879-1880). He was appointed the German Ambassador to İstanbul in 1882 and remained in that office until 1892.
Louis von Kamphövener Pasha (1843-1927)	A Prussian infantry officer who served in the Ottoman army for 27 years between 1882 and 1909.
Mahmud Şevket Pasha (1856-1913)	He was educated in Military Academy in İstanbul and became one of the well-known cadets of Goltz Pasha. After graduation from the academy he joined the Ottoman Army in 1882. He was also trained in Germany and France and was famed for his Pro-German sentiment. He also served as Minister of War and afterwards, in 1912, became Grand Vizier.
Marschall von Bieberstein (1842-1912)	Before he served as German Ambassador to İstanbul between 1897 and 1912, he had held the position of German Secretary of State for the Foreign Office of the German Empire (1890-1894) and Foreign Minister of Prussia (1894-1897).
Max von Duttenhofer (1843-1903)	He was the director and owner of the Rottweil Powder Co. and among the prominent German industrialists and inventors whose company became specifically involved in the production of smokeless powder for rifles and small-guns.

Oscar S. Straus (1850-1926)	He served as the United States' Minister to the Ottoman Empire from 1887 to 1889 and in 1898 he returned to İstanbul as ambassador and remained there until 1899.
Otto August Johannes von Kähler (1830-1885)	The head of the first German military mission arrived to İstanbul in 1882. He served in the Ottoman Army from 1882 to 1885.
Paul Gustav Graf von Hatzfeld (1831-1901)	He served as German Ambassador to İstanbul from 1878 to 1881. In 1881, he was appointed as German Foreign Secretary and head of the Foreign Office where he remained until 1885.
Paul Mauser (1838-1914)	German industrialist acting in rifle production. He was co-founder of Mauser rifles factory in Oberndorf am Neckar with his brother. From 1886 onwards he obtained a monopoly on supplying infantry rifles for the Ottoman Army and held this status for decades.
Reşid Bey (d. 1888)	In 1296/1879 he became Sultan Abdülhamid's private secretary [<i>Kâtib-i Husûsî-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî</i>] and also occupied a position in the Translation Chamber of Yıldız Palace.

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