The Red Army and Soviet Defence Industry, 1934-1941

Tupper, Stephen M. (1982). The Red Army and Soviet Defence Industry, 1934-1941. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

The thesis is devoted to an examination of the development of the Soviet defence establishment during the second and third Five Year Plans. It begins with a brief review of the development of the Red Army and defence industry up to 1934, before considering the strategic position of the USSR and the strengths of the armed forces in that year. The thesis then goes on to demonstrate through an analysis of the individual munitions sectors, that the years 1934 to 1937 were marked by a rapid increase in defence production, which did not, however, lead to an improvement in the strategic position of the USSR. Instead, as the state of the Red Army and its major opponents in 1937 reveals, the strategic position of the Soviet Union had actually deteriorated by the time of the Civil War in Spain. To rectify this situation, in the years 1937-1941 the Soviet government pursued a series of policies designed to rapidly expand the output of military goods and to improve their quality, the individual, armaments sectors and products being discussed in the light of these policies. The analysis comes to the conclusion that a major problem involved in this growth process was the difficulty involved in integrating civilian enterprises into defence sectors, this difficulty exercising a deleterious effect upon the quality of the goods supplied to the Red Army. The reforms which took place in the structure, the tactics and general combat abilities of the Red Army in 1941 are examined, and the final chapter attempts to draw all these elements together to assess the general military-economic potential of the USSR on the eve of the war. The thesis concludes that while in general the USSR had developed considerable defence potential as a result of rapid industrialisation and the expansion of the munitions industries, this general potential was not particularly suited to deal with the specific problems of 1941, due to faulty procurements policies, the lack of contingency planning, and difficulties experienced in producing highly advanced hardware.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

Supervisor(s):