

IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY  
OF RACE

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## S Y N O P S I S

This paper deals with the role of 'ideology' in the sociological study of race. The use of the concept within sociology is discussed and the pejorative definition of ideology, which views it as distorting or limiting the understanding of reality, is found to be inadequate. It is argued that 'ideology' cannot be seen as strictly separated from 'valid knowledge' and tentatively suggested that it may contribute, to some extent, to 'knowledge discovery'. The ideological elements contained in definitions of 'race' are discussed briefly, and various sociological theories of race relations are presented, under the headings of Mainstream and Marxist sociology, in order to partially explicate their ideological contents. Ideology is found to be ubiquitous in the sociological study of race, and within Mainstream sociology to legitimise the status quo, and within Marxist sociology to denounce it. The concluding chapter discusses a possible reformulation of the 'problem of ideology' and the possibility that different sociological approaches, with their respective ideologies, all contribute some insights into understanding race relations. Certain suggestions are also made concerning ways of assessing the relative contributions of Mainstream and Marxist sociology in this area.

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C O N T E N T S

INTRODUCTION	1
I. IDEOLOGY	3
II. DEFINITIONS OF RACE AND THEIR IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS.	16
III. THEORIES OF RACE RELATIONS OR RACISM.	26
IV. CONCLUSIONS.	42

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## INTRODUCTION.

There exists a vast amount of literature concerning the methodological and philosophical problems of sociology. This literature is too abundant and the problems too technical to even outline adequately. The widespread nature of the critiques may be indicated by citing a few of their major proponents: Mills, Myrdal, Gouldner, Winch, Kuhn. Recently, however, criticisms of sociology have focussed, in some part, on the ideological nature of sociology. This constitutes a thoroughgoing criticism of the discipline as legitimising the status quo. The inbuilt conservatism of what may be called 'mainstream sociology' has been indicated not only by Marxists like Horowitz (1), and Nicolaus (2) but also by some of those working within 'the sociological tradition' for example Nisbet (3) and Gouldner (4).

This paper attempts to apply the notion of 'ideology' in its non-pejorative sense (as Weltanschauung)(5) to the sociological study of race. The aim is to partially extricate the way in which the sociologists Weltanschauung expresses itself in this particular area. An attempt has been made to answer two relevant questions concerning the role of ideology in studies of race. The first question is concerned with whether the characterisation of 'Mainstream Sociology' as legitimising the status quo applies in its analysis of 'race relations', and what the ideological contents of this analysis are. The second question is concerned with whether the characterisation of all Sociology, Mainstream and Marxist, as ideological invalidates its conclusions. Certain suggestions are offered in the concluding chapter of a tentative kind concerning this last question.

It must be stressed that the aim of this paper is not to describe the total Weltanschauung contained in respective orientations to race, in the way Mannheim has described that of 'Conservative Thought' (6) . The aim is rather to indicate

that this Weltanschauung finds expression in the assumptions, contentions and solutions presented by respective orientations to race within sociology.

Part I discusses the concept of ideology and argues that the pejorative definition, often advanced in sociology, is inadequate.

Part II looks at some possible ideological aspects of the very definitions of 'race' to be found in various sociological studies.

Part III discusses some theories of race relations under the headings of Mainstream and Marxist sociology.

Part IV, which is the concluding chapter, attempts to present a tentative reformulation of the 'problem' of ideology and its relationship to validity as well as suggesting that ideologies may provide differential insights into race relations.

Throughout, examples will be taken mainly from American literature dealing with race in the United States.

PART I

IDEOLOGY.

Ideology is probably one of the most over-used and inconsistently used concepts within sociological theory. On the one hand, it refers to a political standpoint; the conscious articulation of a system of thought involving, often explicitly, a programme of social preservation and social change in all its variants. Bell (7) talks about "the end of ideology" in this way as the decline of political ideas in the Western World. On the other hand, the concept is used as an antithesis to science. Here ideology is seen in the guise of science but counterposed to it. The implication is that ideology and science are alternatives, and that sociology can and should be conducted as science and not ideology. But as Apter (8) notes, science itself can be seen as a well-defined ideology possessing norms of empiricism, predictability and rationality as guides to conduct.

More comprehensively, ideologies are also defined as world-views which contain conceptual frameworks limiting the understanding of the society in which they are found. In this sense Marxists may refer to the ideology of capitalist society as a 'bourgeois ideology' which legitimises the social structure in the interests of the ruling class.

However, it is defined, and there are also other variants in sociological literature, ideology is on the whole seen as 'limiting', although perhaps having partial and critical insights. It is thus used in its pejorative sense and involves concepts of both conscious and unconscious distortion.

In order to clarify the use of the concept in this paper, I shall give a description of its usage within Marxist and Parsonian theory as indicating quite different, if not antithetical perspectives. The sociology of knowledge in its Mannheimian formulation must also be considered for this approach is founded partly on the analysis of ideology, as Merton has pointed out (9). In terms of this last approach, especially,

an attempt will be made to indicate the usage of the concept as not only limiting but as contributing to knowledge-discovery. Marxism.

For Marx, there are two definitions of ideology: false consciousness and the result of social practice (10). Ideology mystifies reality - it is part of the process of alienation where imaginary entities obscure the real relations of human activity and has its roots in the reification or fetishism of commodities - men regard themselves and their relationships as things. Geras (11) makes the point that 'fetishism' refers to both mystification and domination:

"In capitalist society the phenomenon of fetishism imposes itself on men as @ mystification b. domination. In 'Capital' alienation is located in specific social relations and not in the 'ideal-essence' of man which has been negated, i.e. the concept is tied to forms of domination."

Ideology, in Marx, is also seen as the result of social practice being built on material conditions, although in a dialectical relationship to them. However, Marx didn't see history as merely a succession of ideologies based on specific material conditions, but as the gradual unfolding of 'truth' through the dialectical processes of history.

Two extracts from Marx formulate the two senses in which ideology is used. The first formulation concerns the false consciousness connotation of ideology as serving the dominant class who are its purveyors:

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force." (12)

The second formulation concerns ideology as the result of social practice or the social conditions of knowledge:

"The totality of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundations on which arises the legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social and political life. It is not man's consciousness that determines his existence but the social existence that determines his consciousness." (13)

Although Marx defines ideology in these related ways as distorted and distorting within capitalist society, with revolutionary 'praxis' by the working class, ideology comes to reflect reality. Lefebvre makes the following point:

"It is on the basis of conscious revolutionary praxis that thought and action are articulated dialectically and that knowledge 'reflects' praxis. Until then knowledge was characterised precisely by its failure to reflect reality, namely praxis could only transpose it, distort it, confuse it with illusions." (14)

In this way, ideology may be a path to knowledge, may be consciousness rather than false consciousness. This notion in Marx has been taken up, for example, by Lenin, who argues that an alternative political ideology is needed before the seizing by the working class of state power (15). An alternative political ideology, according to Lenin, will result from political-class confrontation and the creation of a true class in the Marxist sense, i.e. one containing class consciousness. This will be an opposing ideology to that of bourgeois society. Gramsci (16) also discusses the pervasiveness of ruling-class ideology in capitalist society and the way it involves the distortion of reality in its taken-for-granted nature. For Gramsci a new proletarian ideology is necessary and will result from class-confrontation. Thus both Lenin and Gramsci recognise the independent (relatively, for it results from conflictful class relations) force of ideology for social change and the potentiality within it of non-distortion. Althusser (17) recently argues also for the relative autonomy of ideology and the importance, in capitalist society, of 'Ideological State Apparatuses' like education and the family in acting as carriers of the world-view of the ruling class.

Although these elaborators of Marxist theory have certainly made specific and very different contributions to Marxist theory, Marx himself was not the vulgar economic determinist he has been often depicted as. His dialectical materialism posits a reciprocity of relations between sub-structure and superstructure. A degree of relative autonomy is allowed for ideology once it has been created. In any case the mode of production which Marx talked about is not synonymous with that designated by 'bourgeois' economists. Poulantzas (18) makes the following point:

"By mode of production is not designated what is generally defined as the economic sphere of society, the relations of production in the strict sense of the term, but a specific combination of various structures and practices which in combination appear as so many regional structures of this mode of production . . . The type of unity characteristic of a mode of production is that of a complex whole dominated in the final instance by the economic sphere."

Although ideology is seen by Marx as structurally created and located, and based on material conditions within capitalist society which limit the understanding of reality, falsifying and mystifying social relations, it is also found in its non-pejorative sense, as entailing positive insights for change through the imminent historical process. Always though, in the last sense it must be seen as related dialectically to revolutionary social practice. In other words, proletarian ideology results from and leads to social action to put 'reality' on its feet again (19); this ideology does not only 'analyse' social relations more accurately. In Marxism, therefore, ideology is found to mean not only mystification and domination but possibly clarification and liberation.

#### Parsonianism.

Parsons can be seen to be in agreement with some part of Marx's concept of ideology in seeing it primarily as a functional mechanism for maintaining an equilibrium situation. Marx would put it rather differently: as "legitimizing social structures"; the idea however is very similar. But the essential difference here between Marx and Parsons is that whereas Marx sees ideology as legitimising the interests of a ruling class who are the

purveyors of ideas, Parsons assumes that interests in society coincide - he does not conceptualise the conflicting interests in society. Problems of ideological distortion appear largely irrelevant, therefore, given that ideology is functional, integrating and common.

Parson's definition of ideology is summarised in the following extracts:

"An ideology then, is a system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity, i.e. a society, or a sub-collectivity of one-including a movement deviant from the main culture of the society- a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity and of the situation in which it is placed, the processes by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented and their relation to the future course of events." (20)

and

"What we are here calling an ideology has its central focus in the empirical aspects of the nature and situation of the collectivity." (21)

Parsons thus stresses the integrative role of ideology as one constituent of the belief system of a society. He does however recognise the existence of 'counter-ideologies' (22) but these are always the result of 'deviance', either of a sub-culture or a deviant movement. To Parsons the beliefs of "such deviant collectivities often show signs of compulsiveness in the psychological sense" (23). He also discusses briefly the "distortion of ideologies". Firstly, as a result of an element of malintegration in the actual social structure the tendency will be for the ideology to 'gloss it over' because this would entail a threat to the stability of the society. Secondly there is distortion, when there occurs "the ideological legitimisation of the status quo through an over-idealisation of that state of affairs." (24) For Parsons legitimisation does not serve the interests of a ruling class but the interests of societal stability. His concept of legitimisation is quite different to that of Marx as is readily apparent.

Parsons can be criticized for depicting ideologies as one component in an abstract model of society and as ahistorical and empiricist thus preventing him from developing a conditional and changing truth. This in turn lies in his concern with scientific absolutism (springing from a naive scientism). He has disdain in treating his own formulations as possibly ideologically "biased". Ideologies and their possible cognitive distortions already referred to, according to him "will tend to be uncovered and challenged by the social scientist." (25). The implication is that the social scientist is free from such ideological distortions. Apter (26) has argued that social science and ideology are coming to represent two antagonistically conceived roles which stems from the kind of view Parsons and his followers have of ideology. Elaborators and modifiers of functionalist theory have rarely specifically concerned themselves with developing further the Parsonian definition of ideology and are thus not discussed here.

The Marxist and Parsonian approaches to ideology can be depicted in the following paradigmatic form. This entails the selection of what seem to be the most important elements of each and is one among several possible formulations:

Marxism.

- (a) Ideology is related dialectically to material conditions - the mode of production.
- (b) The dominant or ruling class is the purveyor of ideology.
- (c) Ideology has a relative autonomy for social change.
- (d) Ideology is ubiquitous and inevitable, but can involve, through the dialectical processes of history, clarification and liberation.
- (e) Within capitalism ideology serves as a falsification of reality - the social sciences are not immune.

Parsonianism.

- (a) Ideology is a structural and integrating component of the value-system.
- (b) Ideology is given not imposed.
- (c) Counter-ideologies are deviant.
- (d) Ideology legitimises society in the interests of stability - the common good.
- (e) Ideological 'distortion' has been superceded in the social sciences viz positivism and empiricism.

Mannheim.

Mannheim is without doubt the most important formulator of the sociology of knowledge. In fact he derives certain of the basic assumptions of Wissenssoziologie from an analysis of the concept of ideology. He is, however, rather inconsistent in his definition of it:

- (a) Ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realisation of their projected contents (27).
- (b) Antiquated and inapplicable norms, modes of thought and theories are likely to degenerate into ideologies whose function is to conceal the actual meaning of conduct rather than to reveal it (28).

The first definition argues for a pragmatist and retro-active criterion of ideology: we recognise an ideology by its failure to realise itself historically. The second definition is very closely related to Marx's concept of ideology as false consciousness - as the domain of the ruling class which conceals the actual meaning of conduct for its own interests.

One of the problems with giving a summary of Mannheim's conception of ideology is in fact this inconsistency. In distinguishing between the 'particular' and 'total conception of ideology', Mannheim departs from the previous usages of the term and ideology becomes identified with 'perspective':

"Whereas the particular conception of ideology designates only a part of the opponents assertions as ideologies and this only

with reference to their content, the total conception calls into question the opponents total Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus) and attempts to understand these concepts as an outgrowth of the collective life of which he partakes"(29).

The first conception is similar to the lie or conscious/unconscious distortion. The second argues that total world view or perspectives themselves are the product of existential factors. At another point he defines perspective in the following way:

"Perspective is the manner in which one views and object, how one perceives it and how one construes it in his thinking." (30)

The point that Mannheim is making is that the structure of 'consciousness' is determined primarily by the structure and social location of the groups where it is produced and not by the 'objects' of consciousness or consciousness itself, (logic, reason or whatever we call it).

Mannheim then goes on to describe the merging of the particular conception of ideology with the total:

The particular conception of ideology merges with the total. This becomes apparent to the observer in the following manner: previously ones adversary as the representative of a certain politico-social position was accused of conscious or unconscious falsification. Now the critique is more thorough-going in that having discredited the total structure of his consciousness we consider him no longer capable of thinking correctly. (31)

It must be pointed out however that Mannheim's perspectivism holds that Weltanschauung is relevant to the formulation of the scientific problem but not to the validity of the results obtained (in the context of social discovery). That is, that the existential basis of thought only provides us with a suspicion of its partiality but not its invalidity.

Mannheim, at another point, distinguishes between Ideologies and Utopias. Ideologies are ideas rooted in past conditions and are inapplicable for present ones. Utopias are ideas refer-

ring to the future and are incongruent with the present. Both concepts contain "the imperative that every idea must be tested by its congruence with reality" (32). However, not only does this involve a retro-active criterion for distinguishing between the two which verges on the teleological, but the criterion of congruence with reality is not very useful unless its meaning is clearly stated. Moreover, Mannheim seems to end up with a pragmatist view of validity here.

The bearers of ideologies (Weltanschauungs) for Mannheim are social strata, but not in the 'dogmatic Marxist' sense. Class is used in a more flexible way and includes other groups with unique socio-historical experience like generations, sects and occupations. He seems to have an arbitrary way of distinguishing between these groups, and may be indicted with failing to systematically analyse the differences as well as the similarities among them. There are no specific guidelines provided for ascertaining their 'uniqueness'. He does, however, agree with Marx that social classes are the most important of these groups.

In fact, here we enter explicitly into the realm of his sociology of knowledge, which is devoted to an analysis of the social origins of thought and with specifying its existential basis. Mannheim's methodology is concerned with depicting the relationship between the intellectual point of view and the social position through non-evaluative analysis. As Merton (33) has pointed out however, Mannheim sometimes assumes that ideas and forms are congruent with the interests of the subject, and at other times, that social structural characteristics are a prerequisite of certain types of thought. In other words Mannheim is not clear as to the type and kind of relationship between thought and existence. His methodology certainly suffers from this.

One aspect of Mannheim's epistemology is the combination of the substantive enquiry with 'relationism' and not relativism. He, in fact, explicitly rejects the relativist (non) solution. Relativism involves the rejection of all forms of thought which are dependant on the subjective standpoint and the social situation as 'relative'. This relativism, according to Mannheim

contains the contradiction that it still works within the "positivist framework of taking as imperative, knowledge of a strictly puritanical certainty as the only valid knowledge, and having insights into the actual process of knowledge gathering in human affairs, it rejects the latter's validity" (34). Relationism starts off from the different assumption that there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independantly of the values and position of the subject and unrelated to the social context. For him the content of 'formal knowledge' is unaffected by the social and historical situation. Such immunity is enjoyed by the exact sciences but not by the cultural sciences (35). This assumption that the physical sciences are immune from extra-theoretical influences is never fully explained as he fails to distinguish between possibly heterogeneous types of knowledge.

In his relationism, Mannheim was faced with the problem of evaluating the merits of different perspectives. The question he asks, though, is not 'what is true?', 'but which standpoint vis-a-vis history offers the best chance of reaching optimum truth?':

"We need not regard it as a source of error that all thought is so rooted. Just as the individual who participates in a complex of vital social relations with other men thereby enjoys a chance of obtaining a more precise and penetrating insight into his fellows, so a given point of view and a given set of concepts, because they are bound up with and grow out of a certain social reality, offer, through intimate contact with this reality, a greater chance of revealing its meaning." (36)

Mannheim does recognise that there are handicaps involved also. It is clearly impossible to obtain an inclusive insight if the observer or thinker is confined to a given place in society. Mannheim tried to find ground for validity within the limits of given perspectives. This is the role according to him of the particularising function of the sociology of knowledge. This "assists us in ascertaining the limits within which generalised proportions are valid" (37). Whatever is found

true under certain conditions should not be assumed to be true universally or without limits. But this offers only a sceptical view not an evaluating one. The problem of judging the merits of different particular views and validating the 'dynamic synthesis' of these, led him in 'Ideology and Utopia' to follow in the tradition of Marx in finding the validity of social thought (without the dialectic) in one particular view. For Marx it was the proletariat who are the present bearers of the historical process of becoming, who open up the possibility of undistorted social thought. For Mannheim it is the classless position of the 'socially unattached intellectuals'. This proposal is not only naive in its depiction of the intellectuals as above and beyond class interests, but also constitutes a vindication of Mannheim's own position and that of his sociology of knowledge. In parts of his later work he implicitly recognises this and finds that the more 'detached' perspective comes from "two perspectives which conflict and in criticising one another render one another transparent" (38), which is reminiscent of the Hegelian dialectic. This last sees unity as the process of continual historical transformation leading to the restoration of equilibrium at a higher level.

All the proposals of Mannheim are epistemologically problematic and are as yet not only unsolved but perhaps unsolvable. But as has already been indicated Mannheim doesn't argue that 'perspective' is always distorting. He states:

"A Weltanschauung is not of necessity a source of error, but often gives access to spheres of knowledge otherwise closed." (39)

If all knowledge is ideological (about society), in that it is rooted in a particular Weltanschauung created existentially, and this knowledge is not necessarily invalid, then ideology must contribute in some way to knowledge-discovery. Here then ideology, as with Marx, isn't only conceptualised as limiting, but also as clarifying.

But before one can possibly understand what particular insights ideologies contain it is important to understand whose interests they serve. In other words an understanding is needed concerning which ideologies legitimise the social structure and which ideologies denounce it.

Ideology - as Weltanschauung.

The political concept of ideology, the 'bias' connotation and the concept of 'Weltanschauung' are not separate by any means. The articulation of an explicit political ideology and a more implicit 'bias' are both fundamentally linked to a perspective aligned to class interests. The first is distinguishable only in its explicitness in contradistinction to the hidden taken-for-granted nature of the second. Mannheim's notion of perspective is again not very different from Marx's concept of ideology as the result of social practice, apart from the dialectical nature of the last and the fact that Mannheims notion of the existential basis as rooted in class position is more flexible than that of Marx.

For both Marx and Mannheim, ideology can involve conscious or unconscious distortion whose aim is to conceal the actual meaning of conduct. Also for both, ideology is inevitable and ubiquitous but offers possibilities for insights into reality; for Marx it is proletarian ideology in its dialectical relationship to 'praxis' and for Mannheim it is the intellectuals' Weltanschauung. At other times though Mannheim implies that all ideologies have some discovery potential.

The pejorative meaning of ideology as bias or distortion is not utilised in this paper. Neither is Parson's notion of the integrating function of ideology for society. Ideology is defined in terms of Mannheim's notion of perspective allied to Marx's concept of the existential basis, the material conditions. Within the specific concern of this paper, ideology is thus taken to mean a perspective or world view which either accepts and legitimises the existing social structure, or rejects it. Since ideology is ubiquitous it frames the reference for all sociological enquiries, theoretical and empirical. An

analysis will be made, within the sociological study of race, of concepts and theories which (a) legitimise the status quo, (b) denounce it. A cautious suggestion is made in the concluding chapter concerning the relative insights of sociological theories of race relations.

PART II

DEFINITIONS OF RACE AND THEIR IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS.

In order to demonstrate, initially, the way in which perspectivistic vantage points are expressed within the area of the sociological study of race, it is useful to look at the very definitions of race utilised. This brief description of the formulation of concepts shows their integral role within the theoretical frameworks in which they are respectively organised, and presents a first step for the partial explication of the latter.

In fact not only within sociology but within society race 'problems' generally and the negro 'problem' in particular, are to an extraordinary degree affected by conflicting valuations of high emotional tension. This is partly due to the ongoing racial tensions in Western societies and partly to the long history of explicit racist ideologies and the biological and theological support they have contained. Rex argues:

"Long before justification for inequality and exploitation were drawn from biological science they were drawn from theology. Indeed, it could be argued that it was only because the ideological extremism of 19th century positivism demanded the justification of everything in terms of natural science, that biological theories assumed the predominance they did and that the decline of scientism would inevitably lead to the reoccurrence of other forms of theory." (40)

These other theories might include sociological doctrines "about the superiority of particular cultures and social systems" (41). This idea is however not to be found in the contemporary sociological study of race. The main elements of the social science position are noted by L. Paul Metzger (42):

"Research on racial differences shows that there is no instinctual basis for race animosity but it is acquired through socialisation, often meets the emotional needs of those holding them and they are subject to change when conditions which generate and sustain them are altered."

The traditional ideals of the social science 'position' comprise not only non-partisanship but also 'scientific purity'. The on-going tension in society concerning race certainly finds no explicit expression within social science. This must be extricated through the implicit perspectives of the different orientations within the 'position'. Here, of course, because race in different ways is recognised as a problem, sociology takes upon itself the role of social problematics and programatics. As Van den Berghe states (43):

"The field of race relations has been generally characterised by a high degree of emphasis on practical policy applications."

These applications are tied quite closely to the conception of the nature of 'race', and the 'race problem'.

In the following discussion the concept of race and its possible ideological aspects will be briefly indicated. The problematic nature of such a discussion is certainly recognised and the analysis must be seen therefore as suggestive rather than substantive. The way in which the conception of 'race' is related to the perception of the 'problem' and the programatics advanced will also be only indicated. A further and more detailed exploration of the way concepts are tied to ideology of 'Weltanschauung' is beyond the confines of this paper.

Race has been defined within sociology in various ways. None of the definitions mentioned here are seen as total definitions but rather as ideal type formulations, selecting specific features of race for study. The adequacy of the definitions is recognised by those using the formulations as being less than complete. The important point, however, seems to be that the various definitions are seen to come closest to reality than any other by their proponents.

Race has been defined as:-

- (a) One variant of an ethnic group, with the attendant usage of host-immigrant relations.
- (b) As a social class.
- (c) As a caste.
- (d) As an outgroup with the special characteristic of easy distinguishability through colour visibility.

The 'race problem' has been seen as:

- (a) A normative problem - as either the black man's problem of failing to live up to the normative ideals of the wider society or the white man's problem of conforming to these ideals. Allied to this is the problem of assimilation and integration.
- (b) A structural problem springing from institutionalised racism which is inherent in capitalist society.
- (c) A psychological problem - of displaced aggression or scape-goat behaviour.

Solutions are seen in terms of:-

- (a) Legal, cultural, administrative, socialisation processes (i.e. some variant of social reform).
- (b) A revolutionary transformation of capitalist society.

These are all political solutions in the sense that they all have political implications.

An attempt will be made to show the inter-relationships between race definitions, conceptualisation of the problem and solutions advocated.

(i) Sociological analysis which saw race in ethnic terms characterises the work of the 'Chicago School of Sociology during the 1920's and early 1930's. In a more sophisticated mould Warner and Srole include the Negro in studies of comparative mobility rates of various ethnic groups (44). Glazer and Moynihan (45) recently argued that ethnic solidarities are more enduring than earlier sociologists expected them to be and argue for the existence of cultural pluralism in America. The negro is, however, discussed from the same sociological standpoint as other ethnic minority groups. The implication is that it is only a matter of time before the Negro can be assimilated structurally into white society, thus following the path of other ethnic minorities. The Negro problem is seen fundamentally as a variant of the problem of host-immigrant relations. That is, that it is a normative problem of the Negro making full use, through acceptance of the norms of American

society, of the opportunities that society provides. Those who use the ethnic group analogy, on the whole, see the problem as that of assimilation into a pluralist consensus-based society. Each specific version does, however, recognise some differences between the Negro and other ethnic groups. For example, Warner and Srole also use the term 'caste' (in its incipient form) to describe the Negro. The visibility of the Negro prevents him from disappearing into the larger society (unlike other ethnic groups) and contributes to a caste-like rigidity in his status - colour marks his position out as rigid. But the mode of study used, is not in terms of caste but ethnic analysis. This analytical contradiction in Warner's work certainly needs closer study. Glazer and Moynihan on the other hand recognise, to some extent, the social class nature of white-Negro relations but encompass this recognition within ethnic analysis.

Firstly, in the use of the concept 'ethnic group' there is a failure to consider certain crucial characteristics of the Negro situation in American society. The prime difference, historically, is the Negro's experience of slavery; his involuntary migration to a land where he was stripped of his culture (46). There seems to have been a conscious decision by slave-traders to split up members of the same tribe and in many cases the same family (47). Ethnic minorities on the other hand migrated to a 'land of Hope' where they were almost immediately able to compete within the society - their movements for example were not administratively controlled as was the case for Negroes (48). Moreover they transformed their culture at their own pace to a large extent; the subjection of Southern Europeans to an Americanisation programme cannot be seen as similar to Negro experience in its 'total institutional' character (49). True, many ethnic groups in America have lived in ghettos but these were generally one or two generations phenomena-possible stepping stones to a great degree of acculturation and eventual assimilation. The black ghetto on the other hand is a more permanent phenomenon. Moreover, the unique experience of slavery made for special

psychological responses in the Negro illustrated poignantly in the works of black writers like Baldwin (50), Fanon (51), and Carmichael (52). In fact the symbolism of colour, whether created by years of degradation in slavery or whether linked to more essential emotional responses to 'blackness' (53) meant that the Negro's position was unique amongst the large number of different ethnic groups.

Secondly, the Negroes do not constitute an ethnic group in the sense that they are not located in an 'ethnos'; their roots are scattered. Interestingly, only recently are Negroes moving towards cultural nationalism, in the very period when ethnic loyalties tend to be weak if not in total decline (54).

These are substantive inadequacies of the ethnic group analogy of race. Important, however, as an ideological tenet is the assumption that assimilation and integration are as possible and desirable for the Negro as they have been for other ethnic groups. The very idea that assimilation is possible rests on certain assumptions concerning the nature of American society which spring from a definition of that society as essentially benevolent and consensual. Solutions advocated towards the 'problem' of assimilation are defined in terms of legal, administrative and cultural processes. There is in fact a legitimization of the existing social structure apparent in the ethnic group analysts work.

(ii) The approach of the class theorists springs from the conceptualisation of society as containing opposing class interests and class conflict. The chief exponent in the field of race relations is Oliver Cox (55). Though the perspectivistic one-sidedness of this definition of 'race' is, like the ethnic analogy, implicit, it contains a more explicit related political standpoint. The perspective of the class theorists involves a conscious denunciation, in Marxist terms, of colonialism and a total rejection of the institutions of capitalist society.

Cox argues that racism developed out of and as a justification of capitalist exploitation; for the full profitable exploitation of a people the dominant group must devise ways and means of limiting that peoples cultural assimilation (56). The class position of the Negroes is rigidly bound by the needs of capitalist economy and the Negroes constitute the lumpen proletariat of America.

Cox's definition of race in class terms involves the denial of the existence of racism in pre-capitalist society. Van den Berghe argues that this is a problematic assumption and believes that there is some evidence of racism in this type of society:

"In the traditional kingdoms of Rwanda and Hurundi in the Great Lakes area of Central Africa the Tutsi aristocracy (about 15% of the population) ruled over the Hutu majority and a small group of Twa. The three groups are physically distinguishable. . . physical characteristics, notably height, play a prominent role in the Tutsi claim to superiority and political domination." (57)

He also cites another case where physical distinguishability plays a role in the subjection of peoples, from M. G. Smiths 'The Plural Society in the British West Indies':

"In Zaria also, social significance is given to colour distinctions; value is placed on lightness of skin as an attribute of beauty, and as a racial character and a host of qualitative terms reflect this interest. . . The Fulani rulers of Zaria distinguish on racial ground between themselves and their Hausa subjects stressing such features as skin colour, hair and facial form and also make similar distinctions among themselves since past miscegenation produced wide physical differences among them." (58)

This may involve one substantive criticism of Cox's works, although the mere presentation of these cases doesn't posit any systematic explanation of Van den Berghe's position in rejecting the thesis that racism is the result of exploitation, in its rationalised form, within capitalist society. And Van den Berghe does note that 'no other brand of racism has developed such a flourishing mythology and ideology' (59) as the Western strain.

The approach of what has been termed here, the class theorists, defines class in Marxist terms - as the relationship of a group to the productive process. Class is not defined in any other of the multiform variants that exist in sociology. The race problem, for this approach, is that of the structure of capitalist society, which creates racist ideologies as a rationalisation of the inequalities within it, and to divide the working class. In this sense racist ideology has the characteristic of false consciousness and serves the interests of the ruling class who are the purveyors of ideas. The problem is thus 'institutionalised racism'. To merely recognise the existence of a class factor in race relations does not constitute the class definition as it has been described here nor the conceptualisation of the 'problem' in the same way.

Whereas for the ethnic group analysts the solution to the problem of assimilation is to be found partly in greater effort to allow the Negro to seize the opportunities that society provides, the class analysts see the solution to the structure of capitalist society in a revolutionary overthrow of that society by both the white and the black working class. With such wholesale social change the roots of racism will disappear. (iii) Caste analysis has been used quite extensively within the study of race as in the case of Dollard (60) and Davis (61). Warner, also, as has been indicated, compared race to an incipient form of caste although he studied the negro from the same standpoint as ethnic groups. This means that the basic caste marks of physical appearance, endogamy, hereditary status, social isolation vis-a-vis other groups, taboos on visiting, eating and drinking with other groups have been applied to black groups. The case analogy is found in one of the most influential works on race relations in the U.S. : Myrdals *The American Dilemma* (62).

Firstly, there exists a definitional problem for caste, as a sociological concept, refers to the system of rigid social stratification found in traditional Indian society (63).

Van den Berghe (64) also uses caste but in what he calls its minimum sense: Kroebers definition "as an endogamous and hierarchised group in which one is born and out of which one cannot move". But if this is the case the use of 'caste' becomes only an illuminating reference rather than an analytical concept. The term 'caste-like' may be a better description of what is meant in this instance.

Secondly, the caste analogy involves a stress, on the whole, of the behavioural elements of social interaction between black and white groups. It neglects the role of values in determining these behavioural elements (like endogamy) in American society as distinct from traditional Indian society. Thus the 'meaning' of endogamy in Western society is not considered.

Thirdly, as Cox points out (65), a fundamental difference between the Hindu system and that of the U.S. is that the first was based at least until recently, on consent whereas that of the U.S. is based on conflict.

Finally, to use the term 'caste' for race fails to consider its role and analyse the roots of its existence within the essentially class-based society of America. Although the similarities between caste characteristics and the Negro situation are evident they don't contribute to an understanding of the mechanics of caste within a system of social stratification, nor to an understanding of the development of racism and its particular manifestations in American society. What the usage of the term 'caste' does indicate is that race is, among other things, an "extreme case of status ascription making for rigid group membership" (66). The rigidity of the stratification factor, in other words, is certainly recognised by the caste theorists unlike the ethnic analysts.

The ideological implications of the caste analogy are by no means clear cut, and they are difficult to extricate. But the analogy certainly does enable theorists to discuss the rigidity of the Negro's position without delving into possible structural factors involved. The analogy allows for normative or behavioural explanations and thus escapes politically radical implications of rigidity. Myrdal (for example), defines the race problem as a normative one: of the failure of the white

man to live up to the 'American Creed' - an egalitarian creed. This perception of the problem means that solutions are seen as administrative or institutional - in fact some form of social engineering (67). There is an ideological acceptance of the status quo, on balance, where the caste theorists are concerned\*. (iv) Lastly, there exist a large number of studies (68) in sociology which see race as an outgroup. The visibility of the Negro results in the immediate perception of his 'difference'. This definition, on the whole, places emphasis on the psychological characteristics of men, who recognising a group as an outgroup resort to scape-goating behaviour through a process of displaced aggression or fear of deprivation. The 'stereotyping' of the Negro is involved in this process. For some variants of this type of approach it is the personality characteristics of certain white people which is responsible for racial prejudice (69). Empirical study is often utilised to discover the relationship between prejudice as a psychological variable, and discrimination as a behavioural one, in terms of individual indices like class or personality.

The problem is seen as that of man's reaction to 'outsiders', nationally or culturally, and the social conditions or human experiences that transform this reaction into explicit behavioural hostility. Socialisation practices are often advanced as partly responsible for this reaction. Other explanations include, lack of contact (The Stranger) ignorance and fear (70).

The solutions which are advanced by this approach are multi-form, but all 'piecemeal', e.g. better education, multi-racial housing estates, legal changes which may affect those with authoritarian personality structures, and many more. The ideological implication is that it is the individual that must be tackled through social reform, and not the society. Thus an

\*These points apply specifically to writers who use the term caste as an analytical tool rather than a mere descriptive or illustrative tool.

implicit legitimisation of society is involved\*.

What has occurred in this last definition is that the way in which race relations find expression at the individual level, and the wide variety of factors contributing to prejudice and discrimination at that level, are presented as the most important explanation of race conflict. Certainly there is no doubt that contributions have been made to an understanding of individual processes in race relations - but this is at the micro-level and ignores the societal roots of racial conflict. This in itself can be seen as springing from a Weltanschauung that accepts the social structure through never raising fundamental questions about that structure.

The ethnic group analogy of race and the caste definition have also made certain contributions to the field of race relations. It is important to compare and contrast ethnicity and race. But to posit ethnic explanations as primary explanations is not only inadequate, given the concrete historical differences between race and ethnicity, but also can be seen as part of a legitimising Weltanschauung. The caste analogy similarly provides an illuminating parallel with race but again involves an oversimplification not only of the constituents of caste, but those of race. Moreover, both definitions do not raise questions concerning the social structural factors possibly responsible for racial tension.

The class analogy, on the one hand, does not preclude both ethnic and caste analysis and on the other hand attempts to uncover fundamental societal processes for the understanding of racial tension. It can be seen as being an explanation on a different level - a more holistic one than the others - and a more comprehensive one potentially. It is also the only one that is part of a Weltanschauung that makes explicit its partiality by denouncing the social structure. In this sense it is as partial as the others.

\*This characterisation applies specifically to writers whose definition of race as an outgroup is offered as the most important variable for understanding race relations.

PART III

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE RELATIONS.

Sociological theories of race relations involve the kinds of conceptual differences outlined in the last section. The application of theoretical frameworks to race, as in many other fields, is unsystematic and unsatisfactory. This is articulated by Van den Berghe in the following way:

"The field of race relations has been generally characterised by a high degree of emphasis on practical policy applications, a low degree of theoretical integration into the rest of sociology and a high degree of analytical isolation of race from its general social context." (71)

A sociology of race relations does not in fact exist in any coherent form. What does exist is a dominance, certainly institutionally and historically, of the functionalist view of society where the race problem is defined as one of integration and assimilation into the mainstream of a consensus based society. The belief in racial integration as a solution to the American racial problem has been very prevalent within sociology. R. E. Parks extremely influential theory of the 'race relations cycle' in 1926 is a fore-runner of this:

"The race relations cycle which takes the form, to state it abstractly, of contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation is apparently progressive and irreversible." (72)

Warner and Srole also express a similar view-point in 1945:

"The future of American ethnic groups seems to be limited; it is likely that they will be quickly absorbed." (73)

However, despite this orientation, a systematic structural-functional analysis of racism in American society and the function this has in preserving the equilibrium of that society, does not exist. Rather, Gunnar Myrdal's view of racism as 'deviant' within a society which is normatively composed of the American Creed (74) is shared and hope/faith

is expressed that it will disappear given certain institutional changes in the society. Myrdal's emphasis on beliefs and attitudes as at the core of the racial problem (which Blumer calls the prejudice-discrimination axis (75)) has probably been the main theoretical perspective of the American approach to race and has contributed to the lack of focus on social-structural factors. This is the orientation of what has been called at various times mainstream sociology, academic sociology or bourgeois sociology (76).

An antithesis to the mainstream orientation within sociology has been sought in what has been called conflict theory, radical sociology or Marxist sociology. But this antithesis remains problematic. This is partly because the nature of radicalism is itself an issue. For some it means maintaining a critical perspective on the discipline. The 'demythologising' of sociology is taking place in perspectives that are very different, e.g. ethnomethodology and structuralism, both of which lack explicit political orientations. For others it means holding an explicit political position which is opposed to capitalism and its consequences. Thus what is called 'radical sociology' includes a large variety of perspectives as related to each other as to what may be called mainstream sociology, from symbolic interactionism to non-Marxist conflict theory. The term 'Marxist sociology' may be a better description. But as Birnbaum states (77); this term is a shorthand and that:

"the systems of thought at issue are complex and varied, that the two types of sociology interpenetrate and that there are serious conflicts and great differences within each group as well as between them."

The difference between mainstream/academic and radical/Marxist sociology is expressed by Horowitz (78):

"Because academic sociology is subservient to power it doesn't mean that it has nothing to contribute, analytically, towards the understanding of social process. From a generalising concern with social behaviour and organisation, there flows a considerable amount of insight into elements that social orders have in common - into the management and maintenance of social structures. But there is no insight into specific features of capitalist social structure and the determining effect of these features on social priorities and on the configuration of power, politics and social conflict that dominate contemporary historical development. For this kind of insight it is necessary to build the analysis on the historically conditioned class relations that arise from the effort to maintain and expand the material infrastructure of the social order, i.e. the theoretical vantage point first established by Marx."

However, this illustrates the problem of talking about a Marxist sociology. Although what is sociology would require lengthy exploration, historically and traditionally sociology has been seen as a distinct intellectual perspective with an emphasis on the 'social' roots of human behaviour. If what is meant by the term then is a discipline which can be formally separated from economics and other social sciences then there is no 'Marxist sociology'. But in the sense that the Marxist orientation concerns itself with social structures, social class and the dynamics of society, it is sociological. Shaw (79) makes this point and also argues that certainly conflict theory cannot be seen to be an alternative orientation to mainstream sociology:

"Conflict theory as an oppositional trend in sociology seems to consist of assertions that there is conflict in society rather than a serious explanation which is part of a coherent theory." (80)

and regrets the way in which:

"Marx's ideas are converted into abstractions independent of capitalism and of Marxism which can be married to other equally independent abstractions." (81)

The conservative tradition of mainstream sociology has been illustrated recently by Nisbet's 'The Sociological Tradition' (82), himself as Horowitz says a conservative sociologist whose definition of sociology in 'The Social Bond' "as the study of human beings as stuck together in social relationships in 'which we actually find them' is clearly ideology." (83)

Nisbet points to the "close relation between the principal tenets of philosophical conservatism and the unit ideas of sociology" (84). The founding fathers of sociology are, on the whole, depicted as conservative in attitude if not in politics. Comte and Spencer are readily apparent as such but Durkheim, although politically liberal is said to have converted the ideas of French Conservatism into "some of the essential theories of systematic sociology, the collective conscience and the functional character of institutions and ideas" (85). And although Weber and Simmel dissociated themselves from the political and economic conservatives "there is conservatism of concept and of symbol as well as conservatism of attitude" in their work (86).

But M. Nicolaus at the 1968 American Sociological Convention puts most succinctly the possible nature of mainstream sociology:

Sociology is not now and never has been any kind of objective seeking-out of social truth or reality. Historically, the profession is an outgrowth of 19th century European traditionalism and conservatism wedded to 20th century American corporation liberalism. (87)

How far is this categorisation of mainstream sociology as legitimising the status quo applicable to the contemporary sociological study of race, and what are its ideological characteristics in this specific area? At the risk of oversimplifying the wide variety of approaches subsumed under the headings of mainstream and Marxist sociology an attempt will be made to look at a few theories within each, to try to answer this question as well as the concomitant one of the elements within the Marxist orientation to race that ideologically denounce the status quo. The shorthand term 'mainstream sociology' refers to that which works within what has been termed the 'Conservative tradition' even though its liberalism

may be apparent. Marxist sociology refers to that approach with explicit political orientations against capitalist society.

I. Mainstream Sociology.

(a) Pluralist analysis:

The two studies selected here both use the ethnic group analogy of race. These are Glazer and Moynihan's "Beyond the Melting Pot" (88), and Milton Gordon's "Assimilation in American Life" (89).

Glazer and Moynihan argue for the existence of cultural pluralism in America. This refers to the existence of several groups with their own cultural formations. Cultural pluralism according to Gordon, is the result of strong religious communities with primarily ethnic boundaries and entails the growth, for example, of a separate Jewish and Catholic ethic. No social pluralism is posited as all groups are seen to participate in the institutions of American society. The Negro differs from other ethnic groups because he is an American and nothing else - he has no distinct values or culture to protect. Thus he is culturally assimilated and on his way to full assimilation (social).

For Glazer and Moynihan, the ethnic group is not a mere carry-over from traditional peasant culture but is a 'new social form' which is a relatively permanent product of interaction between such cultures and urban America. Since the Negro has no specific culture of his own some differences between his position and that of other ethnic groups are recognised.

M. Gordon distinguishes between cultural assimilation (acculturation) and structural assimilation and argues that although minorities have been rapidly culturally assimilated, their assimilation into the institutions of the 'core culture' at the level of primary participation is limited and will remain so for the immediate future. Gordon recognises the inter-relationships between class and ethnicity:

"... each ethnic group may be thought of as being divided into sub-groups on the basis of social class and that theoretically each ethnic group might conceivably have the whole spectrum of classes within it although in practice some ethnic groups will be found to contain only a partial distribution of social class sub-groups." (90)

Gordon goes on to talk about the ethclass as

"The subsociety created by the intersection of the vertical stratifications of ethnicity with the horizontal stratification of social class." (91)

The Negro is included in this type of analysis.

Turner's concept of the melting pot is the direct predecessor of both Glazer and Moynihan's work and that of Gordon. The assumption was that all cultures were blending together to form a new American ethos. Herberg (92), however, argued that cultural divisions were becoming increasingly religious ones. This thesis has been very influential in American ethnic study. For example, Gordon states:

"... A persons ethclass might be upper-middle class white Protestant or lower-middle class white Irish Catholic, or upper-lower class Negro Protestant and so on." (93).

The inevitable assimilation and integration posited by Turner is found especially in the work of Parks (94), and Warner and Srole (95). The fundamental difference between that and the more recent work by Gordon and Glazer & Moynihan is that the thoroughness of ethnic assimilation in American life is less pronounced. Also recognised, in terms of the melting pot thesis, is that American WASP culture is of paramount importance in the development of ethnic minority groups. However, the implications of the existence of strong ethnic groups for the possibility of racial integration is not systematically analysed by these writers (see N. Glazer 'Negroes and Jews: A New Challenge to Pluralism' - Commentary 38, December, 1964, 29-34).

There are some ideological aspects in this type of analysis of race relations. The full explication of these and their relationship to the total Weltanschauung would require a detailed analysis. Some have already been briefly discussed

by John Horton (AJS 65-66 P709). Tentative suggestions only will be made here.

Firstly, the type of pluralism discussed by both Glazer and Moynihan and Gordon is different from the one identified by for example Funivall(96). He posits as John Rex points out a 'single political unit' "thus recognising coercive ties and a division of labour on racial lines; recognising utilitarian and economic bonds" (97). The conception of pluralism that Gordon and Glazer & Moynihan have is not a conflict one but a consensual one as J. Horton points out (98). For this type of mainstream sociology analysis American society, however plural, has a common social-normative order. Van den Berghe uses the term 'Democratic Pluralism' to identify this type of orientation and states:

"Two assumptions underlie the concept of democratic pluralism, those of equilibrium and consensus about ultimate values" (99).

One of the important questions raised by this approach, then is the sense in which a consensus based society can tolerate separate cultural entities. As it may seem a contradiction in terms to discuss ethnic groups within both the plural and consensual framework, Gordon sees them as separate but assimilated social structures:

"Structural assimilation then turned out to be the rock on which the ship of Angloconformity foundered . . . To understand then that acculturation without massive structural intermingling at primary group levels has been the dominant motif in the American experience of creating and developing a nation of diverse peoples is to comprehend the most essential sociological fact of that experience." (100)

It is interesting to note that structural pluralism does not refer here to differential participation in social institutions but rather to differential social relationships. This springs from Gordon's definition of social structure as 'mans crystallised social relationships'. This very definition allows him to work within both the plural and consensual framework.

Secondly, the definition of 'cultural' pluralism used by Glazer and Moynihan ignores the role of the dominant value system and its relation to culture. The values of individualism, competition and hard work, for example, form some part of the value system of all the religious groups that Glazer and Moynihan call culturally pluralistic. On the other hand, the style of life in the black ghettos entails the formation of a strong opposing value system (of Keil (101), and Blauner (102)), and an emphasis on separate cultural growth. It may thus be seen as constituting a cultural shift away from mainstream America. Nonetheless, because of the 'order' framework Glazer & Moynihan and Gordon work within (Horton (103)) they refer to religious groups with their ethnic history as culturally pluralistic, and the Negro as culturally assimilated.

Thirdly, both Gordon and Glazer & Moynihan see the Negro in the way that Irving Kristol entitles a paper in the New York Times Magazine of September 11th, 1960, 'The Negro today is like the Immigrant tomorrow'. They fail to take into account, in this way, possible crucial differences in American Negro history and the possibility that there are important structural factors limiting the Negro's integration.

Lastly, the idea of integration as desirable (even were it seen as difficult to attain) is itself imbued with valuations. Cleaver in 'The Land Question' (104) makes this point in the following way:

"As an ideological tenet integration embodies the dream of the mother country which sees America as a huge melting pot. It seeks to pull the black colonial subjects into America and citizenize them . . . Viewed on the international plane, integration represents an attempt by the white mother country to forestall the drive for national liberation by its colonial subjects."

(b) The underinstitutionalisation of the American Creed:

Gunnar Myrdal in 'The American Dilemma' defines that dilemma as the faulty internalisation of societal norms by white Americans. The problem is a moral one - the failure in American society between the egalitarian creed and a practice that discriminates against the Negro.

Myrdal conceptualises the Negro as an 'exaggerated American'. Accordingly, only in his reaction to exclusion from white society does the Negro develop any kind of separate cultural expressions - these are both American and negative. Even though the distinctive effects of slavery are recognised as are the effects of the post-Reconstruction Era in creating unique characteristics in the black community these are described as 'pathological'. For Myrdal this means that not only do whites have to rid themselves as prejudice but that negroes also have to shake themselves of their incapacity to assimilate within the American Dream. He posits a principle of cumulation which assumes that beliefs are prime movers for if we can improve Negro status the reason for derogatory beliefs about Negroes is to the extent of the improvement liquidated.

C. Silberman (105) states one objection to Myrdal's thesis:

"The tragedy of race relations in the U.S. is that there is no American Dilemma. White Americans are not torn and tortured by the conflict between devotion to the American Creed and their actual behaviour. They are upset by the current state of race relations to be sure, but what troubles them is not that justice is being denied but that their peace is being shattered and their business interrupted."

The dilemma that Myrdal discusses places emphasis on individual irrationalism and argues that peoples intentions are good but they 'cann't help themselves' because of a vicious circle in American race relations. Negro practice supports prejudicial beliefs and these in turn react on the practice. Myrdal states:

"Behind all outward dissimilarities, behind their contradictory valuations, rationalisations, vested interests, group allegiances and animosities, behind fears and defence constructions, behind the role they play in life and the mask they wear, people are all much alike on a fundamental level. And they are all good people. They want to be rational and just. They all plead to their conscience that they meant well even when things went wrong." (106)

Myrdal's stress on individual failings certainly contains the ideological tenet of seeing the 'social whole' as essentially benevolent in the same way as people too are. The fundamental fault is however "that our structures of organisations are too imperfect, each by itself and badly integrated into a social whole" (107).

Myrdal thus has contributed greatly, as an influential theorist, to the lack of emphasis on social-structural factors in the study of race relations. He himself ignores the possibility as Jordan (108) states that the Negro may have been necessary as a buttress to the social mobility of other ethnic groups, and that the American Dream was built through his exclusion.

One of the important assumptions of Myrdal is that the Negro as an 'exaggerated American' shares with whites a common normative and cultural framework. One feature, as has been pointed out by Blauner (109), is ignored - a dislike, admittedly ambiguous, of the 'man' and the institutions of white society. Blauner, in fact points out the weakness of the argument against a distinct cultural heritage which is explicit in Myrdal's work. This is the failure to take into account the method by which people are physically incorporated or excluded from society. The Negroes colonial heritage may thus be important in separating out his cultural life. Some Negro community studies in fact indicate the possible existence of a distinct culture. Keil (110) finds the core of this to be the 'soul ideology' which he suggests is related to the 'wisdom through suffering theme'.

The developmental aspect of black culture is worth noting. The 'exaggerated American' school have an ideological interest in assuming that the Negro is assimilating to American life in an ever more comprehensive way as barriers fall. What may also happen is a concomitant assertion of Negro social norms as a reaction to the operation of major dominant norms - the development of a contraculture for blacks and 'radical' whites.

The pluralist analysis of Gordon and Glazer & Moynihan, and the normative analysis of Myrdal define the solution to racial harmony as that of assimilation and integration into the existing structure of American society. As Metzger notes this involves a benign view of American society, an "underpinning of liberal optimism and a faith in the inevitable triumph of reason - there is no analysis of the structural pre-requisites of racial change because these are thought to spring from society naturally." (111). The credibility of this type of 'consensus' model of race relations may have been seriously put to the test by the growth of black militancy in the 1960's.

This type of orientation (mainstream sociology) quite clearly shows certain contradictions. This is because clues exist from race relations studies of an empirical kind which show that although race prejudice is reduced with contact in specific situations (e.g. housing or work) this is non-generalisable to other social situations. The altering of social attitudes is also minimally affected by laws prohibiting discrimination in public places - in employment etc. Kardiner and Ovesey in 'The Mark of Oppression' (112) show that strivings by black people for white status ended, in fact, neither in integration nor the dissolution of prejudice.

The above discussion I think illustrates to some extent the way in which a Weltanschauung that legitimises the existing social structure expresses itself in the 'mainstream sociology' approach to race relations.

## II. Marxist sociology.

I think that it is possible to extricate two distinct strands in the Marxist approach to race relations:

- (a) Race is seen as a particular manifestation of social stratification. Racism constitutes part of the ideology of the dominant social class imposing itself on society as a whole. This ideology will be replaced with the revolutionary overthrow of society into one that truly reflects reality rather than distorting it.

Racial tension can only be overcome by the overthrow of capitalism. Race relations are defined in terms of class relations. Perhaps it is possible to describe this approach as the 'traditional Marxist' approach at the risk of over-simplification. The major proponent of this orientation is Oliver Cox (113).

- (b) The dynamic of colour symbolism is superimposed on an essentially class situation. This view allows a degree of autonomy to racist ideology. This again, as simplification, may be referred to as a neo-Marxist approach springing from, e.g. Gramsci and Lukacs (114).

The analytical difference between this and the 'traditional' approach will be made clearer in the following discussions.

In the race field, black writers like Fanon (115), Carmichael (116) and Cleaver (117) utilise this orientation. Robert Blauner (118), accepts the Marxist orientation but argues against a strictly class explanation of race. He discusses the "colonised" status of the Negro in America. It is this last work that will be looked at under the heading on the Neo-Marxist approach.

(a) The Traditional Marxist Approach.

According to Cox, race relations are labour-profit relations or political-class relations. Racism is part of bourgeois ideology and has the function of rationalising the exploitation of non-white people during the imperialistic phase of capitalism. It is also an important capitalist device for dividing the working class into 'opposing camps'. However, although both race relations and the struggle of the white proletariat with the bourgeoisie are part of a single social phenomenon, race relations have a significant variation, Cox argues. The tendency here is for the bourgeoisie to proletarianise a whole people - that is the whole people is looked upon as a class - whereas white proletarianisation only involves a section of the white people. This significant variation means that race is marked by visibility and physical distinguishability

as a class. Physical differences are present but are not explanations of racism or race relations - these must be sought within the processes of capitalist society.

One criticism of Cox is that he may be seen to offer a 'vulgarised' version of Marxist theory by making racism simply an epiphenomenon of the system of production. His emphasis on the 'historical' roots of racism within imperialist forms of domination means that it is very difficult to apply his theory to contemporary race relations in their various ramifications.

It is saying the obvious to indicate that the ideological aspects of his theory involve an explicit denunciation of the structures of capitalist society. The political standpoint is certainly explicit. The solution to the race problem is defined in terms of the revolutionary overthrow of society, but this does not mean that his theory is more ideological than those found within 'mainstream sociology'- ideology is more immediately apparent.\*

What must be stressed is that this type of orientation is more concerned with discovering the 'social economic roots' of racism than the ones mentioned earlier. It alone emphasises social structural factors. It is also the only attempt to understand race relations within a systematic theory of society.

(b) A Neo-Marxist Approach - Internal Colonialism.

Robert Blauner in 'Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt' defines the black group in America as an internally colonised people. Class theory, he argues cannot fully explain racism because (a) black people as an underclass are specially exploited and economically dispensable in an automating society and

\*It is not the concern here to depict the 'total' Weltanschauung of this orientation in terms of an analysis of the existential factors responsible for its development, nor its relation with valuations towards other aspects of 'human experience'.

(b) racism is, in part, an autonomous variable in white-black relations. These relations according to him are essentially those of coloniser and colonised. What has thus been offered by Cox as a historical explanation of race relations is 'brought up to date'. The depiction of 'ideology' as relatively autonomous is also added.

Blauner does distinguish between the process of colonialism and colonialism as a social system, but he argues that their common features relate to the fact that classical colonialism of the imperialist era and American racism developed out of the same historical situation and reflected a common world and economic stratification. According to Blauner, the essential condition for both American slavery and European colonialism was the power domination and technological superiority of the Western world, in relation to the peoples of non-white and non-Western origins. This objective supremacy in technology and military power laid the basis for ideas of cultural superiority of the West, and racist ideologies were elaborated to justify the control and exploitation of non-whites. There are four components to the colonial situation according to Blauner which make the black ghetto in America an eternal colony.

1. Colonialisation begins with forced involuntary entry.
2. The colonising power carries out a policy which constrains, transforms or destroys indigenous values, orientations and ways of life.
3. There is an experience of being managed and manipulated by outsiders in terms of ethnic status.
4. Racism is the principle of social domination by which a group seen as inferior or different in terms of alleged biological characteristics is exploited, controlled and oppressed socially and psychically by a superordinate group.

There is certainly a great deal of use of the colonialism analogy within, especially, the writings of black revolutionaries, like Carmichael (119) and Cleaver (120). Carmichael and Hamilton

quote Kenneth Clark in their book on Black Power where they themselves use the internal colonialism thesis:

"The dark ghettos are social, political, educational and above all economic colonies. Their inhabitants are subject peoples victims of the greed, insensitivity, guilt and fear of their masters." (121)

Eldridge Cleaver (112) also states:

"Black people are a stolen people held in a colonial status on stolen land and any analysis which does not acknowledge the colonial status of black people cannot hope to deal with the real problem."

For Blauner, the 'problem' is one of colonialism today by white America. Solutions are seen mainly in revolutionary struggle by black people for 'national autonomy' - some form of liberation struggle. Before this can be achieved, however, an initial stage of separatism from the institutions of white society is needed. This separatism has the role of raising black self-esteem and creating a positive black identity. Only when psychological and ideological transformation has taken place can black and white workers unite to destroy the capitalist system that exploits them both in different ways.

Again, like the traditional Marxist approach, the ideology contained within this theory is explicitly condemnatory of the social and economic structure of America as a capitalist society. More autonomy is given to racist ideology as more stress is placed on the importance of separate black revolutionary activity. There exists within Blauner's approach a greater explicit identification with the black 'subjective' stage - with black consciousness and black culture\*. Politically this approach accepts black nationalist movements whether they are seen as only tactical movements or as fundamentally concerned with the separation issue.

\*Despite the fact that Cox himself is a Negro writer.

(c) Mainstream and Marxist Sociology of Race Relations - their respective ideologies.

Certainly, an analysis of the respective approaches to race indicates that mainstream sociology functions partly as a legitimising mechanism for the existing nature of American society through its stress on norms, values and individual processes, and its acceptance of both the possibility and the desirability of integration within the existing social and economic structure. Its fundamental lack of concern with social structural analysis also justifies its depiction as 'mainstream' in the sense that we defined this term earlier.

At the same time it is apparent that the Marxist analysis of race, by concerning itself with structure rather than culture and failing to envisage a solution to the 'Negro' problem within existing society, quite explicitly denounces that society.

Does the existence of a Weltanschauung within sociological theory, which either legitimises or denounces the status quo mean that its contributions to race are distorted contributions and involve the falsification of reality? If analysis is partial does this negate explanation? This is the fundamental question which has concerned and will concern philosophers, sociologists and human beings for many years. It is the question of 'valid knowledge'.

The concluding chapter discusses briefly some possible re-interpretations of the age-old question of ideology versus validity.

PART IV

CONCLUSIONS.

In the last chapter, sociology, both mainstream and Marxist, has been characterised as containing a partiality which springs from a particular Weltanschauung. This characterisation is certainly not a new one: already cited have been some critiques of sociology from the same standpoint, both by Mainstream and Marxist sociologists. There have been attempts by some sociologists, however, to answer these critiques. Gouldner (123) offers a self-awareness directive (reflexivity) which will make the sociologist more explicit concerning his ideological framework. This is however a weak response to the kind of characterisation of Weltanschauung as totally taken-for granted and insurmountable, that has been offered by Mannheim. Why this is so is not the concern here and in any case would require a thoroughly detailed and knowledgeable philosophical discussion beyond the concern of this paper.

Sociology as a discipline has been defended explicitly or implicitly in various ways. One of the implicit ways is that sociologists are now bringing their analytical framework to bear on 'radical activists' within the profession, i.e. Marxists. Some would encompass them into a general analysis of student activism with psychologistic explanations like Feuer in 'The Conflict of Generations' (124). Others like Gamson (125) offer certain conditions and factors which might be connected with 'radicalism', e.g. "outside forces in the society and longer term more internal factors" within sociology and its new recruits. Not all by any means of these analysts are hostile to Marxism and Marxists. But the result seems to be a way of 'explaining away' some part at least of radical consciousness as deviant psychologically or perhaps as the latest velleitous trend in the profession.

A more explicit defense of 'mainstream sociology' against the attacks of 'conservatism' is provided by Glazer in an article entitled 'The Ideological Uses of Sociology' (126). He argues here that the sociologist generally comes from 'marginal' groups in the society (relatively unattached to social class interests - reminiscent of Mannheim's intelligentsia) and that sociology itself has a debunking modern character although this is perceived differently by those who have a stake in preserving the existing social order (expressed in 'a fear of sociology'), and those with a stake in changing it.

Within the sociology of knowledge Norbert Elias has argued that sociology possibly has greater potential for 'object-adequacy' than philosophy:

"The greater potential object-adequacy of a sociological theory of knowledge compared with a philosophical theory of knowledge is essentially due to the different symbolic representations of the subject of knowledge characteristic of the two types of theories. In the one case the subject is what we symbolically represent as 'society', or to make its dynamic character more visible, the continuous stream of configurations which human beings form with each other. In the other case, in that of philosophical theories of knowledge the subject of knowledge is what we symbolically represent as 'individual' . . . Sociological theories have the edge on them; their potential object-adequacy is greater." (127)

The problematic nature of this proposal is considerable for until there is a conception of what the 'object' actually is and criteria for adequacy it is difficult to discuss relative object-adequacies. Elias goes on to say:

"In scientific, though not in moral matters, the concept of 'truth' is an anachronism: criteria of advance, though not yet highly conceptualised are widely used in the practice of science." (128)

The question, then, is not whether an approach discovers 'ultimate and final truth', but that it is "an advance in relation to the existing fund of knowledge" (129).

Elias does not however clearly present what the criteria for judging 'advance' are. What Elias does indicate, is the inadequacy of the dichotomy between 'truth' and 'falsehood': 'objective' and 'subjective'; 'ideology' and 'science'. The conceptualisation of such a dichotomy has already been described by Mannheim in the following way as springing from:

". . . an intellectualist conception of science using a universal validity criterion for knowledge and the repudiation of qualitative knowledge with an emphasis on consciousness as such." (130)

This intellectualist conception of science, underlying positivism, according to Mannheim:

"Is itself rooted in a definite Weltanschauung and has progressed in close connection with definite political interests." (131)

Norbert Elias makes the following point on the relationship between objective and subjective which have often been seen as antithetical:

". . . even a scientific statement which appears to be 'objective' or 'true' is also 'subjective', namely a statement about objects as they appear to the subject." (132)

Scientific knowledge itself is not the absolute that it has been conceived in the past:

"The autonomy of knowledge in relation to knowers, though never absolute, can be smaller or greater." (133)

Elias goes on to say:

"Anyone who tries to defend the view that science is value-free, or who is merely understood to defend it, is easily driven into a corner - it is not difficult to demonstrate that scientists make value-judgments." (134)

But the ongoing relationship between object and subject doesn't imply that there is no difference between truth and error - the problem is that these have been conceived in the past in their absolute sense. The question of validity has been the systematic concern, in fact, of philosophical epistemology. It seems, however, that the search for a universal validity criterion is itself a result of the dichotomisation of object and subject.

The liberal trend of accepting the ideological nature of some part of sociological theory has been unable to offer a 'solution' - self-reflexivity and its variants, e.g. Mills and Gouldner, are not enough. Thus it may be necessary to reformulate the problem of 'ideology'. Ideology has been conceived, on the whole, as distorting and opposed to valid knowledge. It may be fruitful, however, to take a relatively neglected earlier phase of the sociology of knowledge during which the notion of ideology was as yet less burdened with the accumulated unsolved controversies it has today. I am thinking of certain suggestions of Mannheim in which it was seen that ideology defined as perspective or Weltanschauung may be a way of 'discovering' knowledge that would otherwise remain hidden. There are various formulations to be found in Ideology and Utopia. One reference is the following:

"What was not noticed was that the world of the purely quantifiable and analysable was itself only discoverable on the basis of a definite Weltanschauung. Similarly, it was not noticed that a Weltanschauung is not of necessity a source of error, but often gives access to spheres of knowledge otherwise closed." (135)

and later, Mannheim states:

"We cannot emphasise too much that the social equation does not always constitute a source of error but more frequently than not brings into view certain inter-relations which would otherwise not be apparent." (136)

Mannheim gives an example of what he means by the knowledge discovery potential of ideology:

"Even though the one-sidedness of historical conservatism consisted in the exaggeration of the significance of the irrational elements in the mind and of the irrational social forces corresponding to it, it did nevertheless bring out an important point which could not have been perceived from another standpoint . . . Bourgeois democratic thought both discovered and developed the possibility of a rational means of carrying on the conflict of interests in society which will retain its reality and function in modern life as long as peaceful methods of class conflict are possible." (137)

Mannheim's empirical study 'Conservative Thought' shows not only its emergence as a reaction by specific groups in France and Germany to the revolutionary movement after the French Revolution, but looks at the specific contributions of that system of thought. What Mannheim thus means is that certain aspects of the world can only be discovered by partial view-points, by ideologies. These discoveries cannot be interpreted as having absolute validity, but rather as constituting part of the fund of knowledge of the society - advancing knowledge by making it more comprehensive. And Marxism, according to him, constitutes a more extensive, comprehensive view:

"To Marxism belongs the credit for discovering that politics does not consist merely in parliamentary parties and the discussions they carry on and that these in whatever concrete form they appear are only surface expressions of deeply-lying economic and social situations which can be made intelligible to a large extent through a new mode of thought. These discoveries signalling the raising of the discussion to a higher level from which a more extensive and more inclusive view of history and a clearer conception of what actually constitutes the domain of politics can be ascertained." (138)

Thus, in certain specific historical concerns, some ideologies may have greater potential than others in the sense of constituting a more inclusive view of the social situation. But this would be very difficult to actually depict. On the other hand it may be less difficult to indicate that some ideologies have greater potential in specific situations because they stress certain crucial features (empirically deducible) of that situation. Thus liberal-bourgeois ideology, as Mannheim says, discovered ways of containing conflicts in society under specific historical conditions. Horowitz argues that mainstream sociology as part of an ideology has provided insights on "elements that social orders have in common - into the management and maintenance of social systems generally". Marxist ideology provides us with insights on the nature of capitalist

society-where social conflict and power "dominate contemporary historical development" (139).

But is it only as a one-sided emphasis that Marxism contributes to knowledge of capitalist society? Only in its stress on conflict, power, structure and alienation which must be synthesised with mainstream sociology's concern with norms interaction consensus and socialisation processes? Some Marxists would argue, like Colletti (140) that Marxism is more than one-sided, it is both ideology and science. Colletti has a rather circular argument which he doesn't clearly elaborate. Firstly, he posits the antithesis between Marxism as a science and Marxism as a revolution. He defines the scientific nature of Marxism in strictly classico-positivistic terms:

Marxism is a theory of the "laws of development of human society."

Marxism essentially consists of the "discovery of objective causal relationships." (141)

He then explains how this scientific nature of Marxism is integrally bound up with revolution or the necessity to "straighten capitalist reality". It is not that capitalist ideology is false or inadequate in explaining a given reality, it is the reality that is distorted; an inverted reality. As an example, he shows how capitalism inverts reality through its practice of depicting labour a part of capital rather than the whole (as its initiator and recreator).

Another example of inversion is provided for instance by Picconi (142):

"The original producing subject is reduced to the level of an object to be bought and sold in the labour market like any other commodity, while the object that he originally produced, in becoming capital, has become the abstract subject - capital functions as if it were a subject alienating both worker and capitalist."

These are two instances of the actual inversion that capitalism produces. Colletti himself only uses the first example. According to him, because Marxism discovers this inversion, Marxism is both an ideology and a science. For him the two sides of Marxism co-exist in some undefined way. It may be possible, however, using Mannheim's notion of the 'discovery potential' of ideology to argue that Marxism produces the above insights on capitalist society because it is an opposing ideology to capitalist/bourgeois ideology; it is the world view of the working classes reflecting their interests.

In order to demonstrate that Marxism as an ideology is an advance on other orientations in understanding reality, there exist certain possibilities - all however raising fundamental epistemological questions:

- (a) Marxism although the vantage point of the working class is potentially universalistic, for capitalism distorts man's 'ideal-essence' - it alienates both worker and capitalist.
- (b) Marxism has greater synthesis potential than other orientations (this constitutes Mannheims point of its more inclusive view of history) - Marxism synthesised the insights of the liberal-bourgeois tendency and a Hegelian historicism which was conservative in tendency, into a revolutionary theory of society.
- (c) Marxism constitutes a dialectical advancement over other orientations in transcending them through encompassing them and offering a theory which is able to explain them within it.

The fundamental questions raised by these above possibilities are to a large extent philosophically insurmountable - these have been mentioned only in order to juxtapose them with certain suggestions of a more modest and more limited kind. A more limited validity and that a relative one to other orientations may be sought in Marxisms special contribution to race relations analysis within capitalist forms of production.

The contributions of Marxism to understanding some of the inversions of capitalist society are found in the example offered by Colletti on labour/capital and that offered by Picconi on

subject/object. These insights spring from Marxism's ability, as an opposing ideology, to recognise the *raison-d'etre* of capitalism - or its rationality - capital growth. It is this rationality of capitalism (its logic) that allows the dehumanisation of worker into commodity, of subject into object, of labour into capital. This particular insight into capitalism encompasses an understanding of some of the fundamental empirical characteristics of race relations. There is in fact very little conflict in sociology concerning these characteristics. For example, all the theoretical approaches to race that have been looked at in the last section accept race relations as constituting differential access (for whatever reason) to the 'reward system' of the society. Empirical studies show the Negro in America to be on the whole, part of the lower echelons of the working class. There is also no lack of consensus on the existence in America of a system of ideas which can be defined as prejudice or racism (whether this system of ideas is conceived as created by individual or institutional or structural processes). Also apparent is the fact that race relations are increasingly becoming conflict relations. This presentation of the empirical characteristics of race relations does not imply that the nature of facts is not a considerable problem. The point made here is that there is very little controversy on these particular facts within the sociological study of race.

Marxism can certainly encompass the empirical characteristics of race relations into an integrated theory of society. The inequality, conflict and racism which are constituents of American race relations are, however, neglected in the theoretical framework of mainstream sociology with its stress on consensus, culture, norms and individual human processes. Marxism can encompass these last, also, into its theory, in terms of the dialectic and may possibly constitute a more "total" approach than Mainstream Sociology. But this last certainly cannot be ascertained within the limits of this paper. It is a suggestion only. Moreover the "appeal to facts" made here is itself imbued with epistemological problematics - it derives from an empiricist/pragmatist view of validity.

The empiricist pragmatist quest for validity has certainly many controversies unsolved. But cautiously offered as merely an exploratory gesture it could provide some suggestions for further discussion. The following are only a few of many formulations of possible analyses to answer the question of Marxism's greater (or lesser) empirical fruitfulness in the race relations field:

- (a) How many of the concepts of Marxism have been encompassed (separated from the total framework of Marxist thought) into the mainstream sociology tradition of race relations, e.g. conflict, power, domination, class, etc.
- (b) How adequate or inadequate are the social programmatics of mainstream sociology in realising their aims in practice? Have the legal, administrative educational solutions offered 'worked' in the race field? If not why not?
- (c) Can Marxism explain and encompass developments in race relations more or less consistently than mainstream sociology?

These are only a few of the possible 'operationalisations' of the idea. It is apparent that they all work with certain assumptions concerning the validity of analyses on these lines. Not only do the above suggestions reflect an empiricism which already has been referred to as a problematic orientation towards validity, but the result of such analyses may depend in some part on the Weltanschauung of the social scientist. Given this it may be well to state my own Weltanschauung at least in keeping with Mill's and Gouldner's self-awareness directive. Already this Weltanschauung is probably apparent; it involves a rejection of mainstream sociology and an acceptance in large part of the Marxist orientation. However, this does not mean that mainstream sociology is seen as not providing insights, but they are insights into ways of controlling and containing human potentialities rather than advancing them.

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