The Anglican Church in Egypt

1936-1956

and its relationship with

British Imperialism

A study by

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Synopsis

This work is a case study in the history of mission and imperialism. It takes as its subject the Anglican Church in Egypt during the years 1936 to 1956. It explores the political context in which the Anglican Church in Egypt grew up and its development in response to that context. The Church had both an expatriate and an Egyptian side to it. This study examines both parts of the church and the extent to which they coalesced or failed to do so. It will examine the lives of key people and institutions and the part that they played in a small church at a momentous time in history.

Dedicated to

The Right Revd Dr Mouneer Hanna Anis

Bishop of Egypt and North Africa

and in memory of

The Revd Jesse Hillman

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Contents

Abbreviations

CMS	The Church Missionary Society, now the Church Mission Society
LE	Livre Egyptien (Egyptian Pounds)
SPCK	Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge

Glossary

Corvee	Localised conscription
Fellaheen	Rural peasantry
Wafd	Literally, delegation
Wakeel	Representative

List of Illustrations

Introduction

> We moralise among ruins: it is always when the game is played that we discover the cause of the result. It is a fashion intensely European, the habit of an organisation that, having little imagination, takes refuge in reason, and carefully locks the door when the steed is stolen. A community has crumbled to pieces, and it is always accounted for by its political forms, or its religious modes. There has been a deficiency in what is called checks in the machinery of government; the definition of the suffrage has not been correct; what is styled responsibility has, by some means or other, not answered; or on the other hand, people have believed too much or too little in a future state, have been too much engrossed by the present, or too much absorbed in that which is to come.[1]

The analysis of decline and failure may be an intensely European fashion but it is especially popular in post-colonial Britain. From the decline of its manufacturing industry to its success (or lack of it) in the World Cup, Britain is particularly fascinated by its own loss of status in the world.

Egypt was never formally annexed by Great Britain, and was therefore never coloured pink on maps of the world. It was, however, subject to British imperialism and was part of Great Britain's much larger "informal empire."[2] The decline of British control

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[1] Disraeli, B., Tancred. London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1882, p379.

[2] In this study we shall take as a definition of imperialism: "a policy of acquiring dependent territories or extending a country's influence through trade, diplomacy etc." (Oxford English Dictionary). In "The Imperialism of Free Trade", Economic History Review Second Series VI, 1953, Gallagher, J., and Robinson, R.E., gave prominence to the distinction between the formal empire of legal control and the informal empire of influence. As we shall see, Egypt was subject to varying degrees of this sort of

over Egypt, which culminated in the Suez Crisis in 1956, a critical moment in the loss of British influence abroad, has a significant place in our understanding of the decline of British influence worldwide.

Since before the time of the Emperor Constantine, imperialism and Christian mission have always been closely entwined. As nations expanded their empires they often took with them their religions. As their empires declined, their religions either declined too, or were left behind. The story of British involvement in Egypt is no exception to this. When the British went to Egypt they took with them their particular brands of Christianity. These included Presbyterianism, and, for the purposes of this study, the Anglican Church. When the tide of British imperialism went out and Britain's political role in Egypt ended, some vestiges of the Anglican Church were left behind. The changing fortunes of the Anglican Church, amidst the fluctuating currents of British policy in Egypt, are the central concern of this study.

The decline and fall of Britain's control over Egypt has been a common subject for political historians. None has yet however, analysed its impact on the Anglican Church in Egypt. The "secular bias of the western academy" has meant that mission has been seen as marginal to mainstream imperial history and has tended to be treated separately.[3] There are two studies covering the Anglican Church in Egypt during the period 1936-1956 which have been written. They are: Arthur Burrell's Cathedral on the Nile[4] and Brian de Saram's Nile Harvest: The Anglican Church in Egypt and the

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control. Though this study may lend some support to Marxist theories of imperialism which highlight economic motives, it will also show that Great Britain's involvement in Egypt was also motivated by strategic concerns.

[3] Cox, J., Imperial Fault Lines Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p 8.

[4] Burrell, A., Cathedral on the Nile. Oxford: The Amate Press Ltd, 1984.

Sudan.[5] Both were written by clergy who had worked within the Anglican Church in Egypt. Though full of first-hand experiences and insights they reflect the authors' deep personal involvement with their subjects and are not unnaturally inclined to preserve the reputations of former colleagues. Both histories are concerned to recall past events before those who remember them pass away. Both begin with the Anglican Church in Egypt as their starting point rather than trying to set it within its political context and examining the impact of that context on its mission. Like all histories, they are products of their time:

> Historians write for their own generation addressing its questions and concerns about the past. For historians the commonplace that "each generation must rewrite the history of its predecessors" is the simple truth.[6]

This study will try to rewrite the history of its predecessors by trying to set the church in its political context and by adopting a more critical approach, unencumbered by personal loyalties to some of the characters involved. It will go further by using the experience of the Anglican Church in Egypt to look at the issue of church state relations and the impact of imperialism on mission more generally. Naturally, it is not intended to be the last word on the subject but part of an on-going discussion to which further generations will contribute.

This study arose out of a desire to tell the story of the Anglican (now the Episcopal) Church in Egypt during a crucial period in Anglo-Egyptian history. It is based on the

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[5] de Saram, B., Nile Harvest: The Anglican Church in Egypt and the Sudan Bournemouth: Bourne Press Ltd, 1992.
[6] Axtell, J., The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, p 12.

belief that politics rather than theology have had the most profound impact on the mission of the church. The origins of Britain's involvement with Egypt go back long before 1936 and will be examined as part of this study. Nevertheless, 1936 remains a significant date in the common history of the two countries. In that year, Egypt and Great Britain signed a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Egypt did so in the belief that the treaty placed the relationship between the two countries on a new and much more equal footing than had existed previously. For the first time, the treaty acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty. It also appeared to look forward to the day when British troops stationed in Egypt would finally leave its soil. Great Britain, on the other hand, signed the treaty believing that it would provide considerable continuity, allowing business to continue very much as usual. The Second World War which followed soon afterwards certainly meant that ideas of Egyptian independence were placed low on Great Britain's list of concerns. On the outbreak of war, the British Government activated clauses in the treaty which, if anything, reduced Egypt's independence from Britain. In the post-war period, Britain once again remained slow to respond to Egypt's renewed aspirations to autonomy. Eventually, in the Suez Crisis of 1956, Britain paid a heavy price for its failure to appreciate the new world order. Suez was a watershed, not just in its relationship with Egypt, but in its position as a world power.

Upon the tempestuous sea of events that took place within these twenty years, the small ship of the Anglican Church in Egypt was tossed about. Though the dates of this study were chosen because of their political significance, they were also profoundly important to the Diocese of Egypt. The foundation stone of the new All Saints' Cathedral was laid on 20th November, 1936, a few days before the Anglo-Egyptian

Treaty was ratified. In 1956, the last British diocesan Bishop of Egypt, the Right Revd Frank Johnston, was forced to leave the country, never to return.

The relationship between British political interests and the Anglican Church in Egypt is a complex one. Sometimes it appears to have been symbiotic, with both sides benefiting from their alliance in different ways. At other times their interests were opposed to each other. While Britons in Egypt were glad to be able to practise their faith and were quite prepared to use the Church as a symbol of their power, British political interests did not support initiatives that would upset the majority Islamic opinion. These included missions among Muslims. In fact, British policy in predominantly Islamic countries like Egypt often appeared to favour Islam at the expense of Christianity:

> Curiously enough, under the British empire, and as a direct result of British policy, Islam received infinitely more converts than the jihads had ever brought it.[7]

Despite this handicap, the Anglican Church in Egypt was often correctly perceived as supporting British interests, to the exclusion of those of Egypt, and this in a supposedly sovereign Egyptian state. Such perceptions cannot but have harmed the Church's mission among Egyptians. At the very least it was naïve of the Church to allow itself to be so often seen in this way.

[7] Walls, A. F., "The British: Missions in the Imperialistic Era, 1880-1920" in the International Bulletin of Missionary Research, (April, 1982), p 64.

This study arose out of an assumption that an indigenous Anglican Church had always been the objective of the Anglican Church in Egypt, and that the vision of the great CMS missionary, William Temple Gairdner, of the 1920's, had been consistently pursued throughout the period in question. This study began with the assumption that the Anglican Church had been the victim of political events beyond its control, and of the failure of Gairdner's successors to live up to the vision he had put forward. This project arose from a desire to tell the story of those turbulent years so that the small Egyptian Episcopal Church that exists today might have a better understanding of its past and might be better equipped to plot its future.

The truth about the Anglican Church in Egypt is, however, far more complex than this. An indigenous Anglican Church that was part of a world-wide Anglican Communion was no more the objective of the Anglican Church in Egypt during this period than a Commonwealth of independent nations was the aim of its predecessor, the British Empire. It happened, but it did so almost by accident. It was a way of making sense of a chequered series of events. Mission to develop an indigenous Anglican church in Egypt was never at the heart of Anglicanism in Egypt. It was never where the power lay. After Temple Gairdner, and even in Gairdner's time, it was not the overarching aim of the Diocesan hierarchy or even of the CMS missionaries in Egypt to create a permanent indigenous Anglican Church. This rather ambivalent approach was part of the reason why the Anglican Church in Egypt was slow to ordain Egyptian priests and why the first Egyptian bishop was not consecrated until 1974. The fact that an indigenous Anglican Church was the part of the Anglican Church in Egypt that survived should not blind us to the truth about what was being aimed for. In fact, there appears to be no single clear view of what that might be. Part

of this study has been to tease out some of the aims of the Anglican Church during the period in question.

When we look at the history of mission, we might wonder what the objectives of that mission might be. There has been a strong theme of service in Anglican mission in Egypt right up to the present day. The love of God was shown through the provision of health care and education in Anglican hospitals and schools. This was done without necessarily any expectation that those who benefited from it would convert from Islam to Christianity. This is not to say that the personal conversion of Muslims to Christianity never happened. It did occur during Gairdner's ministry when a few Muslims were converted and were baptised in the Anglican Church. These tended to be the exception, however, rather than the rule. Most Egyptians who subsequently joined the Anglican Church had previously been members of the Coptic or Presbyterian Churches. On the whole, membership of the Anglican Church has remained fairly static, confined to a small number of families in Cairo and northern Egypt.

For most people in Egypt, religious identity is much more about birth and family loyalty than individual conviction. It was, and is, a question of tribal identity. In Egypt as in the rest of the Middle East, relatively few people have dared to cross the boundaries of their birth. As D. McGavran has noted, when it comes to conversion from one faith to another:

> the great obstacles to conversion are social, not theological.[8]

The same could also be said of the expatriate Anglican community in Egypt. Theirs was the oldest and most powerful of the two cultural streams of Anglican history in Egypt. They saw the Church as the Church of England in Egypt. It was part of their tribal identity, a bit of the baggage of empire that travelled with them wherever they went. It was a club, like the Cairo Turf Club, from which members of other tribes were generally excluded. To have admitted Egyptians to such clubs would, they thought, only have created confusion. The young Penelope Lively, growing up in Cairo before the Second World War, was all too aware of the values of the British community at the time:

> There was English and there was other. To be English was to be among the chosen and saved; to be other was simply to be other.[9]

Penelope Lively's observation was as true for the Anglican Church as it was for any other area of life in Egypt. Such views among expatriate Anglicans had an enormous impact on the Anglican Church in Egypt and it seems that it was mainly because of their approach that the Anglican Church was so slow to indigenise. This made it poorly prepared to survive Suez and the withdrawal of all British personnel. The fact that it survived at all is something of a miracle. The expatriate Anglicans who had helped to create the Church must bear some responsibility for leaving it in so vulnerable a position.

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[8] McGavran, D., quoted in Conn, H.M., "Looking for a Method: Backgrounds and Suggestions" in Shenk, W.R., Exploring Church Growth. Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983, p79.

[9] Lively, P., Oleander, Jacaranda. London: Penguin Books, 1995, p17.

As the more powerful of the two groups, the English-speaking part of the Church left the most evidence of its views and activities. They are easily accessible, both in this country and in Egypt. This study has drawn on fieldwork in the Diocesan archives at All Saints' Cathedral in Zamalek, Cairo in the summer of 2001. It has also utilised CMS archives at the University of Birmingham, and the resources of Lambeth Palace, the Library of St Anthony's College Oxford, the Imperial War Museum, the National Archives at Kew, and the Library and Museum of Freemasonry in London. In addition, it has also benefited from an interview with the Revd Jesse Hillman, (d. November 2004) a retired CMS missionary, who played a significant role in Egypt during the Suez Crisis. A verbatim account of the interview can be found as an appendix to this work.

As Hall and Crichter have demonstrated in their work, Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State and Law and Order, those who control the production of information affect the conclusions derived from it.[10] The dominance of evidence from English speakers during the period in question skews the body of evidence in their favour. This study had set out to tell the story of the Egyptian Anglican Church but has been inhibited in this by a number of factors. The very few records that exist from the Egyptian side of the church are in Arabic in the Diocesan Archives in Cairo and require translation which was beyond the scope of this study. There are very few members of the Egyptian Anglican Church from the period in question still alive. In order to acquire a thorough understanding of their experiences, a great deal of trust would need to be developed by any researcher. This takes more time than was available in this study for fieldwork in Egypt. As a result of all these things, the Egyptian Anglican Church

[10] Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B., Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State and Law and Order. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978, p 54.

cannot be said to speak from these pages. Its voice can, at best, only be inferred from the gaps between the lines of evidence. This study has turned out to be mainly about the expatriate Anglican community and what it believes its impact has been upon Egypt. It is a very one-sided conversation – a westerner writing about westerners. For greater truth to be discovered there needs to be dialogue with Egyptian voices writing about Egyptian Anglicanism.

From the western perspective it would not be an exaggeration to say that Egypt provided an exotic backdrop to a drama played out by the British in an alien land. Egyptians often appear silent, almost ghostlike, in British accounts of the period. They are a supporting cast of walk-ons usually without voices of their own. Far too often the British took the silence of their hosts as consent or dismissed any protests that were made as unrepresentative. Eventually, however, Egyptians were forced to throw out the visitors who had overstayed their welcome. This study takes seriously some of the ideas put forward by Edward Said in his book Orientalism. Said draws on Foucault's notion of a discourse. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault puts forward a concept of the discourse in which the subject of the speaker and the institutional site from which he or she is speaking affect the diversity of opinions put forward:

> Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject, and his discontinuity with himself may be

> determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed.[11]

Within the concept of the discourse, the subject rather than the object takes centre stage. Said applies this to western European culture which generated the discourse of orientalism in the late eighteenth century. It reached its height in the nineteenth century when, according to Said, every writer on the orient:

> kept intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability; this is why every writer on the Orient....saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption.[12]

Said believes that this discourse operated for a purpose. Through it:

> European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, socially, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.[13]

As we shall see, as part of what Gramsci calls civil society,[14] the Anglican Church shared in this discourse of orientalism and helped to maintain the hegemony of the concept among western Europeans until after the Second World War. Orientalism was seen by its proponents as an objective and value-free discourse about the east. In fact,

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[11] Foucault, M., The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Tavistock Publications Ltd, 1972. p55.
[12] Said, E.W., Orientalism. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1978, p 206.
[13] Ibid., p 3.
[14] Gramsci, A., Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci.
Edited and translated by Hoare, Q. and Nowell Smith, G., London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p 12.

Said has shown us that orientalism is very far from being either of these things. Indeed, it says a great deal about those who propagated it. Orientalism in fact helped to define what it was to be European:

> Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hays has called the idea of Europe,[15] a collective notion identifying "us" Europeans as against all "those" non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures.[16]

This is borne out by this study of the Anglican Church in Egypt. Though this work began as an attempt to understand something about the orient, it ended up saying much more about the occident, most especially about the British. Ultimately, orientalism sealed its own fate by failing to allow sufficiently the possibility of change and development in its object, in particular the development of nationalism. In his last annual report from Egypt as High Commissioner in Egypt in 1907, Lord Cromer dismissed nationalism as an "entirely novel idea" and "a plant of exotic rather than of indigenous growth".[17] Nationalism may well have had its origins in the west but it became powerfully rooted in Egyptian soil. Egypt had had a sense of its own nationhood that went right back to the time of the pharaohs. The persistent failure of the British to take nationalism seriously in Egypt was to have serious repercussions for British political interests in Egypt and for the Anglican Church there.

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[15] Hay, D., Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968.
[16] Said, E.W., Orientalism. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1978, p 7.
[17] Marlow, J., Cromer in Egypt. London: Elek Books, 1970, p271.

This study has also found strong evidence to support what Jeffrey Cox describes as Edward's Said's "alternative master narrative in its approach to imperialism, a master narrative of unmasking."[18] This work will provide ample evidence that missionaries in Egypt were racists and imperialists. And when they were not imperialists they were often very marginal.[19] For various reasons which will become clear, Said's narrative of unmasking seems particularly true of the Anglican Church in Egypt. This may have something to do with the fact that Said grew up in Cairo. It would not, however, be true to say that this was the whole story. Missionaries were not just imperialists, even if they were frequently marginal. Selfless service in schools and hospitals did take place. Attempts were made to indigenise the Church. Ordinary Egyptians were often able to make distinctions between missionary institutions and the political and military agents of British imperialism. While the latter were finally expelled, the former endured, albeit in a rather circumscribed form. Anglican mission was terribly compromised by its associations with British imperialism. And yet its fruits survived. Despite everything, an indigenous Anglican church in Egypt persisted, and still exists today.

This study begins with an outline of the history of Great Britain's involvement with Egypt. It explores the reasons for Britain's economic and strategic interest in the country and its military intervention in Egypt in 1882, filling the vacuum left by the decline of the Ottoman Empire. This chapter outlines Britain's attempts to rule Egypt for what it convinced itself was Egypt's own good through the self-delusion of the 'veiled protectorate.' It portrays Great Britain's creation and eventual destruction of the Egyptian monarchy. It also explores the impact of both the First and Second

[18] Cox, J. Imperial Fault Lines Christianity and Colonial Power in India 1818 – 1940. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p 10.
[19] Ibid. p 11.

World Wars, as well as the creation of the State of Israel, on relations between Great Britain and Egypt. The common thread that runs throughout the chapter is the continued failure of Great Britain to respond to the demands for self-determination which repeatedly came from the Egyptian people. This failure eventually resulted in the nadir of Great Britain's authority in Egypt in the Suez Crisis. This had a massive impact on the way in which Britain was perceived throughout the world and speeded up the process of withdrawal from many of its other possessions.

The second chapter of this work outlines the history of the Anglican Church in Egypt. It explores the nature of its dual origins: the older, expatriate part of the Church and that created by the CMS mission to Egypt. The vision of the Revd William Temple Gairdner is fundamental to an accurate understanding of the Egyptian mission. It is also important to note the ways in which the Egyptian part of the Anglican Church in Egypt followed a different path from that which Temple Gairdner might have imagined for it. The attitude of the British Government to missions among Muslims is significant here. The underlying theme of this chapter is the continuing separation of the expatriate and Egyptian parts of the Church.

It is in the person of the bishop of Egypt that the two parts of the Anglican Church found a connection. By far the most influential bishop in the period under review is Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne who was Bishop of Egypt and the Sudan from 1920 until 1946 and whose ministry is described in chapter three. He casts a long shadow over the Anglican Church which extends even beyond the period in question. He arrived as a CMS missionary to the Sudan in 1899, imbued with the tenets of high imperialism which he never really lost. Deeply moved by the self-sacrifice of Gordon of Khartoum

and convinced that Rudyard Kipling's "white man's burden" was one he shared, he remained convinced of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. This deeply affected his long ministry and the Diocese he served. Though his views were becoming unfashionable in the nineteen thirties, they were revived by the onset of the Second World War. Bishop Gwynne's affinity with the British and Allied soldiers caused him to devote much of his time and energy to their needs. This meant that the Egyptian side of the Church received less of his attention.

Bishop Gwynne was succeeded by Bishop Geoffrey Allen (1947-1952) and Bishop Frank Johnston (1952-1958). The ministries of the two bishops are described in chapter four. Bishop Allen appears to have been the most visionary and strategic thinker of the three Bishops of Egypt during this period but he lacked experience of the Middle East and did not remain Bishop for very long. He tried to bring the two parts of the Church closer together and to help the church face up to some post-war realities but he was only able to have a limited impact before he felt called to return to Great Britain. Bishop Johnston lacked the vision of his predecessor but had much more experience of the region. Like Bishop Gwynne, he devoted a great deal of his ministry to the expatriate side of the Church. It was during his episcopacy that it was overwhelmed by the events of the Suez Crisis but it was beyond his, or anyone else in the Church's powers to do anything about its effects.

Following on from these roughly chronological chapters, this work will take a series of "sideways looks" at issues that cut across the period in question. The first of these chapters (chapter five) looks at issues of church and state. The Anglican Church in Egypt took on many of the assumptions about its relationship to the British state from

the Church of England. Neither part of the Anglican Church seems to have examined these assumptions too closely or systematically. One of the most important of these assumptions was that most of the work of the British political establishment is to the general good and that those who oppose it are to be regarded with suspicion. The willingness of the Anglican Church in Egypt to serve the needs of Great Britain (rather than Egypt), or at least its willingness to be perceived as doing so, may well have harmed its mission among Egyptians and seems in the light of Suez to have been at best naïve. The Church could not escape its connection with the imperial might of Great Britain but it could have been more careful to create space between itself and British political policy. The fact that it did not do so suggests that its mission among Egyptians was fairly low down on its list of priorities.

Chapter five will explore some of the reasons why the Anglican Church in Egypt was slow to identify with Egyptians, despite the longstanding existence of its mission among them. It will compare this to its mission among the members of the British and Allied military who were stationed in Egypt, especially those who were in Egypt during the Second World War. The particular affinity that Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne had with the armed services was an important reason why the Anglican Church in Egypt tended to identify with their needs and aspirations rather than those of Egyptians. It tended to adopt an uncritical view of the actions of the British military in Egypt, even when these appear to have been harmful to its mission among the Egyptian people.

It is the relationship between the Diocese of Egypt and the CMS mission among the Egyptians that will be the focus of chapter six. As already mentioned, the expatriate

and Egyptian parts of the Church remained quite distinct for most of the period. This may have helped an indigenous leadership to develop without it being overwhelmed by the more powerful expatriate side of the Church. It also, however, perpetuated a virtual apartheid in the Church. This mirrored that of the rest of British-occupied Egypt during the period but had little foundation in the Gospel. The link between these two parts of the Church lay in the diocesan bishop. Sometimes he would draw on the personnel of the mission to support the work of the expatriate side of the church. There were also situations, however, when there seem to have been distinct limits on the authority which the bishop exercised over the mission. In some ways the CMS seems to have operated a "church within a church," resisting the power of the bishop over its day to day running. Though this may have helped the mission to survive the Suez Crisis, it was not in accord with Anglican ecclesiology.

While personalities and structures are vital to an understanding of the mission of the Anglican Church in Egypt during this period, buildings are also eloquent statements of wider realities. This is particularly true in Egypt which is in large part defined by its architecture. Chapter seven describes the construction and use of the first and former All Saints' Anglican Cathedral in Cairo. All Saints' was very much a project of the expatriate side of the Church. A statement in stone of their views and aspirations. It was built with little regard for the needs of Egyptians or the Egyptian mission.

The decline in the number of expatriates living in Egypt during the nineteen thirties would have meant that there was no need for such a large cathedral. The onset of the Second World War, however, meant that All Saints' was very far from becoming a

white elephant. It became the spiritual home to many service personnel stationed in Egypt. Though it was of limited use to the people of Egypt, its "mission" to British and Allied troops could be said to have been very effective. After the War the Cathedral found it hard to adapt to the realities of the new world order. Having been so closely identified with the British and their war effort it was difficult for it to become a "house of prayer for all nations." It was, however, saved from the difficulties of this adjustment by structural problems which resulted in its eventual demolition.

All Saints' Cathedral was occasionally used by members of the Order of Freemasons. Freemasonry is the subject of the seventh, rather brief, chapter. While other areas of this study were anticipated beforehand, the involvement of several senior members of the clergy in the Diocese of Egypt in Freemasonry came as something of a surprise. This chapter examines the extent of that involvement and its impact on the mission of the Anglican Church.

In terms of its mission to the expatriate side of the Church, the involvement of diocesan clergy in Freemasonry was among many factors which were beneficial. In many ways, the mission of the Diocese of Egypt to expatriates living in Egypt was a very positive one. Many look back on the time they spent as part of the Anglican Church in Egypt with great fondness. Many of these positives, however, had drawbacks for the Anglican mission among Egyptians. In what follows there are many instances in which the Anglican Church failed to recommend itself and the Gospel to the Egyptian people. And yet much good work was done on their behalf and the Egyptian side of the church survived. Though there are plenty of reasons why it

should have died out, it still exists today. Hopefully, what follows will challenge the Church to think critically about its past and to plot the future with greater understanding, and perhaps even bravery.

Chapter One

The Context: Great Britain's Involvement in Egypt

Mission is never pursued *in vacuo*.[1]

Egypt has always been a crossroads between Europe and Africa and between the west and the east. It has been occupied by numerous foreign powers including the Ottoman Empire, France, Great Britain and most recently (it could be argued) the United States. Each invading group has brought aspects of its own culture, including Greek and Roman classicism, Christianity and Islam. At the same time Egypt has maintained a strong sense of its own identity with a rich and unique pharaonic heritage. Egypt has been used to receiving foreign visitors but the lesson of history is that none of them stays for ever. It is this lesson that Great Britain seems to have overlooked in its dealings with Egypt.

1.1 Great Britain's involvement in the nineteenth century

In the nineteenth century, Egypt underwent enormous social and economic change. It was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire but the decline of Turkish power in the region meant that Egypt's rulers had considerable autonomy. In the early nineteenth century, Muhammad Ali (1805-1848), a Turk from Macedonia who had come to Egypt with Ottoman forces sent against the French, but who then defected from the Ottoman Empire, set himself up as the first Khedive of Egypt. He instituted a number of reforms to the country's agricultural policy. Previously Egyptian agriculture had been almost wholly devoted to subsistence farming. This had fed the population but had provided little in the way of foreign exchange. The rich soils of the Nile Delta

[1] Cragg, K., in Ward, K., and Stanley, B., (Eds), The Church Mission Society and World Christianity 1799-1999. Richmond: Curzon Press Ltd, 2000, p 122.

were capable of producing a great deal more. Muhammad Ali was anxious to accumulate foreign currency in order to increase his own wealth and power. He was also keen to purchase goods and services which would assist Egypt in its development into a modern state. Muhammad Ali therefore made great efforts to divert farmers towards the production of cotton for export. Eighty per cent of this production was destined for England. The demand for Egyptian cotton received a boost from the disruption of cotton supplies from the United States during the American Civil War (1861-1865). A side effect of the development of cotton plantations in Egypt was the release of surplus labour from the land which resulted in increased urbanisation. The development of Egyptian railways from the 1850's onwards further contributed to this. Muhammad Ali's reforms also attracted a large number of foreigner businessmen and made Egypt increasingly dependent on the workings of the international economy.

1.2 The Suez Canal

The opening of the de Lesseps' Suez Canal in November 1869 during the reign of the Khedive Ismail (1863-1879) contributed further to Egypt's penetration by European influences. The Khedive used the opening of the Suez Canal to emphasise that Egypt was part of "civilised" Europe by laying on a series of elaborate celebrations. Unfortunately, by 1876, Egypt was unable to service the loan used to finance the construction of the Canal and the Khedive was forced to offer his shares in the Suez Canal Company for sale for four million pounds. The British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli borrowed the money to purchase the shares from the Rothschilds. It turned out to be a good investment for Great Britain.[2] Subsequently, Anglo-French

[2] Fergusson, N., Empire How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Penguin Books, 2003, p 231.

financial control was imposed on the Canal.[3] This further contributed to a process whereby foreigners were increasingly coming to dominate commerce and the professions in Egypt. As a result, educated Egyptians who sought to better themselves were forced to join Egypt's burgeoning bureaucracy. The development of an industrial sector in Egypt would have mopped up the labour surplus created by the reform of Egyptian agriculture. This was prevented, however, by the arrival of cheap manufactured imports from Britain and elsewhere.[4] These forces of economic change and social upheaval were to remain influential in Egyptian society right up until the present day.

1.3 Great Britain's occupation of Egypt 1882

By 1882 British merchants had been working in Egypt for many years, principally in the cotton export industry. It was not until that year, however, that the formal British occupation of Egypt began. In the early nineteenth century Britain had had unhindered access to markets and sources of raw materials, such as cotton, from all over the world with little competition from any other power. This meant that formal control of its overseas markets and areas of supply, which was very costly, had not been necessary. As the century wore on, however, these markets were increasingly threatened, particularly by France.

In 1882, Egyptian nationalists under Arabi had revolted against the Khedive Tewfiq. This threatened Britain's ability to control the Suez Canal which provided speedy access to India and the rest of Asia. With good reason, Britain feared that if it did not act to secure the Canal, other nations, notably France, probably would. In recent

[3] Hourani, A., A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and Faber, 1991, p 283.
[4] Darwin, J., Britain, Egypt and the Middle East. London: Macmillan, 1981, pp 49-53.

years, the British populace had been far from convinced of the wisdom of an imperialist policy abroad.[5] It was seen as costly, both in terms of military force and popular taxation. William Gladstone had come to power in 1880, partly on a platform of opposition to the imperialist policies of Benjamin Disraeli. Reluctantly, however, economic self-interest and a concern for the safety of foreigners in Egypt forced Gladstone and his government to decide to intervene in Egypt.[6] The Royal Navy bombarded the port of Alexandria and troops were landed in the Canal Zone under General Sir Garnet Wolseley. With superior weaponry and training, British forces surprised and destroyed Arabi's much larger army in approximately half an hour at Tel-el-Kebir.[7] As with many occupations of other countries, Britain had not planned to stay long after its original intervention. On arrival though, it found that there appeared to be no sign of an Egyptian government willing to preserve Britain's interests in Egypt against its enemies. As a result, it ended up staying for a great deal longer than the British Government had anticipated:

> Having come for a few nights, the British remained for fifty years[8]

Fortunately for William Gladstone, and rather surprisingly, Britain's occupation of Egypt turned out to be popular with the British electorate.[9]

Great Britain was not the first nation to occupy Egypt. Many nations, from the ancient Greeks to the French had been there before. In 1882, Egypt was still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire. In many ways it was used to being occupied by foreigners.

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[5] Stanley, B., The Bible and the Flag. Leicester: Apollos, 1990, p 36.
[6] Stanley, B., 1990, p 45.
[7] Fergusson, N., Empire How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Penguin Books, 2003, p 233.
[8] Neill, S., Colonialism and Christian Missions. London: Lutterworth Press, 1966, p 306.
[9] Wilson, A. N., The Victorians. London: Arrow Books, 2003, p 466.

But Britain was to mistake the relative acquiescence of Egyptians to its rule for their consent, and it was to outstay its welcome by many years. The forces of Egyptian nationalism which Britain had moved to oppose, and the British desire to retain control of the Suez Canal, were to remain crucial to the relationship between the two countries until 1956. The British failure to recognise and adapt to changes in that relationship were to prove disastrous to its reputation in Egypt and throughout the world. They were also to be harmful to the interests of the Anglican Church in Egypt.

1.4 Lord Cromer

In 1883, Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) arrived as Her Majesty's Consul-General in Egypt. He remained there for twenty three years but his vision and attitude towards Egypt were to set the tone of British policy in the country until the middle of the twentieth century. He was the architect of much of Britain's policy towards Egypt and his figure casts a long shadow over the period. Like many British civil servants working in the colonial service, he was pessimistic about the Egyptians' ability to rule themselves:

> Cromer had spent most of his earlier administrative career in India and came to Egypt imbued with a fervidly Christian belief in the inferiority of oriental peoples and in the superiority of European civilisation. This conviction was not unique to Cromer nor new to Egypt.[10]

Egypt's perceived inadequacy was, however, Cromer's opportunity. He regarded it as part of the British birthright to spread the gospel of good (British) governance:

[10] Baring, E., Modern Egypt, quoted in: Searight, S., The British in the Middle East. London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, 1979, p124.

> The British itch to administer maladministered peoples found scope as great as any in Britain's imperial career in places neglected during the ottoman decline[11]

In his book, Modern Egypt, Cromer later wrote:

> Let us in Christian charity, make every possible allowance for the moral and intellectual shortcomings of the Egyptians, and do whatever can be done to rectify them.[12]

Cromer instituted a period which has become known as the 'veiled protectorate.' This phrase was first coined by Wilfred Seawen Blunt in his anti-imperialist book Secret History of British Occupation.[13] The veiled protectorate was to last until 1936. Through the veil of what was nominally an independent Egyptian government under Ottoman sovereignty, Cromer effectively administered Egypt until his departure in 1907. Baring and Milner (his successor as High Commissioner) convinced themselves that they were working behind the scenes, veiled from the public gaze. Their disguise had, however, something of the quality of the emperor's new clothes. K. Tidrick suggests that there were probably very few Egyptians who had any doubt about who was really in control of their country:

> In Egypt, Lords Cromer and Milner, enthroned in marble halls and surrounded by British soldiers, thought of themselves as playing with the utmost

[11] Monroe, E., Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1971. London: Chatto and Windus, 1981, p 82.
[12] Searight, S., The British in the Middle East, London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, 1979, p24.
[13] Ibid., p130.

> discretion, an exceptionally difficult lone hand; they delighted in the formal restrictions placed on British power, though everyone knew them to be of no political consequence. Cromer cherished the thought that he 'remained more or less hidden [and] pulled the strings, and proclaimed his contempt for publicity; yet it was he of whom the fellahin sang as they laboured at their immemorial tasks.[14]

As part of the British system of control over Egypt, a British garrison was stationed in the country. The British also took control of a diminished Egyptian army to prevent further insurrection:

> A British Sirdar and an officer corps seconded from the British and Indian armies now stood between any future Arabi and a successful military revolt.[15]

By 1894 every Egyptian ministry had a British "adviser" and a team of British assistants. Many of these had previously served in the Indian administration. With their assistance, Cromer instituted many reforms in the government of Egypt:

> The finances of the country were put in order; receipts and expenditure were controlled in accordance with a policy, no longer at the caprice of one person; and a proper system of accounting was introduced. Taxes were more regularly assessed and collected. Irrigation was extended and improved.[16]

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[14] Tidrick, K., Empire and the English Character. London: I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1990, pp 209-210.
[15] Darwin, J., Britain, Egypt and the Middle East. London: Macmillan, 1981, p 55.
[16] Ahmed, J.M., The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism London: Oxford University Press, 1960, p26.

1.5 Relations between Egyptians and the British

The reforms instituted by Cromer enabled the British to persuade themselves that their control of Egypt was in its best interests. Most of the reforms, however, appear first and foremost to have been in the interests of British bankers and exporters. Yet even among the peasantry, there was some support for British rule in Egypt. Despite the fact that their education and health were largely neglected, the Egyptian rural peasantry were still better off than they had been under their previous Turkish masters. Members of the developing Egyptian middle class were, however, less content. Frequently excluded from the best jobs in the administration, the Egyptian middle class:

> was full of hatred 'not only for the foreigners who wielded all authority but also for anything and anybody who was not of pure Egyptian or Arab stock'. These feelings remarked by the Khedive were intensified by Cromer's policy. Of his many faculties he chose to exercise the administrative. His declared purpose was to reform Egypt's finances and revive her prosperity, but democracy and its institutions were suspect in his view.[17]

The growth of an increasingly educated Egyptian middle class and the failure of the British to give it a stake in its occupation were to cost it dear in the longer term. It was from the burgeoning middle class that the future nationalist leaders who would one day throw Britain out of Egypt were to come. Ironically, British influence brought with it exposure to western ideas of democracy and the nation-state. These ideas were

[17] Ahmed, J.M., 1960, p27.

to fan the flames of nationalism in Egypt and elsewhere.[18] In the meantime, the antipathy of the Egyptian middle class towards the British was thoroughly reciprocated. While the colonial power could patronise the honest toil of the picturesque *fellaheen*,[19] it felt uncomfortable around the Egyptian bourgeoisie who increasingly aped western manners but underneath could not be anything else but 'orientals':

> the Englishmen, and still more the Englishwomen, who arrived in Egypt, often from India, in the heyday of a Victorian superiority complex about caste and colour found there a ruling Turkish group that had maintained a deliberate gap between itself and native Egyptians. The British in Egypt never got over these incentives to be clubby, and their exclusiveness was enhanced by differences of upbringing and outlook. Most educated Egyptians of the occupation period were formed on a French rather than a British model, while a large number of the British families on the spot were garrison-born and bred. They felt disdain for a people that had no taste for martial life or field sports, and one of whose proverbs proclaimed that there is no shame in bowing the head if there is no comfortable alternative.[20]

The British preferred to keep Egyptians at a distance and did not appreciate those who attempted to cross the social gulf that lay between them. Egyptians were excluded

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[18] Stanley, B., 1990, p 52.

[19] This was true so long as the rural peasantry knew their place. In June 1906, a dispute involving five British officers who had been shooting pigeons, a staple of Egyptian diet, at Denshawi, a village sixty miles north of Cairo, resulted in the deaths of one officer and several Egyptians. British 'justice' was swift and ruthless. Four Egyptians were hanged and a further sixteen were flogged and imprisoned. The incident left a bitter taste in the mouths of many Egyptians and an estimated one million of them joined the nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kamel. Keay, J. Sowing the Wind The Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East. London: John Murray Ltd, 2003, pp 11-15.

[20] Monroe, E., 1981, p 77.

from such places as the Gezira Sporting Club and the Shepheard's Hotel where the British spent their sometimes considerable leisure hours.[21]

> The British and Egyptians seemed only to make contact at the very edges of each other's existence.[22]

This separation was no less apparent at the British High Commission (later the British Embassy) where members of staff were often poorly informed about public opinion in Egypt. Few Britons who worked at the Embassy, other than the Oriental Counsellor, spoke Arabic. This was to have a significant long-term impact on the ability of the British to read the signs of the times and thus develop appropriate policies in the light of changes in the Egyptian political climate.

1.6 The First World War

Following the outbreak of the First World War, the Turks who were still the nominal rulers of Egypt, declared themselves to be on the side of Germany. British strategists were afraid of a Turkish attack on the Suez Canal. As a result, Great Britain took more formal control of Egypt, severing its ties with the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Egypt was made a British protectorate on 18th December, 1914. Britain secured the replacement of the by then rather troublesome Khedive Abbas II with the apparently more cooperative Hussein who took the title, Sultan. Great Britain introduced severe censorship and restrictions on the right of assembly. This led to bitter student

[21] In 1904, Ronald Storrs suggested that many British people in Cairo spent between one and five hours a day at the Gezira Sporting Club. Searight, S., The British in the Middle East, London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, 1979, p126.
[22] Cooper, A., Cairo in the War 1939-1945. London: Penguin 1995, p305.

opposition. Requisitioning of animals, price rises and the reintroduction of the *corvee* (localised conscription) also led to widespread disaffection among the peasantry.

1.7 The Wafd

The end of the First World War raised expectations of independence from British rule among large sections of the Egyptian population. The compliant Hussein had died in 1917 and been replaced by Sultan Fu'ad who was less amenable to British "guidance". Forty eight hours after the signing of the Armistice in Europe, a nationalist delegation (*wafd)* of three men led by Saad Zaghlul (1857-1927), visited Sir Reginald Wingate, the then British High Commissioner on 13th November, 1918. The delegation demanded negotiations on independence, an end to wartime's martial law, and the right to attend the post-war peace conference at Versailles. Other Arab nations were being granted autonomy in the new post-war order. The supporters of the delegation could not see why Egypt, which had contributed so much to the war effort, should be denied the same thing.

Like many nationalist movements, the desire for independence from British rule was encouraged by the American President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination.[23] Sir Reginald Wingate was sympathetic to the views of the *Wafd.* The Foreign office, on the other hand, disagreed strongly. It was fearful of encouraging similar movements in other imperial possessions, especially India. Encouraged by Sultan Fu'ad, who had fallen out with Saad Zaghlul, the British arrested and then deported the nationalist leader to Malta in 1919.[24] Britain assumed that the *fellaheen*

[23] Darwin, J., Britain, Egypt and the Middle East. London: Macmillan, 1981, p 75.
[24] Keay, J. Sowing the Wind The Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East. London: John Murray Ltd, 2003, pp 101-104.

would remain largely loyal to them and that removing the leader of the nationalist movement would put and end to the matter. Not for the last time they had misjudged the public mood. Widespread riots and strikes followed, involving many strata of society. Wingate's deputy, Cheetham, who had to deal with the crisis while his superior was in England observed that the:

> present movement in Egypt is national in the full sense of the word. It has now apparently the sympathy of all classes and creeds.[25]

It was some time before British forces regained control of the country once again.[26] By then, fifteen hundred Egyptians and forty British people had died in eight weeks of unrest.

1.8 Lord Allenby's Declaration

Sir Reginald Wingate, who was seen by the Foreign Office as an appeaser of nationalist insurrection, was replaced as High Commissioner by Field Marshall Lord Allenby. Lord Allenby was expected to put down the revolt but instead he surprised his political masters by releasing Zaghlul, enabling him to travel to the post-War Paris peace conference. Allenby persuaded the British Government to send a commission to Egypt to determine the future form of the protectorate. The commission was headed by Lord Milner. Britain needed to secure the Suez Canal route to India and could not afford the military expense of controlling an uncooperative population in Egypt. Such control had failed in Ireland and was not popular with the British public. Lord Milner

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[25] Cheeetham to Lord Curzon, Telegram, Very Urgent. 17th March 1919. FO 371/3714/42905. Quoted in Darwin, J., Britain, Egypt and the Middle East. London: Macmillan, 1981, p 74.
[26] Ibid., pp70-72.

tried to negotiate new terms for the British occupation. He struggled to reach a conclusion, however, as many Egyptian politicians, including Saad Zaghlul, refused to deal with him.

Eventually, Britain made a unilateral declaration on 28th February 1922. It came to be known as the Allenby Declaration. It was proclaimed in Egypt on 15th March of that year. Under the terms of the Declaration, Egypt was to be recognised as an independent constitutional monarchy with representative institutions. The Sultan changed his title to King and an Egyptian constitution was promulgated.[27] Under the declaration, Egypt was no longer required to have British civil servants in its ministries. None could, however, be appointed from other nations without British approval. Britain would take on responsibility for foreign communities, removing a possible excuse for other powers to interfere in Egypt.[28] Britain also promised to defend the integrity of Egypt's territory. Significantly, the declaration stated that in the event of war, Egypt would render Britain every assistance, even if its integrity was not affected by the conflict. Britain retained the right to keep a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of her 'imperial communications' but this was not supposed to constitute a military occupation.[29] The Sudan, to which Egypt laid claim but which had been administered by Britain since 1899, remained an outstanding source of disagreement.

It is unlikely that many people in Egypt noticed the changes enshrined in the Declaration. They were an adjustment rather than a fundamental reform but they

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[27] Hourani, A., A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and Faber, 1991, p 318.
[28] Keay, J., Sowing the Wind The Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East. London: John Murray Ltd, 2003, p113.
[29] Mansfield, P., The British in Egypt. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971, p235.

remained the basis of British policy in Egypt until 1936. As far as most people were concerned, Britain was still very much in control. Sultan Fu'ad, who had succeeded in 1917, became King Fu'ad I of Egypt. The British High Commission became the British Residency. It remained an important focus of authority in the country. The Egyptian royal Palace was also a significant centre of power. The populist *Wafd* Party was a third nexus and Britain did its best to play the Palace and the party off against each other. Neither the *Wafd* nor the Palace could govern securely without the tacit support of the Residency. It was a classic example of the British imperial policy of divide and rule. Through it, Britain was able to fend off any further attempts to agree a treaty until as late as 1936. As a result, Britain maintained its influence in Egypt. It was, however, a difficult time with no one body fully in control:

> The years between the death of Zaghlul [1927]and the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936 were increasingly uneasy, as the authoritarian king and the Wafd struggled for control of Egypt. Political instability led to waves of riots, strikes and demonstration, followed by the inevitable clamp-downs initiated by the Palace.[30]

1.9 The 1936 Treaty

In October 1935 Italy dropped bombs on Ethiopia. The possible threat to Egypt of Italian imperialist ambitions concentrated the minds of Egyptian leaders considerably, enabling them to reach sufficient unity among themselves to begin negotiations with Great Britain on 2nd March 1936.

[30] Cooper, A., 1995, p15.

On 28th April 1936, King Fu'ad died, leaving a sixteen year old son, Farouk, who was in England at the time, as his heir. A regency council, headed by the Anglophile Prince Mohamed Aly ruled Egypt until Farouk's eighteenth birthday in July 1937. The Allenby Declaration of 1922 had failed to resolve a number of outstanding issues that existed between the two countries. These included the protection of foreign interests and minorities. Under the Capitulations foreigners had been exempted from Egyptian jurisdiction. The position of the Sudan was also unresolved. The death of King Fu'ad and the accession of a minor, combined with the decline of the Wafd Party and Egyptian fears about Italian imperialism, helped to create a favourable climate for Great Britain. Negotiations began and culminated in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which was signed on 26th August 1936. The treaty was supposed to last for twenty years and it committed both parties to a further alliance when it expired. It abolished the European Security Administration, giving Egypt full responsibility for law and order among foreign communities. It did, however, reserve the right of Britain to intervene if Egypt was unable to protect the lives of foreigners or their possessions. The treaty recognised Egyptian rights over the Sudan but allowed Sudan to determine its own relationship with Egypt. Under the treaty, Great Britain was given the responsibility of remaining in the Sudan to oversee this process.[31] The treaty also provided for the gradual withdrawal of British troops from the rest of Egypt to the Canal Zone and the Sinai Peninsular as Egyptian military capability improved. For the first time since 1882, Egypt gained full control over its own security forces. Its armed forces were expanded and for the first time, the Royal Military Academy opened its doors to members of the Egyptian middle class (including one Gamal Abdel Nasser). In line with the 1922 Declaration of Independence, however, the new

[31] Keay, J. 2003, p 302.

Anglo-Egyptian treaty reserved to Great Britain the right of reoccupation in the event of war with unrestricted access to Egypt's ports, airports, roads and railways. This was soon to have major significance.

At the time of signing, John Keay argues that the two countries viewed the treaty very differently:

> the Egyptian side looked upon it basically as a charter for independence, or at least as a step towards its achievement. The British side, however, saw it as a short-term solution to its problems in Egypt, and one which did not radically alter the imperialistic relationship between them.[32]

This view is supported by the speed with which Great Britain moved to fulfil some of its new obligations under the treaty. If the Egyptians had expected an immediate withdrawal of British troops to the Canal Zone then they were to be disappointed. The movement of British troops was extremely protracted. The number of British soldiers never fell to the agreed level of twelve thousand men in the 'Canal Zone'. Until the 1950's this would constitute the largest concentration of troops on foreign territory anywhere in the world.[33]

1.10 Sir Miles Lampson

Under the 1936 Treaty, its architect, Sir Miles Lampson, (later Lord Killearn) who from 1933 had been the British High Commissioner, became the first British

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[32] Gamal Abdul Nasser, H., Britain and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement, 1936-1952, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994, p 20.
[33] Keay, J., 2003, p 303.

Ambassador to Egypt. In fact he was the only ambassador in Egypt. Other countries maintained legations or consulates headed by diplomatic ministers or consuls. Despite his unique status, Sir Miles found it difficult to adapt to his supposedly diminished new role.[34] Like Lord Cromer before him, Miles Lampson was deeply imbued with notions of British imperial destiny. The change of title did little to alter his approach to the Egyptian government:

> Lampson had not been able to adapt himself to the diminished position of diplomat from High Commissioner. Some of the Embassy staff felt so strongly that Lampson should not have been kept in Egypt that a secret report was sent as a telegram to the Foreign Office outlining their reasons. This was ignored.

The veiled protectorate continued. It just had more veils. Beneath a veneer of deference to the new young King Farouk, Sir Miles continued to exercise a schoolmasterly control over him. On more than one occasion, he is believed to have referred to the King as 'that boy'.[35] Initially, he warmed to the young man but this was not to last. In any case, he never had very much faith in the new king's ability to rule without 'guidance.' He described the young King Farouk as:

> self-indulgent by nature, he had in his early years been hopelessly spoilt by his family and the sycophants at the Palace.[36]

The sorry end to King Farouk's rule was to lend credence to this view but Sir Miles' approach to the young monarch may well have played a part in the King's eventual

[34] St Clair McBride, B. Farouk in Egypt. London: Robert Hale, 1968, p 117
[35] Mansfield, P., 1971, p272.
[36] Evans, T.E. (Ed), The Killearn Diaries 1934-1946. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972, p12.

downfall. It also did little to enhance Britain's reputation. But this is to jump ahead of events.

1.11 The Second World War

The outbreak of war between Great Britain and Adolf Hitler's Germany in 1939 gave the former the pretext to invoke Article VIII of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and effectively seize control of Egypt. All railways and aerodromes were put at Britain's disposal and censorship of the press was introduced. Egypt broke off its diplomatic links with Germany and interned all adult German males living within its borders. It did not, however, declare war on the Axis powers until February 1945. By then the war was nearly over and the outcome assured. This, however, made little difference to Great Britain. The British Government did not want to upset Islamic opinion in the region by bringing Axis bombs down on Egypt in a war in which Egypt had little interest. Neither did Great Britain wish to give Egypt a place at any subsequent post-war conference of victorious allies. Instead, Britain introduced vast numbers of British and Imperial troops to the country. Axis domination of the Mediterranean made travel between Egypt and London increasingly difficult. Britain therefore decided to set up a largely autonomous Middle East Command based in Cairo with its own minister, war council and supply centre.[37]

Not surprisingly, most Egyptians remained very ambivalent as regards the outcome of the conflict. King Farouk was thought to have Axis sympathies. He had spent part of his childhood in Italy and he numbered several Italians among his most trusted courtiers. Officially though, he supported Egypt's official policy of political

[37] Keay, J., 2003, p 264.

neutrality. Other Egyptians were, however, less discreet in their support for the Axis powers. Many of them hoped that Germany and Italy would drive Britain from Egypt for ever. Italian flags were hung from some houses. The cry, 'Long live Rommel' was heard on the streets of Cairo and it was rumoured that a suite had been booked for him at the Shepheard's Hotel. General Aziz Al-Masri was one of a number of prominent Egyptians who believed that Egypt should assist the Axis powers militarily. On the orders of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, he was summarily dismissed from his post.[38]

1.12 The Abdin Palace

Sir Miles Lampson plotted to install a Wafd Government under Nahas which would be sympathetic to the Allied cause. King Farouk resisted this, wanting to appoint Ali Maher who was known to be sympathetic to the Germans. On the evening of 4th February 1942, Sir Miles Lampson went with British tanks to the Abdin Palace to force the King to accept the Nahas administration or to abdicate. King Farouk backed down and agreed to appoint Nahas but this naked British aggression was to prove counter-productive. It starkly revealed the extent to which the Egyptian monarchy was little more than a puppet of Great Britain, damaging the reputation of both of them in the eyes of the Egyptian public. In the process:

> ultimately it destroyed the monarchy, the Wafd, and, in helping to provoke the 1952 Revolution, the British position in Egypt[39]

[38] Mansfield, P., 1971, p274-276.
[39] Ibid., p278.

The Egyptian military felt the King's humiliation keenly. The then Lieutenant Gamal Abdel Nasser wrote to a friend:

> What is to be done now that this has happened and we accepted it with surrender and servility?...I believe that colonialism, if it felt that some Egyptians intended to sacrifice their lives and face force with force, would retreat like a prostitute.[40]

As it turned out, he was not so very wide of the mark.

At the same time as a more sympathetic government in Egypt was put in place, the Allied prosecution of the war in the Middle East improved. General Montgomery took over the Eighth Army and in October 1942 the tide of Axis advance was turned at the Battle of El Alamein.

1.13 Relations between Egyptians and the British

As in the First World War, Egyptians resented the presence on their soil of so many foreign soldiers. By November 1941 there were 140,000 troops stationed in the country.[41] They brought with them considerable purchasing power. The British Army was spending four and a half million pounds in Egypt each month. Some Egyptians benefited from the money that the troops and procurement officers were spending. Egyptian bank deposits tripled as the number of Egyptian millionaires rose from fifty to four hundred.[42] Many more Egyptians, however, suffered from the inevitable rise in

[40] Nasser, G.A., quoted in Lapping, B., End of Empire. London: Granada Publishing Ltd. 1985, p 243.
[41] Cooper, A., 1995, p 112.
[42] Keay, J., 2003, p 303.

prices. Between August 1939 and September 1941, the cost of living in Egypt rose by forty five per cent.[43] Food shortages were common and in January 1942 there was a bread crisis, something that rulers of Egypt have always sought to avoid. Many anti-British posters and leaflets appeared, some of them distributed by the Muslim Brotherhood. They blamed the British troops directly for the shortages.[44] Strained relations between the Egyptians and members of the military were not helped by the attitudes of the visiting troops themselves. British and Empire soldiers often showed little respect for their hosts, encountering many of them only as pimps and prostitutes. British sqaddies sang a version of the Egyptian National Anthem which went:

King Farouk, King Farouk

Hang your bollocks on a hook

or

Queen Farida

Queen of all the Wogs [45]

To the average British soldier, the Egyptians were "Wogs": a word that stood for Wily Oriental Gentleman, but which was in fact a relic of Lord Cromer's day, referring to those members of the clerical effendi class 'Working on Government Service.' There was "wog" labour to do the most menial work in base camps and hospitals, and "wog" food for sale on the streets. The word was interchangeable as an adjective meaning anything Egyptian, or simply a term of abuse.[46] The British tended to be too preoccupied with fighting a war whose outcome was far from assured to

[43] Cooper, A., 1995, p 136.
[44] Tripp, C., Ali Maher and the Palace in Egyptian Politics 1936 –1942. London University: PhD Thesis 1984, quoted in Cooper, A., 1995, p 163.
[45] Mansfield, P., 1971, p279.
[46] Cooper, A., 1995, p116.

worry too much about their effect on Egyptians. Troops were given leaflets on the importance of maintaining good relations with Egyptians but these gave few clues on how this was to be achieved.

After the war, the strain that the troops had placed upon Egyptian hospitality, causing further resentment of the British presence in the country, led to even greater pressure for the complete withdrawal of troops to the Canal Zone. Egyptian newspapers were full of articles saying that El Alamein would not have been possible without Egyptian cooperation. Britain had been Egypt's creditor before the War but afterwards it owed Egypt four hundred million pounds. Commentators argued that Great Britain should make concessions towards the ultimate Egyptian goal of *Istiqal-el-tam* – complete independence.[47] The British Government, however, had other, more immediate things to worry about. In the immediate aftermath of the war it was preoccupied with foreign policy concerns elsewhere, notably in India. HMG was reluctant to encourage moves towards independence anywhere else in its empire by altering the status quo in Egypt. Blinded to the new world order by victory over the Axis forces, the British Government felt, on the contrary, that Egypt should have been grateful for having been protected from an Italian invasion. British troops remained in the Kasr El-Nil Barracks near All Saints' Cathedral, as well as in the Ezbekiyah Gardens and in the strategically and psychologically significant Citadel that overlooks the whole city of Cairo.

[47] Ibid., p59.

1.14 Increasing pressure on Great Britain

In February 1946 there were massive demonstrations of students and workers for an end to the British presence. There were violent attacks on British soldiers and property in Cairo and large numbers of casualties resulted. On 7th May that year, the British accepted the principle of total evacuation but sought a period of five years' grace to prepare for this. The Egyptians pressed for the withdrawal to be completed in twelve months. A treaty was agreed in October of that year. All British forces were to be withdrawn from Cairo and Alexandria by 31st March 1947 and from the whole country by September 1949. But disagreements over the status of Sudan meant that the treaty was never signed.[48] Had it been, the monarchy and the Egyptian parliamentary system might well have survived.[49] The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, abandoned negotiations and Egypt decided to take the matter to the United Nations. At that time, the United States of America was, however, more concerned about containing the threat of communism than encouraging national self-determination. As a result, Egypt's pleas to the United Nations fell on deaf ears.[50]

In January 1950, the Wafd Party returned to power under Mustafa al-Nahas. In October the following year he decided to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and declare Farouk King of Egypt and the Sudan. This won him enormous popular support. Such was the anti-British feeling at the time that a Cairo daily newspaper offered a one hundred pound reward for the murder of any British officer. All Britons

[48] Mansfield, P., 1971, pp 284-288.
[49] Ibid., p 288.
[50] Keay, J., 2003, p 346.

employed by the Egyptian Government were sent packing.[51] Despite the rise in the political temperature though, Cairo remained relatively calm:

> On the whole things have been fairly quiet in Cairo; more so than you might expect from newspaper reports, and more so than one might have expected in almost any country under similar circumstances. So far the government have made every effort to prevent any hostile demonstrations, and there have only been a few crowds and processions, with a little hooliganism.[52]

In the Canal Zone however, the situation was much more difficult for the British:

> Egypt has said our troops must go. We have said we have every intention that they shall stay, unless and until they accept some system of international defence; and we have moved in more troops. And there have been some clashes in the Canal Zone, more serious than anything that has happened here.[53]

The Egyptian Minister of the Interior, Fu'ad Serageddin increased the pressure for British withdrawal by cutting off the supplies of food and labour to the Canal Zone. He also made alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood, communists and neo-fascists who carried out sabotage and guerrilla attacks on the Zone. All this helped to render the Zone militarily useless to the British. The eighty thousand British troops stationed there were kept occupied simply in protecting themselves.

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[51] Rodenbeck, M., Cairo City Victorious. Cairo: AUC Press, 1998, p 198.
[52] Allen, G., Letter to Max Warren 18th October, 1951. AS 59 G2 1950-1951. CMS Overseas Division. CMS Archives. Birmingham University Archives.
[53] Ibid.

1.15 'Black Saturday'

It was not long before the British troops in the Canal Zone started to launch counter-attacks, occupying guerrilla bases and arresting those they believed to be involved in attacks on them. On 25th January 1952 they surrounded the police headquarters at Ismailia, giving the occupants just one hour to surrender their weapons. The Egyptian police replied defiantly with gunfire and British forces stormed the building.[54] Fifty Egyptians were killed and many more were injured. The news of the massacre soon spread to Cairo. The next day, 26th January 1952, was known as 'Black Saturday'. Crowds of Cairenes went on the rampage, destroying seven hundred shops and buildings, especially those associated with the British occupation. These included the Shepheard's Hotel, the offices of the BOAC, Thomas Cook, W.H. Smith, Barclays Bank, and the Turf Club where ten *khawagat* (western foreigners), nine of them British, were burnt alive. The total number of fatalities was between seventy and eighty. Between 3 and 4.5 million pounds worth of British property was destroyed as well as property belonging to other foreigners. As a result of this destruction, an estimated fifteen thousand people subsequently lost their jobs.[55] The Egyptian government did little to stop the carnage and it was not until 6pm that King Farouk, who had been hosting a lunch for six hundred guests, sent in the troops to quell the unrest. Both the government and the King were sympathetic to the mob but their inactivity added to an impression of weakness on their part. Prime Minister Nahas was subsequently sacked and a series of successors followed as Egypt's government gradually imploded.

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[54] Keay, J., 2003, p 402.

[55] The offices of the Standard Stationery Company belonging to the Palestinian father of Edward Said were among those destroyed. The company did a great deal of business with foreign interests. Said, E. Out Of Place. London: Granta Books, 1999, pp242-243.

1.16 The State of Israel

On May 15th 1948 the British Mandate in Palestine had been terminated and the State of Israel came into being. Britain's involvement in the establishment of Israel did little to enhance its popularity in the Arab world. Immediately after the declaration that the State of Israel had come into being, the Egyptian Army entered Palestine as part of the recently formed Arab League. The subsequent Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis, known by Arabs as *al-Nakha*, 'the Disaster', was seen by a number of young Egyptian officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, as an indication of the criminal incompetence of the Egyptian ruling elite.[56] As the principal sponsor of the Arab League and the largest contributor of troops to the war, Egypt's humiliation was deeply felt.

1.17 The Free Officers

Nasser was a member of a growing Egyptian middle class, recently admitted to the military elite, anxious to depose those who seemed to collude with British control. In January 1952, Mohamed Naguib was elected president of an underground movement made up of other such men which was known as the Free Officers. They were gradually coming to the attention of the authorities (as well as the CIA[57]). On 20th July 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the main instigator of the movement, learnt that the Free Officers were soon to be arrested and he and the group decided to take action. On the night of the 22nd July the Free Officers occupied the Abdin Palace and the headquarters of the Egyptian Army in Cairo, as well as the airport, radio station and all key communication centres. The bloodless coup was followed by the abdication of King Farouk in favour of his infant son, Prince Fouad (until June 1953 when Egypt

[56] Mansfield, P., 1971, p291-292.
[57] Keay, J., 2003, p 403-405.

became a republic). King Farouk's popularity, which had already been undermined by his divorce of the much-loved Queen Farida in November 1948, had sunk to disastrous levels as a result of the defeat by Israel. The ex-King of Egypt left Alexandria on board the royal yacht, never to return.[58] He was to die in exile on 18th March, 1965.[59]

The Free Officers had feared that Britain would intervene to support King Farouk but the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was more concerned about protecting British property and lives. Nasser's main objective was the withdrawal of British forces from Egyptian soil and in August 1952 the Revolutionary Command Council announced its willingness to separate the question of Sudan from negotiations with Great Britain over the Canal Zone. This removed the chief obstacle to the resolution of the dispute between the two countries. At the time, Turkey was in the process of joining NATO. As a result, Egypt was no longer as central as it had been to British policy concerns in the Middle East. The Soviet threat through Iraq was more of a worry to western analysts than the Suez Canal. In any case, Britain could no longer afford the massive military presence it had previously maintained there.[60] On the other hand, a forced withdrawal of British troops would have sent dangerous messages to other parts of the British Empire. In the Commons, Winston Churchill led a significant number of Tory backbenchers known as the Suez Group against the idea of withdrawal. The group continued to see the Canal as the 'jugular vein of empire' and resisted withdrawal of British troops.[61] Britain sought a compromise in which it

[58] Mansfield, P., 1971, p300.
[59] St Clair McBride, B., Farouk of Egypt. London: Robert Hale, 1968.
[60] Thornhill, M.T., Britain and the Egyptian Question 1950-1954, DPhil Thesis, Oxford, 1995, p202.
[61] Thornhill, 1995, p203

would maintain up to seven thousand British servicemen in the Canal Zone. Nasser refused to agree and encouraged guerrillas to harass the British presence there.

During this period, the United States had been concerned to form a net of client states to limit Soviet expansion. When these came to include Greece, Turkey and Iran, it withdrew its support for continued British involvement in Egypt.[62] As a result, on 18th October 1954 the British Government was forced to agree a compromise in which all British troops were to be evacuated from Egypt. The Canal Zone base was, however, to be maintained on a seven year lease with a cadre of twelve hundred British civilians on contract to British firms. The base could be reactivated by British forces in the event of an attack on a Middle Eastern Arab country or on Turkey. At the same time, Egypt agreed to allow the Sudan to determine its own destiny. The Muslim Brotherhood was critical of the agreement and was subsequently suppressed by Nasser. General Naguib was implicated in its activities and was placed under house arrest. Nasser then publicly assumed the power he had been exercising in the background from the beginning.[63]

1.18 The 1956 Suez Crisis

There followed a series of tit for tat moves between Britain and Egypt that spiralled downwards to the Suez Crisis in the second half of 1956. Nasser sought a Pan-Arab alliance including Syria, and Saudi Arabia led by Egypt. Britain countered this by forging the Baghdad Pact with Iraq and Turkey in 1955. Western restrictions on the supply of arms to Israel's neighbours prompted Nasser to seek weapons from the U.S.S.R. via Czechoslovakia. These were to be paid for in cotton. This move

[62] Keay, J., 2003, p 422-423.
[63] Mansfield, P., 1971, pp308-310.

threatened America's support for Nasser's World Bank loan to construct the Aswan High Dam. The Dam was expected to cost an estimated one billion dollars. The World Bank was to have lent half the sum on condition that the British and American governments provided the other fifty per cent. Britain had failed to fulfil its original pledge after the dismissal of the British General Glubb as head of the Jordanian Arab Legion in February. This was allegedly brought about by Nasser. America withdrew its support for the Dam after Egypt recognised the People's Republic if China in the April.[64] Nasser responded to the news that the two countries were not prepared to fund the project by nationalising the Suez Canal on 26th July 1956. The decision was a complete surprise to both Washington and London. Unfortunately for Britain, its troops had left the Canal Zone one month before.

The British Prime Minister at the time, Sir Anthony Eden, was fearful of appeasing someone whom he saw as a potential second Hitler or 'a Muslim Mussolini.'[65] Drugs that he was taking to combat the effects of a ruptured bile duct were thought to be behind his increasing mood swings.[66] Eden reacted violently to Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal and subsequently sought his overthrow:

> The pattern is familiar to many of us, my friends. We all know this is how fascist governments behave and we all remember only too well, what the cost can be in giving in to fascism ...with dictators you always have to pay a higher price later on, for their appetite grows with feeding.[67]

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[64] Keay, J., 2003, pp 432-433.
[65] Eden, A., quoted in Keay, J., Sowing the Wind The Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East. London: John Murray Ltd, 2003, p 435.
[66] Keay, J., 2003, p 431.
[67] Eden, A., BBC broadcast 8th August, 1956, in Williams, A., Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa, 1914-1967. London: Macmillan, 1968, p 124.

"But what's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser, of "neutralizing" him, as you call it? I want him destroyed, can't you understand?"[68]

Without informing the British Ambassador in Cairo, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, Britain plotted secretly with France and Israel for the latter to invade the Sinai peninsular. This would supposedly threaten the Canal and give Britain and France a pretext to invade the Zone, ostensibly to keep Egypt and Israel apart. France was the other major shareholder in the Canal and it held Nasser responsible for supporting its enemies in Algeria.

Israel needed few excuses to invade its enemy Egypt. This she did on 29th October, though she only managed to get within thirty miles of the Canal itself. Delays in executing the plan and a run on Sterling caused by the dislocation in the Middle East oil supply, however, undermined the British plan. In order to prevent a further run on the pound, Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was forced to ask the United States for a loan. This was only forthcoming on condition that Great Britain withdrew from Egypt. [69] The joint action with France was a military failure and was aborted on 6th November. On 3rd December France and Britain finally agreed to withdraw. Sir Anthony Eden resigned as Prime Minister on 9th January.[70] There was public opposition to the action in Britain but this was not the reason for his humiliation. The failure of the Anglo-French plan was mainly due to the fact that the United States had refused to support Eden's policy.

[68] Eden to Anthony Nutting, in Nutting, A., No End Of A Lesson, London: Constable: 1967, p 35.
[69] Fergusson, N., Empire How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Penguin Books, 2003. p 356.
[70] Keay, J., 2003, p 441.

> Enraged by Britain's initiation of an electorally inconvenient international crisis and by the carelessness with which the British treated the feelings of the Afro-Asian nationalists Washington was sedulously courting for the West, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles curtly instructed their allies to accept an immediate ceasefire and abort their operation. Faced with the blunt threat that no American oil would be available to cater for their growing oil shortage and that the sagging pound sterling would be denied American support, the British quickly gave way. In circumstances that remain somewhat obscure, the Conservative Cabinet disposed, with equal rapidity of Eden, the premier who had incurred American wrath.[71]

It was in the Suez Crisis that Great Britain finally appreciated the new world order. The days of its empire were now truly coming to an end. In hindsight, it appears to have been remarkably slow in grasping this:

> Even as late as the 1950's, few British or French leaders thought they would live to see the end of direct European control of Africa.[72]

1.19 The new world order

After Suez, Great Britain started to understand that it was no longer a major superpower and had to learn to defer to the United States of America. The threat from the USSR (which had managed to invade Hungary unopposed during the Suez Crisis) was to dominate strategic thinking for decades afterwards. Britain had also underestimated the strength of nationalism in Egypt and elsewhere. Ironically, Britain

[71] Darwin, J., The End of the British Empire. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991. pp 69-70.
[72] Jenkins, P., The Next Christendom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p 37.

had itself helped to create nationalist aspirations in countries like Egypt. The Suez Crisis had only served to strengthen them. National self-determination can be seen as a western aspiration. But Britain's rule of Egypt had rested on the assumption that Egyptians were incapable of ruling themselves. Wartime economic hardships, the growth of an Egyptian middle class, increasing democracy and the flimsiness of post-War colonial administration had all sounded the death knell of British control in Egypt. Great Britain had to withdraw with its international reputation in tatters and all its rights under the 1954 Treaty with Egypt withdrawn. All British subjects were expelled from Egypt and most British economic assets in Egypt were "Egyptianised." Anglo-Egyptian relations had reached their nadir. Huge forces, many of which went beyond Egypt, had helped to create the crisis. The Church was one victim among many of the events that took place. But as we shall see, the Church must bear some responsibility for the way in which it laid itself open to the effects of what took place.

Chapter Two

The Anglican Church in Egypt

2.1 Mercantile origins

The origins of the Anglican Church in Egypt are twofold. The first lay in the development of trade between Western Europe and the Levant. The British demand for cotton in the nineteenth century brought a growing number of businessmen to Egypt. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 gave a further boost to British trade in Egypt as well as increasing its strategic importance. It was the British mercantile expatriate community that built the first Anglican Church in Egypt. The foundation stone for the first Anglican church in Egypt, the Church of St Mark in Alexandria, was laid on 17th December, 1839. A chaplain for St Mark's was subsequently appointed by the Bishop of London

2.2 Missionary origins

The other force which lay behind the development of the Anglican Church in Egypt was a missionary one. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw a tremendous growth of western interest in missionary activity around the world, notably in Africa and India. When attention turned to the Middle East, it was immediately appreciated that there was already a Christian presence there. Though predominantly Islamic, the Middle East had previously been the cradle of Christianity and vestiges of its ancient churches remained. To begin with it was understood that these ancient Eastern Churches were the natural channels for Christian witness. At the same time it was felt that the ancient churches had something to learn from their Protestant neighbours in Europe and the United States:

> It is by bringing back these churches to the knowledge and love of the sacred scriptures that the blessing from on high may be expected to descend upon them.[1]

In 1811, CMS, the leading missionary organisation in Britain in the nineteenth century,[2] received a letter from Dr Cleardo Naudi, urging the use of Malta as a base for strengthening the ancient churches of the Levant, and through them, witnessing to Muslims. Though not exactly in the Middle East, Malta was a British territory with strategic links to the Levant. Foreigners were permitted to enter the Ottoman Empire briefly as pilgrims but could only live and work there by permits (known as "capitulations") which regulated their activities.[3] In 1815, the Revd William Jowett, the brother-in-law of Josiah Pratt, the Secretary of CMS, was sent to the Mediterranean "to enquire into the state of religion in the Levant, and to suggest methods of translating and circulating the scriptures, and other ways of influencing the Oriental Churches."[4] Based in Malta, Jowett was commissioned:

> to visit and correspond with rulers and consuls, local ecclesiastics and travellers of all kinds; to form if possible local associations for the circulation of the scriptures; to prepare for the establishment of a printing press at Malta; to study the languages of the Levant, and to seek for valuable MSS of the scriptures in them. Then it is hoped that some of the distinguished Prelates of our church would open a correspondence with the Patraiarchs of

[1] Stock, E., History of the Church Missionary Society. Vol. I, London: CMS 1899, p 226.
[2] Maughan, S., "Imperial Christianity? Bishop Montgomery and the Foreign Missions of the Church of England, 1895-1915" in Porter, A. (Ed), The Imperial Horizons of British Protestant Missions 1880-1914. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003, p 36.
[3] Cragg, K., in Ward, K., and Stanley, B., (Eds), The Church Mission Society and World Christianity 1799-1999. Richmond: Curzon Press Ltd, 2000, p121.
[4] Stock, E., 1899, p223.

Constantinople, Antioch and Alexandria, so that through their influence our systems of education might be communicated and Bible Societies established.[5]

In cooperation with the Religious Tract Society and the British Bible Society, William Jowett duly established a printing press at Malta which produced tracts and portions of scripture in Maltese, Italian, Modern Greek and Arabic.[6] Editions of the scriptures were also produced in Coptic, Syriac and Ethiopic. The Revd Jowett was to continue his work in Malta until 1832. Subsequently, Christopher F. Schlienz of the Basle Mission continued Jowett's production of religious texts. The most important of these works were the Arabic Bible and the Prayer Book in Arabic, Turkish and Amharic. In 1825, four German Lutherans arrived in the Middle East following training at the CMS institution in Islington. These four included Samuel Gobat, who later became Bishop in Jerusalem. His work was concentrated in Abyssinia. The Revd John Rudolph Theophilus Lieder had the major responsibility for the work in Cairo until his death there in 1865. John Lieder and his helpers travelled all over the Delta, into the Fayoum, and up the river Nile into Nubia, distributing scriptures and tracts to Egyptians. The missionaries established a boys' boarding school in Cairo. In 1842 this was changed into a theological seminary for the training of Coptic clergy. This continued to operate until 1862. Lieder revised the Coptic and Arabic New Testaments and translated some of the works of Macarius.

[5] Stock, E., 1899, p 225.
[6] Cragg, K., in Ward, K., and Stanley, B., (Eds), 2000, p 123.

2.3 A bishopric in Jerusalem

In 1841, after considerable diplomatic efforts at the Ottoman court, the British and Prussian Crowns agreed to establish a bishopric in Jerusalem with authority over 'Palestine, Syria, Chaldea, Egypt and Abyssinia'. Appointment to the see was to be made alternately by the Crowns of the two sponsoring nations, with the Archbishop of Canterbury having an absolute right of veto over any Prussian nominees. Queen Victoria appointed the first bishop, Michael Solomon Alexander, a convert from the Jewish faith. Bishop Alexander arrived in Jerusalem in January 1842. There he ordained two German missionaries for work with the CMS in Egypt. Bishop Alexander followed them to Egypt in 1845 but died on the way there. His funeral took place in Cairo on St Andrew's Day, 30th November.

Following Bishop Alexander's death, it was now the turn of King Frederick William IV of Prussia to nominate his successor. King Frederick chose one Samuel Gobat. Gobat remained Bishop of Jerusalem until 1879. By this time missionary activity in the region had expanded considerably and many missionary schools had been established, twenty five of them by Samuel Gobat himself. His desire to cooperate with Eastern churches in the evangelisation of Muslims met with little encouragement:

> Freedom of lay access to Scriptures, personal faith, piety, and perceptions of grace all combined to make relations tense[7]

[7] Cragg, K., in Ward, K., and Stanley, B., (Eds), 2000, p 127.

Orthodox Christians who were attracted to Gobat's message were threatened with expulsion from their own churches. Rather than abandon them, or his beliefs, Gobat felt obliged to admit them into the Anglican fold.[8] This pattern was later to repeat itself in Egypt.

Unfortunately, British nominees to the See of Jerusalem do not seem to have been as resilient as those from Germany. Gobat was succeeded as bishop by the Irishman, Joseph Barclay, who died just eighteen months after his consecration. Despite its greater success in the appointment of bishops, the Prussian Crown subsequently waived its right of appointment to the See of Jerusalem and withdrew its support for the joint venture. The See then remained vacant for another six years when it was reconstituted as a purely Anglican undertaking under Bishop G. F. P Blyth. Although there was now a small Arab-speaking Anglican Church in Palestine, the reconstituted bishopric was again committed to a firm policy of non-recruitment from local communions.[9]

2.4 British intervention in Egypt

In 1882, Great Britain intervened in Egypt on the pretext of supporting the Khedive against a nationalist revolt led by Arabi. The subsequent 'veiled protectorate' might have been expected to create more openings for British missionaries. Evangelical Anglicans had long supported the imperialist policies of Disraeli. Increasingly they were joined in their support by previously sceptical Non-conformist supporters of

[8] Cragg, K., in Ward, K., and Stanley, B., (Eds), 2000, p 127.
[9] Ibid., pp 129-130.

Gladstone. Gladstone had reluctantly ordered the intervention of 1882.[10] Both Anglicans and Non-conformists saw in Egypt new missionary fields that were ripe for harvest. Just as Britain was anxious to keep the French out of Egypt, so were evangelicals anxious to prevent Roman Catholicism from gaining further influence there.

The harsh truth was, however, that the British Government was reluctant to support any activities which might have further complicated its rule of a mainly Muslim country. The British administration obliged missionaries to confine their activities among Muslims mainly to acts of service rather than those of open evangelism. Miss Mary Whately had for many years worked among the poor in Cairo with small grants from the CMS. On 16th December 1882, Miss Whately was joined by the Revd F.A. Klein. Together, they opened a reading room for Muslims in the city. Miss Whately died in 1889 but further women missionaries continued her work of teaching, visiting, and later, nursing. (Many of these women remain unnamed and largely uncommemorated but their selfless service deserves further examination elsewhere). In 1888, Dr Frank J. Harpur was transferred from the Port of Aden to Egypt to establish medical work in Old Cairo. Later, he developed peripatetic work in the Delta, finally settling on the village of Menouf where the Harpur Memorial Hospital now stands. These initiatives, combined with the work of the Revd William H. Temple Gairdner, were to become the main sources of membership and leadership in what eventually became the Episcopal Church in Egypt. By 1910 the missionaries

[10] Bebbington, D. W., "Atonement, Sin and Empire, 1880-1914" in Porter, A., The Imperial Horizons of British Protestant Missions 1880 – 1914. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003, p 24.

sent by the CMS numbered thirty five clergy, four laymen, seven wives and fourteen other women.[11]

2.5 The Revd William H. Temple Gairdner

William H. Temple Gairdner was born in Glasgow where his father was professor of medicine at the University. Like Llewellyn Gwynne, later Bishop of Egypt, he was deeply impressed by the activities of General Charles Gordon. In 1885, he followed the progress of the unsuccessful British expedition to save General Gordon from the Mahdi in the Sudan very closely. Kitchener's conquest of the Sudan in 1898 also made a deep impression on him at a time when he was seeking direction for his life's work. He and his friend, Douglas Thornton offered themselves to the CMS for work in Cairo. Though the CMS remained committed to the support of the ancient churches, the task of the two men was to work "among students and others of the educated classes of Muslims."[12] This was a significant change of emphasis which, given the central role that Gairdner was to have in the Egyptian mission (Thornton died in 1907), was to have important repercussions for the Anglican Church in Egypt.

Believing that Cairo was the strategic centre of Islam, the Revd William H. Temple Gairdner arrived in Egypt in 1899 and began a period of intensive Arabic study. By the end of a year he was giving several addresses in Arabic each week and by 1912 he was teaching Arabic to missionaries at the Cairo Study Centre. In 1917 he produced his book, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, followed in 1925 by The Phonetics of Arabic. Gairdner's linguistic abilities enabled him to engage in dialogue with Muslims in the

[11] Hewitt, G., The Problem of Success. A History of the Church Missionary Society, 1910-1942. London: SCM Press, 1971, p 306.
[12] Padwick, C.E., Temple Gairdner of Cairo, London: SPCK, 1929, p 71.

company of his associate, the Revd Douglas Thornton. Gairdner sought a positive expression of the Christian faith in these discussions, rather than negative point-scoring:

> We need a song note in our message to the Muslims, not the dry cracked note of disputation, but the song note of joyous witness, tender invitation.[13]

Gairdner used music, drama, poetry and pictures as well as articles and debate to present the Christian faith to Muslims. He brought the Episcopal Publishing House into existence with the magazine, Orient and Occident at its heart. Both of these have survived until the present day. Orient and Occident was circulated as far as Palestine, Syria, India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. From 1917 onwards, Temple Gairdner was joined in the production of the magazine by another great Christian Islamist, Constance Padwick.

Temple Gairdner came to Egypt supporting the CMS policy of wanting to encourage reform in the Coptic Church and to encourage it to reach out to Muslims. He had not sought the creation of an indigenous Anglican church. But by 1921, he had come to despair of such a policy in the short term. He felt that the Coptic Church of the time was incapable of providing an effective mission to Muslims. It had too great a history of persecution by the Muslim majority to admit Muslim converts and it tended to pass them on to the Anglican Mission for baptism.

[13] Padwick, C., 1929, p 158.

> In the year 1921, I rose up in wrath and gathered my colleagues about me, and declared that we should not go on like this any longer: in fact, that we must get on or get out.[14]

2.6 An Egyptian Anglican church

The American Mission (Presbyterian) had already developed an indigenous Evangelical Church in Egypt. Temple Gairdner felt that an indigenous Anglican Church with its own pastors was also a necessity in the short term. Small congregations whose membership included Syrian and Palestinian Christians had already started to grow up in Cairo.

> It was decided therefore to retain the Anglican life and order as a home for converts against that day, of which Gairdner never wholly despaired (though appearances were against it), "when there shall emerge a reformed Orthodox Coptic Church, showing at least those two last 'notes' of a Church – evangelical militancy and Catholicity.[15]

It may be easy for us to identify with Gairdner's frustration and appreciate the practical problems involved in meeting the needs of converts from Islam. On the other hand, we might wonder whether this decision was a rather impetuous action by a young man in a hurry rather than one that was in the best interests of the long term mission of the universal church. Though he had only been in Egypt for a couple of decades, Gairdner assumed that he had a better understanding of mission there than the Coptic Church which had been there for nearly two thousand years. Gairdner felt

[14] Padwick, C., 1929, p263.
[15] Ibid, p264.

free to judge the Coptic Church by his own standards and found it wanting. He failed to grasp that the "Western Reformation had been, almost exclusively, a Western experience."[16] It may have been that Gairdner saw his decision to establish an alternative Anglican Church as provisional. The institutional nature of the Anglican Church meant, however, that once a decision was taken, it was unlikely to be reversed.

In 1923, Gairdner drafted a policy statement which was approved by the Archbishop of Canterbury:

> The primary aim of the Anglican Church in Egypt is the evangelisation of the non-Christian population, and it does not desire to draw adherents from either the Coptic or the Evangelical Churches. Those who, in sincerity, find the Anglican Church their spiritual home are welcome to join it, but the Church does not set out to gain their allegiance. Instead, it seeks to extend the right hand of fellowship to the Coptic Church so as to render it every possible form of service, and at the same time it strives for closer co-operation and greater unity between all the churches in Egypt.[17]

Gairdner threw himself wholeheartedly into the development of the Arabic congregation. This eventually moved to the Church of the Saviour in the deprived Boulac area of inner city Cairo. Gairdner acquired the unofficial title of *Wakeel* (deputy) for the Arabic Church to the Bishop of Egypt and the Sudan, Bishop

[16] Cragg, K., in Ward, K., and Stanley, B., (Eds), 2000, p 131.
[17] G3/E/0/1925/15 CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

Llewellyn Gwynne. Looking back in later years, Bishop Gwynne freely admitted that Gairdner had been the greater man:

> [He] used to magnify my office for the sake of discipline. He was cleverer, more able, knew more than I, yet he served me.[18]

Under Gairdner's leadership, the first Egyptian, Girgis Bishai, was ordained deacon in 1924, and was made priest in the following year. Gairdner always sought close links between the Egyptian and expatriate parts of the Anglican Church in Egypt:

> We are working steadily at drawing our Arabic community into closer and more organic connection with the English half of the Diocese. This is necessary from every point of view if the diocesan movement is to be a true one and the Bishop is to be the Shepherd of one flock and not two, as discrete as two kernels held together by one hard shell.[19]

Sadly, it was to be many years before Gairdner's vision of a single, united church, was to be realised. The Arabic-speaking part of the church was to remain the junior partner, kept at arms length by the stronger, expatriate chaplaincies. This was not unique to Egypt. Many transplanted churches, with missionary and chaplaincy dimensions, failed to give equal authority to both sides. Those connected with a

[18] Gwyyne, L., in Hewitt, G., The Problem of Success. A History of the Church Missionary Society, 1910-1942. London: SCM Press, 1971, p 310.
[19] Padwick, C.E., 1929, p 285.

dominant imperialist power, like Britain, seem almost always to have opted for the expatriate chaplaincy side of the church rather than its missionary branch.[20]

Gairdner had an ambitious list of objectives for his ministry but we should not minimise the difficulties he faced. In a letter of great honesty to his fiancée he wrote:

> I seem to have left the uncloudedness ...behind me for ever and have entered into what I feel to be a sadder life....I see the same thing in front of me – this apparently hopeless effort to cope with Islam.... And above all these terrible disappointments. That's the life I have chosen ... sordid miseries, unheroic and uninteresting. This is a call to enter into a very inner chamber of the sufferings of Christ.[21]

Temple Gairdner also felt thwarted in his ability to fulfil many of his objectives by the administrative demands that the mission placed upon him. In November 1923, Wilson Cash, the CMS Secretary of the Egypt Mission, was obliged to leave Egypt owing to a decline in the health of his wife. As a result the Secretariat then fell on Temple Gairdner's already over-burdened shoulders. The CMS was unable to send him the recruits he needed to share his work. Gairdner's subsequent exhaustion probably contributed to his early death in Cairo on 22nd May 1928.

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[20] The Danish Halle mission at Tranqebar in Southern India from 1706 is one of the few exceptions to this generalisation. Though established under the aegis of the Danish crown, the Lutheran mission exercised a sort of 'option for the poor' in striving to make the church Indian in character with the first Indian translation of the New Testament and Indian hymns, catechisms, schools and a seminary. See Ziegebalg, B., in Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions. Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998, p 761.

[21] Padwick, C.E., 1929, p 95.

2.7 Temple Gairdner's legacy

In 1934, the Church of Jesus, Light of the World, was built in memory of Temple Gairdner in Old Cairo. His vision for the Anglican Church in Egypt as a whole was not, however, to be fulfilled. While education and medical work among Muslims continued, Gairdner's successors seem to have lacked his drive and confidence that Muslim converts were to be expected and welcomed as the basis of an indigenous Anglican Church. A number of factors may lie behind this. Political pressures may well have contributed to a reluctance to seek converts from Islam. Great Britain became increasingly reluctant to offend Muslim opinion throughout the Middle East and especially in Egypt where nationalism was growing. This was reflected in Great Britain's unwillingness to oppose moves by the Egyptian government to insist on the teaching of Islam in all schools, including those belonging to the CMS. The development of the organisation of the Anglican Church in Egypt with its buildings, schools and hospitals, may also have caused it to reach a point of stasis. As the Church acquired more of these things, it had more to lose from upsetting the Muslim majority by seeking converts. As in the Coptic Church, there may also have been a fear of Muslim converts among existing members of the Anglican Church.

Whatever the reasons, however, conversions from Islam subsequently slowed to a trickle. Apart from natural growth through reproduction, the small amount of growth that the Church experienced came from those who had been born members of the Coptic or Evangelical Churches.[22] In 1922 the Episcopal Church in Egypt was reported to have 429 baptized members and 219 communicants. By 1940, there were

[22] Between 1925 and 1947, one hundred and seventy nine people were received into the Egyptian Anglican Church from other churches, one hundred and thirty seven of them from the Coptic Church. AS 35/49 G2 E1 1946-1948. CMS Overseas Division Asia 1935-1959, 174/12. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

approximately 700 members.[23] Though accurate figures are difficult to obtain this position has remained largely static until the present day. Like many other Christian minorities in Egypt, Egyptian Anglicans have remained a tiny minority, defined by family allegiances rather than personal commitment. Bishop Gwynne wrote candidly in 1943 of the challenges facing Anglican missionaries in Egypt at the time:

> 'The small Episcopal Church in Egypt,' ....'has not yet found its feet ... [its] members to a large extent are drawn from other Christian Churches, and are largely families of CMS workers at the hospitals or schools'.....'Those who are called to be missionaries to Moslems let them prepare their souls for a heart-breaking job.'[24]

Though his vision of a church full of converts from Islam was never realised, the almost saintly status accorded to Temple Gairdner by the Anglican Church in Egypt has meant that his development of an indigenous Anglican Church there has never been seriously questioned. The creation of structures and investment in buildings and people has made it difficult to consider its removal. And yet, according to his colleague, friend and biographer, Constance Padwick, a permanent indigenous Anglican Church was never really Gairdner's wish or vision:

> Gairdner never dreamed that this would be Egypt's final way of life and worship.[25]

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[23] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to the Most Revd Foss Festcott, Metropolitan of India, 29th April, 1940. Bundle 92A. CMS Local Oct 1939-1950. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[24] Gwynne, L., to Warren, M., 9th November, 1943, quoted in Hewitt, G., The Problems of Success. A History of the Church Missionary Society, 1910-1942. London: SCM Press, 1971, p317.
[25] Padwick, C.E., 1929, p264.

A church that is truly faithful to the memory of Temple Gairdner needs to examine whether it still needs to continue to exist today.

The CMS hospitals at Old Cairo and Menouf founded by Dr Frank Harpur, remained some of the most visible and lasting symbols of Anglican service in Egypt. By 1913, Old Cairo Hospital was serving fourteen thousand out-patients per annum. It provided training and experience for several future leaders of the Church, among them Girgis Bishai, the first Egyptian to be ordained into the Episcopal Church in Egypt, Ishaq Musaad, the first Egyptian Bishop, and Ghais Abdel Malik, his successor. The current Bishop, Dr Mouneer Hanna Anis, was formerly Director of Harpur Memorial Hospital in Menouf.

Women missionaries working among the poor of Cairo provided a less visible but no less important expression of the love of Christ. The Boulac Welfare Centre recently celebrated its seventieth anniversary. It provided a mother and baby clinic, youth club and income generation through embroidery. Since 1930 this work has been the responsibility of the Arabic-speaking congregation. Other female missionaries served as teachers in the growing number of CMS schools. Financial pressures after WWI and political pressures after the 1936 Treaty of Independence caused some schools to close but in 1940, Old Cairo Girls' School had 274 pupils and Old Cairo Boys', 272, while Menouf Girls' had 179 and the Boys' School had 150.[26]

[26] Minutes of the Standing Committee of the Egypt Mission. CMS Overseas Division Asia 1935-1959. AS 35/59 G2 E2 1938-1946. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

2.8 S. A. Morrison and the churches' influence on government

Much of this work took place under the leadership of S.A. Morrison. He had joined Temple Gairdner in 1920 to work among students at Cairo's Al Azhar University. His knowledge of Arabic and Egyptian affairs were of great use to the mission of the Anglican Church. Morrison was instrumental in the formation of a committee of liaison, the "Missions and Government" Committee of the Egypt Inter-Mission Council. This body lobbied the Egyptian Government on education and other matters of concern to missionary organisations working in Egypt. This lobbying was frequently done through the British Embassy, which was seen as having considerable influence over the Egyptian Government. During negotiations for the 1936 Treaty between Great Britain and Egypt, Morrison was among those who expressed concern that the treaty should enshrine safeguards for religious minorities, ensuring that they were free to express their faith. This was particularly important for Christian schools such as those operated by the CMS. The Egyptian Government had frequently expressed a desire to abolish some of these freedoms. Though sympathetic, Sir Miles Lampson, the British High Commissioner, appears to have been prepared to drop the issue of religious freedoms in order to secure a treaty. He did, however, offer encouragement by suggesting that freedom of religion might be enshrined in Egypt's application to join the League of Nations:

> Early in the negotiations it appeared that there was no hope of securing the insertion in the Treaty of any safeguard for minorities but interviews with Sir Miles Lampson (the British High Commissioner in Egypt), the British Foreign Office, and the State Department at Washington lend encouragement to the hope that provisions similar to those inserted in the Treaty covering Iraq's

admission to the League of Nations will be demanded when Egypt submits to Geneva the application for membership of that body.[27]

Negotiations at Montreaux in May 1937 were seen by Morrison as beneficial for missionaries in that they abolished the capitulations and put a time limit on the life of mixed tribunals. Both of these things had previously contributed to the impression among Egyptians that foreigners, including missionaries, were above Egyptian law. The negotiations at Geneva for the admission of Egypt to the League of Nations were less successful, however, from the point of view of religious minorities:

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

One of the major activities of the "Missions and Government" Committee of the Egypt Inter-Mission Council, of which I am secretary, was the conduct of negotiations with the Egyptian Government, the British Residency (now the Embassy) and the British Foreign Office (through the International Missionary Council) for the securing of guarantees at Montreaux and Geneva. But whereas some success, as we have indicated, attended the negotiations in connection with the Capitulations Conference, those at Geneva were frustrated by the point blank refusal of the Egyptian delegation to give any further assurances for the protection of minorities in Egypt to the League of Nations.[28]

It would not be unreasonable to suggest that at the time, Britain did have sufficient influence over Egypt to secure these assurances. The fact that it did not do so suggests

[27] Morrison, S.A. Annual CMS Letter 1936, G3 AL 1935-1939. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[28] Morrison, S.A., Annual CMS Letter 1937, G3 AL 1935-1939. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

that Great Britain did not place a sufficiently high priority on them to wish to do so. Though Britain was a supposedly Christian country with an established church, it was prepared to sacrifice the interests of Christians in Egypt, including members of the Anglican Church there, in the interests of securing what it saw as a favourable treaty. The interests of the British church were not always co-terminus with those of the British state and the influence of the former over the latter certainly had its limits:

> These Christian minorities have in the past been neglected and somewhat cowed by the rather blatant Moslem-Arab political sympathy shown by H.M.G. and its officials in these parts; largely on account of our desire not to offend the susceptibilities of the Moslem world in general and India in particular.[29]

2.9 Missionaries as agents of British imperialism

One of the tensions with which British missionaries in Egypt lived was that the Egyptian press sometimes accused them of being the agents of British imperialism. This was not unique to Egypt. Wherever empire and mission were to be found together:

> Inevitably national sentiment looked upon missionary activity as inimical to the country's interests[30]

In Egypt, accusations against missionaries were sometimes used to undermine the Wafd Party which was sometimes seen as sympathetic to missionaries rather than to

[29] Letter to Bishop Allen from the British Ambassador 5th July 1949. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[30] Panikkar, K. M., Asia and Western Dominance. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1953, p 455.

the growing tide of nationalism within Egypt:

> Many of the scurrilous attacks on missionary work which appeared in the Arabic press during the newspaper campaign of 1933-4 have been reproduced, and the implication is that the Wafd party is lending its support to missionary activity.[31]

S.A. Morrison believed that among the many effects of the 1936 Treaty:

> Another should be the liberation of missionaries from the oft-repeated charge of being political agents, and of being in the pay of the controlling Power.[32] No longer is there any ground for associating the missionary enterprise in the Egyptian mind with the supposed Imperialistic policy of Great Britain. In this respect, missions should gain rather than lose by the withdrawal of British influence.[33]

Missionaries were quick to reject the charge that they were British agents, though sometimes with a lack of self-awareness that today appears breathtaking. They were citizens of the occupying power and could not help but bring many British values and aspirations with them as part of their mission. Though critical of some aspects of British imperial policy, where their interests coincided with those of the British Embassy, some missionaries appear to have been willing to offer it practical support.

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23 Morrison, S.A. Annual CMS Letter 1938, G3 AL 1935-1939. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

[32] Morrison, S.A. Annual CMS Letter 1936, GS AL 1935-1939. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

[33] Morrison, S.A. Annual CMS Letter 1937, GS AL 1935-1939. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

In one of his reports, S.A. Morrison noted the widespread fear among Egypt's elite of a Communist revolution.

> The fear of a social and economic revolution dominates the thinking of a large proportion of the landowners and industrialists in the Near East, in whose hands rests the major political power, and drastic measures have been instituted to suppress all Communist propaganda and activity at their root.[34]

In 1950, S.A. Morrison felt it was incumbent on him to side with the rich and powerful by assisting the British Embassy in its efforts to oppose the spread of Communism in Egypt:

> The British diplomatic officials have been making a special study of this question at the request of the Foreign Office and my help was solicited in providing information for the report which was sent home.[35]

In the following year, Morrison went further:

> It will also be of interest to know that the Publicity Section of the British Embassy is publishing an edition of 5,000 copies in Arabic of a 32-page booklet I wrote under a 'nom de plume' on "Communism is not the Answer to

[34] Morrison, S.A., 11th April 1951. C.M.S. Overseas Division 1935-1959. AS 69 G2 E1 1950-1951. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[35] Morrison, S.A., Annual CMS Letter 1950, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

Egypt's Problems." This booklet is being published by a commercial book-seller in Cairo, so that the source of the subsidy will not be disclosed.[36]

This was at a time when western paranoia about Communism was very high and many Christians, including Morrison, believed that it was their duty to oppose it. But this covert interference in the domestic politics of Egypt was a very dangerous ploy for any missionary, exposing all missionaries to charges of being agents for foreign powers. It put all the good work being done by CMS in such areas as education and health at considerable risk.

Perhaps this willingness to risk interference in the politics of Egypt was a result of a changing political atmosphere. In 1949, Morrison detected that the political and social climate in which missionaries were operating had eased.[37] The failure of the Arab attack on Israel had weakened the idea of a pan-Islamic Arab block, encouraging Egypt to align herself instead with one or other of the western powers. As already noted, the Egyptian Government was also anxious about the influence of Communism. At the same time, the excesses of the Muslim Brotherhood had shown the dangers of extreme Islamic nationalism. A diverse religious context with strong links to the West seemed desirable at the time. Sadly for the Anglican Church, this situation was not to last.

[36] Morrison, S.A. Annual CMS Letter 1951. ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[37] Morrison, S.A. Annual CMS Letter 1949. ASW AL 1940-1949. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

2.10 Deteriorating conditions for mission

The failure of the British Government to reach agreement with the Wafd Government in Egypt on the further withdrawal of troops helped to create greater instability in the region and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Great Britain. In 1951, Morrison noted that:

> The total situation would appear to be far from stable and any marked change in the international, or political, sphere might have serious repercussions for the position of the Churches and Missions in the Near East.[38]

The abrogation of the 1936 Treaty in the October of that year and subsequent attacks on British forces in the Canal Zone made it increasingly difficult for those Egyptians who were working in what were still perceived as British institutions. As a result of these difficulties, 'CMS' was removed from the titles of all mission institutions in Egypt. The properties, however, remained in the hands of the CMS. CMS was reluctant to place its properties in the hands of local Egyptians because of its experiences elsewhere:

> We have found from very long experience that where the Church is very small in numbers there are great problems involved in giving it complete ultimate control over a vast institution involving a great amount of money and patronage.[39]

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[38] Morrison, S.A., 11th April 1951. C.M.S. Overseas Division 1935-1959. AS 69 G2 E1 1950-1951. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[39] Milford, C.S. Letter to Gurney, H.C. 4th June 1953. 182/1 AS 59 G2 Eg5. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

This caused frustration to CMS personnel in Egypt as well as to local Egyptians:

> At what stage does CMS London recognise a local Christian Council as being independent of mother's apron-strings, and allow it the freedom to improve or to ruin itself which God allows to all children through the gift of free will?[40]

Alongside this frustration, it should also be noted, however, that members of the Egyptian Episcopal Church seem to have been reluctant to accept responsibility for CMS property. This was because they believed that while buildings and land remained in the hands of the CMS, they remained under the protection of the British Government. This situation had applied under the Capitulations which were a hangover from the Ottoman Empire but these had been abolished in 1937. Whatever the causes of the failure to hand over property, the effects were that their administration was made much more difficult after the Suez Crisis.

Whether the name on the property or who owned it had any effect on its safety is not clear. It is significant to note that on 26th January 1952 when many British properties were set on fire following the massacre of policemen in Ismailia, Christian institutions, including those owned by foreign missionary organisations, were left alone. Egyptian respect for buildings with a religious association seems to have been stronger than Egyptian hatred of Great Britain.

Amidst all the political upheaval of the time and the constraints that were placed on missionary activity, there was felt by some to be little room for the active conversion

[40] Gurney, H.G., letter to C.M.S. London, 20th March, 1954. AS 59 G2 E1 December 1951-November 1954, C.M.S. Archives, University of Birmingham.

of Muslims. To some extent, institutional ossification could be said to have set in. Though medical work in Egypt was always seen simply as a form of witness to the love of Christ rather than as a means to secure converts,[41] Jesse Hillman, a CMS missionary working as a Medical Administrator in Old Cairo Hospital at the time felt that the hospital had lost some of its edge as a place where Christian vocations of healing were discovered and lived out:

> The hospital came to be looked upon as a place to provide employment for the children of church members and their friends, not primarily because it was their vocation;[42]

This seems to have been a feature of other diocesan institutions and was an inevitable constraint upon church growth. Being an Anglican increasingly became a matter of family identity rather than individual conviction. H.G. Gurney, a CMS missionary who had previously served in Iran, was even more damning of the Church's evangelistic zeal:

> The Church is formed, not of converts as in Iran, but of proselytised Copts. Many have been doubly proselytised, first from the Coptic Church to Presbyterianism, and then from this to the Anglican Communion. The tiny

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41 The concern for the body is genuine and sincere; so much so that the medical missionary will seek help with utter abandon and without conditions just as if the healing of the body were an end in itself.
Cochrane, T., "The Basic Principle of Medical Missions." London: World Domain Press volume VI Number 4 (October 1928) pp 343 - 347 quoted in Grundmann, C. H., Missions-wissenschaftliche Forschungen. Gütersloh,: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1992, p 13.

42 Hillman, J.J., Annual CMS Letter 1954, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

number of real converts take no position in the Church nor have any influence in it.[43]

It is interesting that Gurney noticed a two-tier membership of the Church. Just as converts from Islam were considered potentially dangerous by the Coptic Church, so they seem to have been excluded from any positions of authority in the Anglican Church. Just twenty five years after Temple Gairdner's death, the Anglican Church in Egypt does not seem to have done much better than the Coptic Church he despaired of. Gurney was clearly frustrated that the Church did not seem to be willing to seek further Muslim converts:

> There is no spirit of evangelism in all the churches. The churches have no form of evangelistic activity whatsoever.[44]

Gurney no doubt believed that his interpretation of the biblical injunction to "go therefore and make disciples of all nations" overrode the political and social realities of contemporary Egypt. Like the Coptic Church, and many other ancient churches in the Middle East, membership of the Anglican Church had increasingly become a matter of birth rather than individual conversion. Its small size meant, however, that there was a real danger that it might not be able to take on responsibility for its institutions and survive in the long term:

> It is very difficult to understand what the future of this church is to be. At the moment it grows merely by natural increase of children. Active and deliberate

[43] Gurney, H.G., Annual CMS Letter 1953-'4, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[44] Ibid.

> proselytisation of Copts is certainly not the way it should grow, and no effort at all is being made to win the Moslem.
>
> It would appear that, unless a real spirit of evangelism revives in the church there is nothing for it but to face ultimate stagnation and possibly disappearance.[45]

In the climate of fear and uncertainty that prevailed at the time, an unwillingness to win Moslems was perhaps understandable. It was, however, difficult to discern the purpose of an indigenous Anglican Church. Temple Gairdner's vision for it seemed largely to have fallen by the wayside. By the 1950's it had become what it was to remain for the next fifty years, a small, largely static church made up mainly of former Copts and Evangelicals. Then as now it clung to the idea that its raison d'être was that it could act as a bridge between Copts and Evangelicals, though Gurney was among those who felt that this was not sufficient:

> It is said that our Anglican church can be a "bridge" church between the non-conformist tradition and the ancient churches – and this I heartily agree with – but only if our church is a live church, and it seems to me that a live church must be a church which is growing not stagnating. The mere existence of a tiny static Anglican church will do very little "bridging".[46]

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[45] Gurney, H.G., Annual CMS Letter 1953-'4, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

[46] Gurney, H.G., Annual CMS Letter 1953-'4, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

2.11 Links with the English-speaking church

Before it could provide an effective bridge between the reformed and ancient churches, the Anglican Church had to bridge the gap between its two constituent parts. These were the English-speaking expatriate part through which the Anglican tradition had originally come to Egypt, and the Egyptian Arabic-speaking part inspired by the CMS missionaries. Members of the British Anglican community helped to provide financial support for missionary work among the very poor in Egypt. Reports on the missionary work of C.M.S. were given at the (British) Anglican Church Council. Members of the British Anglican community would have met missionaries at church and on other occasions. Contact between the British and Egyptian Anglican communities was, however, limited and the idea of sharing resources and power was very slow to develop. Though both small, these two halves lived side by side with very little overlap, except in the person of the diocesan bishop. It is to the Anglican bishops of Egypt in this period that we shall now turn.

Chapter Three

Bishop Llewellyn H. Gwynne C.M.G., C.B.E., D.D., LL.D., 1863-1957

"The East is a career"[1]

Fig. 1
Source: Jackson, H.C., Pastor On The Nile. London: SPCK, 1960.

3.1 Sources

The main sources of information on the life of Bishop Gwynne are his diaries and letters, most of which form part of the CMS archives at Birmingham University. The central published work on Bishop Gwynne's life is called Pastor on the Nile and was

[1] Disraeli, B., Tancred. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1882, p141.

written by H. C. Jackson, published in 1960.[2] It is of a largely hagiographic character. In his forward to the book, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, described Gwynne as:

> a great saint and a great hero of the Church.[3]

This study will try to provide a more critical account of Gwynne's life and his impact on the Anglican Church in Egypt.

3.2 Early life and education

Llewellyn Gwynne was born just outside Swansea on 11th June 1863, long before the period in question. He was to have a profound impact on the course of the Anglican Church in Egypt until his retirement as its Bishop in 1946, and beyond. In order to discover what motivations lay behind his life and ministry, it is necessary to go back to his early life and work as a CMS missionary in the Sudan.

Gwynne was the fifth child of Richard Gwynne, a schoolmaster, and Charlotte, née Lloyd. The family was Anglican and its commitment to Christianity was strong. Gwynne was one of three out of six brothers who, following the deepest wishes of their parents, offered themselves for ordination. Though he attended Swansea Grammar School, Gwynne never professed to be an academic. Neither was he from a particularly wealthy family. Had he stayed in class-ridden Britain all his life, it is unlikely that he would have risen to the rank of bishop. Though preferment was never part of Gwynne's reason for going abroad, it certainly opened up possibilities that

[2] Jackson, H.C., Pastor On The Nile. London: SPCK, 1960.
[3] Ibid., p ix.

would not otherwise have been available. His decision to go abroad as a missionary came at the end of a period in which missionaries had tended to come from fairly humble origins:

> For the first three-quarters of the [19th] century the standard missionary product had been a man of humble back-ground and education who would often not have been accepted for the home ministry. Henry Venn, the celebrated mid-century secretary of the CMS, said of his society's missionary college that there would be no need of it if one could get enough missionaries from the universities and the regular clergy. Its purpose, in other words, was simply to provide enough literature, theology, and good manners for a man from the lower middle class to pass muster as a clergyman.[4]

Later, during the period of high imperialism, the missions attracted more men from Britain's elite, products of its public schools and Oxford and Cambridge. By then, Gwynne's experience meant that he was already in a position of authority in the mission field. Though we might applaud the social and professional mobility that missionary service afforded him, we might also ask whether the mission suffered as a result of his humbler education and background.

3.3 Early influences - Gordon of Khartoum

After a spell of teaching, Gwynne trained for the ministry at St John's Hall in Highbury. While there, he followed the ill-fated campaign of General Charles Gordon in Sudan with burning interest. Egypt had conquered the Sudan in 1821. Gordon

[4] Walls, A. F., "The British: Missions in the Imperialistic Era, 1880-1920" in the International Bulletin of Missionary Research, (April, 1982), p 60.

(1833 – 1885) was its Governor-General from 1877-1879. When a subsequent oppressive government was overthrown by the Mahdi between 1883 and 1885, Gordon was reappointed with orders to put down the slave trade and annex the sources of the Nile to the Egyptian throne. The forces at Gordon's disposal were, however, inadequate. He was besieged at Khartoum and finally killed by the forces of the Mahdi on 26th January, 1885. After much dithering, the British Government under William Gladstone had dispatched a force under General Sir Charles Garnet Wolseley to relieve Gordon but it arrived too late. Its failure contributed to the eventual demise of Gladstone's government in 1885.[5] G. W. Joy's painting of Gordon's Last Stand was a powerful expression of what Gordon came to stand for. According to A. N. Wilson:

> It is an icon of Christian civilization, stoical in the face of anarchic savagery. It is also, paradoxically, an image of white supremacy and power.... he stands as the emblem of what is necessary in the face of such murderous anarchy: calm discipline, goodness such as only the English can bring to the world.[6]

Like many, Gwynne was deeply moved by the failure of the expedition to relieve his hero.[7] He saw General Gordon as a martyr whose untimely death had thwarted hopes of Sudan's conversion to Christianity. Gordon's example of selfless, if paternalistic service was to provide a model for the rest of Gwynne's life:

> I would give my life for these poor people of the Sudan. How can I help feeling for them? All the time I was there, every night I used to pray that God

[5] Wilson , A. N., The Victorians. London: Arrow Books, 2003, p472.
[6] Ibid., p471.
[7] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p11

would lay upon me the burden of their sins and crush me with it, instead of those poor sheep. I really wished and longed for it.[8]

General Gordon had a great sense of duty and felt confident that his actions were divinely inspired:

> I am a chisel that cuts the wood; the Carpenter directs it. If I lose my edge, He must sharpen me; if He puts me aside and takes another, it is His own good will; He will do His work with a straw equally well.... God must undertake the work and I am for the moment used as His instrument.[9]

Gwynne had the same sense of being God's instrument, closely in tune with the divine purpose. This entry in Gwynne's diary is typical:

> A blessed Sunday. 18 at HC. Visited hospital and God the Holy Ghost spoke through me at 6.30 when we worshipped.[10]

Gordon was to remain Gwynne's hero for the rest of his life and he provided the inspiration for much of his ministry.[11] Gwynne mentioned him frequently in sermons and read from Gordon's diaries which seem to have influenced his own diary-

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[8] Nutting, A., Gordon, Martyr and Misfit. London: Reprint Society, 1966, p315.
[9] Gordon, C., quoted by Gwynne, L., in Jackson, H.C., Pastor On The Nile. London: SPCK, 1960, p 59.
[10] Diary entry 23rd June 1935 Diaries of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69 University of Birmingham.
[11] Gordon, who sought the guidance of God in all his undertakings, was a hero to Gwynne, who felt that he could do no better than follow his example.
Jackson, H.C., 1960, p11.

keeping.[12] Through Gwynne's role as Bishop, the life and outlook of General Charles Gordon were to have important effects on the Diocese of Egypt.

3.4 Theology

Another influence on Gwynne, was the Bible which, like Gordon, he read avidly, though with no great scholarship. Gwynne's missionary zeal rested on a belief in the realisation of the lordship of Christ over the whole world. Like many of his contemporaries, Gwynne saw other religions as idolatrous affronts to God's sovereignty. This may have been tempered by experience but he continued to look forward to a time when the earth would be full of the knowledge of the Lord and he saw British imperialism as one agent of this process. Though we tend to play down the imperialist nature of Christianity, Gwynne saw British imperialism as a continuation of the Divine Plan. In common with many other missionaries, Gwynne was committed to its dissemination of the benefits of Western civilisation.[13]

Though he would never have expressed himself in such terms, Gwynne, like other Evangelicals of his day, saw no incompatibility between reason and biblical faith:

> Natural theology – the deduction of the existence and nature of God from the structure of his created work – had a valuable role in supporting the claims of biblical revelation. Reason declared to be probable what revelation declared to be true.[14]

[12] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 58.
[13] Stanley, B., The Bible and the Flag. Leicester: Apollos, 1990, p 65.
[14] Ibid., p 63.

Thus Gwynne, like other contemporary Evangelicals, blended ideas that seemed to reject the Enlightenment with those that arose out of it.[15] Fundamentally, though, Gwynne's religion:

> was and is a religion of enthusiasm, experience and activism.[16]

3.5 Early influences – Rudyard Kipling

A further major influence on Gwynne was the work of another great hero of British imperialism, Rudyard Kipling.[17] Gwynne was by no means alone in his admiration for Kipling. The Revd John Watson, the popular preacher and hymn-writer designated Kipling the "real poet laureate" of England.[18] Kipling's significance as an apologist of Victorian 'High Imperialism" has been examined by R. H. MacDonald in his book, The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880 – 1918[19] and by A. F. Walls in his book, The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History.[20] In W. T. Stead's Review of Reviews XIV of December 1896, Kipling was described as 'the Laureate of Empire'[21] He identified England as the new Israel, a chosen people with a manifest destiny to bring enlightenment and civilisation to a benighted world:

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[15] Stanley, B. (Ed), Christian Missions and the Enlightenment. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001, p 21.
[16] Stanley, B., 1990, p 62.
[17] Jackson, H.C., 1960. p11.
[18] Robertson Nicoll, W., Ian Maclaren: Life of the Rev. John Watson, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908, quoted in Walls, A.F., The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2002, p178.
[19] MacDonald, R. H., The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880 – 1918. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994.
[20] Walls, A.F. The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2002.
[21] Stead W. T., Review of Reviews XIV of December 1896, p 553, quoted in MacDonald, R. H., The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880 – 1918. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994, p 145.

Fair is our lot – O goodly is our heritage!

(Humble ye, my people, and be fearful in your mirth!)

For the Lord our God Most High

He hath made the deep as dry,

He hath smote for us a pathway to the ends of the Earth.[22]

Walls notes that Kipling made free, though not always orthodox, use of biblical imagery which strongly appealed to Gwynne:

> His discourse was so thoroughly biblical that a knowledge of the English Bible was needed for its elucidation; earnest Christians could identify with so much of it that many were prepared to take their chance with the odd worrying application or pagan reference.[23]

In more than one poem, Kipling compared the burden of the British imperialists with that of Moses, leading a reluctant people to freedom in the promised land:

"Why brought ye us from bondage,

"Our loved Egyptian night?"[24]

This was to have a geographical as well as a spiritual resonance with Gwynne's own life.

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[22] Kipling, R., "A Song of the English" in Verses. New York, 1916, pp 181 –194.
[23] Walls, A.F., 2002, p185.
[24] Kipling, R., "The White Man's Burden," in The Collected Works of Rudyard Kipling, (28 vols) New York: A.M.S. Press, 1970, 26: p221-223

Like many others, Gwynne accepted without question the ideals of Victorian High Imperialism. These included the idea that it was the duty of Britons to conquer and civilise 'the dark peoples of the world' for their own good.[25] This calling promised nothing but blood sweat and tears. It brought with it no guarantee of recompense in terms of personal fame or reward. These ideas were most clearly articulated in Rudyard Kipling's poem "The White Man's Burden." Originally written with reference to the American annexation of the Philippines, the "burden" became that of the particular destiny of the British white man going out to serve in the British Empire:

Take up the White Man's burden –
Send forth the best ye breed –
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve the captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness
On fluttered folk and wild –
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.

Take up the White Man's burden –
In patience to abide,
To veil the threat of terror
And check the show of pride;
By open speech and simple,

[25] Stanley, B., 1990, p 36.

An hundred times made plain.

To seek another's profit,

And work another's gain.[26]

Kipling's paternalistic attitude rested on a belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race which was to remain with Gwynne throughout his life:

> There is no doubt that he [Kipling] was responsible directly or indirectly for much that encouraged an unpleasant and even dangerous jingoism – a patronizing view of any other race than our own.[27]

Gwynne was himself to have much to do with Kipling's Sudanese "Fuzzy Wuzzies":

'An 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, with your 'ayrick 'ead of 'air

You big black boundin' beggar – for you broke a British square![28]

By his own admission, Gwynne was no intellectual. Though no man's thoughts remain unchanged throughout life, Gwynne's long ministry abroad meant that he was not often exposed to new ideas from Britain. Those absorbed in early life from people like Kipling were to remain influential throughout his life and ministry. Ideas of the white man's burden and the superiority of the British race were to reassert themselves right at the end of Gwynne's ministry in sermons addressed to troops during the Second World War.

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[26] Kipling, R., 1970, vol. 26, pp 221-223.
[27] Moore, K., Kipling and the White Man's Burden. London: Faber and Faber, 1968, p 85.
[28] Kipling, R., "Barrack Room Ballads" quoted in R. H. The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880 – 1918. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994, p 149.

3.6 Gwynne the missionary to the Sudan

Llewellyn Gwynne was ordained in 1886. After serving in Derby and Nottingham, he left England for the Sudan in November 1899 under the auspices of the CMS. The Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa, had been defeated by an Anglo-Egyptian force led by Lord Kitchener in the previous year in the Battle of Karari.[29] In addition to missionaries from the CMS, the new administration permitted the Verona Fathers and the (Presbyterian) American Mission to enter the Sudan.[30]

1899 is also the year that the Boer War began. It is widely regarded as the high water mark of British imperialism.[31] Gwynne was never to return to Britain for long periods until his retirement. This probably meant that he was not exposed to the changes in thought regarding British imperialism to the same extent as his fellow countrymen and women. The ideals of Victorian High Imperialism were thus to remain with Gwynne throughout his life long after many had come to question or even abandon them.

Gwynne was forced to spend a year in Cairo, waiting for permission from the British authorities to enter the Sudan. While he was there he stayed with Dr Frank Harpur, a medical missionary of the CMS, at the Old Cairo Hospital:

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[29] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 2.
[30] Wheeler, A. C., in Hansen, H. B., and Twaddle, M., (Eds) Christian Missions and the State in the Third World, Oxford: 2002, p 285.
[31] Stanley, B., 1990, p 36.

> his impressions of Cairo were bad – the contrasts of great wealth and extreme poverty, the extravagance and pursuit of pleasure by the ruling classes, the dirt and squalor of the streets.[32]

Though tempered by experience, these impressions were to remain with him throughout his ministry. Sudan, not Egypt, was to be his real love.

Gwynne and Dr Harpur were finally given permission to journey to Omdurman, across the Nile from Khartoum, in what they called the 'Gordon Mission', on condition that they did not attempt to evangelise Muslims:

> The British authorities, anxious lest missionary activity might stir up further Muslim 'fanaticism', refused to allow Christian proselytization north of the 10th line of latitude[33]

General Kitchener, the Governor General of the Sudan, was sensitive to Egyptian claims that the British had captured the Sudan in order to convert Muslims to Christianity. Gwynne tried persuasion:

> "What harm can I do?" he asked. "I can't stir up any trouble among the natives as I don't know any Arabic."
>
> "I know your sort," replied Kitchener. "You'll soon pick up enough Arabic to make yourself understood. What you can do, is to look after the spiritual needs

[32] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 13.
[33] Wheeler, A. C., in Hansen, H. B., and Twaddle, M., (Eds), 2002, p 285.

> of the officers and non-commissioned officers attached to the Egyptian Army in various parts of Sudan; there are plenty of heathen among them."[34]

Gwynne and Harpur had arrived shortly before Christmas, 1899.[35] Gwynne's first service was held on Christmas Day and was attended by around sixty British soldiers. In a letter he recalled that:

> There was something grand in the sight of these Britishers, doing their duty in the sweltering heat of the Sudan, met together to keep the great Festival of our Church and race. We managed to get hold of an altar table, a cross and a few flowers and colonel Ferguson had kindly collected a choir which practised the hymns for the service; we sang 'Come, all ye faithful' and 'While shepherds watched their flocks by night' with zeal and fervour that was most refreshing.[36]

On occasion, Gwynne lobbied the British authorities to adopt more pro-Christian policies in the Sudan. His fruitless campaign to have the weekly holiday moved from Friday to Sunday is a case in point.[37] On the whole though, Gwynne sought to work within the constraints created by those in authority. Despite its suspicion of him and the limitations it placed upon his work, like many of his background, he saw the British Empire as an instrument for the extension of the kingdom of God on earth. Gwynne was prepared to do his bit to encourage and support it in its efforts. In December, 1900, Gwynne was asked to act as chaplain to the British troops

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[34] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 21.
[35] Ibid., p17.
[36] Letter of 29th December 1899, quoted in ibid., p 19.
[37] Jackson, H.C., 1960, pp 71-72.

garrisoned in Khartoum. He became very popular with the soldiers and encouraged many of them to join the church. A keen sportsman, Gwynne organised games of cricket and football for the men, and gave lectures on his hero, General Gordon. This pattern of service among British troops was to be another theme that recurred throughout his ministry and again, it was to have a lasting impact on the Diocese as a whole.

Gwynne was anxious to begin his missionary work among the non-Muslim peoples of the south of the Sudan. Eventually, he was given permission to do so. The Oxbridge-dominated Sudan Political Service in Khartoum had little interest in the south, regarding the north as culturally superior. Administration of the south was loosely conducted through 'Bog Barons' – soldiers seconded from the Egyptian or Indian armies who ran their provinces like Medieval fiefdoms with little influence from Khartoum.[38] Gwynne seems to have shared many of the attitudes of the Sudan Political Service. Journeying south to meet a Nuer chief:

> I felt that it was probably best to treat them as children so I took a bell and a few beads out of my pocket and gave them to the chief.[39]

In 1903, Gwynne was also permitted to open schools in Khartoum for Sudanese children. His work in the area of girls' education in Sudan was to be one of his most lasting legacies. Though he was sometimes ahead of his age in the quest for sexual equality, the same could not be said with regard to race. He grew very fond of the

[38] Wheeler, A. C., in Hansen, H. B., and Twaddle, M., (Eds),2002, p286.
[39] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p53.

Sudanese but he never seemed to consider them as his equals, referring to them often as children:

> How can one help loving these simple children or laughing at their simple ways!...
>
> Ignorant, superstitious, thoughtless and often cruel as they are. Oh! For the day when I can teach them something better...[40]

Like many of his contemporaries, Gwynne saw himself as the bearer of salvation to a benighted and hopeless people:

> to bring the light of Christ into the darkness of the heathen world and to deliver the people for whom Christ died from the malignant powers of evil.[41]

These patronising and racist attitudes were hardly unusual in a British expatriate of the period. According to Gwynne's contemporary, A. H. Keane, the Sudanese Negro was temperamentally:

> sensuous, indolent, improvident, fitful, passionate and cruel, though often affectionate and faithful ." With little sense of dignity, and [only] slight self-consciousness," the Sudanese found "acceptance of the yoke of slavery ... easy." Culturally this lowest division of humankind had been able to achieve

[40] Jackson, H.C., 1960, pp 41-42.
[41] Ibid., p263.

"no perceptible progress anywhere except under the influence of higher races.[42]

Like other evangelical missionaries, Gwynne might be distinguished from scientific racists in that he believed (in theory at least) that, given the right encouragement, other races could be improved.[43] Having said this, Gwynne's expectations do not appear to have been very high. In addition, his limited success as a missionary among Muslims sometimes seemed to throw his belief in the perfectibility of people into doubt. The great length of Gwynne's ministry and the honour accorded to it meant that his views were to continue to have a profound influence on the life and work of the Church in Egypt and the Sudan for many years. During much of the period under examination, while the world was moving from a colonial to a post-colonial situation, the Anglican Church in Egypt was being led by a man still thoroughly imbued with the Victorian tenets of the Empire. Gwynne's biographer, H.C. Jackson, argues that during his life he moved from an imperialist outlook to the concept of "a Commonwealth purged of selfishness which would eventually cover all creeds and all continents and ensure peace and friendliness to all the world"[44] but this was to be led by the British whom he continued to see as a superior people. Quite what is meant by a commonwealth here is unclear. Certainly, Gwynne is unlikely to have seen it as a body of equals. There may have been some movement in Gwynne's attitudes during his long life but he did not tend to see such shifts of position as a virtue:

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[42] Keane, A. H., Man Past and Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899. p41., quoted in Bonk, J. ""All things to all persons" – the Missionary as a Racist – Imperialist 1860 –1918" in Missiology 8, (July 1980), p 298.
[43] Stanley, B., 1990, p 163.
[44] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p256.

> When Gwynne held firm convictions on any subject his stubborn refusal of all compromise sometimes made him a difficult man to have on a committee, whether as a member or in the chair. He has been accused of obstinacy on such occasions but it is only fair to add that he only arrived at a decision after prolonged thought and prayer. Once he was convinced that God had told him what to do he believed most ardently that it would be disloyal to his Maker if he were to disregard the advice that had been given to him in answer to his prayer for guidance.[45]

This reluctance to change in a changing world was to have a profound effect on the effectiveness of the Anglican Church in Egypt from 1936-1956. While the world was altering rapidly around him, the aging Bishop Gwynne remained a symbol of stability, a comforting but increasingly anachronistic representative of a former time.

3.7 An Anglican Cathedral in Khartoum

In 1900, Lord Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General, proposed an Anglican Church in Khartoum for the British community there:

> Though as British Agent and Consul-General he had felt it necessary to oppose all missionary work among the Muslim people of the northern Sudan, Cromer, as a sincere Christian, was deeply concerned for the spiritual welfare of the British community.[46]

[45] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p70.
[46] Ibid., p127.

This was to be a recurring theme in the approach of British authorities to the Anglican Church. They saw it as necessary for their own subjects but were reluctant to see it making native converts. Once again, Gwynne was content to work within the constraints imposed upon him by the colonial authorities, even refraining from teaching his own servants the rudiments of Christianity. The development of an exclusively expatriate church avoided obvious conflicts with the Muslim majority. But one must question whether it was true to the missionary call to make disciples of all nations. The development of a church for white expatriates which did not seek to welcome the black majority seems a poor witness to the love of God for all. The Church was built through private subscription to avoid charges of government sponsorship. It was a distinction that may have been lost on those who observed the members of the British administration attending it. The Cathedral was built in memory of General Charles Gordon, close to the place where he was killed. It contained a memorial chapel in his name which bore the inscription:

> Praise God for Charles George Gordon, a servant of Jesus Christ,
> whose labour was not in vain in the Lord.[47]

The association was obviously dear to Gwynne, made Archdeacon of the Sudan in 1905 (Fig. 2) and consecrated Suffragan Bishop of Khartoum in 1908, as well as to the many Britons who gathered at the Cathedral. It was perhaps not, however, an ideal one for a church seeking to recommend itself to the Sudanese people. The Cathedral was consecrated in 1912.

[47] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p132.



Fig. 2
Llewellyn H. Gwynne
Archdeacon of the Sudan
Source: Jackson, H.C., Pastor On The Nile. London: SPCK, 1960.

3.8 The First World War

Bishop Gwynne was on leave in England when the First World War broke out. He immediately volunteered to be an army chaplain, though he was already fifty years old. His prayerful cheerfulness had made him popular with the troops in the Sudan. A Coldstream Guard stationed there recounted that:

> I likes the Bishop, there's none of that Lord Almighty stuff about him. He talks as if God, him and me was all friends alike.[48]

Gwynne's talents among the troops found ready employment among the forces in France. In 1915 he became Deputy Chaplain General (Fig. 3) with the rank of Major-General. Gwynne believed that all war was contrary to God's will[49] but he sincerely felt that the British cause was just and showed himself willing to assist with the British propaganda machine. He accepted the assumption of General Haig and many other Britons that they had God on their side:

> A good chaplain is as valuable as a good general. The Chaplain's department in the army is one of the most valuable departments in the army and no one could do more than a chaplain to sustain morale and explain what the Empire is fighting for. We are not fighting for our country. We are fighting for Christ and the freedom of mankind.[50]

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[48] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p138.
[49] Ibid., p 151.
[50] General Haig quoted in Jackson, H.C., 1960, p160.

Fig. 3
Bishop Gwynne as Deputy Chaplain General
in France
World War I
Source: Jackson, H.C., Pastor On The Nile. London: SPCK, 1960

This close identification with the needs of Britain won Gwynne many friends in the British establishment. He was awarded the CMG and the CBE, as well as an honorary doctorate from the University of Glasgow for his services.[51] Though grieved by the suffering, waste and divisions of war, his experiences do not seem to have dented his faith in the superiority of Christianity and the inevitability of human moral progress. It is questionable, however, whether his work as a British Army chaplain would have found favour with many of those to whom he was originally called as a missionary.

3.9 Bishop of Egypt and the Sudan

In 1920, Gwynne became Bishop of the newly-formed Diocese of Egypt and the Sudan. It was a vast see requiring enormous energy and stamina of its shepherd. It was quite impossible for Gwynne to do the job of bishop adequately over such an enormous area. But perhaps it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the fact that Egypt held a secondary place in his affections had an impact on the quality of ministry exercised in the northern part of his Diocese:

> For Bishop Gwynne life in Cairo was harder and stormier than in Khartoum. Egyptian resentment at the prolonged British occupation, accentuated by lack of recognition of their share in the laborious side of the First World War and by the rebuff to Zaghlul Pasha's national cabinet when it was over, had led to a series of murders, riots and disorders culminating in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor General of the Sudan[52]

[51] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 173.
[52] Ibid., p190.

3.10 Gwynne's attitudes to Egyptians

Gwynne shared the rather low opinion of Egyptians that many British expatriates in Egypt had at the time. Those mentioned in his diaries by name tended to be members of Arabic congregations or servants:

> Communicated at 7.30. a blessed time...sacked Mohammed who had robbed our guests.[53]

Though he claimed to have many Egyptian friends, including some Muslims such as Sheikh Al Maraghi, later Rector of Al Azhar University,[54] Gwynne's reflections on Egyptians in general were often pejorative:

> The Egyptians are like children in school. a rap over the knuckles or sending them away for a couple of months or expelling them for a time does a lot of good.[55]

Gwynne had little time for Egyptian politicians whom he believed were incapable of governing Egypt without British assistance:

> It is the policy of the British Foreign Office to say that the Egyptians are a most enlightened people with a strong sense of the good of their country and with high ideals of a righteous administration, but the real truth is that they are an uncivilised people, and their Parliament does not represent the country at

[53] Diary entry 3rd March 1939. Diaries of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69. University of Birmingham.
[54] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 191.
[55] Diary entry 29th June 1937 Diaries of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69. University of Birmingham.

all, but only a few thousand intelligentsia. The politicians are not out for the good of their own country, with very few exceptions. They are mainly concerned with enriching themselves and getting posts for the impecunious relations. The bulk of the people of Egypt, the fellaheen, who number about fourteen millions out of sixteen millions, live under conditions of life which are simply appalling, yet are the people who work from morning to night to produce wealth which is squandered by the politicians. These politicians ought never to be allowed the power they have. It is only by consummate tact and wisdom on behalf of our local administrators that they are prevented from doing more damage to their own country. However, they yield to a strong hand, and are not vexed or resentful if we prevent them from doing stupid things.[56]

The growing Egyptian middle class would have been a natural source of prospective Egyptian members of the Anglican Church. It was increasingly adopting western dress and modes of living and was often keen to learn English, essential for anyone who wished to participate fully in the life of the Anglican Church. It was this middle class which could have provided leaders for the future Anglican Church in Egypt. But it was this group that was looked down on above all others by the British community, including Bishop Gwynne. The British despised the Egyptian middle class for trying to ape their ways and preferred instead the humble rural peasantry or *fellaheen* who were easily patronised and did not threaten their own British sense of superiority. It was not unusual for colonialists to despise the middle class of the country which they ruled but this failure to engage with the Egyptian middle class was to prove costly, not

[56] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to the Archbishop of Canterbury 13th August 1940. Archbishop's Correspondence 1921-1950 Box File 15, Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

just to the Church but to British interests in Egypt as a whole. The growing Egyptian middle class was eventually to have its revenge however. It was from their ranks that nationalist leaders came who would one day throw the British out of Egypt.

Bishop Gwynne ordained the first four Egyptian clergy in the Anglican Church. As well as Girgis Bishai, these included Adeeb Shammas who was to bear the burden of running the Episcopal Church after the Suez Crisis in 1956. Bishop Gwynne's overriding approach to Egyptians meant, however, that he was reluctant to indigenise the church and encourage an Egyptian leadership. Given the choice, his loyalties would always lie with his expatriate flock:

> I had to curb the pushing of the Egyptian Church down the throats of our British Community.[57]

On occasion, Gwynne's close identification with Britain and the British led to some embarrassing situations. Once, during a service in the Cathedral, the Bishop was handed a note, saying that the Queen had given birth to a baby. Bishop Gwynne announced the glad news and instructed the congregation to sing the British National Anthem. It was only afterwards that he realised that the note referred to the Queen of Egypt.[58]

In 1934, Bishop Gwynne made speeches to the Egypt and Sudan Diocesan Association and the Society of Bishops in London, suggesting that Egypt was incapable of governing itself:

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[57] Diary entry 5th April 1938. Diaries of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69. University of Birmingham.
[58] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 259.

> We have granted Egypt a Constitution which does not conform to the disposition of the Egyptian people and have given her systems of administration which have been abandoned by some European nations. Then we expected the poor Egyptians to undertake the administration of their country by means of a Constitution which only suits Anglo-Saxon peoples.[59]

This speech was widely reported in Egypt. Bishop Gwynne's critical involvement in the country's politics generated considerable consternation in the Egyptian press and was perceived by some papers as sour grapes on the part of Bishop Gwynne for the failure of Anglican missionaries to secure converts.[60] His views on Egyptians show few signs of having altered much during his life and were to become something of an embarrassment by the time Bishop Gwynne came to retire in 1946, when relations between Egypt and Britain were very sensitive. On 29th July that year the Bishop of Worcester wrote:

> The political situation in Egypt is uncertain owing to the negotiations now going on and I am afraid Bishop Gwynne is not very tactful in some of his statements about Egyptians.[61]

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[59] "A Bishop on Egypt" Egyptian Gazette, 21st July 1934. News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

[60] According to the London correspondent of Al Mokattam and Al Balagh ...Bishop Gwynne attacked the efficiency of Egyptians and declared that they were totally unfitted for constitutional rule. The Bishop, report our contemporaries, "yearned for the days of Lord Cromer and Lord Lloyd."
"Bishop Gwynne Upsets Arabic Press" Egyptian Gazette, 20th July 1934. News Cuttings 2, Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

[61] Letter from the Bishop of Worcester 29th July 1946. Fisher Papers 13. 297. Lambeth Palace Library.

3.11 Ecumenism

Bishop Gwynne did show himself to be ecumenically inclined. He was instrumental in founding the Cairo-based Fellowship of Unity with Temple Gairdner in 1921. This followed similar ecumenical efforts in Sudan and the recent Lambeth Conference's 'Appeal to All Christian People'. Beneath his public support of other churches, however, Bishop Gwynne's low opinion of Egyptians in general seems to have extended to the Coptic Church in particular:

> I told Sandford that to be tied to the Coptic Church was like being tied to a corpse, for at the moment the Coptic Church positively hinders any progress of the Christian Church.[62]

Gwynne was not alone in this. The Bishop of London had written in his diocesan magazine of the members of the Coptic Church as having:

> A very nominal Christian life ...looked after (or neglected, as the case may be) by an often ignorant and ill-educated priesthood.[63]

Despite being publicly polite, Gwynne's feelings of antipathy were thoroughly reciprocated by the Coptic clergy. They were resentful at apparent Anglican attempts to 'convert' Copts. Their minority position in Egypt meant that they were usually obliged to side with Egyptian nationalist opinion rather than with their fellow Christians - the ecclesiastical arm of British occupation.

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[62] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to the Archbishop of Canterbury 19th May 1942. Archbishop's Correspondence 1921-1950 Box File 15. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[63] Stock, E., History of the Church Missionary Society. London: CMS, 1916, Vol. IV, p 113.

3.12 Relations with the British Residency

Bishop Gwynne's relationship with the British Residency was not a straightforward one. Though publicly supportive of the Anglican Church, there is a sense in which the Embassy viewed the Church as having a place in Egypt but that it should not interfere unduly in the running of the country. The High Commissioner (later Ambassador) and his staff attended worship at the Cathedral[64] but frustration was sometimes expressed at the fact that they were not as regular in their attendance as they might have been.

> It is a tragedy therefore that His Majesty's Ambassador only attends Church about three times in the year, and shows no interest in the work of the Church here in Cairo. It was a tragedy that when Mr. Anthony Eden came out to spend some days in Cairo and stayed at the Embassy, he refused an invitation to come and see the Cathedral and look at the work that is going on there amongst civilians and military. [65]

The Bishop was welcome at the Residency and there are references to a number of conversations between the Bishop and the High Commissioner.[66] Sometimes these were on sensitive subjects but they tended to be about the church rather than politics. The Ambassador of the time, Sir Miles Lampson, attended the Bishop's eightieth birthday in 1943.[67] But the Bishop was not often on the guest list for dinner at what was arguably the most powerful table in Cairo. He was not part of the inner circle of British power in Egypt. Though useful in its way, the Anglican Church was relatively

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[64] Archdeacon Johnston's Diary, Sunday 23rd March 1941, Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

[65] Letter from the Bishop of Ripon 24th January 1943. W. Temple Papers 23. Lambeth Palace Library.

[66] Interviewed Miles Lampson about the School and the Wakf and his own soul. Diary entry 24th May 1938. Diaries of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69. University of Birmingham.

[67] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to the Archbishop of Canterbury 13th July 1943. Archbishop's Correspondence 1921-1950 Box File 15. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

marginal to the great political events taking place there. Religion was a great source of comfort to the British abroad but it often complicated the business of government in a predominantly Muslim nation. It appears that the British establishment in Egypt sometimes kept Gwynne at arms length. Part of the reason for this was the Embassy's antipathy towards the British military with whom Gwynne had strong links. During the War the British Army received its orders directly from the War Cabinet in London whereas the Embassy referred directly to the Foreign Office. Coordination between the two bodies was poor and conflicts were frequent. In addition, Gwynne could be famously indiscreet and sometimes divulged operational secrets making him a security risk. During World War II:

> There was an occasion when the wives and families of many of the British and other communities had to be evacuated from Egypt. Some of them told the Bishop in confidence of the date and place of their departure. On the following Sunday a number of staff officers who had come to the Cathedral were startled to hear the Bishop announce in the biddings for prayer, "Let us remember the wives and families who are sailing from Suez this morning.[68]

Though respected for his great faith, Bishop Gwynne did not have a reputation for any great diplomatic or political skill:

> As you know the good Bishop is not always very adroit in diplomatic matters.[69]
>
> He was a great Christian (with an astonishing lack of political flair!)[70]

[68] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 224.
[69] Letter to William Paton, Secretary to the International Missionary Council, 7th June 1941. Lang Papers 182.373. Lambeth Palace Library.

It may be that there was also an element of class snobbery involved in the way in which Gwynne was kept at a distance by the Embassy. He was a "good egg," but not exactly "top drawer." He had not been to the "right" school or university. He was from the bourgeoisie, not the elite. Though he had played cricket in his youth, he enjoyed golf rather than the more elitist polo. Gwynne was deeply involved in Freemasonry, rising to the rank of District Grand Master. This was not a bar to entry at the Embassy. Most of his contacts within Freemasonry were, however, British businessmen or members of the Egyptian administration, rather than Embassy staff.

3.13 Church and State

The interests of the Church were not always co-terminus with those of the British political establishment and there were limits to the influence of the former on the latter. The distinction is clarified in some words by Lord Kitchener when he was High Commissioner in Khartoum quoted by Gwynne in a forward to the Old Cairo Hospital Report of 1939:

> He said to a missionary friend, "If I were in your place I would use every possible means to bring the Christian Faith before the people of this country, but it is my duty to see that your activities do not clash with order or upset unduly the religious susceptibilities of the people and bring about a fanatical rising."[71]

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[70] P. Scrivener, 3rd December 1946. FO 371/53412. Public Records Office.
[71] Forward to the Old Cairo Report, 1939. C.M.S. Local File 1939-1950. Bundle 92A Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

The law regarding religious teaching in schools in Egypt is a case in point. There were repeated attempts in the Egyptian parliament during the interwar period to restrict the teaching of Christianity to Muslims and to require that they be taught Islam. This naturally affected the schools established by the CMS in Egypt, and the Bishop and others sought political support to oppose these moves. But a desire by the British authorities not to alienate the Muslim majority tended to outweigh any sympathy there might have been for the Anglican position and British political support for the Church was often lukewarm. In a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, asking Geoffrey Fisher to make representations to the Foreign Office on the matter, Gwynne complained at the lack of support he had received from the British Embassy in opposing Egyptian Government restrictions on the teaching of Christianity in schools:

> The Embassy here were useless without some intimation from home that the passing of such laws would be against the spirit of the Montreaux Treaty.[72]

Gwynne looked back on the days of Lord Cromer (British High Commissioner 1883-1907) with obvious admiration. They held similar views on many things and Gwynne felt that subsequent representatives at Britain had betrayed the Cromer legacy:

> The British Government has concluded a Treaty with the Egyptian Government, and for the moment it seems to be bringing peace, but unfortunately it means the end of the great Cromer administration which did so much for Egypt.[73]

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[72] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p190.
[73] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to Mr Oliphant 7th December, 1936. Bishop Gwynne's Private Correspondence, 1936. Bundle 77. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

Like Lord Cromer Bishop Gwynne believed that what the Egyptians needed was a firm hand. He sometimes despaired that Sir Miles Lampson (British High Commissioner 1933-1936 and Ambassador 1936-1946) was unable to provide it:

> Bishop Gore visited Egypt and the Sudan in 1925. [He] came out strongly convinced with the old Whig theory that every race should be allowed to govern itself in its own way, and he was impatient with those who held the view that the Egyptians were incapable of self-government for the good of the whole people. I remember so well when he was disillusioned for I had asked to lunch a very distinguished member of the Diplomatic Service on the staff at the Residency, and a well known American missionary, who had been in this country over fifty years. It was the latter who convinced the Bishop that the lot of the millions of fellaheen eking out an existence on about 3d a day, would never be alleviated by the Egyptian politicians of that time. He impressed the Bishop greatly by saying that God had sent England into Egypt in 1882, and that England had brought Egypt out of bankruptcy and set it on its feet again. England has put her hand to the plough and taken it off too soon, with the result that the splendid fabric of administration built up by Lord Cromer (who originally had the same views as the Bishop about self-government), was crumbling to the ground, much to the detriment of the welfare of the bulk of the Egyptian people.[74]

By then Gwynne was an old man. Even in his dreams he seemed reluctant to accept that the world was changing around him:

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[74] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to Mr Brandreth 22nd June, 1938. Bishop Gwynne's Letters 1936-1939. Bundle 47 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

> Had a dream last night. I called on Lord Cromer – he was very stern – when I mentioned that the Treaty destroyed the administration he built up in Egypt – he turned round and asked, "What have you done to keep it going" When I said it was not my job, He said "Can't you see this is not progress but reaction – putting back the clock. It ought not to have been impossible for the wit of man to have preserved the administration which was built up entirely for the Egyptian people. Surely the best of the Egyptians would have been glad to do so – It will all have to be done over again. He turned and went on with the study of small paragraphs of some documents.[75]

3.14 All Saints' Cathedral and the Second World War

Gwynne's main work in Egypt was the construction of the new All Saints' Cathedral on the banks of the Nile. It was an enormous task, making great demands on the Bishop's time and energy. The building was designed by Adrian Gilbert Scott. Doubts were expressed about the viability of such a large building when the British community was diminishing[76] but the outbreak of the Second World War soon revealed an enormous need that the Cathedral, consecrated in 1938, was well placed to meet. All Saints:

> became a spiritual power-house for the armies of the Commonwealth assembling for the defence of Egypt.[77]

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[75] Diary entry 1st October 1937 Diaries of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69. University of Birmingham.
[76] Interview with Sir William Willcocks, Egyptian Gazette, 7th May 1931. News cuttings. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[77] Jackson, H.C., p217.

Bishop Gwynne believed that this was all part of the divine plan:

> God saw this war coming on: God knew Egypt would be filled with people of our race coming from all parts of the world, and God caused the Cathedral and adjoining buildings to be built only two years before the outbreak of war.[78]

Though already seventy five years old, Bishop Gwynne rose to the new challenges that presented themselves and his talent for ministry among the military came into its own once more. Old friendships with soldiers from the First World War were renewed and new ones were readily made. Bishop Gwynne seemed more comfortable with ordinary, fighting men, than with the Embassy elite.

> He was always at his best when addressing a congregation of fighting men or in time of war.[79]

Prior to the War, Gwynne had begun to feel that his attitudes were out of step with the prevailing climate of opinion. He was aware that his high imperial belief in the manifest destiny of the British to spread civilisation throughout the world had become unfashionable after World War I. Gwynne tried hard to be humble in the face of such change:

> Something is happening inside me to try to harden me humble me. A painful situation of subsidence – all that I felt I was proud of + consciously boasted about seems of no value – others with newer experience is of greater interest –

[78] Bishop Gwynne's address to the Anglican Church Council, 15th November 1940. Minute Book 1 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[79] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p218

> all this is of real benefit to my soul. I have asked the Great Father to help me to decreases subside – when he takes me at my word – I find it painful.[80]

The outbreak of the Second World War, however, meant that Gwynne's views became acceptable once again, albeit in a modified form. Gwynne was seventy-five years old but he believed that God still had a great deal of work for him to do. It was not yet time for him to decrease. Once again, he was on leave in Britain when war was declared but this time he returned to his Diocese immediately. He managed to get a berth on the Montcalm which sailed from Glasgow on the following day and had a perilous passage through the Mediterranean.[81] Though advanced in years, Bishop Gwynne's work on his return to Cairo Cathedral was greatly appreciated by the leaders of the Allied military there:

> At the time the sermons of the Bishop were a source of strength, courage and inspiration to all who heard them. He expounded the righteousness of our cause and the steadfastness of our race in a manner that produced spiritual support to our efforts.[82]

Once again, Gwynne had an invincible conviction that God was on the side of the Allies:

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[80] Diary entry 5th February 1939. Diaries of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69. University of Birmingham.
[81] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p 216.
[82] Field Marshall Lord Wilson. Letter to The Times, 9th December 1957, in ibid. p 218.

> I feel a calm and content that God gave me all through the war in France, because I know our cause is just and, as Shakespeare says, "We are therefore twice armed" with a morale resting on moral and spiritual power.[83]

Bishop Gwynne saw no conflict in allowing the Cathedral to be used as part of the Allied propaganda campaign. A fervent patriot, he frequently spoke on the rightness of the Allied cause. On occasion, others used the Cathedral to expound similar views. In 1943, General Sir Bernard Montgomery spoke at Evensong, choosing the hymns himself:

> The Germans, he said, are a military race. German boys play military games as British boys do not. But if we are not military we are – thank heaven! – a martial race.
>
> The German laughs at other people's misfortunes, the Briton at his own.
>
> The Italians are spiteful towards the wounded and prisoners even in the field.
>
> Of all the men of all the armies now fighting... the British soldier is far, far and away the best. No other soldier in the world is so easy to lead, none other is so responsive to leadership. And we have the best corps of regimental officers in the world.[84]

All this was at a time when many Egyptians were far from committed to an Allied victory and saw the war as having very little to do with them. Gwynne was sometimes critical of the War effort and was aware that resources were being diverted away from missionary activity. In October 1939 he wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury:

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[83] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to the Venerable F.G. Scott, 30th April 1940. Bishop Gwynne's Private Correspondence, 1936. Bundle 77 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[84] Censorship file. Box File 37A. Diocesan Archives. Cairo.

> It is pitiable to see how we have to recede from positions won with enormous pains and self-sacrifice, but our missionaries are wonderful people who never doubt and never complain though they are moved about from place to place and sometimes for lack of funds axed for the duration of the war.....[85]

A request from the medical committee of the British community to the Standing Committee of the Egypt Mission that part or all of the Old Cairo Medical Mission be reserved for British subjects in the event of an air raid on Cairo was refused[86] but Fairhaven, the house where missionaries spent their local leave, was taken over as a nurses home for the duration of the War.[87] Despite the sometimes prejudicial impact of British policy on the mission of the Anglican Church in Egypt, Bishop Gwynne felt that his first loyalty was to his compatriots and to support for the Allied war effort. Like many others, he saw the struggle against Hitler as a crusade for the defence of Christian civilisation. Gwynne showed few democratic tendencies but rejected the totalitarianism of National Socialism as fundamentally opposed to Christianity. Though violence was regrettable, he believed implicitly that the Allied cause had divine sanction and felt that the Church should do all in its power to support it:

> The members of the Council were conscious of the enormous tasks and opportunities for the work of the Church of Christ in Egypt: they realised that they were only part of the forces of Christ operating in Egypt, but the work

[85] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to the Archbishop of Canterbury 24th October, 1939. Archbishop's Correspondence 1921-1950. Box File 15. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[86] Minutes of the Standing Committee of the Egypt Mission 27th January, 1939. C.M.S. Overseas Division Asia 1935-1959, AS 38/46 G2 E2, University of Birmingham.
[87] Minutes of the Standing Committee of the Egypt Mission, 31st October, 1939. C.M.S. Overseas Division Asia 1935-1959, AS 38/46 G2 E2, University of Birmingham.

with which they had been entrusted was of great importance for they were responsible for the spiritual life of the majority of men and women of the British race resident in this country.[88]

The needs to which Bishop Gwynne and his clergy sought to minister to were obviously real and urgent ones. Their actions arose from a sincere desire to serve and they won them the admiration of many service men and women. They did, however, divert them from their call to minister to the country in which they found themselves and this was to have a significant impact on Egyptian sympathies for the Anglican Church in the future.

3.15 Riots 1946

The provisions of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which allowed Great Britain to station troops in Egypt during wartime delayed discussion of Egypt's independence and the troops' withdrawal. After the War, Britain was slow to renew negotiations and Egyptian frustration boiled over when a general strike turned into riots in Cairo on 21st February 1946 during which seven people died and two hundred were injured.[89] Shops, schools and clubs used by many different nationalities were attacked but the most violent assaults were on British military and civilian institutions.[90] Just a week after King Farouk had donated a set of bronze grilles to the Cathedral, a mob attempted to set fire to the Cathedral and its Hall. Crockery and linen in the Cathedral Hall were damaged and the Bishop's Residence was looted. Many of his books and papers were also destroyed. The Egyptian authorities were slow to react and British

[88] Bishop Gwynne's address to the Anglican Church Council, 15th November 1940. Minute Book 1 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[89] Serious Riots in Cairo" The Times, 22nd February 1946, News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[90] "Cairo Returns to Normal After Day of Mob Rule" The Egyptian Gazette, Friday 22nd February, 1946, News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

troops were the first on the scene.[91] The cost of the damage to church property was estimated at LE1255.34.[92] The Egyptian Government made an *ex gratia* payment of LE 1,700 to the Cathedral in compensation. The Bishop dismissed the action of the rioters as the work of a handful of criminal fanatics but he seems to have failed to judge the public mood. A week before the attack on 13th April he had made a patriotic broadcast from the Cathedral, primarily to the Commonwealth and its allies. In it, he made no mention of the aspirations of the Egyptian people:

> the omission was open to serious misunderstanding and was no doubt officially noticed by those who suspected, quite wrongly but understandably, a link between the Cathedral, the British military occupation and the Egyptian monarchy, now growing in unpopularity.[93]

The attack was symptomatic of a much wider antipathy towards Britain with which the Cathedral was closely associated. If nothing else, the Bishop and his colleagues entirely failed to gauge the extent of this antipathy.[94] Though it may have been the consequence of perception rather than reality, they often seem to have been naïve about the way in which the Church had been viewed by Egyptians. The effects of this perception had been no less damaging to the reputation of the Anglican Church in Egypt.

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[91] "Serious Riots in Cairo" The Times, 22nd February 1946, News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[92] Box File 22B. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[93] Burrell, A., 1984, p40.
[94] Such failures to appreciate the significance of events were not unique to Gwynne or the Anglican Church in Egypt:

> When a great movement for the political independence of India developed, most Europeans in India, including the missionaries, were wholly unable to read the signs of the times.

Neill, S., Colonialism and Christian Missions. London: Lutterworth Press, 1966, p 108.

3.16 Retirement and final years

Bishop Gwynne was to leave before the extent of this antipathy was to be realised. Perhaps the events of 21st February affected him more than he was prepared to admit. Or perhaps it was simply his great age that led to the decline in his health which caused him to retire on All Saints' Day 1946 aged eighty three. He was subsequently appointed Assistant Bishop of Southwell.[95] Bishop Gwynne had offered to resign on several occasions before, as far back as 1933, but his resignation had not been accepted by the Archbishop of Canterbury.[96] Bishop Gwynne had not pressed the issue partly because he wished to have a hand in choosing his successor and partly because he had no pension, and perhaps following the example of his hero General Gordon, he had half hoped to die in harness. The latter was denied him but a pension paid by the CMS and the Sudan Government was arranged by the Bishop of Worcester.[97]

Egypt and the Sudan had been divided into separate dioceses in 1945.[98] Bishop Morris Gelsthorpe, Bishop Gwynne's assistant in the Sudan, became the first Bishop of the Diocese of the Sudan. It had clearly become impossible for one bishop to run both. While Gwynne remained loved and respected throughout the Diocese, the administrative demands of the post were beyond him. Those who tried to run the Diocese on his behalf were increasingly frustrated by his unwillingness to relinquish power. The Bishop was ex-officio Dean of All Saints Cathedral, though its day to day administration was supposed to be in the hands of Archdeacon Johnston. Nevertheless, Bishop Gwynne retained a considerable amount of control over it, even

[95] de Saram, B., Nile Harvest; the Anglican Church in Egypt and the Sudan. Bournemouth: Bourne Press Ltd, 1992, p 74.
[96] Letter to Bishop Gwynne 18th February 1946. Fisher Papers 13. 255 Lambeth Palace Library.
[97] Letter from Bishop Gwynne 9th March 1946. Fisher Papers 13. 261 Lambeth Palace Library.
[98] De Saram, B., 1992, p 74.

when he was travelling in Sudan, often choosing the hymns for the services there himself.[99] Despite his obvious admiration for him, Bishop Morris Gelsthorpe, was well aware of Bishop Gwynne's limitations:

> He is still, in my opinion the greatest personal spiritual personality in the Middle East. But administratively he has for years been failing and I am informed from English authorities, as it is indeed clear for anyone to see, he has become ineffective. He does in himself realise it but in his unconquerable spirit he refuses to acknowledge it. He clings on to the very last to the belief that his waning administrative powers can be recuperated and revived. He is the most wonderful man I have known.[100]

In 1947, Sudan's first theological college, opened in Mundri, was named after Bishop Gwynne.

Some members of the laity in Egypt were less supportive. A group of worshippers from All Saints' Cathedral wrote to Archbishop Fisher on 20th May 1945:

> 'All young Clergy', the complainants alleged, 'have left or are leaving Egypt since from the Archdeacon downwards they are regarded as children to be directed or quashed by their chief as the mood demands but never allowed a free hand in their work.' The Bishop, 'however charming to meet at luncheons and dinner parties where he is a great raconteur of stories of his life in the Sudan, is really beyond the work of the pulpit'. On Sunday 6 May when

[99] Memo following lunch with Archdeacon Johnston. Ibid, p 285.
[100] Letter from Bishop A. M. Gelsthorpe, Assistant Bishop in the Sudan, to Max Warren, 21st July 1944. AS 35/49 G2 Ed 1 CMS Overseas Division Asia 1935/49. University of Birmingham.

everyone was looking forward with thankfulness to the approaching peace, he gave one of his usual diatribes on the characters of Hitler and Mussolini'.[101]

A year after the end of the War, shortly before Gwynne's retirement, he had delivered a patriotic sermon which was broadcast around the world, ascribing the Allied victory to the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race:

> We acknowledge that without our great allies, the Americans, who sprang from the same British stock as ourselves, and Russia, who fought valiantly, we could not have won the war. But it is our just pride and glory that, by the grace of God, when our only ally had fallen, in 1940, we stood alone for more than a year against the greatest mass of armaments and trained fighters ever known before.[102]
>
> When Rommel not only knocked at the door of Egypt but crossed the threshold to El Alamein, only sixty miles from Alexandria, men of the same old breed from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and other races from India, were there with the home troops, and under Montgomery, flung the Italians and Nazis headlong along North Africa.[103]

Comparisons with Winston Churchill are obvious. Like him, Gwynne was a man of enormous stature, convinced of the rightness of the British cause and able to inspire others to fight for it. But like Churchill, he was something of a dinosaur in the post-war, post-colonial world. Even before the War, Gwynne had begun to have a sense

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[101] Carpenter, E., Archbishop Fisher – His Life and Times. Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1991, p 609.
[102] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p233
[103] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p234.

that he and his views were becoming outmoded. Had there been no War, Gwynne might well have retired sooner. As it was, the War put these thoughts on hold. Older ideas of British superiority and destiny came to the fore again. Amid the drama and demands of the Second World War, the deep-seated aspirations of the Egyptian people were once again ignored. The failure was understandable but during the Suez Crisis, the Church was to pay a heavy price for its neglect. Gwynne lived long enough to see the full extent of that price, though from a distance. He died in England on 9th December 1957, aged ninety three. His ashes were laid to rest in Khartoum Cathedral. Approximately one thousand three hundred people attended the service held in his memory in Westminster Abbey on 27th January 1958.[104] Another memorial service to Bishop Gwynne held at All Saints Cathedral, Cairo, in the previous month, at a time when Great Britain's reputation in Egypt was at a very low ebb, was packed to the doors. Most of those attending the service were Egyptians.[105]

[104] Burrell, A., 1984, p42.
[105] Jackson, H.C., 1960, p ix.

Chapter Four

Bishop Geoffrey Allen and Bishop Frank Johnston

4.1 A successor to Gwynne

Finding a replacement for Bishop Gwynne was not an easy task. There were few men who had the necessary range of skills. The correspondence at Lambeth Palace shows that many names were suggested and discarded. Archdeacon Johnston appeared to be the natural candidate to many in the expatriate community in Egypt. He had loyally served under Bishop Gwynne for many years and was very popular with his flock. The vacancy arose, however, at a time when the Anglican Church saw Egypt as strategically important. The Archbishop of Canterbury seems to have been looking for someone with greater gifts of vision and leadership. Archdeacon Johnston was neither a scholar nor an Arabist:

> It is true that he does not know Arabic; but neither did his great chief at the moment in any period of his career; though each has enough words and sentences to please people.[1]

The main reason why Johnston was rejected, however, was that he did not enjoy good health. He had had a number of operations in recent years, including an appendicectomy in 1946 which had delayed the retirement of Bishop Gwynne. Bishop Gwynne himself was among those who opposed Johnston's appointment on health grounds.[2]

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[1] Bishop, Eric F. F., Letter to Archbishop Fisher, 31st August, 1946. Fisher Papers 13. 315. Lambeth Palace Library.
[2] Fisher Papers 13. 350. Lambeth Palace Library.

The Bishop of Worcester was the first to put forward the name of Geoffrey Allen.[3] Allen was no Arabist but he had overseas experience, having been Dean of Hong Kong, and was thought to have the necessary qualities of vision and leadership to fulfil the role of a bishop. In contrast to the evangelical Bishop Gwynne, he was from the liberal wing of the Church of England. He was also a scholar, which Bishop Gwynne frankly admitted that he and his colleagues were not:

> We have had plenty of brawn and spirit among our senior chaplains and Bishop but not much intellectual equipment.[4]

At the time, Allen was Archdeacon of Birmingham which had been heavily bombed in the War and had large areas of deprivation. The Bishop of Birmingham was very reluctant to let him go:

> May I plead that you do not ask him to go to Egypt, not that he would prove inadequate there but because he is of the quality needed for the home episcopate. There are too few men now available who have been Fellows of their Colleges at Oxford, have had overseas experience, are good administrators, and speak readily and with good sense.
>
> Frankly, I think he would be wasted in Egypt.[5]

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[3] Bishop of Worcester. Letter to Archbishop Fisher, 15th October 1946. Also signed by Max Warren and E.W. Bickersteth the Bishop of Egypt's Commissary. Fisher Papers 13. 343. Lambeth Palace Library.

[4] Bishop Gwynne. Letter to Archbishop Fisher 29th October 1946. Fisher Papers 13. 364. Lambeth Palace Library.

[5] Bishop of Birmingham. Letter to Archbishop Fisher, 22nd October, 1946. Fisher Papers 13. 358. Lambeth Palace Library.

4.2 Appointment and first impressions

Archbishop Fisher rejected these protestations and Geoffrey Allen's appointment was announced on 9th December 1946. On 25th January, 1947, the Venerable Geoffrey Allen, Archdeacon of Birmingham, was consecrated as Bishop in Southwark Cathedral. He was enthroned as Bishop in Egypt in Cairo on 27th March, soon after he and his wife Madeline had arrived there. Bishop Allen learnt little Arabic during his time as Bishop but he brought with him new ideas about how the Anglican Church in Egypt should be structured. Like Archbishop Fisher, he was ecumenically minded, but it seemed to be too early for ecumenical solutions to be found for the problems faced by the small Episcopal Church in Egypt. Instead, he sought a greater partnership between Egyptians and expatriates in order that the Church in Egypt could flourish without outside help:

> I am inclined to think Trimingham was right in saying that we had not been doing enough to encourage a sense of purpose and self-confidence in our Egyptian Anglicans. And I have often said to myself, (with the example of China in the background) that the mission here ought to be working far more strongly than it has yet been doing for the day when it may have to hand over to an Egyptian leadership.[6]

Here Bishop Allen seems to imply that the mission in Egypt was somewhat unusual in its reluctance to hand over control to an indigenous leadership. In a letter to Max Warren, General Secretary of the CMS he wrote:

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[6] Allen, G., Letter to Milford, C.S., 28th August 1951. AS 59 G2 E1 1950-1951. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

> I feel, and have sometimes said to them, that the mission here has been very slow in handing over leadership to local nationals, as compared with places elsewhere.[7]

Bishop Allen was not alone in this. Many missionaries publicly supported his views, including S. A. Morrison, the CMS Mission Secretary in Egypt who wrote:

> I believe that there is an increasing appreciation among our missionaries of the necessity for associating our Egyptian colleagues with us in the conduct and direction of all our initiatives, not merely because of the uncertain future for missionaries in Muslim lands, but also on grounds of policy.[8]

At the same time, it appears that it was often the missionaries themselves who may have inhibited the movement towards greater indigenisation. Back in 1944, Morrison had expressed some doubts as to whether missionaries of longstanding like himself were capable of moving from a paternalistic model of mission to one of partnership with local people:

> Is it in us older missionaries to adopt a changed attitude, from the old paternal attitude, kindly and benevolent as it was, to the genuine brotherly attitude now required by the new situation and national temper?[9]

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[7] Allen, G., Letter to Warren, M., 22nd November 1951. AS 59 G2 E1. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[8] Morrison, S.A., Annual CMS Letter 1950, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[9] Morrison, S.A,. Letter to Hooper, H.D., 21st February 1944. AS 35/49 G2 E1 1944-1945. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

Morrison had been in Egypt for many years. His was a powerful personality that did not always encourage new voices to be heard. Even if he and other missionaries had been more open to the idea of developing an indigenised leadership, there was the basic problem that the pool from which such leadership might be drawn remained very small. Even as late as 1951 Morrison found it hard to see where the new Egyptian leadership was going to come from:

> While it would be quite inaccurate to say that the work in Egypt was in any way at all directed from London yet the preponderant influence of the Mission in Egypt is undoubtedly exercised by foreigners...It is difficult for anything else to happen when as yet there is no significant number of Christians forming a Church.[10]

In 1948 the total size of the "Native Church" was 792, of which 310 were children.[11] Morrison's may have been an accurate assessment but the failure to hand over power to Egyptians may itself have inhibited the growth of the Church. In October 1951, Morrison was seconded by the CMS to the Red Cross for work among Palestinian refugees. His departure left a great gap of experience and energy in the Egyptian mission but it may also have made it easier for new voices to come to the fore, including some Egyptian ones.

[10] Morrison, S.A. Letter to Dr Kraemer, 7th June, 1951. AS 59 G2 E1 1950-1951. CMS Archives, Birmingham University Archives.
[11] Some Notes About the Egyptian Anglican Church 174/12 AS 35/49 G2 E1 1946-1948. CMS Archives. Birmingham University Archives.

4.3 Egyptian clergy

One such new voice was that of Ishaq Musaad, later the first Egyptian Bishop of Egypt, who was sent to St Aidan's College, Birkenhead to train for ordination. On Trinity Sunday 1951, another Egyptian, Thabit Athanasius was ordained priest:

> Many expressed their appreciation of the service afterwards though a good many wished that there had been more Arabic and less English in the service![12]

Another Egyptian, Adeeb Shammas, was also made Bishop's *Wakeel* (representative to the Arabic speaking part of the church) in the same year. As Bishop, some responsibility for these moves towards the development of an indigenous leadership must lie with Geoffrey Allen.

4.4 Structural changes

Bishop Allen made structural changes as well as changes to personnel. As a visible symbol of its increasing independence from the Church of England, the Anglican Church in Egypt became known as the Episcopal Church in Egypt.[13] In January 1950, the Council of the Episcopal Church in Egypt was formed from the CMS Standing Committee, which was made up of foreign missionaries, and the Native Church Council which was made up of Egyptians. Previously, the former expatriate body had control over most of the funds and might be seen as having the lion's share of the

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[12] Morrison, S.A., Letter to Milford, C.S., 25th May 1951. AS59 G2 E1. 1950-1951. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[13] de Saram, B., Nile Harvest; the Anglican Church in Egypt and the Sudan. Bournemouth: Bourne Press Ltd, 1992, p 80.

power in what was supposed to be the Egyptian side of the Church. The new body had equal numbers of Egyptians and expatriates in it. Morrison wrote that:

> for the first time our Egyptian colleagues are in a position to influence effectively the policy of our missionary initiatives as well as the Church. Hitherto the real conduct of missionary policy has been in the hands of the missionaries.[14]

> It is now being accepted as a matter of course that no decisions of major importance will be reached without prior consultation with our Egyptian colleagues. This marks a definite, though belated step forward. A closer link has been forged between the work of the Church and that of the Mission, and the policy of the Mission, to which much thought has been devoted during the past twelve months, is viewed no longer in isolation but in its relation to the growth and expansion of the Church.[15]

At the same time, Bishop Allen was instrumental in establishing a single council for the total work of the Diocese with representatives from both Egyptian and expatriate congregations. This, Morrison believed:

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[14] Morrison, S.A., Annual CMS Letter 1950, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[15] Morrison, S.A. Annual CMS Letter 1951, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

> will serve to emphasise the fact that the Anglican Church in Egypt is not primarily English and only in a secondary sense Egyptian, but comprises both Communities on a basis of equality.[16]

It took a fresh eye like Bishop Allen's to see that such changes were needed in the post-colonial church. Those who had lived in Egypt since before the War did not always appreciate that the world had changed and that the Church needed to change with it:

> It is now obvious that these reforms were necessary though the need was not always apparent at the time to those entrenched in traditional ways. The new bishop's fresh discernment combined with his readiness to act upon it brought about changes which were long overdue.[17]

Previously, expatriate members of the Episcopal Church had been surprisingly ignorant of the conditions under which many poor Egyptians lived. As mentioned before, the two sides of the Church seemed to operate independently of one another. In the new climate of cooperation, greater efforts were made towards greater mutual understanding. A number of English women who attended the Cathedral began taking an interest in the welfare work being done at Boulac and Kirdasa. They formed the 'Friends of Boulac' to provide funding:

> But the value of this cooperation between the English and the Egyptian branches of the Anglican Church goes deeper. It reveals to the former the

[16] Morrison, S.A., Annual CMS Letter 1950, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[17] Burrell, A., Cathedral On The Nile. Oxford: The Amate Press Ltd, 1984, p 47.

appalling conditions under which poorer Egyptians live, and it gives them an opportunity of sharing in a practical way in the missionary and social outreach of the latter.[18]

It was one thing to give greater access to the decision-making process to Egyptians and to increase contact between the two parts of the Church. It was quite another thing to hand over property to the Egyptian Church. The CMS was reluctant to place its properties in the hands of local Egyptians because of experiences elsewhere. This caused frustration to expatriate CMS personnel in Egypt as well as to local Egyptians. CMS's continued control of its institutions in an increasingly anti-British environment made it more and more difficult for them to be run effectively, especially in the Delta and Canal Zone where anti-British feelings were strongest. Members of staff were sometimes threatened.[19] Competition from free government schools meant that on 9th November 1951, teachers at the Boys' School in Menouf in the Delta issued an ultimatum demanding the complete 'Egyptianisation' of the School under the Ministry of Education and pay equal to that paid in the government schools.[20] More seriously, in the same year, it was alleged by demonstrators in Menouf that the CMS Hospital there was being used as a means of generating income to buy British arms. Bishop Allen wrote to Max Warren about the situation:

[18] Morrison, S.A., Annual CMS Letter 1950, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[19] Allen, G. Letter to Warren, M. 22nd November 1951. AS 59 G2 E1. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[20] Allen, G., Letter to Warren, M., 16th February, 1952. AS 59 G2 E1. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

> They ... say we are making money out of our institutions there to buy arms with which the British are shooting Egyptians in the Canal Zone.[21]

As a result of these sorts of accusations, 'CMS' was removed from the titles of all the institutions in Egypt in 1952. The properties, however, remained legally in the hands of CMS. This was to make life considerably more difficult for the Egyptian Church when it was left to run them following the Suez Crisis.

4.5 Egyptian nationalism

Bishop Allen believed (rightly as it turned out) that the strength of Egyptian nationalism was consistently underestimated and that British responses to it, including those of CMS and the Diocese, were failing to keep up, let alone remain ahead of the game:

> I am personally inclined to think that we have got to take the strength of the nationalistic movement very seriously; and I am inclined to think that Morrison, who has been living a little outside the recent tensions, may underestimate them. I think our whole British policy over these last few years has underestimated them, and for that reason each time has been a few months too late with each compromise proposal; that it has been lagging behind, instead of one step ahead, of the developing nationalism and what it would accept.[22]

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[21] Allen, G., Letter to Warren, M., 13th December, 1951. AS 59 G2 E1. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[22] Allen, G., Letter to Warren, M., 13th December, 1951. AS 59 G2 E1. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

Despite his lack of experience, Allen's words were to prove prophetic. Others with more experience of Egypt, including members of staff at the British Embassy, failed to read the signs of the times.

> A week ago, within 24 hours, two senior members of the British community, both of whom have lived a very long time in Egypt, said to me; one of them, that the demonstrations and propaganda were superficial and that underneath the mass of Egyptian people, both educated and the fellahin, wanted our friendship and wanted a settlement; the other that the friendliness, which is still marked amongst educated Egyptians in Cairo, was superficial, and that underneath they hated us and were determined to get rid of British influence. I do not think our Embassy know any more than we do what way things will go.[23]

The construction of an apartment building next to the British Embassy shut out much of the breeze that blew along the river. It was joked that the British Embassy never knew which way the wind was blowing. This failure to understand highlights the gap between British residents and Egyptian citizens. But this situation was not unique to Egypt. The same failure by foreigners to appreciate what was happening was also exhibited shortly before the Iranian revolution of 1979.

Following Morrison's secondment to the Red Cross in Palestine, his position as Mission Secretary was temporarily taken by Miss Dorothy King, and later by Mr Jesse Hillman, Hospital Administrator. This continued until the arrival of the Revd

[23] Allen, G., Letter to Warren, M., 13th December, 1951. AS 59 G2 E1. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

H.C.Gurney in October 1952. Hillman's letters as Secretary record rising tensions following the abrogation of the 1952 Treaty by the Egyptian Government:

> Some of our staff must have had to suffer for their connections with us at a time when employment with the British army was denounced by the government as treason punishable by law; when workers were being called upon to leave British firms employing them, and when British goods were boycotted, even to the extent that doctors were told not to prescribe British drugs.[24]

In spite of this:

> On the whole, the relations between the Egyptian and British members of the Hospital team had not been affected by the tension in the country.[25]

Hillman notes the attacks on British property of 26th January but notes that:

> None of the Christian institutions in Cairo were attacked, even when they were in the very centre of the devastated areas.[26]

As a young man who had recently arrived in Egypt with fresh ideas, Jesse Hillman was sometimes frustrated at the slowness of the Episcopal Church to respond to the changing situation. He felt that the handover of power in the Church to Egyptians

[24] Hillman, J.J., Annual CMS Letter 1952, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

should have been taking place more quickly. He did acknowledge that there had been changes in the relationship between Egyptians and expatriates, notably missionaries:

> we as missionaries have fallen more into our proper place as ordinary church members, and as guests of the Church in Egypt.[27]

But he still felt that there was a long way to go:

> Not that we are anything like satisfied; but at least we feel that we are passing in the right direction.[28]

One of the constraints upon progress seems to have been the gifts and background of Bishop Allen. Though he understood the need to make structural changes to the Church in order to place more power in the hands of Egyptians, the Revd H.G. Gurney, recently arrived from Iran, saw Bishop Allen's lack of Arabic, and the fact that he had only worked with expatriate congregations as major bars to further progress:

> It is actually a big disadvantage having a Bishop who does not speak Arabic. This means that Committees and Councils which he attends must be in English, and limits the freedom of expression of a number on the Committees. The Church will never feel itself indigenous under these circumstances. The Bishop too has been a chaplain to English congregations all his life, and

[27] Hillman, J.J., Annual CMS Letter 1954, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[28] Hillman, J.J., Annual CMS Letter 1952, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.

although very well disposed towards and interested in the Arabic speaking churches, has no experience at all of encouraging and building an indigenous church.[29]

4.6 Allen the prophet

Bishop Allen may have lacked experience of working with an indigenous church but he had a good overview of the whole church in the context of a rapidly changing political environment. He did what he could to change the structures of the Church so that they better reflected the needs of the moment. He was able to look beyond the limits of British expatriate society in Egypt which seemed to take up so much of the time of his predecessor and successor. He is also credited with initiating the provision of relief for Arab refugees fleeing the fighting in Palestine.[30] By 1952, however, he realised that Egypt was no longer of the same strategic importance to Britain. Bishop Allen saw that Great Britain's empire was declining and that this meant an inevitable decline in the size of the expatriate church in Egypt:

> We should not be unduly influenced by the crisis of recent months; but this crisis has exposed and speeded up what was in any case a long-term trend. The following figures for communicants at the Cathedral are illuminating, and typical of other centres:-

[29] Gurney, H.G., Annual CMS Letter 1953-'4, ASW AL 1950-1959. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[30] "New Bishop" 26th June 1952, The Egyptian Gazette, News cuttings 5, Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

1937	4133	
1938	4546	
1943	12672	the peak of the war years
1945	8429	
1949	2783	
1950	2350	
1951	2242	

> We have got to face the fact realistically, that much of our Anglican organization overseas corresponds to a past day of British imperialist expansion, and later of special British zones of influence; that that day has gone, and has been replaced by movements of local nationalism and international organization; and that our organization of Anglican work, and the support we can expect from local Anglican communities, must be adjusted to the realities of our changed political and economic position in the present world. The Anglican members in Egypt today are probably about 4-5000 English speaking and 1000 Arabic speaking which is a very small figure to support or justify a bishopric.[31]

4.7 Departure

Geoffrey Allen was an ambitious man who was not prepared to preside over a situation of further decline. He had perhaps come to the same conclusion as his previous Bishop of Birmingham, that he was wasted in Egypt. He had already decided to leave the Diocese following an invitation to become principal of Ripon Hall Theological College outside Oxford. He saw his future as a leading light of the liberal

[31] Bishop Allen. Comments on letter to Archbishop Fisher from Max Warren 5th February 1952. Fisher Papers 100. 328. Lambeth Palace Library.

wing of the Church of England. England was still for him the heart of Anglicanism while Egypt was distinctly peripheral. He wrote:

> Perhaps it is our task in life to enter into difficult situations for a short transitional period. After two periods on the circumference in China and Egypt, I now have a task for the church again at the centre.[32]

Bishop Allen questioned the need to appoint a successor, suggesting that Egypt should once again come under the jurisdiction of Jerusalem:

> I think some of the Egyptian members may feel that it would be a loss of face if they did not have a Bishop in Egypt. On the other hand I think the members from the English Chaplaincies, who provide most of the funds, may feel that it is very doubtful if they can guarantee the necessary support for the future.[33]

The Diocese of Jerusalem refused to take responsibility for Egypt without further assistance.[34] With the support of Max Warren, General Secretary of CMS and others, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, continued to feel that although the Anglican community in Egypt was small, the ecumenical position in Egypt demanded another bishop as ecclesiastical ambassador for the Anglican Church in an important centre of faith:

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[32] Allen, G., quoted in de Saram, B., Nile Harvest; the Anglican Church in Egypt and the Sudan. Bournemouth: Bourne Press Ltd, 1992, p 81.
[33] Allen G., Letter to Warren M., 16th February 1952. AS 59 G2 E1. CMS Archives, University of Birmingham.
[34] Carpenter, E., Archbishop Fisher – His Life and Times. Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1991, p 612.

> Relations with the Copts and the other Churches in Egypt are very important, and the Anglican Bishop is almost inevitably the king pin in these ecumenical relations.[35]

The question of appointing an Egyptian bishop was raised by Bishop Allen. He had made definite attempts to develop an indigenous leadership in his relatively short episcopacy. According to Bishop Allen, the Revd Adeeb Shammas had shown leadership during his time there but Bishop Allen did not yet feel that it was time for him to be succeeded by an Egyptian:

> If there should come a general anti-British boycott here, we might have to leave the church for a long time under Egyptian control. One of our Egyptian priests, Adeeb Shammas, has shown very good leadership through this time, and would I think be competent for supervision. I think however that our little Egyptian Anglican group is too small for an Egyptian bishop to be the right solution.[36]

Many of Bishop Allen's visionary, if sometimes uncomfortable words were largely ignored. Archbishop Geoffrey Fisher decided that there should be another British Bishop in Egypt. Before his departure, for Oxford, Allen wrote a further letter to Archbishop Fisher which demonstrated his profound grasp of the situation in Egypt. He could see which direction the tide of history was flowing in a way denied to other observers with more experience of Egypt:

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[35] Archbishop Fisher. Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, 11th March, 1952. Fisher papers 100. 335. Lambeth Palace Library.
[36] Letter from Bishop Allen to Archbishop Fisher, 14th December, 1951. 297 Fisher papers 100. Lambeth Palace Library.

> Fundamentally he contended that the Church was short-sighted in refusing to face up to contemporary realities. Egypt, he again asserted, was no longer a dominant sphere of British interest and it was doubtful whether the United Kingdom was any longer a central power in the general politics of the Middle East
>
> The little Arabic Church and a falling number of British residents just could not support the Bishopric. It was important, in this context, not to rely on the advice of those who think 'in terms of pre-war patterns or nostalgic longings for its return.'[37]

Geoffrey Allen had worked hard to bring the two sides of the church together: the older, more powerful, English-speaking expatriate church that owed its origins to British merchants and the Arabic church which owed its origins to the CMS. As it turned out, it was probably better for the Arabic church to remain independent of the expatriate congregations in order to ensure the survival of the Anglican Church in Egypt beyond the next few turbulent years. But the instinct to place more power in the Church in the hands of Egyptians was a right one. The one thing that was supposed to unite both sides was the bishopric but while this remained in the hands of an expatriate, the balance of power remained heavily weighted in favour of foreigners. Indigenisation was necessary for both parts of the Church but this had, and still has, a long way to go.

[37] Carpenter, E., 1991, p 613.

4.8 Bishop Frank Johnston

By 1952 the post of Anglican Bishop in Egypt was not regarded as being as desirable as it had once been. Egypt's strategic importance to Great Britain was diminishing with the development of relationships with other states in the Middle East and the growth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The sun was setting on the British Empire and there was felt to be a great deal for ambitious men in the Church of England to do at home. The Diocese of Egypt was known to be in financial difficulties and the tense political situation in Egypt meant that any successor to Bishop Allen would have to "hit the ground running." Long term experience was felt to count for more than great scholarship or strategic vision. Archdeacon Francis Featherstonehaugh Johnston's name was once again put forward as a possible candidate for the bishopric by the expatriate community in Egypt. He and his wife Gladys had given many years of faithful service to the church there. Although Johnston had very little Arabic[1] he was very popular with the English-speaking community. He enjoyed close links with the British Embassy and was a leading Freemason. In recent years, his health had given cause for concern and it was this that had led Bishop Gwynne to oppose his appointment in 1946. Bishop Allen also had questions about his suitability. He believed that Archdeacon Johnston had perhaps been in a supporting role for too long to provide the leadership necessary in a bishop:

> I think at his age the Archdeacon does at times find it a little difficult to take decisions, and likes to look to someone else for support and encouragement. I

[1] Letter from Revd Eric F. F. Bishop, to Archbishop Fisher, 31st August 1946:
It is true that he does not know Arabic; but neither did his great chief at the moment in any period of his career; though each has enough words and sentences to please people.
315. Fisher Papers 13. Lambeth Palace Library.

> also think that while normally most friendly and genial, he has sometimes been a little hard on clergy he has had serving under him as assistant chaplains.[2]

Despite these reservations, however, Frank Johnston's candidature in 1952 had the backing of the Bishop of Worcester:

> The English community back him solidly and are very anxious for him to be their Bishop. He knows the country.
>
> it is true that he is not a great scholar, but he has a very happy, winsome personality, and he gets on well with all kinds of people.[3]

After nearly forty years of service in the Diocese, Johnston was seen by the Archbishop of Canterbury as the most deserving candidate. Since he was already in the country, it would be quicker and cheaper to appoint him than someone who would have to serve their notice elsewhere and then be shipped out to Egypt. It was unlikely that Johnston's gifts and inclinations would enable him to bring much to the strategic roles in ecumenism and interfaith relations which Max Warren, General Secretary of the CMS saw as desirable in any future Bishop of Egypt. Johnston could do little more in these areas than act as a figurehead. But at least he knew the set up. It was not as if there were scores of men at the time who had the right gifts and experience and were desperate to become Bishop in Egypt. In any case, Johnston's age meant that he

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[2] Letter from Bishop Allen to Archbishop Fisher, 5th July, 1952. 381 Fisher Papers 100. Lambeth Palace Library.
[3] Bishop of Worcester. Letter to Archbishop Fisher (no date). Fisher Papers 100.334. Lambeth Palace Library.

was unlikely to serve for very long, giving others time to assess the changing situation and to chart the future of the Diocese.

Bishop Johnston was consecrated on 25th July 1952 in St Paul's Cathedral in London. Two days earlier in Egypt, a secret group of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers, led by General Naguib under the influence of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser had taken part in a bloodless coup. It was to be some time before the full implications of the coup were to be understood. To become the Anglican Bishop of Egypt at such an uncertain time was a challenge for any man but Bishop Johnston's long experience in Egypt stood him in good stead as he began his new ministry. He was enthroned in All Saints Cathedral, Cairo, in October of that year. Representatives of the new government and sixty clergy from other denominations attended the service. The hymns and psalms were sung simultaneously in English and Arabic. Bishop Johnston was enthroned by Adeeb Shammas whom he had appointed to the post of Archdeacon which he had vacated. Adeeb Shammas had trained at Wycliffe College, Oxford, and had for many years served at The Church of Jesus, Light of the World built in Old Cairo in memory of William Temple Gairdner. Bishop Johnston felt that Adeeb Shammas's involvement in the enthronement was significant:

> The fact that the Bishop was enthroned by one of his Egyptian clergy made an impression on both British and Egyptians[4]

Such changes reflected something of the new climate in which the Anglican Church in Egypt now found itself.

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[4] Letter from Bishop Johnston to Archbishop Fisher, 6th October 1952. 407 Fisher Papers 100. Lambeth Palace Library.

Bishop Johnston built on the diocesan organisation that his predecessor had reformed. This led to closer cooperation between the chaplaincies to expatriates and the missionary work among Egyptians. Increasingly, services at the Cathedral were held in Arabic as well as English. This included the installation of Arthur Burrell as Provost of the Cathedral in 1955. The presence at this service of representatives from many denominations and of only two army chaplains from the Canal Zone also reflected the changing situation.[5] The evacuation of British troops from the Zone had by then almost been completed.

4.9 The Suez Crisis

No growing sensitivity to the new climate of Egyptian nationalism could have fully prepared the leaders of the Anglican Church in Egypt for the effects of the Suez Crisis. After the withdrawal of British and American financial support for the Aswan High Dam project, the by then President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal on 26th July 1956. Bishop Johnston was in England for the inauguration of the Egypt Diocesan Association, recently separated from that of the Sudan.[6] He returned to Egypt as soon as was practical. Arthur Burrell and his wife were in Alexandria at the time. The Burrells had been invited to a party on board a British Navy ship which was visiting the port. But shortly beforehand they received a phone call to say that the party was "off" and the ship weighed anchor.[7] Burrell's response to the crisis further demonstrated a continuing tendency by the leaders of the church to look towards

[5] Burrell, A., Cathedral On The Nile. Oxford: The Amate Press, 1984, pp 55-56.
[6] The EDA is made up of British people who have had an association with the Anglican Church in Egypt. It controls funds which can be made available to the Church in Egypt. One might question whether that control should be handed over to the Diocese of Egypt itself, thereby helping to complete the process of indigenisation.
[7] Burrell, A., 1984, p 57.

Britain and the British community at times of crisis. He returned to All Saints Cathedral in Cairo for Sunday worship where many members of the British community gathered to demonstrate their *sang froid* and consider their futures. Prayers for the Queen and the British Government continued, as did those for the rulers of Egypt, despite the fact that the actions of the latter were considered "quite illegal" by the British[8]. During the delicate negotiations that followed:

> we were very sympathetic towards our Ambassador and his staff[9]

Bishop Johnston had good links with the British Embassy. The Embassy advised that all those who had no compelling reason to remain in Egypt should leave immediately. Bishop Johnston told Jesse Hillman, the CMS Mission Secretary, to evacuate the women and children from the mission. At that time, Jesse and Tony Chase, a hospital doctor, were the only two male CMS missionaries in Egypt. There were fifteen female missionaries and six children.[10] Jesse Hillman disagreed with the Bishop's advice. He believed that there was no pressing need for the evacuation and felt that it would be damaging to the mission of the Church among Egyptians. Bishop Johnston was not inclined to agree. He had a rather poor opinion of the CMS and tended to listen to the Embassy rather than his missionary personnel.[11]

> I'm sure he'd heard from the British Embassy that things were going to be sticky. That Britain was going to attack Egypt. And he called me to him and

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[8] Burrell, A., 1984, p 59.
[9] Ibid., p 59.
[10] Murray, J., Proclaim the Good News A short history of the Church Missionary Society. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985, p 253.
[11] Letter from Jesse Hillman to Milford, C.S., 20th March, 1956. CMS Overseas Division, 1935-59. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. University of Birmingham.

> told me that I must send all the women and children back to Britain and I refused because I could see that the impact of all that on the Egyptian church would have been to destroy any confidence that they had in the unity of Christians across national and cultural boundaries. So I just had to keep stalling because he kept up the pressure. He was very concerned to get all the women and children to the safety of Britain.[12]

Though the Bishop and the Embassy were clearly anxious about the safety of British personnel remaining in Egypt, Hillman had no such concerns about the missionaries and their families. Writing to C. S. Milford in London, he felt that the crisis had had little impact on missionary personnel in Egypt:

> Please do not feel too sorry for us under the present circumstances since most of the excitement, as far as we can gather, seems to be taking place at your end.[13]

Milford seems to have agreed. He replied that he:

> could not agree more heartily that there has been an altogether unnecessary flap in certain quarters here.[14]

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[12] Hillman, J.J., Interviewed 12th April 2002.
[13] Hillman, J.J., Letter to Milford, C.S., 7th August 1956. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.
[14] Milford, C.S. Letter to Hillman, J.J., 7th August 1956. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

It took some time for the effects of the Suez Crisis on the Episcopal Church to be felt. Even in September of that year, the missionaries had experienced few new deprivations as a result of the crisis:

> We are feeling most embarrassed by the number of friends who commiserate with us in the present situation, and who write to assure us of their prayers for our safety. We for our part feel that such sympathy is rather misplaced, in view of the perfect normality of conditions here and the evident friendliness which is shown to us in our ordinary contacts with Egyptians.[15]

On Monday 29th October Israel had invaded the Sinai and by the next day they were reported to be only thirty miles from the Suez Canal. That evening, Bishop Johnston was due to dine at the British Embassy with the Ambassador, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan. Despite the sensitivity of the situation, he seems to have seen no conflict in his role as Bishop of Egypt with associating publicly with Britain's representative in Egypt. Once again, however, sudden changes in the political situation led to the party being cancelled. Shortly beforehand, apparently without prior warning to the British Embassy in Cairo, ultimata had been handed to the Egyptian Ambassador and the Israeli Charge d'Affaires in London, saying that unless the two countries agreed to cease military activity and withdraw to ten miles either side of the Suez Canal by 6am the next morning, Great Britain and France would occupy the Canal Zone to separate the combatants. The British Ambassador in Cairo learnt of this soon afterwards and the dinner was cancelled. As had been planned secretly beforehand, Israel accepted the ultimatum but Egypt refused to do so, giving Britain and France the pretext for an

[15] Hillman, J.J., Letter to Milford, C.S., 6th September 1956. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

invasion. On Wednesday 31st, the bombing by British planes of military objectives in Egypt began.

On 1st November, All Saints' Day, the patronal festival of the Cathedral, Britain started bombing Cairo. The reverberations of the bombs could be felt by those kneeling to receive communion at the altar rail in the Cathedral's Lady Chapel.[16] A message came from the British Embassy advising all British subjects to leave immediately. The Embassy was incommunicado and the British community was now under the official protection of the Swiss legation. On 4th November, Bishop Johnston was given permission to visit the British Embassy and hold a service for the Embassy staff. Shortly afterwards, British and French troops began parachuting into Egypt and landings took place near Port Said and Port Fu'ad. Many members of the British community, mainly teachers and missionaries, found shelter in the Cathedral precincts. Its Egyptian staff continued to come and go but Aziz Wasif, the Verger and Cathedral Clerk was arrested and spent one hundred days in prison. He suffered most for his connections with the British church but other less dramatic prices were paid by many other Egyptians. Church bank accounts were seized. Church schools were turned into internment camps and the Hospital in Old Cairo was taken over by the Egyptian Government. British residents were forced to register at local police stations. On 12th November Arthur Burrell, the Provost of the Cathedral, and Bishop and Mrs Johnston were ordered by the Ministry of the Interior to leave the country altogether within seven days. It was forty years since Johnston had first arrived in Egypt. He was obliged to hand over responsibility for the Church in Egypt to Archdeacon Adeeb Shammas. The deportees managed to get seats on a KLM flight to Amsterdam on 16th

[16] Hillman, J.J., interviewed 12th April 2002.

November. They continued to London where they reported immediately to the Archbishop of Canterbury at Lambeth.[17] Others left on 30th November.[18] Arthur Burrell and Frank Johnston were described on Egyptian radio as leaders of a spy ring. This was not true. But given the threat to Egypt from Britain and the continuing tendency of the Episcopal Church to identify with the home country, it is perhaps not surprising that such perceptions should arise.

It was not long before events were to have a greater impact on CMS personnel. British doctors in Egypt were struck off the Egyptian medical register. Telephones were disconnected and radio sets belonging to Britons were confiscated. Naturally, the question arose as to whether the remaining CMS missionaries should leave Egypt. In a letter of 1st November 1956, Milford left this decision to the missionaries themselves but expressed the hope that they would remain in Egypt as long as they were permitted to do so by the Egyptian authorities.[19] According to a memo of 2nd November, based on a telephone call from Max Warren to Jesse Hillman, it was clear that all the missionaries wanted to stay, despite British Consular warnings that they should leave.[20] Events were, however, soon to overtake them. A few days later, the CMS missionaries were among the seven hundred and thirteen British people and seven hundred and forty French who were deported by the Egyptian Government. They were treated courteously but their passports were marked 'no return'. Some were asked to sign a paper saying they were leaving voluntarily but they refused. The Egyptian Government alleged that they had been involved in anti-Egyptian activities,

[17] Circular letter from Bishop Frank Johnston, January 1957.
[18] Burrell, A., 1984, pp 66-69.
[19] Milford. C.S., Letter 1st November 1956. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.
[20] Warren, M., Memo 2nd November 1956. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

saying that the only measure taken by the Egyptian Government was the deportation of those nationals of the aggressor countries known for having carried out activities that are definitely detrimental to the country's cause. (This accusation was later withdrawn in a statement by His Excellency, Mohammad Omar Loutfi, Egypt's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, in September 1957).

4.10 Criticism of the British Government

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, was outraged by the aggressive actions of the British Government. He wrote to the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden on 2nd November 1956, calling on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from Egypt. His proposal for a national day of prayer on 6th January 1957 was rejected by the Prime Minister. Archbishop Fisher's attack on Lord Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, whose job it was to explain the action to the House of Lords on 1st November 1956 brought criticism from many, including Lord Hailsham:

> This was, perhaps, one of the fiercest attacks on a minister of the Crown ever made in the House of Lords by an Archbishop of Canterbury. It arose from the strength of his feelings and a sense of betrayal. 'I felt,' he wrote later 'that they (the British Government) had not only lost a terribly good opportunity of doing the right thing, they had done a ghastly wrong thing.' Geoffrey Fisher was a strong supporter of the United Nations and felt that the intervention of the British Government over Suez was retrogressive and in opposition to the new and hopeful winds of change that were blowing through the corridors of power.[21]

[21] Carpenter, E., 1991, p404.

The CMS was also critical of the British Government's actions. It issued a press release on 4th November 1956 deploring the British Government's activities in Egypt:

> We are deeply concerned lest the recent actions of our government, even if successful for the moment, may make this [missionary] task much more difficult. All our Christian witness must be given in the context of the aspirations and the climate of opinion in the newly independent countries of Asia, which also profoundly affect Africa to-day. It is part of our privilege and our responsibility to understand these aspirations and to share this understanding with others.
>
> If our Government appear to be trying to re-establish western control by force, the effect on the witness of our Society may well be disastrous. We therefore most heartily endorse, from our special angle the words of the Archbishop of Canterbury during the House of Lords debate: "Here surely we are wise to see what other people think of us."
>
> But our concern is not only with our own work. We believe that the universal desire among formerly subject peoples for self-determination is a healthy movement of the human spirit. This means that our own country among others must accept a diminished position in the international scene. Some, consciously or unconsciously resenting this, may try to set the clock back. We hold it to be our Christian duty to seek, even at considerable risk, an open international society of justice and peace, in which all men can meet each other with mutual respect and in the dignity of freedom.[22]

[22] C.M.S. News Release 4th November, 1956. AS 59 G2 E1 955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

C.S. Milford of the CMS in London compared the actions of Great Britain and France in the Suez Crisis to the Crusades:

> the memory of the Crusades has not been forgotten in the Middle East. They still resent that chapter in our history, and are still suspicious of the West. Recent history has not tended to heal that sore.[23]

These public statements by the CMS appear to have been mild in comparison with those that the returning missionaries might have made. The CMS seems to have been anxious to restrict what they might have had to say at a time of great domestic as well as international political sensitivity:

> They have sent home letters with rather strong expressions of opinion and we think that they should be circumspect about what they say.[24]

At a time when opinions in the country were sharply divided, the missionaries were allowed to talk to the press but were to avoid political comment. They were not to take up speaking engagements and were advised not to say "too much" even to relatives and friends.[25] It was not until 5th March 1957 that C. S. Milford relaxed these instructions.[26]

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[23] Milford, C.S., speaking to a conference of laity at Portsmouth Cathedral House, reported in The Evening News, Portsmouth, 23rd October, 1956. C.M.S. Overseas division 1935-1959 AS 59 G2 1955-1959 subfile 1. University of Birmingham.
[24] Milford, S.S. Letter to Grimshaw, Lt Col. G.C. Nairobi. AS 59 G2 E1 955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.
[25] Milford, C.S., Letter to returning missionaries 30th November, 1956. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959 Subfile 5. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.
[26] Milford, C.S. Letter to missionaries 5th March 1957. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

4.11 The work in Egypt continues

Funds and property in Egypt were still registered in the name of the CMS and were sequestrated by the Egyptian Government. Fortunately, the sequestrator was a Christian who did not try to interfere with the running of the institutions by the Egyptian church leaders. A conference for missionaries from Egypt and Jordan on 11th February criticised the previous failures of the CMS to place its property in the hands of the local church:

> This seems to be a clear object lesson for other countries.[27]

Remarkably, much of the work of the Church in Egypt was able to continue under Egyptian leadership. Old Cairo Hospital was seized by the authorities but Menouf Hospital remained as a church institution, despite financial deprivations. The Episcopal College was taken over by the Egyptian Government but schools in Menouf and on Rhoda Island in Cairo continued their work as usual, as did the Diocesan Literature Board. Services continued in English and Arabic at the Cathedral and in Alexandria. Churches in Maadi and Helwan (suburbs of Cairo) and Suez were subsequently used by other Christian groups while those at Port Said and Ismailia were closed. Given that the British had dropped bombs on Egypt it is surprising that greater restrictions were not placed upon the activities of the Episcopal Church there. It is a tribute to the good work that was being done in its name that the backlash against it was not greater. The Egyptian leadership left to keep things going could not be said to have been fully prepared for the sudden responsibility placed upon it but it succeeded in keeping things going. A shortage of missionary personnel in the months

[27] AS 59 G2 E1 955-1959. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

leading up to the crisis had perhaps helped to prepare Egyptian staff by obliging them to take more responsibility for the running of institutions.[28] Perhaps the dramatic political events which had caused this sudden handover had precipitated something that should have been completed long before and might otherwise have been spread out over a number of years. Sources for the subsequent years in which the Egyptian leadership 'kept the show on the road' are limited and these years lie outside the scope of this study but they are an important part of the history of the Episcopal Church in Egypt and deserve to be told elsewhere. Though some had previously questioned his administrative abilities,[29] Adeeb Shammas and the Egyptian clergy continued to run the Diocese as best they could. The Archdeacon was, however, reluctant to communicate with the Bishop in England. This caused some frustration to Bishop Johnston but is hardly surprising given the precarious position in which the Egyptian clergy found themselves at the time.

Bishop Frank Johnston resigned in exile in Britain in 1958 after medical reports indicated that it would not be advisable for him to work overseas again. Episcopal oversight for the Church in Egypt passed to the Bishop in Jerusalem, Campbell MacInnes, recently made Archbishop in the newly created Province of the Middle East. Sequestrated properties were returned to the Church in 1959. In 1960 the Revd Donald Blackburn was invited to become Provost of All Saints' Cathedral and the Revd Douglas Butcher returned as Chaplain in Alexandria. A number of missionaries followed. Kenneth Cragg, the distinguished Islamist and Arabic scholar, came to Egypt as Assistant Bishop to George Appleton who succeeded Campbell MacInnes as

[28] Letter from Jesse Hillman to Max Warren, 17th March 1956. CMS Overseas Division, 1935-59. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. University of Birmingham.
[29] Gurney, H.C., letter to Milford, C.S., 21st April, 1953. AS 59 G2 E1 December 1951-November 1954, C.M.S. Archives, University of Birmingham.

Archbishop of Jerusalem in 1968. Bishop Cragg was based in Cairo until 1974 when the Bishopric of Egypt was revived and Ishaq Musaad was consecrated as its first Egyptian Bishop. Emigration by Egyptian Christians and restrictions on evangelism have meant that the Diocese has remained numerically small but geographically it covers a huge area. The revived Diocese included the Chaplaincies of Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria necessitating travel over vast distances by its bishop. The Diocese continues to play an important role out of all proportion to its size, providing a bridge between the Evangelical churches and the ancient Orthodox Churches, especially the Coptic Church. It has also played an important role in relations between the Anglican Church and the Islamic world, never more so than today.

Chapter Five

The Church and the State

Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's

Matthew 22 verse 21

The Anglican Church in Egypt raises many questions about the nature of the relationship between the church and state, mission and empire. Specifically, it raises issues about the relationship between a missionary diocese in a nominally sovereign state, and the colonial interests of Britain. These are difficult to tease out because these issues tended to remain poorly defined and were based on assumptions that were rarely written down. As Max Warren, General Secretary of the CMS noted towards the end of the period in question:

> comparatively little attention has been directed to the significance of the relationship between Church and State in the missionary expansion of the Church during recent centuries and the resulting issues confronting both church and state everywhere today.[1]

We must, however, try to clarify some of these issues if we are to enhance our understanding of the Anglican Church in Egypt. As part of this analysis, we shall look at the relationship between the Anglican Church in Egypt and the British military. This is one very significant area in which the "rubber hits the road" in the church-state relationship.

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[1] Warren, M., Caesar The Beloved Enemy. SCM Press Ltd, London, 1955, p7.

5.1 Church and State in England

The Anglican Diocese of Egypt had extremely strong ties to the Church of England during this period. In contrast to the situation today, the Diocese of Egypt was not part of an autonomous province. This meant that it was administered directly by the Archbishop of Canterbury who appointed its bishops. In beginning to examine the relationship of the Anglican Church in Egypt to the state we must look first at the Church of England's own understanding of its relationship with the state. During the past one hundred years, there have been four reports sponsored by the Church of England which have looked at this relationship.[2] All of these have primarily been concerned with the question of the establishment of the Church of England and its legislative independence. Questions about the day-to-day running of the Church, such as its access to power and the limits of that power within the state have always tended to be glossed over. Like other aspects of the British constitution, the relationship between the Church of England and the state has often benefited from not being too closely defined:

> This accords with the English tradition, which has neither the clear-cut logic of the Latin nor the systematic comprehensiveness of the Teutonic mind, but rests on our inveterate national habit of spontaneous conformity.[3]

The Revd Canon Dr Anthony Dyson made a short study of all four reports on the relationship between the Church of England and the British state.[4] In his study, he

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[2] The Archbishop's Committee on Church and State. London: SPCK, 1917.
Church Assembly, Church and State: Report of the Archbishop's Commission on the Relations Between Church and State. London: Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1935.
Church and State. London: Church Information Board of the Church Assembly, 1952.
Church and State. London: Church Information Office, 1970.

[3] Church and State. London: Church Information Board of the Church Assembly, 1952, p 68.

suggested that each of the reports tended to be very deferential to the state. At the same time, each was part of a stealthy movement by the Church to gain greater freedom from the British Parliament in its ability to make changes to its worship. In the process, however, the Church of England was inclined to identify certain areas of life as its 'spiritual' domain (such as worship) while tending to abrogate responsibility for other 'non-spiritual' areas of life, such as politics. Believing itself supported by the idea of rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's, the Church of England bought into a false dualism that undermined the very unity of faith and society upon which the notion of an established church rests. In doing so, Dyson believes that it missed out on many opportunities to influence the national life of post-war Britain.[5]

In its relationship with government, the Church of England has usually been the junior partner. In this relationship, in return for giving legitimacy to Britain's rulers, the Church has enjoyed limited access to power and the ability to nudge some areas of policy in certain directions. The Church has not been inclined to put the limits of its authority to the test, preferring instead to believe that in general, the British political machine was working in the best interests of society and the wider world. The absence of a single creedal expression of Anglicanism has perhaps meant that it has never been required to think systematically about its place in society and the political dimension of its mission.[6] Where it has been prompted to comment, it has done so reactively, rather than from the basis of a defined vision of a desirable social order.

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[4] Dyson, A., ""Little else but name" – Reflections on Four Church and sate Reports," pp282-312. in Moyser, G. (Ed.), Church and Politics Today. Edinburgh: T and T Clark Ltd, 1985.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ecclestone, G. S., The Church of England and Politics. London: CIO Publishing, 1981. pp 3-4.

Though the Church of England has expressed concern about the needs of the world, it has often spent a considerable amount of time discussing its internal questions without pursuing these wider issues very far. This rather myopic approach was nowhere more evident than in 1947:

> This quite massive loss of proportion finds a *locus classicus* in Archbishop Fisher's presidential address to the Convocations in 1947 when he spoke movingly of the needs of the nation, calling for political wisdom, spiritual integrity and economic efficiency, but then moved to the Church's response in its own life requiring as the 'first and most essential step' the reform of Canon Law, a process to which Fisher committed large amounts of the Church's time, energy and attention over several years.[7]

Dyson concludes his criticism of the Church's short-sightedness with the following:

> In matters of peace and war, of poverty and riches, and of relations with other countries, the Church of England (whatever its occasional rhetoric) still seems hypnotised by the history of its complex embeddedness in the state and still sufficiently bemused to think that it can exist apolitically amid political turbulence.[8]

[7] Dyson, A., p307, in Moyser, G. (Ed.), 1985.
[8] Ibid., p309.

5.2 The Oxford Conference of 1937

Such judgments may seem particularly harsh. During the period in question, the Oxford Conference of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work in July 1937 affirmed the sovereignty of God over all areas of life, including politics. According to Graeme Smith in his PhD Thesis on the conference, its organiser, Oldham, was particularly concerned to oppose the secularism which, along with individualism, had, he believed, provided the environment in which totalitarian regimes like National Socialism were able to flourish.[9] In its Church volume the conference rejected the medieval Christendom model of clerical domination over political and economic life.[10] On the other hand the report affirmed the transformation of politics, economics and social affairs by the involvement of lay Christians in these areas – a sort of neo-Christendom.[11] It also argued that the Church had the right to judge the State. Though its report suggested that nationalism might be adopted by the churches, it had to be transformed by them to conform to the purposes of God.[12] Graeme Smith argues that Oldham was suspicious of democracy.[13] In his desire to oppose National Socialism he seemed willing to countenance support for other authoritarian regimes which could defeat it.[14] Perhaps in this lay the seeds of a situation in which a church like the Church of England was once again forced to adopt its customary uncritical view of a government caught in a conflict with Fascism in the Second World War that began two years later. The idea of criticising government policy does not seem to have come naturally to the Church of England. This was especially true in times of crisis.

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[9] Smith, G. R. "The Oxford Conference of the Universal Christian Church for Life and Work, July 1937." University of Birmingham: PhD Thesis, 1996. pp 24-241.
[10] Ibid. p 389.
[11] Ibid. p 391.
[12] Ibid. p 400.
[13] Ibid. p 238.
[14] Ibid. p 404.

5.3 The Anglican Church in Egypt

It is in this environment that the Anglican Church in Egypt existed. Brought into being by a church that often failed to look critically at its relationship with the state in which it was the state religion, the Anglican Church in Egypt similarly failed to examine its role in relation to the state in which it found itself. As Gwynne freely admitted, he and his clergy were no intellectuals. He did not take part in the Oxford Conference and his writings show no evidence of having been influenced by it. He and his clergy tended to go along with many of the unspoken assumptions that the Church of England had about the British state. Not only did they fail to look critically at the loyalty of the church to the state, they accepted and continued that loyalty. This was despite the fact that they were in another, supposedly foreign and sovereign, country. Though critical of some aspects of British policy, especially those that affected the Anglican Church in Egypt directly, such as its approach to mission schools, they tended to go along with the idea that the British Government was working for the greater good in Egypt. They did not, however, give the same benefit of the doubt to the Egyptian Government which was nominally in charge of the country in which they found themselves. Though they prayed for its leaders as well as for the British King, they tended to share the scepticism of the British Government and other British subjects living in Egypt about the ability of the Egyptian Government to rule justly for the good of all.

In Christians and the State,[15] J. C. Bennett argues that the Church should normally be separated from the State because only thereby can the church be sure of avoiding being used for the purposes of propaganda and be clearly distinguishable from the

[15] Bennett, J. C., Christians and the State. New York: Scribners, 1958. quoted in ibid, p308.

national community. The Anglican Church in Egypt was certainly not the established religion of the state in which it found itself but during the Second World War it allowed itself to be used for the purposes of propaganda by an occupying and increasingly unpopular power. Many of these accommodations were made unconsciously and without reflection:

> There are obvious examples of the Church being caught up in propaganda activities and in unsuitable effusions of national sentiment. But it is probably the less obvious instances which are more significant, instances where Christian thought and life accommodate themselves unconsciously and unthinkingly to attitudes of state which are actually far from the Christian mind.[16]

Though it is harder to identify examples of these smaller accommodations, it is clear that the Anglican Church in Egypt was frequently guilty of collusion. The use of the Crusader name and badge by the Eighth Army during the Second World War is an obvious example (see below). Apart from being a poor witness to the universality of the Christian Gospel, these collusions also damaged the reputation of the Church among Egyptians. Frequently, the reputation of the Church seems to have been put at risk more by perception than by reality. For instance, there was a:

> Close and long-standing friendly relationship between the British Embassy and the Cathedral staff. [But] There was primarily a pastoral and never, in any

[16] Smith, G. R., 1996.

way, a political link in spite of suspicions that some observers may have entertained, or rumours that were quite falsely circulated.[17]

In the spin-conscious era of the early twenty-first century the Anglican Church seems at the very least naïve about the way in which such relationships were perceived. Those who took part in them expected to be judged by others according to their intentions rather than the impressions that such relationships might have given. Perhaps there was nothing the Church could do about these perceptions but there seems to have been very little awareness that such relationships might have created problems for the Church's image among Egyptians. A Church that draws so heavily on signs and symbols should perhaps, however, have been more aware of the symbolism of some of its activities. G. S. Ecclestone argues that:

> The Church is called upon to be a sign of the Kingdom. It cannot afford to be inattentive to the messages it is implicitly conveying.[18]

In hindsight, the Church should have reflected more critically on its relationship with the state. It should have been more aware of its status as a church in Egypt in relation to Britain which was a foreign power. It should have been more cautious in its knee-jerk support for the British point of view and more willing to support the aspirations of the Egyptian people and the policies of the Egyptian government. Looking back over the events of the period 1936-1956, it does seem that the Church was often naïve in identifying itself so closely and uncritically with the British political presence in

[17] Burrell, A., Cathedral On The Nile. Oxford: The Amate Press Ltd, 1984, p 58.
[18] Ecclestone, G. S., 1981, pp 3-4.

Egypt. The Anglican Church in Egypt was, however, by no means unique in this. Neill argues that many missionaries from imperialist nations:

> so enthusiastically entered into the plans of their own country in its colonial domains ....as to appear before the eyes of believers and non-believers alike more in the character of agents of a government than as messengers of the Gospel.[19]

5.4 Christendom and the voluntarist approach

Part of the problem with the messages that were sent out by the Anglican Church in Egypt and the way in which they might have been interpreted was that each side had different preconceptions of the way in which "church" and state operated. Lamin Sanneh, in his book, Encountering the West. Christianity and the Global Cultural Process, argues that Egyptians were still living with the idea of Christendom; of religion fundamentally bound up with the territory of states:

> The territorial instinct is alive and well among Muslims even though the caliphate as the Muslim 'Holy Empire' has long ceased to exist.[20]

Through its links with the British political elite in Egypt, the Anglican Church sent out the message that it was still riding on the coat tails of Christendom. In reality, however, Christendom in the west was gradually coming to an end.[21] The causes and

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[19] Neill, S., Colonialism and Christian Missions. London: Lutterworth Press, 1966, p 414.
[20] Sanneh, L., Encountering the West. Christianity and the Global Cultural Process. New York: Orbis Books, 1993, p 216.
21 Christendom is a civilisation in which (a) Christianity is the dominant religion and (b) the dominance has been backed up by social and legal compulsions.

timing of this are open to dispute. The Enlightenment, secularisation, industrialisation, urbanisation and the First World War all seem to have played their part.[22] On the margins of Christendom in the Middle East, however, British policy-makers seem to have been particularly keen to jettison the idea that their aim was to extend the Christian empire. Increasingly, as Sanneh argues, the British political and religious elite in Egypt were operating from a largely unspoken position of the separation of church and state:

> the Church was content to go voluntary, since the State would do duty for biological and territorial loyalty. However, the price paid was religion being driven from the public square and made personal and subjective. The State learnt to get on without religion and to feel, when it was not useful or irrelevant, that religion was a mischief.[23]

Religion in the West was increasingly becoming a matter not of birth and soil but of personal choice. Cox has described how it became more and more voluntarist.[24] A history of religious strife in Europe had led to the Enlightenment's separation of church and state. Increasingly, religious belief was left to the individual.[25] This change was a gradual one and there was little clarity about it even among those whom it affected most. But such a separation would have been alien to the Anglican Church's Egyptian observers to whom it was never fully explained. For them,

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Ustorf, W., in McLeod, H., and Ustorf, W. (Eds), The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p 218.

[22] McLeod, H., in ibid., pp 13-20.

[23] Sanneh, L., Encountering the West. Christianity and the Global Cultural Process. New York: Orbis Books, 1993, p 189.

[24] Cox, J., "Master narratives of long-term religious change" in McLeod, H., and Ustorf, W. (Eds), The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p 210.

[25] Stanley B., Christian Missions and the Enlightenment. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001, p 13.

according to Sanneh, religion was then and remains now very much about birth and nationality.

> It has still not entered the consciousness of Muslims forcibly enough that in the post-Christendom West the Church is subordinate to the State not in the Erastian sense merely of being a wholly owned subsidiary of the national security state but of playing no organizational role in government.[26]

The Anglican Church in Egypt was pulled in two directions during the period in question. Part of it was founded on the older ideas of Christendom. These included the idea that religion was bound up with birth and nationhood, and that the Anglican Church existed to serve the needs of British Christians intent on extending the new Christendom of the British Empire. Meanwhile, its missionaries were working with a new paradigm of religion based on personal choice:

> Evangelical missionaries therefore sought to transform "heathen" societies by means of procuring genuine individual conversions, and they anticipated that on the mission field, as at home, such private acts of religious commitment could be divorced from issues of communal identity and public allegiance.[27]

Sanneh argues that:

> the Christian missionary movement was the funeral of the great myth of Christendom, because mission took abroad the successful separation of

[26] Sanneh, L., 1993, p218.
[27] Stanley, B., 2003, p 13.

> Church and Sate, of religion and territoriality. For mission, religion was a matter for individual persuasion and choice.[28]

This was alien to the majority of Egyptians and was brought seriously into question by the implied messages sent out by the English-speaking part of the Church. Where minority Egyptian Christians were able to conceive of a separation of church and state, there was nationalist pressure on them to identify with the state, as Egyptians first and foremost. Any connections with Britain and its empire through religion were a definite hindrance to Anglican mission among Egyptians. It is to further questions of mission and empire that we shall now turn

5.5 Mission and empire

The Church of England's reluctance to involve itself publicly with British Government policy meant that it made little comment on Britain's imperialist strategy.[29] Historically, overseas mission had tended to be a matter for individual missionary societies rather than the Church of England as a whole. Concerns about the impact of imperialism on that mission were often confined to the societies themselves and therefore rarely had a central place among the preoccupations of the mother church:

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[28] Sanneh, L., 1993, p 191.

[29] As a definition of imperialism, we follow B. Stanley in accepting that put forward by W. L. Langer in The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902. New York, 1951, p67:

> the rule or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one state, nation or people over similar groups, or perhaps one might better say the disposition, urge or striving to establish such rule or control.

> The truth is that for most of the period of its existence, the missionary movement was not a major preoccupation of the Western Church.[30]
>
> Missions were the province of the enthusiasts rather than the mainstream.[31]

In the British colonies and protectorates themselves, however, mission and empire, church and state could be very closely entwined. In The Transformation of Anglicanism, Sachs argues that:

> The Church's relation to colonial policy occurred more in the mission field than in parliamentary corridors. In yet another way the Church had been distanced from government.[32]

In many British colonies, the activities of missionaries had a very practical bearing on British imperial rule:

> Because British imperial policy was concerned to be as cheap as possible, the existing Christian missions were used to 'service' the structures of colonial rule by the provision of health care and education, and so were often drawn into a dependent relationship with colonial administrators.[33]

W. M. Jacob and B. Stanley[34] indicate that the relationship between British missionaries and the British Empire was not always a straightforward one. It is too

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[30] Walls, A. F., in Stanley B., (Ed), 2003, p 23.
[31] Ibid., p 24.
[32] Sachs, W. L., The Transformation of Anglicanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 110.
[33] Jacob, W. M., The Making of the Anglican Church Worldwide. London: SPCK, 1997, p 235.
[34] Stanley, B., The Bible and the Flag. Leicester: Apollos, 1990.

simplistic to say that "'the Bible and the flag' went hand in hand".[35] Sometimes missionaries went to areas of Africa before they were annexed by the crown. On the other hand, not all areas annexed by Britain proved fruitful for Anglican mission. India is a case in point here.[36] Notwithstanding these provisos, mission and empire have always been closely identified, ever since the time of Constantine. The Anglican Church in Egypt is no exception in this.

Max Warren, the influential General Secretary of the CMS, has written most about mission and empire during the period in question. He accepted that Christianity, by its very nature, has an imperialist dimension. The instruction to go and make disciples of all nations would always be imperialist at some level. Like Jacob and Stanley, Max Warren recognised that the relationship between mission and empire was frequently an ambiguous one:

> From Constantine to Mao-tse-tung this intimate relationship has been an embarrassment and a scandal but also a testimony and an adventure of faith. The ambiguity of the relationship is at once a principal theme throughout church history and a perpetual challenge to Christian theology.[37]

For Warren, there was no escaping the reality that missionaries represented, amongst other things, the culture from which they came:

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[35] Stanley, B., 1990, p 12.
[36] Jacob, W.M., The Making of the Anglican Church Worldwide. London, SPCK, 1997, p 195.
[37] Warren, M., Caesar, The Beloved Enemy. London: SCM Press Ltd, 1955, p 11.

> the foreign missionary is never just an individual 'put in trust with the gospel', a citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven. He is always and quite inescapably, a *representative person,* who represents a great deal more than the gospel[38]

P. Cornwell, in his book, Church and Nation, cautioned against being quick to judge past missionaries who have lived with the tensions inherent in their role as representative persons:

> The working out of this being in the world yet not of it, avoiding on the one hand the lure of escape and on the other the peril of being assimilated is the continuing struggle of Christians. The known difficulty of this narrow path will make us avoid simplistic judgements about our forefathers.[39]

In the case of British missionaries, part of their role as representative persons was that they were inextricably bound up with the British Empire.

While Edward Said tends to take a fairly black and white attitude to imperialism (i.e. that you are either for it or against it) Max Warren argues that the relationship between mission and empire should not be condemned out of hand but should be judged by its fruits. On balance, Warren believed that the beneficial effects of empire in general, and the British Empire in particular, on the mission of the church had outweighed its costs. In fact, he would go so far as to say that:

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[38] Warren, M., 1955, p 76.
[39] Cornwell, P., Church and Nation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1983, p 4.

> We can even envisage circumstances in which imperialism has a place in the purpose and providence of God.[40]

Though he was later to become more sceptical about the benefits of imperialism, during the period in question, Warren believed that Anglican mission around the world had gained enormously from the expansion of the British Empire which at its height had covered a third of the surface of the globe:

> it had been under the umbrella of that empire's protection and its fundamental, if sometimes muddle-headed liberalism that the missionary had worked. He might, and often did, disagree with the local District Commissioner as to ways and means and timing. But the missionary absorbed and shared the benevolent paternalism of the Raj. Rarely did the missionary or the District Commissioner sense the mounting resentment of the governed at the whole concept of 'trusteeship', at a pupillage apparently to continue indefinitely, at the humiliation of being under alien rule.[41]

We have already noted in the case of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne, that those who had been abroad for many years perpetuated nineteenth century notions of 'the white Man's burden' to conquer and civilize 'the dark peoples of the world' for their own good.[42] Though younger missionaries who followed him brought new ideas about mission, according to Max Warren, even in the nineteen forties there was an unwillingness to face the end of empire:

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[40] Warren, M., 1955, p 18.
[41] Warren, M. Crowded Canvas. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1974, p 134.
[42] Stanley, B., 1990, p 36.

'the man on the spot' only saw the 'spot'. Nowhere was he seriously facing the end of colonial rule – I write of the late forties.[43]

Whatever their intentions, Warren perceived that the demands of the Second World War meant that experienced missionaries had very little vision or energy left to think creatively about new models of mission:

I was acutely aware that missionaries coming back to England after the war, many physically and mentally exhausted, some with a ten-year gap since last in England, would hardly be in a mood for radical re-thinking.[44]

5.6 Indigenisation

Even where there was a willingness among new, younger missionaries to consider new ideas about mission, it was sometimes difficult for them to put these ideas into practice. Though it was plain that an exhausted mother country could no longer sustain its control of those countries that had previously been coloured pink on the map, even new missionaries found it hard to slough off ideas of their own superiority:

They were right-minded in their liberal instincts, but heredity was against them....it was not easy for the heirs of nineteenth century imperialism to envisage a political and religious situation in which they would no longer play the part of the natural leaders.[45]

[43] Warren, M., 1974, p 170.
[44] Ibid., p 134.
[45] Ibid., p 135.

For all of these reasons, post-war British missionaries were slow to indigenise the Anglican Church among colonised peoples and to hand over authority within the church to them:

> Lip service is universally paid to the desirability for the local church to express its Christianity in a local idiom and in forms congruous with the local culture. For various reasons, some good and some bad, the modern missionary movement has, until recently, made very little significant contribution to such a baptism of local culture.[46]

The post-war indigenisation of the Anglican Church abroad, like the end or empire, may have appeared painfully slow in many countries. Yet the Anglican Church in Egypt was slower still in making itself indigenous and placing authority in Egyptian hands:

> For any missionary venture, the ordination of native clergy must be the acid test of commitment to moving beyond an imperial context. [47]

Samuel Adjai Crowther's consecration as Bishop for the Niger in 1864 may have been looked back on for many years as an aberration, an experiment that was not entirely successful. But Vedanayakam Samual Azariah had been consecrated Bishop of Dornakal, India, as early 1912. In 1918 Tsae Seng Sing was made Bishop of Chekiang in China and in 1923, Joseph Sakunoshin Motada became Bishop of Tokyo. In Egypt, Girgis Bishai had been ordained priest in 1922, Khalil Tadros in 1931,

[46] Warren, M., 1955, p 82.
[47] Jenkins, P., The Next Christendom. Oxford: Oxford University press, 2002, p 37.

Adeeb Shammas in 1935 and Aziz Hanna in 1943. It was not until 1974, however, that Ishaq Musaad, ordained priest in 1952, became the first Egyptian Bishop of Egypt. Why did it take so long for there to be an Egyptian Bishop?

There are few original sources which discuss the reasons for this. Decisions about the ordination of local clergy seem to have been taken almost solely by the bishop without reference to committees or selection panels. There appear, however, to be several reasons why it took so long for one of these clergy to be consecrated as Bishop of Egypt. Part of the reason for the delay was that the Egyptian Bishopric was suspended between 1958 and 1974, when such a consecration might have been expected. As already mentioned, the small size of the Egyptian Anglican Church in Egypt meant that there has never been a very large pool of suitable men from which a bishop might emerge. Given the unpopularity of Britain, it is hardly surprising that there were not queues of men lining up to join the leadership of the "English church." But the reluctance to seek such a man was also due in part to the attitudes of the British members of the church, most notably Bishop Gwynne who casts such a long shadow over the church in this period. He ordained the first four Egyptian priests in the Diocese but does not seem to have considered the possibility of an Egyptian bishop. It appears that his approach was based largely on an underlying assumption of racial superiority.

The ideas of Bishop Gwynne remained influential partly because of the dual origins of the Anglican Church in Egypt. As already indicated, the expatriate side of the church was the older and more powerful partner. The Egyptian side of the church had been born almost by accident. There had always been, at the very least, an

ambivalence about a permanent indigenous Anglican Church in a country which already had its own church and where open proselytism had become increasingly difficult. While a question mark remained over the purpose and future of the church, expatriates might have felt justified in withholding power from an Egyptian in a church for which they felt responsible.

The final reason for the failure to hand over authority is directly connected with British imperialism in Egypt. "Denial is not just a river in Egypt."[48] Britain seems always to have been in denial about the fact that Egypt was a part of its empire. The 'Veiled Protectorate' did not fool many Egyptians but large numbers of Britons went along with the pretence, publicly supporting the idea that Egypt was a sovereign state with an ancient sense of its own nationhood as well as its own monarch and government. And if Egypt was not a British colony then it did not need to be decolonised. This myopia fitted neatly with British strategic interests and encouraged the British Government to resist Egyptian nationalism for as long as possible. The same thought processes (or lack of them) also lay behind the reluctance to hand over the Anglican Church in Egypt to Egyptians. If the British presence in Egypt was largely that of individual businessmen going about their lawful duties or British civil servants "assisting" the Egyptian government, then "their" church belonged to them and did not need to be handed over to Jonny foreigner. It remained a British club.

[48] William Jefferson Clinton.

5.7 The Church and the Military. A Case Study

The relationship between the Anglican Church in Egypt and the military presence (in particular the British military presence) there has been touched on elsewhere but for the purposes of this study its significance is such that it deserves individual treatment here. It is at this point that the issues of church and state, mission and empire are at their most acute. As the most visible and potentially coercive expression of British imperialism in Egypt, the British military had a unique role in the relationship between the two countries. The approach of the Anglican Church to the military presence in Egypt highlights its response to British imperialism in Egypt as a whole.

British forces were stationed in Egypt from 1882 until 1954. Until 1950, when they were evacuated to the Canal Zone, the British Army occupied key institutions in the very heart of Cairo. The most important of these was the Citadel built by Salah al-Din which overlooked Cairo, dominating its skyline. The Citadel had been occupied by every subsequent conqueror of Egypt and its control was a powerful psychological reminder to residents of Cairo of whoever was in charge. Another major place where British troops were stationed was the Kasr El Nil Barracks which were on the site of what is now the Nile Hilton and Tahrir (Liberation) Square, next to what used to be the old All Saints' Cathedral which was consecrated in 1938. For most of the period in question, British troops were a very visible sign of British occupation in Egypt. This was especially true in World War II when the numbers of British and Allied troops swelled considerably. In 1956, British troops once again invaded Egyptian territory and British planes dropped bombs on Egyptian soil. It seems important to examine the attitude of the Anglican Church to a military force that had such an enormous impact on Egypt.

The Anglican Church in Egypt seems to have placed a high priority on seeking to minister to the needs of British and Allied Troops stationed in Egypt. As already mentioned, it often tended to place their pastoral needs above those of Egyptians. At the beginning of the period, the Anglican Church was very much the Church of England in Egypt and felt that it was natural to minister to uniformed members of the Church of England (and other denominations) stationed there. If anything, the Church's relationship with the military was closer than that which it enjoyed with the British Embassy. Even towards the end of the period, when Bishop Allen saw the need for greater indigenisation of the Church, there were frequent contacts with the British military. The Bishop often relied on British military transport to get around his vast Diocese and military chaplains played an important role among its many congregations. The Anglican Church never seems to have questioned the role of the British military in Egypt despite the ambivalence, not to say animosity of many Egyptians towards the British military presence there. As already indicated, this was partly due to the experience of Bishop Gwynne as Deputy Chaplain General during the First World War, and partly because any such examination was rare during the period under consideration. Britain felt itself to be fighting for its life and any questioning of its actions would have been seen as extremely disloyal. But the reluctance of the Church to distance itself from the British military made it a target of the riots in 1946. It also made its loyalties suspect during the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Egyptians, had, over the years, found many reasons to resent the presence of British troops in their country. In 1906, British officers went pigeon shooting in Denshawi, a village near Alexandria without asking the permission of the village leaders. Pigeons were and are an important part of the meagre diet of the *fellaheen* and the British habit

of shooting them was reviled by Egyptians. During the shoot, the wife of the local imam was accidentally wounded. A fight broke out in which several people were badly injured and one man on each side was killed. Fifty two villagers were subsequently arrested. Four were hanged, many were given long prison sentences and the rest were publicly flogged. This incident aroused huge resentment among many Egyptians, including the nationalist leader, Mustafa Kamel. The memory of the outrage remained and continued to taint the reputation of the British military in Egypt.

During World War I, Egypt experienced many deprivations in the hands of the British military in its prosecution of the War. It was made a British Protectorate in 1914 and was subject to widespread requisitioning. Many Egyptians were conscripted into a Labour Corps which was seen as a British version of the *corvee,* a French system of conscription perpetuated by the Turks. Nationalist aspirations boiled over into revolt in 1919 which was forcibly suppressed by British-controlled forces.

Between World War I and World War II, the numbers of British soldiers in Egypt were reduced. Britain exercised control through its "military advisers" who ran the Egyptian Army. British military personnel tended to be officers who worked in the administration rather than soldiers on active duty. Though small in number, these officers had an enormous influence on Egyptian life and were sometimes the focus of opposition to British rule. From the point of view of the Anglican Church, however, they were another part of the expatriate community that the Church existed to serve. As members of the British community, the Diocese felt it was natural to want to minister to them whenever possible. It seems, however, that their needs tended to be given priority over those of Anglican Egyptians. It also appears that concerns about

how meeting those needs might be perceived by the wider populace were never raised. It is not that the needs of British military personnel in Egypt were not real. It is just that they seem always to have been more real than those of other, often less fortunate people among whom they lived. Though a sojourner in Egypt, the Anglican Church always identified with the political aspirations of the country from which it sprang rather than those of the country in which it found itself. In November, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor General of the Sudan, was assassinated in Cairo:

> The funeral took place in All Saints' Church with all the pomp and ceremony of an occasion designed to make a deep impression on the country as a whole.[49]

Sir Lee Stack's assassins were dismissed as evil extremists. No one in the Church chose to examine why such an atrocity should have taken place. Certainly, no one questioned the need of the Church to play its part in a display of tribal solidarity and superiority in the face of Egyptian nationalism. Significantly, when the High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, requested that representatives of the Egyptian Government be invited to attend, Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne sided with the majority of the British community in opposing this. Gwynne appears to have identified with the British tribal instinct to close ranks against all Egyptians rather than seeing the wider need to demonstrate solidarity between those Britons and Egyptians who were running the country. In the end, however, the wishes of Lord Allenby prevailed.

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[49] Hewgill, quoted in Burrell, A., Cathedral on the Nile. Oxford: The Amate Press Ltd, 1984, p14.

5.8 The Second World War

As already mentioned, the ranks of British and Allied troops in Egypt swelled enormously during the Second World War numbering one hundred and forty thousand by November 1941.[50] Egypt was the largest troop base outside Europe. The troops effectively took over the country, requisitioning supplies and facilities and bringing about massive inflation. As already indicated, the foreign soldiers often showed little respect for their Egyptian hosts and further frustrated pre-war hopes of Egyptian independence.

On 26th May 1940, Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne preached at a service to mark a Day of National Prayer called by George VI after Allied setbacks in the War. His words were typical of his Churchillian oratory which never questioned the probity of the Allied cause. He said that:

> They were not there to wrest from the unwilling hand of God a spectacular victory over our enemies, which He would not otherwise grant. They were there to worship the Most High, to offer all they had and all they were in His service...that the malignant forces of evil should not prevail on earth.[51]

The distinction between an Allied victory and the purposes of God was a fine one. Bishop Gwynne believed wholeheartedly in the justice of the Allied cause and had little doubt that it was part of the divine plan that the allies should prevail.

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[50] Cooper, A., 1995, p 112.
[51] Burrell, A., 1984, p24.

Bishop Gwynne was not alone in his convictions. Morris Gelsthorpe, Gwynne's assistant bishop who worked mainly in the Sudan, had been a machine gun officer in World War I and had won the DSO:

> In World War II he became the friend of countless servicemen of all ranks. Like Bishop Gwynne, he paid a number of visits to the western Desert for confirmations and services. Morris knew at first hand, its sufferings and its horrors, but he believed in the necessity of fighting for his country's cause of faith and freedom. He also knew that unless Christ's cause, to which he had given his own life many years before, became paramount in people's lives, victory in war would ultimately be meaningless.[52]

Bishop Gwynne, who was very involved in the moral rearmament campaign after the War, shared in this view. Notwithstanding these concerns, however, both Gelsthorpe and Gwynne believed that the Allied cause was just and that the values which Britain promoted were part of the extension of the kingdom of God. This belief and their primary call to minister to Allied forces allowed them to overlook some of the short-term drawbacks of war, not least those affecting the Egyptian people. Though violence was always to be regretted, the idea of questioning its use in the midst of the War would have been unthinkable to them. From their point-of-view it seemed entirely natural that on 5th November, 1942, in a the capital city of a supposedly neutral country, the bells rang out from All Saints' Cathedral Cairo to mark the Allied victory at El Alamein and the recapture of Tobruk.[53] A window, in memory of the Eighth Army, was later dedicated in All Saints' Cathedral by Field Marshall

[52] Burrell, A., 1984, p25.
[53] Cooper, A., 1995, p218.

Montgomery during Bishop Gwynne's last visit to Egypt in the spring of 1951 (Fig. 7). It survives today in the new All Saints, Cathedral.

Bishop Gwynne was not completely uncritical of the War effort and was aware that resources were being diverted away from missionary activity in Egypt and elsewhere. Clergy were required to act as chaplains and funds which had previously been directed towards the missionary activity of the Church were drying up. In October 1939 he wrote the following to the Archbishop of Canterbury:

> It is exasperating to see how millions of pounds are squandered in this wasteful war when a mere fraction could save a most valuable bit of work from collapse.[54]

5.9 Crusader

There were other occasions on which the mission of the Anglican Church in Egypt and the interests of the British State seemed to clash. Bishop Gwynne had for many years been aware that the mission of the Church in Egypt was hampered by Arab memories of the Crusades:

> I believe the bitterness and hatred of Moslems towards Christians can be traced to those days when our forefathers, the Crusaders, made the most

[54] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to the Archbishop of Canterbury 24th October, 1939. Archbishop's Correspondence 1921-1950 Box File 15 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

lamentable mistake possible in conducting Crusades with a purely material objective.[55]

These painful memories cannot have been allayed by the use of the code name "Crusader" in the first rather unsuccessful operation undertaken by the Eighth Army after its formation by General Auchinlek in November 1941. The same name was given to the Army's weekly newspaper and inspired its Crusaders' Cross badge. This was a gold cross on a white shield on a dark blue background. The cross would have been red, like the original crusader emblem, but it was feared that this might have caused confusion with the Red Cross. There is no evidence that Gwynne or any other members of the Anglican Church made representations to the Army regarding the advisability of the Crusader name and motif, but its use shows how peripheral the concerns of the Church and its mission could be to those of the British state and its military, especially in times of conflict.

In many other ways, the Anglican Church benefited from the British military presence in Egypt. It gave the Church, in particular, a powerful raison d'être. British troops swelled congregations that would otherwise have been in decline. Service chaplains provided invaluable assistance throughout the Diocese and British military planes were used by the bishops to move around their huge diocese. On occasion, the British military provided protection for the Diocese. British troops were the first on the scene after the attack on the Cathedral in 1946. On the other hand, had there been no association with the British military, the Anglican Church might have identified itself more closely with the Egyptian people and their aspirations. This might have

[55] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to Professor K. B. Westman, 3rd December, 1934. Bundle 64 A Bishop Gwynne's Correspondence. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

strengthened its appeal among ordinary Egyptians and made it less vulnerable to accusations that it was the (however unwitting) stooge of an imperialist invader.

Chapter Six

Relations Between the Diocese of Egypt (and the Sudan) and the Church Missionary Society

6.1 The balance of power

As well as raising questions about the relationship between church and state, mission and empire, this study also raises concerns about the relationship between the Church Missionary Society in Egypt and the Diocese of Egypt and the Sudan (later the Diocese of Egypt). The activities of the Church Missionary Society in Egypt were in theory carried out under the authority of the Anglican bishop there. Sometimes this connection seems to have inhibited the work of the Society among Egyptians. Sometimes it caused tensions between the Society and the bishop. More often though, the CMS in Egypt seems to have enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy from diocesan structures. This had costs as well as benefits. Their separation sometimes had important implications for the mission of the Anglican Church as a whole.

As already demonstrated, the actions of the Diocese during this period seem to have been dictated more by the needs of the expatriate Anglican community in Egypt than by the concerns of missionaries seeking to reach out to Egyptians. The Cathedral is a particular case in point. Those involved in its planning and funding were all expatriates. Though they wished to build a commanding symbol of Anglican worship in Cairo, they do not appear to have been driven by a desire to fill it with Egyptians. S. A. Morrison, the CMS Mission Secretary in Egypt, believed that the location of the

Cathedral on the banks of the river Nile, though prominent, rendered it of little use for evangelistic work among Muslims:

> Like many of my C.M.S. colleagues, I do not consider that, geographically, the location of the cathedral is good either for evangelistic work among Muslim students or for the circulation of Arabic Christian literature. The site was never selected with this in mind.[1]

On more than one occasion, the CMS personnel, sent from England to work among Egyptians, were drawn into serving the needs of the English-speaking part of the church. This was particularly true of members of the clergy who were often in short supply in Egypt. Maintaining the large number of English services, in particular those at the Cathedral, was generally seen as a higher priority than many other activities that they might have engaged in. In addition, new clergy arriving in Cairo often seem to have found it difficult to resist the congenial society of their compatriots. It was a welcome alternative to the sometimes thankless struggle of learning Arabic or the more challenging task of building relationships with Egyptians. Expatriates generally enjoyed a much higher standard of living than their Egyptian neighbours which made the divide between the two groups much harder to bridge. As a source of new church members, expatriates may well have seemed to be a much better bet for young clergymen in a hurry. The Anglican Church and its particular culture were familiar to British expatriates. It reminded them of home. Many, particularly those in the armed forces, became more involved in the church than they would have done had they remained in the United Kingdom.

[1] Note from S.A. Morrison to Bishop Allen 10th April 1952. CMS Overseas Division 1935-1959, AS 59 G2 E1 December 1951-November 1954. CMS Archives. Birmingham University Archives.

6.2 Missionary involvement with the expatriate Church

The story of the CMS missionary personnel becoming embroiled in the running of the expatriate side of the church is a recurring one. The Revd Harry Moore, a CMS missionary, arrived in Cairo in 1956. In order to get a visa at what was a politically fraught time, he was appointed by the Diocese, rather than by the CMS. This caused disquiet among other members of the missionary community. They feared that like others before him, he would be obliged to put the priorities of the Diocese and the Bishop before his original call as a missionary:

> Dr Stuart in particular, and some others, are very much afraid that if Harry Moore comes out as one of the Diocesan staff, he will never really get down to learning Arabic as thoroughly as he should do for his future work and will always be at the beck and call of the Bishop.[2]

6.3 The Revd J. Leonard Wilson – a case study

Though the entanglement of missionary clergy in the business of maintaining the English-speaking church was obviously a problem, the CMS seems to have displayed a considerable amount of independence from diocesan structures and the authority of the Bishop. Written evidence of this is scarce but the experience of the Revd J. Leonard Wilson, later Bishop of Singapore and then of Birmingham, who was in Egypt between 1927 and 1929 provides one example. Though just outside the limits of this study, his experience illustrates the potential constraints of the authority of the Anglican bishop in Egypt over the activities of the CMS in his diocese.

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[2] Letter from Jesse Hillman to C.S. Milford, 6th August, 1956 CMS Overseas Division, 1935-59. AS 59 G2 E1 1955-1959. CMS Archives. Birmingham University Archives.

The Revd J. Leonard Wilson was sent by the CMS to Cairo to prepare to take on the job of headmaster of the Anglican Old Cairo Boys' School. He was initially directed by the CMS Mission Secretary of the time, William Temple Gairdner, to immerse himself thoroughly in the study of Arabic:

> I needn't tell you that for a vernacular school like O.C.B.S. a really good knowledge of Arabic is indispensable for really first-rate intricate work. Without it you would be so much in the hands of your new masters, - let alone the necessity of possessing Arabic, both colloquial and literary for the establishing of close spiritual and moral contacts with the boys, - yes and the masters too. My fear is that if you take over the headship after twelve months you will be caught into such a swirl of responsibilities and work that you will simply close your Arabic books altogether, with the task only half done.[3]

Temple Gairdner's fears were fully justified. Wilson did not shine as an Arabic scholar. He found other things to distract him, including his future wife, Mary, the daughter of King Fu'ad's tailor. But this was not his main problem. Wilson was theologically liberal by the standards of the CMS. He was unwilling to dogmatise the pre-existence of Jesus or the Virgin Birth. This brought him into conflict with the Society, and in particular its General Secretary at the time, Wilson Cash. The Revd Leonard Wilson was disappointed to find that the gospel according to the CMS was narrower than that found within the Church of England which it purported to represent abroad:

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[3] Letter to J. Leonard Wilson from W. H. Temple Gairdner. Easter Day, 1927. Correspondence regarding the appointment of J. Leonard Wilson as Headmaster of Old Cairo Boys School. Property of the Revd Martin Wilson.

the work of the Church Missionary Society at least is narrower in many ways than the Church at home.[4]

In the end, Wilson was forced to resign his post and leave Egypt. What is significant about the correspondence involved is the question it raises about the authority of the Bishop of Egypt. As it turned out, Bishop Gwynne did not want Wilson in Cairo. The Bishop was no theologian and he did not want his expatriate flock to be exposed to liberal ideas any more than the CMS wanted them to be expounded among Egyptians. But had he been the one to stand up for Wilson or had he opposed Wilson in the face of CMS support it is hard to see how thing would have turned out:

> The only position the Bishop has with the C.M.S. is that of Chairman of the Egypt Mission.
>
> That may sound a very formidable position, but in all my experience of the C.M.S. methods it counts for very little in a case of this sort.[5]

As Bishop Gwynne himself pointed out, he had little control over the appointment of men who in theory owed their allegiance to him as their father in God:

> The C.M.S brought you out to Egypt. I had nothing to do with your appointment, nor have I ever been asked to give my views on the situation which has arisen between you and the C.M.S.[6]

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[4] Letter to Wilson Cash from J. Leonard Wilson, 15th November, 1929. Correspondence regarding the appointment of J. Leonard Wilson as Headmaster of Old Cairo Boys School. Property of the Revd Martin Wilson.

[5] Letter from Herbert Rivington to Dunlop, 10th August, 1929. Correspondence regarding the appointment of J. Leonard Wilson as Headmaster of Old Cairo Boys School. Property of the Revd Martin Wilson.

6.4 The CMS – a church within a church?

Such examples of a potential conflict of authority between the bishop and the CMS are rare. Usually, it appears that the bishop approved of the activities of the CMS and allowed the Society a great deal of autonomy in his diocese. The bishop had plenty of other things to worry about without interfering in the work of the Society. On the few occasions, however, when a bishop did try to assert his authority over the Society, these attempts were strongly resisted:

> 2. Relations with Diocese
>
> (a) Bishop Allen raised question of Morrison's enlistment of American resources, as subject to his approval and authority – a claim to which Morrison objected. He has no use for an autocratic episcopate.[7]

Such tensions were not unique to Egypt. W. M. Jacob has noted those that existed between the CMS and Bishop Reginald Coplestone in Ceylon,[8] and Bishop Kenneth Cragg identified similar issues in Palestine in an earlier era under Bishop Blyth:

> Asserting the society autonomy, with some asperity vis-à-vis the bishop and their native colleagues, CMS personnel went so far as to claim they were a lay society and, as such, external to the bishop's jurisdiction insofar as it trespassed on their mission autonomy.[9]

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[6] Letter from Bishop Gwynne to J. Leonard Wilson, 9th September, 1929. Correspondence regarding the appointment of J. Leonard Wilson as Headmaster of Old Cairo Boys School. Property of the Revd Martin Wilson.

[7] Interview with Morrison, S.A. 1947, 174/12 AS 35-49 G2 E1 1946-1948. C.M.S. Archives. Birmingham University Archives.

[8] Jacob, W.M., The Making of the Anglican Church Worldwide. London, SPCK, 1997, pp223-224.

[9] Cragg, K., in Ward, K., and Stanley, B., (Eds), 2000, p 130.

The autonomy that the CMS generally enjoyed in Egypt gave it considerable freedom in pursuing its missionary objectives. It allowed it to create a church and institutions which were not as burdened by all the administrative and cultural baggage of the English-speaking church. It may have enabled the CMS to create an indigenous church that was not entirely overwhelmed by its English-speaking twin. This was in line with the vision of Henry Venn, a former General Secretary of the CMS.[10] But it raises profound questions about the church that the CMS was trying to create. The development of a separate indigenous church fitted in well with the racist superiority of English-speaking Anglicans and helped to create a virtual apartheid in the Anglican Church in Egypt. Regardless of the arguments in favour of separate development, the results cannot help but have been perceived as two-tier Anglicanism with little solid foundation in the gospel.

Anglican ecclesiology which the CMS was supposed to support rests on the authority of the episcopacy. According to W. L. Sachs:

> The Church of England's program of foreign mission relied heavily upon initiatives from outside official Church structures as *ad hoc* groups created new forms of church work....This Anglican approach fastened upon the episcopate as the guarantee of the Church's authenticity as a missionary body.[11]

It is the person of the bishop which united the two parts of the Anglican Church in Egypt and connected them with the Church of England from which they both sprang.

[10] Yates, T.E., Venn and the Victorian Bishops Abroad. London: SPCK, 1978, p197.
[11] Sachs, W. L., The Transformation of Anglicanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 108.

The activities of the CMS in Egypt seem sometimes, however, only to have given a nod in the bishop's direction. The fact that the bishop was so tied into the imperialist agenda of the British government could be seen as a reason why the CMS would wish to distance itself from him. The CMS, however, does not seem to have distanced itself adequately for this to have been effective in making it more attractive to Egyptians. Although the CMS resisted attempts by the bishop to assert his authority over the Society, it was sufficiently tied into the rest of the Anglican Church to be regarded with suspicion by Nasser's government.

Comments by the Revd H. C. Gurney, Morrison's successor as CMS Mission Secretary in Egypt, suggest that this resistance to the bishop's authority went further than previously indicated. There was, Gurney was surprised to find on his arrival, a long-standing suspicion of the Diocese:

> For fifteen years I have been quite unaware that CMS had a policy which included such clear suspicion of and distrust in the diocesan set-up. It runs counter to all that I have believed in and have been working for during these years.[12]

6.5 Mission – a specialist interest?

This lack of trust cannot help but have had an impact on the mission and witness of the Anglican Church in Egypt. The CMS has seemed anxious to maintain its autonomy from the institutions of the wider church. Perhaps this autonomy afforded

[12] Letter from Revd H.C. Gurney, C.M.S Secretary in Egypt from May 1952, to C.S. Milford 21st April, 1953. AS 59 G2 E1 December 1951-November 1954. C.M.S. Archives. Birmingham University Archives.

the CMS greater flexibility but it has meant that Anglican mission has tended to be perceived as a specialist interest pursued outside the body of the Church of England rather than the business of all Christians. Despite the fact that a number of CMS missionaries have become bishops in the Church of England, mission has until recently remained relatively marginal to its concerns.

Missionaries from CMS and other societies have operated out of particular theological understandings which have tended to be narrower than those of the Anglican Church as a whole. This has meant that receiving cultures such as Egypt have not been exposed to the breadth of Anglican tradition and their churches have sometimes remained theologically narrow as a result. In 1946, Canon J. McLeod Campbell wrote Christian History in the Making, outlining some of these concerns. He recognised the importance of missionary societies in spearheading overseas mission. McLeod Campbell suggested, however, that just as the chartered companies that had laid the foundation of the British Empire were taken over by the state, so too should the Church have been given "supreme missionary authority" as anticipated by the Lambeth Conference of 1920. [13] Overseas mission has, however, remained largely in the hands of relatively autonomous societies like the CMS. Partly as a result of this, mission has not until quite recently, been seen as part of the integral work of the Anglican Church as a whole and may be said to have suffered as a result.

[13] McLeod Campbell, J. Christian History in the Making. London: The Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1946.

Chapter Seven

All Saints' Cathedral, Cairo, 1938-1978

7.1 Introduction

All buildings are important reflections of the societies that build them. This is perhaps especially true in the land of the pyramids. Right up until the present day, buildings have been important projections of the images of Egypt's rulers. The former All Saints' Cathedral in Cairo was no exception. The fact that it no longer exists prevents us from appreciating it directly although some photographs of it still remain. On the other hand, the absence of the building says almost as much today as its existence did in the past.

During most of the period in question, All Saints' Cathedral was as central to the life of the Diocese of Egypt as any of its bishops. Not only was it an important building in the lives of many Anglicans in Egypt. It also embodied many of the ambiguities in the Anglican Church and its relationship with British political interests. As such, it deserves particular mention in any analysis of the Anglican Church in Egypt.

7.2 Plans

At some point in the development of an Anglican diocese there arises the demand for a cathedral. The idea of building a cathedral at Cairo was first promoted by Bishop Rennie MacInnes who had been the CMS Secretary in Egypt and succeeded Bishop Blyth as Bishop of Jerusalem in 1914. Bishop MacInnes' suggestion was accepted by

the expatriate All Saints' Church Council on 17th April 1915.[1] All Saints' Church in the Boulac had been the place of worship for expatriate Anglicans since 1876. On 21st November, 1921, Llewellyn Gwynne was enthroned as Bishop in the newly created Diocese of Egypt and the Sudan. At the same time, St Mary's Kasr-el-Dubarah became a Pro-Cathedral, adding to the impetus for a "proper" cathedral in Cairo. Captain Adrian Gilbert Scott, who happened to be serving in the British Army Egypt in 1917 was asked to submit some designs.[2] He was the grandson of Sir Gilbert Scott, a leading architect of the High Gothic Revival in Great Britain, and the brother and partner of Sir Giles Gilbert Scott, the designer of Liverpool's Anglican Cathedral.

7.3 Was a cathedral necessary?

There was much debate in the expatriate community about the wisdom of building a cathedral in Cairo. The riots of 1919 had vividly illustrated a growing Egyptian nationalism. British influence in Egypt was already perceived as being in decline and many British officials and businessmen had started to leave in the nineteen twenties. To some, the idea of building a large new cathedral seemed foolhardy and unnecessarily grandiose. The concerns expressed in an anonymous letter, published in the Egyptian Gazette in 1931 are typical:

> It has always seemed to me, and I know to many others, an unwarranted thing that a vast sum should be spent on the building and endowment of any new cathedral, modest or pretentious [3]

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[1] Burrell, A., Cathedral on the Nile. Oxford: The Amate Press Ltd, 1984, p12.
[2] Ibid., p 13.
[3] Letter from "XYZ" in The Egyptian Gazette, 7th May 1931. News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

Sir William Willcox, a prominent member of the British community in Egypt, strongly believed that the money raised to build a cathedral could be better spent on the provision of education.[4] The old church of All Saints had, however become unsafe and the need for a new building had thus become more pressing. In 1925, Lord Lloyd had succeeded Allenby as the British High Commissioner in Egypt. Lord Lloyd was a committed Anglican who made a point of regularly walking to church. Lord and Lady Lloyd gave crucial support to the cathedral project. Lord Lloyd himself launched an appeal for the building and endowment of the new cathedral:

> A fund for the erection of a church adequate to the worship of God and the needs of the British people in Cairo.[5]

We can only speculate that his pious desire to build a cathedral to the glory of God coincided with the political will to build a prominent symbol of British power in the centre of Cairo. At the launch of the appeal, Lord Lloyd spoke of the particular need of British expatriates to have a suitable place where they could worship:

> the need of providing in this land a central place and building for the service of our religion also in this city and representation of the Anglican Church throughout Egypt. If you feel that we alone of all peoples can be without such a shrine, there is nothing more to be said, but to my mind, and I believe 90 per cent of all British people in Egypt, there can be no possible doubt ...that as All Saints; has had to be demolished, it falls to our lot and is our bounden duty to

[4] Letter from Sir William Willcox in The Egyptian Gazette, 6th May 1931. News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[5] "Cairo Cathedral Scheme" News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

> set our hands to work, as generations of our people have done all down the ages...
>
> Wherever we as a people have been all over the world, we have carried with us our flag and our creed and built our churches[6]

An Anglican cathedral was at the time being planned in Delhi. Other nationalities in Egypt had their churches. It was a matter of national pride that the British should have theirs as well:

> The Church of Rome has a great cathedral here; Islam has its great centre at Al –Azhar; the Coptic Church again has its own Cathedral. Only we who have been so much, who have done so much, and are so much in this land of Egypt, have no Cathedral Church for our Bishop, no central rallying for our creed, no inner shrine for our memorials and our memories.[7]

7.4 A British undertaking

This idea that the Anglican Church was British appears to have been widely held, despite the existence of a small indigenous Anglican Church in Egypt. It was for most expatriates, the Church of England abroad. The current emphasis on the international nature of the Anglican Communion should not blind us to the strength of its early identification with Britain.

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[6] "Cairo Cathedral Scheme" News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[7] Ibid.

In his speech, Lord Lloyd went on to identify in particular the need for a memorial to the troops who had died in the First World War, associating them with those who had died in the Crusades:

> "in the doing of it I think not only shall the hearts of men overseas stir to the remembrance of that salvation from Pentecost of past calamity, but the very knights that from Norman England lie buried at Jerusalem shall feel the stirring of the air of the heritage of their own deeds" (Loud applause).[8]

Such associations are unlikely to have delighted the average Egyptian but the meeting at which Lord Lloyd spoke was clearly not for them. They were to have no role in the acquisition of funds to build the new cathedral and no voice in its design or position.

On 14th November, 1925, the last service was held in the old All Saints' Church. The congregation then moved to St Mary's Church in Kasr el Dubara near the British Residency and the then Bishop's house. All Saints' Church, which was now in a prosperous commercial district, was then demolished and the site sold. The money raised from the sale (seventy thousand Egyptian pounds) provided the nucleus for the Cathedral building fund. The later sale of St Mary's Church to the Greek Catholic Church added further to the fund. The Egypt and Sudan Diocesan Association which was formed in Britain by those who had returned from service in Egypt helped to raise further funds.

[8] "Cairo Cathedral Scheme" News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

7.5 A site is chosen

The site for the new Cathedral was not finally chosen until July 1928. Perhaps with some prompting by the British authorities, the Egyptian Government had offered to give the site of the Ismailia Palace to the British community for them to build their cathedral on. This site was, however, larger than was needed and was eventually handed back to the Government. In July 1928 the Egyptian Parliament authorised the sale of a triangular plot of land to the north of the Kasr el Nil Barracks on the east bank of the Nile for the sum of thirty two thousand Egyptian pounds, considerably below its market value.[9] The site and the barracks were themselves just north of the British Residency. All three institutions were to be symbols of British dominance in Egypt during the period in question. To many Egyptians they may have seemed like an unholy trinity of occupation at the very heart of Cairo. According to many expatriates, however, the site for the new cathedral appeared to be ideal. Captain Gilbert Scott reported that:

> the site is a very fine one ... and by far the best of the various ones considered. Its frontage to the Nile is a very fine asset while gardens...should provide a very peaceful atmosphere rarely obtainable in a town site.[10]

The cathedral was within easy reach of Kasr el Dubara and Garden City. The Boulac Bridge provided access from Zamalek and Gezirah. These were all areas favoured for occupation by the expatriate community. The site was thus within easy reach of its planned clientele. As a base for mission among Egyptians though, it was far from

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[9] "Cairo's New English Cathedral" The Egyptian Gazette, Tuesday 7th January, 1936. News Cuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[10] Burrell, A., 1984, p19.

ideal. Another drawback of the site was the fact that an old head-regulator of the Ismailia Canal lay under the building plot. The implications of this were not, however, realised at the time.[11]

7.6 The design

By 1935, the Cathedral Building Fund had amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand Egyptian pounds. Of this, thirty thousand pounds was set aside for an Endowment Fund and thirty two thousand was spent on the site, while the remainder was to be spent on construction. The cathedral complex was to include offices, a parish hall and houses for both the Bishop and Archdeacon. Like Seoul Cathedral which was built between 1922 and 1926, the new All Saints' Cathedral was built in the Romanesque style which was seen at the time as bridging the divide between east and west.[12] All Saints also drew inspiration from John Francis Bentley's influential Westminster Roman Catholic Cathedral which was constructed between 1895 and 1910 in the 'Italo-Byzantine' style. The aim of both All Saints' Cathedral and Seoul Cathedral was 'modified inclusivism' rather than indigenisation.[13] As a concession to its context, after studying local mosques, Scott decided to set the windows low down in the cathedral's walls. The interior light fittings also bore some resemblance to those used in Cairo's mosques (Fig. 4). The Cathedral's pepper pot tower which was one hundred and thirty five feet high, bore some similarities to a minaret (Fig. 5). It was to dominate the Nile skyline like the head of a sphinx while the two houses reached towards the river like the paws of a(n imperial) lion.

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[11] Burrell, A., 1984, p19.
[12] Lee, J.K. A., Architectural Anglicanism A Missiological Interpretation of Kanghwa Church and Seoul Cathedral. University of Birmingham: PhD Thesis, 1998, p 224.
[13] Ibid., p307.

Fig 4

All Saints Cathedral, Cairo
Interior
Source: postcard courtesy of Lady Ghislaine Morris
Former Hon. Sec. Egypt Diocesan Association



Fig. 5
All Saints' Cathedral
Cairo
Source: postcard courtesy of Lady Ghislaine Morris
Former Hon. Sec. Egypt Diocesan Association

> the whole of the place communicating that sense of monumental power and absolute confidence which was so much the hallmark of the British presence in Egypt.[14]

Other commentators were less complimentary but no less expressive:

> The Cathedral ....looked as heavy and purposeful as a power station.[15]

(The new All Saints may have had something in common with the modernist Battersea Power Station designed by Scott's brother and architectural partner, Sir Giles Gilbert Scott which was completed in 1934).[16]

7.7 Construction and consecration

Messrs Hettena Bros submitted a tender for the construction which exceeded the funds available but was thought to be the most suitable. On 18th December, 1935, the General Building Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Miles Lampson, the then High Commissioner, decided to proceed with construction. The foundation stone for the new Cathedral was laid on Friday 20th November,1936, a few days after the Anglo Egyptian Treaty had been ratified by the Egyptian Parliament and a few days before its ratification in London. Construction proceeded quickly and the new All Saints' Cathedral was consecrated on 25th April 1938 by Archbishop William Temple (Fig. 6).

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[14] Said, E., Out of Place. London: Granta Books, 1999, p 143.
[15] Cooper, A, , 1995, p 36.
[16] Watkin, A., A History of Western Architecture. London: Laurence King Publishing, 1986, p 557.



Fig. 6
The Consecration of All Saints' Cathedral, Cairo, by Archbishop Temple, 1938
Source: Jackson, H.C., Pastor On The Nile. London: SPCK, 1960.

7.8 The Second World War

Any anxieties there may have been about the wisdom of creating so large a building for a gradually dwindling community were thrust aside by the onset of World War II on 3rd September 1939 and the arrival of large numbers of British and Allied troops. If for nothing else, it was felt, All Saints' Cathedral had been built "for such a time as this."[17] Daily services of intercession were held in the Lady Chapel and as the numbers of British and Allied troops in Egypt swelled, the cathedral became a focus for many of them. The Cathedral often reminded them of home and gave them spiritual support for the battles that they faced. This support was given unquestioningly, especially by Bishop Gwynne who had considerable experience as Deputy Chaplain General during the First World War. Service chaplains and civilian clergy worked alongside each other in the service of their largely khaki-clad flock. During the War, the Cathedral was busy with Special Days of Prayer, Memorial and Thanksgiving Services for Units returned from the desert campaigns. When the intensity of the war increased, the Middle East Command Headquarters and the British Embassy offices had to be kept open seven days a week. A late Evensong at 9.00pm was added for those who were prevented by work from attending regular Sunday services.[18] Field Marshall Montgomery later paid tribute to the important role the Cathedral played in the Allied War effort:

> Sunday after Sunday in the war years this cathedral was filled to overflowing with British soldiers; who came with veneration for its Lord, and who went

[17] Burrell, A., 1984, p34.
[18] Ibid., p25.

forth from its services steadied and strengthened for the desert road. I was one of them myself.[19]

The spiritual needs of the soldiers which the Cathedral ministered to were unmistakable but inevitably they diverted clergy and resources from mission and ministry among the Egyptian population. Its pivotal role among the troops was another reminder to the Egyptian population that the Anglican Church in Egypt was not for them.

In addition to opportunities for worship, servicemen were offered Bible studies, as well as lectures and slide shows in the Cathedral Hall on matters such as Egyptology. The Services Choral Society practised in the Cathedral Hall under the direction of Sergeant Clifford Harker, the Cathedral Organist and Choirmaster.[20] The Society performed *The Messiah* in the Cathedral in front of approximately one thousand five hundred people in September 1942, shortly before the Battle of El Alamein.[21] In November 1944 they gave a rendering of Haydn's *Creation* to similar numbers.[22] The Cathedral acted as a base for hundreds of Service Chaplains, of all denominations, who passed through Cairo. The Clergy Flat became a Chaplain's Club where no chaplain was ever refused a meal or a bed, or at least somewhere to put his sleeping bag.[23]

W. E. Humphreys, a soldier stationed in Cairo at the time, wrote later:

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[19] Field Marshal Montgomery: address given at the unveiling of the Eighth Army Memorial Window in All Saints' Cathedral, 4th March 1951.
[20] Burrell, A., 1984, p27.
[21] Ibid., p28.
[22] Ibid., p37.
[23] Ibid., p36.

> The Cathedral was absolutely HOME to many in Khaki. Tea was served to anyone who came on Sunday afternoons in the Hall nearby, whilst the evening services were packed completely with officers and men sitting all the way down the aisle with many standing elsewhere... If ever there was a sheet anchor or safe base it was the sureness of the Cathedral to lonely tommies or spiritually starved folk.[24]

7.9 Taking sides

While many Egyptians were ambiguous about the war and its outcome, there could be no doubt about which side the Cathedral was on. Lieutenant General Sir Wilfrid Lindsell wrote to his wife:

> Something to remember – All Saints' Cathedral, Cairo, Sunday evening, September 6th, 1942 – the cathedral was quite full – perhaps seven hundred soldiers and airmen with about sixty women...these crowded services in the Cathedral get to me. All this mass of men there, I think, as much as anything, because it gives them a feeling of nearness or link with their homes. They are, every one of them taking part in the service. The acoustics are bad, but the clergy are good! The reading is excellent; the whole service is a corporate effort of everyone. The Bishop catches them and holds them.... There must be a great co-operative effort – all of us together, just as we seven hundred were all together last night in the Cathedral - together in the desert, together at

[24] Burrell, A., 1984, p26.

> Dunkirk, at Singapore, all day and night on the seas of the world, on land and in the air. I know God is with us in all this.[25]

At the same time, Arthur Burrell, later Provost of the Cathedral and writer of Cathedral on the Nile, felt able to write of All Saints':

> As the mother church of the diocese, representing a part of the Anglican communion, the Cathedral was not subject to either military or political control.[26]

His naïveté is touching but is hardly borne out by the evidence. In August 1941, for instance, the Anglican Senior Chaplain of the South African Forces requested a parade service at the Cathedral to mark the birthday of the Queen of the Netherlands. Archdeacon Johnston checked with the British Embassy before consenting:

> I took the precaution of asking the Embassy if there was any political objection to this service[27]

Fortunately, there was not.

In August 1943, General Montgomery had taken command of the Eighth Army. The following Easter, he sent a message to the Cathedral saying that he was coming to

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[25] Letter from Lieutenant General Sir Wilfrid Lindsell to his wife published by the Ministry of Information in London in a pamphlet called The Spiritual Issues of the War, quoted in Burrell, A., 1984, pp29-30.
[26] Ibid., p34.
[27] Letter from Archdeacon Johnston to Bishop Gwynne, 30th August, 1941. Bundle 96A. Bishop Gwynne's Correspondence, 1935-1942. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

Cairo and wished to attend the evening service and read the lessons. This he did but instead of reading those set for the day, he chose his own: the sacrifice of Isaac and Jesus' teaching on prayer in Luke's Gospel. Afterwards, he addressed the congregation in the Cathedral Hall. On many other occasions, the Cathedral was used by the Allies as a vehicle to support their efforts and to give divine sanction to their cause. As the end of the war approached, an important political and strategic conference was planned to take place towards the end of November 1943. Bishop Gwynne wrote about it afterwards in the Diocesan Review:

> The first intimation that we had was that a United Service with the Americans must be arranged in Cairo Cathedral on the evening of the American Thanksgiving Day (25th November) at 24 hours notice. We were to be responsible for the service and leave the seating in the hands of others. On the eve of the conference our beautiful Cathedral was filled with a huge congregation of British and Americans; the first front row filled with a galaxy of leaders of our Forces, members of Diplomatic Services and their advisers.[28]

Control, was it seems, a relative concept. The Cathedral might well have been built "for such a time as this" but its use by the Allies in support of their war effort cannot but have affected its viability as "a house of prayer for all nations".

[28] Burrell, A., 1984, p35.

7.10 Internationalisation

As the war receded, the numbers of British personnel in Egypt began to decline sharply and there was an increasing realisation of the need to widen the Cathedral's appeal.

> The chairman went on to say that the cathedral could no longer be regarded as a symbol of Imperialism. He felt that there was room and need to increase the non-British interest in the Cathedral, and he hoped that an effort in that direction would meet with success.[29]

Necessity may have been the main motivation behind this movement but an increasing emphasis on the international nature of the church was to be welcomed in the post-colonial period. It would have seemed preferable that such a movement had happened long before but a combination of factors, including the personality of Bishop Gwynne and the onset of war had made this impossible.

7.11 Nineteen forty six

While the British Ambassador may have detected the winds of change, others were slower to read the signs of the times. On 11th February 1946, bronze grilles, given to the Cathedral by the increasingly unpopular King Farouk, were unveiled by the Grand Chamberlain of the Abdin Palace. Two days later, on 13th February, Bishop Gwynne broadcast a message from All Saints' Cathedral, primarily to the Commonwealth and its allies, in a spirit of fervent patriotism and hope for the future.[30] But he made no

[29] H.E. Lord Killearn, The British Ambassador (in the Chair), All Saints Cathedral PCC AGM 1st April 1955, File 8B All Saints Cathedral PCC Minute Books 1952-1956. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[30] Burrell, A., 1984, p40.

mention at all of the aspirations of the Egyptian people. These events further contributed to the impression that the Cathedral was closely wedded to the British military occupation of Egypt as well as the Egyptian monarchy.

In many ways, the expatriate community had so far operated independently of the views and aspirations of the Egyptian people but this was to come to an end. Public opposition to the monarchy and frustration at the apparent inability of the Egyptian Government to secure a British withdrawal boiled over into riots on 21st February 1946 during which All Saints' Cathedral became a target. Cathedral windows were broken, crockery and linen were looted from the Cathedral Hall, and attempts were made to set fire to the vestry door using cotton waste from the furnishings, soaked in oil.[31] Bishop Gwynne said afterwards that he believed that the attack was perpetrated by a deluded crowd whose political passions had been inflamed by ringleaders.[32] Their actions did not seem consistent with British perceptions of Egyptians as compliant and easy-going. But he and others underestimated the public mood. It was eventually to lead to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952 and the expulsion of the British in 1956.

Gwynne's successor, Bishop Geoffrey Allen instituted structural changes within the Diocese that gave Egyptians more of a say in running the church. But although attendances were declining, the Cathedral continued to be a largely British preserve. Services continued according to the Book of Common Prayer. There followed a few notable occasions such as the visit of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh in January 1950 and the unveiling of the Eighth Army Window (Fig. 7) in the Lady Chapel by Field

[31] "Serious Riots in Cairo" The Times, 22nd February, 1946, News Cuttings 2, p42. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[32] Burrell, A., 1984, p39.

Marshall Montgomery in 4th March 1951. These events suggest that the idea that the Cathedral had been built for the War years seems to have lived on. It struggled to find a new identity and purpose in post-War Egypt. A regular Arabic service was not established in the Cathedral until 1955.[33] Non Anglo-Saxons rarely found their way into the English services and when they did, it was very much on the terms of the British. The Palestinian intellectual, Edward Said was confirmed in All Saints' Cathedral in 1949 with a Copt, Jimmy Benshai. Their preparation was, however, entirely in English, and looking back later Said saw his Confirmation as part of his family's attempts to join a growing westernised middle class, rather than as a sign of the Cathedral's greater openness.[34]

7.12 Nineteen fifty six

In times of crisis, the Cathedral again became a focus of British identity in Egypt. On the Sunday following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal on the 26th July, 1956, British Embassy staff demonstrated their British *sang froid* by attending worship at the Cathedral. Once again, All Saints' became a symbol of British power (or lack of it) in Egypt. The Provost of the Cathedral at that time, Arthur Burrell, wrote later of:

> the close and long-standing friendly relations between the British Embassy and the Cathedral staff. There was primarily a pastoral and never, in any way, a political link in spite of suspicions that some observers may have entertained, or rumours that were quite falsely circulated.[35]

[33] Burrell, A., 1984, p56.
[34] Said, E., 1999, pp144-5.
[35] Burrell, A., 1984. p58.

In the current spin-conscious age, such views seem touchingly naïve. Regardless of the truth of the situation, perceptions could be as damaging as reality to the reputation of the Anglican Church in Egypt. Its leaders could have done more to guard its image. But perhaps it could be argued that they had no choice but to remain loyal to Britain. Having hitched its wagon to British colonial interests, the Anglican Church would only be unhitched by a major external event. That event was the expulsion of all British personnel from Egypt in November 1956. Through it, Egypt was finally purged of British influence and British clergy were forced to place the Church in Egyptian hands. A British Charge d'Affaires and a British Provost were not to return until late in 1959.

7.13 Seoul Cathedral – a comparison

A number of Anglican cathedrals were built throughout the world at around the same time as All Saints'. As already mentioned, one such was Seoul Cathedral in Korea. Jeong-Ku Augustine Lee has studied Seoul Cathedral as part of his PhD thesis, "Architectural Anglicanism A Missiological Interpretation of Kanghwa Church and Seoul Cathedral at the University of Birmingham."[36] A comparison between All Saints' Cathedral in Cairo and its Lee's research on its counterpart in Seoul may be illuminating here.

In 1897, the nineteenth resolution of the Lambeth Conference was:

> That it is important that, so far as is possible, the church should be adapted to the local circumstances, and the people brought to feel in all ways that no

[36] Lee, J.K. A., 1998.

> burdens in the way of foreign customs are laid upon them, and nothing is required of them but what is of the essence of the faith, and belongs to the due order of the Catholic Church.[37]

Lee has shown how the construction of Seoul Anglican Cathedral in Korea between 1922 and 1926 did not conform with this resolution. All Saints' Cathedral Cairo cannot be seen to do so either. Just as Seoul Cathedral was built in the diplomatic quarter of Chongdong which was not at all convenient for most Koreans, the site of All Saints' was chosen first and foremost with the needs of British expatriates in mind. But whereas the Cathedral of Saints Mary and Nicholas in Seoul was designed to bring the Koreans to worship together with English residents and their Japanese rulers, All Saints' Cairo was designed to serve the British ruling elite first and foremost. It was only later that it sought to become "a house of prayer for all nations." Both cathedrals were no doubt built to the glory of God. While Bishop Trollope of Korea also used the cathedral in Seoul to stress the subservience of Korean parish churches to the centre, however, All Saints' could be seen as having been built (perhaps subconsciously) to stress the political subservience of Egypt to the British.

7.14 The end – and a new beginning

Prior to the Suez Crisis, cracks had begun to appear in the walls of the Cathedral hall and some of the other ancillary buildings. These were caused by subsidence due to the Cathedral having been built on the site of a lock belonging to the old Ismailia or Sweet Water Canal. Whether this had been fully understood when the site for the Cathedral was provided is unclear. In addition, the immediate environment around it

[37] Coleman, R., (Ed.), Resolutions of the Twelve Lambeth Conferences, 1867-1988. Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1992, p19.

had changed dramatically. The Cathedral compound had become an island in the middle of an increasingly busy sea of traffic. Part of the plan to reduce congestion on the roads of central Cairo included the establishment of a new bridge over the river Nile from the site of the Cathedral to Gezirah Island. Traffic had been used as a pretext for removing the desirable riverside frontage of the British Embassy Gardens to make way for the Corniche expressway. It also provided the excuse for removing the Cathedral, another symbol of British power in Cairo. A notice of the proposed demolition of the Cathedral was received on 25th April, 1963, exactly twenty five years after its consecration. All Saints' was not, however, deconsecrated until 10th February 1978. The Governorate of Cairo agreed to pay for a new cathedral to be built. A less prominent site behind what is now the Marriott Hotel was provided, reflecting the reduced status of what had once been the British church. The old Cathedral was mourned by some but perhaps it had fulfilled its purpose. It was too greatly associated with British colonialism and military might to make the transition to being the Egyptian symbol of an international Anglican Communion. The foundation stone for the new All Saints' Cathedral in Zamalek was laid by the Ishaq Musaad, consecrated as the first Egyptian Bishop in the Episcopal (rather than Anglican) Church on All Saints' Day, 1st November, 1974.

Chapter Eight

Freemasonry in the Diocese of Egypt

8.1 Introduction

When this study was first undertaken, Freemasonry was not on the list of possible areas of research. Study of the archives of the CMS at the University of Birmingham and of the Diocese of Egypt and North Africa in Cairo has, however, revealed that Freemasonry played a surprisingly important role in the lives of some of the leaders of the Diocese of Egypt. Although Bishop Allen was not a Freemason, both Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne and Archdeacon, later Bishop, Frank Johnston were members of Masonic lodges in Egypt and Great Britain. Archdeacon B.J. (Uncle) Harpur in the Sudan was also a Freemason (Egypt and the Sudan were in the same Masonic district). It seems important therefore to discuss what impact, if any, Freemasonry had on the life and mission of the Anglican Church in Egypt.

8.2 Llewellyn Gwynne

The Revd Llewellyn Gwynne was initiated as a Freemason in the Khartoum Lodge on 2nd January 1902. In 1923 he joined the Grecia Lodge in Cairo where by 1931 he had risen to become its Worshipful Master. In retirement, Bishop Gwynne founded the Nile Valley Lodge in London for Freemasons who had returned from service in Egypt and the Sudan.[1] Though Freemasonry remains a largely secret organisation, Bishop Gwynne's involvement with it was not something he sought to hide. In an article in The Egyptian Press newspaper, he is mentioned a "Bishop of the Anglican Church in

[1] The Library and Museum of Freemasonry, London.

Egypt and the Sudan and Worshipful Grand Master of English Freemasonry in Egypt".[2]

Gwynne was not unique in his Masonic involvement. Freemasonry was popular with many men of his social standing, especially those from lower and lower middle class backgrounds who had sought to better themselves. But perhaps Gwynne was partly influenced by his hero, the writer Rudyard Kipling, in his attachment to Freemasonry. According to P. J. Rich, in his book, Elixir of Empire. The English Public Schools, Ritualism, Freemasonry and Imperialism, Kipling was deeply involved in Freemasonry and it provided a great deal of inspiration for his work:[3]

> What comes across strongly in Kipling's work, if one knows where to look, is the appeal of a magic circle, a brotherhood united by esoteric ceremonialism. Masonic themes and expressions can be found in such stories of his as On the Great Wall, the Winged Hat, Hal o' the Draft, and The City Wall. His most famous story is of course The Man Who would Be King.

8.3 Frank Johnston

Frank Johnston was initiated as a Freemason into the Pelasium Lodge, in Port Said in May 1921. He rose to become the Worshipful Master of the Lodge by 1929. He was also a founder member of the Serapeum Lodge, in Ismailia in 1931 and he became Worshipful Master of the Star of the East Lodge, in Cairo, by 1939. Like Bishop Gwynne, Frank Johnston was a founder member of the Nile Valley Lodge in London

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[2] The Egyptian Press, 23rd July 1934. Newscuttings 2 Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
3 Rich, P.J., Elixir of Empire. The English Public Schools, Ritualism, Freemasonry and Imperialism. London: Regency Press Ltd, 1989, p 93.

in 1946. From 1946 to 1960 he was District Grand Master of the Freemasons in Egypt and the Sudan.[4]

There is no evidence that either Archdeacon (later Bishop) Johnston or Bishop Gwynne benefited from their membership of the Freemasons in terms of their preferment. Indeed, Archdeacon Johnstone received several Masonic expressions of sympathy when he was passed over as Gwynne's immediate successor in 1946:

> I am with everyone else in being very sorry that the Powers that Be in the Church have not treated you very differently from the way you have been treated, but that is quite incapable of making any difference to the love and esteem in which each one of our Lodges holds you.[5]

8.4 A British activity

Apart from the Star of the East and Grecia Lodges, Freemasonry in Egypt appears to have been an exclusively British activity, although the wisdom of this was questioned in a letter to Bishop Johnston in 1953.[6] Fellow Freemasons mentioned in the Masonic files of Bishop Gwynne and Bishop Johnston in the Diocesan Archives in Cairo seem mainly to have been businessmen and British employees of the Egyptian Government (until the latter were dismissed in 1951). Some Freemasons were members of the British military serving in Egypt.[7] There are no signs that members of staff at the

[4] The Library and Museum of Freemasonry, London.
[5] Letter from Steve Drane to Frank Johnston 11th February 1951. Box File 10 Masonic File November 1950 – March 1956. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[6] Letter from Charles Haxby to Bishop Johnston, 4th September, 1953. Box File 10 Masonic File November 1950 – March 1956. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[7] Letter from the Deputy Chaplain General, Middle East Land Forces to Bishop Johnston, 17th February, 1955, accepting the position of District Chaplain. Box File 10 Masonic File November 1950 – March 1956. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

British Embassy were Freemasons and certainly, the ambassador is never listed as a member, although archival evidence suggests that the Embassy bag was sometimes used to send Masonic correspondence to and from Great Britain.[8] The correspondence within these Masonic files makes little mention of politics, focusing instead on philanthropy and legal and administrative concerns.

8.5 An Anglican activity

Freemasonry had a much more positive image during the period in question than it enjoys today, especially in the Anglican Church. Joining the Brotherhood was less of an issue than it is at present, particularly for members of the Anglican clergy. Certainly, many members of the clergy of the Church of England, and according to Bishop Mervyn Stockwood, a majority of the English episcopate, at the time were Masons.[9] Though Edward Carpenter makes no mention of the involvement of Archbishop Geoffrey Fisher of Canterbury (1945-1961) with Freemasonry in his lengthy biography,[10] Archbishop Fisher is mentioned as a Mason in a letter of 1951.[11] The Archbishop was Grand Chaplain of the Masonic Order in both 1937 and 1939.[12] Membership of the Brotherhood may have appeared to be a key to preferment in the Church, perhaps especially to men like Gwynne and Johnston who had not been students at Oxford or Cambridge. They may have seen it as a way of overcoming some of the restrictions of the class system in Britain. This is pure conjecture. There is

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[8] Letter to Bishop Johnston 18th March 1952. Box File 10 Masonic File November 1950 – March 1956. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

[9] Bishop Mervyn Stockwood:

"confirmed that the great majority of bishops under Geoffrey Fisher were masons"

quoted in Rich, P.J., 1989, p 57.

[10] Carpenter, E., 1991. p612.

[11] Letter from R.R.Brewis to Frank Johnston, 11th November 1951, describing the installation of the Grand Master at the Albert Hall. Box File 10 Masonic File November 1950 – March 1956. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

[12] Lawrence, J., Free-Masonry – A Religion? Eastbourne: Kingsway Publications Ltd, 1987, p 53.

no evidence that it had any effect on their careers. Beyond any possible selfish motivations for joining the Freemasons, the two men also saw the Brotherhood as a way of bringing men together in common fellowship and endeavour. In his book, Elixir of Empire. The English Public Schools, Ritualism, Freemasonry and Imperialism, P.J. Rich has identified the strong connections between the British public school system, Freemasonry and imperialism.[13] Though Gwynne and Johnston were not products of the English public school system he identifies, their involvement with Freemasonry can be seen as part of a wider network of empire-builders. Its ritual and secrecy helped to unite those who sought to rule over others.

The Roman Catholic Church had never permitted its members to join the Freemasons (though many may have done so). The Methodist Church first questioned whether it was appropriate for its members to join the Brotherhood as early as 1927. Questions about its compatibility with Anglicanism were not, however, raised within the Church of England until 1951. In that year, an Anglican priest, the Revd Walton Hannah wrote an article in Theology entitled, "Should a Christian be a Freemason?"[14] In 1952, the General Assembly of the Church of England rejected a motion to appoint a commission to investigate Hannah's article, reinforcing the suspicion in the minds of many that the Church of England was dominated by Freemasons. In this study, I do not propose to rehearse the debate about whether Christianity is compatible with Freemasonry. What is clear is that Freemasonry had a great deal of influence within the Church of England during the period under scrutiny. The question of whether it was appropriate for Church of England clergy to become members had hardly arisen. Hannah's article only appeared towards the end of the period in question, long after

[13] Rich, P.J., 1989, p 93.
[14] Lawrence, J., 1987, p 53.

Gwynne's retirement. It may not have had much impact on Frank Johnston in Cairo. Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising therefore that Gwynne and Johnston were Freemasons during this time. It may be that Gwynne and Johnston may have pondered on the tensions between Christianity and Freemasonry occasionally but clearly they did not do so sufficiently to want to make them withdraw from the Order. Bishop Gwynne once wrote in his diary:

> Sunday August 2. From the Lodge not a single person. They stand not for the things I stand for.[15]

What are significant for the purposes of this study however, are some of the practical effects of the involvement of Gwynne and Johnson on the mission of the Anglican Church in Egypt.

8.6 Security concerns

Documentary evidence reveals that a number of Masonic meetings and services were held in All Saints' Cathedral during the period in question. At least one of these was held during the episcopacy of Bishop Allen, with his knowledge and consent, though not his presence. There is no evidence that Egyptians were admitted to British Masonic lodges during this period. They were solely expatriate affairs. After the events of 26th January, 1952, it was decided that meetings should be at the discretion of Masonic Masters and were to be as unostentatious as possible. Freemasonry was clearly associated with the occupying power and was therefore vulnerable to attack. On 27th February, 1952, Frank Johnston called a meeting in the Cathedral offices. His

[15] Gwynne. L., diary 2nd August, 1937. Diary of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne ACC 18 F1/56-69. CMS Archives. University of Birmingham.

words at that meeting make it clear that his own contacts with the Embassy were stronger than any that may have existed through Freemasonry:

> I wish to make it clear indeed that my action in calling this meeting, and particularly in seeking another hall in which to hold it, is not in any way inspired by my close association with the Embassy.[16]

It appears that during this time, security was an issue for the Lodge. If this was so then it appears that the security of the Cathedral and of the Diocese may have been put at risk in the interests of Freemasonry.

8.7 Effects on mission

A more significant effect on the life of the Church was probably the amount of time and effort that Freemasonry demanded of its members. The Masonic files of both Gwynne and Johnston are full of references to often frequent meetings.[17] These presumably took up a great deal of their time and energy. The involvement of people like Llewellyn Gwynne and Frank Johnston in Freemasonry in Egypt might be justified in terms of increasing their contact with the expatriate community which they were called to serve. It strengthened their relationships with businessmen working in Egypt and those serving in the Egyptian administration. Such people had been instrumental in the setting up of the Diocese. Gwynne's and Johnston's copies of Masonic accounts also reveal that the various lodges of which they were part did a great deal of philanthropic work and raised considerable sums for charity. While such acts of charity might be commended, the accounts suggest that they were exclusively

[16] Box File 10 Masonic File November 1950 – March 1956. Diocesan Archives, Cairo.
[17] Diocesan Archives, Cairo.

concerned with the support of Masonic institutions in England rather than any that might have existed in Egypt. The British beneficiaries of their endeavours included Masonic schools and hospitals. Even though Bishop Gwynne in particular frequently bewailed the poverty and squalor endured by many Egyptians, Egypt seems to have derived little benefit from his Masonic involvement, or that of Frank Johnston. On the contrary, it seems to have taken them away from working on behalf of the Egyptian people, further weakening the image and impact of the Anglican Church in Egypt.

The membership of the Freemasons by Llewellyn Gwynne and Frank Johnston may be understandable given the climate of the day. Such membership was hardly questioned and indeed seems to have been encouraged within Church of England. The nature of the expatriate society to which they were ministering also encouraged them to participate in Freemasonry. The effects of their membership on the mission of the Anglican Church in Egypt have, however, to be questioned. They are a further example of the failure of the Church to take seriously the challenge of mission among the Egyptian people and to identify closely with their needs. This could be said to have contributed somewhat to the weak position in which the Anglican Church found itself at the time of the Suez crisis.

Conclusion

On 15th May 2000, Bishop Mano Ramalshah, then General Secretary of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, took a taxi from Cairo International Airport to the second All Saints' (Episcopal) Cathedral in Zamalek in the city centre. A Pakistani, he was dressed in traditional Pakistani dress of shawal khamis, long waistcoat and jodpurs with a pectoral cross. He had arrived in Cairo for the consecration of the third Egyptian Bishop of Egypt and North Africa, Dr Mouneer Hanna Anis. He tried to explain to the taxi driver where he wished to be taken. Eventually, the taxi driver realised where Bishop Mano wanted to go. "Ah, you want the English church," he said.

Nearly fifty years after the period under review in this study ended, the Anglican Church in Egypt (now known as the Episcopal Church) is still widely perceived as catering to the needs of English people resident in Egypt. It is not unique in this. In Cairo there are churches for Germans, Swedes, French Protestants, Armenians, Greeks and Koreans to name but a few. But the Anglican Church in Egypt, or at least part of it, was set up with the idea that it would be a church for Egyptians. An indigenous church which was part of the world-wide Anglican Communion. The comments of one Cairo taxi driver are not statistically significant, but they suggest, at least, that the Anglican Church in Egypt still has some way to go before it is seen as a truly Egyptian institution.

As a small minority church within a Christian minority (approximately ten per cent of Egypt's population is Christian), the history of the Episcopal Church in Egypt cannot

be described as one of enormous growth. But it is no less deserving of attention. Outside the West, the history of mission has tended to focus on those areas of the world where the church has grown rapidly. This study arises out of a belief that it needs also to attend to those places where the growth of the church has been limited. In the current political climate this is perhaps especially true of areas where Islam is the predominant religion.

This study arose out of the hypothesis that the Anglican Church in Egypt had always had as its objective a truly Egyptian, reformed, catholic church in communion with, but independent of the See of Canterbury. This study arose from the belief that it had been external events which had prevented the Anglican Church in Egypt from being more widely accepted as such by the Egyptian people. That it was the victim of a history over which it had no control. This was the image projected by the Eighth Army Memorial Window which was unveiled by Field Marshall Montgomery in the spring of 1951 in the former All Saints' Cathedral (Fig. 7). The window is now housed in the Lady Chapel of the new All Saints' in Zamalek. It depicts the church as a toy ship in the hands of the boy Christ, about to be cast upon the turbulent sea of the world's history. Certainly, the seismic shifts that took place within this period and throughout the Middle East, over which the Anglican Church could have had no control, did have a profound impact on the development of the church and its mission among the Egyptian people. The conclusions of this study are, however, that the Anglican Church was not just the hapless victim of history. It helped to shape its own destiny and was profoundly affected by its own origins and composition.

Fig. 7

Eighth Army Window

All Saints' Cathedral, Cairo

The structure of this work begins with the history within which the Anglican Church in Egypt developed. The conviction that an understanding of the historical context in which the Anglican Church found itself remains fundamental to an analysis of its development. Egypt's unique history and location means that it deserves separate analysis from that undertaken in either Europe to the north or Africa to the south. It does not fall into easy categories such as those put forward by Philip Jenkins in his book, The Next Christendom.[1] The repeated occupation of Egypt by different foreign powers and its central position as a crossroads between east and west, north and south, Europe, Asia and Africa, had made it particularly used to the arrival of foreigners. Many of these, among them the Greeks, Romans, French and Turks, brought with them aspects of their culture and religion. The development of cotton production for export had made Egypt an obvious centre of interest for businessmen from Great Britain. Its Lancashire cotton mills had given it a dominant position in the world's cotton market and it was in Great Britain's interests to ensure that the supply of raw cotton was assured. The opening of de Lesseps' Suez Canal in 1869 gave the country an enormous strategic as well as commercial significance to Great Britain with its possessions in the Indian subcontinent and other parts of Asia. Following its military intervention in Egypt in 1882, Great Britain had a strong motivation for maintaining control over the government and economy of Egypt through what became known as the 'veiled protectorate.' This veil was not only one way. Not only was it supposed to hide the fact that Egypt's government was to a greater or lesser degree controlled by Great Britain from the Egyptian people (in this it was largely unsuccessful). It also served to obscure the reality of Britain's control from many Britons. This caused them consistently to fail to recognise the strength of Egyptian nationalism which was

[1] Jenkins, P., The Next Christendom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

repeatedly portrayed as an isolated and exotic phenomenon. This consistent failure to appreciate the strength of Egyptian nationalism eventually expressed itself in dramatic and unexpected fashion. Long before this, however, Egypt's significance to the British had caused a large number of them to come and live in the country. Many brought with them their churches, notably the Presbyterian Church, and for the purposes of this study, the Church of England.

This English root of the Anglican Church in Egypt was to remain significant throughout much of the period in question. It had a profound impact on the choices and priorities of the Anglican Church right up until 1956 and beyond. Had the Anglican Church remained a purely expatriate undertaking it would probably have withered altogether in the Nasser era. But alongside the exotic plant of the expatriate Anglican Church, the Church of England in Egypt, there grew a younger, indigenous plant that would enable the Anglican Church to continue to exist in Egypt right up until the present day.

The need for an indigenous Egyptian Anglican Church was at the very least questionable. Egypt had in the Coptic faith one of the oldest churches in the world. The Coptic Church had survived centuries of persecution and minority status and remains by far the largest church in Egypt. The CMS had not planned to create an indigenous Anglican church to compete with it. The creation of an Egyptian Anglican Church happened almost by accident. There was little thought at the time that an Egyptian Anglican Church would be a permanent (if small) part of the religious landscape in Egypt in the long term.

The CMS had originally hoped that its work in Egypt would be to encourage the Coptic Church to pursue an agenda of reform and a greater evangelistic zeal towards Muslims. Centuries of persecution experienced by the Coptic Church had caused it to regard converts from Islam as potential sources of conflict with the Muslim majority. It was reluctant to seek new converts in the manner that the CMS, with its roots in a majority Christian country, saw as desirable. Those Muslims who did feel called to convert, whether through the activities of the CMS or some other agency, were often ostracised by the Coptic Church in an effort to avoid Muslim reprisals. The CMS, under the guidance of the Revd William Temple Gairdner, which had encouraged many of these converts, felt that it had a responsibility to create a spiritual home for them, if only until the Coptic Church became more militantly evangelistic. Thus the Egyptian Anglican Church came into being in 1923.

The premature death of the Revd William Temple Gairdner in 1928 and a change in the Egyptian Government's attitudes to missionaries during the 1930's meant that the drive to convert Muslims was a relatively short-lived phenomenon. The British Government's unwillingness to offend Muslim opinion meant that there was little or no political support for proselytism among Muslims. Those who did convert were still regarded with suspicion by other Egyptian Anglicans who had come from other churches in Egypt. It was mainly as a result of these Christian 'converts' from other denominations, rather than those converting from Islam, (as well as by natural means) that the Egyptian Anglican Church grew during the period in question, though by relatively modest amounts.

The dual origins of the Anglican Church in Egypt meant that it was to have a rather schizophrenic existence. The older, expatriate side of the Church was to remain the more powerful of the two, having the greater control of resources and a greater number of clergy. The younger, indigenous church often lacked a voice but was to outlast its exotic sibling. As important as the ethnicity of the two groups, however, were the attitudes that lay behind their religious affiliations. The expatriate community of Anglicans made up of businesspeople, soldiers and civil servants and their families, came largely with the idea that Anglicanism was part of their cultural identity. It was part of the Christendom from which they saw themselves as having come. Through commerce and informal imperialism they were in Egypt to extend what they saw as the secular benefits of that Christendom, such as international trade and good governance. They had no interest, however, in extending the Anglican Church to include Egyptians. Religion, for them was very much tied up with race and nationality. It was a question of blood and soil. To be British was for many of them to be Anglican. To admit Egyptians to the Anglican Church would have caused confusion and complicated their political and economic influence in Egypt and the Middle East.

The host population would not have made the same distinction between secular and religious activities but they fully understood the idea of religion being a matter of blood rather than individual conviction. For them, religion was also very much about birth. Whether Muslim or Copt, Egyptian people tended to be born into their religion. It was not a matter of choice. It was part of their tribal identity. To change religion was to weaken the ties that bound communities together and to create friction between religious groups. The host population had a strong sense of their identity as Egyptians

in a mainly Muslim country in the Islamic equivalent of Christendom. If individuals trespassed outside of this framework then they were likely to be perceived as siding with the occupying power which seemed intent on extending the rule of Christendom in Egypt. As a sometimes threatened minority, Egyptian Christians tended to identify themselves as Egyptians first and Christians second rather than side with their co-religionists from overseas.

Into this understanding of faith as something inherited and communal came the missionaries of the CMS with their appreciation of faith as a matter of personal choice. They looked for the extension of Christendom but through the process of individual conversions. It was this view of faith that led to the development of the indigenous Anglican Church in Egypt which included converts from Islam. The influence of this view was, however, to remain short-lived. In a few decades, the traditional view of faith as a matter of blood and soil was to reassert itself within the Anglican Church. The idea of individual conversions from Islam to Christianity had largely failed and the profile of the Anglican Church among Egyptians became mainly one of witness and service. Subsequently, there was little expectation that people would change their religious affiliation as a result.

Within this context of a small Anglican church in two parts with varied and shifting understandings of what membership of it really meant, the role of the bishop is key. It is in the person of the bishop that the two parts of the church are structurally connected. Bishop Llewellyn H. Gwynne, the first bishop of the Diocese of Egypt and the Sudan, which later became the Diocese of Egypt and North Africa, casts a huge shadow over the Anglican Church in Egypt during this period. Though the Sudan was

to remain his great love, his long episcopacy had profound implications for the Anglican Church in Egypt.

Llewellyn Gwynne left Great Britain to work in the Sudan, and later Egypt, at a time when the British doctrines of high imperialism were at their highest. He was thoroughly imbued with the belief that it was the manifest destiny of the British race to bring the light of civilisation and Christianity to peoples who had previously walked in darkness. Gwynne saw the British Empire as an instrument of God's salvation and was happy to cooperate with it in what he saw as the extension of Christendom. It is easy for us to dismiss his views as racist and imperialist and as damaging to the long term mission of the church. These views were, however, sincerely held and were shared with many others of his generation. Long experience revealed to Gwynne the shortcomings of British imperial policy and the limits of its willingness to encourage the spread of the Gospel in Muslim countries. Despite this however, in any choice between British and Egyptian aspirations, Bishop Gwynne always tended to side with those of Great Britain and his fellow countrymen. The difficulties faced by any British missionary seeking to share the Gospel among Egyptian Muslims encouraged him frequently to concentrate instead on his fellow expatriates who, not surprisingly, were more easily gathered in to the Anglican fold. This happened to suit the makers of British policy in the region and won him many British friends.

In Sudan, Llewellyn Gwynne had discovered that he had a particular rapport with British military personnel. This encouraged him to offer his support as a chaplain in the First World War and led eventually to his appointment as Deputy Chaplain-

General to the Forces. Had the Second World War not taken place, Bishop Gwynne would probably have retired at some time in the nineteen thirties. By then, British confidence in its imperial destiny was becoming less certain and Bishop Gwynne's views had become outdated. He had grown old and it was time for a new man with new ideas to set his seal upon the Diocese of Egypt. The Second World War, however, brought large numbers of British and Allied troops to Egypt's shores. Bishop Gwynne's particular gift of being able to relate to service personnel and to inspire them to acts of great bravery and sacrifice once again found ready employment. As a spiritual home for the thousands of troops stationed in Egypt, the newly constructed All Saints' Cathedral, that Gwynne had worked so hard to create, was used far more than its original expatriate sponsors could have imagined. Its role as the "English church" was thus confirmed. In a time of war, Gwynne's imperialist views on the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and the rightness of their cause, became fashionable once again.

The success of the "mission" of the Diocese of Egypt among Allied troops could be seen as a legitimate fulfilment of the aspirations of the expatriate root of the Anglican Church. It was part of their tribal identity and it appeared to give divine sanction to their cause. In terms of the work of the Anglican Church among Egyptians, however, it was at best, counter-productive, reinforcing the idea that the Anglican Church was, at heart, the "English church." Egypt remained neutral throughout most of the War but the Anglican Church appeared to most observers to be decidedly partisan. This was perhaps the most striking, though by no means the only time, when the Anglican Church failed to identify with the aspirations of the majority population among which

it found itself. This failure could be seen to provide some justification for the attacks on the Cathedral compound by Egyptian rioters on 21st February, 1946.

Another drawback which the Second World War had for the mission of the Anglican Church in Egypt was that it delayed the retirement of Bishop Gwynne until 1946 when he was eighty three. Through no fault of his own he had been in post for twenty four years and was no longer equal to the task of leadership and administration in such a vast diocese in rapidly changing times. His views, which had changed only slightly in nearly sixty years of service, had helped to mould the Diocese in ways which were not quickly altered. Like an ocean-going liner, it was difficult for the Anglican Church in Egypt to change direction quickly to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Gwynne's successor, Bishop Geoffrey Allen (1947-1952) began the task by working to bring the two halves of the church closer together and of strengthening the Egyptian leadership. He lacked experience of working in the Middle East, but his visionary and strategic thinking identified important changes that the Anglican Church needed to make if it was to negotiate the post-war context.

Such changes as Bishop Allen was able to make in his relatively brief episcopacy came rather late compared to other parts of the world and were only partial. Bishop Frank Johnston, who succeeded him in 1952 had been greatly influenced by long years of service under Bishop Gwynne and was a steady hand rather than another visionary leader. Like Bishop Gwynne, Bishop Johnston had strong links with the expatriate community in Egypt. Both men had been heavily involved in Freemasonry which was a purely expatriate activity. During his episcopacy, Bishop Johnston could be said to have consolidated the work of Bishop Allen rather than extending it further.

As a result, the small boat that was the Anglican Church was only partially prepared for the tidal wave of nationalism that was to engulf it during his episcopacy. The Anglican Church in Egypt was nearly swept away in the deluge. That it was not is a testimony to the small group of Egyptian clergy who remained, as well as Egyptian respect for religious institutions and the medical and educational work that the Anglican Church had been doing. The grace of God might also be said to have played some part in what might seem to some to have been a miraculous survival.

The first part of this study has taken a fairly chronological approach to the history of the Anglican Church in Egypt. At the same time, it has also thrown up certain themes which deserve further scrutiny. The first of these is the relationship between the Anglican Church and the state, both in Great Britain and Egypt. As already mentioned, the Diocese of Egypt tended to identify itself with the interests of Great Britain rather than those of the people of Egypt and their government. The reluctance of the Church of England to reflect critically on its relationship with the British Government was reflected in a similar situation in Egypt. The dominance of its older, expatriate half made it slow to indigenise. Its identification with Great Britain, was not, however, straightforward. It was an extension of the pragmatic and ill-defined constitution upon which British polity rests.

As the weaker partner, the Anglican Church has always felt it has more to gain from its relationship with the British Government through critical engagement rather than prophetic challenge. Though the relationship between imperialism and missionary activity is not a straightforward one, on balance, the Church seems to have benefited from British expansion overseas, opening up new 'markets' for mission just as it did

for British business. Since the time of Constantine, Christianity has always had an imperialist dimension. Occasionally, the Anglican Church has felt able to question and criticise British policy overseas. The criticism of Britain's actions during the Suez Crisis by Archbishop Fisher is perhaps the most striking example in this study. Sometimes the interests of the Anglican Church in Egypt were wholly at variance with those of British foreign policy. The restrictions placed upon missionary schools in Egypt are another example. But on the whole, the Anglican Church gave British policy the benefit of the doubt, rendering unto Caesar in London rather than in Cairo, even when the things of God seemed under threat.

Nowhere was this more apparent than in its relationship with the Allied military. The Diocese of Egypt frequently allowed itself to be used as a mouthpiece for Allied propaganda during the Second World War and was reluctant to question its activities, even when they risked damage to its wider mission. The use of the crusader name and image by the Eighth Army is perhaps the prime example of this. But perhaps more damaging than actual examples of compromises made with the British political and military establishments were the many instances in which the Church must have been perceived as siding with the occupying power. Sometimes the Anglican Church convinced itself that there was a distinction between its work and that of the Embassy or the Middle East Command. Here the veil seems, however, to be so thin as to be non-existent. It would have been a distinction that was lost on most observers. In the light of the Suez Crisis, the Diocese of Egypt seems at the very least to have been frequently naïve in its dealings with Caesar.

This naiveté was sometimes shared by members of the CMS, among them the CMS Secretary in Egypt S. A. Morrison. Though he was quick to deny accusations in the Egyptian press that missionaries were spies, his papers reveal a surprising level of interference in Egyptian political life. The educational and medical institutions did an enormous amount of good work for the people of Egypt which was valued by many and probably ensured their survival after Suez. This was sometimes, however, endangered by a naïve and uncritical way in which CMS personnel conducted themselves or at least allowed themselves to be perceived. Morrison's work with the British Embassy to counteract the influence of Communism in Egypt is the most glaring example of this.

The involvement of the CMS with the Anglican Church in Egypt also raises significant questions about its relationship with the Diocese as a whole. The CMS operated in Egypt under the authority of the Bishop. Sometimes he drew on CMS personnel to maintain services for English-speaking congregations. There are many other situations, however, in which the CMS seems to have enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy from the Diocese and its bishop. The experience of the Revd J. Leonard Wilson points to the fact that the CMS appointed its own staff with often only a nod in the bishop's direction. This autonomy may have had some benefits when the Church faced persecution, as in the Suez Crisis. It enabled an indigenous church to come into being without being overwhelmed by the older and more powerful expatriate church. It did not, however, help the Anglican Church as a whole to become more integrated or indigenised. It helped to perpetuate a virtual apartheid within the Anglican Church in Egypt in which neither side had much understanding of the other. The autonomy which the CMS mission in Egypt enjoyed sometimes

appears to have created a church within a church. The particular theological view which the CMS expounded has meant that the Egyptian side of the Diocese has grown up with a sometimes narrow understanding of the riches of the Anglican theological tradition. As with other parts of the Anglican Communion brought into being through the work of the CMS this has had major implications for the way in which the worldwide Anglican Communion currently operates. In addition, the fact that overseas mission has tended to be the concern of missionary societies like CMS rather than that of the Church of England as a whole has meant that until recently, mission has been perceived as a specialist interest rather than the business of every follower of Christ.

This study makes uncomfortable reading for anyone with a fondness for the Anglican Church and for Egypt. Its critical tone is designed to balance previous works which in retrospect appear overly self-congratulatory. The evidence assembled here is not designed to undermine the Anglican (now the Episcopal) Church in Egypt but to give it a sounder understanding of its history so that it may more accurately plot its future. It arises out of a firm conviction that "the truth shall set you free."[2] Part of that evidence suggests that a permanent Egyptian Anglican Church was never the intention of its architect but was a temporary measure to address difficult circumstances. Any church must ask itself occasionally whether it should continue to exist. This is especially true if it arises out of the particular circumstances in which the Anglican Church in Egypt developed. Whether or not the Coptic Church now exhibits the qualities that the original CMS missionaries judged it to lack when they first arrived in Egypt, it is unlikely that the gulf of theology and tradition which exists

[2] John 8.32.

between it and the Episcopal Church today could be bridged in the foreseeable future. Though coming from a liturgical tradition which bears some similarities to the Coptic Church, the theology of the current Episcopal Church seems to be moving in a conservative evangelical direction. In today's Middle East, where the Anglican Church represents a tiny part of an already small reformed tradition, which is being made ever smaller by continued migration, it would seem sensible for it to think carefully about further moves towards a united evangelical church of the Middle East, even if this involves a loss of its own identity and power.

The Revd Jesse J. Hillman interviewed 12th April 2002

When were you in Egypt? 1947 -1956

What was your function? Hospital administrator at Old Cairo Hospital which became the Harpur Memorial Hospital. Then lent to American Quakers to set up medical side of relief operation in Gaza Strip in 1949. Returned to Cairo a couple of years later. Continued as Hospital Administrator. Last two years Mission Secretary. Member of Egyptian Hospital Administration. Only non-medical, non-Egyptian. Secretary of the Fellowship of Unity.

On the CMS side, were the objectives of the mission clear? To serve the Egyptian community through hospitals schools etc in name of Christ and support the small Egyptian Episcopal Church. Witness in word and deed. Open preaching in hospitals. Majority of patients were Muslim. Majority of staff were Christian

Did staff have a clear sense of this? Many doctors worked in honorary capacity. Some saw it as Christian service, others as service to the community.

Was there a sense that the EEC would grow or had it reached critical mass? I don't think there was any realistic sense that it would grow because growth would have come either from conversions of large numbers of Muslims which was most unlikely. There were occasional conversions but nothing large. Or from people transferring from other churches which was discouraged. We worked very closely with the Coptic Church. We had the Patriarch as a patient once. The Bishop of Giza said that he felt that the Christian Gospel was better understood through the work of our hospital in Old Cairo than it was through many of the centuries of the worship of the Coptic Church.

How did Egyptian patients respond to the presence of overseas missionaries? They took it for granted. They had been there for donkeys' years. They wanted staff who were honest and concerned for the welfare of the patients.

You wrote that relations between Egyptians and British members of the Hospital team had not been affected by wider tensions in 1952. No, they weren't. Dorothy and I were out with the AUC at a cotton factory. We came back on the bus to find Cairo in flames. People jumping out of buildings. Cars burning with people inside them and so on. The Egyptians told us to lie down so we could not be seen so we got through Cairo with no trouble. It was a pretty unhappy experience.

Was the upsurge of violence a surprise to you? Yes it was. I don't think anyone had anticipated that the feelings of the fellaheen against Farouk and against what they would regard as sinful and anti-Islamic western influence coming into their country. The Greek liquor shops and the opera house and the cinemas and the signs of western penetration which went up in flames. The stock of liquor in some of the shops was such that they burnt for three days.

But in the hospital, you weren't in danger. No we had no problems at all.

Were you affected by attempts by the Egyptian Government to restrict the teaching of Christianity in schools? Not as secretary. It affected us in the hospital in that we had to resist some of the things they tried to impose on us which were not in accordance with their own constitution. We had printed on all the patients' cards something from the psalms about the Lord being my healer and they tried to stop us doing that at one time. And similarly they tried to stop us preaching on the wards but I think it was the Egyptian members of the medical board of the Church who managed to stand up against this and it was never enforced. They had to accept the teaching of

Islam in schools and after long discussions it was felt that this was a fair enough thing to do. There were objections initially but people accepted that that was right.

I was never closely involved in the schools.

There were attempts to appeal to the British Government to use its influence which may have been seen as counter-productive. I think they would be.

Sam Morrison was there throughout our time. He worked with the Near East Christian Council. He seems to have had a lot of influence over the missionary community.

Very much so. He was quite authoritarian in the old fashioned style as was the CMS doctor in Gaza, Dr Hargreaves.

The documents give an impression of people being very stretched, including yourself. I was stretched partly because of the way I went about things. I realised that questions were going to be asked, they were asked by the Egyptian Hospital Association and by the Ministry, about why someone without medical qualification was running the hospital so I studied for my diploma in hospital administration through the British Institute of Hospital Administrators. And I though time was fairly short so I got through the four year course in two years. It was quite tough going. As regards the hospital as a whole, I think the staff were stretched but I think that that would apply to Egyptian as well as missionary staff. Tony Chase was evacuated to Britain with jaundice. That did leave the staff very stretched indeed. He offered to come back during the run up to the Suez Crisis. And then of course he came back and everything blew up in November. It was a help actually because otherwise I would have been the only missionary male coping with all the females and the children, well, our own children.

How well integrated was the Mission with the life of the rest of the church? When I first got there the two were running on parallel lines. It was fairly obvious that

British influence was going to be considerably reduced and Max Warren with his forward-looking thinking was encouraging us to get everything Egyptianised. And the missionary committees and so on ceased to exist and the missionaries were incorporated into the bodies set up by the Episcopal Church.

I think it was a pretty good incorporation. I felt that when we went to East Africa later Egypt were ahead of what they were doing there.

The one thing we were unable to do because the Episcopal Church wouldn't accept it was to transfer the property to them. They still had the old idea going back to the days of the Ottoman Empire that France was the protecting power for Catholic interests and Britain was the protecting power for British interests and that they were more likely to have protection if the property were owned by the British rather than if it became Egyptian. They were afraid that if it became Egyptian it would fairly quickly be nationalised.

You talk about integration. We had quite close relations with the other mission societies and in particular the Egypt General Mission. When their hospital had to be closed down because of the fighting between the British and the Egyptians in the Canal Zone the staff came and worked on the staff of the hospital in Old Cairo.

And what sort of contact was there between the Egyptian side of the church and the expatriate? Precious little. Some of the Cathedral staff did their best. They arranged parties for members of the English Cathedral to go round Boulac and such like places and see what the church was doing there but as so often is the case only a few people went on those. To many people the English-speaking congregation at the Cathedral was English. It was very colonial in its outlook. I preached in the Cathedral and at Maadi. Alexandria was an absolute bastion of Englishness. I got the impression

that they were almost two separate churches. Perhaps a little less than it used to be in the past but the English Diocese had its archdeacon, the Egyptian had its wakeel.

I suppose the fact that the expatriate side provided a lot of the money allowed that to continue. It could have been that. It could have been just relative numbers and the colonial outlook of so many people.

Letter 21st April 1953 from Gurney to Milford:

> **For fifteen years I have been quite unaware that CMS had a policy which included such clear suspicion of and distrust in the diocesan set-up. It runs counter to all that I have believed in and have been working for during these years.**

Is that something you experienced? After I came back in 1956 I think I experienced it particularly with regard to the financial side of things. I had a stand up row with the financial secretary and the Asia secretary because of the way they wanted to treat the hospital's finances. I felt that the hospital had already suffered enough through losing all the missionaries and needed all the help CMS could give it. But I think that there were general suspicions within CMS in London of the machinations, sometimes of missionaries and sometimes of the church, particularly with regard to financial matters.

They felt that the institutions should stand on their own feet? Yes. That's right.

And sometimes there was a concern expressed that they'd send out a missionary, a clergyman, and he'd get involved in ministering to expats at the cathedral and not doing what he was sent out to do. Yes, I think that's true, and sometimes that is not necessarily a suspicion of the institution. It could be a suspicion of the missionary himself because it is so much easier to work for people who are of your own culture

than it is to get stuck into language study and get stuck into a different culture. We had the same problem in Kenya. It wasn't peculiar to Egypt.

Seem to have been tensions between older missionaries and newer ones on the progress of indigenisation. I think the main tensions we experienced when we first got there – we were the first post-war missionaries – all the decent furniture had been pinched by missionaries during the War. We had the scraps that were left over. I think we fell through two beds and two or three chairs in our first month there before we got some decent furniture. With regard to indigenisation, I think it is unavoidable that people who grew up in the pre-war period of colonial outlook should mistrust the ability of those of another culture, particularly in Africa and the Middle east, to take over and run things in the way that they themselves feel they should be run.

You mentioned Sam Morrison being a bit of a martinet well that was true. He would be towards the missionaries but he would also have his own very strong opinions which he would express in church councils. It's a question of I suppose the western outlook as opposed to the oriental. We do things in different ways and we look at things differently. I think it is true that the missionaries who came out in the post war period were much more influenced by Max Warren's ideas that the British Empire was going to fall apart and the church had better make sure it wasn't going to get lost in the flood.

Was enough done to encourage Egyptian leadership? I think it was Isaaq Musaad who came to Britain to study. There were opportunities given to people in many spheres of the church's life. Looking back at the time and the outlook of people then I think as much was done as could have been done.

And it survived. Yes. Isaaq took over my job poor chap.

Certainly in Old Cairo the church council there had some very good Egyptians on it. They were people of calibre who were quite capable of being at least as effective as an English PCC.

Do you think the church should have done more to distance itself from Britain and identify more with Egypt? It depends what you mean by the church recognising that there were almost two bits of the church. When the Suez Crisis was beginning to boil up on the horizon, the Bishop, who didn't speak Arabic, was very closely identified with the British Embassy and with the British community. By himself he identified with them and in the eyes of the British community he was their bishop. When the Embassy was expelled, he was expelled too. Before that time he could see, well, I'm sure he'd heard from the British Embassy that things were going to be sticky. That Britain was going to attack Egypt. And he called me to him and told me that I must send all the women and children back to Britain and I refused because I could see that the impact of all that on the Egyptian church would have been to destroy any confidence that they had in the unity of Christians across national and cultural boundaries. So I just had to keep stalling because he kept up the pressure. He was very concerned to get all the women and children to the safety of Britain.

This was Bishop Johnston who had been in Egypt a long time. But had never got the language. He was, perhaps understandably, far more concerned with his ministry to those at the Embassy and in the British community, and to the chaplaincies outside Egypt.

He was very popular with the British community. Very much so. And rightly so. It was an impossible situation. Whereas in Sudan Oliver Allison spoke Arabic and other African languages, the African side of the church was strong, the chaplaincies were

minute. He was much more able to keep a balance between the two than the bishop in Egypt was.

How did you feel about the Suez Crisis? I think I felt extremely anti. Anti-British and extremely angry at what our country was doing. I said I just could not understand how British pilots could come over and drop bombs on a country that had just nationalised a canal going through the middle of its own territory. I think I also felt that the unity between British and Egyptian Christians was far more important than the war between the two countries. I remember on All Saints Day kneeling at the rail to receive communion from Isaaq [Adeeb Shammas?] the Archdeacon and feeling the thud of British bombs through my knees as I was kneeling. I remember how the British missionaries who had experience of the blitz having to go and comfort Egyptian patients and staff during the British air raids, particularly those in the hoshes which were open to shrapnel coming down through AKAK fire. I remember also how difficult it was to get the blackout enforced because they had so little understanding of aerial precautions which we of course had coped with for several years. I remember when the Egyptian authorities phoned and said, could we send doctors to the first aid posts around the city. I said, do you mean British doctors, Egyptian doctors? They said, we don't mind as long as they are doctors. Equally I remember the local head of the secret police whom I had been trying to teach English, coming round and saying apologetically that he would have to put us under house arrest and he was putting a guard on the front gate of the hospital. And he winked at me because he and I both knew perfectly well that that hospital had four gates. I used to go out and do the purchasing and it was very strange standing in the street with Egyptians all around me watching British planes going overhead to bomb. And I know sometimes I was pretty sunburned and I might have been mistaken for a Greek but a lot of people knew I was

British. It seemed so absurd that here was a country that basically was friendly to Britain and Britain was doing its darnedest to knock it to bits. Those are my feelings and they were extremely strong at the time I'm afraid.

Why were you told not to comment on it after your return? They sent someone to meet me at the airport because I think they were afraid that if I was got hold of by reporters I would make statements that could have been detrimental to the popularity of CMS.

Although there were mixed opinions back in Britain as well.

One of the things that helped our relationships greatly with local Egyptians was that the News Chronicle published on its front page a picture a whole front page picture of the crowds at Trafalgar Square protesting against the invasion of Egypt and one of the Egyptian papers, one or two, reproduced that in their papers. People would say to us that we realise that what is happening is your government not the people of Britain and that helped a great deal I think.....

The closeness of our relationship with the local police and people was shown by the fact that almost all the other missionaries had their radios taken away and their phones cut off but nobody ever attempted to cut us off. So I therefore had to make the evacuation arrangements for example for the Egypt General Mission. We were given ten days to leave. I tried to arrange for people to go to Sudan by train but all the trains were booked up three months ahead. I then tried to see if there were any ships coming into Alexandria that we could get on to. Because the airports were all closed. When the United Nations started coming in with their observers I wondered if we could get a lift on one of their planes but that wasn't possible under their regulations. And then finally the SAS, the Scandinavian Airlines began running a shuttle service between Cairo and Rome. So that's how we got out.

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