

**HOPE AND CONCILIATORY GESTURES
IN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIPS:**

**An Analysis of South Korea's Conciliatory Gestures
towards North Korea under President Kim Dae-jung and
President Park Geun-hye (1998-2016)**

By

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Abstract

Why do some decision-makers, even when facing an adversary, respond not through threats and coercions but by devising conciliatory gestures? This PhD thesis aims to explore the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures in adversarial relationships. The main arguments of this thesis are as follows: I argue that (1) bringing hope explicitly into the debate helps us broaden our understanding of decision-makers' behaviours in devising conciliatory gestures, (2) a decision-maker who experiences hope adopts unconditional conciliatory gestures, (3) a decision-maker who experiences hope interprets and responds to an adversary's defection in a different way than conventional accounts argue.

This thesis aims to develop the *theory of hope in a conciliatory process*, which includes the 'conceptualisation of hope' and 'the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures.' Using the method of documentary analysis and elite interview, I conduct case studies to evaluate the theory against two of Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)'s conciliatory gestures towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea): the *Sunshine Policy* and *Trustpolitik*. We can see different types of conciliatory gestures and clear variations between the presence/absence of hope by the state leaders, President Kim Dae-jung and President Park Geun-hye. I examine the theoretical framework against these two cases and investigate the role of hope in a conciliatory process in IR.

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Introduction

Research Question: Puzzle and Objectives

Why do some decision-makers, even when facing an adversary, respond not through threats and coercion but by devising conciliatory gestures? This PhD thesis aims to explore the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures in adversarial relationships. The main arguments of this thesis are as follows: I argue that (1) bringing *hope* explicitly into the debate helps us broaden our understanding of decision-makers' behaviours in devising conciliatory gestures; (2) a decision-maker who experiences hope adopts *unconditional conciliatory gestures*; and (3) a decision-maker who experiences hope *interprets and responds to an adversary's defection in a different way* than conventional accounts argue.

Despite the flourish of emotion studies in IR, they have still rested upon vague and unspecified notions of *hope*.¹ Many such studies have challenged the notion that the relationship between emotion and reason is dichotomous or contradictory in decision-making (Damasio 1994; Crawford 2000; McDermott 2004, Mercer 2005, Jeffery 2014, Holmes 2015, Rathbun et al. 2017). Emotion has been widely incorporated into foreign policy analysis in IR (Rosen 2005, Löwenheim and Heimann 2008, Sasley 2010, Patalakh 2017, Wheeler 2018; Holmes 2018, Markwica 2018, Ross 2018, Young 2018). However, hope has never been explicitly theorised, and scholarship has generally dismissed hope as an obstacle to sensible decision-making (Janis 1972; Gilpin 1981; Rock 2000; Ripsman and Levy 2008; Markwica 2018).

¹ The important exception to this is Markwica (2018)


This PhD thesis begins with uncertainty about other states' intentions and suggests hope as an alternative response to uncertainty in International Relations (IR).² Compared to the traditional definition of security dilemma (Jervis 1976; 1978), many scholars argue that at its heart is the uncertainty about intentions that places decision-makers in the security dilemma (Herz 1951; Montgomery 2006; Suh 2006; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Tang 2010; Holmes 2018; Baker 2019). The existing literature suggests different responses to the problem of uncertainty about intentions. Offensive realist theory argues that decision-makers have no choice but to assume the worst about other states' intentions and stick to the chronic fear of preparing for the worst situation of being attacked (Mearsheimer 2001; 2006; Rosato 2021). Some rationalists are less quick to dismiss the possibility of alleviating uncertainty and argue that decision-makers manage uncertainty by gathering information (Jervis 1978; Lynn-Jones 1995; Van Evera Glaser 1997; Glaser and Kaufman 1998; Kydd 2005; Glaser 2010). Other scholars argue that decision-makers can respond with subjective certainty, and not solely by gathering information (Wendt 1999; Mitzen 2006; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Wheeler 2018; Holmes 2018; Hagström and Bremberg 2022). However, the debates have not yet explicitly theorised hope as a psychological strategy for managing uncertainty regarding intentions.

Bringing hope into the debates, this PhD thesis aims to explore the role of hope in a conciliatory process. Building upon Michell, a *conciliatory process* in this thesis refers to “a process consisting of sequences of accommodative interaction in which the parties interact in a manner which contains at least a mix of conciliatory and coercive activities, usually with a balance in favour of the former; or in a manner that is almost entirely conciliatory or

² In this PhD thesis, intentions and motivations are used interchangeably. Intentions can be categorised into “malign” and “benign”. A state is malign if it intends to behave aggressively – that is, to threaten or use force – against another state or areas that are strategically important to that state, and it is benign if it does not (Rosato 2021: 10-15).

cooperative” (Mitchell 2000: 40).³ And *conciliatory gestures* are a “broad category of actions or statements that seek to signal to the other party a willingness to stop a pattern of confrontation and to initiate or resume a conciliatory process” (Mitchell 2000: 34, see also 96-102). This thesis investigates the role of hope in two specific phases of a conciliatory process: initiating conciliatory gestures and responding to an adversary state’s defection. This can be illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. A Conciliatory Process in Adversarial Relationships



Conciliatory gestures have been studied in terms of a communication process involving sending and receiving signals, and this PhD thesis focuses only on the *sender*. According to Jervis, in communication processes, actors not only perceive others, but they also signal in order to project images that may be either true or false. The topics of how actors seek to influence others’ perceptions of them and how they perceive others have been kept separate by many IR scholars (Jervis 2001: 296). Even though a theory of signalling requires a careful investigation of how signals are perceived, it is more manageable to split the topics apart, and

³ Mitchell added, ‘de-escalation process’, ‘accommodative bargaining’, or ‘benign spirals’ also capture many aspects of such accommodative sequences (Mitchell 2000: 41).

here I focus on one side in this PhD thesis. Of course, I consider a target state's defection to investigate how a sending state's decision-maker interprets and responds to it, but I do not focus on why the target state defects or how the target state perceives the initiating conciliatory moves. Rather, this PhD thesis only looks at the behaviour of the sending state's decision-makers.

In order to understand the behaviour of the sending state's decision-makers, I also define a target state's *reciprocity* and *defection* here. Reciprocity refers to "exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad" (Keohane 1986: 8). Defection refers to competitive choice or non-cooperative move as the opposite choice of cooperation (Jervis 1978; Axelrod 1984; Majeski 1995: 627; Kydd 2005).⁴ In other words, it is reciprocity when conciliatory gestures are returned for conciliatory gestures; it is defection when non-cooperative or competitive moves are returned for conciliatory gestures.

⁴ Defection is widely used in different context in IR; for example, it refers to competitive choice or non-cooperative move as the opposite choice of cooperation in Game Theory, such as a prisoner's dilemma or stag hunt (Jervis 1978; Axelrod 1984; Majeski 1995: 627; Kydd 2005). In the context of multilateral negotiations, defection is distinguished from ongoing discord in multilateral negotiations in that it is a unilateral action taken after a multilateral agreement to act in concert is reached (Crawford 1996: 484). So, defection depends on standards or norms specified. According to Larson, "Outside game models, it [defection] must mean a departure from a norm or standard of behaviour. When standards of behaviour are specified, explicated, and codified as in an arms control treaty, determining whether another state has defected requires information. Even when behaviour is specified in a treaty however, there may be loopholes, ambiguities, and new technologies that make identifying arms control violations more a matter of interpretation than investigation" (Larson 1988: 286). Thus, I understand in this thesis defection as exchanges of not equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that bad is returned for good.

I focus on *decision-makers* to investigate the role of hope in conciliatory processes. Admittedly, the uncertainty about intentions in IR operates at multiple levels, and conciliatory gestures are not solely individual decisions. The uncertainty operates not only between individuals but also between states. Even when we analyse the intentions of decision-makers, it is not enough to say that the uncertainty of the intention is solely interpersonal because the decision-makers are representing their states and making decisions on behalf of that state. Also, what a sending state's decision-makers perceive is not merely about the target state leader's inner mind, but also the final decision made by the representative of the target state. As Keys and Yorke argued, individual and collective emotional responses operate simultaneously in the international realm, and decision-makers process the emotional responses at a personal level, and the mediation of emotions through their bodies affects the interpretation and evaluation of emotions on behalf of the collective they represent (Keys and Yorke 2019: 1238). Therefore, drawing on many scholars (Yarhi-Milo 2014; Mercer 2014; Wheeler 2018; Keys and Yorke 2019; cf. Sasley 2011; Hall 2015), I focus on individuals to investigate the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures.

This thesis aims to develop a *theory of hope in conciliation*, which includes the 'conceptualisation of hope' (Chapter 2) and 'the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures' (Chapter 3). The main objective of the thesis is to develop the theoretical framework of hope and conciliatory gestures rather than to explain specific cases. In other words, I use a case study as a validity probe for a new factor being important in theorising and conceptualising hope in a conciliatory process. As existing debates have not explicitly theorised hope as a psychological strategy for managing uncertainty regarding the intentions of an adversary, this PhD thesis proposes hope as an alternative response to uncertainty and explore the conceptualisation and the role of hope in a conciliatory process. In order to develop the theoretical framework of hope, I deductively reviewed the existing literature on conciliatory

gestures and found that the absence of a discussion of hope comes from the ‘aversive uncertainty assumption’ in the existing literature. Challenging the assumption underpinning this debate, this thesis develops a theory to explain the presence/ absence of hope and how this opens up new ways of thinking about a conciliatory process in adversarial relationships.

I conduct two case studies to evaluate the theory against two Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)’s leader’s conciliatory gestures towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea): the *Sunshine Policy* (Chapter 5) and *Trustpolitik* (Chapter 6). Even though I conduct case studies to understand different understandings of adversarial relationships, I put more weight on showing the validity of a new factor by using the cases. In order to answer the question, “Why do some decision-makers, even when facing an adversary, respond not through threats and coercion but by devising conciliatory gestures?”, I chose two similar cases with a clear variation of the presence/absence of the new factor. In other words, both the *Sunshine Policy* and *Trustpolitik* clearly initiated conciliatory gestures toward North Korea in a similar domestic and international political context (which will be illustrated in detail in the following section), but we see the presence/absence of hope on the part of two different state leaders, Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Park Geun-hye. The clear variations allow me to utilise the method “structured and focused comparison” which has powerful advantages in the identification of new variables and hypotheses and develop new theories that can be tested through previously unexamined evidence (George and Bennett 2005: 27). Therefore, the two selected cases can be structurally compared to discover the role of hope during a conciliatory process. As such, we can see different types of conciliatory gestures and clear variations between the presence/absence of hope by the state leaders, President Kim Dae-jung and President Park Geun-hye. In the following sections, I will explain further why hope and these empirical cases need to be investigated in the context of a conciliatory process.

Why the *Sunshine Policy* and the *Trustpolitik*?

The Sunshine Policy and the Trustpolitik are two clear conciliatory gestures both sought to signal to North Korea a willingness to stop a confrontation pattern and initiate or resume a conciliatory process. However, existing literature on inter-Korean relations does not fully capture the difference between the two conciliatory gestures, mainly focusing on domestic politics and international structure.

The *Sunshine Policy* is the South Korean conciliatory policy towards North Korea adopted by President Kim Dae-jung between the period 1998 and 2002. Kim won the presidential election on 18 December 1997, with the inauguration taking place on 25 February 1998. Kim characterised his administration as a “Government of the people,” as the election marked the first time in Korean history that the ruling party peacefully transferred power to a democratically elected opposition winner. The Sunshine Policy was one of Kim’s main election campaign promises. In his inauguration speech, Kim declared three basic principles of the Sunshine Policy: “First, we will not allow any form of armed invasion; second, we have no intention of harming or absorbing North Korea; and third, we will actively pursue reconciliation and collaboration with North Korea from the most practicable field. I hope that the South-North interchange will be carried out according to the South-North Basic Agreement” (Kim 1998: 25 Feb). Kim offered assurances that he would enhance economic cooperation and announced that his government would seek engagement with the North by facilitating its exchanges and coaction with the outside world. He further promised to provide food aid to the North, as well as promote economic, social, and cultural exchanges. Under the three basic principles of the Sunshine Policy, Kim also set three guidelines to enhance economic cooperation between South and North – humanitarian support, separation of politics and

economy, and reciprocity.⁵

The *Trustpolitik* is the name given by South Korea President Park Geun-hye to her conciliatory gestures towards North Korea from 2013 to 2016. It aimed to “develop an inter-Korean relationship, make peace in the Korean Peninsula and establish the foundation of unification based on South Korea’s national security” (Ministry of Unification 2013: 11). The idea of trust was placed at the centre of the new policy, which was introduced in the autumn of 2011 in an article entitled “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang”, published in *Foreign Affairs*. As highlighted in the article, Park called it “an alignment policy” in that “it would involve aligning South Korea’s security with its cooperation with the North and inter-Korean dialogue with parallel international efforts” (Park 2011: 15). She differentiated her approach from the policies adopted by previous governments, both progressives and conservatives. As part of the *Trustpolitik*, Park proposed to North Korea in May 2013 the construction of a peace park in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). She also launched a Unification Preparatory Committee in 2014 and called for cross-border family reunions, which took place in 2015.

Some scholars focus on domestic politics when analysing these two conciliatory gestures. Regarding the *Trustpolitik*, Fiori argued that Park had a strong incentive to lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula and adopted the *Trustpolitik* during her electoral campaign in 2013. Considering that the collapse of the former president Lee Myung-bak’s popularity was

⁵ The Sunshine Policy did not suddenly emerge; Kim had been thinking about the goals for peace in the Korean Peninsula even far before he was elected president in 1998. He initially presented the first version of his three-step reunification plan in 1971. And even when he lost the presidential election and declared retirement from politics in 1992, he decided to study abroad as a visiting scholar at Cambridge University, exploring the unification plan further, and devising a desirable model for Korean reunification. After returning from Cambridge, he founded the ‘Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation’ on 27 January 1994.

also influenced by his negative management of relations with North Korea, Park decided to propose a new course of relations based on trust instead of on coercion (Fiori 2017: 13). However, following North Korea's fourth nuclear test in 2016, Park decisively turned her back on further engagement with North Korea, and chose to impose tighter sanctions instead. Further complicating the prospects for conciliatory was in the increased inter-party wrangling within South Korea. Given the extent of the conservative Saenuri Party's electoral defeat during the National Assembly elections in April 2016, Choe argued that Park needed to ensure unity among conservative domestic allies for fear of isolating her remaining conservative domestic allies (Choe 2016).

However, despite being in a similar domestic political context, Kim behaved differently. During the Kim administration, the opposition political party, the Grand National Party, also had a majority, and the Millennium Democratic Party had only one-third of the Assembly seats in 2000. However, Kim adopted a very different approach to conciliatory gestures than that of Park. Right before the general election in April 2000, South and North Korea finally agreed to have an inter-Korea Summit and decided to announce the Summit together. Given that the general election was approaching in a few days, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) warned the Kim administration that the announcement might negatively affect the election and suggested announcing the agreement after the election. NIS was concerned that the opposition party would attack the government, claiming that it was a political tactic for the general election and spreading suspicion about the agreement and Kim's abnormal obsession with the Nobel Peace Prize (Jaung 2002). Despite the expected domestic backlash, Kim announced before the election what had been agreed with North Korea. On 10 April 2000, the Ministry of Unification announced the agreement for the Inter-Korean Summit. The same announcement was made in the North simultaneously. As expected, the opposition political party fiercely criticised it as sensationalism (Kirk 2001). Moreover, three days later, the Democratic Party was defeated in

the general election on 13 April.⁶ Given the same domestic political context of the electoral defeat of their political party, Kim and Park did not adopt the same conciliatory gestures.

Another explanatory factor for South Korea's foreign policy toward North Korea is geopolitical, especially the role of the US in the Korean Peninsula. Some scholars claim that international sanctions towards North Korea finally led Park to turn her back on further engagement and change the earlier *Trustpolitik*. The simultaneous electoral wins of President Barack Obama in the US⁷ and Park Geun-hye in the ROK in 2012 initially offered opportunities for them to coordinate a sustained process of diplomatic and security engagement with North Korea (Govindasamy, Tan and Park 2019: 7). However, the Obama administration settled on a policy approach dubbed 'strategic patience,' which involved the gradually escalating application of nonviolent means of coercion as the North Korean nuclear problem that it purported to arrest grew more acute over time (Jackson 2019). In addition, in January 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and claimed to have successfully carried out a "hydrogen bomb-test" (McCurry and Safi 2016), an event strongly condemned by the UN Security Council, including even China, North Korea's last remaining ally (Choe, Sengupta

⁶ By winning 115 seats, the Democratic Party yielded the position of majority party to the Grand National Party, which won 133 seats.

⁷ As Senator, Obama had made an effort to enter into the fears of the North Korean leadership. Speaking at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2005, Obama had noted that, through its hard-line posture and 'strong rhetoric [the Bush Administration] may have boxed itself in ... North Korea is still going to be on the list of evil empires, and causing the North Koreans to be wary of changing their behaviour.' This was followed by numerous statements during his 2008 Presidential campaign, when he repeatedly outlined his intention to hold dialogue with erstwhile US foes such as North Korea without the rigid preconditions that had been imposed by Bush. Obama, "North Korea: An Update on Six Party Talks and Matters Related to the Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2015.

and Sanger 2016). As a result of these advanced nuclear and missile threats, North Korea was met by the United Nations with the toughest sanctions up to date (the fifth set since 2006), including inspections of all North Korean planes and ships, a ban on North Korea's export of natural resources, UN member states to ban North Korea from opening banks, the expulsion of diplomats engaged in illicit activities, prohibition of training in fields that may help enhance North Korea's nuclear technologies, a ban on the chartering of foreign vessels or aircraft, and a prohibition on aviation fuel supply (Roth, Yan and Ellis 2016).

Some scholars also argue that the Sunshine Policy was shaped by US policy towards North Korea (Cho 2010). The Clinton administration tried to solve the North Korean nuclear problem by signing the Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea in October 1994. The agreement froze North Korea's nuclear weapons development program and made provisions for dismantling it in a step-by-step process of deepening engagement with the United States. Since the Geneva Agreed Framework settlement in 1994, the United States tilted toward the 'soft landing' policy, which was congruent with the Sunshine Policy (Moon 2012).⁸ However, after North Korea tested Taepodong missiles and the US raised a nuclear development allegation in Kumchang-ri in August 1998, the Clinton administration then focused on solving

⁸ According to Moon, in addition to the US, Japan at the time also favoured the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, despite several unresolved pending issues with North Korea, including its missile-launching and the return of Japanese nationals kidnapped by the North in the 1970s and 1980s. Such an attitude was confirmed by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's endorsement of the Sunshine Policy during a visit by President Kim to Japan in October 1998. China was also a staunch opponent of a breakdown of the status quo through North Korean collapse. For all its improved diplomatic and economic ties with the South, China adhered to its traditional policy of *butong buluan*, in which it wanted "no unification, no war" on the Peninsula. Russia followed a similar line. Considering all this, Kim's doctrine of engagement and accommodation nicely dovetailed with the interests of the four major powers in the region (Moon 2012).

the North Korean missile problem and launched the ‘Perry process,’ which purported to get rid of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction through negotiations with North Korea leaders (Paik 2002: 17).⁹ On the contrary, the Sunshine Policy was not aligned with it; rather, as I will show in the empirical chapter, Kim met William Perry several times and put a lot of efforts to persuade the Clinton administration to continue the Sunshine Policy. What is more, despite the next Bush administration’s antagonistic posture toward North Korea,¹⁰ Kim did not give up his conciliatory gestures, and the Sunshine Policy even succeeded the next Roh Moo-hyun administration from 2003 to 2008.

⁹ According to Ahn (2006), the United States Institute of Peace which was created by Congress and is subject to its mandate, claimed, through a special report published in October 1998, that the suspect Kumchang-ri site and the missile test were a direct challenge to the Clinton administration which had applied diplomatic measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and warned that an unwillingness to challenge North Korea now with a deterrence policy would risk being confronted later by a qualitatively different North Korean military threat.

¹⁰ In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush announced that as part of its post-September 11 security agenda, the United States would seek to prevent terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda from establishing links with three regimes – North Korea, Iraq, and Iran – that together form an “axis of evil.” Bush declared that these regimes were intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with which to threaten the United States and its allies. Sceptics, including high-level officials in the Bush administration such as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, have little faith in the ultimate success of engagement. They do not deny that Pyongyang’s recent contacts with the outside world reflect a change in diplomatic tactics for the purpose of obtaining the food and economic aid that the regime needs to stay afloat. But, they argue there is nothing in North Korea’s behaviour (e.g., drawdowns in its threatening military posture) to suggest a deeper, more fundamental change in the regime’s intentions. Kim Jong-il still seeks to subvert liberal-democratic South Korea, and his country’s WMD threat, ballistic missiles, and forward-deployed forces represent the worst of his revisionist intent (Cha 2002: 41).

Even though all these explanatory factors should be considered in the context of a conciliatory process in inter-Korean relations, they are not enough to explain why both Presidents adopted different types of conciliatory gestures. Therefore, I suggest bringing a new factor, hope, to understand the different approaches to conciliation adopted by the two leaders. In addition, although many scholars in the field of peace psychology have repeatedly emphasised the importance of hope in creating an attitudinal platform to find a way out of the conflict (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut and Almog 2008; Halperin 2011) and hope is regarded as critical, especially in protracted ethnonational conflicts (Moeschberger et al. 2005; Halperin and Gross 2011; Cohen-Chen et al. 2017), inter-Korean relations have never been studied from this perspective. Of course, I am not merely saying that this new factor alone can provide a complete explanation. Still, this PhD thesis aims to investigate a new factor, *hope*, that has never been applied to explain these empirical cases and has never been explicitly theorised in IR.

Therefore, this thesis aims to develop the *theory of hope in conciliation*, which includes the ‘conceptualisation of hope’ (Chapter 2) and ‘the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures’ (Chapter 3). I conduct case studies to evaluate the theory against two South Korean conciliatory gestures towards North Korea: the *Sunshine Policy* (Chapter 5) and *Trustpolitik* (Chapter 6).

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organised into eight chapters, including the Introduction and Conclusion chapters. Chapters 1 – 3 provide theoretical frameworks, and the theory is tested against the selected empirical cases in Chapters 5 and 6.

Chapter 1 begins by examining how decision-makers respond to uncertainty and provides a theoretical background for investigating alternative responses: hope. This chapter explains uncertainty as an existential condition, focusing on the uncertainty regarding other states' intentions in international relations and elaborates on different theoretical approaches to how decision-makers respond to uncertainty about intentions: offensive realism, the rationalist approach, and what I call the affective interaction approach. Although these responses show different understandings of whether uncertainty can be alleviated, these approaches assume that uncertainty is always aversive or undesirable. I challenge the idea that decision-makers always perceive uncertainty as aversive, that they experience fear, and rationally react toward it by seeking new information or gaining more power. I argue that uncertainty is not always perceived as *aversive*, but can be perceived as *tolerable*. It is more than just meaning that uncertainty is not always perceived as negative, and more importantly, it also connotes the possibility that uncertainty can be accepted and tolerated by decision-makers. Considering this new dimension of uncertainty leads us to a different possibility to respond to it, and I argue that bringing explicitly "hope" into the debate helps us broaden our understanding of decision-makers' responses to uncertainty about intentions.

In order to bring *hope* into the discussion, Chapter 2 conceptualises it as an alternative response to uncertainty. In this chapter I conceptualise hope in three domains: (i) a particular time at which hope occurs, (ii) hope as a secondary emotion, and (iii) core elements of hope, and defines hope as "one of secondary emotions that arise when someone's goal is not yet achieved, including core components, desire and expectation." Based on the conceptualisation of hope, this chapter also addresses how to infer it. I infer hope from its representations in texts with four classes of signs: *explicit*, *implicit*, *cognitive* and *behavioural* signs, and this chapter explains each in turn. I mainly infer hope through the explicit expression hope and the proxies of desire and expectation, cognitive signs to reappraise situations in a way that the desired goal

can be achieved and behavioural signs of a potential energy that makes people move toward and approach to a goal.

Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework of how hope impacts the devising of conciliatory gestures in adversarial relationships, including two sections: *conciliatory gestures* and *after defection*. The chapter defines conciliatory gestures and suggests categorising them in terms of conditionality. Bringing hope into the debate, I argue that a decision-maker who experiences hope adopts *unconditional conciliatory gestures*. More importantly, all the extant theories argue that decision-makers should meet a defection with a defection, but I argue that the presence of hope leads to a different expectation of behaviour. In this sense, this chapter focuses on what happens *after defection* to examine how the presence of hope leads decision-makers to interpret and respond to defection in a different way than conventional accounts argue. Therefore, according to cognitive and behavioural aspects of hope, I develop four hypotheses on how hope can be expected to impact the interpretations and responses of decision-makers. These are (i) hope and careful interpretation, (ii) hope and selective focus, (iii) hope and keep pursuing conciliation and (iv) hope and responsiveness.

After developing theoretical frameworks of the role of hope in the conciliatory process, Chapter 4 articulates the approach and methodology I adopt in this PhD thesis: case study and elite interviews. In order to test the hypotheses, I conduct case studies of South Korean decision-makers formulating and implementing conciliatory gestures towards North Korea and analyse them by utilising process tracing. I select two South Korean conciliatory process toward North Korea, the *Sunshine Policy* and *Trustpolitik*, where we see different conciliatory gestures and presence/absence of hope on the part of two different state leaders. I use already-prepared text data, such as government documents and autobiographies, as well as collect data from conducting interviews. I conduct elite interviews as a method of triangulation and gather data to corroborate the early findings from documentary analysis. I also address the issues of

how I conduct interviews: semi-structured interviews, recruitment, and interview questions.

The remaining two chapters, Chapter 5 and 6, empirically examine the hypotheses developed in the theory chapters and compare two different conciliatory gestures. Chapter 5 addresses the *Sunshine Policy*, which is the conciliatory gesture adopted in the *presence* of hope; Chapter 6 addresses the *Trustpolitik*, which is the conciliatory gesture adopted in the *absence* of hope.

Chapter 5 empirically tests the hypotheses to understand the role of hope played in the course of devising the conciliatory gestures that constituted the Sunshine Policy. As I hypothesised a decision-maker who experiences *hope* adopts *unconditional* conciliatory gestures and *continues with* the conciliatory process even after defection(s), I expect to find evidence to support this in the chapter. This chapter is divided into three sections according to each factor: (1) unconditional conciliatory gestures – the Sunshine Policy, (2) the presence of hope, and (3) after defection. The chapter first illustrates the Sunshine Policy and its unconditional characteristics, and identifies how hope was *present* during Kim’s presidency. Finally, it scrutinises how Kim interpreted and responded to North Korea’s defection by examining four hypotheses: careful interpretation, selective focus on situational explanations, keep pursuing conciliation and responsiveness.

In contrast, Chapter 6 empirically tests the hypotheses regarding the absence of hope in the course of devising the conciliatory gestures that constituted the Trustpolitik. As I hypothesise a decision-maker who does *not experiences hope* adopts *conditional* conciliatory gestures and *gives up* conciliatory gestures after defection(s) and I expect to find evidence to support this in the chapter. This chapter is also divided into three sections according to each factor: (1) conditional conciliatory gestures – the Trustpolitik, (2) the absence of hope, and (3) after defections. This chapter first illustrates the Trustpolitik and its conditional characteristics, and identifies hope as being absent during Park’s presidency. Finally, it scrutinises how Park

interpreted and responded to North Korea's defection by examining four hypotheses: rushing to a conclusion about North Korea's intention, interpretation in terms of hostile intent, giving up conciliatory gestures and a lack of responsiveness.

The Conclusion outlines the main findings, contributions and limitations of this thesis, and proposes some avenues for future research. As I provided empirical evidence regarding the presence and absence of hope in the two empirical chapters, I summarise and highlight the main findings by comparing the two in the first section. Then, I discuss the contributions and limitations and suggest directions for future research.

Chapter 1. Responses to Uncertainty in IR

Introduction

This chapter examines how decision-makers respond to uncertainty in international conflict and provides a theoretical background for investigating an alternative response: hope. First, I explain uncertainty as an existential condition in IR focusing on the uncertainty regarding other states' intentions. In the second section, I elaborate on different theoretical approaches to how decision-makers respond to uncertainty about intentions: here, I discuss offensive realism, the rationalist approach, and what I call the affective interaction approach. Offensive realist theory argues that decision-makers have no choice but to assume the worst about other states' intentions and stick to the chronic fear of preparing for the worst situation of being attacked. Other rationalists are less quick to dismiss the possibility of alleviating uncertainty and argue that decision-makers manage uncertainty by gathering information. However, this rationalist argument is based solely on the assumption that beliefs are not sticky and not driven by deeply ingrained biased assumptions. Many other scholars claim that information gathering is not the only way that decision-makers are able to manage uncertainty, and they can respond with subjective certainty out of prepossessed assessments: enemy image, affective feeling of 'we-ness,' and social bonding through interpersonal interactions. In the final section, I illustrate how the existing literature has neglected hope as a response to uncertainty, and that hope has never been explicitly discussed and theorised in such a debate.

The Value of Understanding Uncertainty

Our world is so full of uncertainties that individuals cannot possibly process them all, which makes uncertainty an existential condition within our lives.¹¹ Individuals might face natural disasters, economic recessions, or unexpected results of presidential elections. Infrequent events are simply impossible to know in advance. Although uncertainty is a broad phenomenon, this research specifically focuses on the uncertainty in relation to others' intentions. In this section, I explain the security dilemma, one of the critical problems of uncertainty in International Relations (IR), and three related uncertainty problems.

Uncertainty about Intentions in International Relations

One of the most critical problems of the uncertainty about intentions in IR is the *security dilemma*. The security dilemma is traditionally defined as an unintended consequence that a state's attempts to increase one's security by accumulating more arms can be threatening to others and self-defeating. Each state takes defensive actions that the other considers offensive, resulting in an arms race and conflict that is neither expected nor desired (Jervis 1976: 66; 1978: 176). This is primarily because the states that possess military power operate in a self-help anarchic international system where the threat or use of force remains a salient feature of

¹¹ Building upon Hillen et al. (2017: 64), this PhD thesis distinguishes uncertainty from ambiguity. Uncertainty is the more fundamental psychological state constituting the ultimate referent of tolerance, and ambiguity represents not a psychological state but a subordinate phenomenon, a specific feature of information that produces uncertainty. This conceptualisation is consistent with the work of the decision theorist Ellsberg (1961), who specifically defined ambiguity as a feature of information – namely, its lack of reliability, credibility, or adequacy. And some theorists call the cases where assigning probabilities is impossible, 'hard' or 'fundamental' uncertainty (Knight 1971[1921]; Ellsberg 1961).

interaction and survival is the primary goal of powers (Waltz 1979: 111).

Many scholars argue that the security dilemma is not only about an anarchic system, and at its heart is the uncertainty about intentions that places decision makers in the security dilemma (Herz 1951; Montgomery 2006; Suh 2006; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Tang 2010; Holmes 2018; Baker 2019). For example, as Booth and Wheeler (2008: 4-5) elaborately pointed out, the security dilemma consists of the dual dilemmas of ‘interpretation’ and ‘response’ – a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others and a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding. Wheeler (2018: 76) explained these related but distinct dilemmas as follows, “these dilemmas confront decision-makers to decide whether another state’s actions – especially its military behaviour – signal that it has peaceful intentions, or whether it has aggressive intent.” If decision-makers resolve the dilemma of *interpreting* other’s intentions in favour of the view that they face a state with aggressive intent, then the dilemma of *response* does not arise. At this point, there is no security dilemma; rather, actors face a ‘strategic challenge’ (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 9). Likewise, at its heart is the uncertainty about intentions that places decision-makers in the security dilemma, and the uncertainty about intentions entails three problems that are aggravating the security dilemma.

Three Uncertainty Problems Aggravating the Security Dilemma

In the literature, we note that three uncertainty problems that aggravate the security dilemma: The Ambiguity of Weapons problem, the Other Minds problem, and the Future Uncertainty problem.¹² First, the security dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that most means of self-

¹² For example, Booth and Wheeler (2008: 4) clearly specify two apparent predicaments of the uncertainty

protection simultaneously menace others, which is called the '*ambiguous symbolism*' of weapons and their deployment (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 42-5). According to Jervis (1976: 62-67), in extreme cases, states that seek security may believe that the best, if not the only, route to that goal is to attack and expand. The drive for security will also produce aggressive actions if the state either requires a very high sense of security or feels menaced by the very presence of other strong states. Even in less extreme situations, arms procured to defend can usually be used to attack. As a result, the attempts to increase one's security by accumulating more arms can be threatening and self-defeating, which is an undesired effect on both sides. Therefore, it is almost impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, and this inherent ambiguity has been traditionally regarded as a primary problem that makes it harder to clearly discern other state's intentions.

Second, at the base of the uncertainty about intentions is the psychological phenomenon philosophers call the '*other minds problem*' (Hollis and Smith 1990). According to Hollis and Smith (1990: 171-3), the philosophical problem arises because we are inclined to regard each person as a separate individual with a private mind furnished with beliefs, desires, emotions, and experiences directly known only to its owner. Access to other minds then, has to be by inference. Inferences are partly from behaviour, as A reads B's feelings from B's words or deeds. Either way, there is a gap in that A infers from B's outward, public expressions and behaviours that may differ from B's inner and private state. Only B can truly know whether A's conclusions are correct since only B can access what A is referring to. The problem with this way of thinking is that there can never be an independent check on the inferences. It does not guarantee a match between separate inner experiences that even empathy cannot compare directly. Hence, the

aggravating the security dilemma, arguing that the security dilemma is fuelled by the 'Other Minds' problem and the inherent 'ambiguity of weapons.'

philosophical problem of '*other minds*' is how one mind can ever know what is in the mind of another.¹³

Third, and more far-reaching complications are created by the fact that no one knows what others *will* do. Even faced with the possibility of cooperating for obvious mutual gain, the uncertainty about the other's future intentions and actions still remains, which has been called the '*future uncertainty problem*'.¹⁴ Even though there may be a level of clarification as to one's current intention, it is still uncertain how the other will use its increased capabilities earned from mutual gain and states might feel fear lest they will be exploited and defected (Jervis 1978). In other words, although the other state may be believed to have a peaceful intent at present, the incentive to defect or the possibility the intention could be change in the future makes international relations still uncertain (Jervis 1976; 1978: 168). In addition, Copeland explained that states always 'have reason to worry that [a state] might change its spots come years later as a result of a change of leadership, a revolution or simply a change of heart resulting from an increase in its power (Copeland 2000: 200).' Even when a state leader can know about other's motives and they have benign intentions, it does not even guarantee moral goodness or any clue to predict their foreign policies (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]: 5-6). The problem of uncertainty about future intentions compels states to maximize their power so as to hedge against the worst (Herz 1959: 235).

As illustrated, the uncertainty about intentions holds these three uncertainty problems,

¹³ Some scholars argue that there is a way to overcome the *Other Minds problem* and decision-makers can accurately interpret the current intention of an adversarial state through a certain kind of diplomacy, such as face-to-face interaction, and escape the current uncertainty (See Holmes 2018: 241). The key point here is Holmes is arguing that the mirror neuron system allows simulation of intentions rather than approximation. I will discuss it later in this chapter.

¹⁴ See Booth and Wheeler 2008: 40; Wheeler 2018: 88-91.

which aggravate the security dilemma and make uncertainty an existential condition in IR. In the next section, I elaborate on the existing debate on different approaches to respond to the uncertainty about intentions.

Responses to Uncertainty about Intentions

In this section, I engage with the theoretical background of different responses to uncertainty about intentions, focusing on decision-makers. Admittedly, the uncertainty about intentions in IR operates at multiple levels. It operates not only between individuals but also between states. Even when we analyse the intentions of decision-makers, it is not enough to say that the uncertainty of the intention is solely interpersonal because the decision-makers are representing their states while making decisions. Also, the uncertainty decision-makers perceive is not merely about the other state leader's inner mind but more about the final decision made by the representative of the other state. As Keys and Yorke argued, individual and collective emotional responses operate simultaneously in the international realm, and decision-makers process the emotional responses at a personal level, and the mediation of emotions through their bodies affects the interpretation and evaluation of emotions on behalf of the collective they represent (Keys and Yorke 2019: 1238). Therefore, drawing on many scholars (Yarhi-Milo 2014; Mercer 2014; Wheeler 2018; Keys and Yorke 2019; cf. Sasley 2011; Hall 2015), I focus on individuals to investigate different responses to uncertainty. Next, I discuss three different approaches to how decision-makers respond to uncertainty about intentions: offensive realism, the rationalist approach and what I call the affective interaction approach.

Offensive Realism: Assuming uncertainty as immutable and fear is inevitable

For offensive realists, uncertainty is immutable and can never be overcome, so decision-makers

have no choice but to assume the worst about other states' intentions. As Mearsheimer argued, "Intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty" (Mearsheimer 2001: 31). This is because the international system compels all actors to provide for their own security; decision-makers cannot rely on the internal characteristics of other states as an adequate source of information (Montgomery 2006: 155). This does not mean that offensive realists never admit that benign intent to cooperate can exist, and they do agree that all states may be 'reliably benign' (Mearsheimer 2001). Rather, what they maintain is that it is almost impossible to discern other states' types or intentions, even though states might have benign intent. Therefore, as Edelstein argued, offensive realists insist that even if cooperation induces benign intentions, states will rarely know if cooperation has succeeded since reliable indicators are hard to come by, and intentions can always change for the worse (Edelstein 2002:14).

According to this approach, and given that it is almost impossible to be certain about other state's intentions, decision-makers have no choice but to assume the worst about other states' intentions and to prepare for the worst situation that other state's decision-makers have malign intent to attack (Herz 1959: 235; Waltz 1979:91-92; Copeland 2000: 15; Mearsheimer 2001: 31-32; Rosato 2021).¹⁵ They argue that it is always wise and safe to prepare for the worst situation in which a state would be defected and attacked. In this sense, many offensive realists treat uncertainty as *fear* and fear is perceived as a spontaneous response towards uncertainty (Butterfield 1951: 00; Herz 1951; Tang 2009: 594; Rathbun 2006). According to Herz, 'fear leads humans to seek the physical power to protect themselves; this increase in power for self-protection also increases the power to harm others, and so these other groups feel a growing sense of danger' (Herz 1951: 3). This creates 'a mutual suspicion and a mutual dilemma: the dilemma of 'kill or perish', of attacking first or running the risk of being destroyed. According

¹⁵ For example, Herz wrote, 'how could [decision-makers] then, afford not to be prepared for "the worst"?'

to this approach, although the level of fear varies across time and space, it can never be reduced to a trivial level and seeking as much power as they can, which is fostered by fear, is the most ‘sensible and safe’ strategy (Mearsheimer 2001: 32). Therefore, it is difficult for international cooperation in the anarchic society to overcome the predicament of ‘kill or perish,’ and it is always wise to prepare for the worst situation (Herz 1959: 235; Mearsheimer 2001).

Likewise, this theory argues that because actors are unable to know other states’ intentions and result in the necessity of the worst-case assumption, they are conditioned to remain fearful (Butterfield 1951; Herz 1951; Tang 2009: 594; Rathbun 2006). Butterfield called this *chronic fear* in the international realm ‘Hobbesian Fear’ and explained that it is the dominion of fear, not the insatiable lust of humans for power (Butterfield 1960: 85). Specifically, Butterfield explained that the fear exacerbated by the fact that ‘you cannot enter into the other’s counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous (Butterfield 1951: 21).’ He added, ‘it is never possible for you to realise or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have (Butterfield 1951: 21).’ More importantly, this fear is based on the fact that humans have the capacity to inflict pain and death on each other (Herz 1951: 3), and states also always possess some military power capable of harming others (Mearsheimer 2006: 234).¹⁶ So, to recap, offensive realists argue uncertainty can never be delible in IR, so decision-

¹⁶ Interestingly, many psychology studies also support this, arguing that fear often overrules other emotions in a stressful situation, such as uncertainty or threat (Antonovsky 1979; Jacoby and Keinan 2003). This is because fear is a primary negative emotion that is activated spontaneously, automatically and on a low level of the nervous system (Damasio 2003; 2004). There are some studies to mention about positive effects of fear (Bantinaki 2012; Tannenbaum et al. 2015), but fear is basically categorised as a “primary emotion,” or “negative emotion” by psychologists regardless of its positive effect.

makers must remain in chronic fear and prepare for the worst.

Rationalist Approach: Reducing uncertainty via information gathering

Other rationalists, however, do not so quickly dismiss the possibility of alleviating uncertainty and argue rather that uncertainty can be reduced to some extent by information gathering. For example, *Uncertainty Reduction Theory* argues that high levels of uncertainty will result in information seeking, and as communication increases, the level of uncertainty decreases. Overall, the theory suggests that when individuals, groups, or organisations experience uncertainty, they are motivated or driven to seek information to reduce uncertainty (Berger and Calabrese 1975). Uncertainty can lead to an exploratory stance in which people are willing to consider and incorporate new information in order to improve their predictive ability. Often, information exploration may be the most adaptive strategy, as one potential cause of uncertainty is a mismatch between current knowledge and epistemic goals to understand the social context and predict future outcomes (Kruglanski 1990; Trope and Liberman, 1996; Peterson and Flanders 2002). These studies can explain why states try to discover and care about other state's sincere intention.

Assuming that not every state has the same intention or type – benign / malignant (Jervis 1978), security-seeking / greedy (Glaser 1997), trustworthy / untrustworthy (Kydd 2005), rationalists argue that when faced with uncertainty, decision-makers seek to approximate other states' intentions by behaving rationally given their beliefs and changing such beliefs rationally in response to new information: these theories can be grouped under two broad headings, defensive realism and calculative trust.

Defensive realists maintain that if decision-makers can discern other's benign intentions through offense-defence differentiation indicators, then cooperation may be possible even

among adversaries (Jervis 1978; Lynn-Jones 1995; Glaser and Kaufman 1998; Van Evera 1998; Glaser 2010). From the defensive realist approach, decision-makers still feel insecure and respond with fear even when cooperation is clearly the best choice for both. In other words, even when decision-makers interpret another state to have benign intent and incentives to cooperate, fear can still exist.¹⁷ Decision-makers, even when faced with the possibility of cooperating for certain current mutual gain, might feel fear lest they will be exploited and defected in the future, as they do not know how the other will use its increased capabilities earned from mutual gain and the assurance about intention is difficult (Jervis 1978). This is because the other side might not clearly understand the situation, or might not be able to control their impulses when they have a chance to get a smaller but immediate gain, or might fear that some other member of the group is unreliable. Therefore, the incentives to defect must also be considered, even if the other state now undoubtedly has a peaceful intent (Jervis 1976; 1978: 168).

According to this theory, decision-makers feel fearful lest they become too dependent on others through cooperative endeavours and exchanges of goods and services. Accordingly, decision-makers do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. The high interdependence of states means that the states are subject to the common vulnerability that high interdependence entails. This makes a decision-maker afraid that the other may use its increased capabilities to damage their state. While people in a formally organised system with a highly articulated division of labour – such as a domestic system – have no reason to

¹⁷ Jervis (1978: 168) explains this by elaborating Rousseau's "Stag Hunt." For example, if two people cooperate to trap the stag, they will all eat well. But if one person defects to chase a rabbit – which he likes less than a stag – none of the others will get anything. In this situation, thus, all actors have the same preference order, and there is a solution that gives each their first choice: (1) cooperate and trap the stag (2) chase a rabbit while others remain at their posts, (3) all chase rabbits, and (4) stay at the original position while another chases a rabbit.

fear the increased interdependence that goes with specialisation, states under anarchy seek to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency (Waltz 1979: 105 - 107). Put differently, as mentioned in the previous section, the future uncertainty problem remains in defensive realist theory and this exacerbates the decision-makers' fear.¹⁸ Therefore, even though defensive realists respond to uncertainty about intention by gathering information and do not take the worst-case assumption granted (Tang 2008: 456), decision-makers still remain in constant fear for these reasons.

From another rationalist perspective, decision-makers do not necessarily remain in fear, but believe that trust can be developed by behaving rationally and updating new information, which is called *calculative trust* in Wheeler's term (2018: 4-5). Kydd argues that trust can be built through the process of information change reassurance, although decision-makers in anarchy may experience fear when they face threats to their survival so security becomes an important goal (Kydd 2005: 18-19).¹⁹ According to this model, although the generation of fear and mistrust between untrustworthy actors is not surprising, trustworthy states can also come to mistrust each other. When decision-makers face a trustworthy state but misjudge the other's benign intent as malign and have misplaced fear, they try to look at all the information they

¹⁸ For defensive realist approach, the question is whether the preferences change from assurance game to prisoners dilemma (See Wheeler 2018: 109-114).

¹⁹ Kydd develops the Reassurance Game. "The Reassurance Game builds on the Security Dilemma Game but has two rounds. This enables cooperative gestures to be made in the first round that may change the beliefs about each other, possibly building trust and enabling further cooperation in the second round. In each round, the players choose to cooperate or defect, not knowing what the other side has chosen to do in that round. In the second round, though, they know what the other side did in the first round, so they can take that into account in deciding what to do next" (Kydd 2005: 188). In this model, he claims that fear is not necessarily fuelled by structure and he says that of the conflicts we observe, a relatively small percentage will be driven by mistaken fear/mistrust. If we see a conflict, it is more likely to have arisen because one or more of the parties is untrustworthy (Kydd 2005: 19).

have available to seek to approximate those intentions of others. Kydd explains that it is done by behaving rationally and changing their beliefs rationally in response to new information, and decision-makers can finally trust the other side (Kydd 2005: 184).

Importantly, Kydd does not assume that decision-makers know each other's motivations perfectly or find them out easily, nor can one implicitly ask if a state is aggressive or not. There are many obstacles in the way of rational learning about the motivations of other states. But finally, although the learning process is noisy and prone to errors of all kinds, beliefs over time and on average are more likely to converge towards reality than to diverge from it. This implies that if a state is trustworthy, other states are more likely to eventually discover this rather than remain in fear and convinced that it is aggressive. This is because, from this perspective, there are tremendous incentives to get it right if the other side is truly trustworthy. In other words, mistaken fear driven by mistaken beliefs may arise between states, but over time, they are more likely to be corrected than to remain or be further exaggerated (Kydd 2005: 18-19).

However, Kydd's defensive realist argument based solely on the assumption that beliefs are not driven by deeply ingrained biased assumptions and ignores that uncertainty can be overcome not only by information gathering (Wheeler 2018: 109-113). According to the findings of Balcetis and Dunning, when individuals are processing incoming information, pre-existing beliefs tend to have a larger weight and thus influence the acceptance of the information (Balcetis and Dunning 2006: 612). Information that contradicts or is different from prior beliefs is likely to be disregarded as unreliable or unimportant. This prepossessed assessment is a form of what psychologists call 'confirmation bias' or 'psychological bias', which consists of cognitive, affective, and behavioural tendencies that are sticky and last to the extent that they inhibit rational learning (Kahneman and Tversky 1972; 1982; Jervis 1976; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Tetlock 1998; Nickerson 1998). In this sense, depending on the specific

context, the same individuals may exhibit varied responses to uncertainty, and uncertainty does not necessarily lead to information exploration, but rather, lead them to respond in a subjective way. I will discuss such an approach in the next section, which I call the affective interaction approach.

Affective Interaction Approach: Managing uncertainty through affect

Unlike rationalist approach, information gathering is not the only way that decision-makers can manage uncertainty. Information can even increase uncertainty rather than reduce it when the information is unexpected, and limited uncertainty can even be positive in relationships (Kramer 1999: 306). Some IR scholars also agree that uncertainty does not always lead to seeking information. For example, according to Mitzen, the first response to uncertainty is not necessarily an ‘information search’ but a reduction of psychological stress if humans need to make sense of the world when faced with an uncertain world (2006: 348-9). The subjective psychological strategy of managing uncertainty could be exerted in either a negative or positive way; decision-makers could hold enemy images, or they might have feelings of ‘we-ness’ toward the adversary state. Decision-makers can also develop trust through interpersonal social bonding, and not necessarily by gathering calculative information.

Considering the context of adversarial relationships, the possibility should be seriously considered that decision-makers respond with prepossessed assessments of the adversary operating. It is when an ‘enemy image’ (Wheeler 2018)²⁰ or ‘inherent bad faith model’ (Holsti

²⁰ Even though Kydd (2005) argued this barrier can be overcome through iterated information exchanges, if the receiver of the reassurance signal does not interpret it as a costly signal for these reasons, trust is hard to be built between the two states through reassurance.

1962)²¹ is in operation. In other words, decision-makers can try to overcome uncertainty by judging the other side based on the inherent characteristics of the adversary state. They attribute malevolence to the other side based on the character and values of the adversary. For instance, when two states are in adversarial relationships and decision-makers hold ‘enemy images’ of an adversary, it is even more difficult to interpret the other’s behaviours as a benign intent and develop trust. Even if signals are costly or risky enough for a sending state to help the recipient believe its sincerity and “signals appear as though they would be hard to fake, decision-makers that are operation with an enemy image will still interpret such actions in ways that confirm and reinforce their enemy image” (Wheeler 2018: 113).

This way of thinking is also called ‘Ideological fundamentalism,’ which is defined as a ‘syndrome that assigns enemy status because of what the other is’ (Wheeler and Booth 1987: 331; Booth 1978: 42-3; Booth and Wheeler 2008: 65; Wheeler 2018: 93-6). Similarly, from the perspective of Waltz’s second image,²² one can look to the states themselves since war is in the name of the state that the fighting is actually done, and the internal organisation of states is the

²¹ The ‘inherent bad faith model’ come from Holsti (1962)’s content analysis of Dulles’s speeches. According to Holsti (1962), this idea originated from one of the key documents by the US National Security Council in 1950: NSC-68. The document identified the Soviet Union as being ‘animated by a new fanatic faith – anti-thetical to our own, and [seeking] to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.’ The drafter of NSC-68 argued that for the Soviet Union the ‘United States, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design (NSC 1950)’. The document did not identify particular actions by the Kremlin as threatening the United States; rather, the very character of the Soviet state was seen as constituting a fundamental and enduring challenge to everything it stood for (Kissinger 1960: 194, Finley et al. 1967: 26, Booth and Wheeler 2008: 65-6, Wheeler 2018: 93-6).

²² Waltz classified theories of the causes of war into three categories: man, the state, and international system. His second image, ‘the state’ was introduced to explain the causes of war since human nature is fixed and permanent, better to examine the institutions that man has created to discover the source of the issue (Waltz 1959).

key to understanding international affairs (Waltz 2018 [1959]: 81). These arguments can be explained by the image theory (Hermann and Fischerkeller 1995), offering a yardstick for assessing perceptions of others. Negative history adds another layer of prepossessed assessment, which in addition to the uncertainty in intentions that causes a security dilemma in international relations, further complicates efforts to repair relations between adversaries (Herz 1950: 157; Glaser 1997: 171). From this perspective, ‘bad states’ may make war (Waltz 2018 [1959]: 114), and ‘bad states’ necessarily make other states’ decision-makers respond to uncertainty with deeply ingrained biased assumptions of the other state and by virtue of certain inherent characteristics such as its hostile political identity, basic values or history.

On the other hand, some scholars who have advanced a social constructivist approach in IR argue that decision-makers respond to uncertainty about intentions by having a feeling of ‘we-ness’ and blurring the self/other distinction. Wendt argued that “new security practices that promote cooperation depend on a new collective identity in which the ‘Self-Other’ distinction becomes blurred [as] ... the boundaries of the Self [extend] to ... define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self” (Wendt 1999: 299).²³ Hagström and Bremberg also suggested selflessness and empathy as a possible alternative means for transcending the security dilemma

²³ Some scholars have referred to collective identity in terms of a community (Wendt 1994: 384), or ‘we-ness’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 7-8) and others express the hope that it could generate peaceful relations between states (Berenskoetter 2010). In this sense, numerous studies in political science and social psychology have suggested, as a way to overcome conflict, a promotion of universalism that covers over existing identities (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). cf. For the opposite argument, Chung argues that rather than strengthening a sense of “we-ness,” offering group affirmation and making each national identity salient can boost international trust. It is consistent with the intuition that people with a secure sense of their identity are more able to deal with others in a calm, collected, and objective way (Chung 2015).

because the self's ontological dependence on the other per se is at the heart of the security dilemma understood as a social construct (Hagström and Bremberg 2022: 270). A feeling of 'we-ness' is generally accepted as a mode of being that connects us to others and promotes intersubjective relations, enabling the individual subject to move beyond the limits of their own knowledge (Hemmings 2011: 199). It can also be developed even in the context of adversarial relationships. This is because, according to numerous studies in political science and social psychology, this could be on the basis of diverse ways of a super-ordinate identity based on cosmopolitan values (Nussbaum 1994; Held 2003; Mazzini et al. 2009); a sense of "we-ness" in a common in-group (Gaertner and Dovidio 1993); integration that submerges sub-categories through individual contact (Allport 1954); a neo-functionalist spillover (Haas 1958; Rosamond 2000); strategies of assimilation (Waldron 2002; Barry 2002); supranational regionalism (Bache et al. 2011); or the homogenising effects of globalisation (Ohmae 1995).²⁴ Therefore, decision-makers can respond to uncertainty about other states' intentions through "a process that involves a temporary letting go of the self in order to inhabit or share the feeling world of the other" (Yeomans 2016: 75) even in an adversarial relationship.

Along these lines, interpersonal trust theory suggests that decision-makers can respond to uncertainty about intentions with trust developed out of a feeling of 'we-ness,' in the specific form of social bonding. Wheeler (2018) develops a trust-based theory of signal interpretation suggesting that individuals who have developed a strong bond no longer view each other in terms of risk calculation regarding the other's intentions. This is known as 'trust as suspension' (Mollering 2001) and a bond of this kind emerges out of a process of interpersonal interaction that leads to a transformation of identities between self and other. It is argued that the calculative element disappears when a process of bonding leads to identity transformation – what Wheeler calls 'a relationship of bonded trust'. Through a bonding process of this kind,

²⁴ Cited in Chung (2015: 80-83).

two actors in face-to-face interaction come to both positively identify with the interests of the other and recognise the humanity in the other. If this process of identity transformation reaches a certain point, both actors suspend risk calculation in relation to the intent and integrity of the other and develop trust as suspension. Thus, social bonds are critical because they push decision-makers toward suspension of risk calculation and develop interpersonal trust.²⁵

Challenging rationalist theorising in IR, *interpersonal trust theory* explains that a relationship of trust between two state leaders enables them to accurately interpret each other's signals of peaceful intent. In other words, two state leaders who inhabit a mental state of trust as suspension in relation to each other's trustworthiness have intersubjectively escaped the uncertainty about intentions. This is because they now each have a subjective certainty that each other's signals are sincerely aimed at communicating their peaceful intent through the modality of face-to-face interaction at the highest levels of diplomacy (Wheeler 2018; Holmes 2018; Wheeler and Holmes 2020; Holmes and Wheeler 2020; Wheeler and Holmes 2021). According to this theory, betrayal and disappointment are possible. They can be wrong, and obviously, they are not escaping uncertainty in some fundamental way. However, the actors themselves temporarily escape from such uncertainty when there is trust. By doing so, the interpersonal trust theory provides an alternative explanation of a response to uncertainty about intentions.

²⁵ And for the social bond to be developed, exercising empathy, specifically security dilemma sensibility, is a key precondition for the process of social bonding (Wheeler 2018: 8). In addition, according to the model of diplomatic social bonding (Holmes and Wheeler 2020), a positive social bond can be generated when the four ritual ingredients, which are bodily co-presence, barriers to outsiders, the mutual focus of attention and shared mood, are present in an interaction. This is critically based on the assumption that personal relationship and interaction need to be distinguished. According to them, all relationships are forms of interactions, but not all interactions reach the level of sociality and interdependence required for a relationship (Holmes and Wheeler 2020: 135).

From this perspective, face-to-face interaction is an important route to have subjective certainty about other intentions (Wheeler 2013, 2018; Holmes 2013, 2018; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Wong 2016; Holmes and Yarhi-Milo 2017). This is because face-to-face interaction provides a critical mechanism by which a decision-maker can gain information about the trustworthiness of their counterparts²⁶ and a capacity to understand other states' intentions. Unlike the rationalist approach, however, interpersonal trust theory explains that the information here is not based on past and present overt material behaviour such as the reduction or removal of military forces; rather, leaders draw on 'vivid indicators' (Yarhi-Milo 2014: 101; Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012) or 'indices' (Jervis 1989: 18), such as facial expressions, body languages, and other expressive behaviours in order to infer the other's trustworthiness (Wheeler 2018).²⁷ This information is unintentionally delivered and difficult to manipulate. A face-to-face meeting can allow individuals to transmit the information crucially and read the signals that are unintentionally 'give(n) off' (Goffman 1959) and empathise with each other, and this type of empathising process is quick and intuitional (Holmes 2013: 856). What is more, although these signals might be costless, they are often privileged over other sources of information about an actor's intention (Yarhi-Milo 2014; Wheeler 2018). Drawing on the growing body of work at the intersection of psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience, Holmes

²⁶ For example, Wheeler (2018) suggested the mechanism of face-to-face interaction as a very important way of testing out the intuition as to another's trustworthiness. The intuition that another has peaceful intent and is potentially trustworthy has to be put to the test through face-to-face interaction, as what state leaders are seeking in such encounters is an index of the other's trustworthiness. Therefore, through a face-to-face meeting, interpersonal trust tends to be established, and interpersonal relationships between decision-makers can create bonded trust that helps decision-makers accurately interpret the other's signals of peaceful intent as sincere.

²⁷ An index is a signal of inherent credibility as to another's trustworthiness because it is a signal that is not easy to manipulate (Jervis 1989; 2002; 2017: 113).

also supported this by arguing that face-to-face meetings allow individuals to actively simulate the specific intentions of others and individuals know the intentions of others by automatically simulating what we would be thinking and intending if we were in the position of the other (Holmes 2018: 241). The empathising process is supported by discrete architecture and mechanisms in the brain that are devoted to parsing others' intentions via cues that exist only in face-to-face interaction. This brain architecture, referred to broadly as the 'mirroring system', enables advanced neural synchronisation between individuals, which in turn enables actors to directly access the intentions of others with a higher degree of certainty than economic or game-theoretic models of bargaining predict. Through the mirroring system in the brain, individuals can actively simulate the mental and emotional states of others, and replicate for themselves what is occurring in the other's brain. The mirroring system is highly nuanced and able to pick up on micro-changes in facial expressions and realise subtle shifts in the emotional states of others, which conveys their level of sincerity. It has also been shown to play a role in detecting deceptive intentions. The human brain comes equipped with resources to help individuals detect when they are being lied to, a skill that improves greatly in face-to-face interactions because of the wealth and richness of information being transmitted. Put simply, in face-to-face interactions, the mirroring system increases the prospects for understanding intentions. Even though it is not able to subject this specific claim to testing in the context of actual face-to-face diplomacy, Holmes' argument is that this unobservable causal mechanism provides an important explanation of why face-to-face diplomacy is such an effective way of understanding the intentions of one's diplomatic interlocutors (Holmes 2018).

Holmes proposes that decision-makers can eliminate and overcome uncertainty about intentions through face-to-face interaction. He argues that 'there are moments in time when uncertainty *is* resolved, where decision-makers *are* aware of the intentions of others, they have certainty in that feeling, and *there is good reason for them to be certain*: because they are right.

Put another way, the synchronic (not diachronic) security dilemma at the interpersonal level *can be escaped*' (Holmes 2018: 242, 244, emphasis in original). According to Holmes, a face-to-face interaction plays a role as one of the fundamental solutions to the 'Other Minds problem,' although 'Future Uncertainty problem' still exists. Holmes challenges the idea that face-to-face diplomacy is only cheap talk, arguing that the argument is rooted in an important assumption about the nature of human interaction that we cannot gain access to the private information that exists in other people's minds. However, if this assumption is wrong, and there are times when we have sophisticated, precise, and reliable access to the minds of others, then this severely undercuts the problem of intentions that is at heart, more broadly, the security dilemma itself (Holmes 2018: 241). Therefore, for Holmes, face-to-face interaction represents a unique signalling mechanism that allows decision-makers to escape the problem of intentions and empathise with each other, and thus overcome the security dilemma, by communicating their intentions to each other with a very high degree of specificity. He argues that rather than approximating or theorising the intentions of others through behaviour interpretation or observations from the outside, which is the dominant perspective taken by other approaches to the problem of the intention in IR theory, face-to-face diplomacy provides a mechanism by which individuals can understand each other's intentions from the inside.

To sum up, here I examined three key approaches on how decision-makers can respond to uncertainty: i) maximising power driven by fear, ii) gathering information, and iii) pursuing interpersonal interaction. The offensive realist approach treats uncertainty as inevitable, so decision-makers do not have a choice but to assume the worst and remain fearful. However, many scholars open up spaces for a different possibility rather than a chronic fear as a response to uncertainty, and alternatives to offensive realism are generally more sanguine about uncertainty. From the rationalist approach, uncertainty can be alleviated by gathering information, and some interpersonal approaches argue that there is a moment when uncertainty

can be completely escaped. In between, many scholars reveal an aspiration to transcend uncertainty.²⁸ The existing debates clearly show that the three responses differ in whether the approaches regard uncertainty as inevitable. However, the debates have not yet explicitly theorised hope as a psychological strategy for managing uncertainty. In the next section, I will elaborate on *the absence of a discussion on hope* in existing debates and *aversive uncertainty assumption* on which the existing debates depend.

Hope is Missing: Assuming aversive uncertainty in IR

The Absence of a Discussion on Hope in Existing IR Debates

As shown in the IR debates above, hope is not explicitly theorised. For offensive realists, there is no room for hoping for peace between states. According to this theory, fear can never be reduced to a trivial level, and hope is dismissed as a lack of vigilance in that it might impede decision-makers from seeking as much power as they can, which is the most ‘sensible and safe’ strategy (Mearsheimer 2001: 32). In other words, the worst-case assumption over others’ intentions is the unique logic of offensive realists (Tang 2008). Tang stated that “fundamentally, non-offensive realism theories are united against the offensive realism position that states are inherently aggressive, and *they merely differ on how best to cope with uncertainty and fear* (Tang 2008: 464, emphasis in original).” In other words, even though offensive realists admit that states could have benign intent, what they argue is that it is risky and foolish to hope for

²⁸ Building upon Booth and Wheeler’s important clarification between escaping and transcending, many scholars agree that although uncertainty cannot be *escaped* in that it is an existential condition, its pernicious consequences in international politics can be *transcended* (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 172; Holmes 2018; Hagström and Bremberg 2022).

the other's benign intent because 'intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty (Mearsheimer 2001: 31, Rosato 2022).' Moreover, some states with benign intent might even believe they can only be secure if others are insecure, making the act of showing their sincere benign intent much more difficult. This implies the benign intent in IR might denote weakness and leave the state vulnerable to exploitation and betrayal.

Other non-offensive realism theories rejecting the worst-case assumption also do not consider hope. According to Tang, the non-offensive realism theories reject the worst-case assumption for many reasons (2008: 456-457). For example, this is because assuming the worst over others' intentions is self-defeating (Jervis 1976: 64-65²⁹; Betts 1978: 74; Wheeler and Booth 1992: 40; Glaser 1997: 197-198), and because society would be impossible if people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case possibilities (Wendt 1992: 404), and because they reject the logic of preventive war.³⁰ And the non-offensive realism theories might want to transcend the fear and move beyond it. Decision-makers might be able to respond to uncertainty

²⁹ Jervis (1976: 64-65) recognises the danger of assuming the worst over others' intentions, identifying the assumption as a major factor that exacerbates the security dilemma.

³⁰ Preventive war is war that is mostly propelled by one's fear that it is better to fight now than at later because one's capabilities are now in relative decline versus one's potential opponents. States must expand and attack whenever an opportunity arises because all states are inherently aggressive (Levy 1987; Copeland 2000; Boesche 2003; Mearsheimer 2001: 34-35). According to Tang (2008), there are two reasons why non-offensive realism rejects the logic of preventive war. First, is because launching a preventive war, without providing conclusive evidence that another state is going to attack imminently, carries heavy diplomatic costs. A state that does so will not be able to gain allies in the future because other states will deem the state as not only fundamentally unreliable as an ally but also inherently threatening (Lebow 1984; Reiter 1995: 25-28, 33). Second, defence usually holds an advantage over offence. It is better for a state to defend than to attack for the sake of its security (Snyder 1985: 158; Van Evera 1999).

by correcting misplaced fear through exchanging information (Kydd 2005), sharing identity (Wendt 1994), or engaging in social interactions (Wheeler 2018; Holmes 2018),³¹ but they do not mention any hope in the debate.

At the other end of the extreme, some IR scholars argue that the problem of the security dilemma or the uncertainty over other's intention can even be *completely* resolved. As discussed earlier, Holmes argued that there are moments in time when uncertainty *is* resolved and the (only) synchronic security dilemma at the interpersonal level *can be* escaped (Holmes 2018: 242 - 244). For Holmes, the security dilemma is less of a problem than IR theory takes it to be. Drawing on the mirroring system theory in social neuroscience, he argues there is also good reason to be optimistic about the ability of new technologies to tell us a great deal more about the inner-workings of social and political interactions (Holmes 2018: 241, 259). Hagström and Bremberg suggest selflessness and empathy as possible alternative means for transcending the security dilemma (Hagström and Bremberg 2022). They argue that the security dilemma *can be transformed* into different phases by suggesting that social change does not necessarily require a fundamental break with current conditions; rather, the change can be built incrementally. However, even in the 'seemingly full of hope' debate, hope has never been theorised.

The aversive uncertainty assumption can explain the lack of focus on hope

I argue that the absence of a discussion of hope comes from 'aversive uncertainty assumption' in the existing literature. Although the approaches discussed above show different

³¹ Of course, these are not exclusive to each other and can sometimes happen at the same time. For example, Wheeler (2018) argues that bonded trust can emerge out of social interactions and lead to a transformation of identities between self and other. It helps decision-makers interpret accurately sincere signals of peaceful intent.

understandings of whether uncertainty can be alleviated, they assume that uncertainty is perceived as aversive. Many IR scholars consider uncertainty an aversive situation in that it implies a low level of predictive ability, which might make people risky and vulnerable. In this sense, realists define uncertainty as fear, rationalists as ignorance and cognitivists as confusion (Rathbun 2007).

Beyond IR literature, large bodies from other disciplines also assume uncertainty as aversive, as uncertainty provokes fear, worry and anxiety, perceptions of vulnerability, identity insecurity, and avoidance of decision-making (Hillen et al. 2017: 63). The anxiety/uncertainty management theory even argues that uncertainty is both a cognitive and affective problem (Ball-Rokeach 1973; Gudykunst and Nishida 2001). Accordingly, the existing studies maintain that uncertainty often drives one to seek information, and it may be the most rational and adaptive strategy to overcome and avoid uncertainty (Berger and Calabrese 1975; Kruglanski 1990; Trope and Liberman 1996; Peterson and Flanders 2002). Faced with uncertainty, actors will assign probabilities and maximise their expected utility. They then update probabilities by adjusting their initial beliefs about the relative plausibility of an event in light of new evidence, making optimal use of all available information (Morrow 1994). This model has the demanding preconditions that actors must know, at least probabilistically, the alternative courses of action, the causal relationship between action and outcomes, and the consequences of possible outcomes (March 1999: 14-15; Morrow 1994). Humans need to make sense of their world, and when there is insufficient information or meanings that are unsettled, individuals suffer anxiety and results in avoidance.

However, uncertainty can be markedly uneven in how it is experienced, perceived, and responded to (Booth and Wheeler 2022). Depending on the specific context, the same individuals may exhibit varied responses to uncertainty. One reason is that individuals have different levels of *tolerance for uncertainty* (Kellerman and Reynold 1990; Durrheim and

Foster 1997).³² For example, Kellerman and Reynold tested and rejected the idea that the level of uncertainty always causes information seeking and showed uncertainty and information seeking was consistently unrelated in the context of interpersonal communication (1990: 50). Rather, they maintained that *tolerance for uncertainty* had a consistent negative relationship with information seeking. These results suggest that it is not whether people *can* predict and explain others' behaviour but whether they *want* to do so that determines the extent to which they will seek information about others (Kellerman and Reynold 1990: 54). In other words, in the face of uncertainty, there are variations between people that one might want to avoid but the other can tolerate. Some people can even desire uncertainty (Baxter and Montgomery 1996). In this sense, uncertainty may be intolerable for some individuals but be of no concern or positive for others (Kramer 1999: 307).³³ In order to act, therefore, individuals need to bring uncertainty within their own tolerable limits (Mitzen 2006: 346). Shortly, this capacity to tolerate uncertainty is independent of the objective level of uncertainty, which might remain high. Rather, the perception of uncertainty is an internal and subjective property, so it should be considered when investigating the individual's different responses to uncertainty.

Interpersonal trust theory does not see uncertainty as always negative. However, as a response to uncertainty about intentions, a relationship of trust aims to alleviate uncertainty

³² Building upon Berger (1979), they refer to "tolerance for uncertainty" as "person's concern for uncertainty reduction." Berger (1979) separated one's uncertainty level from one's concern for its reduction and identified three antecedents of heightened concern for uncertainty reduction: anticipation of future interaction, deviance, and incentive value.


³³ For example, according to Eisenberg (1984), uncertainty is usually tolerable when people have multiple, often conflicting, goals or motives that they must balance rather than maximising any particular one. Individuals might have goals to communicate cooperatively, to maintain coherence, and to protect their own and their partner's face and so on (O'Keefe & Shepherd 1987).

about intentions in that it enables decision-makers to accurately interpret each other's signals of peaceful intent and have subjective certainty. In a similar sense, face-to-face modality is also an important route to gauge other's intentions as a mechanism by which individuals can understand each other's intentions, and it is even argued to completely overcome uncertainty. In other words, this perspective focuses on 'accurately interpreting other's intentions' and seeks to minimise and avoid uncertainty. But, considering the *tolerance for uncertainty* discussed above, it is more than just meaning that uncertainty is not always perceived as negative, and but it connotes the possibility that uncertainty can even be *tolerated* by decision-makers. Put differently, decision-makers might not necessarily seek to interpret other states' intentions more accurately and reduce uncertainty. It does not mean that decision-makers do not care about other states' intentions, but rather, they might be able to tolerate the uncertainty and focus on other things.

Here, I challenge the idea that decision-makers always perceive uncertainty as aversive, that they experience fear, and rationally react toward it by seeking new information or gaining more power. Instead, I argue that uncertainty can be perceived as tolerable or even desirable,³⁴ and this new approach to uncertainty can open up to other possible responses, namely hope. In this sense, considering this new dimension of uncertainty leads us to a different possibility to respond to it, as shown in Figure 1. I argue that bringing explicitly "hope" into the debate helps us broaden our understanding of decision-makers' responses to uncertainty about intentions.

³⁴ For example, from an ontological security perspective (Mitzen 2006: 360), decision-makers can be *not* afraid of ongoing or upcoming conflicts and rather prefer it to cooperation. She explains that where ontological needs are met by routinised competition, it is no longer accurate to say that states face a physical security dilemma. A state in a true dilemma would prefer cooperation to defection but cannot be sure it won't be exploited. States in routinised competition, on the other hand, are quite sure. On a deep level, they can even prefer conflict to cooperation because only through conflict do they know who they are.

Figure 1. Responses to uncertainty in IR: Bringing hope into the debate.



Likewise, hope has not explicitly studied or theorised in IR. Neglecting the consideration of hope as a possible response to uncertainty, has also limited our ability to recognise different possibilities or types of decision-makers' behaviours in the context of conciliatory gestures.

Conclusion: Understanding uncertainty through hope

This chapter has examined existing literature on how decision-makers' response to uncertainty about intentions and its relation to hope. Existing literature emphasises the predominance of fear as a response to uncertainty, despite disagreements between different schools of thought as to how far this fear can be ameliorated. Offensive realist theory argues that decision-makers have no choice but to assume the worst about other states' intentions and stick to the chronic fear to prepare for the worst situation of being attacked. Rather than fear, some scholars provide other alternative possible responses to uncertainty.

These approaches hold different understandings of whether uncertainty can be alleviated, but they also assume that uncertainty is aversive or undesirable. Here, I challenge

the idea that decision-makers only perceive uncertainty as aversive, experience fear, and rationally react toward it by seeking new information or gaining more power. Instead, I argue that *uncertainty is not always perceived as aversive to decision-makers, which opens up other possible responses to investigate*. Along these lines, I propose investigating hope as an alternative response to uncertainty. I argue that bringing explicitly hope into the debate helps us understand decision-makers' responses to uncertainty about their adversaries' intentions. In the next chapters, I conceptualise what hope is, how we identify the presence and absence of hope, and following this I develop the theoretical framework that explains the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures in an adversarial relationship.

Chapter 2. The Presence and Absence of Hope in IR

Introduction

In this chapter, I propose hope as alternative response to uncertainty. The chapter consists of two sections: conceptualising hope and inferring hope. The first section investigates what hope is and conceptualises hope in three domains: a particular time at which hope occurs, hope as a secondary emotion, and core elements of hope. In this section, I define hope as “one of secondary emotions that arise when someone’s goal is not yet achieved, including core components, desire and expectation.”

Based on the conceptualisation of hope, the second section proposes indicators that help infer the presence and absence of hope. I explain how I rely on four classes of signs: explicit, implicit, cognitive and behavioural, to infer hope in text. I mainly infer hope through the *explicit* expression hope and the *proxies* of desire and expectation. Even though many scholars agree that the core components can account for much of the phenomenology of hope, there are cognitive and behavioural signs associated with hope, which can help assess when hope is present. Therefore, I also consider the *cognitive* signs to reappraise situations in a way that the desired goal can be achieved and *behavioural* signs of a potential energy that makes people move toward and approach to a goal.

Conceptualisation of Hope

Hope and fear are placed at the extreme end of the spectrum of emotional responses to uncertainty (Hillen et al., 2017: 71)³⁵. However, as illustrated in the previous chapter, the existing IR literature neglected that uncertainty can make people feel hope as well as fear and anxiety (Averill et al. 1990; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007). Then, what is hope? Webster's Dictionary defines hope as "to cherish a desire with anticipation" or "to desire with expectation of obtainment or belief in fulfilment." In addition to the definition in the dictionary, many studies from different fields have explored the conceptualisation of hope from various perspectives. In this section, I review existing definitions and conceptualise hope in three domains: a particular time at which hope occurs, hope as a secondary emotion, and core elements of hope.

Scholars understand hope as an emotion provoked by unfavourable conditions, which arises in troubling circumstances in which people fear the worst yet yearn for better (Lazarus 1991, Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Snyder 2000). Hope generally arises when something desired is not yet achieved. Many scholars agree that this is the particular time at which hope can and does occur (Butler 1962; Snyder 1995; Lazarus 1999; Draho 2004; Webb 2007; Lueck 2007; Martin 2013; Eagleton 2015). A fundamental condition of hope is that one's current circumstance is unsatisfactory – that is, it involves deprivation, is damaging or threatening (Lazarus 1999: 654). Individuals are concerned about what is going to happen and, in turn, *hope* that there will be a change for the better. But because the future is uncertain, people cannot know what is going to happen with much confidence. For example, a common scenario of hope is a disabling or life-threatening illness in oneself or a loved one. In either case, individuals

³⁵ Hillen and colleagues examined 150 articles and conceptualised different types of cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses to uncertainty.

know that they may be in serious trouble, yet can hope for a favourable outcome. Because our future is always uncertain in terms of what, when and how this unhappy state of affairs will unfold, a favourable outcome cannot be completely foreclosed, and so people are afforded the opportunity to hope. In other words, one cannot hope for what one is sure will happen. Individuals do not hope to attain what has already happened or what is 100% going to happen. For example, one cannot hope on a Tuesday, that tomorrow will be a Wednesday. In this sense, and translated to IR, hope is one of the possible responses to uncertainty when another state's intentions are uncertain.

Hope is categorised as a secondary and positive emotion, which is more complex than a primary one.³⁶ A primary negative emotion, such as fear, guilt, and shame, is activated spontaneously, automatically and on a low level of the nervous system (Damasio 2003, 2004). Secondary, more complex emotions – such as hope and proud – are based on piecemeal cognitive processes originating in the cortical structures. The cognitive aspect of hope makes it different from other emotions. Hope is mainly based on piecemeal cognitive processes originating in the cortical structures and the cognitive activity of deliberate thinking accompanied by positive affective components (Jarymowicz and Bar-tal 2006: 368; See also Snyder 2000). Therefore, many studies argue that hope is based on, but not limited to, high cognitive processing, requiring setting goals, mental representations of positively valued abstract future situations, use of imagery, creativity, cognitive flexibility, and even risk-taking

³⁶ Many psychologists distinguish primary and secondary emotions, or negative and positive emotions, arguing they function differently due to their origin and neuro-psychological basis (Peeters and Czapinski 1990; Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Cacioppo and Gardner 1999; Ekman and Davidson 1994; Le Doux 1996; Damasio 2004). One of the fundamental differences between the two emotions is that a primary or automatic emotion is based on past and present affective experiences and is usually processed unconsciously and consciously (Snyder 2000a; Jarymowicz and Bar-tal 2006: 368).

(Breznitz 1986; Isen 1990; Lazarus 1991; Clore et al. 1994; Snyder 1994, 2000a; Jarymowicz and Bar-tal 2006: 372; Markwica 2018: 77-78). Given the highly cognitive aspect of hope, a situation typically does not in and of itself generate hope. Rather, it is the individual's cognitive evaluation of that situation that is emotion-generative (Gross 1999: 560). According to emotion regulation theory, this assessment process of changing the meaning of the unsatisfactory situation is one of the ways to generate hope (Gross 1998). As hope is to imagine that a future will be different and better from now, hope is generated when people believe the situation can change in a better way or not change in a negative way. In this sense, Eagleton even maintains that hope can be cultivated by practice and self-discipline (2015: 58).

Hope is one of the forms of imagining a better future in an unsatisfactory situation, including two core components: *desire* and *expectation* in possibility (Halperin and Gross 2011; Martin 2013; Halperin 2015; Leshem 2019). The core components of hope in this research refers to the elements with which most scholars agree as a definition of hope, among various definitions of hope across many fields. It is the lowest common denominator that many scholars agree upon from the various definitions that exist in the field.³⁷

Many scholars agree that *desire* is an essential feature of hope. When someone hopes for something, it means they want or desire it. This connotes that hope tends to head towards something and shows a goal-oriented aspect of hope. Snyder defines hope as “the process of

³⁷ cf. Averill and Sundararajan (2005, 136) show that hope is not a straightforward reporting of facts and it is different between different cultures. For example, Americans draw a sharper distinction between hope and expectancy than do Venezuelans. Koreans tended to classify hope as a permanent part of personality, closely related to intellect and will. The Korean concept of hope lacks the emotional connotation of the English concept. By contrast, Japanese participants listed a cluster of hope-related terms with affective connotation (Averill and Sundararajan 2005: 147). The American participants saw hope as a more transitory state - as an emotion and/or as a way of coping (Averill and Sundararajan 2005: 153). However, these all still include two main components: desire and expectation.

thinking about one's goal, along with the motivation to move toward and the ways to achieve those goals" in his 'Hope Theory' (Snyder et al. 1991; Snyder 1995: 355). He explains that human beings are goal-directed, and there are two necessary components to the goal-directed cognitions, which are included within hope. These components are the cognitive willpower to get moving toward one's goal (agency), and the perceived ability to generate routes to get there (pathways). In other words, Snyder regards hope as 'a cognitive set that is based on a reciprocally derived sense of successful agency and pathways' (Snyder et al. 1991, 571; Snyder 1995: 355). Even though some hope can be classified as open-ended in that it does not have a concrete goal (e.g. I hope it goes well), it is still future-oriented (Webb 2007).

Whilst hope involves a positive disposition towards achieving its goal, desire is characterised by a simple yearning or longing. Bloch stated that 'hope is a moral orientation, not simply a wish or spontaneous impulse' (Bloch 1954). For example, we can desire to smoke, but cannot hope for it. Eagleton also explained that "hope is not a simple appetite, but it is a series of morally refined ones (Eagleton 2015: 52, 59)." Hope is moving towards the good, not simply craving for it. A goal for which hope has the power to attract and draw our attention. In other words, the end is a future good, promising some sort of satisfaction (Shade 2001: 45). It is consistent with many scholars' arguments that the condition of hope tends to depend more on societal standards due to its nature. In this sense, the characteristics of the goal within hope usually connote a socially acceptable meaning. As hope involves a socially acceptable meaning, it is sometimes more related to a collective and communal goal rather than a private and personal one. According to Snyder, individuals who are higher in hope do not seem to be narcissistic in their thinking and rather, think about communal or shared goals (Snyder 1994). Butler also explains that hope is to be humble while optimism remains more strictly in the realm of 'myself' and involves the importance and emphasis of the 'self' (Butler 1962: 61-63)

Additionally, hope is much more than desire in that it involves *expectation* in possibility.

Lueck describes hope as being beyond mere wishing for an outcome, as it requires the additional expectation or anticipation of an outcome (Lueck 2007: 251). What renders hope to be something more than mere desire is the “cognitive act of believing the goal to be possible of attainment” (Webb 2007: 73). According to Marcel, “hoping” and “wishing” differ in the way in which they deal with the unsatisfactory situation (Marcel 1962). Hope, as seen by Marcel, does not deny a situation as wishful thinking might, because hope is a response of the individual to reality that has been faced clearly. Marcel explained that any departure from reality would result in illusion and no longer be hope. In this sense, Eagleton succinctly explained that “impossibility cancels hope, but not desire” (Eagleton 2015: 49).

To summarise, scholars see hope as a highly cognitive emotion which can arise when the desired goal is not yet achieved. Hope can thus be understood as a combination of two main factors: a *desire* (wish) to attain a goal and some *expectation* (assessment of likelihood or belief) that the goal can be achieved. Philosophers Kierkegaard and Ricoeur also describe hope as “the passion for the possible,”³⁸ in which the core of hope is well illustrated. Martin even regarded this set of elements, desire and expectation, as an ‘orthodox definition’ of hope. She provided such a definition as ‘to hope for an outcome is to desire it while believing it is possible but not certain to obtain’ (Martin 2013: 5). Based on the conceptualisation of hope, I investigate how to identify the presence of hope in the next section.

Inferring Hope

Building upon Markwica’s theoretical approach (2018: 100-102), I infer the presence of hope in decision-making from its representations in texts with four classes of signs: *explicit*, *implicit*,

³⁸ Cited in Godfrey (1987: 29). See also Eagleton (2015: 48).

cognitive and *behavioural* indicators. Here, I focus on the explicit expression of hope and the proxies of desire and expectation, cognitive appraisal tendencies and behavioural tendencies of hope which are the kinds of thinking and behavioural impulses one would expect if an actor experienced hope.

Explicit and Implicit Indicators

Hope can be identified through the *explicit expression hope* and the *proxies of desire and expectation*, such as (but not limited to) ‘I am hopeful,’ ‘I have hope,’ ‘I want this,’ and ‘I expect it to be possible’. Even though desire or expectation on their own might not indicate hope, when both are present, we expect hope to be present too.

While some scholars utilise content analysis to quantify emotional terms in texts, I use qualitative sentimental analysis to infer emotions. Based on the frequency with which certain words appear, quantifying approach draws inferences about the speakers’ affective experiences. The more often actors use an emotion term, the more important the underlying emotion is to them, it is argued. Such a quantifying approach certainly has a place in research on emotions in world politics. However, this method of quantifying emotion may be particularly helpful to identify significant emotional dynamics within groups and especially large collectives such as social media users. Therefore, scholars note that it is important to take into consideration the specific context of each emotion term (Markwica 2018). For this thesis, this means that it is important to read the specific context that the decision-makers desire and expect.

When it comes to “desire,” it is especially important to read the specific context. For example, it is not easy to assess whether decision-makers genuinely hold a desire for peace because leaders might say “I want peace” even when their actions show otherwise. And even during the process of conciliation, it is much more difficult to find any state leaders who say,

“I don’t want peace.” Therefore, it is important to carefully consider the context and discern if decision-makers hold a genuine desire for peace *itself*, or if they just seek it *for any other economic or political motivations*.³⁹ Put it differently, in order to discern a decision-maker’s desire for peace, I carefully examine their motivations and investigate how decision-makers prioritise their goal in a conciliation process to understand their desire.

Additionally, given that desire is hard to discern, the key is “expectation in possibility” in order to infer hope. Even though desire is an essential part of hope, hope is not a mere *wish*, and it requires the additional expectation or anticipation of an outcome. This is because even when individuals desire for something, they might not expect or believe it to become possible. For example, a person may wish to be a millionaire, but may not believe it to be possible. Likewise, even when decision-makers desire peace, they might not expect or believe it to become a possibility. So, if someone genuinely desires for peace but does not expect it to be realisable at the same time, then it is not hope.

³⁹ It is close to the subtle distinction between whether an individual needs it or desires it. For example, a person may need a surgery to survive, but the person may not want it. According to Frankfurt (1984: 3), “At the heart of the concept of need is the notion that there are things one cannot do without. When something is needed it must therefore always be possible to specify what it is needed for, or to explain what one cannot do without it. If a person needs surgery in order to survive, then what he cannot do without the surgery is to go on living. All necessities are in this respect conditional: nothing is needed except in virtue of being an indispensable condition for the attainment of a certain end (Frankfurt 1984: 3).” Frankfurt adds, “In many cases, a person needs something because he actively desires a certain *end* for the attainment of which that thing is indispensable. Thus, the person in my example needs a dictionary because he wants to finish a puzzle. In fact, he needs the dictionary only because he wants to finish the puzzle; he would not need it except for that desire. But, of course a person may need certain things for more than one reason, or in more than one way. When something is needed because there is something else that a person wants, then to that extent the need depends upon the person’s will (Frankfurt 1984: 4).” Frankfurt’s explanation implicitly but clearly shows that ‘desire’ entails a goal, and ‘need’ implies means.

Even though many scholars agree that the core components can account for much of the phenomenology of hope, there are cognitive and behavioural signs associated with richer characteristics of hope, which can help assess when hope is present.⁴⁰ In the following sections, I explore additional cognitive and behavioural signs of hope.

Cognitive Signs of Hope: ‘Reappraisal Strategy’

Hope can be inferred by the strong cognitive tendency of those feeling hopeful to reappraise situations in a way that their desired goal can be achieved. According to Markwica (2018: 68), “appraisal tendencies” are widely shared cognitive predispositions to appraise the environment in ways that put people in a position to respond to the event that triggered the emotion. They shape the individuals’ perceptions and reasoning and guide both the content and process of the actors’ thought.⁴¹ In this regard, hope is highly associated with the cognitive tendency to evaluate and change the meaning of the situation, and the assessment tends to align with the desired goal.

Emotion regulation theory clearly demonstrates the cognitive signs of hope, given that hope is categorised as a secondary emotion. According to the emotion regulation theory, which is one of the appraisal models,⁴² a situation typically does not in and of itself generate hope;

⁴⁰ I use insights from “the logic of affect” theory (Markwica 2018) focusing on the mechanisms of how hope influences devising foreign policy it suggests that emotions can shape what and how people think through their “appraisal tendencies,” and they can influence what they want and do through their “action tendencies.”

⁴¹ For example, sadness has been found to be associated with a bias in favour of high-risk and high-reward preference, and it tends to encourage a slower, more effortful, and more complex evaluation of options. See also Tiedens and Linton (2001); Renshon and Lerner (2012)

⁴² According to the ‘appraisal model’ of emotion, “To arouse an emotion, an object must be appraised as affecting

rather, it is the individual's cognitive evaluation of that situation that is emotion-generative (Gross 1999: 560).⁴³ Even though there are various ways a person can go about regulating emotion, emotion regulation theory specifically focuses on two strategies: reappraisal and suppression. 'Reappraisal' is a type of cognitive change and involves changing a situation's meaning, and thus is antecedent focused. On the other hand, 'suppression' is defined as inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive behaviour (Gross 2002: 283).⁴⁴ The assessment process of changing the meaning of the situation, *cognitive reappraisal*, is one of the ways to associate

me in some way, affecting me personally as an individual with my particular experience and my particular aims (Arnold 1960: 171).” Lazarus (1982) stated that cognition is a feature of emotion and that cognition is primary over emotion. The appraisal process is made based on specific criteria, which differ across people, but most agree on novelty, intrinsic (un)pleasantness, predictability, goal-relevance, coping capacity - the ability to cope with the consequences of the event, and normative significance - the compatibility with personal or social norms and values (Coppin and Sander 2016: 18).

⁴³ 'Emotion regulation' refers to the processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions. The emotion regulatory processes may be automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious, and may have their effects at one or more points in the emotion generative process (Gross 1998: 275). Gross provides a process model of emotion regulation which consists of five phases: Situation selection, Situation modification, Attentional deployment, Cognitive change, and Response modulation. The early four phases which can be categorised as 'antecedent-focused emotion regulation' precede emotional response, and the last one which is 'response-focused emotion regulation' occurs after emotion arises.

⁴⁴ Different forms of emotion regulation vary in timing and, additionally, predict different consequences. For example, the proclivity to 'reappraise' is correlated with lower levels of negative emotional experience, higher levels of positive emotional experience, and better interpersonal functioning (Gross and John 2003). Additionally, reappraisal decreases the experience and behavioural expression of emotion and has no impact on memory. By contrast, 'suppression' decreases behavioural expression, but fails to decrease the experience of emotion, and actually impairs memory (Gross 2001). Also, emotion regulation choice is especially critical to a case of decision making, because it involves choosing between internal cognitive processes to control one's internal emotional environment (Sheppes 2014: 134).

with hope. In this sense, psychology scholars maintain that the more people use this specific ‘cognitive reappraisal’ strategy, the more people are likely to experience hope (Halperin and Gross 2011).

Studies of intergroup conflict also note the effects of cognitive reappraisal strategy and its impact on hope (Halperin, Sharvit and Gross 2010,⁴⁵ Halperin and Gross 2011: 1230). More specifically, these studies found that individuals’ tendency to use reappraisal during intergroup conflict was positively correlated with high levels of hope. This is because reappraisal is inherently about benefit-finding ways of thinking about situations that might otherwise elicit negative emotions (Halperin and Gross 2011: 1230). Halperin and Gross interviewed 201 people a week after the outbreak of the war between Israel and Palestine, and found that the general tendency to reappraise could substantially decrease negative emotions and bring about hope (Halperin and Gross 2011). In order to detect levels of reappraisal, these studies used the ‘Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Reappraisal Scale’ (Gross and John 2003). This asks participants to what extent they dealt with the negative emotions they may have experienced during the final days of the war between the Israelis and the Palestinians.⁴⁶ They also found that the tendency to use reappraisal during the war was not correlated with levels of fear or

⁴⁵ From a psychological perspective, the appearance of a belief regarding contradictory goals or interests is always a dual-stage process. The first stage involves subjective evaluations regarding the in-group’s goals, the other group’s goals and the interaction between them. In the second stage, the evaluation is expressed in motivation and readiness to act in a certain way. Hence, cognitive appraisals and response tendencies, both embedded within the structure of emotions, are an integral part of the most basic definition of conflict, attesting to their importance (Halperin, Sharvit and Gross 2010: 86-87).

⁴⁶ Abbreviated version of Emotion Regulation Questionnaire reappraisal scale: 1. When faced with a stressful situation, I’ve made myself think about it in a way that helped me stay calm; 2. I controlled my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in; 3. When I wanted to feel fewer negative emotions, I changed the way I’m thinking about the situation (original scale from Gross and John 2003, Halperin and Gross 2011).

anger but positively correlated only with high levels of hope.

More importantly, in addition to the cognitive tendency to reappraise and change the meaning of given situations, hopeful individuals tend to assess the situations *to align with their desired goal*. In other words, individuals who experience hope have a strong cognitive tendency to evaluate that the situation can change in a way so that the desired goal will be achieved. As illustrated earlier, this is because hope is a highly goal-oriented emotion. Snyder's hope theory mainly emphasises that hope includes goal-directed cognitions (Snyder 1995). McGeer also focused on the goal-oriented aspects of hope and defines hope as "a cognitive activity that involves setting concrete goals, finding pathways to achieve those goals, and tapping one's willpower of agency to move along pathways to specified goals" (McGeer 2004: 103). During the assessment process of situation in alignment with the desired goal, those who experience hope can display selective focus on information that confirms and sustains the belief that it is possible to attain the goal in question (Markwica 2018: 78).

To sum up, hope often entails cognitive signs of assessing situations to align with the desired goal. The tendency to use cognitive reappraisal is positively correlated with high levels of hope because hope is inherently about benefit-finding ways of thinking about situations that might otherwise elicit negative emotions. In other words, the experience of hope usually goes hand in hand with the cognitive appraisal tendencies to evaluate and change the meaning of situations in a way that the desired goal can be achieved.

Behavioural Signs of Hope: Energy and Readiness for Action

Hope entails a potential energy that makes people move toward and approach to a goal. "Action tendencies" influence what people do and how they take action, even though there is no law-like relationship between emotions and behaviours (Markwica 2018: 68). In this regard, many

scholars focus on a potential power and enabling function in hope (Breznitz 1986; Bovens 1999, 670; Lueck 2007).⁴⁷

When hoping, people are expected to do whatever is necessary to bring about the desired outcome (Averill and Sundararajan 2005: 140). In other words, ‘sustained energy’ is one of the behavioural signs of the emotion of hope (Markwica 2018). One cannot hope for what one is sure will happen and hope generally arises in the difficult situation that something desired is not yet achieved, so it naturally allows hope to involve persistence. Aquinas highlighted arduousness as a significant dimension of hope.⁴⁸ In this sense, Shade emphasised the active aspects of hope by explaining that hoping is closer to planning than to wishing in that its ends have potential real means (Shade 2001: 54). Like planning, hoping consists of trying to connect means or abilities with ends. Hope usually, but not always, requires planning to induce the desired outcome in a daily manner to combat what could be a depressing fate if the outcome is not achieved (Draho 2004).

Although hope is not necessarily active, it does imply a ‘readiness’ to act (Benzein and Saveman 1998; Webb 2007; Sliwinski 2012: 228; Pechenino 2015). Hope indicates that ‘our interests, our concerns, our desires, our passions-all of these continue to be engaged by what

⁴⁷ While many scholars have focused mainly on functional aspects of hope, Chae suggests a different perspective that hope can be a perception or feeling about the world itself. Chae argues that hope is not only instrumental but also valuable as ‘a way of experiencing the world in the here-and-now.’ Chae criticises traditional accounts that treat hope primarily as of instrumental value, as something where the purpose is to produce the hoped-for outcome. Understood only in this way, hope becomes appropriate to the extent that it is an effective tool in promoting the end that we seek. As belief-based or probabilistic approaches, this explanation of hope focuses too narrowly on how the world determines or shapes our hopes. These approaches lose sight of the sense in which hope is something that we bring into the world to create meaning in our lives (Chae 2020: 213).

⁴⁸ Cited in Shade (2001: 54).

can be; hence, we lean into the future *ready to act* when actions can do some good' (McGeer, 2004). In this sense, Nunn portrayed hope as a general tendency "of being positively creative and *reactive towards the perceived future*, by subjectively assessing what is probable or important in the future (Nunn 1996, emphasis added)."⁴⁹

What is more, hope involves a devotion of mental energy to what it would be like if some projected states of the world were to materialise. It refers to a 'mental imaging,' which is the term coined by Bovens (1999).⁵⁰ According to him, mental imaging is no less a necessary condition for hoping than the proper belief and desire. Therefore, he explains that "hoping is having the proper belief and desire in conjunction with being engaged to some degree in mental imaging." The mental play that is constitutive of hoping provides satisfaction that one cannot attain from attending to one's actual circumstances (Bovens 1999: 674). Halperin maintained that the mental imaging process leads to positive feelings regarding the desired goal (Halperin


⁴⁹ Of course, hope is not always a question of one's own efforts. One may hope for what lies in principle beyond one's capacities (Boven 1999; Mcgeer 2008: 244-245; Eagleton 2015: 50). For example, people can hope the weather will be good tomorrow. This is another critical reason why hope should be closely studied in the context of uncertainty when actors cannot fully grasp and control the situation. Even though it needs to separate the subject of hope from the subject of agency and pathways, hope is still goal-oriented in that we imagine someone else who has agency and knows pathways to achieve that goal.

⁵⁰ Bovens (1999, 674) calls the devotion of mental energy to what it would be like if some projected state of the world were to materialize "mental imaging." For instance, "Sophie shows up late at some party and asks me very self-confidently whether I had been hoping that she would come. Now suppose that I did indeed believe that Sophie might come and that I consider her to be a welcome guest – i.e. I prefer her coming to the party to her not coming to the party. Still, it seems to me that it would be a lie to say that I had been hoping she would come, unless I had devoted at least some mental energy to the question whether she would or would not come to the party – i.e. I had been looking at my clock wondering whether Sophie would still come, I had been turning my head earlier to check whether Sophie was amongst some newly arrived guests, etc."

2015: 88). Looking at the complete process of hope, it can be seen as an emotion beginning with imagining a desired goal in the future that constitutes a positive change from the existing situation. This naturally allows hopeful individuals to act as if the goal is realisable. At its heart is a certain form of belief indispensable to the activity of hoping. It indicates a willingness to act on a belief or in pursuit of an end, even in the face of risk or doubt (Shade 2001: 68-69). The ‘acting as if’ tendency will be discussed more in detail in the next chapter.⁵¹

To sum up, I define hope as *a secondary emotion that arises when someone’s goal is not yet achieved, including core components, desire and expectation*. In addition to the core components of hope, hope can be identified through the cognitive signs to reappraise situations in a way that the desired goal can be achieved and behavioural signs of a potential energy that makes people move toward and approach to a goal. Based on these, the conceptualisation of hope is illustrated as follows:

Figure 2. Conceptualisation of Hope



⁵¹ Someone who is hopeful typically acts as if he assumes the best (Gordon 1987: 85). On the contrary, in international relations, assuming the worst, a degree of mistrust towards others has traditionally been considered to be the most prudent strategy. In this sense, it is quite understandable why hope has been overlooked in IR theory in that hope results in acting as if the goal is achieved, assuming the best outcome.

Hope as a process

As illustrated in the figure above, I assume the experiencing of hope as a process, not a stable and static state. In his hope theory, Snyder defines hope as “the *process* of thinking about one’s goal, along with the motivation to move toward and the ways to achieve those goals” (Snyder et al. 1991; Snyder 1995, 355). Hope is also seen by Marcel as a *process*, or even an activity. This concept of hope as a process confirms Marcel’s emphasis upon ‘being’ that necessarily means ‘being on the way.’ According to Butler, hope is not a kind of listless waiting; it underpins action or it runs before it, but it becomes degraded and lost once the action is spent. Hope is more than having completed an act; it is acting (Butler 1962: 29). Therefore, drawing on these many psychology and philosophy studies, I argue that all the cognitive and behavioural elements of hope interact together as a process to develop the emotion of hope, and they emerge from dynamic interactions.

Comprehensive studies note that the relationship between emotion and reason is no longer dichotomous nor contradictory (Damasio 1994; Crawford 2000). In addition, considering that hope is a highly cognitive emotion, it is much trickier to clearly distinguish whether ‘its cognitive aspect X causes hope Y ($X \rightarrow Y$)’ or ‘the experience of hope Y causes the cognitive aspects X ($Y \rightarrow X$)’ or even ‘hope Y consists of the cognitive components X ($X \in Y$).’⁵² In this sense, based upon many other scholars (Ruggie 1998; Klotz and Lynch 2007: 15; Kurki 2008: 11-12; Lebow 2014: 60), I understand the concept of causation and constitution in a deeper and broader way beyond strict dichotomy.⁵³ In other words, discovering the relationship

⁵² The symbol $\in$ is used to denote set membership, or that an object, number, or point belongs to a set. The logical sign $\rightarrow$ is used to represent a conditional statement, which is an ‘if-then’ statement (University of Florida 2014).

⁵³ Indeed, the terms are not interchangeable, but in practice there is considerable overlap (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 15). For instance, cognitive appraisal can be ‘constitutive components’ of the emotion of hope in some way and also has ‘causal capacity’ to generate hope. In other words, they are sometimes synchronous and sometimes take

between hope and its cognitive and behavioural elements entails both aspects of ‘causal’ and ‘constitutive’ explanation (or ‘transition theory’ and ‘property theory’ in Cummin (1983)’s term).⁵⁴ For example, cognitive evaluation can be a component of hope and can also cause the occurrence of hope. Evaluation that the conflicts can be resolved or the innate nature of the adversarial state can be malleable, can cause hope. Still, at the same time, the emotion of hope can be constituted by these evaluations. In addition, the behaviour of ‘acting as if’ can be considered as hope itself, not only as a result of hope. This complication is not problematic for my study. I do not examine whether the cognitive aspect of hope is an antecedent or a

time to shape hope. As Kurki illustrated, it is beneficial to consider causal analysis as consisting not of analysis of regularities or laws, but of developing understandings of the nature and the causal powers of ‘ontologically deep’ objects. And conceptualising also causes within constitutive or causally conditioning in a broader way that allows us to understand the causal role of ideas, rules, norms and discourses (Kurki 2008, 11-12). Beach and Pedersen (2013, 29-32) also explain that each step of the causal mechanism can be considered in itself a necessary but not sufficient condition in determining the outcome, where the presence of all the steps is vital for the overall functioning of the mechanism.

⁵⁴ In providing answers to ‘causal questions,’ in saying that ‘X causes Y’, we assume three things: (1) that X and Y exist independent of each other, (2) that X precedes Y in time, and (3) that but for X, Y would not have occurred (Wendt 1998: 105, Woodward 2003, Ylikoski 2012: 34-36, 2013: 281-282, Markwica 2018: 117-118). First two assumptions are crucial to explain changes in the state of some variable. Still, it is hard to say that influential factors considered in this research, such as cognitive reappraisal or joy, are completely independent of the emotion of hope. Rather, it seems much closer to ‘constitutive explanation,’ as this section is about how hope is constituted. However, it is not exactly ‘constitutive.’ According to Ylikoski (2012: 33), the distinction between causation and constitution originated from a debate in biology and constitutive explanations relates properties. The properties (and relations) of parts constitute the properties of the system or environment. The whole is made of its parts and their relations. Unlike causation, constitution does not take time, and they do not talk about the process of constitution. Although things whose properties may be dynamic, and indeed all natural and social systems are always in process, continually being reproduced through time, but constitutive theories abstract away from these processes and take ‘snapshots’ instead, in an effort to explain how systems are constituted (Wendt 1998: 105).

consequent; rather, I focus on cognitive appraisal signs and behavioural signs of hope to infer the presence and absence of hope.

Hope Compared to Other Concepts: Wishful Thinking, Optimism, Confidence

On a final note regarding the conceptualisation of hope, I compare it to other related concepts which have been conflated with hope in the context of IR: wishful thinking, optimism, and confidence. First, *wishful thinking* has been conflated with hope in IR. Hope is different from wishful thinking as the latter depends more only on mere wish, not expectation on probability. For example, the appeasement policy in the 1930s has been in disrepute and regarded as inappropriate because it was based upon *wishful thinking* about the possibility of establishing a lasting peace with Germany and a naïve understanding of Hitler's intentions (Gilpin 1981; Rock 2000; Ripsman and Levy 2008).⁵⁵ Ripsman and Levy maintain that wishful thinking makes political leaders distort or ignore information and finally hinders them from making precise calculations (Ripsman and Levy 2008). This shows why hope has such a bad reputation for pursuing conciliation, as the existing literature argues that hope usually results in failed foreign policy by impeding sensible decision-making. However, the explanation shows and emphasises the policy maker's 'wish' for lasting peace, but not 'probable expectations' of its achievement. While many IR studies miss this distinction, in my work I clarify Marcel, that

⁵⁵ Ripsman and Levy (2008) claim that British appeasement in the 1930s was not based on a naïve understanding of Hitler's intentions or on wishful thinking about the possibility of establishing a lasting peace with Germany, nor was it an alternative to balancing. Rather, they explain that British policy makers perceived the growing German threat and realised that they could not yet win a war. Therefore, British leaders adopted an appeasement policy as a means of buying time for rearmament, thus delaying the likely confrontation until Britain was adequately prepared for war. Ripsman and Levy insist that appeasement policy has to be revaluated because it is not by wishful thinking as previously regarded but by strategic calculations.

hoping and wishing differ in the way in which they deal with an unsatisfactory situation. Hope does not involve the individual denying a situation as wishful thinking might because hope is an individual's response to the reality that has been faced clearly. Marcel explained that any departure from reality would result in illusion and no longer be true hope (Marcel 1962). This is because hope includes an expectation of possibility *as well as* a mere wish.

In a similar sense, IR literature often confuses hope and optimism.⁵⁶ *Optimism* is defined as “generalised expectancy that the future will be positive” (Segerstrom, Carver and Scheier 2017), which seems to place more emphasis on expectation rather than desire. For example, Janis, who studied groupthink as one of the factors affecting failed foreign policy decision-making, suggested that decision-makers captured by the mood of optimism tend to compromise the quality of the discussion (Janis 1972). Other scholars note that a tendency to minimise controversy compromises the quality of the discussion (Hart, Stein, and Bengt 1997: 10-11). Presuming an agreement, decision-makers captured by the mood of optimism ignore crucial information and do not take alternatives seriously. The groups tend to persist in their original policies even when confronted with feedback that the policies were not working out

⁵⁶ An example of an optimism in a bad reputation is “The Stockdale paradox.” The Stockdale paradox is a concept along with its companion concept confront the brutal facts developed by Collins. The name refers to Admiral Jim Stockdale, who was the highest-ranking United States military officer in the “Hanoi Hilton” prisoner-of-war camp during the height of the Vietnam War. Tortured over twenty times during his eight-year imprisonment from 1965 to 1973, Stockdale lived out the war without any prisoner's rights, no set release date, and no certainty as to whether he would even survive to see his family again. Collins met Stockdale and asked him how he dealt with it when he was actually there. Stockdale said. “I never doubted not only that I would get out, but also that I would prevail in the end and turn the experience into the defining event of my life, which, in retrospect, I would not trade.” After about a hundred meters of silence, Collins asked, “Who didn't make it out, then?” “Oh, that's easy,” he said. “The optimists.” (Collins, 2001: 83-85).

well or that they were fraught with risks. This tendency of optimism is supported by psychology studies, but optimism has a distinguishable trait from hope (Carver et al. 2010). The psychology study shows that even though hope and optimism are positively associated with consideration of future consequences, ‘agreeableness’ – one of the personality factors – had a significant moderating effect on the mediating relationship only between optimism and consideration of future consequences at levels of agreeableness, but not with hope. In addition, hope predicts consideration of future consequences, suggesting that individuals who have greater hope for more positive outcomes in the future also tend to be more forward-thinking in that they are deliberate in their planning. On the other hand, optimism is not shown to affect forward thinking.

Finally, as explained above, hope does not come from certainty or impossibility, and this clearly differentiates it from *confidence*. Individuals do not hope to attain what has already happened or what is guaranteed to happen, as hope should include an expectation of possibility. In this sense, a general attitude of hoping for something is inconsistent with *confidence* that it will or will not come about. Differentiating hope and confidence, Boven explained that “one cannot hope for some state of the world unless one has a degree of credence that it will come about which ranges between some threshold value close to 0 for confidence that it will not come about and some threshold value close to 1 for confidence that it will come about (Boven 1999: 673).” According to Wheeler, confidence in the context of security studies has acquired a special meaning in the interactions of states in the form of the idea of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).⁵⁷ These are negotiated agreements that aim to promote increased

⁵⁷ The idea and terminology of Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) emerged from the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which set in train a rather new set of thoughts about the ways in which states and alliances might be reassured that certain legitimate military activities undertaken by potential adversaries are not intended as threatening. Initially the requirements for notification of manoeuvres were not seen as particularly restrictive on the military

confidence in another state's peaceful intentions (Wheeler 2018: 3). The widely accepted definition of CSBMs is by Holst and Melander (1977: 147), who define them as measures that communicate 'credible evidence of the absence of feared threats.' In other words, *confidence* in security studies can be regarded as evidence or proof of peace. On the other hand, hope can still arise from uncertainty even when peace is not yet guaranteed.⁵⁸ Hope and the neighbouring concepts can be summarised in the *Table 1* below:

Table 1. Hope and the neighbouring concepts

	Uncertainty	Desire	Expectation	Other Elements
Hope	X	X	X	
Wishful thinking	X	X		X
Optimism	X		X	X
Confidence			X	X

activities of the signatories. In a sense the Final Act was an act of faith and a declaration of intention to proceed in particular directions. Indeed these CBM are explicitly voluntary, although there was a political commitment by the signatories of the Final Act to notify manoeuvres involving over 25,000 ground troops. (See Alford 2008).

⁵⁸ Markwica (2018) investigated decision-maker's hope in the context of devising coercive diplomacy. For example, he analysed that "Saddam Hussain expressed his *hope* that they [his advisors] might be able to deter a US attack (Markwica 2018: 230). "Khrushchev's pursuit of the deterrence strategy was facilitated by his reduced levels of fear... and by his newly sparked *hope* that the Americans might in the end tolerate the presence of the Soviet weapons in their backyard (Markwica 2018: 176)." Even though he studied hope in the context of devising foreign policy, hope in his empirical case study was closer to hope for victory or military confidence, and they were not clearly distinguished.

Conclusion

This chapter proposes hope as an alternative response to uncertainty and develops a theoretical framework around the conceptualisation of hope. I conceptualise hope in three domains: a particular time at which hope occurs, hope as a secondary emotion, and core elements of hope. Building upon many scholars' understanding of hope as an emotion provoked by unfavourable conditions which arises in troubling circumstances in which people fear the worst yet yearn for better (Lazarus 1991; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Snyder 2000), I suggest hope generally arises when something desired is not yet achieved. Hope is categorised as a secondary and positive emotion, based on the cognitive activity of deliberate thinking accompanied by positive affective components (Snyder 2000; Jarymowicz and Bar-tal 2006). Hope includes two core components – desire and expectation – with which most scholars agree as a definition of hope, among various definitions across many fields. Therefore, borrowing insights from the studies, I define hope as 'one of the secondary emotions that arise when someone's goal is not yet achieved, including core components, desire and expectation.' Hope also entails cognitive signs of assessing situations to align with the desired goal, and behavioural signs of a potential energy that makes people move toward and approach a goal. Therefore, I use this theoretical framework to infer the presence and absence of hope. Based on this conceptualisation, the following chapter develops the theoretical framework of the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures.

Chapter 3. The Role of Hope in Shaping Conciliatory Gestures

Introduction

This chapter develops a theoretical framework to explain how the experience of hope among leaders impacts their devising of conciliatory gestures in adversarial relationships. Given the general omission of hope from IR theorising, it is not surprising that existing work on conciliatory gestures has not examined whether the experience of hope by a leader might change how the conciliatory process is conceived. In order to explore the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures, this chapter consists of two sections: *conciliatory gestures* and *after defection*.

In the first section, I define conciliatory gestures and suggest categorising them in terms of conditionality/non-conditionality. I examine how introducing the experience of hope impacts on the conciliatory process. In the absence of hope, the conciliatory gesture literature has not much focused on the ‘conditionality’ of conciliatory gestures (key exceptions include Mitchell 2000; Wheeler 2013). Therefore, bringing hope into the debate, I argue that a decision-maker who experiences hope adopts *unconditional conciliatory gestures*, which I define as not conditioned to a target state’s reciprocation.

What sets my work apart is that while other IR theories of conciliatory gestures argue that decision-makers should meet a defection with a defection, I argue that the presence of hope leads to a different expectation of behaviour. In this sense, the second section focuses on what happens *after defection* to examine how decision-makers who experience hope interpret and

respond to defection in a different way than conventional accounts argue. Therefore, according to cognitive and behavioural aspects of hope, I develop four hypotheses on how hope can be expected to impact the interpretations and responses of decision-makers. These are (i) hope brings careful interpretation, (ii) hope brings selective focus situational factors, (iii) hope brings persistent pursuit of conciliation and (iv) hope brings responsiveness.

First, I expect a decision-maker who experiences hope to be more likely to tolerate defection and be less likely to rush into an assessment of an adversary's actions because hope involves tolerance and patience. Second, I expect a decision-maker who experiences hope to be less likely to interpret a defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state because the experience of hope often entails a selective focus on information that confirms and sustains the belief that it is still possible to attain the goal in question. Third, I expect a decision-maker who experiences hope to keep pursuing conciliation even after a defection and create new ways to persuade any opposing parties, as the experience of hope fundamentally improves the ability to develop alternative pathways to overcome obstacles. Fourth, I expect a decision-maker who experiences hope to be willing, even after a defection, to show responsiveness toward an adversary to convey amity.

Conciliatory Gestures and Conditionality

For Mitchell, “peace-making often started, or resumed, as the result of a unilateral, sometimes stalemate-breaking initiative on the part of one or other of the adversaries.” For this, he defined conciliatory gestures (or olive branches) as a “broad category of actions or statements” that seek to “signal to the other party a willingness to stop a pattern of confrontation and to initiate or resume a conciliation process (Mitchell 2000: 34, see also 96-102).” Although conciliatory

gestures have been studied in various terms, the nature of conciliation fundamentally includes the overall process of resolving conflicts such as de-escalation, peace-making and accommodation.⁵⁹ Put differently, conciliatory moves broadly share the characteristic that they are intended to convey amity. In this sense, “‘conciliatory gestures’ can best be seen as the basic building blocks of both a peace process taking place within a system previously characterised by all-out coercion and conflict, and of the accommodative sequences or interactions that make up the overall peace process” (Mitchell 2000: 42). Considering that a conciliatory process consists of more than a single move, it is beneficial to analyse conciliatory gestures as building blocks of a conciliatory process.⁶⁰ Therefore, I emphasise that conciliatory gestures are part of a broad category of a conciliatory process. It is worth investigating them in terms of initiating and responding, as I illustrated in Figure 1 in the Introduction.

Building upon Mitchell’s theoretical framework, I suggest categorising conciliatory gestures in terms of their (un)conditionality.⁶¹ (Un)*conditionality* is “whether a conciliatory

⁵⁹ Conciliatory gestures have been studied in various terms. For example, Matte and Weeks (2022) do not distinguish the phrases such as ‘making a conciliatory/cooperative/friendly gesture,’ ‘pursuing conciliation/rapprochement,’ and ‘initiating rapprochement’ and use them interchangeably in the same meaning. Because their meanings tend to overlap and it is not clear where one concept ends and another begins, systematic works of labelling conciliatory gestures are difficult to reach an agreement on their categorisation (Mitchell 2000: 111). Overall, ‘conciliation’ has been generally used as the opposite meaning of ‘coercion.’

⁶⁰ I define a conciliatory process in the Introduction. A conciliatory process in this thesis refers to “a process consisting of sequences of accommodative interaction in which the parties interact in a manner which contains at least a mix of conciliatory and coercive activities, usually with a balance in favour of the former; or in a manner that is almost entirely conciliatory or cooperative” Mitchell added, “de-escalation process”, “accommodative bargaining”, or “benign spirals” also capture many aspects of such accommodative sequences (Mitchell 2000: 40-41).

⁶¹ Mitchell (2000: 123-124) suggests 12 key characteristics of conciliatory gestures in his theory: *magnitude*,

gesture is contingent on some form of reciprocation by the target (especially if the offer made is dependent upon a prior contingency) or is made in a wholly non-contingent fashion” (Mitchell 2000: 118, 122, 156). Therefore, building upon his conceptual framework, I define *conditional conciliatory gestures* as designed to maintain a conciliatory process only if suggested conditions are satisfied; *unconditional conciliatory gestures* are not conditioned to a target state’s reciprocation. For example, verbal promises to refrain from harmful actions can be withdrawn with the excuse that circumstances have changed, or the other side has done something that has resulted in a change of circumstance, or makes the promised inaction no longer appropriate. According to the definition above, a verbal promise can also be regarded as a conciliatory gesture but a conditional one.

In the following sections, I examine existing theories of how the conciliatory process can be conceived in the absence of hope. I suggest that the omission of hope in the discussion led to a partial understanding of when unconditional conciliatory gestures can be adopted. I then explore how far decision-makers who experience hope conceive of the conciliatory process in a different way. Therefore, I argue that conciliatory gestures in the presence of hope can provide further explanations for initiating unconditional conciliatory gestures.

articulation, transparency, voluntariness, unconditionality, distinctiveness, novelty, commitment, costliness, capacity, riskiness, and irrevocability. Mitchell did not rigorously distinguish and define these characteristics, so they do not need to be considered at the same time. He merely listed these likely qualities as being worthy of further investigation, explaining that he “would be reluctant even to place them in any order of importance, or argue that they form either necessary or sufficient conditions for successful conciliation.” Although he derives these traits from one case study and admits it is perilous to claim to have discerned general patterns from one or two cases, he says “one needs the real world in order to start drawing out some generalisations. Hence, tentatively suggesting ideas about what qualities in conciliatory gestures might well be associated with effectiveness seems a reasonable procedure – provided the emphasis is on the ‘tentativeness.’” That is why he listed these likely qualities and “abandoned a simple taxonomical approach.”

Conciliatory gestures in the absence of hope

Given the general omission of hope from IR theorising, it is not surprising that existing work on conciliatory gestures has not examined whether the presence of hope might change how the conciliatory process is conceived. Returning to the theoretical categories set out in Chapter 1, conciliatory gestures have no place in offensive realist theory because they will only serve to weaken states in the struggle for security and power (Mearsheimer 2001; Rosato 2021). For offensive realism, the future uncertainty problem means there is no reliable way by which states can signal their peaceful intentions under anarchy. Therefore, seeking as much power as they can is the most ‘sensible and safe’ strategy (Mearsheimer 2001: 32), not initiating a conciliatory gesture.

However, conciliatory gestures do happen in the real world. Unlike offensive realists, the rationalist approach maintains that it is possible to gather enough information to distinguish whether the other side has benign or malign intent and sending a conciliatory gesture is possible. Defensive realism maintains that if decision-makers can discern other’s benign intentions through offense-defence differentiation indicators and when cooperation is clearly the best choice for both, then a decision-maker could adopt conciliatory moves (Jervis 1978; Lynn-Jones 1995; Glaser and Kaufman 1998; Van Evera 1998; Montgomery 2006: 160-161; Glaser 2010).

Rationalist theories of trust also argue that decision-makers can initiate conciliation, but only small and gradual ones. Decision-makers usually initiate small gestures that enable them to “test each other’s benign intent in a context where the penalties for being betrayed are less than severe” (Larson 1997: 5). In this sense, rationalist trust theory argues that decision-makers should start with small conciliatory gestures, especially amid an adversarial context because a certain level of trust is a prerequisite to reassure with the larger size of signals (Kydd

2005: 199). This is because, for Kydd, the size of the conciliatory gestures depends on the level of trust, and costly signals are conditioned to a certain level of trust.⁶² Moreover, Kydd explained that “signals that are too small do not reassure as they will convey no information about the players’ types and will not influence their beliefs, so the key mechanism that facilitates reassurance is costly signals” (Kydd 2005: 197). Therefore, for Kydd, “it is necessary to go beyond simple gestures and the gesture must be costly to reduce uncertainty, but the signals cannot be too bold and costly” (Kydd 2005: 187-188), decision-makers still need to start with small conciliatory gestures, especially amid an adversarial context.

Osgood also argued that the initiating side should start with a small move and should *not make a concession that threatens its own security* or ability to defend against a hostile act. Osgood developed a conciliatory strategy he called *Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction* (GRIT). GRIT was an attempt to chart “a way out of the tensions/arms-race dilemma, a strategy that would allow a nation to take the initiative by inducing reciprocal tension reduction, yet always operating within tolerable limits of security” (Osgood 1962: 88-94). The strategy of GRIT is initiated when one state in a conflict publicly announces that it is planning to carry out cooperative moves as a way of promoting de-escalation, and then proceeds to implement this.

Even though GRIT should also start with small gestures, the key innovation of GRIT is to argue that, as long as there is no defection, the conciliating state should keep making low level moves – even in the absence of reciprocation (Osgood 1970: 102). In other words, although it is not explicitly elaborated, GRIT is not conditioned on a target state’s reciprocation. For example, Osgood proposed that, even if the Soviet government showed no

⁶² “The lower the level of trust, the smaller the size of the costly signal, the higher the level of trust, the greater the size of the signal” (Kydd 2005: 199).

signs of positively reciprocating, or offered only token concessions, the US government should “keep right on moving, but with further small risk initiative” (Osgood 1970: 94). Of course, GRIT is aimed at inducing an adversary to *reciprocate* with equivalent signals of its own, thereby inviting those that began the sequence of de-escalation to send a stronger signal as a sign of their increased level of trust. GRIT breaks the deadlock by one side unilaterally making the first move, and, crucially, the ultimate test of the strategy is securing reciprocation. Osgood is clear that the announcement of a unilateral initiative is always coupled with an explicit invitation to reciprocate (Osgood 1970: 87). But, at the same time, the latter does not have to be “the same in kind or even equal in quantity”; instead, it is ‘the tension-reducing impact of initiation and reciprocation that must be roughly equated’ (Osgood 1970: 102).

Kydd did not explicitly discuss a situation where the other side does not reciprocate in “the same in kind or even equal in quantity” because there are only two options between ‘cooperate or defect’ in his “Reassurance Game.”⁶³ However, in such a case, Kydd might argue that the signal is not costly enough to continue the conciliatory process (Kydd 2005). This is because, for Kydd, reciprocation is crucial to building trust, and the size of the conciliatory gestures depends on the level of trust. In other words, given the definition of trust as “a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to *reciprocate* cooperation” (Kydd 2005: 3, emphasis added), if a sending state’s decision-maker strongly “believes that the other side is willing to *reciprocate* cooperation,” they might adopt a larger size of the conciliatory move. However, if one side knew the other had defected or not reciprocated in “the same in

⁶³ “The Reassurance Game builds on the Security Dilemma Game but has two rounds. This enables cooperative gestures to be made in the first round that may change the beliefs about each other, possibly building trust and enabling further cooperation in the second round. In each round, the players choose to cooperate or defect, not knowing what the other side has chosen to do in that round. In the second round, though, they know what the other side did in the first round, so they can take that into account in deciding what to do next” (Kydd 2005: 188).

kind or even equal in quantity,” it would be natural to hesitate before cooperating in a second round. Therefore, for Kydd, a conciliatory signal is conditioned on the target state’s reciprocity.

Even though GRIT is a clear example of unconditional conciliatory gestures and can continue even in the absence of reciprocity, it is hardly categorised as a *bold* conciliatory gesture because it is not costly or risky when initiated. As illustrated above, GRIT should not make a concession that threatens its own security and should start with a small initiative. On the other hand, a bold gesture refers to “a conciliatory act or statement in which one state makes a unilateral concession to its adversary that is unprecedented, irreversible, non-contingent, and extremely costly” (Berenji 2020: 129). However, according to the definition of a bold gesture, GRIT is ‘non-contingent’ but ‘not costly or risky,’ so it is unclear whether GRIT is bold. Likewise, the existing studies call “non-contingent,” “dramatic,” “unprecedented,” “unusual,” or “unambiguous” conciliatory gestures “bold,” or “costly,” or “risky” moves and do not distinguish the terms, using them interchangeably (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 234; Kupchan 2010:38; Dalton 2014: 11; Wheeler 2018: 26; Berenji 2020; Kim SJ 2022).

Even though GRIT is difficult to categorise as a bold move, it seems to be initiated when the existing literature says a bold move becomes possible. Osgood argued GRIT can be initiated when decision-makers can see the target state as they see themselves (Osgood 1962: 74). In other words, GRIT becomes possible when a decision-maker overcomes the combination of “Peaceful/defensive self-image” and “Enemy image of rivalry” and develops empathy (See Chapter 1). Interestingly, Berenji similarly argued that decision-makers pursue a conciliation with a bold move when they learn that rivals may be motivated by fear instead of lust for more power. In other words, when decision-makers empathise with the other state

and exercise ‘security dilemma sensibility,’⁶⁴ bold conciliatory gestures can be initiated.⁶⁵ As shown so far, by categorising conciliatory gestures in terms of size and not focusing on their (un)conditionality, it is unclear when unconditional conciliatory gestures are initiated. Therefore, I suggest categorising conciliatory gestures in terms of (un)conditionality and bringing hope in to explain when unconditional conciliatory gestures can be adopted, as I explain in the following section.

Conciliatory gestures in the presence of hope

Considering that GRIT is a clear example of an unconditional conciliatory gesture, what Osgood argues regarding when GRIT can be initiated is important. When Osgood explained it, he once mentioned hope, as follows. Osgood argued that GRIT is not possible when “neither side really holds much hope for reaching agreements on disarmament. Yet the people

⁶⁴ Security dilemma sensibility (SDS) is defined as “an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear” (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 7).

⁶⁵ In Berenji’s case studies, the decision-makers undertook their concession because they could learn the existing deadlock had contributed to the psychological barriers, not other’s hostility. When they knew that, they intended to clearly reassure the other party by making major conciliatory gestures on those very issues that contributed to the other side’s insecurity. Then, it alleviates the other party’s fear and overcomes psychological barriers. Decision-makers employ bold gestures to break through diplomatic impasses and the psychological barriers (Berenji 2020).

on both sides earnestly desire peace” (Osgood 1962: 84). Considering that Osgood did not use a sophisticated conceptualisation of hope, the quote can be rephrased: GRIT is hard to be initiated when both sides do not *expect* reaching agreements on disarmament to be possible, even though they earnestly *desire* peace. Even though he did not seem to pay greater attention to hope, it is still worth examining whether hope influences the devising of unconditional conciliatory gestures. Along these lines, I examine the proposition he suggested, whether hope is needed to initiate unconditional conciliatory gestures. Based on the conceptualisation of hope developed in the previous chapter, I argue that hope can play a role in adopting unconditional conciliatory gestures by focusing on specific cognitive and behavioural aspects, ‘acting as if’ and ‘regardless of evidence’.

First, hope fundamentally assumes the best and leads individuals to act as if the goal is realisable based on the sustained energy as we saw in the previous chapter. In other words, someone who is hopeful typically *acts as if* they assume the best (Gordon 1987: 85). ‘*Acting as if*’ means believing the desired goal is possible and acting upon that belief to determine its veracity. Therefore, the experience of hope is associated with the ‘acting as if’ action tendency, motivating individuals to strive toward their desired goals. Given that the experience of hope often entails the ‘acting as if’ action tendency, a hopeful decision-maker might be able to sustain their energy to keep working to promote peace.

In addition, studies show that the enduring power from hope requires a continuous resolve *regardless of evidence*. Luhmann (1979: 24) emphasises this with a simple but clear quote, “Trust reflects contingency. Hope ignores contingency.” He explains that “trust is only involved when the trusting expectation makes a difference to a decision; otherwise, what we have is a simple hope.”⁶⁶ Hence one who trusts takes cognizance of the possibility of excessive

⁶⁶ Luhmann illustrates the relationship between hope and trust, giving the following example: “if a mother leaves

harm arising from the selectivity of others' actions and adopts a position towards that possibility." In this sense, for Pettit (2004: 159), to have hope is to have something we might describe as cognitive resolution. Webb (2007: 75) also suggests that "resolute hope is to hope for z is to desire z and to possess the cognitive resolve that enables one to *set aside* one's evidence-based belief in the probability of attaining z and to organise one's feeling and actions on the assumption that z is attainable [emphasis added]." Moreover, as hope essentially involves belief in possibility, at its heart is a willingness to act on a belief or in pursuit of an end, even in the face of risk or doubt (Shade 2001: 68-69). Therefore, hope allows people to act before evidence, and it finally leads individuals to *act as if* the desired goal is achieved.

To sum up, when individuals experience hope, we would expect that they believe the desired goal to be possible and buffer against the detrimental impact of negative feedback. In addition, we would expect that they also tend to *act as if* the goal is already achieved, so hopeful individuals do not need any preconditions to move forward. Therefore, I argue that hope can play a role in initiating unconditional conciliatory gestures. I suggest that decision-makers who experience hope might expect a conciliation to be possible and buffer against the detrimental impact of negative feedback. In this sense, they might be less likely to be affected by immediate negative responses from the target state and more likely to adopt unconditional conciliatory gestures which are not contingent on a target state's reciprocity. The debate on the conciliatory gestures in the presence and absence of hope is summarised in Table 2.

a child in the care of a babysitter, a number of *hopes* are associated with this. These are, that nothing untoward will happen, that the girl will be kind to the baby, will not disturb its sleep by turning up the radio, and so on. Her *trust* only extends to eventualities which, if they occur, would cause her to regret her decision to go out at all and to leave her child in the care of anybody. Trust therefore always bears upon a critical alternative, in which the harm resulting from a breach of trust may be greater than the benefit to be gained from the trust proving warranted" (Luhmann 1979: 24).

Table 2. Conciliatory gestures in the presence/absence of HOPE

	Conciliatory Gestures	Unconditional Conciliatory Gestures	Keep Conciliation After Defection
Offensive Realism			
Reassurance game	X		
GRIT	X	X	
Hope in Conciliation	X	X	X

But, more importantly, even though GRIT can support the making of a low level of conciliatory moves even in the absence of reciprocation, it expects that defection will be met with a defection (Osgood 1962; 1970).⁶⁷ This might suggest the need for further understanding of what happens after defection from an adversary state. According to the existing literature, for example, Axelrod (1984) suggests a “tit-for-tat” strategy, which is an effective strategy to cooperate in game theory, and it responds to defection by defecting. Basically, an agent using a “tit-for-tat” strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate an opponent’s previous action. So, if the opponent was previously cooperative, the agent will be cooperative. If not, neither will the agent. In other words, the tit-for-tat player immediately responds to defection by defecting on the next move. Likewise, all the extant literature in the absence of hope, even GRIT, maintains that conciliatory gestures should be stopped when there is defection. In other words, all the extant literature predicts decision-makers always converge on ending cooperation when there is defection, and conciliatory gestures are never possible after a target state’s defection.

⁶⁷ Wheeler understands the unconditional characteristics of GRIT in terms of the distinction between ‘positive reciprocation’ and ‘negative reciprocation’ (Wheeler 2018: 103). The distinction has been made by Ken Booth; ‘Positive reciprocation’ refers to actions that are taken in direct response to a conciliatory signal and that reward the initiating state with an equivalent valued concession; ‘negative reciprocation’ occurs if the state that is rewarded with a concession does not try and take advantage of the initiating state’s concessions by moving against it (Booth and Baylis 1989: 205).

However, an empirical study about conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, albeit in a slightly different context, shows that hope was positively related to the dissipation of the desire to retaliate (Moeschberger et al. 2005). The extant research provided rich empirical evidence on the role of hope in the context of intergroup conflict. It suggested that even though the ‘norm of reciprocity’ makes it more difficult to forgive the adversary in inter-state context than in interpersonal relationships, hope plays a constructive role in facilitating willingness to stop retaliation. As it only focuses on the *public*, it highlights the opportunity to examine how hope works in *decision-makers*’ decisions after defection during a conciliatory process. Therefore, I provide hypotheses related to the role of hope after defection in the following section.

After Defection: Interpretations and Responses

This section focuses on what happens after defection and I argue that when decision-makers experience hope, we would expect that they *interpret* and *respond* to an adversary’s defection differently. Given that decision-makers decide on how to respond based on their interpretations, I divide the role of hope into two steps: *interpretation* and *response*. I develop four hypotheses on how hope can be expected to impact the interpretations and responses of decision-makers, according to the cognitive and behavioural aspects of hope. These are: (i) careful interpretation, (ii) selective focus on situational explanations, (iii) keep pursuing a conciliation; and (iv) responsiveness.

Interpretation of intentions behind a defection

I develop two hypotheses on the role of hope in decision-maker’s interpretations of an adversary’s defection. First, I expect decision-makers experiencing hope are less likely to rush

to an assessment that defection signals the end of the conciliatory process. This is because hoping implies some cognitive analysis which emphasises the more positive future and allows actors to be able to wait and tolerate negative situation. Second, I expect decision-makers experiencing hope are less likely to interpret defection as hostile intent of the target state. This is because the experience of hope often entails a selective focus on information that confirms and sustains the belief that it is still possible to attain the goal in question.

H1. Careful Interpretation of an Adversary's Intent behind Defection

I expect decision-makers experiencing hope are less likely to rush to an assessment about an adversary's intent of defection because hope involves tolerance and patience – the ability to put up with things one does not like. Akhtar even calls patience “a retention of hope” (2015). Given that the experience of hope implies some cognitive analysis that out of all possible futures emphasises the more positive ones regarding the desired goal, the experience of hope allows actors to be able to wait and tolerate until the desired goal is achieved and delay immediate gratification.

Breznitz conducted two experiments and provided experimental evidence that hope is positively correlated with pain tolerance (Breznitz 1999). Since hope involves expectations about the future, Breznitz conducted the first experiment to see if providing *information* can influence these expectations. Given that hope consists of the belief and the expectation that a present hardship will be alleviated in the future, hope should be profoundly affected by information about when the present hardship ends.⁶⁸ The first test was designed to compare

⁶⁸ Information concerning the temporal aspects of threats plays a major role in determining stress levels during the anticipatory phase. Thus, information about the imminence of an anticipated danger – or an otherwise

an information and no-information group. The subject is required to immerse one hand in water mixed with ice and keep it for 4 minutes. The subject in the exact information group has a clock and no clock in the no-information group. The result shows that only 31.6% of subjects were able to successfully complete the task in the no-information group, compared to 76.5% in the exact information group.⁶⁹

While the first experiment clearly showed that providing exact information can promote tolerance, in international contexts, it is unrealistic to expect to have exact information about the duration of a stressful task. This is because information is always partial, and decision-makers face uncertainty, especially in adversarial relationships. Therefore,

stressful event – determines both the intensity of the emotional reaction, as well as a host of cognitive and behavioural outcomes. In situations that provide the person with full information about the onset of the danger, and they are objectively helpless, duration of anticipation increases the stress reaction. There is thus good reason to expect that information about the anticipated duration of the stress itself will have significant effects on stress levels and performance. Most important was the finding that absence of information concerning the duration of the stressful task increased the deleterious effects of stress (Breznitz 1999: 632, 637).

⁶⁹ The ‘cold pressor test’ was used as an experiment in this research. The test provides an opportunity to study reactions to pain within a controlled setting and the most frequently tested outcome using the test is duration of pain tolerance. Typically, the subject is required to immerse one hand in water mixed with ice. The first test was designed to compare an information and no-information group. In the exact information condition, subjects were asked to perform the test for 70 seconds, and after a brief relaxation period to keep their non-dominant hand in the iced cold water for 4 minutes. A digital clock in front of their eyes precisely indicated the passage of time. In the no information condition, on the contrary, subjects were asked to perform both tasks until the experimenter told them that the test was over. There was no clock in the room and their watches were also removed. The result shows that only 31.6% of subjects were able to successfully complete the task in the no-information group and keep their hand in the ice water for the entire 4 minutes, compared to 76.5% in the exact information group. In other words, the success rate was twice as high in the exact information group.

gaining accurate information does not inevitably lead to the best solutions. Breznitz also admitted that, within the context of a particularly stressful task or situation, information about its onset and termination is not always of primary importance, so he set up the second experiment focusing on hope rather than accurate information (Breznitz 1999: 638).

The second test demonstrated that subjects who participated with the initially encouraging information group were more likely to successfully tolerate the pain than those who started with initially discouraging information.⁷⁰ Whereas 81% in the initially encouraging information group (who had hope that this stressful task would end soon) could complete the task, only 50% of those in the discouraging information group could do so. Moreover, the initially encouraging information was even more effective than providing exact information. The study showed that in terms of effectively tolerating stress, telling the exact truth is clearly not invariably the best option.⁷¹ Rather, these two experiments showed the correlation between *hope* and *tolerance*, but not with the accuracy of information.

These studies provide valuable insights, because similarly in IR contexts, when decision-makers face the adversary's defection *even after* their conciliatory moves, this can be experienced as a stressful and threatening situation. As the experiments above

⁷⁰ The second test demonstrated that subjects who hoped with the initially encouraging information group (e.g. they were told that the task consisted of a shorter period of 2 minutes instead of 4) were more likely to successfully tolerate the pain for the target duration of 4 minutes than those that started with initially discouraging information (e.g. they were told that the task consisted of a longer period of 6 minutes instead of 4).

⁷¹ It depends on the information itself. If the duration is one that appears to the person as impossible to manage, it may lead to giving up hope of success, and consequently giving up the task itself. On the other hand, if the duration appears manageable, true information is clearly the most effective, since it also protects the credibility of the informant (Breznitz 1999: 640).

demonstrated, if decision-makers experience hope, they might be able to feel they can manage the current suffering, and they would be more likely to tolerate stress and wait. When decision-makers tolerate something, they might expect it to take some time to be achieved. So, the expectation would allow them to resist an impulse to take an immediately available reward in the hope of obtaining a more-valued reward in the future, and not to rush to a conclusion about the adversary's intention, even facing their defection. When decision-makers do not experience hope, they might hardly tolerate defections from an adversary and might not take enough time to make a conclusion about the adversary's intention. Therefore, I expect as follows:

Hypothesis 1(a): When decision-makers experience hope, they are more likely to *tolerate* defection and take time to make a decision about an adversary's intention.

Hypothesis 1(b): When decision-makers do not experience hope, they will be less likely *to tolerate* an adversary's defection. Instead, they will be likely to rush to a conclusion about the latter's intention.

H2. Selective Focus on Situational Factors

I expect a decision-maker experiencing hope not to automatically interpret defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state. The experience of hope implies some cognitive analysis which emphasises more positive future that the desired goal is achievable. In this sense, it often entails a selective focus on information that confirms and sustains the belief that it is still possible to attain the goal in question (Markwica 2018: 78). Individuals who experience hope may consciously or unconsciously suppress information indicating that the achievement of the aim is unlikely or impossible. Those who deny adverse evidence may distort

information to the extent that they become delusional about the probability of success. Moreover, intense feelings of hope may bring about the probability of neglect. That means actors become preoccupied with the desired goal, even though evidence would suggest that it is unlikely to be reached. Thus, when hopeful decision-makers ponder the future, some form of a ‘pleasure principle’ operates as a selection criterion.

Based on the above, I argue that hope operates as the opposite of an ‘inherent bad faith model’ (Holsti 1962) in foreign policy making. As discussed earlier, when an inherent bad faith model is in operation, decision-makers think an adversary has malign intent by attributing an adversary’s defection to an adversary’s fixed *dispositional factors*. Decision-makers tend to overlook situational information and attribute behaviours to internal dispositions when assessing and forming judgements of an other’s behaviour. Due to the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Heider 1958) and ‘ideological fundamentalism,’⁷² it is easier for decision-makers to interpret an adversary’s defection as hostile. Jervis argues what drives the spiral is the inability of decision-makers to “recognise that one’s own actions could be seen as menacing and the concomitant belief that the other’s hostility can only be explained by its aggressiveness” (Jervis 1976:75). In other words, if decision-makers think that an adversary’s hostility can be explained by other things rather than its aggressiveness (or malign intent), the spiral can potentially be wound down.

On the contrary, decision-makers who experience hope are more prone to consider *situational factors* which are more changeable than dispositional ones and this opens possibilities to explain the adversary’s hostility other than as evidence of its malign intent. This is because hope is generated when we believe situations can change, and it is hard to arise

⁷² ‘Ideological fundamentalism’ is defined as a ‘syndrome that assigns enemy status because of what the other is’ (Wheeler and Booth 1987: 331; Booth 1978: 42-3; Booth and Wheeler 2008: 65; Wheeler 2018: 93-6).

when it is may not change (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014: 70). In other words, hopeful decision-makers would not necessarily stick to an ‘inherent bad faith model’ and can think of different situational reasons for an adversary’s hostile behaviour. They would not place the causes of the defection within a fixed conception of the adversary. Instead, they would look to external situational factors.

What is more, the experience of hope can fundamentally help decision-makers escape from the core belief that “‘we’ want peace, but the ‘enemy’ does not” (Oren 2019; Bar-Tal et al. 2008; 2012).⁷³ In other words, the experience of hope can help decision-makers overcome the *combination* of ‘peaceful/defensive self-images’ and ‘enemy image of the rivalry’ (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 51-6; Wheeler 2009; 2018: 91-93). This is because, according to psychology study, there is a strong positive correlation between an individual’s hope and their appraisals of the adversary’s hope especially in the context of intergroup conflict (Leshem and Halperin 2020). Leshem and Halperin maintain that citizens’ appraisal of their adversary’s hope for peace predicts their own hope such that the higher the appraised hope of the adversary’s group, the higher the citizens’ own hope. More specifically, they found when people experience hope for peace in an adversarial relationship, they are more likely to think that the adversary also desires peace and expects this to be possible.⁷⁴

⁷³ Interestingly, psychology studies also figure out the core belief is prevalent in inter-group conflict. For example, Leshem and Halperin (2020: 14-15) found that approximately 80 percent of the study participants underestimated their rivals’ wishes for peace.

⁷⁴ They utilise a ‘co-orientation model’ with a large-scale survey to examine how the two components of hope – *desire* and *expectations* – are constructed in the seemingly hopeless case of a protracted and violent conflict. The ‘Co-orientation model’ is widely used to study the relationships between peoples’ attitudes – also called ‘orientations’ – toward a particular object and their appraisals of other peoples’ orientation toward that object. The co-orientation model describes three dimensions of comparison between the opinions of in-group and the other

Based on the mechanism that Leshem and Halperin (2020: 8) have identified,⁷⁵ what is driving the formation of in-group members' *desire* for peace is a normative-based competition concerning who wants peace more (Bar-Tal 2013; Oren 2019). To differentiate themselves from their 'enemy' on normative grounds, group members will believe they desire peace more than their opponents. The competition will be manifested in a positive association between citizens' appraisals of the wish for peace of the adversary and their own wish for peace such that an increase in appraisals of the desire for peace will result in an increase in citizens' own desires. Likewise, the experience of hope for peace seems to have a strong correlation with the interpretation of the adversary's desire for peace.

These studies provide valuable insights and invite us to test it in foreign policy-making context. Given the strong positive correlation between an individual's hope and their appraisals

group, which are agreement, congruency, and accuracy. The first dimension is agreement, which signifies the similarity between the opinions of the two groups. For example, if Palestinians and Israelis exhibit identical levels of wishes for peace, we can say that the groups 'agree' on this issue. The second is congruency, which reflects the similarity between group members' opinion on an issue and their appraisals of the out-group's opinion on the same issues. For instance, if Israelis desire for peace and expect that Palestinians also desire for peace, then congruency is high. The third dimension is accuracy, which reflects the similarity between group members' appraisals of the out-group opinions and the out-group's actual opinions. If Palestinians wish for peace and Israelis accurately estimate that Palestinians wish for peace, then accuracy is high (See Leshem and Halperin 2020: 5-6).

⁷⁵ Leshem and Halperin (2020) also provide the second mechanism regarding expectations. The mechanism of how people form in-groups' *expectations* for peace begins the tendency that group members adhere to a common fallacy that the opponent holds the key for resolution (Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2006) and thus is the side responsible for escalation and de-escalation. When citizens think that the 'enemy' holds all the keys to resolution, they are bound to assess the likelihood of peace on their rival's assessment. Leshem (2019), for example, showed that citizens calibrate their expectations for peace depending on whether a member of the rival group thinks that peace is possible.

of the adversary's hope, I expect when decision-makers experience hope, they might assume the adversary might also want peace and focus on situational factors to explain the adversary's provocative moves rather than their hostile intent. Therefore I hypothesise that when a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be more likely to selectively focus on information that confirms the belief that conciliation is still possible because they might be able to think of other situational factors rather than malign intent. This gives rise to the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2(a): When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be less likely to interpret an adversary's defection as evidence of their hostile intent.

Hypothesis 2(b). When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be more likely to interpret an adversary state's defection as evidence of malign intent.

Table 3. Hypotheses on Decision-makers' Interpretations of an Adversary's Defection

	Theory	Hypotheses	Observable Implications
Interpretation of an Adversary's Defection	H1. Careful Interpretation	H1(a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be more likely to tolerate defection and take time to make a decision about an adversary's intention.	- No rush to conclusion about an adversary's intention - Refraining from immediate gratification
		H1(b – alternative hypothesis). When a decision-maker <i>does not</i> experience hope, they will be less likely to tolerate a defection and more likely to rush to a conclusion about an adversary's intention.	- Immediate interpretation of an adversary's defection - Asking for an immediate response to an adversary
	H2. Selective Focus	H2(a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be less likely to interpret an adversary's defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state.	-Place greater weight to small positive changes - Provide different situational explanations
		H2(b – alternative hypothesis). When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be more likely to interpret an adversary's defection as clear evidence of malign intent.	- Pay attention to hostile moves -Place the causes of defection in an adversary's hostility

Responses to defections

Based on the interpretation of an adversary's defection, decision-makers must decide how to respond to it. We expect that the experience of hope would help decision-makers to think they can manage a challenging situation, and the adversary might also want peace so they do not interpret a defection as an obstacle to make them forgo their goal. This kind of interpretation can provide a good basis to keep continuing with conciliatory gestures. I develop the third and the fourth hypothesis on the role of hope in how decision-makers actually respond to a defection.

H3. Keep Pursuing Conciliation

I expect that decision-makers experiencing hope would create new ways to overcome objections against a conciliation and keep pursuing conciliation. When hoping, people tend to do whatever is necessary to achieve the desired outcome (Averill and Sundararajan 2005: 140). Given that hope reinforces willpower and sustains energy in the face of adversity, hope tends to facilitate creativity and imagination about achieving the aim in question (Rego et al. 2014; Soysal et al. 2023), heighten cognitive flexibility and improve the ability to develop alternative pathways to overcome obstacles (Chang 1998; Rand and Cheavens 2009; Cavanaugh et al. 2011; Buchanan and Lopez 2013). According to hope theory (Snyder 1995), hope includes the cognitive willpower to encourage movement towards, and the perceived ability to generate routes or pathways to arrive at one's goal.

More specifically, in the context of inter-group conflict processes, hope has a distinct role in promoting peace in a similar sense that it is associated with searching for new and creative solutions to the conflict (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat 2014). For example, Rosler and his colleagues empirically examine each emotion — empathy and hope — and their unique influence on support for conflict-related policies at different stages of a conflict (Rosler

et al. 2017).⁷⁶ While empathy is necessary to prevent potential further escalation of a conflict, hope is needed to accomplish conflict resolution. In their empirical studies, while participants who felt empathy towards Palestinians *objected to aggressive policies* toward them, participants who felt hopeful with regard to the future of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict *supported conciliatory policies*. Unlike the experience of empathy, the experience of hope did not significantly predict attitudes concerning aggressive policies in the conflict. In other words, empathy is related to relieving the suffering of the other group caused by the conflict (Pagano and Huo 2007), and the emotional goal of empathy is focused only on the internal state of another, which includes suffering from aggressive measures in the context of violent escalation. On the other hand, hope allows people to move toward conciliation and actively search for new solutions to overcome obstacles and support conciliatory policies.

Although an adversary's defection itself is an obstacle to a conciliatory process, it also creates new and other obstacles, *objections* against the conciliation process. Such objections can be raised by any opposition political parties, domestic audiences or allied foreign countries. This is because an adversary's defection can threaten allied foreign countries, and a conciliatory rhetoric, such as apologies and forgiveness, is often attacked as unpatriotic, whereas a nationalistic rhetoric is praised as patriotic (Tang 2011).⁷⁷ What is more, making

⁷⁶ *Empathy* is an other-oriented emotional state, including components of knowing another person's thoughts and feelings as well as possibly taking their perspective; *hope* is a highly cognitive-based emotion that involves expectation and aspiration for a positive goal in the future, as well as positive feelings about the anticipated outcome (Rosler et al. 2015: 117-119).

⁷⁷ According to Tang (2011: 728), decision-makers have relied more regularly on fear and hatred to mobilise the public because they know these emotions are more effective at arousing people than calls for compromise and reconciliation. Consequently, politicians are generally reluctant to deploy conciliatory tones unless they have very strong moral convictions.

conciliatory gestures is domestically riskier for doves than hawks.⁷⁸ Many empirical studies found that domestic audiences tend to respond more favourably when hawks deliver the olive branch to a foreign rival compared to when doves do the same (Cukierman and Tommasi 1995; Cowen and Sutter 1998; Schultz 2005; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Fehrs 2014; Kreps, Saunders and Schultz 2018; Mattes and Weeks 2019).⁷⁹ Considering that studies have shown that high levels of hope have been significantly correlated with decision-makers who are doves (Halperin and Gross 2011: 1230; Plistkin et al. 2018: 166), hopeful decision-makers might be doubly burdened to both legitimise their conciliatory gestures⁸⁰ and convince any opposing side parties, such as domestic audience or allied foreign countries, that ‘I am not blinded by hope’ and ‘this hope does not lead to insensible decision-making.’⁸¹ This is because hope is

⁷⁸ Scholars and policymakers have long used the shorthand of hawks and doves to characterise leader personalities that correspond to a particular political inclination, whereby hawks are considered right-wing and more aggressive in foreign policy, and doves are left-wing and more peaceful (Kesgin 2020: 107, see also Mitchell 2000).

⁷⁹ A popular view holds that foreign policy hawks have an advantage at bringing about rapprochement with international adversaries. This idea is rooted in domestic politics: voters respond more favourably to efforts at reconciliation when their own leader has a hawkish rather than a dovish reputation. In a similar sense, Fearon (1994) also argues that when the executive leadership of democracies is faced with conservative domestic political constituencies, they will be more reluctant to adopt policies of reassurance for fear of arousing domestic criticism. Under such conditions, the extent of reassurance sought by the adversary state may entail an unacceptable level of domestic political costs. Thus, even if policymakers can acknowledge that they may be facing a spiral interaction, domestic pressures may prevent them from attempting to reassure the fears of other states.

⁸⁰ In fact, they often legitimise their conciliatory gestures toward enemy states in terms of strategic action (Read and Shapiro 2014), morality and justice (Tang 2011: 728), or humanitarian policy (Halperin and Gross 2011) or persuade domestic audiences that they have reason to expect the adversary to welcome it (Mattes and Weeks 2022: 958).

⁸¹ Decision-makers might focus on these things rather than ‘this hope is sincere.’ This is because domestic

considered unpatriotic, weak and risky as discussed earlier. In this sense, when hopeful decision-makers face defections from an adversary, they might be expected to develop new ways to overcome objections against a conciliation raised by the opposition political parties, domestic audiences or even allied foreign countries and persuade them to continue a conciliation.

To sum up, the existing studies suggest that the experience of hope improves the ability to develop alternative pathways to overcome obstacles. More specifically, in the context of inter-group conflict, the experience of hope is associated with searching for new solutions to support conciliation policies. For decision-makers, objections caused by an adversary's defection are another critical challenge than defection itself in pursuing conciliation. Given the heightened cognitive flexibility associated with hope, hopeful decision-makers might be able to devise creative pathways to persuade the opposing sides, such as the opposing political parties, domestic audiences, or allied foreign countries, as well as to overcome the adversary's defections. Therefore, I hypothesise as follows:

Hypothesis 3(a). When decision-makers experience hope, they will be more likely to keep pursuing conciliation even after a defection and create new ways to overcome objections against a conciliation.

Hypothesis 3(b). When decision-makers do not experience hope, they will be less likely to create new ways to overcome objections and cease conciliatory gestures after a defection.

audiences arguably care less about the sincerity of *their own state* leaders; instead, they care much about the sincerity of the *other state's* leader. According to Matte and Weeks (2022: 969), perceiving the foreign leader to be sincere led to a sixteen-point increase in support for reciprocation to the foreign country, a result that was highly significant.

H4. Responsiveness Towards an Adversary

I expect decision-makers who experience hope to be more responsive and actively convey amity when they face defections from an adversary. Responsiveness during conflict does not involve simply behaving less negatively and more positively. To be responsive is to be willing to understand and validate others actively.⁸² To understand others is to be aware of one's personal qualities, and to validate others is to value and appreciate one's attributes, accomplishments, and worldview (Reis et al., 2017). Therefore, responsive individuals are more able and willing to be aware of other's personal qualities and appreciate one's attributes, accomplishments, and worldview. The understanding and validating of responses can be embodied in the conciliatory gestures as a performance of emotional affinity to convey amity. According to Hall (2015: 189), "emotional shows of friendship and happiness may function as cheap but meaningful signals. In other words, precisely because it is relatively easy to display the superficial emotional trappings of friendship, choosing not to do so can itself be a strong signal of intentions."⁸³ Showing understanding and validation of an adversary state

⁸² First described in the Intimacy Process Model (Reis and Shaver 1988), perceived partner responsiveness refers to the belief that an interaction partner understands and validates the self and is willing to support one's needs. Perceived partner responsiveness includes three components. First, people must *feel understood* by their partners. Although the relevance of actual understanding to relationship outcomes is debated, researchers agree that perceived understanding — believing that partners are aware of other's inner qualities, value, as one sees them oneself — is essential to relationship well-being (Reis et al. 2017). The second component of perceived partner responsiveness, *validation*, is the belief that partners value and appreciate one's attributes, accomplishments, and worldview. Extensive evidence documents the impact of feeling liked and appreciated in relationships, mainly because these qualities allow people to feel accepted and secure in close relationships.

⁸³ He added, "On a related note, while it might seem odd to suggest happiness is a form of emotional diplomacy with political salience on the international stage, the display of happiness during interactions conceivably does have a role in providing a visible indicator of the quality of a relationship" (Hall 2015: 189).

might be cheap, but it still can convey amity. Moreover, choosing not to be responsive might have a significant impact on delivering negative intent.

Given that responsiveness can work as a facilitator to convey amity and signal intention, it plays an important role in the maintenance of interaction (Davis 1982: 86). In a similar sense, many studies argue that hope also helps smooth social interactions (Pleeging et al. 2021), since hopefulness often goes hand in hand with outgoingness and openness towards one's environment, which makes people more likely to forge relationships and get along with others (Halpin, 2001). Moreover, hope is generally expected to help us deal with disagreement and conflict (Bland and Darlington 2002; Zigon 2009) and to be found in social ties (Giraud 2007). Understanding and appreciating the hopes of others can increase empathy thus creating solidarity (Kadlac 2015). This means that if social hope is effective, people will most likely be willing to collaborate to achieve their shared hopes or even to sacrifice part of their own wellbeing in the interest of the larger community (Braithwaite 2004).

According to Sasaki and Overall, one of the key abilities and motivations to facilitate responsiveness during conflict is the ability to *regulate destructive reactions and negative emotions*, which is closely correlated with the presence of hope (Sasaki and Overall 2023: 3). Sasaki and Overall maintain that people who possess high dispositional self-control or in-the-moment self-regulatory strength have the energy and resources to overcome destructive impulses necessary for responsiveness. They specify the condition that people can be responsive and approach conflict resolution collaboratively, which is when they are able to down-regulate negative emotions, such as by acknowledging and accepting emotions and reappraising conflict in less threatening ways instead of suppressing or amplifying emotions. Defections from an adversary can cause decision-makers' negative emotions and destructive responses, but, by using strategies to regulate emotion such as a 'cognitive reappraisal (Halperin, Sharvit and Gross 2010; Halperin and Gross 2011)', decision-makers might be able

to be responsive and continue to experience hope.

Therefore, I expect decision-makers who experience hope to regulate negative emotions caused by defection and to facilitate their responsiveness, resulting in conveying amity to an adversary. On the contrary, when decision-makers do not experience hope, they will be less likely to regulate their negative emotion caused by defections and will be less willing to be responsive and understand and validate an adversary. The fourth hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 4(a): When decision-makers experience hope, they will be more willing even after a defection to *show responsiveness* toward an adversary to convey amity.

Hypothesis 4(b): When decision-makers do not experience hope, they will be less likely to show responsiveness toward an adversary following a defection.

Table 4. Hypotheses on Decision-makers' Responses to an Adversary's Defection

	Theory	Hypotheses	Observable Implications
Response to an Adversary's Defection	H3. Keep Pursuing Conciliation	H3(a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be more likely to keep conciliation even after a defection and create new ways to persuade others.	-Not giving up conciliatory gestures. -Creating new ways to persuade others.
		H3(b). When a decision-maker <i>does not</i> experience hope, they will be less likely to create new ways to overcome objections and more likely to cease conciliatory gestures after defections.	-Stop conciliatory moves -Never try to persuade others
	H4. Responsiveness	H4(a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be more willing even after a defection to show responsiveness toward an adversary to convey amity.	-To understand and validate an adversary. -To convey amity
		H4(b). When a decision-maker <i>does not</i> experience hope, they will less willing to show responsiveness toward an adversary following a defection.	-Not try to understand and validate an adversary. -No effort to convey amity

Conclusion

This chapter presents the theoretical framework to investigate the role of hope in a conciliatory process. I suggest categorising conciliatory gestures in terms of conditionality, and I argue that a decision-maker who experiences hope is expected to initiate *unconditional conciliatory gestures*. Extant literature which assumes the absence of hope maintains that conciliatory gestures should be stopped when there is defection. In other words, the existing studies predict decision-makers always converge on ending cooperation *after defection* from an adversary, and conciliatory gestures are not possible. However, I argue that the presence of hope leads decision-makers to interpret and respond to defection in a different way than what conventional accounts would expect. I developed four hypotheses on how hope can be expected to impact the interpretations and responses of decision-makers. These are (1) careful interpretation, (2) selective focus, (3) keep pursuing conciliation and (4) responsiveness.

The first two sets of hypotheses involve the role of hope in decision-maker's *interpretations* of an adversary's defection. First, I expect a decision-maker who experiences hope to be more likely to tolerate defection and not rush into a negative assessment of an adversary's actions because hope involves tolerance and patience. Second, I expect a decision-maker who experiences hope not to be less likely to interpret a defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state because the experience of hope often entails a selective focus on information that confirms and sustains the belief that it is still possible to attain the goal in question

The next two sets of hypotheses involve the role of hope in how decision-makers would *respond* to a defection. The hypothesis is that, I expect a decision-maker who experiences hope to be more likely to pursuing conciliation even after a defection and create new ways to overcome objections against conciliation, as the experience of hope improves the ability to develop alternative pathways to overcome obstacles. Fourth, I expect a decision-

maker who experiences hope to be more willing, even after a defection, to show responsiveness toward an adversary to convey amity.

Based on the hypotheses developed in this and the previous chapter, the next chapter explains the methodological approach of the thesis to test these theoretical frameworks (Chapter 4). Part Two of the thesis then tests the hypotheses in Chapters 2 and 3 against the two empirical cases (Chapters 5 and 6) of South Korea's application of conciliatory gestures to North Korea under Presidents Kim and Park.

Chapter 4. Methodology

Introduction

This chapter sets out the approach and method I adopt to explore the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures in two empirical cases. In order to test the hypotheses developed in the previous chapters, I focus on two South Korean decision-makers who formulated and implemented conciliatory gestures towards North Korea and analyse their communication and behaviour by utilising a process tracing method. I use already-prepared text data, such as government documents and autobiographies, and collect data from conducting interviews. Accordingly, this chapter includes two sections: case study and elite interviews.

First, in the case study section, I explain *case selection* and the *process tracing* method. I utilise the method of “structured and focused comparison” (George and Bennett 2005) to discover the role of a new variable, hope, in a conciliatory process. I select two South Korean leaders and explore their use of conciliatory gestures toward North Korea, the Sunshine Policy and Trustpolitik, where we see different conciliatory gestures and presence/absence of hope. Based on the structured and focused comparison method, I utilise process tracing to test the hypotheses in Chapters 2 and 3. I address qualitative sentiment analysis and self-reports and observer-reports of state leaders’ affective experiences that I use to detect the presence/ absence of hope and trace the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures.

In the section of elite interviews, I demonstrate why the elite interview method is adopted and how the interviews are conducted. I conduct elite interviews as a method of triangulation and gather data to corroborate the early findings from documentary analysis. I also address the issues of how I conduct interviews: semi-structured interviews, recruitment, and interview questions.

Case Study

I utilise the method of structured and focused comparison and apply it to the two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. According to George and Bennett, case studies have powerful advantages in the identification of new variables and hypotheses. When researchers think of an entirely new variable, they may move to develop new theories that can be tested through previously unexamined evidence (George and Bennett 2005: 27). Therefore, I use the case study method to test the theories developed around the experience of hope and its impact on conciliatory gestures. As such, this section is divided into two sections: case selection and process tracing.

Case Selection

I select the Sunshine Policy and Trustpolitik, where we see different conciliatory gestures and the presence/absence of hope on the part of two different state leaders, Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Park Geun-hye. The clear variations allow me to use the method of “structured and focused comparison.” According to George and Bennett, the method of structured and focused comparison was devised to study historical experiences in ways that would yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems (George and Bennett 2005: 67-68). The method is “*structured*” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and these questions are asked of each case to guide and standardise data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is “*focused*” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements for structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases.

To make the case study “structured”, I applied the same question to each case: Why do some decision-makers, even when facing an adversary, respond not through threats and

coercions but by initiating conciliatory gestures? Why do some decision-makers respond differently to an adversary's defection in response to the initiation of conciliatory gestures? In order to answer these questions, the scope condition of my thesis encompasses (i) a decision-maker should have initiated a conciliatory process, and (ii) also faced a defection from an adversary state. First, both the *Sunshine Policy* and *Trustpolitik* clearly show conciliatory gestures toward North Korea in terms of peace-making activity. For example, President Kim Dae-jung and President Park Geun-hye published articles to highlight the importance of engaging with North Korea before they were elected president. They emphasised the importance of engagement with North Korea in their inauguration speeches, they achieved the renewal of humanitarian aid through UNICEF, and the separated South and North Korean families reunions happened during both presidencies. The two presidents also faced defections from North Korea, but responded differently. While Kim did not give up his conciliatory gestures even after defections, Park turned her back and explicitly ceased the conciliatory process. Therefore, the two selected cases can be structurally compared to discover their different types of conciliatory gestures and different responses after defection during a conciliatory process.

The case study is “focused” on investigating the role of hope in conciliatory processes.⁸⁴ For this, it is important to have a clear variation of presence/absence of hope in each individual state leader. In the selected cases in my thesis, one state leader clearly shows hope, and the other does not in the face of a similar environment. According to the existing literature, there

⁸⁴ Admittedly, it is important to recognise that a single event can be relevant for research on a variety of theoretical topics. Given that the method should be undertaken with a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective, it cannot address all other relevant aspects of a historical event. Therefore, case explanations must always be considered to be of a provisional character. Therefore, the theoretical conclusions drawn from case study findings can also be provisional (George and Bennett 2005: 90).

are four main possible independent variables to explain South Korean conciliatory gestures toward North Korea: (i) great power politics, (ii) domestic politics, (iii) North Korea's response and (iv) individual state leaders. When it comes to great power politics, both the *Sunshine Policy* and *Trustpolitik* initially confronted scepticisms from the US. Both Kim and Park adopted the conciliatory gestures through a similar domestic institutional process of foreign policy making. For example, the National Security Council (NSC) played a key role as an institutional process to formulate both foreign policies. Kim made the NSC a permanent organisation for the first time; Park re-established the NSC which had been abolished by the previous administration. Most importantly, there were consistent provocations from North Korea during both the Sunshine Policy and Trustpolitik. However, there are *apparent variations on presence/absence of hope* between two individual state leaders. Therefore, I investigate how far the presence/absence of hope explains the variation of different types of conciliatory gestures in the two periods under study.

Finally, in addition to the fact that the selected cases are suitable to test the theoretical framework, there is another reason as to why these cases are appropriate to study. South Korean conciliatory gestures toward North Korea, such as the *Sunshine Policy* and *Trustpolitik*, have been overlooked in terms of the role of hope in ethnonational conflicts. Scholars in the field of peace psychology have repeatedly emphasised the importance of hope in creating the attitudinal platform to find a way out of the conflict (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Almog, 2008, Halperin 2011). Besides, numerous failures to reach an agreement diminished people's hope in the feasibility of peace (Leshem and Halperin 2020: 1391). Even though there are some studies on the role of hope in ethnonational conflicts in case of Israel-Palestine (Halperin and Gross 2011; Cohen-Chen et al. 2017) and Northern Ireland (Moeschberger et al. 2005), inter-Korean relations have not yet been studied from this perspective. Interestingly, according to Kim HJ (2020), the South Korean public showed the emotion of "hope (3.12)"

the most toward unification followed by “joy (3.02), anxiety (2.75), indifference (2.57), sadness (2.34), anger (2.32).” Nevertheless, hope has been paid less attention to than other emotions such as sorrow, fear or hatred, and has not been explicitly studied in the context of inter-Korean relations.⁸⁵ In the next section, I elaborate on the method of “process tracing.”

Process Tracing

I used “process tracing” to test hypotheses and trace the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures. The term “process tracing” refers to the use of “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” and it “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005: 206).

To trace the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures, I take three steps in each empirical case and identify (i) if conciliatory gestures were conditional or unconditional (ii) if hope was present or absent, and (iii) how each decision-maker interpreted and responded to an adversary’s defection. Each of the following empirical chapters are divided into three sections accordingly and I use evidence in texts to identify each variable and demonstrate my argument.⁸⁶ This section focuses on *qualitative sentiment analysis* and *self-reports and*

⁸⁵ There had been deep-rooted hostility between South Korea and North Korea after the Korean War, and the issue of hoping for peace (or unification) toward North Korea becoming faint in South Korea has been problematised as well.

⁸⁶ The approach is using illustrative cases demonstrations, Empirical Plausibility Probes. According to Levy, plausibility probes are intermediary steps between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing. (Levy 2008: 3).

observer-reports of state leaders' affective experiences that I use to detect the presence/absence of hope and trace the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures.

Qualitative Sentiment Analysis of Observing Hope

I conducted the “sentiment analysis” to observe hope through documents and infer verbal expressions of hope during episodes of conciliatory policy. Sentiment analysis refers to “the task of automatically determining feelings from the text, in other words, automatically determining valence, emotions, and other affectual states from text” (Mohammad 2016: 201).⁸⁷ It is appropriate for *historical case studies* because it is impossible to track historical figures' facial muscles or explore their physiological condition to detect their emotions.⁸⁸ Even when they are still alive, it is difficult to meet them or have an experiment to gauge their emotions at the scene of policy making. What is more, sentiment analysis is especially suitable to detect *hope*, given its highly cognitive aspects (Lazarus 1991; Snyder 2000; Jarymowicz and Bar-tal 2006). As the process of policy making necessarily involves deliberate cognitive evaluations and activities, hope can be detected more clearly than any other emotions in the process by analysing the cognitive appraisals.

⁸⁷ The term sentiment analysis can be used to refer to many different – but related – problems. Most commonly, it is used to refer to the task of automatically determining the valence or polarity of a piece of text, whether it is positive, negative, or neutral. However, more generally, it refers to determining one's attitude towards a particular target or topic (Mohamad 2016: 201).

⁸⁸ Emotions are aroused not only in a verbal way but also in various ways, so detecting emotions can also be achieved by observing those external representations of emotions. For example, emotions can be displayed through the body, some examples include the following: facial expression, physiological conditions such as heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductance, cardiovascular, respiratory, electrodermal activity, and brain-based measures of emotions representations.

As elaborated in the ‘Conceptualisation of Hope’ in Chapter 2, I mainly infer hope through the *explicit expression of hope* and the *proxies of desire and expectation*. Explicit expression of *hope* comprises direct references to hope in self- or observer reports, such as ‘I hope for something,’ ‘I have hope in something’ etc. The descriptive emotion terms describe hope they signify and can be found through a sentiment analysis of texts. I also identify hope with an indirect description of its core components, desire and expectation, when direct quotes of hope were not evident in the text. As policy makers may deliberately refrain from spelling out their emotions, or they may not be aware of them, it is certainly helpful to search for the proxies of hope. Policy makers may also fake emotions. However, even though the demonstration might be a merely ‘surface acting,’ psychologists have argued that performing particular emotions can generate corresponding feelings (Ekman 2004; See also Hall 2015: 22). Therefore, it is still useful to search for the core components of hope as proxies. I searched for evidence of *desire* (or want, wish or long for something) and *expectation* (or believe) that something was possible during the conciliatory process.

I have also used *cognitive and behavioural indicators* to understand the influence of hope, based on the specific kinds of thinking and behavioural impulses expected if a decision-maker experiences hope. These markers were: a cognitive tendency to “reappraise situations in a way that the desired goal can be achieved,” and a behavioural tendency to “make actors move toward and approach to a goal.” If these indicators were present during the conciliatory process, then this suggested that hope may have exerted an influence.

In observing the presence/absence and the role of hope in a conciliatory process, I tried to clarify indicators as much as possible. In line with the purpose of cases, this PhD thesis aims to highlight a new focused factor in a certain context, and I have paid attention to avoiding confirmation bias. I first used original Korean data to detect each indicator mentioned above in the text. I then cross-checked it with official translated English versions of autobiographies and

government documents to see if the same results could be found in both languages. For example, After I found the evidence of desire and expectation in the original Korean data, I cross-checked which English words had been used in the English version of the text. When there is no official English version of autobiographies, memoirs and government documents, I put more emphasis on reading a specific context rather than quantifying the frequency of a certain word in English and Korean to overcome potential errors caused by translated data. In the following sections, I will illustrate the types of text I analyse in this research.

Self-reports and Observer-reports

The sample of texts I used contained self-reports and observer-reports. Assessing self-reports and observer-reports is one of the common psychological techniques to study emotion (Larsen and Fredrickson 1999; Robinson and Clore 2002; Barrett 2004). *Self-reports* include personal documents, such as memoirs and autobiographies, to directly show state leaders' feelings, and the main advantage of self-reports is that they may come closest to some of the feelings a person experienced in a given situation.⁸⁹ Therefore, I emphasise scrutinising the experience of hope in the autobiographies, memoirs or letters, such as *Kim Dae-jung's Autobiography I, II* by Kim Dae-Jung,⁹⁰ and *Despair Teaches me Hope Motivates Me, Through the Darkness To the Future* by Park Geun-Hye etc. I examine the personal documents to study the official policy decision making, as well as the private realm. Regardless of private traits even in these types of documents, it should not be assumed that their value as sources is limited to a personal or private domain. Extant studies show that personal documents, such as autobiographies and

⁸⁹ Autobiographies, diaries, memoirs and letters are usually categorised as personal documents, because they are produced by individuals and they tell the story of one's own life, shedding a great deal of light on personal attitudes and feelings.

⁹⁰ I cited from the autobiography translated in English (Kim 2019).

memoirs, are highly revealing about public issues. Indeed, they often constitute the most significant documentary source, because they provide compelling witness accounts by the people involved, as opposed to the bland official statements commonly encountered in committee minutes (McCulloch 2004: 86).

Self-reports can also include official documents such as presidential speeches and minutes, which are written or spoken by state leader themselves. I used 319 presidential speeches including the word ‘North Korea’ (1998 – 2003) for the Sunshine Policy and 118 presidential speeches (2013 – 2016) for the Trustpolitik. Because state leaders may consciously or unconsciously provide information about their emotions in their communications in the official documents, an analysis of their language is thus a useful method for making inferences about their affective experience (Markwica 2018: 98).⁹¹ For example, it was in the 15th South Korean National Assembly minutes on 11 April 2000 that I found the quote that Kim Dae-jung said, “I personally couldn’t help crying tears of joy, as I have dedicated my whole life to our national reunification.” Kim indeed revealed his personal feelings even in the official meeting. Therefore, I examine the presidential speech records provided by the National Archives of Korea, minutes of South Korean cabinet meetings, transcripts of internal meetings, and *Annual White Papers on Korean Unification, Reports on Unification Education* published by the Ministry of Unification etc. All these materials can be accessed online.

I also examine *observer-reports* obtained from observers who make judgments about state leaders’ likely affective experience, such as policy-makers and advisers who worked with state leaders in their presidencies. As the experience of emotion is largely an internal event and policy makers in particular are more often hesitant to share information about their genuine emotions, observer-reports are useful in that emotions are usually associated with external

⁹¹ One of my interviewees who had worked as a Secretary for Speechwriting also agreed that official documents such as presidential speeches are appropriate to understand a state leader’s feeling and thoughts (Interviewee B).

manifestations that can be discerned by spectators (Markwica 2018: 99). Therefore, I use other policy-makers' memoirs, such as *Peacemaker* by Lim Dong-won who was the former Minister of Unification in President Kim's administration, *Who am I* by Choi Seo-won (known as Choi Sun-shil) who was the most influential figure advising President Park, to cross-check the findings from other data. Additionally, I conducted elite interviews and collected data as forms of observer-reports, which will be illustrated in the next 'Elite Interview' section.

There are shortcomings of document analysis. Official documents are usually not suited for the specific purpose of research, as they are already-prepared data, meaning that they are generally not collected to answer a specific question. In addition to that, by presenting the official version of events, the documents often conceal the informal processes and considerations that preceded decision making (George and Bennett 2005: 103). In fact, the experience of hope is rarely documented in official government documents, and it is often regarded as not appropriate to be recorded. Then, personal documents, such as memoirs and autobiographies, might include private information about how they felt, but might also include biased opinions or thoughts. And there has also been naturally some variety in the ways in which such documents have been interpreted (McCulloch 2004: 86). Therefore, to compensate for the weakness and triangulate the findings from documentary analysis, I also adopt the elite interview method and discuss it in the following section.

Elite Interviews

I conduct elite interviews as a method of triangulation. Triangulation, in the research context, refers to the use of multiple methodological resources or practices, and there are different forms of triangulation: multiple data sources, multiple methodologies, multiple data analysis techniques, multiple researchers and multiple triangulation (Thurmond, 2001; Denzin, 2009;

Merriam and Tisdell, 2016; Natow 2020). Elite interviews are rarely utilised in isolation, and the goal of collecting data by elite interviews is often to confirm information that has already been collected from other sources (Tansey 2007: 766). When documents, memoirs, and secondary sources provide an initial overview of the events or issues under examination, interviews with key players can be used to corroborate the early findings. In this way, interviews contribute toward the research goal of triangulation, where collected data are cross-checked through multiple sources to increase the findings' robustness. By ensuring that data is not collected from only one source, or one type of source, the 'triangulation strategy' can increase the credibility of findings that are supported across multiple sources, and can reveal the weakness of some sources that might otherwise have been viewed as reliable. Conducting interviews with elites can therefore confirm the accuracy of information that has previously been collected from other sources. Therefore, I adopt elite interviews and gather data to combine them with documentary analysis, which is the most common technique of using multiple qualitative methodologies (Natow 2020: 164, 166). In this section, I address the issues of how I conducted the interviews: semi-structured interviews, recruitment, and interview questions.

Semi-structured interviews

I conducted semi-structured interviews with foreign policy experts who have been directly involved in the decision-making process of the *Sunshine Policy* or *Trustpolitik*. Interviews were conducted online, and the length of the interviews varied according to availability and enthusiasm, but each interview generally lasted an hour. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the means of data collection because of two primary considerations. First, a semi-structured interview is suitable for interviewees who are experts. This is because experts usually do not just follow the interview structure and answer tamely to a series of prepared

questions when interviewees may even know more than the researcher regarding the critical dimensions of the area (Gillham 2005: 54). It is in this respect that the interview has to be loosely structured at best. Also, the experts serving as interviewees are accustomed to being interviewed, so they can better manage the interview process. According to Marshall and Gretchen (2016: 160), elites often respond well to inquiries about broad areas of content and to open-ended questions that allow them the freedom to use their knowledge and imagination. And they are used to being interviewed and quite sophisticated in managing the interview process.

Second, a semi-structured interview is suitable to allow elite interviewees to respond freely, which leads to more descriptive and informative explanations than the researcher expects. As mentioned above, this research needs rich description to provide a detailed hope-laden dynamics in the conciliatory policy making process. As opposed to surveys, interviewing allows researchers to ask open-ended questions and enables respondents to talk freely, without the constraint of having to answer according to fixed categories (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673). In order to make the best of interviews, I adopted semi-structured interviews and gathered rich detail about key elites' thoughts and attitudes on central issues. It facilitates the process tracing method and provides the kind of data that can be critical in uncovering the causal mechanisms that are central to comprehensive explanations.

*Recruitment of interviewees*⁹²

Interviewees who participated in this project were experts on South Korean foreign policy towards North Korea and officials who were advising on the formulation and implementation

⁹² It is important to note that before recruiting participants, this project received ethics approval from University of Birmingham (ERN_20-0773) in January 2022.

of either the *Sunshine Policy* or *Trustpolitik*. I selected participants on the basis of the following criteria. First, they participated in the foreign policy decision-making process in person as government officers or advisors during the Kim or Park presidency. Second, it would be beneficial to recruit those who had personal interaction with each president to gather richer information.

The first criterion is important in that participants' deep-rooted involvement in the official experience of the foreign policy decision-making process can provide 'corroboration' for initial findings from the documents. To understand the political process, elite interviews should involve asking people who are deeply involved in a political process (Manheim et al 2008: 373). In particular, process tracing requires data collection on crucial political decision-making and activity, often at the highest political level, and elite interviews will frequently be a critical strategy for obtaining this required information (Tansey 2007: 767).

Second, it was important to recruit those who had personal interaction with each president to gather richer information. As well as serving a corroborative purpose, elite interviews can also be used for additive purposes – 'the incorporation of additional information' to what a single data source may provide (Davies 2001: 78). The interviewees who meet the second criteria can provide this kind of further information. For example, it would not be easy to collect data about a president's sincere desire for peace or interpretation of North Korea's intentions solely by analysing pre-prepared documents. Interviewing individuals who had a personal relationship with state leaders can thus play an important role in providing an 'observer report' to detect the state leader's emotion in this research.⁹³ Psychologists found

⁹³ These 'observer reports' are obtained from observers of a target person, such as relatives, colleagues, or even strangers, and emotions may be associated with external manifestations that can be discerned by spectators. According to Markwica (2018: 98-99), analysing observer reports is advantageous to detect emotion. The limitations of self-reports can be balanced out by the collection of observer reports because people are often

mostly significant correlations between self-reports and observer-reports from peers, when they got subjects to participate in an affect measurement exercise with an acquaintance (Larsen and Fredrickson 1999: 49-50). This is because policy-makers, in particular, may try to hide or downplay emotions to give the impression of a ‘rational’ decision-making process, or they may feign feelings that are socially expected or strategically useful, or both, and the interview data is highly useful to corroborate the initial findings from document analysis.

In order to recruit interviewees who meet these two criteria, I employed snowball sampling by contacting initial informants. A snowball sampling or chain sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances (Sharma 2017: 752). This sampling technique is often used in hidden populations which are difficult for researchers to access. As it is hard to access elites who work on government foreign policy and security issues, I adopted the snowball sampling method and recruited eight interviewees – four for each case (Table 5 below). It is not uncommon to see elite interview studies with relatively small numbers of respondents, as gaining access to elites for interviews can be difficult. Indeed, some published studies relied on as few as three or four elite respondents (Natow 2020: 162).

I started by making contact with three people, participants A, B, and C. Participant A was a key architect of the Sunshine Policy during Kim Dae-jung’s administration and attended the first inter-Korean Summit in 2000. Participant B was a former secretary who worked with Kim as a speech writer. Participant C served as a member of the senior advisory group for the inter-Korean summit talks preparation committee during Park Geun-hye’s administration in 2018. He was a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group from 2008 to 2016. These experts provided additional relevant contacts of other government officers who

hesitant to show their genuine emotions.

have worked together when they were involved in implementing foreign policy toward North Korea. After I searched their email address and sent email to ask them to participate in an interview and each subject who agreed was asked to provide other contacts. When I contacted participants, I sent them an ‘information sheet’ and ‘consent form,’ which are attached in the Appendix. The list of interviewees is in Table 5.

Table 5. List of Interviewees

		Interview Date	Interview Mode	Interview Length
Interviewee A	Advisor	Feb 2024	Online	65 min
Interviewee B	Secretary	May 2024	Online	70 min
Interviewee C	Advisor	June 2024	Online	60 min
Interviewee D	Journalist	May 2024	Online	40 min
Interviewee E	Ministry of Unification	Aug 2024	Correspondence	12 pages
Interviewee F	Ministry of Unification	Feb 2024	Online	70 min
Interviewee G	Ministry of Defense	Mar 2024	Online	60 min
Interviewee H	Ministry of Unification	Apr 2024	Online	60 min

Interview Questions

Upon interviewees’ requests, interview questions were sometimes emailed before the interview.⁹⁴ The interview protocol was divided into three parts: presence/absence of hope, interpretation of the adversary’s defection, and response to the defection with conciliatory gestures. However, given the semi-structured interview, I was also able to ask the follow up questions to their answers or ask tailored questions to a specific participant. General interview questions were as follows in Table 6.

⁹⁴ Interviewee A and Interviewee E

Table 6. Interview Questions

	Indicators	Questions
Presence/ Absence of Hope	Desire	• How would you describe Kim / Park: hopeful / wishful thinking / optimistic / pessimistic / realistic / sceptical ? • What was the leader's approach in engaging with unification? How would you compare their approach to other South Korean leaders? Why do you think that? • Do you think there was desire for peace in their approach? How would you gauge their desire ranging from 0 - 10? Why? • Do you think Kim / Park changed their thoughts about peace during their presidency? Or what do you think they learned from the experience? • Some people say that Kim / Park trusted North Korea or Kim Jong-il. What do you think? Do you have specific examples? - (If they trusted North Korea or North Korea leader), which aspects of North Korea do you think they trusted?
	Expectation	• Some people think Kim / Park believed that North Korea could change in the future. Would you agree that they believed that? • Do you think Kim / Park expected the inter-Korean relationship would improve in the future? Why do you think that? - (If they did <i>not</i> trust North Korea), can you think of any other ways in which they could expect negative / positive future?
Interpretation of an adversary's defection	H1. Careful Interpretation -No rush to conclusion - Refrain from immediate gratification	• How do you describe Kim / Park: impatient / patient / careful / cautious / relaxed / general / tolerant ? • Some people would say Kim / Park was tolerant. Would you agree? Can you give me some examples of when you think they were/ were not tolerant? • Some people might say that Kim / Park put up with or waited for North Korea. What do you think? Why? • How could Kim / Park be tolerant of North Korea? What could make them tolerant of North Korea, even though it was directly related to national security or survival? • What was Kim's / Park's priority in making a general decision? What about foreign policy?

	H2. Selective Focus -Greater weight to small changes -Provide different explanations	● Do you know what information Kim / Park mainly considered? (What were they paying attention to?) ● Do you think Kim / Park missed some important information that should have been paid more attention to? (What were they likely to ignore or neglect?) ● What do you think about their interpretation after North Korea's defections? ● Can you remember how Kim / Park interpreted the North Korean intention at xxx time? How did other politicians in the government interpret it? ● From your knowledge of how Kim / Park was making decisions, what do you think determined their assessment of whether North Korea would invade or not? ● Why do you think Kim / Park interpreted North Korean intentions that way? ● Why do you think Kim / Park thought there were different reasons for North Korea to do xxx at each time?
Response with conciliatory gestures	H3. Not giving up -Explicit decision -Persuade others	● Do you think Kim / Park was keen to continue conciliatory gestures? (How could Kim continue the Sunshine policy? Why did Park stop the Trustpolitik?) ● Both Kim and Park faced criticism. Can you tell me anything about how they responded to this criticism? (from public/ other politicians/ other countries) ● Can you share any examples of how Kim / Park engaged with different opinions from others? Do you remember any particular ways in which they persuaded others during meetings? ● In document XX, Kim / Park wrote that xxx. Do you agree with their account? Do you want to add anything else? (e.g. Kim often emphasised taking the initiative in devising the Sunshine policy. Why do you think he did? Any nationalistic or practical reasons?) ● Hyundai played the most influential role as a private sector. Do you know if Kim / Park tried other channels to contact North Korea, rather than Hyundai?
	H4. Responsiveness - Understand and validate NK - Convey amity	● It is documented that Kim / Park said that they wanted face-to-face meetings. Would you agree? Do you know why they wanted them? ● From what you know about how Kim / Park made decisions, what do you think was the most important goal of their diplomacy? (e.g., to convey sincere intention, to test others' intentions, to show the public, to gain more domestic support, as a distraction tactic, etc.) ● How would you say Kim / Park viewed Kim Jong-il? ● Do you think Kim / Park understood North Korean fear of insecurity and the role of South Korea in it? (SDS) How? Why?

The Presence/Absence of Hope

To collect data about the presence or absence of hope, I choose not to mention ‘hope’ directly when questions were asked to interviewees. I choose the indirect measure of hope because this might force and lead to an answer only related to it. Therefore, I asked questions about ‘expectation’ or ‘desire’ rather than directly mentioning ‘hope.’ For example, “Do you think there was desire for peace in their approach? How would you gauge their desire ranging from 0 - 10? Why?” “Do you think Kim / Park expected the inter-Korean relationship would improve in the future? Why do you think that?” Even though the questions that are asked depend on what the researcher wants to know, one should also be careful not to force participants to answer what the researcher wants to hear (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). Continuously asking about a particular concept can make the interviewee give biased answers. Given that it is difficult to know what decision-makers genuinely thought or felt only from already-prepared text data, these questions were important to understand the presence/absence of hope in the psychology of the two state leaders. Further questions on ‘hope’ were only asked if they mentioned hope first.

The Role of Hope: Interpretations and Responses of Decision-makers

To understand how Kim and Park interpreted and responded to North Korea’s defection, I asked questions according to each provocative event from North Korea – e.g. The intrusion of a submarine, allegation of nuclear development in Kumchang-ri, Taepodong Missile, the first and the second battle of Yeonpyong, the withdrawal of NPT for the *Sunshine Policy*, and North Korea’s scrapping of the armistice of the Korean War, the firing of ballistic missiles, the landmine explosion incident, the third, fourth, and fifth nuclear test for the *Trustpolitik*. For example, “Can you remember how Kim interpreted North Korea’s intention behind the

intrusion of the submarine? Why do you think Kim interpreted it in that way?” Or “Do you remember how Park responded to the landmine explosion? Why do you think Park responded in that way?”

In addition, I asked tailored questions to specific interviewees. For example, if the interviewee had attended the Beijing talks in April 1998, then I asked a few further questions in detail about the talk, such as “What was Kim’s intention to deliver to North Korea at the Beijing talk? How did you explain it to them?” “How did North Korea respond to your explanations?” If the interviewee had participated in a Unification Preparatory Committee in 2015, I asked “What was the main goal of the committee? What did Park intended to do with the committee as a part of Trustpolitik?”

Conclusion

This chapter has articulated the approach and method I have adopted in this thesis: case study and elite interviews. I conduct case studies of South Korean decision-makers formulating and implementing conciliatory gestures towards North Korea and analyse them by utilising process tracing. I also adopt elite interviews as a method of triangulation and gather data to corroborate the early findings from documentary analysis.

Drawing on decision-makers’ speeches, memoirs, minutes and interview data, I seek to trace their verbal expressions of hope during the conciliatory process. I trace the role of hope in shaping conciliatory gestures and take three steps in the following empirical cases to identify (i) if conciliatory gestures were conditional or unconditional, (ii) if hope was present or absent, and (iii) how each decision-maker interpreted and responded to an adversary’s defection. Based on the theory developed in the theory chapters, I divide the following two empirical chapters into three sections and trace steps accordingly. In the first section of the case study chapters, I explain each conciliatory gesture, focusing on its conditionality. The second section will

identify the presence or absence of hope in each state leader. If hope is identified in the second section, the third section is expected to provide examples of how a hopeful decision-maker interprets and responds to an adversary's defection (Chapter 5). On the other hand, if hope is not identified in the second section, the third section is expected to demonstrate how a decision-maker interprets and responds to an adversary's defection when they do not experience hope (Chapter 6).

Chapter 5. The Sunshine Policy

Introduction

This chapter empirically examines the hypotheses developed in the theory chapters to understand the role of hope played in the course of devising the conciliatory gestures that constituted the Sunshine Policy. The latter is the South Korean conciliatory policy toward North Korea adopted by President Kim Dae-jung from 1998 to 2002. As I hypothesised a *hopeful* decision-maker adopts *unconditional* conciliatory gestures and *continues with* the conciliatory process, even after defection(s).

To test the related hypotheses, I divide the chapter into three sections to identify each concept (1) the Sunshine Policy – unconditional conciliatory gestures, (2) the presence of hope, and (3) after defection. *Section 1* details political context of the Sunshine Policy and illustrates its *unconditional* characteristics. I examine whether Kim needed any preconditions to keep a conciliatory process, and whether Kim conditioned his conciliatory moves on immediate reciprocation from North Korea. *Section 2* uses nine instances to identify the presence of hope in Kim's psychological make up. As illustrated in the previous chapters, I infer the presence of hope through Kim's explicit expression of hope and the proxies of desire and expectation. I expect to find evidence of hope through these explicit and implicit signs.

Section 3 investigates what happened after North Korea's defection in terms of the interpretations and responses of South Korean decision-makers. First, I examine how Kim *interpreted* North Korea's defection in response to his opening, conciliatory moves. I provide examples to show that (i) Kim adopted a careful interpretation about North Korea's intentions and tolerated the defections, and (ii) Kim provided different situational explanations of reasons

the defections and did not automatically interpret it in terms of hostile intent. Second, I examine how Kim responded to the defection from the North. I use North Korean provocative events – the submarine incident, the test-fired Taepodong missile, the nuclear development allegations, and the first and the second battle of Yeonpyeong to show that (iii) Kim did not stop but maintained his position of conciliation even after the defections and (iv) Kim was willing to show responsiveness to convey his amity towards North Korea.

The Sunshine Policy: Unconditional Conciliatory Gestures

The first section illustrates the Sunshine Policy and identifies the unconditional characteristics: ‘the separation of politics and economy’ and ‘give first and take later.’ The indicators of unconditional conciliatory gestures are (i) whether conciliatory gestures need any preconditions and (ii) whether conciliatory gestures require immediate reciprocation. I expect to find evidence of unconditionality and show that the Sunshine Policy was not conditioned on reciprocation to move forward towards a conciliatory process.

What is the Sunshine Policy?

The Sunshine Policy is a conciliatory policy adopted by President Kim Dae-jung towards North Korea between the period 1998 and 2002. Kim won the presidential election on 18 December 1997, with his inauguration taking place on 25 February 1998. Kim characterised his administration as a ‘Government of the people,’ as the election marked the first time in Korean history that the ruling party peacefully transferred power to a democratically elected opposition winner (Kim 1998: 25 Feb). The Sunshine Policy was one of his main election campaign promises. In his inauguration speech, Kim declared three basic principles of the Sunshine

Policy: “First, we will not allow any form of armed invasion; second, we have no intention of harming or absorbing North Korea; and third, we will actively pursue reconciliation and collaboration with North Korea from the most practicable field. I hope that the South-North interchange will be carried out according to the South-North Basic Agreement.”⁹⁵ Kim offered assurances that he would enhance economic cooperation and announced that his government would seek engagement with the North by facilitating exchanges and cooperation with the outside world. He further promised to provide food aid to the North, as well as promote economic, social, and cultural exchanges. Under the three basic principles of the Sunshine Policy, Kim also set three guidelines to enhance economic cooperation between South and North – humanitarian support, separation of politics and economy, and reciprocity.⁹⁶

Even though “reciprocity” is one of the guidelines for economic cooperation and the basic principle states that “we will not allow any form of armed invasion,” the Sunshine Policy was crucially not conditioned on North Korea’s reciprocity. In other words, it was designed like GRIT to “be continued over a considerable period, regardless of immediate reciprocation

⁹⁵ Between September 1990 and October 1992, the two Koreas engaged in a total of eight bilateral meetings, including the first high-level talks held in Seoul. In December 1991, the two sides signed the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North” (also called the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement). The agreement focused on mutual respect between the two nations, the renunciation of armed aggression, exchange and cooperation in many sectors, and the guarantee of free exchange of people between the two countries.

⁹⁶ The Sunshine Policy did not suddenly emerge; Kim had been thinking about the goals for peace in the Korean peninsula long before he was elected president in 1998. He initially presented the first version of his three-step reunification plan in 1971. And even when he lost the presidential election and declared retirement from politics in 1992, he decided to study abroad as a visiting scholar at Cambridge University, exploring the unification plan further, and devising a desirable model for Korean reunification. After returning from Cambridge, he founded the ‘Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation’ on 27 January 1994 (Kim 2019).

or events of a tension-increasing nature” (Osgood 1962: 103). In practice, its most important operating principle was *flexible dualism*, which was predicated on major changes in the sequential order of inter-Korean interactions. The two most important operational terms of engagement with the North under the Kim government are as follows: “economics first, politics later” and “give first and take later” (Lee and Moon 2016: 227), which made the Sunshine Policy a series of unconditional conciliatory gestures.

The separation of politics and economy

“The separation of politics and economy (Jeong kyung bun ri)” is the main principle of the Sunshine Policy and represents a profound departure from past practices. Previous governments tended to adhere to the principles of the primacy of mechanical reciprocity, but the Kim government attempted to sever the mechanism of negative reinforcement by “pledging to promote economic exchanges and cooperation even if the North engaged in military and political provocation” (Lee and Moon 2016: 228). Based on the principle of the separation of economics and politics, Kim lifted the ban on travel and eased the regulations limited private sector investment in North Korea by announcing the “Guidelines Fostering South-North Korea Economic Cooperation” on 30 April 1998. It read as follows:

- (i) Until now, in accordance with the policy of promoting economic cooperation mainly on pilot projects, visits to North Korea have been restricted for heads of large corporations and economic organisations. However, from now on, visits to North Korea by heads of large corporations and economic organisations will be approved in principle as long as the requirements are met, such as an invitation letter.
- (ii) The validity period of approval, which allows frequent contact without separate approval with one-time approval, has been extended from the current 1

year to 3 years. (iii) So far, in accordance with the policy of promoting economic cooperation mainly on small-scale pilot projects, the upper limit on the investment size has been set at around \$5-10 million. However, from now on, restrictions on investment size will be completely abolished from the standpoint of promoting economic cooperation under the autonomous responsibility of companies in accordance with market economic principles” (Ministry of Unification 1998).

Right after the announcement was released, Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai, one of the biggest South Korean conglomerates made two visits to Pyongyang. Hyundai provided humanitarian aid in the form of cows and fertilisers to North Korea. Based on the principle of the separation of politics and economy, the South Korean Government provided 50,000 tons of food through the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a further 50,000 tons through the World Food Program (WFP). Kim explicitly announced this in public speeches on 7 May and 8 June respectively. For example, in his 8 June speech, he said, “We will continue to provide humanitarian assistance —whether by the government or private sector —*with no strings attached*” (Kim 1998, 8 June). In order to continue it over a considerable period, regardless of immediate reciprocation or events of a tension-increasing nature from North Korea, Kim emphasised the principle of the separation of politics and economy.

Give first and take later

“Give first and take later (Seon gong hu deuk)” is another main operating principle of the Sunshine Policy. Lim Dong-won – the Minister of Unification and Senior secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security – officially introduced it in his interview for the *Chosun il-bo* daily newspaper on 12 March 1999. It was re-established and consolidated after the Beijing talks in April 1998. The Beijing talks were held as North Korea requested. Right after Kim took

office as president in February 1998, North Korea made appeals for food aid to South Korea through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and the fifth inter-Korean Red Cross talk was held in Beijing from 25 to 27 March” (Ministry of Unification 1998, Mar). Given that North Korea requested large scale shipments of fertiliser, Deputy Minister-level inter-Korea talks were held in Beijing for a week in April. When Jeong Se-hyun, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended the Beijing talks as the delegation from the South in April 1998, he explicitly explained to Jeon Keum-chul, the North Korean delegation, that “We are giving first, and you can give us later.” Then, during the break, the North Korean delegation asked him back, “Why are you giving us first? It’s hard to believe” (Jeong 2022). Jeong replied, “We are just providing you with the fertiliser that you requested last year. Isn’t it just what you need because it’s spring when fertiliser is necessary? And then, we can have the ‘separated family reunions’ in autumn when the season of harvest comes. It is no more or less than that.” Likewise, the principle of ‘give first and take later’ was not merely a catchphrase, but a statement of intention that the Kim government would commit to deliver to North Korea. However, the Beijing talks ultimately failed to result in an agreement.

The principle of “Give first and take later” was also in operation while pursuing the inter-Korean Summit in 2000. From the beginning of his presidency, Kim was eager to promote reassurance through face-to-face diplomacy with North Korea (Kim 1998, 25 Feb), and he accelerated it by setting up the inter-Korean Summit as a concrete goal in 2000. He presided over the first National Security Council meeting on 5 January 2000 and announced four essential goals for inter-Korean relations, one of which was to “achieve *unconditional meetings* between the South and the North” (Government Information Agency 2000).⁹⁷ He started

⁹⁷ For this purpose, the South Korean government set four essential tasks: unconditional conferences between officials of both the South and the North; diversification of inter-Korean interchanges; pursuit of inter-Korean

sending more frequent signals toward the North to request a Summit. For example, he publicly mentioned, “*I hope to achieve an inter-Korean Summit*” at least eight times within the first two months of the year (*The Dong-A Ilbo* 2009). After South Korea and North Korea had held several preliminary meetings, the agreement on the Summit was settled on 8 April. The agreement read:

“The South and the North agree to the following in order to advance national reconciliation and union, interchange and cooperation, and peace and reunification, while re-affirming the three principles for reunification, declared in the historic 4 July South–North Joint Communiqué. President Kim Dae-jung will visit Pyongyang from 12 June to 14 June, 2000, according to Chairman Kim Jong-il’s invitation. During this visit to Pyongyang, there will be an historic meeting and a summit between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il.”

After the inter-Korean Summit, the South and North agreed to resolve the question of reunification with their own initiatives and promptly resolve two humanitarian issues: exchanges of delegations of separated family members and solution to the issue of long-term political prisoners.⁹⁸ Even though this historic moment was credited for being the “first” inter-Korean Summit since the Korean War in 1950, it was also criticised because it was unconditional. For example, some

economic community building; and active support for the reunion of dispersed families.

⁹⁸ Agreements specified in the “June 15th Joint Declaration” as follows, 1. The two Koreas agree to achieve the reunification of Korea in an independent way; 2. South Korea advocates confederation approaches, and North Korea proposes a loosely-knit federation when seeking a unification formula; 3. The two sides agree to resolve humanitarian issues. (Exchanges of delegations of separated family members and a solution to the issue of long-term political prisoners); 4. The two sides decide to invigorate bilateral economic exchanges and build mutual trust; 5. They promise to hold authorities-level dialogue to implement the agreements.

politicians from conservative parties argued that “the unconditional return of those North Korean sympathizers who refused to accept the South Korean constitution and authority was too generous. They should have been linked to the return of kidnapped South Korean fishermen and prisoners of the Korean War who are still detained in the North (Moon 2001: 190).” What is more, the South Korean government was even accused of the illegal transfer of funds to North Korea to secure the inter-Korean Summit. The opposition Grand National Party alleged that Hyundai Merchant Marine Company borrowed \$400 million and sent it to North Korea as a reward for Mt. Kumgang tourism. As a result of a 70-day probe, the investigation found that whilst \$400 million of the money belonged to Hyundai and was intended for legitimate business investment in North Korea, \$100 million was sent by Seoul as “politically motivated government aid.” The donation was clearly related to the Summit and had been sent secretly through improper channels before the Summit (*BBC* 2003).

Based upon the principles of “the separation of politics and economy” and “give first and take later,” the Sunshine Policy was designed not to be conditional upon reciprocity from North Korea. Accordingly, Kim provided unconditional conciliatory gestures towards North Korea during his presidency, which provoked criticism from opposing political parties. The main criticism from the opposing political parties was that the economic engagement of the Sunshine Policy helped the North to develop nuclear weapons and sustain its regime, and harshly criticised the unilateral and unconditional “give aways” (*Peojugi*).⁹⁹ In the next section, I examine the existence of hope whilst the unconditional conciliatory gesture was adopted.

Some scholars argue that the unconditional conciliatory gesture were adopted due to

⁹⁹ The Korean word “give away (*Peojugi*)” connotes negative meanings to keep giving something and gaining nothing. For more details on various criticisms and debates on different issues over the Sunshine Policy from diverse actors, see Levin and Han 2002.

the role of the US in the Korean Peninsula (Sheen 2009; Cho 2010). For example, according to Sheen (2009: 200), the sunshine policy has been reinforced by the United States' positive engagement approach. The positive engagement policy of the Clinton administration became clear when Pyongyang was persuaded to abandon its nuclear program through the promise of a reward at the last-minute confrontation in 1994. The Clinton administration tried to solve the North Korean nuclear problem by signing the Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea in October 1994. The agreement froze North Korea's nuclear weapons development program and made provisions for dismantling it in a step-by-step process of deepening engagement with the United States. Since the Geneva Agreed Framework settlement in 1994, the United States tilted toward the 'soft landing' policy, which was congruent with the Sunshine Policy (Moon 2012). However, after North Korea tested Taepodong missiles and the US raised a nuclear development allegation in Kumchang-ri in August 1998, the Clinton administration then focused on solving the North Korean missile problem and launched the 'Perry process,' which purported to get rid of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction through negotiations with North Korea leaders (Paik 2002: 17). Nonetheless, the Sunshine Policy was not aligned with it; rather, as I will show in the following analysis section, Kim met William Perry several times and put a lot of efforts to persuade the Clinton administration to continue the Sunshine Policy. What is more, despite the next Bush administration's antagonistic posture toward North Korea, Kim did not give up his conciliatory gestures, and the Sunshine Policy even succeeded the next Roh Moo-hyun administration from 2003 to 2008.

In addition, according to Kim SY (2023), the Sunshine Policy is attributed to a certain leadership trait. Kim SY suggested that President Kim Dae-jung had a persistently high need for power and relationship focus, along with other idiosyncratic style variables, such as disinclination toward interpersonal conflict, a sense of efficacy, and a sophisticated cognitive quality, and these types of personal trait had a huge impact on devising the conciliatory gesture.

However, these should be compared with other leaders to examine the impact of the factor. Still, the exact same combination of those traits is not comparable to other cases because it is difficult to find an example of a state leader with all those traits. Moreover, fixed and dispositional factors make it hard to consider situational and political context in the conciliatory process in inter-Korean relations. Therefore, it would be better to separate each personal trait to understand the influence of the personal character. Even though all these explanatory factors should be considered in the context of a conciliatory process in inter-Korean relations, it is insufficient to explain the unconditionality of the Sunshine Policy. In the next section, I suggest bringing a new factor, hope, to understand the specific conciliatory gesture and examine the existence of hope whilst the unconditional conciliatory gesture was adopted.

The Presence of Hope in the Sunshine Policy

This part of the chapters aims to specify the experience of hope to understand how hope shaped Kim's conception and implementation of the conciliatory process. Based on the conceptualisation of hope developed in Chapter 2, I use the explicit and implicit indicators identified there to infer the presence of hope in Kim's psychological state when devising the Sunshine Policy.

Instance A.1. After Beijing Talks (March - April 1998)

In this instance, Kim explained how he expected North Korea to change their current unfavourable attitude towards South Korea and explicitly mentioned hope at the same time. A month after the Beijing talks, Kim held a Q&A with the public and the 2-hour session was broadcast live in May 1998. One of the participants asked Kim, "Since this government

commenced, I haven't found any significant changes from the North. What are you going to do to make a break through?" Kim answered, "I can't guarantee anything right now, but *I believe change is coming*. I'm afraid I cannot tell you everything here, but there are some signs from inside and outside. So, *I believe it will come*. Unless North Korea accepts the change, they will face difficulty" (Kim 1998: 10 May) The quote suggests that Kim alluded to the fact that North Korea had to inevitably accept certain changes as the expense of facing challenges, so he expected it to come. It appears he considered the desired future very likely to be realised, which reveals one of the core elements of hope. In addition to expectation – one of the core elements of hope – he also explicitly mentioned hope. He added, "So, I have *strong hope* to be able to do something here. I've decided to do it right now" (Kim 1998: 10 May). Interestingly, when he explicitly mentioned hope, the quote also showed Kim's 'readiness for action' which is one of the prominent behavioural signs of hope illustrated in Chapter 2. Even in the unsatisfactory situation of the failed Beijing talks, Kim's verbal expression of expectations, hope for peace and behavioural signs of hope are found in the data above.

Instance A.2. The Submarine Intrusion Incident (June 1998)

The second instance describes Kim's expectation of peace after the submarine incident. On 22 June 1998, a North Korean combat submarine was found in the South Korean Sea near Sokcho. A South Korean fishing boat first observed several submarine crewmen trying to untangle the submarine from the fishing net. The South Korean Navy sent a Pohang-class corvette which towed the submarine (with the crew still inside) to a navy base at the port of the East Sea (Kirk 1998). The timing coincided with Hyundai president Chung Ju-yung's visit to North Korea during which he provided 50,000 tons of corn and 500 cows. A month later, Kim mentioned the intrusion of the submarine at the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council. He said, "Considering the current international circumstances and North Korean domestic politics, *I*

believe North Korea will positively respond to us in the near future” (Kim 1998: 26 July). Kim also made a similar comment in another speech: “North Korea is so desperate that they have no other choice but to open its door. I will make sure the Sunshine Policy helps North Korea do that, even though it is not easy and could take longer than expected” (Kim 1998: 10 June). Kim said in various writings that he believed that there were only three choices for North Korea: First, provoking South Korea through force and going to war which could end up in the collapse of both Koreas. Second, keeping isolated which could damage their economy. Third, they could adopt an open-door policy, similar to China and Vietnam. He thought, “North Korea would adopt the third option because they had no other choice in order for its survival, if not immediately, then definitely in the long run.” Based on his logic, he strongly believed that North Korea would change just like China or Vietnam. Considering North Korea’s situation, the above provides evidence that Kim believed a positive future was in sight and this was associated with cognitive signs of hope and it will be discussed further in *Instance 2.a.1*.

Instance A.3. Kumchang-ri : Nuclear development allegation (August 1998)

The third instance also describes a similar pattern of Kim’s expectation after allegations of North Korea’s nuclear development. On 17 August 1998, *The New York Times* reported that US intelligence agencies detected a huge secret underground complex in North Korea which they believed was the centrepiece of an effort to revive the country’s frozen nuclear weapons program. According to the report, US satellite photos revealed a suspicious construction site in a mountainous area in Kumchang-ri, some 40 km northwest of North Korea’s main nuclear site at Yongbyon, where approximately 15,000 workers were digging at the site. In response, Kim had an interview with *The Hankyoreh*, one of the main newspapers in South Korea and remarked, “Communism is consolidated when it is isolated, but it *can be changed* once it is

exposed to the outer world” (The Hankyoreh 1998). He mentioned Communism to indicate indirectly to North Korea and it appears that he believed North Korea could change and eventually open up. As elaborated in my conceptualisation of hope in Chapter 2, hope is hard to generate when something is believed to be fixed. In this sense, Kim’s belief in the possibility of North Korea’s change in the quote can be considered as evidence of a positive correlation with hope. He also explained in the interview that he thought “it [the North Korean nuclear development allegation] was just a transitory phenomenon, which is coming from their fear of the crisis of their regime.” This quote also suggests that he exerted cognitive flexibility, which is one of the cognitive signs of hope.

Instance A.4. The first battle of Yeonpyeong (June 1999)

The fourth example illustrates Kim’s hope after the first battle of Yeonpyeong. On the morning of 15 June 1999, there was a shootout between South Korean Navy warships and a North Korean coastal patrol boat in the West Sea. The North Korean boat attacked first, and the South responded with gunfire. The South Korean navy conducted ramming operations to force the ships back across the Northern Limit Line (NLL). Fire was exchanged, sinking one and severely damaging two North Korean boats and killing at least 17 South Koreans and as many as 80 North Koreans. A North Korean torpedo boat sank, and a coastal patrol boat was greatly damaged. Two months later, Kim stated in the 54th Liberation Speech that, “Even though there have been several provocations from North Korea, we consistently keep pursuing conciliation for the peace of the Korean peninsula. As a result, we have achieved significant cooperation with North Korea. (...) *We hope for interactions between the South and the North Korean governments. We are always willing to have high-level official meetings between South and North Korea and offer our full material and emotional support to North Korea*” (Kim 1999: 15

Aug). This quote provides evidence of his explicit expression of hope and the prominent behavioural signs of hope, a sustained energy to continue a conciliatory process. From the above, it appears that Kim experienced hope even after a military conflict with North Korea.

Instance A.5. Inter-Korea Summit (June 2000)

The fifth instance considered here is evidence of Kim's explicit hope and the key components, desire and expectation, when the Sunshine Policy reached its peak. When Kim finally visited Pyongyang to have the unprecedented inter-Korean Summit on 13 June 2000, he explicitly expressed his desire, expectation, and hope for peace in his opening remark:

“I *desire*! I desire 70 million can be free from the fear of war. I *expect*! I expect our relationship of distrust and conflict will turn into a relationship of conciliation and cooperation. (...) And I *hope*! I hope we continue our earnest conversation between both authorities to resolve many problems one by one between South and North Korea” (Kim 2000: 13 June).

When the Sunshine Policy finally reached its peak in June 2000, he expressed his hope by explicitly describing that he desired, expected, and hoped to be “free from the fear of war,” for a “relationship of conciliation and cooperation,” and “continuing the earnest conversation,” which are specific images of peace.

Instance A.6. North Korea admitted the HEU program (November 2002)

The sixth instance describes Kim showing a different tone of expectation for the future but still conveying the importance of desire in promoting peace with North Korea. In early October

2002, President Bush sent Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to Pyongyang. After visiting North Korea, Kelly presented North Koreans with evidence of their High-Enriched Uranium (HEU) program, and North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju confirmed the existence of the program.¹⁰⁰ In response, Kim said in his autobiography, “I was extremely discouraged by this report. It was clear that North Korea’s confirmation of the high-enriched uranium would derail the progress in their relationship with the US. As a result, *the inter-Korean relationship would also deteriorate*” (Kim 2019: 798). This quote indicates he doubted the bright future of the inter-Korean relationship for the first time. So, it can be said that he temporarily lost his hope at this moment.

Interestingly, a month later, Kim showed a constant desire for peace and even explicitly emphasised it in an interview with *Les Echos*, the French daily newspaper. The interviewer asked, “Kim Jong-il’s regime has admitted violating the 1994 nuclear arms agreement. Is it still possible to trust him and continue to negotiate with him?” Kim replied, “We try all our best to keep peace on the Korean peninsula. It does not matter if the other side is good or evil. It is not because we *trust* them, but because we *want* peace” (*Les Echos* 2002). Even though the expectation of peace seemed slightly lower than before, it appears that the desire still remained high even at this time. It is also important to note that Kim mentioned ‘desire’ as a reason to ‘continue a conciliatory process’ in response to the question from the interviewer. As I emphasised in the conceptualisation of hope in Chapter 2, it is crucial to carefully consider the context if decision-makers genuinely desire peace or seek it *for any other economic or political motivation*. In this sense, the quote provides evidence that Kim thought no reason was needed

¹⁰⁰ It was later disputed by the North, however, and Kang Sok-ju explained it was an instance of a communication failure, but it still remains unclear until now. To be specific, according to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kang said “We are entitled to possess such a program,” but US understood it as “We possess such a program.” (Quigg 2009).

other than desiring peace to continue a conciliatory process, which shows Kim's motivations in the conciliatory process.

Instance A.7. Allegations of transferring money to North Korea (February 2003)

The seventh instance below illustrates that Kim expressed his desire and hope for peace even when the South Korean government was accused of the illegal transfer of funds to North Korea. At the end of 2002, the opposition Grand National Party alleged that the Hyundai Merchant Marine Company borrowed \$400 million and sent it to North Korea as a reward for Mt. Kumgang tourism. On 14 February 2003, Kim made a statement regarding the incident of the money transfer to North Korea. He apologised in the statement and said, "This incident also originated from our *sincere desire to block war in the Korean peninsula and enjoy peace and prosperity together*, to nurture *the hope for reunification* while living without worry. I will take responsibility for this event. But I just hope that you will understand my *sincere wish for peace* and our best national interests. I also hope you will not spare generosity and cooperation to preserve the let-up of tension that we have finally achieved and the opportunity to develop national interests" (Kim 2003: 14 Feb). He explicitly expressed his desire and hope for peace to justify the political scandal.

Instance A.8. Farewell remarks (February 2003)

The eighth instance describes Kim's explicit hope and expectation in his farewell remarks when he left his office. On 24 February 2003, he presided over the last cabinet meeting and before that, he made a farewell remark entitled, 'Dedication to Great Koreans.' He stated in the speech, "I have *great hope for our people's future. (...) We will accomplish the dream of peaceful reunification* someday." He added, "Please actively support President Roh Moo-hyun. *The new*

government will pursue and should succeed the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. I have no doubt that President Roh Moo-hyun will accomplish his mission” (Kim 2003: 24 Feb). He explicitly revealed his hope for a peaceful future in the Korean peninsula and said he believed the next administration would accomplish the inter-Korean reconciliation. In his 14 minute-long farewell remark, the only he expressed to the next government was the ‘inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.’ It appears that he consistently expressed his hope in the context of hope.

Instance A.9. Interview data

I complement the analysis of texts with excerpts collected from the interviews I conducted. During the interviews, I asked interviewees to gauge Kim’s desire for peace ranging from 0 to 10. Interestingly, almost all participants gave 10 out of 10 to measure Kim’s desire for peace. For example, one of the participants (Interviewee A) replied, “When it comes to his desire for peace, I would give Kim 10 out of 10.” The participant (Interviewee D) who hesitated to measure it explicitly described him instead, “Even though it cannot be numerically measured, I would say his desire for peace is ‘absolute.’” One participant (Interviewee H) added, “I don’t think it is possible if there is anyone who can desire peace more than him [Kim Dae-jung].” In addition to desire, every interviewee agreed that Kim had also highly anticipated peace (or unification) to come in the future.

In this section, I sought to illustrate the presence of hope during Kim’s development of the Sunshine Policy. Kim mainly used the word “*hope*” with peace or unification throughout his presidency, rather than in relation to other issues such as economic development. Kim’s “*desire*” for peace was prominently emphasised by him. From the analysis of data presented above, I

can infer that Kim expected a negative future in the Korean peninsula only once for a moment, but his “*expectation*” of peace recovered soon. While this section focused on identifying the *presence* of hope mainly through explicit and implicit expressions of core components of hope, the following section focuses on what happened after North Korea’s defections to investigate the influence of hope.

After Defection: Interpretations and Responses

This section focuses on how Kim interpreted and responded after North Korea’s defection(s) and examines four hypotheses to understand the role of hope during a conciliatory process. The hypotheses are as follows:

H1 (a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be more likely to tolerate defection and take time to make a decision about an adversary’s intention.

H2 (a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be less likely to interpret an adversary’s defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state.

H3 (a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be more likely to keep pursuing conciliation even after a defection and create new ways to overcome objections from any opposing parties.

H4 (a). When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be more likely to show responsiveness toward an adversary to convey amity even after a defection.

The analysis of data provided evidence that Kim experienced hope through the explicit (hope) and implicit markers (desire and expectation) in the previous section. This section explores evidence on the *role* of hope in his interpretations and responses through cognitive and behavioural indicators of hope.

Kim's Interpretations of North Korea's Intentions behind Defection

H1 (a). Tolerance and Careful interpretation

This section examines the first hypothesis: When a decision-maker experiences hope, they are more likely to tolerate defection and take time to make a decision about an adversary's intention. The indicators of being tolerant and patient with an adversary's defection are (i) whether a decision-maker rushes to a conclusion about an adversary's defection and (ii) whether a decision-maker can refrain from immediate gratification. In other words, if decision-makers possess high tolerance, they might be more careful and require more time or evidence to make an informed decision. As the data has shown the presence of hope in the previous section, I expect to find evidence that Kim refrained from immediate gratification and Kim did not rush to a conclusion about North Korea's defection in the following instances.

Instance 1.a.1. Taking enough time to interpret North Korea's defection (August 1998)

The first example describes how Kim interpreted North Korea's defection. Two months after Chung's visit to Pyongyang with 50,000 tons of corn and 500 cows, North Korea test-fired a two-stage ballistic missile named 'Taepodong' on 31 August 1998. *On the following day of the missile test*, the opposition political parties, namely the Liberal Democratic Alliance (LDA) made a prompt statement on the missile test that "North Korea keeps showing their hostility and they have not changed it at all, which is so shocking." They further added, "The Kim administration should identify North Korea's true intention behind their test-fire as soon as possible" (*Yonhap News* 1998: 1 Sep). When LDA indicate North Korea's true intention, they used the Korean word "저의 (*Jeo ui*)." The use of this word is interesting because it is mostly used to indicate the *malign intent* behind an act. The statement from the LDA suggests that they assumed the North had a malign intent and already had their conclusion in mind. In addition,

in reaction to North Korea's missile launch, the Japanese government immediately stopped its ongoing negotiation and its food aid, and indefinitely postponed signing the bill for its \$1 billion support of the North Korean light water reactor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1998). Japan's and the US's prompt responses are also clearly described in Kim's biography as follows: "Fear about a North Korean missile attack spread *quickly* in Japan . . . The US also responded *swiftly*" (Kim 2019: 515).

On the contrary, on the day the North test-fired the missiles, the Ministry of National Defense in South Korea announced, "We are not proposing any rapid military response, considering the North did not fire the missile directly toward the Korean peninsula. But we are *carefully investigating* their movements and reinforcing our intelligence operations toward the North" (Yonhap News 1998a). The Kim administration refused to respond immediately and "*very carefully examined North Korea's intentions*" (Yonhap News 1998c).¹⁰¹ According to the news article published *a week later*, "the South Korean government *still did not make a clear judgement* about the incident, and their response was *too careful*," and added, "it was because Kim asked the relevant ministries to respond carefully (Kim and Kwon 1998). In contrast to the opposition political parties making a statement the next day, Kim did not make a conclusion regarding North Korea's intention even after a week. In the above, we can see Kim took more time than other actors to examine North Korea's intentions and did not rush to reach a conclusion regarding North Korea's hostile intent. This incident is considered as evidence of Kim's careful interpretation. It required patience which is associated with behavioural signs of hope.

¹⁰¹ See also Kim (2019: 515).

Instance 1.a.2. Kumchang-ri : Nuclear development allegation (August 1998)

The second example also shows a similar pattern of Kim's careful interpretation. As highlighted earlier, *The New York Times* reported on 17 August 1998 that US intelligence detected a large secret underground complex in North Korea that they believed was the centrepiece of an effort to revive the country's frozen nuclear weapons program. The US Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Talks Charles Kartman said to reporters, "We [The United States and South Korea] have information that has led us to believe that the site in Kumchang-ri is related to nuclear development." However, Kim explained, "Although it looked suspicious, there was no confirmed proof. The US claimed that there was 'strong evidence,' but we, Korean authorities concluded that there was no 'decisive evidence'" (Kim 2019: 537). Kim also publicly spoke about it in November 1998, saying, "since we heard about the nuclear development allegations in Kumchang-ri, we have been *investigating it for a few months*. However, we did not find any evidence" (Kim 1998: 21Nov). In May 1999, the US finally investigated the site and *The New York Times* published, "Suspected North Korean atom site is empty, US finds" (Shenon 1999). Compared to the other actors' rushed conclusions to North Korea's defection, it appears that Kim hesitated to make a hasty and decisive conclusion as it seemed suspicious. Rather, he took more time to assess the evidence, until the facts became clear.

Instance 1.a.3. Delay of gratification

The third example shows Kim demonstrating the ability to refrain from immediate gratification to receive a more desirable outcome in the future. On 7 October 1998, Kim went to Japan to meet with Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko. The Empress said, "Despite many years of suffering, you seem to have a very moderate philosophy, strong beliefs, and a *hopeful attitude*," and he replied as follows:

“You’re too kind,” I responded. “Rather than being brave, I am easily scared. Funny to say, but I am even scared of goblins in the dark. However, I get courage from two things. One of them is my Christian belief. A true disciple fights social injustice and corruption like Jesus, who died on the cross after fighting oppressors. The second is my belief in history.¹⁰² When you look at history, those who committed evil *might not be punished for it during their times, but they are sure to be punished later*. On the other hand, *those who lived for justice and were not rewarded during their times are sure to be justly appreciated later*” (Kim 2019: 519).

These two key beliefs are highly associated with the ability to refrain from immediate satisfaction, and Kim explicitly acknowledged that these beliefs helped him keep up his *hopeful attitude* throughout his life. Choi Kyong-hwan, Kim’s last secretary until 2002, also described Kim as a person who always made a decision without haste and could wait until the desired outcome was achieved. According to Choi, Kim usually said, “*Do not rush*, but do not stop at the same time. Don’t expect any outcome on the first try. You must dig one well deeply, at least for ten years” (Choi 2011: 37). Choi also described Kim as a person who always took the future into consideration when making decisions, saying, “I do not want to be blamed *by my future generations and our descendants*. It always helps me overcome many difficulties. I will not make them disappointed” (Choi 2011: 52). Kim notes the value of being appraised properly at a later point in time rather than during his time. It appears that he could tolerate current stressful or threatening situations and resist the impulse to take an immediately available reward in the hope of obtaining a more valuable reward in the future.

¹⁰² Kim often talked about the belief in history and it facilitated his hope, for example, according to the last secretary Choi, Kim always said “I have belief in history. That allows me not to *have never been in despair*” (Choi 2011: 43).

Taken together, these instances can be seen as evidence of Kim's patience and his careful interpretation of North Korea's intentions. In addition to the examples above, interestingly, one of the interviewees strongly agreed with the statement that "Kim was able to tolerate and be patient with North Korea," and he added, "it was not because he could trust North Korea, but he had *hope* that the Sunshine Policy could do something." Even though I did not directly mention "hope" during the interview, the interviewee attributed Kim's patience to hope. The above analysis confirms Kim was able to tolerate and be patient and did not rush to reach a conclusion about the intentions behind North Korea's defection.

H2 (a). Selective focus on situational explanations

This section examines the second hypothesis: When a decision-maker experiences hope, they are less likely to interpret an adversary's defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state. The indicators of interpreting an adversary's defection in terms of the hostile intent are (i) whether a decision-maker can provide different situational explanations to reason the defection or places the causes of defection in an adversary's hostility, and (ii) whether a decision-maker pays selective attention to hostile moves or the possibility of conciliation. Therefore, I expect to find evidence of the indicators in the following instances and use five provocative events by North Korea to show Kim did not interpret North Korean provocation in terms of its hostile intent.

Instance 2.a.1. Kim's interpretation of the submarine incident

The first instance is Kim's interpretation of the submarine incident. As described earlier, it was when Chung was visiting Pyongyang that a North Korean combat submarine was found in the South Korean Sea near Sokcho. In this sense, a few days after the submarine incident, when Kim visited and met students at Korea University, he received a comment from one student,

“Recently, we sent cows to North Korea, but they sent us back a submarine instead. Many South Korean people, including me, are feeling insecure and anxious” (Kim 1998: 30 June). However, Kim described the submarine incident as follows: “The combat submarine was *adrift* after being caught in the net of a fishing boat” (Kim 2019: 509). Kim’s simple description implicitly showed that it that North Korea’s invasion of the South Korean East Sea was unintentional, rather, the submarine washed away and was there by mistake. It appears that Kim focused on situational factors, which is more flexible and changeable than dispositional ones, to understand North Korea’s defection. It was clearly contrary to the report by *the Chosun Daily*, the oldest daily newspaper in South Korea, describing “Despite our consistent Sunshine policy, North Korea *did not change at all* for the last year.” The article added that “North Korea sent the combat submarine to *invade* our sea” (*The Chosun Daily* 1998a). *JoongAng Daily* also analysed it as provocative behaviour and reported, “It is clear that North Korea still revealed their military ambition” (*JoongAng Daily* 1998: 24 June). These quotes suggest that the conservative press focused on North Korea’s fixed dispositional factors and interpreted North Korea as an unchangeable hostile country.

However, Kim’s focus was completely different from other analyses.¹⁰³ Kim captured a nuanced positive change in North Korea, emphasising that “North Korea responded to this incident *unusually quickly*.” He explained, “Before twenty-four hours had passed, the Pyongyang Broadcasting Station reported that communication with the small submarine was abruptly cut off during training. They said it appeared to be wrecked from currents and storms and that the authorities were searching for it” He added, “The content of the [the Pyongyang Broadcasting Station’s] report was also carefully presented. *Clearly, North Korea did not want the incident to be overblown*” (Kim 2019: 509).” Kim focused on the speed in which North

¹⁰³ According to the interview I conduct (Interviewee D), however, the criticism was not paid much attention at that time because it was right after Chung visited Pyongyang with 500 of cows, which will be described later.

Korea addressed this situation and its positive connotations, as well as focusing on the favourable side of the seemingly provocative behaviour from the North. Kim also noticed a slightly different response from the North, saying, “Around this time, military talks between UN Command and North Korea took place in Panmunjeom after a seven-year gap. North Korea accepted the submarine incident as an agenda item, which was *unusually flexible of them*. I could see *hope* despite the disputes being waged about the Sunshine Policy (Kim 2019: 510).” These quotes suggest that Kim gave greater weight to smaller changes that others did not pay attention to, and he explicitly revealed the hope that had been caused by the changes. Given that the experience of hope often entails a selective focus on information that sustains the belief that is still possible to attain the goal in question, it appears that Kim selectively focused on information that North Korea has been changed in a positive way. Therefore, the above provides evidence that Kim experienced hope as he selectively focused on the positive change that happened in North Korea and interpreted it as a possibility of conciliation.

Instance 2.a.2: Kim’s interpretation of the DPRK test-fired missiles

The second incident describes Kim’s interpretation of the DPRK’s test-firing of missiles. On 31 August 1998, North Korea tested a two-stage ballistic missile named ‘Taepodong,’ and officially admitted the test on 4 September, which they called ‘Kwangmyongsong-1.’ In response to it, the opposing political party, the Liberal Democratic Alliance (LDA) made a prompt statement on the missile test, saying, “North Korea keeps showing *their hostility*” (*Yonhap News* 1998: 1 Sep). The Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu Nonaka, even called the test “deplorable”, and said it was an “extremely dangerous act.” Sadaaki Numata, spokesman for the Foreign Ministry said, “We are seriously concerned about this because the deployment of missiles by North Korea does affect Japanese security and it also affects peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” It appears that the Japanese government regarded it as a serious

threat, and they also understood North Korea had a clear intention to attack. For instance, Toshiyuki Shikata, a retired general in the Japanese Self Defense Forces said, “The real reason for the North Korean missile is its target, which is Japan. And the reason the target is Japan is that the American military bases are here” (Wudunn 1998). This quote suggests that they placed the reason in their intention to attack Japan.

On the contrary, Kim explained that “Given that the test fire was announced the day before the Supreme People’s Assembly amended the DPRK Constitution to usher in the Kim Jong-il era, *it was clear that this was meant to celebrate the new era* with the image of ‘national strength and prosperity (*Gang seong dae guk*)’” (Kim 2019: 515-6). This quote suggests that Kim focused on situational factors to understand North Korea’s testing missiles. It appears Kim considered the specific situations that North Korea was facing and thought of different ways of explaining the causes of the test rather than just malign intent. This approach by Kim is associated with the cognitive tendency of hope as illustrated in Chapter 3. As described in *Instance A.3.*, Kim possessed the belief of the possibility of North Korea to change. It also aligns with Kim’s focus on North Korea’s situational factors rather than their fixed hostile characteristics.

Instance 2.a.3: Kim’s interpretation of the nuclear development allegations

The third instance describes Kim’s interpretation of the nuclear development allegations in Kumchang-ri and his different explanations for the reasons why North Korea fired the missiles in August 1998. Regarding the cases, Kim had an interview with the *The Hankyoreh* and explained that “it [the North Korean nuclear development allegation] is just a *transitory* phenomenon, which is *coming from their fear* of the crisis of their regime” (*The Hankyoreh* 1998). The quote suggests that he understood it was a “transitory phenomenon,” and hope is

generated based upon this kind of belief that situations can change. This is because, as illustrated in Chapter 2, it is difficult for hope to arise in circumstances that appear to be resistant to change.

Kim's interpretation was different to the US Congress. The nuclear development allegations in Kumchang-ri provoked growing threats from the US Congress to stop funding the 1994 Agreed Framework that was the basis for the Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea (Goshko 1999). The congressional complaints that North Korea might be using the Kumchang-ri installation to violate the 1994 agreement finally led to the US inspection of the alleged nuclear facility. However, the quote above provides evidence that Kim believed North Korea's behaviour originated from fear or insecurity and would not last long. It appears that Kim understood North Korea's fear coming out of the situation that North Korea faced, which helped overcome the 'enemy image of the rivalry.' Therefore, the incident can be considered as evidence that Kim did not focus on North Korea's fixed dispositional factors and provided different reasons for explanations for their provocative behaviour.

Instance 2.a.4. Kim's interpretation of the First Battle of Yeonpyeong

The fourth instance describes how Kim interpreted the first battle of Yeonpyeong. Every year, North Korean fishing boats sometimes come below the Northern Limit Line (NLL) to catch blue crabs; South Korea's high-speed navy speed boats have then driven them back out. However, in June 1999, about five or six North Korean coastal patrol boats came down to protect their fishing boats. They had continued to come down every day since 4 June 1999 and had not gone back even when South Korean coastal patrol boats approached. Finally, there was a shootout between South Korean Navy warships and a North Korean coastal patrol boat in the West Sea on the morning of 15 June 1999. The North Korean boat attacked first, and the South responded with gunfire. A North Korean torpedo boat sank, and a coastal patrol boat was

greatly damaged.

Even in the clearly conflictual situation, Kim did not interpret this as evidence of aggressive intent. He wrote, “We spent so much time discussing our engagement policy and a deputy minister-level inter-Korean talk was also scheduled for soon. Given this, it was hard to understand why North Korea continued to provoke us. My concern over the matter kept me awake at night. *What is the goal of this reckless demonstration?* I wondered. *Are there perhaps some internal struggles between the hardliners and the moderates?*” (Kim 2019: 570-571). The above suggests that Kim did not rush to make a conclusive interpretation of the intention and tried hard to understand North Korea’s domestic situation. It appears that Kim placed the reason for their defection in situational factors and did not selectively focus on North Korea’s hostility. In other words, the quote above provides evidence that the ‘inherent bad faith model’ operated in an opposite way. Kim selectively focused on situational explanations for the reason behind the First Battle of Yeonpyeong rather than attributing it to malign intent.

To sum up, the examples support the core proposition that Kim did not interpret North Korean provocations in terms of its hostile intent. Instead, he provided alternative explanations for the defection, selectively focusing on the continuing possibility of conciliation.

Kim’s Responses to North Korea’s Defection

Decision-makers’ responses inevitably depend on how they interpret or rationalise the defection, and the previous sections showed that Kim carefully interpreted North Korea’s intentions behind the defection and did not automatically interpret it in terms of hostile intent. Based upon the interpretations, I hypothesise that a decision-maker who experienced hope (iii) will be more likely to keep pursuing conciliation and create new ways to persuade others (iv) will be more likely to show responsiveness towards an adversary state to convey amity. I examine these in the following instances.

H3 (a). Keep pursuing conciliation

This section examines the third hypothesis: When a decision-maker experiences hope, they will keep pursuing conciliation even after a defection and try to overcome objections against conciliation raised by opposition parties, domestic audiences, and allied governments. The indicators of maintaining a conciliatory process are (i) whether a decision-maker gives up their conciliatory gestures after a defection or continues and (ii) whether a decision-maker creates new ways to overcome opposition caused by a defection. I expect to find evidence that Kim did not give up on the conciliatory process and created new ways to persuade others to support conciliation.

Instance 3.a.1. Kim's response to the failed Beijing talks

The first instance describes how Kim responded after the failed Beijing talks. As described earlier, even though the South Korean government promised at the Beijing talks to send aid that spring in exchange for opening a Family Reunion Centre and having another inter-Korean Red Cross meeting, North Korea did not accept this and instead, asked South Korea to first guarantee the supply of the 200,000 tons of fertiliser. The Head of the North Korean delegation, Jeon Keum-chul, maintained that "The South is threatening our autonomy. We can live without fertiliser, but we cannot live without our sovereignty." He added, "It is us who were defected, not them" (*MBC News* 1998). About ten days later, North Korea also criticised the South Korean government through Pyongyang Broadcasting, claiming that the South Korean government stuck to the confrontational anti-North policy of past governments. Even though North Korea did not make any prominently provocative moves, it can be considered as a defection because it was a 'non-cooperative choice' to Kim's conciliatory suggestion.

However, Kim's response to these statements was not to give up; instead, he continued with new conciliatory gestures. According to the interview data I collected, Kim adjusted his

initial thought and re-established the operating principle of “Give first and take later” to continue pursuing conciliation. At the Beijing talks, Kim first asked the South Korean delegations to make sure to reach an agreement on holding separated family reunions in return for providing fertiliser. Kim still further suggested, ‘giving first,’ but at that time, he needed a guarantee to be able to ‘take later.’ Therefore, the interviewee who had attended the Beijing talks said, “Given the principle of ‘Give and take’ from Kim, I emphasised ‘reciprocity’ to the Press at the photo session on the first day of the talks. So, I think that is why the media could report the talks objectively, and we could avoid criticism.” However, after the Beijing talks failed, the Kim government analysed North Korea’s attitude and strategy at the Beijing, and found North Korea might have felt burdened with receiving aid in return for favours. So, the Kim government decided not to adhere to ‘give and take’ reciprocity and consolidated the operating principle of ‘Give *first* and take *later*’ reciprocity.

This does not indicate the Sunshine Policy was not unconditional. Even though Kim set the operating principle of ‘give first and take later’ and initiated unconditional conciliatory gestures as elaborated earlier, the Kim government emphasised ‘reciprocity’ on the surface. Interestingly, I realised some interviewees who had worked for Kim’s government intentionally avoided using the word “unconditional” and tended to emphasise “reciprocity.” It is quite understandable, considering that this was the main issue that opposing political parties were criticising Kim for at that time as discussed in the first section. Kim tried to prepare for expected criticisms by officially emphasising ‘reciprocity,’ but at the same time, he kept pursuing conciliation by adjusting the operating principle in practice with a different and subtly nuanced ‘reciprocity.’

In addition, Kim focused on the positive meaning of the failed Beijing talks and announced that he would keep pursuing the Sunshine Policy: “It was truly meaningful in that authorities from both Koreas sat face to face for the first time since June 1994.” He added, “We

won't give up and will keep knocking the door until they open it with patience and sincerity. ... I have *hope* for the future” (Kim 1998: 8 June). When he announced that he would not give up conciliatory gestures, he also explicitly showed his hope as well. His tendency to sustain his energy and galvanise efforts to seek improvement in an unsatisfactory situation also seems to conform to the behavioural pattern of individuals who experience hope. This is what occurred with Kim; when he first faced North Korea’s defection, he did not give up and continued with new conciliatory gestures.

Instance 3.a.2. “Guidelines Fostering South-North Korea Economic Cooperation”

The second instance shows how Kim developed an alternative pathway to overcome the failed Beijing talks and uphold conciliation with North Korea. A month after the talks failed, Kim tried to break through the impasse by finding new solutions and continued to facilitate economic cooperation. On 30 April 1998, he eased the regulations that limited private sector investment in North Korea by making an announcement called “Guidelines Fostering South-North Korea Economic Cooperation.” Based on the main principle of the separation of politics and economics, Kim lifted the existing bans on travel and trade with North Korea to find a new way to provide food aid and facilitate economic interaction (Chun and Koh 1999).

Given that Kim made such changes, Hyundai, one of the biggest South Korean conglomerates, was able to pursue a new project in May 1998 with North Korea and prepare to provide unconditional economic aid. After the guidelines were released, Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai, organised a task force team to prepare for his visit and arranged for 1,000 cows from a Hyundai-owned farm to be gifted.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Chung planned to cross the truce line directly, *Panmunjeom*, which was impossible at that time. However, he strongly asked his

¹⁰⁴ Hyundai started owning a huge livestock industry in 1994.

task force team to ask North Korea to consider this option. North Korea refused it several times, but Chung did not give up and stubbornly argued there was no other way. According to the interview in the documentary film (SBS 2023), when Kim Jong-il heard about this, he laughed loudly and finally agreed, saying, “Haha, he is pushing it forward literally ‘like a herd of cows.’ Okay, let him come through *Panmunjeom*.” Finally, Chung visited Pyongyang on 16 June 1998 with 500 cows directly across the truce line to North Korea. It was Kim who created the perfect environment for Hyundai to resume the economic cooperation project, and Kim’s creative way to enhance it finally led to this unprecedented moment.¹⁰⁵

Chung visited Pyongyang again on 27 October with 50,000 tons of corn and 1,001 cows in total.¹⁰⁶ Chung met Kim Jong-il for 40 minutes and made agreements on two North Korean projects: the Kumgang tourism plan¹⁰⁷ and a plan to build a business complex near Kaesong.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ The historic moment of the truce village was even described as “the last avant-garde art of the 20th century” by the economist Guy Sorman (*KBS* 2018).

¹⁰⁶ The number of cows was originally supposed to be one thousand (500 each), but Chung maintained 1,001 because a number that ended in “zero” symbolised the end, whereas a number that ends in a “one” symbolised the beginning. There were 287 adult cows and 213 calves, worth a total of 870 million won. These cows were donated to Tongcheon-gun, Chung’s hometown, as well as South Hamgyong Province, Ryanggang Province, and Chagang Province (Chung 2019).

¹⁰⁷ The Mt. Kumgang Tour Cruise finally set sail from Donghae port, and Chung was on board the cruise ship with his sons on 18 November 1998. At 5:45 p.m., a historic whistle rang out from the Hyundai ship *Kumgangsan*, which carried 1,418 passengers. Even though it was led by the private sector, it was clearly a conciliatory gesture from the South Korean government. This was because Hyundai committed to providing substantial infrastructure to the North to support both projects, which ultimately required the approval and financial support of the South Korean government. Also, as Kim explicitly mentioned, “The Mt. Kumgang tour was a precious child of the Sunshine Policy and the symbol of Korean détente (Kim 2019: 536),” and it was quite meaningful that North Korea opened its front and Changjon, a place of strategic importance for them.

¹⁰⁸ According to the interview by Woo Si-eon, in documentary titled, *The Story of the Day When You Bite the Tail*

As part of the agreements that Chung made during his visit to Pyongyang, he agreed to pay \$12 million per month for access to Mount Kumgang, and the two sides worked out all arrangements necessary for Hyundai to build a tourist hotel and for the two Koreas to put customs arrangements into place, necessary to support South Korean tourism to the North (Snyder 2018: 88-89). Hyundai would also develop oil fields near Pyongyang and supply oil to the South, in addition to the Mountain Kumgang tourism and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Chung's visits to Pyongyang successfully facilitated the Sunshine Policy of economic cooperation. It appears that Kim actively searched for new solutions to overcome obstacles and keep pursuing a conciliatory process.

Instance 3.a.3. Kim's response to the submarine incident

The third instance below describes Kim's explicit declaration of not giving up his conciliatory gestures when the North Korean combat submarine was found in the South Korean East Sea. Even after the submarine incident, Kim declared, "I would *continue to maintain the Sunshine Policy*" at the National Security Council (NSC) meeting. The NSC issued a statement, saying, "We would not allow provocation and would maintain the Sunshine Policy's basic principle. However, considering the current situation, the government will continue to maintain a two-pronged strategy of acquiring firm security and pursuing interchange and cooperation at the same time. We reaffirm that strong security will enable reconciliation and cooperation, and that the improvement in inter-Korean relations will reduce national security threats" (Han 2012). Kim "believed that *we shouldn't be disturbed by every single movement North Korea made*. I

(March 2023), at 9 p.m., on 30 October, the South Korean officers found out the North Korean government officers suddenly looked busy and embarrassed, preparing for something. Then, they told the South, "Kim Jong-il is coming to meet you. He said I would come as the president Chung is the man with age," and added, "it is the first time he comes out to meet somebody in person like this."

reminded people that the North Koreans had provoked us before we had adopted the Sunshine Policy too.” (Kim 2019: 510). Kim acknowledged that North Korea had provoked South Korea, but his logic behind it meant that “North Korea has always been doing like this because they need to strengthen their regime. Therefore, they will never stop it if we keep coercive toward them” (*The Chosun Daily* 1998a). It appears that, as illustrated in the previous section, Kim placed the reason for in their domestic political issue. Based on the above, we see that even though Kim referred to it as “provocation,” the logic ironically justified the Sunshine Policy and he kept pursuing conciliation. The above provides evidence that, for Kim, the actions of North Korea was not the basis for his decisions. Rather, Kim tried to overcome their defection to maintain a conciliatory process, which is also consistent with the ‘regardless of’ action tendency of hope developed in Chapter 2.

Instance 3.a.4 Kim’s response to Nuclear development and the Taepodong missile

The fourth instance below describes how Kim responded when facing North Korea’s nuclear development and ballistic missile testing. In response to North Korea’s provocative moves, the Clinton administration asked William Perry to begin his official investigation on 6 December 1998, and he was required to submit a report to the US Congress within five months. William Perry was US Secretary of Defense during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis and, at that time, he even argued for the bombing of North Korea, as well as preparation for an all-out war (McIntyre 1999).¹⁰⁹ Perry was widely known as a hardliner in South Korea because of this, even though Perry seemed to understand North Korea might fear for their survival (Tan 2014: 109). Considering this seriously, Kim prepared for a meeting and discussed it with Lim Dong-

¹⁰⁹ According to the article, the United States was on the brink of war with North Korea during a crisis in 1994, former Defense Secretary William Perry revealed.

won, Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs. To persuade Perry, they held joint discussions and finally devised a new policy called the ‘Comprehensive Approach Strategy for the Dismantling of Korean Peninsula Cold War Structure.’ Right after he discussed it with Lim, in early December 1998, the South Korean cabinet promptly passed the strategy after consideration at the NSC standing committee. When Kim met Perry at the Blue House (*Cheong Wa Dae*) for more than an hour on 7 December, Kim explained the strategy to him, but Perry returned to the US without supporting it (Kim 2019: 539-541). A few weeks later, Kim sent Lim again to Washington as a special envoy to try and persuade Perry of the efficacy of the new strategy. Lim met Perry there and explained the plan again in detail. Perry listened carefully and finally responded positively, saying that, “it is a *creative* and bold plan, indeed!” (Lim 2022: 321).¹¹⁰ Perry said he was considering a visit to North Korea and asked Lim if South Korea would agree. Lim answered that the South Korean government would willingly encourage him to do so. The above describes how Kim put increasing efforts into persuading the US.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Interestingly, three interviewees also described Kim as a creative person. Moon Jung-in, who was one of the architects and supporters of the Sunshine Policy, described Kim as “a *creative* person,” as Kim always devised a creative way to break through a diplomatic impasse (Moon 2022). See also Choi (2011: 85)

¹¹¹ According to Ahn (2006), the United States Institute of Peace which was created by Congress and is subject to its mandate - claimed, through a special report published in October 1998, that the suspect Kumchangni site and the missile test were a direct challenge to the Clinton administration which had applied diplomatic measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and warned that an unwillingness to challenge North Korea now with a deterrence policy would risk being confronted later by a qualitatively different North Korean military threat. The Republicans publicly insisted on more pressure on the North. After the North’s long-range missile test, Republican Senator McCain argued that the U.S. should cut off all funding to KEDO (Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization). Not only the Republicans but the Democrats became less supportive of the policy of engagement of North Korea. Before the missile test, Congress had provided regular appropriation for KEDO and food assistance.

After three months in early March 1999, Perry visited South Korea again to meet Kim and explain the US foreign policy toward North Korea, titled ‘Comprehensive Approach Plan for an Engagement Policy’. Kim was noted to be relieved and satisfied with the plan, to which Perry has been recorded to smile whilst providing the following arguably modest response, “This is actually your idea. I heard great ideas from Lim Dong-won. I’m embarrassed to say this, but we just stole, plagiarised, and repackaged your strategic plan in an American way,” and they laughed together (Kim 2019: 543). It appears that Kim’s consistent effort to persuade the US was successful. In the Perry review published in October 1999, Perry referred to Kim’s *consistent effort to persuade the US*: “As a leader of great international authority, as our ally, and as the host to 37,000 American troops, *the views and insights of President Kim are central to accomplishing US security objectives on the Korean Peninsula*” (Perry 1999). As the Perry report shows, Kim’s beliefs and political leadership were the most influential factors which led to consistent conciliatory gestures towards the DPRK. In addition, Arnold Kanter who was Under Secretary of State during the George H. W. Bush administration, later said, “The Sunshine Policy was deemed to be ‘naive,’ but now to be a ‘sensible policy’ by *keeping its consistency* (Joongang Ilbo 1999). The above provides evidence that Kim did not stop pursuing a conciliatory process even facing doubts from the US. The US placing a high value on his consistency can also be considered as evidence of Kim’s efforts in maintaining conciliation.

Instance 3.a.5. Kim’s response to the First Battle of Yeonpyeong

The fifth instance illustrates how Kim responded to the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in June 1999. Mt. Kumgang Tour Cruise was scheduled to set sail to North Korea in the evening of the 15 June 1999, but the battle happened in the morning of the same day. In this sense, the South Korean government urgently needed to decide if they should keep working on the Mt. Kumgang Tour. Lim Dong-won, the Minister of Unification, thought that “North Korea sees

the battle as an accidental incident and does not want it to be aggravated. And more importantly, Mt. Kumgang Tour is for our people; many dispersed family members have been waiting so long to visit their hometown again. *We should keep going on it.*” Lim called Kim to discuss this, and Kim was strongly in agreement with his idea. Additionally, Kim and Lim also decided not to stop providing fertiliser to North Korea as promised (Lim 2022: 324-327).¹¹² This data shows the Sunshine Policy was not only designed to be continued over a considerable period, but contra GRIT was kept going, even in the face of an event that significantly increased tensions (cf. Osgood 1962: 103).

As Kim continued with conciliatory moves even after the first battle of Yeonpyeong, some media and opposition political parties harshly criticised the Sunshine Policy. For example, they argued that it did not make sense at all to provide benefits to the adversary state even during military conflict. The critics even cast doubt on the government’s decision that there might have some secret agreement with North Korea (Lim 2022: 327). However, two months after the the battle, Kim explicitly declared again in his speech, saying that, “Even though there have been several provocations from North Korea, we *consistently keep pursuing conciliation for the peace* of the Korean peninsula and we will keep doing it. We *hope* to improve the relationships between the South and North Korea. ... We are always willing to have high-level official meetings between South and North Korea and offer our full material and emotional support to North Korea” (Kim 1999: 15 Aug). This quote suggests that Kim explicitly expressed his hope for conciliation and provides evidence of the ‘sustained energy’ action tendency of hope simultaneously. Kim not only kept pursuing conciliation after the battle, but also emphasised the tremendous victory to the public to show that the Sunshine Policy was not

¹¹² At that time, there was no direct channel to communicate with North Korea, so the South Korean government asked Hyundai to deliver the message to the North.

weak and to reassure the South Korean public.¹¹³ It appears that the battle was not an obstacle for him to stopping his conciliatory gestures, rather, he used the battle to justify the Sunshine Policy and to continue its implementation.

H4 (a). Responsiveness

This section examines the fourth hypothesis: When a decision-maker experiences hope, they would be willing even after a defection to show responsiveness toward an adversary to convey amity. The indicators of responsiveness are (i) whether a decision-maker tries to understand and validate an adversary, and (ii) whether a decision-maker tries to deliver conciliatory intention. I expect to find evidence of these indicators of Kim's responsiveness toward North Korea in the following instances.

Instance 4.a.1. Beijing Talks (Mar-Apr 1998)

The first instance describes Kim's responsiveness towards North Korea's leader. In April 1998, the failed result of the Beijing talks was not what Kim had expected. Kim "expected North Korea would accept our proposal for the reunion of dispersed family members." He also noted that, "More than 60 percent of displaced North Koreans in South Korea had died by then. What could have been more important and urgent than having them meet their family members—if not, at the least, just letting them know whether they were alive or not?" (Kim 2019: 493)." These quotes give us a glimpse of what Kim perhaps thought about the North Korean leader.

¹¹³ While two North Korean combat boats were severely damaged and 20 North Korean sailors were killed in the battle, nine South Korean sailors were slightly injured . According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the North Korean casualties were estimated up to 130 (Lee 2014).

Given that the dispersed family issue was getting more urgent due to increasing cases of ageing and dying, the quote suggests that Kim believed the North Korean leader could understand and consider the situation properly and expected him to make a rational decision accordingly. In other words, Kim expected the North Korean leader to accept because the situation was urgent enough to be considered. His expectations showed that the North Korean leader was sensible enough to consider the situation. The above provides evidence that Kim believed the North Korean leader would understand the importance and urgency of the dispersed family issue and behave differently compared to the past. Even though Kim did not directly deliver it to North Korea at this time, Kim's validation of the North Korean leader that he was capable of making a sensible decision with a proper understanding of a certain situation provided a basis to show responsiveness towards North Korea. Therefore, this incident is considered as evidence that Kim had a positive evaluation of the North Korea's leader and validated him.

Instance 4.a.2. Tokyo Broadcasting interview (February 2000).

The second instance provides further evidence of Kim's positive evaluation of the North Korean leader. It appears that Kim did not stigmatize him as an "evil" or an "adversarial state's leader," and importantly he made the comment publicly in the interview to the press this time, not privately. On 9 February 2000, Kim's interview with Tokyo Broadcasting in Japan stated, "I believe that he [Kim Jong-il] is equipped with judgment and insight as a leader. There is no other way besides dialogue with him to solve inter-Korean issues." In other words, Kim acknowledged the North Korean leader as a sensible dialogue partner who could properly respond to each situation, and he would not be fixed only as an adversary state. Kim also said, "We could not expect any result by condemning or slandering its supreme leader" (Kim 2019: 605). These quotes suggest that Kim did not expect to realise his desired result by holding beliefs that the North Korean leader would be fixed and never change as an adversary. As it

was the first time South Korean leaders made an explicit and public positive assessment of the North Korean leader, many South Korean media published news articles regarding this comment. Even though it was harshly criticised at the same time (Cho 2021), such criticism ironically made the comment more noticeable toward North Korea. I would like to highlight that Kim showed an understanding and validation of Kim Jong-il and this demonstrates a significant difference from all other former presidents and their decision-makers in their governments, which also makes his conciliatory gestures noticeable.

Instance 4.a.3. Private Channel: Hyundai (2000)

The third instance shows what Kim did to deliver his amity to North Korea. In early 2000, Kim tried sending more conciliatory signals through the media, but North Korea did not provide any official response for several months.¹¹⁴ Kim did not stop and tried to reach out to North Korea through another channel and asked Hyundai to contact North Korea. Hyundai has been regularly contacting the North to discuss several business issues. For example, on 27 January 2000, Hyundai announced they would hold a sporting event together soon between the South and the North in Seoul and Chung Ju-young planned to meet Kim Jong-il in a few months to discuss the business on Mt. Kumgang Tour. On 12 February, Chung Ju-young sent a birthday gift to Kim Jong-il, and Hyundai also announced their business plan to develop Changjon Port in North Korea as a part of the Mt. Kumgang Tour project. Even though it apparently seemed a part of business meetings, given the circumstances, people could assume that the South Korean government allowed Hyundai to pursue the inter-Korean Summit. At that time, one of the officers of Hyundai did not explicitly admit it but carefully mentioned the events, saying

¹¹⁴ Scrutinising 963 articles from the five main Korean newspapers from January to February 2000, no single article reported North Korea's official response to the suggestion from South Korea.

that “Isn’t it reasonable for the government to try their best to find a way to pursue the inter-Korean summit?” (*The JoongAng* 2000). This quote suggests that Kim tried diverse ways to deliver his conciliatory intention, which also aligns with the behavioural sign of hope that develops new ways to achieve the desired outcomes. The above provides evidence that Kim tried hard to reach out to North Korea through different channels and showed his responsiveness even when North Korea did not respond to Kim’s signal.

Instance 4.a.4. Kim’s clear responsiveness in preliminary meetings

The fourth instance below describes Kim’s message to convey amity to North Korea. In February 2000, North Korea unofficially proposed a meeting to South Korea in Singapore and strongly requested that it should remain unofficial and secret. Given that the North strongly requested secrecy, the Minister of Unification was not permitted to visit Singapore as a special envoy in the risk of being exposed, and Kim appointed Minister of Culture and Tourism Park Jie-won as a special envoy, as the North wanted. Park later explained that North Korea had showed their doubt about the South Korean government’s intention at the meeting. Park said, “During the meeting, [Vice Chair] Song Ho-gyong did not say much and was just listening to the South. I think that was because what they wanted at the meeting was to know the true intentions of the highest authority in the South” (Kim 2019: 612). In contrast to North Korea’s hesitation, Kim enthusiastically prepared to deliver his desire for this meeting. Before the meeting, Kim told Park that he “should let them know that I *was willing to visit* Pyongyang and that the inter-Korean summit would make inter-Korean economic cooperation easier.” Kim also asked Park “to treat North Koreans *with both sincerity and pride*” (Kim 2019: 611). Accordingly, when Park met Song Ho-gyong on 8 March 2000 in Singapore, he clearly delivered the message that “*we hoped for the summit* in May or June and that President Kim

was willing to visit Pyongyang.” Park also explained Kim’s earlier version of the “Guaranteeing of Peace by the Four Powerful Countries and the Three-Step Reunification Plan” designed during Kim’s election campaign in 1971 and showed the draft of the Berlin Declaration to deliver how sincere Kim was about the Summit. According to Park, Song responded, saying, “I feel as if I am listening to President Kim Dae-jung’s voice” after the meeting (Kim 2019: 612). While North Korea came to the meeting to test out the sincere intention of the South, Kim’s enthusiastic endeavour to show his responsiveness was arguably well delivered.

The anecdote shows how Kim tried to respond clearly to the North’s request and convey the conciliatory message without any confusion. The Hankyoreh daily newspaper analysed that “Kim expressed his will to cooperate by pinpointing the top priority of National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il” (Lee 2022). In other words, the analysis described Kim’s ‘tailoring responses to specific needs’ of North Korea, which also aligns with the theory suggesting that “responsiveness depends on delivering the type of support that matches actors’ needs” (Sasaki and Overall 2023: 2). Therefore, this example can be considered evidence as Kim’s clear responsiveness towards North Korea.

Instance 4.a.5. North Korea withdrawing from NPT (Jan 2003)

The fifth instance describes Kim sending a letter to the North Korean leader expressing his hope after North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 10 January 2003. The North Korean government said in its statement on KNCA, “We can no longer remain bound to the NPT, allowing the country’s security and the dignity of our nation to be infringed upon. Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention of producing nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity” (*Guardian* 2003). In response, Kim still seemed hopeful, saying in his autobiography, “*I hoped to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue as*

best as I could, although my retirement was imminent.” More than just being hopeful, Kim prepared to send his last letter to Kim Jong-il and wrote: “*I sincerely wish* that the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation will continue to develop in whatever situation. ... As we still have time, *I firmly believe that we can accomplish* the connection of the Seoul-Sinuiju Railway if you [Chairman Kim Jong-il] decide to do so” (Kim 2019: 806). Even after North Korea withdrew from the NPT, Kim decided to send a letter to convey his conciliatory message with explicit expression of hope including its two core components – desire (wish) and expectation (belief).

Instance 4.a.6. Kim’s clear responsiveness in Berlin Declaration

Finally, I will use the “Berlin Declaration” case to further provide evidence that Kim publicly conveyed his clear conciliatory message. Right after the confidential meeting in Singapore without any agreement in early March 2000, Kim left for state visits to Italy, the Vatican, France, and Germany. During these visits, Kim made an important speech to publicly show his desire for the inter-Korean Summit, later called the “Berlin Declaration”. The Berlin Declaration was delivered on 9 March 2000 in front of 900 professors and students, and 300 reporters at the Free University of Berlin. Kim made promises to support North Korea’s economic recovery, advocate for the end of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and the achievement of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, guarantee their security, and called for the resolution of the issue of separated families, and suggested direct inter-Korean talks in preparation for a summit (Kim 2000: 9 March).

Moreover, it is evidenced that Kim wrote the Berlin Declaration very carefully by himself. According to the former Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Kim Ha-joong, who visited Germany with Kim at that time, Kim DJ “revised the speech too many times, and also asked me [Kim HJ] to read it a lot for revision.” And he added, “So, I

couldn't sleep enough and got sick of reading the manuscript. But he kept revising it right before he arrived at the Free University of Berlin." In his memoir, Kim HJ said he discussed revising speeches even at 5 AM (Kim HJ 2015: 316). Kim DJ also stated in his autobiography, "I worked with all of my soul, will, and sincerity, revising it even during my European tour. I thought about it over and over again while *keeping the North Korean position in mind*. I thought that both sides should be frank with each other" (Kim 2019: 609). Considering that being responsive is being willing to actively understand others, Kim DJ tried really hard to understand North Korea's perspective and be responsive to North Korea.

This speech would become an important trigger for moving on to the inter-Korean Summit. Six days later, on 15 March 2000, North Korea finally and officially responded to the Berlin declaration by publishing the article entitled "Actions Speak Louder than Words" in *Rodong sinmun* [The Worker's Daily], the official organisation of the Korean Workers' Party. While dismissing the "Berlin Declaration" as nothing new, the DPRK nonetheless claimed that inter-Korean talks could take place "any time if their behaviour is in line with our principled position" (KBS 2000). Former Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Kim Ha-joong, analysed that Kim's consistent conciliatory policy finally aided North Korea to perceive and understand South Korea's benign intent that South Korea will not absorb them and open their mind (Kim HJ 2015: 336). Accordingly, the Berlin Declaration sparked a series of behind-the-scenes inter-Korean negotiations in Shanghai and Beijing to efficiently prepare an inter-Korean Summit accord. On 17 March, the first special envoy meeting occurred in Shanghai, and both Park and Song met again. The second special envoy meeting was held on 23 March, and the third meeting was held in Beijing. After these special envoy meetings between the two Koreas, the agreement on the Summit was settled.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the hypotheses in relation to the *presence* of hope in the Sunshine Policy. The analysed texts provided evidence that Kim did not need any prerequisite conditions to maintain a conciliatory process and did not ask for immediate reciprocation from North Korea, making the Sunshine Policy an *unconditional one*. Second, the data showed that Kim experienced hope during his presidency. Kim mainly used the word ‘*hope*’ with peace or unification during his presidency, rather than in relation to other issues such as economic development. Kim’s ‘*desire*’ for peace was prominently high throughout his presidency. Kim expected a negative future in the Korean peninsula only once for a moment, but his ‘*expectation*’ of peace recovered by the end. Finally, when it comes to Kim’s interpretation of North Korea’s defections, I showed that Kim adopted a *careful* interpretation about North Korea’s intentions and *tolerated* the defections, and Kim *did not automatically interpret these in terms of the DPRK’s hostile intent*. Regarding his responses to North Korea’s defections, Kim *did not give up* conciliatory gestures even after North Korea’s defections and was willing to keep *showing his responsiveness* to convey amity.

Given the above, I have shown the role of hope in the specific type of conciliatory gestures and how to interpret and respond to an adversary’s defection. In the next chapter, I examine related hypotheses in the case of the *Trustpolitik as evidence of what happens in the absence of hope*.

Table 7. The Role of Hope in the Sunshine Policy

		1998				1999	2000	2001	2002/3
	Situations	Beijing Talk	Submarine /Chung's visit	Taepodong Missile	Kumchangri Nuclear	The 1 st Battle of Yeonpyeong	Inter-Korean Summit	The 2 nd Battle of Yeonpyeong	HEUP /NPT
The Presence of Hope	Explicit Hope	Hope				Hope	Hope		Hope
	Desire Expectation	Desire Expectation	Desire Expectation	Desire	Desire Expectation	Desire	Desire Expectation	Desire	Desire Expectation
The Role of Hope	Careful interpretation			Careful examination	Careful investigation				
	No hostility		Different explanations	Different explanations	Different explanations	Different explanations		Selective focus	
	Continue conciliatory gestures	No give up Guidelines	Continue	Persuade US	Persuade US	Keep going			
	Responsiveness	Validate the NK leader					Validate the NK leader Convey amity		Convey amity

Chapter 6. The Trustpolitik

Introduction

This chapter examines how far President Park Geun-hye Trustpolitik policy 2013 to 2016 was an example of a conciliatory process being pursued a leader who did not experience hope towards North Korea. Based on the theory developed in Chapters 2 and 3, I expect to find empirical evidence that Park adopted *conditional* conciliatory gestures and *gave these up* after North Korea defected.

To test the related hypotheses, I divide the chapter into three sections according to each factor: (1) the Trustpolitik – conditional conciliatory gestures, (2) the absence of hope, and (3) after defection. *Section 1* illustrates the Trustpolitik and its *conditional* characteristics. I examine whether Park needed any prerequisite conditions to maintain a conciliation process and whether Park asked for immediate reciprocation from North Korea. *Section 2* uses twelve instances to identify hope as being *absent* during Park's presidency. *Section 3* investigates what happened after North Korea's defection in terms of Park's interpretations and response. First, I examine how Park *interpreted* North Korea's defection in response to her opening, conciliatory offers. I provide several examples to show that (i) Park rushed to a conclusion about North Korea's intentions behind its provocative response to her conciliatory gestures. (ii) Park interpreted North Korea's defection in terms of its hostile intent. Second, I examine how Park responded to defection from the North. I therefore also show that (1) Park gave up conciliatory gestures, and she did not try to persuade other actors to support her conciliatory gestures, and (2) Park showed a lack of responsiveness towards North Korea to deliver her amity

The Trustpolitik: Conditional Conciliatory Gestures

The first section illustrates the Trustpolitik and identifies the conditional characteristics. The definition of conditional conciliatory gesture is one where the implementation is conditioned on reciprocation. I expect to find evidence that the implementation of the conciliatory gesture(s) that constituted the Trustpolitik policy - as against the offer - was conditioned on prior moves by North Korea.

What is the Trustpolitik?

Trustpolitik is the name given by South Korea President Park Geun-hye to her conciliatory gestures towards North Korea from 2013 to 2016. It aimed to “develop an inter-Korean relationship, make peace in the Korean Peninsula and establish the foundation of unification based on South Korea’s national security” (Ministry of Unification 2013: 11). The idea of trust was placed at the centre of the new policy, defined as Trustpolitik, which was introduced in the autumn of 2011 in her article entitled “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang”, published in *Foreign Affairs*. As highlighted in her article, Park called it “an alignment policy” in that “it would involve aligning South Korea’s security with its cooperation with the North and inter-Korean dialogue with parallel international efforts” (Park 2011: 15). She differentiated her approach from the policies adopted by previous governments, both progressives and conservatives. As part of the Trustpolitik, Park proposed to North Korea in May 2013 the construction of a peace park in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). She also launched a Unification Preparatory Committee in 2014, and called for cross-border family reunions that took place in 2015.

Beyond the Korean Peninsula, the Trustpolitik also contemplated an initiative to foster

security cooperation in North East Asia. It aimed to transform the existing structure of mistrust and confrontation into instead, one of trust and cooperation, starting with building a consensus on softer yet equally critical issues such as climate change, environment, disaster relief and nuclear safety. In this way, cooperation would gradually develop among regional players, gradually contributing to solutions to more serious security issues such as territory and history disputes. A process of this kind can be considered as a strategy for creating mutual trust through incremental learning, which could eventually evolve into an institution-based trust-building process (Howe and Lee 2016).

Trustpolitik is designed to be “conditional”

Park clarified in her article that “Trustpolitik does *not mean unconditional* or one-sided trust without verification” (Park 2011: 14). She added “Nor does it mean forgetting North Korea’s numerous transgressions or rewarding the country with new incentives. Instead, it should be comprised of two coexisting strands: first, *North Korea must keep its agreements* made with South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second, there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace.” Even though the aim of the policy is to “develop an inter-Korea relationship and make peace in the Korean Peninsula,” it is not an unconditional initiative.

In her inauguration speech, Park also implicitly acknowledged the policy’s conditionality by saying that, “I urge North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions *without delay* and embark on the path to peace and shared development.” Moreover, in the “Dresden Declaration,” which is also called “The Speech of Peaceful Unification,” Park stated “Should North Korea make the strategic decision to forgo its nuclear program, South Korea would *correspondingly* be the first to offer its active support” (Park 2014: 28 Mar). This clearly shows

she intended to respond to North Korea *only when* North Korea satisfied the conditions that South Korea suggested, which implies conciliatory gestures that are conditional in nature.

The *National Policy Planning Report 2013* also supported this, explaining the condition under which the Trustpolitik could be implemented. In the Q&A section of the report, there were two related questions. First, “Will the policy of trust-building continue to work when inter-Korean ties are under strain?” The reply was as follows: “The policy of trust-building is designed not only to accommodate a resolute response to the North’s provocations, but also promote cooperation upon North Korea’s change in the right direction. Therefore, *providing support and cooperation in return for Pyongyang’s right choices* is also a part of our trust-building process, as is convincing North Korea that its bad behaviour will not be rewarded” (Ministry of Unification 2013: 29).

The second question was, “Would the ‘Trust-Building Process’ take effect subsequent to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue?” And the reply in the report, “It would *not be desirable* to solely promote the development of inter-Korean ties *without progress in denuclearisation*, but at the same time, it would not be feasible to relate every inter-Korean issue to the North Korean nuclear program” (Ministry of Unification 2013: 28). Given the guidelines in the report, it is obvious that the Trustpolitik was different to GRIT because it was not designed to “be continued over a considerable period, regardless of immediate reciprocation or events of a tension-increasing nature” (Osgood 1962: 103). In addition, on 15 January 2015 at the New Year Press Conference, Park gave evasive answers but ironically showed her clear thought about the conditionality of the Trustpolitik, saying that, “I’m not saying it is prerequisite ... but it would be *impossible* to talk about peaceful unification *without any progress in denuclearisation*” (Kim HY 2015).

As a part of the Trustpolitik, Park suggested the construction of a ‘DMZ World Peace

Park' and publicly proposed this to North Korea in May 2013. It was a creative offer to pursue conciliation. Park said, "The ROK government will join efforts with the United Nations and relevant countries to create a world peace park within the demilitarised zone" (Ministry of Unification 2013: 19). However, when Park suggested the proposal of creating the DMZ World Peace Park by giving a speech to the US Congress on 7 May 2013, she explicitly added, "*Only if* North Korea chooses to become a responsible member of international society can a lasting peace be achieved in the Korean Peninsula" (Park 2015: 7 May). The conciliatory gesture includes an explicit invitation to reciprocate to North Korea and it is designed to be implemented only after North Korea. Park emphasised that peace would be possible only under the right conditions. The main goal of the Trustpolitik was to make peace and establish the foundation of unification in the Korean Peninsula; however, it was originally designed not to be able to continue before preconditions were satisfied and clearly contingent on some form of reciprocity from North Korea.

The Implementation of the Trustpolitik was Conditioned on North Korea's Reciprocity

As part of the Trustpolitik, Park also suggested resuming separated family reunions which had been suspended by the previous government, and that family reunions could take place in October 2015 in return for North Korea accepting South Korea's suggestion (Lee and Cha 2015). After Park suggested the family reunions (Park 2015: 15 Aug), North Korea did not immediately accept them and requested instead, "To resume cross-border family reunions, 'the May 24 measures' should be removed first."¹¹⁵ In response to North Korea, Park again

¹¹⁵ 'The May 24 measures' are the sanctions imposed by the previous South Korean government against North Korea preventing economic relations with North Korea, implemented in response to the sinking of the ROKs Cheonan on 27 March 2010.

emphasised, “To discuss the measures, we should meet. So, North Korea needs to accept our offer to have a meeting first” (Ji 2015). Park asked North Korea to reciprocate her suggestion first, and the separated family reunions could not occur until North Korea agreed to meet.

A few months later, North Korea finally agreed to meet after a landmine incident. On 4 August 2015, two South Korean soldiers were maimed after stepping on landmines allegedly planted near one of the South’s military guard posts by North Korean soldiers who had sneaked across the border; Seoul’s immediate reaction materialised in the resumption of loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts across the border for the first time in 11 years (Fiori 2017: 11). In response, the North fired a single artillery round over the border on 20 August, followed minutes later by several more in the direction of one of the South’s loudspeaker units; the shells fell short of the South’s side of the DMZ, and the South Korean military retaliated by firing multiple shells. Following the confrontations, North Korea finally accepted the offer to meet and both South Korea and North Korea had high-level talks at the truce village of Panmunjom inside the DMZ on 25 August 2015.

At these talks, North Korea agreed to stand down from its ‘semi-war state’. At the same time, North Korea also expressed ‘regrets’ for the maiming of two soldiers from the South in landmine explosions. In a deal to defuse tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula that were rapidly escalating toward armed conflict, the Park government subsequently halted its propaganda broadcasts into North Korea and both governments agreed to work towards a resumption of reunions for separated families (Choe 2015). In return for North Korea’s agreeing to have high-level talks and expressing ‘regrets’ for the incident, Park could resume reunions of Koreans who became separated from relatives during the 1950-53 Korean War. Likewise, the Trustpolitik clearly included the announcement of a unilateral initiative that is always coupled with an explicit invitation to reciprocate, like GRIT (Osgood 1970: 87).

However, it did not keep making moves unless North Korea reciprocated, and the implementation of the Trustpolitik was conditioned on North Korean's move. Therefore, as shown above, it can be said that the Trustpolitik was designed not to continue without any prerequisites being met, and the conciliatory gestures that constituted the Trustpolitik policy would only be implemented would after North Korea reciprocated. Given that it was contingent on some form of reciprocity by North Korea, I expect to find evidence of the absence of hope in the following section.

To explain the conditionality of the Trustpolitik, some scholars claim that international sanctions towards North Korea finally led Park to turn her back on further engagement and change the earlier stance. The simultaneous electoral wins of President Barack Obama in the US and Park Geun-hye in the ROK in 2012 initially offered opportunities for them to coordinate a sustained process of diplomatic and security engagement with North Korea (Govindasamy, Tan and Park 2019: 7). However, the Obama administration settled on a policy approach dubbed 'strategic patience,' which involved the gradually escalating application of nonviolent means of coercion as the North Korean nuclear problem that it purported to arrest grew more acute over time (Jackson 2019). In addition, in January 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and claimed to have successfully carried out a "hydrogen bomb-test" (McCurry and Safi 2016), an event strongly condemned by the UN Security Council, including even China, North Korea's last remaining ally (Choe, Sengupta and Sanger 2016). As a result of these advanced nuclear and missile threats, North Korea was met by the United Nations with the toughest sanctions up to date (the fifth set since 2006), including inspections of all North Korean planes and ships, a ban on North Korea's export of natural resources, UN member states to ban North Korea from opening banks, the expulsion of diplomats engaged in illicit activities, prohibition of training in fields that may help enhance North Korea's nuclear technologies, a ban on the chartering of foreign vessels or aircraft, and

a prohibition on aviation fuel supply (Roth, Yan and Ellis 2016).

Further complicating the prospects for conciliatory gestures was the increased inter-party wrangling within South Korea. Given the extent of the conservative Saenuri Party's electoral defeat during the National Assembly elections in April 2016, some scholars argued that Park needed to ensure unity among conservative domestic allies for fear of isolating her remaining conservative domestic allies (Choe 2016). The domestic political context made Park stop the conciliatory gesture. Apparently, it is beneficial to consider all these factors in the context of the process of the Trustpolitik. These help us understand why Park gave up her conciliatory gesture, but they do not provide sufficient explanation of the *conditionality* that was adopted in the first place when the policy was devised. More importantly, there were also consistent provocations from North Korea. In other words, despite being in a similar international and domestic political context, the Sunshine Policy was devised differently. Therefore, it is not sufficient to understand the conditionality of the Trustpolitik, and I suggest examining the influence of a new factor – hope – in the following section.

The Absence of Hope

I selected this case as an example of a historical even where hope was low or absent during Park's presidency. Based on the conceptualisation of hope developed in Chapter 2, I infer hope with the explicit and implicit indicators in the following examples: Park's explicit expression of hope and the proxies of desire and expectation. I evaluated the case based on several instances which demonstrate the absence of direct and indirect evidence of hope and show that Park did not experience hope in the course of devising the Trustpolitik.

Instance B.1. Foreign Affairs article (2011)

The first instance infers Park's hope for peace in her first article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 2011, a year before she was elected President. Park started her article, as follows: "On 15 August 1974, on South Korea's Independence Day, I lost my mother, then the country's first lady, to an assassin acting under orders from North Korea. That day was a tragedy not only for me but also for all Koreans. Despite the unbearable pain of that event, *I have wished* and worked for *enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula* ever since" (Park 2011: 13). She explicitly expressed her 'desire' for enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula when introducing her ideas of conciliatory policy. However, at the same time, she undervalued 'hope' to differentiate Trustpolitik with other policies to engage or deter North Korea. Park stated that, "The ones that have emphasised accommodation and inter-Korean solidarity have placed *inordinate hope* in the idea that if the South provided sustained assistance to the North, the North would abandon its bellicose strategy toward the South" (Park 2011: 15). She used the word of hope only once in the article, but in this context.

Instance B.2. Inauguration speech (February 2013)

The second example shows context in which Park used the word 'hope'. In her inauguration speech on 25 February 2013, 'hope' was used a total of 11 times, with 5 of those times in the context of economic development and only once in the context of conciliation with North Korea. Considering the political context right before Park officially took office, her pattern of using the word hope shows itself. In December 2012, a week before the presidential elections in South Korea, North Korea announced that they successfully put a Kwangmyongsong 2 satellite into orbit, mounted on a Unha-3 rocket in. Subsequently, North Korea also conducted its third underground nuclear test on 12 February 2013. Even right after the incidents, it appears Park focused more on economic issues. For example, Park stated that "So, I pledge to embark

on the making of a ‘Second Miracle on the Han River’ premised on a new era of *hope* hand-in-hand with the Korean people. ... Let us all work together towards a new era of happiness and *hope*, so that we can all become partners in another miracle or a new chapter in the ‘Miracle on the Han River’” (Park 2013: 25 Feb). Given that ‘the miracle on the Han River’ referred to the period of rapid economic growth in South Korea, Park used the idea of hope in the context of fostering economic and technological development than making peace. The same pattern is also be shown in the *Instance B.8*.

Instance B.3. Abrogation of a non-aggression agreement (March, April 2013)

The third instance describes Park’s response to North Korea’s abrogation of a non-aggression agreement. On 8 March 2013, North Korea announced that it was severing the military hotline with the South – which was used to facilitate cross-border movement of personnel and cargo – in response to a UN Security Council Resolution that imposed more sanctions on the country for its third nuclear test. North Korea also abrogated all agreements on non-aggression between the two states, including the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Peninsula (*MBC News* 2013). On 27 March, the North suspended operations in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), the only surviving vestige of the Sunshine Policy, by withdrawing all its employees.

In Park’s presidential speeches during this time, there was no mention of any hope, desire, or expectation of peace. For example, several days after the incident, in a speech at the graduation ceremony at Korean National Police University, Park explained the provocations from North Korea and added, “There can be *no hope* and happiness *in an insecure life*” (Park 2013: 14 Mar). Instead, in response to the incident, Park said, “North Korea keeps threatening, and the current security situation is very serious and urgent ... However *if North Korea decides to change*, I will actively push ahead with the trust-building process and pave the way for us

peacefully living together and achieving unification in the Korean Peninsula” (Park 2013: 8 Mar). After a month, Park also stated that “North Korea has been provoking us with the nuclear test, abrogation of the agreements on non-aggression, closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex ... However, *if North Korea decides to do the right thing*, the South Korean government will support and cooperate with them to move forward together” (Park 2013: 15 Apr). It appears that Park requested North Korea to show evidence first so she could continue the Trustpolitik. As elaborated in Chapter 3, given that the experience of hope is associated with the ‘acting as if’ action tendency, Park might have acted as if North Korea already changed if Park experienced hope. However, Park kept suggesting conditional offer conditioned upon North Korea’s reciprocity. As shown, Park’s no mention of hope, desire, and expectation and her action tendency of requiring evidence provide evidence of the absence of hope.

Instance B.4. After the agreement to reopen KIC (August 2013)

The fourth instance describes Park’s ‘desire’ for peace. As illustrated above, after the North suspended operations in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) on 27 March 2013 at its anger over a UN Security Council vote to impose more sanctions, both South Korea and North Korea agreed to reopen the KIC on 14 August. The agreement came after seven rounds of talks between the two parties aimed at getting the KIC back in motion. As part of the agreement, both governments stated the zone’s operation would no longer be “affected by political situations under any circumstance” (Agreement 2013). After the agreement was announced to the public, Park said, “I *hope* that the agreement today will be a chance for South-North relations to make a new start.” The next day, she stated, “I truly *desire* to start a new win-win inter-Korean relationship” (Park 2013: 15 Aug). It was therefore extremely rare that she expressed her desire for peace without any other conditions attached, considering the pattern she usually used the words ‘want’, ‘wish’ or ‘desire’ to urge North Korea to do what the South

Korean government wanted. However, it was not after North Korea's defection that she expressed her desire for peace, but after South Korea and North Korea agreed upon the settlement on the KIC. It shows a clear contrast to Kim's consistent desire for peace while devising the Sunshine Policy in that his desire even appeared after North Korea's provocative moves with emphasis (e.g. *Instance A.6.*) Moreover, Park's expression was the second and the last time – the first being her article in 2011 (*Instance B.1.*) – where Park expressed her desire for 'peace', not 'changes in North Korea,' while devising the Trustpolitik. Therefore, this is considered as evidence of the rarity of Park's desire for peace.

Instance B.5. Dresden Declaration (March 2014)

The fifth instance looks at the Dresden Declaration, which was also known as "The Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula" to understand the pattern of Park's hope. Park said in the speech that Germany and Korea had in common in that they both had 'hope' even after the Second World War. She said, "In the years following the Second World War, Germany and Korea both endured the pain of seeing their nation be divided. But instead of submitting to despair, Germans and Koreans alike marched forward with hope." She added, "A reunited Germany took its place at the heart of Europe. The years since unification have seen Dresden *emerge from a backwater into a world-class city known for its advanced science and technology*. Other parts of former East Germany also *made huge strides forward*. These images of one Germany encourage those of us in Korea to cement our *hope* and our conviction that unification must also come on the Korean Peninsula." She explained the reason why Korea could have hope and a strong belief in unification, and it was because she could witness Germany become the heart of Europe with prosperity after the unification. It appears that, for Park, economic prosperity seemed to be the important reason for developing hope. As I

emphasised in Chapter 2, this data helps us understand the context of whether a decision-maker sought *other economic or political motivations* while pursuing conciliation. According to the text analysis of presidential rhetoric, Park mentioned economic development 44 times but peace only 6 times, even in the Dresden speech which focused on peace (Park SH and Kim SH 2014). The authors claimed that Park regarded unification as a means of economic prosperity for South Korea, which is distinctive from other South Korean presidents' rhetoric. The above provides evidence that Park emphasised unification with economic motivations rather than an ultimate goal. Park's action tendencies appearing in the Dresden speech will be analysed further in *Instance 4.b.I.* later.

Instance B.6. No Hope after the Fourth Nuclear Test (January 2016)

The sixth instance clearly demonstrates Park's hope was absent in 2016. For example, Park made six New Year addresses in 2016, but there was not a single mention of hope, desire and expectation of peace.¹¹⁶ In all of Park's 42 speeches throughout 2016, there was only one mention of hope for peace, stating that "North Korea disregarded our *hope for peace* in inter-Korea relations by arguing they are the country with Nuclear weapons" (Park 2016: 18 May). Park said in retrospect, she "had desired North Korea to change and open the door, more than anyone else. However, [after the fourth nuclear test] I realised that it was not a good idea to predict that North Korea could be easily changed" (Park 2023e). She desired North Korea's change rather than peace or unification itself. She did not even believe it could come easily. Moreover, she seemed to regret she had wished for it.

Park also asked North Korea to make the right decision for peace and rejoin the world

¹¹⁶ There were six separate New Year addresses in relation to the following topics: general message, messages for the military, economy, female gathering, education, small businessmen's association.

only once in 2016, which showed a clear contrast to Park's earlier suggestions – 17 times in 2013 – of offering peace in exchange for North Korea's actions. In Park's suggestion in 2016, she said, "I strongly urged North Korea to take credible steps toward denuclearisation and peace on the Korean Peninsula" (Park 2016: 3 Mar). Her tone changed strongly, and she did not add any conditions to make collective peace with North Korea, which means she even stopped sending the conditional conciliatory gestures – and her giving-up responses will be illustrated more in detail in *Instance 3.b.2-5*. The above provides clear evidence that Park's hope completely disappeared after North Korea's fourth nuclear test.

Instance B.7. Expectations after the fourth nuclear test (February 2016)

The seventh instance describes Park's expectations about the future after the fourth nuclear test. After the fourth nuclear test, Park explicitly expected a negative future by saying that "Benefitting from the escalated tension in the Korean peninsula, *North Korea will be able to cause any social chaos with provocations and cyber terrors.*" Park also stated, "This nuclear test is a provocation toward our nation's survival and a *severe threat to our future. And this will lead to significant security concerns in the East Asian region*" (Park 2016: 12 Jan). After a month, she officially announced that the South Korean government's patience was limited, saying that, "Now it became obvious that North Korea will not be deterred by our present approach and showing our benign intent also never stopped them developing nuclear weapons. ... It is obvious that it finally will come to *a devastating end in the Korean Peninsula.*" Park further stated, "North Korea's '*nuclear provocation*' will become even bolder from now on because, unlike the first, second and third nuclear test, North Korea did not announce the fourth one in advance." She explicitly added, "I did not relinquish any expectations before the fourth nuclear test, but *I felt sceptical if I could have a significant dialogue with the Kim Jong-un government*" (Park 2023e). As shown, the instance clearly illustrates that Park's positive

expectations disappeared, and she even explicitly expected that the future would become more conflict-prone. This pattern of her expectations is closely related to her interpretation of North Korea's intentions, which will be addressed in the next section (e.g. *Instance 2.b.5.*).

Instance B.8. Interview data

I complement the analysis of texts with excerpts collected from the interviews I conducted. During the interviews, I asked interviewees to gauge Park's desire for peace, which ranged from 0 to 10. One of the interviewees (Interviewee A) who had worked both in the Kim Dae-jung government and Park Geun-hye government stated, "Overall, I would give 10 out of 10 for Kim's desire, and Park's desire would be ... half and half?" One of the other interviewees told me of the story when he met Park in 2002 (Interviewee D), which was in his memoir as well. In 2002, when Park was a member of the National Assembly, she visited Pyongyang and could meet Kim Jong-il. Before Park went to Pyongyang, she asked him for a meeting to ask some questions about the visit. As soon as Park met him, she asked, "What should I do to not make a mistake in Pyongyang?" He was so disappointed at her first question, and could guess what she wanted from the question. He said he thought Park just wanted to make no mistakes and give positive impressions to public.

Overall, I have provided the examples above to show the *absence* of hope during Park's presidency. Park used the word "*hope*" more in terms of economic issues than conciliation, peace or unification. Her "*desire*" for peace was rarely found throughout the data. She used the word desire or wish to urge North Korea to do the right thing. More importantly, unlike Kim's, Park's desire for peace was never found after North Korea's defection. As illustrated in the previous chapter, Kim even explicitly emphasised how much he desired peace after North

Korea's defections. Regarding Park's "*expectation*" of the possibility of peace, Park showed her conditional belief in the possibility of peace at the beginning of her presidency. She gradually became more doubtful of the immediate possibility of unification. In 2016, she finally described a negative future that the relationship with North Korea would be devastating. Whilst this section only focused on identifying the absence of hope through explicit and implicit expressions of core components of hope, now the following section focuses on what happened after North Korea's defection in the absence of hope.

After Defection: Interpretations and Responses

The final section focuses on how Park interpreted and responded in the absence of hope after North Korea's defections and examines four hypotheses:

H1(b). When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be less likely to tolerate a defection and more likely to rush to a conclusion about an adversary's intention.

H2(b). When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be more likely to interpret an adversary state's defection as evidence of malign intent.

H3(b). When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be less likely to create new ways to persuade the opposing sides and stop conciliatory gestures after defections.

H4(b). When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be less likely to show responsiveness toward an adversary following a defection.

As I have demonstrated that Park did not experience hope through the explicit and implicit markers in the previous section, this section expects to find how different her interpretations and responses were by identifying the cognitive and behavioural indicators discussed in Chapter 3.

Park's Interpretation of North Korea's Intentions behind its Defections

H1(b). Rush to a conclusion about a defection

This section examines evidence that relate to the first hypothesis: I expect when a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be less likely to tolerate a defection and more likely to rush to a conclusion about an adversary's intention. The indicators of being able to tolerate an adversary's defection are (i) whether a decision-maker rushes to a negative conclusion about an adversary's defection, and (ii) whether a decision-maker can refrain from immediate gratification. My analysis suggests that hope was not frequently evoked in the first section. Here, I expect to find evidence that Park rushed to negative conclusions about North Korea's intention behind its defections and asked for a quick response from the adversary state in the following instances.

Instance 1.b.1. No 'grace period' (April 2013)

The first example describes how Park interpreted North Korea's provocative move. When North Korea severed the military hotline with the South on 27 March 2013, which was used to facilitate the cross-border movement of personnel and cargo in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Park stated in a resolute tone, "Once North Korea provoked us, we *will nip it in the bud* without any other political considerations" (Park 2023a). A few days later, North Korea's General Bureau for the Special Zone Development Guidance also threatened to shut down the KIC. In response, the South Korean government warned them and gave just one day for North Korea to accept the suggestion of engaging in talks, saying that "unless you accept our suggestion *by tomorrow morning*, we may potentially take significant action" (Park 2023c). As soon as North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK) rejected Seoul's call for talks, Park immediately ordered the Ministry of Unification to withdraw all

workers from the KIC. The next day, all workers working at 123 companies in the complex returned to South Korea. Park did not give North Korea any ‘grace period’ and asked for an immediate response from North Korea. This shows a clear contrast to Kim’s patience when he interpreted North Korea’s intentions behind their provocative moves. After North Korea test-fired a two-stage ballistic missile named ‘Taepodong’ in August 1998, he did not make a clear judgement about this even after a week (*Instance 1.a.2.*). On the contrary, it appears that Park was not willing to wait and have enough time to interpret carefully; instead, she rushed to a conclusion about North Korea’s intentions behind it.

Instance 1.b.2. Shutting down the KIC (January - February 2016)

The second instance also describes similar patterns of Park’s interpretation. After the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the Ministry of Unification announced that the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) was not targeted by the UN Security Resolution, so did not need to be closed. However, the KIC was shut down a few weeks later. Kim Jong-su, a priest and the director of the Policy Reform Committee, testified that the Blue House abruptly notified the Ministry of Unification that President Park had ordered the KIC to be closed. Kim JS said, “Kim Gyu-hyun (the Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign affairs) notified Hong Yong-pyo (the Minister of Unification) of Park’s instruction of the withdrawal from the KIC on 8 February 2016. ... I heard that the Ministry of Unification had been worried about the damage to property rights and opposed it, but she [Park] ignored it” (Jeong HS 2018). He said Park had never discussed it with other departments, such as the Ministry of Unification, National Intelligence Service, or Deputy of National Security in the Blue House, and decided it by herself.

Park hastened it too much and even ignored a legitimate procedure to shut down the complex, leading to a 6-year lawsuit afterwards (*Yonhap News* 2022). Three months later in

May 2016, the enterprises that had invested in the KIC filed a constitutional petition against Park's decision to suspend the operation, claiming it breached a constitutional duty to legislate laws to compensate for property rights violations. Her decision to ignore a procedure finally led to the Park government being sued by the companies working there.¹¹⁷ The above provides evidence that Park made a hasty decision and ignored other departments' opinions to impose a sanction towards North Korea, which even provoked legal disputes.

Instance 1.b.3. Test-fired ballistic missiles and the fifth nuclear test (September 2016)

The third example shows how Park interpreted North Korea's provocative moves. After North Korea fired three ballistic missiles on 5 September 2016. *On the same day* of the fire, the South Korean government officially announced that "North Korea fired ballistic missiles against the UN Security Resolution again. ... It is like a military protest" (Lee YT 2016). Four days later, North Korea conducted the fifth nuclear test. *The next day*, Park presided over an emergency meeting to discuss follow-up measures to respond to the fifth North Korean nuclear test. In response, she described North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's mental state as "out of control" at a security situation review meeting held after the test saying that "Kim Jong-un does not listen to any voice, and this leads us to view Kim Jong-un's mental state as uncontrollable." (*The Hankyoreh* 2016). "This clearly reaffirmed the North Korean regime's recklessness and its obsession with nuclear arms," she added (YTN 2016). How she interpreted the nuclear incident

¹¹⁷ After six years, the court finally ruled that the procedures Park opted for 'do not seem clearly unreasonable' to regard as unconstitutional, and dismissed a lawsuit filed by one of the companies against the government. The ruling concluded a year-long case, saying, "It is suitable to see the suspension as a tool to use economic sanctions to contribute to international consensus, which is deterring North Korea's nuclear weapons development, and to bring stronger international cooperation" (Lee TG 2022).

was quite in contrast to how Kim Dae-jung had interpreted the nuclear development incident in Kumchang-ri in August 1998. Three months after the incident, Kim DJ publicly announced in November that the South Korean government had been investigating it for a few months (*Instance 1.a.3*). It appears that Park rushed to a conclusion about North Korea's defection, interpreted it to be in line with hostility, and she even denounced the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un.

Given the above, I argue that these examples present evidence that Park was less likely to tolerate for North Korea's defection, and she accordingly rushed to a conclusion about their hostile intention behind the defection. This shows a clear difference between Kim Dae-jung's patience and careful interpretation of North Korea's intention in the previous chapter.

H2 (b). Selective Focus on North Korea's Hostility

This section examines the second hypothesis: When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be more likely to interpret an adversary's defection as evidence of malign intent. The indicators of interpreting an adversary's defection in terms of a hostile intent are (i) whether a decision-maker pays selective attention to hostile moves or the possibility of conciliation and (ii) whether a decision-maker places the causes of defection in an adversary's hostility or can provide different situational explanations of reasons for the defection. In other words, when a decision-maker interprets an adversary's defection as clear evidence of malign intent, they might not provide different explanations of reasons for the defection and only focus on an adversary's hostility. Therefore, I expect to find evidence of the indicators above in the following instances. I will use several North Korean provocative events – namely, North Korea's scrapping of the armistice of the Korean War, the firing of ballistic missiles, the landmine explosion incident, and the third, fourth, and fifth nuclear tests to show that Park interpreted North Korea's defection in terms of its hostile intent.

Instance 2.b.1. Park's interpretation of the third nuclear test (February 2013)

The first instance below describes Park's interpretation of the third nuclear test on 12 February 2013. In response, Park said in her inauguration speech on 24 February, "It [the third nuclear test] is obviously challenging to our survival and our future." She added, "I pledge to you today that I will *not tolerate any action that threatens* the lives of our people and the security of our nation" (Park 2013: 25 Feb). The following week, Park delivered the 'Statement to the Nation,' describing that the "North Korean nuclear tests and continuous provocations have *endangered our security*" (Park 2013: 4 Mar). A few days later, Park also said, "North Korea's recent nuclear test and the recurring provocations are *escalating into tensions* of war in the Korean Peninsula" (SBS News 2013). These quotes are considered here as evidence that Park interpreted the defection as hostile. This is because other experts interpreted the third nuclear test differently from Park's. For example, Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, even expected North Korea to probably conduct the third nuclear test around 10 and 15 February, considering Kim Jong-il's birthday was celebrated on 16 February. Yang argued that the nuclear tests would be conducted for domestic reasons (Yang 2013). On the contrary, there is no evidence that Park considered the North Korean domestic situation to explain the third nuclear test. Rather, it appears that Park only focused on its threatening behaviours rather than any other situational reasons for why it happened.

Instance 2.b.2. Park's interpretation of the scrapping of the armistice (March - April 2013)

The second instance illustrates how Park interpreted North Korea's scrapping of the armistice. On 11 March 2013, North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun* newspaper wrote, "The US has reduced the armistice agreement to a dead paper," announcing the decision of the Supreme Command of North Korea's army. "As the armistice agreement has been nullified, no one can expect what

will happen next,” the state-run newspaper editorialised the same day in a bid to play on Seoul’s anxieties (Kim YH et al. 2022). North Korea announced it had scrapped the armistice that put an end to active fighting in the Korean War in 1953, and also shut down a Red Cross hotline with South Korea, an emergency link for quick, two-way communication used by the countries in the absence of official diplomatic channels (Cole 2013). In response, some South Korean politicians explained that North Korea had cancelled its non-aggression pact with the South *to gain leverage in the negotiation with the US*, rather than to reveal their hostile intent (Kang 2019). They argued that the armistice agreement could not be nullified unilaterally by North Korea, considering the multiple parties involved in the agreement. The politicians provided different situational reasons why North Korea had tried to abrogate it.

On the other hand, there is no evidence that Park considered North Korea’s move was to gain leverage in the negotiation with the US. Instead, Park said, “I take the current threat from the North very seriously.” She even added, “*North Korea finally declared a war*. We [the South Korean government] should keep an eye on the safety of our people in Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and overcome these internal and external crises” (Im 2013). Park did not think of any other situational reasons for North Korea’s behaviour. It appears that she not only interpreted the North Korean scrapping of the armistice and withdrawal of people from the KIC as hostile act but even as ‘a declaration of war,’ which implies that she perceived North Korea’s intention was to attack South Korea.

Instance 2.b.3. Park’s interpretation of landmine explosion (August 2015)

The third instance describes Park’s interpretation of the landmine explosion in August 2015. While two South Korean soldiers were on routine patrol duty in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), a buffer stretching two kilometres on either side of the actual frontier line dividing the two Koreas, they were seriously injured in an apparent landmine explosion, and their legs shattered

from the blast.¹¹⁸ The South Korean military blamed North Korea for placing the mines in a neutral area within the heavily fortified DMZ. This was because the area around the blast had been swept for mines, and the sloping terrain made it impossible for mines to drift due to rain or shifting soil. North Korea issued an explicit denial; still, investigations finally revealed that the landmines were typical ones from the North, and wooden fragments from the exploded mines had paint used by the North. Based on the investigations, the South Korean government concluded that the mines were planted by North Korean soldiers to target troops from the South. In response, Kim Min-seok, a spokesman for the South Korean military, said, “*This is a clear provocation by the North Korean military. We will surely retaliate.*” Park also insisted that the landmine explosion incident undoubtedly violated both the armistice agreement and the non-aggression pact (Park 2015: 15 Aug). Park criticised that “It [the landmine explosion] was an *obvious military provocation that North Korea trespassed the military demarcation line and attempted to kill our soldiers* (YTN 2015). She explicitly explained that North Korea showed their intention to attack by trespassing on the military line and trying to kill South Korean soldiers. The above provides evidence that Park thought that North Korea deliberately invaded to attack South Korea.

Instance 2.b.4. Park’s interpretation of the fourth nuclear test. (January 2016)

The fourth incident describes Park’s interpretation of the fourth nuclear test. After the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, Park mentioned 36 times that the test was a ‘threat, crisis, challenge and anxiety’ during just the first half of the year 2016. For example, Park stated this nuclear test was “*a provocation toward our nation’s survival and a severe threat to our future*” (Park 2016: 12 Jan). She emphasised that “the fourth nuclear test differed from the first, second

¹¹⁸ One South Korean soldier had both legs amputated after the blast, while another lost one leg.

and third ones in that North Korea did not announce the test in advance.” Therefore, she said, “North Korea’s ‘*nuclear provocation*’ will be even bolder from now on” (Park 2023e). Park became even more confident in saying that the threat would be getting more severe. Given that negative belief about the future indicates signs of the absence of hope (and as the absence of hope was shown in *Instance B.6.* and *Instance B.7.*), it appears that Park’s selective focus on North Korea’s provocative moves aligns with the cognitive signs of the absence of hope.

More importantly, she also said, “The nuclear test proved again that it is always possible for further provocations from the North, *considering that the North Korean government has been so deceitful and reckless* like this” (Park 2016: 12 Jan). Park interpreted the fourth nuclear test as evidence of North Korea’s consistent hostility based on her consideration of “deceitful North Korea.” It appears that she placed the cause of the defection in North Korea’s fixed “deceitful” characteristics, and the enemy image of rivalry was still in operation. Given that the experience of hope is associated with overcoming the enemy image, the above provides evidence that Park did not experience hope and still held an enemy image towards North Korea.

Instance 2.b.5. Park’s interpretation of the Rodong missile (September 2016)

The fifth instance illustrates Park’s interpretation of the Rodong missile. North Korea fired three ballistic missiles on 5 September 2016. The missiles were fired from areas around Hwangju County, in North Hwanghae province, toward the Sea of Japan. South Korea’s military officials said the launch was believed to be of mid-range Rodong missiles, which flew approximately 1,000 km (620 miles) “without giving any prior navigational warning” (Sohn, Yoon and Jang 2016). In response, Park emphasised that “North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles are not a simple intimidation or tool for negotiation, but they are an *existential threat to be able to destroy all our nations*” (Park 2016: 10 Oct). On the contrary, the South Korean

Joint Chiefs of Staff officially announced that “Considering the upcoming G20 Summit and the Day of the Foundation of the Republic on 9 September, *North Korea is trying to show off their capacity* to produce nuclear weapons and capability to carry the warheads with the military protest” (Lee 2016). While others could provide different reasons why North Korea fired the missiles, Park explicitly mentioned that “Even though the North Korean government is trying to consolidate their regime by escalating military tensions and showing off their nuclear capability, these are *their great mistakes and misjudgement*” (Park 2016: Sep). It appears that Park did not intend to admit North Korea’s other reasons for its provocative moves, but she focused on North Korea’s irrationality. From this incident, we can infer that Park placed the cause of the provocative move in North Korea’s dispositional traits rather than situational explanations.

Instance 2.b.6. Selective focus on North Korea’s provocations in 2016

The sixth instance illustrates that Park paid selective attention to provocative actions from North Korea, in particular when she officially announced the necessity of stopping the conciliatory gestures in 2016. Park obstinately highlighted the most severe military conflicts with North Korea, and explained why the conciliatory gestures must stop, saying that, “If we keep going on without any changes, North Korea would deploy nuclear missiles, and we would suffer from fear and terror. North Korea has been continuously provoking us. For example, *in 2010, a torpedo from a North Korean submarine sank our navy ship Cheonan, taking our precious 46 sailors’ lives. North Korea even directly attacked our territory, Yeonpyeong Island, and last year, North Korea militarily provoked us through the landmine explosion*” (Park 2016: 15 Feb). Though she was not in office in 2010, she emphasised the military conflicts that happened that year because it was one of the most severe military conflicts between the South

and the North. In 2016, Park showed her tendency more often to selectively focus on North Korea's provocative moves, and explicitly announced conciliatory gestures should be stopped, which will be illustrated in the next section in more detail.

In short, the examples above have shown that Park operated with an "Inherent bad faith model," and did not place the reason for North Korea's provocations in situational factors. As a result, this precluded tolerance for provocative moves from North Korea and Park tended to rush into conclusions about North Korea's intentions behind a defection and interpreted it in terms of North Korea's hostile intentions.

Park's Responses to North Korea's Defection

Decision-makers' responses inevitably depend on how they interpret or rationalise the defection, and the previous sections showed that Park consistently perceived North Korean intention as hostile. Based upon the interpretations, I hypothesise that a decision-maker who does not experience hope (iii) will be more likely to give up conciliatory gestures and (iv) less likely to show responsiveness towards an adversary state. I examine these in the following instances.

H3(b). Stop conciliatory gestures

This section examines the third hypothesis: When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be more likely to stop conciliatory gestures after defections. The indicators of *stopping conciliatory gestures* are (i) whether a decision-maker gives up their conciliatory gestures after a defection or continues with these and (ii) whether a decision-maker creates new ways to overcome oppositions caused by a defection or agree with the opposition. I expect to

find evidence that Park gave up their conciliatory gestures and did not try to persuade any other actors against the giving up conciliatory gestures in the following instances.

Instance 3.b.1. Park's Attending China's Military Parade (September 2015)

The first instance describes Park's attempt to cease conciliatory gestures by depending on China. Right after the landmine explosion in August 2015, Park attended China's Victory Day event on 2 September 2015, marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Even though Park did not attend the event in retaliation for the landmine explosion, Park explained in her recent memoir that she "decided to attend China's Military Parade, seriously considering the situation in which *China was not happy about North Korea* at that time" (Park 2023d). In fact, North Korea's delegation to China's 'Victory Day' celebrations received little attention from host China's President Xi Jinping. Park unprecedentedly ranked alongside Russia's President Vladimir Putin as the star VIP at the grand military parade. While Park was pictured standing at a prime position during the main military parade alongside Putin, North Korea's Choe Ryong-hae stood at least 40 people away from Xi. It conveyed a message that North Koreans may have found it difficult to ignore those in high places. North Korean officials articulated concerns about seemingly warming relations between Seoul and Beijing (Carroll 2015). South Korean news media speculated that the recent North Korea's aggression angered China, which may have pressed its ally to pull back from the standoff (Bak 2015). As a result of the high-level talks in Beijing, Park and Xi agreed to "warn together against any actions that could escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula" in a joint announcement, implicitly indicating North Korea (*The Hankyoreh* 2015).¹¹⁹ It appears that Park did not visit China to persuade

¹¹⁹ In response, North Korea showed their displeasure towards South Korea (Bak 2015).

‘angry’ Xi to support her conciliatory gestures but intended to cooperate with China to deter North Korea.

Instance 3.b.2. Park’s response to the fourth Nuclear test I (January - February 2016)

The second instance illustrates that Park changed her approach and stopped her conciliatory gestures in 2016. After the fourth nuclear test from North Korea, she explicitly announced that “Global responses to this nuclear test *should be different from now on.*” (Park 2016: 12 Jan). A month later, Park also firmly stated, “Since I was in the office, I have been putting my consistent efforts into making North Korea change and settling peace in the Korean Peninsula. Emphasising establishing the foundation of unification and settling peace in the Korean peninsula, I did all my best to prevent escalating tensions under the ‘Trust-building process.’ *However, North Korea has responded to our efforts with nuclear tests and missiles, which astounded the international society.*” This quote suggests that Park believed North Korea defected in response to her conciliatory gestures. Park added, “Now it is obvious that *our keeping present approach and showing our benign intent do not work anymore*” (Park 2016: 15 Feb). Park finally decided to reinstall propaganda loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border accordingly. In response to the fourth nuclear test, Park also decided to shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) against the Ministry of Unification’s announcement (Jeong HS 2018). As illustrated earlier in *Instance 1.b.2*, it was the Ministry of Unification that proposed the KIC not be closed but Park unilaterally made a decision to shut it down. Park’s decision to impose this sanction towards North Korea rather obviously aligned with the US decision of economic sanctions on North Korea and the UN Security Council’s unanimous adoption Resolution 2270,¹²⁰ which tightened sanctions in addition to condemning North

¹²⁰ S/RES/2270 (2016)

Korea's fourth nuclear test. Therefore, the above provides evidence that Park perceived the fourth nuclear test as a defection and responded to it by giving up her conciliatory gestures.

Instance 3.b.3. The Deployment of the THAAD system (2016)

The third instance describes how Park decided to stop conciliatory gestures and deploy the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems. The United States had called for the deployment of THAAD in South Korea in early 2014, arguing that it was essential to protect US soldiers and facilities against North Korean missile attacks. In June of the same year, Curtis Scaparrotti, then the Commander of the United States Force Korea (USFK), revealed that he had also personally requested to deploy THAAD to South Korea (Koike 2017). In the meantime, South Korea did not explicitly show its intention to participate directly in a missile defence system built by the United States. However, a week after North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, Park finally declared that “*in view of the threat of nuclear and missile attacks from North Korea, we are considering the deployment of the THAAD system accordingly in line with its security and national interests*” (Park 2016: 13 Jan).¹²¹ Thereafter, on 8 July 2016, the joint South Korea-US task force announced its decision to deploy one THAAD system battery to South Korea (*The Hankyoreh* 2019). Park stated, “North Korea is threatening the peace in the Korean Peninsula. ... We should inevitably deploy THAAD for our minimum defensive sake, responding to North Korea's nuclear weapon and missiles” (Park 2016: 8 Aug). In response, the *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, denounced the move and said that “South Korea will become

¹²¹ Park (2023e) also stated in her recent memoir that her decision on the deployment of the THAAD system was to manage the threats coming from the North. In February, Ministry of Military announced that ROK-US decided to start discussing about the deployment of THAAD system.

a puppet of US policy in Northeast Asia” (*People’s Daily* 2016). Park said, “The deployment of the THAAD system is also for our self-defence to protect our people’s lives *from North Korea’s reckless provocations*” (Park 2016: 15 Aug), which showed Park decided to go against North Korea, aligning with the US. This contrasts with Kim’s response when he faced doubts about Korea from the US. Kim made a lot of efforts to persuade the US to support his conciliatory gestures. Rather, there is no evidence that Park tried to persuade other states to support her conciliatory gestures. Given that the experience of hope is associated with supporting conciliatory policy, the above is aligned with the absence of hope analysed in *Instance B*.

Instance 3.b.4. GSOMIA (November 2016)

The fourth instance illustrates Park’s decision to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan in response to the fifth nuclear test in 2016. North Korea conducted the fifth nuclear test during Park’s state visit to Laos on 9 September 2016, and Park cancelled the rest of the plans in Laos and returned to Korea. After the fifth nuclear test, the South Korean cabinet voted in favour of the bilateral GSOMIA with Japan, and Park immediately approved it. She said, “*Given that the North Korean provocations have been more frequent since the Kim Jong-un government, I cannot delay signing GSOMIA anymore for rapid information collection and analysis*” (Choi 2019). According to Park’s recent memoir, “The US had kept suggesting GSOMIA through various channels since I took office. It was actually the US, not Japan, who eagerly wanted us to sign the agreement” (Park 2023a). Even though South Korea needed Japanese intelligence gathering and Japan also could use South Korea’s human intelligence to identify, monitor and block the infiltration of North

Korea,¹²² some US strategists even called on the US government to play a more active role in reconciliation between South Korea and Japan (Sneider et al., 2016: 2). The North Korean nuclear threat and the US demand strongly compelled Park's decision of security cooperation between South Korea and Japan. The agreement was signed only 27 days after public announcement in South Korea.¹²³ In addition, given the short time, it was South Korea's Defence Minister Han Min-koo and Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Yasumasa Nagamine who signed the documents of the GSOMIA. This even sparked a boycott from photo journalists; they refused to take photos of Japanese Ambassador when entering the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul (Yi 2016). Despite such opposition from some political parties and a large section of the public, it appears that Park did not try to persuade them but just hastened and went ahead with the deal to deter North Korea.

To sum up, the examples above show that, in contrast to Kim's responses to North Korea's defections, Park decided to stop conciliatory gestures after North Korea's defections and depended on other countries to deter North Korea rather than persuade others to continue a conciliatory process.

H4 (b). Lack of Responsiveness

This section examines the fourth hypothesis: When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be less likely to show responsiveness toward an adversary following a defection. The

¹²² Japan has two sets of US TPY-2 radars (the so-called X-band radars) on the ground, several radars of SM-3 sea-based missile interceptors in the sea and other radars and satellites to gather and analyse North Korean missile activities (JMOD 2017: 329–331).

¹²³ A survey by Gallup Korea showed that 59 percent of 1,007 respondents opposed the agreement between the two countries.

indicators of responsiveness are (i) whether a decision-maker tries to understand and validate an adversary, and (ii) whether a decision-maker tries to deliver conciliatory intention. I check the available documents in order to assess whether there is evidence of Park's lack of responsiveness toward North Korea, a lack of recognition of North Korea, and implicit or explicit denunciation of the North Korean leader.

Instance 4.b.1. Park's Dresden Declaration (March 2014)

First, I use the "Dresden Declaration" case to examine whether there is evidence of Park's lack of responsiveness and her underlying attitude towards North Korea. According to the rhetorical analysis of the Dresden speech, North Korea is depicted in the speech as the one "leaving the children who lost their parents neglected out in the cold, struggling from hunger," and "refusing the [separated] family's God-given right to live together" (Park and Kim 2014). The authors argued that this depiction implicitly showed Park's disregard for North Korea as a dialogue partner, and her use of negative expressions and strong tone are not even appropriate language used within diplomacy.¹²⁴ Some scholars argued that the Dresden speech was not necessarily sensitive, subtle, or even cooperative (Frank 2014). According to Frank, Park's choice of the place where the speech was delivered even connotes 'takeover' rather than 'unification.' He explained that the location was chosen in what appeared to be a reference to East Germany at first glance, but in fact, it reminded the audience of a Helmut Kohl speech in Dresden that finalised the transformation of the indigenous East German reform movement into a pan-German unification campaign. Accordingly, he argued that the North Korean leadership might

¹²⁴ In contrast, Kim Dae-jung used kinder expressions to persuade North Korea in 'the Berlin Declaration,' which represents he regarded North Korea as a part of international society and a dialogue partner (Park and Kim 2014: 125-126).

have read: “if you risk reform, this will be your end. We will try to use that opportunity in the same way as Kohl did.” In response to the speech, North Korea published an article saying that “it was an intolerable insult” in North Korea’s main newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* (KBS 2014). Considering that the Dresden speech was also called “the speech for peaceful unification,” it might have been designed to communicate amity. However, it appears that Park did not care meticulously enough about North Korea’s perspective and failed to understand and validate them. Therefore, the Dresden declaration is considered here as evidence of Park’s disdainful attitude towards North Korea.

Instance 4.b.2. Park’s denunciation to North Korea (February, March 2016)

The second instance below describes how Park explicitly denounced the North Korean leader in early 2016. As Park’s stance took an abrupt turn after the fourth nuclear test, North Korea’s main newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* called Park a “traitor,” “dotard” and a wicked woman while using other vulgar expletives in a full-page story critical of her stance on North Korea (*Yonhap News* 2016). Park kept warning that North Korea’s nuclear program would only hasten the collapse of the North Korean regime, not ensure its survival. In the escalation, Park did not use the official title of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un when she mentioned his name. Instead, Park only used his name in the introductory remarks at the national conference of Chief Secretaries, stating that “As Kim Jong-un ordered to prepare for the terrorism against South Korea, we should particularly get ready to protect our people from their terrorism and keep aware of security” (Nam 2016). After several weeks, Park also criticised North Korea as a “tyranny” (Park 2016: 3 Mar). In response, Kim Jong-un directly mentioned “Park Geun-hye” six times without any official title and criticised her as well, which escalated tensions escalated. In retrospect, Park confessed, “[after the fourth nuclear test] It was the moment that I became keenly aware that North Korea was untrustworthy” (Park 2023c). Likewise, after the fourth

nuclear test, Park showed her explicit disregard for the North Korean regime several times.

Instance 4.b.3. Park's denunciation of North Korean leader (September 2016)

Finally, the third instance describes how Park denounced the North Korean leader in response to North Korea's provocative moves. In August 2016, North Korea announced it conducted a 'higher level' nuclear test explosion that would allow it to finally build an array of stronger, smaller and lighter nuclear weapons. Park presided over an emergency meeting to discuss follow-up measures to respond to the fifth North Korean nuclear test. She described the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's mental state as "out of control" at a security situation review meeting held after the North's fifth nuclear test (Kim YI 2016). "This clearly reaffirmed the North Korean regime's recklessness and its obsession with nuclear arms," she added, "Kim Jong-un does not listen to any voice, and this leads us to view *Kim Jong-un's mental state as uncontrollable*" (*The Hankyoreh* 2016). Park did not use the official title of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un when referring to him, intentionally showing her contemptuous attitude. It appears that Park did not regulate her negative emotions and did not intend to convey her amity anymore. Given that the tendency to regulate destructive reactions and negative emotions is correlated with responsiveness, the above provides evidence of her lack of responsiveness to North Korea.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the hypotheses set out in Chapters 2 and 3 in relation to the absence of hope in the Trustpolitik and how Park's approach to conciliatory gestures was affected. First, the analysis above shows that Park suggested preconditions and often requested immediate

reciprocity when devising the Trustpolitik, making it *conditional*. Second, the examination of the documents showed that Park did not experience a high level of hope during her presidency, and what little hope she experienced disappeared completely in response to what she perceived as North Korea's defecting behaviour. Park used the word "*hope*" more in terms of economic issues than conciliation, peace or unification. Her "*desire*" for peace was rarely found throughout the data. She mainly used the word desire or wish to urge North Korea to do the right things, just like someone rebuking their children, 'I want you to clean your room.' More importantly, unlike Kim's, Park's desire for peace was never manifested in the data after North Korea's defection. As illustrated in the previous chapter, Kim even explicitly emphasised how much he desired peace after North Korea's defections. Regarding Park's "*expectation*" of the possibility of peace, Park showed her conditional belief in the possibility of peace at the beginning. She then became more doubtful of the immediate possibility of unification until finally, she described a negative future. Accordingly, when it comes to Park's interpretations, I argue that Park *rushed to a conclusion* about North Korea's intention behind a defection and placed the causes of the defection only in *North Korea's hostility*. Regarding her responses to defections, I argue that Park *gave up* conciliatory gestures and showed a *lack of responsiveness* toward North Korea.

Table 8. *The Absence of Hope in the Trustpolitik*

		2013			2014	2015	2016	
		The 3 rd Nuclear Test	Abrogation of an Agreement	KIC Open	Dresden Speech	Landmine Explosion	The 4 th Nuclear Test	The 5 th Nuclear Test
The Absence of Hope	Explicit Hope	Hope with economic issue			Hope with economic issue			
	Desire Expectation		Doubt	Desire		Doubt	Negative future	Negative future
The Role of Hope	Interpretation		Rush to a negative conclusion		‘Depiction of North Korea’		Unilateral decision	
	Hostility	‘Threatening our security’	‘A declaration of war’			‘Intention to kill’	‘Deceitful N. Korea’	‘Destroy our nation’
	Stop conciliatory gestures		Shut down the KIC			China’s Military Parade	Shut down the KIC Propaganda loudspeaker	THAAD GSOMIA
	Responsiveness				Disdainful attitude		Explicit disregard	Explicit disregard

Conclusion

This thesis has examined why some decision-makers, even when facing an adversary, respond not through threats and coercion, but by devising conciliatory gestures. To answer this question, I introduced the concept of *hope* into the debate and developed a theory of hope in the conciliatory process. To conclude this thesis, I will outline the main findings, contributions and limitations of this thesis, and propose some avenues for future research. As I provided empirical evidence regarding the presence and absence of hope in the two empirical chapters, I summarise and highlight the main findings by comparing the two empirical cases in the following section. Then, I discuss the contributions and limitations and suggest directions for future research.

Main Findings

This section summarises and highlights the main findings, which can be grouped under two broad headings: conceptualisation of hope and the role of hope in the conciliatory process.

Conceptualisation of Hope

I conceptualise hope in three domains: a particular time at which hope occurs, hope as a secondary emotion, and core elements of hope. Building upon scholarship that understands hope as an emotion provoked by unfavourable conditions and troubling circumstances in which

people fear the worst, yet yearn for better (Lazarus 1991; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Snyder 2000), I suggest hope generally arises when something desired is not yet achieved. Hope is categorised as a secondary and positive emotion, based on the cognitive activity of deliberate thinking accompanied by positive affective components (Snyder 2000; Jarymowicz and Bartal 2006). Hope includes two core components – desire and expectation – with which most scholars agree as a definition of hope, among various definitions across many fields. Therefore, borrowing insights from the studies, I define hope as ‘one of the secondary emotions that arise when someone’s goal is not yet achieved, including core components, desire and expectation.’ Inferring the presence and absence of hope through the ‘explicit expression hope’ and the ‘proxies of desire and expectation,’ I showed how Kim experienced hope and Park did not.

Explicit Expression of Hope

In devising the Sunshine Policy, Kim mostly used “*hope*” with peace. And he consistently applied it during the peak of the Sunshine Policy in 2000, and even towards the end of his term. For example, right after Kim took office as president and the Beijing talks failed to result in an agreement, Kim explicitly mentioned hope, when Kim held a Q&A with the public and the 2-hour session was broadcast live in May 1998, “I have *strong hope* to be able to do something (to make peace with North Korea). I’ve decided to do it right now” (Kim 1998). Kim also showed his explicit expression of hope and the core components, desire and expectation, when he finally visited Pyongyang for the unprecedented inter-Korean Summit on 13 June 2000 and the moment the Sunshine Policy reached its peak. He said in his opening remark of the inter-Korean Summit (Kim 2000),

“I *desire*! I desire 70 million can be free from the fear of war. I *expect*! I expect our relationship of distrust and conflict will turn into a relationship of conciliation and

cooperation. ... And I *hope*! I hope we continue our earnest conversation between both authorities to resolve many problems one by one between South and North Korea”

At the end of his term, North Korea announced that they intended to withdraw from the NPT and, to make things worse, Kim was accused in the same year of the illegal transfer of funds to North Korea. However, Kim made a farewell remark before presiding over the last cabinet meeting, and made the following a final comment: “I have *great hope for our people’s future*. ... *We will accomplish the dream of peaceful reunification someday*” (Kim 2003).

On the contrary, Park rarely used “hope” with peace or unification and used it more in relation to economic issues. Park used the word “hope” in her presidential speeches 47 times in 2013, 30 times in 2014, 48 times in 2015, and 42 times in 2016. However, she used it with peace/reunification only *four* times in 2013, *five* times in 2014, *four* times in 2015. In 2016, Park’s hope became absent, and there was *not a single mention of hope*, desire and expectation of peace in the six New Year addresses that year. Her expressions of hope became even less after the fourth North Korean nuclear test. Hope for peace was only mentioned once in all the 42 speeches in 2016, and she stated that “North Korea disregarded our *hope for peace* in inter-Korea relations by arguing they are the country with Nuclear weapons” (Park 2016).

Desire for peace

When it comes to “desire,” as explained in Chapter 2, it was not easy to assess whether Kim and Park genuinely held a desire for peace. However, Kim’s desire for peace was strongly supported by the interview data that I collected. All the interviewees who had worked with Kim did not hesitate at all to strongly agree with the statement that Kim desired peace. On the contrary, there was not a single interviewee that answered with confidence that, “Yes, Park

strongly wanted peace.”

Moreover, the difference is still obvious in the documentary analysis. While devising the Sunshine Policy, Kim’s “desire” for peace was prominently high throughout his presidency. For example, Kim showed a constant desire for peace and even explicitly emphasised his desire when US presented North Koreans with evidence of their uranium enrichment program. In an interview with *Les Echos*, the French daily newspaper, the interviewer asked Kim, “Kim Jong-il’s regime has admitted violating the 1994 nuclear arms agreement. Is it still possible to trust him and continue to negotiate with him?” Kim replied, “We try all our best to keep peace on the Korean Peninsula. ... It is not because we trust them, but because we *want* peace” (*Les Echos* 2002) Likewise, the interview and documentary evidence consistently showed that Kim held a genuine desire for peace itself and prioritised a conciliatory process.

On the other hand, throughout Park’s presidency, Park mentioned a genuine “desire for peace” only once and instead, she often used the word desire or wish to urge North Korea to do the right things, such as, “I *wish* North Korea could abandon the nuclear weapon and join the peace and development” in her inauguration speech (Park 2013). It was rare that she expressed her desire for peace without any other conditions and intentions to urge North Korea to do something. In addition, even in the Dresden speech (Park 2014), also known as “The Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula,” Park mentioned economic development 44 times but cooperation only 6 times and such a linguistic pattern showed Park perceived unification as a means of economic prosperity for South Korea, not as an ultimate goal. It can be clarified in comparison to Kim. For instance, as mentioned earlier, when Kim was elected as a president at the end of 1997, South Korea received the IMF bailout and its remaining foreign currency reserves stood at only one billion. The conditions placed upon South Korea by the IMF meant that the national policy’s top priority had to be restoration of

economic sovereignty, subsequently making inducement of foreign investment into the South Korean market also a top priority. Even under the urgent circumstances, Kim consistently showed his desire for peace and he continued with his conciliatory gestures regardless of the economic situation.

Expectations in the possibility of peace

Given that hope is highly cognitive as a secondary emotion, a clear difference around both presidents' "expectation" is also very meaningful in distinguishing the presence and absence of hope between them. When it came to the Sunshine Policy, Kim expected a positive and peaceful future between South Korea and North Korea throughout his presidency except only on one occasion. Moreover, Kim consistently believed peace could be achieved even when it did not seem possible. For example, when a North Korean combat submarine was found in the East Sea in 1998, Kim mentioned the incident at the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, "Considering the current international circumstances and North Korean domestic politics, *I believe North Korea will positively respond to us in the near future*" (Kim 1998 July). Kim also thought that "*North Korea is so desperate that they have no other choice but to open its door. I will make sure the Sunshine Policy helps North Korea do that, even though it is not easy and could take longer than expected*" (Kim 1998 June). When Kim left office in 2003, he presided over the last cabinet meeting and made a farewell remark, showing his positive expectation and saying, "I have *great hope for our people's future. ... The new government will pursue and should succeed the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. I have no doubt that President Roh Moo-hyun [the next government] will accomplish his mission.*" (Kim 2003). He explicitly revealed his hope for a peaceful future in the Korean Peninsula and said he believed inter-Korean reconciliation would be accomplished.

On the contrary, on devising the Trustpolitik, Park's expectation went through three stages: first, she expressed her low level of expectation by suggesting conditions to North Korea at the beginning; second, she became slightly doubtful of the immediate possibility of unification; and finally, she even stopped suggesting conditions to North Korea and finally stated that the relationship would be worsening. In 2013, Park showed her willingness to promote peace, but only under the right conditions. For example, she said, "*If North Korea decides to do the right thing*, the South Korean government will support and cooperate with them to move forward together." Park started expressing her doubt in the possibility of immediate peace in 2015, saying, "*It seems difficult to expect any immediate changes from North Korea right now*" (Park 2015). Finally, in 2016, Park's expectations completely disappeared, and she even expected the future would become more conflict-prone. After the fourth nuclear test, she stated, "Frankly speaking, I didn't give up any expectations before. However, now, right after the fourth nuclear test, I feel *sceptical if it is possible* to have a meaningful interaction with the Kim Jong-il government" (Park 2023).

To sum up, in the course of devising the Sunshine Policy, Kim showed consistently high hope, high desire and high expectation. On the other hand, Park's desire for peace was rarely found throughout the data and her expectations completely disappeared in the end, which demonstrated the absence of hope. This is summarised in Table 9.

Table 9. The Presence and Absence of Hope: The Sunshine Policy and the Trustpolitik

Chapter 5 (The Sunshine Policy)	Chapter 6 (Trustpolitik)
The Presence of Hope	The Absence of Hope
[Indicators] (i) Explicit expressions of <i>Hope</i> (ii) Implicit markers (proxies) for hope <i>Desire</i> (wish) for peace : Emphasising the desire for peace over others <i>Expectations</i> of the possibility of peace : Cognitive act of believing it to occur	[Indicators] (i) Explicit expressions of <i>Hope</i> (ii) Implicit markers (proxies) for hope <i>Desire</i> (wish) for peace : Emphasising the desire for peace over others <i>Expectations</i> of the possibility of peace : Cognitive act of believing it to occur

[Instances] - Beijing talk1: “I believe it will come.” - Beijing talk2: “expected NK would accept” - Submarine: “NK will respond to us.” - Nuclear: “Communism can be changed.” - Summit: “Desire! Expect! Hope!” - HEU: “will deteriorate,” “try our best to keep peace because we want peace.” - NPT: “hope to resolve, sincerely wish, firmly believe...” - Allegations: “sincere wish for peace,” “sincere desire” “hope for reunification” - Farewell: “great hope” “will accomplish the dream of peaceful reunification.” 1. Kim mainly used “<i>hope</i>” with peace/ unification issues. 2. Kim’s “<i>desire</i>” for peace was prominently high throughout his presidency and has never been faint. 3. Kim usually believed conciliation is possible. He expected a negative future in the Korean Peninsula only once for a moment, but his “<i>expectation</i>” of peace recovered back in the end. →The Presence of Hope: Consistently high <i>hope</i>, with high <i>desire</i> and high <i>expectation</i>.	[Instances] -Advisory Meetings for peaceful unification: “not a single mention of hope” -The third nuclear test: “I wish North Korea could abandon the nuclear weapon.” -KIC: “If NK does the right things.” -DMZ park: “I believe we can grow peace.” -“I hope people can live in peace but if NK makes the right choice.” -“It is difficult to expect NK’s change.” -“Peace as means, (not a goal/desire)” -Newyear message: “I hope peace.” -“Unification does not come immediately.” -Became completely absent of hope in the six New Year addresses. -“A devastating end in the Korean Peninsula” 1. Park used “<i>hope</i>” with economic issues more than with peace/unification. 2. “<i>Desire</i>” for peace was rarely found in the data. She mainly used the word to urge North Korea to do the right things. 3. Her “<i>expectation</i>” had changed - She expressed her slight expectation by presenting conditions to NK at the beginning. - She was getting slightly doubtful of the immediate possibility of unification. - She stopped even presenting conditions and finally admitted that the relationship ended and it would be devastating. →The Absence of Hope: Desire for peace was rarely found throughout the data and expectations completely disappeared in the end.
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The Role of Hope in a Conciliatory Process

Based upon the conceptualisation of hope and the empirical evidence, I have examined the role of hope in a conciliatory process, focusing on the initiation of conciliatory gestures and behaviours after North Korea’s defection. I argue that a decision-maker who experiences hope is more likely to adopt ‘unconditional conciliatory gestures,’ and they interpret and respond to an adversary’s defection differently than conventional accounts argue. More specifically regarding behaviours after defection, I argue that when a decision-maker experiences hope,

they will (1) be more likely to tolerate defection and take more time to make a decision about an adversary's intention, (2) be less likely to interpret an adversary's defection in terms of its hostile intention, (3) be more likely to keep conciliation even after a defection and create new ways to overcome objections against a conciliation, and (4) be more likely to show responsiveness towards an adversary to convey amity.

The Types of Conciliatory Gestures: Conditional vs. Unconditional

I suggested that a decision-maker who experiences hope is more likely to adopt 'unconditional conciliatory gestures.' President Kim, who demonstrably showed the presence of hope, adopted *the Sunshine Policy*, which was designed to "continue over a considerable period, regardless of immediate reciprocation or events of a tension-increasing nature" (Osgood 1962: 103). It relied on the two most important operating principles of "the separation of politics and economy" and "give first and take later," which made the Sunshine Policy an unconditional conciliatory gesture. Two months after Kim took office at the Beijing talks in April 1998, the Kim government explicitly delivered the intention to the North. As the talks failed to result in an agreement, the Kim government analysed North Korea's attitude and strategy again and more firmly reestablished and consolidated those two operating principles. Given the principles of the separation of politics and economy, Kim made an announcement on "Guidelines Fostering South-North Korea Economic Cooperation", lifted the bans on travel, and eased the regulations of limitation on the private sectors' investment in North Korea to keep promoting economic exchanges and cooperation.

The Trustpolitik on the other hand was adopted by President Park who did not experience hope in relations with North Korea. The Trustpolitik was clearly aimed to develop an inter-Korean relationship and form peace in the Korean Peninsula, and it "included explicit

invitation to reciprocation” (Osgood 1962: 101). However, in contrast to GRIT, policies were conditioned on North Korea’s prior reciprocation. For example, as a part of the Trustpolitik, Park suggested the proposal of creating the DMZ World Peace Park, but she added, “*Only if* North Korea chooses to become a responsible member of international society can a lasting peace be achieved in the Korean Peninsula.” Providing support and cooperation in return for Pyongyang’s choices is also a part of our trust-building process (Ministry of Unification 2013). As Park clarified in her article, it was “not designed to be unconditional” (Park 2011) or to be “continued over a considerable period, regardless of immediate reciprocation or events of a tension-increasing nature.” According to GRIT, “it is crucial that actions which have been announced be carried out on schedule, regardless of immediate reciprocation, regardless of the opponent’s expressed intent to reciprocate, or events of a tension-increasing nature” (Osgood 1962: 103). However, the Trustpolitik is different to GRIT. Instead, it can be considered as ‘conditional conciliatory gestures’ in that it was designed to be implemented only when North Korea satisfied the set conditions.

Different Interpretations and Responses After Defection

H1. Hope and Careful Interpretation

I argue that when a decision-maker experiences hope, they can tolerate defection and take time to make a decision about an adversary’s intention; and when a decision-maker does not experience hope, they are less likely to tolerate an adversary’s defection and more likely to rush to a conclusion about the latter’s intention.

As shown earlier, for example, there was plenty of evidence of Kim’s experience of hope in the first half-year of 1998. At the same time, Kim noticeably took more time than other

actors to examine North Korea's intentions. When North Korea test-fired a two-stage ballistic missile named 'Taepodong' in August 1998, *on the following day*, the opposing political party, the Liberal Democratic Alliance (LDA) immediately made a prompt statement on the missile test that "North Korea keeps showing their hostility." On the contrary, according to the news article published *a week later*, "the South Korean government still did not make a clear judgement about the incident, and their response was *too careful*," and the article added, "it was because Kim asked the relevant ministries to respond carefully" (*Yonhap News* 1998 Sep).

On the other hand, there was no evidence of Park's hope in 2016 and Park unprecedentedly rushed to a conclusion about North Korea's hostility after the fourth nuclear test in February 2016, unilaterally deciding to shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). The Ministry of Unification announced that the KIC was not affected by the UN Security Council Resolutions imposed after the test but Park was determined to respond with a countervailing response. She hastened it too much and ignored a legitimate procedure to shut down the complex, even leading to a 6-year lawsuit afterwards (*Yonhap News* 2022).

H2. Hope and Not Automatic Interpretation in Terms of a Hostile Intent

I argued that when a decision-maker experiences hope, they will be less likely to interpret an adversary's defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state. When a decision-maker does not experience hope, they will be more likely to interpret an adversary state's defection as evidence of their malign intent.

In relation to the submarine incident in 1998, Kim described the case in his autobiography as follows: "The combat submarine was *adrift* after being caught in the net of a fishing boat" (Kim 2019). His simple description implicitly showed that it was not North Korea's intentional invasion of the South Korean East Sea, but instead, the submarine washed

away and was just there by mistake. Kim's focus was completely different to other South Korean news media, describing North Korea as an unchangeable hostile country and analysing that "North Korea sent the combat submarine to *invade* our sea" (*The Chosun Daily* 1998) As I developed in the theory chapter, this shows that Kim could escape from the combination of 'peaceful/defensive self-images' and an 'enemy image' of the rivalry. Kim instead described a nuanced positive change in North Korea, emphasising that "North Korea responded to this incident *unusually quickly*" (Kim 2019). By focusing on the speed in which North Korea addressed this situation and its positive connotations, Kim did not regard North Korea as an 'unchangeable enemy state' nor did he interpret the action as evidence of their hostile intent.

In contrast, Park's interpretation of the Rodong missile in 2016 showed a clear difference. In response to the North Korean missile test, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff officially announced that "Considering the upcoming G20 Summit and the Day of the Foundation of the Republic on 9 September, North Korea is trying to show off their capacity to produce nuclear weapons" (Lee 2016). However, Park still emphasised that "North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles are not a simple intimidation or tool for negotiation, but they are an *existential threat to be able to destroy all our nations*" (Park 2016, Oct). She explicitly mentioned that "Even though the North Korean government is trying to consolidate their regime by escalating military tensions and showing off their nuclear capability, these are their great mistakes and misjudgement" (Park 2016, Sep). Park did not intend to admit North Korea's other reasons for its provocative moves and interpreted the case as clear evidence of their malign intent.

Table 10. Interpretations after Defection: The Sunshine Policy and The Trustpolitik

Chapter 5 (Sunshine Policy)	Chapter 6 (Trustpolitik)
H1(a). Tolerate defection and take time to make a decision about an adversary's intention. [Evidence] (i) Not rushing to a conclusion (ii) Delay of gratification [Instances] -The emperor and empress of Japan: "not rewarded during this time." -Personality -History focus -Taepodong missile: "3 weeks to examine" →Kim was patient and took time to interpret North Korea's intention.	H1(b). Not able to tolerate a defection and rush to a conclusion about an adversary's intention. [Evidence] (i) Rushing to a conclusion (ii) Request immediate reciprocation [Instances] - KIC: "by tomorrow" - Landmine: "immediate approval" - The fourth nuclear: "without discussion" - Missile: "Announcement on the day" - Explicit mention "I can't tolerate." →Park rushed into a conclusion about North Korea's intention.
H2(a). Not automatically interpret an adversary's defection in terms of the hostile intent of the target state. [Evidence] (i) paying attention to the adversary's conciliatory moves. (ii) Provide different explanations of reasons for the defection. [Instances] -Submarine incident: "unusually flexible" "It was adrift" - Missiles: "Celebrate the new era" - Nuclear development allegation: "fear" -The First battle of Yeonpyeong: "Apology" "internal struggle" →Kim focused on the nuanced positive connotation and provided situational explanations behind North Korea's defection.	H2(b). Interpret an adversary's defection as clear evidence of malign intent. [Evidence] (i) paying attention to the adversary's aggressive moves. (ii) Provide no other explanations of reasons for the defection. [Instances] -2016 new year: "focus only on provocations" -Landmine explosion: "Apology" -Landmine explosion: "clear provocation" -The fourth nuclear test: "tension of war" -Cancel the nonaggression pact: -Withdraw from KIC: "NK declared a war" -Missiles: "grave provocation" -The fifth nuclear test: "severe threat" -Rodong Missile: "existential threat" →Park focused on NK's provocative moves and did not admit other situational explanations of their defection.

H3. Hope and Keep Pursuing Conciliation

I argued that when a decision-maker experiences hope, they would keep pursuing conciliation even after a defection and create new ways to persuade the opposing side to pursue a conciliatory process; when a decision-maker does not experience hope, they would not create new ways to persuade the opposing side and will stop the conciliatory process.

When facing the North Korean nuclear development allegation and the ballistic missile incident in August 1998, Kim did not give up conciliatory gestures; rather, he tried to persuade the Clinton administration that started conducting the ‘Perry Process.’ To persuade Perry, Kim discussed with Lim, Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and devised a new comprehensive approach strategy, ‘Comprehensive Approach Strategy for the Dismantling of Korean Peninsula Cold War Structure.’ Kim met Perry and explained the strategy to him. A few weeks later, Kim sent Lim again to Washington as a special envoy to keep persuading Perry. Lim met Perry there and explained the plan again in detail in December. Finally, Perry referred to Kim’s *consistent effort* to persuade the US in the Perry report published in October 1999: “As a leader of great international authority, as our ally, and as the host to 37,000 American troops, the views and insights of President Kim are central to accomplishing US security objectives on the Korean Peninsula” (Perry 1999), and the Sunshine Policy was continued. Hopeful decision-makers think they can manage a challenging situation, so they do not interpret a defection as an obstacle to make them forgo their goal; rather, they develop alternative pathways to overcome the obstacle to keep continuing with conciliatory gestures.

In contrast, Park showed explicit expressions of a decision to give up conciliatory gestures several times and stopped them in 2016. After the fourth nuclear test from North Korea, Park announced that “Global responses to this nuclear test *should be different from now on*” (Pak 2016: 12 Jan). A month later, Park firmly stated, “Since I was in the office, I have been putting my consistent efforts to make North Korea change and settle peace in the Korean Peninsula. (...), but, now it is obvious that our keeping present approach and showing our benign intent *do not work anymore*” (Park 2016: 15 Feb). Accordingly, Park decided to shut down the KIC, reinstalled propaganda loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border, and deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems.

H4. Hope and Responsiveness

I argue that when a decision-maker experiences hope, they are willing even after a defection to *show responsiveness* toward an adversary to convey amity; when a decision-maker does not experience hope, they do not show responsiveness towards an adversary following a defection.

Kim and Park's contrasting responsiveness is clearly revealed in their famous speeches: The Berlin Declaration (2000) and The Dresden Declaration (2014). The "Berlin Declaration" was the speech that Kim articulately devised and publicly conveyed to show his desire for an inter-Korean summit at the Free University of Berlin. Kim gave the speech on 9 March 2000, making promises to support North Korea's economic recovery and advocating for the end of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and the achievement of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. He also guaranteed their security, and called for resolution of the issue of separated families, and proposed direct inter-Korean talks in preparation for a summit. Kim emphasised that he "worked with all of my soul, will, and sincerity, revising it even during my European tour. I thought about it over and over again while *keeping the North Korean position in mind*" (Kim 2019). Considering the definition of responsiveness, what he really cared about was understanding North Korea's perspective and being responsive to them. And it is not surprising that the speech sparked a series of behind-the-scenes inter-Korean negotiations to hurriedly prepare an inter-Korean summit accordingly.

On the contrary, even in the Dresden Declaration called "The Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula," Park showed a lack of responsiveness towards North Korea. She stated in her speech, "Should North Korea make the strategic decision to forgo its nuclear program, South Korea would *correspondingly* be the first to offer its active support" (Park 2014: Mar). This shows that she intended to respond to North Korea only when North Korea satisfied the conditions, which may have been interpreted by North Korean elites as the following: 'You are welcome to support me, and perhaps I will even bless you with my attention,

but only if you play according to my rules’ (Frank 2014). It was not an attempt to actively deliver amity and show responsiveness. What is more, North Korea was depicted as the one “leaving the children who lost their parents neglected out in the cold, struggling from hunger,” and “refusing the [separated] family’s god-given right to live together” in the speech; it did not show any understanding or validation towards North Korean leader.

To conclude, their responses to the defection clearly contrasted in terms of giving up conciliatory gestures. While Park gave up on conciliatory gestures, Kim continued with them by developing new ways and showing a clear responsiveness toward North Korea, which is summarised in Table 11.

Table 11. Responses after Defection: The Sunshine Policy and the Trustpolitik

Chapter 5 (Sunshine Policy)	Chapter 6 (Trustpolitik)
H3(a). Not giving up conciliatory gestures [Evidence] (i) Explicit expressions of not giving up (ii) Persuading others who are against conciliatory gestures [Instances] - Submarine: “Continue to maintain it” - Creative strategy to persuade the US - Beijing talks: “We won’t give up” - A new way to foster economic cooperation - Yeonpyeong: “We should keep going.” →Kim did not give up conciliatory gestures and continued with them by persuading others.	H3(b). Giving up conciliatory gestures [Evidence] (i) Explicit expressions of giving up (ii) Finally agreeing with others who are against conciliatory gestures [Instances] -The fourth nuclear test: “showing our benign intent does not work anymore.” -“Urgent decision to shut down KIC” -China: Attending China’s Military Parade -US: Deployment of THAAD -Japan: Signing the GSOMIA →Park gave up conciliatory gestures and finally agreed with the US.
H4(a). Responsiveness [Evidence] (i) To understand and validate an adversary. (ii) To convey amity [Examples] -Berlin Declaration -Preliminary meetings: clear benign intent - Tokyo: “sensible NK leader with insight” -Interview: understanding effort →Kim showed clear responsiveness to NK by recognising the NK leader as a dialogue partner.	H4(b). Lack of Responsiveness [Evidence] (i) Not try to understand and validate an adversary. (ii) No effort to convey amity. [Examples] -Dresden Declaration -Explicit denunciation of NK -Explicit denunciation of NK leader →Park showed lack of responsiveness to NK and explicitly disregarded NK leader.

Contribution

The overall contribution of this thesis has been to develop a conceptualisation of hope in a conciliatory process, and to empirically explore the conceptualisation through case studies of South Korean conciliatory gestures towards North Korea. This thesis has argued that hope holds the immanent potential to promote a type of conciliatory process, by initiating conciliatory gestures and responding differently to an adversary's defection. I have contributed to mapping the empirical dynamics of this understudied and under-theorised concept in IR. This is an important move, as all too often the term hope has been used with little prior thought or engagement with the broader meaning behind in mind. The contribution can be broken down further into the following four key areas.

The first contribution is to theoretical understandings of hope in IR. As I have already highlighted in this conclusion, the concept of hope is an under-theorised one in IR, and even more so in the conciliatory gestures literature. Hope has not been treated as a concept worthy of investigation, but rather as an everyday word that we speak and know it. In this sense, it has been conflated with wishful thinking, optimism, or confidence and, therefore, hope has usually been paid attention to as a cause of a failed foreign policy or a sign of weakness (Janis 1972; Gilpin 1981; Rock 2000; Ripsman and Levy 2008). My theoretical contribution, therefore, has been to develop a conceptualisation of hope that is rooted in the multidisciplinary literature, but still true to the core concerns and principles of conciliatory gesture theories. More specifically, this PhD thesis contributes to broaden understanding of decision-makers' responses to uncertainty about intention. By crucially exploring the presence/absence of hope, I found that decision-makers can experience hope as a response to uncertainty about intention. I also suggest that the experience of hope can affect decision-makers perception of an adversary's intention. This theoretical contribution is expected to provide different mechanism

of decision-makers' understanding an adversary's intention in IR.

By doing so, this thesis also contributes to the extant emotion studies in IR on why and how emotions matter in global politics. Despite the burgeoning emotion studies in IR, comparatively little has been said by IR scholars about hope (key exception includes Markwica 2018). The contribution of this thesis, therefore, is to partially address this omission and develop the relationship between emotional phenomena and IR theory further by exploring the place of hope in foreign policy making. Building upon the studies focusing on decision-maker's emotion in foreign policy making (Löwenheim and Heimann 2008; Renshon and Lerner 2012; Levy 2013; McDermott 2017; Wheeler 2018; Markwica 2018; van Hopf 2018; Keys and Yorke 2019), I explored how hope can be identified in foreign policy decision-making and how hope can be critical to the initiation of a conciliatory process.

The third contribution is to theoretical and empirical understandings of how conciliatory gestures can be continued even after an adversary's defection. All existing literature on conciliatory gestures predicts that decision-makers always converge on ending cooperation when there is defection from an adversary state, and conciliatory gestures should be stopped (Osgood 1962; 1970; Axelrod 1984; Michell 2000; Kydd 2005). However, I have identified a deviant case¹²⁵ where the findings of the case are that the leader of a state did not give up conciliatory gestures, even after an adversary's defection. The case study of Kim's response to defection is a highly important one for leading IR scholars to explore whether the presence of hope in foreign policy decision making might lead to new conceptions of the

¹²⁵ Deviant case analysis refers to "the study of particular cases which are anomalous with respect to a given hypothesis" (Molnar 1967). It is "the process of selecting or searching for highly unusual cases of the phenomenon of interest or cases that are considered outliers, or those cases that, on the surface, appear to be the 'exception to the rule' that is emerging from the analysis" (Cohen and Crabtree 2006).

conciliatory process. By studying the particular case which is anomalous with respect to a conciliatory process given the extant literature, I have sought to contribute to provide a more in-depth understanding of the empirical cases and refine theories of a conciliatory process.

The final contribution is a methodological one. To explore the emotion of hope in IR, this thesis builds upon many experimental studies in social psychology, which can easily ignore the political and strategic context of decisions, including the organisational or institutional contexts within which decisions are made and the international context which includes conflicts of interest between states. Therefore, this thesis attempts to get around the limitations of experiments through the use of historical case studies for the purposes of controlled comparison and ruling out alternative interpretations. In addition, despite the unobservable nature of emotions, this thesis seeks to identify the emotion and its influence by collecting additional interview data which could help understand the emotional experience of key decision-makers.

Limitations and Future Research

Despite the contributions of this research, it is inevitable that it has limitations and that there is much scope for future research. The most obvious limitation of this research is that the conceptual framework is designed to elucidate a very specific context – shaping conciliatory gestures in adversarial relationships. On the one hand, I argue that it is necessary to situate hope within a certain context, but on the other hand, recognise that this limits its applicability to IR scholars interested in broader areas. Therefore, the framework can be applied to different contexts, such as engaging coercive diplomacy in adversarial relationships or shaping conciliatory gestures in multilateral diplomacy. In a similar sense, more research would also be needed to explore empirical cases in different historical and cultural context.

Second, this thesis does not sufficiently capture whether hope was present as an ‘inherent personality trait’, ‘transient emotional experience’, or ‘lasting psychological state’ during the foreign policy-making process. By focusing on the presence/absence and the consequences of hope, it has not been possible to distinguish these different emotional states. Even though I have crucially addressed whether hope is present or absent in a conciliatory process, I have not explained what explains its presence. This brings us to the next suggested future study – the condition under which a decision-maker experiences hope. This thesis has only focused on the *presence/absence* of hope and *consequences* of hope; it has not addressed the *condition* of hope. However, it is genuinely puzzling and worth investigating when and why some decision-makers fear, and others can hope even in the face of uncertainty. Given the highly cognitive aspects of hope as a secondary emotion, the reappraisal strategy could be considered as one of the ways to foster hope. In addition, as many scholars maintain that the condition of hope tends to depend more on societal standards due to its nature (Block 1954; Shade 2001; Terry 2015), emotion norms or different cultural contexts also need to be scrutinised. Even though this thesis does not cover feeling rules or when and how hope is socially accepted and manifested in different contexts due to the limited scope of this research, it can be further studied in the future.

Finally, it is important to note that this thesis does not provide any normative judgement on hope as an alternative response to uncertainty about intentions. In other words, this thesis does not argue that ‘decision-makers should facilitate hope in response to uncertainty about an adversary’s intentions.’ More rigorous research would be needed to explore the consequences of conciliatory gestures coming out of hope because it is still debatable even though many scholars argue hope connotes positive, moral and socially acceptable meanings (Bloch 1954; Shade 2001; Eagleton 2015). More specifically, according to many existing studies, hope is categorised as a ‘positive’ secondary emotion in psychology studies (Snyder 2000; Jarymowicz

and Bar-tal 2006), regarded as an essential and ‘positive’ qualification for leaders (Luthans and Avolio 2003; Helland and Winston 2005; Wallis, Dolery and Crase 2009; Rego et al 2014), and a critical factor for treatment in medical studies (Gilman, Schumm and Chard 2012; Baalen et al. 2020). Instead, in the context of security studies, conciliatory rhetoric involving hope is considered unpatriotic, weak, passive and naïve (Tang 2011; Mattes and Weeks 2019). Therefore, it should be further explored how the consequence of the conciliatory gestures coming out of hope would look like in various senses. For instance, whether and how the consequence of hope could be effective in delivering sincere benign intent to a target state; whether and how it could have a positive correlation with facilitating cooperation between two states; and whether and how it genuinely makes sending state vulnerable or risky etc. could all be points of further research.

Appendix 1.

CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS

I agree to participate in this PhD project conducted by Jiyoung Chang from University of Birmingham, UK.

1. The detailed description of the project is given in *Participant Information Sheet*. I have received sufficient information about this research project and understand my role in it. The purpose of my participation as an interviewee in this project and the future processing of my personal data has been explained to me, and it is clear.
2. My participation as an interviewee in this project is voluntary. There is no explicit or implicit coercion to participate.
3. Participation involves being interviewed by Jiyoung Chang (researcher at the University of Birmingham). The interview will last approximately 30-60 minutes. I allow the researcher to take notes during the interview. I also may allow the digital recording of the interview and subsequent dialogue by audio/video. It is clear to me that in case I do not want the interview and dialogue to be digitally recorded I am fully entitled to withdraw from participation.
4. I have the right not to answer questions. If I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to withdraw from the interview and ask that the data collected prior to the withdrawal will be deleted.
5. I have been given the explicit guarantee that information obtained from this interview will be stored in two ways, in an anonymised and in an identifiable file. First, the researcher will generate an anonymised file: this file will not contain any identifiers. This will be the clean data set. A clean data set does not contain information that identifies participants, such as a name or address. Second, identifying information might be stored in a separate and protected file. Any identifying information such as names and job titles or any other information that might pose risk of identification will be treated anonymously in any output of the study.
6. I obtained a copy of this consent form.

Please tick the appropriate boxes	V
Please choose one of the following two options:	
Any quotes provided by myself during the interview should be first authorised by me prior to use in research reports	
Any quotes provided by myself during the interview do not need to be authorised by me prior to use in research reports	

By signing this consent form I certify that I _____ agree to the terms of this agreement.
(Print full name here)

(Signature) _____ (Date) _____

* For further information, please contact: Jiyoung Chang, _____

Appendix 2.

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

This form details the purpose of this study, a description of the involvement required and your rights as a participant.

1. Research Project Title

Investigating the initiation and types of conciliatory gestures between South Korea and North Korea.

2. What is the purpose of this project?

This PhD project aims to investigate the initiation and types of conciliatory gestures between two adversaries, focusing on state leaders. I focus specifically on the *Sunshine Policy* and *Trustpolitik* of South Korea .

3. Why have I been invited?

You have been invited as an expert, and I would like to learn more about conciliatory gestures in this conflict from you.

4. Do I have to take part?

Your participation as an interviewee in this project is voluntary. If you do decide to take part, you will be able to keep a copy of this information sheet and you should indicate your agreement to the consent form. You can withdraw at any time. You do not have to give a reason.

5. What do I have to do?

Please answer the questions during the interview. There are no other commitments or lifestyle restrictions associated with participating.

6. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used?

Our discussion will be audio recorded to help me accurately capture your insights in your own words. The recording will only be heard by me and my PhD supervisors for the purpose of this study. If you feel uncomfortable with the recording, you may ask that it be turned off at any time.

7. What will happen to the results of the research project?

The interview material will be used in a PhD and other forms of qualitative research (e.g. articles etc.). Any material that I wish to cite in my work will only be used with the strict permission of interviewees. You will not be identified by name or other identifying information in any outputs of this project unless you wish to be and give me explicit permission to do so. Even though identifying information will not appear in any outputs without your permission, any information might potentially pose the risk of accidental identification. To reduce the risk of accidental identification, I will ask for your additional permission before the dissemination of the research results.

If you have any questions, please contact my supervisors or me at any time,

Jiyoung Chang, PhD Candidate

Nicholas J. Wheeler, Professor

Tereza Capelos, Associate Professor

Political Science and International Relations, University of Birmingham

Appendix 3.

The Sunshine Policy

Instance	English	Korean
A.1.	"I can't guarantee anything right now, but <i>I believe change is coming</i> . I'm afraid I cannot tell you everything here, but there are some signs from inside and outside. So, <i>I believe it will come</i> . Unless North Korea accepts the change, they will face difficulty... So, I have <i>strong hope</i> to be able to do something here. I've decided to do it right now" (Kim 1998: 10 May).	"이제 변화가 올 것입니다. 또 그렇게 국제정세가 돌아가고 있고, 북한 내부 사정에도 그렇게 볼 만한 점이 있습니다. 여기에서 구체적으로 말씀드리는 것은 피합니다만, 그렇게 믿습니다. 또 그렇게 변화하지 않고는 북한이 아주 어려운 상황을 겪게 될 것입니다. ... (이산가족) 문제에 대해서 제가 굉장히 집념을 가지고 있습니다. 저는 뭔가 여기서 해낼 수 있다는 희망을 가졌습니다. 제가 지금 할 작정입니다."
A.2.	"Considering the current international circumstances and North Korean domestic politics, <i>I believe North Korea will positively respond to us in the near future</i> " (Kim 1998: 26 July).	"국제정세의 흐름과 북한의 내부상황을 감안할 때, 머지않은 장래에 우리의 대북정책에 호응에 오리라 고 저는 확신합니다."
A.3.	"Communism is consolidated when it is isolated, but it <i>can be changed</i> once it is exposed to the outer world" (The Hankyoreh 1998).	"공산주의 같은 독재체제는 봉쇄하면 더 강해지고, 풀어주고 바깥 세상과 접촉하면 변화하게 마련입니다."
A.4.	"Even though there have been several provocations from North Korea, we consistently keep pursuing conciliation for the peace of the Korean peninsula. As a result, we have achieved significant cooperation with North Korea. (...) <i>We hope for interactions between the South and the North Korean governments</i> . We are <i>always willing to have high-level official meetings between South and North Korea and offer our full material and emotional support to North Korea</i> " (Kim 1999: 15 Aug).	"국민의 정부가 들어선 이래 몇 차례에 걸친 북한의 도발이 있었지만, 정부는 한반도의 평화를 위한 남북간 교류협력 정책을 흔들림 없이 유지해왔습니다. 그 결과, 오늘날 상당한 수준의 남북교류의 성과를 거두고 있습니다. (...) 국민의 정부는 남북간 정부차원의 교류가 이루어질 것을 희망합니다. 우리는 언제든지 남북당국자 간의 대화에 응할 용의가 있고, 북한을 물심양면으로 지원할 용의가 있습니다."
A.5.	" <i>I desire!</i> I desire 70 million can be free from the fear of war. I <i>expect!</i> I expect our relationship of distrust and conflict will turn into a relationship of conciliation and cooperation. (...) And I <i>hope!</i> I hope we continue our earnest conversation between both authorities to resolve many problems one by one between South and North Korea" (Kim 2000: 13 June).	"저는 바라고 있습니다. 이번 방문으로 7천만 민족이 전쟁의 공포에서 해방될 수 있기를 진심으로 바랍니다. 저는 기대합니다. 이번 방문으로 반세기 동안의 불신과 대결의 관계가 화해와 협력의 관계로 바뀌기를 충심으로 기대합니다. (...) 그리고 저는 희망합니다. 남북한 사이에 풀어야 할 산적한 숙제를 하나하나 해결하기 위해서라도 책임있는 당국자간의 대화가 지속적으로 이루어지길 희망합니다."
A.6.	"We try all our best to keep peace on the Korean peninsula. It does not matter if the other side is good or evil. It is not because we <i>trust</i> them, but because we <i>want</i> peace" (Les Echos 2002).	"우리가 공산정권과 협상을 할 때는 어떤 정권이든 그 정권을 신뢰하기 때문이 아니라 평화를 원하기 때문입니다. 평화를 유지하기 위해서는 상대방이 선이 나 악이냐가 문제가 아니며, 상대방을 신뢰하느냐 않느냐가 문제가 되지 않습니다. 전쟁을 막기 위해 모든 노력을 다할 뿐입니다."
A.7.	"This incident also originated from our <i>sincere desire to block war in the Korean peninsula and enjoy peace and prosperity</i>	"이번 경우도 어떻게 하면 한반도에서 전쟁을 막고 민족이 서로 평화와 번영을 누릴 수 있을 것인가 하는 충정에서 행해진 것입니다. 이번 일에 대한

	<i>together, to nurture the hope for reunification while living without worry. I will take responsibility for this event. But I just hope that you will understand my sincere wish for peace and our best national interests. (Kim 2003: 14 Feb).</i>	모든 책임을 지도록 하겠습니다. 다만 국민 여러분께서는 제 평화와 국익을 위해서 한층 정을 이해해 주시기 간곡히 바라마지 않습니다.”
A.8.	“I have great hope for our people’s future. (...) “Please actively support President Roh Moo-hyun. The new government will pursue and should succeed the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. I have no doubt that President Roh Moo-hyun will accomplish his mission” (Kim 2003: 24 Feb).	“저는 우리 민족의 장래에 큰 희망을 가지고 있습니다. (...) 노무현 대통령을 적극 지지해 주십시오. 새 정부가 추구하는 민족 간의 화해협력과 국민참여 속의 국정개혁은 반드시 성공해야 합니다. 저는 노무현 대통령이 그 소명을 다할 것을 믿어 의심치 않습니다.”
A.9.	“Even though it cannot be numerically measured, I would say his desire for peace is ‘absolute.’” “I don’t think it is possible if there is anyone who can desire peace more than him [Kim Dae-jung].”	“갈망이라는 것을 딱 숫자적으로 표현하기는 어렵겠지만, 김대중 대통령의 평화에 대한 갈망을 말하자면 단연코 절대적이라고 할 수 있겠지요.” “아마 그분보다 더 평화를 원할 수 있는 사람이 있을까 싶은데요?”
1.a.1.	“The Kim administration should identify North Korea’s true intention behind their test-fire as soon as possible” (<i>Yonhap News</i> 1998: 1 Sep).	“정부는 가능한 한 빨리 북한의 저의를 파악하여 대북관계 전반에 대한 철저한 검증과 검토를 해야 할 것”이라고 주장했다.
1.a.2.	“Although it looked suspicious, there was no confirmed proof. The US claimed that there was ‘strong evidence,’ but we, Korean authorities concluded that there was no ‘decisive evidence’” (Kim 2019: 537).	“의심스러워 보이는 점이 있기는 했지만, 확실한 증거는 없었다. 미국 측은 ‘강력한 증거’가 있다고 했지만 남한의 관련 부처는 ‘결정적 증거가 없다’고 결론 냈다.”
1.a.3.	“Despite many years of suffering, you seem to have a very moderate philosophy, strong beliefs, and a hopeful attitude”	“여러 어려운 시간들을 보냈음에도 불구하고, 당신은 매우 겸손한 철학과 강인한 믿음과 희망적인 태도를 가지고 있는 것 같습니다.”
2.a.1.	“The combat submarine was <i>adrift</i> after being caught in the net of a fishing boat” (Kim 2019: 509). “Despite our consistent Sunshine policy, North Korea <i>did not change at all</i> for the last year.” The article added that “North Korea sent the combat submarine to <i>invade</i> our sea” (<i>The Chosun Daily</i> 1998b).	“전투용 잠수정은 어선 그물에 걸려 표류 중이었다.” “우리 정부의 일관된 햇볕정책에도 불구하고 북한은 지난 1년 동안 동서해안과 남해안으로까지 잠수정과 간첩선을 침투시켜 대남전략에 전혀 변화가 없음을 드러냈다.”
2.a.2.	“Given that the test fire was announced the day before the Supreme People’s Assembly amended the DPRK Constitution to usher in the Kim Jong-il era, it was clear that this was meant to celebrate the new era with the image of ‘national strength and prosperity (<i>Gang seong dae guk</i>)’” (Kim 2019: 515-6).	“내부 결속과 더불어 국제적인 관심을 끌기 위한 것으로 분석했다. 이 사건은 북한 정권 수립 (9월9일) 50주년을 경축하고 ‘강성대국’의 축제 분위기를 조성하여 김정일 시대의 개막을 알리려 한 것임이 분명했다.”
2.a.3.	“it [the North Korean nuclear development allegation] is just a <i>transitory</i> phenomenon, which is coming from their fear of the crisis of their regime” (<i>The Hankyoreh</i> 1998).	“이것은 체제의 위기가 올라봐 두려워서 발생한, 과도기적인 현상에 불과합니다.”
2.a.4.	<i>What is the goal of this reckless demonstration? I wondered. Are there perhaps some internal struggles between</i>	“무엇을 실험하려고, 무엇을 노리고, 누구를 겨냥해서 저렇듯 무모한 시위를 하는가. 혹시 북한 내부에 강-온 갈등이 있는 것인가?”

	<i>the hardliners and the moderates?</i> ” (Kim 2019: 570-571).	
3.a.1.	“We won’t give up and will keep knocking the door until they open it with patience and sincerity. ... I have <i>hope</i> for the future” (Kim 1998: 8 June).	“우리는 앞으로도 인내와 성의를 가지고 북한의 닫혀진 문을 열도록 하겠습니다. (...) 우리는 앞날에 대해서 희망을 가지고 있습니다.”
3.a.2.	(SBS 2023), when Kim Jong-il heard about this, he laughed loudly and finally agreed, saying, “Haha, he is pushing it forward literally ‘like a herd of cows.’ Okay, let him come through <i>Panmunjeom</i> .”	“소 떼처럼 밀고 들어오는구만! 그래, 판문점으로 들어오도록 해!”
3.a.3.	Kim “believed that <i>we shouldn’t be disturbed by every single movement North Korea made</i> . I reminded people that the North Koreans had provoked us before we had adopted the Sunshine Policy too.” (Kim 2019: 510).	“나는 북한의 . 나는 국민들에게 우리가 햇볕정책을 시작하기 이전에도 북한의 도발을 그동안에도 계속되었음을 나는 국민들에게 상기시켰다.”
3.a.4.	“it is a <i>creative</i> and bold plan, indeed!” (Lim 2022: 321) “The Sunshine Policy was deemed to be ‘naive,’ but now to be a ‘sensible policy’ by <i>keeping its consistency</i> (JoongAng Ilbo 1999).	“아주 창의적이고 대범한 계획입니다!”
3.a.5.	“Even though there have been several provocations from North Korea, we consistently keep pursuing conciliation for the peace of the Korean peninsula and we will keep doing it. We <i>hope</i> to improve the relationships between the South and North Korea. ... We are always willing to have high-level official meetings between South and North Korea and offer our full material and emotional support to North Korea” (Kim 1999: 15 Aug).	“국민의 정부가 들어선 이래 몇 차례에 걸친 북한의 도발이 있었지만, 정부는 한반도의 평화를 위한 남북간 교류협력 정책을 흔들림 없이 유지해왔습니다. 그 결과, 오늘날 상당한 수준의 남북교류의 성과를 거두고 있습니다. 국민의 정부는 남북간 정부차원의 교류가 이루어질 것을 희망합니다. (...) 우리는 언제든지 남북당국자간의 대화에 응할 용의가 있고, 북한을 물심양면으로 지원할 용의가 있습니다.”
4.a.1.	“More than 60 percent of displaced North Koreans in South Korea had died by then. What could have been more important and urgent than having them meet their family members—if not, at the least, just letting them know whether they were alive or not?” (Kim 2019: 493).”	“그 당시에는 남한에 살고 있는 이산가족의 60퍼센트 이상이 돌아가신 때였다. 그 분들을 다시 만나게 해드리는 말고 더 중요하고 긴급한 문제가 어디있다는 말인가. 만나지는 못하더라도 생사여부는 알 수 있게 해주어야 하는 것 아닌가.”
4.a.2.	“I believe that he [Kim Jong-il] is equipped with judgment and insight as a leader. There is no other way besides dialogue with him to solve inter-Korean issues.” “We could not expect any result by condemning or slandering its supreme leader” (Kim 2019: 605).	“나는 그가 한 국가의 지도자로서 판단력과 식견을 갖췄다고 믿는다. 남북관계를 해결하기 위해서는 대화밖에는 답이 없습니다.” “한 국가의 지도자를 비난하고 모욕해서는 아무런 결과도 기대할 수가 없는 것입니다. ”
4.a.3.	“Isn’t it reasonable for the government to try their best to find a way to pursue the inter-Korean summit?” (<i>The JoongAng</i> 2000).	“정부가 남북정상회담을 위해서 할 수 있는 한 여러 방안을 간구하는 것은 당연한 거 아니겠습니까?”
4.a.4.	Before the meeting, Kim told Park that he “should let them know that I <i>was willing to visit</i> Pyongyang and that the inter-Korean summit would make inter-Korean economic cooperation easier.” Kim also asked Park “to treat North Koreans <i>with both sincerity and pride</i> ” (Kim 2019: 611).	“내가 간절히 평양에 방문하고 싶어하며, 남북정상회담이 남북 경제협력을 훨씬 더 쉽게 만들 수 있다는 것을 그들 (북한)에게 꼭 전해주게.”

4.a.5.	"I sincerely wish that the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation will continue to develop in whatever situation. ... As we still have time, I firmly believe that we can accomplish the connection of the Seoul-Sinuiju Railway if you [Chairman Kim Jong-il] decide to do so" (Kim 2019: 806).	"나는 어떤 상황 속에서도 남북협력관계가 계속 발전되어가기를 간절히 원합니다. (...) 아직 우리에게 시간이 있으니, 마음만 먹는다면 경의선 철도 연결을 성사시킬 수 있을 것이라고 확실히 믿습니다."
4.a.6.	"I worked with all of my soul, will, and sincerity, revising it even during my European tour. I thought about it over and over again while keeping the North Korean position in mind. I thought that both sides should be frank with each other" (Kim 2019: 609).	"나는 유럽순방 기간 내내 글을 계속 고쳤고 혼신을 다해 글을 썼다. 나는 글을 쓰는 내내 북한의 입장에서 생각하려고 노력했다. 나는 우리가 서로에게 솔직해져야 한다고 생각했다."

The Trustpolitik

B.1.	"The ones that have emphasised accommodation and inter-Korean solidarity have placed <i>inordinate hope</i> in the idea that if the South provided sustained assistance to the North, the North would abandon its bellicose strategy toward the South" (Park 2011: 15).	n/a
B.2.	"So, I pledge to embark on the making of a 'Second Miracle on the Han River' premised on a new era of <i>hope</i> hand-in-hand with the Korean people. ... Let us all work together towards a new era of happiness and <i>hope</i>, so that we can all become partners in another miracle or a new chapter in the 'Miracle on the Han River'" (Park 2013: 25 Feb).	이제 자랑스런 우리 국민 여러분과 함께 희망의 새 시대, '제 2의 한강의 기적'을 만드는 위대한 도전에 나서고자 합니다. 우리 국민 모두가 또 한 번 새로운 한강의 기적을 일으키는 기적의 주인공이 될 수 있도록 함께 힘을 합쳐 국민행복, 희망의 새 시대를 만들어 갑시다
B.3.	"There can be <i>no hope</i> and happiness in an <i>insecure life</i>" (Park 2013: 14 Mar). However, <i>if North Korea decides to do the right thing</i>, the South Korean government will support and cooperate with them to move forward together" (Park 2013: 15 Apr).	불안한 삶에는 희망도, 행복도 깃들 수 없습니다. 북한이 올바른 선택을 한다면, 우리 정부는 지원과 협력을 통해 공동발전의 길로 함께 나갈 것입니다.
B.4.	"I <i>hope</i> that the agreement today will be a chance for South-North relations to make a new start." The next day, she stated, "I truly <i>desire</i> to start a new win-win inter-Korean relationship" (Park 2013: 15 Aug).	저는 이번 합의를 계기로 과거 남북관계의 잘못된 관행을 바로 잡고, 상생의 새로운 남북관계가 시작되기를 바라마지 않습니다.
B.5.	"A reunited Germany took its place at the heart of Europe. The years since unification have seen Dresden <i>emerge from a backwater into a world-class city known for its advanced science and technology</i>. Other parts of former East Germany also <i>made huge strides forward</i>. These images of one Germany encourage those of us in Korea to cement our <i>hope</i> and our conviction that unification must also come on the Korean Peninsula."	통일된 독일은 유럽의 중심국가로 부상하였습니다. 통일 전 낙후된 지역 중 하나였던 이 곳 드레스덴은 통일 후 세계적 첨단 과학도시로 발전했고, 다른 구 동독지역들도 크게 발전했습니다. 이러한 통일독일의 모습은 우리 대한민국에게 한반도에도 통일시대를 반드시 열어야 한다는 희망과 의지를 다지도록 하는 힘이 되고 있습니다.

B.6.	“North Korea disregarded our <i>hope for peace</i> in inter-Korea relations by arguing they are the country with Nuclear weapons” (Park 2016: 18 May).	북한은 연초 4 차 핵실험과 장거리 미사일 발사를 감행한데 이어, 지난 당 대회에서는 핵보유국이라는 주장을 하면서 남북관계 개선을 바라는 우리의 희망을 다시 한번 외면했습니다.
B.7.	“Benefitting from the escalated tension in the Korean peninsula, <i>North Korea will be able to cause any social chaos with provocations and cyber terrors.</i> ” Park also stated, “This nuclear test is a provocation toward our nation’s survival and a <i>severe threat to our future.</i> And this will lead to <i>significant security concerns in the East Asian region</i> ” (Park 2016: 12 Jan).	앞으로도 북한은 남북 간의 고조된 긴장상황을 악용하여 사회적 혼란을 야기하는 도발이나 사이버 테러를 언제든지 감행할 우려가 있습니다. 북한의 이번 핵실험은 우리 안보에 대한 중대한 도발이자 우리 민족의 생존과 미래에 대한 심각한 위협입니다.
B.8.	“Overall, I would give 10 out of 10 for Kim’s desire, and Park’s desire would be ... half and half?”	“김대중 대통령의 평화에 대한 갈망에 대해서는 10점 줄 수 있을 것 같고… 박근혜 대통령은… 반반?”
1.b.1.	“Unless you accept our suggestion <i>by tomorrow morning</i> , we may potentially take significant action” (Park 2023c).	내일 아침까지 우리의 제안을 받아들이지 않는다면, 우리는 강력한 조치를 취할 수밖에 없을 것이다.
1.b.2.	I heard that the Ministry of Unification had been worried about the damage to property rights and opposed it, but she [Park] ignored it” (Jeong HS 2018).	n/a
1.b.3.	“Kim Jong-un does not listen to any voice, and this leads us to view Kim Jong-un’s mental state as uncontrollable.”(<i>The Hankyoreh</i> 2016).	권력 유지를 위해 국제사회와 주변국의 어떠한 이야기도 듣지 않겠다는 김정은의 정신상태는 통제불능이라고 봐야 할 것
2.b.1.	Park delivered the ‘Statement to the Nation,’ describing that the “North Korean nuclear tests and continuous provocations have <i>endangered our security</i> ” (Park 2013: 4 Mar).	지금 북한의 핵실험과 연이은 도발로 안보가 위기에 처해 있습니다.
2.b.2.	“ <i>North Korea finally declared a war.</i> We [the South Korean government] should keep an eye on the safety of our people in Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and overcome these internal and external crises” (Im 2013).	박 대통령은 “북한이 마침내 전시상태 돌입을 선언했다”며 “현재의 안보 위기 속 대한민국의 주권과 안보를 지키는 데 우리 군의 역할이 대단히 중요하다”고 말했다. “개성공단에 나가있는 우리 국민들의 안위로 잘 파악해 대내외적인 위기를 극복해야 할 것”이라고 말했다.
2.b.3.	, “ <i>This is a clear provocation by the North Korean military. We will surely retaliate.</i> ” Park also insisted that the landmine explosion incident undoubtedly violated both the armistice agreement and the non-aggression pact (Park 2015: 15 Aug).	“이번 도발 사건이 북한 군의 소행임이 확실하게 드러난 이상 북한에 혹독한 대가를 반드시 치르도록 할 것입니다.” 특히, 최근에는 DMZ 지뢰 도발로 정전협정과 남북간 불가침 합의를 정면으로 위반하고, 광복 70 주년을 기리는 거래의 염원을 짓밟았습니다.
2.b.4.	“The nuclear test proved again that it is always possible for further provocations from the North, <i>considering that the North Korean government has been so deceitful and reckless like this</i> ” (Park 2016: 12 Jan).	이번 핵실험 과정을 통해서 재차 확인된 북한 정권의 기만적이며 무모한 행태를 감안 할 때 북한의 추가 도발 가능성은 언제라도 있을 수 있습니다.
2.b.5.	“North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles are not a simple intimidation or tool for negotiation, but they are an <i>existential threat to be able to destroy all our nations</i> ” (Park 2016: 10 Oct).	북한의 핵과 미사일은 단순한 협박이나 협상용이 아닌 우리 민족을 공멸로 몰고 갈 수 있는 실체적인 위협입니다.
2.b.6.	North Korea has been continuously provoking us. For example, in 2010, a torpedo from a North Korean submarine sank our navy ship Cheonan, taking our precious 46 sailors’ lives. North Korea	최근만 하더라도 2010 년 천안함 폭침으로, 46 명의 소중한 우리 장병의 목숨을 빼앗았고, 연평도 포격 도발로 우리 영토에 직접적인 무력 공격을 가했으며, 작년 8 월에도 DMZ

	<i>even directly attacked our territory, Yeonpyeong Island, and last year, North Korea militarily provoked us through the landmine explosion” (Park 2016: 15 Feb).</i>	지뢰와 포격 도발을 일으킨 바 있습니다.
3.b.1.	She “decided to attend China’s Military Parade, seriously considering the situation in which <i>China was not happy about North Korea</i> at that time” (Park 2023d).	(나는) 당시에 중국이 북한에 대해 대단히 불만족스러워하고 있다는 점을 고려하여 전승절에 참석하기로 결정했다.
3.b.2.	“Global responses to this nuclear test <i>should be different from now on.</i> ” (Park 2016: 12 Jan). “Now it is obvious that <i>our keeping present approach and showing our benign intent do not work anymore</i> ” (Park 2016: 15 Feb).	따라서 이번 북한의 핵 실험에 대한 국제사회의 대응은 이전과는 달라야 할 것입니다. 이제 기존의 방식과 선의로는 북한 정권의 핵개발 의지를 결코 꺾을 수 없고, 북한의 핵 능력만 고도화시켜서 결국 한반도에 파국을 초래하게 될 것이라는 점이 명백해졌습니다.
3.b.3.	Park finally declared that “ <i>in view of the threat of nuclear and missile attacks from North Korea, we are considering the deployment of the THAAD system accordingly in line with its security and national interests</i> ” (Park 2016: 13 Jan)	사드 배치는 국가와 국민의 생존을 지켜낼 최소한의 방어 조치이고 북한의 핵과 미사일 위협에 대응하기 위한 불가피한 조치입니다.
3.b.4.	“Given that the North Korean provocations have been more frequent since the Kim Jong-un government, I cannot delay signing GSOMIA anymore for rapid information collection and analysis.” (Choi 2019)	김정은 정부가 들어선 이래로 북한의 도발이 점점 더 잦아지는 것을 보고 나는 신속한 정보교류와 분석을 위해 지소미아 사인을 더 이상 미룰 수가 없었다.
4.b.1.	the one “leaving the children who lost their parents neglected out in the cold, struggling from hunger,” and “refusing the [separated] family’s God-given right to live together”	북한 아이들의 모습을 보고 가슴이 아팠습니다. 경제난 속에 부모를 잃은 아이들은 거리에 방치되어 있었고, 추위 속에서 배고픔을 견뎌내고 있었습니다. 지금 이 시각에도 자유와 행복을 위해 목숨을 걸고 국경을 넘는 탈북자들이 있습니다. 또한 전쟁 중 가족과 헤어진 후 아직 생사도 모른 채, 다시 만날 날만 손꼽아 기다리는 수많은 남북 이산가족들 역시 분단의 아픔을 고스란히 보여주고 있습니다.
4.b.2.	Park confessed, “[after the fourth nuclear test] It was the moment that I became keenly aware that North Korea was untrustworthy” (Park 2023c).	더 이상은 북한을 믿을 수 없다는 것을 절실히 깨닫는 순간이었습니다.
4.b.3.	“This clearly reaffirmed the North Korean regime’s recklessness and its obsession with nuclear arms,” she added, “Kim Jong-un does not listen to any voice, and this leads us to view <i>Kim Jong-un’s mental state as uncontrollable</i> ” (The Hankyoreh 2016).	이것은 북한 체제의 무모함과 북핵에 대한 집착을 재확인해줄 뿐입니다. 권력 유지를 위해 국제사회와 주변국의 어떠한 이야기도 듣지 않겠다는 김정은의 정신상태는 통제불능이라고 봐야 할 것입니다.

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