An investigation into the substance view of persons

Blackshaw, Bruce ORCID: 0000-0002-9115-582X (2025). An investigation into the substance view of persons. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

According to a recent survey, a significant majority of professional philosophers support the permissibility of induced abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy. This thesis aims to defend the minority ‘pro-life’ view that abortion is immoral throughout pregnancy. To achieve this goal, the metaphysical and moral account of human beings known as the substance view of persons will be critically examined. This account maintains that all human beings deserve equal consideration in their treatment. That is, they have equal moral value; they are moral persons. Accordingly, prenatal human beings, like adults, enjoy the same ‘right to life’, and therefore, the substance view implies that abortion is prima facie impermissible. In the course of my investigation of the substance view, I argue that it can be defended against many of the objections of critics. Yet, I nonetheless find that the substance view has important shortcomings. Therefore, I recommend an alternative account I have developed as a replacement, the rational animal account. During this investigation, I also develop some critiques of important pro-choice arguments and evaluate other pro-life arguments that try to avoid the issue of moral personhood.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

Supervisor(s):