The moral and epistemic foundations of faith: a study on Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī’s concept of īmān

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Saygi, Muhammet ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2907-1788 (2024). The moral and epistemic foundations of faith: a study on Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī’s concept of īmān. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

Māturīdism, one of the two major schools of rational theology (kalām) in Sunni Islam, has not received the attention it deserves in Western academic circles, often being overshadowed by its counterpart, Ashʿarism. This study aims to contribute to the understanding and appreciation of Māturīdī theology by focusing on one of its prominent representatives, Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115), who is considered by many contemporary scholars to be the most outstanding figure in the school after its eponym, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). The main focus of the study centred on the analysis of Nasafī’s interpretation of religious faith (īmān) within the context of the ‘Ethics of Belief’ debate, a philosophical discussion that emerged in Anglophone circles in the late 19th century. The first chapter addresses introductory themes, including the theoretical framework of the study, Nasafī’s life and background, a brief history and development of Māturīdism, and an overview of the current state of the field. Chapter two examines Nasafī’s epistemology, his proofs for the existence of God, and two different methods he proposes for acquiring evidence for religious beliefs: one for the learned or experts (ʿulamāʾ) and the other for the laymen or followers (muqallid). Chapter three analyses Nasafī’s arguments in favour of the possibility and reality of prophecy (nubuwwa), as well as their implications for his interpretation of faith. Chapter four explores Nasafī’s perspective on the relationship between knowledge (ʿilm or maʿrifa), assent (taṣdīq), and human free will (ikhtiyār) in forming religious beliefs. Chapter five delves into Nasafī’s intellectual legacy and his contributions to the Māturīdī school of thought. The final chapter of the study summarises its findings and highlights Nasafī’s significance for properly understanding the Māturīdī school. One of the main findings of this study is that, according to Nasafī, evidence or, more broadly, epistemic reasons cannot be ignored in forming beliefs if one aims to be morally justified in holding religious faith. Nasafī and his moderate or ‘sensible’ Evidentialism deserve serious attention within the ‘Ethics of Belief’ debate and potential future kalām jadīd projects. Without understanding Nasafī’s theology and his contributions to the Māturīdī school, our evaluation of the tradition he is part of would remain deficient.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

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