UNPACKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBAN CITIZENSHIP AND INTEGRATION STRATEGY: A CASE STUDY OF OSAKA (JAPAN) AND BIRMINGHAM (UK)

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ABSTRACT

This study has sought to unpack the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy for migrants in Osaka (Japan) and Birmingham (UK). While migration-driven (super)diversification has been evident in urban space, the mechanism of urban citizenship and its operation in the context of the city's migrant integration has yet been underexplored. Through policy analysis of the city's integration-related documents and qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with 'actors' of urban citizenship – namely, policymakers, city officials, civil society organisations and migrant-led organisations –, this research examines the framework, governance and acts of urban citizenship formulated in the integration strategy in Osaka and Birmingham, cities where old and new migration flows intersect.

This study argues that the nexus between urban citizenship and integration strategy is manifested in the multi-scalar dynamics and interactions between various actors, and the city's integration strategy can function to affect urban membership, rights and identity of migrant residents. Actors of urban citizenship strategically use networks that extend beyond the city scale while dealing with national policy directions and discourses, which together dimensionalise the implementation of integration strategy and operation of urban citizenship. This captures the ways through which urban citizenship can be 'co-produced' by various actors that transcend simple top-down/bottom-up dynamics and therefore offers empirical evidence to respond to the emerging academic question of urban citizenship and migrant integration. Furthermore, by conducting data collection during the

COVID-19 pandemic, this study has made a unique contribution to scholarship by exploring the implications of the cities' responses to the pandemic in the context of urban citizenship.

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GLOSSARY

The 1998/2004 Guidelines	Short for the *1998 Basic Guidelines on Measures for Foreign-National Residents*
The 2020 Guidelines	Short for the *2020 Osaka City Guidelines for Tabunka Kyōsei*
Brexit	The UK's withdrawal from the EU that officially took place in 2020
Buraku	Outcast community or hamlet that has been discriminated against in Japan
Burakumin	Members of a social minority group in Japan who are believed to be descended from a discriminated outcast community
CC Strategy	Short for the *Community Cohesion Strategy for Birmingham*
Chima jeogori	Traditional Korean dress
Comprehensive Measures	Short for the *2018 Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Nationals*
CoS Statement	Short for *Birmingham City of Sanctuary Policy Statement 2018-22*
EU2	Countries that joined the EU in 2007: Bulgaria and Romania
EU8	Countries that joined the EU in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
Gaikoku jinzai	Foreign talent
Ginō jisshū	Technical Intern

Hinanmin	Displaced person
Ikeru shitizunshippu	Living citizenship
Imin	Immigrant
Ishin	Short for *Osaka Ishin no Kai*
Japayuki-san	Gone to Japan: Migrant women from Asian countries who were forced to work in sex industry in Japan
Jus domicile	Principle of residence
Jus sanguinis	Principle of descent
Jus soli	Principle of the soil
Jyūmin tōhyō	Local referendum
Kanji	Chinese characters employed in Japanese
Karihōmen	Provisional release from immigration detention centres
Keigo	Japanese honorifics
Kōdo gaikoku jinzai	High-level foreign talent
Kokuryū	Short for *kokusai kōryū sentā*
Kokusai kōryū sentā	Centre for international exchange
Kokusai kurabu	International club; alternative way to refer to *minzoku gakkyū*
Kyōsei shien kyoten	Support hubs
MC Plan	The *2006 Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Community Building*
Meishi	Name card
Minzoku gakkyū	Ethnic class mainly for *zainichi* Korean children
Nanmin	Refugee

Nihonjinron	Theories of the Japanese
Nikkeijin	Second and subsequent generations of ethnic Japanese from South America
Osaka Ishin no Kai	Osaka Restoration Association
Osaka-jin	People of Osaka; Osakans
Seirei shitei toshi	Ordinance-designated city
Sentā kō	Centre school; schools providing Japanese classes
Shimin	City citizen
Tabunka kyōsei	Multicultural coexistence
Tatewari gyōsei	Bureaucratic sectionalism
Teijyū sha	Long-term residents
Tokubetsu eijyū sha	Special permanent residents
Tokutei ginō	Specified skilled
Tokutei katsudō	Designated activities
Zainichi	Resident or denizen in Japan; ethnic Korean residents of Japan whose roots trace back to Korea under Japanese rule
Zairyū gaikokujin	Foreign resident

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BAES	Birmingham Adult Education Service
BARMS	Birmingham Asylum Refugee & Migrant Support
BCC	Birmingham City Council
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic
BVSC	Birmingham Voluntary Service Council
CIC	Community Interest Company
CLAIR	Council of Local Authorities for International Relations
COIC	Commission on Integration and Cohesion
CoS	City of Sanctuary
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSS	Community Sponsorship Scheme
CUKC	Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions
EEA	European Economic Area including EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
EEC	European Economic Community
ESOL	English for Speakers Of Other Languages
EU	European Union
EVW	European Volunteer Workers
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
GIA	General Incorporated Association

GIF	General Incorporated Foundation
GP	General Practitioner
ICRRA	Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act
IHO	International Humanitarian Organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISAJ	Immigration Services Agency of Japan
MEXT	Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
MFC	MiFriendly Cities
MHCLG	Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government
MHLW	Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
MIC	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
NACCOM	No Accommodation Network
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHI	National Health Insurance
NHS	National Health Service
NPO	Non-Profit Organisation
NRPF	No Recourse to Public Funds
ONS	Office for National Statistics
PBS	Points-Based System
SBJ	Statistics Bureau of Japan
SSW	Specified Skilled Workers

TITP	Technical Intern Training Program
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
VCS	Voluntary and Community Sector
VG	Voluntary Group
WMCA	West Midlands Combined Authority
WMSMP	West Midlands Strategic Migration Partnership

DISCLAIMER

This research was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected data collection methods and data analysis. Recruitment of research participants was limited, and a large part of the interview data was collected through online interviews instead of face-to-face methods. I included COVID-related questions, which offered new insight into the city during the pandemic and produced an original contribution to the body of knowledge. Further details can be found in a separate document, *Declaration of disruption to planned research at submission of thesis*.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Migration of people, though it has always been part of human history, ignites public and political debates that shape national, local and individual attitudes towards those who move across borders. In the UK, it is still fresh in our memory that migration became one of the major driving forces for the nation's withdrawal from the European Union (EU) (Barbulescu and Favell, 2020). On paper, Japan does not accept 'migrants' but offers a range of visas, making those who enter the country de facto migrants (Komine, 2014). While the national immigration legislation controls one's mobility and immigration status in the two countries, neither of them has a national-level policy on migrant integration. Although there are national guidelines and strategies that refer to migrants' settlement, they are not as forceful as their immigration control measures. It is often local authorities, such as a city, that implement migrant integration and facilitate their settlement and belonging in local space (Tsuda, 2006a; Rutter, 2015).

Meanwhile, mobility of people boosted by globalisation has questioned our understanding of citizenship and encouraged academics to explore other forms of citizenship that are not necessarily bounded by the nation-state to explain migrants' place-specific belonging and claims-making. Among them, urban citizenship bases itself on the urban space, which is often a city, taking into account the contested, diverse and mobile nature of the space (Yiftachel, 2015). The city is a suitable site to develop urban citizenship, according to Holston and Appadurai:

> Although one of the essential projects of nation building has been to dismantle the historic primacy of urban citizenship and to replace it with the national, cities remain the strategic arena for the development of citizenship. They are not the only arena. And not all cities are strategic. But with their concentrations of the nonlocal, the strange, the mixed, and the public, cities engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship. Their crowds catalyze processes that decisively expand and erode the rules, meanings, and practices of citizenship. Their streets conflate identities of territory and contract with those of race, religion, class, culture, and gender to produce the reactive ingredients of both progressive and reactionary political movements. Like nothing else, the modern urban public signifies both the defamiliarizing enormity of national citizenship and the exhilaration of its liberties. (Holston and Appadurai, 1999, p.2)

As such, there seems an immense potential in the city both as a practical space to implement integration and as a conceptual space to perform urban citizenship. The increasing significance of local-level migrant integration and urban citizenship points to the role of the city, which requires further exploration into the link between the two. Whilst urban citizenship, in principle, embraces all urban residents, it does not automatically promise the inclusion of migrants in the city. In order to understand the reality of migrants' urban citizenship, the city's migrant integration policy and practice can offer us insights into the way in which the city regards and treats its migrant residents.

It is only recently that studies have called for the need for a systematic analysis of urban citizenship and migrant integration rather than having a sole focus either on a top-down

or bottom-up approach (Aiden, 2019; Holm and Lebuhn, 2020; Ataç and Schilliger, 2022). Furthermore, studies on urban citizenship and migrant integration tend to be centred around the Western or European context, lacking findings from the Eastern setting. Defining urban citizenship as *processes through which multi-scalar interplays of multiple actors construct urban membership, rights and identity*, I conducted this study to scrutinise the relationship between urban citizenship and the city's integration strategy of the two cities, Osaka (Japan) and Birmingham (UK).[1] I carried out policy analysis and qualitative interviews with policymakers and civil society actors whose work engaged with migrant residents and their settlement in their respective cities from 2020 to 2021. These three sets of data – policy documents, interviews with policymakers and those with civil society actors – allowed me to scrutinise the ways through which urban citizenship is shaped by policy design, policymaking and implementation processes of the city's integration strategy and explore the roles of policymakers and activists as stakeholders of urban citizenship.

By the word 'migrants', I refer to all those who move from their home country regardless of their length of stay or reasons, following the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) use of the term as an "umbrella term" (IOM, n.d.; see Chapter 2 for further discussion). I treated the city's policy and practices that include or specifically target its migrant population as the city's 'integration strategy' based on the definition suggested by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016a, p.14) to regard policies and practices that positively or negatively affect migrant residents' "process of becoming an accepted part

[1] While 'Osaka' can mean both Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City in the administrative context, this study uses 'Osaka' to refer to Osaka City unless specified.

of society". I employed the word 'strategy' here instead of 'policy' to refer to a set of policies, practices and measures that are sometimes symbolic. As pointed out by many, the local authority can be "an agency that is equipped with a considerable capacity for independent action while being locked into an extensive network of government" (Isin, 2000b, p.8). In order to explain the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy manifested at the city level, it is therefore necessary to delve into policy dynamics involving policymakers as well as actors from civil society organisations and migrant-led organisations.

The city was selected as a site of comparison in order to understand the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy. I selected Osaka and Birmingham and their urban citizenship as a unit of analysis. I chose these two cities since they are known as cities where old and new migration dynamics intersect and are maintained. As explained later in this chapter and Chapter 2, they have a relatively long experience of migration-oriented diversity and active civil society movements. Understanding how urban citizenship can be constructed in the two city settings, therefore, will help better understand the relationship between urban citizenship and integration that can also be applied in the contexts of other cities, which will experience similar migration dynamics in the near future.

Inasmuch as Osaka and Birmingham can be important sites of urban citizenship respectively for Japan and the UK, its comparison holds significance. Japan and the UK are generally understood as opposites in terms of their migration experiences; indeed, there are striking differences between the two, such as the scale and size of migration

and geographic location. However, they share similar migration patterns, colonial legacies, ethnonational identities that have affected immigration legislation, recent policy directions and the dilemma of labour and skill shortages that make the comparison reasonable, as discussed later in this chapter and Chapter 2 (Phillimore et al., 2021). While these points should be taken into account when comparing Osaka and Birmingham, this does not mean that the city-level comparison would end up generalising findings and making them to represent their national-level differences and similarities, as Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2009) warn of pitfalls of methodological nationalism. Rather, comparing two similar cities in different national settings will enable a better understanding of the city's positionality within the nation-state configuration and the fluid characteristics of urban citizenship that is shaped by multi-scalar power and dynamics (see Chapter 4 for further discussion on methodological nationalism).

1.1 Background: connecting urban citizenship and migrant integration

Before introducing my research questions and approach for this study, I link up some of the key concepts, namely, citizenship, urban citizenship and migrant integration. Citizenship and integration both concern those who are or should be included and those who are not, which, in most cases, refer to migrants (non-citizens) and their legal, political and social status and rights: "The question of 'Who gets citizenship?' is indivisible from the question of 'Who belongs?'" (Barbulescu et al., 2023a, p.1). As such, there is a nexus between migration, citizenship and integration that is worth looking at (e.g. Favell, 1998; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2000; Isin, 2008; Goodman, 2015; Giugni and Grasso, 2021; Barbulescu et al., 2023b). Due to their systemic and institutional natures associated with the nation-state configuration, citizenship and integration are broadly recognised as

concepts that can “reproduce colonial orders and exacerbate pre-existing inequalities” (Favell, 2001, 2022; Barbulescu et al., 2023a, p.5). At the same time, some scholars have (re)contested and (re)defined the concepts by situating them in multiple levels and scales. Given the multi-dimensional nature of citizenship and integration, along with the increased mobility of people, the nexus amongst the three would draw rather a complex picture, and utilising the concept of urban citizenship and integration would help to set such complexities in the local context. While the city and urban are not the same concepts, I treat a city as a place of urban citizenship. As discussed later, this is because of the practicality of urban citizenship and the administrative characteristics of the city office as a local institution of authority. By looking at the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy in the city, this study furthers our understanding of the complex nexus of migration, citizenship and integration. In this section I explain each concept in detail and present research gaps that this study addresses (for the in-depth theorisation of urban citizenship and its link with integration strategy, see Chapter 3).

1.1.1 Rescaling citizenship

Citizenship, in a strict sense, signifies one’s legal status attached to a particular country and comes with rights and responsibilities, making one a ‘national’ of the country. Acquisition of a legal form of citizenship adheres mainly to principles of *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) and/or *jus soli* (right of soil) to confer membership and rights upon their citizens. Citizenship has long been bounded to the nation-state, which constructed and produced its ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural and social identity(ies) onto its territory with its pursuit of a legible society (Scott, 1998). Inasmuch as sustainment of citizenship in the nation-state configuration hinges upon protecting such identity(ies), nations have

committed to “drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion that articulate a desired composition – imagined if not necessarily realized – of the nation” with their immigration policy (Ngai, 2004, p.5).

However, as globalisation has boosted mobility of people across the globe (de Haas et al., 2019), the traditional understanding of citizenship came to be challenged and transconfigured into “new geospatial and social formations, loosening, pluralizing, but by no means abandoning, the ties between bounded nation-states and citizenship” (Stasiulis, 2008, p.135). Nation-state-bounded citizenship came to be contested or redefined by scholars who decompartmentalised the concept and blurred its territorial, legal and political dichotomies (Soysal, 1994; Balibar, 2004; Ní Mhurchú, 2014). Academics’ attempts to reconfigure citizenship categories have led to various ideas that capture the ambiguousness experienced by (non)citizens in Western and non-Western contexts (Ní Mhurchú, 2014), such as alien citizenship (Ngai, 2004), irregular citizenship (Nyers, 2011), multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1996) and flexible citizenship (Ong, 1999), to name but a few. According to Shachar et al., determining a single definition of citizenship is “a hopeless task or a sectarian project”, as citizenship is multi-dimensional and can be recognised:

> as legal status and political membership; as rights and obligations; as identity and belonging; as civic virtues and practices of engagement; and as a discourse of political and social equality or responsibility for a common good. (Shachar et al., 2017, p.5)

Hence, citizenship has been and will remain fluid insofar as the nature of individuals, groups, states, and international bodies and agreements continues to shift in this superdiverse and interconnected society (Vertovec, 2007). As such, citizenship is suggested as a "dynamic *process* in which the relevance of legal (non)citizenship cannot be wholly separated from the subjective meanings that individuals attribute to their legal status" that includes "not only everyday understandings of citizenship, but also the relationship between these understandings and meaningful social *action*" (Fein and Straughn, 2014, p.693, italics original).

This fluid and pliable conceptualisation of citizenship has also allowed scholars to rescale the concept beyond the nation-state territory and explain place-based membership deriving from sites ranging from camps (Sigona, 2015) and neighbourhoods (Phillips and Robinson, 2015) to supra-regional communities (Isin and Saward, 2013) and global arena (Linklater, 1999). Blank (2007, p.411) analyses citizenship in three different spheres – global, national and local – and identifies the different logics that these spheres base citizenship on: "the local on residency; the national on lineage or place of birth; and the global on belonging to humanity". While logics, meanings and contents of citizenship vary by different spheres, he concludes that their memberships overlap with each other; local citizenship is constructed not only through the legal construct and political interactions directed towards the local authority, but also through all spheres (Blank, 2007, p.452). Indeed, authors remind us that one's citizenship status and practices in non-national spheres are yet highly associated with one's formal citizenship status and rights (Kostakopoulou, 2008; Bauder, 2014). Yet, the rescaling of citizenship succeeds in critically addressing methodological nationalism, the concept that blindly treats political

and institutional boundaries of nation-states as a container of social phenomena (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002), and urban citizenship is one of the notable examples of the rescaled citizenship.

1.1.2 The city and urban citizenship

Although the terms ‘city’ and ‘urban’ are often used interchangeably in urban citizenship literature, the urban area does not necessarily refer to a city and vice versa. Whereas the city, in most cases, indicates a particular sub-national administrative setting with a certain size of population, the urban does not “so much refer to a geographical place or administrative entity, but to a specific sociopolitical and institutional setting, in which various scales—from the local to the transnational—are layered, condensed and materialized” (Blokland et al., 2015, p.655). Urban citizenship hence embraces the socio-spatial understanding and dynamics of economic, social and cultural forces that operationalise in the sub-national space (see Gottdiener and Hutchison, 2011). As such, this study subscribes to Yiftachel’s (2015, p.730) definition of urban as “denoting, broadly, a developed non-rural region, a way of life marked by diversity, mobility and conflict, as well as a dynamic society and polity, shaped under the ever-deepening influence of global capitalism”. This understanding of urban unsettles the traditional modernist urbanism that assumes the city as a fixed state (Dear, 2003) and further embraces cities that have been ruled out by a restrictive global cities framework (Roy, 2011).

Yet, many urban citizenship scholars are convinced that the city is the most appropriate site to construct urban citizenship. This is mainly due to an administrative construct of the city and its contestedness that suffices the nature of urban. Blank (2007, p.426)

emphasises that sub-national entities like the city possess two contrasting yet overlapping characteristics: “an organ of the central government” and “an autonomous political community with self-rule and an independent package of rights and entitlements”. Indeed, the city often functions as a ‘local’ institution of authority within the administrative structure; although the national government determines the legal membership and rights of its subjects, localities are capable of accommodating local services to their demographic needs and determining the essential aspect of urban citizenship (Tsuda, 2006a). Nonetheless, in order for localities to exercise a certain degree of autonomy, it requires not only political and administrative controls but also financial, information and technological resources (Painter, 2005; Blokland et al., 2015).

Urban citizenship studies often focus on migrants’ urban form of membership to explore the possibility of the urban space for those who do not possess formal citizenship of the host country. A number of empirical studies have successfully captured urban citizenship by examining dynamics within the city realm between the city authority and migrant urban citizens as well as other institutions whose decision-making would influence the city governance and belonging (e.g. Siemiatycki and Isin, 1997; Mackenzie, 2002; Uitermark et al., 2005; Pine, 2010; Phillips, 2015). For instance, Varsanyi (2006) categorises emerging theoretical approaches to urban citizenship that involve various actors; first, the normative approach derives from a cosmopolitan, transnational idea of citizenship that transcends existing nation-state structures. The focus here is a transnational network of cities that enables citizens to formulate a global political identity. The second group sees urban citizenship from a political and territorial perspective and defines it based on one’s residence and membership in the city. Through this rescaling approach, the city can

create its own democratic political structures. The third approach is agency-centred and regards citizenship itself as a process through which one constructs the meanings of citizenship and identity. Key actors here are migrants and residents whose grassroots political efforts would form urban citizenship within the city. The fourth approach looks at local authority and its capacity of creating a 'local citizenship policy' that grant local membership to migrants.

Holm and Lebuhn (2020, p.97), moreover, identify three modes of expanding urban citizenship that respectively involve citizens' claiming of rights, governmental and administrative actions and citizens' daily practices of citizenship, and argue that researchers must look into the relationship between "formal and informal, state and non-governmental, administrative and civil society actors". Given these approaches and actors, urban citizenship is a relational, fluid concept shaped by processes operating at various scales (Staeheli, 2003; Guarnizo, 2012; Allon, 2013). Yet, many empirical studies still focus on either a top-down policy framework or a bottom-up claims-making, which fail to capture a comprehensive picture of the urban citizenship mechanism in the city (Ataç and Schilliger, 2022).

Based on the existing literature, four points can be raised regarding urban citizenship research: 1) urban citizenship is still an academically unexplored field compared to long-standing theories of citizenship; 2) nation-state-based citizenship is still dominant and exerts great influence upon the lives of citizens and non-citizens; 3) manifestation of urban citizenship in a legal term requires long-term administrative and perhaps constitutional transformations; and 4) there are increasing calls for a systematic analysis

of urban citizenship processes. This study addresses these concerns by situating urban citizenship in the multi-scalar dynamics. While taking into account the influence of national-level policies and formal citizenship over migrants' urban citizenship, I examine urban citizenship processes from policy documents, top-down delivery of integration and bottom-up practices, which as a whole enables a systematic analysis of urban citizenship in the city. By looking at cases in Osaka and Birmingham, this study makes a significant contribution to the growing body of urban citizenship scholarship, as the academic discussion on urban citizenship in the Japanese context is very limited.[2]

1.1.3 The local turn of integration and integration policy

This study pays heed to the link between urban citizenship and migrant integration, as examining migrant integration policy and practice can be one of the most effective ways to understand the city's policy approach to migrant residents. Conceptually, integration, in general, refers to migrants' long-term settlement in the host society. For instance, Alba and Foner define integration as:

> The processes that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants to obtain the valued "stuff" of a society, as well as social acceptance, through participation in major institutions such as the educational and political system and the labor and housing markets. Full integration implies parity of life chances with

[2] The concept of local citizenship for non-Japanese nationals has been explored by some (e.g. Tsuda, 2006a).

> members of the native majority group and being recognized as a legitimate part of the national community. (Alba and Foner, 2015, p.5)

More simply put, Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016a, p.14) define it as "the process of becoming an accepted part of society" and argue that integration is multi-dimensional, multi-directional processes that involve migrants and host society and migrants' home countries. Yet, like citizenship, integration is a contested concept that has attracted the authors' attention. Castles et al. (2002, p.114) maintain that "[t]here is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration" because of its complex and multifaceted characteristics.

Whereas integration has often been used in policy contexts, the policy-oriented approach to integration should be acknowledged as fundamentally different from the academic approach to understanding integration in social sciences, according to Penninx (2019). While the integration concept in research ought to serve as a non-normative analytical tool, integration in policymaking essentially determines what and who is a problem and normalises the relations between the "integrated" population and the host society and its desirable outcomes (Penninx, 2019, p.3). In literature, integration policy has been in general understood as 'immigrant policy' situated in contrast to 'immigration policy'; the former concerns settlement of migrants in the new society, while the latter handles immigration control (Hammar, 1985a; Borkert and Penninx, 2011). Integration policy indicators or frameworks have been developed by scholars, and their significance is acknowledged by many (Phillimore and Goodson, 2008; Goodman, 2015). These frameworks and indicators have defined the main domains of integration in different ways

(e.g. Council of Europe, 1998; Bosswick and Heckmann, 2007; Bean et al., 2012; Unterreiner and Weinar, 2014; Spencer and Charsley, 2016; Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019; Solano and Huddleston, 2020). Despite some criticisms, they highlight areas in which migrants' "integratedness" (Spencer and Charsley, 2021, p.9) can be measured, such as civil, political, socioeconomic, cultural and spatial domains. Particularly, the civic domain of integration has often been linked with one's access to citizenship (e.g. Green, 2007). It sets some requirements for migrants to obtain a certain level of "civic skills and value commitments" to access citizenship and other categories of membership by testing their language proficiency, country knowledge and social values (Goodman, 2010, p.754). The country's strategy of civic integration is shaped by various historical and institutional factors, including its policy traditions and strategy, historical flow of migration and citizenship principle. Such integration requirements make citizenship for migrants "a contract relationship", which fundamentally affects integration goals and processes on the practical and symbolic levels and sheds another light on the relationship between integration and citizenship in the policy context (Goodman, 2010, p.769).

Although policies around migration and integration are often structured within the national framework, the significant role of local governments in facilitating practical and pragmatic aspects of integration policy has been pointed out by many (Vermeulen, 1997; Alexander, 2007; Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017). According to Favell, a locality is:

> the real site where the theory of integration is put into practice: a place where the high ideals of the public philosophies are challenged and forced to adapt to

> organisational and practical realities, regardless of party politics, ideological posturing, and central *dictats*. (Favell, 1998, p.244, italics original)

For localities, acknowledging migrant residents as part of the community and responding to their demands is the most reasonable choice to fuel the local economy and avoid any negative repercussions in the community, which would eventually differentiate themselves from the national regime (Tsuda, 2006a). Indeed, whereas the national authority can be reluctant to promote migrant integration, local governments, witnessing local tensions and bearing the responsibility of providing social services, can be more proactive in exercising policy initiatives (Tsuda, 2006a; Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Anagnostou, 2016; Myrberg, 2017).

Penninx (2005) highlights that both top-down guidelines and bottom-up mobilisation are indispensable to facilitate national and local integration processes and suggests that multi-level cooperation and governance among national, regional and local governments are desirable. Multi-level governance can be classified into several approaches depending on the power dynamics and relationship between national and local governments (Scholten, 2013; Zapata-Barrero and Barker, 2014; Spencer, 2018). Recent integration research in Japan, furthermore, suggests to depart from the scope of multi-level governance, which lays emphasis on vertical hierarchy, and to re-examine integration through a multi-spatial and multi-scalar perspective (Aiden, 2019; Komai, 2023; see Chapter 3 for further discussion). City-level comparative studies are recommended by many authors to capture the process through which local-level integration policy, practices and outcomes are shaped by the relationship between local

and national governments and between state- and non-state actors (Favell, 2001; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; Alexander, 2007; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016a). Moreover, since the theoretical development of integration has mainly taken place in the context of receiving countries of predominantly white population, Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore (2018) state that the existing European-centred concept of integration must be reconsidered.

Integration as a concept has faced criticisms from academics who claim that it has enhanced the othering of migrants and the formation of a monolithic host society that migrants are forced to be part of (e.g. Favell, 2001; Wieviorka, 2014; Schinkel, 2018; Rytter, 2019). Spencer and Charsley (2021, pp.5–6), nonetheless, maintain that integration as a concept can withstand such critiques by raising five points researchers should consider when using the concept. First, the integration concept in research should not assume the desired end goal but investigate the actual process. Second, integration should include the population as a whole, not just migrants. Third, society should be illustrated as a diverse, segmented and contextualised entity that is constantly reshaped by different actors and institutions. Fourth, we need to avoid methodological nationalism and take into account local, global and transnational contexts, mobility and dynamics. Finally, integration processes should be understood with a broader approach rather than a narrow focus on indicators and factors (Penninx, 2019; Spencer and Charsley, 2021).

By focusing on the city's integration strategy, this study addresses some of the points made above. My use of the word 'integration strategy' allows me to avoid the definitional ambiguity of 'integration' in the sociological and policy contexts and extend my analysis

to other generic policies that are not necessarily integration-related but "may exert strong influence (positive or negative) on integration processes of immigrants" (Vermeulen, 1997; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016a, p.20). This study captures the interplays of different actors across different levels and scales through interviews with city officials and civil society actors involved in policymaking and implementation of integration in the city. It also translates the concept of integration into the non-European context by utilising the term '*tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence)', the concept often used in academic and policy discourses in Japan (for further discussion, see Chapter 2). In the next section, I discuss the national and local contexts of migration in my case study sites, Osaka (Japan) and Birmingham (UK).

1.2 Case study settings

1.2.1 Japan and the UK

Japan and the UK have traditionally been understood as two distinct nations when it comes to their immigration scales and experiences. Japan's migrant population of 2.7 million (2.2% of the entire population) can indeed seem smaller than that of England and Wales, which hold around 10 million foreign-born population (16.8%) (E-Stat, 2021b; Statistics Bureau of Japan (SBJ), 2021; Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2022).[3] Yet, recent academic interests display some important similarities they share in historical flows and labour market prospects (Hirota et al., 2019; Phillimore et al., 2021). Both countries have accommodated former colonial subjects and experienced a continuous growth of 'new' migrants. Furthermore, taking into account their ageing populations and labour and

[3] This figure does not include Scotland, as Census 2021 was moved to the following year due to the pandemic.

skill shortages, the significance of immigration for both countries has been increasing more than ever. Highlighting such old and new migration-driven superdiversity in Japan and the UK, Phillimore, Liu-Farrer and Sigona (2021, p.11) are convinced that they have "much to learn from each other".

Although the Japanese government, believing in the discourse of 'mono-ethnic Japanese', has denied having migrants or developing an 'immigration policy' (Cabinet Office, 2018), the country has been home to various migrant groups. The country has colonial ties that brought over a number of Koreans who have settled in for generations. Since the 1980s, the country has recruited cheap manual labour from neighbouring countries through various 'side-doors' and professionals through a points-based system. The dilemma between the myth of Japanese homogeneity and the domestic economic pressure can be observed from the way that the country has gradually opened the front door to migrant workers by introducing new visa categories over time. Yet, the government is reluctant to accept other categories of people, such as refugees and asylum seekers.

According to the *Migrant Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX), which measures eight areas of migrant integration policy in 56 countries, Japan is categorised as "immigration without integration" (Solano and Huddleston, 2020). Overall, the country ranked 35th among 56 countries, with a slightly favourable health system, family reunion and permanent residence, yet low scores in areas of anti-discrimination and political participation, as the country lacks anti-discrimination law.[4] Although Japan has no official immigration and

[4] The *2015 Hate Speech Act* remains rather as 'philosophy law' by merely defining the concept without imposing any penalties.

integration policy per se, some policy measures, such as the introduction of the *tabunka kyōsei* concept, are regarded as a "prototype of an integration policy" (Kim and Streich, 2020, p.177) that has drawn scholars' attention in the context of migrant integration. However, at the beginning of the pandemic, Japan rejected the entry of visa-holding migrants, which, according to Burgess (2021, p.17), has "revers[ed] and possibly eras[ed] any progress made to date on integration".

On the other hand, the UK has been regarded as an experienced, old country of immigration and migration-driven (super)diversification (see Vertovec, 2007). The post-WWII period witnessed a large influx of former colonial subjects (Commonwealth citizens) along with the mobility of people accelerated by the formation of the EU. It has also been home to a larger number of refugees and asylum seekers compared to Japan. However, a series of legislation had been introduced to discourage non-white Commonwealth migration and exclude particular British subjects (Webster, 2011). The definition of British citizenship changed from time to time with the country's (post-)colonial practices that created several layers of legal and socio-political ambiguities regarding the status of affected Commonwealth nationals (Rigo, 2005; Wardle and Obermuller, 2019). Other non-British groups, moreover, were also problematised with national policies and practices – undocumented migrants and asylum seekers with the hostile environment measures, and EU citizens with the UK's withdrawal from the EU (Brexit) (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018). Yet, it was signalled during the pandemic that the current policy approach may fail and exacerbate labour shortages (Fernández-Reino et al., 2020).

In a strict sense, the UK does not have a comprehensive integration policy for migrants. Rather than having a national-level policy or legal framework of integration, the UK government has introduced different integration-related measures that targeted different migrant groups and relied on local authorities to implement integration and cohesion at the community level (Cerna and Wietholtz, 2011; Rutter, 2015; Broadhead and Spencer, 2020). MIPEX shows that the UK's integration policy scores 20th among 56 countries; it evaluates the country's anti-discrimination measures as one of the most favourable among MIPEX countries while giving slightly unfavourable scores to family reunion and education areas. On the whole, the UK employs halfway favourable policies and is labelled as a country of "temporary integration", the approach that "encourages the public to see immigrants as equals but as foreigners" (Solano and Huddleston, 2020, p.264). While this may look more favourable than Japan's case, the UK's integration approach seems similar to that of Japan, taking into account the absence of national-level policy and focus on locality-led initiatives (for a detailed discussion on immigration and integration policies of Japan and the UK, see Chapter 2).

1.2.2 Osaka and Birmingham

Osaka and Birmingham are often known as the 'second city' of their respective country and have been one of the biggest destination cities for migrants (Siddle, 2011; Chinn and Dick, 2016). The proportion of migrants in the two cities respectively surpasses that of the national average. Osaka has been one of the most diverse cities in Japan, hosting a high proportion of migrants from Korea and other Asian countries. The rapid industrial growth of Osaka as a "modern megalopolis" in terms of its size and population has drawn various groups of people across and outside the country (Kashani, 2006; Saga, 2012, p.66). It

embraces non-Japanese residents, who account for 5.2% of the city population (Osaka City, 2023b). Similarly, for centuries, Birmingham has been home to migrants from within and outside the UK, forming one of the most diverse areas outside London (GOV.UK, 2022b). In addition to its large non-UK-born population, which accounts for nearly 25% of the whole resident population (ONS, 2021), Birmingham's ethnic diversity is also notable, as the 2021 Census revealed that ethnic minorities represent 51.4% of the entire population of the city (Birmingham City Council (BCC), 2022).

Profiles of migrants in the two cities display some similarities as they both have long embraced communities of people who have come to the country through colonial ties. As ethnic minorities, they have built strong communities and influenced the cities' approaches to migrants. In the past 20 years, Osaka and Birmingham have experienced rapid superdiversification of migrant populations in terms of their nationality, socioeconomic status, migration background and immigration status, given a large influx of newly arrived migrants. A rich history and diversity of the migrant population have inevitably shaped the cities' integration policies that have made migrant residents' urban belonging look different from the national regime (see Chapter 2 for further details of Osaka and Birmingham).

1.3 Research questions and approach

I have briefly introduced concepts of urban citizenship and migrant integration and drawn overviews of Japan and the UK, as well as Osaka and Birmingham, which helped me formulate the direction of my research. I approach the city by spotlighting how migrant residents become urban citizens through the city's integration policy and practice in the

two cities of rich migration-driven diversity. My study aims to *unpack the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy in Osaka (Japan) and Birmingham (UK)* by addressing three research questions:

1) How is urban citizenship articulated in policy documents of the city's integration strategy?
2) How does policymakers' understanding of their roles in multi-scalar governance of integration strategy and its policymaking processes shape operationalisation of urban citizenship?
3) What role do civil society organisations play as actors of urban citizenship in implementing integration strategy?

The first question seeks to understand the current standpoint of the two cities with regard to their policy and practice of integration and urban citizenship configurations. This is done by examining Osaka and Birmingham's policy documents and practices that were in effect as of December 2020. Although each policy and practice encompasses different purposes and contexts that cannot be carelessly brought together as an 'integration strategy', analysing them through the lens of urban citizenship allows us to identify the city's general attitudes towards migrant residents (see Alexander, 2007).

The second and third questions aim to examine how migrant urban citizenship is shaped by various actors across different levels. The second question tries explicitly to comprehend how the city's integration strategy is designed and implemented by city-level policymakers. Semi-structured interviews with city officials, councillors, staff from public

sector organisations and regional- and national-level civil servants can reveal the extent to which different levels of authority and networks affect the policymaking of the city's integration strategy. This can highlight the multi-scalar aspect of integration governance and elucidate different configurations of urban citizenship and their implementation at the policy level. The third question, on the other hand, concerns civil society actors who play a dominant role in delivering integration services and assisting migrants' integration process. This question is addressed through semi-structured interviews with migrant and non-migrant stakeholders whose work engages with local migrant integration. By capturing both vertical and horizontal networking and interactions across different scales, these two questions help to unpack mechanisms of urban citizenship articulated through policymaking and implementation processes of the city's integration strategy.

These three questions not only provide a systematic analysis of urban citizenship and integration strategy but also reveal the relationship between the two concepts that have not yet been articulated in the literature. This study demonstrates how the city's integration strategy can function to affect urban membership, rights and identity of migrant residents and how integration governance and its processes can shape the way in which urban citizenship is articulated, operationalised and practised by multiple stakeholders.

1.4 Impacts of COVID-19 on research and findings

The COVID-19 pandemic, which occurred at the beginning of the data collection stage, affected every aspect of my research, from data collection methods, ethical approval and research timeline to findings (see Chapter 4 for changes to research methods). The pandemic has exerted layers of influence on global, national, local and individual levels,

and its impacts, whether positive or negative, vary based on one's attributes (Napier, 2020; The Lancet, 2020). Impacts and implications of the pandemic have drawn scholars' attention, leading to a recent growth of pandemic-related literature. Citizenship, particularly, is one of the concepts that reflect the impacts of the pandemic, as it concerns one's mobility and belonging to the community as well as rights and duties to the state:

> The global COVID pandemic has confirmed the exclusions physical, legal, political, and ethical boundaries enact to preserve community membership and citizenship. The COVID virus has done so, in part, because it respects neither national boundaries nor citizenship status. The virus travels indifferently across human-made borders and through different populations, revealing along the way the arbitrariness and relative ineffectiveness of government efforts to slow the spread of COVID across national borders through use of the powers of detention and surveillance, powers typically used to demarcate the boundaries of citizenship. COVID in this way has raised the stakes of citizenship. (Kruman and Marback, 2022, p.1030)

It can therefore be assumed that citizenship, both at national and local levels, has changed its shape and functions during the pandemic, and, conducted in the middle of the pandemic, this study can offer insights into such growing interests mainly from two points. First, since the outbreak happened as soon as I started data collection, I was able to include COVID-related questions in the interviews. The data I collected shows early responses of the city office and civil society to the pandemic and the barriers migrants were facing at that time. As it will be described later in Chapter 3, the city's attitudes

towards migrants in times of emergency hold significant implications for urban citizenship as it often draws new boundaries of inclusion and exclusion or reinforces existing gaps. This study therefore offers a unique contribution by conducting a closer examination of urban citizenship before and during the pandemic and examining 'pandemic urban citizenship'. While the discussion on 'post-pandemic citizenship' has been brought up among scholars (e.g. Saperstein, 2022), this study focuses on during-pandemic situations in the cities and the implications they have added to their urban citizenship construction.

Another point refers to the methodological contribution this study offers. The impacts of the pandemic on a researcher and research settings are noteworthy, as I needed to change the data collection method and accommodate to unpredictable, daily-changing situations. As Chapter 4 explains in detail, such changes indeed affected my recruitment of interview participants, rapport-building, and data quality. Methodological implications suggest how the pandemic has shaped my research design and suggest how researchers should navigate themselves during a crisis.

1.5 Research contributions

In addition to the contributions I listed above in the context of the pandemic, this study offers several significant insights into studies of urban citizenship and migrant integration, intersections of which have not been much explored by academics. First, it responds to academics' recent calls for systematic research on various approaches to urban citizenship and migrant integration, as explained earlier in this chapter. This study dissects the relationship between urban citizenship and migrant integration and furthers our understanding of urban citizenship in light of the non-dichotomous dynamics by

conducting policy analysis and interviews with policymakers and civil society actors, whose engagement with migrant integration has often been categorised either as top-down or bottom-up. It also hints at the integration strategy as a useful tool to articulate urban citizenship. In the context of migrant integration policy and practice, this study also provides insights into multi-scalar governance of integration, the recently emerging idea that has been elaborated from the concept of multi-level governance.

Furthermore, this study makes unique academic and methodological contributions by selecting Osaka and Birmingham as case study cities. This study is one of the first to utilise the concept of urban citizenship in the Japanese context to understand the city-based status, rights and identity of migrant residents, expanding the Western-centred urban citizenship studies. Moreover, Osaka and Birmingham indeed demonstrate an effective comparison as the nation's second city with rich migration-driven (super)diversity and strong civil society. At the national level, while displaying some significant differences, Japan and the UK also share migration and integration histories and policy directions. This not only supports the recent trends of Japan-UK comparative studies on migration and integration but also situates Japan in migration studies as a country from which other traditional immigration countries can learn.

In the policy context, exploring the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy holds significance, inasmuch as urban citizenship can be another concept that can be linked up with the local-level integration policy framework. Moreover, this study signals the multi-scalar structure of integration governance, which provides further insight into various roles that stakeholders at different scales play in implementing and facilitating

integration in the city. Interviews and policy analysis in the two cities highlight similar and divergent policy approaches and practices that can contribute to policymakers' understanding of their integration strategy and further development.

1.6 Thesis outline

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the historical backgrounds of migration and integration in Japan and the UK, as well as Osaka and Birmingham, and explains relevant national and local policies and practices to set out the context. In this chapter, I define 'migrants' for this study and discuss how different definitions of 'migrants' or 'foreign residents' have been used in Japanese and British contexts. By comparing national and local profiles and trends, I highlight the significance of conducting a comparative study in these two specific settings. My conceptual framework is presented in Chapter 3, where I draw some critical literature on citizenship and integration. Recent works on urban citizenship and local-level integration point to the interplays of multiple actors across different scales and levels. I highlight the intersections of the two concepts and introduce key actors playing prominent roles in such intersections on which the analysis is based. Chapter 4 introduces the methodology in detail. I first explain my view of understanding knowledge, namely, social constructivism, and discuss issues of translating sociological concepts into Japanese from English and vice versa. Then I expound on data collection and analysis methods, which were constantly shaped by my positionality as a researcher in the field and affected by the pandemic.

Chapters 5 to 7 present empirical findings, addressing each research question. Chapter 5 shows a policy analysis of the integration strategy of the two cities, using the three

elements of citizenship: status, rights and identity. Policy analysis provides a snapshot of the integration strategy and allows one to capture the urban citizenship framework. In Chapter 6, I share findings from policymakers and civil servants whose approaches to the city's migrant integration are often understood as 'top-down'. It also draws voices from the regional- and national-level stakeholders and shows the vertical and horizontal dynamics that shape the city's policymaking and its attitudes towards migrants. In Chapter 7, I analyse the 'bottom-up' approaches to integration strategy based on interviews with civil society activists. Inasmuch as civil society is integral to making citizenship, their practices and strategies for migrant integration offer significant insights. In Chapter 8, the conclusion chapter, I summarise the findings and present contributions this study has made.

CHAPTER 2
MIGRATION FLOWS AND POLICY CONTEXTS OF JAPAN AND THE UK

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I provide background on Japan and the UK in terms of recent immigration flows and policy development in immigration and integration and draw further attention to Osaka and Birmingham. As discussed in the previous chapter, while policies around immigration control and integration are often considered distinct (Hammar, 1985a), both are integral factors that shape and define one's citizenship in various domains. Moreover, local authorities are inevitably affected by the national policy framework (Emilsson, 2015), and in order to understand the local-level integration strategy, it is necessary to understand migration and policy backgrounds in the national context. By drawing national and local contexts, this chapter furthers our understanding of the two cities' demographic and policy backgrounds without falling into the trap of methodological nationalism or detaching this study from the national context.

2.1.1 Defining 'migrants'

Before delving into migration flows and related policies of the two countries, it is important to note that nations employ different definitions and datasets to describe their 'migrant' populations. The way in which Japan and the UK measure and collect migration-related data reflects their political and ideological constructions of 'migrants' and 'citizens'. The only available migration statistics in Japan, where the presence of 'migrants' is denied, are based on one's nationality. Its definition of "*zairyū gaikokujin* (foreign resident)"

includes middle- or long-term visa holders and special permanent residents altogether (Immigration Services Agency of Japan (ISAJ), 2019). This blinds a thorough comprehension of migration figures in Japan, which affects academic, policy and public discussions on the inflow of migrants into the country. For example, by including special permanent residents, ethnic Koreans who have settled in Japan for generations (see later section for further details), the datasets mix up such long-settled communities and newly arrived migrants and treat them as one large group of 'foreigners' (Park, 2017; Hennings and Mintz, 2018). By solely counting individuals by nationality and labelling them as 'foreigners', Japan maintains the image of nationhood that automatically excludes non-Japanese nationals. This is attributed to Japan's ethno-nationalist self-identity, which originates from the assumption that 'genuine Japanese' should share the same nationality, ethnicity and culture and that immigration cannot jeopardise such homogeneity (Befu, 1993; Sugimoto, 1999; Weiner, 2009).[5]

Indeed, Japan adheres to *jus sanguinis,* which means citizenship can be obtained through one's bloodline when one of the parents is a Japanese citizen. Migrants whose financial situation and personal character suffice the criteria can also apply for citizenship and 'naturalise' after residing in Japan for more than five years, but they automatically lose their original citizenship since Japan does not allow dual citizenship.[6] As a result, the number of those granted Japanese citizenship remains roughly 10,000 yearly (Ministry of Justice (MOJ), 2023). As such, identities of 'migrants' and 'citizens' in Japan are constructed based on the ethnonational category of Japanese and non-Japanese,

[5] The discourse of Japanese identity is called *Nihonjinron* (theories of the Japanese).
[6] Residency requirements vary for individuals who were born in Japan or have a Japanese parent.

feeding into Japan's adamant denial of using "the 'I' word; the 'I' standing for '*imin*', or 'immigrant'" (Roberts, 2012, 2018, p.89).

Outlining several different measurements used in the UK context, Anderson and Blinder (2019) emphasise that each dataset holds only a partial aspect of international migration to the country. Amongst various ways to calculate 'migrants' in the UK, one of the most commonly used data is that of the foreign-born population. While this definition "corresponds to a common understanding of migration", this includes British citizens who are not affected by immigration control (Anderson and Blinder, 2019, p.3). The UK data sources also utilise statistics based on nationality and length of stay, among many other variables, to understand the size and trends of migration (ONS, 2018, 2020). However, these two definitions display inconsistent migration figures since one's nationality and length of stay are not fixed elements but can change over time; one's nationality can also be interpreted as "an elective affinity dependent on social and cultural factors and personal feelings, rather than legal status" (Anderson and Blinder, 2019, p.3).

Several legal changes have continued to reshape and redefine who is included in the country's citizenship scheme. One is automatically a British citizen when one of their parents is a British citizen or has indefinite leave to remain. British citizenship is also granted by birth for those who were born before 1983 within the UK or in a British colony with some conditions. The UK allows dual citizenship, and citizenship acquisition is more common than in Japan. Usually, naturalisation requires five years of residence in the country, and applicants must pass the Life in the UK Test and prove their English ability. In the past ten years, between 100,000 to 200,000 decisions have been successful each

year (GOV.UK, 2023b). The high number of citizenship applications and grants is reflected in datasets, too; while the foreign-born population is 9.5 million, the non-British population is 6.1 million, signifying that there are many of those with migrant background and obtained British citizenship (ONS, 2021). As such, policy and public discussions often complicate and produce many definitions of migrants, sometimes including asylum seekers or ethnic minorities, with which they justify their claims for/against immigration control and integration processes (Anderson and Blinder, 2019). It has also been used in making immigration legislation and policies that reinforce the nation-state idea and maintain its racial and national identity (Solomos, 1989); for instance, the 'migrant' category was expanded during the Brexit debate that shifted EU 'citizens' to EU 'migrants', as it will be further discussed later in this chapter (Dennison and Geddes, 2018; Ranta and Nancheva, 2019).

The measurements in Japan and the UK highlight that definitions of migrants and citizens are often contested and politicised, reflecting the nation's view of the state and its members. Given such contestations of measurement of migrants, I use a very broad understanding of migrants introduced by IOM:

> An umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally-defined, such as smuggled migrants; as

> well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students. (IOM, n.d.)

While it is important to clearly define migrants and apply specific uses of related terms (see Douglas et al., 2019), using the term as an umbrella term allows me to facilitate cross-national and local comparisons between institutions that employ different understandings and political intentions of 'migrants'. I also utilise categories of people such as asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants where necessary to avoid oversimplification and to reflect policy aims and dynamics that are embedded in the strategies of nations and cities. Each country has different definitions and underlying aims that have led them to apply their abovementioned understandings of migrants, and the city's migrant integration strategy often sets integration targets that are different from the national-level understanding of migrants. As such, this study does not intend to strictly draw a line between migrants and non-migrants or delve into the nation's imagined community but aims to demonstrate a broad picture of international migration and its significance in the national and local policymaking contexts in the two settings. The statistics and datasets I draw in this chapter may not necessarily align with each other, yet I treat them as relevant data that reflect historical and policy contexts of migration.

2.1.2 Chapter structure

I first introduce the post-WWII migration flow and policy development of Japan. This will be done by going through Japan's link to former colonial subjects, mainly Koreans, and the country's side-door approaches. The later section mentions its strict entry ban measures during the pandemic and moves the discussion onto the country's integration-

related policies. The following section introduces migration flows and integration measures of Osaka. I then move on to the historical and political contexts of the UK, from Commonwealth migration to EU mobility and the hostile environment measures. The following section focuses on the labour shortage triggered by Brexit and the pandemic, emphasising the country's necessity for a labour force. After introducing its national integration measures, I cover local-level integration and Birmingham profiles. The final section summarises the chapter and discusses the similarities and differences that the two countries exhibit while pointing out the difficulty of measuring migration in each setting. I also reiterate my use of 'integration' based on the policy contexts of Japan and the UK.

2.2 Japan: a 'non-immigration' country with migrants

In this section I touch upon notable migration trends and policy development in Japan based on different visa categories. I first introduce the so-called 'old-comer' population from China and Korea, who affected Japan's immigration policymaking during and after the war. Then I move on to the illegalisation of undocumented over-stayers and the introduction of various 'side-door' schemes, with the country's aim to secure a cheap labour force. I also discuss the country's emphasis on high-skilled migrants in its policy discourse, followed by its attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers. The latter part of this section introduces national integration-related policies and demographics and Osaka's important integration policies.

2.2.1 Migration and settlement of colonial subjects

Pre-war migration to Japan was mostly triggered by Japan's incursion into neighbouring Asian countries. The Chinese population was one of the oldest and biggest, given the

active labour migration from China to Japan until the end of the nineteenth century (Liu-Farrer, 2009). Another wave occurred during WWII as a result of the Japanese incursion into China and Taiwan; between 1943 and 1945, more than 38,000 Chinese workers were forced to come to Japan, though most of them were repatriated at the end of the war (Liu-Farrer, 2009). Another important group is people from the Korean peninsula who migrated for colonial programmes since Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 until the end of WWII (Chapman, 2006; Weiner and Chapman, 2009). About 2.1 million Koreans crossed the sea to respond to Japan's demand for a cheap labour force. They were not considered foreigners per se and given Japanese nationality; labelled as colonial subjects, nonetheless, their social and economic freedom was extremely limited amidst the deep-rooted antagonism towards them (Weiner, 1994). While some returned to the peninsula after the war, approximately 1.5 million remained, facing severe discrimination and socio-economic marginalisation (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004; Weiner and Chapman, 2009). The term *zainichi* (resident or denizen in Japan) came to be widely employed to refer specifically to these Koreans.

Despite Japan's defeat in the war and following decolonisation, the legacy of the Empire remained. The *1947 Alien Registration Ordinance* and the *jus sanguinis* citizenship system differentiated the Korean, Chinese and Taiwanese from the Japanese (Weiner and Chapman, 2009; Liu-Farrer, 2020). When the *San Francisco Peace Treaty* declared independence of those occupied territories, the Japanese government released the *1951 Immigration Control Act* and the *1952 Alien Registration Act*. Through these Acts, the *zainichi* population did not have any choice but to lose Japanese nationality and legally became foreigners, which, as a result, set the foreign population soaring on paper (E-Stat,

2014). In light of the Korean conflict that intensified during this period, those from the southern part of the peninsula were granted permanent residency, while those from the northern part were recommended to return. The settlement process of *zainichi* Koreans from 1966 involved fervent bottom-up activism at the local and national levels that called for better legal, social and economic positions in Japanese society (Takenaka, 2015). It was in 1982 when permanent residency for those from the northern part was granted by the *Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act* (ICRRA). The *1991 Special Act on the Immigration Control* created the 'special permanent residents (*tokubetsu eijyū sha*)' category for all the *zainichi* population. Special permanent residents are exempt from some restrictions that permanent residents and other migrants have at borders and within Japan.

2.2.2 Importing labour force through side-doors in the 1990s and 2000s

In addition to the creation of special permanent resident visa, the 1990s and 2000s saw a series of significant policy changes. In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan experienced burgeoning economic growth followed by severe labour shortages, which pushed the country to reform the hitherto structure of immigration policy that had focused largely on controlling the *zainichi* population in the context of 'security maintenance' (Tsuda, 2006a; Usui, 2006; Kondo, 2015). The amendment of ICRRA in 1990 holds great significance, as it illegalised undocumented migrants and opened several channels through which the nation could import and control the labour force. This policy change took place out of the country's dilemma between its urgent domestic economic needs and fear of dishallowing the nation's ethnic homogeneity and cultural purity (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004). Whereas

one's entry was allowed based on their ostensible immigration status, they were expected to provide labour, creating what Shindo (2014, p.376) calls the "category mismatch".

Until the revised ICRRA, the country had regarded visa over-stayers as 'foreign manual labourers' rather than irregular migrants and relied on their labour force (Takaya, 2018). A significant number of them engaged in the sex and entertainment industry, manufacturing and construction (Komai, 1995; Takaya, 2018). Illegalisation of those irregular migrants has gradually replaced them with other migrants who entered through side-doors. Labelling over-stayers as 'potential criminals', the government implemented a five-year plan to reduce the number of over-stayers by half from 2004 to 2008. As a consequence, the number of over-stayers on the whole dropped from 293,800 in 1993 to 219,418 in 2004 and to 113,072 in 2009 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), 2002; ISAJ, 2009). While many were detained and deported, approximately 50,000 over-stayers were regularised during the five-year plan (Takaya, 2018). The number of irregular migrants is reported as 82,868 in 2021 (ISAJ, 2021a); the number has been rising in recent years with refused asylum seekers, technical interns and international students who overstay their visas and become 'illegal' (Takaya, 2018; Sigona et al., 2021).

While illegalising over-stayers, the revised ICRRA provided long-term resident (*teijyū sha*) visa to one of the main groups who were expected to supplement the labour force: ethnic Japanese from South America, called *Nikkeijin* (return migrants of Japanese descent).[7] The mass-'return' of the second-and third-generation *Nikkeijin*, predominantly from Brazil

[7] A large-scale Japanese migration to South America took place between the 1890s and the 1960s (Endoh, 2010).

and Peru, began in the late 1980s when the economic crisis struck Brazil, and it was accelerated by the creation of long-term resident visa that allowed them to live and work without restrictions (Tsuda, 2009; Kondo, 2015). Within a decade from 1980 to 1990, the Brazilian population increased from 1,500 to 56,400 and reached 300,000 in 2005; the population grew more than fivefold in fifteen years (SBJ, 2012). According to Tsuda (2006a, 2009), by relaxing the immigration policy for *Nikkeijin*, the government managed to acquire a large labour force while maintaining 'ethnic homogeneity'. However, its expectation that the ethnic Japanese would smoothly assimilate into their ancestral country was not met. When the global financial crisis caused many *Nikkeijin* to lose their job, the government promoted their 're-repatriation' by providing incentives in 2009; more than 21,000 *Nikkeijin* 'returned' to South America in one year, of which 92.5% were *Nikkeijin* Brazilians (MHLW, 2010). This repatriation scheme demonstrated that this "ethnic return migration" was indeed a "*de facto guestworker program* based on coethnicity" (Sharpe, 2010, pp.360–361, italics original).

The Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) has been regarded as another pool of labour from developing Asian countries, namely, China, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, since its launch in 1986 and alteration in 1993 (Yamanaka, 1993; Chung, 2010). Although the scheme was designed ostensibly to train people from developing countries who would transfer technology, knowledge and skills to their own countries, trainees were rather used as cheap labour and forced to engage in so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs (Yamanaka, 1993; Tsuda, 2006a; Chung, 2010). Yet, trainees have continued to stream into Japan; after the new technical intern (*ginō jisshū*) visa was launched in 2010, around 100,000 interns entered the country. In 2019, the number of

interns who arrived in Japan increased more than fourfold (E-Stat, 2011, 2020). While the *2016 Act on Proper Technical Intern Training and Protection of Technical Intern Trainees* (Technical Intern Training Act) in principle protects interns, the vulnerable and exploitative situations they face, along with the financial burdens posed by mediation agencies, have led to the increasing number of interns going missing (MOJ, 2021).

Furthermore, international students have been another significant source of labour. International students, including university students and Japanese language school students, have attracted attention from employers who intend to host students to secure the labour force. With the introduction of a stricter screening process for international students and assessment of Japanese language schools, the number of incoming students stabilised during the 1990s; with some restrictions lifted in 1999, the number of students increased to 110,000 by 2003 (Li, 2012). The government announced in 2008 that it would aim to further recruit 300,000 international students by 2020 (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), 2008). The low entry threshold and active broking have brought students mostly from Asian countries into Japanese language institutions (Liu-Farrer and Tran, 2019). As a result, in 2019, the number of international students surpassed 310,000 and fulfilled the country's aim (MEXT, 2021a). Students are allowed to work for 28 hours per week, and, despite the original purpose of studying, international students coming to Japan are indeed regarded as part of the labour force for their part-time commitment during their study and for the long-term benefits that students can bring by settling in Japan after graduation (Li, 2012).

Entertainer visa have also brought many migrant women from Asian countries, mainly the Philippines, into the sex and entertainment industry. This international flow to the sex trade in Japan was triggered by the decline in domestic workers in Japan's sex and entertainment industry and high unemployment rates in Southeast Asian countries (Nishiguchi, 2009). They were called '*Japayuki-san* (gone to Japan)' and forced to work as hostesses at clubs and cabarets in Japan until 2005, when the government tightened the restrictions (Ogaya et al., 2020). From 1979 to 2005, among 1,917,063 entries into Japan using entertainer visa, the majority were from the Philippines (Liu-Farrer, 2020). A large number of migrant women married to Japanese customers and settled in Japan, although they faced various barriers to integration (Nishiguchi, 2009).

2.2.3 Further control and selection of 'desirable' migrants from the 2010s onwards

The 2010s saw the introduction of new schemes and policies that emphasise migrants as a 'labour force' more directly. The points-based system (PBS) was launched in 2012 for high-skilled migrant workers, yet did not attract many applicants (Oishi, 2013; Hagiwara and Nakajima, 2014; Kondo, 2015). Given the low number of professionals entering the country, Japan further relaxed conditions for the salary threshold and permanent residency application. It granted those who have more than 80 points not only mid- to long-term stay and family reunion rights but also entitlement to permanent residency after a year of stay in Japan (ISAJ, 2023a).[8] Such measures have resulted in an increase in the total number of high-skilled migrants (Wakisaka and Cardwell, 2021); despite the

[8] Points are acquired based on one's education and professional qualifications and salary thresholds.

pandemic, the number of those who were accepted via PBS has been constantly increasing, exceeding 30,000 in 2021 (ISAJ, 2023b).

Unlike manual workers, whom Japan has been reluctant to give official recognition, migrants who engage in high-skilled jobs are called '*gaikoku jinzai* (foreign talent)' and '*kōdo gaikoku jinzai* (high-level foreign talent)'[9] to be distinguished from other "ordinary" migrants (Roberts, 2018, p.91). This rhetoric can be seen in integration measures as well; the *2018 Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Nationals* (hereafter Comprehensive Measures), one of few Japan's 'integration policies', mainly targets *gaikoku jinzai* (ISAJ, 2021; integration policy in Japan is discussed later in this chapter). This indicates that Japan's official discourse of immigration centres around high-skilled migrants despite the larger presence of other categories of migrants and the nation's desperate need for low- and middle-skilled workers (Roberts, 2018).

Another major change occurred in 2018 when the closed-door policy was finally altered after a long silence. Responding to its falling birth rate and severe labour shortage, as well as strong pressure from the economic community, the government revised the ICRRA and started accepting manual workers in the following year with the specified skilled workers (*tokutei ginō*; SSW) programme. The SSW programme issues two categories of visas: Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 status grants a five-year stay without family accompaniment. Whilst Type 1 aimed to recruit up to 345,150 people in 14 fields,[10] including care work, construction, agriculture and food and beverage in five years, only

[9] Those who have 70 points or more can be recognised as *kōdo gaikoku jinzai*.
[10] The 14 fields were later integrated into 12 fields (ISAJ, 2022a).

4.5% of the target number entered Japan in the first two years (Kato, 2021). On the other hand, requiring relatively higher skills, Type 2 status allows foreign workers to bring their family members and potentially stay in the country permanently. Although then Prime Minister Abe stated that the SSW programme was “not an immigration policy” (Cabinet Office, 2018, p.34), the government has expanded the SSW scheme to respond to the escalating labour shortage and attract more applicants; Type 2 status was extended from 2 fields to 11 fields, covering all the areas of Type 1 except for nursing care in 2023 (ISAJ, 2023c). In 2024, furthermore, the government extended Type 1 status to 16 fields, adding automobile transport and forestry areas, and announced that they would accept 820,000 foreign workers in the next five years (ISAJ, 2024), which demonstrates the shift in Japan’s immigration policy.

2.2.4 (In)experience with refugees and asylum seekers

Japan’s ratification of the *Refugee Convention* was backed by its experience of the Indochina refugee crisis following the Vietnam War in the late 1970s (Koizumi, 2019). The existing immigration framework of ICRRA was originally established in 1982 to respond to its ratification of the convention and set up legal procedures for granting asylum. Between 1979 and 2005, Japan accepted 11,319 refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 2019). Despite such an initiative, Japan has maintained a relatively low acceptance rate. Since 2011, the refugee acceptance rate had been under 1% until 2020 and recorded the lowest in 2017 as 0.1% (MOJ, 2018; ISAJ, 2022c). In 2021, 74 people out of 2,413 applicants were granted refugee status

(ISAJ, 2022c).[11] In addition, Japan has accepted refugees through the resettlement scheme and study abroad programme. Although its size remains small, these schemes have hosted refugees from Myanmar and Syria (ISAJ, 2022c). While the government announced that it would expand the resettlement scheme and double the number of resettled refugees (Cabinet Secretariat, 2019), Japan did not accept any refugees through the resettlement scheme in 2021, but 20 Syrian students through the study abroad programme (ISAJ, 2022c). As such, its extremely low refugee acceptance rate and the detention practices that indefinitely confine asylum seekers have been criticised nationally and internationally (Amnesty International, 2023).

Nonetheless, notable development has been seen in the country's response to the war in Ukraine, as the government promptly announced to accept Ukrainians fleeing the war. Those fleeing from Ukraine, however, are not recognised as '*nanmin* (refugee)' but as '*hinanmin* (displaced person)' and are granted renewable one-year 'designated activities (*tokutei katsudō*)' visa with which they are allowed to work in Japan. While public and private sector organisations have provided Ukrainian refugees with a wide range of support in immigration advice and settlement, which are not available for other refugees (Japan Association for Refugees, 2022), the '*hinanmin*' definition remains ambiguous and strengthens the emergency and temporary aspects of this measure unlike refugees whose settlement are guaranteed as 'long-term residents'.

[11] Besides 74 people who were granted refugee status, 580 applicants were granted special permission to stay on humanitarian grounds.

2.2.5 Racialised border controls during the COVID-19 pandemic

Although the Japanese government did not impose lockdowns but voluntary stay-at-home requests, mobility of migrants within and outside Japan has been hugely limited due to its strict immigration control at the border during the pandemic. In the beginning phase of the pandemic in 2020, Japan closed its border to all non-citizens except for special permanent residents (*zainichi* population). All other migrant residents, including permanent and long-term residents and spouse or child of a Japanese national and of a permanent resident, were banned from re-entering Japan, whilst those who were in Japan at the time of border closures were able to remain in the country. Although this stringent border control was once relaxed, it was brought back in light of the spread of the Omicron variant. Later, re-entry of foreign residents was allowed in principle, while the new entry of foreigners was possible only if they were in “special exceptional circumstances” and sponsored (MOFA, 2022a, para.2). Daily entry cap was also relaxed gradually from 3,500 in November 2021 to 20,000 in June 2022 (Japan Times, 2022).

This strict entry ban dropped the number of foreign residents staying in Japan and restrained the previously increasing trend. Since the stringent control was imposed in April 2020 up to the end of 2021, the number of non-Japanese who entered the country – both new entry and re-entry for short- and long-term – decreased on average by 99.3% from 2019 (ISAJ, 2021b, 2022b). As technical interns and international students were not able to enter the country, particular economic sectors, such as agriculture and care work, struggled with serious labour shortages. The government attempted to mediate the shortage by granting visa to existing technical interns who had completed their programmes to allow them to change a type of industry (ISAJ, 2020).

Despite the country's urgent need for a migrant labour force and its changing immigration policy towards 'opening up', Japan's response to the pandemic reiterated the country's long-held notion that migrants, regardless of their immigration status or background, are all outsiders (Costalunga, 2021; Arudou, 2022). Japan's border control measures are criticised as xenophobic and racialised, given that Japanese citizens were able to enter the country during the closure (Arudou, 2022). The country faces a dilemma between an urgent call for migrants to secure further economic development and its nationalistic identity as a 'non-immigration country'.

2.2.6 The localised approach of *tabunka kyōsei* in a country 'without integration'

While it has been shown above that the country has denied the presence of 'migrants' and lacks migrant integration, there has been some policy development around settlement of migrants in Japan led by national and local authorities. Kondo (2011) classifies four chronological stages of Japan's post-war integration policy, reflecting the country's demographics and migration flow. The first phase focused on the exclusion and assimilation of *zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese right after the war, as they were expected to have a Japanese name, language and culture (Yamawaki, 2002; Chapman, 2006; Weiner and Chapman, 2009). In the second stage, starting in the 1980s, the government promoted internationalisation at the local level through international exchange programmes, while this initiative did not mean addressing existing diversity in the community (Flowers, 2012). It was around this time that public support for the settlement of Indochina refugees started through Resettlement Support Centres, which provided Japanese language education and advice on employment, security, and the Japanese social system. It was yet insufficient in its service provision and had an assimilative aspect

(Koizumi, 2019). The third stage in the 1990s concerned migrants' political rights when the Supreme Court admitted that the Constitution does not deny the voting rights of particular migrants, mainly permanent residents, at local elections and referendums. The fourth stage was initiated in 2006 when the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) issued the *Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Community Building* (hereafter MC Plan). The MC Plan introduced *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) and assigned responsibility for designing and implementing appropriate integration strategies to local authorities (MIC, 2006). The MIC (2006, p.5) defines *tabunka kyōsei* in the MC Plan as: "coexistence of community members with different nationalities and ethnicities by respecting mutual differences and building equal relationship".

This concept, despite its name, does not strictly follow the concept of multiculturalism. Critics of *tabunka kyōsei* (e.g. Tai, 2007; Qi and Zhang, 2008; Tsuneyoshi, 2011; Burgess, 2012; Nagy, 2012; Kashiwazaki, 2013; Nakamatsu, 2014) argue that it highlights the Japanese/foreigner dichotomy and strengthens power relations between the two without addressing diversity within each group. Morris-Suzuki (2002) points out that, even when diversity seems to be celebrated, it is rather consumed as mere commodities, and basic rights and belonging of non-Japanese are disregarded, which can be called 'cosmetic multiculturalism' (Ko, 2013). Although scholars (e.g. Kwak, 2009; Burgess, 2021; Phillimore et al., 2021) have attempted to replace with or rebuild a new concept upon *tabunka kyōsei*, it is still the dominant political discourse employed on a practical level that most characterises migrant integration in Japan. For example, on the website of MOFA, it says: "social integration (*tabunka kyōsei*) of foreign residents of which local

municipalities are in charge" (MOFA, 2022b, para.1), equating social integration and *tabunka kyōsei*. Despite long-standing academic attempts, the use of concepts like *tabunka kyōsei* and integration by policymakers and practitioners tends to be policy-driven and disregards sociological implications attached to 'multiculturalism' and 'integration' (for the theoretical discussions on academic and policy use of the term, see Chapters 1 and 3; for the translation issue of the concept, see Chapter 4).

Other national policy developments include the *2010 Basic Guideline of Measures for Japanese-Descended Resident*s, which targeted *Nikkeijin*, who was gravely affected by the financial crisis. Yet, while the guideline focused on Japanese language support provision and school assistance for children, it is pointed out to be rather superficial and lacking specific measures to promote the integration of *Nikkeijin* (Izawa, 2013). Comprehensive Measures were first introduced in 2018 and have been revised several times. While Comprehensive Measures were a significant step forward for the Japanese government in recognising the need to assist migrant settlement and arranging cross-ministerial policies to improve Japanese language assistance and daily life support (Wakisaka, 2022), the measures are considered to be ambiguous (Yamaguchi, 2020). Furthermore, they include stricter immigration control and focus on particular groups of migrants, disregarding the diversity of needs among migrants and refugees with different statuses (Nagai et al., 2021).

Despite recent progress at the national level, migrant integration in Japan has depended heavily on local municipalities (Tegtmeyer Pak, 2000; Tsuda, 2006b; Aiden, 2011; Iwabuchi, 2016). One of the notable examples can be *kokusai kōryū sentā* (hereafter

kokuryū), centres for international exchange. [12] They are extra-governmental organisations established by municipalities based on the recommendation from the central government to promote international exchange in the late 1980s and later shifted their focus to *tabunka kyōsei* after the MC Plan was issued (Sugisawa, 2013). They have been committed to assisting the settlement of foreign nationals in local communities and promoting mutual understanding between migrants and local residents, but their services and degree of engagement vary with their demographics, resources and size (Kim and Streich, 2020). According to the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) (2019), there are more than 760 *kokuryū* in Japan in which municipalities have been involved. By providing consultation and language services and hosting cultural activities, *kokuryū* has been playing the leading role in integration of migrants at the municipal level (Kim and Streich, 2020).

2.2.7 Osaka: a (super)diversifying metropolis of old and new migration

Osaka City belongs to Osaka Prefecture, one of 47 prefectures of Japan. The city stands as one of 43 municipalities under the prefecture and embraces 24 wards (Osaka City, 2022c). As a 'basic municipality', municipalities are required to provide services based on the 'principle of self-determination and self-responsibility'. Osaka, as a metropolis, is one of twenty 'ordinance-designated cities (*seirei shitei toshi*)', which can administer affairs such as social welfare, financial assistance and urban planning without concerning major decisions of prefectural governments (Osaka Prefecture, 2019). This helps the

[12] Those centres are uniformly called *kokusai kōryū sentā* in Japanese, yet each centre embraces its own English name to emphasise their focus. For example, four associations I interviewed had distinct English names: Osaka Foundation of International Exchange, Osaka International House Foundation, Minoh Association for Global Awareness, and Association for Toyonaka Multicultural Symbiosis.

designated cities to facilitate policy implementation and have a variety of policy designs (Ohsugi, 2011). Ordinance-designated cities embrace ward offices as part of the city office to smoothen the city administration. The city governance is run by the mayor, elected by residents of the city, and the city assembly, elected from each ward. Osaka City and Prefecture are currently governed by *Osaka Ishin no Kai* (Osaka Restoration Association, hereafter *Ishin*), a regionalist, right-wing populist party. In terms of integration-related matters, the city's two offices – the Diversity Promotion Office and the International Affairs Office – are in charge of *tabunka kyōsei* from different aspects. The former, previously named the Human Rights Office, drafts guidelines for foreign residents, and the latter deals with international exchange and language support, mainly for tourists and visitors.

The migrant population in Osaka has diversified notably in the past 20 years. Traditionally, Osaka has been home to *zainichi* Koreans, who accounted for more than 80% of the city's foreign population in 2000. Their settlement was triggered by Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, accelerated by the rising demands for a labour force for industry and the direct boat line between Jeju Island and Osaka (Iwasa, 1998). *Zainichi* Korean population started shrinking due to ageing and naturalisation, decreasing to 43% of the city's foreign population in 2020 (E-Stat, 2021a; Osaka City, 2022d, 2023a). Meanwhile, migrants from neighbouring countries, such as China, Vietnam, Philippines and Nepal, started arriving mainly as technical interns and international students. As of the end of 2021, Osaka City had the highest number and proportion of migrants among Japan's ordinance-designated cities (Osaka City, 2022d). Notably, the Ikuno ward has one of the highest concentrations

of migrants among municipalities, as foreign nationals account for 21.8% of its total population, of which 76% are Koreans (SBJ, 2022).

Osaka's integration strategy has long been centred around civil rights issues for the *zainichi* Korean population, considering *tabunka kyōsei* as part of the "umbrella" of human rights (Tsuneyoshi, 2019, p.188). Its focus on "guaranteeing citizenship rights" of *zainichi* Koreans stems from the city's experience with minority groups, such as *Burakumin* (members of a social minority group in Japan who are believed to be descended from a discriminated outcast community) and Okinawan people in the city (Kashiwazaki, 2014; Tarumoto, 2018, p.200). With a large *Burakumin* population, Osaka has long been a centre of *Buraku* (community of *Burakumin*) activism since before WWII, which later prompted *zainichi* activism. The *1998 Basic Guidelines on Measures for Foreign-National Residents* (amended in 2004; hereafter the 1998/2004 Guidelines) became one of the first city-led initiatives on integration by setting out three aims (Green, 2021): "respect human rights of foreign-national residents", "realise the *tabunka kyōsei* society" and "promote participation to the local community" (Osaka City, 2004, pp.16–17). Defining that "foreigners residing in the city are 'foreign-national residents' who together constitute the local community" (Osaka City, 2004, p.1), the focus of the 1998/2004 Guidelines was dominantly on *zainichi* Koreans. The city's aim to incorporate *zainichi* Koreans and protect their human rights also appeared in other documents, such as the 1999 *Basic Guidelines on Human Rights Governance*, the *2000 Osaka City Ordinance for Creating a Society with Respect for Human Rights* and the *2001 Basic Guidelines on Education for Foreigners in Japan*. The *2016 Osaka City Ordinance on Dealing with Hate Speech* made Osaka the first municipality to pass an ordinance against hate speech even before the

anti-hate speech Act was enacted at the national level. Although it does not impose any penalties, the ordinance is stricter than the national legislation in a way that the city publishes the name of individuals and organisations who have made hate speech (Osaka City, 2016).

Nonetheless, the city's integration strategy seems to have shifted its focus from human rights to the state version of *tabunka kyōsei*, which focuses on newly arrived migrants who need language support. At the end of 2020, the city released the *Osaka City Guidelines for Tabunka Kyōsei* (hereafter the 2020 Guidelines). The 2020 Guidelines define the target as "*gaikoku ni tsunagaru shimin* (city residents with foreign background)" to include not only non-Japanese migrants but also Japanese citizenship holders who have naturalised, returned to Japan before and after WWII or have migrant parents, recognising the shared barriers and challenges such people have in common (Osaka City, 2020b, p.2). While there are still references to human rights in the new guidelines, more emphasis is placed on language and livelihood support for newly arrived migrants, namely, *Nikkeijin*, long- and short-term migrant workers (including technical trainees and international students) and their families and children, who started to be more visible than long-established *zainichi* Korean and Chinese migrants. I further explore this point in Chapter 5 from the policy documents and in Chapter 6 from the perspective of city officials.

2.3 The UK: a country of normalised yet problematised immigration

This section explores the main migration trends and relevant policy development in the UK with a focus on the country's colonial ties and EU mobility. I also discuss harsh immigration controls against asylum seekers and the introduction of 'hostile environment'

policies while touching upon high-skilled migration. The main flow of migrant integration policies and Birmingham profiles are covered in the later part of the section.

2.3.1 Commonwealth migration and racialised border control

In addition to the existing pre-war mobility, migration from former British colonies has greatly shaped the UK's immigration rules and practices in terms of its scale, speed and size. It holds significance inasmuch as migrants from the Commonwealth were not considered migrants but British subjects in a legal sense until relatively recently. After the *1905 Aliens Act* introduced immigration controls for the first time, the *1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act* codified the common law that deemed a person who was born within the Empire to be a British subject (Layton-Henry, 2001). Along with decolonisation, Commonwealth migration to Britain became active after WWII, pushed by the 1948 *British Nationality Act* that established the status of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC). CUKC regarded Commonwealth and British nationals as having the same citizenship, ensuring free entry from Commonwealth countries. The number of British subjects, mainly from the Caribbean, West Africa and South Asia, grew dramatically as a result; it is estimated that the net intake between 1955 and 1962 was approximately 472,500 (Home Office, 2002a). As the size of the non-white population arriving in the country increased, they came to be problematised and referred to as 'immigrants' despite their legal status as CUKC, unlike other white migrants from the dominions and European migrant groups (Webster, 2011). The visibility of Black and Asian migrants was captured as a "colour problem" and reinforced the rise of English identity as exclusive and white (Webster, 2005, p.149). Immigration control hence became an imminent political matter, as the multiracial community that the

Commonwealth had offered to the Empire now became Britain's "domestic problem" (Paul, 1997; Webster, 2005, p.149). On the other hand, Ireland remained one of the biggest sources of labour, sending between 70,000 to 100,000 migrants within ten years after the war (Solomos, 1989, p.42). Given Ireland's independence and withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the *Ireland Act* was enacted in 1949 to justify privileges and exemptions for Irish migrants. However, they faced strong pressure for assimilation based on the prevalent assumption that the same skin colour represented the same culture (Hickman, 2005).

Entry of non-white British subjects was problematised in the *1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act*, followed by the *1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act* and the *1971 Immigration Act*. This series of legislation imposed restrictions on all Commonwealth citizens but those whose parent or grandparent was born in Britain in order to preserve rights to abode for white Commonwealth citizens while operating controls upon "coloured people almost exclusively", as then Home Secretary R. A. Butler stated (Paul, quoted in Webster, 2011, p.132). 'British citizenship' was officially introduced by the *1981 British Nationality Act*, which altered the British citizenship attribute from *jus soli* to *jus sanguinis* in order to preclude children born to Commonwealth citizens in Britain from being entitled to citizenship through their place of birth while granting citizenship to those who were 'settled' in Britain (Blake, 1982). The Act also created two other citizenship categories, particularly for Commonwealth citizens, without entitling the right to abode (Tyler, 2010). By replacing *jus soli* citizenship with *jus sanguinis* and setting the "new sub-sets of lesser citizenships" (Green, 2007, p.97), Britain redesigned its citizenship to define 'aliens' within the country and exclude them (see Tyler, 2010). This can be seen in the introduction of

citizenship tests and ceremonies to make new UK citizens uphold the common British values (Home Office, 2002b). A series of legislation against Commonwealth migration was concluded with the *1988 Immigration Act*, which limited the entry of dependants of Commonwealth citizens. Whereas the door for Commonwealth citizens was closed on paper, its migration flow in practice was affected only slightly. The average number of settlement grants to Commonwealth nationals shifted from 51,000 per year in the 1970s to 33,000 in the 1980s and started to grow from the mid-1990s (Home Office, 2002a). It is understood that those legislations motivated family reunion and application for British citizenship based on the fear of losing entitlement (Werbner, 2005).

Even after the conclusion of legislation that explicitly targeted Commonwealth nationals, exclusive policies and treatments have been retained in many forms. As shown later, one of the examples can be the government's treatment of those who entered the country through the high-skilled migration scheme. The biggest event, however, would be the 'Windrush scandal' that was exposed in 2018. Those who came to the UK from the West Indies between the late 1940s and early 1970s and their children, the so-called 'Windrush generation', were denied their stay in the UK, as it was revealed that the Home Office discarded their records of entry and continuous residency. The absence of official documents has led the Windrush generation to wrongful deportation, detention and denial of their legal rights (Wardle and Obermuller, 2018). Such exclusion of particular migrant groups has been justified and practised under hostile environment policies, which I will explain later in this chapter.

2.3.2 Post-war European migration and formation of EEC and EU

Another significant pillar of migration flows to the UK is European migration, which has contributed to the UK labour force since before the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and EU. As the post-war reconstruction required extensive human resources, European guest workers were welcomed to fulfil the labour scarcity that Britain eagerly sought. The Polish Resettlement Corps became one of the first channels of such migration to Britain in 1946. It was designed for Polish veterans in Britain to be able to work and fulfil the country's labour shortages (Paul, 1997). As a consequence, more than 147,000 Polish were estimated to have been admitted to Britain shortly after the war (Holmes, 1988).

Meanwhile, displaced persons and political refugees in camps in Germany and Austria, mainly from Poland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were recruited as European Volunteer Workers (EVW). Recruitment started right after the war and reached out to other groups from Italy, Germany and Austria. By the time it ended in 1951, approximately 91,000 people had entered Britain under the scheme (Tannahill, 1958; de Haas et al., 2019). Although this was a guest worker scheme, according to Paul (1997, p.87), the British government proactively sought to recruit EVWs and expected them to "naturalize as British subjects, to marry British men and women, and ultimately to produce British children", hoping to avoid miscegenation between British and non-white British subjects from Commonwealth. The racial implication can also be seen in its exclusion of the Jewish population from the EVW scheme. By the end of WWII, it is estimated that about 220,000 Jewish people had been in Britain (Panayi, 2010), yet they were regarded

as ‘undesirable’ until replaced by Asian and Black Commonwealth nationals in the 1950s (Kushner, 1994; Rubinstein, 1996).

The major shift in European migration to the UK was marked by the UK’s ascension to the EEC and the development of the EU. Its membership in the EEC, which came into effect in 1973, contributed to the increase in the number of migrants from EEC countries, especially Ireland, Germany and Italy (Lessard-Phillips and Sigona, 2018). Yet, it was the passage of the *Maastricht Treaty* and the establishment of EU citizenship in 1993 that offered the country a new dimension of mobility. EU net migration reached 33,000 in 1998 and surged after the 2004 enlargement; it increased to 127,000 by 2007 and saw its peak in 2015 at 219,000 after restrictions on those from Romania and Bulgaria were lifted in 2014 (Sumption and Vargas-Silva, 2020). The burgeoning flow from EU8 and EU2[13] nations troubled British politicians that ‘new’ EU nationals would jeopardise the country’s domestic economy and social benefits system (Barbulescu, 2014). ‘Unwanted’ EU nationals were racialised and regarded as migrants and became a centre of political debate for Brexit (Barbulescu and Favell, 2020; Zorko and Debnár, 2021). After the 2016 referendum in favour of leaving the EU, the *2020 Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act* officially ended rights to free movement except for those from Ireland. Along with the pandemic, Brexit has caused a drastic drop in EU nationals living in and coming to the UK; EU net migration declined by 58% from 2016 to 2020, and out-migration surpassed in-migration in 2020 (Sumption and Walsh, 2022). On the one hand, the EU Settlement Scheme allows EU nationals who have been living in the UK to

[13] EU8 countries stand for countries who joined the EU in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. EU2 nations joined the EU in 2007: Bulgaria and Romania.

remain indefinitely; up to May 2022, around 5.83 million people have applied to the scheme (Home Office, 2022b).

2.3.3 Policy developments around asylum seekers and refugees

Asylum seekers have become the new focus of British immigration rules since the late 1980s, when their presence increased significantly and aroused hostility among the public (Bloch, 2002; Layton-Henry, 2004; Panayi, 2010). The number of asylum applications, which remained below 4,000 until 1988, jumped up to over 11,000 in the following year and continued growing (Bloch, 2000). Media portrayal of 'bogus' asylum seekers and remarks of politicians cultivated public xenophobia against asylum seekers and refugees (Panayi, 2010). In such a political and social atmosphere, a series of legislation to control the arrival of asylum seekers and their decisions was introduced, which altogether led to the formation of a hostile environment.

The *1987 Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act* was among the first to restrict the entry of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants by imposing fines on carrier companies that transported passengers without valid documents. The *1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act* and the following 1996 Act imposed further responsibility on airline companies, curtailed housing and welfare entitlement and made fingerprinting mandatory. The 1996 Act also illegalised the employment of migrants without the right to live and work, and employers' responsibilities were further reinforced later (Bloch, 2002). The refugee determination system was also tightened with the passage of the *1999 Immigration and Asylum Act* and the *2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act*. The number of asylum applications shrank significantly after reaching its peak of 84,132 in

2002, of which 13% were granted asylum, and 27% were granted other types of leave, and hit the lowest level of 16,403 in 2010 (Home Office, 2022a). At the same time, the refusal rate soared from below 20% in 1989 to the highest at 88% in 2004 (Sturge, 2022). Since then, while the number of positive decisions has been constantly around 10,000 each year, the successful initial decision rate has increased to 72% in 2021, when 13,147 applicants received positive decisions (Walsh, 2022). This trend of immigration controls was not only national but also EU-wide policy that aimed to curtail non-EU migration (Bloch, 2002).

Whereas those acts shunned the arrival of those seeking asylum, the trend of resettlement schemes has been salient, especially in recent years. In 2015, the government announced that it would expand the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme that was launched in 2014 and resettle 20,000 Syrians in five years, which was achieved in 2021 (GOV.UK, 2021b). Other recent schemes include the Vulnerable Children Resettlement Scheme to resettle 3,000 refugee children and the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme to resettle 20,000 Afghans (GOV.UK, 2021b, 2023a). Through these schemes, 18,345 refugees were resettled in 2021 (GOV.UK, 2023c). The UK government has employed the Community Sponsorship Scheme (CSS) to host resettled refugees in a community and provide integration support through the direct involvement of community groups. This was also utilised to host Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war from 2022 onwards as part of the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme (GOV.UK, 2023d). Apart from the resettlement scheme, the government has offered an immigration route to those who are in Hong Kong to live in the UK as British National (Overseas) citizens since 2020. These schemes have indeed contributed to the resettlement of refugees but, at the same

time, highlight differential treatments between asylum seekers and resettled refugees. Recent policy developments have further strengthened this aspect. The *2022 Nationality and Borders Act* has outlined a new two-tier system in which 'Group 2' asylum seekers who arrived in the UK without entry clearance or via irregular routes can be criminalised and are given limited access to welfare benefits and family reunion. The Act also allows the UK to process asylum applications 'offshore', Rwanda (GOV.UK, 2022c).

2.3.4 Selection of the 'brightest and best' and labour shortages highlighted by the pandemic

In 2010, the UK government mentioned that they would reduce net migration "from the hundreds of thousands, back down to the tens of thousands" (Home Affairs Committee, 2014, art.14), although this goal was not achieved and later abandoned (McNeil, 2021). Given the free movement of EU nationals at the time, the government focused on controlling non-EU migration by restricting entry to "the best and brightest" migrants (The Guardian, 2011, para.73), along with the abovementioned immigration measures against asylum seekers. The Highly Skilled Migrant Programme, introduced in 2002, had allowed high-skilled non-EU migrants to enter the country without a job offer or link to employers. It was replaced by the PBS in 2008 to provide a stricter tier system and reduce non-EU migration with tighter points and earnings requirements (Wakisaka and Cardwell, 2021). Acknowledging the infeasibility of the net migration target and responding to Brexit, the PBS was replaced by the Points-Based Immigration System in 2021 to include EU nationals in the immigration scheme and relax salary and skill threshold to respond to labour shortages in certain areas.

Despite its political discourse against immigration, the pandemic has underlined the country's shortages of 'essential' workers and its heavy reliance on migrant workers both in high-skilled and low-skilled workforces (Fernández-Reino et al., 2020). During the pandemic, the UK's border response was relatively slow and open compared to the neighbouring countries (Home Affairs Committee, 2020). All border measures were removed in mid-March 2020 and re-imposed in June 2020, while a series of national and local lockdowns had been in effect since March 2020. Whilst all travel requirements were removed in March 2022, industries that have relied on migrant workforce, such as agriculture, transportation, healthcare and social care, were struck to a significant extent by Brexit and the pandemic. For instance, as domestic recruitment for seasonal workers in agriculture was unsuccessful, agricultural companies chartered flights to bring seasonal workers from Romania and Bulgaria during the lockdown (Barbulescu and Vargas-Silva, 2020). The shortage of heavy goods vehicle drivers caused serious damage to supply chains (Pocock, 2021). The government has addressed particular shortages by launching temporary visa schemes and constantly updating the Shortage of Occupation List; nonetheless, it is pointed out that such an approach would hardly solve shortages and would exacerbate labour exploitation (Manning, 2022; Walsh et al., 2022).

2.3.5 Creation of a hostile environment

It is in line with the abovementioned policy developments that the British government pursued more exclusive and marginalising measures against migrants, specifically those without documents. A set of 'hostile environment' policies was introduced in 2012 by then Home Secretary Theresa May, who asserted that its aim was to "create, here in Britain, a really hostile environment for illegal immigrants" (quoted in Kirkup and Winnett, 2012,

para.7). The *Immigration Acts* in 2014 and 2016 and following measures made ID checks mandatory in a range of areas such as housing, health care and banks and obliged schools to share immigration status of students while extending No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) subjects. In addition to border enforcement, the government also applied the 'deport first, appeal later' approach to increase deportation figures (Webber, 2019, p.83). Along with Operation Vaken, an advertising campaign against undocumented migrants, a hostile environment was created across the country, bringing borders to migrants' everyday lives (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018). The continuing creation of a hostile environment has scapegoated not only asylum seekers and undocumented migrants but all migrants in the country as political subjects and influenced further policy developments (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018; Goodfellow, 2020).

2.3.6 Fragmented integration and community cohesion policies

In the context of migrant integration, the UK has been through several milestones in its approaches, whilst the primary focus of such measures has been on ethnic minorities rather than migrants (Collett and Petrovic, 2014). The 1960s witnessed the rise of multiculturalism in the British political discourse with a focus on settlement and incorporation of British subjects from the Commonwealth. It first became a prominent policy issue when the rapid diversification of the domestic population and prevalent racism called for state intervention in countering racial discrimination (Webster, 2011). This was pushed along with the strict immigration control measures against Commonwealth migration based on the government's belief that "integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible", as then junior Home Office minister Roy Hattersley remarked (Hattersley, quoted in Favell, 1998, p.104). A

series of *Race Relations Act* (1965, 1968, 1976, 2000) was passed to ban racial discrimination, despite criticism for its limited effectiveness and problematisation of non-white migration (e.g. Solomos, 1989; Geddes, 1996; Spencer, 1997).[14] The multicultural concept was also incorporated into education, crystalised as the *1988 Education Reform Act*, which laid emphasis on multicultural education and educational attainment of ethnic minority pupils (Mathieu, 2018); however, the Act has also demonstrated the assimilative aspect in introducing a national curriculum and strengthening school autonomy (Adachi, 2011).

Multiculturalism came to be challenged widely following race riots in 2001 and terrorist attacks in 2005; in line with the Western trend, it was blamed for having reinforced separatism and jeopardised community cohesion and was declared as a failure by then Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011 (Joppke, 2004, 2014; Vertovec, 2010; Cabinet Office, 2011; Mathieu, 2018). Multiculturalism as a policy discourse was replaced by community cohesion and integration, and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) was launched in 2006, centring on the role of local authorities in promoting community cohesion (COIC, 2007). The COIC report defines an integrated and cohesive community as a place where different individuals and communities share a sense of contribution and individual rights and responsibilities (COIC, 2007, p.42). The focus of community cohesion was on equality and harmony of ethnic minority communities; however, this concept has received similar criticism as multiculturalism for manifesting the essentialist nature and problematising certain communities that, in the eye of

[14] *Race Relations Act* was later repealed by *Equality Act 2006/2010*, in response to the *2000 European Commission's Employment Directive*.

policymakers, do not adopt English values and segregate themselves (McGhee, 2003; Burnett, 2004; Alexander, 2004; Worley, 2005; Thomas, 2011; Squire, 2011). Similarly, the Casey Review in 2016 highlighted the need for migrants to abide by British values in order to achieve safe community building and integration (Casey, 2016).

Integration was introduced and developed earlier in the context of refugees' settlement. The strategy for refugee integration was launched by the Home Office in 2000 to support employment, education, welfare and housing of refugees, albeit limited to recognised refugees (Spencer, 2011). The *Indicators of Integration* in 2004 provided a framework to understand integration of refugees (Ager and Strang, 2004); this was replaced by the *Home Office Indicators of Integration* in 2019 to include migrants and newly arrived groups and highlight integration as multi-dimensional and multi-directional (Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019). The CSS started in 2016 and has recruited volunteers to welcome and sponsor refugees in neighbourhood communities, which assists refugees' integration into the local community (Bond and Kwadrans, 2019).

While utilising the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund established by the EU, the government's recent integration policies place importance on locality-led integration. The focus on local authorities was reiterated in the 2012 policy paper, which also emphasised the shift from the public to the voluntary and private sectors (Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), 2012, p.2). The 2018 Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper defines integration as "communities where people, whatever their background, live, work, learn and socialise together, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities" (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local

Government (MHCLG), 2018, p.10) and clarified that newly arrived migrants are part of the integration measures:

> Integration is a two-way street. Everyone has a part to play in upholding these values. This includes not just the people who are already here, but those who want to make it their home. (MHCLG, 2018, p.10)

In the following year, the *Integrated Communities Action Plan* set out cross-departmental actions to support integration in areas like education, English language acquisition, employment and sociocultural activities at the local level across England (MHCLG, 2019). MHCLG has also launched the Integration Area Programme to work with five chosen local authorities and assist in delivering integrated communities.

Additionally, the City of Sanctuary (CoS) plays a significant role in facilitating local-level integration in UK cities. The CoS movement is considered a “fluid network of practices” (Bagelman, 2013, p.50) to shift political discourses on refugees and asylum seekers and transform the “geographical imagination of the city” (Bauder, 2019, p.32). Cities that participate in the movement pledge to welcome those who seek sanctuary, predominantly refugees and asylum seekers, and provide support networks. Although CoS is not the institutional or administrative initiative that disrupts decisions made by immigration authorities or that allows those seeking sanctuary to have complete access to citizenship, Darling and Squire (2012, p.196) argue that CoS enables “everyday enactments of sanctuary”. By claiming rightful presence, establishing local networks and engaging with CoS activities, one can enact sanctuary and disrupt the uneven guest-host relations

(Darling and Squire, 2012). Despite some concerns over romanticising CoS (Bagelman, 2013), the CoS movement functions as a bottom-up approach to integration in the UK policy context.

However, it is claimed that such a 'local turn' has been ineffective, and the country's approach to integration is "fragmented" due to the lack of political and financial intervention from the central government (Collett and Petrovic, 2014, p.10). The passage of the *2011 Localism Act* and the *2016 Cities and Local Government Devolution Act* has, in principle, given more autonomy and power to local governments. Nonetheless, local governments instead have faced a budget cut and been forced to prioritise statutory duties rather than working proactively with community actors, which allowed the central government to maintain its significant power over localities (Coker, 2018; Galandini et al., 2019; Rex and Campbell, 2022). Furthermore, the hostile environment policies have marginalised many migrants and asylum seekers while placing more responsibility on local authorities. It became an "example of central government coercive and economic steers encroaching on the ability of local authorities to facilitate migrant integration" (Coker, 2018, p.143). In addition to the lack of national-level integration vision that confuses local governments (Galandini et al., 2019), the focus on localism does not necessarily seem to facilitate local- and community-level integration models.

2.3.7 Birmingham: a superdiverse city

Birmingham is one of 36 metropolitan boroughs across England and oversees 69 wards. The city belongs to West Midlands, one of six metropolitan counties (BCC, 2018d). Metropolitan counties hold between one to three million inhabitants (Jones et al., 2018).

Each of the 69 wards in Birmingham is represented by either one or two councillors but does not have an administrative office like Osaka City. Birmingham's administrative departments are responsible for running and providing local services such as welfare, housing, schooling and infrastructure. While the Labour Party is the majority of city councillors, the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA), which covers Birmingham, is chaired by the mayor from the Conservative Party, who was elected by residents of the region (BCC, n.d.-g; WMCA, n.d.). Birmingham is one of the eleven Core Cities, an alliance of large cities that have an economic influence over the country and other regions (Core Cities UK, n.d.). As the largest and the most diverse city outside London, Birmingham's migration experience and integration practice have been integral to the city's development. Within the Council, there are mainly two departments that are in charge of integration-related matters; one is the Equalities and Cohesion Team, responsible for community cohesion, and the other one is the Refugees & Migration Team under the Adult Social Care, which manages CoS and other projects and programmes involving refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, such as the Syrian Vulnerable Resettlement Scheme and MiFriendly Cities (MFC).

Similar to Osaka, the migrant population in Birmingham has significantly diversified in the past 20 years. Those from Ireland formed one of the largest communities in the 1960s, making up 5.3% of the city's total population (Chinn, 2016). Moreover, colonial ties have brought British subjects from the Caribbean and South Asia, particularly Jamaica, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who were pulled by the post-war economy and labour demand (Henry et al., 2002; Chinn, 2016); migration from Pakistan was especially outstanding, making Birmingham one of the most concentrated areas of people of Pakistani origin

(Werbner, 2005). Another significant large-scale migration was from Hong Kong, who started arriving in the city in the 1950s, and from mainland China, whose population dramatically grew in the 1990s (Chinn, 2016). Birmingham has also witnessed a growing EU migration, especially since the enlargement; notably, in a decade between 2001 and 2011, the Polish population jumped tenfold from 928 to 9,477 (BCC, 2013). These migrants have settled in and formed communities, concentrating in particular areas of the city; for instance, Chinatown was established in the late 1980s and led by emerging Chinese communities (Chinn, 2016). As a result, while more than half of the city's migrant population comprised those from Pakistan, India and Ireland in 2001, they amount to less than 35% as of 2021 as migrant groups from other countries have increased (BCC, 2013; ONS, 2023).

Birmingham, for its speed, degree and scale of diversity, has been a place where various integration and equality projects and programmes are launched by different levels of actors. As a "testing ground", the city's integration measures have drawn attention from the British government and other cities (Phillimore and Goodson, 2008; Wilson, 2015, p.587). Following the enactment of *the 1976 Race Relations Act* and two riots[15] in the first half of the 1980s, BCC started taking action to address racism and discrimination experienced by Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities (brap, 2016). With the aim to work with local ethnic- and faith-based communities, BCC in the early 1990s established the Standing Consultative Forum through which the assigned Umbrella Groups represented their views; the structure, however, came to be criticised for

[15] The two riots took place in Handsworth in 1981 and 1985 as a result of racial tension and discrimination (Bloomfield, 2019).

homogenising communities and triggering inter-group competition and disbanded in 1999 (Smith and Stephenson, 2005). Along with the nation's shift towards the community cohesion narrative, BCC published the *Community Cohesion Strategy* (hereafter CC Strategy) in 2006, although the city still maintained the multiculturalist approach in their projects and activities until after a couple of years (Scuzzarello, 2010). The latest CC Strategy was released in 2018 in which the city aims to create "a city of equal opportunity, where everyone is able to achieve their aspirations, regardless of where they live or grow up" (BCC, 2018b, p.5). The strategy acknowledges the city's diverse population as a strength in achieving community cohesion and defines its target:

> Birmingham is a welcoming city, and we are proud of our diversity of cultures, people, and communities. It is home to 1.15 million people, which includes people from more than 200 countries who have made Birmingham their home, and is one of the most diverse cities in the UK. When we talk about community cohesion, we are not just talking about new communities or arrivals. We are talking about how all people of different social backgrounds, ethnicities, faiths, and generations can interact with and relate to each other in a positive way. (BCC, 2018b, p.8)

Furthermore, Birmingham became a City of Sanctuary in 2015 and has committed to welcoming refugees and asylum seekers. The city renewed its CoS policy statement in 2018 to include migrants who are not refugees or asylum seekers. This was motivated by Brexit, which would "affect the perceived and actual status of migrants residing and working in, as well as visiting Birmingham" (BCC, 2018a, p.3). The city's inclusion of these migrant groups further enhanced the mission of CoS to safeguard those whose status is

affected by the national- and transnational-level citizenship frameworks. Rather than just providing sanctuary, the new policy statement further aims to promote integration of people with NRPF who cannot access public services, including welfare benefits and social housing.

The city's recent practices also include MiFriendly Cities, a three-year project across Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton, which was led on the regional level and explored innovative approaches for better integration of migrants, completed in 2021. Furthermore, the city has started the MILE (Migrant Integration through Locally Designed Experiences) project to develop local integration strategies in collaboration with cities across Europe. These engagements demonstrate the city's commitment to creating integration initiatives and collaborating with other local areas. As the city population has increased and diversified, the focus on race relations and multiculturalism for long-standing communities, especially from Commonwealth nations, seems to have shifted to integration of newly arrived migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. While this shift itself seems somewhat similar to that of Osaka, Birmingham still emphasises its attention to long-standing communities as ethnic minorities rather than as migrants. Further analysis of the city's integration strategy and interviews of policymakers are presented in Chapters 5 and 6.

2.4 Summary and conclusion

In this chapter I have provided post-war historical and political contexts of migration to Japan and the UK, as well as Osaka and Birmingham, to feed our understanding of migration and integration realities that underlie the following chapters on city-level migrant

integration strategies. The following subsections briefly summarise national- and city-level similarities and differences.

2.4.1 Japan and the UK

The passage of a series of legislations highlighted in this chapter signifies the two countries' attempts to switch the migration influx on and off (see Anderson, 2007). The main trigger of such political decisions is the domestic labour market. Immigration control measures have been utilised to secure cheap labour from abroad to tackle domestic shortages while limiting the entry of migrants with particular profiles (e.g. Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004; de Haas et al., 2019). Whether successful or not, the countries have aimed to control the flows of particular groups of migrants, and understanding these trends would pose a refined insight into national- and local-level integration policies and practices that the following chapters will refer to.

Table 2-1 Summary of immigration and integration measures in Japan and the UK

	Japan	**UK**
Migrant population (E-Stat, 2021b; ONS, 2022)	2.7 million (non-Japanese nationals)	10 million (foreign-born)
Percentage (E-Stat, 2021b; SBJ, 2021; ONS, 2022)	2.2%	16.8%
Immigration policy characteristics	No immigration policy	Hostile environment
Main immigration policy targets	Chinese and Korean colonial subjects (post-war – 1991)	British subjects mainly from the Caribbean, West

	Ethnic Japanese; technical interns; international students (1990s – 2000s) High- and low-skilled workers (2010s onwards)	Africa and South Asia (post-war – 1988) European guest workers (post-war – 1951); EU citizens (1993 – 2020) Undocumented migrants and asylum seekers (1990s onwards) High-skilled workers (2000s onwards)
Refugee success rate and number of positive decisions (ISAJ, 2022c; Walsh, 2022)	3%; 74	72%; 13,147
Resettled refugees (ISAJ, 2022c; GOV.UK, 2023c)	20	18,345
Grants of national citizenship (GOV.UK, 2023b; MOJ, 2023)	Around 10,000 every year	100,000 to 200,000 every year
MIPEX score (Solano and Huddleston, 2020)	35th; "immigration without integration"	20th; "temporary integration"
Integration policy characteristics	*Tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) No national integration policy Reliance on local authorities	Integration and community cohesion No national integration policy Reliance on local authorities Separate refugee integration guidelines

The table above (**Table 2-1**) summarises the main policy characteristics and migration data of the two countries. The two countries display very different migration landscapes. First, differences in the size and scale of migration, including that of migrants and refugees, are apparent. Simply put, there are many more migrants and refugees in the UK, making up a considerably large part of the entire population and contributing to its diversification. In terms of policy development, it can be said that their immigration policies have been contrasting to some extent. While the British immigration regime had included Commonwealth nationals as British subjects and granted legal status and rights for a certain period, the Japanese government had classified colonial subjects as non-Japanese and treated them as such. Recent contrasting policy developments include their COVID-19 measures that led Japan to close its borders to migrants completely while the UK border remained relatively open. Moreover, while Japan finally opened its front door to low-skilled migrants for the first time, the UK closed one of the main immigration channels with the EU and further tightened immigration control.

As such, one may find the two countries quite different from each other. However, although the size and history of migration are distinct to a great extent, Japanese and British contexts offer interesting factors for comparison. Importantly, they both have a colonial past, and their colonial ties have significantly shaped their demographics and immigration measures. Both countries have attempted to fill a labour scarcity by hosting migrants from neighbouring or closely connected countries; Japan has utilised side-doors, and the UK has benefited from the Commonwealth and intra-EU mobility. While the necessity of low- and middle-skilled workers has been pointed out, they rather encourage entry of high-skilled migrants through PBS. Furthermore, their approaches towards

refugees focus on reinforcing resettlement schemes rather than on granting asylum. Although it may be expressed differently, the nations' recent attitudes towards immigration suggest convergence rather than divergence in that they have applied a selective immigration approach.

Moreover, what underlies their immigration policymaking is the insular nation-state ideology that respectively reveres 'Japaneseness' and 'Englishness' and racialises migrants as 'outsiders'. Japan has tried to maintain such national identity by encouraging the 'return' of ethnic Japanese from South America and border restrictions on visa holders in the initial phase of the pandemic. The country's denial of 'immigration policy' manifests this idea. On the other hand, aiming to control the flow of non-white Commonwealth nationals and closing immigration channels for low-skilled migrant workers, British immigration measures have also been racialised. As the country's immigration policy is often constructed based on its nation-state ideology, it is no surprise that we observe the 'imagined community' in their immigration regimes (Anderson, 2006). Japan's denial of immigration and the UK's creation of a hostile environment demonstrate the idea.

In addition, the two countries seem to be in a similar situation when it comes to integration. They do not offer an official integration policy but have published several guidelines targeting particular migrant groups. It is local authorities that bear the responsibility for ensuring comprehensive integration with the limited resources available. As will be shown later, this has indeed strengthened the role of local authorities and civil society, whose coordination and interplays highlight the significance of exploring the multi-scalar dynamics of integration and making of urban citizenship. With reluctant and selective

immigration policies and decentralised integration measures, the two countries therefore share some significant similarities that make the comparative research between them valuable, although extra consideration must be paid to understanding different policy contexts between the two.

Finally, shifting the focus onto the future prospect, the significance of migration weighs equal to the two countries. Both countries are facing severe labour and skill shortages that have been exacerbated by the pandemic, and immigration policy remains the key (Phillimore et al., 2021); their domestic economy cannot sustain itself without having migrants in the country and encouraging them to settle in. In light of this, local authorities, especially ones with large and diverse migrant populations, are worth examining inasmuch as they have accumulated experiences with ‘old’ and ‘new’ migrants, refugees and asylum seekers while collaborating with civil society and dealing with the changing national regime.

2.4.2 Osaka and Birmingham

Shifting our focus to the local level, Osaka and Birmingham provide an interesting migration landscape as case cities. **Table 2-2** displays profiles of the cities; from the Table, it is evident that there is a considerable demographic gap between the two, as Birmingham embraces almost twice the size of the migrant population while the total population of Osaka is twofold. The ruling political party for each city also contrasts. However, despite some highlighting differences, Osaka and Birmingham share some noteworthy characteristics.

Table 2-2 Summary of city profiles of Osaka and Birmingham

	Osaka	**Birmingham**
Total population (ONS, 2021; Osaka City, 2023c)	2,752,412	1,152,000
Migrant population (ONS, 2021; Osaka City, 2023b)	144,123 (non-Japanese)	286,000 (foreign-born)
Percentage (ONS, 2021; Osaka City, 2023b)	5.2%	24.8%
Main migrant nationality (Osaka City, 2022d; ONS, 2023)	Korea; China; Vietnam	Pakistan; India; Bangladesh
Majority of the council	*Osaka Ishin no Kai* (right-wing populist)	Labour Party (centre-left)

Firstly, both cities are known as the country's 'second city', and their demographic and economic strengths have attracted migrants moving into the city, resulting in a high percentage of the migrant population. The percentage of the migrant population in the two cities is higher than the one at the national level. The strong presence of migrants has indeed motivated both cities to take initiatives to address migrants' demands and promote their integration. This was further strengthened by another common aspect of Osaka and Birmingham, which have been home to a large number of former colonial subjects. *Zainichi* Koreans in Osaka and Commonwealth nationals in Birmingham have established long-standing communities and actively engaged with the city's policymaking processes to push migrant integration from the bottom up. Meanwhile, the two cities have witnessed the rapid increase and diversification of the migrant population in the city in the past 20 years. Newly arrived migrants are mainly from neighbouring countries, which made Osaka and Birmingham one of the first local areas to experience

(super)diversification in their respective countries. This suggests the possible influence over the city's integration-related policies and practices that had long focused on the long-standing communities. Finally, as urban localities, the two cities possess autonomy and influence to a certain extent that has allowed them to design and implement integration measures, although Birmingham has been affected by the government's austerity programme.

2.4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has taken a closer look at migration and integration policy flows in Japan and the UK, as well as Osaka and Birmingham. While this study focuses on the city-level integration strategy and urban citizenship, I have dedicated a large part of the chapter to establishing the national contexts of migration and integration inasmuch as local-level policies and practices are constantly influenced by the national-level legal and political directions (Alexander, 2007; Emilsson, 2015). As explained in the context of multi-level and multi-scalar governance of integration in the following chapter, one can fully comprehend and interpret the local-level policies by understanding the national contexts and policy backgrounds. Furthermore, looking at similar cities in relatively distinct national settings will better reveal the fluid relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy. As touched upon in Chapter 1, this will help address methodological nationalism by avoiding over-characterisation of local features of Osaka and Birmingham associating excessively with their national features (Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). In this sense, selecting Osaka and Birmingham as case cities not only highlights convergence and divergence across two seemingly opposite countries but also offers opportunities to apply

our understanding of urban citizenship and integration strategy to the contexts of other cities that will witness diversification of the population in the future.

For this study I employ the term ‘integration’ to signify policy agendas around migrants’ settlement and inclusion rather than as a particular concept that articulates specific theorisation about those matters. Looking at integration-related policies and approaches of Japan and the UK as well as Osaka and Birmingham, it can be said that there is no agreed definition of integration in sociological and political discussions in those contexts. Bennett contends that:

> Like other concepts, integration is an empty or floating signifier. It is a concept that absorbs – rather than emit – meaning, the word itself possessing zero symbolic value, but rather absorbing meanings and symbolism from its users (Mehlman 1972). (Bennett, 2018, p.49)

For this study, both national and local settings exhibit some policy developments and practices that may not necessarily employ the word ‘integration’. One should be aware that, strictly speaking, they have had distinct conceptual, historical, political and institutional developments that have brought about current policy frameworks, which could diverge from the theoretical and philosophical premise of ‘integration’ that has been discussed so far. Moreover, depending on the political context, timing, departments and levels of authority, the intention and approach of ‘integration’ may be different. While paying heed to such differences, this study aims to explore the link between urban citizenship and the city’s approaches to migrant integration rather than to scrutinise the

underlying configuration of integration. A rather wider definition of integration given by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016b) introduced in Chapter 1 corresponds with the aim of this study; therefore, 'integration' is used rather as an umbrella concept to examine policies that help to explore urban citizenship for migrants living in the city. Contexts set out in this chapter help to connect theories of urban citizenship and integration strategy in the following chapter and develop into empirical research.

CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUALISING URBAN CITIZENSHIP

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I explain the rationale behind my theorisation of urban citizenship and integration, on which this study is based. As Chapter 1 has briefly touched upon, citizenship is a contested idea that poses multi-fold complexities that we cannot disregard (Lessard-Phillips and Nagai, 2021). Although this study looks explicitly at urban citizenship for migrants, urban citizenship itself is not a concept designed only for migrants. It acknowledges and encompasses all urban citizens based on several factors, such as their residence and acts.[16] Yet, the city's measures towards migrants, who do not necessarily possess formal citizenship of the host country, can demonstrate the extent of urban citizenship in the most palpable way.

Urban citizenship has been theorised and investigated by many; some have looked at the city's governance and specific policies (Varsanyi, 2006; Gebhardt, 2016) and the city's positionality within the global networks (Sassen, 2002). Others have examined grassroots activism and mobilisation of urban citizens (McNevin, 2012) and their everyday practices (Holm and Lebuhn, 2020). However, these approaches to urban citizenship reflect only partial realities; in fact, it seems that urban citizenship is constructed and operated at multiple scales with interplays of institutional, collective and individual dynamics (Staeheli, 2003; Çağlar and Glick Schiller, 2018; Ataç and Schilliger, 2022). With this regard, this study brings together the city's measures that assist settlement of migrant residents as

[16] Literature, for example, discusses urban citizenship for LGBTQ communities (Grundy and Smith, 2005), women's rights (Wekerle, 2000) and non-migrant urban citizens' mobilisation (Gillespie and Nguyen, 2019).

the city's integration strategy and examines the relationship between integration strategy and urban citizenship both from policy documents and standpoints of policymakers and local actors. Nonetheless, this is not to fall into the "local trap" and romanticise the urban space as the absolute place for citizenship (Purcell, 2006, p.1921). It rather regards the city as an urban scale that is "not simply seen as nested, subordinated, and bounded within the national but rather as contested, constructed, and dynamically changing, including its relationship to the national scale" (Fauser, 2019, p.606) and aims to capture processes and multi-directional interrelations of different actors across various scales.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, I call the city's policies and practices that (in)explicitly target and include migrant residents as an 'integration strategy' to avoid confusion with 'integration policies' that the city may officially issue. Formulating policies and practices as a 'strategy' also allows me to draw attention not only to policy documents but also to ongoing dynamics and interplays of stakeholders behind the policymaking process. While structures and functions of multi-level governance of integration have been examined by many (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Scholten, 2013; Zapata-Barrero and Barker, 2014), it has been pointed out that the concept may limit researchers' opportunities to comprehensively study spatial implications of hierarchical and vertical relations and interactions of institutional and non-institutional actors that the word 'governance' enfolds. In line with the recently emerging literature (Aiden, 2019; Komai, 2023), this study, therefore, utilises the idea of 'scales' to comprehend interplays of different actors that are not necessarily in straightforward relations. As I discuss in detail in this chapter, this 'multi-scalar governance' idea also accords with processes of urban citizenship that extend to various scales. Similar to urban citizenship, the concept of integration and its policy

application hold multi-dimensional, multi-directional complexities and involve various policy actors. Rather than mixing up the two concepts of integration strategy and urban citizenship, this study attempts to explore intersections of citizenship and integration that are intricate (see Barbulescu et al., 2023a). In addition, by taking into account the city's response during the pandemic, this study reveals how urban citizenship and integration strategy have been shaped and changed in times of emergency. There are yet few studies that capture urban citizenship during the pandemic, and considering how urban citizenship has changed (or not) through the city's integration approach will provide a fresh insight into urban citizenship scholarship.

This chapter consists of five main parts. I first delve into the dimensions of urban citizenship, breaking down into status, rights and identity. The second part expounds in detail different approaches to urban citizenship that have been explored by academics theoretically and empirically and shows that urban citizenship rather enfolds all the approaches across various scales. I then discuss the link between urban citizenship and integration by suggesting a multi-scalar perspective. Based on this multi-scalar configuration of integration strategy and urban citizenship, I identify important stakeholders that range from individuals, groups to institutions, who play (in)direct roles in shaping the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy. The following part draws on emerging literature on citizenship and the pandemic and considers it in the urban context. The conclusion section encapsulates these points as a conceptual framework for this study.

3.2 Dimensions of urban citizenship

In order to study citizenship, it is essential to understand what constitutes citizenship. As touched upon in Chapter 1, there are many ways to construe citizenship, and a number of scholars have explored its various dimensions (Shachar et al., 2017). Amongst them, Joppke (2007, 2010) refines citizenship by conceptualising it into three dimensions: status, rights and identity. According to him, status denotes "formal state membership and the rules of access to it"; rights represent "the formal capacities and immunities connected with such status"; and identity refers to "the behavioral aspects of individuals acting and conceiving of themselves as members of a collectivity, classically the nation, or the normative conceptions of such behavior imputed by the state" (Joppke, 2007, p.38). Status focuses on the link between the individual and the state and one's way to obtain citizenship. Status allows one to exercise their rights, which shape one's identity as a member of the state and the state's conceptions. The three dimensions of citizenship are hence not mutually exclusive but interconnected (see Coutin, 1999). While Joppke's conceptualisation is centred on state-based citizenship, these dimensions are navigated through dynamics at different scales, especially in the transnational context. Therefore, it can be supposed that these dimensions are overlapping and multi-scalar (see Staeheli, 2003) and can be applied to transnational or subnational spheres of citizenship, including urban citizenship theories. Indeed, Gebhardt's (2016) study has analysed diversity policies in Barcelona in detail to scrutinise urban citizenship status, rights and identity and shown its validity. Following Joppke's conceptualisation and Gebhardt's application, I take a closer look at these three dimensions below.

3.2.1 Status

In a strict sense, citizenship as status is understood as a legal entitlement of membership based upon which one's civil and political rights and access to various services are defined. This formal mode of citizenship is usually outlined in the country's citizenship law and fundamentally distinguishes citizens from foreign nationals. There are two main routes through which individuals obtain formal citizenship of a country: by birth or by naturalisation. While entitlement of citizenship is normally through either or a mix of the two principles of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, one's acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation usually requires one's residence in the host country for a certain period of time and, therefore, partially follows *jus domicile*[17] (principle of residence) (Hammar, 1990).[18] At any rate, these requirements for legal citizenship do not merely grant citizens access to the territory within which a wide range of rights is ensured but also contribute to the image of 'nationhood' and 'national identity' of the country. One's formal citizenship is indeed conflated with one's nationality, "implying membership both in a political community and in a collective identity" (Bloemraad, 2000, p.12). Citizenship functions as an instrument to determine one's membership and belonging to the nation and exercise sovereignty over the territory and its political subjects. According to Brubaker (1992, p.182), formal citizenship, therefore, "is a *politics of identity*, not a *politics of interest*", and "[t]he central question is not 'who *gets* what?' but rather 'who *is* what?'" (italics original).

[17] It is also spelled as *jus domicili* or *jus domicilii* (Bauder, 2014).
[18] Some countries combine the three principles to grant citizenship to children when they are born, depending on their parents' residency status (Bauder, 2014).

In this sense, formal citizenship essentially is “internally inclusive and externally exclusive” and enhances the nation-state characteristics of the country (Brubaker, 1992, p.72).

However, Joppke argues that such identity politics of citizenship has declined with the liberalisation of access to citizenship: “Considering the removal of ethnic, racial, and cultural restrictions, citizenship is no longer exempt from the sociological commonplace that people have multiple identities, which are already forced upon them by the process of functional differentiation” (Joppke, 2007, p.40). Indeed, outside the legal boundary of citizenship status, citizenship as status takes a slightly different shape, although one’s legal status as a (non)citizen remains a significant determinant (Bosniak, 1999). One of the most notable examples is ‘EU citizenship’, which has treated all nationals of EU member states as ‘EU citizens’ and granted access to mobility, economic activities and a welfare system, signalling the post-national form of membership (Soysal, 1994). On the other hand, at the local level, while a locality-based registry system is not common everywhere, one’s formal or informal membership to the local realm is determined mainly by one’s residency in the area and often demonstrated in a substantive form of rights and service provision (Blank, 2007; Bauder, 2014). Later in this chapter, I further explain how urban citizenship as status can be formulated based on the principle of residency. Anyhow, status accounts for the core part of citizenship since the concept of citizenship itself signifies one’s granted or denied membership into a community or a state:

> Whatever the substantive content of citizenship might be, by defining a certain sphere of human activity as a sphere of citizenship, one is making a certain theoretical and practical implication: the terms citizenship transforms groups and

individuals into “members” who have rights, or who are “participants” in some kind of a group (be it political, social, cultural, etc.). (Blank, 2007, p.451)

3.2.2 Rights

Rights are a substantial aspect of citizenship, as theorised by Marshall (1950), whose emphasis on civil, political and social rights has greatly influenced citizenship theories. Civil rights concern one’s rights that are “necessary for individual freedom”, while political rights refer to one’s political participation (Marshall, 1950, p.10). By possessing social rights, one is able to receive a wide range of services for welfare and security. Despite a range of criticism Marshall’s work has received, such as his misconceptualisation of the British state system (see Stewart, 1995), this rights-based dimension of citizenship has come to be regarded as an integral aspect: “citizenship requires the possession of rights, and those who possess the rights are usually presumed thereby to enjoy citizenship” (Bosniak, 1999, p.464). Based on this line of thinking, citizenship as rights has extended to include further elements. Joppke (2007, p.42) highlights two points: “the extension of citizenship rights to non-citizens” and “the creation or strengthening of minority rights”. The former refers to a wide range of (stratified) rights that non-citizens of the country are entitled to, such as benefits and pensions. The latter development is articulated as anti-discrimination legislation and protection of minority rights, although such recognition from the state is often competitive.

Such development of citizenship as rights has been influenced by the universal principle of human rights and transnational regimes and has further reinforced the substantive

aspect of citizenship (see Soysal, 1994). Holston and Appadurai observe that citizenship status is no longer a prerequisite for citizenship rights:

> although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship. (Holston and Appadurai, 1999, p.4)

This unlocks the potential of urban citizenship rights for those who do not possess formal citizenship of the host country. In the context of urban citizenship, the concept of citizenship as rights is partially effective in providing rights and ensuring equal treatment when the local authority recognises them as de facto residents. Localities are one of the most effective agencies for facilitating service provision and accommodating the needs of local residents, which enhances the substantive aspect of citizenship (Hammar, 1990; Gebhardt, 2016). This enables one to be recognised as a member of a community and, hence, an urban citizen (Bosniak, 1999; Holston and Appadurai, 1999).

3.2.3 Identity

Citizenship as identity can be broken down into “the actual views held by ordinary people” and “official views propagated by the state” (Joppke, 2007, p.44), respectively asking whether one “feel[s] part of society” and whether one is “accepted as a member of society” (Painter, 2002, p.95). Citizenship as identity therefore has often referred to nationalism, patriotism and citizens’ national identity (Bosniak, 1999). Anderson (1983; 2006) has

theorised a nation as an 'imagined community', defining it as: "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2006, p.6). Within this imagined community, citizenship as identity functions as a symbolic instrument insofar as one's inadequate national identity can hinder them from receiving formal citizenship rights even if they are granted formal status (Painter, 2002). In this sense, identity constitutes an important part in citizenship and is tightly connected with citizenship as status that draws a border of this imagined community.

However, Joppke argues that although the nation-state imposes national identity on its citizens through formal membership, such a strategy is no longer practical. In a globalised, pluralistic society, where the population is more diverse and dual citizenship is allowed in many settings, one's status and rights are not strictly bound by the nation, ensuring various modes of citizenship identity. EU citizenship, global citizenship and transnational communities of migrants can serve as examples of such citizenship identity that enhances one's identity that is "neither here nor there" (Portes, 1996, p.77; Bosniak, 1999). While citizenship tests and ceremonies demonstrate the nations' attempt to reunify the community through identity politics, its effectiveness is yet limited (Joppke, 2007, p.45). In the urban realm, it has been shown that individuals tend to form attachments and identification with their city of residence rather than with the nation (Gebhardt, 2016). Citizenship as identity is "people's collective experience of themselves" (Bosniak, 1999, p.479), and people's everyday experiences in the city can be an important source both for urban citizens and urban polity to envision urban belonging, which in return shapes the way in which urban citizenship status and rights function.

3.2.4 A further consideration of dimensions of urban citizenship

It is notable that authors such as Brubaker (1992) and Bosniak (1999) add a fourth dimension: political participation. This theorisation follows Rousseau's (1712–1778) idea of 'active citizen' and claims that one's political activity at the site of citizenship will allow oneself to be "free in a collective form" (Bosniak, 1999, p.472). It also reminds us of a republican model of citizenship that emphasises the political activity of members as a citizenship requirement (Miller, 1999, 2000). Nonetheless, while maintaining that political participation matters to a great extent to citizenship, Joppke (2010) lists three reasons why he has omitted political participation. First, in the nation-state context, migrants' limited access to political rights has remained unchanged. Second, one's political participation can be less significant than the other three dimensions of citizenship, which are more basic. Third, citizenship of "passive rights-holding" and that of "active participation in the political community" hold distinct nature: "What we saw emerging on the status-rights-identity canvas is a citizenship light: easy to access, with rights (and few obligations) that do not sharply distinguish citizens from certain aliens, and capped by thin identities" (Joppke, 2010, p.147).

In the urban context, looking at citizenship as a process, it seems that political participation can be regarded rather as one of the approaches interwoven into the other three dimensions of citizenship (Gebhardt, 2016). Political rights significantly shape citizens' lives and the collective political community, and (non)citizens can actively take part in civil society that exercises their power across different scales (Bosniak, 1999). However, defining it as another dimension of citizenship would impose participation as an obligation and demand individuals to become active citizens, which can be a demanding

commitment (see Plyushteva, 2009). The other three dimensions are definitive elements of citizenship that shape one's membership to the polity, whereas the political activity of citizens heavily hinges upon their commitment. Furthermore, active citizens often participate in politics in order to achieve their citizenship status, rights, or identity. As such, for this study I treat political activity not as a citizenship dimension but as a means to demand and activate the other three dimensions of citizenship.

To recapitulate, urban citizenship comprises three dimensions that are interconnected: status, rights and identity. In line with Joppke (2007, 2010), who has reiterated the three dimensions, and Gebhardt (2016), whose work on urban citizenship and local policies has corroborated the practicality of the three dimensions in the urban context, I use this framework to scrutinise how urban citizenship is articulated in the city's integration strategy. These three dimensions hold significance in migration and integration literature as well. States have controlled migrants' access to status and rights by endorsing migrants' adherence to the national identity (Kofman, 2005). Migrants' identity is the outcome of "self-representation and social categorization" and therefore affects one's citizenship qualifications, which in turn shapes their identity formation (La Barbera, 2015, p.9). The three dimensions of citizenship are also linked to the main domains of integration, such as civil, political, socioeconomic, cultural and spatial domains. Inasmuch as urban citizenship is not directly employed in the integration strategy of Osaka and Birmingham, this framework of three dimensions can be a useful tool to examine urban citizenship.

3.3 Approaches to urban citizenship

In this section I expound on four approaches through which different stakeholders articulate urban citizenship by drawing empirical findings from urban citizenship studies. These approaches include the use of transnational networks and the domicile principle of citizenship that can be utilised to envision urban citizenship. Next, I discuss urban citizenship from the perspective of 'acts' and 'practices', approaches that can be regarded as 'bottom-up'. As discussed later, these approaches are not mutually exclusive. Inasmuch as we understand urban citizenship as a process, these approaches overlap and influence each other and together shape the city's urban citizenship. In that sense, in the following section, I argue that urban citizenship is shaped through interplays of different dynamics in that stakeholders are involved at multiple scales. Whereas some have argued that urban citizenship is an unrealistic concept (Kostakopoulou, 2008), different approaches to urban citizenship described below emphasise its practicality. It also helps me to map important stakeholders who are involved in designing and implementing integration strategy in the context of urban citizenship, which I introduce later in this chapter.

3.3.1 Urban citizenship through transnational networks

The first approach to urban citizenship is through situating a city and citizenship in a transnational or cosmopolitan context based on the international human rights regime and universal moral values (Isin, 1997; Sassen, 2001). Sassen (2001, 2002, 2004), for instance, through her works on the global city, maintains that when the city is closely connected to the global economy, it can be "reconfigured as a partly denationalized space that enables a partial reinvention of citizenship" (Sassen, 2002, p.6). While revealing

inequalities and power dynamics of the city, globalisation brings an opportunity to the city and its residents to re-imagine the urban community, belonging, and identity. Müller (2011, p.3416) suggests that such an idea leads the articulation of cosmopolitanism to "urban alchemy" – "the belief that diverse and divided populations of urban dwellers may potentially be transformed into one harmonious community of cosmopolitan citizens". This does not, however, depreciate or minimise the role of the city in offering rights and membership to its residents at the local level. Various scholars rather believe that this universal notion of citizenship can encourage migrants to shape urban citizenship in "spatial and territorial forms" that serve local purposes (Wekerle, 2000, p.210): "the global can only exist in terms of the local" (Mazlish, 2005, p.95).

Indeed, albeit relatively few, case studies have demonstrated the links between the city and the global networks and identities, such as the one led by Sassen (2001), who theorised New York, London, and Tokyo as global cities. For instance, studies have found that one can engage in re-making of the cosmopolitan identity of the city by participating in social activities and discourses (Assaf, 2020). Yet, in practice, the cosmopolitan approach to urban citizenship appears to be regarded as unrealistic and uneven. Young et al. (2006), by examining the case of Manchester, identify the ways in which cosmopolitanism can be operationalised in urban governance and how the concept can produce both inclusive and exclusive urban communities. Müller (2011, p.3430), furthermore, investigates urban cosmopolitanism in London and Amsterdam and concludes that the cosmopolitan approach to urban identity can regard all city residents as equal urban citizens, although such urban identity is constantly contested by "the everyday workings of power and national, ethnic and religious identities". On the other

hand, researchers have outlined the transnational aspect of urban citizenship-making with an emphasis on migrants' mobility and their ties to their home country. Smith and Guarnizo (2009) draw examples of the Mexican regime that has proactively sent their nationals abroad and helped them maintain the transnational link. In this context, localities in which migrants settle are situated within the complex transnational networks that link their home country and conational communities in other countries. Transnational civil society organisations, moreover, often assume local roles in delivering services and granting migrants social rights.

3.3.2 Urban citizenship through residency and presence

Another approach involves local authorities granting residents a local membership through their residency or presence. A commonly used principle is *jus domicile*, the principle of residence. Recognising membership through residency, this principle allows one to obtain citizenship by residing in the territory without considering his or her place of birth or ancestry. In contrast to the citizenship law that defines formal citizenship, local authorities' recognition of residents and service provision depends on one's residence and therefore follows *jus domicile* (Bauböck, 2003). According to Bauder (2014, p.93), while the other two principles (*jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*) are "rendering citizenship inaccessible to persons born to the 'wrong' parents or in the 'wrong' territory", the *jus domicile* principle "accommodates the mobility of people between communities and territories". Indeed, while *jus domicile* as a principle is highly territorial, it allows mobile populations, like migrants, to access citizenship by being residents (Bauder, 2014). As such, *jus domicile* is an essential 'logic' to urban citizenship, especially for migrants; it allows movements of residents coming in and out of the city and grants citizenship without

concerning one's legal status that hinges upon one's place of birth or bloodline (Bauböck, 2003; Blank, 2007).

However, at the same time, this framework of urban citizenship can remind us of the territorial nature of citizenship. Like nation-state citizenship, urban citizenship, by defining one's belonging through one's residence in the urban territory, draws a border and fundamentally separates those who possess urban citizenship and those who do not. For Bosniak, this can be overcome by ethically using territoriality that allows the extension of rights and recognition to all individuals through their presence:

> once someone is in the geographical territory of the state, that person must, for most purposes, be treated as fully *in*. The fact of a person's 'hereness' itself triggers the extension of extensive rights and recognition. (Bosniak, 2007, p.391, italics original)

In theory, this universalist approach to territoriality indeed ensures one's urban citizenship merely through presence while highlighting the existing dominant influence of the territorial nature of a political community.

Kostakopoulou (2008) outlines three main challenges to territorial citizenship, and ethical territoriality helps to address the first two points with regard to residents' loyalty to the political community and seemingly contrasting ideas of territorial membership and transnational mobility. Since "the territorial conception of rights for immigrants treats a person's geographical presence itself as a sufficient basis for core aspects of membership"

(Bosniak, 2007, p.391), residents' commitment to the community does not count as a source of citizenship. Furthermore, as the current political system and the way citizenship is articulated are highly territorial, envisioning citizenship through territoriality can be a realistic approach (Austin and Bauder, 2012; Bauder, 2014). In practice, however, realising territorial citizenship that is ethical and inclusive may not be easy; Kostakopoulou's (2008, p.125) third point is that "anational citizenship" is "a far-fetched utopia and, as such, it is unlikely to be empirically feasible". Yet, through empirical examinations, scholars have shown examples of such membership and identified the city as an effective place to do so. Some localities adopt the locality-based registration system; the *padrón* system, for instance, allows Spanish states to provide local membership to residents in the territory by allowing undocumented migrants to sign up without a residence permit. This example shows that, based on the local register system, the city is able to grant membership and provide basic rights and services regardless of residents' legal status (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014; Gebhardt, 2016). There have also been some initiatives led by local authorities that diverge from the national government and realise local-level territorial membership. Varsanyi (2006, 2007) illustrates how local authorities in some states in the United States recognise the presence of undocumented migrants and enable them to live as local citizens. In some states, undocumented migrants are allowed to vote, open a bank account, obtain a driver's license or qualify as in-state students. The consular ID issued by the Mexican government is also accepted as a valid form of identification by some localities. She observes that, whether undocumented or not, migrants are de facto members of the community, and localities are "acknowledging the de facto legitimacy of that person's presence in the community,

and upholding his or her 'local citizenship' or 'membership'" under *jus domicile* standards (Varsanyi, 2007, p.312). Furthermore, by analysing sanctuary-city policies and movements across the US, UK and Canada, Bauder (2017) suggests that sanctuary cities challenge national sovereignty by employing the *jus domicile* principle to welcome any individuals and regard them as de facto residents regardless of their status. These practices of the cities have, albeit partially, shown that urban citizenship can be manifested through the domicile principle and territoriality.

Nonetheless, this 'top-down' approach to urban citizenship presents some pitfalls; inasmuch as the current nation-state setting is in effect and urban citizenship places weight on the territorial logic, the city and urban citizenship cannot avoid the "nation-state's power of exclusion" (Bosniak, 2007, p.397). One's rights and recognition within the city territory are often determined by one's legal status. Moreover, even though the city has the administrative capacity to embrace all residents, the city can deliberately apply exclusionary urban membership. By drawing an example of local offices in Italy posing additional requirements for registration and refusing to serve migrant residents, Gargiulo and Piccoli (2020) are convinced that the cities can be a "mean" entity. According to them, urban citizenship can be used in two ways: as a rhetorical tool of propaganda and as a tool of polity-building. Whilst the former sees migrants as security threats, the latter demarcates an imagined border between urban citizens and noncitizens and stratifies urban citizenship (Gargiulo and Piccoli, 2020, p.32). This approach to urban citizenship entails the political imaginary of the authority, oftentimes the city government. While this can draw distinctive layers of urban status, rights and identity, studies have

shown that such urban citizenship can be contested by acts and practices of urban residents, as explained below.

3.3.3 Urban citizenship through acts

Another approach to urban citizenship is through (non)citizens' mobilisation. This approach lays emphasis on the process through which one engages with claims-making and creates "new sources of citizenship rights and corresponding forms of self-rule" (Holston and Appadurai, 1999, p.12). The bottom-up approach to citizenship is often understood as 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen, 2008b), 'insurgent citizenship' (Holston, 2008) or 'citizenship from below' (Nyers and Rygiel, 2012). Viewed in this way, citizenship is claimed and attained through the actions of individual or collective agents, not based on one's status or profile. While the traditional citizenship configuration regards citizens as a mere recipient of the privilege, the bottom-up approach to citizenship activates one's individual and collective political subjectivity and lets one become a "doer" of citizenship (Isin and Nielsen, 2008b, p.2). This logic allows those who do not possess formal citizenship to access substantive citizenship and become de facto citizens.

Subscribing to this citizenship approach, Holston (2001, p.326) maintains that urban citizenship can be produced when 1) "the city is the primary political community"; 2) "urban residence is the criterion of membership and the basis of political mobilization"; and 3) "right-claims addressing urban experience and related civic performances are the substance of citizenship". In order to formulate the city as a political community and enable the democratic mode of citizenship to manifest, the right to the city plays a crucial role (Holston, 2001). Originally developed by Lefebvre (1968, 1996) in 1968, the concept

of the right to the city has attracted various interpretations. Purcell (2002, 2014), for example, believes that the concept helps to formulate the city as a polity that manifests residents' rights, status and participation and challenges nation-state citizenship. While this territorial view aligns with the theoretical developments around citizenship through presence described in the section above (Bauder, 2016), it is rather seen as a radical version of the concept (Plyushteva, 2009; Purcell, 2014). The mainstream understanding of the right to the city has been refined by Harvey (2003, 2008), who, by highlighting the city as a place of urbanisation through individual and collective mobilisation, argues that:

> the right to the city… is not merely a right of access to what the property speculators and state planners define, but an active right to make the city different, to shape it more in accord with our heart's desire, and to re-make ourselves thereby in a different image. (Harvey, 2003, p.941)

This understanding of the concept regards the city as a place through which individual and collective claims for rights form urbanisation and produce political power. In this sense, urban citizenship overcomes the legal, political and institutional boundaries of the city. Through such urban struggles, individuals can "become active citizens, developing new sources of rights and new agendas of citizenship", and "the lived experience of cities becomes both the context and the substance of emergent forms of citizenship" (Holston, 2001, p.326). By attaining and exercising "the right to *be*—to be an integral part of the city" (Mitchell and Villanueva, 2010, p.671, italics original), the city's residents, regardless of formal status, become political subjects themselves and further engage with "a practice

of articulating, claiming and renewing group rights in and through the appropriation and creation of spaces in the city" (Isin, 2000b, pp.14–15).

Empirical studies have observed such mobilising and claims-making processes of urban migrants and captured their struggles. Since the right to the city draws on the relations between individuals and the urban space, empirical studies highlight (non)citizens' access to and use of public space and examine the process of political and social movements through which they claim rights and urban citizenship. This is often examined through migrant activism and migrants' participation in campaigns, protests, and demonstrations through which migrants claim collective rights and identity (McNevin, 2012; Raimondi, 2019). Moreover, migrants' right to the city is often associated with their right to housing (Weinstein and Ren, 2009; Nur and Sethman, 2017; Montagna and Grazioli, 2019) and their direct involvement with the city governance (Castañeda, 2012; Angelucci, 2019). Cultural events can also provide a space for migrants to claim urban space and make their social and cultural identities visible (Veronis, 2006).

In the Japanese context, Tanno (2019, p.15) asserts that, while "what is called citizenship in English is limited to Japanese nationals" from a legal perspective, migrants can have 'operational citizenship' through which they receive essential social services. A substantive form of citizenship that has developed in Japan through grassroots movements led by long-established *zainichi* Koreans (see Chapter 2) can be defined as "*ikeru shitizunshippu* (living citizenship)", that is "*directly*, historically given *within* a real, social life, *as* a real, social life itself" (Tanno, 2019, p.29, italics original). It is "living" in the sense that one's rights are determined based on the adversarial relations between the

state and social movements that are fluid; one's citizenship, therefore, hinges on their place of residence and its historical ties with such grassroots groups (Tanno, 2019).

At the same time, as scholars point out, one's claim of individual and collective rights in public space necessitates struggles and conflicts (Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Isin, 2000b). Given the uneven distribution of rights and status manifested by spatial, political, cultural and socioeconomic constructs, Joseph (2008, p.30) highlights three dimensions of urban space: "inscribed by boundaries and reflective of patterns of social difference and inequality"; "a site and object of struggle between social groups"; and "a vehicle for social reproduction through the logic of its universe". Through such struggles, one's social identities are formed. In the context of migrants in the city, this framework can be linked with Yiftachel's (2009, 2015) theorisation of 'gray space', which lies between the formal recognition and denial within the urban space. Gray space is marked by "partial and marginalized citizenship and the associated denial of a range of rights, capabilities, accessibilities and powers routinely available to full members of the polity" (Yiftachel, 2015, p.731). Hence, inequality in the urban space is what inspires mobilisation of actors of citizenship, whose struggles and conflicts amplify the uneven distribution of urban citizenship membership, rights and identity and define the urban as "a battlefield of rights and resources" (Brøgger, 2019, p.2978).

Whereas there are some successful cases of cooperation among migrants (e.g. Raimondi, 2019), the urban space has always been contested by political subjects and their citizenship claims, inasmuch as acts of citizenship and the right to the city are designed to "rupture social-historical patterns" (Isin and Nielsen, 2008b, p.2). In the words of

Plyushteva (2009, p.92), “the Right to the City of non-inhabitants acting in pursuit of their rights almost always overrides the entitlement to comfort, predictability and aesthetics of the inhabitants”. She further points out another challenge of fully embracing active citizenship; since this approach to citizenship is only possible through (non)citizens’ engagement with the socio-political process of urbanisation using public space, the right to the city “becomes one very difficult and time-consuming right to exercise”:

> In this vision, the only hope those urban dwellers previously deprived and marginalised, to begin to inhabit a just, accessible and enjoyable city is to roll up their sleeves and work very hard for it themselves, in person, on a regular basis, making space for the Right to the City in their holidays and working weeks. Thus, what might be seen as a ‘right to engage’ within the intellectual debate, is actually a highly-demanding second job, which not every citizen might aspire to. (Plyushteva, 2009, p.86)

Mobilisation constitutes a crucial part of activating urban citizenship. Nonetheless, this approach tends to place particular emphasis on the acts of urban citizens, which are not always the solution to claim and exercise their citizenship.

3.3.4 Urban citizenship through practices

Another way to access urban citizenship ‘from below’ is through everyday practices of citizenship in the urban space. Whilst the claims-making approach to citizenship underlines one’s mobilisation and contestation of the power dynamics vis-à-vis the authority, one can also exercise citizenship through everyday practices of ‘doing

citizenship' (Holm and Lebuhn, 2020). Holm and Lebuhn (2020, p.94) define such a form of citizenship as "strategies and activities of residents through which social and civil rights are being practised independently from – and sometimes even in quite opposition to administrative structures and legal frameworks". In contrast to acts of citizenship whose demands for rights open up a pathway for de facto citizenship, this mode of citizenship and its practice do not involve authorities or mobilisation but migrants' everyday practices that navigate their life as local citizens. Holm and Lebuhn (2020) draw an example of a civil society organisation comprised of medical activists in Berlin that offers free medical services to those who are excluded from the insurance system. Such independent grassroots work can be regarded as part of 'doing citizenship'. A similar idea has been expressed by Buhr (2018), who argues that migrants can 'become local' by utilising urban knowledge and experience accumulated through their everyday life constrained by elements such as occupation, place of residence, means of transport and family composition (Buhr, 2018, p.317). Migrants, in this sense, not merely receive such urban knowledge but also produce it through their engagement with the urban space. Darling and Squire (2012), likewise, observe 'everyday enactments of sanctuary' in the city of sanctuary movement in Sheffield. Following the right to the city concept that is "defined by everyday experience in lived space" (Purcell, 2002, p.106), they argue that:

> In engaging with the city through participating in the routines of everyday life, those taking sanctuary become part of the compositional enactment of urban life – a compositional enactment that entails multiple routines, rhythms and forms of occupation. (Darling and Squire, 2012, pp.200–201)

Therefore, migrants' everyday practices of embodying routines in the urban space can be another approach to making migrants an active part of the city and producing a new urban landscape and urban citizenship.

3.3.5 Interplays of urban citizenship across scales

I have introduced different theoretical approaches to urban citizenship and empirical evidence of how urban citizenship can be granted, enacted and practised. Each approach and logic of urban citizenship seems divergent from each other. However, they are not mutually exclusive ideas; rather, it seems that migrant urban citizenship is constructed through interplays of these different dynamics involving the authority, migrants and civil society who actively utilise resources and networks across different scales (see Blank, 2007). Ataç and Schilliger state:

> a simplistic dichotomization between urban citizenship 'from above' (by municipal governments) and 'from below' (by urban civil society actors/movements) is not helpful. On the contrary,… a successful expansion of urban citizenship is rather achieved through a (cooperative as well as conflictive) interplay between the city administration and the manifold civil society organizations. (Ataç and Schilliger, 2022, p.327)

Indeed, recent studies of urban citizenship have indicated the significance of looking at the multi-directional dynamics of urban citizenship formation. For Holm and Lebuhn (2020, p.97), who have examined the negotiation and contestation of urban citizenship rights between civil society actors and the city administration in Berlin, urban citizenship is

“processes of social production” that are “co-produced” by various stakeholders. The city’s policies and practices are often influenced by demands from civil society organisations and sustained based on their cooperation. In this sense, all approaches to urban citizenship introduced above can involve both administrations and civil society. At the same time, as touched upon already, one’s formal status in the host country still plays a dominant role in determining one’s position at the local level, especially when they are undocumented (Varsanyi, 2006; Blank, 2007; Bosniak, 2007). Urban citizenship cannot negate the national citizenship regime and its constraints over individuals’ status, rights and identity (see Kostakopoulou, 2008).

As such, urban citizenship cannot be defined merely within the city’s socio-spatial realm, nor can it be overly simplified in the ‘top-down/bottom-up’ dichotomy. Taking into account the multi-scalar dynamics helps us better understand urban citizenship processes that produce and are shaped by urban struggles between different groups of individuals. Staeheli (2003, p.99) conceptualises citizenship as multi-scalar, believing that “its legal and substantive components are shaped by conditions, processes, and institutions at the local, national and international scales”. In his view, citizenship is constructed not only at the nation-state scale but is “operating across scales” (Staeheli, 2003, p.99). Furthermore, inequalities and informalities in the urban space are often extended and amplified by the global flows, making urban citizenship further susceptible to multi-scalar dynamics (Joseph, 2008). Urban citizenship and its practices are “a surface expression of forces operating on various scales, and particularly in the interstices of regional (interstate), state and urban” (Yiftachel, 2015, p.731). While the influence of the regional, national and transnational frameworks seem to be vertical ‘from above’, stakeholders’ use of networks

and agency is multi-scalar and multi-directional, situating the city within the dynamic interplays. Moreover, such interplays are often shaped and articulated through the long-term interactions between actors at multiple scales (Sites and Vonderlack-Navarro, 2012). As mentioned earlier, the urban place is where such different institutional forces intersect (Blokland et al., 2015), and it can therefore be said that urban citizenship is formed through and simultaneously produces interplays of different actors at different levels and scales.

While institutions and civil society negotiate and interact with each other, migrants themselves are also involved in this process. Through examining how low-income migrants in São Paulo acquire urban citizenship rights, Amrith (2015, p.660) concludes that there are multiple pathways to urban citizenship, and migrants "deploy a combination of collective and individual strategies to access their rights as residents" rather than by "following a singular, coherent or linear pathway". They make use of their access to institutional landscapes, urban social movements and their personal networks to shape migrant urban citizenship in the city, although such rights may be fragmented (Amrith, 2015, p.660). Çaglar and Glick Schiller (2018, p.216), in their comparative examination of city-making processes of three cities, argue the significance of centring a multi-scalar view as "an essential form of methodology, theory, and analysis". They further state:

> whether we as individuals build personal transnational networks or maintain that we live within the confines of a single neighborhood or locality, we are all actors within multiple simultaneous processes that make and remake the mutually constituting scales of locality, region, nation-state, the supranational, and the

> global. This simultaneity and multiplicity allows individuals multiple forms of belonging, multiple possibilities for finding domains of sociability, and multiple possibilities of becoming politically active within a range of social movements. (Çağlar and Glick Schiller, 2018, p.218)

Focusing on city residents' processes of city-making and social mobility, they are critical of "the celebration of 'urban citizenship' as an alternative site for rights and entitlements" (Çağlar and Glick Schiller, 2018, p.223). While they draw more attention to the way in which citizens engage with multi-scalar networks of power and accumulate capitals that reflect on their lives in the city, other scholars suggest that urban citizenship can be understood in a wider sense and function as a practical tool to analyse multi-scalar dynamics of institutions and social mobility that are manifested on the urban level (Smith and Guarnizo, 2009; Guarnizo, 2012). Inasmuch as our understanding of citizenship itself embodies boundaries between inclusion and exclusion and institutional and individual expressions of such boundaries, urban citizenship holds a significant place in citizenship studies. Looking at multi-scalar networks and dynamics allows us to understand urban citizenship not merely as rights and entitlements confined within the city territory but as complexities of phenomena that involve various actors and their workings at different scales.

In sum, there are several ways to understand migrant urban citizenship in the city. Different approaches focus on different actors that play a main role and apply different theories to envision and operationalise urban status, rights and identity of migrants. Yet, it does not mean that each approach excludes other stakeholders; rather, all relevant

actors in urban citizenship, such as transnational networks, international communities, the state, the city administration, civil society and migrants, are interconnected. Their citizenship operations and struggles are not necessarily directed at the city, but their interplays influence the ways through which they are involved with processes of entitling, enacting and practising urban citizenship. Citizenship at the urban scale is considered substantive rather than normative, as the city itself as a polity does not impose citizenship *de jure*. As long as urban citizenship can be imagined as processes of entitling, enacting and practising urban status, rights and identity, there is no sole approach to realise urban citizenship; it is constructed and negotiated through complex interactions and interplays of dynamics between various actors across scales (Staeheli, 2003).

3.4 Linking urban citizenship with integration policy and governance

Urban citizenship and integration share intersecting complexities. There is no universal definition of citizenship or integration, and both can be understood as processes that involve interrelations of various actors and institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, at multiple scales. In order to contextualise integration for this study, I explain how academics have interpreted governance of integration in a multi-level or multi-scalar setting and link it with the urban citizenship concept.

3.4.1 Integration policies and governance at multiple levels and scales

As explained in Chapter 1, the capability and role of local-level integration policies have been of interest to many academics. According to Dekker et al. (2015, p.635), their approaches can be understood in three ways: the local dimension, the localist and the national models. Firstly, exploring the local dimension of integration, researchers have

examined the decentralised governance structure and the increasingly pragmatic role of local authorities in integration policymaking and implementation (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx, 2016). Tsuda (2006a) expounds on municipal capability by depicting how localities recognise the migrant population as settled residents and promote pragmatic integration policies in Japanese cities. However, this approach also suggests exclusive characteristics of local-level policymaking, as local policies can "disguise themselves as universalistic, aimed at the protection of general interests" and exclude migrants in terms of civil, social, cultural, security-, and economic right (Hagan et al., 2011; Ambrosini, 2013, p.138).

Secondly, the localist approach focuses on the local problem situation, political setting, and specifically local policy legacies and therefore assumes that policy approaches to integration may differ between localities (Dekker et al., 2015, p.636). Jørgensen (2012), through his examination of Danish cities, has shown incongruent rationales and institutional dynamics along with different opportunity structures that drive localities in their integration policymaking. Moreover, by examining migrant integration in small towns and rural areas, Danson and Jentsch (2012) remind us of different characteristics and policy effects of different scales of 'locality'.

Thirdly, some researchers support the idea that local authorities play a role as sub-national institutions that reflect centralised, top-down decision-making. Here, it is important to take into consideration Emilsson's conclusion on the control and influence of the national government over local authorities and their autonomy to formulate integration policies:

> If the state decides which integration measures should be implemented at the local level it means that local authorities have little room for manoeuvre.… Integration policies that go against the national models can be formulated at local level, but may be limited in scope. (Emilsson, 2015, p.3)

Highlighting national and local dimensions of integration policies leads to the idea of multi-level governance. The framework of multi-level governance has often been employed by integration researchers to map how different levels of governance allow local-level policymaking to follow or diverge from the national framework and local politics to influence national policies and approaches (Scholten, 2016; Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017; Spencer, 2018). Within the multi-level governance setting, supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks, a significant part of which are constituted by cross-sector interactions (Marks, 1993, pp.402–403). Indeed, through examining local- and national-level integration policies in three different European cities that only displayed a certain extent of the latter two models described above, Dekker et al. (2015, p.653) conclude that there is not a single, distinct local dimension of integration policies, but that multilevel interactions promote mutual exchanges between local and national level policies. They insist that each policy level is not detached from the other but connected with various forms of multi-level interactions that extend vertically and horizontally.

The degree, extent, and context of power dynamics vary in different countries and localities, and these overlapping roles and powers of authorities can pose some challenges in practice. However, multi-level governance can be understood as a flexible

concept that embraces such disparities. For some, ‘governance’, in contrast to ‘government’, involves flexible institutional approaches that require multi-level networks and negotiations (Pierre, 2012). While the multi-level governance concept has developed concerning the EU and supranational policymaking (Marks, 1992, 1993), it can also be applied in other contexts, such as Japan and South Korea (Milly, 2014). In her comparative work between Japan, South Korea, Italy and Spain, Milly (2014) highlights the significant role of non-governmental actors in informing local and national policies in all four countries. She further discusses various ways through which they interact and utilise the multi-level governance functions to shape integration policies at different levels, which eventually defines migrants’ belonging and membership in local communities. Multi-level governance therefore carries significance in migrant integration as it incorporates both top-down guidelines and bottom-up mobilisation in the policymaking process while involving various stakeholders, not only national- and local-level institutions and policymakers but also activists and experts from civil groups (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Penninx, 2005; García, 2006; Piattoni, 2010).

Although multi-level governance has been well acknowledged amongst integration researchers, some criticisms have arisen that led to further theoretical developments. For instance, in the context of the EU, Jessop (2016) problematises the concept, critiquing its excessive focus on vertical and horizontal relations and lack of socio-spatial considerations that are extended from each level:

> multilevel government and/or governance cannot be fully understood without considering their complex relations with other nodes located above, below, and

> transversal to the EU. Each scale and node is involved in complex, tangled relations with others located above, below, or transversal thereto and many parallel power networks are also involved in their coordination and collibration. (Jessop, 2016, p.20)

Instead of multi-level governance, some researchers have proposed to explore multi-scalar dynamics. Brenner (2001a), for example, argues that a multi-scalar configuration can capture the interrelations of socio-spatial processes of economic, social and political productions and rejects the multi-level idea that lays a heavy weight on hierarchical relations: “Scalar hierarchies constitute mosaics not pyramids” (Brenner, 2001a, p.606). His conceptualisation of scales indeed accords with multi-scalar approaches to understanding and constructing citizenship, as described earlier in this chapter. Whereas theories of multi-level governance are yet dominant in research around integration policies, recently emerging studies have attempted to examine integration policymaking and governance with a multi-scalar scope. Aiden’s (2019) work examines local integration policies in Japan and emphasises that the relations and interplays between institutions and actors are rather multi-scalar and multi-spatial than multi-level. Similarly, Komai, observing migrant integration policy in Japan, employs the multi-scalar concept and supports that:

> Migrant integration policy has gradually evolved into a multi-scalar configuration of governance where actors and frames iteratively communicate with each other shedding light on the importance of considering national, subnational, and trans-local scales. (Komai, 2023, p.19)

In both European and Japanese contexts, more researchers have started to turn their eyes to considering integration governance in a broader light. This multi-scalar concept indeed corresponds to interplays of urban citizenship that are manifested in multi-scalar dynamics, highlighting the interesting intersection between the two concepts.

3.4.2 Intersection of urban citizenship and integration strategy

I have unfolded the multi-scalar perspective to better understand urban citizenship and integration governance; yet, this is not to blindly treat the two concepts as the same. As Goodman (2015) argues, they are two distinct concepts with different policies. By utilising two concepts, I spotlight the partial reality of the complex picture that the intersections of these two concepts draw (see Barbulescu et al., 2023b). I argue here that urban citizenship and migrant integration are linked with each other inasmuch as they are constructed, shaped and articulated in the multi-scalar dynamics that involve various individual and collective actors. In practice, for the two cities that this study focuses on, there are no urban citizenship policies or integration policies per se. Since the policy applications of integration rather take a normative approach and (in)explicitly show its integration target and desired outcomes, examining policy documents and measures would allow one to understand the city's normative approach to migrant residents, in other words, who is included and what it means to be included. However, this is not sufficient to comprehend the entire picture. As highlighted in this chapter, one needs to look at various forms of interrelations of stakeholders at multiple levels and scales. It is therefore necessary to take a look at processes through which such policy measures are formulated and how multiple actors engage with such processes. Using 'scales' is more appropriate

in this sense to describe multi-directional approaches that these interplays demonstrate than using ‘levels’ that may oversimplify vertical and hierarchical relations.

3.5 Identifying stakeholders

The sections above have discussed the multi-scalar interplays of actors as a key to understanding how the city’s integration strategy is formulated, which signifies the ways in which urban citizenship is constructed in the city realm. Here, I list the main stakeholders that this study focuses on and their significance and roles vis-à-vis the construction of urban citizenship and integration strategy. The term ‘stakeholders’ represents groups and individuals who constitute a web in which they intricately interconnect and influence each other across different scales (Goodpaster, 1991, p.54; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). For this study, stakeholders include migrants in the city and groups and institutions that play various roles that (in)directly affect the making and implementation of the integration strategy. This does not mean that their functions are always positive; the presence of different actors and their power relations do not necessarily lead to successful and inclusive outcomes. It is also important to note that these stakeholders do not possess a single identity but act both individually and collectively. This is apparent when we take into consideration different layers and degrees of attributes that complicatedly interplay and shape one’s individual and collective identities (Vertovec, 2007). Taking into account the web of multiple identities of these actors and their relations and influences, one can identify different approaches and strategies that are manifested in the form of integration strategy and urban citizenship (e.g. Pine, 2010).

City authority

The city authority, including the city council, office and affiliated agencies, is with no doubt crucial, given that the city authority can play roles as the state, agency and sub-national institution to construct the urban citizenship ideal and determine integration norms of who should belong and what they are entitled to (see Blank, 2007). Their policies and practices draw lines demarcating between urban citizens and non-citizens and internal boundaries of each category. In addition to the city's integration measures towards residents, the city's intention behind policy implementation and their perception of different migrant groups are also key to understanding whether and to what extent urban citizenship is articulated through the city governance for whom (Uitermark et al., 2005; Hoekstra, 2018).

Regional authority

Identifying the city as an institutional entity in which urban citizenship takes place does not reduce the significance of other levels of authority; rather, within the multi-scalar setting of urban citizenship and integration strategy, the sub-national authority plays a unique role in strengthening decentralisation and bridging national and city authorities. Indeed, the regional authority, as a result of devolution and decentralisation of powers, can redefine the distribution of status and rights and increase the sense of regional identity, which shapes the urban model of citizenship (see Hepburn, 2011).

National authority

As mentioned already, the power that the national government displays upon the city cannot be disregarded. Migrants' immigration status yet weighs heavily in their daily life and their positionality in the local community, which also affects their formation of urban

citizenship (Varsanyi, 2006). In academics' attempts to articulate urban citizenship in the current political and legal structure, one must not blindly deny the nation as an enemy of urban citizenship but explore its presence and influence as one of the determinants of local-level membership (Dekker et al., 2015).

Transnational bodies

Transnational and trans-local communities and networks hold significance in influencing national and local policymaking and in facilitating claims-making processes. Besides international civil society organisations whose nature is voluntary, international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the EU, established based on formal agreements among nations, also exert a certain influence on the city. International agreements and regimes not only unsettle traditional values of national citizenship but also assist urban citizenship and promote transnational city networks (e.g. Soysal, 1994). For the city, the political presence of international organisations can increase the city's significance as a democratic actor in the global community and allow it to bypass the national government to formulate policies (Brodie, 2000; Ford, 2001). Transnational networks of cities, as mentioned earlier, can be another source of connecting the city to urban citizenship. Networks also offer the city an opportunity to exchange policy ideas and practices at the trans-local and transnational scales. Sister-city relations are another existing form of such city networks. While the idea and aim of sister-city relations strongly reflect cities' socioeconomic and political intentions, sister-city relations would help to understand how and in what terms the city identifies and establishes its connection with other cities (Baycan-Levent et al., 2010). However, as some argue, sister-city relations

can turn into a closed structure between cities that emphasises ethnic essentialism and limits urban citizenship (Smith and Guarnizo, 2009).

Civil society

For this study, civil society implies organisations and groups of civil activists that include both migrant and non-migrant activists. I employ the word civil society to signify their collective forces and functions in the context of urban citizenship and integration. While empowering migrants as urban citizens, the disciplines, targets and activities of the civil society groups can directly shape the city's policymaking and influence upper-level governance (de Graauw, 2012; Milly, 2014). Amongst such civil society organisations, migrant organisations are usually associated with migrants' ethnicity or nationality and are not only connected to the host country but also to migrants' countries of origin. They are understood to be able to "help migrants to uphold their standards and values, and support both individual and collective identity building and the politics of belonging" (Pries and Sezgin, 2012, p.1). Migrant organisations contribute to improving migrants' political and social situations by advocating for better access and policy while maintaining their visibility in the community (Bloemraad and Gleeson, 2012). In addition, those organisations are able to encourage migrant residents to participate in local politics and foster migrant leaders to inform the city's decision-making processes (de Graauw, 2012).

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whether migrant-related or not, are able to provide necessary services and assist the concerned population. Their role tends to weigh heavily on migrant settlement, as they provide migrants with basic needs, assist them in accessing public services, and advocate for migrants' political and social rights

(Ghosh, 2009). NGOs are based on international, national, or local scales and contribute to diversifying the service provision and target population while sometimes overlapping with national and local public sectors and creating conflicts (Agrela and Dietz, 2006). Furthermore, faith communities also play a significant role in civil society. Religious organisations at the local level help migrants maintain their sociocultural identity and settle in the community (Levitt, 2004). Whereas faith communities are known to be capable of facilitating migrants' claims-making, their influences may vary by groups and locations (Statham et al., 2005).

Migrants

Migrants who do not possess formal citizenship of the host country are vital to activating urban citizenship. First of all, the presence of migrants without formal citizenship and their urban belonging signifies the very *raison d'être* of urban citizenship vis-à-vis the nation-state configuration. It is hence essential to examine how the migrant population is situated within the city and involved in the local decision-making process as well as 'acts' and 'practices' of urban citizenship. Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that migrant individuals possess distinct approaches to urban citizenship, migrants are by no means a homogeneous group of foreigners, but different migrant communities and organisations exert different implications upon the city's decision-making process, therefore making the city the "battleground" (Isin, 2002, p.50; Uitermark et al., 2005). It is also important to understand that undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are often situated in distinct and perhaps more vulnerable positions than others (Varsanyi, 2006). Examining how different migrant groups are incorporated in the city's policy and how they

are involved in the process of shaping urban citizenship is crucial to fully understand 'migrants' as agents in city politics.

3.6 Urban citizenship and the pandemic

The impacts of the pandemic have heavily struck the hitherto citizenship trends that had embodied its liberal, globalised aspects. Although few studies have been published regarding citizenship during the pandemic, the emerging body of literature has examined what is sometimes called 'pandemic citizenship' (Calzada, 2021). According to Kruman and Marback (2022, p.1028), "apparatuses of citizenship – among them detention, surveillance, mobility, and political action – were mobilized to respond to the spread of a virus, something for which they were not originally designed". Indeed, the nation-state citizenship configuration was reinforced by border closures, mobility restrictions and surveillance. Moreover, citizens' political and social actions were limited, while the discourse of 'good citizens' became prevalent and reconstructed the national identity of citizenship (Andreouli and Brice, 2022). The pandemic, furthermore, "highlighted and exacerbated preexisting inequalities of race, gender, social class, and nationality through which citizenship is constructed and contested" (Kruman and Marback, 2022, p.1027). Migrants, whose characteristics are determined by their mobility and movement to the host society, were therefore situated in a more precarious position within closed borders.

It is meaningful to consider urban citizenship in this context, given that the concept is not legally bound in most cases and would allow flexible responses from local authorities. While many national governments offered some temporary measures that included the non-citizen population, local authorities' responses should also be worthwhile to examine.

The pandemic and subsequent restrictions like lockdowns have impacted one's mobility and unsettled one's global sense of space while increasing the sense of space in local, neighbourhood, and private realms (Bissell, 2021). The fluid nature of the urban space, especially, can be a site where citizenship processes that are distinct from the national scale emerge. Shatkin et al. (2023) indeed note that:

> analyses of the urban impacts of COVID-19 must consider not only how the spatial impacts of the pandemic are eliciting municipal policy and planning responses, but also how these spatial impacts are interacting with and reshaping the political dynamics of ongoing processes of the rescaling of capital. (Shatkin et al., 2023, p.1782)

While studies are still very limited, empirical research offers some glimpses into 'pandemic urban citizenship'. Looking at the urban poor groups in Delhi, Dhaka and Manila during the pandemic, Recio and colleagues (2021) see the pandemic as a disaster that "always occur[s] in political spaces, which necessitate more equitable and inclusive modes of disaster preparedness, response, and redress for the underlying inequalities that contribute to conditions of compounded risk and precarity" (Douglass and Miller, 2018, p.271, quoted in Recio et al., 2021, p. 502). They have examined governments' emergency responses and documented exclusionary and criminalising practices against impoverished urban residents, who are mostly migrants. At the same time, they draw attention to the role of NGOs and civic groups in "filling the social service gaps and drawing public attention to government failures" by making "the unseen and unimagined communities" visible (Recio et al., 2021, p.510).

Amongst approaches to urban citizenship that have been mentioned in the previous section, several theories can be utilised to review pandemic urban citizenship. First, the state exerts the dominant influence on the extent to which migrants can be 'visible'. While the national government often plays the main role in determining migrants' status and rights, local authorities' emergency responses also reflect who can be regarded as urban citizens in the local context. Bosniak's (2007) use of ethical territoriality can help to understand whether and to what extent migrants can be recognised through their presence rather than their registered place of residence or legal status. However, it must be noted that authorities' emergency measures can entail some pitfalls. In/visibility of migrants is greatly attributed to their 'illegality', constantly re-defined and re-shaped by bordering (see van Baar, 2017; Humphris and Sigona, 2019). In that sense, recognition through presence, even at the local level, emphasises borders through which migrants' in/visibility is constructed; inasmuch as the territorial principle lays heavy weight on 'being within', it cannot escape from authoritative practices of bordering within the territory, as pointed out by Bosniak (2007). In addition, national and local authorities often respond to "native residents' perceived emergency… with the ultimate goal being to 'control' rather than to assist migrants" (Semprebon et al., 2017, p.210). Another main actor in pandemic urban citizenship is civil society, whose claims-making actions and practices of citizenship can effectively affect migrants' substantive livelihood. Examining what was actually happening in the city during the pandemic and how migrants were (dis)regarded as urban citizens can further the growing literature on urban citizenship at the time of the pandemic and capture the role of the city in responding to emergencies.

3.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have drawn concepts around migration, citizenship and integration that together constitute the conceptual framework for this study, which examines the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy. Urban citizenship can be understood based on three dimensions: status, rights and identity. These dimensions of urban citizenship can be designed, delivered and practised by various stakeholders through four different approaches listed in this chapter. Some approaches may emphasise either the 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' direction of citizenship approach; for example, *jus domicile* can be mostly used by the city authority to grant local membership to those who are without formal citizenship status while migrants can activate and practise citizenship by claiming the right to the city. However, the multi-scalar interrelations of such approaches are complex and multi-directional, indicating that there is no singular, direct route to urban citizenship from the top-down or bottom-up. Indeed, *jus domicile* can also be used by civil society to strengthen their claims, and the city council can reflect the right to the city into the urban planning and justify its inclusive or exclusive measures. In addition, in many cases, the city's migrants-related policies and practices are influenced and shaped by local demands, whose actions are influenced by the presence or absence of the city's initiatives. While oftentimes academics highlight the bottom-up process through which migrants and civil society claim urban citizenship, urban spaces and urban citizenship reflect struggles amongst transnational, national and urban scales "that involve state actors, migrants' supporters, human rights movements and urban protesters—in support of or against the arrival and stay of migrants—as well as, not least, the migrants" (Fauser, 2019, p.619).

Building up on this, I have defined urban citizenship for migrants as *processes through which multi-scalar interplays of multiple actors construct urban membership, rights and identity*. Integration strategy can function as a meaningful tool to understand urban citizenship, a concept not clearly addressed in policy documents. While we need to pay attention to different aims and understandings that integration holds in the theoretical and policy contexts, integration is widely acknowledged as two- (or three-)way processes of migrants becoming a part of the community (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016a, p.14).

In the later section, I have identified key stakeholders for this study who are mainly involved with processes of multi-scalar integration governance and formulation of urban citizenship. They are based across different scales of institutions and organisations, interconnected with each other through individual and collective networks. I have also discussed how the pandemic has underlined and amplified the existing boundaries of citizenship and highlighted some notable theoretical approaches to urban citizenship in times of emergency. Together with Chapter 2, this chapter has established the ground on which this study has taken place. In the next chapter, I explain the methodology and my choice of research methods that have enabled data collection with these stakeholders in Osaka and Birmingham.

CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology for this research. As outlined in the previous chapter, the city's integration strategy can provide a valid angle to investigate how the city's urban citizenship is constructed, and in order to do so, it is necessary to study how different stakeholders are involved in the process of making and practising the integration strategy, along with the integration strategy itself. I selected two cities as case study sites, namely Osaka, Japan, and Birmingham, the UK, and conducted qualitative research that involved policy analysis and interviews with stakeholders.

I employed qualitative research methods based on the social constructivist view of the world. As the previous chapter has described, urban citizenship itself is an intangible concept, yet it does not mean that it is unsubstantial. A social constructivist approach that seeks to see the nature of knowledge produced within the social structures can hence help to articulate how urban citizenship is constructed in the city's integration processes and configurations within which various actors interact. It was the appropriate approach also because I selected two cities that required two different languages for data collection as my units of analysis; knowledge production is essentially shaped by a language used in the process that reflects the local reality of the environment in which the language is used (Phillips, 1960). Selecting case cities from different national settings and using both English and Japanese throughout the research therefore are a challenging knowledge

production process, and the social constructivist approach has helped me to overcome its difficulty.

In order to understand the ‘snapshot’ of the city’s urban citizenship, I conducted policy analysis of policy documents released by the respective city authority and affiliated institutions that address migrant integration. I also analysed policies that do not explicitly target the migrant population but include them. The second part of the research was dedicated to qualitative, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders whose work is involved in the city’s integration. Broadly speaking, the interview participants can be divided into two groups: officials from the city council and other public sector organisations; and staff and activists from civil society organisations. These stakeholders were regarded as playing a determinant role in designing and implementing the integration strategy in the city through their direct and indirect involvement with migrant populations. The fieldwork took place in Osaka between February to September 2020 and in Birmingham between September 2020 to April 2021. As I mentioned earlier, the data collection process was significantly impacted by the pandemic, which, as a result, affected the entire knowledge construction process.

I first expound my research philosophy, social constructivism, and its application to a comparative research design. I then discuss issues of translating from English to Japanese and vice versa in light of social constructivism. In the following section I introduce the data collection and analysis methods I used, namely, policy analysis and qualitative interview, and summarise how I determined participants and conducted interviews. The following section further delves into my positionality as a researcher in

elite interviews and how I navigated myself in Osaka and Birmingham using my insider/outsider positionalities. The impacts and implications of the pandemic are discussed in the following section, with a specific focus on the use of online interviews. The later part of this chapter discusses ethical considerations, followed by conclusion.

4.2 Social construction of knowledge in comparative case study research

4.2.1 Applying social constructivism

In addressing the research aim to *unpack the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy in Osaka (Japan) and Birmingham (UK),* I adopted social constructivism to situate my research. Social constructivism, albeit wide-ranging, seeks reality constructed through knowledge and meanings attached by individuals and groups. Within the constructivist paradigm, thinkers have slightly different relationships with the external world and institutions, but social constructivists are convinced that the nature of knowledge is social and produced through shared experiences (Kant, 1959; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Vygotsky, 1978; Prawat and Floden, 1994; Risse, 2004). Constructivist ontological and epistemological views of reality as a flux and actively cognised entity can be seen to some extent in both Eastern and Western literature, tracing back to Lao-Tzu, Buddha and Heraclitus (Mahoney, 2002). Although there have been criticisms against constructivism for lacking theoretical exploration and rather fulfilling its role as an approach (e.g. Checkel, 1998; Smith, 2001), constructivists have advanced ontological and epistemological arguments to refine its theoretical configuration by highlighting “the mutual constitutiveness of (social) structures and agents” that distinguishes themselves from positivism and relativism and underlies the roles played by (political) actors vis-à-vis

institutions (e.g. Haas and Haas, 2002; Risse, 2004, p.161; Kostakopoulou, 2005; Lombardo, 2016).

Social constructivists' emphasis on co-construction of reality helped to frame my research. As examined in the previous chapter, in order to understand urban citizenship, one must see how such a concept can be expressed through meaningful actions. Since urban citizenship cannot be measured merely by legal and political documents but also by city officials' policymaking processes and negotiations and everyday practices of local actors, urban citizenship is endowed with both objective and subjective reality; it is negotiable and contestable (see Christiansen et al., 2001). The 'local' nature of social constructivism also helps to delve into urban citizenship, a place- and time-specific concept that hugely relies on the context of each city regarded as a polity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Christiansen et al., 2001, p.3). The same argument can be applied to migrant integration. Social constructivism is thus a suitable paradigm to look at how concepts like urban citizenship and migrant integration are constructed through processes of continuous social interactions of different actors.

4.2.2 Shaping comparative research design

With these in mind, I compare cases of Osaka and Birmingham. A case study was the most appropriate approach since it can approach context-specific construction of knowledge and situate it in the complex social world (see VanWynsberghe and Khan, 2007; May, 2011). Moreover, comparison itself is fundamental to humans' conceptual processes and constitutes the nature of social research (Swanson, 1971; Øyen, 1990). According to Bloemraad (2013, p.29), all migration research is comparative by nature,

and comparative study serves to reconfigure existing social theories, build new concepts and theories, and identify causes that build phenomena. Hence, maintaining a comparative perspective in a case study enables constructivist researchers to unpack 'institutionalised' realities and actions that are taken for granted and construct new knowledge by focusing on the social-cultural context of the case (see Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

Looking at cities in two countries helps me address some concerns about comparative case studies and be aware of a 'container' of traditional geopolitical boundaries (see Beck, 2000). As touched upon in Chapter 1, methodological nationalism has long been criticised for its insensitivity to the complexity of society and adherence to the nation-state configuration, and this study's focus on urban citizenship helps to reconfigure such political and institutional territories (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; Beck and Sznaider, 2006). Yet, it is not to reject the values of studying national contexts; borders, territory and sovereignty of nation-states and their impacts upon one's mobility and meaning-making are indeed part of social reality. It is important that researchers do not take "the state's spatial unity and internal homogeneity" for granted as "a 'reality' of social life in general" (Agnew, 1994, p.71; Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). On the other hand, scholars engaging with geographic comparisons at the sub-national level also must avoid using local contexts to characterise and represent their nation-states (Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). When conducting a place-based comparison, one must pay heed not to fall into the "territorial trap" by rescaling the global/national/regional/local relations and recognising that "the global and the local (as well as the national) are mutually constitutive" (Agnew, 1994; Brenner, 2001b, pp.134–135).

Particularly, Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2009) raise several conceptual questions over local-level comparative studies on migrant incorporation by drawing urban geography and neoliberal rhetoric, which I reflected in my research design. Their criticism against the global city framework corresponds with my choice of non-capital, 'non-global' cities, Osaka and Birmingham, inasmuch as non-global cities are also shaped by the complexity brought by globalisation. Furthermore, urban citizenship is not to determine and demarcate the geopolitical terrains of these cities but to situate them by looking at their political, historical and cultural contexts as well as different levels and scales of networks of stakeholders that go beyond administrative boundaries. Migrants themselves play an essential role in achieving urban citizenship, making sense of Glick Schiller and Çağlar's emphasis on migrants as "constitutive of the repositioning struggles" of the cities (p. 189). The idea of multi-level governance also helps to take into account the role of states and their "differential power hierarchies" and "varying outcomes" (p. 182). This study further develops this idea by introducing the multi-scalar perspective. Collecting data from policy documents and interviews that look at different levels of governance and networks allows this study to envision both institutional and practical processes of integration and articulate urban citizenship that would look different in each city. At the same time, such a mix of primary and secondary data analysis also prevents this research from 'oversocialising' realities, one of the prominent weaknesses of 'radical' constructivists, and enables appropriate comparison (see Schmidt, 2001).

4.2.3 Translating sociological concepts in comparative research

Social research in cross-national settings entails a variety of approaches and brings both opportunities and challenges to a great extent; Hantrais (1999, p.105) is convinced that:

“there is no single recipe, or one best way, for carrying out cross-national comparisons”. Particularly, it is crucial to examine issues around language and translation in sociological research in multi-language comparative settings from a social constructivist perspective since it underlines not only the technical part of the research but also its ontological and epistemological understanding (Mangen, 1999; Bradby, 2002; Harkness, 2003; Temple and Young, 2004). To translate sociological concepts, researchers must first consider what they are transferring. For social constructivists, language constructs research questions, the entire research process and results; therefore, cross-national comparative study is never neutral and depends on the researcher who employs the language, as different languages present different approaches to constructing and seeing society (Green, 1994). It is not sociological concepts and theories in a literal sense that should be transported to another context, but the meaning and operationalisation of concepts that give a link between theoretical discussions and local realities and make sense of comparison (Rose and Mackenzie, 1991).

Furthermore, my research has compared a city in Japan and the UK, and there was a risk of using Western sociological theories and concepts in the Japanese context since sociological concepts are “inappropriately bounded – specifically,… ‘methodologically Eurocentric’” (Bhambra, 2010, p.40). Despite extensive academic discussions on whether Japan is ‘Western’ (see Hall, 2018), studying ‘Eurocentric’ concepts in the Japanese context would require careful consideration. Many have agreed that labelling and comparing countries either as West or non-West (East) only enhances essentialism on both sides and, as a result, leads comparative studies to fall into methodological

nationalism (see Said, 1978; Befu, 2001; Hall, 2018). Ito (1993), for instance, rejects such extreme ideas:

> There are many social theories, including widely accepted theories, that do not explain the Japanese experience at all. Yet there *are* other social theories developed outside Japan that explain the Japanese experience quite well. Furthermore, there are social theories that explain Western *and* Japanese experiences very well but do not explain the experiences of Third World countries. In this sense, social theories, unlike natural science theories, are culturally bound. Many social theories reflect cultural norms, biases, and other characteristics. (Ito, 1993, p.250, italics original)

This study aims to explain the relationship between two sociological concepts that were mainly developed in the Western or European context: urban citizenship and integration. In light of Ito's view, utilising 'Western' theories in the Japanese context itself may not be problematic as long as they "explain the Japanese experience", but disregarding the "cultural norms, biases, and other characteristics" of the Japanese context can obscure the social phenomena (Ito, 1993, p.250). To avoid essentialism in comparative research, researchers should be aware of multiple powers manifested in groups and individuals as well as social relations within and between countries (Nozaki, 2009).

In order to contextualise sociological concepts in comparative studies, it is recommended that researchers have intimate knowledge of the society, language and culture of studied countries (Hantrais, 1999). However, at the same time, Wiederhold (2015, p.606) signals

that researchers who work at ‘home’ must be aware that their local knowledge can “color their questions, interpretations, and representations”. While I discuss the issue of insider/outsider positionality later in this chapter, here I reflect this point on the Japanese-English translation issue. As a Japanese person, having lived in English-speaking countries for more than seven years, I was familiar with the social and cultural contexts of Japan and the UK, and my knowledge construction was always done in both languages. Nevertheless, I had to consider that my positionality and local knowledge can ‘color’ the way I translate and, therefore, ‘color’ the results themselves. I was very careful in capturing the contexts and finding the best way to translate them, yet translation was never possible without reflecting on my positions and recognising the bias.

I used both Japanese and English during data collection and analysis. Since this study was designed in English, I had to explore the comparability of different political and cultural contexts when conducting interviews in Japanese. I had to carefully explain the key concepts and purpose of the study to the participants and translate data into English not by merely translating English jargon into Japanese and vice versa but by fully understanding the contexts of two languages and choosing appropriate expressions and words. For example, when interviewing in Japanese, I employed the term ‘*tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence)’ to replace the word ‘integration’ in the documents and interviews since ‘integration’ was not a familiar term in the Japanese context. Even when I had interviews in Osaka with participants who preferred using English, I explained the research using both terms ‘integration’ and ‘*tabunka kyōsei*’ so they could grasp the concept and situate it in the Japanese context. Whilst these two terms diverge in a strict sociological sense, they share a similar idea that was applicable enough for the interviews

(see Chapter 2 for the contextualised use of integration in the Japanese policy landscape). This “meaning-based” approach enabled the participants in Japan to better comprehend the aim of my research and facilitated the recruitment and interview process (see Shklarov, 2007; Liamputtong, 2010, p.48). My use of those different terms and the participants’ use of them further benefited the analysis process to highlight local contexts and attitudes without necessarily falling into methodological pitfalls of research in non-Western contexts (see, for example, Alatas, 2006; Gunaratne, 2010).

During the interview, some participants pointed out that I was taking notes mixing Japanese and English. It was natural for me to (re)construct knowledge from interviews and record it in different languages depending on their social, historical and cultural backgrounds. This indicates that the knowledge I obtained and constructed through this research was always embedded and negotiated in the contexts of two languages. Being familiar with both languages and cultures further signifies that I played both researcher and translator roles. The constructivist approach values the process of knowledge production, and the researcher/translator embodiment gives further contexts to the meaning construction process while avoiding the complicacies of involving a translator/interpreter whose view of social reality must be taken into account beyond the data collection stage (Temple and Young, 2004). In this view, social reality is always influenced by the researcher’s (and the translator’s) position, and during fieldwork, my insider/outsider status and “cultural baggage” in the two cities exerted a considerable influence on the process of knowledge production (Hantrais, 2013, p.234), as I expound later in this chapter. This study therefore did not demonstrate a perfect translation; rather,

translation was an exercise to understand local reality and contexts and to produce my own knowledge of a discourse constructed by multi-language data (see Phillips, 1960).

4.3 Data collection and analysis

I used two data collection methods, namely, policy analysis of the city's integration strategy and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders identified in the previous chapter. Policy analysis helps to scrutinise policies and further offer policy developments (Collins, 2005; Walt et al., 2008). Policy analysis addresses my first research question: *How is urban citizenship articulated in policy documents of the city's integration strategy?* Qualitative interviews with stakeholders will address the second and third questions, which are: *How does policymakers' understanding of their roles in multi-scalar governance of integration strategy and its policymaking processes shape operationalisation of urban citizenship?*; *What role do civil society organisations play as actors of urban citizenship in implementing integration strategy?* The approach of semi-structured interviews allows me to "incorporate both open-ended and more theoretically driven questions, eliciting data grounded in the experience of the participant as well as data guided by existing constructs" (Galletta and Cross, 2013, p.45). Planning and delivery of integration strategy, as well as its implementation in the context of urban citizenship, are the socially constructed reality that is not available in policy documents. Interviews with policymakers and other key stakeholders determined in the previous chapter are useful to situate their organisations and positions in integration processes and reveal information "beyond the official line" (Signal et al., 2018). This section explains how data collection and analysis took place.

4.3.1 Policy analysis of the city's integration strategy

In this study, policies, ordinances, and administrative practices concerning the migrant population and their integration are considered as part of the city's integration strategy. Policy documents were collected online, mainly from the city government websites. Given that some guidelines and measures are issued by other affiliated institutions, such as the Educational Board and *kokuryū,* whose projects are commissioned by the city government, documents from such related organisations were also included in the analysis. This study focused on integration measures that were in effect as of December 2020. This timeframe allowed me to capture the current state of the city's view of migrant residents, taking into account the history of migration in the two cities and the recent demographic changes, as described earlier in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. It also allowed me to include the city's initial responses to the pandemic, which has offered an opportunity to look into the city's urban citizenship during the crisis.

Main policy documents included, for example, the 2020 *Osaka City Guidelines for Tabunka Kyōsei* and the *2016 Osaka City Ordinance on Dealing with Hate Speech* for Osaka, and *Community Cohesion Strategy* and the City of Sanctuary Policy Statement for 2018-2022 for Birmingham (See Appendix 1 for a full list of studied policy documents). Aligning with scholars' emphasis on the importance of including policies that do not explicitly target migrants' integration (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016b; see Chapter 3), it has also taken into account the city's policies and measures that do not specifically mention migrants but aim such population. In addition, since this study's purpose is to examine the interplays of different stakeholders in relation to the city's integration strategy, it has also taken into account some older policies that were no longer

in effect in order to contextualise policy flows and backgrounds at the time of the study. These old policies and practices were not included in the policy analysis itself, yet incorporated in findings across Chapters 5 to 7.

I analysed policy documents thematically based on three elements of urban citizenship that I outlined in Chapter 3, namely, status, rights and identity. I used NVivo 12 to compile all the policy documents I collected. Documents from Osaka and Birmingham were saved in different folders and coded into the three categories, ‘status’, ‘rights’ and ‘identity’. Within each category, codes were assigned to sub-categories that describe the focus of its policy and practice, such as ‘political participation’, ‘education’ and ‘housing’. As policy documents were collected prior to December 2020, policy analysis and fieldwork periods overlapped. Looking at content, context and policy processes helped refine interview questions during the fieldwork. Preliminary research on the cities’ policies was useful in determining and mapping relevant stakeholders involved in city-level integration. It also helped me to keep an eye on the cities’ policy situations, which benefited the interviewing process. Furthermore, interviews with city officials and service providers during the pandemic informed my understanding of the city’s responses to the pandemic that were incorporated in policy analysis.

It was important for me to bear in mind the purpose of policy documents that require wider contextualisation. Mangen (2004, p.314) warns that such documents are “selective in total coverage, highly edited and structured to serve specific purposes, which entails extra work on the part of the researcher in terms of wider contextualization in order to avoid naïve interpretation”. I carefully conducted policy analysis so as not to blindly deem the

content of policy documents as facts without considering social and political contexts. Especially in the local policy context, local authorities are under the great influence of the national government, and, as Chapter 3 has outlined, the local governance of integration involves dynamics at different levels and scales.

4.3.2 Mapping and recruiting interview participants

Semi-structured interviews with stakeholders explored how urban citizenship for migrants was articulated in the form of an integration strategy and how networks at different levels interacted. Based on stakeholders listed in the previous chapter, participants for interviews were determined through the process of mapping the bottom-up influence that stakeholders and migrant groups have on the policymaking process and the top-down influences cities' integration strategy wield on them, taking into account the cities' historical backgrounds of migration. First, I identified officials from public office, city council and affiliated organisations who were involved in the policymaking process or delivery of integration strategy. This included staff from the Osaka City office and Birmingham City Council as well as assemblypersons for each city and affiliated service provision institutions such as *kokuryū* and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). I also listed upper- and lower-level authorities in Osaka and Birmingham cities, such as Osaka Prefectural office, Osaka's ward offices, WMCA and MHCLG.[19]

[19] Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government was reverted to Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities in 2021. Since data collection and analysis took place while the office remained as a ministry, this study uses its former name.

The second group included activists and experts from key civil society organisations (CSO) that were working to assist migrant populations in each city. The groups I identified have slightly different organisation types depending on national contexts. While CSOs in Birmingham were mostly charity, faith-based organisations (FBO) and community interest company (CIC), those in Osaka varied from NGOs, non-profit organisations (NPO), voluntary groups (VG), general incorporated association (GIA) to general incorporated foundation (GIF). They are not necessarily based in Osaka or Birmingham, as there were some international humanitarian organisations (IHO) whose work engaged with a settlement of migrant residents.

Next, I determined who were regarded as 'migrants' in each city, although they were not necessarily called as such. By reflecting on the demographic and historical backgrounds of the two cities and looking at who was targeted (or not) for integration through the city's policies and practices, I listed prominent migrant groups in each city. Activists from migrant organisations were selected among different migrant communities that were active in assisting migrants' well-being and aiming to increase the political and social presence of the concerned population.[20] This study does not take ethnicity or migrant groups as the unit of analysis but organisations and their positions in integration processes. Hence, I ensured that I would not equate organisations with ethnic groups and homogenise their identities, social and cultural standings, and approaches to integration

[20] Members from such migrant communities are not all necessarily non-Japanese or non-British nationals, but include those who possess Japanese or British citizenship and their descendants.

during data collection and analysis (Brubaker, 2002). In the later section, I further explain the profiles of interview participants by city.

After determining key actors through the mapping exercise and collecting relevant information, I recruited them via e-mail and phone. I also employed snowball sampling, asking respondents for other possible participants since they were often part of the network through which they co-create integration strategy, and they would be well aware of the functions and positions of each organisation. Upon recruiting, I created different versions of information sheets for policymakers, CSO staff, and migrant organisation staff, and the participants were given an information sheet and consent form before the interview. When interviewing participants from the public office, I also sent a list of questions beforehand while advising that the interview would take a semi-structured form (see Appendix 2 and 3 for topic guides and information sheets). The participants were able to withdraw at any time before or during the interviews. They also had until three months after the interviews to decide to remove their data. Upon recruiting participants, I told them that I would provide briefs with key findings and access to the thesis. Participants also had a chance to see their scripts if they wished. Due to the nature of the study participants, I did not provide any incentives to encourage participation.

4.3.3 Interview structure

All interviews were semi-structured since it helps to describe participants' opinions and perspectives in a relatively flexible structure by optimising "the knowledge-producing potentials of dialogues" (Brinkmann, 2014, p.286). Having a topic guide is helpful in visualising research questions and maintaining the consistency of the interview (Arthur

and Nazroo, 2003). Based on the conceptual framework of urban citizenship and integration strategy, I developed topic guides for each stakeholder group in each city, both in English and Japanese, which all had four main themes: 1) profile of the interviewee and his/her organisation; 2) network with other offices and organisations; 3) city's integration strategy – policymaking process, target population, target domains, influence and feedback, and city's capability –; and 4) future perspectives (see Appendix 2 for full topic guide). These allowed me to understand the role the participants and their organisations are playing in the top-down or bottom-up process of integration and explore how the city's integration strategy and CSOs, as well as migrant groups, are mutually influenced.

Specifically, interviews with officials were structured to explore their assumption of local membership of migrants and the process in which they articulate it into the local integration framework. Sub-topics included their relationship with the national government, community members and groups, and other municipalities and their attitude towards migrant groups that are not explicitly mentioned in their official publications, such as undocumented migrants and asylum seekers. Topic guides for interviews with activists and experts from CSOs and migrant groups included sub-sections around the influence of their groups on the community and their demands for national, regional and local governments. Questions about the impacts of the pandemic on the respondents' organisations and on concerned migrant communities and their integration were added to topic guides for all stakeholders, as I discuss in detail later.

4.3.4 Conducting interviews

The first half of my fieldwork was carried out in Osaka, where I conducted 35 interviews with 48 participants from February to September 2020. Due to the pandemic, the data collection period in Osaka was extended for two months and resulted in a mix of online and on-site interviews. I carried out 20 interviews with 20 participants in Birmingham from September 2020 to April 2021. All the interviews in Birmingham were conducted online. Overall, in Osaka, I conducted 10 interviews with participants working in the public sector and 25 interviews with activists from CSOs and migrant community groups. The former group included policymakers, councillors and *kokuryū* staff. Three of them were officials who were directly involved with Osaka City, while the rest of the interviews were with those who work outside the city, such as other city officials and prefectural officials. The latter group of CSOs included Japanese and non-Japanese nationals from organisations that support migrants living in the city and a wider Kansai area. Those organisations were mainly NPOs and VGs but also included an FBO and general incorporated organisations. Profiles of migrant groups supported by those organisations were wide-ranging: long-established *zainichi* Korean communities; newly arrived economic migrants; international students; technical interns; spouses of Japanese nationals; migrant children; refugees; asylum seekers and those who are on provisional release; and undocumented migrants. In Birmingham, I conducted 5 interviews with participants working in the public sector in Birmingham and in a wider area; three of them were directly involved with integration matters in the city. I also had 15 interviews with CSO individuals, including British and non-British nationals from groups and organisations, ranging from charities and FBOs to a CIC. They worked for a wide range of migrant (and non-migrant) groups: long-standing

ethnic minority communities from Commonwealth countries;[21] refugees; asylum seekers; undocumented migrants; economic migrants; and EU nationals.

Due to the pandemic, I made several changes in my data collection. One of the biggest changes was the switch to online interviews using the Zoom software. When carrying out interviews online, I sent out a Zoom link and consent form to the participant via e-mail, and the consent form was signed online. While I used such a method for some interviews in Osaka and all interviews in Birmingham, around two-thirds of interviews in Osaka were carried out in person upon the participants' requests. In order to mitigate the risk, however, I primarily suggested meeting online and passed up the invitation to visit offices when the participants were located outside Osaka City. Face-to-face interviews took place in the participants' office, with the exception of one interview at a café. When in person, safety guidelines, such as wearing a face mask and physical distancing, were strictly followed, and these initiatives were offered predominantly by the participants themselves (specific changes and measures taken place in light of the pandemic are discussed later).

Some respondents in Osaka preferred to be interviewed with other staff, resulting in 8 interviews with multiple participants, ranging from 2 to 6. In such a case, I collected a consent form from every participant. Interviews took an hour on average, whereas a couple of interviews lasted more than two hours. In Japan, 4 interviews were carried out in English, and the rest of the participants were comfortable talking in Japanese, while all

[21] While many of ethnic minority communities are British nationals, this study took into account of those communities, as their arrival and settlement in the UK have often been discussed in the context of integration and community cohesion. Furthermore, anti-immigrant sentiment and hostile environment have often extended to such racialised groups (Danewid, 2020; Mosselson, 2021).

interviews in Birmingham were conducted in English. With the participants' consent, I recorded interviews with an IC recorder and a phone, both password-protected. Online interviews were recorded using the Zoom function (technical challenges of online interviewing are discussed later in this chapter).

4.3.5 Interview data transcription and analysis

All interviews were transcribed using NVivo 12. Transcription became unpredictably challenging since the online meeting device often picked up only one speaker's voice when there were overlapping voices speaking simultaneously. In addition, having face-to-face interviews in a room with open doors and windows with face coverings and social distancing required extremely diligent listening and transcription because recorded data were often full of background noises, and the respondents' voices were muffled and small.

As discussed earlier, data collection and analysis processes always involved both Japanese and English, and I played the role of a translator and a researcher. Interviews conducted in Japanese were transcribed in Japanese, and those in English were transcribed in English. I utilised the Zoom auto-transcription function when I had online interviews in English. Coding and data analysis were carried out using both Japanese and English, and some parts of Japanese transcriptions were translated into English only when they needed to be quoted.

Using NVivo, data analysis first started by categorising stakeholders based on their affiliation in order to highlight the roles played by public institutions and civil society. Data was differentiated based on whether they were from public or third-sector organisations.

Here, I decided to group third-sector organisations and migrant organisations together and treat them as CSOs due to their shared characteristics and goals and the low interview recruitment rates of migrant organisations in both cities. Consequently, all interview transcripts were coded line by line. Data analysis of interviews followed thematic analysis based on an inductive approach. Thematic analysis was applicable inasmuch as it can flexibly identify and analyse themes embedded within collected data (see Braun and Clarke, 2006; Joffe, 2012). It helped me identify relations between different stakeholders that shape the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy.

The following round of the coding process categorised individual nodes into bigger code groups based on a coding book. The coding book was developed based both on the conceptual framework (see Chapter 3) and on the gathered data through policy analysis and interviews. Some nodes were coded into multiple codes when they conveyed overlapping ideas. Categories were created mainly based on stakeholders involved in the narrative and their relations with other stakeholders. For example, when the city official talked about the city's integration practices that involved third-sector organisations, it was added under the category of 'city-third sector'. Some codes and categorisations were added as the coding process continued, including topics related to the pandemic, which were highlighted and coded separately. The second round of coding brought together codes under bigger categories that signify different approaches to urban citizenship outlined in Chapter 3, namely, 'transnational networks', 'residency and presence', 'acts' and 'practices'. I also assigned codes that highlighted the multi-level and multi-scalar influence exerted on the city's integration strategy into a code called 'multi-level and scale

governance'. Coding was a crucial stage of "breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.61) and "defin[es] what the data are all about" (Charmaz, 2001, p.341).

4.4 Researcher positionalities and the field

Social constructivism looks at how different actors are involved in the social production of knowledge, and the positionality of the researcher is manifested in such knowledge production. Sword (1999, p.277), reflecting on how she manifested herself throughout the research process, concludes that "no research is free of the biases, assumptions, and personality of the researcher" and "[w]e cannot separate self from those activities in which we are intimately involved". Researchers can never become independent of their research, and acknowledging one's positionality and evaluating its effect make reflexivity possible. The position and worldview of the researcher affect three aspects of the research: 1) access to possible participants to the study; 2) the researcher-researched relationship; and 3) findings and conclusions as one's positionality signifies the 'lens' the researcher chooses to filter the information (Berger, 2015, p.220).

Such reflexivity carries special weight in fieldwork since 'the field' is where the researcher collects data and produces knowledge. Inasmuch as the field is always shared by the researcher and the researched as a space where knowledge is produced and the researcher-researched interactions occur, the field is a contested idea and mutually constructed by both the researcher and participants (England, 1994). The knowledge from the field is, therefore, mutually constructed by the researched and the researcher throughout the course of fieldwork. The researcher must pay heed to the relationship he

or she builds and maintains with the participant and to the way in which researcher identities are positioned within their interpersonal relationships (Chacko, 2004; Giampapa, 2011); it is inevitable that the researcher's fluid, multiple identities and positionalities make fieldwork contested and shifting (Srivastava, 2006). Researcher identities, meaning and hierarchy the interview respondent assigns to the researcher (and the other way around) can shape power relations and the interviewee's responses as well as the researcher's interpretation and translation (e.g. Banks, 1998; Liamputtong, 2010). In this section I examine my positionality during the fieldwork and power dynamics, especially with 'elite' participants. Furthermore, my identity as an international student from Japan has affected how research participants and I positioned myself in the interview setting. This section addresses how I mitigated the power dynamics to facilitate the interview process.

4.4.1 Interviewing elite participants

As mentioned above, a significant number of interview participants for this study, mainly civil servants, can be characterised as elites who are associated with specific power and privilege. Although definitions and power attached to the 'elite' conception have been questioned (Smith, 2006), elites in general can be understood as possessing access to particular resources, professional networks, and social and discursive figures as elites (Woods, 1998, p.2108). Unlike other study participants who are selected based on certain criteria such as class, gender and race, elites are often "identifiable individuals or groups of individuals" (Odendahl and Shaw, 2001, p.301). In light of this, policymakers and civil servants for this study can be regarded as elite participants in the sense that they all possessed leadership positions in the public sector. Furthermore, other participants who had a leadership role in CSOs can also be categorised as such since their status allowed

them to exercise certain power upon their groups and extended communities through their own resources and networks. They are elite also because of their expertise and knowledge of situations of migrants in the community and their settlement in the city.

When interviewing those elites, the researcher's understanding of the elite culture is significant (Ostrander, 1993; Hunter, 1995; Odendahl and Shaw, 2001). Particularly, researchers must bear in mind the power dynamics that derive from the position of elite respondents that would make the interviewing, coding and analysing phases difficult (Dexter, 1970; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Beamer, 2002; Goldstein, 2002). It is widely acknowledged that the individual background of the researcher and interview settings are "together intertwined with activities through which power appears, with each of these activities further playing a role in shaping the course and content of the interview" (Vähäsantanen and Saarinen, 2013, p.507). This was obvious in my interviews, where the participants who held a position in their affiliated organisation or institution played a 'teacher' role in sharing their experience and knowledge about migrant integration (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Beamer, 2002; Goldstein, 2002; Hoffmann, 2007). I gathered background information about elite participants' affiliated organisations, including their missions and roles in the national and regional contexts, relations with other organisations, and existing policies, to facilitate interviews and thoroughly understand the study subject. I tried to ensure formality and acknowledge my social status in order to mitigate the power dynamics, conduct productive interviews and retain the integrity of the research. This point is also linked to my insider/outsider positionality as a researcher, which I will discuss later. These practices helped me take control of the study in a power relation and establish my "own authority" to some extent (Ostrander, 1993;

Hunter, 1995; Richards, 1996; Odendahl and Shaw, 2001, p.311); nevertheless, I often found myself 'powerless' and lost control of the flow and structure of the interview, as I describe later (see Thomas, 1993).

In elite interviewing, moreover, I was aware that bureaucratic elites such as civil servants and other expert elites like representatives from CSOs may vary in their knowledge production and construction process due to the different nature of their political and social positions and responsibilities (see Meuser and Nagel, 2009). In addition to taking into account available sources such as publications, websites and their social media posts, before the interviews, I examined policy documents and explored local political and social contexts of organisations vis-à-vis the city and the national government, which helped me to understand their positionalities in migrant integration issues.

Another feature of elite interviewing is that elite participants are not meant to give an answer to establish "the truth" but to provide "an insight into the mind-set of the actor/s who have played a role in shaping the society… and an interviewee's subjective analysis of a particular episode or situation" (Richards, 1996, p.200). During the interview and at the analysis stage, I was aware that the responses that participants had given might not accurately reflect reality and may lack validity (see Dexter, 1970). By taking into account other written reports and respondents' social and political perspectives, I gained an objective standpoint for assessing the validity of information, whether they spoke on behalf of their affiliated organisations or shared their personal accounts (Beamer, 2002).

4.4.2 Power dynamics in physical and virtual fields

Academics insist on the significance of the researcher's understanding of the power dynamics that derive from the position of respondents as well as the location of the interview, and my experience of conducting in-person and online interviews corroborates this (see Ostrander, 1993; Hunter, 1995; Solarino and Aguinis, 2021). For instance, one participant, a middle school teacher in Osaka, suggested to meet at his school. I was invited to sit down in a classroom where he answered my questions and told his stories, standing in front of the blackboard. The teacher-student relationship allowed the participant to take the lead and manifest his power, and eventually altered the usual researcher-researched relationship. Another example can be drawn from the interview in Japan, where a public servant accompanied five other officers. Our conversation proceeded along with the agenda they had prepared based on the list of questions I had provided beforehand. Although I was still able to ask 'improvised' questions to clarify their responses, the authority in the room was in the hands of the six officers. They manifested power over me by demonstrating their supremacy in their title (public employee vs student), expertise (teacher vs learner), number (six vs one) and age (older vs younger).

Nonetheless, such a shift in power relations hardly occurred for online interviews. Since face-to-face interviews mostly take place in (elite) participants' offices or places they wish, power is already manifested in the space and its owner. Once the researcher agrees with the meeting place and enters it, a certain degree of power is granted to the participants, who can take control over how the interview could proceed. Nevertheless, online interviews are usually set up by the researcher who provides the meeting link and holds a position as a 'meeting host'. Participants are 'invited' to the virtual place owned by the

researcher, who can ‘open’ and ‘close’ the space, granting the researcher an invisible power to take the lead. For example, on one occasion, when I had an online interview with two participants, background noise from a participant was interrupting the other participant who was answering my question. I put her on mute after gently advising her that the noise was coming from her office and that I had to mute her. Since she did not know how to do it by herself, I kept un/muting her during the whole interview. This indicates that I had control of the participants and timing they could talk. Spatial contexts of interviews, therefore, matter to a great extent as long as interviews in participants’ workplaces allow them to own the physical space and exert power over how the interview is conducted, and online interviews could turn over the power relations between the researcher and the researched regardless of their positions. It adds another layer of complex researcher positionalities in the ‘field’.

Gender also plays a crucial role in controlling power dynamics (e.g. Manderson et al., 2006). Though being a female interviewer, I did not face any particular situations in which my gender and that of the participants were explicitly emphasised, and this is perhaps because my research topic was not necessarily a sensitive one. However, some considerations can be taken away from the fact that I had more female gatekeepers than male gatekeepers in Japan and the UK. As often suggested, it could be because women would feel more comfortable building rapport and sharing their experiences with female researchers (Hamberg and Johansson, 1999). However, it is also pointed out that gender is not the dominant factor that automatically distributes power but only one of the factors that shape interpersonal relations together with environmental, biographical and psycho-social attributes (Broom et al., 2009; Vähäsantanen and Saarinen, 2013). The

intersectionality of these attributes had to be considered well in order to constructively shape the collected data and reflexivity.

4.4.3 Insider/outsider positionality and negotiation in the field

In an attempt to gauge and contextualise the position of the researcher in the field, the concept of insiders and outsiders has often been used. While the insider/outsider boundary is useful in providing a broad overview of the researcher's positionality, field researchers have insisted that it is rather a fluid, ambiguous spectrum and that the researcher can be an insider and outsider at the same time (e.g. Song and Parker, 1995; Hellawell, 2006; Carling et al., 2014; Aiello and Nero, 2019). Academics are convinced that the positionality of the researcher vis-à-vis the interview respondent or their affiliated community cannot be determined a priori but negotiated through multiple positionings in the course of field research practices (Song and Parker, 1995; Kusow, 2003). My positionalities vis-à-vis each participant were constantly in flux, as my fieldwork took place in two different countries using both face-to-face and online means in two different languages (see, for example, Narayan, 1993; Adler, 2004).

Although insider/outsider research is traditionally categorised based on whether the researcher is at home (insider) or away from home (outsider), the relationship between the researcher and the field is also contested and fluid, transcending a simple binary (Adu-Ampong and Adams, 2020). Multiple researcher identities imply various approaches and strategies the researcher can and should apply in the field. I indeed had different positions and relationships vis-à-vis two ‘home’ fields and adopted different approaches in order to better situate myself and conduct productive research. Fieldwork in Japan was

my ‘return’ to home, as I was born and raised in Osaka and stayed with my family during data collection. On the other hand, the fieldwork in Birmingham was also a ‘return’ to the city where I had spent the past four years. However, the degree of ‘homeness’ obviously varied for the two cities when looking at the number of years spent, my visa status and so on. Although the number of years I had spent in Birmingham was less than that of Osaka, Birmingham encompassed most of my academic and personal networks; on the other hand, I rarely had a chance to update my local knowledge of Osaka since I left the city after high school. The understanding of ‘home’ among academics is recognised as fluid, and, in my case, both cities were home where I had a certain level of local knowledge and personal network with local communities (see Wiederhold, 2015).

As several researchers reported, seemingly ‘insider’ research at home encompasses complexities and unique dynamics (Chacko, 2004; Sultana, 2007). Since the ‘insiderness’ of the researcher makes the participants aware of his or her knowledge of local contexts and norms, any other differences can easily impact their relationship and turn the researcher from an insider to an outsider (Ganga and Scott, 2006; Sultana, 2007; Weiner-Levy and Abu Rabia Queder, 2012). Such subtleness of insider research can be managed to some extent by (not) showing one's own social attributes. Srivastava (2006, p.214) calls these social attributes “currencies”; although researcher identities are first determined by the participants from fixed attributes such as gender, race, age, education and surname, other ‘grey’ attributes are rather in the hands of the researcher to be utilised for negotiating one’s positionalities.

Throughout fieldwork, I tried to maintain proximity and conduct smooth and efficient interviews by forming a 'cultural commonality' and finding common ground with the respondents (see Song and Parker, 1995). In addition to local knowledge and cultural practices, religion and my familiarity with local geography were two main 'grey' attributes that I spontaneously and deliberately made use of. In Japan, for example, I signed my name in *kanji* (Chinese characters employed in Japanese), carried my *meishi* (name card) – a common practice in Japan even for a graduate student – and followed the most polite manners by only using *keigo* (honorifics) to all, even to the participants younger than me. This was not only to show that I was a 'common' Japanese but also to maintain the power relations with elite participants, whose social status played a decisive role in interviews.

Most of the participants in Japan asked me whether I was from Osaka and posed further 'local' questions about the ward I lived in and the school I went to, which indicated that they, too, attempted to measure the proximity with me. However, I was very careful in disclosing my religious identity in Japan, where religious practices are not common, and people could have a stigma against it. Furthermore, the religious organisation I belong to was often associated with a particular political party that was not necessarily supported by the research participants. To avoid their judging and heightening my 'outsiderness' on the grounds of religion and politics, I did not mention the name of my religious organisation or the school I went to (which was associated with my religious affiliation) except for a couple of respondents who were already informed about my background. Such concern was specific to the Japanese context.

On the other hand, in the UK, I attempted to build a positive relationship with participants and smoothen interviews by emphasising my identity as someone having resided in the UK for over four years rather than just as an international student. Indeed, some participants' accounts seemed to be situating me as non-local; for example, when giving general information about the UK or Birmingham, a couple of participants said, "I'm not sure if you know this, but here we…" assuming that I was an 'outsider' because of my status as a student, East Asian identity and English skills. In order to show my 'localness' and build further familiarity, I conducted "strategic undressing" and attempted to find a shared identity and foster trust with the participants (see Thurairajah, 2019, p.136). Whenever the respondents talked about local places in Birmingham, I tried to show some gestures to imply that I was familiar with those places. When they mentioned any places I had lived, I always told them that I once lived there and added some local information or characteristics of the place. Furthermore, when I knew someone that they were working with, I mentioned their names at the beginning of the interview so that they would regard me as more than a mere researcher. I also deliberately expressed my personal views on migration issues to inform the participants that I shared the same political views.

This strategy of handling 'grey' attributes indeed helped me build rapport and 'level the field' (see Dickson-Swift et al., 2007) yet indicated some challenges of drawing and maintaining the boundary with the participants both in Japan and the UK. For instance, some participants asked further personal questions concerning my family, which could be too personal. I was also sometimes asked for my personal contacts or invited over to their houses. Although I appreciated the bonds I created with those participants, I had to draw a line and clarify my role as a researcher. My positionality vis-à-vis participants indeed

shifted sometimes, and the relationship I built with them took various shapes throughout the data collection stage. These boundary negotiation practices enabled me and the participants to identify shared social locations while ensuring our roles as the researcher and the researched.

4.5 Global pandemic and its impact on research methods

The COVID-19 outbreak occurred around the time I started fieldwork in Japan in February 2020. Teti et al. (2020, p.1) assert that it was “not just a medical pandemic” but “a social event that is disrupting our social order” and further introduce the following from MacGregor et al. (2020):

> The dynamics of the virus, infection and immunity, not to mention on-going efforts to revise and improve clinical care, and endeavors to develop medical treatments and vaccines, are a critical part of the unfolding story. So, too, are peoples’ social responses to the disease and interactions with each other. COVID-19 is revealing, reinforcing, and catalyzing new social and cultural relations; laying bare inequalities and anxieties, discrimination and division; but also galvanizing solidarities and collective action. (MacGregor et al., 2020, para.1)

The pandemic has exerted short- and long-term, collective and individual, global and local impacts that are not yet completely evident at the time of writing. In light of methodology, the situations of both the researcher and the researched have been unsettled inasmuch as my fieldwork period witnessed the world shifting from the ‘pre-pandemic’ to ‘mid-pandemic’ settings. My entire fieldwork was conducted during the pandemic, and I

adopted both face-to-face and online interviewing methods, which added some technical, methodological and ethical concerns.

4.5.1 Conducting fieldwork during the pandemic

Although I was able to continue fieldwork and collect data, I had to revisit my pre-pandemic research design. In practice, fieldwork in the two cities was disrupted by the outbreak and following restrictions, and it took longer than initially planned. As discussed in Chapter 2, Japan and the UK applied different measures to mitigate the situation, and my fieldwork experience and collected data therefore reflect those differences. When I started fieldwork in Japan, it was the initial stage of the outbreak, and its severity was still unknown. Since the country did not impose any restrictions but 'stay-at-home advice' and the low number of cases even allowed the government to encourage social activities, I was still able to meet the interviewees in person following safety measures, except for those who wished to meet online or who lived far from the city. On the other hand, by the time I finished data collection in Birmingham, respondents in the UK had seen three lockdowns with much higher coronavirus cases and deaths, and when I arrived in September 2020, it was a time between the first and second lockdowns. I met all the UK participants only virtually, and, while the pandemic was mentioned rather as a 'chitchat' during the interviews in Japan, it was one of the main topics the Birmingham participants brought up and wished to discuss. As the fieldwork carried on in 2021, vaccination and its rollout became a more popular topic.

Carrying out data collection in the beginning and midst of the pandemic, I also extended my consideration to each participant who must have been affected in many ways yet

agreed to participate in the research. In the shared document *Doing a fieldwork in a pandemic*, edited by social scientists responding to the crisis in the early phase, it is pointed out that researchers must consider “affective atmospheres”:

> of conducting any kind of social research in a pandemic, when normal routines are disrupted and many people are feeling uncertain and worried, or are ill or caring for ill family members. People may be living in environments where they are subjected to harassment, violence or surveillance by other family members. (Lupton, 2020, p.20)

I was always ready to offer support and careful with the vulnerability and confidentiality of each participant. However, of course, I cannot know the extent to which each participant has been affected and therefore cannot fully reflect how their responses and attitudes were shaped by the impacts of the pandemic both at collective and individual levels. Collecting data from people who have been affected differently through different phases of the pandemic in different settings, I must consider how the participants and their accounts were shaped and affected by the pandemic – the medium, participants’ availability, the way they responded to my questions, contents and flow of the interviews, and so on. The comparison also had to be done by taking into account differences created by the pandemic in addition to considering already existing cultural and regional factors that comparative researchers have looked at. As such, data collected and analysed for this research is not committed to illustrating the pandemic in two settings in full detail but rather to capturing glimpses of the ways migrant integration and urban citizenship have (or have not) shifted in the eyes of different stakeholders at the time of the pandemic.

4.5.2 Technical challenges of online interviewing and its implications for rapport building

Online interviews have highlighted some particular implications in data collection, from the technicality of the interview to rapport building. The shift to online medium was rather smooth, as many participants were already familiar with the Zoom software. While using Zoom allowed me to establish audio-visual interactivity and remain cost and time effective while being physically away, I went through several challenges pointed out by researchers when conducting online interviews (e.g. O'connor et al., 2008; Janghorban et al., 2014; Weller, 2017). First, some participants expressed their concern about their lack of knowledge and experience in using Zoom and signing the consent form online. Some people, especially the elderly, were not comfortable talking online and were discouraged from taking part or demanded to meet in person, whereas younger participants had relatively little trouble with online interviewing, which might have affected my recruitment and data collection process. Although I provided as much technical support as I could, it eventually depended on individuals' digital knowledge and environment. At one interview, the participant was trying to install Zoom but could not work out the audio. After thirty minutes of giving instructions over the phone and email, we decided to move on to Microsoft Teams, but I could not record the interview due to technical issues. Sometimes, I had to pause the conversation because the participants 'froze' or their voices 'broke down'. Moreover, some participants raised their concerns about using Zoom in light of its security concerns, such as 'Zoom-bombing'. To mitigate the risk, I paid extra attention to prevent security breaches by not sending a Zoom link until nearer the interview date (possibly within 48 hours before the interview), requiring a password for a meeting,

deleting recordings on my computer soon after they were moved to the secure data storage.

At the same time, online interviewing limited opportunities for me to build rapport with participants and observe their workplace, which would have benefitted data analysis and further network building. Although researchers have reported that the remote setting of interviews that do not require each other's physical presence can sometimes benefit in making participants feel relaxed in a comfortable environment (Jenner and Myers, 2019), online rapport building was challenging for me compared to face-to-face meetings. As Weller (2017, p.619) asserts, virtual settings can affect "an interrelationship between rapport and setting articulated through participants' assumptions about (a shared) understanding of the broader spatial context in which their lives were located". I indeed had an interesting experience of remote rapport building. One participant who joined the online interview told me repeatedly that it would be easier for me to understand his work if I visited his office. He showed me his workplace inside out with his phone for over an hour. With his attempt, it was obvious that he felt that I would not be able to comprehend his responses to my questions entirely without being there physically. For that participant, a virtual tour was the way to share what I might have missed virtually and enhance rapport. Some participants, in addition, required me to add them on social media so they would know my face before meeting virtually. This indicates the possible concern that respondents might have had towards the idea of meeting a stranger online and building a rapport, signalling Mann and Stewart's (2000) discussion on the emotional connection with a (stranger) participant through online communication. The absence of 'greetings' and 'leavings' interchanges in online interviews also made the interview experience

different from face-to-face occasions (see Weller, 2017). Rapport building was quicker and smoother for in-person meetings, as I was able to have casual conversations with participants before and after the interview. Online interviews gave me little chance to have such casual conversations that could have allowed me to strengthen the relationship with the participants.

Moreover, as reported by Deakin and Wakefield (2014), the virtual distance between the researcher and participants and the absence of rapport may have made some participants feel less committed to the interview. Despite a reminder I sent along with a Zoom link, some participants forgot about the meeting until I contacted them. I had to reschedule for some cases when they were not reachable because they did not check their email or phone, and their office line was not available due to a lockdown. On another occasion, it was difficult to manage their attention on the screen, as the participant was distracted by multi-tasking, and I had to repeat questions and explain my project several times. Such cases were significantly evident for interviews in the UK, as I had more online interviews in the UK than in Japan.

4.6 Ethical considerations

I adhered to the ethical guidelines of the University of Birmingham and obtained full ethical approval from the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee before starting the fieldwork. Changes made during fieldwork in light of the pandemic, specifically the shift to online interviews, online collection of consent forms and the addition of new COVID-related questions, were reported to the committee in 2020. Here, I extend my considerations over the participants' anonymity and vulnerability in this research.

4.6.1 Anonymity and personally identifiable information

Given the nature of some of the interview participants, there are limits of confidentiality and anonymity of elite interviewing that participants would wish to speak on behalf of affiliated organisations and may be identifiable to the public with the information in the research output. Interview participants were not anonymous, and they were classified based on the occupations, titles, and characteristics of their organisations, such as policymakers, civil group activists, and migrant organisation spokespersons. As such, in the recruiting process, I particularly put emphasis on whether it would be fine for the participants if their names, positions, and organisations were named, while this thesis does not disclose such information unless necessary. I also made sure that all necessary information regarding confidentiality and anonymity was included in the consent form. Although some participants refused to be named in the research outputs, they had to be aware that they may be identifiable due to their position and characteristics of organisations. I made sure the participants were comfortable with being named and recording the conversation, and I noted their risk of being identified both in the information sheet and before the interview. Furthermore, some of the attributes of participants, such as gender, age, immigration status and professional experience, were also taken into account in data analysis to better shape the voices of the interviewees in different sectors. All other personal details, such as contact details, were stored separately from the interview data and password-protected so that they were not transcribed or coded. In addition, participants sometimes talked about other individuals, their names, socio-economic situations, legal status or personal events, which can be traced back to them. In such a case, I did not transcribe personally identifiable details to maintain confidentiality.

4.6.2 Vulnerability

Although this research recruited ‘elite’ stakeholders whose public identity was already established to a certain degree, the vulnerability of some participants, especially those who were migrants, had to be considered (Fisher and Anushko, 2008). Although this risk was mitigated with my research design that only targeted stakeholders who held positions in official or private organisations, I was extremely careful in protecting personal details by thoroughly following confidentiality and properly managing informed consent. With the pandemic, further attention was given to respondents’ health vulnerability and privacy issues since such ‘affective atmospheres’ in a society full of anxiety and uncertainty could maximise one’s physical, emotional and clinical harm (Lupton, 2020). COVID-related questions at the interview centred on its impacts on concerned communities and organisations, which allowed the respondents to speak on behalf of the organisation rather than as individuals affected by the situation. When they shared about their personal matters or particular cases of other individuals (mostly migrants) with regard to the pandemic, I made sure that they were comfortable enough to do so and that identifiable information would remain confidential. I was also prepared to offer assistance in case participants needed any personal help or showed any signs, although it was unlikely to happen considering the nature of the research design.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have described my research design and fieldwork practicalities. Based on the conceptual framework drawn in Chapter 3, I have discussed how I approached the research questions based on social constructivism and expounded on challenges and limitations experienced mainly during data collection. While policy analysis of the cities’

integration strategy allows me to understand how urban citizenship is incorporated and expressed in policy documents, it is also notable that policy documents are themselves constructed with particular social contexts that policymakers may wish to convey (Mangen, 2004). Interviews with stakeholders, therefore, help me to understand the whole policy processes behind such documents and better capture the realities of urban citizenship. Throughout the interview process, my social constructivist approach allowed me to learn different social realities constructed by individuals who belonged to public or third-sector organisations and the meanings they attach to the topic of migrant integration and the city's strategy. However, there is no absolute knowledge or truth that is without bias. Since knowledge is constructed by social and interpersonal interactions, my lens as a researcher was influenced by my identities and local knowledge as well as the relationship and social proximity I established with each participant throughout my fieldwork practices. This also applies to the translation of sociological concepts between Japanese and English and the way in which I played a role both as a researcher and as a translator for this study. The social status of participants exerted a certain extent of influence over data collection methods and the content of the data itself, which signals the nature of elite interviewing. While I was able to mitigate some challenges, limitations still remain around the way that some elite participants manifested their power within the interview setting, especially in face-to-face situations.

In addition, the pandemic exerted a great impact on my research design, myself, the participants, and national and local situations of migrant integration that have together dynamically shaped participants' responses and the ways in which they and I interpreted and constructed them. The pandemic forced me to utilise both physical and virtual tools

to interact with the participants, but it also gave me an opportunity to consider some spatial implications with regard to interview methods, the researcher-researched relationship, power dynamics and rapport-building strategies. The points outlined in this chapter have indeed influenced and shaped the process of knowledge production of this research, which I present in the following three chapters.

CHAPTER 5
ANALYSING INTEGRATION STRATEGY THROUGH THE LENS OF URBAN CITIZENSHIP

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present policy analysis of the integration strategy of Osaka and Birmingham and argue that the city's integration strategy is a suitable tool for understanding three elements of urban citizenship, namely, status, rights and identity (Joppke, 2007; Gebhardt, 2016; see Chapter 3). While integration approaches and measures applied by Osaka and Birmingham are divergent and respectively shape their urban citizenship, some similarities can be observed. Through examining city-level migrant integration strategy, one can better capture the ideological construction of the urban citizenship framework that demonstrates how the city imagines its space and people. This study pays particular attention to those who arrived from overseas and do not possess citizenship of the host country and attempts to explore how their urban citizenship is articulated in the city in the form of an integration strategy. By doing so, one can better understand the role of the city and its polity in articulating urban citizenship.

As discussed earlier, I consider policies, ordinances and administrative practices concerning the migrant population and their integration as the city's 'integration strategy'. This includes different ranges of policies and policy measures that directly target the migrant population as well as the ones that do not explicitly target them but cover such populations. Combining them as an 'integration strategy' allows analysis of the city's generic integration approach (see Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016b). At the same

time, the absence of such policy and practice can itself be a policy decision and form the city's attitudes towards migrants (see Hammar, 1985b).[22] Hence, this study has taken into account the city's inaction with migrant integration.

Through policy analysis of integration strategy, this chapter particularly demonstrates what status, rights and identity are granted to migrant residents as urban citizens through the city's integration policy and practice. As touched upon in Chapter 3, one way to examine status and membership of urban citizenship is to look at targets of integration strategy and migrants' representation and political participation, which helps to understand whether migrants are included in the configuration of urban citizenship. Migrants' status of urban citizenship can also be examined by using the concept of territoriality to understand how the city recognises migrants' presence during the emergency. Substantive rights of urban citizenship can be studied through migrants' access to various services. Migrants' access to services and rights entails two main characteristics: rights to basic services extended to non-national populations and rights particular to minority groups (Joppke, 2007; Gebhardt, 2016). Migrants' access to basic services, such as education and health, can be granted by the national law or by the local government. It is also important to take into consideration how their access to services is facilitated by the local government through service providers or multi-lingual information. On the other hand, one can examine urban citizenship rights designed specifically for migrant residents by looking at the city's policy around equality and human rights for minority groups. The identity dimension of urban citizenship can be understood from how

[22] For example, the absence of official immigration policy in Japan is a result of policymakers' decision not to act and therefore an 'immigration policy' (see Hammar, 1985b, pp.277-278; see Chapter 2).

migration-driven diversity is regarded in policy documents and how the city recognises migrants' identities, especially with regard to their cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. Similar to the characteristics of the rights dimension, these highlight whether migrants are embraced in the city's collective identity and the extent to which the city respects the individual identities of migrant residents (Gebhardt, 2016) (see Chapter 3 for further discussion on the dimensions of urban citizenship).

I first present findings from Osaka based on the three dimensions. Findings from Birmingham are presented in a similar manner, followed by a conclusion that offers a comparative insight into the findings. As explained in Chapter 2, the political and administrative structures of Japan and the UK are distinct, and so are the demographics and size of the two cities. Yet, studying the integration strategy of the two cities can reveal how their urban citizenship is translated into their integration strategy and show some similarities and differences between the two cities. Moreover, the city's integration strategy has been significantly shaped by power and administrative relations between national and local authorities. As such, the findings and discussion offered in this chapter will benefit the following chapters, which provide empirical perspectives into processes of urban citizenship and integration strategy.

5.2 Osaka: focus on 'old-comer' and 'newcomer' migrants

5.2.1 Status: registered migrants as city citizens

Target of integration

The city's main target within its integration strategy draws lines between inclusion and exclusion. The 2020 Guidelines outline their target as "*gaikoku ni tsunagaru shimin* (city

citizens with foreign background)" and define them as "not only 'foreign residents' based on Basic Resident Register Act, but also Japanese citizenship holders", acknowledging that integration is needed not merely for foreign nationals but also for Japanese citizenship holders with foreign background, including those who naturalised and who are second- or third-generation (Osaka City, 2020b, p.2). While the city's understanding of city citizens (*shimin*) includes migrant residents, it avoids mentioning undocumented migrants and asylum seekers who are not registered based on the *Basic Resident Register Act*.

Osaka's integration strategy seems to have two focuses: integration of the *zainichi* population and that of newly arrived migrants. While the former has developed through the long-standing presence of *zainichi* communities and concerns their ethnocultural identity from a human rights perspective (see Chapter 2), the latter focuses on multilingual information provision for those who do not speak Japanese. Recognising that previous guidelines (the 1998/2004 Guidelines) mainly targeted *zainichi* Korean residents, the 2020 Guidelines maintain that they take into account needs and challenges diversified by newly arrived residents with different nationalities (Osaka City, 2020b, p.1). As the city's demographics have diversified, Osaka's integration strategy has expanded its focus to include newly arrived migrants as their main targets of integration.

Political participation and representation

Although being defined as *shimin*, registered migrants do not possess political rights. In Japan, municipalities have the autonomy to grant voting rights for local referendums to

non-Japanese citizens,[23] but Osaka does not (Osaka City, 2020a; Minjyuu, 2020).[24] Whereas registered migrants are treated as *shimin* together with the native population as well as Japanese citizenship holders with foreign backgrounds, there is a clear distinction between *shimin* with Japanese citizenship and those without in terms of their political rights as urban citizens. This signifies that the city chooses to follow the national framework of citizenship that distinguishes its residents based on their nationality.

In addition, migrants' representation and participation in city governance are further limited. The advisory committee on policy for foreign residents, launched in 1994, was abolished in 2014 due to the court ruling (Osaka City, 2022e).[25] The committee had invited up to fourteen Japanese and non-Japanese members, especially those who were actively engaged with civil society, to discuss issues migrants faced and co-designed the 1998/2004 Guidelines with the city. However, since 2014, no formal bodies to represent the migrant population have been set up by the city; instead, the city occasionally conducts interviews with a couple of academics and experts in the area (Osaka City, 2022e).

Another aspect of Osaka's control over migrants' representation is the employment of non-Japanese as a public officer. Although Japan does not allow non-Japanese citizens to apply to become civil servants for national government agencies, the Diet and court,

[23] Although participation of non-Japanese citizens in local referendums is determined by local authorities, non-Japanese citizens do not possess local suffrage.
[24] In 2020, Osaka City's then Mayor Matsui asserted that it would not be acceptable that "foreigners get directly involved with administration of the state as well as municipalities" and stated that, "if you want to vote [in a local referendum], get a Japanese citizenship" (Osaka Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 2020, paras4–5).
[25] The city follows the court ruling in Hiroshima that municipalities need an ordinance to launch any affiliated advisory or investigative bodies (Osaka City, 2022e).

local governments can employ non-Japanese citizens for some selected positions. Osaka has gradually expanded employment opportunities for non-Japanese residents since 1974, even before the central government officially approved it in 1991 (Ikeda, 2003), and the number of non-Japanese public employees in Osaka is relatively higher than in other municipalities. However, the city follows the state-level agreement that does not allow non-Japanese citizens to be involved in a higher decision-making process and, therefore, precludes non-Japanese employees from management positions (Osaka City, 2022a).

Recognising migrants through their presence during disasters

With a series of natural disasters regularly hitting the country, disaster management and preparedness have been one of the top priorities of *tabunka kyōsei* for municipalities across Japan (MIC, 2006). Indeed, one of the core objectives of the 2020 Guidelines is the promotion of disaster preparedness, whose measures include providing information in multiple languages, including plain Japanese, encouraging migrants to take part in local disaster drills and educating them about earthquakes and necessary preparations (Osaka City, 2020b). In the event of a natural disaster, the city *kokuryū* operates the Multilingual Disaster Support Centre to provide information online with NPOs and volunteers. Working with *kokuryū*, the city furthermore seeks to incorporate migrants' perspectives into disaster drills and improve the environment of evacuation centres. While the 2020 Guidelines explicitly target registered migrants in the city, their presence can be recognised through everyday preparation for such emergency.

5.2.2 Rights: investing in multilingual information provision

Kokuryū as the key to service provision

Osaka's integration measures seem to be eager to facilitate migrants' access to services, such as health care, childcare, pension schemes, tax payments, school education and disaster preparedness, by placing multilingual information and consultation services as the first objective of the guidelines. Those basic services are available for registered migrants by national law and provided by the city, and it is the city *kokuryū*, who plays a key role in reaching out to migrants and notifying them of available services. Funded by the city, *kokuryū* had a budget of more than ¥36 million in 2020 for multilingual information provision and consultation services (Osaka International House Foundation, 2022), while the budget allocated to the city's Community Service Department for 'promotion of *tabunka kyōsei* measures' was nearly ¥3 million in the same year, of which multilingual information provision amounted to ¥118 thousand (Osaka City, 2021b).

With regard to service provision, the city *kokuryū* is commissioned to fully function as the contact point for migrants and inform them about available services. It runs a consultation desk to respond to enquiries in 30 languages and translates calls made directly to the city office that needs language support while holding workshops to assist migrants' employment and entrepreneurship. It also holds legal consultations for migrants concerning immigration and employment matters. In 2020, *kokuryū* responded to more than 5,000 enquiries in various areas of public services and provided nearly 250 legal consultations (Osaka International House Foundation, 2021). During the pandemic, Osaka City relied on *kokuryū* to provide multilingual information and respond to consultations from migrants. Such information included general guidance, application for cash handouts and government subsidies and information on vaccination, which are measures only available for migrants registered on Resident Record.

Education

School education is one of the areas that the city pays particular heed to, and, working with NPOs, the city has led some practices to enhance migrant children's educational experiences. Albeit not compulsory, public school education is open to all migrant children, including those without immigration status, through elementary and junior high schools. The city has paid attention to the needs and integration of migrant children, especially those whose first language is not Japanese. In 2020, it opened support hubs (*kyōsei shien kyoten*) within the four selected public schools with a high proportion of migrant children (Osaka City, 2020d). These hubs are available for all students, pupils, guardians and school staff across the city. The hubs, working in collaboration with the city *kokuryū*, invite migrant children and their guardians to pre-school classes where they learn school-related Japanese words and what to expect in school life. Coordinators are assigned to each hub and send support staff and Japanese tutors to local schools where migrant children need assistance. In the *Tabunka Kyōsei* Room launched in the hub, staff from the city's Board of Education give advice to guardians and school teachers on matters relating to the learning and school life of migrant children (Osaka City, 2020d).

In addition, some schools in the city are designated as '*sentā kō* (centre school)', which provide Japanese classes for migrant children across the city after school hours.[26] Furthermore, several public schools accept migrant students in the city by admission quota and support their learning. All these practices within and outside schools enormously entail public-third sector cooperation. Many NPOs provide various learning

[26] As of 2020, there are 12 elementary and junior high schools that were designated as *sentā kō*.

supports for migrant children by teaching Japanese, assisting in school homework, supporting high school enrolment and encouraging them to maintain their own cultural and lingual identity. Network and cooperation amongst the city (Board of Education), support hubs, *kokuryū*, NPOs and schools are regarded as essential elements in supporting migrant children in the city (Osaka City Board of Education, 2021).

Health

Migrants who are registered for more than three months are covered by the National Health Insurance (NHI) system, which reduces their medical costs for primary and secondary care, except for migrants whose country of origin is in the national social security agreements with Japan. Osaka has distributed information booklets in multiple languages to encourage migrants to submit the NHI application. At the same time, some health services, such as vaccination, maternity care and tuberculosis tests, are widely available by national law for migrants regardless of their immigration status and are provided by municipalities. The city also mentions that free/low-cost medical services for people in low-income households are available for migrants with or without immigration status on a case-by-case basis (Osaka City, 2022f). Furthermore, it provides an alternative benefit for elderly migrants with particular profiles who are not eligible for the National Pension System, while it is a rather as small amount as ¥10,000 each month (Osaka City, 2021a).

Protecting the human rights of migrants

Given the presence and activism of *Buraku* and *zainichi* communities, the city has been eager to promote human rights measures for these minority groups (see Chapter 2). The

2000 Ordinance on Creating a Society of Respect for Human Rights maintains the city's responsibility to promote human rights measures in all policy areas and expects *shimin* to cooperate with such measures (Osaka City, 2000). The ordinance launched the Osaka City Council on Promotion of Human Rights to invite experts and academics and discuss matters regarding human rights, including the city's *tabunka kyōsei* policy. The 2005 Basic Guidelines of Human Rights Governance especially ensure equal opportunities for all citizens to access services. In addition, consultation services are available for all residents to seek advice on human rights matters (Osaka City, 2005). While the *2016 Osaka City Ordinance on Dealing with Hate Speech* seeks to prohibit hate speech (see Chapter 2), the assessment process is relatively slow; among 32 cases that have been assessed since 2016, 11 cases have been confirmed as hate speech, while a couple dozen cases are carried forward each year (Osaka City, 2022b).

5.2.3 Identity: maintaining children's identity

Focus on cultural exchanges

The city recognises its demographic diversity brought by a long-standing experience with *zainichi* communities and the increasing number of migrants coming to the city (Osaka City, 2020b). The city's *tabunka kyōsei* policy emphasises the cultural identity of migrants and cultural exchanges with Japanese residents. One of the main aims of the 2020 Guidelines is to "create an environment where various cultures of citizens with foreign background are respected and their identity is accepted, and to become a city in which all the people residing in Osaka respect each other and live as themselves" (Osaka City, 2020b, p.24). *Kokuryū* takes the lead in hosting cultural exchanges where people

introduce their culture and customs. However, most of those cultural events and Japanese classes were cancelled or moved online during the pandemic.

Maintaining cultural identity through tabunka kyōsei practices in school

The school has been recognised as a place where the cultural identity of migrant children is maintained, and all students and pupils learn about *tabunka kyōsei*. The *2001 Basic Guidelines of Education for Foreign Students* set out five foundations to "eliminate ethnic prejudice and discrimination" and "nurture awareness and pride of students' own country, ethnicity and culture" (Osaka City Board of Education, 2001, p.23). The guidelines specifically aim to integrate *zainichi* children and students and encourage them to use their Korean names and establish their ethnocultural identity. *Minzoku gakkyū* (ethnic class) is an educational practice supported by the city, where Korean teachers hired by the Board of Education teach *zainichi* pupils Korean culture and language and help them enhance their identity. It originated in the closure of Korean schools and students' transfer to public schools within Osaka in 1948 and, pushed by the grassroots movement, developed among schools with a large Korean population. It was later recognised by Osaka City and Prefecture offices and integrated as 'promotion measures of education for international understanding'. As the number of children from other countries and cultures increased, the city renamed it as *kokusai kurabu* (international club). As of 2020, there are 109 public schools with *kokusai kurabu* (Yamamoto, 2020).[27]

[27] Despite the new name, this study uses the former name, *minzoku gakkyū*, to refer to this practice, as it was more prevalently used by practitioners whom I interviewed.

At the same time, defining *tabunka kyōsei* education as “creating new values through mutually understanding various cultures in the world, living together with people with different cultures and working together” (Osaka City, 2020b, p.30), the city has launched the *tabunka kyōsei* educational programme for children to promote understanding of human rights of migrant children in collaboration with local NPOs and university (MEXT, 2021b; Ohkawa, 2021). This includes enhancing English classes and training school teachers in human rights education.

Promoting Japanese values

The city also considers that migrants should learn Japanese culture and values. The 2020 Guidelines include “promoting understanding of social rules” and originally put in the draft as: “inform social rules such as rubbish collection in plain Japanese and multiple languages so that (foreign residents) can understand and follow social rules and manners”, giving somewhat an assimilating impression (Osaka City, 2020c, p.34). In response to public comments, it was later revised to: “inform in plain Japanese and multiple languages to avoid troubles that stem from the absence of opportunities to learn Japanese customs and social rules” (Osaka City, 2020b, p.36).

The city also released *Multicultural Interaction Guide: Ask Us Anything!,* a booklet for Japanese nationals to have meaningful interactions with migrant residents. More than 85% of the budget for *tabunka kyōsei* measures in 2020 was spent on the booklet (Osaka City, 2021b). It encourages Japanese nationals to understand the situations of migrants in the neighbourhood and give advice on local matters such as rubbish collection rules and community activities. It also suggests that the meddlesome but friendly

characteristics of *Osaka-jin* (people of Osaka) would help them to interact with migrants (Osaka City, 2021c). However, the booklet seems to polarise 'Osaka-*jin'* and 'foreigners'. For instance, throughout the booklet, native Japanese residents are called 'us' or 'you' while migrants are referred to as 'foreigners'. Indeed, the front page of the booklet reads: "By picking up some concerns and issues experienced by foreigners due to their lingual and cultural differences, this booklet helps you Japanese people to give some advice and assistance to them and deepen mutual understanding in an entertaining manner, Please talk to your foreign neighbours using this booklet" (Osaka City, 2021c, Front Page).

5.2.4 Summary

When it comes to the city's integration strategy, Osaka has set out *tabunka kyōsei* measures for non-Japanese residents and Japanese citizenship holders with foreign backgrounds, defining them as *shimin*. The main target of such measures has been so-called 'old-comer' *zainichi* residents and 'newcomer' migrants whose linguistic and cultural identity does not necessarily align with the host community. Although this indicates that registered migrants are recognised as part of the city and able to receive basic services, their participation in city politics is restricted on the grounds of their nationality. Meanwhile, placing disaster management as one of the priorities of *tabunka kyōsei*, the city promotes migrants' integration into the local communities and their participation in the disaster preparedness plan.

With regard to the substantive aspect of urban citizenship, Osaka's integration policy puts heavy weight on providing multilingual information and consultation services to smoothen migrants' access to services. The city *kokuryū* serves as the key hub to assist migrants

and connect them to the city office while the number of available languages is limited. In addition, the city's initiatives in school education and Japanese classes in cooperation with local NPOs are notable practices. The city is also committed to human rights issues, especially bearing in mind its long-settled *zainichi* population.

Osaka's history, its large *zainichi* population and their activism have shaped how the city recognises migrants' identity and forms the city's identity. *Minzoku gakkyū* (*kokusai kurabu*) is a practice developed in Osaka and includes children of newly arrived migrants. While enhancing the ethnocultural identity of migrant children, the educational programme for *tabunka kyōsei* can also promote such values to Japanese students and pupils. However, such practices are carried out mainly in public schools with a great concentration of non-Japanese students, creating a gap in access among students within the city, depending on where they live. At the same time, the city considers that migrants need to learn local rules and customs to create a *tabunka kyōsei* society. Its emphasis in policy documents produces the relationship between migrants who need to be informed and Japanese nationals who educate them.

5.3 Birmingham: focus on those who need a sanctuary

5.3.1 Status: offering sanctuary to everyone

Target of integration

Birmingham's integration strategy expresses two main groups as its policy targets: minority ethnic groups through the community cohesion strategy and refugees and asylum seekers through integration practices. Community cohesion concerns a wide range of communities, yet with a specific focus on minority ethnic groups. Reflecting the

national COIC report that aims to incorporate all communities (COIC 2007; see Chapter 2), Birmingham's CC Strategy is committed to addressing "everyone who lives in, works in, and visits Birmingham" (BCC 2018b, p.4). It further highlights the presence of migrants by giving "[a] strong recognition of the contribution of the newly arrived and of those who have deep attachments to a particular place" (BCC 2018b, p.9).

Meanwhile, as CoS, Birmingham has committed to welcoming refugees and asylum seekers through resettlement programmes such as the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme. By creating a culture of welcoming for refugees and asylum seekers, the city shows its willingness to include and integrate those whose formal citizenship status is precarious, which indicates urban membership of the city transcends that of the nation (BCC, 2018a). The target of sanctuary, furthermore, has extended beyond refugees and asylum seekers. While the city has focused on providing sanctuary to refugees and asylum seekers, its *CoS Policy Statement for 2018-2022* (hereafter CoS Statement) recognises the need to include migrants whose status has been affected by Brexit:

> it is important to ensure that this statement is extended beyond asylum seekers and refugees to also include migrants to ensure that they also can feel that Birmingham is a welcoming place of safety, both during and after Brexit. (BCC, 2018a, p.1)

The CoS Statement states that Brexit would "start to affect the perceived and actual status of migrants residing and working in, as well as visiting Birmingham" (BCC, 2018a, p.3).

Furthermore, the document defines migrants as “people who choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons”, suggesting the need of sanctuary for the extended migrant population (BCC, 2018a, p.2).

Political participation, representation and active citizenship

While the national government is in charge of determining the voting rights of non-UK nationals, there is a gap among migrants based on their country of origin. Resident Irish citizens and qualifying Commonwealth citizens[28] can vote in all UK elections (Johnston, 2022). EU citizens can vote in local elections as of 2022, but only those who have been residents in the UK before 2021 and who have leave to remain or do not require it will be able to retain voting rights from 2023 (GOV.UK, 2021a; Johnston, 2022). While Scotland and Wales allow any legal residents to vote in some devolved elections regardless of nationality, UK Parliamentary elections and any elections in England do not allow other non-UK citizens to vote (GOV.UK, n.d.-b). Local referendums in the UK follow local government franchises, hence making only Irish and qualifying Commonwealth and EU citizens eligible to vote in Birmingham. Birmingham’s political decision-making therefore only involves a part of non-British groups who may not be straightforwardly categorised as migrants, which affects the degree of urban citizenship status that one is entitled to.

With regard to migrants’ representation in the city, BCC has maintained several networks through which it liaises with organisations and individuals from public, private and

[28] A qualifying Commonwealth citizen must have leave to enter or remain in the UK, or not require that leave (Electoral Commission, 2022).

voluntary sectors working closely with migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Such networks and partnerships help the city to “listen to the voice of lived experience to create meaningful change” (BCC, n.d.-f, para.1). For instance, Birmingham Migration Forum consists of over 200 people across different sectors, including stakeholders such as National Health Service (NHS), police and faith groups. BCC facilitates the network and hosts regular meetings and roundtables to address situations surrounding migrants, refugees and asylum seekers within the city. CoS Partnership Board also comprises individual and organisational stakeholders who meet regularly to discuss the progress (BCC, n.d.-f).

Regardless of the limited political rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, the city has put emphasis on active citizenship to promote integration, and their access to rights and representation is regarded as an indispensable component. MiFriendly Cities (MFC) project, a joint project with Wolverhampton and Coventry, has listed active citizenship as one of its themes, aiming to encourage migrants and refugees to become active in communities and “understand their legal, civil and political rights” (MFC, n.d.-a, paras2–3). In order to assist migrants in becoming active citizens, the city stresses the significant role of the voluntary and community sectors (BCC, 2018a). Through the MFC project, the city led active citizenship programmes along with statutory and voluntary actors, providing citizenship advice and consultation services, training migrants and refugees to become health champions and empowering migrants to voice their opinions. These programmes were designed and implemented to help migrants and refugees feel “confident in accessing these rights, represent themselves and feel that they are fully-fledged citizens” (MFC, 2019b, p.8). This shows that, regardless of immigration status,

migrants in Birmingham can enact active citizenship in the city realm by participating in local communities and understanding their rights.

Recognising the presence of migrants during the pandemic

In addition to CoS activities that acknowledge refugees, asylum seekers and migrants through their presence, the emergency housing scheme during the lockdowns has increased the visibility of migrant rough sleepers and enabled them to receive support for the first time, which gives insights into the status of urban citizenship in times of emergency. During the pandemic, with emergency support from the central government, known as the Everyone In scheme (GOV.UK, 2020a), BCC provided temporary accommodation to rough sleepers to mitigate the impacts of public health risks. This included people with NRPF, such as refused asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, who cannot access public services, including welfare benefits and social housing. Along with the following government-led programmes, the city was able to provide accommodation to nearly 80 people of NRPF status in 2020 (BCC, 2020b; Local Government Association, 2021). The city has also worked together with support providers to help them obtain immigration status or receive further housing and financial support (Local Government Association, 2021).

5.3.2 Rights: initiatives and networks for service provision

Initiatives to improve migrants' access to services

Local authorities in England are responsible for providing statutory services to their residents. Funded by the central government, these services include education, child support, social care and community safety. The city acknowledges that equal access to

those opportunities is necessary and that language and structural barriers should be removed (BCC, 2021). The city has been part of several programmes and networks to take initiatives to support various aspects of migrants' everyday lives, such as public health, ESOL (English for speakers of other languages) and employment. These projects are often funded by the national government or international bodies, and the city commissions local agencies to deliver them. For example, MFC had a specific focus on migrants' health, employment and entrepreneurship in Coventry, Birmingham and Wolverhampton and was awarded over £4 million from EU-based Urban Innovative Actions (NFC, n.d.-b). During the 3-year initiative, several projects were undertaken to inform migrants about their rights and improve their access to health and employment.

Moreover, as CoS, the city has underscored the importance of support provision for refugees and asylum seekers, although asylum seekers' access to public services is limited (BCC, 2018a). The city has welcomed refugees under resettlement schemes that are led and funded by the Home Office and provided a range of services, including housing, school enrolment, ESOL, GP (general practitioner) registration and city orientation, in collaboration with commissioned service providers and volunteers (BCC, n.d.-h). Furthermore, based on networks like Migration Forum and CoS, the city has developed Birmingham Asylum Refugee & Migrant Support (BARMS), an online one-stop directory of local charities and organisations that assist refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in accessing information and services (BARMS, n.d.). The following sub-sections introduce the city's practices in notable areas of migrants' substantive rights.

Education

In England, all migrant children, including asylum-seeking and undocumented children, are entitled to school education, and it is the local authority's duty to provide education for children (London City Hall, 2023). Under the national-level School Admissions Code, local authorities are responsible for issuing a Fair Access Protocol to arrange a school place for vulnerable children outside the normal admissions period (Department for Education, 2021). This includes children of refugees and asylum seekers (BCC, 2017b). In addition, around 70 schools in Birmingham, both primary and secondary, have been recognised as part of the Birmingham Schools of Sanctuary Network (Birmingham CoS, 2022). These schools not only welcome refugee and asylum-seeking pupils and students but also raise awareness among them through various types of classroom activities, workshops, and curriculums (Birmingham CoS, 2022). The CoS movement has also extended to public libraries; Birmingham libraries are recognised as libraries of sanctuary to provide a place of welcome. Staff receive training courses to have a better understanding of people seeking sanctuary. Some libraries offer membership to those who live in hostels and host training and workshops for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants who seek sanctuary (CoS, 2020).

ESOL and employment

Language has been identified as one of the most significant key issues, as the CC Strategy states that "inability to communicate in the English language" hinders people from participating and accessing services and that a "shared language and means of communication is a prerequisite for community cohesion" (BCC, 2018b, p.17). ESOL is therefore regarded as an important area in integration in Birmingham, especially in the workplace; ESOL programmes have been carried out in various integration programmes,

such as MFC and resettlement programmes. Moreover, as part of BCC, Birmingham Adult Education Service (BAES) offers ESOL courses across the city, which economically disadvantaged migrants can attend free of charge. BAES also hosts the Birmingham ESOL Hub centre, where individuals can take the English test and find suitable ESOL course providers (Birmingham ESOL Hub, n.d.). Through the ESOL for Work programme, English learners can gain IT skills and prepare for employment (BCC, 2018b; BAES, n.d.). In addition, the city has provided employment support such as Youth Promise Plus, a project targeting young people, including migrants, who are legally able to work in the UK to receive consultation and training to obtain employment (Change Grow Live, n.d.). As part of MFC, BCC has hosted an employers' roundtable to promote the employment of refugees and non-EU migrants and provide the latest information on legislation (MiFriendly Cities, 2019a).

Health

Primary care through GP and hospital treatment is available to all residents in the UK free of charge, regardless of their nationality, although registered migrants, including those from the European Economic Area (EEA)[29] after 2021, need to pay immigration health surcharge unless they have indefinite leave to remain (GOV.UK, 2022a). Some services, such as emergency services, maternity care, COVID-19 treatment and sexually transmitted infections, are available to those who do not regularly reside in the country (GOV.UK, 2022a). Birmingham has listed equity between different groups in the city as one of the main objectives of public health strategies (BCC, 2019b) and ensured that

[29] European Economic Area includes EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

migrants and refugees have equal access to health services, especially primary care (BCC, 2018a). Local groups and charities are working with BCC to enable migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to have access. During the pandemic, BCC published the COVID-19 guidelines and information in several languages (BCC, n.d.-e, BCC, n.d.-b). Furthermore, the MFC programme trained community health champions from asylum seekers, refugees, and migrant groups to receive public health training and deliver information in their communities during the pandemic (MiFriendly Cities, 2020).

Housing and spatial segregation

The city carries out several housing practices respectively for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, whereas it is difficult for undocumented migrants to secure private housing due to the right-to-rent check required by the Home Office (GOV.UK, n.d.-a). The council received £896,251 from MHCLG's Controlling Migration Fund[30] to carry out the Rogue Landlords Project from 2017 to 2020 (BCC, 2017c). The project aimed to tackle rogue landlords who exploited migrant tenants in poor housing conditions, especially in areas with a high concentration of migrants. It further intended to inform migrant residents about their rights as tenants and signpost to local services (BCC, 2017c). Resettled refugees receive support in accessing housing through resettlement schemes. As a major dispersal city to accommodate asylum seekers, Birmingham hosts two initial accommodation centres and provides temporary accommodation for asylum seekers in destitution who have newly arrived. BCC has utilised a network with private contractors and statutory and voluntary groups with regard to their safety and well-being (BCC, n.d.-

[30] Controlling Migration Fund aims to address local pressures affected by increasing migration (GOV.UK, 2018).

i). In addition, as BCC's wholly-owned company, Birmingham Children's Trust provides financial support to families with children on NRPF status to assist with their accommodation and daily subsistence (Birmingham Children's Trust, 2022; BCC, n.d.-c). This is based on the *Children Act 1989,* which states that local authorities have a statutory duty to support children in need (Birmingham Children's Trust, 2022).

Nevertheless, social and neighbourhood segregation, as well as deprivation, are well acknowledged by BCC as a challenge to community cohesion. One's ethnicity, faith, language and socioeconomic circumstances are considered some of the main factors that shape segregation and deprivation (BCC, 2018b). The city therefore puts weight on neighbourhood-level empowerment and inclusion to develop solutions, funding and policy planning for local areas, according to the CC Strategy, Development Plan, and Equality Strategy (BCC, 2017a, 2018b, 2021). The CoS Statement (BCC, 2018a, p.5) also maintains that the uneven distribution of migrants and refugees across Birmingham is "not helpful to trying to create cohesive and integrated communities in the city" and points out increasing pressures on services and communities in neighbourhoods that have not experienced much migration.

Tackling discrimination

Under the *Equality Act 2010*, discrimination based on the nine protected characteristics is prohibited by law at the national level, one of which refers to discrimination against

migrants on the basis of their nationality, ethnicity, or national origin.[31] Based on the national legislation, the city is obligated to set at least one equality objective and work towards eliminating discrimination and enhancing equality (BCC, 2019c). *Equality Objectives 2019-2023* are dedicated to tackling discrimination in the public sector, including BCC, by setting out five objectives. These include promoting civic engagement in decision-making, assessing the inclusivity of the Council's decisions for service provision and creating a culture of equality and inclusion within BCC through its diverse workforce (BCC, 2019c).

5.3.3 Identity: as a superdiverse city

Recognising migration-driven cultural diversity

Birmingham City recognises its migration-driven diversity as part of the city's identity. The CoS Statement asserts that migration is "an inherent part of our history, language, culture and society" and "literally part of our DNA" (BCC, 2018a, p.3). The CC Strategy lists superdiversification of the demographics as one of the challenges and recognises that such diversity in communities and neighbourhoods means that "we all need to develop a greater understanding and awareness of the range of cultural norms and identities that exist in our city", which is a "big social and cultural shift for some people, with big changes for the way that we all live, work, and learn together" (BCC, 2018b, p.13). This indicates

[31] The nine protected characteristics are: age, race, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. Race discrimination includes discrimination on grounds of colour, nationality, ethnic origin and national origin (Equality Act 2010).

that the city acknowledges multiple identities brought by migration and how such changes shape the city's collective identity.

Cultural and sporting engagement and celebration are used to maintain residents' cultural identity and enhance their local identity. A range of art activities are available to bring people together at the district, ward and neighbourhood levels (BCC, n.d.-a); for instance, the Connecting Communities programme, funded by the Arts Council England and then Department for Communities and Local Government, has aimed to promote engagement and integration of communities through arts programmes and strengthened arts infrastructure, such as local arts fora (BCC, n.d.-d). There are ten local arts fora across the city that offer arts and cultural interactions in neighbourhoods that bring local communities together in collaboration with local and national stakeholders (BCC, n.d.-a). Furthermore, the Birmingham Museum has collected objects and stories of local people to reflect the city's superdiversity and its multiple cultural, religious and ethnic identities (Birmingham Museums, n.d.-b, n.d.-a).

With regard to cultural diversity and school education, *Birmingham Curriculum Statement* ensures that its educational curriculum would "value, celebrate and build on children's religious and cultural heritage and develop a sense of identity, honouring the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child" (BCC, 2019a, p.1). Along with the tradition of multicultural education and national laws prohibiting discrimination in school admission, BCC has appreciated the diverse backgrounds of students and pupils and promoted mutual understanding in schools. *Birmingham Curriculum Statement* aims to provide children with the best educational opportunity in order to grow mutual respect and

eliminate discrimination. Based on the *Equality Act 2010*, it ensures that the school curriculum enables children and students to understand and respect cultural and religious diversity without growing prejudice or inequality (BCC, 2019a). The *Equality, Diversity, and Cohesion Framework* for Birmingham schools highlights the responsibilities of the governing board, teachers and staff to maintain the equality policy and practices. Examples of practices include activities to promote students' and pupils' understanding of the experiences of refugees and migrants (BCC, 2018c).

Identity as the city of sanctuary

The city's identity as a welcoming place embraces refugees, asylum seekers and migrants who have already arrived and those who will arrive in the city in the future, regardless of their national-level immigration status. In the CoS Statement, the city notes the mission of CoS as: "work[ing] to build a culture of welcome, hospitality and inclusiveness right across every sphere and sector of society, so that wherever people seeking sanctuary go they will feel safe, find people who welcome them and understand why they are here, and have opportunities to be included in all activities" (BCC, 2018a, p.1). BCC celebrates Refugee Week by hosting events and activities and officially recognising the significance of welcoming refugees and asylum seekers (BCC, 2020a). Sanctuary schools also eagerly celebrate Refugee Week by leading several activities within and outside schools (Birmingham CoS, 2022). The Council recognises that the city should be a welcoming place for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants to settle and integrate (BCC, 2018a).

Maintaining British values

Following the national vision, the city also regards the shared British identity as an important element of community cohesion. The CC Strategy notes that positive interactions between people from different backgrounds in the city are “underpinned by the recognised British values of: democracy; the rule of law; individual liberty; mutual respect for and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs and for those without faith” (BCC, 2018b, p.9), suggesting the need for migrants, as part of the community, to follow such national values as civic basis.

5.3.4 Summary

Overall, amongst various policies and practices that comprise Birmingham’s integration strategy, it seems that Birmingham’s CoS membership has largely shaped the symbolic construction of the city’s urban citizenship for migrants in all dimensions of status, rights and identity. Their membership in the city does not concern their immigration status or formal citizenship but their presence in the city, and it seeks to provide access to services and opportunities for social and cultural activities. Nonetheless, the city has not provided a practical framework for CoS, and the idea of the provision of sanctuary discussed in CoS-related documents yet remains symbolic.

In addition, the city’s efforts to accommodate rough sleepers hold a significant implication for urban citizenship in the context of the principle of territoriality, as migrant rough sleepers, especially those with NRPF status, have been recognised and provided support based on their presence within the city territory (see Chapter 3). Although this practice demonstrates the status of urban citizenship granted to marginalised migrants, its

temporality problematises the practicality of the territorial principle. I further delve into this accommodation measure from the viewpoint of policymakers in Chapter 6.

Another notable point is the city's emphasis on active citizenship. The city has promoted the idea of active citizenship so that migrants can be more aware of their rights and actively engage with local communities, and therefore become "fully-fledged citizens" (MFC, 2019b, p.8). Nevertheless, migrants' political rights depend on their country of origin and migration experience, demonstrating multiple layers of urban citizenship and exclusion.

With regard to the dimension of rights, Birmingham has utilised local networks to liaise with stakeholders, who are often migrants themselves, and to deliver services. In addition to facilitating migrants' access to basic services, such as NHS and school enrolment, which are available nationwide, the city has also led some initiatives as part of nationally and internationally funded projects rather than as a form of policy. Programmes like MFC and Rogue Landlords Project have indeed contributed to improving migrants' access to English language, health, employment and housing services, albeit a limited period of time and resources.

Migration-driven diversity is deeply embedded in the city's identity, as reflected in the collection of the Birmingham Museum and various events celebrating Refugee Week hosted by the city. In addition, the city has also engaged with creating a safe and respectful environment in schools; schools have been a place where mutual respect and equity are promoted, especially among sanctuary schools. At the same time, however,

British values are intertwined in this shared identity of the city and regarded as a necessary element that glues residents with different backgrounds. Even though migrants are not necessarily the sole target of community cohesion, they are still assumed to constitute “everyone who lives in, works in, and visits Birmingham” (BCC, 2018b, p.4).

5.4 Conclusion: seeing urban citizenship through the analysis of integration strategy

I have examined the local-level integration policies and practices of Osaka and Birmingham. By closely looking at their integration strategy, it can be concluded that the city’s integration strategy articulates status, rights and identity of the city’s urban citizenship. These three dimensions of citizenship are interrelated; the political rights of migrants, for instance, not merely determine the rights dimension of urban citizenship but also define status and identity of urban citizenship. As discussed in Chapter 3, urban citizenship is not a concept that automatically makes a city an inclusive space for migrants and ensures all rights and recognition (e.g. Varsanyi, 2008; Ambrosini, 2013; Gargiulo and Piccoli, 2020), and the integration strategy of the two cities demonstrate their urban citizenship differently.

For Osaka, it seems that the city’s urban citizenship to a great extent follows the state framework of citizenship and national discourse of *tabunka kyōsei*. Its reluctant attitude towards migrants’ political participation and representation indicates that migrants’ urban citizenship status is not equivalent to that of Japanese nationals, shaping Osaka’s urban citizenship is shaped by the binary categorisation of Japanese and non-Japanese. Access to local political rights is used by the city as a “tool of polity-binding” to exclude

non-Japanese citizens from its imagined local political community (Gargiulo and Piccoli, 2020, p.32). Its increasing focus on service provision and lack of migrants' political participation also accord with this and corroborate academics' criticism that *tabunka kyōsei* programmes are solely centred around multilingual information provision, weakening migrants' role in community building (e.g. Takezawa, 2009; Kashiwazaki, 2016). In the identity domain, likewise, it can be suggested that the city's approach enhances the us/them dichotomy. While encouraging the native population to interact with migrants, the booklet's use of the local identity of *Osaka-jin* as 'us' and its consistent contrast with 'foreigners' indicate that migrants are not regarded as part of the local identity. Osaka's *tabunka kyōsei* vision and policy can therefore be "'[o]thering' not by exclusion but by inclusion" (Burgess, 2021, p.15), drawing a boundary of urban citizenship identity between Japanese nationals and others.

However, the city's policies around disaster management pose another perspective on the dimension of status. The city's disaster preparedness measures that include migrants seem to derive from their presence in the city realm, not from their immigration status or nationality. Indeed, through his research on volunteering and active citizenship after the Kōbe earthquake, Avenell (2016, p.203) argues that participation of migrants and ethnic minorities in emergency management can produce "new practices and imaginations of citizenship beyond formal, legal, national state citizenship, and based on interethnic, multicultural communities of cooperation". On the city level, projecting and preparing for migrants to be present at the disaster already enacts migrants' "hereness" (Bosniak, 2007, p.391). The city's emphasis on disaster preparedness can therefore be a catalyst to realising territorial membership of migrants and expand its urban citizenship.

By welcoming refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, especially those who have been marginalised due to their immigration status and decisions, Birmingham demonstrates their own inclusion, indicating that the city's urban citizenship transcends national-level citizenship. The emergency housing scheme that included migrant rough sleepers can be an example of the enactment of urban citizenship status through the principle of territoriality. The CoS network has facilitated everyday enactments of sanctuary that can contest everyday bordering by offering sanctuary to those who are excluded from the national regime (see Yuval-Davis et al., 2018), as Squire (2011, p.300) asserts that CoS enables "participation through presence" of refugees and asylum seekers, not through their legal status or socio-cultural attributes that are often emphasised by the national integration and cohesion discourses. Such recognition of groups of people through their presence in the city can be understood as status of urban citizenship. Moreover, by safeguarding those who are affected by Brexit, the city demonstrates its urban membership extended beyond national-level decisions on one's status while suggesting the contested identity of EU nationals (e.g. Guma and Dafydd Jones, 2019; Brahic and Lallement, 2020; Godin and Sigona, 2022). The CoS network, furthermore, offers various activities, events and voluntary opportunities through which refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are able to make their presence rightful and claim a "right to have rights" (Darling and Squire, 2012, p.196). It has also reinforced the city's territorial and relational identity by creating urban responsibilities and imagined identity attached to the place itself that encompasses those who are welcomed (see Darling, 2010). Such identity of the city is also reflected in the Birmingham Museum's collection of superdiversity, which confirms

multiple identities that migration has brought to the city and the way the city's place-identities are formed (see Ashworth, 1994).

However, it must be noted that the CoS framework remains rather symbolic, and the national-level policy framework is still influential in practice. While CoS has articulated an inclusive membership for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, access to various rights and services for migrants in general is yet dependent on their immigration status. Integration measures and programmes are often short-term and run with limited resources, and the city's emphasis on cherishing British values yet recalls the assimilationist approach often applied by the national government. In addition, the city's promotion of active citizenship highlights both benefits and limitations. Although migrants' increased representation and active participation in local communities enable bottom-up enactment and negotiation of urban citizenship (Bloemraad, 2000; Smith and McQuarrie, 2012; Blokland et al., 2015), the city-led active citizenship scheme can evoke its shortcomings. In the urban realm, where socioeconomic segregation and gaps are produced, communities "cannot simultaneously be the cause of, and the solution to, urban disorder" (Flint, 2002, p.253). Additionally, albeit indirectly, the concept of active citizenship itself is framed and governed by the authority and can contest the urban space and identities in the process of conceptualisation of urban citizenship (Foucault, 1991; Flint, 2002). This coincides with the limitation of the CoS movement, whose "governmentalizing process" (Bagelman, 2013, p.56) might impose localised immigration control on the status of urban citizens. The following section discusses Osaka and Birmingham's integration strategy from a comparative perspective.

5.4.1 Comparing integration strategy

While policy analysis alone may be inadequate to fully capture the urban citizenship reality of each city, the comparative lens allows us to observe and situate migrants in the city's urban citizenship configuration. Depending on their immigration status, length of stay or nationality, migrants are entitled to different degrees of urban status and rights. The dimension of status concerns who has urban citizenship, and the status of Birmingham's urban citizenship seems open to a wider group of migrants than that of Osaka, as the former provides a place of welcome and supports integration for all who seek sanctuary. Birmingham's scheme targets mainly refugees, asylum seekers and migrants whose status is disrupted by the state decisions. Yet, the inclusion of migrants is not accompanied by practical measures that enhance their rights or identity, as discussed above. Having an integration strategy does not necessarily confirm that migrants are full urban citizens, inasmuch as the political rights of migrants are either absent or limited in both cities. Unlike Birmingham, whose migrants' political rights are determined by the state, Osaka has deliberately denied migrants' participation in local referendums by limiting local political membership to Japanese citizenship holders. Even though migrants have access to urban status, rights and identity to a certain degree, they are excluded from becoming full citizens without political rights (Soysal, 1994), which Benhabib (2002, p.455) calls "permanent alienage". In this sense, status, rights and identity of migrant residents as urban citizens of Osaka and Birmingham are limited, considering those of Japanese and British nationals in their respective countries.

Both cities, on the other hand, show their capability to include migrants through their responses to or preparation for crisis. During an emergency, the city recognises and

incorporates migrants merely based on their presence in the city territory rather than through their registration status. The case of Birmingham is notable, as during the nationally-led Everyone In programmes, migrant rough sleepers' 'hereness' in the city outweighed their NRPF status, and they were able to receive emergency accommodation and further services, being treated as urban citizens. Nonetheless, such inclusion only occurs during an emergency and is meant to be temporary and 'extraordinary' (Stewart and Sanders, 2023). It may hence be worth taking into consideration local authorities' emergency measures not only during an emergency but also before and after the event. In line with this, Osaka's disaster preparation measures promoting migrants' participation can be considered a significant part of its integration strategy in relation to urban citizenship.

With regard to rights of migrant urban citizens, both cities implement their own measures that allow migrants to access services, supplementing the national-level framework. Education and health are the areas both cities have put emphasis on. Both Osaka and Birmingham have committed to promoting language education and creating an inclusive school environment. In the area of health, both cities provide access to some health services, such as vaccination and maternity care, regardless of migrants' status and nationality. The cities have also worked on protecting the human rights of migrant residents by issuing human rights guidelines and equality objectives, respectively. It was also shown that service delivery in both cities depends hugely on the voluntary sector and expects to play a "gap filling" role (Mayblin and James, 2019, p.392). While the significant role of civil society in migrant integration is indeed well recognised in the contexts of Japan and the UK (e.g. Tsuda, 2006a; Baglioni et al., 2022), localities' heavy dependence on

the voluntary sector can be attributed to the fact that both countries do not have comprehensive integration policy at the national level.[32] The absence of national policy or legislation leads to the lack of budget, which affects the city's capacity to respond to migrants' demands or commission service delivery to NPOs and charities, therefore creating the 'gap' (Ishikawa, 2012; Baglioni et al., 2022). I further explore this point in the following chapters, which delve into how networks between the city and local actors are maintained and utilised in the two cities and how the ongoing austerity has, in practice, affected the city in terms of service delivery and implementation of integration strategy.

An extensive experience of migration has established the two cities' identity as a city of rich ethnocultural diversity. Particularly, policies in Birmingham highlight its ethnic, cultural and religious diversities by referring to the 'superdiversity' concept. Osaka's strategy, on the other hand, recognises its diversity of people with various ethnocultural backgrounds yet hardly mentions its religious diversity. In practice, while recognising diversity through cultural exchanges and activities, both cities pay particular heed to school education. Public schools have been projected as a place where the identities of migrant pupils and students are respected and maintained through particular curriculums and classes. In Birmingham, in addition to a multicultural educational curriculum, BCC celebrates Refugee Week and sanctuary schools. In Osaka, *minzoku gakkyū*, the ethnic class for migrant children, helps maintain and enhance children's identity. These practices

[32] Although refugee integration has been framed separately from migrant integration for the UK, refugee resettlement schemes and community sponsorship programmes still rely predominantly on local efforts of third sector organisations (see McCabe and Phillimore, 2017).

emphasise the city's diversity and form its identity of which migrants are part (see Gebhardt, 2016).

At the same time, both cities highly regard Japanese or British identity as part of their integration strategy, with the expectation that all residents, including migrants, should follow national values to achieve integration. As such, urban citizens, although their cultural identity is to some extent protected, are expected to be familiar with and committed to Japanese or British values in order to achieve belonging to the city. Localities' attachment to their national values as their civic basis demonstrates their urban citizenship imbued with that of the state (see Joppke, 2007).

The comparative perspective, furthermore, gives an insight into the absence of integration policy and practice that are worth mentioning (see Hammar, 1985a; Alexander, 2007). First of all, Osaka's integration strategy does not specifically mention refugees, asylum seekers or undocumented migrants but rather focuses on registered migrants as a large group of foreign residents. This contrasts with Birmingham's integration strategy and suggests that the different needs of migrant groups are not necessarily considered in Osaka's integration strategy. Their lack of mention of undocumented migrants further implies that they are not considered urban citizens by the city. Furthermore, amongst various forms of diversity the city has acknowledged in its integration strategy, religious diversity is missing. It points to the city's unawareness of the demands of migrants from various religious backgrounds. Another absence in Osaka's strategy is measures around housing and spatial segregation, although they are rather visible phenomena in Osaka (Fukumoto, 2010). This can be partially because of the administrative role of ward offices,

which is greater for Osaka than for Birmingham. Ward offices in Osaka City are in charge of creating a local community, balancing “voices and needs of diverse ward residents” (Osaka City, 2023d, p.6), resulting in the lack of a city-wide approach to housing and spatial integration. On the other hand, Birmingham’s integration strategy does not show an extensive interest in long-term disaster management, while its response to emergency health and housing schemes during the pandemic was notable. This can be attributed to the city’s lack of resources and the lower risk of disasters than that of Osaka (see Parzniewski, 2020). While the CoS framework, in theory, includes all urban citizens through their presence, the city’s integration strategy can be insufficient to embrace all the residents for the long term.

Several factors of the two cities can be considered to have influenced the divergences. First, the number and proportion of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are bigger in Birmingham than in Osaka (see Chapter 2). The presence of migrant residents, in terms of its history, scale and size, exerts a significant influence that determines the city’s policy-making (Tsuda, 2006a), and Birmingham’s large migrant population can motivate the city office to lead and implement an inclusive integration strategy. Second, differences in the two cities’ administrative structures may have exerted influence over how and to what extent the city regards itself as being in charge of integration practices, as mentioned above. Third, national legislation is a determinant of local policy-making since local authorities bear the responsibility to follow the national-level legal framework, and material and financial resources are also distributed according to national policies. While both cities have committed to creating a city where human rights and equality among

residents are protected, Birmingham's equality measures seem more specific and comprehensive due to the national anti-discrimination legislation.

Finally, national discourses on integration are reflected in the respective local integration strategy. Whilst the emphasis of community cohesion and integration is on cultural and ethnic diversity in the community of which migrants are part and on common values and language that connect them, *tabunka kyōsei* focuses on migrants' attributes that are distinct from those of the native population. Both Japan and the UK do not have a national integration policy per se but rely on local authorities' initiatives to promote integration; however, national-level policies and discourses have a significant influence over local authorities and their integration policy-making, as urban citizenship is consistently affected by the state framework of formal citizenship and integration (Dekker et al., 2015; Gebhardt, 2016; Galandini et al., 2019). Some city-led initiatives in Osaka and Birmingham, at the same time, have developed with the strong presence of migrants and demonstrated bottom-up negotiations for urban inclusion.

The city's integration strategy shows how the city regards its migrant population and to what extent they are included or excluded, which helps us understand how urban citizenship is constructed in the imagined realm of the urban city. Both cities' strategies suggest that not all migrants are automatically entitled to urban citizenship and that their urban-level status is affected by their state-level profiles, such as immigration status and nationality. Furthermore, while substantive rights of migrant urban citizens are protected to a certain extent, they are often complemented by voluntary sectors that play a role in connecting the city government and migrants. Migration-driven diversity has been

celebrated as part of the identity of both cities, yet national values are also stressed to build an integrated community in the city. So, how is integration strategy actually governed and operationalised in these cities, and what are their implications for urban citizenship? The following chapters will delve into practical aspects of urban citizenship from the perspectives of policymakers and local actors, whose networks and interplays shed another light on multi-scalar governance of integration and the role of the city.

CHAPTER 6
POLICYMAKERS' APPROACHES TO URBAN CITIZENSHIP THROUGH MIGRANT INTEGRATION GOVERNANCE

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse urban citizenship through the governance of the city's integration strategy by drawing interview findings from policymakers and officials. I conducted interviews with city-level officials and officials at upper- or lower-level institutions to comprehend how policymakers' understanding of their roles in multi-scalar governance of integration shapes urban citizenship. As the previous chapter has analysed policy documents that demonstrate how urban citizenship can be articulated in ongoing policies and practices of integration, this chapter and the following chapter dimensionalise the "'paper reality' of policy documents" (Hoekstra, 2018, p.364) to unpack the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy through presenting interviews with various stakeholders. I argue that the city's integration strategy is designed and implemented within the multi-scalar configuration, and urban citizenship is constantly affected by such dynamics of actors and institutions across different scales. Within such dynamics, policymakers' understanding of their roles within the city office and vis-à-vis upper and lower levels of authority as well as local civil society is reflected in the integration strategy, shaping ideological and practical realms of urban citizenship.

I present findings thematically based on three themes: the focus of integration strategy; multi-scalar governance of integration; and the impacts of the pandemic on urban citizenship. The first point delves into the city's integration strategy, which has been

examined in the previous chapter, focusing more on place- and historic-specific contexts upon which urban citizenship is constructed (see Blokland et al., 2015; Hoekstra, 2018). Voices of policymakers clarify the city's target of integration strategy and help us comprehend their recognition of migrant urban citizens through residency and presence, as discussed in Chapter 3 (see Bauböck, 2003). I then move on to discussing the multi-scalar governance of integration strategy. Specifically, I take into account the city's administrative capacity, its vertical relations of power and horizontal networks. Migrant integration policy and governance are configured in a "complex multi-level governance field" (Scholten, 2016, p.974), where policies at the national, local and transnational levels interplay and sometimes converge or diverge and, as Chapter 3 introduced, the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy can be better captured in a multi-scalar context. This includes dynamics within the city administration, its relations with the upper level of government, particularly the national government, and horizontal networks between the city and local actors from voluntary and third-sector organisations (Guiraudon, 2000; de Graauw and Vermeulen, 2016; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016b; Scholten and Penninx, 2016; Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017). While I sometimes refer to these interplays and dynamics as top-down/bottom-up or vertical/horizontal for simplicity, they are not necessarily linear phenomena (Brenner, 2001a; for multi-level/scalar governance discussion, see Chapter 3).

Finally, I discuss policymakers' responses to the pandemic. As I collected data in the early- and mid-phases of the pandemic, most respondents mentioned the pandemic and its impacts on the city's integration and their everyday life and work. Although future prospects and the longer-term effects of the pandemic had remained uncertain at the time

of interviews, I introduce the cities' immediate responses regarding migrant integration and its implications for urban citizenship. It also draws attention to the city's attitudes towards undocumented migrants, whose degree of urban membership symbolises the city's divergence from the state framework of citizenship (Bosniak, 2007).

6.2 The focus of the integration strategy

I first examine city-level officials' points of view on the target of the city's integration strategy in order to highlight contexts and backgrounds that are not mentioned in policy documents. To recap Chapters 2 and 5, Osaka's integration strategy has two main targets: long-established 'old-comer' communities and newly arrived migrants. The presence of long-established *zainichi* communities has indeed displayed a considerable impact on the city's integration policymaking. Before the term *tabunka kyōsei* emerged, Osaka had already been working on integration of such communities with a focus on their rights and systemic discrimination. The human rights perspective had been an integral part of the city's integration strategy, especially the 1998/2004 Guidelines, which focused on removing systemic barriers for colonial subjects and their descendants, mainly *zainichi* communities.

Meanwhile, Birmingham also shows two main approaches to integration: community cohesion and integration. Birmingham has maintained the mainstreaming aspect in the CC Strategy, which recognises the city's ethnic and social superdiversity and states that "[c]ommunity cohesion is an approach that enables us to respond to the wide ranging and kaleidoscope of identities, rather than simply focusing on a white majority and small number of ethnic minority identities" (BCC, 2018b, p.46). At the same time, the city has

worked on migrant integration measures with a specific focus on migrants in need, such as refugees, asylum seekers and newly arrived migrants. The interviews with city officials in Osaka and Birmingham shed another light on the cities' integration approaches, revealing their understanding of 'who needs integration' and dilemmas between 'old' and 'new' migrants.

6.2.1 Osaka: from a human rights approach to *tabunka kyōsei*

Although respondents listed migration-driven diversity as the key identity of Osaka, difficulties were identified in catching up with the rapid increase and diversification of migrant profiles. The city used to be able to cover "more than 90%" of the foreign population by providing information in Japanese, Korean, Chinese and English (*Interview O10, city office staff, Osaka*). Yet, according to several respondents, they now need more language options, such as Vietnamese and plain Japanese, which would require more resources. City-level officials shared that they find it challenging to capture the scale and mobility of migrant groups and reach out to migrant residents, who are relatively small and scattered (*Interview O18, prefectural kokuryū staff, Osaka; Interview O3, city kokuryū staff, Osaka*). The city's approach to integration itself has gradually shifted to providing multilingual information and removing the "language barrier" since the late 2000s (*Interview O4, city kokuryū staff, Osaka*).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the city's new 2020 Guidelines are one of the examples of such a transition from human rights to *tabunka kyōsei*. The city official who was in charge of drafting the new guidelines indeed highlighted a new scope of the 2020 Guidelines:

> The new guidelines, while succeeding some existing practices, are not specialised in human rights anymore, but they contain what should be included at this very moment, especially when we project the increasing foreign population coming to Japan, and particularly Osaka, given the change in Immigration Control Act and so on [...]. (*Interview O10, city office staff, Osaka*)

The renewed guidelines with a new focus, nevertheless, triggered a chorus of criticism from civil society activists as soon as the draft was released for public comment in March 2020, when I started fieldwork in Osaka. For instance, emphasis on the universal human rights of foreign nationals and references to the city's 'human rights measures' that had mainly targeted *zainichi* communities – participation of foreign nationals into city governance; employment of foreign nationals for public officers; ethnic education (*minzoku gakkyū*); funding for ethnic schools; and availability of services to migrants regardless of visa status – had been omitted (Osaka City, 2020b, 2020c). Responding to public comments, the 2020 Guidelines published in December eventually added some of those omitted points, including participation in city governance, employment for public officers, ethnic class and education and health services for migrants without status. When asked about these points that had been once removed from the draft, the city official responded:

> [F]or us, what is written in the previous guidelines and its contents are still ongoing. We chose not to include them (in the draft) because we had an understanding that these things have already been achieved. But we received comments saying that they seem absent if not written down.… However, it does not necessarily mean

> that what we didn't include this time, which was mentioned in the previous guidelines, are all remaining either. (*Interview O10, city office staff, Osaka*)

This account indicates that city officials consider the city's integration approaches to 'old-comer' and 'newcomer' migrants differently. Although policymakers assumed that specific integration measures for *zainichi* residents would no longer need to be mentioned, civil society actors regarded otherwise. Oppositions from the public that led the city to eventually include those points indicate existing strong demands for the city's long-standing integration practices, which I come back to in Chapter 7.

6.2.2 Birmingham: the city's attempt to establish a long-term integration

In Birmingham, Respondent B1, a city-level official, explained that the city's sole focus of integration had long been assisting migrants in crisis and destitution when they needed help while voluntary and community sector (VCS) organisations were handling general matters. It was only in the past several years that the city came to grasp its increasing role in migrant integration and changed its direction of the integration strategy, given Brexit and its commitment to the CoS movement. While holding responses to crisis and destitution as a priority, the city started to invest in the long-term picture of integration and work on the needs around employment, enterprise, active citizenship and mental health in order to ensure equal opportunities for migrants and increase their sense of belonging (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*). Such expansion of focus was also confirmed by the council member:

> This is a city that's always been built on migration, and it's been built on migration over hundreds of years. And that's a great asset and strength for us if we, you know, unlocking that properly, if we invest in proper welcome, if we create those opportunities for people (newly arrived communities). (*Interview B5, city councillor, Birmingham*)

Nonetheless, the city's new focus on the longer-term integration of migrants was obstructed by the pandemic, which halted most of the city's integration-related activities and altered the integration priorities to safeguarding, as discussed later.

Furthermore, the ambiguous distinction between 'migrants' and 'non-migrants' affects the city's integration governance. Particularly, long-established communities and EU citizens were listed as examples of migrant groups that the city has committed to reaching out to. Long-established community members who have settled in the city for decades often no longer identify themselves as migrants and stop accessing services that other migrant groups would use; those communities have created their own community organisations through which they established various services. However, the respondents believed that, by maintaining relations with them, the city could make use of their experiences and community identity to further develop its integration measures. Officials working for integration-related agendas in Birmingham expressed that connecting with the long-established communities would benefit the city's integration not only by facilitating their access to public services but also by bridging them with newly arrived migrants and building a wider network in the city. For instance, one long-established community, whose members retained their identity as migrants, was 'found' and reached out by the city in

order to facilitate their engagement with newly arrived communities and refugee groups (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*). Meanwhile, 94 thousand EU nationals in Birmingham suddenly became 'migrants' who needed the municipality's support, such as procedures with the EU Settlement Scheme, although the respondents were not entirely certain of the impacts of Brexit and the actual needs of EU nationals at the time of the interview. It is difficult for the city to identify and assist those who were not on its radar before, and the city-level official admitted that, despite the city's efforts in establishing an informal network and coming up with creative strategies to reach out, there was still a gap of communication between those who were assisted and those who were not (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*).

6.2.3 Summary: divergent approaches to long-established communities

Interviews show policymakers' understanding of their respective cities' identity as large, diverse urban cities and their positive feelings towards migration-driven diversity, confirming Osaka and Birmingham as urban spaces where urban citizenship processes take place (Wilson, 2015; Hoekstra, 2018). However, respondents from Osaka and Birmingham pointed out the difficulty of finding and reaching out to some migrant communities. This suggests the heavy weight that migrant social networks place on migration infrastructure (Xiang and Lindquist, 2014) and the bottom-up making of urban citizenship by migrants, which I explore in the following chapter. At the same time, the respondents from both cities mentioned long-established communities in the context of integration of newly arrived migrants. While the city-level policymakers felt the need to change the integration strategy to adapt to the diversifying migrant population, their approaches to long-established communities diverged.

Osaka recently shifted its human rights approach to the *tabunka kyōsei* approach that targets newly arrived communities, exclusively registered migrants. The interviews in Osaka indicate that it was assumed that the integration of *zainichi* communities had been completed and that the city has now switched to that of newcomer migrants. Such an assumption that the former group has already been integrated does not necessarily have negative implications on urban citizenship, as this can signify that one can be recognised as part of mainstream residents. However, in the case of Osaka, opposition from the public and the city's eventual decision to amend the final draft suggest otherwise; the city's recognition of the needs of long-established communities still has a significant implication for urban citizenship of 'old-comer' migrants. Policymakers' decision to avoid referring to particular integration matters can be understood as a policy act of "non-policy" (Hammar, 1985a). Alexander (2007, p.80) explains that the local authority's non-policy response can occur due to some conditions: the low presence of migrants in the area; the municipality's incapability and mismanagement; and decision-makers' perception of migrants as transient and mobile. In addition to these, the remark from the city official suggests that decision-makers can also 'hide' existing policies in order to shift their integration focus and disregard certain groups of migrants.

Birmingham also holds a similar view towards long-established communities, regarding them as already integrated, yet the city's approach towards such communities seems opposite to that of Osaka. The city draws a clear distinction between mainstreaming community cohesion for ethnic minority groups and safeguarding newly arrived migrants and (resettled) refugees. However, the interviews reveal that city-level officials were eager to expand the integration scope for the latter groups to facilitate their long-term

integration processes. Although this was hindered by the pandemic, which in turn further strengthened the safeguarding aspect of Birmingham's integration strategy, the respondents' accounts show that the city-level officials considered involving such 'non-migrants' was significant for accelerating integration of newly arrived migrants.

Meanwhile, integration of EU nationals sheds another light on urban citizenship in Birmingham. The respondents indeed referred to EU nationals and their new identity as 'migrants' and included them in their target of the integration strategy. EU nationals had long been urban citizens and not 'under the radar' of integration-related agenda because of their EU citizenship, which shaped their mobile identity and offered them a unique opportunity to negotiate and establish their urban citizenship (see Lebuhn, 2013). Nonetheless, their transnational identity was disrupted by Brexit, and city officials now feel the need to recognise their presence within the city in order to assist with their settlement procedure. Historical policy backgrounds and policy changes often fluidise one's legal citizenship as well as the identity that derives from such membership (Lessard-Phillips and Nagai, 2021), and it can be said that, with Brexit, EU nationals' main channel to urban citizenship has changed from the one through transnational networks to the residency- and presence-based one.

6.3 The role of the city in multi-scalar governance of integration

In this section, I analyse how the city's integration strategy is shaped by the multi-scalar governance of integration. Accounts from city-level policymakers and officials from other levels of authority highlight their roles in integration strategy that affects the operationalisation of urban citizenship. Such multi-scalar dynamics in integration

governance can be classified into three main power dynamics: the city itself, national-local relations and the city's use of networks. The first point looks at the city office and its position as a political body to implement integration. This includes the inner dynamics of the city office. Next, (in)direct influences of the national government and its policy directions are considered as the key element of policymaking and implementation of integration strategy. Lastly, the city's use of local, national, and transnational networks is notable as this signifies how its integration strategy involves multi-scalar actors. The cases of Osaka and Birmingham display similar administrative challenges as a large city office, characterising them as 'urban'. They are also under pressure from the national government, which plays a critical role in shaping the local integration strategy. However, while they significantly depend on local civil society organisations to deliver services, their use of regional and transnational networks varies considerably. The interviews stress the complex dynamics of stakeholders across multiple scales that are not necessarily simple vertical or horizontal relations.

6.3.1 Osaka: the ideal place for *tabunka kyōsei,* yet without a direction

Difficulty of handling tabunka kyōsei at prefectural and ward levels

Whilst different levels of administrative bodies exert influence towards each other, it seems from the interviews that the city is regarded as an ideal level to implement *tabunka kyōsei*. Stakeholders at the prefecture-level have all expressed that the prefecture as an administrative body is "distant" and "indirect" from local residents to respond to *tabunka kyōsei* issues, which mostly fall into the city's direct governance (*Interview O5, prefectural office staff, Osaka*). Meanwhile, a ward, the smallest body of the municipality, lacks resources for *tabunka kyōsei* practices. Each ward within Osaka City possesses a high

migrant population compared to other municipalities; Ikuno Ward, particularly, is known as one of the most diverse areas with old-comer and newcomer migrants, who account for over 20% of its entire population. Although such diversity encouraged the ward to identify *tabunka kyōsei* as one of the three main pillars of ward governance, a limited amount of budget distributed to wards has hindered Ikuno from fully engaging in migrant integration (*Interview O19, city councillor, Osaka*). Moreover, it was pointed out that other ward offices easily underestimate the needs of foreign nationals in their constituency wards, assuming that their migrant population is less than one in Ikuno. The councillor from Ikuno stressed the significance of governing *tabunka kyōsei* at the city level:

> It gets blurred once you extend it (*tabunka kyōsei*) to wider (than Ikuno).… So, although it's a common theme, I feel that there's a shading (between wards).… Osaka city is, of course, a metropolis, densely populated, and they (migrants) as well, of course, study and work here. I think we should go a step forward as a whole city. It gets too wide when we think at the prefecture level. On the other, Ikuno Ward, as an administrative body, can't do anything alone because they don't have money.… In that sense, it should be at the Osaka city level to get things done. (*Interview O19, city councillor, Osaka*)

This remark highlights the capability of the city to promote *tabunka kyōsei* while pointing to the difficulty of a big city such as Osaka, whose lower-tier municipalities may have divergent priorities and goals of *tabunka kyōsei*.

Furthermore, city office staff listed bureaucratic sectionalism (*tatewari gyōsei*) that hinders cross-department cooperation as a major challenge for the city's administration of integration. Whilst the 2020 Guidelines were issued by the Diversity Promotion Office in the Citizens' Affairs Bureau (*shimin-kyoku*), the city *kokuryū* is operated by the International Affairs Department in the Economic Strategy Bureau (*keizai senryaku-kyoku*) (*Interview O11, city office staff, Osaka*). While the two offices often work together in *tabunka kyōsei* matters like publishing multilingual information, their administrative structure is different. Staff from the city *kokuryū* shared the struggle they experienced in such an administrative structure:

> When it comes to foreigners' everyday life in general, it is about the city's public administration as a whole. There is a department in charge of that, but it exists in a different structure from sections in charge of human rights or foreign residents. So, we can say that we find negative effects of this *tatewari gyōsei*. However, while we feel such effects very often, we can't keep complaining. We're working together with many people, so we go share our views with the department in charge and tell them that we need this and that. So, we exchange ideas and work together as Osaka City and as a Foundation. (*Interview O3, city kokuryū staff, Osaka*)

While officials at other levels of authority felt that *tabunka kyōsei* measures could be most effective at the city level, the city's large administration structure is experienced as a barrier to cross-department cooperation for implementing the city's integration strategy.

Top-down influence of the absence of the national-level integration regime

The interviews with city officials revealed that the absence of definitions for '*tabunka kyōsei*' and 'migrants' throughout the administrative structure has complicated the vision and policymaking of integration at the city level. When asked about the influence of the national *tabunka kyōsei* policy directions, one official shared the challenges they were experiencing with the lack of national-level policies:

> To be honest, it's difficult. We are in charge of promoting *tabunka kyōsei* in this office, which is to make sure that thorough service provision is the premise of all policy implementations, but the concept of *tabunka kyōsei* itself is very ambiguous, and no one knows if it goes to the right direction when the number of foreign residents increases. Also, there's a disparity because the national government says they are not immigrants.… I feel like there's no right answer, anywhere. (*Interview O10, city office staff, Osaka*)

For Osaka City officials, existing national guidelines, such as the MC Plan, were helpful to a very limited extent. Although they agreed that the guidelines could help raise nationwide awareness about *tabunka kyōsei*, these guidelines were not very useful for policymaking, as the city had already had their own integration guidelines. Many respondents in Osaka also agreed with the need for national integration legislation, while one prefectural councillor pointed out the risk of having national legislation that could limit the flexibility of local governments to respond freely to local demands.

Japan's denial of immigration has not only confounded the city-level policymaking from a conceptual perspective but also affected the city's practical approach to integration. The

absence of national legislation regarding *tabunka kyōsei* has affected the city's budget allocation and priorities of the city's governance. Respondents O10 and O11, both city office staff, said that the city's budget allocation would depend on whether there is a basic law that supports the spending. Without a legal framework, *tabunka kyōsei* matters are not the priority for the city's expenditure. In addition, the presence of national law would facilitate public administration and make it easier to "convince" residents and implement policies and services (*Interview O10 and O11, city office staff, Osaka*). For Osaka City, therefore, the absence of a national integration policy does affect the extent to which the city justifies and carries out *tabunka kyōsei* as a policy priority.

With regard to the city's integration strategy management, respondents admitted that the political vision of *Ishin*, the ruling party of the City Council, affected its integration governance, especially in terms of resources and facilities. The city and non-*Ishin* prefecture assembly members often opposed *Ishin*'s attempt to shut down *kokuryū* and withdraw some services with high demands from foreign residents, such as evening school programmes. Budget cuts have exerted a substantial impact, as *Ishin* reduced or terminated subvention to organisations that worked for human rights and integration issues, causing many of them to scramble to manage finances or close down.

The city's disuse of networks and the presence of active kokuryū

When asked if there were any occasions to work on integration-related issues with other cities and municipalities, the city official said, "not at all" (*Interview O11, city office staff, Osaka*). The city *kokuryū,* on the other hand, has "put efforts into networking" with other *kokuryū* within Osaka Prefecture and local NPOs (*Interview O4, city kokuryū staff, Osaka*).

There are several *kokuryū* within the prefecture, and they maintain a strong network by meeting regularly and sharing local needs, which is not always the case for other areas (*Interview O18, prefectural kokuryū staff, Osaka*). They are in regular contact with migrant groups and NPOs and developed the networks to extend their support. Local demands and feedback *kokuryū* receive are shared with their affiliated city offices and departments to feed back into policymaking. Topics like disaster preparedness and migrant children's education have been some of the main interests of the network. The wider *kokuryū* network in the Kinki area[33] has also allowed them to learn each other's practices and share *tabunka kyōsei*-related information. While the city office does not focus primarily on networking, it is the *kokuryū* that reaches out within and outside the city to facilitate integration.

Osaka City's transnational network mainly concerns seven sister cities, which had initially aimed to promote cultural exchanges and interactions. Nonetheless, its focus is rather maintained as part of the city's economic strategy nowadays. The city's economic strategy department is in charge of the sister city, and respondents from the prefectural office also agreed on the changing focus of the sister city network. One *kokuryū* staff from Minoh City, one of the cities that were fervently committed to the sister city, maintained that the sister-city network is only focused upon interactions with people outside the city rather than diversity within the city, as "the era of sister-city has ended" (*Interview O1,*

[33] A wider region in Japan including Osaka Prefecture and neighbouring prefectures, which are Kyoto, Hyogo, Shiga, Nara, Wakayama and Mie.

Minoh kokuryū staff, Osaka). It seems that the transnational network of cities is not necessarily playing a role in the city's approach to integration.

6.3.2 Birmingham: operating integration with a vision yet limited resources

Managing integration in the 'big city'

"Birmingham is a big city" was the feeling shared among many respondents, regardless of their positions or sectors. The political leadership of the Council exerts a considerable influence over the city office; one official said that officers could not intervene but follow the political tone set by councillors and implement their plan. Given that the Labour Party has been the majority of the Council, the support from council members for the integration-related agenda was described as one of Birmingham's strengths in promoting integration (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*). While superdiversity was another characteristic of the city acknowledged by most of the respondents, some challenges seemed to derive from the city's management of superdiversity. In particular, as one of the largest municipal bodies, cross-department working was listed as a challenge. According to Respondent B1, although cross-department working is necessary for migrant integration, the Council encompasses so many departments that not all officials are aware of refugees' needs or basic information like the difference between refugees, asylum seekers and migrants (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*).

The national-local relations reflected in the city's integration governance

Respondents at different levels of administration referred to the significance of the 'local turn' of integration. Nonetheless, the top-down influence of the national government upon delivery of the local integration strategy was strongly felt among respondents in

Birmingham. Interviews confirmed that the central government has a definite influence and control over local integration governance. One of the most prevailing determinants of such phenomenon is the austerity measure imposed by the central government. By highlighting that the Council has had its budget reduced by £760 million since austerity in the past ten years, BCC mentions in the policy statement that "[e]ssentially there are limits to Birmingham's capacity to be able to successfully welcome, resettle and integrate migrant communities" (BCC, 2018a, p.2). All respondents from the public sector at different levels in Birmingham shared the dilemma between increasing demands and reduced budgets. They attributed inequalities and socioeconomic gaps between communities to the lack of budget. The city councillor explained what the budget reduction could mean to the city's service provision ability:

> I think one of the most depressing aspects has been the degree to which things haven't changed, and perhaps have got worse. So we know that pattern of disadvantage, of poverty, of inequality in the city has certainly worsened over the last ten years. And that is a direct reflection, in my view, of 10 years of austerity. So Birmingham City Council has lost two-thirds of its controllable budget over that period, which has meant that we've had less resource to do the kind of stuff that helps to support communities, delivers the prevention services that stop people [from] falling into further crisis. (*Interview B5, city councillor, Birmingham*)

Respondent B1 also emphasised the immense influence that the national-level decisions have upon the city's integration efforts despite the 'local turn' of integration. Although the city, as a City of Sanctuary, would like to welcome more migrants and asylum seekers, it

can only secure short-term funding that often comes with many requirements and limitations on profiles of migrants the city can assist or on geographical locations of the city (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*). Even though BCC is willing to provide services to newly arrived migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, the city is under-resourced, and the state hinders its full capacity to perform its CoS initiative.

In addition, despite the city's efforts to embrace asylum seekers, the city often struggles with legal limitations and hostile environment policies (see Chapter 2). With regard to migrants whose formal status is confined by the national regime, BCC has been lobbying the central government to lift the ban on asylum seekers' right to work. While the city was one of the first councils to join the campaign, the city councillor expressed his frustration:

> I mean, it's a constant challenge. And, of course, part of the problem that we have in English local government is that we can only do what we're legally allowed to do.… it is frustrating because we can't do certain things that we'd like to do. We cannot do as a result of the law other than campaign for changes in the law. (*Interview B5, city councillor, Birmingham*)

A similar view was shared by Respondent B4, who stated that the DWP needed to rely on the network with the voluntary sector to support individuals without status or those who cannot claim asylum since they "cannot go beyond the law" (*Interview B4, DWP staff, Birmingham*). While their accounts show the extent of power the national government exerts over the local authority and local authorities' limited autonomy, BCC strategically

used their resources to assist migrant rough sleepers who had no recourse to public funds during the pandemic, as discussed later.

The interview with the office staff from MHCLG revealed that different institutions within the national body assume different roles and relations vis-à-vis local authorities. The official described that given many departments and ministries in the national government, “everyone owns what they own” (*Interview B2, MHCLG staff, Birmingham*). Whereas policies led by other departments, such as the Home Office, deal with certain migrant groups or their particular integration domains, the MHCLG office has pushed cross-departmental working by proactively informing other departments. He further emphasised their role in communicating with local authorities and government departments and in reflecting local demands into national-level policymaking:

> Departments do what they do. Local authority, some of them are huge, like Birmingham is a massive local authority. They're like big companies, aren't they? They run themselves. And for us, it's about joining up the dots, really, and the dots are a golden thread for all of this.… And then if one person… will have questions or problems or challenges or whatever it might be, and that feeds back everywhere. What we want to do is [to] make sure that whatever that person or that community is telling the local authority as quickly as they can, we're aware of that. Because that can inform the policy. Primarily, it's really helpful to us because then we're not designing policy that doesn't work. (*Interview B2, MHCLG staff, Birmingham*)

Birmingham's integration governance suggests the strong presence of top-down policy coordination in terms of funding and resources. Yet, national-level agencies are not a uniform entity either, as they may have distinct approaches towards integration matters and the role of local authorities. There seems to be a possibility for the city to effectively utilise the connections across multiple levels and scales.

The city's strategic use of networks

Birmingham is part of various networks and partnerships at the local, regional, national and transnational levels, and many respondents, both from public and third sectors, listed the alliance of VCS as the city's strength. The city has been working together with VCS through networks and projects like CoS and MFC, in addition to liaising regularly through the Migration Forum. BCC has an officer who is in charge of smoothening communications between VCS and the Council as well as within the Council and reaching out to migrant communities to improve their representation. BCC and other public offices frequently utilise the network and signpost VCS to assist migrants, especially those with NRPF, a group of migrants that the city cannot reach out to due to legal limitations. For instance, Respondent B4 shared the benefit of working with VCS, claiming that migrants grow more trust in VCS compared with public offices like DWP and Jobcentre. It is therefore meaningful for DWP to work closely with VCS, who can advocate and gain trust from migrants before they seek support from public offices (*Interview B4, DWP staff, Birmingham*).

The city has grown extensive networks with other localities within and outside the UK through various partnerships and projects, ranging from West Midlands Strategic

Migration Partnership (WMSMP), MFC, CoS, Core Cities, Inclusive Cities and Eurocities. As one of the largest and most diverse cities in the country, Birmingham is “at the leading edge” among other cities, according to Respondent B5 (*Interview B5, city councillor*). The city’s inter-local relations within the West Midlands are regarded as a positive experience that allowed the city to address particular issues like unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and migrant health (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*). These partnerships and networks are funded by different organisations – WMSMP by the Home Office and MFC by the EU, for example – and have different focuses and priorities depending on funders, which sometimes makes it difficult for the city to commit to long-term integration matters (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*). Furthermore, Brexit has unsettled the city’s EU-based networks and funding opportunities. However, Respondent B5 emphasised that Birmingham would remain as a European city:

> [T]his is one of the real depressing things about post-Brexit Britain.… But we’ve always been a very much connected across Europe as a city.… we’re all kind of dealing with similar challenges in slightly different ways that reflects our national political characteristics and systems, but there's an awful lot to learn and share from that.… we're certainly very clear that Birmingham is still a European city, regardless of what decisions national government may have made around our membership of the EU. (*Interview B5, city councillor, Birmingham*)

While the respondent’s voice reflects his political view on Brexit, this account implies the city’s identity that can transcend national-level decisions and allow the city to make use of the EU network and resources to address local integration issues.

6.3.3 Summary: shared challenges as an urban city in the complex multi-scalar dynamics

Integration governance involves agencies and institutions across various scales, and interviews indeed illustrated the city's integration strategy that has been significantly affected by various actors. In both cities, officials mentioned the benefits and challenges of promoting integration at the city level, which partially attributed to the urban characteristics of the two cities. Both cities especially experienced difficulty in facilitating cross-department cooperation. The bureaucratic sectionalism hinders city-level officials from stepping over their immediate jurisdiction to handle issues, which has created difficulties in delivering integration strategy and providing services (Tegtmeyer Pak, 2000). Interviews with officials from Osaka, moreover, offered a glimpse into the complexity of integration governance in relation to upper and lower levels of authority. Whereas prefectural-level officers do not regard themselves as directly in charge of local-level migrant integration, *tabunka kyōsei* visions and priorities of lower-tier ward municipalities under Osaka City vary along with their limited capacity, creating gaps within the city. Although the city's lack of measures around housing and spatial segregation was pointed out in the previous chapter, the interviews suggest that ward offices may not possess adequate resources to address those issues.

At the same time, both Osaka and Birmingham are greatly affected by the national policy (in)decisions, which have frustrated local policymakers. The remarks from city officials from Osaka show that the absence of national policy can also limit the extent and content of local-level integration policy. Ambiguous definitions of '*tabunka kyōsei*' and 'migrants' seem to confuse the city's policymaking process, and the fact that *tabunka kyōsei* is not

prioritised in the city's policymaking suggests that the city's urban citizenship is affected by the national-level policy directions. It seems that the nation's denial of the immigration reality has indeed functioned as a policy decision and affected the city-level budget allocation and policymaking (see Hammar, 1985a), supporting Emilsson's (2015) argument on the power relations between national and local governments in the context of multi-level governance. Whereas the 'local turn' of integration has seen local governments taking initiatives in carrying out pragmatic integration measures, the power relations between national and local governments are yet uneven and allow the central government to control and limit the possibilities for local governments to carry out local integration (Alexander, 2007; Emilsson, 2015, p.3). Furthermore, *Ishin*'s presence seems to have a heavy weight on the city office and its integration policy-making. The top-down pressure of the mayor and the leading political party is often discussed in the urban context of migrant integration and membership both as inclusive and exclusive interventions (e.g. Barber, 2013; Gargiulo and Piccoli, 2020). In the case of Osaka, the top-down pressure directs its integration strategy to a more exclusive one.

On the other hand, since migrant and refugee integration, as well as community cohesion, have been discussed in England, such conceptual confusion or lack of sense of direction was not seen in Birmingham; the city also has outlined its integration visions through various projects and partnerships. Instead, the national power over the city was seen in hostile environment policies and the austerity programme. As Chapter 2 has explained, so-called hostile environment policies imposed by the national government have affected the way migrants, especially those without status, are treated by local agencies, and such bordering policies and practices have produced everyday urban hostile environments

(Yuval-Davis et al., 2018; Gawlewicz and Yiftachel, 2022). Furthermore, since 2010, local authorities have suffered from funding cuts from the central government (see Featherstone et al., 2012; Clayton et al., 2016; Rex and Campbell, 2022). The austerity programme has affected the city's ability to deliver services to its residents and exacerbated the unequal distribution of services and resources by making new migrants "invisible populations" (Humphris, 2018, p.101). Respondents' remarks on austerity corroborate Bloomfield's (2019, p.174) observation on austerity in Birmingham that "fall[s] heaviest on urban areas" and "transform[s] the role and functions of local government". The slogan of localism pushed by the central government has resulted in higher centralisation of power and autonomy, and the austerity programme has significantly impacted Birmingham and its capacity to implement integration (Coker, 2018; Galandini et al., 2019; Rex and Campbell, 2022).

As such, neither city possesses the capability to prioritise integration matters, confirming the dominant influence of the national government over the way integration is carried out in the city. Tegtmeyer Pak (2000) and Tsuda (2006a) have highlighted local governments' ability to challenge the absence of national-level policies and to independently respond to migrants' needs without much concern for local party politics and electoral demand. Nonetheless, from the interviews, the city-level integration policies and practices certainly seem to be greatly influenced by such dynamics. The interviews show that the practicality of city-level integration is significantly limited by the state power, affecting the way urban citizenship is envisioned and operationalised through integration strategy as a result (Dekker et al., 2015; Gebhardt, 2016; Galandini et al., 2019). Such limitations and gaps created in the city are often fulfilled by civil society actors. Both Osaka and Birmingham

maintain a close relationship with voluntary and community sector organisations and individuals, who often take up the role of assisting migrant residents, especially in accessing services and additional support, as I further discuss in the following chapter.

Meanwhile, both cities are involved in networks with other cities, although the degree and extent vary between Osaka and Birmingham. Osaka's sister-city network focuses on its economic strategy and is barely concerned with the city's migrant integration. Instead, *kokuryū* builds a network with *kokuryū* in other cities and prefectures that have allowed them to exchange integration ideas and practices, which in turn feeds into the city's policymaking. On the other hand, Birmingham seems to be using networks with other municipalities at the local, national and EU levels more actively to promote migrant integration. Birmingham's network use has indeed helped the city to shape its identity as a welcoming, inclusive city through the CoS network and Eurocities.[34] These national and transnational networks of cities have shaped the city's urban citizenship, which is divergent from the national framework of immigration and integration. Furthermore, the city's European identity and relation with other European cities disregard the national-level decision to leave the EU; to some extent, it even seems that Brexit has strengthened Birmingham's identity as a European city. The city seems to be actively engaged with 'vertical venue shopping', a strategy of policy actors to privilege specific levels of 'policy venues' (Guiraudon, 2000). By "venue shopping" at the EU level and building a horizontal network, cities can increase their "entrepreneurship in developing their own integration philosophies" that eventually push forward their local integration policies (Scholten and

[34] Eurocities list migration and integration as one of the network's focuses and provide opportunities for cities to exchange their ideas and develop a joint project relating to integration (Eurocities, n.d.).

Penninx, 2016, pp.104–105). Likewise, the city's use of EU-level membership enhances the spatiality of urban citizenship, shaping residents' local sense of status, rights and identity (Wekerle, 2000; Isin, 2000a). From accounts of the councillor and the city's maintained relations with European cities after Brexit, it can be said that Birmingham uses the supra-regional and national network more strategically than Osaka in order to benefit its local integration strategy and reinforce their transnational as well as local (urban) identities.

As such, although the top-down influence of the national government is dominant over the city's understanding of integration and its financial capacity, the city's integration strategy seems to be shaped within broader dynamics. The networks Osaka and Birmingham maintain with their local actors as well as other municipalities – even cities in other nations in the case of Birmingham – signify that such dynamics involve not only hierarchical pressure but also "parallel power networks" that exist within the city administration (Jessop, 2016, p.20). In addition to the internal dynamics within the city office I mentioned above, it can therefore be claimed that the city's integration strategy is operated within multi-scalar governance within which its urban citizenship is shaped.

6.4 The city's operation of integration strategy and urban citizenship at time of emergency

Examining the cities' responses during the pandemic shows how the crisis can shape urban citizenship. Interviews in Osaka took place in the very early phase of the outbreak, as many respondents expressed the hopeful expectation that the outbreak would be over by the end of 2020. While most points concerned the short-term impacts of the pandemic,

they helped to comprehend the immediate effects of the pandemic on the way in which integration strategy was managed. On the other hand, interviews in Birmingham were conducted months after the first lockdown and the initial confusion of the pandemic, and participants' responses were around how initial responses to the outbreak took place and how they affected the city's integration measures. At the time of the interviews, many participants admitted that they were not entirely aware of the long-term impacts or prospects of the pandemic. Yet, their perspectives still offer insights into how the city regards its migrant population, especially in times of emergency, and its implication for the city's urban citizenship.

6.4.1 Osaka: enhancing the regular operations

In terms of integration governance and administration, *tabunka kyōsei* was regarded as inconsequential and given a low priority in the city office during the pandemic. City officials who were in charge of drafting the 2020 Guidelines said that their work on guidelines was delayed due to the outbreak. The drafting process would require approvals from various bureaus and ward offices, and the officials "cannot really ask them to draft the guidelines in the midst of coronavirus" (*Interview O11, city office staff, Osaka*). A similar remark was made by the prefecture *kokuryū* staff, who said that local municipalities were at capacity and unable to work on *tabunka kyōsei* during the pandemic (*Interview O18, prefectural kokuryū staff, Osaka*).

From interviews, it seems that the city's early response to the pandemic focused mainly on information provision and consultation services, which have always been the regular *tabunka kyōsei* operations. In the early stage of the pandemic, the city and prefectural

offices, as well as *kokuryū,* were committed to providing information in multiple languages. *Kokuryū* also responded to enquiries and consultations from migrant residents who lived within and outside the city. All the *kokuryū* I interviewed saw a steep increase in consultations from migrants. Moreover, all activities, such as cultural events, Japanese classes and support classes for migrant children, were cancelled or moved online. This not only hindered migrants from having opportunities to receive support and connect with local communities but also made it difficult for policymakers to reach out to the local communities and gather local voices and demands, the city councillor maintained (*Interview O19, city councillor, Osaka*).

Meanwhile, the expansion of essential services such as healthcare was not seen during this time. While some general health services were available for any city residents regardless of their immigration status, unregistered migrants were not eligible for the government's benefit and vaccine programme. When asked about them, the city office staff admitted that they were not regarded as residents who could receive the city's services. Yet, the respondent continued that they should be included in a bigger picture:

> When thinking about the target of Osaka City's administration and services, basically, it is about providing services to residents… so it may be that they (migrants without status) are inevitably excluded.… But, there's 'administration' in another aspect, like human rights discourse or involvement in the local community and social interactions at the neighbourhood level, and this shouldn't rule out undocumented or illegal stayers. Within a big, global 'administrative' framework,

> we cannot disregard them as long as we are all humans. (*Interview O11, city office staff, Osaka*)

While the city cannot administratively recognise undocumented migrants as 'residents' or implement any integration measures, the official also acknowledged their presence through their neighbourhood-level participation. Such "administration" that Respondent O11 mentioned based on a global point of view is not to be led by the city authority but by residents who would be engaged in daily interactions at the neighbourhood level, which is further explored in the following chapter.

6.4.2 Birmingham: extending the city's recognition of migrant rough sleepers

Regarding the pandemic, one respondent said, "whether people directly talk about COVID or not, COVID has washed over everything" (*Interview B2, MHCLG staff, Birmingham*). The respondents agreed that the pandemic revealed and exacerbated the gaps within the city, especially based on residents' socio-economic situations, ethnic backgrounds, place of residence and immigration status. As the pandemic hit, long-term goals of the integration strategy were replaced with more urgent and basic needs such as health and housing (*Interview B1, city-level official, Birmingham*). In order to provide basic services, the city utilised and maximised the existing networks with stakeholders that the city had built for integration purposes. This included various community organisations, voluntary organisations and faith groups, from big to small. Since such networks are sometimes managed and operated by migrants themselves, it benefited the city to circulate information from the top-down and bottom-up. For instance, the health network of the MFC project, led by migrant health champions, allowed the city to deliver public health

information and government's messages while understanding local demands. Likewise, information provision on vaccination was facilitated through these local networks. Particularly, one of the needs emphasised by the respondents was digital inclusion. Many migrants, especially socio-economically disadvantaged migrants, did not have a device or know how to use it, which hindered them from obtaining accurate information, participating in social activities and accessing services. Despite some funding programmes and local networks that tackled this matter, it was difficult for the respondents in the public sector to address all individual problems that emerged amidst the pandemic.

In addition to addressing the basic needs of the migrant population through the existing networks, the city proactively accommodated rough-sleeping migrants with NRPF. With the advice and grant from the central government confirmed in March 2020 (GOV.UK, 2020b), BCC provided temporary accommodation to rough sleepers, including those with NRPF, such as refused asylum seekers and undocumented migrants (see Chapter 5). Although they had not been well recognised by the city on a practical level and had been relying on the voluntary sector, BCC was able to radar them and provide housing and legal support to some extent during the pandemic. Many stakeholders, both from the public and third sectors, agreed that the city's work on providing emergency accommodation was positive. Respondent B5 admitted that, although the city as a local government cannot fully assist people with NRPF, the emergency created by the pandemic enabled the city to use resources flexibly:

> We found a number of people with no recourse to public funds who are essentially rough sleeping.… They had nowhere to go and no means to support themselves whatsoever. So we used the flexibility that we had under public health powers to basically take those people in and accommodate them. And we've been working with that cohort to try and formalise and legalise their status, so they can then either apply for settled status, apply for asylum and then be able to access some form of support. So we made use of the opportunity, I suppose, that COVID created for us to be able to do something in that space, you know. (*Interview B5, city councillor, Birmingham*)

As touched upon earlier, the local authority has been facing legal barriers as well as a lack of resources to assist migrants, especially those with NRPF. However, the city was able to extend its autonomy to accommodate migrants and assist them in legalising their status, which could perhaps be unfeasible in normal times due to several limitations. On this point, Respondent B2 talked about how local authorities increased such autonomy and sense of the place during the pandemic:

> So we couldn't help them (rough sleepers) because we didn't know they were there.… So COVID has been awful, continues to be awful, but you need to look at what we're doing in terms of our support.… And I think, [through] three lockdowns actually, most authorities have probably a better sense of their town, city, village that they never had before because they've had to get to know everybody or certainly the area and those that need the support very quickly, and where they've

> not had before, they've had to build those networks really quickly. (*Interview B2, MHCLG staff, Birmingham*)

It can therefore be said that the pandemic, in some sense, has allowed the city to obtain a better idea of its residents and build local networks, which helped the city government to increase the sense of its territory as polity and exercise autonomy. Indeed, Respondent B2 added that such networks increased residents' awareness about the Council:

> [W]e've seen through COVID actually that people's appreciation for local authorities has gone up because there's an awareness of what they do beyond bin collections… It's become very clear that communities now value what the local authorities have done since March (2020), and have a real kind of transparency now, in terms of: 'all right, that's what Birmingham City Council is doing for us. It's not [the central] government. This is what you are doing for everyone in Birmingham'. (*Interview B2, MHCLG staff, Birmingham*)

The pandemic and the following government responses exerted uneven influences on residents based on their socioeconomic attributes and immigration status. However, by utilising local networks with civil society actors and assisting those who did not have access to statutory services, the city increased its presence among urban citizens.

6.4.3 Summary: impacts of the pandemic and contrasting responses of the two cities

While both Osaka and Birmingham have managed to address the demands and challenges posed by the pandemic, their responses were rather contrasting in the context

of integration and urban citizenship. In Osaka, instead of the city office, *kokuryū* took the full initiative by providing information and consultation for the city's migrant population while utilising the network with local NPOs; no other city-led measures for the migrant population were observed in the early stage of the pandemic. The city's efforts in including migrants in disaster preparedness and management, introduced in the previous chapter, did not seem to be reflected in the city's responses to the pandemic, confirming that the city's disaster preparedness and management are intended for natural disasters, especially earthquakes.

Moreover, migrants without visa were not granted any form of local membership in Osaka, with or without a disaster. During the pandemic, which is well regarded as a 'disaster' (Recio et al., 2021), urban membership based on humanitarian reasons did not seem to be enacted (see Bosniak, 2007). As the city official's remark touched upon, the city office was aware of the presence of undocumented migrants who cannot be recognised administratively but are treated as local residents from the human rights viewpoint. As the respondent drew, this view is often discussed in a cosmopolitan context, supporting the universal notion of citizenship (Wekerle, 2000; Mazlish, 2005); yet, in practice, this does not ensure any practical solutions and instead makes them rely on grassroots networks. This shows the limitation of the 'top-down' approach to urban citizenship and signals the significance of bottom-up acts and practices of urban citizenship status, rights and identity, as examined in the following chapter.

On the other hand, BCC also connected with migrants and supporting groups during the pandemic, using the existing networks. In addition, by accommodating rough-sleeping

migrants with NRPF and assisting their legal processes, Birmingham has extended its urban membership to those who had not been recognised before based on their presence within the city's territory. This emergency measure was significant in acknowledging the urban membership of migrants based on their physical presence in a city territory (rough sleeping) rather than on their legal status (NRPF) (see Faist, 1995). This can be considered as what Bosniak (2007) called ethical territoriality, the principle which allows urban citizenship to be granted based on humanitarian considerations (see Gebhardt, 2016; see Chapter 3). Albeit temporary, Birmingham extended its urban membership to those who had not been entitled to a legal form of citizenship by flexibly using its resources. This, as a result, has transformed the "local political arena" and enhanced the city's presence in its relations vis-à-vis residents (Blokland et al., 2015, p.660). The existing and new networks in the city can be used to demonstrate not only the city's articulation of its political and administrative agenda but also residents' negotiations of rights. In a sense, for Birmingham, the pandemic has reinforced the city's polity and strengthened urban citizens' local sense of the city as a space for constructing urban citizenship (see Blokland et al., 2015).

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I analysed the city's integration governance by drawing findings from interviews with stakeholders in the public sector in Osaka and Birmingham. The city stakeholders' voices on policymaking and governance of integration offer deeper insights into the city's integration strategy, which are not necessarily mentioned in their policy documents analysed in the previous chapter. The interviews provide us with a better understanding of how urban citizenship is operationalised through the city's integration

strategy. The cases of Osaka and Birmingham signal that the city's integration strategy reflects the extent of urban citizenship for migrant residents. Amongst migrant groups in the city, the city's basis for recognising and granting urban status, rights and identity varies depending on their migration background and length of settlement in the community. Particularly for those who do not possess Japanese or British nationality, having their needs addressed in the city's integration strategy holds significance. It can therefore be said that having the integration strategy secures one's urban citizenship in the city.

However, the city functions in a complicated configuration of integration governance, and urban citizenship operationalised through the integration strategy is not reliant on the city alone. The way the city's integration strategy is designed and implemented constantly changes within the dynamics of institutions and actors across various scales. While facing pressures from the central government and its policy direction, the city office utilises horizontal networks with other cities and local actors to facilitate integration. At the same time, the city as an administrative body of the integration strategy is not a monolithic institution, as there is a gap in understanding among city-level officials with regard to the significance of integration and policy priorities. Hence, migrants' urban citizenship, its design and operationalisation of status, rights and identity, is shaped by multi-scalar governance of integration, of which the city is part.

Interview findings have also shed light on how urban citizenship can change in times of emergency. During the pandemic, the two cities demonstrated contrasting responses to migrant residents, as Birmingham expanded its scope using the national resources and

Osaka maintained the normal operation of *tabunka kyōsei*. The series of measures taken by the city towards migrant residents during the pandemic illustrate how the city regards its migrant residents, which helps us discern the top-down operation of urban citizenship. In the following chapter, I analyse interview findings from civil society actors, another significant part of the implementation of the city's integration strategy to draw 'bottom-up' formation of citizenship claims in the urban contexts.

CHAPTER 7
CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS' APPROACHES TO URBAN CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MIGRANT INTEGRATION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the voices of local activists and staff from CSOs, including migrant and non-migrant organisations, who have been involved with integration practices. In the previous chapter, I examined policymakers' approaches to urban citizenship by looking at the perspectives of city authorities and policymakers on migrant integration. While the top-down framework of citizenship still carries a heavy weight upon (non)citizens and their status, their mobilised attempt to claim status, rights and identity constitutes an integral part of the citizenship process, as discussed in Chapter 3 (Staeheli, 2003). As such, the local stakeholders I interviewed are active agents of such "continuous negotiation" for urban citizenship (Staeheli, 2003, p.101). Through their work and practices of migrant integration in the city, I highlight the 'bottom-up' approaches to urban citizenship by drawing interviews from civil society actors who play a key role in implementing integration strategy. CSOs in Osaka and Birmingham demonstrate similar approaches to integration practices and urban citizenship. I argue that CSOs play an essential role in activating and practising urban citizenship in the city while such approaches to urban citizenship are negotiated and shaped within the multi-scalar dynamics.

This chapter follows a similar structure to the previous chapter by presenting findings based on three themes: histories, legacies and conflicts of urban mobilisation; CSOs' acts and practices of urban citizenship; and the impacts of the pandemic. First, I explore how histories, legacies and conflicts in the city have affected CSOs' acts of urban citizenship. Group dynamics amongst CSOs and community organisations constitute a significant part of the bottom-up approach to urban citizenship, taking into account the long history of mobilisation and activism that the two cities have experienced and their superdiversifying population. In order to avoid the pitfalls of "uncritically celebrating local movements or moralistically judging them" (Blokland et al., 2015, p.663), it is necessary to understand their relations and how the bottom-up making of claims to urban citizenship is actually fragmented by group dynamics.

I then move on to analysing the processes through which their roles as actors of urban citizenship contribute to the implementation of the city's integration strategy. As Chapter 3 has explained, there are two main approaches; first, CSOs' direct involvement with the city authority in implementing integration can be understood as 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen, 2008a; see Chapter 3). Second, independent activities CSOs undertake are what Holm and Lebuhn (2020) call 'doing citizenship', which bases the process of citizenship upon "residents' social practices and daily routines" (p.82). I then discuss CSOs' early responses to the pandemic that illustrate the strengths and limitations of grassroots support for migrants during the crisis, followed by the conclusion.

7.2 Histories, legacies and conflicts of urban mobilisation

Before examining various 'bottom-up' approaches through which local actors claim and practice urban citizenship, this section delves into inter-group dynamics that exist among different migrant groups in Osaka and Birmingham. As Chapter 2 briefly introduced, both cities are identified with strong activism that has influenced the city's integration strategy. It has been led by *Buraku* and *zainichi* activists in Osaka and by ethnic minority communities, including long-established migrant community organisations, in Birmingham. Although some of those groups are not migrants, in the context of local grassroots activism and conflicts over material, social and symbolic resources, their presence as long-established communities vis-à-vis newly arrived migrants and refugees offers implications on urban citizenship.

7.2.1 Osaka: a 'tug-of-war' among minority groups

Many respondents, including city officials and activists from CSOs, attributed the city's integration efforts to a history of civil rights movements by *Burakumin* and *zainichi* Koreans. With a large population of *Burakumin*, Osaka has been a centre of *Burakumin* activism since before WWII, which established "the foundation of human rights activism upon which the *zainichi* civil rights movement developed" (*Interview O48, NPO representative, Osaka*). One of the most notable achievements, for example, can be seen in the progress of education for minority children in Osaka, called *minzoku gakkyū* (ethnic class) or *kokusai kurabu* (international club) (see Chapter 5). It was developed based on integration education practices for children from *Buraku* in public schools in Osaka, which led to a similar practice for *zainichi* Koreans. Indeed, *minzoku gakkyū* is a community-derived initiative since it was initiated by local residents and teachers and later integrated

into the city-led measure. Amongst several benefits of *minzoku gakkyū* that various respondents shared, Respondent O37, whose child went to *minzoku gakkyū*, described its positive influence on the local space. When she went to her child's elementary school wearing *chima jeogori* (a traditional Korean dress), students from nearby junior high school greeted her in Korean:

> They greeted me, '*annyeonghasimnikka*', '*annyeonghaseyo*' (hello in Korean)…. They were also saying, '*jeogori* makes me feel nostalgic'. I was so surprised to see how (open-minded) children who grew up in elementary school with *minzoku gakkyū* would become. I truly felt the meaning of *minzoku gakkyū*…. 'Ah, this is such a good area', I felt. I'm convinced that *minzoku gakkyū* fosters such space and mind. (*Interview O37, VG member, Osaka*)

This account highlights how the community-led activity, which later became one of the city's integration measures, has been able to shape the shared cultural identity in the local space.

Respondents from CSOs concurred that legacies of grassroots movements and achievements led by *Burakumin* and *zainichi* Koreans paved the way and built the foundation of Osaka's human rights and *tabunka kyōsei* measures. The "continuity with the past" has advanced migrant integration in the city and has become Osaka's tradition and strength (*Interview O41, FBO staff, Osaka*). At the same time, however, minority groups in Osaka have constantly been in competition with other groups and communities in order to 'win' recognition in the city. In the context of migrant integration, the *Buraku*

Liberation Movement and the *zainichi* Korean movement maintained a complicated relationship, as the former was supportive of the *zainichi* movement only when it was under control, according to Respondent O48, a *zainichi* Korean activist. He pointed out that the same territorial competition has been seen in the relationship between *zainichi* Koreans and newcomer migrants in Osaka. He explained the mechanism behind such competition between *Buraku* and *zainichi* as well as *zainichi* and newcomer migrants:

> There are lots of people among *zainichi* Koreans who are annoyed by newcomer migrants, of course. 'Newcomer foreigners come here out of nowhere and take away the coexistence community we have built and all the public interest in *zainichi* Koreans', not few people think. This doesn't mean that *zainichi* Koreans are narrow-minded, but implies how much division the discriminatory structure the Japanese society is creating. The same goes for the *Buraku* Liberation Movement; the value [of the *zainichi* Korean movement] for the *Buraku* Liberation Movement varied significantly, depending on whether you do it inside or outside the territory of the *Buraku* Liberation Movement. The *Buraku* Liberation Movement would help *zainichi* Koreans' civil rights movement within their territory, under their control and hegemony, but they wouldn't help outside their realm. So that means they had a kind of fear of losing public interest in the Liberation Movement by being replaced with another standard-bearer at the forefront of the civil rights movement. This shows how narrow the territory we have gained, no matter how hard we have fought in this civil rights movement. We, the minority, are forced to be in this kind of tug-of-war within that territory. (*Interview O48, NPO representative, Osaka*)

Indeed, CSO activists, whether working for *zainichi* Korean groups or newcomer migrants, acknowledged that such conflicts have been fuelled by different demands and situations of long-settled communities and newly arrived migrants.

Respondent O20, a *zainichi* activist supporting newcomer migrants, highlighted that the balance between old-comer migrants, newcomer migrants and Japanese residents is integral for migrant integration in Osaka and that civil society has a significant role in bridging different groups and redefining their responsibilities. He, along with other respondents, also noted generation and space as playing a crucial role for *tabunka kyōsei* of old and new migrant groups in Osaka. Since first-generation *zainichi* Koreans did not have the capacity to engage with human rights issues, second- and third-generation *zainichi* Koreans stood up. The legacy of old-comer migrants' activism should therefore be passed onto the second- and third-generation newcomer migrants who would experience similar challenges eventually (*Interview O20, NPO representative, Osaka*). At the same time, some respondents highlighted spatial implications of the relations between long-established communities and newly arrived ones by mentioning that many *zainichi* Koreans now move out from their concentrated area to a 'richer area' and rent the old place to newcomer migrants, letting them settle in the more deprived area.

7.2.2 Birmingham: competitions over funding and resources

All respondents from public, private and third sectors acknowledged Birmingham's well-established community organisations and CSOs, which have maintained the networks with the city, while attributing it to Birmingham's rich experience with migration. At the same time, the flow of the history of migration and communities in Birmingham indicates

conflicts and divisions that have complicated processes of community cohesion and integration in the city. Since the British government started measures around multiculturalism and race relations in the 1960s, the integration progress in Birmingham has been “a constant cycle of two steps forward and one step back”, according to Respondent B19, who long worked for community organisations relations in Birmingham (*Interview B19, VG member, Birmingham*). Despite measures to launch multicultural education and promote employment of the Commonwealth communities into BCC, segregation and socioeconomic gaps between different ethnic communities in their concentrated areas were yet evident. More proactive measures were imposed by BCC after riots in the 1980s, but community organisations remained rather divided, as each community had to rely on their self-sustainability. Respondent B19 maintained that the concept of community cohesion has become an easy “byword” for race relations that has obscured the essence of the problem and “constructed a tapestry of language around it, which confuses the issue rather than deals with the issue” (*Interview B19, VG member, Birmingham*).

Such divisions exist in the current dynamics between different communities and migrant groups as well. While many respondents acknowledged the rich number and size of community organisations in Birmingham and their strong commitment to equality, one respondent called it a “new hostile environment” in which all people but British nationals and permanent residents are excluded from equality and hindered from accessing to services (*Interview B16, CIC representative, Birmingham*). Socio-economic segregation based on one’s race, ethnicity and place of residence within the city was also pointed out as the challenge to community cohesion that affected migrants’ well-being. Indeed,

competition and conflict amongst long-established communities, as well as newly arrived migrant communities, were often discussed in the interviews. For instance, by drawing an example of members from migrant communities and ethnic minority communities in Birmingham who voted for Brexit, Respondent B19 explained about competitions between long-established communities and the newly arrived migrant groups over limited resources:

> [N]ow that you've got in and sort of settled here, you want the drawbridge closed for anybody else because you have got this sort of fear of what you're likely to lose in terms of so-called distribution resources from new people coming in. So this constant churn of, which side are you on, who's entitled to this, and who's entitled to that. (*Interview B19, VG member, Birmingham*)

Many local actors, furthermore, felt that communities in Birmingham lacked networks and coordination with each other that would allow them to share their issues and take the initiatives or lobby the authorities, which resulted in the self-sufficient operation of the community and hence more competition. One of the respondents shared the difficulty of forming a closer network between community groups due to the competitive nature of organisations' funding structure:

> We're all competing for funding from the same funders. Yeah, it's a competitive market,… if they've got beneficiaries from a particular community, that's their assets. And they're very wary about giving you access to those people because that's how they get their funding. (*Interview B18, charity staff, Birmingham*)

Furthermore, migrants themselves would experience such gaps based on public resources and services they have access to. For instance, some programmes and networks, such as the resettlement programme, focus on a certain group of refugees and provide services, including housing, English language courses, training opportunities and social activities, which are not available for other migrant groups. One respondent warned about such differential sources of services:

> It's the danger, creating a sort of two-tier system where one group of migrants will get certain things there will be migrants who will not get that. And it can cause resentment or it could cause upset. (*Interview B9, charity staff, Birmingham*)

In addition to the existing group dynamics at the local level, integration programmes and projects that target particular migrant groups have created a similar structure in which migrants are identified whether they are welcome based on the resources they are entitled to.

7.2.3 Summary: inter-group competition symbolising local activism of Osaka and Birmingham

Most of the respondents from the two cities were proud of the strong presence of CSOs and the legacies of their bottom-up activism that became salient, especially after the war. Active civil society signifies the rich demographic diversity that the cities have embraced and the shared history of grassroots activism, which shapes urban citizenship identity of such minority groups as well as urban spaces. The respondent's account of the school district with *minzoku gakkyū* highlights the positive impacts of the integration strategy on

the formation of collective identity in urban space that embraces the cultural diversity of local residents (Gebhardt, 2016; see Chapter 5).

However, the interviews revealed that such a bottom-up approach to urban citizenship cannot be homogenised and it rather enfolds intergroup conflicts amongst community groups, showing that their urban citizenship is that of '*ikeru shitizunshippu* (living citizenship)' (Tanno, 2019; see Chapter 3). Local actors in both cities acknowledged conflicts between long-established ethnic minority communities and newly arrived migrant communities. In Osaka, conflicts between the *Buraku* community and the *zainichi* community, as well as between *zainichi* and newcomer migrants, were told in the context of civil rights and public interest. It was the *Buraku* community's concern that the civil rights movement in the limelight and the symbolic resources they earned would be undermined by *zainichi* activism. As Chung (2019) illustrates, whilst sharing a fight against structural discrimination, the two groups have utilised each other as a strategy to defend their cause. The same logic can be applied to the relationship between *zainichi* and newcomer migrants; given that Osaka has shifted its focus of the integration strategy from old-comers to newcomer migrants, the long-established *zainichi* communities feel threatened by their increasing presence. Likewise, in Birmingham, community organisations for long-established communities from Commonwealth countries have faced symbolic threats, as some felt that the political discourse of community cohesion and integration had replaced the public discussion on race relations. Furthermore, interviews have provided some examples of group competition over material resources. Funding opportunities for community organisations, as well as public services for migrants,

including refugees, are sometimes limited, leading to the respondents experiencing a sense of competition and resentment among CSO actors and migrants.

This confirms Joseph's (2008) three dimensions of the urban space (see Chapter 3). She argues that the urban space is patterned by social and symbolic boundaries; social boundaries are characterised by the uneven distribution of resources, while symbolic boundaries signify attributes and identities that assign individuals to specific groups (Joseph, 2008, p.32). Manifested by intersections of social and symbolic boundaries, conflicts within and between groups can be seen. Specifically, intergroup competition is understood to occur when the perceived access to resources – not only material or economic but also symbolic and social – is limited to a certain group (Esses et al., 1998, 2001; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Long-standing communities in both cities cannot simply be categorised as 'migrant communities'; they have settled in the countries over generations, and many of them possess citizenship of the host country, while some in Japan hold special permanent residency, which would still distinguish them from other visa holders. They are therefore better equipped to live in the host society with the legal, social and linguistic advantages gained through their status and well-established communities (social boundaries) (van Ours and Veenman, 2003). In this sense, they are in groups that may possess dual (or more) identities derived from their ethnic origins and the host society (symbolic boundaries) (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2016). However, given group competitions with new out-groups (migrants), it is apparent that those long-standing communities feel that they are yet othered (Triandafyllidou, 2000). The national and local integration policies can reinforce their threat perceptions (Castles, 1995; Weldon, 2006; de Haas et al., 2019), and this was seen in the respondents' remarks on the city's shifting

integration strategy. The shift of focus and missing references and terms in policy documents are indeed received as threats to long-established communities, which can amplify their negative views towards newly arrived migrants. In other words, such policy shift has reconfigured social boundaries and reinforced symbolic boundaries manifested by the old-new migration discourse within the urban space, which influenced the way *zainichi* and Commonwealth communities perceive and negotiate their urban citizenship. This demonstrates how (perceived) inequalities are normalised in migrant urban citizens' struggles for the right to the city and how various boundaries confine their public, social and political positions in the urban space.

Such dynamics amongst migrant and community groups signify the "situational nature of urban citizenship" (Blokland et al., 2015, p.663), through which various group dynamics and their fragmented claims to citizenship are intersected and navigated. The bottom-up claims of rights and membership of urban citizenship and mobilisation of urban citizens should not be regarded as a unitary process inasmuch as status, rights and identity that resident groups imagine in the urban space vary depending on their group identity as well as socioeconomic situations (Joseph, 2008; Cohen and Margalit, 2015). Looking at how long-settled migrant and ethnic minority communities have responded towards newly arrived migrant groups, it can be stated that their local identities are constantly contested and navigated by being situated in-between "simultaneously dominating and subordinated, insiders and outsiders, majority and minority" (Cohen and Margalit, 2015, p.683), placing them in 'gray space' (Yiftachel, 2009, 2015). Furthermore, it is also notable that group relations in both Osaka and Birmingham exert spatial implications. While some areas in the city, such as Ikuno, have long been known as the *zainichi* Koreans' settled

area, the inflow of newly arrived migrants from other Asian countries into the area due to the relatively low housing prices has been evident. Likewise, socioeconomic disadvantages that ethnic minority and migrant groups experience in their concentrated areas have been pointed out by many in Birmingham. This landscape functions as a mechanism of inequalities and shapes symbolic boundaries that affect the future claims-making of urban citizens, such as the next generation of newcomer migrants (Joseph, 2008). As Cohen and Margalit (2015, p.683) have shown, the bottom-up claims-making of urban citizenship is not a straightforward process of urban mobilisation and actions but rather a process through which one's imaginary urban status, rights and identity are constantly shaped and constructed by a "messier socio-spatial dynamic involving different groups in a battle over urban rights and space".

7.3 CSOs as an actor of integration and urban citizenship

I analyse CSOs' roles in shaping integration strategy and urban citizenship by scrutinising two 'bottom-up' approaches. Indeed, CSOs in the two cities demonstrate similar integration approaches. First, I focus on their direct involvement with the city authority in making claims and facilitating integration, which signifies their 'acts of citizenship'. Both cities embrace active CSOs that have campaigned for political participation and representation of migrants in the city. Second, CSOs' independent 'practices of citizenship' are notable inasmuch as they utilise trans-local and national networks and resources to play a role in providing integration services instead of the city office and, therefore, increasing their presence in the local space that shapes the process of urban citizenship.

7.3.1 Osaka: pride in education and claims for political rights

CSOs' involvement with the city in education and policymaking

Respondents described that the network between CSOs and the city, especially *kokuryū*, plays a significant role in facilitating migrant integration. For instance, migrant children's education at and outside school enormously entails public-CSO cooperation, given Osaka's long tradition of education for minority children. Different CSOs provide various learning support for migrant children by teaching Japanese, assisting in school homework, supporting high school enrolment, and helping them maintain their identity. While some of these projects have been commissioned and funded by Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City has also actively cooperated with CSOs to launch a *tabunka kyōsei* educational programme (see Chapter 5). The rich connection in education suggests the possibility of non-public sector actors making bottom-up impacts on the city- or prefecture-led integration agenda.

At the same time, all respondents from CSOs agreed that the city's integration strategy is not sufficient, and activists have claimed migrants' rights in areas of their everyday lives, ranging from political and civil rights to equal access to public services. A notable example of bottom-up claims for migrants' rights was a local CSO's campaign for migrants' right to vote in the local referendum that was carried out in November 2020 to restructure Osaka Prefecture and City. The term 'local referendum (*jyūmin tōhyō*)' in Japanese is directly translated as 'resident election', but, as Chapter 5 has touched upon already, in Osaka, participation in the referendum is limited to residents who possess Japanese citizenship, although non-Japanese citizens who stay more than three months in the city can obtain a Resident Record and become 'residents'. Despite lobbying and petition efforts, non-

Japanese citizenship holders were not allowed to participate in the 2020 referendum.[35] Yet, the movement gave those who were excluded from the referendum an opportunity to speak up and claim their political membership as the city's residents.

Respondent O37, a member of the CSO who participated in this activity, who is *zainichi* and does not possess voting rights, underscored the difference between local suffrage and voting rights for a local referendum. While local suffrage covers national and regional elections and places migrants' rights in the national political context, voting rights for the referendum simply consider all those who live in the city as residents:

> We're not talking about local suffrage. We're residents, and we want to participate [in the referendum] as residents. Between making a decision with 95% of the population and with 100% of the population, which can make a better decision if you listen to the 'voices of residents'? We can listen to the 100%.… Aren't we living together? I want to keep emphasising that we're all residents. (*Interview O37, VG member, Osaka*)

It is notable that through this campaign, they did not aim to be recognised by the national government to obtain local suffrage, which impacts their formal citizenship status, rights and identity. Rather, their demand was to be recognised as full residents of the city by the city government, which is an urban form of citizenship.

[35] This particular referendum on Osaka's metropolis plan required national law revision to enable non-Japanese citizens to participate, and, in spite of the CSO's fervent campaigning, the city office did not support the law change.

Furthermore, as the previous chapter has touched upon, public comments for the 2020 Guidelines played a crucial role in the city's policymaking process at the time of interviews. Many respondents based in the city submitted public comments, expressing their opposition against matters such as the omitted references to integration, leading to the revision of the draft. One respondent, whose organisation used to be the city's extra-government body but became a general incorporated foundation (GIF) due to a budget cut from the city, mentioned the different dynamics his organisation experienced as a non-governmental body in submitting public comments:

> Well, to Osaka City, we could never say such things in the past. First, we couldn't even submit [public comments] cause they would tell us, 'what the hell are you thinking?', 'you have no business saying anything'. Now, we have no issues about submitting them. (*Interview O47, GIF staff, Osaka*)

This depicts the key presence that civil society can make in providing feedback and shaping the city's policymaking, which can sometimes be stronger than that of the city's affiliated office.

Strategic use of local and supranational networks in providing basic services

Whilst directly communicating with the city office and *kokuryū*, CSOs have also utilised their independent networks to fill the gaps that the public sector creates in providing services. Despite its strong *tabunka kyōsei* emphasis on information provision (see Chapter 5), many CSOs distribute their own multi-lingual materials because of the very limited availability and accessibility of the city's multi-lingual information. No matter how

fervent the public sector advocated for their efforts in providing multilingual information, such measures were seen by local actors rather as an “alibi” to show off their efforts (*Interview O35, VG member, Osaka*). Furthermore, migrants’ access to services is often rejected at a city or ward office counter, although their access is guaranteed. Such treatments happen especially when migrants request access to education, healthcare or benefits. In order to enable migrants’ access to services, Japanese supporters from CSOs usually accompany migrants and assist with translation and bureaucratic procedures. For instance, although compulsory school education is available for migrant children regardless of their immigration status, the ward office staff rejected the access when one asylum-seeking child tried to enrol in a local elementary school. While they were able to enrol in school with the fervent support of the local NPO group who directly communicated with the upper-level educational board, the supporter lamented the lack of knowledge of officials:

> There are 3,000 migrant children in Osaka City… However, why on earth don’t officials at the counter know anything? This is the reality: they don’t know anything about children or school enrolment. […] We accompanied the entire process, and this is today’s Japan, where you can’t even go to school without going that far. To what extent do you think [the services] are maintained when even children are left like this? … Almost none. (*Interview O21, NPO representative, Osaka*)

Moreover, another respondent pointed out that officers at the counter not only lack knowledge as to which services are available for migrants but also often naturally assume that non-Japanese nationals are not eligible for services and deny access without

consulting any documents or their managers. In order to enable migrants to access services, Japanese supporters who accompany them also need to be educated about migrants' rights so that they can challenge the officials (*Interview O35, VG member, Osaka*).

In order to support migrants' everyday life in the city, CSOs maintain their own independent networks with other CSOs at the local, national and supranational levels. Within Osaka, CSOs liaise with each other mainly based on the nationality or immigration status of migrants they support. CSOs' independent networks are often used to support migrants without formal status, such as over-stayers, asylum seekers and those on provisional release who are not considered in the city's integration strategy. One respondent said that these migrants "can't live as a human being" without formal immigration status, and CSOs are required to fully utilise resources and networks to provide all everyday support, including financial and legal assistance as well as health and housing support (*Interview O41, FBO staff, Osaka*). Locally, they use the skills and expertise of volunteers; one CSO, for example, started offering a free health check-up to a migrant on provisional release when a medical doctor signed up to volunteer (*Interview O21, NPO representative, Osaka*).

CSOs' networks also extend to a wider area. A respondent from the Catholic Church said that their internal network across Japan helped them raise funds to assist migrants on provisional release who do not possess rights to work. Furthermore, the worldwide Catholic network allowed them to help migrants escape from state intervention:

> We have Catholic churches all across Japan and all over the world; we also have the Vatican. Since we are so connected to each other, our strength is that we are able to move people around through church, like letting them go or working on something behind closed doors. We also have many non-Japanese priests and sisters who can promptly respond when we need non-Japanese speakers. In that sense, I think there are times when the Catholic network is very effective and useful. (*Interview O41, FBO staff, Osaka*)

Another example of the strategic use of transnational networks was observed in school education. In addition to *minzoku gakkyū*, some elementary schools have utilised the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Associated Schools Network to promote global understanding for students. Respondent O20 described that this was a strategy to avoid attack from right-wing opponents who are not convinced with *minzoku gakkyū*:

> Besides *minzoku gakkyū*, they (the elementary school) have UNESCO Time as a subject, the educational programme for international understanding for Japanese students. As a result, conservative and nationalist people in Japan, who often attack *minzoku gakkyū* or *kokusai kurabu*, can't oppose it anymore, under the big sign of UNESCO. That's why they applied for the UNESCO School: as a strategy. (*Interview O20, NPO representative, Osaka*)

Integration measures such as *minzoku gakkyū*, though officially led by the city, are often disapproved by some residents. The account above shows that local actors have

strategically used supranational frameworks in order to facilitate local integration practices while avoiding antagonism.

7.3.2 Birmingham: strong local networks and a quest for better political representation

CSOs' understanding of their presence and claims for political representation

CSOs maintain a close relationship with the city to assist its integration practices through networks such as BARMS and Migration Forum (see Chapters 5 and 6). They are often involved in city-led initiatives such as MFC and CoS that require their expertise in the specific integration area. Respondents evaluated the CoS movement as a meaningful initiative inasmuch as it has deepened the link between the city and Birmingham Voluntary Service Council (BVSC) and the link amongst different organisations and promoted the idea of welcome and sanctuary at the city level. Moreover, CSOs often actively lobby the city authority and the upper level of government together as "an amalgamation of minority groups" (*Interview B18, charity staff, Birmingham*). One respondent described how stakeholders from private and third sectors, as well as Birmingham Council members, formed an opinion and promoted the living wage campaign. Although the mayor of the West Midlands Combined Authority, who was from the Conservative Party, was initially unsupportive, after their strong demands, the mayor agreed to support the campaign (*Interview B14, FBO staff, Birmingham*). He highlighted the importance of local residents to get involved in city governance and develop civic policy:

> [B]y articulating what the community feels by listening to the community, then working collaboratively with other groups, you can actually present a distilled

> version of that (civic policy) to the city decision-makers.… I think in the past, perhaps some local groups have not realised that they've got a lot of power because you are a local group representing thousands of people. And I think once you realise that, it gives you a great, greater degree of strength to go and speak to civic authorities and Members of Parliament because they realise [that] actually your opinion might jeopardise or improve their possibility of staying in [the] path, whether it's through the forthcoming voting programs, elections, etc. (*Interview B14, FBO staff, Birmingham*)

The influence that civil society can exert upon the city council as well as the upper-level government is therefore well recognised by CSOs, and, in order to do so, CSOs are expected to be able to articulate the demands of the people whom they represent.

Local-level actors recognised the city's efforts for migrant integration to a certain extent; however, at the same time, respondents also pointed out the city's lack of ability to provide services for refugees, migrants and asylum seekers. Amongst all, housing was often listed as one of the main barriers to integration. One respondent described that Birmingham has been "always a terrible landlord" for providing low-quality accommodation to asylum seekers and refugees (*Interview B16, CIC representative, Birmingham*). As asylum seekers are accommodated in hotels, their temporality and uncertainty have been supporters' main concerns; since their stay in emergency accommodation is regarded as temporary, it has often discouraged them from registering for statutory services that are available for them. Whilst the city's emergency accommodation measures for migrant rough sleepers during the pandemic (discussed in

Chapters 5 and 6) were welcomed by many, the poor environment, as well as uncertainty around evictions and access to benefits, were also raised. Furthermore, it was emphasised that such emergency measures should not be limited during a crisis, and the city is responsible for providing accommodation to all the people living in the city, even in normal times. Accommodation practices for asylum seekers are administered by the Home Office, and there is a limitation as to what extent the city can step in. These points raised by the respondents demonstrate the local actors' expectations towards the city's responsibility.

A similar emphasis was found in the respondents' remarks on migrants' political rights and representation in the city, although the voting rights of non-UK citizens are limited (see Chapter 5). Some respondents raised the Commonwealth Games, which took place in Birmingham in 2022, as an example. The executive committee initially was comprised of all white members; responding to local activists' strong calls, members from different ethnic backgrounds joined the committee. In addition, many respondents felt that Birmingham's migration-driven diversity was not well reflected in the composition of the City Council:

> Birmingham, we label our city as superdiversity or superdiverse. But in terms of what does that mean in action, in terms of acceptance,… our voice is not being heard.… And I think if you start to say to people [that] these people are here, they have contributed, and they are contributing to the development of Birmingham. And how do you do that, by highlighting these people and putting them into

> strategic positions. Then you would have fulfilled what it means to be an effective superdiversity. (*Interview B10, charity staff, Birmingham*)

While bottom-up claims-making is regarded as a powerful practice, civil society actors recognise that this process can be facilitated by increasing representation and including more voices.

CSOs' networks to fill the gaps and keep integration going

While showing some understanding that "local governments are themselves victims" of the national government and its austerity measures (*Interview B16, CIC representative, Birmingham*), respondents also insisted that CSOs have been playing the role that the public sector should play in assisting migrants' access to public services and providing services. For instance, migrants' access to services is often rejected or limited by frontline staff. This seems to happen often with refugees and their families and asylum seekers who wish to register with GP, access the Jobcentre and enrol in school. Respondents explained that such rejection derives from frontline staff who do not respect the guidelines and are not aware of the social services to which refugees and asylum seekers are entitled.

Furthermore, some questioned the practicality of the city-CSO networks such as CoS. One respondent stated that barriers in accessing services such as healthcare, education and welfare services were often experienced among asylum seekers and refugees, and the city still lacks the two-way integration approach. Although the CoS provided networking opportunities for community organisations in the city, the city excessively

relies on the network of CSOs to fill the gaps in service provision rather than improving them (*Interview B15, IHO staff, Birmingham*). Moreover, while it seems to be a shared feeling among the respondents that the city has been sending a welcoming message to asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, some respondents pointed out the hostile environment prevalent in the city. Hostile environment policies have affected the everyday life of all migrants, especially when they try to access services, and such hostility has been accelerated by anti-immigrant sentiments emphasised during the discussion around Brexit.

To facilitate their commitment to local-level integration, CSOs have utilised independent, nationwide or transnational networks. One respondent drew an example of the No Accommodation Network (NACCOM), the network of organisations across the UK tackling the destitution of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants with NRPF and its collective action:

> We're independent, but we work closely with them (NACCOM) because there are various charities like us, but in other cities that are part of NACCOM. We are in relationship with them, and we try to have collective action because we're always stronger when we're together. (*Interview B8, charity staff, Birmingham*)

Such emphasis on the collective actions of CSOs was seen in others' accounts, too. Respondent B7, who campaigned for EU nationals in Birmingham, described that his organisation was able to utilise the "massive flag" of "European solidarity" to be connected with other Europe-related CSOs. This helped them to get involved with activities against

Brexit and assist EU nationals in Birmingham in applying for Settlement Status (*Interview B7, VG member, Birmingham*). Moreover, some respondents were involved in faith-based groups that have been among the strongest supporters of integration practices in Birmingham. They mainly provide information and resources ranging from housing, health, education and mental well-being to legal advice, and maintain local and national networks. However, one respondent from the FBO shared the difficulty of engaging with integration support as a faith group and connecting with other groups. Faith groups are not homogeneous, and internal and external dynamics often prevent them from offering support to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (*Interview B14, FBO staff, Birmingham*).

7.3.3 Summary: similar acts and practices of urban citizenship led by CSOs in Osaka and Birmingham

Interviews with local CSO activists have revealed that their act of bottom-up claiming has shaped the city into a "powerful public sphere" from which urban citizenship emerges (Eizaguirre et al., 2017, p.426). This bottom-up approach to urban citizenship corresponds with the concept of the right to the city inasmuch as it signifies the "exercise of a collective power to reshape the process of urbanization" (Harvey, 2008, p.23; see Chapter 3). In Osaka, local activists' campaign for obtaining non-Japanese citizens' voting rights for the local referendum demonstrates urban citizens' acts of citizenship. Activists emphasised that their aim was not to call for local voting rights for non-Japanese citizens but to achieve migrants' rights as 'residents' to vote at the referendum on a city-specific issue. This shows that their demands for citizenship are not bounded by the formal, state-level framework but are rescaled to the urban level, making the city a space where

“renegotiations of citizenship” occur (Holston and Appadurai, 1999, p.3; Blokland et al., 2015). Their “awareness of their right”, as well as their identity as residents of the city, has shaped “the appearance, functioning and meaning of the urban space” (Plyushteva, 2009, p.93). However, as I pointed out in Chapter 5, the city’s denial to include migrant residents in the referendum indicates a clear line between Japanese and non-Japanese urban citizens drawn by the city.

Supporters in Birmingham voiced similar claims to urban citizenship of migrants by calling for a better representation of the city’s superdiverse population and an equal opportunity for housing. Acknowledging the city’s diverse demographics and reflecting on its political representation are integral parts of urban citizenship, which envisions collective status, rights and identity of local residents (Blokland et al., 2015). In addition, migrants’ “right to urban life” (Lefebvre, 1996, p.158) has often been used in their claims to secure housing and shelter (Harvey, 2008; Aalbers and Gibb, 2014). Local activists’ demands, therefore, correspond with Plyushteva’s (2009, p.95) conclusion of two rights: “the right to have sufficient access to, and make full use of, urban public spaces” and “the right to directly participate, in contentious and collective ways, in urban political processes”. This is also applicable to identity and rights that the CoS movement offers; through accepting the presence of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the city and encouraging them to be part of activities and networks, CoS enables migrants to claim the “right to have rights” in the urban setting (Dikeç, 2001; Darling and Squire, 2012). As such, civil society actors’ claims for political participation and representation in the two cities can be understood as their demands for the right to the city, which forms the bottom-up approach to urban citizenship in Osaka and Birmingham.

In addition to their involvement with the city to facilitate integration and claim rights to the city, CSOs have also witnessed everyday bordering and utilised their networks to tackle it, which can be understood as practices of urban citizenship. In both cities, it was reported that migrants are often rejected from accessing services that they are entitled to, ranging from education and healthcare to employment, due to the front staff's lack of knowledge and false assumptions. This is one of the typical practices of 'everyday bordering', the constructions of bordering between 'us' and 'them' in one's everyday life that contest their belonging (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018). In Osaka, the respondents described that it is difficult for migrants to access services without the assistance of Japanese nationals. Respondents in Birmingham also draw an interesting implication on everyday bordering in the context of hostile environment and CoS. In the context of the UK, everyday bordering has functioned as a technology to enhance the hostile environment towards migrants as well as racialised minorities, not only undocumented migrants (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018). As explicated earlier, CoS is understood as a movement that enables migrants to establish their presence in the city realm through their everyday enactments of sanctuary (Darling and Squire, 2012). Respondents often mentioned the benefits of CoS while pointing out infrastructures for migrants and the hostile environment as the main barriers to integration. Despite the city's will to provide a sanctuary and local stakeholders' integration efforts, the city's capacity is limited, leading to everyday bordering practices. This corroborates Mosselson's (2021) observation of Sheffield, another CoS where contrasting practices of CoS and hostile environment contradict the infrastructures available for migrants. As pointed out in the previous two chapters, the city has struggled with putting the CoS concept into practice due to the lack of resources,

which has led to CoS and a hostile environment overlapping in the everyday reality of migrants. It can, therefore, be ascertained that migration infrastructures in Birmingham are contested between the two practices, and everyday experiences of urban citizens are situated both in a sanctuary and hostile environment and constantly negotiated.

A strong presence of communities and CSOs and their grassroots activism have played an essential role in counterattacking everyday bordering. They not only work closely with the city authority in order to facilitate the city's integration strategy and fill the gaps but also utilise their resources to support migrants whose legal presence may not be acknowledged by the authority. Their responses to vulnerable migrant groups during the pandemic, which I explain below, further reinforce their role in "doing" citizenship "independently from administrative structures and legal frameworks, thus helping to realise the rights of some of the most marginalised and underserved communities" (Holm and Lebuhn, 2020, p.96). This also signals the significance of migrant infrastructures whose "processes, spaces and actors" shape migrants' settlement experiences in the local space (Sigona et al., 2021, p.16).

Here, two significant points about 'doing' urban citizenship can be raised. First, the solidarity of communities and organisations itself enables the bottom-up claims of urban citizenship even though each organisation may not be directly engaged with citizenship claims-making:

> Claims to citizenship are not isolated phenomena, they always take place within a specific ensemble of relations that *enable* those claims. Forms of civic association

> that strengthen solidarity and trust in a community may not in themselves constitute citizenship claims, but they can be vital in leading to the activities that do. Hence those forms of association that support the development of strong identities enhance the degree of mutual trust and solidarity, and promote a stronger sense of participatory rights and responsibilities in traditionally non-political spheres, while not themselves constituting citizenship claims, can nevertheless provide the necessary conditions for these to emerge. (Rocco, 2010, p.235)

Indeed, not all activities of CSOs in Osaka and Birmingham are necessarily citizenship-related or seeking the right to the city; some groups rather focus on cultural and social interactions between migrants and non-migrant residents. Nevertheless, the presence of organisations and groups that support the identity and rights of individuals automatically leads to 'conditions' for the city to acknowledge their presence in the city.

The second point considers stakeholders' strategic use of networks. While the city's use of transnational networks was discussed in the previous chapter as a way for local policy actors to actualise their own integration ideas, grassroots activists' use of independent networks encompasses another dynamic. In Osaka's case, the strategic use of UNESCO resources has helped migrant communities avoid xenophobic views and uphold international standards over national or local ones. This indeed is directed to urban citizenship inasmuch as using a global- or transnational-level framework still requires a 'local' space in which rights are situated (Mazlish, 2005). Whereas the promotion of education for international understanding and sustainable development has been the aim

of this UNESCO network (Kodama, 2019), its local use can indeed be understood as a "place-based strateg[y] in opening up new political spaces" in the city that activists employ to normalise *minzoku gakkyū* to maintain identities of migrant children (Wekerle, 2000, p.210). Likewise, nationwide networks CSOs maintain in Birmingham have helped them shape the city into a new political and social space in which collective ideas and solidarity are brought in order to serve local demands for migrants' rights, identity and status. Furthermore, the presence of faith-based groups is noteworthy, as they bear multiple roles "as civil society actors, as religious representatives or as migrant associations" (Mattes, 2017, p.44) and facilitate the local integration process. While no FBO can be regarded as the same, the interviews suggested how the extensive network of FBOs has assisted migrant integration at the city level. CSOs and communities can therefore transform the city into a space where urban citizenship is claimed and performed through their presence and solidarity, along with their strategic use of independent networks.

7.4 The impacts of the pandemic on civil society actors and their work on integration

The pandemic has impacted CSOs in several ways; it increased migrants' vulnerability and disrupted integration practices while impacting the sustainability of CSOs and the everyday lives of CSO actors. The interviews offer a glimpse of how acts and practices of urban citizenship performed by CSO actors, as mentioned above, were affected in such turmoil. This section briefly touches upon the main challenges migrants and CSOs faced, which give significant insight into bottom-up processes of urban citizenship during the pandemic.

7.4.1 Osaka: supporting vulnerable migrants and creating opportunities

When it comes to service provision, the respondents shared that migrants were not informed of public services available for them, and this was due to several barriers between migrants and the city administration, such as language, lack of understanding of city office staff and the administrative structure. The difficulty of accessing services that migrants experienced can be "synonymous with excluding foreigners" (*Interview O48, NPO representative, Osaka*). While CSOs themselves experienced financial hardship to sustain their activities as fundraising opportunities were limited, they worked fervently to support migrants in the city by sharing information in multiple languages, providing resources and offering free counselling and consultation services.

Particularly, undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and those who are on provisional release had to rely on support from CSOs. The number of provisional releases increased in order to prevent infection within detention centres, and without any public support, they often ended up in destitution.[36] However, some pandemic-oriented activities were also used to enhance their sense of belonging and empower them. Respondent O41 shared opportunities that they created for undocumented migrants to make gowns out of garbage bags to donate to hospitals through their regional network:

[36] Some of those who are detained in detention centres can be granted a temporary provisional release (*karihōmen*) although decisions are made arbitrarily. Successful cases are few, except for during the pandemic.

> We're ending up taking out more (money) for gowns. But they feel kind of valued by contributing to society in the face of the pandemic, and that's why I think this (making gowns) is important. (*Interview O41, FBO staff, Osaka*)

While the organisation struggled financially to sustain the activity, she felt that making gowns would help them establish their presence, which was "forgotten and abandoned" by the national and local government (*Interview O41, FBO staff, Osaka*). Another respondent shared about the transnational network his organisation maintained during the pandemic; his organisation fully utilised the network of Vietnamese migrants in Japan and Japanese migrants in Vietnam to support Vietnamese technical interns and international students across Japan on a one-on-one basis. They also imported gowns from Vietnam through this network and donated to hospitals in Osaka (*Interview O42, GIA representative, Osaka*). During the pandemic, CSOs have come up with various ways to support migrants, utilising local, regional, and transnational networks and filling the gaps that the national and local governments have left.

7.4.2 Birmingham: strengthening the solidarity and presence as a whole civil society

As mentioned in Chapter 6, digital exclusion was raised as an urgent issue by the CSO respondents as well. Supporters were forced to switch to online service provision, and, with the absence of face-to-face consultations and social interactions, digitally excluded migrants found themselves isolated. One respondent who supported asylum seekers said that migrants were feeling hopeless during the lockdown:

> They were telling me, 'I feel like all my life is in lockdown. It's not only me not able to move, my legal process is blocked, I don't have any recourse to public fund, I cannot go outside to see my friends', so it was really harsh. (*Interview B8, charity staff, Birmingham*)

In addition, discrimination against Chinese migrants and the lack of an administrative system to tackle such discrimination were also pointed out by some respondents. Since the outbreak, CSOs continued to support migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the city despite physical, financial and technical limitations, as they were aware that CSOs were “central service” and “people are dependent on us” (*Interview B10, charity staff, Birmingham*). Some respondents reported that CSOs’ activities became more tailored while the networks expanded. Respondent B15, who assisted asylum seekers, was able to provide in-depth support to newly arrived asylum seekers in the city due to the national government’s decision to pause their legal process (*Interview B15, IHO staff, Birmingham*).

Another respondent shared his experience of participating in meetings with BCC and BVSC, which happened on a regular basis, where they shared about key issues across the city. The non-migrant sector often experienced the same issues, such as homelessness, unemployment, loneliness and digital exclusion, and they were able to bring them up to the table and demand the council “with a more powerful voice” as a whole voluntary sector (*Interview B9, charity staff, Birmingham*). Another respondent made a similar point, highlighting the significance of putting the idea of intersectionality into practice and engaging with a wider community (*Interview B14, FBO staff,*

Birmingham). The pandemic posed several challenges to CSOs and migrant groups while their solidarity increased.

7.4.3 Summary: similar trends of increased roles and presence of CSOs between the two cities during the pandemic

Vulnerabilities of migrants were especially prevalent among undocumented migrants and asylum seekers during the pandemic in both cities. While the state, including the national and local governments, offered some measures for them, as discussed in the previous chapter, CSOs played a main role in safeguarding migrants. Despite limitations in communications and resources, they actively engaged with the city office to share migrants' demands. Especially in Birmingham, migrants' opinions were voiced by CSOs through their lobbying and networks with the public sector. The respondents' accounts of the cooperation with non-migrant sector groups and the reinforced solidarity among the VCS signify that the pandemic did not wholly halt activists' capacity to mobilise but increased their voices, as studies have shown (Kowalewski, 2021; Kriesi and Oana, 2023). The claims-making of migrants' right to the city was exercised in the two cities despite the pandemic and shaped the city into a place of urban citizenship practices.

At the same time, as respondents from Osaka shared, CSOs utilised their independent networks that go beyond the city realm, which can be understood as practices of citizenship. The example of undocumented migrants making gowns can be understood as a practice of urban citizenship. The pandemic triggered the booming demand for disposable gowns, and by creating gowns and responding to demands from hospitals, undocumented migrants became a part of the community, albeit to a limited extent.

Scholars (Darling and Squire, 2012; Buhr, 2018) maintain that one can achieve a unique form of citizenship by becoming part of the everyday routine of local life. In this case, it was rather an everyday routine of 'emergency' that undocumented migrants were able to access and practice citizenship, although their legal precarity and immobility remained.

7.5 Conclusion

Based on the interviews with local-level activists, I have discussed how urban citizenship in Osaka and Birmingham is shaped through the bottom-up approaches to integration. The dynamics of civil society actors and their roles in implementing and facilitating integration processes in Osaka and Birmingham are overall quite similar, indicating the mechanism of enactment and practice of urban citizenship performed by civil society actors in the city. It was highlighted that the integration strategy of Osaka and Birmingham cannot be fully delivered without CSOs, whose integration efforts function as acts and practices of urban citizenship. Such local efforts not only directly provide local-level status and rights to migrant residents but also form the local identity that embraces them as urban citizens. CSOs, therefore, play a crucial role as agents of urban citizenship for migrants by taking an active part in migrant integration in the city.

At the same time, the interviews have shown that mobilisation and claims-making of urban citizenship is not a unitary process but a contested one; limited material and symbolic resources for migrants and minority groups and the perceived threat shared in the group have produced the group dynamics. Furthermore, the city office and its policy direction of integration strategy exert a significant influence inasmuch as CSOs' integration practices are mainly around safeguarding and assistance, which enhances or complements the

existing integration strategy. The making of status, rights and identity of urban citizenship for migrants is therefore very situational, constantly swayed by policy discourses at the national and local levels and migrants' positionality vis-à-vis other community groups and the city. In this sense, it can be concluded that civil society actors' 'bottom-up' approaches to urban citizenship are exercised within the multi-scalar dynamics, taking into account their negotiation with the city and upper-level authorities and their horizontal and vertical use of networks that extend across various scales.

CSOs have played an indispensable role in assisting migrants during the pandemic, and the interviews displayed how their acts and practices of urban citizenship were extended during the pandemic. The wider network of CSOs in Birmingham built with non-migrant sector organisations in order to address local demands to the city authority and undocumented migrants' everyday practices of making gowns in Osaka suggest that the pandemic has strengthened the significance of civil society in the making of urban citizenship, especially for migrants with precarious legal status. In the next and final chapter, I bring together my findings and draw my conclusion and contributions to knowledge.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

This study has dissected the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy in Osaka and Birmingham. Defining urban citizenship as *processes through which multi-scalar interplays of multiple actors construct urban membership, rights and identity*, I have set out three questions to tackle in this study:

1) How is urban citizenship articulated in policy documents of the city's integration strategy?
2) How does policymakers' understanding of their roles in multi-scalar governance of integration strategy and its policymaking processes shape operationalisation of urban citizenship?
3) What role do civil society organisations play as actors of urban citizenship in implementing integration strategy?

Based on the theoretical framework I developed in Chapter 3, I conducted policy analysis of the integration strategy of the two cities and qualitative interviews with stakeholders in the public and third sectors in Osaka and Birmingham from 2020 to 2021. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 responded to each research question listed above. In doing so, this study sheds light on the relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy from three different aspects – from policy documents, policymakers and civil society actors –, which, as a whole, provide a holistic view of urban citizenship and integration strategy. These were selected as the most efficient approach to thoroughly understand the reality and

processes of the integration strategy that shapes urban citizenship. Through comparing the cases of Osaka and Birmingham, cities with one of the most superdiversifying populations in their respective country, this study has offered insights into the mechanism of operation of urban citizenship in different contexts. Below, I summarise the findings to address each research question by incorporating a comparative perspective from the cases of Osaka and Birmingham.

1) How is urban citizenship articulated in policy documents of the city's integration strategy?

It is rarely the case that the city issues an 'urban citizenship policy'. Instead, the city's integration strategy – city-level policies, ordinances and administrative practices concerning the migrant population and their integration – can serve as an instrument that articulates the city's framework of urban citizenship interwoven in the city's policy and practice. The integration strategy of Osaka and Birmingham demonstrates that status, rights and identity of urban citizenship are interrelated, and integration practices, such as migrants' political participation or access to basic services, can exert influence and shape all three dimensions of urban citizenship. Furthermore, policy analysis has confirmed that urban citizenship is not necessarily a unitary, inclusive concept but an "internally inclusive and externally exclusive" (Brubaker, 1992, p.72) concept, differentiating those who belong and those who do not. Although 'integration' itself concerns the inclusion of migrants into the host community, it was shown that, when analysed through the lens of urban citizenship, the presence and/or absence of integration measures can function as exclusive practices that produce layers within urban citizenship. Indeed, Osaka's urban citizenship articulated in its integration strategy is exclusive to registered migrants,

indicating that the city's urban citizenship follows the national framework of citizenship. On the other hand, Birmingham holds a wider, inclusive vision of integration, yet the lack of practical measures for the CoS framework grants those who seek sanctuary limited temporary urban citizenship. While this is only a partial reality of urban citizenship, understanding the framework of urban citizenship through policy documents enables a deeper and holistic understanding of the processes of urban citizenship.

2) How does policymakers' understanding of their roles in multi-scalar governance of integration strategy and its policymaking processes shape operationalisation of urban citizenship?

The interviews with policymakers have helped me to obtain insights into the policymaking process of integration strategy, which helped me to dimensionalise the "'paper reality' of policy documents" (Hoekstra, 2018, p.364) of urban citizenship. The target of the integration strategy highlights the extent of urban citizenship, and the interviews showed the policymakers' attitudes towards different migrant groups. City officials of Osaka and Birmingham mentioned the different integration approaches between long-established communities and newly arrived migrant groups, including refugees and asylum seekers in the case of Birmingham. Yet, their integration-related policymaking processes are shaped by various factors and interplays of local, regional, national and transnational actors. What was common between the two cities was that their integration strategy, policymaking and operation are greatly shaped by the national policy framework in conceptual and practical terms. Its (non)policy and national discourse of integration affect the way the city defines who migrants are and the extent to which the city can use its own resources for integration measures, be it inclusive or exclusive. Although urban

citizenship is not a legal concept, the national government exerts significant influence over the city's urban citizenship. Furthermore, the city government as the agency of urban citizenship is not a unitary institution inasmuch as cross-department cooperation was raised as one of the administrative challenges to integration. Although urban citizenship takes place in a large city, the city as an administrative body faces inner dynamics that sometimes limit visions, priorities and practicality of integration. The city's internal operation of integration, therefore, hinges rather upon individual officials, although its policymaking, designing and implementation of the integration strategy are constantly under pressure from the national government.

However, the interviews also highlighted the city's flexibility in modifying the integration strategy by responding to local demands and utilising trans-local and national city networks. In the case of Osaka, officials' decision to reinstate the 'old' integration practices in the new guidelines based on public comments reflects the local demands from civil society actors. It also indicates that being acknowledged in the integration strategy carries significant weight for long-established communities like *zainichi* Koreans in order to secure their urban citizenship. In Birmingham, in spite of the city officials' attempt to introduce long-term integration visions for newly arrived communities, it was halted by the pandemic, which strengthened the safeguarding aspect of the integration strategy. However, during the pandemic, the city was able to expand the national accommodation measure flexibly to protect migrants with NRPF, whom the city had not been able to reach out to. City officials also maintain their network with other European cities to inform their policymaking. The dynamics of individual and collective approaches to integration strategy are manifested in a multi-scalar setting rather than multi-level,

making urban citizenship “shaped by conditions, processes, and institutions at the local, national and international scales” (Staeheli, 2003, p.99).

3) What role do civil society organisations play as actors of urban citizenship in implementing integration strategy?

The voices of civil society actors are equally important, as their engagement with integration practices plays an essential role in implementing integration and informing policymaking, which contributes to the making of urban citizenship. They play two main roles in activating urban citizenship: engaging with the city’s operation of integration strategy and independently assisting migrant residents. CSOs in Osaka and Birmingham demonstrated similar tactics. In cooperation with the city office, CSOs deliver services and inform local service providers and the city office. They bridge the city office and migrant population, and their presence is vital in the city’s integration strategy. Meanwhile, integration of those who are not included in the city’s integration agenda, such as undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, is dependent on civil society; CSOs utilise their networks that extend locally, nationally and internationally to assist such migrant groups, yet their power and resources are often limited, as displayed during the pandemic. Another notable finding from the interviews is that their acts and practices of urban citizenship are shaped, disrupted and facilitated by inter- and inner-group conflicts and struggles over symbolic, material and social resources. This was especially apparent in the relations between long-established minority communities and newly arrived migrant groups. Similar to the case of policymakers, the interviews with civil society actors show that their approaches to urban citizenship through facilitating integration processes

operate within multi-scalar dynamics, adding further layers of fragmentation of urban citizenship.

In conclusion, the city's integration strategy affects migrants' membership, rights, and identity of urban citizenship in both policy and practice. The way in which urban citizenship is articulated, operationalised and practised is constantly shaped within the complex dynamics of various actors across different scales rather than a simple down/bottom-up linear interaction. In particular, city officials and civil society play key roles both in policymaking and implementation of the integration strategy, being agents of 'co-production' of urban citizenship (Holm and Lebuhn, 2020; Ataç and Schilliger, 2022). This study has also shown that the city's urban citizenship entails differential patterns and processes, granting different degrees of status, rights and identity to migrant citizens. For instance, urban citizenship for a registered migrant in Osaka and that for an undocumented migrant may look very different, as the city prioritises service provision for registered migrants while migrant infrastructures of undocumented migrants are mainly provided through CSOs' assistance. Likewise, the experience of a non-EU economic migrant who has just arrived in Birmingham would be completely different from that of EU nationals or refugees who arrived through a resettlement scheme. I therefore reiterate that, built upon various interplays of different stakeholders, urban citizenship is not a solid entity that uniformly welcomes all those who live in the city but rather a concept that symbolises several layers of inclusion and exclusion of urban residents. In the case of migrants' urban citizenship, the city's integration strategy well articulates such inclusion and exclusion and dynamics of different stakeholders. This study's findings support scholars' understanding of migrant urban citizenship as a relational, fluid concept that is

shaped by various processes operating at various scales (Staeheli, 2003; Guarnizo, 2012; Allon, 2013; Amrith, 2015; Holm and Lebuhn, 2020). In the next section, I further discuss several academic, methodological and policy contributions this study has made.

8.1 Implications and contributions

8.1.1 Contributions to scholarship

This study has offered several contributions to scholarship on urban citizenship and migrant integration. First, for urban citizenship studies, I have demonstrated a systematic analysis of different dynamics of actors involved with urban citizenship, the view that has been pointed out to be absent in the literature (Ataç and Schilliger, 2022). I have successfully captured the ways through which urban citizenship can be "co-produced" (Holm and Lebuhn, 2020, p.97) by various actors that transcend simple top-down/bottom-up dynamics and therefore offered empirical evidence to respond to the emerging academic question of processes of urban citizenship.

Second, urban citizenship has long been discussed in a limited geographical context, mainly in Europe, linking the discussion with the EU-level citizenship discourse. By conducting a comparative study between Osaka and Birmingham, this study has contributed a non-European perspective to urban citizenship scholarship. This will benefit future research on other cities that are or will be experiencing migration-driven (super)diversity in understanding how the city can deliver a more inclusive urban membership through its integration strategy. This point leads to another contribution this study offers to Japanese contexts of urban citizenship and migrant integration. This study

has become one of the first to investigate urban citizenship in Japan and provided fresh insights based upon which further theoretical and empirical studies can be developed.

Furthermore, the pandemic cannot be dismissed when reflecting on this study. A new aspect of the city's urban citizenship, which can be labelled as pandemic urban citizenship, was observed during the pandemic. Pandemic urban citizenship becomes more salient for legally excluded populations, such as undocumented migrants, since the pandemic increases the visibility of their legal and socioeconomic vulnerability. The city authority can recognise migrants through their presence and offer membership and rights. On the other hand, CSOs' gap-filling role and claims-making practices can also shape the city's pandemic urban citizenship. Helping migrants engage with a new everyday routine of emergency allows migrants to participate in the local fight against the pandemic and empowers them.

This study suggests that pandemic urban citizenship is not necessarily humanitarian but a very realistic and limited entity. In a public health crisis like the pandemic, the government's inclusive accommodation measures are expected to be effective in preventing the outbreak in the community and, therefore, temporary. As such, pandemic urban citizenship is not necessarily based on humanitarian grounds but on the state's damage mitigation. It can be used as an exclusionary strategy to differentiate and control 'temporary' urban citizens (see Semprebon et al., 2017). Furthermore, pandemic urban citizens' mobilities are hugely limited. While the pandemic has made citizenship more "liquified", especially in the virtual field (Calzada, 2021, p.2), originally excluded groups of the population, like undocumented migrants who do not have access to digital devices,

are kept immobile. During the pandemic, the city, civil society and migrants have shaped urban citizenship in a way that may look different from the one in the pre-pandemic. Yet, its logic of inclusion and exclusion remains the same. While the bottom-up approach by CSOs and migrants suggests the positive aspect of pandemic urban citizenship, it still entails further layers of limitations added by the pandemic.

This study further gives implications to the literature on migrant integration by utilising the migrant integration strategy as a tool to understand the city's urban citizenship. While multi-level governance has been the dominant framework, I have highlighted the power dynamics and interplays that go beyond a vertical interaction and suggested to extend the view to apply multi-scalar governance of migrant integration. Whilst local governments, such as the city council in this case, are indeed heavily influenced by the upper level of authorities, they can also strategically utilise transnational institutions and discourses to facilitate local-level integration. At the same time, on the city scale, CSOs are often commissioned by the city to provide services and possess influence over the city governance of integration by using local, national or international rhetoric of inclusion. The city's integration strategy is, therefore, a product of the city's attempt to accommodate such local dynamics and top-down pressures with limited resources. This spotlights the city's autonomy in governing and administering integration with its strategic use of vertical and horizontal relations. While the multi-level governance emphasises the dominant presence of the national government that determines the 'model' of integration governance, capturing it as a multi-scalar phenomenon allows us to focus on the flexibility and capability of the city-level authority and those of various actors whose involvement with local integration does not necessarily follow the hierarchical structure. In this sense,

it corresponds with scholars' recent call for shifting integration discussion from multi-level governance to multi-scalar governance (Aiden, 2019; Komai, 2023). Furthermore, by bringing in the *tabunka kyōsei* concept and drawing Osaka's case, this study has contributed to advancing the discussion on integration and integration governance that had often been criticised as European-centred (e.g. Favell, 2001, 2022; see Chapter 1).

Lastly, this study brought together long-established communities, newly arrived migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants and discussed their urban citizenship in a wider context, which offers unique insights into migration studies. They have different degrees of legal, political, social, cultural and generational attributes that make their urban citizenship very divergent; this study is not to blindly treat them as the same 'migrant' group. Rather, I have shown that a migrant's urban citizenship – its status, rights and identity – is marked by the multi-scalar interplays of different stakeholders. Struggles, conflicts and continuity of bottom-up activism are what characterise the local space as 'urban' and constitute urban citizenship (see Yiftachel, 2015). In this sense, bringing together 'old' and 'new' migrations in the dialogue and using 'migrant' as an umbrella term enabled me to capture the comprehensive dynamics of urban citizenship. While studies based on particular migrant individuals and groups are significant, this study has pointed to the benefits of examining the construction of urban citizenship in the city as a whole phenomenon.

8.1.2 Methodological implications

Methodological implications and contributions include three main points. Firstly, this study has provided a unique opportunity to examine urban citizenship and migrant integration

between Osaka and Birmingham. To the best of my knowledge, this study has become one of the first to compare Osaka and Birmingham. As Chapters 1 and 2 delved into, Osaka and Birmingham share common features with regard to the demographics and histories of migrant residents as well as their administrative characteristics as the second cities of their respective countries. As mentioned above, my case study selection has addressed gaps in the literature on urban citizenship and migrant integration that have heavily focused on Western and European contexts. In addition, the mechanisms of urban citizenship and integration strategies of Osaka and Birmingham can be learned and applied to other cities. As (super)diversity has long been discussed in different national and local settings, there will be more cities like Osaka and Birmingham, cities that have not traditionally been categorised as 'global cities' yet witnessed further migration-driven diversification of the population. This study can offer Western and non-Western examples of urban citizenship of such 'second' cities, which will play an increasingly significant role in facilitating local integration processes.

Secondly, this study has become an addition to the recently emerging academic interest in comparative studies between Japan and the UK (see Phillimore et al., 2021). As I explained in detail in Chapter 2, sharing a similar migration history as former colonial nations and following similar policy paths, the two countries have provided national contexts that made the cases comparable. I utilised the concept of *tabunka kyōsei* to explain and study migrant integration in the context of Osaka. Although the two concepts entail different meanings in a strict sense, I demonstrated the interchangeability of the concepts with thorough and careful consideration and practice throughout the data collection and analysis stages. This not only encourages further Japan-UK migration

studies but also contributes to the way the paradigm of Japan's migration studies can be treated. In migration studies, Japan has long been regarded as a new immigration country that can learn from other traditional immigration countries. This study situated Osaka and Birmingham, as well as Japan and the UK, in the same light in the context of urban citizenship and migrant integration and helped to acknowledge Osaka and Japan as study sites from which other immigration countries can learn.

Finally, the pandemic has affected the way this study was conducted. My interview data collection was significantly affected by the pandemic, which required me to change collection methods and approaches (see Chapter 4). The pandemic has increased risks for all participants and myself, making the recruitment process challenging. The shift to online interviewing demonstrated positive and negative implications for the data I collected. Although it allowed me to set up interviews with stakeholders who were not based in Osaka or Birmingham, the remote distance affected rapport building and interview lengths, which impacted both the quantity and quality of data collected. In addition to such benefits and challenges of online interviewing, through this study, I have shown the effectiveness of a mix of online and in-person interviewing in a comparative study. Methodological implications that I gained by adapting research methods and conducting fieldwork during the pandemic can offer insights into researchers who are or will be conducting research during an emergency.

8.1.3 Policy implications

By examining the city's policymaking process of urban citizenship, this study offers several implications for policymakers. Overall, the focus of this study points to the

possible policy framework for urban citizenship that all stakeholders, including city-level policymakers, upper-level officials and civil society actors, can take into account. Understanding the multi-scalar configuration of integration governance through which urban citizenship is characterised allows them to further create and flexibly utilise individual and collective networks to facilitate migrant integration. For policymakers in Osaka and Birmingham, particularly, this study can help them to have a comprehensive understanding of integration processes in each city and learn from each other's practices.

For city-level policymakers in general, urban citizenship can be another concept on which their inclusive policies can be based. Although I did not thoroughly examine the cities' integration strategy in terms of their effectiveness and outcomes, I have emphasised the significance of local-level integration strategy in determining migrants' urban status, rights and identity. This study can be an interesting read for understanding the city's positive practices and their implications for migrants and the challenges they encounter in their everyday lives. Moreover, the city's integration initiatives can address cross-department coordination to facilitate the administrative aspect of integration governance.

Upper-level policy stakeholders can also benefit from this study as it has highlighted the great extent of influence that such authorities exert upon city-level integration-related policy. Particularly, it is notable that not only does the presence of policy shape the city-level policy, but its absence or 'non-policy' can also affect the way migrant integration is considered and practised at the city level.

Furthermore, civil society actors can learn from each other's practices and reinforce their presence within the city. Understanding the significant influence they have both on the city governance of integration and migrants in the city can encourage them to reinforce their multi-scalar networks and effectively utilise available resources to support migrants. Theories of urban citizenship can also be useful tools for enhancing their bottom-up presence in the city and facilitating integration practices.

8.2 Limitations and opportunities for future research

Like every other research, this thesis has demonstrated a partial knowledge constructed by specific case study settings and a specific selection of theories and methods. Here, I list the main limitations of this study and signal possibilities for future research directions.

8.2.1 Limitations of this study

Firstly, interview data collected for this study was limited to city-level policymakers and CSOs and did not focus on migrants themselves as agents of urban citizenship; therefore, I may not have captured some dynamics of migrant integration and urban citizenship in the two cities. As shown throughout this thesis, migrants themselves play a key role in integration processes as well as in approaches to urban citizenship. The migrant population can never be regarded as a homogeneous group, but they possess various attributes that have made the city superdiverse (see Vertovec, 2007) and, therefore, affect the way in which the city's integration strategy and urban citizenship are operated. In addition, interview data may have limited my analysis, as there are many stakeholders who did not take part in this study, or I was not able to identify and reach out. This was partly due to the pandemic, which put many stakeholders at capacity. As Chapter 4 has

mentioned, the data sample and interview format between Osaka and Birmingham were considerably different, and one could say that data from Osaka was richer than that of Birmingham because of its bigger sample size and in-person interviews. However, it is also true that data collected from policy stakeholders and practitioners in the midst of the pandemic have given unique implications and contributions to urban citizenship research, as I mentioned earlier. The pandemic has cast another light on the city's possibility and limitation in migrant integration, and the 'unfair' urban citizenship has been reported (Recio et al., 2021).

The second point refers to a limitation of cross-national/local comparison. Although this study selected two *local* settings, Osaka and Birmingham, comparative analysis has included *national*-level political, cultural, social and demographic contexts to a great extent. A city-level comparison has indeed helped me to escape from completely falling into the pitfall of methodological nationalism and to take into account the multi-level factors in making urban citizenship, as I explained in Chapter 4 (see Favell, 2001; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). Nonetheless, the distinct national and local settings of the two cities could lead to the essentialisation of geo-political boundaries and obstruct a comprehensive understanding of the national and local contexts of migrant integration strategy and of the roles that the cities can play independently from the national regime.

Thirdly, my definition of the 'urban' and use of the city as a local polity of urban citizenship may have also limited my analysis, as concepts like urban, city and local are not necessarily interchangeable. By focusing on the city's integration policies and practices, this study has confined the extensive definition of 'urban' to the city jurisdiction. As

Chapter 3 touched upon, urban polity and its scale are “connected with - but not subjected to - the complexities, institutions and discourses of the local state which [is] the historico-geographic product of the dialectics of state and civil society” (Keil, 1998, p.617). While I have shown that the city can be regarded as an adequate place to explore urban citizenship, urban as a scale of governance and imagined political realm entails other scales of governance as well as inter-scalar networks of actors (Keil, 1998; Brenner, 2000). Analysis of the city-led policies alone may present only a partial reality of urban citizenship, confined within the city boundary, and constrain the *urban* space.

Finally, treating the city’s integration-related policies altogether as an integration strategy could excessively disregard different contexts, dynamics and purposes for each policy and practice. Despite such policy divergences, however, it is still possible to “identify *prevailing*” policies and inform the city’s attitudes toward migrants and urban citizenship (Alexander, 2007, p.38, italics original). Therefore, the ‘integration strategy’ in this study was used not to generalise each integration policy but to facilitate analysis and discern the dominating attitudes of the city. This point was carefully considered and taken into account in the analysis as much as possible, inasmuch as such background details are not necessarily mentioned in policy materials.

8.2.2 Opportunities for future urban citizenship research

This study offers a range of opportunities to further research into urban citizenship. In this study, I have demonstrated the complex relationship between urban citizenship and integration strategy that operates in multi-scalar dynamics and highlighted the city as a place where various forms of inclusion and exclusion are manifested. As this study did

not much take into account attributes such as gender and socioeconomic status of migrants, future research can delve into individual migrants' experience of urban citizenship and the way through which their urban citizenship experiences are shaped by their intersectionality within the multi-scalar configuration of integration. This will address further complexities and boundaries of inequalities constructed in urban space that shape one's urban citizenship. Furthermore, it may be interesting to consider the non-migrant population and their urban citizenship, which would offer another insight into the concept itself and help us see whether and how their urban citizenship is constructed differently from that of migrant residents.

Following the relationship between urban citizenship and the city's integration strategy that this study has shown systematically, future research can take place in other city settings within and outside Japan and the UK. For instance, within Japan, cities with a high migration-driven diversity like Hamamatsu and Kawasaki would demonstrate similar or distinct migrant integration strategies; studying municipalities with a high concentration of migrants without immigration status, such as Warabi and Kawaguchi, would allow further investigation into making of urban citizenship. On the other hand, in the UK, future studies can look at other 'sanctuary' cities such as Sheffield and Leicester and cities like Warwick that are part of the nation-led Integration Area Programme. Examining other Core Cities, such as Manchester and Leeds, could offer another insight into the role of urban cities. Shifting the gaze to outside Japan and the UK, it would be interesting to study other 'second' cities like Melbourne, Shanghai and Rio de Janeiro in order to better understand the formation of urban citizenship and its relations vis-à-vis the state and other

cities. Transnational networks of cities can also be another focus, and comparing cities within such a network would enhance studies on multi-scalar dynamics and interplays.

It must also be noted that, while this research focused on urban citizenship, it does not reject the values and meanings of other forms of citizenship, and examining them can cast another light on the city's integration strategy and other forms of citizenship and eventually push forward citizenship studies as a whole. It is claimed that the neighbourhood, like the city, entails 'a structural, cultural, economic, and political construct, in addition to a spatial one' (Joseph, 2008, p.46), and investigating the production of urban citizenship at the neighbourhood level may be worthwhile. Furthermore, researchers, for example, can take into account other scales of citizenship, such as local citizenship (Tsuda, 2006a) and rural citizenship (Kyed and Buur, 2006) and bring citizenship examinations into other non-urban areas. In addition, researchers can take a deeper look into the urban characteristics of the city and urban citizens' approaches to them rather than focusing on territorially-bounded citizenship. Other perspectives on citizenship have been raised by scholars to better understand various bases, approaches and practices of citizenship in the urban realm, such as infrastructural citizenship (Lemanski, 2018) and garbage citizenship (Fredericks, 2018). Urban geography has also committed to rethinking various relationships between the urban space and its residents (Hall and Barrett, 2011). Following those approaches to rethinking citizenship can offer us a multidisciplinary perspective that will enable a more holistic understanding of citizenship.

Although urban citizenship does not demonstrate as dominant influence as formal citizenship, advancing urban citizenship research will lead to a better understanding of the urban, where, in spite of legal and political forces, non-migrant and migrant residents are engaged with “dynamics of fragmented claims that, in their own complex and often not universalizing ways, do the work of the city” (Blokland et al., 2015, p.664). From such an in-depth understanding of urban citizenship, derive new values and meanings that could enrich status, rights and identity of migrant residents living in the city. I believe that this study has provided several points of entry for researchers to explore the practicality of the concept of urban citizenship that can improve the urban living of migrants.

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APPENDIX 1

A FULL LIST OF STUDIED POLICY DOCUMENTS

Osaka

- *Gaikokujin kigyō katsudō sokushin jigyō' ni kakaru kigyō jyunbi katsudō keikaku no shinsei uketsuke ni tsuite* (Regarding acceptance of application for entrepreneurship preparation activity plan for 'Foreign Entrepreneurship Promotion Project')
- *Gaikokujin shokuin no jyūji suru shokuni kansuru* yōkō (Guidelines regarding the work non-Japanese staff engage with)
- *Gyōmu oyobi zaimu ni kansuru shiryō* (Resources regarding our business and finance)
- *'Heito spīchi eno taisho ni kansuru jyōrei' ni kakaru anken no toriatsukai jyōkō ni tsuite* (Management status of cases regarding 'Ordinance on Dealing with Hate Speech')
- *Jyūmin tōhyou no shōsai ya kongo no yotei ha kimatte iruno?* (Are there any confirmed details or schedule on referendum?)
- *Minkan netto chōsa 'tabunka kyōsei ni tsuite' (Reiwa 2 nen 10 gatsu jisshi) no kekka* (Results of private surveys on 'multicultural coexistence' (conducted in October 2020))
- *Osaka kokusai kōryū sentā anyuaru repōto 2020 nenhō* (Osaka International House Foundation annual report for 2020)
- *Osaka shi gaikoku seki jyūmin shisaku kihon shishin* (The 2004 Basic Guidelines on Measures for Foreign-National Residents)
- *'Osaka shi gaikokuseki jyūmin shisaku kihon shishin' no jitsugen ni muketa torikumi ni tsuite (teigen)* (Practices to implement 'Osaka City Basic Guidelines for Foreign Residents' (proposal))
- *Osaka shi heito supīchi eno taisho ni kansuru jyōrei* (Osaka city ordinance against hate speech)
- *Osaka shi jinken gyōsei kihon hōshin* (Osaka City Basic Guidelines of Human Rights Governance)
- *Osaka shi jinken sonchō no shakai dukuri jyōrei* (Osaka City ordinance on creating a society of respect for human rights)
- *Osaka shi tabunka kyōsei shishin* (Osaka City Guidelines for *Tabunka Kyōsei*)
- *Osaka shi tabunka kyōsei shishin (soan)* (Osaka City *Tabunka Kyōsei* Guidelines (draft))

- *Osaka shi tabunka kyōsei shishin (soan) ni kakaru paburikku komento tetsuzuki no jisshi kekka ni tsuite* (Outcomes of public comments on Osaka City *Tabunka Kyōsei* Guidelines (draft))
- *Osaka shi zainichi gaikokujin kōreisha kyūfukin shikyū yōkō* (Osaka City foreign elderly residents benefits outline)
- *Reiwa 2 nendo yosan jigyō ichiran no kōhyō ni tsuite* (Regarding publication of a list of budget by programme as of fiscal year 2020)
- *Reiwa 2 nendo yosan, setsumei* (Budget summary for the fiscal year 2020)
- *Shakai fukushi hō dai 2 jyō dai 3 kō ni kitei suru seikei konnnan sha no tameni muryō matawa teigaku na ryōkin de shinryō o okonau jigyō ni tsuite* (About medical practices free of charge or at a low cost for the needy for provided for in the Social Welfare Act Article 2 Section 3)
- *Shimai, yūkō toshi kōryū* (exchanges with sister, friendship cities)
- *Shingata korona wirusu kansensō ni tsuite (denwa sōdan fukumu)* (Regarding the novel coronavirus (including telephone consultation))
- *Tabunka kōryū otasuke gaido: 'nandemo kīteya!'* (Multicultural interaction guide: ask us anything!)
- *Tabunka kyōsei no machi dukuri* (Creating a city of multicultural coexistence)
- *Tagengo shiryō ichiran o sakusei shimashita* (We created a list of available multilangual information)
- *Zainichi gaikokujin kyōiku kihon hōshin - tabunka kyōsei no kyōiku o mezashite -* (Basic guidelines of education for foreign students: towards education for tabunka kyosei)

Birmingham

- ‘Arts and culture on our doorstep’
- ‘BCC response to rough sleeping snapshot in England’
- ‘BHealthy’
- ‘Birmingham celebrates refugee week with virtual festival’
- ‘Birmingham history’
- ‘Birmingham looks at twin city Zaporizhzhia as Ukraine celebrates Independence Day’
- ‘Birmingham set to receive almost £600k in support for rough sleepers’
- ‘Birmingham translation, interpreting and accessible information services’
- ‘Birmingham welcomes’
- ‘Children's Trust’
- ‘Connecting communities through culture’
- ‘Controlling migration fund bid - tackling rogue landlords and supporting communities’

- ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19) - information in other languages’
- ‘ESOL - English for speakers of other languages’
- ‘European and international affairs’
- ‘Families with no recourse to public funds’
- ‘Partnerships and policies’
- ‘Past projects’
- ‘Resettlement in Birmingham’
- ‘The Birmingham ESOL hub’
- ‘What happens in an emergency’
- ‘What we do to support asylum seekers, refugees and migrants’
- Adopted Birmingham Development Plan 2031
- Birmingham City Council Workforce Race Equity Review
- Birmingham City of Sanctuary Policy Statement 2018-22
- Birmingham Curriculum Statement
- Birmingham Migration Forum terms of reference – December 2017 (final)
- Birmingham Public Health Green Paper
- Birmingham Schools of Sanctuary
- Birmingham where the world meets: inquiry report
- Birmingham’s Fair Access Protocol
- Birmingham's Strategy for Children, Young People and Culture
- Community Cohesion Strategy for Birmingham: forward together to build a fair and inclusive city for everyone
- Equalities and Cohesion Toolkit: all equal, all different
- Equality Objectives 2019 – 2023

APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE[37]

Policymakers

Background *[Stakeholder profile]*	Tell me about your job	• What do you do, who do you work for? • How many years have you been working in a current position? • How does your work engage with migrant population?
Integration strategies *[target]*	Who are 'foreign residents (migrants)'?	• Could you specify who these 'all foreign residents' are? Why? • How does the city regard those with undocumented status and asylum seekers? Are they a part of multicultural coexistence? • How do you think the way your office (the city) regards those foreign residents has changed over the years?
Integration strategies *[policymaking process]*	How and to what extent does the policy reflect/respond to profiles of local population, its dynamics and demands?	• How did you (the city) consider and reflect the local demography and history into this policy? • When formulating this policy, was there any pressure or demands from local population or other groups/communities that pushed this policy? • Who were they? What was their approach? Area? • How did you incorporate those demands into the policy? Was there any priority in terms of target groups or integration domains?
Integration strategies	How do different levels of authorities influence Osaka's policymaking?	• Do you think if there is any difference between Osaka's approach and the national guideline?

[37] Additional questions regarding the pandemic are highlighted in yellow.

[multi-level governance]		• Is the national guideline sufficient enough to 'guide' the local policies? • How do you think this city's approach is somehow unique/different from other cities/countries? Any role model?
Integration strategies *[domains]*	What is the city's /policymakers' focus in migrant integration? What is multicultural coexistence for you?	• Which is the area that the city considers as especially important for this policy, and why? • What was the motivation for anti-hate speech ordinance? To what extent will the city grant other civil and political rights to foreign residents, esp local voting rights? • Any areas the city thinks should be improved?
Integration strategies *[impacts]*	How has the policy influenced migrant population? How does the city recognize it?	• How were the responses from nationals and migrants like? • How do you think migrant residents regard this policy and available services? • Do you think this policy has allowed migrants to have rights and access equal to those of national residents? • What are the impacts of COVID-19 on concerned 'foreign residents', and how are you dealing with it? • Which foreign population do you think is the most affected and which area?
Integration strategies *[future perspectives]*	How will the city develop integration strategies, responding to changing demographics?	• If any, what would be a change for the next revision, and what is the goal of the revision? • As the foreign population will keep increasing, how will the city cope with the rapidly-changing demography and demands from population? • What is this city's strength in promoting migrant integration?

Civil group activists

Background *[Stakeholder profile]*	Tell me about your job Tell me about your background	• What do you do, who do you work for? • How many years have you been working in a current position? • Could you tell me about your background? • How does your work/organization engage with migrants? Which group? • How does your work/organization engage with other civil groups? Which group? • How does your work/organization engage with the city authority?
Integration strategies *[impression]*	How do civil activists think about the city's integration policy?	• How do you assess this policy? • Do you think your (organization's) vision is reflected in the policy? How?
Integration strategies *[policymaking process]*	How have civil activists engaged in policymaking?	• Have you or your organization involved in the policymaking process? How, which stage, when, in what area? • To what extent was it entirely reflected in the policy?
Integration strategies *[impacts]*	How has the policy influenced migrant population?	• What have been the impacts of this policy on local residents and migrants that your organization concerns? Specific groups? Any examples? • To what extent do you think migrants have gained rights and access? Are they equal to those of national residents? • Any challenge/difficulty in migrants' everyday life that hinders them from utilizing this policy? • How do you think the way your group and the city regards those foreign residents has changed over the years?

Integration strategies *[improvement]*	How can the city improve its integration policy?	• What would you add (or delete) in this policy? For whom? Which area? • Who do you think should be included in this integration policy for 'all foreign residents'? Undocumented migrants and asylum seekers?
Role of stakeholders *[Network and future perspectives]*	How do stakeholders influence/contribute to integration in Osaka? How powerful are they?	• How and to what extent do you think your organization can influence city politics to assure rights and membership of foreign residents in the city? • Has your organization/activity consulted any universal principles or network with other groups (within and outside Osaka) in order to promote integration in Osaka? Which principle/group specifically and how? • What are the impacts of COVID-19 on concerned migrant groups, and how are you dealing with it? • What would you need national/local governments to work on for those migrants in light of the pandemic? • How will your organization cope with the rapidly-changing demography in the city? • To realize migrant integration in Osaka, who do you think is the key actor? • What do you think is this city's strength in promoting migrant integration?

Migrant group activists

Background *[Stakeholder profile]*	Tell me about your job Tell me about your background	• What do you do, who do you work for? • How many years have you been working in a current position? • Could you tell me about your background? • How does your work/organization engage with migrants? Which group? • How does your work/organization engage with other civil groups? Which group? • How does your work/organization engage with the city authority?
Integration strategies *[impression]*	How do migrant activists/ communities think about the city's integration policy?	• How do you assess this policy? • Do you think your (organizations' or community's) need is reflected in the policy?
Integration strategies *[policymaking process]*	How have migrant groups engaged in policymaking?	• Have you or your organization involved in the policymaking process? How, which stage, when, what area? • To what extent was it entirely reflected in the policy?
Integration strategies *[impacts]*	How do migrant groups think of the policy?	• What have been the impacts of this policy on local residents and migrants, especially groups that your organization concerns? Any examples? • To what extent do you think migrants have gained rights and access? Are they equal to those of national residents? • Is there any gap among other migrant groups? • Any challenge/difficulty in migrants' everyday life that hinders them from

		utilizing this policy and being a part of the community? • How do you think the way your group and the city regards those foreign residents has changed over the years?
Integration strategies *[improvement]*	How can the city improve its integration policy?	• What would you add (or delete) in this policy? For whom? Which area? • Who do you think should be included in this integration policy for 'all foreign residents'? Undocumented migrants and asylum seekers?
Role of stakeholders *[Network and future perspectives]*	How do migrant stakeholders influence/contribute to integration in Osaka? How powerful are they?	• How much influence do you think migrant population currently has on the city governance? How can they strengthen their presence? • How and to what extent do you think your organization can influence city politics to assure rights and membership of foreign residents in the city? How to engage with national residents? • Have your organization/activity consulted any universal principles or network with other groups (within and outside Osaka) in order to promote integration in Osaka? Which principle/group specifically and how? • What are the impacts of COVID-19 on concerned migrant groups, and how are you dealing with it? • What would you need national/local governments to work on for those migrants in light of the pandemic? • How will your organization cope with the rapidly-changing demography in the city? • To realize migrant integration in Osaka, who do you think is the key actor?

		• What do you think is this city's strength in promoting migrant integration?

APPENDIX 3

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Comparative study on integration strategies in Birmingham, U.K., and Osaka, Japan

I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Ask questions if anything you read is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not to take part.

ABOUT THE RESEARCHER AND THIS STUDY

I am a doctoral student at the University of Birmingham. My doctoral research is looking at the role of city in promoting migrant[38] integration. This study specifically aims to explore whether and how migrant residents are recognized as local members through city-level migrant integration strategies. This study regards city-level policies and plans for migrant population as 'integration strategies,' and I would like to look into how local, national and transnational networks of different civil groups have contributed to the formation and implementation of integration strategies and how the strategies influence different stakeholders.

PARTICIPANT ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY

You have been chosen because as a member of a migrant-related group, you will have knowledge and experience in listening to migrant voices and representing them in Birmingham. I will conduct an interview to ask you about the role of your organization in empowering migrant population, the process through which the network of migrants and stakeholders promotes integration, and the influence of integration strategies on local communities. The interview will be up to one hour and take place online (may change depending on the government guideline). The interview will be conducted in English, but if you prefer other language, a translator will be accompanied. The interview will be audio-recorded.

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be able to keep a copy of this information sheet and you should indicate your agreement to the consent form. You can withdraw any time before or during the interview. You also have until three months after the interview to

[38] Here I employ the word 'migrants' to include those who have their origins abroad, such as refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers, professionals, expats, international students and undocumented migrants, and their descendants.

decide to remove your data. Audio files from the interview will be deleted when you wish to withdraw and thus will not be transcribed. You do not have to give a reason when withdrawing.

DATA STORAGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY

The interview will be transcribed and I may be using your direct quotes. You can see the interview transcript if you wish. Some of your attributes such as age, gender, immigration status and professional experience in addition to your job title and nature of your organization will be recorded and may be reported. Your name, job position, the name of your organization and your position in the organization will also appear in research outputs if you wish to be named. All the information collected in the form of signed consent forms and audio recordings will be retained as part of the research process. Due to the nature of this project, you may be identifiable even if you wish not to be named in the research outputs. However, other personal details such as your contact details will remain confidential as they will be stored separately to the interview data and password protected.

The data obtained from the interview will be protected in accordance with the Research Data Management Policy of the University of Birmingham. All data, including interview recordings, transcripts, analyzed data and your contact details will be stored on the Research Data Store (RDS) for five years. Access to the RDS is restricted to myself and my main supervisor (Professor Nando Sigona), and will be password protected.

I will provide a brief summary of key findings after this research project. Access to the thesis will also be given to you.

POSSIBLE BENEFITS AND RISKS

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in this project, it is hoped that this work will contribute to better understanding the influence of integration strategies and capturing the interrelationship among different stakeholders including migrants that will further enhance integration at the local level.

Participating in the research is not anticipated to cause you any disadvantages or discomfort.

The potential physical and/or psychological harm or distress will be the same as any experienced in everyday life.

CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Nobuko Nagai

Doctoral researcher

School of Social Policy, Sociology and Criminology

University of Birmingham

[redacted]

[redacted]

Supervisors:

Professor Nando Sigona

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Dr Laurence Lessard-Phillips

[redacted]