

**Turkey and the European Union: A Step Too Far?
An Investigation into the Journey of Turkey's Road to EU
Membership**

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Abstract

The relations between Turkey and the European Union has been a long subject of discussion. Not least due to the fact Turkey has been pursuing an active policy for membership for over two decades and if its application is accepted, it would become the first Muslim member of the EU. This research will provide some insight into the development of Turkey's application by exploring the problems faced during the first years of submitting the request. The positioning of Turkey shall be elucidated upon to provide a full picture of the importance of Turkey's place in regional and international politics. A brief comparison with Greece will be discussed so as to further display the candidacy of Turkey. Directly addressing the benefits of Turkey joining the EU will show the impact the country can have in building bridges whilst strengthening the economic and military aspect of the EU.

For my Beloved, my dear parents, my family, friends and my dedicated supervisor Steve Morewood; thank you for your support, patience and continuous concern

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List of Abbreviations

AKP	Justice and Development Party
BOTAS	Petroleum Pipeline Corporation
BRSA	Banking and Regulation Supervision Agency
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CIP	Competitiveness and Innovation Programme
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Commission of Security and Cooperation Organisation in Europe
EC	European Community
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organisation
ECU	European Currency Unit
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	European Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
EU	European Union
FIR	Flight Information Responsibility
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMP	Integrated Mediterranean Programme
MEP	Member of European Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ND	New Democracy party
NSC	National Security Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Council
PASOK	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
PEP	Pre-accession Economic Programme
PKK	Kurdish Worker's Party
SME	Small Medium sized Enterprises
SPO	State Planning Organisation
TRNC	Turkish Republic of North Cyprus
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT	Value Added Tax

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research is to investigate the development of Turkey's application to become a member of the European Union (EU) and its surrounding controversies. In Turkey's drive to become Western, after having joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), it also began to become more European and this was first established in 1959 when the European Economic Community (EEC) accepted Turkey as an Associate member. The slow progress towards becoming a full member has continued since 1987 when the official application was made, but over twenty years later that status has still to be achieved notwithstanding the earlier admittance of Greece, Spain and Portugal (the 'Med Club') in the 1980s and the more recent enlargement to embrace former members of the Soviet bloc, all of which had serious deficiencies and yet gained admittance. The reason for researching about this specific EU member applicant is due to the obvious fact Turkey is the first Muslim country to seek full membership and yet conversely this is also the reason why negotiations with the EU have been so protracted and conditional. The many sceptics who have concluded the EU is a 'Christian club' and those who have anticipated a clash of civilisations will soon be put to the test.¹ The hopefuls who do not adhere to the 'Christian culture' mentality will also be tested through the response the EU gives to Turkey after negotiations are concluded.

With so many unique qualities possessed by Turkey, such as it being politically secular in outlook, whilst being a majority Muslim country situated in a strategic

¹ Huntington, 1996, 184

region with burgeoning economic prowess, it will be interesting how this journey ends. This is especially due to the current situation in the EU, since after the recent enlargements, it is now experiencing a period of self-assessment; thus the EU's further reaction towards Turkey's ongoing application will be carefully planned. I hope to explore several key areas. Firstly, I will attempt to explain the situation Turkey is facing by way of laying out the problems of the past because the heritage of the distant past (associated with the Ottoman Empire's near conquest of Europe until its forces were halted at Vienna) and more recent past (especially the Armenian massacres and the invasion of Cyprus) has influenced the reception towards its prospective entry from EU member states, especially Austria, France and Germany. This will be explored in Chapter I entitled 'Turkey's difficult case for membership' which will analyse why Turkey's application process has become the longest in the EU's history. In Chapter II titled, 'Turkey and the world around it', the positioning of Turkey will be discussed. This will include the geostrategic and political importance that Turkey has established as a stable regional power sandwiched between the conflict torn Balkans and the Middle East. The chapter will also explore the recent developments that have led Turkey to become stronger and more aware of the impact it can have in politics within the Middle East and further afield. To assess Turkey's application in its real context, a comparison with neighbouring Greece's journey to becoming an EU member shall be considered. Thus Chapter III, titled 'Greece leads the way', will be a well suited comparison as the two countries share many similar qualities while also differing in some key respects. The final chapter, 'The Prospects of Turkey entering the EU', will assess the current progress Turkey is making. The chapter will explore the benefits Turkey has to offer in its own right as well as the benefits it can provide for the EU.

During this research, several questions have arisen which will be answered through the following chapters. Naturally the most important question is ‘Will Turkey enter the European Union?’ Although the question seems to demand an automatic and simple yes, this is not the case, as shall be explored later. The second question ‘If yes, then when?’ will explain the difficulties that face Turkey in progressing with ease and swiftness. A third question, considering all the consequences and pondering: ‘Should Turkey become a member of the EU?’ Conversely, ‘Should the EU accept Turkey as a full member?’ These questions have no short answer and no answer can be complete or correct in totality. The ‘facts’ are never clear and information can be used to build a strong case for rejecting or accepting Turkey. This will be discussed in the conclusion, bringing all aspects of Turkey’s application to light and assessing its case as fairly as possible.

In terms of sources the thesis naturally draws heavily from EU publications, which provide essential data such as the conditions for accession, negotiation chapters as well as explaining the process of decision making. Reports from the Economic Commission and reports on Turkey’s progress have also been key primary sources in ascertaining the official stance of the EU. The opinion of independent member states as well as the views of independent analysts has also been taken into consideration. Because the controversies surrounding Turkey's membership application date from the 1980s, a considerable secondary literature is available. My research has also therefore explored the older views held by political commentators, whether pro-Turkey or anti-Turkey. These have been included in the analysis to provide an encompassed understanding of Turkey’s protracted progress towards membership.

The approach is to explore Turkey's development over the past forty years from a historical, legal and social aspect. This will help provide a better picture of how Turkey has progressed and changed as a country, with its legal institutions beginning to reflect the needs its modernising society now demands. The move away from top-down rule to bottom up reform has greatly impacted relations with the EU as well as the speed of progress in its application. Thus I will reflect upon these changes and explain how they are relevant specifically to the EU application and this will enable a more informed conclusion to be reached as to the questions posed.

I

TURKEY'S DIFFICULT CASE FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

The reasons that have hindered Turkey's hopes of entering the EU can be seen in two ways. Firstly, there are long term problems of the past, dating from the early Republic such as the strong military presence within Turkish politics. The influence of the military has consistently been a key consideration influencing the EU's cautious approach towards Turkish membership. There are also long standing reasons that have stumbled Turkey's progression, such as the issue of the treatment of the Kurdish peoples in its South-Eastern region. Whilst the Kurdish situation must be dealt with appropriately, it does not itself present an important reason to halt accession. The second way to interpret Turkey's accession prospects is by assessing the issues surrounding them as being integral or superficial. Thus, some may argue that the human rights situation in Turkey is a superficial obstacle, as similar situations can be observed in many existing and recently admitted EU member states, with little pressure on them to improve and uphold basic human rights before being granted accession. Integral reasons could be viewed as situations that have not changed or have become more important, such as the geo-strategic positioning of Turkey. The weight of certain problems can increase according to the importance that is placed upon them. Thus a changing trend can be observed, beginning in the 1960s with the military being a central concern, along with unstable politics, the Kurdish problem and the Cyprus issue arising from Turkey's invasion of the North of Cyprus in 1974. The economy, the Cold War situation and human rights infringements are short term reasons that prevented progress at the time. The attitude of Greece an EU member

since 1981 has remained an important consideration in Turkey's case for accession, although recently Greece has become a favoured friend within the region. The key reasons as well as the superficial problems will be assessed to provide a clear analysis of Turkey's bumpy road to accession.

Military Interventions Since the Early Republic

The Paris Conference in 1856 placed Turkey firmly within the European sphere despite the fact that the rest of Europe shares a memory of being united against the 'terrible Turk'.¹ Due to this unavoidable truth, Turkey has since continued to create a new perception of itself by welcoming modernisation for the purpose of 'Europeanisation'.² With this, Mustafa Kemal sought to move away from its Ottoman past by combining modernist tenets for socio-economic change in a charismatic manner.³ This top-down approach created a modern Turkey that was isolated from its people.⁴ This environment needed to be protected and controlled; a responsibility assumed by the military of Turkey. They exercised their power whenever they felt the Kemalist principles were being threatened, thus showing the weakness upon which democratisation was progressing. In 1946 a multi-party system began, with hopes of full democracy taking root. The 1950s saw the Democratic right party come to power, and though it was pro-Kemalist in principle, it was less harsh on peasants and on religion.⁵ The coup of 1960 represented the power and the extent to which the military were to intervene in politics. Organised by the Junta, the coup initiated a new commission named the National Unity Commission, with hand-picked intellectuals to

¹ Paris Conference, 1856, 20

² Bac, 1999, 243

³ Sunar, 1996, 141-142

⁴ Sunar, 1996, 143

⁵ Dodd, 1996, 132

show the way forward.⁶ The military ensured its involvement within the political sphere by creating a National Security Council, which advised the Cabinet.⁷ This heavy handed approach led to instability and “parties and leaders now wooed the generals”.⁸ The coup of 1971 followed to restrict the freedom of and ensure checks on leftist parties, which led to the assassinations of public figures.⁹ The 1970s saw much regional violence and state terrorism, and because of this liberalism was not able to flourish due to the pull of these past events.¹⁰ Bureaucracy and administration remained rigid and the continuous fractured governments feared intervention by the military.¹¹ The EU’s conditions for enlargement clearly states, “Any European country which respects the principles of...the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union.”¹² Yet in the Turkish case democracy was only to continue so long as it conformed to the Kemalist principle and the military approved.

Kurds ‘Disrupting’ Homogeneity

During the Ottoman Empire, people’s status was based upon confessional lines and not their race or ethnicity.¹³ The Kurdish issue arose due to the fact the Turkish Republic is based upon ethnic lines, with the hope of creating unity through homogeneity. Before the states such as Iraq and Turkey were formed, the Kurdish people moved freely, but after the formation of these states, each country attempted to embrace them.¹⁴ As the countries formed on the basis of power, Turkey embraced

⁶ Ahmed, 2003, 119-120

⁷ Dodd, 1996, 131

⁸ Ahmed, 2003, 124

⁹ Dodd, 1996, 133

¹⁰ Onic, 1996, 148-149

¹¹ Bachard, 1998, 13-14

¹² http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm (accessed 14 April 2010)

¹³ Spencer, 1993, 3

¹⁴ Park, 2005, 11

almost twenty percent of all Kurds, thus presenting a problem for decades to come.¹⁵ In the 1920s a separate state for the Kurdish people was briefly entertained as a reward for the joint Muslim battle against the Greeks, though this was quickly dashed by Mustafa Kemal.¹⁶ He interpreted this notion as an attempt by the USA and others to weaken the new Republic through civil turmoil and separatism.¹⁷ The Republic ensured its own protection through the constitution, which defined Turks by place of living, religion and ethnicity.¹⁸ Thus, Mustafa Kemal was able to eliminate any legal reference to the Kurdish people and with this he imposed martial law, banned the Kurdish language and began his secular Turkification.¹⁹ In 1925 the Kurdish people rebelled against these new laws, only to be harshly suppressed by the Turkish armed forces.²⁰ As Cagaptay states, “High Kemalism had made the Kurds into obedient yet inactive members of the Republic.”²¹ The new wave of secularism was partly enjoyed by the Kurds, some of whom were from the religious minority of Alevi Muslims and so the elimination of Sunni Islam in public life gave them greater religious freedom.²² In the 1960s, there was a resurgence with the Kurds demanding more cultural freedom and regional investment.²³ The elite believed they could suppress their voices through military action²⁴ but this time the Turkish forces were beginning to suffer greatly.²⁵ In 1984, the Kurdish movement became systematically militarised under the name of the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party); a creation of Turkish miscalculation that would lead

¹⁵ Park, 2005, 14

¹⁶ Treaty of Sevres, 1920, 807

¹⁷ Park, 2005, 13

¹⁸ Cagaptay, 2006, 159

¹⁹ Park, 2005, 17

²⁰ Pope, 1997, 249

²¹ Pope, 1997, 113

²² Spencer, 1993, 3

²³ Ahmed, 2003, 163

²⁴ Ahmed, 2003, 163

²⁵ Cagaptay, 2006, 112

them further away from their EU dreams.²⁶ Almost one quarter of the Turkish land forces were being used to fight the guerrilla group, but soon the issue became internationalised and the world now took interest.²⁷ Local villages were being paid to break the PKK's camouflage tactic of hiding in villages.²⁸ The new European concern became manifest in 1989 with the first international conference on the Kurdish question in Paris.²⁹ It was estimated over a 15 year period that more than 37,000 people were killed and in 1997 Jacques Pour, the Luxembourg foreign minister, saw the Kurdish problem as a major issue hindering Turkey's accession bid.³⁰

The EU did not support the actions of the PKK, but it did question the excessive force that was being used by Turkey to suppress this internal struggle.³¹ There were attempts to settle the situation on a semi-official level. However the Ocalan affair worsened any possibility of this.³² Italy and Syria had been accused of supporting and protecting the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and through pressure from Ankara, Syria caught Ocalan and handed him over to Turkey.³³ The ensuing death sentence was to be carried out but international pressure led the case to be put before the European Court of Justice and Ocalan was spared.³⁴ Such international intervention annoyed Turkey as it felt it was being attacked without anyone understanding the situation it was facing.³⁵ Turkey was not denying the existence of the Kurdish people but did not want to privilege them with minority status,³⁶ as some far right secularists feared the

²⁶ Pope, 1997, 251

²⁷ Kramer, 2000, 37-38

²⁸ Ahmed, 2003, 165

²⁹ Pope, 1997, 264

³⁰ Langhorne, 1996, 20

³¹ Kramer, 1996, 221

³² Itzkowitz, 1994, 239

³³ Ahmed, 2003, 165-166

³⁴ Ahmed, 2003, 166

³⁵ Itzkowitz, 1994, 207

³⁶ Kramer, 1996, 220

end of a unified Turkey.³⁷ The 1990s saw a breakthrough for Turkish politics as President Ozal reversed the law that banned the Kurdish language.³⁸ By 1995, the overtly Kurdish People's Democracy party was formed, but it did not vie for a separate state nor did it support the PKK.³⁹ The urban elite within Turkey have begun to understand the Kurdish plight for ethnic recognition,⁴⁰ which is positive for internal cohesion and the EU bid. New legislation has allowed the Kurdish language to be spoken but the new anti-terror law has limited freedom of speech.⁴¹

Regional Issues: Cyprus

Another problem that is facing Turkey in its bid for accession is the longstanding issue of Cyprus. Cyprus is a strategically important island as the British realised and hence annexed it from the Ottomans after the First World War, which was recognised in the Lausanne treaty.⁴² In 1950, the Greek Cypriots sought independence from Britain seeking Enosis with Greece.⁴³ Over several years a guerrilla army fought the occupying forces, eventually forcing Britain to concede independence albeit by retaining two sovereign bases in perpetuity.⁴⁴ After negotiations in London between Turkey, Greece and Britain, the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960.⁴⁵ The uneasy relationship of the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios as President and the Turkish Cypriot, Dr.Fazil Kucuk as vice-president soon began to break down.⁴⁶ Sanctions on Turkish Cypriot areas⁴⁷ and the planned coup in 1974 led to tensions,

³⁷ Kramer, 2000, 43

³⁸ Bac, 1999, 250

³⁹ Pope, 1997, 255

⁴⁰ Itzkowitz, 1994, 52

⁴¹ Pope, 1997, 266

⁴² Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, 966

⁴³ Itzkowitz, 1994, 126

⁴⁴ Holland, 1998, 307

⁴⁵ Ahmed, 2003, 129

⁴⁶ Ahmed, 2003, 129

⁴⁷ Itzkowitz, 1994, 129

though it could be said the North invasion presented an opportunity for Turkey to balance out the power struggle. As a guarantor of the 1959 tripartite treaty, Turkey believed it had the right to intervene after Britain rejected assistance in intervention.⁴⁸ In July, Turkish President Bulent Ecevit ordered the invasion and the Turkish army took control of 40% of the island.⁴⁹ This situation agitated relations with Greece and with the rest of the world as it was seen as external aggression. An informal separation was created based on geography, with the Greek Cypriots living in the South and the Turkish Cypriots residing in the North. The separation was made concrete with the creation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983.⁵⁰ As Turkey was the only country to recognise the new state, some interpreted this move as part of Turkey's expansionist aims within the region. This was made explicit when the government in Cyprus was restored and the occupying Turkish troops did not leave.⁵¹ Emigrants from Turkey were encouraged to settle in the north to counterbalance the south's Greek Cypriot community.⁵² Turkey will continue to aid its fellow Turks as it would now lose face and prestige against Greece.

With the race for accession to the EU, Turkey has been forced to assess its priorities. Being an Associate member since 1963 and applying for membership in 1983, the case of Cyprus will be a problem. The garrison on the island and the fact Turkey helped establish a separate state within Cyprus are issues that need to be dealt with according to EU terms. With Cyprus having pushed for membership with the EU through an Association Agreement since 1972, Greece stated it would veto any

⁴⁸ Ahmed, 2003,140

⁴⁹ Ahmed, 2003, 141

⁵⁰ Itzkowitz, 1994, 150

⁵¹ Bachard, 1998, 36

⁵² Emilianides, 2009, 100

Eastern European country in its own desire to bring Cyprus into the EU.⁵³ The President of the TRNC, Rauf Denktash, led the poorer and under-developed part of Cyprus.⁵⁴ The number of Turkish troops number around 30,000 and there are little signs of their leaving due to the mutual suspicion and Greece's possible attempt to militarise the island. From Greece's point of view, they see Turkey's attempts to dominate the island as a continuation of the Ottoman-Turkish desire to raid and re-capture Greece.⁵⁵ Whilst on the other hand, Turkey does seek to resolve the situation on its own terms, as economically it is burdening Turkey \$200 million per annum to keep Northern Cyprus afloat.⁵⁶ Maintaining the status quo is vital for Turkey if it is to exert its strength in the Mediterranean.

On 3rd July 1990, Cyprus applied for EU membership, which quickly led to the questioning of the legitimacy of the application.⁵⁷ Many objections arose such as the fact that Cyprus was a bi-communal society and so any decision had to be taken by both communities. In addition, Cyprus could not join a 'union' Turkey and Greece were not part of, and freedom of goods was an unfulfilled requirement.⁵⁸ However, most objections were unfounded; the EU was a loose union which does not conflict with the Cyprus constitution and Turkish Cypriots would not join in the EU bid. It is important to recognise the implications of granting EU membership to Cyprus; permanently dividing the country and continuing the rift between Turkey and Greece, and the EU.⁵⁹ In 1992, progress was made as all sides agreed to work with the United

⁵³ Langhorne, 1996, 36

⁵⁴ Pope, 1997, 109-110

⁵⁵ Itzkowitz, 1994, 165

⁵⁶ Pope, 1997, 124

⁵⁷ <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/33D74C8D5E59FFC8C2256EBD004F3CF4?OpenDocument>, (accessed 16 September 2010)

⁵⁸ http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/appendix_b.html (accessed 17 September 2010)

⁵⁹ Itzkowitz, 1994, 211

Nations for a solution in Cyprus.⁶⁰ Turkish President Demirel and Greek President Mitsotakis were weary of jeopardising their narrow government majority and so acted cautiously.⁶¹ A loose federation was one solution offered, as it kept the bi-zonal system but allowed for equality in higher government.⁶² Though attempts were made to unite the island, by 1995, the European Commission ruled accession could take place without unification.⁶³ By 1998, the EU had approved the beginning of negotiations to which they were concluded just four years later in 2002.⁶⁴ Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004 which meant another vetoing power against Turkey.⁶⁵ This also means that other EU member states can be directly influenced by Cyprus and Greece through the body of the EU. Thus Turkey has become more limited in applying pressure as the Greek Cypriots are less affected by Turkish efforts to reunite the island since the goal of EU membership has been achieved.

Regional Issues: Greece

The security and stability of Cyprus would have a direct affect on the security of the Mediterranean. It is the meeting point of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, as well as being a route for oil pipelines from Iraq to pass through.⁶⁶ In 1997, the EC-Turkey Association Council stated that the dispute between Turkey and Greece needed to be resolved, even if that meant settling it in the International Court of Justice.⁶⁷ For Turkey to be given a clearer sign for membership would ensure a better approach on

⁶⁰ Spencer, 1993, 18

⁶¹ Spencer, 1993, 18-19

⁶² Peristianis, 1999, 126-127

⁶³ Bahcheli, 2004, 109

⁶⁴ <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/portal/portal.nsf/All/33D74C8D5E59FFC8C2256EBD004F3CF4?OpenDocument> (accessed 24 September 2010)

⁶⁵ http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-countries/countries/member-states/cyprus/index_en.htm (accessed 24 September 2010)

⁶⁶ Itzkowitz, 1994, 175

⁶⁷ Bac, 1999, 256

the issue of Cyprus, and for the EU this would mean stability in the region.⁶⁸ The referendum in 2004 to decide the future of Cyprus, as to whether the people wished for unification, found the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan proposal with 75.8% voting no, whilst 65% of voting Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan.⁶⁹ Greece had consistently vetoed any decision of the EU in the hope of forcing the EU to give in and promise negotiations with Cyprus.⁷⁰

The recent controversy surrounding Turkey refusing to open its ports to Cyprus for trade in 2006 was another bad move for Turkey as it led to a freeze on accession talks.⁷¹ The European Commission concluded that it would “monitor Ankara’s progress on opening ports to Cyprus in 2007, 2008, 2009 as appropriate”.⁷² This confirms the viewpoint that Turkey’s chances of joining the EU will improve according to the state of its relations with its neighbours. Although it can be argued this is unfair and not according to any specific law within the EU charter, Greece has been able to use this advantage and sway the debate to rest the blame upon Turkey. When asked about the Cyprus issue, President Gul said he felt frustrated, reiterating the viewpoint of the Turkish Cypriots of feeling cheated.⁷³ Some have criticised the movement of the new AKP (Justice Party) as being indecisive in its position on Cyprus. The report written by the European Parliament by Camiel Eurlings in 2006 left a bitter taste in Turkey, as it laid the onus on them to reform in many aspects.⁷⁴

⁶⁸ Theophanous, 1999, 183

⁶⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3656753.stm> (accessed 16 September 2010)

⁷⁰ Guney, 2005, 287

⁷¹ www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-freeze-talks-on-turkey-membership-428085.html (accessed 9 January 2010)

⁷² www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-freeze-talks-on-turkey-membership-428085.html (accessed 9 January 2010)

⁷³ <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1868084.ece> (accessed 9 January 2010)

⁷⁴ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A6-2006-0269&type=REPORT> (accessed 16 September 2010)

The relationship between Greece and Turkey has been bitter for most of their history. It can be said much of this is based upon the way the two states formed. Greece had been part of the Ottoman Empire under the millet system, which was used to protect the various religious minorities.⁷⁵ The notion of nationalism rose in the Greek people from the Western world, who forced upon them the concept of Hellenism and being heirs of the Byzantine Empire.⁷⁶ The Greeks embraced this new identity and used it to exaggerate the misrule of the Ottomans, thus inciting rebellion.⁷⁷ In 1831 the Greek national state was founded, and since then Greek history books begin with the war for independence and the revival of the Megali idea.⁷⁸ The two greatest blows to Greece have been in 1922 when the Greeks lost heavily against the Turks and during the 1974 invasion of Cyprus.⁷⁹ Furthermore, the Treaty of Lausanne officially categorised the Greeks in Turkey as a minority and forced an exchange of populations, thus crushing any idea of a Greater Greece.⁸⁰ All this has led to a crisis in Greek identity and an inevitable nationalistic confrontation with Turkey, who had been portrayed as the aggressor.⁸¹ The armed conflicts that took place in 1912, 1918 and in 1920-22 sealed the possibility of reconciliation and increased the concept of 'the other'.⁸² There was a rapprochement engineered by Venizelos but this was shattered when Turkey stood aside when Nazi Germany invaded Greece. Many of the Greek novels are often based upon stereotypical views of the Turks, with many stories featuring the Turk taking 'our' women.⁸³ This type of literature has led to a group psychology but on an

⁷⁵ Millas, 2004, 57

⁷⁶ Itzkowitz, 1994, 178

⁷⁷ Millas, 2004, 55

⁷⁸ Millas, 2004, 54

⁷⁹ Itzkowitz, 1994, 184

⁸⁰ Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, 973

⁸¹ Aydin, 2004, 23

⁸² Heraclides, 2004, 67

⁸³ Millas, 2004, 57

individual basis interactions are better.⁸⁴ Thus those who are in power often determine the outlook that will be created.⁸⁵

The main reason for the hostility apart from historical tensions lay in the Aegean; namely air space, territorial waters, the continental shelf and the islands. These issues are important as they present strategic and economic gains and losses.⁸⁶ With regards to the airspace and territorial waters, the contention lies in the theoretical and legal application of laws. The 1982 law of the seas dealt with such issues, but had not been signed by Turkey.⁸⁷ The 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation stated the width of territorial waters determined the airspace a country legally had.⁸⁸ Greece had claimed ten miles of airspace over its six mile territorial waters; thus Turkey and other countries would regularly fly within the six miles of Greece.⁸⁹ Article 3 of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 stated twelve miles was the maximum a state could claim as territorial waters.⁹⁰ As Turkey did not sign this convention, Greece has not exercised this right and has remained within six miles of its territorial waters.⁹¹ Turkey sees this as unfair as it would severely limit their movement in the Aegean.⁹² The EU forced harsh rules upon Turkey, for threatening an EU member's territorial waters.⁹³ The Flight Information Responsibility (FIR) based on the International Civil

⁸⁴ Itzkowitz, 1994, 172

⁸⁵ Millas, 2004, 64

⁸⁶ Aydin, 2004, 27

⁸⁷ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (accessed 16 September 2010)

⁸⁸ http://www.icao.int/icao/net/arch/doc/7300/7300_1ed.pdf (accessed 16 September 2010)

⁸⁹ Aydin, 2004, 29

⁹⁰ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed 16 September 2010)

⁹¹ Bahceli, 2004, 99

⁹² Itzkowitz, 1994, 167

⁹³ Itzkowitz, 1994, 170

Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has placed the duty on the Greeks, who have been accused of watching Turkish movements in the Aegean.⁹⁴

The issue of the Aegean's continental shelf is also a heated contention. Turkey has been willing to negotiate distribution and at first Greece accepted this, but then rejected it calling for the matter to be dealt by the International Court of Justice.⁹⁵ In 1987 the dispute nearly led to an outbreak of war, but relations cooled through the Davos talks, though the position remained the same.⁹⁶ As of yet, no oil has been found in the Aegean but if it had the quiet disagreement would quickly fire up as both countries have not signed a delimitation agreement in maritime borders.⁹⁷

Dispute has also arisen in regard to the islands scattered around the Aegean. The Treaty of Lausanne established that 2,200 islands would be part of Greece, whilst the islands closer to Turkey would be in their possession, with the islands east of the Aegean being de-militarised for fifty years.⁹⁸ In 1996, a Turkish cargo vessel passed some rocks and this quickly led to both countries laying claim to ownership of the rocks.⁹⁹ Frogmen and troops were sent by both countries, escalating matters till the US and NATO intervened and prevented further action.¹⁰⁰ Here, the military weakness of the EU was clear, as it was unable to calm the nations.¹⁰¹ Since 1996, hundreds of islands have become grey areas.¹⁰² The placing of s-300 anti-aircraft

⁹⁴ Aydin, 2004, 30

⁹⁵ Itzkowitz, 1994, 166

⁹⁶ Aydin, 2004, 31-32

⁹⁷ Aydin, 2004, 28

⁹⁸ Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, 964-965

⁹⁹ Itzkowitz, 1994, 169

¹⁰⁰ Itzkowitz, 1994, 169

¹⁰¹ Bachard, 1998, 28

¹⁰² Itzkowitz, 1994, 169

surface-to-air missiles in Cyprus did not help the situation.¹⁰³ According to some, Turkey is superior in its military capability and is less obsessed about Greece's military capacity, making more attempts at dialogue.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, the fact is Greece has many Muslim neighbours; the Turkic connection between them, as shown in the 1990s with the Bosnia crisis, has increased their fear.¹⁰⁵ Any step to move away from the status quo position will be interpreted as appeasement, anti-nationalistic and a weakness.¹⁰⁶ Thus, Turkey and Greece are forced to continue this game, until their people are ready to re-dress their history and engage.

Turkey's Economy

Another reason why the case for Turkey has been set back is the economic position of the country. Although currently this reason is less important, during the early stages of the EU bid it was an integral impediment as its weak economy was potentially destabilising for the EU. The early Republic was still under the influence of Kemalist principles such as statism, which placed emphasis on industrial planning which was inevitably state run.¹⁰⁷ The relationship with foreign states including Great Britain was reduced through strict foreign exchange, import controls and high import duties.¹⁰⁸ This constrained economic progression and by 1957 Turkey faced a macroeconomic crisis.¹⁰⁹ In 1960, the State Planning Organisation (SPO), chaired by the Prime Minister, supervised the economy over a five year period, resulting in an economic-political entanglement.¹¹⁰ The labour versus capital argument continued

¹⁰³ Itzkowitz, 1994, 171

¹⁰⁴ Heraclides, 2004, 69

¹⁰⁵ Aydin, 2004, 41-42

¹⁰⁶ Itzkowitz, 1994, 164

¹⁰⁷ Hale, 1984, 108

¹⁰⁸ Hale, 1984, 108

¹⁰⁹ Sunar, 1996, 119

¹¹⁰ Ahmed, 2003, 124

until in the 1970s the military intervened and decided progress was to be made through a capitalist way.¹¹¹ With the onset of Turkish workers moving to Germany for industrial work, the manufacturing sector improved whilst the agrarian developed more slowly.¹¹² The oil shock in 1973-1974 and the invasion of Cyprus led to the EU placing strict sanctions upon Turkey, thus slowing down economic growth and the bid for membership.¹¹³ The Association Agreement was signed in 1963 and if a Customs Union was to follow, Turkey had to abolish its customs duties and align with EU policies.¹¹⁴ As Sunar rightly points out, the reforms that have taken place in Turkey have often been inconsistent and the pull of past regimes will hinder attempts at liberalism.¹¹⁵ The non-performance of some EU policies has meant reduction in only two tariffs at ten percent.¹¹⁶ It should be noted that through the 1980s, the state subsidy system began to reduce and Turkey pursued an export orientated economic policy.¹¹⁷

A key cause of the fluctuation in the Turkish economy has been the imbalance in redistributing wealth and reducing rising inflation. For example, the Southeast region has always been neglected for political reasons and this lack of development reduced investment opportunities and thus increased unemployment.¹¹⁸ The rural workforce was much larger than any other workforce and yet income levels were much lower, which meant the GDP per capita was still low at \$4,260 as compared to Greece

¹¹¹ Sunar, 1996, 146

¹¹² Ahmed, 2003, 125

¹¹³ Ahmed, 2003, 146

¹¹⁴ Kramer, 1996, 204

¹¹⁵ Sunar, 1996, 149

¹¹⁶ Kramer, 1996, 207

¹¹⁷ Spencer, 1993, 12

¹¹⁸ Spencer, 1993, 11

\$10,960 in 1990.¹¹⁹ As tariff reduction was taking longer to implement as some sectors such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals were more difficult to reduce,¹²⁰ the prospect of a Customs Union was being pushed further back. The EU policy changed after 1975 as it now had security concerns, and so it introduced a ‘global Mediterranean policy’ offering trade concessions.¹²¹ As Turkey received less than it expected, President Ozal and the businesses exerted efforts towards the Muslim world, to show their dissatisfaction.¹²² The problem of inflation still held Turkey back from optimising its economic performance. A key reason for the persistent high inflation was due to tax evasion, low taxation¹²³ and inefficiency in the public sector.¹²⁴ The increase of inflation from the 1990s from 50% to 80% by 2003 shows the Treasury did not account for all its debt.¹²⁵ The lack of transparency and accountability in debt management will encourage foreign investment, and with the new debt law this is positive progress.¹²⁶ In 1996 the national deficit increased but in 1997 an increase in exports meant the deficit was reduced.¹²⁷ Many are waiting for Turkey to show a strong commitment and implementation of EU policies.¹²⁸

Another issue is the integration and competition of Turkish agriculture within EU markets. The agriculture sector employs around 26 % of the national work force

¹¹⁹ http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?country=TR&indicatorid=19 (accessed 7 September 2010)

¹²⁰ Kramer, 1996, 212

¹²¹ <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/promoting-neighbourhood/mediterranean/#h2-2> (accessed 17 September 2010)

¹²² Kramer, 1996, 208-209

¹²³ Kramer, 2000, 16

¹²⁴ Kramer, 2000, 13

¹²⁵ Klingen, 1984, 33

¹²⁶ Lim, 1984, 40

¹²⁷ Itzkowitz, 1994, 188

¹²⁸ Itzkowitz, 1994, 201

whilst representing 9% of the GDP.¹²⁹ The size of Turkey's GDP and farming sector will mean larger funds would be allocated to Turkey, so for example five percent of the current GDP of Turkey would lead to €9 billion in structural funds.¹³⁰ Such vast amounts of funds being directed to one country has led to a questioning of whether the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) should be extended to Turkey.

Human Rights

Another issue faced by Turkey in its bid to become an EU member is of human rights. Article six of the EU conditions for enlargement specifies very directly, "The Union shall respect...Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950."¹³¹ This shows human rights have to be dealt with before Turkey can hope for membership. Whilst it may be an insignificant reason for others to see, the EU principles are a reflection of collective norms; thus integration of these policies can be said to be part of 'Europeaness.' For Turkey, the issue of human rights is the insecurity Turkey has with itself; any questioning of government actions are quickly labelled as being rebellious or pro-Kurdish.¹³² By the 1980s, Turkey was willing to accept scrutiny by the EU as the Balfe report in 1985 discussed the major barriers to membership now being moral principles such as maintaining human rights.¹³³ Furthermore, a report by the EC in 1999 criticised Turkey's lack of implementation, stating, "There has been no evolution of the situation in Turkey with regard to human rights and minority problems."¹³⁴ This was a reference to the 'deep

¹²⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/enlargement/countries/turkey/profile_en.pdf (accessed 25 September 2010)

¹³⁰ EU-Turkey Working Papers, number 6 August 2004, 4

¹³¹ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C_2002325EN.000501.html (accessed 7 January 2010)

¹³² Langhorne, 1996, 30-31

¹³³ <http://www.ena.lu/> (accessed 16 September 2010)

¹³⁴ European Commission Regular Report, 1999, 751

state'¹³⁵ Turkey continues to deny, as even though the 1982 Constitution reversed many of the freedoms that had been suppressed, those higher up in the government did not heed the new laws.¹³⁶ Many Commission officials recognised the progress that had been made but stressed that if Turkey did not address its human rights situation, promised aid would not be sent.¹³⁷ The Turkish Human Rights Association was founded in 1986 and since then has gained much international support, and has criticised many of the torture techniques committed by the Police force.¹³⁸ A new demand within Turkey led to a full re-dress of the situation and the AKP government sought to tackle the issue institutionally, through the police academies, thus breaking the circle.¹³⁹ The number of cases of people dying in Police custody was decreasing even though 692 cases were filed in the first six months of 2004.¹⁴⁰ Unfortunately, the case of human rights being violated is not unique to Turkey but several EU members such as Bulgaria and Romania are known to have a bad record too.¹⁴¹ These double standards of allowing such countries to enter without penalising or slowing their membership process do not encourage Turkey to tackle the issue.¹⁴² Thus it can be said the issue of human rights is as important as the EU wishes to make it, as ultimately no country can completely rid itself of human rights violations. Although Turkey paid less attention to human rights during the early years of the EU relationship, it has since sought to challenge these discrepancies. This will take time, as do all deep-rooted issues, though it would be unfair to hold Turkey back on this point.

¹³⁵ 'Deep state': Conspiracy theory subscribed to by some analysts that speculates about the existence of a 'state within a state' influencing Turkish politics and decision making.

¹³⁶ Spencer, 1993, 9-10

¹³⁷ Bachard, 1998, 7

¹³⁸ Kramer, 2000, 20

¹³⁹ Morris, 2005, 137

¹⁴⁰ Morris, 2005, 137-138

¹⁴¹ Bac, 1999, 255

¹⁴² Morris, 2005, 137

To conclude, it is clear there have been several key issues which have prevented Turkey from benefiting fully from the EU. The stranglehold of the military in Turkish politics has meant a lack of transparency and development in politics and parties within Turkey. However, it cannot be said that Turkey stands alone in this dilemma; during Greece's accession period the situation was similar as was the case with Spain and Portugal. Thus it does remain an anomaly that Turkey's military was used to retard progress in the EU membership process. With this said, the presence of the military has been reduced significantly and Turkish politics has now begun to understand the importance of liberal democracy and real unhindered civil leadership. The Kurdish issue is also a reason that was a major impediment in the 1980s, mainly due to the violent clashes between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces. Though support was not unanimous on both sides, this era began to subside and allowed a fresh approach to Turkish-Kurdish relations. It must be said, with the relaxation of the military presence in politics, Kurdish cultural and political movements have grown and the implicit recognition of a separate but equal culture had reduced the possibility of violent clashes. Turkey's human rights record was rightly criticised by the EU and inhumane treatment of people held by the police should be condemned. In response to open criticism, Turkey attempted to deal with the issue by setting up new watchdogs though the challenge of wiping out the deep-state will take much longer. The economy in the early period was also weak and an important reason to sour EU-Turkish relations. However, just as other hopeful states were given financial aid to help their transition to liberalising policies, Turkey should have also been a partner. That is not to say they received no concessions. However, the extent and lack of encouragement up till the 1990s is clear. The success of implementing new policies

paid off and Turkey can now boast a booming and varied economy. What remain the key issues to preventing Turkey from entering the EU are the situation in Cyprus and Turkey's relations with Greece. The 1974 invasion of Cyprus will not be forgotten by the Greek Cypriots and Greece, and the fact Turkey remains firm in its support of the TRNC, a state that is not recognised in international law cannot be taken lightly. However, prestige is at stake and Turkey will not remove its troops unless an island agreement is made, which would no longer happen since the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus has gained the invaluable membership of the EU. The recent relationship with Greece has been better than the previous thirty years. Many of the disagreements, although not settled, have not been brought to the fore. This is wise politics from both sides and since Greece ended its constant veto in 1999, Turkey has progressed in its membership with the EU. Thus it seems the previous reasons by which Turkey was being halted such as the military, the Kurdish issue, human rights and economics have now been submerged. Turkey's strange obsession with Cyprus and its fluctuating relationship with Greece are considerations the EU will take into account before it resumes membership talks with Turkey.

II

TURKEY AND THE WORLD AROUND IT

This chapter will explore the interaction and relationship between Turkey and the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. It is important to understand the influences from the pre-independence periods of these regional modern states to explain the mindset from which these states have chosen to react to situations within the region. The historical, political and economic relationship has fluctuated over the centuries and recent conflicts have forced open the debate as to the reason for such violent outbursts. Whilst some lay the blame on religion, others have pointed to ethnic differences, and yet others recount history to provide a more encompassing explanation. The chapter will attempt to briefly explain the history of the three regions from the Ottoman period up till modern times. The conflicts that have taken place will be explored along with the core issues relating to them. The place of Turkey in these regions will be analysed to show the motives Turkey is driven by to participate as a regional player. Furthermore, this will help us to understand the regional importance of Turkey and its true place within the world and especially its relationship with Europe.

Ottoman Period

The presence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans began from the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, and despite the end result being a draw, it opened the region to Ottoman influence.¹ In 1463 and 1482, Bosnia and Herzegovina converted to Islam voluntarily

¹ Friedman, 1996, 16

on a mass scale.² The fact the region was granted full hereditary rights for its nobles, shows the importance and respect given on the part of the Ottomans.³ In 1528, Croatia was also incorporated and the region was given much autonomy with regards to its administration and law.⁴ The fact many Grand Viziers were in general of Balkan descent,⁵ reinforced the relationship between the Sultan and the region, indicating a natural affinity due to ethnic similarity. Friedman claims the reason for the weakening of Ottoman rule in the Balkans can be explained by the structural problem of non-Muslim allegiance being re-directed from the Sultan to the Patriarch and local administration.⁶ Rather, the weakness lay in the fact tolerance of different religious and ethnic groups was no longer maintained, and with the dawn of 'nationalism' these lines were drawn harder. With external compromises being made such as with Russia in 1774 to give access to the Straits and Black Sea for trade purposes,⁷ it was clear the Ottomans would soon lose their stronghold. As Russia modernised in the nineteenth century, it sought expansion at the expense of the Ottomans.⁸ In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Balkans had begun to disintegrate into *de facto* separate states; Montenegro, Serbia and Romania claimed independence.⁹ In 1878 Bulgaria declared independence from the Ottoman Empire and Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by the Hapsburg Empire.¹⁰ Despite the loss of these states, the cultural Ottoman influence on the region was visible and echoed throughout the period to come.¹¹

Twentieth Century-1900-1950

² Hupchick, 2002, 154

³ Hupchick, 2002, 153

⁴ Murvar, 1989, 21

⁵ Murvar, 1989, 40

⁶ Friedman, 1996, 31

⁷ Eren, 1977, 11

⁸ Eren, 1977, 14-15

⁹ Winrow, 1993, 10

¹⁰ Hupchick, 2002, 279

¹¹ Winrow, 1993, 10

During the twentieth century the Balkans was being used in various ways by other regional powers to fulfil their own ambitions. The first Balkan war of 1912 instigated by Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece (the Balkan League) was an attempt to gain independence and territory from the Ottomans.¹² The second Balkan (1913) war saw the switching of sides with the Ottomans opportunistically joining Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania to thwart Bulgaria's expansionism.¹³ The beginning of World War I meant great chaos and the crumbling Ottoman Empire foolishly sided with Germany, eventually being humiliated when the Central Powers were defeated in 1918.¹⁴ Such an unwise decision further confirmed for the Kemalists to break away from the Sultan and establish a new Western style state that later became inward looking.¹⁵ This meant the new movement was geared towards establishing inner security and thus there was less focus on foreign relations.

The new leader of the Turkish people Mustafa Kemal was preoccupied with maintaining Anatolia and establishing sovereignty there for Turkey.¹⁶ By defeating the Greeks, this allowed Russia to dominate Yugoslavia and Albania, for Ataturk believed in 'peace home, peace abroad', thus he was less interested.¹⁷ After the Turco-Soviet treaty of 1921, relations between the two states were generally peaceful.¹⁸ In 1936, Turkey signed the Monteux convention, which principally meant the Straits would be open to all maritime powers though Turkey would have first consideration on military security.¹⁹ By 1939, Stalin began to demand the Straits plus some territory on the

¹² Rankin, 1914, 240

¹³ Winrow, 1993, 10

¹⁴ Ahmed, 1993, 40

¹⁵ Ahmed, 1993, 33

¹⁶ Winrow, 1993, 10

¹⁷ Winrow, 1993, 12

¹⁸ League of Nations, 1936, 225

¹⁹ Atlantic Papers, 1977, 11

borders they shared in the South.²⁰ During the Cold War, the Balkan states were used as an inter-bloc between the superpowers, as South-Eastern Europe was an internally stable region, though later this changed.²¹

1950 to the Present

The dynamic of the Soviet Empire's bloc was such that the states inside the 'Union' were denied any nationalist desires until the Empire collapsed. This unnatural situation later erupted into a surge of nationalism as is evident in the 1990s, especially with the Yugoslavia civil war. The policy of Turkey in this period was one of non-interest despite the Muslim presence in the Balkans, as Turkey was still coming to terms with itself as a new state.²² By the 1980s, Turkey became more interested as the Turkish minority in Bulgaria were being persecuted on an ethnic basis and forced assimilation was taking place.²³ The situation in Bulgaria was dire; mosques were being closed down and propaganda was spread that Bulgarians had been forced to convert to Islam in the centuries before.²⁴ Many Turks had been deported, their land confiscated and the Turkish language was banned from being spoken.²⁵ Through pressure from Turkey, Bulgaria was forced to re-think its policies as Turkey was in a better position to exert influence. Accepting the influx of Turks that fled Bulgaria and Turkey demanding rights be given, Bulgaria began to reverse the situation by re-opening the mosques and lifting the language ban.²⁶ By the early 1990s, Bulgaria was progressing in its reform and it was becoming more democratic through new political

²⁰ Atlantic Papers, 1977, 15-16

²¹ Karaosmanoglu, 2006, 188

²² Karaosmanoglu, 2006, 188

²³ Winrow, 1993, 13

²⁴ Eminov, 1997, 52

²⁵ Karpat, 1990, 19-20

²⁶ Eminov, 1997, 63

groups forming such as the MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedom).²⁷ In 1992, Bulgaria also agreed to remove its troops from Thrace persuading Turkey to remove two of its battalions from the border.²⁸

By this time, Europe had realised its stability was intertwined with that of Eastern Europe's; thus it began to pay attention to the region.²⁹ In 1976, the Balkan conference was attended by all the Balkan states except Albania, though little was achieved as the recent Cyprus invasion by Turkey led to cautious behaviour by other states.³⁰ The situation after the Cold War marked the beginning of a new conflict; this time between the Balkan states themselves. The atrocities that took place in former Yugoslavia in Serbia's desire for a greater Serbia shocked the world, though the reaction was still divided.³¹ Thousands fled from the ethnic cleansing, the land was ravaged with sixty percent of housing being destroyed.³² The cause for such an outburst has been explained in three ways; the first being from the viewpoint of the Balkans suggests that nationalist conflicts arose due to the ambitions of external powers to exert influence. The second reason was the supposed unavoidable clash of civilisations of Islam versus Christianity. The third cause is seen from the West that the 'return of ancestral hatreds' led to the conflict.³³

Turkey saw three options in dealing with the situation: firstly it could directly intervene since Bulgaria rejected it permission to enter its territory. Secondly, Turkey could remain totally passive, but this was not an option as there was uproar in the

²⁷ Winrow, 1993, 23

²⁸ Winrow, 1993, 15

²⁹ Karaosmanoglu, 2006, 189

³⁰ Winrow, 1993, 28

³¹ Hammel, 2000, 34

³² UNCHR, 2009, 2

³³ Anderson, 1996, xiii-xiv

country.³⁴ The third possibility was to remain cautious for fear of being labelled ‘neo-Ottoman’, thus Turkey condemned the violence through the United Nations.³⁵ In Turkey, there is a large community of Albanians and Bosnians;³⁶ thus the connection was clear, reinforced by the fact there was the Turkic connection. Thus Turkey pushed for more action through the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) meetings.³⁷ Turkey also actively joined an arms embargo against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent the US continued its embargo, whilst Bosnia became a UN no-fly zone.³⁸

The Dayton agreement, which formally ended the Yugoslavia civil wars, was intrinsically flawed as it allowed Serb and Croat leaders to set the terms, which was unfair considering ethnic cleansing was part of their policies.³⁹ Later Yugoslavia was placed under international sanctions, though this led to violence and a refugee influx into Macedonia from Kosovo.⁴⁰ Many excused themselves from realising Bosnia had coexisted in a multi-ethnic region for centuries. However, now the violence broke out due to ultra-nationalistic desires.⁴¹ Progress and reconciliation would not come about unless the perpetrators were punished and there was a full acknowledgment of the war crimes.⁴² The policy of Turkey was to conform to what other states did; thus they had first recognised Yugoslavia and when it broke up, Turkey also recognised the newly formed successor states.⁴³ The international commission rightly asserts the major mistakes of the West were the lack of understanding of the conflict, and the fact they

³⁴ Winrow, 1993, 17

³⁵ Winrow, 1993, 16

³⁶ Anderson, 1996, xxiv

³⁷ Winrow, 1993, 18

³⁸ <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb050102.htm> (accessed 14 September 2010)

³⁹ Kurspahic, 2006, 82

⁴⁰ Cameron, 2006, 99

⁴¹ Kurspahic, 2006, 79

⁴² Kurspahic, 2006, 83

⁴³ Karaosmanoglu, 2006, 189

did not want to get involved militarily until the end when the US led NATO air force intervened.⁴⁴ Thirdly, they defined the conflict as a humanitarian crisis rather than stating the obvious that it was blatant aggression.⁴⁵

In Kosovo, the world failed to help the people, and only at the end did NATO become involved by bombing Serbian camps.⁴⁶ Thus it can be said the atrocities that took place in the Balkans in the 1990s were one of the worst episodes of ethnic cleansing of the twentieth century, not because of the extent of the ruthlessness to wipe out a people, but due to the reluctance of the world to act against the perpetrators. The role of Turkey was minimal even though it wanted to be more involved; as it would be misinterpreted by many as having another agenda. Thus, it acted through the various organisations, namely the UN and NATO.⁴⁷

Economics

Since the end of the formal crisis in the Balkans, there is now a need to create stability through economic and political development. As Shasko correctly asserts, the treaties that were made can only be significant if the society sees the benefit in its economy.⁴⁸ Such theories of Pan-Turkism⁴⁹ must be sidelined to focus on the real agenda of rebuilding the Balkans. In June 1992, the Turkish initiative of Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC) was formed, which included Russia, Ukraine,

⁴⁴ Anderson, 1996, 57

⁴⁵ Anderson, 1996, 60

⁴⁶ Cameron, 2006, 101

⁴⁷ Karaosmanoglu, 2006, 189

⁴⁸ Shashko, 2006, 219

⁴⁹ Winrow, 1993, 22

Moldova, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Albania.⁵⁰ Its aims were to promote the circulation of goods, services, inter-governmental cooperation in transport, energy, agriculture, tourism, as well as encouraging non-governmental organisations too.⁵¹ This led to friendship treaties between Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey, with joint ventures in culture, science and the environment.⁵² In 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Summit held in Sarajevo was beneficial in encouraging democracy and development.⁵³ Turkey is also building economic ties with Bulgaria and Albania, which is positive and beneficial for both sides.⁵⁴ In terms of transporting Caspian energy to the West, these states are key to European defence and stability.⁵⁵ Thus the EU should not be restrictive in the way it can financially support their development.⁵⁶ It is a positive sign that Macedonia has applied to join the EU, whilst Albania and Bosnia are on the way to stabilisation and the Association Agreement.⁵⁷ This demonstrates it had taken Europe much longer to lead the way in the Balkans, as up till 2003 NATO had been the policing force till the EU assumed this duty in Bosnia and Macedonia.⁵⁸ Moreover, the military presence is now being used for civil purposes so as to lessen the disruption of downsizing.⁵⁹

It is clear the economic incentive acts for both the Balkans and Europe, as security is based on the stability of neighbouring states. With the possibility of oil and gas being transported to Western Europe, the major organisations need to keep faith with the

⁵⁰ <http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx> (accessed 1 September 2010)

⁵¹ <http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx> (accessed 1 September 2010)

⁵² Shashko, 2006, 211

⁵³ <http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp> (accessed 14 September 2010)

⁵⁴ Anderson, 1996, 146

⁵⁵ Karaosmanoglu, 2006, 193

⁵⁶ Shashko, 2006, 219

⁵⁷ Cameron, 2006, 99

⁵⁸ Karaosmonoglu, 2006, 101

⁵⁹ http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15:eufor-fact-sheet&catid=185:about-eufor&Itemid=134 (accessed 28 July 2010)

Balkan states and ease it into a new world of industrial development. Turkey's role here is significant, as it can act as a bridge between East and West. Turkey can act as a 'big brother' state that can help the Balkan states to emulate and learn progressively. This would also mean a development of democracy, which is useful for the EU considering the energy potential in the region. The shared regional, ethnic and religious factors no doubt influence Turkey's movement and these are positive guides. The new regional assertiveness of Turkey is also important as it will ensure stability and prevent any violent conflicts breaking out.

The Caucasus and Central Asia

With the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in 1989-91, the states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, previously belonging to the Soviet bloc, had begun to declare their independence by joining the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO).⁶⁰ It is true smaller states are often more susceptible to the influence of larger states,⁶¹ and this is also clear in the case of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The foreign policy of Turkey in this region is reflective of its history as well as a need to secure energy supplies.⁶² Geographically, the Caucasus has the Black Sea as its opening and Central Asia only has access from the Caspian Sea; thus the Caucasus would naturally orientate itself towards Turkey and Europe.⁶³ Both these close regions have similar tribal style loyalties, with Central Asia's ethnicity being mostly Turkic and mostly Muslim in religious background,⁶⁴ whereas the Caucasus has a greater Christian population.⁶⁵ In 1993, these states all joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),

⁶⁰ Winrow, 1997, (b) 182

⁶¹ Robins, 1994, (a) 57

⁶² Harris, 2006, 259-260

⁶³ Mozaffari, 1997, 8

⁶⁴ Robins, 1994, (a) 60-61

⁶⁵ Mozaffari, 1997, (a) 8

successor to the USSR, to ensure economic and military protection from each other.⁶⁶ In June 1992, the countries signed an agreement to assure free movement of goods, with Turkey taking charge of the secretariat and managing the data centre.⁶⁷ It is clear Turkey is seeking to forge a relationship with the Caucasus and Central Asia partly for the sake of increasing its regional strength to enhance its importance for the EU.⁶⁸ The economic relationship that is being developed will deepen the regional integration and since Turkey will be a key player in achieving this, it will become the long term reciprocator of the benefits too. Greater regional importance would increase international prestige, thus strengthening Turkey's case for its desire to join the EU.

Geography

In terms of geography, Turkey shares few direct borders and this has hindered its relationship with the region. Furthermore, it has allowed other regional players such as Iran to enter the arena,⁶⁹ as Iran shares borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan.⁷⁰ Thus, Turkey and Iran are both vying for stability and prosperity by exerting influence on their neighbours.⁷¹ However, it was Turkey who first recognised the newly formed states and established its embassies in the countries;⁷² a clear mark of Turkish intentions to build a close relationship. Armenia and Georgia are the only countries that border Turkey, and in August 1995 Turkey opened the Georgia-Turkey border gate at Turkgozu to avoid using Iranian territory for passage.⁷³ In 1992, the first Turkic summit was held in Turkey with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

⁶⁶ Mozaffari, 1997, (a) 13

⁶⁷ Winrow, 1997 (b), 184

⁶⁸ Poorsoltan, 1993, 182

⁶⁹ Robins, 1994, (a) 64

⁷⁰ Mozaffari, 1997, (a) 21

⁷¹ Calabrese, 1998, 75

⁷² Winrow, 1997, (b) 109

⁷³ Mozaffari, 1997, 18

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan attending.⁷⁴ Although President Ozal was hopeful and boasted many promises of aid and development, the result was less impressive as Turkey was not in a financial position to be supporting other states.⁷⁵ Since Turkey was distant in geographical terms, it pursued other means such as communication with the PTT, a public sector telecommunication company that provided free public telephone exchanges for five of the republics.⁷⁶ In Turkmenistan, forty Turkish companies have been established, and over seventy percent of contracts to the West have been taken up by Turkey.⁷⁷ In 1993, Turkey was the biggest provider of technical and financial support to Turkmenistan, with Turkish investors settling firmly in the country.⁷⁸ The Turkish pipeline company BOTAS has secured a long term contract with Turkmenistan,⁷⁹ which will include 4000 km of pipelines running through Iran, which has been concluded with success.⁸⁰ Turkey and Azerbaijan have a close relationship despite the distance as it has most similarity in language and culture.⁸¹ Thus Turkey supported the Azeris in their Nagorna-Karabagh conflict with Armenia.⁸² In 1995, Turkey created a Ministership to deal with the affairs in the Turkic states,⁸³ which shows the official importance placed upon Turkey's connections with the Caucasus and Central Asia. Despite all this, Russia will always be dominating, as all the CIS have signed bilateral security treaties with Russia.⁸⁴ Russia should not be alarmed as the export trade with Turkey in 1994 was only 2.5%,

⁷⁴ Winrow, 1997 (b) 110

⁷⁵ Wirminghaus, 1997, 76-77

⁷⁶ Robins, 1994, (a) 73

⁷⁷ Robins, 1994, (a) 74

⁷⁸ Wirminghaus, 1997, 77

⁷⁹ Hacisalihoglu, 2008, 869

⁸⁰ Wirminghaus, 1997, 78

⁸¹ Ataov, 2006, 101

⁸² Poorsoltan, 1993, 181

⁸³ Winrow, 1997, (b) 112

⁸⁴ Mozaffari, 1997, (a) 9

a figure of \$ 310.8 million, whereas export trade was around 20% with Russia.⁸⁵ Turkey has also confirmed trading deals with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, thus showing a steady progression in establishing a wide economic sphere for Turkey.⁸⁶ In 2001, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a long-term contract that will transport gas over 1050 miles, with the possibility of extending it further to Europe.⁸⁷

All this shows Turkey's new dynamism with inter-regional trade booming and it is using its geography to its benefit.⁸⁸ Turkey realises there is some potential in the region due to the naturally rich countries. Moreover, Turkey has also been able to gain strength in Central Asia due to its cultural links and Turkic common factor. The CIS see Turkey as a model by which to progress. The fact that the Caucasus and Central Asian states are restricted in their water access means Turkey is a useful neighbour to have, thus increasing Turkey's international credibility.

The Middle East and its Ottoman Past

It is clear past history had steered much of the modern discourse, with the Ottoman Empire complexes still influencing contemporary decisions. Since the 1960s onwards and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab states were able to re-assess their position with Turkey. With pro-Islam leaders, Turkey sought more economic trade with the Middle East. The Gulf War strained relations due to external influences and pressure. However, despite this Turkey is seeking more closeness with the various states. The relationship will always be susceptible to weaknesses but it seems relations will improve over the coming years.

⁸⁵ Winrow, 1997 (b) 116

⁸⁶ Ataov, 2006, 110-112

⁸⁷ Hacisalihoglu, 2008, 1871

⁸⁸ Ataov, 2006, 115

Turkey shares borders with several Middle East countries, which in the past has led to irredentist claims and border disputes, namely involving Syria and producing the Hatay settlement.⁸⁹ Since World War II Turkey has not suffered any major physical or human destruction,⁹⁰ whilst the Middle East has been a Cold War cauldron, creating lasting divisions in the Arab world between the pro-Western regimes such as Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf states on the one hand and the likes of Syria on the other.⁹¹ It is clear relations will never be fully reciprocal as both the Arab states and Turkey are currently pursuing strong nationalist policies.⁹² However, now that Turkey has begun to accept its own Ottoman history and is relaxed about its own position, it is able to re-assess its regional relations.⁹³ The links that Turkey is pursuing with Israel and NATO have created suspicion from the Arab states,⁹⁴ reminiscent of Ottoman rule over the Arabs. In the same way, Turkey has not forgotten during the First World War, when the Arabs revolted for their own territorial ambitions.⁹⁵ Thus, Turkey has kept its distance from the Middle East, as history has left an uneasy feeling from both sides of the Middle East.⁹⁶ As Robins correctly states, the way Turkey continues its policies in the Middle East, the Arab states will react accordingly.⁹⁷ The Cold War was unfortunate in terms of the relations between Turkey and the Arab states, as some states were on the 'opposite side' with the Soviet Union, whilst Turkey aligned with the US.⁹⁸ Since the end of the Cold War, there has been

⁸⁹ Robins, 1991, 48

⁹⁰ Mango, 1992, 56

⁹¹ Robins, 1991, 49

⁹² Mango, 1992, 67

⁹³ Fuller, 1998, 212

⁹⁴ Barkey, 1996, 36

⁹⁵ Birand, 1998, 171

⁹⁶ Birand, 1998, 171

⁹⁷ Robins, 1991, 68

⁹⁸ Benli, 2006, 230

more room to manoeuvre and relations have changed in many ways.⁹⁹ The last few years have seen increased trade and tourism with the Middle East as a whole, with free visas being offered to increase tourism which promotes a better regional understanding.¹⁰⁰

Foreign Relations

From the perspective of Turkey, many of its elite believe their country has a role to play in the Middle East through diplomacy to begin to reduce problems.¹⁰¹ One of the main approaches is by showing itself as a model by which the Arab states can modernise,¹⁰² though hindrances with regard to Syria are clear. Turkey has built two dams, the Keban in 1964 and the Karakya in 1987, which re-direct water from the Euphrates to Turkey.¹⁰³ This has further been aggravated by the Turkish Southeast Anatolian Project, which has reduced the quality and quantity of water that Syria and Iraq receive.¹⁰⁴ Eventually a protocol was achieved where Turkey promised to guarantee at least 500m³ per second of water to Syria.¹⁰⁵ In 1996 Turkey then signed a military and education training agreement with Israel to which Syria felt encircled and led to a worsening of relations.¹⁰⁶ By 1998, both countries were on the brink of war but within the same year the issues were resolved in the Adana agreement.¹⁰⁷ Syria has pursued a regional tact by solidifying its relations with Egypt, and has also improved relations with Greece and Iran, leaving Turkey feeling threatened.¹⁰⁸ After

⁹⁹ Benli, 2006, 234

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkeys-visa-policy-has-turkey-given-up-its-demand-of-free-movement-in-the-eu-2010-02-14> (accessed 24 September 2010)

¹⁰¹ Aras, 2005, 89-90

¹⁰² Aras, 2005, 90

¹⁰³ Muslih, 1998, 121

¹⁰⁴ Barkey, 1996, 37

¹⁰⁵ Robins, 1991, 52

¹⁰⁶ Yari, 1990, 49

¹⁰⁷ Tur, 2006, 229

¹⁰⁸ Benli, 2006, 235

11th September 2001, the Middle East became the centre of attention and aggression. The Prime Minister Ecevit was pro-Islam and thus attempted to settle differences, to which Syria welcomed.¹⁰⁹ A trade agreement was signed in 2004 which is beneficial for Turkey as Syria could become an outlet for exporting Turkish goods to the Arab world.¹¹⁰

Turkey's relationship with Israel dates as far back as 1950 then being the only Muslim country to recognise the legitimacy of the state.¹¹¹ However, by 1988, Turkey also became the only NATO member to recognise the Palestinian state,¹¹² thus showing the fine balance Turkey has been keeping in the Israel-Palestine dispute. Being in such a position has privileged Turkey to be one of the few to openly criticise Israel's actions, such as the taking of East Jerusalem in 1980.¹¹³ Maintaining such connections has created suspicion from Arab states and thus relations with Turkey have been shallow.¹¹⁴ Pahlavan correctly asserts bridges can be built once the Arab world has a united outlook, and that Turkey's negotiating capacity should not be overlooked.¹¹⁵ Turkey has recently shown its ability to be firm regarding the Gaza Freedom Flotilla killings by Israelis forces, which has severely strained Turkish-Israeli relations.¹¹⁶

Relations with Iraq are somewhat different as Iraq is land locked and thus must seek peaceful relations with its neighbours.¹¹⁷ In 1984, Iraq allowed Turkish forces 'hot

¹⁰⁹ Tur, 2006, 238

¹¹⁰ Leverett, 2005, 118

¹¹¹ Sayari, 1997, 46

¹¹² Sayari, 1997, 50

¹¹³ Muslih, 1996, 118

¹¹⁴ Barkey, 1996, 33

¹¹⁵ Pahlavan, 1996, 215-216

¹¹⁶ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/09/turkey-israel-gaza-flotilla-row> (14 September 2010)

¹¹⁷ Robins, 1991, 58

pursuit' of the PKK as both countries have sizeable Kurdish presence and both countries see this as potentially destabilising.¹¹⁸ During the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey acted as a transit country to Iraqi export goods to the Arab world.¹¹⁹ In the Gulf War Turkey was placed in a difficult position as to whether it should close the oil pipeline that runs between Iraq and Turkey.¹²⁰ However, the UN had condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 3rd August 1990, which allowed Turkey to condemn Iraq with international backing.¹²¹ The traditional approach by Turkey has been cautious, but as the Gulf crisis continued, President Ozal sought to reap the benefits and allowed foreign bases to establish in Turkey.¹²² Turkey also offered its troops to protect Saudi Arabia, but they rejected the offer, showing the old resentments were still present.¹²³

Relations with Iran have stretched out for many centuries from the Safavid and Ottoman Empires, with many highs and lows. The twentieth century saw the creation of the republics of both Iran and Turkey, with an attempt to clearly demarcate the separate places of religion and the state.¹²⁴ After the Iranian revolution in 1979, existing problems of the Kurds, Azerbaijan and Iranian immigrants were exacerbated.¹²⁵ In 1999, there were allegations that Turkish aircraft had bombed Iranian soil, which led to much hype, though the matter was resolved as the investigation concluded it was accidental.¹²⁶ As Olson rightly notes the states the constant bumps in relations will continue to appear and then subsume.¹²⁷ The UN decision to place sanctions on Iran for continuing its nuclear programme was not

¹¹⁸ Sayari, 1997, 47

¹¹⁹ Robins, 1991, 60

¹²⁰ Sayari, 1997, 45

¹²¹ United Nations, 1996, 167

¹²² Robins, 1994, (b), 77–78

¹²³ Birand, 1998, 172

¹²⁴ Pahlavan, 1996, 71

¹²⁵ Pahlavan, 1996, 75

¹²⁶ Olson, 2000, 877

¹²⁷ Olson, 2000, 888

supported by Turkey shows a new relationship is forming with Iran.¹²⁸ The new joint venture in car manufacturing reiterates this points that Turkey is actively seeking better relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours.¹²⁹

Turkey has also extended its relations with Saudi Arabia after joining the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) in 1969.¹³⁰ Through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Turkey established links and by 2003 there was \$1.2 billion worth of trade with Saudi Arabia, with over 100,000 Turks living there.¹³¹ Saudi Arabia has propped itself up as the leader of the World Muslim community,¹³² though this has led to subtle clashes with Turkey, whose Muslim population are Sunni whilst Saudi promotes Wahabism. Moreover, Saudi Arabia also gave over \$3 billion in aid to Central Asia, which Robins aptly characterises as ‘silent competition’ with Turkey.¹³³ Turkey also has trade links with Libya dating from the 1980s, with over \$8.7 billion in trade,¹³⁴ notwithstanding its partial status as a terrorist state until recently. The new craze of Arab citizens travelling to Turkey as a holiday destination is very apparent and beneficial for both Turkey and the Middle East, as it will ease tensions within the region and beyond.¹³⁵

To conclude, the positioning of Turkey in the world is such that it can be a great asset to its neighbours, especially those in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

¹²⁸ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm> (accessed 24 September 2010)

¹²⁹ <http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article142439.ece> (accessed 24 September 2010)

¹³⁰ http://www.oic-oci.org/member_states.asp (accessed 14 September 2010)

¹³¹ Aras, 2005, 96

¹³² Birand, 1998, 31

¹³³ Robins, 1994, (a) 70

¹³⁴ Robins, 1991, 105

¹³⁵ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00tnvn6> (accessed 22 September 2010)

Constrained by geography, the states within these regions will look to Turkey for a water outlet for exporting their goods. This will allow Turkey to be seen as a model country that is on its way to establishing a balance between its secularism, religion and ethnic identities. Moreover, the initiatives such as BSEC and others have also helped the developing states in ways of economics, political maturity and technology; thus Turkey remains a strong regional player. The end of the Cold War helped Turkey to exert its influence and with the Ottoman history, religion and ethnic relationship, there were better chances for Turkey to aid its near neighbours. Thus history, politics and most importantly economics has led to the clustering of the regimes in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia around Turkey. In the case of Turkey's relationship with the Middle East, this has yet to be developed on cultural terms as ethnically there are no connections. History has proved to be a hindrance in creating a willingness to build relations. Politics has been a constant problem, as notions of nationalism remain high in Turkey and most Middle East countries; thus it is difficult to extend links in this way. Iran is a strong contender for influence in Central Asia and with the variance in religious outlook, Turkey will most likely remain cautious of the moves Iran makes. With Syria, Iraq and the GCC countries, politics has also remained high on the agenda, as Turkey has maintained relations with Israel and has interfered with the flow of water in the Euphrates. However, economics through tourism has come to the fore and with more contracts being signed, relations will improve. Furthermore, as external interferences are muted, the Middle Eastern states will be able to engage with Turkey better. There remain many weaknesses in the new relationship between Turkey and the Arab world but it seems there is progress and once Turkey has its foot in the door, more influence will be exerted. Thus, for the countries that are in closer proximity with Turkey, there is more to be gained by those

states and Turkey, namely economically and politically. The countries more distant from Turkey, such as the Caucus states, do not yet rotate around Turkey and never will in that sense, though they are realising the importance of Turkey vis-a-vis the West; and it is this that will encourage greater collaboration in the future.

III

Greece Leads the Way

In this chapter I will attempt to make a comparison with Turkey's ongoing application to that of Greece's successful application to join the EU. This is due to the obvious fact the two countries share common traits both being considered from 'Southern Europe'. Also, they share similar geographical strategic positioning in that they sit between three continents and both have Mediterranean and Balkan associations. However, through analysing Greece's application process, I will show the different reasons for which Greece initially made the application and the European Economic Community (EEC) reacted positively to the application. The way Greece's application was handled till it was accepted will be a key consideration with regard to how Turkey has been dealt with as a candidate country as it will show if there has been uneven enforcement of European rules for accession.

The President of the Council of Ministers Ludwig Erhad proclaimed, "We see in your country the cradle of European culture. How then could we possibly conceive a European community without Greece?"¹ This statement sums up the EEC reaction to the application of Greece in 1959 and was further supported by the Association Agreement, just two years after submitting the first application.² This shows the clear political motives of the European states to eventually allow Greece to enter the club as if 'they' owe it to Greece. Although Greece would not accede immediately since the

¹ Stathatos, 1979, 3

² <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/European+Policy/Greece+in+the+EU/> (accessed 17 September 2010)

country was economically weak, the EEC would not rule out the possibility of membership.

Problems During the Early Years

The 1950s and 1960s saw many structural problems in Greece, such as the clientele system and the blatant tax evasion meant Greece would always lag behind the big six EEC members until it directly addressed these problems. The dictatorship of the Colonels between 1967-1974 was based on direct control of the economy and this was a hindrance as it created superficial output numbers and was not in harmony with real markets.³ By 1967, there were many complaints from Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Holland against Greece for mistreatment, torture and clear disregard of human rights.⁴ The situation led to Greece leaving the Council of Europe and the EEC application and financial assistance was frozen though trade continued.⁵ In the 1970s, Greece was considered to be a middle income country, with slow movement from agriculture to new industry.⁶ This was due to the new civilian government of President Karamanlis, which initiated a new programme of development.⁷ There were still problems of centralisation and this meant ineffective policies were causing difficulty in dealing with globalisation.⁸ The direction Karamanlis was taking was disliked by the populace as they saw the clear movement away from Hellenism toward the West.⁹ This was necessary as Karamanlis had recognised the potential economic and political benefits by aligning with the EEC and NATO.¹⁰ Greece also wanted to join the EEC

³ Kafkalas, 2004, 37

⁴ Clogg, 1979, 192

⁵ Kazakos, 1994, 3

⁶ Pagoulatos, 2003, 90

⁷ Pagoulatos, 2003, 91

⁸ Mossialos, 2000, 3

⁹ Clogg, 1979, 175

¹⁰ Clogg, 1979, 175

for strategic reasons as there had been clashes with Turkey through the invasion of Cyprus in 1974.¹¹ Conversely, Greece capped its expansionist ideas and had recognised it had to strengthen its economy if it was to challenge Turkey.¹²

During this period, Turkey was also seeking to solidify itself through broader organisations such as the EEC, and from being an associate member in 1959, Turkey signed the Association Agreement in 1963.¹³ In 1975, a new radical constitution was drawn up with special reference to the EEC, as this took place just before official candidature to the EEC was accorded.¹⁴ Joining the EEC has been important for Greece as it was to open their economy to international markets, helping Greece to liberalise and establish better governance.¹⁵ Thus Greece began to reduce its inflation and the military spending which was around twenty five percent of the budget.¹⁶ There was still little investment in the manufacturing industry, with much of the loans from the EEC going straight to private investors.¹⁷ In the field of technology, there had been little improvement or even desire to enhance this field, as only 2% of the annual budget was used for technological advancement.¹⁸ The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was an EEC initiative to encourage development in areas that would benefit from extra funding to boost development. Greece had on several times applied for this fund naming developed cities such as Attica for further funds.¹⁹ It is clear that Greece intended to reap benefits after being admitted into the EEC while avoiding changing the deep structural problems within Greece.

¹¹ Dalis, 2004, 74

¹² Dalis, 2004, 80

¹³ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 17 September 2010)

¹⁴ Yataganas, 1982, 337-338

¹⁵ Tsoukalis, 2000, 37

¹⁶ Clogg, 1979, 208

¹⁷ Giannitsis, 1991, 214

¹⁸ Giannitsis, 1991, 216

¹⁹ Kafkalas, 2004, 38

The 1973-74 oil shock also affected Greece significantly as the inflation increased back to double digits.²⁰ During this period, the financial system was highly regulated with direct influence from the government; there was also increased reliance on foreign borrowing to support the public sector.²¹ This was not productive and instead it meant the government was cushioning the real problems. In 1975, Greece sent forth its application to the EEC, and perhaps the small size of Greece meant it would have a better chance of entering as the burden would be smaller.²² The fact the Customs Union was established a year prior to this shows Greece had a good chance of being accepted.²³ In 1977 a second protocol was signed, which included financial assistance and abolishing duties as the 'EC have to show it's not just for the rich'.²⁴ Turkey also signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 for the similar purpose of reducing tariffs and other trade barriers.²⁵ It is interesting to note how the aim of the Protocols Turkey was signing was to establish the Customs Union,²⁶ though in the case of Greece this had happened before the Additional Protocol was signed. The economy of Greece was worse than it appeared from official statistics, with consumption increasingly relying more on foreign imports than domestic goods.²⁷ Competition was seen by the EC as useful for Greece as it would force improvements in its domestic productivity but instead Greece isolated large sectors and this led to decline in productivity.²⁸ Thus in

²⁰ <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/Inflation-CPI.aspx?symbol=GRD> (accessed 17 September 2010)

²¹ Tavlos, 2001, 47

²² Wallace, 1979, 22

²³ Stathatos, 1979, 6

²⁴ Stathatos, 1979, 8

²⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 17 September 2010)

²⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 17 September 2010)

²⁷ Giannitsis, 1991, 220

²⁸ Yannopoulos, 1986, 172

comparison with Portugal and Spain, who were better economically,²⁹ Greece was not the best candidate to enter the EEC; however, political considerations were always more important.

Membership

Of course there were many reasons for Greece to join the EEC, as Ioakimidis states, for Greece it meant the consolidation of democracy after the years of dictatorship and reducing reliance on foreign powers, namely the US.³⁰ Membership was also meant to act as a catalyst for modernisation and economic gains.³¹ In 1979, Greece signed the treaty of accession and a further 19 months was given as an interim period till 1st January 1981 Greece became the tenth member of the EEC.³² President Karamanlis decided this would be the moment to choose Demotic Greek to translate the new laws that had to be passed, though hundreds of directives still had not been passed after the interim period.³³ Such leniency given by the EC and the short time for Greece to attain full membership in comparison to Turkey's long twenty year bid does raise some doubts. The new government that had been elected in 1981 was PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement), was opposed to EC membership.³⁴ After accession, it sought more favourable terms and Greece continued as if it had no new responsibilities and in 1983 when it devalued the drachma, it did not consult the EC or the Commission.³⁵ PASOK maintained its rhetoric of being the people's party, aiming to please the 'non-privileged'.³⁶ This idea of populism often occurs in periods of rapid

²⁹ Heywood, 2004, 14

³⁰ Ioakimidis, 1994, 141

³¹ Ioakimidis, 1993, 406

³² <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/European+Policy/Greece+in+the+EU/> (accessed 18 September 2010)

³³ Yataganas, 1982, 348

³⁴ Couloubis, 2004, 80

³⁵ Verney, 1993, 146

³⁶ Lyrintzis, 1993, 35

social and cultural change such as the accession to the EC.³⁷ It was clear PASOK did not want to carry the burden of entering the EC as even basic taxes such as the Value Added Tax was only introduced in 1987 though it was originally set for 1984.³⁸ Many of the liberalisation reforms that were encouraged by the EC were not adhered to by Papandreou's government.³⁹ In the case of removing tariffs they were merely replaced by new selective protectionist policies to the extent that by 1986 the total state aid was 24.3% compared to the EC average of 4%.⁴⁰ The general public support for the EC was also low and only increased when the economic benefits were becoming apparent.⁴¹ Foreign investment was slow as Greece had failed to implement structural changes whereas in Spain and Portugal investment was increasing.⁴² By 1985, a financial injection of almost 100 billion drachmas had been steadily flowing in to Greece till it became 30% of public investment budget, thus showing Greece was living off EC funds and not using the funds to make changes.⁴³ The new IMP (Integrated Mediterranean Programme) was initiated by Greece as a compensation for the changes and financial difficulty that would be faced with integration into the EC for the countries in the Mediterranean.⁴⁴ Greece became the largest net recipient of funds of all EC members and acquired a reputation as the black sheep of the community. Despite the net sum of 3 billion ECUs being received by Greece, there was little decrease in debt, inflation remained high and export performance was still among the lowest.⁴⁵ Within Greece, large sectors such as the farmers were still not

³⁷ Lyrintzis, 1993, 34

³⁸ Verney, 1993, 139

³⁹ Pagoulatos, 2003, 95

⁴⁰ Pagoulatos, 2003, 96

⁴¹ Mavris, 2004, 114

⁴² Axt, 1997, 30

⁴³ Plaskoitis, 1994, 117

⁴⁴ Plaskoitis, 1994, 118

⁴⁵ Ioakimidis, 1993, 408

being taxed and many people retired at the early age of fifty,⁴⁶ which shows there was little will in progressing with tighter economic policies. Thus, eventually in 1984 a harsh austerity package was imposed upon Greece to address its dire financial situation.

The austerity package that followed the dismal economic situation marked the first occasion Greece was to try to deal with the problems head on, at a time it was plagued by holding the highest inflation in all OECD countries.⁴⁷ The programme forced a reduction in public debt, freeing the market from price controls, devaluing the drachma, and imposing wages reductions of 10-15%.⁴⁸ There were to be tighter controls on domestic credit for both public and private sectors, which if completed successfully would release an EC loan of \$1,750 million.⁴⁹ Such harsh measures were disliked by PASOK and marked the beginning of the end of the PASOK government. Similarly, in Turkey there was an anti-EC atmosphere with the Motherland Party which had criticised the terms of the Customs Union.⁵⁰ The Bank of Greece also began to move towards a market framework and it abolished credit controls and regulations; a positive move even though this was forced by the EC.⁵¹ Despite this improvement, during 1988-1994, over a fifth of cases to the European Court of Justice were related to Greece's market-related infringements.⁵² With this said, the period 1986-1992 was also the best period for the harmonisation of EC policies, a better system of justice, even though it lacked transparency and real consultation.⁵³ The

⁴⁶ Axt, 1997, 39

⁴⁷ Tsoukalis, 1991, 193

⁴⁸ Konstans, 1987, 57

⁴⁹ Tsoukalis, 1991, 198

⁵⁰ <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Turkey-HISTORY.html> (accessed 18 September 2010)

⁵¹ Pagoulatos, 1983, 123

⁵² Passas, 2004, 5

⁵³ Giannakourou, 2004, 55-56

second term of PASOK was thus better in terms of its financial and economic measures but support fluctuated as it reversed the previous promises for a better life.⁵⁴ As a result, by 1989 the upper class and middle class reverted to the ND (New Democracy) party led by Constantine Mitsotakis, causing the end of the PASOK government.⁵⁵

Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of Greece since it has been accepted in to the EC has fluctuated, with some clear diverging viewpoints from the rest of the EC states. During the Falklands war (1982), Greece signed the EPC (Economic Political Cooperation) condemning Argentina for landing on the island, but then abstained from voting in the United Nations, and as Susannah Verney points out this was hypocritical considering the reaction to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.⁵⁶ Again Greece refused to join the majority of EC states to impose sanctions on the USSR during its war with Afghanistan.⁵⁷ In the early 1990s, Greece once again stood alone not to recognise the new state name of Macedonia, arising from the break up of Yugoslavia, arguing its significant closeness to Ancient Greek culture.⁵⁸ Greece also refused to condemn Syria for attempting to blow up an Israeli airliner.⁵⁹ Thus it is clear that although Greece was in harmony with most policies of its major political partners, it would not hesitate to differ in opinion. In the 1990s, Greece also took itself to task by pointing out the incompatibility of Turkey's economy and political system with the then EU

⁵⁴ Mavris, 2004, 115

⁵⁵ Lyrantzis, 1993, 35

⁵⁶ Verney, 1993, 142

⁵⁷ Konstans, 1991, 50

⁵⁸ Verney, 1993, 151

⁵⁹ Verney, 1993, 151

and stood prepared to exercise its veto to prevent its rival's assimilation.⁶⁰ The irony is that Greece was not too long ago in a situation not dissimilar from Turkey, though politics overrides the fact Greece is still struggling to meet EU standards. Though some attempt has been made to increase links with the Balkans, it will only come to fruition after stability has been achieved in the region.⁶¹ Conversely Turkey has been more synchronised in the opinions it held in international matters. Even in the Balkan crisis, Turkey spoke out whilst officially being in line with the UN position. However, Greece has been outspoken and yet has not faced any difficulty in its international relations with other states.

It can be summed up that the period of the 1980s marked a time which Greece fully realised the mixed effects of being a member of the EC. This included many benefits and investment, and it also meant abiding by the regulations of the EC. The early period was marked by a constant ignorance of or defiance in following protocol, whilst the second half of the 1980s forced a strong change after the austerity measures were put in place. There were improvements in the economy and the prospects seemed to improve after the elections in 1989.

1990s Onwards

The 1990s saw a better era for Greece as it strived to improve its situation. Significant improvement was made in the economic sphere, with stabilisation and more liberalisation taking place. In terms of Greek perception of having entered the EU, this too began to become a permanent and positive view, coinciding with the EU moving towards a single market and a single currency. The economic stimulus

⁶⁰ Konstans, 1991, 61

⁶¹ Thomadakis, 1997, 57

provided by the Olympic games in 2004 further enhanced Greece's chance to improve the structurally weak economy.

Though changes were gradual, the 1990s began with more financial assistance to cover Greece's debts to which the EU lent 2.2 billion ECUs with strict conditions.⁶² Due to this reliance on funds from the EU, the question of Greece entering the European Monetary Union (EMU) had been discussed extensively. The main benefit of joining the EMU would be the reduction of inflation and a fixed exchange rate.⁶³ In 1991, inflation in Greece was at a staggering all time high of 76%, whilst the support for the EU was also high, which is beneficial and an important reason to push for entry into the EMU.⁶⁴ Similarly, Turkey was also experiencing these structural problems during the 1970s and 1980s, but through austerity packages these problems were tackled head on so that by 1995 Turkey was entering a Customs Union with the EU.⁶⁵ A key factor that has rattled Greece since the 1960s has been the lack of efficient taxation and coordination of the private and non-private initiatives, which if done would raise the revenues.⁶⁶ The main weaknesses in Greece's approach can be said to be the lack of unified policy with it often being defensive and reactionary.⁶⁷ These are important reasons as Greece needed to show a clear line of objectives and must prove they were ready in every aspect to join such an institution. As Dimitrakopoulos explains this process entailed greater convergence to 'Europeanisation', which can mean anything from political unification to changes in

⁶² Ioakimidis, 1993, 409

⁶³ Alogoskoufis, 1993, 166-167

⁶⁴ Mavris, 2004, 115

⁶⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 18 September 2010)

⁶⁶ Thomadakis, 1997, 56

⁶⁷ Passas, 2004, 4

external boundaries and power.⁶⁸ Thus Greece had to be serious and tread carefully as there would be expectations to input too. With a macroeconomic stabilisation programme and a clear focus to reduce public deficit being pursued to meet the convergence criteria Greece was entering a better position to join the EMU.⁶⁹ Joining the EMU promised to further aid the reduction of interest rates, eliminate of exchange rate fluctuation, thus helping fiscal consolidation.⁷⁰ In 1993 the drachma was devalued as it joined the EMS (European Monetary System) and full liberalisation of capital movements, nominal convergence and development of domestic markets were introduced, associated with the single market.⁷¹ This shows there was a strong pro-European attitude on the part of Greece, with a new maturity with greater involvement in the institutions “to regain its credibility as a reliable partner vis-a-vis the rest of the union.”⁷²

From 1996-2001, during the era of Prime Minister Costas Simitis, there was continued support for European convergence as it had now become synonymous to modernisation.⁷³ There was a great reduction in the public deficit from 20% to 8%⁷⁴ and with an annual increase of GDP of 3.3%.⁷⁵ This shows there was a real effort being made for Greece to draw level with its EU neighbours. Since the privileged access of government to banks was abolished in 1994, fiscal policy sharpened and the Maastricht agreement in 1992 lifted exchange rate controls.⁷⁶ By 1999 the Amsterdam treaty was favoured by Greece and in 2000 polls suggested 55% of Greeks trusted the

⁶⁸ Passas, 2004, 8

⁶⁹ Pagoulatos, 2003, 127

⁷⁰ Pagoulatos, 2003, 169

⁷¹ Papdemos, 1993, 145

⁷² Kafkalas, 2004, 45

⁷³ Mavris, 2004, 123

⁷⁴ Keridis, 1997, 85

⁷⁵ Bosworth, 2001, 169

⁷⁶ Tavlos, 2001, 62

EU.⁷⁷ Thus despite some tough decisions being forced upon Greece in the 1980s and 1990s, this continued level of support shows Greeks realised the lasting benefits of being part of a large political and economic institution. Greece realised better reforms will create a better position for Greece within the EU and thus in the international sphere.⁷⁸ Though there still needs to be greater decentralisation, transparency, and independence within the Greek institutions,⁷⁹ there has been significant improvement. A continued effort with creating new think tanks, discussion groups and greater development of the private sector will help the overall performance of Greek society and its economy.⁸⁰

Since the 1980s Greece has employed a more positive attitude towards the EU and this maturing of behaviour has helped accrue more funds for the country.⁸¹ After the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties, which emphasised environmental policies, Greece created new ministries for planning, housing and the environment.⁸² This shows an understanding of what the outcomes of the EU are as well as active participation towards those goals. Though there is some stubbornness from Greece having constantly vetoed Turkey's application until 1999, it has created a perception they will only accept Turkey if this means compensatory benefits. Failing to support fellow countries beyond conditionality is a weakness in international relations and should be examined to allow greater flexibility.⁸³ Some such as Tsoukalis have argued Turkey's application is problematic due to its religious fundamentalism, and military

⁷⁷ Mavris, 2004, 124

⁷⁸ Keridis, 1997, 94

⁷⁹ Keridis, 1997, 95

⁸⁰ Paphelas, 1997, 104

⁸¹ Kafkalas, 2004, 46

⁸² Giannakourou, 2004, 53

⁸³ Mossialos, 2000, 25

involvement in politics.⁸⁴ It is unfair to decide a country's weakness should become the basis of rejection, as clearly Greece's weak position was one of the main reasons to allow it to enter the EU, to act "as a catalyst for domestic reform/modernisation."⁸⁵ Furthermore, as Papademos states, allowing Greece to enter the EMU was a way to force change by having to coordinate with set principles and rules.⁸⁶ Greece's performance is yet sluggish in terms of growth as inflation is still too high as the figures suggest that in 2010 deficit will be around 10% of GDP.⁸⁷

History Repeating

The recent crisis that Greece has entered can be seen to be a repeat of the situation in the 1980s but with wider implications upon EU countries. The crisis also highlighted other issues, namely the position of Greece in the EU, as some have begun to point out clear discrepancies such as the fiddling of numbers to enter the EMU as noted by Traynor.⁸⁸ The budget deficit of Greece was 12.7%, almost four times the permitted level of the EU, which was due to constant over borrowing.⁸⁹ As Connolly correctly asserts, the situation was a 'self-made crisis' and now the rest of Europe will have to help Greece lift the burden before the crisis leads to the collapse of the Euro.⁹⁰ This new national debt of €300 billion clearly meant a new bail out was to be created; however, this stirred contentions between Germany, which does not want to be the main burden carrier and France, which has openly come to the rescue of Greece.⁹¹ Rather Germany has insisted on a first time austerity package led by the IMF

⁸⁴ Tsoukalis, 2000, 46

⁸⁵ Tsoukalis, 2000, 49

⁸⁶ Papdemos, 1993, 48

⁸⁷ OECD table, 2010/guardian.co.uk (accessed 15 June 2010)

⁸⁸ Traynor, *The Guardian*, 2010, 1-2

⁸⁹ Smith, *The Guardian*, 2010, 6-7

⁹⁰ Connolly *The Guardian*, 2010, 6-7

⁹¹ Traynor *The Guardian*, (a) 2010, 1

(International Monetary Fund), European Central Bank and the European Commission.⁹² Other options that have been presented include devaluing the currency, though this cannot happen due to the single currency of the Euro.⁹³ The EU has pressured Greece into introducing heavier taxes, adding an extra 12 pence on petrol.⁹⁴ The fact is Greece has never taxed well with evasion being rampant; even now the average restaurant owner pays €4000 in tax, whilst a lawyer pays out only €10,000.⁹⁵ In this regard, Turkey has done better, as the negotiation process shows it has aligned well in the chapter on Taxation.⁹⁶ By April-May of 2010, plans for €4.8 billion austerity package for Greece had been widely spoken of, which included a huge reduction of civil servants.⁹⁷ Duty would also be increased on luxury items, alcohol and cigarettes by 10%⁹⁸ and VAT from 21% to 23%.⁹⁹ The bailout by the three major players will add up to €140 billion; the largest international bail-out ever.¹⁰⁰ In the midst of all of this, some are sceptical that although the huge financial aid will help Greece with its debt, it would not encourage any permanent structural change.¹⁰¹ On May 18th 2010, Greece was provided with guarantees for the delivery of €110 billion over a three year period to assist in the payment of government bonds as they matured.¹⁰² The same day a deputy minister of culture and tourism resigned after her husband had evaded €5 million in tax, as both had filled out the tax reform

⁹² Traynor *The Guardian*, (a) 2010, 1

⁹³ Elliott *The Guardian*, 2010, 7

⁹⁴ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greek-government-workers-strike-in-cuts-protest-1894808.html> (accessed 10 February 2010)

⁹⁵ Lichfield, *The Independent*, 2010,

⁹⁶ Commission Staff Working Document Turkey 2009 Progress Report, 62

⁹⁷ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/30/greek-bailout-plan-almost-completed> accessed 30 April 2010

⁹⁸ Smith, *The Guardian*, 2010, 6

⁹⁹ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jun/29/emu-greece> (accessed 20/09/2010)

¹⁰⁰ Smith, *The Guardian*, 2010, 6

¹⁰¹ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/17/greece-debt-restructure> (accessed 17 May 2010)

¹⁰² Smith, *The Guardian*, 2010, 6

form.¹⁰³ This is not helpful news as it only reiterates the concerns of many as to the depth of sincerity Greece is putting in to alleviating the situation. On June 24th 2010, Greece announced preparations it was making in selling and offering long-term leases on hundreds of islands in an attempt to raise funds to alleviate the debt.¹⁰⁴ The investment is to lead to new jobs and capital or as Makis Perdikaris, the Director of Greek Island Properties said, “The point is to get money.”¹⁰⁵

To conclude, though the examination of Greece’s application has been brief some interesting and clear conclusions can be made. Since the application of entering the EU in 1959, Greece has been given preferential treatment in the way it has continued its bid, during its accession and after becoming a member. From the onset, Greece would always be treated differently as Ludwig Edhard clearly said Greece had a special and permanent place in the EC. The EC maintained relations if even at a distance and felt it had to show itself to be welcoming of poorer nations to prevent exclusivity based on wealth. For Greece, there were incentives to keep close to the European power, as Turkey which militarily was much stronger, had already attacked Cyprus and threatening in the Aegean, and so Greece needed to create strong allies. Thus for both the EU and Greece, membership was based on political motives as a primary reason. Economics was also important; however as Greece was accepted for membership by 1979, the problems lay unaddressed as it took over nineteen months till the actual agreement was signed. Thereafter, the move for change was still slow and even several laws pertaining to the EC were not passed through parliament. By

¹⁰³ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/18/greece-gets-first-bailout-cash> (accessed 18 May 2010)

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/24/greece-islands-sale-save-economy> (accessed 24 June 2010)

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/24/greece-islands-sale-save-economy> (accessed 24 June 2010)

1984, the situation was clear; Greece had not modernised and yet had been over spending to a point where the EC had to bail the small country out. The cut backs were harsh and helped Greece back on its modernisation track. The point to be realised is the way in which Greece was aided in its current financial crisis shows the extra care with which the EC treads. Harsh measures may have been in place, but it still did not lead to a questioning of the lack of benefit Greece has brought to the EC. Nor did it structurally change the core problems within Greece, as after twenty five years the same problem occurred with greater consequences. The entry into the EMU has been argued by some to be a bad mistake, as no country should enter the EMU if its track record is weak or to use the EMU to stabilise itself. Greece did not qualify in the first wave of single currency applicants but was admitted in the second wave after it cooked the books to make it appear it had met the convergence criteria when it had not. To compare this situation with Turkey there are some clear differences and similarities. Turkey's desire to enter the EC was based on a political desire to Westernise, though the EC looked to Turkey in an economic perspective. The yard stick applied to Turkey's application was longer and harsher as the dates for Association Agreement, Customs Union and accession negotiations show. Thus Greece's application into the EU was easier than Turkey's application so far since the reasons for entry and the EC's perspective favoured Greece more than Turkey.

IV

THE PROSPECT OF TURKEY ENTERING THE EU

This chapter will explore the positive qualities and benefits Turkey's possesses as a candidate country. It can be said that too often the focus has been on Turkey's apparent inability to meet entry conditions, always falling short of the benchmark set by the EU or the artificial conditions some member states have sought to attach to its case. However, due recognition should be given to the many positive qualities Turkey can use in its favour to continue negotiations, even speeding them up to reach the destination of membership. This chapter will be split into three sub levels; the first addressing the issue head on by providing some estimates given by analysts as to accession dates for Turkey whilst also examining the chapter negotiations. The chapter negotiations will explore those that have been opened and are either closed or reaching closure, as well as those chapters which will remain closed for reasons that will be explained. The second sub level will discuss the key aspects of Turkey's bid to become a member, briefly showing the benefits membership can provide for Turkey itself. The final sub level will analyse the prospective benefits of such a country acceding based on the needs of the EU.

Chapter Negotiations

Having read through the '*European Voice*' from the beginning of Turkey's negotiations in 2005 up till the present date, it has become clear that most of the articles regarding Turkey evince a positive tone. Indeed, several columnists speculate as to possible dates for entry within the European Union; for example Martin Banks has agreed with 'optimists' that a time scale of at least ten years will elapse till Turkey completes negotiations.¹ David Cronin'

¹ Banks, *European Voice*, 29 September-5 October 2005, 10

reiterated the foreign minister Joschka Fischer's estimate as to Turkey's entrance into the EU involving 10-15 years.² By contrast other sources are pessimistic: some have categorised Turkey's bid as ten years good behaviour followed by ten years of negotiations.³ This shows the general view with regards to Turkey's entrance into the EU is at least ten years and possibly a maximum of twenty years away.

The records of the negotiations that have been under way between Turkey and the EU since 2005 provide some interesting insights. First the chapters that are open will be discussed followed by those chapters waiting to be opened and those closed for reasons that are somewhat external and indirect influences.

In December 2004, the European Council voted on the application of Turkey to become a member of the European Union with a good majority of 407 in favour, 262 against and 29 abstaining.⁴ The Council recognised Turkey's weaknesses but decided to press ahead with negotiations in 2005. It was made clear that Turkey could not become a member until the current absorption of the ten new members took place properly⁵ and the 2014 EU long term budget was planned.⁶ Though this seemed abrupt, later a Pre-Accession Assistance package was prepared for candidate countries, to ease the alignment process, with Turkey receiving €11, 468 million for the years 2007-2014.⁷ Amongst the first chapters to be opened and closed provisionally was that of Science and Research, which took place in June 2006.⁸ In November 2006, the European Commissioner Olli Rehn commented on Turkey's progress, affirming the continuation of negotiations but at a slower pace due to the laxity in

² Cronin, *European Voice*, 29 September-5 October 2005, 16

³ Park, 2005, 135

⁴ Eurlings, 2004, 6

⁵ http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm (accessed 23 September 2010)

⁶ Eurlings, 2004, 7

⁷ European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union, 2008, 147

⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (7 September 2010)

implementation.⁹ The following March, the chapter on Enterprise and Industry was opened and in June of the same year the chapters Financial Control and Statistics were opened too.¹⁰ By December, the chapters on Trans-European networks, and Consumer and Health protection were opened for negotiations.¹¹ In 2008, a revised accession partnership was created to review progress so far. It concluded there were improvements in the legal framework as well as implementation, but the fact Turkey had refused to its open ports to Cyprus, thus not complying with the Additional Protocol, meant eight chapters would remain closed.¹² The eight chapters included Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.¹³ This was a serious setback for Turkey as it decreased support for the country's bid in the EU as well as leaving little room for manoeuvre in other chapters. Despite this response from the EU, a further two chapters of Intellectual Property and Company Law were opened in June 2008.¹⁴ In June 2009, the chapter on Taxation was opened and in December the chapters on Environment and Free movement of Capital were opened too.¹⁵ In June 2010 the chapter on Food safety, veterinary and Phytosanitary policy was opened.¹⁶ Thus in five years a total of thirteen chapters have been opened and if this is used as a basis to predict the opening of the other chapters, it will take approximately another ten years to conclude negotiations. This does not include the fact many chapters are very difficult to resolve such as Cyprus, moreover France

⁹<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/727&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (accessed 11 September 2010)

¹⁰http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 7 September 2010)

¹¹http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 7 September 2010)

¹² Accession partnership, 2008, 1

¹³http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 7 September 2010)

¹⁴http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 7 September 2010)

¹⁵http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 7 September 2010)

¹⁶http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm (accessed 7 September 2010)

has implied it will make the closure of chapters difficult.¹⁷ The EU have also made it clear that if Turkey fails to upkeep the conditions of the Copenhagen criteria, negotiations will end and new conditions will be set for resumption.¹⁸

There are several reasons for the slow negotiation process of chapters being opened or even closed. These shall be discussed outlining some of the general and specific hindrances on the part of member states or the EU in general.

During the negotiations leading to the Accession Partnership between the EU and Turkey, several voices within the EU were calling for a ‘Christian culture’ as a pre-condition.¹⁹ Though Brussels rejected this condition it nonetheless it showed the incoherence in outlook from the EU members. Furthermore, Turkey is faced with the difficult situation of choosing who to please within the EU, as all states have the right of veto, including stark opponents of Turkish admission such as France, Austria and Cyprus.²⁰ In 2005, Turkey was scolded for adding an additional declaration to a protocol so as to abrogate parts of the Customs Union concerning Cyprus.²¹ Another article explained the postponing of voting by MEPs on the Customs Union, as a punishment for Turkey’s closure of ports to Cypriot vessels; to which Turkey retaliated by stating it would only open ports if Cyprus stopped vetoing aid for Northern Cyprus.²² This disagreement arose since Turkey had signed the Customs Union which clearly provided access to ports by all countries including Cyprus, though, as Muftuler Bac states, some EU states are using this to hide their prejudices and delay negotiations.²³ The Progress report of 2009-2010 clearly states that the following chapters would not achieve acquiescence until Turkey resolved its issue with Cyprus. The chapters that remain closed are

¹⁷ Taylor, *European Voice*, 31May-06 June 2007, 6

¹⁸ Aras, 2009, 698

¹⁹ Font, 2006, 200

²⁰ Dyson, 2007, 56

²¹ Beatty, *European Voice*, 31 March-6 April, 2005, 3

²² Beatty, *European Voice*, 31August-6 September, 2006, 3

²³ Bac, 2008, 207

free movement of goods, Financial services, Fisheries, Transport policy, Customs union and External relations. Moreover, France has also voiced its determination to keep five chapters closed as it states these will only be relevant once Turkey gains membership.²⁴ This seems quite strange as the point of the chapters for negotiations is for candidate countries to align with EU regulations before they join. This places doubt over France's real motives to stop negotiations, which has been made clear on several occasions with President Sarkozy remarking, "I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe."²⁵ As recently as May 2010 the European Commission announced it would meet in June to discuss the Lisbon treaty as it may be able to go around Cyprus's veto since MEPs have now been granted powers of co-decision.²⁶ This would help Turkey with the blocked chapters, whilst predictably, Cyprus is unhappy with the situation as it sees it as tacit recognition of the TRNC, and so plans to challenge in the European Court of Justice.²⁷ So far, the question of trade with the EU has currently been passed to the European Parliament who will then make the final decision on the matter.²⁸

It can be seen that the EU is in a complex situation, wavering between keeping its image as a fair institution whilst its member states have abused the rights granted within the EU to pursue their individual goals. This means Turkey is playing a dangerous game to keep on the favourable side of members within the EU. In a poll surveying EU people's view on Turkey becoming a member, around 47% oppose to their possible membership.²⁹ Thus the EU cannot be ready until it has more support from the people within the EU.³⁰ Since each state has a

²⁴ Vogel, *European Voice*, 6-14 October, 2009, 17

²⁵ <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3251/turkey-39-s-eu-membership-eu-39-s-identity-crisis.html> (accessed 23 September 2010)

²⁶ Vogel, *European Voice*, 20-26 May 2010, 1

²⁷ Vogel, *European Voice*, 20-26 May 2010, 1

²⁸ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4869&format=XML&language=EN> (accessed 23 September 2010)

²⁹ Grabbe, 2002, 39

³⁰ Grabbe, 2002, 23

different perspective on what the chapters mean, negotiations will inevitably be long and arduous.³¹ Moreover, it has been pointed out that the term and idea of negotiations is questionable. Since all has been previously defined, it is merely a matter of time to adjust to the obligations set out.³² Therefore it is clear Turkey will find difficulty opening and closing chapters due to the opposition from some member states.

Of Turkey for Turkey

This section will consider Turkey's development over the last seven to ten years, exploring its many improvements along the way that have resulted in creating positive attributes for Turkey as a state.

In 2004, the European Commission noted the strong economic growth of Turkey despite the sharp output contraction during 1999 and 2001.³³ The Commission stated Turkey had made improvements in its institutional and regulatory setup, with the essentials having been put into place.³⁴ In 2004, inflation had reduced significantly, with stricter fiscal policies being applied and greater transparency in the public sector.³⁵ With the abolition of the death penalty in 2002 and limiting the powers of the National Security Council, Turkey was praised for its radical reform packages.³⁶ The Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), submitted by Turkey, and launched in 2004 was aimed at strengthening macroeconomic stability and ensuring sustainable growth.³⁷ Through private consumption and domestic investment, Turkey experienced a boom in 2004,³⁸ which confirms the trend of more liberal encouraging

³¹ Jorgensen, 2007, 32

³² Jorgensen, 2007, 32

³³ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2004, number 1, 37

³⁴ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2004, number 1, 38-39

³⁵ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2004, number 1, 41-42

³⁶ Eurlings, 2004, 7

³⁷ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2005, number 24, 69

³⁸ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2005, number 2, 469

of economic growth. Turkey also met its target in the general budget deficit of 4.4 % in line with the agreement set by the IMF.³⁹ The Central Bank of Turkey, by lowering interest rates helped to reduce the inflation which was drastically reduced from 11.8% to 5.3%⁴⁰ and through greater independence from the state it achieved greater credibility.⁴¹ The Progress report in November stated Turkey was fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria adequately, having improved its ability to take on obligations and was thus given ‘transition assistance’ of €256 million, €702 million, and €720 million to continue these efforts.⁴² Turkey also became the third country to join the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) which meant Turkey was able to emulate best practise from EU member projects.⁴³ Considering Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) account for 30% of the Turkish economy,⁴⁴ this was very beneficial and showed Turkey would use this information to its advantage. Being attached to such projects in formal ways highlights Turkey’s desire to be recognised for its efforts. Furthermore in international relations, the European Commission “applauded the steps that Turkey took” with regards to normalising relations with Armenia.⁴⁵ The strategic importance of Turkey has also been recognised by the EU, as “the EU and Turkey share essential strategic interest e.g. in security, economy and dialogue of civilisations.”⁴⁶ Thus the energy supply would build Turkey’s capacity to develop its energy market whilst becoming a key transit country for Europe. The Progress Report 2009-2010 outlined some key developments in Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. With regard to Freedom of Religion, it noted Turkey’s change to incorporate non-Muslims foundations into the care of

³⁹ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2005, number 24, 79

⁴⁰ Commission Staff Working Document Progress Report, 2009-2010, 35

⁴¹ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2005, number 26, 44-45

⁴² General Report on the Activities of the European Union, Economic Commission, 2008, 148

⁴³ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/206&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (accessed 13 Jul 10)

⁴⁴ European Commission, Enlargement papers, 2004, number 1, 47

⁴⁵ General Report on the Activities of the European Union, 2010, 56

⁴⁶ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/748&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (accessed 13 July 10)

the Ministry of Religious Affairs as ‘smooth’.⁴⁷ A major step was the announcement of a TV channel that would broadcast twenty-four hours a day in the Kurdish language.⁴⁸ In international relations, the European Commission praised Turkey for its peace mission efforts in neighbouring regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus and in Africa too.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the fact Turkey had ratified the Kyoto agreement demonstrated the seriousness of Turkey’s desire to conform to international standards.⁵⁰ Thus it is clear from the many reports of the European Commission that Turkey has been progressing in the right direction during the last six years.

The history of the Turkish Republic rising from the Ottoman Empire has taken on the trait of always looking towards Europe.⁵¹ As Ulusoy mentions, this European influence is beneficial as it dismantles old coalitions and creates a new brand of institutions and a fresh method of decision-making.⁵² This brief section will explore the secondary research into the progress made by Turkey in its desire to become a modern state.

Since 1964, Turkey has had programmes with the IMF, with neo-liberal reforms beginning in the 1980s,⁵³ and it was only in the 2000s that longstanding problems such as high inflation and debt were structurally controlled and reduced.⁵⁴ Following the crisis in 2001, the IMF created a \$19 billion package, through which the BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency) would ensure implementation; Turkey was praised for its rapid recovery.⁵⁵ During this period, the European Commission stated Turkey had begun a reform

⁴⁷ Conclusions on Progress Report, 2009, 2

⁴⁸ Conclusions on Progress Report, 2009, 2

⁴⁹ Commission Staff Working Document, Progress Report, 2009-2010, 87

⁵⁰ Commission Staff Working Document, Progress Report, 2009-2010, 79

⁵¹ Ulusoy, 2009, 364

⁵² Ulusoy, 2009, 366

⁵³ Bird, 2009, 139

⁵⁴ Bird, 2009, 140

⁵⁵ McCarthy, 2005, 81

that was the result of a bottom up approach to bringing about change,⁵⁶ clearly showing recognition by the international world. A key factor in the rapid progress in the last decade is the strong single party majority of the AKP in parliament, as this naturally leads to a stronger ability to commit to reforms.⁵⁷ A major amendment to the constitution was the supremacy given to European and International conventions over Turkish domestic law.⁵⁸ As Nihat Gultekin and Kamil Yilmaz assert, Turkey is now mature enough to experience modernisation, with the “EU membership as a further catalyst for change and reforms”.⁵⁹ Another clear positive aspect of the new AKP government is the platform of dialogue they have created between the state and Islam, thus also developing civil society by fostering a national spirit.⁶⁰ As Kotsovilis notes, this has led to a rise of the under represented groups,⁶¹ and has created a stronger Muslim brotherhood that has been likened to providing a model for the Middle East.⁶² The release of Leyla Zena and other Kurdish activists from prison demonstrated a unity in Turkish society and a development in outlook.⁶³

Being near over 70% of the world’s oil and gas reserves means Turkey will take the opportunity to maximise the benefits of becoming a transit country for these energy resources.⁶⁴ The dreamed Nabucco pipeline, which will cross from the Caspian Sea to Austria and Turkey, will help to diversify the gas supply, breaching Russia’s monopoly, providing up to 31 billion cubic metres a year,⁶⁵ with the possibility of a joining pipeline from Egypt.⁶⁶ Becoming a transit country for Europe means Turkey will gain substantial income whilst also

⁵⁶ Ulusoy, 2009, 376

⁵⁷ Bird, 2009, 147

⁵⁸ Webber, 2003, 90

⁵⁹ Yilmaz, 2005, 61

⁶⁰ Turam, 2007, 135

⁶¹ Kotsovilis, 2006, 57

⁶² Turam, 2007, 154

⁶³ Ulusoy, 2007, 476

⁶⁴ Williams, 2009, 341-342

⁶⁵ Taylor, *European Voice*, 17-23 July 2008, 21

⁶⁶ Taylor, *European Voice*, 29 January-2 February 2009, 17

being able to satisfy its own domestic needs, which is always key. As Toby Vogel notes, the EU should be prepared to deal with a more assertive Turkey that has a clear strategic vision and has begun to recognise its place within its region and the world.⁶⁷

Being strategically placed between Europe, the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Middle East has lent Turkey the obvious advantage in being a part of various coalitions and key organisations such as NATO, BSEC and ECO.⁶⁸ Joshua Walker comments interestingly on Turkey's positioning, as he analyses Turkey's previous inward looking nature pre-World War II, to a new reassertion as a regional player.⁶⁹ This new regionalism has been actively encouraged by Chief Foreign Policy Ahmet Davutoglu advisor to Erodgan, through economic ties to strengthen the region,⁷⁰ whilst using the also using strength of the past.⁷¹ As part of this policy, trade with Syria has increased by 30% with Iraq by 60%, clearly demonstrating Turkey's encompassing vision.⁷² Turkey has also been busy in promoting reconciliation, by leading talks between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and after months of diplomatic efforts Boris Tadic, President of Serbia attended the memorial at Sebrenica and condemned the infamous massacre perpetuated during the recent civil wars.⁷³

Thus it is clear Turkey has increased its capacity to act as a regional leader through trade, promoting democracy and fostering better relations. This was achieved after having become stable in its internal matters of monetary and fiscal policies, establishing firm structures that were followed through. This encouraged the strengthening of civic society and opened an arena for dialogue between all sections of society. The natural allies in the region, Turkey has

⁶⁷ Vogel, *European Voice*, 15-21 April 2010, 13

⁶⁸ Park, 2005, 129

⁶⁹ Walker, 2009, 503

⁷⁰ Sonumut, *European Union*, 9-15 July 2009, 10

⁷¹ Walker, 2009, 504

⁷² Vogel, *European Union*, 15-21 April 2010, 15

⁷³ Vogel, *European Union*, 17-23 June 2010, 15

been able to develop key pipelines that will be for domestic consumption as well as carrying energy supplies forward to Europe. All this has placed Turkey in a central position of being recognised as an active player in acquiring its interests whilst also developing the capacity to the same for other countries.

Turkey For the European Union

Turkey is also an important asset for the EU, as it has been able to exercise its influence in areas the EU has not been able to exert its power. This section will explore the various reasons why Turkey is considered vital for the EU as a fully fledged member. Most importantly Turkey has clout in its economy, its geo-strategic positioning, and military strength.

In 2009, the General Report of the European Commission stated the EU accession “provided a strong incentive for Turkey to advance to democracy and human rights and continue modernising.”⁷⁴ This is supported by the continual emphasis in the progress reports that Turkey has a functioning market economy.⁷⁵ Moreover, the impact of Turkey joining the EU would be positive as there has been strong alignment in the economic sphere.⁷⁶ In addition, with the increasing openness of the economy, this is an incentive for foreign investors to come to Turkey for trade.⁷⁷ With EU trade standing at 48% of GDP in exports in 2008 this shows Turkey is able to trade at a competitive level.⁷⁸ Advanced legislation in fields such as the Free Movement of Goods is promising and should be taken into account despite the current lag in implementing these reforms.⁷⁹ In the negotiations chapter of Enterprise and

⁷⁴ General Report on the Activities of the European Union, 2010, 56

⁷⁵ European Commission, Enlargement Papers, 2004, number 1, 39

⁷⁶ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, 5

⁷⁷ European Commission, Enlargement Papers, 2005, number 26, 50

⁷⁸ Commission Staff Working Document Progress Report, 2009, 39

⁷⁹ Conclusion of Progress Report, 2009, 4

Industrial Policy there has been progress with new strategies and improvement in enforcing this shows Turkey will become a key member.⁸⁰ In Social Policy and Employment a parliamentary commission on equal opportunities was set up to ensure men and women are treated equally and reduce the polarisation of the labour force.⁸¹ The removal of tariffs on industrial goods after accession would mean increased trade, within the European economic area and this is important for both the EU and Turkey.⁸² The signing in 2009 of the intergovernmental agreement of the Nabucco project signifies a joint venture and evidences progress in working together for mutual economic benefit.⁸³ This means Turkey can become important in helping to diversify the sources of oil and gas for the EU.⁸⁴

“The EU and Turkey share essential strategic interests” is a statement that typifies the crystallising relationship that is forming between the EU and Turkey as it is one of mutual interest.⁸⁵ The EU will be able to come in to close contact with parts of the Middle East through Turkey, who will be able to promote ideas of democracy and help stabilise key energy regions.⁸⁶ Turkey’s impressive military capacity of over 739,000 military personnel, the second largest standing army in NATO, has served in many regions and can significantly boost the EU’s security policy.⁸⁷

Thus it is clear Turkey offers many benefits should it become a member of the EU. Stronger policies will enable other foreign investors to invest and create businesses in less saturated areas. The energy sector is one of special interest and if the Nabucco project is completed it

⁸⁰ Commission Staff Working Document Progress Report, 2010, 66

⁸¹ Conclusion of Progress Report, 2009, 5

⁸² Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, 14

⁸³ Commission Staff Working Document Progress Report, 2009, 66

⁸⁴ Commission Staff Working Document Progress Report, 2009, 2010, 26

⁸⁵ <http://europa.eu/geninfo/query/resultaction.jsp?userinput=turkey> (accessed 13 July 10)

⁸⁶ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, 7

⁸⁷ Commission Staff Working Document, 2004, 10-11

will clearly demonstrate the necessary point of Turkey being a transit country and a member of the EU. In the military sphere too, Turkey is unrivalled in its experience in working with neighbouring countries to ensure peace. Being a full member will mean the EU will benefit from added security.

Exploring the secondary sources concerning the benefits of Turkey for the EU, it seems there is corroboration with the aforementioned reasons in the primary sources. These sources do also mention some pertinent points with regards to the set up of the EU, which will be discussed. The military and economic factors have contributed to being key reasons for expanding the current relationship between the EU and Turkey.

International structuralists assert external influence is amongst the most forceful reason to anchor a country's desire to establish democracy.⁸⁸ 'We have a moral obligation to keep the door open for further enlargement', 'deals must be respected' and 'we must be consistent', are key statements made by the EU which indicate recognition of the potential Turkey holds.⁸⁹ Muftuler Bac discusses some of the possible reasons the EU will consider Turkey as a member; he proposes firstly, the material benefits and costs of Turkey; proposal two is based upon the logic of appropriateness considering the European culture idea; and the third proposition is looking at the internal dynamics of the EU in this current period.⁹⁰ All three viewpoints show hesitation in absorbing Turkey into the EU, but in principle the EU has argued 'unity in diversity', with all cultures being celebrated.⁹¹ The economic benefits would also be high, for when the tariffs and other trade barriers are removed, EU companies will

⁸⁸ Mousseau, 2006, 97

⁸⁹ Malmstorm, *European Voice*, 27 April-3 May 2006, 24

⁹⁰ Bac, 2008, 204

⁹¹ Spiering, 2007, 178

have access to millions of potential new customers.⁹² Moreover, once the corruption perception index is improved the GDP of Turkey will increase by 5-6%,⁹³ and Turkey will contribute around 1.2% of its GDP to the EU budget.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the planned project of irrigating 3.6 million hectares of land by 2030 would mean greater export and domestic consumption.⁹⁵ An important step in showing a desire to assist Turkey in this respect was the announcement in 2009 that the EU will provide €250 million⁹⁶ to jump start the Nabucco project, whilst the EIB offered a €2 billion loan to help finance the project.⁹⁷ It is perhaps for this reason France announced it would open the chapter on Energy during its EU presidency rotation.⁹⁸ The ten year ‘Agenda for culture’ initiated in 2007 will encourage a greater understanding between the varying cultures within the EU, and will prepare the EU for accepting new members who do not share the supposed ‘Christian’ culture some opposers promote.⁹⁹

Turkey is also a key regional player and closeness to Turkey would be beneficial for the EU, most importantly since its soft power approach would be strengthened. Turkey borders many developing and unstable regions such as the Balkans and the Middle East. For this reason, the EU could strengthen its Eastern flank by tasking Turkey with border control and such related issues.¹⁰⁰ With regards to Iran and its desire to pursue nuclear energy, the big EU-3 (Great Britain, France and Germany) have not been able to create a firm stance.¹⁰¹ This weakness in a collective security policy is confirmed by the lack of any documents to deal with such

⁹² Font, 2006, 203

⁹³ Ugur, 2006, 25

⁹⁴ Ugur, 2006, 33

⁹⁵ Alvarez, 2008, 486

⁹⁶ Taylor, *European Voice*, 29 January -4 February 2009, 17

⁹⁷ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/banks-start-appraising-4bn-loans-nabucco-news-497509> (accessed 23 September 2010)

⁹⁸ Taylor, *European Voice*, 17-23 July 2008, 21

⁹⁹ Gordon, 2010, 102

¹⁰⁰ Font, 2006, 204

¹⁰¹ Kibaroglu, 2006, 178

matters. Thus with Turkey present, their experience can help coordinate policies.¹⁰² With Turkey being a long standing NATO member and having established relations with the US, Turkey can also become the bridge to unite the European and American members of NATO.¹⁰³ The new civil code that has become approved by the Copenhagen criteria will enable Turkey to truly be a model for the Middle East, promoting the compatibility of democracy and Islam.¹⁰⁴

It is clear there are many issues affecting the EU's process towards accepting Turkey as a full member. The internal dynamics within the EU and Turkey are currently being redefined; thus there is unease in the relationship.¹⁰⁵ Since Turkey was portrayed by some as the 'Other' for historical reasons, this has meant the EU has first had to settle this matter.¹⁰⁶ The only way to do this would be to accept Turkey, as this would also strengthen of the image the EU. The additional economic benefit of securing some of the EU's energy would enhance Turkey's chances of membership. The military knowledge and experience that Turkey offers would hugely benefit the EU and help it to assume a greater position in regional politics.

To conclude, Turkey has been in the negotiation process for over five years and progress in reform has been uneven. This has partly been due to the hindrances caused by external influences such as France and the dispute with Cyprus, causing blocking of chapters. Turkey's own inability to be consistent in implementing reforms has also aggravated the situation. The lack of cohesion displayed by the EU through the actions of its member states weakens the credibility of the EU and perhaps explains the lag in reform by Turkey. That said, Turkey has overwhelming benefits on offer for itself and for the EU through full membership; thus it cannot be pushed to the side. Turkey's strong economy and tight fiscal

¹⁰² Kibaroglu, 2006, 178

¹⁰³ Atasoy, 2005, 189

¹⁰⁴ Mousseau, 2006, 104

¹⁰⁵ Albert, 2009, 223

¹⁰⁶ Albert, 2009, 223

policies that are in place means it will remain stable and continue to grow. The statistics and many EC reports affirm this progress too. Reforms in all sectors of society from law, administration, and freedom of religion, make clear Turkey is serious about pursuing its intention of membership. Attachment to various international institutions gives added strength to Turkey's desire to be among the leaders in world politics. Turkey's energy potential makes it a powerful energy corridor, thus strengthening its case. Being strategically placed and having experience of the region enables Turkey to calculate and deal with situations better than most. As a specific benefit for the EU, Turkey has its growing economic strength to prove itself and the fact Turkey has not yet reached its potential means the EU can become the main recipient of these escalating benefits. The energy sector is only one known part the EU can benefit from as other sectors can be developed to provide such benefits. Being a known regional player, the EU can be reinforced on the Eastern side, as well as becoming a bridge for communication and promotion of key values such as democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Thus the estimates given by analysts of 10-15 years as a minimum seems a good approximation and some developments within the EU suggest some better progress. One of the most important points that should be remembered is Turkey's changing society. This is important as a new generation will develop, encouraging the continuation of reforms, offering the prospect that any negative aspects of Turkey will soon be ironed out, or at least outweighed by the positive aspects which are becoming more apparent as reflected by Turkey's elevation to a major tourist destination.

CONCLUSION

To bring this research to a conclusive end the four chapters will be summarised briefly whilst attempting to answer the initial questions posed at the beginning of the investigation into Turkey's application for EU membership. Chapter I discussed the many problems faced by Turkey especially during the 1980s and 1990s that led to a slow progression in its hope for membership. Factors such as the strong military presence prevented Turkey from being seen as a fully fledged liberal democracy as the military interference was felt and seen through the coups and the NSC. However, the current role of the military has been limited through several reform packages and most importantly through the recent referendum, which has allowed the possibility of trying coup leaders in civilian courts.¹ The Kurdish situation was once unspeakable but since the internationalising of the domestic issue, it has become recognised that Turkey has moved away from violent containment to wilful engagement. This has been seen through the permanent airing of Kurdish television as well as the economic commitment to the Southeast, thus showing societal development on the issue. The issue of human rights is also being dealt with and it is becoming apparent that Turkey is not alone in this weakness, though it has progressed a long way. Recognising this weakness was one of the first steps to tackle the problem of infringing the basic right of every human. Relations with Greece were also once a major problem, however, through confidence building measures, there has been less contention regarding the Aegean or any islands. The maturity of both countries as well as the encouragement from the international community has been vital in achieving better relations. A major worry was the burden of the Turkish economy on the EU; this thought has been

mostly dispelled. With a booming economy, strong in FDI and national practises being improved, the EU looks to gain much from this structurally sound and functioning market economy. The only issue that remains is that of Cyprus and this can only be cleared through the EU asserting itself stronger in its negotiating capacity. Although the Annan plan did not work due to obvious reasons, this effort needs to be continued to settle the many years of strife for the islanders and regional disagreement.

Chapter II looked into the regional capacity of Turkey in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Within the Balkans, it is clear the historical connection was most felt and for this reason Turkey was limited in its options to intervene during the 1990s since notions of Pan-Turkism was being associated to any gesture towards the region. However, it sought to establish economic ties with success and this has led to better regional politics as well being a model of Western democracy. The Caucasus always had better economic chances due to its energy capacity, thus Turkey has been proactive in establishing ties despite the geographical distance. The Nabucco project is one such endeavour that has connected Europe with that region through the intermediary of Turkey. With regards to the Middle East, Turkey has had to accept its own Ottoman past before engaging on a meaningful level with the Arab states. Acute issues such as the water dispute with Syria or its relations with Israel have led to a wariness of Turkey's motives. With the recent conflict in Iraq and Palestine, Turkey and the Arab states have been able to reassess and reassert their positions. Thus Turkey has adopted a 'zero-problem' policy with its regional neighbours and this has led to increased tourism, trade and established friendly relations. Thus, to answer question three of the investigation, 'Should Turkey become

a member of the EU?’ the answer would be yes. This is because Turkey has much to offer, most importantly to become a role model and mediator in the relations between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’. Turkey’s softer approach to presenting democracy would be grasped better by the regional states and encourage further dialogue. Pursuing the economic policy combined with politics has worked well for Turkey. Turkey has come to realise its neighbours cannot be ignored for the sake of Western orientation, but rather engaging with them on a regional level has increased Turkey’s own standing in the European and international sphere. Backed with military might, Turkey can become a strong Southern flank to contain any threat if need be, though its diplomatic means would always be exhausted first.

Chapter III analysed the journey of Greece, becoming an EU member in 1981, despite its many weaknesses and few strengths. The comparison was made as there were similarities such as the geostrategic positioning of both countries. Moreover, both states experienced economic problems and structural weakness, though Turkey eventually dealt with its problem before acceding to the EU. The political motivations were greater than other states which have joined, and thus played a major factor in preparing Greece for eventual membership. Despite the interventions made by the IMF during the 1980s to reform Greece’s ill fated economy, Greece has yet again made the same mistakes and suffered harsh austerity programmes; this time to limit the potential damage caused to the EU as a whole. Thus to answer question four ‘Should the EU accept Turkey as a full member?’ the answer is yes. The reasoning behind this is simply if Greece can enter based on its criteria and state of affairs in 1979, Turkey has more right to enter now with its reform process increasing constantly. Turkey has more to offer economically than Greece, being a major

exporter of fruit, nuts and vegetables. Furthermore, in military means and in a political context too, Turkey has a larger clout of influence which it can use to ensure the stability of the region. Since the recent conflicts in the region and the example of the 1990s, Turkey can become an important military ally in more concrete ways through the EU, thus strengthening the capacity of the EU and developing its military aspect.

Chapter IV assessed the current situation Turkey is faced with after being accepted in 2004 for accession negotiations. This is a very positive step as it partly answers the first question posed 'Will Turkey enter the EU?' The EU cannot say no, which leaves much room for hope and development of Turkey's standards to conform to EU standards. If it is assumed the EU did continue negotiations to finally accept Turkey as a full member, the question of when this would happen could then be posed. Thus the time frame upon possible accession ought to be discussed. Having reviewed the opinions of analysts and viewpoints of EU member states and others, it would seem the best estimation for Turkey's accession would be around 2020. This is because the EU at present is evolving and whilst deeper integration is the focus, the new states will establish their place within the EU. Thus, if they desire a fellow 'South-eastern' state who could balance the power dynamics in the EU, then this will be favourable to Turkey. The main benefit Turkey has to offer the EU is perhaps the new regional leadership it has taken on. Based on internal economic stability, Turkey is able to penetrate its region through economic and political means to enhance its reputation whilst benefiting from regional stability. Furthermore, when assessing the future of Turkey's position within the EU, it should be remembered the EU will be very different in its outlook over the next ten years. Thus, the current decision by France

and Austria to hold referendums in their respective countries may or may not hold great importance. EU legislation is constantly changing as the issue of Cyprus blocking EU aid to Northern Cyprus has shown and over the next few years the option of qualified majority voting may be used on all major issues, such as the accession of Turkey. The development of Turkey will also be interesting to see as the present situation forecasts a more stable, economically flourishing, vibrant societal based Turkey to which the EU cannot refuse entry. This is believed on the obvious assumption Turkey will continue to develop in all aspects including legislative, societal and legal. Thus it can be concluded the idea of Turkey entering the EU is not a step too far but a step that has taken too long to achieve and the current trend of EU-Turkey relations is the right course of direction.

Appendix I



- Figure 1 Map of the European Union ‘Map of European states’
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/europe_map.htm (accessed 25 September 2010).

The Balkan Region



Figure 2 Map of the Balkans

<http://lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/balkans.jpg> (accessed 25 September 2010)



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Figure 3 Map of the Caucasus and Central Asia

http://www.jozan.net/maps/caucasus_cntrl_asia_pol_00.jpg (accessed 25 September 2010)



802588 (R02107) 6-98

Figure 4 Map of Middle East

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-192062619-middle_east_pol_2008.jpg
 (accessed 25 September 2010)

Appendix II

Table 1 GDP of Turkey and Greece

2006	\$402,709,900,000.00	\$244,951,400,000.00
2005	\$363,369,600,000.00	\$225,206,300,000.00
2004	\$302,678,300,000.00	\$209,109,900,000.00
2003	\$240,375,800,000.00	\$175,556,100,000.00
2002	\$183,888,300,000.00	\$135,029,100,000.00
2001	\$145,243,600,000.00	\$119,109,400,000.00
2000	\$199,267,300,000.00	\$114,601,000,000.00
1999	\$183,823,400,000.00	\$122,707,900,000.00
1998	\$199,633,800,000.00	\$124,648,900,000.00
1997	\$189,164,600,000.00	\$124,025,300,000.00
1996	\$181,051,100,000.00	\$127,109,800,000.00
1995	\$169,318,500,000.00	\$120,152,100,000.00
1994	\$129,734,000,000.00	\$102,353,400,000.00
1993	\$179,408,200,000.00	\$95,512,780,000.00
1992	\$158,890,300,000.00	\$102,022,300,000.00
1991	\$150,765,400,000.00	\$92,295,010,000.00
1990	\$150,641,900,000.00	\$85,929,070,000.00
1989	\$107,029,800,000.00	\$69,494,750,000.00
1988	\$90,102,280,000.00	\$66,942,350,000.00
1987	\$86,927,860,000.00	\$57,630,100,000.00
1986	\$75,596,730,000.00	\$49,490,020,000.00
1985	\$67,237,680,000.00	\$41,977,300,000.00
1984	\$59,895,990,000.00	\$42,152,050,000.00
1983	\$61,517,750,000.00	\$43,388,930,000.00
1982	\$64,389,470,000.00	\$47,943,880,000.00
1981	\$66,455,470,000.00	\$45,950,190,000.00
1980	\$70,903,190,000.00	\$49,884,890,000.00
1979	\$88,093,060,000.00	\$47,824,290,000.00
1978	\$66,561,960,000.00	\$38,860,850,000.00

1977	\$61,088,410,000.00	\$31,755,780,000.00
1976	\$53,306,790,000.00	\$27,346,080,000.00
1975	\$46,479,220,000.00	\$25,040,380,000.00
1974	\$37,338,190,000.00	\$22,253,410,000.00
1973	\$27,100,420,000.00	\$19,616,800,000.00
1972	\$21,545,090,000.00	\$14,821,590,000.00
1971	\$17,098,680,000.00	\$12,809,090,000.00
1970	\$17,875,390,000.00	\$11,534,090,000.00
1969	\$20,306,670,000.00	\$10,276,880,000.00
1968	\$18,168,330,000.00	\$9,044,548,000.00
<u>1967*</u>		\$8,334,468,000.00
<u>1966*</u>		\$7,713,171,000.00
<u>1965*</u>		\$6,933,215,000.00
<u>1964*</u>		\$6,093,739,000.00
<u>1963*</u>		\$5,427,087,000.00
<u>1962*</u>		\$4,859,789,000.00
<u>1961*</u>		\$4,575,618,000.00
<u>1960*</u>		\$4,056,104,000.00

* No data found for these years for Turkey

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