Putting explanation first: progress in science and philosophy

Emmerson, Nicholas James Charles (2023). Putting explanation first: progress in science and philosophy. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

While the claim that science makes progress is uncontroversial, the question of “how?” such progress is made has long been contested. Until the turn of the 21st century, this debate had largely been dictated by meta-scientific considerations. On the one hand, realists like Popper (1959) and Niiniluoto (1980) argued that progress is made when we increase our stock of verisimilar, or truthlike, beliefs. On the other, antirealists like Kuhn (1962) and Laudan (1977) argued that progress is made by solving “puzzles” or “problems”, success in which can be judged only from within a “paradigm” or “research tradition”.
However, in 2007 new life was breathed into this debate with the emergence of a second realist account. According to Bird (2007), science progresses not through the increase of truthlike beliefs, but rather through the accumulation of knowledge; true belief, justified by reliable scientific methodology. Since 2007 the literature on scientific progress has seen rapid expansion and a third realist account has now been proposed.1 On Dellsén’s (2016) view, science progresses when understanding increases, that is when scientists grasp how to explain, or predict, more aspects of the world than they could before.
In stark contrast, debate concerning the nature and scope of philosophical progress has focused upon the question of “whether?” philosophers can claim to have made any significant progress. What’s more, responses to this question have largely been pessimistic. This pessimism is typically motivated either by the apparent lack of consensus on paradigm topics, or the observation that philosophical theories are rarely superseded.2 Nonetheless, recent literature suggests that the “how?” question concerning scientific progress, and the “whether?” questions concerning philosophical progress are more closely connected than one might expect.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

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