Luck and perfect being theism

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Rusavuk, Andre (2023). Luck and perfect being theism. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

Philosophers interested in better understanding the divine nature have explored God’s relationship to time, space, creation, morality, sin, and other features of reality; largely unexplored is God’s relationship to luck. The question I investigate in this doctoral thesis is the following: is the greatest possible being, i.e., a being who is perfect or maximally great, subject to luck?

Although luck’s role in God’s life is mostly uncharted territory, plausibly, pre-philosophical reflections would elicit the following intuition: God is not subject to luck as finite, frail, and contingent beings are. It might seem that subjection to luck would stain divine greatness, perhaps by
diminishing God’s responsibility, creditworthiness, and praiseworthiness. Hence, a lucky God would not be maximally great. Here’s the thesis that captures this view:

Perfect Immunity Thesis (PIT): Necessarily, God is perfectly immune to luck

However, I argue that there are good reasons to think that PIT is false and thus, even a perfect being cannot escape luck. I begin by offering an account of divine luck and control that I will employ throughout my investigation. With this analysis in place, I examine whether God could be
exposed to various kinds of non-moral and moral luck.

First, I set out to show that God is lucky—with some qualifications—to be perfect, and thus God is subject to constitutive non-moral luck (which is luck in one’s constitution). Then, I argue that if divine actions satisfy libertarian conditions on free will, God is subject to present luck, i.e., luck found at or around the moment of action. Thirdly, I make the case that a perfect being could be subject to circumstantial non-moral luck (luck in one’s circumstances) and resultant non-moral luck (luck in the consequences of one’s actions). I use certain popular views within perfect being theism to make my case. Lastly, I argue that God is also subject to moral luck. I also consider whether subjection to certain varieties of moral luck is potentially problematic for theists.

I conclude that some forms of luck affect all versions of perfect being theism, some affect a large subset of perfect being theism, and some affect only specific models of perfect being theism. Accordingly, the falsity of PIT is established. At the end of the thesis, I offer two alternatives to PIT
and invite theists to inquire further and deeper into God’s relationship to luck.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

Supervisor(s):