THE GOVERNMENT OF THE VAN REGION UNDER THE KARA KOYUNLU

by

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A thesis submitted to the

Faculty of Arts

of the

University of Birmingham

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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SYNOPSIS

During the rule of the Kara Koyunlu over Armenia, from the late 14th century to the demise of the dynasty as a Near Eastern power in A.D. 1469, the Van region was governed essentially by a series of local Kurdish principalities whose princes derived their power from tribal allegiance. Owing to the tribal interrelationships within the respective principalities, to the transhumance patterns of the constituent tribes, and to geographical factors, the principalities formed a local political system which was by and large in equilibrium, that is to say there was little tendency for borders, tribal allegiance and summer and winter pastures to change. In so far as there was a tendency towards such change, the Kara Koyunlu provided the small counterbalance necessary. The Kara Koyunlu achieved this merely by demanding submission from the local principalities and enforcing it where necessary; otherwise they abstained from interference in the principalities' internal affairs. The Kara Koyunlu did directly administer a group of districts in the north-east of the region, but seem to have maintained only a minimum apparatus in those districts too. The thesis emphasises the study of local political institutions and of the interaction between them. They seem to be the key, not only to building up a wider picture of government by successive rulers of the period, but also to an understanding of the lives of the subject Christian populations.

The text of this thesis, exclusive of notes and appendices,

contains approximately 85,000 words.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The first debt of this thesis is to my several supervisors at Birmingham. Prof. Anthony Bryer has discussed many questions, great and small, arising out of the subject, and read the text with close attention. Dr, now Prof., Michael Ursinus, helped me particularly with Ottoman material, and in improving my knowledge of Ottoman Turkish itself. Dr Johann Strauss helped with ideas on the study of place names in documents and on the interpretation of documents.

Dr Robert Hewsen has provided me with new insights into all aspects of the Armenian content of this thesis. He has also read many parts of the text and commented in detail on the argument and expression. Similarly Prof. Charles Dowsett has read several chapters and appendices and commented in particular on aspects which concern the Armenian language.

Stephen Album has greatly helped by checking most of my coin lists, giving me the benefit of his opinions, mostly unpublished, on the political significance of the coins, and allowing me to use the printouts of his coin collection's skeleton catalogue. Likewise Dr Judith Kolbas, beside reading several sections of the text, has commented on my use of coin evidence and provided me with several ideas about Il-Khanid coinage. Prof. Michael Rogers has also read several parts of the text and commented particularly on the aspects of the subject which concern Islamic institutions. Profs. Nejat Göyünç and Faruk Sümer have helped with suggestions for material in the Persian and Ottoman sources respectively.

James Christie typed nearly all the diacritical marks in the thesis -- displaying, therefore, heroic patience and proverbial kindness -- and gave me much advice and

support in questions of layout and in the best use of computers and printers.

The help of the Skilliter Library Committee and of the Seven Pillars of Wisdom Trust in financing my short stay in Istanbul to study the Ottoman *defter*s is acknowledged with much gratitude.

It is a great pleasure to acknowledge the wisdom, expertise, advice and support of all the people mentioned above; but in the end the responsibility for the thesis is mine, and any mistakes and misinterpretations are mine too.

Tom Sinclair

March 1993

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TRANSLITERATION, LAYOUT ETC.

A. SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION

I. Proper names

1. Place names. Turkish spelling has been preferred throughout. Occasionally, if a text is under close discussion, a strict transliteration of the spelling found in the text has been chosen. For example, "Mūsh" instead of "Muş" in the discussion of a 16th-century Persian text.

1.2. If the place in question is not in modern Turkey, then an Anglicised form of the name is put. There are also occasional cases of modern Turkish names which are not etymologically descended from the medieval name. In that case an Anglicised version of the medieval name has been chosen. For example, "Vostan"; modern Turkish name "Gevaş".

1.3. Exact transliterations of most names, including ones given here in their modern Turkish form, are given at various points in the text of this thesis, particularly in Appendix I. Other transliterations can be found by consulting the list at the end of the thesis: this list gives equivalents for Anglicised forms found in the text.

2. Personal names, tribal names etc.. These have mostly been spelt in an Anglicised form of the name which does not attempt to be a strict transliteration. The spelling chosen will be that already accepted in English, or an approximation using strictly the English alphabet only. If the name occurs in more than one language, an appropriate choice of language from which to take the form to be Anglicised has been made. The appropriate language will vary according to context and according to the original text used.

2.2. If the bearer of a name is a Turk and the name is current in modern Turkey, then the modern Turkish form of the name is used: for example "Iskender".[a] In the case of "Iskender" and one or two other cases even the modern Turkish spelling has been simplified: here the dot over the capital I has been dropped.

2.3. At the end of the thesis a list of non-transliterated personal and tribal names is included with strict transliteration equivalents in the relevant languages.

2.4. In the main text of this thesis the transliterated form has only been used as the standard form of a personal or tribe name etc. if it occurs rarely or if a non-transliterated spelling would be thoroughly misleading as to pronunciation. For example, the tribal name "Ruzagi" is extremely common, but removing the diacritical marks (correctly translit. "Rūzagī") is not significantly misleading as to pronunciation. However to remove those marks from the word "Pāzūkī" (also a tribal name) would be highly misleading; nevertheless the name "Pāzūkī" occurs commonly in this thesis.

2.5. On occasion the same name has been spelt differently to reflect different contexts: for example "Süleyman" (the modern Turkish spelling) used to name an Ottoman sultan, but "Sulayman" used to name a Kurdish prince.

2.6. In sum, personal names are represented in this thesis according to a variety

---

[a] Cf. "William" instead of "Guillaume" in the writing of English medieval history.

of different policies. In principle one could find representations of names according to these different policies (time-honoured conventional form, Anglicisation, modern Turkish form, strict transliteration etc.) in the same paragraph. The object is to reduce the typographical complications to a minimum; to keep to familiar forms as far as possible; and generally to lighten the burden of reading.[a] Despite the complexity of the overall policy employed, the text reads more easily and without the unnecessary worry introduced, especially when one of the languages in question is unknown to the reader, by precise transliteration. A transliterated form is nearly always available, whether in the text or in the list at the end.

3. Technical terms. (a) If a term is reasonably common in English (whether scholarly literature or not) then it is put in an Anglicised form, following a similar policy to that for personal names. The word is not italicised. For example, "sanjak".

(b) If the term is reasonably common in modern Turkish (whether scholarly literature or not) but not so in English, the modern Turkish form is put, but italicised. For example: *tahrir*, *timar*. Sometimes an adjustment has been made in order to indicate more exactly the spelling in Arabic script: e.g. *ze'amet*.

(c) Otherwise an Anglicised form of the term is generally chosen, and is put in italics. The precisely transliterated form can be found in the list of names at the end of the

[a] Among other reasons is the incompatibility between the transliteration systems for the different languages written in the Arabic script. The incompatibility is in part inevitable, assuming that variations in pronunciation are to be reflected, and partly the result of lack of foresight. These transliteration systems are also to an extent incompatible with that used for Armenian. Given the differences, which are engrained in scholarly practice, it seems better to apply the systems more or less as they are. But this means it is no longer possible to talk of accuracy where a name or word occurs in two different languages, unless two or more different forms are put down simultaneously. The argument that approximation by means of Anglicised forms is inaccurate therefore collapses.

thesis.

(d) In some contexts, especially where the emphasis is on the word in an original text, the transliterated form is used. In some cases the transliteration has been varied according to context: *nāhiya* (Pers.) in the late medieval context; *nāhiye* in an Ottoman context, where the meaning of the term is considerably different; *nahiye* (the modern Turkish form) also in an Ottoman context, but where less emphasis is placed on original texts, or in a modern Turkish context.

II. Arabic, Persian and Ottoman spellings

For Arabic, a modified version of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* system; for Persian, a modified version of that employed by Steingass in his dictionary;[a] for Ottoman, the very rigorous system now in use by European scholars. The latter includes the underlining of vowels which are pronounced short but written long. The latter feature has occasionally (in the present thesis) been applied to Persian as well. In order to cut down the possible misunderstandings and confusions, the modern Turkish equivalents in sound and the transliteration symbols denoting the equivalent sound in Classical (*not* Modern Western) Armenian have been included in the following table.

[a] F.Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary* (1892, repr. Beirut 1970, 1975).

	Arabic	Persian	Ottoman	Modern Turkish	Class. Armn.	No.
ا	ā, if long a	ā, ditto	ā, ditto	â		
ت	t	t	t	t	t	
ث	th	s̲	s̲	s		(1)
ج	j	j	c	c	ǰ	
ح	ḥ	ḥ	ḥ	h		(2)
خ	kh	kh	h	h	x	(3)
د	d	d	d	d	d	
ذ	dh	z̲	z̲	z		(4)
ز	z	z	z	z	z	
س	s	s	s	s	s	
ش	sh	sh	ş	ş	š	(5)
ص	ṣ	ṣ	ṣ	ṣ		(6)
ض	ḍ	ż	ż	z		(7)
ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	t		(8)
ظ	ẓ	ẓ	ẓ	z		(9)
ع	‘	‘	‘			(10)
غ	gh	gh	ġ	ğ	ł	(11)
ق	q	q (pron."gh")	ķ	k		(12)
ک	k	k	k, ġ, ñ	k, ğ, n		(13)
و	(i) w (ii) ū	(i) v, u (ii) ū (iii) o̲, ö̲ (iv) small, spscrpt. w	(i) v (ii) ū (iii) ü̲, ö̲ etc.	(i) v (ii) û (iii) ü, ö, u, o		(14)
ه	h	h	h	h	h	
ی	y, ī	y, ī, ê	y, ī	y, î	y	(15)

ئ	ʾ	ʾ	ʾ			(16)
-و/		u, o	u̲, o̲ etc.	u, o	u	(17)
-ى/	ī	ī	ī, i̲, e	i, i, e		(18)
Short vowels	a, i, u	a, e, i, u	a, e, i, ı, o, ö, u, ü	a, e, i, ı, o, ö, u, ü		(19)

Explanations of sounds and transliteration symbols

(1) Pers. and Ott. pron. "s", no diff. from س.

(2) Rough h.

(3) Scrape, back of throat

(4) Arab.: voiced "th", e.g. Engl. "that". Pers. and Ott.: "s".

(5) Eng. "sharp".

(6) Letter "ṣād". Arab.: emphatic "s" hissed with tongue against front teeth. Pers. and Ott., indisting. from س.

(7) Letter "ḍād". Arab.: "d" with tongue against upper front teeth. Pers. and Ott., indisting. from ز.

(8) Letter "ṭā". Arab.: "t" equiv. to ض/ḍād. Pers. and Ott.: indisting. from ت/t.

(9) Letter "ẓa". Arab.: "z" equiv. to ض /ḍād. Pers. and Ott., indisting. from ز/z.

(10) Letter "ʿayn". Arab.: guttural sound with constricted throat. Pers.: similar, but often not pron.. Sometimes lengthens preceding vowel. Ott.: generally not pron.. Mod. Tk.: not pron..

(11) Letter "ghayn". Arab.: limited scrape in throat. Pers.: similar. Ott.: similar; or else the semi-vanishing sound of mod. Tk. ğ. This takes the form of a /w/ or /y/ sound or a stop in the breath. Armn. ł is similar to Arab., but velar, i.e. the sound is made by contact with the soft palate rather than the throat.

(12) Arab.: clicked "k" at back of throat. Pers.: "gh", as غ; but sometimes pron. as Arabic.[a] Ott.: indisting. from ک/k.

(13) Ott.: can represent ġ, esp. in verbal suffixes; and n, esp. in noun suffixes.

[a] Information from Prof. C.J.F.Dowsett, passed on from Profs. Lambton and Gandjei.

(14) (I) Arab.: either (i) /w/ sound or (ii) long u, as in "shoot".
(II) Pers.: (i) in place of Arab. /w/ sound. If between two vowels, at beginning or end of word, or after a consonant, then pron. v. If before a consonant, a /w/ sound, here translit. "u".
(Purpose: to obviate temptation to pron. /v/.)
(ii) If represents long u, same as Arab..
(iii) If a short vowel represented, as in some place names, then u̲, ü̲, o, ö. etc. (e.g. بِنگول, "Bingol")
(iv) In some cases the combination ـُوَ, represented a vanished ـَ and a long ā. Translit. with small superscript w. E.g. "Khʷārizmshāh" (translit.), "Khwarizmshah", without expl. that w is unsounded, in Anglicised form.
(III) Ott.: (i) in place of Arab. "w" sound, "v" in all cases.
(ii) If represents long u, same as Arab..
(iii) If represents short vowel, then u̲, ü̲, o̲, ö̲.

(15) Arab.: either consonantal y, or long i as in "street". Pers.: beside the sound values possible in Arabic, can also represent the long glide ei, as in the English surname "Paish". E.g. بیگ is translit. "bêg", not "bīg".[a] Ott.: same as Pers., but ê replaced by ė.

(16) Letter "hamza", usually written above other letters. Arab.: glottal stop. Pers.: if used as sign of *ezāfe*, then omitted in translit.. Ott.: as Pers..

(17) As combination at beginning of word. Pers. and Ott.: short vowel.

(18) As combination at beginning of word. Arab.: rare, but can indicate long i, "street". Pers.: generally long i. If short vowel, translit. e or i. Ott.: translit. "ī" if long i; "i" if short i; ė if represents short e.

(19) Short vowels. Pers.: generally a, i, u, but treated freely and without consistency here.

III. Armenian

The Hübschmann-Meillet system has been used. The only adjustment is the use of ë and Ë instead of ə and Ə for ը, ët'. The Hübschmann-Meillet system is designed to represent

[a] See A.K.S.Lambton, *Persian Grammar* (Cambridge 1953, repr. 1988), p.xii.

Classical Armenian spelling and pronunciation. Modern Western pronunciation differs markedly from Classical: in particular there are eight consonantal sound changes, the result of an exchange of sound between four pairs of consonants.[a] It is conventional, in transliterating Modern Western Armenian, to apply the Hübschmann-Meillet system in spite of the sound changes, and the same has been done here. Such a policy does not obviate confusion; it is merely the least confusing alternative.[b]

It should be remembered, too, that in the 14th and 15th centuries A.D., with which this thesis is concerned, and subsequent centuries up to the 18th, writers of Classical Armenian who described events in the Van region generally had in mind a Modern Western pronunciation. At this stage Modern Western dialects were the unwritten vernacular of the Van region and of other areas now inside modern Turkey. This is clear from the spelling of loan words. However even here the writers are not consistent: they may spell the same word in two different ways, which reflect respectively the sound values in Classical and those in Modern Western.

The following table includes only those letters in respect of which confusion is at

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[a] This is not strictly accurate, as the modern Western sounds are all aspirate, whereas the Classical ones are all non-aspirate. The point is emphasised in the table and below.

[b] The alternative to Hübschmann-Meillet is Toumanoff's system in his *Studies*. The latter uses the backward comma ‘ to represent aspiration, but substitutes combinations of letters in the English alphabet for certain of the symbols in the Hübschmann-Meillet system: for example ts instead of c, ts‘ instead of c‘, ch instead of č. Toumanoff's is quite acceptable as a precise transliteration system for the Classical Armenian of the 5th to 7th centuries A.D.. However as soon as the different pronunciations of Modern Western enter the argument, his system is no longer defensible as a precise transliteration. Its advantage is that it represents sounds using an alphabet that is already known. But this looks, even when dealing with an invariant pronunciation, as though it concentrates on the representation of sound rather than on an unambiguous conversion, into a parallel lettering system, of the letters. When the same Armenian letters can be pronounced differently the difficulty becomes worse. If the reader has in mind the Modern Western pronunciation, either we appear to be indicating the sound incorrectly while providing an accurate account of the spelling; or we appear to be indicating the sound correctly while changing the spelling.

all likely. It should be emphasised that the symbols in the second column are transliteration instruments, primarily designed for Classical Armenian, and for our purposes carry no precise indication of sound. Those in the fourth column are a means of indicating the sound of given letters in the Modern Western pronunciation and are not transliteration symbols.

	Classical Armenian		Modern Western Armenian	
	Translit.	**Expl. of sound**	**Sound**	**Explanation of sound**
ա	a	As northern Engl. "hat"	a	Put here for explanation of examples below.
բ	b	As in Engl. "burn".	p	Aspirate. Otherwise letter exchanges sounds with պ.
գ	g	Hard g	k	Aspirate. Otherwise changes sounds with կ.
դ	d		t	Aspirate. Otherwise exchanges sounds with տ.
ե	e	As in Engl. "bell". But at beginning of word a /y/ sound precedes it. Cf. "(Y)erevan".	e, ye	Generally no /y/ at beginning of word.
զ	z		z	
է	ē	Long e.	e	No diff. from ե.
ը	ë	Low unrounded semi-vowel, unstressed. Roughly as in Engl. "*a*bout". See notes (1) and (2).	ë	
թ	t‘	Aspirate	t‘	
ժ	ž	As French "j".	ž	
ի	i	As in Engl. "tin".	i	
խ	x	Glottal scrape, harder than Scottish "lo*ch*".	x	

ծ	c	Ts, non-aspirate.	j	Aspirate. Otherwise exchanges sounds with ց.
կ	k	Non-aspirate.	g	Exchanges sounds with ք.
հ, Հ	h		h	
ջ, Ջ	j	Dz, as Engl. "adze".	ts	Aspirate. Otherwise changes places with ծ.
ղ	ł	Gh. Velar sound. See note (3) below.	ł	Limited scrape in throat, similar to Arab. 'ayn.
ճ	č	Ch, as in "church", but non-aspirate.	ǰ	Exchanges sounds with ջ.
յ	y	Y. But (i) pron. /h/ at beginning of word, (ii) not pron. at end, e.g. - = - . But see also note (4) below.	y	As in Classical.
շ	š	Sh as in "short".	š	
ո	o	As in Engl. "pot". But if at beginning of word, preceded by /v/: e.g. "(V)oskean".	o	As in Classical.
չ	č'	Ch as in "church"; aspirate.	č'	As in Classical.
պ	p	Non-aspirate.	b	Changes places with փ.
ջ	j	As in Engl. "judge".	č	Ch as in "church", but aspirate. Changes places with ճ.
ռ	ṙ	Rolled or trilled.	ṙ	
ս	s		s	
վ	v		v	
տ	t	Non-aspirate	d	Changes places with դ.
ր	r	Resembles standard English r.	r	
ց	c'	Ts; aspirate.	c'	As in Classical.
ւ	w; but is translit. u.	/V/, except ու, ոււ, իւ, on which see note (5) below.	v; = u	As in Classical.

փ	p‘	Aspirate p.	p‘
ք	k‘	Aspirate k.	k‘
օ	ō	Long o; see note (4).	ō
ֆ	f	For loan words or adaptation of loan words.	f

Notes to table

(1) The *shwa*, written ը, ë, sometimes represents the reduction of an original full vowel. In other cases it is inserted between pairs of consonants, especially in groups of more than two consonants, merely in order to ease the pronunciation. However in such cases it is not generally written. Sometimes, nevertheless, it is inserted in the spelling of a word, especially by writers of the late Middle Ages and the Ottoman period. Usage was not consistent. No attempt has been made here to render this sound if unrepresented in the Armenian spelling of a word.

(2) The same unwritten *shwa* occurs in the pronunciation of words beginning st-, sp-, and sk- in Classical Armenian. For example: ստորագրութիւն , translit. "storagrut‘iwn", pron. in late Middle Ages "ësdorakrut‘yun". Again the sound is sometimes indicated in the Armenian spelling of a word, particularly by writers of the late Middle Ages and Ottoman period. In the latter case the occurrence of the letter in the Armenian original is indicated in the transliteration.

(3) Velar: produced by contact with the soft palate.

(4) However the letter *is* pron. at the end of monosyllabic nominal forms, e.g. հայ , pron. "Hay", meaning "Armenian".

Note that in the late Middle Ages etc. -այ is sometimes written յ: e.g. փայլայ seems to be interchangeable with փայլ ·

(5) The pronunciation of ու.

(i) the combination ու is pron. "u" as in Engl. "put". But sometimes long, as Engl. "loot".

(ii) In certain cases the combination աւ is pron. ō (long o as in Northern English dialects). But in texts after the 12th century A.D., the letter (Armn.), translit. ō, is written instead.

(iii) In some cases the combination իւ is a diphthong pron. /iu/. This is always the case at the beginning of a word.

But again the authors were not consistent. Sometimes աւ is written when the pronunciation

must have been /ō/ rather than /av/.[a]

IV. Syriac

The present writer compiled a table of transliteration symbols, Anglicisations and Classical Syriac pronunciation in Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.x. The forms used in the present thesis are taken from the writings of modern scholars. If in any given instance (in this thesis) the presence of exact transliteration is not signalled, then an Anglicisation approximating to the sound in Classical Syriac is being offered. If exact transliteration *is* signalled, then the system used by modern Syriacists is meant. The sound system and alphabet are closely related to Arabic; nevertheless the pronunciation of several letters differs from that of their equivalents in Arabic. Among the differing transliteration symbols used, note especially h (Arab. equiv. kh; but the sound in Syriac is softer) and š (Arab. equiv. sh).[b]

B. OTHER MATTERS

1. Dates. The standard dating scheme in this thesis is the Julian calendar (A.D. years). "H." means "Hijrī" (Arab.), i.e. the year in the Muslim calendar. If two dates, separated

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[a] Authors writing to represent the sound /ō/ were attempting in this case to hark back to the orthography of the early period of Armenian literature, but only succeeded in confusing the reader as to which pronunciation he (the writer) intends, let alone the one current at the time of writing. Both of these would have been unambiguously indicated by writing (translit. ō), which was the usual practice.

[b] But š is used in other systems of transliteration from Arabic.

by a slash, are given, then the first is that according to the Muslim calendar and the second that according to the Julian. Often it is necessary to indicate the second date (that according to the Julian calendar) by means of two years, as the Muslim lunar year never exactly coincides with A.D. years.

"Armn." means "Armenian": Armenian authors use the Armenian calendar. If the Armenian year (always accompanied by the abbreviation "Armn.") is followed by a slash and another date, then that second date is the year according to the Julian calendar. The Armenian year runs from April to April, so here, too, it is sometimes necessary to put two A.D. years as the equivalent.

2. Coins. These have all been put at the end of the relevant cities and towns in Appendix I. In nearly every case no page references are given, as the coin can quickly be identified from its year. Square brackets in the entries mean information not on the coins but nevertheless validly attributable.

3. Endnotes and footnotes. Short page references and comments are put in footnotes. Notes of a more argumentative and discursive character are put at the end of the thesis.[a]

[a] The ideal would have been to have a third category, in which an assertion requiring an endnote is given a footnote too. The immediate references for the assertion are put in the footnote, so that the reader does not have to break the flow of consultation of the main text to check the immediate sources. (Cf. D.Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ*, Princeton 1950.) However this would be impractical and lengthy in the present context.

CHAPTER I

SOURCES AND METHODS

1. Subject

Scope. This thesis is concerned with the government of the Lake Van area during the occupation of Armenia by the Kara Koyunlu. Exact definition of period will be deferred to Ch.II, sect.1. But as a rough indication the following can be said. The Kara Koyunlu appear to have become masters of the Lake Van region and other parts of Armenia in the 770's/1370's and 780's/1380's. They held it until the last defeat of the last Kara Koyunlu sultan in the Near East, Hasan 'Ali, in 874/1469.[1]

The area under study is naturally a unity and its boundaries clearly mark it off from others. To the west the boundary is the western border of the plain of Muş. To the east it is the hills over which the present boundary between Iran and Turkey runs. To the south it is the modern political boundary between Turkey and Iraq. However the relief and hydrography suggest that of the area north of the Turco-Iraqi boundary only the easterly half, the complicated river system of the Zab, should be included. Towards the west the Taurus mountains and modern boundary lie well apart, and the district looks towards the upper Tigris basin. The rivers here are tributaries of the Tigris which join that river at points well west and upstream of the Zab. The region under study measures some 300 km. square, or, in rough terms, has the same area as the whole of southern England and the

Midlands put together.

Aims. Armenia's history after the Mongols has been painted in the blackest terms, particularly by Armenian historians. On the whole such historians view the Mongols favourably. But the Turcoman period is viewed as one in which the two nomadic confederations constantly fought over Armenia and during which that country was devastated by the invasions of Timur. An Armenia constantly fought over by two groups of nomads (goes the argument) must have suffered grave decline and depopulation: agriculture must have been disrupted by the incursion of nomads and by incessant fighting. Tacitly it is assumed that the cities either contracted to insignificant proportions or else died; or if not, no attention is given to the condition of the cities, which creates an impression to the same effect. Our image is of a rural society forming the battleground for the two confederations. Once cities are removed from the picture, it becomes natural to assume that no permanent administration existed capable of providing local defence and security.[2]

Of the many sources providing information about the period, the contribution of any single source is highly fragmentary. Nevertheless a reasonably complete picture of the period can be constructed by consulting all the sources. Unfortunately when sources yield information in a fragmentary manner it is hard to see just what picture can be constructed by combining them. By taking just one source or category of sources, a misleading picture will be created. Modern Armenian historians have tended mostly to consult Armenian sources, and so created a partial picture. But the picture painted by the Armenian sources is so dark that a casual reading scarcely encourages the reader to study the period thoroughly. In the Turcoman period, moreover, the major Armenian chronicles, which

would have provided more systematic information, give out. The modern historian immediately senses a difficulty which can be forgotten by simply dealing with other periods. Reason turns back on itself: inadequate Armenian sources suggest a dark picture, which discourages the student from investigating the period, taking its patchy sources as a sign of chaos and agony for the Armenian population; which in turn leaves the student with a distaste for the fragmentary Armenian sources and an easy reason for dismissing the period as a disaster so traumatic that further study would only deepen the wounds of contemplation without sharpening the image of the period's events.[3]

The first step in investigating such questions as economic decline and depletion of populations must be to establish sensible criteria. Since the mid-7th century the Armenian population had been more or or less continuously the subject of Muslim overlords, at one remove or another. It was frequently exposed to foreign invasions and to fighting between local rulers. Emigration was, if not constant, at least characteristic of the whole Islamic period.[a] Yet it has always been accepted that until the Turcoman period Armenian society remained the base population, and that it survived all the disasters. One may therefore ask what made the Turcoman period so exceptional in terms of economic decline and population loss.

It could be argued that while the Turcoman period is nothing exceptional if taken on its own, nevertheless after the cumulative burden of previous suffering the period provided the final blow under which Armenian society as a whole lost its integrity and coherence, and lost, too, its ability to resist penetration by Muslim peoples and gradual conversion to Islam. Such a proposition, however, has never been supported by evidence.

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[a] On the process of invasion and diaspora in the early Middle Ages, see any of the standard histories of Armenia; for example *Histoire des Arméniens* or Grousset, *Arménie*.

It could equally well be argued that the processes just described took place in the Ottoman period. Such processes, it could be said, first gained momentum in the Ottoman-Safavid wars of the 16th and the first third of the 17th century, during which part of the population was uprooted and taken to Iran, and when the opportunities for voluntary westward migration were easier than at almost any stage in the previous 900 years. Subsequently there occurred the outstanding and easily the most significant economic decline in Armenia's history during the Turkish period: its isolation for nearly two centuries from the main avenues of world trade. It was this, in ways which would take too long to specify here, which caused the depletion of Armenian society, mainly through conversion, to the point where, in the late 19th century, Armenians were a majority, and that a slim one, in only six Ottoman provinces.

During the Turcoman period Armenian society, and particularly that of the Van region, appears, in reality, to have been productive and resilient. One index is the production of manuscripts in monasteries; another, the volume of building work. A third is the evidence that the cities still prospered, though they had somewhat declined since the Il-Khanid period.[a] This was a process undoubtedly started under the Il-Khans themselves. All the evidence shows a decline in the cities beginning about 736/1335, when infighting between various short-lived Il-Khans and their rivals began.

It has now been argued that critical questions arise about Armenian society in the Turcoman period, that they bear on broader questions in a longer sweep of Armenian history, and that the answers are by no means a foregone conclusion; indeed the indications are that the state of Armenian society was not significantly more grave than at any previous stage in the Islamic period. But at this point it is essential to remind the

[a] For these matters, see under the various cities in Appendix I, and Ch.V, sect.II.

reader that the purpose of the present thesis is not to answer any of the questions just mentioned, but to examine the political framework of one large portion of Armenia in the Turcoman period. To reconstruct the political framework is to undertake essential groundwork in the provision of answers to such critical questions as have just been posed.

The relevance of such groundwork to the issues just outlined becomes apparent as soon as it is undertaken. It undercuts some of the presuppositions on which the gloomy view of Armenian society in the Turcoman period is based. It was mentioned above that such a view represents Armenia as a battleground between two nomad confederations. But, as we shall go some way towards showing, in much of Armenia local power was not in the hands of either confederation. It was wielded by territorially stable Kurdish principalities. These were, of course, vassals of one or other Turcoman confederation. But it is an open question what difference such vassalage made to the local operations of these principalities.

The "battleground" view of Armenian society in the period suggests rapidly shifting frontiers and fighting in a great variety of regional theatres. But the Turcomans' tenure of power via the medium of local subordinates ensured that the boundaries between the two confederations' spheres were, in the short term, more or less fixed. Fighting would therefore take place along a fairly stable frontier, leaving large areas of Armenia unaffected except by raids. The movement of the border was slow, and in much of Armenia can only be described as the acquisition and loss of principalities. When it comes to examining the administration carried out by local powers, whether that of the Kurdish principalities or the Turcomans, one of the first steps is to locate the cities and towns on which it was based and to define their size and function. Here is a third way in which examining the government of an area is immediately relevant to the study of its

population.

Beyond these points it is unnecessary to be specific, and the relation between political framework and the history of local Armenian society becomes more elusive, though scarcely less strong. Any question about the character and whereabouts of local population has to be answered against the backdrop of the political framework, or by defining the local institutions and personnel with which Armenians had immediately to deal. Of most immediate relevance are the social organisation of the local principalities, the location of the Kurdish groups on which the principalities' power was based, the local institutions (such as governorships and apanages) which formed the vehicle of administration within the local principalities; equivalent institutions within the districts directly governed by the confederations; and the character of land tenure and taxation. The whole network of local principalities was held together by the overlord Turcoman power; another immediately relevant question, therefore, is the character of its relations with the local principalities and any effect this might have on the relations between the principalities.

Having outlined the aims of examining the political framework, we have more or less defined the programme. In sum, the programme is to point out the existence of the local principalities, to define geographically both the principalities and any areas directly administered by the overlord power; to examine the institutions forming the vehicle of administration, whether within the principalities or in directly-administered areas; and to elucidate the character of the hold which either Turcoman confederation had over the principalities. Put tersely, the programme is to define local political institutions and their general character and interrelation. It does not extend to an examination of their effect on the Armenian population; this would involve a narrative and an evaluation of their

operation.

After outlining the reason for studying the political institutions of the period, reasons have to be given for targeting the present study on the Kara Koyunlu and the Van region. The Kara Koyunlu governed Armenia, or most parts of it, for about a century; the rule of the Ak Koyunlu, as undisputed power, over most of Armenia lasted only thirty years. The character of Ak Koyunlu dealings with the local principalities seems to have changed considerably during that period, and was affected for more than twenty years by violent and widespread factional fighting. The Kara Koyunlu period is therefore likely to have been more influential, and offers a less shifting and friable picture. As a starting-point in the wider subject of the whole period between the Mongols and the Ottomans, the Kara Koyunlu period appears the best, both on general historical grounds and on grounds of greater ease in drawing conclusions and a smaller number of conceptual difficulties.

The Van region constituted the greater part of the province of Armenia ("Arminīya") on the definition of the medieval Arab geographers. On an older and wider definition, Armenia's boundaries lay, in broad terms, on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and, to the north-east, included the massifs surrounding Lake Sevan. If the wider definition were applied to the late Middle Ages, the Van region, as a region, was probably the most productive and active in Armenia, though individual centres elsewhere, such as the monastery of Tat'ew, may have been more active than any individual centre in the Van region.[4] The latter region contained two of the most powerful Kurdish principalities, Bitlis and Hakkari. In a political sense it is possible to isolate the region and treat its institutions as a self-sufficient system. For one thing, it was wholly within the Kara Koyunlu sphere. Erciş, renowned as the city most favoured by the Kara Koyunlu, lay within the region. It would be desirable to examine adjoining areas, but it is valid not to do so, given that

a suitable starting-point in the systematic study of the period has to be found.

The need for a suitable starting-point in the examination of the post-Mongol period and thus for studying just one region of Armenia arises from the difficulty of using the sources to reconstruct the political system. (The difficulty is discussed in the next two sections.) One region and shorter period need to be chosen as a place to prove certain methods of employing the sources. Among these methods are: the use of a combination of published sources in different languages, and from different periods, to construct a complete picture of local political power relations; the use of modern anthropological literature to interpret the information and vocabulary of the sources, particularly the *Sherefname*, concerning institutions in the Kurdish principalities; and the use of Ottoman defters to construct districts which, on a view whose historical probability wil be discussed below, formed the building blocks for the local principalities.

The chief purpose in proving and refining such methods is to expand the present study geographically to the whole of Armenia on the wider definition and chronologically to encompass the period of Ak Koyunlu domination. However it would be possible to extend the use of such methods to the rest of the Kara Koyunlu empire. That this has not been done probably constitutes the most powerful reason why the Kara Koyunlu have been little studied from an institutional and religious, and even a dynastic and chronological, standpoint. Questions of tribal organisation within the Kara Koyunlu, lines of command, geographical split, family relations, and of religious leanings (particularly the vexed question of Shi'ism), will not be adequately answered, and it is doubtful if attempts will even be made to answer them, until the local political framework of the other regions within the Kara Koyunlu empire have similarly been investigated. Of course the institutional questions (particularly that of tribal organisation) and the religious ones

(particularly that of Shi'ism) are the first to be posed. But answers to these questions will be meaningless until the local political institutions, and preferably the populations, of the different regions presided over by the Kara Koyunlu have been examined.

2. Methods

Two issues will be dealt with which are peculiar to the present thesis.

(i) Use of information relevant to other periods

The sources directly descriptive of events and circumstances in the Kara Koyunlu period contain serious gaps. Information has been taken from nearby periods, particularly the Ottoman, in order to fill these. For the internal constitution of some of the Kurdish principalities certain features of the Armenian principalities of the Late Classical period and of the Middle Ages up to the 11th century have been adduced. The Kurdish principalities endured into the Ottoman period, in most cases into the 19th century. The source which systematically expounds the history of these principalites, the *Sherefname*, does not, except in the case of the Bitlis and Hakkari dynasties, begin to supply accurate and reliable information until the period of the Ak Koyunlu occupation, and is only full where it deals with the 16th century (the first century of Ottoman occupation). Without its information we should be unable to describe many aspects of internal constitution and geographical extent. Something similar is true of Evliya Çelebi, whose information pertains to an even later period, the mid-17th century; however Evliya gives us a detailed

picture only of the Bitlis principality.

The procedure of taking information from periods other than the Kara Koyunlu is a salient feature of this thesis, and needs some discussion. In the first place, is it possible to assume that the procedure supplies a correct form of conclusion ? For example, can we assume that aspects of Kurdish political institutions obtaining in the Ottoman period also obtained in the Kara Koyunlu period ? Secondly, does the employment of the procedure actually amount to an investigation of the Kara Koyunlu period, or are we simply informing ourselves about the Ottoman and other periods while pretending to reconstruct the period when the Kara Koyunlu were in power ?

As to the first question, whether information can be taken from other periods and fitted into the picture of the Kara Koyunlu period, on the whole the justification for this is as follows: while the procedure supplies conclusions less accurate or less certain than information directly concerning the period, it is nevertheless necessary for the investigation of certain features of the Kurdish principalities in respect of which conclusions would otherwise be impossible. This apart, there are some features the investigation of which actually benefit from the procedure and in some cases require it. Any durable feature of the principalities is in this category. Their durability *per se* can only be demonstrated by following their history in previous and subsequent periods. Within any given principality, inter-tribal or intra-tribal entities or structures either are durable or else are fragile; here again the questions can only be settled by looking outside the target period.[5]

However certain other features either suffered or may have suffered metamorphosis under the impress of incorporation into the Ottoman administrative system or of other changes in circumstance. Among these features are the arrangements for apanages for

members of the ruling families of the principalities, and the principalities' geographical extent. Here the logic of the procedure of importing and infilling becomes particularly exposed. If there may have been change, how can we assume no change ? Suppose, too, that we make the assumption of no change, deduce certain features in the Kara Koyunlu period, rediscover the same features in the Ottoman period, and conclude that no change occurred; then this whole argument is simply circular.

The logic of the procedure is considerably less vicious than such criticisms imply. Sometimes we can be sure that a change took place, but have only the later or the earlier picture to draw on. In such cases, provided we know the nature of the change, a reasonable inference can be made as to the situation in the Kara Koyunlu period. A simple example can be given. When the prince of Bitlis fled from the Ottoman empire in 1535, the principality was converted into three non-hereditary sanjaks (Bitlis, Muş and Hınıs) and a *nahiye* (Ahlat) of a fourth.[6] Subsequently, in 1578, the son of the emigré prince was invited back and was given as a hereditary sanjak just *one* of the sanjaks, that of Bitlis (the city of Bitlis was also capital of the whole principality).[7] Now we know that in the late Middle Ages there were four divisions of the principality (called sub-principalities in this thesis), for which members of the principality's ruling family were responsible. In these circumstances it is reasonable to conclude that the boundaries of the sub-principalities were the same as those of the three sanjaks and the *nahiye*. There are no indications to the contrary. So if we want an estimate of the sub-principalities' boundaries, the Ottoman ones can be used, adding suitable provisos and an estimate of probability. Of course there may have been changes at the margin. But again, limits can be put on the possible alternative changes. By and large the units of territory which were transferred (if any transfer took place) are not likely to have been smaller than the Ottoman *nahiyes* which appear in the

*tahrir defter*s. This is one reason for constructing a picture of the Ottoman *nahiye*s.

A second example can be given from the Hakkari principality. To obtain an idea of the boundaries of individual apanages, the picture of Armenian districts in the Late Classical period and, under the Arcruni principality, in the first half of the Middle Ages, has been used. These districts were both economic and political units, most of them being the patrimony of individual Armenian princes. Now certain information about the apanage boundaries in the late Middle Ages is available. The Armenian evidence is used to supplement this rather than as an import to fill a complete absence of information relevant to the target period. If there were indications that boundaries in the two periods (target and source) did not coincide, the method would have to be abandoned. But there are no such indications; and *a priori* their absence is scarcely surprising. It is likely that districts which on the one hand have a political function but on the other are of small size, will retain their identity (perhaps not their name) from period to period. Within the districts, certain economic relationships (that of the villages to the market town, for example) obtained, and these themselves were often brought about, in part or in whole, by features of topography such as mountain ranges. The districts' boundaries, therefore, are unlikely to have changed. But when, as in the Kurdish period, the districts were combined into larger apanages, it would be considerably more risky to argue that the particular combinations obtaining in an earlier period (that of the Arcruni principality) also obtained in the Kurdish one.

The logic of the procedure, therefore, does not always depend on the unproven assumption of no change, or of change in a particular direction. Provided we have some information from the target period, and reasonable pointers (whether empirical or *a priori*) to the nature of the change, then propositions about the Kara Koyunlu period can be

inferred in a reasonably sound manner.

This said, the type of deduction now under discussion undoubtedly involves circularity of reasoning, in at least two respects. In the first place, as was pointed out in the previous two paragraphs, reasoning about change often involves *a priori* assumptions as to continuity. In the second place, doubt may arise about the question whether in earlier or later periods the institutions in question, the principalities and any institutions or social structures within them, are the same as during the target period. Is a tribe going under a particular name in the 17th or 19th century the same as one of the same name in the 14th ? It is not the intention here to try to solve such vexing questions,[8] but merely to point out that the assumption of identity over time, particularly in the absence of evidence dated to points in the intervening period, is bound to involve circularity of argument.

That being the case, it seems reasonable to restate the aims of the thesis, in so far as the Kurdish principalities are involved. An exact geographical and institutional picture is presented here; but given the uncertainty of the arguments involved it would be better to see this picture (despite its specificity of reference) as an estimate of the identity, geographical position and character of the institutions, of their roles and relationships, and of the factors and forces bearing on those relationships in the region and during the period in question.

Even if the arguments employed here, which reason backwards and forwards in time, are cogent, the question arises whether it is worth employing them. If, for example, we take so much information from the Ottoman period and proceed to project it backwards in time (applying certain mutations, admittedly), could we be accused, nevertheless, of tacitly constructing a picture of the Ottoman period and leaving the picture of the Kara Koyunlu period in a somewhat bloodless and tentative condition ? In the one case the

information is solid, and in the other case we are dealing with little information at all, but for the most part a series of deductions.

The primary reasons for studying the Kara Koyunlu period in this thesis have more to do with the condition of Armenian society than with Kurdish or Turcoman. The question of whether the Turcoman period was a pivotal one in Armenian history has been raised, and it has been pointed out that constructing the political framework of that period is an essential first step in investigating Armenian society at the time. So the picture of political institutions and relationships in the Kara Koyunlu period has to be accepted as a genuine and primary aim.

Nevertheless, given the shortage of information directly descriptive of the Kara Koyunlu period, the volume of information imported from neighbouring periods, particularly the Ottoman, alters, in a manner not previously mentioned, the nature of the picture produced and the aims of producing it. The picture is not just one of the Kara Koyunlu period, but of several, the target period being the only one in focus. The picture becomes more blurred and partial, the further from the target period the events under description.

This said, the use of data from earlier and later periods yields positive advantages, as well as compensating for the shortage of information directly pertinent to the target period. Even if we were well supplied with such information, there would still be gaps, particularly as regards the regional role played by different principalities. Earlier and later periods allow us to fill the gaps, i.e. to complete an estimate of the likely role played by given institutions or entities. The point is particularly relevant when it is remembered that we are aiming at an estimate of forces at play, rather than more accurately specified relationships.

Apart from filling gaps in empirical data, there is a further advantage in consulting periods to either side of the target. Assessing character and behaviour in a given period is not just a question of observing actual instances, but of asking about hypothetical behaviour under alternative conditions. In the nature of the case, empirical data relevant to the given period are inadequate for this purpose. But examination of the Kurdish principalities' behaviour in nearby periods allows us to specify likely roles and reactions under alternative conditions in the Kara Koyunlu period. To allow the process of filling gaps in the empirical data and of specifying likely behaviour under alternative conditions, a history of each Kurdish principality, attempting to focus on the Kara Koyunlu period, has been constructed.

There are other advantages in this beside the one just mentioned. To analyse structure, institutions, relationships with overlord power and so on, examples are taken from the principalities' history. These have to be put in context; but then the context itself has to be explained, given that the histories of these principalities have not been satisfactorily worked out so far.[9] It is more economical to construct a complete history and refer to various details of it for purposes of analysing institutions. Once this is done, analysis enriches narrative, because it improves understanding of cause and effect and of the institutional context of individual events; and narrative enriches analysis, because we are enabled, not merely to analyse a system, but also to watch it in motion.

Considerations also arise which depend on more abstract and *a priori* historical premises. Our general conclusion as to the nature of the relationship between the Kara Koyunlu and the local Kurdish principalities is that the Kara Koyunlu dealt with the principalities at arm's length and intervened little in their internal affairs. Despite the simplicity of the adjectives, the conclusion is comparative, not absolute, in nature. The

best comparison is with the treatment of the same vassals by different overlords. Carrying out the comparison is recommended not only by the implicit logic of the statement expressing the above conclusion (because "loose" is in a logical sense a comparative adjective in this context), but also by its practical advantage. It throws the features of Kara Koyunlu policy into relief.

This practical point leads to one resting on further abstract considerations. It is valid for purposes of exposition to construct a picture of a particular period as though the institutions and relationships within it were governed by a set of forces in equilibrium. In reality they were not; those forces themselves were undergoing change. Change was not merely something that led to the situation under review, or happened subsequently; it was part of that situation. Now in such an ill-documented portion of history, judgements as to the nature and pace of change are likely to be facile, if not contradictory or meaningless. But we can at least indicate the direction of change.

Even a summary indication of the direction of change is in this case highly problematic; but we can move towards some understanding of the change by following the principalities through time. To repeat: the purpose in question is not to follow change before and after the Kara Koyunlu period, but to represent it as part of the situation. This requires, however, the examination of neighbouring periods.[10]

The present section has discussed the validity and purposes of taking information from neighbouring periods to illuminate the target period. In the first place it was concluded that even if *a priori* assumptions about identity and continuity have to be made, arguments from other periods are workable provided that some information directly relating to the target period is available. For example, to argue from Ottoman sanjak boundaries to the boundaries of the sub-principalities subject to the Bitlis princes is not a

procedure free from logical faults, because it rests on certain unprovable assumptions; but it is nevertheless reasonable, because we know at least that sub-principalities of the same names did exist in the late Middle Ages. All the same the nature of such arguments makes it necessary to revise the aims of the thesis. The aim is to produce a picture of the agents in the political arena and of the general forces at play, and not a picture of more specific relationships, even though many specific events are alluded to.

Secondly the question was raised whether the procedure of drawing information from neighbouring periods, even if valid, did not effectively destroy itself under its own weight. That is to say, in attempting to argue from events in neighbouring periods, are we not in effect drawing a convincing picture of those other periods, meanwhile leaving the picture of the target period in a tentative and somewhat unconvincing state ? This notion was rejected, but a revision of aim was again seen to be necessary. So far as concerns the Kurdish principalities, the aim is a picture of several periods in which only the target period is in focus.

However the question was then turned round, because the advantages, even for the Kara Koyunlu period, of looking back and forward in time, became apparent. In the first place, constructing histories of the Kurdish principalities reaching through several periods benefits the analysis of the state of their institutions during the target period. It allows us not just to perceive the relationships within a system, but to see the system in motion at a given time. Secondly, the system itself was undergoing change during the target period as well as before and after it. Constructing the history of the principalities helps us to grasp the nature of that underlying change.

(ii) The use of modern anthropological work and the study of the language of the sources in order to understand Kurdish tribal society in the late Middle Ages

The sources, and particularly the *Sherefname*, do not employ a consistent terminology to denote entities, such as tribes and tribal sections, within Kurdish society.[11] Moreover they fail to mention at all several of the types of entity, such as lineages, which modern anthropological study has identified as basic within Kurdish society. In order to discover the roots of the Kurdish princes' power we need at the very least to know what Kurdish social entities could have existed within those principalities, and in particular what could lie behind the various terms actually used by the sources.

Preferably we should also have in mind a scheme of the structure of relationships between those entities. To speak more accurately, different structures exist in modern Kurdish society, and several different schemes appear to be applicable to Kurdish society of the late Middle Ages.[12]

To meet such a need, modern anthropological work has been used. As in the previous section, we are faced with the problem of circularity. To begin importing features of modern Kurdish society to our picture of the equivalent in the late Middle Ages, we need to know that the two societies are similar, but if we knew that they were similar, we should not need to carry out such importation in the first place. The problem is more acute than in the previous section. It is not hard to think of *a priori* reasons why the general nature of Kurdish social groups and of the relations between them, should have changed, as well as reasons why they should not have changed.

Understanding Kurdish society of the late Middle Ages is essential to this thesis, as will be argued in Ch.II, sect.2. Recourse to modern anthropological work is the only available means, so the risks of using modern anthropological work as a fund of possible

comparisons have to be accepted. The procedure is not vicious in the sense of lacking empirical justification entirely. There are certainly some points of correspondence, particularly the existence of tribes, a *pyshtmala* or "Praetorian guard" and tribal councils. So there is a reasonable justification in supposing that other features of modern society were in fact mirrored by medieval society, even though medieval evidence is lacking. Moreover the picture of late medieval society which results is consistent and convincing, and it explains some chance references in the texts, for example references to *amirzade*s or the group of young potential heirs to the reigning prince.[13]

The question then arises how to study the terminology of the texts. The main difficulty is that the terminology is not consistently employed, and the denotation of any given term varies from one occurrence of the term to another. In fact the denotation has to be worked out from the context each time.

However the procedure is fully justified by the results. The meaning of a given term, or the range of different meanings, is worked out, sometimes bringing to bear the modern anthropological findings. We then know that groups and institutions covered by that meaning actually existed; and since the meaning of the term is precisely defined, so is the nature of the institution which it denotes.

3. The sources

3.1. Contemporary sources

In effect there are no administrative documents dating from the Turcoman period which help with the subject.[14] A *ferman* of Timur and one of Shah Tahmasp confirming the rights of the Bitlis dynasty are preserved in the text of the *Sherefname*,[15] but, as it happens, are unhelpful to the present subject. The region's vicissitudes in the 16th and 17th century and the defeat and expulsion of the princely families by Ottoman forces in the 1840's are no doubt responsible for the lack of documents.

3.2. Persian narrative sources

The Sherefname (Sh.).[16] The text was substantially finished in 1005/1597. It gives the history of each of the Kurdish dynasties in a region stretching from the Euphrates in the west to Azerbayjan in the east, and from the north borders of the Van region to the Sulaymaniya district of Iraq. The author was that very prince of the Bitlis dynasty who in 1578 was invited back from exile in Iran to take the post of prince-cum-sanjak bey of Bitlis.[17] Later he abdicated in favour of his son, presumably in order to write the text.[18]

The information in the text mainly concerns the Ottoman period; in some cases it goes back to the Ak Koyunlu period; only in one or two (notably the author's own dynasty of Bitlis, the account of which is very full, and that of Hisn Kayfa, which falls outside the present subject) does it reach further back in time. The information seems mainly to have reached the author by word of mouth. Moreover most of it, whether relating to recent events or to ones beyond living memory, appears to rely on oral transmission. But as head

of one of the leading Kurdish dynasties and one in residence at Bitlis for about twenty years before completion of the text, he had almost the best possible access to information. As regards the Bitlis house itself, he must have had access to documents, or at least to people who remembered them. The dates of events before the Ottoman occupation are unlikely to have been included if this were not the case.

The author shows a meticulous concern to include all the Kurdish dynasties. Without this concern, the comprehensive geographical coverage of the present thesis would be impossible. The author's approach is on the whole critical.[19] The gaps in the author's knowledge appear to be the result of chance rather than of systematic misinterpretation. The presentation is also remarkably fair. The author does not conceal, for example, the submission of the various dynasties to Shah Ismail. Since the Ottoman court constituted part of the work's audience, the inclusion of the Kurds' submission to Shah Ismail shows great concern for balance.[20]

Part of the programme of the present thesis is to ensure that the *Sherefname* is exploited fully for the study of that subject which it was written to expound: the comprehensive picture of the Kurdish dynasties. In an exact sense, modern authors have fought shy of this, mainly through lack of interest in the Kurds.[21] As mentioned before, the *Sherefname*'s language is a highly important subject of study, as it can be made to reveal the nature of groups and institutions within the principalities.

The Kitāb-i Diyārbakriyya (KD). This is a detailed, geographically very specific panegyric history of the Ak Koyunlu dynasty up to a point well towards the end of Uzun Hasan's reign. It was substantially completed in 875/1470-71.[22] It is disappointing but not negligible as a source for the activities of the Kara Koyunlu in the Van region. It has little

to say about the Kurdish dynasties: little of the action takes place in the Van region.

The Aḥsan al-Tavārīkh of Ḥasan Rūmlū (AT). This is useful on certain details of early and mid-16th century history which reveal aspects of political boundaries, settlement histories etc..

Other chronicles. These are relevant only incidentally. The chief ones are Samarkandi and Mirkhwand.[a]

3.3 Ottoman narrative sources

Evliya Çelebi (Ev.). Evliya's *Seyaḥatnāme* contains a truly remarkable account of Melek Ahmet Paşa's dealings with the Bitlis dynasty in the mid-17th century, in which Evliya himself played a part. The account is strewn with valuable information on the personnel and institutions of the Bitlis principality. This apart, information on the other sanjaks of the Van *eyalet* can be found in Evliya. These enlighten us, again, on institutions within and on the later history of the principalities. There is also information on settlements, castles and routes; but it is not clear if Evliya undertook all the relevant journeys.[23]

However the sections of the *Seyaḥatnāme* relevant to this thesis, with the exception of one or two passages concerning Abdal Khān of Bitlis, bear no sign of the tall-story telling for which Evliya has such a widespread reputation. Any general scepticism with regard to the relevant sections of the *Seyaḥatnāme* must be justified by a demonstration

[a] But no effort has been made to check through the major Persian chronicles. This is mainly for reasons of time, but also because these chronicles do not have the local perspective which this thesis tries to create.

of inaccuracies or invention.

3.4. Ottoman sources: *tahrir defters*

The use of these has been limited to the search for village and other place names and the nahiyes and sanjaks to which they belonged. The boundaries of the nahiyes and sanjaks can then be found on the map.[a] This in turn gives good grounds for opinions about the late medieval boundaries, as explained in sect.2; appropriate provisos and caveats have to be expressed. The *defters* also help with several problems of the location of settlements.

Other than this, no use has been made of the defters. Further use is precluded by limitations of time and money and by restrictions on obtaining copies of the documents. On the other hand the defters are undoubtedly the category of historical source most suitable for further research which might amplify the conclusions of this thesis. The first step would be to search for mentions or summaries of pre-Ottoman administrative arrangements -- for example, summaries of waqf deeds. A second step would be to undertake a study of population and settlements, using the appropriate material in the defters (for this purpose the financial data would not be necessary). A further step would be to expand this study to make a picture of the settlements' economic functions and interrelations, in the standard manner of the defter study, in the 16th century and use it to comment on late medieval political boundaries and relationships as well as the city and town histories constructed in Appendix I.[24]

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[a] The results of the brief search in the Turkish archives are in Appendix III.

3.5. Armenian sources

Colophons (Clph.). As historical sources these have to be evaluated according to the purpose of the individual scribe in producing the manuscript, including the colophon, and that of the individual patron in commissioning the book. The key to understanding these purposes is the idea of commemoration. Scribe and patron generally wish to commemorate events and people in their own family or circle; in the realm of politics and in ecclesiastical affairs of wide scope they similarly wanted to commemorate events which affected them personally.[25] However it is probably fair to say that the colophons' growth in importance as a record of events in the political field is to some extent a response to the decline in the production of longer and more systematic historical works.

In the world of Turcoman and other overlords and local Kurdish principalities, the colophons have several strengths as historical sources. They fill in gaps left by the Muslim sources, and for certain events or sequences of events become the sole source. They are near in time and place to the events under description. They also supply a different point of view. The value of this point of view does not reside merely in the scribes' and patrons' concern for the impact of events on the local population; in other words its value is not confined to the study of that local population. The different point of view is genuinely a corrective, unintended it is true, to the concerns of the Muslim sources, strictly within the world of local principalities and their overlords.

Their most serious drawback is the reverse side of the same coin: the scribes sometimes understood events in a manner so different from our own (on occasion failing completely to set the context) that it is hard to interpret the colophons according to modern historical concepts. A second disadvantage of the colophons as sources is that, like modern newspapers, they have a serious bias towards the mention of disasters and suffering.

Thomas of Mecop‘ (T‘M). The *History* describes Timur's campaigns in Armenia and subsequent fighting between his son Shah Rukh and the Kara Koyunlu. It also deals with church affairs. Everything that has been said about the colophons also applies to Thomas. (He even shares their literary style.) Not surpisingly his information is strongest where it concerns the two cities, Erciş/Arčēš and Adilcevaz/Arckē, nearest to his monastery.

Minor Chronicles (MC). This title designates, not a category of chronicle (except in respect of length), but simply a collection of chronicles made by a modern scholar. The works are thoroughly disparate in coverage, including period, and in date of composition. Several do concern the Mongol and Turcoman periods, but the amount of information relevant to the present subject which can be found only in these chronicles is slight. Admittedly in a tantalising manner, they occasionally fill an important gap. For the present argument they have more value where they concern the Ottoman period.

Arak‘el of Tabriz (abbrev. "Arak‘el (1669 ed.)"). This *History* covers certain aspects of the Turkish Middle Ages in Armenia, but for the present subject its information only becomes valuable where it describes events in the Ottoman period, especially ones within the Mahmudi principality. Here, in fact, it offers, for the mid-17th century, detail comparable to that of the *Sherefname* on some of the local dynasties in the 16th century.

3.6. Arabic sources

The medieval geographers are valuable on city histories in particular. Al-‘Umari's *Masālik al-Abṣār* (Mas.Abs.) makes an important contribution to the history of the Hakkari

principality before the Kara Koyunlu period. No attempt has been made to comb the Mamluk chronicles. This could be done in future, but the yield for the present thesis would be marginal.[26]

3.7. European sources

Two of the Italians who travelled to Iran, whether as diplomats or as merchants, in the late 15th and early 16th century supply a small quantity of highly interesting information, mostly on settlements. The two in question are the Merchant in Persia and Barbaro. Clavijo, unfortunately, does not help with the Van region.[a]

3.8. Coins

These rarely help with the political history of individual principalities in the region and period concerned. The exceptions are the coins minted by the Bitlis princes in their own name in the 15th century and aspects of Jalayrid history revealed by coins of Van, Vostan and Erciş.

Taken in the aggregate the coins can be somewhat more helpful. The expansion in the number of mints in southern Armenia and the Diyar Bakr during the Mongol period in the 710's/1310's certainly has some political significance. It marks a local devolution of power, though it is hard to say whether the stimulus was an initiative on the part of the central administration to secure the loyalty of local, and otherwise unknown, amirs, perhaps so as to balance the power of local Mongol appointees at Ahlat and Erciş, or whether the central administration granted minting rights to the local amirs as a means of

[a] Briefly discussed in Ch.II, sect.3, p.66, note a.

legalising power which the amirs had already seized, or whether for economic reasons the administration genuinely wished to increase the number of mints and so make the mints generally more accessible.

A similar general point could be made about the Kara Koyunlu period. The geographical distribution of the mints was inherited from the Mongol period, and it is probable that the pattern of local principalities was largely the same. A similar general conclusion as to devolution of power therefore applies; this time, however, there is no question of a Kara Koyunlu initiative, or of an economic motive.

Within the confines of the present subject, much the most important contribution of the coins is in the reconstruction of individual cities' histories. Varying frequencies and weights do appear to track the cities' economic fortunes. The use of coins for this purpose is subject to certain well-known dangers. The coins that we have are only a selection of the total minted, and are by no means a random sample. They mostly come from hoards which, whether singly or collectively, may well not be representative of the totality of coins. Even if they were representative of that totality, the minting history of an individual city may not march hand in hand with the city's general economic history. Coins were sometimes minted at one place rather than another for reasons of lingering habit and inertia, or for political reasons.[27]

But the coins do seem a powerful clue to individual cities' histories. They work well with the other available evidence, each giving the other support. There is never anything implausible or self-contradictory about the picture which results from the use of the existing coin evidence. Despite the above strictures concerning its accuracy as a pointer, that evidence does seem very useful.

3.9. Archaeology and upstanding monuments

Little excavation of relevant sites in the region has been done. On the whole archaeology and the study of surviving buildings have little to offer to the political historian; the situation might well change if more excavation were carried out. A tie between inscriptions on monuments and persons named in a historical text can be found at Ahlat and at Vostan.[28]

Buildings, whether fallen or intact, excavated or above ground, help greatly with individual cities' histories; this is the case even when a building can be dated, by its form and decoration, only approximately. Detectable or surviving buildings also supply the main evidence for a city's extent and the distribution of its parts. Buildings and their attributes have been exploited to the full in constructing the histories of individual cities.

4. Modern work

Only a few landmarks and standard works will be mentioned.

Sümer's *Kara Koyunlular* (KK), vol.I, relates the general political history of the dynasty and confederation up to the death of Kara Yusuf in 1420.[29] As far as chronology, dynastic history and the relations of the Kara Koyunlu with overlord and neighbouring states are concerned, Sümer's work is fundamental. However Sümer, in this work, was not interested, except incidentally, in regional or institutional history or in the local vassals of the Kara Koyunlu. By failing to examine such subjects he presents, by simple omission, a somewhat blank local political landscape. The latter, in the present writer's opinion, is the opposite of the actual historical situation, both because the local landscape was full and

because when it is presented in its fullness the notion of uniform local control by the Kara Koyunlu is dispelled. Similar remarks can be made about Roemer's contribution to the *Cambridge History of Iran* (CHI), vol.VI, on the Turcomans.[30]

On the Kurds two modern landmarks exist. One is Sevgen's *Doğu ve Güney-Doğu Anadolu'da Türk Beylikleri*, in which he traces the history of the major Kurdish dynasties. The strength of this book is the author's use of a series of Ottoman documents to illuminate the dynasties' respective histories. Otherwise it fails to take into account several other categories of source, including (sometimes) Evliya Çelebi, and relies heavily on the French translation of the *Sherefname*. Sevgen never undertook to analyse tribal structure or nomenclature, but if he had it is unlikely he would have been successful.

Van Bruinessen's *Agha, Sheikh and State* is a highly challenging and richly researched book: it reaches back into Ottoman and Turcoman history to found a theory of tribalism which is formulated essentially to explain the present-day condition of Kurdish society. The author's contention is that the power and authority of the tribe rises and falls with the degree of organisation and effectiveness of the state. Under the Kara Koyunlu (begins his argument) the Kurdish principalities were held on a loose rein, but in a highly organised political framework such as that of the 16th-century Ottoman empire the tribal principalities reached a peak of authority and internal complexity. After the 16th century the state began to decay, and with them the tribal principalities and the tribes. Today, continues the argument, the tribe is an empty shell: it exists, but has no authority. The author concludes that the tribe is an artificial group.

Although the above summary reveals the weaknesses in Van Bruinessen's argument, the book's importance is that it is an attempt to describe how Kurdish tribes and their overlord powers mutually influence one another under varying conditions. One does

not have to agree with the author's theory to understand the importance of analysing the one type of group in terms of influences exerted on it by the other. Although I disagree strongly with Van Bruinessen's theory, his book challenges any writer on the same subject to tackle similar themes and formulate the results of the enquiry in such a way that agreements and disagreements with Van Bruinessen's theory would be exposed. That said, it is not the purpose of this thesis to argue for or against Van Bruinessen, or to produce a general theory, couched in terms of historical change, of the political role of Kurdish tribes. However his theory forms a pervasive aspect of the intellectual landscape in which this thesis is set.[31]

Lastly, mention should be made of Minorsky's short article "Thomas of Metzop' on the Timurid-Turkmen Wars". This gave a more or less complete account of the different political agents (principalities, Kara Koyunlu governors) in the Van region, and was the seed from which this thesis developed. Taking Thomas of Mecop' as a base, Minorsky's article fills out the picture, mainly with the help of the *Sherefname*. Although the addition of more sources shows the need for certain corrections in Minorsky's account, the article showed that a complete account was possible. This thesis develops Minorsky's account by asking not merely who was in the Van region, whether Kara Koyunlu or Kara Koyunlu vassal, but also what nature of institution each of the political entities was and, given their nature, how the Kara Koyunlu managed to govern the region as a whole.

CHAPTER TWO

GENERAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT

1. General aspects of Kara Koyunlu government

1.1. Chronology

The first reliable reports of the Kara Koyunlu concern their activities in the Diyar Bakr in 750/1349, when Bayram Hoca helped to liberate al-'Adil, Kurdish prince of Hisn Kayfa.[a] They remained agents in that region's complicated affairs; they became overlords of its Kurdish princes, and continued as such for roughly a century.[b] Bayram Hoca seems to have taken Mosul for the first time in about 1355.[c] Thereafter that city and its dependent district passed in and out of Kara Koyunlu hands until 1376, after which it stayed more or less continuously under Kara Koyunlu jurisdiction until the demise of the dynasty as a Near Eastern power.[d]

When Erciş and other districts by the north and east shores of Lake Van became the estate of the Kara Koyunlu is not clear. The first clear indications of Kara Koyunlu

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[a] Cahen, "Diyar Bakr" (14 c.), 78; Sümer, KK 39.

[b] Sümer, KK 39-42.

[c] Sümer, KK 40.

[d] Sümer, KK 41, 42, 43.

tenure come in 1374 and 1377.[a] But Sümer is very likely right in supposing Erciş to have been in Kara Koyunlu hands well before then: a date in the 1350's is most likely.[b] In any case, if Erciş was their estate from such an early date, they were still, as masters of Erciş, vassals of the Jalayrids at least until 1374.[c] At this point Bayram Hoca captured Erzurum, and, in the next plain eastwards from that city, the two castles of Avnik and Hasankale. He temporarily gained Azerbayjan too.[d] This must have shaken off Jalayrid control of the Lake Van region. In 1377 the Kara Koyunlu were once more putting pressure on Azerbayjan.[e]

However it is not certain that the Kara Koyunlu had by this stage gained any ascendancy over the Kurdish princes of the Van region. The Hakkari princes recognised the Jalayrids Husayn and Ahmad on their coins in the late 1370's and early 1380's. There is no reason to suppose Kara Koyunlu sovereignty over the Hakkari had begun at this stage. Similarly the known history of the Bitlis dynasty betrays no evidence for submission to the Kara Koyunlu before the mid-1380's; indeed Bitlis may never have submitted to the Jalayrids. Ahmad's accession to the Jalayrid throne in 1382, after which he needed the help of the Kara Koyunlu in quelling revolts,[f] may well mark the beginning of Kara Koyunlu ascendancy over the Kurds. In 1385 Ahmad had to abandon Tabriz to Timur and flee to Baghdad, thus removing any possible basis for a pretence of Jalayrid overlordship

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[a] Sümer, KK 43, 44.

[b] Sümer, KK 43.

[c] Two coins of the Jalayrid Uways are known at Erciş in 762.

[d] EI², "Djalāyir ..." (J.M.Smith), II.401.2; Sümer, KK 43.

[e] CHI VI.8.

[f] EI², "Djalāyir ...", II.401.2.

in the Van region.[a]

But the state of affairs in which the Kara Koyunlu were ultimate overlords of the Van region lasted, in the 14th century, only a few years. In 789/1387 Timur invaded Armenia, partly in order to secure Kara Koyunlu submission. He captured Erzurum, then the cities of the north shore of Lake Van, including Erciş. He left Armenia by way of the Hakkari fortress-town of Van, which he reduced.[b] The Van region was now part of Timur's empire: the Bitlis principality had in fact submitted to Timur without a fight;[c] the Hakkari's submission came only after the siege of Van was concluded. Timur held all the north shore cities.

Although Erciş was recaptured at least twice by Kara Yusuf in the interim,[1] the Van region stayed under Timur's administration (with which we are not, except incidentally, concerned) until Timur's death in 1405. Meanwhile Kara Yusuf had fled to Mamluk Syria and been imprisoned there. Escaping from his prison, he came back to the Van region in 1406 and regained the allegiance of its local princes.[d] He then captured Azerbayjan (810/1408).[e]

The Van region then remained part of the Kara Koyunlu empire to the end of that empire's existence. To the north lay directly-administered Kara Koyunlu territory (Erzurum, Eleşkirt, Ani, the Aras valley). To the north-west, beyond Bingöl Dağ, was the only stretch of territory adjacent to the Van region not in Kara Koyunlu hands. This

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[a] EI², "Djalāyir ...", II.401.2.

[b] Sümer, KK 49-51.

[c] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(ii).

[d] Sümer, KK 68-69.

[e] Ibid. 70-76, esp. 75-76.

was the Ak Koyunlu estate of Kiğı, which was backed by Ak Koyunlu territory to west and north-west. To the west the Kurdish principalities of the Diyar Bakr were also Kara Koyunlu subjects. To the south the Kara Koyunlu ruled Iraq (from 815/1412; between 836/1433 and 848/1445 it was in the independent hands of Aspand, a son of Kara Yusuf)[a]. To the east was Azerbayjan, which admittedly was the subject of competition between the Kara Koyunlu and Timurids for a decade and a half after Kara Yusuf's death in 1420. After the death of Shah Rukh in 850/1447, Jahan Shah, the best known of the Kara Koyunlu rulers, made conquests in central and south-western Iran, and turned the Kara Koyunlu, for a short period, into something approaching an empire in size and significance.[b]

Kara Yusuf was succeeded in 823/1420 by his son Iskender. The latter had to compete for Azerbayjan with Timur's son Shah Rukh, to whom the Kurds of the Van region submitted in late 1420 and early 1421. Iskender then had to defeat them and bring them into Kara Koyunlu allegiance (1422-25).[c]

Iskender was defeated by his brother Jahan Shah in 840/1436 and murdered in captivity the following year.[d] There followed the period of greatest internal stability and external influence in the dynasty's history: it ended with Jahan Shah's defeat by Uzun Hasan in 872/1467.[e] But during this period, in 862/1458, Jahan Shah's son Hasan 'Ali rebelled in Azerbayjan: beside parts of Azerbayjan Hasan 'Ali seems to have seized from

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[a] CHI VI.162, 167. Stephen Album tells me that from 844 to 848 a certain Pūlād or Fūlād is known there.

[b] CHI VI.163-4.

[c] On Shah Rukh, CHI VI.102-3.

[d] CHI VI.163.

[e] Woods, AQ 109-10; IA, "Kara Koyunlular" (M.H.Yinanç), 3.185.1-188.1.

his father the directly-administered domains to north and east of Lake Van. The rebellion was soon crushed.[a]

It was Hasan 'Ali who took the reins of power after the defeat and death of Jahan Shah; but in 873/1468 he too was defeated, and the whole Kara Koyunlu empire fell into Uzun Hasan's hands.[b] The Van region remained in the Ak Koyunlu empire until 1501. Then or soon after, the Kurdish principalities declared their submission to Shah Ismail, although the Safavid acquisition of the districts north and east of the lake (which had been directly administered by the Kara Koyunlu) seems to have taken a few years.[c] The Kurdish principalities declared their support for the Ottoman cause shortly before the Çaldıran campaign (1514), and thereafter remained Ottoman vassals. But it was not until the 'Irakeyn campaigns of 1533-35 that the area began, piecemeal, to be incorporated into the sanjak system. The area's conquest was complete when in 1548 the fortress-town of Van was captured for good.[d]

1.2. Introduction to general aspects of Kara Koyunlu government in the Van region

For the Kara Koyunlu the Van region was a summer pasture area. Until the acquisition of Azerbayjan the winter pastures were the Diyar Bakr and northern Iraq. The Kurdish

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[a] CHI VI.164; on the Lake Van territories, Appendix I, Erciş and Malazgirt.

[b] Woods, AQ 111; CHI VI.173-4.

[c] Appendix I, Erciş.

[d] See under the various principalities in the next chapter. On the Ottoman conquest, the best modern work, apparently underestimated, is Kırzıoğlu, *Kafkas-Elleri*.

principalities of the former region were their subjects from the mid-14th century onward; they occupied Mosul and its district more or less permanently from 1376.[a] As Kara Yusuf said to his chiefs in 1406, attempting to dissuade them from fighting Abu Bakr the Timurid: "Let us go to the Ala Dağ [north-east of Erciş] in summer and in winter go to the Diyar Bakr and the bank of the Euphrates".[b] After the conquest of Azerbayjan the position was no doubt more complicated: but Ala Dağ certainly continued to be used as a summer pasture.[c]

That the Ala Dağ was the pasture principally grazed by the Kara Koyunlu is one of the principal reasons why the area directly held by the Kara Koyunlu lay around the north-easterly arm of the lake. This was an area of plains (the Abaghā/Çaldıran plain, that of Erciş, the Malazgirt plain and smaller areas communicating with it) which lay around the Ala Dağ on different sides. Erciş, a city by the lake shore not far from the mountain pasture of the Ala Dağ, had been of special importance to the Il-Khans.[d] It was also the city favoured by the Kara Koyunlu; several of the confederation's leaders had themselves buried there. However the city on which the Kara Koyunlu appear to have based their administration is Adilcevaz.[e]

The position of the Ala Dağ pasture was not the only reason why the area held directly by the Kara Koyunlu was the series of plains north and east of the lake's north-easterly arm. In this high, flat, open country, with its accessible and vulnerable city sites,

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[a] Above, sect.1.1.

[b] Sümer, KK 72, n.197 (on p.73).

[c] Appendix I, Ala Dağ and Nawshahr.

[d] Appendix I, Erciş.

[e] Ch.IV, sects.4.1.(a), 4.2; Appendix I, Adilcevaz.

it was hard for the Kurdish tribes to settle permanently. Although the relief suited this area to short- and medium-range transhumance, its height did not. The districts better suited to the Kurdish tribes' economy and habits were the more mountainous ones on the other sides of the lake. Here a variety of altitude and of possible land use provided just the right conditions for tribes to settle in fixed transhumance patterns and gradually to form principalities. Such principalities naturally developed and survived best in mountainous country. The latter was hard of access and provided defensible city, town and castle sites.

The flat country north and east of the lake was also easier to traverse; the Il-Khans had kept open a track between Khoy and Erzurum passing Erciş, Malazgirt and Hınıs,[a] and the north shore cities of Erciş and Ahlat had flourished under the Il-Khans, partly because, from the early 13th century at least, caravans had used the north shore of the lake and the Bitlis pass as a way connecting Iran with the Diyar Bakr and thus northern Syria. There is some evidence that the same routes were in use during the Kara Koyunlu period.[b]

The Kurdish principalities lay, for reasons just outlined, in the mountainous districts south, west and east of the lake. The most powerful of these was Bitlis, which occupied land, including the plain of Mus, to the west and south-west. Next most influential was that of Hakkari, which occupied an equivalent position to the south-east. Of the remaining principalities the Mahmudi was easily the most influential, though unlike the first two it never played a role outside the region. Lastly, between the two largest principalities, lay three small ones, which owed their existence, in part at least, precisely to the intermediate position.

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[a] Mustawfi, *Nuzhat* (LS), 183.

[b] Appendix I, Bitlis, Ahlat, Erciş.

As adumbrated above, apart from the simple fact of vassalage it is hard to know the nature of relations between the Kurdish princes and the Kara Koyunlu at Erciş and Adilcevaz before the withdrawal of Jalayrid representation from the Van region in or just before 1385. In any case there follow only another two years before the region passed into Timur's empire. It is only in the period after 1406 that evidence is available as to the precise form of the Kara Koyunlu's dealings with the Kurds.

In this period, the Kara Koyunlu capital was no longer at Erciş, and there is no evidence that Erciş or Adilcevaz were used as bases from which to deal with the Kurdish principalities. Whatever the Kurds' obligations, these were owed directly to the Kara Koyunlu sovereign, whose capital was generally, though not always, Tabriz. Relations between the two may therefore have been somewhat different from those in the period of two years or so before Timur's conquest. Consequently it makes sense, as regards the relations of vassalage between the Kara Koyunlu and the Kurds, to concentrate on the second and much longer period.

2. The Kurdish principalities. General nature and general aspects of their dealings with the Kara Koyunlu

2.1. Tribal groups and institutions

The vassals of the Kara Koyunlu were tribal principalities. By this term is meant a principality where the power of the prince rests on tribal allegiance. He has authority over a tribe or, more typically, a number of tribes, and these themselves are each composed

of a number of lower-level groups. The first task in investigating tribes and their constituent groups is to define the groups in question. Here we draw on modern anthropological literature.[2]

Tribe. The normal definition is as follows. A tribe is a group of families owing allegiance to a single chief and and, often by appeal to a foundation myth, claiming a common ancestor. The definition seems inadequate. Inherent in the use of the term and the behaviour of the groups known as tribes is the notion of a common pastoral or hunting interest, generally in land.[a] One term, the commonest, employed by the Muslim sources to denote tribes, is unambiguous. This is "'ashīra" (Arab.) and variants: "'ashīret" (Pers.); "'aşīret" (Ott.); "eşîret" (Kurd.). Other terms are used: "tīra" (Pers.: lit. "section"); "qabīla" (Arab., Pers.; Ott. "ḳabīle"); "tāyfa" (Pers.; Arab. "tā'ifa").[b]

Tribal section. The term employed by the anthropological literature is "clan". The term is highly unsatisfactory, as in English (outside anthropology) its most common application is to the Scottish clans, which on the definition above must count as tribes. Here the term "clan" will be simply avoided except with emphatic warnings of ambiguity.

By "tribal section" is meant simply a group within a tribe intermediate in size between the tribe and the lineage. The latter is defined as a group of families all of whom not only trace their descent from, but genuinely are descended from, a common ancestor. Thus in respect of size tribal sections are the level of social groups immediately beneath

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[a] Especially well expressed by Cribb, *Nomads* 52-5.

[b] Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State* 51-3, 59-64 for a conspectus of terminology. Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State* is also abbrev. "V.Br., ASS".

the tribe, and a tribe may be said to be composed of a number of tribal sections. In the limiting case a tribe can consist of just one section.

A number of terms are employed: "tīra", "qabīla",[a] "tāyfa". Given the overlap with the terms denoting tribes, clearly any given term for sections found in the medieval sources will not by itself be a guide to the entity denoted; which is not to say that in context the denotation is unclear.

Lineage or lineage segment. A definition has already been given. A tribal section is composed of a number of lineages. As with tribes and tribal sections, in the limiting case a tribal section can consist of just one lineage.

In Kurdish society the lineage, compared to the equivalents in other societies, is a very closely-knit group. This is because of the high incidence of marriage between cousins; generally the man marries his father's brother's daughter.[b] Now if lineages are closely-knit, it does not necessarily follow that tribal sections will be correspondingly closely-knit, and in turn that tribes will be so; but it creates a likelihood, and anthropologists describe Kurdish tribes as having an unusual degree of fierce loyalty to the chief precisely on account of the prevalence of cousin marriages.[3]

It is impossible to say whether the high proportion of cousin marriages prevailed also in the late Middle Ages. But given the degree of fit between various known features of late medieval Kurdish society, mostly to be discussed below, and features of 20th-century Kurdish society, a reasonable presumption exists that there were high rates of marriage between cousins in late medieval society. Such a feature goes some way towards

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[a] V.Br., ASS 55.

[b] Barth, *Kurdistan* 26-7; 67-72; 136-7.

explaining the cohesiveness and durability, not only of the tribes, but also of the principalities, in the late Middle Ages.

The lineage is the highest level of group for which, apparently at least, the medieval sources do *not* have a term. The modern terms, again, are various: hoz,[a] bavik, tira. The importance of lineages in recreating likely structures for the late medieval principalities will be seen below.

For the sake of completeness and of understanding one or two features of Kurdish tribal society mentioned in the texts, the two lowest units of tribal society (the first in two alternative forms) will be defined.

Camp group. This is generally but not always composed of closely related families: each family lives in a single large tent. The group exists either in both summer and winter, if the tribe or at least the camp group is purely nomadic,[b] or only in summer. In the latter case the winter equivalent is the village.

If not closely related, the families would normally come from the same lineage, which means that the camp group can be considered the building-block of the lineage in the same way that lineages are the building-blocks of tribal sections. However camp groups do sometimes contain families from different lineages.[c] They may even contain hired shepherds etc. not belonging to the tribe. Moreover the same camp group does not always contain the same families: a consequence of its being a group of tents, sometimes

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[a] Barth, *Kurdistan* 37, top. However from Barth's discussion at this point one can derive a precise and orderly view of structures and groups only after careful thinking and making careful distinctions.

[b] Like the Jaf: e.g. Barth, *Kurdistan* 35.

[c] For an example, Cribb, *Nomads* 193-5; in this case even different tribal sections.

congregating only in summer.[a] Nor does it necessarily contain families all from the same village.

The terms are: "khel",[b] "qabile".[c]

Village. The permanent equivalent of the camp group. Many villages are tribal or partially so, in other words sedentarisation does not lead to the break-up of tribal organisation. Villages often contain families from different lineages.[d]

Family, in the extended sense. Occupants of single tents and single houses. Families may sometimes keep within the house or tent relatives too distant to be considered members of the family, or non-relatives. These are normally hired.[e]

2.2. Different tribal structures within principalities

In modern times tribes, tribal sections and lineages have been combined in different structures. The latter, depending on the individual case, will be either a principality or a tribe. By "modern times" is meant the 19th and 20th centuries, during which the observation of such groups, if not carried out by anthropologists, has been accurate enough to permit analysis by anthropologists.

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[a] Barth, *Kurdistan* 38.

[b] Barth 38.

[c] V.Br., ASS 55.

[d] V.Br., ASS 56.

[e] Barth, *Kurdistan* 39.

The Jaf. This was a tribe of north-eastern Iraq and adjacent parts of Iran. But at the highest level the constituent groups of which it was composed were, again, tribes -- not tribal sections. These tribes were, to make matters worse, known as *tīra*. Some of the tribes were composed of several sections. Over a certain period in its history the tribes were organised in three groups, though one of these later broke away.[a]

The tribe as a whole was held together by the *begzada*, a lineage whose leader was the tribe's chief.[b] It also attracted hangers-on (for the term, below), in the form of families, lineages and tribal sections, from other tribes.

The Jaf are a useful model on which to hang the textual data concerning the Bitlis principality. It will be noted in Ch.III that the comparison is between a principality on the one hand and a tribe, with fewer territorial pretensions, on the other.

The Bābān. This was a principality founded in the 16th century.[c] Its territory lay around Sulaymaniya in eastern Iraq; the present town, however, was founded only in the late 18th century.[d] As in the case of the Jaf its most powerful group was a *begzada* rather than a ruling family. The prince was not a tribe chief, but the head of the *begzada*. Within the principality were a large number of tribes. Among these, in fact, were the Jaf, itself composed of a number of tribes. Members of the prince's family, generally brothers or uncles of the prince, had a following consisting of a group of such tribes; but the

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[a] Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs* 141, 143-5, 146. Barth, *Kurdistan* 34-44 *passim*; but Barth does not mention the division of the tribes into groups; which may even have been a thing of the past by the time of his visit in 1950.

[b] Barth, *Kurdistan* 36 (wrongly calling it a family), 41, 43. For other examples, V.Br., ASS 90 (the Pizhdar); Nikitine, *Kurdes* 123.

[c] EI[1], "Sulaimanīya" (V.Minorsky), IV.538.

[d] Rich, *Kurdistan* (also abbrev. "Rich"), I.387.

attachment of the tribes to the relevant member of the family was not, apparently, always tribal in nature. Neither the prince nor the relevant members of the family were the chiefs of tribes. Thus the attachment was considerably looser than in the case of the groups of Jaf tribes.

The tribes could threaten to take their loyalty elsewhere; the prince exploited the rivalries between members of his family by beckoning the tribes to such manoeuvres. Each of the family members in question lived on the income from a number of estates. It was within the power of the prince to move the respective members of his family between estates, and he did so from time to time. This was a further means of playing off one brother against another. Despite the Machiavellian cynicism and contrived instability of such manipulation, the prince himself would have been in danger if he had not carried it out.[4]

The Bābān principality provides a useful schema by means of which to understand the Hakkari principality -- however the information concerning the Hakkari principality is inadequate for certainty as to the parallel's exactness.

The Shakākī and other tribes of the Van region and adjacent districts of Iran in the 19th century. The Shakaki were a tribe of about 60,000 people; the tribe's area of residence comprised land on either side of the Turco-Iranian border to the west of lake Urmia. The tribe consisted of seven sections known as *qabīla*.[a] This simple hierarchical structure was mirrored by the other tribes in nearby territories: the Jelali, Melanli and Hayderanli.[b] The structure seems a useful schema on which to base an understanding of the Mahmudi

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[a] Blau, "Tribes" [2], 591-3, esp.592.

[b] Blau, "Tribes" [2], 584-9, esp. 586, 588; 589-91, esp. 590, 591; 593-5, esp.593.

principality. The latter was composed only of one tribe, but this tribe may, like the Shakākī, have been a large one, considering the extent of the territory over which it had jurisdiction.

The Hamawand. Again a tribe of north-eastern Iraq, they consist, according to Barth, of just one section or tira, which is divided into four "primary branches" (Barth's phrase). It would perhaps be better to state the point in a manner consistent with our terminology: the Hamawand were a single tribe (whereas the Jaf were a tribe composed of many tribes) made up of four sections. Though Barth does not explicitly make the point, each of these primary branches must consist of one or more lineages. The tribe (here the same as the tribal section) has no chief; the aghas or leaders of the four branches meet in a council.[a]

The Hamawand seem to find no precise known parallel in the late Middle Ages. Their tribal structure points to the many diverse possibilities for different structures within the tribe or principality. In particular it shows the possibility of a split tribe without overall leadership. This was a condition in which the Pāzūkī tribe, which summered to the north of Lake Van, may have found itself in the late Middle Ages.[b]

The Hamawand also provide a second example (the Jaf is the first) of a tribe which is not a principality. This has nothing to do with size; nor does it mean that the Hamawand or Pāzūkī lacked their own grazing land and villages. But it does rest on the question whether land is considered primary in the definition of the entity concerned. The Jaf or Hamawand would be the same whatever land they occupied, but the Bābān

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[a] Barth, *Kurdistan* 45-7.

[b] Below, Ch.IV, sect.3; and esp. Sh.I.333. Compare the division of the Guirdî into two: Nikitine, *Kurdes* 130.

principality would not; nor would the Bitlis or Hakkari principalities have been. It is doubtful whether the Jaf considered its grazing grounds to be the hereditary possession of the chief or of the *Begzada*; but the ruling families or lineages of Bitlis or Hakkari did consider their principalities, and the territories of those principalities, to be theirs in a hereditary sense.[a]

Detachment and annexation. In talking of structure nothing immutable is meant. At the margin, tribes can be detached from, or annexed to, principalities, and sections can be added to or detached from tribes. Indeed the entities and groups under discussion sometimes disintegrated altogether, and not just because of a hostile overlord government. On the whole tribes or sections were annexed because of inferior strength. Either they were independent tribes which could not withstand the attacker, or they belonged to a principality or tribe whose strength was on the decline.[5]

Tribes could also expand their territory by capturing villages. This generally led to the phenomenon of the tenant village (below, sect.2·4), where the former owners of the village become a tenant substratum beneath a tribal lineage or group of families.[b] The village's owner is a member of the tribe.

2.3. Other organisational features of tribes and tribal principalities

Leadership and succession. In Kurdish society as a whole it seems there is no established and universally accepted principle of succession to the position of tribe chief. On the other

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[a] Appendix II, sect.2.4.

[b] V.Br., ASS 92.

hand, it does seem to be universally accepted that the hereditary principle is the first choice. Moreover in the larger and more complex tribes succession does seem always to proceed according to the hereditary principle.[a] Such was the position in the Kurdish dynasties during the late Middle Ages and early Ottoman period. Sons succeeded in order of age. Then followed male cousins and uncles of the sons; however here the order was not, apparently, fixed according to any precise formula.

However the choice of successor was always vetted by the tribe's council (see below), and there are cases where the council regularly made the choice on its own initiative, without reference to any formula, whether hereditary or not. The successor according to the above hereditary formula could be rejected by the council if he was judged unsuitable.[6] Moreover a reigning prince or tribe chief could be thrown out if his performance was disastrous and he had lost the council's confidence. In cases of rejection the council's natural choice is the next in line according to the above formula. But when successors from the ruling family are lacking, the council may choose a chief or prince from outside that family. All such procedures appear to be paralleled in the late Middle Ages and early Ottoman period.

Council. Its composition was not governed by any clear rules of inclusion, but membership was decided by prominence within the tribe or principality. Within a principality of many tribes, the tribe chiefs were generally included. The second category of members was the more prominent landowners (on which see below). Beside vetting and making choices of successor to a tribe chief, the council was also involved in the ruler's more important decisions.[7] There is every indication that the medieval principalities

[a] V.Br., ASS 79-80.

possessed such councils.

Van Bruinessen, discussing the seventy tribe chiefs whom Evliya found at Bitlis at his first visit in 1060/1665, has suggested that they were at the prince's court primarily as hostages for the good behaviour of their tribes. There is no doubt some truth in this. But the chief or prince only ruled with the support and confidence of the tribes in any case. It is much more likely that the tribe chiefs (not by any means the only tribe members) were there as members of the council: they had to live, at least part of the year, in Bitlis, because travelling times were long.[8]

Hangers-on. Tribes or principalities collected around them miscellaneous tribes, lineages, families, and individuals. This is a somewhat different process from what has been described above as annexation. In the case of annexation the annexed tribe nearly always keeps its identity; but hangers-on generally lose their identity in the end. However both processes are ways in which a tribe or principality can increase its size or influence.

The hanger-on tribe is a rarity. The hanger-on lineage or lineage fragment would tend to become integrated with the host tribal section. Hanger-on families and individuals tend to be ones hired by lineages, camp groups or families: the case where they were hired by families was mentioned above, sect.2.1.[a]

Admittedly proof is lacking, but the word "aḥshāmāt" in the *Sherefname* appears to refer to such hangers-on. The word occurs in the phrase "'ashā'ir" va aḥshāmāt". The latter is a standard phrase somewhat like "'ashā'ir va qabā'il" ("tribes and *qabīle*s [tribal sections]"), which is not intended to have any precise reference to tribal structure, or to the particular tribes and tribal sections of a given principality or region. Rather it suggests

[a] V.Br., ASS 57-9; Barth, *Kurdistan* 39; Nikitine, *Kurdes* 123.

the totality of personnel. So does the phrase "'ashā'ir va aḥshāmāt". However the use of the word "aḥshāmāt" at all probably indicates the existence of such hangers-on in the Kurdish milieu of the 16th century. It does not refer to any given hangers-on in connection with the events under description.[9]

2.4. Economic and territorial aspects

(i) Land and tribes. In modern times the tribes have mostly been transhumant. Summer and winter grazing-grounds generally stay the same from year to year. Indeed many tribes, or tribal sections or lineages, live in villages during the winter. They do not confine themselves to pastoralism, which means that it is not possible for whole villages to move to upland pastures during the summer. In the regions inhabited by modern Kurdish society there are, except in a few districts, no other racial groups (Armenians, Nestorians) who could grow the necessary crops.[10]

The Kurdish tribes of the late Middle Ages were certainly transhumant, and many lived, too, in villages during the winter. (See below.) But in this period there was a second population, the Armenian, which occupied itself primarily with crop-growing. There is no case for saying the Kurds were exclusively pastoralists or that the Armenians were exclusively agriculturalists. The emphasis of the two groups' economic activities differed. Provided it is understood that the Kurdish population did to some extent engage in agriculture, that the Armenians did possess flocks and that some of these flocks were taken to higher-level pastures in summer, it is safe to characterise the Kurds as pastoralists and the Armenians as an agricultural, settled population.

The Van region's terrain itself is a good indication that the Kurds were transhumant

pastoralists: in the next chapter the terrain will be explored, district by district, as each principality is dealt with. Another indication is that people in the same region still practise transhumance. The best indication from a written source is a passage in the *Sherefname* which describes the Kurds as living on the edge of the plain of Muş and the Armenians as living in densely-distributed villages elsewhere, presumably in more central portions, on the face of this very fertile plain.[a] The reference could hardly be clearer: the Kurds live on the edge of the plain, because they will migrate en masse to yaylas during the summer (the *Sherefname* mentions the excellence of one such yayla, the mountain of Sharaf al-Din, which lies immediately north-west of the plain)[b]. But the Kurds also engage in agriculture, as they live on part of the plain. The Armenians, on the other hand, live in more central parts of the plain, because they are primarily agriculturalists.

The conclusion is that the Kurdish tribes, certain long-term considerations apart, were territorially fixed. Individual tribes probably had tribal grazing land, in other words land in the communal ownership of the tribe: this is a normal feature of Kurdish tribes in the modern period, and some tribal sections have their own communal land too.[c] In the long term, of course, the Kurdish tribes were not fixed: for one thing, they had not always inhabited the region, and for another certain conditions could have forced them to move.

Given that the tribes were territorially fixed, the next question is whether their economies were self-sufficient. If so, the principalities had no economic need to ally with other principalities or political entities, or to subordinate them, or to be subordinate to

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[a] Sh.I.354; cf.353.

[b] Sh.I.353-4 (yaylas of plain of Muş in general); 355 (Jabal Sharaf al-Din, presented as a yayla of Hımıs).

[c] V.Br., ASS 53-6.

them. If they were not self-sufficient, then the need did arise.

The analysis of the different principalities' territories in the next chapter indicates that, irrespective of the individual *tribes*' self-sufficiency, each of the *principalities* was self-sufficient. In other words its territory, taken as a whole, provided the right mix of terrain, and thus of produce, to satisfy the needs of its population as a whole. It provided both summer and winter grazing grounds for individual flocks (the migration paths might vary in length, and cross or overlap), and sufficient agricultural land to feed not only the agriculturalists but also, by exchange, the pastoralists.

To say that the principalities were economically self-sufficient is not to imply that they were economically isolated. This is most unlikely to have been the case. Modern medium- and long-distance transhumance patterns cross the boundaries of the medieval principalities. For example, pastoralists, some of whom may still be tribal, winter in the Tigris basin (formerly the Diyar Bakr) and summer in the Taurus mountains, the plain of Muş, or on Nemrut Dağ to the west of Lake Van.[11] Their winter residences are therefore outside, and their summer residences within, the territory of the former Bitlis principality. Economic isolation is most unlikely, moreover, to have been a condition for a viable principality. It is much more likely that there existed a web of relationships, partly involving activity outside a given principality's land, which together constituted economic self-sufficiency for that principality.

Modern studies have concentrated on rural society. But in the medieval principalities there was another element which made for territorial fixity, not to mention economic diversity. This was the cities and towns. These were not only a source of wealth for the princes, but residences for themselves and sometimes for family members with apanages or other forms of landholding.

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(ii) Village ownership. Studies of modern Kurdish society describe two types of village. (1) The *tribal* village, where the inhabitants all belong to the same tribe. Here a proportion of produce is paid to the village's owner, who is also a member of the tribe. (2) The *tenant* village. Here the majority of the inhabitants do not belong to a tribe at all. A small group of families belonging to a single tribe also live in the village: in some cases they live off the produce paid by the non-tribal tenants, but in general they too have to farm in order to live. This is a sharecropping arrangement in which the non-tribal tenants pay a proportion of the produce as rent for the land which they work. The choice of proportion paid is up to the landowner, not the tenant -- clearly the landowner is limited by considerations of practicability and humanity.[a]

In the almost complete absence of empirical evidence either way, it nevertheless seems likely that in the late Middle Ages, Kurdish villages (whether wholly or partly Kurdish-inhabited) were of tribal or tenant type, according as they were wholly or partly occupied by tribal Kurds. But in the case of tenant villages the tenants were mostly Armenians rather than Kurds.[12]

A third type of village would be the purely Armenian one in which the inhabitants were subject to a basket of taxes traditional in the Islamic world (see next section, (iii)). The taxes would have been paid to a landowner or, more strictly, landholder. As usual nothing is known about the basis of the landholder's tenure, but such taxes were normally levied on the basis that the right to levy them had to be granted. In the medieval Kurdish case the grant*or* was the prince.

There are two pieces of empirical evidence as to ownership and tenure of villages. One is the bestowal of a village by the prince of Bitlis on a member of one of the

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[a] Barth, *Kurdistan* 48-9, 53-60, 80-81. V.Br., ASS 92, 106.

principality's tribes. The circumstances suggest that the village was not tribal. The village in question was outside the district inhabited by the tribe. A tribal village could only be bestowed at all if the bestow*er* and bestow*ee* were both members of the same tribe as occupies the village. However having decided that the village in question was not tribal, we have not the means to decide whether the village was of the remaining two types, tenant in the Kurdish sense or the standard case of a *re'āyā* village in the Islamic sense. The former seems more likely in this case.[13]

The other piece of evidence indicating the nature of land ownership or tenure is the existence of the practice of creating *waqf*s. This we know the princes of Bitlis to have done.[a] If the income from a village, or part of the income, could be bestowed by the prince on an institution such as a madrasa, then the right to that income must have belonged to the prince. Such a situation points, uncertainly, to the *re'āyā* village of the Islamic world rather than to the tenant village. But the information in the *Sherefname* is not specific as to the form of tenure prior to the creation of the *waqf*. It is possible to imagine the arrangement for exacting rent from the sharecroppers in a tenant village being changed just for the purpose of creating a *waqf*.

The likelihood is that the three types of village -- tribal, tenant and *re'āyā* -- existed in the late Middle Ages. Beyond a few hints in the *Sherefname* and some commonsense considerations we have no idea (except, perhaps, by further consulting the Ottoman *tahrir defters*) of the distribution of villages between the various types. On a priori grounds it seems best to keep in mind the notion of a mosaic where the types are interspersed. The distribution, however, would not have been a uniform mix; the emphasis would have varied. For example, on the plain of Muş, a few vital details of which are

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[a] Sh.I.380; discussed Ch.III, sect.I.3.1.(b).

described by the *Sherefname*, the emphasis would have been on tribal and tenant villages at the plain's edge and on *re'āyā* villages in the more central portions. It is also a mistake to suppose that the totality of tribal and tenant villages occupied by a given tribe would have been owned by just one man, or just a few men. Although the term *agha* is unspecific as to function, such landowners are probably the bulk of the men named as aghas in the texts.[a]

(iii) Taxation. The discussion of the Bitlis principality in the next chapter will show that the Bitlis princes did have extensive powers of taxation. The two instances to be discussed there suggest that taxes of a kind standard and current within the Iranian sphere (a sub-section, of course, of the Islamic world as a whole) could be levied by the Bitlis princes. Such a conclusion may be correct, but the instances in question seem to arise out of special needs such as foreign invasion.

On the other hand in Kurdish society of modern times the taxation and levy rights of landowners do not correspond to taxation rights standard in the medieval Islamic world or in the late medieval Iranian world.[14] In the first place a completely tribal village pays tribal dues to the village's owner, and makes no other payment outside the village. The tribe as a whole must pay dues to the chief; the identity of the person or persons responsible for the payment varies from tribe to tribe.[b] Secondly, in the tenant villages, the tenants pay a single yearly rent to the landlord, and again make no other form of

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[a] See appendix II, sect.II.C.3.

[b] V.Br., ASS 86-7; Barth 55-6 (Hamawand); Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs* 13-14 (tithes, animal tax, *koda*); Rich I.123 and note 153-4 (voluntary contributions from Bahdinan clans [sections]).

payment elsewhere.[a] A proportion of the rent finds its way to the tribe's chief, in the form of tribal dues. In the Middle Ages, if this type of landownership was in force, the prince of a given principality would eventually have received a proportion of the rent.

The taxation arrangements accepted in modern Kurdish tribal society, therefore, do not correspond to those traditional in Islamic society, and it is fair to ask whether and to what extent the traditional Islamic taxes were in force. It seems likely (purely on a priori grounds) that the villages inhabited by the tribes were only of tribal or tenant type, in which case the taxation arrangements in those villages arose at least to some extent from tribal dues or rent. Many villages, though, were inhabited purely by Armenians, and we can reasonably assume these to have been subject to a mix of the taxes current within the Iranian world, themselves derived both from taxes traditional within the Islamic world and from taxes introduced by the Mongols.

In 937/1531 Sharaf (soon to be Sharaf Khan) of Bitlis needed to pay for tribute and gifts to Shah Tahmasp. Tahmasp had just saved Sharaf from an Ottoman attack. He took one-fifth of the *emvāl u jihat-i mevāshī u marā'ī-i kufre u islāmīye*.[b] This should be translated, as will shortly be argued, "the cattle- and pasture-tax on non-Muslim and Muslim alike". The word "emvāl" is deceptive, as it suggests the totality of the moveable possessions of Sharaf's subjects. This is hardly likely. If the word is changed to "māl", the phrase "māl u jihāt", meaning the combination of taxes to be paid, of whatever sort, results.[c] (Strictly speaking "māl" refers to taxes payable in kind, and "jihāt" to indirect taxes payable in cash; but the composite phrase denotes the whole basket of applicable

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[a] V.Br., ASS 106; Barth, *Kurdistan* 48-9, 80-81.

[b] Sh.I.425; discussed Ch.III, sect.I.3.1.(b).

[c] CHI VI.535-6.

taxes.) The word "mevāshī" in its more basic meaning means "cattle", but can also mean a cattle-tax. Similarly "marā'ī" means "pasture-tax" as well as "pasture". Both taxes were current in Iran in the second half of the 15th century: they were descendants of taxes first imposed by the Mongols.[a] The passage just quoted therefore appears to mean that one-fifth of the cattle- and pasture-tax was levied on non-Muslims and Muslims alike.

The conclusion to be drawn is not so much that within the Bitlis principality and, perhaps, other principalities of the Van region, exactly the same taxes were levied as in neighbouring parts of Iran, but that some taxes similar to those levied in Iran were available to the Kurdish princes of the Van region. In the case of purely Christian villages the conclusion raises few problems. In the case of tribal and tenant villages it suggests that taxes levied in Iran, such as the cattle- and pasture-tax, were applied alongside tribal dues and village rent; if they were paid by tribe chiefs and village owners, the taxes could to some extent have been raised *in the form of* tribal dues and village rent.

The other known episode of tax collecting is that in which the Katholikos of Aghtamar collected taxes from the Bitlis prince's subjects. Again the account suggests that tax was collected from all the prince's subjects.[b] But in this case it is hard to believe the katholikos was allowed by the prince to visit the tribal and tenant villages. It is much more likely that he collected taxes only from the purely Armenian villages. These were the only villages peopled purely by his own spiritual subjects.

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[a] CHI VI.538.

[b] Clph.XV.II.221, pp.174-5 (S.1462.3, pp.272-3). Discussed Ch.III, sect.I.3.1.(b).

2.5. Summary of characteristics

The tribal base of a Kurdish principality was a group of tribes. The structure relating the tribes within the group to one another varied from principality to principality. Leaving out of consideration the very long term, the principalities were territorially fixed. Their tribes had fixed summer and winter pastures, and often lived in villages during the winter. The principalities, in any case, were based, in part, on cities and towns. Moreover they were economically self-sufficient, and so no need for territorial acquisition or exchange arose. Of course the principalities were competing for territory at the margin, but very little change took place. Dramatic changes must have taken place before the Kara Koyunlu period. As the principalities were formed and as they expanded or contracted, large-scale territorial shifts must have taken place.[a]

Taken together with economic self-sufficiency, the tribal structure of these principalities, which defined their size as well as the prince's power base, also suggests, what has been left undiscussed so far, the notion of a structural limit on size. In the short term it can only extend its influence by acquiring vassals; and this the Bitlis and Hakkari principalities did. In the longer term the principality can only grow by changing its nature.

The stability of the total picture of territorial division, with the tribal structure and economic self-sufficency of the principalities, suggest the notion of a system in which the various principalities were in equilibrium. Moreover the evidence, inadequate for some aspects of the region's political system, would appear to be adequate for this. In the next two chapters virtually every valley of the Van region will be assigned to one or other of the principalities or to the area directly governed by the Kara Koyunlu.

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[a] For the general notion, Cribb, *Nomads* 56-9. For the argument in general, sect. 4.2 below.

Given the economic potential of their respective terrains, each of the principalities had reached a state of territorial expansion and intertribal relationships which, given that the other principalities were also in a stable state, was self-maintaining except at the margin. Of course a series of marginal changes would eventually amount, over a period, to a radical change and therefore to a disturbance of the equilibrium. Equally, once a principality had been weakened, territorial change would not necessarily be slow. Under the combined predation of neighbouring principalities, its disintegration might be rapid and take place with increasing speed.

Given that the equilibrium was for the most part self-maintaining, the question arises, in so far as it needed maintaining, what did maintain the equilibrium.

2.6. The role of the Kara Koyunlu

Direct evidence bearing on the relationships between the Kara Koyunlu and the local Kurdish principalities is almost completely lacking. As mentioned in Ch.I, sect.3, no contemporary documents have survived. Two are preserved in the text of the *Sherefname*,[a] but these add nothing to the information gleaned from elsewhere in the same and other sources. We know of one episode which proves that tribute was demanded by the Kara Koyunlu. This is the Zakaria tax-collecting incident, where the katholikos of Aghtamar collected from the Bitlis prince's subjects the taxes necessary to pay the tribute.[b] It is hard to say just what the position was with regard to tribute. Probably it was demanded of the three biggest principalities (Bitlis, Hakkari, Mahmudi) when the Kara Koyunlu felt able

[a] Sh.I.376-8, 428-30.

[b] Above, sect.2.4.

to demand it. Certainly the Zakaria incident took place at a time when, under Jahan Shah, the Kara Koyunlu had reached the height of their power. When it was too difficult to demand tribute, the demand was probably not expressed.

What we can be sure of is the requirement to acknowledge sovereignty and not to express submission to any other power. We do have evidence of submission to the Kara Koyunlu.[15] Attacks, several in a row if necessary, were mounted on a principality's cities if the principality expressed submission to another power or, without acknowledging another power, refused to submit to the Kara Koyunlu. The evidence for such punitive attacks is reasonably good.[16]

On the other hand there is no evidence of any interference in the local principalities' affairs beyond the periodic exaction of tribute and the requirement to acknowledge sovereignty. After the acquisition of Tabriz in 1408 the Kara Koyunlu appear to have kept no large permanent force in the region. All the attacks, whether on local cities and towns or on Shah Rukh's troops, appear to have been mounted from Azerbayjan.[a] There is no evidence, in fact, that troops adequate to the task of subduing the principalities were permanently kept at Erciş or Adilcevaz before, let alone after, Timur's annexation of the region in 1387.

The Kara Koyunlu's policy toward the local principalities was therefore one of thoroughly loose supervision and of requiring that the Kurds remain their vassals and no-one else's. One reason for the looseness of their control over the principalities has just been given: the absence from the region of resources adequate for the maintenance of a more interventionist policy. But it is essential to ask whether, for the Kara Koyunlu confederation's limited aims in this region, any intervention in the internal affairs of the

[a] E.g. those on pp.115-16, 190-92 below.

local powers was necessary.

It has already been argued that the tribal principalities formed a local system in equilibrium. There was room for change at the margin, and in the longer term the equilibrium could have been disturbed, perhaps at increasing speed, eventually resulting perhaps in the complete dismemberment of one of the principalities. Of course such long-term processes, or, alternatively, quick but radical changes, did not take place. But their failure to take place requires some explanation.

The explanation would appear to be the presence of an overlord power exercising an arm's-length sovereignty. This was the little that was necessary for the system's equilibrium. First of all, the existence of the overlord provided a general umbrella of stability which deterred the principalities from all but short-range acts of aggression. Secondly, there is some evidence that the Kara Koyunlu exploited the rivalries between the principalities in order to maintain the balance.[17]

This was not merely a policy which worked; it was probably the best possible policy in the circumstances. Intervention in the tribal principalities' internal affairs would have meant the beginning of a process of unravelling of the various structures which, without any cost to the overlord power, provided virtually all the elements necessary for political stability. It is not the purpose of this thesis to work out the point in detail, but it can be indicated first of all in general terms and then by means of comparisons of the treatment of individual principalities by the Kara Koyunlu and by subsequent dynasties. To end this general section on the principalities, some remarks about the subsequent dynasties should be made.

2.7. Subsequent overlords

The Ak Koyunlu, as soon as they gained the overlordship of the Van region in 872/1469, started attempting not only to subjugate the principalities but to get rid of their ruling families and *begzades*. From the foregoing sections it will be immediately apparent how misguided an attempt this was. The principalities were not a threat outside their own localities, though they may have hampered communication along the region's more important through routes. To replace the ruling families with an appointed governor was an attempt at implantation which stood no chance of acceptance unless the structures and elements of the principalities underwent radical change. Even worse, in one case (the Hakkari) the attempt was made to replace the ruling family with another tribe.[a] There is little doubt that the Ak Koyunlu would have tried to break down the tribal structures within the principalities if their own empire had survived intact. As it was, the empire suffered from factional fighting after the death of Ya'qub in 896/1490,[b] and the ruling families were able to reclaim their principalities.

The relations of the Van region Kurds with the Safavids were somewhat different. The Kurds initially acknowledged the overlordship of Shah Ismail. Afterwards some, probably all, rejected it, apparently in 911 or 922/1506 or 1507. Ismail attempted to subvert the region, in particular by imprisoning Sharaf of Bitlis and appointing his own governor to the Bitlis principality.[18] But the attempt appears to have been somewhat half-hearted; and for reasons just given stood no chance of success unless accompanied by thoroughgoing intervention, leading to radical change, in the affairs and society of the

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[a] Sh.I.93; discussed Ch.III, sect.II.5.(v).

[b] Woods, AQ 160-75.

principality.

The Ottoman solution was considerably more ingenious. Instead of attempting to evict the ruling families and unravel the fabric of the principalities, the Ottoman empire incorporated them into the sanjak system. The sanjak beys were appointed from the ruling families. Generally several sanjaks were created out of one principality. The sanjak beys had to provide the usual military contingents: the land was surveyed in the usual process of *tahrir*.[19]

It would be tempting to suppose that splitting the principalities into several sanjaks and subjecting the land to *tahrir* meant the end of the principalities. However they continued to exist. Within them the same tribal, territorial and family relations obtained as before. The principalities were designated as "hereditary *ḥükūmet*s". They kept all the old principles of appointment to the position of prince except that the sultan was entitled to intervene if an existing prince, or proposed candidate, did not fulfil, or appeared unlikely to fulfil, his obligations.[a] The prince was sanjak bey of the sanjak containing the principality's capital (for example the Mahmudi prince was the sanjak bey of Hoşap). Similarly the other sanjak beys were members of the ruling family, and were appointed to the sanjaks in just the same way as the same members would have been appointed to the apanage from which the sanjak had been created.[20] It is easy to misjudge the nature of the transition by allowing the particular case of Bitlis to form the general image. Bitlis, despite its pre-eminence among the Kurdish houses, was an isolated, atypical instance. Three-quarters of its territory was seized from the principality, and the prince was left with the sanjak of Bitlis only.

The Ottoman government maintained the whole dual system of sanjaks and

[a] Discussed V.Br., ASS 158-60.

principalities, again, by ingenious means. Unlike previous powers they created an impressive military apparatus in the Van region. This was principally done by converting Van into a large military base with a janissary contingent; but there were detachments of janissaries in other cities and towns. The whole Van region, with the exception of Hınıs and Malazgirt, became part of the *eyalet* of Van. The Kurdish sanjak beys had a tendency to fail in their duties; the technique of the Van *beylerbeyi* in this case was to order the other sanjak beys to take part in bringing the rebel to heel.[21]

The Ottoman arrangements for the Kurdish principalities showed greater understanding of their nature, and of the difficulty of eradicating them, than the Ak Koyunlu or Safavid attempts at subordinating them. The Ottoman government did not try to destroy them, but simply adjusted the obligations of certain leading posts within the principalities. The policy cannot be said to have shown greater or less understanding than the Kara Koyunlu policy; but it was certainly more interventionist. As for maintaining the balance between the principalities, the Ottomans did this, too, but again they did it by intervening more closely and investing more resources in the region. This was, of course, fully in line with policy in other newly-conquered areas; but it was necessitated anyway by the border position of the Van region and the large-scale, ruthless nature of hostilities with the Safavid empire.[22]

3. The directly administered areas

By contrast with the Kurdish principalities and their vassal relations with the Kara Koyunlu, there is very little to be said by way of introduction to the direct Kara Koyunlu

administration of the area, which included the districts of Erciş, Adilcevaz, and Berkri, to the north and east of the lake.

The Christian population was certainly taxed, but we have virtually no direct evidence as to the basis of taxation. First of all the tax arrangements current in Iran at the time will be summarised, then the very partial evidence from Armenian sources bearing on the directly-administered portions of the Lake Van area will be considered.

In the last decades of Il Khanid Iran the basic taxes on the agrarian population seem to have been the *kharāj* or land tax prescribed by the Sharī'a and the *qubchūr* or cattle tax. The latter, however, was paid by Muslims as well as *dhimmīs* and was introduced by the Il-Khans themselves. Moreover the qubchūr and kharāj were never exacted simultaneously in the same region: they were alternatives.[a] In post-Mongol Iran the taxes seem to have remained essentially the same until the reforms under the Ak Koyunlu; however the nomenclature and clarification were different.[b]

The only passage which genuinely instantiates the practice of taxation by the Kara Koyunlu in the Van region is one in Thomas of Mecop'. This relates to the exactions of Pīr 'Alī, governor of Amik, in the territory of Erciş and Adilcevaz, about 1436. Pīr 'Alī took a poll tax of 40 *tanka*s per head. The difficulty with the passage is that the tax is clearly an irregular one and in any case levied *outside* the district for which Pīr 'Alī was responsible.[23] Thomas also mentions a *bahra* which had to be paid quite separately from the poll tax. This will be considered below. After the disappearance of the Kara Koyunlu from the region, two incidents took place which may reflect the arrangements in force, or capable of being in force, under the Kara Koyunlu. In 1484 various leading members of

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[a] CHI V.531,533.

[b] CHI VI.535-6; reforms 534-5, 537-9.

the Armenian population of Van succeeded in getting the "ǰwan" abolished, in raising the "dahiandzdē", in "making the *mlk'anē* one from ten" and in freeing the priests from the tax-collector.[a] At any rate it seems likely that the priests were taxed under the Kara Koyunlu.

In 1498, when the Ak Koyunlu Alvand was defending his throne in one of a succession of civil wars, his forces imposed a tax of 2000 tankas ("dahekan") per head in the district of Erciş.[b] Again the imposition of the tax is irregular. But it is possible to conclude from this passage and from that in Thomas of Mecop' quoted above, that, contrary to the general practice of taxation in Iran, a poll tax in the nature of the jizya was at least sometimes exacted. From the second passage we can conclude with reasonable confidence that priests were generally taxed under the Kara Koyunlu. Thomas of Mecop''s "bahra" and the "mlk'anē" are the *bahra-yi mālikāna* of Mongol and post-Mongol Iran. This is simply rent paid to his landlord by the peasant in the form of a share of the crop. It can be concluded that some Armenian peasants were tenants of Muslim landowners, and quite apart from any taxation paid to the treasury, had to pay a share of the produce to their landlord. The other terms (*ǰwan* etc) are difficult to interpret. The area under Kara Koyunlu administration was divided into a number of governorships, but these may have been combined at various points, not necessarily in the same combinations each time. The operation of taxing and governing appears to have been supervised by a governor for the whole area whose seat was Adilcevaz.[c] This governor and those of the smaller districts under his command may have been the recipients of *soyūrghāl*s, in other words an

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[a] Clph. XV.III.66, p.62.

[b] Clph. XV.III.348, p.256.

[c] Ch.IV, sects. 4.1.(a), 4.2.

entitlement to the district taxes.[a] There is evidence that Kurdish tribes resided, or at least summered, on the extensive plains north-west and east of the area's main cities (i.e. the Malazgirt plain and the Abaghā/Çaldıran plain).[b] These were not principalities, but simply tribes, and in this respect were much like the Jaf and Hamawand of modern times. The exact relations of the Kara Koyunlu with these tribes are unknown; in Ch.IV it will be proposed that some form of tribute was exacted.

4. The inheritance from the Mongols

Reference has already been made to the circumstance that the Kara Koyunlu inherited from the Mongols certain features of their manner and method of holding and governing this region. It will be a satisfactory means of tying up this chapter's general discussion, and at the same time help to explain something of that manner and method, if we summarise the Kara Koyunlu's inheritance from the Mongols in this region. In sum, the areas directly administered by the Kara Koyunlu were, apart from Ahlat, precisely an inheritance from the Mongols; and the Kurdish principalities of the Kara Koyunlu period are likely to have been in place, substantially in the same form, towards the end of the Il-Khans' occupation. However the Mongols are likely to have exercised even less strict supervision over the Kurds than the Kara Koyunlu.

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[a] CHI VI.504-8. The passage in Clavijo (1943 ed., p.241) describing the shareout of at least part of the Kara Koyunlu dominions between three Kara Koyunlu sons in the period before Timur is unfortunately not relevant, because the areas in question (Erzurum, Ani and Alashkert) are not in the Van region.

[b] Ch.IV, sect.3.

4.1. The directly administered areas

Little needs to be said. With the exception of Ahlat and Hınıs, exactly the same regions seem to have been under direct Kara Koyunlu administration as were under Mongol. The reasons have been discussed: the Ala Dağ pastures were germane to them, but the flat, high districts north and to an extent east of the lake were not germane to the Kurdish principalities. The loss of Ahlat to the Ruzagi of Bitlis meant that the foremost city under direct Mongol administration could not become the administrative base of the Kara Koyunlu in this region. The Kara Koyunlu appear to have treated Erciş, a day's walk from the Ala Dağ massif, as the region's foremost city and the one where most of their affections were invested. Much as Mongol governors had been buried at Ahlat, so the Kara Koyunlu had their türbes constructed at Erciş. But as the administrative base for the whole directly-administered area the true successor of Ahlat was Adilcevaz. A more defensible site than Ahlat or Erciş was required.

4.2. The Kurdish principalities

In appendix IV it is argued that a small principality, based on the Ruzagi tribe, had been established by the mid-12th century. It probably acquired Bitlis at or soon after the Ayyubid occupation of Ahlat in 607/1207-8; if not then, the acquisition probably took place soon after the Mongol conquest. The principality had certainly acquired Muş by the end of the Il-Khanid occupation.[a] It had gained Ahlat by 750/1349.[b] There is no means

[a] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(i).

[b] Appendix I, Ahlat; Ch.III, sect.I.5.(i).

of knowing when Hınıs was annexed by the principality; the first date when argument would support the assertion that it was in the principality's hands is 1387, when Timur first arrived in the region.[a]

Below it is shown that a part of the Hakkari tribe had arrived in the upper Zab district somewhere between the 660's/1260's and the 700's/1300's.[b] This therefore gives the approximate date at which the Hakkari principality began to take shape. The town of Julamerk[c] was probably its capital from the start. The Hakkari had certainly acquired the Gevar plain by the 740's/1340's and Vostan by 752/1351-52.[d] Otherwise it is hard to say which districts they occupied. But the principality was certainly in place by the end of the Mongol occupation.

For the remainder of the area occupied by the Kurdish principalities in the Kara Koyunlu period, in other words that of the Mahmudi and the smaller principalities to the south of Lake Van (Hizan, Moks and Isbāīrd), an argument can be constructed from two items of information concerning Hizan and Moks and from the much-quoted passage of Yaqut concerning Zawazān.[24]

We know that as late as 1169 a small Armenian principality survived at Moks. The latter name denotes areas of differing size in different periods, but in this case it denotes the valley of the Müküs Çay, a northerly affluent of the Bohtan Su.[e] We know that in 541/1146 Hizan, which lies in a separate basin immediately west of the Müküs valley, was

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[a] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(ii).

[b] Ch.III, sect.II.5.(ii), esp. pp.179-85.

[c] Its modern name is Hakkari, a name which is generally left out of the main text in this thesis.

[d] Ibid., pp.179-81.

[e] Markwart, *Südarmenien* 519, 523; Ch.III, sect.IV.2, p.226, and sect.IV.2, p.231.

taken by the Shah-i Arman (whose capital was Ahlat).[a] So the small Armenian principality of Moks known in 1169 is not likely to have included Hizan; even if it did, Hizan was in principle detachable from Moks, whereas formerly the two had belonged to one principality, the Armenian one of Mokk'.

These points do not show that Kurdish principalities did exist at Hizan and Moks during the Mongol period, but they show that their existence in that period is possible. However Yaqut's evidence shows that even in the 1220's Kurdish tribal entities with at least a limited political function and import existed immediately to the south and east of Moks and Hizan. The likelihood is, not only that small principalities existed at Moks and Hizan, but that by the 1220's these were Kurdish already.

Yaqut[b] takes his information from Ibn al-Athir (the passage itself reveals this). The information relates to the 1220's or before.[25] According to Yaqut, the Zawazān stretch from the vicinity of Mosul to the first borders of Khilāṭ and to the [nearest] territory of Salmās in Azerbayjan. In the region are many castles, some of them the possession of the Bashnawīya and some the possession of the Bukhtīya Kurds. Among the castles of the Bashnawīya are Barqa and Bashīr; among those of the Bukhtīya, Jurdaqīl, seat of their *malik* [chief, prince], Ātīl and 'Allūs. But the lord of Mosul [in fact Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu'] holds Alqī (1), Arūkh (2), Bākhawkha (3), Barkhū (4), Kinkiwār (5), Nīrūh (6) and Khawshāb (7). [These have been numbered for convenience in the discussion.]

Yaqut's information concerns political organisation as well as built structures. That is to say, the mention of a particular castle in this list implies not just the existence of a

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[a] Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri Tarihi* 159; Appendix I, Hizan.

[b] Ed. Wüstenfeld, VI.957. The whole question of the extent of Zawazān has been dealt with by Markwart, *Südarmenien* 422-7, but Markwart assumes constantly that Zawazān is the Arabic name for Armenian "Anjewac'ik'", the upper Norduz basin.

castle on a given site, but also the existence of territory dependent in some sense (economic and/or administrative etc.) on the castle. It implies the existence, too, of a social unit or units dependent, equally, on that castle. The unit or units dependent on the castle might be an apanage of a given principality, or a whole principality (if a small one), or a tribal section, or several tribes. In the case of the Bashnawī and Bukhtī Kurds we can be sure of the existence of a composite tribal principality such as was discussed in sect.2 of this chapter. But in the case of the castles under the control of the lord of Mosul, the text does not provide material to make the judgement as to which type or types of political entity are centred on the named castles. But the existence of a number of Kurdish castles does at least imply the existence of political structures of a tribal nature which must have been the precursors of the tribal principalities known at a later stage in the Middle Ages.

The term "zawazān" in Arabic implies summer pastures, and given the rough whereabouts of the region discussed by Yaqut, the summer pastures in question must be pastures for flocks wintering in the Mesopotamian plain or its foothills. For the designation "zawazān" to be a meaningful and workable one, it is not necessary that the whole of the region defined by Yaqut's list be summer pasture land whose primary use is to be grazed by flocks from the Mesopotamian plain. It is quite sufficient that some of it should be such land, and some should be land which could be so grazed, but whose primary use is different. It would also be quite in order for one or two of the castles to lie out of reach of flocks commuting from the Mesopotamian plain: just so long as this was true of only one or two castles, there is nothing improper about the designation "zawazān" which would disqualify it from applying to the area as a whole. Nor is it necessary that all of the land grazed or grazeable by Mesopotamian flocks should be

included in the list of castles. We shall argue that Yaqut's list of castles covers areas in primary use as summer grazing, some, on the northern fringes, which were not in primary use as such but which probably were grazed and certainly have been in recent times, and some, too, which cannot be said to be in either category but where the district dependent on the castle is at least visited, at the edge, by Mesopotamian flocks. Moreover Yaqut's own stated boundaries (not the ones deducible from the list of castles) coincide precisely with the ones implied by the castles' positions and with the description of the area in question as *zawazān*. The stated boundaries are the borders of Khilāṭ (which probably means the whole of what later became the province of Akhlāṭ/Khilāṭ under the Il-Khans) and the western border of Azerbayjan.

We shall also argue that part of the region justly designated by the word "Zawazān" (by reason of its climate and accessibility from the Mesopotamian plain) is not specified in the castle list. This is the Nestorian-inhabited districts either side of the Upper Zab. The reason for these districts' non-inclusion is very simple: there were no Kurdish castles there, as the Hakkari principality was not yet in being and the districts in question had not yet been conquered by Kurds.

Barqa and Bashīr, castles of the Bashnawī/Beshnevī Kurds, will be towards the east edge of the Tigris basin: the castle of Bashīr will be somewhere near modern Beşiri, just west of the Garzan Su. Among the Bukhtī's castles, Jurdaqīl appears to have stood on the southern slopes of Judi Dagh/Cudi Dağ.[26] Ātīl is Tili at the confluence of the Bohtan and Tigris.[27] 'Allūs has not been identified; but with the knowledge that Jurdaqīl is the seat of the Bukhtī *malik* we at least have a political entity resembling the Bukhtī principality whose internal constitution, geographical extent and achievements in later

periods are reasonably well known.[a]

Within the area held by the lord of Mosul the castles of Alqī (1), Kinkiwār (5) and Khawshāb (7) can be located without much argument. Alqī is Armenian Elki, near modern Beytüşşebap.[b] Kinkiwār and Khawshāb are respectively the former Kangavar in the upper Norduz basin and the castle of Hoşap, both in the north-east of the area indicated. Alqī is within primary summer grazing land. The southern slopes, effectively the north side of the Taurus watershed, of the upper Norduz basin were until recently visited by tribes from northern Iraq.[c] The upper Hoşap basin, centred on Hoşap, is beyond the limits of the country grazed by Mesopotamian flocks, but as stated above this does not affect the designation "zawazān" provided it is confined to one or two cases.

As Alqī (1) is first in the list and Kinkiwār (5) and Khawshāb (7) are among the last three, Yaqut's list would appear to be ordered according to a rough geographical principle, starting in the south-west and working towards the north-east. Moreover, as will shortly be argued, Arūkh (2) certainly lay in the Bohtan Su valley to the north of Alqī, and the true starting-point of the list, as far as geographical ordering is concerned, is the Bukhtī castles in the south-west corner of the whole *zawazān*. The geographical principle of ordering is confirmed by the position of Barkhū (4) in the Norduz valley between Kangavar and the Çatak valley (see below). Part of the *zawazān*, on the definition of actual or potential summer pasture, is excluded. This is the Nestorian districts on the Zab, about which a little more will be said at the end of this discussion.

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[a] Some attempt at reconstruction in Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey*, III.400-1, 409-10. On their coins, Ilisch, "Münzen der Buhti".

[b] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 337; Markwart, *Südarmenien* 383. Description of castle, which appears to have been decidedly unimpressive, Maunsell, MRETA I.339.

[c] See the discussion of modern transhumance, based on Hütteroth's study, later in this section.

The modern descendant of the name Arūkh (2) is Eruh. The present town of Eruh lies in the northern part of the Bohtan region. However the castle lay in the Bohtan Su valley to the north-east of modern Eruh, in the district of Berwari (Kurd.)/Pervari (mod. Turk.).[28] The district of modern Eruh was one of the apanages of the Bukhtī principality.[29]

Barkhū (4) has been identified with a district of the same name on the Norduz Çay, between the upper Norduz basin and the Çatak valley.[30] A village of Berhopahik is marked on the map (USAF 1:250,000), and the castle may have been near this village. Given that the district of the castle of Barkhū (4) occupied this sector of the Norduz valley, a position for Bākhawkha (3) somewhere north-east of the Berwari/Pervari district would seem logical. Ziril Kale has been suggested,[a] but Çatak itself would seem the best choice.[31] As for the remaining castles, two have been already dealt with. Kinkiwār (5) is Kangavar in the upper Norduz basin, Khawshāb (7) is Hoşap and Nīrūh (6) (perhaps vocalised "Nerwa") is impossible to identify.[32]

The Zawazān of Yaqut can now be compared with the data on transhumance patterns supplied by a study of Kurdish tribes carried out in 1953: the study, however, also collected data pertaining to the period before the First World War. The study concerns Kurdish tribes which winter mainly in the plains south of Judi Dagh/Cudi Dağ but also in the Bohtan district just above the river Tigris and in the Garzan district itself (where the castle of Bashīr appears to have been located).[b] However before the First World War some tribes which summered in the Taurus wintered in the environs of Mosul

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[a] Markwart, *Südarmenien* 424.

[b] Hütteroth, *Bergnomaden* 48-63, *passim*.

and Arbil.[a] The great majority of the tribes in question used the Bohtan valley between the Berwar/Pervari district to the west and Ziril Kale to the east, as a migration path rather than a pasture.[b] By nearly all the tribes the flat-topped, spreading Harakol Dağ, immediately south of the Pervari district, was used as a half-way point. This was possible partly because the tribes' migrations were phased; when one tribe arrived at Herakol Dağ, another departed.[c] Herakol Dağ was also the final summer pasture for a tribe from the Müküs valley.[d] The half-way halting-place on Herakol Dağ and the use of the Bohtan valley as a through route helps to explain the importance of Arūkh/Ḳal'e-i Rüstem.

The final summer destinations were as follows. (1) The heights to the west of the Müküs valley.[e] (2) In the Çatak district, the east side of Arnos Dağ, which lies between the Müküs and Çatak valleys,[f] and the lower end of the Çatak valley.[g] Further north, one tribe reached the south and west slopes of Artos Dağ.[h] Others went to Tirişin Yayla and Çalnık Yayla, which lie on the broad watershed of the Taurus above the upper Norduz basin. The upper Norduz basin, which they overlooked from the south, contained the castle of Kangavar, and was later to be, or possibly by this stage already was, part of the Mahmudi principality.[i] Before the First World War, but not afterwards, tribes from upper

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[a] Ibid. 63.

[b] Ibid. 49, 55, 56, 59.

[c] Ibid. 49, 50-52, 56, 59, 61, 63. 72-3: note that the nomads even had fields here!

[d] Ibid. 129.

[e] Ibid. 60.

[f] Ibid. 53, 63.

[g] Ibid. 57, 58, 59.

[h] Ibid. 54.

[i] Ch.III, Sect.III.1.

Mesopotamia summered in the Hakkari district, both to the heights forming the watershed between the upper Zab and the Hazil Su, and to the heights north of the Zab (Kara Dağ etc.).[a]

The modern study reveals a web of migration routes, made more complex and cohesive by the phasing of the different tribes' movements and the use of Herakol Dağ as a nodal half-way stage. The area united by the migration routes, with certain exceptions, corresponds with remarkable exactitude to Yaqut's *Zawazān*. The chief differences are: (1) that Yaqut's *Zawazān* includes as certain winter pasture areas, those of the Tigris basin and the Bohtan district, and (2) that Yaqut's Barkhū, Kinkiwār and Khawshāb lie beyond the observed band of summer pastures. On the other hand the Artos Dağ pastures lie beyond Yaqut's *Zawazān*. And there is no reason why the lower Norduz valley etc. could not have been used as summer pastures in the 13th century. In any case the border of the region of Khilāṭ/Akhlāṭ has to be borne in mind. If that region included the Hizan basin, the Müküs valley and the *lower* Hoşap valley, but nothing further south, then Barkhū and the upper Hoşap valley would have had to be included in Zawazān for want of a better alternative.

We may now add in Hizan and Moks again. We saw that these were separate entities by the mid-12th century, which suggests that they could well have been so in the early 13th. However in the mid-12th century Moks certainly, and Hizan perhaps, were not Kurdish polities. By the early 13th century matters could well have been different, as the example of the Zawazān castles shows. In any case the purpose of examining Yaqut is not so much to establish the position in the early 13th century as to use a reconstruction of the situation immediately before the arrival of the Mongols in order to indicate just what the

[a] Hütteroth, *Bergnomaden* 63.

situation during the Mongol occupation is likely to have been.

The minimum conclusion to be drawn concerning the early 13th century is that in the upper Bohtan valley, probably in the Hizan basin and Müküs valley, in the upper Norduz basin, in the Norduz valley further downstream, probably in the Çatak valley and certainly in the upper Hoşap valley there were social and political groupings served by and dependent on the identified castles.

Beyond the minimum conclusion lie different alternatives. The castles of Kinkiwār/Kangavar, Khawshāb/Hoşap and perhaps Barkhū could have belonged to a principality very similar to the Mahmudi principality known later. In fact the Mahmudi principality may already have existed and had similar boundaries to those which probably obtained during the Kara Koyunlu period. Bākhawkha and (on an alternative assumption) Barkhū may have been a small principality very similar in size, function and tribal base to those of Moks, Hizan and Isbāīrd known from the post-Mongol period.[a] Thus in so far as Hizan, Moks, Isbāīrd, Bākhawkha, Barkhū, Kangavar and Khawshāb are concerned, a political configuration very similar to the one obtaining in the post-Mongol period may have existed before the arrival of the Mongols. The investigation of Yaqut's list is worthwhile when it leads to such a conclusion. There are, however, alternative possibilities: the Mahmudi tribe may not have arrived in the upper Hoşap valley, the territory of the Mahmudi principality, then (in this supposition) not yet in existence, could have been divided between a number of smaller independent principalities, each based on castles such as Kangavar and Hoşap.

Whatever the situation in Yaqut's time, it may well have developed during the Mongol occupation. Perhaps some of the principalities of the Kara Koyunlu period took

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[a] Ch.III, sect.IV.

shape during the Mongol period; the likelihood is that the Mongol occupation brought about changes in the composition and relationships of the mosaic of tribal entities in the district concerned.

Yaqut's list does suggest that no Kurdish principality yet existed in the upper Zab valley. The latter was Nestorian-populated and, in so far as it had a political organisation, probably Nestorian-ruled. We know that a fragment of the Hakkari tribe came into the upper Zab valley, fleeing from Mongol persecution, during the Mongol occupation; and the date of its arrival is quite consistent with the picture suggested by Yaqut's list. The post-Mongol political arrangement in the Zab valley was therefore the result of the Mongol presence.

CHAPTER THREE

THE KURDISH PRINCIPALITIES

I. THE RUZAGI PRINCIPALITY OF BITLIS

1. Introduction

In this section we shall show first of all that the Bitlis principality possessed extensive, well-balanced, productive and on the whole economically self-sufficient territory. Then we shall point out the large number of tribes dependent on the prince, and examine the inner group of tribes which formed the core of his power base. We shall look at the system of sub-principalities which the great extent of the territory and the large number of tribes necessitated. We shall then see that Bitlis possessed a kind of junior ally, the small principality of Sasun; that another neighbouring principality, Hizan, was at least from time to time the vassal of Bitlis, and a neighbouring tribe, the Pāzūkī, was also a vassal. All these dimensions of the principality's constitution and influence add up to a formidable local power.

We then examine the way in which the Kara Koyunlu dealt with the principality and compare this with the methods of subsequent dynasties in controlling what was more or less the same principality. Our conclusion, of course, will be that the Kara Koyunlu kept the principality on a very loose rein, demanding in effect only allegiance and not attempting to interfere otherwise. The explanation for the Kara Koyunlu's conduct towards

this and the other principalities will have to be kept for our final chapter.

2. Territorial extent and economic cohesion

2.1. Territorial extent

A. The Bitlis valley and neighbouring districts. That part of the Bitlis valley within the principality can be taken as comprising the immediate environs of the city of Bitlis and the valley of Kifendūr, a castle which was five hours' walk down the main valley from Bitlis.[1] The valley of Kifendūr seems to have been inhabited by and to have been at least part of the territory of the Bāyegī tribe.[2]

The *nāhiya* of Tātīk was the valley neighbouring that of Bitlis to the south-east.[3] It certainly belonged to the principality at the time of the Ottoman attacks on Bitlis in 1531-33,[4] and given its position it is highly likely to have done so in the late Middle Ages.

The *nāhiya* of Kārjikān, the western half of the southern shore of Lake Van, was certainly within the principality in the early 16th century A.D., though the principality lost the district after its defeat in 940/1533.[5] Lastly there is a strong indication in the *Sherefname* that the district of Tatvan was part of the principality's territory in 900/1494-5,[6] and given its position at the upper end of the Bitlis valley, between the two Bitlis-held districts of Ahlat and Kārjikān, it is very likely to have been a permanent possession of the Bitlis princes.[7]

B. The district of Ahlat. This was a narrow strip of land along the shore of the lake

marked off by a low watershed which begins at Nemrut Dağ and follows the the curve of the shore at a distance.[a] The districts on the other side of the watershed were those of Chuqūr, in the plain of Muş, and to the north-west part of the Murat Su valley, known formerly as Hark, later known as Upper and Lower Bulanık and now part of the sub-principality of Hınıs.[b]

C. The plain of Muş and surrounding mountain districts. The plain of Muş was divided into three *nāḥiya*s, those of Muş (Pers. Mūşh), Chuqūr and Oḥgān. It may be that parts of the plain were not included in these three *nāhiyas*, perhaps because they belonged to monastic estates, particularly that of the great monastery of Surb Karapet in the hills north-west of the plain.

The position of the town, and therefore roughly of the *nāhiya*, of Muş, is clear. The nāhiya of Chuqūr was the east end of the plain. The medieval and Ottoman town must have been at Norşin (new name Güroymak), about five kilometres east of modern Çukur.[8]101 Oḥgān was a castle north of the town of Muş, almost certainly the present Mercimekkale ("Lentil Castle") by the Murat Su.[9] So the *nāhiya* was a portion of the plain against the plain's northern edge. There is some evidence that the three *nāhiyas*, or parts of them, could be the estates of different *āghās*; on the other hand this raises the question, answered in sect. 3 below, what it meant to be lord of the whole Muş basin.

Surrounding mountain districts. Soon after the defeat of Sharaf Khan by Ottoman forces in 939/1533, Ulama, who had been appointed in Sharaf's place by the Ottoman

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[a] On the boundaries of the district, see Appendix III.

[b] This part of the Murat Su valley is discussed fully below, under D.Hınıs and esp. n.12 to p.82.

government, detached four castles from the *eyālet* (i.e. former principality) of Bitlis; they were then given to Ibrahim, son of Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī, as a sanjak. They were Amūrek, Pughanad, Khūyt and Kirenj.[a] The district of Khūyt (Armn. Xoyt') lies in the highest zone of the band of mountains between the upper Tigris basin and the plain of Muş, north-west of Bitlis.[10] The other three castles must have been nearby. Probably the district defined by the four castles closely corresponded to the present Mutki district. On balance it is likely that the district in question was counted as part of the sub-principality of Muş, rather than that of Bitlis. The district of Sasun, the next one westwards in the same range of mountains, was not generally within the principality, although its dynasty was occasionally allied by marriage with that of Bitlis.[b] However other hill districts bordering the plain of Muş must have been within the sub-principality, for example the Şerafettin Dağları to the north (west of the Murat Su).

D. The district of Hınıs (Armn. "Xnus", "Xanus"; Pers. "Khinūs"). The fertile plain of Hınıs is not a flat expanse like the plain of Muş, but has a basically undulating surface. However it is eminently suitable for agriculture, and in the late Middle Ages seems to have been heavily exploited by a sedentary Armenian population.[11] There is reasonable evidence that in the 16th and 17th centuries the district of Hınıs included, beside the plain of Hınıs and surrounding hills, the mainly flat area between that plain and the plain of Muş. This area comprises a section of the Murat Su valley and the valley of its tributary, the Çarbuhar Dere. The Murat Su flows westward down the middle of the area; the Çarbuhar Dere from the opposite direction; at the confluence the Murat Su turns a sharp

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[a] Sh.I.442-3.

[b] Discussed sect.4 below.

angle southwards and finds a passage through the hills on the north side of the Muş plain. The easterly part of the area (that drained by the Murat Su) comprises what became the 19th-century nahiyes of Upper and Lower Bulanık. Upper Bulanık lay along the Bulanık or Kör Su, and Lower Bulanık to its west, along the Liz Su. The two were separated by the Bilecan hills. The Çarbuhar Dere valley is the district called Varto.[12]

2.2. Economic cohesion.

The territory just outlined contains a diversity of terrains, whose uses complement one another. On the one hand the Muş plain, the evenly sloping west and north-west shore strip, whose capital was Ahlat, the Hınıs plain and the Murat Su and Çarbuhar Dere valleys are fertile cornland. On the other hand the hills and mountains surrounding the plains and other flat areas, particularly Bingöl Dağ, the district of Sū Shehrī on its west shoulder and the Jabal Sharaf al-Dīn south of the Varto plain,[a] and some other mountain areas such as those either side of the Bitlis valley are good summer grazing land, and would also have carried some forests; but they would have been hard or impossible to use for purposes other than grazing. Other land again, such as the plain of Hınıs, is more naturally summer pasture, but equally can be used to grow corn. Apart from the overall extent of its territory, the principality needed such diversity; it is hard to imagine that a principality the nucleus of whose territory was that surrounding Bitlis, could have wielded much power if it did not also control cornland such as the plain of Muş.

There was plenty of scope for the type of short-range local transhumance discussed

[a] Sh.I.355.

in Ch. 2 above. The evidence for transhumance between the plain of Muş and the surrounding hills and mountains is especially good.[13] Moreover there is some evidence for transhumance over longer distances within the principality or to destinations just outside its boundaries. Such transhumance was confined to the same climatic zone, rather than involving journeys between the Lake Van region and Upper Mesopotamia. We could call it medium-range transhumance.

Bingöl Dağ was singled out by the *Sherefname* in the late 16th century as a choice yayla.[a] In the Melek Ahmet Paşa episode of the mid-17th century we hear that Abdāl Khān, hereditary sanjak bey and prince of Bitlis, has raided Bingöl and taken 70,000 sheep on the pretext of levying a tax from the local Kurds.[b] By that time the district of Hınıs, in which Bingöl Dağ lay, had been detached from the Bitlis principality and made into a sanjak in a different province, that of Erzurum -- of which, at the time of the raid, Melek Ahmet Paşa was beylerbeyi. One reason for putting Bitlis and Hınıs in two different provinces was no doubt that Hınıs contained some of the best yaylas for the principality.[14] Apart from Abdāl's wish for extra sheep the incident indicates something about habitual transhumance, not only in the 17th century but also in the late Middle Ages. Bingöl was the summer pasture; the winter pasture must have been somewhere under Abdāl's jurisdiction. At the time his principality was confined to the district of Bitlis, in the sense defined above. However that district is itself mainly suitable for summer pasturing. Abdāl also, however, had certain rights over the Muş district, and the reason was that the large, composite Ruzagi tribe partly resided in that district and needed it for economic reasons. This leads to the conclusion that one winter grazing-ground for those

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[a] Sh.I.355; see above.

[b] Ev.IV.126 (D.159). On the episode, sect.5.(ix) below.

summering on Bingöl Dağ was the plain of Muş or its immediate environs. We have a case of medium-range transhumance.

One other passage indicates the same. During the Safavid overlordship the Pāzūkī tribe had been given as an estate not only the districts of Malazgirt and Hınıs but also the *nāhiya* of Ohgān in the district of Muş.[a] Of course Hınıs and Ohgān had been taken from the Bitlis principality. The Pāzūkī used to winter in Ohgān;[b] and the fact that such an estate could be created at all implies that the summer grazing-grounds were in Malazgirt and Hınıs. Among these, of course, was Bingöl Dağ. This again illustrates medium- as well as short-range transhumance.

In the Melek Ahmet Paşa episode of the mid-17th century it emerges that the Kurds [of the Bitlis principality] went up to summer pasture in [the district of] Malazgirt.[15] Malazgirt had never been part of the principality of Bitlis; as with Hınıs, one reason for putting it in the province of Erzurum may have been just to cut it off from Bitlis and Muş. As pointed out above, the principality of Bitlis was now confined to the district of Bitlis (now a sanjak) and certain rights over the Muş district. Again the conclusion is that the flocks summering in the Malazgirt district stayed the winter in that of Muş, less likely in that of Bitlis. Here again we see the process of medium-range transhumance.

Quite apart from the short- and medium-range transhumance which emerges from the texts, parts of the principality's territory were a natural venue for nomads from the Tigris basin. These have been discussed in Ch.2 (pp.69-75) and more will be said about them in Appendix IV (story E).

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[a] Sh.I.329, 435.

[b] Sh.I.435.

3. Institutions and tribal base

3.1. The prince and his powers

(a) Tribal allegiance

The numbers of dependent tribes. When Evliya Çelebi visited Bitlis in 1060/1655, seventy-seven *'aşīret beġleri* were present at the court of the prince, who of course was also an Ottoman sanjak bey. Allowances have to be made concerning the accuracy of the number. Seventy is a favourite round number; exaggeration, especially for the sake of an impressive round number, is possible. But after making such allowances there is every reason to assume that Evliya's number is roughly right: he was present when the *'aşīret beġleri* touched their foreheads to the ground, stayed in Bitlis as the prince's guest for twelve days, took part in the defeat of the khan shortly afterwards and stayed at Bitlis again in the following year. In other words, the information and impressions with which he was showered during his stays at Bitlis would have served either to corroborate or correct any count or rough estimate of the number of *'aşīret beġleri* made at the initial meeting with the khan.[a] Later in the Melek Ahmet Paşa episode, when the council assembles to elect a successor to Abdāl, the figure of seventy (not seventy-seven) tribes is given.[b]

An *aşiret beği* (mod. Turk. translit.) is the chief of a tribe; and Evliya's figure

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[a] Ev.IV.82 (D.43).

[b] Ev.D.275 (MS 274.a.3-4; figure seventy not in Ist.IV.239).

would therefore appear to give us the number of tribes paying allegiance to the Bitlis prince at the time. Perhaps some of those present were not in fact chiefs of tribes, but either chiefs of lineages or else some other type of agha.[a] But even if we cut the figure down, perhaps to 50, it is still an impressive one, and consistent with the estimates of soldiery available to the khan at the time. Evliya gives us a total of 70,000 men, which is probably the total, regardless of quality or type, that can be raised in an emergency. Of these 10,000 are the bodyguard or *pyshtmala*. Tavernier, passing through Bitlis at almost exactly the same time, was told the prince could raise 20-25,000 cavalry and a large number of infantry.[b]

What makes these quantities even more impressive is that the territory ruled by the khan at the time was only the sanjak of Bitlis: the dynasty had lost the former sub-principalities of Ahlat, Muş and Hınıs.[c] Of course tribal allegiance to the khan must have spread much further than the boundaries of the Bitlis sanjak, certainly into the former sub-principalities of Ahlat and Muş and perhaps into other areas with traditional political or economic links, such as that of Hazo.[d] On the other hand a number of tribes must have been gradually lost after the separation from Bitlis of the Muş and Hınıs sanjaks and the Ahlat *nāhiya*, particularly in the interval (1535-78) when no hereditary prince, but an externally-appointed sanjak bey, governed Bitlis.

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[a] Evliya, IV.121 (D.145) wrote that some a'yān, owners of ze'āmets and collectors of hāss and harāc, lived in the town; but their tribes' territory must have been outside the town. The point was noted by Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State* 169. For a discussion of the reason for the presence of the *aşiret beğleri* in Bitlis, our discussion in Ch.II, pp.47-8, esp. n.8.

[b] 70,000: Ev. IV.89, cf. IV.197 (D.179). 10,000: Ev.IV.121 (D.142). 20-25,000: Tavernier, 1679 ed., I.304.

[c] Sects. (viii) & (ix), esp. pp.127-9.

[d] Again, the discussion pp.127-9.

A more serious caveat about the figure of seventy tribes is the possible changes in the size of tribes between the late Middle Ages and the 17th century. There is nothing positively to indicate such changes, and a few of the tribes mentioned in the *Sherefname* were still tribes by the end of the 19th century and early 20th[a]; nevertheless some caution must be exercised, for this and the other reasons indicated, in dealing with the figure of seventy. At the end of our doubts, however, we are still left with an extraordinary number of tribes. The first question to arise is the nature of the allegiance given by the tribes to the prince.

The core group: the Ruzagi. The *Sherefname*, in its account of the origin of the Bitlis principality, relates that the Ruzagi are a group of 24 tribes who in a single day voluntarily chose to unite.[b] Elsewhere the text gives us the names of these tribes, divided into two groups; unfortunately only 15 names are given, which casts doubt on the first number, 24.

Later on, continues the *Sherefname*, the Ruzagi (24 tribes) conquered Bitlis and its immediate locality, and subsumed a further five tribes from that locality: these the text also names.[c]

There is no reason to think that the named tribes are a fiction: of the 15 named tribes some are mentioned elsewhere in the text; and of the five tribes mentioned in this passage as resident immediately around Bitlis two are known from elsewhere in the *Sherefname* as living in that very locality. Some of the fifteen and of the five tribes are

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[a] Appendix IV, story C.

[b] Sh.I.358-9. Discussed Appendix IV, Story A.

[c] Sh.I.361.

even known in the 20th century.[a] The fiction is not the tribes, or the conquest of the five by the twenty-four, but the voluntary association of the twenty-four.

A further point to note is that the 24 (or some lower number, not lower than 15) were in two groups, the Qavālīsī and the Bilbāsī. Amirs by the name of Qavālīsī and Bilbāsī play leading roles in various episodes of the principality's history; and in the late 15th century, when the two cousins Ibrahim and Sharaf are fighting for the throne, it is clear that the two are each backed by one of the groups in question.[b] The two groups are a reality, too, and were occasionally in conflict; but there is little evidence of a chronic weakness in the principality due to the division into two groups.

The Ruzagi, then, are a number of tribes welded into two large groups, which are in turn welded into a single group (there is no suggestion that the bond between the Qavālīsī and the Bilbāsī was ineffectual and shallow; just that each of the two was internally more cohesive than the Ruzagi as a whole); and the whole group owed allegiance to a prince. How did such allegiance arise ?

In recent times similar relationships have existed. Between the First and Second World Wars the Jāf, a tribe of Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan, consisted of about twenty tīras or clans, each of which was either a lineage segment or a number of lineage segments.[c] They were divided into three principal groups: the Muradi, that of Jawanrud and that of

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[a] On the tribes mentioned elsewhere in the *Sherefname* and those known in the 19th and 20th centuries, Appendix IV, story C.

[b] Rivalry of Ibrahim and Sharaf: Sh.I.400-06, noted by Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State* 165-6. Shaykh Amir Bilbasi, in the *Sherefname*'s narrative at least, plays the role of determined grand guardian of the principality. Later he precipitated the imprisonment of Sharaf c.1511 A.D., Sh.I.408-12.

[c] Barth, *Kurdistan* 34-8, 40-44; cf. Rich, *Kurdistan* 112, 280-82. Note Barth's mistake in applying the term "tribe" to the constituent groups. Full discussion of the Jāf above, Ch.II, pp.43-4.

Kirmanshah. However the latter had broken away and joined a different tribe.[a] There was a ruling lineage segment called the Begzada,[b] a word whose other sense of son and potential heir of the prince has to be carefully distinguished. In fact the Jāf Begzada were descendants of Zahir Beg (lived late 18th century), a Muradi, which means that the Jāf Begzada came from one of the principal groups of tribes, rather than from neither.

The Ruzagi as an inner group of tribes ('ashīret) within the whole Bitlis principality closely resemble the Jāf as a group of tribes called *tīra*. The resemblance is in respect of cohesion, of division into two groups, and of a further point which we shall note below. Evliya seemed to have spotted a difference between the core group of tribes, or Ruzagi, and the outer ring of tribes within the principality when he spoke of the Ruzagi's distinctive refined quality as they walked around the city of Bitlis; and he does not mention any other tribesmen as being in Bitlis, probably because they resided further away (see below).

We can be fairly sure that there was a ruling lineage segment, or possibly clan, among the Ruzagi: every other cohesive agglomeration of Kurdish tribes known in any detail in the 19th or 20th centuries has had one, and without one it would be hard to account for the group's cohesion. For purposes of exposition we shall assume below that we are dealing with a Begzade lineage rather than a clan: we shall speak of "the Begzade lineage" or, more loosely, the "ruling lineage" or "the ruling family".

How did the process of agglomeration of tribes occur ? Ch.2 above deals with this in a general way: it is a process of subordination to the Begzade and of voluntary attachment for reasons of security. Instances of subordination to the Jāf, followed by

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[a] Edmonds, *Turks, Kurds and Arabs* 141.

[b] Barth, *Kurdistan* 36, 41-4.

incorporation into the Jāf as one of its tiras, are known.[16] Equally it was possible for clans to break away, and instances are known, again, from the history of the Jāf.[17] The *Sherefname* mentions instances of breaking away, or something close to temporary break-up. But it does not mention the process of subordination, because it is already committed to the fiction of voluntary association, a fiction which underpinned the authority of its Begzada lineage -- the latter not mentioned under any recognisable name in the *Sherefname*.

The process of subordination by the Begzada, both in the Jāf and in the Ruzagi, is a process of welding whereby the whole group functions as a tribe, despite the fact that the constituent tribes (in the case both of the Ruzagi and of the Jaf) maintain their separateness. The welding then accounts for the extraordinary loyalty of the Ruzagi, the core group of tribes, in the Bitlis principality.

There may be a further explanation for the great cohesiveness of the Ruzagi (the core group). The Bitlis princes used marriage as an instrument of political alliance with other principalities (see sect.4 below). But they seem also to have used it, at least on a limited scale, within the Ruzagi. In the Melek Ahmet Paşa episode of 1665, when Abdāl, prince of Bitlis, was defeated by the pasha, he fled to his relative (hısım) Mudikī 'Alī Āġā.[a] Now the Mūdikī[b] were part of the Ruzagi; they were one of the five tribes resident in the immediate environs of Bitlis which were conquered by the 24 (or fewer) original Ruzagi.[c] So if Abdāl was related to a Mūdikī, at some point there must have been a marriage between a member of the ruling family and a member of the Mūdikī

[a] Ev.D.247, 270a.13-19 (Ist.IV.227 misleading).

[b] Spelling of the *Sherefname*.

[c] Sh.I.361; above, p.43.

tribe. We get no other news of such marriages, however.

It would be legitimate to question whether the "tribes" mentioned as constituting the Ruzagi, or core group, genuinely were tribes, or whether they were not tribal sections happening to be called tribes by the *Sherefname* ? Although the notion that they were really tribal sections has a superficial attractiveness, everything militates against it: several of the tribes enumerated by the *Sherefname* survived until the 19th and 20th centuries, when their status as tribes can be guaranteed; and the great size of the Ruzagi indicates something much bigger than the Jāf. Again, should the core group of tribes be called a tribe as opposed to an agglomeration of tribes ? The *Sherefname* never hesitates to call it a tribe (and it leaves open the question, naturally enough, whether the totality of tribes within the principality, as opposed to the totality of the core group, is a tribe); it functioned like a tribe; and in our view it was a tribe, if a composite one.

Geographical area occupied by the core group. Five of the core group were the original inhabitants of the immediate neighbourhood of Bitlis.[a] It can be verified from the text of the *Sherefname* itself that three of these were indeed resident in that neighbourhood.[b] This is a first clue to the geographical location of the core group tribes.

The first Ruzagi group of tribes (15 or more in number), that which conquered and absorbed the five to form what we have called the core group, came into being by voluntary assembly, according to the *Sherefname*,[c] at Ṭāb in the *nāhiya* of Khūyt, a mountainous district north-west of Bitlis: Khūyt's location is such that it can naturally

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[a] Sh.I.361.

[b] P.487 of Appendix IV (story C) and esp. n.3 there.

[c] I.358-359.

belong either with Bitlis or with Muş.[a] Of course the story of voluntary assembly is a myth; but the district of Khūyt as a vague indication of the habitat of the original group is very likely an element of history which the text, perhaps not for reasons of historical accuracy, nevertheless faithfully preserves. That habitat was, no doubt, a section of the Taurus mountains north-west of Bitlis, but may have included contiguous districts in any direction except the south-east. This gives a second clue.

Finally there is some evidence that one of the tribes resided in the *nāhiya* of Chuqūr, at the east end of the plain of Muş, and in that of Muş, which means the small district, just one part of the whole basin of the Muş plain, dependent on Muş. This is the Qavālīsī tribe, one of those in the Qavālīsī group.

The three clues give a reasonable indication of the core group's habitat. It comprised the immediate environs of Bitlis, the Taurus mountains north-west of Bitlis, one or two parts of the plain of Muş and, no doubt, various unspecifiable adjacent districts. Not surprisingly the bulk of this habitat lies within the sub-principality of Bitlis.

The outer circle of tribes. Given that the figure of seventy (from Evliya) is an indication of the total number of tribes in the whole principality and that the core group of around twenty tribes lived in an area immediately round and to the north-west of Bitlis, what was the relation of the outer circle of tribes to the core group, and where did the latter live ?

Members of the core group and members of the outer circle were equally subordinates of the ruling lineage. But the former were a highly cohesive group, tightly bound to one another and to the ruling lineage, and on the whole highly loyal to the latter; whereas the members of the outer circle were not so tightly bound either to the ruling

[a] For Khūyt's position, n.1 to appendix IV, p.483.

lineage or to one another. Their ties to the ruling lineage were more a matter of the need for security and of inferior strength; those of the core group more a matter of traditional loyalty. The ruling lineage could not have subordinated tribes in the outer circle without the use of the core group. The looser relationship between the ruling lineage and members of the outer circle is similar to that obtaining between the ruling lineage of the Bābān principality of southern Kurdistan and the bulk at least of its subordinate tribes; in the case of the Bābān there is less good evidence as to the existence of a core group.

The geographical location of tribes of the outer circle can be addressed only briefly, as there is no direct evidence. Although the designation "outer circle" is not primarily intended to be geographical, the position of the core group does indicate that the other tribes lived, on the whole, in places more distant from Bitlis. Since that city lay towards the south of the whole principality, naturally the bulk of the outer circle lived to the north of Bitlis, in the sub-principalities of Muş and Ahlat; some would have been in the sub-principality of Bitlis, in the districts of Kārjikān and Tātīk; fewer would have been in the sub-principality of Hınıs, in fact one reason why Hınıs was added late to the principality is probably that Hınıs was, in the late Middle Ages, a largely Armenian-populated area.[18]

To conclude: the core group of tribes, the Ruzagi proper, were a tightly-knit group bound to one another and to the ruling lineage by ties of traditional loyalty. The stability of the whole principality depended on the core group. The latter seems to have inhabited an area immediately around and to the north-west of Bitlis, the principality's capital. The members of the outer circle of tribes, on the other hand, were more loosely tied to the ruling lineage; the subordinate relationship grew more out of current weakness than out of traditional loyalty; and members of the outer circle were tied inwards to the core group

rather than sideways to one another. Finally the habitat of the outer circle spread beyond and outside the core group's area of residence, particularly to the north.

(b) Sources of revenue: the prince and the aghas

Tribal allegiance to the prince was the chief source of the prince's power over his principality; we shall now consider the meagre evidence for another source, his rights to tax revenue. The taxes in question seem to be both the traditional Islamic ones -- those on produce, the poll tax and so on -- and the sharecropping dues typical of non-tribal tenant villages. Our conclusion will be that in this sphere the prince's power, though clearly superior, was different only in degree to that of individual tribe leaders and other aghas.

First, two incidents which would seem to point in just the opposite direction, i.e. which, taken by themselves, provide evidence that the prince did possess powers different in kind from those of the tribe leaders and other aghas. In 1462 or not long before, Jahan Shah's troops had captured the city of Ahlat and were preparing to besiege Bitlis and other places within the principality. The main reason appears to have been the failure of the prince, Sharaf III, to pay a tribute. The katholikos of Aghtamar, Zakaria III (1434-c.1464), offered to collect the tribute so as to save the principality's inhabitants from further invasion and destruction of life and property. Jahan Shah gave him a letter of authority, and after securing the withdrawal of Kara Koyunlu forces he collected the tribute in three months.[a]

The second incident is as follows. After Shah Tahmasp had relieved the first Ottoman siege of Bitlis in 937/1531, Sharaf, the prince of Bitlis, held a sumptuous three-

[a] Clph.XV.II.221, pp.174-5 (S.1462.3, pp.272-3).

day feast for Tahmasp at Ahlat, in which he handed gifts to the shah and some of his officers. To finance the feast, which from the *Sherefname*'s description seems genuinely to have been fit for a padishah and genuinely did deserve a reputation in all the inhabited world, and the gifts, Sharaf took one-fifth of the moveable possessions, and of the taxes from the cattle and pastures, of infidel and Muslim [alike], of the tribes and followers of the principality (emvāl u jihat-i mevāshī u marā'i-i kufre u islāmīye-i ulusāt u ahshāmāt).[a]

The phrase "tribes and followers" ("ulusāt u ahshāmāt") in this passage probably indicates only that the tax was applied to the tribal element of the population as well as to the rest. The phrase "infidel and Muslim [alike]" ("kufre u islāmīye") tells us in effect the same. Sharaf was able to extract one-fifth of the taxes on cattle and pasture from the whole of his population. The prince was thus in possession of a power of taxation not available to any other leader within the principality. The meaning of "one-fifth" is highly problematic. It may mean that one-fifth of the tax *base* was extracted.

But the two incidents illustrate the limitation as well as the extent of the power of taxation. In each case the taxes were collected for a special occasion. In the second case the purpose was to express gratitute to the shah and, more important, to secure a high place for Sharaf and his principality within the Safavid empire -- inclusion in which was the price of Tahmasp's help in keeping the Ottomans out. So the sudden, as opposed to regular, imposition of tax was only possible on exceptional occasions, which means for the most part foreign invasions which threatened the principality's existence or integrity. Moreover the one-fifth proportion featuring in the second incident (the feast for Tahmasp)

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[a] Sh.I.425. Siege and relief of Bitlis: I.424-5. The feast: I.425-30. Fit for a padishah etc.: I.425-6. Gifts: I.425 and 426.

is not to be taken as a guide to the typical tax take.

So much for the general right, peculiar to the prince, of taxation over the whole territory of the principality. Next we must consider the rights of the individual tribal chiefs and other aghas. These are likely to have consisted in tribal dues, which are not tied to given parcels of land, and income from land. The prince must be considered one of the chiefs or aghas, as there is every indication (see below) that he held territory in a personal and family title, just as the aghas did; the difference between the prince and other aghas in this respect appears to have been simply a difference in the amount of land held. But precisely what this personal and family title consisted in and was grounded in cannot be convincingly ascertained; we can only rely on the few arguments given in Ch.2, and state our conclusion there, which was that both the rights to income from land traditional within the Islamic world and the sharecropping dues from a tenant village are likely to have been involved. We will discuss the feeble evidence for the holdings of the aghas at large and the almost equally feeble evidence for the prince's landholdings, which includes the evidence from the princes' waqf foundations.

Abū Bakr Bāyegī had provided rope-ladders for the recapture from the Ak Koyunlu of the citadel of Bitlis in 900/1494-95. In return Shah Muhammad, the prince of Bitlis who was set on the throne after the recapture of the principality, bestowed on Abū Bakr [the village of] Khnzōrgīn,[19] one of the dependencies of Tatvan, and the village of Iksūr, as *mulkiyat*.[a] Leaving aside the word's dead literal meaning of absolute rights in perpetuity, we will rely on the *a priori* arguments set out in Ch.2 in favour of saying that we could just as well be dealing here with the institution of sharecropping rights as with that of the landlord's rights to income current and traditional within the Islamic world. But

[a] Sh.I.398; the date, I.399.

the incident does show convincingly that whatever title to income was in question, the title could be transferred: the prince held the title, then it was transferred to Abū Bakr. It is unlikely that the power to transfer was limited to the prince, but at least the incident demonstrates that the prince could hold such rights to income from land on the same terms as tribe chiefs and other aghas. It also suggests a greater quantity of land in the holding of the prince than in that of any other individual.

The existence of the institution of waqf and the large number of public buildings within the city of Bitlis founded by the princes, not only demonstrates the quantity of estates held by those princes but also indicates the existence of an institution of rights to income of a different kind, in other words that common and traditional within the Islamic world. The estates made over as waqf for his *zawīya, dār al-shifā* (hospital), *dār al-ziyāfa* and *jāmi'* by Shams al-Din I ("Veli"; early 15th century) were the village of Trmīt (Armn. "Trmerd") on the plain of Muş, the village of Kfū in the district of Kārjikān, the village of Kāzūkh between Erciş and Adilcevaz (therefore outside the territory of the principality -- the only instance), four *mezra'as*, seven shops, a single caravansaray and twenty Armenian families from the city of Bitlis and nearby.[20] As noted in ch.2, the creation of such a waqf does not demonstrate finally that these particular parcels of land were held by the prince in the fashion standard within the Islamic world, but merely creates a probability.

To sum up: in normal course the revenue of the prince came from four types of source. First, taxation. This was the right which distinguished him from the tribal leaders and other aghas. Secondly, rights to income, of a type standard within the Islamic world, from estates; and thirdly, sharecropping dues from tenant villages. These latter rights were of a type also enjoyed probably by most tribal leaders and other aghas. That the prince's

estates were the largest in the principality is more than likely; it is most unlikely they amounted to more than a fraction of the total quantity of land within the principality. Fourthly, the prince is very likely to have received a form of tithe from the tribal leaders simply in respect of their tribal allegiance. As outlined in Ch.2, the tribal leaders and other aghas may well have received tribal dues themselves, and so to an extent they were simply passing on to the prince what they had received from their own tribesmen. The prince, too, in his capacity as *begzade* leader rather than overall leader of the principality, may have received tribal dues; but these must have been very limited; on the other hand the tribe leaders may well have paid a form of tithe to the prince merely in respect of their tribal allegiance.

(c) Bases of the prince's power: comparison and conclusions

A large number of tribes obeyed the prince; the allegiance of an inner group of tribes was close. In addition the prince disposed of revenue from a number of estates, which, while larger than that received by any other individual, was not different in kind and can only have been a small fraction of the total in the principality.

The history of the principality demonstrates the great local power exerted by the princes; and the prince had at his disposal an extraordinary number of troops.[a] What, in sum, was the basis of his power ?

Our analysis of tribal allegiance and of the prince's revenue are enough to show by themselves that it was predominantly tribal allegiance on which the prince's power was based. Evliya's evidence, though considerably later than our target period, as to the

[a] Above, sect.(a), pp.85-6, and below, sect. (c), p.99.

number of men for which revenue from estates did pay bears the point out neatly. The Ottoman imperial estates of the sanjak of Muş paid for the commander of the citadel of Bitlis and its 200-strong garrison.[a] There were 13 *ze'āmets* and 124 *timārs* in the sanjak of Bitlis (roughly speaking the former sub-principality of Bitlis). In total these supplied 3,000 cavalry.[b] Out of 20,000 cavalry (Tavernier's figure)[c] and a total of about 70,000 troops in all this leaves many more to be supplied from another source, if the 20,000 even includes the 3,000; that source must have been the troops made available to the prince by the tribes.[d] This was one of the duties which constituted tribal allegiance.

However the picture of a structure of tribes at the top of which sat a prince who could order the tribes in any direction at his whim is misleading. In reality he depended on the tribes as much as they depended on him. His power depended on making decisions which in the long run pleased the tribes. Moreover he was obliged to consult, and on some occasions was overborne by, the tribe leaders in the council, which apart from being a direct vehicle of influence over the prince also formalised his dependence on the tribes. As the council is the only direct evidence we have of the mutual influence of prince and aghas, we will examine two instances of its operation.

The most detailed description is available in Evliya's account of the appointment of a new prince after the forced flight of Abdāl in 1060/1665. Here not only the exiled bey's relatives, but also the seventy tribe leaders and the '*ulemā*' were present.[e] Due

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[a] Ev.IV.89: on the reasons why the bey of Bitlis received those revenues, sect.5.(ix) below.

[b] Ev.IV.89; see Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State* 168.

[c] Above, p.86.

[d] Pointed out by Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State* 168.

[e] Ev.D.275 (273b.32-274a.5)(> Ist.IV.239-40, incomplete).

caution must be exercised: the council was presided over by Melek Ahmet Paşa, who had just defeated Abdāl in battle.

It was not just for the election of a new prince, but for other crucial decisions, that a council was called. Before the battle of 940/1533 in which Sharaf Khan was killed, something more in the nature of an ad hoc deliberation between Sharaf and those of his aghas who were loyal to him took place. First of all Sharaf proposed that a force should set off towards Ala Dağ so that help could be requested from the Safavid governor of Tabriz. But he was opposed by the aghas, particularly Sayyidī 'Alī Āghā Pertāfī, described as the *vekīl* (minister) and *jumlat al-malik* of Sharaf Khan and the muqtada (leader) of the Ruzagis. Sharaf then said that Ulama's luck was at its zenith and that of the Ruzagis in its nadir, and it would be counter to the indications of astronomy to fight Ulama (the enemy). But "the unfounded arguments and the foolish discourse of the tāyfa of the Kurds" prevailed, and the fatal attack on Ulama was initiated.[21]

3.2. The sub-principalities

(a) Principle of appointment; geographical extent

We shall state our conclusion first, then discuss our evidence, which is hard to interpret. There were three sub-principalities, those of Muş, Ahlat and Hınıs. The princes of these were relatives of the prince of Bitlis. The principle of succession to one of the three sub-principalities is unclear. Most likely they were family apanages, to which in principle the prince of Bitlis could appoint members of his family in a single dispensation at the beginning of his reign, and as occasion demanded (for example after the death of one of the three, or if he rebelled). But in practice, provided there were no conflicts with the

prince of Bitlis, the succession is likely to have been hereditary. That is to say, though in principle an incoming prince of Bitlis was entitled to remove an existing prince of Muş, in practice he was generally content to let the existing prince of Muş stay.

The best evidence for this arrangement comes early in the recorded history of the Bitlis principality. In the year 750/1349-50 al-'Ādil, Ayyubid prince of Hisn Kāyfa/Hasankeyf, organised a coalition of mostly Kurdish princes against Husayn Bêg, a Turcoman chief then terrorising the Diyar Bakr. In this coalition were Ḍīā' al-Dīn (Pers. Żīā' al-Dīn) al-Rūshakī, lord of Bitlis; his brother Shams al-Din of Muş; and Ibn al-Ghīrz, lord of Ahlat. From elsewhere in the same source (the Arabic MS in Vienna summarised by Cahen) we know that the lords of Muş and Bitlis were sons of Ghīrz (whose history is otherwise unknown); which means that the lord of Ahlat, too, was a brother of the prince of Bitlis. Our argument in Appendix IV is that the dynasty originated near Bitlis, and captured Bitlis as its capital, well before Ahlat was abandoned by Il-Khanid appointees (including the governor), which was perhaps four or five years before our date, 750/1349-50. It is hardly likely, therefore, that Ahlat was the senior partner at that date, despite the fact that the city was probably still more prestigious and bigger than Bitlis. The city of Muş, too, was certainly not of greater size or importance than Bitlis, and it is even less likely that Muş was the senior partner. As for Hınıs, we have no evidence that it belonged to the Bitlis principality at this early stage. If it did, it must have been junior to Bitlis.

Of course in strict terms the rule of three separate but geographically close principalities by three brothers, one of which is bound to have been the senior partner by virtue of ruling the oldest of three principalities, does not prove that the senior partner had appointed the other two. It is quite possible that he had not; and it is not essential to our

argument that at this early stage he had. That he had so appointed them could only be loosely inferred from this passage by combining with it the evidence of later incidents; but by the time of those later incidents it is a much more tenable proposition that the prince of Bitlis did have the power to appoint and depose one of the other three.

The incident in which three brothers, respectively lords of Bitlis, of Muş and of Ahlat, take part in a coalition, leaves straightaway the impression that the territories governed by the three, given the positions of the three cities, were contiguous and formed a single spread of land. Leaving aside for the moment the precise geographical extent of the sub-principalities, however, we will look at one or two further indications that Muş, Ahlat and Hınıs were family apanages of the Bitlis dynasty.

In 903/1497-8 Ibrahim, a son, only two years old, of Shah Muhammad, became prince of Bitlis, with suitable regents. His cousin Sharaf (the future Sharaf Khan) was Ibrahim's *nā'ib* (deputy) in the *nāhiya* of Muş. But a powerful faction was behind Sharaf. The latter eventually defeated Ibrahim, was appointed prince in his place and kept him in captivity.

The term "nāhiya" is loosely applied here: we do not know from this passage alone whether the author intends the whole plain of Muş and dependent areas around, or simply a much smaller area, similar in size to an Ottoman *nāhiye*, for which Muş was the market town. But taking other passages into account it is very likely that the former is intended. The term na'ib, too, is used loosely here. It cannot simply mean an appointee in the Mamluk sense, as if it were merely a coincidence that Sharaf was Ibrahim's cousin. It is most unlikely to mean simply a subordinate, although Sharaf undoubtedly was subordinate to Ibrahim. The most likely meaning is that Sharaf was appointed to the position as part of a new family dispensation when Ibrahim inherited the throne, although in this case it

was the regents who carried out the dispensation rather than the prince, on whose behalf the regents were acting.

The same episode furnishes a little more material for our conclusion. After a defeat outside Muş, Ibrahim's faction retires to Bitlis and is besieged there by Sharaf. A conciliator is brought by Ibrahim and his regent; the conciliator proposes that Sharaf be given Bitlis and Ahlat, while Ibrahim would take Muş and Hınıs. He also proposed that the overall governance of the principality should be split between the two: presumably an arrangement which would have been unworkable from the start.[a] However during the celebrations to cap the agreement the leader of Sharaf's faction, Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī, entered the throne room, deposed Ibrahim (who for the time being was occupying the throne as sole ruler of the whole principality) and put Sharaf in his place. Ibrahim was then imprisoned.[b]

The proposal to split overall governance of the principality between two cousins is a remarkable feature of the story: it is worth bearing in mind as an aspect of the rules governing the choice of prince, though it may not even have been meant seriously, leaving aside its workability if it was meant seriously. However the point relevant to the present purpose is that Ibrahim will, according to the agreement, take Muş and Hınıs, while Sharaf will take Bitlis and Ahlat. Ibrahim will take Sharaf's former estate or sub-principality of Muş, plus a second, Hınıs. Sharaf will take Bitlis and Ahlat, Ibrahim's former estates. That the four estates are family apanages, to be swapped around in successive arrangements, emerges clearly from the story. We may also suspect from this story that the ruler of the whole principality, besides holding the sub-principality of Bitlis

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[a] Sh.I.403.

[b] Sh.I.404-5.

by virtue of his office, also generally held the sub-principality of Ahlat. A separate prince of Ahlat is not generally mentioned during the history of the Bitlis principality.

We shall now examine one or two items of information which indicate that the four sub-principalities were large areas exhaustive of the principality's territory as a whole, rather than smaller areas dependent on the respective cities (Muş, Ahlat etc.). The two passages cited above (the three brothers known in 750/1349-50; and the proposed shareout between Ibrahim and Sharaf) both strongly leave that impression, but in fact each story would work well if the sub-principalities featuring in them were smaller territories dependent on the respective cities, which together did not account for the whole of the Bitlis principality's territory. However the diploma given to Sharaf Khan in 939/1532 after Shah Tahmasp had saved him and his principality from the first invasion by the Safavid renegade, Ulama, and an Ottoman force, suggests the larger areas more positively: "We have bestowed on him the government (eyalet) of Bidlīs, Mūsh and Khinūs ..."[a] Here of course Ahlat is left out, but there is a strong possibility that the district of Ahlat genuinely was administered by a Safavid governor at this stage.[22] But the phrase "the government of Bidlīs, Mūsh and Khinūs" naturally suggests that the three names Bidlīs, Mūsh and Khinūs together account for the whole of the principality's territory; as long as we make the assumption, which can be argued from elsewhere in the *Sherefname*, that the three names designate sub-principalities, then we have our conclusion.[23]

A further passage is even more positive, but only as regards the Muş sub-principality. One of the Armenian Minor Chroniclers, Dawit' of Bałēš [Bitlis], records that in 1394 Timur came to Tarōn, whose amir received him with affection [i.e. paid him

[a] Sh.I.429; the whole diploma, I.428-30.

the forms of allegiance].[a] Now Tarōn was the Armenian name not only for the plain of Muş but for the whole basin of which that plain was the floor.[b] The amir in question can hardly be anyone other than the prince of Mūsh, given that Mūsh was the chief town of the plain. So our passage indicates that the territory ruled (in some sense) by the prince of Muş included the whole Muş basin. Another text, a colophon of 1434, mentions an "*amiray* of the Marac' [Kurds] who sat at Muš".[c] This helps to substantiate the conclusion, while offering little evidence independant of the passage in Dawit' of Balēš concerning the events of 1434.[d] If we could find similar passages for the sub-principalities of Ahlat, Hınıs and Bitlis our conclusion would be well proved.

That conclusion is, that the four sub-principalities, apanages of the ruling family, together accounted for the whole principality.

(b) Relation to the tribes and to the prince

How did the institution of the sub-principalities fit the network of tribal allegiance and fusion which by and large formed the basis of the Bitlis princes' authority ? The system of tribal allegiance almost certainly bypassed each of the sub-principalities -- no evidence is known which suggests the sub-principalities were the focus of any tribal allegiance. (The princes of Muş, Hınıs and Ahlat were not even tribe chiefs, but simply relatives of the prince, himself the leader of a lineage rather than a tribe.) Certainly the princes of Muş,

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[a] MC II.350.

[b] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 325-7 for references.

[c] Clph.XV.III. Add.525, pp.388-89.

[d] In strict terms the passage tells us nothing about the size of the area ruled by the *amiray*, but only the identity of the town where he resided.

Hınıs and Ahlat must have enjoyed income from estates, in the manner of the prince and many aghas (above, sect. 3.1.(b)). But this was the sum total of their power base, and combined with their relationship to the prince also the extent of their apanage.

They were simple appointees of the prince of Bitlis, and were subject in principle to reshuffle at the accession of a new prince of Bitlis. Their function was perhaps to oversee the tribes in their respective territories and muster soldiers for war; which the prince of Bitlis could not do by himself, owing to the great size of his principality.

Muş must have been the most important of the sub-principalities. Given the history of Taron in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, it is quite possible that there had been a separate Kurdish principality of Muş during part of the Mongol period,[a] and the prince of Muş probably retained some of the local allegiance given to the princes of the Mongol period. That a source mentions an "army of Mūsh" during the first Ak Koyunlu attack on Bitlis in 1470[b] suggests both a body of men with a certain reputation for cohesion and that the prince of Mūsh would have been responsible for gathering it. The prince of Mūsh appears in one or two incidents, mentioned above, in his own right.[24]

We never hear of a prince of Ahlat who was not also the prince of Bitlis; and, given the small size of the dependent district, this may have been the usual arrangement. Ahlat, at the end of the 14th and in the early 15th century A.D., seems to have been the burial place for leading members of the ruling family, which would fit the notion of a partner city and district.[25]

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[a] Discussion Ch.II.

[b] KD II.543; sect.5.(vi) below, esp. n.47.

4. Relations with other principalities

4.1. Neighbouring principalities

To the best of our knowledge the princes of Bitlis pursued policies of alliance, sometimes alliance by marriage, with a neighbouring Kurdish principality, Sasun, and in the Kara Koyunlu period probably held as vassals two other Kurdish political entities, the principality of Hizan and the Pāzūkī tribe.

Sasun lay in the Taurus mountains to the west of Khūyt and other Bitlis territory. It was therefore adjacent to the principality of Bitlis on two sides, the north (the plain of Muş) and the east (Khūyt etc.). At least towards the end of the Middle Ages Sasun also possessed the adjacent territory of Hazo, which lay in the Tigris basin.[26] So the relationship between the Sasun and Bitlis principalities appears to be that Sasun was the yayla for Muş, and the Bitlis sub-principality the yayla for Hazo.

The Bitlis and Sasun principalities do not ever seem to have been hostile to one another. Between them marriage alliances may have represented both a recognition of mutual and complementary needs for one another's territory and established political associations. The association between Sasun and Muş had been particularly strong in the 12th century, when a minor Armenian principality ruled both. That between the district of Bitlis and Hazo was even older, and went back certainly to the 7th century.

The meagre evidence conveys little impression that Sasun was ever subordinated to Bitlis. From time to time the two seem to have enjoyed a certain thick solidarity. Bitlis could certainly have defeated Sasun, but at a cost, given the difficulty of entering the

territory of Sasun and capturing its castle or walled town.[a] On the other hand the question of subordination did not normally arise, because the interests of the two coincided to such a great degree. Nevertheless there is no question but that Sasun represented a useful extension of the power of the Bitlis principality. Sasun was a constrained ally. Bitlis called the tune; Sasun would follow.[27]

The small principality of Hizan, which abutted that of Bitlis on the south-east side, seems to have been, from time to time at least, simply a subordinate. The principality therefore represented an addition to the Bitlis principality's power.[28]

The other neighbouring entity which the Bitlis principality sometimes held in vassalage was the Pāzūkī. Below (Ch.IV, sects. 3, 4.(c), we argue that this tribe lacked the territorial rights which would have marked it out as a principality rather than simply a tribe. It must have lived in the districts of Adilcevaz, Erciş, perhaps Malazgirt and perhaps Bulanık. The relationship with the Bitlis principality was one not only of neighbourhood but also of rivalry for pasture in the Malazgirt district and perhaps that of Bulanık and Bingöl Dağ.

In the Kara Koyunlu period the likelihood is that the Pāzūkī were hangers-on of Bitlis. The tribe, or parts of it, were on the fringes of the outer circle of tribes. At this period the Pāzūkī needed the protection of Bitlis. On balance this was to Bitlis' advantage; however the Pāzūkī were not allies who made Bitlis strong, but only subjects because Bitlis already was strong.

In the period of direct Ak Koyunlu rule and in the Safavid and early Ottoman occupations we find members of the Pāzūkī ruling family and parts of the tribe

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[a] On this castle, Sh.I.202; however the castle is brought in here in connection with the 'Izz al-Dīn and Żīā al-Dīn story (story E, Appendix IV), where Hazo rather than Sasun is the twin castle to Bitlis.

contracting a marriage alliance with the Bilbāsī group of tribes, siding with one of the Ruzagi's internal factions, and siding with their external enemies as well as submitting to the Bitlis principality. This behaviour came about as a result of Bitlis' weakness.

What was the occasion of marriage alliance with the Bilbāsī group, of siding with internal factions, and of siding with enemies ? The Pāzūkī tribe, like Sasun, would have been easy to defeat in open battle, but battle would not generally have been open, and at times of general disadvantage for the Bitlis principality the Pāzūkī, as a transhumant tribe on the borders of the Bitlis principality which competed with Bitlis for pasture, could always have been a nuisance if there were no effort at alliance. A marriage alliance thus ended up as a way of sorting out pasturage and land tenure conflicts. Its aim was not an extension of power but a means of avoiding its dilution, or at least of avoiding a drain on effort and manpower. When the Ruzagi were in serious difficulties the Pāzūkī could assume the role of allies or even take the side of Bitlis' enemies. On the ground this sometimes meant success in getting access to pasture on Bitlis territory, and on one occasion being granted part of that territory as an estate.[29]

By allying with the first of these three neighbours (Sasun, to the south-west) and subordinating the second and third (respectively to the south-east and north-east), therefore, the Bitlis principality extended its power outside its circle of dependent tribes. This was only natural, given the smaller size of these neighbours.

4.2. The Hakkari principality

The Hakkari principality, the other great principality of the region, seems to have been more or less the constant enemy of Bitlis. First of all, the two raided and fought over territory at the margin, though there was never any attempt at deep invasion. Secondly,

the two sometimes submitted to the sovereigns of competing outside powers, apparently for no other reason than to gain an easy advantage over the other. Here again one must note that no attempt was made to seize large parts of the other's territory at the same time, or to reduce the other to a subordinate or generally weaker position. Thirdly, there seems to have been a long-standing feud between the two. This is something that can only be sensed in the sources until Evliya bluntly states the existence of a blood feud (which may have started as a fight over territory); even then only one of the tribes in the Hakkari confederation, the Jilo, is stated to be the enemy of the Ruzagi.[a]

The most striking example of the hostility is the raid carried out jointly by Kara Yusuf and Shams al-Din I of Bitlis on the territory of Van and Vostan in 1406. It was followed by a counter-raid in which 60 villages in the Bitlis principality were burnt.[b] Of course the motives of both attackers were mixed. Whereas Shams al-Din had just willingly submitted to Kara Yusuf, 'Izz al-Dīn of Hakkari was showing signs of restiveness under his new allegiance to the Kara Koyunlu. Kara Yusuf, by means of the raid, forced him to submit again,[c] but he immediately began a secret correspondence with Timur's grandson Abū Bakr, ruler of Azerbayjan and 'Irāq-i Ajem.[d]

Ṙštunik' and the island of Aghtamar seem to have been the constant theatre of such border fighting, and it seems that Bitlis was always the aggressor.[e] The island was

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[a] Ev.IV.236 (D.241: "Cülo").

[b] Sect.5.(iv) below, esp. n.41.

[c] T'M 70; Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular* 69.

[d] Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular* 69.

[e] (a) Clph.XV.II.154, p.117 (S.1459.2, pp.263-4)(raid on Gawaš, part of Ṙštunik', in 1459, and unsuccessful attempt at capturing Aghtamar). (b) Clph.XV.III.348, pp.257-8 (raid in 1498, which 370.a, p.276, shows to have been carried out by Bitlis). (c) Clph.XV.III.373, p.279 (raid in 1499 by Hakkari, which may have been carried out partly in revenge for Bitlis' raid the

perhaps the one piece of territory that Bitlis wished permanently to annex; but in its periods of subjection to or occupation by the Hakkari principality, the latter was its natural overlord.[a]

To complete this discussion, the assertion of almost continuous mutual enmity should be qualified in two respects. First, the border fighting was limited in scale; this goes back to the tribal base of the two principalities, which made it impossible to acquire territory at any speed. Second, it is quite in keeping with great-power rivalry, in conditions of equilibrium or near equilibrium, occasionally to do one another a favour. Bitlis and Hakkari sometimes did. At the end of the 15th century 'Izz al-Dīn of Vostan reconciled Timur's son and deputy Mirān Shāh with the ruling family of Bitlis after Mirān Shāh had killed Ibrahim, prince of Bitlis.[30] In the Ak Koyunlu and Safavid occupations the two principalities helped one another on more than one occasion; Sayyid Bêg of Hakkari attended the wedding of Shams al-Din IV, last prince of Bitlis before the period of direct Ottoman rule over that principality, in 1533.[31] Perhaps the two great ruling families of the Van region temporarily made common cause against an enemy, the Ak Koyunlu, who tried to deny them their principalities and subsequently against an overlord, Shah Ismail, who tried to control them too tightly.

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previous year). On the attacks of 1498 and 1499, Appendix V.

[a] In the context of the capture of the island by Sharaf Khan of Bitlis from the Hakkari in 939/1532-33, the Sherefname claims it to have been a Bitlis possession from ancient days, though in recent years it had been in the hands of the Hakkari principality. (Sh.I.436.) In reality there is no record of any previous permanent occupation by Bitlis.

5. History of the principality

(i) Origins of the Ruzagi tribe and the Bitlis dynasty

Here we summarise the relevant points of Appendix IV, which extracts the genuine historical material from the *Sherefname*'s account of these origins. The Ruzagi tribe was formed out of fifteen or more tribes in an area near, but not including, Bitlis. This was probably to the north-west of Bitlis, in the Taurus mountains. The most likely date at which the Ruzagi acquired Bitlis is at or soon after the Ayyubid conquest of Ahlat and the Shāh-i Arman principality in 607/1207-8. Alternatively they may have acquired Bitlis soon after the Mongol conquest of the area in 641 or 642 (1244). At this stage the Ruzagi absorbed the five tribes of the Bitlis locality. Whatever the date of acquisition of Bitlis, the Ruzagi princes were vassals of the Il-Khans, whose governor resided at Ahlat, until the late 1340's.

(ii) From the Mongols to the Kara Koyunlu and Timur's first invasion (A.D. 1387)

The first mention by a reliable historical source of the Bitlis principality relates to the date 733/1332-33.[32] The Muş plain may well have been in Ruzagi occupation by that date.[33] At a guess the Mongols retained a direct hold over the town of Hınıs,[34] but otherwise the Ruzagi may already have been using the Hınıs plain as summer pasture. Ahlat and its district did not belong to the Bitlis principality by H. 733, as it was under direct Mongol control.[a]

In 750/1349 the principality had already gained Ahlat. It consisted of three sub-

[a] Appendix I, Ahlat, and Ch.II, sect. 4.1.

principalities: Bitlis, Muş and Ahlat. The lord of Bitlis was no doubt the senior of the three princes. The source, Cahen's anonymous Vienna manuscript, mentions the Bitlis principality as part of a coalition of Kurdish princes, whose other members resided in the eastern half of the Diyar Bakr, formed in opposition to a Turcoman prince called Husayn Bêg. The latter was not a Kara Koyunlu: it was the Kara Koyunlu Bayram Hoca who came to the aid of the alliance and crushed him.[35] At various points between 750/1349-50 and 787/1385-86 the Bitlis principality is mentioned as engaged in factional fighting between the various principalities, mostly Kurdish, of the eastern Diyar Bakr.[36] The Bitlis principality had probably gained the district of Hınıs by the time of Timur's first appearance in the Van region.[37]

The arguments as to the likely date, about A.D. 1380, at which the Van region passed for the first time under Kara Koyunlu suzerainty are discussed in Ch.II.

(iii) Under Timur and Mirān Shāh

In A.D. 1387 Timur entered the plain of Muş from the west, and approached its city. The amir of Muş went to him with a great number of gifts.[a] Timur continued to the city of Bitlis, where the prince, Sharaf, received him with "love". Timur gave him a letter of "reconciliation". There was tranquillity in the whole district.[b] To put it more realistically: the amirs of Muş and Bitlis voluntarily submitted, and Timur gave the latter a *fermān* or *manshūr*, which implicitly rejected the principality's former allegiance to the Kara Koyunlu and brought it into Timur's empire. In A.D. 1394 the allegiance to Timur was

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[a] T'M 27.

[b] T'M 28.

confirmed. It was at this point that Timur granted Pasin, Avnik and Malazgirt to Sharaf.[38]

A few years afterward, however, the prince seems to have repudiated the allegiance to Timur, for which he was eventually seized and killed by Timur's son and deputy, Mirān Shāh, in Armn. 845/1396-97. By now the prince of Bitlis was an Ibrahim; it was not necessarily he, though, who had thrown off the allegiance to Timur.[39]

(iv) Shams al-Din I under the Kara Koyunlu Kara Yusuf and İskender (1406-23)

Kara Yusuf, after escaping from his prison near Damascus in Rajab 807/January 1405,[a] spent the winter of 1405-6 in Mosul,[b] and after clashes with the Ak Koyunlu between Mardin and Hisn Kāyfa[c] came to Bitlis. He was greeted warmly and with gifts by its prince, Shams al-Din. He bestowed on Shams al-Din the district of Pasin and the *qal'a* of Avnik (which together meant the Pasinler plain, east of Erzurum); married his daughter, or one of them, to Shams al-Din; and gave to Shams al-Din a *nishānī* or letter of entitlement, of which the *Sherefname* preserves the text.[40]

He also helped Shams al-Din attack and ravage the districts of Van and Vostan, which belonged to the Hakkari prince; Shams al-Din was of course in turn helping to secure the submission to Kara Yusuf of the Hakkari principality.[41] Beside this service to Kara Yusuf, Shams al-Din helped Kara Yusuf to defeat one of Timur's grandsons, who now ruled Azerbayjan and, in name at least, Armenia. This took place in Jokhr Sa'ad the

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[a] Sümer, KK 67; CHI VI.161.

[b] Sümer, KK 68.

[c] Sümer, KK 68-9.

same summer, 1406. The victory gave Kara Yusuf control over north-west Azerbayjan and small parts of Armenia adjoining it.[a] Later the whole of Azerbayjan fell under Kara Yusuf's control (1408 and 1410).[b]

Before trying to assess the relationship between Shams al-Din and Kara Yusuf, we shall continue the story, in so far as we can, to the end of Shams al-Din's reign in 1423. Before Kara Yusuf's death two events, both of them campaigns against the Ak Koyunlu in the Diyar Bakr, are relevant. One is Kara Yusuf's campaign in spring 812/1409, on which Kara Yusuf took Shams al-Din and other Kurdish princes.[c] The second is the campaign of 814/1412, which was preceded by a feast on the plain of Muş in honour of Pīr Būdāq, the favourite son whom Kara Yusuf had proclaimed sultan.[d] That many coins survive which were minted in 814 in Bitlis jointly in the names of Kara Yusuf and Pīr Būdāq may mean that Shams al-Din minted a special issue in Pīr Būdāq's honour.

In Dhū'l Hijja 823/December 1420, however, only forty days after Kara Yusuf's death, Shams al-Din sent a messenger to Timur's son Shah Rukh at Karabagh, and in Jumāda 824/June 1421 he and other Kurdish princes kissed the hand of Shah Rukh during the latter's stay at Ahlat.[42] This was a highly abrupt rejection of Kara Koyunlu sovereignty.

At the time, the sons of Kara Yusuf were fighting for the succession; but when a clear successor (İskender, known as Qarā Iskandar) emerged, he attacked Ahlat and Bitlis twice, in 1422 and 1423, and during the second attack executed Shams al-Din in front of

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[a] Sh.I.376.

[b] CHI VI.161; Sümer, KK 72-76.

[c] Sümer, KK 80.

[d] Sümer, KK 89-91.

Ahlat.[43]

What purposes can we give to the actions of Kara Yusuf and Shams al-Din ? Shams al-Din was clearly an able ruler; he was also learned, closely connected with Sufis, and responsible for several buildings in the city of Bitlis.[a] He clearly decided to throw in his lot whole-heartedly with Kara Yusuf as soon as the latter appeared at Bitlis. Timur was already dead, and Shams al-Din must have felt that loyalty to the Timurids offered no hope. He also used Kara Yusuf to further his feud with the Hakkari principality; but it has to be said that the latter were threatening to side with Shah Rukh.

On his side Kara Yusuf had a serious need of Shams al-Din's loyalty in 1406, when he was rebuilding and about to expand his dominions. After 1410 Kara Yusuf may have been in a better position to enforce his overlordship (if the need had arisen), but Shams al-Din appears to have been a consistently loyal subject, nor is there any sign that Kara Yusuf used force to ensure that loyalty. One can only speculate why. Did Shams al-Din see great advantage in a thoroughgoing loyalty, which would protect his territory and its trade and agriculture; or was there perhaps a personal warmth (coincidental with the formulaic vocabulary of "affection", "intimacy" and so on found in the texts) between the two men ?

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[a] Sh.I.379.

(v) From the death of Shams al-Din to the end of Kara Koyunlu rule

Dynastic history. Shams al-Din's son, Sharaf, who succeeded him, was an idiot[a] who, however, appears to have ruled without regents or guardians. At his death (date unknown) his son Shams al-Din II became prince, but this time the principality was effectively ruled by Shams al-Din's mother, Shāhum Khātūn, and her new husband Mīr Sayyidī Ahmad Nāsr al-Dīnī. In practice this led to anarchy: the regents lost control of most districts within the principality. For example, a Mīr Muhammad Nāsr al-Dīnī, who must have been related to the regent Ahmad, seized Ahlat, and an 'Abd al-Rāhman Āghā Qavālīsī seized the *nāhiyas* of Chuqūr and Mush.

The child prince Shams al-Din then gained real power by attracting the aghas one by one to his cause, which of itself persuaded Mīr Ahmad Nāsr al-Dīnī (his stepfather) to escape to the Bukhti principality.[b] Shams al-Din immediately thereafter killed his mother; and when he had secured the return of Ahmad, had him killed too.[c] After the short reign of Shams al-Din's son Ibrahim (from no earlier than 835/1431-32 to no later than 840/1436 -- the other four sons had died of natural causes before their father), Hājī Muhammad, probably Ibrahim's son, reigned until about 1445, when he became insane. A council of notables was held, which appointed in his place his nephew, Shams al-Din III (our reconstruction of dynastic history depends on imputing a serious mistake to the *Sherefname*, on which see our annexe to section 5 (p.135)). Shams al-Din seems then to have been succeeded by Ibrahim III, son of the insane Muhammad, in whose name we

[a] Sh.I.381.

[b] Sh.I.384.

[c] Sh.I.384 (mother) and 384-6 (Ahmad).

have coins. Ibrahim may have been bypassed in the council of c.1445 on grounds of age.

By A.D. 1458 Ibrahim had been replaced by a Sharaf (III), very likely, too, a son of the insane Muhammad; this Sharaf, too, minted coins in his own name. And (if our reconstruction of dynastic history is right) this Sharaf was still reigning when the Kara Koyunlu sultan Jahan Shah was defeated on the plain of Muş in A.D. 1467 and the Ak Koyunlu, under Uzun Hasan, then replaced the Kara Koyunlu as overlords of the Van region.[a]

Relations with the Kara Koyunlu. We will briefly give the evidence, then try to draw some conclusions. In Armn. 875/1426 took place another siege of Bitlis by İskender.[44] This may well have been a reprisal for a savage attack by the prince of Bitlis on Adilcevaz the year before. The latter attack was probably carried out while İskender was occupied in the capture of Van.[b] At any rate we can conclude that the Bitlis principality did not lie quiescent in the few years between Shams al-Din's death and the death in 1426 of his executioner İskender. Probably the regents, Shāhum Khātūn and Aḥmad Nāsr al-Dīnī, decided their local position was strong enough to take advantage of the circumstance that İskender was engaged in conquering a district on the other side of the lake. That they perceived the matter thus, and took such a decision, vaguely suggests a policy, perhaps ill-worked out, of limited defiance, that is to say of defiance without high cost.

We have evidence of three attacks on the principality by İskender's uncle Jahan Shah (reigned 1436-67), in 1451, 1457 and 1462. In the first such attack Jahan Shah

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[a] For the evidence for rulers from the deposition of Hājī Muḥammad to Sharaf, annexe at end of sect.5.

[b] T'M 85. Thomas says the attack on Arckē/Adilcevaz took place "in the same days" as the capture of Van and Ṙštunik'.

"enslaved" as well as "devastated" the principality, acording to the source, an Armenian colophon. After the third, the patriarch of Aghtamar intervened when Jahan Shah's troops had captured the city (though not the citadel) of Ahlat, and were readying themselves for further assaults. The patriarch then offered to collect from the principality of Bitlis the levies which it owed to the Kara Koyunlu.[a]

Jahan Shah's attacks were probably occasioned by thoroughgoing insubordination on the part of the principality. In this period fall the reigns of Shams al-Din III (nephew of Hājī Muhammad), 1445 to c.1554, Ibrahim III (son of Hājī Muhammad), c.1454 to c.1458, and Sharaf III (probably also a son of Hājī Muhammad), c.1454 to 1467 or after, all of whom minted coins in their own names.[b] Clearly the campaign of 1462 was provoked by the failure of the Bitlis prince (Sharaf III in our reconstruction) to pay his tribute. But as this is the only mention of tribute to be paid to the Kara Koyunlu by the local principalities, it is hard to interpret. The best guess is that Jahan Shah gained an ascendancy over the principality in the 1430's and 1440's by means of which he did succeed in imposing a regular tribute; but later the princes entered on a heyday of local power and freedom which allowed them to assume the overt forms of independence such as refusing to pay tribute and minting coins in their own names. Hence Jahan Shah's expeditions. The last and the first of these seem to have succeeded in their aim, the re-subordination of the principality.

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[a] 1451: Clph.XV.I.721b, p.644 (S.1450.1, p.216). 1457: Clph.XV.II.112, p.81 (S.1457.2, p.258). 1462: Clph.XV.II.221, p.174 (S.1462.3, pp.272-3).

[b] For the coins, Appendix I, Bitlis. For the arguments as to the coins, annexe at end of sect.5.

(vi) Seizure by the Ak Koyunlu and subsequent independence

In Safar 873/August 1468 the Ak Koyunlu Uzun Hasan defeated Jahan Shah's son Hasan 'Ali near Marand in Azerbayjan, and Hasan 'Ali fled.[a] In Rajab 873/January 1469 Uzun Hasan defeated Abu Sa'id, a grandson of Timur and the ruler of Khurasan and Transoxiana. Abu Sa'id was attempting to recover western Azerbayjan for his own empire; if he had won, the Ak Koyunlu might never have gained any part of Iran.[45] As it was, the victory immediately gave Uzun Hasan Azerbayjan, and the remainder of the Kara Koyunlu empire in Iran and Mesopotamia followed during the course of 1469.[b] In an early stage of this process of rapid conquest, Hasan 'Ali was finally defeated (Shawwal 873/April-May 1469).[c]

The Kurdish principalities had been loyal to Hasan 'Ali. Uzun Hasan seems to have been determined, not merely to subordinate the main principalities, but to deprive them of any power to inconvenience him in future. The cities of the principality of Bitlis were attacked in each of the three years 1470-72, and Bitlis was finally taken in 1473 -- the difficulty encountered by the Ak Koyunlu in capturing Bitlis suggests just how powerful the Bitlis princes had become.[46] Ibrahim, the reigning prince, signed a treaty with the Ak Koyunlu general, Sulaymān Bizhen Oghlī, in which he renounced his power over his principality. He moved to Iran, with 12 families from the Ruzagi tribe, and was assigned a personal pension "vazifat-i jihat-i u" in the city of Qūm. The more prominent personalities in the principality fled to relatively inaccessible parts of its territory.[d]

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[a] Woods, AQ 111.

[b] Woods, AQ 112-14 on the stages of conquest.

[c] Woods, AQ 112.

[d] For all these events, Sh.I.389-90.

Probably there were Ak Koyunlu garrisons in the three main cities of the principality; perhaps Ak Koyunlu generals were given rights to income from the land.[47] At any rate the principality seems now to have been under direct administration.

This was an entirely different way of dealing with the Kurdish principalities of the Van region. The reason should probably be sought by looking back in time at the personality and preferences of Uzun Hasan himself. He had never preferred a loose subordination on the part of his vassals. In the 1450's and 1460's Hasan, able to see the extreme insubordination on the part of the Bitlis princes towards the Kara Koyunlu, had pursued extreme policies of subjugation towards two willing vassals of the Kara Koyunlu. These were the Ayyubid prince of Hişn Kayfa/Hasankeyf and the Bukhti prince of Jazîra/Cizre, the two most powerful Kurdish princes of the Diyar Bakr. Expelling them from their hereditary domains, he put their lands under direct administration. In both cases (Hisn Kayfa and Jazira) he had already secured the principality's submission: he apparently preferred to content himself with submission until he was in a strong enough position to defeat and remove the ruling families. Jazîra, capital of the Bukhti principality, was taken only in 1469, so the first attack on Bitlis (1470) took place immediately after the expulsion of the Kurdish princes from the Diyar Bakr.[48]

Hisn Kayfa and Jazîra were at the border of the Kara Koyunlu dominions with those of the Ak Koyunlu, and a case could be made for saying that Uzun Hasan preferred to maintain a direct administration in former principalities which would always have been easy for the Kara Koyunlu to come back and subvert. If this is true, the same could not be said of the principalities of the Lake Van area after the defeat of the Kara Koyunlu. These principalities were now surrounded by Ak Koyunlu territory on all sides. They were not liable to be subverted by an outside power. One could therefore see Uzun Hasan's

expulsion of their princes as a simple continuation of a policy learnt in the past fifteen years which it was now second nature to apply in the Lake Van area.

It would certainly be valid to argue that now the principalities were surrounded on all sides by the territory of an empire, it was important to guarantee the safety of communications through the Lake Van area, which in turn implied preventing the principalities from rebelling and from other acts of insubordination. The only way, in Uzun Hasan's view, was to remove the ruling families altogether. After 1410, however, the Kara Koyunlu would have had equal reason to apply such an argument. That is to say, in that period their lines of communication between the Diyar Bakr, northern Iraq, Azerbayjan and northern Armenia were nearly as important to them as the equivalent lines of communication later were to the Ak Koyunlu. But they did not draw the conclusion that the ruling families of the Kurdish principalities must be eradicated or banished.

So long as the princely family could be kept out of the principality and so long as the Ak Koyunlu could closely supervise the remainder of its aghas, the policy seems to have been a success. However during the reign of the Ak Koyunlu Ya'qub (883-96/1478-90) the Ruzagi, or some part of the group, rebelled, and in retaliation Ibrahim (the Ruzagi prince removed by Uzun Hasan) was executed.[a] But after the death of Ya'qub in A.D. 1490 the Ak Koyunlu empire was torn apart by rival factions and local usurpers, and the Ruzagi of Bitlis, like other Kurdish ruling families and groups, took advantage of the unsettled conditions to recapture their principality (900/1494-95). The new prince was Shah Muhammad, youngest son of the ousted and now murdered Ibrahim.[49] Shah Muhammad (died 903/1497-98) issued coins in his own name, perhaps an index of Ak Koyunlu disorganisation as well as of Ruzagi strength.

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[a] Sh.I.390.

(vii) Sharaf Khan (c.1500 to 1533): Safavid hegemony and occupation (1508-15); the reign of Sharaf under Ottoman hegemony (1515-33)

Shah Muhammad's two-year-old son Ibrahim was appointed, but a faction gathering around the "nā'ib" of the *nāhiya* of Muş, Sharaf, defeated the regents, and Ibrahim was kept in captivity.[a] Sharaf submitted to the Safavid Shah Ismail at Ahlat, probably in 1502.[50] But later, probably in 1507, Sharaf was imprisoned, along with several other Kurdish amirs at Shah Ismail's court. This must have happened because the Kurdish princes had committed various acts of insubordination. Although the others were let go (1508), Sharaf was not. Ismail decided to seize the principality, and after two and a half years of resistance the Ruzagi, now princeless, surrendered to Ismail's deputy, Chāyan Sultān, in 1510 or 1511.[51] The principality of Bitlis was put with Adilcevaz and Erciş in a single governorship.[b]

However Sharaf escaped,[c] made an initial attempt to recapture Bitlis, was then persuaded to join the Ottoman cause, along with other Kurdish princes, by İdris Bidlisi, and finally recaptured Bitlis after taking part in the battle of Koçhisar of 1516, which gave the Diyar Bakr to the Ottoman empire.[d]

Sharaf was a gifted and effective ruler. In his second reign (1515-33), under Ottoman hegemony of course, he appears to have been one of the most beneficial of the

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[a] Sh.I.400-406.

[b] Sh.I.414.

[c] Sh.I.412-13.

[d] Sh.I.414-18. The text (I.415) implies that the first attempt on Bitlis came only a few days before Sharaf was persuaded by İdris Bidlisi's diplomacy to contribute toward the Ottoman effort during the Iranian campaign of 1514.

Bitlis princes, and the *Sherefname* speaks highly of his achievements.[a]

His downfall in 940/1533, and the half-century of direct Ottoman rule over the principality's domains, should be seen as the result of an increasingly aggressive Safavid stance in the border areas. Ulama, Safavid governor of Van, defected to the Ottoman side, and slandered Sharaf, who, however, had brought him safely to Ottoman territory in the first place. Ulama persuaded the sultan to grant him the principality of Bitlis (probably 937/1529-30). A first Ottoman attempt to capture Bitlis was defeated in the nick of time by the Safavid Shah Tahmasp. Sharaf had been forced to change sides, and was given a diploma by Tahmasp as *amīr al-umarā* of Kurdistan (939/1532). He was defeated and killed the following year because he refused to retreat in the face of the second Ottoman expedition.[52]

Sharaf's son Shams al-Din was then put on the throne of Bitlis with an atabeg, Hājī Sharaf b. Muḥammad Āghā Kelhūkī. The principality had now reverted to Ottoman vasselage. However on Süleyman I's return from his second Azerbayjan campaign in 1535, the principality was finally given to Ulama. Shams al-Din fled to Shah Tahmasp after being told that the grant of the sanjaks of Malatya and Maraş was a trick.[b] It was only in 986/1578 that one of his sons, Sharaf (V), the author of the *Sherefname*, returned to Bitlis, and then only as sanjak bey, with hereditary rights, of the former sub-principality of Bitlis.[c]

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[a] Sh.I.435-7.

[b] Sh.I.437-44.

[c] Sh.I.454-5.

(viii) Ottoman government without the hereditary princes: 1535-78

The whole territory was converted into three sanjaks and part of a fourth: Bitlis, Muş, Hınıs and the Ahlat *nahiye* of the Adilcevaz sanjak. Each of these was subject to *tahrir* or enumeration for tax purposes. No doubt the timars and ze'amets, tax regulations and payments and the *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders themselves were simple confirmations of pre-existing arrangements. But the aghas, former landowners on a sharecropping basis, and now converted to *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders, were now bound by obligations towards the sanjak bey which applied to *timar* and *ze'amet*-holders throughout the Ottoman empire. At least from the point of view of the Ottoman court they had dropped their tribal obligations.[a]

The arrangements enjoyed by Sharaf V after his return in 1578 indicate roughly those applied to the sanjak beys appointed between 1535 and 1578. This meant the receipt of revenues of specified amounts from four villages, one *mezra'a* and sources in the city of Bitlis itself, and the *ihtisāb* or market taxes of that city. On the other hand half the cizye or poll-tax of the sanjak had to be paid to the *beylerbeyi* of Van, the province in which the Bitlis sanjak was included after 1548.[b]

(ix) After the return of Sharaf

Size and status of the principality. Sharaf's domain was by and large the territory of the former Bitlis sub-principality.[53] The now hereditary beys of Bitlis were entitled to the

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[a] Sh.I.354: *tahrir* and an update, both in the reign of Süleyman I. Dankoff, Bitlis 15 (p.62 here for comment). Tahrir documents, Appendix III.

[b] Notes 54, 56 below for the sources.

revenues of specified monetary amounts from four villages, from one *mezra'a* and from the city of Bitlis; and to the market taxes (*ihtisāb*) of Bitlis. They also received an additional 40,000 akçe out of the revenue from the imperial estates within the sanjak (havās-i hümāyūn). This brought his total income up to 500,000 akçes.[54] In 1583 the income from the *nahiye* (not the sanjak) of Muş was added. According to Sharaf himself this was an extra 200,000 akçes. But Sharaf also states that the extra 200,000 brought his total revenue up to 1,400,000 akçes, not the 700,000 which might have been expected.[55] The total in excess of the parts is probably to be explained by the addition of another source of revenue sometime between 1588 and 1597 (the date of the *Sherefname*'s composition) and from which the bey was still benefiting in 1665. This was half of the *cizye* or poll tax levied on the Christian *re'āyā*.[56]

Sharaf and his successors ruled a hereditary *hükümet*, a principality where many of the pre-Ottoman rights of the prince, tribal chiefs and others were preserved, sometimes by conversion into Ottoman institutions. The principality was now a sanjak within the jurisdiction of the *beylerbeyi* of Van. Judged as a hereditary prince, the bey possessed limited rights; but his rights as a sanjak bey, by the standards of the Ottoman empire as a whole, were unusually wide.

The right of succession seems to have been somewhat limited, because the Ottoman government had the power to dismiss the bey for disobedience. On the other hand the successor had to come from within the family. The bey had the unusual right of appointing various legal and religious officials, including the *qāżī* and mufti. Those with estates simply kept their estates and the rights to the income, but the estates were registered as *timar* and *ze'amet*. The *timar*- and *ze'amet*-holders had the usual military obligation to march under the banner of the Bitlis bey.[57]

The tribes. There is little evidence as to the number of tribes owing allegiance to the bey of Bitlis. *A priori* it seems safe to assume that he lost several tribes in the sanjaks of Muş and Hınıs and in the *nahiye* of Ahlat. This is not because those sanjaks were now separate, meaning that the bey had no jurisdiction over them in Ottoman law. Nor is it because some system of tribal allegiance to the beys of those sanjaks may have developed. Instead it is also because the period of rule by non-hereditary Ottoman sanjak beys (1535-87) was a perfect opportunity for tribes to drift away from allegiance to the Ruzagi core group.

However the core group and many of the old outer circle remained, and the relationship between the two was intact. This tribal structure, a partial survival from the late Middle Ages, was indeed the principal reason for the formidable strength of Abdāl Khān, the prince of Bitlis with whom Melek Ahmet Paşa had to contend (in a mid-17th century episode which will be briefly narrated below). The Melek Ahmet Paşa episode contains one or two indications of the core group. Before being attacked by the pasha, Abdāl is accused of gathering round him a number of tribes, one of which is the Khālitī. The latter figures on the *Sherefname*'s list of the core group's members.[a] When Abdāl withdraws into the citadel, he takes with him the same tribes.[b] Again some of the tribes in the whole confederation did not reside on the territory of the sanjak. There is nothing to indicate, for example, that the Khālitī themselves had moved. One of Abdāl's subordinate tribe leaders came from the district of Gavāsh, just east of that of Kārjikān.[c] This indicates not merely the existence of a network of tribal allegiance which extended beyond the Bitlis sanjak's boundaries, but that parts of the former network could have

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[a] Ev.IV.195 (D.175); Sh.I.361; pp.87-88 above.

[b] Ev.D.193 (MS 263.a.18; not in Ist.).

[c] Ev.D.243 (MS 269b.11-12, 15; Ist.IV.227 incomplete).

remained within the territory of the former sub-principalities, now lost to Bitlis, of Muş, Ahlat and Hınıs.

Abdāl also received the support of a number of other sanjak beys, and this is likely to have been the result of a vassal relationship, though by no means all of the sanjaks in question were hereditary in any sense. The bey of Hazo was Abdāl's son-in-law, and was in Bitlis at the time of Melek Ahmet Paşa's attack on the city. So were those of Cıska (probably Cıksı, near Kulp) and Zırikī (near the lower end of the Bitlis valley).[58] Those of Çemişgezek and Çapakçur wished to come, but were caught before they could: it is hardly surprising that the bey of Çapakçur, near modern Bingöl, should try to come, but quite astonishing that the bey of Çemişgezek, in the Dersim district north of Harput, should do so.[a]

A number of beys from sanjaks south-east of Bitlis, which as a group abutted the Bitlis sanjak's boundary, had sent troops to take part in Melek Ahmet Paşa's expedition, but failed to come in person. These were the beys of Ispāīrd, Zerikī, Şirvān, Hizān, Kārnī and Kesān. Their geographical position gives the clue to the reason for their failure to appear; they were, again, in some vassal relationship to Bitlis, repeated in at least some cases, notably Hizan, from the late Middle Ages.[59] Another and stronger clue is their treatment after the defeat of Abdāl. These beys were held prisoner; that of Şirvān was then allowed to ransom himself, and that of Hizan released after a gift from, surprisingly, Abdāl Khān.[b] On the other hand a group of beys from sanjaks east and south-east of Lake Van had not merely failed to present themselves, but had not even sent soldiers. Yet somehow they were forgiven and let off with a slap in the face ![60] The text of Evliya

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[a] Ev.IV.203 (D.193-5).

[b] Ev.IV.260, 261 (D.327, 329).

does not explain why, but the most credible reason is that they were not Abdāl's vassals. The pasha did not need to teach them a lesson, and did not want to antagonise them for the future.

Relations with the Ottoman government. Sharaf V abdicated in favour of his son, Abū'l Me'ālī Shams al-Dīn (V), sometime before 1597.[61] In 1601 an attack on Bitlis, presumably a punishment, was mounted by a pasha of Van. The bey of Bitlis was Sharaf Khan. It seems more likely that Sharaf had regained his throne, rather in the manner of Abdal Khan half a century later, than that the source, a colophon, misnames the bey of Bitlis. There was a long resistance, and in 1602 Sharaf Khan was defeated and his treasure plundered by the Ottoman forces.[a] In 1603 we hear of a Żiā' al-Dīn (II), who in 1604 killed the bey of Muş and the latter's two sons.[b] In short, the beys of Bitlis were once again rebellious and assertive.

The next view of the principality comes in the Melek Ahmet Paşa episode of the mid-17th century. A summary of that episode will supply information relevant to certain aspects of the principality's constitution and behaviour. In 1045/1635 the sultan Murad IV had been so well entertained by Abdāl Khan of Bitlis that he had made over the harac of the Muş sanjak in perpetuity to the hereditary beys of Bitlis.[62] In 1048/1638, after Murad IV's conquest of Baghdad, Abdāl had refused to say "Ġazān mübārek ola" (i.e. to congratulate him). Melek Ahmet Paşa had been instructed to take revenge on Abdāl, but had abandoned the expedition after an agreement under arbitration. When Ahmet Paşa was

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[a] Zulalyan, *Ar. Hay.* 55

[b] Clph.XVII.I.126, p.104 (1603); 181, pp.184-5 (1604). Last mentioned in 1607: ibid. 336, p.272.

appointed to the Van province, he paid Abdāl a visit in Bitlis.[a]

Despite the friendly terms on which the two had parted, Melek Ahmet Paşa found a pretext for an expedition against Abdāl. When the expedition has been decided on, better reasons appear. Abdāl had raided the sanjak of Malazgirt, stealing 40,000 sheep and killing 300 men. In Bitlis he had confiscated the goods of certain merchants on the pretext of extracting a toll, and beaten and maimed them when they complained.[b]

After a specious reply to Melek Ahmet Paşa's ultimatum, a force was gathered from the Kurdish sanjak beys of the Van province and Abdāl was defeated.[c] Abdāl fled to his kinsman Mūdikī 'Alī Kāyā in the Mūdikī district.[d] A council of '*ulemā*', elders, shaykhs and prominent men ("a'yān-i eşrāf"), presided over by the pasha, appointed as prince-cum-sanjak bey Żīā' al-Dīn, the middle (not the eldest) son of Abdāl. The pasha's agreement is needed for the appointment, and he makes it clear that without the agreement of the council collectively to guarantee payment of Abdāl's debts (40,000 sheep to the bey of Malazgirt and his dues to the Van garrison) the government will ignore the hereditary rights of the sanjak's ruling family.[e]

In Cumāda'l-evvel 1066/February 1656 (when, by chance, Evliya, the source for the whole episode, is visiting the city), the news arrives that Melek Ahmet Paşa has been

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[a] Ev.IV.125-7 (D.157-61); the whole visit to Bitlis, IV.81-129 (D.43-163).

[b] Ev.IV.191-2 (D.165-7).

[c] Reply: Ev.IV.197-8 (D.179-83). Force of sanjak beys: Ev.IV.199-202 (D.185-9). Defeat: Ev.IV.202-32 (D.191-255).

[d] Ev.D.247 (MS 270a.13-19; Ist.IV.228-9 misleading).

[e] Ev.D.275-9 (MS 273b.32-274b.36; Ist.IV.239-40 incomplete). Abdāl's treasure was auctioned immediately afterwards so that the debt could be paid: Ist.IV.241-58 (D.281-321).

removed from the governorship of the Van province.[a] The very next day Abdāl returns, and everybody hastens to submit to him, including the new prince-cum-sanjak bey Żīā' al-Dīn.[b] The latter in fact continues as prince: Abdāl refuses to accept that position.[c] But it is clear from the events of the next month that in effect he directs the government of the principality.[d] Nūr al-Dahīr, younger brother of the prince, Żīā' al-Dīn, murders the latter.[e] The Ruzagi tribes then demand the blood of Nur al-Dahīr, and kill him; Abdāl takes over as prince. Evliya, the source, states that he instigated the murder of Żīā' al-Din.[f] In 1076/1665 Abdāl was deposed by the pasha of Van and replaced by his son Badr al-Dīn; he was kept a prisoner in Istanbul and later put to death.[63]

From the remainder of the 17th and from the 18th centuries, several similar incidents are known. In each case the Ottoman governor of Van intervened in the succession, just as Melek Ahmet Paşa had done; he extracted the dues by force; and on some occasions took hostages.[64] The dynasty came to an end in 1849, when the last prince, Sharīf, was defeated by Reşid Paşa and taken to Istanbul.[65]

Before about 1780 there is no good evidence that the *vali* of Van lost control of the Bitlis sanjak for more than a year or two. The story may well have been different at the end of the 18th and in the 19th century up to the year 1849, when the last prince was deposed.[66] As usual in eastern Asia Minor, the impression that the central government

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[a] Ev.V.21 (D.341); Evliya's business in Bitlis, V.19 (D.339).

[b] Ev.V.21-2 (D.341-3).

[c] Ev.V.22-3 (D.343-5).

[d] Especially the murder of Molla Muhammad the sorcerer, Ev.V.31-3 (D.361-7).

[e] Ev.D.377-9 (left out of Ist. between V.34 and 35).

[f] Ev.V.41-2 (D.393-5); Vardan Bałišec'i (MC II.397) flatly states that he killed both.

had only nominal control over the sanjak beys during whole of the 17th and 18th centuries turns out, on a closer inspection of the evidence, to be based on an actual breakdown of central control only in the last third of the 18th and first third of the 19th century.

The Bitlis sanjak-principality had a reputation for lawlessness, independence and open defiance of the central government during the Ottoman period. A thorough examination of the evidence, including the highly dramatic Melek Ahmet Paşa episode, shows that until the last two decades of the 18th century the pasha of Van was able to bring the principality to heel within a year or two; in those two decades and the first half of the 19th century the situation was no doubt different. Before those decades there seems to be no question of openly disavowing allegiance to the Ottoman empire, and the principality had in many respects been brought within the sanjak system. The empire had succeeded for the most part in imposing discipline.[67]

Nevertheless the sanjak-principality caused the empire much expenditure of military effort in forcing the bey to pay his dues and carry out the proper forms of obedience. It is an open question whether the Ottoman requirements were well suited to a tribal principality, and whether the Ottoman government would have done better to spare the principality those requirements and so save itself the trouble of enforcing them.

Annexe to sect. 5: princes of Bitlis

Sharaf al-Din Abu Bakr. Attested 733/1332-33. Sect. (ii).

Zıa al-Dīn I. Attested 750/1349. Sect.(ii).

(Haji) Sharaf I. Reign started before 1387, ended perhaps c.1395, at any rate after 1394 and before 1399. Sect.(iii).

Ibrahim I. Attested between 1396 and 1399 (p.114, n.39). An infant son, Šamšati, who may well be Shams al-Din I, was put in his place. Sect.(iii).

("Veli") Shams al-Din I. Started before 1406; executed by İskender in 1423. Probably son of Sharaf I. Prominent ruler. Sect.(iv).

Sharaf II. An idiot. Reign started 1423; date of death perhaps c.1426. Son of Shams al-Din I. Sect.(v).

Shams al-Din II. Reign perhaps started c.1426, ended 836/1431-2 or a little later. Anarchy at first. Sect.(v).

Ibrahim II. 836/1431-2 or a little later, to A.D. 1436 or a little earlier. 5th son of Shams al-Din II. Sect.(v).

(Haji) Muhammad I. Started A.D. 1436 or a little earlier; ended c.1445, when became insane. Probably Ibrahim II's son. Sect.(v).

Shams al-Din III. Started c.1445, ended c.1454. Nephew of Haji Muhammad. Probably minted coins in his own name. Sect.(v) and note at end of annexe.

Ibrahim III. C.1454 to 1458 or before. Son of Haji Muhammad (I), perhaps bypassed in c.1445 on grounds of age. One coin known. Sect.(v) and note at end of annexe.

Sharaf III. Started 1458 or just before; ended after 1467. Probably a son of Hājī Muhammad. Minted coins in own name. Sect.(v) and note at end of annexe.

Ibrahim IV. Known 1473. Sect.(vi).

Ak Koyunlu direct rule. 1473-900/1494-5. Sect.(vi).

(Shah) Muhammad II. 900/1494-5 to 903/1497-8. Minted coins in own name. Sect.(vi).

Ibrahim V. 903/1497-8 to c.1500, certainly before 1502. Infant son of (Shah) Muhammad II. Sect.(vii).

Sharaf Khan, IV, first reign. C.1500 to 1507 or 1508, when imprisoned by Shah Ismail. Nephew of (Shah) Muhammad II. No prince, 1507 or 1508 to 1510 or 1511; the principality then surrendered to the Safavids. Sect.(vii).

Safavid administration. 1510 or 1511 to 1515. sect.(vii).

Sharaf Khan, IV, second reign. 1515 to 1533. Prominent and beneficial ruler. Sect.(vii).

Shams al-Din IV. 1533 to 1535, when dispossessed by Ottomans and fled to Iran. Son of Sharaf Khan. Sect.(vii).

Direct Ottoman rule. 1535 to 1578. Sect.(vii), (viii).

Sharaf V. 1578 to c.1595. Son of Shams al-Din IV. Author of *Sherefname*. Abdicated, partly to write the *Sherefname*, which is dated 1597. Sect.(ix).

(Abū'l Me'ālī) Shams al-Dīn V. C.1595 to c.1600, certainly before 1603. Son of Sharaf V. Sharaf may have come back to rule and rebel in 1601 and 1602. Sect.(ix).

Zia al-Din II. Known in 1603, 1604 and 1607. Sect.(ix).

Reigning princes unknown, 1609 to 1638. Sect.(ix).

Abdal Khan, first reign. Before 1638 to 1665, when defeated by Melek Ahmet Paşa and fled. Sect.(ix).

Zia al-Din III. 1665 to 1666. Son of Abdāl; murdered by brother. Sect.(ix).

Abdāl Khan, second reign. 1666 to 1675. Deposed by Ottomans. Sect.(ix).

Badr al-Din. Started 1675.

Note to Annexe.

Hājī Muhammad, Shams al-Din III, Ibrahim III and Sharaf IV

(A) The *Sherefname* claims (I.387) that (Haji) Muhammad I died in 865/1460-61. But this is contradicted by several colophons, which are almost contemporary with the events they retail, whereas the *Sherefname* was composed a century and a half later.

(i) Clph.XV.I.657, p.585 (S.1445.3, p.204). "Šēx Mahmat" [Sanjian wrongly transliterates "Mahmūd"] became insane; the notables assembled and appointed in his place his nephew Amir Šamšadin. Clph.XV.I.666a, p.592 (S.1446.1, p.205) repeats the deposition of Muhammad and his replacement with "Šmëzdin".

(ii) Clph.XV.II.57, pp.46 (S.1454.5, p.252). "Barony" of Mir Šamšedin in our region.

(iii) Clph.XV.II.136, p.101 (S.1458.5, p.262). "Amirate" of Malik Šaraf in our city. Clph.XV.II.165a, p.126 (S.1459.8, p.265). Rule of amir Šaraf in Bałēš. Clph.XV.II.188, pp.149 (S.1460.12, p.268). Amirate in our region of the amir Šaraf. (Written at monastery of Ełrdut, near Muş.)

(B) For the continuation of the reign of this Sharaf, who is unknown to the *Sherefname*: Clph.XV.II.238, p.195 (S.1463.2, p.280); Clph.XV.II.328a, p.257 (S.1467.2, p.291). Sharaf's reign had certainly come to an end by 1473, the date of the Ak Koyunlu capture, when an Ibrahim is known.

(C) To reconstruct the succession we have also to take account of

(i) Sh.I.387 (sic). (Haji) Muhammad I was succeeded by his son Ibrahim.

(ii) Ibid.. His other son was Shams al-Din.

(iii) We have a single Bitlis coin bearing the name Ibrahim b. Muhammad. Like others minted by Bitlis princes, it bears no date, but is of similar design to the others.

(iv) We have several Bitlis coins in the name of Sharaf b. Muhammad.

(D) Reconstruction.

(1) From A(i) above, Haji Muhammad's reign came to an end in 1445 or shortly before: he was deposed because he was mad. His successor was Shams al-Din (not Ibrahim: compare C(i)), who was his nephew (not his son: compare C(ii)).

(2) From A(ii) above, Shams al-Din's reign continued until 1454.

(3) This gives us only until 1458 or just before for the reign of Ibrahim. In 1458 or just before starts the reign of Sharaf (A(iii)). However Ibrahim did reign: we know this from his coin (C(iii)). And he was the son of Muhammad (ibid.). If it was a short reign (four years or less) the poor coin output is not surprising. But why was Ibrahim turned down in favour of his cousin Shams al-Din ? Probably on grounds of age. When Shams al-din died, Ibrahim was appointed.

(4) Sharaf reigned from 1458 or just before (A(iii)) to 1467 and possibly later, but his reign had ended by 1473, when Ibrahim is known to have been reigning. He has a

reasonable coin output, which fits with the length of his reign. He also is a son of Muhammad (C(iv), coins). So presumably he is the youngest of the three known sons of Muhammad.

(5) The coins marked "Shams al-Dīn ibn Dīā al-Dīn" and just "Shams al-Dīn" do not help with the question of different rulers' dates, but the question of their attribution naturally arises at this point. These and the coins of Ibrahim and Muhammad are very similar in design and lettering style, and the coins of the three rulers seem to form a group. Are the "Shams al-Dīn ..." coins those of Shams al-Din III (c.1445 to c.1454), whom we have just instated on the evidence of the colophons, or those of Shams al-Din II (c.1426 to 836/1431-2 or a little later) ? Or could they be those of Shams al-Din I (1406 or before to 1423) ? The latter is the *Sherefname*'s candidate, at least when the author looked at the coins (see our discussion in Appendix IV, story F); but there is no period when Shams al-Din would have wanted to mint coins in his own name. He was a willing subject of Timur, Kara Yusuf and Shah Rukh in turn.

Shams al-Din III is more likely. We do not know his father or that of Shams al-Din II, so that is no check. However the reign of Shams al-Din II started in anarchy and with a pounding from İskender Kara Koyunlu, which leaves little time or confidence for this prince to start minting in his own name. If Shams al-Din III were the ruler in question, the coins would fall in a period when the Bitlis princes behaved with more freedom and were therefore attacked several times by Jahan Shah in the 1450's and 1460's (sect.(v) above). The coins' close similarity in design and style becomes also more explicable, and the succession of three sovereigns all minting in such a style one after the other further strengthens the candidacy of Shams al-Din III.

6. Conclusions

The Bitlis principality possessed a large territory which to a great extent was economically self-sufficient and contained a good balance of pasture and agricultural land. Much of both categories of land was of high quality, and the topography was well suited to short- and medium-range transhumance. A further source of wealth was the two cities of Bitlis and Ahlat, and perhaps that of Muş.

An inner circle of tribes, probably twenty in number, was tightly bound to the prince. But the total number of tribes owing allegiance to the prince within the principality was considerably greater -- at least fifty. The whole group of tribes was a highly loyal and solid power base, in particular the core group: it seems only to have split its loyalties in times of regency or of crisis (whether internal or external) for the principality as a whole. The territory, and the whole group of tribes, were so large that a system of sub-principalities was created. Essentially the princes in question were appointees of the Bitlis prince, whose task was to supervise the tribes. Despite the slimness of the evidence, the system appears to have worked. Beside his own principality the prince had a kind of junior ally, the principality of Sasun; a further principality, Hizan, was from time to time a vassal; and the Pāzūkī tribe was also subjected to Bitlis.

The Bitlis principality was thus an extremely formidable vassal for the Kara Koyunlu. To examine the latter dynasty's way of dealing with Bitlis we have included an account of the methods employed by the Ak Koyunlu, Safavid and Ottoman empire in dealing with the same principality.[68] The Ak Koyunlu tried simply to get rid of the ruling family and thus ensure the principality's permanent subjection. The method might have

worked in time, but the Ak Koyunlu lacked the resources to implement it. Shah Ismail tried to solve the problem of Sharaf's disloyalty by imprisoning him. The Ottoman empire's approach was different. It broke up the principality into several sanjaks; only that of Bitlis inherited the tribal principality. The latter was partly integrated into the fiscal and administrative system of the empire as a whole, while the prince retained certain important hereditary rights. The Bitlis princes committed serious acts of insubordination from time to time, and the task of quelling them cost much effort and bloodshed, but on the whole they were kept in order by the system.

After comparison with the three later dynasties the Kara Koyunlu emerge as maintaining a looser and more liberal relationship with Bitlis. They did not try to root out the ruling family or otherwise interfere with the principality's internal affairs. They insisted only on allegiance. In the 1430's and 1440's Jahan Shah was probably working towards tighter control, but unfortunately it was in the following two decades that the Bitlis princes enjoyed a heyday of freedom, which caused Jahan Shah to mount several highly destructive punitive campaigns against the principality. As for the reasons behind the Kara Koyunlu's policy and the degree of its success overall, we shall deal with them in our final chapter. Meanwhile the conclusion is that the Kara Koyunlu's overlord relationship with the formidable Bitlis principality was relatively loose and permissive.

II. THE HAKKARI PRINCIPALITY

1. Introduction

The territory of the Hakkari principality was divided into two parts, geographically separated from one another and very different in character. The less accessible inland half was heavily dependent on pastoralism and lacked cities; the emphasis of the coastal area, which possessed two cities, was agricultural. The base population of the inland half, which lay either side of the river Zab, was Nestorian; that of the coastal area was Armenian. The two halves were complementary, but communication between them was difficult. Moreover the economic coherence of each half by itself was considerably greater than that of the principality as a whole.

To analyse the relations between the prince's family and the Kurdish tribes on Hakkari territory we have to employ roundabout methods. First we look at the inland districts in the 19th century, the first period in which the nature and whereabouts of the tribes are adequately documented. In the 19th century the Kurds were highly fragmented, and the grouping into tribes apparently rather shifting and unstable. This situation seems to have come about mainly because the Nestorians occupied a large portion of the inland districts. Moreover their valleys were hard of access and easy to defend. Since the Nestorians are unlikely to have been proportionately less numerous or to have occupied strategically and economically less advantageous districts in the late Middle Ages, a similar situation may well have existed in the Kara Koyunlu period.

Secondly we look at the principality's turbulent history in the first century of

inclusion, in one capacity or another, in the Ottoman empire. Apart from the peculiar combination of vulnerability to and entrenched strength against the Ottoman empire afforded by the position on the border with Persia, that border position also seems to have unlocked the potential for conflict between the tribes subject to the Hakkari prince and between members of the ruling family. In short, it revealed the lack of cohesion between the tribes. The princes could count on the loyalty of their own tribe, of which they seem to have been the chief, but they could not count, as could those of Bitlis, on a united tribal base. There is some evidence for a system of apanages at the disposal of the prince; the prince may have periodically redistributed these among his relatives, as did the Bābān princes, to maintain a balance between those relatives and so survive himself. One apanage which certainly was not used in this manner, however, was Vostan. Vostan, owing to its wealth on the one hand and its separation from the inland districts on the other, was entrusted to a close relative who in practice would not be disturbed in his tenure.

In respect of relations with neighbouring tribes and principalities, Hakkari again differs from Bitlis. There is evidence dating from the 1330's or 1340's that some type of alliance or association existed between the Hakkari, considered as a tribe, and two tribes residing on the pastureland just inside the present Iranian border. Such an association, naturally, could extend the influence of the principality; but it had the potential to aggravate its weaknesses too. This was shown in the early Ottoman period when another tribe, again residing outside Hakkari territory, took sides in tribal and dynastic struggles within the principality. As for other principalities, relations seem to have been generally either cold or outright hostile.

Lastly we shall review the history of the principality, concentrating as usual on the policy of the Kara Koyunlu and subsequent powers and on the relationship between these

policies and the principality's tribal constitution. We shall note that the period of the Kara Koyunlu and their more permissive attitude corresponds to a period of strong Hakkari princes and apparent tribal unity. The Ottoman presence at Van, however, and a more interventionist stance on the part of the Ottoman government, corresponds to a period of tribal division and dynastic struggles. As for the precise significance of these correspondences, we shall elucidate that in the conclusion to this section.

2. Territorial extent and economic cohesion

2.1. Introduction. The territory as a whole; general topographical features

The Great Zab river system. The great Zab rises at the north end of the Baskale plain (the district of Albāq (Pers.), Mec Ałbak (Armn.)). Turning south-west, it passes through a series of remarkable but well-known gorges in a knot of the Taurus mountains. To north-west are the elevated yaylas of the Kara Dağ, rising to 3,900 m.. The Kara Dağ can be regarded as the hub of the river and mountain systems south of Lake Van; most of the river systems radiate away from it. To the south-west is Cilo Dağ (Syr. "Jīlū"). This is a group of precipiced peaks, impassable even now, whose lower slopes are nevertheless highly suitable for summer pasture. The Taurus continues south-westward as the Sat Dağ, a group of similar but somewhat smaller peaks. To the north-east of the Cilo and Sat Dağ is the long Gevar plain (Armn. "Gawar", Arab. "Gawār"; now renamed "Yüksek Ova", "High Plain"). This plain, which coasts the borders of the two mountain knots, was an important part of the Hakkari principality.

Turning from a south-westerly to a southerly direction, the Zab passes through further gorges and comes out into the foothill district connecting the Taurus to the northern edge of the Mesopotamian plain. Breaking through the northerly ridges of the foothills, it turns southward down a wide and deep valley. Thus after the Başkale plain the river describes an odd course in three legs. These are three sides of a trapezium, travelling respectively south-west, south and south-east.

The ways into this part of the Taurus -- the Great Zab river system -- from its southern foothills were essentially two. The first was the Zab gorges themselves, which took a path from the largest fortified town in the foothills, Amadiya, to the capital of the late medieval Hakkari principality, Julamerk (Arab. form).[a]

The second was the valley of the Shamsdinan Su. This is a northern tributary of the Great Zab which joins the latter river near the beginning of its third leg, which flows south-east. After following the Shamsdinan Su north-eastwards the way splits. One track goes due north up a tributary. It reaches the steep Oramar valley, which separates the Cilo Dağ and Sat Dağ, and from there the Gevar plain. The latter, however, drains north-west into the Zab rather than south-west into the Shamsdinan Su. The second fork of the Shamdinan Su path into Hakkari territory came via the upper course of the Shamdinan valley itself. The rocky, well-watered district draining into the upper half of that river's course is known as the Shamdinan district. The district offers a roundabout and twisting but somewhat lower and less confined route into the Gevar plain.

Districts adjoining the shore of Lake Van; connections thereto. Given that the northerly

[a] Now confusingly called Hakkari, which is why the modern name is left out of the main text at this point.

half of the principality, and its two cities, lay near the shore of Lake Van, communication between the two halves was necessarily difficult. The easiest way came from the Başkale plain into the upper valley of the Hoşap Su, after which there was a direct way to Van, or else the shore of the lake could be reached via the lower Hoşap Su. Equally Julamerk was connected by tracks over the Kara Dağ into the Norduz Çay basin. These tracks led quite easily into the lower Hoşap Su valley. However both these routes went through the territory of the Mahmudi principality, either in the upper Hoşap Su valley or in the Norduz Çay basin.

The third way was to go over high pastureland to the Çatak valley, from which an easy pass led into the lower valley of the Hoşap Su.[1] The high land in question lay out of the Zab river system altogether: from Julamerk one would cross first the headwaters of the eastern Khabur, a tributary of the Tigris, then part of the upper Bohtan valley. The Bohtan Su is itself a tributary of the Tigris, but it flows west, not south, and joins the Tigris in a completely different basin from the Khabur. The Çatak valley was probably in Hakkari hands for the whole of the late Middle Ages, not to mention the early Ottoman occupation.[a] Who governed the intervening pastureland, and the upstream sections of the two valleys themselves (Khabur and Bohtan), is not known, and in practice it may not have been governed at all in any formal sense.

The land adjoining the shore of the lake possessed, of course, a quite different character from the Zab river system in the Taurus mountains. Three fertile plains (that of Van, the lower Hoşap valley and the plain behind Vostan) approached the lake, separated one form another by hills. The two cities of Van and Vostan made a further contrast with the essentially pastoral character of the terrain of the Zab river system.

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[a] P.149 below.

Conclusions. The Hakkari principality was hard to approach from the south; while not completely sealed on that side, it was much more open to the outside world on the shore of Lake Van. It was equally difficult to approach from the south-west (the valleys of the Bohtan and Khabur).

On the other hand the paths between the southern and northern halves of the principality lay over high yaylas. Here the principality may have had little control, let alone jurisdiction. In fact communication was possible only in the summer. This, along with the exceptional fertility of the three coastal plains, the existence of two cities and the strength of the citadel at Van, helps to explain the importance given to the Vostan apanage and to the governorship of Van. The traditional arrangement whereby the amir of Vostan was always a son or close relative of the Hakkari prince, and whereby often no governor of Van was appointed, because it was a second residence of the prince himself, suggests a series of districts closely tied to the principality's southern half. In reality the traditional arrangement resulted from the opposite: the difficulty of communication between the two halves.

2.2. The Zab river system

A. Zab valley, section dependent on Julamerk. This was the heart of the principality. As a whole it was hard of access, and the town of Julamerk harder of access still. Julamerk lay above a tributary of the Zab; but the first few miles of that tributary's valley were simply a high, vertical gorge. The district spread to the heights of the Kara Dağ on one side and to the Cilo Dağ on the other. Its character was laregely pastoral; the yaylas between Julamerk and the summit of the Kara Dağ particularly fine. It was peopled mainly

by Nestorians.

B. Albāq (Armn. "Alʰbak Mec", "Great Alʰbak", and in the late Middle Ages sometimes "Barm" or "Barmn"); the Başkale plain. Despite its height above sea level, this supports a large number of villages round its edge and particularly at its southern end. Short-range transhumance was probably practised by most villages: the surrounding hills lend themselves to it easily. The population Armenian in the northern half and mainly Nestorian in the southern half.

C. Gevar, or the Gevar plain (Armn. "Gawaṙ"; Arab. & Pers. "Gawār"). Although about the same height as the Albāq plain, this can get hot and dry in summer. However it is prime agricultural land, and again well-suited to short-range transhumance, particularly to and from the Cilo and Sat Dağ. Population: Mixed Syrian and Kurdish, some Armenian.

D. Bāy. The *Sherefname* twice mentions a "castle of Bāy", implying it was the castle from which a district of the principality was administered, or at least was the seat of one of the principality's prominent figures or families. Bay at present is a village at the north-west corner of the Shamsdinan district. It lies at the upper end of a side-valley leading into the Humaru valley. The district attached to the castle of Bay was probably the north-west quarter of the Shamsdinan district, known as Humaru. But the castle was probably in the main valley a few kilometres east of Surunus, which seems previously to have been named Bay.[2] The district therefore adjoined the Gevar plain on its north-west side and extended up to the lower slopes of the Sat Dağ towards the west. South-east of Humaru was the

other main division of the Shamsdinan district, Rustāq, later Zerzān. This is known to have been outside Hakkari territory.[a] Population of Humaru: Nestorians and some Kurds.

E. Chal. At Chal, now renamed Çukurca,[b] the river comes out of the mountains and into the foothill district. Chal was a town set on a ledge high above the Zab to the west and above a steep drop overlooking the fotthills to the south. A small Nestorian- and Kurdish-populated district dependent on Chal, including perhaps part of the foothill district, seems to have been part of the principality.[3] Further south lay the small estate, sometimes principality, of Amadiya. This had been the original territory of the Hakkari tribe, and in the late Middle Ages may well have been the territory of a branch of the tribe.[4]

F. Nestorian *ashiret* territory. This lay on the southward-flowing (second) leg of the Zab's course (district of Tkhuma, not including Chal) and further east, all the way to the Cilo and Sat Dağ. It is likely but not certain that the Nestorian population of this territory, which became known in the 19th century as a fierce, independent, *non*-tax-paying pocket of five Nestorian tribes, was in some manner subject in the late Middle Ages to the Hakkari princes. Its precise location and character are dealt with below, sect.3.1. A small proportion of the population was Kurds, who were probably for the most part mixed with the Nestorians.

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[a] Sect.II.4 below.

[b] Scene of recent refugee débâcles.

2.3. Northern half; by the lake shore

A. Vostan and Van. In respect of the period when the Hakkari principality held both (till 1425, then in the mid-15th century and around the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries) not only must the two cities be considered a complementary pair but the attached districts too must be considered as to some extent a unity.

First of all the city of Van lay in a highly fertile plain bordered by hills. A broad ridge of hills separates this plain from the valley of the lower Hoşap Su. The latter itself consists of two plains, an inland one (Norgüh and Gürpınar) and the shore plain, and a broad, deep section of valley which links the two plains. Continuing clockwise around the shore of the lake, there follows a district of hills descending to the shore strip from a high ridge which includes Artos Dağ (3540 m.). A third plain opens out within these hills, connected to the shore strip by a valley on whose lower shelves lay the city of Vostan.[a]

The Van plain and dependent hills was known, and had for long been known, as Tosp. Vostan's dependent district was Ṙštunik' (pron. "Ṙështunik", rolled or trilled r followed by short neutral vowel). In the Late Classical period and early Middle Ages the name "Ṙštunik'" had designated the hill area, including Vostan, all the way to the Kaputkogh peninsula.[b] The lower Hoşap Su valley had been called Erwandunik' (pron. "Yervandunik"),[c] no doubt belonging at that distant period to a small princely family of that name. The valley, or at least the coastal plain and the more confined section of valley, was now known as "Hayoc' Jor" (pron. "Hayots Dzor"), "Valley of the Armenians". For

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[a] Appendix I, Vostan.

[b] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 340-41.

[c] Hübschman, *Ortsnamen* 343, not spelling out the topography in terms of two plains.

political purposes Hayoc' Jor now belonged with Vostan. On the other hand to the west of Vostan a new district, Gavash (Pers. "Gavāsh") is known. Certainly for purposes of geographical designation this counted as part of Ṙštunik', but in principle could be separated and put under a different amir, generally in combination with the island-town of Aghtamar.[5]

The population of the whole dependent district of Van and Vostan was predominantly Armenian, but at least in the hinterland of Vostan some Kurds were intermixed with them.[6]

B. Çatak (Armn. "Šatak'", Pers. "Shatāq"). The district consists of a single valley, that of the Çatak Çay, in its southern half and two tributary valleys, those of the Sortkin Çay (flowing from the north) and the Norduz Çay (flowing from the north-east). The Sortkin Çay valley communicates with the lower Hoşap Su valley. At the south end egress is only feasible via an impressive gorge, whose mouth was commanded by the castle of Ziril.[a] But the castle from which the whole district was administered was that at the town of Çatak itself.[7]

3. Tribal and ethnic base; economic coherence

3.1. Populations and their whereabouts

In the case of the Hakkari principality the question of the whereabouts of different

[a] Ziril in use in the late Middle Ages: Clph.XV.I.604, p.534 (S.1442.2, p.198).

populations becomes highly important. In the first place, the Armenians and Nestorians, the societies of the two different ethnic groups which formed the principality's base population, were differently organised and -- though we have little direct evidence -- must have stood in a very different relationship to the principality. The Armenians of the Van plain, of Ṙštunik' and of Šatak were a tax-paying, subject people. At least in Ṙstunik' and in Šatak, monasteries were thickly spread among them. They were a partly urban population; otherwise they were mainly sedentary cultivators.

The Nestorians, on the other hand, were tribally organised. In the Ottoman period five of their tribes paid taxes, not directly but via the Nestorian patriarch, and lived in a state of near independence. As usual we are short of direct evidence pertaining to the late Middle Ages, but a similar situation may have obtained. In other words the Nestorian districts as a whole acknowledged the overlordship of the Hakkari princes, but in practice several of the tribes, residing in the inaccessible country which later became known as that of the five *ashiret* districts, were free within their own territory.[8] As compared with the 19th century the Nestorians probably inhabited a greater proportion of the land constituting the principality's southern half; and the government that they dealt with did not possess the modern resources available to the Ottoman government of the mid-19th to the early 20th century.

The Nestorians, although living in villages during the winter, were much more dependent on transhumance than the Armenians of the coastal plains. This was the effect partly of the steep and confined valleys where most of their villages lay. The shortage of agricultural land meant they relied more on sheep and goats. But in their valleys they were short of pastoral land too. Even for their sheep and goat products, already a larger component of their economy than in the Armenian case, they relied more than the

Armenians on transhumance. Quite apart from the mould of the terrain, the Nestorian villages lay at a lower height than those of the Armenians: in fact the burning summer temperatures of the valleys approach the heat of the northern plains of Iraq. As regards the influence of monasteries, there seem to have been many fewer, although such as did exist certainly exerted influence in their immediate localities.

Secondly, the Nestorians and Armenians were geographically divided from one another, except in Albāq. So given the differences between their respective relationships to the Hakkari princes, questions of Kurdish tribal base, economic dependence and so on have to be considered not just in respect to geography but also in respect to base population. Often such questions have to be formulated for each half of the principality before they can be answered for the principality as a whole.

The whereabouts of the Nestorian population. If we can work out the districts inhabited almost exclusively, and those inhabited partly, by Nestorian tribes, this gives us, by subtraction, those parts of the principality's southern half in which Kurdish tribes could have been living. In the Armenian half of the principality the same point does not apply. No evidence exists for the concentration of Kurds in particular pockets of that half of the territory. On the other hand some evidence does exist that Kurds were settled in that half of the territory at least to some extent.[a] Moreover some tribes, or sections of them, were probably moving back and forth among Armenian population.

The method of fixing the Nestorian-inhabited areas will be to argue from the positions of the Nestorian tribes in the 19th century. Clearly the method has its faults, but at any rate it is not likely to result in an overestimate of the quantity of territory inhabited

[a] Merchant in Persia 161: see n.6 to p.149 above.

by Nestorian, as opposed to Kurdish, tribes. An underestimate is much more likely. *A priori* the Nestorian population, and the districts inhabited by its tribes, are likely to have diminished as a proportion of the total. Before the arrival of Kurds in significant numbers (here perhaps in the 8th and 9th centuries A.D., but this is not the place to discuss the date of that event) the territory was simply inhabited by Syrians. The region was part of the whole band of Syrian-inhabited territory stretching from Syria and Iraq to west Azerbayjan.

It used to be thought that the Nestorians only came to the area after the Mongol invasions and that of Timur; or alternatively that the area only became a predominantly Nestorian one in that period. But that opinion, which was rashly formed, on the basis of a very sketchy knowledge of late medieval Islamic history, by one of the first British missionaries to visit the region, has been shown to have no substance.[a] Even more fundamental as a mistake than the notion of a flight from northern Iraq to escape the Mongols or Timur is the notion that the Hakkari district is so remote, impenetrable, precipitous and infertile that a people would only take up residence there in order to escape from northern Iraq. Even in the absence of foreign invasions remoteness and height had great advantages.

Among the five independent tribes of the 19th century, which inhabited the so-called *ashiret* districts, that of Tyari (Syr. "Tyārī") occupied the Zab valley more or less from the beginning of the southward-flowing (second) leg to a point not far from the river's emergence into the foothill region. The villages lay in the tributary valleys as well as in the main valley. The next district southwards on the Zab was one of the "raya" or

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[a] Fiey, "Hakkari Turc"; the initiator of the mistake is Badger, *Nestorians* I.257, quoted by Fiey, p.444.

subject districts, that of Chal (Syr. "Tšal"). The district of Tkhuma (Syr. "Thūma") lay on the middle course of the only long eastern tributary in this sector of the Zab's course. Jilu and Baz (Syr. "Jīlū" and "Baz") are generally mentioned together, partly because the Baz tribe's territory was so insignificant and partly because writers have not known where that territory began and ended. Jilu and Baz together occupied the Medi Dere, a deep and wide valley running south-eastwards against the south side of the Cilo Dağ peaks. Baz lay at the lower end of the valley; Jilu extended into part of the Oramar valley. The last *ashiret* district is that of Dez or Diz. This was the Diz valley, which comes northwards out of the Cilo Dağ and curves before joining the Zab upstream of Julamerk/Hakkari. The *ashiret* districts, therefore, lay in a chain along some of the steepest, most enclosed and most impenetrable land of the region.[a]

The *raya* districts were as follows. Walto as a district lay south of the Zab opposite Dize, and adjacent to the upper end of Tyari: for ecclesiastical purposes it was counted with Tyari. Tal was a tributary valley of the Zab, immediately east of Walto. It was adjacent to Tyari towards the south-west and to Jilu on the south-east. Chal (Syr. "Tšal") was a small district immediately downstream from Tyari, but mainly on the east bank. The town, later large village, of Chal/Tšal lay within it. Further east and probably contiguous with Chal lay Rekan. This was on the southern boundaries of Nestorian territory, and was contiguous with Tkhuma on the north-west side, but may not have touched Jilu to the north-east.

To the north of the Zab was an almost continuous band of Nestorian *raya* districts. That of Lewin was the valley of the Levin Su. At the head of the Julamerk valley

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[a] The details are in Appendix III, where villages known to be in given districts are tabulated, and on the maps.

(tributary of the Zab) was Khananes, centred on the village of the same name. Next, a tributary valley with several feeders, all amounting to a wide, high-sided basin beneath Kara Dağ and neighbouring summits. The basin is accounted for by the districts of Upper and Lower Berwar, also known by the alternative names of Berwar d'Kudshane (Syr. "Berwar d'Qudšanes") and Berwar Sevine ("Berwar Sevine"). In the former of these lay the village of Kochanes ("Qudšanes", mod. Turk. "Koçanes"), seat of the patriarch from the mid-17th century onwards. Across the Zab from this basin lay Berwar d'Shwa'uta (Syr. "Berwar d'Šwa'uta") and the small district of the Bilijnaye ("Bilijnāye").[a]

There were many Nestorian villages in the Albāq district. These were mostly in the valley through which the Zab leaves the Başkale plain, and, towards the south, in the hills forming the west slope of the basin. Further north the population was predominantly Armenian, but some Kurds were permanently resident. It is worth mentioning the Nestorian villages of the uppermost slopes of the Norduz basin, of which the best known is Marwanen. These communicated in the first instance with the Lewin/Levin Su valley.

So far a picture has been drawn of almost continuous Nestorian occupation, and very little space left for Kurds. Before drawing exact conclusions we must deal with the district of Gevar (Syr. "Gawar" etc.), which stands very much by itself in respect of topography and economy, and to a certain extent in terms of Nestorian ecclesiastical administration. In the 19th century the majority of its villages were Nestorian (*raya*) and the remainder Kurdish, though the majority was by no means overwhelming. To the east, the high and open basin of the Şehsemzin Deresi (flowing into the Gevar plain) and the Bajirge Deresi (which flows towards L.Urmia) was also a Nestorian area, part of the diocese of Gawar.

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[a] Fiey, "Hakkari Turc" 446 wrongly places both of these.

Whereabouts of the Kurds. The conclusion is that the 19th-century extent and concentration of the Nestorian population, which is likely to have been exceeded by that of the late Middle Ages, allows very little room for Kurdish tribes. The remainder is as follows: a small valley between Lewin and the Julamerk side-valley, and the middle and lower parts, containing the town of Julamerk, of that valley itself. This we shall argue was the district of the "Julamerkī" tribe known in the mid-14th century: of course in reality the Julamerkī was the ruling tribe of the principality. Secondly, some villages of the Gevar district. A tribe called Gawār, occupying a district of the same name, is also known in the mid-14th century; so in this case the 14th-century and the 19th-century evidence fit one another perfectly. Gevar, or more accurately certain pockets of it, was the second Kurdish enclave in the southern part of the principality.

Apart from these two enclaves the survey of Nestorian geography does not leave any other specific pocket of land where Kurds could have lived, but Kurdish tribes, or sections of tribes, were living among the Nestorians, even among the "ashirets", in the 19th century. This is a useful picture to bear in mind, though the number of Kurds living among the Nestorians is likely to have been considerably smaller in the late Middle Ages.

Of the tribes or sections of tribes found in the 19th century in what had been the principality's southern half, the largest and most interesting is the Pinyanishi. It is also known in the 16th century, when it played a critical part in leadership disputes, and in that and the following century seems to have been a hereditary *ḥükūmet* with just the same status, though with little permanent land and of much smaller size, as Bitlis and Hakkari.[a]

[a] Dankoff, *Bitlis* 15; for comment, p.62 above. On the location of their small pocket of land, p.175 below.

In the early 20th century it was a tribe of 1,200 families with an interesting offshoot, the "Little Pinyanishi", of a further 500 families.[a] The latter would no doubt have been included within the Pinyanishi in the 16th century, and assuming that the tribe existed in that period, in the late Middle Ages too. As the tribe still exists, it seems to have uncommon staying-power, and perhaps did exist in the late Middle Ages. In the 19th century it resided partly to the south of Tkhuma, which probably means south of and outside Nestorian territory altogether (i.e. not in Chal), and partly in Gevar.[b] However we know from Evliya that in the 16th and 17th centuries the Pinyanishi lived in the hills east of the present Persian frontier, either east of Gevar or east of the Shamsdinan district.[c] Consequently the tribe lived outside the Hakkari territory and in the late Middle Ages. But its move from one district to another points to the shifting character of the tribes in the area.

Elsewhere we find in the 19th century a sprinkling of what are reported as tribes but which were probably tribal sections. In Gevar, beside the Pinyanishi, resided the Dirini, who also inhabited the wide basin adjoining Gevar to the north-east: the latter descends towards Gevar from the Persian border.[d] A Nestorian *raya* tribe of the same name also resided in the Şehsemzin basin.[e] From a different source we hear of the

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[a] Sykes, "Tribes" 73.

[b] Rhea, "Hakkari district" [JAOS 10 (1880)], 118.

[c] Sect.II.4 below.

[d] Rhea, "Hakkari district" [JAOS 10 (1880)], 119. On the district of the Dirini, Fiey, "Hakkari Turc" 446.

[e] Fiey, ibid.. Of course Fiey's "Derrenāye" are Nestorians; both the Nestorian group and the Kurdish tribe had the same name, because the name is derived from a place.

presence in Gevar of a section of the Shakākī tribe called, precisely, the Gavar.[a] Another tribe, or tribal section, the Dastigani, appears to have lived partly in northern Iraq and partly in the Oramar valley.[9] The Bilijani resided between Gevar and Julamerk, just in the same place as the Nestorian tribe of the same name.[b] In the Zab valley just south of Albāq lived the Sorani,[c] which may have shared a name with a Nestorian group known from the 10th/11th century A.D..[d] In Albāq itself were the "Albaghi", near Başkale,[e] the Mogor or Mukurri and the Shemseddinli, the latter two being sections of the Shakākī.[f] Finally in the Levin valley resided the Lewani.[g]

Several of these names are either derived from geographical names or else shared with Nestorian tribes; and only the name "Pinyanishi" has survived to the present.[h] These circumstances suggest that the names changed fast, and that they were not an important part of the identity of these tribal sections.[10] The reason is that that identity itself was rapidly changing, either through processes of break-up and re-assembly or through changes of tribal allegiance.[11]

From the evidence just discussed there emerges the following picture of the 19th-century Kurdish population of what had been the Hakkari principality. Apart from the

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[a] Blau, "Tribes" (1) [ZDMG 12], 592: "Gawar" or "Gewer" in German.

[b] Rhea, "Hakkari district" [JAOS 10 (1880)], 119. Sykes, *Tribes* 461, identifies them as a section of the Pinyanishi.

[c] Rhea 119.

[d] Appendix III, p.476.

[e] Rhea 119.

[f] Blau, "Tribes" (1) [ZDMG 12], 592.

[g] Rhea 119.

[h] Yalçın-Heckmann, *Tribe and Kinship* 98-101 gives several but not all of the modern names. Bilicani, p.100; Pinyanishi p.101.

Pinyanishi we have to talk of tribal sections rather than tribes, of changing identity and floating allegiance. In Gevar and in the Şehsemzin basin to its north-east were one or two tribal sections; another lay in the mountains north-west of Gevar, towards the Zab valley (Bilijani), and there were several others in Albāq and in the Zab valley just downstream therefrom. Another tribal section lived in the Levin valley.

As might be expected, these tribal sections resided in the flatter and more accessible parts of the Nestorian *raya* country; in other words the *ashiret* valleys and the less accessible parts of the *raya* country (those either side of the *ashirets* -- Walto, Tal, Chal -- and the two Berwar districts north of the Zab) were fairly free of Kurds, although we know a number of Kurds did live among the *ashirets*, some as subordinates of the *ashirets*.

Such a picture is helpful in deciding where the Kurds of the Hakkari principality's southern half were residing in the late Middle Ages, and what their tribal character might have been. In the earlier period the Nestorians are not likely to have been fewer in number and the *ashiret* districts unlikely to have contained more Kurds, than in the later period. So in very broad terms the picture may well have been the same. Some differences are known. In Gevar and the adjoining Şehsemzin basin we know of the presence of a whole tribe, not just a tribal section, in the mid-14th century.[a] Of course the mid-14th century position may have been temporary, too; that the tribe's name was "Gawār" points strongly to that conclusion. But if it was different from that of the 19th century, that suggests the late-14th and the 15th-century position may have been different from that of the 19th century too. In Julamerk and part of the Zab valley was a tribe called the Julamerkī, which similarly is not compatible with our picture. Below it is suggested that the Gawār

[a] 'Um., Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 320.

were a tribe of a transitory nature, whereas the Julamerkī were the ruling tribe of the whole principality. In Albāq there were probably fewer Kurds than in the 19th century, but there were probably some.

Overall, then, a tentative picture of the geographical position and character of the Kurdish population in the southern part of the principality can be offered, as follows. They were concentrated in the Gevar plain and in the first section of the Zab valley (which passes Julamerk) and its northern tributaries, and were mostly mixed with Nestorians. The latter were concentrated south of this section of the Zab valley and in its second, southward-flowing section. The picture is essentially one of small numbers, fragmentation, instability and dispersal among Nestorians.

3.2. Economic base and coherence

(a) The principality as a whole.

As a single whole the territory possessed a certain interdependence and economic rationale, ignoring any division into parts which possessed greater coherence by themselves. First of all there were within the territory several plains: those of Gevar inland, and the two Ṙštunik' plains and that of Van on the coast. These are all broad and fertile, and must together have produced enough grain to feed most of the principality's population. Secondly, admirable pastureland exists almost everywhere else. Short-range transhumance was almost certainly practised by the Nestorian population of the late Middle Ages, as in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and must also have taken place between the various plains and the immediately surrounding hills. Medium-range transhumance could

have been practised between the plains of the Lake Van shore and the higher mountains of the Taurus watershed such as Artos Dağ.

As with the Bitlis principality, the Hakkari principality also permanently possessed one thriving city, that of Vostan, and for most of the period between the mid-14th century and the early 16th century possessed another, that of Van. The history of the principality seems to show that Vostan was regarded as an essential possession, and Van was a highly prized one, though several times disputed with other powers.

But the above account, although satisfactory in a statistical sense as regards the economic balance of the principality as a whole, is unconvincing as regards its economic cohesion. In the latter respect it is more valid to examine the principality in two halves. We shall show that each half by itself can be considered a cohesive organism, whereas the principality as a whole was not a cohesive organism. For an account of economic balance it is better to look first at the two halves separately, then at the balance between the two.

(b) Each half separately

A. Northern half. If we take the northern half of the Hakkari principality and add the whole of the Mahmudi principality of Hoşap, we get something which shows a fairly close correspondence to the Arcruni principality, later kingdom, of Vaspurakan (the latter lasted from the 8th to the 11th century A.D.). The Mahmudi principality occupied the upper Hoşap Su valley, the adjacent Norduz Çay basin, all the country stretching northwards from there to the Erçek valley, and possibly the Kara Su valley. This, on the map, fills the hollow within the crescent of the Hakkari principality and stretches further north.

The principality of Vaspurakan was somewhat more extensive, especially towards the north-east. It included, of course, the part of the Zab valley dependent on Julamerk,

known in Armenian as Little Albak, and Great Albak, later known simply as Albak or Albāq. To the north it stretched to Garni (the Çaldıran plain) and to the neighbouring district of Artaz (whose capital was Maku). To the east it encompassed the Kotur valley (Armn. "Anjaxijor"), the Çingi Dere ("Torṙnavan") and the upper river system of the Ak Çay (sometimes "Kızıl Çay" -- Armn. name "Č'uašṙot"). These three easterly districts are all now in Iran.[a]

So provided not too close a correspondence is required, there is considerable overlap between the north half of the Hakkari principality and the Mahmudi principality, taken together, on the one hand, and the Arcruni principality on the other. The overlap is unlikely to be a coincidence, and the most probable explanation, to be developed below, is one resting on some form of economic cohesion, including patterns of transhumance and tribal tenure of pastureland. A further coincidence helps to point in this direction. The Vaspurakan principality was divided in A.D. 903 or 904 between two Arcruni brothers, Gagik (builder of Aghtamar) and Gurgen. Gurgen held an area in the south-east and centre. This, admittedly, embraced Great Albak, Little Albak and probably Gevar to the south; but it extended northwards to the upper Hoşap valley, then to the Erçek valley. The upper reaches of the Erçek valley were in fact divided between Gurgen and Gagik. As that northern half (of the Erçek valley's upper reaches) is centred on the Saray plain, the correspondence between Mahmudi territory and Gurgen's share is not exact even in this sector.[b]

However Gagik held Ṙštunik' (Aghtamar and Vostan) and the Van plain or Tosp, and his territory stopped somewhere between Van and Amik until he captured the latter

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[a] Discussed Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.322.

[b] Arcuni (ed. Patk.) 251-2

fortress. He also held the Çatak valley, at least after capturing Ziril Kale. To the north and east he possessed Gaṙni (the Çaldıran plain), Artaz (capital Maku) and the three eastern valleys (Kotur valley, Çingi Dere and and upper Ak Çay river system), not forgetting the Saray plain. Gagik's territory therefore neatly circumscribes Gurgen's to west, north and east. The latter, leaving aside Great and Little Alḃak, corresponds with remarkable exactitude to the Mahmudi principality. The principles of cohesion which held the latter together appear to have been two: first, a balance between cornland (mainly the upper Hoşap Su valley) and pastureland; and second, medium-range transhumance between the upper Hoşap Su valley on the one hand and the Erçek valley, including Saray, and perhaps the mouth of the Kara Su valley (further north) on the other.[a]

Before attempting a more general explanation of economic cohesion in the northern half of the Hakkari principality, it is worth looking further back in time at the "province" of Vaspurakan as delineated in the *Ašxarhac'oyc'*, conveniently known as the Armenian Geography. This document, the date of which is now accepted as the early 7th century,[b] divides Armenia into "provinces" (*ašxarh*). The latter are not necessarily entities with political functions at all -- some had, some did not. Indeed the term "nahang" has no inherent political or administrative implication, but instead is pressed into service, in the document and no doubt to some extent in the accepted political vocabulary of the period, as a convenient technical term for the document's higher-level groups of smaller districts. The latter, for which the document's term is "gawaṙ", are the essential political units of the Classical and Late Classical periods in Armenia; most *gawaṙ*s were the sole possession of an individual princely family.

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[a] Sections III.1, 4 below.

[b] Hewsen, "Ašxarhac'oyc'".

The Vaspurakan of the *Ašxarhac'oyc'* is not a province with a recognisable political function. Moreover this circumstance appears not to be due to definition by subtraction. In other words it is not the case that the Vaspurakan of the *Geography* was defined simply as everything left over after neighbouring provinces, which genuinely did cohere according to political function, had been delineated. "Vaspurakan" must have meant something at the time as a geographical term, which is why the *Geography* chooses it as the name for a large group of districts. At the margin the *Geography* shifts and re-disposes districts between one province and another according to current political circumstances and according to convenience in placing all Armenia's districts in one province or another. But some principle must unite the whole territory, taken as a rough geographical area, and this principle is worth enquiring into.

To the south the Vaspurakan of the *Ašxarhac'oyc'* did not include Little Albak (part of the Zab valley) or Gevar, although it did embrace Great Albak. To the north it extended further than the Arcrunis' Vaspurakan. Arberan or Arberani, the Muradiye plain, belonged to it, but was denied to the Arcruni by the 'Uthmanid emirate of Berkri/Muradiye. Beyond Artaz (capital Maku) and Č'uašřot (Ak Çay valley) it extended into the Aras valley, and embraced Naxčavan, Julfa (the district was then known as Golt'n) and Marand (further east). Otherwise we are dealing with the same territory as Arcruni Vaspurakan.

By the shore of the lake and nearby, Late Classical Vaspurakan consisted in a series of plains with productive cornland and the possibility of short-range transhumance to bordering hills and mountains. Certainly towards the south the string of plains coheres for a number of reasons, notably that the plains communicate easily, and Van and Vostan appear to have been mutually dependent settlements. Further inland is the enclave of what

later became the Mahmudi principality, whose cohesion has partly been explained in terms of medium-range transhumance.

It is the districts further east and north-east which provide clues to the coherence of Late Classical Vaspurakan and to that of the other entities under consideration. Either side of the heights followed by the present Turco-Iranian political border we find, in the mid-19th century, large Kurdish tribes which either commute between the lower-lying territory in modern Iran and higher land now in Turkey, or else straddle the border, probably using the border heights as summer pastures, though our source (Blau) does not mention the point. These tribes' habitats and transhumance paths cannot be expected fully to explain the borders of Vaspurakan, at whichever period it is considered. Nevertheless the 19th-century tribes give an indication of the type of occupation and transhumance activity that may have obtained in the late Middle Ages.

First of all the Jelali tribe commuted over the border heights in the sector south of Mt. Ararat. It wintered, partly in villages, around Ak Göl, north of Maku, and therefore in what had been Artaz. It summered in the plains between Diyadin, Balık Göl and Mt. Ararat.[a] Second, the Melanli or Mela tribe wintered in the upper reaches of the Ak Çay river system (the former Č'uašřot) and summered in the mountains around Kotur.[b] Third, the Shakākī tribe lived either side of the border immediately south of the Melanli. Various of its *qabīle*s (sections) resided in Albāq, Gevar and immediately adjacent districts of Iran (Tergavar, Mergavar) as well as further towards L.Urmia.[c] The source, Blau, does not indicate any transhumance on the part of the Shakaki, but all the areas he mentions as

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[a] Blau, *Tribes* [1][ZDMG 12], 584-9, esp. 586-7.

[b] Blau, *Tribes* [1], 589-91.

[c] Blau, "Tribes" (1), 592-3.

inhabited by them are flat and predominantly agricultural, so the border heights themselves were probably used for summer pasture.

Of course the areas of residence and the summer and winter pastures of given Kurdish tribes in the 19th century need not necessarily mirror the activities and locations of Kurdish tribes in the late Middle Ages, but they probably indicate the forces which bound 7th-century Vaspurakan together. The 19th-century evidence explains very well how the eastern and north-eastern sections of Vaspurakan could form a coherent social entity. But it also hints at further binding links further west and south-west: transhumance could have taken place, for example, between the Erçek valley and the mountains around Kotur. The border heights functioned as a summer pasture zone: winter pasture for some would have been in valleys further west, whether the Garni plain (plain of Çaldıran), the Erçek valley or parts of the Hoşap valley. There is no reason why the north-south transhumance paths which helped the Mahmudi principality to cohere should not have overlapped with such links. The main point is that Late Classical Vaspurakan, leaving aside the coastal plains, appears to have been held together, in part, by a series of adjacent or overlapping transhumance paths and areas of tribal residence. One difference with the late Middle Ages was that the tribes in question were Armenian rather than Kurdish.

Such patterns of 19th-century Kurdish residence and transhumance will also help to explain how Gevar and Little Alʙak (Julamerk) could be part of the same principality as Alʙak. Such were the links which tied Gevar and Little Alʙak to the bulk of 7th-century Vaspurakan; with such ties in existence, Arcruni Vaspurakan could be created. The 19th-century patterns of Kurdish residence and transhumance, explaining as they do a link between Albāq/Great Alʙak and Gevar and Julamerk, will also help to explain, what is in any case much easier to understand, how these districts could belong to the same half

of the same late medieval principality. In the late Middle Ages the point of view shifts: that is to say that the south half of the Hakkari principality was centred outside 7th-century Vaspurakan, and Albāq is the only part of 7th-century Vaspurakan to be included within that southern half.

B. The southern half. Here the relevant "province" of the *Ašxarhac'oyc'* is Korčayk' (also spelt "Korčēk'"). This stretched in a band running east-west between the heights of the Taurus chain to the north and the lowlands overlooking the Mesopotamian plain. The westernmost district of Korčayk' was the Bohtan area, the angle between the Bohtan Su to the north and the Tigris to the west: towards its southern limit the Bohtan included Judi Dagh/Cudi Dağ. The easternmost districts were Little Ałbak and those of the Nestorian *ashiret* country from Tkhuma to Jilu. Gevar was not included, and appears not to have been within the Armenia of the *Ašxarhac'oyc'*. Later it became part of Arcruni Vaspurakan.[a]

Korčayk', like the Vaspurakan of the *Ašxarhac'oyc'*, was not defined by political coherence. Nor was it merely a dustbin province, into which unclassifiable districts could be thrown (whether by geographers or by political authorities). It held together by virtue of being the *zawazān* (Arab.) or *zozān* (Kurd.) for the plains of northern Iraq and for the intermediate foothill areas. The parts of Korčayk' which fit this principle worst are precisely the Nestorian *ashiret* districts, from Tkhuma to Jilu. Nevertheless there is evidence that these districts were used as summer pasture by tribes coming from the south; and in a racial sense they were also linked with the foothills and the plain. The essential links of Korčayk' as a whole (rather than the eastern end taken by itself) were with the

[a] This account of the boundaries of Korčayk' is fully argued in Appendix III, pp.465-81.

south, not the north.

7th-century Korčayk' was not by and large Armenian-populated, though its districts belonged to the Armenian nobility and that of Korduk' (the Bohtan district) features prominently in Late Classical Armenian history. The population of 7th-century Korčayk' was Syrian, and belonged to the Church of the East (i.e. the Nestorian church). There is no evidence that the population was Kurdish, that "Korčayk'" refers to Kurds, or even that "Korčayk'" was meant as an umbrella term for the whole population. It is much more likely to be a name transferred from another entity, perhaps one of the tribes on its territory, to do duty as the province name. In the same manner "Deutschland" and "Germany" both derive from the names of individual tribes, each just a small part of the total German population.[a]

Analysis of the economic base of the Hakkari principality's southern half is relatively simple. The Nestorian *ashiret* country and adjacent *raya* areas in the Zab valley were a relatively self-sufficient block, relying mainly on pastoralism and particularly on short-term transhumance. It was more or less homogeneous as regards race, though some Kurds were mixed with the Nestorians. The latter had few natural economic or other links with Armenian areas further north. Gevar was linked both racially and economically with the *ashiret* country further west, providing cereal crops for a mainly pastoral and mountainous area. We have already seen how Albāq could be linked with Gevar and the Zab valley (Julamerk). Gevar and Albāq, moreover, were the two districts where Kurds were concentrated (without, of course, being predominant in those areas) in the 19th century. We also saw above how a single Kurdish tribe could inhabit both Albāq and Gevar. But the link between the centre of gravity of the principality's southern half, the

[a] Again Appendix III, pp.465-81, argues in full this account of the population etc. of Korčayk'.

Nestorian *ashiret* country and the Zab valley, and Albāq, was one which could only be created at the margin. In other words that centre of gravity did not naturally cohere with areas further north than Albāq.

C. The two halves together. Summary. The discussion has taken each half of the principality separately and pointed to the economic coherence of each half by itself. The coastal plains and the two cities of Van and Vostan form a mainly agricultural complex with an Armenian population. The southern half comprises a balance of land uses: short-range transhumance in the Zab valley and *ashiret* districts combined with agriculture in the two plains (Albāq and Gevar). The discussion showed that it was more useful to see the principality as two halves, each functioning well by itself, but not strongly linked to one another.

However the discussion has also shown that miscellaneous links did exist. Historically there was a precedent for the combination in one principality of Van and Vostan on the one hand and Julamerk and Gevar on the other. Moreover the examination of the economic rationale of two of the "provinces" of Late Classical Armenia, Vaspurakan and Korčayk', suggested that politically Albāq had in the past been linked to the coastal districts. The mainly urban and agricultural coastal districts balanced the inland half, which emphasised pastoralism. Thus the principality, although basically consisting of two physically separated halves, each with a coherent economy, had in certain minor ways more economic unity than the map would immediately suggest.

3.3. Tribal base and institutions

Tribal base and relations between prince and tribal elements. Section 3.1 created a picture

of the whereabouts and composition of the Kurdish element of the principality which suggested that, relative to other parts of the Lake Van area, the Kurds were an unusually small proportion of the population; that they were confined to certain areas, particularly in the southern half; and that they were somewhat fragmented and shifting in respect of tribal structure.

The princes did not rule by the medium of a large, united tribal base as did the Ruzagi princes of Bitlis. Indeed we have no information concerning the princes' strictly tribal relationship with the rest of the Kurdish population, except one reference. This is the reference of al-'Umari, pertaining to the 1330's or 1340's A.D., to the Julamerkī tribe and that of Gawar. The Julamerkī of al-'Umari are the branch of the Hakkari which moved from the district of Amadiya in the 1260's or perhaps 1280's.[a] Since this was, after all, the Hakkari principality, it is reasonable to assume that in the 1330's and 1340's they were the dominant tribe, and loyal to the prince. It is also reasonable to assume that in later periods the prince could count on the loyalty of a tribe or tribal section. This would have been descended from the Julamerkī of al-'Umari. Still, we do not hear of such a tribe or tribal section living near Julamerk after al-'Umari.

In the 19th century, when an accurate picture is possible, the Gevar district presents a picture of tribal division and febrility, and it seems unlikely that the Gawar tribe of al-'Umari lasted for more than a few decades. Excepting the likelihood of a single dominant tribe or tribal section, that of the prince, everything known about the principality's subsequent history suggests nothing so simple or united as a single, enduring tribe with which the prince could act in unison and with which simple relations of subordination or alliance could be formed. The only exception is the Pinyanishi tribe; but

[a] Sect. II.5.(i) below.

it seems clear that the latter were not even counted among the Hakkari princes' subjects.

The first opportunity to examine the princes' methods in ruling and attempting to unite the tribes occurs in the 16th century. In that period members of the ruling family itself several times fought one another for the position of prince. They were each supported by one or more tribes. The Pinyanishi tribe intervened, taking one side or another. If this is at all indicative of the situation in the late Middle Ages, then the following account of the princes' methods of dealing with the tribes in the late Middle Ages may have some validity. He ruled through a single loyal tribe, tribal section or, perhaps, lineage. He struggled to create or maintain a rough-and-ready dominance, weaving the other sections and tribes together and exploiting local disputes. On the other hand the princely family itself was unusually prone to dissensions which could be created or exploited by the different tribes.

It is unlikely that the Hakkari princes had numerous and effective forces at their disposal, either for offence outside the principality or even for the defence of the principality. The various groups within the principality (tribes, sections etc.) were impossible to unite in a single force. Evliya, in the mid-17th century, puts the total of men available to the prince at 47,000.[a] But in the expedition against Abdal Khan of Bitlis he marched with only 12,000 soldiers.[b] This may well cover the parts of the medieval principality still remaining (Vostan, Çatak and some of the Nestorian districts, as well as Julamerk).[c] However in defence the princes had one strength which generally safeguarded

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[a] Ev.IV.177.

[b] Ev.IV.220 (D.229).

[c] Below, sect.5.(vi).

them and indeed deterred most outside powers from even making the attempt at invasion or conquest of the whole principality. This was the steep terrain and isolated position of the inland districts and in particular the difficulty of reaching the capital, Julamerk.

Institutions. The evidence justifies only a discussion of the apanages and other governorships into which the principality seems to have been divided. The status of one at least is clear. Vostan was an apanage of the prince's family. The ruler of Vostan seems to have been the most important person in the principality after the prince himself. Vostan was held by a close relative of the Hakkari prince such as a brother or uncle. The Hakkari prince probably had the power to nominate successors and even to demote existing holders of this position. But in practice an incoming Hakkari prince would not generally have dismissed an existing ruler of Vostan, nor would he have upset an existing convention as to choice of successor (eldest brother, eldest uncle etc.).

Armenian colophons written in Ṙštunik' sometimes mention the ruler of Vostan and the Hakkari prince jointly as overlords; some others mention only the ruler of Vostan.[a] This comes about not just because of Vostan's importance, but probably also because because of the high degree of autonomy which Vostan in practice possessed. Autonomy does not entail disagreement or rebellion; except one case,[b] there is no record of either. The importance and relative autonomy of Vostan fully reflect the fertility of Ṙštunik' and its isolation from the interior half of the principality.

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[a] Clph.XV.I.185, p.177 (S.1415.1, p.137); 187, p.177 (S.1415.2, p.137); 217, p.204 (S.1417.5, pp.141-2); 238a, p.220 (S.1418, p.142); 252, p.231 (S.1419.4, p.144); 269a, p.243 (S.1420.4, p.145); 291d, p.265 (S.1421.10. p.149). On the names for Muhammad, ruler of Vostan, n.19 below.

[b] Sect.II.5.(iii) below.

Despite the interdependence of the two cities, the apanage of Vostan did not extend to Van. When Van was in Hakkari hands, the prince himself seems often to have acted as its governor, no doubt taking part of the district's produce. Otherwise he appointed a relative.

To the west, the territory within the apanage of Vostan stretched, in normal times, as far as the western boundary of the whole principality in the Kaputkogh peninsula. However in the division of the principality into seven apanages or governorships (see below) during the short Safavid overlordship, a governorship separate from Vostan is known which covered Gavash, a district west of Vostan. This included the island of Aghtamar.

When the Hakkari dynasty was temporarily expelled by the Ak Koyunlu, the Dunbeli tribe took "the castle of Bāy and part of the principality". The location of Bāy has been dealt with above. The district immediately attached to it was that of Humaru, the north-west sector of the Shamsdinan district.[a] It is impossible to say whether the whole apanage dependent on Bāy was wider. (For example, it may well have included Gevar, of whose administration we otherwise have no knowledge.) The apanage may or may not have been the same as the part of the principality taken by the Dunbeli.

The only other clue providing information about institutions within the principality is its division between his seven sons, early in the Safavid overlordship, by Zahid. Later, in 1507, when Zahid has repudiated Shah Ismail's overlordship, the anonymous Merchant in Persia found Zahid at Van "very proud [from possessing] this fine fortress with many other castles in these mountains ...": he had many sons, who "govern the castles round".[b]

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[a] References and argument, sect.II.2.2 and esp. n.2.

[b] Merchant in Persia 161.

Does this reflect the exhaustive division of the principality, even in normal times, into a number of apanages, all to be held by members of the prince's family ? The *Sherefname* does not introduce the event as a normal one, in fact such divisions occur rarely on its pages. That Zahid felt proud (meaning perhaps strong and secure) of possessing so many fortresses, all governed by his sons, suggests that the motive for the division was to secure the principality at a time of crisis: he puts the whole principality in the hands of his many sons, who are too many to unite against him; moreover any enemy who captures one of the castles, with its apanage, will have to labour over the piecemeal capture of the rest. The estate of Gavash, for example, which was one of the seven, may have been the temporary creation of the moment.

Nevertheless it is likely that estates other than Vostan and Bāy existed which provided income for members of the ruling family; and in that case the prince could re-dispose them between his relatives. In practice, of course, the prince is unlikely to have been free of constraints when it came to depriving members of his family of particular estates. In the Zahid episode, when the principality was divided between his sons, the prince's action hints at the possibility of his behaving somewhat in the manner of the Bābān princes in north-eastern Iraq. The latter reshuffled estates between members of the ruling family in order to maintain their own pre-eminence within the family. That is to say it was possible, on occasion, for the Hakkari prince to redistribute estates (though not necessarily a group of estates which together accounted for the whole principality) among various members of his family, in order to prevent any of those members building up a power base or losing his dependence on the prince.

4. Relations with other local powers

Other tribes further east. Al-'Umari, writing of the 1330's or 1340's, states that the Julamerkīs, then the dominant tribe of the Hakkari principality, were both related and allied to the Zerzārīs and the Margavar.[a] Elsewhere he writes that the Zerzārīs lived in Rustāq and the city of Malāzkird (sic), and paid no tribute to anyone.[b]

Mergavar is a district just inside modern Iran and east of the Shamsdinan district. In the mid-19th century a section of the Shakākī tribe was named Mergewār after the district. This would indicate that al-'Umari's Margavar are a short-lived tribe or else a tribal section with shifting tribal allegiance. Still, al-'Umari's information indicates the type of relationship which the Hakkari princes could have enjoyed with tribes or tribal sections on the Persian side of the heights travelled by the present international boundary.

Rustāq was a district which now forms the south-eastern tip of Turkey.[c] It was a Nestorian bishopric in the late 13th century.[d] It was part of the wider district of Shamsdinan. Later it became the 19th-century Ottoman *nahiye* of Zerzān:[e] the name indicates the survival for some time of at least a section of the Zerzārīs. "The city of Malāzkird" in al-'Umari is likely to be a mistake for a town by another name, perhaps Dazgīr; at any rate "the city of Malāzkīrd" seems effectively to denote the upper drainage basin of the Barāndūz, the district immediately east of Rustāq and separated from it by

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[a] 'Um' Mas.Abs, tr. Q., 320: "Merkewān" in text.

[b] Ibid. 316.

[c] Fiey, *Adarb. Chret.* 406.

[d] Fiey, *Adarb. Chret.* 405. The seat of the bishop was Nehri.

[e] Nikitine, "Shamdinan" (EI), 303.1; Appendix III.

an unusually steep and tall sector of the border range. This was the Nestorian-populated district of Šapat, a bishopric which was regularly joined to that of Rustāq.[12]

The particular relationship between the Margavar, the Zerzārīs and the Julamerkīs described by al-'Umari is not likely to have been a constant feature of the associations with tribes or tribal sections enjoyed by the Hakkari principality on its eastern border. Nevertheless it indicates the type of relationship which could have extended the influence of the Hakkari principality beyond its own boundaries. Nothing is said about subordination to the Julamerkīs, indeed al-'Umari explicitly denies that the Zerzārīs paid tribute to anyone.

The Pinyanishi. In sect.5.(vi) below it will be seen that in 16th century the Pinyanishi are known to have intervened twice in struggles for control over the principality. Evliya's account of his visit to their principal castle and others within their territory show that the territory lay somewhere within the districts of Tergavar and Mergavar.[13] These are respectively east of Gevar and the Şehsemzin Deresi basin and east of the Shamsdinan district. The Pinyanishi's territory therefore lay outside that of the Hakkari principality, and the tribe was associated with it in much the same way as the Margavār and Zerzārīs. Indeed it is probable that elements of the Margavār were comprised within the Pinyanishi, and, further, that the Pinyanishi were the 16th-century equivalent of the Margavār. The existence of some equivalent in the Kara Koyunlu period can be presumed, and it probably matters little whether that equivalent tribe was called the Pinyanishi or not.

The Hoşap principality. The two known incidents involving the two principalities are cases of conflict over Albāq, the obvious bone of contention. Under the Ak Koyunlu Albāq was

gained from Hakkari by the prince of Hoşap, and only regained by Hakkari after help from Bitlis.[a] Hoşap was able to gain Albāq once more under Shah Tahmasp.[b] It is difficult to draw general conclusions about relations between the two; there was always potential for conflict; probably relations were generally somewhat cold.

Bitlis. This has been dealt with above (sect.I.4.2). Briefly, the conclusions were the following. First, at the margin the two great principalities of the Van region often fought each other over territory, but only in that sector of the Hakkari principality's boundary, along the west side of Ṙštunik', where the two were contiguous. Second, there was a tendency on the part of the two principalities to submit to different outside powers merely in order to do the other a disfavour. Thirdly, there was a longstanding feud between the ruling family of Hakkari, or perhaps the tribe to which it belonged,[c] and the Ruzagi of Bitlis. Nevertheless there were times when one helped the other, which is characteristic of great powers in equilibrium.

[a] Sh.I.301; sect. III.3 below.

[b] Sh.I.302; sect.III.3 below.

[c] Sect.3.2 above.

5. History of the principality

(i) Early history of the tribe

From the 10th to the early 13th century the Hakkari are known as a tribe inhabiting the district of Amadiya, a fortified hill-top town in the foothill district between the Taurus mountains and the Mesopotamian plain. The territory was small. Not far to the south was the little principality of 'Aqra (sometimes "'Aqr") and Shūsh. The district's western extent is probably marked by the Khabur or, more accurately, the watershed to its west.[14] Another tribal territory, that of the Zinārīs, probably lay to the east, in the Zab valley and therefore south-west of the Shamsdinan district.[a]

The whole of northern Iraq was administered from Mosul, which lay south and a little west of Amadiya. The Hakkari princes troubled successive rulers of Mosul, and expeditions were mounted against them.[15] The Hakkari appear finally to have relinquished Amadiya in 615/1218. The town was surrendered to 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī, descendant of the better-known atabeg and lord of 'Aqra and Shūsh. Zangī's brother 'Izz al-Dīn Mas'ūd (renamed "al-Qahīr", "The Conqueror"), lord of Mosul, had just died. Although Mas'ūd had named his son as successor, the atabeg Lu'lu' began to behave as ruler in his own right. Mas'ūd's brother Zangī secured the town of Amadiya as his first step in resisting Lu'lu'.[b]

However there is no reason to think that the Hakkari tribe moved from the district of Amadiya at this stage. On the contrary, a Kurdish garrison seems to have stayed at

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[a] 'Um., Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 320.

[b] All in Patton, *Lu'lu'* 11-18.

Amadiya.[a] There were still Kurds here in 657/1259, when Hulagu's troops decimated them in his Syrian campaign,[b] and in the mid-14th century A.D..[c]

(ii) The situation in the 740's/1340's and 750's/1350's

A picture can be constructed, mainly from the survey of al-'Umari, who seems to describe the 1340's, at any rate a period no later than 1349, the date of al-'Umari's death. We shall argue that the Hakkari principality known in the Kara Koyunlu period was substantially in place at this date. First we shall lay out the elements of the picture.

The situation in different areas, according to al-'Umari and the Vienna manuscript

A. Northern Iraq

1. The *district of Zīnār and Hakkar* (بلاد الزينار و الهكر).[d] The district, and the Zinaris, are mentioned here for the sake of the name Hakkar, whose relevance will become clear later. Al-'Umari implies that the district lay towards 'Aqra and Shūsh[e] and

[a] Patton, *Lu'lu'* 25. In 618/1221 the garrison transferred its allegiance from Zangī to Lu'lu'; but there is no sign that it was replaced by Lu'lu'.

[b] Rashid al-Din, ed.Q., 328; Minorsky, "Kurds" (EI), 455.2.

[c] See section (ii).

[d] 'Um., Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 320-21.

[e] عقر شوش, wrongly.

the district of Amadiya. The Zīnārīs were a tribe of 500 men who had for a long time been at war with the Māzinjānīs, although the two were now at peace. The Māzinjānīs were a tribe which lived well south-east of Amadiya near the Zab; this puts the Zīnārīs immediately south-east of Amadiya and of 'Aqra and Shūsh.[16]

2. The *Hakkari* tribe, acording to al-'Umari,[a] resided in the district of Amadiya. The amir was Ġars al-Dīn, son of 'Ali. But previously there had been rivalry between 'Ali and his brother Abu Bakr. The latter had been arrested, however, by the governor of Mosul and killed while trying to escape, leaving 'Ali in sole command.

B. Territory of the Hakkari principality in the Taurus and by the shore of Lake Van

1. *Vostan.* This time the source is the anonymous Vienna manuscript chronicling the history of the Hiṣn Kayfa/Hasankeyf principality in the Diyar Bakr. According to the chronicle, in 752/1351-52 'Imād al-Dīn, son of the *malik* Asad, lord of Vostan, was master of the Hakkaris (sic).[b] In 754/1353-54 al-ʿĀdil of Hisn Kayfa attacked Jazira/Cizre; in 755/1354-55 the Hakkari, under Asad, helped the Bukhti princes of Jazira to repel the attack.[c]

From what we know of the principality's later history, the Hakkari tribe could well have become masters of Vostan by this time. It is quite conceivable that Vostan was the seat of their prince. But, if they did, it is most unlikely that they held none of the land in

[a] Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 321-3.

[b] Cahen, "Diyar Bakr" (14 c.), 90.

[c] Ibid. 79.

the Taurus mountains (Julamerk etc.) stretching between Vostan and the Amadiya district. However if they held such land in the Taurus, it is much more likely Vostan was not in fact the seat of the Hakkari prince, but simply identified as such by the chronicler. A city of some prestige, past and current, it made a much more credible princely residence than the actual capital, Julamerk.

2. *The Julamerkī tribe*. The source is now al-'Umari.[a] According to him, the Julamerkīs took their name from their place of residence [Julamerk]. They were said to be members of the Hakāmī tribe who, at a moment of catastrophe for their family, took refuge in difficult mountains. From elsewhere we know that the Hakāmī tribe lived in the province of Arbil, which implies south or west of Amadiya, 'Aqra etc..[b] The Julamerkī were numerous, having more than 3,000 fighting men. [Formerly] their chief was 'Imād al-Dīn, son of Asad (sic); 'Imād al-Dīn was succeeded by his son Asad al-Dīn. [Lately] the Julamerkīs had been ruled by Bahā' al-Dīn, son of Quṭb al-Dīn, who commanded great respect among the Kurds. Their prince was now Bahā' al-Dīn's son [whose name is not given in the text].

3. *Gawār* [Gevar]. Again the source is al-'Umari.[c] There were mountains and a district of this name, with extensive pastureland and fertile [agricultural] land. There was a tribe of the same name. The amir Shams al-Din managed to gain their affection [i.e. loyalty]. 3,000 [fighting] men.

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[a] Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 317-19.

[b] I.Ath. K. VI.93, 145; 'Um., Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 317, n.2.

[c] Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 320.

Gawār was the Gevar plain and surrounding hills and mountains. Evidently a tribe lived here, taking its name from the district. The Shams al-Din whom al-'Umari describes as ruling them may well have been the same as the Shams al-Din, cousin of the reigning Julamerkī chief, whom al-'Umari has previously mentioned in his account of the Julamerkīs. The authorities [the Il-Khan's officers] lured him out of his town to a palace where he lived a luxurious life until his [natural] death. His son submitted to those authorities.[a] In other words the Gawār tribe were ruled by a relative of the Julamerki prince.

4. *The Margavār and Zerzārīs*. The Margavār tribe lived near the Julamerkīs, on the mountain of Margavār [after which the tribe, or more probably tribal section, was named.] An alliance existed between the Margavār and two related tribes, the Zerzārīs and Julamerkīs.[b]

Margavar is a high, pastureland district, now in Iran, bordering the Shamsdinan district immediately to the east. The Zerzārī territory was the south-east corner of the Shamsdinan district and now lies exactly in the south-east corner of modern Turkey.[c]

Reconstruction

I. The Hakkari tribe are in Vostan (Vienna MS) but somehow (the implication of al-'Umari) not in Julamerk. (B.1 & 2 above.) This is difficult to believe.

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[a] Mas.Abs., tr.Q 219.

[b] 'Um., Mas.Abs., tr.Q., 319-20.

[c] Below, sect.4.

II. The coincidence of rulers' names is perhaps of some significance: 'Imād al-Dīn, son of Asad, at Vostan, in 752/1351-52 and 755/1354-55; and 'Imād al-Dīn, son of Asad, followed by another Asad, at Julamerk, several generations previously. It is tempting to conclude that the 'Imād al-Dīn, son of Asad, at Vostan and that at Julamerk are the same men, in other words that some mistake in the author's information, muddle in their interpretation or confusion in the copying of al-'Umari's manuscript has led to a misplacing of this man in the sequence of Julamerkī princes in al-'Umari's text. But no discrepancy within one or other of the two sources, or between the two sources, argues for a displacement of generations somewhere in the historical tradition. More likely we are dealing with a similar policy in naming princes; just as we find several Shams al-Dins and Sharafs at Bitlis, so we find several Asads (Asad = Shīr ('Izz al-Dīn Shīr was another popular name later on in the history of the Hakkari dynasty) = Lion), two of them naming their sons 'Imād al-Dīn, in the Hakkari principality. The 'Imād al-Dīn, son of Asad, at Vostan and the 'Imād al-Dīn, son of Asad, at Julamerk are not the same person, but members of the same family. We have the same family at Vostan as at Julamerk. So the prince of Vostan is related to the prince of Julamerk; the relationship (Vostan a major apanage) could well be the same as in the Kara Koyunlu period.

III. The Gevar plain is ruled by a prince related to that of Julamerk. We may have a related dynasty. Possibly al-'Umari shows us an early stage of a minor related dynasty of the Hakkari ruling family.

First conclusion. Al-'Umari's Julamerkīs are not a mystery tribe without provenance, but the dominant tribe of the Hakkari principality. That principality already controlled Vostan,

possibly Van as well. There was a related dynasty, a minor branch, in Gevar.

IV. The Margavār and Zarzārīs are related tribes, and political allies, of the Julamerkīs, i.e. of the dominant tribe within the Hakkari principality.

Second conclusion. This tells us the minimum territorial extent of the Hakkari principality's influence. But no further information is available concerning other areas known to have been within the principality later on: Albāq, Chal, Çatak. Some or all of these, however, may well have been within the principality as small subject tribal entities or else allied to it in the same manner as the Margavār and Zarzārīs.

V. The Julamerkīs had been forced by a catastrophe to escape to "difficult mountains" several generations back. (B.2.) The sequence of rulers is the only clue to the date of the catastrophe: Asad; 'Imād al-Dīn; Asad al-Dīn; Quṭb al-Dīn; Bahā' al-Dīn; the latter's son. The last of these was ruling in the 740's/1340's or perhaps the previous decade. If we make three different assumptions about the average length of reign -- respectively 10, 15 and 20 years per ruler -- we get back to Asad in the 700's/1300's, 680's/1280's and 660's/1260's. We can add more years if need be: there may be another ruler between Asad al-Dīn and Quṭb al-Dīn; and Asad may have started ruling after the catastrophe and flight northwards.

The catastrophe in question may have been the Mongol massacre during Hulagu's Syrian campaign in 1259;[a] or it may have been a subsequent Mongol purge designed to deal once and for all with the Kurdish threat to northern Iraq and so eradicate that threat

[a] Section (i) above.

from the area's politics. It is considerably less likely to have been the seizure of Amadiya and other Hakkari fortresses in 1218 by 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī.[a]

VI. Were the Julamerkīs really Hakāmīs (B.2 above) ? Al-'Umari introduces the information straight after the assertion that the Julamerkīs are descendants of a branch of the Umayyads, a typical Kurdish claim to ancestry. "Hakāmī" would appear to mean a descendant of Hakām, father of the caliph Marwan I.[17] As the Hakkari are most unlikely to have been descended from Hakām, the assertion that the Julamerkī are Hakāmīs looks like another ancestry claim, added by al-'Umari or an informant to one propagated by the Julamerkīs themselves. There was a real Hakāmī tribe, living in the province of Arbil.[b] But the Julamerkīs were almost certainly not part of it. They were Hakkaris, not Hakāmīs.

Third conclusion. One or more Mongol purges were visited on the Hakkari in the Amadiya district. Either in 1259 or in a subsequent massacre perhaps 20 years later the bulk of the tribe, or a substantial section of it, was forced to escape to Julamerk and the nearby Zab valley. A small principality was set up. The nature of the political entity which they replaced is a mystery: perhaps it was an obscure Armenian principality.

Much later the Hakkari of Julamerk, or Julamerkīs, conquered Vostan, wanting agricultural land, a city on a minor trade route and perhaps an Armenian catholicosate. Al-'Umari does not mention the Hakkari, under any name, at Vostan. The argument that they were therefore not at Vostan in the 1330's or 1340's would be dangerous. It suggests

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[a] Suggested by Minorsky, "Kurds" (EI), 454.2. For the seizure, above, sect. (i).

[b] I.Ath., K. VI.93, 145; 'Um., Mas.Abs., tr.Q. 317, n.2.

a sounder one. The Hakkari seized Vostan and perhaps Van in the years after 1335, when the reigning Il-Khan, or one of the factions, were weak or too preoccupied to prevent that seizure.

Perhaps in the 1330's too, Shams al-Din, relative of Bahā' al-Dīn of Julamerk, gained the small tribal polity of Gevar (which perhaps had never been fully independent in any case). Other areas, such as Albāq, may have stood in a similar relationship to the fledgling Hakkari principality. The Julamerkīs/Hakkari also wielded influence on their borders, as they were allied to, and must have had some sway over, the Zerzārīs and Margavār.

VII. In the district of Amadiya were a group or tribe calling themselves Hakkari. (A.2 above.) Were they really Hakkaris ? There is no likelihood of a mistake in al-'Umari which might have arisen, for example, out of a similarity of rulers' names. The names are different from those of the Julamerkī (Abū Bakr, 'Alī etc.). In any case if this tribe or group lived in the district of Amadiya or Hakkar, they automatically were Hakkaris by virtue of their location. But they were probably Hakkaris by descent too; in other words they were descendants of the same Hakkaris whose history can be traced in the Amadiya district from the late 10th to the mid-13th century A.D.. After the Mongol massacre of 1259 or other disaster, members of the tribe who did not flee to Julamerk either stayed in the Amadiya district or else were forced to scatter within northern Iraq and subsequently regrouped in the Amadiya district.

Fourth conclusion. A branch of the Hakkari still resided in the district of Amadiya, though not in that city itself. They were related to the Julamerkīs, because the latter were also

Hakkaris whose ultimate provenance was the Amadiya district. The difference between the two was that the Hakkari of the Amadiya district were Hakkaris certainly by location and very likely by descent, whereas those of Julamerk were certainly Hakkaris by descent and certainly not Hakkari by location.[18]

Al-'Umari thought of the Julamerkīs as Hakāmī rather than Hakkari; so he forgot, or never knew, the tribal affinity between them and the Hakkaris of the Amadiya district, and failed to provide the material with which to explain the puzzle of the origins of the Hakkari principality in the Taurus mountains.

(iii) Relations with Timur

Timur's attack on Van in 1387 was occasioned by the Hakkari principality's loyalty to the Kara Koyunlu. Other than their acknowledgement of Kara Koyunlu sovereignty, however, we have no other information on the relations between the Hakkari principality and the Kara Koyunlu before the arrival of Timur. The Hakkari probably acknowledged the Kara Koyunlu as overlords soon after 784/1382-83, the date of the last Jalayrid coin minted at Van.

Timur stormed the citadel of Van and seized 'Izz al-Din Shir, the Hakkari prince.[a] This was enough to persuade 'Izz al-Din to submit, and Timur then gave him a diploma of authority over his principality and released him.[b] Timur's seizure of Van may have

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[a] T'M 30-31; Clph. XIV.717, p.573 (S.1388.1, p.105); Sh.I.90-91. Some of the details are discussed in Appendix I, Van.

[b] Sh.I.91.

caused a temporary weakening in his hold over the whole principality. In 1392 he recaptured Vostan from his own brother.[a] This very likely means, not that the brother had usurped Vostan, but that once having been granted it he attempted to convert Vostan into an entity independent of the Hakkari principality as a whole.

In Armn. 845/1396-97 'Izz al-Din helped to reconcile Miran Shah, Timur's deputy, with the Bitlis principality's ruling family after the punitive execution of Ibrahim, the Bitlis prince.[b] But in 1398 he was caught and imprisoned at Aghtamar, while raids were carried out on Julamerk and Gevar.[c] The source does not name the power who imprisoned him and raided Julamerk; but it must be Timur's governor. 'Izz al-Din had in some manner shown insubordination. Afterwards the *malik* of Vostan, probably 'Izz al-Din's son, appears to have helped in Timur's sack of Baghdad in 1401.[d] This implies that 'Izz al-Din was by now at least willing to co-operate with Timur's governor.

In 1387 'Izz al-Din submitted unwillingly and through force of necessity. He was never a willing vassal of Timur's. The imprisonment on Aghtamar shows some act of contempt for Timur's authority. The presence of the *malik* of Vostan at Baghdad in 1401 is likely to have been due to suggestion, suasion or severer forms of pressure. The scattered data create the impression that 'Izz al-Din submitted when he had to, and rebelled when he could.

From the point of view of Timur and his deputy in Armenia, the Hakkari prince was important and powerful enough to warrant the maintenance of a representative at Van

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[a] Clph. XIV.743, p.597 (S.1392.1, p.110); "Ēzdin".

[b] T'M 69, wrongly under the year 845/1405-6: Miran Shah's reign as governor of Armenia came to an end in 1399. See sect. I.5.(iii).

[c] Clph.XIV.778, pp.621, 622 (S.1398.1, p.116).

[d] T'M 64.

and the keeping of a close watch on his movements. If the dates are right, it was at most a year after helping to reconcile Miran Shah and the Bitlis prince before 'Izz al-Din committed some rebellious act; the punitive raids on Julamerk and Gevar, and 'Izz al-Din's imprisonment, appear to have followed swiftly. On the other hand the governor at Van and a close watch on 'Izz al-Din were the limit of the measures available to and desired by Timur's government. No attempt was made to put parts of the principality other than Van under direct administration, or to direct 'Izz al-Din's internal activities within the principality.

(iv) The Kara Koyunlu, 1406 to 1469

Under Kara Yusuf. At and soon after Kara Yusuf's return to Armenia in 1406, 'Izz al-Din's behaviour promised a repeat of his relationship with Timur and Timur's officers. His restiveness under Kara Koyunlu sovereignty occasioned the joint raid by Kara Yusuf and Shams al-Din of Bitlis on the territory of Van and Vostan in 1406. Subdued temporarily, he began a secret correspondence with the Timurid Abu Bakr, ruler of Azerbayjan and 'Irāq-i Ajem, whom Kara Yusuf soon after defeated.[a]

Three years later 'Izz al-Din's stance had changed somewhat. Alā al-Dawla, son of the Jalayrid Sultan Ahmad, escaped from his father in Baghdad. Kara Yusuf received Alā al-Dawla at first, then made him return to his father: he did not wish to sour relations with Ahmad. But on the way, near Khoy, Alā al-Dawla was seized by some of 'Izz al-Din's men. 'Izz al-Din intended to keep him prisoner (presumably as a bargaining tool),

[a] Sects.I.4.2 and I.5.(iv) above.

but was warned by Kara Yusuf to hand him back, not to Sultan Ahmad but to himself, Kara Yusuf. This 'Izz al-Din did.[a] In other words, 'Izz al-Din wished to use Alā al-Dawla for his own ends, but dared not defy Kara Yusuf.

Another year later 'Izz al-Din had become a more willing subject, and one whose advice was apparently respected by Kara Yusuf. In January 1410 he came in person, with gifts, to Kara Yusuf at Tabriz and presented his respects. He then persuaded Kara Yusuf not to send a force against the Shīrvān Shāh, Shaykh Ibrahim, and, acting as mediator, reconciled the two.[b] In August of the same year 'Izz al-Din and his son fought on Kara Yusuf's side in the battle of Asad, in which Sultan Ahmad was finally defeated, bringing to an end the Jalayrid dynasty.[c]

Admittedly there seems to have been some act of insubordination, as a result of which Kara Yusuf attacked Vostan in 1411.[d] But as far as the sources allow an accurate impression, a fairly harmonious relationship with Kara Yusuf seems to have existed from 1408 to Kara Yusuf's death in 1420. Apparently, however, this was not so warm as the relationship between Kara Yusuf and Shams al-Din of Bitlis.

The period was the heyday of the Vostan apanage. The colophons frequently speak of the benevolence of its ruler, 'Izz al-Din's son Muhammad.[19] Kara Yusuf seems to have allowed 'Izz al-Din to take Van back and keep it. Certainly he held the city by the time Iskender was in a position to settle accounts with him.

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[a] Sümer, KK 78-79.

[b] Sümer, KK 82.

[c] Sümer, KK 83, 84.

[d] Clph.XV.I.129, p.129 (sic) (S.1411.5, p.135).

İskender and the capture of Van and Vostan. Almost immediately after Kara Yusuf's death 'Izz al-Din went to Shah Rukh at Karabagh (Muḥarram 824/1421 -- somewhat later than Shams al-Din of Bitlis). Timur's diploma was renewed.[a] 'Izz al-Din was followed three months later by his son Muhammad, *malik* of Vostan.[b]

In 1422 İskender besieged Ahlat, and in 1423 besieged both Bitlis and Ahlat. Outside Ahlat he executed Shams al-Din, prince of Bitlis.[c] In or before the 1423 campaign Muhammad of Vostan set out to help İskender. This was either because İskender had commanded him, or because as İskender's vassal he felt it politic anyway. However in the event İskender had him poisoned. The motive well have been as follows: İskender meant in any case to take Van and Vostan from the Hakkari, and killing the prince of Vostan was a first step. In normal course it would not have been feasible to kill him without besieging the two cities, but since he had already presented himself it was a convenient beginning. Muhammad's position in Vostan was strong. He must have been favoured by the Armenian population, his fair treatment of whom is frequently mentioned by the colophons. He had reigned in Vostan at least since 1415.

Next year (1424) İskender besieged Van. By a trick he had first of all managed to seize the new ruler of Vostan, Ahmad, and used him as a hostage to further the siege. After the failure of the siege, he took Ahmad away with him and eventually executed him. Next year (1425) he finally took Van. When the fall of the citadel was imminent he must have allowed the governor, son of 'Izz al-Din the Hakkari prince, to leave. He also captured Vostan, killing the new ruler, who this time was a brother of 'Izz al-Din.[20]

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[a] Sh.I.91; Sümer, KK 117.

[b] Sümer, KK 120.

[c] Sect.I.5.(iv) above, and esp. n.43 to p.116.

Van and Vostan were made into a Kara Koyunlu governorship.[21] Initially İskender's son Yār 'Alī was appointed.[a] But in Armn. 879/1429-30, after complaints about extortionate taxation, İskender called him to account and he fled.[22]

It is probable that by 1431 the Hakkari were back in possession of Vostan, and this may mean they had also regained Van.[b] The repossession of Vostan and perhaps Van by the Hakkari may indicate a local disturbance and temporary weakness on the part of the Kara Koyunlu. It is not known whether the Kara Koyunlu came back and retook these cities before the beginning of Jahan Shah's reign (1437). But in 1444 the Kara Koyunlu certainly held Vostan and Van.[c] This means that Vostan and perhaps Van were retaken sometime after 1431 and before 1444.

In sum, Iskender's policy was to make Vostan and Van into a direct Kara Koyunlu governorship. He was successful between 1425 and 1429; but it is not clear at what date Vostan was lost to the Kara Koyunlu, whether Van was lost at the same time, and whether either city (with dependent district) came back into Kara Koyunlu hands before the end of Iskender's reign (1436).

Jahan Shah. In the 1440's to 1460's the relationship of the Hakkari princes to Jahan Shah was entirely different from that which seems to have existed between them and İskender. Like the Bitlis principality, that of Hakkari seems to have become more confident and was locally more powerful. It recaptured Van and Vostan, and even after subsequent dispossession by Jahan Shah was able to come back and recapture them. Jahan Shah seems

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[a] Sümer, KK 127, wrongly under 1424.

[b] See Appendix V, p.511 and esp. n.9.

[c] Below, p.193 and esp. n.23.

initially to have been in a position to bring the principality to heel; then, in the late 1440's or a little later, to have lost Van and Vostan; and finally, in the mid-1450's, to have won back Van but left Vostan to the Hakkari. In the late 1450's and the 1460's there was, as far as can be seen, an uneasy relationship in which Hakkari consented both to vassalage and to Kara Koyunlu tenure of Van, while the Kara Koyunlu acquiesced in Hakkari government of Vostan.

We know that in 1442 Jahan Shah captured Ziril Kale/Zirēl (at the southern egress from the Çatak district) and Julamerk.[a] In the case of Bitlis it was concluded above that by 1461 Jahan Shah had attempted to impose a tribute, or at least had insisted on payment of a tribute imposed by a previous ruler: the Bitlis prince failed to pay, and this occasioned the Zakaria tax-collection incident.[b] Similar incidents, including insubordination by the princes, may have occurred between Jahan Shah and the Hakkari principality. The insubordination in question is not likely to have been an attempt to transfer allegiance elsewhere: the Hakkari principality was surrounded on all sides by Kara Koyunlu territory.

In capturing Ziril Kale and Julamerk Jahan Shah showed he was prepared to devote many more resources to striking back at the Hakkari prince than İskender and perhaps Timur's governors. Ziril Kale and Julamerk, both well fortified, were some of the least accessible settlements in a generally mountain-locked principality. They were also castles on high rocks, whose capture by force presented severe difficulties. The incident demonstrates both a rebellious tendency on the part of the Hakkari prince and great energy and resources on the part of Jahan Shah.

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[a] Clph.XV.I.604, p.536 (S.1442.2, p.198): Zërēl and Julamerk.

[b] Sect.I.3.2.(a) and I.5.(v), this chapter.

Between 1444 and 1452 the Kara Koyunlu lost Vostan and Van to the Hakkari. The exact date may fall somewhere in the late 1440's, but it is hard to be sure. In 1452 Jahan Shah besieged Vostan for a whole winter: this means that he had lost the city by that date, but since we are not told of a successful capture he probably did not capture Van and Vostan in that year.[23]

The repossession of Van took place somewhere in the mid-1450's. We know that in 1458 Van was taken by the Kara Koyunlu Kılıç Arslan. However at this stage Kılıç Arslan was probably acting for Jahan Shah's son and rival Hasan 'Ali. In other words Kılıç Arslan had shown disloyalty to Jahan Shah by joining a rebel. Moreover the capture of Van in 1458 was not permanent. Kılıç Arslan made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Van in 1459, which demonstrates he had lost it between times.[a] In 1462 took place the episode in which Zakaria, katholikos of Aghtamar, brought the right hand of the Illuminator to Aghtamar, making ceremonial entries to Van and Vostan on the way. Jahan Shah's foster-brother was governor of Van. The colophon's account paints a picture in which the Kara Koyunlu are secure in their possession of Van, but content to leave Vostan in the hands of the Hakkari. Whereas the Kara Koyunlu governor of Van received Zakaria well, the Kurdish prince of Vostan plotted against him.[b] The arrangement may well have continued, not merely until Jahan Shah's death in 1467 but until that of Hasan 'Ali in 1469.

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[a] (a) 1458: MC I.143 (anon. chron.). "Ł1ič Aslann", without specifying on whose behalf. (b) 1459: Clph.XV.II.154, p.ii7 (S.1459.2, p.263).

[b] Clph.XV.II.221, pp.175 (S.1462.3, p.274).

(v) The Ak Koyunlu

The Ak Koyunlu took Van from the Kara Koyunlu immediately after the final victory in 1469.[24] At first they left the Hakkari in possession of their principality. Later, however, in 896/1491, the Ak Koyunlu sultan Ya'qub expelled the ruling family. 'Izz al-Din Shir (descendant of the better-known, long-lived 'Izz al-Din Shir of the 1380's to 1420's) had been one of the leaders of a Kurdish revolt against the Ak Koyunlu. It took the Ak Koyunlu general Sulaymān Bizhen Oghlī two years to quell the revolt.[a] Another Kurdish tribe, the Dunbeli, were given the governorship. The Dunbeli were no doubt chosen precisely because they were a tribe without a hereditary claim to land, residing partly within the Hakkari principality but with every interest in retaining the governorship and in remaining faithful to the Ak Koyunlu.[b]

The ruling family then drove out the Dunbeli, and Asad al-Dīn, who had formerly been in Mamluk employment, became the prince. The date of the repossession may have been in the mid-1490's.[25]

(vi) Competition between Safavids and Ottomans

The period from 1502 to the peace of Qaṣr-i Shīrīn of 1639 is one of rebellions and insubordination (whether to the Safavid or to the Ottoman empire); internal rebellion against the reigning prince; and competition between the Safavid and Ottoman empires.

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[a] Sh.I.92-93.

[b] Sh.I.93.

The Hakkari ruling family was put both in a strong and in a weak position: strong, because both empires needed its services, and weak, because it had to satisfy at least one of the two empires, both of which insisted on a greater measure of control than the minimum implied by mere acknowledgement of sovereignty.

Within the Safavid empire: before 1514. At first the prince, Zahid, submitted willingly to Shah Ismail. But by 1507, although Hakkari still lay within the Safavid rather than the Ottoman sphere, Safavid domination over the principality and probably the rest of the Van area had become a dead letter. Zahid Beg was seen by a visiting Italian merchant at Van. The merchant records that the Hakkari prince minted coins in his own name at Van and openly disavowed Safavid sovereignty.[a]

Within the Ottoman sphere: to 1548. The Hakkari prince, Zahid, probably gave his allegiance to the Ottoman cause immediately before the Çaldıran campaign.[26] Until 1548, when Van was captured and converted into a province capital, the principality seems generally to have paid allegiance to the Ottoman empire, and was gradually drawn into the sanjak system. The beys of the sanjaks into which it was divided, all members of the princely family, probably had at first only nominal duties. On the other hand the Safavid empire was always on the doorstep. In fact it possessed Van for nearly the whole period, and the neighbouring Hoşap principality seems mostly to have fallen under Safavid sway.

Van was perhaps lost to the Hakkari dynasty in the Safavid counterthrust soon after Çaldıran. Safavid forces regained Azerbayjan, conquered in the Çaldıran campaign by the

[a] Merchant in Persia 161. On the division of the principality into several estates, each held by one of Zahid's sons, of which the Merchant is aware, sect.3.3 above.

Ottomans, the following year,[a] and Van might have been taken from the Hakkari in the general tide of reconquest. At any rate we know Van and Vostan were in Safavid hands by c.1529.[27] Ulama, who was to defect to the Ottoman cause in 937/1529-30, had just previously taken up residence in Van.

Consequently by c. 1529, and probably in 1515, the Hakkari principality was once more shorn of Van and Vostan. At this stage, or at any rate in 1527, the principality seems to have been considered a kind of honorary sanjak. Nominally it was within the system, but the bey was paid no salary and apparently had no responsibilities within the empire.[28]

By 1534 the principality had regained Vostan, but Vostan was now an Ottoman sanjak, probably of *ocak* status. It had been won for the Ottoman empire in the 'Irakeyn campaigns, which were still in progress, but a member of the Hakkari ruling family was only allowed to regain possession of Vostan on condition of assuming genuine responsibilities, including provision of troops. The remainder of the principality probably possessed the same status as in 1527, and still seems to have consisted of a number of apanages. Several of these will have been in the hands of members of the ruling family. The prince, Malik Beg, was a son of Zahid.[29]

Till 1548 the status of the Hakkari territories may have remained the same as in 1534. In other words Van now lay in Safavid territory; Vostan was a hereditary Ottoman sanjak, whose bey was a member of the ruling family; the remainder was still a principality, now subject to the Ottoman empire, but with no responsibilities other than acknowledging Ottoman overlordship. It was, as before, divided into a number of estates, many of them in the hands of relatives of the prince.

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[a] Shaw, *History* 81-2.

Within the Ottoman empire: the statutory position after 1548. After the Ottoman conquest of Van in 1548 the large Ottoman province of Van was formed, and the Hakkari lands incorporated into it as a series of sanjaks. The hereditary principality of Hakkari remained. At some point, too, the Pinyanishi tribe was made into a hereditary principality: very little is known about its borders and constitution.[30]

In 1555 we know of sanjaks of Vostān, Ahtamār, Albāḳ and Ḥakkārī.[a] This still seems to mean that much of the southern half of the principality was considered just one administrative unit. No mention is made of Çatak. Later, in the mid-17th century, Evliya tells us of three sanjaks within the principality: Şataḳ, Vostān and "Eşīr-i Çölemerik". The latter seems to mean the inland half of the principality: the term emphasises the tribal organisation of the prince's subjects, both Kurdish and Nestorian.[31] Çatak is now included. Albāq is not in Evliya's list; but we know that it was part of the principality after 1548 all the same.[32]

The prince and the hereditary sanjak bey of Julamerk were always one and the same person. The prince certainly appointed members of his family to the sanjak of Albāq,[b] and probably did the same in the other sanjaks. The statutory position of the Hakkari prince-cum-sanjak bey of Julamerk seems to have been exactly the same as that of the Bitlis princes after the return of Sharaf in 1578.[c] The statutory position of the other sanjak beys is less clear: in practice the *beylerbeyi* at Van probably allowed the prince to

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[a] Kırzıoğlu, *Kafkas-Elleri* 246: a list in Celâlzâde of sanjaks on the Ottoman border after the treaty of Amasya in 1555.

[b] E.g. Sh.I.102; and see the discussion below, p.199.

[c] Sect.I.5.(ix); Dankoff, *Bitlis* 15; Ev.IV.177.

make appointments from his own family unless or until the appointment was found unsatisfactory. The subsequent appointee would still be chosen from the same family.

Dynastic history, 1502 to 1639. There is plenty of information in the *Sherefname* about dynastic struggles and other questions of succession to the title of prince. But the difficulty is to tie the events narrated in the *Sherefname* to dates. For the dates the following account relies on Sevgen. Sevgen either does or does not have sources on which to base the dates he gives, but at any rate generally quotes no sources for his dates. Moreover in other parts of his book his judgement is sometimes seriously at fault. Nevertheless we must follow his very useful account. If there are mistakes, the following narrative at least gives some indication of the nature of dynastic politics within the framework of vassalage to and inclusion within the Ottoman empire.

First of all we know from the document of 1534, quoted above, that Malik Beg, son of Zahid, was the prince at that date. But the *Sherefname* does not anywhere say that Malik Beg ever became the prince. Instead it says the following. In Zahid's distribution of apanages to his sons, Malik Beg received the castle of Bāy, which means Humaru, the north-west part of the Shamsdinan district, and possibly Gevar.[a] Then Zahid was toppled by a rebellion. This was led by Zaynal, Malik Beg's first son and commandant of the castle of Bāy. Zaynal took Bay, and other rebels captured Zahid. He was allowed to escape, first to his brother Sayyid Muhammad of Vostan, then to Sharaf Beg of Bitlis. The rebellion therefore happened before 1533, the date of Sharaf's death.[b]

In the document of 1534 quoted above, Malik Beg is named as the prince and

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[a] Sh.I.95; on Bāy, sect.2.2 above.

[b] Sh.I.95-6.

Sayyid Muhammad as bey of Vostan. Muhammad now seems to have ousted Malik Beg with the help of the Pinyanishi tribe and become prince himself.[33] But Zaynal was favoured by the Ottomans and, after a narrow escape from death at the hands of the Bukhti of Jazira/Cizre, managed to expel Muhammad.[a] Sevgen places these events immediately after the formation of the Ottoman province of Van.[b] In 1551 Muhammad was captured by the Ottomans; Muhammad's son, Ya'qub, now sped to the Hakkari principality in order to take possession; when he heard of the approach of a Mahmudi force sent to capture him, he took refuge among the Pinyanishi tribe. But he was betrayed by one of the Pinyanishi, who had longstanding ties of friendship with the Mahmudi prince. Sayyid Muhammad and Ya'qub were put to death. The Ottomans brought back Zaynal.[c]

In 1568 Zahid, son of Zaynal, was sanjak bey of Albāq. He had, apparently, expelled the janissary garrison from a castle called Sertek (Turkish form) and somehow stirred up the tribes of the principality.[d] He seems to have been caught by the Van *beylerbeyi*. Zaynal appointed in his place another son, Ibrahim.[e] A decade later, in 1578, Zaynal himself indulged in sedition, building himself a castle in Albāq somewhere near Başkale. Sevgen plausibly suggests that he did so because an old enemy, the son of Shāhqūlī, the Pinyanishi chief, had been let out of prison.[34] Zaynal, however, was forgiven and died in Ottoman service at the battle of Marand in 993/1585.[f] The *vezīr-i*

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[a] Sh.I.97.

[b] Sevgen, *DGA Türk Beylikleri* 142.

[c] Sevgen, *DGA Türk Beylikleri* 143-4; Sh.I.100.

[d] Sevgen, *DGA* ... 144-5.

[e] Sevgen, *DGA* ... 145; Sh.I.102.

[f] Sevgen, *DGA* ... 147-8; Sh.I.103.

a'ẓām, Cafer Paşa, tried to have Zahid, eldest son of Zaynal, installed as prince; but he was unpopular with the majority of the tribesmen within the principality, and killed by them. Cafer Paşa had to appoint a second son, Zakarya.[a]

26 years later Zakarya in his turn rebelled. In 1613 he and the bey of Albāq retired to the castle of Albāq (presumably Başkale), for an unspecified reason, and with unknown outcome.[b] The next but one appointee, another son of Zakarya, was killed because of opposition by one of the tribes, or a group of tribes, which had rebelled against him (1632).[c] Another appointee, probably the next, was replaced by the Ottoman government for failing to join Murat IV's train on the return from the Erevan campaign in 1045/1635.[d]

Role of the Safavids and of the Ottoman beylerbeyis in dynastic history. The principality's stormy history in the period of Ottoman vasselage (1514-48) and the first century or so of incorporation into the sanjak system (1548-1639) betrays a few differences with the Bitlis principality. The inland Hakkari districts were so difficult of access, particularly from Van, that the Ottoman government made little attempt to instal janissary garrisons, or to carve districts away from the principality and make them into non-hereditary sanjaks. This in turn allowed the ruling family, backed by the tribes, to retain local power, and on occasion even to kill or throw out the Ottoman-sanctioned prince-cum-sanjak bey. Moreover the Ottomans failed to stop the influence or operation of a second tribal factor,

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[a] SH.I.103-4 (cf. I.106); Sevgen, *DGA* ... 148.

[b] Sevgen 153-4.

[c] Sevgen 154-5, 155-6, saying killed by "the tribe".

[d] Sevgen 156-8.

the Pinyanishi. On the whole this tribe, for reasons difficult to ascertain, took the side of those candidates who were not supported by the bulk of the Hakkari tribes.

Proximity to Iran also meant greater freedom for the Hakkari princes in the first century of participation in the Ottoman administrative system. We have no record of Persian involvement after the execution of Sayyid Muhammad in 1551. However the two empires waged several wars in the period, and Safavid forces mounted several attacks on Van and neighbouring places. The possibility that Iran could get involved (by, for example, backing a rebel candidate for the throne) changed the risk equation for the Hakkari princes. Even setting aside the retention of hereditary rights, the Ottoman beylerbeyi of Van was forced in practice to give the Hakkari princes a latitude which could not have been contemplated in the case of most sanjak beys.

On the other hand the presence of a large and well-fortified military base, and of the governor of a large province, at Van meant that the Ottoman government was able to resort to a comparatively cheap method of controlling the dynasty's affairs. This was intervention in, or the creation of, family power struggles by backing candidates for the position of prince. We have no record of such intervention by the Kara Koyunlu.

(vii) The mid-17th century to the end of the dynasty

Evliya Çelebi gives a few items of information concerning the principality's state in the mid-17th century. Evliya's information leaves the impression of a rather calmer state of affairs. The Hakkari sanjak bey, though failing to come in person, sends without demur

a contingent to Melek Ahmet Paşa's expedition against Abdal Khan of Bitlis.[a] The Hakkari troops are among the most effective in the attack on Bitlis.[b]

Until the final violent days of the dynasty in the 1840's, little information is to be had. In 1780 an Ottoman expedition attacked the prince of Julamerk; but between the 1630's and 1840's this is the only mention of such an action.[35] The Hakkari beys were more difficult than Hoşap or Bitlis to attack. The last two decades of the 18th and the first forty years of the 19th century were a period of almost complete freedom from interference by the Ottoman government. At some point Hakkari lost Çatak and Vostan.[36]

The end of the dynasty is well known. This was one of the last Kurdish principalities to be subjugated, and its dynasty expelled, in the campaign following Mahmut II's reforms and Ibrahim Paşa's invasion of Syria and north Mesopotamia. A massacre of Hakkari Nestorians in 1843 was precipitated by the establishment of an American Protestant mission at Ashita in the Lower Tyari (in a tributary valley west of the Zab). Nurallah Bey of Başkale, which was now the senior branch of the dynasty, was ordered in 1847 to appear at Van; he escaped to Iran, then, after many incidents in Iran, came back to Neri in the Shamsdinan district. He hoped for the protection of the Naqshbandi sheikh residing there. He was arrested at Neri and taken via Istanbul to exile in Crete (1849).[c]

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[a] Ev.IV.221 (D.231).

[b] Ev.IV.226, 227 (D.241).

[c] Joseph, *Nestorians* 50-67; Sevgen, *DGA Türk Beylikleri* 158-70 (cf. 93-94); Yalçın-Heckmann, *Tribe and Kinship* 57-61.

6. Conclusions

The Hakkari principality consisted of two halves, an inland and a coastal, between which communication was difficult or impossible. Each half had rich resources in land, and the pastoral emphasis of the Zab districts complemented the agricultural prosperity of those by the shore. However each half by itself was considerably more coherent than the territory as a whole.

Unlike those of Bitlis, the Hakkari princes enjoyed no unified tribal power base, but only the loyalty of a single tribe. The Kurdish population was fragmented, the tribal structure probably unstable. The prince had constantly to manoeuvre and manipulate in order to contrive unity. One of his instruments was, perhaps, the redistribution of apanages among the members of his family. The one stable institution was the apanage of Vostan; but Vostan and Van were often lost to the Hakkari. The Hakkari principality certainly had links with tribes on its eastern border, but while this sometimes made for an extension of influence, it could worsen the disunity and factionalism when the tribe or tribes in question took part in the internal tribal or family struggles.

In short the principality suffered from inborn instabilities. In part these were territorial: Van and Vostan were relatively easy to capture and often were captured, leaving a mountain-locked shepherd's principality. In part they were tribal, because there was endless potential for inter-tribal struggles, not to mention shifts in the internal composition of the tribes. And in part they were familial, although the possibility of family struggles depended on the potential for inter-tribal enmity.

The vehicle by means of which the attitudes and actions of the Kara Koyunlu

towards the Hakkari will be evaluated is a comparison between the Kara Koyunlu and succeeding dynasties. Here, beside the factors just dealt with, the one abiding strength of the Hakkari must be remembered. This was the difficulty of access to the inland districts and particularly to the capital, Julamerk.

In the Kara Koyunlu period the Hakkari principality appears to have been governed by a series of strong princes who suffered little from dynastic and tribal opposition to themselves or rivalry between groups or factions. The most outstanding of the princes was 'Izz al-Din Shir, the object of Timur's wrath and at times the willing vassal of Kara Yusuf. The reasons for the princes' strong position in this period are hard to understand. Possibly the most important is that the dynasty had finished a stage of expansion in which it had extended influence gradually over other tribes. This may well have accelerated in the late 1370's and early 1380's, when Jalayrid infighting left a power vacuum in the locality.[37] However another reason is the policy of the Kara Koyunlu themselves. The latter did not wish to commit resources to beating the Hakkari princes on their inland territory or besieging their inland castles.

After Timur's death, two phases of Kara Koyunlu policy can be distinguished. The first was Kara Yusuf's reign. After the joint raid by Kara Yusuf and Sharaf of Bitlis in 1406, and subsequent insubordination in the same year,[a] 'Izz al-Din Shir seems to have settled down to a state of peaceful vasselage. 'Izz al-Din on one occasion even voluntarily lent his help and advice to Kara Yusuf. The second stage lasted till the demise of the Kara Koyunlu as a power in Iran, Armenia and Mesopotamia. İskender and Jahan Shah conquered Van or else Van and Vostan together, only to have the cities wrested back by

[a] Sect.I.5.(iv) and II.5.(iv) above.

the Hakkari a few years later. Except on one occasion[a] the Kara Koyunlu did not attack the inland districts. In so far as far as accurate judgement is permitted by the evidence, the Hakkari were rebellious vassals of the Kara Koyunlu until the late 1450's and the 1460's, when a calmer but still uneasy relationship appears to have existed. Hakkari strength appears to have been matched by the willingness of Jahan Shah to attack the shore cities repeatedly until overlordship was acknowledged. However the Hakkari did not acknowledge Kara Koyunlu overlordship until the late 1450's, and it seems clear that the Kara Koyunlu did not have the resources, even when in possession of Van and Vostan, to do more than obtain such submission. Apart from gaining the two cities and ensuring acknowledgement of vassalage they did not intervene in the principality's affairs.

The Ak Koyunlu present a complete contrast. After leaving the princes alone for twenty odd years, they expelled the reigning prince by reason of a revolt. It was an attempt to expunge the ruling family. The policy required much time and resources if it was to work, and the Ak Koyunlu had neither. The Safavid overlordship represents a return to the Kara Koyunlu position; at first Zahid acknowledged Ismail's authority, then he disavowed it. In neither case was Ismail in a position to enforce his authority.

The period of gradual incorporation into the Ottoman empire and the first century of existence within it, during both of which periods the sources permit reasoned judgement, present a picture of dynastic and tribal infighting and rivalry within the principality, when the goal was often the position of prince itself. The princes seem to have been generally weaker. This may have been due in part to a general decay within the principality, and a loss of power over the constituent tribes. The Ottoman period revealed the lack of a firm tribal base for the prince and the lack of unity between the tribes. If the

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[a] In 1442: see Clph.XV.I.604, p.536 (S.1442.2, p.198), and sect.5.(iv) above.

explanation is correct, it is the reverse of that given above for the strength of the Hakkari in the Kara Koyunlu period. However the events of the Ottoman period suggest that to an extent Ottoman intervention itself was responsible for the weak position of the princes.

In searching for such an explanation, the limitations of Ottoman power have to be kept in mind. Firstly, it was still hard to attack the inland districts of the Hakkari. Secondly, the proximity of the Persian frontier generally introduced an element of risk for the Ottoman *beylerbeyi* at Van whenever intervention was considered. Such limitations, however, only applied when the principality was united and the power of the prince unquestioned. The Ottoman governor at Van was a permanent presence disposing of greater resources than any Kara Koyunlu governor there had ever done. He was able to use his stable position to intervene in various internal struggles. Although no internal rebellion against the prince, or other rivalry, was deliberately initiated by the Ottoman *beylerbeyi*, the latter fostered such infighting by favouring one faction or another. Moreover the mere fact of the Ottoman presence made rebellions within the family or inter-tribe struggles more tempting. The proximity of the Persian frontier did not lessen the likelihood of sponsored infighting, provided the Ottoman governor was prepared to see the opposing faction supported by Iran. In short, the border position was advantageous to the princes given a united principality, but was a source of weakness given tendencies to internal division.

To sum up, during the Kara Koyunlu period the Hakkari princes were in an internally strong position. The Kara Koyunlu, on the other hand, were deterred by the inaccessibility of the inland districts and by their own limited resources within the Van area and elsewhere. They contented themselves with seizing one or both of the two shore cities and with an acknowledgement of suzerainty. Sometimes they achieved neither. In

any case their ambition was never to direct the affairs of the principality beyond ensuring submission to themselves and no-one else.

During the Ottoman period the position of the princes seems in any case to have weakened. But the Ottomans proceeded to weaken it further, by taking sides and generally intervening in family and tribal struggles. Beyond the mid-17th century the principality's internal history is virtually unknown. But the accounts of its last ruler's defeat and expulsion convey the impression that by the mid-19th century the ruler's position had decayed to the point where he enjoyed the support of very few tribes. There was little opposition to the Ottomans; the principality simply dropped out of history, and the materials from which it might have been recreated were simply no longer present.

III. THE MAHMUDI PRINCIPALITY OF HOŞAP

1. Its extent

In the following survey of the principality's territory we shall be including areas other than the district of Hoşap, the acknowledged capital of the principality in both the late Middle Ages and the Ottoman period. The evidence that these areas belonged to the principality dates to the Ottoman period. Yet, paradoxically, by the Ottoman period they were separate sanjaks from that of Hoşap, and although these sanjaks seem to have been counted, in the Ottoman period, as part of the principality, they were not, in Ottoman jurisdiction, dependent on that of Hoşap. The explanation of the paradox is that in the Ottoman period the Mahmudi principality, as a network of tribal allegiance, covered the same wide territorial area as it had done in the late Middle Ages; but the tribal prince was now the sanjak bey only of Hoşap rather than of the whole territory of the principality. Our argument depends on the paradoxical assumption that when sources of the Ottoman period talk of a district or a sanjak, other than Hoşap, as Mahmudi, they mean that its Kurdish population belonged to the Mahmudi tribe and owed allegiance, in that sense, to the sanjak bey of Hoşap; but within the Ottoman administrative system their sanjak beys owed him no such allegiance. (This is not to say that their sanjak beys were appointed from outside the Mahmudi tribe: what evidence we have suggests that on the whole they were.) So the evidence for the territorial extent of the unified principality of the late Middle Ages dates from a time when that principality, at least according to the Ottoman administrative titles, had been broken up, and the administrative competence of the prince, in the Ottoman

system, was confined to Hoşap and its district.

(a) Khōshāb, now Hoşap, was the capital. The castle on its precipitous rock and the walled enclosure attached to the castle's eastern slope lie at the northern edge of a plain, which is traversed by the upper reaches of the Hoşap Su. It is unlikely that the lower half of the river's course belonged to the Mahmudi. Towards its debouchment into the lake it was the means of communication between the territories of Van and Vostan, which generally were both in the hands of the Hakkari principality,[a] and which as settlements functioned and were often considered together.[b] The boundary of the Mahmudi territory in the Hoşap Su valley is indicated by the castle of Zernak, which lies on the hilly and indented land downstream of the upper Hoşap Su plain.[1] Downstream of Zernak is the Gürpınar plain, which forms a natural focus for the lower half of the Hoşap Su valley.

(b) Āghchaqal'a, castle of the Norduz Çay basin, which lies immediately west of the upper Hoşap Su basin.[2] The estate seems to have been a possession of the Mahmudi ruling family, probably an appanage.[3] It was the Anjewacik' of the early Middle Ages,[c] and consisted primarily of pastureland. In the Middle Ages and until the highly destructive earthquake of 1648, the castle, Āghchaqal'a, where the bey resided, was at Kangavar, not Kasrik (the latter now officially Kırkgeçit), which is four kilometres to the north-west of Kangavar.[4]

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[a] Above, sect.I.2.2.

[b] See in particular our appendix on Van and Vostan: Appendix I, Sect.II, on Van and Vostan.

[c] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 342-3, sums up the evidence.

(c) Qal'a-i Ashōt or Pagan (now officially Yeşilalıç). According to the *Sherefname*, Kara Yusuf the Kara Koyunlu gave the Mahmudi the castle of Ashōt, for the sake of tranquillity. He made the *nāhiya* of Ashōt and that of Khōshāb an emirate for Shaykh Mahmūd [putative founder, almost certainly not the real founder, of the dynasty].[a] Later, in the Safavid occupation, Ḥājī Bêg Dunbelī was temporarily established at Qal'a-i Ashōt.[b]

By chance the name Ashōt has been recorded as belonging in recent times to Pagan, a castle whose remains have been interpreted as Urartian and which lies on the watershed between the upper Hoşap Su valley and the Kotur Çay valley: in Urartian times at least the castle must have controlled movement between Hoşap and Satmanis (now officially Örenburç). According to the archaeological report on the castle at Pagan, that castle was known in Armenian as Ashotakert.[c] The *Sherefname* gives no help as to the castle's location, but the proximity of Pagan to Hoşap and the contiguity of other Mahmudi territory further north make this a highly plausible identification.

Where was the *nāhiya* of Qal'a-i Ashōt ? Pagan, on a secluded rock among hills at the watershed between broad plains, would seem not to be at the centre of a naturally definable geographical district, and on the other hand the Satmanis plain, further north-east on a tributary of the Kotur Çay, provides a natural focus for a district whose capital could well have been Pagan, which is unaccounted for if it was not Mahmudi territory, and which lies between Pagan and the Mahmudi district of Saray further north.[5] Probably the nāḥiya of Qal'a-i Ashōt was centred on the Satmanis plain, but its stronghold

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[a] Sh.I.301.

[b] Sh.I.304. The Ashūt/Ashōt conquered by Zengi, Sh.I.366, will not be here.

[c] Sevin & Belli, "Pagan" [AnAr 4-5 (1976-77)], 368.

was Pagan.

(d) Erçek. According to Evliya, Ḳal'e-i Erecik (قلعهٔ ارجلاغ) was in the *idāre* of the Mahmudi bey. It was said [once] to have been the capital of the Mahmudi *ülke*.[a] The castle of Erecik or Erçek was most probably in or near the present small town of Erçek.[6] The district seems to have consisted of the whole Erçek valley.[7]

(e) Abāġa Ḳal'esi (Pers. "Abāghay"). This was within the Mahmudi principality in the mid-17th century.[8] Evliya went there from Erçek, in an eastwards direction, taking seven hours.[b] The site indicated by this information is Saray, which lies in the middle of a plain (called the Mahmudiye plain at least in the period before the before the First World War), and through which, before the First World War, lay one of the tracks between Van and Kotur.[9] Of course since the castle was known in the mid-17th century as Abāġa (Ott. translit.) and the town was known in the late 19th and the 20th century as Saray ("Palace"), one might want to conclude that the Il-Khans' palace known as Alā Tāq (mod. Turk. Ala Dağ) was here. However the Abāghay district (not castle) was the Çaldıran plain, as it is now called, which is further north (see below, Ch.IV, sect.2), and the Il-Khans' palace must have been somewhere in the district centred on that plain. That the castle at Saray came to be known as Abāghay and that the town came to be called Saray after that probably reflects a misconception as to the site of the Mongol palace. Such a misconception could easily have arisen after the palace had been abandoned.

The dependent district of Abāġay Ḳal'esi must have been the upper half of the Erçek

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[a] Ev. IV.274.

[b] Ev. IV.275.

valley, centred on the Saray plain.

(f) Karaca Kale. Evliya tells us that it was governed by Evliya Bey (sic), a Mahmudi, and that it was seven hours' ride east of Abāġa Kal'esi.[a] It must have been on the Çingi Dere, well inside the modern boundary of Iran.[10] At the time of Evliya's visit the castle was garrisoned by 4,000 soldiers (compare the 2,000 soldiers in the castle of Erçek),[b] and cannot have been of insignificant strength.

Summary. The principality's territory emerges as a unified block with clear natural boundaries. It lay immediately to the east of the east shore strip of the lake: the shore strip was always denied to the Mahmudi. To west, south and east was the territory of the Hakkari principality, and to the north, separated by a chain of hills, the Muradiye and Çaldıran plains (their present names), part of the territory directly administered by the Kara Koyunlu. To the south the Mahmudi territory consisted of the plain of the upper Hoşap Su and surrounding hills, and the mostly pastureland district of the Norduz Çay basin. Beyond a range of hills lay the territory's northern half: the Erçek valley, the adjoining Satmanis plain at the upper end of the Kotur Çay valley, and the district of Karaca Kale in the upper Çingi Dere.

To an extent there is an economic rationale to the composition of the principality's territory. Evliya reports that all the Mahmudi Kurds have their summer pasture on the Hasan Taptı Yaylası.[c] This was on the left as one went from Bendimahi towards Van, and

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[a] Ev. IV.275, under heading Vān Karahisārı. For a comment on this name, n.13 to p.175.

[b] Ev. IV.274.

[c] Ev. IV.151. Ott. "Hasan Tapdı yaylası".

therefore somewhere in or around the lower end of the Erçek valley, either in the bottom of the Erçek valley itself, or in that of the Kara Su valley, or, more probably, on the much higher ground forming the northern side of the Kara Su valley at its lower end (i.e. not including the feeder streams in the south part of the Çaldıran plain). Evliya also tells us that the best Mahmudi horses pasture near Erçek.[a] The three easterly plains (Saray, Gölçimen and Satmanis) must similarly have provided good summer pasture.[11] So the northerly territory may have functioned as a summer pasture for the Mahmudi -- more accurately, summer pasture formed a more important component of its economic activities than of those of the upper Hoşap Su plain, where agriculture would have been more important than in the northerly territory.

2. The principality; tribal and other institutions

Size. In his survey of the sanjaks of the Van eyalet in 1655, just before the attack by Melek Ahmet Paşa on Bitlis, Evliya says that the Mahmudi bey had at his disposal 20,000 *'aşīret beğleri*; all receive *yolluk* and *donluk* from him. This gives an indication of the principality's size and importance relative to Bitlis (70,000 men, according to Evliya himself)[b] and Hakkari (47,000 soldiers).[c] Evliya's meaning seems to be that as tribal

[a] Ev. IV.274.

[b] Ev. IV.89. Above, sect.I.3.1.(a).

[c] Ev.IV.177. Above, sect.II.3.3. This is the total that could be mustered in an emergency rather than the number that the Hakkari bey actually sent on the expedition against Bitlis: but the figure of 47,000 is for that reason strictly comparable to 20,000 for the Mahmudi 70,000 for Bitlis.

leader the Mahmudi bey could muster, via his various subordinates, 20,000 men.

The position of prince. This was hereditary, the right of succession was generally respected and the princes' tenure of power was generally stable.[12] But in the Ottoman period powerful groups within the principality sometimes juggled with the succession, and in the late Middle Ages it was no doubt possible for the same to happen, though we have no record of its doing so in that period. In Armn. 1100/1650-51 or soon after, ten or more of what appears to have been an inner clique of influential tribe members in the entourage of Sulayman, the Mahmudi prince, plotted to kill him because the district was being ruined by raids against Sulayman. They approached Mustafa, Sulayman's brother-in-law, and offered to make him prince in Sulayman's place. They succeeded in killing Sulayman, but were frustrated in their purpose of replacing him with Mustafa, because Ibrahim, the eldest of Sulayman's brothers, became aware of the murder quickly and managed eventually to outwit the plotters; after securing his own position as prince he conducted a purge against them.[a] In the early 18th century A.D. several pashas of Van attempted to bring the hereditary Mahmudi sanjak bey of Hoşap to heel by forcing out the sitting bey and securing the appointment of a relative, either a son or a brother.[13]

The prince's subordinates. In the narration of the murder of Sulayman Beg, and the attempt to instate Mustafa, discussed immediately above (this page), Aṙak'el, the source, tells us that at the time of Sulayman's murder, Ibrahim Beg, the eldest of Sulayman's

[a] Aṙak'el (1669 ed.), 490-95. In Aṙak'el's text the incident comes after the Č'ōmar incident, which is dated 1100/1650 (Aṙak'el (1669 ed.), 480).

brothers, and Evliya Beg, the youngest, each lived in his own fortress, not far from Hoşap.[a] By itself the information does not justify precise conclusions; but it suggests that the prince's brothers, or at least near male relatives, had at their disposal, by virtue of their kinship with the prince, a castle in the neighbourhood of the capital. Probably their rank, with the opportunities that it brought them, and the dangers that it presented to the reigning prince, necessitated a private castle near Hoşap. The prince could always watch their movements, and on the other hand residence in a private castle gave them security against any sudden arbitrary acts by the reigning prince.

Aṙak'el also says that after Ibrahim Beg, the eldest of Sulayman's brothers, defeated the conspirators, thus gaining the position of prince, Evliya Beg, the youngest of the brothers, went to the fortress of Abāghay (Armn. "Apałay" or "Apała"), his previous residence.[b] Above (p.211) we identified Apała/Abāghay with the present Saray, in the upper Erçek valley, which is separated from the upper Hoşap Su valley by at least one *nāhiya* (that of Qal'a-i Ashōt, pp.210-11 above). The passage suggests that Abāghay is a family apanage to be handed to members of the family, according to rank, expediency and so on, in successive dispensations. (The implication is that Evliya holds two estates, that of Abāghay (the upper Erçek valley), and the castle near Hoşap.) Āghchaqal'a seems to have been another family apanage similar to Abāghay (above, p.209 and n.3).

Above (sect.1) six castles with dependent *nāhiyas*, which together seemed to make up the principality's territory, were identified. Five of the six became Ottoman sanjaks after the principality finally passed into the Ottoman empire (mid-16th century A.D.: see next section): the exception is Qal'a-i Ashōt, which probably stuck with Hoşap.[14] As late as

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[a] Aṙak'el (1669 ed.), 494.

[b] Aṙak'el (1669 ed.), 495.

the mid-17th century all six castles were thought of as Mahmudi sanjaks (above, sect.1). Hoşap was the estate of the ruling prince, although some of the land in its district seems to have been hived off as minor estates for the prince's closest relatives, some of whom at least had other and probably larger estates elsewhere in the principality (above, p.215). Judging by the evidence of the Ottoman period, Āqchaqal'a and Abāghay were apanages of the prince's family (pp.209 & 215). Of the others, perhaps some or all were of the same status. Any that were not were perhaps estates ruled by the chief of a tribal section subordinate to the Mahmudi.

3. History of the principality

The first reliable mention of Hoşap as the residence of a Kurdish prince or chief occurs in the passage of Yāqūt discussed in Ch.2; Kangavar is mentioned by Yāqūt in the same terms as Hoşap. Yāqūt's evidence relates to the early 13th century. According to him, a series of castles in Zawazān, the mountainous area between the Bohtan valley and northern Iraq, are inhabited by members of two different Kurdish tribes. From Yāqūt's evidence can be extracted the limited conclusion that a Kurdish prince, almost certainly tribal, sat at Hoşap, and another sat at Kangawar/Āqchaqal'a, who may or may not have been subordinate to that at Hoşap. It is possible, but cannot be substantiated, that the Mahmudi dynasty already existed and held Hoşap.[15]

According to the *Sherefname* the Mahmudi principality was founded when Kara Yusuf the Kara Koyunlu gave the two *nāhiyas* of Ashōt and Khōshāb to Shaykh Mahmūd, a relative, according to one tradition [i.e. a tradition reported by the *Sherefname*], of the

Bukhti, the Kurdish rulers of Jazira (modern Cizre).[16] That Kara Yusuf confirmed one of the Mahmudi amirs in the possession of Hoşap and Qal'a-i Ashōt is no doubt historically accurate, but by this time the principality probably encompassed the other estates (Erçek, Abāghay etc.).

The *Sherefname*'s next mention of the principality comes during the Ak Koyunlu occupation of the Van area, when the fortunes of the ruling amir, Mīr Husayn Bêg, rose, and the *nāhiya* of Albāq (the Başkale plain) was "liberated" from the Hakkari principality. However after several invasions of the latter principality's territory, 'Izz al-Din Shir of Hakkari (not the better-known 'Izz al-Din who had dealings with Timur and Kara Yusuf) got help from the amir of Bitlis and Mīr Husayn of Hoşap was killed.[17]

In the short Safavid occupation of the Van region, 'Ivāz Bêg (the ruling Mahmudi prince) quarrelled with the Safavid governor of Van and Vostan, and was for a time imprisoned at Van. Sharaf Khān of Bitlis pillaged the district of Van and Vostan with the threat of continuing the pillage until 'Ivāz Bêg was let go; and this secured his release.[a]

The Mahmudi principality, unlike the other emirates of the region, seems never to have left Safavid allegiance until Süleyman I's campaign of A.D. 1533-34 (see below). The same 'Ivāz Bêg was made governor of his principality's territory by Shah Tahmasp I (reign started A.D. 1518). This allowed 'Ivāz Bêg to secure the *nāhiya* of Albāq for his principality once again.[b]

A few years later the reigning Mahmudi, Shāh 'Alī Bêg, was killed, and the principality was given to a Kızılbaş amir called Delū-Pīrī; the natural heir, Hamza, was

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[a] Sh.I.302. At I.436-7 the same event is alluded to, with the additional information that the Kızılbaş helped the Mahmudi in the attack on the Hakkari.

[b] Sh.I.302.

made his subordinate. However the Mahmudi tribe killed Delū-Pīrī and made Hamza prince. As a result, Hamza and other Mahmudi aghas were sent to Khoy to serve the Dunbeli tribe, who were at that time administering Khoy for the Safavids. Khān Muhammad Benjevī, a Mahmudi, was temporarily put in charge of the principality. However he was imprisoned in Van, the Dunbeli killed Hamza and the aghas, and the Mahmudi principality was given to the Dunbeli. Khan Muhammad then escaped from his prison and evicted the Dunbeli beys from the Mahmudi castles. On the news that an Ottoman messenger had been despatched to Muhammad, Shah Tahmasp wrote a diploma (manshūr) of command over the Mahmudi for Muhammad.[18]

However, during the attack of Süleyman I on Azerbayjan in A.D. 1533-4, the principality's allegiance shifted to the Ottoman empire.[a] It was made a hereditary *hükumet* (a sanjak where the traditional institutions were converted into Ottoman ones without curtailing the right of hereditary succession to the position of prince).[b] By the end of the 16th century A.D., several of the ruling Mahmudi prince's relatives, and perhaps other members of the tribe, were in Ottoman government posts outside Mahmudi territory, although after the principality's shift of allegiance some junior Mahmudi princes had taken posts in the Safavid empire.[19]

In the mid- and late 17th century the beys of Hoşap showed marked recalcitrance, to say the least, from time to time.[20] The 18th century saw a whole series of expeditions by the pasha of Van against the bey at Hoşap. Some of these expeditions were aimed at

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[a] Sh.I.307. The principality was "bestowed" on Hasan by Süleyman, just as Tahmasp (I.306-7) had done.

[b] Dankoff, *Bitlis* 15. This is fully discussed in Ch.II, sect. 2.7. The Mahmudi principality also negotiated the right not to pay tax on the sheep belonging to the Mahmudi tribe: Sh.I.307.

replacing the bey with another of his family.[21] The sources do not usually so much as hint at the reasons for these expeditions. However it may be surmised that the beys of Hoşap failed from time to time to provide their large quota of troops for expeditions, despite having ample troops available; and that they were responsible for some damaging raids on nearby sanjaks. They probably took advantage of their position on the border with Persia, and may well have carried out raids in concert with Persian forces conducting border manoeuvres.[22] They probably interfered with traffic passing between Khoy and Van, as the most direct tracks went through the principality's territory.[23] Any inhibition on the part of the pashas of Van against mounting expeditions to Hoşap must have been diminished by the Yezidism of the Mahmudi tribe, or part of it. Indeed in the case of one expedition at least, the source clearly implies that the expedition was aimed at massacring or otherwise persecuting Yezidis.[24]

4. Role of the principality

There is practically no evidence directly and explicitly relevant to the Mahmudi principality's activities and role during the Kara Koyunlu period. To reconstruct from the preceding discussion a picture of its probable role under the Kara Koyunlu we shall begin with the relevant geographical and economic aspects.

The principality occupied a position behind the lake shore (above, p.212). It was somewhat secluded, apart from the circumstance that the routes between Tabriz and Van came through its territory.[a] The economy of its territory seems to have been mainly

[a] Some comment on this, n.23, and Appendix I, Hoşap.

agricultural and pastoral, probably more the latter than the former. There is some evidence that it was self-sufficient as regards transhumance: the movements took place within its boundaries (pp.212-13 above). There were no cities in its territory, but it is likely that the Mahmudi princes derived some revenue from the passage of merchandise through its territory.[25] The principality did not compare in size of territory or in population with those of Bitlis or Hakkari; but after those two it was easily the largest.

However the principality seems to have been little affected by internal tribal divisions (as Bitlis and Hakkari were) or by dynastic conflict,[26] and the princes could count on a loyal and united tribe. It was hard for an outside power to defeat the tribe on its own territory. Outside powers tried to control the tribe by deposing the prince and replacing him either with a close relative or with an outsider. But this never worked. The many Ottoman attempts to replace the Mahmudi prince with a relative seem to have ended in defiance on the part of the new prince or the latter's successor.[a] Even the policy, tried by Tahmasp, of leading away the prince and the leading aghas to captivity did not work, because the Mahmudi simply assassinated the Kızılbaş appointee. Tahmasp then appointed Muhammad Benjevī, a cousin of the deposed prince. Later a different policy again was put into effect. The Dunbeli tribe were allowed to take over the government of the principality; but the Mahmudi simply recaptured the castles from them.[b]

Thus, although the principality did not have the potential for much influence outside its own boundaries, its resources were ideal for large-scale raids on neighbouring districts, and the story of Ottoman punitive expeditions against Hoşap in the 17th and 18th centuries

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[a] Discussed pp.218-19 above and esp. notes 20 and 21.

[b] Discussed on p.218 above, and in n.3 (on Āghchaqal'a).

suggests that it did indulge in such raids during those centuries.[a] The secluded position of the principality and the powerful castle of Hoşap made it difficult to conquer the principality or even punish it except by raiding its villages in turn. Over the medieval dynasties the Ottoman pashas of Van had the advantage of gunpowder and greater proximity; medieval rulers would have been more reluctant to mount an expedition against Hoşap. (But İskender's capture of Van in A.D. 1425 may have been partly aimed at controlling the Mahmudi amirs.)[b]

The principality's ambitions in its relations with neighbours, both during the late medieval and during the Ottoman period, are likely to have centred on disputes over land with the Hakkari principality. In such disputes the Bitlis principality seems generally to have come to the help of its enemy, Hakkari.[27] Such a paradox is not so uncommon.[28]

During the Ottoman period the Mahmudi princes seem to have been able to exploit their position as a border principality of the empire.[c] This suggests that when Azerbayjan was controlled by a different overlord from that controlling the Van area, or there was no enmity between the two powers, the Mahmudi prince's position was considerably weaker than during the Ottoman period. Such is likely to have been the case under the Kara Koyunlu.

Under the Ak Koyunlu the Mahmudi were able to take the *nāhiya* of Albāq from the Hakkari principality and subsequently to invade that principality's territory several times.[d] The mechanism by which the acquisition of Albāq is most likely to have been achieved

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[a] Discussion pp.218-19 above.

[b] On the capture of Van, p.190 above.

[c] For the Ottoman expeditions against Hoşap as evidence of persistent recalcitrance, pp.218-19 and esp. notes 20 and 21 above. Discussion of the advantage of nearness to the border, p.219.

[d] N.17 above, (a) and (b).

is the following. The Ak Koyunlu, of course, controlled an empire which included Armenia and parts of Iran. However the Hakkari principality defied the Ak Koyunlu, and the Hakkari prince was at one point expelled by them.[29] Submissiveness to the Ak Koyunlu on the part of the Mahmudi prince probably exploited the Hakkari principality's defiance, and gained him Albāq.

The Hakkari principality, although generally posing no fundamental threat to the Kara Koyunlu, engaged in many wrangles with that dynasty. Of this the Mahmudi could easily have taken advantage. But in general the Mahmudi princes, although secure in their own territory, are likely to have been relatively powerless in the face of the Kara Koyunlu and of their local enemies, the Hakkari principality.

IV. HIZAN AND MOKS

1. Introduction

In this section we shall deal with a series of small estates which were severally combined into three separate principalities. These estates together account for the Hizan basin, the Müküs valley and to an extent at least the Bohtan valley downstream of Zṙēl/Ziril Kale. The Hizan basin and the Müküs valley are drained respectively by the Gindig Su and the Müküs Çay. Each river is an affluent of the Bohtan Su; and the sector of the Bohtan into which the two valleys debouch is clearly defined and marked off from the next sector downstream by a hill barrier. This sector of the Bohtan valley coheres and communicates naturally with the Hizan basin and Müküs valley.

Historically the three districts (Hizan basin, Müküs valley, Bohtan valley) had been combined in the principality of Mokk'. This is last heard of in the late 10th century.[1] In the early 7th-century document called the *Ašxarhac'oyc'* Mokk' is represented as composed of a large number of districts apparently too small to function as family or tribe principalities, and certainly much smaller than the great majority of the districts enumerated elsewhere in the document.[a]

In the area as a whole (the three larger districts -- Hizan basin, Müküs valley, Bohtan valley -- taken together) the situation in the early Ottoman period and (we shall argue) the late Middle Ages was similar. The tiny sanjaks of the early Ottoman period,

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[a] Below, sect.3.

descendants of late medieval estates, are at first sight too small for viability as family or tribe principalities. They are in fact a series of estates, each in the hands of a petty amir, whose interrelationships, apparently preserved, with few changes, down the centuries, are explicable by reference to family ties between the respective amirs.

Such an explanation, however, does not go far enough. It fails to show that, and why, the Hizan-Moks area was split between three principalities, each composed of smaller amirates. Other areas, some of them larger than this, were held by just one principality (for example the Mahmudi), but split into a number of apanages. The *Sherefname* treats the Hizan-Moks area as a series of individual principalities on the one hand, and the Mahmudi as a single principality on the other.

The Hizan-Moks area differed from other principalities such as the Mahmudi by reason of the local population's character and for reasons of local topography and economy. The valleys which constituted the individual estates were pockets of purely Armenian population, each relatively self-sufficient in an economic sense, and having little easy communication with its neighbours. There was no Kurdish stratum spread over the whole area, as in the case of the Mahmudi. The individual component districts were defined and separated by the incidence of chains of difficult hills, and of impassable valley mouths. The difficulty of communication within the area was in certain cases compounded by the ease of communication with districts outside it: this was particularly true of the north part of the Hizan basin.

The Armenian populations of each small district were coherent societies with or without the Kurdish presence; no Kurdish tribal section or other group helped to define the districts or their populations. The amir simply occupied the district in question and dealt directly with its population. But the difference with a principality such as that of the

Mahmudi did not essentially turn on distinctions of race. A similar situation had obtained in the first half of the Middle Ages, when the small districts' petty lords were of the same race as the local population. The difference turned on the absence of a tribe or tribes, spread throughout the area, whose subdivisions helped to define the small estates and which provided a useful medium through which the prince, or princes, could govern.

2. The Ottoman sanjaks

We shall now examine the system of sanjaks into which the area was divided in the early Ottoman period. The sanjaks in question are: Hizān; Isbāīrd; Aġakīs; Gārgār; Kesān; Moks. We shall also include the *nahiye* of Namīrān.

2.1. Location of the sanjaks

Hizan (Ott. "Hizān"; Pers. "Khīzān", "Ḥizān"; Armn. "Xzan", "Xizan", "Hizan"). The residence of the bey was the town of Hizan. The sanjak occupied the south-west quadrant of the Hizan basin. The eastern border was the Gindig Su, which flows down the middle of the basin.

Isbāīrd (Ott. and Pers. form; Armn. "Sparkert", pron. "Ëspargerd", sometimes spelt in English works "Spargird"). This was the valley of the lowest eastern tributary of the Gindig Su, apart from the small valley containing the villages of Evzit, Papur etc.. The villages of Isbāīrd were Harat, Sure, Kekülan, Bast etc..

Aghakīs (Pers. form; Ott. "Aġakīs"; Armn. "Ełiłis", "Ełełis", pron. "Yeghighis", "Yegheghis", or "Axis Ełiłis"). This was the lower half of the Akhis Dere valley. Its villages were Pertek, Çakiran, Tasu, Hinzirot, Ahkis etc..

Gārgār (Ott., Pers. "Kārkār", prob. pron. "Gārgār"; Armn. "Karkar"). The upper half of the Ahkis Dere valley. The villages were Horodis, Aht, Mulk (Armn. "Młkanc'") etc..

Kesān (Pers., Ott.: Ott. sometimes "Kesānī"). The valley of the Kesan Deresi and, on the strength of the Armenian evidence presented below, the Orans Dere too. The two rivers are the upstream branches of the Gindig Su. The villages were Honik, Pindivanis, Hürüntus etc. (in the Kesan Deresi valley), those of the Orans valley; and probably those of the valley east of the Kesan Deresi, i.e. Askirin, Vartinis, Pürüz etc..

Moks (Pers., Ott. "Moks"; Armn. "Moks" (pron. "Mokës", unstressed "ë"), the name having formerly been "Mokk'"; mod. Turk. "Müküs", though used only as name of town and river). This seems to have been the whole of the Müküs Çay valley all the way to the debouchment into the Bohtan valley.

Namīrān, a *nahiye* rather than a sanjak. This is the Nemran district. The latter is defined by the short valley of the Nemrun Deresi (as it is spelt on the map) and its affluents. The Nemrun Deresi is a northern affluent of the Bohtan Su, and its valley is that immediately west of the lower reaches of the Müküs valley.

The Bohtan valley. This is not accounted for by any Ottoman sanjak, and one or more of the unplaced sanjaks of the Van province may have lain here. At any rate for the purposes of reconstructing the late Middle Ages it must be discussed here.

Hizan appears to have had at least a claim on Namīrān.[2] That would suggest, though not entail, that Namiran was contiguous with the rest of Hizan's territory, or at least with an area over which Hizan had some control. However Namiran was not contiguous with the south-west quadrant of the Hizan basin, the sanjak and immediate district of Hizan. What is contiguous is the Bohtan valley. The principality of Hizan, therefore, probably had some rights in the territory of the Bohtan valley. However parts of the valley were probably not within the control of any sedentary political authority, as they were the summer haunts of Kurds from the Mosul area and probably from that of Jazira/Cizre.[a]

2.2. Family and other relationships

The *Sherefname* says that three brothers came to the area from the district of Bilejān (north of Lake Van) and became princes respectively of Hizan, Moks and Isbāīrd.[b] The notion that the founders of the three principalities were brothers is no doubt myth; but the idea that at some remove there were family relationships between the three principalities' rulers has to be taken seriously, particularly as the text asserts at another point that the amir of Isbāīrd was the cousin of the prince of Hizan.[c] The story of the three brothers

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[a] Below, sect.4, end, and esp. Ch.II, sect. 4.2.

[b] Sh.I.217.

[c] Sh.I.219.

also suggests that the area under discussion (composed of the Hizan basin, the Müküs valley and the Bohtan valley) could at one point be more or less accounted for by the territories of the three principalities. (The three basic districts are not coextensive with the three principalities, however.) We shall try to decide whether the whole area can in fact be accounted for, and whether family relationships existed between the beys of the estates in any one principality.

It is convenient to start with Isbāīrd. The existence of the principality in the early 1490's can be guaranteed.[3] The known history of the little principality can probably be taken back another 50 years, in other words well into the Kara Koyunlu period.[4]

Shortly before Çaldıran the prince of Isbāīrd was a Mahmud. His son Ibrahim succeeded him, but another son, Sharaf, was dissatisfied and went to the Ottoman court. He got the *naḥiya* of Aghakīs detached from Isbāīrd and made into a sanjak for himself. The sanjak of Aġakīs, however, seems to have been granted on non-hereditary terms, and after his death non-hereditary beys were appointed.[a] Aghakīs was therefore in the territory of Isbāīrd during the reign of Mahmud. Very likely it was also within the territory of Isbāīrd in the Ak Koyunlu and Kara Koyunlu periods. It must have been an estate, governed by a family member, within the principality of Isbāīrd.

The first explicit mention of Moks in Kurdish hands pertains to the year 1487, when the district of Moks was attacked by the Ak Koyunlu. The amir fled, and the district of Moks was put under direct Ak Koyunlu rule.[b] The second mention concerns the rule of the amir Abdal, which perhaps started early in the Ottoman hegemony. Abdal had two sons, Ahmad and Hasan. Ahmad was his father's heir. But he was forced by the Ottoman

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[a] Sh.I.220.

[b] Clph.XV.III.118, p.98.

sultan Süleyman I to relinquish the *nahiye* of Gārgār to his brother Hasan, who held it as a sanjak. Ahmad's son Abdal (grandson of the first Abdal) regained Gārgār, however. After a marriage alliance with the Hakkari dynasty, whose territory bordered Moks to the east, Hasan received the support of that dynasty during his efforts to regain Gārgār. However Hasan's son Rustam (cousin of Abdal and another grandson of the first Abdal) succeeded in detaching Gārgār again and having it re-established as a separate sanjak. Here he was supported by the *serdar* Mustafa Paşa and by the Mahmudi tribe. The latter were rivals of the Hakkari and, again, near neighbours of Moks.[a]

A similar conclusion may be drawn to that concerning Isbāīrd and Aghakīs. In the Kara Koyunlu period Gārgār was generally an apanage within the amirate or small principality of Moks: in the Ottoman period at least, the holder of the apanage could, with outside help, break away.

The core territory of the Hizan principality was the south-west quadrant of the Hizan basin. We saw above that Namīrān, a tributary valley of the Bohtan, was an estate within the principality of Hizan. In the early Ottoman period, after the struggle for the Hizan principality between Hasan and his uncle Yusuf, Yusuf had to accept Namīrān as compensation for losing the principality.[b] Subsequently Haji, Hasan's cousin, managed to acquire Namīrān as his own estate.[c] Namīrān can be taken as a district whose status in the late Middle Ages was similar to Aghakīs and Gārgār.

The third and last district of the Hizan principality is that of the Uranc' and Kesan Deresi valleys. For reasons connected with the *early* medieval configuration of districts,

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[a] Sh.I.217-19.

[b] Sh.I.216.

[c] Sh.I.217.

the most likely compass of Kesan is both valleys rather than just that of the Kesan Deresi. As for the political associations of Kesan, we do not know the circumstances under which it became a sanjak, and have no direct evidence concerning its status before conversion into a sanjak. Given its size, perhaps it was a *nahiye* whose bey belonged to some larger principality and wished to break away, in the same manner as the beys of Aghakīs and Gārgār. If so, the larger principality was Hizan. The latter emerges as the largest of the three local principalities.

3. The Armenian evidence

The early 7th-century *Armenian Geography* or *Ašxarhac'oyc'* presents a list of the nine *gawaṙs* or districts which together constituted the *ašxarh* or province of Mokk'. The list is examined here for the sake of extra evidence and arguments with which to interpret the picture so far provided of principalities in the late Middle Ages and early Ottoman period. By examining a picture of the same area at a different period we are able to point to features of the political relationships within the area which seem to have recurred in successive periods, and which could therefore be expected to have obtained in the Kara Koyunlu period. The early 7th-century and the early Ottoman picture do appear to possess certain common features, and these in turn are explicable in terms of the area's topography and aspects of its society. The 7th-century picture is examined because there is no equivalent array of evidence for any period between then and the Ottoman period.

Mokk' was a principality in the hands of a branch of the Bagratid family from the 4th century to the 10th. On the other hand we cannot be sure that when sources mention

the principality of Mokk‘ they are referring to the same area as the *Geography*’s *ašxarh* of Mokk‘. It is important for the argument that this assumption should be made, because the circumstance that the districts in question belonged to a single principality is an important part of the 7th-century picture. It seems likely that the principality of Mokk‘ encompassed all or nearly all the districts.

The name "Mokk‘" itself, as applied to the whole *nahang* or the whole principality, requires explanation. In the Ottoman period "Moks" meant just the one valley rather than the whole area. The *Geography* also names a district called Aṙanjnak Mokk‘, literally "Special Mokk‘", but perhaps better "Mokk‘ proper". The name appears to mean the district which traditionally had been called Mokk‘, as opposed to the principality which had more recently acquired the same name. Aṙanjnak Mokk‘ can hardly fail to be the Müküs valley, or at least a part of it. The name "Mokk‘" therefore appears to have been applied to the whole area when that area became united under the one principality.

Aṙanjnak Mokk‘ appears also to have been the principality’s centre of gravity, the district where the princes of Mokk‘ most often resided. The princes may have resided in the town later called Moks or Müküs. Despite its impressive town wall Hizan would appear not to have been the capital of Mokk‘ in the early Middle Ages: the town’s defences and secure site were only put to use as a capital of any sort in the mid-12th century A.D.. At this point Hizan was certainly a separate estate or principality, while a reduced principality of Mokk‘ continued in being.

With such basic questions answered, the *Geography*’s list of districts can be examined. Hübschmann’s presentation in *Die Altarmenischen Ortsnamen* (p.331) will be followed. The districts are: 44. Išair; 45. mews Išair, "the other Išair"; 46. Išoc‘ gawaṙ (either (a) "district of Išk‘", where "Išk‘", a plural form, would be the name of a district,

or (b) "district of the Išk'", where "Išk'" would be the name of a people);[5] 47. Aṙvenic' jor; 48. Miǰa; 49. aṙanjnak Mokk'; 50. Ark'ayic' gawaṙ (lit. "Valley of the Kings"); 51. Argastovit; 52. J̌ermajor.

Of these the easiest to identify are 49. aṙanjnak Mokk' and 52. J̌ermajor. The first is the present Müküs valley. Without further argument one could not be sure whether certain side-valleys or sections of the main valley were included, but the argument below shows that the name denotes the whole valley. The second is the Bohtan valley from Ziril Kale downstream: Ziril Kale, at least in the early 10th century, lay in J̌ermajor.[a]

In the name "Išair" (no.45) it is easy to recognise the later "Isbāīrd" (Pers., Ott.). But this only certifies that the Isbāīrd valley (Kekülan, Süre etc.) was one or the other of Išair (no.45) and mews Išair ("the other Išair"; no.46). In and of itself it does not determine which of the two was the Isbāīrd valley or the location of whichever was not. However the answers to these two questions are made considerably more secure by the Ottoman and late medieval history of Isbāīrd and Aghakīs. Most likely Išair (no.45) was the valley of Süre and Kekülan and mews Išair (no.46) the next valley northward, that of the later Aghakīs and Gārgār.

The name "Aṙvenic' jor" (no.47) means "valley (jor) of the Aṙvenk'", where "Aṙvenik'" is the name of a tribe or other group of people.[b] Alternatively "Aṙvenk'" is the name of the district, so one would translate "valley of Aṙvenk'". To identify Aṙvenic' jor with the Uṙanc' valley seems very easy, especially since "Uṙanc'" is a genitive form too. Arcruni, writing in the 10th century, implies that Aṙvenic' jor is adjacent to the path along the south shore of Lake Van connecting Tatvan and Ṙštunik' (capital Vostan). He

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[a] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 331.

[b] "Aṙvenic'" is the genitive form, "Aṙvenk'" the nominative.

also implies that Arvenic' jor was adjacent to and accessible from Erewark, the later Karǰikan. The latter is the shore district west of the Kaputkogh peninsula, to which the Uṙanc' valley certainly is adjacent. As will shortly be seen, there are no other names available to cover the Kesan Deresi valley, and it seems that the Kesan Deresi valley should be included in Arvenic' jor.[6]

Miǰa (no.48) is placed by Eremyan in what he calls the Mamrtank' district, in other words the Nemran district. Eremyan's reason is the existence of a village of Miǰa in that district. Although the present writer has not found the name on a map, the reason seems sound and Nemran is a district with well-defined borders, difficult to subsume in any other district.[7]

Ark'ayic' jor (no.50) is identified by Eremyan with aṙanjnak Mokk' (no.49). Intuitively this makes good sense; in other words the document is presenting as names for two districts what actually are two names for the same district. The "valley of the kings" was the district where the princes of Mokk' resided.[a] This is the least rigorously arguable of the identifications; however there are no positive grounds for putting Ark'ayic' jor anywhere else, and, as the next paragraph will show, the scheme so far is highly satisfactory as regards geographical principle of organisation and completeness of coverage.

Only Išoc' gawaṙ (no.46) and Argastovit (no.51) are unplaced. Even without placing them, a scheme of organisation is apparent. The *Geography*'s list ends with J̌ermajor. Two items before that we have aranjnak Mokk', the Müküs valley. Within the Hizan basin the list starts with the two Išairs (44, 45), in the south-east of the basin. It progresses to Išoc' gawaṙ (46), whose position in the list suggests the south-east quadrant

[a] Eremyan, *Hay. ëst Ašx.* 71.2.

of the Hizan basin, the immediate district of Hizan.[8] Next, continuing the clockwise arrangement within the Hizan basin, comes Aṙvenic' jor (47). The Hizan basin accounted for, the little district of Miǰa (48) is dealt with before crossing to aṙanjnak Mokk' (49), otherwise known as Ark'ayic' gawaṙ (50). The list is to end with J̌ermajor (52), after the scheme has described a large clockwise movement. Eremyan has cogently suggested that Argastovit (51) should be identified with the valley of the Sineber Deresi, a major southern affluent of the Bohtan, and the various ramifications of its upper river system.[9] This fits well with the general movement of the scheme.

The *Geography* is therefore giving a consistent account of the districts of Mokk', and the account is ordered according to a principle which is clear and well-suited to the positions of the districts and to local topography.

The enumeration of such a number of small districts within a "province" which in comparison to the others is already small, requires an explanation. The districts in question are not mere geographical divisions, as in that case there would be no need for the inclusion of such small ones in the *Geography*. Larger ones, perhaps the three basic districts (Hizan basin etc.) would have done. The districts are, in part, political divisions: their number reflects the area's parcellation in Late Antiquity. That in turn was caused by the geographical barriers within the area and the self-sufficient, enclosed, nature of the societies within individual valleys and other districts.

Given that all districts' masters were subject to the prince of Mokk', there are a number of different forms which the area's political parcellation could have taken. The districts could severally have been combined into a smaller number of sub-principalities, or they could each have been the domain of a petty ruler directly subordinate to the prince

of Mokk'. There could have been family ties between one district's ruler and another and between the district's rulers and the prince of Mokk'.

4. Character of the principalities

In this section we shall attempt to bring together the threads of the arguments presented so far, and to draw a picture of the three principalities, first in general terms, then one by one. In the next section (sect.5) we shall attempt a history of the principality of Hizan, the only one of the three on which enough material is available for a history through time as opposed to an estimate of character. As usual this will allow its political and social constitution to be seen in operation over a period.

4.1. General character

(a) Internal constitution

As far as we can tell, these were tribal principalities like the others so far described. In the case of the Hizan principality one tribe is mentioned as providing part, at least, of the prince's power base. This was the Namīrān tribe.[a] Since the latter name is also the name of a small district geographically isolated from the Hizan basin, the essential territory of Hizan, it is hard to draw conclusions about the relation between this tribe and the principality. Elsewhere in the *Sherefname*, two tribes are mentioned as intervening in the

[a] Sh.I.211.

principality's affairs during the Ottoman period. These are the Belīlān and the Shīrevan.[a] However these are likely to have been strictly extraneous to the Hakkari principality.[b] Otherwise we do not know which tribes formed the base for the three principalities, nor whether the same tribe supplied the base for all three. Moreover tribal divisions (whether between or within tribes) do not seem, as in other principalities, to have helped define territorial divisions or any other type of division within each principality. In part this was because the proportion of Kurds to Armenians was particularly low. The Namīrān district, if an exception at all, is probably the only one. We have no information on the tribes of the Hizan basin.

More fundamentally it was because of the stability of local Armenian society and its organisation into self-sufficient compartments. The Hizan basin is a fertile area, with the capacity for a balanced produce. On the other hand it is highly compartmentalised by the incidence of its ridges and gorges. The Müküs valley is predominantly pastureland, but still hard of access owing to its steep and high boundary ridges: the same is true of the Namīrān/Namrun district.

Thus the districts ruled by the princes and their petty vassals were defined by local Armenian society. The local rulers can have relied little on Kurdish support, as the Kurdish element was so small.

We shall shortly attempt to spell out this analysis district by district, referring to features of local topography and certain limited information about local society. For the

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[a] Sh.I.215, 216. The Shīrevān played a part in the Yusuf and Hasan episode: see sect.5.

[b] This chapter, sect.II.4.

present we will concentrate on the exiguous textual evidence that the principalities here were tribal ones on a model similar to some of those so far described.

The first known event in the Hizan principality's history is the amir Sulaymān's abdication in favour of his son Dāwud in 1417. Subsequently, when Dāwud's rule, for some reason, dissatisfied him, he reclaimed the sovereignty.[a] A case of abdication is known from the Bitlis principality.[b] Abdication can be expected when authority ultimately stems from tribal approval. (We may not be dealing with a whole tribe; but it is convenient to discuss the Kurds of the principality as if they were a single tribe.) The principal reason for Sulaymān's abdication and return may have been the disapproval of himself, and subsequently of Dāwud, by the tribe, not by Sulaymān. There is one other instance of the deposition of his own son by a prince. Abdal Khan of Bitlis fled, admittedly after defeat by the Ottoman *beylerbeyi*, only to return and in effect depose his own son.[c]

In the 16th century, under Ottoman hegemony and probably after incorporation into the sanjak system, the prince of Hizan, Hasan, murdered his uncle Yusuf in a treacherous manner. The latter had been granted the *nahiye* of Namīrān as a compromise after a leadership struggle. Hasan was forced to sell most of his land in order to pay indemnities for the act of murder; and still he was in debt.[d] If he financed the payment of the indemnities by selling his own land, that suggests he was one landowner among several:

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[a] Clph.XV.I.212a, p.198 (S.1417.2, p.141); sect.5 below.

[b] Sect.I.5.(ix), p.129.

[c] Sect.I.5.(ix), p.131.

[d] Sh.I.216-17.

a status which the Bitlis princes seem also to have held.[a] As before, the episode is merely consistent with the supposition of a tribal principality, and rings true on that supposition. It does not provide proof.

During the Ottoman period, in 1005/1597, a struggle took place between the incoming bey of Moks, Ahmad, and the lord of Gārgār. The latter, Hasan, was Ahmad's second cousin.[10] We are told that Ahmad, "with the agreement of the peoples and clans (*aqvām va qabāīl*) went out of the *qal'a* to repulse Hasan Beg".[b] The passage at least indicates a body of tribal Kurds in Moks; it is not adequate ground for the deduction that those Kurds belonged to different peoples, tribes or tribal sections.

(b) External relations

Above (sect.I.4.1) it was argued that Hizan was at least from time to time a vassal of Bitlis, both in the late Middle Ages and during the 16th and 17th centuries; and the Abdal Khan episode suggests that that prince had established some kind of ascendancy over Isbāīrd too.[11] Similarly it has been seen that in the Ottoman period the Hakkari and Mahmudi intervened in the affairs of Moks (sect.2). These two circumstances argue plausibly for the notion that the whole area was one in which Bitlis and Hakkari played and competed for influence; from time to time at least Hizan was the protégé of Bitlis and Moks the protégé of Hakkari. They also help to explain the precise manner of the area's fragmentation: three small principalities, including a small one (Isbāīrd) between Hizan and Moks.

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[a] Sect.I.3.1.(b) above.

[b] Sh.I.218-19.

If Bitlis and Hakkari could hold Hizan and Moks as protégés, could they ever have subsumed those little principalities into their own ? In the conditions of the late Middle Ages, this would have been impossible. A trio of circumstances, each insufficient on its own, combined to prevent the process. First, such an extension of authority was obstructed by the terrain. Second, whichever of Hakkari or Bitlis was making the attempt to annexe Moks or Hizan, the other would work to prevent it doing so. Third, it is safe to assume the Kurds of Hizan, Moks and Isbāīrd belonged to different tribes from any in Bitlis or Hakkari. Despite these circumstances, there was scope within the area for some change in the borders and composition of its mosaic of small principalities, and scope, too, for the two bigger powers to play a part in such a change.

In short, the parcellation of the area into several principalities, each composed of a number of small estates, while chiefly the product of local topography and society, was helped by the presence of the two great principalities of Bitlis and Hakkari. In the late Middle Ages this was an equilibrium state: it not merely existed, but for good reasons persisted.

4.2. The individual principalities

We shall now look at the principalities one by one and provide some substance for the statement that their composition and constitution was chiefly determined by local topography and society.

Hizan. The core district, the south-western quadrant of the Hizan basin, was the former Išoc' gawaṙ named in the 7th-century *Geography*. This consisted essentially of a series of

narrow valleys and confined basins separated by steep, wooded riges. The district is hot, but well-watered. Each valley supports wheat, fruit-trees or vines.[12]

The Uŕanc'/Orans and Kesan Deresi valleys were together the district of Aŕvenic' jor, later the sanjak of Kesan. Both are steep-sided and confined.[13] The Uŕanc' valley must have been a purely Armenian district and one difficult for raiders or prospective settlers to penetrate. It was here that the patriarch of Aghtamar fled in 1432 after the occupation of the island by Pīrī Bêg.[a] We suggested above that Kesan was a component of the Hizan principality; but it was easy to detach, as the sanjak of Kesan, because the valleys, and in particular that of the Kesan Dere, were easily accessible from the north and therefore from outside the principality.[b]

The Namīrān/Nemran district, another *nahiye* of the Hizan principality, was reported in the early 20th century as well-cultivated; most of the villages were Armenian; several deep valleys drained into it.[c] The district communicates easily with the Bohtan valley, but must have been somewhat remote from the Hizan basin and the district of the town of Hizan. With the latter it could only communicate via Isbāīrd or via the Bohtan valley, over which the Hizan principality may have had only limited rights. Namīrān would have been an easy district to detach from the Hizan principality, and was certainly an easy one in which to settle a defeated candidate for the position of prince.

Isbāīrd. The map suggests that the valley is confined and steep. Much fruit grew there.[d]

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[a] Appendix V, p.511.

[b] *Hdbk. (1917)* 215.

[c] *Hdbk.* 208.

[d] *Hdbk.* 216.

The district of Aghakīs, the lower half of the Ahkis Dere, was a vassal *nahiye*, in the ruling family's hands, until converted to a separate sanjak under the Ottomans. No information on its products, but it was peopled wholly by Armenians until at least the end of the 19th century.[a]

Moks. The Müküs valley is deep and steep-sided: in its upper levels it provides fine pastures, for which at least in the late 19th century it was well-known.[b] But by the river in the valley's base was agricultural land, described at the end of the Ottoman period as "well-cultivated".[c]

Gārgār was the upper half of the Ahkis valley, and a *nahiye* of the Moks principality, probably in the ruling family's hands, until the creation of a separate sanjak in the 16th century. Again its population was wholly Armenian at least until the end of the 19th century.[d] It was difficult of access and lay off the main tracks. It was adjacent to the Müküs valley, but difficult to reach over the high, bare watershed. Consequently it is easy to understand both its inclusion within, and its detachment from, Moks.

The Bohtan valley. It was suggested above that none of the small principalities could count this as one of its *nahiyes*, but that the principality of Hizan may have had some limited involvement there. Strictly it does not belong to this survey; but for the sake of

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[a] Thierry, "Monastères IV" [REArm 7 (1970)], 165.

[b] Cuinet II.715.

[c] *Hdbk.* 209.

[d] Thierry, "Monastères IV" [REArm 7 (1970)], 165.

completeness and to illuminate the reasons why none of the reasons managed to gain full control over it, we end with one or two remarks on its use.

On the valley floor, near the river, there was much cultivation, including fruit-growing and beekeeping.[a] On the slopes to either side, however, were expanses of wooded, uninhabited grazing land, to which Kurdish groups from the districts of Cizre and Mosul came in summer.[b]

5. History of the Hizan principality

The first certain reference to the principality comes in 1417, when a colophon reports: "the amir Dayut' [Pers. "Dāwud"]'s father gave his own *huk'm* [Arab. & Pers. "ḥukm", "government"] to his son; but when he failed to heed his command he took it back and banished [his son]".[c] From the events of 1421 we know that the father's name was Sulaymān. As usual the reference is ambiguous in its implications, but appears to mean that Sulaymān abdicated in favour of his son, but when the son, Dāwud, began to abuse his power or, perhaps, to break certain conditions he had accepted at the time of the abdication, Sulaymān evicted Dāwud and remained as prince for some years.

In 1417 the principality was the vassal of Kara Yusuf.[d] After Kara Yusuf's death, however, Sulaymān, like other local princes, lost no time in acknowledging the

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[a] Cuinet II.615; *Hdbk. (1917)* 207-8.

[b] Cizre district: above, p.74. Mosul: Cuinet II.615-16 (from Mosul); cf. *Hdbk.* 208.

[c] Clph.XV.I.212a, p.198 (S.1417.2, p.141).

[d] Clph.XV.I.274, p.247 (S.1420, p.146).

overlordship of Shah Rukh. He sent his son to Shah Rukh; it is significant that the son went in the company of Shams al-Dīn of Bitlis.[a] This son was probably Dāwud, since the latter succeeded his father in the same year; but if so Dāwud must have been forgiven by early 1421.

However during İskender's first invasion of the Van region, later in 1421, he was joined by forces from Hizan,[b] so the principality had probably dropped the allegiance to Shah Rukh within a year. On the other hand, since Bitlis had not submitted to İskender, and was only forced to do so in 1423, Hizan at this stage appears to have broken free of its ties to Bitlis. By this time Sulaymān had been succeeded by Dāwud.[c]

The reign of Dāwud lasted until 1442 at least; he appears to have been loyal to Iskender and then to Jahan Shah.[d] Dāwud was followed by another Sulaymān, who is known in 1456 and 1459, and was, again, loyal to Jahan Shah.[e] A prince of unknown identity was also Hasan 'Ali's vassal in 1468.[14]

In 1497 a second Dāwud ruled the principality of Hizan.[f] Soon after Shah Ismail's accession a second Dāwud of Hizan, like the other Kurdish princes of this and other regions, submitted to Ismail.[g] The same Dāwud, however, may have left Ismail's allegiance by 1507, just as the two largest principalities of the Van region had done.

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[a] Sh.I.212.

[b] T'M 79.

[c] Clph.I.293, p.267 (S.1421.12, p.149).

[d] Clph.XV.I.388, p.367 (S.1427.3, p.173); 441, p.412 (S.1431.3, p.179); 607, p.538 (S.1442.4, p.198); III.Add.512.a,p.377 (year 1434).

[e] Clph.XV.II.104, p.76 (S.1456.5, p.256); 155, p.118 (S.1459.3, p.264).

[f] Clph.XV.III.327, p.238.

[g] Sh.I.409.

Dāwud was one of the amirs who helped to regain Bitlis for Sharaf (later Sharaf Khan) after the battle of Koçhisar in 1516.[a] It appears to have been the same Dāwud who helped the Ottoman expedition under Ulama and Fīl Ya'ḳūb to besiege Bitlis in 1532. Although Bitlis was relieved by Shah Tahmasp, Dāwud's action incurred the wrath of Sharaf, and in 1533 Sharaf besieged Dāwud in Hizan before Sharaf was defeated and killed by a second Ottoman expedition.[b] However Dāwud was, after all, an Ottoman vassal.[c]

In the remaining years of the 16th century the little we know of the principality suggests that in that period Ottoman rule provided a cover for family strife, and at the same time the authorities were involved in and sometimes fostered that strife. It is during this period that the struggle between the reigning Hasan and his uncle Yusuf, the latter backed by the sultan and vizier, took place. After one defeat Yusuf tried again, and was killed by Hasan in a treacherous manner. He incurred such odium that he had to pay large indemnities to the government, sold most of his land, and remained in debt even then. Finally Hasan was ousted from the position of prince-cum-sanjak bey by his cousin Haji, and pensioned off with the *nahiye* of Marwanan.[d]

We know at least the name, Hasan, of the prince-cum-sanjak bey in the early 17th century.[15] In 1700 took place an attack on Hizan by the pasha of Van, which shows with reasonable certainty that Hizan went the way of other local principalities: it committed

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[a] Sh.I.417-18; sect.I.5.(vii).

[b] Sh.I.431-4. At I.213 the *Sherefname* states that in 940/1533 Ahmad (not Dāwud) of Hizan instigated Ulama to attack Bitlis.

[c] He is mentioned in the 1527 list of Ottoman vassals: Kunt, *Sultan's Servants* 108.

[d] Sh.I.216-17; above, sect.2.

rebellious acts such as refusing to provide men for the army or a local raid, and an expedition had to be mounted against him.[16]

6. Conclusions

In the late Middle Ages there existed in the Hizan basin and Müküs valley a political equilibrium brought about jointly by topography, and hence features of local society, and by the competitive but balancing ambitions of the Bitlis and Hakkari principalities. The area is fertile and productive on the one hand, but naturally compartmentalised on the other. There were fewer Kurds than elsewhere in the Van region. So although the local principalities were tribal, the basic sub-divisions of the area were determined by local Armenian society and not by the divisions of Kurdish society. These basic sub-divisions were estates severally combined to form the area's three small principalities, one of which was generally the vassal of Bitlis and the other of which was generally the vassal of Hakkari. The presence of Bitlis and Hakkari to one side and to the other helped to maintain the area's parcellation into estates and small principalities, without tending to destroy those small principalities' separate identities.

In trying to reconstruct any dealings the local principalities might have had with the Kara Koyunlu, the risk of inaccuracy due to lack of evidence is even greater than in the reconstruction of the local principalities themselves. But petty princes in an area so difficult of access from the shore of Lake Van cannot have had many direct dealings with the Kara Koyunlu. They are much more likely to have maintained direct contact only with the neighbouring principalities of Bitlis and Hakkari.

CHAPTER FOUR

TERRITORY DIRECTLY ADMINISTERED BY THE KARA KOYUNLU

1. Introduction

In this chapter we consider the evidence for organised administration and personnel in the area round the north-east corner of Lake Van, which was governed directly by the Kara Koyunlu. The land use and inhabitants of each district are briefly examined; whether a district was under cultivation or used by pastoralists, and whether the inhabitants were Armenian or Kurdish, had an important bearing on the character of administration there. The evidence for governors in individual districts is examined, and a case made out for the existence of a command over the whole district as well as governorships in individual districts. It seems certain that in an administrative sense Adilcevaz, not Erciş (as might be expected), was the most important of the cities.

2. The districts

A. The Erciş plain or (Armn.) K'ajberunik'. The plain is well-watered by streams from both the Boz Dağ and the Ala Dağ. To the west the boundary with the district of

Arckē/Adilcevaz was probably the hills immediately west of the city of Erciş; otherwise the district of Adilcevaz would have consisted in little other than a shore strip defined by Şüphan Dağ and a range of hills to its west.

B. The district of Arckē/Adilcevaz or (Armn.) Bznunik'. To the north this was defined by Şüphan Dağ and the ridge of which that mountain forms part. To the south-west and south of Şüphan Dağ the district consists of a series of well-watered valleys descending into the lake; east of Adilcevaz the mouths of these valleys are connected by a fertile shore strip. Further east the land beneath Şüphan Dağ, including the Arin peninsula, is a plain.[a]

C. The Malazgirt district. Its primary constituent was the great plain, once called Apahunik', of which Malazgirt was the focal settlement. To the north is a second plain. This is joined by a flat corridor to that of Apahunik' and is likewise watered by the Murat Su. The northerly plain and its basin probably formed part of the district of Malazgirt; the alternative would be to suppose that they were governed from Alashkerd and combined with the Alashkerd plain for administrative purposes. The clearest natural border is the range of hills bounding the Alashkerd plain along its southern side. So in this period the northerly plain, which communicated in any case with that of Malazgirt, very likely belonged to Malazgirt. Lastly, there is evidence that a third plain, west of Malazgirt, was also attached to that city. This was the valley-plain of the Kör Su, an affluent of the Murat Su. It is convenient to call this valley-plain Upper Bulanık. Lower Bulanık consisted of the remainder of the Murat Su valley and those of its southern affluents as far as its

[a] On the extent of the district of Adilcevaz, Appendix III (Ottoman evidence). As the Appendix makes clear, the medieval district of Adilcevaz may have extended north of Şüphan Dağ and its ridge into what became in Ottoman times the *nahiye* of Sarı Su.

southerly bend. Lower Bulanık belonged to Hınıs, one of the districts constituting the Bitlis principality.

D. Berkri and its plain. The plain stretches south-westwards from the town; in strict topographical terms it ends at the hills a little southwest of the mouth of the Bendimahi Çay. However the district probably spread along the southerly shore of the lake's north-east finger, in other words it included the shore strip generally associated with the plain of Berkri in the past. The limit would have lain some way short of Amiuk.

E. The Çaldıran plain (as it is now called, on the false presumption that the Ottoman-Safavid battle took place here). This was called by Armenians the plain of Gaṙn or Gaṙni (after the early medieval name of the district centred on the plain). The plain and the Ala Dağ to the north were known together as the *district* of Ala Dağ (Pers. "Ālātāq" and variant spellings); in the medieval sources the name did not denote a mountain. The plain extends south all the way to the upper catchment area of the Kara Su. Just over a range of hills forming the southern border of the plain was another plain, which is now centred on the town of Saray. This plain, part of the Erçek Su river system, was a constituent district of the Mahmudi principality's territory.

3. Land use and population

The Erciş plain, the district of Adilcevaz and that of Berkri were essentially agricultural areas. The agriculture was complemented by fruit-growing, especially in and around

Adilcevaz and, in the Erciş basin, at the base of the Ala Dağ.[a] The Ala Dağ and Boz Dağ provided excellent summer pasture.

The terrain of the Malazgirt district and of the Çaldıran plain lent itself easily to agriculture, but the meagre evidence indicates that after the arrival of the Mongols agriculture took second place to pastoralism. The low revenues from the two districts reported by Mustawfi indicate a small agricultural population.[b] By the mid-19th century at least, the Malazgirt district was as much the haunt of transhumant pastoralists as it was the residence of cultivators.[c] A potent index of the greater emphasis on pastoralism in the Malazgirt district is the decline of the city of Malazgirt, which started at a point somewhere in the 13th century: this point may well have been the Mongol conquest (A.D. 1242 or 1243).[d]

The Çaldıran plain, in Urartian and no doubt early medieval times, was evidently in intensive agricultural use. The number of villages and small towns, relative to the land area, was large.[1] By the 1930's the plain was used largely by the Kurdish pastoralists who summered there.

Pastoralism was perhaps not so predominant in these two districts in the late Middle Ages as it was in the mid-19th century. But the situation may well have been that the two districts had been partially converted to pastoral use, following the arrival of the Mongols, in the late Middle Ages.

A further piece of evidence, while relying on even more complex arguments than

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[a] Appendix I, Erciş and Adilcevaz.

[b] *Nuzhat* (LS), 101.

[c] Blau, "Tribes" [1], 593-4.

[d] Appendix I, Malazgirt.

the evidence so far adduced, may help in the derivation of some notion as to the identity of the pastoralists. It is convenient to take the example of the Çaldıran plain first. In the Ottoman period this was known as Abaghā or Abāqāy (Pers.; Ott. "Abāġāy"[a]). In the second half of the 16th century we hear three times of the bestowal of Abāqāy on members of the Dunbeli tribe's leading family, or of the possession of Abāqāy by one of the family.[2]

The frequency of bestowal and possession does not automatically imply prior residence; but is nevertheless a strong pointer to the fact. This apart, other areas granted to the Dunbeli in the same period indicate that the Abaghā plain was one of the regular summer grazing-grounds of the Dunbeli. After the second of the above grants of Abāqāy to a Dunbeli, the districts of Chaldīrān, Sulaymān Sarāy and Sukmānābād were granted to the Dunbeli chief.[b] Of these districts Chaldīrān is north-east of the Abaghā plain (not that plain itself, as the erroneous location of the battle would suggest); Sulaymān Sarāy is the district of the present Sarāy, just south of the Abaghā plain; and Sukmānābād is a district, centred on a plain, between Kotur and Khoy. Of the four districts, two are to the west of the heights forming the present political border, and two are to the east. The areas bestowed on the Dunbeli reflect the pattern of their summer and winter transhumance. A similar pattern was maintained in the mid-19th century by the Melanli tribe.[c]

The Dunbeli are first heard of during the Ak Koyunlu occupation of the Lake Van region. When the Hakkari principality's ruling family was expelled by the Ak Koyunlu,

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[a] For more spellings of this name, Appendix I, Ala Dağ palace.

[b] Sh.I.316.

[c] Blau, "Tribes" [1], 589-90.

the Dunbeli were given responsibility for and power over that principality.[a] Later, the Dunbeli were given the temporary governorship of the Mahmudi principality by Shah Tahmasp.[b] Now if the Dunbeli tribe existed in the Ak Koyunlu occupation, it is reasonable to assume that it did so during the Kara Koyunlu period.

Certainly when the Mahmudi principality was bestowed on the Dunbeli, the latter were a natural choice as the replacement for an evicted local dynasty: their own territory bordered Mahmudi territory, indeed they may well have summered regularly on Mahmudi territory if Sulaymān Sarāy was, as suggested above, part of their summer grazing area. Now the narratives of the two above cases (Hakkari and Mahmudi) of local principalities' being handed over to the Dunbeli contain no reference to the habitual residence of the latter tribe at the time. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that their summer and winter grazing grounds had changed between the Ak Koyunlu period and the second half of the 16th century; and as just intimated, the choice of the Dunbeli to govern the Mahmudi principality in the Ak Koyunlu period tallies well with the supposition that they did graze in those same areas. No other tribe is known to have resided or summered on the Abaghā plain. The same argument can be adduced in respect of the Kara Koyunlu period.

We therefore have a reasonably trustworthy indication that in the Kara Koyunlu period the Dunbeli tribe summered in the Abaghā district. The plain, though, was shared with year-round sedentary villages. The question of the probable nature of relations between the Kara Koyunlu and Dunbeli will be dealt with in the next section.

The information regarding the Malazgirt district is considerably less helpful and

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[a] Sh.I.93.

[b] Sh.I.303-4.

even less directly relevant. In periods subsequent to the Kara Koyunlu, we know of governorships of what had been the territory directly governed by the Kara Koyunlu. Although their precise geographical constitution varied, these governorships were always centred on Erciş and Adilcevaz. The first of them was that given to the Pāzūkī tribe: the *Sherefname* enumerates the constituent districts as Kīghī/Kiğı, Erciş, Adilcevaz and Alashkert/Eleşkirt.[a] The period in question, according to the *Sherefname*, is that of the Turcomans and Safavids. The period can, however, be narrowed down. Enough information is available on the Kara Koyunlu period to show that under the Kara Koyunlu Erciş, Adilcevaz and probably Malazgirt and Berkri were a governorship which is most unlikely ever to have been given to members of the Pāzūkī tribe.[b] Moreover the other instances of the formation of such a governorship occur late in the Ak Koyunlu period or under the Safavids.

Shams al-Din, a member of the Bitlis house, attempted to reconquer his principality from the Ak Koyunlu (shortly before the successful recapture in 900/1494-95).[3] In connection with this attempt, we are told that Berkri, Erciş and Adilcevaz were in the hands of the *'ashīret* of Muḥammad Shalūvī the Turcoman.[c] At this point, then, the governorship was not in Pāzūkī hands. A similar governorship was subsequently granted by Shah Ismail to Behram Bêg Dulgadır.[d] This was probably the first such appointment by Shah Ismail.[4] At the time of Sharaf's return to Bitlis c.1516, a similar governorship was in the hands of a Kızılbaş, Kūrd Bêg Sharqlū. This governorship's constituent districts

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[a] Sh.I.328.

[b] Sect.4.

[c] Sh.I.395.

[d] Sh.I.345.

are enumerated by the *Sherefname* as Bitlis, Adilcevaz and Erciş.[a] However Bitlis could have been added to the governorship only in 1510 or 1511, when the principality of Bitlis was finally surrendered to Ismail's deputy.[b] It seems likely that other districts belonged to the governorship in 1516: the *Sherefname* mentions only three in order to indicate general extent and key cities.[5] A final appointment, relevant to the argument here but of a somewhat different nature, is that of Uways Bêg Pāzūkī to Adilcevaz by Shah Tahmasp.[c]

The above information and certain other arguments can be used to indicate where the Pāzūkī resided and the nature of their tenancy of this land. First of all we may be dealing with an eastwards-shifting picture, in which the Pāzūkī gradually rolled forwards the eastern frontiers of their penetration, and correspondingly rolled up the western frontiers. There are indications that in the reign of the Ak Koyunlu Ya'qub a Pāzūkī was recognised as lord of Çemişgezek.[d] This comes after or at roughly the same date as the appointment to the governorship of Kīghī/Kiğı, Erciş, Adilcevaz and Alashkert/Eleşkirt. Nevertheless the eastward movement seems to have been slow, it is impossible to track it except in the vaguest of terms and it is reasonable to assume for the present investigation that the Pāzūkī stayed in one place during the 15th and 16th centuries.

It is likely but not certain that for the creation of such a governorship a continuous stretch of territory would if possible be chosen. Kiğı, however, lay to the west of Bingöl Dağ, on the Peri Su, a river which joins the Murat Su well downstream from the Muş

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[a] Sh.I.414; Sharaf's return, I.412-15. See Ch.III, sect.I.5.(vii).

[b] Sh.I.406, 407; Ch.III, sect.I.5.(vii).

[c] Sh.I.330.

[d] Woods, AQ 209.

plain. Moreover it was separated from Malazgirt, not to mention Erciş and Adilcevaz, by districts of the territory of Bitlis -- the Hınıs district and Lower Bulanık. Similarly Alashkert, the Ağrı plain, does not communicate with Erciş or Adilcevaz except by a long passage of the Ala Dağ or Boz Dağ. But if we add in Malazgirt, the resulting area is one which an incoming power, given the boundaries of the Bitlis principality, might well designate a governorship. Malazgirt is not accounted for in any other manner in this period; and on the other hand the reason for the *Sherefname*'s failure to include it in the list of districts constituting the governorship is probably that, as usual, the author is trying to indicate only the governorship's whereabouts, not to give an exhaustive list of districts. This the author does by naming the key districts and those which define the governorship's overall extent. The Malazgirt district probably did form part of the governorship, and of some of the subsequent ones too.

The argument concerns not just the geographical constitution of the governorships but the area of residence of the Pāzūkī. If they could be granted a governorship including Erciş, Adilcevaz, Kiğı, Malazgirt and Eleşkirt, Malazgirt is not merely one of the Pāzūkī's districts of residence but the one where they were most thickly concentrated. Erciş and Adilcevaz were districts well suited to agriculture and fruit-growing, each supporting a prosperous city. Sections of the Pāzūkī may well have been present in those two districts. But it would not have been in the interest of the Kara Koyunlu to let them concentrate there. The district of Malazgirt, on the other hand, does seem to have been abandoned as an agricultural preserve. It is true that the Pāzūkī were given the Safavid governorship of Adilcevaz by Shah Tahmasp.[a] But this was in a period when Malazgirt was securely within the Ottoman empire.

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[a] Sh.I.330.

To summarise: the districts of Erciş, Adilcevaz and Berkri were primarily in agricultural use, and the population for the most part sedentary and Christian. In Erciş and Adilcevaz there must have been a Kara Koyunlu element; there may also have been a Kurdish element, to wit sections of the Pāzūkī tribe. In the large district of Malazgirt and in the Abaghā/Çaldıran plain, much land had been turned over to use by transhumant pastoralists. In the one case these were mostly sections of the Pāzūkī tribe and in the other members of the Dunbeli.

4. Institutions

4.1. The cities and their districts

(a) The districts: Adilcevaz

The evidence for district governorships under the Kara Koyunlu is much the best in the case of the district of Arckē/Adilcevaz. During Timur's campaign of 1387, Timur came to Adilcevaz from Bitlis. The *išxan* (Armn., lit. "prince") of the city, Sahand, went out to meet him, and appears to have won Timur's favour.[a] Timur gave him the governorship of Erciş too. This proved highly beneficial at least to the districts of Erciş and Adilcevaz, if not to other areas, such as Berkri, directly governed by the Kara Koyunlu.[6]

Another episode narrated by the same source, Thomas of Mecop', probably concerns the same man, though the episode occurs much later in Thomas's text. The date

[a] T'M 29.

is Armn. 844/1494-95, and the governor in question is again Sahand. This time Sahand is identified as *k'ałak'apet*, "city-head" or "town-head". The incident in question is the martyrdom of Step'annos, bishop of Arckē; he was betrayed to the *k'ałak'apet*, though Thomas does not explain what form the betrayal took.[7]

A further example of a governor at Adilcevaz is the Sawalan episode of 879/1429. Thomas merely tells us that he "got established" at Arckē,[a] but as İskender, later in the incident, is helping him against an attack by Shah Rukh,[b] there is a reasonable presumption that he was the Kara Koyunlu governor. The following Easter İskender came back to Adilcevaz and besieged it.[c] This means that the city had now fallen into Shah Rukh's hands, even though Thomas's text does not mention any such capture between times. Here again a "lord of the city" (*ter k'ałak'in*) is known. The local Christians persuaded İskender not to harm the city, but the "lord of the city", Salt'in [Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn] and his adviser, called by the local Armenians Danišman, was killed.[d] Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was therefore Shah Rukh's governor in Adilcevaz.

The final instance of a governor at Adilcevaz occurs in 1467. Jahan Shah was about to launch the expedition into Ak Koyunlu territory which resulted in his defeat and death on the plain of Muş. He was at Sukman Ova or Sukmānābād, a district lying just west of Khoy and on the track towards the Abaghā/Çaldıran plain, Erciş, Erzurum etc.. A courier

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[a] T'M 89.

[b] T'M 89-90.

[c] T'M 92.

[d] T'M 92-3. "Danišman" is not the man's real name as it means simply "adviser".

arrived from Mahmūd the *mihmandār*, who was *vālī* in Adilcevaz.[a]

Before we consider the responsibilities denoted by these terms (*išxan*, *k'ałak'apet*, *tēr k'ałak'in*, *vālī*), let us first look at the evidence for governors in the Van region anywhere other than Adilcevaz. We have no specific mentions of governors; on the other hand it is clear that the district of Erciş, and probably that of Berkri, were considered separate administrative districts from that of Adilcevaz. When Timur came to Adilcevaz in 1387 he gave Erciş to the *išxan* of Adilcevaz, Sahand.[b] This entails that up to that time Sahand had charge of Adilcevaz only. Berkri, too, was in principle detachable, even if in some instances it came under a governor at Erciş or Adilcevaz. One loose indication of the fact comes in 879/1429, at the time of İskender's second attack on Adilcevaz in the same year. Adilcevaz was now in Shah Rukh's hands. Berkri was held by a Kurd called Sewdin [Sayf al-Dīn], a member of the Hakkari house. Under this Kurd's guidance Shah Rukh's troops attacked the district of Van.[c] The appointment of a member of the Hakkari ruling family to Berkri must have been the work of Shah Rukh or one of his deputies.[8]

If Erciş and Berkri could, at least on occasion, be held by men other than the governor at Adilcevaz, it follows that in principle these could be separate governorships. However it is worth dwelling on the circumstance that we do not have specific mentions of Kara Koyunlu governors at Erciş and Berkri; we have them only at Adilcevaz. Despite the prestige of Erciş, it is probable that Adilcevaz was, in the Kara Koyunlu period, considered the most important administrative base in the area directly controlled by the

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[a] KD II.408. The word vālī carried no technical or specialised meaning, as it did in the late Ottoman empire, but only the general meaning of "deputy".

[b] T'M 28; discussed above.

[c] T'M 92; Minorsky, "Thomas of Metsop'" 17.

Kara Koyunlu. Its governor may have had some overall responsibility for the area. Conceivably there were two posts, one for the whole area and one for Adilcevaz. The reason why Adilcevaz had acquired this pre-eminence was that Adilcevaz was a much more secure and better-fortified site than Erciş. Further evidence for a post with responsibility of some sort for the whole area will be given below.

After seeing that there were at least in principle separate district governorships, and that some command may have been created covering the whole area, we can consider the meanings of the various terms *išxan*, *k'ałak'apet*, *tēr k'ałakin* and *vālī*. The term "išxan" ("prince") comes in the phrase "*išxan* of the city";[a] however it is most unlikely to denote a governor merely of the city. The governor's competence must have extended to the district of Adilcevaz at least. That Sahand was later given Erciş also suggests that he was a district governor (in both cases). But the term "išxan" ("prince") suggests something more than a district governor (always in a relatively informal sense); there is a possibility that it reflects the wider responsibility which Sahand was later given.

"K'ałak'apet" and "tēr k'ałak'in" ("city-head" and "lord of the city") equally suggest, at first sight, a man with responsibility only for the city. Again this is most unlikely, though always possible. The governor's competence must have extended to the district. But again there is a possibility that the term "k'ałak'apet" conceals a wider competence still: the responsibility for the whole area, a command which was based at the *k'ałak'* of Arckē/Adilcevaz.

The last term is "vālī". Of course its meaning is open-ended, but we shall see below that there is some evidence for a *vilāyat* whose administrative base was Adilcevaz and which encompassed Erciş, Berkri and Malazgirt. But there is no positive indication

[a] T'M 29.

that the *vālī* of 1467 had a district or city, as opposed to an area, responsibility.[a] So discussion of this term will be postponed.

We have practically no evidence as to the responsibilities of the district governors. The man described as *k'alak'apet* probably had judicial responsibilities; Sawalan (who features in the first episode of 879/1429, where İskender helps him against an attack by Shah Rukh) seems to have been responsible for defence. The governors must have had certain rights to revenue from land. This is the limit of possible conclusions.

(b) The local Christians

After Thomas of Mecop''s narrative of the martyrdom of Step'annos by the *k'alak'apet* Sahand,[b] there follows an interesting coda. Step'annos' son Yovhannes was made *jeṙnawor* of the city and *hramanat* of the district (*erkir*). These terms provide evidence of the local institutions with which the Kara Koyunlu governors had to deal; the Kara Koyunlu may have had a hand in shaping those institutions.

Jeṙnawor means literally "hand-wielder", *hramanat* "order-giver". These are general terms for a person in authority. One had authority over the city, the other over the district. Now it is possible, though perhaps unlikely, that one of these is an alternative for the title "bishop" (*episkopos*). But it is most unlikely that both were such an alternative. If "erkrin hramanatn" is simply a new phrase for describing bishops, it is likely that "the *jeṙnawor* of the city" meant something else; perhaps something resembling a mayor, through whom the Kara Koyunlu governor at Adilcevaz would deal with the city's

[a] It should be stressed again that the two words "vālī" and "vilāyet" carry only the general, flexible meaning of current usage, not a sense special to a particular government.

[b] T'M 112-13.

Armenian population. The "erkrin hramanatn" could also have been a civilian, as opposed to an ecclesiastical, position; and this in fact seems the most likely possibility. The two terms, in fact, probably do not denote different appointments, but only the two differing responsibilities -- town and country -- of the one appointment. This appointment is the secular leadership of the local Armenian population. Not much more can be said.

(c) The Kurdish tribes

The question arises how, if at all, the Kara Koyunlu governed the Malazgirt and Abaghā/Çaldıran districts. The question is complicated by the presence in those districts, perhaps only for the summer months, of Kurdish tribes: in the previous section it was shown that the Pāzūkī grazed the Malazgirt district and the Dunbeli the Abaghā/Çaldıran district. The only textual clue is that the Kara Koyunlu probably maintained some formal presence in the city of Malazgirt: if a chronicler can say that Hasan 'Ali (Jahan Shah's son) "built" Malazgirt,[a] it is likely but by no means certain that the Kara Koyunlu had access to the city, and that it was not in the hands of a local Kurdish tribe. If the Ala Dağ palace was maintained, we can talk of a formal presence there too, at least during the summer months.

Despite the lack of direct evidence, it is worth speculating what kind of relations might have existed between the Kara Koyunlu and the populations of the Malazgirt and Abaghā/Çaldıran districts. They may have collected taxes from the local Armenian population, but by reason of the Kurdish tribes' presence perhaps failed to make contact with as high a proportion as in the Erciş and Adilcevaz districts.

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[a] MC I.143 (Anon. Chron.), and for interpretation Appendix I.

As for the tribes themselves, a loose relationship can be suggested: perhaps the Kara Koyunlu dealt only with the tribe chiefs, and exacted a tribute of some description.

4.2. The area as a whole

It has already been pointed out that we have several references to governors residing at Adilcevaz, and no references to governors elsewhere, despite the fact that it was likely Erciş and Berkri were in principle separate districts which at least from time to time were given their own governors. The term "*išxan* of the city" implied a competence not merely wider than the city of Arckē/Adilcevaz, but also wider than the district. The term *vālī* ("deputy") is quite unspecific as to responsibilities, but is associated with the term *vilāyat*, ("area", "district" etc.), and the phrase "vālī of 'Adiljevaz" might therefore imply a district or area competence.

There is one piece of evidence for the idea that some post with responsibility for a whole area, inlcuding at least Erciş and Berkri, was based at Adilcevaz. During the short reign of Hasan 'Ali, an amir was sent on behalf of Uzun Hasan the Ak Koyunlu to demand from Hasan 'Ali the surrender of the *vilāyāt* of Avnīk and 'Adiljevāz.[a] This by itself does not guarantee that that the two *vilāyāt* were contiguous, or that the *vilāyat* of 'Adiljevāz encompassed the districts of other cities and towns, such as Erciş, Berkri and Malazgirt. But Avnik would naturally be the capital of the Hasankale plain and upper Aras basin.[b] The area belongs to an entirely different drainage basin to the Malazgirt district, let alone Erciş and Adilcevaz. The Aras flows north-east to the Kura and eventually to the

[a] KD II.461.

[b] For more information on these areas, Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* II.226-41.

Caspian. The Malazgirt district, on the other hand, was centred on the Lower Euphrates, and communicated easily with Erciş and Adilcevaz. It would more likely be controlled from one of those cities.

If Erciş had been the leading city of the area, it is likely that Uzun Hasan's amir would have demanded the *vilāyāt* of Avnik and Erciş, not Adilcevaz. The demand for Avnik and Adilcevaz does circumstantially point to the pre-eminence of Adilcevaz and to the notion that Adilcevaz was the base for a command over a whole area, including Malazgirt, Erciş and probably Berkri. The same could be said of the message given to Jahan Shah at Sukmanabad. Why was it the *vālī* of Adilcevaz, not a *vālī* of Erciş, who sent the message ?

5. The Kara Koyunlu presence

It is of some importance in ascertaining the character of Kara Koyunlu administration in the north-eastern sector of the lake Van area (Erciş, Adilcevaz, Malazgirt etc.) to make some statement about the presence in the area of a population that could properly be said to belong to the Kara Koyunlu confederation. In fact the Kara Koyunlu population is likely to have been negligible in numerical terms. There is no evidence for any settled population. Parts of the north-east area were used as summer grazing. Some troops were permanently maintained there, but their number is likely to have been small. Whenever the Kara Koyunlu fought incomers in this area, it was with troops brought from elsewhere in their domains. They must, however, have kept troops at Erciş and Adilcevaz.

The Ala Dağ pasture was grazed in summer, both by reason of the quality of the

grazing and because of its strategic position. Kara Yusuf in particular made a habit of summering there.[a] The regular use of a mountain massif as summer pasture, however, is not equivalent to a permanent presence or residence.

That said, it is likely that some members of Kara Koyunlu tribes resided permanently in and around Erciş and Adilcevaz. It is highly unlikely that a succession of Kara Koyunlu sultans would have been buried at Erciş if no members of the confederation permanently lived there.[b] Adilcevaz seems to have been the only permanent district governorship. It may also have been the seat of a governor for the whole area, though from time to time at least the two were the same. To maintain a governor at Adilcevaz must have required the presence of some troops and some families all the year round.

6. Conclusions

In the area directly administered by the Kara Koyunlu there were three districts which in principle could be put under separate governors -- Erciş, Adilcevaz and Berkri. We have hard evidence of a Kara Koyunlu governor (as opposed to one appointed by, for example, Timur) only in the case of Adilcevaz. Moreover that governor may have been one appointed to oversee the whole northeasterly corner of the Van region. In this period, but not under the Il-Khans, Adilcevaz certainly seems to have been administratively the most important of the cities. Erciş, on a less secure site, seems to have had importance to the Kara Koyunlu only by virtue of its associations with the Il-Khans and the Ala Dağ 46-

[a] Appendix I, Ala Dağ palace and Nawshahr.

[b] For the burial of Kara Koyunlu rulers at Erciş, Appendix I.

pastures.

Any picture of organised, hierarchical administration would appear unrealistic -- always remembering the severe limitations of the evidence. Even less can we assume organised administration in the two more peripheral districts of Malazgirt and Abaghā/Çaldıran. Here the Kara Koyunlu appointee, whether at Adilcevaz or in one of the local towns, probably dealt with local Kurdish tribal leaders, and was less able to make contact with local Christians for purposes of taxation.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

I. Government

1. Summary. Components of the regional system

In summarising the nature and interrelationships of the various local political entities in the Van region during the Kara Koyunlu hegemony, the first question is whether the Kurdish tribal formations such as Bitlis and Hakkari genuinely were principalities, or whether the Kara Koyunlu were dealing instead with petty tribal agglomerations lacking the formal organisation which would qualify them as principalities. In part the answer depends on definitions, but on any common-sense definition of the word the amirates were principalities. They had all the requisite institutions -- ruling dynasty, tax-gathering powers, councils, standing armed forces, military obligations. They did not lead a purely rural existence, but in part were city-based. That the prince's power stood on a base of tribal rather than any other type of allegiance should make little difference to our estimate.

Chapter III showed that at least one of the principalities, Bitlis, was a significant power that any empire or kingdom in Asia Minor or Mesopotamia, whether the overlord of Bitlis or not, would have to reckon with. The principality possessed such power by virtue of its size, wealth and strategic position. Whether the Hakkari principality can be put in the same category as Bitlis is doubtful, since this principality did not lie in such a commanding position. Nevertheless, Hakkari was locally a formidable power. Bitlis and

Hakkari must be considered the two outstanding local powers in the Van region. All questions about the political influence of the other local principalities have to be answered, in part at least, by reference to the policy and geographical location of these two.

The Mahmudi principality should be considered the sole occupant of an intermediate category. This principality was not influential outside its own borders. But it was economically self-sufficient, its position was relatively secluded, and it possessed several strong castles. To eradicate the Mahmudi principality or to seize part of its territory would have been difficult.

The lowest rank of local Kurdish political entity was occupied by the three small principalities of Hizan, Moks and Isbāīrd. These lay in a district which was geographically compartmentalised, which was difficult, though not impossible, to traverse, and which separated the Bitlis from the Hakkari principality. It was argued in Ch.III that three entities, all in the same district, of such small size could only exist by reason of the district's inaccessibility and the opposing pressures of the two pre-eminent local powers.

The other regional political power was the Kara Koyunlu confederation itself. The Kara Koyunlu were the overlord power of the whole region. But in respect of their direct tenure of Adilcevaz and Erciş and part of the stretch of territory, a high proportion of it flat, north and east of Lake Van, the Kara Koyunlu should also be considered a local political agent alongside the Kurdish principalities. The whole of the area just named seems to have been administered by a governor at Adilcevaz. There were probably lower-level governors of smaller districts centred on Adilcevaz, Erciş and probably Berkri and Malazgirt. Within the area, principally on the Malazgirt and Çaldıran plains, Kurdish tribes were subject to the governors. Quite apart from their capacity as a local power alongside the local principalities, the Kara Koyunlu were also the power wielding

sovereignty over the whole region. In evaluating their manner of governing the Van region, it has to be born in mind that they were always masters of a considerably larger territory. The districts of Erciş, Adilcevaz etc. were not the only territory directly administered by the Kara Koyunlu. In the period after Timur's death and Kara Yusuf's reconquest of the Van region, the Van region was in no sense the centre of Kara Koyunlu administration; Azerbayjan was its centre, and in Jahan Shah's reign the empire comprised a good half of Iran.

2. Relationships within the system; and Kara Koyunlu policy

In Ch.III we demonstrated that each of the tribal principalities was economically self-sufficient. The Kurdish element of each principality consisted of a web of transhumance routes and a series of overlapping clusters of summer and winter grazing areas. The former was the sum of individual tribes' or tribal sections' migration paths, and the latter the sum of individual tribes' summer and winter pastures. In the pastoral dimension of a principality's economic existence, self-sufficiency meant that the tissue of migration routes and grazing grounds adequately supported the needs of each group (tribe, tribal section etc.). The territories of the several principalities were sufficient in respect of agriculture, too.

Given economic self-sufficiency, there was no need on economic grounds for any of the principality's boundaries to change. This is not equivalent to saying that the actual boundaries were the only ones which could have produced configurations of local, economically self-sufficient amirates. Perhaps other configurations would have been as

good; they might even have been better. The only point being made at present is that in none of the territories in question were there persistent scarcities of summer or winter grazing, or of agricultural land. If there were, these were not such as to lead to processes of conquest or a general realignment of the pattern of vassalage with the region. The statement that there were no persistent scarcities of pasture and agricultural land is meant as a high-level statement -- one that will allow further general conclusions to be drawn. In the proper sense of the word, this is a model of the region. The statement is not meant to imply that in absolutely no village or yayla in the whole region was there not a single scarcity of the relevant type.

However the local principalities were quite unequal in size and military power, and the next question to arise is whether there were reasons, other than economic ones, inherent within the configuration of principalities, which could have led to the dismembering, diminution or subordination of some and the enlargement or increase in influence of others. In general terms the answer is that such processes might under certain other circumstances have taken place, but despite rivalry and border fighting they did not. The reasons, again in general terms, were as follows. Each principality was a group of tribes linked to one other in a structure containing patterns of loyalty. Such structures could not quickly be broken up or otherwise changed. They could, admittedly, change at the margin by transfer of tribal elements between principalities, or by movement of grazing grounds. But such processes were prevented by a package of factors obtaining over the whole region simultaneously. These factors were the respective military strengths of the local principalities; certain topographical features making for relative ease and difficulty of passage over certain parts of the terrain, particularly near the borders between the principalities; and the geographical location of the principalities relative to one another.

The reasons which kept the whole system in balance will shortly be worked out in more specific terms, but in order to do so the role of the Kara Koyunlu themselves, as sovereign power, must first be summarised. As overlords the Kara Koyunlu simply demanded submission from the local powers, and if the need arose ensured submission by punitive attacks. They also demanded tribute, perhaps not with complete regularity. Apart from this, the Kara Koyunlu did not engage in the affairs, internal or external, of the local principalities, except to play a balancing role. In so far as there was a tendency for territory or human groups, such as tribes, to be lost by one principality and taken by another, the Kara Koyunlu helped to counteract that tendency.

The ways in which they did so can be summarised as follows. First, they maintained a presence in the north-east part of the Van region. This automatically had a stabilising effect on two borders, the eastern border of the Bitlis principality and the northern border of the Mahmudi. It must be remembered that, if the two Kurdish polities were to attack the directly-administered Kara Koyunlu territory, there were not only land, but also tribes or tribal sections, which could be annexed in this area.[a] Secondly, there is some evidence that they played off one principality against another.[b] Thirdly, they seem to have concentrated their efforts against the two largest principalities, Bitlis and Hakkari. This probably helped to keep Bitlis and Hakkari in check and to preserve the territorial integrity of the smaller principalities. It should be stressed that little in the way of intervention was required; by and large the local principalities, taken with the Kara Koyunlu as a local power, were a balanced system.

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[a] Ch.IV, sect.3.

[b] Ch.II, sect.2.6, n.17 to p.60.

We will now use the detailed examination of the principalities and of the Kara Koyunlu's local administration in Chapters III and IV to gain a summary view of the interaction of all the various local political entities in the region. The notion of a balance or equilibrium should be borne in mind.

The large and powerful Bitlis principality, in its Kurdish dimension, was a complex and stable structure of tribes which with few exceptions stayed loyal to the prince. Within its borders, cornland balanced pastureland. The principality was held together by short- and more particularly by medium-range patterns of seasonal migration. The migration paths were not confined to the principality's territory. To the south there were links with Sasun and almost certainly with areas, including Hazo, in the north-east corner of the Tigris basin.[a] There is some evidence that flocks were taken into the Malazgirt district in summer.[b] There was very likely some cross-penetration of borders between tribes of the Bitlis principality and the Pāzūkī tribe in the area of the two Bulanıks and perhaps part of the plain of Muş.[c]

Beside Sasun, Bitlis held as vassal the small principality of Hizan, which lay on Bitlis' south-east border. Hizan was smaller and weaker, but neither the principality as a whole nor any of its constituent tribes was ever annexed by Bitlis. The dense pattern of mountain ridges in this section of the Taurus made the Hizan and Moks district difficult to pass; behind Hizan, Moks, and Isbāīrd lay the Hakkari principality and potential conflict.

The Bitlis principality is known to have mounted attacks on Kara Koyunlu territory,

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[a] Ch.III, sect.III.4.1.

[b] Ev.D.181, 261b.12-15 (> Ist.IV.197); Ch.III, sect.I.2.2 above.

[c] Ch.III, sects. 2.2, 4.1.

particularly the city of Arckē/Adilcevaz.[a] This was a theatre in which the principality could in time have extended its border. Similarly there was potential for expansion in the Bulanık-Malazgirt area. In both theatres the Ruzagi of Bitlis must have been opposed by the Kara Koyunlu; in the case of the Adilcevaz district there was probably no tribe or tribal section which could have been subsumed. There was, in fact, one sector of its border over which the Bitlis principality does appear to have made a permanent gain in territory during the early Kara Koyunlu domination, or if not in that period, then sometime after 1349, in other words at the end of the Il-Khanid occupation or during the Jalayrid tenure of the region. The territorial gain in question was Hınıs.[b] The aquisition of Hınıs, however, scarcely upset any delicate balances within the Van region.

The Hakkari principality appears to have possessed a much less stable substructure of tribes than that of Bitlis. It was militarily weaker, and perhaps only formidable when engaged in the defence of the depths of its territory, the districts in the Zab valley. However the principality's southern half, centred on those districts along the Zab, was economically coherent and self-sufficient, and during its periods of tenure of Van and Vostan the principality's two halves also cohered. The Hakkari principality may have had associations with neighbouring tribes in the Kara Koyunlu period, just as it had in the Il-Khan and Ottoman periods. However it appears never to have subordinated another principality; nor is there any evidence that the associated tribes, whether of the Il-Khan or of the Ottoman period, stood in a relation of inferiority to the Hakkari.[c]

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[a] Attack of Armn. 874/1425: T'M 85 (date, p.84), 42-3; Clph.XV.I.350, p.329 (S. 1425.5, p.168).

[b] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(ii), where it is argued that in 1349 Bitlis did not possess Hınıs, but that the principality had probably gained Hınıs by Timur's first visit to the region in 1387.

[c] Ch.III, sect.II.4.

Iskender Kara Koyunlu seized Van and Vostan from the Hakkari in A.D. 1425, and in the 1440's to 1460's Jahan Shah tussled with the principality over the two cities.[a] It is hard to say why Van and Vostan were so important to the Kara Koyunlu. Part of the reason may have been the attraction of the fertile plains and their high tax yield. But whatever the motive, the effect of denying Van and Vostan to the Hakkari was to weaken the principality as a whole and afford to the Kara Koyunlu a base from which to oversee both the Hakkari and the Mahmudi principalities.

The latter principality is a highly interesting case. It was a middle-sized entity, economically self-sufficient, and very cohesive as regards tribal structure. It appears never to have submitted to the Hakkari or any other local power. Equally it never held any other principality or tribe as vassal. It disputed the Albāq district with Hakkari; but it seems never to have enjoyed longstanding tenure of that district, and cross-border fighting on its south-eastern border does not seem to have had much potential for destabilising either principality. The Mahmudi may have been strengthened by Kara Koyunlu action against the Hakkari.

The three small principalities of Hizan, Moks and Isbāīrd have already been dealt with. They were clearly not influential outside their own borders, but, for the political and geographical reasons already indicated, neither could they be seized by Bitlis or Hakkari. It is somewhat unlikely that Moks and Isbāīrd had any direct dealings with the Kara Koyunlu,[1] and Hizan can only have had few. However, through their relationship with Bitlis and Hakkari, the Kara Koyunlu exercised some influence on the history of all Hizan, Moks and Isbāīrd.

It remains to consider the Kara Koyunlu themselves, in their capacity as a local

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[a] Ch.III, sect.5.(iv).

power, and with them the Kurdish tribes on their directly-administered territory. There appears to have been no tendency, from either party, towards the destabilising of the border with the Mahmudi principality. The impression given by the evidence (already discussed in this section) is that to the west the Kara Koyunlu were on the defensive against Bitlis, but that despite some cross-infiltration between Bitlis tribes and the Pāzūkī, no process of creeping infiltration or loss of tribal groups inside Kara Koyunlu territory ever took place.

3. Did the policy work ? Control of the region

In evaluating the Kara Koyunlu domination over the Van region the prime objective of government to be borne in mind is that of ensuring that the region remained under Kara Koyunlu control. The objective divides into two: that of ensuring that the population directly governed by the Kara Koyunlu (districts of Erciş, Adilcevaz etc.) did not rebel or break away, and that of ensuring that the Kurdish principalities did not rebel, become independent, or take their allegiance to a different master. Other objectives could be considered. It could be asked, for example, whether governing the Van region was a revenue loser for the Kara Koyunlu or whether in net terms domination of the region gained them revenue. Though this question is worth a mention, the attempt at a thorough consideration would be frustrated in the present study by gross lack of evidence. The impact of Kara Koyunlu domination on the population, and particularly the question of its well-being, could also be considered as a criterion (though not necessarily an objective) of effective government. In Chapter I it was indicated that such an aspect of government

would be better examined in another context, where the prime object of study was the population itself.

If control is the prime object to be considered, Kara Koyunlu policy in the region was in general a success. The population of the directly-administered areas posed no threat in any case. By and large -- the exceptions will be discussed shortly -- the Kurdish princes submitted to the Kara Koyunlu. By and large they did not rebel or try to take their allegiance elsewhere. The reason was that, again allowing for exceptions, the tribal nature of the principalities gave little reason to expect serious attempts at independence or redirection of allegiance -- provided that the overlord did not intervene in the strictly internal affairs of the subject principalities. Moreover the eventuality that any one of the principalities might start to encroach on the territory of any of the others or to attract some of their constituent tribes to its own following was already taken care of by the balance of forces within the region. The Kara Koyunlu's method of loose supervision must also be considered to have required considerably less expenditure of effort, troops and other resources than would have been entailed by other means of government. In so far as the Kurdish principalities were concerned, no administrative apparatus was required.

The policy of loose supervision had one serious drawback. It depended on an absence of rivals competing directly with the overlord power. If such competition had developed, it would have become far more difficult to retain control over the princes. As it was, the sudden defeat of Jahan Shah precluded the development of a stage in which Ak and Kara Koyunlu competed for the region. But that sudden defeat itself indicates the weakness of Kara Koyunlu control. There were insufficient forces permanently in the region to allow a solid retrenchment of the military position. Except at Adilcevaz, Erciş etc., there was no Kara Koyunlu administration at all.

Jahan Shah's defeat in 1467 points to an important secondary issue in the consideration of Kara Koyunlu success in retaining control over the region. This issue is the loyalty of the local princes. The exact nature of the loyalty extended by tribal principalities to an overlord power will be explored more thoroughly below. For the immediate present it suffices to distinguish between loyalty and allegiance. For the retention of control, allegiance, whether willing or unwilling, is required. Loyalty is willing allegiance.

In 1467, once Jahan Shah's defeat was known, the local princes did not immediately transfer their allegiance. They remained loyal to Hasan 'Ali, Jahan Shah's son. Even after Hasan 'Ali's defeats in the following two years, the Kurdish principalities did not accept Ak Koyunlu overlordship without costly struggles.[a]

After the death of Kara Yusuf, three of the Van region's princes, those of Bitlis, Hakkari and Hizan, went and paid their allegiance to Shah Rukh.[b] In the 1440's to 1460's the Bitlis and Hakkari princes from time to time refused to carry out the forms of allegiance, if they stopped short of the more serious types of rebellious behaviour. The Bitlis princes at least once refused to pay tribute; they also minted coins in their own names. These, however, are the exceptions. By and large their behaviour was loyal. In the few cases of disloyal behaviour, too, it is hard to interpret their motives. Did the Bitlis princes, for example, mint coins in their own names because they anticipated little supervision of their minting by the Kara Koyunlu, or because they had no intention of paying tribute in any case, or because they intended open defiance ? At any rate it seems

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[a] Bitlis: see Ch.III, sect.I.5.(vi) -- sieges of Bitlis in four successive years. Hakkari: Ch.III, sect.II.5.(vi) -- a Kurdish revolt which took two years to quell.

[b] Ch.III, sects.I.5.(iv), II.5.(iv), IV.5.

clear that Jahan Shah interpreted certain of the Bitlis princes' gestures as a failure to show allegiance. The basic test of Kara Koyunlu attitudes was the mounting of expeditions against the principality.

Certainly these incidents (failure to pay tribute, minting coins in their own names etc.) constituted a withdrawal of loyalty; but to consider such incidents on their own is to employ superficial criteria of loyalty. There is no evidence (apart from the one case in which the local princes submitted to Shah Rukh) of an attempt to transfer allegiance elsewhere; it is doubtful if they were trying to sever allegiance permanently. Perhaps, in minting their own coins or refusing to pay tribute, they had no long-term aim. They may have had only the short-term aim of freeing themselves of two of the more constricting features of allegiance.

In the end it is hard to know what motives to impute to the local princes. Indeed it may be a mistake even to try. It is not so much a question of the criteria for feelings of loyalty or disloyalty, or for the motives of loyal or disloyal behaviour, but more of the criteria for loyal or disloyal behaviour itself.[2] If we consider their behaviour over the long term, the princes were loyal to the Kara Koyunlu. Although the point is a high-level one (it must be discussed at several removes from the root evidence), the reason may well have been the lightness of the burden imposed by the Kara Koyunlu. By contrast, Ak Koyunlu and Safavid allegiance were quickly thrown off.[a]

[a] Ch.III, sects.I.5.(vi), (vii); sects.II.5.(v), (vi); sect.IV.5. The Mahmudi may not have thrown off Ak Koyunlu sovereignty, and apparently stayed within Safavid allegiance until the 'Irakeyn campaigns of 1533-34: Ch.III, sect.III.3.

4. Change

In Chapter I, sect.2, the question of change was introduced. Consideration of questions of change was said to be one advantage of examining the region in periods before and after the Kara Koyunlu. Can we discern processes of change in the region's political system, either change from one period to another or within the Kara Koyunlu period ?

It is hard to be sure exactly what changes took place between the Il-Khans' and the Jalayrid occupations on the one hand and the Kara Koyunlu occupation on the other. Although various elements were present beforehand, the Mongols appear to have been responsible for the emergence of the political system known under the Kara Koyunlu. That is to say, under the Mongols some of the principalities came into being, others took the shape known under the Kara Koyunlu, and the system of interrelationships between the local principalities was formed, as was the network of relationships between the principalities and their overlord, in this case the Il-Khan government. The Kara Koyunlu, heir to the Il-Khans, presided over the system in a stable state. The Ak Koyunlu not merely began to unravel the social ties within the principalities by ejecting the princely families, but also began to disturb the pastoral equilibrium of tribal grazing-lands by introducing extraneous tribes into one at least of the principalities.[a] Shah Ismail may have been attempting similar processes.[b] The first century of Ottoman rule appears to have seen, again, a solidification of the system.

It is thus possible to discern changes between the periods. One advantage of so doing, it was pointed out (Ch.I, sect.2), is that it gives meaning to our characterisation of

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[a] Ch.II, sect.2.7.

[b] Ibid..

the Kara Koyunlu period. That is to say, our characterisation of the period is implicitly a comparative one; if it is to acquire genuine descriptive force, material for comparison must be provided. Another advantage of putting the Kara Koyunlu period in the context of the others is precisely the perception that it rests within a movement of change between periods.

Other processes of change can be looked for. In Chapter I it was argued that it is wrong to hold down a political organisation, and the relationships linking a series of such organisations, beneath a microscope as if these entities and states of affairs were in a steady state. In reality the subject of study is in motion and undergoing alteration all the time.[3] Are we right merely to compare one period with another ? A second difficulty exists. The political relationships of the Kara Koyunlu period have been described as a stable system. But if this is a correct description, it appears to contradict the notion of continual change.

Can we discern processes of change, characteristic of the region as a whole, *within* the Kara Koyunlu period, perhaps part of a longer movement crossing several periods ? At this point we may be building conclusions at too great a vertical distance from the evidence, that is to say constructing one conclusion on top of others in such a way that firm semantic and logical grounding in the evidence is impossible. However it is worth attempting to characterise an evolution within the period if we believe that such an evolution took place. It is perhaps possible to discern an increase, not only in the power of the local principalities, but also in their consciousness of power, between the time of Timur's acceptance of Bitlis as his vassal and of his subjugation of Hakkari, and the more violent and rebellious times under Jahan Shah. It would be difficult to imagine the prince of Bitlis having the capacity, whether or not he was so inclined, to put up such a fierce

and long resistance to the Kara Koyunlu in 1406 as the principality did to the Ak Koyunlu in the years 1470 to 1473. Similarly the Hakkari, although they resisted Timur for forty days at Van, then reached an agreement with him and retired to the interior of their principality. But this contrasts with the fierce contests for Van and Vostan between the Hakkari and Jahan Shah in the 1440's to 1460's. It does not seem to be a question of poorer overall loyalty, but more a question of the boldness of the liberties taken and the underlying military strength.

Perhaps the movement had a longer historical sweep than the Kara Koyunlu period. In 1507 the anonymous Italian Merchant in Persia found Zahid Beg a rebel against Shah Ismail.[a] Similarly he found Sharaf Beg "half a rebel" against Shah Ismail. Sharaf was "considered in Persia as the master of this fine fortress" [i.e. not beholden to anyone in the governance, not only of his fortress, but of his principality].[b] At least for a few years we are genuinely dealing with independent princes.

The above is only an impression, and is not put forward as a solid conclusion. The reality behind the impression is difficult to grasp, and the impression itself difficult to express. But however elusive the impression, and however subtle and slippery the arguments tying it to the hard evidence, the impression does seem to describe a real process, which no doubt started under the Il-Khans rather than under the Kara Koyunlu. It is one of gradual hardening of institutions and ties within the principalities, of marginal extensions of territory by the two largest, of a sense of hereditary rights honoured by time, of an increase in self-respect and confidence and of heightening of consciousness, on the

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[a] Merchant in Persia 161. Zahid also minted coins in his own name at this point, but as mentioned in sect.3 it is hard to know whether this argues for straight disobedience or whether it constitutes an instance of disloyal behaviour within a general framework of loyalty.

[b] Ibid. 157.

part of their princes, of these two principalities' regional roles. To explain such a process would require a general examination of the circumstances of neighbouring regions and of Near Eastern history in the whole period. However one of those circumstances (whether in given regions or in the Near East as a whole) was the stability of the political environment created by Kara Koyunlu domination. Here the contradiction pointed out above is, in part, resolved. The idea of change does not contradict the notion of stability; the process of change was the product of stability.

II. The framework for the study of the Christian population

In Chapter I, sect.1, it was argued that establishing the political framework of the period was an essential prerequisite for the accurate study of the Christian population, particularly the Armenian. This section will point very briefly to some of the ways in which our conclusions, descriptive and evaluative, provide essential premises in the examination of specific aspects of that population's life. It seems fair to include such comment, as the latter arises not merely out of the *a priori* considerations enumerated in Chapter I, but also out of the particular and detailed aspects of the political framework which have been established in the body of the thesis.

1. The location of activity

The growth and decline of cities has been shown to have a close connection with movements in the geographical pattern of principalities and Kara Koyunlu territory. Neither of the two processes should be seen as determining the other without a reverse

influence, nor should they even be seen as alternately influencing one another. Instead, they should be seen as different aspects of the same process.

It then has to be remembered that the cities consisted largely of an Armenian population. For example, in Appendix I the growth of Bitlis in the mid-15th century is described. This growth was partly an Armenian phenomenon, and partly, too, a monastic one. That is to say the movement of population to, and the establishment of several monasteries in Bitlis at the time is in part the result of the region's political organisation.

The location and general scale of monastic activity itself may emerge as being partly explicable by reference to features of political organisation. In our period the districts of Hizan and Moks were home to a series of monasteries highly active in the field of manuscript copying and, in particular, illumination.[a] It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the same districts were divided between three small principalities with relatively inaccessible territory. The monks were working sometimes in the same town as, and sometimes only a few miles away from, the residences of the Kurdish princes. It is unlikely the princes exerted no influence whatever, intentionally or unintentionally, directly or indirectly, on the so-called "schools"[b] of Moks and Hizan. This puts the point at its abstract minumum. Even if no kind of active causation is observable, the local princes must have enabled the copying and illumination to take place simply by virtue of non-interference.

Many of the monasteries had been founded beforehand,[4] and the reasons for the

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[a] Kiwrtean, *Xizani dproc'ë*; Hakobyan (H.H.), *Vasp. Manr.* II.83-108; Der Nersessian, *Armenian Art* 229-30; Thierry, *Armenian Art* 263-4 (314 on later history); many illustrations in *Hayk. Manr., Vasp.*.

[b] A term which we would quickly discredit if monastic activity were the prime object of our attention at present.

original foundation of such monasteries in the Hizan and Moks districts are unlikely to have been dissimilar to the reasons for their continued activity and maintenance in the late 14th and the 15th centuries. But the prior foundation of the monasteries is not by itself a sufficient explanation of their wealth of activity at the very end of the Middle Ages. Intentionally or not, the local princes must have contributed to the creation of conditions which allowed and to some extent encouraged lay population and monasteries to live and work in relative peace. Just how they contributed to those conditions is not part of the present study, but it is material to the present argument to point out that the question is there to be examined. It may even be possible to discern the influence of the Muslim environment on the style and content of the illuminations themselves.[5]

A case of a different kind is provided by the monasteries of Mecop' and Arcuaber (pron. "Metsop" and "Artsvaber"). These were highly active and influential institutions in our period.[a] It cannot be right to dismiss as complete coincidence the proximity of Erciş, a city which came into prominence under the Il-Khans and retained the affection of the Kara Koyunlu, though the true administrative capital had moved to Adilcevaz in the next district westward.

2. The influence of Muslim society, and particularly the Kurdish principalities, on the life on the Christian population

The question of the coexistence between the largely sedentary Armenian population and the tribal, pastoral Kurds is well worth investigation. In Chapter II, sect.2.4, it was surmised that some of the Armenian villages were inhabited by sharecroppers who were

[a] Mecop': Sov. Arm. Enc., "Mecop'avank'i Dproc'", 7.441.3-442.1; Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* II.419-42. Arcuaber: Voskean, ibid. II.396-412.

tenants of tribal landowners. This arrangement and other forms of taxation must have borne down heavily on the agricultural population. However there is no *a priori* reason to suppose they bore down more heavily in this than in other segments of the Turkish period. Despite the difficulties of finding adequate evidence, an attempt could be made to assess the general tax load (whether in the form of sharecropper's rent or not) in successive periods.

Coexistence with pastoralists was not necessarily deleterious to the condition of the Armenians. It is well known that pastoralists and agriculturalists have much to offer each other. Moreover the Kurdish influx may have contributed positively to the local economy. Similar types of transhumance had perhaps been practised by Armenians before the arrival of Kurds in significant numbers in the Van region. However the Kurds may have exploited the pastures more intensively. 19th- and 20th-century experience should not be allowed to colour judgment concerning such questions; one cannot project back in time the racial and religious antagonisms of those two later centuries. General attitudes apart, the examination of these issues will also run into problems of shortage of evidence.

The dealings between Armenian society, particularly its clergy, and explicitly political institutions and leading individuals in the Kurdish principalities (not to mention the Turkish governors within the Kara Koyunlu territories) are well worth looking into. Again there are no good *a priori* reasons for assuming hostility on the part of the Kurdish princes. The arguments in favour of this point do not arise merely out of the statements in certain texts that such-and-such a prince favoured the local population. They would emerge from an examination of the functioning of Armenian institutions, relative to the location of Kurdish ones. That is to say, *a priori* there is nothing in our present state of knowledge concerning Armenian institutions of the time to argue for ingrained hostility

on the part of Kurdish leaders and institutions; and relating Armenian institutions to Kurdish ones might lead to the conclusion that each accommodated the other.[a] Direct evidence of contact between Kurdish and Armenian institutions is not the only relevant kind.

The outstanding question is that of Armenian diocesan organisation. It and the geographical organisation of the principalities might turn out to be related. The question to be investigated is not whether dioceses corresponded to principalities, but whether units of the one kind of organisation coincided with units of the other. The boundaries of the principalities and of their subdivisions might also turn out to help explain the boundaries of the katholikosate of Aghtamar and of the districts which were shorn from its territories during the Kara Koyunlu period.

III. Research methods and assumptions

Since the point was raised near the beginning, it seems appropriate to end this thesis with a short comment on its assumptions. It is not necessary to comment on the somewhat experimental nature of this thesis, on its use of modern anthropology, or on the difficulties involved in applying evidence from preceding or succeeding periods to the illumination states of affairs in the target period.

One assumption has not been tested. This is the assumption that the Van region was a closed system in the target period. It was mentioned that in order to make a valid start

[a] Again Bitlis is an outstanding example. The interest is not quite the same here as in our discussion of the location of activity under the previous heading. The interest there was primarily in location; here it is primarily in causes.

on the systematic and thorough investigation of a little-researched period of Armenian history, in other words the period between the Il-Khans and the Ottomans, a choice of one geographical region and one chronological segment had to be made. However the making of such a choice implies the assumption that no influences from elsewhere in Armenia, or from surrounding areas, were felt in the Van region, and vice versa. Clearly the assumption is wrong, but whether the application of the same methods to the political system in other parts of Armenia, or, further afield, in other parts of the Kara Koyunlu empire, or an examination of Kara Koyunlu government practice as a whole, would upset any of our conclusions here, is another matter. The situation is interesting.

APPENDIX I

CITIES AND MAIN TOWNS IN THE VAN REGION

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Conventions etc. in coin lists

Abbreviations

n.d.	No date: i.e. date not intended to be part of die.
d.m.	Date missing: i.e. space left for date on die, but figures never cut.
d.b.	Date blundered
d.l.	Date lost, after minting (but not blundered during minting)
o/s, os.	Overstrike
c/s, cs.	Counterstrike
c/m	Countermark
obv.	Obverse
rev.	Reverse

Coins in collection of Stephen Album ("Album (UT)" and "Album"). Many of the coins are only known to me from printouts very kindly sent me by Album. These are lists of his research collection which has been bought by the University of Tübingen (hence "(UT)"). In time the whole collection will be thoroughly catalogued. The catalogue numbers after

the abbreviation "Album (UT)" are those in the trays at Tübingen. However the present lists contain only basic information.

"Album". This means part of Album's collection, whether or not at Tubingen. Many of the coins in question no doubt are in Tübingen, but it is unwise to present the point as certain, and in any case the Tübingen catalogue numbers are lacking. The numerical references given, of the type "91-23-45" mean "Year-Batch-Number in Batch".

Appellations "dinar" etc.. Many of the coins had not been weighed by the time of transport to Tübingen. The designations "dirham", "dinar", "1/3/ tanka" etc. are quick and ready classifications based on an estimate of weight and dimensions. They are not denominations of currency value, whether explicit or accepted *de facto* in the medieval marketplace. Ditto for "shahi" and "ashrafi" in the case of Safavid coins.

Types of a given ruler's coins. Album divides the coins of a given Mongol or Jalayrid ruler into types: these are the types mentioned in the third column. Most of the definitions of the types can be found in Album's articles "Il-Kh.I" and "Il-Kh.II" [StudIran 13 (1984) and 14 (1985)].

Coins in Zambaur's lists. In Zambaur's *Münzprägungen* (Zb.) the coins in the lists for each city are either referenced to a source such as a coin catalogue or given no reference. In the latter case it has to be assumed that the coin in question was part of Zambaur's own collection or had otherwise been seen by him. The present writer, trying to follow up Zambaur's references, found this so hard that he questioned the worth of the activity, and meanwhile found some of the attributions either impossible or highly unlikely. Album himself concluded it was not worth trying to follow up Zambaur's references, and was also critical of many of the attributions.

In this appendix any coins the attributions of which by Zambaur are impossible or highly unlikely are put into a special category at the end of each city's list of coins. The remainder of the coins in Zambaur's lists are put in the lists of this appendix under the appropriate year; but the entries are preceded by a question mark (?) and indented. The object of this is (1) to distance them somewhat from the remainder of the coins and give them (along with certain other coins) a distinctive label of dubiety, but (2) on the other hand to allow them to contribute to the collective impression of minting patterns (bunching in certain periods, increased output under certain rulers etc.) given by an individual list. Cumulatively Zambaur's attributions, apart from the impossible or highly dubious ones, are unlikely to convey an inaccurate impression; but the attributions of individual coins have to be treated with a certain reserve.

ANS references of the form "1916.18.256". As with Album's numerical references, these mean "Year-Batch-Number in Batch".

1. BITLIS PRINCIPALITY

Bitlis

(Armn. "Balēš", sometimes "Balałēš"; Pers. and Ott. "Bidlīs")

Situation, size and character. The city was built at the junction of two valleys, each descending in a general southwards direction. The houses spread up the sides of the two

valleys and those of two tributary valleys coming respectively from east and from west.[1] The two streams come together in a narrow waist, then diverge again in two swift and wide curves, at the end of which is the confluence. The citadel occupies an eminence, the end of the ridge between the two valleys, just south of the "waist" between the two rivers. It enjoys powerful natural defences: as the westerly stream approaches the waist and curves outwards again it flows beneath a tall cliff. There are further cliffs, not so high, on the citadel's south side and the ground slopes steeply down from the citadel's remaining side, the north-west. In the late Middle Ages, as in previous periods and at least in the early Ottoman period, a wall complemented the two rivers as they curved first away from the citadel, then flowed in a contrary curve and finally converged. This was the only town wall the city had.[2]

All the descriptions of Bitlis we have, which start in the late 16th century, show that the city was regarded by inhabitants and visitors as serene, beautiful and prosperous. Evliya reports twenty-seven springs, which gave rise to a total of seventeen streams.[a] Thus there was plenty of greenery among the houses,[b] and along the rivers there were a total of 12,000 gardens, containing summer-houses.[c] All visitors to the city speak of the houses for year-round living as large and comfortable (Evliya puts their number at 5,000), rising up the valley sides.[d] There were a total of twenty-eight mahalles in Evliya's time, of which seventeen were Muslim and eleven Christian. Evliya gives the total of

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[a] Ev.D.83 (MS 226.a.21-24; Ist.IV.95); D.89 (> Ist.IV.99); D.147 (MS 234a.24-25; Ist.IV.122 misleading).

[b] Tozer, *Turkish Armenia* 301.

[c] Ev.D.89 (MS 227a.20-24; >Ist.IV.99); D.147 (MS 234a.24-25;Ist.IV.122 misleading).

[d] Ev.IV.93 (D.73); Tozer, *Turkish Armenia* 301.

mihrabs (i.e. in all categories of building, not just mosques) as 110.[a]

Although population numbers are not by themselves a convincing guide to a town's prosperity and its suitability as the capital of a principality, we could consider the significance of these numbers. In the first place, rather than aiming at an estimate of total population, let us consider what it means for a city to contain 12,000 gardens with summer-houses and only 5,000 houses proper. Evliya tells us that the population, rich and poor, migrated from the city to these summer-houses, or at least the gardens, eight months a year.[b] Apart from the likelihood that at least one of the numbers is wrong, it is still improbable that Evliya put the number of gardens at more than the number of houses proper if he did not think that some relativity of the sort existed. Although it is likely that some families split up in the move from winter house to garden, the conclusion must be that there were winter-houses other than the 5,000, perhaps too small or poor in appearance to mention. It is not likely people came into the city from outside for the eight (or more likely the six) months. It is much more likely that some left it altogether for those months.[3] Two centuries later, when the population had declined, Hommaire de Hell was told that the previous number of houses had been 12,000 as against the present 4,000.[c] Although the date which Hell's informant had in mind as that of the 12,000 houses is left thoroughly vague and the figure was in any case probably pulled more or less out of the air, that figure gives some confirmation to our argument here.

The conclusion is that the number of families was between 5,000 and 12,000, probably nearer the latter. If we go low, say 8,000, and take a low estimate of family

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[a] Ev.IV.91 (D.71).

[b] Ev.IV.99 (< D.89-91). *Cihānnüma*, tr. Charmoy, 167, six months.

[c] Hommaire de Hell I.492.

size, say five, we get a minimum of 40,000 inhabitants. 10,000 families would mean 50,000 people; with a bigger but probably more realistic average faimly size of six or seven, they would mean 60,000 or 70,000. Remembering that the total populations given by the Ottoman tax registers for the population of Āmid/Diyārbekīr in 1541 and 1564 respectively are 18,950 and 28,600,[a] we are dealing, in the mid-17th century, with a large city. What if all Evliya's figures are exaggerated ? In the absence of a study based on the *tahrir defters* we have no better figures, but if all Evliya's figures are halved we are still dealing with a city comparable in size to Diyarbakır in the mid-16th century.

As a result of continued prosperity the city was endowed, often by the Bitlis princes themselves, with a series of fine public buildngs. There were four *jāmi*'s (congregational mosques) by the end of the 16th century and (apparently) five in the mid-17th; and 26 *masjid*s (district mosques) at the latter date.[4] At the end of the 16th century the number of *madrasas* was five;[b] that of *tekkes* (lodges for dervishes) in the mid-17th century was twenty.[c] There were four Armenian parish churches within the city and four Armenian monasteries either in it or just outside. Each of the monasteries, it seems, was paired with one of the parish churches, and functioned as both parish church and monastery: each pair served a quarter (north-west, south-east etc.) of the city in the literal sense rather than a single mahalle. Although this arrangement does not assign one parish church or monastery to one *mahalle*, it does give a total of Armenian churches and monasteries equal to or just short of the number of Armenian *mahalles*.[5] There were at

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[a] Van Bruinessen & Boeschoten, *Diyarbekir* 33.

[b] Sh.I.347.

[c] Ev.IV.91 (D.69).

least eight public hamams at the end of the 16th century,[a] and 41 public fountains in the mid-17th.[b]

Bitlis was a home of Muslim religious scholarship. It had a large Sufi population and there was much Sufi activity in the 16th and 17th centuries.[6] Equally there was a flourishing Armenian school here in the 16th to 18th centuries, based mainly in one of the monasteries, Amrtol.[c] In the mid-17th century the city possessed a number of notable physicians and surgeons.[d]

Why was the population of Bitlis so large, the city so well endowed with buildings and its cultural and religious activity so flourishing ? The precise answer will vary from period to period. But in brief, the city's wealth was derived from long-distance trade, from its industries, part of whose product was sold outside the region, and from local taxation or at least local agricultural production. Evliya mentions that in the city's population the social class beneath that of the *a'yān* and *ze'amet*-holders is that of merchants doing business mostly with Iran and Georgia,[7] and it is well known that Bitlis commanded an important caravan path between Iran and markets to the south-west such as Aleppo. That is to say, the existence of such trade and the fact that such merchants lived in the city created wealth and employment which in turn were responsible for the presence of part of the city's population. In Evliya's time the goods passing through the city required nine caravansarays,[e] which is not to mention the several caravansarays near Bitlis on the path

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[a] Sh.I.347.

[b] Ev.D.69 (MS 224b.10; missing from Ist.IV.91).

[c] Akinean, *Bałeši Dproc'ë*.

[d] Ev.IV.93 (< D.75).

[e] Ev.IV.91 (D.71).

up the valley.[a]

Evliya describes the city's industries. Among these were leather-tanning, some of the product was sold in Europe, and the manufacture of bows and arrows.[b] At the end of the 16th century there were 800 shops in Bitlis;[c] Evliya in the mid-17th century gives the number as 1200.[d] Of course many of the shops both sold to local demand and bought from local producers.

The contents of the treasury, opened in 1065/1665, of Abdal Khan, prince of Bitlis, were truly astonishing.[8] They included a vast collection of books, among them 200 printed books from Europe;[e] weapons from many manufacturing cities in Europe and from Islamic cities as far east as India;[f] jewellery in gold and silver or decorated with jewels;[g] and a collection of precious stones including 1000 rubies.[9] Over what period had the treasure been built up ? Probably since the inception of the hereditary sanjak of Bitlis in 1578,[h] which means about 80 years. Regardless of the precise interpretation of this quite extraordinary treasure, one of the most impressive features of which is its variety of provenance, Bitlis was far from being a minor provincial town, and the prince far from a local tribal leader. He had access to extraordinary wealth, and the city was a fit capital

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[a] Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.308-10; IV.358-9.

[b] Ev.IV.121 (D.143).

[c] Sh.I.348.

[d] Ev.IV.91 (D.71).

[e] Ev.IV.246-7 (D.293).

[f] Ev.IV.249-50 (D.299-303).

[g] Ev.IV.252 (< D.307).

[h] See p.125.

Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.326) and spread to Māyyāfāriqīn (Silvan) and other parts of the Diyar Bakr shortly after. The Marwanids kept Ahlat until 1070 (ibid. I.328). So it is unlikely Bitlis' status changed in the 11th century.

In the 12th century Bitlis was the second city of a small Turkish principality which occupied the east half of the Diyar Bakr and whose capital was Arzan. This dynasty is known to Turkish scholars as the Dilmaçoğulları.[a] The Dilmaçoğulları were subjects of the Shāh-i Armān, Sukman, whose capital was Ahlat, though they threw off this allegiance at Sukman's death in 1112 in favour of the Artukids of Mardin.[b] But both before and after this change of allegiance Bitlis was still stuck between two great cities, with neither of which it could compete. In 588/1191-92 the town was captured by Bêgtīmūr, ruler of the Ahlat principality (the dynasty ruling for most of the 12th century was now extinct -- Bêgtīmūr was one of that dynasty's mamluks).[13] Thus it would have been included within the lands of the Ayyubid dynasty, that of Māyyāfāriqīn, which subsumed the Shāh-i Armān principality in 604/1207-8.[c] Here again there was little chance for the status of Bitlis to change. The question of the status of Bitlis as a settlement is not affected by that of the presence or absence of a local Kurdish dynasty, the Ruzagi, at Bitlis around the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries. We argue in Appendix IV that the dynasty may well have arrived in Bitlis at the demise of the Shāh-i Armān dynasty in Ahlat and the usurpation of power by Bêgtīmūr; or else at the takeover of the Ahlat principality by the Ayyubids of Māyyāfāriqīn. In either case the Ruzagi were subordinates

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[a] IA, "Bitlis", II.662-3; Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri* 111-14; conveniently Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* III.394.

[b] Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri* 112.

[c] Humphreys, *Saladin to the Mongols* 128-9.

of Ahlat, and Bitlis was subordinate to Ahlat even if the Ruzagi were not at Bitlis by this time.

With the capture of the region by the Mongol empire (1244), however, things may have begun to change. This is not because of any decline in the status of Ahlat, which perhaps embarked on its most prosperous and lively period, and was to become in any case the capital of Il-Khanid Armenia. But the Mongols seem not to have kept a close control over this region apart from Ahlat, Erçis and the Ala Dağ palace, and we certainly have no evidence for Mongol appointees outside those three places. So if there was a local dynasty at Bitlis it may well have been left to manage its own affairs on its own territory, provided of course that allegiance was paid to the empire.

Moreover the Mongol conquest did indirectly bring about the collapse of Māyyāfāriqīn and, much later, that of Arzan. Both of these cities lay in the Diyar Bakr, not far west of Bitlis. Their collapse can only have benefited Bitlis, with its more secure site. Arzan and Māyyāfāriqīn dwindled fast with the opening of the Mongol-Mamluk front in upper Mesopotamia and Syria in 1260, which prevented the use of the Diyar Bakr as an avenue for international trade until 1315, when a new treaty appears to have facilitated its flow through the district.[14] The Mongols may have sucked in behind them new Kurdish and Turkish tribes, who probably disrupted agriculture in the Diyar Bakr. Loss of population from Arzan and Māyyāfāriqīn can only have helped Bitlis, and the town is not likely to have suffered when trade began to pick up after 1315. It is hard to say if it is mere coincidence that we find coins minted at Bitlis in 715/1315-16, 723/1323-24 (?), 740/1339-40 and another in the 740s. This was a time of proliferation of mints; the vagaries of coin finds and of minting policy have also to be remembered. On the other hand the mint was certainly not a short-lived one. The coins were of course minted in the

name of Il-Khans, but it is possible that from the start the mint was run by the local dynasty at Bitlis. The likelihood that it was so run becomes considerably greater after 1335.

The real change in Bitlis' urban character came with the gradual decline of Ahlat and the abandonment of that city by Il-Khanid appointees c.1349.[a] Ahlat seems to have begun to decline after the death of the last strong Il-Khan, Abu Sa'id, in 736/1335, and after that date Bitlis probably began to gain population from Ahlat. The process can only have been continued when Ahlat fell into the hands of the Bitlis princes in c.1349.[b]

Bitlis' gain, and Ahlat's loss, was in the first place population, in the second place scholars and scientists and in the third place masons and new buildings. Whereas Bitlis may have surpassed Ahlat in population only in the mid-15th century, it perhaps took over Ahlat's pre-eminence in the field of Islamic scholarship and science, and attracted the bulk of Ahlat's *'ulemā'* quite swiftly after the gain of that city by the Bitlis principality in c.1349. In the field of new construction, we cannot be sure of the relative histories of Bitlis and Ahlat until Ahlat is properly excavated, but it seems likely all the same that Bitlis became the venue for new building which Ahlat had formerly been. Some masons probably moved from Ahlat, which had had a fine record of building and architectural decoration. Certainly in the buildings which survive on both sites Bitlis is the stylistic successor of Ahlat.[15]

Its known building history is in fact one of three instruments we shall use to try to trace the urban development of Bitlis. Compared to the total extant or known from documentary sources, the number of buildings on which precise dates can be put is

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[a] This appendix, Ahlat, p.315.

[b] Ibid., esp. pp. 315-17.

limited. The first are those of "Veli" Shams al-Din (I), which he built in the early 15th century. These are a *zawīya*, *dār al-shifā*, *dār al-ziyāfa* and *jāmi'* in the Gök Meydan.[a] As far as can be judged these were, on the whole, small buildings for their type, though the size of the *jāmi'* is unclear.[16]

In 847/1443-44 Haji Muhammad (c.1436 to 1445) built a *madrasa* and *masjid* by the side of the Rubat, the river combining the waters of the two main streams.[b] These must be the so-called Hatibiye Medresesi and Memi Dede Mescidi, on the north bank of the river.[17] The *madrasa* was a substantial building, resembling in layout the two large late-14th century *madrasas* in Mardin, the Sultan İsa and the Kasım Paşa Medresesi; only half of it has survived.

There is a third building (apart from several türbes) which very likely belongs to the 15th century. This is the Kızıl Cami; it stands on a high platform in the east side of the main valley, and again is a substantial building, though not equivalent in size to one of the larger mosques of the Seljuk period in Asia Minor.[18]

Coming to the 16th century, an extraordinary complex of buildings was built in the 1520's and possibly early 1530's by Sharaf Khan (d.1533). This is the so-called Şerefiye Camii, which besides the prayer-hall (completed in 935/1529) includes the medrese to the south and the *imaret* on the north side of the courtyard, opposite the prayer-hall. The prayer-hall would do credit to any *beylerbeyi* of Diyārbekīr building in Āmid; the madrasa is equivalent in size; the imaret is also substantial.[c] In addition to this complex Sharaf Khan also built a *zawīya*, a *qaysarīya* (normally an extensive covered building to cover

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[a] Sh.I.380. The text gives a precise date for the mosque, 810/1407.

[b] Sh.I.387.

[c] All described Arık, *Bitlis* 19-26.

shops) and a large, two-storeyed han, probably for shops rather than travellers.[19]

We do have buildings from the interregnum of non-hereditary Ottoman administration (1535-78), which are decidedly small in scale, but the building to which attention should be drawn is the İhlasiye Medresesi, completed in 997/1589 by Sharaf V. This is a large, ingeniously planned building with an ornate facade.[a] It consciously borrows features from madrasas of the Seljuk period, and part of the ingenuity of its planning consists in the meshing of such features with ones current in madrasa architecture in nearby parts of the Ottoman empire.

In the 17th century we have only one datable building which is strictly public in function, the "Ayn el-Barit Camii" of 1075/1664-65. This is a small prayer-hall consisting of a single rectangular chamber.[20] However in the middle years of the century a sumptuous and extensive palace, described in detail by Evliya Çelebi, was erected by Abdal, the wily, talented and ruthless opponent of Melek Ahmet Paşa. This palace occupied the hill-top north-west of the citadel, and consisted of an "outer palace", round an open square, where the prince's troops were quartered; the residential quarters; a large garden, to which the private hamam was adjacent; and an artificial lake.[21]

Given that public buildings alone cannot tell the history of a city's development, the dated Islamic buildings discussed above do, however, give a fairly clear picture of change: in the early 15th century, small and unambitious buildings; later in the century, larger and bolder ones; in the following century, two ostentatious, somewhat self-conscious and above all extensive and ambitious buildings; in the 17th century a private palace on a grand and lavish scale -- clearly the spirit of public benefaction had deserted the princely family by this stage, but the palace at least leaves no doubt as to the wealth

[a] Described Arık, *Bitlis* 47-51.

at the disposal of the prince, some of which was available for building. Much more difficult to interpret is the evidence as to the foundation of monasteries in and near the city. The first we hear of any monastery seems to be the mention of that Veri Vank' in 1406.[a] Thereafter we hear of the monastery of Goms or Gomuc' Vank' in 1414[b] and that of St. Ananias in 1418.[c] However of these only Goms is one of the four great monasteries for which the city was later to be known; and from the absence of later references Veri Vank' and St. Ananias probably failed sometime later in the century. Otherwise the first of the monasteries to be mentioned is that of Amrtol in 1455, then in 1487,[d] after which all four are attested in the 16th century and an active school was established by the beginning of that century.[e] The copying of manuscripts in Bitlis was especially common in the 1440's and 1450's, and several were executed in the 1430's.[22] Given this, we can say one or more of the four great monasteries had been founded by the 1430's, and all four by the end of the 15th century. It is hard to tell what sort of structures were built in that century, but the same monasteries, when seen in the 19th century, seem to have been impressive walled complexes, which would have required considerable resources to build.[23]

Regardless of whether it had had any before, Bitlis attracted new monasteries in the 15th century, perhaps mainly in the 1440's to 1460's. This represents both a development of the city's built structures and an augment to its population, both lay and

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[a] Clph.XV.I.69.a, pp.63-4.

[b] Clph.XV.I.168, p.165.

[c] Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* III.914.

[d] Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* III.903-4, 905 n.10.

[e] Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* III.896-18, 919-37, esp. 905, 922, 928; Akinean, *Bałeši Dproc'ë*, esp. p.27.

clerical. For the most part the monks must have come from elsewhere, attracted by the relatively secure site and prosperous population. Probably they were encouraged by the princes of Bitlis themselves; but of this there is no record.

The coins tell a similar story. Those of the Il-Khanid period have been mentioned above. There follows a gap until Timur's occupation, after which there is some activity in the early 15th century, particularly the issue in the joint names of Pir Budaq and Kara Yusuf, and three of the Bitlis princes minted coins in their own names, two of them apparently in fair quantities, in the mid-15th century. The thirty-year Ak Koyunlu occupation was fairly active, but afterwards minting tailed off. The first half of the 16th century probably did see a temporary lessening of economic activity in the city. But the relative paucity of Ottoman coins has, of course, nothing to do with prosperity or its absence. However the steady minting of the 14th century does argue for a prosperous city where trade was done in manufactured goods and goods carried long distances.

The three aspects of urban life and development examined here, Muslim public buildings, monasteries and coins, are only taken as an index of what would anyway be expected by considering the commercial circumstances. A busy trade route, active from the early 14th to the mid-17th century, ran through the city. It had done so too in the 10th to 13th centuries, but now Ahlat was on the decline as a commercial centre.[a] Bitlis simply grew at Ahlat's and probably Arzan's expense.

Whether Bitlis' growth was steady or took place in short surges is impossible to say, and the examination of the three indices of development (Muslim buildings, monasteries and coins) above is not meant to suggest that the city's population grew in tandem with any or all of those indices. But it is intended to provide sound arguments for

[a] On the trade route, our remarks p.297 and on Ahlat the following section.

the view that the city continued to benefit from its position on a busy trade route; that by the mid-15th century building on a substantial scale was taking place and in the 16th century became more lavish; and that by the mid-15th century the city was both prosperous and populous and may have got more so in the following two centuries. From its expansion in the late Middle Ages the city's history progresses to the 16th and 17th centuries, from which we have more accurate descriptions; these have been discussed above.

Bibliographical note. The article in İA, "Bitlis" (M.H.Yınanç), is in many ways excellent: very little of the evidence from Muslim and Western sources is missed, and the article provides a thorough account of the city's political history, with the exception of the end of the Middle Ages. As usual the article does not tackle systematically the urban as opposed to the political history of Bitlis. Otherwise the encyclopaedias (EI; Sov.Arm.Enc., "Balēš"; Enc.Iran., no entry) are not helpful.

Coins

715, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE8 C4. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.33.
(?) 723		Zb.69 (63 no.1560)
740a, Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams, 1.764 g.	Album, Il-Kh. II, 63-64, no.131. Will be same as GL7 B1, B2 or B3. "Type B".
740b.1, Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL7 B1. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.80. "Type B."
740b.2, Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL7 B2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.80. Variant of previous.

740b.3, Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL7 B3. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.80. Different from previous.
74x [probably 741], Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL7 B4. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.80. "Type C", 741 or much less likely 742 or 743.
N.d., Haji Sharaf	AR dirham	ANS 1955.34.35 (Arm.).
N.d., [Timur] and Mahmud, a	AR, tanka	Album 90-28-32.
N.d., Timur and Mahmud, b	AR, tanka, 5.90 g.	Album 90-28-34. Obv. in circle, rev. in square.
N.d., Timur and Mahmud, c	6.37 g.	YKB Timurid VII.AR.1/109. Notes S.Album. Obv. in plain circle, rev. in plain square.
N.d., Timur and Mahmud, d	6.16 g.	YKB Timurid 1/14. Notes S.Album.
(?) N.d., Timurid		Zb.69, no ref..
814a, Pir Budaq & Yusuf	AR, 5.20 g.	Artuk II.no.2447. Kara Yusuf proclaimed his favourite son Pir Budaq sultan and the coins were minted in their joint names: Album, NumChron 1976, 135.
(?) 814b, ditto		Zb.69 (153, no.490)
(?) 814c, ditto		Zb.69 (219, no.450)
814d, ditto	5.25 g.	YKB KK, 3.Kara Yusuf, 3/7. Notes S.Album.
814e, ditto	5.30 g.	YKB KK, 3. Kara Yusuf, 3/8. Notes S.Album.
814f, ditto	5.30 g.	YKB KK, 3.Kara Yusuf, 3/9. Notes S.Album.
814g.1-4, ditto	Four specimens. N.w.	YKB KK 3/7-10. Notes S.Album.
N.d., Pir Budaq & Yusuf, a	AR 5.31 g.	Album, NumChron 1976, 134, no.17. "Bidlis type." (See note (1) at end of this list.) Must be 814 or soon after.
N.d., ditto, b	AR 5.32 g.	Album, NumChron 1976, 135, no.18. Ditto.
N.d., ditto, c.1	AR tanka	Album (UT) HE5 D4. 15 c. Iran, 30.4.89, p.3. This and D5 and D6 will together account for a and b above.

N.d., ditto, c.2	AR tanka	Album (UT) HE5 D5. 15 c. Iran, 30.4.89, p.3. See previous coin. Variant.
N.d., ditto, c.3	AR tanka	Album (UT) HE5 D6. 15 c. Iran, 30.4.89, p.3. See previous coins. Third variant.
N.d., ditto, d	AR 3.67 g.	BM Kara Koyunlu. My notes p.2.
N.d., ditto, e	AR 2.72 g.	BM Kara Koyunlu. My notes, p.2.
N.d., ditto, f	AR dirham, 5.20 g.	ANS 1956.137.34 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, g	AR dirham, 4.12 g.	ANS 1917.216.1573 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, h	AR dirham 4.44 g.	ANS 1922.216.350 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, i	AR dirham 4.360 g.	ANS 1949.163.316 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, j	AR dirham 0.900 g.	ANS 1949.163.318 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, k	AR dirham 0.830 g.	ANS 1949.163.319 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, l	AR dirham 0.910 g.	ANS 1949.163.320 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, m	AR dirham 0.780 g.	ANS 1949.163.321 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, n	AR dirham 0.980 g.	ANS 1949.163.322 (Arm.)
N.d., ditto, o	AR dirham 1.020 g.	ANS 1949.163.323 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, p	AR dirham 0.900 g.	ANS 1949.163.324 (Arm.).
N.d., ditto, q.1-4	AR dirham, four specimens. 4.44, 5.20, 4.12, 4.36 g.	ANS QQ II, no.10.
N.d., [ditto,] r.1-2	AR dirham, two specimens. 0.87, 0.90 g.	ANS QQ II, no.14. "As no.10", therefore almost certainly in name of Kara Yusuf and Pir Budaq.
N.d., ditto, s	4.35 g.	YKB KK, 3.Kara Yusuf, 3/10. Notes S.Album.
N.d., ditto, t	5.4 g.	Tab. 151 T. Notes S.Album.
N.d., Iskender, a	AR 5.24 g.	Album, NumChron 1976, 141, no.30. Same as Album HE7 C6, 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.5. "Bidlis type".
N.d., Iskender, b	AR 4.85 g.	YKB KK, 4.Iskender, 4/1. Same type as previous.

N.d., Shams al-Dīn ibn Ḍīā al-Dīn, a	AR	Lane-Poole Cat. VII.102, no.248. BM Budlees. My notes p.4. Almost certainly Shams al-Din III, 1445 to c.1554, not Shams al-Din II ("Dushevar"), c.1426 to 836/1431-2 or a little later. See Ch.IV, sect.I.5.(vi), and note to annexe, end of sect.I.5.
N.d., Shams al-Dīn ibn Ḍīā al-Dīn, b	AR 4.41 g. [68 grains]	BM Budlees. Card on coin has "Add. II [i.e.Lane-Poole Cat. vol.X] 246e", but entry in catalogue is for Sharaf b. Muhammad (see below). My notes p.4. Very similar to previous coin.
N.d., Shams al-Dīn b. Ḍīā al-Dīn, c	AR 3.95 g.	Artuk II.869, no.2516. Artuk wrongly gives "b. malika" as part of title.
N.d., Shams al-Dīn b. Dīā al-Dīn, d	AR tanka	Album (UT) HD3 B3. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.20.
N.d., Shams al-Dīn b. Ḍīā al-Dīn, e		Zb.69 (288, no.864). Zambaur gives the dates of this Żīā al-Dīn as H. 941-86, which must mean Shams al-Din IV, who in fact reigned for only two years under Ottoman suzerainty. See Ch.III, sect.I.5.(v), (vii).
N.d., Amīr Shams al-Dīn	AR 2.70 g.	Artuk II.869, no.2517. Probably same Shams al-Din as previous.
N.d., Shams al-Dīn, a	AR tanka	Album (UT) HD3 C2. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.20. Same remark.
N.d., Shams al-Dīn, b	AR tanka	Album (UT) HD3 C3. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.20. Ditto. Variant on previous.
N.d., Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad	AR 4.44 g.	Artuk II.868, no.2514A. This is Ibrahim III, c.1447 to 1459 or a little before. Son of Haji Muhammad (I). See Ch.III, sect.I.5.(v) and note to annexe at end of sect.I.5. Artuk perhaps has the right Ibrahim, but gives the dates as 1460-66.
N.d., Sharaf b. Muḥammad, a	AR 4.47 g. [69 grains]	Lane-Poole Cat. VII.101, no.246. BM Budlees. My notes p.2. (1) The ruler. Sharaf III, 1459 or just before to after 1467. Successor to Ibrahim III, and likewise a son of Haji Muhammad (I). See Ch.IV, sect.I.5.(v). (2) Full title on coin "Al-wāthiq bī'l-ṣamad Sh. b. M.". Lane-Pool puts "Haji" before "Sharaf", which wrongly suggests Haji Sharaf (I) of Bitlis. But "Haji" is not on the coin.

N.d. ditto, b	AR 4.41 g. [68 grains]	Lane-Poole Cat. X.178, no.246d. BM Budlees. My notes p.1. Name hard. L-P. reads "El-Wāthiḳ bi-ṣ-ṣamad Sharaf ibn Muḥammad".
N.d. ditto, c	AR 4.41 g. [68 grains]	Lane-Poole Cat. X.178, no.246e. BM Budlees. (N.B. that marked 246e in tray is coin of Shams al-Din and of different weight.) My notes p.1.
N.d, ditto, d	AR 4.31 g. [66.5 grains]	Lane-Pool Cat. VII.102, no.247, wrongly under heading Shems-ed-Deen, which is reading given.
N.d., ditto, e	AR 4.55 g.	Artuk II.868, no.2514.
N.d., ditto f	AR tanka	Album (UT) HD3 A5. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.19. See previous coin.
N.d., ditto g	AR tanka	Album (UT) HD3 A6. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.19. Variant on HD3 A5.
N.d., ditto h	AR tanka	Album (UT) HD3 B1. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.19. Variant on both HD3 A5 and HD3 A6.
(?) N.d., ditto i		Zb.69 (153 no.450).
(?) N.d., ditto j		Zb.69 (288 no.1798).
N.d., ditto k	AR dirham	ANS 1902.1.1282 (Arm.).
N.d., [ditto], l	AR dirham	ANS 1928.87.1 (Arm.). ANS reading "Al-Wathiq bi'l Samad", therefore almost certainly Sharaf b. Muhammad.
N.d., [ditto], m	AR dirham	ANS 1928.87.2 (Arm.). As previous.
N.d., [ditto], n	AR dirham	ANS 1928.87.3 (Arm.). As previous.
N.d., Uzun Hasan, a	5.12 g.	YKB AK 5/5.
N.d., [Uzun] Hasan, b	4.79 g.	BM Ak Koyunlu, wrongly under Tabriz, Ya'qub, 4. Rev. c/s in square, "Hasan 'adil sultan"; traces of earlier c/s. Notes S.Album, wrongly (?) under Ya'qub.
891, Ya'qub	AR 5.15 g.	BM Ak Koyunlu. Ya'qub, AK Sultan 883-96.
N.d., Ya'qub, a	AR tanka	Album (UT) HF6 A6.
N.d., Ya'qub, b	Tanka 5.05 g.	Album 92-11-132. C/s "'Adil sultan Ya'qub, Bidlis" in octafoil. Orig. coin Tabriz, ruler illegible.

N.d., Ya'qub, c	AR tanka 5.15 g.	YKB AK 7/7. Notes S.Album. Pre-reform type struck c.883-91.
N.d., Ya'qub, d	AR tanka 5.08 g.	YKB AK 7/8. Notes S.Album. Post-reform type with "fa man ya'mul" rev., struck c.891-96.
N.d., Ya'qub, e	AR tanka 5.05 g.	YKB AK 7/9. Notes S.Album. As previous.
N.d., Ya'qub, f	AR tanka 5.02 g.	YKB AK 7/10. Notes S.Album. As previous two.
N.d., Baysunghur [AK], a	AR 1/3 tanka	Album (UT) HF9 F4. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.15. Baysunghur, AK sultan 896-97.
N.d., Baysunghur, b	AR 1/3 tanka	Album (UT) HF9 F5, 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.15. See previous coin. No mint name, but same dies as HF9 F4.
N.d., Rustam [AK], a	AR 1/3 tanka	Album (UT) HG1 C1. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.15. Rustam, AK sultan 897-902.
N.d., Rustam, b	AR 1/3 tanka	Album (UT) HG1 C2. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.15. See previous coin.
N.d., Rustam, c	AR tanka	Album (UT) HG1 B2. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.15. See previous coin. C/s on uncertain host.
N.d., Rustam, d	5.15 g.	YKB AK 9/2. Notes S.Album. Similar to previous (letter 25.7.92).
N.d., Rustam, e	2.00 g.	YKB AK 9/3. Notes S.Album. Similar to previous (letter 25.7.92). Obv. in "AK 8-foil". Rev. in "AK square".
N.d., Rustam, f	1.98 g.	YKB AK 9/4. Notes S.Album. Similar to previous (ibid.). Obv. in pointed quatrefoil. Rev. in sq., K around.
N.d., Rustam, g	1.95 g.	YKB AK 9/5. Notes S.Album. Similar to previous (ibid.).
N.d., Rustam, h	AR dirham	ANS 1965.123.57.
N.d., Rustam, i		ANS AQ 28. Notes S.Album. Obv. "AK 12-foil". Rev. in convex square.
N.d., Shah Muhammad	AR 3.70 g.	Artuk II.869, no.2515. (Shah) Muhammad (II), 900/1494-5 to 903/1497-8. See Ch.III, sect.I.5.(vi).

N.d., Saf. (Sh. Ismail), a	AV ashrafi 3.50 g.	Artuk II.849, no.2446. Artuk puts AE; denied by Album (letter 25.7.92).
N.d., Saf. (Sh. Ismail), b	AV ashrafi 3.50 g.	Artuk II.849, no.2447. Same correction as previous.
N.d., Saf. (Sh. Ismail), c	AV ashrafi	Album (UT) IA2 A2, Saf. 27.1.89, p.1.
N.d., Saf. (Sah Ismail), d	AR 1/2 shahi, 2.07 g.	ANS 1922.216.570 (Arm.).
922, Selim I, a	AV, altın	Schaend. 95.
922, Selim I, b	AV, 3.40 g.	Ölçer, *Selim I coinage* 117, cf. p.182. Ölçer collection no.9321. YKB no.112. Year mistakenly written 669.
922, Selim I, c	AV, 3.42 g.	Ölçer, *Selim I coinage* 118. Ölçer collection no.9322.
922, Selim I, d	AR, 0.62 g.	Ölçer, *Selim I coinage* 118. Ölçer collection no. 9331. Date wrongly written 966.
926, Suleyman I	AR mangır, 3.28 g.	Ölçer, TNDB 1 (1976), 14. Obv., animal design. Both obv. and rev. in ring of dots. N.B. 926 may or may not be actual year minted: some coins bearing the date were minted later.
955, Süleyman I	AR akçe 1.2 g.	Ölçer, TNDB 8 (1982), 21-22.
985, Murat III	AR mangır	Schaend. 103.
1049, Ibrahim I, a	AR mangır	Schaend. 111.
1049, Ibrahim I, b	AR akçe	Schaend. 111.
[1]124, Ahmet III	AE mangır 4.87 g.	ANS 1949.163.497 (Arm.).
1134, Ahmet III	AE mangır	Schaend. 116.
1143, Ahmet III	AE mangır, 4.24 g.	Ölçer, TNDB 1 (1976), 14. Rev. in pearl chain.
N.d, Ahmet III, a	AE	ANS 0000 [sic].999.19886 (Arm.). Long rectangular flan. See note (2) below.
1143, Mahmut I, a		Schaend. 117.
1143, Mahmut I, b	AE mangır	Schaend. 117.

1143, Mahmut I, c	AE fals	ANS 0000 [sic].999.12880 (Arm.). C/s "Maḥmūd".
1143, [Ahmet III or Mahmut I]		Zb. 69 (288, no.864).
1150, Mahmut I, a	AE mangır	Schaend. 118.
(?) 1150, Mahmut I, b		Zb. 69 (288, no.896 [?]).
1162, Mahmut I, a	AE mangır	Schaend. 119.
(?) 1162, [Mahmut I], b		Zb. 69 (288, no.914 [?]).
(?) 1165, [Mahmut I]		Zb. 69 (288, no.914 [?]).

Attribution impossible, highly dubious or too vague

(?) 7xx, Il-Kh.		Zb.69 (127, no.580).
N.d., KK, a-f	Six specimens. 0.83, 0.91, 0.78, 0.98, 1.02, 0.90 g..	ANS QQ III.20. Rather crude, several dies.
800, KK [!]		Zb.69, no ref.
(?) N.d., AK		Zb.69 (219 no.490).
91(3), Muhammad b. Ibrahim [?]	AE fals	ANS 0000 [sic].999.11300 (Arm.). However in the year 913 Sharaf should have been prince of Bitlis. No Muhammad b. Ibrahim is known in any case; but an Ibrahim b. Muhammad is.
N.d., Badr al-Din	AR dirham	ANS 1973.225.2 (Arm.). The last known prince of Bitlis in the 11th/17th century was a Badr al-Din, but if the coin is really a dirham in general type it will not be of the Ottoman period.
N.d., no ruler	AR dirham	ANS 1949.163.325 (Arm.).
[Bitlis type only ? -- see note (1) below]		Tab. 152 T. Notes S.Album.

Notes to this table

Note (1). "Bitlis type". An obverse type consisting of a hexagon inscribed within a curled

and looped 18-foil. It was first struck in 814 in the names of Pir Budaq and Kara Yusuf, not just at Bitlis but at many other mints in Armenia and Azerbayjan. But at Bitlis the type was adopted as standard: many of the coins minted in the names of Bitlis princes carry it.

Note (2). When I met Ölçer about the spring of 1991, he told me of a collection of long, heavy Ottoman copper coins of Bitlis, dating from the 17th century A.D., which he planned to publish. This ANS coin sounds like Ölçer's, except that from Ölçer's description I had the impression of coins with a round rather than a rectangular cross-section. However nothing very precise was said. I do not know whether Ölçer published the Bitlis coins, but at the time I was told he had only a year to live.

Ahlat

(Armn. "Xlat'"; Arab. "Khilāṭ"; Pers. and Ott. "Akhlāṭ")

Ahlat, after the Turkish invasions, was considered the chief city of Armenia, on the more limited definition of Armenia employed by the Arab geographers: the latter meant the Lake Van region and the district of Erzurum. After a period as the capital of a Turkish principality more or less confined to the Lake Van region, then as part of a minor Ayyubid principality, the city became capital of the Il-Khanid province of Armenia (Arminīya). It seems to have been a highly prosperous and extensive city from the 12th to the first half of the 14th century A.D.; the key to this prosperity was the passage of merchandise along the north shore of Lake Van between, on the one hand, trading centres

such as Aleppo, Antioch and ultimately European ports and on the other hand Tabriz and ultimately China. There is evidence in the 13th and early 14th centuries for cultural and scholarly activity beyond the requirements of a local capital. In the Kara Koyunlu period, when the district of Ahlat was an apanage of the Bitlis principality, the city had lost its administrative importance and was losing, too, its reservoir of scholarly and artistic skills and some of its population to Bitlis. But it never suddenly slumped; it could be said to have remained a city until the mid-14th century; and never failed as a settlement until the Safavid attack of 955/1548, in which its walls and public buildings (except the giant türbes and fine cemetery) were ruined. Before this attack the city never lost the prestige which the Il-Khans had given it, and continued to receive visits from the sovereigns of outside powers owing to the suitability of the plateau on which the city stood to the accommodation of a large army or ceremonial gathering.

The walled area occupied the flatter part of the plateau, from which the land slopes gently south-eastwards down to the lake. To the west is a broad ravine; the citadel, which played a vital role in several of the city's many sieges, was created by fortifying the knife-edge of rock standing up out of the bottom of the ravine. The city walls appear to have descended the easterly slope of the ravine and joined the citadel at either end: some of the city's medieval buildings lie on that slope. At least some of the türbes of the Il-Khanid period on the plateau must have lain within the former walled area. It is not clear whether the extensive cemetery, which lies immediately next to the ravine and towards the lake, was within the walls. The present thin rectangular walled enclosure leading down to the lake is an Ottoman construction built soon after the Safavid attack which destroyed Ahlat's public buildings.

Ahlat rose as a city in the 10th and 11th centuries, in a period of commercial

prosperity during which the north shore of the lake was a favoured route for east-west traffic.[a] During the period of the "Shahs of Armenia", the 12th-century Turkish dynasty whose capital was Ahlat, and the first 60 years of the 13th century A.D. were probably the first of two zeniths in the city's history. Ahlat became part of the easternmost apanage of the Ayyubid family empire: it was conquered by the Ayyubid al-Awhad of Māyyāfāriqīn in 604/1207-8.[b] It is worth considering why this city should be the only one north of the Taurus and outside the low-lying arc of upper Mesopotamia to have been brought under Ayyubid control. Equally it is worth considering why the Khwarizmshah Jalal al-Din should have expended such pains in besieging the city over the years 623/1226 to 627/1230, only to abandon it a few months later.[c]

The passage of trade along the northern shore of the lake must have been severely hit in 1260, when the first of many Mongol-Mamluk wars started in Upper Mesopotamia and north Syria.[d] Serious damage appears to have been done by an earthquake of 674/1275-76, in which solidly constructed buildings were ruined.[e] However Ahlat now became the capital of Il-Khanid Armenia.[f] Very likely the Mongols buried in the tomb-towers at Ahlat were governors of Armenia; the first of those in which Mongols are buried

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[a] The best collection of references, principally from the Arab geographers, to Ahlat's urban condition and status in this period is in Sumer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 49-52.

[b] See e.g. Humphreys, *Saladin to the Mongols* 128-9; Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri Tarihi* 105-6, putting al-Ashraf for al-Awhad.

[c] See Humphreys, *Saladin to the Mongols* 181, 215-16, 217-18, 219.

[d] See e.g. Cahen, *Syrie du nord* 709-12.

[e] Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 57 and several references.

[f] Mustawfi, *Nuzhat* (LS), 100. At the accession of Abu Sa'id in 715/1316, Sutay Noyan was made governor of Ahlat, which in context must mean governor of Armenia on the narrow definition: Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 58, n.59.

dates from 678/1279.[a]

There is no reason why, from the reign of Abu Sa'id (716/1316-736/1335) and more or less to the end of Il-Khan control over the city (probably in the mid-740's/1340's, and no later than 1349) Ahlat could not have seen a second period of commercial expansion. A treaty of 715/1315 had put an end to the border fighting in Upper Mesopotamia, and it seems likely that commercial traffic once again travelled the north shore of the Lake Van on its way between Iran and other markets to the east and Syria to the south-west. There is a copious coinage, so far as the known coins indicate, from 712/1312 to 743/1343. Although it is a somewhat unreliable indicator, the tombstones of the cemetery in Ahlat are at their largest and their decoration at its most luxuriant in the years 1312-35, after which the series of large, profusely-decorated gravestones more or less comes to an end, though gravestones on a less grand scale are found, mainly in small series, until the early 16th century, some four between 736/1335 and c.749/1349.[24]

In the 13th and early 14th centuries A.D. various arts and fields of science and scholarship flourished in the city. The skill of the masons is evident in the surviving turbes and tombstones, and masons signed themselves "of Akhlāṭ" elsewhere.[25] Two experts in natural science from Ahlat are known in, respectively, the early and the mid-13th century A.D..[26] A chemist, Ibrahim ibn 'Abdallah, is known here in the early 14th century.[27] Various scholars in religious fields, and shaykhs, are known here in the 13th and early 14th century.[28]

In Il-Khanid Ahlat there were at least several stone-built public buildings such as mosques, madrasas and hospitals; but "several" is a cautious estimate which would probably have to be abandoned after a thorough excavation of the site. These buildings,

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[a] Gabriel, *Voyages* I.245, 347 no.133, türbe of Hasan Timur.

with the exception of the giant türbes, were destroyed in Shah Tahmasp's attack of 955/1548; however a hamam in the ravine just east of the citadel survives, there is a report of a ruined mosque also in this ravine, and recently a building which seems to be a large private house, perhaps pre-Mongol, has come to light and been excavated.[29] However for at least a century afterwards their remains were detectible. Evliya cites an inscription which speaks of 35,000 mihrabs at Ahlat, which may be taken as an indication of a large number of public buildings and nothing else.[30]

The Mongols finally lost control of Ahlat to Bitlis probably in the mid-740's/1340's, certainly by 750/1349. Eventually Bitlis took much of Ahlat's population and livelihood and almost completely absorbed its tradition of stonemasonry and learning: the process of transfer may have begun as early as the the mid-1330's. That is to say ordinary inhabitants, traders of various sorts, artists, *'ulemā'* and other learned men may have begun to move to Bitlis as early as the late 1330's and the 1340's.[a] Bitlis also replaced Ahlat as the principal mint in the district west of the lake, in fact after the mid-740's/1340's little was minted at Ahlat apart from certain issues during Timur's occupation.

In 1335 the series of tall, lavishly-carved tombstones in the Ahlat cemetery comes to an abrupt end. Between then and 1350 only four gravestones are known. It can scarcely be a coincidence that the year 1335 falls at the end of Abu Sa'id's reign, after which the Il-Khanid empire was split between rival khans and their factions. The explanation for the abrupt end to the series of tombstones is by no means that the Mongols lost control over the city -- it was taken by Bitlis only in the mid- or late 1340's -- or that their hold over Ahlat was so precarious that the city disintegrated. There is ample coin evidence for the

[a] See on Bitlis, p.298.

continuation of Ahlat as a viable city fully under Mongol control for at least another eight years; nor were the general commercial conditions inimical to its continued prosperity. But it does seem likely that the year 1335 marks the beginning of the reversal of roles between Ahlat and Bitlis. Bitlis, formerly living in the shadow of Ahlat because of its restricted site, now began to draw level with it as a city because the Mongol grip on the area generally was more tenuous and the princes of Bitlis were beginning to rival the Mongol governors at Ahlat as a local power. The absorption of Ahlat into the Bitlis principality (late 1340's), of course, greatly facilitated the reversal of roles.

From 1335 to the destruction by Shah Tahmasp was a period of long-term decline. But Ahlat continued to be a substantial city and a commercial centre until perhaps the mid-15th century. From then till 1548 it was a fair-sized town. When Shah Tahmasp attacked Ahlat in 955/1548 he found an intact city wall, into which the Turkish force retired. The wall was then breached by mines, and after the city's capture Tahmasp had the city wall destroyed.[a] This does not suggest a defunct or ailing town: on the contrary, Ahlat probably presented to Tahmasp a prestigious and populous, but at the same time vulnerable target which at relatively little cost would cause maximum inconvenience to the Ottoman military and administrative effort in this region. Up to the time of Tahmasp's attack Ahlat had been a functioning and well-populated town.

It was only thirty years or so after the city fell into the hands of the Bitlis princes that the principality submitted to Timur (1387) and Timur entrusted the administration of the city and its dependent districts to his governor at Adilcevaz, Hakan.[31] This is not likely to mean that the city had suffered a drastic loss of status or population in the same way that rather less than two centuries later the inclusion of Ahlat in the Ottoman sanjak

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[a] AT 358-9; Sh.I.352.

of Adilcevaz undoubtedly did mean that Ahlat no longer justified a separate sanjak. Timur's action is much more likely to mean, first, that he did not want to allow the Ruzagis of Bitlis to keep the city so soon after its loss to them by the Mongols, and second that the city was difficult to place once it was detached from the Bitlis principality. Timur's action does not point to a perception that Ahlat was an inferior city to Adilcevaz. The known coins suggest the reverse, since, as far as we know, he minted nothing at Adilcevaz. By 1394 Ahlat had somehow slipped back under Ruzagi control: in that year Haji Sharaf of Bitlis handed Timur its keys.[a] Again, the reversion to Ruzagi government hints at a city worth depriving Timur of.

A series of gravestones, still the product of much ingenuity and care, in the cemetery from the years 780/1378 to 823/1420 throw much light on the history of the town in the period, not so much by their presence at all, though this counts for something, as through their inscriptions.[b] The dead person in one gravestone dated 780/1378 or a few years either side is Sulaymān, son of Shaykh Amīn, son of Amīr Bahā' al-Dīn Rūshagī.[32] All we can deduce with confidence is that a Ruzagi, almost certainly a member of the ruling lineage, was buried here; but this is interesting enough from the point of view of the city's status.

Probably from 788/1385 or 798/1395 comes the grave of Pasha Khātūn, daughter of the amīr Shaykh Sharaf, son of the amīr al-kābir Amīr ... [effaced], son of Takin, son of the amīr 'Izz al-Dīn al-Rūshagī.[33] Again all we can be sure of is that Pasha Khātūn and her father etc. were Rūzagīs, very likely of the ruling lineage. But there is a strong possibility that her father Sharaf is a prince of Bitlis already known, who submitted to

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[a] Sh.I.372: on 15th Rajab 796/18th May.

[b] Karamağaralı, *Ahlat Mezartaşları* 225-6, 237-44: six tombstones.

Timur in 1387 and whose reign ended c.1395.[a] So Ahlat was chosen for the burial of a Ruzagi princess, which may indicate little about the size of the city at this stage; but a vague indication as to its size would be given if this princess turned out to be the daughter of one of the Bitlis princes themselves.

From 815/1420 comes the tombstone of the amīr and amīrzāde Husām al-Dawla wa'l-Dīn, Amīr Birmish, son of the *amīr al-kabīr*, the *amīr-i miṣr* Ibn Ḥājī Zayn al-Dīn al-Rūshagī.[b] The dead man is a Ruzagi, almost certainly, as just remarked, a member of the ruling lineage. His father is both *amīr al-kabīr* and *amīr-i miṣr*. The latter term might mean something like "amīr of the city"; however it is much more likely to mean "Egyptian amir", in other words an amir in the service of the Circassian Mamluks of Egypt.[c] More realistically, the amir may only have been sent the trousers which symbolised his new status.[d] "Amīr al-kabīr" need not mean a person of great power within the Bitlis principality as a whole, but the two terms taken together must indicate a person with high responsibility within the principality.

In 799/1396-97 a princess, Arzan Khātūn, daughter of an Amīr 'Alī, was buried in a türbe at Ahlat, not in the walled area but a kilometre further east, where the modern town now stands.[34] Since we do not know who 'Ali was, it is hard to decide the significance of the choice of Ahlat as the place of burial. It indicates a city or at least a settlement of note. Probably the easterly location was chosen because this was a cemetery

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[a] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(iv). The gravestone repeats the title, Amir Shaykh Sharaf, which the Sherefname applies to this Sharaf (I) at Sh.I.364-5. The latter is a list of Bitlis princes coming before the passage on Sharaf which opens the historically much better-documented narrative concerning the Bitlis principality.

[b] Karamağaralı, *Ahlat Mezartaşları* 240-41, no.105.

[c] This was suggested to me by Prof. J.M.Rogers.

[d] Again, suggested to me by Robert Irwin.

well outside the walled area, over which Timur's governor (either here or at Adilcevaz) had control. The location therefore loosely suggests a Kurdish lady, probably of the Ruzagi ruling lineage or a tribe in the Ruzagi "core group". Either there was just a cemetery here (a türbe, the "Şeyh Necmettin Türbesi", had already been built here in 619/1222-23)[a] or there was also a mahalle of the city, as in the late Ottoman period ("Erkezen Mahallesi").

It seems that a masjid or madrasa was founded at Ahlat by an amir Shams al-Din. This must be Shams al-Din I (d.1423). However the indications are vague and not especially sound. The source is the local historian, Abdürrahim Şerif Beygu, who claimed to have seen a vakfiye (deed of endowment) stating that this amir founded a *madrasa* and *masjid* at the village of Abri (in fact eight hours' walk west of Ahlat) and at Ahlat.[b] The author does not quote the text verbatim, so we can only go on the precise words used by himself in his book, *Ahlat Kitabeleri*. Those words simply say the amir founded a *madrasa* and *masjid* at Abri and Ahlat. Clearly each place must have had one, but the text does not say which of the *madrasa* and *masjid* was founded where. (Conceivably each of the two places received both a madrasa and masjid.) It would make some difference whether Ahlat received a *madrasa* or a *masjid* -- the latter could be founded anywhere, the former could be founded only in a city or large town, or at any rate is most unlikely to have been founded in a village. But the foundation of a masjid or madrasa does not suggest the Bitlis amirs thought of Ahlat as a site not worth investing in for the present, despite its glorious past.

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[a] Described Tabak, *Ahlat* 11; date etc., Şerif, *Ahlat Kitabeleri* 87-88. The name Najm al-Dīn does not appear on the inscription.

[b] Şerif, *Ahlat Kitabeleri* 54, referring to İstanbul Evkâf dairesi, defter no.2-3-11. So in principle it would be possible to check, but in practice very hard.

In 1422 and 1423 the Kara Koyunlu Iskender made fruitless attempts to capture Ahlat; in 1423 he executed Shams al-Din of Bitlis outside the city, apparently having used the threat of execution as a means of capturing the city (the incident, and the two failed sieges, do not bespeak a small or ill-defended city).[a] In 1462 came a siege by the Kara Koyunlu Jahan Shah, which lasted long enough and was considered serious enough for the Katholikos of Aghtamar, Zakaria, to mediate and persuade the Kara Koyunlu to lift the siege in return for payment of tribute.[b]

The sieges may have contributed to a depopulation of Ahlat and loss of commercial importance by the mid-15th century. The Venetian ambassador to Uzun Hasan's court, Barbaro, after passing Ahlat in 1471, described the city thus (in the 16th-century English translation):

> "... a faire, stronge castell, in a place called Allarch, standing upon a lake [Lake Van] ... . Under Allarch is a towne of about m^{l} houses ..." (Barbaro 85.)

It is always hard to speculate just what was there when such travellers passed a town and later penned such descriptions. Had Barbaro walked around in the whole of the built area, where most of the city's public buildings must have been, or just stayed in the ravine beneath the citadel ? Is he mixing up Ahlat with another town such as Muş, which he has just passed through ? In recollection several months after the event this would be very

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[a] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(iv).

[b] Clph.II.221, p.174 (S.1462.3, pp.272-3); Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 61; above, Ch.III, sect.I.5.(v).

easy to do. It seems likely he is underestimating the number of houses, but uncannily accurate as to Ahlat's status at this point in time. Perhaps it was just a town.

However it took the Ak Koyunlu Bāyandūr b. Rustam six months to capture Ahlat in 1472; he was then buried with his son in a large, profusely decorated türbe of, nevertheless, somewhat gauche execution (886/1481).[a] Ahlat must have passed back into Ruzagi hands after the restoration of the Bitlis principality to the Ruzagi ruling family in 900/1494-95, after which occurred Shah Ismail's visit in 1502.[b] Sure enough, four large gravestones in the grand, profuse style of the zenith years under the Il-Khans appear in the cemetery in the years 1502 to 1509: the first belongs to an amir bearing the name Rūshagī, who was therefore probably a member of the ruling lineage.[35] The Ruzagi amir was probably buried here because Shah Ismail's visit had once more put local people in mind of the city's past glory and because it had recently come back under Ruzagi control. Still, the other three are a *qāżī* (himself the son of a *qāżī*), his daughter and his brother; which suggests simply that a large, functioning town still stood here.

All of the above suggest that Ahlat continued with the population and activities of a genuine city until the mid-15th century, and those of a large town until 1548. That apart, the city and the plateau on which it stood continued to attract visiting sovereigns as the venue for ceremonies. In 824/1421 Shah Rukh camped in a meadow in the environs of Ahlat to receive the submission of Shams al-Din I of Bitlis.[c] In 939/1532 Sharaf Khan of Bitlis gave Shah Tahmasp an extraordinary banquet at Ahlat, to express his gratitude for

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[a] Siege: Clph. XV.II.424b, p.335 (S.1472.1, p.305); above, Ch.III, sect.I.5.(vi). On the türbe, ibid. n.46 to p.120.

[b] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(vii), p.123 and esp. n.50.

[c] Sh.I.378-9. Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 60.

saving the principality from Ottoman capture.[a] The choice of Ahlat is explained, not only by the suitability of the ground for such ceremonies, but also by the city's prestige as the former Il-Khan province capital, outside which the enthronement ceremony of Geikhatu had taken place in 690/1291,[b] not to mention the continued existence of a city or town here.

The monuments now visible on the site give the impression that Ahlat collapsed as a city or even a substantial settlement with the breakdown of effective Il-Khan rule. So far we have given a picture of the city's life which suggests that this is far from the case. The real collapse came with Tahmasp's attack in 1548; the real drift from the size and functions of a city into those of a town came in the mid-15th century. To establish that a viable city or town which could have been a base for administration existed here in the late Middle Ages, the above account is enough. But by cutting off Ahlat's history in 1548 we are in danger of letting that history drift as a somewhat bloodless intellectual construct. By bringing it down to the present we can establish a link with the period of most interest to us (the late Middle Ages) which will endow that period with greater substance and corporeality, and give us more confidence in our conclusions concerning it.

The Ottomans built a new walled area stretching in an awkward long rectangle from the flatter part of the plateau to the lake shore. No doubt they built it to a much more limited size than the previous walled area: it was meant only to house a small town. Within this walled area two small mosques were eventually built.

Ahlat was now a *nahiye* of the sanjak of Adilcevaz. According to Sümer, the *tahrir*

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[a] Sh.I.425-8; date (given by that of the *ferman* granted to Sharaf by Tahmasp) I.430. See Ch.III, sect.I.5.(vii).

[b] Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 58.

defter of 963/1556 shows a taxable population of 128 people; at all events the town's population was tiny.[a] Part of the population continued to live among the ruins of the former walled area. Here only a single mosque was upright.[b] By the end of the 16th century, when the *Sherefname* gives a brief report of its condition, the new town in the Ottoman walled area had not begun to prosper or grow.[c] It is interesting to speculate on the reasons. The mid-16th century was not a period of slump; for twenty years after the treaty of Amasya (962/1555) the Van region was relatively free of warfare between the two empires. The north shore of the lake continued to be used by merchants carrying goods between Tabriz and Aleppo. So general conditions were not conducive to the failure of a recently destroyed, but subsequently refounded, city. Instead we must look at the destruction itself. Once the public buildings had gone, there was no longer a reason for a large population. The type of functions, including markets, supported by a city or large town population failed to re-establish themselves; it is doubtful whether caravans did more than rest the night here -- most of the trading was done at Bitlis and nearby caravansarays such as the great Rahva han. So there was little to attract a population to Ahlat. Given that farming was now the only means of livelihood, dispersion to nearby villages made much better sense. Of course the nearest village lay in the area formerly enclosed by the city walls.

Evliya found a somewhat different situation in the mid-17th century. The new town was the seat of the sanjak bey of Muş. Perhaps this was due to some arrangement resulting from the granting of the harāc of Muş to the beys of Bitlis (Ch.III, sect.I.5.(ix)).

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[a] Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 63.

[b] Ev.IV.137.

[c] Sh.I.352.

There was a harbour, where a customs official levied a 10% due. There were 350 houses in the new walled area, and "hundreds" of houses among the ruins of the old one.[a] Naturally the town had not reached the proportions of the city or large town of the late Middle Ages, but it seems to have grown somewhat as a result of the move of the Muş bey's residence to Ahlat and the establishment of the port, which had obviously been envisaged when the new Ottoman walled area was planned.

But at some point, probably the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman walled area was all but abandoned and its population moved to Erkezen mahallesi.[b] This may already have been inhabited to an extent; probably there was a cemetery; certainly the two türbes stood here (those of "Shaykh Najm al-Dīn" and Arzan Khātūn). This is where the town still stands; a village still straggles behind and among the medieval türbes on a deserted and peaceful site.

Bibliographical note. Much the best history is Sümer's article in Belleten L (1980), repr. in Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri*. Beside being a political history of the city, this also deals to an extent with its prosperity and size. But it does not deal with Ahlat's economic function or trace its decline, especially in our period of interest, or extract from the sources the aspects of the evidence relevant to such questions. EI^2, "Akhlâṭ", and İA are quite inadequate. Enc.Iran., "Akhlāṭ", is balanced but rather short, as regards both history and monuments. Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri*, Ch.III, sects. 8 & 9 are useful, if a little

[a] Ev.IV.137-8. Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 64, seems to have missed this important evidence, though he does quote Evliya, and on the other hand it is not clear that the evidence of Katib Çelebi which he quotes on the same page is worth anything.

[b] Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.203 and the refs. on p.208. Sümer, *D.A. Türk Beylikleri* 64-65 has some population figures from the Bitlis salname of 1310/1892-93 and the 1985 census.

overplayed, on the life of the city in the "Shāh-i Armān" and Mongol eras.

Coins

Pre-Il-Khanid		Marwanid, Shah-i Arman, Ayyubid. Zb.112.
(?) 698, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (115 & 347)
698, Ghazan	AR dirham 2.375 g.. "Khilāṭ".	ANS 1949.163.315 (Arm.).
699, Ghazan	AR, dirham	Album (UT) GD5 C5. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.24.
700a, Ghazan	AR 4.13 g. [63.8 grains]. Arminīya	Lane-Pool Cat. VI.38, no.106. BM Mongols tray 10. My notes p.4.
700b, Ghazan	AR 2.14 g., Khilāṭ	BM Mongols tray 10. My notes p.5.
700c, Ghazan	AR dirham. "Khilāṭ". Month of Rajab.	Album (UT) 90-28-4
700d, Ghazan	AR dirham, 2.14 g.. Month of Muharram.	Album (UT) 92-10-17.
(?) 700e, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (no ref.)
(?) 701a, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (no ref.)
701b, Ghazan	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GD5 D1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.24.
701c, Ghazan	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GD5 C6. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.24.
702, Ghazan	AR, 2 dirhams, 3.92 g.	Album (UT) 92-11-97.
D.m., Ghazan	AR, dirham	Album (UT) GD5 D2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.24.
D.b., Ghazan	AR, dirham	Album (UT) GD5 D3. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.24.
N.d./d.m., Ghazan	AR dirham, 2.203 g.	ANS 1917.215.1818.

(?) 706, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (no ref.)
(?) 709, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (no ref.)
(?) 710a, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (no ref.)
710b, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE6 C6. Mong.Emp.20.6.89, p.32. Type B.
(?) 714a, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (no ref.)
714b, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE6 D1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.32. Ahlat obverse muled with Tabriz reverse.
[71]4c, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE6 D2. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.32.
715, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE6 D3. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.32. Type C.
718a, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 C6. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.24. Type B.
718b, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 D1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type B, variant of 718a.
719a, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 D2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type C.
719b, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham, 3.44 g.. "Khilāṭ".	ANS 1958.183.50 (Arm.).
720, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 D3. Type C.
721a, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) 92-11-101. Type C. Strange unread word after mint name.
721b, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams. "Tumān Akhlāṭ".	Album (UT) 91-5-194. Unread word after mint name.
722a, Abu Sa'id	AR, 3.57 g.	BM Mongols tray 16. My notes p.10.
722b, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams. "Al-Khilāṭ".	Album (UT) GG1 D4. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type D.
722c, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 D5. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type D.

722c, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 D6. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type D, but variant on 722b.
722d, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham 3.54 g.. "Khilāṭ".	ANS 1922.216.347 (Arm.).
722(?)e, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham 3.502 g.. "Al-Khilāṭ".	ANS 1958.183.51 (Arm.).
(?) 722f, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (153, no.480)
724a, Abu Sa'id	AR 2.980 g. [46 grains]	Lane-Poole Cat. X.110, no.212e. BM Mongols tray 16. My notes p.10.
724b, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 E1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type F.
724c, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 E2. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type F. Peculiar calligraphy; contemp. imitation.
724d, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham 3.515 g.. "Al-Khilāṭ".	ANS 1922.216.348.
(?) 724d, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (29, 92)
7[2]7a, Abu Sa'id	AR 2.59 g. [40 grains]	Lane-Poole Cat. X.110, no.214s. Mongols tray 16. My notes p.11.
727b, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 E3. Mong.Emp.20.6.89, p.44. Type F.
729a, Abu Sa'id	AR [2 dirhams], 3.10 g.	Artuk II.789, no.2269.
729b, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album GG1 E4. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type G.
729c, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham, 1.55 g.	Album (UT) 91-2-12. Type G.
729(?)d, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham, 3.106 g.. "Al-Khilāṭ".	ANS 0000 [sic].999.11298.
(?) 729d, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (63, no.1580)
72x, Abu Sa'id	Ar 3.50 [54 grains]	Lane-Poole Cat. X.110, no.215m. BM Mongols tray 16. My notes p.11.
730, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 E5. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type G.

733, Abu Sa'id ("Busa'id(a?)")	AR 2.85 g.	BM Mongols tray 16. My notes p.12.
Kh.33a, Abu Sa'id ("Busa'id(a?)")	AR dirham 2.78 g., al-Khilāṭ	BM Mongols tray 16. My notes p.12.
Kh.33b, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG1 E6. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.44. Type H.
Kh.33c, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham, 2.77 g.. "Al-Khilāṭ".	ANS 1974.26.378.
Kh.33d, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham. "Al-Khilāṭ".	ANS 1002.1.1281.
D.b., Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams, 2.78 g.	Album, Il-Kh. I, 59, no.4. Type F. "Probably a contemporary imitation or outright counterfeit."
738a, Muhammad	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GK1 C3. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.69. Type B.
738b, Muhammad	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GK1 C2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.69. Mint and date retrograde. Type B.
(?) 738c, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (196, no.17)
739a, Sati Beg	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GK4 E2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.71. Type A.
[739]b (n.d.), Sati Beg	AE fals	Album (UT) GK6 C5. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.71.
740a, Sulayman	AR, dirham, 1.615 g. "Khilāṭ"	Album, Il-Kh. II, 57 no.41. Among nos.41-3 and possibly no.130 are Album GL5 E4 and E5. Type B.
740b, Sulayman	AR, 1.78 g. "Khilāṭ"	Album, Il-Kh. II, 57 no.42. Type B.
740c, Sulayman	AR 1.785 g. "Khilāṭ"	Album, Il-Kh. II, 57 no.43. Type B.
740d, Sulayman	AR 1.77 g. "Al-Khilāṭ".	Album, Il-Kh. II, 63 no.130. Muşt be same as Album (UT) GL5 E6, Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.79. Type B. "Miserable calligraphy, but apparently not an imitation."
740e, Jihan Timur	AR 1.78 g. "Khilāṭ".	Album, Il-Kh.II, 68 no.178. Type A.

740f, Jihan Timur	AR 1.77 g. "Khilāṭ".	Album, Il-Kh.II, 68, no.180. This or no.179 is presumably Album (UT) GL5 A3, Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.78. Type A.
740g, Jihan Ṭimur	AR 1.75 g. "Khilāṭ"	Album, Il-Kh.II, 68, no.179. See previous coin. Type A.
741, Sulayman	AR 1/2 dirham. "Khilāṭ".	ANS 1972.183.51 (Arm.)
742, Sulayman	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL5 F1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.79. Type C.
743a, Sulayman	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL5 F2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.79. Type D.
743b, Sulayman	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL5 F3. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.69. Type D. Variant of GL5 F2.
743c, Sulayman	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL5 F4. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.79. Type LE.
(?) 743d, Il-Kh.		Zb.112 (115, no.331f)
74x, Sulayman	AR, dirham	Album (UT) GL5 F5. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.79. Type LE.
746, Anushiravan	AR dirham, 1.28 g.	ANS 1922.216.349 (Arm.)
[C.750's], n.d., no ruler	AR dirham "Akhlāṭ".	Album (UT) HD2 C2. 14c. Iran 11.1.89, p.19. Inner ring, 8-foil. Perhaps last years of Il-Khans (mid-750's) or, more likely, just post-Il-Khan, but in either case presumably minted at order of Bitlis princes.
(?)[C.750's], n.d., no ruler	AR dirham. "Qal'a", prob. Ahlat.	Album (UT) HD2 C3. 14c. Iran 11.1.89, p.19. Similar to previous.
765	AR dirham. "Al-Khilāṭ".	ANS 1973.117.2 (Arm.). ANS entry: "Uways" (?). Not clear if (1) name hard to read or (2) no part of inscription seems to be a ruler's name, but "Uways" would be good guess on grounds of date.
D.b., Uways	Dinar, 1.90 g.	Album 92-27-30. Type C, 766-73. Coarse calligraphy; i.e. die not supplied from central mint.
N.d., [Timur &] (Mahmud)-- a	AR 2 dinars	Album (UT) HG10 B1, Timurid 30.4.89, p.1. Should date to second half of 790's.

N.d., [Timur &] Mahmud -- b	5.60 g.	YKB Timurid 1/7. Notes S.Album. Rev.: octafoil, alt. points and rounds.
N.d., [Timur &] Mahmud -- c	AR dirham 5.903 g.. "Al-Khilāṭ".	ANS 1974.26.379 (Arm.).
N.d., [Timur &] Mahmud -- d	AR tanka	Album (UT) HG10 B2, Tim. 30.4.89, p.1. 12-foil etc.. Date should be somewhere from 796 to 807.
N.d., [Timur &] Mahmud -- e	AR tanka	Album (UT) HG10 B3. Tim. 30.4.89, p.1. Variant of previous.
N.d., [Timur &] Mahmud -- f	AR tanka	Album (UT) HG10 B4. Tim. 30.4.89, p.1.
N.d., [Timur &] Mahmud -- g	AR tanka	Album (UT) HG10 B5. Tim. 30.4.89, p.1.

Attribution impossible or highly dubious

(?) 768	Zb.112 (no ref.). Question-mark by date even in Zb.. Attrib. to "minor principalities" [in this case Bitlis] by him.
N.d., (?) KK	Zb.112 (219, no.456).

Muş

(Armn. "Muş", Ott. & Pers. "Mūsh")

In the 12th to early 14th centuries Muş may possibly have qualified as a city, but in our period, although it seems to have been of city size, it cannot have had the economic functions of a city, and it would be unwise to call it such. However Armenian sources refer to it as a *k'alak'* (a term which implies, if not a city, then a town of some size),[36] it was the chief town of a large and highly fertile district, coins were minted here in the early 14th century,[37] the town certainly had a walled area in the late Middle Ages and there is some direct evidence for an exceptionally large town in our period. Muş could perhaps be described as a large, important and prosperous town. But it was vulnerable to the misfortunes of the district: it seems to have lost population rapidly and easily, and perhaps gained it rather more slowly. It is possible that the Bitlis princes, by building a castle above the town for the prince of the district, contributed to general security in the town and district and so helped to maintain the town's size. Previously there seems to have been a sudden collapse, probably owing to breakdown in law and order towards the end of Abu Sa'id's reign.[38]

As a large town or city, the chief settlement of the Muş plain, Muş appears to be the creation of the early Middle Ages, when it was the residence of a branch of the Bagratid family which ruled the whole of Taron (the Muş plain and the rest of its basin). Previously the residence of the princes of Taron seems to have been Olkan, now called Mercimek Kale, which lay north of Muş by the Murat Su.[a]

The town lay, and still lies, at the southern edge of the plain; most of the land

[a] For references, Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 325-6 and on Olkan specifically, p.80 above.

occupied by the walled area, whose whereabouts are roughly indicated by the four surviving monuments (three mosques and a han),[a] slopes gradually northwards into the plain, but to the west of what must have been the walled area is a prehistoric mound now known as the citadel site. The mound stands at the top of a swelling in the surface of the slope.[39]

There were both a walled area and a citadel in the late Middle Ages. The citadel, as it happens, was an hour's walk from the town in this period (see below). Often the word "qal'a" (Pers.) or "berd" (Armn.) is ambiguous as to whether it denotes a citadel or a walled area. One can only be sure one or the other existed, but not which one and whether both were present. But in the case of Muş the existence of both is assured by a passage in the Sherefname which refers both to the "qal'a" (walled area) and to the "ḥisār" (citadel).[40]

During most of the Middle Ages the citadel no doubt lay on the mound just west of the mosques etc. in the centre of the town. However the *Sherefname* reports that in the time of the author's ancestors the citadel lay at a distance of one *farsākh* to the south of the city, on (Pers. "bār") the summit of a mountain; this citadel flourished for a long time.[b] The period in question perhaps starts in the late 1340's, the probable date at which the Bitlis principality acquired the district of Taron. It ends in 1535, when the Ruzagi ruling family was dispossessed of its principality by the Ottoman empire.

The castle in question, at a distance of an hour's walk south of the town, is that noticed by Ainsworth in 1840, a "picturesque round-towered and battlemented castle of olden times", "high up on the side" of the hills behind Muş, at "Mogiyunk".[41] Compare

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[a] Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.293-4.

[b] Sh.I.353.

the *Sherefname*'s "on the summit of a mountain": "mountain" is a flexible term.

It now becomes very clear what Barbaro saw in 1471:

> "... a litle stronge castell called Mus, standing on an hyll amongest certain mountaignes, having a citie vnderneath it of iij myles compasse, very well enhabited." (Barbaro 85.)

If the town had genuinely been three miles in circumference, it would have been about the size of the walled area at Āmid/Diyarbakır, one of the largest walled areas in the Middle East. So Barbaro's estimate of the size is hard to believe; on the other hand Barbaro clearly thought the town was populous, and he calls it a city. In fact the town must have been an especially lively and prosperous one. Five years earlier, in 1466 (not 1467), Uzun Hasan had demolished the "berd" of Muş.[42] Here "berd" probably means "walled area" or at least the town walls. In five years it had become "very well enhabited". In the struggle between Sharaf and his cousin Ibrahim at the end of the 15th century Sharaf, based here, "made the qal'a of Mūsh strong".[a] Given the ruination of the "berd" by Uzun Hasan about 30 years previously Sharaf may well have been rebuilding a ruined wall.

After 1535 the Ottoman sultan Suleyman I ruined the Bitlis princes' castle in the hills south of the town. He repaired half of the "old castle, which is on the west side of the town, on the summit of a hill (tall)".[b] To interpret: the prince of Muş, a kind of overseer of the whole district appointed from the ruling family of the Bitlis principality,[c]

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[a] Sh.I.402.

[b] Sh.I.353.

[c] Ch.IV, sect.I.3.2.

required a spacious citadel as residence for his family and garrison and possibly for a small court, and it was convenient for this citadel to lie at a distance from the largely Armenian town, away, too, from its diseases and smells. The Ottoman empire, by contrast, required only a small citadel for its garrison of 50 soldiers.[a] So it chose the "old" citadel, in other words the prehistoric mound on the west side of the town which had carried the citadel in the period before the rule of the Bitlis princes over Muş.

Later Muş did decline. Evliya, in the mid-17th century, describes a ruined city. Timur, according to him, had made the city and its qal'a *ḫarāb* and *yebāb* ("ruined and devastated"), its people kebāb ("roasted flesh") and its houses *türāb* ("dust"). The ruins of the city were still visible, and Evliya walked about among them.[b] Somehow the town had lost population, and the abandoned houses were crumbling. In part the move of the sanjak bey to Ahlat was responsible.[c] Perhaps the princes of Bitlis were exploiting the area, having been granted its ḫarāc.[d] Perhaps local security had been impaired, meaning that much commercial traffic no longer came through the town.

The town did not regain the population size of the Middle Ages until perhaps twenty years ago. The district was the preserve of a rebellious Kurdish chieftain in the late 18th century, which cannot have improved the economic health either of the town or of the whole district. Travellers and consuls of the first half of the 19th century found Muş small and impoverished, though there seems to have been an increase in activity during the second half. But after three centuries of obscurity and poverty it is somewhat hard to

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[a] Sh.I.353.

[b] Ev.III.228-9.

[c] See on Ahlat.

[d] Ch.IV, sect.I.5.(x).

imagine the "very well enhabited" town of the late Middle Ages.

Note on the movements of the citadel, or at least the governor's residence. To complete the history of the citadel and its various locations: the rebel Kurd of the late 18th century had based himself at Mercimek Kale. When the area was brought back under government control, the residence of the sanjak bey was again established in the hills behind the town, this time not at the Bitlis princes' castle but in a "mud and stone mansion" below it in a dip.[43]

The periods of the location of the citadel or governor's residence at the different sites can be summed up as follows.

Most of Middle Ages, until perhaps the late 1340's, at the town site.

End of Middle Ages, until 1535. Site in the hills behind Muş.

Early Ottoman period, perhaps until mid-17th century. Town site.

Mid-17th century, perhaps for only a short period, at any rate no longer than a century, at Ahlat.

Late 18th century, period of loss of control by government. At Mercimek Kale.

Late Ottoman period, mansion beneath the old castle in the hills.

Bibliographical note. İA (B.Darkot) is full of information and generally sound; as usual it does not tackle questions of decline or the town's status etc. in the late Middle Ages. EI[1] and Sov.Arm.Enc. are poor.

Coins

715, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GF3 E1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.38. Type C.
(?) Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams, 3.66 g.	Album 91-2-11. Mint name not certain. Album mentions no date. Probably type C.
D.b., [717-19], Abu Sa'id	2 dirhams	Album (UT) GH10 E5. Type B. 719 unlikely.
719, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GH10 E6. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.55. Type C.
7[19] or 7[20], Abu Sa'id	AR, dirham	Album (UT) GH10 F1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.55. Type C. Last two digits of date illegible, but 719 and 720 are the only possible dates for this type.
D.m. [prob. 719 or 720, conceivably 721], Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GH10 F2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.55. In a letter of 25.7.92, Album adds that the date of 719 or 720, possibly 721, is likely on ground that type C coins of "eastern Anatolia" are of those dates.
D.b., Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams. 3.51 g.	Album (UT) 91-2-18. Type not noted.

Hınıs

(Armn. "Xnus"; Pers. "Khanūs", "Khanus"; Ott. "Ḫinūs")

Coins

715, Uljaytu	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GF2 D6. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.37. Type C.
718, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GH7 A4. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.56.
728 (?), Abu Sa'id	AR dirham, 1.62 g.	Album 91-2-16
D.m., Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GH7 A5. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.56. Type B.

Attribution difficult

718 (?), Uljaytu (?)	AR dirham, 1.62 g.	Album 91-2-16. Type not noted.

2. HAKKARI PRINCIPALITY

Vostan and Van

These are a pair of cities which in the second half of the Middle Ages need always to be considered together because their functions were complementary, and thought to be so by the power which controlled them, generally the Hakkari dynasty.

Physical remains on the site of Vostan are few, and are not in any case seen by locals or visitors as ones indicating the past existence of a city. Nobody on the ground remembers a city; the small town of Gevaş which lies nearby is not reputed by anyone to be the successor of a city. Moreover no account of the city's history exists which might create a convincing image of the medieval city. Its image is still somewhat ghostly, despite the evidence for a substantial settlement. That settlement had a walled area, although it lacked an adequate citadel.

By contrast the notion of Van's existence as a city in the late Middle Ages suffers from no credibility problems. But by a double paradox it appears not to have been, in this period, a genuine city at all. It was a town with an extraordinarily powerful citadel, but had no walled area; it was not a genuine city until its transformation by the Ottomans.

Thus apart from being the administrative and market centres for their respective districts (Ṙštunik' and Tosp), the proximity of the two settlements to one another allowed them to perform functions on one another's behalf. The relationship, however, changed over time. In the century before the permanent Ottoman conquest Vostan waned and became a small town.

In the period of the Vaspurakan kingdom, after the building work of Gagik

(identifiable to many as the founder of the Aghtamar church), the roles of the various settlements were as follows. Vostan was the only city of the kingdom. The ruler's residence was the island of Aghtamar, where a palace had been built by Gagik near the church. Van, on the other hand, functioned as the most secure fortress of the kingdom. Thus Vostan and Van served both their immediate district, that of Ṙštunik' and Tosp combined, and the kingdom as a whole, in complementary ways. Vostan served the district as its city; Van served it as the citadel of its city. The same was true of their relationship to the kingdom as a whole.

After the Byzantine occupation of the kingdom in the 11th century, perhaps even during it, Vostan appears to have waned. Population may have been attracted from the city of Vostan to Aghtamar. The island was from 1114 the seat of a local patriarchate serving the Lake Van basin, and with Amik and Lim one of three secure Armenian strongholds on the south-east shore of the lake. Van probably survived as a small town.

Under the Il-Khans Van appears to have received some government attention (the evidence is partly numismatic and partly archaeological, in the shape of the Great Mosque). The government no doubt valued Van for its powerful and easily defensible fortress on the citadel rock. Vostan appears not to have attracted any Il-Khanid interest.

From the mid-14th century, however, there is evidence, in the form of coins and references in texts, that Van and Vostan grew in tandem. To reconstruct the circumstances which caused this growth would require much painstaking work on the economies of other parts of the Middle East, but it is worth suggesting one or two reasons. Certain intervals excepted, Vostan and Van were in the hands of the Hakkari princes, and those princes, by providing security and perhaps direct encouragement, may have helped their growth. A second possible reason concerns trade patterns. Between Iran and north Syria the

standard path for caravans was the north shore of Lake Van. This, although crossing the upper end of the Erçek valley, and therefore passing Van at a distance, did not come through Van or sufficiently close too it to make much difference to its size or function. Now although the north shore must have remained the preferred route, a second route from Khoy, itself three days from Tabriz, to the Diyar Bakr was possible. This came to Van, then to Vostan, then over hills to Hizan. From the latter town it would normally continue westwards directly into the Tigris basin rather than diverging sideways to Bitlis and continuing down the Bitlis valley. We know that such a route was in use during the late 15th century.[1]

The route may have come into use, or started to attract caravans away from the lake's north shore, in the mid-14th century. This might have come about because the Bitlis princes (at Ahlat and Bitlis) and the Kara Koyunlu (at Erciş) made the northern route less attractive (not *un*attractive) by imposing dues, which would have been extracted in an irregular manner. Factional fighting at Ahlat and in the Ala Dağ district in the 1340's might have offput travelling merchants further. More fighting in the 1420's and 1430's at Ahlat and Erciş might again have been a deterrent.

The purpose of speculation about the reasons for the simultaneous growth of Vostan and Van is not so much to point to precise causes as to say the following: there must have been causes, Vostan and Van lay on an east-west route; and the route may have had something to do with the reasons for their growth. At any rate Vostan and Van were important places in the 100 years from the mid-14th to the mid-15th century, and this fact was probably among the reasons why Iskender Kara Koyunlu made it such a priority to capture them. With much effort he eventually did; the Kara Koyunlu seem to have retained them for about twenty years, after which Jahan Shah won back Van in the mid-1450's.

Certainly from the mid-15th century Vostan declined, and by the early 16th century had become a fairly small town. It is hard to say if the decline had any economic causes, such as trade patterns, of such a nature as to affect Vostan and Van jointly rather than Vostan by itself. There is no compelling reason why this should have been so, however. Van grew, but at Vostan's expense; and it is possible, too, that Aghtamar, which is described as a minor city in the late 15th century, received some of Vostan's population.

The border fighting of the 1530's and 1540's must have affected both towns seriously. The permanent Ottoman occupation, though, transformed the whole situation. Van was built up into a great military base and a populous city; Vostan was allowed to decline to the point of losing its status, not just as a city but as a town. In the mid-17th century it was a village.

Vostan

(Armn. "(V)ostan"; Pers., Ott. "Vostān";
Arab. "Wustān"; now "Gevaş")

Site. The medieval city appears to have lain on the gentle lower slopes of a short valley leading towards Lake Van. This short valley connects two plains, one a triangular plain on the lake shore and the other small and mountain-locked. The only well-known remnant of the city is the cemetery which lies towards the inner angle of the shore plain: in other words it lay near but not quite adjacent to the walled area.

The medieval city lacked a strong citadel, but on a promontory jutting out into the shore plain from a point west of the city's medieval site is a small castle, now called Hişet

Kale.[a] On the inland plain, near the inland mouth of the valley, is a small, neatly-shaped prehistoric settlement mound. In the early 19th century, by which time the small town had been reconstituted around the tell, the local begs lived in a house atop it. The visitor providing this information described the house as "wearing the air of a castle".[b] Perhaps a fort here served as a second citadel in the Middle Ages.[2]

Evidence as to the precise position and disposition of the medieval city is short. The position of the modern town of Gevaş is misleading. The modern town lies on the inland plain around the small tell. Such a position was ill-protected and ill-watered. From the medieval point of view it was an unsuitable site. Much more suitable are the slopes of the valley; probably the walled area was confined to the higher part, midway between the two plains, of the west slope.[3] Today houses, forming outlying *mahalle*s of the modern town, are scattered on this slope amid lush orchards: the area is well-watered.

The surest evidence that the medieval walled area lay here is a medieval mosque, by the side of which there appears to have been a madrasa. The mosque bears no construction date, but only a dubious restoration date of 850/1446.[4] We also know of a church somewhere on the same slopes as those on which the mosque lies; and of a small türbe somewhere between the mosque and the castle (Hişet Kale) on the promontory.[c]

History. Apart from being the only real city, Vostan was also the only walled civilian settlement, within the Arcruni principality, later kingdom, of Vaspurakan.[5] In the period from the late 9th to the mid-11th century it appears to have been a large and prosperous

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[a] Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.223.

[b] Southgate, *Tour* I.249.

[c] Both Lynch II.125.

place.[6] Gagik (builder of Aghtamar) rebuilt the city wall, built a palace and pavilions, laid out streets, and restored the buildings of a church, probably the principal church.[a] Until the mid-14th century very little is known about Vostan. It seems to have declined to the status of a middle-sized town.[b] But at this stage a certain revival seems to have begun. The only known Il-Khanid coins appear to be those minted in 740 and 750. However in the 770's/1370's, especially towards the end of the decade, and in the early 780's/1380's a surprising number of coins are known. The reason is not likely to be that the Jalayrids Husayn and Ahmad, in whose names the coins are minted, suddenly took a special interest in the city. Instead it is much more likely to be that Vostan, like Van, was the scene of greater activity, and the Hakkari princes wished to encourage or facilitate such activity: they themselves were taking an active interest in the city. Almost certainly they were responsible for the minting of the coins; since they had already gained Vostan by 740,[c] they probably minted that year's coins too. Cause and effect are hard to disentangle. Vostan was the seat of the most important apanage in the Hakkari principality: by 1386 a palace for the rulers of Vostan had been built there; or perhaps this was a restored version of Gagik's palace.[d] The Hakkari princes probably took a greater interest in the city because it was already undergoing a certain increase in activity, but they themselves may have helped to stimulate that increase.

The minting continues steadily in the 15th century until the reign of Jahan Shah (the date of the coin in Jahan Shah's reign, though, is unknown). The Kurdish princes

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[a] Arcruni (ed. Patk.) 252, 292.

[b] Mustawfi, *Nuzhat* (LS) 102.

[c] Ch.III, sect.II.5.(ii).

[d] Clph.XIV.703, p.563 (S.1386.3, p.103).

always minted in the name of an outside power; in any case for a period after A.D. 1425 Vostan was directly governed by the Kara Koyunlu -- in which period minting continued all the same.

From the mid-14th to the mid-15th century, therefore, Vostan appears to have been a large, prosperous city. It still had city walls, it possessed a permanent market and the Kurdish princes had built a palace there.[7]

However after the mid-15th century the city lost population quickly. Barbaro passed through in 1474, and described the city thus (in the 16th-century English translation):

> "... Vastan, a citie decaied and yll enhabited, for it hath not about ccc houses."[a]

The anonymous Merchant in Persia, in a visit of 1507, found a town that was still functioning (Shah Ismail had destroyed its wall, but it still had its bazaar), but on his own evidence it was smaller than Van (which he calls a large town) and Aghtamar (a small city with many churches).[b] By the mid-17th century the place was simply a village.[8]

Bibliographical note. Sov.Arm.Enc., "Vostan" (8.639.3-640.1) is some help, esp. on buildings and building history, but not on the history of our period. No entry in İA.

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[a] Barbaro 51. By "about" in the translation, "above" must be meant.

[b] Merchant in Persia 160-61.

Coins

740, Jihan Timur	AR, 1.808 g.	Album, Il-Kh.II, 69, no.193. Prob. same as Album GL5 B5, Mong.Emp.20.6.89, p.78.
750, Anushiravan	AR dirham, 1.21 g.	ANS 1922.216.351.
N.d./d.m., Uways	AR dirham, 2.01 g.	ANS 1921.999.113 (Arm.).
(?) 770a		Zb.271 (no.127, 605).
(?) 770b		Markov, Djal. p.13, no.52.
[7]77, Husayn	AR, 1.52 g., Jalal al-Din Husayn	Markov, Djal. p.23, no.100.
(?) 777b, [Husayn]		Zb.271 (no.127, 607).
[7]80a, Husayn	AR, 1.35 g., Jalal al-Din Husayn	Markov, Djal. p.27, no.123.
(?) 780b, [Husayn]		Zb.271 (no.127, 607)
780c, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 E4; 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.11. Type C.
780d, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 E5; 14 c. Iran, 11.1.89, p.11. Type C. Variant on previous coin.
780e, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 E6. 14 c. Iran, 11.1.89, p.11. Type C. Second variant.
780f, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 F1. 14 c. Iran, 11.1.89, p.11. "Fourth" variant.
780g, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 F2. 14 c. Iran, 11.1.89, p.11. Type C. "Fifth" variant.
N.d., Ahmad	AR, 1.70 g.	Markov, Djal. p.38, no.167.
[796], [Timur]	AR 1/4 tanka, 1.38 g.	Album 92-2-136. Type of Tabriz 796. Obv., plain circle. Later c/m, prob. "Allāh hasbi".
[79]7, [Timur]	AR, tanka, nom. overlord Mahmud	Album (UT), HH9 B4. Tim. 30.4.89, p.9. Obv.: hexafoil within hexagon (Tabriz 795 type). Rev.: plain circle. Date uncertain.
802, [Timur]	AR, tanka, nom. overlord Mahmud	Album (UT), HH9 B5. Tim. 30.4.89, p.9. Obv.: 12-foil (in square with [?] corner lobes pointed). Rev.: octofoil in square, corner lobes pointed. Mint name retrograde.

N.d., [Timur], (a)	AR, tanka, nom. overlord Mahmud	Album (UT), HH9 B3. Tim. 30.4.89, p.9. Hexafoil type of Tabriz 795 [cf. [79]7 coin].
N.d., [Timur], (b)	AR, tanka. Nom. overlord Mahmud.	Album (UT), HH10 D1. Tim. 30.4.89, pp.10-11. Hexafoil type of Tabriz 795, but circumscribing hexagon reduced to small points at each angle.
N.d./d.m., Pir Budaq and Kara Yusuf, a	AR dirham, 5.24 g..	ANS 1971.106.13 (Arm.).
N.d./d.m., Pir Budaq and Kara Yusuf, b	5.24 g.	ANS QQ II, no.12. [Same as preceding ?]
N.d., [Shah Rukh], (a)	AR, 5.33 g.	Album, NumChron 16 (1976), 119-20, no.6. Prob. same as Album (UT), HJ5 F4: Tim. 30.4.89, p.24. Must have been minted in the years 823-8/1420-5, the years when the Hakkari principality was the vassal of Shah Rukh.
N.d., [Shah Rukh], (b)	AR, 1/3 tanka	Album (UT), HJ5 F3. Tim. 30.4.89, p.24. Variant of next coin. Rev. has central square. For date, see N.d. [Shah Rukh], (a).
N.d., Shah Rukh, (c)	AR, 1/3 tanka. Shah Rukh named.	Album (UT), HJ5 F2. Tim. 30.4.89, p.24. Obv. in eye-shape.
N.d., Iskender (a)	AR, 4.72 g.	Album, NumChron 1976, 114, no.44. This and the next coin, NumChron 1976 no.45, will be the same as Album (UT), HE8 B6 & C1. Must date to 828/1425 or after (see above, Ch.III, sect.II.5.00).
N.d., Iskender (b)	AR, 4.66 g.	Album, NumChron 1976, 144, no.45. See previous coin.
N.d., Jahan Shah	AR, tanka.	Album (UT), HE10 D5. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.7. Eye pattern on rev..
N.d., [Uzun] Hasan, a	AR 1/3 tanka. 1.65 g.	Album 91-18-2. From type, date must be somewhere from 873-82.
N.d., [Uzun] Hasan, b	AR, 1/3 tanka. "Hasan".	Album (UT), HF4 E3. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.10. Mint name in square on rev..
N.d., Ya'qub, (a)	AR, tanka.	Album (UT), HF8 F1. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.14. "Reform type, with Khayran".
N.d., Ya'qub, (b)	AR, tanka.	Album (UT), HF8 F2. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.14.

N.d., Ya'qub, (c)	AR tanka, 4.99 g.	Album 92-10-121. C/m "'adl sultān Ya'qūb Wustan". Earlier c/m containing "... al-'adl ..."
N.d./d.m., (Shah Ismail)	AR 4.50 g.	ANS 1922.216.582 (Arm.).

Attribution impossible or highly dubious

766, Il-Kh. [!]	Zb.271 (288, no.1542)
N.d., Jalayrid	Zb.271 (no.127, 609)
77x, Muzaffarid [!]	Zb. 271 (no.127, 61)
N.d., Ak Koyunlu	Zb. 271 ([prob.] no.127, 609)

Van

(in Armn. sometimes "Šemiramakert"; Arab. "Wān"; Pers. & Ott. "Vān")

We shall first of all briefly define the elements of the site, taking note of differences between periods. Then (in another section) the function of those elements at different periods and their relation to one another will be summarised, using whatever details are known about the state of those elements, taken individually, in the different periods. The following section will treat the evidence for a particular aspect of the town's state in the late Middle Ages. That aspect is the existence and relationship of certain elements: a strong citadel, an inner citadel and an *un*walled civilian settlement beneath the citadel rock's cliff. This section will be followed by a history of Van as a city during the late Middle Ages, including whatever is known about the construction of buildings.

Site. The remarkable citadel rock rising up out of the plain is about one kilometre long

from east to west, but in breadth never more than 200 m.. It has a vertical south face, which creates a long cliff on this side, but to the north descends at a gradient quite manageable on foot.

The cliff is at its highest towards the middle, and the contours of the north face provide correspondingly a site at the summit which was occupied in successive periods by a small inner citadel (*ḥiṣār*). The other walled area was the *berd* (Armn.) or *qal'a* (Pers.). The latter two words mean either "(outer) citadel" (as opposed to the *ḥiṣār* or inner citadel) or "(city's) walled area", depending on what is enclosed by the fortified wall in question.

In Urartian times a wall ran at mid-height along the north face of the rock, shutting off the upper half of the north face. Strictly speaking the wall is unlikely to have reached the western tip of the citadel rock. This would have entailed its descent to ground level: the top line of the rock descends the last 200 m. to the west tip in an even and gentle fashion. The wall is much more likely to have turned sharply to the south, as the Ottoman wall does, and end at the cliff-edge about 250 m. from the west tip. The wall, in that case, took advantage of an abrupt fall in the citadel rock's top line at this point. In the Urartian case the wall should be considered a city wall; in other words this enclosure was the city's walled area. Apart from the inner citadel at the summit of the rock there was no other Urartian fortification at Van. Unprotected by a wall, part of the population at least lived on the flat ground to the south of the cliff.

In the period of the Arcruni principality, later kingdom, of Vaspurakan (8th to 11th centuries A.D.), Van as a whole appears to have functioned as a fortress rather than as a city. The *berd* was an outer citadel rather than the walled area of a city. The ditch east

of the inner citadel[a] may have been dug in this period. The ditch shortened the area enclosed by the wall of the *berd*. Nevertheless the line of the *berd*'s north wall was that of the Urartian *berd*, and the same enormous stones were in place.[b] It is likely that the same arangements were in force during the Mongol period and at the end of the Middle Ages. In these periods (Vaspurakan principality to the end of the Middle Ages) at least some part of the settlement's population lived on the flat ground below the cliff. This is assured by the various buildings constructed on that ground; on which see the historical section below.

It was the Ottoman occupation which changed the whole nature of the settlement and the relationship of different parts. The settlement was greatly expanded, and the houses on the flat ground below the cliff enclosed by a wall. This was the city wall. The main enclosure on the rock was now the outer citadel, still generally referred to as the *berd*. A *ḥiṣār* still existed, though chained to the outer citadel by various intermediary walls.[c]

The city wall on the plain was attached to either end of the cliff. But to assure the complete defence of the city a wall was built from the outer citadel's ditch to the east end of the rock. This wall faced down the north slope of the rock, despite being backed by the vertical precipice. West of the outer citadel there was no wall completing the circle; the gap was commanded by guns on a double bastion built above a steep rise in the top line of the rock.

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[a] See plan, Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.181.

[b] See next section, discussion of Timur's attempt to dismantle the citadel.

[c] a and b on the plan, Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.181.

Function of citadel etc. in different periods. We shall now go through the same historical periods, putting more flesh on the bare outline of fortification history so far presented.

For most of the Urartian period the city was the capital of the state of Urartu; but the city's population was probably much smaller than in the Ottoman period, when it again functioned as a capital. A good proportion (say half) lived within the city wall, i.e. the wall at mid-height on the north slope of the citadel rock. Others lived further down the slope, beneath the wall, and others again on the flat ground beneath the cliff. By this time the canal bringing water to the city from the lower Hoşap Su valley had been built, so it is likely that the part of the city on the plain below the cliff was complemented by a fan of outlying farming hamlets which could be considered an extended suburb of the city.

In the Arcruni period, although the settlement functioned as a fortress complementary to Vostan, Gagik, builder of Aghtamar and the first of the Arcruni princes to be crowned king, also built a church on the plain beneath the cliff, and it is possible that the church built over the "Madır Burcu", an Urartian outwork at the rock's west end, was put up during this period. Two buildings which seem to have been summer pavilions, one to east and one to west of the inner citadel, were also put up in this period.[9] Thus the settlement was composed of a citadel (*berd*), probably an inner citadel, and miscellaneous groups of houses on the plain below the cliff and perhaps on the north slope beneath the *berd*. For the rest of the Middle Ages a similar arrangement persisted: we know for sure that in the early 15th century A.D. there was an inner citadel (*ḥiṣār*).[a]

Soon after the final Ottoman capture of Van in 1548, the houses on the plain below the cliff were enclosed by a great wall with several gates. Again there was a *berd* (outer citadel) with its own mosque, and a *ḥiṣār* (inner citadel). East of the *berd* the wall along

[a] T'M 84; see below.

the top of the cliff may have followed the line of an Urartian one, but faced down the north slope. The Urartian wall had faced south, overlooking the cliff, because it had helped to enclose the upper half of the rock's north slope rather than the houses below the cliff.

Evidence that Van was a fortress rather than a walled city in the late Middle Ages. This means evidence that in the period Van consisted of a great fortress (*berd*) on the rock with an unwalled town on the plain below the cliff. It should be remembered that the town below the cliff grew in size during the late Middle Ages.[a]

A. The best evidence is that of the anonymous Italian Merchant in Persia, who passed through Van in 1507. By this time the princes of Hakkari had repossessed Van from the Ak Koyunlu; Zahid, the reigning prince, had initially recognised Safavid authority, but by 1507 had thrown it off.

(1) The "fortress" of Van is described as

> "... built on a mountain or hill of hard rock, from which fresh water springs forth everywhere; it is more than a mile in circumference, built narrow and long, like the rock on which it is built ..."[b]

(2) The town on the plain:

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[a] Argued above (introduction to Vostan and Van) and below (next section).

[b] Merchant in Persia 161.

"Below the castle is a large town, and the greater part of the inhabitants are Armenians, but within the castle they are all Curds."[a]

(3) The account of the initial capture of the citadel by Bayram Beg ("Bairambec" in the text) on behalf of Shah Ismail also confirms the impression that there was no city wall. The Hakkari prince, Zahid ("Zidibec"), entertained Bayram Beg on the plain of Van, promising he would not rebel. But then Zahid invited Bayram Beg into the fortress for a tour. Once Bayram Beg was inside, the gates were shut and he was attacked. Zahid's soldiers also attacked Bayram Beg's forces outside the fortress [by itself the word is unspecific]. However Bayram's forces were not defeated, and besieged the castle [again the word itself is unspecific] for three months. They eventually managed to capture the castle by hitting with cannon the wall which retained the spring inside the castle. Zahid escaped. [Presumably Bayram somehow avoided being killed inside the citadel.][b]

We can probably assume that the words "fortress", "citadel" and "castle" in the English translation all refer to the same place, the citadel. The Merchant places the "fortress" on the rock ((1) above). Taken strictly, the distance of one mile which the Merchant gives as the citadel's circumference would imply that the citadel extended to the east end of the rock. A citadel occupying only the central position would have a circumference of only 1,300 yards or so. It is possible in fact that the citadel did extend to the east end of the rock, as the top line of the rock immediately east of the ditch is not much lower in height than the central portion. However the Merchant's figure does not have to be taken strictly; the citadel's shape would still be long and thin if it stopped at

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[a] Ibid..

[b] Merchant in Persia 161-4.

the ditch; and to take it to the rock's eastern end would have created an extra length of wall which brought little military advantage but required considerable resources for its defence.

The Merchant talks of a large town, inhabited by Armenians, beneath the castle ((2) above). He makes no mention of any wall enclosing that town; indeed to say that the town lies beneath the castle but not to make any mention of a wall enclosing the town distinctly implies there was no such wall. The implication is strengthened by the following consideration. As pointed out above, the words for citadel, castle and fortress in use at the time ("berd", "qal'a" etc.) could also be applied to the walled area of a city or town. So if this town had been walled, one might have expected some qualification to the statement that the town lay beneath the castle. Of course the implication is not watertight; we shall never be sure until thorough excavations are carried out.

Nevertheless other aspects of the Merchant's account help to build up the impression of an unwalled civilian settlement. Bayram Beg visits the castle rather than the town ((3) above): this is likely to be because the castle is considered the essential and enduring part of the settlement. In the account of the siege, no mention is made of a walled area or of an attack on such a walled area: but a besieger would naturally capture such a walled area first. Indeed the cannon which broke the wall retaining the spring water inside the citadel would have been placed in the area of the town or just outside it: the spring in question is in the cliff face.

B. A second text offering some assurance that the town below the rock was still unwalled in the late Middle Ages is the great 15th-century colophon recounting first of all the efforts of Zakaria III, patriarch of Aghtamar, to reconcile Jahan Shah and the prince of

Bitlis, Sharaf, and then the patriarch's journey from Echmiadzin to Aghtamar: by means of this journey he brought the right hand of St. John the Baptist to Aghtamar, having been made Katholikos of the whole Armenian church. [a]

Arriving in the district of Tosp (the Van plain) he enters the city of Van accompanied by a great crowd -- no mention of a wall.[b] Then he goes up to the citadel at the invitation of the Kara Koyunlu governor of Van, who resided in the citadel. To visit the governor he stands at "the gate of the upper citadel".[10] Again the only part of Van as a whole which we can be sure was fortified is the citadel on the rock; and here, in this instance too, resides the governor. The colophon tells us, too, that an inner citadel (*ḥiṣār*) existed when it talks of the "gate of the upper citadel".

C. A third event offering clues as to the extent of Van's fortifications in the late Middle Ages is Timur's capture of the city in 1387. After a preliminary siege, the Hakkari prince, 'Izz al-Din, gave himself up. To describe 'Izz al-Din's departure from the *berd*, Thomas of Mecop', one of several sources reporting the event, uses the word "descended" (ijeal).[c] A relative of 'Izz al-Din's, Nāṣr al-Dīn, then resisted a further 27 days in the *qal'a* (for this detail we are relying on the *Sherefname*). As a result Timur ordered a massacre of those inhabitants who had taken refuge there. Thomas of Mecop' records that Timur's men carried out the massacre by throwing the inhabitants from the citadel (*berd*).[d] This would only make sense if the *berd* in question were that on the citadel rock.

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[a] Clph.IV.II.221; S.1462.3.

[b] Clph.XV.II.221, p.175 (S.1462.3, p.274).

[c] T'M 30; cf. Sh.I.90. As usual the word *berd* will not help, by virtue of its meaning, to solve the question.

[d] Sh.I.90; T'M 30.

A further interesting detail is the attempt at destroying the citadel afterwards. It proved impossible for Timur's troops to dislodge the great stones, and, records the *Sherefname*, Timur's amir "contented himself with [only] a little destruction", presumably of walls not constructed of the great stones in question.[a] These stones are Urartian blocks, and the only defensive walls built by the Urartians were on the citadel rock.[11]

The case for supposing there was no city wall on the plain in the late Middle Ages is thus strong, but not overwhelming. Texts relating to three separate events seem to mean by "berd" or "qal'a" the citadel on the rock rather than a walled area on the plain; and they do not otherwise mention a walled area on the plain. The weakness of the evidence from the three texts is that they might still have failed to mention such a walled area if it had been there, and nothing in the episodes which they recount makes the existence of such a walled area impossible. On the other hand if there had been a walled area on the plain the events of each of the three incidents are such that it would very probably have featured in the accounts of those events.

History in the Middle Ages and early Ottoman period. Thomas Arcruni's account of Gagik Arcruni's achievements allows a somewhat partial picture of the town at Van in the period (10th century A.D.). The town was probably limited in size, and our argument above indicates it was not walled. However Gagik built a church at the foot of the citadel rock, on the north side. He also completed on the citadel rock what appear to have been pleasure pavilions to east and west: possibly these were outside the citadel altogether, though still on the citadel rock, or else they were within the citadel but either side of the

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[a] Sh.I.91.

ḥiṣār.[a] The citadel itself must have been the most important element in the whole settlement.[12]

During the first two centuries of Turkish rule Van's size and status appear to have changed little. A small mosque was built in the north-east corner of what was later to be the walled area on the plain. The construction of the mosque (now called the Kızıl Cami) need not indicate more than the presence of a few Muslims in the town; it is unlikely to mean that any expansion of the town took place.[13]

It may be that some stirrings of change were being felt in the early 14th century. A series of Mongol coins were minted here in the first two decades. This indicates commercial activity of some sort. The first coins occur before the general expansion of mints in H. 715 under Uljaytu, so were likely to have been minted in response to a need rather than as part of a sudden, and to an extent unexplained, proliferation of mints.

The Great Mosque, ruined by the late 19th century, seems to have been constructed in the early 14th century.[14] The position of the Great Mosque some 200 metres from the citadel rock by itself indicates a town of some size. The mosque need not have been at the town's centre, but equally it cannot have been at the edge. (The Ottoman walls are at most 700 m. distant from the citadel rock.) The building of a mosque so rich in decoration very likely signals a change in the city's role or size, and with the evidence of the coins may well show that during part of the Il-Khanid occupation, the first third of the 14th century A.D., Van had some kind of government function, perhaps as the base for a detachment of troops.

The minting of several issues of coins bearing the names of the Jalayrid rulers Husayn (776/1374-783/1382) and Ahmad (783/1382-813/1410) probably indicates a further

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[a] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 252-3.

growth in importance in the 1360's and 1370's. Those of the coins which bear legible dates were minted in 779/1377-78, 780/1378-79, 781/1379-80, and 784/1382-83, and bearing in mind the dissensions within the Jalyrid state which led to its sudden loss of influence soon after Ahmad's accession,[a] those four issue dates probably indicate the time limits within which the Jalayrid coins were minted. The coins are not to be taken as signals of a sudden Jalayrid interest in Van -- the same point applies to the contemporary coins of Vostan --, but more as signs of the growing importance of the two cities and the growing confidence of the Hakkari dynasty, who must have been responsible for the minting.

The state of the settlement in the late 14th century and in the 15th century should probably be imagined as follows. The town on the plain was large and prosperous, and inhabited mainly by Armenians.[15] The citadel was the preserve of the governor of Van, representative of the Hakkari prince, Timur, the Kara Koyunlu or the Ak Koyunlu. In the citadel were the family and retainers of the governor, and the town's garrison.[16] It seems likely that a belt of outlying farming hamlets or farms was spread around the town, at least to east and south (west and north the land was too damp, as today). These were not just villages which happened to be near the town, but farms and houses which existed because of the proximity of the town.

Van was transformed by the Ottoman administration. It now had a permanent regional administrative role and a highly important defensive role near the Persian border. The building of a city wall enabled it to grow rapidly. A janissary detachment was installed in the citadel; a palace was constructed in the walled area. Mosques, a market and more churches were built in tandem with the expansion in population. The growth of

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[a] CHI VI.8.

the outlying settlements, later to be known as the Aykestan (lit. "Vineyard") or Garden City, was facilitated by the reactivation of the Shamiram canal bringing water from the lower Hoşap valley to the vicinity of the walled city.[a]

Bibliographical note. Much the best history is Göyünç's contribution to the article "Van", İA 13.197.2-200.2. The pages devoted to the Ottoman period (199.2-200.2) are particularly well informed. As often its account of the late Middle Ages is weak. Sov.Arm.Enc., "Van", is informative on the town's history in the Urartian period and very enlightening on the 19th century, but not helpful on the late Middle Ages. My history in *Eastern Turkey* I.180-2 has the advantage of tying changes in the town's physical disposition to other aspects of its history. It is followed by much bibliography on history and archaeology, including surviving monuments. See also ibid. IV.352-4.

Coins

(?) 700, Ghazan	AR, dirham	Album (UT), GE4 D3. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.31. Mint uncertain, perhaps imitation. See note at end of table.
716, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT), GF7 E5. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.42. Type C.
(?) 717		Zb. 269 (no.141, 89).
(?) 719		Zb.269 (no.141, 91).

[a] MC II.482 (Martiros Xalifay).

(?) 730		Zb. 269 (no ref.).
779, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 E1. 14 c. Iran, 11.1.89, p.11. Type B.
780a, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 E2. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.11. Type C.
780b, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 E3. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.11. Type C. Variant on previous.
(?) 781		Zb.269 (no ref.)
N.d., Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT), HB9 D6. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.11. "Local type, quatrefoil/plain circle".
D.l., Husayn	AR, 1.70 g.	Markov, Djal. 29, no.128.
784, Ahmad	AR, 1.65 g.	Markov, Djal. 32, no.139.
(?) 784b		Zb. 269, no ref..
N.d., Ahmad	AR, 1.65 g.	Markov, Djal. 36, no.158.
795, [Timur]	AR, 2 dinars. Nom. overlord Mahmud	Album (UT), HH9 B1, Tim. 30.4.89, p.9. Tabriz 795 type, inscribed hexafoil.
N.d., [Timur]	AR, 2 dinars. Nom. overlord Mahmud.	Album (UT), HH9 B2, Tim. 30.4.89, p.9. Same type as HH9 B1, but cruder style.
N.d., Ya'qub	5.02 g.	YKB AK 7/45. Notes S.Album.
N.d., Rustam	AR, 1/3 tanka.	Album (UT), HG3 C5. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.17. Cs. on Shirvanshahi type of 89x.
N.d., Rustam, (b)	5.08 g.	YKB AK 9/26. Notes S.Album. C/m "'adl Rustam sulṭān ḍuriba Wān" on uncertain Timurid coin of Herat (probably Abu Sa'id).
N.d., Rustam, (c)	2.00 g.	YKB AK 9/27. Notes S.Album. Same c/m as previous, on apparently, a Mamluk coin.
(?) 930a		Zb. 269: no ref..
930b, Tahmasp	AR 2 shahi	Album (UT), IB6 F1, Saf. 27.1.89, p.11.
939a, Tahmasp	AR, 2 shahi	Album (UT), IB6 F2. Saf. 27.1.89, p.11.
939b, Tahmasp	AR, 2 shahi	Album (UT), IB6 F3. Saf. 27.1.89, p.11. Same die as preceding.

948a, Tahmasp	AR, 2 shahi	Album (UT), IB6 F4. Saf. 27.1.89, p.11.
948b, Tahmasp	AR, 2 shahi	Album (UT), IB6 F4. Saf. 27.1.89, p.11. Same die as preceding.
982, Murat III	Dirham	Schaend. 103.
1003, Mehmet III	Dirham	Schaend. 105.
1012, Ahmet I	Medīnī	Schaend. 107.
N.d., Ahmet I, (a)	Medīnī	Schaend. 108.
N.d., Ahmet I, (b)	Akçe	Schaend. 108.
[1027], Osman II	Akçe, 0.27 g.	Ölçer, TNDB 20 (1986), 10.
N.d., Osman II	Akçe	Schaend. 109. Osman II, Ott. sultan 1027/1618-1031/1622.
N.d., Murat IV, (a)	Akçe	Schaend. 111. Murat IV, Ott. sultan 1032/1623-1049/1640.
N.d., Murat IV, (b)	Medīnī	Schaend. 111.
N.d., Mehmet IV	Mangır	Schaend. 113. Mehmet IV, Ott. sultan 1058/1648-1099/1687.
1100a, Süleyman II	AE mangır	ANS 1917.216.1913.
1100b, Süleyman II	AE mangır	Schaend. 114.
1177a, Mustafa III	AE mangır	Schaend. 122.
1177b, Mustafa III	AE fals. But mint name uncertain	ANS 1949.163.782.
1182 (?), Mustafa III.	AE fals.	ANS 1917.216.1976.
N.d., Mustafa III	AE mangır	Schaend. 124.
1201, Abdülhamid I	AE mangır	Schaend. 129. Abdülhamid I, Ott. sultan 1187/1774-1203/1789.
1231, Mahmut II	AE	Schaend. 135.
1239, Mahmut II	AE	Schaend. 137.

Attribution highly dubious or impossible or too vague

744, Injuid [!]	Zb.269 (no.78, lot 441)

747, Injuid [!]	Zb.269 (no ref.)
750, Jalayrid	Zb.269 (no ref.)
N.d., Jalayrid	Zb.269 (no.7, 94)
828, Timurid	Zb.269 (no ref.)
899, Timurid [!]	Zb.269 (possibly no.16 (no.672), the reference for a coin of 879)
N.d., Ak Koyunlu	Zb.269 (no.103 (no.36))

Note to table.

Kolbas, *Thesis* II.550-51 mentions a coin of 701 minted at Van. Album has cast doubt on the mint.

Aghtamar

(Armn. "Alt'amar"; Pers. "Akhtamār"; Ott. "Aḫtamār";

mod. Turk. "Akdamar", "Ahtamar")

The island of Aghtamar would not belong in this appendix were it not for the evidence that a town existed on the island in the late Middle Ages and for the commonsense consideration that links existed between the island and its monastery on the one hand and the local city, Vostan, on the other.

The island was probably protected by a wall. In the 10th century Gagik Arcruni had built a remarkable wall on an artificial embankment of rocks thrown onto the lake's bed at the edge of the island. He had also fortified the island's small hill as a citadel and built there storerooms and a treasury.[a] There is every reason to think the wall and citadel were maintained in the late Middle Ages.[17] A fortress called K'aradašt (pron.

[a] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 293-4, 296.

"Karadasht" or "Karatasht"), or the "fortress of Manačihr",[18] stood opposite the island on the shore of the lake. The fortress presumably gave some protection to the island monastery, as its garrison could prevent a force assembling boats on the shore. The patriarch had a house at the landing-stage.[a]

There had been a town here in the 10th century. Apart from fortifiying the island and building a palace for himself, Gagik had laid out streets and gardens, and houses for other princes (probably Gagik's vassals) were built.[b] Thus the infrastructure for a town, or at least the ruins of an infrastructure, existed. It would have been easy to make or maintain a town here. Was there actually a town on the island in the late Middle Ages?

Angiolello, passing the island in 1473, found that the island was occupied by a town of 600 houses. There were several churches. Angiolello probably counted the monastery as just one church; the others served the town. The anonymous Merchant in Persia wrote that during the time he went back and forth along the shores of L.Van, he observed an island called Arminig on which a small city, containing many churches, existed.[19] An Armenian colophon of 1489 calls Aghtamar a "k'ałak'".[c] As always the word can mean either "town" or "city".

By 1473 Vostan was on the decline,[d] and Aghtamar may have received some of its population. Nevertheless, in an insecure time the island would have been more attractive than some other locations, even the suburbs of Vostan. It was not proof against a well-equipped invasion force, but the intervening water was a deterrent against peacetime

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[a] Appendix V.

[b] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 294-6.

[c] Clph.XV.III.173, p.135.

[d] This appendix, Vostan.

robbers and against casual plunderers in any serious invasion. If there was a town here in 1473 there was probably a town in the second half of the 14th and in the 15th century.

The presence of the patriarchal monastery on the island is the chief explanation, however, for the presence of a town. The island supplies little to live on, still less if half its surface is covered in buildings. Good reasons must exist for significant numbers of people to live here.

Quite apart from its function as the seat of the local patriarchate, did the strictly monastic activities of the monastery contribute to the size of the town? This is possible. The monastery was immensely active in the field of manuscript copying.[a] Some building work was done, admittedly in the late 13th century.[b] There is little direct evidence as to the size of the monastic establishment. The only genuine piece of evidence known to me is the news that in a colophon written in 1371 the number of monks is mentioned as 15.[c] This is neither small nor large. However the monastery required support from the town's population: food supplies and cooking at the very least. Just how much support it received, though, is impossible to say.

Bibliographical note. The archaeological literature on the monastery is collected in Der Nersessian & Vahramian, *Aghtamar* and Davies, *Aghtamar*. The first two of these are themselves exhaustive accounts of the standing monuments. As regards history, the best single account is Akinean, *Aghtamar*, but this is in essence a history of the patriarchate. Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* I.89-133 concentrates on monastic life. There is a history of

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[a] This can easily be seen by searching the colophons publications (Clph.).

[b] Akinean, *Aghtamar* 44; Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* I.101.

[c] Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* I.113.

the monastery in Der Nersessian & Vahramian, *Aghtamar*, but this consists of a bare list of events, is short on interpretation within the sweep of changing historical circumstances, and is uncritically based on Akinean.

Julamerk

("Julamerk" is Arab. and Pers. form; Armn. "J̌łmar"; Ott. "Çölemerik"; mod. Turk. "Çölemerik"; now renamed "Hakkari")

The site is a plateau in the very steep side of a valley. This is a tributary valley of the Zab, which runs towards that river in a south-westerly direction. The town is only 4 km. or so from the Zab, but the first kilometre runs above a high and vertical gorge, and in the Zab valley, both from upstream and from downstream, the approach to the mouth of the tributary lies beneath cliffs for at least two km. on the northern side (i.e. that where the tributary debouches). Since the town lies on the east side of the tributary valley, the only possible approach to it (as opposed to the mouth of the tributary) came by a path above cliffs for 2 km. on the north side of the Zab valley, then turned to run above cliffs in the tributary valley.

The town was thus protected by the formidable and somewhat frightening approach path from the Zab valley. One could certainly reach it from the north by a less precipitous route, but this involved several days' journeying, over high yaylas, from the nearest town. In practice nature provided almost perfect defences on the only approach which an attacker was likely to take, an approach which could be blocked by a few men.

The town was not walled, and scarcely needed to be.[20] It was protected by a

castle on the edge of the plateau.[21] The castle may have been the residence of the Hakkari princes. The town spilled down from the plateau along the side of the valley south-eastwards, towards the Zab.[22] Parts of the plateau were under cultivation in the late Middle Ages.[23]

This was the capital of the Hakkari principality until the 18th century A.D. at least.[a] It was never a city, and never could have been one. The site was too cramped, access was too difficult and the local economy was not rich enough to support a city. The town was the market centre for the immediate district.[24] However there was probably a town here during the whole of the Middle Ages,[25] and the town continued its existence throughout the Ottoman period until the present day.

Bibliographical note. No entry in İA.

[a] Explicitly stated at Sh.I.106.

3. MAHMUDI PRINCIPALITY

Hoşap

(Armn. "Xōšap", Pers. "Khōshāb")

There is insufficient evidence for a history of Hoşap as a town, but enough exists to indicate what kind of town it might have been in the late Middle Ages.

Evliya's evidence (mid-17th century) indicates a town of middling size, but the castle was powerful and strategically placed, and the size of the area enclosed by the present traces of walls is considerably greater than Evliya's evidence indicates.

The castle rock is defended, to west and south, by cliffs which rise more or less directly off the plain. The surface of the rock descends eastwards from the eastern cliff towards the plain. On this surface are two separate walls protecting a keep at the south-west corner. The existing walls date from the Ottoman period, except perhaps the upper of the two walls. However the medieval castle is likely to have had a very similar layout. In other words it was powerful and difficult to capture.[1]

Evliya tells us of a population within the town walls of 800 houses with just one *cāmi'*, one caravansaray, one hamam and a few shops.[a] The surviving stretches of the town wall suggest a similar population, and add to Evliya's picture of the town's built structures. These stretches are thick, mud-brick constructions which must have been built in the Ottoman period. The town wall starts from the ends of the castle's two cliffs, and the enclosed area lay, roughly speaking, between the castle and the hills at the edge of the plain to the north. From the castle to the northerly corner of the circuit is perhaps 3/4

[a] Ev. IV.273.

km.; the breadth is rather less. This gives, for Evliya's 800 houses, a long periphery and an extensive enclosure; but it has to be said that on its northerly side the wall is taken, for defensive reasons, along hills away from the plain, and the walls thus embrace parts of the hills which may never have been built on.[2] However the town is at least of middling size by Ottoman standards, and there is no reason to think it was any smaller in the late Middle Ages. Of course there may not have been a wall in the Middle Ages, but this is unlikely to have exerted much downward influence on the size of the town.[3]

One of Hoşap's functions was as a market town, but it also functioned as a point of exchange for commercial traffic, which came to it from and in various directions. 1. From northern Iraq routes existed via Başkale. They started (a) from Amadiya[a] and (b) from Rowanduz[b] . From Hoşap one could go either to Van or to Bitlis etc. by continuing down the Hoşap Su valley to the shore of Lake Van. 2. Among Iranian starting-points one could come either from (a) the direction of Tabriz (via Khoy and Kotur)[c] or (b) from Salmas (Dilman in the 19th and early 20th centuries; now Shahpur).[d] It may be that because traffic came south-north (and vice versa) between northern Iraq and Van through Hoşap, east-west traffic between Tabriz and Van was sometimes attracted to Hoşap; merchants could buy and sell goods at the latter town. At any rate the story that Sulaymān, Mahmudi prince of Hoşap in the mid-17th century, seized merchandise on the

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[a] *Handbook of Mesopotamia (1917)*, 129-39, Amadiya to Julamerk, and 139-43, Julamerk to Başkale.

[b] Ibid. 82-6, Rowanduz to Dizeh (now Yüksekova) on the Gevar plain (now the "Yüksek Ova"), and 114-17, Dizeh to Başkale.

[c] *Handbook of Mesopotamia (1917), 167-9* shows the route from Hoşap to the Saray, itself on the Van-Kotur track.

[d] *Handbook (1917)*, 160-61 shows the route from Salmas into the Başkale plain.

way between Tabriz and Van[a] shows that at least in the 17th century some traffic travelling between Khoy and Van probably did take a more southerly route. That traffic should have travelled from Salmas (now Shahpur) to Van via Hoşap is easier to explain, because the route is more direct.

Mustawfi (*Nuzhat* (LS), 101) states that Hoşap was a town (qaṣaba), which is all that the present Ottoman structures and the physical relief of the site would indicate. Otherwise direct evidence of the size and prosperity of Hoşap in the late Middle Ages is lacking. However the scale of the castle and town walls suggest a large settlement. A further indication, admittedly rather circumstantial, of the settlement's size is the succession of Ottoman attacks on the castle in the 17th and 18th centuries,[b] which may well have been launched against Hoşap just because the town was so flourishing and substantial in those centuries -- in which case there is a reasonable likelihood that it was so in the late Middle Ages.

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[a] Aṙak'el (1669 ed.) 471.

[b] Ch.III, sect.III, pp.218-19 and esp. in notes 20 and 21.

4. HIZAN AND MOKS

Hizan

(Pers. "Khīzān"; Ott. "Hīzān"; Armn. "Xzan", "Xizan", "Hizan"; sometimes "Khisan" in European lit.)

Site. The town lay on a plain of limited extent within a generally wooded and indented district.[a] The present configuration of the town wall is based on an implicit rectangle, but there are several departures from rectangular form, mostly to be explained by features of the terrain. In length (east-west) the walled area is about 230 m., in breadth about 200 m.. In the mid-17th century the town is described as a well-populated *ḳal'e* and *ḳaṣaba*.[b] The suburb contained several substantial residences.[1] This probably implies both a full walled area and a suburb of some size outside it; both of these must have existed in the late 14th and the 15th century as well.

History. Hizan is first known in the mid-12th century A.D.; it was captured, along with several towns on the north and eastern edges of the Diyar Bakr, by the atabeg Zengī in 533/1139.[c] After Zengī's death it was taken by the Shāh-i Armān in 541/1146.[d] At this stage, then, a town existed which served at least the former Išoc' gawaṙ, the south-west quadrant of the Hizan basin.[2]

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[a] *Handbook of Mesopotamia (1917)* 211.

[b] *Cihānnüma*, tr. Charmoy, 180-1.

[c] Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri Tarihi* 157.

[d] Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri Tarihi* 159, cf. 93.

But it was in the late 14th and the 15th century that Hizan grew to its full size. The town and certain nearby monasteries were an enclave in which much manuscript production took place. The style of these manuscripts' illumination is recognised as distinctive and, in its own way, excellent. The Armenian colophons consistently describe Hizan as a *k'ałak'*, a town or city. Given the size of the walled area and the physical extent of the suburb outside it, this is likely to mean a town of middling size.

The first mention of Hizan as a *k'ałak'*, and the first manuscript known to have been copied here, come in 1336.[a] This date is likely to be a fair indication of the date at which population, including monks, started to migrate to Hizan. However for the time being it was the monastery of Gamałiēl, a short distance outside the town, where the activity was concentrated.[b] It was only in the 15th century that manuscript production was concentrated in the town.[3] This may indicate that most of the Armenian migration into the town had taken place by the end of the 14th century.[4]

In the first quarter of the 17th century Hizan was again the scene of much manuscript production.[5] We only know of one madrasa, the madrasa founded by the second amir Dāwud in the early 16th century,[6] one mosque, and an imaret.[7] Another indication of the strength of the Christian element in Hizan's population is the existence of a Christian *nayip*, whom one colophon calls an assistant (*ařajǐkay*), to the prince-cum-sanjak bey, Hasan.[c] The function of this *nayip* is obscure. He may have been something akin to a mayor (compare the *jeřnawor* at Adilcevaz).

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[a] Clph.XIV.355, pp.289-90.

[b] Clph.XIV.554, pp.458-9 (A.D. 1363); 584, p.479 (1367); 596, p.488 (1368); 773, p.619 (S.1397.2, p.115).

[c] Clph.XVII.I.43, p.43 (sic); 83, pt.2, p.73 (ařajǐkay). The *nayip*'s name was Xač'atur, which makes it certain he was Christian.

Coins

N.d., [Uzun] Hasan		ANS AQ 5. Notes S.Album. Obv. in plain circle. Rev.: mint name in square, itself inside plain circle.
N.d., [Uzun] Hasan.	4.95 g..	YKB AK 5/7. Notes S. Album. Obv. plain circle; rev. mint name inside square.
N.d., [Uzun] Hasan	5.08 g.	YKB AK 5/14. Notes S.Album.
N.d./d.m., (?) [Uzun] Hasan	AR dirham	ANS 1966.126.108 (Arm.).
891, Ya'qub	4.98 g.	YKB AK 7/19. Notes S.Album. Obv. in pointed 12-foil, rev. pointed square, K along edges.
892, Ya'qub	AR tanka	Album (UT) HF7 B2. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.12. Date retrograde.
N.d., Ya'qub, (a)	AR tanka	Album (UT) HF7 B1. 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.12. Horizontal pointed lozenge, "pre-reform, cs. Mohr-i Lhijan".
N.d., Ya'qub, (b)	5.05 g.	YKB AK 7/20. Notes S.Album. Rev.: mint name in lozenge, surr. by square. K around square, in Kufic.
N.d., o/s on [Bitlis] Malik Muhammad, (a)	AR tanka. Mint "Hizan" recut over "Bidlis"	Album (UT) HD3 B6. 14 c. Iran, 11.1.89, p.20. The Bitlis prince in question seems to be Muhammad II (900/1494-95 to 903/1497-98). He is the only Muhammad of Bitlis to have minted coins in his own name. However the coin we have is inscribed "Shah Muhammad". At any rate the o/s dates from during or after Muhammad's reign.
N.d., o/s on [Bitlis] Malik Muhammad, (b)	AR tanka. Mint "Hizan" recut over "Bidlis"	Album (UT) HD3 B5. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.20. Same remarks.
N.d./d.m., Ismail I	AR 4.40 g.	ANS 1922.216.579 (Arm.).
N.d./d.m., Ismail I	AR 4.695 g.	ANS 1922.216.580 (Arm.).
918a, Selim I	AR 0.57 g.	Ölçer, *Selim I coinage* 150, no.9551. YKB 9/49.
918b, Selim I	AR akçe	Schaend. 94.
(?) 924, 934		Zb. 114 (64, no.182f). The dates are, nevertheless, credible for an Ottoman mint in

		Hizan.
(?) 974		Zb. 114 (288, no.827)

Moks

(Armn. "Moks";[8] Pers., Ott. "Mōks";[9] in European lit. sometimes "Müküs", "Möx", "Möks")

The site is a flat and open one, despite the generally constricted character of the V-shaped bottom of the Müküs valley.[10] The mid-17th century *Cihānnüma* reports a large town and strong *ḳal'e*.[11] In that century there were three churches at least.[12]

Coins

N.d., Alvand, (a)	1.40 g.	YKB AK 12/2. Notes S.Album.
N.d., Alvand, (b).1-4	Four specimens. 4.85, 4.75, 4.48, 4.62 g..	YKB AK 12/3-6.
N.d./d.m., [Sh.] Ismail	AR 4.499 g.	ANS 1922.216.587 (Arm.).
922, Selim I	AR 0.57 g.	Ölçer, *Selim I coinage* 172, Ölçer collection no. 9671, YKB no. 140.
N.d., Selim I	AR 0.55 g.	Ölçer, *Selim I coinage* 172 (cf. p.186), Ölçer collection no. 9672, YKB no. 9/99.
N.d., Selim I	AR 0.55 g.	Ölçer, *Selim I coinage* 172 (cf. p.186), Ölçer collection no.9673, YKB 9/100.
N.d., Süleyman I	AR akçe	Schaend. 100.
982, Selim II	AR akçe	Schaend. 102.
N.d., Murat III		Schaend. 104. Murat III, Ott. sultan 982/1574-1003/1595.
1255, Abdülmecid		Kurkman, TNDB 2 (1977), 31. Abdülmecid I, Ott. sultan 1255/1839-1277/1861. Coins are years 20, 40.

5. KARA KOYUNLU TERRITORY

Erciş

(Armn. "Arčēš"; Arab., Pers. "Arjīsh";[1] Ott. "Ercīş")

Site. The medieval city lay on flat land by the lake's shore. The citadel stood on top of a small hill, which seems for the most part to have been natural. The city appears to have had a walled enclosure,[2] but no traces have ever been found. As a whole the city spread to the south (towards the lake), to the west and to the north of the citadel, and part of the mass of housing was unconstrained by the city wall.

The citadel was a rectangle in shape. The land around the rocky hill was barely above the level of the lake. By the 17th century (when the lake's level seems to have been somewhat higher than in the 14th and early 15th century, and when Erciş had been reduced to the size of a small town), the lake could flood all this land, leaving only a narrow neck on the west side.[a] The citadel was in fact inhabited partly by civilians: in Evliya's time it contained 1,000 houses and about 200 shops.[b]

Perhaps 300 m. south of the citadel stood the principal mosque, which from Lynch's photograph appears to have been low, large and rectangular.[3] Further south, near the edge of the shore, lay another mosque.[c] The city probably spread, in the late Middle Ages, a few hundred metres west of the citadel. In this direction, at about 2 kms. from the citadel, stood a settlement mound used as a cemetery.[4] To the north the city wall ran

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[a] Ev.IV.148. Evliya says the land could be flooded for eight months at a time.

[b] Ibid..

[c] It was this mosque's minaret which was noticed by Lynch (II.27).

at a distance of 200 or 300 m. from the citadel.[a] On the east the land was probably too low, and therefore waterlogged and subject to flooding, to permit settlement. On this side the lake shore was very near, and here was the harbour.[5]

About 6 kms. north-east of the citadel was a separate inhabited area. This lay around several thermal springs,[6] at a crossroads. North-west went the track to Malazgirt and Erzurum, south-west one could reach the main built-up area or, taking a little more westerly direction, could bypass the main mass of housing and go more directly to Arckē/Adilcevaz. A track towards Bārgīrī led off south-eastwards and similarly bypassed the main spread of housing attached to the citadel.

This exurb of the city was the spot where the türbes of members of the leading Kara Koyunlu family were built.[7] When the site of medieval Erciş was finally abandoned in 1841, much of the population moved here. This place, known to Armenians as Akans (translit. "Agans"; lit. "Springs", accusative form), was seen as inheriting the old city's identity, though in reality parts of the population went to villages round about.[b]

Such may be considered the various parts of the city proper. But only 9 or 10 kms. to the north of the citadel and walled enclosure lay what Thomas of Mecop' calls the "giwłak'ałak'" of Zarišat.[8] The word means "city-village" or "town-village". Its meaning alone would indicate an extraordinarily large village or a town: the same word was applied to Van in the 10th century.[c] Now Zarišat was undoubtedly a separate settlement from Erciş, but the fact that such a large settlement lay just 10 km. from Erciş on the same plain is information which increases our estimate of the economic significance of Erciş,

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[a] Lynch's photograph, II.28, including gate in city wall.

[b] İzbırak, *Cilo Dağı, Hakkari, Vangölü* 142.

[c] Arcruni (ed. Patk.),

just as the proximity of Burnley, St. Helens and Salford to Manchester increases our estimate of the latter city's economic significance. Just how Arčēš/Erciş and Zarišat were related cannot be exactly specified. Zarišat's size was due in part to the exceptional fertility of the plain; which is of some relevance to the function and site of Erciş. If the relative positions of settlements and tracks had been different, some of Zarišat's population might well have lived in Erciş. In the Classical period the two settlements also existed side by side. Erciş was then called Arsissa in its Greek form.

Another area which must be considered in surveying the elements of the city is its gardens. These, though not part of the city site or an exurb, were essential to the city's existence. They lay on the slopes of the Boz Dağ, and therefore at a distance of at least 15 km.. The population retired there for at least three months every year.[9]

History of the city. From the frequent minting which started a year after Ghazan's coin reform the city seems to have been highly active during the first third of the 14th century.[10] That the minting continues during the short reigns of the various Il-Khans following Abu Sa'id (who died in 736/1335) indicates, as at Ahlat, both a highly active city, of durable strength, in the first third of the century, and one of continuing strength in the next fifteen years. In those fifteen years the coins were minted not only through the force of a tradition derived from previous activity, but also in response to the strict demands of current activity.

The city was probably at its greatest physical extent in the late 13th century and the first 30 or 40 years of the 14th. Towards the end of the 13th and at the beginning of the 14th centuries, many manuscripts were produced here and in the immediate district.[a]

[a] Sov.Arm.Enc., "Arčeši Grč'ut'yan Kentron" (2.88.2-3).

In the late 13th century three different churches are named in the colophons (further churches, whose dedications are unknown, must have existed).[11] At some stage between 1312 and 1324 the city's fortifications were rebuilt.[12]

The minting becomes a trickle in the second half of the 14th century. The city must have lost population over a period starting c.1335 and continuing at least to the 1370's or 1380's. It must have suffered much in the attacks by Kara Yusuf and 'Izz al-Din the Hakkari prince in 1394. Kara Yusuf had been thrown out of Erciş by Timur's forces, and now counter-attacked, recapturing the city. At some point the city was burned, though it is not clear whether this was the work of Timur's forces, those of Kara Yusuf or those of 'Izz al-Din.[a] Kara Yusuf was forced out again in Armn. 844/1395,[b] and did not return until 1406.

In Armn. 846/1397, however, reconstruction work started. The governor appointed by Timur, Ahmad, acceded in that year to a request from two ecclesiastics, one of them the abbot of Mecop', to allow rebuilding in their own monasteries.[c] However the reconstruction work spread to the city itself, where the rebuilding of the principal church was started in 1402.[d] Timur's governor apparently favoured Christians. This may have been because local Turks either were Kara Koyunlu or were sympathetic to the Kara Koyunlu.[13] After Kara Yusuf's return Erciş suffered no invasions or disasters until Armn. 878/1428.[e] Kara Yusuf built a zawīya here,[f] and there may be something in the

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[a] T'M 47.

[b] T'M 49.

[c] T'M 49.

[d] T'M 58-9.

[e] T'M 88.

tradition that he encouraged the city's development.[a] The quality of manuscripts produced in the first half of the 15th century is, it seems, an improvement on the preceding half-century.[b]

By 1420, owing to the permanent inclusion of Azerbayjan within the Kara Koyunlu domains, Erciş had lost its position as one of the principal Kara Koyunlu cities. This probably made little difference to the amount of attention given the city by Kara Yusuf, who died in 1420. Thereafter, though, it received little attention from the Kara Koyunlu. For the remainder of the 15th century Erciş appears to have remained a small city, neither growing nor contracting. It was attacked a few times, like all other cities in the region.[14] On the other hand the Kara Koyunlu did not lose interest in it, and it kept a place in the hearts of Kara Koyunlu leaders after Kara Yusuf. Hasan 'Ali, who appears to have quietly assumed control over Erciş, Adilcevaz and other local towns in 1458, renovated the dome of the principal church in the year 1461.[15] Jahan Shah, his mother, and other members of the leading family were buried in the city.[c]

But the fighting which took place in the 16th century does seem to have brought about a gradual decline. Probably the most destructive episode was the period of fierce competition between the Kızılbaş, Dulgadır and Sharaf of Bitlis in the years 1501 to c.1510.[16] In 1533 the population was forced by the janissary garrison to take refuge in Adilcevaz when Shah Tahmasp approached.[d] A particularly difficult siege took place in

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[f] Sümer, KK 112.

[a] Ev.IV.147.

[b] Sov.Arm.Enc., "Arčeši Grč'ut'yan Kentron", 2.88.2-3.

[c] N.7 to p.374.

[d] MC II.231 (Hovhannēs of Arčeš).

959-60/1551-53, when the citadel was besieged by Safavid troops for three months and dismantled after its capture.[a] By the mid-17th century the place had become a small town, still defended by the citadel on the low hill.[b]

Bibliographical note. Sov.Arm.Enc., "Arčēš" (2.87.1-882) is full and evenly balanced between different periods; "Arčeši Grč'ut'yan Kentron" (2.88.2-3) adds more. EI², "Ardjīsh" [N.B.], 1.627 (Cl.Cahen), is helpful on the city's pre-Mongol history. İA, "Erciş", 4.285.1-286.2 (B.Darkot), is useful only on the period from Evliya onwards, particularly the abandonment and subsequent state of Akans.

Coins

700, Ghazan	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GD7 E2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.25.
701, Ghazan	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GD7 E3. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.25. Muled with obverse of Khilāṭ.
702, Ghazan	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GD7 E4. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.25.
70x, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE8 F3. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.34. Uljaytu type A.
710a, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE8 F4. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.34. Uljaytu type B.
710b, Uljaytu	AR dirham, 4.317 g.	ANS 1968.212.45 (Arm.).

[a] AT 367-70; Sh.II.205.

[b] *Cihānnüma*, tr. Charmoy, 165; Evliya's account, IV.148-9.

710(?)c, Uljaytu	AR dirham 4.039 g.	ANS 1959.165.256 (Arm.). Holed.
714a, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams, 2.68 g.. "Arjīsh Tumān jār".	Album 91-2-2.
714b, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE8 F5. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.34. Uljaytu type C.
715a, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE8 F6. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.34. Uljaytu type C.
715b, Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GE9 A1. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.34. Variant of GE8 F6.
71(5?), Uljaytu	AR, 2 dirhams. Mint name followed by "Tumān ...", but name of *tuman* unclear: perhaps Jazīra	Album (UT) GE9 A2. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.34.
(?) 715		Zb.40 (196, n.p.)
N.d./d.m., Uljaytu	AR dirham, 4.167 g.	ANS 1968.212.46 (Arm.).
718, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG9 A3. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.49. Abu Sa'id type B.
719a, Abu Sa'id	AR, 3.43 g.	Lane-Poole Cat. X.176[d], p.109. BM, Mongols tray 16. My notes p.16.
719b, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG9 A5. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.49. Abu Sa'id type C.
(?) 719c		Zb. 40 (105, no. 176d)
(?) 729		Zb. 40 (no ref.)
(?) 730		Zb. 40 (no ref.)
(?) 738		Zb. 40 (127, no.580)
Kh.33a, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG9 A6. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.49. Abu Sa'id type H.
Kh.33b, Abu Sa'id	AR dirham	ANS 0000 [sic].999.11299.
Kh.34, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GG9 B1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.49. Abu Sa'id type H.

740a, Sulayman	AR, 1.676 g.	Album, Il-Kh. II, 57 no.47. Sulayman type B. probably same as Album (UT) GL7 C3, Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.80.
740b, Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL7 C4. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.89. Sulayman, type B. Blundered style, probably imitation.
N.d., Sulayman	AR, 1.816 g.. Not clear that mint is Arjīsh.	Album, Il-Kh.II, 63 no.129. Prob. same as Album (UT) GM3 B3. Sulayman type B. Date off flan. Calligraphy poor. Probably imitation.
741, Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL7 C5. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.80. Sulayman type C.
744, Sulayman	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GL7 C6. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.80. Sulayman type D.
D.m., Anushiravan (745-57)	AR, 2 dirhams	Album (UT) GM4 C3. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.85. Anushiravan type B.
762a, Uways	AR, dinar	Album (UT) HB4 A1. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.7. Uways type B.
7(6)2b, Uways	AR, dinar	Album (UT) HB3 F6. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.7. Uways type B.
780, Husayn	AR, dinar	Album (UT) HB7 D6. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.10.
[795], Timur	2 dinars, 0.98, pierced	Album 92-2-120. Date off flan, but type struck only in 795. Obv. hexafoil, rev. quatrefoil.
N.d., [Timur &] Mahmud	AR, tanka	Album (UT) HH1 E6. Tim. 30.4.89, p.2. Plain circle with mint interlinearly on reverse, as at Ahlat.
N.d., Iskender	AR tanka, 4.72 g.. Ruler's name, "Isq..." only is legible.	Album, NumChron 1976, 142, no.31. Presumably same as Album (UT) HE7 D1, 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.5.
N.d., Iskender	4 g.	Tab. 154 T. Notes S.Album.
949, Tahmasp	2 shahi, 5.12 g.	Album 91-14-25.
(?) 951		Zb. 40 (285, no. 951)
953, Tahmasp	AR 2 shahi, 5.12 g.	Album 91-1-30.
N.d., Tahmasp, (a)	AR, shahi	Album (UT) IA7 C5, Saf. 27.1.89, p.5.

N.d., Tahmasp, (b)	AR, 2 shahi, 5.13 g.	Album (UT) IA7 C1. Saf. 27.1.89, p.5.

Attribution dubious or impossible or too vague

N.d., Il-Khanid	Zb.40 (no.109)
809, Ghiath al-Din Ahmad & Kara Yusuf	Zb.40 (128, no.898)

Adilcevaz

(Armn. "Arckē"; Arab. "Dhāt al-Jawuz"; Pers. "'Ādiljevaz", "Zāt al-Jawuz", sometimes "'Abd al-Jawuz"; Ott. "Ādilcevāz", "'Adilcevāz")

Site. First of all certain aspects of local topography must be outlined. A valley approaches the shore of Lake Van from the north. Although only about 5 kms. long, the valley has a flat floor more than a kilometre in width, and this broadens at the approach to the lake. A river runs over the floor of the valley, the whole of which is well irrigated. At present the valley's floor is covered with orchards and gardens, among which houses, either single and isolated or in small groups, are interspersed. With some differences, the use made of the small, well-watered plain was probably the same in the late Middle Ages and the Ottoman period as now. Despite the various migrations of the walled area and markets, this was always the small city's garden suburb.

The ridge of hills lining the valley along its west side is taller and steeper than that to the east. The crown of the last hill on the west side was fortified by a narrow circuit of walls, the citadel of the medieval city. The medieval city's walls (as opposed to its citadel) ran down towards the lake from either end of the citadel. Strictly in the Middle Ages, a circuit was thus formed: the walls descending from opposite ends of the citadel

simply met by the lake shore.[a] The walls enclosed several small hills by the lake shore; the hills evidently descended straight into the lake, with no room for a shore strip.[17] In the lake was an island on which was established the monastery of Cipnay.[b]

At some point in the 15th century or the first half of the 16th, the lake's waters rose and flooded the lower half of the medieval walled area. Thereafter, probably over a period of years, part of the walled area's population moved to a location at the mouth of the valley, near the lake's shore. Here stands the mosque built perhaps in the 1550's or 1560's, shortly after the permanent Ottoman conquest. Eventually, and again the date cannot be exactly ascertained, a new walled area was built on the plain. This was certainly small; it is not known if it enclosed the Ottoman mosque or not; nor have its walls been found.[18] Exactly when the whole process of migration and rebuilding took place is unknown; but the building of the Ottoman mosque is the *terminus ante quem*. The process could not have started before about 1430.[19]

In the 19th century the town centre, though not the general cover of gardens, orchards and houses in the plain, moved to a point further inland on the plain. This move may have been necessitated by the same rise in the lake's level which caused the wholesale migration of Erciş to Akans, 6 km. inland, in 1841.[c] Perhaps the move was prompted by an earthquake of the early 19th century.[d] Thus the present distribution of houses and other buildings is misleading as to the early Ottoman position, let alone the late medieval.

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[a] Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.275.

[b] See esp. Clph.XIV.191, p.154 (S.1319.1, p.62) and for the name, Clph.XV.I.216, p.203 (S.1417.4, p.141).

[c] This appendix under Erciş.

[d] De Cholet, *Arménie etc.*, 216.

Site and function. Although Evliya's account relates to the mid-17th century, by which time many things could have changed, it is at any rate instructive to consider the information he gives. According to him, there were 700 small houses without garden or orchard (*bağ*) in the *ḳal'e*, i.e. the medieval walled area. In the lower *ḳal'e* [i.e the Ottoman one] there were 300 houses. [Elsewhere,] in the town, [i.e. in the garden suburb], there were small and large palaces, the houses of *re'āyā*, orchard houses [i.e. houses built among orchards for the purpose of tending them] and 1,100 "güzel" houses. In all there were seven *mahalles*, and 7,000 gardens.[a]

The changes in the level of the lake's waters would have diminished the space available for houses in the medieval citadel. So in the late Middle Ages, before the first rise in the lake's level, there would have been room for more houses than the 700 mentioned by Evliya. For the sake of example we could imagine that the 300 in the Ottoman citadel were instead living on the lower ground, later to be flooded, in the medieval walled area. Still, the medieval walled area was evidently somewhat cramped, and the bulk of the population lived on the plain. Here Evliya is unhelpful as to numbers, but if there were 1,100 "güzel" houses then we might assume rather more, say 2,000, in the category of *re'āyā* houses and fewer, say 500, in that of orchard houses. This would give about 4,500 houses. On the assumption of 6 per house, this means 27,000 people, and on the assumption of 8 per house it means about 36,000. These are respectable totals.[20] On the other hand it seems clear that Adilcevaz, in whatever period, was effectively a densely-populated tract of farmland protected by a powerful fortified enclosure. In other words it was primarily a farming city. Besides this function, it played the role of market town to the district and must have served passing traffic to some extent.

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[a] Ev.IV.142-4.

The medieval walled area with its hilltop citadel was a powerful place of defence, and in crises served the whole district as a refuge. In 1429 the Christian population of the district crowded into the walled area to escape a threatened attack by Shah Rukh.[21] Adilcevaz was also useful to the Kara Koyunlu as a prison: this probably means the hilltop citadel.[a]

There is no evidence of a decline. A rise in the city's population from the mid-14th century is much more likely. It offered greater security than either Ahlat or Erciş, both of which were on the decline in this period. Nor is there any sign of neglect. After Timur's ravage of the city and district in 1387, repairs were carried out on the buildings affected.[b] An inscription of Jahan Shah is reported in the walls,[c] which means probably that Jahan Shah maintained them.

Bibliographical note. Sov.Arm.Enc., "Arckē" (2.71.1-3) is full on the pre-Turkish period and on the 19th century, but unhelpful on the late Middle Ages and early Ottoman period. No entry in EI, İA.

Coins

7xx, Uljaytu	AR 2 dirhams. "Javāz-i Khilāṭ".	Album (UT) GF1 D2. Mong. Emp. 20.6.89, p.36. Uljaytu type C.

[a] Sümer, KK 79: imprisonment of Ala al-Dawla, son of the Jalayrid sultan Ahmad.

[b] T'M 30.

[c] Kafesoğlu, "Ahlat ve çevresi", 186.

N.d, Uljaytu	AE, fals	Album (UT) GF9 B6. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.36.
721a, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams. "Javāz-i Khilāṭ".	Album (UT) GH4 D1. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.54. Abu Sa'id type C.
721b, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams. "Javāz-i Khilāṭ" (earlier misread as "Tumān ... Lārestān").	Album (UT) GH8 C4. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.54. Abu Sa'id type C.
Date uncertain, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2 dirhams. "Javāz-i Khilāṭ".	Album (UT) GH4 D2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.54.
N.d. [1421 or 1422], Aspan [Kara Koyunlu]	AR, 5.34 g.. Mint "'Ad.l ...". Overlord "Asan".	Album, "Lake Van hoard" [NumChron 1976], 139, no.26. Very likely same as Album (UT) HE7 B2, 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.4.
N.D., Iskender	AR tanka, 4.83 g.. "'Abd al-Jawuz".	Album, "Lake Van hoard" [NumChron 1976], 144, no.46. Presumably same as Album (UT) HE7 C2, 15 c. Iran 30.4.89, p.5.

Malazgirt

(Armn. "Manazkert", "Manckert"; Pers. "Malāzgīrd"; Arab. "Malād-h-gird"; Ott. "Melazgīrd", "Melazgird")

The site, developed early in the Middle Ages, mainly by local Arab emirates of the 8th to 10th centuries A.D., was large and well-fortified. The city walls enclosed an area 600 m. in length and 350 m. in width. The walls encircled a plateau at the end of a lava tongue travelling north-westwards into the plain from Şüphan Dağ. The site was naturally strong, with falls in the ground outside the plateau on all sides except the north-east (where the upper surface of the lava tongue joined the fortified plateau). On this side stood a small but powerful citadel.[22] The ground enclosed by the city wall may have been completely covered in housing in the early Middle Ages, and probably remained so until

the mid-13th century.[23] In our period the walled area was perhaps partly empty.

The sources have little to say about Malazgirt in the period, and it is unlikely such reticence conceals a bustling, well-populated city. Malazgirt was already reduced in size by the 14th century. This came about for two reasons. First, even by the 12th century Ahlat had already taken Malazgirt's position as the leading city of the districts north of Lake Van: which is not to say that Malazgirt suffered seriously in that century. Secondly, the Il-Khans would have compounded the decline: they took an interest in Ahlat and Erciş, and maintained a permanent presence at least in Ahlat. After the Mongol occupation the district had also been partially invaded by transhumant nomads, which reduced the city's prosperity.[a] If these are the reasons for the city's decline, the serious decline must have taken place from the mid-13th century. Those leaving Malazgirt probably went to Erciş and Ahlat. The fortunes of both these cities improved in the late 13th century.

Nevertheless the sources are not completely silent, and do not by any means suggest abandonment or reduction to a picturesque village within a disused circuit of walls. C.1340 Mustawfi wrote that the city had a strong and imposing *qal'a*, i.e. walled area, but that its revenue was 14,000 dinars. The size of the revenue is hardly suggestive of a large city, though strictly speaking this is the revenue of the district.[b] The town lay on a track between Erzurum and Khoy via Erciş and the Ala Dağ district.

Manckert/Malazgirt is referred to as a *k'alak'* in 1387:[c] the Armenian word can denote either a town or a city, but not a village. Hasan 'Ali, son of Jahan Shah, "built"

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[a] Ch.IV, sects. 3, 4.1.(c).

[b] Mustawfi, *Nuzhat* (LS) 101-2.

[c] T'M 21.

the town in 1461.[a] It is hard to be sure what is meant: perhaps the financing of repairs to one or two public buildings, such as churches, and repairs to the city walls.[24] The likelihood is that the town's walls were used, but not given extensive repairs, throughout the late Middle Ages.

By the mid-17th century Malazgirt was a town of middling size. The town as a whole was not especially prosperous, though the houses within the walled enclosure were in good repair. The walls, however, were not.[25]

Bibliographical note. İA, "Malazgirt" (7.239.2-241.2), covers well the history to c.1230. Sov.Arm.Enc., "Manckert", 7.210.2-211.1, is helpful up to 1071 and on the year 1915. EI^2, "Malazgird", 6.242.2-243.1 (the part which concerns the city's history) is somewhat short and fragmentary. Lynch II.269-74 is an important reference on the town's state at the end of the 19th century.

Berkri

("Berkri" is Armn. spelling; Arab. "Bārkīrī", "Bīrgīrī", "Bārkirī";[b] Pers. and Ott. "Bārgīrī"; now renamed "Muradiye")

This was a large town: in the late Middle Ages it was in the same league as Muş.

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[a] MC I.143 (Anon. Chron.).

[b] The k of the Armenian and Arabic spellings would have been pronounced "g" in this region during the late Middle Ages.

Mustawfi calls it a small city.[a] In the 9th to 11th centuries it was called a *berdak'ałak'*, which means for our purposes a town whose safety lay in the strong citadel above it.[b]

The plain below the town was a strategically vital area in which the track from Khoy to Erzurum via Erciş, travelling roughly south-east to north-west, was joined by the track from Van. Berkri never had much administrative or military importance in the late Middle Ages, however, because most functions resided in nearby Erciş and Adilcevaz.

The town lay on a low rise at the north edge of the plain. It was unwalled, but above it rose a strong citadel on a mainly steep-sided rock.[26]

Bibliographical note. Sov.Arm.Enc., "Berkri, k'ałak' ...", 2.425.1-2, has some useful points, though not on our period. Nothing in EI, İA.

Coins

715, Uljaytu	2 dirhams, 3.64 g.. "Bīrgīrī".	Album 91-2-6. Uljaytu type C.
729a, Abu Sa'id	Dirham, 1.54 g..	Album 92-10-31. Abu Sa'id type G.
729b, Abu Sa'id	Dirham, 1.579 g.	ANS 1917.215.1819 (Arm.).
747	1.32 g.. "Bargirī".	YKB Timurid [sic] 17/8. Notes S.Album.

[a] *Nuzhat* (LS) 101.

[b] Sov.Arm.Enc., "Berkri, k'ałak' ...", 2.425.2.

The Ala Dağ palace and Nawshahr

Names. "Ala Dağ", "Mottled Mountain", is modern Turkish. Pers. "Ālāṭāq", "Alatāq" etc.[a] "Nawshahr", "New City" (Pers.), represented on the ground now by villages of Yukarı and Aşağı Noşar.

Introduction. The Ala Dağ palace was founded by the Il-Khan Arghun (A.D. 1284-91) to facilitate the grazing of the Ala Dağ pastures in summer. The town of Nawshahr seems to have sprung up partly in consequence of the Il-Khans' use of the Ala Dağ pasture: otherwise its existence was due to the passage of travellers along the south side of the Abaghā plain (or Çaldıran plain as it is now called).

When medieval sources refer to the Ala Dağ they mean an area including the mountain, not the mountain by itself. Indeed one source identifies the district, not with the mountain, but with the plain.[b] The mountain lies north of the plain, which it waters, both on the surface and underground. The probable site of the palace is on foothills near the northerly corner of the plain. The palace was thus within easy reach of the pastures and of villages on the plain which could supply what the pastures could not. The plain as well as the mountain had its uses for mounted troops: while the mountain was a grazing-ground, the plain was a parade-ground. Nawshahr appears to have been the spot chosen for mustering troops. It was the Kara Koyunlu Kara Yusuf in particular who made use of the plain in this way.[27]

The palace was sited at a day's journey from Bayazīd (the castle and town above

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[a] See Krawulsky, *Reich* 418.

[b] MC I.45 (Stephen the Bishop); see on the identification of the palace's site below.

modern Doğubayazıt). The journey involved the ascent of and descent from a pass on the east shoulder of Tendürek Dağ.[28] Bayazīd lay above and at a short distance from the principal corridor for traffic between Iran and Anatolia, the Erzurum-Tabriz track. To the south-west of the palace, on the Abaghā plain, were the paths on a second route between Iran and Anatolia. This, like the first, connected Erzurum and Khoy, but was considerably shorter and lay for a greater proportion of the distance over high, well-watered pastureland. This made it suitable for the passage of mounted troops towards Erzurum and Erzincan or towards Tabriz. The route came into the southerly part of the plain, passing Nawshahr, to Berkri/Muradiye. The palace was less than a day's journey from Nawshahr, but to reach places west of Berkri one would go directly to that town. To Berkri was a day's journey.

History of the palace's use. In A.D. 1259 the Il-Khan Hulagu mounted a famous expedition against Syria which started in Azerbayjan, passed the Ala Dağ mountain and continued along the north shore of Lake Van. This was Hulagu's discovery of the Ala Dağ as an excellent and excellently-placed summer pasture.[a] Hulagu later summered on the Ala Dağ pasture.[29] Hulagu's successor Abagha (spelt Abāqā in the texts) decided on Tabriz as his capital. Tabriz was closer to the Ala Dağ than Hulagu's capital, Maragheh, and Abagha chose the Ala Dağ as one of his two summer residences.[30]

It was the Il-Khan Arghun (1284-91) who ordered the construction of a palace.[31] The palace and pasture were also used as a summer residence by Geikhatu.[32] Ghazan also resided there.[b]

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[a] CHI V.350.

[b] He was residing there when he seized Shaykh Mahmud and took him to Tabriz. (Tar.Uws. 56.)

During the years of factional fighting which followed Abu Sa'id's death in 1335, the Ala Dağ palace and pasture were sometimes the base for the faction of the reigning Il-Khan, and battles took place either on the plain or on its approaches.[33]

It is not clear if any of the Jalayrid rulers made use of the palace or pasture. Nor can we be sure that the palace was kept up by subsequent rulers, including the Kara Koyunlu. On balance it seems probable that it was kept up, particularly as the structure with which it should probably be identified was to a large extent intact as late as the 1930's.[a]

Before being forced to flee the Van region in 1394, Kara Yusuf spent one or two summers on the Ala Dağ. This was not just because he took a personal liking to the district; in 1392 the Ala Dağ proved a useful base from which to embark on the second siege of Tabriz.[34] In 1394 Timur himself pastured his horses here.[b]

On his return to the Van region in 1406, Kara Yusuf again took to summering here. Again this was not just a matter of his personal preference or of the excellence of the pasture. The Ala Dağ had a governmental function too. The plain was useful as a mustering area and both the plain and the pasture as a stopping-place for expeditions.

Kara Yusuf spent four summers, those of 1408 to 1411, on the Ala Dağ pastures.[35] In 1410 his troops were paraded on the plain at Nawshahr. Kara Yusuf was on his way back from Erzincan, which the Jalayrid sultan Ahmad had just captured from him. This was after the summer sojourn.[c] In 1420 a similar use was made of the plain. This time the main Kara Koyunlu army lay there, and the contingent of Pîr Ömer, who

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[a] See below.

[b] Sümer, KK 57.

[c] Sümer, KK 83, spelling Nevşehir.

had failed to recapture Erzincan, was due to rendezvous with it there. But it was ambushed on the way by the Ak Koyunlu under Kara Yülük Osman.[a]

Thereafter no ruler seems to have used the Ala Dağ solely and strictly as a summer pasture. Instead it was used as a stopping- or resting-place much recommended by its pastures or hunting.[36] The last monarch to have stopped on the Ala Dağ pastures seems to have been Shah Ismail. In 908/1502-3 he set out on his expedition against Alvand in the Diyar Bakr, and on his way stopped to take advantage of the hunting on Ala Dağ.[b]

After the Ottoman occupation monarchs and their mounted troops no longer spent summers on the Ala Dağ pasture, mustered troops on the plain, or even rested on the mountain a few days. The Ala Dağ was a natural summer pasture area only for rulers whose capitals were in Azerbayjan or Iraq. During most of the time that the Ala Dağ lay within the Ottoman empire's boundaries, Tabriz was separated from the Ala Dağ by the border between the two empires. The whereabouts of the palace were forgotten: by local people it was assumed to be at Saray, in the next valley southward from the Abaghā/Çaldıran plain.[c] In time the battle of Çaldıran was refought on the Abaghā plain;[37] the name of which, however, is a muddled memory of the second Il-Khan. A final twist was given to the deforming of the tradition when the name "Abagha" was distorted to "Abaza".[d]

Location of the palace. First of all, as noted above, "Ala Dağ" in the sources (it does not

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[a] Sümer, KK 102-3.

[b] AT 63.

[c] On Saray, p.211 above.

[d] Maunsell, MRETA I.162, 190. "Abaza" in Turkish means "Abkhaz".

occur, of course, in this spelling) denotes an area which included both the mountain and the plain to the south. Secondly, various Armenian authors mention that the palace lay on a plain, the name of which varies from author to author. Kirakos calls it the plain of Daṙn;[a] Stephen the Bishop "the plain of Duṙn, which today they call Alatał [pron. "Aladagh"]";[b] the Anonymous of Sebastia the plain of Aṙan.[38] The solution appears to be that the correct name was Gaṙni, the district name in the early Middle Ages and the one known to the early 7th-century *Ašxarhac'oyc'*.[39] A D could easily be written for G in Armenian (ԴforԳ); similarly once D had been established, "u" could easily be written for "a" (ունforան). "Aṙan" is not so easily explicable, but we may be dealing with a simple loss of the initial letter. The "a" between "ṙ" and "n" is not surprising, as a half-vowel would generally be pronounced, though not normally written, in this position anyway. Now Gaṙni was centred on the Abaghā/Çaldıran plain, and that plain or the slopes leading to it from the mountains to the north is where the next piece of evidence, Mustawfi's, points.

Mustawfi mentions that the district of Ālātāq/Ala Dağ was upstream of Bārgīrī/Muradiye on the Band-i Mahi river.[c] Following the river's course upstream from Muradiye we first of all find a gorge, which is more or less impossible as the location of a palace. We then enter the Abaghā/Çaldıran plain.

The course of the river is no longer an exact guide, because its different feeders congregate near the plain's west edge, and none can be considered the principal branch. The sites at Çaldıran (modern name of the plain's present market town) and Aşağı

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[a] Kirakos, ed. Blake & Frye, 343.

[b] MC I.45.

[c] *Nuzhat* (LS), 101.

Şerefhane could be considered.[40] Both of these appear to be Urartian fortresses, though that at Çaldıran certainly carries some post-Urartian masonry. A more serious difficulty is that although both lie next to one or the other feeder of the Bendimahi Çay, they nevertheless lack supplies of fresh water and access to pasture.

A much more promising site, unnamed, lies off the plain in the foothills of Tendürek Dağ or even higher. In 1938 the American archaeologists Kirsopp and Sylva Lake were told that there was an almost perfectly preserved castle near the north end of the plain which could only be reached on horseback.[41] This sounds much the best possibility; unfortunately the building has never been inspected. The site at Aşağı Şerefhane is the second best candidate because it lies on the plain proper and not far from the beginning of the slopes.

Bibliographical note. A few references to Persian sources in Krawulsky, *Reich* 418-19.

Coins

7xx, Abu Sa'id	AR, dirham. "Nawshahr".	Album (UT) GI1 B2. Mong.Emp. 20.6.89, p.55. Abu Sa'id type B.
(?) Kh. 34	AR, 2.51 g.. Weight reduced by subsequent piercing. Mint name apparently "Nawshahr", but uncertain.	YKB Abu Sa'id 9/445. Notes S.Album.

Kh. 35, Abu Sa'id	AR 2 dirhams, 2.83 g.. "Nawshahr".	Album 92-27-22. Abu Sa'id type H.
(?) Kh. 35, Abu Sa'id	AR, 2.78 g.. Mint name apparently "Nawshahr", but uncertain.	YKB Abu Sa'id 9/244. Notes S.Album.
740	[AR]. "Nawshahr".	Album, Il-Kh. I, 80 & esp. n.88. Sati Beg type A, but after her reign.
75(9)	AR. "Alataq".	Album (UT) HA10 B2. 14 c. Iran 11.1.89, p.6. Rebellion of Akhi Juq.

APPENDIX II

POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY IN THE *SHEREFNAME*

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List of principalities

Bitlis (Ruzagi tribe)
Hakkari (Hakkari tribe)
Mahmudi (capital at Hoşap)
Hizan
Moks
Isbā'īrd
Pāzūkī (tribe name)
Dunbeli (tribe name)

I. WORDS DENOTING GROUPS OF A TRIBAL OR CLAN NATURE

1. Ṭāyfa

This seems to be the most general of the terms for some kind of tribal or clan group, and the word applied to the biggest groups. It is regularly used for the tribes of the principalities. For example:

I.94.17-18. Asad al-Dīn, when he had fulfilled the duty of head of state and day-to-day government over the Hakkari *ṭāyfa*, withdrew his hand from the skirt of the transitory world.

I.218.11-12. Rustam Bêg [of the family of the Moks princes] detached the *nāḥiya* of Kārkār from the sanjak of Moks and made it his own, with the help of the Mahmudi *ṭāyfa*.

218.last-219.1. [Rustam Bêg] got the *nāḥiya* of Karkar established as his own, with the assistance of the Mahmudi **'ashīret** [not *ṭāyfa*] and with the kind condescension of the Serdār Muṣṭafā Pāshā.

I.417.7-9. In that battlefield [of Koçhisar] the first to light the flame of war and slaughter ... were the Ruzagi *ṭāyfa*.

I.423.16-18. A horse fell into the hands of the the *amīr* Sharaf [of Bitlis] in a raid on the Pāzūkī *ṭāyfa*. 435.8-13. Among the *ṭāyfa*s which had terrorised or been treacherous to the ancestors [of Sharaf al-Din of Bitlis], and on whom [Sharaf] now took revenge, was the

Pāzūkī *'ashiret*.

"Ṭāyfa" used for larger groups than the above:

I.387.15-16. Ūzūn Ḥasan ... brought about the death of Jahānshāh, son of Qarā Yūsuf, as a consequence of the ancient enmity which existed between the two *ṭāyfas* [i.e. Ak and Kara Koyunlu].

Smaller groups:

I.366.Last-367.2. The Serājīān *jama'at*, who are remnants of the Great Seljuks, and whose name is a mistake for "Saljūqyān", are in the *vilāyat* of Bitlis, [which implies, not, admittedly, with absolute reliability, that they are part of the Ruzagi, themselves described as a *ṭāyfa*].

I.382.11. Anarchy erupted among the Ruzagi *ṭavāīf* [which must be divisions of the Ruzagi, elsewhere themselves called a *ṭāyfa* (above, I.423.16-18) and *'ashīret* (see below). But it is most unlikely that the author of the *Sherefname* has in mind any particular type of sub- division of the Ruzagi in this sentence.]

Note also that the word "ṭāyfa" is used to denote the totality of the Nestorian tribes of the Hakkari, who were subjects of the Hakkari princes. E.g.:

I.392.4-5. [Muhammad Agha, a Ruzagi, has brought to the Hakkari district the two *amīrzādes* (sons eligible to be *amīrs*) of the murdered Ibrahim, one-time prince of the Ruzagi, whose capital was Bitlis.] He brought them among the Assyrian *'ashāīr*. 10-11.

At that stage the Assyrian *ṭāyfa* was in opposition to 'Izz al-Din Shir, its ruler. 17. The two Ruzagi *amīrzāde*s perished on the battlefield among the Assyrian *ṭāyfa*.

2. 'Ashīret

This again is a standard term for the tribes of the principalities. E.g.:

I.302.3-4. After the death of his father, 'Ivāz Bêg became *mīr-livā* of Khōshāb and responsible for the administration (*żabṭ*) of the Mahmudi *'ashīret*.

I.331.Bottom. In the reign [of Yādigār, a Pāzūkī prince] the Pāzūkī *'ashīret* became wealthy.

I.363.2-4. The Ruzagi *'ashīret* exalted to government 'Izz al-Din in Bitlis and Zia al-Din in Hazo.

I.391.15-16. "If your servant [i.e. myself] ... could make one of your sons a fellow-traveller, and he could be allowed to travel about Kurdistan, he would make the Ruzagi *'ashīret* assemble around him ..."

I.394.18-19. When they [the *amīr* Shams al-Din, shortly to be the prince of Bitlis, and his vassal Muhammad Agha] arrived at the border [of the principality of Bitlis], 1,500 men of the Ruzagi *'ashīret* assembled around [Shams al-Din].

I.407.4. After the flight of the *amīr* Ibrahim [during the Safavid occupation], the Ruzagi *'ashīret* held the citadel of Bitlis [against the Safavids] for six months.

I.441.8-9. The [Ottoman] grand *vazīr* Ibrahim Pasha will be present today at a meeting with 150 men of the Ruzagi *'ashīret*, [which will be a good opportunity, considering the Ruzagi men will be loyal, to stab the grand *vazīr*].

However the word is not used only to denote one of the tribes which underly the principalities, but to denote a smaller group within such a tribe. E.g.:

I.97.5-6. Sayyid Muhammad, [uncle of Zaynal Beg, the Hakkari prince who had illegally taken part of the principality, based on the castle of Bāy], with the help of the Pinyanishi *'ashīret*, gained the ascendancy over Zaynal Beg and expelled him from the Hakkari principality.

I.358.8-13. The Rūzhagī *'ashīret* was assembled from 24 Kurdish tribes (*qabīle*). But of these one division, consisting of 12 tribes [the word *firqa* is used, but the 24 *qabīle*s are clearly what is meant], are called Bilbāsī, and the other division is called the Qavālīsī. ... According to one tradition Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī are the names of two *'ashīret*s [i.e now a smaller unit than the Ruzagi *'ashīret*] from the *tavāīf* of the Bālābān [an otherwise unmentioned group -- but we are dealing with an ancestry myth]. [The division into Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī is referred to a second time -- see below, I.361.13-19. However in the second reference the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī do not exhaust all the small groups composing the Ruzagi.]

I.359.1-2. According to [another] tradition the Ruzagi captured Bitlis from the Kōrdekī [? Gōrdegī] *'ashīret*. [But the latter is later named as one of the small groups composing the Qavālīsī division of the Ruzagi -- see below, I.361.17-19.]

I.359.2-3. Another tradition: the Ruzagi took Bitlis from the Zuqīsī *'ashīret*. [This, too, is mentioned later as one of the tribes making up the Ruzagi, though not as one of the Bilbāsī or Qavālīsī. See I.361.14-15.]

I.361.13. The Ruzagi *ṭāyfa* is divided into 24 groups (here *sha'b*). 14-15. Among these are five (the Qisānī, the Bāyegī, the Mōdikī, the Zuqīsī and the Zīdānī), who are [i.e. together make up] the ancient *'ashīret* of the principality of Bitlis.

I.361.15-19. The other 15 [presumably the word "sha'b" should be supplied; note that the arithmetic is wrong] are the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī. [I.e. the remaining 15 *sha'b* belong to the two major divisions, the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī.]

[Names of the *sha'b* of the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī are then given. Note that 20 names in all are given here, which with the above five makes 25 -- not far off the advertised total of 24. Note also that one of the Qavālīsī tribes is called Qavālīsī -- sic.]

I.400.13-14. The real control over critical aspects of government [in the Ruzagi principality] fell into the capable hands of 'Abd al-Raḥman Āghā Qavālīsī and the *āghās* of that *'ashīret* [i.e. the Qavālīsī, probably the larger division, not the tribe -- see I.358.8-13 and preceding item -- is now being referred to as an *'ashīret* too.]

I.40.16-19. A little later, Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī and his *'ashīret*, against the will of 'Abd al-Raḥman Āghā [and] of the Qavālīsī *jamā'at*, made haste to enter the service of the *amīr* Sharaf. [Same point.]

3. Firqa

As before the word does not denote any specific category of group, but is more a general word for a group: in any given passage the size and type of the group being referred to by the word becomes clear from the context.

I.328.Last. The *amīr*s [of the Pāzūkī] are in [two] *firqa*, the Khaled Bêglū and the Shukr Bêglū. [This sounds something like the division of the Ruzagi between the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī.]

I.334.9-10. A *firqa* of [the Pāzūkī], with the *amīr*s of the Dunbeli, came to submit to the imperial threshold.

I.358.10. The Ruzagi *'ashīret* was divided into two *firqa*, the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī ... [see above, under section 2, 'Ashīret]. 10- 11. The Bilbāsī had 12 *firq*, the Qavālīsī had 12 *karva*. [I.e. "firqa" can denote either the larger or the smaller group.]

I.403.10-11. Day by day, and *firqa* by *firqa*, the *āghā*s of the Ruzagi turned from the *amīr* Ibrahim and joined Sharaf.

4. Jam'

This, too, just means a group or collection, probably with little connotation of tribe or clan affinities.

I.303.Last-304.2. Khān Muḥammad Benjevī, a Mahmudi, set himself free from his prison at Van [where he has been put by a Kızılbaş governor]. ... A *jam'* of the Mahmudi *ṭāyfa* made haste to join his service.

I.314.7-8. A *jam'* of the Dunbeli *ṭāyfa* assembled around the flag [of Haji Beg, a Dunbeli].

I.414.5. [Bitlis and the rest of Kurdistan are under Safavid occupation. The amir Sharaf has escaped from Safavid captivity, although he is not yet on the soil of the Bitlis principality, and Amīr Shaykh Bilbāsī is helping to reinstate him.] Before the coming of the *amīr* Sharaf he [Amīr Shaykh Bilbāsī] brought a *jam'* of the Ruzagi over to his side.

5. Jamā'at

Similar remarks apply.

I.400.16-19. The Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī and his *'ashīret*, against the will of 'Abd al-Raḥman and the Qavālīsī *jamā'at*, made haste to enter the service of the *amīr* Sharaf [of Bitlis]. [The Qavālīsī are, however, elsewhere called an *'ashīret*; see above, under sect. 2, I.400.13-14. In any case the Bilbāsī, here called an *'ashīret*, are a group of the same size and type as the Qavālīsī; ibid., I.358.8-13.]

I.405.16-19. [Sharaf has beaten Ibrahim in the contest for the principality of Bitlis, and Ibrahim is now in prison.] 'Abd al-Raḥman Āghā Qavālīsī and the other *jamā'at* of adherents of Ibrahim, who had gathered [round Ibrahim] like the Pleiades, dispersed and scattered like the Plough.

I.414.10-11. [The Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī is trying to expel the Kızılbaş from Bitlis so as to re-instate the *amīr* Sharaf, who is still outside the borders of the Bitlis principality. The

Kızılbaş governor of Bitlis, Kurd Bêg Sharqlū, and other Kızılbaş amirs gather a force to combat the Shaykh Amīr.] He, for his part, with the *jamā'at* that was ready [i.e. under the orders of the Shaykh Amīr and prepared to fight with him ?], formed ranks to meet [Kurd Bêg] in the Gök Meydan of Bitlis. [This *jamā'at* appears to be the same as the *jam'* which the Shaykh Amīr has just gathered. See under sect. 4, I.414.5.]

6. Ulūs

The word regularly means a division of one of the principality- tribes. But apart from this implication, the use of the word in the *Sherefname* does not suggest a group of any particular status or function, and it is unlikely that the author had groups of any particular status or function in mind. Instead the word is used to refer to the totality of one of the principality-tribes; in other words by saying, for example, "all the *ulūsāt* of the Mahmudi", the author is referring simply to the Mahmudi, but supplying the intimation that none of the different groups composing the Mahmudi has been left out of consideration. The example of I.429.17-430.1 below suggests, not very forcibly, that to the extent that the *Sherefname* has a clear picture of the relations between *ulūs* and *'ashīret*, the *ulūs* is a division occupying a particular district.

That the plural of "ulūs" is several times followed by "aḥshāmāt", which means something like "followers" or "hangers-on" (see next section), is interesting. It suggests, again, that the author wishes to refer to the totality of the Mahmudi (or whichever tribe is in question), and that he wishes to do so by talking not only of the components of the Mahmudi (its *ulūsāt*), but also of any groups or families which may have got attached to

it. As with the *ulūs*es, it is unlikely that the author of the *Sherefname* has any specific "aḥshāmāt" in mind, or that he has a clear idea of what they amount to or why they have got attached to the Mahmudi.

I.306.9-11. A group (*jam'*) of the *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt* of the Mahmudi took the road to Soldūz ... and had altercations with Shaykh Haydar, ... 11-12. Ḥamza Bêg [a Mahmudi] and his brother Qubād Bêg, with about a hundred men of the Mahmudi *'ashīret* and its *mutābi'ān* [followers] met their death. [The example suggests that the *'ashīret* could be described as the sum of the *ulūsāt*.]

I.333.13-15. [After Shah Tahmasp had broken the Ottoman-Safavid treaty] the *aḥshāmāt* and the *ulūsāt* of that place [the district of Alashgerd, now in the territory of the Pāzūkī] ... scattered in all directions, and the signs of ruination appeared.

I.354.4-6. [Of the pastures of the Ruzagi] one is Ṣū Shehrī and Bīñgöl, and another is Jabal Sharaf al-Dīn, which, in the time of the ancestors and forebears of the writer of these pages, the *ulūsāt* of the Kurds made their summer pasture.

I.425.14-17. As a bountiful gift to the shah [of Iran], the *amīr* Sharaf distributed to the pillars-of-the-state [the nobles] of the padishah one-fifth of his moveable possessions (*emvāl*) and of the *jihat* of the cattle and pastures of infidel and Muslim alike, of the *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt* of the vilayet of Bitlis and its appendages. [In the Persian sentence the words "kufre" and "islāmīye" qualify the cattle and pastures, not the *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt*; hence the strange grammar of the English sentence.]

I.429.17-430.1. [Part of the diploma given by Shah Tahmasp to Sharaf of Bitlis.] The

kalanters [chiefs], the *maliks*, the *ketkhudās*, the *re'āyā*, the *muqīmāt* [i.e. townspeople? Charmoy II.1.311 translates "bourgeois sédentaires"], and all the inhabitants of the aforementioned *vilāyat* [Bitlis], and the *tushmālān* [chiefs ? Charmoy II.1.312 translates "commissaires ou délégués"] of the *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt* belonging to those districts (*mahāl*) must recognise the aforementioned refuge-of-the-eyālāt (*eyālet-panāh*) as the *ḥākim* and *ṣāhib-tiyūl* of those districts.

7. Followers (aḥshāmāt or mutābi'ān)

See the general comments at the beginning of sect. 6, Ulūs.

I.306.9-11. A group (*jam'*) of the *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt* of the Mahmudi took the road to Soldūz ... and had altercations with Shaykh Haydar, ... 11-12. Hamza Bêg ..., with about a hundred men of the Mahmudi *'ashīret* and its followers (*mutābi'ān*) met their death.

I.310.4-6. At present it is twelve years that Shīr Bêg [a Mahmudi] has been engaged with the *emārat* of Khōshāb and with the leadership of the *amīrs*, the *aḥshāmāt* and the *a'yān* of the Mahmudi. [The example, of course, indicates a different meaning for "aḥshāmāt": simply the population of the Mahmudi tribe other than its leading lights. The *emārat* of Khōshāb must mean the position of chief of the Mahmudi tribe, which in Ottoman times entailed the position of sanjak bey of Khōshāb. See sect.II.B.4 below. *A'yān*: sect.II.C.4.]

I.333.13-15. The *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt* of Alashgerd. See under previous section, 6. Ulūs.

I.370.10-12. The sultan [the Khwarizmshah] dispersed his tribes (*khayl*) and followers

(*hashm*), retired to Bitlis and gave himself up to amusements and pleasure.

I.391.2-6. [Muhammad Agha, a Ruzagi, is now in exile, along with most leading members of the tribe, after the Ak Koyunlu took over the administration of the Bitlis principality. He schemes for the return to power of the Ruzagi princes.] He ... sometimes carried out an approximate estimate of the assistants (*a'vān*) and helpers (*anṣār*) of the Ruzagi *'ashīret* ....

I.425.14-17. A tax on the *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt* of the vilayat of Bitlis. See in previous section, 6. Ulūs.

8. Ancestor traditions or myths

I.217.11. The rulers (*ḥukkam*) of Khīzān, Moks and Isbāīrd [a small principality to the south of L.Van, contiguous with those of Hizan and Moks] were brothers and came from the *nāḥiya* of Bilījān to that *vilāyat*. ["Nāḥiya" means a small geographical district with some kind of economic coherence (see below, sect.II.E.2); "vilāyat" in this case simply means the geographical region of a principality, not the principality as an administrative entity (see below, sect. II.B.2).] 11-12. According to the tradition of some writers, they were cousins. They have been sharing the region [i.e. that of Khīzān, Moks and Isbāīrd] since taking possession of it in the [time of] the Seljuk sultans. 13-14. Whatever assumption one makes, the first *amīr* of Moks who became famous is the *amīr* Abdāl. [I.e., the first *amīr* to whom an accurate historical memory attaches.]

I.300.Bottom. In the frank spirit and right-minded judgment of the declaimers of intimate truth, historians who have shown us the [true] paths, have demonstrated that the [line of] the Mahmudi princes goes back to the Marwanid sultans. According to one tradition, they are cousins of the rulers of Jazira. 301.1. A man called Shaykh Maḥmūd came, according to some versions, from Syria, and, according to other versions, from Jazira.

Foundation myth of the Ruzagi tribe and Bitlis dynasty.

I.358.8-360.5. The principality and tribe were founded in a single day, when 24 tribes assembled in a place called Ṭāb, in the district of Khōyt, [south of the plain of Muş]. They raised one of themselves to the position of ruler (*ḥākim*). Anybody who did not take part in the original assembly is not in origin a Ruzagi. The Ruzagi liberated Bitlis and Hazo from a Georgian prince called Tavit, though according to another version they took Bitlis from the Kōrdekī *'ashīret* and Hazo from the Georgian. When the elected ruler died, the Ruzagi were thrown into confusion. They decided to bring from Akhlāṭ two brothers called 'Izz al-Din and Zia al-Din, who were descended from the Akāsra [Sasanians, i.e. the Chosroes family]. One of the brothers, Zia al-Din, was appointed to Hazo, the other, 'Izz al-Din, to Bitlis.

I.361.1-365.2-4. Under the [Sasanian] Anushiravan, Jamasp, son of Firūz, was given the governorship of Armenia and Shirvān. Of his three sons, one succeeded to the governorship of Gilan; the second succeeded to the governorship of Shirvan; the third, Bahvāş, decided to fix his residence at Akhlāṭ. [The two brothers found by the Ruzagi as replacement rulers were descendants of Bahvāş.] Of these, Zia al-Din [then at Hazo] eventually supplanted 'Izz al-Din of Bitlis by a trick. 'Izz al-Din had become unpopular.

I.367.6-371.3. The Khwarizmshah, Jalal al-Din, fled from the Mongols towards Armenia. He took Akhlāṭ from the brother of the reigning Ruzagi prince. This ruler, with his Ayyubid allies, defeated Jalal al-Din on the plain of Mūsh. Because the Mongols were again approaching, Jalal al-Din had to make friends with the Bitlis prince, and married his daughter. He then took refuge in Bitlis. The Mongol army came up and demanded that he be handed over. Jalal al-Din, after being woken up with a bucket of cold water, agreed to leave Bitlis.

II. RULERS OF THE TRIBES AND THEIR DIVISIONS; INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE PRINCIPALITIES

A. HEREDITARY SUCCESSION TO THE POSITION OF RULER OF ONE OF THE PRINCIPALITIES

1. Instances of hereditary accession

Hereditary succession was the rule, from which there were very few departures. The next five instances are chosen from the pre-Ottoman period. The *Sherefname* is unspecific about the relative age of brothers; therefore in the information it gives about succession it gives no clue as to the existence of a rule of primogeniture. On *a priori* grounds, though, it is likely there was such a rule. At any rate division of principalities was very rare, as was deposition of a reigning prince or the election of a prince by the senior figures of the

tribe. On the terms "vilāyat" and "emārat", see below, sects.II.B.2 and 4.

I.95.1-3. Malik 'Izz al-Dīn Shīr bin Asad al-Dīn Zerīn-Chang ["of the Golden Hook"] [heading in text]. After the decease of his father, he occupied himself with the affairs of government and was the supervisor of the important business of the *emārat* .... [In short, he became prince of the Hakkari principality.]

I.217.13-15. Whatever assumption one makes, the first *amīr* of Moks who became famous is the *amīr* Abdāl. [I.e., whatever assumption one makes about the misty early history of the Moks principality, the first of its princes about whom we have any accurate information is Abdāl.] He had two sons, Aḥmad Bêg and Ḥasan Bêg. Aḥmad Bêg was girded with the necklace of the *emārat* after his father.

I.328.Last-329.3. The first individual among them who *amārat namūde* [governed the [Pāzūkī] tribe] and who was famous for it in the world at large [see my remark on previous passage] is Ḥusayn 'Alī Bêg. He had two sons, Shehsuvār Bêg and Shukr Bêg. Shehsuvār Bêg, son of Ḥusayn 'Alī Bêg [heading in text]. After the Āq Qōyunlū dynasty, he chose the retinue of the *amīr* Sharaf, ruler of Bitlis.

I.373.18-374.1. ... after the death of Hājī Sharaf, his rightful successor, the *amīr* Shams al-Din, known as Velī, became the superintendent (*mutaṣaddī*) of the affairs of state and responsible (*mutakaffil*) for the business of the *emārat*.

I.381.12-13. ... after the death of the great *amīr* [Shams al-Din], his rightful successor, the *amīr* Sharaf, became the *vālī* of the *vilāyat* and the superintendent of affairs, and the bridle of the government (*ḥukūmat*) [i.e. became prince of Bitlis].

I.387.4-7. The *amīr* Sharaf took leave of the ephemeral world and went to his appointed death, in the flower of youth and in the prime of life. The *amīr* Ibrahim became the covenanted *valī* after the death of his father. He reigned for a while. When he walked into the eternal world, his proper successor the *amīr* Haji Muhammad carried out his father's function. 9-10. After him [Haji Muhammad] there remained two blessed sons, called Ibrahim and Amīr Shams al-Din, as souvenirs on the page of the world.

Cases of division of a principality:

I.95.10-11. [Zahid Beg, prince of Hakkari,] left two sons, Malik Beg and Sayyid Muhammad Beg ... . At the end of his life he divided his *mamlakat* [principality; below, sect.II.B.5] between his sons ... .

I.400.1-406.14. [After the death of Shah Muhammad of Bitlis in 1497/8], his only son was Ibrahim, a minor. But Ibrahim assumed the position of prince. Real control over the affairs of government, however, passed into the capable hands of 'Abd al-Raḥman Āghā Qavālīsī and the *āghās* of that *'ashīret*. With the approval of the Ruzagi *a'yān*, he [probably 'Abd al-Raḥman is meant] made Sharaf al- Din, Ibrahim's cousin, his *na'ib* in the *nāḥiya* [district] of Mūsh. However the Bilbāsī *'ashīret* took the side of Sharaf al-Din, who now started a bid for the position of prince. After a combat, Ibrahim and 'Abd al-Raḥman brought in an arbitrator, who divided the principality into two: Bitlis and Ahlat went to Sharaf al-Din, and Mūsh and Khanus to Ibrahim. However Ibrahim was seized at a feast in Bitlis, and was kept for seven years in prison. He then escaped and made an attempt to kidnap Sharaf al-Din's two-year old son.

I.406.18-407.3. For a further two years Ibrahim and Sharaf struggled. Ibrahim then gave up and retired to Siirt. He left a young son, whom Sharaf imprisoned, despite the fact that he had joined Sharaf's service.

[A'yān; sect. II.C.4. Nāḥiya: sect.II.E.2.]

An instance of deposition of a ruler and election by the tribe:

I.331.12-15. When Uvays Beg's mother divested her own son of the *emārat* over the Pāzūkī, the tribe met and made over the *emārat*, with the *ulkā* [district] of Alashgerd, to Yādīgār Bêg, conformably with the royal [Safavid] diploma. [Emārat: sect.II.B.4. Ulka: sect.II.E.3.]

2. The word "dynasty" (khānevāde, dudmān)

I.391.2-6. .... the great number of the assistants (*a'vān*) and helpers (*anṣār*) of the Ruzagi *'ashīret* and ... the greatness and antiquity of their dynasty (*khānevāde*) in the region of Kurdistan among the totality of the noble dynasties (*avjāqāt*)and noble families (*dudmān*) of the princely rulers. [For other aspects, see above, sect.I.8.]

I.392.7-9. [The Ak Koyunlu have expelled most of the Kurdish princes from Kurdistan. Muhammad Agha, a Ruzagi, has brought the two sons of the former prince of Bitlis into the Hakkari region with a view to re-establishing a Ruzagi as ruler of Bitlis.] He turned his steps to the *vilāyat* [geographical region] of Bitlis, where he gave the news [that the two sons of the former ruler were in the region of Hakkari] to those who were well-disposed towards ..., and were partisans of, the *khānevāde* of Zia al-Din [i.e. of the

legendary prince who was the first Ruzagi to hold both Bitlis and Hazo].

I.415.Bottom. [One attempt to win the principality of Bitlis back from the Kızılbaş, and to instal the *amīr* Sharaf as its ruler, has failed. Muhammad Agha is beginning another attempt.] Muhammad Agha, a well-wisher of the *khānedān*, and well-disposed towards the prosperity of the khans of the ancient *dudmān* of Zia al-Din, intimated [to Sharaf] the advice that he show loyalty and affection towards the blessed threshold of the Ottoman Porte.

3. The term "maurūṣī", "hereditary", applied to the principalities and to land owned by the princes

On the words for "principality" (*vilāyat, ḥukūmat, eyālat*) see below, sect.II.B.

I.97.6-7. [Sayyid Muhammad has defeated his nephew, Zaynal Beg, who rebelled against his father and for a time ruled the Hakkari principality.] He brought the *vilāyat-i maurūṣī* (hereditary *vilāyat*) under his rule en bloc.

I.216.2nd to last-217.1. [Mir Hasan of Hizan has treacherously killed his uncle Yusuf.] Because of the smell of the suspicion of being guilty of this crime, he was severely punished, and had to consent to innumerable exactions; so much so that he sold a number of desirable holdings (*qat'a*) from among the villages of the *vilāyat* of Khīzān and the greater part of his own hereditary land and *emlāk*. [Land would, presumably, be the major part of his *emlāk* in any case.]

I.399.12-13. [The principality of Bitlis has been recaptured from the Ak Koyunlu.] They set the *amīr* Shah Muhammad on the throne of the hereditary principality (*bar sarīr-i ḥukūmat-i maurūsī*), after the manner of his great and noble ancestors and forebears.

I.403.17-18. [A proposal is being put forward by an arbitrator for the partition of the principality of Bitlis between two rival claimants.] "Let them show diligence and enthusiasm in the sharing of the governance (*ḥukūmat*) of the hereditary *vilāyat*."

B. TERMS FOR THE TRIBAL PRINCIPALITIES

1. Ḥukūmat

(a) In the sense of a principality. The word is almost exclusively used to denote one of the tribal principalities, rather than a subdivision of one such or one of the outside powers.

I.93.8-10. [Some Assyrians, on business in Egypt, see Asad al-Dīn, a member of the ruling family, who has taken service with the Mamluks after the Ak Koyunlu occupation of the Hakkari principality.] When they observed the behaviour and deportment of Asad al-Dīn ... they decided among themselves that this person possessed the qualities for governing the Hakkari *ḥukūmat*.

I.102.13-14. Zaynal Beg, of his own volition, made over the Hakkari *ḥukūmat* to his other son Sayyidi Khan. [The example is perhaps not clear, but is not ambivalent either.]

I.301.8-9. The *nāḥiya* [district] of Albāq was liberated from the Hakkari princes, and

became an addition to the *ḥukūmat* of Mir Husayn [the reigning Mahmudi].

(b) In the sense of the process or activity of government.

I.93.10-11. [The Assyrians of Hakkari who have spotted Asad al-Dīn, the self-exiled Hakkari prince, in Egypt, judged him capable of ruling the Hakkari *ḥukūmat* (*principality*: see above, (a)). They said:] the proper thing to do is to beguile him, take him [from Egypt] and lead him to the *vilāyat* [i.e. principality] of Hakkari, so that we can entrust him with its *ḥukūmat*.

I.310.17-18. For a long time the *ḥukūmat* and *dārāyī* [possession] of the castle of Bāy was recognised as being in the care of the Dunbeli *ṭāyfa*.

I.382.4-7. After the *amīr* Sharaf walked off to the gardens of Paradise and left a boy of tender years called Shams al-Din, who was not yet fit for *ḥukūmat* and *dārāyī* [sovereignty], the rein of the political and financial affairs of the *vilāyat* [principality] of Bitlis came into the competent hands of Mīr Sayyidī Aḥmad and Shāhum Khātūn.

I.400.11-13. The *amīr* Ibrahim, still a minor, began to occupy himself with the affairs of *ḥukūmat* and became responsible for the important business of the *vilāyat* [principality].

(c) In the sense of the reign of a particular prince.

I.102.16-18. When the period of the *ḥukūmat* of [Zakarya Beg, a Hakkari prince] had extended two years, ...

I.434.10-11. The days of the *ḥukūmat* of [Sharaf al-Din, prince of Bitlis], were more than

30 years.

2. Vilāyat

(a) In the sense of "principality", where the emphasis is on the ruler's power and relations with other states.

I.96.8. Zaynal Beg became the *vālī* of the *vilāyat* of Hakkari, on terms of absolute independence, after his uncle Sayyid Muhammad.

I.367.8-9. In the first stages [of the story of the Ruzagi princes], Malik Ashraf, who stepped on the throne of the *ḥukūmat* [government] of the *vilāyat* [principality] of Bitlis, was a governor [appointed by] the sultan of Egypt and Syria.

I.381.12-13. After the death of the great *amīr*, the latter's rightful successor, the *amīr* Sharaf, became the *vālī* of the *vilāyat* and the controller of affairs, and the bridle of the *ḥukūmat* [process of government].

I.417.17-18. [After the defeat of the Kızılbaş, who had occupied Kurdistan], each of the Kurdish *amīr*s took the [return] road so as to subjugate his own *vilāyat*.

(b) In the sense of a geographical area, generally that defined by one of the principalities. The emphasis is on the notion of a certain tract of land with defined borders. However there are cases where the tract of land in question is not defined by any political entity at all.

I.91.15-18. ... he [Shah Rukh, son of Timur] granted them leave to return, so they

returned to their own *vilāyat*.

I.301.1. A person called Shaykh Mahmud, [a mythical founder of the Mahmudi dynasty], came, according to some versions of the story, from the *vilāyat* of Shām [i.e. the region of Syria].

I.310.14. According to the authentic tradition, the Dunbeli tribes (*'ashāīr*) came from the *vilāyat* of the Bukhti [i.e. the area covered by the three -- not one -- principalities of the Bukhti, to the south-west of the L.Van region].

I.351.11. The apple of Akhlāṭ is famous in the *vilāyat* of Arman [Armenia] and Azarbayjān.

I.392.7-9. He himself turned his steps to the *vilāyat* of Bitlis.

3. Eyālat

This generally means a principality, as in the first meaning of *ḥukūmat* or *vilāyat*. It is not generally used in the Ottoman sense of "province": except Bitlis (and then late in the 16th century A.D.) none of the Kurdish principalities became an Ottoman *eyālet*, because the Ottoman *eyālet*s were larger. In discussions of the Safavid occupation of the area the word can mean a minor principality or governorship smaller than one of the tribal principalities: see I.311.6-7.

I.95.7-8. Shāh Isma'īl Safevī granted [Zāhid Bêg, a Hakkari prince], a diploma (*manshūr*) for his hereditary *eyālat*.

I.216.13. [Yusuf, uncle of the reigning prince, Hasan], again demanded the *eyālat* of Khīzān.

I.311.6-7. [Shah Tahmasp] joined the *ulkā* [district; see III.E.3 below] with [the district of] Sukmānābād, and bestowed them on [the Dunbeli] Haji Beg as an *eyālat*.

I.438.10-11. They transferred the direction of the affairs of the *eyālat* [of Bitlis] into the capable grip of Ḥājī Sharaf bin Muḥammad Āghā Kelhūkī.

4. Emārat

The general meaning of "emārat" outside the *Sherefname* is the function or possession of an *amīr*. But the incidence of the word in the *Sherefname* diverges from this in a highly interesting manner. The great majority of instances occur in the narration of the affairs of three minor dynasties, the Mahmudi, Dunbeli and Pāzūkī; the latter are responsible for about half of all instances. The Dunbeli and Pāzūkī were tribes which until the Safavid period had no territory which they could call their own: they grazed on land to the north and east of L.Van which seems either to have been directly administered by outside powers such as the Kara and Ak Koyunlu, or to have had no administration at all. In short, they had no *ḥukūmat*, *vilāyat* or *eyālat*.

In the *Sherefname* the word means either the leadership of the whole tribe or, in the Safavid period, the government of a particular district or combination of districts on behalf of the Safavid monarch. The leadership of the tribe, in the case of the Dunbeli and Pāzūkī, seems to carry no particular rights of government or taxation over land, whereas leadership of the Ruzagi tribe (for example) would carry such rights over land, the land

of the *vilāyat*. The leader of the Dunbeli or Pāzūkī did, as a matter of fact, hold rights over a particular piece or pieces of land, but he did not hold this land by virtue of his *emārat*, and it had to be assigned to him.

Mahmudi

I.301.5-6. [Kara Yusuf, the Kara Koyunlu], made the *nāḥiya* of Ashōt and the *nāḥiya* of Khōshāb an *emārat* for [Shaykh Mahmud, legendary founder of the Mahmudi dynasty and tribe], and made [created] the *ṭāyfa* surnamed the Mahmudi.

I.304.9-10. Khan Muhammad resigned the *emārat* over the Mahmudi to Hasan, with willingness and grace.

Dunbeli

I.314.6-7. In the *fatarāt* of sultan Bāyezīt, the *nāḥiya* of Abaghā [now the Çaldıran plain] was bestowed on [Haji Beg] as an *emārat*.

I.315.6-8. When the death of Haji Beg became known, the sultan Muhammad Shah entrusted the *emārat* over the Dunbeli to Sultan 'Ali Beg, and added the *nāḥiya* of Sulaymān Sarāy and half of that of Abaghā [see previous passage] to one another, and bestowed them on him.

Pāzūkī

I.330.5-6. Shah Tahmasp bestowed on [the Pāzūkī, Uvays Bêg] the emārat over Adiljevāz

[which had been directly administered by the Kara Koyunlu].

I.330.End. Shah Tahmasp entrusted [Qilīj Bêg] with the *ulkā* of Zakam, one of the dependencies of Ganja of Arrān, and with the *emārat* of the Pāzūkī.

I.331.12-15. Uvays Bêg's mother divested her son of the *emārat* over the Pāzūkī. The *jamā'at* of the Pāzūkī then met and made over the *emārat*, with the *ulkā* of Alashgerd, to Yādigār Bêg, conformably to the imperial [Safavid] diploma.

I.333.6-8. When Niyāz Bêg, through his own fault, was deprived [of the *emārat*], the emārat over the Pāzūkī and the *ulkā* of Alashgerd were bestowed on him.

I.333.13-15. [On the difficult terms *ulūsāt, aḥshāmāt, firqa* and *ṭāyfa* used in this passage, see sects. I.1,3,6 and 7 above.] There was disunity among the *ulūsāt* and *aḥshāmāt* of Alashgerd, and the *emārat* of the Pāzūkī, by the sensible deliberations of Amīr Khan, was divided into two [presumably there were two irreconcilable factions]. 334.9-12. A division (*firqa*) of the Pāzūkī [presumably one of the two factions, now with its own *emārat*], together with the amīrs of the Dunbeli, came to submit to the imperial [Ottoman] threshold. The *emārat* of that *ṭāyfa* [no doubt the *firqa* in question], with the *nāḥiya* of Alashgerd, was assigned by the *serdār* Ferhad Pāshā to a certain Ibrāhīm Oqchī Oghlī. [There is an unfortunate textual problem in the last sentence of this passage, which makes it uncertain whether "one of the *nāḥiyas*" or "the *nāḥiya*" of Alashgerd is meant. The latter is much more likely.]

Bitlis

I.359.4-5. [After the foundation of the Ruzagi tribe, the tribe elected a leader, then captured Bitlis and Hazo.] The man who was entrusted with the affairs of government (*amr-i ḥukūmat*) and was liable for the business of the *emārat* (*mahamm-i emārat*) governed for a period, then died without progeny. [That the word "emārat" is used soon after the formation of the tribe and its acquisition of permanent territory suggests that *emārat* here denotes leadership of the tribe as distinct from any other form of power.]

I.373.18-374.1. After the death of Haji Sharaf, the *amīr* Shams al- Din, his rightful successor, ... became the superintendent of the affairs of state (*mutaṣaddī-yi umūr-i ḥukūmat*) and responsible (*mutakaffil*) for the business of the *emārat*. [The example seems to contrast *emārat* with *ḥukūmat*, and the meaning of "leadership of the tribe" for "emārat" would be a natural one.]

5. Mamlakat

I.95.10-11. [Zahid Beg, a Hakkari ruler,] left two sons, Malik Beg and Sayyid Muhammad Beg. At the end of his life he divided his *mamlakat* between his sons, and departed to the house of eternity. ["Mamlakat" therefore seems in this case to mean "principality", like "vilāyat" and "ḥukūmat" in their first senses.]

I.360.3. [The Ruzagi *'ashīret* has fetched the two Persian princes from Ahlat, so as to make them their own rulers, one at Bitlis and one at Hazo.] They [the Ruzagi] placed their

heads in the halter of obedience to them. They put into their capable hands the regulation of their vital affairs ... . They placed the reins of decision in the *mamlakat* in [their] power. [Here again "mamlakat" seems to mean "principality".]

D. WORDS FOR RULERS AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING PERSONS WITHIN THE PRINCIPALITIES

1. Ḥākim ("ruler")

In the *Sherefname* the term is almost exclusively used to denote the princes of Hakkari and Bitlis, the two most powerful principalities in the Van region. Outside the Van region the word is also applied to the prince of the Hisn Kayfa principality, which was the equal in prestige and political weight of that of Bitlis, and to the prince of Amadiya. The word "ḥākim" therefore indicates a certain status among the princes of the tribal principalities, or at the very least betrays a certain attitude on the part of the author of the *Sherefname*. Note that the term "ḥākim" is not simply the term for the human being who carries out *ḥukūmat* (government).[a]

For the equivalent rulers in other principalities the term "amīr" is used. The term also encompasses, as it happens, the *ḥākim*s of the two major principalities (see, in particular, I.410.8-11 in sect. II.D.2 below). In other words, among the amīrs those two are hākims. The application of the term "amīr" in the *Sherefname*, however, is not confined to the princes of the tribal principalities, but extends also to the highest-ranking persons within a principality.

[a] It should be noted that the Sherefname's use of this term is not standard within contemporary Persian and Ottoman usage.

There are two cases where rulers of a status not only lower than that of the rulers of the two major principalities, but also lower than that of *amīr*, are described as *ḥākim*. One is the *ḥākim* of Vostan, who was a member of the Hakkari dynasty (I.95.5-6). The other is the *ḥākim* of Aghtamar (I.436.8-10). This *ḥākim* was in fact also a member of the Hakkari dynasty, who was responsible for the district of Gavāsh as well as for Aghtamar (see I.95.14-17, quoted below). At the period in which these two *ḥākim*s are mentioned, Vostan and Aghtamar were under Safavid sovereignty. The word "ḥākim" in these two cases seems to imply a minor member of the dynasty whose power over his estate within the principality is seen by the Safavid administration as a governorship.

Examples of both "amīr" and "hākim" used in the same sentence:

I.410.8-11. On the second occasion when Shah Ismail wintered in Khoy, the *amīr* Sharaf, together with the *umarā' va ḥukkām* of Kurdistan (in particular Malik Khalil, *ḥākim* of Hisn Kayfa; Shah 'Ali Beg Bukhti, *vālī* of Jazira; Mir Davud of Khīzān; 'Ali Beg of Sasun; and eleven other *umarā*) came to the Exalted Portal at Khoy, [where] the Shah was kissed.

I.416.11-14. [Idrīs Bidlīsī puts a request to the Ottoman sultan from the *amīr*s of Kurdistan, as follows.] The amīrs [the text does not say *ḥākim*s as well as *amīr*s at this point] of Kurdistan pray to the shah of the world ... that he will return to them their hereditary domains (*vilāyat-i maurūṣī*: the term seems to refer to the whole of Kurdistan) and establish one individual among them as *buzūrg* (chief) and *bêglerbêgī*, so that they can drive Qarākhān [a Kızılbaş, now Safavid *vālī* of the Diyar Bakr] out of the Diyar Bakr. 15-18. [The Ottoman sultan replied,] Whichever of the *umarā* and *ḥukkām* of

Kurdistan they consider fit to be *amīr al-umarā*, let him be established [as *amīr al-umarā*] among them, so that the other Kurdish *amīrs* can submit to him ... and briskly drive out the Kızılbaş.

"Ḥākim" by itself:

I.92.16. [The Aq Qoyunlu generals Ṣūfī Khalīl and 'Arabshāh Bêg were charged with conquering the Hakkari principality. Ṣūfī Khalīl waited for an opportunity to attack.] The day of opportunity showed itself, and he mounted an expedition against the *ḥākim* of Hakkari.

17-18. 'Izz al-Din Shir, who at that time was its *ḥākim*, ... said, "Today is Wednesday. It is not the day for combat ... ."

I.96.5-6. [Zaynal Beg has captured his father Malik Beg, and intends to blind him. By the efforts of Husayn Beg, another of Malik Beg's sons, Malik Beg escapes.] He took refuge with his brother Sayyid Muhammad Beg, who was *ḥākim* of Vostan. [See introduction to this section for an explanation of the role of this *ḥākim*, and the comment on I.436.8 ff. for the problem of the apparent overlap between the jurisdiction of this *ḥākim* and that of Aghtamar.]

I.96.7. Zaynal Beg [see previous quotation] took refuge with Sultan Husayn Beg, *ḥākim* of Amadiya.

I.100.5-6. Ya'qub Beg, son of Sayyid Muhammad [see previous example but one], was informed that the [Ottoman army was coming to capture him, since the Ottoman sultan now wants Zaynal to be prince of the Hakkari]. He [Ya'qub] threw himself among the

Pinyānishī *'ashiret* [sect. I.2 above], so that they should make him the *ḥākim* of Hakkari ...

I.362.14. The line (*nasab*) of the *ḥukkām* of Bitlis goes back to [Bahvās: see sect.I.8] ...

I.376.4. [Kara Yusuf the Kara Koyunlu went from the Diyar Bakr to Bitlis to seek asylum. At that time] Malik Shams al-Din was *ḥākim* of Bitlis.

I.387.4-6. When the Turcoman soldiers encamped outside the citadel [of Bitlis], the *amīr* Ibrahim, son of Haji Muhammad, who at that period was the *ḥākim*, strengthened the castles and forts [of the principality of Bitlis] and chose to retire.

I.436.8-10. In [9]39 they organised boats and coracles, with the intention of capturing the *qal'a* of Akhtamār. ... 11-12. They captured the *qal'a* ..., and the *ḥākim* of the *qal'a*, Rustam Beg son of Malik Khalil Hakkari, was killed in the struggle by musket fire. Cf. I.95.14-17. Rustam Beg, son of Malik Beg, had the responsibility for the protection and guarding of the *nāḥiya* of Gavāsh and the *qal'a* of Akhtamār.

[See the introductory remarks to this section for a preliminary explanation of the role of this *ḥākim*.]

2.Amīr

The compass of this word's use is outlined in the introductory remarks to the previous section.

The word "amīrzāde" happens to be used in the *Sherefname* to denote members of the ruling dynasty who are sons of the ruler, or deposed ruler, and therefore either the heir

or in line for the succession.

I.381.12-13. After the death of the great *amīr* [Shams al-Din of Bitlis], his rightful successor, the *amīr* Sharaf, became the *vālī* of the *vilāyat* ...

I.391.9-13. [The Ak Koyunlu have dispossessed the Bitlis dynasty of its principality, and murdered the deposed prince, the *amīr* Ibrahim, in Qum. Ibrahim's wife and sons are living in Qum, and Muḥammad Āghā Kelhūkī goes to visit them there in order to persuade the mother to let her sons come back to Kurdistan and start a revolt against the Ak Koyunlu. His argument is:] If one of the *amīrzādegān* were to be visited by the desire to go to Kurdistan, many helpers and assistants from the Kurdish tribes and peoples (*'ashāīr va qabāīl* -- entirely unspecific as to type of group) would assemble at his mere arrival. [The conquest] of the castles of the *vilāyat* [of Bitlis] would be smooth and easy ...

I.394.2-3. [The two *amīrzādegān* of the previous quotation are then killed in a battle between 'Izz al-Din of Hakkari and his rebellious Assyrian subjects (see above, sect.I.1, under I.394.2-3). Muḥammad Āghā Kelhūkī is utterly dismayed.] One of his friends brought to his ear the news that the *amīr* Shams al-Din, brother of the *amīr* Ibrahim, was in the *nāḥiya* [district] of Arūkh. [I.e. the brother of the deposed prince is also an *amīr*.]

I.400.16-19. [The young Ibrahim, prince of Bitlis, a grandson of the Ibrahim of the previous item, had made his cousin Sharaf al-Din his *na'ib* (governor) in the *nāḥiya* of Mūsh.] A short time later, *Shaykh Amīr* Bilbāsī and his *'ashīret*, against the will of 'Abd al-Raḥman Āghā and the Qavālīsī *jamā'at*, made haste to enter the service of the *amīr* Sharaf. [The groups denoted respectively by the words "'ashīret" and "jamā'at" are the

two halves of the Ruzagi tribe: see under sect.I.2, I.358.8-13 and I.361.13-19.]

["Shaykh Amīr" could be simply a name with no pointer to position. But it is more likely that it precisely does identify a position: the Persian could even be translated "*the* Shaykh Amīr of the Bilbāsī". There are no clues elsewhere in the *Sherefname* as to what the position of *shaykh amīr* amounts to. Perhaps it is a title given to a particular individual who happens to be both a *shaykh* and an *amīr*. In this case he is also the head of one of the halves of the Ruzagi tribe.]

I.410.8-11. The *umarā* and *ḥukkām* of Kurdistan go to kiss Shah Ismail at Khoy: see previous section.

I.416.11-12, 15-18. Electing one of the *umarā* and *ḥukkām* of Kurdistan to be *amīr al-umarā*. See previous section.

I.417.17-418.1. [In the battle of Koçhisar (1516) the Safavid forces were beaten and had to retire from the Diyar Bakr. Kurdish troops took part in the battle on the Ottoman side.] Afterwards, each of the Kurdish *amīr*s returned to subjugate his own *vilāyat*. The *amīr* Sharaf went back to Bitlis, which they [Sharaf's men] started to besiege. Muhammad Beg of Hazo, *Mīr* Davūd of Khīzān, *Mīr* Shāh Muḥammad Shīrevī and the *amīr*s of Moks and Isbāīrd helped him. [*Mīr* seems a title more or less equivalent to *amīr*.]

Denoting a category wider than members of the ruling family:

I.310.4-6. At present it is 12 years that Shir Beg has ... held the *emārat* of Khōshāb and the leadership of the *amīr*s, the *aḥshāmāt* (followers) and the *a'yān* (prominent men) of the Mahmudi. [The example does not prove, but suggests, that there is a group of men

called *amīr*s, wider than the prince's family. Otherwise why talk of leadership of the *amīr*s ? On *aḥshāmāt*, see sect. I.7, but the present instance is not helpful in elucidating the word's meaning, nor are the examples given in I.7 any help with understanding this one. On *a'yān*, sect.II.C.4.]

I.310.11. To begin with the *umarā* and *'ashāīr* of the Dunbeli practised the principles of the Yezidis.

I.334.9-10. A division of them [the Pāzūkī], with the *amīr*s of the Dunbeli, came to submit to the imperial [Ottoman] threshold. [At this stage the Pāzūkī and Dunbeli are within the Safavid empire.]

3. Āghā (sometimes spelt "āqā")

The term certainly denotes a person of lesser rank and importance than "amīr". From the information we are given (especially I.434.3-4) there were a large number of them in any one of the tribal principalities. The term perhaps means any member of the tribe (e.g. Ruzagi, Mahmudi) who received revenue from land, and implies that before old age the *āghā* was capable of bearing arms on behalf of the tribe. In the Ruzagi tribe, the *āghās* seem to include the chiefs of the 24 *sha'b* or constituent tribes.

I.359.18-19. [The Ruzagi have decided to bring 'Izz al-Din and Zia al-Din, the two princes of Sasanian descent, from Ahlat. One of these is to be the prince of the Ruzagi.] Several of the *āghās* of the *'ashīret* went to the city of Akhlāṭ, took away the princes ... and brought them to Bitlis.

I.382.8-11. [Sharaf, prince of Bitlis, has just died, and left only a son of tender years, Shams al-Din. The affairs of the principality fell into the capable hands of Mīr Sayyidī Aḥmad and his wife Shahum Khātūn.] As a consequence the Ruzagi *āqās* began to be be unruly and rebel. Each one possessed himself of a *nāḥiya* of [the territory] of Bitlis, according to his whim. For example, Mīr Muḥammad Nāṣr al-Dīnī seized Akhlāṭ; 'Abd al-Raḥman *Āghā* Qavālīsī seized the *nāḥiya*s of Chuqūr and Mūsh. Anarchy erupted among the Ruzagi tribes (*tavāīf*; sect.I.1, Ṭāyfa).

I.390.End. [The principality of Bitlis has been seized by the Ak Koyunlu, and many of the prominent members of the Ruzagi have gone into exile or hiding.] Żīā' al-Dīn Muhammad *Āghā* Kelhūkī, who had been the pillar of the Ruzagi, was forced into the service of the Ak Koyunlu. [Kelhūkī are not one of the 24 Ruzagi *sha'b*, according to I.36.16-19.]

I.400.13-14. [When Ibrahim, still in his minority, succeeded to his father Shah Muhammad,] real control over the vital affairs [of the principality of Bitlis] fell into the capable hands of 'Abd al-Raḥman Āghā Qavālīsī and the *āqās* of that *'ashīret*. [What the text means in this instance by the "Qavālīsī *'ashīret*" is one of the two divisions of the Ruzagi principality. However "Qavālīsī" was also the name of one of the 24 *sha'b* or small tribes of which the Ruzagi were made up: see sect.I.2, I.358.8-13 and I.362.13-19.]

4. A'yān

When it pertains to Ottoman history the term is generally translated "notables". In the *Sherefname* it seems to indicate a wide category of prominent men within one of the tribal

principalities. Probably the author of the *Sherefname* has no precise definition of "a'yān" in mind. The compass of the term may in practice be the *amīr*s and *āghās*, which does not, of course, prevent the *Sherefname* from referring to "*amīr*s and *a'yān*" (see I.310.4-6; 426.9-13).

I.310.4-6. At present [i.e. at the time of writing] it is 12 years that [Shir Beg] has had precedence in holding the *emārat* of Khōshāb and the leadership of the *amīr*s, the followers (*aḥshāmāt*) and the *a'yān* of the Mahmudi. [On *aḥshāmāt*, sect.I.7. Here the term may have a different significance from what was suggested in sect.I.7, but the general meaning of "aḥshāmāt" still indicates people beneath the *a'yān* in the social scale.]

I.373.16-18. In the *fatarat* [lapses of loyalty toward the Ottoman empire] in which Sharaf Khan died and Shams al-Din Khan, his son, made off to the region of the 'Ajam [Iran] with the *a'yān* of the Ruzagi, Timur's [*yarlīgh*, granted to the Bitlis prince] was lost ....

I.402.12-15. [The struggle between Sharaf and Ibrahim for the Bitlis principality was in progress. Chōlāq Khaled of the Pāzūkī tribe -- of whose nature there is a discussion in sect.II.B.4, Emārat -- was in Ibrahim's camp, whereas his father Suvār Bêg is in Sharaf's, and in fact is Sharaf's *lālā* -- see sect.II.D.3 below. Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī is, of course, Sharaf's leading supporter.] One day Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī and Suvār Bêg sent to [Chōlāq Khaled] the message, "We are both supporters of the *amīr* Sharaf, and equally most of the Ruzagi *a'yān* are inclined towards ... Sharaf. What advantage is there for you in being with the *amīr* Ibrahim...?"

I.421.11-13. [Ulama has apparently defected from Shah Tahmasp, but is suspected by Sharaf, prince of Bitlis, who is at present an Ottoman vassal, of duplicity. The Ottoman

sultan has commanded that Ulama be brought to Constantinople; Sharaf is now bringing him under guard from Van to Bitlis. Ulama tells Sharaf (via his *vekīl* -- second-in-command ?) that he objects to being taken to the imperial court in this fashion: either he must be allowed to return to Van, or he wishes to have his own head and those of several of his companions cut off. Sharaf answers:] "We will consult the *amīr*s and *a'yān* [of our principality], and send our decision to the sultan's court."

D. THE PRINCES' RESPONSIBILITIES; RELATIONSHIPS AND INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE PRINCIPALITIES

1. The princes' responsibilities

The *Sherefname* is disappointing on the subject. It merely gives lists of words which amount to "protection and government".

I.93.4-5. [The Ak Koyunlu generals] delivered the responsibility for the protection, guardianship, internal security and safety (*ḥafiz va ḥirāsat va żabṭ va ṣiyānat*) of the [Hakkari] *vilāyat* into the hands of the Dunbeli *'ashīret*.

I.104.3-4. On the order from Ja'far Pāshā, [Ott. "Ca'fer Paşa"] [*beylerbeyi* of Van,] Zahid Beg took on the responsibility for the *ḥafiz, ḥirāsat, żabṭ* and *ṣiyānat* of the [Hakkari] principality.

I.333.8-9. [Niyāz Bêg] lived for several years in Alashgerd, and performed the *emārat* [sect.II.B.4], *żabṭ* and *ṣiyānat* of the Pāzūkī.

I.418.8-10. For a long space of time, the protection, guardianship, internal security and the integrity of borders and boundaries [of the Bitlis principality] (*ḥafiz, ḥirāsat, żabṭ, ṣiyānat-i sinūr va serhad*) were in the care ... of the *amīr* Sharaf [as responsibilities given him by] the *dīvān* of the *ṣulṭān* and, after him, under ṣulṭān Sulayman Khan.

I.430.2-3. [Ferman of Shah Tahmasp to Sharaf.] The duty of the aforementioned [prince] will be to behave in such a manner towards the *re'āyā* amd *mutalvaṭṭīn* [inhabitants] that oppression by the strong is never visited on the weak ...

2. Relationships between princes and amīrs, aghas and other members of the tribe

(a) Subordination to the prince; the notion of service

I.100.8-9. [The example is a case of the duty of service owed by a subject to his prince -- that of Hakkari -- being overridden by friendship between this subject and the prince of the neighbouring Mahmudi principality. The background is as follows. Ya'qub Beg, son of Sayyid Muhammad, has raced to the Hakkari principality so as to take possession of it in the interregnum between his father Sayyid Muhammad and his cousin Zaynal Beg: Zaynal Beg has gone to the Ottoman sultan Süleyman and persuaded him to depose Sayyid Muhammad and instate him (Zaynal) as prince. Ya'qub, Sayyid Muhammad's son, throws himself among the Pinyānīshī *'ashīret* (sect. I.2) in the hope that with the assistance of Shāhqulī Balīlān the Pinyānīshī will put him on the throne of the principality. However Shāhqulī Beg had longstanding ties of friendship with Hasan Beg Mahmudi, who has been

sent to capture Ya'qub Beg: and the two resolve to exterminate the family of Sayyid Muhammad.]

Shāhqulī put the duties of long-standing service (*khidmetkārī- yi sābiq*) in the arch of forgetfulness. [Sayyid Muhammad and Ya'qub were then put to death, and Zaynal was made prince of Hakkari.]

I.398.4-6. [Shah Muhammad has come back to the town of Bitlis to recapture his principality from the Ak Koyunlu: the previous prince was deposed by them. A plan to capture the citadel of Bitlis by means of rope-ladders has been made. Now the question of where to find such rope-ladders arises.] By chance, Abū Bakr Bāyegī ... hastened to enter the service of Shah Muhammad. He said, "The occupation of your servant, while Bitlis has been in the power of the Turcomans, has been to make rope-ladders, [in the hope] that the heir to the king (*vāriṣ-i malik*) might appear, and that I might acknowledge his authority (*khidmet be-jā-yi āvarde bāsham*) 7-8. I have put [the rope-ladders] in jars ..." 9-12. In the twinkling of an eye Abū Bakr Āghā made the rope-ladders available. His affection, his loyalty, his strength and his good service (nekō khidmetī) pleased the heart of the *amīr* Shah Muhammad. As recompense for this service he bestowed on him Khnzōrgīn, one of the dependencies of Tatvan, and the village of Īksur, as *mulkiyat*. ["Khnzōrgīn" is a highly plausible textual emendation; Īksur, if the name is right, has not been identified.]

I.402.10-11 etc. [The struggle for the Bitlis principality between Sharaf and Ibrahim is in progress. Suvār Bêg Pāzūkī is on Sharaf's side.] 10-11. Chōlāq Khaled, son of Suvār Bêg Pāzūkī, opposed his father, and was in the service of [Ibrahim]. [Shaykh Amīr Bilbāsī

and Suvār Bêg then ask Chōlāq Khaled what advantage there is in his attachment to Ibrahim. 15-16. "Your duty to your father requires that you abandon the service (*mulāzimāt*) of the *amīr* Ibrahim and enter obedience and submission to the *amīr* Sharaf." 17-18. Khaled accepted the argument. 403.5-6. During the [ensuing] battle, Khaled, in conformity with his decision and promise, deserted the *amīr* Ibrahim, and joined the forces of the *amīr* Sharaf.

[On the Pāzūkī, who as a tribe do not form part of the Bitlis principality, see above, sect.II.B.4, Emārat.]

It does not seem to be true that the tribes (Ruzagi, Pāzūkī etc.) had the right to elect their princes, even when the reigning prince was unsatisfactory, but they certainly intervened in the choice of prince, and the story of the election of the first Ruzagi prince (see below) suggests that at the very least the question of the legitimacy of a prince's title was held to depend on more than hereditary rights. Apart from the choice of ruler, the *āghās* of the tribe were evidently consulted on issues of policy or immediate action, and from I.432.4-7 below it seems that they could block the prince's proposed course of action. Whether they could themselves make proposals and get them accepted is another question.

I.104.4-7. Since the inclination of the majority of the tribe [a loose translation for what is clearly a loose phrase, "'ashāīr va qabāīl", "tribes and peoples"] was for Zakarya Beg, they did not submit to Zahid Beg [the Ottoman appointee]. The matter came to a head in fighting and slaughter, and in the end Zahid and his son met their death.

I.216.8-10. The inhabitants of the *vilāyat* [of Hizan] refused to obey [Yusuf Beg, who was trying, with the blessing of the Ottoman sultan and the *vezir*, to gain possession of Hizan

from his nephew Hasan.] The same thing [i.e. the inhabitants' refusal] happened several times, and mediators were appointed.

I.331.12-15. When Uvays Beg's mother divested her own son of the *emārat* over the Pāzūkī, the *jamā'at* of the Pāzūkī met and made over the Pāzūkī *emārat* with the *ulkā* of Alashgerd to Yādigār Bêg, conformably with the royal [Safavid] diploma. [On *ulkā*, sect.II.E.3.]

I.358.15-18. [In the legendary history of the foundation of the Ruzagi tribe and principality, the 24 constituent tribes are assembled at Ṭāb in the district of Khōyt, south of the plain of Mūsh.] They exalted a ḥākim from among themselves, and started to subject the locality.

I.363.5-6. [Later on in the early history of the Ruzagi principality, its first ruler has died without an heir, and two princes have been brought from Ahlat to become respectively prince of Bitlis ('Izz al-Din) and prince of Hazo (Zia al-Din).] Day by day the inclination of the men of Bitlis for Zia al-Din grew. Towards 'Izz al-Din they did not feel so much esteem. [In the end Zia al-Din, seeing the preference of the men of Bitlis for himself, decides to play a trick on 'Izz al-Din by which he gains possession of the citadel of Bitlis and then the principality.]

I.432.4-7. Sharaf Khan decided to set off towards Āla Ṭāq and Alashgerd [and] to send someone to request Mūsā Sulṭān and the *amīr*s at Tabriz to bring their forces, so that he could make haste to ... defend himself against Ulama. The Ruzagi *āghā*s were not receptive to that course. ... 15-17. Because of the unfounded arguments and the foolish discourse of the Kurdish *ṭāyfa* [tribe], he was not able to control himself. Of his own

accord he decided to engage the large army of Ulama with his own small force.

[In this episode Sharaf was also opposed by the *vekīl* Sayyidī 'Alī Āghā Pertāfī, who is mentioned at I.432.7-12. See sect.II.D.3.]

3. Institutions and posts within the principalities

By "institution" is meant not just a body of men which existed permanently, as for example the divan, but also one which could be summoned into being on occasion, such as conciliators.

The dīvān. I.432.9-10. Owing to an excess of stupidity and ignorance, [Sayyidī 'Alī Āghā Pertāfī, a senior figure in the principality -- see next item] said, in the presence of the *khān* and of the *khān*'s divan, "If the Ruzagi *'ashīret* is dilatory and negligent in .. going to war with Ulama, I will impose a levy on the infidels and Armenians of the *vilāyat* of Bitlis and will use my energies to repel him." [In the end Sharaf decided to fight Ulama, and was defeated and killed.]

Vekīl, "Minister". I.432.7-9. [Sharaf decides to fight Ulama.] The Ruzagi *āghās* were not receptive to his proposal. In particular Sayyidī 'Alī Āghā Pertāfī, who at that time was the *vekīl*, the *jumlat al-malik*, the *muqtadā* (leader) and the whitebeard of the Ruzagis, owing to an excess of stupidity and ignorance, said ... [see previous item].

Vekīl. I would suggest this means the prince's right-hand man: the man whom he charges with his most important orders, and whom he consults on the most important matters.

Jumlat al-malik, "assembly, totality etc. of the king", apparently a nonsense phrase.

Charmoy's translation, "alter ego", has an intuitive appeal, and a conceivable reason for this meaning might be that the *alter ego* is the complete understudy or copy of the king, ready to step into his shoes when he is away or ill. Muqtadā. It is difficult to see in this word any meaning over and above those of the other three words or phrases used here. Whitebeard. Presumably the most respected of the tribe's old men.

Khāne-i gūch, "moveable household" [?]. I.442.14. [Shams al-Din has in effect been ousted from his principality of Bitlis by Ulama. He is on his way to Malatya. In exchange for the principality of Bitlis he has been promised the districts of Malatya and Maraş as a hereditary apanage (*mulkiyat*). But he decides not to finish his journey to Malatya, on the ground that Shah Tahmasp would punish his defection to the Ottoman side by raids on his own tribe.]

He went towards Tabriz with his *khāne-i gūch*.

Qushūn, "bodyguard" [?], "reserve" [?]. I.419.4-5. ... the *amīr* Sharaf assembled his soldiers and his *qushūn* and set off towards Van.

Farrāsh, chamberlain. I.405.12-13. See below, sect.III.2.

Lālā, "guardian" [?].

I.401.150-18. [Suvār Bêg Pāzūkī was *lālā* to the *amīr* Sharaf.]

I.420.12-13. [Muḥammad Shaḥnemān Qavālīsī was *lālā* to the *Sherefname*'s author.]

[The circumstances of the appointment are not given in either case. In the former case there is no reason to think Sharaf was young or a minor: he had already been made *nā'ib* of Muş. Perhaps the term means an anchor and a senior confidant for a junior figure

with his eyes on greater power.]

Conciliators.

I.216.8-10. The inhabitants of the *vilāyat* [of Hizan] refused to obey [Yusuf Beg, who is trying, with the blessing of the Ottoman sultan and the *vezir*, to gain possession of Hizan from his nephew Hasan.] [The same thing] happened several times in [the same] manner, and mediators came between them.

I.403.13-14. [Sharaf and his faction are besieging Ibrahim and his faction in the citadel of Bitlis: Sharaf is challenging Ibrahim for the principality.] Matters got to the point where the *amīr* Ibrahim and 'Abd al-Raḥman Āqā brought conciliators in ... [The conciliators then divided the principality between Sharaf and Ibrahim. See Ch.III, Sects.I.3.2.(a), I.5.(vii).]

E. LAND AND PROPERTY

1. Mulk, mulkiyat

I.216.End-217.1. [Mir Hasan of Hizan has killed his nephew Yusuf in a treacherous manner. Because of the suspicion of his guilt he had to consent to so many exactions, that] he sold a number of desirable holdings (*qat'a*) among the village of the *vilāyat* of Khizan and the greater part of his own hereditary land and *emlāk*. [His hereditary land means, of course, the land he holds on the same terms as his *āghās*, not his principality. Presumably

his hereditary land is the greater part of his *emlāk*. Ottoman period.]

I.354.15-16. In the time of the sultan Ghāzī Suleymān, when they carried out the taḥrīr on the *vilāyat* of Bitlis, and revised it; leaving aside the villages which are *evqāf* property and those which are *emlāk*, [but including the *jīzya* and *kharāj*, and making certain assumptions; then the total revenue of the plain of Mūsh was 1,533,324 *aqches*].

[The example at least seems not to throw objections in the way of the opinion that we are dealing with *mulk* owned by members of the principality, which could have existed before the Ottoman period, rather than with an Ottoman imperial holding.]

I.398.11-12. The village of Khnzōrgīn is bestowed on Abū Bakr Bāyegī as *mulkiyat*, [in reward for providing rope ladders with which to capture the citadel of Bitlis.] [See sect.II.D.2.]

A principality as mulkiyat

This perhaps means a hereditary estate, given that in each example the princes are being granted, or confirmed in, their rights over their principalities by a foreign monarch.

I.90.2-3. Even if some sultans have taken their *vilāyat* [that of the Hakkari princes], after holding it they have given it back as *mulkiyat*.

I.376.Bottom. After [Kara Yusuf] had been raised to the sultanate he bestowed on [Shams al-Din] the *vilāyat* of Bitlis, with its appurtenances and dependencies, as *mulkiyat*.

2. Nāḥiya

The word means a small but economically coherent district. As a working definition, "economically coherent" means that the whole district could be served by the same market town.

To the extent that the Kurdish principalities were robbing each other of territory, the *nāḥiya* was the smallest unit of territory which could change hands. This by no means entailed that a *nāḥiya* was an administrative unit under one of the outside powers such as the Kara Koyunlu or Ottomans, or the estate of a member of one of the princely dynasties; however some of them were such. Some of the *nāḥiya*s were big enough to become Ottoman sanjaks, others were too small; none was too big. The word is remarkably frequent in the *Sherefname*.

The *Sherefname* does occasionally speak of a *nāḥiya* containing another *nāḥiya*: for example the plain of Muş is a *nāḥiya* at I.353.3, but at I.329.End we find that Oḥgān "of Mūsh" was a *nāḥiya*. At I.382.8-11 it becomes clear that Chuqūr, which lies at the east end of the plain of Muş, was a *nāḥiya* and therefore, like Oḥgān, a subdivision of the *nāḥiya* which consisted of the plain of Muş. But if Chuqūr is a sub-division of the plain of Muş, then the *nāḥiya* of Mūsh mentioned with that of Chuqūr, as though a parallel case, at I.382.8-11 is almost certainly another *nāḥiya* of the plain of Muş. In other words it is the sub-division depending on the town of Muş.

I.213.10-13. Aḥmad, prince of Hizan, instigated Ulama to attack Sharaf Khan of Bitlis. Ulama came [to Hizan], then to the *nāḥiya* of Tātīk, then to the *vilāyat* [i.e. geographical area of the principality] of Bitlis. [Tātīk is a small valley whose river flows westwards into the upper Tigris basin.]

I.301.7-8. In the time of the sultans of the Āq Qōyunlū the fortunes [of Mir Husayn Mahmudi] rose. The *nāḥiya* of Albāq was again set free from the Hakkari princes (*ḥukkām*). It became an addition to the principality (*ḥukūmat*) of Mir Husayn.

I.329.End. In the period when the *nāḥiya* of Oḥgān of Mūsh was in the power of [the Pāzūkī] Rustam Beg, brother of Khaled Beg, Rustam Beg and a group of Pāzūkī men were killed in the battle with Sharaf Khan, ruler of Bitlis ...

I.351.5-6. The city of Bitlis has ... pleasant surroundings and *navāḥī* [pl. of "nāḥiya"]. The *nāḥiya* of Ahlat is one of them ... . ["Navāḥī" generally means "neighbouring areas" or "countryside", but the context indicates that it is meant here simply as the group of *nāḥiya*s dependent on Bitlis.] 353.3. Another *nāḥiya* of Bitlis is Mūsh. 14. It has a good plain and excellent pasturage. 355.4. Another famous *nāḥiya* of Bitlis is Khanus, which has extensive pastures.

I.382.8-11. ... the Ruzagi *āqā*s began to be unruly and to rebel. Each one of them became possessor of whichever *nāḥiya* of Bitlis he pleased. For example Mīr Muḥammad Nāṣr al-Dīnī seized Akhlāt; and 'Abd al-Raḥman Qavālīsī seized the *nāḥiya*s of Chuqūr and Mūsh.

I.382.15-16. A person called 'Umar Yadigārān, of the Ruzagi *'ashīret*, loaded his mule with some fuel. He came to the city [of Bitlis] from the *nāḥiya* of Kīfendūr [downstream of Bitlis in the same valley, and from other passages known to be part of the Bitlis principality], in order to sell [his goods].

3.Ulkā

When "ulkā" is used to mean something like "hereditary domain", it generally denotes one of the tribal principalities, and is generally coupled with the word for one of those principalities (*vilāyat, eyālat* etc.).[a]

Sometimes, however, the term denotes a smaller area. In these cases the *ulkā* is generally an area composed of two or more districts of *nāḥiya* size. It is no coincidence that the word is used when such an area is given to an *amīr* as a governorship, no doubt considered temporary by the Shah, in the Safavid administration. Nor is it a coincidence that several of the examples concern the grant of a governorship to one of the Pāzūkī. These, precisely, were a tribe who lacked a hereditary principality (*vilāyat, eyālat* etc.: see sect.II.B.4, Emāret). In these cases the word seems to steal on behalf of the temporary administrative district the aura of legitimacy of the hereditary domain.

(i) Hereditary domain

I.90.Last-91.2. Great sultans and generous khans have always tried to honour and respect [the Hakkari princes]. They have not coveted their *ulkā* and *vilāyat*.

I.303.16-17. The *ulkā* and *vilāyat* of the Mahmudi were graciously bestowed by the shah's *dīvān* on the Dunbeli *ṭāyfa* [tribe; sect.I.1].

I.373.11-12. [Timur] supplemented [Haji Sharaf's] *ulkā* and *vilāyat* [of Bitlis] with additions, to wit Pasin, Avnik and Malazgirt, and granted them to him.

[a] The term "ulkā" derives from a Mongol word meaning simply "district". The meaning "hereditary domain" appears to be non-standard for the Persian of its time; in any case the examples in category (i) on this page perhaps do not compel the conclusion that the word could carry such a meaning.

(ii) District

I.302.11. Sharaf Khan gave the order to pillage the *ulkā* of Van and Vostan.

I.316.1-3. The *ulkā* of Chāldirān, Sulaymān Sarāy and half of Sukmānābād was bestowed, according to ancient rights, by the high imperial grace [that of Shah Tahmasp] on Nazar Bêg and his brother Qilīch Bêg.

[Chāldirān, Sulaymān Sarāy and Sukmānābād were three contiguous areas on the eastern borders of the present Iran and Turkey. That of Chāldirān was in Iran, and is not the present-day plain of Çaldıran in Turkey. Nazar Bêg and Qilīch Bêg are Dunbelis.]

I.329.8-9. [Shah Ismail] joined the *ulkā* of Khunus and Maladgirt [sic] and the *nāḥiya* of Oḥgān of Mūsh as an *ifrāz* [see comment], and bestowed them as an *emārat* on Khaled Bêg and his brother.

[The districts, combined to form one *ulkā*, of Hınıs and Malazgirt, were certainly contiguous, and the *nāḥiya* of Oḥgān probably contiguous to them. Khaled Beg and his brother were Pāzūkīs. "Ifrāz" seems to mean, technically, a bounty, but a governorship of sorts is no doubt indicated here.]

I.331.12-15. When Uvays Beg's mother divested her own son of the *emārat* over the Pāzūkī, the tribe met and made over the *emārat*, with the *ulkā* of Alashgerd, to Yādigār Bêg, conformably to the royal [Safavid] diploma. [Emārat: sect.II.B.4.]

I.332.17. [Shah Sultan Muhammad divided the Pāzūkī into two. One part, the Shukur Bêgī, he gave to Niyāz Bêg. The Khaled Bêgīs assembled around Qilīch Bêg.] They divided the *ulkā* of Alashgerd in two.

I.376.4-5. [Kara Yusuf] bestowed on [Shams al-Din] the *ulkā* of Pasin and the *qal'a* of Avnik.

I.435.10-13. Among the [tribes on whom Shams al-Din of Bitlis took revenge was] the Pāzūkī *'ashīret*, [which had been treacherous to his dynasty] since the time when Shah Ismail had made Chōlāq Khaled *amīr al-umarā* of Kurdistan so as to show his appreciation. [At that point] [Chōlāq Khaled] had possessed himself of the *nāḥiya* of Oḥgān, one of the dependencies of Mūsh, included it in the *ulkā* of Khanus, and given it to his brother Rustam Beg.

[This seems to be the same incident as reported in I.329.8-9, although in different clothing. The "ulkā of Khanus" is probably the same as "the ulkā of Khanus and Maladgirt."]

4. Income from land

Unfortunately all these examples relate to the Ottoman period, and it would be unsafe to draw conclusions from them about any taxation arrangements in force during the period of Kara Koyunlu sovereignty.

I.354.13-14. The treasury receipts from [the plain of Muş] in the period of the Chingīzīye sultans, according to Ḥamdallah Mustawfī, were 69,500 dinars.

I.354.15-19. In the time of the sultan Ghāzī Suleymān, when they carried out the *taḥrīr* on the *vilāyat* [still not in the sense of a province] of Bitlis and revised it (*bāzdīd*);
leaving aside the villages which are *evkāf* property and those which are *emlāk*;
but including the *jīzya* and the *kharāj* on four thousand head of infidels;

then, on the assumption of the old *jīzya*, which was that each person paid the fixed sum of 70 *aqche*s, [the total] was 1,533,324 Ottoman *aqche*s; and 12 Ottoman *aqche*s are one *miṣqāl* of pure bullion [silver].

I.354.8-9. Each year [the *nāḥiya* of Khanus] produces 400,000 'Osmānīs [*aqche*s]. In respect of the imperial taxes (*huqūq-i dīvānī*) it is the equal of Mūsh, although the Armenian *re'āyā* of the district have become fewer. But they have handed over most of its villages and *mazra'a* to *iqtā'*s and to the owners of *tīmār*s. There are about 400 owners of *iqtā'*s there. Arab horses are bred in the *nāḥiya* of Khanus, and it does not produce on its territory anything in the nature of grain.

I.456.6-8. They annexed to the *eyālat* [this time the Ottoman province] of Bitlis the *nāḥiya* of Mūsh as a *ḫāṣṣ*, with its villages, at a [yield] of 200,000 *aqche*s; in such a way that the sum total of the *ḫavāṣ* [pl. of *ḫāṣṣ*] of the humble [author] became 1,000,400 Ottoman *aqche*s.

[Probably the 200,000 *aqche*s are the income to the ḫāṣṣ-holder, not the total assessed tax-revenue, which is the figure discussed at I.354.15-19.]

III SUBORDINATION TO OTHER STATES

1. Acknowledgement of sovereignty; the sovereign's favours

I.91.8-14. ... the *amīr* Timur made Malik 'Izz al-Din [of Hakkari] the object of his favour, and bestowed on him his hereditary property (*mulk-i maurūsī*) and inherited *eyālat*

(*eyālat-i arsī*) as inalienable property (*mulkiyat*). He gave him a diploma of government (*manshūr-i ḥukūmat*) and a *fermān* of responsibility (*fermān-i eyālat*) ... and honoured him with permission to go back [to his own principality]. In the year 824 [1421], Malik Muhammad bin Malik 'Izz al-Din, conjointly with the *vālī* of the *eyālat* of Bitlis and Ahlat [i.e. the Bitlis principality], the *amīr* Shams al-Din, ... became blessed with the immense بعز of the carpet of the kiss (bisāt-i bōs) of Mirza Shahrukh, son of Timur. [Possibly the ب in بعز is an addition by a copyist, and the original word was عز, 'izz, dignity.]

[Timur is most unlikely, in spite of the text, to have converted 'Izz al-Din's principality into inalienable property, but is much more likely simply to have confirmed existing rights by the grant of the *manshūr* and *fermān*. On the significance of Shah Rukh's kiss, see comments on I.409.-410.8 and I.425.14-430.7 below.]

I.95.7-10. [Zahid Beg of Hakkari] submitted to Shah Ismail, and became the object of the shah's favour. Out of his extremely regal bounty he granted him a diploma (*manshūr*) for his hereditary principality (*eyālat-i maurūsī*). Sometimes he addressed him with the word "'ammī" ["uncle"]. The manner of intimacy and harmony between them and the pure sense of loyalty and devotedness existed to a high degree and intensity.

[The intimacy and harmony are in reality Zahid Beg's loyalty and Ismail's sovereignty. To the extent that there is genuine intimacy and harmony, it is they which arise out of the political relationship, rather than the other way round.]

I.373.8-15. The *ṣāḥibqirān* [Timur] ...made Haji Sharaf [of Bitlis] the recipient of kingly kindnesses (*'avāṭif*) and honoured with unlimited favours (*'avārif*). He caressed him many times. He made him privileged and exalted above his peers [by giving him] a robe

embroidered in gold (khil'at-i zardōzī). He supplemented his *ulkā* and *vilāyat* with additions, to wit Pasin, Avnik and Malazgirt ... He bestowed an imperial *yarlīgh* to this effect ... He entrusted to him Ayq Ṣūfī, one of the sons of the Uzbek padishahs, who had conceived plots and tricks [against himself, i.e. Timur]; and made [Haji Sharaf] imprison [Ayq Sufi] in the citadel of Bitlis.

I.376.14-17. There existed a way of unity (*ittiḥād*) and intimacy (*khuṣūṣiyat*) ... between Qarā Yūsuf and the *amīr* Shams al-Dīn [his] servant. [Qarā Yūsuf], after he had been raised to the sultanate, bestowed on Shams al-Dīn as *mulkiyat* the *vilāyat* of Bitlis and its appurtenances and dependencies.

[See comments on I.91.8-14 and I.95.7-10.]

I.378.18-379.4. In a meadow near Akhlāṭ, where Shah Rukh's army had camped, the *amīr* Shams al-Din [of Bitlis], with some of the *amīr*s of Kurdistan, went to meet the royal party. At the beginning of Jumādā of the same year [4th June 1421] he kissed the bountiful fingers of the commander (*serāfrāz*). This brought forth consequences that might have been made by the philosopher's stone. He received regal caresses and imperial kisses. [Shah Rukh] renewed the signatures of the diplomas of the *eyalat* of Bitlis (*manāshīr-i eyālat-i Bidlīs*).

I.379.18-380.4. In the period of the Turcomans he had the *sikka* and *khuṭba* carried out in his own name. Today [end of 16th century A.D.] a famous coin of Shams al-Din survives. The author [of the *Sherefname*] has also seen three dirhams minted in the names respectively of Muhammad bin Sharaf, Sharaf bin Muhammad and Shams al-Din bin Zia al-Din.

I.409.9-410.8. When the tents of [Shah Ismail's] army appeared at Ahlat, the *amīr* Sharaf [of Bitlis] was happy to enter his service. He prepared a banquet for the Shah [the *Sherefname* gives the details of this luxurious banquet]. After the ceremonies of hospitality and after the banquet he presented horses and amblers *be-ṭavīle* and *aghnām be-kalla* [perhaps "rams"] and camels and mules *be-qiṭār* [in a file]. He was honoured with imperial kindnesses (*'avārif*) and enveloped with favours (*'avātif*) of an unsurpassed regality. He was [invested] with the diploma (*manshūr*) of the *eyālat* of Bitlis and with costly, magnificent robes of honour (*khil'at-hā-yi fākhira*).

[In short, the ceremonies of hospitality, the banquet and the gifts are Sharaf's way of acknowledging the sovereignty of Shah Ismail. Similarly Shah Ismail's favours are not merely a symbol of sovereignty, but a vehicle for its establishment and exercise.]

I.425.14-430.7. The feast given by Sharaf of Bitlis to Shah Tahmasp, and Tahmasp's diploma. [The occasion of the feast was Shah Tahmasp's rescue of Bitlis when it was under siege by Fīl Ya'qūb, who was Ottoman *beylerbeyi* of Diyar Bakr, and by Ulama, the renegade Kızılbaş.]

The *amīr* Sharaf gave to the Shah and his [nobles] one-fifth of his [moveable] possessions (*emvāl*) and of the tax on the cattle and pastures of infidel and Muslim alike, of the *ulusāt* and *aḥshāmāt* of the *vilāyat* of Bitlis and its appendages [for comment, above, sect.I.6]. At Ahlat he prepared an abundant feast fit for a padishah. [The details of the feast are described at length by the *Sherefname*.] He then presented gifts to the Shah (falcons, horses, cloth, European velvet, etc.). Tahmasp in return gave Sharaf a decorated belt and a gold-embroidered caftan, which conferred on Sharaf the title of Sharaf Khān with the post of *tavājī bāshī* of the army and that of *amīr al-umarā* of Kurdistan.

[He then gave him a diploma, of which the *Sherefname* gives the text. Some of the relevant passages are as follows.] 428.4-7. We have bestowed on him the *eyālat* of Bidlīs, Mūsh and Khanus, with their dependencies and other districts which have [always] been in the possession of the aforementioned exalted *amīr*s [those of Bitlis], and which are among the provinces of the empire. 7-8. We have entrusted to this prince the reins of absolute power over the temporal and spiritual affairs of this principality. 13-15. The *amīr*s, chiefs (*kalānterān*) and eminent men (*qāydām*) of Kurdistan should carry out the ceremonies of obedience and sympathy to this khan, whom they should recognise as their *amīr al-umarā*.

429.17- 430.1. The chiefs (*kalānter*), the *malik*s, the *ketkhudā*s, the *re'āyā* and *muqīmāt* [see sect.I.6], and all the inhabitants of the aforementioned *vilāyat*, and the chiefs (*tushmālān*) of the *ulūsāt* and their followers belonging to those districts [i.e. the *vilāyat*] must recognise the aforesaid [*amīr*] as the ruler (*ḥākim*) and *ṣāḥib-tiyūl* [exact meaning unexplained] of those districts.

[The feast given by Sharaf Khan for Shah Tahmasp, and his gifts, are an act of submission as well as a means of thanking Tahmasp for raising the siege of Bitlis. Similarly Tahmasp's gifts are an act by which sovereignty is established or confirmed.]

2. Manshūr (diploma)

I.91.9-10. *Manshūr-i ḥukūmat* given by Timur to the Hakkari prince. See previous section.

I.91.15. Shahrukh renewed the *manāshīr-i ḥukūmat* of the Hakkari prince.

I.95.7-10. *Manshūr-i ḥukūmat* given by Shah Ismail to the Hakkari prince. See previous

section.

I.304.8-9. Shah Tahmasp wrote the *manshūr* for the *emārat* over the Mahmudi in the name of Khan Muhammad [a Mahmudi], when he heard the news of a messenger's being dispatched to the Ottoman sultan Suleymān.

I.331.12-15. The Pāzūkī tribe met and made over the *emārat* of the tribe .... to Yādigār Bêg, conformably with the royal [Safavid] *manshūr*. [See above, sect.II.B.4, Emārat.]

I.379.4. The renewal of the signature of the *manāshīr-i eyālat-i Bidlīs* by Shah Rukh. [See previous section.]

I.405.11-12. [Sharaf and Ibrahim have agreed that each will take half the Ruzagi principality: on this, see sect.II.A.1 above. Although the text does not say so, there was probably still an understanding that Ibrahim was the senior partner, since he was the rightful heir of the previous ruler. Sharaf, however, has mounted a coup during a feast in the citadel of Bitlis, and Ibrahim has been captured.] The secretaries (*munshīān*) of the *dīvān* ... wrote the diploma of government (*manshūr-i eyālat*) and the *ferman* of administration (*ferman-i ḥukūmat*) in the name of this blessed person [i.e. Sharaf]. The chamberlains of the palace ... folded up the carpet of the government (*ḥukūmat*) of that miserable being [Ibrahim].

I.410.7-8. Shah Ismail gives the *manshūr* of the *eyālat* of Bitlis to Sharaf. See previous section.

APPENDIX III

DISTRICTS IN THE VAN REGION AS DEFINED BY PLACE NAMES

Layout, method, references etc.

Apart from the lists of Nestorian villages in sect.II, this appendix is the result of an exercise using village names taken from the Ottoman *tahrir defters*. First, the village names were extracted from the *defters*, always noting the *nahiye* name, in a quick search lasting about fifteen days. Second, the names were transcribed with the aid of *Köylerimizin Adları* (KA), a list of village names in early Republican Turkey,[a] and their modern equivalents found on the map. They were then grouped according to *nahiye*: in the *defters* they often occur in entries relating to an individual officer's *timar* or *ze'amet*, in which case the group of villages in question may be scattered throughout several *nahiyes*. Limitations of time and particularly of money necessarily made this a rough exercise, but for the purposes of indicating the boundaries of small districts of the early Ottoman occupation which probably reflect the basic districts of the late Middle Ages not much more work would be required. On the other hand a thorough compilation of place names would require perhaps ten times as many days spent in the archive and a similar multiplication of effort in placing them on the map and arriving at precise boundaries. The only document that would fill a serious gap in the present study is TT 874 (the Erzurum *eyalet*).[1]

Documents consulted

TT 208. *Icmal* defter, apparently of an intended *eyalet* of Bitlis which was never created. This would date the document to A.D. 1535 or soon after.

TT 297. *Mufassal* of sanjak of Adilcevaz, 963/1556.

TT 413. *Mufassal* of sanjak of Bitlis.

TT 730. *Icmal* of sanjak of Van, dated H. 990, but with revisions carried out in the 1020's.

Other documents relevant to this exercise: (1) TT 874, of the Erzurum *eyalet*. I did no more than verify that it was full and complete on the Hınıs and Malazgirt sanjaks. (2) From Çetin's catalogue, TT 189 (Bitlis sanjak), 313 (Van), 639 (Bitlis), 739 (Van), 818 (Van) and 911 (Sukmanabad) would appear to be relevant.

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[a] It was compiled before the alphabet reform, and gives the names both in the Arabic alphabet and in a French transcription which helps mainly with the names' vocalisation.

Abbreviations and references

Defters

References: document number, page, line on page. E.g. "730.58.E." In this case the whole page is divided into lines of entries, including headings for *nahiye*s, *timar*s etc.. However sometimes, for ease of reference, the document's own headings have been used to divide the page: e.g. "TM.A" means "in the group of entries beneath the first timar heading on the page". Where necessary a line reference within the group is given. Other abbreviations follow.

TM: *timar* heading.
ZM: *ze'amet* heading.
HH: heading "ḫāṣḫā".
Head1, Head2. Heading on page, regardless of type.
MZ: *mezre'a*

Within the lists of village names below, no *un*placed names are included, as they are just a handful of the names not caught in the search, for whatever reason, or not deciphered. However the number of unplaced names is included, to indicate the degree of mismatch between village names on modern maps and those in the documents.

Maps

G = German map, 1943 (*Deutsche Heereskarte Türkei*, 1:200,000)
T = Turkish 1:200,000 map, publ. 1940-50
US = USAF 1:250,000 map, publ. 1951

I. BITLIS PRINCIPALITY

1. (Former) sub-principality of Bitlis

(a) Bitlis valley

Nahiye of Tatvan

Tuğ (413.39.B; Tuġ)
Por (413.40.A; Por)
Kizvak, US (413.41.B, Kizvak)
Papşin, US (413.42.B, Bābşīn)

Kumus, US (413.37.C, Kūmus)
Çihor, US (208.4.C, Cilḫōr)

Unplaced: one

Nahiye of Koltik

This appears to have occupied the west bank of the Bitlis valley downstream of Bitlis.

Tütü, G (413.18.B; Tutu)

Unplaced: three, incl. Ḳoltik itself.

Nahiye of Kifendir

Name of nahiye: Kīfendīr, Kifendīr, Dere-i Kifendīr.

Kermate, US (413.25.B; Kermāte)
Bucan, US (413.25.D; Būcān)
Yako, US (413.27.D; Yako)
Hahokan, G (413.27.E; Hāçugān)
Dereç, G (413.26.A; Derec)
Yk. Surim, G (413.28.B, Sūrīḥim; KA 413, Sūrīm)
Riclek, US (413.29.C; Reclik)
Yk. Ölek (413.30.B; Ölek-i 'Ulyā & Suflā)

Unplaced: two.

(b) Nahiye of Mutik

Name of nahiye: Mūtīk. Part of the present Mutki district.

Sin, G (730.130.TM.B, Şīn)
Caman, G (730.130.TM.C, Çemān)

(c) Tatik

Tatik as a medieval district appears to have occupied the whole of the upper Güzeldere valley and the tributary valley connecting the latter to the Hizan basin via the Panor pass. But the district was divided into two Ottoman *nahiyes*, Güzeldere and Tatik. Güzeldere lay at the very top of the valley; the Ottoman *nahiye* of Tatik occupied the remainder.

Güzeldere

Hart, US (413.43.B; Ḥart)
Balakan, US (730.128.ZM.C; Bāl̲ikān)
Sak (730.125.C; Sa̲k)

Unplaced: three.

Tatik

Sasunan, T (?) (730.128.ZM.C; Ṣāṣūs or Ṣāṣūk)
Vanek, US (730.128.ZM.C; Vānik)

Unplaced: two.

(d) Nahiye of Karcikan

This was not confined to the Karǰkan district (Armn. name), but seems also to have occupied the Orans and Kesan Dere valleys. The date of the two *defter*s in question is somewhat later than the mid-16th century, when a sanjak of Kesan is known.

Poga, US (208.13.C; Poġa)
Kevarvanik or Karcikanvanik, US (208.13.C, Vān̲ik)
Pürüz (?), US (208.13.D, P̲irūn̲is; KA 1038, Pro̲n̲is)
Kinesor (208.13.H; Kina̲ḥo̲r)
Kindirans (208.13.E; Kindira̲ns)
Goms, Komus (US) (208.13.L, Ko̲mus)
Sorp (730.2.B; Ṣo̲rb)
Bağ (730.2.B; Pa̲ġ)
Ahkis, US (730.3.C, Aġākīs)

Unplaced: two.

2. Nahiye of Ahlat

Zağgi, US (208.5.E; Zaġegī)
Karmuç, US (208.12.B; Ḳārmūc)
Aş. Sor, US (208.12.C, Ṣo̲r)
Süfresor (US), Sifrasor (G) (297.31.Head2.A, Subra̲ḥo̲r; KA 414, Ṣufra̲ḥo̲r)
Hinin, US (297.32.Head1.A; H̲inūn)
Irsonk, G (297.64.A; Irso̲nk)

Unplaced: five.

3. Sub-principality of Muş

The Ottoman picture shows two *nahiye*s respectively at the east end of the plain and against its northern edge, those of Çuḳūr and Oḥgān. These almost reflect faithfully the late medieval *nahiya*s of Chuqūr and Oḥgān. However the vast Ottoman *nahiye* of Muş very likely embraces districts such as those of Amūrek, Pughanad and Kirenj known from the *Sherefname*.[a] Further work would be required to locate these. The Ottoman *nahiye* of Muş also seems to extend into part of the district of Sasun.

Nahiye of Çukur

Çapkis (208.8.G; Çapkis)
Musuru, G (208.8.H; Musuri)
Özkagak, US (208.30.E, Öṣkaġak)
Şeyhan, US (208.30.F, Şeyḫkān; KA 412, Şeyḫān)
Balekan, US (208.30.F; Bālikān)
Pay, G (208.25.G; Pav)
Mişakşin, US (730.129.ZM.A; Muşāḳşīn)
Yk. Morh, US (730.129.TM.B, Morḫ-i 'Ulyā)

Unplaced: two.

Nahiye of Oḥgān

Bağlı (G), Bağlımelik (US) (208.10.B, Bāġlü)
Sakav (G), Sakavi (US) (208.12.G, Saḳāvī)
Derik (730.86.ZM.B; Dirik)
Akpınar, US (730.93.TM.A; Āḳ Pınar)
Kirvel (US), Firavi (G) (730.108.TM.A, Kirāvī; KA 424, Kirāvī)
Kalecik, US (730.109.TM.B, Ḳal'ecik)

Unplaced: two.

Nahiye of Muş

Hasköy (208.11.H; Ḥāsköy)
Horonk (730.12.D; Horonḳ)
Kirtagom, US (730.82.D, Kurtagom)

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[a] Sh.I.442-3; Ch.3, sect.I.2.1.C. The defters cast doubt on the reading "Pughanad" in the *Sherefname*'s text.

Pazu (730.83.ZM.A, Pāzū)
Dom (730.83.ZM.A, Dom)
Kol (G), Gol (US) (730.85.ZM.B, Kol)
Alikirbon, G (730.87.ZM.C, 'Alī Kirbon)
Arak (730.88.ZM.A, 'Arak̤)
Miğrakom (US) (730.92.TM.B, Miġānkom)
Hoper (730.98.TM.C, Hopėr)
Bardik, G (730.99.TM.A, Bartik)
Tapik (730.100.TM.C, Ṭāpik)
Mollababa (no village of exactly this name found; but Mollababa Dağı above north-east edge of plain, and several villages whose names begin "Molla-" are marked on the US map) (730.106.TM.C, Monlā Baba)
Acimanük (US), Açmanuk (G) (730.107.TM.A, Acmānuk)

Unplaced: nine.

Nahiye of Hoyt

Name of nahiye: Hoyt (Armn. Xoyt', Pers. Khōyt.)

One unplaced name.

II. HAKKARI PRINCIPALITY

1. Shore districts

Nahiye of Van

Edremit (730.4.M, Ardemīd)
Şuşans (730.12.B, Şuşans)
Zivistan, or Hindistan ? (730.15.D, ...pistān, or .....īstān)
Köşk Köy (730.10.ZM.A, Köşk)

Unplaced: four.

Nahiye of Vostan

Norkuh, US (730.5.K, Norgyuġ; KA 1037, Norkuh)

2. Inland districts

[Abbreviations relevant to this section of the appendix;

B = Badger, *Nestorians*
Ch. = Chevalier, *Montagnards*
Fiey, HT = Fiey, "Hakkari Turc"
N = Nikitine, "Shamdīnān" (EI)
T = Turkish 1:200,000 map, publ. 1940-50
US = USAF 1:250,000 map, publ. 1951]

[Method used in finding Nestorian villages:

Badger's lists of villages were used, and villages found on the map. Sometimes Chevalier's discussion provides a name lacking in Badger, and Chevalier, particularly his map, is a useful starting-point in placing the various Nestorian districts on the map. More names could be found by consulting other literature. There is a second list in Cutts, *Christians under the Crescent*, and other village names could be supplied by picking through the missionary and other travel literature. But the payoff, for the purposes of this thesis, would not be worth the time and trouble. The point of the present lists is to establish with reasonable precision the boundaries of the various districts and mark those boundaries and the relevant villages on the map.

The map used is the USAF map (see above), but names from the Turkish map have been plotted on this one. Of the alternative forms of given village names to be found sometimes on the two maps, that of the US map is generally put down here, but if the name on the Turkish map is chosen then this is noted ("T"). If there are serious divergences between the two names and the US map's form is chosen, then this is marked by "US".]

Albāq

Nestorian villages

These are all at the south end of the district.

Hozi (B.398, Hôzé)
Mengelava (B.398, Menjil Awa)
Erci (B.398, Erji)
Atis (B.398, Ates)
Ömerhalan (prob. B.398, Alamiyyan)
Şirkanis (perh. B.398, Shareenes)
Berdük (B.398, Boorduk)

Pizan (T; prob. B.398, Poosan; poss. B.'s Poosan is Boşan)

Kalanis (B.398, Kalanes. This brings the boundaries of Albāq far south, and beyond the natural boundary suggested by the watersheds surrounding the Başkale plain)

Ch.102-3.

Gevar

Gevar

I.e. the plain and bordering slopes, as opposed to the Şehsemzin basin or district of the Derrenāye, which lies to the north-east: see next heading.

(Nestorian villages)
Orisa (Ch. Map 1; B.397, Ooreesha)
Derav (B.397, Darawé)
Kiyat (B.397, Kiyyat)
Memkan (B.397, Memekkan)
Dize (B.398, Dizza; but Christian inhabitants reported to be Armenians)
Pavilan (B.398, Pa Elan)
Memkova (B.398, Maken d'Awa)
Pirzalan (B.398, Pir Zalan)
Dara (B.398, Dâra)
Cardivar (B.398, Cher Diwer)
Zizan (B.398, Zeezan)
Sinava (B.398, Seen Awa)

Ch.105-7.

(District of) Derrenāye

Name and extent of the district. Fiey (HT 446, 467) calls it the "pays des Derrenāye"; it was a sub-diocese of the Nestorian bishopric of Gawar in the 19th century. The Derrenāye were evidently a Nestorian *raya* group. The district of the Derrenāye is the basin of the Şehsemzin Deresi, which flows into the Gevar plain, and of the Bajirge Deresi, which flows into Iran. The district is thus composed, in strict truth, of two basins rather than one, and the watershed between the L.Urmia basin to the east and the L.Van basin to the west cuts across the district rather than falling to one side. However the district is well demarcated on the Iranian side by the divide between the more confined upper basin of the Bajirge Deresi and the open plain into which it flows.

Bajirge (B.398, Mar Be-Yeshua). (In the village was the monastery of Mar Bisho, < Mar Be-Yeshua. It seems that the village was sometimes known by the name of its monastery. Fiey, HT 446, 467.)
Basan (B.398)

The Shamsdinan district

The sub-divisions here are those of the late Ottoman *nahiyes*, whose villages are listed in Nikitine, "Shamdīnān" (EI), 303.1 (here abbrev. "N.").

Ch.107-9 (whole district).

1. Zerzān[a]

Halana (N, Helāna)
Husuru (perh. N, Serārū)
Masiru (N, Masirū)
Hazne (N, Hezna)
Navsar (N, Nowshahr or Benarwe)
Rebunuz (N, Rebunīs)

2. Humārū

Evliyan (N, Awlīān)
Nehri (N)
Surunis (N, Surunīs)
Bembo (N, Benbō)
Bay (N, Baï)

3. Guirdi Herikī

Betkâr (N)
Şabatan (N, Shepatāne Guirdīān)
Mavan (N, Mawān)
Biskân (N)
Servinan (N, Sherwenān)
Begur (N, Begūr)
Kilit (N, Keled)
Nihava (N, Nehāwa)
Rizi (N, Zewia Rezī)

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[a] Nikitine writes "Zerzān with Nehrī" as the name of this *nahiye*, apparently justifying the title by the notion that Nehri was the seat of the kaymakam. However Nehri was in the *nahiye* of Humaru, and it seems simply wrong to include Nehri in any way within Zerzān. If the seat of Zerzān's *mūdīr* had been at Nehri while Nehri still belonged to Humārū there would be some force in the argument for including Nehri in Zerzān.

4. Herkī

Bigalta (N, Bégālte)
Herki (N, Nefsi Herkī)
Zizan (N, Zizāni)
Bedava (N, Bedaw)
Sat (US wrongly "Şat"; N, Sate)
Dirri (N, Diri)
Sutūnī (N, Stūni)

The Nestorian *ashiret* districts

Upper Tyari

Cemiku (prob. B.395, Chamba d'Koorkhé, or B.394, Chamba d'Coordhâyé)
Tchomba (Ch. Map 1; B.394)
Derau (B.395, Darâwa)
Kelitan (prob. B.395, Kalayâtha)
Rontik (prob. B.394, Roomta)

Ch. 93-4.

Lower Tyari

Beziz (B.394, Be-Zeezo)
Lizan (B.394, Leezan)
Minyanis (B.394, Minyanis)
Zavite (B.394, Zaweetha)
Aşuta (B.394, Asheetha)
Kisra (roughly placed on my map; T; B.394, Mâtha d'Kasra)
Sivaslibey (T (cf. Ch.93); US Sivaşilbay; B. Rawola d'Salabeken)

Ch. 92-3.

Tkhuma

Behriq (US; ? B.396, Be-Arijai)
Hişet (US; prob. B.396, Gissa)
Mezraa (B.396)
Gundiki (B.396, Goondooktha)

Ch.94.

Jilu

Alsan (B.396)
Medi (B.396, Medhi)
Zerani (B.396, Zerêni)
Ziri (B.396, Zèr)
Serpil (B.396, Serpel)
Bubova (B.396, Boo Bâwa)

Ch. 95-6.

Baz

Ergub (Ch. Map 1; perh. marked as Kuntjüri Hr., T; B.397, Argeb)
Bazi. Not in B.397

Ch.96.

Diz

Suva (T; B.395, Soowwa)
Kelesor (B.395, Golozor)
Saraynüs (B.395, Sarâmos)

Ch.96-7.

The Nestorian *raya* districts

Walto

Hodyane (B.395, Khadiâna)
Sirte (B.395, Seerta)

Tal

N.B. Badger includes in Chal (his "Tcall") the names of villages actually belonging to Tal; and has no separate heading for the villages of Tal.

Talunamaşhohe (US; B.397, Talâna)
Rabat (T; B.397, Rabbat)
Azizan (T; B.397, Be-Azeeza)

Chal

Syr. "Tšal"; Badger's "Tcall"

Biyadir (US; prob. B.397 Ba-Dârê and Biyya are two false names resulting from a misunderstanding of this single name)
Belat (US; B.397, Be-Letha)
Çal. Not in B.397.

Rekan

Erbuş (B.397, Erbesh)

Lewin *(Badger's "Léwun")*

Balekân (B.399, Bellekken)
Nevgüzan (B.398, Nevgeezan)

Ch.101-2.

Khananes

Khananes (Ch. 100 & Map 1; roughly marked here; B.398, Khanânes Alleita & Khanânes Tahteitha)

Upper Berwar

Name of district: Syr. "Berwar d'Kudshane", translit. "Berwar d'Qudšanes".

Koçanis (B.395, Kochânes)
Tarmil (B.395, Tarmil)
Sorinis (B.395, Soreenes)
Harus (B.395, Hâros)
Hicac (B.395, Be-Khajij)

Lower Berwar

Name of district: Syr. "Berwar Sevine"; Badger's "Berwer Siweené")

Hardalanis (B.396, Khardalânes)
Kotranis (B.396, Kotrânes)
Sevin (B.396, Siweené)
Salan (B.396, Sallen)
İsp (B.396, Espin)
Kerme (Ch. Map 1; B.396)

Göranis (B.396, Goorânes)

Berwar d'Shwa'uta

Sekran (B.396, Sakerran)

(District of) **Bilijnaye**

Dedin (B.396, Daden)
Avart (B.396, Awert)
Nerdivan (perh. B.396, Nauberi)
Ahesbi (perh. B.396, Be-Respi)

III. MAHMUDI PRINCIPALITY

Nahiye of Erçek

Erçek (730.5.F, Erçek)
Ermanis (730.5.G, Ermānis)
Yk. & Aş. Noşar (730.18.C, Nōşār)
Aktaş (730.25.F, Āḳ Ṭaş (MZ))
Kızılbulak, US (?) (730.28.B, ...Bulaġı)
Boğazkesen (?) (730.29.E, ...Kesen)
Akgöl (730.31.D, Āḳ Göl)

IV. KARA KOYUNLU TERRITORY

Nahiye of Erciş

No names found.

Nahiye of Adilcevaz

This appears to have stretched along the shore eastwards to embrace the Arin peninsula and the next expanse of coastal plain, so as to touch the nahiye of Erciş. The nahiye of Sarı Su is always associated with Adilcevaz rather than Erciş in the defters etc., and may well have been part of the dependent district of Adilcevaz in the late Middle Ages.

Essentially this was an inland district lying behind Şüphan Dağ and the chain of heights extending to the east of that mountain. It does not appear to have extended south into the coastal plain. However two villages, Armutlu and Arzigak, appear in the defters as belonging to both Adilcevaz and Sari Su, and a more thorough search of the documents might reveal somewhat different boundaries.

Koğus (US), Gagus (G) (208.56.J, Kōġōs)
Yk. Subhan, US (208.56.J, Subhān-i 'Ulyā; 730.48.B, Supān-i 'Ulyā; 208.57.A, Subān-i suflā)
Horans, US (208.57.C, Ḫōrans)
Arincikuş, G (208.57.D, Arincikūs)
Koçeri, US (208.57.E, Ḳoceri)
Arzigak, US (208.57.F, Arżiġāk)
Nurşin, T (297.15.A, Norşīn)
Arin (297.15.Head1)
Haskündürük (US), Hasgündürük (G) (297.16.Head2.A, Ḥāsḳundurik)
Patnos, G (730.51.E, Paṭnos)
Viran Uri (730.52.TM.A, Virān Uri)
Cihangir (730.57.TM.A, Cihāngīr)

Unplaced: five.

Nahiye of Sari Su

Keham, T (?) (208.59.D, Kāġān)
Haçli, US (297.51.A, Ḫaçlü)
Kazan (?) (297.57.A, Ḫāġān)
Hanik (730.58.TM.D, Ḫānuk, with Āġçaören)
Armutlu (730.69.TM.B, Armudlu)

Unplaced: four.

Note to Appendix III

The "province" of Korčayk'; location, ethnic composition and districts falling within the Hakkari principality

In the discussion of the degree to which the Hakkari principality possessed economic unity (Ch.III, sect.II.2), it was asserted that Korčayk', one of the "provinces" of the

Ašxarhac'oyc' (henceforth in this appendix "Ašx."; the abbreviation is included in the bibliography), was a band of territory stretching from the Bohtan district on the west to the Nestorian *ashiret* districts and the Julamerk sector of the Zab valley on the east. The conclusion was drawn that Korčayk' was linked essentially to northern Iraq rather than to south-east Armenia: it was the *zōzān* or summer pasture for the north part of the Mesopotamian plain and the foothill districts. The Ašx. is a document dating from the early 7th century A.D..[a] It lists the *gawaṙs* or districts of Armenia, grouping them in *ašxarhs* or "provinces". As pointed out above, neither term is automatically applicable to the categories of geographical area in question, particularly when precise assumptions about the relationship between *gawaṙ* and *ašxarh* are made. In the document the terms have been adapted for specialised use.

In a discussion, so far unpublished, of the *gawaṙs* of Vaspurakan listed in the Ašx., I made out the case for saying that towards the end of that list a sequence of twelve district names has been interpolated. Six of the names were taken from the text of T'ovma Arcruni, which was composed in the early 10th century.[2] Of these six, five are the first in the sequence of twelve, and the other is the next but one. By the 10th century much of the geographical nomenclature had changed. The names of some districts had dropped out of use after the demise of the princely families who held those districts; they had been replaced by names with a purely geographical denotation. It is possible that some of the interpolated names were in use, during the Arcruni period (8th to 11th centuries A.D.), concurrently with the old ones. It is also possible that the districts they denoted had different boundaries from those denoted by the former names. The interpolated names are

[a] Hewsen, "Ašxarhac'oyc'".

not wrong ones, in their period. But since the districts whose names occur in the list are supposed to be mutually exclusive, it is wrong to include the interpolated names in that list. They are alternatives to those already in the list, or, if changed boundaries are in question, provide an alternative geographical nomenclature for certain groups of districts. The known history of the Ašx.'s textual tradition does not rule out an interpolation based on Arcruni. The earliest known text of the Ašx. is dated A.D. 1178.[a]

The main argument for supposing an interpolation was, in brief, as follows. The districts in the list, up to a certain point, can be arranged in three geographical rows, roughly from south-west to north-east. These account for the territory of Vaspurakan in a complete and consistent manner, apart from the last three in the whole list, to wit Naxčawan, Gołt'n and Marand. The principle of the list's ordering would suggest that the latter three should come at the end of the third row. So to exclude the twelve interpolated names merely completes the third row; to include them results in cases where districts already named are named again, as previously explained. The interpolator would presumably have been inclined to add the twelve names at the end of the list. But he puts them just before the end so as to disguise the addition.

Another argument for the insertion of twelve names is that those twelve names do not occur in early Armenian texts (5th to 7th centuries A.D.). Beside the text of the Ašx. they can be found either in the text of Arcruni or nowhere else. But all the names other than the twelve do occur in early texts. The interpolator was familiar with current geographical nomenclature, which was reflected in Arcruni; he probably used Arcruni as a check. This accounts for the occurrence in Arcruni of a group of the interpolated names

[a] Hewsen, *Armenian Geography*, 3.

in the Ašx..

The principle of the above argument will be applied in the coming discussion of the districts of Korčayk': the validity of applying the principle of the argument to Korčayk' does not rest on the validity of the original argument in the discussion of Vaspurakan. The discussion of Korčayk' starts with the list of districts found in the Ašx.; Hübschmann's numbering in *Die Altarmenischen Ortsnamen* will be followed. The districts are (Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 333-6):

53. Korduk'
54-56. Upper, Middle and Lower Kordrik'
57. Aitvank'
58. Aigark'
59. Mot'ołank'
60. Orsirank'
61. Kart'unik'
62. Čahuk
63. P'ok'r Albak (Little Albak).

Among these districts the positions of 53. Korduk' and 63. Little Albak are agreed. Korduk' is the Bohtan district and Little Albak is the section of the Zab valley pasing and dependent on Julamerk, that is to say a part of the valley starting at a point somewhere downstream of the Zab's exit from Albak (the Başkale plain) and the river's southward turn.

Korduk' in the Late Classical period was not Kurdish ! Scholars have assumed that Xenophon's Kardouchoi (beginning of 4th century B.C.) were Kurds -- without any positive sign beyond the name. Even the name, however, is a suspect indication. It is the same name as Qardū, the Syriac name for the Bohtan district. The phonology of the two names ("Kurd" vs. "Qardū"; "k" vs. "q") has been held by philologists to give no support

to the identification of Kardouchoi with Kurds.[a]

Moreover the inhabitants of the Bohtan district in Late Antiquity were not Kurds! They were Syrians, part of a continuous Syrian-inhabited sweep of territory in northern Mesopotamia. Other Syrian-inhabited territory lay to north, west, south and even east: the latter point of the compass will be discussed below. When information unambiguously indicating the name of the inhabitants of Bohtan district/Qardū becomes available in the 4th century A.D. onwards, the district's base population is revealed as entirely Syrian. Qardū was a well-known monastic area, like the Tur 'Abdin to the west and parts of Iraq to the south and south-east.[b]

The political masters of Qardū/Korduk' were, of course, Armenians. But no Kurds were in sight ! The first mention of Kurds here comes in the early 10th century A.D., when a Kurdish chief set up a small principality, probably similar to the Armenian one of the Late Classical period. Like that of the Armenian principality, its capital was at Fenek.[c] When the Kurdish chief in question set up his principality, nobody greeted the event with an interpretation to the effect that the Kurdish population was finally getting the political leadership it needed. Nor has any modern scholar put such an interpretation on the event.

Moreover the idea of an Iranian people residing, in the early 4th century B.C., in an unexplained enclave within the Syrian-populated continuum is somewhat hard to credit. The Kurds moved westwards from Iran in the 10th century and onwards.[d] They did not

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[a] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 334; Minorsky, "Kurds" (EI), 448.2-449.1.

[b] Fiey, *Nisibe*, 174 and 196-222 *passim*.

[c] Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* III.385.

[d] Vanly, "Déplacement".

spread outward from Qardū sometime after the 4th century B.C.. No source between then and the 10th century A.D. hints at their having done so. No modern scholar has explained how the Kurds of the 4th-century B.C. subsequently spread to other parts of the Middle East.

The next districts in the list are 54-56. Upper, Middle and Lower Kordrik'. Kordrik' (as a whole) was the combination of the Hazil Su basin and the Habur valley. That it contained the latter is certified by the presence of Alki, modern Beytüşşebap, on its territory.[a] There is no sign that the territory of Korduk', predecessor of the Bohtan district, spread into the Hazil Su basin. The two districts (Bohtan district/Korduk' and Hazil Su basin) are quite different in character. Qardū/Korduk' was primarily a settled district, though it did at the same time serve as summer pasture for tribes from the Mesopotamian plain. The Hazil basin is primarily pastureland, though containing a number of villages living off agriculture. The division of Kordrik' into Upper, Middle and Lower immediately suggests we are dealing with just one river valley, but in practice it is unlikely that, if asked, the compiler of the Ašx. would have been able to place the three divisions on the ground or on the map, and no other source considers Kordrik' as divided into an upper, middle and lower part. In short, the division into three is arbitrary, and need not follow a precise geographical rationale.

The Kordrik',[3] after whom the district took its name, may have been Kurds, but more likely were not. The district had previously been inhabited, and in the early 7th century was perhaps still partly inhabited, by a Syrian people, the Tmorāye (Syr.) or

[a] MX (Tiflis 1913), 183; Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 337, quoting a different edition.

Tmorik' (Armn.).[a] The previous name of the district had been Tmorik'.[b] Indeed the name "Tmorik'" was in use up to the 10th century.[c] The Kordrik' were very likely recent newcomers to the district.[4] From an incident when some of them were taken prisoner along with Armenians, we know they were non-Christian.[5]

Were the Kordrik' Kurds ? The similarity of names would certainly argue for the identification. But realism requires a look at the name by which this group, presumably a tribe, would have called itself and the name by which neighbouring groups would have known it. If a single tribe of a people invades a district, it would be more usual for the existing inhabitants and for observers in nearby districts to call the newcomers by the name of the tribe rather than by that of the whole people. If, for example, the Alamanni, a German tribe, invade part of Gaul, then the inhabitants of Gaul will call the Alamanni simply Alamanni. If they call them Germans, there is no way of distinguishing the Alamanni from other Germans. We should also remember the invading tribe, too: it is unlikely to identify itself by the name for the whole people rather than its own name. The opposite process is common: that is to say the process whereby a whole people comes to be identified by the name of just one of its tribes (for example, "Alleman" and "Allemagne" in French). Still, nobody quite has that process in mind when they argue simply from similarity of names that the Kordrik' were Kurds.

The Armenian names for Kurds that we know from other contexts are "Mark'" (pl.) and "K'urd" ("K'erd", "K'urt'").[d] The above considerations suggest that we cannot

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[a] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 337.

[b] MX (Tiflis 1913), 132; Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 335, 336.

[c] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 336-7.

[d] Sanjian, *Colophons* 436.

employ the similarity of names to argue that the Kordrik‘ were Kurds. If the current Armenian name for Kurds was "Mark‘", then the argument finds no premise in the first place (because the names are not similar at all). If the current Armenian name for Kurds was "K‘urd" (or close variants) then its similarity to "Kordrik‘" will not help us towards the conclusion that the Kordrik‘ were Kurds. Nothing is predictable with certainty; perhaps after all the name "Kurd" or an Armenian form of the name was applied to just this particular tribe. But in the absence of certain information all we can do is argue from likelihood.

On balance the Kordrik‘ are not likely to have been Kurds; they were another Syrian people. Non-Christian, Syrian tribes could easily have survived in northern Iraq by the fourth century A.D., the date by which the Kordrik‘ are first known in the Hazil Su and Habur basins.[a] One of the tribes could have moved into the district, partially or wholly displaced the Tmorāye/Tmorik‘ and given their name to the whole district.

The problem that arises next is the geographical ordering of the remaining districts of Korčayk‘ in the Ašx.. The solution to be proposed here is that the geographical path along which they are being arranged by the text goes eastwards through the Nestorian *ashiret* country, then curls round anti-clockwise to land at Little Albak. Orsirank‘ (60), Kartunik‘ (61) and Čahuk (62) are later interpolations put in with the geographical nomenclature of a later period, and the text of Arcruni, in mind. The interpolator wished to complete the picture of Armenia according to a vision, including boundaries and nomenclature, current in his own time. Different geographical names were in use (Orsirank‘, Kartunik‘ and Čahuk are examples) and new areas were under Armenian

[a] N.3 to p.470 above.

control (Kartunik' and Čahuk). As in the case of Vaspurakan, the interpolator adds them to the list just before the final name (Little Albak). The three added names follow a sensible geographical order on their own, but that order itself conflicts with the ordering of the original list.

Since Aitvank', Aigark' and Mot'olank' (nos.57-59) are hard to place, we will start with Orsirank' (60). The name is not known before Arcruni's history, where it comes up during the narration of the mid-9th century fight against the Turk Bugha. In the text Orsirank' is named as a district:[a] the other clues in Arcruni's text will be dealt with shortly. Two other texts dealing with the same events name a village (not district) of Orsiran, specifying that the village is in Albak, the Başkale plain.[b] We do find a village of Saronis at the mouth of the Akinis valley (the former district of Akē): here the Akinis valley meets the narrowing southern snout of the Başkale plain. A village called Soran lies at the west edge of the plain, but towards the plain's southern end. Although the evidence is not absolutely watertight, it immediately suggests we are dealing with a case of overlap between nomenclatures.

The name "Albak" covers the Başkale plain, whether in the 7th century or the 10th. But it is hard to decide just how far down the Zab valley the district extended. It is possible to argue that the plain is the defining feature of the district, so the southern boundary of Albak is given by the southern snout of the plain. This would put the boundary just north of the mouth of the Akē valley. Two indications argue for a more southerly boundary. First, we are faced with two names, Albak and Little Albak, which

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[a] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 143.

[b] Asołik (St. Pet. 1885), 108; John Kath. XXXV.57 (tr. Maksoudian, p.121); Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 335 (quoting different edition of John Kath.).

suggest contiguity between the two districts. In other words, they must meet on a line somewhere in the Zab valley. Little Ałbak may well be defined by the positions of J̌łmar/Julamerk, the Diz valley (containing the castle of Sring), and the later Nestorian district of Berwar. Taking it further upstream than Berwar would result in a somewhat unwieldy district, which would be difficult to control from its capital J̌łmar/Julamerk. Moreover the exit from the Baskale plain is not abrupt: the valley continues wide, its floor rolling. The natural break occurs further downstream, where the gorges begin. So it would be natural for Ałbak to extend further downstream. Whether the Masiro Deresi valley, an eastern tributary, was included is hard to say. Badger's admittedly much later lists of Nestorian villages include one of Kalanis, in the Zab valley well downstream of the plain.

If we can take Ałbak to include the first sector of the Zab valley downstream of the Başkale plain, then Orsirank' can be defined as part of the plain towards the south end plus the first sector of the valley downstream of the plain. If the above definition of Ałbak's boundaries is wrong, then Orsirank' may only have consisted of the southern part of the plain. On the other hand, even if Ałbak was confined to the plain, Orsirank' could have spread beyond Ałbak downstream in the Zab valley. This would mean a district which overlapped with Ałbak but did not lie entirely within it. As we shall shortly see, there are reasons for supposing that Orsirank' was contiguous with the district of Gevar to the south-east. To repeat: if the name "Orsirank'" was not part of the original Ašx., this does not mean it was an invalid name in periods subsequent to the document's composition. It was simply inconsistent with the nomenclature and district boundaries assumed by the Ašx..

The argument can be developed by bringing in Arcruni's narrative. A battle took place on the Gevar plain in the mid-9th century between Gurgen Arcruni and a force sent

by Bugha, the Turkish general in charge of subduing Armenia. The site of the battle can be identified from its name in the text of Arcruni, the valley of the Arean Lič, "Lake of Blood", a large lake. This must be the lake, now a swamp, at the south-east end of the plain.[a] Gurgen camped on the side of a mountain dominating the village of T'ov, which lay in the valley of the Arian Lič. The village of T'ov appears to correspond to the modern Tuvani,[b] which lies in a side-valley debouching into the Gevar plain. Provided the "valley of the Lake of Blood" is taken in a broad sense as a district name, rather than strictly as the name of the plain, Gurgen certainly did camp in that valley.

The text, without naming a starting-point, simply specifies that Gurgen went to the district of Orsirank', and encamped on the mountain above the village of T'ov. By itself, taken dead literally, this would entail that T'ov was in Orsirank'. Such may have been the case; nothing prevents T'ov from lying in both Orsirank' and the valley of the Arean Lič. On the other hand the text may be somewhat loosely expressed, and may mean simply that Gurgen went through Orsirank' to get to T'ov. This would be a more natural interpretation. If it is right, we still have to decide whether Orsirank' was merely the southern portion of Albak or that and more. Arcruni's narrative, not very compellingly, suggests the latter. It suggests that Orsirank' was adjacent to the valley of the Lake of Blood, on whose edge the village of T'ov did in fact lie. Gurgen crossed Orsirank', then arrived at the village.

This gives us the conclusion that Orsirank' included part of the Zab valley downstream from the Başkale plain; and the conclusion seems probable. Another

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[a] Arcruni 143.

[b] The form of the name marked on the USAF 1:250,000 map.

clue from the 19th century confirms it. In that century a Kurdish tribe, or perhaps tribal section, called Sorani resided "between Gevar and Julamerk".[a] This indicates part of the Zab valley downstream of Ałbak, though admittedly not immediately downstream.

What was the defining feature of the district of Orsirank'? The southern half of the Başkale plain, even in the 19th century, contained a large number of Nestorian villages; and so did the next sector of the Zab valley. In other words the name, in the 9th century, could have denoted an area which was defined partly according to the race of its inhabitants.

The etymology of the name "Orsirank'" appears to have nothing to do with the various names for Syrians and Nestorians. Geographical denotation and the denotation of a group of people are hard to disentangle from one another; and it is hard to distinguish cause and effect. Nevertheless we are not dealing with a pure case of a name which was applied first to a group, then to a place. That the same name can be given to a Nestorian group, then to a Kurdish one, shows that each group successively took its name from the place; and the presence of the villages of Orsiran, Soranis and Soran confirm this conclusion. There is no reason to think the 19th-century Sorani were Kurdified Nestorians (many of the villages in the same area still were Nestorian in the 19th century), or that the 9th-century Orsirank' were a Kurdish tribe living among the Syrians and Armenians. They were a Nestorian group living at the south end of the Başkale plain and in the next sector of the Zab valley.

Since Orsirank' spread into southern Ałbak, it belongs to a nomenclature which overlaps with that of the original 7th-century list in the Ašx.. In other words it does not

[a] Rhea, "Hakkari district" [JAOS 10 (1880)], 119.

belong in the original list, though in the 9th and 10th centuries it was quite correct as a geographical reference.

One of the clues to the location of Čahuk (62) is that it contained a castle called Agarak and was near, probably on the border of, Persia. A certain Gagik, one of the Arcruni dynasty, was given the castle and district, and given a command on the frontier of Persia.[a] The district, with its castle, is mentioned a number of times as changing hands, being bestowed, seized etc.[b] and seems to have been fairly important. The name "Agarak" ("field", "estate") is suggestive, however loosely, of flat and fertile land. Although we have no further clues to go on, the district which fits all the clues and which badly needs a name in this period is Gevar, which was centred on the large and fertile Gevar plain. Probably the name denotes the whole of the Gevar basin; Thomas Arcruni called the same area the "valley of the Lake of Blood". Such a name was somewhat cumbersome for the list in the Ašx..

The district of Kartunik' (61) should certainly be located near the Gevar plain, since a village called Kertinis lies in the plain.[6] Strictly speaking if the village lies in the Gevar plain, that would indicate Kartunik' *was* the Gevar plain. However Čahuk, evidently a fairly important district, fits the Gevar plain very well. Kartunik' is somewhat shadowy. It is not met with outside the Ašx., and would appear to be a small and unimportant district. One possible location is the basin of the Şehsemzin Deresi and Bajirge Deresi.[7] This basin was later to be known to Nestorians as the "district of the Derrenāye": the latter were also a Nestorian group. Another possibility is the Masiro Deresi valley. This

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[a] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 263.

[b] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 225, 260, 263, 278, 279.

would mean that the Ašx. was listing the three districts in a line going from north-west to south-east.

At any rate the sequence Orsirank'-Kartunik'-Čahuk (nos.60-62) gives us a group of districts, probably contiguous, of which the first occupies part of Ałbak and the last consists in the Gevar plain. To progress from Kordrik' (57-59) immediately to Orsirank' (60) requires a sudden leap quite at variance with the usual clear principles of geographical ordering followed by the Ašx.. Having arrived at Čahuk, we have then to go to one end or other of the Nestorian *ashiret* country. If we go to the west end of the *ashiret* country, we make another leap, only to arrive at the border of Čahuk again before curling round to finish at Little Ałbak. If we go to the east end, which at least would not involve an inexplicable jump, we then have to progress westward to the border of Kordrik' before curling round to Little Ałbak. The need for such discrete, long-distance, irregular movements suggests that the leap to Orsirank' was not a feature of the original list. Independently of this point, we know that Orsirank' could not have been part of the original list, as it doubles part of Ałbak.[8] Kartunik' is a name known only from the Ašx.'s text. Čahuk is known only from Arcruni and the Ašx.. The exegesis of the Ašx. is made much simpler if we leave out the three names. They were put in after the original composition of the Ašx., not at the end of the list of Korčayk''s districts, but in the middle. This, in the perhaps not very farsighted or ingenious mind of the copyist, was seen as a ruse to foil anyone who suspected an addition.

Beside Little Ałbak, whose position, occupying part of the Zab valley and with J̌łmar/Julamerk as its capital, is clear, there remain Aitvank' (57), Aigark' (58) and Mot'ołank' (59). Given the position of Little Ałbak (63) these three ought to be in the Nestorian *ashiret* country. Can we see in "Mot'ołank'" the consonants of "Tkhuma" ?

"Aigark'" might yield "Jīlū" (g/(Syr.) j; r/l). Aitvank' is hard to place, but if Hübschmann's alternative form of "Atrvank'" is correct,[a] then we can see "Tyārī" in that. The three identifications would give the progression Tyārī, Jīlū, Thūma, which geographically is ill-ordered. "Aigark'" could alternatively represent "Rekan", which would give an order determined by consistent principles.

At any rate there seems to be some correspondence between the three names in the list and those of the Nestorian districts. However the three names probably did not account for the whole of the Nestorian *ashiret* country, even at the time; on the other hand the names of the Ašx. may not denote districts with exactly the same borders as the *ashiret* districts of the time, and of course the *ashiret* districts of the time may have had different borders from those that we know from the 19th century.

It is worth trying to be precise about the borders of Little Albak. Arcruni, writing in the 10th century A.D., mentions that the castles of Jǐlmar/Julamerk and Sring lay in the province of Little Albak.[b] Since Arcruni is discussing the Parthian period at this point in his text, he must assume that both castles had been within Little Albak since then, and the two occur as a pair in the narration of much more recent events.[c] Sring certainly lay somewhere in the Diz valley. The stream within that valley was called the Suringa Su, and there certainly was a castle called Sring in the valley; but its precise site is uncertain.[9] This means that, in addition to the tributary valley of Julamerk, the Diz valley was included within Little Albak. The conclusion is surprising, since Diz was one of the

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[a] Hübschmann, *Ortsnamen* 335 refers to ZAPh. 1, 133; but the abbreviation is not in his list of abbreviations. "Zeitschrift für Armenischen Philologie" ?

[b] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 54.

[c] Arcruni (ed. Patk.), 196, 279.

Nestorian *ashiret* districts.

Beyond this we have no precise clues. However the Ašx. appears to aim for an exhaustive account of territory, and so far the district of Berwar, upstream of Julamerk on the north bank and occupying certainly a small sector of the river's course,[a] is unaccounted for. It is a reasonable assumption that Berwar was included. It is possible also that Tal and Walto, downstream of Julamerk, formed part of Little Albak.

After working out the positions of its constituent districts, we can draw some general conclusions about Korčayk'. Its general shape, in the original text of the Ašx., was a band running from west to east. It narrowed to pass through the three districts running through the Nestorian *ashiret* country, then curled round to include Little Albak. Economically the "province" of Korčayk' is united by a clear rationale; racially, too, it was (in the 7th century) homogeneous. All the districts were Syrian; there cannot have been many Armenians in Little Albak, even as late as the Arcruni period. Politically, of course, Korčayk' was a rag-bag, and not united in any way.

Who were the Korčayk' ? They were decidedly not one of history's most prestigious peoples. In fact the name is so obscure that it is unlikely to have been in general use in the 7th century to denote the peoples of the "province". Instead it was brought from some other context to serve as a title for the "province". There was no title current in ordinary speech, particularly in the place itself and in neighbouring areas. In the context of the Ašx., the Korčayk' are the Syrian peoples of the *zōzān* country, which stretched from the Bohtan district in the west to the Zab valley in the east. In its original context it denoted a small tribe or other group; this no doubt resided somewhere within

[a] See the village lists in this appendix; Ch.III, sects.II.3.2.2, II.3.1 above; and the map.

the whole "province" conveniently denoted by the name "Korčayk'". In the fourth century A.D. a district of Korčēk', presumably inhabited by a group known under the same name, is known which was evidently much smaller than the 7th-century *ašxarh* of the Ašx.. This Korčēk' is hard to locate, but the most probable location is the Hazil Su valley. The Korčēk' after whom, for reasons of convenient nomenclature, the Ašx.'s Korčayk' is named, were probably the group inhabiting the smaller Korčēk'.[10]

APPENDIX IV

THE ORIGIN OF THE RUZAGI PRINCIPALITY

ACCORDING TO THE *SHEREFNAME*

An account of the Bitlis principality's early history can be worked out by combining the various purportedly historical episodes narrated by the *Sherefname* to explain the principality's foundation, with more solidly-based aspects of the history of surrounding regions and towns. Without accurate knowledge of the history of regions adjacent to the Van area in the 12th to 14th centuries the various stories incorporated in the *Sherefname* look like the fanciful import to the history of Bitlis of certain prestigious characters and dynasties of Middle Eastern history with the aim of endowing that of Bitlis with a false importance, lineage and antiquity. But if an accurate knowledge of those characters' and dynasties' history and of the history of surrounding regions is brought to bear on the *Sherefname*'s stories of the foundation of the Bitlis dynasty, the *Sherefname*'s stories each emerge as conveying some facet or point of the Bitlis dynasty's history, though transmuted into a form which at first sight strikes the reader as a legend woven partly from aspects of the history of better-known dynasties.

Each of the several semi-historical legends given us by the *Sherefname* seems to be more or less independent of the others as regards the tradition in which they originated. Moreover most of them would on their own suffice as accounts of the dynasty's foundation. But, presumably after careful cutting and grooming, the *Sherefname* gives them in such a form as to provide connections between them, or at least to ensure a

minimum of inconsistencies. Presumably the purpose is to combine the disparate legends into something the more impressive for the diversity of grand origins which it attributes to the Bitlis dynasty. The *Sherefname* does not on the whole narrate these legends in immediate succession, however. They are generally separated by short sections of text relating to other matters. This is presumably done in order to disguise the disparatenes of the legends, the fact of their different origins, and whatever inconsistencies remained after their grooming by the author.

Let us summarise the eight legends, using the word "story" (without prejudice as to the quantity of fiction, myth, or even narrative -- true or fictional -- contained in each) to designate them.

Story A. Amalgamation of 24 tribes; election of hakim.

(Sh.I.358-9.)

The Ruzagi tribe was created in one day from 24 tribes, who assembled at Ṭāb in the nahiya of Khūyt.[1] Twelve of the tribes belonged to the Bilbāsī group (firqa), the other twelve to the Qavālīsī. The twenty-four chose a *ḥākim* from among themselves. At the time the *ḥākim* of Bitlis and Hazo was Tavit, one of the rulers of Georgia.[2] They took Bitlis and Hazo from Tavit.

Significance. (i) 24 tribes. That the Ruzagi originated as an agglomeration of several tribes is highly likely. The number 24 is chosen for its general acceptability in accounts of this sort (cf. the number of Oğuz tribes). The process of agglomeration must have involved

subordination of one tribe by another or at least by a ruling lineage. The *Sherefname* fails to say so, and fails to say too that if a leader was chosen at such short notice it is highly likely that his tribe or lineage segment would have been the dominant one.

(ii) Two groups (Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī). This is an entirely natural formation: it is discussed with parallels from the 19th- and 20th-century condition of Kurdish tribes in Ch.II and Ch.II.

(iii) Bitlis and Hazo. Why Hazo, which was not part of the Ruzagi principality's territory and not a town of much size either ? In the 12th century A.D. Bitlis and the city of Arzan, to the south-west of Bitlis and well outside the Van region, were in the hands of the same dynasty, a Turkish one known to modern historians as the Dilmaçoğulları; and Hazo *as a town*, though not as the seat of a dynasty, was to some extent the successor of Arzan. This will be explained more rigorously in connection with another story, E.

(iv) Tavit, the Georgian. This is none other than David the Great, Bagratid prince of Tao-Klarǰet'i from A.D. 961 to 1,000. David did indeed acquire territory in the Murat Su valley and further north (Malazgirt, the upper Aras basin and so on) and made an attempt on Ahlat, though he did not take it. At Malazgirt he was supplanted by the Marwanids, a Kurdish dynasty, who also held Ahlat. The *Sherefname* is probably drawing, too, on a memory of Georgian attempts to take Ahlat in the 12th and early 13th centuries. David could never have conquered Bitlis or Hazo. Probably he is brought in (if we unscramble the thought and expose its errors and inconsistencies) by the following train of thought: Bitlis was captured by the Ruzagi confederation from a local dynasty; David held Ahlat (strictly he did not, but he held Malazgirt and attempted to take Ahlat); David, a Christian monarch, was supplanted at Ahlat by the Marwanids, a Muslim and Kurdish dynasty (strictly he was supplanted by the Marwanids only at Malazgirt, but the

Marwanids held Ahlat); the aura of Ahlat, capital of Il-Khanid Armenia, must at all costs be transferred to Bitlis; therefore David must be represented as holding Bitlis. (And as Bitlis is to be twinned with Hazo, for reasons just explained, he is given Hazo too.)

Story B. 'Izz al-Din and Zia al-Din brought from Ahlat. (Sh.I.359-61.)

The original *ḥākim* is without sons or daughters. So the Ruzagi deliberated the next step, and decided to bring from Ahlat 'Izz al-Din and Zia al-Din, two brothers who are princes of the Sasanian dynasty (sic -- Akāsra, i.e. the Chosroes (plural form), in the text). 'Izz al-Din becomes prince of Bitlis, Zia al-Din prince of Hazo.

Significance. (i) Ahlat was the city whose prestige had at all costs to be captured on behalf of Bitlis. We will defer discussion of Hazo (as before) to story E and of the Sasanians till story D below.

(ii) Zia al-Din is the name of a prince of Bitlis, attested in 750/1349, and probably the second well-attested prince of the Ruzagi principality.[a] It is probably no coincidence that his name occurs in the story here; Zia al-Din was prince of Bitlis just at the time when Bitlis was gaining on Ahlat as a city and beginning to rival it as a base of administrative power.

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[a] Cahen, "Diyar Bakr" (14 c.), 78. The first well-attested prince is Sharaf al-Din Abu Bakr, known c.733. See Ch.III, sect.I.5.(ii).

Inconsistencies and "over-explanation". The first Ruzagi *ḥākim* (elected by the confederation) of story A conveniently dies without progeny; any heir would have made necessary the whole story of an import of princes from Ahlat.

Story C. Constituent tribes. Sh.I.361.

The Ruzagi are divided into 24 *sha'b* (peoples). Five of these (Qisānī, Bāyegī, Mōdikī, Zuqīsī and Zidānī) are the ancient *'ashīrets* of the *vilāyat* (here, district) of Bitlis. The other fifteen (sic) constitute the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī groups. The *Sherefname* then gives the names of the fifteen, claiming however that there are ten in each group (sic).

Inconsistencies and historical significance. We now have five ancient tribes of the district of Bitlis, plus fifteen (on the total count) more from the Qavālīsī and Bilbāsī, or twenty more (if we take the two groups as containing ten tribes each). This leads to an inconsistency with story A, which talked of 12 in each of the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī. Whether we take the total of the Qavālīsī and Bilbāsī in story C as 15 or 20 (10 + 10), this is inconsistent with the 24 of story A.

This is only by way of clearing away the obvious inconsistency before coming to the important material yielded by the *Sherefname*. Story A says that the Ruzagi were formed out of the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī groups, and story C tells us that the Bilbāsī and Qavālīsī groups are different from the five ancient tribes of the immediate district of Bitlis. We can deduce that the Ruzagi did not originate in Bitlis and that they conquered it from other tribes. Plausible a priori; and unexceptionable from the viewpoint of

historiographical method, which would recommend seeing any claim of autochthony as an attempt at legitimation for current hegemony.

In any case the *Sherefname* itself provides evidence that three of the five local tribes did reside, in the 15th century, in the neighbourhood of Bitlis. Now of course one could suspect that the list of five local tribes was arbitrarily drawn up from a knowledge of which tribes lived in the locality at the time of writing of the *Sherefname* and chance knowledge of tribes living in the locality in previous times. However the 15th-century events where the names of the tribes are betrayed are not narrated for the purpose of glorifying the tribes, nor are there any tell-tale inconsistencies or attempts elsewhere in the text to produce lists. In short, there is no sign of forcing the narratives to suit the list, or vice versa.[3]

The Mōdikī tribe features in the Melek Ahmet Paşa episode of the mid-17th century, in which Abdal Khan of Bitlis escapes to his kinsman the Mōdikī chief.[a] Some of the tribes, too, are known in the Mutki district as late as the turn of the 19th and 20th century. To be sure, some transformations had occurred between times. The Mōdikī tribe had caught other tribes, or sections of them, under its wing, and formed a confederation of subordinate tribes. Among these are the Kusan (Sh., Qisānī) and Zeidan (Sh., Zidānī).[b]

The members of the Qavālīsī and Bilbāsī groups also have credentials both within the text of the *Sherefname* and later in date than its composition. One of the Qavālīsī group was the Qavālīsī *tribe*. There is some evidence from the early 15th century that

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[a] Ev.D.247, MS 270a.13-19 (Ist.IV.227 misleading).

[b] Sykes, "Tribes" [JAI 38 (1908)], 464-5. I suspect that the Mōdikī confederation is the successor of the Ruzagi.

the tribe resided in the *nāḥiyas* of Chuqūr, at the east end of the plain of Muş, and of Muş itself, one segment of the plain.[4] A member of the Kalājīrī (one of the Bilbāsī tribes) features in the late-15th century story of the principality's recapture from the Ak Koyunlu.[a]

We find the Khāliṭī, a Bilbāsī tribe, in the district of Sasun and Hazo in the 16th and the mid-17th century.[b] The Kārisī, a Qavālīsī tribe, lived on the east bank of the Tigris north of Fenek in the 17th century.[c] Two Bilbāsī tribes, the Bālikī and Khiaretī, are known in the 19th or early 20th centuries, one in the Sasun district and one in the Mutki district as part of the Modiki confederation.[d]

There is no ground for suspicion in the fact that several of the tribes are later found outside the territory of the Bitlis principality. They could have moved in the interim; but, even if they had not moved, these tribes, or sections of them, could have lived outside the boundaries of the principality while owing it allegiance. It is more disconcerting that the positions of the Qavālīsī and Bilbāsī tribes, where known, do not indicate any rough geographical area for either of the two groups. Indeed the indications conflict somewhat. But the Qavālīsī and Bilbāsī tribes need not have lived in mutually exclusive zones: there could have been a different geographical emphasis in the location of each group's tribes, but some overlap and a mosaic of Qavālīsī and Bilbāsī tribes therein.

Inconsistencies etc.. Apart from the numerical inconsistency noted above, there is another

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[a] Sh.I.413.

[b] Sh.I.206-8; *Cihānnüma*, tr. Charmoy, 61-61 (Halidī); Ev.IV.226 (D.243) (Halitī).

[c] *Cihānnüma*, tr. Charmoy, 59, 151 (Kārisī).

[d] The Bālikī: Taylor, JRGS 1865 [Kurdistan], 28-9; Sykes, "Tribes" [JAI 38 (1908)], 458. The Khiaretī: Sykes 465 (the Erikli, part of the Modiki confederation, are sometimes called Khiarta).

minor matter. In story A one of the alternatives features the Kōrdekī as natives of Bitlis; but in story C they are one of the Qavālīsī group, which with the Bilbāsī conquered Bitlis.

But stories A and C are consistent otherwise. Story A says the Ruzagi were formed outside the district of Bitlis, in Khūyt, before conquering Bitlis and Hazo.

Conclusion. So far we can conclude that the Ruzagi was a composite tribe formed outside Bitlis. The number of constituent tribes was fifteen or twenty, or somewhere very near those numbers. Subsequently the Ruzagi conquered Bitlis, subordinating the five tribes residing in the city's neighbourhood.

Story D. The Sasanian Bahvāš is ancestor of the Bitlis dynasty.

Sh.I.362.

Bahvāš was a son of Jamasp (sic), himself son of Firūz, the fifth sovereign of the Sasanian dynasty. Bahvāš fixed his residence at Ahlat [rather more than] 760 [Hijri] years ago.[5] [And he is the ancestor of the Zia al-Din and 'Izz al-Din who were brought from Ahlat to Hazo and Bitlis respectively.][6]

Historical significance. Ahlat was not the capital of Armenia, or even a local capital, in the Sasanian period. Nor were the Bitlis princes descended from the Sasanians. However Ahlat was the capital of Il-Khanid Armenia, and was considered by Arab geographers Armenia's most prestigious city. (In both cases Armenia is a greatly cut-down version of

Classical and Late Antique Armenia. It consists of the Lake Van area and certain territory (including Erzurum) to north and west.) The Sasanians did control the Lake Van area, part of Armenia on either definition. So it would be natural, when searching for a prestigious ancestor dynasty, to choose the Sasanians and to grant them a local capital at Ahlat.[7]

Story E. Zia al-Din takes possession of Bitlis, and forces 'Izz al-Din to swap it for Hazo. Sh.I.363-4.

Zia al-Din notices that the population of Bitlis inclines towards him rather than 'Izz al-Din, meets his brother in Bitlis, and as he is leaving pretends he must go back to the citadel to collect his seal-ring. He seizes the citadel and 'Izz al-Din is forced to take up the government of Hazo and Sasun. The present dynasty of Hazo is descended from him.[8]

Historical significance. Why Hazo in particular ? (The explanation has been held over from story B.) In the 12th century Bitlis belonged to the same dynasty as the city of Arzan, which lay in the east half of the Tigris basin, west and a little south of Bitlis. Bitlis seems to have parted company with Arzan in 588/1191-2, when it was captured by the Ahlat principality.

Meanwhile the Arzan principality survived until 750/1349-50. In that year the great city of Arzan was sacked by the neighbouring Ayyubid principality of Hisn Kayfa (Hasankeyf), and seems never to have been repopulated. Population migrated to neighbouring towns and cities. At this time the chief recipient was probably Siirt. Later,

however, occurs the first indication of the existence of the town of Hazo, at the join between the floor of the Tigris basin and the Taurus mountains. The best explanation for the town's growth seems to be that, not for the first time, the main east-west trade route through the Tigris basin had shifted. Previously it had touched Arzan and then turned north-west to the Malabadi bridge (between Hazo and Mayyāfāriqīn/Silvan) or else continued west to cross the Batman Su by a ford. But with the loss of Arzan it was quicker, though probably more insecure, to take a line along the base of the Taurus mountains directly between the exit of the Bitlis pass and the Malabadi bridge.

The territory attached to Hazo had been part of the dependent territory of Arzan. The territory lay either side of the Garzan Su as it flows through the Tigris basin: Hazo lies at the exit of the river from the Taurus mountains.

By now, however, Hazo and its territory belonged to the princes of Sasun, who eventually made it their capital: Sasun lies north of Hazo in the highest valleys of the Taurus. The Bitlis princes maintained a close connection with the dynasty of Sasun and Hazo: marriage alliances are known, for example. Sasun was a kind of constrained ally rather than a subordinate principality.[a] This was probably for the same reason as that which connected Bitlis and Arzan in the 12th century. The district of Bitlis is a natural summer grazing-ground for flocks wintering in the Tigris basin. Similar transhumance must have been taking place between the plain of Muş and the Sasun district.

Why do the princes of the story swap Hazo and Bitlis ? If there is any historical significance in this part of the story, it may be simply that tradition, and the author of the *Sherefname*, wish to emphasise the close and continuing connection between Bitlis and Hazo. Without the story of the swap, the history of Hazo would seem too easy to separate

[a] For the evidence, Ch.III, sect.I.4.1.

from that of Bitlis.

Story F. Early princes of Bitlis, down to the time of Timur. Sh.I.364-5.

The names of eighteen rulers of Bitlis are known. The period covered by them goes back more than 450 years ...[a] [The first of these rulers is] Malik Ashraf, whom the *Sherefname* claims to have been in power at the time of the invasion of the Khwarizmshah Jalal al-Din [1226, though the city was only taken in a siege of Shawwal 626/August 1229 to Jumāda I 627/April 1230].[9] Then follow Malik Ashraf's brother Malik Majd al-Din; 'Izz al-Din; Mir Abu Bakr; the amir Shaykh Sharaf; then the amir Zia al-Din, who had an interview with Timur. After Zia al-Din the history of the city's rulers is established.

Historical significance. We can almost certainly rule out the existence, at the claimed date, of a prince of Bitlis called Malik Ashraf (the Malik Ashraf of this passage is a partial calque on the Ayyubid of Ahlat who resisted Jalal al-Din for a time: see discussion of story G below). To start from the other end: the amir Zia al-Din is said to have had an interview with Timur. Unfortunately other sources conflict with this statement. The only ruler of Bitlis known from other sources to have received Timur is Haji Sharaf, who will be the same as the amir Shaykh Sharaf of the present list. The two interviews took place in A.D. 1387 and 1394. The *Sherefname* itself, later on, is quite clear about the interview

[a] Our summary excludes at this point the assertion that the name of the ruler from whom the atabeg 'Imād al-Dīn [Zangi] conquered Bitlis is not known; and that Kızıl Arslan conquered Bitlis in his invasion of Azerbayjan and Armenia. On this, below, pp.496-500.

of 1394: this is the first historical event on which it has veridical detail.[a]

Various explanations for the conflict of sources are available, none of which carries mathematical certainty and all of which involve imputing a mistake to the *Sherefname*. The following paragraphs will argue our preferred explanation; the alternative explanations will then be stated without identifying or evaluating their merits and demerits. This will have the advantage of avoiding muddle in understanding the preferred explanation.

There was no Zia al-Din ruling Bitlis at the stage proposed by this passage of the text. The author is getting muddled, because he lacks certain items of information, some available to us, and attempts to construct this stage of dynastic history by deductions, of a certain cogency, from other stages, and by two straight confusions which have no cogency whatever but which are entirely understandable in an author composing a long text. His sources for the early period (up to the reign of Shams al-Din I, first known in A.D 1406) are lacunary; later parts of the text have yet to be written; the author is working from memory of his sources; and occasionally becomes confused and, no doubt, frustrated.

(1) The author is probably unaware there were two interviews with Timur. If so, to give the one interview to Zia al-Din, precede him by Sharaf and then, later in the text, give the interview to Sharaf, with plenty of convincing detail, is a confusion without any cogency at all. Suppose the author knows there were two interviews: still the confusion is without cogency, because the later passage gives the second interview to Sharaf.

(2) No other source mentions a Zia al-Din directly after Sharaf. As far as we know, Sharaf's successor was an Ibrahim, who is mentioned by Thomas of Mecop' as having been seized and killed by Timur's son and deputy, Miran Shah. The event must

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[a] A.D. 1387: T'M 28. A.D. 1394: (a) MC II.350 (Dawit' of Bałēš); (b) Sh.I.372.

have taken place between 1366 and 1399.[a] But the *Sherefname* does not know this Ibrahim; so Zia al-Din is a name that he supplies as Sharaf's successor, for one reason or another and from one source or another, which will be discussed shortly. Miran Shah set on the throne an infant son of Sharaf, called Šamšati by the source, Thomas of Mecop'.[b] This Šamšati may well be Shams al-Din I, the next known ruler. Shams al-Din I is well attested, first in 1406. If Šamšati is not this Shams al-Din, then his name is still Shams al-Din. So Zia al-Din cannot be the successor of Ibrahim either.

(3) There is a confusion later on in the text. At I.374 (in the section heading) the text says Shams al-Din I is the son of the amir Haji Sharaf. But later (I.379), discussing Shams al-Din I's achievements, it talks of the coins minted by this Shams al-Din, of which the author himself had seen examples, and mentions the patronymic on the coin, ibn Żīā' al-Dīn. Such coins actually survive. The author is clearly muddled, but it seems fair to suppose that when it came to supplying a successor to Sharaf in the early part of the text, where his sources are scrappy, he also knew he was muddled. He may have got into a state of bewilderment and frustration, and supplied the name of Shams al-Din's father, also Sharaf's son, from the coins. If he had kept his head he would have seen he was contradicting his earlier assertion that Sharaf was the father of Shams al-Din. From his point of view the idea that Sharaf was Shams al-Din I's father is entirely cogent: he knows of no intervening ruler. And as a matter of fact, on Thomas of Metsop''s evidence, it is also correct.

(4) Unfortunately the author makes a second mistake, again one of little cogency. The Shams al-Din ibn Zia al-Din of the coins is not Shams al-Din I, but III. First of all,

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[a] Ch.IV, sect.I.5.(iii).

[b] Ibid..

our indications are that Shams al-Din's father was Sharaf, not Zia al-Din; secondly all that we know of Shams al-Din I's reign shows a series of willing subordinate relationships to other rulers: Timur, Kara Yusuf, Shah Rukh. There is no period when he would have wanted to mint in his own name. But Shams al-Din III is a different case.[a]

(5) In the list of rulers under discussion, Sharaf is preceded by a Mir Abu Bakr, whom we know from another source, al-'Umari, in the year 733/1332-3.[b] Unfortunately the name given in that source is Sharaf al-Din Abu Bakr: the *Sherefname* probably leaves out the "Sharaf al-Din" to avoid muddle in the reader. However between this Sharaf al-Din Abu Bakr and Haji Sharaf another ruler is known, a Zia al-Din, in 750/1349-50.[c] At a guess the author is committing a further mistake, which he could only have done by relying on his memory of written sources. Probably he knew this Zia al-Din too, but forgot that this Zia al-Din came after Abu Bakr, not before. He also got his name wrong, putting 'Izz al-Din instead. The latter mistake is not very surprising, given the frequency with which the two names have already been coupled, and given, too, that the author knows he will be putting a Zia al-Din after Sharaf.

In sum, the *Sherefname* is confused in a way which helps not at all with the dynasty's history. The correct sequence after Malik Majd al-Din is: Sharaf al-Din Abu Bakr; Zia al-Din; Haji Sharaf; Ibrahim; Shams al-Din I. The *Sherefname*, at this point in the text, is trying to put a Zia al-Din in place of Ibrahim, who is not known to the author.

We will simply mention the other possible solutions. First, Zia al-Din comes between Šamšati and Shams al-Din I; this would be based more or less on pure

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[a] For more, Ch.III, sect.I.5.(iv) and (v), and note to annexe at end of sect. 5.

[b] Ch.III, sect.I.5.(ii).

[c] Ibid..

imagination. Secondly, Zia al-Din never ruled, but was simply the father of Shams al-Din. This naturally has the disadvantage of ignoring both accounts of the father that we actually have and of attributing the coins to Shams al-Din I, who seems to been quite happy in his subordination to a succession of outside rulers.

Story G. Occupation of Bitlis by Zengi; subsequent emergence and establishment of the Ruzagi at Bitlis. Sh.I.365-7.

During the reign of the [Great Seljuk] Mahmud [511-25/1118-31][a] [when the Great Seljuks still did, as a matter of history, hold the local dynasties of Armenia and northern Mesopotamia in subjection], the responsibility for 'Irāq 'Arab was given to the atabeg 'Imād al-Dīn [Zangi, more often written Zengi], while that for Azerbayjan and Armenia was given to the atabeg Ildigiz. In the year 534[/1139-40] Zengi captured Bitlis, Jazira and other places in northern Iraq ('Aqra etc.). But in 576[/1180-81] Salah al-Din, son of Nur al-Din (sic), was defeated in a battle with the Egyptians. This broke the power of the Seljuk atabegs (sic) and the Ruzagi were able to emerge from the mountains and forests, and re-establish themselves in Bitlis.

Another tradition says that the town of Bitlis was under the authority of Kizil Arslan [son of Ildigiz]. (I.366.)

The Serājīān group, who are still in the district of Bitlis, are a remnant of the Seljuks: "Serājīān" is a mistake for "Saljūqīān".

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[a] EI².VI.63-64, "Mahmud b. Muhammad b. Malik-Shāh ..." (C.E.Bosworth).

Historical significance. 576/1180-81, the date of the supposed defeat of Saladin, is from the viewpoint of the *Sherefname* a critical one for the history of the Ruzagi in Bitlis. In story F it said that the names of eighteen rulers, going back more than 450 years, are known (p.492 above). In the same story it then goes on to say it is not known which Ruzagi was ruling Bitlis at the time of Zengi's occupation (note a to p.492 above). If we take 450 from 1005, the date of writing given in a nearby passage, we get 555, twenty-one years short of 576. So "more than 450 years" would be a more or less exact description of the period between H. 576 and the date of writing. The *Sherefname* believes that after 576 the Ruzagi rulers are all known.

Moreover this period of 450 years and a little more is a great deal more substantial in the mind of its author than the previous years of Ruzagi power at Bitlis, of which the author has no accurate conception and which are claimed on behalf of the Ruzagi so as to stiffen the image of antiquity and long-standing power and assert the connection with the Sasanians (stories B and D above). In other words the author has complete faith in the notion that over the period of 450 years or more the claim to more or less continuous Ruzagi power at Bitlis can be soundly sustained. That Bitlis was occupied by Seljuk atabegs is not a circumstance the author minds admitting, given the Great Seljuks' reputation; and he even goes so far as to hijack that reputation by claiming that the "Serājīān group", who still live in the district of Bitlis, are really a Seljuk remnant under a wrong name.[10] But occupation by subsequent dynasties is harder to take, though the author does unflinchingly recount occupations by subsequent dynasties.

Next we shall deal with Zengi's putative capture of Bitlis in 534 and the Ildigizid tenure of Armenia. There is no evidence that Zengi did capture Bitlis, though he certainly captured a number of places in the Diyar Bakr, bringing about a redistribution of territory

among its mosaic of local dynasties. Does any well-attested historical event lie behind the *Sherefname*'s misconception ? We can reason as follows. The *Sherefname* does not know of the 12th-century Shah-i Arman dynasty, whose capital was at Ahlat. This seems somewhat surprising, and conceivably the author and other repositories of local historical memory had some hazy recollection of a local dynasty which had actually been at Ahlat, but whose location, in their memories, was left floating. However the *Sherefname*'s ignorance of the Shah-i Arman dynasty would explain why the author imputes to Ildigiz a control over Armenia which he never had.[a] On the other hand a capture of Bitlis did take place in 588/1191-92.[b] Now the captor was not exactly the Shah-i Arman, but Begtimur, a former mamluk of the Shah-i Arman dynasty who had put an end to it and taken over the principality. However this makes very little difference: the principality, territory and capital city of the invading power were the same, and Begtimur can be taken, for the purposes of this story, as representing a continuation of the dynasty. Could tradition have represented the capture of Bitlis by a local dynasty, vassal of the Great Seljuks,[11] by talking of the capture of Bitlis by Zengi ? At any rate when the *Sherefname* talks of the release of Bitlis from the "Seljuk atabegs" in or just after 576, it may well have in mind the release of the city from the power of the Shah-i Arman dynasty (strictly from Begtimur's son) at the Ayyubid takeover of the principality, including Bitlis, in 607/1207-8. The *Sherefname* claims Malik Ashraf as the first known ruler of Bitlis and the first in the more substantively conceived and more authentic string of 18 after the recapture from the "Seljuk atabegs". Malik Ashraf belonged to an Ayyubid, and therefore Kurdish, dynasty. It need not surprise us, allowing for some confusions, if the *Sherefname*

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[a] EI^2.III.1110-12, "Ildenizids" (C.E.Bosworth).

[b] See Appendix I, Bitlis.

takes as the occasion for the re-assertion of Ruzagi control over Bitlis, and the beginning of the more concretely imagined period of Ruzagi rule, the putative defeat of the best-known Ayyubid, Saladin. The latter point, however, is not essential to the argument.

Now to deal with this putative defeat of Saladin. Saladin was not the son of Nur al-Din, but the son of Ayyub; he was not defeated by the Egyptians, but with his father was responsible precisely for the conquest of Egypt on behalf of Nur al-Din in January 1169.[a] What may lie behind the notion of a defeat in 576 is, not Saladin's defeat by the Egyptians, but his victories over the local rulers of Upper Mesopotamia in the early 1180's.[b] These victories (in the understanding of local tradition at Bitlis) would have weakened the power of any ruler (even the Seljuk atabegs) who had recently subjugated Bitlis, so allowing the Ruzagi to re-emerge and re-assert their government at Bitlis.[12]

We should note, before considering the alternative "tradition" concerning Kızıl Arslan, the contradiction and over-explanation contained in the *Sherefname*'s account of the occupation of Bitlis from 534 to 576. Azerbayjan and Armenia, says the text, were given to the atabeg Ildigiz in the reign of the Great Seljuk Mahmud (*before* the capture of Bitlis by Zengi; this is the implication of the text, as well as being indicated by the actual dates of Mahmud, 511-25). So why introduce an account of its capture by Zengi (another "Seljuk atabeg") when it is, according to the *Sherefname*, being administered by a Seljuk atabeg already ? The contradiction seems to support the conclusion drawn above: the capture of Bitlis by Zengi substitutes for the real capture by the Shah-i Arman dynasty (strictly Begtimur), itself not exactly a Seljuk atabeg but at any rate a Seljuk subordinate.

How does the alternative "tradition" concerning Kızıl Arslan fit in with the series

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[a] EI[1].IV.85.1, "Saladin".

[b] See e.g. Cahen, *Syrie du nord* 420-1, 422.

of historical errors in the *Sherefname*'s account of the occupation by "Seljuk atabegs" from 534 to 576 or soon after ? Kızıl Arslan was the son of Ildigiz and ruled the Ildigizid territories from 582/1187 to 587/1191.[a] So the mere fact of Armenia's being administered by Kızıl Arslan would explain the presence of Seljuk atabegs at Bitlis. As noted above, its capture by Zengi in 534 and release in 576 or soon after are otiose as an explanation. To repeat: the Ildigizids seem to be introduced into the story as a substitute for the Shah-i Arman dynasty.

Since the proposed analysis of story G is somewhat complicated, its salient points will be put in a table. It should be noted that the historical errors which we attribute to the *Sherefname* will not make much difference to the reconstruction of the Bitlis dynasty's origins with which this appendix will end. Least of all will that reconstruction be affected by our proposition that the defeat of Saladin in the text substitutes for his historically-attested victories over local dynasties in Upper Mesopotamia. But if that proposition seems far-fetched, it should be remembered we only made it only to account for something which was far-fetched in the first place: that the *Sherefname* makes Saladin the son of Nur al-Din and attributes to him a defeat by the Egyptians in 576.

[a] EI², "Ildenizids", III.111.2 (C.E.Bosworth).

Table: summary of events in story G and their historical analogues.

Actual event	Substitute in Sherefname	Alternative in Sherefname
Capture of Bitlis by Shah-i Arman, strictly Begtimur, in 588/1191-92	Capture of Bitlis by Zengi (a "Seljuk atabeg"), 534	Rule by Kızıl Arslan, son of Ildigiz, a "Seljuk atabeg"
Release from Shah-i Arman dynasty, strictly Begtimur's son, at Ayyubid takeover in 607/1207-8	Release from "Seljuk atabegs" as result of Saladin's defeat in 576	[Perhaps implied: Ildigizid rule over Bitlis ends about the same time.]

The main conclusion arising out of story G will now be stated. The Ruzagi tribe acquired Bitlis in or soon after the Ayyubid takeover of the Shah-i Arman principality in 607/1207-8. This could well have come about through disturbances in the wake of the Ayyubid takeover, and an accommodation between the Ayyubids at Ahlat and the incoming Ruzagi at Bitlis, whereby the latter agreed to become vassals of the former.

Story H. The Khwarizmashah Jalal al-Din, after capturing Ahlat, takes refuge from the Mongols with the Ruzagi Malik Ashraf in Bitlis. Sh.I.367-72.

In 625[/1227-28] the ruler of Bitlis was Malik Ashraf. He had deputed his brother Majd al-Din to govern Ahlat. In that year the Khwarizmashah Jalal al-Din fled from India for fear of Chingiz Khān, then came back to Iran and conquered it. Two years later the new Mongol khan, Ogatay [Ögedei], sent forces against him. Again, he fled, this time to

Ahlat, which he besieged. Majd al-Din eventually surrendered, and entered the service of the Khwarizmshah. As a result of a plot against the Khwarizmshah [with which Majd al-Din was falsely associated], the latter was imprisoned. Meanwhile the [Ayyubid] forces arrive which Malik Ashraf has requested from Syria and Egypt, and with Malik Ashraf and the latter's subjects, defeat the Khwarizmshah. The latter retreats to Ahlat, but then, again because of the Mongols' approach, takes refuge at Bitlis, marrying Malik Ashraf's daughter and releasing Majd al-Din. Later Malik Asraf persuades him to flee (with his wife). The manner of his end is unknown.

Historical significance. Many parts of the story are reasonably well known, and the *Sherefname* quotes other chronicles. The element which is otherwise unattested is the presence of a ruler at Bitlis who holds Ahlat in subjection. In reality, when the Khwarizmshah arrived at Ahlat to besiege it, a local Ayyubid dynasty resided at Mayyāfāriqīn/Silvan and Ahlat, and Bitlis could only have been a subordinate governorship or small subordinate principality. The story is given here in some detail to show the many inventions necessitated by the simple fiction of a ruler at Bitlis who has power over Ahlat. The only invention not so necessitated is the Khwarizmshah's stay at Bitlis and escape from the city. This is put in the story so as to contrive an episode where the Bitlis dynasty, instead of merely defending itself against him successfully, has him in a dependent position. Of course the name "Malik Ashraf" is stolen from the real ruler of Ahlat at the time; but the author has the cheek to say that his Malik Ashraf (of Bitlis) was a "contemporary of Malik Ashraf" -- without giving the latter a home. (I.367.)

The *Sherefname* is stealing for Bitlis what was actually Ahlat's: the seat of the real Malik Ashraf, and hegemony over the other city. The question which remains is whether

there was at this time a Kurdish dynasty at Bitlis, subordinate to the Ayyubids of Ahlat and Māyyāfāriqīn. We are free to suppose that the *Sherefname*, or the local tradition on which it draws, is making this point up, and that the Bitlis dynasty only came into being later, perhaps after the Mongols had captured Ahlat (641 or 642: 1244 in either case).

It is very likely at least that there was a local governor at Bitlis, given that it was the capital of a district. If we can imagine a local governor, why not imagine a local subordinate dynasty ? The only point which appears to tip the balance in favour of the latter is the *Sherefname*'s insistence on the emergence of the Ruzagi dynasty after the withdrawal of the "Seljuk atabegs". We argued (story G) that that withdrawal seemed to reflect, by a process of dim and highly inaccurate recollection, the loss of power over Bitlis on the part of the Shah-i Arman dynasty (strictly Begtimur's son) when it (strictly he) lost the principality to the Ayyubids of Māyyāfāriqīn in 607/1207-8.[a] Could we be dealing with a local Kurdish dynasty which emerged at that time ? There is not much more to be said: the argument on the other side is almost equally strong. That argument is, that the previous story was equally an invention, grafted on to a series of historical events and circumstances, themselves much deformed in the remembering.[13]

Suppose that the theory of the acquisition of Bitlis by the Ruzagi dynasty at an early date, well before the first mention by a reliable source (733/1332-33), is basically correct, but that the date for which we argue is wrong ? The next most plausible date is one soon after the Mongol conquest of the area in 641 or 642 (1244 in either case). The Mongol administration of the area seems to have been based on the maintenance of garrisons in just two cities, Ahlat and Erciş, and once the Mongols, and local Kurdish

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[a] On that event, see e.g. Humphreys, *Saladin to the Mongols* 128-9; Turan, *D.A. Türk Devletleri Tarihi* 105-6.

chieftains, realised that Mongol supervision of every city in the area was impossible, the Mongols may well have been ready to come to an accommodation with a local Kurdish group.

If this latter date for the foundation of Bitlis were found to be correct, would any of our other arguments arising out of the various stories be affected ? The previous one (story G) would be affected, as the earlier date emerged from the argument there. Otherwise no argument would be affected.

Summary. Historical events buried in the *Sherefname*'s account of the Ruzagi dynasty's origins

Note to this summary. The accompanying table puts the eight stories in chronological order and according to the direction of causality implied by the text. The summary itself works through the stories, extracting what we have argued to be the genuine historical material.

Well-attested historical events not mentioned by the *Sherefname* are put in square brackets. For a note on the historical probability of aspects of two of the events recorded by the *Sherefname*, and for alternative dates, see headings "[Shah-i Arman captures Bitlis]" and "[Collapse of Shah-i Arman dynasty ...]" below.

Sasanian hegemony over much of Armenia. (D -- Bahvāṣ, Ahlat.)

Formation of Ruzagi tribe. Five tribes of Bitlis not yet absorbed. (A,C.) Date: anywhere

Diagram to illustrate relation of stories A-H in respect of time and causality



from the 10th to the 12th century A.D..

[Bitlis part of the Arzan principality.] (A, B, E: recollection of association with Arzan.) Date: c.1100 to 1191-2 A.D..

[Shah-i Arman dynasty, strictly Begtimur, captures Bitlis.] (G: occupation of Bitlis by "Seljuk atabegs".) Date: 1191-92.

Note: whether the Shah-i Arman capture of Bitlis is the historical event which occasioned the *Sherefname*'s story of the Seljuk events in Bitlis is somewhat speculative; but this does not affect any other part of the interpretation.

[Collapse of Shah-i Arman dynasty; strictly the ousting of Begtimur's son. Ahlat and presumably Bitlis taken over by branch of Ayyubids.] Ruzagi enter Bitlis; [perhaps facilitated by disturbances created in connection with the Ayyubid conquest etc. and by ethnic kinship with Ayyubids.] (G: emergence of Ruzagi and "reconquest" of Bitlis.) Tribes of Bitlis absorbed into Ruzagi confederation. (C) Start of line of Bitlis rulers "known" to the *Sherefname*.(F) Date: 1207-8.

[Khwarizmshah at Ahlat.] (H -- at Ahlat and Bitlis.) Date: 1226 (first siege) and 1228-30 (second siege and flight of Jalal al-Din).

[Ahlat is Mongol capital of Armenia for a time and evidently an important religious centre.] (D -- Bahvā̱s.) Date: probably sometime in 1260's to late 1340's.

Meanwhile, local dynasty continues at Bitlis. (F) The first well-attested Ruzagi

ruler of Bitlis is known c.733/1332-33.

[Bitlis becomes chief city of north and west shores of Lake Van.[a]] (A: conquest of Bitlis and Hazo. B: the two princes brought from Ahlat.) Date: process lasts from c.1335 to perhaps c.1370. Ahlat and its district perhaps annexed by Bitlis in the late 1340's.[b]

Local dynasty continues. First ruler of whose life the *Sherefname* has hard detail, Sharaf. (F) Sharaf first known in 1387 by any source, but only date mentioned by *Sherefname* is 1394.

[a] See esp. Appendix I, Bitlis and Ahlat.

[b] Argued in Ch.III, sect.I.5.(ii), and in Appendix I, Bitlis and Ahlat.

APPENDIX FIVE

THE PATRIARCHATE OF AGHTAMAR

In the late Middle Ages (starting in 1114) and almost to the end of the Ottoman period, the monastery on the island of Aghtamar was the seat of a local patriarchate whose jurisdiction was always independent of those regarded as and claiming to be supreme katholikoi of Armenia. The latter variously resided at Rum Kale (till 1292), at Sis (till 1441), then at Echmiadzin. The monastery's principal church, that of the Holy Cross, had been built as a palatine church by Gagik Arcruni, prince and later king of Vaspurakan, in the early 10th century. The island was used by Gagik as his residence, and he built a palace, laid out a small town and fortified the island.[a]

The patriarchate was in effect a dynastic institution in which patriarchs were chosen, apparently according to rules of precedence and suitability, always from the Sefedinian family. The latter was descended from the Arcruni dynasty.[1] The precise boundaries of the region over which the patriarchs exercised ecclesiastical jurisdiction gradually shrank. At first the whole Van basin, including the north shore of the lake, Muş and Bitlis, appears to have fallen within their competence. K'ajberunik', the district dependent on Erciş (formerly known as Ałiovit, then Gnunik'), Adilcevaz and the districts of the Bitlis principality were lost c.1400. This probably came about as a result of the temporary absence of the Kara Koyunlu from Erciş and the unification of Armenia under

[a] Arcruni (ed. Patk.) 293-7. The best commentary is in Der Nersessian, *Aghtamar*.

Timur.[2]

The patriarchs of Aghtamar certainly intervened in events within the sphere of politics. The Zakaria incident, in which among other events Zakaria III persuaded Sharaf of Bitlis to allow him to collect the tribute required of him by Jahan Shah,[a] suggests much local influence. In 1463 or 1464 Smbat, brother of the patriarch Step'anos IV, was made king of the Armenians. Smbat was a Sefedinian and therefore descended from the Arcruni. The episode suggests a revival of Arcruni royal power via the medium of the Aghtamar patriarchate.

Such episodes, and the jurisdiction of the patriarchate over the whole Van basin, indicate that the patriarchate constantly played a local political role; that in spite of having in a formal sense no political powers, the patriarchs in fact exerted influence, behind the scenes, on political events in the Van region. The aim of this section is simply to discuss the local political role of the patriarchs. In essence it will be argued that their local political role was muted, and confined to a concern for the well-being of their flock.

In A.D. 1315 the patriarch of Aghtamar, Zakaria I, visited the court of the Il-Khan at Baghdad. Here he managed to obtain a *yarlīgh* against taxes on the clergy and monasteries and succeeded in persuading the vazīr 'Ali to revoke an order commanding the destruction of churches in an area stretching from Mosul to Urmia.[3] Another patriarch, Step'anos III (1336-46), seems again to have succeeded in freeing the clergy from taxes.[4] The two incidents are clear evidence that the patriarch had local political influence: to change the mind of the Il-Khan's vizier in this period (after the permanent conversion of the Il-Khan dynasty to Islam) was no mean achievement.

At the same time he exercised his power only in order to carry out his function as

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[a] Clph.XV.II.221, pp.174-5 (S.1462.3, pp.272-3).

guardian of the Armenians within his jurisdiction. Moreover the nature of the incident gives an indication, satisfactory proof in context, that the only political power and influence he had with temporal rulers was the power to protect his flock. The incident does not by itself prove the point, but given certain common-sense considerations one can be fairly sure. To have tried to intervene in affairs with no bearing on his patriarchal duties would have been a failure guaranteed in advance. The patriarch had no troops, whether for offence or for defence. Though there were adequate fortifications on the island and on the shore right opposite, and despite the probable existence of a town of some size on the island in this period,[a] it was impossible to defend the island against organised attack. This became clear in subsequent events.

The next relevant episode is the murder of Zakaria II in 1393 by the prince of Vostan.[5] The precise circumstances of the murder are very enlightening as to the type of local power the patriarch possessed at the time. A mullah requested that his own satchel be delivered to the patriarch's house on the shore.[6] The patriarch suspected a trick,[7] and refused the request on the ground that his house was unsuitable as a repository for the satchel. This angered the mullah, who seized and beat the patriarch. The monks rushed to the latter's defence, but this only angered the mullah further. He tore out the patriarch's beard, hit him in the face and, uttering threats, went to the amir of Vostan to slander the katholikos and the men of the island.

At the same time, and unknown to the mullah, the patriarch went to the amir (he had himself carried, perhaps because he was weak). The amir, who was in the hamam, tried to browbeat the patriarch into renouncing his faith. When the latter refused, he was severely beaten and the dragged through the streets.[8] After this treatment he died; his

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[a] Appendix I, Aghtamar.

body was picked up and honourably buried.

Far from any question of local behind-the-scenes political influence on the part of the patriarch, a mullah sees fit to play a trick on that dignitary, and is able to unbeard and beat him. Subsequently the mullah goes to the amir of the local city, assuming that his slanders will exonerate himself. The amir takes the side of the mullah, and puts pressure on the patriarch to apostasize! The amir apparently judged the bathhouse a suitable place for the patriarch to see him, though urgency may have precluded delay. There follow a beating and a drag through the streets.

'Izz al-Din Shir, the Hakkari prince, was imprisoned on Aghtamar in 1398.[a] Apart from the suitability of the island's hill-top fort as a prison,[b] this event shows that Aghtamar was now in the jurisdiction of Timur's administration and troops obedient to Timur's governor in Van were on the island. The legal situation before Timur's invasion is not clear; but in practice the island was sovereign territory, and certainly not occupied by troops of any power, local or external. Timur's advent changed the situation: Aghtamar was seen as part of a local governorship, probably administered from Van.

A colophonist, reporting Iskender's capture of the island in 1425, treats the event as the first occasion when the island was trodden by enemy feet.[c] The island now came under direct Kara Koyunlu administration: it was treated as part of the governorship of Van and Vostan.[d] Despite the occupation under Timur (of which 'Izz al-Din's imprisonment is the proof) the claim contains an important element of truth.

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[a] Clph. XIV.778, p.621 (S.1398.1, pp.115-16)

[b] Appendix I, Aghtamar.

[c] Clph.XV.I.400a, p.374 (S.1428.1, p.173). For the date of Van's capture, sect.II.5.(iv), p.190 and esp. n.20.

[d] Ch.III, sect. II.5.(iv).

First of all, it is not clear that the katholikos would have regarded the presence of Timur's troops on the island as detrimental to the patriarchate or to its subjects. On the other hand the Kara Koyunlu occupation would have been seen as such: the Vostan amirate had in the past twenty years not oppressed its Christian subjects. Secondly, it is not clear that under Timur Aghtamar was seen as anything more than a convenient prison. In the first instance this was the responsibility, no doubt, of the governor of Van; but the governor may not have raised taxes, provided for the island's defence or concerned himself with it except as a prison. But the Kara Koyunlu seem to have treated Aghtamar as territory to be administered in just the same way as the territory of Van and of Vostan.

In 1431 the island was seized by a member of the Hakkari ruling family, Piri Beg. The latter was probably the amir of Vostan: at any rate he was the grandson of 'Izz al-Din Shir, best-known prince of the dynasty and subject of Timur and Kara Yusuf. The monks had to flee to a village in the Hizan district, Uranc', and were unable to return for two years. Piri Beg plundered the valuables of the church.[9] In other words the island was defenceless against such a raid, once the amir of Vostan abandoned his inhibitions against attacking it. He lost his inhibitions probably because the Kara Koyunlu had in effect treated the island as part of the district of Vostan. When the Hakkari regained Vostan it was natural to occupy Aghtamar.

The fortunes of the patriarchate changed dramatically under Zakaria III (1434-64). In 1459 this patriarch managed to frustrate an attempt by one of the Ruzagi of Bitlis to invade and plunder the island. This may not in itself mean much; the patriarch may even have been helped by the Hakkari, whose territory the Ruzagi had invaded. But afterwards the patriarch went to Jahan Shah and persuaded him to come to the district with a large

force and "avenge its destruction and the suffering of the Christians".[a] Jahan Shah's prime motive may well have been other than to to teach the Ruzagi, and perhaps the Hakkari, not to plunder and slaughter local Armenians. But the patriarch evidently had some influence with him.

Perhaps in 1460, Jahan Shah gave Zakaria the patriarchate of Echmiadzin, so that he now held both positions.[b] This naturally gave him greater authority and helps to explain his achievements in the remainder of his reign.

In 1461 Zakaria played an important role in local political affairs when he succeeded in reconciling the Bitlis prince, Sharaf, with Jahan Shah. Jahan Shah's troops were besieging Ahlat and Bitlis because Sharaf of Bitlis refused to pay tribute. Zakaria, out of concern for the suffering of his flock within the Bitlis principality, went to Jahan Shah and agreed to collect the taxes necessary for the tribute's payment if Jahan Shah would raise the sieges. Jahan Shah's generals called off their troops when Zakaria took the *fermān* to them; Sharaf allowed the patriarch to collect the taxes in person (according to the source).[c]

Zakaria was then informed that Jahan Shah's son Hasan 'Ali was threatening to seize him and, perhaps using him as a hostage, plunder Echmiadzin. Still in 1461, the patriarch brought the right hand of Gregory the Illuminator from Echmiadzin to Aghtamar and deposited it there.[d] The act was not merely one of safekeeping; it symbolised an

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[a] Clph.XV.II.154, pp.117-18 (S.1459.2. pp.263-4).

[b] Clph.XV.II.221, pp.172-3 (S.1462.3, p.272); Akinean, *Aghtamar* 111.

[c] Clph.XV.II.221, pp.174-5 (S.1462.3, pp.272-3).

[d] Clph.XV.II.221, pp.175-7 (S.1462.3, pp.274-6).

increase in the prestige of Aghtamar. Shortly afterwards he moved back to Echmiadzin.[a] Two years later he was poisoned.[b]

His successor at Aghtamar, Step'anos IV (late 1463 or early 1464 to 1489), does not seem ever to have occupied the throne of Echmiadzin.[10] However at his accession occurred another appointment, that of Smbat, his own brother and cousin of the previous patriarch, as "king of all the Armenians". This appointment is unlikely to have lasted beyond 1467, the date of Jahan Shah's defeat and death. "... they consecrated ... Smbat king, just as his ancestors, [the line of] Gagik, had been, because from of old the race of the Armenians had not seen a king."[11] Smbat commanded no troops; he raised no taxes; he had no council or *amīrs* or *naxarars*; only two colophons of the period mention him; the title was soon abandoned, probably in 1467. The claim that he was being created king in the manner of the Arcruni kings of Vaspurakan is therefore thoroughly hollow.[12]

Who appointed Smbat ? The "they" of the text are not specified. However Jahan Shah had been instrumental in the establishment of the patriarchate at Echmiadzin in 1441. It was he to whom Zakaria had gone for help in combating local princes in 1459, who had appointed Zakaria III to the see of Echmiadzin in 1461 and to whom Zakaria went, in the same year, in order to arrange the payment of tribute by Jahan Shah's subject, the prince of Bitlis. It would be a narrow reliance on the argument from silence to ignore the likelihood that Jahan Shah was behind the establishment of Smbat as "king of all the Armenians". Since the kingship was created at Step'anos' accession, it must have been Zakaria rather than Step'anos with whom the subject of a titular kingship was raised.[13]

Zakaria's local role, and in particular the peaceful extraction of tribute from Sharaf

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[a] Clph.XV.II.225a, p.181 (S.1462.6, p.277).

[b] Clph.XV.II.270, p.223 (S.1464.12, p.286).

of Bitlis, should be seen as a *quid pro quo* for the combination of the two patriarchates in Zakaria's person; and in turn the subsequent appointment of a titular "king of all the Armenians" residing at Aghtamar should be seen as a return favour. It benefited Jahan Shah too, however, as will shortly be argued. There is no need to suppose explicit negotiation to the effect that Jahan Shah's favours should be swapped for Zakaria's services. The arrangement nevertheless recognised, tacitly or not, that each person needed the other.

What was the role, then, of the king ? Above it was argued that the king had no genuine powers. So despite the reference to the revival of the Armenian monarchy, his role was symbolic. This was so in two ways.

First, the patriarchs of Aghtamar were an ecclesiastical rather than a political authority, though by virtue of their position they necessarily exerted some influence on local political events. At this point in time, however, the patriarch was being asked to do more, indeed already had done more, than engage in political events strictly within his ecclesiastical competence. He was intervening in events outside his ecclesiastical competence, though on his side the motive was, no doubt, the safety and well-being of his flock. The appointment of the king precisely symbolises the involvement of the patriarch in political affairs beyond his ecclesiastical remit. It neatly legitimates this involvement by creating a new role, but avoiding the explicit mention of a new role for the patriarch himself. The title of the latter's new political burden is born by the king; who, however, cannot carry the burden itself.

Such a legitimation was needed, not to ease an affront to the patriarch's Armenian subjects (because there was no affront), but to disarm the local Kurdish princes and other temporal powers. These princes would otherwise charge Jahan Shah with the creation of

an illegal tool, the use of an ecclesiastical authority for Jahan Shah's political ends. The charge would have been correct; it was deflected by the appointment of a "king".

The second symbolic role of the king was closely related. The patriarch was now Jahan Shah's agent in a locale otherwise dominated by the Kurdish princes. Admittedly the 1460's seem to have been a period of quiescence in the histories both of the Bitlis and of the Hakkari house. But the tendency of the local rulers would have been to sap the patriarch's new role and nudge him back to his old position. The function of the new king was to act as a symbol which conferred authority on the patriarch. In some institutions symbols exist to which tacit conventions are attached: to possess them is to hold authority; to be deprived of them is to lose authority.

To give a parallel which at first sight seems far removed from the patriarchate of Aghtamar: the mace in the House of Commons is the symbol of the Speaker's authority. It has no practical function. When the mace lies in front of the Speaker, this is acknowledged to mean that he has the authority to direct certain aspects of the debate. To deprive him of the mace is to challenge that authority, rather than to rob him of any practical utility the mace may possess. Moreover the mere presence of the mace is a deterrent to any attempted challenge. Its peculiar efficacy is that to tamper with the mace is the only possible vehicle for such challenges.

It was in this manner that the kingship functioned as a symbol of the patriarch's new authority. It was a deterrent to any local prince who decide to infringe it. To mount a challenge to the patriarch's new role, a challenge to the king would have been necessary. Again the appointment neatly deflected possible opposition to Jahan Shah or to the patriarch, the actual holders of power, on to the king, a dummy ruler.[14]

The next relevant event in the patriarchate's history is the island's invasion in 1499

by Zahid, prince of Hakkari. Zahid plundered and wrecked.[a] Afterwards, perhaps until the permanent Ottoman conquest of Van in 1548, the Hakkari seem to have held the island as part of their territory. That is to say that although the patriarch continued to reside there, the princes had certain rights there too, and may have extracted a tribute or tax. Aghtamar seems generally to have been put with the district of Gavāsh, which lay to the west of Vostan, under a single member of the Hakkari family.[b]

In 1498 and 1499 occurred two more raids, respectively by the Bitlis and by the Hakkari principality. They took place against a background of internal wars in the Ak Koyunlu empire. The second raid, that mounted by the Hakkari, took place in the same year as an attack on Bitlis by the Hakkari. The latter was certainly carried out in revenge for Bitlis' raid on Aghtamar the previous year; the Hakkari may have raided Aghtamar similarly with motives of revenge.[15]

The island was useful as a prison and as a retreat. In 907/1501-2, shortly after Shah Ismail's seizure of power in Iran, he imprisoned the three sons of the recently murdered Haydar at Aghtamar for a short period, before taking them to Iṣṭakhr.[c] The event does not imply that the Hakkari had made over the island to the Safavid monarch, but that at this early stage in Ismail's reign Zahid was his willing vassal (later he threw off the allegiance). The island was lent to the Safavid monarch as a suitable prison.

In 939/1532-33 Sharaf of Bitlis captured the island.[d] He did this shortly before the Ottoman invasion of his territory in which he was defeated and killed. When that invasion

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[a] Akinean, *Aghtamar* 123 ("Zēhid bēk"); Voskean, *Vaspurakan-Van* I.123 [sic].

[b] Ch.III,sect.II.3.3.

[c] Sh.II.133-4.

[d] Sh.I.436.

loomed, Sharaf's son and heir, Shams al-Din, was taken to Aghtamar for safety.[a] The island must have reverted to Hakkari control when Shams al-Din himself was forced to flee to Iran and the throne of Bitlis was left empty, the principality becoming a series of Ottoman sanjaks.

To arrive at an estimate of the patriarchate's local role during the Kara Koyunlu period, its history will be reviewed, this time taking into account a fuller picture of the circumstances affecting that role. In sum, the patriarchate seems to have been able to play a political role when the local Kurdish princes did not challenge their overlord and when that overlord was remotely interested in the fate of the Christian population. The patriarch's ability to play a political role appears not to be affected by his motives. As far as can be seen, his motives remained the same: to safeguard and organise the Armenian congregations, clergy and monasteries under his care.

In 1315 and 1349 the patriarch succeeded in getting taxes lifted off the backs of the clergy and in getting an order to destroy churches countermanded. The position of the Kurdish princes in the first half of the 14th century is unclear in most details. But at least it seems clear that they posed no challenge to the Il-Khans, while on the other hand the Il-Khans' governors at Ahlat made no attempt to interfere with the princes. This was why the patriarch was able to go to Mongol authorities at Baghdad and elsewhere and get taxes and other orders lifted.

The murder of Zakaria II in 1393 by the prince of Vostan is hard to explain in the framework suggested above. Timur had brought 'Izz al-Din of Hakkari to heel in 1387. The presence of troops loyal to Timur at Van should have acted as a deterrent to such a blatant murder; it is most unlikely that the murder had the blessing of Timur's

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[a] Sh.I.424; cf. 430.

representative at Van. But at any rate the murder illustrates the patriarch's vulnerability to the local princes.

Aghtamar was at the disposal of Timur's government, probably (in the first instance of the governor at Van) by 1398. As remarked above, this appears to have brought about a change in the patriarchs' position. Previously the island was regarded as sovereign territory, even by the Hakkari princes. Now Timur's government was exercising certain rights over it, however limited.

Iskender's capture of the island in 1425 deepened the change. Iskender brought it under the Kara Koyunlu governorship of Van and Vostan. Perhaps for the first time since 1114 it experienced full government by a power other than the patriarch. From this time onwards it seems to have been linked in an administrative sense to Vostan and sometimes to Van. When the Kara Koyunlu were expelled from Vostan (probably in 1429-30) the Hakkari probably thought of Aghtamar as falling within their own territory; in practice, though, they rarely set foot on the island until the very end of the 15th century.

By the time Piri Beg the Hakkari *amīr* invaded the island in 1431 the Hakkari had regained Vostan and were locally in a strong position. The Kara Koyunlu were probably not in a position to intervene, if they were even interested in the wellbeing of local Christians. They may well not have had a governor at Van. There was nothing to prevent the invasion of 1431.

In the 1460's matters were very different. Jahan Shah had, after battles and invasions, forced Bitlis and Hakkari to acknowledge his sovereignty on peaceful terms. Although the Hakkari held Vostan, the Kara Koyunlu had a governor at Van. Thus the Kara Koyunlu could and did extend some protection to Zakaria III (1460 to 1463 or 1464) and his successor Step'anos. This explains why a king, however nominal his powers, could

be appointed in 1463 or 1464. Of course the question is more complicated than this. As explained above, the patriarch Zakaria had already thrust himself into the arena of political events and issues beyond the strictly ecclesiastical domain. The appointment of a king made the patriarch into an agent of Jahan Shah as much as it evidenced the protection which the latter extended.

The invasion of the island in 1499 occurred at a time of chaos and division within the Ak Koyunlu empire. Zahid, the Hakkari prince, therefore had a free hand in the locality, and once more there was little the patriarch or the Ak Koyunlu could do to prevent the invasion. Thereafter the island was Hakkari territory in any case.

The patriarchs were concerned above all with organising the clergy within their jurisdiction and with the well-being of the congregations on their territory. Their competence and concern were essentially ecclesiastical. Such a competence did not exclude them from the world of political events. The incidents of 1318 and 1340 could be viewed as political in nature. Such incidents show, too, that the patriarchs could function to an extent as a political representative of their flock, who otherwise lacked any representation. But the patriarchs ventured into the field of politics simply in order to carry out their ecclesiastical remit. The only occasion when they went beyond that remit was in the 1460's, with the mediation role between Sharaf and Jahan Shah and the appointment of the king.

The patriarchs had no military forces; and although the island was fortified it was easy to capture. Without an outside protector the patriarchs were defenceless when the Hakkari abandoned inhibitions and invaded the island. This is not to say the Hakkari always saw advantage in raiding the island. The Armenian population on their territory was probably so numerous that antagonising it was sometimes a mistake. But once that

consideration had been disregarded there was little the patriarchs could do to defend themselves.

The patriarchate was not an unseen hand in local political affairs. It was an ecclesiastical authority with no power or will to play a political role beyond its ecclesiastical competence.