

**RECOGNITION WITHOUT INFLUENCE? GERMAN TRADE UNIONS AND JEAN
MONNET'S ACTION COMMITTEE FOR THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE
1955 – 1975**

by

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Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship of the German trades unions with Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. In doing so it moves away from the traditional Monnet-centred narratives that surround the Committee to examine it from the viewpoint of one of the participating member groups. Monnet promoted European integration to resolve the dilemma of early post-war Europe – how to balance the need for French security against an economically reviving Federal Republic. Integration into Europe helped stabilise democracy in the new Federal Republic, a process in which the unions believed they should play a key role. Side-lined by Adenauer at home, the German unions saw Europe as a means of achieving the reforms denied domestically. However, union leaders failed to develop an agenda to make use of the Committee and when disappointed by the outcome of the negotiations for the Rome Treaties, lost interest in it, a process which was eased by the Committee's decline in relevance during the 1960s. Nevertheless, membership of the Committee was important in socialising German elites, including union leaders, into Europe after the war. As well as deepening our understanding of the Action Committee itself, the thesis explores the interplay of domestic and integration politics during the period and the role of permissive consensus, which underpinned the union leaders' attitudes to the Committee, during the early years of European integration.

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List of Abbreviations

ABVV	Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond, q.v. FGVB.
ACV	Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond, q.v. CSC.
AdsD	Archiv der sozialen Demokratie
AFJME	Archives de la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe
AKE	Aktion Komitee für Europa
AKVSE	Aktionskomitee für die Vereinigten Staaten Europas, q.v. CAEUE
BDI	Bund der deutschen Industrie
BRD	Bundesrepublik Deutschland, q.v. FRG
CAEUE	Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe q.v. AKVSE
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CECA	Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, q.v. ECSC, EGKS
CFDT	Confédération française démocratique du travail
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail
CISL	Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori
CNPF	Conseil National du Patronat français
CSC	Confédération des syndicats chrétiens, q.v. ACV.
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union
DAF	Deutsche Arbeits Front
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
DKV	Deutsche Kohle Verkauf
DP	Deutsche Partei
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community, q.v. EGKS. In French CECA
EDC	European Defence Community. In French CED; in German EVG.
EEC	European Economic Community, q.v. EWG
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EGB	Europäischer Gewerkschaftsbund, q.v. ETUC
EGKS	Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, q.v. ECSC, CECA
ERO	European Regional Organisation (of ETUC)
ESF	European Social Fund
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation, q.v. EGB
ETUI	European Trade Union Institute
EU	European Union
EUI	European University Institute
EWG	Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, q.v. EEC
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FGVB	Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique, q.v. ABVV
FJME	Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe

FO	Force Ouvrière
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany, qv. BRD
GBV	Geschäftsführender Vorstand (DGB)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GFV	Geschäftsführender Hauptvorstand (ÖTV)
HA	High Authority (of ECSC)
HGRG	Haus der Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets
IAR	International Authority of the Ruhr
IBFG	Internationaler Bund freier Gewerkschaften, q.v. ICFTU
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, q.v. IBFG
IFCTU	International Federation of Christian Trade Unions
IGB	Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau. In 1960 IGB changed its name to IGBE.
IGBE	Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau u Energie.
IGC	Industriegewerkschaft Chemie. Subsequently IGCPK
IGCPK	Industriegewerkschaft Chemie-Papier-Keramik
IGM	Industriegewerkschaft Metall
ILO	International Labour Organisation
KVP	Katholieke Volkspartij
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MLF	Multi-Lateral Force
MRP	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEI	Nouvelles Equipes Internationales
NVV	Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
ÖTV	Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr
PSB	Parti Socialiste Belge
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid
SEA	Single European Act
SFIO	Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UDSR	Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance
WdA	Welt der Arbeit
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WWI	Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Institut

INTRODUCTION

Overview

In the summer of 1945, the countries of Western Europe lay in ruins. Millions of their citizens were dead, displaced or, in the German case, in captivity as prisoners of war. Economic activity had come to a virtual standstill, with much of industry unable to function effectively and communication and transport networks severely disrupted.¹ Germany itself was divided into four occupation zones, each separately administered by one of the Allied victors, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), France and the Soviet Union (USSR).² The Allies' initial aim had been that occupied Germany should be treated as a single economic unit but it quickly became apparent that disputes between them over the country's future made agreement on this impossible. Over the following 18 months each Ally implemented its own zonal policies, disagreements between the three Western Allies and the USSR meant that decisions concerning the political and economic future of Germany went unresolved and living conditions in Germany deteriorated, exacerbated by the harsh winter of 1946 - 47. By early 1947 the situation in the three Western zones of Germany, as in much of Western Europe, was critical; economic dislocation, deteriorating living conditions and political uncertainty combined with fear of Communist expansion as the pressures of the Cold War grew in an increasingly divided Europe.

¹ See Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945. From War to Peace* (London, 2009) for the situation in Germany. For a wider picture including Eastern Europe see Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945* (London, 2010). Ch. 1.

² The German lands east of the Oder-Neiße line were to be administered separately by the USSR and Poland, pending a final peace settlement. In the west a somewhat similar situation pertained as the industrial Saarland was administered by France as a protectorate. The remainder constituted occupied Germany.

In these circumstances, the two major questions that faced the Western Allies became ever clearer. How could Europe be rebuilt politically and economically and what was to be the future role of Germany in post-war Europe? Given the lack of Soviet cooperation, it became increasingly clear that the Western Allies would only be able to influence events in Western Europe. Yet, countries in an economically weakened Western Europe could fall prey to Communist expansion, either directly through external aggression, or more likely, through the election of a coalition including Communists, the result of desperation at low living standards. To counter the appeal of Communism, and to reduce the economic demands of the German occupation on the Allies themselves, the European economy needed to be revived. However, due to the country's importance and location, European recovery would be impossible if Germany were to be excluded from the process. Yet, even the truncated Germany of the three Western zones matched France in population, while the industrial potential of those zones was far greater than that of their most important neighbour. European recovery without Germany was unimaginable, but how could Germany contribute to the process of recovery while not developing into a security threat to her neighbours?

The answers to this dilemma proved to be firstly European integration based on Franco-German reconciliation and secondly the establishment of a stable, democratic West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) which could form part of the new Europe.³ These two developments were inextricably linked. The establishment of a stable and viable democracy in the Federal Republic helped convince her western neighbours that she was no longer a

³ In this thesis West Germany will normally be referred to as the Federal Republic or FRG.

threat to their very existence.⁴ This acceptance in turn allowed the Federal Republic to re-establish relations with the West European countries she had conquered, occupied and exploited less than a decade previously. In parallel the Federal Republic's post-war integration into new institutions in which she participated as an equal helped legitimise and stabilise her new democracy, contributing to the overall process.

Integration could, however, take different forms and require varying degrees of institutional power sharing amongst those involved. The experience of both the Council of Europe and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) showed the limits of inter-governmental cooperation. In both organisations proposals for integration that were dependent on unanimity among a large number of national actors could be rejected by individual governments; a more distinctive and focussed framework was required.⁵ From 1950 on the process of European integration was based on the participating countries' recognition that a degree of sovereignty had to be ceded for all to benefit. Beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), integration on this basis promoted economic prosperity, increased political stability and provided a framework for the safe incorporation of the Federal Republic into Western Europe.

⁴ See Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, 'Germany and European Integration', in Reimund Seidelmann (ed.), *The New Germany: History, Economy, Policies* (Baden-Baden, 2011), pp. 316-334, esp. Introduction.

⁵ The Council of Europe was established in 1949, following The Hague Congress the previous year. The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, was established in 1948 with the aim of helping to coordinate the disbursement of Marshall Plan funds. In broad terms, the two organisations promoted political and economic cooperation respectively; the two aspects of recovery were kept separate. See Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51* (London, 1984).

One man in particular is associated with this development – Jean Monnet.⁶ Colloquially he is often known as the ‘Father of Europe’ and in 1976 the European Council bestowed the formal title of ‘Honorary Citizen of Europe’ on him in recognition of his work.⁷ Monnet promoted the initial steps in European integration based on Franco-German reconciliation in 1950 and worked to implement them over the following years. He understood the importance of involving a wide range of elite players in the process, among whom he counted the leaders of the democratically based trade unions. Monnet recognised the importance of binding the Federal Republic into the integration process. As President of the ECSC’s High Authority (HA) he thus placed particular emphasis on developing relations with the leaders of the newly established German Trade Union Federation (the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*) and their equivalents in the unions involved in the ECSC, *IG Metall*, the metalworkers’ union, and *IG Bergbau*, representing miners.⁸ The domestic political situation in the Federal Republic meant these leaders had good reason to respond positively to his advances. Monnet resigned from the High Authority in 1954; when he founded the Action Committee the following year, he took care to maintain these relationships.

Monnet’s Action Committee (1955 – 1975) was an organisation dedicated to promoting Monnet’s vision of a united Europe. Its establishment also signalled his intention of remaining a key player in the integration process.⁹ The Committee represented a prime example of the

⁶ Monnet’s career and the assessment of his work in the historiography of European integration are discussed later.

⁷ For the resolution granting him this title, see Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (London, 1978), p. 525.

⁸ In future the abbreviation DGB will normally be used for the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*. *IG Metall* and *IG Bergbau* will be abbreviated to IGM and IGB respectively.

⁹ Aspects of the Action Committee touched on here will be explored in greater depth later in the thesis.

Neofunctionalist approach that Monnet endorsed as a means of achieving integration.¹⁰ It drew its membership from the political and trade union (but not business) elites of the ECSC's six member states. In theory at least, the unions enjoyed a privileged position on the Committee which offered them the possibility of promoting their views. In fact, Monnet managed the Committee on his own terms, convening it as he deemed appropriate and setting the agenda for each session, much of which was predicated on the Neofunctionalist assumption of spillover, the belief that progress in one area of integration would drive further developments in others. As its founder and driving force, Monnet dominated the Committee and with only a couple of exceptions, its public statements reflected his views. The Committee was most active immediately after its foundation; from the early 1960s President Charles de Gaulle's consolidation of power in France meant that Monnet was increasingly removed from influence in French political life. Espousing an agenda that was either unrealistic or unlikely to be endorsed by the Community's member states, the Committee drifted into irrelevance and was finally dissolved in 1975.

This thesis considers the relationship of the German trade unions to Monnet's Action Committee over the 20 years of its existence, with a short account of the revival of the Committee after Monnet's death. In doing so it illuminates the interplay between domestic politics and European integration for the German unions; union attitudes to the Committee fluctuated in part according to the unions' proximity to domestic political influence. The German unions joined the Action Committee at a time of rapid progress and development in the European project. This thesis explores their reasons for joining the Committee in the light

¹⁰ Neofunctionalism and other integration theories will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 1.

of their limited expectations and lack of influence domestically, but at a time when the process of European integration had received renewed impetus. It considers how the German unions tried to make use of Monnet and the Committee in the negotiations leading to the Rome Treaties and how successful they were in doing so.¹¹ The thesis also examines how far the unions achieved their ambition of achieving greater union representation in the new Community institutions and how far these institutions reflected union demands for 'social Europe' as a counterpart to economic integration. Finally, it considers the German union leaders' participation in the Action Committee once the new European institutions had been established by the Rome Treaties, how they viewed the Committee after this episode and whether they saw the Committee as an appropriate vehicle for achieving the changes that they sought in Europe.

Participation in the Committee with its elite membership was important to the union leaders as a way of achieving the acceptance and equality of status that they, like so many Germans, sought after 1945. Membership demonstrated both their commitment to the European project and recognition of their role in it. By the time domestic political circumstances in the Federal Republic moved in the unions' favour in 1969, the country's integration into Western Europe had been completed. By now the majority of German union leaders had lost interest in the Committee and only supported it nominally, if at all; the change they wanted to see could be achieved more effectively using their domestic contacts. Moreover, more than 20 years after the war, earlier animosity towards Germans had largely dissipated and the German

¹¹ Although UK usage normally refers to the Treaty of Rome, the phrase Rome Treaties (in German *Die Römischen Verträge*) is more accurate as it includes Euratom and the integration of the ECSC and I will use this appellation going forward.

elite, now appreciated as reliable partners in the integration process, had been accepted as equals in the institutions of post-war Europe; the Committee's role in this socialisation process was no longer relevant. Nevertheless a memory of what Monnet and the Committee had originally represented remained and when domestic politics again took an unfavourable turn for the unions in 1982, a new generation of union leaders was initially prepared to support the revived Committee (the Second Action Committee); this Committee and the unions' reaction to it are briefly considered in the Conclusion. Tracing the unions' relationship to the Action Committee shows how hopes of achieving union objectives were mixed with a less specific but equally important quest for status and recognition and how the balance between the two shifted over time.

Monnet's Action Committee is little remembered today. Nevertheless, when it was active it commanded the support of a wide range of democratic politicians and trade unionists in all countries of The Six.¹² Monnet invited members to join the Committee not as individuals but as representatives of the organisations in which they were already prominent and influential. By focussing on the German trade unionists on the Committee, this thesis provides the first study of how one particular national interest grouping related to the Committee. In doing so it builds on existing studies, which, as will be shown in the discussion of the Committee's historiography, primarily consider Monnet's role and influence, often treat the Committee purely as an extension of his personality or discuss members' participation solely on the basis of their relationship with him.

¹² The composition of the Committee is discussed in Ch. 3. The phrase 'The Six' refers to the six founding members of the ECSC and subsequent European Economic Community; Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and The Netherlands.

The German trade union leaders supported Monnet's plans for the Action Committee from an early stage and their financial support for it was always crucial. Yet, from the beginning the union leaders' attitudes towards the Committee remained ambivalent. Europe would never take priority over the day-to-day issues that constituted the bulk of their workload and membership of the Committee remained the concern of a minority of union executive members in all three organisations represented. The union leaders involved were accordingly careful to manage communication about the Committee in union publications to minimize its profile and downplay their involvement in it to their own rank and file membership.

Their ability to do this reflected a further aspect of Neofunctionalism. Its elite driven approach to integration rested on the assumption that few citizens would be interested in what was done in their name so long as it followed guidelines they generally supported, an attitude described as permissive consensus. This thesis examines the concept of permissive consensus during the early years of European integration and discusses how far it is applicable to the relationships the union leaders developed around their participation in the Committee. Despite its appellation as an Action Committee, from the early 1960s the Committee developed into a form of think-tank, 'a federal authority of the mind', keeping the European idea alive during a decade which saw little institutional progress in integration.¹³ By joining the Action Committee, the German union leaders involved had the opportunity to contribute to the debates over integration and potentially to use the Committee to advance their own agenda. The thesis shows how far they were able – or chose - to do so.

¹³ Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's description, quoted in Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 408.

Membership of Monnet's Action Committee represented just one small facet of the German unions' international involvement. The DGB became a member of the social democratic based International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) on its founding in 1949 and then participated in its European Regional Organisation (ERO).¹⁴ IGB and IBM were members of the *21er Ausschuss* established to give the Free trade unions directly involved in the coal and steel industries representation in the ECSC.¹⁵ Membership of all these organisations was intended to gain recognition and acceptance for the German unions while enabling them to pursue the interests of their members.

The thesis covers a period which, after the traumas of the Third Reich, saw the creation and establishment of a stable, European-orientated, social-market democracy in the Federal Republic. The early years of this period also saw the achievement of major institutional development for Europe as the creation of the Common Market in the 1957 Rome Treaties followed the earlier establishment of the ECSC. The unions were, however, increasingly concerned that integration was following a purely economic path. They thus promoted the idea of 'social Europe', to be established alongside the economic development prioritised by national governments. 'Social Europe' required that the resolution of social issues be assigned the same status as that of economic ones, with the unions fully embedded and involved in Community institutions to ensure this happened. 'Social Europe' was much discussed but not achieved while the Action Committee functioned, and the German unions' attempts to attain it provide a consistent theme throughout the period this thesis covers. Their favourable

¹⁴ Going forward I will use the abbreviation ICFTU when referring to the Confederation. The German term for the organisation is *Internationaler Bund freier Gewerkschaften* (IBFG).

¹⁵ The Christian unions had an equivalent organisation the *Fédération des Syndicats chrétiens dans la CECA*.

experience of Monnet's ECSC Presidency encouraged the union leaders to regard him as a potential ally. Priding themselves on their internationalism, committed to rebuilding democracy and anxious to widen workers' rights and the social agenda as well as gaining equality of treatment, the German unions welcomed the formation of Monnet's Action Committee, seeing it as an organisation that warranted their support.

A study of the German unions' membership of the Action Committee provides the opportunity to revisit the history of the Committee from the participants' viewpoint and also to understand the aspirations of the German trade unions during the early stages of European integration. As previously stated, in doing so this thesis will consider the union leaders' aims in joining the Action Committee, the support that they provided for it, its relevance for them and the way they communicated their participation to union members. It will examine how far they were successful in using Monnet and the Committee to achieve their objectives of 'social Europe', particularly during the negotiations for the Rome Treaties, and how far their views of both evolved as a result of the experience. It contributes to the current historiographical debates on integration theory by assessing the role that Neofunctionalism played in the formation and role of the Action Committee itself. In doing so it brings a new perspective to Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe, an organisation whose establishment the German union leaders were initially happy to support but which subsequently delivered few positive benefits for them.

Methodology and Sources

This study is based on archival research relating to the organisations considered in the thesis, the Action Committee, the DGB and the individual unions represented on the Committee, as well as existing literature.

Monnet's own archives remain a starting point for all aspects of his life and career. The archives of the *Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe* (FJME) at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland contain a large section devoted to the Action Committee.¹⁶ These include documentation covering the first half of 1955 when Monnet was considering options for integration as well as his own future, his views on the integration process itself and the founding of the Committee as well as the documentation for each session held. The archives also contain full listings of Monnet's correspondence with the Committee's members.¹⁷ These have proved invaluable in detailing the volume and timing of written correspondence between the two, illustrating both Monnet's relationships with Committee members and the development of the Committee itself.

The trade union archives contain general correspondence and discussion papers which trace the day-to-day development of the unions' relationship with Monnet and the Committee. Where available I have consulted the official minutes of the DGB and union executives. In order to assess the importance of the Committee for the unions, I have also consulted

¹⁶ Hereafter references to the archives of the *Fondation Jean Monnet Pour l'Europe* are abbreviated to AFJME. Documentation on the Action Committee is to be found in Dossier AMK in the AFJME.

¹⁷ Series C1 in the AFJME archives. The indexing system is explained in Ch. 4.9 which analyses the correspondence between Monnet and the individual Committee members.

additional material, much of which is available in the library of the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* (FES) in Bonn. These include DGB publications, to gauge coverage of the Committee and the extent to which this was communicated to the wider union membership, a key issue in the consideration of permissive consensus.¹⁸ I have also consulted the obituaries of the German trade union members who sat on the Committee.¹⁹ Both sources provide a good indication of how involvement in the Action Committee was viewed by the union leadership and the value they placed on it.

The trade unions' relationship with Monnet and the Committee was largely mediated through the DGB whose records are held in the *Archiv der sozialen Demokratie* (AdsD) located in the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. These archives hold substantial material on the DGB's relationship with the Committee, grouped in a series of files under the headings of both the *Auslandsabteilung* and the Chairman's office. The archives also contain the minutes of the DGB executive (*Bundesvorstand*) and the unpublished minutes of the standing executive (*Geschäftsführender Vorstand - GBV*), these cannot be accessed directly by individual researchers due to the inclusion of confidential personnel matters in them.²⁰

Monnet made a point of not keeping minutes of Committee sessions, a practice discussed in Chapter 3. Apart from some sparse and undated jottings (author not given) concerning the third session, there are no unofficial records of the Committee's sessions in the DGB

¹⁸ The issue of permissive consensus is discussed in the bibliographical review in Ch. 1.

¹⁹ DGB and IGB press coverage and obituaries are discussed in Ch. 6.8.

²⁰ The published minutes of the DGB *Vorstand* from 1949 – 75 are covered in four volumes. These are part of the *Quellen der Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert* series, as are the IGM minutes mentioned below.

archives.²¹ Günter Grunwald, a member of the DGB's International Department, forwarded a summary of the January 1956 session to both IGM and IGB later that month. The author is unknown and there are no identifying references on the paper.²² This was a one off; the lack of unofficial records means that a potential source of the union representatives' view of the debates and Monnet's management of the Committee is thus lacking. There are no further records of the Committee sessions in the DGB archives beyond the official printed declarations circulated after the sessions, filed without annotation as no further action was normally required.

Herbert Wehner, a longstanding SPD stalwart of the Committee, did provide detailed reports of its second and third sessions for the SPD Executive and circulated his report of the third session to Ludwig Rosenberg, the future DGB Chairman and most enthusiastic advocate for the Committee within the DGB.²³ This may have been a favour for the latter who was unable to attend the session due to illness. Unfortunately Wehner did not continue his reports after 1956, the reason for this is not known.²⁴

²¹ See AdsD 5/DGDO000014. The jottings are undated but placed between documents dated 21 and 24 September 1956 it is likely that they refer to the Committee's 3rd Session.

²² AdsD 5/IGMA090579 Grunwald to IGM 31-1-1956. Also HGRG IGBE 3062 for the copy sent to Imig.

²³ See AdsD 2/EOAA000438 for Wehner's report of the 2nd Session dated 21-7-1956 and 2/PVAH000024 dated 22-9-1956 for his report of the 3rd Session. (Both archive series refer to the SPD not the DGB and tellingly the September report is located in a file on atomic energy, AdsD 2/PVAH0000024 *SPD Parteivorstand Secretariat Erich Ollenhauer Atomenergie 1956*). Wehner forwarded the September report to Rosenberg on 24-9-1956, see AdsD 5/DGDO000014.

²⁴ The author discussed this with Frau Richter, the curator of the Wehner archives, during visits to the AdsD in October - November 2017 and she was of the opinion that Wehner had not produced any further reports of this nature. Sadly Frau Richter died unexpectedly in Sept 2018 but correspondence with her successor Frau Kneib suggests that this is almost certainly the case. Conversations Frau Richter October – November 2017; correspondence with Frau Kneib July 2020.

The archives of the individual unions involved in the Committee are more varied. Of the four unions that supported the Committee financially, only two, IGM and IGB, participated actively in it.²⁵ The IGM archives are located in the AdsD; those of IGBE can be found in the *Haus der Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets* (HGRG) in Bochum.²⁶ Fortunately these are the two unions with the best archival records. The published minutes of IGM's Executive cover the period 1950 – 62 and there are also files covering the union's relationship with the Committee. The IGBE archives also contain files relating to the Action Committee but the Executive minutes are incomplete. Moreover, since these contain personnel issues they cannot be viewed directly but Dr Alexander Schwitanski, the archivist at the HGRG, has confirmed that there is virtually nothing relating to the Action Committee in them.²⁷ Much of the material in the archives of both unions replicates that in the DGB archives; Monnet circulated the same documentation directly to all the members of the Committee. The amount of new material to be found in these unions' archives is thus relatively low, and tends to reinforce existing conclusions, with only a minor proportion providing new information.

The archives for the two unions which helped finance the Committee but had no day-to-day engagement with it are in a less satisfactory state. Those of the public sector union *Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr* (ÖTV) are incomplete and contain no records concerning Monnet or the Committee, although a virtually full set of minutes for the *Geschäftsführender Hauptvorstand* exists for the period and has been consulted. These archives are located alongside those of IGBE in the HGRG. According to Dr Schwitanski the state of the *IG Chemie*

²⁵ The reasons for this are considered in Ch. 4.

²⁶ The abbreviation IGBE refers to the union's post 1960 appellation, when *Energie* was added to the title.

²⁷ Correspondence with Dr Alexander Schwitanski 12-10-2018.

archives is far less satisfactory than those of ÖTV.²⁸ As a result of Dr Schwitanski's judgement and timing constraints I did not consult them.

The FJME does not hold any material on the Second Action Committee so this part of the thesis relies on union sources.²⁹ These are primarily in the DGB and IBGE archives, the latter being of particular value as the IGBE leadership remained in contact with the Committee for a year after the DGB had effectively withdrawn from it.

Quotations are generally provided in the language used in the relevant document or text. Monnet did not speak German but much of his correspondence to the German union leaders was in that language, the appropriate translation being made by one of his team. They in turn replied to him in German, relying on Monnet's office in Paris to arrange translation.

In summary, despite some minor gaps, sufficient material exists both in Germany and at the FJME archives in Lausanne to provide an effective analysis of the German unions' relationship with Monnet and the Action Committee. It is thus possible to understand the expectations, actions and ultimately disappointments involved in their membership of it.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ There is apparently material on the Second Committee at the *International Institute of Social History* (IISH) in Amsterdam but I did not have the opportunity to consult this.

Structure of the Thesis

After an initial chapter discussing the historiography of the main subject areas the thesis considers and an introductory chapter that provides context and background to the study, the thesis follows a chronological approach. The Conclusion also contains a brief summary on the revival of the Committee from 1984.

Chapter 1 *Historiography* discusses the existing literature on the three main subject areas the thesis covers - European integration, the German unions' involvement in the integration process and the Action Committee itself. The chapter reviews the current status of discussion on the processes behind integration, Neofunctionalism, Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, relating them to their period of development and the integration process. Monnet was a proponent of Neofunctionalism so this approach to integration warrants particular attention. The narratives of integration are also discussed, with an emphasis on the heroic narrative and how it was grounded in the European 'founding fathers' search for peace and their understanding of European exceptionalism. The role of the German trade unions in the integration process has received relatively little attention from historians, an omission aggravated by their early marginalisation, but recent work has started to redress this balance. Much of the discussion of Monnet's Action Committee treats it as an extension of his personality; this thesis adopts a new approach to the subject. The historiographical analysis concludes with a discussion of permissive consensus and its role in shaping the early years of European integration; the thesis will demonstrate how far permissive consensus shaped attitudes within the unions towards the Committee.

Chapter 2 *Setting the Scene* discusses events relevant to this thesis from the end of World War II to 1955. Newly established as a unitary organisation, which led to them having a different focus from the SPD, the unions failed to achieve the economic and social reform they had hoped for immediately after the war. This was in part a result of the US requirement to rebuild the nascent Federal Republic as a bulwark against Communism. Fearful of a revived Germany, this in turn led to a reappraisal of their German policy by French politicians. The solution was European integration, which also provided a new forum within which the German unions could operate. Initially sceptical of the ECSC, their welcome by Monnet encouraged their engagement in Europe. When in 1955 the *relance* of Messina, offered new possibilities for the unions— but also dangers – they were prepared to join Monnet in his new venture.

Chapter 3 *The Action Committee* analyses the Action Committee, considering Monnet's original vision for it, and how far this illuminates his views on integration, but also how it acted as a vehicle for his own ambitions. Monnet determined the composition of the Committee and the reasons and consequences of his refusal to allow the participation of employer organisations are explored. As Chairman Monnet was also able to manage the Committee to promote his own views, as an analysis of its resolutions shows. The chapter concludes with an account of the Committee's dissolution, showing that it had remained frozen in the economic and political circumstances of the mid-1950s.

Chapter 4 *German Trade Union Membership of the Action Committee 1955 – 60* considers the German unions' involvement with the Committee over that period. Building on existing literature, the unions' reasons for joining are analysed. It was a low key process which set the

tone for their future involvement, leading to consideration of the issue of permissive consensus regarding the relationships the union leaders enjoyed with the Committee. The thesis shows that neither the DGB nor the individual member unions attempted to develop a positive agenda to use the Committee to promote their own aims. There was a passive membership. While IGB and IGM both participated, ÖTV and *IG Chemie* supported the Committee financially but took no further role. ÖTV's attempts to participate alongside IGB and IGM are explored as they cast light on the constraints facing both Monnet and Rosenberg at the time of the Committee's formation. The chapter also contains sections discussing the role of the two DGB Chairmen of the period, Walter Freitag and Willi Richter, showing how they related to the Committee and the wider political impact of their participation. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the correspondence between Monnet and the German Committee members, and their meetings, over the entire lifespan of the Committee. This clearly illustrates both the developing nature of the Committee, how the German unions' involvement changed and how far they were willing to interact with Monnet as members of it.

Chapter 5 *The Unions, Monnet and the Rome Treaties* considers the German unions' attempts to promote their aims during the negotiations for the Rome Treaties. Compared to the unions' involvement in the Schuman Plan negotiations, there has been relatively little study of this subject. The thesis provides an analysis of the unions' attitudes and behaviour during this important period. The unions hoped for greater representation in the new European institutions and a revised balance between social and economic integration. My thesis discusses these aspirations, the course of the negotiations between 1955 – 1957 from the

unions' viewpoint and their eventual outcome. A final section analyses the unions' position during the early years of the European Economic Community (EEC), showing how contemporary commentators and later historians were essentially correct in endorsing the unions' own verdict on the outcome of the process.

Chapter 6 *German Trade Union Membership of the Action Committee 1960 – 75* commences with a short discussion of domestic developments in the Federal Republic which affected the unions during this period. The thesis then analyses the participation of the German unions in the Committee after 1960 until its dissolution. It shows how union attitudes to Monnet and the Committee changed subtly as a result of the outcome of the treaty negotiations. The attitudes of the DGB Chairmen, Ludwig Rosenberg and Heinz-Oskar Vetter, are discussed, the former being of particular importance due to his long-term relationship with Monnet and the Committee. The chapter also focusses on three episodes, the Fouchet Plan, the debate over the proposed Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) and the proposals for a European Company Statute, which illustrate the German union leaders' attitudes to the Committee. An analysis of the union press and obituaries shows how mention of the Action Committee was minimised, articles only appearing when they aligned with union objectives and its wider implications ignored. The chapter concludes with an account of the DGB's 1973 evaluation of the Committee's value for the German unions and a discussion of the unions' own assessment of their participation in it.

The Conclusion contains a brief introduction to the Second Action Committee where one element of the original consensus between Monnet and the unions broke down as the unions

found themselves members of an organisation that took no account of them and was at variance with their objectives.

In summary, the thesis will show how the German unions joined the Action Committee with no firm agenda, failed to use it to advance their own interests and then lost interest in it as the Committee became increasingly irrelevant. Considered in these terms, their membership was a failure. Yet, success cannot always be measured by tangible events; the Committee helped the unions to achieve the recognition, acceptance and equality they craved in post-war Europe. Monnet's Action Committee provided one platform among several for socialising the German unions into a Europe in which they would become increasingly important participants by the time of German reunification.

Ch. 1 HISTORIOGRAPHY

This thesis intersects the historiography of three subjects – European integration, the German unions' involvement in that process and Monnet's Action Committee. Of these, the first has produced by far the most debate among historians and political scientists, an indication of the subject's importance and the different approaches adopted by those studying it. Although part of the integration story, the other two subject areas have been relatively neglected, offering opportunities for further research. Finally particular attention has been paid to the concept of permissive consensus, which provides a tool for examining union relationships concerning the Action Committee and understanding how the union leaders involved were only prepared to operate within accepted parameters.

1.1 European Integration

The history of European integration is a history of the creation and development of institutions and also of the motives that brought those institutions into existence. European integration in its present form began over 70 years ago with the foundation of the ECSC and from our current perspective can be divided into two distinct periods – pre and post the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The Action Committee belonged to the first period of integration, one identified by Frank Schimmelfenning as the period 'from Messina to Maastricht'.¹ This period of integration took place against the backdrop of the Cold War in a Community that was relatively small and not particularly diverse in its economic and social structures. It was largely managed and driven by Europe's political elites and was a period of permissive consensus in

¹ Frank Schimmelfenning, 'What's the News in "New Intergovernmentalism"? A Critique of Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53 (2015) pp. 723 - 730, p. 723.

which the majority of the population took little part in the process. It was the Europe in which Monnet operated and which he knew well. In contrast, integration in the post-Maastricht period took place once the Cold War was over, Germany had been reunited, and during an era of accelerating globalisation. The European Communities and subsequent European Union (EU) expanded geographically and became more diverse with the inclusion of the formerly Soviet controlled states of Eastern Europe. There was greater public debate, often contested, about integration and an increasing emphasis on identity among Europe's citizens. Not all countries had consistently followed Keynesian economic policies during the earlier period but post-Maastricht there was an increasing emphasis on implementing neo-liberal economic policies. Monnet's name was invoked in its support but it was not necessarily a Europe he would have recognised.

Integration Theory

Three main theories explaining European integration were developed during or after the pre-Maastricht period and all have their origins in it. Debate has continued to understand how far these can be used to explain more recent developments in integration, particularly in the light of the difficulties the European Union has faced since the financial crisis of 2008.² The first of these theories, Neofunctionalism, was developed in the 1950s and early 1960s and assumed to apply to the very earliest period of integration up to the mid-1960s. The stagnation of the Community by the mid-1960s led to the development of Intergovernmentalism, a theory spurred largely by the rise of de Gaulle in France. Finally Andrew Moravcsik developed his

² See for instance the November 2018 debates in *The Journal of Common Market Studies* which will be discussed later.

theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) from the early 1990s. Moravcsik believed that LI could be used to explain developments in integration from 1955 on and it has become the baseline theory of integration, capable – with some finessing – of explaining developments up to the present.

Neofunctionalism

Intellectually Neofunctionalism drew on David Mitrany's work on integration theory.³ It was Monnet's preferred approach to integration and in a somewhat circular fashion based partly on observation of him and his work. Its two major proponents, the American academics Ernst Haas, author of *The Uniting of Europe: political, social and economic forces, 1950-1957* and Stuart Scheingold, who co-authored *Europe's Would-Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community* both spent long periods in Brussels.⁴ Although originating from the earliest period of integration, the concept of Neofunctionalism has been revived in recent debates.

In *Ernst B Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism* Philip Schmitter identified several working assumptions of Neofunctionalism.⁵ The first assumption is that states are no longer the only (or even key) actors in the integration process, a view subsequently challenged strongly by both Stanley Hoffman and Moravcsik in their later work. Both recognised that the

³ Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Ernst B Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12 (2005) pp. 255-272, p. 256.

⁴ Ernst B. Haas, *Uniting of Europe : Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Ann Arbor, 1996). Haas' book was first published in 1958. Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970).

⁵ Schmitter, 'Ernst B Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism', pp. 258 – 259.

Neofunctionalist assumption that states only possess 'residual powers', reducing them to 'formal co-signatories' of treaties, significantly understates their influence. From the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC, the integration process has been promoted by a series of treaties (Rome, Maastricht, and Lisbon) initiated by national governments; integration would not happen unless states allowed the process to proceed. Neofunctionalism also assumes that interests, not common ideals or identity, are the driving force for integration and that actors agree not because they have the same aims but because their preferences overlap, even if only temporarily. As will be shown later, while interests cannot be discounted, the earliest stages of European integration were underpinned by an explicit common ideal – the search for peace and an end to Europe's fratricidal wars. This idea in turn rested on a shared understanding of European identity among the politicians concerned, and will be discussed later as part of the heroic narrative of integration.

The assumption of the Neofunctionalists that actors cannot be confined to existing nation states was, however, more realistic. Integration resulted in the growth of supranational institutions, increasingly populated by a multi-national elite with its own esprit de corps, somewhat colourfully described by Werner von Simson as 'a European mafia ... who believed in a new dimension to European political life'.⁶ This new dimension was to be achieved through spillover, a further key concept for the Neofunctionalists, who believed that functions or 'interest areas' (such as coal and steel) should provide the initial focus for integration and would in turn spillover, requiring supranational activity in new fields. In essence,

⁶ Werner von Simson, 'Reflections on Jean Monnet's skillful handling of Member States and People during the first years of the Community', in Giandomenico Majone, Emile Noël, and Peter van der Bossche (eds.), *Jean Monnet et l'Europe d'aujourd'hui* (Baden-Baden, 1989), pp. 29-36, p. 33.

Neofunctionalism assumed that integration would take the form of a chain reaction driven by a supranational elite, with new perspectives and opportunities opening up once the process was underway.

The concept of spillover is central to Neofunctionalism and played a major role in Monnet's thinking.⁷ In his reappraisal of Neofunctionalism at the time of Maastricht, *Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC*, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen identified three forms of spillover.⁸ The first, functional, recognises that introducing supranationality in one area will inevitably have a ripple effect, requiring further action to solve problems that arise as a result of the implementation of the original decision. The second form, political, results from the growth of supranational institutions, such as the ECSC's High Authority and the later European Commission. These institutions involve the creation of a new supranational elite and the transference of loyalties of those involved away from their previous national positions towards ones based on pan-European interest, a process noted by Richard Mayne, an Englishman who worked for the ECSC and then Monnet, whose Memoirs he translated.⁹ This leads to the third form, cultivated spillover, where the supranational institutions strive to assume wider responsibilities, and greater influence, by promoting integration beyond that originally envisaged. Here these institutions were often to encounter opposition from national governments who wished to keep policy areas under their own control. Tranholm-Mikkelsen could have added a fourth category – spillover of

⁷ See Ch. 2.

⁸ Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC', *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 20 (1991), pp. 1-22.

⁹ Richard Mayne, *The Recovery of Europe : From Devastation to Unity* (London, 1970), p. 208.

expectations. This was the hope of the German unions, whose leaders expected to see the development of 'social Europe' as a counterpoint to the 'economic Europe' being constructed.

Neither Haas nor Lindberg assumed that spillover was necessarily automatic, though others, misreading their work, did.¹⁰ In fact as Tranholm-Mikkelsen pointed out 'the logic of spillover has been more in evidence in some periods than others', implying its progress was dependent on external factors.¹¹ Lindberg himself suggested that achieving a state of equilibrium could 'inhibit forward linkages'; spillover requires a degree of tension and contestation in order to be effective - but not too much otherwise its development would be delayed.¹² When the original economic stimulus originating from the Rome Treaties was achieved with the final removal of customs barriers by the end of the 1960s, the initial spillover process generated came to an end. Integration required a new impetus to move forward again. It did not receive one from member states and stagnation resulted.

Schmitter also identified two generic assumptions concerning Neofunctionalism.¹³ The first was that integration would be consensual. This was easier in the pre-Maastricht period with elite support for the process and little popular involvement at a time of permissive consensus, a concept discussed below. The second was how to make 'Europe without Europeans' at a time when the majority of political activity occurred domestically. National political actors were primarily concerned to strengthen their domestic position, a realisation that pointed the

¹⁰ Schmitter, 'Ernst B Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism', p. 261.

¹¹ Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?', p. 16.

¹² Lindberg and Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity*, p. 197.

¹³ Schmitter, 'Ernst B Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism', p. 258.

way to Intergovernmentalism and the role of the nation state. In contrast, Schmitter left unmentioned the point that Neofunctionalism functioned best when the economy was strong and all parties could benefit from growth. Economic growth seemed to mean that hard decisions concerning economic distribution could be postponed during the 1950s and 1960s; Moravcsik showed emphatically that this was not the case. Finally, the Neofunctionalist approach ran the risk of portraying supranationalism as inevitable, embodying a logical progression, which, at its extreme as Monnet put it, would lead 'to the organised world of tomorrow'.¹⁴ Jonathan White's work is a reminder that, although strongly influenced by Neofunctionalist theory, Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European Commission after 1958, was astute enough to recognise that integration still needed to take account of the material interests of the parties involved and would not happen automatically.¹⁵

As a result of the stagnation experienced by the Community during the 1960s Haas became increasingly disenchanted with his approach (he never called it a theory) and declared it 'obsolete' in the 1970s.¹⁶ The judgement was premature and since then several commentators have suggested that Neofunctionalism can still represent a relevant approach to the integration process. In his 1991 article Tranholm-Mikkelsen reappraised its role in the light of the introduction of the Single Market and Maastricht Treaty.¹⁷ He suggested that the Commission aimed to achieve 'cultivated spillover' at both the economic and political levels and that Neofunctionalism played a role in the increased pace of integration after 1985. This

¹⁴ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 524.

¹⁵ Jonathan White, 'Theory Guiding Practice: The Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission', *Journal of European Integration History*, 9 (2003), pp. 111-132.

¹⁶ Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?', p. 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 10 – 16.

attitude was reflected in the aims of the Second Action Committee, which had been founded a year earlier and promoted a security based agenda as well as an economic one. Both the creation of the Single Market and the Maastricht Treaty were, nevertheless, still the result of political decisions made by the national member states. Tranholm-Mikkelsen was writing when the expansion of the European Union beyond Western Europe had not taken place; Monnet's Europe, while undergoing major change, had not yet fully developed into a more diverse post-Maastricht one.

Reviewing Haas' legacy in the post-Maastricht environment, Schmitter built on Tranholm-Mikkelsen's work by showing that although the Single European Act (SEA) had been dominated by intergovernmental thinking, it had nevertheless created a series of spillovers that needed to be addressed.¹⁸ The experience of the SEA showed that spillover could be automatic, just as the Neofunctionalists had envisaged, but only within the scope determined by an existing treaty. Thus a decision in principle led to impacts that only became clear after implementation; spillover did not kick start a new development but meant addressing a number of issues without which the original project would have been less successful. More recently A. Nieman and D. Iannou in *European Economic Integration in Times of Crisis: a Case of Neofunctionalism?* show how the 2008 financial crisis set off a series of spillovers, some proposed and managed by the supranational European Central Bank.¹⁹ Yet, as the authors concede, much of the agenda was set by national governments; spillover could essentially only happen within the parameters that national leaders were prepared to allow, a position both

¹⁸ Schmitter, 'Ernst B Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism', p. 262.

¹⁹ Arne Nieman and Demosthenes Iannou, 'European Economic Integration in Times of Crisis: a Case of Neofunctionalism?', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22 (2015), pp. 196-218, pp. 210 – 212.

Schmitter and Nieman endorsed when stating that spillover can no longer be regarded as a stand-alone explanation for integration.

Apart from providing a tool to analyse the integration process, the importance of Neofunctionalism lies in its backing by Monnet, who believed it was crucial in driving the integration process and promoted it relentlessly both before and after the Messina Conference. Neofunctionalism was implicit in the approach of the Action Committee which was established at a time when the concept was seen as an important – if not primary – driver of integration. The Committee's loss of role during the 1960s was in part a reflection of Neofunctionalism's lost impetus and the increasing emphasis on an Intergovernmental approach to integration.

Intergovernmentalism

By the mid-1960s the EEC was in a state of stagnation with de Gaulle pressing for a dilution of the Community's supranational aspects. Reflecting these developments, in 1966 Hoffmann proposed his theory of Intergovernmentalism (sometimes now referred to as intergovernmental institutionalism) in *Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe*.²⁰ Hoffmann believed that integration was dependent on national governments whose views were moulded by external events, primarily foreign affairs and defence. These views in turn depended on the countries' 'national situations' and the fact that each had different levels and understanding of national consciousness.²¹ Hoffmann saw

²⁰ Stanley Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus* 95 (1966), pp. 862-915.

²¹ Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete?', pp. 889 ff.

this reflected in de Gaulle's actions as he vetoed British entry to the EEC and forced the move away from majority voting to emphasise French power in the Community. However, by the 1970s Community stagnation also demonstrated that with the first stage of the Common Market successfully completed, there was little agreement among The Six about how integration should proceed. This prevented further effective action, as shown by Quentin Jouan in his analysis of inputs from The Six's political and socio-economic elites for the 1976 Tindemans report.²²

Hoffmann was correct in seeing governments as the drivers of integration. While de Gaulle's rise provided the catalyst for his theory, the political reality of governments taking control of the integration agenda had been central from its beginning. Both the 1951 Treaty of Paris and the 1957 Rome Treaties were only possible as a result of intergovernmental agreement and were preceded by lengthy intergovernmental negotiations. With its emphasis on peace and security the establishment of the ECSC did not owe its origins to Neofunctionalism but rather to Intergovernmentalism. The process could only begin with French readiness to pool their national coal and steel industries and the Federal Republic's willing acceptance of the offer. Both parties based their attitudes on national considerations, the very criteria Hoffman had identified as the drivers of Intergovernmentalism. Nevertheless by concentrating on the role of governments and seeing defence and security issues as the main drivers of integration, Hoffmann discounted many other non-governmental players, who over time came to play an increasingly important role, and the wide variety of viewpoints that they represented.

²² See Quentin Jouan, 'Narratives of European Integration in Times of Crisis: Images of Europe in the 1970s', *Journal of European Integration History*, 22 (2016), pp. 11-28.

The core of the Intergovernmentalist approach would eventually be incorporated into Liberal Intergovernmentalism but recently Bickerton and others have attempted to revive Hoffmann's concept as the New Intergovernmentalism.²³ They argue that in the post-Maastricht era the increase in Community activity has not been marked by an increase in supranationalism. Instead they claim that the post-Maastricht period has seen the emergence of a distinctive form of European integration, one that is not an 'extension of the longer running integration process initiated in the early 1950s'.²⁴ In this they correctly differentiate the post-Maastricht period from the earlier period of integration. However, their statement implies that Moravcsik's theory of LI was no longer relevant to the later period, a viewpoint discussed below.

Monnet was an opponent of Intergovernmentalism, consistently arguing for greater supranationality and technocratic input, hence his disappointment when the Council of Ministers was inserted into the structures of the ECSC during the Schuman Plan negotiations. However, Monnet was also realistic enough to appreciate that power lay with national parliaments and one of his reasons for resigning from the High Authority in 1954 was his realisation that they would be the instigators of change.²⁵ Intergovernmentalism meant that spillover was still possible (and as shown above would happen in certain circumstances) but the initial impetus for change was firmly in the hands of member states. The Action

²³ Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson, and Uwe Puetter, 'The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53 (2015), pp. 703 - 722.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 717.

²⁵ This is discussed further in Ch. 3.1.

Committee's agenda attempted to promote subjects such as monetary union that would continue the spillover process. When national governments ignored these the Committee's potential role as a catalyst for change was diminished and it would lose relevance for its members.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Hoffmann's approach was refined and expanded by Moravcsik in an article published in 1993 and his major 1999 work *The Choice for Europe*.²⁶ Moravcsik's work was comprehensively reviewed in the November 2018 issue of *The Journal of Common Market Studies* (JCMS) with a complete issue devoted to the concept of LI, several of the contributing articles are discussed below.²⁷ Moravcsik's argument is based on the three assumptions of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmental analysis of interstate negotiation.²⁸ States will act rationally, will seek a variety of inputs and, once an agreed national position has been reached, negotiate on an intergovernmental basis to achieve them. Moravcsik built on Hoffmann's work by continuing to stress the importance of national actors and governments but also accepted that a wide range of interest groups can input to them during the process of domestic policy formation. In this way LI originally underpinned an elite model of integration but with governments driving the integration agenda rather than the supranational technocrats seen as the prime movers in Neofunctionalism. Moravcsik expounded his theory in the immediate post-Maastricht period

²⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31 (1993), pp. 473-524; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London, 1999).

²⁷ *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Nov 2018, vol. 56, issue 7.

²⁸ Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community', p. 480.

but his initial work was based on the earlier period of integration before the European Community became the subject of wider and more populist political debate.

Moravcsik believed that each new step in the integration process started with a situation or problem requiring a solution. Each state involved then defined its interests and aims, based on a range of inputs, including non-governmental ones, such as those of particular business groups. States negotiated on an intergovernmental basis to achieve their preferred aims and then established common institutions to ensure the implementation of the agreed solution. The process was 'liberal' in that it involved a wide range of inputs and 'intergovernmental' by ensuring that the governments of the individual nation states involved in the process remained in control. Supranationalism was only possible as far as the governments concerned would permit it; spillover was neither sought nor encouraged. Acceptance of Moravcsik's work is such that it has become the 'baseline' theory for understanding of the integration process as Mareike Kleine and Mark Pollack acknowledged in their introductory article to the JCMS debate, *Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics*.²⁹

By initially concentrating on the Messina to Maastricht period, Moravcsik did not cover the Treaty of Paris and the formation of the ECSC in his work. Yet the institutions (High Authority / Commission, Assembly / European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Court of Justice) agreed during the Schuman Plan negotiations and established for the ECSC have remained in place over the last 70 years, even if their competences have expanded and

²⁹ Mareike Kleine and Mark Pollack, 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56 (2018), pp. 1493 - 1509, p. 1506.

the balance of power between them has fluctuated. The foundation of the ECSC was a matter of 'high politics', and could thus fall under Hoffman's definition of Intergovernmentalism, but even so Matthias Kipping shows that in France it was still marked by interest group negotiation between steel producers and consumers and their respective ministerial supporters of exactly the nature Moravcsik describes.³⁰ However, consideration of sectoral interests was downgraded by both Monnet in France and Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic's first Chancellor, during the Schuman Plan negotiations, leading Hermann Reusch, one of the plan's more outspoken critics in the German steel industry, to resign from the *Unterausschuss Eisen und Stahl* in protest.³¹ The establishment of the ECSC represented a major turning point for the nations participating and politics were to override sectional commercial interests to ensure its success. Many of the same political pressures still pertained five years later in the negotiations for the Rome Treaties but were now subject to a wider range of inputs from those impacted by the proposed common market rather than two specific sectors. Messina thus made a more convenient and rational starting point for Moravcsik's work.

Maastricht did nevertheless represent an appropriate end point for Moravcsik's initial analysis. The interest groups Moravcsik referenced tended to be organised, were often officially recognised, and of an industrial or commercial nature. The Maastricht Treaty however set off a series of debates in which the nature of integration was often contested and

³⁰ Matthias Kipping, *Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz. Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen Einigung 1944 - 1952* (Berlin, 1996).

³¹ Werner Bühner, *Ruhrstahl und Europa* (München, 1986), p. 186. The Committee had been established by the Federal Government to deal with technical aspects of the Schuman Plan.

its advance challenged in national referenda and parliamentary debate.³² In their article *A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus*, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks demonstrated the importance of identity in the integration debate, a trend that has only increased since then.³³ Since 1992 national politicians have been much more concerned with public opinion about Europe than had previously been the case; the era of permissive consensus was over. It is nevertheless worth questioning whether the 'increased salience' which Hooghe and Marks identified is actually damaging to the cause of integration.³⁴ When properly handled, it could be beneficial in leading to a deeper level of engaged debate; salience only became destructive when appropriated by populist politicians who wanted to ensure a greater degree of contestation for their own purposes.

The question of how well LI was suited to the changed circumstances of the post-Maastricht period was addressed in the 2018 issue of the JCMS. The introduction by Kleine and Pollack supported Moravcsik's claim that the LI model was still applicable even after the upsets of the Euro crisis, the 2014 Russian annexation of the Crimea and Brexit, all of which had shaken the European Union (EU).³⁵ They also identified three 'extensions' of Moravcsik's original work; firstly the debate over the EU's supposed 'democratic deficit', an issue to be considered later due to the links drawn between it and Monnet's original actions, and the role of permissive

³² Referenda were held in Denmark, France and the Irish Republic and the Treaty was accompanied by intense parliamentary debate in the UK.

³³ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science*, 39 (2009), pp. 1 - 23.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁵ Kleine and Pollack, 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics', p. 1506.

consensus in underpinning it. The second extension was the question of how far after the Brexit vote the EU had reached a 'stable constitutional settlement' and the third was whether the EU qualified as the world's 'second superpower'.³⁶ Moravcsik gave positive answers to all these questions; the EU had no democratic deficit, it had achieved a stable constitutional state and was indeed a superpower. Yet while the EU's internal constitutional settlement might be stable, and possibly enhanced by the departure of British governments which had often sought to impede further integration, it is difficult to argue that the EU acts as a superpower. With little foreign policy coordination and no defence capability, the EU as a proponent of democratic, rules based governance with widely accepted industrial standards is an example of soft power at best.³⁷

In his response to his critics, in *Preferences Power and Institutions in 21st Century Europe*, Moravcsik showed how each element of his original theory could be reworked to incorporate developments since the 1990s.³⁸ Here he cited the example of public opinion which had been much less important as an input to the decision making process when he wrote his original work. He also nuanced his approach to the other two features of his original theory, admitting that even small states could have a major impact on interstate negotiations if they employed the power of veto and finessing his views on institutions to differentiate between standard setting institutions (e.g. those licensing drug use) and those where 'deeper forms of delegation

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 1501 – 1506.

³⁷ The Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced the EU to adopt a more consistent foreign policy in this area but at the time of writing (March 2022) it is too early to say whether this will continue and be extended to other foreign policy issues.

³⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences Power and Institutions in 21st Century Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56 (2018), pp. 1648-1674.

or pooling' were required.³⁹ Kleine and Pollack did not demur from Moravcsik's suggestion that 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism...is richer than its critics portray it'.⁴⁰ LI's ability to encompass new developments meant it could still be regarded as the baseline theory of integration and was of continuing relevance to the debate.

Giandomenico Majone published his work on the regulatory state just as Moravcsik was introducing the concept of LI.⁴¹ He traced the move from a dirigiste state, which often owned industries directly, to one in which the state regulated private (often privatised) industries via agencies whose separation from government was designed to ensure they would provide expertise, continuity and stability. Majone believed that European level regulation would stop inconsistency between individual member states and avoid interest group capture. His work complements Moravcsik's focus on the Community institutions' role of securing agreed gains; it could thus be incorporated into the latter's with little difficulty. However, incorporating the results of the intergovernmental decision making process does not necessarily mean that the rules enforced are objectively neutral as Majone had assumed.

The three approaches of Neofunctionalism, Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism are not necessarily in competition with each other but rather represent different emphases and timeframes across the integration narrative. Right from the beginning of the integration process national interest had played a major role and inconvenient domestic interests had fought to be heard via governmental mediation in the negotiating process – a

³⁹ Ibid., p. 1655.

⁴⁰ Kleine and Pollack, 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics', p. 1506.

⁴¹ Giandomenico Majone, 'The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe', *West European Politics*, 17 (1994), pp.78-101.

fact which was painfully apparent for the unions as will be shown in Chapter 5. The first steps towards integration had always been the result of actions by national governments; there was no other way for power to be peacefully transferred in the first instance. While Intergovernmentalism and LI both recognise the role of nation state politicians in promoting integration, they differ in terms of richness and input. Hoffmann's version of Intergovernmentalism assumes the primacy of 'high politics' in integration, a not unreasonable view at the start of the process, but LI is more flexible and encompassing in its inputs and, as the 2018 debates showed, allowed the integration of new perspectives due to changing circumstances. Hooghe and Marks drew a distinction between Neofunctionalism, dealing with day to day policy making, and Intergovernmentalism, concerned with the negotiation of major treaties.⁴² It is a pertinent distinction; within the overall context of the LI approach, there is considerable evidence that the spillover element of Neofunctionalism, often driven by a technocratic elite, takes place on a limited scale to address the problems emerging within a frame-work established by national governments. Neofunctionalist spillover can thus be regarded as a means of ensuring the fullest implementation of Intergovernmental decisions.

Integration Narratives

The three approaches constructed by political scientists help to explain the process by which integration occurs and Moravcsik's work considered individual episodes in the integration process.⁴³ Nevertheless, none of the approaches really address the underlying reasons for

⁴² Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory', p. 4.

⁴³ This is most apparent in Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe* and is discussed in the section on the Economic narrative below.

European integration and what drove the statesmen involved to undertake the original ‘bold, constructive act’, of 1950, as Monnet described it.⁴⁴ Explanations for why integration occurred are better sought in the narratives which historians have constructed over the years. In the wake of the EU’s award of the Nobel peace prize in 2012, Ian Manners and Philomena Murray identified six narratives of European integration.⁴⁵ Three of these – Nobel (heroic), economic and social – are relevant to the period this thesis covers.⁴⁶

The Heroic Narrative

The Nobel or heroic narrative is a significant historical and political interpretation of European integration which remains the EU’s official self-representation.⁴⁷ In this narrative, politics, particularly the original keystone of Franco-German rapprochement, is seen as the prime motive and driving force for integration. This view was espoused by F Roy Willis in his book *France, Germany and the New Europe 1945 – 67*.⁴⁸ Willis stressed the political aspects of rapprochement, showing how France moved from early post-war attitudes of revenge to reconciliation with her former enemy. France’s foreign minister Robert Schuman is praised for breaking the deadlocked Ruhr situation in 1950 and the early years of de Gaulle’s presidency are viewed positively as he worked with Adenauer to popularise reconciliation and then institutionalise it in the 1963 Elysée Treaty. Willis’ is a political interpretation which rightly views economics as a way of achieving political goals. He showed that reconciliation

⁴⁴ Monnet, *Memoirs*, title to Ch. 12.

⁴⁵ Ian Manners and Philomena Murray, 'The End of a Noble Narrative? European Integration Narratives after the Nobel Peace Prize', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54 (2016), pp. 185 - 202.

⁴⁶ The ‘new narrative’ for Europe and the Green narrative refer to more recent periods of integration. Manners and Murray also identified a ‘Global narrative’ which I will mention when appropriate.

⁴⁷ See, for example, President José Manuel Barroso’s speech at the summit of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates in 2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-520_en.htm. (Accessed 2-3-2020).

⁴⁸ F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe 1945-1967* (London, 1968).

was not just a matter for political leaders by drawing attention to the post-war growth of Franco-German forums, and the promotion of trade links, conferences and exchanges, all of which provided a basis for further integration; reconciliation was to take place across society.⁴⁹ In referencing figures such as Edouard Bonnefous, who provided ideas for the future of the steel industry, Willis also showed how the work of Europe's 'founding fathers' such as Monnet, Schuman and Adenauer rested on a wider, if less visible, base of political and practical support.⁵⁰ A supporter of integration, Willis was dismayed by de Gaulle's turn towards anti-European nationalism, as evidenced in the Preface to the revised 1968 edition of his work.

In *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe 1945 – 55* John Gillingham likewise endorsed the heroic narrative of reconciliation but through an economic prism.⁵¹ Gillingham believed that by the late 1940s the danger was of Germany 'being revived without being reformed'.⁵² He saw Monnet, backed by his American connections (John McCloy, the US High Commissioner in Germany, was a personal friend) as the prime mover of integration, which in the case of the steel industry was the logical conclusion of moves that had begun during the inter-war years. Like Willis, he also welcomed the rebuilding of non-governmental relations as a way of strengthening links between the two countries.⁵³ For Gillingham, the ECSC was a producer dominated economic failure, whose economic achievements he downplayed. This

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 234 – 242.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 81.

⁵¹ John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955 : the Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community* (Cambridge, 1991).

⁵² Ibid., p. 115.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 219 – 221.

understated the real progress made in opening up the coal and steel markets as well as in regulating transport costs and taxation, key elements in ensuring a level playing field for those same markets. Gillingham nevertheless regarded the ECSC as a political success which provided the 'political underpinnings for a new international settlement', allowing the Europeans to retake control of the integration agenda later in the decade.⁵⁴

Other American academics investigated the ECSC as a new form of political organisation, an interest that reflected the positive attitudes towards integration of US administrations during the 1950s.⁵⁵ Contemporary studies by Henry Merry, Derek Bok and Louis Lister were predominately economic in scope and, with the Community in existence, all regarded it as an economic success.⁵⁶ Politically they were less certain of its role, and although Lister recognised the ECSC was 'more than a free trade area', Bok did not believe that it was likely to lead to further integration.⁵⁷ Merry and Bok's works were both published in 1955; they were writing in the light of the previous year's failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) when the prospects for further integration would have looked bleak.

For both Willis and Gillingham, Europe was built by the Europeans on the basis of rapprochement and reconciliation. In this historiographical review my thesis will show that

⁵⁴ John Gillingham, 'Jean Monnet and the ECSC: a Preliminary Appraisal', in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford P. Hackett (eds.), *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (New York, 1991), pp. 157 – 158.

⁵⁵ John Gillingham, 'American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties', *Journal of European Integration History*, 1 (1995), pp. 21-36.

⁵⁶ See Henry J. Merry, 'The European Coal and Steel Community. Operations of the High Authority', *Western Political Quarterly*, 8 (1955), pp. 166-185; Derek Curtis Bok, *The First Three Years of the Schuman Plan* (Princeton, N.J., 1955); Louis Lister, *Europe's Coal and Steel Community : an Experiment in Economic Union*, (New York, 1960).

⁵⁷ Lister, *Europe's Coal and Steel Community*, p. 9; Bok, *The First Three Years of the Schuman Plan*, p. 79.

integration represented a positive moral and political choice by statesmen who wanted to secure peace and escape the horrors of the past, a moral dimension to integration which has been recently reemphasised with the Catholic Church's recognition of Schuman's 'heroic virtues'.⁵⁸ Schuman's introductory statement at the press conference announcing his plan made this clear and the opening words of his Declaration stressed the need for peace and recognised Europe's role in its safeguarding.⁵⁹ Adenauer likewise spoke of Europe as a 'third force' which could reduce conflict and secure peace in his press conference that same evening.⁶⁰ When explaining the plan, Monnet too reiterated that it was about 'Europe and peace', rather than emphasising its technical aspects.⁶¹ Adenauer and Monnet's accounts date from after the actual event, but their subsequent declarations and actions in promoting integration show their concern for peace. The legacy of World War II rested heavily on the 'founding fathers' and after 1945 the fear of a third was a constant backdrop to their lives.

The memoirs and publications of those involved in the initial process of 'building Europe' show how important it was to them as a means of promoting peace. That this made it an attractive interpretation for them, and their audiences, does not mean it was invalid. On the centre-right those involved included Hallstein, whose memoirs *Europe in the Making* stressed the

⁵⁸ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-57534918>. (Article dated 19-6-2021, accessed 26-7-2021).

Recognition of 'heroic virtues' can begin the process leading to canonisation.

⁵⁹ For the press conference see <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=329344011085429> (accessed 2-4-2022); for the declaration see https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_en. (Accessed 2-4-2022). This was actually a reconstruction filmed a couple of weeks after the event as due to time pressure no arrangements had been made to film the announcement on the day.

⁶⁰ Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945 - 53* (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 329 – 331. The press conference covered both the FRG's potential accession to the Council of Europe and the Schuman Plan.

⁶¹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 304.

heroic background to integration.⁶² For Hallstein, originally a law professor, the new Europe was based on the rule of law, representing a stark contrast to the lawlessness of the Nazi era.⁶³ Hallstein saw Europe as a way of promoting peace, eventually developing its own foreign and defence policy but significantly failed to mention social policy – an omission that was to alienate the unions after 1957. Hans von der Groeben was the German official initially responsible for relations with the ECSC and then involved in the 1956 Brussels negotiations leading to the Rome Treaties. His short account of the 1956 negotiations *Die Anfänge der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Kurze Darstellung eines Zeitzeugen* was a somewhat self-congratulatory narrative.⁶⁴ Nevertheless by concluding that the treaties represented a hope for economic prosperity, security and a constructive role for Europe in the world, he identified the main concerns of Europe's founders.⁶⁵ As shown, both Adenauer and Schuman endorsed the understanding of Europe as a peace project; as French Foreign Minister the latter had spoken out relatively early of the need to integrate the nascent Federal Republic into Europe to preserve peace and identified the issues around it.⁶⁶ For all the politicians referenced here Europe integration was seen as the way to secure and guarantee peace.

The German trade unionist Heinz Potthoff, a member of the ECSC's High Authority, also saw integration as a way of resolving bloody conflicts and breaking the cycle of suspicion and

⁶² Walter Hallstein, *Europe in the Making* (London, 1972). Ch. 1 The Foundations of a United Europe.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Ch. 2 Law in Place of Force.

⁶⁴ Hans von der Groeben, 'Die Anfänge der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Kurze Darstellung eines Zeitzeugen', in Rudolf Hrbek and Volker Schwarz (eds.), *40 Jahre Römische Verträge : der deutsche Beitrag : Dokumentation der Konferenz anlässlich des 90. Geburtstages von Dr. h.c. Hans von der Groeben* (Baden-Baden, 1998), pp. 165 - 171.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁶⁶ Schuman's speech of December 1948 quoted in René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman : une âme pour l'Europe* (Paris, 1986), p. 111. The book is a rather hagiographical biography by one of Schuman's assistants.

jealousy that had caused them.⁶⁷ The view of Europe as a peace project was in many ways a bi-partisan one that very definitely crossed the political spectrum. Potthoff, however, added a rider, having no hesitation in stating that the EEC also had the duty to follow social aims as well as economic ones, a key concern for the unions and one which was to be neglected in the Rome Treaties.⁶⁸ This was also the view of Ludwig Rosenberg, the future DGB Chairman, whose views will be considered in more detail later.⁶⁹ The unions believed peace should be promoted through integration, but not at the expense of organised labour. All these accounts could suffer from the benefit of hindsight, calling into question how far they reflected the authors' views at the time. In fact, the way that all approached the topic of integration, although from different domestic political standpoints, and in the case of the trade unionists with different expectations, while still emphasising the centrality of peace as its key driver, goes a long way to demonstrating the importance it held for them at the time.

Walter Lipgens' work *A History of European Integration* provided an intellectual foundation for the 'heroic version' of integration.⁷⁰ Lipgens believed that Europe (or at least his version of 'core Europe') was based on Christianity and culture, concepts that will be discussed below.⁷¹ Reviewing the ideas of the inter-war period and then the wartime resistance movements, he traced Europe's self-awareness back to its civilisation but also to economic

⁶⁷ Heinz Potthoff, *Vom Besatzungsstaat zur europäischen Gemeinschaft* (Hannover, 1964), Schlußwort pp. 65 – 67.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁶⁹ See Ch. 6.4.

⁷⁰ Walter Lipgens, *A history of European integration. Vol. 1, The formation of the European Unity Movement* (Oxford, 1982).

⁷¹ For Lipgens' personal views see Wolfram Kaiser, "'Überzeugter Katholik und CDU Wähler": zur Historographie der Integrationsgeschichte am Beispiel Walter Lipgens', *Journal of European Integration History*, 8 (2002), pp. 119-128.

necessity, the depression of the 1930s had shown the inability of small states to protect their populations economically. Lipgens believed unity would make war impossible and was the way to achieve reconciliation with Germany.⁷² He was prescient in identifying that those countries whose populations had not experienced war in the 'disaster area' lacked the self-awareness of those that had and would be less amenable to integration.⁷³ Here Lipgens principally had the UK in mind but also referenced de Gaulle who had rejected the German occupation of France from the outset; both were at different times to be seen as non-cooperative members of the Community whose benefits they enjoyed.

Lipgens believed that Europe's wartime experience had shown that governments were unable to fulfil their first duty - to provide security for their citizens.⁷⁴ Alan Milward built on this observation in *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* to analyse integration as a way of ensuring that states could provide economic security for their populations, an issue discussed in the economic narrative below.⁷⁵ Wishing to emphasise the economic roots of integration, Milward accused Lipgens of 'beach-combing' for pro-integration quotes in his work but whatever their context the quotes Lipgens had gathered expressed the sentiments of those who made them and showed a distinct pattern of pro-integration thought.⁷⁶

⁷² Lipgens, *A history of European integration. Vol. 1*, p. 53 – 55.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁷⁵ Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London, 2000).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Milward's chapter on the European 'founding fathers' in fact provides ample evidence of the wider values that encouraged them towards integration.⁷⁷ Tracing the political evolution of the key politicians and statesmen who came to embrace integration by 1950, he notes both Schuman's emphasis on the 'need to maintain social cohesion in a just society' and Adenauer's insistence that 'the unity of Western Europe [was] a precondition for the defence of the German people against physical and spiritual assault'.⁷⁸ By bringing the countries of Western Europe together, integration was designed to strengthen internal and external cohesion, making Europe an economic force on the world stage. Yet the 'founding fathers' were not isolated individuals but part of a wider intellectual community, 'convinced [of] the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can bring to civilization', a stance which reflected Manners and Murray's global narrative of integration.⁷⁹

Milward refers to 'the accident of where they [Adenauer, Schuman and the Italian Christian Democrat Alcide de Gasperi] were born' but their origins in contested frontier areas had marked the early lives of all three.⁸⁰ Their views were driven by a form of European exceptionalism which they would have considered self-evident; all three individuals had come to political maturity before 1914 and recalled a world in which Europe had been pre-eminent. Adenauer himself came from the Rhineland and had toyed with separatism after World War I, Schuman was born in Luxemburg and originally had German citizenship, only becoming

⁷⁷ Ibid., Ch. 6 The Lives and Teachings of the European Saints.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 290 – 291. Milward's first edition (1992) referred to the 'unified Western defence of common spiritual and political values', p. 291.

⁷⁹ Preamble to the 1951 Treaty of Paris.

https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_coal_and_steel_community_paris_18_april_1951-en-11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58.html (Accessed 7-6-2021); Manners and Murray, 'The End of a Noble Narrative?', pp. 195-196 refers to 'taming globalisation'.

⁸⁰ Milward, *European Rescue*, p. 289.

French in 1919, while de Gasperi came from Alpine Italy and had begun his political career in Habsburg Vienna. Milward sees their early promotion of mass-democratic political Catholicism as a reaction to unsympathetic nation states, but their Catholicism also gave them a wider political vision which underpinned their emotional support for integration, reinforced after 1947 by membership of the anti-Communist *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (NEI).⁸¹ For them, Europe represented a reality beyond the nation state, whose boundaries could shift with every turn of events and over their lifetimes had done so; as Adenauer himself said '...state frontier[s], they come and go'.⁸² Their concept of Europe was strengthened by common beliefs and attitudes; it was an exceptionalism based on culture, civilisation, and religion. For the 'founding fathers', Europe was much more than just a geographical expression.

After World War II this exceptionalism served to remind Europeans both of their own importance but also stressed the benefits they believed a united Europe could offer the world. Exceptionalism provided a framework within which the initial process of integration could take place. It was not an exceptionalism based on legal concepts but rather a broader and culturally grounded exceptionalism based on common self-understanding.⁸³ It rested on the assumptions of an overwhelmingly white, (Catholic) Christian, European-based culture; when Adenauer addressed the *Grandes Conférences Catholiques* in Brussels on integration in 1956, he first referenced 'the responsibility which we carry in politics because of the Christian

⁸¹ Milward refers to 'aggrandized, secular, centralising republics after 1918', Milward, *European Rescue*, p. 289.

⁸² Quoted in Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol II The Statesman 1952 - 67* (Oxford, 1997), p. 501.

⁸³ For a comparative discussion of European exceptionalism, see Georg Nolte, and Helmut Philipp Aust, 'European Exceptionalism?', *Global Constitutionalism*, 2 (2013), pp. 407 - 436.

culture that is common to all European peoples', mention of economics came second.⁸⁴ Likewise in France the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) to which Schuman belonged described itself as a federation established 'on the basis of the natural unity of West European values' and Schuman himself saw a direct link between Christianity and democracy.⁸⁵ Ironically, the emphasis on Catholicism, while reinforcing the common identity of those who believed in it, could also have the opposite effect; both the German Social Democrats (SPD) and the British in general found it off-putting.⁸⁶ The secular minded Monnet was something of an outsider here but he too regarded Europe as exceptional, and his understanding of Europe's importance for the world can be seen in much of his writing.⁸⁷ This exceptionalism, together with the responsibilities it brings, still finds resonance, as Barroso's speech demonstrated when he stated that 'Europe equally has a role to play in bringing stability to the world'.⁸⁸ A self-confident belief in Europe's own future and its contribution to the world underpinned the heroic narrative of integration.

The Economic Narrative

The original 'heroic narrative' of European integration, with its emphasis on the political motives of Europe's 'founding fathers', came under scrutiny from the early 1990s. In *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* Alan Milward rejected their role and stressed the

⁸⁴ Adenauer's speech 25-9-1956, quoted in Armin Grünbacher, *The Making of German democracy : West Germany during the Adenauer Era, 1945-65* (Manchester, 2010), pp. 206-207, Doc 97.

⁸⁵ Quoted in Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe*, p. 99. For Schuman's views see <http://www.association-robert-schuman.eu/docs/pour-l-europe.pdf>, p. 3. (Accessed 3-4-2022).

⁸⁶ For the SPD see William E. Paterson, *The SPD and European Integration* (Farnborough, 1974); for the British see Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot : Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (London, 1998), pp. 50 – 51.

⁸⁷ See for instance his situation paper AFJME AMK2/1/7 of 27-1-1955.

⁸⁸ President Barroso's speech at the summit of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates in 2009.

economic imperatives that he believed underpinned integration.⁸⁹ Milward rightly saw that the Europeanisation of national problems enabled states to obtain popular support and pay for the policies needed to achieve their twin aims of full employment and rising living standards. For Milward Europeanisation was an economic choice by member states, but in fact using the integration process to achieve these aims was an essential part of their political programme of promoting domestic stability and peace in Western Europe. Side-lining its political and cultural aspects, which the participants themselves held dear, provides a very one-dimensional view of the forces driving integration. As Christian Bailey commented, it is also unable to account for a process that continued well after the nation state had been 'saved'.⁹⁰ Nor were the founders of the European project unaware of the economic imperatives for integration. Many, including Monnet, were painfully aware of Europe's economic weakness in the late 1940s and believed economic growth would be promoted by the political decision to integrate.⁹¹ Economic interpretations of integration act as a reminder that economics represented a means of achieving those political ends but were never the prime motivation for them.

Moravcsik's work on LI likewise prioritised the economic aspects of integration but equally understated the political context; after 1957, bargaining and negotiation took place within a Community framework already committed to integration. In *The Choice for Europe* Moravcsik concentrated on three key treaties (Messina, the 1986 Single European Act and Maastricht)

⁸⁹ Milward, *European Rescue*. (The original version was published in 1992). See in particular Ch. 6 The Lives and Teachings of the European Saints and Ch. 3 Coal and the Belgian Nation on the Belgian coal industry which Milward used as a case study of the Europeanisation of a national problem.

⁹⁰ Christian Bailey, 'Visions of Europe in the Twentieth Century', *German History*, 34 (2016), pp. 315-20, p. 316.

⁹¹ Monnet's views on the economic importance of integration will be considered in Ch. 2.

as well as the establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the quest for monetary integration to illustrate his arguments. In perhaps his most contested work Moravcsik adopted a revisionist approach to de Gaulle and the CAP, arguing that de Gaulle had been driven by commercial motives rather than the quest for French *gloire* in his approach to these negotiations.⁹² His view was critiqued by Robert Lieshout and others in 2004 who argued that Moravcsik's work was marred by the use of soft rather than hard primary sources and that his reading represented a misinterpretation of them.⁹³ Their detailed analysis of Moravcsik's references and critique of his over reliance on Alain Peyrefitte's memoirs, highlight the issues in his approach.⁹⁴ As his most recent biographer, Julian Jackson, shows, de Gaulle was seeking both 'gain *and* grandeur'.⁹⁵ De Gaulle appreciated that French *gloire* rested on economic strength; the primacy of politics over economics remained. In LI Moravcsik has provided an effective approach to understanding how integration took place, but based on this example his views on the forces driving it are far less convincing.

The Social Narrative

The social narrative as a means of understanding integration was relatively unimportant during the early years of the EEC. The principle articles of the Treaty of Rome dealing with social matters, 117 and 118, were not prescriptive and the necessity for social Europe was

⁹² Moravcsik's original chapter *Grain and Grandeur: Consolidating the Common Market 1958 – 1969* in *The Choice for Europe* was expanded and revised in a 2000 article for *The Journal of Cold War Studies*.

⁹³ Robert H. Lieshout, Mathieu Segers, and Anna M. van der Vleuten, 'De Gaulle, Moravcsik and the Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6 (2004), pp. 89-139.

⁹⁴ The authors analysed all the references relating to one section of the chapter in which Moravcsik argued that de Gaulle had successfully hidden his motives from contemporaries and future historians behind a smokescreen of geopolitical rhetoric, see Lieshout et al, 'De Gaulle, Moravcsik and the Choice for Europe', p. 95 Table I Correctness of References Cited and pp. 121-136 Appendix II Handling of Sources by Moravcsik.

⁹⁵ Julian Jackson, *A Certain Idea of France : the Life of Charles de Gaulle* (London, 2018), p. 658. (Jackson's italics).

really only recognised by national leaders at the 1972 Paris Summit. This was in contrast to the ECSC where the role of the unions had been recognised, a foundation which they hoped to build on during the negotiations for the Rome Treaties. For the unions, 'social Europe' meant equal representation in Community institutions, participation in its decision making processes and a recognition that Europe was not just an economic construct, economic integration should be accompanied by social progress.

Works from the 1970s relating to the unions' attempts to achieve 'social Europe' outline union demands in these areas but also generally lament the lack of social progress made up to then. JD Neirinck provided a good introduction to the issues involved.⁹⁶ A former Director of Social Affairs in the EEC, he endeavoured to adopt a positive approach but nevertheless had to admit that shortcomings in the treaties, the reservations of the parties concerned (especially the employers) and the unwieldy nature of the Community machinery all impeded progress.⁹⁷ While identifying some limited successes, he accurately painted a bleak picture and could only hope that concerted action from both sides of industry would help in linking social and economic progress.⁹⁸ It was an example of anticipated spillover that was not to happen.

Writing in 1972 Hoffmann concluded that while there was a conviction that a common approach to economic problems was needed, there was 'nothing comparable in social policy

⁹⁶ J.D. Neirinck, 'Social Policy of the EEC', in Alfred Kamin (ed.), *West European Labour and the American Corporation* (Washington, 1970), pp.21 - 65.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

matters'.⁹⁹ Hoffmann saw governments as the problem, they were under little domestic pressure to adopt a more active social policy and for electoral reasons preferred to be seen as the ultimate dispensers of benefits to their own populations. The following year, Jan Kulakowski, General Secretary of the European Organisation of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), identified the unions' main concerns as the expansion of social integration and the need to use the proceeds of economic growth to promote social progress.¹⁰⁰ Kulakowski's treatment of the subject inverted the title of his article, instead of looking at the unions' contribution to integration he asked what the EEC had done to promote workers' interests. Like Neirinck and Hoffmann before him he came to the understandable conclusion that it was relatively little.

Other writers concentrated on the structure and work of the European institutions in which the unions were involved. Gerda Zellentin's 1962 article on the Economic and Social Committee showed its activity was so circumscribed that it was unable to even define its own procedural rules.¹⁰¹ Diarmid McLaughlin's later analysis showed that the Economic and Social Committee was not treated as a full institution, criticized partly because it had 'a smell of syndicalism' about it.¹⁰² In this environment, favourable consideration of union demands was unlikely. The situation would only begin to change in the early 1970s when the Action Committee was reaching the end of its existence.

⁹⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, 'Forward', in Marguerite Bouvard (ed.), *Labour Movements in the Common Market Countries* (New York, 1972), p. vii.

¹⁰⁰ Jan Kulakowski, 'Der Beitrag der Gewerkschaften zur Europäischen Integration', *Sozial- und Gesellschaftspolitik in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft* (1973), pp. 39-49.

¹⁰¹ Gerda Zellentin, 'The Economic and Social Committee', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1 (1962), pp.22-28.

¹⁰² Diarmid McLaughlin, 'The Work and Aims of the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC and Euratom', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 15 (1976), pp. 9 - 28, p. 10.

In 1976 Emil Kirchner undertook the first structured analysis of the unions' impact on the Community's social agenda.¹⁰³ His findings are considered more fully in the discussion of the aftermath of the Rome Treaties, but it is worth noting that 20 years after the Community's founding the unions had only achieved a small part of their ambitions; for the unions, 'social Europe' still seemed remote.

Stefan Remeke proposed a more positive view in 2009, arguing that the period 1957 – 1974 had actually been a period of progress for social Europe, driven by the unions and the DGB.¹⁰⁴ However, his main example, protection for working youth, in which the DGB did play a major role, ended as a recommendation to member states only.¹⁰⁵ The major changes identified by Remeke in the period actually occurred as a result of the 1972 Paris Conference; Remeke's analysis essentially confirms the earlier ones discussed.

The most recent study of the subject, Heike Wieters and Karim Fertikh's *Ringten um ein soziales Europa: Gewerkschaften auf dem Weg nach Brüssel, 1950er bis 1970er Jahre*, brings a new perspective to the debate by identifying the existence of a 'small transnational trade union elite'.¹⁰⁶ This included Walter Schevenels of the ICFTU, Rosenberg and Robert Bothereau of *Force Ouvrière*; both Rosenberg and Bothereau were members of the Action Committee. The

¹⁰³ Emil Kirchner, *Trade Unions as a Pressure Group in the European Community* (Farnborough, 1977).

¹⁰⁴ Stefan Remeke, 'Gewerkschaften als Motor der europäischen Integration: Der DGB und das soziale Europa von den Römischen Verträgen bis zu den Pariser Gipfelkonferenzen (1957 - 1974)', in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.), *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009), pp. 141-164.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 161 – 163.

¹⁰⁶ Heike Wieters and Karim Fertikh, 'Ringten um ein soziales Europa: Gewerkschaften auf dem Weg nach Brüssel, 1950er bis 1970er Jahre' in Ludger Kühnhardt (ed.), *Ungleichskonflikte in Europa* (Baden-Baden, 2019), pp. 93 - 111, p. 100.

authors suggest that this transnational network went beyond union leaders to include personalities such as Robert Marjolin, a Monnet protégé and later EEC Commissioner, and Monnet himself, meaning that union proposals and concerns could be aired with a wider audience. Even if this was the case, it did not mean that they were implemented. The authors view the unions as *'Gesprächspartner'* – in itself a designation that implies little authority – but admit that the unions only achieved power and influence gradually in the European institutions. Their argument that Henk Vredeling's period as a Commissioner (1977 – 81) resulted in better representation for the unions at Community level only serves to emphasise the extent to which the unions remained institutionally disenfranchised even 20 years after the Rome Treaties, with their status still uncertain and their own efforts at reform having had little success.¹⁰⁷

The social narrative only became important after the period covered by this thesis, most notably during Jacques Delors' presidency after 1985. Historians and commentators were correct in identifying the period from 1957 to at least the mid-1970s as one in which the unions were side-lined and their expectations ignored. This thesis analyses how far the unions attempted to use Monnet and the Committee to pursue the social agenda that otherwise eluded them and whether they were successful in doing so.

1.2 The German Unions and European Integration

There are three potential sources for literature on the German unions and European integration; general works on the German unions, studies dealing with the unions' European

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.105.

institutions which often contain comparative studies of unions by country, and works dealing specifically with the topic.

Introductory studies of the post-war German unions tend to concentrate on the issues of rebuilding the unions in the late 1940s, their organisation and domestic activity, including wage bargaining; these activities represented the preponderance of their activity during the period covered by this thesis. Europe as an issue is rarely mentioned and, if it is, features only in terms of the international organisations to which the German unions belonged. It is an approach irrespective of the authors' viewpoint, adopted in such works as the Socialist Frank Deppe's *Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung* and the British trade unionist ECM Cullingford's sympathetic 1976 study *The Trade Unions in West Germany*.¹⁰⁸ Writing at the turn of the millennium Stephen Silvia could still identify Europe as at best a secondary interest for the unions, a judgement that was even truer for earlier periods and their historians.¹⁰⁹

Specific works on European trade unions are often concerned with the organisation of the European trade union movements and the issues facing them at the time of writing. In doing so authors such as Colin Beever and Walter Kendall also offer portraits of the unions in the

¹⁰⁸ Frank Deppe, Georg Fülberth and Jürgen Harrer, *Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung* (Köln, 1978); E.C.M. Cullingford, *Trade Unions in West Germany* (London, 1976). See also Hans O. Hemmer and Kurt Thomas Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland : von den Anfängen bis heute* (Köln, 1990); Andrei Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions. Strategies of Class and Interest Representation in Growth and Crisis* (Cambridge, 1986); and Dieter Schuster, *Die deutschen Gewerkschaften seit 1945* (Stuttgart, 1973).

¹⁰⁹ Stephen J. Silvia, 'Every Which Way but Loose. German Industrial Relations since 1980', in Andrew Martin and George Ross (eds.), *The Brave New World of European Labour. European Trade Unions at the Millennium* (Oxford, 1999), pp.75-124, p. 78.

more important countries, including the Federal Republic.¹¹⁰ Beever identified the problems facing the unions as the negotiations for the Rome Treaties began; later studies mostly focussed on the unions' failure to obtain their demands during the negotiations for the Rome Treaties and their subsequent marginalisation by the Community during the 1960s and beyond.¹¹¹ This failure represented a serious setback for the unions and influenced their views of both the European institutions and the Action Committee; as such it is discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

The first specific study of German trade unions and Europe stressed the importance of politics over economics. Hans-Dietrich Köpper's in-depth study, *Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik*, was based on the theory of penetration, whereby domestic and foreign events interplay.¹¹² Köpper traced the unions' reactions to the Schuman Plan but then switched his attention from the ECSC to concentrate on the EDC and the debates over rearmament in the mid-1950s. He also explored the 'dual nature of unions', showing how over the period, the unions moved to a position of working within the capitalist system but with little expectation of being able to change it in a significant way. By moving his focus away from the ECSC during the 1952 – 54 period Köpper overlooked developments in union attitudes towards the organisation which were subsequently analysed by other historians. However, Köpper's work aroused little

¹¹⁰ R. Colin Beever, *European Unity and the Trade Union Movements* (Leyden, 1960); Walter Kendall, *The Labour Movement in Europe* (London, 1975).

¹¹¹ Rainer Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter: Leitbilder gewerkschaftlicher Europapolitik bis in die Mitte der 1970er Jahre* (Düsseldorf, 2018); Eric Jacobs, *European Trade Unionism* (London, 1973); B.C. Roberts and Bruno Liebhaber, 'The European Trade Union Confederation: Influence of Regionalism, Detente and Mutinationals', *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 14 (1976), pp. 261-273.

¹¹² Ernst-Dietrich Köpper, *Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik. Die Stellung der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften zur wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Integration der Bundesrepublik in die Europäische Gemeinschaft und in die NATO* (Frankfurt am Main, 1982).

interest, there were no reviews and over the years his book has rarely been cited. The reason for this is not clear, but Köpper's career as a teacher rather than an academic may have played a role.

There was little further work on the topic until 1996 when Hans-Erich Volkmann published his article *Der DGB, Adenauer und der Schumanplan*.¹¹³ Volkmann's article reemphasised the link established by Horst Thum a decade earlier between Adenauer's need to build a domestic coalition to ratify the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC and his concession of parity *Mitbestimmung* (co-determination) in the *Montanindustrie* in early 1951.¹¹⁴ It did, however, introduce a new factor by analysing the careers, actions and expectations of the union functionaries most involved in the negotiations such as Franz Grosse, head of IGB's economics department, and Rolf Wagenführ, chief statistician of the DGB's *Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Institut* (WWI), the unions' economic think-tank, a theme that was taken up in more detail by Bernd Bühlbäcker a decade later.¹¹⁵

Werner Bühner's article *Les syndicats ouest-allemands et le Plan Schuman* built on Volkmann by stressing how the plan helped to split the DGB and the SPD.¹¹⁶ He categorised the planners such as Grosse and Wagenführ as part of a *Kriegsjugend* generation, drawing on Köpper's work

¹¹³ Hans-Erich Volkmann, 'Der DGB, Adenauer und der Schumanplan', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 3 (1996), pp. 223-246.

¹¹⁴ This episode is discussed in greater detail in Ch. 2. While the term *Montanindustrie* can refer to a variety of extractive industries based on mining, its most common usage refers to the coal, iron and steel industries (i.e. those industries covered by the ECSC) and the term will be used in that sense in this thesis. See Horst Thum, *Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie : der Mythos vom Sieg der Gewerkschaften* (Stuttgart, 1982).

¹¹⁵ Bernd Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch : Personal und Personalpolitik deutscher Parteien und Verbände in der Montanunion, 1949-1958* (Essen, 2007).

¹¹⁶ Werner Bühner, 'Les syndicats ouest-allemands et le Plan Schuman', in Andreas Wilkens (ed.), *Le Plan Schuman dans l'histoire: intérêts nationaux et projet européen* (Bruxelles, 2004), pp. 303-322.

to show how they combined traditional internationalism with modern concepts of economic integration and planning. In the most recent work on the specific topic of the DGB and the Schuman Plan, Severin Cramm concludes that it is noteworthy how far the DGB was integrated into Adenauer's European policy.¹¹⁷ This alignment did not extend to the domestic arena and actually reflected the DGB's pursuit of a position that allowed it to pursue its own interests. Nevertheless in doing so it coincidentally mirrored Adenauer's foreign policy priority of *Westintegration*, the integration of the Federal Republic into the wider West European community, and resulted in union participation in the institutions of the newly established ECSC.

Hitoshi Suzuki's 2007 thesis *Digging for European Unity* covered much of the same ground as Köpper's work twenty five years earlier.¹¹⁸ However, unlike Köpper who emphasised the unions' internationalism, Suzuki placed the Schuman Plan firmly in the context of the 'German problem' and the question of the Ruhr. He also showed that union involvement was key to the success of the plan and for that reason it was designed to be a 'labour friendly' proposal.¹¹⁹ This reflected the need to win union support in the political circumstances of the early 1950s and provided an implicit contrast to the later negotiations for the Rome Treaties. Suzuki also saw the plan as a product of the Europeans, even if the Americans saw it as so important that it could not be left totally in their hands.¹²⁰ He continued his study by describing how the

¹¹⁷ Severin Cramm, 'Im Zeichen der europäischen Integration. Der DGB und die EGKS-Verhandlungen 1950 - 51', *Zeitschrift für Historische Studien*, 15 (2016), pp. 78-96.

¹¹⁸ Hitoshi Suzuki, *Digging for European Unity: the Role Played by the Trade Unions in the Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community from a German Perspective 1950 - 1955* (Florence, 2007).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 17ff.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

unions created specific organisations to interface with the ECSC and promote the case for organised labour, but like Köpper, did not cover the organisation of the High Authority itself. Suzuki identified the Action Committee as an organisation which the unions believed warranted their support, particularly due to Monnet's stance on nuclear power, and included it in a final chapter.¹²¹ His work complements Köpper's rather than contradicting it but still leaves some of the same gaps concerning the unions' role in the ECSC.

These were covered by Bühlbäcker in *Europa im Aufbruch*. Bühlbäcker built on previous studies by looking at the individuals (not all of whom were necessarily prominent) who made the ECSC happen and broke new ground in detailing the intricate manoeuvres which led to the appointment of trade unionists to the ECSC's High Authority and Consultative Committee.¹²² He also analysed the administration of the High Authority, which he – like several of those involved at the time – found inadequate, a failing which he largely, and reasonably, attributed to Monnet's management style.¹²³ In his work on the trade unionists involved in the negotiations and then the establishment of the ECSC, Bühlbäcker endorsed Bühler's verdict regarding the importance they placed on planning. Bühlbäcker also emphasised that there was no broad base of support for Europe in the unions, participation in the Action Committee was a matter for the elite, the implications of which I will consider later in the thesis.

¹²¹ Ibid., sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3; Monnet's attitude to nuclear power is discussed in Ch. 2.8 below.

¹²² Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, Ch. 6, *Die Personalpolitik der deutschen Parteien und Verbände in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS)*.

¹²³ Ibid., Ch. 7, *Die Verwaltungsorganisation der Hohen Behörde der EGKS in der Monnet-Phase*.

As Jürgen Mittag noted, research on the unions and Europe only began to receive sustained, in-depth attention in the years after the millennium.¹²⁴ This was not the result of archival availability; instead the EU's increasing emphasis on 'social Europe' now made an understanding of its background and origins more relevant. His book *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* includes essays on a wide variety of topics; for the purposes of this thesis, those dealing with *IG Metall's* attitudes and the DGB's position on 'social Europe' are the most relevant. Jelena Jojevic's article on IGM's experience within the ECSC complements Bühlbäcker and helps fill the gap left by Köpper by showing how the benefits of membership meant the union came to accept working within the system.¹²⁵ Karl Lauschke's article on IGM comes to the same overall conclusion as Jojevic – that the union felt it had to work within the system.¹²⁶ However, Lauschke points out how IGM felt disadvantaged during the Schuman Plan negotiations compared to IGB, having no equivalent of the latter's Grosse on the central negotiating team. More pertinently at the onset of the negotiations, IGM was afraid that there was a danger of losing *Mitbestimmung* in the steel industry; Lauschke does not explore to what extent the introduction of *Montanmitbestimmung* in 1951, legally securing the British occupying authorities earlier concession, changed the union's viewpoint.

¹²⁴ See Jürgen Mittag, 'Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration: Forschungsphasen, Desiderate und Perspektiven aus historischer Sicht' in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.) *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009), pp. 5 - 24.

¹²⁵ Jelena Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung? Reaktionen und Strategien der IG Metall gegenüber der Montanunion in den 1950er Jahren' in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.) *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009), pp. 103-122.

¹²⁶ Karl Lauschke, 'Zwischen Mitbestimmungs- und Europapolitik: Die IG Metall und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration' in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.) *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009) pp. 89-102.

Yves Clairmont's more focussed recent study of the metalworkers' European organisation *Vom Europäischen Verbindungsbüro zur transnationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisation* deals primarily with the period 1963 – 90.¹²⁷ However, it also explores the change from the trade unions' relatively favourable status in the ECSC of the early 1950s to their far less encouraging situation in the EEC after 1957. Understanding union aspirations during this period of transition, and analysing how far union leaders achieved them using their membership of the Action Committee, is a key component of this thesis. In analysing these issues it builds on Bühlbäcker and Suzuki's earlier work in recognising the importance of the Committee for the unions, which is discussed in the section below.

1.3 The Action Committee

Compared to other aspects of integration history the Action Committee has received relatively little attention. The emphasis on Monnet as a 'great man' can now seem old-fashioned and the Committee's gradual decline into irrelevance over its lifetime means it has been overlooked; it does not feature in general histories of post-war Europe such as Tony Judt's *Postwar*.¹²⁸

As the driving force behind the Committee it is easy to conflate the Committee with Monnet personally and studies can regard it as an extension of him; hardly surprising when his personality, prestige and influence are considered. The titles of the works published often

¹²⁷ Yves Clairmont, *Vom europäischen Verbindungsbüro zur transnationalen Gewerkschaftsorganisation : Organisation, Strategien und Machtpotentiale des Europäischen Metallgewerkschaftsbundes bis 1990* (Stuttgart, 2014).

¹²⁸ Judt, *Postwar*.

reinforce this tendency, with an emphasis on *Jean Monnet's* Action Committee for the United States of Europe (author's italics). Two of the major works on the Committee, Pascal Fontaine's, *Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet* and Pascaline Winand's, *20 Ans d'Action du Comité Jean Monnet*, apply this phraseology.¹²⁹ Fontaine's father was an admirer of Monnet and had worked with him on the Committee. Personal loyalty reinforced Fontaine's approach; the danger is that under these circumstances the Committee and its members play a subsidiary role to Monnet himself in authors' considerations.

This thesis examines the Committee from a new standpoint by considering it from the members' perspective, rather than following the top-down Monnet centered narrative. Writing in 2009 Klaus Mertsching suggested that the DGB archives had been neglected in the study of the unions and European integration.¹³⁰ Using these and other union resources helps correct this imbalance and enables consideration of the Committee from the viewpoint of one group of members who participated in it because of the organisations they represented. However, no work has been undertaken on how these organisations, and their leaders, actually related to the Committee, how they viewed it and what use they intended to make of their participation.

¹²⁹ Pascal Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet* (Lausanne, 1974); Pascaline Winand, *20 Ans d'Action du Comité Jean Monnet* (Lausanne, 2001). The works are discussed further below.

¹³⁰ Klaus Mertsching, 'Europäische Integration und Gewerkschaften im Spiegel der Akten des DGB Archivs (Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn, 2009)', in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.) *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009), pp. 311-317.

By adopting this approach the thesis straddles several potential areas for research identified by Mittag to the Committee, including the unions' role as lobbying organisations.¹³¹ The German unions represented one of the Committee's most important single membership groups, and provided key financial support for it. In doing so, the thesis not only illuminates the workings of the Committee, moving away from a Monnet centered narrative, but helps trace the interplay between the domestic German political situation, the success or otherwise of union aspirations and the wider development of European integration.

Despite the identification of Monnet with the Committee, it is not extensively covered by either him or his biographers. Monnet's life was long, rich in achievement and involved working for both governmental and commercial organisations around the world. Neither his autobiography nor the four major biographies of him devote more than a small part of their narrative to the Committee.¹³² None provide a consistent history of the organisation. All, and especially Monnet, major on its founding, which Monnet and the others correctly portray as a success in uniting disparate groupings to a common goal. In all cases mention of its later years is sporadic and fleeting, an indication of how the Committee lost influence over time, an issue discussed in Chapter 3. Reflecting this, their assessments of it necessarily major on its moral authority and influence rather than concrete achievements.¹³³ Nevertheless, all four

¹³¹ Jürgen Mittag, 'Zwischen Transfer- und Pionierforschung: zwölf Problemfelder einer Agenda europabezogener Gewerkschaftsforschung', in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.) *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009), pp. 285-309.

¹³² Monnet, *Memoirs* Ch. 16 The Action Committee for the United States of Europe (1955 – 1975), pp. 405 – 430; François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet : the First Statesman of Interdependence* (London, 1994); Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet, 1888-1979* (Paris, 1996); Sherrill Brown Wells, *Jean Monnet : Unconventional Statesman* (Boulder, 2011); Klaus Schwabe, *Jean Monnet. Frankreich, die Deutschen und die Einigung Europas* (Baden-Baden, 2016).

¹³³ See Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 338; Schwabe, *Monnet*, p. 302.

biographers are clear in seeing how Monnet embodied the Committee or as Roussel put it '*en définitive, le Comité est bien à l'image de Jean Monnet*'.¹³⁴

The most detailed history of the Committee is by Pascal Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet*, published in 1974, just before the Committee's dissolution.¹³⁵ Fontaine treated the Committee as a whole, with little differentiation between members, reflecting Monnet's own insistence on unanimity within it, outlined its origins and development and showed how Monnet used the Committee to promote his own programme. After an introduction covering the Committee's founding and a section discussing Monnet's management of it, both of which underline how much the Committee was Monnet's own creation, the book follows a chronological format. Fontaine correctly saw the Committee's early period from 1956 – 63 as the most important and influential while the period after 1968 is treated cursorily and its final dissolution is obviously not covered.¹³⁶ Fontaine's emphasis is on the Committee as a whole under Monnet's direction, with the 1960s seen in the context of Monnet's disagreements with de Gaulle, contrasting the former's supranationalist approach with the latter's growing nationalism.

The book also includes some useful annexes, including one showing the Committee's members, grouping them by the country and organization represented. However, no dates of membership are given and stand-in (*suppléant*) representatives are ignored.¹³⁷ In fact the

¹³⁴ Roussel, *Monnet*, p. 696.

¹³⁵ It does, however, note the Committee's final session in May 1973, Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 215.

¹³⁶ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, Part II *La Haute Epoque* pp. 65 – 136; *Conclusion: un second souffle pour l'Europe?* pp. 189 – 204.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 216 – 219.

members' generation, their period of membership and the length of time served all had a major bearing on an individual's attitudes towards Monnet and the Committee, as did their attendance at Committee sessions. By identifying the German union leaders' attendance at the Committee's sessions, my research has rectified this omission for this membership group and in doing so throws considerable light on their involvement in the Committee. In contrast to Fontaine, Pascaline Winand's work covers the full life of the Committee, including its dissolution.¹³⁸ By consolidating all the Committee's declarations (including those produced between the formal sessions) in one volume she has provided a useful resource. However, her short introduction only touches on some aspects of the Committee's life such as finance and does not attempt to provide a full account of its development.

Two articles published in 1965 considered the Committee's development to that point.¹³⁹ Walter Yondorf traced the overlapping connections of the members represented on the Committee, showing how they were part of an emerging European elite. It was a reminder that Monnet's Committee was just one forum among others; as Europe developed, the possibilities for networking became greater and the Committee would lose its importance in this respect. Yondorf also analysed the impact of the Committee's resolutions on governmental action, which decreased markedly after 1960. An omission in his work is that Yondorf did not analyse how many would have been implemented in any case, without promotion by the Committee. His findings nevertheless correlated with those of Jean

¹³⁸ Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*.

¹³⁹ Walter Yondorf, 'Monnet and the Action Committee: The Formative Period of the European Communities', *International Organization*, 19 (1965), pp. 885-912.; Jean Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats Unis d'Europe', *Annuaire européen*, XIII (1965), pp. 3 - 27.

Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski who considered the Committee as a pressure group, concluding it had been particularly successful in its early years. Both articles demonstrated the early interest of political scientists in the Committee, the result of Monnet's prestige and his success in bringing together a wide range of organisations often opposed domestically.

Two further studies on the Action Committee were produced before the turn of the millennium. The first was Elsa Guichaoua's analysis of the Committee's influence on the press, including an analysis of Monnet's relations with journalists.¹⁴⁰ The second was Maria Grazia Melchionni's more general appreciation, which originated from a 1997 symposium on Monnet, Europe and peace.¹⁴¹ In her discussion on defining the Committee, Melchionni suggests that members saw themselves as part of a motor to change the context of events.¹⁴² My thesis will demonstrate that this is a highly optimistic interpretation, at least for the German union members. She also considers the Committee's impact. However the fact that it lasted 20 years did not necessarily mean it was effective for the entire period and, quoting Kohnstamm, Melchionni herself admits the Committee was weakened from the early 1960s and that the normally optimistic Monnet became discouraged after de Gaulle's second veto of UK entry in 1967.¹⁴³ As previously mentioned, my thesis will likewise show how the Committee did indeed become increasingly irrelevant to some of its members after 1960. However, by referencing

¹⁴⁰ Elsa Guichaoua, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe et son Influence sur la Presse', in René Girault and Gérard Bossuat (eds.), *Europe brisée - Europe retrouvée. Nouvelles Réflexions sur l'unité européenne au XX siècle* (Paris, 1994), pp. 289 - 306.

¹⁴¹ Maria Grazia Melchionni, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe: un réseau au service de l'Union européenne'. in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkins (eds.), *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la Paix. Actes du Colloque de Paris du 29 au 31 mai 1997 organisé par l'Institut Pierre Renouvin de l'Université Paris-1/ Panthéon Sorbonne et l'Institut Historique Allemand de Paris* (Paris, 1999), pp. 221-251.

¹⁴² Ibid., pp. 240-241.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 249.

the personal links of friendship and solidarity the Committee helped create, Melchionni notes an important aspect of it which is discussed later in the thesis.¹⁴⁴

The Action Committee was the subject of a major symposium organised by the FJME in 2009, *Une Dynamique Européenne. Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe*.¹⁴⁵ Divided into three sections on the organization of the Committee, the impact of the Committee on specific policy areas, and the Monnet method and influence of the Committee, the wide-ranging scope of the contributions pays tribute to the breadth of Monnet's interests and influence. Some papers are of particular interest for this thesis. These include an article by Martial Libera on the German members of the Committee.¹⁴⁶ This contains much useful data on individual members, together with a discussion on their role and influence, showing how membership helped bring about the adoption of a bipartisan policy on Europe in the Federal Republic. The subsequent discussion agreed with Libera that the Germans enjoyed a privileged place on the Committee; a good reason for further study of their role. This was partly due to the lack of heavyweight French representation after de Gaulle had come to power, but was also a reflection of Monnet's appreciation of the German members' importance and need for recognition. Libera's approach contrasts starkly with Melchionni's, whose work on the Italian politicians on the Committee just concentrates on their correspondence with Monnet,

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.251. See also Ch. 6.2.

¹⁴⁵ Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, *Une Dynamique Européenne. Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe. Actes du colloque organisé par la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne, 11 et 12 septembre 2009* (Lausanne, 2009). (Hereafter referred to as *Une Dynamique Européenne*)

¹⁴⁶ Martial Libera, 'Jean Monnet et les personnalités allemandes du Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe (1955 - 1975)', in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 35- 50.

analyzing each individual's links to him, a continuation of the approach to the Committee discussed earlier.¹⁴⁷

Philippe Mioche considers 'social Europe', a key concern for the unions during this period, but one they were unable to progress despite enjoying Monnet's sympathy.¹⁴⁸ Mioche leaves open the question of whether the Committee contributed significantly towards its creation but leans towards Meynaud and Sidjanski's view of limited influence, a credible judgement in the light of the EEC's lack of social agenda during the 1960s.¹⁴⁹ Monnet's views on security, and his quest for a US-European partnership of equals are analysed by Gilles Grin.¹⁵⁰ Here Monnet's support for the US backed Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) led to disagreement with the German union leaders (and others) at the Committee's June 1964 session, an instructive episode in understanding the relations between them and Monnet which will be considered later in the thesis.

The symposium also considered Monnet's philosophy and his approach to work and problem solving, the so-called 'Monnet method', with papers providing background material on both this and his influence through the Action Committee.¹⁵¹ An earlier symposium to mark the centenary of Monnet's birth in 1988 had likewise considered the 'Monnet Method', principally

¹⁴⁷ Maria Grazia Melchionni, 'Les hommes politiques italiens dans le Comité Monnet' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 57 – 93.

¹⁴⁸ Philippe Mioche, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe, Jean Monnet et "l'Europe sociale". (Visions et Revisions)' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 131 – 157.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

¹⁵⁰ Gilles Grin, 'Jean Monnet et le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe: une vision de la paix et de la sécurité' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 239 – 278.

¹⁵¹ Gérard Bossuat, 'Les trois étapes de la méthode de Jean Monnet' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 297 – 324; Antonio Varsori, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe: un lobby européen ou un instrument de la stratégie de Monnet?' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 3 – 19.

with the aim of uncovering lessons applicable to the times, but also discussed the Committee.¹⁵² 1989 saw the publication of a series of articles in *Jean Monnet et l'Europe d'aujourd'hui* and 1999 a collection of articles following a 1997 symposium, *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les Chemins de la Paix*; Melchionni's specific contribution here has been discussed above.¹⁵³ Otherwise both publications cover a heterogeneous range of themes and only some mention the Committee. For this reason I have chosen to comment on them in the main narrative where appropriate. From the mid-1990s there has also been a steady flow of articles either looking at how Monnet's early life shaped his later actions or assessing Monnet's role in contributing to the Community's so-called 'democratic deficit'.¹⁵⁴ The latter contribute to the ongoing debate about how far Monnet influenced the democratic development of the European Community and are discussed in the following section of this review.

The revival of interest in the trade unions' relationship with Europe after the millennium resulted in renewed mention of the Committee. For both Bühlbäcker and Suzuki it was

¹⁵² Jacques Delors (ed.), *Jean Monnet : Proceedings of Centenary Symposium organized by the Commission of the European Communities : Brussels, 10 November 1988* (Luxembourg, 1989).

¹⁵³ Giandomenico Majone, Emile Noël and Peter van der Bossche (eds.), *Jean Monnet et l'Europe d'aujourd'hui* (Baden-Baden, 1989); Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens (eds.), *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les Chemins de la Paix. Actes du Colloque de Paris du 29 au 31 mai 1997 organisé par l'Institut Pierre Renouvin de l'Université Paris-1/ Panthéon Sorbonne et l'Institut Historique Allemand de Paris* (Paris, 1999).

¹⁵⁴ Kevin Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 32 (1994), pp. 149 - 170; Gérard Bossuat, 'Jean Monnet: La mesure d'une influence', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 51 (1996), pp. 68-84; Gilles Grin, 'Jean Monnet, le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe, et la genèse des traités de Rome', *Relations Internationales*, 136 (2008), pp. 21-32; Philippe Mioche, 'Jean Monnet, Businessman avant l'Europe', *Journal of European Integration History*, 18 (2012), pp. 143 - 158; Constantin Chira-Pascanut, 'Discreet Players: Jean Monnet, Transatlantic Networks and Policy-Makers in International Co-operation', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52 (2014), pp. 1242 - 1256; Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Das Erbe Jean Monnets', in Daniel Göler, Alexandra Schmid and Lukas Zech (eds.), *Europäische Integration: Beiträge zur Europaforschung aus multidimensionaler Analyseperspektiven* (Baden-Baden, 2015), pp. 57-74; David Ramiro Troitiño, 'Jean Monnet before the first European Community: a historical perspective and critic', *TRAMES: A Journal of the Humanities & Social Sciences* 21 (2017), pp.192 - 213.

essentially a coda to their main narrative, largely covering its founding.¹⁵⁵ Bühlbäcker's chapter on the Committee contains one of several partial accounts describing the German unions' involvement in the negotiations for the Rome Treaties. These are considered more fully in Chapter 5 where, due to their importance for the unions and their centrality to this thesis, my research has followed these negotiations in detail to understand their impact on the development of union attitudes towards Monnet and the Committee.

Apart from the sources mentioned above, there is little systematic coverage of the Committee. None of the German trade union leaders involved with the Committee wrote an autobiography in which they could have assessed their membership of it.¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, some further perspectives are provided by others involved with Monnet and the Committee. Max Kohnstamm's role as Monnet's faithful deputy is covered by his biographers, Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, in *Max Kohnstamm. A European's Life and Work*.¹⁵⁷ However, their assertion that the Committee only lost impetus after 1970 needs qualification; the thesis will demonstrate that the Committee had become irrelevant for the German trade unions well before then.¹⁵⁸ Mayne provides some patchy coverage of the Committee, but no consistent narrative.¹⁵⁹ Finally, J.-Gérard Lieberherr, Monnet's son-in-law, provided a recent appreciation of the Committee, drawing lessons from Monnet's life which he believed would

¹⁵⁵ Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, see Ch. 8, *Der verbands- und parteipolitische beitrage zum 'Aktionskomitee für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa'*; Suzuki, *Digging for European Unity*, see chapter 5.2.2.

¹⁵⁶ Based on a search of the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* library catalogue October 2020. Ahland suggests that Eugen Loderer of IGM did write an autobiography but there is no record of one in the FES library catalogue, Frank Ahland, *Bürger und Gewerkschafter Ludwig Rosenberg : 1903 bis 1977 : eine Biografie* (Essen, 2016), p. 21.

¹⁵⁷ Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, *Max Kohnstamm. A European's Life and Work* (Baden-Baden, 2011), see Ch. 6.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁵⁹ Mayne, *Recovery of Europe*, *passim*.

still be applicable nowadays.¹⁶⁰ His judgement that involvement of the Action Committee would have avoided the turmoil around the Euro ignored changing circumstances - the Committee belonged to an era when Europe was more compact politically, culturally and geographically than today. Discussion of the Action Committee still exists but it receives little consideration *per se*, other aspects of integration appear more relevant and interesting.

The Committee was revived in 1984 but the Second Action Committee is rarely mentioned, even as a coda to the literature on Monnet's original Committee. This is unsurprising, the Second Committee claimed to be inspired by Monnet but in reality owed little to him. There is no documentation on the Second Committee at the FJME but some of Kohnstamm's papers concerning it are apparently archived at the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam.¹⁶¹ G.M.F. Tolsma's thesis compares the effectiveness of the two Committees as lobbying organisations but her relatively short bibliography does not reference any specific material on the Second Committee.¹⁶² The most thorough treatment of the Second Committee at present is that provided by Harryvan and Harst in their biography of Kohnstamm, who as Secretary-General was closely involved with the organisation.¹⁶³ There is no existing study of the subject, but the Conclusion to this thesis includes a brief introduction; further consideration of the Second Action Committee would fill a gap in the current literature on European integration and provide some important contrasts of substance and style with

¹⁶⁰ Lieberherr was married to Monnet's second daughter Marianne. J-Gérard Lieberherr, 'The Teachings of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (Monnet Committee)', *The EuroAtlantic Union Review*, 1 (2014), pp. 169-189.

¹⁶¹ The author had intended visiting the IISH but was unable to do so due to the 2020 Coronavirus outbreak.

¹⁶² G.M.F. Tolsma, *De invloed van lobbyorganisaties op besluiten in hoge politieke arena's in de Europese Unie. Een case-study van het Actiecomité voor de Verenigde Staten van Europa en het Actiecomité voor Europa* (Groningen, 2008).

¹⁶³ Harryvan and Harst, *Kohnstamm*, pp. 147-161.

Monnet's original Committee. For the German union leaders, membership of the Second Committee continued the interplay between domestic and European activity that had marked their original engagement with Europe from the early 1950s.

1.4 Permissive Consensus – Democratic Deficit?

The concept of permissive consensus is one that has come to be associated with the early development of the European Communities and its pre-Maastricht era in particular. It recognises that initially the implications of integration were limited and only involved specific groups. Much of the population were thus passive by-standers who would have had little appreciation of the longer term impact of decisions taken by technocratic elites on their behalf.¹⁶⁴ Permissive consensus thus has links to Neofunctionalism, although as will be shown Monnet's view was more nuanced, accepting the need for democratic legitimacy. Permissive consensus is sometimes seen as facilitating Europe's alleged 'democratic deficit'. This is not necessarily the case; those taking the decisions were themselves elected or at least operating under the authority of those who were. Indeed the very concept of permissive consensus as originally developed involved operating within parameters acceptable to public opinion.

The concept was first developed in an American context by Vladimir Key, who pointed out that the 'existence of general support for a proposition creates what can be termed a "permissive consensus", which is often an antecedent to action'.¹⁶⁵ In America Key could reference opinion polls as a way of establishing public opinion. In the Europe of the 1950s establishing

¹⁶⁴ Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory', p. 5.

¹⁶⁵ Vladimir Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1961), p. 32.

public opinion was more difficult as six countries were involved and the polling industry was not as developed as in the United States. However, as proclaimed in the preamble to the Treaty of Paris establishing the Coal and Steel Community, European integration was based on a wish to promote peace and prosperity. Few Europeans would have wanted to contest these aims and despite differences between Social and Christian Democrats on how they could best be achieved, all democratic political parties and unions supported them. Key maintained that 'when a permissive consensus exists, a government may be free to work out a solution of the issue'.¹⁶⁶ In embarking on the European project, the governments of The Six had done just that, directly addressing the wishes of mainstream politicians and reflecting the wider consensus in society that they represented.

Key's work was referenced by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, who transferred it with a slight variant to a specifically European context.¹⁶⁷ They saw the Community as primarily a 'creature of elites' whose 'immediate clientele tends to be restricted to those officials and interest group leaders who are directly affected by its work'.¹⁶⁸ Trade union leaders would have qualified as 'interest group leaders' in this context, given their role in such institutions as the Economic and Social Committee. Lindberg and Scheingold concluded that 'positive indicators simply suggest to us that policy makers can probably move in an integrative direction without significant opposition'.¹⁶⁹ Permissive consensus reduced the chance of any effective fightback and ensured that once achieved gains were unlikely to be lost, a key

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁶⁷ Lindberg and Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity*, p. 41

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 41.

assumption of the Neofunctionalist integration model. This ratcheting of gains was particularly suited to the European project; many (including Monnet) saw integration as a journey, the Treaty of Rome itself referring to 'ever closer union', where progress would be made on a step by step basis.¹⁷⁰ 'Europe' may not have been a defined destination except in the most general sense, but each step in the process was intended to be irreversible and bring it closer.¹⁷¹

The concept of permissive consensus has come under more recent consideration in the debates concerning national populism. Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin specifically refer to the European situation in their recent work on populism, stating that

crucially, during the early years the push for European integration avoided educating the people about what was happening or mobilising their mass support, other than through broad statements about the need to unite Europe to prevent future fratricidal wars. Instead, integration was pushed forward by an elite consensus, with the construction of complex legislation devised in the interests of the people but not *by* the people.¹⁷²

By suggesting that elites 'avoided educating' the people or 'mobilising mass support', the authors imply that the integration process was designed to by-pass the general population of the member states. This ignores the reality that during the 1950s and 1960s the European institutions did not directly impinge on the lives of the majority of Europeans unless they were involved in farming. Eatwell and Goodwin were correct in referring to an 'elite consensus'; with the exception of the Communists and French Gaullists, all mainstream European political

¹⁷⁰ Monnet's thoughts on integration are considered in Ch.2.

¹⁷¹https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html (Accessed 4-5-2022)

¹⁷² Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, *National Populism : the Revolt against Liberal Democracy* (London, 2018), p. 97. (Eatwell and Goodwin's italics).

parties supported integration as did the Social Democratic and Christian unions. In fact there was little realistic alternative to the elite approach during these years, which was facilitated by the deferential social attitudes that pertained throughout much of the period. As Hooghe and Marks pointed out, this elite approach was defended by Haas on the grounds that with little overt popular support, progress with integration would otherwise have been impossible.¹⁷³

Many of the hallmarks of permissive consensus can be seen during the first quarter century of European integration. The scope of the European institutions was relatively limited during the period, and the democratic input into the Community indirect, with members of the European Assembly or Parliament nominated by national bodies.¹⁷⁴ However, from the mid-1970s on the situation changed. The creation of the European Council in 1974 and particularly the introduction of the first direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979 raised the profile of the Community institutions, a process which gathered momentum with the 1986 SEA and then the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The remit of the European Union now expanded, raising awareness of its activities more than ever before.¹⁷⁵ The era of permissive consensus which had started to weaken in the 1970s had now definitely come to an end.

¹⁷³ Hooghe and Marks, 'A Postfunctionalist Theory', p. 6.

¹⁷⁴ The European Assembly was renamed the European Parliament in 1962, although it had been referred to as a Parliament in Germany and the Netherlands after 1958. This change was officially confirmed by Article 2 of the 1986 Single European Act.

¹⁷⁵ Reflecting the development of the EU in the post-Maastricht period, Hooghe and Marks developed the concept of 'constraining dissensus' followed by van Midelaar's 'binding dissensus' both of which refer to a period beyond the scope of this thesis

The concept of permissive consensus provides a framework for understanding the early years of integration. It can also be applied to the relations between the German trade union leaders, their rank and file members and the Action Committee itself. The Committee operated during the period when the elite nature of the European institutions and their personnel remained essentially unchallenged by the public at large. The trade union leaders' status within the European elite was acknowledged by their membership of the Committee. The available evidence suggests that consideration of the concept can enhance our understanding of both the relationship between the union leadership and rank and file members and also of the relationship between the union leaders who sat on the Committee and Monnet himself, issues discussed in Chapter 4.3.

The question of how far the Community's so-called 'democratic deficit' was – or remains – a consequence of permissive consensus has been much debated. At best this deficit, an apparent lack of democratic representation in the Community's institutions and insufficient democratic input in its decision making processes, is seen as a failure of the Community; at worst it is employed as a means of delegitimising the Community and its achievements. Some commentators, who have identified a democratic deficit, particularly in the early years of the Community, see this as a result of Monnet's own inclinations and decisions. David Troitiño analysed Monnet's early career, suggesting that democracy was not a priority for Monnet, and that his method of working via elite networks contributed to the deficit.¹⁷⁶ Keith Featherstone accepted that Monnet's reliance on experts led to a technocratic form of governance, '*engrenage*', with a reliance on interest groups including the unions to represent different

¹⁷⁶ Troitiño, 'Jean Monnet before the first European Community', *passim* and p. 210.

viewpoints, but also pointed out that Monnet accepted the idea of a democratic assembly quite quickly.¹⁷⁷

While possessed of a technocratic outlook, Monnet nevertheless understood the importance of legitimising the European project through democratic backing. In the early 1950s he had supported the creation of a European Political Community to underpin the proposed EDC, in early 1955 he hoped that large-scale sectoral integration would provide the impetus for a directly elected assembly, and he campaigned for a directly elected parliament during the years of the Action Committee. In this he was backed by the unions, who were suspicious of 'experts' and saw a directly elected assembly as a safeguard against their undue influence.¹⁷⁸ Any democratic deficit was due to the influence of national governments, who did not want to see the legitimisation of alternative sources of authority, rather than to Monnet who was prepared to soften his technocratic leanings for the sake of the project to which he devoted so many years' work.

As Vivien Schmidt pointed out, the question of democratic deficit is more difficult to assess with 'compound authorities', such as the EEC, rather than with 'simple' ones, typically nation-states, where 'governing activity has traditionally been channelled through a single authority'.¹⁷⁹ Schmidt's article refers to a later period of Community development but the argument is valid for earlier periods. Right from the beginning of integration, management of

¹⁷⁷ Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit"', pp. 155, 159.

¹⁷⁸ Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 13.

¹⁷⁹ Vivien Schmidt, 'The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42 (2004), pp. 975-997, Abstract p. 997.

the ECSC meant a diffusion of governing activity, involving numerous stakeholders and both domestic and supranational institutions. In these circumstances, the complexity of the relationships involved, plus the fact that they were adapting to changing circumstances, could be seen as contributing to the deficit, particularly for those critics who chose not to probe too deeply.¹⁸⁰ As Moravcsik points out, comparisons involving the European institutions were often made against some form of 'ideal' structure, which did not exist in reality. In his view, in terms of democratic accountability the EU compared well in comparison with existing nation states and there was little evidence that by 2002 Europe 'suffer[ed] from a fundamental democratic deficit'.¹⁸¹ Like Schmidt's, his article refers to a later stage of Europe's development than that covered by the Action Committee, but it was also a period by which the competences of the European institutions had expanded greatly compared to the 1950s and 1960s. Moravcsik described what he saw as a balance between competences and legitimacy within the European institutions. To achieve it, the Community had steadily increased both, but not necessarily at the same rate, so there had been periods of imbalance along the way. Increasing democratic accountability, scrutiny and public debate, including greater openness and communication by the Commission, helped to move Europe away from being purely an elite project. Likewise such major milestones as the introduction of direct elections for the European Parliament from 1979, provided a way of closing the gap and ensuring a greater degree of democratic accountability.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ These superficial attitudes were given full reign in the debates concerning the legitimacy of the European institutions at the time of the UK's Brexit referendum in 2016.

¹⁸¹ Andrew Moravcsik, 'Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (2002), pp. 603 - 624, p. 621.

¹⁸² It could be argued that participation levels and the lack of a European wide debate during these elections (debate and voting patterns mainly reflecting national concerns) means this is not the case. Nevertheless, direct elections opened up new possibilities for democratic involvement and the recent introduction of

Monnet's approach to the Action Committee reflected the permissive consensus of the period during which it functioned. Nevertheless, Monnet used the Committee to push for greater democratic participation within the Community by means of a directly elected assembly. In this he was unsuccessful in his own lifetime; direct elections to the European Parliament were first held in the year of his death. Yet, during the period the Action Committee was operating, any democratic deficit in the European institutions made little difference to the Committee's work. The Committee was a project for the European elite and Monnet was quite capable of maintaining a balance between its operations and the wider pressures inherent in the democratic process. It was a course he had similarly followed in his management of the French recovery plan in the late 1940s – pursuing the objectives he believed were necessary for success while simultaneously balancing the external pressures promoted by sectional interests.¹⁸³ Permissive consensus provided the environment in which Monnet could operate effectively, making use of the tacit understanding it provided to promote his own vision.

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A review of the historiography demonstrates that this thesis can build on existing literature to show how a study of German union membership of the Action Committee furthers our understanding of European integration and the unions' involvement in the process. By analysing the Committee from a new standpoint, highlighting and discussing the unions'

Spitzenkandidaten by the main political groupings in the Parliament shows the development of European wide debate is possible.

¹⁸³ For Monnet's involvement in the French reconstruction plan see Wilfred Loth, 'La Philosophie politique de Jean Monnet' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 325 – 340, pp. 331 ff.

reactions to the negotiations for the Rome Treaties and developing the concept of permissive consensus, it will add to our appreciation of the first decades of European integration.

Ch. 2 SETTING THE SCENE

The primary narratives of the early years of the Federal Republic were of international reconciliation with Western Europe and the creation of a stable democracy domestically. As opponents of Nazism, the trade unions expected to be involved in the building of this new democracy but were side-lined by Adenauer's conservative coalition after 1949. The beginnings of European integration after 1950 offered the unions an alternative platform; Gabriel Almond, citing Helmut Schelsky, referred to an 'escape into Europe'.¹ While the original comment referred to German business, it was equally applicable to the German union movement. Despite initial reservations, the unions were encouraged by Monnet's support and their experience in the ECSC and came to embrace Europe. When Monnet announced the formation of his Action Committee to push for further integration in 1955, the German unions had little hesitation in supporting him.

2.1 The Re-founding of the German Trade Unions

The German trade unions had been destroyed in 1933, their resources expropriated and incorporated into the Nazi organised *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (DAF). As a result of the take – over and persecution some leaders of the Weimar-era unions had fled into exile, others suffered imprisonment and yet others had faded into the background, hoping for a return to better days. After the war the initial revival of the unions began early, but bypassed the old leadership. Instead rank and file union members sprang into activity establishing Anti-Fascist committees (*Antifas*) in newly liberated areas even while fighting was still continuing. This

¹ Gabriel Almond, 'The Politics of German Business', in Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison (eds.), *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Evanston, Illinois, 1957), pp. 195-241, p. 233.

was not a development welcomed by the Western Allies, even though they recognised the importance of trade unions in building a democratic society. The Allies were determined that the rebuilding of union structures should be achieved under their own control using union leaders they could trust; their immediate action after Germany's surrender was to prohibit union activity. When no four-power agreement could be reached on the subject, each occupying power followed its own policies, with the UK and US laying down guidelines in September 1945 and the French the following month. The Western Allies now intended to use recognised leaders from the Weimar era, experienced but uncompromised and committed to democracy, the vast majority middle-aged or elderly, to build a revived union movement. Organisationally this was to be achieved from the bottom up starting with local groups which could then be brought together at a regional and eventually national level. The final form the trade union movement would take was still a matter for discussion but using these leaders would provide a safeguard against infiltration by ex-DAF personnel and minimise the chances of the reconstructed union movement falling under Communist influence.²

The potential leaders of the new organisation had already begun to consider the future of German unionism during the war.³ Their reflections covered both the nature and organisation of the future union movement and also the demands that they would pursue to reshape German society and the economy for their members' benefit. Their first task was to recognise their own failure; the fractured nature of the Weimar-era union movement meant that it had been unable to resist the rise of National Socialism effectively. Many of the most important

² For the history of the unions in post-war Germany, see Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*.

³ See for instance Hermann Herberts, *Walter Freitag - Weg und Wollen eines deutschen Gerwerkschafters* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 32 ff.

union leaders, including Hans Böckler, who became the first Chairman of the DGB on its founding in 1949, were determined to avoid repeating this mistake. Seeing the unions as one of the principal defenders of democracy in the new Germany, they resolved that the movement should not be weakened by being split on political lines, with Socialist based 'Free' as opposed to Christian Trade Unions, as in many other European countries.

Neither the British nor particularly the Americans wished to see a centralised union organisation; the Western Allies' emphasis was on the decentralisation of power and authority in the new Germany. Aiming for maximum decentralisation, the French had accepted the model of industry-based unions, unitary bodies that represented all groups and trades within a particular sector or company with the principle 'one company one union', in their zone from April 1946 and the British, though officially neutral, also tended to favour this approach.⁴ Allied fears that centrally run organisations would be bureaucratic, with a wide gap between members and leadership, laying them open to the possibility of Communist domination, strengthened the rationale for an industry-based union structure. It was a solution supported by both Böckler and Walter Freitag, the head of the metal-workers in the British zone, which included the heavily industrialised Ruhr area.

As a result, the vast majority of union members in the newly established Federal Republic came to be included in 16 industry-based unions, although separate organisations remained for white collar workers (*Angestellte*) and civil servants (*Beamte*). This industry-based

⁴ For the concept of unitary unions, see Jürgen Hoffmann, 'Industrial Relations and Trade Unions in Germany: the Pressure of Modernisation and Globalisation' in Jeremy Waddington and Reiner Hofmann (eds.), *Trade Unions in Europe: facing challenges and searching for solutions* (Brussels, 2000), pp. 249 - 276, p. 249.

organisation was finally agreed at the DGB's first conference in October 1949 just after the founding of the Federal Republic, with the DGB itself acting as an umbrella organisation for the individual unions.⁵

Within the overall structure of the union movement, the DGB had the roles of representing the movement to the government and public, education and of providing some services for the smaller unions. It was not involved in wage bargaining, which the individual unions jealously guarded as their own prerogative. The role of the DGB Chairman was in many respects a representational one and his power and influence depended both on his personality and the degree of support he received from the individual unions. Subsequent events showed his position could be strengthened if he came from one of the larger heavyweight unions.

The individual unions themselves varied considerably in size and influence. At the DGB's founding the biggest, IGM, accounted for almost 25% of the DGB's total membership.⁶ IGM often assumed a pioneer role in wage negotiations for the union movement as a whole, enabling other unions to benefit from its bargaining power. The larger unions aimed to stress their individual autonomy, they had the numerical strength and resources to do so. In contrast the smaller unions tended to be more dependent on the DGB, seeing it as a counterweight to the larger ones.

⁵ For the DGB's founding congress, see Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, pp. 88 – 94.

⁶ In 1950 IGM had a membership of 1.4m compared to the DGB's overall 5.5m. See Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, p. 463 Tabelle I and p. 475 Tabelle 13.

The new structure of the union movement also required a realigning of attitudes among union leaders. The merging of Free and Christian trade unions after 1945 meant that the union movement now encompassed a wider range of political viewpoints within a single organisation; IGM contained members from both the Weimar-era Free *Deutscher Metallarbeiter Verband* and the Catholic *Christlicher Metallarbeiterverband*. Within individual unions there were informally agreed representation levels for the numerically smaller membership from a Christian union background and in the case of the DGB it was accepted that one of the two Vice-Chairmanships would be filled on the same basis.⁷ This link was reinforced by the existence of the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) *Sozialausschuss*. Apart from ensuring that union concerns remained visible within the CDU, the *Sozialausschuss* also provided a reminder of the importance of Christian trade unionism, as represented by figures such as Jacob Kaiser and Karl Arnold. Given that more than 25% of DGB members were practising Catholics, both Free and Christian traditions had an incentive to pursue consensus.⁸ Discussion and a degree of flexibility, if not compromise, now became necessary for the smooth running of the new unitary organisation.

⁷ Otto Kirchheimer, 'West German Trade Unions: Their Domestic and Foreign Policies' in Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison (eds.), *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Evanston, Illinois, 1957), pp. 136 - 194, pp. 147 - 148; Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, p. 93.

⁸ Mark Edward Ruff, 'Review of William L. Patch - Christian Democratic Workers and the Forging of German Democracy 1920 - 1980', *German History*, 37 (2019), pp. 434 - 436.

2.2 The Failure of *Neuordnung* and the Establishment of the Federal Republic

The initial priorities of the German trade unions outlined at the DGB's founding conference centred on domestic reform.⁹ In his work on trade unions, Keith Ewing identified five levels of involvement, representing 'differing stages of trade union maturity', from benefits for members to public administration functions.¹⁰ Post-war German union demands did not ignore the basic functions but laid particular emphasis on the wider aspects of union activity, making visible the 'dual nature' of trade unions, which Köpper referenced in his work.¹¹ The unions were not just interested in working within the existing system to obtain short-term advantages for their membership but sought to change the system itself with a series of far-reaching economic and social initiatives.

Acceptance of union demands would mean a '*Neuordnung der Wirtschaft*'; a restructuring of economic relations within the newly established Federal Republic in favour of organised labour including the socialisation of key industries.¹² The unions' programme emphasised *Wirtschaftsdemokratie*, based on *Mitbestimmung* (worker participation or co-determination).¹³ *Mitbestimmung* was regarded by the unions as the keystone of economic democracy; if fully implemented it would embody the concept of worker participation from plant or enterprise level through to national economic planning. Many in the unions thought

⁹ See Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, pp. 95 – 97.

¹⁰ Keith Ewing, 'The Function of Trade Unions', *Industrial Law Journal*, 34 (2005), pp. 1 - 22, p. 3.

¹¹ Köpper, *Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik*, pp. 1 – 16 *Einleitende Bemerkungen zum Vorverständnis und zur Fragestellung*.

¹² The initial reference here is to '*Neuordnung der Wirtschaft*' to differentiate the unions' demands from industrialists' use of the term *Neuordnung*, which basically referred to industrial restructuring. From now on the term *Neuordnung* will refer to union demands unless otherwise indicated.

¹³ See Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, pp. 95 – 97 for the DGB's Munich Programme.

that Weimar had been a democratic state hampered by an authoritarian economy.¹⁴ The union intellectual Theo Pirker believed *Neuordnung* would help guarantee democracy by removing power from industrialists who were seen as having co-operated with the Nazi regime and placing it in the hands of organised labour which would uphold democratic values.¹⁵ In the event, as will be shown, the unions were by-passed, first by the Allied Military Governments and then Adenauer's conservative coalition, and largely failed to achieve their demands.

The economic and political restoration of the immediate post-war years has been seen by some historians as a missed opportunity; the unions' failure to achieve *Neuordnung* attributed not just to the strength of the domestic political opposition but also to pressure from the US occupying authorities for a liberal market solution.¹⁶ This interpretation also critiques misjudgements by the unions themselves, seeing the union leaders as too afraid of the Allies to push for more concessions.¹⁷ It is an interpretation that minimises the difficulties the union leaders faced at the time. At the beginning of the occupation period, while the population struggled with the basics of daily existence, punitive conditions including the dismantling of industrial plant provided an unpromising backdrop for union demands.

¹⁴ 1st Conference of Bavarian Trade Unions 27/29-3-1947, quoted in Deppe et al, *Geschichte*, p. 290.

¹⁵ Theo Pirker, 'Die Gewerkschaft als politische Organisation', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 2 (1952), pp. 76 - 80.

¹⁶ Deppe et al, *Geschichte*, pp. 333 ff.; Eberhard Schmidt, *Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-1952 : zur Auseinandersetzung um die Demokratisierung der Wirtschaft in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 84-85.

¹⁷ See for instance Deppe on the European Recovery Programme in Deppe et al, *Geschichte*, p. 312; Schmidt, *Die verhinderte Neuordnung*, pp. 170 – 171.

When Allied occupation policy began to ease after 1947, it was the unions' political opponents who proved best able to capitalise on the situation. Domestically the unions faced considerable opposition; the steel barons of the Ruhr were able to start reconstituting their organisation as early as August 1945 and sought to strengthen their position by offering advice and support to the Allies.¹⁸ They also successfully re-established inter-war cross-border links with French steel industrialists.¹⁹ These manoeuvrings, combined with an employer-friendly coalition in power after 1949, meant that by 1952 little had changed in terms of industry ownership and concentration.²⁰ This did not mean Gillingham's fears of revival without reform had been vindicated.²¹ The industrialists' position had indeed been secured successfully, but within a totally new context with the advent of the ECSC.²² As a result of these developments the unions saw the opportunities for domestic influence disappearing in the face of employer and government opposition.

By the time the Federal Republic was established in 1949, union hopes for *Neuordnung* were unrealistic and the unions faced major obstacles to their demands. The United States had been the most important occupying power and even before the merger of the UK and US zones into the Bizonia in January 1947 pressed for the implementation of a liberal free-market economic policy across the Western Zones, blocking proposals for socialisation in Hessen in

¹⁸ Bührer, *Ruhrstahl und Europa*, pp. 34-46.

¹⁹ Françoise Berger, 'Les sidérurgistes français et allemands face à l'Europe: convergences et divergences de conception et d'intérêts 1932 - 1952', *Journal of European Integration History*, 3 (1997), pp. 35-52.

²⁰ Isabel Warner, *Steel and Sovereignty: the deconcentration of the West German steel industry, 1949-54* (Mainz, 1996), Ch. 3, Implementing the Deconcentration 1951 - 52 .

²¹ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel*, p. 115.

²² Warner, *Steel and Sovereignty*, Ch. 4, Terminating the Deconcentration 1952-1954 ; Gillingham, *Coal, Steel*, see Ch. 6, The Success of a Failure: the ECSC in action 1952 – 55.

1946 on the grounds that it would prejudice future arrangements.²³ As the Cold War developed, the growing need to restore stability in Western Europe to counter the Soviet threat required rebuilding the German economy, on which its neighbours' prosperity also depended. American thinking on the need for German economic reconstruction was made explicit in declaration JCS 1779 in July 1947, which stated that 'an orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany'.²⁴ A free market would reinvigorate the German economy without which a European recovery was impossible.

The announcement of the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) in June 1947 demonstrated that the United States was both willing and able to deploy considerable financial resources to achieve its aim of stabilising Western Europe, making real the promises implied in the Truman Doctrine announced earlier that year. The Marshall Plan in turn was followed by reforms to the domestic German economy. Ludwig Erhard, a free-market orientated economist, became Director of Economics for the Bizone in April 1948. When the Americans introduced currency reform two months later, Erhard followed immediately with the *Leitsatzgesetz*. This law benefited employers rather than labour; wages were frozen for three months while the abolition of rationing and price controls on all but basic items led to price increases.²⁵ Currency reform also had wider implications; enacted only in the three Western sectors of Berlin, it contributed to the raising of tensions which led to the Berlin blockade, further

²³ The Bizone was created by merging the UK and US zones of occupation in January 1947. The French occupation zone was added in August 1948 to create the Trizone. For a summary of events in Hessen see Schmidt, *Die verhinderte Neuordnung*, p. 85.

²⁴ JCS 1779 of 11 July 1947, quoted in Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, pp. 47 – 49, Doc. 21.

²⁵ See Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, p. 77.

polarising Cold War relations between the USSR and the Western Allies and in turn only increasing the Americans' determination to stand firm.

Both the unions and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), with which the unions had a considerable overlap in personnel and interest, endorsed the Marshall Plan, albeit with reservations.²⁶ For both, the plan represented 'dollar imperialism' and the union leaders were particularly concerned that it could impact the introduction of *Neuordnung*. However, the views of the two organisations to the now fast developing domestic political situation had already begun to diverge. The unions' attention was concentrated on material issues including resisting the Allied policy of *Demontage*, the dismantling of heavy industry. This gave them a different perspective to the SPD, which pursued a more intransigent line in both its domestic and foreign policies under Kurt Schumacher, its first post-war leader.

Schumacher believed that its opposition to Hitler made the SPD was the only party entitled to rule a new, democratic Germany. His stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise, sometimes in the face of internal party opposition, disadvantaged the SPD and the unions once Germans could reengage in political life in the Western zones. He effectively excluded the party from any influence by refusing to cooperate in a Grand Coalition in the Bizonal Economic Council when it first met at the end of June 1947. As a result all the Administration Directors elected by it that July were conservatives. The CDU itself moved to the right over the next couple of years, jettisoning the 1947 Ahlen Programme, which had endorsed some

²⁶ See Klaus Armingeon, 'Trade Unions under Changing Conditions: The West German Experience 1950 - 85', *European Sociological Review*, 5 (1989), pp. 1 - 23, especially pp. 9 – 13 for the issue of personnel overlaps between the two organisations.

aspects of *Neuordnung* such as socialisation, in favour of the more traditionally conservative *Düsseldorfer Leitsätze* by the time of the 1949 elections.²⁷ As the Council's responsibilities increased, Schumacher effectively handed decision making to his political opponents, ensuring that union demands could be downgraded and helping to pave the way for the eventual formation of Adenauer's centre-right coalition.

Schumacher was equally inflexible in foreign affairs. He was a proud nationalist, born in West Prussia, and conscious that the Soviet Zone had historically provided much of the SPD's support. Schumacher prioritised reunification over Adenauer's policy of *Westintegration*, to which he adopted an uncompromisingly critical approach. This left Adenauer a free hand to pursue a policy supported by the Americans; Schumacher's strident claims that the Chancellor was the '*Bundeskanzler der Alliierten*' did nothing to advance the SPD's cause.²⁸ Under his leadership the SPD would vote against the Schuman Plan, which Schumacher believed would result in the wrong sort of Europe, one that was *klein* (without the British and Scandinavians), *kartellistisch*, *kapitalistisch* and *klerikal*.²⁹ Schumacher died in August 1952, to be replaced by the colourless Erich Ollenhauer, but Schumacher's unwillingness to compromise in the face of changing circumstances had by then led the SPD into a political cul-de-sac that was to last for over a decade.³⁰

²⁷ Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, pp. 76-80, see Doc. 31 for the Ahlen Programme and Doc. 32 for the *Düsseldorfer Leitsätze*.

²⁸ Schumacher's claim in the Bundestag 24-11-1949 quoted in Paterson, *SPD and European Integration*, p. 43.

²⁹ Patrick Bredebach, 'Vom bedingten "Nein" zum bedingten "Ja": die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und die europäische Integration in den 1950er Jahren' in Maria Gainar and Martial Libera (eds.) *Acteurs Institutionelles, Milieux Politiques et Société Civile* (Stuttgart, 2013), pp. 191 - 205, p. 193; Paterson, *SPD and European Integration*, pp. 55-66.

³⁰ Wolfgang Benz, 'Kurt Schumachers Europakonzeption' in Werner Bührer, Ludolf Herbst and Hanno Sowade (eds.), *Vom Marshallplan zur EWG : die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt* (München, 1990), pp. 47-62.

The unions' more flexible approach represented a stark contrast to the increasing isolation of the SPD at federal level during the late 1940s. This did not imply a lack of determination in achieving their goals, the unions had called a general strike in November 1948 in opposition to Erhard's economic policies, but reflected their new organisation and an experience of working beyond the union movement. For their own reasons, unions and employers were united in opposing *Demontage* which the unions feared would result in increased unemployment. Parity *Mitbestimmung* on supervisory boards in the steel industry was introduced in the British occupation zone in 1947. Even if introduced as a pacification measure, as Plumpe suggests, it still had the effect of introducing an element of democracy into the industry.³¹ This had the effect of strengthening the influence and experience of the trade unionists involved but equally required them to work with others. Although the majority of union leaders inclined towards the SPD in their political views, the merging of the two union cultures meant that up to 1953 the DGB leadership was normally careful to avoid espousing an overtly party political line. The result was a union movement that began to diverge from the SPD leadership, a gap that would widen due to differences over Europe.

Böckler signalled the DGB's independence of approach early on when, much to Schumacher's annoyance, he voted against the SPD position to approve the Petersberg Agreement in November 1949.³² Under the agreement the newly established federal government could join

³¹ See Werner Plumpe, 'Unternehmensverbände und Industrielle Interessenpolitik seit 1870' in Wolfgang Köllmann, Hermann Korte, Dietmar Petzina and Wolfhart Weber (eds.), *Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter, Geschichte und Entwicklung* (Düsseldorf, 1990), pp. 655 - 727, p.722.

³² Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, pp. 175 – 176.

the Council of Europe as an associate member and was granted a limited degree of freedom in other areas. Most importantly for the unions, it largely ended the post-war dismantling of heavy industry.

Böckler's support for the agreement showed that when governmental actions aligned with union demands the DGB would be prepared to support Adenauer, an early example of Cramm's point that the DGB's interests could on occasion match those of the government coalition.³³ As will be shown, it was a factor that later came into play with Adenauer's need to ratify the Treaty of Paris. The episode also showed that government and unions were prepared to work constructively to achieve their aims, exploiting and building on opportunities as they appeared. Though referring to the unions, Rosenberg summarised the approach of both; '*Gleichberechtigung und Anerkennung durch Partizipation*'.³⁴

Rosenberg was correct; progress towards the goals of equality of treatment and recognition for the Federal Republic, its institutions and its leaders, key issues for German elites after the war, could only be achieved through active participation and engagement in the political process. It was a point Heinrich von Brentano, later Adenauer's Foreign Minister, also accepted in a speech the following month.³⁵ Participation and working with others would require compromise to be effective. Not always successful, it was nevertheless an approach the unions were to adopt to European integration from the following year.

³³ Cramm, 'Im Zeichen der europäischen Integration', passim.

³⁴ Quoted in Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 34.

³⁵ Von Brentano's Bundestag speech 16-12-1949, quoted in Hans-Erich Volkmann, 'Adenauer, Frankreich und die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft,' in Andreas Wilkens (ed.), *Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn, 1999), pp. 161 - 186, p. 161, FN 1.

The elections for the new Federal Republic's *Bundestag* in August 1949 resulted in a narrow defeat for the SPD.³⁶ That September Adenauer became the Federal Republic's first Chancellor, presiding over an unstable coalition elected in the *Bundestag* by only one vote, his own. The new government faced major difficulties. Adenauer's Christian Democrats were still a loose association with little central organisation and did not adopt a formal federal structure until the following year.³⁷ Despite the currency reform of June 1948, the economic recovery was sluggish and a work creation programme had to be announced in February 1950 to help combat unemployment.³⁸ It took the increase in economic activity generated by the Korean War which broke out that June to kick start the *Wirtschaftswunder* of the next two decades.

In the limited sphere of foreign engagement allowed to the new Republic, events likewise got off to a difficult start. When Schuman made his first official visit to the Federal Republic in January 1950, the visit degenerated into a series of arguments over the status of the Saarland.³⁹ The situation deteriorated further following France's publication of the Saar Treaty the following month; Adenauer's hopes for *Westintegration* now appeared to be in tatters. Yet, within three months the situation was transformed when on 9 May 1950

³⁶ The SPD was in fact the largest single party but the combined strength of the CDU/CSU was greater. See Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, p. 122, Doc. 58.

³⁷ Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: the CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945-1976* (London, 1977), Ch. 1, The Occupation Period...(1945-1949) and Ch. 2, The Period of Adenauer's Ascendancy...(1949-1959).

³⁸ Gerold Ambrosius, 'Das Wirtschaftssystem' in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band II Wirtschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 11 - 81, p. 74.

³⁹ Ludolf Herbst, *Option für den Westen. Vom Marschallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag* (München, 1989), Ch. 1, *Robert Schuman besucht die Bundesrepublik*.

Schuman outlined his plan for the merging of Western Europe's coal, iron and steel industries, the first step in the long and as yet incomplete process of European integration.

2.3 The Background to European Integration

From its inception the process of European integration that began in 1950 was a political project. It was by no means a new idea; in the wake of a previous World War, the concept of a united Europe had been promoted by Count Coudenhove-Calergi in the 1920s. Plans for union had also been drawn up by the French Premier Aristide Briand with the support of the German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in 1929. Stresemann's death and the onset of the depression meant the idea was not taken further at governmental level but the concept continued to be debated among resistance groups during the war. The difference between these earlier hopes and the situation that confronted politicians after 1950 was that ideas were now to be finally turned into reality.

Nor was the emphasis on coal and steel new; various plans for the integration of these industries on a Franco-German (or even West European) basis had been floated, going back to the inter-war years and even earlier.⁴⁰ These had become more widespread after the war; Monnet too had considered the possibility of a 'heavy industry state' centred on Lorraine and the Saar.⁴¹ Coal and steel were the threads connecting the frontier regions of the Saar, Luxemburg and Lorraine. This area had been a constant source of friction between France

⁴⁰ Otto Hue, the German miners' leader, made proposals in 1912. See Paterson, *SPD and European Integration*, p. 1.

⁴¹ Some of these are discussed in John Gillingham, 'Die Französische Ruhrpolitik und die Ursprünge des Schumanplans', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 35 (1987), pp. 1-24; for Monnet's ideas see Schwabe, *Monnet*, pp. 136 ff.

and Germany, much contested and fought over and together with the *Ruhrgebiet* to the north comprised the greatest concentration of heavy industry in Europe. While overall the region was self-sufficient in industrial resources, there was one key imbalance between the countries involved; the smelting of French iron-ore in Lorraine was dependent on high quality German coal from the Ruhr coalfields. After 1947 the American policy of promoting German industrial recovery ran the risk of depriving French industry of coal supplies. The establishment of the International Authority of the Ruhr (IAR) in April 1949 was designed to pacify the French who wanted to see the Ruhr separated politically from Germany.⁴² Following the Petersberg Agreement the Federal Republic was able to send delegates to the Authority but the inclusion of the Ruhr in the Federal Republic meant that the IAR could not provide a stable long term solution to France's supply problem once the German steel industry was freed from Allied controls.

In his role as head of French post-war reconstruction in the late 1940s, Monnet was acutely aware of this situation. The French reconstruction plan was designed to develop a modern economy, overcoming the stagnation of the inter-war years and befitting France's status as a great power. In the short term, Monnet knew that French economic recovery depended on German coal. In the longer term, however, he knew that France's security could only be guaranteed by Franco-German reconciliation. French governments faced a dilemma; the economic benefit provided by a strong German economy had to be weighed against the need to guarantee France's security against just such a revival. From 1947 on the USA showed itself prepared to build up the future Federal Republic as a key element of its anti-Communist Cold

⁴² Amos Yoder, 'The Ruhr Authority and the German Problem', *The Review of Politics*, 17 (1955), pp. 345 - 358.

War strategy. This was anathema to most French politicians of the time, who saw German reconstruction as a major threat to France's security. By 1950, faced with the potential failure of French policy towards the newly established Federal Republic, whose growing importance was already apparent, Monnet pursued a solution by changing the context of the debate, an approach he endorsed consistently.⁴³ He realised that the tension between the two competing imperatives of security and industrial recovery could be solved most effectively by European political and economic integration. This integration would require the establishment of new supranational institutions, involve new ways of working, and be based on the keystone of Franco-German reconciliation, which he had identified as crucial to the integration process as early as 1943 in his Algiers Note.⁴⁴

The solution of integration also appealed to the Americans, who saw it as a means of strengthening post-war Western Europe against the Soviet threat. With the British unprepared to take the lead in promoting integration, the Americans came to see the French as their preferred partners for this task, a position confirmed by Dean Acheson, President Harry Truman's Secretary of State, who in Autumn 1949 stressed the need for the French to take the lead in Europe.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, some leading French politicians had already confronted the reality of German economic recovery. They realised France would be unable to prevent

⁴³ See Richard Mayne, 'Gray Eminence' in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford P. Hackett (eds.), *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (New York, 1991), pp. 114-128, p. 126.

⁴⁴ Key extracts from the Algiers note are given in Pascal Fontaine, *Jean Monnet : a grand design for Europe* Luxembourg (1988), p. 41. The evolution of Monnet's thought is outlined in his memoirs, *Monnet, Memoirs*, especially Ch. 11, Europe in the Dark (1947-1949) to Ch. 13, The Schuman Plan Conference (1950).

⁴⁵ Acheson's letter to Schuman of 30-10-1949 quoted in Schwabe, *Monnet*, p. 152.

America strengthening the Federal Republic. In the face of American pressure, France could not rely on keeping Germany weak.

As early as January 1948 Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, had instigated a change in French occupation policy; the first punitive stage of demanding reparations was over and policy would now concentrate on looking forward to a more cooperative future.⁴⁶

Bidault, like Schuman, his successor, was a member of the MRP, a Christian Democratic party with many views and interests in common with Adenauer's own Christian Democrats across the border.⁴⁷ American support and encouragement together with the change of attitude among leading French politicians made Monnet's task easier. Searching for a solution to the immediate dilemma of balancing growth and security, Monnet now successfully posed the existing questions in a new European context.

Monnet's timing was also astute; in May 1950 the Allies were about to authorise an increase in West German steel production that would have put the delivery of Ruhr coal to France under pressure, as well as further boosting the Federal Republic's industrial strength. Alongside fears that the forthcoming Allied Foreign Ministers' London Conference on 11 May might even abolish the IAR, handing back control of the Ruhr to German industrialists, Monnet's proposal found a receptive audience in Paris.⁴⁸ In his Memoirs it suited Monnet to emphasise the drama of the days before the announcement but the speed of the decision,

⁴⁶ For Bidault's policy see Gillingham, 'Die französische Ruhrpolitik', pp. 11 - 12.

⁴⁷ Despite several changes of administration, from early 1947 Bidault and then Schuman served continuously as Foreign Minister providing a degree of stability over the period.

⁴⁸ The term Allied Foreign Ministers referred to the three Western occupying powers.

against the deadline of the London Conference, underlined Schmitter's point that one of Neofunctionalism's distinctive features was taking decisions under pressure, often with imperfect information.⁴⁹

The late 1940s saw many varied proposals for integration, leading to debate over the originality of Monnet's ideas. Yannis Karagiannis rightly demonstrates that Monnet was not operating in an intellectual or political void, while David Troitiño emphasises how Monnet drew on his past experiences in formulating the Schuman Plan.⁵⁰ Yet criticism of Monnet for using others' ideas misses the point. Monnet's strength, and a key part of his method, was, as Constantin Chira-Pascanut identified, 'his awareness that the process of putting an idea into practice involved two complementary stages: the production of an idea, and its implementation' and that two different sets of people, the authors of ideas and politicians in power, were required to achieve this.⁵¹

Monnet proved capable of capturing and distilling the various proposals that existed at the time, turning them into a coherent policy, and then had the high-level contacts that enabled them to be implemented. Beyond this ability were two further qualities equally important to Monnet's success. The first was his understanding of the 'need to change the context of an issue by adding another dimension'.⁵² Many politicians and commentators talked of 'Europe'

⁴⁹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, pp. 298 – 303; Schmitter, 'Ernst B Haas and the legacy of Neofunctionalism', p. 259.

⁵⁰ Yannis Karagiannis, 'The Origins of the Common Market: Political Economy vs. Hagiography', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54 (2016), pp. 233-246, p. 246; Troitiño, 'Jean Monnet before the first European Community', *passim*.

⁵¹ Chira-Pascanut, 'Discreet Players', p. 1254. There is a discussion of the current relevance of the Monnet method in Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, *Une Dynamique Européenne*, pp. 349 – 372.

⁵² Delors, 'Centenary Symposium', comment by Emile Noël p. 49.

and integration in general terms; Monnet's breakthrough in 1950 was to relate the potential of European integration to the specific situation at hand. Finally, Monnet was a master of timing, a point which Karagiannis acknowledges.⁵³ By unveiling his plan just before the London Conference was due to meet, Monnet's proposals came at exactly the right point to win the support of the French government. The management and presentation of the Schuman Plan proposals showed Monnet at his most effective and represented the high point of his career.

Thus, although named after the French foreign minister who announced it, the Schuman Plan was very definitely Monnet's own creation. By pooling sovereignty in the coal and steel industries, the key components for the manufacture of armaments as the Schuman Declaration recognised, it offered an elegant solution to several of the key questions of the day. French industry would be guaranteed German coal supplies, future war rendered impossible, economic growth promoted, living standards improved and the steel barons of the Ruhr, whom many considered a prime source of aggressive German militarism, tamed. While Adenauer's Germany was the main focus of Monnet's attention, the first four drafts of the declaration only mentioned the Federal Republic, demonstrating Monnet's focus on Franco-German reconciliation, the plan was also designed to appeal to France's neighbours.⁵⁴ Four other countries, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, but not the UK, accepted Monnet's preconditions and entered the negotiations that began in Paris that June.

⁵³ Karagiannis, 'The Origins of the Common Market', p. 246.

⁵⁴ Andreas Wilkens, 'Entscheidung für Europa. Deutsche und französische Optionen in den 1950er Jahren' in Jörn Leonhard (ed.), *Vergleich und Verflechtung. Deutschland und Frankreich im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2015), pp. 61-77, p. 66.

2.4 The Schuman Plan and *Mitbestimmung*

The German unions initially welcomed the Schuman Plan, hoping it would raise living standards and allow them to extend their domestic agenda; at this stage the fragility of Adenauer's coalition still allowed them to believe in the possibility of reform. Regarding themselves as part of a longstanding internationalist tradition, for them, just as for Adenauer, the plan offered an opportunity to win acceptance among their peers, in this case primarily the other European trade union organisations. The DGB had been accepted into the newly established ICFTU in 1949 when the non-Communist unions had split from the Communist dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) over the Marshall Plan. Nevertheless, considerable suspicion of the Germans remained, much of it a result of the war-time experiences of fellow trade unionists in German-occupied countries. German trade unionists would have to win back acceptance through their participation in international institutions. This would not necessarily be easy; in 1951 the Belgian trade unionist Arthur Gailly was to object to the inclusion of a German trade unionist in the new ECSC's High Authority purely on the grounds of nationality.⁵⁵ More generally von der Groeben noted that it took time for 'German colleagues' in the European institutions to become 'German colleagues and friends'; feelings ran deep.⁵⁶ Participation in the Schuman Plan would enable the unions to demonstrate their desire to promote internationalism and cooperation.

⁵⁵ See Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 75, FN 267.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Jürgen Elvert, 'Hans von der Groeben. Anmerkungen zur Karriere eines deutschen Europäers der ersten Stunde' in Mareike König and Matthias Schulz (eds.), *Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung 1949 - 2000* (Stuttgart, 2004), pp. 85-103, p. 95.

Schuman's proposal also offered Adenauer a way out of the foreign policy impasse that had existed since the beginning of the year, and transformed the situation in Western Europe. The Chancellor endorsed Schuman's initiative enthusiastically as it provided a first practical step towards his policy of *Westintegration*.⁵⁷ Not least among the plan's attractions was the fact that, even though the Allies would still be involved, it offered equality of treatment for the Federal Republic in a key economic field which up to then had been subject to Allied restrictions. It was the opportunity Adenauer needed to start the Federal Republic back on the long road to full acceptance by its neighbours, economic means acting as the vehicle for political ends.

To ensure the maximum domestic support for his policy, Adenauer appointed the trade unionist Hans vom Hoff, a protégé of Böckler's, to the delegation sent to Paris for the plan negotiations. Vom Hoff was in favour of integration, but concerned that it should go hand in hand with social progress and increasing living standards; the unions wanted to see a distinctive social agenda incorporated into the Community. Some union officials, such as Grosse of IGB and Wagenführ of the WWI, went further and saw it as an opportunity to introduce economic planning at the supranational level, a possibility denied to them domestically.⁵⁸ Despite vom Hoff's involvement in the negotiations, all these aspirations went unrealised and as the negotiations progressed, his initially enthusiastic reports back to the DGB became less optimistic. The agreement negotiated in Paris fell short of the unions' demands, with the future of the *Deutsche Kohle Verkauf* (DKV) cartel being of particular

⁵⁷ See Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945 - 53*, pp. 327 – 331.

⁵⁸ See Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, Ch. 2, *Gewerkschaften und Europa*; Lauschke, 'Zwischen Mitbestimmungs- und Europapolitik', p. 93.

concern, due to the potential implications for unemployment if uneconomic pits were to close. As a result the unions' support for the plan became increasingly equivocal.⁵⁹ This presented a problem for Adenauer. The pro-business Free Democrats and conservative-nationalist *Deutsche Partei* in his ruling coalition could not be relied on to support the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC and he needed to build a domestic coalition to ensure its ratification.

Adenauer was able to break the deadlock and achieve his foreign policy aims by meeting the unions' demands for *Mitbestimmung* in the *Montanindustrie*. Negotiating directly with Böckler over the heads of the parties immediately concerned, Adenauer conceded parity *Mitbestimmung* for these industries in early 1951.⁶⁰ The unions would have equal representation on the Supervisory Board (*Aufsichtsrat*) and the right to veto the nomination of the Labour Director, a statutory appointment, who sat on an enterprise's Executive Committee (*Vorstand*). This gave the unions a one-off achievement but it was a pyrrhic victory. It was a personal success for Adenauer whose prestige was enhanced.⁶¹ With his political position now strengthened by foreign policy success, an improving economy in the wake of the Korean War and rising living standards, the unions found themselves in a relatively weaker situation. Events the following year would show they had effectively sacrificed *Mitbestimmung's* wider introduction.⁶²

⁵⁹ Köpper, *Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik*, Ch. 2, *Die Stellung der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften zur wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas.....(1949-1952)*.

⁶⁰ Parity *Mitbestimmung* applied to companies with over 1000 employees, effectively only impacting the de-cartelised enterprises as only they tended to have a sufficiently large workforce to qualify. The law was extended to include holding companies some years later.

⁶¹ Gabriele Müller-List, 'Adenauer, Unternehmer und Gewerkschaften', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 33 (1985), pp. 288-309.

⁶² Thum, *Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie*, Ch. 6, *Montanmitbestimmung und ihre Folgen....(Frühjahr 1951 bis Sommer 1952)*.

Adenauer's one-off domestic concession ensured that his initial step in foreign policy was secured. The SPD voted against ratification of the ECSC treaty but the unions were supportive, albeit with reservations, with the DGB Executive's decision endorsed overwhelmingly at the extraordinary congress held in June 1951.⁶³ The split between the DGB and SPD on European policy also widened. Moreover, as Adenauer's political position now improved, he was no longer interested in making concessions to the unions. A further link between Adenauer and the unions was broken when Böckler, whose relationship with Adenauer dated back to 1920s Cologne, died suddenly just after the *Montanmitbestimmung* agreement had been concluded. Government consultation with the DGB fell away during the second half of 1951 under pressure from the pro-business parties in the coalition and the 1952 *Betriebsverfassungsgesetz*, defining company law for companies outside the *Montanindustrie*, failed to extend parity *Mitbestimmung* to them. Meanwhile the stark divisions of the Cold War and events such as the failed 1953 East German uprising only served to underline the wisdom of Adenauer's foreign policy choices for many citizens of the Federal Republic.

The Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community represented Adenauer's first major success in his policy of *Westintegration*. Explicit in defining European integration as a primarily political rather than economic project, the signatories' key concern

⁶³ Although the SPD voted against the treaty, it is likely that some trade unionists within the SPD parliamentary party broke ranks as a result of the *Mitbestimmung* agreement to give Adenauer his majority for ratification. This may warrant further more detailed investigation of voting patterns.

was with the establishment and preservation of peace, which was referenced in four of the five Preamble clauses.⁶⁴

The determination to renounce the recent past evident in the Preamble illustrates the role political will played as the prime driving force in European integration.⁶⁵ Concluding the preamble with the phrase ‘to lay the basis of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny’, also made it clear that the new Community represented the first step on a journey, even if the signatories were unsure, in specific terms, where it would lead.⁶⁶ By commencing with coal and steel, the founders of the new Community aimed to demonstrate how departing from the autarkic economic policies of the inter-war years, a source of international tensions, and promoting economic growth could achieve the twin aims of securing peace and raising living standards. As such it was an agenda designed to appeal to the German unions.

2.5 The Early 1950s: Domestic Challenges for the Unions

Despite the one-off success of *Montanmitbestimmung*, domestically the early 1950s were difficult years for the unions, marked by infighting and a lack of political success. Böckler’s death had robbed the union movement of a personality able to manage it effectively. Christian Fette, Böckler’s successor as DGB Chairman, was unceremoniously evicted from his

⁶⁴ 1951 Treaty of Paris

https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_coal_and_steel_community_paris_18_april_1951-en-11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58.html (Accessed 7-6-2021)

⁶⁵ The actual phrase used is ‘Resolved to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their [the participants’] essential interests’.

⁶⁶ Preamble to the 1951 Treaty of Paris.

role in October 1952 after only 15 months in post, mainly as the result of his failure to deliver an extension to parity *Mitbestimmung*. Orchestrated by IGM, the episode demonstrated the clout possessed by the DGB's largest constituent union. Over the following years pro-European officials within the union movement such as Wagenführ and Grosse were removed from their posts, their departure ironically coming at a time when the union leaders themselves were beginning to see the benefits of the Community and their expertise could have been employed.

Fette's successor, Freitag, took a robust approach to the domestic political situation, authorising a 'Campaign for a Better [i.e. SPD majority] Bundestag' during the summer of 1953 prior to the federal elections that September. Freitag's initiative reflected the unions' 'state fixation' – the belief that union interests would be promoted by their natural partner once an SPD government attained power. The campaign was a failure; Adenauer's coalition increased its majority while the SPD's percentage of the vote fell, leading to the prospect of a further four years of governmental neglect of union concerns.⁶⁷

While still paying lip-service to the concept of *Neuordnung*, the unions now concentrated their efforts on more immediate issues such as improved working conditions, as outlined in the 1955 Action Programme, rather than structural change. This move represented a change from the unions' original post-war strategy and led to debate among union leaders. Markovits sees the period 1953 – 1959 as one of tension between 'activist' and 'accommodationist'

⁶⁷ Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, p. 122, Doc. 58.

unions.⁶⁸ The former, of which IGM was the most prominent example, saw unions as a counterforce to the government, the 'accommodationists', which included IGB, were prepared to work within the system rather than seeking confrontation.

In fact the Action Programme was initially promoted by Otto Brenner, IGM's new Chairman, who saw it, among advantages which included raising IGM's profile and promoting economic democracy, as a way of enabling Victor Agartz's 'expansive wage policy'. Agartz believed that higher wage settlements would stimulate the economy, by giving workers greater purchasing power, and in doing so would also raise living conditions.⁶⁹ It was a form of Keynesianism in contrast to Erhard's economic liberalism, where although real wages were rising, they did not match productivity increases and labour's share of GDP remained below that of 1949.⁷⁰ As the Action Programme showed 'activism' and 'accommodationism' were in reality less positions in opposition to each other than different emphases of approach. Although the preamble to the Action Programme echoed the language of the DGB's opening conference, the demands promoted by what Markovits termed Brenner's 'bread and butter micro-radicalism' such as the introduction of the 40 hour week, equal sick pay for blue and white collar workers and improved work safety, were all ones the 'accommodationist' unions were happy to promote.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, pp. 83 – 93.

⁶⁹ Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, pp. 140 – 142.

⁷⁰ For wages see Siegfried Mielke and Fritz Vilmar, 'Die Gewerkschaften' in Benz (ed.), *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band II: Wirtschaft*, (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 82-139, p. 122, Tabelle 8; for productivity see Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, p. 137.

⁷¹ Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, pp. 85 – 86.

The achievement of such reforms would, however, take time. The unions' lack of immediate success in achieving reform led to dissatisfaction with the union leadership and disputes grew within the rank and file membership. By 1954 – 55 many activists were in uproar over the issue of rearmament, seeing it as much as anything else as a way of ventilating their disagreements with a union leadership that appeared to take them for granted and patronise them.⁷² Autumn 1955 even saw the emergence of a breakaway Christian union, a reaction to what its members saw as the move away from the DGB's non-party political stance. It is little wonder that by 1956 the political scientist Otto Kirchheimer could begin his article on the West German unions with the stark statement that 'the German labour unions are presently passing through a critical period'.⁷³ Domestically it was a valid judgement, the following section considers whether they had achieved greater success in Europe during the same period.

2.6 The German Unions and the European Coal and Steel Community

Once the Treaty of Paris had been ratified, the DGB's final decision to participate in its institutions was taken without great enthusiasm on the basis that the unions needed to be involved to protect their own and their members' interests.⁷⁴ However, the actual experience of 'Europe' proved much more encouraging than the union leaders had anticipated and the sectoral nature of the ECSC provided IGB and IGM with a structured forum within which they could operate. The Treaty of Paris embedded the unions in the ECSC's institutions. The unions

⁷² Köpper, *Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik*, Ch. 4, *Gewerkschaften und Verteidigungspolitik...*(1949 – 1952/53) and Ch. 5, *Der letzte Widerstand*(1954 – 1955/56).

⁷³ Otto Kirchheimer, 'West German Trade Unions', *World Politics*, VIII (1956), pp. 484-514, p. 484.

⁷⁴ Köpper, *Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik*, pp. 121-122.

received guaranteed participation on the ECSC's Consultative Committee with one third of seats, alongside employer and consumer interests, giving them the right to raise issues of concern directly with the High Authority. There were thus hopes that articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, which referred to maintaining continuity of employment and improving living and working conditions, could be used to promote union objectives. Finally the leading union official Heinz Potthoff, who already had international experience of the *Montanindustrie* as a member of the IAR, was appointed as one of the two German representatives to the HA, providing a further link to the DGB. With two trade unionists, Potthoff and the Belgian Free trade union leader Paul Finet, serving as members, the unions had representation at the highest level and the institutional processes within the ECSC ensured their views were considered.

Representation in the new institutions showed that the unions were regarded as equal partners in the new Community, although the fact that the 'consumers' on the Consultative Committee were the immediate industrial users of coal and steel would later cause the unions some concern. Monnet's attitude towards the unions also helped their integration; Monnet himself took good care to cultivate his contacts with the unions, valuing their grounding in the population as well as believing that they would bring a wider perspective than any employer could do.⁷⁵ Suzuki thought that union influence, in particular German, was one of the primary reasons for the Monnet authority's decision to stop the dismantling of cartels.⁷⁶ Given Monnet's often hostile attitude to the employer organisations, to be discussed in the following

⁷⁵ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 32.

⁷⁶ Suzuki, 'Digging for European Unity', p.252.

chapter, Suzuki believed that their pressure alone would have been insufficient; union concerns were the deciding factor. Now regarded as equal participants in the new Community, Rosenberg's formula of '*Gleichberechtigung und Anerkennung durch Partizipation*' was becoming reality for the German unions. This acceptance in turn aided their integration into the international trade union movement as some of the ambivalence about them now began to diminish with time. It also contrasted with the attitude of Adenauer's coalition which, as shown, after the concession of *Montanmitbestimmung* adopted a policy aimed at side-lining the unions and minimising their influence domestically.

The experience of the ECSC was a transformative one for the German unions, not least because of Monnet's readiness to engage with them.⁷⁷ Participating in the institutions of the Community broke down the unions' earlier reservations about it and introduced them to working with Monnet. Monnet himself enthusiastically listed the benefits that he saw the unions obtain from membership, including the ability to compare wages across the Community.⁷⁸ The Federal Republic was also the prime beneficiary of grants for the construction of workers housing.⁷⁹ It suited Monnet to emphasise the benefits but they were real and the unions were grateful, wage comparison being particularly valued for the information it provided in the justification of Agartz's (now renamed) 'active wage policy'.

⁷⁷ Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung?', p. 117.

⁷⁸ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 391.

⁷⁹ Heinz Potthoff, *Die Montanunion in der europäischen Gemeinschaft* (Düsseldorf, 1965), p. 43; Lorenzo Mechi, 'L'Action de la Haute Autorité de la CECA dans la construction de maisons ouvrières', *Journal of European Integration History*, 6 (2000), pp. 63-88, p. 86.

However, the situation was more nuanced than Monnet claimed; Dirk Spierenberg and Raymond Poidevin concluded that changes in the social arena were slow in coming, at least in part because of the time required for investigation and coordination with member states, for whom social Europe was not necessarily a priority.⁸⁰ In the case of IGM, concerns about the principle of membership had been overcome partly because, as Jelena Jojevic has charted, the union promoted a number of initiatives that enabled it to deal effectively with the Community.⁸¹ Along with an internal union reorganisation, these included Freitag's success in ensuring individual national unions, not just their international federations, could make representations to the Consultative Committee, and sending representatives to the Economics Ministry's relevant industry Committee, even though it remained employer dominated. Having originally agreed to participate with the aim of countering the negative effects of the ECSC, by 1957 the union was happy to show how its activity had contributed to the improvement of social and economic conditions. However, this change in stance had not just depended on Monnet, the union had needed to react proactively to the challenges of ECSC membership. Although he moved from IGM to chair the DBG in October 1952, Freitag also underwent much the same transformation in attitude, and by the end of 1954 was well disposed towards Monnet personally.⁸²

The situation in IGB was somewhat different; Grosse was in favour of integration and had supported the Schuman Plan from the beginning.⁸³ He had been directly involved as a

⁸⁰ Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community* (London, 1994), pp. 184-185.

⁸¹ Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung?', pp. 112 – 115.

⁸² Freitag's views will be discussed in Ch. 4.4.

⁸³ See Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, pp. 79 – 85.

delegate in the Paris negotiations; IGM had not enjoyed the same level of representation, which concerned some IGM officials, who thought the union had been disadvantaged by this omission. Despite opposition within the union's executive, August Schmidt, IGB's Chairman, endorsed Grosse's approach. The experience of participation in the Community completed the process of reconciliation under Schmidt's successor Heinrich Imig.

By the mid-1950s both IGB and IGM accepted membership of the ECSC as a fact but unease about the new Community still existed in trade union circles. Some concerns tended to centre on specific issues such as IGM's worries about insufficient investment in the steel industry. However, while the rationalisation of transport costs and the tax treatment of steel exports to correct market deficiencies demonstrated spillover in action, there had been little equivalent activity in the social sphere; the unions' spillover of expectations had not taken place. The major concern among the unions was the feeling that despite their involvement in the Consultative Committee, the High Authority was too timid in using the Treaty to promote a social agenda.⁸⁴ Finet argued that the High Authority could not exceed the powers granted it under the Treaty of Paris.⁸⁵ However, at least retrospectively, Potthoff endorsed the union position, arguing that the Consultative Committee should have been less constrained by the Treaty than the members of the HA felt they needed to be.⁸⁶ There had accordingly been little progress towards the unions' main objectives of ensuring a fairer balance between the

⁸⁴ Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung?', p. 117; Lauschke, 'Zwischen Mitbestimmungs- und Europapolitik', p. 101.

⁸⁵ See report of ERO's Wiederbelebungs Conference in August 1955, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/netzquelle/01548.pdf>, p. 16 (Accessed 10-2-2021). The Conference is discussed in more detail in Ch. 5.1.

⁸⁶ Potthoff, *Die Montanuion*, p. 69.

economic and social elements of integration. Following the Messina Conference the unions were concerned that failure to achieve this baseline would disadvantage them when negotiations on integration reopened in earnest.

2.7 The European Political Situation in the lead up to Messina

Monnet resigned from the Presidency of the High Authority in November 1954. His health played a role in the decision, he had suffered a stroke earlier in the year, but his real reason was his belief that only outside the formalities of official life would he enjoy the freedom of action he wanted.⁸⁷ Monnet's failure to get to grips with the administration of the High Authority made the decision easier for him, as did his sometimes strained relations with the Council of Ministers.⁸⁸ Moreover he had also expended considerable time and energy on promoting the EDC which had diverted him from his tasks in Luxemburg. Following the French rejection of the EDC that August, Monnet wanted to engage in the debates on integration, which were now taking on a new intensity, as a free agent.

The collapse of the EDC meant the loss of the *Generalvertrag*, designed to end the Federal Republic's occupied status once the Defence Community came into being; German aspirations for more equal treatment appeared to have suffered a setback. The result of this failure was a flurry of diplomatic activity, with the Paris Accords that October proposing a new status for

⁸⁷ Paul Callowald, 'Intervention de Paul Callowald' in *Une Dynamique Européenne*, pp. 54 -56, referring to RTL interview with Jean Monnet 9-6-1955; Europa Archiv Vol 9, July – Dec 1954, p. 7189.

⁸⁸ For a discussion of Monnet's administration (and its failings) at the High Authority, see Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, Ch. 7 'Die Verwaltungsorganisation der Hohen Behörde der EGKS in der Monnet-Phase', pp. 317 – 336; on Monnet's relationships with the other ECSC institutions see Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, 'La première Institution supranationale: du nouveau sur l'histoire de la Haute Autorité de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier', *Journal of European Integration History*, 1 (1995), pp. 129-41, p. 133.

the Federal Republic. Ratification of the Accords by the *Bundestag* followed in February 1955, granting the Federal Republic a much greater degree of sovereignty from that May and enabling its entry into NATO. Success boosted Adenauer's prestige and domestic popularity; he was now in a position to conduct his own foreign policy, a further step on the road to equality of treatment, and to continue his quest for *Westintegration*.

This in turn meant that debates on integration would be a matter for Europeans alone, no Allied involvement was required as had been the case in the negotiations over the Schuman Plan. However, the failure of the EDC also meant the disappearance of the political community designed to give it democratic legitimacy. With the political route to integration blocked, discussion now focussed on its economic aspects. The failure of the EDC provided the impetus for renewed debate on integration and the Federal Republic's new status revised the framework within which it could happen, but the purely economic route integration now followed would have major repercussions for the unions.

The outcome of the Paris Accords raised issues for the German unions, particularly as Adenauer's success could not be denied. NATO entry meant rearmament and even raised the spectre of German nuclear weapons, issues which caused protests among rank and file members.⁸⁹ January 1955 saw the start of the *Paulskirche* movement opposing atomic weapons, supported by many individual rank and file union members. Domestic difficulties were compounded by a relative lack of progress in Europe, where the unions had not achieved

⁸⁹ See Gerard Braunthal, 'West German Trade Unions and Disarmament', *Political Science Quarterly*, 73 (1958), pp. 82 - 99.

their objective of greater social progress. Talk of new European institutions now opened the possibility that the unions' position, and hopes of achieving greater representation and a wider social agenda, could be weakened by a Federal government whose position had strengthened markedly since the difficult days of the early 1950s.⁹⁰

In France the fall of Pierre Mendès-France's government in February 1955 and his replacement by the more pro-European Edgar Faure as Premier opened up new possibilities for integration. With the political situation now more fluid, the spring of 1955 became a period during which many initiatives for European integration were proposed, considered and then modified or rejected. Here Monnet was just one player among many, the Foreign Ministers Johann Beyen of the Netherlands and Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak being just two of the most important politicians whose inputs played a major role at Messina that June.

The renewed atmosphere of cooperation making further integration possible was confirmed at the end of the year with the Saar referendum in October 1955. When a large majority (67%) of the Saar population voted to reject the proposed Saar Statute, France did not object to the region's return to the Federal Republic. For France the growing crisis in Algeria required winning support in Europe, the promised canalisation of the Moselle River provided a sweetener, and the success of the ECSC meant that the return of the Saar's *Montanindustrie* to the Federal Republic no longer posed a security threat. A major obstacle to Franco-German reconciliation which had previously bedevilled and complicated the relationship had been removed. Despite Adenauer's ambiguous approach to the Saar referendum, it was the success

⁹⁰ This issue will be considered in greater detail in Ch. 5.

that counted.⁹¹ His policy of *Westintegration* had received a further boost, contributing to victory at the polls in 1957 when the CDU/CSU coalition won an overall majority. In contrast to the disappointments of the previous year, 1955 was a year of political progress in the development of European integration.

Taking advantage of the changes in the political situation, in April 1955 Beyen revived plans for a common market. These had previously formed part of the discussions for the political community designed to underpin the EDC. In Beyen's view sectoral integration distorted economic activity as a whole and by being limited to specific areas of the economy did little to promote a feeling of Europeanism. Beyen's judgement here was valid; the feelings of Europeanism that had developed through working together were effectively limited to those involved in the Coal and Steel Community.⁹² More pertinently, sectoral integration did not meet the Dutch economy's requirement for greater free trade, which a common market would do. Beyen's proposals were taken up by Spaak who incorporated them, along with Monnet's suggestion for the sectoral integration of civil nuclear power, into the Benelux Memorandum published on 20 May. The memorandum acted as a basis for discussion at the Messina Conference which Monnet, now holding no official position, did not attend, much though he wanted to.

While the Benelux Memorandum provided one input to the discussions, a less formal one had already taken place. Adenauer and the French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay had met at the

⁹¹ See Schwarz, *Adenauer Vol II*, pp. 179 – 187; Henning Köhler, *Adenauer : eine politische Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), pp. 890 – 905.

⁹² See Haas, *Uniting of Europe*, passim.

end of April and agreed on the need for further integration. For Adenauer, anxious for the economic and political benefits further integration would bring the Federal Republic, the real question was what form this should take. By the time the conference convened at Messina, the domestic German debate between Erhard, the Economics Minister, and Hallstein, at the time *Staatssekretär* at the Foreign Ministry had essentially been settled by Adenauer in favour of the latter.⁹³ Erhard, an economic liberal and opponent of sectoral integration, believed that the Federal Republic's economic interests would be best served by a free trade area; for Hallstein a more compact and focussed common market was preferable for political reasons. For the Chancellor the politics of *Westintegration* would always trump economic considerations. It was a point he emphasised on several occasions during the debates on European integration, most notably in his directive of 19 January 1956, even as Erhard continued to agitate unsuccessfully for his own solution.⁹⁴

In the discussions leading up to Messina, Adenauer had also made it clear that he was only prepared to include Monnet's proposal for Euratom in the debate if it was linked to the German demand for a common market (the so-called *Junktin* approach), a situation which Monnet accepted. Adenauer's insistence on *Junktin* was understandable; it opened the way for a common market from which German industry was likely to benefit. Euratom was opposed by the German industrialists involved in the nuclear industry but Adenauer

⁹³ For Erhard's views see Tim Geiger, 'Ludwig Erhard und die Anfänge der Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' in Rudolf Hrbek and Volker Schwarz (eds.), *40 Jahre Römische Verträge : der deutsche Beitrag : Dokumentation der Konferenz anlässlich des 90. Geburtstages von Dr. h.c. Hans von der Groeben* (Baden-Baden, 1998), pp. 50 - 64; Werner Bühner, 'Die Montanunion - ein Fehlschlag?' in Gilbert Trausch (ed.), *Die europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom : Pläne und Initiativen, Enttäuschungen und Misserfolge : Beiträge des Kolloquiums in Luxemburg, 17-19 Mai 1989* (Baden-Baden, 1993), pp. 75-90.

⁹⁴ Quoted in Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, pp. 203 – 205, Doc. 96.

understood that foreign sensitivities meant Germany could only embrace nuclear technology on a European basis.⁹⁵ Moreover, Euratom's professed aim of preventing further nuclear proliferation appealed to both the SPD and the trade unions, effectively blunting any opposition they might provide.

With the three Benelux countries also in favour of a common market, the French attitude was crucial. While unenthusiastic about a common market for fear of German competition, Faure realised that following the defeat of the EDC the previous year, France would be isolated if he vetoed a second European initiative and the country's image as a promoter of integration severely dented.⁹⁶ A second explanation for the French willingness to compromise has also been proposed, but it is very much a minority view. In an interesting observation on Monnet's self-regard, Kohnstamm reflected Monnet's contention that the latter's attempt to rescind his resignation from the High Authority shortly before the Messina Conference was a ploy. The French, having vetoed Monnet's reappointment to the High Authority, would now be unable to veto the main conference.⁹⁷ Monnet had thus effectively sacrificed his own political future for the greater European ideal. There were tensions within the French cabinet over Europe but, given that the EDC involved far more important issues than the continuation of Monnet's Presidency did, the latter scenario seems highly unlikely and represents a case of special pleading on Monnet's part. Monnet's attempt to rescind his resignation had not been a ploy, he realised the dangers of exclusion from the debates now taking place. The episode showed

⁹⁵ Schwarz, *Adenauer Vol. II*, p. 231.

⁹⁶ For greater detail on the Messina conference, see Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: a History of European Union* (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 66 – 69 and Duchêne, *Monnet* pp. 279 – 283.

⁹⁷ See Harryvan and Harst, *Kohnstamm*, p. 109. Mayne, another Monnet disciple, also makes the same claim, Mayne, *Recovery of Europe*, p. 233.

the limits of his influence and for him personally reinforced the need for a vehicle to remain engaged in them.

Despite an uncertain start, the Messina Conference was a success; chastened by failure the previous year, the politicians involved recognised their responsibility to continue the integration process. A last-minute compromise, which as Craig Parsons identifies involved the pro-integration Pinay going beyond his instructions, resulted in agreement to establish an intergovernmental working party under Spaak to explore the possibilities of both a common market and sectoral integration for nuclear power.⁹⁸ Now that his proposal had won official approval, Monnet wanted to be sure that the working party would deliver concrete results, that the governments of The Six would act on them and that the integration process would continue. As he pointed out in an interview to *Freie Gewerkschaftswelt*, the Ministers at the conference had good aims but had made no commitments as to how these were to be achieved.⁹⁹ The Action Committee, founded in October 1955, was Monnet's chosen vehicle for ensuring this and remaining a player in the debates that followed.

2.8 Monnet's Preparation for the Action Committee

Monnet was preparing his thoughts for his new role outside the ECSC as these events unfolded. The period January to April 1955 saw the production of a series of drafts and positioning papers under his auspices, outlining his thoughts on what needed to be done. The

⁹⁸ Craig Parsons, 'The Triumph of Community Europe' in Desmond Dinan (ed.), *Origins and Evolution of the European Union* (Oxford, 2014), pp. 115 - 135, p. 128.

⁹⁹ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet interview with the September edition of *Freie Gewerkschaftswelt*, included in a summary of press cuttings from the DGB's International Department to Freitag dated 2-12-1955.

archives of the *Fondation Jean Monnet* contain over 80 documents from the period dealing with this issue, with the majority produced in January and February.¹⁰⁰ Early versions dealt primarily with the process of integration but the later versions also included names of potential members for his proposed new organisation. His 'Notes on the Next Stages of European Integration', first drafted on 25 January went through numerous revisions, with input from Pierre Uri.¹⁰¹ Draft 11, essentially the final version, was produced two days later, showing the speed at which Monnet worked, and drove his assistants. It was a much longer document (11 pages compared to the original six), enabling him to set his thoughts against a wider background with an emphasis on the European context of Franco-German reconciliation and stressing the need for British participation.¹⁰²

Worried by Europe's increasing dependence on oil, Monnet was seriously concerned with the issue of energy security. Civil nuclear power would not just establish Europe as a key player on the world stage, its development was crucial for improving European living standards.¹⁰³ He also saw it as a means of preserving peace. With its own energy source, Europe would no longer be drawn into the quarrels of an unstable Middle East; the following year at the time of the Suez crisis Monnet referred to how nuclear power '*nous délivrera d'une guerre inévitable*'.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ AFJME AMK 2/1 *Elaboration de la déclaration de Jean Monnet pour le moment de son départ de Luxembourg janvier – février 1955*; AMK 2/2 *Programme d'action et organisation d'un comité janvier - février 1955* and AMK 2/3 *Notes diverses sur l'intégration, l'énergie etc. Documents de travail pour 2/1 & 2/2 janvier -avril 1955*.

Duchêne identified 'not far short of fifty drafts' for the period December 1954 – April 1955, Duchêne, *Monnet.*, p. 263. Some of the drafts in the AFJME are partial which most likely explains the difference in numbers.

¹⁰¹ AFJME AMK 2/1/4 '*Note sur les modalités de réalisation de la prochaine étape de l'intégration européenne*' 25-1-1955. Uri's reply AMK 2/1/6 is dated 26-1-1955.

¹⁰² AFJME AMK 2/1/7 *Projet No. 11* dated 27-1-1955.

¹⁰³ AFJME AMK 2/2/14 untitled paper dated 20-2-1955.

¹⁰⁴ AFJME AMK 6/4/53 draft # 8 of 4-9-1956 of the resolution for the 3rd Session in September 1956.

Monnet saw nuclear energy as the key to the integration process.¹⁰⁵ Building on the success of the ECSC over which he had presided, Euratom would represent a further step in sectoral integration. For Monnet Euratom meant the Europeanisation of civilian nuclear power and would ensure non-proliferation of nuclear arms. He believed that similar integration in other energy sectors could be achieved by means of expanding the scope of the ECSC, thus simplifying the whole process, but the importance of nuclear power meant it required a new organisation of its own. Civil nuclear power fitted particularly well with Monnet's preference for Neofunctionalism; it embodied a sectoral approach, emphasised supranationalism and the nature of the project required technocratic guidance and input which he believed could best be provided at the European level.

In contrast, Monnet continued to regard the establishment of a common market as too complex and thus too ambitious an initial objective. He was also concerned that it was only too likely to resemble a free trade area, lacking strong institutions and thus undermining the political aspects of integration.¹⁰⁶ Rousset quotes a speech by Monnet from April 1956 suggesting that Monnet was not against a common market *per se* but did not feel the time was ripe – it was at least partly a matter of timing.¹⁰⁷ By this time British proposals for a free trade area posed a threat to the plan for a common market, giving Monnet cause to defend the concept, but it is likely that Monnet's antipathy to a common market remained, for the

¹⁰⁵ For Monnet's views on the energy question see Nicholae Paun and Radu Albu-Comanescu, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe et l'énergie' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 159 – 181. The article deals primarily with nuclear energy but also shows how, after a gap, Monnet returned to the subject, this time in relation to oil, in the early 1970s.

¹⁰⁶ Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 270.

¹⁰⁷ Rousset, *Monnet*, pp. 710 – 11.

reasons given above. Monnet did not believe that the lowering of customs barriers would provide sufficient impetus on its own to kick-start the integration process. Resources needed to be pooled to be effective; a further reason for adopting the sectoral approach.¹⁰⁸ Thirty years later Uri suggested that Monnet was not solely interested in sectoral integration and that his main concern with a common market was of 'overloading the ship'.¹⁰⁹ The amount of energy Monnet expended on sectoral activity during the period leading to the Rome Treaties suggests this was not the case and the judgement is likely to be a post-event rationalisation on Uri's part; by 1988 the Common Market had gone from strength to strength while Euratom had failed to achieve Monnet's hopes for it.

Civil nuclear power was to be only one of a series of sectoral integrations that Monnet considered in the early months of 1955, the others being energy, including a European electrical grid, transport and arms production.¹¹⁰ Transport and armaments (like atomic power) would both require new institutions modelled on those of the ECSC. Monnet also believed that this degree of sectoral integration would provide the impetus for a directly elected European Parliament, rather than the indirectly elected Assembly established under the Treaty of Paris.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ AFJME AMK 2/2/14 untitled paper dated 20-2-1955, p.4. Although Monnet uses the phrase '*marché commun*' in it, the paper is concerned with sectoral integration and the phrase occurs in comparison to the use of cooperation and bilateral agreements both of which he rejects.

¹⁰⁹ Pierre Uri, 'Réflexion sur l'approche fonctionnaliste de Jean Monnet et suggestions pour l'avenir' in Giandomenico Majone, Emile Noël and Peter van der Bossche (eds.), *Jean Monnet et l'Europe d'aujourd'hui* (Baden-Baden, 1989), pp. 75-82, p. 76 for sectoral integration; for 'overloading the ship' see Uri's comments in Delors, 'Centenary Symposium', p. 54.

¹¹⁰ AFJME AMK 2/1/4 dated 25-1-1955, p. 1.

¹¹¹ AFJME AMK 2/1/7 *Projet No. 11* dated 27-1-1955, p. 11.

These aspirations were quickly whittled down over the following months; the sectoral approach often involved political complications. Both transport and energy sectors tended to be key domestic industries, often nationalised, over which governments would have been keen to maintain control. These were quite different from the ‘sinews of war’, coal and steel, over which they had ceded a degree of authority since 1951. Monnet himself accepted that governments were in charge of national interests, although he did not define these ‘interests’ more exactly.¹¹² Moreover, the industries concerned employed large unionised workforces whose jobs could have been placed at risk by integration, thus alienating the unions whose support was a key component of Monnet’s plan. Civil nuclear power was a relatively new industry with fewer vested interests to overcome and its importance put it in a category of its own.¹¹³ Initially dependent on American supplies of uranium, and with high investment costs, at the time no continental European country was in a position to create an independent industry. Monnet rejected rival proposals for an intra-governmental approach under the auspices of the OEEC; Euratom represented an opportunity to promote supranationality in a new industry that would be key for Europe’s future.

During this period Monnet worked with his close collaborators, Pierre Uri, Jacques van Helmont, and Etienne Hirsch.¹¹⁴ He also consulted Guy Mollet, the leader of the French Socialists, and Spaak, with whom he worked closely during this period.¹¹⁵ Monnet’s closest collaborators at this time, Uri, van Helmont and Hirsch shared both his technocratic approach

¹¹² AFJME AMK 2/2/14 dated 20-2-1955, p.3.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 6.

¹¹⁴ Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 268.

¹¹⁵ Mollet is mentioned in AFJME AMK 2/2/46 Chronology of Letters 11 – 14 March; for Spaak see Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 268.

and belief in integration; all had worked on France's post-war recovery plan and then moved with Monnet to the ECSC. Uri and van Helmont were economists by training and Hirsch an engineer. Uri and van Helmont both enjoyed good links with Spaak; Uri would help draft the Spaak Report and van Helmont had acted as Spaak's *Chef de Cabinet* when Spaak had served as President of the ECSC's Common Assembly. The connections were an obvious advantage for Monnet during the spring of 1955 when Spaak was actively generating ideas for further integration. All three were bound to Monnet personally, particularly van Helmont, who resigned from the security of the ECSC in June 1955 to work with Monnet even before the Committee was formed.¹¹⁶ Their role was to help Monnet in the all-important drafting process, working with him to refine his ideas.

Monnet's emphasis on civil nuclear power also made sense in the wider context of his proposed organisation. Having resigned from the High Authority, Monnet had the opportunity to consider a variety of options, including a return to French domestic politics, which he rejected on the grounds that he wanted to operate at a European level, not restricted to one national jurisdiction.¹¹⁷ An organisation bringing together democratic politicians from The Six would require involving German politicians, including those from the SPD. Attitudes to European integration in the party were beginning to change. The SPD welcomed the outcome of the Messina Conference and particularly the emphasis on the sectoral integration of civil nuclear power; a supranational approach would offer economic benefits without the danger of national nuclear weapons or proliferation. It was a position Ollenhauer would stress in his

¹¹⁶ Van Helmont's CV produced by Euratom c. 1963. <http://aei.pitt.edu/74263/2/BIO - MULTI - Helmont.pdf> (Accessed 9-4-2020). Van Helmont joined Euratom in 1958 but was seconded to Monnet until July 1967.

¹¹⁷ See Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, p. 1.

acceptance of Monnet's invitation to join the Action Committee and raise at regular intervals thereafter.¹¹⁸

That the SPD was changing its stance on Europe was down to modernisers such as Herbert Wehner who were pushing for change. Events in early 1955 made their task easier. Up to then, especially for members who opposed rearmament, the issues of defence and European integration were regarded as deeply intertwined. Now following the Federal Republic's accession to NATO, the two issues were separated, a development that benefitted both the integration debates and Monnet's own planning.¹¹⁹

Monnet's support for civil nuclear power provided a way of attracting the SPD to his cause. Fontaine correctly stressed how Monnet needed SPD support to give his committee credibility; without it the German delegation would look seriously unbalanced compared to those of other countries, where politicians of both left and right were to be represented as well as the unions.¹²⁰ Given the party's long-standing opposition to Europe, Monnet's success in bringing the SPD onto the Action Committee was duly commended in the press at the time of the Committee's formation.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ See AFJME C1 /31/4 for Ollenhauer's acceptance dated 27-7-1955. In C1 /31/61 dated 18-10-1956 at Monnet's prompting Ollenhauer raised the subject with von Brentano, the West German Foreign Minister; in C1/31/81 dated 21-2-1957 Ollenhauer complained that the SPD was being cut out of the negotiations for the Rome Treaties with civil nuclear power listed as one of his four key concerns.

¹¹⁹ Paterson, *SPD and European Integration*, p. 107.

¹²⁰ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, pp. 32-33.

¹²¹ See AFJME AMK 3/2 & 3/5 for the French and German press respectively.

The German trade unions and SPD were just two groups of many whose support Monnet needed to win over before launching his new organisation. Monnet did not finally leave the High Authority until June 1955, a decision confirmed at the beginning of the Messina Conference. Now free to act and with the outcome of the Conference known, on 16 June 1955 Monnet gave a lengthy interview to *Le Monde*, a newspaper whose director, Hubert Beuve-Méry, was a friend and supporter.¹²² In it he was now able to outline his views on the new organisation with clarity:

*Pour persuader les gouvernements de faire le choix qu'ils ont retardé et de proposer à leur Parlement des institutions fédérales qui sont indispensables, il est nécessaire et urgent pour les partis politiques, les syndicats, et tous ce qui sont en faveur de l'unité européenne, de s'organiser afin de faire valoir leur conviction auprès du public et des gouvernements.
En ce qui me concerne, je ferai naturellement tout ce que je pourrai pour que ces résultats puissent être obtenus sans retard.*¹²³

The Action Committee had not been launched and had no name but its objectives and composition were now visible. The next chapter will consider Monnet's specific aims in founding the Action Committee, its composition and how he managed it to achieve his ends.

¹²² Eric Roussel, 'Intervention d'Eric Roussel' in *Une Dynamique Européenne*, p. 113; Bossuat, 'Jean Monnet: La mesure d'une influence', p 76.

¹²³ Quoted in Roussel, *Monnet*, pp. 691 – 692.

Ch. 3 MONNET AND THE ACTION COMMITTEE

The foundation of the Action Committee in October 1955 came at a crucial time for both Monnet and the future of European integration. Believing his personal role and the future of integration were linked, the Committee provided Monnet with a platform from which he intended to be involved in the European *relance* and ensure its success. As Monnet's chosen vehicle for promoting both, the Action Committee was his creation and he remained in control of it throughout the Committee's life. Mostly unchallenged, Monnet's management of the Committee limited the agency its members could exercise, among them the German unions.

3.1 Monnet's Vision for the Action Committee

Convinced of the need for Europe to unite so that it could overcome its bloody and divided past, develop the economies of industrial scale that would raise living standards and become a power on the world stage, Monnet founded the Action Committee with its elite membership to bring together a supranational body to promote and strengthen the process of integration. In his work Fontaine takes Monnet's motives in founding the Committee as so self-evident in the light of his various pronouncements that he does not examine them in detail. The section on the formation of the Committee concentrates on the political background and Monnet's concern to ensure that both the German trade unions and the SPD joined.¹ Following the French rejection of the EDC and the collapse of the European Political Community which was to underpin it, Monnet believed the need for continued integration had become more urgent, the alternative was a rise in nationalism, German above all.² Although he had now

¹ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, pp. 30 - 34.

² Melchionni, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 226.

relinquished an official role, he nevertheless believed that his prestige, influence and contacts would enable him to continue playing an important role in building Europe and in his interview with *Le Monde* he had outlined the putative Committee's aims, tasks and composition in general terms, all of which are considered in greater detail below.

A week before the Committee's launch on 13 October 1955, Monnet penned a '*Note d'Information*' which addressed the role of the Action Committee more specifically.³ The note is to be found in the file relating to invitations to join the Committee and was most likely designed as a form of promotional material for prospective members.⁴ The note illuminates Monnet's thinking and is thus well worth consideration as a means of appreciating his aims but also of understanding the constraints to which he was subject.

Monnet begins the note (Point I) by stating that up to that time achieving the United States of Europe had lacked a sufficiently popular and political base.⁵ However, while Monnet was prepared to use the phrase 'United States of Europe' his definition of the term was unclear, both then and later. As Kohnstamm pointed out, Monnet employed a variety of expressions when articulating his thoughts on the matter of integration, utilising the terms '*Union européenne*' and, less frequently, '*entité européenne*'.⁶ 'Entité' here suggested a more

³ AFJME AMK 2/5/11 '*Note d'Information. Pourquoi un Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe*', 6-10-1955.

⁴ Correspondence with M. Bezençon of the FJME 30-5-2022. M. Bezençon also pointed out that if it had been an internal memo for Monnet's own use it would most likely have been located in the file containing his thoughts on the creation of the Committee.

⁵ Since Monnet frequently uses the term *Etats-Unis d'Europe* (United States of Europe), I will use the abbreviation USE from now on when appropriate.

⁶ Max Kohnstamm, 'Jean Monnet face à l'Union européenne' in Giandomenico Majone, Emile Noël and Peter van der Bossche (eds.), *Jean Monnet et l'Europe d'aujourd'hui* (Baden-Baden, 1989), pp. 39-44, p. 40.

abstract concept than 'union', which implied a structured organisation. In Kohnstamm's view it made more sense to look at Monnet's objectives than the terms he used. Monnet was a practical man who emphasised action and the achievement of constructive, pragmatic solutions. Hungdah Su suggests that Monnet was obliged to systematise his arguments for integration as time passed.⁷ This may well have been the case but by the mid-1950s Monnet's diagnosis of Europe's problems and their solutions dated back over a decade to World War II.

Yet even if Monnet was unable to specifically define the form his final vision would take, he was pragmatic in the solutions he was prepared to adopt in moving towards it and, on occasion, ruthless in doing so. A contributing factor to the debate surrounding Monnet's aims was, as Jacques Barrot indicated, that Monnet's work was original and thus difficult to categorise within existing concepts.⁸ The result was no precise definition on Monnet's part and by the 1970s it was unclear whether he meant a Federation or Confederation.⁹ While his aim was to see Europe united, so that it could be regarded as an equal partner of the United States, 'Europe' was as much a journey as a destination. Monnet's emphasis on Neofunctionalism required it to be a one-way journey with no turning back. Hence Monnet's adoption of the 'rosary model' – integration should take place by counting one bead at a time – which underpinned and reflected his support for the sectoral approach.¹⁰

⁷ Hungdah Su, 'Jean Monnet's Grand Design for Europe and its Criticism', *Journal of European Integration History*, 15 (2009), pp. 29-45, p. 44.

⁸ Jacques Barrot, 'Intervention du Jacques Barrot' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), p. 294. Barrot was an EU Commissioner 2004 – 10.

⁹ Schwabe, *Monnet*, pp. 457-458.

¹⁰ Harryvan and Harst, *Kohnstamm*, p. 118.

Monnet's analysis that European integration lacked a popular support base was correct. 'Europe' did not excite the attention of most Europeans, who were now beginning to enjoy the fruits of post-war prosperity. The statement was also somewhat disingenuous for, as will be shown, Monnet did not intend his Committee to operate at anything other than an elite level, drawing in the key actors whom he considered crucial for the success of his project. Monnet was not interested in mobilising the wider public. He aimed to work through political parties, trade unions, and national parliamentary processes to achieve his aims; the failure of the EDC had reemphasised the importance of these domestic players for him and he believed that their lack of support had impeded integration.¹¹ Monnet now concluded that the impetus for change in these organisations could only come from outside the organisations themselves. His statement that *'l'impulsion doit donc venir de dehors'* was an understanding that further integration was dependent on decisions made by national parliaments who would need to be encouraged to take them; it was not a call for a mass, popular movement.¹² It was also an admission that Monnet's view of integration was operating on two planes; while espousing a Neofunctionalist approach with his emphasis on elite working and self-sustaining spillover, Monnet was also tacitly admitting that the whole integration process was in fact dependent on national governments for its initial impetus.

Point II of the note contains the key arguments for the constitution of the Committee.¹³

Monnet believed that the founding of the Committee would create a new situation – his

¹¹ AFJME AMK 2/5/11 'Note d'Information. Pourquoi un Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe', 6-10-1955, p. 2.

¹² *'L'impulsion doit donc venir du dehors'*. Monnet's speech to the ECSC Parliamentary Assembly 30 November 1954 quoted in Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 24.

¹³ AFJME AMK 2/5/11 'Note d'Information', pp. 1 – 2.

favoured way of overcoming a problem – whereby political parties and trade unions would become the engine for constructing Europe, applying pressure on domestic governments to forward the integration process. There was no mention of corresponding employer organisations, an omission which will be discussed below. Monnet noted how the parties and unions had come together despite their political differences and stressed their popular appeal. The democratic Christian, Socialist and Liberal parties represented had won a majority of votes at their last national elections. Communists and Gaullists were not invited to participate due to their opposition to integration. Likewise the Christian and Socialist unions (Communist unions being similarly excluded) represented 10 million workers.¹⁴ Members of the Committee already held significant positions in the political and economic world and had not been invited as individuals in their own right but as representatives of their respective organisations. In joining the Action Committee they were expected to endorse its aims, which Monnet had already drawn up and published at its launch.¹⁵

Monnet was particularly proud that the national trade unions had come together for the first time to work for a united Europe. While technically correct, this did in fact overlook the point that the unions had already been cooperating in the context of the ECSC with the formation of the '*21er Ausschuss*' and the '*Fédération des Syndicats Chrétiens dans la CECA*'. These two organisations had been created by the Socialist and Christian trade unions respectively with

¹⁴ In his memoirs twenty years later Monnet claimed 14 million, possibly the result of intervening growth, see Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 411.

¹⁵ Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, pp. 15 – 17, Communiqué à la presse: Constitution du Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe.

the specific aim of interfacing with the new Community.¹⁶ It was nonetheless Monnet's achievement to encourage the leaders of the two trade union traditions into one organisation, even if it was not a specifically union-based one. Monnet placed particular importance on involving national trade union federations and not their international organisations; the latter would be unable to exert influence at a national level.

Most importantly the Action Committee was to be a proactive organisation, financially independent from outside interests, which could have compromised its freedom of action. The definition of 'outside interests', however, was at Monnet's discretion alone; hence the inclusion of trade unions, which Monnet regarded favourably, and the exclusion of employer organisations, which he did not. The Committee members would work alongside governments to carry out their task of promoting the European idea. In his note Monnet used the term '*propagande*', the word and context implying a very definite emphasis on proselytising and positive action by them.¹⁷ Here Monnet's aspiration was only partially successful. The 1st Session in January 1956 agreed a declaration that was submitted to all the national parliaments of The Six by the members of the Committee concerned. It was a positive first step for the Committee but it was not repeated; when the 13th Session in June 1967 proposed a similar action it could only be promoted in four parliaments.¹⁸ These, however,

¹⁶ For a discussion of the unions' international cooperation during the early years of the ECSC, see Beever, *European Unity*, Ch. 8, Trade Union Representation in the Community; Clairmont, *Vom europäischen Verbindungsbüro*, pp. 89-93.

¹⁷ AFJME AMK 2/5/11, p. 2.

¹⁸ No French Committee members were in a position to promote the declaration and it was not presented to the Luxembourg parliament.

were isolated instances. How far the German union leaders were prepared to promote the Committee's agenda on a regular basis is considered in chapter 4.

Point III of the note was uncompromising in its vision.¹⁹ The final objective was the establishment of a United States of Europe. This was to be achieved by the successive transfer of powers to federal institutions, with the first step being the follow up to the Messina Conference, notably the peaceful use of atomic energy and the 'progressive establishment' of a European Common Market. This was to incorporate appropriate social safeguards, building on institutions such as the Consultative Committee embedded in the structure of the ECSC. Monnet's attitudes towards organised labour meant that for him Europe required a social dimension, a stance that aligned him with the unions and is discussed below.

Point IV reiterated that the member organisations of the Committee were joining on the conditions laid down by Monnet, thus underlining the importance of his role and ensuring his future control of the Committee's operations. Point V stressed that the realignment of political and trade union forces meant the time had come for further integration; the proposition was presented as a sentiment and rallying cry rather than a piece of analysis. Monnet thus encouraged the governments of The Six to continue with the *relance européenne*, and emphasised the need to support the intergovernmental working party chaired by Spaak which had been established as a result of the Messina Conference to explore options for further integration.²⁰

¹⁹ AFJME AMK 2/5/11, p.3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Monnet's *Note d'Information* clearly showed that the Committee's aims, structure and terms of membership were to be regulated by him alone and were in reality preconditions for membership. This reflected his preferred approach; participation in the Schuman plan negotiations five years previously had likewise been subject to Monnet's preconditions and provided one of the pretexts for the British refusal to participate. The members of the Action Committee were about to join an organisation which Monnet controlled and in which they would have relatively little room for manoeuvre.

While the concept of the Committee itself was new, none of the ideas proposed were particularly surprising, as Monnet's views were well known. Moreover, with its emphasis on group representation, the Action Committee could be seen as an extension of the ECSC's way of working, reconciling the experience of the Consultative Committee and the Common Assembly, albeit outside the formal organisation and with somewhat different players.²¹ The narrowing of sectoral integration to civil nuclear power may have represented a reduction of Monnet's ambitions for integration. However, the aims of the Committee, its membership and management were all at his discretion and Monnet intended to utilise them to ensure he remained a leading figure in the integration process.

3.2 The Action Committee as a Vehicle for Monnet's Ambitions

As the Committee's founder, Monnet believed he was well placed to remain at the centre of the integration debates. Rosenberg had recognised Monnet's reliance on the Committee for personal validation relatively early, writing in 1960 that '*dans une large mesure le Comité*

²¹ Varsori, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 7.

d'Action était une bonne excuse pour Jean Monnet sur les gens, une telle action aurait été beaucoup plus difficile, ou peut-être en partie impossible, sans le Comité'.²² Nevertheless the Committee was not just a vehicle for Monnet's ambition; the failure of the EDC had shown that success in integration was not guaranteed and delay in implementation could be fatal to progress. Personal considerations, and the wish to prolong his career, merged with Monnet's fears that integration could stall. The Committee allowed Monnet to mask his own ambition behind an organisation with whose aims few mainstream politicians in The Six would disagree.

This was possible for Monnet still possessed many attributes that would enable him to continue in public life. He was a well-respected public figure, identified with the success of the ECSC and regarded as the public face of Europe. Gérard Bossuat refers to Monnet being regarded as a 'proto-European figure' in the United States.²³ Given Western Europe's reliance on the United States for defence, this was an important link. Monnet's US experience and connections meant he had friends and admirers, often well placed politically, in both Democratic and Republican administrations who could provide goodwill, help and expertise when needed. It can only have helped Monnet's profile that other European politicians were less well known and less visible in America than he was. Monnet's name would open doors in a way available to few others and he maintained an extensive range of contacts, meaning his influence reached far and wide. However, while most members of the Committee held recognised public office, Monnet's lack of an official role was an exception. Haas stressed the

²² Kohnstamm to Schaetzel 26-9-1960, quoted in Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, p.3.

²³ Bossuat, 'Jean Monnet: La mesure d'une influence', p 78.

importance of non-governmental actors in the integration process but as this thesis will show, Monnet's influence – if not his prestige – declined without a base of domestic political support.

As the Committee's founder and driving force, Monnet chose its first members on the basis of their public positions, only seeking members from organisations which supported his aims. Many of the initial members of the Committee were contemporaries of Monnet, had worked with him and knew him well. They too had shared the experience of having seen Europe torn apart by war and faced the issue of how to rebuild a better continent. As such many shared his vision. However, as they died or retired, newer members who succeeded from within the member organisations were not necessarily so committed or able to relate to him personally. They would also have much less opportunity to meet Monnet as sessions became more infrequent from the early 1960s, and the Committee, which had been relatively stable up to then, saw more changes in membership. In these circumstances relationships changed and newer members may have regarded their mythic Chairman, '*l'Inspirateur*', with awe. Even a politician of Helmut Schmidt's standing - Schmidt joined the Committee in 1967 and was 30 years Monnet's junior - saw Monnet as a '*père politique*' and he may well not have been alone.²⁴ (Schmidt himself pointed out that his own father was born the same year as Monnet).²⁵ As the age gap between Monnet and the other members of the Committee widened over time, Monnet's prominence on it would become ever more pronounced.²⁶

²⁴ Quoted in Guido Thieme, 'Helmut Schmidt, the Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe et l'intégration monétaire européenne' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 117-130, p. 121.

²⁵ Helmut Schmidt, 'Jean Monnet und das neue Gesicht Europas nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg' in Andreas Wilkens (ed.), *Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn, 1999), pp. 13 - 22, p. 13.

²⁶ Libera, 'Jean Monnet et les personnalités allemandes', pp. 39-40, Tableau 2.

Moreover, while some members of the Committee were of long standing, many others only served for a few years and would have had little interaction with Monnet personally, again only serving to enhance Monnet's status on the Committee. In all 41 Germans sat on the Committee at one time or another. However, from the mid-1960s, 11 of these served for 5 years or less.²⁷ Since many would have attended only one or two sessions, it is unlikely that they would have had much opportunity to influence the Committee, especially as by this time most were many years Monnet's junior.²⁸ (The Germans were not unique in this regard – the same would have been equally true of members from the other states). Monnet aimed for unanimity on the Committee, and mostly achieved it, but the structure and circumstances of the Committee did not necessarily encourage an alternative approach.

This leads to the question of how far members were able – or willing – to influence the Committee. Once the Committee's aim of ensuring ratification of the Rome Treaties had been achieved, Monnet, as Chairman, could manage the agenda to reflect his own interests, as will be discussed below. An increasingly docile membership, the result of the growing generational gap between Monnet and the members, the short length of service enjoyed by many of them and the changing nature of the Committee from the early 1960s, showed little inclination or desire to confront Monnet. As will be shown, in the case of the German unions there was normally little attempt to do this. It was easier for members to acquiesce, unless

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37, Tableau 1. I have started the count in the mid-1960s as it was from this point that the Committee became less effective. The numbers thus exclude unionists like Freitag and Imig who were crucial to Monnet's original plans but died in 1958 and 1956 respectively after only a short period of membership.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40, Tableau 2.

their essential interests were affected, a situation which both reflected and accelerated the Committee's decline into irrelevance.

That the whole structure of the Committee and the way it operated was designed to bolster Monnet's position was made clear from the very beginning. The initial invitation to participants went out in Monnet's name, clearly spelled out the aims of the Committee and was precise in detailing Monnet's expectations of the members in bringing their respective organisations on board.²⁹ Members were expected to support his ideals, which involved, as Fontaine phrased it in possible imitation of the opening sentence of de Gaulle's memoirs, '*une certaine idée de l'Europe*', even if the '*certaine idée*' – an attitude rather than anything more prescriptive – went undefined.³⁰

Monnet was also keen to include only '*chefs de partis*' (i.e. persons of influence) on the Committee and not '*européens professionnels*'. This somewhat disparaging reference encompassed the leaders of the more popularly based European movements. Monnet regarded these as talking shops and did not believe they were representative in the ways that trade unions and political parties were.³¹ It also included the European federalists, whom he regarded as ineffectual although they included some major political personalities.³² Fontaine thus rightly rejects Meynaud and Sidjansky's view that Monnet only intended people without

²⁹ See for example the standard letter AFJME C1/13/2, C1/17/1 and C1/37/1 to Freitag, Imig and Sträter respectively, all are dated 8-7-1955. Ollenhauer also received the standard letter C1/31/2.

³⁰ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 55.

³¹ AFJME AMK 2/4/17 dated 27-8-1955. Monnet's views on the federal movement being unrepresentative are quoted in Harryvan and Harst, *Kohnstamm*, p. 115.

³² Schwabe, *Monnet*, p. 139.

government posts to be members.³³ This would have made little sense for it would have excluded some of Monnet's most prominent supporters and made it much harder to achieve his aim of exerting pressure on national governments. It would also have meant fluctuating representation, as governments changed, which would have destroyed the continuity of the Committee and weakened its standing. Membership thus included members of both government and opposition, France from the early 1960s being the major exception.

Finally, having established the Committee, Monnet had no intention of relinquishing control of it and in 1959 turned down a suggestion by Baron René Boël, President of the European League for Economic Cooperation, that the League, the Committee and the European Movement should all merge.³⁴ Monnet's response was that he was unwilling to merge different types of organisations but it is noteworthy that such a move would have diluted the Committee and brought it into a closer relationship with big business (Boël was an industrialist married into the Belgian Solvay family), potentially jeopardising Monnet's union links.

3.3 The Composition of the Committee

Yondorf shows that members of the Committee were already members of an emerging European elite. Yet while he identifies multiple overlapping points of contact, it is noteworthy that members moved primarily within their own circles.³⁵ Thus, of 15 trade unionists whose roles were analysed by Yondorf, nine were on the Economic and Social Committee and two

³³ Referenced in Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 52; Meynaud and Sidjanski, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 8.

³⁴ Mioche, 'Le Comité d'Action', pp. 144 - 145.

³⁵ See Yondorf, 'Monnet and the Action Committee', pp. 887 – 895, esp. Table 1 Multiple Roles of Members of the Monnet Committee, May 1960.

were on the ECSC's Consultative Committee (one of the two was on both). Seven were on the European executive of the ICFTU and two on the European executive of the IFCTU. Only four were members of national parliaments, of whom three were also members of the (appointed) European Parliament. This representation contrasted sharply with that of the nine Christian Democrats on the Committee, of whom seven were members of national parliaments. Four had been members of the European Parliament or ECSC's Assembly. The only non-parliamentary role held among all nine was a single membership of the Council of Europe. Monnet's achievement was to bring together members from organisations that might otherwise have had little interaction at the European level. At its inception the Action Committee was a unique organisation that offered its members an opportunity to transcend their domestic differences in the quest for a common goal.

The original list of Committee members was balanced by country, although there were three German union representatives (Freitag, Heinrich Imig of IGB and Heinrich Sträter, a member of IGM's Executive) out of a total of 13, reflecting both the importance of the German union movement to Monnet and recognition for the individuals who had offered early support for his initiative.³⁶ The need to include representatives of both Free and Christian union organisations accounted for the relatively high number of trade unionists on the Committee, 13 out of a total of 33 members. Yondorf implies that this was a deliberate policy aimed at uniting the moderate political left but it was in fact a reflection of divisions within the union movement itself.³⁷ Apart from the Federal Republic and Luxemburg, most countries had two

³⁶ For the list of original members see Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, pp. 15 – 16; re the German trade unionists' initiative see Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 407.

³⁷ Yondorf, 'Monnet and the Action Committee', p. 896, FN 24.

union representatives (Free and Christian, a result of historical traditions), except for The Netherlands with three (Free, Catholic and Protestant). This compared with the political representation of just 6 Socialists, 7 Christian Democrats (The Netherlands again having both Catholic and Protestant representation) and 7 'Liberals & Others' on the Committee.

Over time the balance of the Committee changed and Libera shows how numerically the German representation came to be overweight, comprising 25% of the membership by 1974.³⁸ This reflected the Germans' commitment to the organisation, with all three political parties as well as the unions supporting membership. However relations with the Liberal *Freie Demokratische Partei* (FDP), whose representative Martin Blank, their Parliamentary Secretary, opposed the exclusion of the industrialists, only improved once Walter Scheel joined the Committee in 1968, after becoming FDP leader that year.³⁹ There is no evidence that Monnet objected to this overrepresentation or that he tried to reduce it. It resonated with his appreciation of the importance of the Federal Republic in European affairs and his belief that European integration was to be built on the cornerstone of Franco-German reconciliation.⁴⁰ German representation added weight to the Committee; a factor that became particularly important once the French representatives had been side-lined and without influence after de Gaulle had consolidated his position in the early 1960s. Up to 1962 all the Committee's sessions had been held in Paris. It was a sign of Monnet's displeasure with

³⁸ Libera, 'Jean Monnet et les personnalités allemandes', p. 36.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁴⁰ Monnet made many references to this; see for example AFJME AMK 2/1/7, p. 9, dated 27-1-1955 where Monnet set down his thoughts in expectation of an early release from the Presidency of the HA.

the French political scene that future sessions largely alternated between the Federal Republic and Brussels.⁴¹

The importance of the German membership did not just lie in its strength of representation but also in its continuity; some of the German members remained on the Committee for long periods of time. Among the union representatives, Rosenberg and Otto Brenner (IGM) served for 20 and 17 years respectively, Rosenberg's unique position will be discussed later.⁴² However, while only the DGB, IGM and IGB sent representatives to the Committee sessions, both ÖTV, the public sector union, and *IG Chemie* (IGC), representing workers in the chemical industry, paid subscriptions to the Committee via the DGB without sending any representatives to sessions, a peculiarity discussed in the following chapter.

In one area of national representation Monnet failed significantly. Monnet had always wanted to include Great Britain in the integration process and was keen to offer membership of his Committee to the key British players.⁴³ Encouraged by the Association Agreement that Britain had just signed with the ECSC in December 1954, Monnet thought he detected the first signs of change in official British attitudes towards European integration.⁴⁴ In fact, optimism caused him to misread the situation; as Miriam Camps recognised, Monnet had relatively few UK contacts and had, as Mayne understood, 'a slightly optimistic view of how far and how quickly

⁴¹ The March 1969 session was held in London to welcome the new British members.

⁴² Walter Arendt (IGB) also served for 15 years but as will be shown actually only attended one session during that time. Among the German politicians on the Committee, Willy Brandt (SPD) and Franz Etzel (CDU) both served 15 years and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) and Herbert Wehner (SPD) effectively matched Rosenberg with 19 and 20 years respectively.

⁴³ AFJME AMK 2/2/1 dated 4-1-1955.

⁴⁴ See AFJME AMK 2/3/2 dated 18-3-1955 for Monnet's stress on the Association Agreement and AMK 2/3/5 dated 24-3-1955, p. 7, for his expectation of changing attitudes.

the British would move'.⁴⁵ What Monnet saw as the start of a new relationship was for the British government nothing more than a technical agreement. Nevertheless, hoping to capitalise on a softening of British attitudes towards the European project, Monnet was prepared to offer membership to British representatives. This would be as individuals, without the requirement for them to commit their organisations.⁴⁶ The concession represented a considerable departure from the Committee's formal stance; countries other than The Six could be represented on the Committee only if actively participating in building the United States of Europe.⁴⁷ Monnet was in contact with the Labour politicians and trade unionists Alf Robens and Charles Geddes, who in 1955 was President of the TUC, concerning an 'English Section' of the Committee as late as June that year.⁴⁸

However, it is debateable whether the concept of an English Section was ever realistic. In April, van Helmont, who was working on preparations for the Committee on Monnet's behalf, reported a conversation with Henri Yrissou, Pinay's *Chef de Cabinet* at the French Foreign Office.⁴⁹ Yrissou thought bringing UK members onto the Committee might cause issues with members from The Six; a stance which could also have reflected fears that French influence would be diluted by British participation. The reaction of other potential members is not recorded in the FJME archives but Monnet let the idea drop; the inclusion of 'unofficial' British

⁴⁵ Miriam Camps, 'Jean Monnet and the United Kingdom' in Giandomenico Majone, Emile Noël and Peter van der Bossche (eds.), *Jean Monnet et l'Europe d'aujourd'hui* (Baden-Baden, 1989), pp. 129-34, p. 134; Richard Mayne, 'Jean Monnet and the United Kingdom' in Giandomenico Majone, Emile Noël and Peter van der Bossche (eds.), *Jean Monnet et l'Europe d'aujourd'hui* (Baden-Baden, 1989), pp. 121-27, p. 126.

⁴⁶ AFJME AMK 2/2/6 dated 8-2-1955 mentions the possibility of a British section made up of '*membres à titre individuel*'.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ AFJME AMK 2/4/12 dated 26-6-1955. Note that Monnet frequently used the terms 'England' and 'English' when referring to the United Kingdom as a whole.

⁴⁹ AFJME AMK 2/4/1 dated 16-4-1955.

members would have lessened the Committee's ability to act effectively. In fact the three major British political parties only became members in 1968 with the UK's second EEC membership application and the TUC never followed. Even then Mayne was by no means convinced that the British members ever really understood the organisation that they had joined.⁵⁰

3.4 The Unions' privileged Position

In his *Memoirs* Monnet wrote that 'I have always been drawn towards union, towards collective action'.⁵¹ It was a view endorsed by his closest collaborators, the focus of discussion at many events celebrating or studying his life and even seen as a way to proceed with European integration after his death.⁵² The collegiate atmosphere that Monnet aimed to achieve with the Action Committee can be viewed as an extension of the tripartite arrangements on which the ECSC was founded. Nevertheless, by consciously excluding employer representatives from the Action Committee, Monnet chose to break with this understanding of tripartism and in doing so prioritised his relations with the unions.

Mioche suggests that Monnet deliberately excluded the employers from the Committee in order to win support from Mollet of the French Socialists and specifically from the SPD leader Ollenhauer, asserting that Monnet promised Ollenhauer that he would take this step in order

⁵⁰ Mayne, 'Jean Monnet and the United Kingdom', p. 123.

⁵¹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 221.

⁵² See for instance the hagiographical publication produced by the European Community on the 100th anniversary of Monnet's birth, Fontaine, *Grand Design*, on pp. 27 – 28 there is a section entitled 'Working together for the common good'.

to ensure the SPD's affiliation.⁵³ Mioche provides no reference for this assertion and even if Monnet did make such a promise, the decision to exclude employer representatives actually reflected a much more fundamental stance on his part.

By the mid-1950s Monnet had developed a much more favourable attitude towards trade unions than to the employers' side of industry and regarded an 'enlightened worker policy' as essential for modernisation.⁵⁴ His attitudes in part stemmed from his earlier experiences in managing the French reconstruction plan during the late 1940s and then during the negotiations for the ECSC. Both episodes had resulted in serious disputes with the employers' associations, particularly those involved in heavy industry.⁵⁵ In his memoirs, Monnet downplayed the issue, rather coyly referring to 'attitudes hostile to change' in relation to the reconstruction plan but there had been disagreement and Monnet remained suspicious of employer-driven cartels.⁵⁶ The employer organisations returned this animosity; in early 1955 Pierre Ricard, President of the French Steel Syndicate, accused him of neglecting his duties at the High Authority and implicitly of using his position there to play politics.⁵⁷

Monnet had endeavoured to build good relationships with the union leaders during his time as President of the High Authority. Incorporating them into the Action Committee confirmed that Monnet recognised their role in society but also meant there would be a pro-labour bias

⁵³ Mioche, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 143.

⁵⁴ Gillingham, 'Die französische Ruhrpolitik', p. 15.

⁵⁵ See Roussel's intervention referring to the *Comité des Forges* in Mioche, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 157.

⁵⁶ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 245 for 'attitudes hostile to change'. For Monnet's view on cartels see Schwabe, *Monnet*, pp. 192 – 193.

⁵⁷ 'Ricard gegen Monnet' 'Französische Kritik an der Montanunion', *Handelsblatt* 25-2-1955.

on the Committee. Monnet was happy to use the unions tactically, seeing them as a way of influencing Governments and thus putting pressure on employers. As he explained to Sir Robert Shone, the head of Britain's National Economic Development Organisation, in 1962, 'the key to success is to get Labour on your side'; union leaders could then be used to facilitate relationships between government and industry.⁵⁸

Monnet's cultivation of the unions was not purely tactical; Monnet had a high regard for the role of unions both in society in general and in building Europe in particular. The numerical strength of the unions enabled them to deliver a powerful message at national level. Moreover, as he later told Pascal Fontaine,

*les partis politiques et les syndicats ont une vue générale désintéressée. Les organisations patronales sont nécessairement intéressées par le profit. C'est leur devoir. Pour faire l'Europe, les partis politiques et les syndicats présentaient cet élément de désintéressement nécessaire. Les partis politiques, obligatoirement, ont une vue d'ensemble. Quant aux syndicats, ils s'intéressent à la vie.*⁵⁹

Employers represented an interest group concerned with profit, a fact which Monnet understood. In contrast Monnet saw the unions' views as impartial [*désintéressée*], which meant they, like political parties, could be relied upon to take a wider, and implicitly more constructive, view based on life. As Monnet added in his Memoirs, the unions were interested in practical matters and alive to change – two attributes required to build Europe.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 155.

⁵⁹ Conversation Fontaine – Monnet 12-2-1973, quoted in Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 32.

⁶⁰ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 407.

Speaking at the 1963 Dortmund Rally organised by Rosenberg and the DGB for the ICFTU unions of The Six, Monnet expanded on this theme, reiterating his support for their involvement in the European project and stressing that they had a particular responsibility as part of the democratic process. *'Bei diesen Aufgaben [the need for a political authority to complement the economic one and the corresponding need for workers to be involved in this development] haben die Gewerkschaften als ein so bedeutender Teil der aktiven demokratischen Kräfte der Gemeinschaft eine besondere Verantwortung'*.⁶¹ Monnet was telling his audience what he thought they wanted to hear but the statement was in line with his previous utterances and his support for the unions during the negotiations for the Rome Treaties.⁶² It was for this reason that Monnet was determined to engage solely with the Free- and Christian-based unions in the Community. He saw no point in engaging with the Communist based ones that were opposed to integration.⁶³

Monnet's exclusion of employer organisations did not go unnoticed. Early in December 1955 Freitag received a briefing from the Foreign Department of the DGB on the press reaction to the launch of the Action Committee. In it mention is made of Spaak's press conference on 21 October 1955, quoting a Dutch journalist (Stempels), who asked why the employers were excluded from the Committee.⁶⁴ Spaak replied that Stempels should ask Monnet but speculated that it was possibly due to the large number of employer organisations with

⁶¹ DGB (ed.), *Vereinigte Staaten von Europa, Partner der freien Welt : Großkundgebung der freien Gewerkschaften der EWG-Länder in Dortmund am 6. Juli 1963*, (Düsseldorf, 1963), p. 7.

⁶² See Ch. 5 The Unions, Monnet and the Rome Treaties.

⁶³ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 48.

⁶⁴ AdsD 5/DGAI003917. The report is dated 2-12-1955, see pp. 3 – 4. Eberhard Kadow of IGB also picked up on the point, see HGRG IGBE 3062 Aktennotiz of April 1956.

different views and that Monnet did not want to split them by including some and excluding others. It was a clever response to a difficult question but in the light of Monnet's views most likely untrue. Monnet himself went on record that month as saying that he felt employers were uninterested in new ideas, particularly when they contradicted existing interests – a likely gibe at cartels.⁶⁵

A decade later, Rosenberg reiterated Monnet's approach. Writing to George Woodcock, Chairman of the British TUC, when that organisation was considering joining the Action Committee, he suggested in his first letter to Woodcock that the Committee was 'more efficient as only political parties and trade unionists are working together'.⁶⁶ Six weeks later Rosenberg added that 'for your information it may be of interest to know that the Committee purposely did not include representatives of industry or employers in that capacity because we believe the political task of the Committee should not be mixed with business interests'.⁶⁷ Both statements carried a grain of truth and doubtless there was a concern that employers could use the Committee to pursue their business interests. Nevertheless, Monnet was quite willing to see the trade unionists carry on their own 'business' within the framework of the Committee. Indeed on occasion he supported them in their endeavours, as with his initial intervention on their behalf in the debates over representation in the new Community institutions. Monnet was not impartial in his appreciation of the two sides of industry and the composition of the Committee reflected his views.

⁶⁵ Monnet interview in *Kölnische Rundschau* 14-10-1955, quoted in Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 339.

⁶⁶ TUC 292B/940/4 Rosenberg to Woodcock 29-8-1968. The letter was in English.

⁶⁷ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Rosenberg to Woodcock 11-10-1968. The letter was in English.

In fact this exclusion made little if any material difference to the Committee's deliberations or output. Despite their exclusion from it, the employers enjoyed indirect representation on the Committee in the form of those Conservative and Liberal politicians who were members, were well disposed to industry and had industrial connections and could have lobbied on the employers' behalf if required. In the Committee's first major task, ensuring that the Messina declaration became reality, the unions failed to achieve the recognition they wanted in the Rome Treaties despite Monnet's support. The Europe of the 1960s was unreceptive to union concerns and as much of the Committee's output now involved increasingly irrelevant or uncontentious resolutions, there was normally little to concern the employers and their exclusion mattered less. The unions' privileged position on the Committee remained but it was now equally of little importance.

3.5 Monnet's Management of the Committee

Monnet controlled the Committee's management and operation.⁶⁸ Once the Committee started to function it was Monnet who managed the agenda, ensuring that the Committee's concerns would follow his lead. In order to help shape the debate as he wanted, Monnet did not allow subject experts to input directly to it, a decision that he only reversed for the 15th Session in July 1969. The German union leaders had no involvement in establishing the agenda; as will be shown in the following chapter, there is no evidence that they ever attempted to do so.

⁶⁸ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, pp. 42 – 44.

Monnet worked with his closest advisors before consulting the members, strengthening his team in Paris by recruiting Kohnstamm to supplement van Helmont in June 1956. It was a unilateral decision on Monnet's part with the members only being informed after the event.⁶⁹ Kohnstamm was particularly valuable to Monnet as he spoke German. Appointed Head of the German Department of the Dutch Foreign Ministry in 1950, his views on the need for reconciliation with Germany reflected Monnet's. He thus enjoyed Monnet's full confidence ('you can speak to him as you would to me') as the PS in a subsequent letter from Monnet to Ollenhauer affirmed.⁷⁰ Kohnstamm rapidly assumed a key role on the Committee, acting as the main link with the German unions, and operating as a valuable sounding board in the crucial drafting exercise that preceded each session.⁷¹

The German trade unionists did not normally challenge Monnet's management style. As will be shown, Monnet corresponded regularly with the Committee members, particularly in the early years of the Committee, sharing his views and ideas with them in letters and discussion papers.⁷² He normally received very little feedback in response; a reflection both of the union leaders' other priorities and the fact that in general they had little reason or inclination to contest his views.

Monnet's emphasis on consensus meant that he tended to consult as widely as possible before sessions with numerous revisions to agree the Committee's output. This consisted of

⁶⁹ AFJME C1/13/41 Monnet to Freitag 7-6-1956. A similar letter went to the other members.

⁷⁰ AdsD 2/PVAH0000024 Monnet to Ollenhauer 19-6-1956. (Author's translation).

⁷¹ Jan van der Harst, 'Max Kohnstamm - le fidèle ambassadeur de Monnet' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 21-33, pp. 25-26.

⁷² Monnet's correspondence with the Committee members is discussed in Ch. 4.9.

the Committee's declaration, which outlined the latest political developments and the Committee's view of the integration process, and the resolutions, identifying the particular measures required to address the issues.⁷³ The aim was that the bulk of the preparation should be done before the session; the actual Committee sessions were generally only used for finalising discussion and agreement, although small modifications were possible.⁷⁴ During the drafting process Monnet never recognised the suggestions' origin; they were just incorporated into the revised draft, meaning that members would find it difficult to identify the source of a revision unless they themselves had made it in the first place or been advised of it by another member.⁷⁵ This process does not seem to have concerned the German union leaders.⁷⁶ Monnet offered the opportunity for input when needed; otherwise they were happy to benefit from his groundwork, particularly when much of the Committee's agenda was non-controversial. In a spirit of permissive consensus, from the early 1960s they were prepared to let Monnet run the Committee as he saw fit, so long as his initiatives did not threaten their or their members' interests.

Monnet's management of the Committee during the drafting period also extended to his dealings with the press. Both Guichaoua and Elsa Glombard show how Monnet managed the

⁷³ *Interview de Richard Mayne dans le cadre de l'émission The America Way présentée par Raymond MacCalvy, sur le thème de l'idéal et les aspirations du Comité d'action.* FJME MJM 51, <https://archives.jean-monnet.ch/archives/MJM-051> (Accessed 24-2-2023).

⁷⁴ For a detailed account of Monnet's conduct of the sessions and the construction of the resolutions, see Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, pp. 42 – 46.

⁷⁵ See for instance HGRG IGBE 12700 Monnet to Gutermuth 11-12-1962 where Monnet mentions that he has incorporated changes to the text but doesn't detail them and remarks that they were only presentational.

⁷⁶ This is discussed further in Ch. 4.

press during the drafting period, using it to help him set the terms of the debate.⁷⁷ Glombard points out that Monnet, who was normally more than happy to air his views via the press, tended to minimise press contact during the drafting process.⁷⁸ His meetings with members during this (semi) closed period were just noted rather than reported fully. Views and feedback from individual members (or groups of members) were transmitted by Monnet and his team to enable a consensus. The process was designed to help Monnet steer the Committee's deliberations. Monnet himself would only expand on the Committee's views in public once the final resolutions had been agreed and published.

Monnet did not circulate minutes of the discussion that took place during the Committee's sessions. These could have provided an insight both into his chairmanship and the views of the participating members. However, Monnet believed that unanimity was all important; if the Committee was to be successful in promoting further integration, its members needed to take a consistent message back to their domestic audiences. The Committee's published resolution and declaration represented the common position of all members; the one major exception being discussion of the MLF at the 11th session held in June 1964.⁷⁹ Minutes providing an official statement of members' positions would have undermined the coherence of the Committee by identifying individual viewpoints and allowing commentators to follow the progress of the debates.⁸⁰ When Jeremy Thorpe, the leader of the British Liberal Party,

⁷⁷ Guichaoua, 'Le Comité d'Action', pp. 293-294; Elsa Glombard, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe et son influence sur la presse (1955 - 1957)' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), pp. 95 – 112, pp. 98-99.

⁷⁸ Glombard, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 98.

⁷⁹ There were also a couple of minor abstentions at the seventh and eighth sessions in 1959 and 1960, Meynaud and Sidjanski, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats Unis d'Europe', p. 10.

⁸⁰ Monnet outlined his reasons for not taking minutes prior to the first session in January 1956, quoted in Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 43.

cited the Committee's proceedings to embarrass Michael Stewart, the Labour Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons in 1969, he broke one of the unwritten rules of the Committee.⁸¹

Wehner's reports discussed in the Introduction show that there was debate at the sessions; given the diversity of views and the standing of the participants it would have been unrealistic to expect otherwise. Despite this, the organisation and management of the Committee remained Monnet's. Through his control of the consultation process leading to the sessions, as well as his emphasis on unanimity, he was, with very few exceptions, able to maintain control of the Committee's output and to shape the resolutions that it agreed and published. After the ratification of the Rome Treaties and as the Committee lost impetus during the 1960s these resolutions became of decreasing interest to the unions and failed to address their core concerns.

3.6 The Committee's Resolutions

The Action Committee was designed to act as a catalyst, promoting Monnet's views, and from the outset stressed the importance of opening up new areas of integration. Appendix I provides a summary of the Action Committee's resolutions, grouped by theme. It clearly demonstrates the evolving nature of the Committee's (or rather Monnet's) interests and their development over time. The full analysis on which the summary is based can be seen in

⁸¹ Quoted in Valerie Aubourg, 'Le Comité d'Action pour les Etat-Unis d'Europe et le premier élargissement des Communautés européennes' in *Une Dynamique Européenne* (Lausanne, 2009), p. 203.

Appendix II. In general the resolutions have been taken from Winand's summary in the index to her article.⁸²

The activities of the Committee can be divided into four periods. In the first two years of the Committee's existence, the Committee was preoccupied with the need to see the negotiations for Euratom and the Common Market completed and then ratified. Thus, the emphasis was on the promotion of integration, but also on Monnet's key interest, the energy sector and specifically Euratom. These were all areas that the unions were keenly interested in, related to policies that they supported and, in the case of the negotiations, involved their own interests.

The second phase, from 1958 – 1960 / 61, covered the period which saw the initial construction of the Common Market before de Gaulle finally stabilised his domestic political position in 1962. This period continued to see discussion on building Europe with the question of UK membership, another of Monnet's key concerns and a matter of interest to the unions, coming to the fore. Monnet's hopes for continued spillover were represented in his quest for monetary union. However, as will be shown, failure to achieve their aims in the negotiations for the Rome Treaties meant the German union leaders were now beginning to lose interest in the Committee. As the Committee's agenda widened away from their core concerns, it became increasingly peripheral to their interests.

⁸² Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*. Where resolutions were combined with the declaration, I have identified the key issues for the Committee, as I have also done with the four communications that were made outside the formal sessions which are also included in the analysis.

The third period from 1961 / 62 – 1967 is perhaps the most interesting. During this period, which saw de Gaulle's ascendancy in France, the Community was in crisis. De Gaulle's veto of British membership in January 1963, followed by the 'Empty Chair Crisis', when France boycotted Community institutions, meant the Community was in a state of stasis. This was only resolved with the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise which markedly lessened the Community's supranational nature.⁸³ During this period the Committee's emphasis changed significantly. Of 27 issues discussed from 1962 – 67, ten referred to global matters, principally Monnet's wish to build a partnership on equal terms between Europe and the USA and to see Europe playing a role in reducing East-West tension.⁸⁴ These were long-standing concerns of Monnet's, who saw European integration as only the beginning of an ever widening change in international relationships, culminating in 'the organised world of tomorrow'.⁸⁵ However, this move into geopolitics represented a major change of emphasis from the earlier years of the Committee, perhaps encouraged by Monnet's optimistic belief that the Cold War was coming to an end.⁸⁶

In his biography of Monnet, Schwabe suggests that many of the Action Committee's resolutions during this period can be seen as a response to de Gaulle's actions.⁸⁷ Monnet

⁸³ For the Empty Chair crisis, Luxembourg Compromise and emergence of a 'veto culture', see Anthony Teasdale, 'The Life and Death of the Luxembourg Compromise', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31 (1993), pp. 567-579.

⁸⁴ The remaining resolutions included 11 on European development, three on UK membership, two on monetary policy and one on the Third World. The period included the 12th Committee session, held in Berlin on the 20th anniversary of the end of World War II, which resulted in a record eight resolutions, many of which were essentially aspirations with little detailed commentary.

⁸⁵ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 524. Monnet's views on Europe's role in changing international relations are discussed in Kohnstamm, 'Jean Monnet face à l'Union européenne', pp. 43 – 44.

⁸⁶ For Monnet's comments on the Cold War see AdSD 5/DGCG000016 Monnet's speech of 8-12-1966 when he received the Robert Schuman Prize.

⁸⁷ Schwabe, *Monnet*, Ch. 8.1-3, passim.

disapproved both of de Gaulle's veto of UK entry into the Community in January 1963 and also of his distancing from the United States during much of this period. Monnet responded to these developments by stressing the need for UK entry (particularly when negotiations for it were taking place) and ensuring that mention of the US-European partnership appeared in the Committee's resolutions several times during the 1960s. The resolutions certainly reflected Monnet's increasing alienation from a man he had previously supported and whose accession to power he had endorsed in 1958.⁸⁸ Monnet's writings nevertheless demonstrate they represented his long-standing strategic concerns and objectives, which pre-dated de Gaulle's accession to power and which he would have sought to promote in any event.⁸⁹

Much of the Committee's agenda during this period was thus of little concern to its union members for whom 'Europe' represented only a small part of their overall agenda. Interest in the Committee dropped markedly during this period of stagnation, a period when, with little possibility of progress in European integration, Monnet pushed his own geopolitical agenda. Much of this was based on wishful thinking; after President John Kennedy's assassination in 1963 there was no further talk by the Americans of a Europe – US partnership and the USSR was very unlikely to negotiate a settlement that Monnet hoped would lead to German unification within the European Community.⁹⁰ For the German union leaders the only

⁸⁸ See Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 316. Rosenberg considered Monnet's support for de Gaulle's new constitution sufficiently important to circulate a copy of Monnet's interview in *Le Monde* (10-9-1958) to the other members of the DGB executive on 22-9-1958, see AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Rosenberg to DGB Vorstand.

⁸⁹ See for instance AFJME AMK 2/1/7 *Notes sur les Modalités de réalisation de la prochaine étape de l'intégration européenne* (draft #11) dated 27-1-1955 and AMK 2/1/13 *J'ai quitté Luxembourg...* dated 14-2-1955.

⁹⁰ 11th Session, 1 June 1964, Point IV *'Evolution par des accords successifs d'une coexistence pacifique entre l'Occident et l'URSS, réglant les problèmes européens et notamment la réunion dans la Communauté Européenne des Allemands aujourd'hui séparés'*.

exceptions to this lack of interest were the debates over MLF and the possibility of a European Company Statute.⁹¹

Overall, the lack of focus during this period reduced the Committee to virtual irrelevance; it was at its strongest and most effective when dealing with specific issues relating to the development of European integration. Monnet himself recognised this and admitted that much of the 1960s had been unproductive for the Committee and that it had lost credibility. Writing to Heinz-Oskar Vetter, newly elected as DGB Chairman following Rosenberg's retirement, at the time of the 1969 Hague Summit, he summarised the need for action rather than releasing general statements, *'Wir sind an einem Punkt angelangt, an dem die allgemeinen Erklärungen durch die realisierbare Aktion [sic] ersetzt werden müssen'*.⁹²

This lack of action became apparent during the fourth, and final, stage of the Committee's existence from 1968 / 69 to its dissolution in 1975. Seizing the opportunity offered by the Hague Summit, Monnet summoned the Committee three times in 1969, a striking contrast to the irregular sessions of the previous few years. The focus of the Committee's resolutions was very definitely on Europe's development as well as British membership which again now seemed possible. Monnet may well have seen the opportunity to involve the Committee in a form of *'relance'*, equivalent to that of the mid-1950s, with the Committee members involved in ensuring the passage of legislation in their respective parliaments; after the December

⁹¹ These are both discussed in Ch. 6.

⁹² AdsD 5/DGAJ000150 Monnet to Vetter 30-10-1969.

session he produced several status reports to track the progress of the Hague resolutions.⁹³ The format of the sessions also changed; for the first time the July 1969 session saw consideration of three expert reports as Monnet now allowed other inputs to the agenda. Even the wording of the declarations and resolutions became shorter and more concise.

The Committee's revival was not to last and it again lost impetus once it became apparent that many of the Summit resolutions would not be implemented, lost in the currency turmoil of the early 1970s following the floating of the US dollar and then the economic recession resulting from the oil price rises of 1973. Once the summit was over, the final two sessions of the Committee in 1971 and 1973 reverted to the themes of the 1960s.

While Monnet intended the Committee to promote the integration process in general, its first years had been focussed on a specific objective – the ratification of the Rome Treaties. After this success there was no one focus to animate the Committee. As the possibilities for integration appeared to recede many of its resolutions concentrated on global issues that neither Monnet nor the members had much possibility of influencing. Monnet's stress on geopolitics had little relevance for members who could employ their time and energy on more immediate concerns. As Duchêne points out, Monnet had always stressed the importance of concentrating on limited goals to succeed but after de Gaulle's return, when Monnet had lost all influence in Paris, 'each [resolution] sprayed four or five targets like buckshot'.⁹⁴ Monnet's

⁹³ AdsD 5/DGAJ000150 contains correspondence between Monnet and Vetter concerning the implementation of the resolutions; Monnet sent out status reports on 27-3-1970 and 22-6-1970.

⁹⁴ Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 337; Meynaud and Sidjanski made much the same point, see Meynaud and Sidjanski, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 23.

enthusiasm could run away with him and from the mid-1960s, with many of the original members, often his closest collaborators, dead or in retirement, it was increasingly problematic for those remaining to contradict '*Inspirateur*', especially when there was no benefit to be gained from doing so. It was Monnet's Committee and easier for members to acquiesce to his wishes unless they had pressing reasons to do otherwise.

3.7 The Dissolution of the Committee

Monnet dissolved the Action Committee on 9 May 1975.⁹⁵ It was a date redolent with symbolism; the 25th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration and the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II. The choice of date married the end of the old Europe of warring nations and the beginning of the new one which Monnet hoped to bring into being. Monnet, now 86 years old, gave his health as the main reason for his action.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, other reasons played a role. Monnet's financial resources had been severely depleted by the Committee's activities and his wife was pressing him to write his memoirs to generate some income. Monnet had had to support the Committee financially; in the period 1967 – 1971 expenses ran at more than 2.5 times income (FF1.8m v FF0.7m), the balance being made up by Monnet personally from his own funds or other supporting organisations.⁹⁷ Monnet had always prided himself on the Committee's financial, and thus political, independence but towards the end of its life even he had had to make compromises, accepting money from the Ford Foundation

⁹⁵ The letter was dated 15th April 1975.

⁹⁶ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 517.

⁹⁷ For a discussion on Monnet's finances, see Duchêne, *Monnet*, pp. 339 – 40. For the Committee's finances see AdsD 5/DGAJ000151 van Helmont to Rosenberg 18-12-1972. Rosenberg had earlier made the point that Monnet was subsidising the Committee out of his own pocket, see AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Rosenberg to Cool 14-11-1967 and Rosenberg to Storti 20-3-1968.

for some specific activities and, perhaps much more controversially, from German industry in the late 1960s.⁹⁸

By the time of its dissolution it was clear that the Committee had become 'frozen', marooned in the political and economic landscape of the mid-1950s. Coal and steel had been the mainstays of the European economy for almost a century when Monnet founded his committee and Monnet's experience in the ECSC confirmed their inclusion as a natural choice. As a result the German coal and steel unions were represented on the Committee, even as coal was about to lose its importance in the European energy market, to be replaced increasingly by oil and (Monnet hoped) atomic power. Nevertheless Monnet made no attempt to restructure the Committee over its lifetime, to reflect either the new sources of energy or the sectors of the European economy that were being increasingly impacted by the development of the EEC. Monnet's original choices, reflecting economic circumstances at the time of its formation, and his failure to adjust to changing conditions meant that institutionally German union representation remained frozen right to the end of the Committee's life.

Political membership of the Committee was also frozen as the experience of the French politicians represented on it showed.⁹⁹ The initial French political membership was drawn from the 'centre bloc' parties of the IV Republic; the SFIO (Socialists), Christian Democratic

⁹⁸ See Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 339 for the Ford Foundation. For German industry see Werner Bühner, 'Dirigismus und Europäische Integration. Jean Monnet aus der Sicht der deutschen Industrie' in Andreas Wilkens (ed.), *Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn, 1999), pp. 205-224, pp. 223 – 224. The Thyssen-Krupp archives A/32920 Sekretariat Sohl – Spenden records a subsidy to the Action Committee in 1969.

⁹⁹ The Italian Nenni socialists joined the Committee in 1967 and the non-Gaullist French Independent Republicans in 1968 but these developments essentially represented 'mopping-up' operations rather than a fundamental change of direction.

MRP and various Radical groupings.¹⁰⁰ As de Gaulle consolidated his authority after 1958 these parties were excluded from power. Reduced to virtual insignificance, they either folded or were subject to a series of splits and mergers. By 1971 only three French politicians remained on the Committee – Guy Mollet (SFIO), Maurice Faure (Radical) and Antoine Pinay (Independent).¹⁰¹ With the exception of the Socialists, the parties they represented had played no role in French political life for over a decade. The French politicians on the Committee now bore no relation to those in power in Paris and remained on it only on the basis of their earlier membership status and friendship with Monnet. The result was that, unlike in Germany, the main political players in France had no role on Monnet's Committee and the French Committee members no influence in government. By 1971 the three remaining French politicians on the Committee represented little but themselves and a last memory of a bygone and now almost forgotten era.

There is no mention of this stasis in Monnet's Memoirs or the accounts of the Action Committee, so the reasons Monnet allowed this fossilisation of the Committee to develop must be subject to conjecture. On a personal level, as illustrated by continuation on the Committee of the French politicians mentioned above, the membership of the Committee represented a choice of people and institutions that he himself had determined in the first place. Familiarity played a part and Monnet tended to maintain relationships, as his wide range of disparate contacts showed. As he grew older he may well have found it difficult to

¹⁰⁰ A total of 15 French politicians sat on the Committee at various points, including one who died during the period. The representation was as follows – Socialist 4, MRP 3, Radical and Independent groupings 8.

¹⁰¹ AFJME Membres du Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe de 1955 à 1975. Fichier CR5 P: 11 CRE2 CRE P 328 – 329. Two French trade unionists also remained on the Committee; André Bergeron of CGT-FO and Eugène Deschamps of the CFDT.

disappoint old friends and colleagues, even – perhaps especially – if they had outlived their usefulness. In the same way changing the institutions represented on the Committee would have been even more problematical, doubtless involving extended and difficult negotiations between the parties involved. It could also have opened up a whole set of new questions about representation among existing members, alienating those who felt they would lose out in the process. It was easier just to maintain the status quo.

In addition, as with his rejection of Boël's offer to merge the pro-European movements, Monnet may have feared that upsetting the balance on the Committee, and introducing new interest groups, would weaken his control of the Committee and its agenda. In fact there was little pressure from outsiders to seek representation on the Committee after its first flush of activity. Membership of the Committee grew but the interests represented did not widen as members such as Rosenberg remained in a personal capacity once they had retired, replaced by their successors from the same organisations.¹⁰² The frozen membership became another example of how the Committee grew increasingly moribund from the early 1960s on. When Monnet founded the Committee, it represented a new and unique forum through which members could engage with each other and, Monnet hoped, the institutions of the nascent Community. By the early 1970s, the growth of Community institutions and regular high-level meetings such as those of the Council of Ministers meant that this was no longer the case. At the same time other interest groups were also developing stronger links across the

¹⁰² AdsD 5/DGAI002364 Müller-Engstfeld note dated 19-9-1973. Müller-Engstfeld referenced a 1971 membership list showing 59 Committee members of whom 12 were German but admitted this was out of date. Libera identifies 19 German members in 1971 but many of these would have been too busy to have attended sessions (e.g. Brandt, Schmidt, Scheel) while others were effectively retired, e.g. Kiesinger. Libera, 'Jean Monnet et les personnalités allemandes', pp. 37-38, Tableau 1.

Community with the DGB instrumental in helping to found the European Trade Union Confederation in 1973. Monnet's Committee had lost its unique role and been reduced to being just one forum among many.¹⁰³

These changes were reflected in the one major success Monnet could reference as he dissolved the Committee - the creation of the European Council in 1974, which formalised the role of heads of state or government within the Community. Yet, paradoxically, while providing a welcome, if initially informal, forum for discussion and then decision making, its development marked yet another step away from the concept of supranationality that Monnet had so valued at the beginning of the integration process. Having promoted the concept of the Council, Monnet saw it as a potential force for future integration, its realisation perhaps providing a final valid excuse to dissolve his creation.

Monnet's involvement with the Committee ended in 1975 and he died in March 1979. After the Committee was formally dissolved, Helmut Schmidt and Leo Tindemans tried to keep it alive on an unofficial basis.¹⁰⁴ However, the Committee had revolved around Monnet and there was no structure to survive him; an ironic commentary on a man who had always stressed the importance of institutions to maintain collective memory.¹⁰⁵ The attempt failed and is not mentioned in Schmidt's two autobiographies.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, Schmidt and Tindemans revived the Committee formally in 1984 with Kohnstamm as its Secretary General.

¹⁰³ See Thiemeyer, 'Helmut Schmidt', p. 129.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 126-128.

¹⁰⁵ Aubourg, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 215; for Monnet and institutions see Fontaine, *Grand Design*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁶ Helmut Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin, 1999); Helmut Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte 2, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn* (Berlin, 1990).

The German unions hurried to support it but the Committee's second existence was very different to that of Monnet's original Action Committee and they were to be bitterly disappointed. The Second Action Committee is discussed briefly at the end of this thesis but offers an opportunity for further more detailed research.

Ch. 4 GERMAN TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP OF THE ACTION COMMITTEE 1955 - 1960

The passive and low-profile way in which the unions joined the Committee prefigured their subsequent involvement in it. In the absence of employer representation the unions had an opportunity to use the Committee to advance their own interests. In fact, neither the DGB nor the individual unions developed a positive agenda to make use of their membership and their attitude towards the Committee became purely reactive. The unions' first years on the Committee were concerned with the negotiations for the Rome Treaties and their place in the new European institutions created by them, a topic covered in the following chapter. Failure to achieve their demands in Europe was complemented by the unions' difficulty in defining a domestic role in the light of Adenauer's continuing success and tensions within the union movement itself.

4.1 The Domestic Background

As in the early part of the decade, the later 1950s continued to be a difficult period for the German unions. Domestic stability, growing prosperity which enabled improvements in welfare including pension reform and progress in normalising relations with Western Europe meant Adenauer continued to enjoy electoral success, with the CDU/CSU coalition winning an overall majority in the 1957 *Bundestag* elections. The result represented the high point of Adenauer's post-war career.

Following defeat in the 1953 elections, the SPD faced a further four years of opposition. This prompted the SPD to take the first tentative steps away from Schumacher's negative legacy. The party's 1954 Berlin Conference agreed to formulate a new *Grundsatzprogramm*, more

suiting to the circumstances of the Federal Republic, to replace the now outdated 1925 Heidelberg Programme. It was the beginning of the process that was to lead to the adoption of the Godesberg Programme in 1959, moving the party away from a nominally Marxist approach towards acceptance of a social market economy. The new programme was welcomed by the 'accommodationist' unions but criticised by Brenner and the more 'activist' members. At the same time the party was also beginning to change its attitude to Europe, initially by voting in favour of ratification of the Rome Treaties in 1957. The SPD's acceptance of *Westintegration* was finally confirmed by Wehner's June 1960 Bundestag speech endorsing a bipartisan foreign policy for the Federal Republic with regard to Western Europe. Markedly different in 1950, over the course of the decade the views of the DBG and SPD aligned on European integration.

Within the union movement, there was continued discussion of the unions' role and tensions between 'activists' and 'accommodationists' persisted. Rearmament and the question of atomic weapons continued to cause tension both within the rank and file membership and between them and the leadership. The Supreme Court's decision to outlaw political strikes meant the DGB could not back a general strike over the question but splits within the union organisation meant it took almost a year for the DGB to formulate a response to the April 1957 *Göttingen Manifesto*, in which leading nuclear scientists argued against arming the Federal Republic with tactical nuclear weapons.

Yet while issues of domestic politics bedevilled the union movement, progress on bread and butter issues was far more encouraging. Real wages increased by around 70% over the

decade.¹ Due to economic growth and the lack of unemployment, actual wages were often higher than the negotiated wage tariff, leading to union attempts to incorporate actual rates into the tariffs.² Unions were also able to look beyond wage rates in their negotiations; one of the main demands of the bitterly contested Schleswig-Holstein metalworkers strike in 1956 – 57 was parity of sick pay between blue and white collar workers. Initial progress was also made on the move away from the standard 48 hour working week, a key union demand, with the 1956 *Bremer Abkommen*, in which IGM negotiated the move to a 45 hour week with no loss of wages, providing a precedent that other unions could follow in subsequent years.³ The unions enjoyed greater success in achieving benefits for their members than in widening the scope of their domestic engagement with Adenauer's coalition.

By the late 1950s there was recognition within the DGB and the 'accommodationist' unions that the movement needed to adapt to the economic and political developments seen in the Federal Republic since 1949. It was a feeling crystallised by the SPD's adoption of a new programme, which showed the SPD had come to terms with these challenges. At the DGB's 1959 Stuttgart Conference the 'accommodationists', led by Georg Leber, Chairman of the construction workers' union, succeeded in promoting a resolution calling for the drafting of a new basic programme.⁴ Supported by Rosenberg, who was elected DGB Vice-Chairman at the conference, the move demonstrated the unions' acceptance of the need for change if the movement was to remain relevant into the 1960s.

¹ Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, p. 482, Tabelle 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 216.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁴ Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, pp. 92-93.

4.2 Joining the Action Committee

The way that the unions joined the Action Committee in October 1955 set much of the tone for their subsequent membership. There was no doubt that they would join; Freitag, Sträter and Imig had already promised to support Monnet in his new venture. Following a meeting on 1 July 1955 with the three, Monnet dispatched their official invitations a week later.⁵ All three accepted, although Sträter advised that the IGM executive would need to agree the financial implications.⁶

However, once the decision to join had been taken, both the DGB and the two member unions involved proceeded in a very circumspect manner. The executives of all three organisations were keen to preserve the issue of membership as a matter for the union leadership alone. In the case of IGM, the confused situation around Monnet's resignation from the High Authority (and his abortive attempts to rescind it) was discussed at a meeting of IGM's council in mid-July.⁷ Despite the fact that Sträter had already spoken to Monnet, had probably received Monnet's formal invitation to join the Action Committee and was about to accept it, the council's minutes make no mention of the Committee. Sträter presumably felt that it was better to keep the union's proposed membership confidential and on a need to know basis, even among its leading members, until the Committee had been formally announced.

⁵ See Monnet Reduit Diary for the meeting. See AFJME C1/13/2, C1/17/1 and C1/37/1 for the letters to Freitag, Imig and Sträter respectively.

⁶ AFJME C1/13/4 Freitag to Monnet dated 27-7-1955, C1/17/2 Imig to Monnet dated 21-7-1955 and C1/37/2 Sträter to Monnet dated 21-7-1955.

⁷ Walter Dörrich, (ed.), *Quellen der Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert. Band 10 IG Metall 1950 - 1956*, Doc. 76, *Sitzung des Beirates 12 – 13 Juli 1955. Bericht über das Gespräch mit dem Bundesminister für Wirtschaft am 22 Juni 1955.*

Mention of the Action Committee in the IGB archives only begins with the first session in January 1956. In the absence of other evidence it is likely that Imig followed both Sträter and Freitag's example and did not raise the subject with his executive until it was necessary to do so.

In the case of the DGB, Freitag avoided mention of the decision to join until just before Christmas, when he sent out a note to the DGB Executive telling them that the Committee's first session was in January.⁸ He then raised the subject in the *Geschäftsführender Bundesvorstand* (GBV) early in the new year. The proposal to send Freitag and Rosenberg was agreed, with the proviso that the participating unions might want to send their own representatives.⁹ It subsequently became clear that this was not a simple matter and involved considerable discussion between Rosenberg and Monnet during the first part of the year.¹⁰ The issue of membership was then discussed at the DGB's January *Vorstand* (Executive) meeting, where it was agreed to send a delegation of six to the Action Committee's first session. There was no formal decision by the Executive to join; participation might not be universally accepted within the union movement and sending a delegation officially implied an indication to consider membership rather than a commitment to it, should any *Vorstand* members have private doubts.¹¹

⁸ AdsD 5/DGDO00014 Freitag to DGB Vorstand 23-12-1955.

⁹ AdsD 5/DGAI00372 GBV Protokoll 3-1-1956, item 7.

¹⁰ The question of union representation discussed below Ch. 4.7.

¹¹ There was some suspicion of Monnet in parts of the SPD. During the SPD *Vorstand's* discussion on joining Fritz Heine, the member responsible for press and propaganda, commented that '*auch is Monnet sehr an römische Kreise verbunden*', AdsD, SPD-Parteivorstand, Protokoll zur Sitzung vom 13 – 14 Januar 1956, p.4.

Despite this lack of a formal decision, membership of the Action Committee became a reality since representatives continued to attend its sessions and the DGB agreed to help fund it. From Monnet's point of view this informality (even if he knew of it) was irrelevant, representatives of the DGB, IGM and IGB had all agreed to join the Committee on behalf of their organisations and were attending. The peaceful use of atomic energy was a key concern for the unions during the discussions leading to the Spaak report, as shown in *Welt der Arbeit's* December 1955 supplement, *An der Schwelle des Atom-Zeitalters*, which referred to 'das starke Interesse der internationalen Gewerkschaftsbewegung an diese Frage [the peaceful use of atomic energy]'.¹² By heading the agenda item for discussion by the DGB *Vorstand* 'Konferenz des Aktionskomitees zur Bildung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa über Atomfragen, Freitag had prepared the ground carefully, linking Committee membership with the question of civil nuclear power, thus ensuring that participation in Monnet's Committee would receive a favourable response while its wider implications could be downplayed if required.¹³

The joining process so far had been muted, with consultation of the DGB and union executives kept to a minimum by those most involved. Exactly the same process was followed when informing the rank and file union membership; members were unlikely to have been particularly interested in the development but the union leadership was anxious to ensure an inconspicuous approach and minimize any disquiet on their part. The first mention of the

¹² *Welt der Arbeit, Jhr. VI, Nr. 49, 9-12-1955, Beilage 'An der Schwelle des Atom-Zeitalters', inset box p. 1.*

¹³ Josef Kaiser, Josef (ed.), *Quellen der Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert. Band 11 Der deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1949 - 1956* (Köln, 1996), Doc. 104, *Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes 3-1-1956, Agenda item 7.*

Committee in the DGB's weekly newspaper, *Welt der Arbeit*, came with an article by Rosenberg at the end of January. Entitled '*Handeln für Europa!*' it primarily concerned atomic energy and Monnet's success in bringing trade unionists and politicians together to put pressure on governments.¹⁴ Located within a much larger article about the need for a European initiative on nuclear power, it was designed to ensure that the membership received the same message as the Executive: nuclear power was the prime motivator for involvement. No wider issues were referenced, even though Spaak's working group was determining the implications of the Messina Conference at the time. The Committee was not mentioned by name and the fact that it operated '*mit dem Ziel der Schaffung der Vereinigten Staaten Europas*' was relegated to the end of the article. Nor did Rosenberg see fit to add that he was actually a member of Monnet's Committee. Initial involvement with the Committee was to be limited to Freitag and a small group who shared his views.

These union leaders may well have seen membership of the Committee as a natural continuation of their involvement with Monnet in the ECSC, personal connections providing a link between the two. Rank and file members had little need to be involved. The leadership's position was fully compatible with the concept of permissive consensus; they were merely following a policy members had already approved through a new, and in their view, appropriate organisation.¹⁵

¹⁴ *Welt der Arbeit, Jhr. VII, Nr. 4*, dated 27-1-1956. The DGB's overall press treatment of the Committee is discussed in Ch. 6.8.

¹⁵ The question of permissive consensus is discussed in the following section.

The unobtrusive way in which the union leadership joined the Committee means that it has been difficult to examine their motives for the step; there are no archival records and the decision to participate is subsequently taken as a fact. Writing in his *Memoirs*, Monnet was in no doubt about why the German unions had decided to support him, they trusted him and wanted to continue 'building Europe' with him.¹⁶ Monnet was writing almost twenty years after the events described and both assertions need a degree of qualification. The unions had indeed come to have a degree of trust in Monnet; they had enjoyed a supportive environment in the ECSC, even if the results had fallen short of their aspirations. Fontaine wrote that as a result of seeing Monnet at work, the unions had been converted to his aims and methods.¹⁷ Fontaine's admiration for Monnet meant he normally viewed the latter's actions favourably but the unions themselves drew a comparison between Monnet's willingness to engage with the Consultative Committee and his successor, René Mayer, who IGM felt was too inclined to promote French national interests.¹⁸ Suzuki also comments on Freitag's personal connection with Monnet, a relationship that will be discussed later, which developed as a result of the former's work with Monnet in the context of the ECSC.¹⁹

Nevertheless Monnet's assertion that the German unions wanted to continue 'building Europe' was partly a vocalisation of his own ideas. The German unions certainly wanted to see a greater emphasis on social matters in the new institutions being discussed by Spaak's

¹⁶ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 407.

¹⁷ Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, p. 33.

¹⁸ Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung?', p. 117.

¹⁹ Hitoshi Suzuki, Hitoshi, 'The High Authority of the ECSC, the European Network of Trade Unions and the DGB: Ideas, Strategies and Achievements' in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.), *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und Europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009), pp. 63 - 88, p. 86.

working party and wanted to ensure that the position they currently enjoyed would not be undermined. Bühlbäcker believed the German unions joined the Committee in the hope that they could influence the post-Messina discussions, quoting Sträter who was alert to the danger of what he saw as the unions' already minimal influence being further weakened.²⁰ Sträter's comment dated from 1959 but the following chapter will show the unions were well aware of the dangers once Spaak's working party had convened. Bühlbäcker's view complemented his earlier work, in which he noted the Action Committee's emphasis on social as well as economic questions.²¹

To a certain extent the institutional reasons for joining the Committee and the personal feelings of those involved coincided. Jojevic also quotes Sträter in saying how the ECSC opened up new channels for the unions, with the implication that Monnet's Committee was a new channel which they could also utilise.²² Input into the post-Messina negotiations was an important consideration for the unions and they had reason to believe the connections forged within the ECSC would facilitate the representation of their interests.

From his knowledge of German politics Monnet was aware of the unions' domestic position and alive to the differences on Europe between the SPD and the unions. He believed that he would need the German unions to win over the SPD to membership of the Committee. Referencing the differences between the two organisations, Köpper saw the German unions'

²⁰ Bernd Bühlbäcker, 'Debatten um die Montanunion: Gewerkschaften und Europäische Integration in der 1950er Jahren' in Jürgen Mittag, Klaus Mertsching, Holger Heith and B. Hijma (eds.), *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und Europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2009), pp. 43-62, p. 62.

²¹ Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 337.

²² Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung?', p. 121.

decision to join the Committee as evidence of their new self-confidence in foreign affairs.²³ In fact the DGB had been willing to differentiate itself from the SPD from the beginnings of the Federal Republic as their reaction to the Petersberg Agreement had shown; for the unions joining the Committee was a continuation of existing behaviours. Both Duchêne and Fontaine reflect these disagreements and pay more attention to the fact that DGB membership would encourage the SPD to join than to the DGB's own decision to do so.²⁴ The absence of specific evidence means DGB membership of the Committee is accordingly often taken for granted, overshadowed by Monnet's undoubted success in obtaining SPD support for his venture.

In his dissertation Suzuki writes that the German unions were 'convinced that Monnet's new initiative was valid' but does not elaborate on the point.²⁵ He then jumps straight to the August 1956 DGB Executive meeting at which the Committee was discussed, correctly stating that the unions' readiness to pay nearly a quarter of the Committee's budget was a 'more than symbolic gesture' for support for Monnet.²⁶ Unfortunately Suzuki does not discuss the unions' membership before this date or take the narrative any further. However, he does refer to the unions' support for Euratom which was expressed at the meeting. This was a key factor in encouraging their membership of the Committee; both the unions and the SPD supported the case for civil nuclear power with Ollenhauer stressing it was the priority issue for the party.²⁷ Writing at the same time Bühlbäcker noted the SPD's interest in the subject but somewhat

²³ Köpper, *Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik*, p. 172.

²⁴ Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 285; Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action*, pp. 32-33.

²⁵ Suzuki, 'Digging for European Unity', p. 262.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

²⁷ AdsD 2/PVAH000012 Ollenhauer to Monnet 27-7-1955.

surprisingly the DGB's same interest is assumed yet not stated in his writing.²⁸ That it was nevertheless an issue for the union leadership is confirmed by Frank Ahland in his biography of Rosenberg; after an initial period of hesitation, one of the immediate factors which led Rosenberg to support the Committee was its stance on nuclear power, where he was particularly concerned to avoid an outcome involving private industry.²⁹

Writing in the late 1970s, Lutz Niethammer was sceptical of the value unions had gained from their involvement in Europe.³⁰ By invoking the term 'defensive integration', Niethammer suggested that the unions were not genuinely committed to the European project. In his view, unions engaged with Europe either because they believed in the cause having swallowed Europe's right wing agenda, or – if they did not accept that agenda – because Europe provided an arena where they were not constrained by conservative domestic politics.³¹ Niethammer was correct in identifying Europe as an arena where the unions were less constrained politically. However, in 1955 the German unions involved could identify the benefits they had gained from Europe and were anxious to secure more by widening the ECSC's social agenda, as discussed in the ERO's *Wiederbelebung des Europa-Gedankens* conference considered in the following chapter. The decision to join the Committee was defensive only in so far as the unions wanted to keep the benefits they had already won; to a far greater extent it was pragmatic, as Clairmont suggests in relation to their overall European involvement.³²

²⁸ Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 338.

²⁹ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, pp. 164 – 166.

³⁰ Lutz Niethammer, 'Defensive Integration - der Weg zum EGB und die Perspektive einer westeuropäischen Einheitsgewerkschaft' in Ulrich Borsdorf (ed.), *Gewerkschaftliche Politik: Reform aus Solidarität. Zum 60. Geburtstag von Heinz O. Vetter* (Köln, 1977), pp. 567-596, p. 573.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 576.

³² Clairmont, *Vom europäischen Verbindungsbüro*, p. 42.

Participation in Europe reflected and reinforced their domestic move away from a search for structural change to a greater emphasis on winning day-to-day benefits for their members. Monnet had already shown himself sympathetic to the unions' viewpoint, it made sense for the unions to hope that using him and the Committee would facilitate their participation in the negotiations and thus open the way for further progress in these areas. In this respect there was little difference in approach between the 'activists' and the 'accommodationists' within the union movement, there is no record of dissension by either IGB or IBM in the DGB archives.

Union participation in the Committee was driven by a combination of issues. As Melchionni identified, Monnet wanted the unions to be represented. However, his reasons for doing so went beyond just wanting to improve workers' living standards and blunting the impact of economic liberalism on them.³³ For Monnet the question of SPD representation was crucial and the DGB provided a bridge to that organisation.³⁴ As far as the unions were concerned, the wish to promote civil nuclear power provided the backdrop for Committee membership and enabled it to be promoted uncontentiously within the union movement, as illustrated both by Freitag's use of the topic to frame the original agenda discussion and its presentation to the wider union membership in *Welt der Arbeit*. Personal considerations eased the process, membership meant building on existing relationships forged by working together. Finally the requirement to safeguard the unions' existing position within the European institutions

³³ Melchionni, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 235.

³⁴ Monnet, *Memoirs*, pp. 407 – 408.

provided an immediate reason for joining. Now members of the Committee, it only remained to see what use the unions could make of whatever opportunities it provided.

4.3 The Unions' Low-Profile Approach to Committee Membership

The circumspect way in which the union leaders had joined the Committee was reflected in their approach to it once members. As discussed in Chapter 1, for Key, who developed the concept, permissive consensus meant operating within policy guidelines that had been generally agreed and when it existed, governments were free to work out solutions within that context. Moving away from the governmental level, this attitude could be found among the German trade union leaders in relation to their membership of the Action Committee, informing not only their attitudes to Monnet but also their relationship with their own rank and file.

The union leaders were happy to support Monnet so long as his emphasis was on integration and the promotion of union rights. That, after all, provided one of the reasons they had joined the Committee in the first place. As Appendix II shows, virtually every session of the Committee included discussion of issues that would be of direct concern to the unions, including social affairs, the management of cartels and UK entry. The one glaring exception was the 1964 session at which MLF was discussed. For the union leaders Monnet was operating within the guidelines that they considered acceptable. These guidelines did not need to be formally defined but were underscored by the unions' professed internationalism and referenced in general terms in a short passage on International Social Policy in the DGB's

1963 Programme.³⁵ The Committee's agenda and resolutions demonstrated there could be little doubt that Monnet and the Committee were in sympathy with the basic tenets of DGB and union policy. On that basis membership of the Committee was acceptable to the union leaders and they were normally prepared to let Monnet manage the Committee as he wished. Intervention on the unions' part was only necessary when they believed Monnet went outside the guidelines they considered acceptable, as with the MLF debate, or their members' interests needed to be secured, as in the debates over the European Company Statute.

A parallel situation existed for rank and file members, but it involved an additional consideration for the leadership. The rank and file expected the union leadership to promote their interests. If this meant membership of the Action Committee, that was a decision for the leadership to determine; Monnet's Committee operated at a social and political level far removed from that of even the most dedicated union activist. The decision to participate could therefore be justified to rank and file members, but it was the union leadership who assumed the decision on their behalf. The union leaders maintained an anomalous relationship between Monnet and their own members, on one hand allowing Monnet freedom of action and on the other expecting their membership to allow them the same facility.

For that reason, while not totally absent, communication about the Committee to rank and file members in official union press publications was kept at a low level as demonstrated in Chapter 6. This may not have been a conscious decision, and there is no archival evidence to

³⁵ <https://library.fes.de/prodok/fc98-01742.pdf> , p.22. (Accessed 21-8-2022).

suggest that was the case. However, given the generally low profile accorded the Committee by the union executives, it would be realistic for other union officials to assume that rank and file members would not be interested in it and that mention of it should be minimised. The Committee had little direct impact on individual members' lives and offered few opportunities for involvement even for union activists. Union officials acted accordingly but it is doubtful if many rank and file members would have been deeply interested in any event.

As a result there was an implicit understanding that mention of the Committee was only a matter for the union leadership, not for the rank and file membership or even lower levels of union management. Thus in July 1969 when Brenner wondered if IGM should circulate the texts from the recent Committee session, Karl-Heinz Friedrichs, who had himself attended the Committee as a substitute, was against the idea; *'würde Ich es nicht für erforderlich halten, daß wir diese Unterlage unseren Bezirksleitungen und Verwaltungsstellen zur Verfügung stellen'*.³⁶ It was not that Friedrichs was against using the Committee's output; in fact, he specifically suggested to Brenner that the texts could be used as a basis for resolutions by the European Regional Office of the ICFTU or International Metalworkers, both being organisations that operated at a European level where those attending would be aware of Monnet and the Committee. Nonetheless, Friedrichs did obviously consider that such information should be used carefully, or preferably not at all, in a domestic context. Reference to membership of the Committee and its activity was to be minimised as far as communication with the rank and file membership was concerned.

³⁶ AdsD 5/IGMA09497 Brenner to Friedrichs 28-7-1969; Friedrichs to Brenner 4-8-1969.

While members' presumed lack of interest in the Committee provided the background for this approach, the question of the unions' financial contributions offered a more material reason. Although Rosenberg was theoretically in charge of finance, the Committee's finances were opaque. During the debate on union contributions that occurred in the early 1970s Vetter underlined a key section in a letter to him from Heinz Vossheirich saying that IG C-P-K would be more inclined to support the Committee financially if the DGB had a greater say in how the money was spent.³⁷ Vetter was not in a position to reply; the finances of the Committee remained directly under Monnet's control to the end of its life.

Despite the fact that the German unions were paying a substantial part of the Committee's costs, it is difficult to get a consistent view of its relevant cost to them. At the beginning of the Committee's life the total cost for the German unions was FF4.5m p.a. or DM 53,800 at the then exchange rate.³⁸ Given that a skilled worker's wage in the mid-1950s was DM 4200 p.a. this represented the equivalent of 12 – 13 workers in total, an expenditure that could have caused comment.³⁹

By 1968 the total financial support from the German unions had fallen to DM 37,300 p.a., a figure that reflected the Committee's much lower levels of activity.⁴⁰ However in addition they had to pay a special contribution, after Monnet appealed for help in defraying the

³⁷ AdsD 5/DGAI000151 Vossheirich to Vetter 5-4-1971. Vossheirich was the IGC executive member responsible for finance.

³⁸ AdsD 5/ÖTVB140007. Meeting 30-4-1956, agenda item 2. Their contribution of FF 900k represented 20% of the German unions' overall total. Exchange rates are taken from <https://www.historicalstatistics.org/Currencyconverter.html> (Accessed 8-12-2022)

³⁹ My thanks to Dr Grünbacher for information on wages.

⁴⁰ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Rosenberg to colleagues 30-4-1968. The amount in new Francs was FF46050.

expenses he had run up on behalf of the Committee over the previous year or so.⁴¹ Subsidising the Committee was not an excessive burden but the contributions were material and by the mid-late 1960s came at a time when financial pressures forced retrenchment in other areas of union activity.

Discretion thus required downplaying the unions' participation in the Committee and ensuring that mention of it demonstrated its alignment with union objectives. It was an approach visible from the very beginning of the unions' involvement.

4.4 Walter Freitag and the Action Committee.

Born in 1889, Walter Freitag was Monnet's contemporary. Active in the Metalworkers Union during the Weimar era, Freitag helped found IGM in the British zone after the war and from 1950 – 52 acted as the union's deputy chairman.⁴² He was a strong supporter of unitary unions and also of *Mitbestimmung*. In October 1952 he became chairman of the DGB in place of Christian Fette, a member of the small print workers' union, *IG Druck u. Papier*. In contrast Freitag was backed by IGM, the largest and most influential union in the DGB, and its influence had been crucial in his elevation to the DGB Chairmanship. Membership of IGM's Executive had brought him into contact with Monnet and involvement in the ECSC.

Freitag was seen as being more SPD friendly than his predecessor at a time when the party was adamantly opposed to Adenauer's policy of *Westintegration* and had opposed the

⁴¹ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Monnet to Auguste Cool 14-11-1967; Monnet to Rosenberg 8-3-1968; Rosenberg to Bruno Storti (CISL) 20-3-1968.

⁴² Freitag's official title was 2nd Chairman.

Schuman Plan which Freitag himself initially regarded as a French plot to weaken German industry.⁴³ He seemed an unlikely candidate to promote integration but the evolution of his attitudes towards the ECSC matched that of IGM.⁴⁴ Ahland suggests that both Freitag and Willi Richter, his successor as DGB Chairman, were uninterested in Europe, unengaged in the affairs of the Community, *'europapolitisch kaum engagiert'*, and only members of the Action Committee by virtue of their office.⁴⁵ Richter's attitudes will be considered later but it was a harsh judgement on Freitag, whose attitude to Europe had become more positive during the early 1950s as a result of his involvement with the ECSC and seeing the benefits that resulted from membership. It was Freitag who had sought out Monnet in December 1954 to offer the German unions' support after the latter's resignation from the High Authority and the following year Monnet himself noted that Freitag was '1st class [sic]', an unlikely judgement if the latter had not amended his original views.⁴⁶ By the mid-1950s Knipping too rightly sees Freitag as *'integrationsfreundlich'*, a view endorsed by Fattmann.⁴⁷ Freitag could, nevertheless, still remain suspicious of the French and believed Monnet's resignation from the High Authority had been provoked by 'French influences'.⁴⁸

For Monnet, Freitag's particular importance lay in the connections he had to the SPD leadership. Quoting Franz Knipping, Fattmann sees Freitag as one of the key influences on Ollenhauer in encouraging the SPD to take part in the Action Committee, a view also held by

⁴³ Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung?', p. 106.

⁴⁴ For a discussion of IGM's views in the early 1950s see Ch. 2.

⁴⁵ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 178.

⁴⁶ AFJME AMK 2/4/6 Monnet's notes on a conversation with Potthoff 7-6-1955, p. 2. Imig also warranted the same description.

⁴⁷ Franz Knipping, *Rom, 25. März 1957. Die Einigung Europas*, p. 90, quoted in Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, p. 163.

⁴⁸ AFJME AMK C/1/13/1 Freitag to Oldenbroek 20-1-1955.

Fontaine.⁴⁹ Monnet, writing twenty years after the foundation of the Committee, credited Wehner for the SPD's move.⁵⁰ Wehner was an important member of the Committee and one of the long-term SPD representatives on it. However, given that Monnet's recognition appeared in a book marking Wehner's 70th birthday, it is not impossible that Monnet's statement may have been a means of offering retrospective recognition and thanks for Wehner's longstanding support. Whoever was ultimately responsible for the decision is less important than the decision itself. For Ollenhauer to consider joining Monnet's Committee and committing the SPD to its objectives meant a major turning point for the party.

Gabriele D'Ottavio recognised the importance of Ollenhauer's decision to join the Action Committee.⁵¹ He also approvingly quoted Hans Küsters in this regard.⁵² Yet Küsters verdict that 'now it was Monnet's initiative for the Action Committee which caused the change of the Social Democrats' attitude towards European integration' is too stark. In his biography of Wehner, Christoph Meyer quotes a discussion paper by Wehner addressing foreign policy issues dating from autumn 1953, in which he argued for a more positive approach to integration.⁵³ The process of rethinking the SPD's position had been continuing for at least 18 months before the Action Committee was formed. Monnet's courting of the SPD provided the opportunity for the party leadership, where politicians such as Fritz Erler and Willi

⁴⁹ Knipping, *Die Einigung Europas*, p. 90 quoted in Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, p. 163.; Delors, 'Centenary Symposium', p. 68.

⁵⁰ Jean Monnet, 'Gemeinsame Arbeit für Europa' in Gerhard Jahn (ed.), *Herbert Wehner. Beiträge zu einer Biographie* (Köln, 1976), pp. 209-211.

⁵¹ Gabriele D'Ottavio, 'The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD's Europe Policy', *Journal of European Integration History*, 13 (2007), pp. 103-114.

⁵² Hanns Jürgen Küsters, 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC Treaty' in E. Serra (ed.), *Il rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma. Actes du colloque de Rome 25-28 Mars* (Baden-Baden), 1987, p. 505, quoted in D'Ottavio, 'The Treaties of Rome', p. 106.

⁵³ Christoph Meyer, *Herbert Wehner Biographie* (München, 2006), p. 182.

Birkelbach as well as Wehner himself had moved towards a more positive view of integration, to adopt an early, but relatively low-key, indication of the direction they now wished to follow.⁵⁴ It would be publicly confirmed 18 months later when the SPD voted to ratify the Rome Treaties, an about-turn from its earlier opposition to the 1951 Treaty of Paris. Freitag was only one of the influences on Ollenhauer but as Chairman of the DGB he was an important one and his support, particularly in view of his initial scepticism, helped provide Ollenhauer with the political cover to take one of the first public steps in the SPD's new direction.

Monnet invited Freitag to join the Committee at an early stage and the relationship between them seems to have been good, with Monnet addressing at least one letter to '*mon cher ami*'.⁵⁵ According to Monnet's diary they met twice more in 1955 and twice again in 1956. Freitag's attendance on the Committee was marred by ill health, he missed part of the Committee's first session in January 1956 and the third session that October (the second session was primarily administrative). Monnet marked his retirement in October 1956 and withdrawal from the Committee with a letter thanking him for his help both on it and in the High Authority.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Paterson, *SPD and European Integration*, pp. 120 – 122.

⁵⁵ AFJME AMK C1/13/2 Monnet to Freitag 8-7-1955 – the official invitation to join the Committee. The other German trade unionists were invited on the same day; AFJME C1/13/34 '*mon cher ami*', Monnet to Freitag 7-4-1956.

⁵⁶ AFJME AMK C1/13/55 Monnet to Freitag 20-11-1956.

4.5 Willi Richter and the Action Committee

Richter was born in 1894 and had been active in the Metalworkers Union in Hessen during the Weimar era, followed by underground trade union activity after 1933. He was also markedly anti-Communist; his address to the 7th World Congress of the ICFTU was strongly anti-Communist in tone and he had previously expressed concern that the organisation could lose ground to Communists in developing countries.⁵⁷ Domestically he was interested in pension reform, which his biographer, Gerhard Bier, stressed in his contribution on Richter in a set of essays on union leaders.⁵⁸ Richter's own writings catalogued in the FES library are predominately concerned with domestic issues.⁵⁹ Indeed on occasions he could take quite a parochial view; when Monnet circulated a letter in January 1957 referring to the 'latest events' (the Suez crisis) causing difficulties between the USA and Europe Richter wrote somewhat acerbically in the margin of his copy '*Europa? Gilt doch wohl nur für England und Frankreich*'.⁶⁰

Internationally, Richter was very interested in international development. However, as far as Europe was concerned he largely confined his involvement to trade union matters. Bier was a personal friend of Richter's and reflects this in his main work on Richter which is part biography and part collection of Richter's speeches and writings.⁶¹ The chapter dealing with

⁵⁷ Willi Richter, 'Grußwort zum 7. Weltkongress der IBFG', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 7 (1962), pp. 385 - 386; Willi Richter, 'Internationale Solidarität ist unser Grundgesetz', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 5 (1960), pp. 257-259.

⁵⁸ Gerhard Bier, *Schulter an Schulter, Schritt für Schritt. Lebensläufe deutscher Gewerkschafter* (Köln, 1983). Richter's biography is on pp. 145 – 150 and is subtitled '*Vater der Rentenreform*'.

⁵⁹ Willi Richter, 'Ein entscheidenes Schritt in soziales Neuland', *Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst*, H22 1957 (26-01-1957), p. 7; Willi Richter, 'Mit der SPD in eine bessere Zukunft: Für den sozialen Rechtsstaat', *Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst*, H274 1960 (2-12-1960), p. 1; Willi Richter and Rudolf Dux, 'Eine Fülle von Aufgaben wartet', *Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst*, H231 1956 (06-10-1956), pp. 1-4.

⁶⁰ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 5-1-1957.

⁶¹ Gerhard Bier, *Willi Richter. Ein Leben für die soziale Neuordnung* (Köln, 1978).

Richter's DGB chairmanship has nothing on Europe and the index contains no reference to Monnet; Bier's silence here mirrors Richter's own detachment.⁶² The text of an interview given by Richter on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the DGB makes no mention of Europe at all and contemporary assessments of Richter in the Social Democratic press are likewise silent on the subject.⁶³

Richter's lack of enthusiasm for Europe was particularly evident in his attitude towards the Action Committee. His attendance record shows that the Committee was not a high priority for him. Richter pulled out of the fourth session in May 1957, which would have been his first as DGB Chairman, on the basis of 'diary clashes'.⁶⁴ Invitations to subsequent Committee sessions were rejected, often at the last minute, on the same basis.⁶⁵ Prior to the Committee's final session before his retirement Richter was part of a long correspondence from March to June 1962 in which he vetoed Monnet's first suggested date as it clashed with an ICFTU conference and then cited 'conferences' as an excuse for rejecting two further suggestions, leading Monnet to postpone the session.⁶⁶ In the event Richter attended none of the six Committee sessions held during his Chairmanship, suggesting both that he did not value

⁶² Bier, *Richter*, pp. 211 – 252. The chapter is titled '*Vorsitzender, Parlamentarier und Multifunktionär*'. None of the marginalia on the pages in this chapter mention Europe.

⁶³ Bier, *Richter*, p. 445. Interview with Joachim Freitag on *Westdeutschen Rundfunk* über '*Stellung und Angaben der deutschen Gewerkschaften zehn Jahre nach Gründung der DGB*' on 13-10-1959.; NK, 'Willi Richter - 65 Jahre', *Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst* H220 1959 (29-09-1959), pp. 7; NK, 'Ein Leben im Dienst der Demokratie: Willi Richter wird 70 Jahre alt', *Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst* H185 1964 (28-09-1964), p.2.

⁶⁴ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Wedel to Monnet 24-4-1957.

⁶⁵ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Richter to Monnet 10-11-1959 re November 1959 session; AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Richter to Monnet 10-6-1960 re June 1960 session; Richter to Monnet 1-6-1961 re July 1961 session.

⁶⁶ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Abt. Richter to Monnet 18-4-1962; Richter to Monnet 3-5-1962; Monnet to Richter 19-5-1962.

membership or see the Committee as a vehicle for effective action and – at least in the case of the Action Committee – fully justifying Ahland’s verdict.⁶⁷

It is thus not surprising that Richter met Monnet only twice (in 1956 and 1959) during the 11 years he was on the Committee.⁶⁸ Richter left management of the relationship with Monnet and the Committee to Rosenberg, who following the DGB’s 1954 Nuremberg Conference, had become Head of the DGB’s Economic Department, meaning he was still professionally concerned with the economic aspects of European integration. As early as July 1956 Kohnstamm had realised that *‘es ist deutlich, daß Rosenberg für uns [the Committee] der Mann ist, der die europäische Sache unter den Gewerkschaften lebendig hält’*.⁶⁹ It thus made sense for Monnet and Kohnstamm to involve Rosenberg as much as possible.

During the period of Richter’s chairmanship, 85% - 90% of the letters sent by Monnet and his central team to Richter were copied to Rosenberg.⁷⁰ While much of this correspondence was of a purely administrative nature, Richter’s lack of interest in the Committee made it logical for Monnet to maintain close links with Rosenberg. Rosenberg, as will be seen, was only too happy to cooperate, as in June 1962 when Monnet asked him to coordinate the German members in publicising the Committee’s declaration in favour of UK membership.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 178.

⁶⁸ Data taken from Monnet Reduit Diary provided by AFJME.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 168.

⁷⁰ Analysis by the author. During this period Richter received a total of 74 letters from Monnet and his team. 63 were also sent to Rosenberg, with a further 3 possible. Only 8 were definitely not duplicates, based on an analysis by writer and date of letter.

⁷¹ Concerning the June 1962 declaration see AdsD 5/DGAI002366, correspondence May - June.

Richter nevertheless remained on the Committee to which he did not contribute and Monnet made no attempt to remove him from it. Richter's position and the German unions' financial contribution meant it would be impossible to dislodge him without creating a major upset. Nevertheless, it did mean that at least one important member of the Committee had little interest in using it to promote a pro-integration agenda. The situation was far from ideal, given Monnet's hopes for a proactive Committee which would engage domestically to promote an integration agenda. Richter could still number himself among Europe's 'great and good' but without committing himself personally to anything more than nominal membership. On the other hand he made no attempt to interfere with the Committee, he merely ignored it. Richter's status precluded changing the composition of the Committee; his inactivity both highlighted and facilitated the permissive consensus which allowed Monnet to manage it without undue interference to promote the agenda he wanted.

Richter's attitude may not actually have mattered that much as far as the DGB's relationship with Monnet and the Committee was concerned; the pro-European Rosenberg effectively shadowed Richter and maintained good relations with both Monnet and Kohnstamm. Moreover, the second half of Richter's chairmanship saw a decline in the Committee's activity once the Rome Treaties had been ratified. The post-ratification period was one in which relations between the unions and Monnet were strained due to the unions' failure to achieve their objectives following Messina. Richter was little concerned with Europe or the Committee but the unions nonetheless remained involved with both.

4.6 The DGB and Participating Unions' Involvement in the Action Committee⁷²

The Union Executives

Having joined the Committee, the pattern of discreet involvement continued with Monnet's Committee normally having little place in union Executive deliberations. Following the decision to send representatives, and effectively join it, the Committee was next discussed in July 1956 when the DGB Executive agreed its financial contribution, which at this stage was to be split three ways between the DGB itself, IGM and IGB.⁷³ While Rosenberg was in contact with Monnet during early 1956 in an attempt to resolve the question of union representation, there is no mention of this in the minutes of the Executive or GBV, perhaps understandably due to the sensitivities involved.⁷⁴ There was then a year's gap until in September 1957 when, at Rosenberg's request, the GBV authorised the following year's payment; the subject was not discussed by the full Executive.⁷⁵ There is no mention of Monnet in the deliberations that took place in 1957 – 58 over the arrangements for the new Commission, and both he and the Committee disappeared from the Executive's discussions for the next few years.

The correspondence held in the DGB archives also shows that there was no discussion of ways the Committee could be used to advance union objectives. Apart from that of an administrative nature, the correspondence for the first two years of membership referred exclusively to the progress of the Treaty negotiations, demonstrating their importance for the

⁷² This section also includes reference to the minutes of the DGB's *Geschäftsführender Bundesvorstand* (GBV) where appropriate. The GBV was smaller than the full Executive and dealt with day-to-day administration. I would like to express my thanks to Herr Woltering of the AdsD for his search of these GBV records on my behalf due to the confidentiality issues noted in the Introduction.

⁷³ Kaiser, *Band 11 Der deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1949 - 1956*, Doc. 109, Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes 7-8-1956.

⁷⁴ This issue is discussed in section 4.7.

⁷⁵ AdsD 5/DGAI000373 GBV Protokoll 23-9-1957, item 21.

unions and emphasising the role they had played in the original decision to join, and was confined to a tight group of Executive members, principally Rosenberg, Freitag and then Richter.

This group maintained oversight of the union's relationship with Monnet but did not use it to advance the unions' agenda via the Committee. Apart from finance, the Action Committee was not discussed by the DGB's Executive. The relevant archives contain no letters or memoranda suggesting topics for discussion by the Committee and the DGB Executive did not solicit suggestions from its member unions on the subject. If the Action Committee was discussed by Executive members outside formal meetings (in itself highly unlikely), this was not translated into official memoranda or papers for further discussion and never forwarded to Monnet officially for inclusion on the Committee's agenda and consideration at its sessions.

Like the DGB, IGM and IGB's involvement in the Committee once they had joined was equally low. This did not preclude individual members from taking an interest in it. Within IGB, Eberhard Kadow, the *Vorstand* member for organisation, produced briefing documents on the Committee at the beginning of IGB's membership.⁷⁶ However, either his own interest then waned, or the ambitious Kadow, who in 1983 was the first *Arbeitsdirektor* to become a *Vorstandsvorsitzender* in the *Montanindustrie*, realised that there was little enthusiasm for the subject; there are no further papers from him after 1956.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ HGR IGBE 3062 Kadow produced briefings on 12-1-1956 prior to the first session and 18-10-1956. The January briefing was in fact a precis of the briefing sent to Imig by Grunwald of the DGB's International Department.

⁷⁷ For Kadow's appointment see *Wirtschaftswoche* 20-5-1983, pp. 53 – 54.

The archives of both IGB and IGM show how the Action Committee was a low priority for the participating unions. The IGM and IGB representatives on the Committee received the same correspondence and documentation from Monnet as their DGB counterparts and, just like them, appear to have done little with it. The minutes of IGM's *Vorstand* from 1955 – 62 contain no references to the Action Committee, underlining how remote the Committee was from the union's main day-to-day concerns even during the early years of membership.⁷⁸ Unfortunately the records of the IGB *Hauptvorstand* are very incomplete, making a similar analysis of IGB's position unrealistic. However, I have been assured that there is no mention of the *Monnet-Kommittee* [sic] in those records that do exist.⁷⁹ Correspondence relating to the Committee in both organisations follows the same pattern as that of the DGB and there is no archival evidence of any attempt to engage in a wider debate about the role of the Committee or to encourage the DGB to do so.

This passive membership was contrary to Monnet's avowed aim of actively involving members in '*propagande*' on behalf of the Committee. How far a more proactive approach by the unions would have suited Monnet must be open to some doubt, as it could have affected his ability to manage the Committee's agenda. Nevertheless, as Bossuat commented, Monnet did expect members to get the Committee's resolutions adopted by their own organisations.⁸⁰ In the case of the DGB and the two participating unions, there is no evidence that the leadership

⁷⁸ Dörrich, *Band 10 IG Metall 1950 - 1956*; Felicitas Merkel, (ed.), *Quellen der Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert. Band 9 IG Metall 1956 - 1962* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1999). I reviewed the agenda for each meeting from 1955 – 1962 and the Committee did not appear as an agenda item, nor was it mentioned under the heading '*Verschiedenes*'. Volumes covering the later period have yet to be published.

⁷⁹ Correspondence with Dr Schwitanski of the HGRG 12-10-2018.

⁸⁰ Bossuat, 'Les trois étapes', p. 320.

tried to do so except when it fitted their own agenda, as in the case of British entry to the Community.

The following chapter will show that the union leaders placed considerable faith in Monnet's ability to use his influence for their benefit but even this aspect of the Committee's work was not discussed openly by the Executive. The union leaders saw the benefit of participating in the European institutions, but their handling of the Committee precluded the development of an agenda that would have allowed them to exploit their membership. Review of the Committee by the DGB was infrequent and by the union executives virtually non-existent, avoiding engagement beyond the narrowest practical issues. Active involvement was still tightly confined to a few key individuals and only the barest details communicated to the wider union membership. There was little possibility of opening up discussion even at *Vorstand* level to evaluate any opportunities the Committee could offer. The issue of nuclear power had provided a valid opening for the unions to join Monnet's Committee but also meant that at least initially any wider consideration of the opportunities stemming from membership was effectively side-lined. By the time Euratom's status had been finalised in the Rome Treaties, the unions' perceptions of the Committee had changed and they were beginning to lose interest in it.

German Union Leaders' Attendance at Committee Sessions

Union participation at the Action Committee's sessions by the DGB, IGB and IGM also casts light on the individual organisations' involvement. The table at Appendix III shows overall union attendance for the two periods 1955 – 60 and 1961 – 75. This is supplemented by

Appendix IV which shows the attendance of the German union leaders at individual Committee sessions.

As befitted the unions' lead organisation, DGB representatives regularly attended Committee sessions. Of the eight sessions that took place from 1955 - 1960, the DGB was represented at seven. Representation was primarily through Rosenberg, who attended five of the sessions and sent Albert Preuss, head of the DGB's Paris office, as a substitute on a further two due to diary clashes. Rosenberg was unable to attend the September 1956 session due to illness. No other DGB representative attended during this period; Freitag had gone to Paris for the initial session but had been taken ill and had returned home early, while Richter avoided Committee sessions. Rosenberg's attendance meant a degree of consistency for union representation on the Committee. However, it also had the effect of ensuring that DGB representation remained confined to someone committed to Monnet and his ideals. The DGB's passive stance and Rosenberg's fundamental agreement with Monnet's aims meant there was little motivation for the organisation to instigate a debate over the Committee's objectives during this period.

IGB representatives attended four of the sessions in question. Imig died in February 1956 and thereafter IGB's attendance was patchy. Heinrich Gutermuth attended one session as Chairman but thereafter sent substitutes, Walter Arendt and then Waldemar Lambrecht. More important than the lack of continuity was the fact that the substitute attendees were of declining importance; while Arendt went on to be IGB Chairman after Gutermuth, Lambrecht was in 1960 the official managing the Chairman's office. As can be seen from the tables, IGB's

attendance during the early years of the Committee set the pattern for the years after 1960 when the union's representation fell away dramatically.

IGM representatives participated on a more regular basis than IGB's, attending six of the eight sessions in this period. The union's original representative, Sträter, attended two sessions but then handed over to Otto Brenner due to pressure of work.⁸¹ Brenner, who became Chairman of IGM in 1956, attended two sessions personally and sent substitutes to a further three, Karl-Heinz Friedrichs on one occasion and Robert Lung, the union's legal advisor on two. Brenner's presence added weight to the Committee and showed that at least initially IGM was prepared to take it seriously, making a greater effort than IGB to be represented.

4.7 ÖTV's Attempts to Gain Representation

Replying to Monnet's invitation to the Committee's initial session, Freitag had replied that representatives of four individual unions would attend besides himself and Rosenberg. These included Karl Osterkamp, an economist employed in the headquarters of ÖTV, the public services union, and Wilhelm Gefeller, Chairman of *IG Chemie*.⁸² In fact Osterkamp and Gefeller had not been invited by Monnet as ÖTV Chairman Adolph Kummernuss believed.⁸³ The invitation had come from Freitag, who had taken it upon himself to invite the four trade unionists.⁸⁴ In the event, while Imig and Sträter attended the session in Paris, neither

⁸¹ AFJME AMK C1/37/28 Sträter to Monnet 8-5-1956

⁸² AFJME C1/13/17 Freitag to Monnet 9-1-1956. Only surnames are given in Freitag's letter to Monnet. My thanks to Andreas Marquet of the AdsD for clarifying Osterkamp's identity and role.

⁸³ AdsD 5/ÖTVB140006 GFV Sitzung 30, 9-1-1956, agenda item 2, '*Internationale Konferenz Aktionsausschuss Europa in Paris*'.

⁸⁴ There is no record of any correspondence from Monnet or any of those on his 'central' team with the leaders of ÖTV and IGC, a point that will be expanded on later.

Osterkamp nor Gefeller did. The reason for this is unclear as nothing in Monnet's correspondence with Freitag or the DGB files refers to their absence. However, while IGC accepted the decision without further comment, Kummernuss of ÖTV did not.

The issue was revived when Rosenberg wrote out to all four unions early in April to say that the Committee's next session had been postponed.⁸⁵ In doing so he apparently assumed that, despite the events of January, all four would still be involved. He then confirmed to Monnet that he had invited representatives of all four unions, adding enthusiastically that it was a good idea to invite Kummernuss of ÖTV and Gefeller of IGC to the session as *'es handelt sich um einflußreiche Personen der Gewerkschaftsbewegung und sehr grosse Verbände'*; at the time ÖTV was the DGB's second largest constituent union.⁸⁶ Writing to the unions with details of the financial support required, Rosenberg added that following discussions with Kummernuss and Gefeller he had asked Monnet to invite all four unions to the next session.⁸⁷ Replying to Rosenberg's letter, ÖTV confirmed that the union would pay its share of the unions' overall contribution to the Committee and stressed it was keen to become a member and be invited to the Committee sessions.⁸⁸ In fact the request found no response, the matter was dropped and from then on ÖTV's participation in the Committee was purely a financial one.

⁸⁵ AdsD 5/IGMA090579 Rosenberg to IGB, IGC, IGM and ÖTV 3-4-1956. The session eventually took place in July 1956.

⁸⁶ AdsD 5/DGDO000026 Rosenberg to Monnet 23-4-1956. In 1956 ÖTV had 852k members, Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, p. 477, Tabelle 15.

⁸⁷ HGRG IGBE 3063A Rosenberg to IGB, IGC, IGM and ÖTV 25-4-1956.

⁸⁸ AdsD 5/ÖTVB140008 ÖTV (Kummernuss' office) to Rosenberg 2-5-1956.

It was not, however, the end of the discussion between Monnet and Rosenberg on the subject. In early June Monnet wrote to Rosenberg, saying that he would like to see ÖTV and IGC represented on the Committee.⁸⁹ Monnet, however, was conscious that this could lead to difficulties; the Committee was already quite large and increasing the membership would make the Committee unwieldy. Nevertheless, he still hoped to work around the issue. In his reply Rosenberg agreed with Monnet that the unions should be included, as incorporating representatives of these 'two important organisations' would 'bind their interests to the Committee'.⁹⁰

Both men appeared sympathetic to the idea of including ÖTV and IGC on the Committee. Yet, while Monnet and Rosenberg agreed that they needed to discuss the matter, there is no record in the DGB archives or Monnet's diary to suggest that they did. The subject was dropped and the situation remained unchanged; ÖTV and IGC representatives did not join the Committee.

Rosenberg's positive response was most likely due to the assumption that ÖTV and IGC membership would give the German union movement more influence on the Committee. Backing them would also gain him credit with the two unions concerned at a time when he needed to consolidate his position within the DGB. The industry-based nature of the German union movement meant that there were a variety of viewpoints to be accommodated, as well as the personal interests of individual union leaders, a fact of which Rosenberg was well

⁸⁹ AdsD 5/DGDO000026 Monnet to Rosenberg 2-6-1956.

⁹⁰ AdsD 5/DGDO000026 Rosenberg to Monnet 7-6-1956.

aware. In the mid-1950s Rosenberg was relatively isolated within the DGB leadership. He had gone on holiday specifically to avoid the October 1954 Frankfurt Congress and afterwards had been moved from the DGB's International to its Economic Department, where he was involved in an internal struggle to consolidate his position.⁹¹ Bringing IGC and in particular ÖTV, whose leaders had pressed for involvement, onto the Committee would doubtless win him friends in those unions and possible future support, if ever needed.

Monnet appears to have been sympathetic to IGC and ÖTV's inclusion on the Committee, despite the organisational difficulties this could involve. Nevertheless, the balance of the Committee needed to be considered. The Committee would grow from its original 33 members in October 1955 to 36 by the time of the third session the following September, with the three additional members (Wehner of the SPD, Brenner of IGM and Rosenberg himself) all being German and on the centre-left. Membership was at Monnet's discretion but expansion ran the risk of making the Committee unworkable. Germans now accounted for nine out of 36 members, with seven of them being either Social Democrats or trade unionists. Apparent favouritism between different interest groups or nationalities would weaken the Committee at the time when Monnet most needed it to be effective. Although both Rosenberg and Monnet would have liked to see ÖTV and IGC represented on the Committee, Rosenberg was not in a position to force the issue and Monnet unwilling to do so.

The episode concerning ÖTV's attempted participation throws light on several important points. First, Monnet wanted to keep his Committee effective. At this stage Monnet was still

⁹¹ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, pp. 140 – 141, 143-144.

focused on ratification of the Rome Treaties. He expected the Committee members to press for the ratification in their national parliaments and may well have doubted that the inclusion of the two additional unions would add significantly to the pressure for this in the *Bundestag*. Secondly, it draws attention to the fact that the German trade union movement was diverse with its industry-based unions representing a variety of interests. Some unions, of which IGM and IGB were the most prominent, were by their nature drawn into European affairs. To others, Europe would not have been of such interest or importance and their relevance for Monnet would have been accordingly less.

The proposed inclusion of ÖTV in the Committee was problematic as the union had a lower international profile than the other three unions concerned. Unlike IGM and IGB it had played no part in the ECSC. The majority of ÖTV's workforce was engaged in domestic operations, such as regional and local administration and unlikely to be affected by the EEC in the short term. For that reason ÖTV's wish to participate in the Committee was unlikely to stem from having a particular agenda it wished to promote, and which in any event it could have flagged to the Committee via the DGB. Freitag may have originally sought ÖTV's inclusion due to its size, assuming this would give him a bigger voice in the Committee's deliberations. As far as Kummernuss was concerned, with no apparent agenda to promote via the Committee, it may just have been that he believed ÖTV's importance meant it warranted inclusion and his own participation as a member.

4.8 ÖTV and IG *Chemie's* Involvement in the Action Committee

IGC and ÖTV's involvement in the Committee was thus minimal. Analysis of the IGC *Vorstand* minutes is not possible, due to the poor state of the archives, but there is no documentary evidence to assume its views were different from those of the other unions.⁹²

Once ÖTV's initial show of interest had been rebuffed, the union took no further part in the Committee and there is little reference to it in the ÖTV archives. Analysis of the agendas of ÖTV's *Geschäftsführender Hauptvorstand* (GFV), which met almost weekly, between 1955 and 1975 shows how little the Committee impinged on the union's consciousness.⁹³ The Committee was discussed in January 1956 when membership seemed possible and in late April the GFV agreed to pay ÖTV's share of the German union contribution to the Committee.⁹⁴ The payment was not tied to any conditions and the question of attending Committee sessions was not discussed; based on Rosenberg's letter of 3 April the union expected to be involved. A further mention of the Committee appeared a few months later when a report on the subject of 'Monnet and Euratom' was included in the reports section of the agenda but no details were given in the minutes.⁹⁵ After this mention of the Committee was strictly limited to financial approval of the union's contribution.⁹⁶

⁹² Correspondence with Dr Schwitanski, 12-10-2018.

⁹³ The ÖTV archives are to be found in the *Archiv der sozialen Demokratie*. The *Protokolls* of the ÖTV *Geschäftsführender Hauptvorstand* for 1955 – 1975 are in the sequence AdsD 5/ÖTVB140006 to 5/ÖTVB140034. This sequence also includes the GFV's meetings with its regional officials (*Bezirksleiter*).

⁹⁴ AdsD 5/ÖTVB140006 meeting 9-1-1956, agenda item 2; 5/ÖTVB140007 meeting 30-4-1956, agenda item 2.

⁹⁵ AdsD 5/ÖTVB140007 meeting 13-8-1956, agenda item 1.

⁹⁶ AdsD 5/ÖTVB140013A meeting 16-10-1961, agenda item 10; 5/ÖTVB0014 meeting 1-6-1964, agenda item 5; 5/ÖTVB0017 meeting 18-12-1967 agenda item 7.

The decision taken in early 1956 determined the future course of German union representation on the Committee. During its existence only the leaders of the DGB, IGM and IGB were involved with the Committee. The legacy of the ECSC, as well as the personalities involved, still took priority. This was at a time, from the mid-1950s onwards, when the ECSC with its sectoral emphasis would become less and less important and the EEC's common market ever more so as the impact of tariff reductions began to take effect after 1958. The decision taken in early 1956 stood and was accepted by both Monnet and the DGB. This is confirmed by the fact that there is no record of any correspondence between Monnet, or the members of his team in Paris, with the Chairmen of ÖTV and IGC during the life of the Committee.⁹⁷ All correspondence between Monnet and the German trade union members of the Committee was solely with the DGB, IGB and IGM and often channelled via the DGB. When arranging a meeting with the German trade unionists in February 1956 Monnet wrote directly to Freitag, who in turn notified the others involved.⁹⁸ Gefeller and Kummernuss were not mentioned in the correspondence and presumably did not attend the meeting.⁹⁹

While ÖTV's domestic orientation provided justification for its exclusion from the Committee, IGC's situation was very different. Chemicals were a growing industry that could expect to be impacted by the development of the EEC and the German chemical industry was the most

⁹⁷ My thanks to M. Walther of the AFJME for confirming this point, correspondence October 2018. The four individuals involved were Wilhelm Gefeller (Chairman 1949 – 1969) and Karl Hauenschild (Chairman 1969 – 82) of IGC and Adolph Kummernuss (Chairman 1949 – 64) and Heinz Kluncker (Chairman 1964 – 82) of ÖTV.

⁹⁸ AFJME C1/13/26 Monnet to Freitag 18-2-1956; AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Freitag to Rosenberg, Imig and Sträter 21-2-1956.

⁹⁹ In Monnet's diary, only Freitag's name is given for the meeting on 24-2-1956 but this makes sense as Monnet obviously relied on him to invite the other attendees.

important in the Community.¹⁰⁰ Although representation in the industry was confused, with groups of workers switching union affiliation, IGC was one of the unions for workers in the emerging nuclear power industry.¹⁰¹ Given Monnet's emphasis on Euratom, there would have been accordingly greater reason to include IGC in the Committee. As an article in *Le Monde* in early 1956 pointed out, one of the key centres of resistance to Euratom was among German industrialists, particularly in the chemical industry, who wanted a private industry based solution.¹⁰² Involving IGC as a counterweight to the industrialists would have been a sensible move but after June 1956 Monnet never raised the subject again, although the union's inclusion would have meant representation for an interest group with a key stake in his favoured project. It was a further example of how the Committee's development remained frozen.

ÖTV and IGC were nevertheless prepared to pay for a Committee which they never attended and in which they also showed little ongoing interest. In fact they may not have been particularly worried about participation, or in the case of ÖTV become reconciled to it not happening. They may have paid their contributions out of solidarity with the wider union movement in the way many businesses at the time also supported outside organisations and interest groups financially. Gerard Braunthal reported that industry spent as much as 2% of its total turnover on the Federation of German Industry (BDI) and other associations.¹⁰³ Financial support did not necessarily imply participation; in the 1950s the *Gutehoffnungs*

¹⁰⁰ Johann P. Murmann, 'Chemical Industries after 1850' in Joel Mokyr (ed.), *Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 398 - 406, p. 400, Table I.

¹⁰¹ Correspondence with Dr Schwitanski 15-11-2019 and 4-12-2019.

¹⁰² *Le Monde* 12-1-1956, pp. 1 – 2.

¹⁰³ Gerard Braunthal, Gerard, *The Federation of German Industry in Politics* (Ithaca, NY, 1965), p. 41.

Hütte steelworks and its subsidiaries held membership of 56 associations and chambers.¹⁰⁴ By financing the Committee, IGC and ÖTV were demonstrating their approval for an organisation the DGB supported and endorsing the cause of European integration. Active participation in the Action Committee was not essential for them. The unions concerned could achieve representation internationally through a variety of other organisations, including the relevant union groupings; Gefeller was President of the International Federation of Chemical and Textile Workers from 1964 – 69. Non-participation in the Action Committee by no means meant lack of engagement in other European initiatives.

4.9 Correspondence and Meetings

The level of day-to-day engagement between Monnet's core team, which consisted of himself, Jacques van Helmont and Kohnstamm, plus a secretary, and the individual members of the Committee can be traced through correspondence and meetings. An analysis of these day-to-day interactions shows how they reflected the unions' attitudes towards the Committee and the level of engagement they dedicated to it. Please note that for ease of reference and due to the nature of the graphs shown, this section covers the whole period of the Committee's existence.

Correspondence

The levels and direction of correspondence between the Committee and its members can be used as a proxy for both activity, low levels indicating an inactive organisation or relationship,

¹⁰⁴ Armin Grünbacher, *West German Industrialists and the Making of the Economic Miracle : a History of Mentality and Recovery* (London, 2017), p. 109.

and engagement – a one-way flow suggesting a lack of interest from the other party involved. This is particularly pertinent for the period under consideration (1955 – 75) as letters were the main form of everyday communication. Schwabe suggests that Monnet mainly made use of the telephone but while this was Monnet’s preference, international calls were difficult to make and very expensive for most of the period; Monnet used telegrams if speed was required.¹⁰⁵ Monnet would also have needed a translator when speaking with many of the Germans, Rosenberg being an exception as both spoke good English. Written correspondence was thus the primary means of regular communication.


The analysis below is based on the correspondence in the FJME archives; in calculating the volumes of correspondence, letters from Monnet, van Helmont and Kohnstamm have all been counted under the Committee centre and duplicates (including translations) have been excluded, as have any discussion papers or similar which are detailed in the index.¹⁰⁶ The analysis thus shows the volumes of actual correspondence (primarily letters but with the occasional telegram) between the individual parties, giving a good indication of the levels of interaction involved.

The following chart shows the total correspondence between the centre and the German Union members over the life of the Committee:-

¹⁰⁵ Schwabe, *Monnet*, p. 301

¹⁰⁶ The correspondence is contained in the series AMK C1/nn/xx where nn refers to the individual concerned (in alphabetical surname order) and xx to the individual piece of correspondence (in date order).

Chart 4.1 Correspondence between Action Committee Centre and German Trade Union Members 1955 - 1975




Source – Based on AFJME. Action Committee correspondence (Series AMK/C1)

The chart tells a very clear story of declining activity over the years of the Committee’s existence, with a slight increase in the correspondence to members in the late 1960s, around the time of the Hague Conference. As such it reflects the phases of the Committee’s life outlined earlier; once the Rome Treaties had been ratified, engagement – as reflected in the flow of correspondence – fell away rapidly during the years of stagnation, reaching a low point in 1966. The short burst of activity in the late 1960s was then followed by a further decline until the Committee’s demise in 1975.

It was not just the level of correspondence that was important. The flow of correspondence between the centre and the individual members also demonstrates interesting features. The following chart shows the percentage of the total correspondence that went from the centre to the individual German union members.

Chart 4.2 Outgoing Correspondence (Action Committee Centre to German Trade Union members) as a percentage of all (in & out going) Correspondence



Source – Based on AFJME. Action Committee correspondence (Series AMK/C1)

As can be seen, the correspondence was almost entirely one-way. The percentage of correspondence sent by the centre to the individual members rarely fell below 80% of the total exchanged between the two parties. (The percentages for the 1970s are impacted by the small volumes involved). This meant that on average Monnet and his central team sent


out four letters for every one they received back. This does not suggest a high level of engagement on the part of the German union members; much of the time Monnet was circulating ideas, memoranda and papers and receiving little or no feedback in return. It was essentially a one-way communication. With other priorities, the German trade union members had little inclination to comment, at least on paper, on the majority of Monnet's thoughts and proposals if they did not directly concern union interests.

As well as the lack of response, the question of how far the union members paid attention to the documents Monnet did circulate needs to be considered. This is appreciably more difficult to judge. However, an overall perusal of the DGB archives relating to the Committee does provide two important clues. The first is that many of the letters from individual members to Monnet were in fact of a purely administrative nature; principally concerned with fixing the dates of Committee sessions around the diaries of busy and important members. The second is that many of Monnet's papers lodged in the DGB archives have no annotations on them. This does not necessarily mean that they were not read by the recipients, though that may well have been the case. It does, however, suggest that, apart from two exceptional instances, both in the 1960s, the union leaders were not engaged enough to annotate them and had little need or inclination to reply.

The centre's communication with individual members also raises points of interest. The following chart shows the average total correspondence (left-hand scale - number of items)

per annum of membership for each of the German union members of the Committee as well as (right-hand scale) incoming mail as a percentage of all correspondence for each member.¹⁰⁷

Chart 4.3 Action Committee Centre Correspondence with Individual German Trade Union Members



Source – Based on AFJME. Action Committee correspondence (Series AMK/C1)

The data here appears to show a disparate picture. Nevertheless, on closer examination certain patterns are apparent. Rosenberg’s unique position stands out very clearly here – both in terms of the volume of correspondence and also its flow, with Rosenberg being much more engaged in correspondence than the majority of union leaders. Rosenberg enjoyed a good relationship with Monnet, but the high volume of correspondence and its more balanced

¹⁰⁷ The datings of membership used in the calculations are based on Libera, 'Jean Monnet et les personnalités allemandes', pp. 37-38, Tableau I.

nature also reflects his Chairmanship of the Committee's Finance and Administration Sub-Committee, meaning he had regular contact with Monnet and the central team on these matters. (The figures for members like Otto Kersten, Alfons Lappas and Eugen Loderer are impacted by the low volumes of correspondence and the short duration of their memberships at the end of the Committee's existence). Otherwise it becomes apparent that those members who were involved at the beginning of the Committee's life such as Freitag had higher levels of correspondence than those who joined later, a reflection of the changing levels of Committee activity over time, while some members such as Gutermuth appear to have been recipients of more attention on the part of Monnet than others. In Gutermuth's case the bulk of the correspondence dates from the period 1956 – 60, reflecting his early membership of the Committee but may also result from the IGB Chairman's reaction to the coal crisis which began in the late 1950s. This requires further investigation.

Analysis of the correspondence between the centre and the individual members thus evidences a low level of day-to-day engagement, with Monnet and his team sending out letters and documentation that normally aroused little interest or excitement among the German union members. It could be argued that Monnet's more general discussion papers did not require a reply, particularly when they did not impinge on union concerns and thus went unanswered. Nonetheless, the same treatment of Monnet's proposed agendas for Action Committee sessions reinforces the view of a low level of engagement on the unions' part. Issues arising from Monnet's correspondence were never placed on the agendas of the DGB or member unions for formal discussion in Executive meetings.¹⁰⁸ When the union

¹⁰⁸ The period 1960 – 75 will be covered in Ch. 6.

leaders had no concerns, they were prepared to let Monnet manage the agenda as he wished. The contrast to the situation when the unions felt their interests, or those of their members, to be threatened was stark. In these cases the unions reacted immediately to protect their interests. As will be shown, they replied to Monnet formally, stated their position clearly and intervened proactively with the aim of achieving their objectives.

Meetings

Meetings between the central team and individual members represented another opportunity for interaction between the two parties outside Committee sessions. In the case of the German members, these meetings would have been arranged primarily through Monnet himself or the German-speaking Kohnstamm who was Monnet's key link to the German members of all political persuasions.

Monnet's meetings are detailed in the *RDV Monnet réduit diary* which gives details of his appointments from 1955 to the end of his life, covering the period of the Action Committee.¹⁰⁹ Kohnstamm also conducted meetings with the German members of the Committee. However, his *Journaux Intimes de Max Kohnstamm*, covering the period 1953 – 67, contain Kohnstamm's reflections, rather than just appointments, are written mostly in Dutch and are in his own hand.¹¹⁰ Due to these constraints this analysis concentrates on Monnet's meetings with the German trade unionists.

¹⁰⁹ I am grateful to M. Mathias Walter, formerly chief archivist at the AFJME, for sending me a copy of this appointment diary. Correspondence 14-11-2017.

¹¹⁰ The *Journaux Intimes de Max Kohnstamm* can be found online in the Historical Archives of the European Union at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence; <https://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/162351?item=MK-03> (Accessed 19-3-2018). I wrote to Dr Harryvan,

Strictly speaking the RDV is not a diary. It is rather a listing by subject name, with a brief description such as 'German politician' and sometimes a very short listing of key positions held, together with the dates Monnet met the individual concerned. Primarily based on scheduled appointments, the diary may well not record chance meetings. In the case of the German union leaders, these would have been unlikely, since with the exception of Preuss all lived and worked in the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, there would have been occasions, such as seminars, anniversary celebrations and Community functions, when the parties could have met, albeit probably fleetingly and in an informal setting. Finally some individuals had appointments with Monnet for days on which the Committee met; these are assumed to have been outside the formal session, possibly in the morning of the opening day as the Committee normally first convened for a working lunch, and have thus been counted in the totals.

The table at Appendix V shows the meetings noted in Monnet's appointments diary for the individual German union leaders. The shaded background indicates the period during which the individuals concerned were members of the Committee.¹¹¹

Three main points emerge from this analysis. The first is that the majority of scheduled meetings between Monnet and the German trade unionist members took place during the early years of the Committee, with contact virtually non-existent over the last decade of the

Kohnstamm's biographer, to ask if it is likely that Kohnstamm's diaries will be transcribed in the near future but did not receive a response.

¹¹¹ The table is based on the *RDV Monnet réduit diary* from the AFJME. The membership dates are taken from Libera.

Committee's life. It was a sign of how far he had departed from earlier practice that in May 1971 Monnet wrote to Heinz-Oskar Vetter (Chairman of the DGB since Rosenberg's retirement in 1969) requesting a meeting. The two had met at Committee sessions in July 1969 and February 1971 but it is unlikely that they had had the opportunity for more than a fleeting conversation. Monnet now wrote that *'Je me propose, suivant notre tradition depuis le début du comité, d'aller vous voir et de discuter avec vous – ainsi qu'avec chacun des autres membres – au cours des prochaines semaines'*.¹¹² The DGB Chairman was a key contact but had nevertheless been in post for over two years before they finally met on a one to one basis in 1972, more or less at the end of the Committee's life. It was a further indication of how moribund the Committee had become and how far Monnet had let matters slip as he aged.¹¹³

The second point is that Rosenberg remained a key contact throughout the life of the Committee. Monnet used Rosenberg when coordination with the German union leaders was required; it is likely that 'Rosenberg' was entered in the diary as shorthand for meetings with other trade union leaders, which Monnet presumably then relied on Rosenberg to arrange. Rosenberg's specific role on the Committee also meant that Monnet needed more frequent contact with him than the other Committee members, as demonstrated by the level of correspondence between the two. Nevertheless even if Rosenberg did arrange some meetings for the other members, it is still the case that their frequency fell away sharply after the early years.

¹¹² AdsD 5/DGAJ000151 Monnet to Vetter 29-5-1971.

¹¹³ See Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 338 on Monnet's failing health.

Finally, it is highly likely that there were members of the Committee, particularly in its later years, whom Monnet never met outside the official Committee sessions, a view endorsed by M. Walter of the FJME, who added that impromptu meetings were unlikely.¹¹⁴ This was the situation Monnet was trying to rectify when he contacted Vetter in May 1971. He would thus have had only the most superficial connection with these members. It was a far cry from the relationships he had cultivated with his original union supporters when he founded the Committee.

As he grew older, Monnet increasingly left Kohnstamm to maintain contact with members.¹¹⁵ These meetings normally preceded the formal Committee sessions, as Kohnstamm socialised Monnet's draft agendas and sought feedback from the individual members and their organisations; a process of consultation which lasted to the end of the 1960s but lapsed once Kohnstamm's role was no longer subsidised by the Ford Foundation.¹¹⁶ These meetings allowed the members to feedback concerns to Monnet in advance of the Committee's session and to input to the final resolution and declaration. While the process did run the risk of being mediated by Kohnstamm in a way that direct contact with Monnet would have avoided, the danger was probably small given Monnet's trust in his aide, especially as the unions resorted to direct correspondence with Monnet over matters that concerned them.

¹¹⁴ Correspondence from M. M. Walter 9-2-2018.

¹¹⁵ Harryvan and Harst, *Kohnstamm*, pp. 120 – 122.

¹¹⁶ AdsD 5/DGAJ000150 Monnet to Vetter 30-10-1969 where Monnet refers to the talks '*die Herr Kohnstamm oder* [originally "*und*" but corrected by JM] *Ich, unser Tradition gemäss, mit den Mitgliedern unseres Komitees vor der Tagung führen*'.

In conclusion, although less easy to evidence overall, it is most likely that the frequency of meetings between the Committee centre and the individual members followed the same pattern as that of the correspondence generated, initial engagement followed by decline. Europe was not the unions' main priority and there was increasingly less requirement to meet or discuss the issues involved.

Day-to-Day Interaction between the German Union Members

Identifying and evaluating the day-to-day interaction between the German union members concerning the Committee is by definition much more difficult than tracking their correspondence or ascertaining their attendance at official meetings. Day-to-day interaction would often have been fleeting, unofficial and undocumented, a quick word after a meeting on a separate topic or the result of a chance encounter, just as it would be for any group of busy individuals. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some of the main ways in which the union members consulted, to see if agreement on a particular approach was required in advance of an Action Committee session.

The most important is that having identified an issue of major concern to them, the union leaders approached Monnet on a formal basis. On other occasions, documentation was circulated, with Rosenberg often acting as coordinator, to ensure that all were aware of the Committee's position. This form of passive endorsement was used when Monnet's secretary wrote to Rosenberg concerning the Committee's March 1967 press *communiqué*, asking if '*wie üblich*' it had been agreed with Arendt of IGB and Brenner of IGM.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Topel (Monnet's secretary) to Rosenberg 3-3-1967.

Union leaders also had the opportunity to input to the Committee by means of the meetings that Kohnstamm held regularly prior to each Committee session. Beyond the odd letter proposing a meeting date (but no follow-up correspondence to show if the date was actually agreed), there is no record of these in the DGB or union archives. Further research in this area depends on transcribing Kohnstamm's diary, which should indicate whether he only met Rosenberg or whether other union leaders attended, and if so, how often, and could also cast light on the issues debated.¹¹⁸

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The first years of the Action Committee up to 1960 saw a prudent degree of engagement on the part of the German unions. The European *relance* demanded this involvement; enjoying Monnet's confidence they hoped to use him and his connections as a way of leveraging greater representation and support for social Europe in the new European institutions. The following chapter will outline their concerns in more detail and describe their attempts to use the Committee to influence the negotiations leading to the Rome Treaties. Their hopes were to be sorely disappointed and the outcome of the debate would affect their subsequent view of both Monnet and the Committee.

¹¹⁸ Rosenberg's diaries are available at the AdsD. However, these are pocket sized and only show appointments, with the odd word added. For reasons of time I did not examine them fully.

Ch. 5 THE UNIONS, MONNET AND THE ROME TREATIES

As discussed in the historiographical section of this thesis, the trade unions' attitude to the Schuman Plan and their involvement in the subsequent negotiations has been the subject of several studies. In contrast there has been little analysis of the unions' involvement in the post-Messina negotiations for the Rome Treaties. The contributions here are partial and fragmented, with several historians contributing to the debate but no full account or discussion of the subject overall.

Writing in 2007 Bühlbäcker provided an early short analysis of the negotiations in the context of the German unions' involvement in the Action Committee.¹ He stressed how Monnet pushed for worker representation, encouraging the Committee to adopt a more balanced approach to integration.² However, Bühlbäcker commenced his narrative of Monnet's involvement in the negotiations with their temporary stalling over social costs in October 1956. While the question of social costs was of interest to the unions, Monnet had in fact been active on their behalf for several months previously. Bühlbäcker's narrative comes to a somewhat abrupt end; he recognised the unions' defeat and considered their reaction but did not explore the consequences in detail.

The three other contributions to be considered all date from the following decade. In contrast to Bühlbäcker, Fattmann discussed both the unions' demands and their reaction to the

¹ Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, Ch. 8 *Der Verbands- und parteipolitische Beitrag zum 'Aktionskomitee für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa'*, pp. 337 - 349

² *Ibid.*, p. 337.

outcome of the negotiations but omitted any mention of the process that linked the two.³ In his biography of Rosenberg Ahland really only discussed the process of the negotiations from November 1956, like Bühlbäcker he neglected mention of Monnet's earlier initiatives.⁴ By only considering the negotiations from autumn 1956 Bühlbäcker and Ahland both diminish Monnet's role in supporting the unions and his efforts on their behalf.

Wieters and Fertikh take a somewhat different approach in discussing the negotiations, concentrating on union objectives rather than the process itself. They find it surprising that rather than asking for specific measures or pushing for 'social Europe', the unions were more concerned with institutions and representation.⁵ In fact the latter approach made more sense. Adoption of specific measures might have resolved some immediate issues but it was only representation in the new institutions, and defining the powers they possessed, that would permit the unions to promote their demands on a consistent, long term basis. In some respects the situation the unions now faced was analogous to that created by the introduction of *Montanmitbestimmung* during the Schuman Plan negotiations, and with the same dangers. Achievement of limited specific objectives might have provided a short one-off success but could have sacrificed the possibility of future gains.

There are several reasons for this relative lack of historiographical coverage. The Schuman Plan was the first step in European integration and involving the unions was seen as a necessary measure in ensuring its success. As a result, the final settlement offered the unions

³ Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, pp. 198 – 202.

⁴ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, pp. 172 – 173.

⁵ Wieters and Fertikh, 'Ringgen um ein soziales Europa', p. 106.

considerable benefits. In contrast, the unions were excluded from the negotiations following Messina and the Rome Treaties and the outcome was regarded unfavourably, both by the unions themselves, contemporary commentators and later historians. This chapter will examine the German unions' ambitions, trace their involvement with Monnet during the course of the negotiations in detail and consider the implications of the final settlement for the unions' demands. It will show how Monnet was involved from the beginning of the process but also how he abruptly changed his stance at the end of the negotiations, much to the union leaders' dismay and disappointment.

5.1 Union Hopes and Fears

The Treaty of Paris establishing the Coal and Steel Community had guaranteed the unions' participation in the new Community's institutions. They were represented on the tri-partite Consultative Committee along with employers and consumers and enjoyed the right of access to the High Authority. The unions also occupied two of the nine seats on the High Authority, even if this had resulted from national nominations rather than being written into the Treaty itself. By the mid-1950s the unions wanted to build on their position and use the opportunities arising from the *relance* of the European project to push for a wider social agenda, extended rights for the unions, more supranational powers for the Community and increased economic powers in certain fields.⁶ The *Gewerksschafts-Konferenz für die Wiederbelebung des Europa-Gedankens* in August 1955, discussed below, showed the extent of their ambitions, the previous December they had already signalled their intentions by making use of the ECSC's

⁶ See Beever, *European unity*, Ch. 9, The Trade Unions and Treaty Revision; Barnouin, Barbara, *The European Labour Movement and European Integration* (London, 1986), Ch. 1, European trade unions and European integration: a historical overview.

Consultative Committee to pass a resolution calling for harmonisation of pay and social conditions.⁷ However, the changed political environment around the negotiations for the new Communities proposed at Messina meant that the primary issue for the unions was to become one of maintaining their hard won benefits, rather than extending them.

The founders of the ECSC had been aware that they needed to win the unions over to the concept of integration. The member countries were in many respects still in a parlous state in 1950. The war had been over for only five years and shortly after the Schuman Plan negotiations began war broke out in Korea, a country divided just like Germany, as Communist North Korea invaded the American backed South. The Federal Republic itself was less than a year old, enjoying only partial sovereignty under the Allied High Commissioners, with its coalition government only allowed limited freedom of action. All the European economies were still suffering major economic dislocation, and in the Federal Republic the benefits of Erhard's economic liberalism had yet to be seen. Adenauer knew that he needed the unions to build a domestic coalition to ratify the Treaty of Paris and had secured the DGB's support with the introduction of *Montanmitbestimmung*. At that time, as Suzuki showed, exclusion of the unions from the integration process and new European institutions, disenfranchising their mass membership and ignoring their position as one of the few German institutions unsullied by National Socialism, would have been inconceivable.

Half a decade later the situation was very different. The European economies had recovered from the war and were enjoying a period of sustained growth. This was particularly the case

⁷ Haas, *Uniting of Europe*, p. 90.

in the Federal Republic where the *Wirtschaftswunder* was now delivering real economic benefits, thus reducing the dangers of 'indirect aggression', the Communist exploitation of economic failure.⁸ Adenauer had enjoyed electoral success, fuelled by a growing economy and the success of his policy of *Westintegration*, which had resulted in effective sovereignty in 1955, while the Communist vote had collapsed.⁹ The unions in contrast had not flourished, with many of the more activist members alienated by the leadership. Increasing prosperity had taken the edge off many workers' radicalism, and there appeared few alternatives to Adenauer's policies, with the SPD opposition seemingly unable to adapt to the new political realities, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) offering little in the way of an alternative role model. As a result domestically the German Trade Unions were less powerful compared to Adenauer's ruling coalition than they had been in 1951.

In addition the developments following the Messina conference meant that the European situation had become more complex as far as the unions were concerned. While the ECSC had concentrated specifically on the *Montanindustrie*, a narrow if important industrial sector, the economic impact of the proposed common market potentially affected all industries and offered much less opportunity for the unions to press their demands on a single front. It thus lacked the focus for union activity that sectoral integration had provided. Moreover, the emerging nuclear industry where sectoral integration was proposed contained fewer vested interests for the unions than either coal or steel had done. In these circumstances, there was little reason for Adenauer to feel the need to offer incentives to the unions in the way he had

⁸ For 'indirect aggression', see Kratochwil, 'Das Erbe Jean Monnets', p. 68.

⁹ See Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, p. 122, Doc. 58.

done earlier. Schwarz notes that at this time Adenauer was totally opposed to legislation that would extend the influence of the trade unions.¹⁰ There was no reason for the new European institutions to be an exception.

Rosenberg had initially underestimated the importance of the Messina conference, commenting in late June that the Beyen Plan for a common market would fail (it had been rejected in London) and future discussion be much more limited in scope.¹¹ His judgement was incorrect and the existence of Spaak's working group meant the unions needed to react to the situation. That August the unions represented in the European Regional Organisation of the ICFTU held a conference in Brussels entitled '*Wiederbelebung des Europa-Gedankens*'.¹² Welcoming the steps taken at Messina for a new European initiative, their declaration pointed out that the Conference had also opened up new perspectives for social and economic harmonisation (point 3), and identified the need to do this with the aim of improving workers' conditions (point 7). The declaration also emphasised sectoral integration with the peaceful use of atomic power (point 14) and called for the concept of social progress to be written into the new treaties (point 16) with the workers themselves involved in the discussions starting under Spaak (point 17). The ICFTU's position was backed by the Christian IFCTU which produced a memorandum a month later making many of the same points.¹³

¹⁰ Schwarz, *Adenauer Vol. II*, p. 488.

¹¹ AdsD 5/IGMA100429 Rosenberg to IGM 27-6-1955, reporting on a conversation he and Brenner had with Erhard.

¹² HGRG IBGE 2125B '*Gewerkschafts-Konferenz für die Wiederbelebung des Europa- Gedankens*', Brussels, 25 – 27 August 1955. The Conference minutes can be found at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/netzquelle/01548.pdf> (Accessed 10-2-2021)

¹³ See Etienne Deschamps, 'The Role of the Trade Unions and the Social Provisions of the EEC Treaty', *CVCE.EU* (2016), https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/24cea7ea-2551-4a63-bbe5-92ab407bf809/Resources#9ad6ea60-d0ca-48cf-aec3-d64de99030f3_en&overlay (Accessed 18-11-2020)

The unions' agenda was an optimistic one and the union leaders showed themselves prepared to compromise early in the face of potential governmental opposition. Late in November 1955 Potthoff wrote to Ollenhauer that he had met Monnet, Freitag and Sträter on 19 November, with Finet also present.¹⁴ Amongst other issues they reviewed an early version of the draft resolution for the December Action Committee session (later postponed to January 1956) which Monnet had published on 24 November and agreed that the stress needed to be on the '*Angleichung*' rather than '*Harmonisierung*' of social policy, i.e. adjustment rather than a rather more aggressive harmonisation of rules.

In fact, these union related issues did not feature in the declaration and resolutions of the Committee's first session. The reason for this is unclear. It is possible Monnet did not want to introduce items that could prove controversial at the Committee's first session; with the exception of Euratom much of the Resolution dealt in generalities. However, point 4 with its emphasis on rapid action provides an initial glimpse of Monnet's overriding priority of ensuring that nothing would impede the integration process.¹⁵ The long, painful and ultimately unsuccessful process of EDC treaty ratification had convinced Monnet that a tight timescale was required if success was to be achieved.¹⁶ At this point Spaak's working party had not yet delivered its report and there is no archival evidence that the union leaders, while appreciating the issues, saw them as pressing; the ramifications of Messina were not yet fully apparent.

¹⁴ AdsD 2/PVAH0000012 Potthoff to Ollenhauer 30-11-1955.

¹⁵ Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, p. 20.

¹⁶ Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 306.

By the time of the Committee's second session in July the situation had changed dramatically. In the space of four months the Foreign Ministers of The Six had agreed to aim equally for Euratom and a common market, the Spaak report had been delivered and accepted at their Venice Conference in May and negotiations on the treaties had already started in Val Duchesse at the end of June. The contrast with the participative environment of the ECSC was becoming clear; the unions had been denied direct involvement in both the Spaak report and the inter-governmental negotiations that followed. The speed and turn of events were a wakeup call for the unions, and the ICFTU responded by establishing the 'Paris Bureau', designed to enable the union leaders to establish a common position towards the negotiations. The dangers of exclusion were apparent; the Spaak Report made no mention of an Economic and Social Committee, an omission that was only rectified subsequently due to pressure from the Dutch and Belgian governments.¹⁷

The unions now had no alternative but to act if they were to maintain their existing status within the new communities. Given that concerns about Messina had provided one of the reasons for joining the Committee in the first place and in Paterson's words 'the outstandingly good relations they enjoyed with Monnet', it made sense for the union leaders to use him to press their case.¹⁸ Monnet moreover had the contacts that would facilitate the process. Officially the July session of the Committee was primarily concerned with administration. Nevertheless, within days, Monnet had written to the heads of government.¹⁹ In his letter he indicated his aspirations for a process of consultation between the unions and the delegates

¹⁷ Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, p. 201.

¹⁸ Paterson, *SPD and European Integration*, p. 115.

¹⁹ AFJME AMK 5/8/5 Monnet to Heads of Government 23-7-1956.

currently working in Val Duchesse, adding that he hoped the other countries involved would follow the Belgian example by doing so. Monnet's intervention reflected his understanding of the active role the unions should play in creating Europe. Monnet also wrote to the Foreign Ministers of The Six specifically on behalf of the Committee on the particular need to establish a Consultative Committee for Euratom, emphasising in a letter to Finet that the Action Committee had charged him to do this.²⁰ There was no officially published output from the July Session but Monnet could reference the Declaration that the Committee had agreed to submit for parliamentary approval in January 1956. In a letter to the members unable to attend the July session he stressed that more attention needed to be paid to the social aspects of integration as they were currently only being dealt with indirectly by national parliaments and the negotiations in Brussels.²¹ The German unions did not reply to Monnet but the unions' exclusion from the negotiations did not represent an auspicious start to the process of establishing the new communities and, as will be shown, subsequently constituted one of their major complaints about the process.

Many of the unions' concerns were, in fact, identified in the period leading up to the treaties. A report entitled '*Bericht über die Entwicklung der öffentlichen Meinung über die EGKS und die europäische Integration in der BRD, Frankreich, Belgien, Italien, Holland, sowie in den Gewerkschaftskreisen*', dates from 1955 - 56.²² Its provenance is unknown but the report was most likely an input into the Spaak Committee providing background material for the use of

²⁰ AFJME AMK 5/8/8 Monnet to Foreign Ministers 24-7-1956; AMK 5/8/9 Monnet to Finet 24-7-1956.

²¹ AFJME AMK 5/7/8 Monnet to Committee Members 24-7-1956.

²² AdsD 5/IGMA100429 '*Bericht über die Entwicklung der öffentlichen Meinung über die EGKS und die europäische Integration in der BRD, Frankreich, Belgien, Italie, Holland, sowie in den Gewerkschaftskreisen*'. The report is undated but the content indicates this period.

delegates during the Val Duchesse negotiations.²³ The report consists of a 21 page analysis of the political attitudes in the countries of The Six. As far as the unions were concerned, the report noted that they had supported the ECSC since its formation with the exception of *'einer gewissen Zurückhaltung'* on the part of the German unions. It is unclear whether this comment referred to the German unions' original debate on whether to take up representation in the ECSC institutions or to subsequent events. If the latter, the report did reflect the frustration among many trade unionists at the lack of social progress at a European level.

The report was correct in recognising that basic agreement with the European project remained high. Had this not been the case Freitag, Imig and Sträter would not have chosen to approach Monnet in December 1954 offering their support. This was the result of union experiences in the ECSC with Monnet's cooperation being particularly valued by them.²⁴ Dissatisfaction and disappointment at the slow implementation of social progress expected from the Paris Treaty, a point articulated at the unions' *Wiederbelebungs* Conference the previous August, did not invalidate the overall verdict.

There was likewise the feeling among the unions that the High Authority should make more use of its economic powers, i.e. *'stärker dirigistische orientierte Politik erfolgen'*. In discussing treaty changes the report mentioned that despite the failure of the EDC, the unions, in their

²³ The report in the IGM files is in the same typeface and on the same type of paper as a summary of the Spaak Committee recommendations. It is almost certainly not a paper from the HA as these were normally identified as such. The section on the unions starts on p. 19.

²⁴ Jojevic, 'Nachholende Europäisierung?', p. 117.

Congresses and meetings, were pushing for the continuation of European integration. Both the Free and Christian unions were reported to have three main demands: the extension of the HA's competences to include other energy sources; the realisation of economic (and even political) integration with supranational organs, even if these were not exact copies of the ECSC's institutions; and the need for social harmonisation to be promoted alongside economic integration. The possibility of an Economic and Social Council was often mentioned. Spaak's working group was, however, only the beginning of a long and tortuous process, involving numerous players and most particularly national governments, which would lead to the final treaties the following year. The input report provided a good summary of the unions' position, identifying their major concerns for the negotiations. However, identifying union concerns did not mean addressing them. The unions' exclusion from Spaak's working group and then the negotiating process meant there was no certainty that union demands would be incorporated in the final treaties if major governmental players were determined to reduce union influence.

5.2 The Negotiations

There was a pause in activity during August 1956 but in early September Monnet, conscious that he would need to report progress at the Committee's September session, followed up his earlier letters (to which there had been no reply) by again writing officially to the Foreign Ministers on its behalf.²⁵ Rosenberg forwarded his copy on to the German union leaders on 13 September to ensure they were aware of Monnet's actions.²⁶ In his letter Monnet argued

²⁵ AFJME AMK 5/8/12 Monnet to Foreign Ministers cc. Rosenberg 3-9-1956.

²⁶ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Rosenberg to Freitag, Gutermuth, Brenner, Sträter, Gefeller and Kummernuss 13-9-1956.

for a Consultative Committee for Euratom as *'la réalisation de l'Euratom présente un intérêt évident pour les travailleurs'*. The common market was not mentioned; the extension of existing organisational models would not be as applicable in this case as it would be with the sectoral integration of Euratom. Social and economic policy was thus on the agenda for the Committee's September session, as van Helmont confirmed to Ollenhauer in a letter a week later.²⁷

The Committee's third session on 19 – 20 September 1956 formalised the arguments Monnet had made in his previous correspondence to the Foreign Ministers. Point 2 of the introduction reminded the Foreign Ministers of the importance of associating workers and employers in Euratom, *'notamment dans un Comité consultative'* and point IV,7 of the resolution spoke of the need for cooperation between workers' organisations, employers and consumer representatives, i.e. tripartite consultation on the ECSC model.²⁸ The precise nature of the Committee's demand was thus left unclear with the Committee backing employee representation but referencing both parity and tripartite models. Tripartite representation tended to favour business interests as 'consumer' representatives had traditionally given the employers additional weight, the 'consumers' being the immediate industrial users of coal and steel such as the power and automobile industries. Parity representation gave the unions equal status to the employers and avoided the complication of a third, potentially hostile, grouping. Wehner's report of the session noted that some members drew attention to *'ungünstige Erfahrungen'* with the ECSC's Consultative Committee, most likely a reference to

²⁷ AdsD 2/PVAH0000012 van Helmont to Ollenhauer 10-9-1956.

²⁸ Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, pp. 23 – 27.

the unions' belief that the 'consumer' representatives on the Consultative Committee, as industrial employers themselves, tended to side with the employers.²⁹ The resolution allowed unanimity on the Committee by avoiding a clear choice between the two forms of representation but did little to progress the debate and by concentrating on process and the mechanics of representation side-stepped the question of the wider social agenda.

Wehner's report of the meeting, which he forwarded to Rosenberg, was principally devoted to Monnet's outlining of the energy and atomic situation, followed by the debates on these subjects. However, union representation was also discussed, with Wehner reporting that the unions needed to meet and agree a set of concrete proposals. Here Wehner reported that during the meeting Monnet promised to help the unions and had reiterated this again to him in private. Wehner concluded that he proposed speaking to Rosenberg, Brenner and Richter about union representation.

Meanwhile, on 22 September van Helmont wrote to Robert Bothereau of the French union *Force Ouvrière* to advise him that the French parliamentarians on the Committee had written to Mollet concerning the need for union representation in the negotiations and received a favourable reply.³⁰ Replies to Monnet's letter of 3 September were now received from Joseph Bech the Luxemburg Prime Minister, Edgar Faure in France and Johan Beyen in the Netherlands.³¹ The tone of these varied; Faure (a Radical) was the most supportive of union

²⁹ AdsD 2/PVAH0000024, Wehner's report on 1st Session, p. 5.

³⁰ AFJME AMK6/8/2 Van Helmont to Bothereau 22-9-1956.

³¹ AFJME AMK 6/9/7 Bech to Monnet 24-9-1956; AMK 6/9/8 Faure to Monnet 25-9-1956; AMK 6/9/10 Beyen to Monnet 27-9-1956.

involvement, while Bech (a Christian Democrat) said he had taken note of the need for union involvement and passed the note on to Brussels. Beyen (an Independent Liberal with a business background) merely replied that he did not want to pre-empt the negotiations. All expressed apparent sympathy for Monnet's request but none was prepared to make any positive moves to promote it. However, Hallstein's reply (on behalf of von Brentano who was ill) was markedly cooler in tone, with Hallstein just saying that he thought the issue of a Consultative Committee would be discussed at the Brussels Conference.³² The replies showed how difficult it would be for the unions to progress their cause in the face of national government indifference or even hostility.

During October and November Monnet was preoccupied with the British Chancellor Harold Macmillian's proposal to establish a free trade area (Plan G), which he viewed as designed to undermine the concept of the common market.³³ He was also concerned by the apparent breakdown in the Val Duchesse negotiations due to the French demands for the harmonisation of social costs, which the Germans in particular feared would make their industries uncompetitive. This issue was finally resolved at the Franco-German summit between Adenauer and Mollet on 6 November. This resulted in a general statement on social harmonisation saying that it would come about as a consequence of the common market but no timescales or conditions for implementation were specified.³⁴ Writing to Ollenhauer after the summit, Monnet tried to put a gloss on the decision, suggesting that there was still the

³² AFJME AMK 6/9/12 Hallstein to Monnet, October 1956.

³³ See Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 307.

³⁴ Lisa Rye, 'In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France and Claims for Social Harmonisation in the European Economic Community, 1955 - 56', *Journal of European Integration History*, 8 (2002), pp. 85-102, p. 101.

possibility of social conditions equalling up over time.³⁵ The reality in fact was different, as Pierre Guillen recognised, *'les engagements précis font place à des déclarations d'intention ou à des formules de compromis assez vagues'*.³⁶ The episode showed that the key European players emphasised progress over precision, particularly as far as the social aspects of integration were concerned. Given the ambivalent or unfavourable responses to Monnet's letter of 3 September, this emphasis was not an encouraging precedent for the unions' campaign. Their demands were unlikely to be considered if they risked obstructing the progress of the negotiations.

October 1956 also saw changes in the German union leadership. Freitag, whose background in IGM involved working in a European context, was replaced as Chairman by Willi Richter, who had worked in the DGB administration since 1950 and, as shown, was much less European minded. All three of Monnet's original contacts from the German unions had changed during 1956; Imig of IGB had died that February to be replaced by Heinrich Gutermuth and in May 1956 Otto Brenner had replaced Sträter in representing IGM. Change meant building new relationships with members who had not been among Monnet's original contacts. The change also occurred at a point when union attention was largely focussed on domestic matters. The Schleswig-Holstein metalworkers' strike began late that October; after earlier setbacks IGM needed a success and as the union was a 'pioneer' in wage demands for the unions in general, the course of events was followed closely by the DGB and other unions.

³⁵ AdsD 2/PVAH0000024 Monnet to Ollenhauer 9-11-1956.

³⁶ Pierre Guillen, *L'Europe remède à l'impuissance française? Le gouvernement Guy Mollet et la négociation des traités de Rome (1955-1957)*, *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 102 (1988), pp. 319-335, p. 331, quoted in Rye, 'In Quest of Time', p. 101.

The unions continued to press their case for representation. By the middle of November the union members on the Committee had drafted a letter to the Foreign Ministers of The Six.³⁷ This stated that despite Monnet's earlier approaches, there had been no attempt to involve the unions in the negotiations. It continued by pointing out the role that unions played in all the countries concerned and that

*es wäre nicht denkbar, daß den Arbeitnehmern innerhalb der europäischen Gemeinschaft nicht die gleiche Stellung eingeräumt wird, die sie auf nationale Ebene innehaben, wo doch unsere Gewerkschaften ihre Stärke und ihren Einfluss im Interesse der Schaffung von Euratom und des gemeinsamen Marktes geltend gemacht haben.*³⁸

The unions feared the possibility of their European position being weaker than their domestic ones. Nor did they feel that their efforts in promoting integration had been sufficiently recognised and appreciated. The situation was far from an 'escape to Europe' for the German unions.

The original typed draft of the letter referred to '*die freien Gewerkschaften*'; it was then amended by hand to '*unsere Gewerkschaften*' to include the Christian unions, strengthening the message accordingly. Relations between the Christian-based IFCTU and the Free trade unions were strained at the time due to the recent formation of a Christian trade union in the Federal Republic.³⁹ Here at least they could cooperate under the umbrella of Monnet's Committee, where both were represented.

³⁷ AFJME AMK 6/9/13 dated 14-11-1956.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁹ Patrick Pasture, 'The Fist of the Dwarf. Formation, Organisation and Representation of the Christian Trade Unions (1945 - 58)', *Journal of European Integration History*, 1 (1995), pp. 5-26, p. 19.

The letter made specific demands for a tripartite council for Euratom, and involvement in the management (*Geschäftsführung*) of the trading agency (*Handelsagentur*) as well as in specialist training and the development of safety measures, seen as particularly important in the nuclear industry. Given the emphasis on nuclear power, demands concerning the common market were less specific, asking only for the development of 'similar terms' but involvement in the administration of the planned Adjustment and Investment Funds was specifically mentioned. The ongoing nature of the negotiations meant the description of some of the institutions may have been imprecise but the unions' demands for both Euratom and the common market were quite clear. In the unions' view social integration should go hand in hand with economic and political integration, with the new communities pursuing a balanced approach between the three areas. Interestingly, the document made no mention of the ECSC when discussing their requirements for the new communities, the unions preferring to reference their comparison to existing national arrangements, which may have seemed more appropriate when addressing national politicians.

The signatories expressed their hope that the recipients were of the same view concerning the role of the unions, '*wir möchten mit Sicherheit annehmen, dass Sie der gleichen Auffassung sind*'.⁴⁰ This was highly unlikely in the German case as Hallstein's lukewarm reply the previous month had implied. *Montanmitbestimmung* had been a one-off and the ECSC's institutional arrangements reflected the earlier requirement to win union support. Adenauer, who in Schwarz's words 'unhesitatingly sought to trim their [the unions'] influence' and 'instinctively...regarded trade unions as hostile organisations' was opposed to this level of

⁴⁰ AFJME AMK 6/9/13 dated 14-11-1956, p. 2.

union representation becoming embedded in the new institutions.⁴¹ The unions' exclusion from the negotiating process was a means of achieving this.

At least initially, Monnet seems to have been unaware of this development, even though the unions were writing under the aegis of the Action Committee. Monnet had positioned himself as the main link between the unions and national governments in this matter, using his contacts and influence to push for a solution to the question of union representation. However, the autumn had seen other questions that required his immediate attention; first the need to reply to Macmillan's Plan G, which the Committee did with its Communiqué of 16 October, and secondly, Monnet's continued push for civil nuclear power which resulted in the appointment of the 'Three Wise Men' on 13 November to review Europe's nuclear energy requirements.⁴² After receiving replies from the Foreign Ministers to his letter of 3 September, Monnet made no attempt to follow the issue up further, an indication both of the pressure he was under and also of the fact that union recognition was just one concern among several.

Monnet's background meant he was well-disposed to the unions and supportive of their demands for representation. These attitudes were, nonetheless, mixed with other, more patronising, ones, as Fontaine identified when he quoted Monnet as saying that Europe needed to be constructed '*avec et pour les gens qui souffraientdes guerres*'.⁴³ Speaking of

⁴¹ Schwarz, *Adenauer Vol. II*, p. 488.

⁴² The wise men were Franz Etzel a CDU politician and Vice-President of the ECSC, Louis Armand then the head of French railways and Francesco Giordiani, an Italian Chemistry Professor involved with the nuclear industry.

⁴³ Intervention de Pascal Fontaine in *Une Dynamique Européenne*, p. 182.

the need to win the support of labour, Monnet opined that 'an industrialist, or politician for that matter behaves better when a trade unionist is present, even if the trade unionist never opens his mouth'.⁴⁴ If it was the case that the presence of a trade unionist impacted (either consciously or subconsciously) on the other members of a meeting, it was a situation that Monnet had encouraged in the ECSC and which he wished to see continued in the new communities. Here Monnet did what he thought was right; his support for the unions would not necessarily have won the approval of all members of the Committee but he nevertheless pursued union interests vigorously over the course of the year.

Union attitudes to Monnet's initiative began to change in mid-autumn. Up to then the unions had been prepared to let Monnet promote their cause. Now as Monnet was drawn into other issues and with social harmonisation side-lined at the Adenauer-Mollet summit, they began to doubt his effectiveness. Returning to the subject after a two-month gap, Monnet used the occasion of Richter's appointment as DGB Chairman to write to him suggesting they meet and stressing how he had pushed for union participation in the new institutions.⁴⁵ As he had not received any response, Monnet now suggested sending a precise demand (*präzise Forderung*) from the Committee about union participation in Euratom and the Common Market.

However, on 6 December Rosenberg intervened, advising Richter in response to Monnet's letter that while the proposed letter to the Foreign Ministers could be supported by the Action Committee, it should nevertheless go from the unions themselves, '*Ich halte es für unklug,*

⁴⁴ Quoted in Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 155.

⁴⁵ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 23-11-1956.

daß eine solche gewerkschaftliche Forderung durch das Monnet-Komitee getreten wird'.⁴⁶

Rosenberg did not give a reason for his stance but the implication is that while Monnet's support was welcome, Rosenberg did not necessarily want him or the Committee intervening further in matters the unions should handle themselves. He added that he had already spoken to Walter Schevenels, General Secretary of the European Regional Office of the ICFTU, Louis Major, General Secretary of the Free Belgian Trade Unions and Robert Bothereau, head of *Force Ouvrière*.⁴⁷ All had agreed that the ICFTU's European Regional Office would write in conjunction with the Confederation itself. He now wanted Richter to reply to Monnet endorsing this approach.

This proposed change of approach shows that after almost six months the ERO leaders were losing faith in Monnet's initiatives and believed that operating via their own channels was more appropriate. Ahland suggests that due to differences within the organisation, Rosenberg was sceptical of the ERO's ability to influence the negotiations.⁴⁸ He was, nevertheless, prepared to let the ERO initiative proceed, as even if ineffective, it was unlikely to damage the unions' position. Rosenberg's implied criticism of the Action Committee may have been a gesture aimed at demonstrating to the DGB's new Chairman that he, Rosenberg, was not prepared to let support for the Committee impact union interests. Most likely, however, is the probability that Rosenberg had concluded that both the Monnet and ERO initiatives were bound to fail. A couple of days earlier he had accordingly embarked on a new initiative which is detailed below, lobbying the Federal government directly. In fact Richter

⁴⁶ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Rosenberg to Richter 6-12-1956.

⁴⁷ At the time only Bothereau was a member of the Committee, although Major joined later.

⁴⁸ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 173.

had already sent the letter on 3 December, using the Committee's headed paper.⁴⁹ In the event this did not matter as two weeks later Rosenberg wrote to Richter again saying that as trade unions in the other member countries had sent it, Richter should do likewise or the DGB would be left out.⁵⁰ Richter thus sent the letter again just after the New Year, this time on DGB headed paper, and then copied it on to Monnet.⁵¹

Monnet continued his campaign by writing to Spaak the following day. Due to timings he would not have seen Richter's second letter, but his letter was essentially a covering one to follow up on the letters the union leaders had sent before Christmas and to state that the Committee supported their stance.⁵² This was not necessarily the case for all members but Monnet could, if pressed, refer to the Resolution of the January Session to justify his action. He again asked for union participation, proposing an economic and social council for Euratom and the Common Market, and pointing out that that the Dutch unions were supporting their government's request for such an institution. No response is recorded in the DGB archives and Monnet again wrote to Spaak three weeks later, calling for union representation in Euratom and specifically in the Provisioning Agency that was to be established, and copying the letter to both Rosenberg and Richter.⁵³ Richter underlined his key concerns on his copy; that the Provisioning Agency should have union representation and that the negotiators'

⁴⁹ AFJME AMK C1/33/2 Richter to Foreign Ministers 3-12-1956

⁵⁰ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Rosenberg to Richter 20-12-1956.

⁵¹ AFJME AMK C1/33/4 Richter to Foreign Ministers 3-1-1957; AdsD 5/DGDO000026. Richter to Monnet 3-1-1957.

⁵² AdsD 5/DGDO000026 Monnet to Spaak 4-1-1957.

⁵³ AdsD 5/DGDO000026 Monnet to Spaak 24-1-1957. The copies were forwarded by van Helmont on 25-1-1957.

approach represented '*anti-soziale Diskriminierung*' by excluding the unions from the negotiating process.

In fact, by December 1956 the unions' lack of progress had led Rosenberg to conclude that neither involving Monnet nor the other national federations was going to achieve union aims. He accordingly embarked on a parallel course of action, which is detailed by Ahland.⁵⁴ Rosenberg now approached the government directly, writing first to Siegfried Balke, the Atomminister, on 3 December and then together with Richter directly to Adenauer and other leading members of the coalition two weeks later to press the unions' case. National governments were in control of the negotiation process and achieving representation required winning governmental support. Rosenberg's demands were high; a Consultative Committee with parity *Mitbestimmung* and a Social Department headed by a trade unionist. Even with a sympathetic government, the approach would have been too late; the negotiations had already been underway for six months and were close to finalisation.

The government was not sympathetic, Franz Blücher, the Vice-Chancellor and (by now) *Deutsche Partei* member, remarking tongue in cheek that '*würde das Recht der Gewerkschaften anerkannt, mit einem Sitz in der Kommission die Interessen der Arbeitnehmer vertreten zu wollen, so könne [sic] der Anschein erweckt werden, als ob die Bundesregierung nur die Interessen der Arbeitgeber vertrete*'.⁵⁵ Rosenberg's approach went unheeded, just as Monnet's initiatives had done. A final attempt to influence the negotiations was made by the

⁵⁴ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, pp. 173 – 174.

⁵⁵ Quoted Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p 174.

ICFTU when in January the organisation sent two memoranda to the negotiators in Val Duchesse asking for increased powers for the European Assembly and for a place on the European Commission or Court of Justice to be reserved for a trade unionist.⁵⁶

All these approaches were too late. The negotiations were almost over and all the last-minute representations were unsuccessful. Three weeks later van Helmont wrote to Rosenberg to say that the Economic and Social Committee was not to be involved in nuclear procurement, only producers and consumers would be represented on a special *'beratende Ausschuss'* for provisioning.⁵⁷ Van Helmont wanted the unions to fight this, presumably through the Committee, *'Sie werden daraus ersehen, daß ein Eingreifen notwendig ist, um den jetzigen Text, der eine Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung am vorgeschenen besonderen beratenden Ausschuss ausschliesst, abzuändern'*, and added that Monnet had already pointed out on behalf of the Committee that this exclusion discriminated against workers, who needed to be represented.

However, Monnet, writing a week later just after the Heads of Government meeting which concluded the negotiations, took a far more positive view of events and no longer appeared interested in intervening on the unions' behalf.⁵⁸ He stressed that Euratom had been given ownership of fissile material, which he saw as *'ein politisches Ergebnis von allerhöchster Wichtigkeit'*, and that US control would be supplanted by Euratom, which he believed would put the US and Euratom on an equal footing. The establishment of an Economic and Social Committee for Euratom and the Common Market is only mentioned in point 4 of the letter,

⁵⁶ Deschamps, 'The Role of the Trade Unions', p.2.

⁵⁷ AdsD 5/DGDO000026 van Helmont to Rosenberg 15-2-1957.

⁵⁸ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Rosenberg, cc. Richter 23-2-1957.

with Monnet highlighting the areas for which it would be responsible - transport and social policy for the Common Market, training and safety for Euratom - but ignoring its reduced powers compared to the ECSC's Consultative Committee. In the final paragraph he noted that the Committee would not be responsible for procurement and this was expected to be discussed later. It was a replay of events the previous autumn; issues which could have proved contentious and delayed the ratification of the treaties were to be side-lined or postponed for resolution at a later date. Richter highlighted the paragraphs concerned and noted '*Aussenminister?*' in the margin; if this was a reference to an intended appeal to the Foreign Ministers it came to nothing. Positive to the last and eager to move on, Monnet concluded his letter by stressing the need for early ratification of the treaties.

The situation was unsatisfactory from the unions' point of view, their demands had not been met. Writing to the DGB's *Bundesvorstand* in early March, Rosenberg pointed out that as the Treaties were due to be signed on 25 March, any amendments to them would have to be made later via the ratification process.⁵⁹ This course of action was highly optimistic and very unlikely to be successful as it would mean winning a debate in the *Bundestag* and the other national parliaments. In a more general letter, dated the same day, Rosenberg outlined the situation in the various new institutions, recommending that '*in jedem Fall ist es erforderlich, dass wir uns mit den Verträgen auseinandersetzen und uns zu den politischen Fragen des Vertrages äussern*'.⁶⁰ However, he made no specific suggestions for further action and there was little the unions could do to remedy the situation; the Foreign Ministers' report appended

⁵⁹ AdsD 2/EOAA000438 Rosenberg to Bundesvorstand 8-3-1957.

⁶⁰ HGRG IGBE 3373 Rosenberg to DGB, associated unions and WWI 8-3-1957.

to Rosenberg's letter showed that the federal government reserved its position on the whole section entitled '*Sozialpolitik*'.⁶¹

Monnet meanwhile continued to dwell on the positives of the situation and the progress made in integration, lauding the work of the Three Wise Men in London, which he hoped would result in UK association with Euratom, as a '*großer Fortschritt*'.⁶² Van Helmont in turn confirmed that the Economic and Social Committee would have employer – employee parity but this turned out to be incorrect.⁶³ In its final version the Committee also contained 'representatives of general interest' (Group III members) who replaced the 'consumer' representatives of the ECSC's Consultative Committee.⁶⁴

Monnet himself circulated a detailed analysis of the treaties in early April, in which he considered their institutional, social and political aspects.⁶⁵ In it Monnet acknowledged that despite covering a wider range of economic activity, the competences of the new Commission were narrower than those of the HA.⁶⁶ In the section of union participation, he nevertheless stressed how the EEC and Euratom would of themselves lead to higher living standards as a result of productivity increases and technical progress.⁶⁷ This was essentially the sentiment promoted in the Foreign Ministers' report on the founding of the Common Market. Under the

⁶¹ HGRG IGBE 3373 '*Bericht über den Entwurf des Vertrages über die Gründung des Gemeinsamen Marktes*', p. 19.

⁶² AdSD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 2-3-1957.

⁶³ AdSD 5/DGAI003917 van Helmont to Richter 12-3-1957.

⁶⁴ For details of the Committee's membership see McLaughlin, 'Economic and Social Committee', pp. 11-13.

⁶⁵ AdSD 5/DGAI003917 Arbeitsdokument of CAEUE. '*Institutionelle, Soziale und Politische Aspekte der Verträge vom 25 März 1957*', dated 1-4-1957.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.8.

heading *'Sozialpolitik'* the member states pledged to improve living and working conditions for their workforces but *'ihres Erachtens wird sich eine solche Entwicklung aus der Wirkungsweise selbst, der [sic] die Harmonisierung der sozialen Systeme begünstigt, und auch aus dem Verfahren, die in diesem Vertrag vorgesehen sind...ergeben'*.⁶⁸ The implication was that as far as the Ministers were concerned no further specific measures were required. Harmonisation now depended on spillover but, as will be shown, with national governments in control of the process and the relevant clauses of the Treaty weak, this was unlikely to happen. Monnet's acceptance of the situation played into the hands of national governments and undermined the unions' position. His analysis also presented the Economic and Social Committee as a positive development but overlooked the fact that its mandate was constrained compared to that of its ECSC predecessor. The Committee's members had no right of initiative to the Commission such as their earlier counterparts had enjoyed, their position was to be purely reactive. Ironically the governments of The Six were now effectively arguing that the possibility of spillover lessened the rationale for the unions' proactive participation in Community institutions but ensured the processes that would have enabled participation were weakened anyway.

The unions had lost the debate over representation. After a delay of six weeks Monnet again wrote to Richter attaching a copy of his earlier analysis and admitting that the text of the Treaties suggested the unions would not get treatment equivalent to that at national level.⁶⁹ Monnet then proposed that the aim should be to get this in practice, but by stating that time

⁶⁸ HGRG IGBE 3373 *'Bericht über den Entwurf des Vertrages über die Gründung des Gemeinsamen Marktes'*, p. 19.

⁶⁹ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 13-5-1957.

was passing and ratification needed to be completed showed where his true priorities lay. The situation was much the same as that the previous autumn, with the difference that now the treaties had been signed there was even less scope for amendment. Monnet, too, with his constant emphasis on the need for quick ratification was prepared to leave contentious issues unresolved to ensure the success of the *relance*. In prioritising quick ratification of the treaties, Monnet showed that he was prepared to subordinate union interests for the sake of achieving a key step on the road to a united Europe. The unions were important and valued allies but Monnet was not willing to allow their interests to deflect him from the wider goal. If Monnet could have achieved both his aims and those of the unions, he would doubtless have been happy to do so. As it was, their priorities differed, and for Monnet the wider goal of driving integration forward would always come first.

The unions were not the only party to suffer from Monnet's emphasis on progressing integration at the expense of other interests. In her biography of Monnet, Wells details his treatment of Max Isenbergh, an American lawyer who worked for the US Atomic Energy Commission.⁷⁰ Isenbergh was instrumental in developing the concept of Euratom which he saw as an instrument for promoting non-proliferation. He was infuriated when Monnet, anxious to keep the project alive, continued to support it even after the French had forced the abandonment of the non-proliferation clause in the treaty. Isenbergh was clear in his judgment of Monnet's priorities and the lengths he would go to achieve them; 'I think Monnet had...his goal – the integration of the six [sic]. He was indifferent to ways of getting there'.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Wells, *Monnet*, pp. 197 – 198.

⁷¹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 197.

The parallels with the situation that faced the unions are clear; nothing, in this case not even the integrity of Monnet's own favoured project, was to stand in the way of European integration.

Monnet next contacted Richter in early July attaching a status report on ratification and asking for help with the process.⁷² (Richter was due to attend the convention of European Socialists in Tunis). Richter marked the letter '*bestätigen*'. The reply from his Secretariat, in itself a sign of a less warm attitude on Richter's part, thanked Monnet for the report but did not offer any further help.⁷³

From then on Monnet regarded the matter as closed, there was no correspondence between him and Richter between the end of July and mid-October. The Committee's fourth session from 6 – 7 May 1957 promoted a positive view of the treaties plus, as always, a stress on the need for ratification.⁷⁴ There was no mention of trying to deal with the issue of union representation during the ratification process. The session provided no comfort for the unions whose concerns were ignored in the resolutions. Monnet's positive public stance was, however, tempered in a subsequent letter to Brenner, who had missed the session.⁷⁵ In it Monnet did admit that the treaties were imperfect ('*unvollkommen*') but offered no solution, merely reiterating his earlier points on ratification and aiming to get greater powers in practice.

⁷² AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 1-7-1957.

⁷³ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Sekretariat Richter to Monnet 18-7-1957.

⁷⁴ See Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, pp. 29 – 30.

⁷⁵ AFJME AMK C1/7/41 Monnet to Brenner 13-5-1957.

Monnet's focus now moved on to his next concern, the location of the European institutions, preferably in a single 'European District', which he supported on the grounds of greater efficiency and promoting a European identity. This kept Monnet occupied during much of the autumn, resulting in a declaration published by the Committee on 25 November 1957.⁷⁶ The subject was due to be discussed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 18 – 20 December, where the issue of filling the various posts created for the new institutions would also be considered. Monnet wrote to Richter before the meeting with a list of the issues he thought the Foreign Ministers needed to address and stressed the need for nomination of union representatives to some posts.⁷⁷ However, in comparison to his earlier initiatives during the negotiation process, Monnet now did not refer to any efforts on his own part to promote this, the onus was pushed back on members to exert pressure on national governments. The change of direction represented a disengagement from his previous approach.

Monnet's next letter to Richter was after the meeting, repeating his wish for union representation on the Commission but stressing the difficulties involved and concluding that *'es is klar, daß noch schwierige Hindernisse zu überwinden sind, ehe dieses Ergebnis erreicht werden kann'*.⁷⁸ Given the difficulties the unions had faced up to then the judgement was a realistic appraisal of the situation and likely future developments. Richter marked this paragraph of the letter and also Monnet's statement that he would try to get the Committee's resolution on the European District enacted. He made no reply to Monnet and the next letter

⁷⁶ See Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, pp. 30 – 32.

⁷⁷ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 6-12-1957.

⁷⁸ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 21-12-1957.

Richter addressed to him was dated almost two years later.⁷⁹ It was a recognition of how little could now be done to remedy the situation.

Despite these setbacks, Monnet remained determined to accentuate progress wherever he could identify it. In January 1958 he wrote to Ollenhauer disregarding the bigger failure to achieve union representation on either of the new Commissions but celebrating the fact that Finet had now been appointed President of the HA.⁸⁰ He followed this up in a general letter a few days later, saying that this was a success '*das in den national Einrichtungen unserer Länder wenig Beispiele hat*'.⁸¹ Given that one of the reasons provided by Finet's predecessor, René Mayer, for his resignation from the HA to take up a business career was his fear that the ECSC was becoming a political and economic backwater, this judgement can be considered a piece of hyperbole to save Monnet's blushes and both he and the recipients would have known it.⁸²

Monnet supported union demands and had attempted to help the union leaders in their quest for representation. Nevertheless when forced to choose, he had no doubt that his main priority was the success of the *relance* and continued integration; union demands were not to stand in the way of achieving this wider goal. The implications of the Rome Treaties for the unions are discussed in the next section. These determined the background to the unions' involvement for the remainder of the Action Committee's existence; how this affected their relationship with Monnet and the Committee is discussed in the following chapter.

⁷⁹ AFJME AMK C1/33 Correspondence Monnet – Richter. The letter was dated 10-11-1959. The gap between the two letters included two Action Committee sessions.

⁸⁰ AdsD 2/EOAA000438 Monnet to Ollenhauer 1-1-1958.

⁸¹ AdsD 5/DGDO000026 Monnet to Rosenberg 10-1-1958.

⁸² Spierenburg and Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority*, pp. 364 – 366.

5.3 The Aftermath

The varied nature of interests within a Common Market meant that workers' interests were more diverse than before and harder to reconcile between sectors; what for instance should be the balance between cheaper food for industrial workers and support for farmers once agriculture was included in the Community?⁸³ By definition the Common Market covered all sectors of the economy; no union could now automatically assert pre-eminence, in the way that the coal and steel unions had done in the ECSC. The ECSC itself was now only one of three Communities and coal was declining in relative importance as a fuel, which resulted in a Community wide crisis in the coal industry at the end of the 1950s. Finet, whose appointment Monnet had lauded, was himself replaced as President of the HA in 1959 by Piero Malvestiti, an Italian Christian Democrat, again reducing union influence. At the same time the Council of Ministers' failure to declare a state of 'manifest crisis', allowing greater market intervention to counter the situation in the coal industry, angered the unions. The changes reflected the declining importance of the ECSC compared to the Economic Community. This was a setback for IGM and IGB; the ECSC had provided a distinctive forum within which they could operate.

Institutional change and the composition of the new Commission likewise disadvantaged the unions. Fattmann asserts correctly that as President, Hallstein, a Christian Democrat closely identified with Adenauer's foreign policy, appeared uninterested in workers' rights.⁸⁴ However, this judgement needs to be placed in a wider context. As Hoffmann observed, national governments were unwilling to cede control of social affairs; social policy in so far as

⁸³ Agriculture was included in the Common Market as a result of the July 1958 Stresa Conference.

⁸⁴ Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, pp. 204-205.

it affected wages was too important an issue to be delegated and in many countries including the Federal Republic there was little pressure for change if the prevailing influences on government policy came from business interests. Moreover governments wanted to keep a monopoly on distributing benefits – delegating this to Brussels would mean a loss of control and kudos and still cost money.⁸⁵ The Intergovernmental approach taken by member states ensured that spillover from the economic to the social arena would be kept to a minimum.

BC Roberts and Bruno Liebhaberg concluded that '[the Treaty of Rome] did not embody within its provisions the specific aim of social reform desired by the trade unions', adding that 'nor did it establish.....the executive institutions that could and would subjugate the national interests of the member states for the benefit of a Europe conceived according to the social image of the trade unions'.⁸⁶ While accurate, the first judgement was harsh and did not allow for some evolution which the authors accepted took place subsequently based on provisions within the Treaty.⁸⁷ The verdict on the executive institutions was accurate, the status of the Commission reflected national governments' determination to minimise its influence on policy. Roberts and Liebhaberg's analysis on the limitations of the institutions complemented Hoffman's on the factors obstructing the growth of a common European social policy; in both cases governments wanted to retain control of the process.

⁸⁵ Hoffmann, 'Forward, pp. vii-viii.

⁸⁶ Roberts and Liebhaberg, 'The European Trade Union Confederation', p. 270.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 270.

That there was no trade unionist on the Commission epitomised the weakness of the unions' position in personnel terms, a situation Monnet personally regretted.⁸⁸ The first trade unionist, Wilhelm Haferkamp, was only appointed to the Commission in 1967. The union leaders saw this deficiency at the top of the new organisation replicated in other appointments. When referring to the choice of personnel for the new institutions, Monnet in his *Memoirs* confined his comments to not wanting 'to place the institutions in unreliable hands' and the need to 'nominate men who were competent and determined to act'.⁸⁹ It was a matter for celebration that integration had moved on to a new and more encompassing phase; there should be no regret at the decisions that had been made along the way to achieve this success. Nor did Monnet mention the subject of union representation in his *Memoirs*. Given the importance he had previously placed on the issue, his reticence suggests that he did appreciate he had let his trade union associates down badly and did not want to reopen old debates. Monnet's biographer Duchêne was equally silent on the matter; his only reference to the establishment of the Commission being Hallstein's appointment as President, which is presented as a testament to Franco-German rapprochement.⁹⁰

As befits the study of a pro-European trade unionist, Ahland's biography of Rosenberg deals with the unions' engagement more fully.⁹¹ Once the treaties were ratified, disagreement over personnel for the new institutions harmed the unions' cause. Internationally they were at first unable to agree on a joint candidate for the Commission. Then, when the proposed candidate

⁸⁸ AdsD 5/DGAJ000375 Monnet's speech to the *Generalversammlung der freien Gewerkschaften*, 5 – 6 November 1959, Luxembourg.

⁸⁹ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 426.

⁹⁰ Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 309.

⁹¹ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, pp. 172 – 179.

Giulio Pastore of the Christian *Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori* (CISL) withdrew towards the end of 1957, they tended to assume that Rosenberg would automatically obtain a role on it. Even when the federal government announced it would nominate two government officials to the Commission, there was still an assumption that Rosenberg was destined for the ECSC High Authority. The assumptions were unfounded and Adenauer did not offer Rosenberg a European role.

The unions were equally unsuccessful in nominating lower ranking personnel for the Commission; the nominations were late going forward, allowing the Government to reject them. In the face of government intransigence and their own miscalculations, the unions had suffered a further serious setback. Kurt Hirche, one of Rosenberg's reports in the DGB, put the debacle down to the *'schwache und unsichere Haltung Willi Richters'*.⁹² It was a judgement that overlooked the wider context. Richter had become DGB Chairman at a critical time for the unions. Realistically he could not be blamed for the failure to achieve a favourable settlement for the unions in the Rome Treaties themselves; by the time he took over the Chairmanship the battle to shape the new institutions had effectively been lost. Nonetheless Richter could have taken a more proactive line as far as the nomination process was concerned. The unions' procedural shortcomings detailed by Ahland allowed Adenauer to reject their candidates and left the German unions underrepresented in the new institutions.

The status of the Economic and Social Committee on which the unions were represented likewise showed the institutional disadvantages they faced and the difficulties they

⁹² Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 177.

encountered in attempting to promote their own agenda. The Economic and Social Committee itself was active with numerous sub-Committees but most of this activity only concerned specific areas of agriculture such as the Eggs or Hops Committees; other economic sectors received little attention.⁹³ Given that there was parity between employers and unions on the sub-committees, Fattman's verdict that the unions could act as consumer representatives on them may well be justified but this activity represented a substantial downgrading of influence compared to their previous role in the ECSC and reduced the wider scope of their activity.⁹⁴

Gerda Zellentin ascribes any weight the Committee had to its composition and it was the case that it included some important trade unionists, Rosenberg was Chairman from 1960 – 1962.⁹⁵ Nevertheless the Committee's overall impact was limited; during the period the Action Committee functioned, Nicole Bernard *et al* were correct in judging that it suffered from being '*un rôle d'organe mineur dépourvu d'autonomie, d'initiative et de moyens d'expression*', procedurally the Committee only achieved the right of initiative with the Commission in 1972.⁹⁶ In these circumstances the unions' scope for action was limited. Their exclusion from the Spaak working group and subsequent negotiations had largely set the tone for the 1960s as far as the Community's pursuit of social Europe was concerned. The Dutch and Belgian governments might have succeeded in gaining agreement to a Social and Economic

⁹³ Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, p. 225.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 225. See also Rainer Fattmann, 'Die europäische Gewerkschaftsbewegung und die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik (1958-1972): Annäherung an einen neuen Forschungsgegenstand', *Journal of European Integration History*, 16 (2010), pp. 45-58.

⁹⁵ Zellentin, 'The Economic and Social Committee', p. 23.

⁹⁶ Quoted by Michael Hodges, 'Review of Nicole Bernard, Claude Laval and Andre Nys, Le Comité économique et social', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 12 (1973), pp. 205 - 206, p. 206.

Committee but its powers were much weaker than those of its predecessor; politicians of the centre-right were able to exploit this by downplaying the role of union representation in the new Community after 1958.

The DGB was now confronted with the same decision it had faced in 1951 – whether or not to participate in the new European institutions. Initially, even if the institutional arrangements were deemed unsatisfactory, it had seemed a straightforward choice. When the DGB Executive met on 8 October 1957 with *‘Schaffung einer Einrichtung der Gewerkschaften für die Institutionen der Europäischen Integration’* as the first agenda item, it was agreed that as only parliamentarians and government representatives could be included in the General Assembly, it was important that the unions were well represented on the Economic and Social Committee. This was followed by a discussion on the nomination of individuals to its sub-Committees. The disappointment the DGB felt with Monnet meant that no one suggested asking for his assistance with the task.⁹⁷

Six months later the situation appeared less promising and the incentives for engagement correspondingly fewer. The structure and competences of the institutions did not reflect the unions’ wishes and moreover, as was commented on bitterly at the DGB Executive meeting of 6 May 1958, the DGB’s list of nominations for the Economic and Social Committee had not been accepted and some people appointed who were unknown to the organisation.⁹⁸ This

⁹⁷ Jens Hildebrandt, (ed.), *Quellen der Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert. Band 12 Der deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1956 - 1963* (Bonn, 2005), Doc 19., Protokoll der 14. Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes 8-10-1957.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Doc. 31. Protokoll der 22. Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes 6-5-1958.

was despite an appeal from Richter to Adenauer, asking that the DGB's nominations for the Committee be considered.⁹⁹ There was thus a discussion over whether the unions should take up their places on the Committee or not. Eventually it was agreed that they should; just as in 1951 participation was deemed preferable to abstention, even though some individual unions were unhappy that they were not represented on the Committee. It was also agreed that the question of representation should be taken up with Adenauer in the hope that future appointments would take greater consideration of union views. It was a proposal based more on hope than experience; in October 1962 Adenauer would nominate Karl Hettlage, a lawyer and previously *Staatssekretär* in the Finance Ministry, as Potthoff's successor to the ECSC High Authority without consulting the DGB.¹⁰⁰

Rosenberg saw the results of the negotiations for the Rome Treaties as *'ein beträchtlicher Rückschritt'* for union demands.¹⁰¹ His speech at the opening session of the Economic and Social Committee on 19 May 1958 accordingly provided a hard-hitting critique of the events leading up to its constitution, *'wir sind der Meinung, daß die Zusammensetzung des Wirtschafts u. Sozialausschusses, was die Arbeitnehmer anbetrifft, nicht nur unzureichend ist, sondern auch eine starke Desavouierung für die ganze Arbeitnehmerschaft darstellt'*.¹⁰² Far from improving their position, the unions had actually suffered a major setback. Rosenberg then proceeded to detail his complaints, which included the absence of trade unionists on the

⁹⁹ HGRG IGBE 3109 Richter to Adenauer 9-5-1958. This letter was presumably written as a result of the DGB Executive meeting but referred to an earlier letter dated 29-4-1958 which is not in the file.

¹⁰⁰ For Hettlage's nomination see HGRG IGBE 3064 Adenauer to Rosenberg 10-10-1962.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 190.

¹⁰² HGRG IGBE 3109 *'Erklärung von Herrn L. Rosenberg, abgegeben anlässlich der konstituierenden Sitzung des Wirtschafts u. Sozialausschusses am 19 Mai 1958'*.

Commission and their exclusion from the negotiating process, before concluding that the unions' overall treatment demonstrated how little respect ('*Geringschätzung*') the member governments had for them.

Although Rosenberg was speaking from his own German perspective, other national federations felt the same. Antoine Krier, the General Secretary of the Luxemburg federation, catalogued his dissatisfaction with the settlement in the federation's newspaper, *Arbecht*. Like the DGB, the federation supported the Treaties despite the fact that they '*befriedigen die organisierten Arbeiter noch lange nicht*'.¹⁰³ Maria Eleonora Guasconi's review of Andrea Ciampani's work on the CISL shows that organisation too had essentially the same view of the treaties and the negotiations leading to them as the DGB.¹⁰⁴ The unions' status had been downgraded and they were no longer to be seen as partners in the way that they had been in the ECSC. In spite of having pushed for change, the unions had not achieved it. Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome did mention the need to encourage improvements in living and working conditions but the Commission, rather than the Economic and Social Committee, was given the task of promoting cooperation between member states in the social sphere. The issue was a Community wide one; the unions' influence was to be reduced and the institutions and processes of the Community had been designed to consolidate this change.

¹⁰³ Krier's article, quoted in Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, pp. 202 – 203.

¹⁰⁴ Maria Eleonora Guasconi, 'Review of Andrea Ciampani, La CISL tra integrazione europea e mondializzazione. Profilo storico del "sindacato nuovo" dalla Conferenza di Londra al Trattato di Amsterdam', *Journal of European Integration History*, 8 (2002), pp. 139-141.

As discussed in the historiography, many contemporary commentators lamented the unions' loss of influence as a result of the Rome Treaties and their failure to achieve greater progress in achieving 'social Europe'. In his work *Trade Unions as a Pressure Group in the European Community*, Emil Kirchner attempted a more detailed analysis.¹⁰⁵ From interviews and documentation, Kirchner identified five policy areas of interest to the unions; the expansion of the European Social Fund (ESF), the establishment of a common vocational training scheme at European level, the harmonisation of social security provision for migrant workers, the harmonisation of social security systems in general and the implementation of the principle of equal pay for men and women.¹⁰⁶ A summary of his findings can be found at Appendix VI. Kirchner published his work in 1977 and his analysis covers the period 1968 – 76, the final years of the Action Committee. The fact that he did not think it necessary to cover the initial decade after the ratification of the Rome Treaties shows how little progress there had been in the social sphere during that period.

Kirchner's judgement was that 'substantial' progress had been made in three areas (the ESF, social security for migrant workers, and equal pay), but had been 'small' in vocational training and 'slight' in general social security harmonisation.¹⁰⁷ However, while undoubtedly beneficial for those affected, the measures relating to migrant workers were by their very nature restricted to a small percentage of the population.¹⁰⁸ A more realistic assessment of

¹⁰⁵ Kirchner, *Trade Unions as a Pressure Group*, pp. 66-87.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119 Table 6.1 Impact of Community Pressure Groups.

¹⁰⁸ In 1975 foreign workers in the Federal Republic, by no means all of whom would have been EEC citizens, numbered 2.1m and with dependents 4.1m, see Hartmut Esser, 'Gastarbeiter', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band II: Wirtschaft*, (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 326-361, p. 333, Tabelle 1. This compared to an economically active population of 26.9m and an overall population of 61.8m, see Ambrosius, 'Das Wirtschaftssystem', p.32, Tabelle 8, or 7.8% and 6.6% of the respective totals.

this situation in terms of its overall impact would categorise progress as ‘small’, as shown in Appendix VI. The two areas where ‘substantial’ progress was made were either extensions of existing ECSC activity like the ESF or covered by a specific article in the Treaties, where Article 119 referred to gender harmonisation. The areas where progress had been ‘small’ or ‘slight’ were covered by the more general Articles 117 and 118 (vocational training was also covered in very general terms by article 128). Application of the two general articles promoting social harmonisation had proved largely ineffective in the face of employer opposition and governmental unwillingness to intervene; the commentators were by and large correct.

As Ahland comments, the founding phase of the EEC and Euratom could not be seen as a success from the unions’ point of view.¹⁰⁹ The marginalisation of the unions, their representation and their demands thus continued throughout the 1960s; the 1964 ERO Conference noted the increasing tendency of governments to make decisions concerning economic and social questions without involving the trade unions.¹¹⁰ As a result the events of 1956 – 58 and their repercussions left the unions with feelings of discontent which lingered. As late as February 1971, thirteen years after the events concerned, when Vetter was asked to introduce the discussion on ‘*Aktion im Sozial Bereich*’ at the 17th Session of the Committee, he had little hesitation going over old ground.¹¹¹ After saying how an economic community could only be constructed in conjunction with a social one, he went on to comment on how little emphasis on social issues there had been in the original treaties, pointing out that the

¹⁰⁹ Ahland, Rosenberg, p. 178, ‘*der Gründungsphase der EWG und Euratom lässt sich aus gewerkschaftlicher Sicht kaum als Erfolgsgeschichte beschreiben*’.

¹¹⁰ Quoted in Wieters and Fertikh, ‘*Ringens um ein soziales Europa*’, pp. 104-105.

¹¹¹ AdSD 5/DGAJ000151 Notes for Vetter’s introduction 23-2-1971.

unions had constantly drawn attention to this deficiency during the founding period. (The fact that they had done so without result merely served to highlight the unions' own failure, a point Vetter appeared to overlook). After dealing with individual points such as the use of the Social Funds, Vetter called for greater institutional contact between the unions and the Commission. This was an indication of how much circumstances had changed. The arrival in power of Brandt's social-liberal coalition in 1969 meant that the unions now had hopes of influence at a national level while their impact had declined in Europe. The German unions' changing relationship to the Committee after 1960 will be the subject of the next chapter.

Ch. 6 GERMAN TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP OF THE ACTION COMMITTEE 1960 – 1975

The activity and relevance of the Action Committee diminished after 1960 but the German unions maintained their membership. However, as will be shown, the relationship between the union leaders and Monnet had changed. Membership of the Committee became increasingly transactional, with union leaders only intervening if their or their members' interests were threatened. Changing political circumstances in the Federal Republic meant that after 1969, the unions felt they had an ally in government, giving them the ability to achieve change domestically that had previously not been possible. When Monnet dissolved the Action Committee in 1975, the contrasts between the unions' public and private reactions pointed to the ambiguities that had increasingly surrounded their membership.

6.1 The Domestic Background

Adenauer's grip on power faltered after 1960. His conservative coalition won the 1961 election but required Liberal support to remain in office, while the SPD, who had replaced Ollenhauer with Brandt as Chancellor Candidate, made substantial gains.¹ After a series of scandals, including the *Spiegel Affair*, Adenauer resigned in late 1963 to be replaced by Erhard. The change of Chancellor made little difference domestically with Erhard continuing his social-market economic policy. The major impact was internationally, where the new Chancellor took a more robustly Atlanticist approach than his predecessor and relations with France deteriorated.

¹ Grünbacher, *German Democracy*, p. 122, Doc 58.

Rosenberg had succeeded Richter as DGB Chairman in October 1962, bringing a new style to the organisation, which included opening discussions with the employers' associations. One of his first achievements was to oversee the introduction of a new programme in November 1963. This programme emphasised planning, social action and democracy and in doing so aligned the union movement more closely with the SPD's earlier *Bad Godesberg* reorientation. The journalist Günter Gaus saw it standing for '*eine planmäßig gelenkte, soziale gestaltete und demokratisch bestimmte Marktwirtschaft*'.² The programme was heavily influenced by Rosenberg, reflecting his 'accommodationist' approach to union matters and determination to modernise the movement.³

Domestically Rosenberg's period in office was marked by a gradual transition from some of the passive and apolitical attitudes of the 1950s, which emphasised domesticity and social conservatism.⁴ The 1963 Frankfurt trials of Auschwitz guards opened debate about German involvement in the war which had previously seen little discussion. Student unrest broke out after 1966 as a new generation of baby-boomers began to question their parents' attitudes and involvement in the past, as well as demanding greater political and personal freedoms for themselves.

² Quoted in Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 273.

³ Helga Grebing, 'Die Arbeiterklasse löst sich in ihre Bestandteile auf', in Reiner Hoffmann and Michael Guggemos (eds.), *Gewerkschafter und Europäer. Ein Lesebuch zum 100. Geburtstag von Heinz Oskar Vetter* (Berlin, 2018), pp. 49-62, p. 60.

⁴ For a discussion of these attitudes, which were often captured under the umbrella term *Hörzu*, after a popular TV magazine of the time, see Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (München, 2014), p. 684.

Most significantly for the unions, slowing domestic growth culminated in a recession and an increase in unemployment by 1967. This in turn led to concerns about the Federal Republic's social and political stability and temporarily clouded the *Wirtschaftswunder*, seen as one of the country's most impressive post-war successes. Following the withdrawal of the FDP from Erhard's coalition in autumn 1966 over economic policy, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger of the CDU formed a Grand Coalition with the SPD and Brandt became Vice-Chancellor. It was the first time the SPD had enjoyed power at a federal level since 1949. As a result, even though the SPD was the junior partner, the unions, although divided over the decision to join the coalition, expected to see developments in the economic and political landscape which would benefit them.⁵

Change came with the Grand Coalition's move away from Erhard's economic policies in an attempt to overcome the recession. Within the framework of the market economy, the Grand Coalition's 1967 Stability and Growth Law emphasised the need for balance between price stability, maintaining a high level of employment, and external equilibrium (basically a stable balance of trade), accompanied by steady and adequate economic growth.⁶ The emphasis on maintaining employment was welcomed by the unions while the implementation of 'concerted action', tri-partite forums involving government, employers and unions, meant they were now involved in formulating economic policy, a demand that dated back to the late

⁵ Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, p. 106.

⁶ <https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Gesetze/Laws/1967-06-08-act-to-promote-economic-stability-growth.html> (Accessed 27-6-2022).

1940s.⁷ However, while welcomed by the ‘accommodationists’ who were prepared to work within government structures, many union activists were concerned that participation in ‘concerted action’ would tie their hands in pay negotiations.⁸ A gap widened between the union leadership and activists, contributing to a series of unofficial strikes in September 1969.⁹

That same month following the federal elections, Brandt became Chancellor, heading a social-liberal coalition. Later that autumn Heinz-Oskar Vetter replaced Rosenberg as DGB Chairman. Expectations among the unions following the change of government were high, as Vetter himself somewhat nostalgically recalled just over a decade later when he retired from the chairmanship, ‘*das Ende der sechziger Jahre und insbesondere das Jahr 1969....waren geprägt von außenpolitischem Aufbruchsgest und innenpolitischem Reformwillen im Zeichen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs*’.¹⁰

Vetter’s view on domestic progress was initially justified with the introduction of pension reform in 1972 and a revised Works Councils Law the same year which updated the 1953 Act. The new law allowed the unions access to works councils in their own right; while previously union officials and members had often been elected to them, it had been on a personal basis. However, there were also tensions between the SPD in government and the unions. Despite the introduction of ‘concerted action’, the DGB could not guarantee wage stability in the face

⁷ Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, pp. 108 - 109; Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, p. 261.

⁸ Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, pp. 110 – 111.

⁹ Hemmer and Schmitz, *Geschichte der Gewerkschaften*, pp. 273 – 278.

¹⁰ Heinz-Oskar Vetter, ‘Am Ende einer Amtszeit: Aussichten’, *Gewerkliche Monatshefte*, 5 (1982), pp. 257 - 265, p. 263.

of activist demands while the SPD was constrained by its more pro-business FDP coalition partner. The experience of the 1972 Works Council Act showed it was impossible for the SPD to fully deliver union demands. Combined with a deterioration in economic conditions from 1974, the later extension of parity *Mitbestimmung* beyond the *Montanindustrie* demonstrated the limits of the SPD's influence and proved a disappointment for many union members. The new law was finally adopted in 1976 but only after six years of contested debate and with its original provisions substantially amended in the employers' interest.

By this time too Brandt had been replaced by Helmut Schmidt, who after 1975 adopted a markedly tighter fiscal policy in the face of mounting economic difficulties; as Vetter had noted, economic growth made the achievement of reform easier. Both Markovits and Silvia suggest that when confronted by the adverse circumstances of the earlier conservative-led coalitions, the 'accommodationists' in the unions suffered from a 'state-fixation', the belief that the election of an SPD government would solve their problems – the '*innerpolitische Reformwille*' that had so enthused Vetter.¹¹ The division between the first and second half of the 1970s and the contrasts between the Brandt and Schmidt Chancellorships showed that these hopes would also be contingent on economic conditions and wider political factors. Although unrelated to these developments, Monnet's dissolution of the Committee came at a time when growth was stalling, unemployment rising and economic circumstances again moving against the unions as the post-war boom came to an end.

¹¹ Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, p. 444; Silvia, 'Every Which Way but Loose', p. 95.

6.2 Union Engagement with the Action Committee

Within the EEC the early 1960s saw a concentration on the implementation of the Rome Treaties and the reduction of tariff barriers between the member states. This process was satisfactorily completed ahead of schedule, a demonstration of the Community's economic success. Political progress was more elusive. In 1960 de Gaulle launched an initiative (the Fouchet Plan) designed to give the Community a greater intergovernmental, rather than supranational, emphasis; the German unions' reaction to requests for involvement by other unions is discussed below. The biggest test for the new Communities came in 1965 with the 'Empty Chair' crisis. Following a dispute over grain prices and the role of the Commission, which Hallstein wished to enhance, de Gaulle boycotted Community institutions. The stand-off was resolved the following year with the 1966 Luxemburg Compromise which by emphasising unanimity in voting in the Council of Ministers and introducing a de facto national veto, underlined the increasing intergovernmental nature of the Community.

In these circumstances, progressively departing from Monnet's conception of Europe, the relevance of the Action Committee declined. The Committee's sessions became less frequent, correspondence from the centre to the individual members slowed, and the number of meetings between Monnet and the German union leaders fell. As Appendix III shows, attendance by the individual participating unions fell away during this period and the German unions' membership relied increasingly on DGB participation. Appendix IV shows that Rosenberg attended Action Committee sessions without fail, except in March 1969 when he had flu, continuing his membership on a personal basis even after his retirement. The DGB Executive itself continued high level representation until the last session in 1973.

In the case of IGB, Gutermuth attended no Committee sessions after 1960 and sent no substitutes, while his successor Walter Arendt attended the first session after his election to the IGBE chairmanship in 1964 but none thereafter. Born in 1925, Arendt was 40 years younger than Monnet, and unlike the earlier union leaders had not shared the same experiences and had no personal connection to him. Arendt most likely considered the Committee a waste of union time and resources; in 1973 IGBE was one of the two unions to precipitate a discussion of the German unions' membership of the Action Committee by withdrawing its financial support for the organisation.

In contrast IGM continued a reasonable attendance at Action Committee sessions until the end with Brenner attending personally on three occasions during the period and sending substitutes on four others. Unlike IGBE, Brenner and his executive saw benefit in continuing to attend the sessions and Brenner himself remained in regular contact with Monnet, meeting him seven times outside Committee sessions between 1960 and 1965.¹²

Monnet saw the Hague Summit as a means of relaunching the Committee but his efforts were unsuccessful, it was partly a matter of his age but also of changing political circumstances. The German unions could now concentrate their efforts on achieving reform via a friendly domestic administration. This was underlined by an article in *Welt der Arbeit* that Autumn, 'Zeitplan für Europa', which reported that Vetter, Brandt, Walter Scheel (the FDP Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor) and Karl Schiller (the SPD Finance Minister) had made a joint declaration concerning the Hague Conference, stressing that the individual governments of

¹² Data taken from Monnet Reduit Diary provided by AFJME.

the community needed to become more active in social affairs.¹³ It was a reminder that in many areas of domestic policy, executive authority still remained with national governments. With a favourable domestic environment, and hoping to capitalise on union connections with the SPD, Arendt served as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs from 1969 – 1976, Europe had become relatively less important for the German unions, especially as they perceived Europe as lagging in the social sphere. When the last years of the Committee coincided with those of Brandt's social-liberal coalition, the unions saw no reason to divert their attention away from domestic politics, refocussing on Monnet's now almost moribund Committee would bring few gains.

The unions' defeat over the Rome Treaties did not lead to a wholesale reappraisal of their relationship with Monnet or the Action Committee. There was no break with him and no open recriminations over the outcome of the negotiations, despite the initial grumblings described in the previous chapter. Contact continued, albeit on a much less regular basis due to the Committee's lack of activity. Nevertheless, the relationship did change subtly. The negotiations for the Rome Treaties had demonstrated that the Committee was not a practical vehicle for promoting union interests. Despite this there is no evidence that the German unions ever considered resigning from it, and they continued their financial support. From the unions' viewpoint the reasons for integration remained as valid as ever, even if their cause had suffered a reverse. Membership of the Committee clearly signalled the unions' commitment to the integration process, underlined their internationalism and aided their quest for equality of treatment.

¹³ *Welt der Arbeit, Jhr. XX, Nr. 48, 28-11-1969, p. 8.*

These were all issues that had encouraged the German unions to engage with the ECSC and the Action Committee in the first place. However, by the early 1960s these considerations were less pressing than they had been. The unions had demonstrated their commitment to integration over the previous decade and their internationalism was no longer in doubt, they were accepted as full members of the international union movement. Overall Germans had obtained equality of treatment, if the German unions felt they had not achieved this in the European institutions, they were disadvantaged as unions – just like the other unions in the member countries of The Six – not as a result of their nationality.

That they remained members of the Action Committee was a mark of Monnet's standing and a realisation that it was still useful as a venue for the informal exchange of ideas and information. Membership also carried a degree of prestige, and offered access to the European 'great and good', as Rosenberg had underlined to Brandt just after the latter joined the Committee.¹⁴ Finally membership made few demands on them as individuals. Nevertheless the emphasis had shifted. While these reasons for membership were as valid as they had ever been, they now assumed greater significance as both the nature of the Committee and the unions' engagement with it changed.

This represented a further step in the Committee's evolution away from Monnet's original vision of it as an active proponent of integration. When Melchionni remarked on the '*liens personnels d'amitié et de solidarité*' which the Committee had promoted, she drew attention

¹⁴ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Rosenberg to Brandt 22-3-1961.

to a wider aspect of its significance and development.¹⁵ For Schmidt the Committee became '*eine Art privater Gesprächsgruppe*'.¹⁶ Even this description seemed too formal and business-like for Rosenberg, in whose words it became '*eigentlich weniger ein Komitee als ein Freundeskreis*', a meeting point for like-minded individuals, but not one where serious business could be transacted or decisions taken and implemented.¹⁷ Wehner, another stalwart of the Committee, concurred with the *Freundeskreis* description, pointing out that its members all served the same cause and that the Committee itself was 'a treasure that could not be allowed simply to sink into oblivion'.¹⁸

For Schmidt, Rosenberg and Wehner, the change in the Committee's status did not necessarily negate its value. Even if the unions had considered withdrawing from the Committee as a result of Monnet's failure, after the early 1960s they did not really need to do so. Changing political circumstances ensured a discreet distancing from it on their part as a matter of course. As Monnet's aspirations were side-lined by national governments and in particular de Gaulle, who grandiloquently (if with some exaggeration) announced in March 1961 that 'we are no longer in the era when M. Monnet gave orders', Monnet's political hopes for the Committee were rendered redundant but its softer and less tangible social benefits remained.¹⁹

¹⁵ Melchionni, 'Le Comité d'Action', p. 251.

¹⁶ Schmidt, 'Jean Monnet und das neue Gesicht Europas', p. 14.

¹⁷ Quoted in Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 166.

¹⁸ Quoted in Duchêne, *Monnet*, p. 338.

¹⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 315.

Just as with the Committee, the union leaders' view of Monnet only changed subtly; previously, their relationships with him had reflected the prestige and status he had enjoyed as creator of the Schuman Plan and then as first President of the High Authority. By 1960 Monnet had been out of office for five years and, in the face of his exclusion from the new Commission and the change in French domestic politics, his influence as mediated via the Committee was visibly waning, as Yondorf's analysis for the years after 1960 showed.²⁰ His name still commanded respect but his views no longer carried the weight they had done. Nevertheless Monnet had helped the unions in the past and his prestige meant there was no reason to cease contact. Just as with membership of the Committee, there was no need for sudden change. The unions did experience a distancing from Monnet during the 1960s but it took place as a result of change in the Committee itself with the replacement of his original contacts with younger members who had little personal contact with him.²¹ In these circumstances, the initially close relationships could not be maintained. Due to the number of non-acceptances, not just from trade unionists, Rosenberg had difficulty in finding guests for Monnet's 80th birthday celebration, eventually having to rely on the German Foreign Office sending six senior civil servants to fill gaps in the party.²²

It is worth stressing that these changes only affected the unions' relationship with Monnet and the Committee. The German unions remained fully active in other international organisations where they could pursue their aims and express their concern for international

²⁰ Yondorf, 'Monnet and the Action Committee', pp. 898-900, Table II.

²¹ See Ch. 3.3.

²² AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Ritzel (Foreign Office) to Rosenberg 25-11-1968.

solidarity, notably the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) which they helped found in 1973 and at a global level the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

Monnet remained in control of the Action Committee until the end. The result was that its members, including the German trade unionists, could only act within the framework that Monnet had constructed. From the early 1960s the German unions found that they were members of a Committee that was peripheral to their key interests. With little ability to influence its development, the German unions were relegated to the role of passive participants, unable – but also unwilling - to develop a positive agenda for it and, as will be shown below, only inclined to intervene if their interests were directly threatened.

6.3 The Fouchet Plan – the limits of solidarity?

The first example of this attitude came with the German unions' response to their Dutch counterparts over the latter's concerns with the Fouchet Plan in 1960. The episode demonstrated both their lack of a wider perspective as far as the Committee was concerned and their unwillingness to use it to promote a more general debate on integration.

The Fouchet Plan, proposed by de Gaulle following his Rambouillet summit with Adenauer in July 1960, represented an alternative to the supra-nationality explicit in the EEC. It envisaged a 'Union of States' which would function on an inter-governmental basis, starting with the Heads of Government and then developing to include other ministerial functions.²³ Mayne

²³ For a detailed account of the Fouchet Plan and the reactions to it see Anthony Teasdale, 'The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle's Intergovernmental Design for Europe', *LSE "Europe in Question" Discussion Paper Series*, no. 117/2016 (2016).

subsequently had no difficulty in castigating the plan as it 'retained Community terminology but only to disguise its desertion of Community principles', yet Monnet's initial response was surprisingly favourable.²⁴ In a long letter to Richter, covering several other topics, he noted that the plan could act as a step to help bring about greater integration.²⁵ Political cooperation could lead to confederation and then ultimately to federation, with the added benefit that the cooperative nature of the plan was more likely to appeal to the British. Monnet subsequently revised his opinion; Dinan suggests that Monnet initially agreed to support the plan in exchange for a guarantee that de Gaulle would maintain the integrity of the Rome Treaties.²⁶ A subsequent, fuller, realisation on Monnet's part of the plan's Intragovernmental aspects and consequent reduction of supranationality for the Community would have been sufficient reason for him to change his mind.

The plan was not welcomed by the smaller countries, especially the Netherlands, who saw the dangers of a Franco-German axis which would marginalise the other members of the Community. The following week, two Dutch members of the Committee, the Socialist J.A.W. Burger and Derk Roemers of the Free trade union NVV, replied to Monnet. They criticised the initiative on the grounds that inter-governmental meetings would be at the expense of the Community and that some questions (such as Third World issues) needed to be discussed in a wider forum than that of The Six, and asked for their views to be circulated.²⁷ Monnet replied to the two Dutch members, stressing that further advances could only be made on the basis

²⁴ Mayne, *Recovery of Europe*, pp. 261 – 262.

²⁵ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 22-11-1960. Based on the AFJME correspondence listings, the letter was also sent to Brenner, Preuss and Rosenberg.

²⁶ Dinan, *Europe Recast*, p. 100.

²⁷ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Burger and Roemers to Monnet 29-11-1960.

of the existing situation and that confederation would be an important step towards eventual federation.²⁸ He then circulated Burger and Roemers' original letter plus his own thoughts to the members of the Committee.²⁹

The DGB showed little interest in Burger and Roemers' views and failed to respond either to them or Monnet. There are no annotations on the correspondence Richter received and no further reference to it in the DGB archives. Gutermuth of IGB did reply to Monnet, but only to say that the question was complex and needed further discussion, which was not possible before Christmas.³⁰ This was most likely an elegant evasion; there is no evidence that he followed up the issue in the New Year. Solidarity with like-minded members of the Committee counted for little. Burger and Roemers might have been fellow Socialist and union members of the Committee, but their concerns struck no chord with Richter or the DGB, even to the extent of a formal acknowledgement to them of the issues they had raised. In this respect it is immaterial whether the DGB supported the plan or not. (Rosenberg disapproved of the plan seeing it as integration in name only).³¹ What was relevant was that the German union leaders were happy to ignore a request from fellow socialists mediated via the Committee, even on a matter which related to its publicly stated goal, when their own interests were not affected. Their conception of the Committee and their role on it was a narrow one.³²

²⁸ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Burger and Roemers 2-12-1960.

²⁹ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Monnet to Richter 5-12-1960.

³⁰ HGRG IGBE 12365 Gutermuth to Monnet 21-12-1960.

³¹ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 170.

³² Union views of the Fouchet Plan in the other countries of The Six could provide an opportunity for further research.

6.4 Ludwig Rosenberg and the Action Committee

Richter's replacement by Rosenberg in autumn 1962 made little difference to the DGB's approach to the Committee. Rosenberg was an avowed supporter of European integration, a commitment that stemmed from his belief in the importance of the individual and his determination that the horrors of the immediate past should never be repeated. Unfortunately for Rosenberg, however, his period as DGB Chairman coincided with the lowest point of the Committee's activity, a situation he was unable to remedy.

Rosenberg's views on integration had been clear from the early 1950s; he was passionately in favour of it but equally determined the unions should benefit from the process. As Head of the DGB's International Department, he had spoken out in favour of the Schuman Plan at the earliest opportunity, linking it to union aims, and making union support conditional on the plan not being misused to undermine them.³³ The following year, in the shadow of the Korean War, he pointed out that European countries, obsessed with the idea of national sovereignty, were impotent on their own and that Europe was the solution, '*wir wollen – Europäer sein und als Europäer leben*'.³⁴ Europe had the resources to compete with the super-powers but needed American style economies of scale to exploit them properly, and achieve US level living standards, a theme also close to Monnet's heart. A strong supporter of *Mitbestimmung*, he underlined that economic integration was not sufficient on its own and needed to be accompanied by social change, which would be the core of the new democratic Europe.³⁵

³³ Ludwig Rosenberg, "Eine Idee beschäftigt die Welt," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 6 (1950), pp. 241 - 244, p. 244.

³⁴ Ludwig Rosenberg, "Europa ohne Konzeption," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 4 (1951), pp. 169 - 172, p. 170. (The hyphen is in the original quote).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

Rosenberg summarised many of these themes in his review of 1951, stressing that Socialists needed to be involved in building Europe and suggesting that progress would be driven by the people who were more courageous and progressive than the governments that professed to represent them.³⁶ Here Rosenberg may well have had both the Adenauer coalition and SPD opposition in mind. The previous sentences in the review referred to governmental failure to ensure democratic control of cartels, while an earlier reference to Socialists in the article suggests criticism of the SPD, who opposed the Schuman Plan. Rosenberg may well have doubted that a Schumacher led government would have been as willing to grasp the opportunities the plan offered as Adenauer had done. In referring to 'the people', Rosenberg was being somewhat disingenuous; at this stage they would not necessarily be involved directly in the process, their interests were to be mediated via the union movement as the later experience of union representation on the Action Committee was to show.

On becoming DGB Chairman Rosenberg had the opportunity to emphasise a pro-integration approach. He organised the Dortmund rally in July 1963, bringing together an estimated 20,000 ICFTU members from the six member countries of the EEC. Rosenberg gave the keynote speech after Monnet, making it clear in the introduction that European integration was not just a matter of economics but involved much higher aspirations,

*so geht es nicht um Lohn und Gehalt, nicht um Arbeitszeit und Sozialversicherung, sondern um etwas, das mehr als alle materiellen und sozialen Forderungen die Grundlagen der Gewerkschaftsbewegung von jeher betrifft. Es geht um Völkerverständigung, es geht um Frieden, es geht um das Gemeinsame, das alle werktätigen Menschen in allen Teilen der Erde verbindet.*³⁷

³⁶ Ludwig Rosenberg, 'Europa - Anfang oder Ende?', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 1 (1952), pp. 1-4, p. 4.

³⁷ DGB, *Vereinigte Staaten von Europa, Partner der freien Welt*, p. 9.

Europe was not just a matter of improved working conditions and prosperity, important though these were, and of obvious interest to his audience. He also wanted to remind them that a united Europe had a higher purpose. Europe stood for peace and freedom, acting as a hope and inspiration for people around the world. Here Rosenberg was reiterating the exceptionalism, and stressing the need for peace, that had underpinned the original push for integration a decade earlier. For Rosenberg, European integration represented a decisive break with the past '*europäischer Bürgerkrieg*', a Eurocentric interpretation of the events from 1914 – 45 whose phrasing and interpretation were normally indicative of a firm believer in European integration.³⁸ Rosenberg was thus uncompromising in his key demand – '*Wir wollen keine Bündnisse und keine Freihandelszone - wir wollen die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, nicht weniger und nicht mehr*'.³⁹ These were heady sentiments; federations and free trade areas were neither acceptable nor sufficient. For Rosenberg European unity would be an undoubted force for good in a troubled world.

His writings suggest that Rosenberg would have been an enthusiastic member of Monnet's Action Committee. Without doubt he was, yet he downplayed his involvement in it to the wider domestic trade union audience; few of Rosenberg's articles on Europe in the union press reference the Committee.⁴⁰ His attitude here was somewhat paradoxical. On one hand Rosenberg believed the 'people' should be involved in building Europe, even if few would have regarded it as one of their primary concerns; on the other, for reasons already discussed, he

³⁸ Ibid., p. 9. Interestingly Dean Acheson also used the same phraseology, referring to the 'European Civil War', Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation : My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), p. 387.

³⁹ DGB, *Vereinigte Staaten von Europa, Partner der freien Welt*, pp. 11 – 12.

⁴⁰ The DGB's press coverage is discussed later in this chapter.

did not feel rank and file union members needed to be overly aware of the unions' involvement with Monnet.

Rosenberg did not downplay the Committee because he saw it as unimportant or irrelevant. He supported it enthusiastically and devoted time and effort to it. Even so, for Rosenberg the Committee was just one of several interfaces into different aspects of European integration, others being his membership of the Economic and Social Committee and his involvement in the ICFTU, of which he was Vice-President from 1963 – 69. The Action Committee was important as it offered him access to the European elite beyond the union movement. Rosenberg may have regarded the Committee as a *Freundeskreis*, but he still considered that it deserved his full-hearted support. Drawing up a list of his numerous professional commitments in 1967, Rosenberg placed the Committee at the top of his list.⁴¹

The Committee was, however, marginal to union concerns and the failure of 1957 – 58 only strengthened the case for adopting a low profile approach to it. There was little point in advertising Monnet's failure to help the unions achieve their demands for representation; hence Rosenberg's lack of comment on events in the union press during those years. The Committee's low level of activity during Rosenberg's DGB Chairmanship meant that maintaining its low profile among rank and file members was straightforward. With a couple of important exceptions, much of the Committee's agenda during this period would have been of little relevance or interest to the wider trade union membership. And finally if the Committee was indeed a '*Freundeskreis*', a term which implied civilised debate and a meeting

⁴¹ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 18.

of minds for discussion rather than action, there was little reason to involve the wider world in its deliberations.

Rosenberg also had good reasons to maintain a low-profile personally as far as the Committee was concerned. During his Chairmanship the DGB was relatively weak compared to its constituent members and Rosenberg was working to redress the balance, with the individual unions often unwilling to cede power to the central organisation.⁴² The DGB also faced a period of increasing financial pressure in the mid-late 1960s, which resulted in cuts to some of its activities.⁴³ Subsidising the Action Committee did not necessarily involve a large expenditure but many members would have seen it as a non-core activity of little value; for them the money could have been better deployed elsewhere.

There is also some evidence that towards the end of the decade the idealistic Rosenberg was becoming frustrated at the way integration was stalling. In 1967 he returned to the theme of European exceptionalism; Gaullism was a dead end and the world would look very different if Europe could play a fuller part in world affairs instead of getting mired in detailed rules about vegetables.⁴⁴ Rosenberg's high-minded vision of Europe meant he could regard the negotiating issues involved in resolving complex details as a means of sabotage used by Europe's opponents.⁴⁵ In the same article Rosenberg stressed the need to use the opportunities offered by the recent Hague Conference. Europe needed to move on beyond a

⁴² Ahland, *Rosenberg*, see Part V, Ch. 1, pp. 226 – 239.

⁴³ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, see Part V, Ch. 1, esp. p. 237.

⁴⁴ Ludwig Rosenberg, 'Europa - Partner der freien Welt', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 1 (1967), pp. 1-5.

⁴⁵ Ludwig Rosenberg, 'Chance für Europa?', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 5 (1970), pp. 288-291, p. 289.

period of stagnation, and not get stuck in what he regarded as irrelevant details. As Rosenberg argued, was it really the case that *'die Frage der Einfuhr der Orangen als entscheidener für das Wohl der Menschen in der Gemeinschaft angesehen würde als die Harmonisierung ihrer sozialen Sicherung'*.⁴⁶ Returning to his theme that people understood the need to hand over sovereignty to the European institutions better than governments did, he called for direct elections to the European Parliament, together with increased powers for it and coordinated social as well as economic policies.

Nevertheless despite these pressures Rosenberg's support for the Committee never wavered. His role in its administration meant he was in regular contact with Monnet and Kohnstamm as well as acting as a coordination point for the trade unionists on the Committee as a whole. He effectively maintained contact between Monnet and the DGB during Richter's chairmanship. Underlining the connection, Rosenberg also mentioned in a note to Richter that Monnet often rang him at home to discuss issues.⁴⁷ Apart from highlighting the good relations between the two, this also supports the view that Rosenberg was Monnet's preferred DGB contact. Rosenberg also got on well with Kohnstamm, with the latter staying at the Rosenbergs' home on at least one occasion.⁴⁸

Rosenberg's enthusiasm for Europe stemmed from his liberal background and time in exile; in Ahland's words he was one of *'der eifrigsten Unterstützer des Franzosen [Monnet]'*.⁴⁹ Yet,

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 290.

⁴⁷ AdsD 5/DGAI003917 Rosenberg to Richter 11-3-1957.

⁴⁸ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Kohnstamm to Rosenberg 30-1-1964.

⁴⁹ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 166.

despite this, Rosenberg's involvement with the Committee made little difference to the DGB's stance. The German unions' loss of faith in Monnet and the low levels of Committee activity during his chairmanship meant that Rosenberg had no opportunity to rebuild the relationship or use the Committee more proactively. After retiring in 1969, Rosenberg remained on the Committee and continued to attend its meetings on a personal basis, a friend, admirer and believer in Monnet to the end.

6.5 The Multi-Lateral Force – a live issue for the membership.

The biggest disagreement between the German union leaders and Monnet also occurred during Rosenberg's chairmanship. The union leaders were anxious to avoid issues which would involve the Committee, and their role in it, in controversy. The American proposal, developed during the early 1960s, for a multi-lateral nuclear force, which had won the support of Erhard's government, threatened to do just that.

Monnet wanted Europe and the USA to deal on terms of equality and his vision went beyond the purely economic; involvement in MLF would mean the extension of the US-European partnership to include security.⁵⁰ Monnet was anxious to promote this partnership, as his letter to Brenner following his US visit in July 1964 made clear, and he was correspondingly keen that the Action Committee should endorse the MLF proposal.⁵¹ However, the suggestion of German military nuclear involvement, even in a multi-lateral force, touched a raw nerve in

⁵⁰ For an analysis of Monnet's thinking on the partnership and his wider global vision, see Grin, 'Une vision de la paix et de la sécurité'.

⁵¹ AdsD 5/IMGA090497 Monnet to Brenner 30-7-1964. The visit followed the Committee's June session, showing the importance Monnet placed on the partnership.

union circles. Many union leaders opposed it on principle and were also aware that it ran the risk of reopening divisions within the unions' rank and file membership, just as the issue of rearmament and the *Kampf gegen Atomtod* campaign against nuclear weapons had done a decade earlier. Mishandled, the issue had the potential to raise questions about union involvement in the Committee, disturb the permissive consensus that underpinned membership by diverting integration into a new - and for the unions unwelcome - direction, and embroil the union leaders themselves in controversy.

The debate began in 1963 with the draft resolution for the proposed session in November that year. In the event the session was postponed to June 1964 but Monnet must have been aware of discontent within the Committee and took soundings behind the scenes. Thus, when the subject resurfaced in February, Kohnstamm wrote to Rosenberg saying that, following discussions with members, Monnet had already made changes to the Declaration and Resolution to make the idea of partnership clearer and to place MLF in this context.⁵² A further (amended) draft followed a week later. Neither this nor the previous letter has any annotations by Rosenberg and he did not reply to Monnet on the matter; either Rosenberg was satisfied with the drafts at that point or, more likely, other matters were more pressing.

In mid-May Monnet sent out a letter confirming the dates for the session and noted that Erhard would meet the Committee during its time in Bonn. His only reference to MLF was to mention an amendment proposed by C.A. Bos, a Dutch Christian Democrat.⁵³ He likewise

⁵² AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Kohnstamm to Rosenberg 18-2-1964.

⁵³ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Monnet to Rosenberg 14-5-1964.

noted some amendments on the issue of monetary union which was also on the agenda. Given Monnet's emphasis on unanimity by the Committee, it is likely he would have continued consulting members had he been unsure of their reaction. The single reference to MLF suggests that at this point Monnet was confident that the amendments he had already made were sufficient to obtain agreement among them.

This was most emphatically not the case as the publication of the session's draft declaration and resolution proved. Apart from Germany's involvement with nuclear weapons, the proposed structure of the MLF and its operational arrangements were completely unacceptable to the unions because they were seen to disadvantage the Federal Republic. In the draft he received Rosenberg questioned the sentence *'durch den Plan wird die Kontrolle dieser Atomstreitmacht nicht von der Gesamtheit der an ihr teilnehmenden europäischen Länder übernommen'*.⁵⁴ Deployment of the forces remained under US control and under the proposed arrangement the bulk of US strategic forces would have remained outside the MLF.

In retrospect Monnet argued that MLF would have put the Germans on an equal footing with her European Allies.⁵⁵ Though strictly speaking correct, this rather missed the point that all the European countries participating would have been disadvantaged compared to the USA. The proposal echoed the lack of symmetry in the Plevin Plan of the early 1950s, under which some French forces would have remained outside the EDC while the Federal Republic was regarded as a lesser, and by implication inferior, participant. The MLF proposal questioned

⁵⁴ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 van Belmont to Rosenberg 20-5-1964. The underlining of *'nicht'* in the comments is Rosenberg's own and was supplemented by a question mark in the margin.

⁵⁵ Monnet, *Memoirs*, p. 468.

the Federal Republic's claims for equality of treatment and evidenced continued distrust of the Germans, even among their allies.⁵⁶ For the unions the plan threatened a toxic mixture of support for nuclear weapons, lack of political equality for the Federal Republic and the possibility of reigniting the rearmament debates of the previous decade, while casting their involvement in the Action Committee in an unfavourable light as far as the rank and file were concerned.

Other members now joined the debate with a flurry of comments and amendments. These were not all negative. Christian Democrats such as Pierre Pflimlin of the French MRP and Norbert Schmelzer of the Dutch *Katholieke Volkspartij* (KVP) saw MLF as a possible bridge to further political cooperation; they believed it would need to be accompanied by a supranational institutional structure, just as with the EDC the previous decade. Dutch members such as Bos and Schmelzer also believed the project would strengthen the Atlantic alliance.⁵⁷ Monnet's management of the drafting process meant that not all the authors of the various amendments are identified in the draft circulated, some just reference 'several members of the Committee'.⁵⁸ There is no detectable version control and amendments referring to the separate agenda items on EU-US partnership and the MLF project sometimes appear to have been merged. On this occasion, due to the importance of the issues involved for those concerned, the ambiguity that could sometimes facilitate the drafting process failed.

⁵⁶ The American satirist Tom Lehrer stereotyped concerns about German involvement in MLF in his 1965 song 'MLF Lullaby', <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3j20voPS0gl> (Accessed 14-2-2018)

⁵⁷ The amendments are shown in AdsD 5/DGAI002366. The copy is Rosenberg's.

⁵⁸ See Ch. 3.5.

Brenner reflected Rosenberg's concern and wrote to Monnet saying that he could not support Section III of the Declaration concerning atomic weapons, adding that he had raised this at their last meeting in Bad Godesberg.⁵⁹ He stated bluntly that IGM had been against atomic weapons for many years and as Chairman he could not go against Conference resolutions and endorse MLF. It was a clear signal to Monnet of the difficulties that Brenner knew the resolution would cause with his rank and file. Brenner added that in his view the MLF project was questionable and would not serve the process of Europe's atomic *'Mitbestimmung'* (an interesting extension of the concept) in the Atlantic alliance. He also warned of the dangers of nuclear proliferation, which he saw as an 'extraordinarily dangerous' development. He concluded that he could not vote for the resolution and believed others would be in the same position. He did, nevertheless, hold out an olive branch; a change to the draft might enable the Committee to come to unanimity.

Brenner copied his letter to Rosenberg and IGB the same day.⁶⁰ (There is no archival evidence that IGB took part in the discussions on MLF and as shown earlier the union leadership had lost interest in the Committee by this time). A handwritten note by Rosenberg on his copy of Brenner's letter refers to a subsequent phone conversation confirming that Brenner would not vote against the resolution. Rosenberg noted that he was in the same position as Brenner and had spoken to Monnet; the German trade unionists would abstain on Section III. Rosenberg had convinced Brenner to accept a degree of compromise that aligned them both with the majority of those opposed to Monnet's resolution.

⁵⁹ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Brenner to Monnet 25-5-1964.

⁶⁰ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Brenner to Rosenberg 25-5-1964; HGRG IGBE 12700 Brenner to IGB 25-5-1964.

The upshot was the most serious disagreement the Committee had seen and, preferring to stress the positive, reference to it is omitted in Monnet's *Memoirs*. Although the Committee's approval of the initiative was subject to a series of conditions, seven or eight members of the Committee nevertheless abstained on Section III of the declaration and one voted against, as detailed in Appendix VII. Having devoted several pages to placing Monnet's thinking on MLF in context, Fontaine merely notes that 'for different reasons' (which he does not specify) these members either abstained or voted against the resolution; he too wanted to minimise the episode. With the exception of Pflimlin of the MRP, those doing so were all politically to the left of centre, representing Socialist parties and trade unions. However, the German left was split on the issue with both Brandt and Wehner supporting the proposal, possibly unwilling to break the recent bi-partisan foreign policy established and most likely also conscious of the Federal Republic's dependence on the US for defence.

After the Committee's session, Monnet visited the United States and on his return wrote to Rosenberg saying that he thought the USA was still looking for a partnership of equals with Europe.⁶¹ In fact President Lyndon Johnson was already considering a retreat from the MLF programme, which was finally dropped in December that year.⁶² It is likely that, as Kohnstamm appreciated, Monnet's contacts, many of whom dated from his younger days, were not aligned to the new administration's thinking.⁶³ Monnet's reliance on them and his

⁶¹ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Monnet to Rosenberg 30-7-1964.

⁶² Johnson signed National Security Action Memorandum No. 322 on 17 December 1964. This effectively ended the MLF programme.

⁶³ For Kohnstamm's view see Harryvan and Harst, *Kohnstamm*, p. 125.

enthusiasm for a Europe-US partnership had blinded him to the realities of the changing political landscape as his correspondence with Rosenberg and Brenner showed.

Monnet's enthusiasm had also overridden his normal concern for unanimity on the Committee. He regarded the issue as so important that he was determined to continue regardless and not prepared to heed warnings such as Brenner's. For their part, the unions could not support the resolution. Endorsing a policy many rank and file members opposed risked inauspiciously raising the Committee's profile, upsetting the unspoken consensus that underpinned membership and potentially casting participation in it in a negative light.

6.6 Workers' Rights – a central union involvement.

The final issue on which the unions intervened with the Committee concerned workers' rights, a key concern for the unions. *Mitbestimmung*, which the unions saw as one of their principal post-war achievements, was emblematic for the unions and the extension of parity *Mitbestimmung* beyond the *Montanindustrie* remained a priority for the German union leaders during the 1960s. *Mitbestimmung* was not just a matter for the industries concerned; union leaders such as Rosenberg also saw it as a way of integrating workers into society and strengthening democracy.⁶⁴ The German unions would consistently oppose any developments which appeared to threaten *Mitbestimmung* or dilute other established workers' rights.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 268.

⁶⁵ See Alfons Lappas, *Der Beitrag der Gewerkschaften zur europäischen Integration* (Bonn, 1973), in which he stressed the importance of parity *Mitbestimmung*.

These concerns came to the fore during the mid-1960s with the debates over a possible European company statute. The early and mid-1960s had seen considerable US investment in Western Europe, driven by lower labour costs and with the notable exception of the Federal Republic aided by the strong dollar.⁶⁶ It was a development that caused concern particularly in France, where, with the automotive industry primarily in mind, in 1965 de Gaulle proposed that European mergers should take priority and be backed by a European statute.⁶⁷ On this occasion, de Gaulle's concerns meshed with Monnet's own aspirations to strengthen European industry. Reflecting the debate, he now took the opportunity to pull together several themes aimed at strengthening the European economies for discussion at the Action Committee session in May 1965. These included the possibility of a European company statute, greater cooperation in scientific and technological research, the development of an internal financial market and a common commercial policy towards Eastern Europe, the last also reflecting Monnet's wider geopolitical concerns. For the German unions, the development of a Europe-wide company statute was particularly problematic, as it threatened to undermine the achievements they had won domestically.

The draft declaration for the 12th Session was published in mid-March 1965.⁶⁸ Having reviewed it, Rosenberg replied to Kohnstamm with his comments and concerns.⁶⁹ Rosenberg questioned some of the translations used in the document, which he believed could be

⁶⁶ The Federal Republic was an exception to this trend due to the 1959 currency revaluation but the US dollar had risen by around 40% against the French Franc from \$1= FF 3.50 to FF 4.94 during the decade 1955 – 1965, <https://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf> (Accessed 6-11-2022).

⁶⁷ See *Der Spiegel* 5-10-1965, 'Wir [the Americans] kaufen die ganze deutsche Industrie'.

⁶⁸ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 draft Resolution for 12th Session dated 13-3-1965.

⁶⁹ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Rosenberg to Kohnstamm 31-3-1965.

misconstrued in a German context. He also raised the question of *Mitbestimmung*, saying the threat of its dilution was used by the GDR for propaganda purposes. He thus suggested a rewording, appreciating *Mitbestimmung* was not necessarily a popular concept in France and Italy for fear of Communist infiltration. He concluded by saying the declaration was good but needed to be better structured and suggested an alternative. Rosenberg had particular grounds for concern. The session, which he had agreed to host, was taking place in Berlin and was special in that it both looked back to the 20th anniversary of the end of the war and, on the anniversary of the Schuman Plan, forward to a new European future.⁷⁰ Given the DGB's stance on the matter and Rosenberg's own views, he would not want the session to be associated with a declaration that undermined one of the DGB's most important policies.

There were further discussions, for two weeks later Monnet sent a telegram to Rosenberg confirming an earlier conversation.⁷¹ Referring to the creation of European enterprises, Monnet confirmed that in the case of mergers, required to ensure competitiveness with American industry, his view was that workers' rights should be maintained and continuity of employment assured. This was to be achieved by extending the Social Fund, and the Commission should ensure that the Treaty of Rome was enforced to forbid cartels and the abuse of economic power.⁷² Extension of the Social Fund, with its support for retraining in the case of job losses, was a key union demand and would ensure their support for Monnet's

⁷⁰ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Kersten to Kohnstamm 31-3-1965.

⁷¹ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Monnet to Rosenberg 15-4-1965. The conversation was earlier the same day.

⁷² For further detail on the European Social Fund see European Communities, *European Social Fund. 50 Years Investing in People*, (Luxemburg, 2007), pp. 9-10.

proposal.⁷³ Circulating the revised text for the session a week later, Monnet confirmed that, despite splitting it into a declaration and a resolution, which some members wanted, there was no essential change to the wording.⁷⁴

To reinforce the message Monnet gave an interview in *Welt der Arbeit* in which he stated that existing laws benefitting workers must remain intact, even if he was unsure whether *Mitbestimmung* could be extended to other countries. He was clearly concerned to show that the German unions would not be disadvantaged domestically by developments at the European level. He then sent a copy of the article to Rosenberg to make his stance clear.⁷⁵ The unions' demands were carried into the declaration from the session with point 2 of the Declaration requesting a more active social policy and highlighting the anti-cartel and company statute issues.⁷⁶ These were then made more explicit in Resolution 3 asking for a Europe wide company statute which would allow mergers and which would '*maintienne les responsabilités et les droits que les législations existantes confèrent aux travailleurs*'. The next paragraph addressed the issue of continuity of employment which, the Committee proposed, should be underpinned by widening the scope of the Community's Social Fund, particularly in the area of professional education.⁷⁷ Monnet and the Committee had met the unions' demands and incorporated their wording into the session's declaration and resolution. This

⁷³ For the importance of the Social Fund to the unions, see Kirchner, *Trade Unions as a Pressure Group*, pp. 67 – 68.

⁷⁴ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Monnet to Rosenberg 23-4-1965.

⁷⁵ AdsD 5/DGAI002366 Monnet to Rosenberg 30-4-1965. The article appeared in *Welt der Arbeit*, Jhr. XVI, Nr. 19, 7-5-1965, pp. 1 & 3. As the letter was pre-publication Monnet presumably sent a proof of the article.

⁷⁶ Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, pp. 85 – 90.

⁷⁷ For the importance of the Social Fund to the unions see 5/IGMA090497 correspondence Nov – Dec 1969.

did not, of course, mean that it would be automatically accepted by the governments of The Six.

The Commission likewise followed up de Gaulle's proposal and in 1966 published a memorandum in favour of a European company statute.⁷⁸ This gave the concept greater prominence and Monnet returned to the question at the Committee's next session in June 1967. Rosenberg suggested amendments to an early draft of the declaration, again making the point that workers should not lose existing rights to *Mitbestimmung* where these existed.⁷⁹ He subsequently wrote to Arendt, Brenner and Bernhard Tacke, the DGB Vice-Chairman and also a member of the Action Committee, saying that because the resolutions were important, he was circulating them for approval.⁸⁰ Rosenberg was most likely to have been concerned with the resolutions concerning company statutes, which directly affected the unions, and the one concerned with UK entry. (The other two resolutions referred to relations with the USA and USSR). He did, however, express his personal view that he approved the resolutions and thought they should be accepted, adding that he had discussed them with Brandt and they had been approved by both him and Wehner, confirming the SPD was in agreement.

Highlighting the importance of the resolutions when circulating the document showed Rosenberg was keen to ensure a common approach. This was not always necessary, draft

⁷⁸ For the history of the European Company Statute, see European Trade Union Institute, <https://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company-SE/History> (Accessed 23-9-2020).

⁷⁹ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Rosenberg notes on draft dated 10-4-1967.

⁸⁰ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Rosenberg to Arendt, Brenner and Tacke 24-4-1967.

resolutions on subjects of lesser concern than key union interests did not require the same degree of consultation. Neither ÖTV nor IGC were included in the correspondence, although multinational chemical enterprises would have been affected by the statute. In fact, only Brenner replied to Rosenberg's letter, stressing the importance of *Mitbestimmung* and suggesting an amendment which Rosenberg included word for word in his own draft, '*ohne die bestehenden Mitwirkungs- und Mitbestimmungsrechte der Arbeitnehmer in den einzelnen Ländern zu beeinträchtigen*'.⁸¹ Such was the importance that Brenner placed on this point that he suggested reservation ('*Vorbehalt*') on it, presumably including the possibility of abstention, if the wording was not adopted. In the event, there was not an issue and the first point of Section II of the Resolution incorporated the agreed wording.⁸² It was also agreed at the session that members would aim to get the four Committee resolutions debated in their national parliaments and the DGB now worked with Schmidt of the SPD and Rainer Barzel of the CDU (both also members of the Committee) to see that this was done.⁸³ Members were expected to promote the Committee's resolutions domestically but it is noteworthy that the German unions only worked to do this when their own interests were involved.

The output of the two sessions represented a favourable outcome for the unions. They had successfully steered the Committee to the conclusion that they wanted to see and had achieved a debate in the Bundestag following the 1967 session.⁸⁴ In reality, *Mitbestimmung's*

⁸¹ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Brenner to Rosenberg 3-5-1967.

⁸² Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, pp. 93 – 97. The French wording was '*tout en maintenant les droits des travailleurs qui leur ont été accordés sur la base des législations existantes*'

⁸³ AdsD 5/DGAI003923 Monnet to Rosenberg 21-7-1967; Rosenberg to Schmidt 25-7-1967; Rosenberg to Barzel 1-8-1967. The debate took place on 13-10-1967 after which Monnet thanked Rosenberg for his help; Monnet to Rosenberg 17-10-1967.

⁸⁴ The Committee's 1967 declaration was only submitted to the German, Italian, Dutch and Belgian parliaments.

status was not under threat from the Commission; despite further memoranda drafted by it, no discernible progress on European company law was made until the 1990s. The episode does nevertheless show how, despite normally allowing Monnet considerable latitude in managing the Committee, the unions were prepared to intervene to protect their own interests and those of their members, particularly when one of their key post-war achievements appeared to be threatened.

6.7 Heinz-Oskar Vetter and the Action Committee

While Freitag had been positive, Richter indifferent, and Rosenberg enthusiastic, Vetter's attitude to Europe was both less emotional and more realistic than that of his immediate predecessor. After 20 years of integration, Europe was an accepted part of union engagement and potentially one of increasing importance; the 1969 Hague Conference offered the possibility (if essentially unrealised) of a European relaunch.

Vetter's DGB Chairmanship coincided with the period of the Social-Liberal coalition in federal politics, first under Brandt and then Schmidt. Vetter accordingly faced a far more sympathetic domestic situation than any of his post-war predecessors, all of whom had been forced to deal with conservative-led governments.⁸⁵ For the unions social and economic progress was now no longer so dependent on Europe when domestic lobbying and representation could prove more effective; a reversal of the situation that had applied during the earlier years of conservative dominance. Vetter commented on this growing gap between the influence

⁸⁵ Rosenberg's final three years as DGB Chairman coincided with the 1966 – 69 Grand Coalition but this was still CDU led under Kiesinger.

unions could exert at the national level and their relative powerlessness at the Community level, a situation he attributed to the weakness of the original treaty, in his introductory remarks to the Committee in 1971.⁸⁶ More than ever, the domestic political scene took priority.

Vetter's views had been influenced by the failures of the late 1950s, which he was still prepared to reference over a decade later. During the first years of his DGB chairmanship (1969 – 82) Vetter adopted an unemotional attitude to Europe, which really only changed following his election to the European Parliament in 1979. His writings during this period concentrate on domestic issues as in his New Year message just after assuming the chairmanship.⁸⁷ Brandt's article on the occasion of Vetter's 60th birthday in 1977, before he became an MEP, made no mention of Europe and none of the Action Committee of which they had both been members.⁸⁸ An appreciation of Vetter's life, published by the DGB on the 100th anniversary of his birth, contains a mixture of articles, mostly dealing with domestic matters during his time as DGB Chairman plus some personal reminiscences, and tends to support the view that while his transactional view of Europe remained, his emotional attachment strengthened over time.⁸⁹ In the contributions Vetter's European experience is clearly delineated from his time as DGB Chairman and discussion of it focuses on his role in the European Parliament. Writing in 2018 Reiner Hoffmann, Vetter's current successor as DGB

⁸⁶ AdsD 5/DGAI000126 *Einleitungswort im Monnet-Komitee am 23-2-1971*, p. 5.

⁸⁷ Heinz-Oskar Vetter, 'Ein neues Jahrzehnt', *Gewerklische Monatshefte*, 1 (1970), pp. 1 - 4.

⁸⁸ Willy Brandt, 'Dank an den Weggenossen : Zum 60. Geburtstag des DGB-Vorsitzenden Heinz-Oskar Vetter am 21. Oktober', *Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst* H201 (19-10-1977), p. 1.

⁸⁹ Reiner Hoffmann and Michael Guggemos (eds.) *Gewerkschafter und Europäer. Ein Lesebuch zum 100. Geburtstag von Heinz Oskar Vetter* (Berlin, 2018).

Chairman, was clear that it was after his retirement from the DGB that Vetter devoted himself most fully to Europe.⁹⁰ Vetter's career comprised two very different episodes as far as Europe was concerned, yet even with the benefit and safety of hindsight no mention is made of Monnet or the Action Committee in the book.

Vetter nevertheless supported the Committee, attending three out of a possible four meetings during his time as DGB Chairman and introducing discussion on the social and economic agenda at two of them.⁹¹ However, Vetter was not uncritical of Monnet and the difference in age between them, Vetter's relatively short experience on the Committee towards the end of its life and the German unions' improved status on the international stage by the 1970s meant that on occasions he was prepared to adopt a less emollient position than his predecessors would have done. This was clear when in March 1974 Monnet wrote to Vetter notifying him that the CDU/CSU wanted to send three further representatives, Helmut Kohl, Karl Carstens and Franz-Josef Strauss, to the Committee.⁹² (All parties were confused here, only Kohl was actually a newcomer to the Committee). Perhaps most annoyingly for Vetter, despite the proposed change in the Committee's composition, the letter contained no suggestion that the unions might object or want to make their own changes in the light of this event. Lappas, now the second DGB representative on the Action Committee, who was copied on the letter, followed this up with Volker Jung in the DGB's Europe section, asking what the process for

⁹⁰ Reiner Hoffmann, 'Die alten Herausforderungen sind die neuen' in Reiner Hoffmann and Michael Guggemos (eds.), *Gewerkschafter und Europäer. Ein Lesebuch zum 100. Geburtstag von Heinz Oskar Vetter* (Berlin, 2018), pp. 7-22, p. 19.

⁹¹ See AdsD 5/DGAI000126 *Einleitungswort im Monnet-Komitee am 23-2-1971*; AdsD 5/DGAI000126. *Einführungsbeitrag zur Diskussion im Monnet-Komitee am 3-5-1973 in Brüssel.*

⁹² AdsD 5/DGAI002364 Monnet to Vetter 5-3-1974.

nominating members was and stressing the need to ensure the unions would not be disadvantaged.⁹³ A handwritten note on Lappas' letter, presumably by Jung, replied that the CDU had actually just swapped members, and that there was no change to the balance of the Committee. Apart from illustrating how Monnet still regarded the Committee proprietorially, the episode acted as a reminder that the DGB leaders would be quick to challenge any initiative that appeared to threaten their own position on it.

Vetter's chairmanship of the DGB occurred at the end of the Committee's life. Vetter was well aware that after 1969 economic and social reform could now be best achieved by working with a sympathetic federal government, a view which would only have been strengthened as the reforms proposed at The Hague Summit failed to materialise. Europe had moved on from the early days of integration and while the Committee still represented a focus for the 'great and good' of Europe, it was virtually moribund and its deliberations ignored by national governments. Vetter accepted German union involvement in the Action Committee was required but it was a commitment he had inherited from his predecessors and his focus was elsewhere.

6.8 Union Press Coverage of the Action Committee

The DGB and its constituent unions published a wide range of newspapers and magazines during the time that the Committee was active. These included publications by the individual unions and a wide range of material published by the DGB itself. Some of these publications

⁹³ AdsD 5/DGAI002364 Lappas to Jung 18-3-1974. I am grateful to Herr Woltering of the AdsD for identifying 'Volker', to whom the letter is addressed, as Volker Jung.

were specific in nature, e.g. for youth, while others were designed to be of more general interest, with appearance varying from sporadic to weekly.⁹⁴ The importance that an organisation accords a particular subject can often be gauged from the coverage that subject receives in the organisation's press and publicity. A review of the DGB's press coverage is accordingly helpful in understanding the DGB's attitude towards the Action Committee (or *Monnet-Komitee* as it was usually termed in the union press). This analysis is based on two major DGB publications from this period, *Welt der Arbeit* and *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, as well as a specifically European orientated briefing, *Europa-Informationen*, produced during the early 1960s and a short analysis of IGB's press coverage. Together these publications throw an interesting light on the unions' attitudes towards an organisation of which they were members, as do obituaries of the trade unionists who sat on the Committee.

Welt der Arbeit (WdA) was founded as the DGB's official weekly newspaper in 1949 and had a circulation of 186,000 copies per week by the mid-late 1970s, which represented an increase on the early 1960s.⁹⁵ Although obtainable on the open market, the vast majority of copies were delivered direct to its readership, which was heavily orientated towards union functionaries.⁹⁶ During the period under consideration (1955 – 75), both its format and style

⁹⁴ For a general review of the German union press, see Horst Borghs, *Meinungsbildung für Millionen. Die Presse- u Öffentlichkeitsarbeit des DGB* (Köln, 1973). My thanks to Herr Woltering of the AdsD for obtaining references to the press and circulation figures for me.

⁹⁵ Reinhard Jühe, *Gewerkschaftspresse. Organisation, Kosten, Ziele* (Köln, 1977), p. 32, Table 7; Hans P. Schlobben, and Richard Kirsten, *Die Deutsche Gewerkschaftspresse* (Köln, 1961), pp. 136 – 137 give a circulation of 108.4k for c. 1960 based on date of publication; Borghs, *Meinungsbildung für Millionen*, p. 51, quotes a figure of 126k, again no date is given but based on the date of publication this is likely to have been the early 1970s.

⁹⁶ Jühe, *Gewerkschaftspresse*, p. 31. An analysis of the IGM *Funktionärszeitschrift* by the same author shows the overwhelming majority of copies went to Betriebsrat members and Vertrauensleute, Jühe, *Gewerkschaftspresse*, p. 30. It seems reasonable to assume that WdA followed the same pattern of readership.

evolved, with the paper developing a lighter feel over the years with greater emphasis on entertainment and sport. However, its core function of providing coverage of political and economic developments from a union viewpoint remained consistent. It was produced by a professional staff but union leaders such as Rosenberg often contributed. Due to the volume of material (51 editions were produced a year) plus the fact that the content has not been indexed or put on line, this analysis has been based around Action Committee sessions and declarations, which would provide an opportunity for *Welt der Arbeit* to comment on developments. In fact this happened rarely, as demonstrated in Appendix VIII. More pertinently, right from the very beginning with its supplement on atomic energy in December 1956, there were numerous occasions when the paper could have taken the opportunity to mention the Committee but failed to do so.⁹⁷

While *Welt der Arbeit* was a weekly publication aimed at a general readership, *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, seen as '*das theoretische Diskussionsorgan des DGB*', was aimed at a more academic audience with a circulation of 6k by the mid-1970s.⁹⁸ Only two of the articles, dating from 1961 and 1966, make any mention of the Committee whatsoever; both are concerned with the the status of European economic integration and the references are very brief, one relating to the Committee's call for currency union and one to Monnet's

⁹⁷ Supplement to *Welt der Arbeit*, *Jhr.* VI, Nr. 49, 9-12-1955 mentioned in Ch. 4.2. Other instances came to light as a result of the more structured analysis around the Committee's sessions and are indicative rather than providing a definitive list.

⁹⁸ *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* has been digitised and is fully online, <http://library.fes.de/gmh/index.html> (Accessed 29-9-2020). The quote is from the home page. For circulation see Jühe, *Gewerkschaftspresse*, p. 32, Table 7.

1959 suggestion of merging the three Commissions.⁹⁹ Further details are given in Appendix VIII. As well as being kept relatively low profile for the general membership, Monnet's Committee did not feature highly in the theoretical discussions of the DGB and its more academic supporters.

By the early 1960s, Rosenberg, as head of the DGB's Economic Department, was aware that those union officials and members regularly dealing with Europe needed a reliable source of information. *Europa-Informationen* was first published in September 1961 with an introductory letter from Rosenberg, saying that the newsletter's aim was to provide regular information and updates on the workings of the European institutions.¹⁰⁰ It ceased publication in May 1965; no reason was given but its frequency of publication had fallen year on year and it is likely that publication ceased partly due to the financial pressures the DGB was facing by the mid 1960s and also because the information it provided could be found in the official publications of the EEC.

As with the DGB's two other publications, coverage of the Action Committee was at best patchy and often duplicated information in *Welt der Arbeit*, see Appendix VIII. However, the Committee's June 1964 session in Bonn was reported at length over 1½ pages, outlining the resolutions agreed by the Committee. The session's location meant that a more engaged readership were likely to have been aware of it and omitting mention of it would have seemed

⁹⁹ 'Der Stand der wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas im Herbst 1961', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 10 (1961), pp 623-626 mentions currency union; 'Der Stand der wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas im Herbst 1966', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 10 (1966), pp. 619-623 mentions Monnet's 1959 suggestion.

¹⁰⁰ *Europa-Informationen* can be found under reference AMZ 509 in the library of the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. I have not been able to obtain circulation data for the publication.

strange. Nevertheless, as in *Welt der Arbeit*, the editors were reluctant to identify participants, referring only to the Monnet-Komitee, '*der auch namhafte Vertreter der Gewerkschaften angehören*'.¹⁰¹ It was the Committee's last mention in the newsletter, which ceased publication just under a year later.

Like the DGB, many of the individual unions also produced newspapers to keep their membership involved and informed. In the case of IGB complete sets of the union press are maintained in the union's archives.¹⁰² During the period the Committee was active, IGB (from 1960 IGBE) produced two weekly publications; *Die Bergbauindustrie* from 1948 – 1960 and *Einheit* from 1960 – 1995.¹⁰³ Each appeared weekly until 1965, after which *Einheit* appeared fortnightly. Both reported European events where relevant (e.g. activity of the ICFTU and the European Parliament) but an examination of the publications shows coverage was at least 90% domestic. Analysis of the period around each Action Committee session shows virtually no reporting of the Committee's activity or its closure, although as will be seen, IGB had ceased membership a couple of years earlier. The only exceptions were references to the Committee's declaration concerning the application for British entry to the EEC in June 1962 and a report of the July 1963 Dortmund Rally.¹⁰⁴ As in *Welt der Arbeit* the report contained no mention of the Committee itself. Communication of the Action Committee's activities to the union rank and file was most certainly not a priority and the sparse coverage effective confirmation of the unions' own level of interest in the Committee.

¹⁰¹ *Europa-Informationen* 10/1964 15-6-1964, pp. 4 – 5.

¹⁰² Time constraints meant an investigation of IGM publications was not possible.

¹⁰³ In 1960 *IG Bergbau* changed its name to *IG Bergbau und Energie*.

¹⁰⁴ *Einheit*, Jhr. 15, Ausgabe 15, 1-8-1962, p. 12, '*Erklärung des Monnetkomitees*'; *Einheit*, Jhr. 16, Ausgabe 14, 15-7-1963, p. 12, '*Rosenberg: Wir wollen keine Bündnisse....*'.

The same approach to Committee involvement could be found in the obituaries of the union leaders who had sat on it. Further details are given in Appendix IX. Domestic activity took pride of place when celebrating their achievements but even when an individual's international involvement was mentioned, this was usually restricted to trade union activity. The Committee remained a low priority, and an unspoken commitment even after its participants were dead.

Official union publications thus tended to ignore or downplay union involvement in the Action Committee. To avoid causing controversy it was only mentioned if its decisions reflected union policy or were uncontroversial. In the early days of the Committee this tended to mean an emphasis on atomic questions; later on support for UK entry into the Community took precedence as a subject on which there was widespread agreement. There was also a tendency to keep participants' names out of publications and to downplay union leaders' links with it; Rosenberg's leading role in it was only referenced once the Committee was virtually moribund and Rosenberg no longer active as DGB Chairman.¹⁰⁵ The wish to dampen interest in the Committee meant that reporting avoided divisive subjects, omitted mention of meetings which would be of little interest to union members and noticeably failed to pursue opportunities for follow up. All this was facilitated by the Committee's lack of activity after 1960 which offered few opportunities for positive reporting.

¹⁰⁵ *Welt der Arbeit, Jhr. XXIV, Nr. 26, 29-6-1973, p. 3.*

The union press coverage of the Action Committee throughout its life and the obituaries of those union leaders who sat on it reflected the ambivalent nature of the relationship the DGB and participating unions had with the Committee. They acknowledged its existence to their members but made no attempt to garner wider support for it or reference it to stimulate wider debate. The image of the Committee that they promoted echoed both the Committee's fortunes and their own unwillingness to engage with it more effectively.

The union leaders' reactive stance stemmed from the permissive consensus that underpinned their approach to the Committee. Monnet was to be allowed to pursue policies they generally approved of and could justify and they expected the same consideration from their own members. With a couple of exceptions, the arrangement was effective; Monnet's Action Committee belonged to the pre-Maastricht period of integration which accepted elite ascendancy and enabled such an approach. As will be shown in the Conclusion, at the time of the Second Action Committee one part of this arrangement, the relationship between union leaders and the Committee's officers, was already breaking down. The union leaders who sat on Monnet's original Committee were fortunate that the circumstances of the 1950s and 1960s enabled their circumspect approach to the Committee. Greater contestation and debate about Europe and integration after 1990 would have rendered such a course of action impossible.

6.9 The 1973 Evaluation and After

In early 1973 *IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik* (IG CPK) informed Lappas that the union would pay its contribution for 1971 (despite previously saying that 1970 would be the last payment) but

would now make no further contributions towards the Committee.¹⁰⁶ Lappas investigated the situation and having consulted the other unions involved, discovered that IGBE also wanted to cease contributions from 1973, which would leave the DGB with a funding gap.¹⁰⁷ The question dragged on until just before the Committee's closure, with the DGB finally agreeing to fund 60% of the union contribution with the remainder split between IGM and ÖTV.¹⁰⁸

The episode led to a decision to review the DGB's support of some of its non-union related European commitments, including the Action Committee.¹⁰⁹ Anton Müller-Engstfeld, the DGB Executive member for European Affairs and a member of the Committee, provided some input, pointing out that the Committee's name made its aim clear, a somewhat disingenuous statement if the Committee's activity after 1960 were to be considered, that it met once or twice a year (very much an exaggeration) and that it provided a contact point for members, an observation more relevant to the first years of the Committee's life than the circumstances of the early 1970s. He also provided a 1971 list of the members but added that it was out of date, an indication of the Committee's lack of importance in the eyes of its DGB members.¹¹⁰ In these circumstances, it was little surprise that Karl Hauenschild, the Chairman of IG CPK, rather grumpily questioned, *'ob dieses Komitee überhaupt noch sinnvoll sei'*.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ AdsD 5/DGAI002364 Vossenrich to Lappas 20-3-1973. The earlier letter can be found in AdsD 5/DGAJ000151 Vossenrich to Vetter 5-4-71.

¹⁰⁷ AdsD 5/DGAI002364 Lappas to Vetter 2-4-1973.

¹⁰⁸ AdsD 5/DGAI002364 Lappas to the DGB Executive 2-3-1975 outlined the final proposed financial settlement.

¹⁰⁹ Klaus Mertsching, (ed.), *Quellen der Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert. Band 16 Der deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1969 - 1975* (Bonn, 2013), Doc 84, Protokoll der 9. Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes 5-6-1973.

¹¹⁰ AdsD 5/DGAI002364 note by Müller-Engstfeld dated 19-9-1973.

¹¹¹ Mertsching, *Band 16 Der deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1969 - 1975*, Doc 84, Protokoll der 9. Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes 5-6-1973.

The report, which was produced in October 1973 and also covered the German branch of the European Movement, appeared to come to no definite conclusion. It recognised the importance of the Committee's membership, which meant that non-participation was inconceivable; *'für das Monnet-Komitee, dem die Spitzen aus Staat und Gesellschaft angehören, gilt in verstärktem Maße [compared to the European Movement], daß es von Nichtbeteiligten kaum zureichend dargestellt werden kann'*.¹¹² Despite this, the author, Karl Feldengut, the young *Abteilungs-Sekretär* of the DGB's *Europa-Abteilung*, was forced to recognise that participation had brought few positive benefits.¹¹³ The resolutions passed by the Committee were not binding on the governments who would be responsible for taking action and provided little justification for the effort involved in membership.

Feldengut suggested that withdrawal would mean self-exclusion from an important group of opinion formers. However, on the other hand, he admitted that the results of the Committee's deliberations provided few grounds for union involvement, while the question of whether the Committee provided 'informal benefits' could only be answered by a member, and the cost also needed careful consideration. Ostensibly Feldengut was balancing the benefits and costs of the Committee. Nonetheless, the actual phrasing suggested that he was subtly suggesting that membership of it was no longer worthwhile.¹¹⁴ What use the DGB *Vorstand* made of the report remains unclear; despite having been commissioned by the Executive, it was not discussed either by them or the *Geschäftsführender Vorstand* and was

¹¹² AdsD 5/DGAI002364 *'Darstellung über die Europäische Bewegung, Mitgliedschaft des DGB im deutschen Rat der europäischen Bewegung und im Monnet-Komitee 8-10-1973'*.

¹¹³ Feldengut was born in 1947. The report bears Feldengut's office reference (Fd) but not his name. My thanks to Herr Woltering of the AdsD for helping me to identify Feldengut as the author of the report.

¹¹⁴ My thanks to Dr Armin Grünbacher for help with this point.

buried, in itself a testament to the contradictions it contained. The Action Committee had in effect ceased to operate by the time the report was published, the last session had already taken place in May 1973, and the Committee was dissolved within 18 months.

Despite Feldengut's report the DGB's official verdict at the Committee's dissolution was unambiguous – the Committee had been an outstanding success, a judgement outlined in an article by Rosenberg in *Welt der Arbeit*.¹¹⁵ The dissolution of the Committee in 1975 was an opportunity for the DGB's leadership to finally acknowledge the Committee's existence and celebrate its achievements. Three weeks after Monnet's letter dissolving the Committee, *WdA* produced a three-quarter page article (including photo) by Rosenberg marking the 30th anniversary of the end of the war under the headline '*Kriegsende. Die Chancen des Nullpunktes. Gewerkschaften ebnen den Weg nach Europa*'. In the article Rosenberg wrote about the unions' contribution in establishing post-war democracy and covered the Committee in some detail. He pointed out that the Action Committee had been established to forward the aims of European integration and that '*es ist unbestreitbar, daß ohne dieses Komitee und seine Arbeit, das, was wir heute auf dem Gebiet der europäischen Integration erreicht haben, nicht möglich gewesen wäre*'. It was a verdict that ignored both the reality of the unions' disappointment with Monnet and the Committee's increasing lack of influence after 1960.

However, the article did reflect Rosenberg's high regard for Monnet, whom he saw as irreplaceable and 'for whom there is no successor'. Rosenberg concluded the article by saying

¹¹⁵ *Welt der Arbeit*, Jhr. XXVI, Nr. 19, 9-5-1975, p. 9.

that building Europe was the only way of overcoming nationalism, arrogance and hate. It was a generous tribute to the Committee, placing it in the context of the 'founding fathers' original motives for integration, the need to overcome war and division. In doing so Rosenberg was affirming the heroic interpretation of integration which he had espoused from the beginning. War and integration were symbolically linked, hence Rosenberg's focus on the importance of 9th May as a key date in recent European history which encompassed both the end of war and the beginning of integration. Emphasising the themes that Monnet held dear, the article would have won his full approval. It was also a verdict that justified, if only in retrospect, the unions' involvement in Monnet's venture to their own members.

In private the assessment was much less generous. An internal DGB paper providing a short history of the Committee dealt in detail with its early days but quickly glossed over the 1960s.¹¹⁶ The author was well aware that the Committee had drifted after the early 1960s with the unions showing little interest in it and it in turn having little impact on them. Outlining a series of steps in the European project, Ahland comments that the Committee had devoted itself to a '*schrittweise Verwirklichung*' of them, a judgement seconded by Fattmann, and a phrase that reflected its Neofunctionalist origins.¹¹⁷ Yet, while the Committee certainly debated and promoted these issues such as monetary union and UK entry, it was not in a position to achieve them; that competence lay with national governments alone. The negotiations for the Rome Treaties had shown the limits of the Committee's power; after that its authority was a moral one and its influence dissipated over time.

¹¹⁶ AdsD 5/DGAI002364 *Aktions Komitee für die Vereinigten Staaten Europas (1955 – 75)* dated 22-4-1975.

¹¹⁷ Ahland, *Rosenberg*, p. 171; Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, p. 164.

Towards the end of the Committee's life Rosenberg, by now in retirement, had written to Lappas that *'toute l'activité du comité tient essentiellement et presque exclusivement au fait des relations étendues internationales et personnelles de M. Monnet'*.¹¹⁸ It was a recognition of how far the Committee had depended on Monnet and was his own creation. Yet, Monnet in turn had needed the unions who provided realism and both the perception and recognition of popular backing. As Bruno Friedrich, Vice-President of the Socialist Grouping in the European Parliament, rightly recognised at the time of his death *'für Jean Monnet..... war der Aufbau Europas ohne die Gewerkschaften undenkbar'*.¹¹⁹ Twenty years previously both Monnet and the unions saw themselves benefiting from their relationship on the Committee; disappointment and changing political circumstances had subsequently weakened their attachment. It was, however, an attachment that had been dependent on a very limited base of union leadership support, which had itself diminished over time.

In essence the DGB's verdict on the Committee at the end of its life mirrored Feldman's ambiguous judgement; too important to ignore, at least at its outset, it nevertheless appeared to provide few tangible benefits for the unions. Yet when the Committee was revived just under a decade later, the positive aspects of involvement were recalled enthusiastically by a new generation of union leaders and the doubts initially forgotten.

¹¹⁸ AFJME C1/34/553 Rosenberg to Lappas 11-12-1972. Lappas' original letter concerned the Committee's expenditure AFJME C1/34/552 Lappas to Rosenberg 6-12-1972. I have quoted from the French translation of Rosenberg's letter in the FJME archives as the original does not appear in the Committee's files in the AdsD archives.

¹¹⁹ *Gewerkliche Monatshefte*, 5 (1979), p. 290.

CONCLUSION

The Second Action Committee operated from 1984 – 1992. It is, however, rarely mentioned. The reasons for this omission are understandable; Monnet died in 1979 and although the revived Committee claimed to be inspired by him, it would be of little interest to his biographers. Although Kohnstamm, who founded it with the help of leading European politicians such as Tindemans and acted as its Secretary-General, was a dedicated believer in integration, the Committee lacked the single driving force that Monnet had provided. The Second Committee was also short-lived, operating from 1984 – 92, and only held five meetings.¹ It was not a simple replication of the original Committee; Europe had by this stage expanded beyond the original Six, and industrialists sat on the Committee, significantly altering its balance. The Committee's remit was reduced from Monnet's original aspirations for a united Europe to a narrower emphasis on a business driven economic and defence agenda, related to the introduction of the European single market and the intensification of the Cold War during the 1980s. Finally, the Committee's existence straddled the fall of Communism in Europe. After 1989 those involved with it had more important issues to concern them as the European Community was required to deal with the issues of post-Soviet Eastern Europe.

By the mid-1980s the European Community was in a state of stasis, as Erwin Kristoffersen, Head of the DGB's International Department, wrote in an appreciation to the DGB Chairman

¹ The DGB and IGBE archives cover the five meetings to November 1989, after which according to Harryvan and Harst there were no further meetings, see Harryvan and Harst, *Kohnstamm*, pp. 156- 157.

Ernst Breit shortly after the decision to revive the Committee had been taken.² The conclusion was clear, *‘wenn also Krisen in der Gemeinschaft eine Neubelebung des Monnet – Komitees erfordern, dann ist es jetzt Zeit dafür’*. Kristoffersen’s enthusiasm for the Committee resulted from seriously overestimating the Committee’s interest in the social and economic spheres while ignoring mention of security and defence which were very much part of its remit. Although Kristoffersen did not draw the parallel, the situation confronting the German unions was now analogous to that they had faced in the early days of European integration. Schmidt’s social-liberal coalition had fallen in 1982, to be replaced by a conservative-led coalition under Helmut Kohl. Europe again represented a way of escaping from conservative dominance at home while establishing a role for the unions in a revived route to European integration that could deliver tangible benefits for them and their members.

Unfortunately for the unions, they faced major obstacles in their membership of the Committee. The composition of the Committee now included industrialists and demonstrated a significantly centre-right profile throughout its life.³ The Committee’s method of operating did not help; the trade unionists were excluded from working parties, such as that on defence commissioned after the 1987 Rome meeting, representing a serious break with Monnet’s original practice which had stressed consensus. No union representatives took part in the group and there is no evidence in the union archives that they were invited to participate.⁴

² AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Aktennotiz. Betr.: Aktionskomitee für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, ‘Monnet – Komitee’, 21-1-1985, p. 1.

³ HGRG IGBE 17656 *Liste des membres du comité d’action pour l’Europe présents à la reunion constituante du comité, 6 – 7 juin 1985.*

⁴ HGRG IGBE 17656 *‘Empfehlungen der Arbeitsgruppe für die eigene Sicherheit durch die Erreichung eines Europäischen Sicherheits u. Verteidigungssystem im Rahmen des Atlantischen Bündnisses’*. The report of the working group is attached to Kohnstamm’s letter of 18-12-1987 to Meyer. The members were Jacques Chaban-Delmas (centre-right), Egon Bahr (Social Democrat), Markus Berger (centre-right), Alfred Dregger (centre-right),

Nor was the Committee's agenda one likely to appeal to the unions; its original declaration made clear the emphasis on achievement of the single market and a strengthening of the European defence contribution. The reduction of unemployment was merely seen as a way of winning public approval for its wider economic agenda.⁵ The permissive consensus that had underpinned Monnet's relationship with the union members of the original Committee had been broken.

Union representations were ignored in the follow up to the first meeting with Karl Carstens, the Committee's President and a prominent CDU politician, unapologetic on the matter.⁶ Within a year of the Committee's founding it was becoming clear that the Second Committee was not interested in the unions' concerns and would make little attempt to address them. The result was that no DGB representatives attended after the Committee's first meeting. Kristoffersen and his deputy, Heinz Matthiesen, lambasted the Committee for its ways of working and complained about the '*ausgesprochene liberal-technokratische Handschrift*' of its declarations.⁷ Both also felt that the Committee was out of touch, a refuge for retired politicians, had achieved little of value and served only to benefit Kohnstamm.⁸ They also complained at its refusal to adopt new ways of thinking, although given that the creation of

François Fillon (centre-right), Gerard Fuchs (Socialist), Michael Heseltine (centre-right), Giorgio La Malfa (centre-right), Manuel Medina (Socialist) and Hans van Mierlo (Liberal).

⁵ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 *Raison d'être des Aktionkomitees für Europa*, ND, points 6 & 7.

⁶ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Carstens to Breit 25-11-1985.

⁷ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Matthiesen 'Zur Arbeit des Aktionkomitees für Europa' dated 29-1-1987, p. 1; the DGB's International Department's report AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 '*Zur Arbeit des Aktion Komitees für Europa*' dated 7-12-1987 complained about exclusion from the working group mentioned earlier.

⁸ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 '*Zur Arbeit des Aktion Komitees für Europa*' 7-12-1987, p. 3.

the European Single Market was the Committee's key aim, this most likely represented a criticism of its neo-liberal approach and rejection of the social agenda.⁹

Kristoffersen pressed Breit to withdraw from the Committee on a regular basis, especially as the German unions were paying a large proportion of its costs.¹⁰ However, Breit was concerned that non-participation meant leaving the field open to the employer organisations with the risk of by-passing the unions; the dilemma the unions had faced since the beginning of integration. Nevertheless, as the Committee made no attempt to meet union demands, this view became less and less tenable. By 1987 Breit was under pressure from Kristoffersen to leave, from Kohnstamm to participate and from the Dutch and Belgian unions who did not want to be left alone if the DGB withdrew, but were nevertheless still deeply unhappy with the Committee.¹¹

Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who combined Kohnstamm and Carstens' roles from 1988, did try to mollify the unions.¹² However, it was too little, too late. Breit had already effectively resigned from the Committee earlier that year; in contrast to Monnet's time, membership was on a personal basis.¹³ IGBE, invited onto the Committee with IGM by Breit at its inception in

⁹ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 *Die Entwicklung des Aktionskomitees für Europa* dated 12-4-1988, p. 5.

¹⁰ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Carstens to Breit 11-12-1986 includes accounts for the first two years of the Committee. The Committee's income in the year to Sept. 1985 was Belg. Frs. 3.6m. In the year to Sept. 1986 this fell to Belg. Frs. 2.5m, of which Belg. Frs. 1.5m (62%) came via the DGB. It is not clear if all these funds came directly from the DGB but given the Benelux unions' refusal to contribute, in all probability they did. The author has not found any accounts for subsequent years.

¹¹ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Matthiesen 'Zur Arbeit des Aktionskomitees für Europa' dated 29-1-1987; AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 DGB International Dept report 'Zur Arbeit des Aktion Komitees für Europa' 7-12-1987; AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Kohnstamm to Breit 18-12-1987; AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Jeff Houthuys to Matthiesen 13-3-1987.

¹² HGRG IGBE 17656. Chaban-Delmas to Kohnstamm 13-10-1988.

¹³ AdsD 5/DGAJ000041 Breit to Kohnstamm 12-1-1988.

recognition of the original Committee's composition, remained in contact with Chaban-Delmas for a further year but neither of the two unions ever played a role in the Committee.

Participation in the Second Action Committee provided no benefits for the German unions. The union leaders were very uncomfortable with the Committee's agenda and believed themselves actively excluded from its deliberations. Nor, in contrast to the 1950s, did the Committee offer an escape to Europe. Ten years after the closure of the first Committee, the DGB had forgotten its frustrations with Monnet but the reality of the Second Committee for the German unions was to be dissatisfaction, irrelevance and impotence. Ironically now that the Federal Republic was an accepted equal on the international stage, the unions themselves had lost equality of treatment on the Committee with none of the supportive friendship that Monnet had offered the first post-war generation of German union leaders when the European project began.

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The last meeting of the Second Action Committee took place just two weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The event marked the end of the divided Europe of the Cold War that Monnet had known and in search of whose stability and prosperity he had based much of his thinking and action. The new post-Cold War Europe was wider than the Europe in which Monnet had been active and involved new challenges, of which the political and economic stabilisation of the former Soviet satellites, including the GDR, was the most important. Just as integration had helped resolve the issues of the post-war period in Western Europe, this stabilisation of Eastern Europe was eventually achieved by their integration into the European Union. East European motives for integration mirrored those of the original Six; the quest for political

stability, the desire to raise living standards and, just as for the post-war Federal Republic, recognition that they were accepted members of the wider European community

That the members of the European Community were in a position to welcome the candidate countries from the ex-Soviet bloc after 2004 was a tribute to the decisions taken by European leaders in the decades after 1950. The period up to 1990 saw the achievement of economic progress and political stability in Western Europe, built around the partnership of Franco-German reconciliation. The creation of a democratic, stable and economically prosperous Federal Republic enabled its integration into a norms-based European Community which had itself proved so attractive that six further countries had chosen to join it by then.¹⁴ That they wanted to do so showed that the choices made by the 'founding fathers' in 1950 and consolidated and extended over subsequent decades had proved successful despite periodic setbacks.

Monnet's Action Committee belonged to the first two decades of integration. When founded it was seen as an appropriate vehicle for promoting the process, its founder had great hopes for the organisation and its launch was greeted enthusiastically by his supporters in the media. The Committee broke new ground in bringing together disparate interest groups, often domestically opposed, and provided a forum which Monnet hoped he could use to maintain his influence over the progress of integration. For the German unions, the Action Committee promised engagement in the face of domestic isolation, recognition and equality in the face

¹⁴ The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986.

of suspicion and the potential to influence the debates that would affect them and their members.

Melchionni wrote that the Committee saw itself as *'un instrument visant à provoquer une révolution pacifique'*.¹⁵ It is a description that the German union leaders who were members are unlikely to have recognised or endorsed. This thesis shows that the German trade unions signally failed to make use of the Committee from the time that they joined it. Affiliation made sense in terms of their previous experiences and relationships and offered an apparent means of dealing with an immediate and pressing problem, but that was all. The German unions made no plans to make use of the Committee and the ambiguous relationship they adopted towards it – high-level engagement combined with minimising its role as far as the rank and file were concerned – meant that they were unable and unwilling to discuss their membership candidly, promote it effectively or use it constructively.

Monnet and the Action Committee also failed their first major test as far as the German unions were concerned. Instead of consolidating and expanding their representation in the new European institutions as well as achieving a better balance between social and economic integration, the unions lost considerable ground as a result of the negotiations for the Rome Treaties. The processes and institutions of the new EEC meant that their representation was delayed by 10 to 15 years and the advent of 'social Europe' for even longer.

¹⁵ Melchionni, 'Le Comité d'Action ', p. 240.

This defeat was followed shortly by other events that undermined the Action Committee's position and rendered it less attractive for the German unions. De Gaulle's consolidation of power in France diminished the Committee, meaning there was no effective engagement with it by the Community's politically most important member. As the Committee lost influence, a development he appeared unable to check, Monnet used it to promote his own agenda, and meetings became less frequent. Over time too Monnet's original contacts and supporters died or retired. In these circumstances the thesis shows how the German union leaders adopted an increasingly transactional view of the Committee. As their interest waned, participation by the individual unions involved fell away, effectively leaving the DGB leadership, and above all Rosenberg, as their sole representation on the Committee. Membership of it remained the concern of a small group of individuals and the unspoken policy of permissive consensus surrounding the Committee meant there was no attempt to involve the wider union membership in its debates.

Yet despite these failures the Action Committee contributed towards socialising the German unions into the institutions of post-war Europe. Rosenberg's description of the Committee as a '*Freundeskreis*' could be read as a statement of the Committee's failure, reflecting its change in status from Monnet's aspirations of a proactive organisation that would promote integration to a closed circle of friends meeting for discussion. In fact the Committee was one of many meeting points that helped transform relationships. Reconciliation after the war happened at many different levels and via many different forums. Monnet had recognised this from the outset and ensured that the Germans, and particularly the German unions, were treated as valuable members. It was, as von der Groeben noted, a way of transforming

'German colleagues' into 'German colleagues and friends'.¹⁶ The Action Committee was one contributor to the process, providing access to Europe's 'great and good' and, especially at the beginning, a significant one because of the personalities involved. To label the Committee as a '*Freundeskreis*' is not to downplay its importance but to recognise how valuable these aspects of legitimisation and socialisation were to its German members, and particularly the unions who had also been side-lined domestically under Adenauer. As a result Rosenberg, admittedly a Jew and exile under National Socialism, came to be fully accepted as one of the leading trade union personalities within the EEC during the 1960s and his successor, Vetter, could assume the role of President of the ETUC from 1974 - 1979. Union participation in Europe and the passage of time meant that a quarter of a century after they were made, Gailly's comments on German participation in the European institutions were no longer credible.¹⁷

From the beginnings of integration, the German unions' central demand had been for 'social Europe' – that the benefits of integration should be shared equally between capital and labour. The results of the Rome Treaties represented a significant blow to these hopes. This thesis has shown how union demands were thwarted and only minimal progress achieved during the 1960s and 1970s. Ironically concentration on 'social Europe' only began a decade later during the Delors' presidency at a time when the unions were being side-lined by the Second Action Committee. Initially the economic impact of this marginalisation of the unions appeared less relevant; economic growth meant that all sections of the population enjoyed

¹⁶ Quoted in Elvert, 'Hans von der Groeben', p. 95.

¹⁷ Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 75, FN 267.

higher living standards during the 1960s and in these circumstances the issue of 'social Europe' appeared less important.¹⁸ Moreover, national politicians ensured that the benefits of growth could only be distributed by themselves within the framework of the nation state. The unwillingness and inability of the European Community to deliver union demands meant that the German union leaders saw the advent of Brandt's social-liberal coalition in 1969 as an opportunity to press their agenda domestically. This development also meant that during the 1970s 'social Europe' was not their immediate concern, especially as more pressing domestic issues, such as unemployment, needed to be addressed.

Despite these drawbacks the Action Committee was not an organisation that the unions could easily abandon while remaining true to their stated aims and ideals. They continued as members of the Committee; resigning would have been a denial of Rosenberg's participatory approach, negating their professed commitment to internationalism and solidarity and denying themselves an undemanding opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to European integration. It was only towards the end of the Committee's life that doubts about participation were raised by some of the union leaders themselves. That the report produced as a result of their discussions attempted to balance the tensions between the costs of membership and its by now barely discernible material benefits only served to highlight the ambiguities that had always been inherent in participation.

This thesis builds on the existing studies of historians who have worked on integration, the international relationships of the German unions and the Action Committee itself. By moving

¹⁸ See Fattmann, *Das Europa der Arbeiter*, p. 234.

away from the traditional Monnet-centred narratives of the Committee, this thesis has explored how one of its key membership groups related to it over the twenty years of its existence, a relationship that depended largely on external events but was exacerbated by developments within the Committee itself. The DGB and union archives show how erratic the German unions' engagement with the Committee actually was. This failing was not necessarily their responsibility; the Committee's activity had always been dependent on Monnet and for the unions domestic issues would always take precedence. No one indicator can quickly summarise the German unions' involvement but all the available evidence – internal and external correspondence, meetings and the unions' own press coverage – points the same way. In this instance the gaps in the archival records, where positive action would have left a record of engagement, speak just as powerfully as the existing documents themselves.

Over the twenty years of the Committee's life Europe developed and the political and economic circumstances around the Committee changed. The original generation of union leaders whom Monnet had cultivated had established a pattern for union involvement in the Action Committee. Their successors, less bound to Monnet personally, continued this involvement even as Europe developed around them and the Committee became increasingly irrelevant to their concerns. Membership of the Action Committee justified Rosenberg's strategy of '*Gleichberechtigung und Anerkennung durch Partizipation*'.¹⁹ Participation in it helped confirm recognition of the unions' role, status and importance in post-war European

¹⁹ Rosenberg's phrase '*Gleichberechtigung und Anerkennung durch Partizipation*', quoted in Bühlbäcker, *Europa im Aufbruch*, p. 34.

society and politics and facilitated the increasing integration of Germans into Europe; the unions' influence on the Committee, however, remained negligible to the end.

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Appendix I Summary of Action Committee Resolutions 1955 – 1975.

Meeting	#1	#2	#3	Communique	#4	Resolution	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9
Europe general	Jan-56 1	Jul-56 1	Sep-56 1	Oct-56 1	May-57 1	Nov-57 1	Oct-58 2	May-59 1	Nov-59 2	Jun-60 2	Jul-61 1
Energy	2		1	1	1		1	1	1		1
Monetary policy							1	1	1	1	1
UK membership							1	1	1	1	1
Third World								1		1	1
Anti Trust									1		
Global politics											1
Pages	4	0	5	1	2	2	5	5	8	8	5

Meeting	Declaration	#10	#11	#12	Press Conf	#13	#14	#15	#16	#17	#18	Overall Total
Europe general	Jun-62	Dec-62	Jun-64	May-65	May-67	Jun-67	Mar-69	Jul-69	Dec-69	Feb-71	May-73	30
Energy		3	1	5	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	8
Monetary policy		1			1				1	1	1	8
UK membership	1	1				1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Third World		1										4
Anti Trust												2
Global politics	1	1	3	2	1	2				2	1	14
Pages	3	5	9	6	1	3	3	3	4	6	5	78

Appendix II Analysis of Action Committee Resolutions 1955 - 1975.¹

Date	Session	Resolutions	Categorisation
18 Jan. 1956	1 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support Messina and Val Duchesse discussions 2. Atomic energy 3. Parliamentary approval for declaration. (This mostly dealt with atomic energy though GB situation also mentioned) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Energy 3. Energy
19-20 July 1956	2 Paris	No resolutions	N/A
19-20 Sept. 1956	3 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Push to conclude Common Market treaty 2. Need to ratify Euratom treaty by end 1956 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Energy
16 Oct. 1956	Press Communique	Govts. to conclude negotiations on Common Market and Euratom (in light of MacMillan proposals for Free Trade Area)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Energy
6-7 May 1957	4 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Salutes signature of Rome Treaties 2. Welcomes work of 'Three Wise Men' on atomic energy 3. Need for speedy ratification and treaties to be put into effect. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Energy
25 Nov. 1957	Resolution	Demand for European district	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general
16-17 Oct. 1958	5 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Build Euratom reactors 2. Ensure first tranche of Common Market tariff reductions happens 3. Harmonisation of finance policies 4. UK association 5. European district 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Energy 2. Europe general 3. Monetary policy 4. UK association 5. Europe general

¹ For the source of the Appendix, see the notes at the end.

Date	Session	Resolutions	Categorisation
11 May 1959	6 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Energy policy (coal crisis) 2. Common finance policy 3. Relations with 3rd parties, esp. UK 4. Under developed nations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Energy 2. Monetary policy 3. UK association 4. Third World
19-20 Nov. 1959	7 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Relations with other parts of the world. (Mainly deals with relations between The Six and The EFTA Seven) 2. Merging of Commission Executives 3. Anti-cartel measures 4. Energy 5. European Finance policy 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UK membership 2. Europe general 3. Anti-trust measures 4. Energy 5. Europe general
11 June 1960	8 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Merging of Commission Executives 2. Universal suffrage for European elections 3. Implementation of European anti-trust laws 4. UK (and other country) association 5. Help for under developed regions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Europe general 3. Anti-trust measures 4. UK membership 5. Third World
10-11 July 1961	9 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aid to under developed countries 2. Economic expansion and monetary stability of West 3. Creation of common European Monetary reserves 4. UK (and other country) association 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Third world 2. Global politics 3. Monetary policy 4. UK association
26 June 1962	Declaration	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UK application for entry 2. Europe – USA partnership 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UK membership 2. Global politics

Date	Session	Resolutions	Categorisation
17-18 Dec. 1962	10 Paris	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conclude negotiations with GB 2. UK entry means political union more urgent 3. Creation of European monetary reserve 4. Europe – US partnership 5. Agricultural politics 6. Policies for under developed countries 7. Suggestions to speed up Community decision making 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UK association 2. Europe general 3. Monetary policy 4. Global politics 5. Europe general 6. Third World 7. Europe general
1 June 1964	11 Bonn	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pursue European integration 2. Europe – US partnership 3. Europe – US collective policy in nuclear questions (MLF debate) 4. Coexistence between West and USSR; reunification of Germany within European Community 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Global politics 3. Global politics 4. Global politics
8-9 May 1965	12 Berlin	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Democratisation of institutions, inc. European Parliament 2. Financing of Community 3. Social Europe 4. Scientific and technical research 5. Common energy and transport policy 6. European capital market 7. Reform of international monetary system 8. Commercial policy with East Europe and USSR 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Europe general 3. Europe general 4. Europe general 5. Europe general 6. Monetary policy 7. Global politics 8. Global politics
17 May 1967	Press Communiq ue	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create USE by stages 2. United Europe as contributor towards peace between East and West 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Europe general 2. Global politics
15 June 1967	13 Brussels	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UK application 2. Technological development 3. Equal links with USA 4. Cooperation with USSR and Eastern Europe 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UK membership 2. Europe general 3. Global politics 4. Global politics

Date	Session	Resolutions	Categorisation
11 Mar. 1969	14 London	1. UK membership issues 2. European political integration	1. UK membership 2. Europe general
15-16 July 1969	15 Brussels	1. Complete common market 2. Commission to prepare for UK negotiations	1. Europe general 2. UK membership
15-16 Dec. 1969	16 Bonn	1. Plans for economic and monetary union 2. Social Europe / social funds 3. UK membership 4. European political organisation / unification (The session was immediately post The Hague summit)	1. Monetary policy 2. Europe general 3. UK membership 4. Europe general
23-24 Feb 1971	17 Bonn	1. UK membership 2. Economic and monetary union 3. Social action 4. Links with USA 5. Links with USSR 6. Political organisation of Europe	1. UK membership 2. Monetary policy 3. Europe general 4. Global politics 5. Global politics 6. Europe general
3 May 1973	18 Brussels	1. Economic and monetary solidarity 2. Europe – US relations to be on an equal basis 3. Regional development in EC 4. Contribution to social progress	1. Monetary policy 2. Global politics 3. Europe general 4. Europe general
15 Apr. 1975	Dissolution letter		

Sources

1. The list is taken from Winand, *20 Ans d'Action*, passim.
2. The basis of my analysis is discussed in Ch. 3.6.

Appendix III German Union Representation at Action Committee Sessions 1955 – 1975.²

	1956 -60	1961 -75	
Meetings in period	8	10	18
<i>Attended</i>			
DGB	7	9	16
IGB	4	1	5
IGM	6	7	13

² A full list of German union attendees at each Committee session is given in Appendix IV. This table shows whether the organisation was represented at the session or not so on several occasions, particularly for the DGB, more than one individual was involved.

**Appendix IV German Union Members' Attendance at Action Committee Sessions
1955 – 1975.³**

Session	Date	Entitled to Attend	Attended	Organisation	Comments
1	Jan-56	Freitag Rosenberg Imig Sträter	Rosenberg Imig Sträter	DGB DGB IGB IGM	Ill - represented by Rosenberg
2	Jul-56	Freitag Rosenberg Sträter	Rosenberg Brenner	DGB DGB IGM	
3	Sep-56	Freitag Rosenberg Gutermuth Sträter Brenner	Dürrbeck Friedrichs	DGB DGB IGB IGM IGM	Unable to attend as ill. Sträter replaced by Durrbeck Brenner represented by Friedrichs
4	May-57	Richter Rosenberg Gutermuth Sträter Brenner	Rosenberg Gutermuth Lung	DGB DGB IGB IGM IGM	Brenner represented by Lung
5	Oct-58	Richter Rosenberg Gutermuth Brenner	Preuss Lung	DGB DGB IGB IGM	Rosenberg represented by Preuss Brenner represented by Lung

³ For the basis of the Appendix, see the discussion on sources at the end.

Session	Date	Entitled to Attend	Attended	Organisation	Comments
6	Apr-59	Richter		DGB	
		Rosenberg	Preuss	DGB	Rosenberg represented by Preuss. Clash with Economic & Social Committee
		Gutermuth	Arendt	IGB	Gutermuth represented by Arendt
		Brenner		IGM	
7	Nov-59	Richter		DGB	
		Rosenberg	Rosenberg	DGB	
		Gutermuth		IGB	
		Brenner	Brenner	IGM	
8	Jul-60	Richter		DGB	
		Rosenberg	Rosenberg	DGB	
		Gutermuth	Lambrecht	IGB	Gutermuth represented by Lambrecht
		Brenner		IGM	
9	Jul-61	Richter		DGB	
		Rosenberg	Rosenberg	DGB	
		Gutermuth		IGB	
		Brenner	Substitute - NK	IGM	
		Preuss		DGB	Preuss shown as attendee
10	Dec-62	Rosenberg	Rosenberg	DGB	
		Gutermuth		IGB	
		Brenner	Substitute - NK	IGM	

Session	Date	Entitled to Attend	Attended	Organisation	Comments
11	Jun-64	Rosenberg Tacke Gutermuth Brenner	Rosenberg Brenner	DGB IGB IGM	
12	May-65	Rosenberg Tacke Arendt Brenner	Rosenberg Arendt Friedrichs	DGB DGB IGB IGM	Brenner represented by Friedrichs
13	Jun-67	Rosenberg Tacke Arendt Brenner	Rosenberg Tacke Friedrichs	DGB DGB IGB IGM	Brenner represented by Friedrichs
14	Mar-69	Rosenberg Tacke Arendt Brenner		DGB DGB IGB IGM	Rosenberg had flu
15	Jul-69	Rosenberg Tacke Vetter Arendt Brenner	Rosenberg Vetter Brenner	DGB DGB DGB IGB IGM	

Session	Date	Entitled to Attend	Attended	Organisation	Comments
16	Dec-69	Rosenberg	Rosenberg		Membership now on personal basis
		Tacke		DGB	
		Vetter	Kersten	DGB	Vetter represented by Kersten
		Arendt		IGB	
		Brenner	Brenner	IGM	
17	Feb-71	Rosenberg	Rosenberg		Membership now on personal basis
		Tacke	Tacke	DGB	
		Vetter	Vetter	DGB	
		Arendt		IGB	
		Brenner		IGM	
		Kersten	DGB	Kersten shown as attendee.	
18	May-73	Rosenberg	Rosenberg		Membership now on personal basis
		Vetter	Vetter	DGB	
		Lappas		DGB	
		Loderer		IGM	
				Kersten	DGB
		Müller-Engstfeld	DGB	Shown as representing DGB	

Sources

Identifying individual attendance at the Action Committee's sessions is not easy as no consistent records were kept. The table above has been compiled using records at the AFJME as the starting point; there are numerous documents (attendance lists, hotel bookings, table plans etc.) as each session of the Committee is catalogued separately. Any remaining gaps and inconsistencies were then resolved by means of other records, principally at the AdsD.

Based in Paris, Preuss may well have made use of opportunities to socialise with old friends (there are pictures of him at the 7th and 8th sessions) but I have not included him in the analysis above if he does not appear in the Action Committee listings.

My thanks to MM. Walther and Bezençon of the AFJME and Herr Woltering and Frau Bobzien of the AdsD for their help in this matter.

**Appendix V Meetings between Monnet and German Trade Union Committee Members
1955 – 1975.**

Year	Arendt	Brenner	Fretag	Friedrichs (s)	Gutermuth	Imig	Kersten (s)	Lambrecht (s)	Lappas	Loderer	Lung (s)	Müller-Engstfeld (s)	Preuss	Richter	Rosenberg	Sträter	Tacke	Vetter	Total
1955			3													3			8
1956		1	2		1									1	2				7
1957						1									9				10
1958															1	2			3
1959		1												1	2	2			4
1960		3													4				7
1961													2		3				5
1962														2	1				1
1963		1													5				6
1964		2													2				4
1965		1													1	1			2
1966															2	2			3
1967															2	1			2
1968															4				5
1969															1				2
1970													1		3				3
1971															1				1
1972															1				3
1973															1			2	1
1974															1				0
1975															1				0
Total	0	9	5	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	45	6	0	2	77

Source – Monnet réduit diary

Appendix VI Impact of Trade Unions as a Pressure Group *pace* Kirchner.

Issue	Kirchner View of Progress 1968 - 76	Comments	Author's Revised View
Expansion of ESF	Substantial		Substantial
Common Vocational Training policy	Small		Small
Social Security benefits for migrant workers	Substantial	Low overall impact	Small
Social Security harmonisation in general	Slight		Slight
Equal pay for men and women	Substantial		Substantial

Source – Kirchner, Trade Unions as a Pressure Group, p. 119, Table 6.1 (abridged and amended).

Appendix VII Voting Patterns concerning the MLF Resolution at the June 1964 Action Committee Session.

Although the main details of the abstentions and vote against the resolution are known, there are nevertheless some areas of dispute between the various sources which are worthy of comment.

AFJME AMK 16/5/22 is a handwritten record, presumably taken at the session, showing the result of the vote. In it the following members are shown as abstaining

Otto Brenner	FRG	IGM
Georges Brutelle	France	SFIO
André Kloos (representing Roemers)	Netherlands	NVV
Victor Larock (representing Collard)	Belgium	PSB
Louis Major	Belgium	FGTB
Pierre Pfimlin	France	MRP
Ludwig Rosenberg	FRG	DGB

One member voted against the resolution

Anne Vondeling	Dutch	Pv.d.A
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However, AFJME AMK 16/5/25 is a typewritten record (presumably drawn up later) which in addition to all those detailed above also shows Mollet of the SFIO as having abstained, although he was not present at the session.

This leads to an interesting issue which Gilles Grin, Director of the FJME also raised.⁴ Grin states that two German trade unionists abstained and one voted for the resolution. Rosenberg and Brenner were the only attendees at the session and both abstained, see above. It is, however, likely that Bernhard Tacke, a CDU member, who as DGB Deputy Chairman was entitled to attend Committee sessions, indicated his support to Monnet separately but his

⁴ Grin, 'Une vision de la paix et de la sécurité', p. 264.

name does not appear on either of the lists in the AFJME archives. M. Bezençon of the FJME was unable to follow this up with M. Grin due to the latter's workload but thinks this is the most likely explanation of the episode.⁵

In conclusion, it is certain that the positions of all those listed on the original document AMK 16/5/22 are all correct. Mollet, who was not present, was added to the list later – he presumably asked Monnet to record his abstention. In the same way, Tacke wished to differentiate himself from Rosenberg and Brenner (but most likely without making a fuss about it – there is no record in the DGB archives) and asked Monnet to record a vote for the motion on his behalf. In doing so he aligned himself with both the SPD and CDU politicians on the Committee, rather than his union colleagues.

⁵ Correspondence with M. Bezençon Sept – Dec 2020.

Appendix VIII German Trade Union Press Coverage of the Action Committee 1955 – 1975.

1. References to the Action Committee in *Welt der Arbeit*

Date	WdA Reference	Headline	Comments
27-1-1956	Jhr. VII Nr. 4, p.1	<i>Handeln für Europa!</i>	See Ch.4.2
5-10-1956	Jhr. VII Nr. 40, pp. 1 - 2	<i>Appell an das europäische Bewusstsein</i>	Committee's warnings on energy situation and support for Euratom
6-7-1962	Jhr. XIII Nr. 27, p. 4	<i>Gewerkschaften für grosses Europa</i>	Support for UK entry
18-1-1963	Jhr. XIV Nr. 3, p.2	<i>Kommentar</i>	DGB condemned de Gaulle's veto
12-7-1963	Jhr. XIV Nr. 28, pp. 1 & 6	<i>Wir wollen die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa</i>	Report of Dortmund rally. JM differentiated from other trade union speakers
5-3-1971	Jhr. XXII Nr. 10, p. 8	<i>Gewerkschaften wollen in der EWG nicht zu kurz kommen</i>	Session in Bonn. Discussion on social issues introduced by Vetter.
29-6-1973	Jhr. XXIV Nr. 26, p.3	<i>Das zweite Leben des Ludwig Rosenberg. Der ehemalige DGG Vorsitzende wird 70 Jahre alt</i>	Rosenberg's 70 th birthday. Now safe to mention the Committee
9-5-1975	Jhr. XXVI Nr. 19, p. 9	<i>Kriegsende. Die Chancen des Nullpunktes. Gewerkschaften ebnen den Weg nach Europa</i>	Appreciation of Committee on its closure. See Ch. 6.9

2. References to the Action Committee in *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*

Using 'Monnet' as a search term produced 13 results; six of which referred to the post-war French 'Monnet' Plan, reflecting union interest in economic planning, and a further two to Monnet's role in the ECSC.⁶ Of the remaining five references, three were to Monnet generally, briefly mentioning his role in European integration. The final two referred to the Action Committee, as detailed in the narrative.

3. References to the Action Committee in *Europa-Informationen*

Date	Europa-Informationen Ref	Comments
2-11-1961	4/61, p. 11	Report of Committee's proposals for European currency reserve
30-11-1961	6/61, p. 1	Report that December session of Committee not taking place
1-7-1962	12/1962, p. 3	Support for UK membership. A virtual reproduction of WdA article on same subject
1-6-1963	10/1963, p. 3	Report on Dortmund Rally. Mention of Monnet but none of Committee
15-6-1964	10/1964, pp. 4 – 5	Report of Committee's June 1964 Bonn session

⁶ A search was also made under 'Aktions-Komitee' but none of the 26 results referred to the Monnet Committee.

Appendix IX Obituaries of German Trade Union Members of the Action Committee.

Name	Organisation	Date of Death	Mention in Welt der Arbeit Obituary?
Walter Arendt	IGB	7-5-2005	Died after closure of WdA
Otto Brenner	IGM	15-4-1972	No mention of Action Committee
Walter Freitag	DGB	7-6-1958	No mention of Action Committee
Karl-Heinz Friedrichs	IGM	NK	Date of death not identified. Stand in member of Committee only
Heinrich Gutermuth	IGB	28-6-1977	No mention of Action Committee
Heinrich Imig	IGB	24-2-1956	No mention of Action Committee but oblique mention by Potthoff of support for Monnet.
Otto Kersten	DGB	17-11-1982	No mention of Action Committee
Waldemar Lambrecht	IGB	NK	Date of death not identified. Stand in member of Committee only
Alfons Lappas	DGB	NA	Still alive 2018
Eugen Loderer	IGM	9-2-1995	Died after closure of WdA
Robert Lung	IGM	Nov 1971	No obituary in WdA. Stand-in member of Committee only
Anton Müller-Engstfeld	DGB	July 1976	No obituary in WdA. Stand-in member of Committee only
Albert Preuss	DGB	NK	Date of death not identified
Willi Richter	DGB	27-11-1972	Scant reporting overall. No mention of Action Committee.
Ludwig Rosenberg	DGB	23-10-1977	Widespread coverage over two weeks. No mention of Monnet or Action Committee
Heinrich Sträter	IGM	11-4-1968	No obituary in WdA. Stand-in member of Committee only
Bernhard Tacke	DGB	10-3-1994	Died after closure of WdA
Heinz-Oskar Vetter	DGB	18-10-1990	Died after closure of WdA

Comments

1. The list of members is taken from Libera, 'Jean Monnet et les personnalités allemandes', pp. 37-38, Tableau I.
2. The analysis is based on obituaries in *Welt der Arbeit* which ceased publication in 1990
3. My thanks to the library staff of the FES for help in identifying the dates of death of Committee members. Those for Friedrichs, Lambrecht and Preuss could not be found. Significantly Libera could not identify the date of birth for Friedrichs and Lambrecht. None of the three are listed in the *Neue Deutsche Biographie* <http://www.ndb.badw-muenchen.de/>. (Accessed 20-1-2020).

SUMMARY BIOGRAPHIES

(Please note that these are not intended to be full biographies. They are intended as a quick guide to personalities mentioned in the text, drawing particular attention to points that reflect on their roles outlined in the narrative).

Acheson, Dean (1893 – 1971). American lawyer and politician. Acheson was a Democrat who served in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. As US Secretary of State 1949 – 1953, he aimed to build up Western Europe as a barrier to Soviet expansion.

Adenauer, Konrad (1876 -1967). German Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. Lord Mayor of Cologne during the Weimar Republic. A tireless proponent of *Westintegration*, Adenauer was one of the founders of the CDU. During his period as the Federal Republic's first Chancellor 1949 – 1963 he successfully steered West Germany back to international respectability.

Agartz, Viktor (1897 – 1964). German politician (SPD) and trade unionist. An economist, as Head of the WWI 1948 – 1955 Agartz developed the concept of 'active wage policy'. He was expelled from the SPD and DGB in 1958 due to his links with the KPD.

Arendt, Walter (1925 – 2005). German trade unionist. A miner and SPD member, Arendt sat in the *Bundestag* 1961 – 1980 and in the European Parliament 1961 – 1970. Elected Chairman of IGB in 1964, he was Minister for Labour 1969 -1976 in the social-liberal coalition. Member of Action Committee 1959 – 1973.

Armand, Louis (1905 – 1971). French engineer and administrator. Armand was one of the Three Wise Men appointed to review Europe's energy needs and 1958 – 1959 was President of Euratom

Arnold, Karl (1901 – 1958). German politician (CDU). Arnold worked for the Christian trade union movement during the Weimar era. After the war he was one of the founders of the CDU and served as Minister-President of North Rhine Westphalia 1947 – 1956. Like Jakob Kaiser he endorsed a more centrist approach to domestic policy than Adenauer.

Balke, Siegfried (1902 – 1984). German politician (CSU). A chemist, Balke initially pursued a business and academic career after the war. Elected to the *Bundestag* in 1957, Balke was Federal Minister for Atomic Energy 1956 – 1962.

Barroso, José Manuel (1956 -). Portuguese politician – Social Democrat. A lawyer, Barroso was Prime Minister of Portugal 2002 – 2004 and served as President of the European Commission 2004 – 2014.

Barzel, Rainer (1924 – 2006). German Christian Democrat politician (CDU). A lawyer, Barzel served as a minister under Adenauer and then in Kohl's conservative coalition as Minister of Intra-German Relations 1982 – 1983. Member of Action Committee 1964 – 1975 and of Second Action Committee.

Bech, Joseph (1887 – 1975). Luxemburg politician (Christian Social People's Party). Regarded as one of the 'founding fathers' of the European project, Bech was Prime Minister of Luxemburg 1953 – 1958 and took part in the Messina Conference.

Bergeron, André (1922 – 2014). French trade unionist. Originally a printer, Bergeron succeeded Bothereau as General Secretary of Force-Ouvrière 1963 – 89. Member of Action Committee 1964 – 1971.

Beuve-Méry, Hubert (1902 – 1989). French journalist. Beuve-Méry founded *Le Monde* in 1944. A friend and supporter of Monnet, he was initially supportive of de Gaulle, but became more critical of the President from the early 1960s.

Beyen, Johan (1897 – 1976). Dutch politician (independent but with economically liberal views) and businessman. As Minister of Foreign Affairs 1952 – 1956, Beyen was heavily involved in the discussions leading to the Messina Conference.

Bidault, Georges (1899 – 1983). French centre-right politician (MRP). Bidault fought in the resistance and after the war was Foreign Minister and briefly Prime Minister (1949 – 1950) during the IV Republic. He initially supported de Gaulle but then broke with him over Algerian independence.

Birkelbach, Willi (1913 – 2008). German politician (SPD). Birkelbach was a member of the *Bundestag* 1949 – 1964 and a member of the European Parliament 1952 – 64. Member of SPD Federal Executive 1954 – 1958.

Blank, Martin (1897 – 1972). German Liberal Democrat (FDP) politician. Member of the *Bundestag* 1949 – 1957. An industrialist, Blank opposed their exclusion from the Action Committee and voted against the Treaty of Rome. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1956.

Blücher, Franz (1896 – 1959). German politician – FDP, then DP. A founder of the post-war liberal FDP, Blücher served as Vice-Chancellor under Adenauer 1949 – 1957.

Böckler, Hans (1875 – 1951). German trade unionist. Böckler was active in Cologne politics during the Weimar era and an SPD member of the Reichstag 1928 – 1933. After the war he was instrumental in re-establishing the trade union movement in West Germany and was the first DGB Chairman from 1949 until his death, just after negotiating parity *Mitbestimmung* in the *Montanindustrie*.

Boël, Baron René (1899 – 1990). Belgian industrialist. President of the European League for Economic Cooperation.

Bonnefous, Edouard (1907 – 2007). French academic and politician – Left Republicans. In the late 1940s Bonnefous was involved in the debates over European integration. 1955 – 1956 served as Transport Minister under Edgar Faure.

Bos, Corstian A. (1923 – 2009). Dutch Christian Democrat politician (*Union chrétienne historique*). A specialist in foreign affairs, Bos was a member of the House of Representatives 1963 – 1972. Member of Action Committee 1964 – 1969.

Bothereau, Robert (1901 – 1985). French trade unionist. Bothereau broke with the CGT in 1947 to help found Force Ouvrière where he held the position of General Secretary 1948 – 1963. Member of Action Committee 1956 – 1962.

Brandt, Willy (1913 – 1992). German Social Democrat (SPD) politician. After returning from exile, Brandt became active in federal and West Berlin politics, where he was Governing Mayor 1957 – 1966. 1966 formed Grand Coalition with Kiesinger, becoming Foreign Minister. First SPD Chancellor of post-war Germany 1969 – 1974, heading social-liberal coalition, until forced to resign due to spy scandal. Member of Action Committee 1960 – 1975.

Breit, Ernst (1924 – 2013). German trade unionist. Breit helped establish the *Deutscher Postgewerkschaft* after the war and was Chairman 1971 – 1982. As DGB Chairman 1982 – 1990 he had to contend with Kohl's conservative led coalition and the aftermath of the *Neue Heimat* affair. Member of Second Action Committee but never attended.

Brenner, Otto (1907 – 1972). German trade unionist. As Chairman of *IG Metall* 1956 – 1972, Brenner espoused more left-wing views than Rosenberg, with whom he clashed on several occasions over DGB and union policy. Member of Action Committee 1956 – 1972.

Brentano, Heinrich von (1904 – 1964). German Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. A lawyer by profession, von Brentano sat in the *Bundestag* 1949 – 1964 and was Adenauer's Foreign Minister 1955 – 1961, where he faithfully executed Adenauer's foreign policy. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1964.

Briand, Aristide (1862 – 1932). French politician (Republican Socialist). Prime Minister numerous times during the III Republic, after 1918 Briand worked to achieve international cooperation and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926.

Brutelle, Georges (1922 – 2001). French Socialist politician (SFIO). Brutelle was politically active during the IV Republic. Member of Action Committee 1958 – 1965.

Burger, J.A.W. (1904 – 1986) Dutch Socialist politician who helped found the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA). Member of Action Committee 1956 – 1962.

Carstens, Karl (1914 – 1992). German Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. After a series of senior civil service roles and a period as a law professor, Carstens sat in the *Bundestag* 1972 – 79. Federal President 1979 – 1984. Member of Action Committee 1963 – 1974. Carstens was also President of the revived Action Committee 1984 - 1988.

Chaban-Delmas, Jacques (1915 – 2000). French politician (Gaullist). Chaban-Delmas was Prime Minister 1969 – 1972 and stood unsuccessfully as President 1974. A Member of the Second Action Committee, he combined the roles of President and Secretary-General from 1988.

Collard, Léo (1902 – 1981). Belgian politician – Socialist. Member of Action Committee 1960 – 1969.

Cool, Auguste (1903 – 1973). Belgian trade unionist. Cool spent most of his working life as a union officer. 1932 – 1946 Secretary General and 1946 – 1968 President of the Christian trade union *Confédération des syndicats chrétiens (CSC)*. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 73.

Coudenhove-Calergi, Richard von (1894 – 1972). Austrian politician who proposed the idea of a united Europe in publications from the 1920s on. His suggestion of using Beethoven's *Ode to Joy* as a European anthem was later taken up by the Council of Europe.

Delors, Jacques (1925 -). French politician (Socialist). 1981 – 84 held economic and finance posts under Mitterand. 1985 – 1995 President of European Commission where he oversaw the introduction of the Single Market and the beginnings of monetary union. 2015 created third 'Honorary Citizen of Europe' in recognition of his achievements.

Deschamps, Eugène (1922 – 1990). French trade unionist. Employed in the steel industry and originally a member of the Christian based CFTC, Deschamps was General Secretary CFDT 1964 – 1971. Member of Action Committee 1969 – 1971.

Duchêne, François (1927 – 2005) French academic and disciple of Monnet. Born in England of French parents and originally a journalist, Duchêne became English Language Information Officer at the High Authority 1952 – 1955. He then followed Monnet to work on the Action Committee, handling press liaison. An advocate of the 'Monnet method', he wrote the first biography of Monnet and became Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 1969 -1974.

Erhard, Ludwig (1897 – 1977). German Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. Under the Americans, Erhard was responsible for the 1948 currency reform, seen as paving the way for the *Wirtschaftswunder*. An economic liberal, as Economics Minister 1949 – 1963 he favoured the widening of free trade and his book *Wohlstand für Alle* was designed to popularise the idea of the social market economy. Federal Chancellor 1963 – 1966.

Erler, Fritz (1913 – 1967). German SPD politician. A member of the *Bundestag* from 1949 until his death, Erler was interested in defence issues. Member of Action Committee 1964 – 1967.

Etzel, Franz (1902 – 1970). German Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. Etzel was a founder of the CDU and nominated by Adenauer as 1st Vice-President of the ECSC 1952 – 1957, during which time he served as one of the Three Wise Men reviewing Europe's energy requirements. He then returned to domestic politics as Finance Minister 1957 – 1961. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1970.

Faure, Edgar (1908 – 1988). French politician. A Radical, Faure was Prime Minister in 1952 and 1955. During the second period he confirmed France's involvement in the European *relance* at Messina. Initially opposed to de Gaulle, he later held several ministries in the Gaullist administrations of the 1960s.

Faure, Maurice (1922 – 2014). French politician. A leading member of the Radical-Socialist Party, Faure served under Pinay in Guy Mollet's government 1956 - 58. Excluded from office under de Gaulle, he served briefly under François Mitterrand in 1981. Member of Action Committee 1956 and 1958 – 1971.

Feldengut, Karl (1947 -). DGB employee. During the 1970s Feldengut worked for the DGB's Dept. for European Integration and subsequently became Head of Dept. for Policy and Political Planning.

Fette, Christian (1895 – 1971). German trade unionist. Chairman *IG Druck u. Paper* 1948 – 1951. Elected DGB Chairman June 1951 following Böckler's death, Fette was ousted in October 1952 due to dissatisfaction over his failure to secure an extension of *Mitbestimmung* and his support for German rearmament.

Finet, Paul (1897 – 1965). Belgian trade unionist. Finet was General Secretary of the Socialist *Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique* 1936 – 52. He was appointed to the ECSC High Authority in 1952 and remained on it until his death, with a period as President 1958 – 1959.

Fontaine, François (1917 – 1996). Senior French civil servant. A longstanding assistant and admirer of Monnet, Fontaine worked with him from 1946, initially on the Plan and then as Monnet's *Chef de Cabinet* at the ECSC. 1955 – 1981 Fontaine was head of the Community's Paris office. Fontaine helped Monnet write his memoirs. His son Pascal wrote the most detailed history of the Action Committee yet published.

Freitag, Walter (1889 – 1958). German trade unionist. Chairman of *IG Metall* in Bizone and then FRG 1948 – 1952. Member of *Bundestag* 1949 – 1953. As DGB Chairman 1952 – 1956 Freitag was initially a Eurosceptic but won over by the experience of the ECSC; domestically he began the campaign for a 40 hour week. Vice President ICFTU 1953 – 1956. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1958.

Friedrichs, Karl-Heinz (nk – nk). German trade unionist, member IGM. Stand-in (suppléant) member of Action Committee 1965 – 67.

Gailly, Arthur (1892 – 1974). Belgian Socialist politician and trade unionist, with a background in the steel industry.

Gasperi, Alcide de (1881 – 1954). Italian politician and statesman, regarded as one of the 'founding fathers' of European integration. Born in the South Tyrol, de Gasperi was one of the founders of the Italian Christian Democratic Party. He served as Prime Minister in several post-war coalitions, and was a committed believer in European integration.

Gaulle, Charles de (1890 – 1970). French army officer and statesman. De Gaulle came to prominence as leader of the Free French after 1940. Initially involved in the politics of the IV Republic, he resigned in 1947. He returned to power following the Algerian crisis in 1958 and as President 1959 – 1969 concentrated on rebuilding French strength and influence. His vision of a *Europe des Patries* was at odds with that of Monnet and the two became increasingly estranged during the 1960s.

Geddes, Charles (1897 – 1983). British trade unionist. Active in the Union of Post Office Workers, Geddes was its General Secretary 1944 – 1957 and Chairman of the TUC 1955.

Gefeller, Wilhelm (1906 – 1983). German trade unionist. Chairman of *IG Chemie* (later *IG Chemie, Papier, Keramik*) 1949 – 1969. SPD member of *Bundestag* 1953 – 1957. President of International Federation of Chemical Workers 1964 – 69.

Giordiani, Francesco (1896 – 1961). Italian Professor of Chemistry. Giordiani was one of the Three Wise Men appointed to review Europe's energy needs in 1956.

Groeben, Hans von der (1907 – 2005). Senior German civil servant and EEC Commissioner. 1952 – 58 von der Groeben worked in the *Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft*, where he was responsible for relations with the ECSC. Von der Groeben understood the political imperatives for integration and was involved in the 1956 Brussels negotiations as Chairman of the Common Market Committee and then nominated as an EEC Commissioner, where he served 1958 – 1970.

Grosse, Franz (1903 – 1978). German union official. An economist and statistician, the pro-European Grosse was Head of the International Department of *IG Bergbau* at the time of the Schuman Plan. Subsequently forced out of office he then worked in the coal industry.

Grunwald, Günter (1924 – 2011). German trade unionist. Grunwald worked in the DGB's International Department and was subsequently the first director of the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*.

Gutermuth, Heinrich (1898 – 1977). German trade unionist. Secretary of the Christian Miners Association 1926 – 1933. After the war, Gutermuth worked for *IG Bergbau* (from 1960 *IG Bergbau u. Energie*), acting as Chairman 1956 – 1964, following Imig's death. President of International Miners Association 1963 – 1964. Member of Action Committee 1956 – 1965.

Haferkamp, Wilhelm (1923 – 1995). German trade unionist and European Commissioner. After the war, Haferkamp worked as a trade union official, becoming Head of the DGB's Economic Department 1962 – 1967. Member of EEC Economic and Social Committee 1964 – 1967. Nominated as European Commissioner 1967 and 1970 – 1984 Vice-President of European Commission, holding several portfolios over the period.

Hallstein, Walter (1901 – 1982). Civil servant and EEC President. Originally a Law Professor, Hallstein was chosen to lead the German delegation at the negotiations for the Schuman Plan. 1951 – 1958 *Staatssekretär*; first in the *Bundeskanzleramt* and then in the Foreign Office. A convinced European, Hallstein was the first President of the EEC Commission 1958 – 1967.

Hauenschild, Karl (1920 – 2006). German trade unionist. Hauenschild was one of the founders of IG Chemie and its Chairman 1969 – 1982. From 1970 President of the International Chemical Workers Federation. He was a Socialist member of the European Parliament 1979 – 1984.

Heine, Fritz (1904 – 2002). German SPD official. Heine spent his working life in the SPD and was *Vorstand* member responsible for Press and Propaganda 1946 – 1958.

Helmont, Jacques van (1920 – 1996). French economist and civil servant. Van Helmont worked with Monnet on the modernisation plan, and then on the negotiations for the Schuman Plan. 1952 – 1955 worked at the ECSC High Authority, latterly in Monnet's private office. 1955 – 58 worked for Monnet on the Action Committee and then took a post at Euratom 1958 – 1962 before returning as Secretary- General of the Action Committee until its dissolution.

Hettlage, Karl Maria (1902 – 1995). A lawyer with industrial connections, Hettlage was *Staatssekretär* in the Finance Ministry 1959 – 1962 and 1967 – 1969. From 1962 – 1967 he was a member of the ECSC High Authority.

Hirche, Kurt (1904 – 1999). German Trade union official employed in DGB.

Hirsch, Etienne (1901 – 1994). French civil engineer and civil servant. A close associate of Monnet from 1943, Hirsch worked with him on the modernisation plan and then moved to Luxemburg to work with him in the ECSC High Authority. 1959 – 1962 President of European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

Hoff, Hans vom (1899 – 1969). German trade unionist. A member of the DGB Executive 1949 – 52, vom Hoff was part of the German delegation to the Schuman Plan negotiations, the only trade unionist in all the delegations. 1952 became a special advisor to Monnet in the High Authority and later Social Attaché at the German embassy in Vienna.

Hoffmann, Reiner (1955 -). German trade unionist. Hoffman held posts at the Hans Böckler Stiftung (1984 – 1994), the European Trade Union Institute for Research (1994 – 2003) and the European Trade Union Confederation (2003 – 2009). Following a period with IG BCE, he joined the DGB in 2013 and in 2014 became Chairman.

Houthuys, Jef (1922 – 1991). Belgian trade unionist. Originally employed by the Metalworkers union, Houthuys was Chairman of the Christian trade union ACV 1969 – 1987. Member of Action Committee 1969 – 1973 and of Second Action Committee.

Imig, Heinrich (1893 – 1956). German trade unionist. A miner, Imig became active in union affairs from 1920. SPD member of *Bundestag* 1949 – 53 and of ECSC General Assembly 1952 – 53. An early supporter of Monnet, he became Chairman of IGB in 1953 and was elected President of the International Mineworkers Federation in 1954. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1956.

Isenbergh, Max (1913 – 2001) During the 1950s Deputy Legal Counsel of US Atomic Energy Commission. 1961 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational & Cultural Affairs in State Department.

Johnson, Lyndon B. (1908 – 1973). American Democratic politician. As President 1963 - 69, Johnson championed civil rights and the Great Society, but showed himself less interested in Europe than his immediate predecessors.

Kadow, Eberhard (1922 – nk). German trade unionist. An official in IGB, Kadow headed its Organisation Department in the early / mid 1950s before becoming an Area Officer. 1983 became Chairman of *Eschweiler Bergwerksverein AG*, the first trade unionist to be appointed to such a position in the *Montanindustrie*.

Kaiser, Jakob (1888 – 1961) German trade unionist and Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. Kaiser was one of the founders of the CDU and as one of the authors of the Ahlen Programme proposed a much more centrist approach than Adenauer in domestic affairs. 1949 – 57 member of *Bundestag* and Minister of All German Affairs, due to his immediate post-war involvement in the politics of the Soviet zone.

Kennedy, John F. (1917 – 1963). American politician. Following periods in the House of Representatives and Senate, Kennedy was President 1961 – 63. Domestically his 'New Frontier' policy was aimed at ameliorating social conditions. Internationally he opposed Communist expansion in Europe, South East Asia and Latin America with the 1962 Cuba Crisis.

Kersten, Otto (1928 – 1982). German trade unionist and DGB official. After leaving the GDR Kersten worked for the DGB from 1965. He subsequently became General Secretary of the ICFTU 1972 - 1982. Stand-in (suppléant) member of Action Committee 1965 – 75.

Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg (1904 – 1988). German Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. A lawyer, Kiesinger sat in the *Bundestag* 1949 – 1959 and 1969 – 1980. As Chancellor in the Grand Coalition 1966 - 1969, Kiesinger was keen to repair relations with France which had suffered under Erhard's chancellorship. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1974.

Kloos, André (1922 – 1989). Dutch Socialist politician and union leader (NVV). Kloos worked as a union official and served as Chairman of NVV 1965 – 1971. Member of Action Committee 1967 – 1969.

Kluncker, Heinz (1925 – 2005). German trade unionist. Kluncker made his career in the public sector union ÖTV and was Chairman 1964 – 1982. He was President of the Public Services International 1973 – 1982.

Kohl, Helmut (1930 – 2017). German Christian Democrat (CDU) politician. Kohl was Minister-President of Rhineland-Pfalz 1969 – 1976 and Chancellor 1982 – 1998. He was committed to European integration, worked to strengthen reconciliation with France and oversaw German reunification in 1989 – 90. Member of Action Committee 1973 – 1974.

Kohnstamm, Max (1914- 2010). Dutch historian and civil servant. A committed European and disciple of Monnet, after the war Kohnstamm worked as Queen Wilhelmina's private secretary and 1948 - 1952 in the Dutch Foreign Office where he was involved in the Schuman Plan negotiations. 1952 – 56 Secretary at the ECSC High Authority. 1956 – 1975 Vice-President of Monnet's Action Committee. 1973 – 1981 President of the European University Institute, Florence. 1984 – 1988 Secretary-General of the Second Action Committee.

Krier, Antoine (1897 – 1983). Luxemburg politician (Socialist) and General Secretary of Luxemburg Trade Union Federation. Member of Action Committee 1956 – 1965.

Kulakowski, Jan (1930 – 2011). Polish trade unionist and subsequently politician. 1954 – 1957 Kulakowski was a member of the General Secretariat of the IFCTU. Post 1990 involved in Polish politics and worked on Poland's accession negotiations to the EU.

Kristoffersen, Erwin (1932 – 1993). German trade union official. Originally a member of *IG Metall*, Kristoffersen served as Head of the DGB's international department from 1973.

Kummernuss, Adolph (1895 – 1979). German trade unionist. Active during the Weimar period, Kummernuss helped rebuild the union movement in his native Hamburg after the war and was Chairman of the public sector union ÖTV 1949 – 1964.

Lambrecht, Waldemar (1913 – nk) German trade unionist. Originally employed in the shipbuilding industry, Lambrecht worked for IGB from 1949, where from 1960 he managed the Chairman's office. Stand-in (suppléant) member of Action Committee 1960 – 61.

Lappas, Alfons (1929 – xxxx). German trade unionist. Lappas was active in the *Garten – Forst u Landwirtschaft* union, becoming President in 1968. He was later responsible for Finance and European integration within the DGB. Member of Action Committee 1973 – 1974.

Larock, Victor (1904 – 1977). Belgian politician – Socialist. Not a member of the Action Committee, Larock represented Collard of the FGTB at the June 1964 session.

Leber, Georg (1920 – 2012). German trade unionist and politician (SPD). After the war Leber worked for *IG Bau-Steine-Erden* and served as Chairman 1957 – 1966. 1966 – 1978 he served in various Ministerial functions, ending as Defence Minister.

Lieberherr, J-G (nk – 2019). Jean Monnet's son in law, married to his second daughter, Marianne. Lieberherr was a banker and industrialist.

Lipgens, Walter (1925 – 1984). German historian. Lipgens is best known as one of the first historians of European integration.

Loderer, Eugen (1920 – 1995). German trade unionist. Loderer was active in IG Metall, becoming a union official. He was elected Chairman 1972 following Brenner's death, a post he held until his retirement in 1983. He was elected to the European Parliament in 1979 but gave up his mandate that December due to pressure of work. Member of Action Committee 1972 – 1974.

Lung, Robert (nk – 1971) German trade unionist. Lung was IGM's legal advisor during the 1950s and 1960s. Stand-in (suppléant) member of Action Committee 1957 – 61.

Macmillan, Harold (1894 – 1986). British politician – Conservative. After holding a series of ministerial positions, Macmillan served as prime minister 1957 – 63. In 1961 his government made the UK's first, unsuccessful, attempt to join the EEC, which was vetoed by de Gaulle.

Major, Louis (1902 – 1985). Belgian trade unionist and politician. After World War II Major was active in the Socialist FGTB as its Deputy General Secretary 1945 – 1952 and General Secretary 1952 – 1968. 1968 – 1973 he was Minister of Labour and Employment. Member of the Action Committee 1961 – 67.

Malvestiti, Piero (1899 – 1963). Italian politician (Christian Democrat). Malvestiti held a variety of ministerial roles during the 1950s. He was appointed a European Commissioner in 1958 but resigned to become President of the ECSC High Authority 1959 – 1963.

Marjolin, Robert (1911 – 1986) French civil servant and academic. Marjolin won a scholarship to study at Yale in 1931. During the war he worked with Monnet on the Supply Commission and followed him to become Deputy Commissioner General for reconstruction (the Monnet Plan). 1948 – 1955 he was Secretary-General of OEEC and then led the French delegation in the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome. 1958 – 1967 served as a European Commissioner.

Matthiesen, Heinz (nk – nk). During 1980s responsible for European Trade Union policy within the DGB's International Division.

René Mayer (1895 – 1972). French politician (Republican / Radical). Mayer served in several IV Republic administrations, including a brief spell as Prime Minister 1953. He was President of the ECSC's High Authority 1955 - 1958.

Mayne, Richard (1926 – 2009) International civil servant and journalist. Committed to European integration, Mayne joined the High Authority in 1956 and worked as Hallstein's personal assistant 1958 – 63 in the European Commission. An admirer of Monnet, Mayne worked for the Action Committee from 1963 and later translated Monnet's memoirs into English. 1973 – 76 Head of the London Office of the European Commission.

McCloy, John (1895 – 1989). American lawyer and diplomat. McCloy served as a Presidential advisor during World War II and as President of the World Bank 1947 – 49. As US High Commissioner for Germany 1949 – 1952 he helped establish the Federal Republic and supported Monnet during the Schuman Plan negotiations.

Mendès-France, Pierre (1907 – 1982). French politician (Radical). Mendès-France was French prime minister 1954 – 55, during which time the French National Assembly rejected plans for the EDC. His main achievement as prime minister was to negotiate French withdrawal from Indo-China.

Mollet, Guy (1905 – 1975) French politician (SFIO / Socialist). A proponent of European integration Mollet was premier 1956 – 57 and negotiated and signed the Treaty of Rome. He adopted a repressive policy in Algeria and joined Britain in invading Egypt in 1956. Briefly held office under de Gaulle but resigned 1959. Member of the Action Committee 1956 – 1971.

Monnet, Jean (1888 – 1979).

Müller-Engstfeld, Anton (1915 – 1976). German journalist and DGB official. In the early 1970s Müller-Engstfeld was the DGB Executive member for European affairs. Stand-in (suppléant) Member of Action Committee 1972 – 1974.

Ollenhauer, Erich (1901 – 1963). German Social Democrat (SPD) politician. Ollenhauer spent the years 1933 – 1946 in exile. He sat in the *Bundestag* 1949 – 1963 and was elected Chairman of the SPD in 1952 following Schumacher's death. During his chairmanship the SPD remained in opposition at the federal level but Ollenhauer modernised the party, enabling future electoral success. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1963.

Osterkamp, Karl (1901 – 1972). German trade union official. An economist, Osterkamp worked for the *Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Institut der Gewerkschaften* 1949 – 53 and from 1954 was the ÖTV Executive member responsible for economic and social policy.

Pastore, Giulio (1902 – 1969). Italian trade unionist and politician (Christian Democrat). Pastore was among the founders of the CISL in 1950 and served as its General Secretary until 1958. He also held several government positions in the late 1950s – early 1960s.

Peyrefitte, Alain (1925 – 1999). French public servant and politician (Gaullist). Peyrefitte served as de Gaulle's Minister of Information 1962 – 1966 and was the author of several books on current affairs.

Pflimlin, Pierre (1907 – 2000). French Christian Democrat politician (MRP). A lawyer, Pflimlin held various posts in the IV Republic, including two weeks as prime minister directly before de Gaulle's return to power. He served under de Gaulle but broke with him in 1962 over Europe. Member of Action Committee 1967 – 1973.

Pinay, Antoine (1891 – 1994). French politician (Radical then conservative). Pinay held numerous ministerial posts during the IV Republic, principally Prime Minister 1952 – 1953 and Foreign Minister 1955 – 1956 which led to his involvement in the Messina Conference. Supported de Gaulle in 1958 but later broke with him over Algeria. Member of Action Committee 1957 – 71.

Pleven, René (1901 – 1993). French lawyer and politician (UDSR then MRP). Associated with Monnet from the mid-1920s, Pleven initially followed an international career. He was Prime Minister twice during the IV Republic and gave his name to the Pleven Plan, the attempt to form a European Defence Community in the early 1950s. Member of Action Committee 1956 – ?1969.

Potthoff, Heinz (1904 – 1974). German economist, trade unionist and politician (SPD). Potthoff was nominated to the International Ruhr Authority and was then a member of the ECSC High Authority 1953 – 1962.

Preuss, Albert (1904 – nk). German trade unionist. Preuss fled to France in 1934 and fought in the resistance. After the war he headed the DGB office in Paris, founded the *Pariser Kurier* newspaper and worked for Franco-German reconciliation. Member of Action Committee 1958 – 71.

Reusch, Hermann (1896 – 1971). German industrialist. A member of the *Gutehoffnungshütte* Executive, Reusch was an opponent of *Mitbestimmung* and sceptical of the ECSC.

Ricard, Pierre (nk – nk). French industrialist. As head of the French Steel Syndicate Ricard opposed the Schuman Plan. He helped found the employers' organisation CNPF after 1945 and served as Deputy Chairman.

Richter, Willi (1894 – 1972) German trade unionist. After the war, Richter helped rebuild the union movement in Hesse. As Chairman of the DGB 1956 – 1962 he showed an interest in pension reform and was tipped to be Brandt's Minister of Labour if the SPD had won the 1961 federal election. Member of Action Committee 1956 – 66.

Robens, Alf (1910 – 1999). British trade unionist and politician (Labour). Chairman of the Coal Board 1960 – 1971.

Roemers, Derk (1915 – 1983). An economist and Labour party politician, Roemers was Chairman of the NVV Free trade union 1959 – 65. Member of Action Committee 1959 – 1965.

Rosenberg, Ludwig (1903 – 1977). German trade unionist. After exile in England, Rosenberg returned to Germany in 1946 and worked in the DGB, serving as Chairman 1962 – 1969. He was a committed European and supporter of Monnet. Member of Action Committee 1956 – 1975.

Scheel, Walter (1919 – 2016). German Liberal Democrat (FDP) politician. As Party Leader 1968 – 1974 Scheel led the FDP's change of support to the SPD. 1969 – 74 Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor in Brandt's social-liberal coalition. 1974 – 79 Federal President. Member of Action Committee 1968 – 1975.

Schevenels, Walter (1894 – 1966). Belgian trade unionist. Schevenels became Deputy General Secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions in 1929. After the war he worked for the ICFTU and was General Secretary of its European Regional Organisation 1950 – 1966.

Schiller, Karl (1911 – 1994). German politician – SPD. An economist by training, Schiller helped to modernise the SPD during the 1950s. He served as Minister of Economic Affairs from 1969 and then as Finance Minister 1971 – 1972 before resigning in disagreement with Brandt's economic policies.

Schmelzer, Norbert (1921 – 2008). Dutch Christian Democrat politician. Leader of the KVP 1963 - 1971. Member of Action Committee 1964 – 1971.

Schmidt, August (1878 – 1965). German trade unionist. Active in mining unions from the early part of the century, Schmidt was IGB Chairman 1949 – 53.

Schmidt, Helmut (1918 – 2015). German Social Democrat (SPD) politician. Schmidt was politically active in Hamburg, making his name after the 1962 floods. A convinced Atlanticist, he served as Minister of Defence and then Finance under Brandt before becoming Chancellor 1974 – 1982. Member of Action Committee 1966 – 1975.

Schumacher, Kurt (1895 – 1952). German Social Democrat (SPD) politician. A convinced opponent of Nazism, Schumacher spend much of the Third Reich in concentration camps. After the war he refounded the SPD in the Western zones, serving as leader 1946 – 1952. His prioritisation of reunification over *Westintegration* put him at odds with Adenauer.

Schuman, Robert (1886 – 1963). Luxemburg born French lawyer and Christian Democrat politician. After the war Schuman helped found the MRP and served twice as Prime Minister of the IV Republic. A convinced European, he was influential as Foreign Minister and promoted Monnet's plan for the integration of the European coal and steel industries to which he lent his name.

Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques (1924 – 2006). French journalist and politician (Radical / centre-right). Servan Schreiber is best known for his 1967 work *Le Défi Américain*, which outlined the economic challenge America presented for Europe.

Shone, Robert (1906 – 1992). An academic who moved into industry, Shone was an exponent of tripartism and 1962 – 66 served as Director of the UK's National Economic Development Council.

Spaak, Paul-Henri (1899 – 1972). Belgian Socialist politician. Spaak was instrumental in establishing the Benelux customs union after World War II. A convinced multilateralist and supporter of European integration, Spaak chaired the Committee established at Messina to investigate further opportunities for integration. Secretary-General of NATO 1957 – 61.

Stewart, Michael (1906 – 1990). British Labour politician. The pro-European Stewart served in various capacities during Wilson's first premiership, ending as Foreign Secretary 1968 – 1970. Member of Action Committee 1969.

Storti, Bruno (1913 – 1984). Italian trade unionist and politician (Christian Democrat). Storti was General Secretary of the Catholic based CISL 1958 – 1977 and President of ICFTU 1965 – 1972. Member of Action Committee 1959 – 1971.

Sträter, Heinrich (1896 – 1967). German trade unionist (IGM). Member of IGM Executive during 1950s and Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1961.

Strauss, Franz-Josef (1915 – 1988). German politician – Conservative (CSU). A founding member of the Bavarian CSU, Strauss was Party Chairman 1961 – 1988. After holding a series of ministerial posts in the 1950s and 1960s, he was Minister President of Bavaria 1978 – 1988. Member Action Committee 1966 – 1974.

Stresemann, Gustav (1878 – 1929). German politician (National Liberal, then DVP). Stresemann was Chancellor in 1923 and then served as Foreign Minister 1923 – 1929, where he worked for reconciliation in Western Europe.

Tacke, Bernhard (1907 – 1994). German trade unionist and politician (CDU). A member of *GW Textil-Leder-Bekleidung*, Tacke served as DGB Vice Chairman from 1956. Member of Action Committee 1960 – 1972.

Thorpe, Jeremy (1929 – 2014). British lawyer and politician. Leader of the Liberal Party 1967 – 1976. Member of Action Committee 1969 – 1971.

Tindemans, Leo (1922 – 2014). Belgian politician (Christian Democrat). Tindemans was Prime Minister of Belgium 1974 – 1978 and Foreign Minister 1981 – 1989. The 1976 Tindemans Report advocated the development of common European polices but did not result in any immediate action.

Truman, Harry S. (1884 – 1972). American politician (Democrat). As President 1945 – 1953, Truman was central to the major decisions concerning the rebuilding of post-war Europe.

Uri, Pierre (1911 – 1992). French economist. A Socialist, Uri worked with Monnet on the reconstruction plan and was then an advisor for Spaak, helping to draft the Spaak Report. 1962 – 1966 he worked for the Atlantic Institute before returning to academic life.

Vetter, Heinz-Oskar (1917 – 1990) German trade unionist and politician (SPD). A member of IGB, Vetter was DGB Chairman 1969 – 1982. He served as President of ETUC 1974 – 1979 and was an MEP 1979 – 1989. Member of Action Committee 1969 – 75.

Vondeling, Anne (1916 – 1979). Dutch politician (Socialist). Vondeling was in office during the early 1960s. Member of the Action Committee 1962 – 1964.

Vosshenrich, Heinz (1922 – 1985). German trade unionist. From 1958 Vosshenrich worked for IGC, where from 1968 he was the Executive member responsible for finance and personnel.

Vredeling, Henk (1924 – 2007). Dutch politician – Socialist. Vredeling ws Minister of Defence 1973 – 1977 and European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs 1977 – 1981.

Wagenführ, Rolf (1905 – 1975). An economist and statistician, Wagenführ was a proponent of economic planning. From 1949 he worked for the DGB's *Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Institut* and 1954 – 1966 headed the ECSC's Statistics Department.

Wehner, Herbert (1906 – 1990). German Social Democrat (SPD) politician. On his return to Germany from exile, Wehner joined the SPD and was instrumental in modernising the party during the 1950s. He was Minister of Intra-German Relations 1966 – 1969 and then led the SPD parliamentary party 1969 – 1980. Member of Action Committee 1955 – 1975.

Woodcock, George (1904 – 1979) British trade unionist. Woodcock was Assistant General Secretary of the TUC 1947 – 60 and General Secretary 1960 – 69.

Yrissou, Henri (1909 – 2009). High level French civil servant (*Inspecteur des Finances*). Yrissou served as Antoine Pinay's *Chef de Cabinet*, most notably in the Foreign Ministry 1955 – 1958.

