MUSIC-MAKING AS A PERFORMED THEOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN RELATING

by

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ABSTRACT

Most current work which seeks to engage both music and theology is mainly focused on music for the contribution it can make to understanding theological themes which can generally be understood otherwise (Begbie), or on integrating music and theology into a wider social, cultural, and intellectual context which acknowledges God's presence throughout the world, and assigns to music a sacramental role (Brown). The thesis avoids both these approaches, seeking rather to understand music-making as having theological import in and of itself.

From the side of theology, Trinitarian theology and the work of Daniel Hardy, Herman Bavinck and Christoph Schwöbel are major themes. From the side of music, performance practice, the reception of music, and the extra-musical qualities which are nonetheless integral to music-making are to the fore.

The thesis turns on being able successfully to draw an analogy between intra-Trinitarian life and the relational life of performing musicians, especially those in small musical ensembles. On the basis of this analogy, I conclude that music-making is a performed theology which captures what it is for human beings to be related to one another in Christian ways.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCING THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIÆ, THE COMPENDIUM OF THEOLOGY,* AND

THE *SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES* OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

Quotations from the *Summa Theologicæ* are from Timothy McDermott's "Concise Translation" which is listed in the Bibliography as

> Aquinas, T. (1991). *Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation.* (T. McDermott, Ed. & Trans.) Notre Dame: Christian Classics.

> Footnote references follow the standard form: Part.Question.Article.

Quotations from *The Compendium of Theology* are from the edition retitled *Light of Faith* which is listed in the Bibliography as

> Aquinas, T. (1993). *The Compendium of Theology.* (C. Vollerts, Trans.) Bedford NH: Sophia Institute Press.

> Footnote references are by page numbers.

Quotations from the *Summa Contra Gentiles* are from the Aeterna Press edition listed in the Bibliography as

> Aquinas, T. (2014). *The Summa Contra Gentiles.* (The English Dominican Fathers, Trans.) London: Aeterna Press.

> Footnote references are by Book.Chapter.Page according to the Aeterna Press edition.

REFERENCING *THE ORDINATIO* OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

The quotation from *The Ordinatio* is from the translation listed in the Bibliography as

Scotus, D. (1987). *Ordinatio.* (A. Wolter, Trans.) Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company.

The citation of *The Ordinatio* of Duns Scotus in footnote 311 on page 109 follows the standard internal divisions: *Ordinatio 1*, d (distinction), q (question), n (paragraph number).

BIBLE QUOTATIONS

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PART 1: THEOLOGY AND MUSIC

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The thesis thematises two features of contemporary Christian theology: Trinitarian theology and the music/theology nexus.[1] Scholarship in the field of theology and music has tended to ignore the 'relational dimension' in music-making, the relationships between performing musicians. The focus has tended to be on music rather than on music-making, and this has had the consequence that music has been viewed as contributing to the understanding of theological themes or as a vehicle for worship, rather than as a practice which might be theologically important in its own right. Might music-making be a performed theology?

I will argue that as we make music together, not only do musical relationships between us arise, but as they do so our identities, at least for the duration of the performance, are continuous with those relationships. Continuity plays an important role in the thesis. Therefore, I devote the whole of Chapter 7 to a discussion of continuity and its role in the thesis. But these relationships which are musical through and through are more than continuous with us as performers, they define our identities in their entirety. It is not that we relate to one another musically but otherwise remain, nonetheless, separate. Rather, as we make music together, we become formed into a unity in diversity. The simplicity of the thesis, then, is that I wondered if this conception of music-making might bear some analogical likeness

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[1] There are many other distinguishing features of contemporary Christian theology, these include, feminist theology, liberation theology, nouvelle théologie, and theology and the environment. Not just music, but the arts generally have received generous attention in their relationship with theology in recent decades.

with the life of the Trinity, and, if so, might there be an argument subsequent to it which would establish music-making as a performed theology of Christian relating? One way of thinking of the thesis, therefore, is as a project whose aim is to search for and, hopefully, to discover if there is in fact such an argument. The three chapters and Conclusion of Part IV take up this search in earnest.

This idea, that as performers our identities are formed in terms of our musical relationships with which we are continuous, is referred analogously to the identities of the Persons of the Trinity. Therefore, Chapter 4 in the methodology part of the thesis is devoted to a detailed examination both of analogy in our talk of God, and, following on from that as a basis, of whether or not its use in the context of the thesis does the job required of it.

Perhaps at this early stage I could emphasise two things. First, my focus is firmly on music-making as a practical activity which, as well as physical and technical aspects, also requires and induces dispositions such as selflessness, love, and absorption in the music-making process itself. I argue for a continuity between good music-making and all these aspects and dispositions, even that they are coterminous with one another. Let me try to put this another way. I shall try to argue that it would not be possible to have one without the other. This is perhaps more readily acceptable when we think from music-making to the dispositions, than it is in the opposite direction. May we not have the dispositions without the music-making? Yes, we certainly can, but then the dispositions will not lead to the indwelling. Music-making seems to me to be a particularly favourable context for the realisation of the dispositions, and, as I hope

becomes clear as the thesis unfolds, realised in an especially potent way. In the chapters on music-making (Chapters 8, 9 and 10) I have attempted to demonstrate the validity of this view. My focus, then, is not on music as some sort of thing which can be considered separately from its instantiation in performance. Second, my focus is on *good* music-making. This is not the elitist position it might appear to be. Rather, my arguments are made in the context of good music-making because, as I shall try to show, good music-making is an indication of the indwelling of the performers.[2] My concern is that poor musical performances often result from the lack of commitment which players have for the music, the occasion, to one another, to the performance itself, and so on, and thus that they do not indwell one another. Beginners in this context, can give good, even compelling, performances from which the odd squeak from a clarinet, an occasionally overblown flute, or a finger-slip do not substantially detract. These players can be committed to the music and its performance to the best of their ability. Their commitment transmutes into, or is continuous with, their indwelling, and that is what interests me in the thesis. Perhaps I should also say that I do not think commitment guarantees good performances. My point is just a general one, namely, that the greater the commitment, the better the performance is likely to be. Conversely, the better the performance the more likely it is that the players indwell one another. This latter claim I try to argue for especially in Chapters 8, 9, and 10 of Part 3 on music-making, though I reaffirm it in other chapters too.

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[2] For the sake of variety, I use alternatives to 'good' such as 'compelling' or 'persuasive'.

In this first chapter, I indicate the development of the thesis by chapter and follow this with a fuller outline of the structure of the thesis. I then briefly introduce Trinitarian theology and the theology/music nexus, and begin to develop my overall approach, contrasting it with some of the current work taking place at the interface between music and theology. I draw attention to some of my guiding concerns, especially the status of music as theology as opposed to its functional and illustrative use in worship and theological elucidation.

<u>The approach to structure in the thesis</u>

Because relationality is a constant theme of the thesis, the criterion by which the claim of the thesis is substantiated, namely, that an analogy can be drawn between intra-Trinitarian relationality and that of performing musicians, is thus also addressed throughout the thesis. It is also worth noting as the thesis progresses, that I have adopted a certain kind of theological writing which is required because I am working with overlapping domains. For example, indwelling initiates the discussion of '*communio*' which overlaps with Trinity. This approach can be dubbed 'recursive', a kind of improvisation on a double-headed theme: the mutual indwelling of the divine Persons, and that of performers in small musical ensembles. Thus, there is expository material and recapitulation in different 'orchestrations' as the thesis moves to the culminating arguments of Part 4.

There are two sets of discussions which ground these culminating arguments. The first, the methodology section of Part 2, refers various concepts – analogy, 'the other',

and social Trinitarianism, for example – to my overall concerns, especially indwelling and identity. The second, in Part 3, establishes what kind of practice music-making is, also especially regarding indwelling and identity. Finally, in Part 4, I weave these two discussions together in the context of Trinitarian theology with the aim of thereby constructing music-making as a performed theology of Christian relationality. Thus, I make my case in a cumulative way, building up an account of indwelling and identity, both Trinitarian and musical, in conversation with modern theology. Progression through the thesis is thus not entirely linear, though the overall arc of the thesis is linear, with a ground plan which moves from setting the scene in Part 1, to methodology in Part 2, practical music-making in Part 3, and a bringing together of all my themes in Part 4.

Development of the thesis by chapter

Chapter 1: Introducing the thesis – thesis hypothesis – criteria for testing the hypothesis – thesis outline.

Chapter 2: Literature Survey – beginning to situate the thesis in the theology/music field.

Chapter 3: Does God's radical otherness permit an analogy between the relationality of intra-Trinitarian life and the relationality of human life?

Chapter 4: Analogy – the methodological pivot of the thesis

Chapter 5: Social Trinitarianism – developing an account of Trinitarian life, especially perichoresis, being the first half of the analogy

Chapter 6: The Other – developing an account of relationships from theoretical perspectives on the other and relating these to music-making, being the second half of the analogy

Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10: Music-making – developing an account of practical music-making especially in terms of the relationships between players.

Chapter 11: Music, the Trinity and Conversation – extending the account of relationality in music-making and Trinitarian life using the notion of conversation.

Chapter 12: Trinity, Relationality and Music – contextuality in relation to the Trinitarian activity of God in the world - some resonances between this, indwelling and music-making – the ontological status of music-making.

Chapter 13: Conclusion: Music and Christian Relating – music-making, identity, signs, and love – a further pointing up of the indwelling amongst, and the identities of, performers against the indwelling of the divine Persons and definitive status of love in intra-Trinitarian life – the conclusion that music-making is indeed a performed theology of Christian relating and that it is a sonorous analogue of the life of the Trinity.

Trinitarian Theology

In the modern era, Kant dismissed doctrinal interest in the Trinity because "it requires a faith about what God is in himself that 'would be a mystery surpassing all human concepts'".[3] This is a classically Enlightenment thought; for Kant, knowledge of things in themselves is impossible, all we can aspire to is knowledge of how they appear to us. Del Colle remarks that "Through a combination of the classical Protestant soteriological emphasis […] and the post-Kantian limits upon knowledge claims […] it was merely a matter of logic before Trinitarian doctrine found itself on the margins of Christian theology".[4] Adolf Harnack is perhaps a good example of this marginalisation.[5] Hegel is something of an exception to this trend, however, though his concern is to develop a meta-philosophy rather than to contribute to the doctrinal issue.

The revival of Trinitarian theology in the twentieth century had a number of facets, among them Barth's contention that only the Word of God is adequate as a prolegomena for dogmatics and that this requires an affirmation of the Trinity: "to the same God who in unimpaired unity is Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness, is also

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[3] O'Regan, 2014, p. 254. The embedded quotation is from Kant, 2018, p. 168.
[4] Del Colle, 1997, p. 135.
[5] See Harnack 1901, pp. 124-46.

ascribed in unimpaired variety in Himself precisely this threefold mode of being".[6]

There is a hint here of the modalism of which Barth has been accused.[7]

Another facet, one which has played a prominent role in the twentieth-century resurgence of Trinitarian theology, is social Trinitarianism. I will highlight some of the problems which arise as a consequence of my engaging Trinitarian theology alongside the social practice of music-making using social Trinitarianism as guide. I do this in Chapter 5. Subsequently, I will fall back on a more general use of the terms 'social Trinity' and 'Trinity' which is sensitive to the problems which I have highlighted.

Moltmann was an important early advocate of social Trinitarianism, writing that "the Trinity corresponds to a community in which people are defined through their relations with one another and in their significance for one another".[8] Later social Trinitarians adopted social Trinitarianism for different purposes. Volf adopts social Trinitarianism with a view to its implications for church structure. He writes, "Conceiving the structure of the Church in a consistently Trinitarian fashion, means conceiving not only the institution of office as such, but also the entire (*local*) *church* itself in correspondence to the Trinity".[9] Boff has the whole of society in his sights when he writes, "So human society is a pointer on the road to the mystery of the Trinity, while the mystery of the Trinity, as we know it from revelation, is a pointer

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[6] Barth, 1936, p. 344. Besides Barth, other important revivers of Trinitarian theology in the twentieth century include Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jürgen Moltmann, John Zizioulas, Colin Gunton, Christoph Schwöbel, Alan Torrance, Miroslav Volf, Catherine Mowry LaCugna, and Leonardo Boff amongst others.
[7] For a defence of Barth on this point, see Jowers, 2003, pp. 231-246.
[8] Moltmann, 1981, p. 198.
[9] Volf, 1998a, p. 218. Emphases in the original.

toward social life and its archetype."[10] Human society holds a *vestigium Trinitatis* since the Trinity is 'the divine society'".[11]

Catherine Mowry LaCugna[12] laments the influence of Greek philosophy on Christian theology which, for her, has been at the expense of biblical revelation. She advocates a return to biblical and pre-Nicene patterns of thought which emphasise that God's Trinitarian life is one, and that to distinguish between God's inner life and outer life as it is revealed in the economy of salvation is misleading. She believes such a return would enable the doctrine of God to be reconnected to the rest of theology as well as to ethics, spirituality and the life of the church.[13]

Gunton is interested in social Trinitarianism for its metaphysical possibilities. He asks, "Does a development of Trinitarian transcendentals enable us to contribute to a discussion of the nature of created reality".[14] Gunton distances himself from the label 'social Trinitarianism', saying, "It should be clear by now that, although there is developed in this book what can be called a social rather than a psychological approach, those ways of speaking are highly inadequate".[15]

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[10] Boff says this is "The central thesis of F. Taymans d'Eypernon's *Le Mystère primordial* (Paris 1950), especially pp. 56-62"; see Boff, 2005, p. 251, n. 14.
[11] Boff, 2005, p. 119. For the embedded quotation see Boff, 2005, p. 251, n. 15.
[12] LaCugna, 1993.
[13] Ibid., p. 1.
[14] Gunton, 1993, p. 152.
[15] Gunton, 1997, p. 195.

As these quotations illustrate, social Trinitarianism is not one-dimensional, but appears in quite different guises according to the particular contexts and purposes in and for which it is used.

In Chapter 5 I address some of the criticisms of social Trinitarianism. In particular I argue that I have not projected ideals of human sociality back on to the life of the Trinity.

In the twentieth-century, the question of the relationships between the three Persons came to the fore. These relationships were described as perichoretic, the Persons being understood to interpenetrate one another whilst remaining distinct and participating in their Being as one. For Kilby, perichoresis is simply a label for elements of human relationships, for example, or mutual giving. However, these qualities are projected onto God: "the concept [of perichoresis] is filled out rather suggestively with notions borrowed from our own experience of relationships and relatedness".[16] Though supportive of the previous genre of claim, Kilby is critical of the next move which some social Trinitarians make, to suggest that we should model our human relationships on the divine perichoresis: "projection […] is particularly problematic in at least some social theories of the Trinity because what is projected onto God is immediately reflected back onto the world, and this reverse projection is said to be what is in fact *important* about the doctrine".[17]

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[16] Kilby, 2000, p. 442.
[17] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

As I will explain further in Chapter 5 below, chastened by concerns like Kilby, I would like to read 'perichoresis' in a different, more cautious way. I will avoid using explicit description of the dynamics of the intra-Trinitarian life, as indeed we can have no understanding of the interpenetration of the three Persons as it is in itself. Instead, following scholars like Barth,[18] I will treat Triune relationality as an analogical concept. 'Perichoresis' for the purposes of this thesis is a descriptive concept, not an explanatory one. I do not ask, then, that we model our relationships, musical or otherwise, on the divine perichoresis. I subsequently draw an analogy between the mutual indwelling of musicians as they perform together and that of the three Persons of the Trinity. I shall try to resist the possible criticism that this move is a projection of the indwelling of the musicians and the qualities which define that indwelling back onto the Trinity. Rather, I shall hope to show that the indwelling of the musicians can be established and understood in purely musical terms, leaving the divine perichoresis as beyond our understanding in and of itself but, nonetheless, as one half of an analogical relation with the musicians.

Music and Theology

The twentieth century witnessed a flowering of interest in music in relation to theology. Perhaps the preeminent English-speaking scholars here are Jeremy Begbie

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[18] Gunton remarks, "He [Barth] is right to develop his theology of analogy on the basis – foundation – of the implications of God's triune relatedness to that which is not God"; Gunton, 1993, p. 140.

and David Brown, with many others including Férdia Stone-Davis, Maeve Heaney, and Albert Blackwell making important contributions.[19]

Towards the end of his *Theology, Music and Time* Begbie says that his

> intention throughout has been to allow the ultimate 'pressure of interpretation' to come not from musical practice considered in and of itself (as some kind of autonomous, normative arbiter), but from a focus on the activity of the triune God, definitively disclosed in Jesus Christ, whose purpose is the participation of the world – including music - in his own triune life.[20]

Whilst it is true that my interest in music in the thesis is on its practice considered in and of itself, as autonomous, rather than giving music the status of some kind of arbiter, I shall aim to understand it theologically by way of an analogical comparison with the indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity. In this regard, and as I will aim to show in later chapters, my project has a certain continuity with Begbie's.

It is a common-place to suggest that in the course of performing musicians are at one with the music, or that they dwell within it. In the thesis, I shall try to show that we might – using analogy – render this as the theological claim, that in performing

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[19] Begbie, 2015; Begbie, 2004; Begbie, 2008; Begbie, 2012; Begbie, 2000; Begbie & Guthrie, 2011; Brown, 2007; Stone-Davis, 2011; Stone-Davis, 2015b; Stone-Davis, 2015c; Stone-Davis, 2015a; Heaney, 2012; Blackwell, 1999; Chua, 2020.
[20] Begbie, 2000, p. 278.

together they indwell one another. This can be put another way: if, in a musical performance *par excellence*, the players can become so wrapped up in 'in-dwelling' the music-making, one might say that the music 'plays them', there is a kind of continuity between their performance and their musical identities. I explore this theme further in later chapters, arguing that we may go on to say that their musical identities for the duration of the performance are entirely formed in terms of the music-making itself, that is, who they are can be understood in terms of the coherence of the performance; a coherent performance ensures their mutual indwelling as a unified ensemble. I emphasise that performances must be coherent precisely because this guarantees, and is an indication of, the mutual indwelling of the players.[21] As I will argue, performance takes on a kind of ethical dimension: during the course of music-making, the players as players must indwell one another in transparency and even with a certain love that is expressed in a desire to give good performances

While I follow Jeremy Begbie in exploring Trinitarian theology for the sake of the theology of music, I attempt to enhance his account in several key ways. Begbie's approach to music in relation to theology can tend to be instrumental. The value of music is almost entirely framed by its usefulness either as a means of elucidating theological concepts or as an aid to worship and the expression of faith. For example, Begbie commends the musical triad as an apt analogy for Trinitarian perichoresis; the

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[21] That the performances I have in mind throughout the thesis are coherent is essential for the thrust of my arguments. Since I refer to such performances frequently, for the sake of variety I refer to them in different ways, as good or compelling or persuasive, for example. The point at issue, however, is always the same, namely, that such performances are an indication that the players are at one, are indwelling one another. Good, coherent, and persuasive performances are not possible otherwise; I argue this in later chapters.

three notes sound through one another, are clearly distinguishable though they form a unity.

Also, Begbie appeals to Zuckerkandl's analysis of musical space into three aspects. First, the way in which sounds interpenetrate one another. This parallels Begbie's use of the triad as an analogy for Trinitarian perichoresis.[22] Second, the perception of sound does not involve perception of its source. "This", Begbie says, "speaks of the need to do justice to what we can call the '*for*-one-anotherness' of the Persons".[23] Third, the sympathetic vibrations of strings which Begbie relates to the mutual glorification of the divine Persons which cannot be contained.[24]

David Brown's approach to music in relation to theology[25] is quite different to Begbie's. Brown assigns to music a sacramental role, seeking to integrate music and theology into a wider social, cultural, and intellectual context which acknowledges God's presence throughout the world, and the force of Scripture within that context. Brown seems chiefly interested in music's power to evoke a religious sensibility and to manifest God's presence. Stressing the importance of participation, he is also impressed by music's ability to take listeners beyond the mere assertion of dogma and towards an experiential affirmation of it.

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[22] Begbie, 2018, p. 32.
[23] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[24] Ibid., p. 33.
[25] Brown, 2007, pp. 217-385.

Even on this brief description of Begbie's and Brown's very different plumbings of the possibilities for bringing music and theology together, it seems, nevertheless, apparent that they both see music as having a primarily functional role; for them, music is theology's handmaid.[26] Most, though not all, scholars in this field similarly ascribe to music functional or illustrative roles in relation to theology. In Chapter 2, I explore some of these roles in detail and try to explain how my approach is different.

In contrast to Brown and Begbie, the thesis does not engage questions about music's ability to perform metaphorical roles in the understanding of theology or to be the vehicle for the expression of religious thought, sentiment, or belief, neither does it concern itself with socio-political or cultural roles for music nor with questions about what music might mean, whether it is a language and so on. I want to argue that music in and of itself can be understood theologically in its own right apart from its functional and metaphorical usefulness in relation to theological themes. This is a lacuna in the area of scholarly work bringing theology and music together which the thesis seeks to fill.

There are some necessary limits to my argument, however. For the purposes of the thesis, music-making is thought in terms of the materials of music and their shaping in performance. It is true that extra-musical influences may bear on performance and legitimately so, but my position is firmly centred on the musical requirements of music-making as such and the dynamics between the performers which they

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[26] I defend this view in Chapter 2.

engender. It is the working of the materials of music as such which I hold to in this thesis as what it is to make music. It is true that values and expectations of what it is to make music are culturally embedded, but the answers to questions of performance are overwhelmingly musical and made without reference to cultural factors beyond those which are part of musical culture itself.

To summarise, there are two claims implicit in the thesis:

1. Whilst music has a role to play as illustrative of, or as a metaphor for, theological themes and the truths of Christian doctrine, and whilst it has a functional role, as a vehicle for praise or the expression of religious sentiment or feeling, these roles do not by any means exhaust its theological importance,

2. To make music is to perform a kind of theology which is performative rather than propositional; primarily a matter of action rather than of narration, description, and system.

In order to set the stage for these arguments, I begin in the next chapter with a more in-depth exploration of the modern treatment of theology and music.

Thesis Outline

Part 1: Theology and Music

The aim of the first chapter is to provide an outline of the thesis and to set the frame within which it unfolds. The outline is followed by a brief introductory survey of recent Trinitarian theology and of recent scholarship in the music/theology field. The different approaches of Jeremy Begbie and of David Brown to music in its relation to theology are briefly outlined. The chapter continues with a more detailed account of the orientation to music and theology taken in the thesis.

Chapter 2 surveys recent literature which addresses the relationship between theology and music, focussing especially on the work of Begbie, Brown, Heaney, and McGann. With this chapter I aim to give my readers an overall impression of the state of scholarship in the music/theology field. My project will thus more readily appear both a continuation of this work, in terms of the use of analogy for example, and to be rather different from it.

Part 2: Methodology and the Concept of the Other

Part 2 undertakes largely preliminary work with the intention of trying to settle some large methodological questions before using an analogy between the relationships of the divine Persons and the relationships of performing musicians in Part 4. Before I can begin to fill out the content of the analogy on which the thesis turns and then make the analogy itself, I must, for example, establish the legitimacy of pursuing the analogy; this is the purpose of Chapter 4, which is a detailed examination of analogy. Analogy by attribution and analogy of proper proportionality are explained and

applied to the thesis hypothesis that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relationality.

Another potential difficulty which might obstruct pursuit of the analogy resides in my appeal to Trinitarian doctrine generally and, potentially, to social Trinitarianism in particular. I explain the difficulty and try to solve it in Chapters 3 and 5. In Chapter 3 the issue is that the doctrine of the Trinity seeks to hold God's radical otherness from his creatures on the one hand, together with his Incarnation on the other. This leads to the following question: Can the relationality which is fundamental to this doctrine bear association with the relationality of creatures? Because the analogy I wish to draw is dependent on an affirmative answer to this question, I try to make headway with it in this early chapter and before discussing analogy.

The thesis turns on an analogy between the relationality of the Trinity and that of small musical ensembles. These small ensembles are often thought in terms of a *communio,* and this makes the thesis vulnerable to the criticisms made of social Trinitarianism. Chapter 5 takes up the issue of social Trinitarianism, considering some its common criticisms in the context of the thesis. I hope to have successfully shown that the thesis is not guilty of projecting human values onto the Trinity. This chapter provides the first half of the analogy on which the thesis turns, namely intra-Trinitarian relationality.[27]

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[27] The second half of the analogy is provided in Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10.

The concept of the other plays a large part in the argumentation of the thesis. In small musical ensembles, the performers are very much concerned with one another, that is, with their inter-relationality as an aspect of their coherence as a performing ensemble. This relationality is a central concern in the overall conception of the thesis, therefore in Chapter 6 I examine how some conceptions of the other fare in the context of the thesis.

The goal of the chapters in Part 2 is to clear the ground upon which I will then be able to think what it is to make music in Part 3, go on to make use of the analogy between the relationality of music-makers and that of the Persons of the Trinity in Part 4, and conclude that music-making is indeed a performed theology of Christian relating.

Part 3: Music-making

In Part 3 focusses on music-making itself, especially on the relationships between the musicians which it demands and engenders. This forms the second half of the analogy on which the thesis turns.[28]

Music-making is often portrayed in the thesis as imbued with qualities of love and selflessness. In Chapter 7 I address the question as to whether this portrayal accords with practice or is too idealistic. Whilst this chapter is thus a defence of a

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[28] The first half of the analogy, namely, intra-Trinitarian relationality, is the subject of Chapter 5 on social Trinitarianism.

methodological move, I have placed it in Part 3 on music-making because, as I hope to show, love and selflessness are integral to good music-making.

The thesis makes much use of the concept of continuity. Continuity between the music-making and the music-makers, between the venue and performance, to give just two examples. In Chapter 8 I discuss various conceptions of continuity within the context of the overall argumentation of the thesis. Whilst this chapter begins to explicate a concept rather than musical practice, the concept is a 'practical' one which I use especially, though not exclusively, in the context of the practice of music-making, and thus I have placed it also in Part 3 on music-making.

In Chapter 9 I outline some performance and reception aspects of music-making. This puts flesh on the notion that music is to be thought in purely musical terms. The physicality of music-making is emphasised. First, though, I briefly address Begbie's fear of musical hubris, the fear that music gives privileged access to God. The bulk of the chapter is informed by Férdia Stone-Davis' analysis of music-making in which continuity plays a large part. Her analysis makes use of the concepts of 'impact', 'absorption', and *'ekstasis'*.

Chapter 10 builds on Chapter 9 by focusing on good performance practice. The concept of a co-created creative space is introduced in which the relationships between performers, music, scholars, the performance space, and listeners can be understood in purely musical terms. I dwell on the notion of musical truth, linking it with performance practice. The association of truth and performance has a number

of features which include, relationships between musicians, the relation between score and interpretation, and expressivity. Wittgenstein is an important interlocutor in this section of the thesis.

Part 4: The Trinity, Music, and Christian Relating,

The purpose of Chapter 11 is to begin to think more deeply about music and Trinitarian theology together. First, I explore Daniel Hardy's work with the aim of finding resonances between Hardy's descriptions of God's engagement with the world and music-making. There are also references to Zizioulas and Young. Second, and briefly, I turn to Herman Bavinck's theology of revelation to supplement Hardy's account of God's involvement with the complexities and particularities of the world. Third, Christophe Schwöbel offers an opportunity to think of God as conversation. I relate this to music-making, not because music-making is conversational but because the conversations which God has both with himself and his creation, and the conversation which is music-making all define the participants in the conversations. That identities, both of performers and of the Persons of the Trinity, are formed and defined in their entirety by the relationships they enjoy is a major part of the argumentation of the thesis.

Chapter 12 builds on Chapter 11. In part, this involves developing the notion of mutual indwelling amongst the three Persons of the Trinity. Also, the claim that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating will be approached by noting 'resonances' between music-making and certain aspects of God's Trinitarian life.

In Chapter 13, I argue that love is an important ingredient in music-making and in revealing its Trinitarian aspects. The arguments here rely on the validity of the arguments made in Chapter 7 on the extra-musical qualities needed for good music-making. I reflect on the connection between love and identity, and between love and signs. This leads to some thoughts on the creativity of good music-making and its implications for the mutual indwelling of the performers. There is some analysis of the concept of an event which enables me to draw out further implications and characteristics of music-making in relation to Trinitarian theology.

In the Conclusion I try to point up what I hope is the distinctive character of the thesis. First I compare my depiction of performers with that of Stone-Davis. Second, I return to the importance of love, but now in the context of what for Messiaen is the continuity of love, revelation, and technique. The thesis concludes that, on the basis of the analogy between, on the one hand, the continuity of music-making, the coinherence and thus the identity of the musicians as musicians, and, on the other hand and separately, the coinherence and identity of the Persons of the Trinity, music-making is a sonorous analogue of the relationality of the Trinity, a performed theology of Christian relating.

CHAPTER 2: SURVEYING THE FIELD: THEOLOGY AND MUSIC[29]

In 2006 Stolzfus observed that

> the theological literature has been almost completely silent with
> regard to the type of roles music and musical-aesthetic factors
> might have played in the evolution of modern theology. Indeed,
> the very notion that theologians may have 'derived' (Tillich) ideas
> from the field of musicology or musical aesthetics has scarcely
> been conceived as a possible or even interesting line of research.[30]

In 2009, Sander van Maas's uncompromising view was that "academic thought on the relation between music and religion […] appears to be seriously anaemic".[31] This situation within the academy is, Maas thinks, no longer appropriate "because of both the return of the religious in public intellectual debate and far-reaching transformations of orthodox forms of religion in the contemporary world".[32] Maas acknowledges that since 2000 Jeremy Begbie "has done much to fill the gaps".[33] Today, indeed, we are able to point to a large body of work that Begbie has published

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[29] In the Literature Survey, I include only scholars who have written about music in relation to theology.
[30] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 245. The reference to Tillich and the ironic speech marks are in the original.
[31] Maas, 2009, p. ix.
[32] Ibid., p. x.
[33] Ibid., p. 7.

in the thirteen years since Maas's acknowledgment, and which has contributed very substantially to the literature on music and theology.[34]

When Begbie published his *Theology, Music and Time* in 2000, he maintained that music had "received virtually no sustained treatment in contemporary systematic theology",[35] and that although there had "been some courageous forays into theology by musicologists, twentieth-century theologians paid scant attention to the potential of music to explore theological themes".[36]

Begbie is perhaps the doyen of English-speaking theologians and philosophers working at the interface of music and theology. His astonishing contribution encompasses studies of music and modernity,[37] music and the Trinity,[38] and music and sacrament[39] amongst many others including co-edited volumes on theology and music and the arts generally.[40] My project in the thesis is continuous with Begbie's insofar as it relies on the use of analogy and points to the significance of Trinitarian theology for this field. However, whereas Begbie's analogical focus is musical language, mine is the performance aspects of music.

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[34] Begbie, 2015; Begbie, 2008; Begbie, 2002; Begbie, 2018a; Begbie, 1991; Begbie, 2018b. Of these six texts only the first two are exclusively about music and theology, however the others have substantial sections on music and theology.
[35] Begbie, 2000, p. 3.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Begbie, 2015.
[38] Begbie, 2018.
[39] Begbie, 2004.
[40] Begbie, 2018b, Begbie & Guthrie, 2011.

Music: theology's handmaid – Jeremy Begbie

Begbie's case for music's relevance to theology is that it acts as a compelling handmaid. For example, he takes the view that music, specifically improvisation, "would seem to have much to offer in *understanding* and *describing* the dynamics of [...the] contextualisation" of the Gospel as it takes "particular form in the various times and places of the church's history".[41] Catherine Pickstock characterises this as an attitude "which sees music as but the envelope for the readier conveying of the more essential verbal message, or as an instrumental means of evoking the right inward pious attitude".[42] David Brown is equally critical. He acknowledges that

> Jeremy Begbie has done more than anyone else in England in recent years to re-establish connections between theology and music, but his approach is essentially illustrative rather than a learning exercise. That is to say, the music is used to expound or develop biblical insights.[43]

Besides 'describing' and 'understanding', Begbie's book has very many examples of how music serves to "remind", "alert", "model", "instruct" and "elucidate" when thought in a theological context. In his essay 'Music, Mystery and Sacrament', Begbie says that "music *in its own ways* can bear witness to and mediate the momentum of

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[41] Begbie, 2000, p. 216. My emphasis.
[42] Pickstock, 2016, p. 15.
[43] Brown, 2007, p. 245.

triune grace".[44] The thrust of my argument will be that music-making – not just music - does indeed bear witness to triune grace, because its relationality can be compared analogously to Trinitarian relationality.

Scruton specifically adopts the handmaiden metaphor for music and the arts with regard to religion:

> Myths, stories, dramas, music, painting – all have lent themselves to the proof that life is worthwhile, that we are something more than animals, and that our suffering is not the meaningless thing that it might sometimes seem to be, but one stage on the path to redemption. High culture has in this respect been the handmaiden of religion.[45]

Begbie talks about music's ability "to extend our wisdom about God, God's relation to us, and to the world at large".[46] Begbie clearly has a wisdom in view which pre-exists engagement in musical activities. He makes use of music to extend and enrich what is already 'there' in terms of primarily linguistic theology. The thesis takes a position which challenges what Re Manning sees as the hegemony of such theology.[47] The movement of the thesis tends, therefore, towards music as a performed "unwritten theology".[48] Interestingly, Begbie calls for theology to be more performative,[49] but his

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[44] Begbie, 2004, p. 187. Emphasis in the original.
[45] Scruton, 2006, p. 138.
[46] Begbie, 2000, p. 3.
[47] Re Manning, 2015, p. 65.
[48] Steiner, 1989, p. 218.
[49] Begbie, 2000, p. 280.

comments immediately previous to this imply that he has in mind not what is involved in performance but what can be added to usual ways of doing theology such that an over-intellectualism in which "thought is effectively severed from other aspects of our humanity [and] a certain blinkered vision resulting in an inability to come to terms at any depth with the vibrancies of contemporary culture"[50] are combated. From a more explicitly performance perspective, one in which the performance itself does theological work, Stolzfus remarks of Begbie that

> his models of musical performance serve to reinforce or reconceptualise the already existing, unexamined *'cantus firmus'* of 'the triune God, defined and definitively disclosed in Jesus Christ'.[51] In the few instances where the concept of God actually emerges in the discussion, it is in the context of that which, for the jazz artist, sets *'a vast array of constraints'*[52] upon performance.[53]

In a footnote, Stolzfus quotes Heidi Epstein who is harshly critical of Begbie because, in her view, he fails to take account of the cultural context of performance and thus is "little more than 'an evangelistic revealer of Christian truth'".[54] In this thesis I argue that music-making has substantive theological content in its own right which is not parasitic on primary linguistic theology. Thus, the thesis demonstrates a different way of bringing music and theology together on this point. Begbie says his "hope is [...] that

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[50] Ibid., p. 279.
[51] Ibid., p. 278.
[52] Ibid., p. 201.
[53] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 15. The emphases are Begbie's.
[54] Ibid., n. 42. The embedded quote is from Epstein, 2004, pp. 84-6.

the reader will conclude that music […] has significant potential to help us discover, understand, and expound theological truth".[55] Here the direction of travel seems to be from music to theology.

Music: theology's handmaid – Mary McGann

The approach taken to music in this thesis also contrasts with that taken by Mary McGann. She writes that "worship and its music are performed theology precisely because they express embodied relationality […] theology is, after all, about relationships".[56] This characterisation of music certainly suggests concerns close to those of the thesis. But whereas McGann says that music expresses relationality and actualises "the spiritual, ecclesial, eschatological and ecological relationships that express and create a community's identity",[57] my argument will suggest that music-making, rather than *expressing* Christian relationality, is an *embodiment* of relationality. Later McGann has slipped from characterising music as an expression of relationality to asserting it to be an "an integral part of the theology embodied in worship" because it

> evokes and enacts relationships [with God, with one another as
>
> ecclesial community, and with the rest of the human family],
>
> engages persons in intuitions of God's presence and action within
>
> the church-at-worship, situates a community within its own

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[55] Begbie, 2000, p. 8.
[56] McGann, 2012, p. 38.
[57] Ibid.

political, social, and cultural history, and shapes their action in the

world.[58]

On my reading, this is largely an account of music or music-making as functional. Seeking to contrast with this approach, I avoid the language of music-making as functional, regarding it instead purely as a 'performative activity' which, though it might achieve something, can be seen as a *process* of engagement, evocation, situatedness, and shaping which simply is, and in the 'simplicity' of its physicality, performativity and reception *is* a kind of theology of Christian relating.

Music: theology's handmaid – David Brown

As I have noted above, perhaps the key philosopher/theologian to set contrastingly alongside Jeremy Begbie is David Brown.[59] Brown sets out to integrate music and theology into a wider social, cultural, and intellectual context which acknowledges God's presence throughout the world, the force of Scripture within that context, and assigns to music a sacramental role. He writes: "there is a great range of ways in which God's presence can be made known through music. Such an understanding is, I believe, best captured by talking about the sacramental role of music".[60]

Although Brown's approach to music is very different to Begbie's, it is nonetheless arguably functionalist in similar ways, as I think becomes apparent in my survey of his

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[58] Ibid., p. 67.
[59] Brown, 2007.
[60] Ibid., p. 246.

work which follows. Both scholars think of music instrumentally. For Brown, it promotes religious experience. For Begbie it bolsters our understanding of theological themes.

Brown's major statement on the music/theology nexus is found in Part 2 of his *God and Grace of Body*.[61] Already on the third page of this Part we find that Brown's intention is "to indicate what features of […] music help to communicate the presence of a God who is already there waiting to be experienced".[62] Where Begbie sees the functionality of music mainly in terms of illustration by way of metaphor and as having "much to offer in *understanding* and *describing* the dynamics of […the] contextualisation" of the Gospel,[63] Brown makes a case for music's ability to promote and convey religious experiences, "there seems little doubt", he says, "that religious experience can […] be generated through the power of music".[64] He appeals to the authority of Chronicles where he finds that music is valued because it enables a sense of the presence of God, and he concludes that "music was […] in effect the means whereby God made his presence known to his people", and that this happens by "divine decree".[65]

As the thesis unfolds, it should become apparent that my project is closer to Begbie's than to Brown's. Like Begbie, I use analogical reasoning towards a *specifically* Christian theology. Though I am focussed on the experience of musical performance, my project

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[61] Ibid., pp. 217-385.
[62] Ibid., pp. 221-2.
[63] Begbie, 2000, p. 216, my emphasis.
[64] Brown, 2007, p. 224. With his choice of 'generated', Brown clearly affirms his functional approach.
[65] Ibid., p. 236. Brown references 2 Chron. 5. 13-4.

has no commonality with Brown's emphasis on music's power to evoke or speak to what I take to be an under-specified account of religious experience. As I think becomes apparent below, Brown seems to work with a generic account of religious experience, whereas Begbie works with a Christian one. Begbie uses analogy to enhance theological understanding. The direction of travel of the analogy is from music to theology. I use analogy to learn something new about music-making. If the relationality of music-makers bears analogical comparison with that of the Persons of the Trinity in the ways I indicate later in the thesis, I argue that we learn that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating. There seems not to be a direction of travel here either from or to theology, rather there is a kind of unveiling once the analogical comparison is made.

Brown pursues a course between two extremes: strong objectivism and pure subjectivism.[66] He wishes to avoid "a postmodern pluralism whereby a positive religious role is seen as only legitimated in the light of Christian revelation but not otherwise subject to assessment".[67] He characterises the objectivist position in terms of the ancient idea of the music of the spheres, namely that human music is somehow a reflection of the harmony which inheres in the world generally, citing the simple mathematical ratios, discovered by Pythagoras, which define the harmonic series.[68]

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[66] Ibid., p. 237.
[67] Ibid.
[68] This view came to be severely questioned by Romanticism through the growing importance of emotion in music as opposed to structure and reason, though it had previously been challenged by the realisation that the Pythagorean ratios did not give intervals which could be accommodated within the octave without some adjustment.

Brown claims what he calls an "exalted status for music […]: God's presence made manifest through music".[69] Thus he wishes to talk about the "sacramental role of music".[70] He stresses that the emphasis on participation is crucially important, concluding that music "is so designed that, as with the eucharist, the original experience can be re-enacted as God's presence in our midst once more made known".[71]

Brown proceeds to illustrate his case for music's ability to evoke religious experience by conducting his readers on a whistle-stop tour of the classical tradition from Bach to Messiaen. He tells us that "Bach would have been in full agreement" with Leibniz's view that "the way in which dissonance in music, when ultimately resolved into consonance, can generate a greater overall sense of harmony", thus illustrating Leibniz's "general theory about the perfection of the created world".[72] Despite the enlightenment erosion of religious certainties, "the strict symphonic structure(s)" of Haydn and Mozart "continued to give listeners a sense of living in a divinely ordered world".[73] The relationship between suffering and religious experience is thematised in Beethoven and Schubert, says Brown,[74] and he quotes E. T. A. Hoffmann for whom Beethoven's Fifth Symphony "tears the listener irresistibly away into the wonderful spiritual realm of the infinite".[75] Brown notes that the nature-religion which he says is apparent in Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony is frequently dismissed by theologians

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[69] Brown, 2007, p. 246.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid., p. 247. As we have seen and shall see again, Brown's functionalist approach has several aspects; music can facilitate, generate, enact, provide access, encourage, invite, and so on.
[72] Ibid., p. 253.
[73] Ibid., p. 254.
[74] Ibid., p. 256.
[75] Ibid., p. 258.

who, in his view, thereby make a mistake because, for example, stars symbolised transcendence, indeed God's dwelling place was taken to be beyond the stars. Most strikingly, Brown writes that the music of the Creed in Beethoven's *Missa Solemnis*

> encourages the listener to hear in the words much more than dogma. Instead, there is a real invitation to participate in the particular details of divine presence and action as they are enunciated.[76]

Citing the *Grosse Fuge* by way of example, Brown believes that Beethoven's music "might provide access […] to a conviction of divine grace in pain".[77]

When Brown turns to Schubert, he commends a kind of courage which finds life significant despite the inevitability of death, and which tries "to engage with what might be described as the darker side of God: the awe as well as the reassurance".[78]

Mahler and Bruckner provide Brown with interesting comparisons and contrasts when it comes to "how the experience of God might be facilitated through music".[79] He quotes Mahler with seeming approval:

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[76] Ibid., pp. 261-2.
[77] Ibid., p. 263.
[78] Ibid., p. 264-5.
[79] Ibid., p. 267. Note the strongly functional word 'facilitated'.

music enables us 'to rise once again to Heaven' as we seek 'to reach God and his angels [...] on the soaring bridge of music that joins this world and the hereafter'.[80]

Brown's Mahler is a restless seeker after the meaning of life whose symphonies and song-cycles portray both the struggle to affirm life and what Schoenberg referred to as a mystic revelation which, says Brown, "involved the transcendent".[81] Holbrook states that "Mahler's achievement was to find a sense of being confirmed in an invulnerable sense of meaningful existence in a Godless universe".[82] If this is a correct assessment of the extra-musical themes which Mahler sought to address in his music, then the case for the relevance of this music in terms of Christian theology is not easy to make. That Mahler's preoccupation with the meaning of existence and with transcendent themes somehow finds its way into his music certainly brings it onto the same territory as Christian theology, but if the context of these preoccupations is a Godless universe, then how is it possible to make any connection between them as they are manifest in the music with Christian theology? Although the Christian theologian and the unbeliever might stand together on the same territory, even stand shoulder to shoulder confronting the same existential questions and dealing with the same existential crises, their orientations are fundamentally different. I conclude, therefore, and assuming that Holbrook is correct in describing Mahler's achievement to be that of finding meaning in a Godless universe, that Brown is mistaken if he thinks that Mahler's music is capable of evoking Christian religious experience or is relevant

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[80] Ibid., p. 269. Brown references Martner 1979, pp. 25-6 for the embedded quotation from Mahler.
[81] Ibid., p. 270.
[82] Holbrook, 1975, p. 12.

to a Christian religious life, or, rather, that it can evoke and be relevant to a Christian religious experience and life. The situation is worse than this, however, because it would seem that on the Holbrook view Mahler's music encapsulates a seeking after meaning and transcendence which ends without God. Can this be the message Brown wishes us to take from Mahler?

"That Bruckner intended his symphonies to draw others into an experience of God can hardly be challenged", says Brown, adding, "this is especially true of his Adagios".[83] For Brown, Mahler "more accurately reflects the restlessness of modern religious belief […but] it is Bruckner who more accurately expresses the Christian vision".[84] But how does Brown know this? Certainly, the music provokes a response, but this need not be one which the listener recognises as religious let alone Christian. Perhaps some listeners are deeply involved with the sensuousness of the sounds, the formal aspects of harmony and structure, or the intricacies of the part-writing and so on. These are purely musical responses. In the absence of other emotional and/or religious responses, must we say that Bruckner has failed in his attempt to bring his listeners to an experience of God? If yes, is the music thereby worthless? Certainly not. Have I failed as a listener if I do not have a religious experience when listening to Bruckner, or an experience which I do not recognise at religious? Again, certainly not. All that needs to be said is that the music is enjoyed, or found satisfying or unsettling and so on.

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[83] Brown, 2007, pp. 273-4.
[84] Ibid., p. 275.

All this brings up the issue of authorial intention. This is far too large a topic to be engaged in this thesis. For the sake of the thesis, I will suggest that musical performance as I define it exists only *in performance* and its reception and experience for listeners is a separate matter, one which is undoubtedly culturally and subjectively inflected as Brown suggests. This means that some listeners will have what they might call a religious listening experience whilst others might not.

Though my approach here will not touch on the experience of listening to music, it is worth noting my discomfort with Brown's apparent view that all experiences consequent on listening to music and which can be declared as generic religious experiences should necessarily have something to offer Christians and Christian theology. Brown would seem to confirm this indeed to be his thinking when he writes:

> What I suggest Stravinsky's ritualistic music does, whether the theme is pagan or Christian, vocal or instrumental, is to reaffirm a religious placement for human beings [...] dissonance and ritual are thus not enemies but the composer's way of opening up his listeners' lives to God.[85]

Although Brown gives 'God' a capital first letter, it is surely legitimate to ask which God or god we are talking about here. The subject matter of Stravinsky's ballet *The Rite of Spring,* whose subtitle is *Pictures of Pagan Russia in Two Parts*, could hardly be

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[85] Ibid., p. 287.

further from a Christian conception of God's relationship with his Creation: a young girl dances herself to death as a propitiatory sacrifice to the earth. The titles of the two parts of the ballet are *Adoration of the Earth* and *The Sacrifice.* This music might evoke a 'religious' experience, though one might wonder if it is one which can be associated with the Christian God.

At this point I cannot help but think that Brown's lines of argumentation are undermined by his working with too wide a conception of what is to count as religious experience as well as by his seeming tendency to give too much weight to our human wills and dispositions.

Begbie's response to Brown

This reservation is highlighted in Begbie's response to Brown's work. While Begbie agrees with Brown about the importance of recognising "the width of divine presence in the world at large, and the possibilities of divine encounter which this affords",[86] he would "prefer to characterise [...] 'rumours of transcendence' in terms of God's grace-full, reconciling action, linked to a far more overt and developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit".[87] This is a quite different approach to one which makes us entirely responsible for religious experiences, experiences of God's presence, and it seems truer to a Christian understanding of our relationship with God. Begbie's unease with Blackwell's use of sacramental language seems equally applicable to Brown's view of religious

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[86] Begbie, 2012, p. 153.
[87] Ibid.

experience. Begbie complains that Blackwell's use of sacramental language is such that *"God's free and purposeful agency is muffled"*.[88] I agree with Begbie that whilst Brown's conception of what can be counted as a religious experience is properly wide-ranging it is, nonetheless, too wide-ranging, and his talk of human wills and dispositions seems to muffle God's free and purposeful agency. Indeed, Brown's celebration of the composer's and music's ability to 'conjure', 'evoke' and 'generate' religious experience greatly outweighs Brown's acknowledgement of God's agency. Begbie acknowledges the advantages of Blackwell's contention that "musical sounds mediate (or can mediate) divine presence" [89]: "it encourages us to take the material properties of the medium seriously – in this case, musical sounds".[90] Even so, Begbie fears a parallel disadvantage: "that it risks muting God's prevenient intentional activity, God's *movement toward* the world".[91] This points to a contrast between Brown and Begbie with regard to the frame within which their thought is situated. Brown's frame is that of the presumed sacramentality of music and an acknowledgement of God's presence in the world. Begbie's frame is that of God's purposes in and for the world. To this extent, it is Trinitarian. For example, he links reflections on music's potential "to help us comprehend these temporalities",[92] namely, our identities and vocations as established within God's purposes and promises for the world, "with the Trinitarian ontology of God".[93] This emphasis on Trinity gives Begbie's theology its Christian identity, something which is clouded in

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[88] Begbie, 2004, p. 176. Emphasis in the original.
[89] Ibid. This is Begbie's characterisation of what he takes to be "the logical form" of [Blackwell's] book: Blackwell, 1999.
[90] Begbie, 2004, p. 176.
[91] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[92] Begbie, 2000, p. 152.
[93] Ibid.

Brown's work. This thesis is concerned very much with identity, namely, that of performing musicians, and analogically reflects on that in association with some notions regarding intra-Trinitarian life.

Gavin Hopps' response to Brown

It would seem, then, that Brown finds theological vestiges, sometimes strong ones, sometimes weaker ones, in all manner of music and which are able to engender in listeners religious experiences. Hopps refers to the

> generosity of Brown's gaze […] which with robust and daring charity reaches out into the fallen midst of our tangled predicament and holds fast to the passing, partial and potential goodness in things.[94]

Brown certainly has an "unprejudiced vigilance for the possibility of divine activity in dark, troubled, apparently barren and unpromising places",[95] but whether all the experiences which we might deem religious are in fact of God needs, as Begbie argues, an account of God's divine providence in the world and of "his grace-full, reconciling

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[94] Hopps, 2012, p. 162.
[95] Ibid., p. 167.

action, linked to a far more overt and developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit",[96] and by extension, a more Trinitarian theology.

Though Begbie and Brown differ on the kind of theology they are doing, they are similar inasmuch as, for Brown, music has a functional role in promoting, strengthening, validating and giving access to religious experience, and, although Brown rejects Begbie's approach on the grounds that it is "essentially illustrative rather than a learning exercise",[97] it would seem that his approach to music is quite as functional as is Begbie's.

As Brown draws the chapter to a close, he leaves us in no doubt about his functional approach to music: "it is surely important to acknowledge that experience of the divine will inevitably by multifaceted, with some composers better at inducting us into one aspect rather that another".[98] But Brown exceeds all his previous claims for composers and music when he says:

> Messiaen in effect offers us an extension of the incarnation in
> which West and East, sound and colour, human invention and the
> music of nature, visible and invisible, all combine to draw creation
> and its Creator closer together. In all of this believer and non-
> believer alike can scarcely avoid hearing the glories of nature or a
> timeless presence. God is, as it were, brought alongside, but

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[96] Begbie, 2012, p. 153.
[97] Brown, 2007, p. 245.
[98] Ibid., p. 293.

whether something further happens remains of course, entirely

with the individual wills and dispositions of those who are

listening.[99]

Music: theology's handmaid – Maeve Heaney

Maeve Heaney's *Music as Theology*[100] might well be thought by virtue of its title to

have an approach to the music-theology nexus which sits alongside that of this thesis,

namely an interest in music-making for the theology which making music as such

performs, but this would be mistaken. Towards the end of the book, for example,

Heaney embarks on a section in which she says she will reflect on contemporary music

in terms of "its revelatory capacity of the Word of God in the daily living out of

Christian faith, and its place in and *as theology itself;* that is to say, *music as mediation*

of faith and theological praxis."[101] This sounds extremely promising from a

performance point of view, but her argument leads only to tentative conclusions such

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> If music's aim is [...] to open a space in which both musician and
>
> listener share in that experience, it is a least 'reasonable' to ask
>
> about how that dynamic could open human sensibility to (and in)
>
> the presence of the triune and sharing God, [... music] creates a
>
> different relationship with reality than verbal understanding and

[99] Ibid.
[100] Heaney, 2012.
[101] Ibid., p. 279, my emphasis.

expression does (sic), [... it] helps us inhabit the present moment in which we are living, [... this] does not [...] mean that *all* music bridges to the presence of Christ: on the contrary, it is more precise to say music creates a bond with the reality of which it is born [...] therefore we are talking more of the potentiality of a form of symbolic communication than of its direct use. However, if the person composing, playing, or singing a given piece of music *is,* indeed, in contact with the living reality of Christ in the world, is it unreasonable to suggest that this connection is somehow accessed?[102]

But is this music *as* theology? Is it not still music as functionally useful? Music "could *open* human sensibility to [...] the presence of [...] God". It "*creates* [...] relationship". It "*helps us inhabit* the present moment", it "*creates a bond*", it has "*potential*", it *accesses* connections.[103] Several of these achievements of music are to do with relationality and so would seem close to the concerns of this thesis. The emphasis in the thesis, though is not on music but on music-making, and rather than music-making creating bonds I hope to show that the music-making is continuous with the bonds not something separate from them. Similarly, I hope to show that rather than creating relationship, music-making is continuous with precisely musical relationships, that is, there are not two things, the music-making and the relationality, but one thing, music-making which is relationship. A little later Heaney draws attention to the role music

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[102] Ibid., p. 281.
[103] The emphases are mine.

can play in "helping people access faith"[104] and to its "capacity [...] to touch, enter into and 'minister to' our embodied pain".[105]

Heaney thinks music can "take on" a dynamic of transformation whereby (and here Heaney quotes Davies) "the world is made in some small way more permeable and responsive to the order of divine grace: to the living telos of the world in whom we act and in whom we now live".[106] Heaney "intuits" that music's "spiritual potential [...] has something to do with the physical act of singing when united with conscious prayer and praise."[107] We seem to be back with what music can do, the various functions it can fulfil.

In Heaney's view, music "integrates player and listener in a common space".[108] This seems very close to what I will suggest in Chapter 10 about the gathering of music-makers in a co-created creative space, but it does not of itself lead to a concept of music as theology. Later, in Chapters 11 and 12, I will appeal to the work of Daniel Hardy, Herman Bavinck, and Christoph Schwöbel in order to develop such a concept.

Music: theology's handmaid – Don Cupitt

Don Cupitt observes that music gives "access […] to the wellsprings of religious feeling", "that [it] is more directly and clearly emotivist and 'non-cognitive' than other

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[104] Heaney, 2012, p. 283.
[105] Ibid., p. 284.
[106] Davies, 2010, p. 23; quoted Heaney, 2012, p. 285.
[107] Heaney, 2012, p. 285.
[108] Ibid., p. 283.

arts, and therefore can continue to be unabashedly religious in an age when most people are aware that no religious doctrine is (in the old strong sense) actually True".[109] Further, "music is the best and most innocent doorway to religious feeling that we have. We don't have to commit our heads to it: only our hearts".[110] This, again, is a functionalist approach to music's relation to theology.

Summary and my response

To summarise, this survey reveals that whilst there is a variety of theological orientations amongst scholars, they nonetheless tend to make functional and illustrative uses of music and music-making. I mean to build on what many of these scholars seem to suggest with their rhetoric but do not necessarily reach with their approaches. In my account, I want to approach music in terms which are integral to it, to its performance, that is, in the purely technical and musical terms of the *performance* of music.

Having said this, I agree with Begbie's analogical approach to music and theology which is astonishingly fecund, subtle, and deployed across a vast range of musical and theological themes. The success of my project depends on the effective deployment of an analogy between the relationality of the Persons of the Trinity and that of performers in a small musical ensemble. However, I would like to employ analogy rather differently to Begbie. Whereas he uses musical *language* to speak of theology,

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[109] Cupitt, 2010b, pp. 54-55.
[110] Ibid., p. 55.

my focus is on musical *performance*. Though my use of analogy does not serve to illuminate theological themes as does Begbie's, one could nonetheless argue that it serves to reveal something about music-making, namely that it captures what it is to relate in Christian ways. Thus, the thesis can be thought an extension of Begbie's programme though in a performative rather a propositional domain.

I approach the concept of music-making which is used in this thesis by noting that Steinberg would have us construe "'art' and 'work' as processes and verbs rather than fixed entities and nouns",[111] as he says, "a musical work remains a function of performance with the veracity [..] of every performance a font of debate".[112]

Heeding Steinberg and Begbie, who tells us that, "a growing number of music theorists urge that we should see the foundational realities of music not as works but as a set of practices, […] the most basic of these being *music-making and music-hearing*",[113] I prefer to talk about music-making rather than music, and to think of music-making as a set of practices. This approach is characterised in much the same way as Hugh Wood characterises Brahms' approach to composition. In Wood's view,

> what makes Brahms not only a very great but also a very good composer [is] his absolute and total preoccupation with the *materia musicae*, his supreme skill in handling it, and his assumption […] that there is no conflict between technique and

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[111] Steinberg, 2004, p. 10.
[112] Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[113] Begbie, 2004, p. 179. Emphasis in the original.

expressiveness, but rather that one feeds the other and that both

are mutually dependent.[114]

Wood seems to suggest that in his commitment to the *materia musicae*, the expressivity that interested Brahms was a musical expressivity or imagination whose manifestation was entirely reliant on technical ability. On this view, if a piece of music or a performance is not interesting, it is so because the composer or performer lacks either musical imagination or the technique to realise strictly musical potentials; it does not result from a failure to capture or express something beyond the music. The composer Joseph Phibbs captures this perfectly: "The technical ingenuity is one and the same with the expressive".[115]

Walter Fleischmann takes a similar approach.[116] His book deals with musical principles and the limits of notation, dynamics, articulation, agogics, the use of the pedal, and notation. A command of technical matters such as these are the ingredients of good musical performances and may be taken as the technical parameters within which music-making is thought in the thesis. Thus 'technique' in this thesis generally refers to the physical skills necessary for compelling musical performances.[117] This is elaborated upon in Chapters 9 and 10.

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[114] Wood, 2007, p. 61.
[115] Phibbs, 2015, p. 386.
[116] Fleischmann, 2020.
[117] The level of technical accomplishment required for compelling performances depends on the level of difficulty of the piece in question.

PART 2: METHOLOLOGICAL ISSUES AND THE CONCEPT OF THE OTHER

The hypothesis I hope to defend is that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relationality. In unpacking what this means, I look, along with a range of other modern theologians, towards the relationality of the members of the Trinity and explore the content and limits of analogical comparison to the relationality between members of a small musical ensemble. The relationality I have in mind in both cases has two main features: (i) it is one of mutual indwelling, (ii) it is constitutive of the identities of those who indwell one another.

This focus on indwelling and relationship also inflects the methodology of the thesis. Indwelling and relationship are approached from a number of perspectives. For example, in Chapter 6, I discuss the concept of 'the other' from various theoretical perspectives which I use as springboards from which to explore relationality amongst performing musicians. I also explore indwelling and identity amongst performers from the perspective of the practical business of music-making, its reception, and good performance practice. My goal here is to build up a robust and multi-faceted concept of the relationality of those who make music together. I adopt a similar procedure with the notion of continuity. I first examine the theoretical parameters and challenges and then relate an account of continuity to the music-making context in Chapter 8. The thesis is infused with these two concepts of the other and of continuity. Having explored them from various theoretical perspectives, I use them in other parts of the thesis where they can be enriched in a music-making context and so serve to cement my arguments.

CHAPTER 3: TRINITY, MUSICIANS, RELATIONSHIPS

The chief methodological move of the thesis is to draw an analogy between the relationships which obtain between the members of the Trinity, focussing particularly on indwelling, and those between musicians.

Perhaps the first thing to emphasise is that the inter-creaturely relations with which this thesis is concerned are very specifically musical ones. The relationality between the musicians is neither superficial nor merely procedural, but much deeper, even definitive of who they are as performers in *this* performance. It is not a matter of, in the case of a string quartet for example, four separate individuals with their differing personalities, musical and non-musical, coming together under the umbrella term 'string quartet'. Rather, the relationships which musicians form with one another are ones which lead to changes for individuals, personality in general is put to one side;[118] Holst wrote about the pleasure he found in "the impersonality of orchestral playing".[119] All that remains is musical personality,[120] and if performances of a quartet are to be coherent and persuasive, then the musical personalities as such have to be compatible.[121] I admit that personality in general can influence musical personality,

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[118] I expand on this putting-to-one side in other sections of the thesis, especially in Chapter 7, in which I wonder about the extent to which my conception of music-making is unrealistically idealised or even romantic, and also in Chapters 9 and 10 which are about performance practice and the reception of music.

[119] Holst and Vaughan Williams: Making Music English, 2018. The quotation is from one of Holst's letters read by Amanda Vickery, one of the presenters of the film directed by Alastair Laurence and broadcast on BBC4 on Sunday 25th May 2022.

[120] It can be questioned if this this putting-to-one-side such that only musical personality remains is possible. I address this issue later in, for example, this section of the thesis in the discussion of Greshake's exploration of the relationships between lovers.

[121] This is why it is not uncommon for quartets to change its members or to break up completely. Musical personalities may change and develop, but if the quartet is to stay together the changes and developments must be commensurate with one another.

nonetheless insofar as this happens the resulting musical personalities of the players must be compatible with one another.

It is also worth re-emphasising as I have noted at the outset that the thesis focuses entirely on *performance* relationships, that is, the inter-player relationships understood in purely musical terms, in the (re)creation of a musical work, the outworking of its ideas as music. In this conception, the continuity between players and the music-making could not be greater. That is why the thesis claim is that *music-making* is a *performed* theology of Christian relating. The relationships arise *as* music-making, the theology, as Stolzfus says,[122] arises *as* performance.

The analogy

Thus, the analogy I would like to draw is not between intra-Trinitarian relationships and the relationships between human beings in the ordinary sense of 'human relationships'.[123] Instead, the analogy will be with musical relationships, not those aspirational or imagined musical relationships which are uncovered by the analysis of a score, but the real ones which are necessary for the performance of a score. These relationships are formed and are constituted by the listening and the responding to one another according to a shared vision of the musical work which determines interpretation, the shape of phrases, tempi, articulation, and so on. I hope to show that in this way the identities of the musicians *qua* musicians are formed *in*

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[122] Stolzfus, 2006.
[123] Issues of analogy arise here. I address these issues in Chapter 4. Here I would like to focus on emphasising the relationships which are my interest in the thesis as musical ones.

performance and that these identities are musical through and through. Analogously, and to put things rather briefly and roughly, the members of the Trinity also share a vision, listen and respond to one another according to that vision, and their works cohere perfectly. I use 'share', 'listen', 'respond' and 'vision' analogously, for it is clear that "relational properties are not univocal between God and creatures".[124]

John 17:22 is perhaps a touchstone for the indwelling of Father and Son and the possibility that there can be an analogous indwelling of humans: "that they may be one, even as we are one". The fourth Lateran Council of 1215 decreed that the union(s) here are to be distinguished as a union of grace and love in the case of believers and as a unity of identity in nature in the case of the Father and the Son.[125] On this reading, "the analogy from God to created reality is no strict correspondence: the divine unity of persons is significantly different from the ecclesiastical unity in the created reality".[126] The Council thus provided what is known as the hermeneutical rule which Saarinen gives as follows: "For between Creator and creature there can be noted no likeness (*similitudo*) so great that a greater dissimilarity (*dissimilitudo*) cannot be seen between them".[127]

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[124] Cross, 1999, p. 66.
[125] Saarinen, 2014, p. 417.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.

The problem here is that although interpretation is unavoidable, in the case of John 17:22-23 the hermeneutical rule determines that we have but a weak understanding of what Jesus means.

Modern theology remains committed to safeguarding the greater dissimmilarity than similarity between Creator and creatures. The use of analogical language takes place against this background. Jüngel, for example, thinks of metaphor not simply in expressive terms, but as a means for increasing the semantic power of language; new phenomena, for example, can be described using traditional concepts.[128] Jüngel thinks that theology legitimately uses metaphor in order to speak of God; the increased semantic power of metaphor over ordinary or literal language is necessary when speaking of things which are beyond language. The kingdom of heaven, for example, is like a treasure hidden in a field. The analogy 'plays' with the idea of discovering something precious and hidden, and it is important that it says nothing about the nature of the kingdom in itself. This is important for the thesis because there is no suggestion that the worldly phenomenon, the jewels, say, is a metaphor for the heavenly kingdom beyond it being precious and hidden. The analogy reveals the event of the kingdom not the mystery behind it. Similarly, the comparison in the thesis tells us nothing new about the nature of the mutual indwelling of the members of the Trinity. All the comparison entails is that the indwelling defines the relationality in both cases, or, better, the indwelling and the relationality are one and the same thing.

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[128] Jüngel, 1986.

Perhaps we can make some progress with the question concerning the legitimacy of comparing the Trinity and a small musical ensemble by looking at a similar extension which Miroslav Volf makes in exploring of the possibilities for a trinitarianisation of Church structure.[129] Volf thinks that revelation as a phenomenon in this world legitimates using trinitarian ideas in the Church. However, whilst he affirms a correspondence between the Trinity and the Church, he emphasises that any perceived correspondence needs to be examined in detail. Is this thought applicable to the thesis? Two aspects are notable. First, Volf says, for example, that the leadership of the Church must be collegiate and that the gifts of church members must correspond to the divine multiplicity. Here Volf's account maps quite closely onto the string quartet case. I have written about this in the chapters on good performance practice and the selflessness of music-making. Second, Volf advocates difference in unity. Again, this maps onto the music-making of small ensembes very closely. One need only think of the differences between the violins, viola and cello of a string quartet together with their different parts to appreciate the difference in unity which a quartet manifests. Although Volf's interest is in the Trinity and the Church, his recommendations do seem to bear transfer to music-making, at least in these two instances.

Heim's reflections on Trinity and faith[130] also shed light on the comparision of the Trinity and musical ensembles. Heim goes so far as to say that the Trinity is 'like a musical polyphony, a simultaneous, non-excluding harmony of difference that

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[129] Volf, 1998a, especially pp. 191-259.
[130] Heim, 2003.

constitutes one unique reality. Each voice has its own distinctive character by virtue of its relation with the others. We can equally say that each receives its special voice by participation in the oneness of the whole musical work".[131] Again there is the reference to difference and unity. But this analogy is also of interest in the thesis because it seems that Heim already 'knows' both sides of the analogy separately from one another, and subsequent to that he makes the comparison. Heim already understands the Trinity to be a perfect mutual indwelling of the Persons, and he already knows about musical harmony and polyphyony, how the contrapuntal lines are interwoven with one another without obscuring one another, how the notes of a chord similarly interpenetrate one another without obscuring one another.[132] Thus he realises that his understanding of musical polyphony is an excellent analogue of his understanding of the Trinity as a perichoretic unity in difference, even though this cannot be known in itself. This parallels my strategy in the thesis exactly. Although the trinitarian perichoresis cannot be understood as it is in itself, the concept of mutual interpenetration of the Persons is intelligible as a perfect mutual indwelling. Separately, we understand the sense in which the members of a small musical ensemble such as a quartet can be said to indwell one another. The purpose of the thesis is simply to bring these together. The indwelling of the members of the Trinity, even though not known or understood in and of itself, is part of Christian theology. The chapters in the thesis on good performance practice and on the performance and

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[131] Ibid., p. 167.
[132] This is akin to Begbie's use of the triad to illustrate the perichoretic nature of the Trinity.

reception of music put flesh on the notion that in good, coherent, and persuasive music-making the players can be said to indwell one another.

Interestingly, Heim outlines three fundamental ways in which persons can meet one another. He says these ways correspond to the members of the Trinity. First, the meeting can be an impersonal and universally valid one. Second, the meeting can be one in which people become acquainted with one anothers' distinctive personalities. Third, people meet sharing the same experience. Concerning the first way of meeting, where there is music-making, the players are together impersonally and, in the context of *this* performance, universally. I have written about the need for selflessness in music-making, that the promotion of personality traits has no place except in terms of musical personality which must, nonetheless be attuned to the interpretive vision shared by the players. Equally, the players have a validity in the context of the performance which comes from their irreplaceability and from their contribution to coherent performances in accordance with the shared interpretive vision. And their presence is universal in the sense that it encompasses all the other players. In the second way of meeting, distinctive musical personalities – ways of shaping a phrase, the colours found in an instrument – are understood and valued. This is a common phenomenon amongst string quartets who grow together, the musical personalities coming to blend and support and enhance one another. String quartet players exemplify the third way of meeting, they share the one experience of *this* performance.

<u>Perichoresis</u>

Colin Gunton gives us a modern perspective on perichoresis. He takes issue with Aquinas because he thinks that Aquinas conceives the analogical relation between Creator and creation as one between the simple divine substance and composite created beings. Gunton wishes to theorise the analogy as one between composite creatures and God's relational triunity.[133] His view is that perichoresis "is not conceptually foreign to createdness".[134] His argument is that since God is the source of being, meaning, and truth, it is "reasonable to suppose that all being, meaning and truth is, even as created and distinct from God, in some way marked by its relatedness to its creator".[135] Gunton hopes to find "the structure (*taxis*) of relations in God [...] reflected in the world".[136] He summarises his project as one in which he will "develop a trinitarian analogy of being (and becoming): a conception of the structures of the created world in the light of the dynamic of the being of the triune creator and redeemer".[137] Human beings are made in the image of God, and so, thinks Gunton, that human beings are perichoretic beings is a straightforward deduction. In fact, Gunton wants to argue that perichoresis is a transcendental: "If, as I am suggesting, the concept of perichoresis is of transcendental status, it must enable us [...] to explore whether reality is on all its levels 'perichoretic', a dynamism of relatedness".[138]

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[133] Gunton, 1993, pp. 139-40.
[134] Ibid., p. 167.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid., pp. 167-8.
[137] Ibid., p. 141.
[138] Ibid., p. 165.

Richardson puts forward a different proposal. Rather than stipulating perichoresis as a transcendental in order to arrive at the conclusion that the world "is perichoretic in that everything in it contributes to the being of everything else, enabling everything to be what it distinctively is",[139] Richardson develops the concept of christological perichoresis.

Richardson begins from "the central feature of Creator/creature relationality, […] that the human is formed according to the *imago Dei* who is Christ".[140] By virtue of the "representative and reconciling person of Jesus Christ",[141] human beings are invited into the fullness of a created correspondence within all relationality which flows from the "eternally reciprocal interiority of Father, Son and Holy Spirit".[142] Richardson concludes that "God […] is ontologically the basis for relationality itself".[143] Perichoresis never obscures particularity even though it speaks of intimate closeness. Further, perichoresis in not mere relationality, rather, the emphasis is on how in relationship human beings "mutually constitute each another, make each other what the are".[144] Gunton reminds us that in Christian marriage "the man and the woman become one flesh – bound up in each other's being".[145]

Although a comparison of the relatedness of the members of the Trinity with that of musicians is not straightforward because it is an analogy, there is enough in Gunton's

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[139] Ibid., p. 166.
[140] Richardson, 2014, p. 82.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid., p. 83.
[144] Gunton, 1993, p. 169.
[145] Ibid., p. 170.

and Richardson's arguments to suggest that an analogical comparison is legitimate. Although we cannot understand God's perichoretic nature in itself, Richardson's account of Christological perichoresis, whereby human nature is taken into God, gives us a ground upon which the comparison can be made.

The Trinity as *communio*

I would like to take the argument forward by thinking about the Trinity as *communio*. Again, the term *'communio'* is used with reference to the Trinity only analogously because it is understood initially in terms of our human experiences. Therefore, we must stipulate greater dissimilarity than similarity with our human understanding of it when we come to apply it to God.

The Council of Nicaea agreed that there exists within the One divine being and nature a difference of Persons. This opened the way for a concept of plural personal relations, and since hypostasis came to refer to person rather than to *ousia* as universal and immutable being, the ontological understanding was no longer of a being determined by and confined to the limits of its own existence, but of a being that transcends them *in communio*, that is, a being which is itself and wholly itself not because it is its own existence but because it is a relational being.[146]

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[146] See pp. 117-8 below where *'communio'* and 'community' are distinguished.

Greshake notes two senses associated with *'communio'*.[147] The first is that of entrenchment. Greshake comments:

People who are *'in communione'*, find themselves together behind a common embankment, i.e. they are joined in a common existential reality, which ties them together to a life in common, in which each person is dependent on the other.[148]

The second sense is one of service to others especially by giving, a giving which shapes and forms both giver and receiver. If we put these two senses of *'communio'* together, we have the idea of many coming together in giving and receiving and of them being joined in a common reality which exhibits unity in diversity.[149]

Communio means mediation of identity and difference, of the particular and the universal. That which differentiates, that is different, the strange or foreign, is drawn into unity by partaking in and/or the shared giving of a common reality, without thereby losing the element of their differences.[150]

I would like to suggest that this could be a description of music-making. Music-making blends identity and difference in, for example, the transformation and transposition

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[147] Greshake, 2012, pp. 333-334.
[148] Ibid., p. 333.
[149] In 1 Corinthians, Chapter 12, Paul speaks of the Christian community as the body of Christ. He emphasises that the one body needs many parts.
[150] Ibid., p. 334.

of themes or in their re-harmonisations. It mediates the particular and the universal by the renewal of musical forms and by realising them in particular works; it takes the universality of scales, arpeggios, modes, and chordal structures and gives them a specificity of context, voicings and spacings whose particularity is not exchangeable for any another. Different instruments come together in a unity which is the coherence of *this* performance which is their shared reality, and in their coming together there is no loss of their individual characteristic differences.

We can take one other aspect of *communio* which is eminently applicable to music-making: that it has a dynamism "which stresses the very event of the mediation of the particular with the many, the part with the whole, the different with the identical".[151]

In music-making the dynamic mediation of particular and many, part and whole, different with identical is seen, for example, in the interweaving of themes which are subtly transformed, the development of themes as parts of the work are gathered together to form the whole, and the wholesale manipulation of themes as they are subjected to inversion, retrograde displacement, and contrapuntal and harmonic refashioning. This purely musical dynamic is inhabited by the players such that their relatedness *as musicians* is the relatedness of the musical ideas contained in the work.

The realisation that God in Himself is Life which shares itself has profound implications for the nature of all being, namely, that it is relational, a *communio*. God as a relational

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[151] Ibid.

unity communicates with himself and this, according to Hünermann, is the necessary basis for a conception of God in which He shares his Logos with the world.[152] "Only on the basis of a relational God can it be understood that God himself enters into the relationality of history […] only a God who is in Himself communicative can communicate His own very self".[153] Hemmerle says, "all Being experiences a radical turning if God is the threefold, and, as the threefold, has His history in our history".[154]

Aquinas and Greshake on relations and music-making

We can note an important shift in thinking about relations which occurs with Aquinas. Before him, relations were considered to be accidental connections between independent beings, and so relations could not be considered constitutive of being. Aquinas identified the being of relations with the divine substance

> and so inversely identified the divine substance with the *Communio* of absolutely relationally understood persons. The one divine substance is the one ongoing communication of different persons, who within the very structure of the *Communio*, acquire, retain, and perfect their uniqueness.[155]

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[152] Huenemann, 1994, p. 145.
[153] Greshake, 2012, pp. 335, n. 7.
[154] Hemmerle, 2020, p. 32.
[155] Greshake, 2012, p. 337.

The resonance of this conception with music-making is striking. Perhaps we can paraphrase: the one performance *is* the ongoing communication of different persons, who within the very structure of the music-making retain and perfect their uniqueness.[156] But the analogy cannot be taken much further because, as Greshake reminds us, the community which is God is not the coming together of three independent persons. As he puts it

> In God, there are not originally three, who subsequently out of their self-subsisting states enter into relation with one another. Rather […] the three persons mutually transmit the divine life and in this exchange prove both their distinctiveness as well as, and above all, their oneness".[157]

In string quartet playing there are originally four who enter into relation with one another. However, they do not mutually transmit, except in a somewhat attenuated sense to do with training and enculturation generally, a life which they previously led. Rather, they come together to realise a musical work, and this realisation comes about in an exchange which proves both their distinctiveness as well as, and above all, their oneness, a oneness which is a coinherence. Greshake characterises the unity of God as "an original relational unity of love [which] in 'being no other than itself, is in itself relation and community'".[158] What I hope I am pointing to here is not a resemblance

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[156] I here think of a performance as a substance. 'Persons' is used analogously. For the sake of the paraphrase, I have retained 'perfect'.
[157] Ibid., p. 338.
[158] Ibid. The embedded quotation is from Hemmerle, 1996, p. 91.

of content as concerns the communications between the members of the Trinity on the one hand, and those of a quartet on the other, rather, it seems there is a resemblance which is of form or taxis. In both cases, there is community which *is* its own communication; the quartet *is* the music-making, the Persons of the Trinity are their contributions to the divine life. In neither case are there two things. In *this* performance, there are not these musicians as they are in the performance *and* the music-making, just as in the Trinity there are not the Persons *and* the divine life. To imagine otherwise is a category mistake in the same way as it is to imagine there are the dancers *and* the dance. (It would be odd to say, "I see the dancers but where is the dance?".) As dancers in *this* dance, they are one with the dance. There are simply dancers dancing. There are simply musicians performing a musical work. They are who they are in their entirety in *this* performance in their relationships with one another which are not just determined by the work but are an instantiation of the work, that is, the relationships are musical ones through and through.

Greshake's arguments and mine compared

My argument here seems to oppose Greshake's when he writes about human relationships. Having made it clear that never is only one divine Person at work, and that "precisely because of their difference they are radically united and are reciprocally interpenetrated",[159] he goes on to highlight that these are statements of faith which nonetheless are verifiable in the light of human experience. He quotes

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[159] Greshake, 2012, p. 340.

Aquinas on the transforming power of love. The lover is transformed into the beloved "such that nothing belonging to the beloved is excluded in the union with the lover".[160] Even so, says Greshake, "there remains the difference between the uniting act or realisation of their love and the being of the lovers that yet remains independent each of the other [and] this is because […] they remain nevertheless outside the actual realisation of their love two separate, distinct individuals. This must be different in God, since [for Him] there is no difference between act and being".[161]

Now, I would like to suggest that in the love-making there is no difference between being and act. In the love-making the lovers are defined precisely as lovers, as who they are as lovers. When we say that lovers make love, we precisely do not mean that there are people who are engaged in something which is outside themselves. In fact, we worry if one of the lovers feels as though they are detached from the love-making. Of course, having expressed their love in their union, the lovers become separate individuals again. This parallels the end of music-making, and just as the lovers 'hold on' to the significance of their union in the rest of their lives such that it operates as a touchstone for their lives, we would hope that, once the concert is over, players would take the 'meaning' of the performance in terms of the theology of relating, and weave it into their non-performing lives.[162]

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[160] This is Aquinas quoted by Greshake, 2012, p. 340 where the reference for the quotation is given.
[161] Greshake, 2012, p. 340.
[162] I address the question of what happens when the concert is over in the Conclusion of the thesis. I use 'meaning' here to encompass the giving and receiving in mutual respect for and responsiveness to one another which I hope I have successfully argued here and elsewhere in the thesis are the characteristics of good music-making.

Greshake goes on to say that

> the uniqueness proper to each person [of the Trinity] is possessed
>
> in such a way as to be shared through that person with the others,
>
> and so the distinguishing traits of all form the one fullness of the
>
> divine life.[163]

Greshake illustrates this with the analogy of the human body: "each organ, each member has its own peculiar function […] but this peculiarity is such only in so far[164] as it affects the whole of the body".[165] The whole body is supplied with oxygen by the lungs, so the "peculiar becomes common within the organism. Seen from the other angle, the identifying trait of the lung would cease to exist were it not made possible and sustained by the whole of the body".[166]

Now, is this not true of a member of, say, a string quartet? Each player has his or her own peculiar function, but a cellist, for example, has this peculiarity only insofar as he or she contributes to and affects the quartet as a whole. The whole quartet is 'supplied' with the cellist's contribution which thereby becomes common within the quartet. And it is certainly true that the identity of the cellist would cease to exist were it not made possible and sustained by the whole quartet. This is another way of expressing and understanding my claims that musicians are who they are in their

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163 Ibid.
164 Throughout the thesis I write 'insofar' as one word. Greshake writes it as three.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.

entirety by virtue of the relationships which obtain between them in the ensemble, and that these relationships are musical ones through and through, hence music-*making* is a *performed* theology of relating. The identity of the lung can only be understood in the context of the functioning of the whole body. The identity of the cellist can only be understood in the context of the functioning/performing of the whole quartet.

Greshake now continues by arguing from the Trinity to human beings. He says,

> from a Trinitarian God a decisive paradigm on the world of relationality of the person is opened up […] Being-in-relation reveals itself […] as the most profound nature of reality. The most sublime and actual reality both in the creatural as well as the divine existence is Being-with-one-another, *Communio*.[167]

Greshake sums up his argument:

> God […] is an interpersonal relational structure. The one divine nature exists only in the dynamic living exchange between Father, Son and Spirit […] the persons in God […] have no self-existence

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[167] Ibid., p. 341.

apart from each other. Instead, *what they are*, they are such *only*

in Being-from-others, Being-with-others and Being-for-others.[168]

Insofar as, and only insofar, as the members of a quartet have no existence apart from each other, and because they are what they are as musicians in any given performance only in being from, with, and for the other players, they and the quartet are analogous to the Trinity and its persons. I would like to stress that the direction of the argument here, mine and, as he specifically states, Greshake's, is from the Trinity to humans – members of small musical ensembles specifically. There is no back projection here.[169] Whilst there is much else to say in other chapters of the thesis about music-making and, indeed, the Trinity, the present discussion based on the idea of *communio* together with the comments which relate it to music-making are the heart of my argument that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating, for if the analogy between the Trinity and the quartet in the terms in which it is given here is as close as it appears to be, then it follows that the relating which structures the quartet is analogous to that which, as Greshake says, is the relational structure of God. Greshake's conclusion draws together the notion of God as *communio* and the description of human beings as being in the image of God. Elsewhere in the thesis I argue that the act of music-making partakes of the nature of communion and that God

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[168] Ibid., pp. 341-342. My emphasis.
[169] Please refer to Chapter 5 on social trinitarianism which addresses the issue and dangers of projection.

is communication in terms of conversation[170], of revelation[171], and of his 'ways with the world'[172].

Music-making and Tanner on God and human relationships[173]

In her essay *Social Trinitarianism and its Critics*,[174] Kathryn Tanner addresses precisely the question of "how to move from a discussion of God to human relationships".[175] Perhaps it is worth noting that Tanner's discussion is prompted by the question of how "to base conclusions about human relationships on the Trinity",[176] and that this is not quite what I wish to do in the thesis. Tanner concludes that "because God is not very comprehensible to us […] discussion of the Trinity […] seems of little help in better understanding human relationships".[177] But rather than coming to conclusions about the relationships in music-making which are based on the Trinity, or attempting to better understand human relationships on the basis of a discussion of the Trinity, I hope to have shown that these musical relationships are seen to be analogous to those within the Trinity *subsequent* to their independent identification and description. Nonetheless, Tanner identifies three problems which need to be addressed by the thesis. First, because God is radically other than human beings, it seems likely that "we do not understand very well what we mean when using ordinary language to speak of

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[170] Schwoebel, 2003.
[171] Bavinck, 2018, Bavinck, 2011, Bavinck, 2003-8, Bavinck, 1909.
[172] Hardy, 1996a.
[173] I revisit some of what follows in the different context of a discussion in Chapter 5 of social Trinitarianism.
[174] Tanner, 2012.
[175] Ibid., p. 378.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.

the Trinity".[178] Two of her examples are pertinent to the thesis; first, the persons of the Trinity are said to be "in one another, but what does 'in' mean here?"[179] Second, the three persons are said to be "distinguished from one another by the character of their relations, but who understands exactly what that character is?"[180]

Now, I certainly see performing musicians as indwelling one another. I have given more detail of what I mean by this in the chapter in the thesis on continuity[181] and also where I examine the extent to which my characterisations of music-making might be idealistic and not stand up to empirical scrutiny,[182] I also address this in the chapters on performance practice and the reception of music.[183] The nub of my argument is that a persuasive performance is not possible unless the players perform as one.

It is certainly true that human beings can have but a hazy idea of what indwelling is when thought of the Trinity, yet, as Tanner says, we have the notion that the three persons "have overlapping subjectivities".[184] I hope that my characterisations of music-making strongly suggest that this is true of performing musicians. Also, in the section of the thesis in which I address social trinitarianism and the problems which might arise for the thesis, I have argued for the meaningfulness of the language of indwelling when applied to the members of the Trinity. I have emphasised the

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[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Chapter 8.
[182] Chapter 7.
[183] Chapters 9 and 10.
[184] Tanner, 2012, p. 379.

scriptural warrant for using the language of indwelling, especially the authority which flows from Jesus' use of it. The use of 'indwelling' as applied to the persons of the Trinity must be analogical because our understanding of it arises in the context of our human experience. Scripture legitimates the analogy.[185] It is true that there are logical difficulties in using language in this way in this context, however, the reality which it intends has communicated and made sense to Christian believers throughout the centuries. This language is one of the best of the very few ways we have of indicating the most intimate of relationships, our being bound up with one another. Jesus's language and his associated use of metaphor, simile, even hyperbole, and that of Paul and other New Testament writers has, against all the odds and surely as part of the divine economy, been capable of understanding, reception, and communication.

We can acknowledge that 'in' partly suggests a certain mysticism. Even so, this does not mean that identity is totally subsumed. It does mean the closest describable intimacy, so that identity only makes sense in relation to the other or others and this is particularly so in relation to the Trinity.

I also note that in the analogous use of 'indwelling' we cannot specify the elements which are common to human and Trinitarian indwelling. I address the issue of specifying common elements in analogy by proper proportionality in the chapter on language and analogy.

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[185] For example, John 17:21.

Tanner's second example concerns our thoroughly inadequate understanding of the relationships between the members of the Trinity. She suggests that "divine persons […] seem much more relational than human beings", and that "much of what is said about the Trinity simply does not seem directly applicable to humans".[186] Part of Tanner's worry is that human beings exist before relationships are formed, whereas the persons of the Trinity are supposed not to precede the relations among them and which make them who they are. 'Person' need not be construed on Cartesian lines in reference to an isolated individual, but to someone whose identity is a matter of mutual relations with others. It is questionable as to whether even the new-born infant has no relational ties, despite Tanner's view that "human beings have no character to begin with as that is decisively shaped by what happens to them later".[187] The neonate has enjoyed an especially intimate relationship with its mother.

On McFadyen's account, human personhood is formed in dialogue, and this is a matter of being in dialectical relations with other persons.[188] A prominent exponent of personhood understood in relational terms is Zizioulas. He expounds a patristic view that "there is no true being without communion. Nothing exists as an 'individual', conceivable in itself. Communion is an ontological category […] the person cannot exist without communion".[189]

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[186] Tanner, 2012, p. 379.
[187] Ibid.
[188] McFadyen, 1990, p. 99ff.
[189] Zizioulas, 2004, p. 18.

When used of the Trinity and of human beings, perichoresis, as both Gunton and Richardson are keen to point out, is an analogy. Gunton says that the intension of the concept of perichoresis, that is, its internal content, necessarily changes when applied to beings limited by time and space.[190] This, as we shall see, is a point made by Kathryn Tanner. For her, human finitude militates against the human attempt to achieve "the perfectly mutual indwelling of the Trinity". But why should human perichoresis not be possible even though not perfect; Gunton's and Oster's (see below) examples provide arguments which suggest that it is possible.

Tanner also argues that human character is not as closely tied to relationships as is that of the trinitarian persons. I can, for instance, have a general tendency towards certain relationships before it is realised by actual relationships. Also, certain of my characteristic traits can remain even though the relationships which gave rise to them have ended. Neither of these possibilities exist for members of the Trinity. I agree that I come to music-making with already existing musical relational tendencies, and that as a musician I will have characteristic traits that remain once the music-making has ended. However, I would like to suggest that in the course of performing music my musical character is as closely tied to my relationships with my fellow players as it could possibly be, otherwise a coherent and persuasive performance is not possible. As a member of *this* quartet playing *this* work, I am almost entirely my relationships with the other members of the quartet, and in this respect I am analogously similar to the "Trinitarian persons [who] are not in themselves […] other than the persons they

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[190] Gunton, 1993, p. 170.

show themselves to be to us".[191] Similarly, in the music-making context, Tanner's view

that "the human relations that distinguish people never simply define them"[192] does

not apply. My relations with the other players precisely define me as, say, the second

violinist, they are constitutive of my identity.

Tanner also worries that "human finitude […] seems to entail that humans give of

themselves so that others may gain in ways that often bring loss to themselves";[193]

this is not the case with the trinitarian persons. When I give myself to the performance

of a musical work, do the other performers gain and do I suffer loss? This question

seems a very odd one. Surely as one of the members of *this* quartet giving *this*

performance I gain hugely from the others, and contributing to the performance does

not bring any loss to myself. Again, I could not exist as this musician at this time

without the others and the same applies to them, we all exist in terms of the

performance.[194]

Tanner's third problem is that "direct translation of the Trinity into a social programme

is problematic because […] human society is full of suffering, conflict, and sin".[195] I

have devoted part of the section in the thesis on social trinitarianism to this issue

which includes the problem of projection, and I hope I have said enough there to

persuade my readers both that it is no part of my intent in the thesis to translate

trinitarian relations into human terms, and also that my arguments in the thesis are

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[191] Tanner, 2012, p. 380.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.
[194] C.f. Begbie on Zuckerkandl on p.15.
[195] Tanner, 2012, p. 381.

not vulnerable to charges of projection. What I do in the thesis is discover that in terms of constituting identity the relationships amongst the members of a small musical ensemble are analogously similar to those amongst the members of the Trinity, but, crucially, this discovery is subsequent to a prior description of the quartet's relationality and hence of its members' identities.

Tanner wonders about closing and bridging "the gap between the Trinity and sinful, finite human persons […] in ways that allow us to see its implications for human community".[196] It is not my purpose in this thesis to see implications for human community in the Trinity as it were recommendations for social programmes or for how musicians should relate to one another. However, Tanner does seem to pose a problem for the thesis when she suggests that one way of closing the gap is to look to the economic Trinity because there we come closer to what humans are capable of, namely, a fellowship of love and mutual service. Tanner says that humans can imitate this because it is in keeping with their finitude. What is not in keeping with our finitude, and therefore not open to us, is the "perfectly mutual indwelling or perichoresis" of the Trinity.[197]

Perhaps I can highlight again that I am not suggesting that the members of a small musical ensemble set out to imitate the perfectly mutual indwelling of the Trinity. What I do suggest is that having explored how musicians relate to one another, one

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[196] Ibid.
[197] Ibid.

sees that this relating is an indwelling and so might be analogous to the mutual indwelling of the members of the Trinity.

Is there room to wonder what work 'in keeping with their finitude' does in Tanner's argument such that it allows love and service in human relationships but disbars indwelling? This question becomes a little more pressing in the case of musicians indwelling one another. I hope I have done enough elsewhere in the thesis (especially in the chapters on performance practice and the reception of music, but also in the chapter which addresses the extent to which I portray music-making as unrealistically selfless) to make a good case for the indwelling of musicians even though they are finite beings. What we want to say is that God loves in a divine way and that we love in a creaturely way, in which case, why can we not say that God self-indwells in a divine way and creatures indwell one another in a creaturely way? Could it be that Tanner thinks that finitude is of itself a bar to humans indwelling one another? Oster thinks that human finitude is not a bar to indwelling. Of lovers he says, "becoming-one with the other [...] considered in the context of love that acknowledges the other as an 'other' [...] presents two aspects of the same experience".[198] Musicians who perform together become one with one another, presenting different aspects of the same experience, the same performance. This is not to say that they experience the performance in the same way, it is simply to say that there is *this one* performance to

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[198] Oster, 2012, p. 365.

be experienced. Oster goes on to relate this to indwelling in a passage which is worth quoting (almost) in full:

> The personal relationship of one to the other allows both partners of the relationship a certain kind of *reciprocal indwelling*, since each of the two is not a static encapsulated 'I' = 'I' but rather lives in an equanimous self-relatedness, in which he, in the manner of being-with-the-other, is wholly himself, and at the same time allowing room in himself for the other. […] When this encounter occurs in the context of a reciprocal trusting relationship, each partner in the relationship dwells equally in the other as well as in himself".[199]

It would be hard to devise a more apt description of what goes on in music-making. I enlarge on this in the practical terms of good performance practice and the reception of music in Chapters 9 and 10. My arguments there will show that human finitude is not a bar to indwelling.

I have tried to argue in Chapter 6 on the other that in music-making room is indeed made for the other. There, I also hope to have made the case for music-making being an activity in which the musicians do not overwhelm each other, indeed that they

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[199] Ibid. My emphasis.

enter into a co-created creative space in which their mutual flourishing is crucial for and continuous with an animated and vibrant performance.

Writing in the context of an "apophatic entanglement" of relations "in and as *theology*",[200] Keller tells us that, "to know another is to participate in the construction of that other within the mirror play of a shared context. But both are still happening in and through each other".[201] I shall try to argue this too is characteristic of music-making. For the moment, though, I turn to analogy as the pivot upon which the thesis turns.

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[200] Keller, 2015, p. 7. Emphasis in the original.
[201] Ibid., p. 20.

CHAPTER 4: ANALOGY

Perhaps the principal methodological move in the thesis is to explore the ways that analogical understanding of Trinitarian doctrine might speak to the context of music-making, especially the relationships which obtain between musicians as they make music together. There are major methodological questions to be confronted at the outset here, particularly the question of the relationship of the Creator to creatures, and by extension the methodological limits to speech about God. The thesis explores one way in which Christian relationships might be understood, namely, by thinking about the formation of the identities of those in relationship, both human and divine.

As Aquinas and moderns such as James Torrance[202] have observed, when we speak of God we must necessarily use language which we have learnt in our interactions with one another and with the world. Yet this represents a tension with a theological desire to preserve the transcendence of God as "wholly other".

Nicholas Lash puts the difficulties metaphorically: "to try to speak of God is, unavoidably, to work with words and images carved from the world's wood, the territory of the familiar".[203] The question, then, is in what ways is human language, the language we use day by day as we pursue our worldly lives, appropriate for speaking about God who transcends the world? In his discussion of the contrasts between the Palamite tradition of the East and that of the Thomist West, Paul Collins

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[202] Torrance J. , 1989, pp. 4-5.
[203] Lash, 2004, p. 51.

stresses that "both traditions demonstrate a realisation that especially in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity, the task and process of theological reflection is one of contemplation rather than of precise definition".[204] Burrell agrees, noting that "nothing strains the resources available to human language so completely as our attempts to speak of God".[205]

One way of unpacking the implications of the discussion regarding the indescribability of the divine life, that we cannot speak with absolute precision about God, is not that we ought to fall silent, but that our uses of analogy for theology may in some sense be creative. Taking this as a starting point, Catherine Keller characterises her *Cloud of the Impossible* as "a series of encounters between the relational and the apophatic, or, to paraphrase, between the nonseparable and the nonknowable".[206] The book "hopes to demonstrate that […] relations that materialise as selves and as collectives […] come also apophatically entangled in and *as theology*".[207] This willingness to use creativity in Theology proper, will form part of my own methodology in this thesis. This works out in terms of the content of my claims, such as the argument that as they perform together musicians become related to one another in ways that are constitutive of their identity in the moment of performance; or that the ways in which a quartet is a set of relations which materialises as a kind of collective also comes into being at the moment of performance. But it is also the case that, following Keller, I want to explore the ways that such relations become entangled in and *as theology*. This is a

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[204] Collins, 2008, p. 97.
[205] Burrell, 2016b, p. 65.
[206] Keller, 2015, p. 6.
[207] Ibid., p. 7. Emphasis in the original.

development of my earlier claim that the relationships arise *as* music-making, and I

quoted Stolzfus for whom the theology arises *as* performance.[208]

If we can say that we know that God is self-indwelling and if, separately, we can make

the case, as I shall try to do, that musicians as they perform together under the

demands of good music-making also indwell one another,[209] then this partial

symmetry indicates that there is an analogy to be drawn. But rather than thinking of

one indwelling in terms of the other, I note, in particular, that in both instances the

indwellings are entirely constitutive of the divine Persons on the one hand, and of the

musicians on the other; these are separate observations. Perhaps it is useful here to

recall the distinction Aquinas makes between the order of knowledge and the order

of things. These orders are not always the same. In this case, the order of knowledge

suggests that the indwelling of humans is the primary use of 'indwelling' because our

acquaintance with the notion of indwelling comes from our human experience. On the

other hand, the order of things suggests that God's self-indwelling is the primary use

of 'indwelling' because on a participatory view human beings cannot, logically cannot,

indwell one another unless relationality is given to creation by its Creator. Aquinas

says, "since we arrive at the knowledge of God from other things, the reality of the

names predicated of God and other things is first in God according to His mode, but

the meaning of the name is in Him afterwards. Wherefore He is said to be named from

His effects".[210] Another of Aquinas' distinctions applies here, that between the *res*

significate and the *modus significandi*; human beings indwell one another in a

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[208] Stolzfus, 2006. See p. 52.
[209] I argue for these claims in Chapters 3, 5, 9, 10, 11 and *passim.*
[210] Aquinas, 2014, Bk. 1, Ch. 34, p. 50.

creaturely mode, the divine Persons in a divine mode. On pp. 30-31 I have suggested

that Begbie's use of analogy travels from music to theology.

We can better understand the parameters of Aquinas' account of analogy as they are

worked out in modern theology with a brief glimpse of Foucault's 'prose of the world'

in his first *episteme.* Here Foucault highlights three important aspects of analogy

which by extension I see in the contemporary deployments of thought. First, there is

the emphasis on relations. Second, there is "a centre upon which relations are

concentrated and from which they are […] reflected".[211] Third, there is a background

of understanding against which analogies are able to appear.

For Foucault, knowledge until the end of the sixteenth century was characterised by

the unity of words and things in "a seamless web of resemblances".[212] Foucault tells

us that this web of resemblances was "extremely rich",[213] and that there were four

essential figures determining "the knowledge of resemblance":[214] *convenientia,*

aemulatio, analogy, and *sympathy.*[215] For the purposes of the thesis, I propose to

consider only analogy largely because that is the figure which has occupied

theologians most in their attempt to understand how it is that human language can

be used meaningfully of God who transcends all that is human.

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[211] Foucault, 2002, p. 26.
[212] Merquior, 1991, p. 43.
[213] Foucault, 2002, p. 20.
[214] Ibid.
[215] Ibid.

Foucault comments that the "power of analogy is immense" because the similitudes it treats need only be the resemblances of relations[216] rather than, for example, "the visible [and] substantial ones between things themselves".[217] This means that analogy can be used to link all the features of the universe; Foucault refers to an "analogical cosmography".[218] In a not dissimilar vein, Gilbert Narcisse re-interprets Aquinas' frequently cited dictum that grace perfects nature,[219] together with his assertion that "all things agree in being"[220] to contend that eschatologically speaking there is a compatibility underlying all creation, its present fallen state notwithstanding. Indeed, Aquinas tells us that "God is said chiefly and simply to love those whom He endows with these effects of His love by which they are enabled to reach their last end, which is He Himself, the fountainhead of all goodness".[221]

Narcisse holds to an aesthetic theory according to which all being is capable of harmony, a harmony which is God-given, and thus for him

> the analogy that obtains between God and creation is a kind of
> *convenientia*; indeed, that the Word should become flesh to
> redeem humankind is *convenientissimum*, and all *convenientiae* in

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[216] Resemblances of the relations between the members of the Trinity and of small musical ensembles is at the heart of the argumentation of the thesis.
[217] Foucault, 2002, p. 24.
[218] Ibid., p. 25.
[219] Aquinas, 1993, p. 162.
[220] Aquinas, 2014, Bk. 1, Ch. XLII, p. 57.
[221] Aquinas, 1993, p. 163.

history are harmonized in a cosmic *exitus-reditus* that is super

determined by the advent and second coming of Christ.[222]

In the Foucauldian account of the pre-seventeenth century "prose of the world"[223] all

these similitudes find their focal point in the human being who "stands in

proportion[224] to the heavens",[225] and who is "the great fulcrum of proportions".[226]

But although Foucault's four figures of similitude enabled humankind to construct

knowledge showing the interconnections between all the varied features of the world

in terms of their resemblances, it was nonetheless necessary for there to be a further

form of similitude which would be, as it were, the guarantor that resemblances were

not simply fanciful or, even, virtuosic displays of mankind's imaginative creativity but

were truly part of reality and, indeed, of "the order of things".[227] This guarantee was

provided by what Foucault calls signatures, "the visible marks for the invisible

analogies".[228] Foucault is clear that "there are no resemblances without signatures.

The world of similarity", he says, "can only be a world of signs",[229] and he quotes

Paracelsus

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[222] Pomplun, 2008, p. 247.
[223] Foucault, 2002, pp. 3-50.
[224] Proper proportionality of relations is one of Aquinas's forms of analogy to be treated later in this chapter.
[225] Ibid., p. 24.
[226] Ibid., p. 26.
[227] Ibid. "The Order of Things" is the title of Foucault's book.
[228] Ibid., p. 29.
[229] Ibid.

It is not God's will that what he creates for man's benefit and what

he has given us should remain hidden… And even though he has

hidden certain things, he has allowed nothing to remain without

exterior and visible signs in the form of special marks – just as a

man who has buried a hoard of treasure marks the spot so that he

may find it again.[230]

Foucault's cultural archaeology provides us with one further insight into the 'analogical imagination',[231] as it was manifest in what Foucault regards as the first *episteme*, that is, era of knowledge,[232] and which lasted until the end of the sixteenth century.[233] Foucault tells us that the "precision" of analogical reasoning is consequent on "the grid through which we permit the figures of resemblance to enter our knowledge", and that this grid "coincides" with the already existing learning.[234] Foucault does not amplify these remarks beyond referring to an analogical cosmography and portraying the analogical dimension in terms of a "space of radiation [which surrounds] man on every side".[235] Merquior's exegesis of Foucault at this point makes use of the notion of "a *Lebenswelt*, a lifeworld saddled with a heavy philosophical infrastructure," and that in the Foucauldian archaeology *epistemes*, eras of knowledge, "are unconscious *Lebenswelten*".[236]

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[230] Ibid., quoting Paracelsus, 1928, p. 393.
[231] Tracy, 1981.
[232] Merquior, 1991, pp. 41-43.
[233] Foucault, 2002, p. 19.
[234] Ibid., p. 25.
[235] Ibid., p. 26.
[236] Merquior, 1991, p. 41.

For David Tracy, "analogy is a language of ordered relationships articulating similarity-in-difference. The order among the relationships is constituted by the distinct but similar relationships of each analogue to some primary focal meaning, some prime analogue".[237] Tracy affirms that for Christian systematics, the "primary focal meaning will be the event of Jesus Christ [which] *as event* will prove the primary analogue for the interpretation of the whole of reality".[238]

In Thomas Aquinas' view it is possible to speak of God even though our speaking is wholly inadequate to the task of saying what God is "because we can only talk of God as we know him, and we know him only through creatures, which represent him inadequately".[239] Burrell comments that it is […] impossible to "speak of God at all […] unless it be under the rubric of 'the first cause of all'".[240] But such a rubric does not aid us in our search for meaningful speech about God because such a cause is not in any way akin to the patterns whereby we identify cause and effect. This is not a difficulty which resembles in any way the difficulties which attend the scientific endeavour to understand and link causes and effects. Rather, it is a logical difficulty which arises from what Burrell calls "the grammatical observation that God is outside any genus, even the comprehensive pseudo-genus of substance".[241]

If we are to take up this kind of analogical approach, what are the limits of analogy? To what extent can words and their meanings which are learnt in the human context

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[237] Tracy, 1981, p. 408.
[238] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[239] Aquinas, 1991, 1.13.2.
[240] Burrell, 2016b, p. 68.
[241] Ibid., pp. 68-9.

be legitimately used when speaking of God? If, for example, our understanding of what it is mutually to indwell one another is rooted in human interactions, to what extent can this same terminology be used of God? The contextual background against which this question must needs arise is the Christian understanding of God as transcendent and beyond compare with all other things. As Frances Young says, "To get an inkling of Trinitarian relationships, our limited experience of finding and losing ourselves in mutual love for an other has to be stretched into the unknown, ungraspable reality of divine unity and simplicity".[242]

In contrast to Keller, Young argues that at the peak of the apophatic tradition,

> the possibility both of religious language and of religious
> knowledge was denied. This denial was partly philosophical: there
> is no logic common to ordinary language and language used of the
> divine. But it was also religious: a God worthy of worship is beyond
> comparison with anything derivative from the Creator.[243]

Gregory of Nazianzus suggested that although God cannot be known in his essence, he can be known in his attributes or activities: "Sketching God's inward self from outward characteristics, we may assemble an inadequate, weak and partial picture".[244]

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[242] Young, 2013, p. 400.
[243] Ibid., p. 392.
[244] *Oration 30,* quoted in Young, 2013, p. 393.

The classic account of the point at issue is focused on the univocal, equivocal, and analogical use of terms, and its main protagonist is St Thomas Aquinas. James Ross maintains that though "most recent writers in philosophical theology have made some reference to the theory of analogy current in medieval times, […] almost universally these writers have judged it hopeless",[245] nonetheless Ross' view is that

> if one wishes to render philosophically plausible the claim of most orthodox Christians that their traditional and descriptive statements about God are both literally meaningful and true, one must employ an analogy theory fundamentally similar to that of St Thomas.[246]

We begin by distinguishing between univocal, equivocal and analogical uses of language. To use terms univocally is to intend them to carry the same sense in their various uses. 'Being', for example, used univocally, is intended to carry the same sense when used to refer to God as when used of human beings. When the same term is used with quite different meanings, it is being used equivocally, when, for example, we say grass is green and a person is green meaning they are naïve or inexperienced.

Because we understand God as completely other, it clearly cannot be the case that God's wisdom can be thought as somehow continuous with human wisdom; it is not

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[245] Ross, 1976, p. 93.
[246] Ibid., p. 138. This is not to say that other scholars have not made significant contributions to the debate about how to speak of God, viz. John Duns Scotus, Cajetan, and in our own time David Burrell (2016a), Janet Martin Soskice (1985), Herbert McCabe (2005), David Tracy, (1981), and Sallie McFague (1982) amongst many others.

that God's wisdom is like human wisdom taken to an infinite degree. We cannot, in other words, use 'wisdom' univocally when speaking of human beings on the one hand and of God on the other. Davison comments that "to talk about God and creatures as beings in a univocal way risks making *being,* for instance, more fundamental than God, since 'being' would underlie speech about both God and creatures. That is a sort of blasphemy".[247]

If terms are used in two statements equivocally there is no overlap in the sense intended by the two applications. For example, the equivocal use of terms such as 'being', 'goodness', and 'beauty' denies that there can be any shared meaning between divine and creaturely instances of their application. Moses Maimonides held to this position explaining that God "lives, but not through life; He is powerful, but not through power; He knows but not through knowledge".[248] Burrell's gloss on this is that "God's *manner* of being wise is such that being God is the very norm and source of wisdom".[249] On this account, whilst we are able to say that God lives, we can have no conception of what his living consists in because our only means of understanding what it is to live is derived from our lives as creatures and God's life is infinitely and absolutely other than our lives. This way of thinking leads to Aquinas' distinction between *res significata* and *modus significandi,* a distinction I address below.

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[247] Davison, 2020, p. 177.
[248] Maimonides, 1974, Vol. 1, p. 57.
[249] Burrell, 2001, p. 53. Emphasis in the original.

Yet we do wish, and regard it as legitimate, to talk about God's wisdom, being, and so on, and that to do so is meaningful; in this case our use of 'wisdom', 'being' and so on is analogical.

In order to examine the analogical use of language, we can usefully begin with Aquinas's assertion that we can know that God exists but not what he is, and ask if, that being the case, there are any truths about God which we can state with confidence. It is not Aquinas's view that we can have no knowledge of God whatsoever, rather, it is that our knowledge of him must take the form of analogy, and Aquinas sets out to show how analogy functions in talk of God, that is, he uncovers the grammar which legitimates our ways of speaking of God as true and meaningful. McDermott says, "We can, so to speak, deduce what must be said of him [God] if language is to be language".[250] Burrell also is keen to give us to understand that in his doctrine of analogy Aquinas is giving us a grammar for speaking about God: "Aquinas' account intends to lay out the grammar of 'God'",[251] or again, "[Aquinas} is engaged in the metalinguistic project of mapping out the grammar appropriate *in divinis*. He is proposing the logic proper to discourse about God".[252] Davies makes the same point, saying that Aquinas's writings on analogy "can also be read as a reflection on or description of what is going on with the language we use in talking of God before we construct a doctrine of analogy".[253] In this connection, Davies quotes Mascall: "The

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[250] McDermott, 1991, p. 10, 'Introduction' in Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*: A Concise Translation, 1991. This quotation is taken from Timothy McDermott's introductory remarks to the section of his Concise Translation of the *Summa Theologiae* titled 'What God is not', pp. 9-35.
[251] Burrell, 2016b, p. 83.
[252] Ibid., pp. 18-19.
[253] Davies, 1992, p. 73.

function of the doctrine of analogy is not to make it possible for us to talk about God in the future but to explain how it is that we have been able to talk about him all along".[254] To these motivations for uncovering the grammar of God-talk may be added that of wishing to avoid idolatry, as te Velde puts it "an essential boundary exists between the universe of creatures and the eternal One, who stands apart from the whole universe".[255] Te Velde's exegesis of Aquinas is forthright here: "The negative dimension in our knowledge of God means a breach in any continuity we may feel tempted to project between the finite and the infinite".[256] But negation is premised on prior affirmation. Te Velde resists the notion of Aquinas' theology as negative. "Negation", he says, "is part of the intelligible structure of the causal relationship between creatures and God, and thus part of how God can be known from his effects".[257] The *via negativa* is predicated on the affirmation that God as cause is not one of his effects. This means that a positive statement about what God is must be followed by a negation of it which says that he cannot be whatever is affirmed of him in the same way as the affirmation is understood as one of his effects. If it is possible for human beings to indwell one another, this is so only because, on a participatory account, one of the effects of God's creation is indwelling. But God does not indwell as human beings do.

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[254] Mascall, 1949, p. 94.
[255] te Velde, 2016, p. 74.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid., p. 75.

Before exploring Aquinas's doctrine of analogy,[258] it is worthwhile noting that although he does indeed make a distinction between univocal, equivocal and analogical discourses, they are distinctions between literal modes of discourse. It is not, for example, that to speak of God as good is to mean that he is good but not in the way 'good' is usually meant. The use of 'green' is univocal and literal in both 'the grass is green' and 'the paint is green'. The use of 'card' is equivocal and literal in 'birthday card' and 'he is a card' meaning he has a quirky sense of humour. If we say someone is loving and that God is loving, 'loving' is used in different but related ways and, in each case, is meant literally. One of the points which Aquinas is anxious to get across is that when we use words analogously of God and of his creatures, the words apply primarily to God and only secondarily to creatures. His meaning here is that human wisdom, for example, derives from God because human beings and all creatures derive from God.

Analogy, then, falls *between* univocal and equivocal uses of language. Burrell refers to this as a median,[259] and notes that Aquinas gives two ways of finding it: "(1) by reference to one focal meaning (attribution), and (2) by an ordered relationship among different uses (proportionality)".[260] We need to take care with terms; Kallenberg notes that Aquinas "explicitly *denies* that theological language employs proportionality to depict what God is like",[261] noting that Aquinas made "a distinction

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[258] Although it is common to speak of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, scholars such as Burrell and Davies hold that Aquinas did not in fact have such a doctrine – see Burrell 2016b, p. 62 and Davies 1992, p. 70, n. 39. Burrell ascribes what he calls "the theoretical formulation" to Cajetan (Tomasso de Vio) 2009: see Burrell, 2016b, p. 62, n. 45.

[259] Burrell, 2016b, p. 62.

[260] Ibid.. Proportion is Aquinas' name for relation.

[261] Kallenberg, 2019, p. 35, emphasis in the original.

between proportion and proportionateness (*proportionalitatem*)".[262] I try to give a detailed exposition of these methods below.

There is a kind of denial hidden in the analogical use of language for although we wish most emphatically to say that God's goodness, for example, is not like human goodness, yet, as Denis teaches, this negation must itself in a sense be negated. He says:

> This is how it must be: we need to acknowledge, recognise and affirm in him who is above all knowledge and intellect all the positive attributes of all existing things, in that he is the cause of all things; and more appropriately and more firmly we need to deny all such attributes, in that he is transcendentally above them all, supreme in his own nature and distinct from them all, and not to be of opinion that the denial of existing things is contrary to the original affirmation of them, but to hold steadfastly what is seen in faith, that he who in himself is above all things is above all negation of things that exist or could exist, yes, above both their negation and their affirmation.[263]

Aquinas concurs with this view:

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[262] Ibid., p. 42, n. 62. Kallenberg says in the note this is an insight he owes to Michael Cox. Kallenberg references Aquinas: 'Liber IV Distinctio XLIX Questio II, in *Scriptum Super Sententiis*.
[263] Denys, 2001, p. 3.

in every term employed by us, there is imperfection as regards the

mode of signification, and imperfection is unbecoming to God,

although the thing signified is becoming to God in some eminent

way […] wherefore, as Dionysius teaches, such terms can be either

affirmed or denied of God: affirmed, on account of the signification

of the term; denied of account of the mode of signification.[264]

Similarly, for Nicholas of Cusa, who "revels in paradoxical expression" [265] and whose

"analogies are illustrative rather than argumentative [since] they do not try to

establish a point but only to render it more plausible",[266] God is Not-Other, since for

him "there is no common measure between Creator and creatures, only an

asymmetrical relationship of gift bestowal and dependence".[267] Consequently,

Nicholas insists that, when speaking of God, not only must any affirmation be negated,

but this negation must itself be negated.[268] Nicholas Lash is coruscating in his criticism

of a "negative theology which denies the appropriateness of the things that the

simple-minded say".[269] He emphasises that the Bible lays great store on the imagery

of the poet and story-teller "to express the relations that obtain between the Holy

One and the creation which He convenes and calls into His presence".[270] Lash is at

pains to point out that "*everything* we say of God […] is anthropomorphically,

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[264] Aquinas, 2014, Bk. 1, Ch. XXX, p. 46.
[265] Hopkins, 1979, p. 5.
[266] Ibid., p. 7.
[267] Sherman, 2014, p. 142.
[268] de Cusa, 1979, p. 41. Catherine Keller writes that she has "hardly been able to write ['God'] to *subject* it to sentences that start 'God is', 'God does'. As though 'God' identifies something, some One, rather than, as Meister Eckhart insists, 'a non-God, a nonspirit, a nonperson, a nonimage'" - Keller, 2003, p. 172, emphasis in the original. The embedded quotation is from Eckhart, 1981, p. 207.
[269] Lash, 2007, p. 137. By 'the simple-minded' Lash means people "who still go to church".
[270] Ibid.

metaphorically said".[271] He thinks that if we somehow imagine that we are nearer "to getting a 'fix'"[272] on God by using abstract expressions we are quite wrong: "'Oh, I *see*: God is 'spirit', God is 'transcendent', God is 'ineffable' – *now* I understand'. Oh no you don't!".[273]

Even though God's goodness is prior to the goodness found in creatures because what is found in creatures derives from God, it is also the case that because we first learn to call creatures good and then call God good, "God's goodness […] is secondary to what is found in creatures".[274]

It is important to contrast the use of analogy with that of metaphor. Janet Martin Soskice defines metaphor "as that trope or figure of speech in which we speak of one thing in terms suggestive of another".[275] Her example is when we speak of God as a farmer separating the wheat and the tares. In later chapters I do not mean to imply that the members of the Trinity or the players in, for example, a string quartet are somehow interchangeable and can be spoken of in equally reciprocal terms. This is particularly true of the inner dynamics of the Triune life. I do not think of the indwelling of the divine Persons in terms of human indwelling. In chapters below, I use 'indwelling' in both cases, but I do so analogically. I give a detailed analysis of analogy below, during the course of which I note that on a Thomist reading to speak analogously is to use a term which applies more to God than it does to creatures;

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[271] Ibid.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid., pp. 137-8. Emphases in the original.
[274] Davies, 1992, pp. 72-3.
[275] Soskice, 1985, p. 54.

'good', for example. To use a term metaphorically is to use it in such a way that it applies more directly to some aspect of the world than it does to God; 'stronghold', for example. Does 'indwelling' apply more to God than to creatures? God's self-indwelling, the relationality within the Godhead, is the origin and cause of human indwelling, of all relationality in the world. This is a participatory view; human beings are able to indwell one another, if indeed they do indwell one another, precisely because they participate in God. Thus, I follow Rahner whose "affirmation of the Absolutely Real [as] a condition of the possibility of knowing the worldly, finite real is dependent upon St. Thomas' metaphysics of participation".[276]

Aquinas seems to make a clear distinction between analogy and metaphor.[277] For him, to speak analogously is to use a term which applies more to God than it does to creatures; 'good', for example. To use a term metaphorically is to use it in such a way that it applies more directly to some aspect of the world than it does to God; 'stronghold', for example. McInerny, however, suggests there is room for confusion as to Aquinas' view and that this confusion is exacerbated by Cajetan aligning metaphor with analogy of attribution which leads to 'healthy', which, says McInerny, is one of Aquinas' favourite examples of an analogous name, being a metaphor.[278] The confusion is only increased when Aquinas says that the metaphorical use of a name for God is said *per prius* of creatures and of God because of a similarity of proportions. McInerney's argument here is that these names, being said *per prius* of creatures, are "said *per posterius* of God with reference to creatures [… and that is] what we mean

[276] Caponi, 2003, pp. 375-376.
[277] Aquinas, 1991, 1.13.6.
[278] McInerny, 1971, p. 145.

by an analogous name".[279] The solution to this conundrum is to uncouple what the predication is attached to from what the predication signifies. In McInerney's example Christ is called the lion of the tribe of Juda because he acts bravely as lions do. The point of the example is that acting bravely is associated with being a lion as it were a property of being a lion, and this in fact is what is transferred to Christ but under the name 'lion'. So, in the example, the predication signifies bravery, but naming Christ as lion will not include him in the set of all lions in the world, and this means that Christ is named lion metaphorically not analogously. McInerny thus wonders if "a name is used metaphorically when that to which it is transferred does not fall under the *ratio propria* of the name",[280] that is, does not fall under the defining concept associated with the name. However, this does not finally settle the question of how or if metaphor and analogy can be distinguished. Davison frames the issue in terms of participation. He notes that Aquinas sees a participatory basis for metaphor and that this makes it somewhat analogical.[281] Reverting to the lion example, whereas Aquinas does not take bravery to be part of the definition of 'lion' any more than it is of 'man', otherwise why speak in terms of effects – the lion displays strength and bravery in his works – nonetheless "the lion does not simply happen to have strength. It has strength from God".[282] Thus, it would seem to be legitimate to ascribe strength primarily to God, and this undermines Aquinas' previous rule concerning the *ratio proprio* which determines that names are used metaphorically when understood primarily according to their material instantiation in the world of the senses. This turn in the discussion

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[279] Ibid.
[280] Ibid., pp. 146-7.
[281] Davison, 2020, p. 193.
[282] Ibid.

toward participation has a nominalist/anti-nominalist strain, and although further discussion is beyond the remit of the thesis, it is perhaps worth mentioning that those who espouse a participatory way of thinking tend to see similarities as real and capable of being discerned and recognised rather than simply a question of the assignation of the same name to similarities which are imposed or projected upon things. Nominalists thus tend to assimilate analogy to metaphor, whereas the participatory approach, as the example of the lion receiving its strength from God illustrates, tends to assimilate metaphor to analogy.

I will argue that our human ability to indwell one another flows to us from God as Creator, and God as Trinity is the origin of all relationality in creation. That God is a three-personned God tells us that his self-indwelling is one of his perfections. Thus, although our understanding of what it is to indwell one another comes about by virtue of our human experience, to speak of the three Persons of the Trinity as indwelling one another is an analogous use of language not a metaphorical one.[283] Aquinas makes a distinction between the *res significata* and the *modus significandi*.[284] In my analogous use of 'indwelling', the mode of indwelling is different between the Trinity and the members of a string quartet, yet what is signified remains the same (though not univocally so) and is the basis of my claim that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating.

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[283] I return to and amplify this theme later on.
[284] I explore this distinction in some detail below.

Aquinas' analysis of language from which springs his theory of analogy, was designed to solve two problems: (i) how is it that ordinary language, whose terms, meanings, and use are learnt experientially, can be applied to God who is absolutely different from the objects of ordinary human experience? Aquinas wished to preserve the literal sense of our beliefs about God; (ii) having accepted the Aristotelian theory of the categories and thus that statements which are transcategorical, for example "both clouds and numbers exist" (clouds fall into the category of substance and numbers fall into the category of quantity), cannot have univocal predicates, how are transcategorical statements, particularly those metaphysical ones which by their very generality are transcategorical, to be judged meaningful?

Following Aquinas, we can distinguish between analogy by attribution and analogy of proper proportionality.[285] The fundamental difference between these is that analogy by attribution, also known as analogy of one-to-another and analogy of proportion, compares things, whereas analogy of proper proportionality compares relations between things. Davison says, "proportion points to a relationship, while proportionality, also known as proper proportionality or intrinsic proportionality, points to a relationship between relationships".[286] The relevance of this to the thesis is that the analogy I wish to draw between the indwelling of the divine Persons on the

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[285] Whilst the following analyses of analogy of attribution and of proper proportionality are heavily centred on and draw from the writings of Aquinas, the work of other, mainly contemporary, scholars is included so as to be able to support contemporary questions concerning analogy which arise in relation to the claims of the thesis.

[286] Davison, 2020, p. 186.

one hand and the members of a small musical ensemble on the other is that this is an analogy between two sets of relationships.

Analogy by Attribution

Suppose I say a string quartet is self-indwelling and the Trinity is self-indwelling. Is this an example of analogy by attribution?

Statements which employ analogy of attribution have the form "X is Z" and "Y is Z". In this sort of statement, the term "Z" is a predicate of two quite different subjects, and only one of the subjects can be said properly to possess the predicate term. For example, in "Fred is healthy" and "Fred's colour is healthy", only Fred can properly be thought healthy. Also, "healthy" signifies numerically one and the same thing in both statements; Fred's healthy colour does not signify a different state of affairs than does "Fred is healthy"; the health in "Fred's colour is healthy" is one and the same as the health in "Fred is healthy".

In my example, indwelling is a predicate of two quite different subjects; a string quartet and God, and only God can be said properly to possess the term 'indwelling'. But 'indwelling' does not signify numerically one and the same thing in my example.

Ross takes a pair of statements which he says enables him "to push [Thomas'] analysis a little further than he did": "John is brilliant" and "John's work is brilliant".[287] In this example, when we say John's work is brilliant we are saying something about the work and not just about John, even though the term 'brilliant' is applied primarily to those "who can and habitually do produce work of a given quality".[288] Ross raises a problem with this analysis: it can be difficult to identify the primary instance of the predicate term. Is John's brilliance as the cause of the brilliant work primary, or is it that the brilliant work is primary because it is on the basis of the brilliant work that we say John is brilliant?

Aquinas proposes a rule for deciding which is the primary instance. This rule uses a distinction between the order of things and the order of knowledge. On the basis of this rule, the primary instance is the one which is pre-supposed by all others, the one which must be known first.[289] Applying this rule suggests that, because we must first have evidence that John's work is brilliant before we can say he is brilliant, then the primary sense is the quality of the work. The order of knowledge is not always the same as the order of things, for instance, John must be in possession of certain intellectual powers before he can produce brilliant work – a logical priority (the order of things), but our knowledge of his brilliance comes after our acquaintance with the work – a psychological priority. Thus it is that we describe John's abilities in terms of the quality of the work, although John works in terms of his abilities. This difference in the order of things and the order of knowing is the basis upon which Aquinas tells

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[287] Ross, 1976, p. 104.
[288] Ibid., p. 109.
[289] Aquinas, 2014, Bk.1, Ch. 34, pp. 49-50.

us that although we know God from his effects, the effects are consequent on God's

powers. Aquinas pursues this argument in terms of naming God from his effects:

> On the other hand, when that which comes first according to
>
> nature, comes afterwards according to knowledge, then, in
>
> analogical terms, there is not the same order according to the
>
> reality and according to the meaning of the name: thus the healing
>
> power in health-giving (medicines) is naturally prior to health in the
>
> animal, as cause is prior to effect; yet as we know this power
>
> through its effect, we name it from that effect. Hence it is that
>
> health-giving is first in the order of reality, and yet is predicated of
>
> animal [290] first according to the meaning of the term.

> Accordingly, since we arrive at the knowledge of God from other
>
> things, the reality of the names predicated of God and other things
>
> is first in God according to His mode, but the meaning of the name
>
> is in Him afterwards. Wherefore He is said to be named from His
>
> effects.[291]

At this point, however, we must insert an important caveat with regard to naming God

from his effects, for the argument holds only if sufficient similarity has already been

established between God and things to support the claim that there is a causal

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[290] The quotation is correct as it appears in my edition of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, but perhaps it should read "is predicated of <u>the</u> animal"; compare with three lines previously.
[291] Aquinas, 2014, Bk. 1, Ch. 34, p. 50.

relation. In terms of the previous example, we must already know there is a causal relation between John's mental abilities and his work in order to be able to call him brilliant, name him from his effects. We must already know, or at least believe, there is a causal relation between God's powers and his effects in order, for example, to name him as the Sustainer of the universe. God's power to sustain the universe is prior to the sustained universe, and our naming God as Sustainer is justified because we already know, or at least believe, that he is the Creator of the universe as cause to effect, but the universe is called a sustained universe with priority in the order of naming. In other words, there must already be grounds for our knowing or believing that God and the universe are related as cause and effect.

What are the implications of this discussion for my example of the self-indwelling of God and of the string quartet? Well, indwelling is first in the order of reality, of things, because, on a participatory account, God is its source. However, it is predicated first of human beings because of its meaning. The issues here are filled out in the next paragraph.

Cross reasons that if the terms we use of God are taken to refer to simple attributes, ones that cannot be reduced to more basic elements, and are not univocal then they must necessarily be equivocal and not analogous because simple attributes cannot by definition "have more basic common features in virtue of which they could be similar".[292] Since "the doctrine of God's simplicity reaches the zenith of expression and

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[292] Ibid.

sophistication in the thought of Thomas Aquinas [who] regard[ed the doctrine of divine simplicity] as the centrepiece of the Creator-creature distinction,"[293] Cross' reasoning seems to strike at the heart of Aquinas' theory of analogy.[294] Although a fuller treatment of this problematic is beyond the scope of the thesis, we can note that Davison understands it in terms of the shift in emphasis which he purports to see in Aquinas' writings from "thinking of the relation of the world to God in terms of an analogy of proportionality to an analogy of attribution".[295] He admits the importance of taking into account the *modus significandi* of attributes and thus the need for proportionality, but he thinks that this is to "remain in the realm of epistemology".[296] What matters for Davison is that the relationship which exists between God and the world is ontologically prior to our speaking about it, and that this relationship is identified linguistically as an analogy of attribution. Further, the analogy of proportionality between God and the world must, then, be based on the participation of creature in Creator which is constituted by there being one source from which all else derives, and this, Davison says, is what underlies analogy of attribution.[297]

Analogy by attribution has the interesting property that the primary analogate is part of the definition of the other analogates. For example, if the primary analogate is Mary, then to say that Mary is happy is to posit a certain affective state which is true about Mary and which justifies the statement "Mary is happy". If a secondary

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[293] Dolezal, 2011, p. 6. Dolezal adopts DDS as shorthand for 'doctrine of divine simplicity' which I have therefore written out fully in the square brackets in this quotation.
[294] To pursue this issue of divine simplicity is beyond the remit of the thesis. For a comprehensive review of the doctrine of divine simplicity including its advocacy by patristic, medieval, reformed and modern theologians as well as recent criticisms of it see Dolezal, 2011, Ch. 1.
[295] Davison, 2020, p. 196.
[296] Ibid. p. 197.
[297] Ibid.

analogate is Mary's smile, then to say her smile is happy is to claim that the smile has those qualities which are signs that Mary is in fact happy, that is, that Mary is in such and such an affective state, and thus this affective state must be part of the definition of Mary's happy smile. Aquinas realises that we do not always necessarily agree about what is to count as the primary sense of the analogous term, 'happy' in the above example, but it is clear this does not invalidate the point at issue. Ross reminds us that this requirement that the meaning we attach to the primary analogate – a happy Mary – must be included in the definition of the secondary analogate – Mary's smile, is a tautology.[298] His example is that when we describe someone as charitable, we mean that she or he is disposed to engage in charitable acts. When we say an act is charitable, we mean that it is a sign of a charitable disposition, that is to say, we in effect attribute a causal relation between the analogates, and this is a further property of analogy by attribution.

A final property of analogy by attribution is that the analogous term does not carry exactly the same meaning in all of its occurrences.[299] Ross' example of John who is brilliant and his brilliant work is a case in point. As Ross says,

> Sometimes we are not sure whether a term indicates only a property of its subject or a relation to a property of another subject [...] The term cannot possibly have exactly the same meaning in all

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[298] Ross, 1976, p. 114.
[299] Cajetan, 2009, Ch. 2, par. 15.

its instances if we include as part of its *meaning* in some instances

the *relationship* of the definitive property to the subject.[300]

Analogy of Proper Proportionality

Analogy of proportionality seems not to feature to any great extent in Aquinas' work; indeed, Davison refers to it as "an outlier and a departure",[301] and in his view "might simply have been relegated to a footnote in Thomist studies were it not that Cajetan promoted proportionality as the definitive category in Aquinas' discussion of the analogy of creatures to creator".[302]

In his earlier texts such as the *Commentary on the Sentences* from about 1252, "Aquinas seems to have taken the likeness of creatures to God as given",[303] assuming a primitive relation of imitation which he did not attempt to explain.[304] In *Questions on Truth* written between 1256–1259, however, Aquinas abandons his earlier position because it does not seem to accommodate God's utter difference from his creatures, a difference which makes a likeness between them implausible. Nonetheless Aquinas is not willing to abandon his conviction that there is such a likeness and develops analogy of proportionality which enables 'names' to be attributed both to God and to creatures.

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[300] Ross, 1976, p. 115. Emphases in the original.
[301] Davison, 2020, p. 187.
[302] Ibid.
[303] Ibid.
[304] Pini, 2014, p. 499.

A common example of analogy of proper proportionality is the analogy between the eye and sight on the one hand and the mind and intellectual sight on the other; analogy of proper proportionality rests on comparing two relations, in this case that between the eye and sight and that between the mind and intellectual perception. It is important to remember that the analogy is between the relations and not between elements that are related. So, in the example the comparison is not between physical visual perception and intellectual perception but between the eye and its sight and the mind and its insight. In a general form, we can say this kind of analogy states that our knowledge is to our being as God's knowledge is to his being. This can be expressed formulaically as a:b::c:d. Davison points out that there is a weakness in this way of speaking since the comparison between creatures and God tells us nothing about the relation of creatures to Creator on which the comparison rests.[305] As it stands, we appear to have what Herve Thibault calls "an unexplained pluralism" whereby resemblances between creatures are not accounted for, and neither are those between creature in relation to God.[306] What proportionality does is to posit parallel relationships of essence and existence between the beings to whom the analogous predicates are applied. The difficulty is addressed by an appeal to causation, for it is causation which binds being together: there is indeed proportion between God and creature, namely that between cause and caused. So, there is a causal resemblance of creatures to God insofar as they owe their being to him. This means that what is received from God is present in the creature according to its mode of being. The cause, we can say, is present in the effect. In terms of Aquinas' distinction

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[305] Davison, 2020, p. 188.
[306] Thibault, 1970, p. x.

between *res significate* and *modus significandi*, we can say, for example, that what is signified and derived from God, beauty say, is always the same but the manner in which it is manifested varies according to the being of the creature; Davison, for instance, talks about arboreal, canine, and lapidary beauty.[307]

We can briefly review the characteristics of analogy by proper proportion. First, if we consider such pairs of statements as "My cat knows how to catch mice" and "My wife knows me", or "My cat is the cause of her meowing" and "My success is the cause of my happiness", then it is clear that 'knows' and 'cause' are not univocal in their predicative senses. The second characteristic follows from the first, namely, the sentences in which the predicated property appears having different subjects, the predicated property must have different senses. This second characteristic marks the most important difference between analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. Thus, in analogy of attribution, though the sentences might have different subjects – viz. John and John's work – the property referred to by the analogous term 'brilliant' is the same, numerically one, whereas in analogy by proportionality the analogous predicates are not numerically one, causing happiness on the one hand and the sound of meowing on the other are different kinds of causes, as are knowing someone and knowing how different kinds of knowing. However, this characteristic gives rise to a problem. If the causing and knowing differ in the two sentences, that is, they are used equivocally, then there needs to be a criterion which determines the extent to which they may differ before a quite different property is

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[307] Davison, 2020, p. 189.

indicated. The problem is that, given an equivocal use of the terms, the terms must nonetheless refer to the same property: the property of knowing or of causing, and it seems that we cannot in fact know that the same property is indicated in an equivocal use of a term. At this point, Ross says, "we must demand some analysis from St Thomas which will allow a term to be univocal in signification while being equivocal in not conforming to the rule for univocity in intention".[308] In other words, in using terms in this way we wish to point to the same property in both cases whilst acknowledging that the way in which it is manifest differs in the two cases. This is a distinction which in fact Aquinas makes, that is, the distinction between the *res significata* and the *modus significandi*. Ross and Bates say that "the manner of attribution (*modus significandi)* is contracted from the *modus essendi* (the manner of being) of what is referred to, God or creatures,"[309] and they offer us some useful examples:

> like the contextual capture when you say, 'the paper *turned red* with spilled ink', 'his face *turned red* with embarrassment' and 'the sky *turned red* with the dawn'; the signification, the verbal meaning, *'turned red'* is the same, but the *modus significandi,* differs according to the different ways the reddening happens. So, Aquinas said, it is with God and creatures; and thus, there is no univocation of positive predicates, only analogy (relatedness of meaning).[310]

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[308] Ross, 1976, p. 118.
[309] Ross & Bates, 2003, p. 213.
[310] Ibid.

However, Duns Scotus does not agree with Aquinas in making this distinction. For him, the *modus essendi* of God or of creatures is not part of the meaning of the predicates used analogously of them. Whilst he agrees that the modes of being of God and of creatures do indeed differ, he argues that this does not alter the meaning of words in their application. Thus, he says that "infinity does not destroy the formal nature of that to which it is added".[311] Since for Duns Scotus, the definition of a predicate entails the same meaning regardless of its signification, it follows that the divine perfections are univocally predicated of God and of creatures. But, armed with Aquinas' distinction between *res significate* and *modus significandi*, we can now say that what is signified by the analogous term is understood univocally, but that the mode in which it is signified indicates an equivocal use of the term. When we come to consider the perfections as they exist in creatures, wisdom, for example, we recognise that they come from God, but the mode in which God possesses and exhibits them is not the same as that in which creatures possess and exhibit them. Since we creatures only know a perfection from our own experience of it, it must necessarily be the case that our use of the term always falls short when we apply it to God, for God's mode of being is exemplary whereas ours is not.

Aquinas further differentiates between two different uses of '*modus significandi*' whose functions are quite different. First, suppose we talk of knowledge in relation to a human person and to a dog. What is meant by 'knowledge' is the same in both cases, but the kinds of knowledge possible differs. It is not that when we apply 'knowledge'

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[311] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1, d. 8, q. 4, n. 17.

to a dog we mean it anthropomorphically or metaphorically, rather it is that terms

such as 'knowledge' encompass a very wide range of activities within their realms of

signification. Aquinas thus says that the sense of 'knows' when applied to a dog and

to a human are proportionally the same, but that the mode in which the property is

possessed in each case makes the kinds of activities which result from the knowing

different. Different natures participate unequally and in different ways in one and the

same property according to their different modes of being as determined by their

natures. McInerney gives us a further example: "the similarity of proportionality does

not argue for any substantial similarity in the lion and Christ, but for a similarity of

mode of action".[312]

Given that a term, 'knows' for example, can be legitimately applied to God, to human

creatures and to animals and thus, as it were, is neutral with regard to its modes of

signification, we might wonder why it is not univocal. Aquinas holds that terms are to

be deemed univocal or equivocal according to their use in sentences. Ross points out

in this connection that Aquinas conceived knowing very differently to our

contemporary conception of it.[313] First, "he assumes that the man is more than

quantitatively different from the dog; he is *essentially* different".[314] He also assumes

that knowing is "the possession of the form of another as belonging to another

according to one's natural mode of possession".[315] Since knowledge is pre-eminently

possessed by God and only secondarily by human creatures, we must therefore

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[312] McInerny, 1971, p. 151.
[313] Ross, 1976, p. 122.
[314] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[315] Ibid., p. 123.

acknowledge that the use of 'knowledge' is equivocal when applied to God, to human creatures and to animals, for not only are the three essentially different, they must also necessarily possess knowledge according to their different modes of possession. The upshot of this part of the discussion is that in terms of what is signified, the *res significate*, analogous predicates are used univocally, but in terms of how what is signified is manifested the analogous predicates are used equivocally. We have the same result when we come to consider Aquinas' second use of *modus significandi* and its function. Here we are concerned with how we learn to use the term in question; "for we express things by a term as we conceive them by the intellect: and our intellect, since its knowledge originates from the senses, does not surpass the mode which we find in sensible objects".[316] This means that our understanding of 'goodness' cannot exceed that which our intellects have been able to garner from our creaturely experience and, thus, that to apply 'goodness' to God is wholly inadequate even though proper proportionality requires that 'goodness' signifies one and the same property in God and in human creatures.

A third characteristic of analogy by proper proportionality is that there must be a proportional similarity between what is signified in the two uses of the analogous term. By similarity we understand that two things are identical in at least one respect and that they are never numerically identical. 'Proportion', as Aquinas understands it, is a synonym for 'relation', and proportionality is a question of the similarity of the relations which two things have with some other things, events, or properties. Ross

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[316] Aquinas, 2014, Bk. 1, Ch XXX, p. 46.

takes for example the proportional similarity which exists between Fido who knows his dog-house and Plato who knows his philosophy; "the relations signified by 'knowing' which obtain between Fido and his dog-house and Plato and his philosophy are similar (that is, in its two instances the relation signified by the term 'knows' has some common properties or relations)".[317] We will see in due course that there is some difficulty in specifying in any given instance what these common properties or relations might be.

A fourth and final characteristic of analogy by proper proportionality is that there should be a criterion by which we can establish that two things are in fact proportionally similar, that is, have similar relations. There are two aspects to this: (i) not only must the two things indicated by the predicate be proportionally similar, but, also, (ii) the relations of the things must be similar. In some cases, say ones such as Fido and Plato cited above, one just recognises the similarity of the relations. When we come to consider this characteristic in terms of what we might analogously want to say of God, then if it can be established "that God has certain relations to the world (from empirical premises) then it will follow from the general form of language that the relations are similar to relations of our experience".[318] For Ross, relations are similar if they have a common property. The difficulty is that we cannot be sure that our recognition of apparently similar relations can be relied upon. Also, even if the conditions for analogy by proper proportionality, that is, that the relations are in fact similar, share a common property, could be definitively determined, how could we be

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[317] Ross, 1976, p. 129.
[318] Ibid., p. 130.

sure that they obtained in any given case? Ross' view that similarity of relations is defined by their having a common property, he says, "is very similar to St Thomas' assumption that if the relations are sufficiently similar we will recognise that fact and use the term to signify the two relations".[319] Is there a hint here of Wittgenstein for whom we understand the meanings of terms according to our appropriate use of them in forms of life? Aquinas sets out to understand the conditions under which it is possible for believers, whose language and form of life interpenetrate one another, to make meaningful statements. Ross claims that, despite the difficulty in specifying conditions which when satisfied would ensure similarity of relations, the practice of speaking analogously by proper proportion is not thereby hampered unduly.[320] It is likely that this claim would be rejected by Burrell who regards the *res/modus* distinction as "leading quite naturally to some form of intuitionism"[321], a standpoint which he rejects.[322]   Although Ross does not allude to Wittgenstein, it is interesting that the Wittgensteinian point about the mutual interpenetration of language games and forms of life, that they cannot be understood independently, is relevant here. After all, Aquinas is partly motivated to undertake the analysis of analogical language in order to preserve the meaningfulness and truth of religious statements as made by believers when speaking of God and of their life and relationship with and in him. In this connection, Alister McGrath makes the interesting observation that

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[319] Ibid., p. 131.
[320] Ibid.
[321] Burrell, 2016a, p. 139.
[322] Ibid., p. 161, n. 75.

"Wittgenstein's insistence upon the actual usage of words is an important corrective to more ontological approaches to analogy".[323]

This line of reasoning however does not persuade Burrell for whom, "the distinction of *res* and *modus* [...] cannot accomplish what Aquinas wants it to".[324] Burrell begins to explain his position by focussing on the structure of predicate terms. He says:

> the radical grammatical distinction of subject/object, together with its logicometaphysical counterpart substance/accident suggests the *res/modus* distinction. Starting from a frank recognition of the realism of ordinary language, it proposes some relief by offering a certain distance".[325]

It would seem, however, that in Burrell's view this certain distance is illusory because "the manner of signifying is associated with grammatical inflections and [the] distinction wants to claim that these may vary without altering the meaning of the word".[326] Burrell contests this on the grounds that "no name signifies outside of a grammatical position without 'consignifying' as well. Things are simply not distinguishable from their manners".[327] Even though Aquinas insists that our language is entirely inadequate for speaking of God, it would appear, as we saw above, that "some residual core of meaning seems to result from a straightforward use of the

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[323] McGrath, 2007, p. 47.
[324] Burrell, 2016a, p. 136.
[325] Ibid., p. 137.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Ibid., pp. 137-8.

res/modus distinction",[328] that is, in terms of the *res significata*, analogous predicates are used as co-significations. Burrell's argument is that, since according to Aquinas we can only speak as we understand and we understand in terms of our sensory experiences, then what we intend to signify of God by the *res significata* must be entirely beyond our grasp. If this is the case, an appeal to the *res significata* is empty of meaning and the analogous intent fails. This difficulty is clearly related to the difficulty mentioned above of establishing that in its two instances the relation signified by the term 'knows' has some common properties or relations.[329]

To echo my point regarding the problems of precision at the beginning of this chapter, Burrell concludes that "the issues of analogical discourse cannot be resolved on the level of logic or semantics alone",[330] and, with echoes of Wittgenstein, he suggests that a semantics "whose unit of meaning is the statement and not the word and whose attention is directed to use as well as structure will provide a satisfactory analysis".[331] He acts on this suggestion by turning to a "philosophical anthropology"[332] which starts by considering the perfections and noting, first, that 'perfect' connotes what must be possessed by something for it to conform to its nature completely, and, second, that "every nature seeks its perfection as its end".[333] This leads Burrell to talk about aspirations, for we are not able to fill out concepts of perfection with content, and the reason for this is that perfections are not about achievement but about aspirations.

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[328] Ibid., p. 138.
[329] See pp. 106-7 above.
[330] Burrell, 2016a, p. 139.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Ibid., p. 141.
[333] Ibid., p. 140.

Aspirations, hence perfections also, exist for us not as substantive endpoints but only as a progressively unbiased awareness which is cultivated by "increasingly disinterested involvement".[334] In this way, although all statements about God must be negated, the affirmation of God as the plenitude of all perfections now allows Aquinas to frame analogy as the use of perfection terms whose meaning for us appears under the rubric of aspirations. The essential point is that whereas "everything finite may be denied of God, [...] God is said to be pre-eminently just, merciful, or good",[335] and we can note that the members of the Trinity may be said to indwell one another pre-eminently. Thus, the legitimacy of analogical predication is now accounted for by the human aspiration towards perfection, which perfection derives from God. This formulation is important in order to circumvent the danger that God's transcendence might be construed simply as the ultimate expression of human existential consciousness, a consciousness capable of aspiring to ever greater heights, revealed by "increasingly disinterested involvement"; this would be idolatrous. Adkins and Hinlicky concur with this conclusion, saying that when "God is used practically for the symbolisation of human aspiration [... this is] idolatrous".[336] Perhaps I should note here that although I draw an analogy between the indwelling of musicians and that of the Persons of the Trinity, the highest degree of co-inherence on the part of the musicians and our conception of what would count as the very summit of musical excellence which would indicate such indwelling, does not fully exhaust the divine indwelling.

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[334] Ibid., p. 141.
[335] Ibid.
[336] Adkins & Hinlicky, 2014, p. 107.

In speaking of progressively unbiased awareness, Burrell is speaking of an on-going process which he contrasts with "the claims of the medieval theologico-grammatical program that we affirm what was signified while denying all manner of signifying".[337] One of the difficulties with this program was that it drew attention away from the infinite variety of uses to which perfection terms are put. The consequence of this was that 'good', for example, was understood to refer to a category rather than as pointing to an experience framed according to the contours of language-use and experience, a failure so thoroughly explicated by Wittgenstein. In Burrell's view, "use yields meaning",[338] and he maintains that Aquinas "in effect rejects the notion that talk about transcendent realities, or pervasive metaphysical principles, can be explicated as a series of logical moves".[339] Furthermore, he holds that Aquinas "tried to show how [analogical predication] is not so much a projection as a recognition of needs, indeed of the imperious demands for order and fulfilment",[340] demands which the human attempts to meet by aspiration.

As I will highlight below with regard to the development of musicianship, aspiration is closely connected with growth; if one truly aspires to something, one needs to grow, in understanding, for example, or in skilfulness, or by becoming fitter, or more sensitive to the feelings of others. Kallenberg outlines what he calls five "aspects" of theological reasoning.[341] The fifth is 'Theology as disclosive modelling'[342] with Aquinas

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[337] Burrell, 2016a, p. 163.
[338] Ibid., p. 162.
[339] Ibid., p. 163.
[340] Ibid.
[341] Kallenberg, 2019.
[342] Ibid., p. 34.

providing "a toehold into the notion of disclosure models in his notion of 'analogy'".[343]

Kallenberg sees the practice of theology as "the employment of [...] growth terms to effect always provisional disclosure models of God. Kallenberg's point is that "a disclosure model shows or gestures towards something that cannot be stated explicitly",[344] and by way of example he gives us a series of polygons in which the next polygon has one more side that the previous one, it being easily seen that the series tends to a circle. This is an unfortunate example because the circle can be stated explicitly as the locus of a point travelling on a flat plane at a fixed distance from a fixed point. The example works for Kallenberg because, he says, "a circle has no 'side' at all".[345] Nonetheless, the connection with a growing awareness, or, in Burrell's terms, progressive insight, is clear. Kallenberg reminds us that "a significant percentage of words require growth of the speaker if the speaker is to employ them well",[346] and his example here is the word 'love' of which, he suggests, teenagers have but a "thin understanding".[347] Some decades later the "no-longer" teenagers

> will have grown into a deeper fluency with the word 'love' [...] it is
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> not that the word 'love' has changed in meaning over the course
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> of time, but that the human speakers have grown.[348]

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[343] Ibid.
[344] Ibid., p. 35.
[345] Ibid.
[346] Ibid.
[347] Ibid.
[348] Ibid.

If we stay with Kallenberg's example, even though some teenagers can be quite mature in matters of love, we see that what the teenagers point to is certainly love even if they have an immature understanding of it, and this maps neatly onto Aquinas' distinction between the *res significata* and the *modus significandi*. We have arrived at some sort of conclusion with regard to the analogical use of language when speaking of God: "God's *operations* will have properties in common with some operations, like causing, which are internal to the world. And we will *name* God from his operations".[349] This means that what we attribute to God "will not be grossly anthropomorphic and will not be arrived at by invalid arguments".[350]

Ross distinguishes several elements which together comprise the analogical use of language in regard to religious statements as analysed by Thomas Aquinas.[351] First, various relations exist between the world as it can be described according to our experience of it and God who is not part of the world, not another entity in the world. One such relation is the relation of causing. We describe various aspects of our experience of the world in terms of one thing causing another, and we wish to say God is the (efficient) cause of the world.[352] But, second, the term which identifies these relations cannot be used in exactly the same way when applied to God as it is when applied to our experience of the world. This is because God does not have properties or relations in the same way as do his creatures; God possesses them in a divine mode, his creatures in a creaturely mode. Thus, we can say that God is proportionally similar

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[349] Ross, 1976, p. 133.
[350] Ibid.
[351] Ibid. pp. 134-38.
[352] Aquinas has adopted Aristotle's classification of causes. Efficient causation answers the question 'who made this, who did it?'

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to his creatures because, for example, the relation 'is caused by' is similar in statements which describe something as being caused by God on the one hand and in statements which describe something as being caused by human beings on the other. The proportionality is a question of the term being used equivocally in the two instances but not entirely so. We should note that although we can understand from experience the mode in which entities, including human beings, may be said to possess causation relationally, we cannot do this with God.

But even though we might say God is proportional to his creatures, we cannot specify the positive elements which distinguish the divine mode of God's self-relating from the creaturely mode of relating to others. I defend and explore my analogous use of indwelling language in later chapters below in relation to the members of a string quartet. We can responsibly use the language of indwelling to describe the relationships between members of the Quartet because our understanding of 'indwelling' already comes from 'below'. On the other hand, our use of analogy with regard to divine relations ensures that even our most perfect account of human indwelling will never completely equate to the divine relations.

Third, the consequence of the above two points is that such knowledge of God as we can possess depends on being able to show that relationships do in fact exist between the world and God. Besides having shown this in his exposition of the Five Ways as arguments for the existence of God, Aquinas, as previously mentioned, takes this as a matter of belief and faith.

Fourth, the terms which signify the relation become the names of God. The terms are first analogous by proper proportionality and then become names by attribution since we can call a person by the names of his or her actions on the grounds that the person is the cause of his or her actions; for example, someone who teaches is called a teacher.

Fifth, building on naming God by analogy of attribution, Aquinas then thinks what properties God must have in order to be Cause, Sustainer, and so on. These are ones such as intelligence, free will and simplicity. These can in turn become relation predicates, that is, they can be shown to be analogous to ordinary language use by proper proportionality. This means that, sixth, since all terms used of God are analogous by proper proportionality, this type of analogy is what Ross calls "the general form of language about God".[353] Seventh, we can discern a logical and psychological priority of statements concerning God which are analogous by proper proportionality over statements concerning God which are made analogously by attribution. For example, "God sustains the world" has logical and psychological priority over "God is the Sustainer of the world", or "the world is caused by God" has logical and psychological priority over "God is the First Cause".

Consequences for the thesis

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[353] Ibid., p. 137.

Burrell cautions that "awareness is not knowledge, nor is it intuition", and he commends submission to criticism, the avoidance of conscious bias and fidelity to the demands of inquiry.[354] The affinity which these recommendations have with the demands made on musicians if they are to give compelling performances is not far to seek. The analysis of indwelling in an analogical way above, opens up this concept for use with regard to music-making. As I will unpack below, music-making need not stress objective criteria by which to judge the performance. What is needed is constant attention to one's own playing and that of others. Using this language of indwelling, I want to stress that there is no place for ego-led opinions in music making. This allows one to stress the need for fidelity to the score coupled with a critical yet constructive approach to the music-making which it engenders. It stresses an awareness of performance traditions, and so on. Insofar as all this pertains to compelling music-making, then it is aligned with Burrell's recommendations. This is by no means to establish music-making as an analogue of Christian relating, but it does suggest that the dispositions required for compelling music-making are very close to those which heighten an awareness of what is being aspired to in talk of the perfections which we attribute to God. The perfection which is being aspired to in music-making is a *modus significandi* of the *res significata* which is found in God.

Burrell argues that we have progressive insight into the meaning of perfection words. This applies equally to musicians as they perform together. 'Ensemble',[355] and 'tuning' are two obvious examples here, but so is the developing understanding of a musical

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[354] Burrell, 2016a, p. 161.
[355] With this term, I refer to the 'togetherness' of the players, not to the group as such.

work and what makes for its compelling performance; as a performer one never stops learning, one grows into a piece, one's insight into a performance deepens. As the members of a string quartet grow accustomed to one another, the more they perform together the greater their awareness of one another and of the music. I make a case for this as the development of a co-created creative space which includes not just the performance venue, but the players and the music and listeners. This space is a space of aspiration and of growth. The musicians grow insofar as they aspire to give good musical performances. Another way of stating this is that they become defined as musicians under the impetus of aspiration.

The analogical predications in this thesis are intended to draw attention to what seems to be an analogical resemblance between intra-small ensemble relationality and intra-Trinitarian relationality and, namely, that it is constitutive of the identity of the three Persons of the Trinity on the one hand and the members of a small ensemble on the other. The sole concern here is on the continuity between the relationalities and the identities, and not on the nature of the identities. The relationships are constitutive of the identities in their entirety. The upshot of this is that when I speak of the members of the Trinity indwelling one another, I do so in a way which draws analogically on an understanding of human beings indwelling one another.

In Part 3 below, I make the case that the demands of good music-making are such that the performers must indwell one another. Certainly, like a marriage relationship, musicians have one music-making, a performance whose contours they inhabit as one even though, in the case of a string quartet, they are four. Even though the members

of a string quartet, for example, might on occasion have to play as though their individual parts are somehow antagonistic to one another,[356] they must agree on how, as an ensemble, they are going to convey this aspect of the music to an audience, and in the performance itself they must indwell one another in order to do so; to this extent the performance and the indwelling are one. I argue in Part 3 of the thesis that this indwelling is a relationality which entirely defines the musicians *qua* musicians. This is the basis of my claim that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating, for just as the indwelling which is enjoyed by the members of the Trinity is a comprehensive form of relationality, this relationality also entirely defines who performers are in the moment of performance. In other words, I argue that an analogy can be drawn between the indwelling of musicians in performance and the indwelling of the members of the Trinity. As I will explore in the next chapter, one way of speaking of Trinitarian indwelling is to speak of perichoresis and this raises issues concerning social Trinitarianism.[357] For the moment, however, I consider the validity of drawing an analogy between the ways in which human beings can be said to indwell one another and those in which the members of the Trinity can be said to indwell one another.

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[356] This is largely a matter of interpretation and would have to be agreed between the members of the quartet as a preliminary to their performance, their mutual indwelling which I argue is necessary in order to secure the interpretation.
[357] See Chapter 5.

I argue in the thesis that compelling musical performances are not possible unless there is one-ness, indwelling, amongst the musicians. The argument is pursed in various contexts and, especially, in terms of what I dub co-created creative space.[358]

The kind of analogy I use in the thesis can be formulaically expressed as a:b::c:d, in other words the analogy is a relation between two relations. We are not concerned with analogy by attribution because though there are two different subjects, the predicate term, 'indwelling' in not numerically one as it is in the case of 'Fred is healthy' and 'Fred's colour is healthy' where there is just one state of health. Here we have two indwellings.

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[358] See Chapter 10.

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL TRINITARIANISM

A small musical ensemble may be likened to a community, or, better, a 'communio' because it is a unity made up of a certain number of persons who nonetheless retain their distinctive voices within the ensemble: unity within diversity. In a passage worth quoting in full, Greshake defines *communio* as

> a process of mediation; many individuals become a unity that is imparted and reciprocated; the unity resulting from communication has it 'contrary' – multiplicity and variety – not outside itself, but within; the unity of the *Communio* is therefore the enduring unity of many that are different. This comes to exist by the fact that the many partake of one and the same reality […] a reality that is common in so far as it is communally realised by the giving and receiving it entails. In [whatever] form it may appear, *Communio* means mediation of identity and difference, of the particular and the universal […] without […] losing the element of […] difference.[359]

As I hope will become apparent in the chapters on performance practice, a great deal of this definition is particularly apt as a description of music-making. Greshake goes on to stress the difference between *communio* and community. Whereas

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[359] Greshake, 2012, p. 334. The original uses upper-case Cs for *communio*.

'community', he thinks, is "associated with the static being-together of different persons, […] '*communio*' is a thoroughly dynamic term which stresses the very event of the mediation of the particular with the many, the part with the whole, the different with the whole". [360]

Nonetheless, the distinction between community and *communio* does little to combat the suspicion that the thesis sails close to social Trinitarianism and is vulnerable thereby to the criticisms which can be made of it. In this chapter of the thesis, therefore, I give an account of social trinitarianism and of some of the more common criticisms levelled against it. I go on to assess these criticisms, especially in the context of the thesis, and to indicate in a beginning way the role which the conception of the Trinity as '*communio*' plays in the thesis.

I would like to re-emphasise a point I made in the Introduction, namely that I use social Trinitarianism as a guide for highlighting some of the problems which arise as I engage Trinitarian theology alongside the social practice of music-making. Subsequent to this I use the terms 'social Trinity' and 'Trinity' in a general way which is, nonetheless, sensitive to the problems which I have highlighted.

Although a community-inflected understanding of the Trinity is present in patristic accounts of the doctrine of the Trinity, Moltmann is generally credited with being the first to retrieve such an understanding in modern times. He writes, "what the doctrine

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[360] Ibid.

of the Trinity calls *perichoresis* was also understood by patristic theologians as *the sociality* of the three divine Persons."[361] For Moltmann, the Trinity has its counterpart in human life:

> the Trinity corresponds to a community in which people are defined through their relations with one another and in their significance for one another, not in opposition to one another, in terms of power and possession.[362]

Boff takes a political stance towards the idea of a social Trinity, developing the full equality of the divine Persons in terms of a liberationist theology.[363] Volf, on the other hand, developed the implications of the idea of the social Trinity in terms of ecclesiology.[364]

Perhaps the most decisive influence on modern social trinitarianism has been that of John Zizioulas. In his *Being as Communion*,[365] he argues that the Cappadocian Fathers effected a revolution in ontology by insisting that the being of God is constituted by the mutual relations of the three Persons. Rather than nature and substance, the Fathers suggested that personhood and communion are the primary ontological categories.[366] Zizioulas' work greatly influenced that of Colin Gunton, Robert Jenson,

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[361] Moltmann, 1981, p. 198. Emphasis in the original.
[362] Moltmann, 1981, p. 198.
[363] Boff, 2005.
[364] Volf, 1998a.
[365] Zizioulas, 2004.
[366] Ibid., p. 40ff.

and Christoph Schwöbel, all three adopting a relational and communal understanding of God's being.[367]

Wolfhart Pannenberg also developed a social account of the Trinity that was grounded in biblical revelation.[368] Catherine Mowry LaCugna, for whom "trinitarian theology is *par excellence* a theology of relationship […] the doctrine of the Trinity affirms that the 'essence' of God is relational,"[369] has also made an important contribution to social trinitarianism which emphasises the communion of the three Persons in the context of salvation.[370] Most especially, LaCugna sees the radical practicality of the doctrine of the social Trinity to lay in the challenge it presents to us to live in communion with God and with one another.[371] This is an example of the claimed usefulness of social trinitarianism and which is questioned by critics. I deal with this criticism later in this section of the thesis.

Like many of his contemporaries, however, Colin Gunton eventually developed some reservations about labelling approaches 'social trinitarian' or, for that matter, 'psychological'. He writes:

> It should be clear by now that, although there is developed in this
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> book what can be called a social rather than a psychological
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> approach, those ways of speaking are highly inadequate. There is

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[367] Gunton, 1997, Gunton, 1993, Jenson, 1982, Schwoebel, 2003.
[368] Pannenberg, 2009, pp. 259-448.
[369] LaCugna, 1993, p. 243.
[370] Ibid., p. 320.
[371] Ibid., p. 1 and p. 377ff.

not a 'model' known as trinitarian doctrine, a fixed set of

formularies, but rather a process of intellectual development – a

tradition – during the course of which a number of conceptual

possibilities have been shaped.[372]

Outline of relational accounts of the Trinity

To stand back and abstract some of what we might take as the parameters of these

kinds of relational accounts of the Trinity, we can usefully begin with Van den Brink's

"four clearly distinguishable insights" which are common to the writers mentioned so

far, he says "these insights may be seen as the heart of a social (or communal or

relational) view of the Trinity".[373] Of the four, I choose three.

The first insight is that it is better to think of God as three-personned in the sense of

being three equal centres of consciousness than to risk "impersonal alternatives

('modes of being', etc.) which conjure up the image of God as, in the end, a unitary

substance or single subject".[374] Second, the relationship of love shared freely is

paramount because eternal perfect love is constitutive of the personhood of the

Father, Son and Spirit. Thus, "Father, Son and Spirit find their personal identity in their

eternal perichoretic relationality".[375] I turn to the theme of love in the last chapters of

the thesis, and attempt to show that the identities of musicians *qua* musicians as they

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[372] Gunton, 1997, p. 195.
[373] Van den Brink, 2014, p. 336.
[374] Ibid.
[375] Ibid.

make music together is precisely a question of their egoless mutual interweaving as they freely give themselves to the demands of good music-making. I hope to argue that the relationships demanded by good music-making analogically resemble those which obtain within the Trinity, and, thus, that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating.

The third insight I choose is that the doctrine of the Trinity has ethical implications. Specifically, according to Van den Brink, it should "guide and inform Christian ways of viewing, experiencing and acting in relation to God, ourselves and the world".[376] This insight links to my thesis but is significantly different to it. It is worth noting a point (which I will develop further below) of contrast between my own analogical account and this view which was developed in social Trinitarianism models summarised above: rather than arguing that musicians should seek to relate to one another as the members of the Trinity are conceived to do, I argue that they do so relate under the demands of good music-making. In this sense their relationships are not a mirror of those between the members of the Trinity, musicians do not set out to mirror trinitarian relations. Rather, it is that if there is to be good music-making, then these relationships must be in place, if they are not, I will argue, the music-making is severely adversely affected. Just as, on a social Trinitarian model, the members of the Trinity find their identities in the perichoretic relationships between them, so, I shall hope to argue, do the musicians find their identities. Indeed, the identity of, for example, a

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[376] Ibid.

string quartet is precisely a question of four centres of consciousness whose separate identities are together constitutive of the one quartet.[377]

Some criticisms of social Trinitarianism

Van den Brink helpfully summarises the principal criticisms in modern theology of social Trinitarianism.[378] To begin with, doubts are expressed by some theologians about the practical usefulness of social trinitarianism. In particular, Kilby and Holmes point out that different theologians draw "different practical conclusions from [social trinitarianism], and that these differences simply reflect their own preconceived views".[379] Holmes, writing that "wildly divergent implications can be drawn from the same doctrine", takes the view that this undermines the practical usefulness of a social doctrine of the Trinity.[380] Kilby's case is that those who espouse social Trinitarianism are projectionists, that is, they presume to fill in the concept of perichoresis with analogies drawn from human experience and relationships characterised by love and empathy. The concept, that is, a concept of what is taken to be inter-trinitarian relationality but which is in fact a projection from human society onto trinitarian life, is then used to undergird suggestions as to what would be desirable in human society. On this showing, the usefulness of the doctrine is hopelessly compromised.

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[377] I shall have much more to say about this as the thesis progresses.
[378] Ibid., pp. 337-49.
[379] Ibid., p. 338.
[380] Holmes, 2009, p. 82.

Van den Brink, however, thinks that Holmes goes too far, for "if pointing out that two theologians [Volf and Zizioulas] who disagree about the implications of a certain claim is enough to falsify that claim, then certainly not a single piece of Christian doctrine [...] will stand".[381]

This seems a valid but weak rebuttal of the 'usefulness' objection to social trinitarianism. Though we might say social trinitarianism is useful, this is not enough. It is more than useful, for, if a legitimate model, which it seems to be at least at the economic level, it does not merely have implications but is an imperative for human living, relationships, and community. Social Trinitarianism is not merely useful on account of implications for living, but, if a legitimate doctrine, it issues a challenge which goes to the heart of what it is to be Christian. This leaves open the question of the legitimacy of the doctrine.

Kilby's criticism seems to cut much more deeply than does Holmes'. Van den Brink gives two examples which seem to bear that out. First, he tells us that Zizioulas' appeal to Cappadocian sources is now often considered to be indebted in some degree to "twentieth-century existentialist notions of freedom".[382] Second, van den Brink provides an example of ideological abuse of social trinitarianism: "Chinese church leaders recommend it because it seems to fit neatly into the idea of a harmonious

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[381] Van den Brink, 2014, p. 338.
[382] Ibid.

society as propagated by China's rulers".[383] Van den Brink's counters this by contending that,

> these dangers do not specifically threaten social trinitarianism, however, but every form of theology which does not consciously take its starting point in God's revelation. Therefore, whether or not social trinitarians are guilty of projection depends on whether or not they are true to the sources of the Christian faith. For if they are, it cannot be sustained that they project their own or their society's 'latest ideals of how human beings should live in community' onto God.[384]

Part of the dogma of the Trinity is that the three Persons are indeed bound together as One. Kilby is provoked by the thought that what binds them together is given a name, namely, 'perichoresis', and that this concept is then filled in with human estimations of what constitutes such mutual interpenetration, cooperation, and community. This is indeed a potentially dangerous move. However, faith in the Persons being so perfectly bound together – that the action of one Person is the action of them all as the one God, for example – includes the understanding that their identities are entirely a question of these mutually interpenetrating relationships. Moreover, whatever it is that binds them together – love, cooperation, empathy - is

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[383] Ibid. Van den Brink references Kung, 2011; a paper given at the second conference of the East-West Theological Forum,Seoul, 6-9 April 2011 (there is no page number). The quotation I have given is from van den Brink.
[384] Van den Brink, 2014, pp. 338-339. The embedded quotation is from Kilby, 2000, p. 441.

manifested to perfection in their inter-relations, is the very stuff of those relations, their constitutive elements. Therefore, any analogous resemblance between the way in which the members of the Trinity relate to one another and the way in which performers relate to one another must have profound consequences for the thesis, indeed it forms the basis for the claim that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relationality. Even though the nature of God *in se* is beyond human comprehension, the dogma whereby the three Persons are understood as perfectly bound together is upheld as part of the basic understanding of God; it seems inconceivable that the three Persons are not perfectly bound together. In the thesis, I shall argue that this being perfectly bound together which results in the formation of identity amongst the members of the Trinity analogically resembles that which obtains between musicians performing together under the demands of good music-making; the latter are not the result of a conscious attempt to take the relationships amongst the members of the Trinity as a model to be cultivated or instantiated in music-making. As I make this argument, is there a danger that I use 'love', for example, univocally with reference to the Trinity and members of small musical ensembles? Though we talk about the love of the Father for the Son or for his creation, we do so analogically. This is an analogical predication which is akin to analogy by attribution which has been discussed in the previous chapter. Here we can note that there are two subjects, God and human beings, but there is not one state of affairs, rather we have two loves, divine and human.

There is the question about the extent to which social Trinitarianism reflects the authority of Scripture. Cornelius Plantinga is clear that "a person who extrapolated

from Hebrews, Paul and John would naturally develop a social theory of the Trinity".[385]

This seems true of the economic Trinity. Sanders tells us that "everyone is bound to be a social trinitarian at the economic level".[386] This, however, leaves the question open at the immanent or ontological level which concerns God's innermost being.

Whilst it may be true that a reading of Scripture could tend towards a social Trinitarian understanding of the Trinity, this needs to be demonstrated. Mosser makes the point that classical trinitarians

> have always been aware of the kinds of texts modern social trinitarians cite in favour of their distinctive positions. Moreover, they have always accepted the evidence drawn from these [biblical] narratives in a straightforward manner.[387]

This means that if we are to be persuaded of social Trinitarianism, then its advocates need to show that the biblical sources do rather more than simply allow for a social Trinitarian understanding of the Trinity. Since classical Trinitarianism affirms the 'one God, three Persons' understanding, it needs to show what the biblical sources can provide by way of support for its distinctive understanding of the Trinity.

All this does not refute Kilby's criticism that human categories are used to explain how perichoresis works to maintain God's unity. This means that Kilby's 'projection'

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[385] Plantinga, 1989, p. 27.
[386] Sanders, 2007, p. 45.
[387] Mosser, 2009, p. 147.

criticism stands, and so it is questionable whether the supposed practical usefulness of social trinitarianism can be upheld.

A further objection to social Trinitarianism is articulated with particular force by Kilby:

> The doctrine of the Trinity, I want to suggest, does not need to be seen as a descriptive, first order teaching – since there is no need to assume that its main function must be to provide a picture of the divine, a deep understanding of the way God really is. It can instead be taken as grammatical, as a second order proposition, a rule, or perhaps a set of rules, for how to read the Biblical stories, to think and talk about the experience of prayer, how to deploy the 'vocabulary' of Christianity in an appropriate way.[388]

Mosser's view, which complements Kilby's, is that social Trinitarianism takes the New Testament witness to the roles of Father, Son and Holy Spirit to be "direct descriptions of their immanent relations, [thus collapsing] the distinction between the economy of salvation narrated by the text and the life of God in himself".[389] This is one of the criticisms made of Rahner's Rule that "the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity".[390] Barth held that the Rule was correct insofar as there is just one Holy Trinity which exists in two forms, but that it was incorrect insofar as it suggests that the two forms can indeed be dissolved

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[388] Kilby, 2000, p. 443.
[389] Mosser, 2009, p. 147.
[390] Rahner, 1970, p. 22.

together. Hunsinger's commentary brings out the force of Barth's position: "If the Trinity's 'immanent' form is eternal, while its 'economic' form is temporal or historical, then to collapse the two forms would be to collapse the distinction between time and eternity, and thus between God and the world".[391]

We seem to have reached something of an impasse. On the one hand it is clear that on the Barthian view we cannot collapse the immanent and economic Trinities together, on the other hand it would seem that of God in himself we can know nothing since he is absolutely other. This is a most unsatisfactory situation because we cannot know if the God revealed to us in the economy of salvation is the true God or whether the true God is something quite different. However, Barth points out that if we distinguish between *Deus revelatus* and *Deus in se*, we render the idea that God reveals himself void, therefore:

> If we have to do with His revelation we have to do with Himself
> and not, as modalists of all periods have thought, with an entity
> distinct from Himself. And it is as the answer to the question about
> the God who reveals Himself in revelation that the doctrine of the
> Trinity interests us. [...] In a dogmatics of the Christian Church we
> cannot speak correctly of the nature and attributes of God without

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[391] Hunsinger, 2014, p. 310.

presupposing that it is God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost of whom we are speaking.[392]

For the purposes of the thesis, I shall follow Barth and take it that the God whom we know in revelation and in the economy of salvation is indeed the true God, even though our ways of speaking of him can never reach him as he is in himself, whilst remembering, however, that we know in faith that God does not reveal himself in ways which conflict with or contradict his inner being. This claim rests, to some extent, on my account of analogy and relations developed above.

There is however a further objection to social trinitarianism which I must attend to: that it fails to do justice to the unity of God. This issue is very relevant for the thesis because many social Trinitarians maintain that it is the perichoresis of the three divine Persons which constitutes their unity. Rather than the three Persons being separate, self-sufficient individuals, their very identity is what it is solely in view of their reciprocal relationships of love, relationships which, therefore, are the very being of the three Persons. In the thesis I shall argue that, under the demands of compelling music-making, that is, not as a result of a decision to try to institute the community relations which might be said to obtain between the Persons of the Trinity, this perichoretic relationship analogically resembles that which obtains between musicians when they make music together, and that the identity and unity of the performing ensemble is thus constituted, and this is the basis upon which I maintain

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[392] Barth, 1936, p. 358.

that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating. As I will argue below, I think that a robust account of analogy addresses this problem, at least to a certain extent. I have also, in Chapter 4, argued that there is a limit to analogical reasoning: it stops short of describing the inner divine life.

I have already applied 'community' to a musical ensemble, but the reciprocal bonds of love in divine communion so far surpass any human community that the analogy seems entirely misleading. And so the question becomes one of the legitimacy of any understanding of the Trinity whatsoever. Kilby's remarks are pointed. Referring to the descriptions some social theorists give of the Trinity, she says "social theorists speak of intense empathy, of verve and zest. Where exactly, one might wonder, did they acquire such a vivid feeling for the inner life of the deity".[393] Cornelius Plantinga is a case in point, for he portrays the Trinity as "a zestful, wondrous community of divine light, love, joy, mutuality and verve [in which] there is no isolation, no insulation, no secretiveness, no fear of being transparent to another".[394]

Tritheism

A particularly difficult aspect of this assumed knowledge of the inner life of the Trinity is that social Trinitarians speak of the three centres of consciousness of the three Persons. Barth and Rahner reject the notion that the divine *hypostaseis* is of distinct persons precisely because that would "make it impossible to do justice to God's unity

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[393] Kilby, 2000, p. 439.
[394] Plantinga, 1989, quoted by Kilby 2000, n. vii.

and would in fact lead us into the realm of […] tritheism".[395] Barth does not equivocate: "the meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity is not that there are three personalities in God. That would be the worst and most pointed expression of tritheism, against which we must be on our guard […] But in it we are speaking not of three divine 'I's,' but thrice of the one divine I".[396]

Although he is not writing in the contest of social Trinitarianism specifically, Mascall offers a view which combats the charge of tritheism. He takes as his starting point an idea first put forward by Whitehead and Russell in *Principia Mathematica*. A relation between two terms is thought of as a predicate with two subjects instead of the usual one. For example, 'John is taller than Jack' implies 'Jack is shorter than John'. Then these statements are regarded as specifying John and Jack's functions "as subjects of the dyadic predicate" of comparative height. Russell generalised this insight to include relations between more than two terms and predicates with more than two subjects. Using this argument, Mascall tells us that in a triadic relationship "each of the subjects has his own uninterchangeable place, function and contribution, yet each exists and functions only in view of his relation as co-subject with the other two".[397] This understanding excludes subordinationism and mitigates tendencies to modalism and tritheism.

Colin Gunton makes this point forcefully: "God *is* no more than what Father, Son and Spirit give to and receive from each other in the inseparable communion that is the

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[395] Van den Brink, 2014, p. 346.
[396] Barth, 1936, p. 403.
[397] Quoted by Kerr, 2014, p. 341.

outcome of their love […] there is no 'being' of God other than this dynamic of persons in relation".[398] "A person is different from an individual in the sense that the latter is defined in terms of *separation from* other individuals, the person in terms of *relations with* other persons".[399] Furthermore, "A relation is first of all to be conceived as the way by which persons are mutually constituted".[400]

Although personhood can be understood in terms of finding one's identity in mutual relations with others, does it follow from this that the three Persons are three distinct centres of consciousness and will? Could one not argue that classical Trinitarianism can accommodate this view? On the classical account, the three Persons just are the relations on account of paternity, filiation and spiration.

This returns us to the vexed question of perichoresis, that is, perichoresis is taken by social Trinitarians to explain God's unity. As van den Brink has it: "according to many adherents of social Trinitarianism, it is this perichoretic communion which accounts for the divine unity".[401]

Van den Brink suggests that "perhaps it is not incumbent on the social trinitarian to show exactly *how* the three divine Persons are one […] it is enough to confess *that* the

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[398] Gunton, 1997, p. 10. Emphasis in the original.
[399] Ibid., p. 11. Emphasis in the original.
[400] Ibid.. Gunton makes similar remarks on pp. 12 and 13. Also see Torrance, 1996, p. 229.
[401] Van den Brink, 2014, p. 347.

three are one".[402] He thinks this is what the doctrine of the Trinity is all about, and appeals to Janet Martin Soskice for whom

> the doctrine of the Trinity is precisely the reflective means by which unacceptable inferences from the primary language of the New Testament have been kept in place: for instance, the unacceptable inference from the fact that there are three names – Father, Son, and Spirit – to the conclusion that there are three Gods.[403]

This 'confessional' or faith approach is unlikely to mollify the critics, however, for they are likely to demand of social Trinitarians that they provide stronger arguments for a position which is vulnerable to charges of tritheism.

Van den Brink proffers two arguments which he says support social Trinitarianism. First, there is the "trustworthiness of revelation or divine self-communication".[404] The argument here has three aspects: a) those who read the New Testament naturally find a social account of the economic Trinity, b) the Barthian claim that when we encounter God's revelation we encounter Godself, and c) Rahner's Rule that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. Taking these three together van den Brink comments that "a

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[402] Ibid., p. 348.
[403] Soskice, 2007, p. 113.
[404] Van den Brink, 2014, p. 349.

social (or relational) account of the Trinity may provide the most compelling interpretation of the biblical saying that 'God is love'".[405]

The second argument is "from the nature of salvation".[406] The nub of this argument is that

> a participatory account of salvation articulates the fact that Christ died for us and lives in us, that the Spirit prays for us, and that in such ways we are reunited with the Father. All this seems to presuppose if not a social, then at least a fairly robust form of trinitarianism.[407]

This is perhaps disappointing. Van den Brink seems to have conceded that a participatory account of salvation does not presuppose social Trinitarianism, in other words, there is nothing in such an account that would serve to distinguish social Trinitarianism from classical trinitarianism. This unsatisfactory state of affairs is compounded by the fact that classical trinitarianism does provide a robust understanding of God's inner life and outward acts. The Son proceeds from the Father and is sent by him for our salvation. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son and is sent for our strengthening and comfort, binding believers to Christ. This means that we participate, though according to our creaturely mode, in the divine life. On

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[405] Ibid.
[406] Ibid.
[407] Ibid., p. 350.

this showing, a participatory account of salvation does not require a social understanding of the Trinity.

Bauerschmidt's criticism of social trinitarianism is not dissimilar. Having decried social trinitarianism because "the doctrine of the Trinity is emptied of its specific content so as to serve as a schema or blueprint for various commendable things",[408] he contends that social Trinitarianism

> present[s] the doctrine of the Trinity as being about something other than the Father who sends the Son into the world for our redemption in the Spirit. Any political relevance of the Trinity must be found not in abstractions made from the doctrine, but in the actual life of God as this is revealed to us in its threefold fullness.[409]

It is true that political matters along with cultural ones, are of minimal interest in the thesis. Nonetheless, one definition of the political is that it concerns how we live together, and this certainly includes how we relate to one another. Bauerschmidt's position seems to be that not only does social Trinitarianism not flow from a participatory account of salvation, but that it tends towards a denial that Trinitarian doctrine is about salvation. This is surely a criticism too far, as is clear from a

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[408] Bauerschmidt, 2014, pp. 535-536.
[409] Ibid., p. 536.

consideration of a very recent approach to social Trinitarianism by Jeffrey Dukeman and to which I now turn.

Mutual hierarchy

Dukeman's approach, which he dubs 'mutual hierarchy', has some features which make it attractive for the purposes of this thesis. First, I will give an outline of mutual hierarchy, then I will suggest why it commends itself to the thesis.

Dukeman provides a useful initial orientation to mutual hierarchy as follows:

> the divine Persons have a mutual hierarchical relationship with each other. […] Each divine Person has a unique hierarchy over the others, and yet each uses this hierarchy to serve the others in a dignified way.[410]

Dukeman pursues his theme under what he sees as the tension between hierarchical approaches and equality approaches to social Trinitarianism. This tension is usually "resolved by giving logical priority" to either the hierarchy or the equality approach. When the tension is resolved in favour of hierarchy, insufficient account is taken of the dignity of the divine Persons. On the other hand, when the tension is resolved in favour of equality, insufficient account is taken of the uniqueness of each divine

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[410] Dukeman, 2019, p. xi.

Person. In Dukeman's view social Trinitarianism must take account of both the uniqueness of the divine Persons, which hierarchical social Trinitarianism does but egalitarian social Trinitarianism does not, and the dignity of the divine Persons which egalitarian social Trinitarianism does but hierarchical social Trinitarianism does not. Dukeman contends that his mutual hierarchy approach to social Trinitarianism maintains both uniqueness and dignity. It does this in two ways: first by associating uniqueness with the hierarchy of each Person over the others in terms of "his vocation" in the economic Trinity and his "personal properties" in the immanent Trinity.[411] Second, by giving each Person hierarchy over the others in "a mutual manner" such that each Person seeks "to foster the dignity of the other divine Persons".[412]

The tension manifests itself in relation to the economic Trinity as one which "revolves around matters of interpretation associated with the place, in the biblical narrative, of the Son".[413] Those who tend towards the equality pole stress mutual relations and the mutual indwelling of the three Persons. The problem here, as Dukeman sees it, is that this "confuses the vocations of the divine persons due to the posited similarity between the vocations".[414] Dukeman's example is from Millard Erickson for whom the members of the Trinity do not really have separate experiences if they share consciousness with each of the others.[415] Theorists who tend towards the hierarchy

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[411] Ibid., p. xiii.
[412] Ibid.
[413] Ibid., p. 7.
[414] Ibid.
[415] Ibid.

pole stress "the Father's hierarchical sending of the Son".[416] Dukeman takes as his example Pannenberg who stresses the obedience of the Son, noting that Jesus "will not allow himself to be called equal to God".[417] Dukeman comments that "Pannenberg and other hierarchical social trinitarians arguably tend to portray Jesus in the economy as isolated or oppressed".[418]

When we turn to the immanent Trinity, Dukeman reminds us that Moltmann distinguished in his doctrine of the immanent Trinity between two levels: one of constitution in which the Father constitutes the Son and the Spirit hierarchically by begetting and spirating, and one of relation in which the three Persons relate in full equality. Pannenberg, Boff, Erickson, Gruenler and Gunton offer a different view, one in which the divine processions are seen as mutual relations.[419] The problem, as Dukeman sees it, is that mutual indwelling does not sufficiently account for the distinctness of the three Persons since "there is no hierarchy among them that would distinguish them".[420]

Even at this early stage, and taking Dukeman's point that mutual indwelling is not sufficient to distinguish amongst persons, we can note that the members of a string quartet, whilst indwelling one another in ways which I indicate in the chapters on

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[416] Ibid.
[417] Ibid., p. 8. See Pannenberg, 2009, pp. 319-327.
[418] Dukeman, 2019, p. 8.
[419] Pannenberg, 2009, p. 325, Boff, 2005, pp. 141-146, Erickson, 1995, pp. 303-310, Gruenler, 1986, pp. x-xx, Gunton, 1993, p. 214, and Gunton, 1997, pp. 165-170.
[420] Dukeman, 2019, p. 9.

music performance and reception, nonetheless give way to one another in the course of performances thus establishing termporary hierarchies between them.

Dukeman employs the concept of the "differentiated kenotic vocations of the divine Persons".[421] This concept is intended to capture the way in which, as Dukeman sees it, each of the three Persons has a unique vocation which involves "authority over the other divine Persons" yet which is undertaken in such a way that dignity is fostered in "the trinitarian work". This, Dukeman believes, gives a "more consistently social understanding of the economic Trinity".[422]

'Mutual' and 'hierarchy' have explicit meanings in the context of Dukeman's discussion of the economic Trinity. 'Hierarchy' indicates that each Person has "a unique or differentiated vocation in relation to the other divine Persons that involves a hierarchical power over the others".[423] 'Mutual' indicates that each of the Persons limits his power in relation to the others and thereby fosters dignity in the trinitarian work.

In explaining the mutual hierarchy approach to the economic Trinity, Dukeman focuses on St. John's Gospel where the Father sends the Son and the Spirit into the world, a sending necessitated by his vocation as the Creator who is transcendent and

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[421] Ibid., p. 53.
[422] Ibid.
[423] Ibid., p. 70.

invisible.[424] In this context, Jesus speaks of being a servant who is not greater than his master who sends him.[425] Dukeman says that

> as the Creator who sends the Son and Spirit, the Father is […] able to empower and provide stability to the missions of the Son and the Spirit, for in his transcendence the Father is not in direct danger in the way, for example, that especially the Son is at the Cross.[426]

Dukeman's final example of the Father's vocation as Creator is that he is the goal of Creation.[427] In these ways, God is seen to exercise hierarchical power and authority over the Son and the Spirit.

The Son's vocation is to be the Saviour of the world. The Son, together with the Father, sends the Spirit into the world and in this he is in authority over the Spirit. He also exercises hierarchical authority over the Father inasmuch as the Father can be seen to be dependent on the Son to the extent that Jesus says, "Father the hour has come; glorify your Son that the Son may also glorify you".[428] Dukeman comments that the Father is dependent on the Son for the success of his own work.[429]

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[424] John 1:1-3, 1:18, 6:46.
[425] John 13:16, 14:28.
[426] Dukeman, 2019, p. 73.
[427] John 14:2, 20:17.
[428] John 17:1.
[429] Dukeman, 2019, p. 75.

In John's Gospel the vocation of the Spirit is to sanctify the lives of human beings. He is also associated with help, sight, healing, teaching, and bearing witness.[430] Dukeman writes about the Spirit exercising hierarchy over the Father, when, for example, the Father is dependent on the Spirit as recorded in John, 4:23 when the Spirit is responsible for bringing people to worship the Father and teaching them how to do so in truth. Dukeman directs us to John, 6:63-65 where we find "the Father dependent on the Spirit to bring the life of faith to people so that they can come to Jesus".[431] Thus the vocation of the Spirit involves this kind of hierarchical authority over the Father.

Finally, the Spirit exercises hierarchical authority over the Son by, for example, playing a part in the sending of the Son.[432] Two further examples are, first, Jesus' baptism, and second, the role that the Spirit has in mediating the Father's will to Jesus during his time on earth. Dukeman comments that "Jesus is thus dependent upon the Spirit [...] Jesus sees what the Father is doing in his life largely through seeing the external works of the Spirit of the Father".[433] Dukeman's final examples are the "Spirit's sanctifying work in the church",[434] and that the Spirit is the Spirit of truth who will bear witness to the truth leading the disciples into all truth.[435]

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[430] John 14:16, 14:26, 15:26, 16:7.
[431] Dukeman, 2019, p. 76.
[432] John 10:36.
[433] Dukeman, 2019, p. 76.
[434] Ibid., p. 77.
[435] John 16:13.

The vocations of the three Persons, as well as being hierarchical in relation to one another, are kenotic, according to Dukeman, in the sense that each Person limits the use of his power in pursuing his vocation so as to serve the others.

The Son, in pursuing his vocation as Redeemer, manifests kenosis both in relation to creation and to the other divine Persons. In John 13: 12-17, for example, Jesus, whilst pointing to his Lordship and authority as Teacher, tells the disciples that they should do as he has done: serve them in humility by washing one another's feet. In chapter 10, verses 17-18, Jesus makes it clear that no-one has the power to take his life from him but that he lays it down voluntarily so that the Creation may be redeemed. The Son limits his power relative to the Father and the Spirit as he is led and helped by them. In the verses just referred to, Jesus says he has been commanded by the Father to lay down his life and to take it up again. Dukeman comments that the Son

> is dignified in that he does not try to perform his mission in isolation from the Father and the Spirit, but rather works with, trusts, and follows the Father and the Spirit in his redemptive mission. [In this way] he fosters their dignity as they too are allowed their roles in humanity's salvation".[436]

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[436] Dukeman, 2019, p. 80.

An example of the way in which the Father's vocation is exercised kenotically, occurs in John 5: 22-23:

> The Father judges no-one, but has given all judgement to the Son,
> that all may honour the Son, just as they honour the Father.
> Whoever does not honour the Son does not honour the Father
> who sent him.

This would seem to involve the Father in a certain self-limiting. It also means that the Father is vulnerable when the Son is not honoured. The Father is involved in Jesus' life and affected by it. Dukeman comments:

> In John, the Father is kenotic relative to the Son and the Spirit both
> as he empowers and supports their missions and as he is affected
> by their struggles. Through such kenosis the Father is portrayed as
> dignified and fostering the dignity of the other divine Persons.[437]

The Father is kenotic in relation to Creation in that he so loves the world that he gave his Son for its redemption.[438] As he sends and interacts with his Son and the Spirit, the Father's authority is at the service of Creation and thereby gives his actions dignity;

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[437] Ibid., p. 81.
[438] John 3:16.

despite his transcendence, omnipotence, and majesty he does not keep his distance from the world.

Lastly, the Spirit has a kenotic vocation in relation to the Father and the Son. We see this in John 20: 21-22: as the Father has sent the Son, so the Son sends the disciples and breathes the Spirit on them. The Spirit usually seems to work quietly in his mediating role between Father and Son and this lends dignity to the work and to the Father. Dukeman comments that "the Spirit represents the Father in a humble, loving and kind way to the Son, [and] here the kenotic Spirit is dignified, largely deferring to the Father".[439] The Spirit not only makes himself available for the work of the Father but also for the work of the Son who sends him and for the work of the disciples as he works in their lives filling their words and actions and helping them bear the persecution which they will encounter in their mission. It seems that the Spirit limits his authority as he serves the disciples, comforting and helping them. This is to exercise his authority in a dignified manner.

In sum, then, Dukeman argues for "a mutual hierarchy framework"[440] in which each of the three Persons of the Trinity has a unique vocation the exercise of which constitutes its hierarchical nature and its dignity, and allows for a differentiation within the Godhead:

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[439] Dukeman, 2019, p. 83.
[440] Ibid., p. 85.

the Father is the Creator who sends the Son and the Spirit into the

world for its sake; the Son is the glorious Redeemer who dies and

rises for the world; and the Holy Spirit is the sanctifier of human

beings in the world.[441]

The mutual hierarchy approach to the immanent Trinity is intended to show the

mutual constitution of the three Persons according to which the hierarchy of each

over the others is connected with his divine and personal properties and is used to

constitute the others in a dignified way. It will be a crucial part of the argument of the

thesis that this dignified, one might say, respectful, mutual constitution is a feature of

the performing life of, for example, a string quartet and of music-making in general.

Dukeman is careful to stress that "*how* this mutual constitution occurs in many ways

remains a mystery".[442] Is this disclaimer strong enough? Whilst it seems reasonable to

think through ways in which the three Persons are mutually constituted, how this

happens is surely entirely beyond human ken. Dukeman talks about drawing analogies

from "family life and drama", saying that this is an appropriate approach because

"human communities were originally made in the image of the Trinity",[443] and because

"such analogies are used in the New Testament".[444] But some theologians maintain

that the New Testament provides scant support for social Trinitarian models. Welch,

for instance, argues that "it is not correct […] to say that the New Testament bears

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[441] Ibid., p. 86.
[442] Ibid., p. 102. Emphasis is mine.
[443] Ibid. Dukeman offers Genesis 1: 26-27 in support of this claim.
[444] Dukeman, 2019, p. 102. Dukeman offers John 17:21 in support of this claim.

primary witness to the divine plurality. […] In the New Testament there is no interest in Jesus […] apart from the action of God the Father", and that "the biblical God is One subject, One Thou, One personal Being".[445]

The three Persons complement and constitute one another because each occupies a unique position in relation to the others which is associated with hierarchical properties "so that the divine persons […] truly complement and constitute one another".[446] The Father's unique properties are leadership, structural grounding and giving stability. The Son's unique properties are responsiveness and completion, while the Spirit's unique properties are intimacy, mediation and fostering fellowship. For Dukeman, Ephesians 5:21 – 6:4 displays a mutual hierarchy framework, with verse 21 of chapter 5 "provid[ing] the overall framework for the entire pericope. Each family member serv[ing] the others through his or her gifts as all live together under Christ".[447]

In Dukeman's mutual hierarchy approach, the divine processions partly constitute the mutual constitution of the Persons. The Father generates the Son in the Spirit and has an initiating leadership role in divine life. Dukeman argues that the Trinity is organised around, and is stabilised by, the Father. He limits his powers and thus gives dignity to the Son and the Spirit. In this way room is left for the Son and the Spirit to respond in ways appropriate to their personal properties.

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[445] Welch, 1952, pp. 264 and 268.
[446] Dukeman, 2019, p. 105.
[447] Ibid., pp. 108, n. 42.

The Son responds to the Father and the Spirit and thus is associated with complementarity and completion. He too limits his powers insofar as room is left for the personal properties of the Father and the Spirit. This also ensures the dignity of the Father and the Spirit, and this means that the Son's

> powers in such areas as responsiveness, complementing, and fostering completion are the basic forms the Son's love takes as he uses his personal properties to contribute to the precessions in the mutual constitution of the divine persons.[448]

The Spirit's unique properties are first to respond to the Father and the Son's spiration of him, and second to assist in the Father's generation of the Son, and third to help the Son in his response to the Father's generation. Dukeman comments that "the Spirit in his unique position in the immanent Trinity limits his powers in the midst of his exercising of them to amplify the Father and the Son".[449] The Spirit's powers are those of mediation, intimacy and fostering fellowship, and these forms of his love contribute to the procession and thus to the mutual constitution of the divine Persons.

In sum, Dukeman's mutual hierarchy approach to the immanent Trinity is based on the unique properties of each of the three Persons and which constitutes their hierarchy over the other two. The three Persons respect each other's dignity by limiting the power with which they deploy these properties. Further, the contribution

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[448] Ibid., p. 113.
[449] Ibid., pp. 113-114.

which each makes to the divine processions by so limiting their powers is a crucial part of the means by which they mutually constitute one another. Dukeman's chief analogy by way of illustration is that of preparing and performing a play. He points out that the

> playwright needs to use his skills to bring out the best in the director and actor and then leave them room to use their skills, [and that] the same is true in the case of the director and actor.[450]

Social Trinitarianism in the context of the thesis

I end this chapter by viewing social Trinitarianism from the perspective of the purpose of the thesis.

The first of van den Brink's insights, that it is better to think of three centres of consciousness than risk "impersonal alternatives (modes of being) which conjure up the image of God as […] a unitary substance or single subject",[451] connects with the thesis insofar as I shall argue that the members of a string quartet are four centres of consciousness but that they make up a unitary 'substance', namely, the quartet itself. This aspect of social Trinitarianism, therefore, is apt for use in the thesis. But talk of three centres of consciousness or of God as a three-fold subject brings us dangerously close to tritheism, and this is exacerbated by talk which gives the impression that 'person' is being used univocally rather than analogically. In Grenz's estimation, the

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[450] Ibid., p. 109.
[451] Van den Brink, 2014, p. 336.

overwhelming view in recent years has been that, rather than beginning with the one divine substance, Trinitarian doctrine must start from the three Persons and move to the divine unity. Pannenberg, though, has been to the fore in warning that the social model of the Trinity must avoid any hint of tritheism. It is not that God is three persons who have relations, but that God is three subsistent relations that are persons. In Nicholas Lash's words, "we *have* relationships; God *is* the relations that he has […] God is […] relationship without remainder".[452]

Lash's formulation has startling relevance for the thesis. A large part of my argument is that as they perform together, the performers *qua* performers are their relations which are their identities without remainder. I argue for this especially in Chapters 8, 9, and 10, but also, for example, in Chapters 6 and 7.

These criticisms and difficulties coalesce around the problem of how to understand ontologically 'person' when applied to the Trinity. One possibility is to think in terms of communion. I have explored this concept theologically in Chapter 3. Gunton lauds the Cappadocian fathers for having "create[d] a new conception of the being of God, in which God's being was seen to consist in personal communion".[453] I would like to emphasise that I am not committed to using 'person' univocally with reference to human persons and the divine Persons. Rather, with reference to the divine Persons, I am content to use it simply as a means of 'pointing' to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. As I have expressed it elsewhere in the thesis, it cannot be

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[452] Lash, 1992, p. 32.
[453] Gunton, 1997, p. 53.

doubted that these three mutually indwell one another, are One. In this I seem to be close to Kilby. She suggests that the doctrine of the Trinity can function as a grammatical, second order proposition. This would mean that we would use it as a rule to guide our reading of the Bible and our use of Christian vocabulary.[454]

Social Trinitarians hold that "the relationship of love shared freely is paramount because eternal perfect love is constitutive of the personhood of the Father, Son, and Spirit".[455] In due course, I will argue that love is a necessary component of music-making, and defend the potential criticism that in doing so I present music-making in an idealised way that might not stand up to empirical scrutiny.[456] I shall argue that love for the music and for one's fellow performers in terms of mutual respect and support is integral to music-making. However, I would like to emphasise that in drawing an analogy between the relationships of the divine Persons and the relationships of performing musicians, I make no claims as to what it is that makes for the perichoretic unity of the Trinity, only that its members are indeed bound together perfectly in love.

The claimed practical relevance of social Trinitarianism[457] is directly relevant to the thesis, simply because the purpose of the thesis is to test the hypothesis that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating on account of the resemblance of the relationships between performing musicians and of the Persons of the Trinity.

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[454] Kilby, 2000, p. 443.
[455] See p. 121 above.
[456] See Chapter 7.
[457] See pp. 125-30 above.

It is therefore important to make a reasonable defence of social Trinitarianism. To this task I now turn.

How useful is social Trinitarianism? That such very different conclusions for its implementation can be drawn from it, undermines this usefulness and weakens faith in it, especially when these conclusions simply reflect pre-conceived ideas, having been projected onto the Trinity and then, as it were in all innocence, taken as normative for social and political arrangements. However, this criticism does not really touch my concerns in the thesis. First, it is not part of my method in the thesis to implement social Trinitarianism in the context of music-making. Performers do not look to an external model for how they should relate to one another, for that is something which is integral to performing well. Second, I take the mutual indwelling of the three Persons as a fundamental tenet of Christian theology which is beyond doubt, and do not speculate regarding a descriptive content of 'mutual indwelling'. My argumentation requires no more than the bare fact of mutual indwelling on the part of the Persons.

I would like to underline that I do not appeal to social Trinitarianism on account of its usefulness in the sense that I do not set out to address a problem for which it is a good solution. This is a criticism which Cunningham makes of Gunton. In *The One, the Three and the Many*,[458] Gunton fashions a view of western intellectual history which, says Cunningham, opposes a Parmenidean One to a Heraclitan plurality, allowing him to

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[458] Gunton, 1993.

resolve this opposition in Trinitarian terms.[459] I hope it is clear that in the thesis I am

not seeking the solution to a problem in this or any other sense.

Kilby argues that "it is built into the kind of project that most social trinitarians are

involved in that they *have to be* projectionist".[460] Perhaps the straightforward point

to make here is that in the thesis I am not involved in a project *as* a social Trinitarian

and so it seems that there is no necessity for me to be projectionist, and, as I have

emphasised, performers are formed into a community under the demands of good

music-making, not by conforming to an external model. I do, however, find Trinitarian

doctrine useful in the sense that I argue for an analogical resemblance between the

indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity and that of musicians as they perform together.

Kilby acknowledges that "any language that is used about God is drawn from human

experience in some way or other".[461] The problem, as she sees it, is that the difficulty

this presents when we come to think through what it is that binds the members of the

Trinity together, that is, to fill out the notion of perichoresis, must be drawn from

human experience and that, therefore,

> what is at its heart a suggestion to overcome a difficulty is
>
> presented as a key source of inspiration and insight. So the social
>
> theorist does not just say, perhaps the divine perichoresis, which
>
> we can understand as being akin to our best relationships, only

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[459] Cunningham, 1998.
[460] Kilby, 2000, p. 441. Emphasis in the original.
[461] Ibid.

better, makes the three Persons into one God; she goes on to say,

should we not model our relationships on this wonderful thing, the

divine perichoresis?.[462]

Kilby says that "a concept, perichoresis, is used to name what is not understood, to name whatever it is that makes the three Persons one".[463] Certainly, we do not understand God *in se*, and so it is clear that the mutual indwelling of the three Persons which perichoresis is, is beyond our understanding, not just because the concept is too difficult to understand but because whatever we do to 'cash it out' fails because our language is inadequate when it comes to descriptions of God. But that the three Persons do mutually indwell one another, that they inter-penetrate one another, remains a legitimate way of understanding intra-Trinitarian relations, even if only because it is inconceivable that this is not the case. Whilst our humanly-grounded understanding of mutual indwelling and of love is not just merely inadequate to describe the inner life of the Trinity but entirely unable to achieve any toe-hold whatsoever on it, the Scriptural warrant for mutual indwelling and love amongst the three Persons is clear: "and behold, a voice from heaven said, 'This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased'",[464] "I and the Father are one",[465] "Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority, but the Father who dwells in me does his works".[466] The fact that the Father, Son, and the Spirit are One means that if their identities are

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[462] Ibid., pp. 441-442.
[463] Ibid., p. 442.
[464] Matt. 3: 17.
[465] John 10:30.
[466] John 14:10.

mutually constituted, then there is no remainder that is not so constituted. I argue in Part 4 of the thesis and especially in my discussion of conversation amongst the three Persons, that they do mutually constitute their identities. Again, I would like to emphasise that musicians do not look to an external model for how they should relate to one another, but that this is integral to good music-making.

This, then, is my basal use of the doctrine of the Trinity. Kilby asks, "Where exactly, one might wonder, did they [social Trinitarians] acquire such a vivid feeling for the inner life of the deity".[467] My basal understanding of the Trinity does not involve me in claims regarding my 'feeling' for the inner life of the deity. It only extends to the Scriptural assurance of the mutual indwelling of the Persons, their love for one another, and that their identities are entirely coterminous with their relations of indwelling.

My analogical comparison, then, is between this basal understanding of intra-trinitarian relationality and the relationality of musicians as musicians. Human relationships are often characterised by mutual love, an indwelling whereby we are sympathetic to one another's needs and sensitivities, whereby we support and respect one another, build one another up, and so on. My argument is that music-making is an exemplification of this. I shall argue that qualities of selflessness, respect, co-

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[467] Kilby, 2000, p. 439.

operation, and love, in other words, a degree of mutuality which it is hard to find in other spheres of human activity, are integral to, demanded by, good music-making.

Is social Trinitarianism true to its claimed patristic and Scriptural sources? I need defend only my basal understanding of social Trinitarianism, and that I have done above with Scriptural quotations which precisely use the language I wish to use in describing the relationships which exist between those who make music together. Perhaps, nonetheless, it would be as well to emphasise my argument, that though the issue of analogical predication is ever present, there is Scriptural warrant for such language use. Jesus must needs use human language to describe his divine relationship with his Father. Jesus did not speak in the belief that his hearers would be entirely uncomprehending. He knows how we will understand what he says, and so we can surely use the same language to articulate our understanding of his relationship with his Father as he does. This is not to say that in so doing we have knowledge of this relationship as it is within Godself, and so perhaps this is the point at which we are confronted by mystery, the point at which, having spoken, we relinquish speech, embrace apophaticism. Karen Kilby argues that

> When we say God is wise or good […] we at least *think* we know
> what we are saying, even if a reflection on issues of the *modus*
> *significandi* of our words means that we then have to acknowledge

that our conception of goodness and wisdom are not adequate to

God.[468]

In my use of 'indwelling', 'love', and other words that Jesus himself uses to describe his relationship with God the Father, I do not intend, and have no need, to go beyond an understanding of the inner life of the deity which Jesus himself authorised us to have.

Another aspect of this objection was that social Trinitarianism takes the New Testament witness to the roles of Father, Son and Holy Spirit to be straightforward descriptions of their immanent relations. This, so the objection goes, collapses the distinction between the economy of salvation as given in the text and God's immanent life.[469]

I hope I have done enough to show that I do not take the New Testament witness to the roles of the members of the Trinity to be "direct descriptions of their immanent relations",[470] and that I do not take my basal understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity to correspond to a "first order teaching [...] a deep understanding of the way God really is".[471] I have stressed that we cannot have knowledge of God *in se* whilst yet holding to the language that Jesus uses to enable our understanding of the

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468 Kilby, 2005, p. 425. Emphasis in the original.
469 Mosser, 2009, p. 147.
470 Ibid.
471 Kilby, 2000, p. 443.

relationship of love and indwelling which obtains between him and the Father, which, as Gunton points out is "a conception of relatedness without absorption".[472]

Does social Trinitarianism fail to do justice to the unity of God? Bauerschmidt sees one of the primary characteristics of social Trinitarianism to be its emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Persons and its criticism of western theology's "purported emphasis on the unity of the divine nature".[473] Perichoresis is the name social Trinitarians give to whatever it is that binds the members of the Trinity into a unity, and this is chiefly to be understood as a mutual indwelling in love. For Kilby, it is problematic that our projections of what we take to be the best about human relationships – love, empathy, equality, and so on – is then "immediately reflected back onto the world, and this reverse projection is said to be what is in fact *important* about the doctrine".[474] The reason for this importance is that the Trinity is taken to be a model for human community, society, and relations in general. But I hope I have said enough to persuade that this is no part of my intention in the thesis. Rather, it is as though the relationships demanded by compelling music-making stand on one side of a divide, and those which obtain in terms of the mutual indwelling of the three Persons stand on the other. I am very clear that divine indwelling is not taken in the thesis as a model for how musicians should relate to one another. My argument is that, given the existence of these two sets of relationships as independent of one another, once the resemblances between them are perceived, then the thought that music-making might exemplify in a human way what it is to relate together in Christian ways is going

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[472] Gunton, 1993, p. 205.
[473] Bauerschmidt, 2014, p. 534.
[474] Kilby, 2000, p. 442. Emphasis in the original.

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to arise. I say resemble advisedly, because I do not wish to suggest that we can know how the members of the Trinity relate to one another *in se,* but I do hold to Jesus' authorisation of the language of indwelling to describe his relationship with his Father, even though our understanding of 'indwelling' is inevitably derived from human experience.

Given that social Trinitarianism partakes of analogy insofar as the nature of the relationships of the three Persons cannot be known by humans beings *in se,* Heim's analogy of the Trinity is nonetheless apposite: the Trinity "functions like a musical polyphony, a simultaneous, non-excluding harmony of difference that constitutes one unique reality".[475] This is similar to Begbie's use of the triad as a metaphor for the Trinity:

> What could be more apt than to speak of the Trinity as a three-note chord, a resonance of life; Father, Son, and Spirit mutually indwelling, without mutual exclusion, and yet without merger, each occupying the same space, 'sounding through' one another, yet irreducibly distinct, reciprocally enhancing, and establishing one another *as* other? [476]

If we accept the Trinity as revelation occasioned by the economy of salvation, then we can think in terms of Godself on the one hand and of God's work on the other. We can

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[475] Heim, 2003, p. 167.
[476] Begbie, 2008, p. 293.

go a step further than Rahner's Rule. It is not just that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, but that "through their perfections, the persons of the Trinity perfectly unite their thoughts, their acts, their wills, and their consciousnesses".[477] Bracken also argues that "while as distinct persons they possess separate consciousnesses, nevertheless they together form a single shared consciousness which is perfect in all respects and which thus corresponds exactly to their communitarian reality as one God".[478] Do these formulations say anything more than that the three Persons indwell one another perfectly, and that this constitutes their unity, both of which are uncontroversial from a social Trinitarian point of view? But if there are three separate consciousnesses, what is the force of "together [they] form a single shared consciousness"? Is there not a danger that the separateness is lost in the sharing? Conversely, if a single consciousness is shared, then each person's consciousness would seem to be only a part of the shared consciousness "which […] corresponds to their […] reality as one God", and this means that each person is not God. This perhaps gets to the heart of the difficulty of understanding 'three Persons, one God'. At least, though, Bracken has given us a formulation which goes some way to refuting the charge that social Trinitarianism threatens God's unity. Although somewhat redundant, it is perhaps worth saying that we cannot show that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity unless we can, as it were, place them side by side and compare them. But theology is not modern science. It operates

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[477] Bracken, 1991, p. 130.
[478] Bracken, 1985, pp. 24-25.

against a background of faith, and faith teaches that the true God is indeed revealed in the economy of salvation.

I can now summarise my position vis a vis social Trinitarianism as follows. First, my basal understanding of Trinitarian doctrine is not infected with projectionism because I only need indwelling, for which we have the authority of Jesus; I do not need to look to human beings for examples of whatever it is that binds the three Persons together. Second, I take from mutual hierarchy that the identities of the Persons are constituted by their relationships with one another. Whilst this claim is not unique to mutual hierarchy, it is especially well expressed there. It is part of my argument that the identities of performing musicians are formed by and as their relationships with one another. Third, the unity of the three Persons can be conceived only by way of an analogy, not in itself. The analogy (not example) of a string quartet is useful; its members have separate centres of consciousness, yet they share in a single consciousness understood partly in terms of their commitment to, and awareness of, the coherence of performance. What is so powerful about this analogy is precisely that it is only valid in the context of the actual making of music, not, for example, when the quartet members are discussing interpretation. This is why I argue that music-making, not just music, is a performed theology of Christian relating. It is the music-making which binds them together, which is perichoretic and is constitutive of their unity. Thus, in the case of the quartet, we can know what binds its members together, namely, a shared consciousness as to the coherent performance of the musical work, together with actual performance. And we can say that their identities are formed out of the relationships that a good performance of the work demands. This makes the

comparison with mutual hierarchy especially striking, especially insofar as the members of a string quartet have particular roles within the quartet, now deferring to one another, now taking the lead, and so on. Again, I wish to emphasise that this does not involve projection of the relationships required for good music-making upon the Trinity, rather, it is a question of comparing two sets of relationships which are sufficiently known independently of one another.

I argue in Chapter 11 that the conversation which takes place within the Trinity is constitutive of each Person's identity. Whilst conversation is an analogy, I show that there is Scriptural warrant for this. Again, the comparison with the music-making of a string quartet is noteworthy.

There is a final question about whether I am justified in slimming down social Trinitarianism to suit my purposes in this thesis. I have, after all, subtracted any knowledge of what in itself it is that binds the Trinity together, and I have side-stepped doubts about the extent to which social Trinitarianism is true to Scriptural and patristic sources by arguing that Jesus authorised the use of the language of indwelling when he wished the disciples to know what the nature of his relationship with the Father is. When it comes to the making of identities by virtue of the relationships which obtain between the members of the Trinity, the basic theme of mutual hierarchy, the mutual deferring according to the roles of the members of the Trinity, seems well attested in Scripture and adds strength to the argument that the identities of the members of the Trinity are entirely a question of the relationality of their mutual indwelling. Stanley Grenz, referring to what he calls "the coalescing of theology with the widely accepted

philosophical conclusion", says that "'person' has more to do with relationality than with substantiality and that the term stands closer to the idea of communion or community than to the conception of the individual in isolation or abstracted from communal embeddedness".[479] The analogical resemblance of this to the mutual indwelling of the members of a string quartet is the basis for the claim that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relationality.

It is a mainstay of the argumentation of the thesis that this description of the Trinity as a self-indwelling which constitutes the identities of the three Persons in their entirety, applies to human beings in the particular situation of music-making. Kathryn Tanner poses the main problem with this as follows:

> No matter how close the similarities between human and divine
>
> persons, differences always remain – God is not us – and this sets
>
> up the major problem for theologies that want to base conclusions
>
> about human relationships on the Trinity.[480]

Now I do want to base a conclusion about human relationships on the Trinity, namely, that the relationships of performing musicians are an exemplification, humanly speaking, of Christian relationality. Tanner asks, "how exactly […] does a description

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[479] Grenz, 2001, p. 4.
[480] Tanner, 2012, p. 378.

of the Trinity apply to us?".[481] She says that "three specific problems arise here".[482] First

> the differences between God and us suggest we do not understand very well what we mean when using ordinary language to speak of the Trinity. What the Trinity is saying about human relations becomes unclear, because the meaning of the terms used to talk about the Trinity is unclear.[483]

Tanner lights on three instances: granted the three divine Persons are equal, but in what sense? Or what does it mean to say that they are 'in' one another? Third, if the three Persons are distinguishable in virtue of the character of their relations, can we really have anything like an "exact" understanding of that character? Tanner concludes that because God is little comprehended by us, then "discussion of the Trinity, all by itself, seems of little help in better understanding human relationships".[484]

Above, I have tried to suggest that difficulties such as these are mitigated by Scriptural authority and by Jesus himself. Jesus uses the language of equality and relationship, and this suggests that we do so quite legitimately. Whilst that we cannot have an exact understanding of the character of intra-Trinitarian relationships is beyond question,

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481 Ibid.
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
484 Ibid.

should we not acknowledge a danger in "positing God's otherness and transcendence in so absolute a fashion that all assertions […] could never in any way, any longer, be a testimony".[485] In this circumstance "God would become a mere vanishing point […] his transcendence would no longer have sufficient force to reach our immanence".[486] Hemmerle goes further: God cannot reveal himself in other than human words, but since God is the condition for human words then they are both prior to God, that is, we learn them first in human interaction, and subsequent to God. This maps on to Aquinas' distinction between the order of things and the order of knowing which was discussed in Chapter 4. Hemmerle sums up:

> For that God should surrender what is proper to Him to an interpretive horizon which is determined by what is proper to another, by another's possibilities – by what is proper to and possible to human beings, precisely – that God, who comes before everything, should come, in His word, after another, is an assertion of singular import about God.[487]

What we have here is, in Hemmerle's words, "a double *a priori* […] the *a priori* of the divine for the human and the *a priori* of the human for the divine".[488] Revelation and theology on this showing are necessarily anthropological but not entirely so.

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[485] Hemmerle, 2020, pp. 11-12.
[486] Ibid., p. 12.
[487] Ibid., p. 15.
[488] Ibid., p. 18.

Tanner's second specific problem is that "much of what is said about the Trinity simply does not seem directly applicable to humans",[489] and this is mainly a question of human finitude. Tanner's example is extremely pertinent to this thesis. She says that human beings can indwell one another only metaphorically; it is key to my argument that musicians indwell one another when performing together. Tanner says when one member of the Trinity acts, so do the others; this is not the case for humans. Even though I can enter empathetically into a loved one, I do not act when my beloved does.[490] Jesus is God, therefore when Jesus acts, God in his triunity acts. But human A is never human B. Even so, can one person not act for another? If, in a legal sense, A acts for B, the action carries all the authority it would if performed by B, and B can be held responsible, and so on. From the perspective of the thesis, it is interesting to note that it is not finally clear that our actions are quite so ineluctably ours and can never be another's too as Tanner seems to suggest. It is not simply that we talk quite reasonably of joint action. Rather, it is that if A is playing the cello, then, normally, B cannot play it at the same time. Nonetheless, Peter Schidlof, the violist of the Amadeus Quartet, tells us that,

> When I play the viola, I don't think particularly about my part only,
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> I think much more about the other parts. I imagine I am playing the
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> first fiddle or the cello, and one just fills in.[491]

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[489] Tanner, 2012, p. 378.
[490] Ibid., p. 379.
[491] Nissel, 1998, p. 10.

It is true that Schidlof 'only imagines' he is playing the other parts, but his imaginative entering into the performance of the other parts seems to chip away at Tanner's flat assertion that we cannot enter into one another's actions. Imagination is a mental act which is integral to the physical act. Schidlof is not simply being empathetic, he is not simply attuned to what the other players are doing. Is it not suggestive that we can say that in imagination he *actively* enters into their playing? Schidlof's remarks seem to suggest that he plays all the parts and sounds just one of them. This compares with a keyboard player who is playing all the parts, say of a fugue, and who is responsible for the sounding of all the parts; the sounding is continuous with the physical playing. But suppose the keyboard were a dummy one so that the physical playing produced no physically detectable sound, the sounding being an entirely mental phenomenon existing only in the player's mental space. Schidlof says he plays all the parts, and in this he is like the player of the dummy keyboard except that he sounds one of the parts and hears the others. And what seems to be true for Schidlof, we can reasonably suppose to be true for the other three members of the quartet.

Or think of Jack and Jill toiling up the hill carrying a pail of water between them. Is there not one action of which both Jack and Jill are equally the agents?

Tanner makes this point about human beings not being able to be in one another in terms of "overlapping subjectivities"; human beings cannot have them.[492] Perhaps, though, the string quartet and Jack and Jill examples raise some doubt about this.

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[492] Tanner, 2012, p. 378.

Although person A cannot occupy the same space as person B, it is less clear that A's subjectivity cannot overlap B's subjectivity. If subjectivities are defined (at least in part) by their objects, then the members of a string quartet have a common object in view, not just their own part. And Jack and Jill have a common purpose, namely, to carry the pail of water. Who they are in terms of their subjectivities as they carry the pail is the same to the extent that they are engaged in the same action, not the same as in Jack carries this pail and Jill this other pail, but the same as in they are both carrying the same pail. This seems generalisable: the members of a football team share subjectivities, they are all engaged in the same activity, namely, trying to win the game, that is, playing the same game in terms of strategy, pulling together, not engaged simply in wishful thinking but keeping to the same game-plan. Think of the employees of a company, or any joint enterprise. Could one not say that to the extent that those engaged in a joint venture do not have overlapping subjectivities, then to that extent the venture is less likely to succeed? And does this not apply to performing string quartets?

Tanner also worries that

> divine persons […] seem much more relational than human beings. Human persons can never be as closely tied to their relations with others as persons in the Trinity are commonly thought to be.[493]

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[493] Ibid., p. 379.

One facet of this worry is that human beings precede their relationships, whereas the persons of the Trinity do not precede the relations that make them who they are. Tanner says,

> human beings have no character to begin with as that is decisively shaped by what happens to them later: I therefore exist prior to relations with duplicitous significant others, for example, that end up making me a bitter, distrustful old person.[494]

There is perhaps room here to wonder about the status of the 'I' in the middle of this claim. Whilst the persons of the Trinity are their relations, it is less obvious that there is an 'I' before my relations with others. Not only is Descartes' method of radical doubt whereby he claimed "I exist" having 'subtracted' the existence of others flawed, but Wittgenstein has shown the impossibility of a private language. Perhaps Tanner's point is that the persons of the Trinity are their relationships without remainder, but that that is not the case with human beings. Is there a slippage here from talking in terms of persons, both human and divine, to talking of an 'I'? On page 133 above there is some discussion which supports the view – held especially by Gunton – that human persons are constituted entirely by their relations. Gunton makes much of the distinction between an individual, one might say an individual 'I', and a person.

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[494] Ibid.

Consequences of the above discussion for the thesis

What are the consequences of this line of thinking for the thesis? I argue that performers *as* performers for the duration of the music-making are indeed constituted entirely by their relations. To employ the terms of Tanner's argument, performers do not exist as performers prior to their relations with other performers, indeed they exist as performers only while they are performing with others.

Tanner has a further worry which stems from her view that human beings are less relational than divine persons. She says,

> Character […] in human beings is not as bound up with actual relations with others. I can be defined by certain general relational capacities before […] these capacities are actualised in my relationships.[495]

Her example is that I can have a general tendency to be suspicious "before and whether or not my relations with others give me good grounds to be that way".[496] This seems strange even if only because one could argue that I don't become suspicious out of the blue, but precisely on account of my relations with others. But might I not be born suspicious? Perhaps, but suspicion seems just the sort of thing that arises in the context of relationships with others. Again, to employ Tanner's terminology, whilst

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[495] Ibid.
[496] Ibid.

it may well be true that some are born performers whose abilities are realised in relationships with other musicians, the characteristics of a performing musician are likely to be principally a matter of being bound up with others; musicians study and form their characters in the context of a tradition, this is a learning which cannot be achieved any other way.

There is one more facet of the difficulties which make it problematic to apply what can be said about the Trinity to humans; this relates directly to one of the concerns of the thesis which is addressed in the Conclusion: what happens to the 'good' relationality which is enjoyed by performing musicians once the concert is over? Tanner says,

> the character formed in me in virtue of my relations with others remains even when the relations that gave rise to it end […] the relational characteristics of Trinitarian persons, on the contrary, are much more tightly a function of actual relationships: the Father, for example, is not defined as someone with the general capacity to beget someone or other, but as the Father who is and remains such only in begetting the Son".

From the point of view of the thesis, though, we should say that as he or she performs *this* particular quartet, the cellist is not just a cellist in the general sense, but the cellist who, along with the other three players, is bringing this particular quartet to life by playing these particular parts. Yes, it is true that once the performance is over, he or

she reverts to a cellist with the general capacity to play any cello parts, not only this particular part just played. So, in the case of musicians performing together, I would suggest that, during the actual performance, the characteristics of the players both individually and together are more tightly formed by their relationships than Tanner's comments would lead one to think. But I wonder if the distinction between characteristics and relationships is too finely drawn here. Tanner talks about characteristics being a function of relationships. What does this really mean? Could it suggest that the relationships somehow articulate what it is to be the Father and to be the Son? But if this is so, exactly the same could be said about the first violinist in a quartet: the characteristics of being first violinist are articulated precisely by his or her relationships with the other three players. More than this, the relationships are the very stuff of being the first violinist *qua* first violinist.

Tanner rightly points out that "the character formed in me in virtue of my relations with others remains even when the relations which gave rise to it end".[497] This is not so with the characters of performing musicians, or at least, not to the same extent. Yes, it is not unlikely that when I leave the company of a certain group of people, the characteristics I displayed with them might undergo a kind of weakening, become modified and so on. Even so, perhaps the characteristics that make me a good quartet player – patience, egoless attention to the other players, and so on – remain with me for longer than might often be thought.

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[497] Ibid.

Tanner has a further point which connects with the arguments of the thesis. She says that "the character of a human person takes different forms in the course of relations with different people".[498] This means that "to know a human person in her relations with you is to know her only incompletely".[499] Trinitarian persons, on the other hand,

> are fully themselves in their relations with one another and with us [… they] are not in themselves, for example, other than the persons they show themselves to be to us.[500]

The relevance of this for the thesis is that the members of a quartet as they perform together are not other than they appear to be. As with the members of the Trinity, they are fully themselves as players in their relations with one another and with us. When Tanner says, "the human relations that distinguish people never simply define them",[501] I would like to say that the relations which distinguish the violist from the cellist in a quartet do define them as violist and cellist in that performance in their entirety. Equally, Tanner says that the intensity of relationships in the Trinity never "threaten the individuality of the Persons in the way that relations like that threaten to blur the identities of human beings".[502] She thinks that human beings need to "police" the boundaries between themselves and others lest they cease to be their "own person". Her example is that she needs to "break away from the incredibly

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[498] Ibid.
[499] Ibid.
[500] Ibid., p. 380.
[501] Ibid.
[502] Ibid.

intense relationship [she has] with [her] mother" in order to be her own person.[503] This, she says, is not so with the members of the Trinity. But a member of a quartet has incredibly intense relationships with the other players during performance which do not threaten that player's individuality, on the contrary they are constitutive of it; furthermore, he or she cannot be his or her own person as that player during that performance if he or she attempts to break away from the others. Tanner says, "in the Trinity […] the Persons are absolutely different from one another in the very intensity of the relationships they have with one another. It is because the relationship is so intense for them both, so to speak, that the Father can only be a Father and the Son only a Son".[504] This, I suggest, is exactly the case with the members of a quartet. The greater the intensity of the relationships which the players have with one another, the greater the differences between them are delineated, but always within the context of their unity as a quartet. The intensity of the relationship between violist and the other members of a quartet is the condition for the violist to be the violist as it is for the other players to be cellist and violinists.

We must now address the third and final problem which Tanner identifies in any attempt to apply a description of the Trinity to human beings. It is that

> human finitude […] seems to entail that humans give of themselves
> so that others may gain in ways that often bring loss to themselves.
> In the case of Trinitarian persons, in contrast, their perfect equality

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[503] Ibid.
[504] Ibid.

is usually thought to involve giving without loss and receiving without increase.[505]

Tanner herself argues that the loss incurred in giving is bound up with the fallen state of the world. She says, "it is possible in principle for the world to be arranged in ways that make giving to others a benefit to oneself".[506] So this last problem becomes one of the sin, suffering and conflict in human lives which it is impossible to compare with "the peaceful and perfectly loving mutuality of the Trinity. Turned into a recommendation for social relations, the Trinity seems unrealistic [and] hopelessly naïve".[507]

When we consider a string quartet, we find that the mutual giving and receiving of, for example, rhythmic and melodic phrases, the giving way to one another as first one part then another takes prominence in the musical texture does not involve loss, neither does the receiving involve gain. To this extent, the giving and receiving which is part of good music-making bears comparison with the giving and receiving which Tanner ascribes to the members of the Trinity.

Though Tanner has recommendations for how the gap between sinful, finite humans and the Trinity can be bridged, my interest is rather in comparing relations between the members of the Trinity on the one hand with those between musicians whilst they are performing together on the other. This is not to bridge the gap between humans

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[505] Ibid.
[506] Ibid., p. 381.
[507] Ibid.

and the Trinity, only to explore the notion that what is on one side of the gap can bear analogical comparison with what is on the other, the two sides having been previously and separately characterised in terms of an indwelling which in both cases is entirely constitutive of identity. On the basis of this comparison, I shall argue that when musicians perform, their relationality is Christian. Tanner says, "The Trinity tells us what human relations should ideally be like",[508] but rather than wishing to use the Trinity as a model of how musicians should relate to one another during performance, I hope to show that musicians as they perform already relate to one another in ways which bear analogical resemblances with the relationality of the Trinity, and that they must necessarily do so because good performances are not possible otherwise.

Tanner's other strategy for bridging the gap between the Trinity and human beings is to look to the economic Trinity, which, she says, makes it clear "how human relationships could come to approximate Trinitarian ones".[509] In fleshing out this strategy, Tanner raises a potential difficulty for the thesis:

> in the economy the Trinity appears as a dialogical fellowship of
> love and mutual service between Jesus and the one he calls Father
> – the kind of relationship that human beings could imitate because
> it is one in keeping with their finitude – in contrast, say, to perfectly
> mutual indwelling or perichoresis.[510]

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[508] Ibid.
[509] Ibid.
[510] Ibid.

I try to characterise the relationality of performing musicians as one of indwelling. 'Indwelling' has overtones of settledness, of belonging, of being in the right place, of being, as it were, at home that apply to, say, the members of a string quartet as they perform together. Later in the thesis I employ the concept of a co-created creative space. This is a space all of which is inhabited equally by all the players, they belong to it; it is the space of their perichoretic relationality. For sure, there is no question of their perichoretic relationality being perfect. Neither is it a question of the musicians imitating in any conscious manner the perichoresis of the Trinity.

Begbie and Scruton write about the perichoretic nature of musical sounds in musical space:

> When more than one sound is present, occupying the same space which remaining audibly distinct, we may speak of a space not of mutual exclusion but of 'interpenetration' […] the sounds of a chord can be heard sounding *through* each other […] we need only to think of a three-tone major chord, which we hear as three distinct, mutually enhancing (not mutually exclusive) sounds, but together occupying the same aural space […] the sound is rich and enjoyable, even more so in polyphony when different melodies can interweave and enhance each other.[511]

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[511] Begbie, 2000, pp. 24 and 25.

In music […] we confront a single process in which multiplicity is simultaneously preserved and overridden. No musical event excludes any other, but all coexist in a placeless self-presentation […] It is as though these many currents flowed together in a single life, at one with itself".[512]

These descriptions beautifully fit our experience of music sounding in space, in the co-created creative space I introduce in Chapter 9. Begbie makes the point that this is not true of all sounds: "Contrast the confusion of three people speaking simultaneously".[513] Could we say that the subjectivities of the musicians are like many currents flowing together in a single life? Could we say that in music-making we "confront a single process"? The concept of a co-created creative space is precisely one in which there are overlapping subjectivities which nonetheless remain distinct yet interweave, interpenetrate, and enhance one another, a perichoresis. And so I would like to go further than Begbie and Scruton. It is not that only musical sounds interpenetrate one another, but that the subjectivities of the musicians do so also. We have the witness of Peter Schidlof already mentioned,[514] and I would also refer back to my examples of overlapping subjectivities on pages 166-8.

Peter Leithart ascribes agency to the singing voice:

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[512] Scruton, 1997, pp. 338-339.
[513] Begbie, 2000, p. 25.
[514] See pp. 169-70 above.

> When we sing together, each voice provides the setting for every other; each is the room in which every other dwells, even as each dwells in the room provided by all the others.[515]

This seems close to claiming mutual indwelling for the musicians; in the very next sentence Leithart slips even closer to claiming this:

> The sopranos provide a house in which the basses dwell, and the basses lay a foundation for an aural space within which other voices live, move, and have their being. The sounds of the whole choir penetrate each singer, even as the singers inhabit the sound they produce.[516]

Finally, Leithart would have us know that "music-making is the form of mutually indwelling society".[517]

Leithart has here articulated the basis upon which this thesis will attempt to show that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating. What response, then, can be made to Kathryn Tanner's view that human beings cannot aspire to imitate trinitarian "perfect mutual indwelling or perichoresis"?[518] It is not that musicians do not set out to imitate trinitarian perichoresis, although that is true. Rather, the

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[515] Leithart, 2015, p. 95.
[516] Ibid., pp. 95-96.
[517] Ibid., p. 96.
[518] Tanner, 2012, p. 381.

challenge for the thesis is whether human indwelling can be compared with trinitarian indwelling. Do we really have any idea of what trinitarian indwelling is, and if not, how can the comparison be made? My strategy here is very simple: we do not need to know what trinitarian indwelling is like, only that it takes place. And this we know on Jesus' authority. Certainly, the divine Persons indwell one another in ways beyond our human understanding, but indwell one another they do. Therefore, the comparison with human indwelling is analogical. I address the issue of speaking of God in analogical terms in Chapter 4.

Part of Tanner's own strategy for closing the gap between human community and trinitarian community is to "look to what the Trinity is doing for us".[519] She says,

> The Trinity itself enters our world to close the gap […] in Christ the
> Trinity enters our world to work over human life in its image,
> through the incorporation of the human within the divine
> Trinitarian life. By joining us to those relations, Christ gives us the
> very relations of Father, Son and Spirit for our own. […] in Christ
> we are shown what the Trinity looks like when it includes the
> human, and what humanity looks like when it is included in the
> Trinity's own movements – the character of a human life with

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[519] Ibid., p. 382.

others when it takes a Trinitarian form, as that is displayed in Jesus'

own human life.[520]

Crucially,

the gap between divine and human is not closed [….] by making

the two similar to one another, but by joining the two very

different things - humanity and divinity – into one via Christ, via

incarnation.[521]

Tanner thus moves away from thinking of the Trinity as something that might serve as

a "model" for human community to thinking of it as something in which we

"participate".[522] The consequence of this understanding is that "a life-brimming, spirit-

filled community of human beings akin to Jesus in their relations with God […] is what

Trinitarian relations […] amount to in human relational terms".[523] Insofar as the Trinity

is still thought of as a social Trinity in this altered understanding, it is now the crucible

in which human beings are formed in their relations with one another and with God

in accordance with God's purposes for his Kingdom. And so Tanner asks, "To what

extent is the Kingdom […] reflective of the Trinity's own character"?[524] If this

discussion of Tanner on the social Trinity seems to have taken us quite some way from

a position in which the relationality of the Trinity can be compared to that of musicians

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[520] Ibid.
[521] Ibid.
[522] Ibid.
[523] Ibid., p. 385.
[524] Ibid.

as they perform together, her answer brings us back to it. For Tanner likens the Kingdom to the Trinity because both are

> supremely life-affirming for all their members, organised to bring about the utmost flourishing of all. Both are paradigmatic instances of […] a community of mutual fulfilment in which the good of one becomes the good of all.[525]

But this is also an apt description of, say, a string quartet. The superlatives must, for sure, be understood in terms of what is possible for humans this side of Heaven's Gate. What is particularly noteworthy for the thesis is that 'life-affirming', 'flourishing', 'community', 'mutual fulfilment', and 'the good of one becomes the good of all' are coextensive with the music-making itself, that is, they are all constitutive of a co-created creative space which is necessary for successful performances and without which they are not possible.

Whilst we cannot know or have a feel for the mutual indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity as it is in itself, Jesus used the language of mutual indwelling in order that we would *know* about his relationship with his Father: "If I am not doing the works of My Father, then do not believe Me. But if I do them, even though you do not believe Me, believe the works, that you may know and understand that the Father is in Me, and I am in the Father".[526] It would seem that Jesus deemed the language of indwelling in

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[525] Ibid.
[526] John 10: 37-38.

describing his relationship with his Father to be adequate to the task. In using the same language, we can, therefore, be sure that we really do speak with understanding concerning the relationship between Father and Son, even if that understanding is woefully inadequate. When Jesus spoke of being one with the Father, he conveyed to his hearers a truth, imparted knowledge, even if in analogical form.[527] This is the basis upon which the legitimacy of comparing the two sets of relationships rests.

A further aspect of the legitimacy of comparing the two sets of relationships concerns the use of words such as 'love', 'respect', 'giving way to one another', 'taking the lead' and so on. We can question the legitimacy of applying the notions of, for example, 'giving way to one another' and 'taking the lead', both of which are aspects of how musicians may be said to indwell one another as they perform, to performers and to the Persons of the Trinity alike.[528] Here again, it would seem, we run up against issues of analogical predication. Although I take Burrell's point that analogy can only work if a core meaning can be carried through from one analogate to the other and that this is impossible when one of the analogates is God because God is absolutely other, we cannot accept that we cannot say anything meaningful about God because all our understanding of what words mean begins with and is rooted in our own human

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[527] I have addressed the issue of analogy and language-use when speaking of God in Chapter 4.
[528] See earlier in the chapter where I discuss Dukeman's mutual hierarchy approach to social trinitarianism which makes much of the way in which the members of the Trinity pursue their "differentiated kenotic vocations" (Dukeman, 2019, p. 53), now exercising authority over one another, now limiting their power so that the others can pursue their vocations to the full.

experiences.[529] This is the point at which Cross upholds semantic univocity rather than its value as an ontological category, arguing that

> […] discussion about God could not get started unless the univocity theory were true […] if there are concepts applicable only to God and not to creatures, we could not know what these concepts are since we have no cognitive mechanism for constructing them.[530]

Alister McGrath makes a parallel observation: "Wittgenstein's insistence upon the actual usage of words is an important corrective to more ontological approaches to analogy".[531]

The Scriptural use of words attests to the validity of the language-use and conceptual schemes of the mutual hierarchy approach. This approach, as I have sought to show, accords well with descriptions of the ways in which performing musicians relate to one another and which I outline in the chapters on the performance and reception of music and on good performance practice.[532] All these ways, both in the mutual hierarchy approach and in relation to music-making are, in fact, ways of indwelling, that is to say, they constitute indwelling, to act in these ways is definitive of what indwelling is; we cannot be said to indwell one another if we fail to act in these ways.

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[529] See Chapter 4 on analogy.
[530] Cross, 2007, p. 249.
[531] McGrath, 2007, p. 47.
[532] Chapters 9 and 10.

The goal of the above discussion has been to establish that it is legitimate to talk about the mutual indwelling of the Trinity, and that it is possible to do so without the spectre of projection lurking in the wings.

From the discussion in this chapter, I take forward a basal understanding of the relationality which is part of the doctrine of the Trinity, namely that it is one of a loving and mutual indwelling by virtue of which the identities of the divine Persons are formed and defined in their entirety. My aim has been to show that this understanding and its use in the thesis are not vulnerable to the criticisms often made of social Trinitarianism. Finally, my goal has been to show that Tanner's worries about the differences between intra-Trinitarian life and the life of human beings and which centre around human finitude, are not applicable to the life of a small musical ensemble such as a string quartet. On the contrary, I have argued that her characterisations of the life of the Trinity bears analogous comparison with that of a quartet.

That a small musical ensemble is like a community which I compare analogously to the Trinity can give rise to the suspicion that I adhere to some form of social Trinitarianism and that the thesis is vulnerable to some of the criticisms which are levelled at it. This chapter has sought to combat that suspicion, and in the course of doing so it has become apparent, I think, that I am not a social Trinitarian at all. What I have called my basal understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is indeed of the base of that doctrine. I have laid down some of the basic structure here which future chapters will build on and reinforce.

CHAPTER 6: THE OTHER

In a thesis about relationality, the other will clearly be a central concern. However, I shall not attempt a reconstructed generalised concept of the other for use in the argumentation of the thesis. My general contention with regard to the music-making of small ensembles, is that the members of, for example, a string quartet are best thought of as a unity in diversity rather than as four separate individual 'others' grouped together under the label 'string quartet'. The members of a quartet are placed in a network of overlapping relations; they all exist both for themselves and for the others.

I would like to suggest that for the purposes of the thesis, the string quartet or other small ensemble are the best contexts in which to think relationships between performing musicians. This context is an interesting one for analysis because the other(s) seem to take on a very particular role. Perhaps the closest example is a conversation, but a conversation is not a performance of a script or a score. The performance of a musical score in a small ensemble is sufficiently different from other forms of human interaction to make the others with whom one is involved in it not subsumable under a generalised concept of the other, so in this chapter I develop some of the peculiar aspects of musical relationality in continued conversation with theology. What I would like to do is to explore the approaches to the other taken by various philosophers and theologians, and relate these to the music-making context. In taking this hermeneutical approach, and with its brief references to a theology of

time, my intention in the chapter is to strengthen my arguments about the relationality involved in music-making as such.

Although this chapter is focussed on the human situatedness of self and the other as they 'confront' one another in music-making, my hope is that it does not detract from the overall Trinitarian thrust of the thesis. Rather, the intention is to foreground some aspects of otherness and relationality as they are manifested in music-making. I need to do this because they are integral to the analogy I draw between performers and the members of the Trinity, and the analogy is the methodological fulcrum of the thesis.

Otto and Barth

The concept of the other entered European thought as part of the reaction to the neo-Kantianism prevalent in early twentieth century German thought. Friedrich Schleiermacher and Johan Jakob Fries had emphasised the subjectivity of religious experience in an attempt to resist what they saw as the over-rationalist approach advocated by Kant,[533] and this ushered in the new field of *Religionspsychologie* of which William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is a well-known example.[534] In Rudolf Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*, in which he set out to rehabilitate the sense of the numinous, we find an idea of the wholly-other which is formally established and a prelude to the work of Karl Barth.[535]

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[533] Kant, 2018.
[534] James, 1985.
[535] Otto, 1950.

The Idea of the Holy first appeared in its original German in 1917. In 1919 Barth published his *Der Römerbrief* which contains two arguments that contributed significantly to the development of the concept of the other. The first, which is methodological, is that the problem of the other is timeless. This is Barth's break with historicism, his rejection of the method for which it is axiomatic that meaning and understanding are dependent on historical situatedness. In his 'Preface to the First Edition', Barth wrote,

> the differences between then and now, there and here no doubt require careful investigation and consideration. But the purpose of such investigation can only be to demonstrate that these differences are, in fact, purely trivial. The historical-critical method of Biblical investigation has its rightful place […] nevertheless my whole energy of interpreting has been expended in an endeavour to see through and beyond history into the spirit of the Bible […] What was once of grave importance, is so still. What is today of grave importance […] stands in direct connection with that ancient gravity. If we rightly understand ourselves, our problems are the problems of Paul".[536]

Barth's second argument concerns the absolute transcendence of God. For him, God's otherness is total; there is an infinite distance between God and human beings. Moyn

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[536] Barth, 1968, p. 1.

describes this argument as diastatic,[537] that is to say, there can be no commerce between human beings and God such that there is the possibility of some kind of resolution or mediation of their difference.

Although Barth adopted an uncompromising stance on the absolute alterity of God, he nonetheless argued against an extreme apophaticism which rendered God entirely unknowable. His argument turns the negative theologian back on himself, for such a theologian's method is to focus on the limits of the self which he attempts to overcome by negating even the negations of what he would say of God perhaps by way of metaphor and analogy. The consequence of this, although, as Barth admits, it is correct insofar as it emphasises the infinite distance between human beings and God, is to speak of oneself, thus it is not other-centred. Moyn is clear: "Barth […] refused to label his theology negative. An exclusively negative approach did no more than lead man to the tantalising brink of the other while keeping him occupied with himself".[538]

We can note also that Barth's insistence that nothing can be said about God seems at first sight to be self-contradictory. Stephen Webb, however, suggests that Barth's extreme emphases on God's otherness "should not be taken literally but instead as examples of hyperbole".[539] He goes on:

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[537] Moyn, 2005, p. 137.
[538] Ibid., p. 140.
[539] Webb, 1991, p. 100.

Barth does not know the unknowability of God. All he knows is that

religions claim to know something about an otherwise unknown

God. He knows that the effect of revelation is to destroy this

knowledge.[540]

Indeed, it is revelation, Barth insists, that enables human beings to know something

of God despite their absolute inability to approach him. Human beings can only wait

on God, and it is religion that provides the frame within which they can do so. It is

what is revealed by and in the humanity of Jesus that provides Barth with the starting

point for his discussion of "the basic form of humanity".[541] Barth finds that human

beings must be like Jesus "in some basic form",[542] otherwise

it would […] be difficult to see how the 'man' Jesus could be for

and from and to other 'men', how He could be inwardly affected

by their being, how He could be called and sent to be their Saviour

[…] how he could interpose Himself with His human life for these

other beings, acting and suffering and conquering in their place

and as their Representative.[543]

For Barth, that Jesus is for others "creates a new ontological reality in the human

situation".[544] Barth argues that God is the Creator of all men as well as the man Jesus,

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[540] Ibid.
[541] Barth, 2001, §45.2, pp. 222-283.
[542] Ibid., p. 223.
[543] Ibid.
[544] Johnson, 1997, p. 83.

and this means that in humanity we should seek the creaturely essence which is given by God. The crucial question is: "what is it that makes [men] capable of entering into covenant with God as the creatures of God".[545] The criterion here is the humanity of Jesus: "in theological anthropology what man is, is decided by the primary text, i.e. by the humanity of the man Jesus".[546] Because the humanity of Jesus is for human beings, then it belongs inescapably to the humanity of human beings that they too are for others. The definition of the humanity of man consists, then, "in the determination of his being as a being with the other".[547] There is a reciprocity in this; all humanity is for all humanity. Barth makes an interesting qualification here. We are reciprocally for one another only when there is the genuine duality of "singularity on both sides. The singular, not alone but in this duality, is the presupposition without which there can never be humanity in the plural".[548] Humanity's basic form, then, consists in our co-humanity, and this calls for reciprocity and the recognition that "I am as thou art".[549] This recognition has a Hegelian ring about it, as Hegel writes:

> Recognition is [...] two-sided, mutual. Mutual recognition is the realisation and suspension of the contradiction that the other [appears] to be opposed to me as an immediate being, and that I likewise appear to the other as immediate.[550]

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[545] Barth, 2001, p. 224.
[546] Ibid., p. 226.
[547] Ibid., p. 243.
[548] Ibid., p. 244.
[549] Ibid., p. 248.
[550] Hegel, 2007, p. 188.

The respect which is integral to Barth's 'I am as thou art', demands that there be real conversation, speaking that is truly listened and responded to. When we speak, listen, and respond, we are putting ourselves before the other according to various interpretations we give to one another.

There are four elements to encountering one another in this way: "reciprocal expression and its reciprocal reception, reciprocal address and its reciprocal reception".[551] In her essay *An Ironic Mimesis*, Kate Mehuron considers speech as Merleau-Ponty conceives it; again, we find reciprocity:

> the dynamism of one spoken address to another is similar to the way in which we actively welcome the passage of a musical phrase. […] One expressive situation elucidates the other; spoken address communicates via affective, intonational valences taken up by the other.[552]

This reciprocity is indeed characteristic of the relationality of performers. Although Mehuron is talking about the way we welcome a phrase of music, her point about valences being taken up by the other is particularly apt for music-making. The burden of this thesis is that it is the music-making itself which is the performed theology of relating; but the music-making 'contains' the players in the sense that they are defined

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[551] Barth, 2001, p. 253.
[552] Mehuron, 1989, p. 92.

as musicians by the music-making itself. The relationality manifested is musical and performed.

We can summarise what Barth achieves in his anthropology under four heads: (i) human existence is always being-in-act. To this extent our humanity is something set before us as a task to be accomplished. We are not yet fully human but only in our basic form. Our full humanity is to be realised at the eschaton; (ii) the meaning of the *imago Dei* is given by and in the person of Jesus; thus (iii) the divine-human union in Jesus can be understood in terms of his truly divine life lived in a *truly* human way; his is the only true humanity; (iv) the otherness of God with respect to human beings together with his connection to them is located in the being of Jesus which in its perfection is both for God and for humanity.

This discussion of Barth's anthropology alerts us to the one vital component in our relationship with the other, namely, that "one's human identity is grounded not in neutral separation or sameness but in concrete, engaged openness to the 'other'".[553] Because the humanity of Jesus is the true humanity, his being for others constitutes the imperative that our humanity must be directed towards others if it is to be realised. This means that the other presents us with opportunities for the realisation of our humanity.

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[553] Johnson, 1997, p. 155.

The other and music-making

If our humanity is grounded in engaged openness to the other as Barth contends, what is the implication of this for musicians performing together? I would like to suggest that music-making precisely requires an engaged openness to the other. This is particularly evident in my example of string quartet playing, where the ability to listen and respond to one another is essential. The identity of the musicians as musicians in *this* performance is entirely a question of this listening and responding. Certainly, identity is not the same as humanity, but Barth's requirement could hardly be met more completely. String quartet playing seems, then, to be a paradigmatic instance of the grounding required for our common humanity.

Cohen writes that "the self finds its inexhaustible resources when and only when it is without reserve in the service of the other".[554] Jesus in his humanity exhorts us to be-for-others. I would like to suggest that in music-making we are indeed for others, inescapably so if the performance is to be compelling and coherent. Such being for others in music-making has nothing to do with the players personalities in general, but everything to do with what is required by the music-making; this being for others is musical through and through. In music-making our humanity is to the fore and therefore our relationships are true, not strategic in the Habermasian sense, not ego-led.

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[554] Cohen, 1989, p. 43.

<u>Levinas</u>

Levinas presents us with a secularised version of Barth's insistence that the divine other is infinitely different, qualitatively speaking, from all finite entities. Although Levinas can speak of 'the face' as though an abstract idea, his intention is to emphasis the ability of the face to disrupt conventional constructs and to "call into question the horizons of the world".[555] The face of the other is in fact so emphatically concrete that it "cannot be approached with empty hands but only from within society".[556] When we make music together, the 'faces' of one's fellow performers are emphatically concrete and cannot be approached with empty hands. But this is acknowledged in the music-making itself. The players 'approach' one another as co-performers, and this means they give and receive musical ideas not in the abstract but as specific phrase-shapes, specific rhythmic and harmonic shapes, specific gradations of tone, and so on. There is little trace of generality or of convention in this reciprocity; each performance is new and must not, for fear of the dull repetition of previous performances, fall prey to generalities and conventional gestures, but challenge the horizons of what has been done; the interpretational possibilities of a great musical work cannot be exhausted. Gadamer tells us that, "the text itself still remains the first point of relation over and against the questionality, arbitrariness, or at least multiplicity of the possibilities of interpretation that are directed towards the text".[557]

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[555] Bernasconi, 1989, p. 33.
[556] Ibid.
[557] Quoted by Michelfelder, 1989, p. 52.

<u>Signing texts</u>

Gadamer's point here need not be a denial of the fecundity of the text, that the interpretation of great works of music cannot be exhausted, rather, it is to flag up the authority of the score; not any interpretation will do. There is what Diane Michelfelder calls "an imperative to sign [a] text".[558] This imperative arises "whenever we perform the signature of the other and make the other speak",[559] and this signing "belongs to the structure of textuality".[560] Is this not what happens in the performance of a musical score which is the signature of another? The imperative to sign is a demand that "we respond to the text […] by *returning the text* to its author through our reading of it in such a way that we recognise his or her *irreducible particularity*".[561] To interpret and reinterpret the music anew is to make it newly available to others in a recreated form. It is as though the musicians liberate (at least some) of the potentialities of the music, making them available to others for whom they can become an inspiration; this is a kind of gift. This is to honour both composer and fellow musicians.

Translating this to musical performance, we have the demand that not just the authority of the score be respected, but that the unique voice of *this* particular composer is not erased even though the notes he wrote are reproduced exactly as he or she wrote them. Examples of erasing the voices of composers are not difficult to find, especially in the many transcription of piano and organ music for full orchestra.

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[558] Ibid.
[559] Ibid.
[560] Ibid.
[561] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

For instance, Bach's great Passacaglia and Fugue for organ in its transcription for full orchestra by Respighi becomes a romantic showpiece with which to show off the colours of the orchestra. Similarly, Bach's Fantasia and Fugue in C minor BWV 537 as transcribed for full orchestra by Elgar achieves a kind of Edwardian grandeur far removed from anything Bach could have envisaged. Even though performers should aim to make the old new for each new audience, one feels the force of Michelfelder's injunction to sign and respond to the text such that we recognise the irreducible particularity of the composer, and this is now a *sine qua non* of authenticity in musical performance.

A binary pairing to be found in Levinas' work is that of 'the same' and 'the other', and Levinas must find a way of theorising the relationship between them. He does this with his concept of 'the face' which can be thought of as a concretisation of infinity. Although the face is visualised, it is not a visual manifestation of the infinity of the other, rather, it presents us with an 'expression'; it reveals as well as it conceals, and herein resides its infinity. From moment to moment, "the face of the other […] destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its […] adequate idea".[562] Here we find that the face mediates between the self and the other. The face, as ever-changing expression, that is, revelation of infinity, of the other, cannot be contained by the self but is provisional in what it reveals moment by moment.

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[562] Levinas, 1969, pp. 50-51.

The point for Levinas about the face, which is his word for another person, is that it always and already has a claim on me. I am not able to hold the other before me in his or her full presence because he or she is always in excess of my abilities to synthesise what the face presents me with, which is to say that the face overwhelms me.

But what happens in music-making? There are two kinds of excess in music-making. First, the range of possible interpretations is inexhaustible. Second, in *this* performance what the other players present me with and what I present them with is "already present (has already passed), and is yet to come (has not yet arrived into the present), such that the 'other' cannot in principle – and especially in principle – be brought to presence".[563]

Cohen is here explaining how it is that for Levinas the other is, in principle, overwhelming. This description also maps well on to what is going on in musical performance. What is played at any given moment refers back ("is already past") and forward ("has not yet arrived into the present"). Insofar as they are continuous with the performance, the players cannot be brought to presence, the excess overwhelms me. The point about a coherent performance is that at its end the past and the future *have* been brought together. The musical potentialities of the themes of the work have been thoroughly explored and developed. Only at the end of a piece of music are we able to understand any given moment in it. There has been a consummation of the work as a whole. The relationality inherent in the work has been perfected, and this is

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[563] Cohen, 1989, p. 40.

one reason why *music-making* is a *performed* theology of relating. Musically speaking, the performers have been engaged in perfecting their relationships. This is not just a question of developing technique or of coming to a shared vision of the work in question. Rather, it will have been a matter of relating to one another in terms of the musical ideas inherent in the work. This relating has been a moment-by-moment *musical* endeavour and also something which by the end of the performance has reached its fulfilment. Begbie seems to express a view consonant with this when he writes:

> it would seem that the 'reality' we experience at any one 'moment'
> in music cannot be exhausted by those phenomena which can be
> said to exist 'now'. We are not given an evaporating present but a
> present through which the past directed towards the future, or –
> to put it another way – with phenomena which in their physicality
> are intrinsically and very closely bound to earlier and later music
> occurrences.[564]

The immediate context for this is not human relationality but the passage of music through space-time as we experience it. It is however apt for my reflections on the formation of relationships which take place in music-making as a *musical* endeavour.

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[564] Begbie, 2000, p. 67.

The thorough exploration of the possibilities inherent in a theme is relatively easily seen in variation form and especially so in fugue. Perhaps the paradigmatic example is Bach's *The Art of Fugue*, BWV 1080. In this work, Bach subjects a simple theme to the whole gamut of fugal and contrapuntal possibilities.

Levinas admits that it is possible to obstruct the alterity of the other. However, the one thing that is not possible in ensemble music-making is that players bracket out one another. Instead, they receive and give to one another in the fullness of what they have to offer to the performance. Does this contradict what I say elsewhere about the oneness of musical ensembles? The desirability of coherent performances ensures that individuality cannot be construed as opposition, rather, it must be an individuality which contributes to the overall unity of performance. Thus, that the alterity of another can and might be ignored in most contexts is not something to be feared in the context of music-making.

Levinas pursued the possibilities for decoupling transcendence from its theological anchorage;[565] in this respect he presents us with a secularised version of Barth's insistence that the divine other is infinitely different, qualitatively speaking, from all finite entities. Thus, Levinas opposes the other's nature as infinity to the finite nature of the self; it is transcendent in its relation to the self. Here we have a very different transcendence than that associated with God. Levinas could write that the other "remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it remains terrestrial",[566]

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[565] Moyn, 2005, p. 181.
[566] Levinas, 1969, p. 203.

furthermore, the relation between self and other is "not enacted outside the world".[567]

We could say that Levinas' ethics of transcendence is a response to the impasse which is presented to human beings when the other in its uncontainable alterity is thus always beyond our consciousness. This is a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the subject, the consequence of which is that it becomes a necessary condition of perception and cognition that the subject must subordinate the other to its consciousness if it is to construct a (or the) truth concerning the other. Thus, that which I can name, that which I can substantively perceive, and, especially, that which I can perceive as the same are essential in the construction of truth by consciousness. For Levinas, the other also exists in a pedagogical relation to me, but it can teach only provided I surrender my interests and abandon the subordination I would otherwise inflict on it. The other now becomes the other that "tears me away from my hypostasis",[568] thus here there is violence. Levinas writes: "The eye can conceive [the asymmetry between self and other] only by virtue of position, which as an above-below disposition constitutes the elementary fact of morality".[569] On this account, it would seem that either I stand over and above the other, or the other stands over and above me. This spatiality structures the ethical in my relations with the other; as Edith Wyschogrod comments, "'above' and 'below' in this context are not abstractions".[570] Even so, violence is not inevitable, rather, violence is the failure to pay proper

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[567] Ibid., p. 172.
[568] Levinas, 2006, p. 74.
[569] Levinas, 1969, p. 297.
[570] Wyschogrod, 2005, p. 359.

attention to the other in their alterity. For an encounter with the other to be free of violence requires the self and other to move beyond the confines of ordinary sociality. The proper response to alterity in the other is to stand in the excess of ordinary sociality which it demands. In this excess, self becomes responsible for the other, and espouses charity.

Charity, we might say, is fragile; the other remains in constant danger of being (re)instrumentalised. And are not 'above' and 'below' potentially subject to continual oscillation from one to the other, and what can arrest such oscillation? Is it not rather that instead of 'above' and 'below', the ethical is structured by a mutual partial knowing and unknowing on the part of self and other? The future is decisive here. Self and other face the future together, a future which cannot be completely known, and the complete subordination of the one to the other cannot take place unless one somehow robs the other of its future.

Richard Kearney tells us that "*Persona* is that eschatological aura of 'possibility' which outstrips but informs a person's actual presence here and now. It is another word for the otherness of the other",[571] and it encompasses the infinity of Levinas' other, for it includes the other's past and future and all that which in the other escapes my consciousness.

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[571] Kearney, 2005, p. 371.

I outline Kearney's ideas on 'persona', and then relate them to the music-making context, focussing especially on the inexhaustible possibilities for the interpretation of a musical work, and, thus, for the relationality of the performers.

For Kearney, any encounter with another is to configure them in some way. This configuring is an attempt not to limit the other either to pure presence or pure absence; the first is to make of the other a thing, the second is to make of the other a nothing; to do either is to disfigure the other. And so, in an encounter with the other we must hold fast to a paradox whereby we "grasp [the other] as present in absence, as both incarnate in flesh and transcendent in time [… and this is] to *transfigure* the other, allowing this other to appear as his/her unique *persona*".[572]

Kearney accepts that to maintain the paradox in our encounters with the other is difficult. He says, "the other always appears to us 'as if' it was actually present".[573] This makes a link with Levinas' view that our encounters with the other are always a matter of more or less violent subordination. Kearney expresses this in terms of appropriation: we "appropriate them to our scheme of things, reading them off against our familiar models of understanding and identification".[574] But the *persona* always exceeds our ability to take it in. Equally, we can easily come to the *persona* as though it were an idol rather than an icon of transcendence; "In this case, the 'as if' presence of the *persona* is suspended in the interests of deification or apotheosis".[575]

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[572] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[573] Ibid. The 'as if' has enclosing apostrophes in the original.
[574] Ibid.
[575] Ibid.

So Kearney's argument here is that we can disfigure others in two ways: by seeing them according to our pre-conceived ideas and identitarian categories, and also by refusing their "flesh and blood thereness".[576]

Kearney goes on to develop the notion of the *persona* as eschaton which echoes Augustine's view of the mind as an *imago*. Whilst Augustine is often thought to be seeking psychological analogies for the Trinity, he can be thought of as, according to Ayers, "using the language of faith to explore the mind and using what he finds there to think through how we might imagine the divine three as distinct and yet never divided".[577] Ayers pursues this line of thinking to suggest that, for Augustine, the mind seeks to know itself but that desire "occludes our vision".[578] Consequently, the mind as an image of the Trinity cannot know itself until we are transformed and purified through grace. Ayers concludes, "thus Augustine offers us an account of an image present yet eschatologically realised".[579] For Kearney, the *persona* guarantees "the irreducible finality of the other as *eschaton*",[580] giving us to realise that the *persona* as eschaton of the other always escapes any power we may wish to wield over him/her. The otherness of the other is constituted by possibilities and powers that are beyond the reach of my powers and possibilities which constitute my otherness for the other. Kearney expresses this when he says, "if we could figure out – in the sense of knowing and appropriating – the other's *persona*, it would no longer be *other*. We would have

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[576] Ibid., p. 372.
[577] Ayers, 2014, p. 133.
[578] Ibid., p. 134.
[579] Ibid.
[580] Kearney, 2005, p. 372.

denied the other's temporality, futurity, alterity".[581] This linking of otherness with time is clearly of relevance to the thesis. Kearney gives us a most useful quotation from Levinas: "The relation with the other is the absence of the other; not absence pure and simple, not absence as pure nothing [*néant*], but absence in a futural horizon, an absence which is time".[582]

Kearney's concept of *persona* appears to provide us with a bulwark against the fragility of charity in relationships and against the danger in relationships of oscillation between subordination either of self to other or of other to self. This bulwark exists in the tension, the paradox, whereby the other appears as presence in absence, both transcendent in time and materially enfleshed in the here and now. The other is past, present, and future, that is, beyond time, yet it stands before me in this moment straining against its past and its future; absence in presence.

In music-making, there is a learning. The players absorb and respond to intensities of dynamic, phrasing, tempi and so on. As they indwell one another, what they play and express triggers their united expressivity, their worlds coalesce.

Musicians indwell one another in terms of the variations in the intensity of the expressivity of their playing. They perceive, and respond to variations in the expressive intensity of musical ideas, for example, the significance of melodic lines and harmonic rhythm, which they give to the music-making. This intensity of the expressivity of the

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[581] Ibid., p. 373.
[582] Levinas, 1948, p. 64. Quoted Kearney, 2005, p. 373.

other players which, in part, gives them their identity for me, exists as part of my world, that is, they indwell me, and they indwell me in terms of the music-making. The more we indwell the music-making, the more we indwell one another.

This thought takes us back to Michelfelder's comments on signing a text and returning it to the author in such a way that it is a recognition of his or her irreducible particularity, an aspect of continuity, for, as Benson contends, composition and performance bleed into one another.[583]

The voice of the composer no less than the voices of my fellow players must not be erased, though I do need to respond to them with musical imagination and insight, and this will be done in accordance with the vision of the work which we have together agreed previously will determine our interpretation of it.

Although *this* performance of the music cannot exhaust all the possibilities the work contains for realisation in performance, a good performance will come close to fulfilling all the possibilities which the musicians provide for one another in *this* performance according to *this* conception of the work. An indicator of this would be a coherent performance, that is, one in which the players severally and together thoroughly explore and integrate all, or nearly all, the facets of *this* conception of the work.[584] Conceived in this way, the good performance as a coherent performance is not achieved until the last notes die away. Until then, knowledge of the other(s), that

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[583] Benson, 2003, p. 161.
[584] Please see p. 203 above for my comments on performances, for example fugues, which exhaust all the musical possibilities inherent in the work.

is *musical* knowledge of them, can be only indirect and partial. One might see a link

here with Kearney's concept of the *persona* in its eschatological aspect, its temporality

and futurity. Quoting Levinas, Kearney says, "the relation with the other is the absence

of the other; not absence pure and simple, not absence as pure nothing [néant], but

as absence in a futural horizon, an absence which is time".[585] The time of the work

ends once the last notes have died away, the work, or at least that particular

conception of the work, has been brought to its consummation; at that moment the

performing of a theology of relating ends too.[586]

Hegel

Hegel's view is that not all otherness is eliminated as Spirit comes to greater and

greater awareness of itself. Schacht comments: "Hegel states quite explicitly that at

the level of absolute knowledge, otherness remains a 'moment'. Spirit at this highest

level is said to be 'at home in its otherness as such' […] it is […] otherness experienced

as alienness that is eliminated".[587] Hegel's distinction which Schacht expresses as the

distinction between otherness and alienness is pertinent to my argument, for when

we perform with others we feel 'at home' in and with their otherness, bound together

with them in the performance yet without any accompanying sense of alienation. On

the contrary, my freedom as a member of the quartet is predicated on this otherness-

without-alienation. On Hegel's account, otherness thought as distance would seem

essential to comprehension. Kaufmann reminds us that Hegel drew a further

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[585] Levinas, 1948, p. 185. Quoted Kearney, 2005, p. 373.
[586] In Chapter 13, I address the question of what happens when the concert is ended.
[587] Schacht, 1972, p. 56.

distinction between *bekannt* and *erkannt*. The first is a knowing by acquaintance, the second knowing is one of comprehension.[588] "Comprehension", says Kaufmann, "requires some distance and consists in a triumph over distance".[589] Familiarity can obscure the truth. By way of example Kaufmann invites us to consider what happens when we become over-familiar with a play or a piece of music. He says, "we lack distance and must become alienated if we would comprehend it".[590] Over-familiarity is a constant danger for performers with a repertoire which they need to be able to access at short notice, and so every so often they need to stand back and view the music afresh lest it becomes stale in performance.

When Kaufmann says "we […] must become alienated", I suggest we should read this is terms of a viewing-anew. The music, its performance/interpretation, together with one's fellow performers, should not be taken for granted. To take something and/or someone for granted in this way is to do them/it violence, as Levinas suggests violence is the failure to pay proper attention to the other in their alterity.[591] In Kearney's terms this is to configure the music and its performers as pure presence and thus to disfigure them. In Kearney's terms, musicians will hold the other, both music and fellow performers, as presence in absence, thus acknowledging, and creating conditions for the appearance of, their uniqueness. In this there is a reciprocity amongst the members of, say, a string quartet, and, as such, it is comparable to what Husserl has in mind by *Einfühlung*, which is understanding, empathy and sensitivity,[592] and for

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[588] Kaufmann, 1972, p. xxv.
[589] Ibid.
[590] Ibid.
[591] See pp. 205 above.
[592] Terrell, et al., 1997, p. 195.

Husserl denotes a sympathetic "perception of an Other, of another I [as a] for-itself-I, as I am".[593] The reciprocity here is one of 'co-presence',[594] and that performers are co-present to one another is clearly essential for good performances. In music-making in which all the participants are united together in their vision of the music, blend together rhythmically and tonally, respond to one another so that the music-making has life and vitality, then the players form, as it were, a single consciousness, even, as Hegel might say, a single self-consciousness:

> self-consciousness […] reaches beyond itself; it continues in an other self-consciousness so that there are no longer two self-seeking individuals opposed to each other; rather there is a single self-consciousness.[595]

Schacht frames up a range of core issues which pertain to accounts of 'the other' and the concept of alienation in philosophical, sociological, and psychological literature. Of these, three are particularly pertinent to the arguments of the thesis and help to consolidate some of my key points in this chapter. The first ties in with why I emphasise good music-making, that it is an indication of the close relationships between the players. Schacht writes, "a certain kind of solidarity with others is possible if, and only if, one shares a set of values, beliefs and practices with them".[596] *Musical* solidarity occurs when one shares musical values, beliefs, and practices with

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[593] This translation is by Schacht, 1972, p. 219 from Husserl, 1954.
[594] Schacht, 1972, p. 219.
[595] Hegel, 2007, p. 194.
[596] Schacht, 1972, p. 262.

one's fellow performers. This sharing is more than a love of music *per se*; coherent performances will not result if, for example, some players in a quartet take a 'romantic' approach to a Mozart score whilst other take a more historically informed approach. Incoherent performances are thus an indication of poor relating between the players, and this is why I stress throughout the thesis that coherent and compelling performances are those in which relationships between the players are at their best, and that these are performances which, therefore, I hold up as being performed theologies of Christian relating *par excellence*.

For Schacht, "one's individuality is not complete unless or until one rejects conformity to sociocultural institutions and the expectations of others".[597] I reject this claim in part. I would like to suggest that as a musician in *this* performance of *this* work my individuality (identity) is complete precisely as I conform to *this* vision of the work as agreed with my fellow performers. The others are essential to my identity, that is, I cannot be, for example, a baroque violinist in a small ensemble unless the other players provide the appropriate context, as I must for them. I cannot achieve an identity *in this performance* if I play in a romantic style in a baroque ensemble; my identity as a romantic player can only be established through knowledge of my previous performances in (so called) romantic music, otherwise I simply appear in *this* performance as a player who, precisely, is not able to relate to the others. As I cannot

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[597] Ibid., p. 263.

have a private language (Wittgenstein), neither can I be a romantic player unless others validate me as such in a 'romantic playing style' form of life.

On the other hand, I accept that unthinking and unimaginative conformity to musical conventions and expectations obstructs the formation of individuality, and an identity which contributes to fresh and lively performances. In order to make such contributions I must have a secure sense of self, I must be self-conscious and freely express my identity, and this, on a Hegelian view, is realised in another self-consciousness; "the I comes to be for itself only through the mediation (recognition) of another".[598] This is consonant with the argument in the previous paragraph.

The last issue I would like to mention is that "a person is not as he should be to the extent that he does not exist in some sort of unity with others".[599] Human beings, it is said, are social by nature. My account of the relatedness of the members of small musical ensembles emphasises the unity which must obtain between them if performances are to be persuasive, coherent, and compelling.[600]

My intention in this chapter has been to emphasise that an other in his or her particularity is not exchangeable for another other. As the authors I have reviewed have argued, the particularity, the otherness of the other, their futurity, their infinity, can never be taken as it were for a fixed datum. So it is with musicians who, in pursuit

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[598] Williams, 2007, p. 21.
[599] Schacht, 1972, p. 264.
[600] I pursue this theme in various contexts throughout the thesis, but see especially Chapters 9 and 10 and the discussion of co-created creative space.

of good music-making, must remain attuned to all these and more aspects of their fellow performer's otherness as it is manifested in phrasing, tone, articulation and so on. In the next part of the thesis, I develop this and related claims in the context of the practicalities of music-making.

PART 3: MUSIC-MAKING

CHAPTER 7: THE EXTRA-MUSICAL QUALITIES OF GOOD MUSIC-MAKING

Although the understanding of music-making in the thesis is confined to the purely musical, ignoring, for example, its cultural, social, political, and emotional aspects, nonetheless good music-making is not possible unless it is engaged in with a spirit of devotion, even love and selflessness. In this chapter I aim to defend this claim, especially because love has a prominent part in the argumentation of later chapters.

Perhaps it is worth noting that although the focus in this chapter is on human qualities, this is not to dilute the Trinitarian theme of the thesis overall. Indeed, at the end of the chapter we find Oster linking love, knowledge, and passion in action with the person as a "being-in-relation",[601] and he reminds us that this is Aquinas' description of "the inner-Trinitarian persons".[602]

Music-making, especially that of small ensembles, demands a certain relationality between the performers. This relationality is characterised by respect, empathy, awareness of one another, and so on.[603] The players must be able to form a coherent unit without losing their individuality, that is, they need to indwell one another. This is the basis of the analogy with the Trinity.

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[601] Oster, 2012, pp. 353-4.
[602] Ibid., p. 354. See Aquinas, 1991, 1.29.4, p. 69.
[603] These personal qualities are also discussed and defended as essential to good music-making in Chapter 6 on the other.

Stewart Gordon, writing about the need "to create some sort of philosophical foundation for our performance lives",[604] is clear that "love for our specific field of endeavour is an aspect of performance motivation that to some extent permeates our efforts from the first to the last".[605] Gordon speaks of the way in which one is drawn into a field of interest "resulting in intense personal dedication".[606] He reports that

> veterans in many fields express love and devotion for their conceptual ideal. Creative artists, such as musicians, actors, writers, painters, and poets, often speak of an intense love for whatever activity they pursue.[607]

Gordon expands on this theme in ways which are entirely familiar to performing musicians who are indeed dedicated to their art:

> When a number of individuals profess such love, a bond is forged that generates feelings of being part of a special society, a community of celebrants that offers understanding and support."[608]

The community, mentioned by Gordon, that offers understanding and support, bears comparison with my notion of co-created creative space. The love of, and dedication

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[604] Gordon, 2010, p. 25.
[605] Ibid., p. 29.
[606] Ibid.
[607] Ibid.
[608] Ibid.

to, their art demands that musicians indwell one another; interpretation must be consistent, one takes one's place in the ensemble respectfully, the coherence of a performance demands a lively awareness of the contribution fellow performers make to the overall performance.

My arguments are perhaps couched in terms of an unattainable ideal of perfect dedication. But the ideal stands, we can aspire towards it. The extent to which performing musicians dedicate themselves to the music-making is reflected in the quality of their performances, and the dedication works itself out in this theological account of performance I am offering here, in the mode of mutual indwelling.

Talking about his life as a composer, Michael Berkeley says, "If you don't believe passionately in a piece, you shouldn't be writing it. In other words, you go through a sort of love affair with it".[609] For 'writing', could we not substitute 'performing'?

Andrew Porter wrote of the love that the conductor Herbert von Karajan brought to a performance of Brahms' Third and Fourth Symphones. The interpretations of these great works were "voyages of discovery; loving traversals of familiar, exciting ground with a fresh eye and mind, in the company of someone prepared to linger there, exclaim there".[610]

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[609] Berkeley, 2015, p. 62.
[610] Quoted by Osborne, 1999, p. 672.

Karajan himself is unequivocal concerning the neccesity for love in music-making. Referring to the experience of being so immersed in music-making that "one is carried away as if by a wave that towers higher and higher", he tells us that "it takes years of work" to make this possible and that it "derive(s) from decades of effort, work and love".[611] Again, from the conductor's point of view, Bernard Haitink says, "the secret of music-making is that you must embrace the orchestra".[612]

The composer Joseph Phibbs tells us that "Britten said as a composer you can only write the kind of music you love, that your heart is in".[613] I would suggest that one might easily substitute 'perform' for 'write'?

I point in later chapters to an exchange between Xenakis and Messiaen which suggests that, at least for Messiaen, love is an integral part of the composition process; and if it is of composition, surely it is no less so of performance which is often thought of as a sort of re-composition.

What is common to each of these authoritative musicians is the perveived need for love of music when composing or performing it. As I attempt below to provide a theological account of this kind of love, I argue that we might say that (drawing on my Trinitarian reflections in previous chapters) it engenders a mutual indwelling on the

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[611] Karajan, 1999, p. 738, included as Appendix A in Osborne, 1999.
[612] Bridcut, 2020: Bernard Haitink: The Enigmatic Maestro.
[613] Phibbs, 2015, p. 385.

part of the performers. That musicians indwell one another is necessitated by the desire to give good performances, it flows from a love of the music.

The testimony of Britten, Berkeley, Osborne, Karajan, Haitink and Messiaen strongly suggest that love, dedication, sacrifice, and selflessness are desirable ingredients of good music-making. These qualities can be tainted with egocentricity on occasion,[614] but egoism must be held firmly in check during the course of performances otherwise the coherence of a performance, its structural integrity with regard to things such as phrasing and interpretation generally are lost. Egoism may well be apparent in other aspects of the performing musician's life, contract negotiations, for example.

Love, indwelling, discernment and music-making

Whilst poor performances are possible despite the players having a love for their art – perhaps the performance space is cold or has very poor acoustics, or perhaps the players have just received some bad news - I suggest that good performances, ones which I call 'compelling', are only possible when the music-making is undertaken with love. Love for the music gives rise to the desire to perform it as well as possible, and this in turn seems to depend on the mutual indwelling of the performers.

 In Saint Paul's well-known words "Love is patient and kind; love does not envy or boast; it is not arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way".[615] These qualities

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[614] See Osborne, 1999 and Vaughan, 1990 for several such examples.
[615] 1 Cor. 13:4.

characterise musicians when they perform together. Although performers might be rude, impatient, and so on when not actually performing, all these things would simply get in the way when they do perform. There is give and take in performance, and that is kindness of a sort as well as it affords dignity and respect to the other players. There is no place for envy during performances, rather, the players rejoice in the technical skills and interpretive insights of their colleagues because they play an invaluable part in bringing the musical score to life. Further, the performance of any one player is partly dependent on the accomplishments of the others; they feed off, and hand on to, one another, they pull together. These are all aspects of indwelling.

In commenting on 1 Corinthians 13 'The Way of Love'. William Cavanaugh suggests that in this chapter Paul is making it quite clear that communal discernment is not "effective without the virtue of love". He continues, "As anyone who has lived in a community knows, it takes a great deal of patient love even to want to find a common way forward […] the discernment of a true common life requires some measure of love".[616] In this way, I would argue that we can look at a string quartet when it is performing as a small community; it must discern the way forward as regards the interpretation of a piece of music at this time, in this place and set of circumstances; the manner of performance of *this* phrase determines its forward performances, the tempo set at the beginning has implications for the performance of later sections of

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[616] Cavanaugh, 2019, pp. 171-172.

the work. Discerning the way forward is driven by a love of the music, and the consequent desire to perform it as well as possible.

Perhaps it is worth stressing this point a little: the love to which I am referring in the thesis apropos music-making is directed toward the music itself and the music-making. This seems to pull away from an exclusively Trinitarian orientation. I argue, however, that love for the music and the desire to perform it as well as possible necessitates the players indwell one another during the performance. It is well-known that string quartet players frequently disagree and quarrel, sometimes violently, when preparing a performance, but these are occasioned by a passion for the music and the disagreements must be resolved by the time of the performance itself;[617] during the performance the players indwell one another as a condition of good music-making. Indwelling is the basal notion underlying the analogical comparison of members of a small musical ensemble with the members of the Trinity. In this way, we can see an account of Christian love as overlapping Trinitarian theology, as I have suggested in previous chapters.

Clausen tells us that, "Self-knowledge depends on acknowledging the other, through whom we slowly come into awareness of our placement. The gift of the other is the place of the self, for the other makes possible the self's realisation."[618]

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[617] See Nissel, 1998 for several good examples of disagreements between string quartet members as they prepare performances.
[618] Clausen, 2018, p. 17.

What Clausen says here applies to each and every member of a musical ensemble. Each musician is 'placed' within the ensemble by all the others. On Clausen's account, then, placement is a gift of others, and it is easy to see how this applies to a string quartet. One might say it is a gift of love, where love is understood in the terms given above: respect, giving way, support, selflessness, patience and so on. But if we were to think empirically, these virtues of respect, support, selflessness, patience and so on would require operational definitions as would love. In this way we come to actual performance practice, and I devote Chapters 9 and 10 to showing that mutual indwelling on the part of performers is an integral part of successful music-making. It is worth re-emphasising the connection to Trinitarian theology here. As I read it, Clausen's account of these virtues by which we gift to one another our place in the world, including our place in the world of the musical performance, resonates in a strong way with Dukeman's account of the members of the Trinity in his mutual hierarchy version of social Trinitarianism, which I discuss in Chapter 5 above.[619]

When musicians are fully attentive and listen to each other for the sake of performance, in my theological account, we may say that the quality is maximised. Individual features of this account, for example, full absorption in the other, full co-operation with the other, can be said to have an analogical similarity with accounts of intra-Trinitarian relations.

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[619] See Chapter 5 on social Trinitarianism.

<u>Performing musicians are subsisting relations</u>

Throughout the thesis I try to show that descriptions of music-making can be inflected theologically. Stefan Oster appeals to a musical analogy in his discussion of becoming a person. His view is that a person becomes more and more him- or herself "through loving knowledge and knowingly loving".[620] If I have successfully argued in this section of the thesis that persuasive music-making is a question of a selfless devotion to the performance of the music which is characterised by love, then Oster's musical analogy seems to fit my thoughts about the identity of musicians being entirely formed by their musical relationships with one another. He writes:

> The person [...] is simply a respondent, a listener, an observer, one who reacts. He is immersed in what is at hand and lets himself be led along by the [...] conversation, by the other person. And yet, in the midst of all this, he is completely himself, he acts [...] and behaves as himself: the action is the passion and vice versa. [...] In loving knowledge and knowing love, there exists selfhood as a manner of being-in-relation; there the person is a *relatio subsistens*".[621]

In a footnote at the end of this quotation, Oster reminds us that Aquinas uses just this expression – *relationis subsistentes* – "in order to describe the inner-Trinitarian

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[620] Oster, 2012, p. 352.
[621] Oster, 2012, p. 353-4.

persons".[622] The thesis is an attempt to make good the connection here made, namely, that in performance musicians are subsisting relationships as, analogously, are the members of the Trinity.

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[622] Ibid., pp. 354, n. 24. See Aquinas, 1991, 1.29.4, p. 69.

CHAPTER 8: A PRELIMINARY ORIENTATION TO SOME ASPECTS OF CONTINUITY IN THE MUSIC-MAKING CONTEXT

Continuity has a crucial role in the argumentation of the thesis, especially, but not only, the continuity between the music-making and performers. As I use it in the thesis, it is a 'practical' concept which is best understood in the specific contexts in which I use and develop it in later chapters, especially, but not exclusively, the following two chapters on the practice of music. Here I provide a preliminary orientation to its use in the thesis which I hope will serve as a useful background against which to assess its effectiveness in forwarding my later arguments.

The kind of continuity which will be the focus of this chapter is found *in* relationship in the midst of music-making, within the mutual indwelling of musicians and continuity across their identities as they perform *this* work together at *this* time.

That the performer is continuous with the music-making, specifically, that the performer is defined in his or her entirety as performer by the music-making is central to my overall argument. Here I give a brief introduction to what I have in mind by this. I argue for it in more detail in later chapters where the discussion gives a more fertile context for its development.

It would seem that the continuity which plays an important part in the thesis has little to do with the continuities and infinitesimals of mathematical calculus. But consider the continuity between an equation of a curve, that is, a mathematical function, and

the curve itself. Given the conventions of Cartesian co-ordinates, the equation defines the curve in its entirety; there is continuity between them. This is not generally true of definitions and that which they define. The definition of a cup as a vessel for drinking from does not define any given cup in its entirely; shape, size, material, and decoration, for example, are missing from the definition. Is the continuity between musicians and music-making like that between the mathematical equation (function) and curve? Is one entirely defined by the other?

We can start to answer this question with an example in which there is a very strong continuity: dancers and the dance. The dancers define the dance in its entirety, they are one and the same, the overlap between them is exact, it is only in language that an apparent separation between them can be made; there are not two things, only the (one group of) dancers dancing. The continuity, we can say, is in both directions. It would be a category error if someone were to see the dancers dancing yet say they could not see the dance, or if they were to say they were watching dancing but could not see the dancers.

In the same way as there is continuity between dancers dancing and the dance, I would like to suggest that there is continuity between musicians playing and the music they make. The continuity between dancers and dancing is extremely strong because the whole body is involved in the execution of the dance, even facial gestures can be considered part of the dance, especially, perhaps, in ballet. In music-making, the whole body is less likely to be involved. But let us think about the player as making *this* music at *this* time. As the dance *is* the dancers dancing and the dancers dancing *is*

the dance, the instrumentalist as the maker of *this* music at *this* time is continuous

with the music-making. What I have in mind is that moment by moment the player *as*

that player is entirely defined by the music he or she makes. Unless the musician is

distracted from her or his playing, there seems no gap between him or her and the

music-making. Because this continuity is important for my overall argument, this is

why I lay such stress on the need for good performances, for the performer who is

distracted will not contribute to a good performance and will not be entirely defined

by the music-making. This continuity has a physical manifestation in, for example, the

movements of the violinist's fingers on the violin's finger-board and the movements

of his or her bowing arm. It can be seen in the breathing and the lip-shapes of brass

and woodwind players. Bowie observes that,

> The purely physical description of something which we understand
>
> as music […] has to be complemented by an interpretive aspect […]
>
> the supposedly purely objective turns out not to be separable from
>
> the supposedly subjective because it is inextricably bound up with
>
> human action.[623]

Bowie's view here coincides with what Wood tells us about Brahms for whom there

was no separation between the technical and expressive aspects of music-making.[624]

There is a sense in which taking something up into oneself is an aspect of continuity.

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[623] Bowie, 2009, p. 9.
[624] See pp. 46-7 above.

Performers, as it were, take into themselves, contract, the elements of *this* music in the course of performing it, and thus become continuous with the music-making.

Continuity and time, music and music-making

Here I give a brief statement of one of the reasons why the thesis is focussed on music-making rather than on music. This distinction is developed especially in Chapter 9 on the performance and reception of music. I also briefly sketch an argument for thinking of performers as constructed in time from the momentary instants which are manifestations of the music as it exists and develops in time. This is a further argument for the continuity of the performers and the music-making.

As Begbie suggests, music-making is something which occurs in, and is dominated by, time. We say that it changes and extends over time. Thus, we might be tempted to say that any given act of music-making is a continuant. Aristotle's view was that continuants were primary substances and that they were capable of possessing contrary qualities while remaining the same.[625] Aune's example is of a mature maple tree which over the course of a year has "light green leaves in the spring, dark green leaves in the summer, brown or reddish leaves in the fall, and no leaves in the winter. These changes are entirely comparable with its remaining the very same tree

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[625] Aune, 1986, p. 78.

throughout the year".[626] The changes, however, must be what Aristotle called 'accidental'; a change in substance or 'essence' signals the end of a thing.

Now whilst music is not a primary substance, it does exist across time and so is a continuant though it depends for its existence on the activity of musicians. Also, it has processual qualities which result from the actions of musicians who are themselves continuants. The continuity of cause and effect allows us to speak of a continuity between the musicians and the music-making; the music-making is caused by musicians. Thus, insofar as I seek an argument which shows that music has theological import in its own right in terms of the relationality of performers, my focus is on *music-making* rather than on music as 'thing'.

Another aspect of the continuity which plays such a large part in the thesis can be approached by thinking about events as Carnap and Russell do.[627] For them, an event is something which persists in time and whose manifestation at any given moment is an 'instance'. On this view, a continuant is a reality derived by logical construction from events. The music is the same musical work throughout its changes. 'Things' happen to it: themes are transformed, instrumental colours shift, and so on. On this view, the case as made above for continuity between music-making and music-makers is strengthened. We can say the musical work, which is a continuant, is a construction out of momentary instances. The instances are continuous with the music-making, which is continuous with the music-makers, hence the music-makers are 'constructed'

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[626] Ibid.
[627] Russell, 1948, pp. 97-98, Carnap, 1958, pp. 197-216.

out of all the momentary instances which are manifestations of the work as it exists changingly through time.

Continuity and co-created creative space

One of my key trajectories in the thesis is to establish the idea of the co-created creative space of music-making. One prominent aspect of this space is the continuity between all its various components. Here I provide a descriptive account of this space and the continuity which is integral to it. This is to bolster my claims for the continuity of music-making and performers, and another illustration of why my emphasis is on music-making rather than simply music.

The space is constituted not only by the venue including its size, shape and materials, but also by the audience and their expectations, by the performers, by the instruments, by the nature of the occasion, by the editorial decisions of the score, even by musicologists, and socio-cultural and political influences.[628] A co-created creative space includes all elements which taken together make the music event what it is. The space is clearly co-created by performers but also by designers of instruments and of the concert venue for example, and it is itself creative, that is, it generates *this* music-making, determining all aspects of it. A difference in one or more of the elements makes for a difference in the music-making. Materials both of buildings and instruments, playing methods and techniques, musical understandings, and musical

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[628] Whilst socio-cultural and political influences may be at work in a music-event, the argumentation of the thesis is focussed exclusively on the musical aspects of performance, the realisation of a score.

training are some examples of the elements of a co-created creative space which vary and thereby alter the music-making from one performance to another. Further examples of differences in co-created creative space are the alteration of tempi to take account of new acoustic contexts, the alteration of registration for organ pieces to take account of different instruments, altering the spatial layout of an orchestra or choir to take account of the characteristics of part-writing or the compatibility of voices. These alterations, take place in the context of a continuity of tradition and performance practice that is nonetheless always evolving, of the musicological influences that impact on performance decisions, even of such things as phrasing and articulation, which also illustrate the continuity between performances themselves and the elements of the creative space.

What is especially noteworthy is that there is not an independent reason outside of the music-making, the co-created creative space, which can be said to govern the process whereby the musicians come to indwell one another. The score is not a candidate here, for it indicates not a totally fixed possibility for performance, but is only an indication of the great variety of interpretive possibilities according to which it can be realised in performance. Also, the score is itself part of the co-created creative space.

All these aspects of continuity can be seen in terms of the relation between cause and effect.

Continuity between music-making and interpretation

Chapters 9 and 10 of the thesis explore issues of performance practice and the reception of music. An aspect of both of these is the continuity which obtained between rhetoric and music especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries but which in fact existed from the late fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century, with our own time recognising the underlying continuity between expressive means and the arousal of human affect. The topic here is again the continuity between music-making and the players, but this time extended to accommodate their shared interpretive vision.

Judy Tarling tells us that "Quantz cited the voice and skills of an orator as his models for good performance, with the ultimate goal of both musician and orator to become 'masters of the hearts of their listeners'. He urged both types of performer to be aware of their shared aims and techniques".[629] Tarling also references a work written towards the end of the eighteenth century by William Cockin, *The Art of Delivering Written Language,* which, Tarling says, "described the common ground between speaking and playing music expressively".[630] This common ground is a psycho-cultural construct. Cultural because it is about oratory and making music, psychological because the tropes of both have affective consequences.[631]

We find an explicit recognition of continuity in the musical aesthetics of the eighteenth century and earlier, a continuity which exists for us still, though not perhaps in the

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[629] Tarling, 2005, p. i.
[630] Ibid.
[631] See Tarling, 2005, pp. 84-88 for tables which give the correlations between intended affects on the one hand, and range and tessitura, tempi, intervals and harmony, movement types, combinations of affects, and rhythmic devices on the other.

form which it took two hundred years and more ago. Judy Tarling gives a fascinating

account of the role which rhetoric played in the performance of eighteenth-century

music.[632] Performers aimed "to persuade and to entertain the audience's intellect and

emotions".[633] Thus, there was developed a sophisticated rhetorical account of how

this could be achieved. We get a very strong sense of the continuity which was held

to exist between delivery and the affect aroused in listeners. Kirnberger wrote:

> It is immediately apparent to everyone that the most moving
>
> melody would be completely stripped of all its power and
>
> expression if one note after another were performed without
>
> precise regulation of speed, without accents, and without resting
>
> points, even if performed with the strictest observation of pitch.[634]

Kirnberger is here warning that the continuity between performance and affect can

be broken. Interpretive finesse is expected of modern performers, though the tropes

of ancient rhetoric might not be held to exert the power which they once did.

Nonetheless, that there is continuity between the interpretive means at a musician's

disposal and the extent to which listeners are persuaded of the quality of the

performance, is clearly evident. The continuity extends back from interpretive means

to the interpretive intent of the player, which in turn is continuous with the tradition

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[632] Tarling, 2005.
[633] Ibid., p. vi.
[634] Kirnberger quoted by Tarling, 2005, p. 99.

of performance in which she or he was trained, the musicological ethos in which he or she is immersed, and so on.

Continuity, tradition and music-making

This concluding section of the chapter briefly introduces the notion of continuity in playing traditions and in the training of performers. Again, the importance of this is that it emphasises the continuity between the player and the music-making itself by drawing attention to one aspect of how performers are infused with music as a practice with which they identify and by which their identities as performers are initially established.

Writing in the context of a discussion of the case for women's ordination, Frances Young draws our attention to Ruth Edwards for whom continuity and faithfulness to tradition and foundation documents can exist "without excluding change and development".[635] Ruth Edwards, says Young, gives us a

> distillation of principles from the 'hermeneutical interaction' of scripture, tradition, reason and experience, allowing for the creation of new insight out of the very fabric of what is received; thus continuity is ensured".[636]

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[635] Young, 2013, p. 325.
[636] Ibid.

I suggest that this is a most apt description of what happens when musicians think about interpretation. Though there is no founding text in music which corresponds to scripture, musicians nonetheless must, in some sense, remain faithful to the score which can be thought of as founding performance.

Musical performances take place within a tradition. Reason and experience must be brought to bear on matters of interpretation. Tradition, reason, and experience do not destroy continuity even when something new arises. Rather, they are the conditions of continuity. Without them there is only sameness. There must be development and change for there to be continuity. Continuity is an indispensable ingredient of the compelling performances to which I assume players aspire. I shall argue that such performances demand a certain relationality amongst the players, and it is this relationality which I shall compare analogically with the relationality of the Trinity, concluding that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating. Continuity is thus necessary for the relationality which interests me in the thesis, and its importance in the thesis will become evident in the chapters on the performance and reception of music, and, especially, from what I call a co-created creative space.[637] When musicians are said to be at one with their instruments, this is continuity. When I am completely absorbed by the music so that it occupies my entire perceptual field, this is continuity.

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[637] See Chapters 9 and 10.

In the performance context, continuity does not erase distinctiveness. We get the sense of this from Peter Schidlof's comment that,

> When I play the viola, I don't think particularly about my part only,
> I think much more about the other parts. I imagine I am playing the
> first fiddle or the cello, and one just fills in.[638]

Schidlof as an individual would be discontinuous with the other members of the quartet; this would not engender good music-making. When Schidlof plays, he receives and gives signs from and to the other members of the quartet: an accent here, a tenuto there, and so on. These signs are acted upon by the other players, and this makes for continuity, that is, the performance coheres as the totality of the work. To paraphrase Adkins: to think a musical performance is to think the singular […] the continuous […] without subordinating it to the individual, the discrete.[639]

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[638] Nissel, 1998, p. 10.
[639] See Adkins, 2015, p. 19.

CHAPTER 9: THE PERFORMANCE AND RECEPTION OF MUSIC

The thesis is concerned only with the physical aspects of music-making. Luther thought of music as a completely outward, physical phenomenon, and he "wanted to emphasise the importance of the physical world as the bearer of spiritual reality".[640] This chapter focuses on the physicality of the practice of music-making by way of preparing the ground for the argument that it is a performed theology of relating.

Begbie points to the dangers of a kind of theological-musical hubris, warning against the tendency in theology of music to adopt a "theological aestheticism" in which music works entirely on its own terms and thus becomes "a new theological master [giving] supreme access to God".[641] Although music for the purposes of this thesis is analysed and viewed as rooted entirely in its performative aspects, and here it is worth noting Benson's insistence that "the structures that we call pieces of music are 'composed' of the activity of music making itself; rather than music making 'plus some other thing' (that we would call a 'work')",[642] I would like to argue that, rather than thinking of music-making as giving some kind of access to God, a thought about which my misgivings are expressed in the section of the thesis on David Brown, music-making is better described as a performed theology of Christian relating that, in demanding mutual indwelling from performers, is Trinitarian. The difference between these descriptions is important because to describe music as a performed theology of

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[640] Antilla, 2013, p. 97.
[641] Begbie, 2008, p. 22.
[642] Benson, 2003, p. 161.

relating which is Trinitarian in the mutual indwelling of musicians is a less controlling theological orientation for music than is Begbie's feared 'gaining access to God'.

A phenomenological orientation to the physicality of music-making

Music-making, I wish to argue, is completely analysable in terms of its performative, that is, its practical and technical aspects, and this analysis is fundamental to the aim of this thesis. The intention is to see what sort of thing music is prior to its being judged and brought under the strictures, definitions, presuppositions and so on of other perspectives by which we normally structure our interactions with the world. Specifically, the focus is on music as "an embodied art-form and practice that requires participation and engagement through simultaneous action and reception".[643]

Stone-Davis' work commends itself not only for its focus on the physicality of music, but also because it sits well alongside the emphasis in this thesis on the mutual indwelling of performers which compelling music-making requires.

To construe music-making solely in terms of its physicality and performativity has the virtue that the physical need not be transcended. The intention in this thesis is to defer for others' attention the debate about music and the extra-musical, its alleged functionality, for example, or whether it is a language, what it is for, and so on.

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[643] Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 161.

A second virtue is that the physical need not be relativised to the subjective, rather, physicality becomes a matter of embodiment per se, not a matter of the isolated individual experiences of particular subjects, and this ensures a certain objectivity when analysing the relationship between music and those who perform it. Perhaps a more down-to-earth version of this is that individual personality and ego drop out of the analysis.

A third virtue of this approach is, as Stone-Davis puts it, that "attending to music's physicality does not lead inevitably to its absolutisation as some kind of channel through which transcendence flows, for this is beyond the scope of the physical which can only point towards an immanent transcendence".[644] This, as Stone-Davis says, removes the fear of "theological aestheticism" that Begbie, as noted above, warns against.[645]

A fourth virtue is that music is not taken to be free-floating and autonomous. Music is first and foremost a practice, and as such it is ineluctably embodied. I therefore avoid, for example, a "Platonist conception of musical works as objectively existent [...] entities whose structures, properties and salient features fix the truth-value of our various statements and judgements concerning them".[646] According to this view, the

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[644] Ibid., p. 159.
[645] Ibid., n. 1.
[646] Norris, 2006, p. 9.

various performances of musical works are only imperfect copies of the pre-existing entities.[647]

Stone-Davis' analysis of the physicality of music has two parts: the exploration of "music as produced sound [and] an examination of music as received".[648] These two parts of the analysis arise because "music is an embodied art-form and practice that requires participation and engagement through simultaneous action and reception".[649]

Stone-Davis begins the first part of her analysis – music as produced sound – by noting that "the performance of music is an embodied event, comprising a succession of physical actions".[650] Thus, she considers the physical relationship which players' bodies have with instruments whereby, for example, the length of strings and of channels of air are altered, and she finds a reciprocal relationship between the body - which impinges on instruments - and the sound which is thereby produced which impacts the body; this reciprocity she calls 'attunement'; the player's body, his or her instrument, and the sound become one.[651]. Now "attunement is not an isolated moment, but a process",[652] music is a succession of events which stand in a particular relation to one another. And, further, it is clear that this mutual impacting of player

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[647] Plato's theory of art, including music, is set out most fully in Books III and X of *The Republic,* Plato 1974. For an excellent survey of Plato on art and artists see Murdoch 1978.
[648] Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 161.
[649] Ibid., p. 160-1.
[650] Ibid., p. 162.
[651] Ibid.
[652] Ibid.

and instrument results in the absorption of the player by the music, the player becomes as it were lost in the music and dead to all outside it. Stone-Davis says,

> the musician and music unite. The musician attends to the instrument, the sound, and the music. She is absorbed by music, cohering with its 'present', its direction, and its flow, becoming an embodiment of it. The self is thus *ekstatic*, its attention wholly outward facing.[653]

Thus, others are included in a continuity which is that of player-instrument-sound-music. This is an example of continuity which is explained more fully in Chapter 8, but because continuity is a major building block of my overall argument, it is important at this stage to note the absence of a gap between its various components. By way of example of this, Stone-Davis quotes Merleau-Ponty for whom

> the performer is no longer producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself, and the others feel him, to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata sings through him or cries out so suddenly that he must 'dash his bow' to follow it".[654]

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[653] Ibid., pp. 165-6.
[654] Merleau-Ponty, 2000, p. 177, quoted by Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 166, n. 9.

In the same note, Stone-Davis remarks that a good performance is precisely a question of this "embodiment of the performer by the music".[655]

For the moment, however, it is enough that this brief exegesis of "music as performance"[656] has shown that music-making is indeed an activity which is "grounded in the physical"[657] and which has the power to unite performers, listeners, instruments and the performance space in a continuity. All the components of this continuity exist in a reciprocal relationship of "acting and being acted upon".[658]

Stone-Davis's analysis of music as reception

Stone-Davis begins her analysis of "music as reception" [659] by noting that "the reception of music is as physical an act as that of its production",[660] and that it is not only the ear which is impacted by music but also the body generally; this means that music is felt as well as heard and that the whole body resonates in response to music. The upshot of this is that performers, listeners, and the music itself become attuned; [661] the physicality of the music initiates this attunement because it thereby "signals its presence and invites the subject's attention and engagement".[662]

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[655] Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 166, n. 9.
[656] Ibid., p. 162.
[657] Ibid., p. 167.
[658] Ibid.
[659] Ibid.
[660] Ibid.
[661] Ibid.
[662] Ibid.

For Stone-Davis the physicality of "music qua music" has three characteristics:[663] 'Impact', 'absorption', and '*ekstasis*'. 'Impact' refers to the physicality of music which, "lies at the heart of music".[664] 'Absorption' refers to "the ways in which the subject is absorbed by the musical experience",[665] a striking example of continuity, while '*ekstasis*' enables absorption to be expressed "in terms of the outward-facing relationship that results".[666] Stone-Davis tells us that,

> It is through active and full engagement and attunement that absorption and *ekstasis* emerge most completely since it is thereby that the subject enters into the proximity of music, and it is *through time*, the fundamental structure of music, that experience is constituted and reconfigured.[667]

This strongly implies that if the potential for music-making to be the occasion for a renewal and strengthening of harmonious relationships, a corollary of the thesis's main claim, then musicians have a certain responsibility to become actively and fully engaged with the music, to seek attunement. This requirement will be revisited in later chapters below as part of a larger need for musicians to create what will then be called a co-created creative space,[668] and to attend to the demands the music makes if performances are to be compelling. *Ekstasis* is important in the thesis when I discuss

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[663] Ibid., p. 160.
[664] Ibid.
[665] Ibid.
[666] Ibid. *Ekstasis* is a transliteration of the Greek word which literally means 'standing outside oneself'.
[667] Ibid., p. 169. Emphasis in the original.
[668] See Chapter 10.

and reframe the relationality of performing musicians in terms of communion. The basic point for Stone-Davis is that "the succession of tones is internally related. It is from the fundamental relation of tones (each of which comes in and out of existence but which is multi-directional in its 'intention') that higher levels of relation, or schemes, emerge".[669] These schemes, which include tonality, repetition, rhythm, melody, timbre and style, encourage the hearer to become attuned.[670]

Stone-Davis makes an important distinction between 'real' time and 'musical' time which revolves around the experience in which real time appears to be speeded up or slowed down by or in relation to musical time. But, as she rightly notes, music is not always, or does not always seem to be, directed by time, that is, some music seems to stand outside, or largely outside, time altogether. Minimalist music is a case in point, as is some of Messiaen's music, for example his organ pieces *Le Banquet Céleste, Apparition de l'église éternelle* and *Desseins éternels.[671]* But music cannot evade time altogether; movement and duration are always present. The reason for this is that "music is the relation of tones selected and placed within a sequence. The relations may not be immediately obvious, yet they are all present, structuring the musical experience of the recipient".[672]

The conclusion of Stone-Davis' analysis of music as a received phenomenon is that the physicality of music "transforms the 'ordinariness' of the present moment or more

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[669] Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 170.
[670] Ibid., pp. 170-3.
[671] The first two pieces mentioned are 'stand-alone'. The third is a movement from the nine movement work *La Nativité du Seigneur*.
[672] Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 175.

specifically series of moments".[673] This transformation is constituted by the attention that the subject pays, in quite specific ways, to the music qua music, and this amounts to a certain openness on the part of performers and listeners. Music demands that performers and listeners leave their egos and personalities behind.

In the course of enunciating the dynamics of music-making in terms of the performance and reception of music, this chapter has emphasised the importance of particular concepts for the later development of the thesis. Amongst these is the responsibility incumbent on performers and listeners to seek attunement. The following chapter fills out these concepts by setting them within the context of good performance practice.

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[673] Ibid., p. 177.

CHAPTER 10: GOOD PERFORMANCE PRACTICE

An analysis of the physicality of music's performance and reception as presented in the previous chapter is one of the basic building blocks of a theology of music which aims to show that those engaged in music-making as performers and listeners are in fact engaged in making relationships which are Christian in character. To make good this claim I need to extend the analysis of music-making as so far undertaken, however for the moment I simply flag up that I shall claim that mutual indwelling is not merely characteristic of Trinitarian life and of music-making, but that it is essential to both. This will lead to a discussion of being rapt out of oneself in a state of communion by intimate participation, and to further consideration of *ekstasis*. The purpose of the present chapter is to advance this claim by amplifying the arguments of the previous chapter. As part of that endeavour, the concept of a co-created creative space will be introduced, and the sphere of analysis will be enlarged to include performance practice whilst maintaining the focus on the physicality of music, its technical aspects.

Co-created creative space

The concept of a co-created creative space which is employed in the thesis is indeed of a space in which music-making takes place, but this space is much more than a mere container, a concert hall, for example. In the first place, its acoustic properties are integral to the music-making, influencing tempi, dynamic range, chording and instrumental balance. It is also a space which is inflected by rhythm, by combinations of notes and their pitches, by consonance and dissonance. So, it is certainly a musical

space.[674] Interestingly, renaissance writing on architecture makes specific reference to the temporal aspect of music; as musical space is structured by rhythm, pitch and harmonious relationships between them, so architectural space can be similarly articulated.[675]

But the concept of a co-created creative space as meant in the thesis also includes what Goktepe seems to have in mind when talking about the notion of creative responsiveness which "both captures the need for an openness to others and the environment".[676] Creative responsiveness in this sense is essential if musical performances are to be compelling and do justice to the creative fullness of the work. Indeed, it is indispensable for the mutual indwelling of performers which, I shall argue, is part warrant for the claim that music-making entails a relationality amongst the performers which is Christian.

The distinction between music and music-making is significant. 'Music' carries the temptation to see the work as having a fixed identity. 'Music-making' resists this enticement even if only because it points to an activity rather than a thing. In Chapter 13 'musicking' is used to avoid the impression that a concert, for example, is a thing rather than a fluid interaction of influences between the musical score, the performers, the audience, the venue and so on. This means that instead of understanding 'music is being played' as one would 'a trumpet is being played', there

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[674] There might well be other kinds of co-created creative spaces such as ones in which dance or theatre take place; see the following paragraph.
[675] Vergo, 2005, p. 147ff.
[676] Goktepe, 2019, p. 241.

is a focus on a continuing transformation which is not of a thing but of itself. This is to return to the notion of a co-created creative space, for it is not that the space is an enclosed space in which something happens, rather the musicking is of the space itself. Rather than there being the transformation of a thing, there is simply transformation, transformation which is not predicated on the fixity of a concept whereby some thing is transformed into some other thing.

For Stone-Davis, "the beauty of music, epistemologically speaking, is its capacity to instil a certain mode of attention", and, further, that music "turns the subject outwards and in doing so creates a focus on that which is irreducibly other, sustaining the interest of the subject and thereby encouraging it to dwell in this encounter."[677] Indeed, I argue that dwelling in the encounter is essential if performances are to be compelling. Although I agree with Stone-Davis that music-making entails a turning of attention outward to the other,[678] contrary to Stone-Davis the concept of a co-created creative space resists the categorisation of one's fellow performers as irreducibly other.

The claim this thesis seeks to defend is that in performing together musicians necessarily relate to one another in ways which are Christian. For the moment, though, it is enough to establish that performers and the musical performance itself inhabit a co-created creative space which preserves the individuality of the players whilst at the same time ensuring a relationality between them which is predicated on

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[677] Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 178.
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what is written into and demanded by the very nature and experience of good music-making.

Musical truth and performance practice

Is it legitimate to conceive truth as an emergent property which requires some kind of creative energy to bring it forth? Not any kind of creative energy will do, and this is the reason why this chapter will emphasise good performance practice. An emergent property is one which results from the interaction of the various parts of a system none of which contains the property in question. Again, this is relevant to the present thesis; interaction between parts of a system is just what takes place when music is performed, and some aspects of this have been explored in the previous chapter. Stone-Davis is clear that "truth is an emergent and evolving property that is experienced within events rather than an unconditional proposition understood in abstraction".[679] Specifically, at least part of the truth of music towards which this thesis is working its way is that of good relationships, and again Stone-Davis points the way for she contends that

> the subject understands the significance of aspects of her life from
> the position of the here-and-now, [...and] that something
> analogous occurs within the musical event, which is a border or

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[679] Stone-Davis, 2015c, p. 145.

liminal practice that gathers and holds together relations in both

real and virtual time and space.[680]

For Putnam, the legitimacy of judgements of value lies in their being made only by those who are actively involved with the issues concerned. Bowie thinks that judgements of musical value constitute a parallel case: "the ability to distinguish between what is 'deeply expressive' and merely 'meretricious' involves […] a mastery which is not just of the vocabulary for verbal expression about music, but of the music itself".[681] The norms governing good performance do not pre-exist actual performance, or do so only in a very general way; melodies should not be swamped by accompaniments, for example.[682] Bowie's interest here is in "an asymmetrical relationship between two ways of thinking of truth".[683] In this way of thinking, my first-person perspective is that the truths I hold are internally related to their justifications, and this is part of my understanding of what truth is; I must believe that the justifications I advance for the truth of my convictions actually do the work required of them. This is important because it underpins the notion of good interpretations. Unless truth and justification are thus held together, I have no means of distinguishing between the fittingness of various interpretations, that is, I have no basis upon which I am able to defend the value or authenticity of interpretations or to develop critical awareness generally. This logic does not, however, apply to the view I

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[680] Ibid.
[681] Bowie, 2009, p. 322.
[682] There might be several melodies in play at any given moment. Fragments of an important melodic theme might be used for accompanimental purposes and as such might be given a certain prominence in performance, but this is precisely a question of interpretation and not one of pre-given normative standards.
[683] Bowie, 2009, p. 325.

take of the justifications advanced by others. Whilst I realise that others' justifications

hold good for them, they need not for me. The upshot of this is that the tie between

truth and justification is both fundamental to the concept of truth and the root of

disagreements about what is to count as truth. Bowie translates this into "an

analogous claim [that] can apply to musical judgements in the form both of verbal

judgements *about* and of practical judgements *in* performance".[684]

Now this claim by Bowie is of a piece with Férdia Stone-Davis' contention that

"meaning is not presented 'definitively' within the musical experience".[685] It is true

that her emphasis is on musical meaning, and that she includes along with expression

and evocation in music what she refers to as music's "first-order mode of being" by

which she means that musical experience "involves a suspension of the distinction

between subject and object (promoting instead their mutuality) or, rather, a retrieval

of the pre-reflective moment before this distinction asserts itself".[686] Bowie and

Wellmer show that musical interpretation and judgments about the musical worth of

performances in general, though they appear to have teleological impetus and are

susceptible, at least in part, to rational debate, are, if we adhere to a non-metaphysical

notion of truth, in their very nature contestable; the idea that there is one correct

interpretation or judgement is logically incoherent on this view. Stone-Davis, similarly,

allows for a variety of meanings, interpretations, and judgements. Whereas Bowie

starts from an analysis of how truth functions in ordinary discourse, Stone-Davis starts

from a consideration of the physicality of music which extends to all who hear it.

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[684] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[685] Stone-Davis, 2011, p. 188.
[686] Ibid., p. 159.

Bowie's methodology, leads to the realisation that the first-person perspective of multiple others must result in multiple justifications which are in principle capable of being rejected by all except the subject for whom they must, logically must, hold true. Thus, for both Bowie and Stone-Davis, musical meaning, interpretation, and judgement are always open to debate, that is, they are in principle never finally decidable. Indeed, one can go so far as to say that as soon as a performance or interpretation is claimed to be finally definitive, then we may be sure that ossification has set in. As Bowie points out, "A crucial aspect of the history of art consists precisely in the continual transformation of norms by aesthetic practice".[687] This means that performers and listeners alike have a responsibility to remain constantly open to fresh possibilities for interpretation and performance, for it is a mark of great music that these possibilities cannot be exhausted by, or receive their full due in, any one interpretation or performance.

Bowie tells us that for Adorno there is inevitably a contradiction between a score and its performance because "the score implies a telos of true performance, but actual performances reveal ongoing disagreements concerning the score".[688] But how or why does a score imply a telos of true performance? Few composers, especially pre-romantic ones, would be likely to hold such a view, it being demonstrably true that many valued the variety of interpretations and arrangements to which their scores give rise. Bach's habit of transcribing his own music with little alteration is a good example here.[689] Adorno, however, insists on a "fundamental antinomy of art-

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[687] Bowie, 2009, p. 324.
[688] Ibid., pp. 325-6.
[689] The 'Schübler Chorales' are a case in point.

music",[690] an antinomy which "has to do with relationships such as those between score and interpretation".[691] The explanation for this antinomy arises when considering the extent to which "a score should determine its interpretation".[692] The problem as Adorno presents it is that "musical notation is, of course, expression of a musical *Idea*, which it, so to speak, standardises, reifies, alters and which … is to be awoken, restored. In a certain sense true interpretation *revokes* the notation".[693] As Bowie says, "The notation that is 'revoked' is at the same time that without which the music could not exist, hence the antinomy".[694] But improvised music exists without a score, and surely it would be rather strange to say there is no interpretative element involved when music is improvised; when a theme is repeated, for example, its first incarnation has a forward impact on how it shall be played subsequently.

Bowie alerts us to what Adorno has in mind by 'musical idea': "the significance generated by [a] theme's relationships to its contexts […] what the work means in history by being realised in performance".[695] Straightaway, however, this does not merely allow for different legitimate interpretations, it writes difference into the very nature of music, the musical idea, and it does this because the history of performance-practice is necessarily varied. Thus, the musical idea is equally varied. All this Adorno captures neatly when he says that "interpreting language means: understanding language; interpreting music means: making music".[696] Further, "Whether a phrase is

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[690] Adorno, 2001, p. 74; quoted in Bowie, 2009, p. 327.
[691] Bowie, 2009, p. 327.
[692] Ibid.
[693] Adorno, 2001, p. 182, quoted in Bowie, 2009, p. 327. Emphasis in the original.
[694] Bowie, 2009, p. 328.
[695] Ibid., n. 14.
[696] Quoted by Bowie 2009, p. 328.

played in a meaningful manner can be precisely converted into technical correlates like accents, pauses for breath, etc. But in order to carry out this conversion one must first understand the meaning of the phrase".[697] Adorno's view that musical meaningfulness can be converted into technical correlates resonates with Stone-Davis' analysis of music in terms of its performance, reception and physicality. Thus, the argument that music-making has something to teach us about what is involved in the making of good relationships is strengthened, for successful interpretations, that is, the communication of musical meaning, are dependent on both performing and listening to music in terms of the history and tradition of practice. This claim can be unpacked a little more by asking what it is to understand a musical phrase. One answer is that such understanding revolves around the notion of communicative practice, and this means that initiation into what is to count as understanding cannot be achieved outside of actual performance practice, for musical understanding "requires 'knowing how' which is not simply cognitive and propositional, [though it is] not merely behavioural either".[698]

This would seem to point to the notion of musical understanding and meaning as emergent properties dependent on the interaction of the various aspects of music-making previously described. Bowie tells us that "For Besseler, the manner of being of music in modernity was constituted by engagement in practice, rather than being the representation of something already objectively existing".[699]

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[697] Adorno, 2001, p. 159, quoted Bowie 2009, pp. 328-9.
[698] Bowie, 2009, p. 329.
[699] Ibid., p. 331.

Besides Bowie and Stone-Davis, Stolzfus is another scholar for whom performance practice is key to understanding music. Stolzfus believes that "a new consciousness of the ontology of music is emerging".[700] He identifies three areas in which this is happening: pedagogy as exemplified by the Suzuki method; performance practice particularly as it focuses on performance traditions; and poststructuralist and postmodern approaches which challenge the hegemony of earlier conceptions of music as autonomous and non-representational.[701] "Music", writes Stolzfus, "has now come to be understood as an irreducibly performative phenomenon, dependent for its life and intelligibility upon the cultural performance tradition out of which it arises".[702] Although Stolzfus engages deeply with the work of Barth and Schleiermacher, and although he acknowledges "a high degree of originality in their theological-aesthetic thinking", he criticises them for their adherence to a correspondence theory of aesthetics according to which art mirrors "either affective states of consciousness or cosmic structures of being".[703] Stolzfus, anxious to explore music's performance possibilities for theology, turns to Wittgenstein because "his philosophical commitments are developed in continuity with distinctive reflections upon music as a performance art".[704] It would seem, then, that Wittgenstein has something of value for the present thesis which seeks to develop a view of music-making as a performed theology of Christian relationships.

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[700] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 7.
[701] Ibid., pp. 5-7.
[702] Ibid., p. 7.
[703] Ibid., p. 167.
[704] Ibid., p. 168.

Musical expressivity and performance are one

In Chapter 1 the question was asked whether music might have something to contribute to theology which was of itself as opposed to it being merely a vehicle for, or descriptive of, theological propositions otherwise capable of linguistic formulation without loss. What is not to be excluded is musical expressivity. In the course of his exegesis of Wittgenstein's critique of expressivism, Stolzfus asks, "Are a musical work and its expressive effects two separate things?".[705] As he says, it is absurd to imagine that one could separate "the feelings and images from the music, so that we could simply dispense with the music".[706] This is another example of continuity.

Wittgenstein's interest in the performance-aspect of music can be found in his *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*.[707] He is clear that an understanding of the musical expressivity of a piece of music, perhaps of music in general, is built up through acquaintance with performances of music. Wittgenstein thinks that understanding the meaning of propositions is similarly acquired, an aspect of the well-known Wittgensteinian alignment of meaning with use, another example of continuity. The essential point here is that one knows, has learnt, what counts as a good performance, that is, a good *musical* performance, by virtue of having engaged with previous performances; there is no standard external to performance to which one can appeal as the criterion by which performances of music can be judged. Certainly, performance practice is subject to changes of fashion

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[705] Ibid., p. 203.
[706] Ibid.
[707] Wittgenstein, 1978.

which might be triggered by research into historical practice, or into the socio-cultural ethos prevailing at the time of composition. But when I appeal to musicological scholarship in defence, for example, of a certain approach to articulation, phrasing and tempo, the appeal is finally justified in terms of musical effectiveness; any other justification is special-pleading. Or when the teacher tells the pupil to play or sing with more feeling because when he wrote the piece the composer was undergoing a severe emotional crisis which surely is reflected in the music, the pupil responds in purely musical ways, adding a crescendo here, a tenuto there, and so on. And if other players or singers are involved, then their performance decisions will be affected by these changes. When a listener or critic insists that she hears the emotion in the music, she hears it in purely musical terms. All of this is consonant with Brahms' view mentioned earlier on pp. 46-7.

Wittgenstein is not simply responding to the entrenched view that music expresses something external to it, but also to the difficulty we sometimes experience in trying to explain to others just why we find a phrase more significant when played like *this* rather than *this.* The problem is that it seems as though we have recourse to some extra-musical criteria, for how otherwise would we be able to decide between the two ways of playing the phrase.[708] This, though, is not what usually happens in practice, as Stolzfus, quoting Wittgenstein, points out:

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[708] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 212.

But in most cases if someone asked me 'How do you think this melody should be played?', I will, as an answer, just whistle it in a particular way, and nothing will have been present to my mind but the tune *actually whistled* (not an image of *that*).[709]

Stolzfus summarises what he takes from *The Blue and Brown Books* as: "In music, understanding and mastery is in many cases shown from within the doing of a performance, not from reference to an auxiliary datum projected upon it".[710] When he turns to the *Philosophical Investigations*,[711] Stolzfus finds the same emphasis on music as performance. In this text, Wittgenstein is interested in the notions of rule-following and family resemblances which he develops in order to undermine Plato's construction of "the meaning of a concept as a simple, essential reality that all manifestations of its use necessarily have in common".[712] The significance of this is twofold: first, there is no means of showing that a piece of music has an existence which is independent of its performances; second, if there is a rule for singing a melody, knowledge of the rule can only be demonstrated by actually singing the melody. Stolzfus says, "what one would call 'the piece' remains concretely situated and embodied in particular activities".[713] I cannot enter here into a critical discussion of Wittgenstein's thinking surrounding rule-following and family resemblances, but note that when we talk about musical thought (or, for that matter, spoken thought), this can only be done in a public manner, a performative context. Whilst Wittgenstein

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[709] Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 166. Quoted in Stolzfus, 2006, p. 213. Emphasis in the original.
[710] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 213.
[711] Wittgenstein, 1972.
[712] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 218.
[713] Ibid., p. 219.

makes this move as part of his attack on Cartesianism, its assertion of internal, purely private mental activity, it nonetheless lends weight to my decision to focus on the performative aspects of music in the attempt to read music in terms which relate directly to it as music-making stripped of factors external to the musical experience as such. In §535 of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein asks, "What happens when we learn to *feel* the ending of a church mode as an ending?".[714] His answer is that one learns by experience, and that what happens is that the feeling develops entirely by virtue of performance and its reception, not by learning a definition or a formula, it is, in other words, a skill learnt by immersion in practice. Stolzfus summarises: "The feelings and experiences of a passage [of music] are there as they are performed [...] Anything that is hinted at or discussed later [... is] engaged in completely different 'playing' than what takes place in performance".[715] Wittgenstein's 'dawning of an aspect' is not far away here, and it may well require several performances of a particular piece of music for its musical significance to dawn such that the listener (or performer, even) now 'understands' it. But there is a complication here; whereas the duck/rabbit figure is fixed and can be examined at leisure for an indefinite time until the other aspect 'clicks' into place, the musical figure is time-limited, and the availability of a particular aspect could be limited to a single performance. It is true that some performances reveal new aspects by virtue of the conviction with which the player performs. Stolzfus comments that

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[714] Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 144.
[715] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 223.

the musical performance 'becomes' different things", a march, a

dance, depending on the ability or imagination of the participants

to hear different tempi, modulations, keys, variations on a theme

and so on [...] Moments of critical shift in perspective [...] are

grasped, demonstrated, and negotiated only in the course of an

entire culture of self-transforming performances.[716]

Performance remains the yardstick by which music is 'understood'. "The performer

lives in a world and a language into which he or she is continually, performatively

incorporated".[717]

To briefly recap, this chapter so far has attempted to show that music can be

understood on its own terms. This is not to deny that it can be conceived otherwise,

and some of these have been outlined in Chapter 2.

My approach to music-making is, as my adoption of Stone-Davis' concepts of

absorption and attunement suggests, phenomenological, but my focus is firmly on the

structural dynamics of the performance relationships of musicians as they are

immersed in the music-making. This focus has been enlarged to include a brief

consideration of musical understanding conceived in performance terms alone.

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[716] Ibid., p. 224. In this learning how to apply rules and see different aspects there are implications for music education, and although they cannot be explored in the thesis, it might nonetheless be important for churches to consider these if the case for the theological import of music-making can be made successfully in the thesis.
[717] Ibid.

Co-created creative assemblage

The various aspects of music-making as I have outlined them so far coalesce around the notion of co-created creative space. This space is indispensable for the adequate performance of music, including its interpretation, and in the next section I build on what has gone before in order to fill out this notion more adequately.

In the course of his critique of expressivism, Wittgenstein argues against the reduction of music to some kind of analogue of emotional states, instead he advocates a position which maintains the idea of musical value but which conceives this value to arise in the interactions between performers and listeners rather than from the music-work's evocation of, or connection to, an external state, be it psychological or otherwise.[718] Stolzfus explains: "what we want in a judgement of value in musical expression is a communicative space in which to make comparisons".[719] More than this, however, I wish to stress the continuity between performers, listeners and the space in which the music-making occurs. This continuity has already been explored in earlier sections of the present chapter. In those sections the focus was on the physicality of music *qua* music and what this means for the performance-practice aspects of music-making and its reception. Listening to music or performing it entails a joining together of players, listeners, and the environment into a kind of unity, a continuity. More than this, players, listeners and performing space interpenetrate one another, and this assemblage is indeed a co-created creative assemblage or space. This assemblage

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[718] Wittgenstein, 1978.
[719] Stolzfus, 2006, p. 202.

exists under the aegis of the cultural phenomenon called music-making, and is itself

creative, that is to say, it gives rise to new, otherwise unsuspected, relations between

its component members. This includes not just relations between performers and

listeners, but also between them and the space in which music is made as well as

between these three – players, listeners and space - and the music itself. New

interpretations and understandings of the music arise, and that they do so within the

context of the assemblage is crucial for the thesis because their appearance can be

accounted for in purely musical terms as functions of musical understanding, yet they

gather together the subjectivities of all the participants in, and listeners to, the music-

making. This means that the inter- and intra-relationships between performers and

listeners can be understood in purely musical terms. The musical relationships that

obtain in performing are not simply musical but are constitutive of the relationships

between the musical subjects of performing and listening. To put this at its lowest, the

music does not play or interpret itself, although various genres and instruments have

a significant role to play in interpretation. The music is played and interpreted by

people who are obliged to enter into relationships with one another which are

characterised by a mutual indwelling, and this in order to secure successful

performances;[720] "there is", says Keith Sawyer, "no music without collaboration".[721]

I make frequent use of the notion of compelling music-making in the thesis because I

take it that this cannot happen unless the performers are immersed in the music-

making such that it is as though the music plays them. I shall argue that by virtue of

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[720] Howsoever 'successful performances' is understood.
[721] Sawyer, 2016, p. 284.

this immersion the musicians are defined in their entirety and I need this to be the case as part of my overall argument that to make music is to perform Christian relationality. The question arises therefore as to what successful and compelling music-making consists of. An answer is suggested by recalling the thought that musical understanding can be conceived as an emergent property which arises from the interaction of the various aspects of music-making previously described.[722] For Sawyer, "collaborative action is never fully fixed and predictable. Collaborative emergence is always present in some degree […] and is more likely to be found as a group becomes more aligned with […] four characteristics".[723] These characteristics are:

> the activity has an unpredictable outcome, rather than a scripted,
> known, endpoint; there is moment-to-moment contingency: each
> person's action depends on the one just before; the interactional
> effect of any given action can be changed by the subsequent
> actions of other participants; [and that] the process is
> collaborative, with each participant contributing equally.[724]

As Sawyer points out, a fully improvised performance would seem to meet these criteria most perfectly, nonetheless in any musical performance there is always "some degree of collaborative emergence because of the unavoidable moment-to-moment

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[722] See p. 251.
[723] Sawyer, 2016, p. 273. Collaborative emergence is not here equated with musical understanding conceived as an emergent property.
[724] Ibid.

contingency of performance and the interactional effects of each performer's action on those of the others".[725] These characteristics would seem to be very much in play in music-making, perhaps more obviously so in the case of small ensembles such as string quartets.

We can distinguish between synchronic and diachronic collaboration. Synchronic collaboration takes place when collaborators are all present at the same time in the same location, this means they continuously monitor one another, and interactions are more or less immediate. Diachronic collaboration, on the other hand, takes place at different times and frequently at different physical locations; "the creative contributions could be separated by days, weeks, or even years".[726] In an age of such rapid communication and easy access to information, musicians are aware of the work of contemporary scholars, theoreticians, and other performers as well as those of the past.

This chapter has made the case for thinking music in purely musical, that is, technical terms, appealing especially to the notion of good performance practice. Also, the opportunity has been taken to explain Deleuze's concept of the dividual which will help fill out what I have in mind when I think of the continuity and mutual intra-relationships present in small musical ensembles.

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[725] Ibid.
[726] Ibid., p. 275.

PART 4: TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY, CHRISTIAN RELATIONALITY AND MUSIC

CHAPTER 11: MUSIC AND THE TRINITY AS CONVERSATION

I would now like to put in place the final building blocks of the thesis, namely, a Trinitarian theology of revelation (Herman Bavinck), of conversation (Christoph Schwöbel), and of God's involvement with the complexities of world, especially through language (Daniel Hardy). Part of the discussion will be picked up in some of the reflection in Chapter 12 where I introduce Jüngel's and Barth's Trinitarian conception of God's being as being in becoming. This links with Hardy's view that "God is a dynamic structured relationality in whom there is an infinite possibility of life",[727] and he talks of "the fulfilment of initial conditions [in the Godhead] through an ongoing self-structuring".[728]

One of the main purposes of this chapter is to draw out an aspect of the Trinitarian theology of indwelling outlined in previous chapters around 'conversation'. What I hope to show is that just as in an account of Trinitarian indwelling God can be conceived as conversation, then there may also exist a kind of conversational mutual indwelling for music makers. The analogical dimensions of the discussions in previous chapters suggest that we might be justified in thinking along these lines, in particular that not only is there conversation between the three divine persons but also between Godself and creation. Given the aim of the thesis is to argue for music as a performed theology of Christian relating, my intention is to refer the conversation which is music-making to the conversation which God has with Godself and with creation, always

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[727] Hardy, 1996b, p. 81.
[728] Ibid.

remaining mindful that we cannot conceive the nature of this conversation in and of itself, though we know from Scripture that the members of the Trinity speak to one another and that God speaks with human creatures. The conversational aspects of music-making are to be thought in terms of music's performance and reception in the context of co-created creative spaces as described in previous chapters.

My method here is not to draw a parallel between divine conversation and human music-making as conversation, and, on the basis of this parallel, to assert that to make music is to perform a theology of relating. Rather, I shall build on previous arguments that music-making entails a mutual indwelling amongst the performers which, for as long as they continue to make music, is entirely constitutive of their identities. The claim, then, is that music-making is Trinitarian because it is constituted by a mutual indwelling of the musicians which is analogically comparable with the indwelling of the Trinitarian Persons. Colin Gunton, speaking of the indwelling of the members of the Trinity, puts their mutual constitution beautifully: "Each is only what he is by virtue of what the three give to and receive from each other; and yet, by virtue of their mutually constitutive relations each is distinctive and particular".[729] There is certainly a question about what happens when the members of the quartet go their separate ways after a performance, and I give some thought to this in the Conclusion. But perhaps the question serves to emphasise that the thesis is couched in terms of music-

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[729] Gunton, 1997, p. 12.

making and not just music, and that the claim defended is that music-making is a theology that exists in performance.

Commandeering language and music

I would like to build on the notion of commandeering language in speaking of God, and begin by enlarging very briefly on the discussion in Chapter 3 of *communio*.

To summarise where we have got to: I have argued that one may discover they are in communion (relationship) with the other musicians once they have begun to make music with them. I am drawn in, not just into the music, but into 'fellowship' with the other musicians, and the subjectivity of this 'points' to the objective status of the relationships which are demanded by the music, or, better, by its adequate performance.[730] Though relationships between performers are felt by them as part of their subjectivity, without the non-subjective reality of good relationships between them an adequate performance would not be possible. It is not enough for the players merely to think from either their individual or collective subjectivities that they are attuned to one another musically; there would be plenty of room for illusions. What is indispensable is that their good relationships should be publicly verifiable in terms of good performances. This criterion is sufficiently robust to support the argument that, whilst good relationships between the performers might not be the final guarantee of a good performance, nonetheless a poor performance does indicate that

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[730] See p. 229 for Bowie on the inseparability of subjectivity and objectivity in the description of music.

the relationships between them are flawed. These relationships are always to be construed in musical, or to be more specific, technical terms. It might be that a lack of technical facility on the part of one member of a quartet could undermine the co-inhering relationships between them, and this will be manifest in flawed performances. The point here is that the musicians' failed communication and understanding militate against their mutual indwelling; the thesis is predicated on such indwelling as it is demanded by the music itself if it is to receive good performances.

Hardy argues that the Parable of the Prodigal Son has implications for language, namely, that it can be redemptive: "it is addressed to others (in their otherness) as the means by which they are to be met, responded-to, bonded-to and raised to their truth".[731] Is music-making also a means by which others are raised to their truth? In music-making others are responded-to, bonded-to and raised to their truth as those whose participation in the performance is indispensable, they are shown for who they are as participants in *this* performance. Kathryn Tanner tells us "the Trinity is coming to us to give us the sort of life-giving relations of mutual flourishing which the Trinity itself enjoys".[732] What I mean to argue is that good music-making *is* the relations of mutual flourishing. The Trinity is the ground of all created relationality, and Trinitarian indwelling defines Christian relating. Where Hardy says that "the 'logic' of the Trinitarian life and work of God – hence the logic of God's activity in language – is that of the most radical form of gift", and that this gift is present when "human speakers

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[731] Hardy, 1996d, p. 64.
[732] Quoted by Schwöbel, 2014, p. 65.

reach out to others in their particularity and speak lovingly",[733] it seems to me this happens in music-making too. Music-making requires an engagement with others in their particularity not simply as players of this or that instrument playing a part which is uniquely theirs (as in a string quartet), but also as fellow instrumentalists whose musical personalities must be responded too so that coherent performances are achieved. This engagement requires a certain love. In previous chapters and in the Conclusion I make the case for the presence of love in music-making.

Indwelling: music-making and the Trinity

Torrance notes that lying at the heart of Barth's "semantic ontology" is a certain "dynamism" whereby language is 'commandeered' by "revelation in and through which God actively conditions (reconciles) the 'sense' of the terms involved".[734] Torrance is impressed by Jüngel's recasting, that is, interpretation, of Barth's argument with regard to the priority of a revelatory dynamic in its relationship to theological language, especially in the context of Barth's worries about *vestigia trinitatis*. Jüngel stresses the point that, for Barth, theological language is necessarily the world's language, but that it must always speak in a manner which is contrary to the world, and that revelation cannot be caught in language by a logical construction which, for Barth, "would be just an *analogia entis.* But the language in which the revelation shall be able to come to speech must, as it were, be commandeered by revelation".[735] Barth is anxious to assure us that there is indeed what he calls "a real

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[733] Hardy, 1996d, p. 65.
[734] Torrance, 1996, p. 204.
[735] Jüngel, 2014, p. 23.

vestigium trinitatis in creatura, an illustration of revelation, but it we have neither to discover nor to validate ourselves".[736] He goes on to say that "the real right meaning of the *vestigia* doctrine […] consists of the form which God Himself in His revelation has assumed in our language, world, and humanity",[737] and he glosses this in terms of "what we hear when […] we listen to God's revelation, what we apprehend in Scripture [… and] what the proclamation of the Word of God actually is in our life".[738] "In this way", says Barth, God "creates a *vestigium* of Himself and so of His three-in-oneness".[739] This is the point in his exposition of Barth at which Jüngel speaks of interpretation placing a demand on language which, he says, "must be understood in such a way that revelation grants *courage* to language, so that interpretation is made possible".[740]

To anticipate a little, the bold hope for this thesis is that music-making too can be shown to be commandeered by revelation. Bavinck will help with this a little later in the thesis, but the ground of this hope is that music-making is Trinitarian insofar as it necessarily entails mutual indwelling on the part of music-makers, an indwelling in which the musicians are entirely themselves *qua* musicians as the three persons of the Trinity are entirely and fully themselves in their mutual indwelling. Again, this is not an attempt to instigate a mode of living or human existence modelled on the Trinity; there is no question of designing a programme with specific substantive content which would claim to promote such a mode of being. Rather, it is to make the claim for

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[736] Barth, 1936, p. 399.
[737] Ibid.
[738] Ibid.
[739] Ibid.
[740] Jüngel, 2014, p. 24. Emphasis in the original.

music-making that it is already and albeit imperfectly, analogically comparable to Trinitarian relationality, this is so precisely on account of the mutual indwelling amongst its practitioners which it occasions. Gunton says, "The world and all in it takes its creation and recreation from the Trinitarian relatedness of Father, Son and Spirit".[741] Intra-Trinitarian conversation is a form of being which is a mutual indwelling, and this is the analogy with music-making. Thus, music-making can be conceived to be ontologically grounded in what is revealed to us in faith of God's triune life as a conversation which of itself is a mutual indwelling. It is not that conversation promotes indwelling. There are not two separate things, the conversation and the indwelling. Rather, the conversation is already an indwelling, an aspect of continuity.

It remains to show that the being of the Trinity is one of mutual indwelling. If this can be achieved and I can thus say that music-making and Trinitarian life are modes of being in which the participants fully indwell one another, are entirely themselves and yet remain distinct although they would none of them exist were it not for the others, then I shall have made good progress towards making good my main claim; that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relationality.

Relationality

First, however, I need to heed a warning. Although our understanding of relationality relies heavily on our experience of our human relationships, it is important to beware

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[741] Gunton, 1997, p. 99.

of the difficulties in comparing these with those of divine persons in their relationality. Pannenberg spells out the two crucial differences.[742] First, and most important, whereas human persons have the capacity to distinguish, at least partly, their own identity and to establish their own constitution, "the Trinitarian persons", as Peters puts it, "[…] are *totally* dependent upon their relation to others".[743] Second, human beings experience an often-painful tension between the ego and the self. The self is partly determined by others whereas the ego is not. This tension is not felt by the persons of the Trinity. Pannenberg says,

> the Son is wholly himself in the relation to the Father and the Father in the relation to the Son, so that both are wholly what they are in the witness of the Spirit. The Spirit for his part, in his personal separateness, is simply the Spirit of the Father and the Son inasmuch as these are the objects of his working, an object, however, that is always realised already in the eternal fellowship of the divine life.[744]

So how, in the context of the thesis, should I respond to the differences between human and divine relationality to which Pannenberg has pointed? An initial thought is that relationality in the thesis is confined to the fact of indwelling, not the content of it except insofar as indwelling completely determines the identities of the Trinitarian persons on the one hand and of the musicians on the other. Also, the comparison is in

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[742] For an excellent exegesis of Pannenberg on this see Peters, 1993, pp. 139-42.
[743] Peters, 1993, p. 139. Emphasis in the original. See Pannenberg, 2009, pp. 430-31.
[744] Pannenberg, 2009, p. 431.

terms of analogy. Certainly, human beings have the ability to establish their own identities, at least in part, in life generally, and it is certainly true that they experience tensions between their egos and their selves, but it is remarkable that this ability and experience are minimised in the case of those who make music together. Although performing groups have distinguishable performing styles, the individual members of a particular group become absorbed into that group's style and must serve the music; thus, individual identity is minimised except insofar as it is part constitutive of the group's overall style (identity). On the other hand, the individual identity of performers is understood in the thesis in *entirely* musical terms, that is, an individual performer's identity in *this* performance is entirely dependent on the performance of *this* work at *this* time; the identities are continuous with one another. Something similar applies in the tension between ego and self. Ego is to be eschewed in music-making. Music-making is not a vehicle for egoism; once the egos of individual players enter into performances, the integrity of the music is lost, not least because music-making can often be characterised precisely as a conversation among equal partners, and this remains the case even when one partner or another takes the lead at a particular point in the conversation. This minimisation of the tension between ego and self and of the ability to determine one's own identity in contra-distinction to others considerably reduces the force of Pannenberg's worries. Additionally, as has been previously emphasised, the point about the appeal to the relationality which inheres in the Trinity is that it is constitutive of its members in the sense that it is their identities.

Conversation makes for a very particular kind of relationality. The conversation between the three persons of the Trinity is a communion of perfect relationality in which all three persons are fully themselves precisely in this relationality. Can music-making be analogously compared to intra-Trinitarian activity because it too fosters such a relationship? This is to ask if music-making as conversation promotes a relationality of mutual indwelling; if it does, this would seem to imply that the claim that music-making is a theology of Christian relating might be successfully defended. Whereas intra-Divine communion is perfect in the mutuality of its indwelling, this is not so for human persons. Trinitarian life is ontologically definitive of relationality, human life is not. Yet the performance aspects of music-making do seem to indicate that its participants are, *qua* musicians, totally dependent on one another for their identities, that is, their identities are wholly in terms of their relationships with one another, as musicians they are fully themselves in these inter-relationships. The extent to which musical mutual indwelling approaches perfection is a function of the quality of the music-making.

In Anne Hunt's view, the move to a more social explication of Trinitarian theology can be understood "from a methodological perspective as a shift in the function of Trinitarian meaning, to use Bernard Lonergan's terms, from the cognitive to the communicative".[745] For her, human conversation "intimates and implies the very mystery of Trinitarian being, wherein interpersonal relationality is characterised by 'ecstasis' or 'decentring' of the self in radical other-regarding relationality".[746] This

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[745] Hunt, 2003, p. 69.
[746] Ibid. p. 88.

ecstasis and decentring and other-regarding relationality, as we have seen, is integral to music-making. Hunt's is a positive view of conversation in relation to theology. Lieven Boeve thinks rather differently, bringing a postmodern perspective to bear on issues of conversation and theology which leads to the conclusion that conversation in theology "should [probably] end and leave room for the God who cannot be grasped by our words, phrases, and narratives – although this God can only be referred to by these same particular words, phrases and narratives".[747]

Whilst Hunt's view of conversation parallels the view of music-making I take in the thesis as I have presented in the chapters of Part 3, and whilst Boeve's view seems highly critical of conversation in theology and ends in a postmodern dilemma which highlights the inescapable role of analogy in talk of God, my undertaking in this part of the thesis is to draw on Schwöbel's work in order to develop a theological account of conversational relationality. This positions me closer to Hunt though, as I have indicated previously in the thesis, I make no claims about the inner life of the Trinity beyond its being one of perfect mutual indwelling in love.

For Christoph Schwöbel, "conversation is not something external to Christian theology, [rather] all Christian theology ultimately has the character of conversation".[748] This follows from conceiving faith as "an ongoing conversation about God and with God", which is itself "rooted in the fact that God engages in conversation with his creation", which in turn "is rooted in God's own being as conversation so that

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[747] Boeve, 2003, p. 209.
[748] Schwöbel, 2003, p. 45.

the being of the world has its ground in the conversation that God is".[749] Schwöbel

does not claim this to be an original proposal, but he does argue that it is radical "in a

precise way since it argues for the view that the conversation God *has* with creation

has its roots in the conversations that God *is*, and both of these in their

interconnectedness are the roots of a relational theology."[750] The interest of this for

the thesis is that a relational theology thus grows out of God's being as conversation

and out of the conversation God has with creation. Thus, the argument results in a

theological ontology of communicative relations.

The radical nature of Schwöbel's thesis is better appreciated when recalling the two

major paradigms according to which reality has often been conceived. First, until the

advent of modernity substance metaphysics dominated thought about the nature of

reality. On this view, reality is a question of that which underlies and bears the

changing attributes of a thing. Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, and Locke all espouse

substance metaphysics in one form or another, and according to these various

versions relations are always external, that is, relations can always be analysed in

terms of attributes which indicate being in relation to something else. This means that

relationality is never a question of that of which something is predicated, neither is it

constitutive of that which is predicated. Schwöbel thus contends that, "In this

framework, being in its substantial structure determines knowing. However, the

relationship of knowing remains external to being".[751]

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[749] Ibid.
[750] Ibid. Emphases in the original.
[751] Ibid., p. 44.

The second paradigm to have dominated the discussion about the nature of reality in western philosophy has been the idealism associated especially with Kant and Berkeley. For them, the mind is the fundamental factor in knowledge, and this has the consequence that all knowledge claims are forms of self-knowledge. Thus, in contrast to substance metaphysics, the structure of idealism is one of relationality, and this has the consequence that reality is known only in terms of its internal relation to the self-relationality of the knowing subject. Whereas substance metaphysics yields relations which are only ever external, subjectivity yields relations which can allow neither for genuine otherness nor for objectivity.

Thus, if I wish to develop a theology of relating, I need to be able to think relationality such that both substance metaphysics and idealism as the paradigms according to which the structures of reality are conceived are avoided, that is, I seek a relationality which is not merely external on the one hand, and which is objective and allows for genuine otherness on the other, and therein lies the radical nature of Schwöbel's argument, for he shows that a theology of Christian relationality springs from the conversation that God is and the conversation which God has with his creation. The conversation between the three divine persons cannot be merely external to their natures, God in his triunity is what God speaks, a wonderful example of continuity. Yet this conversation also encompasses otherness and objectivity, Schwöbel arguing that the biblical witness is constitutive of an ontology.

Schwöbel insists that,

> Whichever conceptualities of relationality Christian theology proposes, they must be rooted in the theological understanding of God. [Professing the triune God] as the one who relates to the world in creation, reconciliation and consummation, makes all patterns of relationality dependent on God as the ground, meaning and goal of everything there is.[752]

Schwöbel appeals to scriptural witnesses and to Luther to support the idea of God as conversation.[753] He is impressed that, regardless of their varying theological conceptions, preoccupations and orientations, the scriptural witnesses all "present communication as a normative paradigm for depicting the God-world relationship".[754] There are many examples. God speaks the world into being, human beings are made in the image of God who speaks to them and to whom they can respond. Schwöbel says that "creaturely responsibility lies in hearing and responding to God's address".[755] The history of Israel's relationship with God is one in which words are paramount: the covenant is established and maintained by God's promises and by the people listening to God's commandments. When the people disobey God, he speaks again, sometimes in the words of prophets. The people address God in psalms of praise, of thanksgiving, of sorrow and of supplication. Jesus is "the first and last word of God".[756] The divinity of Jesus is precisely understood as his authority to speak the word of God and his ability to make the perfect response to God in obedience and faith such that he is "the

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[752] Ibid., pp. 44-5.
[753] Ibid., p. 46.
[754] Ibid.
[755] Ibid., p. 47.
[756] Ibid.

founder and perfecter of our faith".[757] God's actions and speech are united because God "does things with words and […] makes things that speak".[758] And so "God's action is communicative action, and God's speech effects what it says".[759]

Schwöbel's commitment to the witness of Scripture and to what he takes to be the intention of the Bible writers, namely, to define an ontology, establish the framework of reality, sets him apart from those scholars who attempt to interpret the biblical narrative within the context of an already given ontology. He says,

> the theological challenge therefore consists in taking the biblical texts seriously in their ontological claims and in trying to reconstruct an ontology, a conceptual reconstruction of the biblical views of reality, on their basis. The theological challenge for a relational theology therefore is not to impose an already defined framework of relationality on the biblical witness but to try and define relationality from these roots.[760]

In Genesis, creation is quite clearly to be understood in terms of God's speaking: God said, 'Let there be…and there was…'.[761] More than this, God's speech establishes ordered relationships both within creation and between creation and God himself. Despite its absolute dependence on God, on God's word, creation enjoys what

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[757] Heb. 12:2. Quoted by Schwöbel, 2003, p. 48.
[758] Ibid., p. 49.
[759] Ibid.
[760] Ibid., p. 50.
[761] Here I am referring to the late exilic account of approximately 587 BCE in Genesis 1:1 to 2:4.

Schwöbel calls "created and […] creative interdependence".[762] The creative activity of music-making is, as I hope I have been able to show, the making of relationships, an interdependent creative activity, a mutual indwelling on the part of the performers.

Schwöbel's argument suggests that music-making as an ordered activity is dependent on God's speech. Continuity would suggest that music-making is the ordering of relationships, and so Schwöbel's argument would suggest it is grounded in God, and that it is to perform a theology of relationality which is Christian.

Since creation comes into being by God's word, "there cannot be a division between being and meaning […] Meaning is invested into the created order from the beginning by God's word".[763] This is yet another example of continuity: the meaning of the created order is written into it at its very deepest levels, despite its fallen state. Theologically speaking, creation is not ontologically neutral, neither can it be properly understood in terms of scientific analyses or of the purposes to which it is subjected by human will and activity. Creation has a relative independence from God which gives it real otherness. It is thus capable of being addressed by God and of "being called into communion with God".[764] I note that, if meaning is invested in the created order and cannot be separated from being, this capability stands in close proximity to the demand made on, and the courage given to, theological language to interpret revelation.[765] Schwöbel's Lutheran understanding of the relationship between God

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[762] Ibid., p. 51.
[763] Ibid.
[764] Ibid.
[765] See p. 267ff above.

and humanity is that to establish communion between them is "the aim of creation", and thus that creation is from the beginning "a covenantal form of life".[766] Schwöbel's point here is that this is a form of life which from its inception is conversational through and through.

Luther, too, portrays God's dealings with human beings as conversation, giving an insightful reading of the first verse of St. John's Gospel:

> St John thus declares that there was in God a Speech or Word who occupies all of God, that He was God Himself, that He had preceded the existence of all creatures […] Thus it must be a word or conversation not of any angels or of any creatures but of God Himself. Thus, we see here the term 'the Word', not any ordinary word but a Word that is as great as God Himself. Indeed, the Word is God Himself.[767]

On this account, God and creation are intimately engaged with one another in terms which are conversational.

Schwöbel continues his argument by invoking Rahner's identification of the economic Trinity with the immanent Trinity and understands it as a statement which proclaims a perfect alignment of God's action and being in relation to the world on the one hand,

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[766] Schwöbel, 2003, p. 53.
[767] Luther, 1958b, p. 12.

and to himself on the other. This prompts the question as to whether God *is* conversation or simply takes part *in* conversation.[768] Schwöbel concludes that both notions apply to God and that all God's speaking is Trinitarian, and this means that the doctrine of the Trinity "can be understood as an attempt to answer the question: 'Who is God if God is as he speaks, is spoken to and is spoken of in the divine-human conversation recorded and carried out in Scripture and continued in the church?'".[769] The overarching profession that "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God",[770] enables God's speaking to be identified in terms of the conversational relationships between the three divine persons.

Schwöbel summarises: "With regard to the Trinity which can only be spoken of within the discourse of faith, the relations between the three divine persons must be understood as internal and constitutive relations".[771] This, says Schwöbel, has "surprising metaphysical implications",[772] one of which is that God as conversation gives a mutuality between the three Persons which goes beyond the classical conception of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, for "the Father who is the initiating speaker in the Trinity also becomes the listener and the responsive speaker when the Son who is the first listener becomes the responsive

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[768] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[769] Ibid., p. 63.
[770] John 1:2.
[771] Schwöbel, 2003, p. 64.
[772] Ibid.

speaker in his relationship to God the Father",[773] and a similar dynamic holds good for the Spirit.

Schwöbel ends his essay by considering the possibility that 'conversation' is merely a metaphor which has no substantive connection with the actual structural and relational dynamic which is the Trinity. This is not the place to go into this possible difficulty in any detail, suffice to say that Schwöbel thinks it important to note that, if God is conversation and if the relationship between God and the world is validly conceived in terms of a discourse, then the distinction between literal and metaphorical discourse is problematic. More than this, though, he thinks that if we understand reality as a divine-human conversation, then the Trinitarian conversation "which constitutes being becomes a primary metaphysical category".[774] This has the important consequence that "speaking is prior to being",[775] things are spoken into existence which means that "how God does things with words becomes the way in which things are to be understood".[776] In sum, Schwöbel thinks that if we take the notion of God as conversation seriously, as the biblical witnesses exhort us to do, then we find "that God is eventful, relational, personal [and] communal".[777]

In this chapter the intention has been to set out some of the arguments as to how God can be conceived as conversation, conversation which is the mutual indwelling of the three Persons of the Trinity, an indwelling which is constitutive of Trinitarian

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[773] Ibid., p. 65.
[774] Ibid.
[775] Ibid.
[776] Ibid., p. 66.
[777] Ibid., p. 68.

relationality. If, as previously argued, music-making is constitutive of a relationality which is characterised by a mutual indwelling which is minimally contaminated by narrative content, an over-bearing individual identity and the tensions between self and ego, I hope to have made good progress towards establishing music-making to be a performed theology of Christian relating.

CHAPTER 12: TRINITY, RELATIONALITY AND MUSIC

The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the specific process of music-making in relation to Trinitarian thought. I will pick up theological themes developed in previous chapters and further develop the notion of mutual indwelling amongst the three Persons of the Trinity with regard to musical performance. Also, the claim that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relating will be approached by noting 'resonances' between music-making and certain aspects of God's Trinitarian life.

Being made in the image and likeness of God means that the co-ordinates of our reality, what it is to be human including what it is to relate in truly human ways, is grounded in his (self) relating as Three-personned God. Explaining that in patristic thought "the being of God is a relational being [… and that] it would be unthinkable to speak of the one God before speaking of the God who is communion, that is to say, of the Holy Trinity",[778] for Zizioulas, "the Holy Trinity is a *primordial* ontological concept".[779] This means that "the only way for a true person to exist is for being and communion to coincide. The triune God offers in Himself the only possibility for such an identification of being with communion; He is the revelation of true personhood".[780] For 'communion', I would argue, we may substitute 'relationality'. In music-making especially, though this is not the usual language we use, the relationships between the musicians amount to a kind of communion; I will try to

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[778] Zizioulas, 2004, p. 17.
[779] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
[780] Ibid., p. 107.

show in the next chapter that these relationships are sustained by, and are manifestations of, love.

The relationality required by music-making bears the hallmarks of Christian relationality, and this is because the relationality demanded by compelling performances of music constitutes a kind of mutual indwelling of the musicians which can be analogously compared to the indwelling of the three Persons of the Trinity, an analogy explored in this thesis in terms of the conversation which takes place between them and is definitive of the Triune God. If I know the co-ordinates of my reality, I can know my position in relation to the rest of reality, and to act on this knowledge is just what human relating, by grace, truly is. This is perhaps a specific, if small, example of what Begbie calls "music's ability to re-shape, reconfigure our temporal co-ordinates".[781]

Hardy on the Trinity and language

In Daniel Hardy's thinking on language and the Trinity there are insights which would seem to support my thesis that music-making is a performed theology of Christian relationality. Hardy is anxious to repudiate what he castigates as the sub-Christian appeal to transcendence, made, for example, by George Steiner, "which", says Hardy, "serves as a theological authorisation of autonomous human creativity".[782] He agrees

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[781] Begbie, 2004, p. 177.
[782] Hardy, 1996d, p. 60.

with Steiner "that language is – and must be – underwritten by the assumption of God's presence".[783] Steiner argues that language is underpinned by

> a direct and immediate sense of givenness, of awareness of something Other and something More, of experience of being taken beyond oneself […] deep into something which is both the basis of, and the promise and fulfilment for the sheer and mere fact that one is there (here) and actually experiencing some possibilities both of creativity and of creation.[784]

Whilst Hardy applauds Steiner's view which not only gives theological authorisation to autonomous human creativity, but also "makes the question of God central to culture without compromising the freedom of culture",[785] he criticises it for failing to take into account the involvement of the Triune God in the dynamics of language as well as in its truth content. Hardy believes that "God actively confers himself in establishing and re-establishing our language and truth as we communicate with each other".[786] Perhaps it would be reasonable to wonder if the substitution of 'music' for 'language' would be legitimate. However, perhaps there is no need to become embroiled here in debates about music as language, instead, I hold to the conviction that (at least part of) what we communicate to one another as we make music can be conceived in purely musical terms, that is, musical ideas. Hardy invites us to consider

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[783] Ibid. This is Hardy not Steiner.
[784] Steiner, 1989, p. 3.
[785] Hardy, 1996d, p. 60.
[786] Ibid., p. 61.

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the Last Supper, arguing that the language then used is "intrinsic to the redemptive purposes of God. Language," he says, "is an 'economy' in which the Trinitarian God is active".[787] He argues that "Christ reopens the connection of language with its source, but that [that] does not establish a single preferred language. Instead, the Spirit brings about a witness which is contingent and appropriate for every place but fundamentally one in Christ".[788] It would seem, then, that the substitution of 'music' for 'language' would indeed be legitimate. Hardy finds inspiration in the Parable of the Prodigal Son. He says, "In telling this parable, Jesus appears to have been portraying the fundamental content of the Trinitarian life and work of God, an abundance which goes out to meet others, to embrace and raise them".[789] He then argues that the implication of this for language is that language can be redemptive, "it is addressed to others (in their otherness) as the means by which they are met, responded-to, bonded-to and raised to their truth".[790] Now, I would argue that music-making too is inflected in these ways. Those who make music together precisely address one another as other, as playing, for example, countermelodies. The music exists precisely only because performers meet, respond and bond to, one another, and this is demanded by the music itself and is to be understood in purely musical terms, it is integral to the adequate performance of the music. Musicians raise one another to their truth, truth as musicians and as it pertains to the individual players place and relationship with his or her fellow performers. Hardy thinks of language "in which the Trinitarian God is active" as a gift.[791] It occurs, he says "where human speakers reach

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[787] Ibid.
[788] Ibid., p. 63.
[789] Ibid., p. 64.
[790] Ibid.
[791] Ibid., p. 65.

out to others in their particularity and speak lovingly".[792] Again, it would seem that this is what happens in music-making; this theme is taken up more fully later in the next chapter, especially the Conclusion.

Finally, in this section, I note Hardy's concern with the diversity and complexity of language whereby it is too often used to further individual special interests and is too often the vehicle for tension and difference. Hardy believes "God is active in developing [such] diversity and complexity and yet resolving the tensions which emerge in such diversity".[793] It need hardly be said that the creation and resolution of tension is one of the hallmarks of musical composition and performance. This is not to make the composer and performer God-like, rather, it is to see them as engaged in an activity which is informed by God's activity as, in Hardy's view, is language: "language is founded not in transcendence but in the involvement of the Trinitarian God in the dynamics of language itself".[794] And when Hardy tells us that "individuals and groups must be able to rejoice in particularity while at the same time recognising each other with compassion", it is surely legitimate to draw a parallel with music-making. Hardy refers to "the abundance of God in language [which] enables each thing or person to be different in its particularity, and yet capable of achieving unity through reference to the common source of particularities which/who is present in the dynamics of mutual engagement", and that this is, as he says, "astonishingly liberating".[795] In other words, particularities of difference need not be inevitably

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[792] Ibid.
[793] Ibid., p. 65.
[794] Ibid., p. 60.
[795] Ibid., p. 66.

antagonistic, rather, their truth is their unity which is from God. Hardy contends that

his argument as I have outlined it here means that "the Trinitarian God can be seen to

participate in any identification of a thing in its particular truth, and to participate in

their relation".[796] This seems further warrant for claiming music-making to be a

performed theology of Christian relating, for the gift of music-making can be

understood as an activity in which the participation of God is the ground of the identity

of the performers as performers, that is, their truth in terms of the performance, and,

equally, to be the ground of their coherent relationships. The relevance of this for the

thesis is that where Hardy grounds the coherence of language in the participation of

the Trinitarian God, I claim the same for music-making. For music-making has a

coherence, a logic which is open to us as creatures made in God's image. The fact of

different musics, different tunings and so on is accommodated within this claim; life

would not be possible were creation, including the place of human beings within it,

not coherent in the relatedness of its various elements, and this coherence

guaranteed by its Creator.[797]

Hardy's conclusion regarding language is striking:

> The creative Trinitarian activity of God […] promotes a language in
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> which there is true – that is relative – differentiation, a
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> differentiation in free mutual responsibility. The true language of

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[796] Ibid.

[797] This thesis cannot support a discussion of the anthropic principle according to which "a life-giving factor lies at the centre of the whole machinery and design of the world", and "man is adapted to the universe. The universe is adapted to man": Wheeler, 1988, p. vii.

such free mutual responsibility is a language which arises in the

inner life of God himself.[798]

If the translation to music-making is legitimate, then we can say that music-making in

its truth also arises in the inner life of God and is therefore truly a performed theology

of communicative action.

Hardy says that he agrees "with Steiner that language is – and must be – underwritten

by the assumption of God's presence".[799] However, as we have seen, he disagrees that

language is founded in transcendence, arguing instead that it is founded "in the

involvement of the Trinitarian God in the dynamics of language itself".[800] In pursuing

his argument with reference to the Parable of the Prodigal Son, he is clear that

language can be redemptive, a means "through which others can be met, heard and

abundantly raised to their own truth".[801] If music-making is a parallel case, albeit one

which must be construed in strictly musical terms both with regard to the event of

music performance and to the identity and truth of those who perform, then music-

making is further revealed as a performed theology of Christian relating.

All conversations take place within a given context, a co-created creative space. I

would like now to think about what Daniel Hardy has called "contextuality" in relation

to the Trinitarian activity of God.[802] As a preliminary to this consideration, it is useful

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[798] Hardy, 1996d, p. 66.
[799] Ibid., p. 60.
[800] Ibid.
[801] Ibid., p. 64.
[802] Hardy, 1996b, p. 68.

to remember that in the previous chapter it was noted that in music-making not only is ego-led individuality put to one side, but that it has a minimum of narrative and propositional content. This first preliminary can be linked with a second, namely, that the absence of ego-led individuality and of narrative and propositional content in music-making leaves musicians more open than they would otherwise be to "the experience of grace in the body".[803]

Music-making as a contextualised, performed theology

The theological context which I would now like to bring to bear on music-making as *ekstatic* and as demanding that musicians and listeners alike become highly sensitive to their encounters with one another, their subjectivity as musicians, is that this gives credence to the thought that "making music [is] a fertile ground for exploring divine-human relationships".[804]

My starting point is that all of Creation is pervaded by the presence of God, and this includes music-making even though as a practice it is to be thought in strictly musical terms alone. God is always and everywhere actively reconciling the world to himself.[805] Thus, this section of the thesis is about the meaning of music-making given the faith-based espousal of the contextualisation of the world as the sphere of God's reconciling activity.

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[803] O'Connor, et al., 2017, p. xi.
[804] Ibid.
[805] 2 Corinthians Ch.5, v. 19.

Hardy provides me with a useful approach to contextualisation from the Christian theologian's point of view.[806] He begins with a statement of faith: "It […] needs to be understood that the Trinitarian God does not designate one alien to this world, the world in which human beings and cultures and the natural world are interwoven".[807] He makes it clear that by 'context' he does not have in mind "that which surrounds us, as if that were distinct from us, as if it were an envelope in which we are contained".[808] Rather, he thinks of contextuality as "the interweaving of human subjects with their cultures and the natural world, and of cultures with each other and the natural world".[809] The Christian seeks the Trinitarian God in this interweaving, but in order to do so needs "to develop a creative perception by which to sing our world as a hymn of praise to God, [and] fashioning such a song […] is actually the task of theology".[810] Hardy's overall theme is 'The Spirit of God in Creation and Reconciliation',[811] and he makes three important comments with regard to our contextuality as he pursues issues of creation and reconciliation. First, human beings are not autonomous, and the assumption that they are "is based on a very limited notion of contextuality, an essentially separatist and instrumental view of others and the social and natural worlds".[812] I have previously argued that autonomy in this sense is inimical to good music-making. Second, this rejection of autonomy extends to all the factors which delineate contextuality, both natural and social. Social factors include "symbolic signification (linguistic and cultural procedures), political order (the distribution of

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[806] Hardy, 1996b.
[807] Ibid., p. 68.
[808] Ibid.
[809] Ibid.
[810] Ibid., p. 69.
[811] Ibid., p. 68.
[812] Ibid., pp. 74-5.

responsibilities), economic order (the distribution of benefits) and customary/legal structures (the regulation of practices)".[813] Natural factors include the "cosmic order (comprised of elements both spatial and temporal), and the order and distribution of animate being and of human beings".[814] Third, although much of the Christian tradition presupposes God to be somehow isolated from contextuality, this needs to be questioned. Specifically, Hardy affirms that "we can only know God through his relation to the contextuality which is ours".[815] Hardy invokes Rahner's famous identification of the economic and immanent Trinities, commenting "the *economy* through which the Trinitarian God is *himself* is our contextuality".[816] Significantly for the thesis, Hardy separately identifies a final factor which needs to be taken into account, namely, "the creativity with which human beings use their contextuality".[817]

This human creativity comes into play in a situation which Hardy describes as "affirmative underdetermination".[818] The world is characterised by thorough-going diversity which offers considerable freedom for a restructuring accomplished through various interactions, though this freedom is not absolute because it is limited by already existing structures. There are, therefore, constraints upon both behaviour and upon what can count as plausible explanations for it. Even so, for Hardy the affirmatively underdetermined world has "two outstanding features which suggest the possibility of the presence of God".[819] The first is a "vitality present in the turmoil

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[813] Ibid., p. 73.
[814] Ibid.
[815] Ibid., p. 75.
[816] Ibid. Emphases in the original.
[817] Ibid., p. 74.
[818] Ibid., p. 79.
[819] Ibid., p. 80.

of change, the […] realisation that all things share one breath".[820] The second is "the

open structure of contingency".[821] Hardy thinks of these as "the primary aspects" of

the dynamics of contextuality,[822] and maintains his faith-based perspective by

proclaiming the Christian God as a God who defines himself in his economic

relationship with the world as it is manifest in his interactions with his creation which

take place within the world's contextuality. God is never anything other than himself,

and "the consistency of his life is an ordered but energetic congruence with his

world".[823] This view has clear resonances with Jüngel's view that God's being is in

becoming.[824] As Jüngel makes very clear, he is not arguing that God's being can in any

way be identified with God's becoming, on the contrary his intention is to emphasise

an ontological point; "'becoming' […] indicates the manner *in* which God exists, and in

this respect can be understood as the ontological place of the being of God".[825] As

Jüngel insists, God's being cannot undergo augmentation or diminution, so God's

becoming cannot be understood as some kind of transition from past to present to

future states. Such an understanding of 'becoming' is metaphysical, not theological.

Theologically, 'becoming' refers to a Trinitarian category, and as such indicates a

fundamental ontology.[826] God has to do with his creation in a dynamic way; he speaks

to human beings, he sustains them and creation generally; he is not the God of deism,

he reveals himself in the person of Jesus Christ. Thus, God's consistency (being) is

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[820] Ibid.
[821] Ibid.
[822] Ibid.
[823] Ibid., p. 81.
[824] Jüngel, 2014.
[825] Ibid., p. xxv. Emphasis in the original.
[826] Ibid., p. xxvi.

never compromised as he interacts dynamically (becoming) with his creation. Hardy

puts it thus:

> He (God) is himself in maintaining the consistency of his life in an
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> ordered but energetic congruence with his world; he is capable of
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> self-restructuring in a controlled response to the perturbations
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> (constructive or destructive) which occur in that interaction and in
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> those with whom he interacts.[827]

In Chapter 10 the concept of a co-created creative space was introduced. Alongside

that discussion, which emphasised the creativity inherent in good music-making as

exemplified in good performance practice and its reception, can be placed Hardy's

insights concerning the "the open structure of contingency",[828] and his comment that

account needs to be taken of "the creativity with which human beings use their

contextuality".[829] Hardy asks, "What are the *marks* of the activity of the Trinitarian

God in the contextuality of the world?".[830] Part of his answer is to acknowledge the

immanent unity of God, but to assert that "it is an active unity"[831] which arises in the

diversity of things. Thus, the immanent unity is more accurately described as God's

active engagement with the world which is an interweaving of himself into its

contextuality, and this is an activity by virtue of which "God is one".[832] Thus this is a

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[827] Hardy, 1996b, p. 81.
[828] Ibid., p. 80.
[829] Ibid., p. 74.
[830] Ibid., p. 82. Emphasis in the original.
[831] Ibid.
[832] Ibid.

Trinitarian conception of God which re-emphasises the identity of the immanent and economic Trinities and refers back to Jüngel's formulation that God's being is in becoming.

Of particular interest is Hardy's view that God's Trinitarian activity "sustains a complexity of particularities, establishing 'relativities' with their own integrity in fully contextual interweaving".[833] This account of God's Trinitarian activity in the world is also an apt description of what happens in music-making, for music-making is about sustaining a complex of particularities, for example, melodic lines, harmonic progressions, consistent phrasing, instrumental balance and so on, and establishing their relativities, namely their coherence in a compelling performance, and each particularity must, as it were, exhibit its own integrity within the fabric of the music, achieving a "fully contextual interweaving". All this demands a creativity from the musicians which is not just about the realisation of the musical score, crucially it is also about maintaining a space in which such creativity can flourish. These two aspects of the creativity needed for compelling music-making are not finally separable in performance, but the creative space is a logical pre-condition of creativity in the actual music-making. It demands and is constituted by a lively awareness of the contribution of the other musicians and their interactions, not just of one's own playing and one's own responses to their interactions.

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[833] Ibid.

Hardy provides a depiction of the immanent Trinity which is very similar to his depiction of the economic Trinity. God's unity is again a matter of "a dynamic consistency, not inert but energetic in the consistency of his self-structuring in self-sameness".[834]

Conversation, communion, indwelling, and music-making

Young talks about the unity which comes about in a communion of "individual beings (*hypostases*) who are […] constituted as themselves by their very relationship of co-inherence".[835] The "very relationship of co-inherence" is what I mean by mutual indwelling, and it bears a very strong resemblance to Schwöbel's description of the Trinity as conversation which was outlined in the previous chapter. The conversation between the three members of the Trinity is perfect – perfect communion – its perfection is a matter of this co-inherence precisely. It is perhaps not surprising that Young refers to Zizioulas. For Zizioulas, "being is *constituted* as communion".[836] It is a mistake, he thinks, to begin by supposing persons are separate entities which then form relationships. Persons, says Zizioulas, are inconceivable outside of their relationships: "being a person is fundamentally different from being an individual or a 'personality', for a person cannot be imagined in himself but only within his relationships".[837] This is an ontological point and hence to do with the truth of existence. Hardy, too, arrives at relationality. He sees God's self-restructuring as God

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[834] Ibid., p. 81.
[835] Young, 2013, p. 399.
[836] Zizioulas, 2004, p. 101. Emphasis in the original.
[837] Ibid., p. 105.

interacts with his creation, a restructuring by virtue of which God maintains his "self-sameness", as "a congruence with the world in love", and recasts this in terms of God's "dynamic structured relationality", and connects it with God's "infinite possibility of life".[838]

Hardy outlines the relationship of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit by way of an elaboration of the presence and activity of the Trinitarian God in the world and his congruence with it in its contextuality, and the notion of the relationality between the three Persons is central. Hardy refers to a "fullness of ordered relationality in God" which manifests the "conditions by which God is himself".[839] This concept of a fullness of ordered relationality in God which manifests Godself, whilst not making use of the language of mutual indwelling, does parallel it very closely, especially if taken together with Zizioulas' arguments that being is communion. Hardy speaks of an "active bestowal […] of the highly contingent complexity of the contextuality of our being and activity, in which are interwoven nature, sociality and God".[840] This contingency, he says, is the condition of our freedom which at the same time establishes the reach of such freedom and the limits within which it can be exercised. This freedom is from God, and because it is grounded in "the free ordering of God, by which it is blessed/enriched", and because it is thus written into creation, there are consequences for its right use.[841] In the first place we should recognise that "the proper use of our freedom-in-contextuality follows the pathway followed by

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[838] Hardy, 1996b, p. 81.
[839] Ibid.
[840] Ibid., p. 83.
[841] Ibid.

God's Spirit, the pathway constituted by the initial conditions of 'the Father' and fulfilled in the ordering of the Logos".[842] Hardy contends that this means we use our freedom properly when we are turned outwards from ourselves towards others, "conferring the benefits of our particularity upon those with whom we are interwoven".[843] This, it seems to me, has clear resonances with the spirit in which we make music. In music-making we do indeed bring our own particularity to bear on the overall performance. This is not just a question of the particular part I play in, for example, a string quartet, the viola part, say, but also of the particularity which I bring as an individual musician with a training and musical sensibility shaped by specific influences in specific contexts whose effects have been modulated by the wider cultural, political, social and personality factors which make me the person I am.

Some exploration was made in Chapter 9 of the *ekstatic* aspects of music-making. We turn outward towards the other musicians with whom we make music with a mutually conferred freedom. This freedom is demanded by the music insofar as coherent performance is dependent on the musicians performing in mutually compatible ways, allowing one another the creative space in which to bring the music to life, give an authentic performance. Hardy says, "our freedom confers freedom through our love".[844] Equally, the freedom with which musicians work in a co-created creative space comes about by virtue of a love which is usually expressed as a love of music. It is more usual to speak of such love as primarily a professional attitude, a thorough-going *musical* commitment which manifests itself in terms of touch, articulation,

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[842] Ibid.
[843] Ibid.
[844] Ibid.

harmonic and instrumental subtlety and so on. This commitment is a love which is present when fellow performers mutually confer upon one another co-created creative space with its concomitant freedoms. Love occupies an important place in the argument of the next chapter and the Conclusion.

Hardy refers to "God's ongoingly active/energetic self-structuring in the bestowal and sustenance of the highly contingent complexity in which our contextual being-in-freedom consists".[845] This conception also has clear links with what Jüngel has in mind when he talks about God's being as a matter of becoming,[846] and Hardy thinks it makes for a "complex and contingent relation between [God] and our contextual being".[847] There is a clear parallel here with performers engaged in music-making such that, recalling that musicians are entirely themselves as musicians only by virtue of the inter-relationships which are held in place by their music-making, and that the three Persons of the Trinity are themselves entirely by virtue of the relationships between them, it begins to seem that the musicians' mutual bestowal of a creative freedom which maintains their contingent, interwoven contextual being can be said to be analogous to that of the Trinity. Thus, later in this chapter I will argue that this bestowal is ontologically definitive of the musicians in a way which is analogous to the ontologically definitive relationships of the three Persons of the Trinity.

Hardy says, "our freedom to confer love and freedom is itself contextual, mediated through all the factors – natural, biological, social – which locate us and render us

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[845] Ibid.
[846] Jüngel, 2014.
[847] Hardy, 1996b, pp. 83-4.

finite there".[848] May we not understand good performance practice and reception, as explored in chapter 10, in terms of an exercise of freedom in which love and freedom are manifested and contextualised by the co-created creative space which has been outlined previously? And when Hardy immediately continues by arguing that "the sign of blessing which God confers is in our conferral of such blessing on others [together] with […] the creativity by which to fashion new and more humane contextual interweavings",[849] the pressure to claim that this is just what happens in music-making is hard to resist. We indeed confer blessings on others with whom we make music. For O'Connor, Kim and Labriola, music-making requires a certain kind of "musical patience – an art of listening, phrasing, and shaping the sound",[850] and they go on to argue that this is a means of strengthening and deepening relationships which, "theologically speaking, is an experience of grace in the body".[851]

The cumulative result of all these considerations is that music-making can be recognised as a performed theology of Christian relating.

In reminding us of Nietzsche's madman and his declaration that we have killed God, Hardy shows how keenly aware he is that we are only too capable of denying God and

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[848] Ibid., p. 84.
[849] Ibid. Gschwandtner says that for Marion, the holiness and love given freely in Christ "is best received by being passed on ceaselessly": Gschwandtner, 2016, p. 22.
[850] O'Connor, et al., 2017, p. xi.
[851] Ibid.

his gifting of himself in his interweaving with the contextuality of the world in all its aspects.[852] So whilst Hardy thinks

> it can be said that the conditions for the full contextual interweaving of human beings and other animate creatures, as well as nature itself, are already actively present in the contextuality of human life, and that we are here simply uncovering what already is by God's grace, so that it may be seen and performed more fully, [...] it is also accurate to say that it is not actively present there.[853]

The reason for this is that human beings fail to align their mutual interweavings with "the active presence of God and the energetic order which that provides".[854] The consequence of this failure is diminished contextual relationships which Hardy thinks of as "the contextual counterparts of sin".[855]

But if Hardy is right about "the contextual loss of God",[856] how is it possible to uphold the claim of the thesis, when it may well be the case that the majority of musicians have very little if any practical allegiance to Christianity? It is not usual for musicians consciously to "orientate their interweaving with others to the active presence of God

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[852] Hardy, 1996b, pp. 84-5.
[853] Ibid., p. 84.
[854] Ibid.
[855] Ibid.
[856] Ibid.

and the energetic order which that provides"[857] when they perform. Hardy's examples of what he calls "social narcissism" which he believes are evidence for these contextual counterparts of sin, all involve "reducing [the] dynamics of [the social universe] to those of human autonomy, whether social or individual. And God is seen to have been the false projection of [...] ideal human attributes".[858]

Is this a challenge to the thesis? I begin to answer this question by noting again two related aspects of music-making as it has been characterised for the purpose of the thesis. The first is that music-making is being thought of in abstraction from its social, political and cultural contexts, in other words its contextualisation for the purposes of this thesis is entirely musical, and this being so it would seem that music-making combats and minimises Hardy's 'sins', at least the social ones he mentions. For music-making does not constitute an arena for the exploitation of the natural world, though it would not be possible without the resources provided by the natural world. Those who make music are often very conscious of the effects of the natural world on their music-making and realise the necessity for cooperating with it. This cooperation is not just a question of the right use of natural materials in the making of instruments, keyboard 'ivories' is an obvious example, but, rather more deeply though not necessarily more importantly, extends to using the properties of the music space and of the materials of its construction appropriately in pursuit of greater coherence in performance. Organists, for example, are particularly aware that the often very resonant spaces in which they perform have direct consequences for tempi and

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[857] Ibid.
[858] Ibid., p. 85.

registration. This can be dubbed 'good exploitation' of nature. Whilst this is to form a relationship with nature in terms of its acoustic properties, it is carried out in response to purely musical considerations. Hardy says that "human beings [can come] to see the natural world as 'only a resource' upon which human society may endlessly draw".[859] But even though music usually takes place in spaces which make use of nature's resources in terms of building materials and so on, the requirements of good music-making strongly tend towards a positive and respectful engagement with nature. Beyond acoustic considerations there is the care and pride with which instruments are treated; woods and metals are polished, valves oiled, storage conditions carefully monitored for humidity and temperature. Certain materials are prized for their musical properties or for their suitability in the construction of instruments. Even where a people or community is hungry for music, this does not eventuate necessarily in the exploitation of nature; a string quartet performing to an audience of hundreds does not 'use' natural resources to a greater extent that it does when performing for a few dozen, though in the latter case the performance space might be smaller and thus 'use' fewer natural resources. One might argue that string quartet music is better served by being performed in smaller venues. But large concert halls and the like are used over and over again. Perhaps it could be argued that there is a kind of consumer exploitation of nature when valuable instruments are locked away in vaults or displayed in cabinets, but then the music-making has been left behind. Music-lovers who are not performers but who own such instruments very often arrange for them to be lent to musicians so they can be played rather than

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[859] Ibid.

allowed to deteriorate; this caring for the instruments is an honouring of the natural resources of which they are made and the craftsmanship they manifest. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the use of natural resources in music-making is not a question of consumer greed.

Another example of social narcissism occurs when "society structures its interrelations in 'totalities' […] the result is – in the name of Ideals of 'purity' – to eliminate the very social diversity by which society preserves its flexibility and long-term survival".[860] It is clear, though, that such ideological prejudices have no place in music-making. Even if, for example, it seems that music is often better performed by native musicians than it is by others, this is finally a musical judgment. A compelling performance of the dumka and furiant dances in Dvorak, for example, is a question of getting the rhythms and inflections of the melodies right, not of the nationality of the performers; witness the Australian Sir Charles Mackerras' outstanding performances of Czech music, for example.

Hardy's final example is seen "where society structures its interrelations as encapsulated within a 'present' which bears no relation to its past or future, thereby losing sight of the sources and effects of its own structured dynamics".[861] Again, as the discussion of music in terms of performance tradition which was briefly explored in Chapter 10 makes clear, there is no room in music-making for such an exclusive focus on the present. Whilst performance fashions change, they can only do so within the

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[860] Ibid.
[861] Ibid.

context of a tradition and culture which points up their newly-discovered and advocated insights and desirability. A good performance of a great work reveals a fullness and richness of invention which promises infinite possibilities for future performance. Good performances are thus acutely attuned to their present contexts, sensitive to the tradition of great works and performances which contextualise present performances and herald a future in which such works retain their place in the culture of a flourishing society.

Thus, it can be argued that music-making in and of itself stands against the commission of Hardy's 'sins'. Is it unreasonable to wonder if music's oft-claimed ability to enable access to deeper levels of existential relevance and meaning rests partly on its resistance to 'social narcissism'? Whilst a conscious orientation to "the active presence of God" is not usually an integral part of music-making, it does seem to require a removal of selfish motives, of acquisitive tendencies and ideological foundations if it is to be true to the music as such. Perhaps this represents the establishment of a space, a context indeed, in which God's grace can more easily flow even though it be unrecognised. Such a thought is a return to the comments above, namely, that grace flows more freely in the absence of personal narratives, propositional contents, and egoistic and selfish pursuits. Interestingly, Rowan Williams makes a similar point in the course of a discussion of Maritain's aesthetics. He points out that one of Maritain's concerns was to "resist the kind of theological tyranny which assumes that the data of revelation can be brought in as a direct solution to the

problem of specific discourses".[862] Part of what is meant here is that God has created

a world with its own integrity, thus it does not need "God's constant direct

intervention" to be itself.[863] But it also means that there is a unity between grace and

nature such that "the integrity of the created process will, if pursued honestly and

systematically, be open to God's purposes".[864]

Hardy has a thorough-going theological conception of God as "a dynamic order […]

which he confers on human beings in and through their world". He goes on to say that

"this confers not only a richer source of energy on the world than that which is

available simply by reference to the ecosystem itself, but a higher quality of

relationality than is available therein".[865] So if Hardy is saying that God confers

relationality, and it is accepted that music-making evinces a dynamic relational

structure whereby musicians as musicians are entirely themselves as the members of

the Trinity are entirely themselves in their relatedness, then, I would argue, there is a

powerful commensurability between the relationality within God-self and that which

pertains between music-makers. To put the argument more straight-forwardly, the

relationality which is part and parcel of the right performance of music has the same

outcome in terms of the formation of musicians as does the relationality which exists

between the three members of the Trinity; in both cases the very relationality is

internal to and constitutive of the truth of the persons involved, that is, it is

ontologically determinative. If the human side of this ontological equation is conferred

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862 Williams, 2006, p. 9.
863 Ibid.
864 Ibid.
865 Hardy, 1996b, pp. 86-7.

by God himself, as Hardy contends, then it would seem that the analogy between the mutual indwelling of the three Persons of the Trinity on the one hand and that of those who make music together on the other, has shown music-making to be a performed theology of Christian relating.

Bavinck's theology of general revelation and music-making.

The previous line of argument can be strengthened by an appeal to the theology of Herman Bavinck. Ximian Xu contrasts Bavinck's 'yes' to general revelation with Barth's 'no'.[866] Whereas Barth's 'no', Xu tells us, "is due to his soteriologically-centred concern", Bavinck's 'yes' follows from his concern to "elaborate God's revelation and its relation to 'the rest of our knowledge and life'. Central to this task was how God's revelation in nature and history is related to all human beings".[867] According to Xu, Bavinck's theology of general revelation has three hallmarks.[868] First, it is Trinitarian. Bavinck says, "all God's works *ad extra* are undivided and common to all three persons [and] all things originate simultaneously from the Father through the Son in the Spirit".[869] Second, it focuses on God's creation.[870] For Bavinck, "creation is not just a past event but a continuous process",[871] and "revelation […] extends to the uttermost ends of creation […] With the whole of nature, with the whole of history, with the whole of humanity, with the family and society, with science and art it is intimately

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[866] Xu, 2019.
[867] Ibid., pp. 324 and 326. The embedded quotation is from Bavinck, 1909, p. 24.
[868] Xu, 2019, pp. 327-31.
[869] Bavinck, 2003-8, Vol. 2, pp. 329-40 and 423, quoted in Xu, 2019, p. 327.
[870] Xu, 2019, p. 329.
[871] Veenhof, 2011, p. 4, quoted in Xu, 2019, p. 329.

connected".[872] Third, Bavinck's theology of general revelation is Christocentric. Revelation is grounded in Christ who is the guarantor of its unity. Xu tells us that this is Bavinck's warrant for his contention that "there is an illumination of the Logos among pagans. This illumination is operating through the work of the Spirit".[873] Since revelation extends to all aspects of creation and is grounded in the second person of the Trinity whose light shines under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, Bavinck's theology of revelation is essentially Trinitarian.

Bavinck's thinking with regard to general revelation gives an hitherto unsuspected warrant for interpreting music-making as a performed theology of Christian relating since revelation for Bavinck is inseparable from the relationality which obtains between the three persons of the Trinity.[874] Previous discussion has shown that the relationality which obtains between the three persons of the Trinity is wholly definitive of who they are, and that, similarly, the relationality which obtains between musicians is wholly definitive of who they are as musicians. Bavinck's theology of general revelation takes full cognisance of the diversity of God's creation whilst emphasising its organicism which follows from the commensurability between God and his Creation; God is what God does; continuity. This is to be reminded of what Hardy calls the "complexity of particularities" which establish "relativities with their

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[872] Bavinck, 1909, p. 27, quoted in Xu, 2019, p. 330.
[873] Xu, 2019, p. 330. There is a resonance here with Rahner's concept of the anonymous Christian.
[874] Ibid.

own integrity in fully contextual interweaving", which "contextuality/interweaving […] should be attributed to the Trinitarian activity of God by which God is one".[875]

If all human activity reveals something of what it is to be human, if revelation does indeed extend to the whole of creation mediated by Christ, and if music-making requires a relationality which is as free as any human activity can be of individual ambition, selfishness and so on, this all seems to point to music-making as a paradigmatic example - humanly speaking - of Christian relating. Humanly speaking because there is no question of the relationality which music-making requires being pure; it is contaminated by sin. Also, and crucially, it is possible only to draw an analogy here, since we cannot know what intra-Trinitarian relationality is in itself. As previously argued, music-making combats and minimises those sins of social narcissism enumerated by Hardy. Solo pieces written with an eye to self-aggrandizement through virtuosic display must work musically, and if they fail in this they fall into the category of exercises, even if sophisticated ones. Paganini's *Caprices for Solo Violin*, Liszt's *Transcendental Studies for Solo Piano*, and the *Études* for piano by Chopin and by Debussy, for example, work superbly as music and cannot be adequately performed without a thorough-going commitment to them in which virtuosity serves not itself but the music. If, as previously argued, music-making requires and inhabits a co-created creative space in and through which grace can flow more readily than in many other human contextualities, then it is useful to note that in Bavinck's view it is not nature but sin that is in opposition to grace, indeed "grace

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[875] Hardy, 1996b, p. 82.

and nature are 'organically related' via general revelation",[876] something which

follows upon the three hallmarks of revelation previously described. Furthermore,

this organic relationship is such that nature and grace, and the world and God's

kingdom are of a piece, a unity.

Contextualisation and revelation

For Bavinck, besides being the ground of revelation, Christ is also its organic centre:

"In Christ, in the middle of history, God created an organic centre; from this centre, in

an ever-widening sphere, God drew the circles within which the light of revelation

shines".[877] This means that history is Christocentric and thus that it is itself organic.

Consequently, history has a telos which is "the fullness of the Kingdom of God".[878] If

Hardy's thoughts about God's interweaving of himself with the contextuality of the

world are taken together with Bavinck's Christocentric grounding of general

revelation, I maintain that a further consequence for this thesis can be uncovered and

its arguments strengthened thereby.

Putting Bavinck's thinking of history in Christocentric terms, namely, as being

teleologically oriented toward the eschatological fulfilment of the Kingdom of God,

together with Hardy's convictions about God's interweaving himself into the

contextuality of the world, leads me to think this is to stumble upon one of the reasons

why music often seems to point to and evoke a kind of bliss. This can be put in more

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[876] Xu, 2019, p. 334 who references Eglinton 2012, p. 153 for this connection.
[877] Bavinck, 2003-8, Vol. 1, p. 383.
[878] Bavinck, 1909, p. 141.

concretely theological terms: music-making, as innocent as any human activity can be of sin, begins to reveal what is ontologically true about the world in its redeemed state. The popular version of this is that music can give listeners a glimpse of heaven on earth. For Kelsey, human beings live both in their own creaturely time and in 'borrowed time' which is "the proleptically present time of God's future for creation".[879] Music-making, it seems, is a means of grace which grants us a foretaste of such future as well as it thus confirms our 'eccentric existence' as "ontologically grounded outside [ourselves] in the triune God's gracious gift of new creation".[880] Perhaps this does justice to Begbie's desire that proper consideration be given to

> the New Testament's sense that revelation in the present is (as much as anything else) a revelation of what *will be*, of the future breaking in through Christ and the Spirit, or a radical re-ordering of our history, made possible through the disruption of cross and resurrection, of the Gospel as enacted promise.[881]

In Begbie's view, "music might be singularly well equipped to embody just these dynamics".[882] I hope this thesis contributes to raising awareness of the potential which music-making has in this regard.

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[879] Kelsey, 2009, pp. 1:480-1.
[880] McDougall, 2016, p. 114.
[881] Begbie, 2004, p. 177. Emphasis in the original.
[882] Ibid.

This chapter has emphasised the communing (loving), egoless, boundaryless and accepting-of-the-other nature of music-making, a nature in which diversity, complexity, particularity, and identity are held together in a mutual indwelling which characterises the relationality both of musicians and of the Trinity. Thus, I conclude that music-making is an enacted theology of Christian relating.

CHAPTER 13: CONCLUSION: MUSIC AND CHRISTIAN RELATING

Our understanding of the relationality of musicians as they perform together can perhaps be amplified a little by thinking of the interplay of the potentialities of the score, music-making itself and love. My aim in this chapter is to consolidate the overall arc of the thesis by exploring some of these possibilities.

<u>The feed-back loop of music-making</u>

Within the context of music-making, there is a 'feedback loop' which links the musicians together. They will indwell one another for the duration of the performance, and their identity as musicians is entirely a question of this indwelling. But this indwelling, though a *sine qua non* of good musical performances, results from the demands of the music itself, it is not something which the musicians generate for themselves solely as an act of will. Perhaps when the musicians first start to make music together the feedback loop might not be firmly established. Perhaps the players have not yet developed the rapport between them that is necessary for good performances. Perhaps there is a tension between the nature of the music and the life-world of one or more of the players, or perhaps players are distracted by non-musical cares and attachments. Establishing the feedback loop is a matter of entering a co-created creative space. One of the purposes of warming-up before giving a performance proper is to get this process of co-creating a creative space going, as well as to loosen fingers, secure a tricky passage, warm instruments and so on. The more the musicians become immersed in this co-created creative space, the more the music

begins, as it were, to play them. The crucial point is that the players must look to the music for what is required of them in order to give compelling performances, and this can always be rendered in the technical terms which map onto the overall command that the player has over her instrument such that all the demands made by its music can be met. Players begin to give themselves to the music and to meet its demands. They begin to indwell one another, and as they do so they begin to discover aspects of the music which had been hidden from them hitherto. As they enter more fully into a co-created creative space, then performances become marked by creativity and commitment. Musical ideas flow between the players; a new performance of the music takes shape, one which is not a stale repetition of previous performances; great music can never be exhausted in terms of its musical possibilities. If music-making is a performed theology of Christian relationality, then being drawn further and further into the music itself and thus to indwell one another as musicians more and more is to perform that theology ever more articulately.

A vital aspect of the indwelling which gives the members of the Trinity as well as music-makers their identity is surrender, aspects of which have been explored in the chapter on social Trinitarianism. When applied to music-making, surrender has previously been expressed in terms of the suppression of ego.

If, on previous arguments, music-making is accepted as being as free of sin as is possible, and if the relationality and the identities of the performers are one and the same as they are for the members of the Trinity, then it seems very much to the point

that music-making involves a kind of surrender to the music-making and to one another on the part of performers which is marked by love.

<u>Love</u>

It has been argued that musicians find their identity within the context of a mutual indwelling which is an imperative of good music-making, yet each player exhibits an individuality which is, nonetheless, an indispensable part of a whole because it contributes to the distinctive character of the whole. Blend in a quartet is just that, the distinctive blending of the individualities of the four players, not a homogenising. In this sense, each player has to find his or her own voice which in its turn contributes to the voice of the quartet as a whole. Love for playing and for the repertoire is crucial to finding one's own voice, for it requires extreme attention to one's own playing, its technique and tone, strengths, and weaknesses. This requires an openness to new possibilities. There is a kind of self-discovery, and it requires players to be prepared to surrender old ideas and habits. Fresh and vibrant performances, ones which are not stale and mere repetitions can only occur when the players 'speak' from ignorance, from what is not fixed and fully developed. Instead, they explore what is underdeveloped, embryonic. Stark comments that "it is at those moments when the self is undone […] that thought and creativity become possible".[883] Musical selves cannot be completely undone; one needs a basis in a solid technique, knowledge of the repertoire and so on for there to be the possibility of a coherent performance.

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[883] Stark, 2012, p. 106.

Nonetheless, the point is well-taken. In revealing new possibilities, the players in a small musical ensemble provide one another with opportunities to renew their love for the music.

The performing musician is a specialist in reading signs, and this links with the method in the thesis to think music in purely musical, that is, technical, terms. It also links with what was said in Chapter 10 about Wittgensteinian notions of how one learns to interpret a piece of music, namely, the public nature of performance which establishes musical expressivity and meaning. The signs in a musical score are an inexhaustible fount of difference and interpretation. Yes, if the composer writes a middle C, then a middle C should be played. But how is it to be played? Loudly, softly? Should the phrase of which it is a part be played legato? Whilst a composer has many signs and devices by which to indicate how the score is to be played, nonetheless players have to make many decisions for themselves. The range of interpretations is infinite. As the musician studies the score and tries various ways of realising it, she is motivated by a kind of love, a love which desires to know the depth of the riches hidden in the score.

In view of this, the previous definition of the musicians' co-created creative space should be extended to include the intensities of the influences upon the interpretational possibilities contained in the musical work. This gives additional support to the claim made earlier that finally no clear distinction can be drawn between the musical work, the musicians, and the space within which performances of the work take place.

Music-making, then, requires the players to give themselves to the demands of good performances, and this is a kind of surrender characterised by love for the musical work in which the promotion of self has no part. The musician is prepared to abandon at least part of her present love for the musical work in order to be able to discover a renewed love for it. She does this for the sake of revivified performances. Hannah Stark writes: "only by abandoning limited notions of love can new forms of love, […] and connection become possible".[884] True love is predicated on the refusal to categorise, and fix the identity of, the beloved, be it another person or a musical work. This means that such love acknowledges that the other has a certain unknowability. Here we have echoes of Levinas and Kearney.[885] This unknowability can be revealed to me only provided I am prepared to suspend my objectifying judgements which close off the possibility of the other being able to choose me in love. Love is essential in music-making which aspires to compelling performances.

The creativity of music-making

Besides being an important ingredient in the musician's approach to the score, to the repertoire, and to playing an instrument generally, love is also present in the wider context of music-making. When we make music together there is the potential for new experiences and understandings, for new insights and the transformation of expectations and attitudes, for growth both musical and, if the thesis is successful, spiritual. All this comes about because the musicians indwell one another, acting and

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[884] Ibid., p. 107.
[885] Please see Chapter 6 on the other.

reacting as individuals in unity in pursuit of a coherent and compelling realisation of a score in the context of the performance as determined by venue, audience, interpretive vision and other factors to which I have drawn attention in the thesis. Music-making is not just re-creative, either as recreation or as the re-creation of a piece of music, it is creative.

When musicians are open to new possibilities as described previously, music-making is genuinely creative. An example of this might be the effect on the harmonic rhythm of a passage when there is a change of tempo which arises spontaneously. The quality of the sound changes with different venues; stone buildings render musical sounds differently to wooden ones and the new possibilities must therefore be explored and accommodated within the overall interpretive vision for the work. Or consider the creative reaction of one musician to an improvised embellishment by another, as happens routinely in small jazz ensembles; the musician is open to this aspect of the music-making and able to react creatively to it, an example of the continuity and indwelling which good music-making demands.

In music-making there can be eruptions which send, or threaten to send it in a quite different direction. An example of this is the side drum's explosive entry in Nielsen's *Fifth Symphony*. Nielsen instructs the player(s) to improvise "as if to arrest the progress of the music", and the progress of the music comes perilously close to being derailed completely. The creativity demanded of the side drummer(s) here is extreme; they must improvise against what is being created by the rest of the orchestra.

Music-making has its own 'logic' which demands that the players indwell one another to an extraordinary degree. Performing demands integrity, an integrity that is to be found in the music itself as it plays us and we inhabit co-created creative space, it is not found in egotistically determined interpretations. Such integrity has the name 'love'.

Music-making draws together many forces and influences of varying intensity. There is convergence and divergence between the physical, the concert venue and its acoustics, for example, and the non-physical such as the expectations of, and relationships between, audience members, for example, and this determines the coherence of the music-making as an event, its harmony and stability. When there is a convergence between physical and non-physical, this leads to heightened intensities; for example, the venue, the playing, and audience expectation all converge to give a heightened musical experience.

I have tried to argue that performances are contextualised by co-created creative spaces, and these spaces are constituted by transformative forces, do not merely contain them, and these spaces are shot through with the intensities associated with the unfolding of the musical 'logic' and all the aspects of the music-making as described in the thesis.

Good performances are not mere reproductions of pre-existing blueprints. On the contrary, each one is a new creation which arises from within the music-making itself and from the convergence and divergence explained above. There is no quasi-Platonic

Ideal form of the performance of a piece of music to which all actual performances should aspire and against which they must be judged. Each new performance unfolds, develops under the transformative effects of the music-making itself and in which love plays a vital role. Performances are forever referring backwards to previous performances both by the current players and others, to practice sessions, to lessons, to scholarship, to what has already been played in this current performance, and forwards, for example to tensions to be resolved later, to all future performances both of this particular work and to musical performance in general.

Music-making, it turns out, is the site of a creative transformation of everyday relationships into those of a mutual indwelling which is demanded by music-making itself. These musical relationships are entirely constitutive of the identities of the performers, as are those of the members of the Trinity, and, like the Trinity, they are a unity in diversity. This can be illustrated by a letter which Debussy wrote to the eminent French musicologist and man of letters, Louis Laloy:

> The people in *Boris* [*Godunov*] do not form a true crowd; here one group sings, here another, and here a third, each in its turn, and most often in unison. As for the people of *The Meistersingers*, it's not a crowd but an army, powerfully organised in German style and marching in ranks. What I would like to make is something more sparse, more divided, more relaxed, more impalpable, something inorganic in appearance and yet fundamentally ordered; a true human crowd in which each voice is free, and yet in which all the

united voices together produce one impression and one movement.[886]

The string quartet, whilst being a cohesive group with its own identity allows for the individuality of its members who, nonetheless, find that individuality precisely as they indwell one another more and more. When the members of a string quartet play together, not only are they absorbed by the music, but their mutual indwelling also becomes the *sine qua non* of their identity as musicians. Creative musicians must be forever made anew, and that is not possible without its converse, their unmaking; a settled performance is the first of any number of stale performances. To keep their music-making fresh, musicians must be able to let go of (at least) some ways of playing and interpreting in order to be able to adopt new ways. Any given performance of a musical work is a new unfolding of the myriad possibilities suggested by the score. The players must connect with, must come to indwell, each new unfolding even as they disconnect with previous ones. This is a requirement for the formation of the unity to which a quartet aspires. The music begins to play the players, yet it does so in such a way that the quartet becomes "a collective phenomenon within which multiple entities come into being and acquire a certain degree of cohesion and group identity, yet do so without dissolving and merging with one another".[887] The music unfolds according to the infinite possibilities for its performance which are signed in the written score. On this argument, to talk about the music playing the musicians is no more appropriate than to talk about the musicians playing the music. Rather, there is,

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[886] Bogue, 2003, p. 42. The letter is cited in Barraque, 1962, p. 159.
[887] Bogue, 2003, p. 43.

to adopt one of Christopher Small's concepts though wrested somewhat from its original context, musicking.[888] Stagoll captures this well when he writes "we ought not to say 'the tree became green' or 'the tree is now green' […] but rather 'the tree greens'".[889] Musicking extends across the whole of the creative space so as to encompass listeners as well as the performers, it even extends to all those who have ever performed and listened to the piece and to all those who will do so in the future.

It is not for nothing that reviewers praise some live performances for their spontaneity and sense of ever-renewed discovery, as though the music were being played and heard for the first time. This is what happens in music-making characterised by a co-created creative space, by the indwelling demanded by compelling performances. Music-making engenders an atmosphere with an identity all its own. There are intensities and movements of expression, spontaneity, mutual indwelling, and creativity that tend to dissolve the pre-performance individualities of the players, instead giving them identities which indwell one another.

The themes of the thesis have revolved around two centres: music-making and Trinitarian theology. Music-making, on the account I have presented, brings about a creative transformation of personal relationships which is continuous with the music-making itself. In what follows, I consolidate this conclusion by first pointing up the notion of indwelling by contrasting my depiction of performers with that of Férdia Stone-Davis. I do this in close proximity to notions of love in music-making and as

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[888] Small, 1998.
[889] Stagoll, 2010, p. 90.

definitive of intra-Trinitarian life. Here, the continuity between indwelling and the identities both of performers and of the divine Persons is to the fore.

I then ask what the response to music-making should be if it is indeed a performed theology of Christian relationality. Finally, I return to love but this time in the context of an exchange between Xenakis and Messiaen which illustrates what Messiaen saw as the inseparability of love and technique. This means that music-making seen, as I have presented it, purely in musical terms, that is, *as a practice,* when it is imbued with love, as I have argued good music-making is, is a distinctively Christian mode of relating.

Stone-Davis revisited

Stone-Davis does not go beyond the notion of a subject which, although always in transition, although taken beyond herself, nonetheless remains intact as one who makes sense of aspects of the musical environment and "herself in relation to them".[890] But the transformation I have envisaged in the thesis comes about not because musicians make sense of the musical environment, but because performers, the co-created creative space, instruments, and scholarship, and performance is such that the music plays the performers, or, better, there is musicking. Stone-Davis perceives a subject who "indwell[s] a musical process", and for whom "the changing perception of musical aspects across the time and space of the piece" enables her to

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[890] Stone-Davis, 2015c, p. 145.

make sense of what is presented.[891] This perception contrasts with my conception of music-making as a performed theology of Christian relating. For the argument has been not just that the members of, for example, a string quartet indwell the musical process, though this is obviously true in a certain sense, but that in doing so they indwell one another. Whilst Stone-Davis acknowledges the conversational character of string quartet playing, the point about the appeal to conversation in this thesis is not that, for example, it "reinforces the idea that place arises from interaction and that meaning emerges in process, varying between subjects according to the investment that each makes in the experience as a whole, and formed by the experiences that each subject brings to bear",[892] although this is true. The point about intra-Trinitarian conversation is that it defines the members of the Trinity in their entirety, that is, no member is conceivable outside of the conversation nor exists in isolation from it. This, it has been argued, holds true for musicians also, string quartet players being suggested as the prime exemplars. This, then, is the crucial point about the conversational relationality which exists between the members of the Trinity on the one hand, and those of a string quartet on the other: it is not a relationality which exists between otherwise separate individuals; for the duration of the performance they are a unity in diversity.

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[891] Ibid., p. 144.
[892] Ibid., p. 138.

<u>After the concert</u>

What happens to the musicians as exemplars of Christian relating when the music-making is over? Does the dispersal of the quartet members signal the end of the Christian relating which this thesis has argued quartet-playing exemplifies? If to make music is to perform a theology of Christian relating, what is the appropriate creative response to that music-making? The creativity which is appropriate, demanded even, given the overall thrust of the thesis, is that of a continuing deepening and strengthening of the relationality which music-making engenders. Mechthild of Hackeborn, so Johnson tells us, claimed a "musical intimacy with Christ"[893] such that she saw her priestly role of cantress to be co-redemptive with Christ.[894] For Johnson, "Mechthild reminds us to take seriously the fact that the music we make has powerful effects on our communities, societies, and the universe. If we desire it to be, our music has the power to make lasting changes, even saving ones".[895] In his review of *Music, Theology, and Justice*, Matthew Jarvis notes that "building […] social and spiritual bridges requires a performative act, which in turn follows from music's physicality and our bodiliness", and he goes on to speak of "the inherent 'sacramentalism' of musical performance".[896]

Much has been made in this thesis of the intention to understand music in exclusively technical terms, the need for metaphorical or emotional terms when describing the

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[893] Johnson, 2017, p. 183.
[894] Ibid., pp. 182-91.
[895] Ibid.
[896] Jarvis, 2019, p. 132 (reviewing O'Connor, et al., 2017).

effects which listening to music can produce notwithstanding. Neither does the presence of love in music-making, the giving of oneself selflessly to the performance, to the creative space, detract from the exclusive focus on the technical aspects of music-making, indeed the development and application of technical resources in the giving of compelling performances, the pursuit of strictly musical meaning can be construed in terms of love.

Messiaen, Xenakis, Love

I have tried to argue that to make music reveals Christian relationality performatively, and that love is an important ingredient in this process. An exchange between Messiaen and Xenakis is revealing in this regard. Catherine Pickstock, referencing Xenakis and Samuel,[897] sketches this exchange as follows. Messiaen asks what it is that governs the construction of serial music.[898] Pickstock explains: "a series simply offered a neutral repertoire or *mathesis* from which one could select a way or ways of organising this series, as in mathematical set theory. But what dictates the choice? Purely formal considerations? Why go one way rather than another?".[899]

In the exchange, Messiaen asks at what point love enters into the selection process. Whilst Xenakis was "prepared to talk about 'revelation' here, […] the question for Messiaen seemed to be whether there can be […] a clear distinction between pure

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[897] Xenakis 1985, pp. 27-47; Samuel, 1967, pp. 69-79 and *passim*. Pickstock references Xenakis and Samuel at Pickstock, 2011, p. 202, n. 24.
[898] Pickstock, 2011, p. 201-2.
[899] Ibid., p. 201.

mathematical technique, on the one hand, and the mysterious intervention of 'revelation', on the other".[900] Now it is true that it is not entirely clear, at least from Pickstock's sketch, what Messiaen had in mind by 'revelation', although Pickstock does say that for Messiaen there was no "technique/love duality", and that "it would seem Messiaen saw his selection of formal rules and the creative operation of these rules as itself already guided by 'love' or 'revelation'".[901] This running together of love and revelation might indicate that Messiaen thought in terms of love's revelatory potential, that to love something is to make it possible for there to be the revelation of something which would otherwise remain hidden.

Although Messiaen was referring to the processes of composition, that love can act as a catalyst for revelation would seem to be of a piece with what has been argued in the thesis with regard to music-making. When I give myself in love to fellow performers and to the music-making, what is revealed is a Christian relationality. To be the catalyst for this revelation is love's work.

The methodological decision to focus on music-making in and of itself and give it a theological inflection, has had the goal of establishing theological import for it to put alongside its valuable roles in elucidating theological themes, aiding theological reflection, and enhancing worship. My goal, in this regard, has been to fill a gap in the literature on theology and music, and, if this has been achieved, is the original contribution to the field which I hope the thesis has made.

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[900] Ibid. Single speech marks in the original.
[901] Ibid., p. 202.

Musicking, its co-created creative space in which the music and musicians are one in a mutual indwelling which is their identity, is analogically comparable to the indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity which is constitutive of their identities. I conclude, therefore, that music-making makes sonorous, but only analogically so, the relationality of the Trinity. It is a performed theology of Christian relating.

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