A threefold response to the evidential argument from evil

Chang, Han Jen (2023). A threefold response to the evidential argument from evil. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

In this thesis, I develop a threefold response to the evidential argument from evil. I first raise a new version of skeptical theism, data-based skeptical theism, to defend theism from the evidential argument from evil, but it works only under certain conditions. Data-based skeptical theism needs to be supplemented by other arguments. I then raise the evidential argument from evil against naturalism to reduce the explanatory power of naturalism over evil. Finally, I develop the divine justice theodicy to enhance theism’s explanatory power over evil. In this way, theism can defend the attack of the evidential argument from evil. My thesis can be further detailed as the following:

First, l develop data-based skeptical theism to protect theism from being directly disproved by the evidential argument from evil while avoiding skeptical theism’s two general unwelcomed consequences: global skepticism and moral skepticism. However, data-based skeptical theism works for people who hold no other competing theories to theism. When naturalism is regarded as a competing theory for the existence of evil, the evidential argument from evil can still disconfirm theism indirectly. Because data-based skeptical theism does not offer explanations for evil and naturalism can explain more evil than theism, evil’s existence favours naturalism. Therefore, I supplement data-based skeptical theism with the other two arguments: the evidential argument from evil against naturalism and the divine justice theodicy. The former can reduce the explanatory power of naturalism; the latter can increase that of theism. The two arguments render theism’s explanatory power over evil stronger than that of naturalism. Hence, theism will not be indirectly disconfirmed by the evidential argument from evil. Instead, theism becomes a more plausible theory than naturalism with respect to evil.

In summary, data-based skeptical theism can prevent the evidential argument from evil from directly disconfirming theism; the evidential argument from evil against naturalism and the divine justice theodicy can help theism avoid being indirectly disproved by the evidential argument from evil. The three strategies constitute a solid threefold theistic response to the evidential argument from evil.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

Supervisor(s):