Russia's way of war: reinterpreting Russian strategic culture

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Fasola, Nicolo' ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9126-4383 (2023). Russia's way of war: reinterpreting Russian strategic culture. University of Birmingham. Ph.D.

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the ultimate categories of thought (beliefs) underpinning the Russian way of war, unpacking their nature, development, and interaction between 2008-2018. Prevalent Western interpretations of Russian strategic and military behaviour are affected by two limitations. First, they fail to consider Russian choices on their own terms. Russia’s actions are frequently reduced to the opportunistic pursuit of material gains, the anti-democratic drive of an autocratic regime, or Putin’s personal agency. The intellectual nuances and the peculiar system of assumptions backing the reasonings and decisions of the Russian elite are largely disregarded. Second, the 2014 war with Ukraine believed to be a watershed in Russian military-strategic thinking. Such assessment fails to recognise the strong consistency of strategic perspectives and military modi operandi that Russia has displayed since 2008. The present thesis addresses such limitations by stressing the influence of Strategic Culture (SC) on Russia’s decisions on whether and how to wage war. SC is the dominant set of beliefs concerning security policy and the threat or use of force held by a state’s security elite. A SC-led approach allows us to explore in depth the motivations, nuances, and mechanisms underpinning Russia’s way of war and explain change, or lack of it, across time.

The thesis proceeds as follows. First, I research the concept of SC, proposing a refined model that is more coherent theoretically and easily employable for empirical analysis. Second, I interrogate Russia’s SC via this conceptual framework. By examining a wealth of Russian primary sources and broad military practices (e.g., reforms, exercises) within the timeframe 2008-2018, I form general hypotheses about the ultimate beliefs underpinning the Russian approach to strategy and war-fighting. Third, I test such hypotheses against three case studies, namely Russia’s interventions in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015). These case studies will confirm my expectations about the reasonings motivating Russia’s strategic behaviour and its preferences regarding the use of force, while showing their nuances as well as consistency across time and case studies. This thesis contributes not only to the progressive development of the concept of SC but also, most importantly, to the understanding of Russian thinking on security and war. While staying clear from making forecasts on future conduct, my analysis provides a solid basis on which to build expectations about and chart strategies for counter-acting Moscow’s actions — including in the context of the current iteration of the Ukraine war.

Type of Work:

Thesis (Doctorates > Ph.D.)

Award Type:

Doctorates > Ph.D.

Supervisor(s):