

GROUP IDENTITY IN POLITICS:

Perceptions of Intergroup Identification in the European
Union Referendum held in the UK and the US Presidential
Election of 2016

by

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to examine how voters make sense of their political choices, comparing established versus newly-formed political groups, to understand more about the role of identity in political competitions. I examined the US Presidential Election of 2016 as an example of a longstanding political competition, and the European Union Referendum held in the UK as an example of newly created voting categorisations. I adopted a mixed methods design (surveys and focus groups) to compare the European Union Referendum and US Presidential Election political groups on perceptions of identity, activation of intergroup bias, positive distinctiveness, and identity integration. I found that perceptions of intergroup identification and intergroup bias were shown in both the UK - EU Referendum groups as well as the US Election but that these patterns were stronger in the more established US Election groups. Additionally, I found that identification and intergroup bias perceptions were active in both of the political events though stronger in the established groups than newly-formed. Further, the data provides evidence that the identity (motivations, values) of the group interacts with the establishment of the group to create variations in intergroup perceptions. The conclusion drawn is that political groups go through the process of identity establishment but that this affects their perceptions in different ways, depending upon their motivations, values, and group identity. The implication of this is that we gain a deeper understanding of what is differentiating political groups in the same competitions and what is similar across groups in different competitions.

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CONTENTS

<i>ABSTRACT</i>	<i>I</i>
<i>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</i>	<i>II</i>
<i>CONTENTS</i>	<i>III</i>
<i>TABLE & FIGURES CONTENTS</i>	<i>VI</i>
1. CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The role of political group identity in political decision making	2
1.2 Types of political events: newly formed versus established groups	4
1.3 The approach presented in this thesis	5
1.4 Key contributions	8
1.5 Thesis structure	10
2. CHAPTER 2 - THE POLITICAL EVENTS	12
3. CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY	18
3.1.1 Group purpose and the UK-EU Referendum and US Election	20
3.2 Values and group identity	23
3.2.1 Value perceptions in the political events.....	24
3.3 Perceptions of intergroup differences	26
3.3.2 Self-categorisation in the context of political competition.....	28
3.4 Identity embeddedness	30
3.5 Summary	32
4. CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK	37
4.1 Research design choices	37
4.2 Study 1: The surveys	39
4.2.1 Recruitment	40
4.2.2 Procedure	40
4.2.3 Participants	42
4.2.4 Operationalisation of measures	42
4.3 Study 2: Focus groups	50
4.3.1 Recruitment	51
4.3.2 Procedure	54
4.3.3 Participants	55
4.3.4 Focus group measures	55
4.3.4 Preparing the focus group data	57
4.4 Limitations and considerations	59
4.5 Research philosophy	62

4.6 Analysis plan	63
5. CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Surveys	66
5.1. Hypotheses 1 & 2: Intergroup identification perceptions.....	66
5.1.2 Discussion.....	69
5.2 Hypotheses 3 & 4: Values linked to identity	72
5.2.1 Correlations	72
5.2.2 Predicting identification from values	76
5.2.2 Discussion.....	82
5.3. Hypotheses 5 & 6: Perceptions of intergroup differences	87
5.3.1 Discussion.....	90
5.4 Hypotheses 7 & 8: Perceptions of belonging to the political group	92
5.4.1 Discussion.....	95
6. CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Focus groups	98
6.1 Intergroup perceptions of identity	99
6.1.1 Task-driven group identities.....	100
6.1.2 Identity-focused group identities	103
6.2 Group values and motivations of group identity	108
6.2.1 Motivations for group identification and formation	108
6.2.2 Perceptions of group values.....	114
6.3 Perceptions of intergroup differences.....	115
6.3.1 The role of competition	116
6.3.2 Emotions as a drivers of intergroup differences	120
6.3.3 Change over time.....	122
6.4 Belonging.....	124
6.4.1 Experiences of bias and prejudice	124
6.4.2 Disassociation.....	128
7. CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION	132
7.1 Key findings	132
7.1.1 Identity driven versus task driven.....	132
7.1.2 Values linked to identity.....	134
7.1.3 Perceptions of intergroup differences.....	137
7.1.4 Perceptions of belonging to the political group.....	140
7.1.5 Summary of key findings	141
7.2 My contribution	142
7.2.1 My contribution to Political Psychology	143
7.2.2 My contribution to Social Identity Theory	144
7.2.3 My contribution to understanding contemporary political events.....	145
7.3 Strengths and limitations	148
7.3.1 Strengths	148
7.3.2 Limitations.....	149
7.3.3 Personal considerations and reflections.....	154
7.4 Future Avenues of Research.....	155
7.5 General Conclusion	158

8. REFERENCES.....	160
9. APPENDICES.....	164
Appendix 1 - Case 1 – the United States Presidential Election	164
Appendix 2 – Case 2 – the European Union Referendum in the UK.....	169
Appendix 3 – Questionnaire	173
Appendix 4	177
Appendix 5 – focus group information	178

TABLE & FIGURES CONTENTS

Table 3.1 – Summary of research aims and research hypotheses	pg 36
Table 4.1 – Composite variable: voting group * group value assignment	pg 45
Table 4.2 – Value systems composites – Rokeach’s values into a 4-factor solution	pg 49
Table 4.3 – Partisan identity items and scales	pg 52
Table 4.4 – Mean partisan identity scores per voting group	pg 53
Table 5.1 – Mean identification scores for participants’ voting group vs the competing group across different campaign groups	pg 67
Table 5.2 – Post hoc contrasts with Bonferroni correction comparing identification between political groups	pg 69
Table 5.3 – Republican correlations identification and value clusters	pg 73
Table 5.4 – Democrat correlations identification and value clusters	pg 74
Table 5.5 – Leave correlations identification and value clusters	pg 75
Table 5.6 – Remain correlations identification and value clusters	pg 76
Table 5.7: Coefficient values for the regression models predicting ingroup and then outgroup identification from the four value clusters by voting group	pg 79
Table 5.8 – Mean scores for intergroup value cluster ratings by political event	pg 88
Table 5.9 – Mean difference in Value Ratings between political groups from post-hoc t-tests	pg 89
Table 5.10 - Means and post hoc Bonferroni comparing value scores between political and value cluster comparisons between the group and self	pg 94
Table 6.1 – Outlining the themes of the focus group data	pg 98
Table 6.2 – Compilation of values attributed to one’s competing group	pg 114
Figure 4.1 – Distribution of values across the 4 clusters	pg 48
Figure 5.1: Comparing identification distance across the campaign group contrasts	pg 68

1. CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines how voters in the UK-EU referendum and the 2016 USA elections made sense of their political choices, what the role of their perceived group identity was and what impact this had on their perceptions of intergroup differences. These themes were motivated by the increase in studies paying attention to identity politics (Fukuyama, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2018; Walters, 2018). Identity politics has focused on the shift towards group identity and a sense of belonging motivating political groups, rather than political belief and affiliations (Huddy et al., 2015, 2018). Consequently, this has an impact on our understanding of what is driving political decision making (Huddy, 2001; Cohen, 2003; Greene, 1999, 2004). This is because group identity is linked to greater perceptions of intergroup differences in the value systems driving political affiliation. This can generate a higher activation of intergroup bias. This leads to increased prejudice and discrimination between competing political groups rather than cooperation even once a political competition has come to pass (Iyengar et al., 2012), thus, feeding the growing political divide. It also means motivations behind political decision making are driven by identity rather than political gain. This creates a muddled picture of what is driving decision making and behaviour in political groups. Therefore, a key aim of this thesis is to deepen our understanding of the nature and determinants of political competition.

In this thesis, I examine perceptions of group identity and intergroup difference perceptions in the US Presidential Election of 2016 as an example of a longstanding established political competition, and the European Union (EU) Referendum of 2016 conducted in the United Kingdom as an example of a one-off political competition with newly created political group categories. Similarities between the two events include the emphasis placed on the rhetoric of a restoration to a “greater” earlier time because of social and economic globalisation (Hogan & Haltinner, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). The differences between the two events

that I will focus on in this thesis include the type of competition and the time the political groups have had to establish their group identities (Lickel, et al., 2000, 2001). These comparisons are taken on board through the discussion of identity perceptions with the aim to work towards an overall goal of suggesting solutions for the growing political divide from an intergroup identity driven perspective. This is to add to the discussion on how group political identities develop and what their impact is on political group members' perceptions. To do this, I apply of tools and models from within social and political psychology that provide an understanding of the impacts and outcomes of social intergroup competition.

1.1 The role of political group identity in political decision making

Understanding perceptions of political group identity in political decision making allows scholars to assess the impacts of political competition as well as understand more about the identity and motivations driving behaviour. An example of this is having a more favourable perceptions of one's own group as compared to their competing. This is possible as the social group identities to which individuals assign themselves determine their political actions. For instance, scholars who studied the civil rights movement and the women's rights movement have found evidence that social identities play a role in the motivation for socio-political change (see, e.g., Taylor & Whittier, 1995). This occurs because political groups have incorporated the same process of identity formation so that feeling a sense of belonging to a party is redefining political group affiliation (Huddy, 2001, 2015; Cohen, 2003; Greene, 1999, 2004). Therefore, the social identity of individuals is increasingly important when looking at factors that motivate voting.

To support this, Greene (2004) found that partisan social identity is a main predictor of party engagement in the US Presidential Election, even when controlling for strength of support for one's campaign. Further, Fowler and Kam, (2007) evidenced that social identity, alongside

CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION

altruism, was a significant predictor of political participation in both Republican and Democratic voters. Moreover, Devine (2015) measured ideological social identity and psychological attachment to find that liberals and conservatives show attachment to their group but that conservatives show higher scores of social identity than liberals. Therefore, understanding identities, how they form and how they affect perceptions of individual members allows scholars to make inferences on the presence and effect of biases held by political group members that lead to greater political division.

According to Cohen (2003), a cohesive group identity comes about in political competitions when group members are encouraged to clarify their aims and values and they feel secure in the identity that these aims and values form. Cohen argues that this is more likely apparent in groups that belong to longstanding cyclic political competitions because they work to clarify their position and identity. This is supported by the literature which examines the intergroup differences that result in partisanship affiliation in political events, i.e. what differentiates the voters from one group to those from another. For instance, Abramowitz and Webster (2016), used the American National Election Studies to assess what causes negative partisanship in the US. They found that social, cultural and ideological differences were driving the partisanship divide. They argued that there has been an increase in group loyalty and negative feelings towards the outgroup and their leaders during the 21st century, i.e. affective polarisation. The consequences of which have resulted in an increasing divide between political competing groups that has built over time and continued intergroup competition.

There has also been discussion in the literature as to which types of group identities are linked to political decision making. Green et al. (2004) found evidence that the party loyalties of individual voters from the US exit polls lay within their social identification with group membership. Yet, Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) argued that party identification was more

important that general social identifications from group memberships. Considering the mixed findings presented by these two studies, it is important to define the type of identity that is being assessed when understanding motivations of political voting, i.e. is the social group or the political group identity a bigger driver of political decisions? A gap in these studies is that loyalty and identification to the ingroup is used as a proxy to theorise feelings towards the outgroup without direct measurement of such. To account for this gap, I look at individuals' scores of identification with the political group they are voting for as well as competing against.

Whilst we can see the important role of identity in politics, there is the question as to whether all political groups are showing such negative feelings towards their competing groups or whether this is seen only in groups that have existed in the political climate for an extended amount of time. It is also important to understand whether intergroup perceptions of identification are exclusive to specific types of political events or are common across different types of political decision making, such as the difference between leadership contests and elections aiming to elicit social change. Examining if there are differences in identification perceptions between different types of political events allows us to understand more about when political identity is formed and so when the intergroup bias perceptions begin to impact individual voters perceptions of their competing groups.

1.2 Types of political events: newly formed versus established groups

There are political groups that are temporary and have the potential to disband once the outcome of the political event is known, for example, same-sex marriage referendums or country independence referendums. These groups are often formed with aims to maintain or challenge the status quo of society (Jost et al., 2004; Jost et al., 2009). Jost et al (2009) argue that once these types of temporary groups fulfil their aims they can disband, as the identity of the group was formed around the task at hand (Lickel et al., 2000, 2001). According to Lickel

et al (2000, 2001), *temporary groups* form their identity around the task that bands them together and therefore it is not needed or maintained once the task is complete. Yet, *established groups* form their identity around belonging and ingroup tasks are irrelevant to the continued existence of the group identity¹. By applying this extension of social group dynamics from Lickel and his team, I aim to assess the foundations of identity formation in political groups. By examining both newly formed “task-oriented” groups with established “identity-focused” groups, I examine if political identity is a driver of both established and temporary voting groups or only with those that have had time to establish their identity. The implications of this are that I offer an insight into how to close the growing divide driven by identity politics (Monroe et al., 2000; Cohen, 2003) by understanding the motivations behind and structuring of the groups that are interacting in political competition.

1.3 The approach presented in this thesis

The key question that centres this thesis is: *how do voters’ perceive their group identity and intergroup differences in the newly created Leave and Remain voting categorisations of the UK-EU Referendum and in established political group identities of Republican and Democratic in the US Election?* **Duration of existence** (newly formed or established identities) and **group purpose** (task-oriented or identity driven) are specified as natural differences between the EU Referendum and the US Election due to the nature of the differences in each political competition (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Wilson, 2017).

Therefore, in my thesis I examine the nature and degree of belonging when one votes for “Brexit” or “Trump”. I examine if these individuals also feel a part of a group and how they

¹ Something to consider is that whilst we are focusing on the categorisation of groups as being task-oriented or identity-focused, there is the potential for such categorisations to continue on even after group dynamics begin to shift. For instance, an established group might still develop as task-focused, or a newly-formed group might be generated around goals of identity shifts. The point here is that identity is complex and this needs to be considered as we use these categories to structure our understanding of the identity motivations of groups.

CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION

perceive the structure (values and foundations) and identity (motivations and drivers) of the group. Finally, I examine how the perception of belonging to a group impacts how individuals perceive themselves and perceive the outgroup with which they are in competition with. Research argues that the process of identity formation and establishment, interacts with changes in group purpose and duration of existence (Lickel et al., 2000, 2001). Therefore, by measuring group dynamics such as ingroup favour, intergroup difference perceptions and identity embeddedness in groups that are expected to differ on purpose and duration, we can better understand how political identities are established in the context of contemporary politics. Therefore, I present the research aims that stem from the discussion of the existing literature presented above.

- Research Aim 1: To use theories that explain the intergroup perceptions of identity to understand group dynamics in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.
- Research Aim 2: To use the link between social values and group identification to examine motivations of group structure in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.
- Research Aim 3: To understand perceptions of intergroup differences of group values in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.
- Research Aim 4: To examine how degrees of similarity in perceptions of self and group values help to understand whether voter's personal identities are linked to the group identities of the political groups.

To address these aims, I adopt a mixed methods design, using surveys and focus groups, from which to develop our understanding of how embedded identity is in political groups during a heightened state of political competition. First, I will compare the Republicans,

CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Democrats, Leavers and Remainers on their perceptions of group identity and intergroup perceptions of the foundations of the groups. Next, I will attempt to understand the motivations of group categorisation and continued identification allows for an in-depth exploration of meaning behind Republicans, Democrats, Leavers and Remainers perceptions of their group identity. Therefore, I present two empirical studies that focus this thesis:

Empirical Study 1 adopts a quantitative design using five surveys to examine intergroup identity perceptions and compare them across the two electoral contexts (UK / USA). Here I am interested in understanding how the groups perceive their own group identity foundations versus how they see those that they consider as being part of their competing group. Specifically, I measure and compare the intergroup perceptions of group foundation values of one's own and one's competing group. Moreover, I examine whether group members give more worth to their own group than to their competing group. I check for similarities and differences between the US Election and UK- EU Referendum. Finally, I examine whether the group members belonging to the Republicans and Democrats in the US Election and the Leave and Remain UK- EU Referendum voting groups show similar perceptions of their group identity to their perceptions of their competing group. I use statistical analysis to compare the difference between the values they attribute to themselves and to their group.

Empirical Study 2 is a qualitative design complementing Study 1. It uses four focus groups to examine how group identities are defined from voters belonging to each of those groups and what motivates such belonging. I examine group bias perceptions and how group members have experienced this, as well as how voters align with their own and competing campaign groups. And finally, I ask how group members feel about belonging to their political group affiliations. I use reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2014) from which to derive meaning from the discussion presented in the focus groups. This allows for a detailed

exploration of perceptions of group identity in the political events, from the perspective of the group members.

1.4 Key contributions

In this thesis I aim to explain distinctions in intergroup perceptions that may occur between political groups. I do this through the integration of theories from within social and political psychology to create a model of understanding group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987; Hogg et al., 2004), group purpose (Lickel et al., 2000, 2001) and social values (Rokeach, 1973; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt et al., 2009). From previous literature, we understand what differentiates between those who chose to vote Republican or Democrat or chose to vote for Leave or Remain in the US Election and EU Referendum respectively. Briefly, these intergroup differences include: differences in value systems (Ballard-rosa et al., 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Kaufmann, 2016), socio-demographic differences (Bor, 2017; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Vyver et al., 2018; Whitehead et al., 2018) and considered broader socio-political changes in society, such as globalisation and immigration, as motivators of voting preference (Azari & Hetherington, 2016; Holden, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Kaufmann, 2016). I aim to add to the understanding of intergroup differences in the literature presented above, with the suggestion that intergroup differences that have been measured may also be influenced by the group dynamics that these political contests create. This is important as a question in the research that has been raised is: how is group identity linked to perceptions of intergroup bias? And so how does group identity act as a motivator of intergroup difference perceptions in these political groups? (Andreouli & Nicholson, 2018).

I have three key contributions to offer the literature. My first contribution is looking at Republican and Democrat and Leave and Remain groups in the US Election and EU Referendum from an intergroup perspective. An intergroup perspective means asking

CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION

participants to think about their own group but also to ask them about their perceptions of their competing group. By understanding the similarities and differences in how voters are viewing the voting groups, I can examine on the extent to which the context of group identity is a further motivating factor that must be considered in the assessment and exploration of the US Election and the UK-EU Referendum.

My second contribution is that I am investigating intergroup perceptions on group identity in two different types of political events. The US Election outlines a continued electoral leadership competition, and the UK-EU Referendum outlines temporary voting categories to elicit changes in social structure. By comparing temporary to established political identities I can examine the creation and development of political group identity and how that links to perceptions of intergroup bias that is driving political divides in society (Huddy, 2001; Cohen, 2003; Greene, 1999, 2004).

My third contribution to the literature comes from the design of the thesis. This thesis provides the opportunity to test theory that is widely accepted in social and political psychology about groups with complex identities in an intergroup competition (Huddy, 2001), this will add to the validity and reliability of the applications of such models in further research. I adopt a mixed methods design to allow for the triangulation of findings that come from different ways of assessing the variables of interest. By utilising a mixed methods design, I can compare perceptions of voting groups quantitatively as well as delve into deeper meaning of the perceptions qualitatively. Finally, in this thesis, I aim to offer an understanding of how group dynamics, as measured through perceptions of intergroup identity and intergroup differences, is impacting the perceptions of those belonging to these political groups. This is to identify potential pathways forward to encourage movement away from intergroup hostility and ingroup prejudice.

1.5 Thesis structure

In Chapter 2, I present a comparison of the USA Presidential Election of 2016 and UK-EU Referendum held in 2016. I examine the literature that assesses our understanding of the intergroup similarities and differences between the voting groups of these events.

In Chapter 3, I present the theories upon which this thesis is constructed to examine the similarity of the voting groups in the two political events. This will provide the basis for considering and evaluating the key factors outlined above: duration of existence, the purpose of political intergroup competition, intergroup perceptions, group worth and identity integration. I will use social identity theory, and its extensions, as a tool to examine perceptions of social values and how they structure group identity within these two political events.

In Chapter 4, which describes my methodology, I explain how the use of surveys measuring the levels of identification and perceptions of social values allow me to investigate whether there are differences in intergroup perceptions held by the Republicans, Democrats, Leavers and Remainers (Tajfel, 1981; Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Further, I will outline the methodological and analytical planning and decisions that have created the qualitative examination of the perceptions of these group members about the motivations of group belonging and behaviour. Additionally, I outline the participant sample, limitations to the sample and design and the decisions made to address these, as well as the measures I used in this thesis.

In Chapter 5 I present the quantitative analysis examining the research aims presented above. Specifically, I will address how the factors of **duration of existence** and **continued intergroup competition**, can explain the development of established political identification and whether this phenomenon is visible regardless of identity consolidation in the group. Specifically, I compare intergroup identification perceptions between the political events.

CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Additionally, I examine how the groups see their own group identity foundations versus how they see those that belong to their competing group. I do this by comparing the **intergroup perceptions of group foundation values** of one's own and one's competing group. Moreover, I examine whether group members' perceptions of what **structures the identity** of their group, and whether these patterns are comparable in between the US Election and UK- EU Referendum through the link between intergroup identification and value perceptions of the group. I examine perceptions of **intergroup differences** of the voting group members. Finally, I examine whether the group members belonging to the US Election voting groups and to the UK- EU Referendum voting groups, show similar **perceptions of their group identity to their perceptions of their competing group**. I compare the difference between the values they attribute to themselves to the values they attribute to their group. I will then present a discussion outlining the limitations of the conclusions that can be drawn from these quantitative examinations.

In Chapter 6, I present the qualitative analysis that attempts to address the gaps presented in the surveys. I ask how group identities are **defined** from voters belonging to each of those groups and what **motivates** such belonging. Next, I ask about perceptions of **intergroup differences** and the impact of these. Then, I ask how voters **align** with their own and competing campaign groups. And finally, I ask how group members feel about **belonging** to their political group affiliations.

In Chapter 7, to conclude, I discuss the implications of the findings and what this means for understanding the role of identity in politics. Finally, I discuss my conclusions concerning the implications and limitations of my research, and how the understanding from this thesis can extend the existing literature.

2. CHAPTER 2 - THE POLITICAL EVENTS

The US Presidential election was a leadership contest to elect a Republican or Democratic Party leader to lead the country (Azari & Hetherington, 2016). The structure of the US electoral system is such that groups promoting the election of a candidate deemed unsuccessful after the results of the Primary election will have to decide whether they continue to vote for the group or whether they instead vote for an external candidate (Kernell et al., 2017). Research has argued that the US election debates of 2016 were centred on each political group's interpretation of American identity and values, and the behavioural aims of the leader (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). There were 306 Republican electoral votes of the 538 US electors. Therefore, the Republican leader, Donald Trump, was elected as President of the United States (Heredia et al., 2018). This political event is representative of a longstanding competition creating established group identities with each of the voting campaign groups (Huddy, Mason & Aaroe, 2015; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016).

The European Union (EU) Referendum was a vote taken by the general public of the UK as to whether citizens wished to stay as a member of the EU, or if they wished to leave the union. Yet, some scholars argue that there was a lot more to this debate. For instance, research has stated that within the UK- EU Referendum, the debates centred on immigration and international trade, with an overarching theme of European versus British national identity (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2016). Moreover, members of traditionally opposed political parties in the UK were required to collaborate to facilitate either the Leave or Remain campaign (Kaufmann, 2016). For example, traditional Conservative and Labour voters voted Remain. To win, the Leave and Remain campaigns were created separate to the Conservative and Labour political affiliations driven by motivations of national identity, immigration and multiculturalism

CHAPTER 2 - THE POLITICAL EVENTS

(Hobolt, 2016). The Leave campaign, representing those who wished to exit, won with 51.9% of the vote (Goodwin & Heath, 2016) beginning the movement towards the UK exiting the union. This political event is representative of a one-off political event creating task-focused and newly created group categories.

Both the UK-EU Referendum and the US Presidential election are examples of political events that have allowed for intergroup competition to be manifested at a national level. The US Primary was held between March and September of 2016, the UK- EU Referendum in June and the US General Election in November 2016. This means that much of the political narrative was occurring simultaneously and so it is likely that such narratives interacted. In fact, Wilson (2017) identified similarities between the two political events. Wilson identified the parallels and interconnectivities of the campaign strategies, public rhetoric and the pathways of social and economic support between the Brexit and Trump campaigns (Atton, 2006; Hogan & Haltinner, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Müller, 2017). Wilson noted the link between the Leave and Brexit voters striving for these outcomes, and the mirroring of the campaign narratives of separation and restoration to a “greater” time (Crandall et al., 2018; Hobolt, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Virdee, 2017).

The narrative of a restoration to a greater time has fuelled the approach to examining the UK - EU Referendum and the US Election as a response to threat to the representation of the identity and values held by voters in a globalising world (Cox, 2017; Holden, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Stewart et al., 2019). Drawing upon literature from social psychology, this suggests a context by which individuals are searching for ways to feel secure in the identity and in the status of their own group in both political contexts (Atton, 2006; Hogan & Haltinner, 2015). This generates the question as to what searching for and gaining security in political group identity impacts, especially at an intergroup level.

CHAPTER 2 - THE POLITICAL EVENTS

A few scholars have expanded work on intergroup comparison and distinctiveness to examine whether individuals in these electoral contests see their group as distinct from that which they are competing with. These studies examine the role of **national identity** as a predictor of voting decisions, specifically in the UK-EU Referendum. Vyver et al. (2018) used identification with national identity, amongst worldview, conservatism and intergroup threat to predict voting intentions and behaviour in the UK- EU Referendum held in the UK. They measured these variables prior to the vote and followed up participants to ask whether their intended vote matched their actual vote. They found that level of national identity and perceived threat act as mediators between worldview and conservatism, and political voting. Their research suggests that national identity plays an important role in strengthening political behaviour in the UK- EU Referendum. However, Vyver and colleagues focus on the ingroup as British and the outgroup as European. Whilst there is merit in understanding this intergroup dynamic, there is still a gap in that intergroup perceptions are not assessed at the level of the competing voting groups. Therefore, intergroup bias between the competing groups is not directly assessed. What this thesis aims to show is that there is an ingroup bias present in the debates presented in the UK-EU Referendum voting groups.

If a bias is present, then this suggests there is the potential for biased induced difference perceptions between groups that may supplement real intergroup differences. Oberhauser et al. (2019) conducted research assessing the influence that geographical location, social identity threat and economic threat had on voting in the US Election of 2016. They stated that location and identity (in this context identification with groups of age, education, whiteness, and religiosity) were the highest predictors of voting for Trump, but not economic threat. Importantly for this thesis, a main conclusion drawn from their research was that an imagined threat to the social identities of voters, especially in geographic locations less likely to interact with diversity, was more powerful a motivator of voting for Trump than “real” threats to the

CHAPTER 2 - THE POLITICAL EVENTS

personal economy of said voters. The findings of their study suggests that there is an ingroup preference that is activated. This means that a bias towards the outgroup and depersonalisation of outgroup members is possible (where the identity of the group is the main driver of action and the identity of the individual becomes less important) (Turner et al., 1987). If an ingroup bias can be activated at a national level, then I would like to examine whether similar bias may be active between competing voting groups.

Further, whilst investigating the US Election of 2016, Ballard-Rosa et al. (2018) proposed that globalisation and economic decline has impacted perceptions of the group status of individuals belonging to groups that were historically more dominant in the social system. This theorisation proposes one way in which the impact of bias perceptions on group identity has manifested. The research proposes that this perceived decline of group symbolic status has created a need for structure and an inclination towards authoritarian values. They theorise the impact that variation in the perceived status of the ingroup can have on patterns of identity, and on what motivates the identity of the group. Ballard-Rosa and colleagues argue that it is a threat to the identity of the group that is guiding support towards authoritarian values. If the identity of the group is associated with specific foundational values followed by the group (Turner et al., 1987) and if values of voting groups differ, then, is there a link between group identity and foundational values in how a group is structured? Can we detect intergroup bias in intergroup perceptions of group values and identification? Addressing these questions gives opportunity for the development of methods to assess intergroup identification within political group dynamics models.

The focus on key factors of demographics, nationalism, collectivism, and values as motivators of group belonging in these political events has been beneficial to understanding more about the voters belonging to the different groups. Yet, there is a gap that remains in our understanding, that is, what role does political group identity play in motivating perceptions of

CHAPTER 2 - THE POLITICAL EVENTS

intergroup differences. Also, how much are these perceptions of intergroup differences motivating bias and so increasing the partisanship divide between these groups. Andreouli and Nicholson (2018) present a bottom-up approach suggesting that debates limited to demographic differences and national identity do not encompass all the motivations of support in the EU Referendum. They conducted focus groups with EU Referendum voters finding nationalism and collectivism (loyalty to the nation and loyalty to collaboration and connection) were important themes in the UK-EU Referendum voters' perceptions of motivations driving the political event. Importantly, they also found evidence of a distinction between reason and bias. Participants associated bias with ideological thinking and reason with logical political debates often associated with economical driven narratives. This shows further evidence of bias that is presented in perceptions of Brexit voters. Assessing these themes at an intergroup level will help us to consider the role that bias has in the instigation of these perceptions and make inferences about how these affect decision making.

Whilst there are many similarities between these political events, there are two important factors that separate the voting groups within them. The importance of these distinctions is that they drive the key comparisons between the EU Referendum and US Election in this thesis. The first difference is the **length of time** that the political categorisations have existed and the extent to which this impacts the **establishment** of the identity of the voting groups. As outlined earlier, the UK- EU Referendum voting groups were newly created categorisations (entitled "Leave" and "Remain") for the purpose of organising the referendum vote, whereas the US Election voting groups form an essential role in the cyclic political system in which the fight for US leadership is based. Therefore, whilst arguably constantly changing (Bartels, 2000), the US Election groups are not new group categorisations for members to become accustomed to. Therefore, the US Election is driven by voting group categorisations that are much more embedded into the personal identity of the individual voters (Turner-

CHAPTER 2 - THE POLITICAL EVENTS

Zwinkels et al., 2015) than those in the UK- EU Referendum voting groups. In other words, the US Election groups have an established identity as compared to the UK- EU Referendum groups. This is important to consider when assessing how individuals see themselves as a part of the group.

The second factor is that the UK- EU Referendum voting groups are driven by the **task of the vote**, i.e. the **purpose** of the group is task-driven (Lickel et al., 2000; Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2015). Whereas research conducted by Cohen (2003) supports that the current US political climate is one that is motivated by group belonging more so than policies, campaigns, and manifestos (Vyver et al., 2018), this suggests the US groups are **identity driven** (Lickel et al., 2000). Research has shown that perceptions of group entitativity (the extent to which a group perceives themselves as a cohesive whole unit) (Hogg et al., 2004), varies within different types of groups or even between similar groups with different purposes (Lickel et al., 2000). Consequently, the purpose of the group has an impact on the extent to which methods of identity consolidation are drawn upon. This is important for my research because I argue that identity consolidation is a driver of patterns found in perceptions of intergroup bias and of drawing upon different motivations behind group belonging and group identity development.

3. CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

As my thesis primarily focuses on group dynamics, and because group dynamics are the focus of social identity theory, I draw on it extensively (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrams & Hogg, 1998). SIT has been used in the field of political psychology to examine the impact of intergroup perception and bias on voting behaviour and decision making within politically driven groups (Monroe et al., 2000; Huddy, 2001, 2017; Oakes, 2002; Huddy et al., 2013). This is because SIT addresses the implications of group belonging on the psychological makeup of the groups and the perceptions, decisions and behaviours that come from the groups. SIT expands our understanding of intergroup perceptions in the voting groups of the EU Referendum and the US Election of 2016. Further, the application of SIT to aid our understanding allows a valid and measurable model to assess the ways in which the political voting groups view their own group and view their competing group. This allows an examination of how different types of political groups give worth to their group belonging, and how individual voters integrate with the group identity.

This chapter is split into four sections that focus on the research aims highlighted in the previous chapter: intergroup perceptions of identity, intergroup bias perceptions, positive distinctiveness in the competing groups and identity embeddedness. These are presented in this order because they attempt to address the different elements of what it means to have created a social identity. Intergroup perceptions of identity explains the extent to which there is an intergroup context, i.e. are the participants viewing these groups as distinct from one another. Intergroup bias perceptions and positive distinctiveness further this claim to see how much competition is present when the foundational values of the group are matched to intergroup

perceptions of identification. This is to see if the perceived differences exist as measurable differences between the groups and if the groups are viewing their own group as distinct from their competing group. Finally, I present identity embeddedness, which highlights the extent to which the social identity matches the personal identity of the group member. This is presented last as it was important to first establish a group context prior to testing if this context is embedded in the individual member.

3.1 Intergroup perceptions of identity

Social identification is defined as the process of adopting the identity of the group into one's own self-concept (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Hogg (1988) define two theories of social identity, both of which are important when considering political groups as formulating social identity. The first definition: "an analysis of intergroup conflict and social change, focusing on individual needs to maintain and enhance the positively valued distinctiveness of their ingroup compared to outgroups to achieve a positive social identity" (pg. 14). The second definition: "self-categorisation theory, which represents a general theory of group processes based on the idea that shared social identity depersonalises individual self-perception and action" (pg. 14). Whilst the first outlines the processes associated with social identity, the second outlines the process that creates a social identity. The distinction between these two definitions of social identity motivates questions within this thesis.

Social identity theory describes the aspects of an individual's self-concept that comes from their belonging to a social group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and the status at which that group stands in a wider intergroup context (Turner et al., 1987). This encompasses knowledge of the self as a group member and the emotional significance of being a group member. This is important for political groups because it begins to show how political competition can shift from being task-focused to identity centred. Doing so means that political voters going through

the process of this shift are embedding the identity of the group they belong to into their own identity. If this is the case, then such groups should show distinguishable identification patterns between their own group and that with which they are competing. Yet, it is important to consider whether there is a difference between self-categorising into a group (as exemplified by newly created group identities – i.e. UK- EU Referendum) and belonging to a group (as exemplified by established identities – i.e. US Election).

For groups that are in the process of stabilisation of their identity, this means that self-categorisation (the process of encompassing the newly joined group identity into the personal identity of the self) can be in flux as the identity of the group is developing. This suggests that there will be differences in measurable perceptions of intergroup identification between established groups and newly formed groups. The theory predicts that the distinction between identification with one's own group and one's competing group will be greater in the established US groups than the temporary UK-EU Referendum groups. This is because there will be higher fluctuation in the drive and identity of the temporary UK-EU Referendum groups and so more chance of intergroup similarity as they more recently belonged to previous superordinate groupings.

3.1.1 Group purpose and the UK-EU Referendum and US Election

Group purpose describes what is focusing the goals of a group. For instance, a group could be task driven or it could be identity driven. Lickel et al. (2001) provided evidence that there is an interaction between the identity of the group and the purpose of a group. According to their research, those with an established identity are driven more by that group identity and belonging, rather than to fulfil a task. Yet, for those that are task-driven, the identity of the group is a lower motivator than the task of the group. Further, for newly created groups, there is the possibility of movement from being task driven to being identity driven. This process

CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

happens over time and/or over intragroup interaction. Therefore, Lickel et al. (2001) showed that for some groups, the identity of the group can be determined by the tasks/purpose of the group. Lickel., et al. (2001) also showed that other groups can be fuelled by shared psychological underpinnings, and that individuals identify with the group for the purpose of belonging.

Lickel, et al., (2000) argue that if groups are identity-focused then they draw their esteem from their ingroup, whereas if groups are task-focused, they draw their esteem from the completion of the task. Based on this, we can expect that established political groups could show higher distinction in identification scores between the ingroup and outgroup. This is because the cyclical nature of most political contexts, i.e., the 4 year election cycle of the US Presidency, means the state of competition may fluctuate but is maintained by the same purpose, to gain power for the ingroup leader to create and maintain group status and esteem. We could also expect that new political groups driven by the task of the competition and having had less time to establish their identity, will show lower distinction in intergroup identification scores, especially if they come from the same superordinate or previous mixture of social identities (in this case political affiliations). Therefore, according to the group purpose argument presented above, it can be argued that Republicans and Democrats will show greater difference in their perceptions of ingroup and outgroup identification than the Leave and Remain groups.

To support this, Cohen (2003) examined the extent to which Democrats and Republicans in the USA were driven by their membership to the group or by the policies to which they were voting for. He found that identifying with a political group party can result in voters using that identity to make political decisions. Cohen's (2003) work states that the importance of political identity can be relied upon because of member trust in the criteria

CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

identified as important to allow for belonging to the same social group, i.e. that those that belong to the same group, adhere to the same value systems. Therefore, Cohen's research suggests that identity has become an important feature in decision making and attitudinal judgements in political contexts and values are a way to structure that identity. In the context of the US, Cohen argues that this shift to a greater role of identity in political decision making is due to the establishment of the Republican and Democrat party groups, which has created intragroup trust.

In theory, the UK Referendum groups can disband once the competition is over whilst the US election groups will continue into the next round of leadership debates. This disbanding means that as the UK group identities are deconstructed, i.e., members return to political affiliations or to the wider national superordinate identity. Yet, the adoption of strategies to consolidate the status of the winning group and acting towards the wider superordinate national identity may play a role in intergroup identification perceptions. This could be that the loss for a newly established group, i.e. the Remain campaign of the EU Referendum, acts as a catalyst for identity formation. Another point of consideration is that Lickel's work suggests that in less established group categories, group members look to their patterns of identity from other group belonging to simulate how to act in the current group. Livingstone et al., (2011) has shown that this can exaggerate expected scores of intergroup identification patterns and motivations of group belonging to account for the less established group identities.

Therefore, I expect that: *Republican and Democrat identifiers in the US Election will show significantly greater difference in the comparison of their ingroup and outgroup identification scores than Leave and Remain identifiers in the EU Referendum of the UK (Hypothesis 1)*. This is because the UK groups are newly created, belong to a single political event, and could disband to return to previous political affiliations once the temporary

competition is complete. I also expect that *the motivations of group affiliation will show that Republican and Democrat identifiers will show evidence of being identity driven, through expression of belonging whilst Leave and Remain identifiers will show evidence of being task driven (Hypothesis 2)*. We would expect to see the task of the vote to structure the perceptions of the UK-EU groups, whereas we would expect to see perceptions structured by feelings of group belonging in the US groups.

3.2 Values and group identity

A value is a set of principles that is suggested to influence behaviour (Rokeach, 1973). Individuals hold social values based on what is important to them, and this can often be traced back to their personal context, e.g., culture or their personality (Rokeach, 1973). Turner et al. (1987) labelled values as the foundation of the identity of a group because they theorised that group members can compare and identify themselves and others based on the values they hold and the values they associate with the group. Moreover, examining existing research linking group belonging and value identification, Gecas (2000) concluded that “identities anchored in values and value systems are important elements of self-conception...values give meaning” (pg., 94). When values are motivators of self-conception, then values become a part of one’s personal identity, much like how belonging to social groups adds to personal identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Therefore, perceptions of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences can be assessed by comparing the value perceptions of the groups. Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione and Barbaranelli (2006) using data from the Italian National Election of 2001, showed that basic personal values were strong predictors of political behaviour. Therefore, measuring values in the context of an intergroup competition, i.e., comparing value perceptions between groups, provides an opportunity to assess the impact of group identity on intergroup perceptions.

Rokeach (1973) identified the importance of social values in determining political allegiance and action. He showed that values held can be context specific, meaning values can be impacted by social structural changes. He states that values or value perceptions are malleable, and that this may be impacted by the context of the group. Additionally, Turner and colleagues (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2011) theorised that values can act as a precursor to understanding identity and thus behaviour. Hitlin (2003) proposed that the values an individual holds can influence the formation of a social role or identity, thus, impacting group belonging and social identity². Therefore, assessing perceptions of intergroup values alongside patterns of identity strengthens understanding of the identity of the group. Yet, it is important to note that value perceptions only tell part of the story of how a group perceives itself but provides a method by which to measure such bias perceptions. If the difference in intergroup value perceptions is greater than the measurable intergroup value differences, then there is evidence to suggest that there is intergroup bias in between these groups.

3.2.1 Value perceptions in the political events

If values are motivators of political decision making and political voting groups are identity driven (Cohen, 2003), then it is likely that perceptions of values attributed to each of the political groups in competition, will be impacted by the competition. Competition for resources, and status or position, produces a need for distinction, which is triggered even when there is no distinction. Scholars have shown that there is a propensity to focus on what

² Hitlin explored “*volunteer identity*” in first year American University students and the extent to which assessment could be attributed to the different personal values held by volunteers. They concluded that the personal values (social values) of an individual drive their social identities because values of helping, for example, were associated with higher levels of volunteer identity.

CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

differentiates groups in both the US Election and UK- EU Referendum of 2016 (Pettigrew, 2017; Vyver et al., 2018).

Importantly, Goren (2005) tested the relationship between political identity and a list of political values in US Election voting groups, with the aim of determining directional causality of the relationship between identity and values. Goren found support for political identity predicting political values. Whilst this is important evidence supporting the examination of the relationship between identity and values, another important conclusion presented by Goren is that the link between political identity and values indicates that the differences between groups are imagined rather than real. This means greater differences are perceived between groups than the differences that exist between them in terms of their value structure. However, drawing upon the social identity literature there is ample support that social identity is internalised as personal identity and therefore perceived intergroup differences are a real and measurable component of group behaviour (Tajfel, 1970; 1971). So intergroup differences and perceptions of differences regardless of if they are real or perceived is possible through the measurement of value perceptions.

Another useful theory to draw upon to discuss the link between group identity and value systems in a political context is the moral foundations theory (MFT; Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009). MFT shows support for the link between different value systems assigned to different political identities (Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009). The theory argues that values as foundations of groups create the differences between groups, and such differences impact prestige and self-esteem of individuals and the group. Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) have provided evidence that liberals and conservatives in the context of US political groups, rely on different sets of moral foundations. Their research states that whilst liberals favour the

individual as the locus of morality, for conservatives that responsibility tends to fall on the group.

Haidt argued that this has shifted the message behind political campaigns from tackling social issues to justifying or promoting representation of the values held by the leader and the group. Therefore, suggesting that the identity of the group and the leader of the group hold much more importance than the social attitudes of the group. Therefore, MFT supports the link between the structure of the group and the identity of the group from a moral standpoint, through the measurement of group values. But moral foundations do not account for how one group sees another as compared to their own. Therefore, what the theory does not access, is how these differences might manifest in intergroup bias perceptions. Touching upon this, Lakoff (2002) argues that disagreements and dislike towards competing political groups are a result of differences in moral bases. What this together suggests is that the morality, the values, held by a group sheds light on the meaning that motivates the identity of that group and protecting and justifying one's group values has the potential to generate intergroup bias.

Putting all this together, I expect that: *Higher ingroup values will be predictive of higher identification with one's own group across the voting groups. Individual values will be predictive of identification with more liberal groups, whereas both individual and group values will be predictive of identification with more conservative groups (hypothesis 3).* Further, I expect that: *Higher outgroup values will be predictive of higher identification with one's competing group across the voting groups (hypothesis 4).*

3.3 Perceptions of intergroup differences

Intergroup differences are often perceived as group members favour those of their own group over those with whom they are in competition (Tajfel et al., 1971). This group favour produces

CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

a propensity to show a bias towards the ingroup in which there is perceived differentiation between the groups (Gaertner et al., 1994). To enhance identification, often, there are discriminatory cognitions and behaviours displayed towards those who do not belong to the ingroup, but to the outgroup. This is to fulfil a need to maintain distinction between groups (Castelli & Carraro, 2010) for competing groups in a similar context to remain confident in their ability to obtain or maintain the status of the group.

Linking back to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), groups that are in competition are likely to show that group members perceive intergroup differences that may not exist or exaggerate intergroup differences (Hogg, 2006). This is because for group members to gain their esteem from their group belonging there will be a difference between how those members perceive their own group versus the competing group (Schopler, 1998; Jost et al., 2004; Spears et al., 2009). One method to maintain intergroup distinction is that the ingroup is viewed more positively than the outgroup (Spears et al., 2009). Another is that ingroup members see themselves as similar to other ingroup members and that this strengthens the identity of the group (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Lickel et al., 2000). This social comparison (Turner et al., 1987, 1994; Hornsey, 2008) can lead to greater difference perceptions. This is important to understand as it provides evidence to the discussion as to whether difference perceptions are motivators of decision making of the groups, thus driving intergroup perceptions of between group differences and aiding political divide.

Self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987, 1994) describes that to maintain intergroup differentiation there may be differences between groups that might not be as strong as they are perceived to be. In the field of political psychology, partisanship begins to touch upon this concept. However, the partisanship debate focuses more on why people lean politically to the left or to the right (Bartels, 2000). This means the focus is on what differences

exist between the groups rather than whether or at what level such differences are perceived. I attempt to address this, in this thesis.

3.3.2 Self-categorisation in the context of political competition

Applied to political competition, we have groups that are competing in the same contexts and can cross over in their values and aims for the wider superordinate identity (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). A main assumption of self-categorisation theory is that ingroup members will perceive themselves as similar to one another, but different to outgroup members (Turner et al., 1987, 1994). Self-categorisation theory predicts that, if a group is too similar, it will be harder to categorise it as an outgroup. This would therefore breed intergroup biases, due to a need to maintain a separation between an ingroup and an outgroup. In political contexts when the groups are being assessed on their stances on the same social issues, this process of separation helps to grasp a separate identity to the competing group to maintain support for the campaign. This could be one reason why political campaigns focus on how they differentiate from their competition, for example Trump's stance was on immigration, whereas Clinton's focus was on several national social issues (Atton, 2006; Hogan & Haltinner, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). This can manifest perceptions of greater ingroup differences than those that actually exist between the groups (Brewer & Yuki, 2007).

Brewer (1993) identified that positive distinctiveness can mean that the more positively one rates one's group, the more distinct the ingroup is perceived from the outgroup. This mechanism is shown by social groups whereby intergroup distinction perceptions help to maintain the esteem of ingroup members. This is because seeing a competing group as different and more negative to the ingroup is a mechanism to psychologically confirm the status of the ingroup. Therefore, to remain positively distinctive from a competing group, group members are likely to give more worth to their own group standing rather than to their competing group.

CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

This means those that highly identify with their group are more likely to attribute lower evaluations of the competing group. The complexity of political groups (Huddy, 2001) is that they exist within structures that are dependent upon the status of themselves and their competitors and this can impact group members perceptions (Noel, 2014).

Further the social change belief system (Abrams & Hogg, 1998) examines differences in intergroup identification as caused by the perception of the status of the outgroup in comparison with the position of the ingroup. Thereby the security of the group is reliant upon the stability that is perceived of the status of the group and more importantly the differences in statuses between groups. If an ingroup sees the outgroup as less stable in their purpose, identity, and status, then their esteem is heightened and so are their levels of identification with the group. Further, considering group purpose theory, if a task-driven group completes their task, i.e. when they win the competition, they are able to disband. However, if their competing group does not accept the task completion and adds “fighting against the outcome” to their purpose, then the group must reform to defend their position and status. This maintains the need for intergroup distinctiveness fuelled by continued competition. This creates the context for continued difference perceptions within and between groups.

Political competition can be motivated by how the ingroup views the “threat” of the outgroup (Stewart et al., 2019). Such methods of distinctiveness have been displayed in groups that have established their identity (Lickel et al., 2000). Yet, this pattern can also be seen in groups that have not yet formulated their group identity (Christian et al., 2013), because individuals can draw upon past experiences of group belonging to inform how to behave in a newly created group identity. Therefore, I expect that *the within group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show*

significant differences (Hypothesis 5). I also expect the between group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show no significant differences (Hypothesis 6).

3.4 Identity embeddedness

What we have yet to examine is the extent to which the social identity of the group matches the personal identity of the group member. This is important as the embeddedness of the group identity in the self-concept of the individual determines how much esteem they derive from their group categorisation thus how much they adhere to intergroup differences (Hogg, 2006). Identity embeddedness occurs because intragroup similarity creates greater conformity within groups (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). So, individual group members are depersonalised and work together as a collective. It means that the more an individual identifies with a social group, the more they will believe that other group members also hold the same values and identify with the group in the same way (Turner et al., 1994). Self-categorisation theory suggests that this sense of shared thinking across the group offers a basis for norms and values that shape the ideological grounds of a group (Turner et al., 1994). Then, those that see themselves as more like the group are likely to identify with the group more strongly. Therefore, ingroup members have the same moral sensibility, i.e., values, and so attitudes and behaviours will be similar at an intragroup level (Turner et al., 1987).

As stated previously, Turner et al. (1994) established the link between group identity and the values that help to inform this identity. To reiterate, their research states that values form the structure of the identity of a group and help to build the norms and conditions of belonging to the group. Therefore, it is possible to measure the extent to which individuals see themselves as like other ingroup members by comparing the values they rate for themselves to

CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

the values they rate for the ingroup. Cohen (2003) argued that Republicans and Democrats in the US Election relied on group identification and political debate to make their electoral decisions. This is because of the trust members hold that other members belong to the same value systems. Moreover, in Haidt, Graham and Joseph (2007) work on moral foundational drivers of political partisanship, they argue that morality is a foundation of what fuels the merging of an individual and group. I expect that the values of the individual group member may form the values of the group, but that the values of the group will be similar to the values of the individual group member.

However, research has shown that the extent to which individual group members perceive themselves as like the group to which they belong varies between social groups (Hogg et al., 2004). Lickel et al.'s (2000) empirical research suggests that this can be dependent upon the strength of the identity of the group. He states that the more established an identity the more likely individuals are similar to other group members. This is because the process of identity establishment takes time and so individual group members will have a chance to get to know each other and build the trust through exposure to other group members that they are like their group. Considering this, I expect that the process of incorporating the values of the self and of the group also takes time.

Whilst a relationship between intragroup similarity and group identification may be present in both political events, it is likely that this relationship will be stronger in the more established identity context, i.e. the US Election. This is because I expect that the duration of existence of the groups will impact how integrated the group and personal identities are. This is interesting as it has implications for understanding more about group identity formation in political groups. If there are differences, it is possible that the establishment of a political group identity encompasses an integration of the personal and social identities as outlined in the social

identity literature. If there are no differences, it is likely that there is a different process as to how political group identity forms. Therefore, *I expect that in the Republicans and in Democrats there will be no significant difference between the value ratings of themselves and of the values of the group (Hypothesis 7). I expect that in Leavers and Remainers, self values will be rated as significantly higher than the values of their group (Hypothesis 8).*

3.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have used theories of perceptions of intergroup identification, intergroup bias, patterns of motivations, and group identity integration between newly created and established political groups, to make predictions about political identity development in the US Election and UK-EU Referendum. I have considered how theories on social identity inform the impact that group dynamics can have on perceptions of group members. I have considered extensions to the concept of social identity as a way to understand variations that might occur in groups that are structured differently based on their intended purpose. I have considered avenues of study from within political psychology that have generated methods by which to assess perceptions of bias that are active between political competing groups. Finally, I have discussed how the interaction of all of these provides the opportunity to compare intergroup bias perceptions between different types of political groups driven either by task or identity. All of this is to add to the debate on the role that group identity is playing in perceptions and decision making in a political context. In this section, I aim to summarise the key discussion points and predictions that stem from them, and how these key predictions link to the research aims of my thesis. A summary of the research hypotheses linked to the aims are outlined and discussed below, and also listed in Table 1.

Research Aim 1: To use theories that explain the intergroup perceptions of identity to understand group dynamics in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum

CHAPTER 3 - INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Here, I am arguing that established political identities are driven by belonging (Cohen, 2003) but that newly created political groups are driven by task. As the Republicans and Democrats are established identities they are classified as identity driven groups. This is because, individuals in these groups will have had longer for intergroup distinction to maintain their esteem. This means the Republicans and Democrats will show more distinction in between their scores of identification with their own group and with their respective competing group. Yet, as the Leave and Remain groups have not had that time and space to establish the identity of the group past the purpose that drove the formation of the group, they are classified as task-driven groups. This means the Leavers and Remainers will show lower distinction between perceptions of intergroup identification.

H1: Republican and Democrat identifiers in the US Election will show significantly greater difference in the comparison of their ingroup and outgroup identification scores as compared to the scores of the Leave and Remain identifiers in the EU Referendum of the UK

H2: I expect that Republican and Democrat identifiers will show evidence of being identity driven, through expression of belonging, whilst Leave and Remain identifiers will show evidence of being task driven.

Research Aim 2: To use social values and group identification to examine perceptions of group structure in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.

I expect to find significant relationships between intergroup identification perceptions and intergroup value perceptions, across all groups (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain). However, I expect that the relationship between intergroup values and intergroup identification will be stronger in the Republican and Democrat groups (which are firmly established) than the Leave and Remain groups (which are newly formed). Additionally, I argue that Republicans will associate all types of values with their ingroup identity but that Democrats will associate

individual focused values with their ingroup identity. This is in line with moral foundations theory that states conservative groups show a group and individual morality focus whereas liberal groups show an individual value focus. Previous research has not explored the types of moral value classifications these voting groups associate with their competing groups nor the types of moral value classifications associated with the groups of the EU Referendum.

H3: Higher ingroup values will be predictive of higher identification with one's own group across the voting groups. Individual values will be predictive of identification with more liberal groups, whereas both individual and group values will be predictive of identification with more conservative groups.

H4: Higher outgroup values will be predictive of higher identification with one's competing group across the voting groups.

Research Aim 3: To understand the activation of intergroup bias in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.

Here, I am arguing that all political groups (Republicans, Democrats, Remainers and Leavers), despite the purpose or consolidation of their political identity and despite the differences in the value hierarchies that structure their identities, will show perceptions of intergroup differences regardless of if there are any, as activated by the context of intergroup political competition. This is because social groups consolidate their status and identity through comparison with other groups or to individuals who do not belong to the group. This is activated by the state of intergroup competition. Further, self-categorisation theory predicts that, if a group is too similar, it will be harder to categorise it as an outgroup. This would therefore breed intergroup biases, due to a need to maintain a separation between an ingroup and an outgroup. Such methods of distinctiveness have been displayed in groups that have established their identity (Lickel et al., 2000). Yet, this pattern can also be seen in groups that have not yet formulated their group identity (Christian et al., 2013), this is because individuals

can draw upon past experiences of group belonging to inform how to behave in a newly created group identity, but this difference may not be as strongly visible as compared to established groups.

H5: The within group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show significant differences.

H6: The between group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show no significant differences.

Research Aim 4: To use the similarity in perceptions of self and group values to understand whether voter's personal identities are linked to the group identities of the political groups.

Here I argue that the value ratings of the identity foundations of a group and value ratings of oneself are likely to be more similar in groups with established group identities, i.e. the Republicans and Democrats, as compared to newly created groups, i.e. the Leavers and Remainers. This is because the process of identity establishment takes time as individual group members have the chance to get to know each other or to get to know the identity of the group. If ingroup members have the same moral sensibility, i.e., values, then their attitudes and behaviours will be similar at an intragroup level (Turner et al., 1987). This means the extent to which individuals feel like other group members can impact how they feel they belong to the group and thus how much the identity of the group becomes embedded into their personal identity. However, the extent to which individual group members perceive themselves as like the group to which they belong varies between social groups (Hogg et al., 2004). Further, drawing again upon Lickel et al. (2000, 2001), it is likely that the more established an identity the more likely individuals see themselves as similar to other group members in their moral sensibilities.

H7: *I expect that in the Republicans and in Democrats there will be no significant difference between the value ratings of themselves and of the values of the group.*

H8: *I expect that in Leavers and Remainers, self values will be rated as significantly higher the values of their group.*

Table 3.1 – Summary of research aims and research hypotheses

Research Aim	Research Hypotheses
<p>Research Aim 1: To use theories that explain the intergroup perceptions of identity to understand group dynamics in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.</p>	<p>H1: Republican and Democrat identifiers in the US Election will show significantly greater difference in the comparison of their ingroup and outgroup identification scores than Leave and Remain identifiers in the EU Referendum of the UK H2: The motivations of group affiliation will show that Republican and Democrat identifiers will show evidence of being identity driven, through expression of belonging whilst Leave and Remain identifiers will show evidence of being task driven. This is to be explored in the focus group themes.</p>
<p>Research Aim 2: To use the link between social values and group identification to examine motivations of group structure in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.</p>	<p>H3: Higher ingroup values will be predictive of higher identification with one’s own group across the voting groups. Individual values will be predictive of identification with more liberal groups, whereas both individual and group values will be predictive of identification with more conservative groups. H4: Higher outgroup values will be predictive of higher identification with one’s competing group across the voting groups.</p>
<p>Research Aim 3: To understand perceptions of intergroup differences in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum.</p>	<p>H5: The within group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show significant differences. H6: The between group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show no significant differences.</p>
<p>Research Aim 4: To use the similarity in perceptions of self and group values to understand whether voter’s personal identities are linked to the group identities of the political groups.</p>	<p>H7: I expect that in the Republicans and in Democrats there will be no significant difference between the value ratings of themselves and of the values of the group. H8: I expect that in Leavers and Remainers, self values will be rated as significantly higher than values of their group.</p>

4. CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

To test my eight hypotheses, I adopt a mixed methods approach consisting of surveys and focus groups that generates quantitative and qualitative datasets. I justify this approach and provide details of the design of my empirical studies and how they align with the research hypotheses.

4.1 Research design choices

A mixed methods research design allows for a qualitative, in-depth exploration of the meaning and function of political identities, as well as the quantitative measurement of their ingredients and impact on political preferences. As outlined by Doyle et al., (2009) there are several benefits to a mixed methods approach to research. For my thesis, a mixed methods approach of surveys and focus groups allows me to utilise qualitative data to examine how citizens relate to politics in their own words, which is often underexplored, as well as to utilise quantitative data to allow me to compare perceptions across different groups that belong to different types of events. This is beneficial as it allows for patterns of intergroup perceptions to be derived from participants and then provides the chance to explain the understanding and motivation behind the patterns found. This allows for a more comprehensive exploration of my research hypotheses.

In Study 1, I adopted a repeated cross-sectional design. I designed two surveys pertaining to the UK-EU Referendum and USA Election to assess perceptions of intergroup identification, intergroup differences and group dynamic perceptions. These were collected across 10 independent points of data collection. The key advantage of utilising survey data methods is that they enable reach and speed of data collection in a quickly changing political environment (Berrens et al., 2003). This is suitable for the questions in this thesis that ask about the relationship between variables and how such relationships differ between political events. Therefore, in the survey study, I focused on how the political groups see their own group

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

identity versus how they see those that belong to their competing group. I compare the perceptions of group foundation values attributed to one's own and one's competing group. I measured how people identifying as Republicans and Democrats in the USA and those identifying as Leavers and Remainers in the UK perceive their group identity and the identity of their competing group.

A repeated cross-sectional design is advantageous when there is a possibility of change within the sample population being examined (Lebo & Weber, 2015), as in this thesis. This type of design is useful for this thesis as it means that data are collected across the same conditions but allows for variation of which group member is being assessed. It allows me to test for conclusions to be drawn about group perceptions that are reliably representing the identity of the group being assessed. As the context of a competition changes and the status and position of a group shifts, their emotional responses guiding intergroup behaviour have the capacity to change (Marcus, 2003). Emotions that are driving the behaviours of the groups will be at the optimum state to be measured (Cohen, 2003; Green et al., 2004; Greene, 2004; Iyengar et al., 2012). Yet, as I have argued, research has suggested that this is more probable of task-focused rather than identity-focused groups (Lickel et al., 2000, 2001). In collating the data, I can examine whether despite such context changes, perceptions of intergroup identification and intergroup bias perceptions are maintained.

In Study 2, I designed four focus groups to examine group bias perceptions and whether group members are aware of this bias activation and how voters align with their own and competing campaign groups. Within these focus groups, I asked how group members feel about belonging to their political group affiliations. Therefore, I adopt an interpretivist approach to research. The focus groups allow me to examine how group identities are defined from voters belonging to each of those groups and what motivates such belonging. This allows for an in-

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

depth exploration of social processes whilst allowing for the complexity of contextual factors to be examined. This is particularly important for our understanding of these political events, as past literature has not examined them through the lens of intergroup dynamic perceptions, i.e., how one group perceives another in comparison to their own and whether this explains bias as a factor impacting voting choice.

4.2 Study 1: The surveys

In the US Election (Case 1), there were two independent samples of data collection. The first sample was collected shortly after the Primary Elections in the United States in 2016, 11th July 2016. The second sample was collected prior to the General Elections in the United States in 2016, 1st November. The two samples of data collection were chosen to measure group perceptions at the height of the competition, i.e., before each stage of voting. This was because there is literature that already exists that has assessed intergroup perceptions between these groups both within and outside of the context of the competition (Bartels, 2000; Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). This literature suggests that the establishment of the political identities in the US Election creates intergroup competition that surpasses the context of competition (Cohen, 2003). Due to limited resources and a movement towards the next Presidential election, further independent samples were not possible for the survey data collection.

In the UK- EU Referendum (Case 2) there were three independent samples of data collection. The first sample was collected a week prior to the European Union Referendum vote held in the United Kingdom on 13th June 2016. The second sample was collected a week after the European Union Referendum vote held in the United Kingdom in 2016, 28th June 2016. The third sample was collected a year after the European Union Referendum, 27th June 2017. Case 2 represents a one-off political competition. The three data points were therefore

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

collected as the status of the competition changed. This is because, research has suggested that in group identities that are task-focused (Lickel et al., 2000, 2001), perceptions are impacted by the wider context of that task. So, it is important to gather perceptions across all of these potential shifts in perception.

4.2.1 Recruitment

Participants were recruited from Amazon's social research platform, MTurk, and Prolific. The reason for the change in the online data collection platform used is that the terms and conditions for using MTurk changed in 2017, where no new participants outside of the US were able to become a member. Considering this, participants for the Time 3 UK- EU Referendum (27th June 2017) were recruited using Prolific. I used online survey data collection methods to account for the geographical and demographic reach that would not be possible in the same time frame of data collection if such methods as face-to-face survey data were collected.

4.2.2 Procedure

Participants who responded to the advertisement clicked the survey link, to ensure informed consent was obtained³. Participants were told that the study assesses social perceptions and values of political groups belonging to the event they intended to or had voted within. They were told they would be asked to complete a survey that would take approximately 20 minutes to complete. There was minimal risk of harm as there was no manipulation or deception in the study design. Participants were informed of their right to withdraw before and after the questionnaire. Finally, the nature of the online platforms meant participants are anonymous to the researcher. Participants were paid anonymously via the online platforms.

³ Ethical approval for this research was obtained from both the University of Birmingham's ethical review board and the Department of Psychology at Claremont McKenna colleges in the US to gain access to the US based MTurk service to collect data.

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Case 1 – the United States Presidential Election

Participants responded to an advertisement asking for supporters of each campaign group (Democratic and Republican). They were told the study assessed their social perceptions and that they would be asked to comment on the values of both the Democratic and Republican groups. Next, procedures about the confidentiality, data storage, and withdrawal from the study were explained. Written informed consent was collected. Participants indicated which candidate they planned to vote for (Clinton, Trump, Sanders or Cruz at Time 1 and Clinton or Trump at Time 2). Participants were asked to complete a series of items measuring identification with one's own and one's competing group, social values, and personal characteristics. Participants were thanked and debriefed. On average the study took 20 minutes to complete, all participants were paid £1.75 each for their participation. This was consistent with the recommendations for hourly wage from the Amazon payment structure.

Case 2 – The European Union Referendum

Participants responded to an advertisement for either a “Vote Remain (Remain in the EU)” or “Vote Leave (Leave the EU)” survey of social attitudes. They were told the study assessed their social perceptions and that they would be asked to comment on the values of both the Remain and Leave groups. Next, procedures about the confidentiality, data storage, and withdrawal from the study were explained. All participants provided written consent prior to completing the survey. All participants answered questions about the extent to which they supported the campaign. Participants were then asked to complete a series of items measuring identification with one's own and one's competing group, social values, and personal characteristics. Participants were thanked and debriefed. On average the study took 20 minutes to complete, participants were paid £1.75 each, as was consistent with the recommendations for hourly wage from the Amazon payment structure.

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

4.2.3 Participants

In total 1232 participants completed the five surveys. There were 605 participants from the US Election (Case 1) and 627 participants from the UK- EU Referendum (Case 2)⁴. The selection criteria required participants to be able to vote in the political competition (UK- EU Referendum/US Election). Additionally, as a part of the self-categorisation into each voting group, participants were asked to only fill out the questionnaire that corresponded to the voting group to which they belong, this was based on either their intended vote or actual vote, depending on the point of data collection.

4.2.4 Operationalisation of measures

4.2.4.1 Social identification

Social identification measures the extent to which group members identified with the group they were voting for and the extent to which group members identified with the competing group (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Postmes et al., 2013). In line with Postmes et al. (2013)⁵. I used a single item measure of political group identification perceptions⁶.

⁴ In Case 1, there were two independent samples of data collection. Sample 1 (July 2016) had 199 participants in total. Sample 2 (November 2016) had 406 participants in total. In Case 2, there were three independent samples of data collection. Sample 1 (June 2016) had 150 participants in total. Sample 2 (June 2016) had 87 participants in total. Finally, sample 3 (June 2017) had 390 participants in total. See appendix 6 for participant details.

⁵ They presented the argument that most multi-item measures of social identity were created with Tajfel's (1974) original studies of group membership in mind, and therefore tap onto the knowledge of group belonging and the significance of group belonging for the individual rather than treating the group as a whole entity. Considering this, Postmes and his team proposed that a measure of social identity should assess the extent to which an individual has a relationship to the entity that is the social group. Moreover, they conducted studies comparing the correlations and predictability of several different measures of social identity (Leach et al., 2008) in multiple contexts, concluding that many of the constructs that multi-item measures tap onto can be captured by using a single item measure. As a part of this research, they conducted a meta-analysis of single item measures used in the field of study to compare the validity, relational and reliability checks they had conducted on the single item measure of social identity. They found that the single item measure of social identity was the most reliable of the single item measures used in the field.

⁶ Postmes et al., conducted a series of tests to assess the validity, the reliability, and the utility of a single item measure for social identification. They found a single item measure to be as reliable as a multi-item measure when assessing social identification specifically. Brewer and Roccas (2001) identified the many faces of social identity and expressed the need for clarity in what aspects of group identity research is attempting to capture.

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The following question was asked twice: “To what extent do you identify with the other [choice of: LEAVERS/REMAINERS or DEMOCRATS/REPUBLICANS]?” The choice was filled based on which voting group the participant had self-identified as a part of. For example, if the participant is a Republican, their first question asked, “to what extent do you identify with the other Republicans?” and the second questions asked, “to what extent do you identify with the other Democrats?” Likewise, if the participant was a Remainer, their question asked, “to what extent do you identify with the other Remainers?” and the second questions asked “to what extent do you identify with the other Leavers?” and so on. These were scored on Likert scales ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*).

4.2.4.2 Identification with groups

I operationalised identification scores taking the two scales items (own group/competing group) and puts them into an intergroup context. This gave me two variables: **identification with voting group** and **identification with competing group**. These variables had a range score from 1-5 (1 being low identification and 5 being high identification).

4.2.4.3 Social values

Social values measure the foundational attributes of a group that in turn determines their group identity and decision making (Jost, 2017). I measured perceptions of values held by the ingroup and the outgroup and the values participants rated for themselves. This creates a direct pathway

Their arguments suggest there is an advantage to a measure that directly asks for the measurement of social identity from participants, as different multi-item measures of social identity have accessed different aspects of the concept. From a political psychology perspective, Greene (2004) conducted experiments to test the reliability of several measures of partisanship identity. The research team created the Identification with Psychological Group (IwPG) scale (Weisberg & Hasecke, 1999; Greene, 2004). The IwPG however, asks about how the individual feels as a part of the group, not the extent to which they feel a part of the group, therefore providing further support for an exploration of identity rooted in the context of the group. The examples presented above supports the use of social identity as a single item measure. This is both in order to access the concept as a whole and in order to place the measured identity into the group context.

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

to explore the internalisation of social values into the self and the associations between ingroup and outgroup value perceptions. I used Rokeach's (1973)⁷ framework on social values.

A total of 36 values were measured (see Appendix 3 for the full set), there are 18 terminal values (i.e., a desirable end state) and 18 instrumental values (i.e., preferable modes of behaviour). Participants were asked to complete the process of rating values three times, once to rate the extent to which they perceived the values to be held by the ingroup (both terminal and instrumental values), then to rate how much the same values are held by the other group, and finally to rate how much they themselves held each value as important. A 5-point Likert scale was used, ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*) (see Appendix 3).

Correlational examination indicated high multicollinearity between the different types of value scores. Factor analysis⁸ shows that terminal values load onto a single factor and instrumental values load onto a single factor. Therefore, I used several ways to operationalise the value data based upon the research question being assessed.

⁷ Rokeach's measure of values was chosen as, despite the conception of the tool being approximately 50 years ago, the measures are still validly used today. He created a standardised list of values that are central to many of the groups encountered in society (Rokeach, 1973). The usual method of measuring values as proposed by Rokeach and his team is by ranking the instrumental and the terminal values by order of importance to the individual. However, this creates information that is not completely independent within the individual, i.e. each value ranked is influenced by the position of the others in the list. Instead, the research questions aim to understand the importance of each individual value (terminal and instrumental combined) when associating them with the ingroup and the outgroup and the self, therefore they were measured as scaled items rather than ranked. This is because there is little understanding of the differences of perceptions of social values held between groups and how such differences may be linked to patterns of identity displayed by such groups. The way that the values were measured, i.e. using scales instead of ranking to assess intergroup and interpersonal differences, meet the requirements to answer some of the research questions presented in the introduction.

⁸ Values (terminal and instrumental; $r = .895^{**}$); I conducted an exploratory factor analysis to assess the collinearity between the terminal and instrumental values. A four factor solution was the outcome but all terminal and instrumental values of the ingroup loaded into the first factor at above a loading of .50. This first factor had an eigenvalue of 19.710 accounting for 54.75% of the variance. The second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.848 with 5% of the variance explained, yet only one component loaded into the second factor at the same value it loaded into the first. This supports the high multi-collinearity of the terminal and instrumental values.

4.2.4.4 *Ingroup and outgroup values*

Ingroup values (for the value ratings of one’s voting group) and **outgroup values** (for the values rated for one’s competing group) were created through the composite variables averaging the scores of all terminal and instrumental values collectively for the values rated of one’s voting group, then of one’s competing group.

4.2.4.5 *Value-campaign composite*

Value-case composite pairs the Campaign with the values rating direction (the voting group or the competing group) to create a categorical variable. This was to be able to test whether a group assigns value ratings to their own group that are different to the values the competing group assigns to themselves (e.g. RpR versus DpD). Also of interest, is whether a group assigns value ratings to their own group that are different to the value this group assigns to the competing group (e.g. RpR versus DpR). Table 4.1 below, displays the variations attributed to this variable. This was necessary so that the value scores could be compared across the dimensions outlined below in the post hoc testing. An example is RpR which looks at the Republican perceptions of the Republican values and RpD, which looks at the Republican perceptions of the Democrat values.

*Table 4.1 – Composite variable: voting group * group value assignment*

Voting Group * Group Value Assignment
RpR = Republican perceptions of the Republicans’ values
RpD = Republican perceptions of the Democrats’ values
DpD = Democrat perceptions of the Democrats’ values
DpR = Democrat perceptions of the Republicans’ values
LpL = Leave perceptions of Leave values
LpR = Leave perceptions of Remain values

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

RpR = Remain perceptions of Remain values

RpL = Remain perceptions of Leave values

Note: A group's perceptions of their own group values, e.g. RpR, a group's perceptions of their competing group's values, e.g. RpD.

Using an example, the analysis aims to clarify whether the Republicans group value perceptions of Republicans and the Democrats group value perceptions of Democrats are significantly different from each other. This also tests whether the Republicans group value perceptions of Republicans, and Democrats value perceptions of Republicans are significantly different from one another. If the group to group comparison of their own group's values is significant, then the differences are value structure based, if the group to competing group comparison is significant, then the differences are group bias based.

4.2.4.6 Group-self similarity

Group-self similarity measures the similarity between group rated and self-rated value perceptions. I created these composite variables with the following calculation:

Ingroup score on value - Self score on value

This gave the similarity score between the values rated for the group and the values rated for each individual group member. I then created a further composite that gave me the average of this similarity across all 36 (terminal and instrumental) values. This combined composite is labelled as **group-self similarity**.

4.2.4.7 Value systems composites

Finally, to assess the differences in value systems held between voters within the groups, clustering was conducted to create **value system composites**. In past research that has utilised Rokeach's values, there have been many methods used to group the values into meaningful

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

clusters based on the data collected. The method chosen to group the values are often determined by the research question being asked. Many of the pre-existing clusters would be theoretically suitable for the research questions of this thesis, yet few of those clusters were derived from an intergroup perspective of competing groups. This means values were grouped only based on group member's perceptions of their own group. I conducted the cluster analysis to include not only the ingroup perspective, but to also include the outgroup and self value perspective. I decided this because value clusters driven by the perceptions of the participants representing the wider voting group identities means that the data are grouped in a way that represents the views of the sample that is being tested, providing greater validity of the measure. A disadvantage is that there is the risk that the grouping is specific only of this sample rather than a more representative population and so generalisability becomes more difficult. However, the aim of this thesis is to examine group members' perceptions of groups in competition and so basing the preparation of variables to test the relationship between these perceptions on the group members being examined means the clusters of values are more representative of the sample. Therefore, the following method was adopted in this data:

The cluster analysis created a dissimilarity matrix to assess the distance between data points. The data points used here were the value scores for each participant regardless of the group focus (ingroup / outgroup / self) or voting group (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain). An agglomerative clustering technique was chosen, which groups data based on their similarity (the code and process of this is available in appendix 5). The process of this is that each data value is treated as an individual cluster, these are then paired with other clusters successively until all have been merged into one large cluster that contains all of the data. This creates the dendrogram, which is a tree-based representation of how the data are similar to one another. Agglomerative clustering was chosen as this technique created balanced clusters across the branches. The next step to the agglomerative clustering was to determine the eigen

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

values for each of the generated factors. A scree plot was used to assess the point at which the eigenvalue began to fall out of the pattern, i.e. the elbow of the plot. A 4-factor solution was chosen. Figure 4.1 below displays the heat map that shows the distribution of the values across the 4 factors. The darker the colour, the more strongly the value fits into that cluster. The black line across the heat map shows the instrumental values above the line and terminal values below the line.




Figure 4.1 – Distribution of values across the 4 clusters

Table 4.2 presents the values in each cluster and presents the cluster titles. This table is taken from the heat map presented above and outlines how each value is clustered. The names of the four clusters were created based on Rokeach's own categorisation of the terminal and instrumental values (Vauclair, Hanke, Fischer, & Fontaine, 2011). Rokeach stated that within the terminal values, some are focused on others (social cluster) and some on the self (personal

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

cluster), and within the instrumental values, some are focused on morality and relations (morality cluster) and some on competence (competence cluster). Rokeach argues that the values are interconnected but separate from one another. Since this initial categorisation of value structures, research has started to test how these values are grouped together in different contexts. This is to increase the reliability of the measure as society and social contexts have changed since the conception of the model.

My clusters are similar to Rokeach's groupings. The Social focus value cluster outlines 8 values that impact the social world around them. These values involve a social component and match many of those categorised into Rokeach's social cluster. The Fairness/morality value cluster outlines 10 values that create a fair and or moral society, this cluster includes values that maintain balance in a social structure and again match many of those categorised into Rokeach's morality cluster. The Self-focused value cluster outlines 14 personal values, within which many of the instrumental values fall within. The Life aspirations value cluster outlines 4 values that suggest life goals. Each cluster has a mixture of terminal and instrumental values. This process has grouped the values in a meaningful way based on the data.

Table 4.2 – Value systems composites – Rokeach's values into a 4-factor solution

Social focus	Fairness/Morality	Self-focused (behavioural goals)	Life aspirations
Polite	Obedient	Self-controlled	Ambitious
Independent	Logical	Responsible	A sense of accomplishment
Helpful	Clean	Loving	An exciting life
Courageous	Broadminded	Intellectual	A comfortable life
True Friendship	Wisdom	Imaginative	
Social Recognition	Salvation	Honest	
Mature love	Pleasure	Forgiving	
A world of beauty	Inner harmony	Cheerful	
	Equality	Capable	
	A world at peace	Self-Respect	
		National Security	
		Happiness	
		Freedom	
		Family security	

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

4.2.4.8 Sociodemographic Characteristics

To control for sociodemographic characteristics, participants were asked to report their age (in years), gender, and education, using open-ended items. These were later recoded into continuous variables using binary coding so that they could be used as dummy variables in the analysis. Blankmeyer (2022) offers a discussion on the use of dummy variables as independent variables in linear regressions concluding that such variables that are equal in group segregation and notwithstanding outliers in the data are suitable for linear regressions. In light of this, I have ensured that the dummy variables of Gender and Education met these criteria. Gender is coded as: Female = 1, Male = 0 (to be labelled as Female for the binary coding). Education is coded as: Higher education = 1, anything below university level education = 0 (to be coded as higher education for the binary coding).

4.3 Study 2: Focus groups

Focus groups are useful when a social setting may reveal discussion and meaning of the feelings and thoughts of group members because they will be in the setting of the group (Munday, 2006). This is important for my project because the elections had passed, and Campaign group members needed to be placed into a social setting that activated the context of belonging to that group. Creating the context of a group setting was achieved with the presence of other group members that highly identify as a part of that group (Hollander, 2004). Hollander (2004) argues that focus groups create complex social environments where the responses of one participant are not independent of another's. Therefore, focus groups allow for the activation of the social political context that has occurred previously but whose identities are still a part of political narrative, even if the events are completed. Moreover, focus groups allow us to address and assess the social-personal identity interaction that is occurring in political voters by recreating the complex environment that is the interaction of political and

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

personal identities. A focus group in the context of this thesis, is an attempt to mirror the environment that political debate and competition creates by placing participants into the context of the group that they self-identify into (Munday, 2006). This is by creating a collective identity in this focus group that focuses on that which all participants will have in common, their voting decision.

The focus groups also allow for the partially addressed or unanswered questions from the survey to be examined further. The surveys could not examine the meaning and motivation behind voting choice and categorisation into one's voting group, the focus groups aims to examine these gaps. A further point to address is to provide evidence to supplement the patterns of intergroup identification perceptions that support that the UK are task-focused and the US identity-focused in these specific political events. Another line of query is whether perceptions of bias are intentional and based on intergroup differences or based on a want for intergroup distinctiveness. Also, there is the possibility of exploring perceptions of intergroup structure/values and the impact on intergroup identity and acceptance and how these group identities are embedded into the self identity of the participants. Finally, the research design of the Republican, Democrat, Leave and Remain focus groups allows for limitations of sample representation and measures of the survey to be addressed.

4.3.1 Recruitment

Participants were recruited using the social media platforms of Twitter and Facebook, between 05/10/2021 and 25/10/2021. An advertisement was put onto the social media platforms calling for participants who were interested in engaging in a discussion about their political voting decisions in a group made up of voters belonging to the same campaign. The advertisement can be seen in Appendix 5. The use of social media and online methods to recruit participants was chosen as it has the greatest reach with limited resources, as there was no funding available for this data collection (Gelinis et al., 2017). Yet the use of social media provided a wider

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

access to the general population platforms. Hashtags and social media groups were targeted for recruitment (e.g. #Republican, #USElection2016). This suggests those accessed actively belong to virtual groups that represented their political identities, making it more likely to find high identifying voters.

The selection criteria required that participants had voted in the UK- EU Referendum and in the US Election. Additionally, participants were asked to fill out Huddy et al.'s (Huddy et al., 2015) expressive partisanship identity. As the contexts of the competitions that focus this thesis had passed by this time, I placed members of the same voting campaigns into a group context to reactivate that group identity (Abrams & Hogg, 2006). This was particularly pertinent as the groups consisted of high identifiers of those campaign groups (Huddy, 2015; Huddy & Brook, 2015). The measures for selection criteria are outlined below:

- Did you vote in the *US Presidential Election of 2016/EU Referendum held in the UK In 2016*?
- Please select which campaign you voted for:
 - Republican or Democratic
 - Leave or Remain
- Are you willing to take part in a focus group that will last between 1 to 2 hours with a group of 6-10 people who voted as you did?
- What is your availability on the following dates?

Participants were also asked to complete the expressive partisanship measure presented by Huddy et al., (2015). This measure consists of four items all on varied point scales. The average score of these were worked out to see which participants scored over half on the scale. The items and scales are presented in the table below:

Table 4.3 – Partisan identity items and scales

Item	Scale
How important is being a *insert political group* to you?	Extremely important Very important Not very important Not important at all

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

How well does the term *insert political group* describe you?	Extremely well Very well Not very well Not at all
When talking about *insert political group*, how often do you use “we” instead of “they”?	All of the time Most of the time Some of the time Rarely Never
To what extent do you think of yourself as being a *insert political group*?	A great deal Somewhat Very little Not at all

Those who scored above half on the scale were considered for the focus group. Those who scores lower on than half on the scale were thanked for their time but were not considered for the focus group sample. In order to assess whether there were differences between voting groups on the partisanship level, I conducted a univariate analysis of variance, with a dependent variable of total partisan identity and voting group as the fixed factor. This is because only high partisan identifiers were selected for the focus groups. As expected, there was no significant difference between voting groups on the total partisanship score ($f(3, 26) = .617, p = .611, \eta^2 = .074$). The mean partisan identity scores are presented in the table below. We can see that the Remain group had the highest mean partisanship identity score ($m = 16.25$), then the Republican group ($m = 16.17$), the Leave group were lower in their score ($m = 15.75$) and the Democrats had the lowest mean partisanship identity score ($m = 15.40$). Whilst the means show some difference, they were not significant and so all group members show a similar strength in identification with their own group, thus getting rid of variations in identity as a mediating variable in differences of views within the focus group discussions.

Table 4.4 – Mean partisan identity scores per voting group

Voting Group	<i>m</i>	<i>sd</i>
Leave	15.75	1.39
Remain	16.25	1.49
Republican	16.17	.75
Democrat	15.40	.89

Note - Total score is 17

4.3.2 Procedure

Participants who responded to the advertisement clicked the survey link, to ensure informed consent was obtained. Participants were told that the study assesses social perceptions and values of political groups belonging to the voting campaigns they had voted for. They were provided with the participant information sheet (see Appendix 5), asked to complete a survey asking for their socio-demographic variables, to fill out the partisanship identity measure (see Section 3.6.1 below), and to select their availability to take part in a focus group that will last up to 1 hour over the platform Zoom. They were asked if they were comfortable being on camera over zoom for the focus group and told that no personal information is to be shared with anyone within the focus group. They were told they would be in a group of 5-10 people who had voted as they had. They were told they would answer questions on their feelings of belonging to their voting group, motivations behind their affiliation with that group and their perceptions of those belonging to their competing groups. There was minimal risk of harm as there was no manipulation or deception in the study design⁹. Participants were informed of their right to withdraw before the focus group and informed that anyone who wishes to withdraw within two weeks may do so, and every effort would be made to remove their contributions, however, that it may not be wholly possible due to the nature of focus group discussions.

Once organised by the availability of the participants, the focus groups were conducted over Zoom. The Remain focus group was conducted on 19th October 2021 at 5pm GMT and

⁹ Ethical approval for this study was obtained by the University of Birmingham ethical review board

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

lasted 60 minutes. The Leave focus group was conducted on 21st October 2021 at 5pm GMT and lasted 56 minutes. The Democrat focus group was conducted on 24th October 2021 at 10pm GMT and lasted 37 minutes. The Republican focus group was conducted on 25th October 2021 at 10pm GMT and lasted 46 minutes.

At the focus group, the participants were read the participant information sheet and the rules of conduct. These included remaining muted when not speaking to avoid feedback, to allow each other to finish sharing their points before adding to the discussion, that this group is confidential and so no names or other personal information was to be shared. Once everyone was comfortable, the recording was started. The researcher then asked the group questions in line with the focus group schedule (see Section 3.6.2). Once the discussion was complete. The participants were thanked for their time and told to contact the researcher if required.

4.3.3 Participants

In total, 27 participants took part in the four focus groups. There was one focus group for each voting campaign: there were 5 Republican participants and 6 Democratic participants, belonging to the US Election of 2016; there were 8 Leave participants and 8 Remain participants, belonging to the EU Referendum in the UK. For each focus group, there were 12 people recruited initially that filled out the online survey confirming their availability to partake in their corresponding focus group. Within each focus group there was attrition at two levels, the first was the confirmation of attendance the day before the focus group was held and the second was showing up to the focus group. Of the 12 participants recruited, 8 Republicans confirmed and 3 did not show; 7 Democrats confirmed and 1 did not show, 12 Leave participants confirmed and 4 did not show; 8 Remain participants confirmed, and all showed.

4.3.4 Focus group measures

The focus group schedule questions come from themes presented by the research aims of this thesis. I adopted a latent approach, and I coded the data to capture the underlying patterns,

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

themes and assumptions based on these questions formed from the gaps in the previous study.

I group the around three main themes that feed into the research aims presented in the introduction (see section 2.5 – summary, for details on how these fit into the research aims and quantitative data). The first theme aims to understand group identity and motivations, this includes how national identity links to the political identities and how identification may change over time. The second focuses on intergroup bias perceptions. The third is on core values of the groups. The fourth examines.

4.3.3.1 Group identity

With this category, I seek to examine group identity, to assess participants' understanding of the factors that compose and impact the identity of their voting group. Here, participants are asked questions about how they view and feel towards their own and competing group, why they voted as they did and whether they would again now, their perceptions of people's feelings of the outcomes of the votes, and questions on their personal and national identities and how they think these link to their group identification. With this theme, I aim to assess how participants' perceive their group identity and what motivated them to categorise themselves as a member of this group, as well as the role of national identity perceptions and how perceptions of identity have changed over time.

4.3.3.2 Intergroup bias

Intergroup bias aims to assess participants' perceptions of the potential bias that exists between their own and competing group. Here, participants are asked questions about their views on their own group, then their views on their competing group, centring on why they think individuals voted as they did. Participants were then asked about their perceptions of the relationship between those belonging to the competing groups, as well as what they think might be similar and different about those belonging to the competing groups. The aim of this theme

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

was to examine participants' perceptions of intergroup bias that exists between their own and competing group.

4.3.3.3 Social values

Social values aims to assess participants' perceptions of the values that motivate the decision making and structure the identity of the groups in competition. Here, participants are asked questions about the values they think are held by their own group, and the values they think are held by their competing group, as well as how they think those values match the broader superordinate identity to which both groups belong (national identity). The aim of this theme is to understand which values participants' attribute to their own and competing groups as well as how they think these values link to the boarder aims of the political campaign that the groups exist within.

4.3.3.4 Sociodemographic variables

Participants were asked to report their age, gender, and ethnicity, education using open-ended items. These were later recoded into continuous variables using binary coding (see Appendix 3 for further details).

4.3.4 Preparing the focus group data

I chose to conduct the focus groups with the intention to use reflexive thematic analysis to analyse the data. Reflexive thematic analysis is a qualitative research method that focuses on experiential research (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Clarke & Braun, 2014). It was chosen due to the flexibility of this research method, theoretically and in design (Clarke & Braun, 2014) and its accountability for the epistemological impacts on conclusions drawn. The main purpose of thematic analysis is to identify patterns within the shared experiences and perceptions of participants, which fits into the main aim of the qualitative investigation set up in this thesis.

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Thematic analysis follows a three-tier process where the data are analysed first into codes of meaning, then into larger patterns or groups of meaning, then into shared core ideas or an organising theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This means the researchers' analytic observations of the data are central to the findings and conclusions that can be drawn from this qualitative investigation, again, showing support for the combined ontological and epistemological philosophical design of this thesis. Yet, there are methods to account for the subjectivity of qualitative data interpretation. In this thesis, I chose to adopt Nowell et al., (2017) extension of Braune and Clarke's (2006) six phase approach to thematic analysis. This six phase approach aims to create trustworthy, and so, reliable analysis that minimises bias. Therefore, I have monitored the following in my analysis:

During Phase 1 of familiarisation, one of Nowell et al's suggestions is to triangulate different data collection modes. This means bringing together different ways of answering the same research questions to assess if similar themes and patterns are found. As my focus group questions are to supplement quantitative examination of the four research aims, it suggests validity of the 'familiarity with the data phase'. Moreover, I have documented my theoretical and reflective thoughts (see Appendix 5), so that my thought processes behind theme creation can be accessed.

During Phase 2 where initial codes are generated, Nowell et al suggest the use of a coding framework. The coding framework is presented below. It outlines several codes that were searched for to identify the presence of a theme. These codes were generated from patterns identified in the past literature (see references below).

Next, during Phase 3, searching for themes, they suggest note taking to keep track of hierarchical theme creation as well as diagramming to make sense of connections between the themes, both of which are evidenced in Appendix 5.

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In Phase 4, where themes are reviewed, themes are to be vetted by team members and a selection criterion of 3 iterations of the code is needed for it to be included as a broad theme, my analysis has been reviewed by the research team.

In Phase 5, defining and naming, such themes should be data and literature driven. I discussed these in depth with my supervisory team before they are finalised. I documented the thoughts of this discussion in Appendix 5.

In Phase 6, it is advised to keep track of all decision making and present this alongside the findings. I have included the table used to create my thematic model in Appendix 5.

Finally, reflexive thematic analysis accounts for the role and experiences of the researcher in understanding the social phenomenon at hand. This method allows for preparation of potential themes that could come from the findings as well as flexibility to allow for new themes previously unthought of to be considered. In preparation for the thematic analysis, I created a list of codes that will indicate the presence of a theme topic. These themes come from expectations in the literature. How these codes link to the research questions of this thesis will be listed in the Analysis Plan, see Appendix 5.

4.4 Limitations and considerations

Utilising online data collection platforms impacts the generalisability of the sample to the general population from which it was taken. Several studies have suggested that there are differences between participants recruited through online platforms and social media versus those recruited through face-to-face paradigms (Howard et al., 2001; Evans & Mathur, 2005). Specifically, those who agree to take part in such online studies are more likely to have completed other similar types of research, they may be more affluent with online survey formats and question types, and they tend to be from specific demographic backgrounds such as young men from high income households who tend to be Caucasian over any other ethnicity (for more information see, Andrews et al., 2010).

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Yet, studies using the M-Turk and Prolific platforms are thought to account for such limitations, as they allow for the specification of recruitment requirements and ethical stances of research. Furthermore, in testing this assumption about population limitations, Peer et al. (2017) compared multiple data collection platforms. They found that the extended geographical and demographic reach of online participation research tools allowed stronger findings and enhanced the chance of replication, as compared to University student populations. After weighing up the potential advantages and limitations to using online platforms, I decided the ability to access participants overseas was stronger than the potential sample limitations in this instance. However, to account for this, a more diverse sample was attained in the qualitative data collection (details on this can be found below).

Further, whilst there are multiple data collection points within the two samples relating to the two political cases, there is not enough statistical power due to low participant numbers at each point of data collection to compare across data points and so a longitudinal design was not possible. This decision is further supported by the lack of representation of the sample as well as between-subject design across the points of data collection. The power calculations were conducted using G*Power software (Faul et al., 2009), stating the sample size of each of two groups compared must be 602 within each to achieve power of .95. Due to the different sample sizes that were available at the time of each round of data collection, there is a power limitation when considering a comparison between groups and across time points. Therefore, I could not compare across time points because I do not have longitudinal data. This further motivated the decision to compile the data sets into two Cases as well as collect additional data to examine the perceptions of the group.

I considered population weighting which is in common usage amongst census and political opinion and exit poll data (Kalton et al., 2003). Population weighting is an adjustment

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

that is used when there is a lack of representation of particular groups within a sample (Kalton & Kasprzyk, 1986). The weighting gives more importance to the scores of those who belong to the under-represented groups and less to those that are in over-represented groups. These weighted values are then used to run further analysis to ensure that all groups belonging to the wider sample are represented in the data being analysed. Whilst this is advantageous when there are low numbers of individuals belonging to specific groups within a sample, there are some limitations to this approach that must be considered. Yet, weighting in this research sample does not account for the intragroup diversity in different ethnic groups. I decided it was better to include the equally weighted importance of one member of an ethnic group rather than assume their attitudes are representative of the entire ethnic group. I decided not to remove these participants as their responses form a part of the general population too and maintain the power needed to run reliable analyses on this data. I also used this same justification to decide against increasing the importance of the data points collected from those in the minority age band and gender categorisation in my data set.

It is important to acknowledge that a stratified sample that allowed for much more representation of the variation in the socio-demographic details of participants would have been advantageous to ensure the sample is representative of the wider general population. Therefore, conclusions drawn from this thesis must consider the implications that a more representative sample might have had on the data I am presenting. It could be that those who belong to groups that are classified as minority groups might have shown different patterns of identification. System justification theory (outlined in Chapter 2 – Jost et al., 2004) suggests that minority group members that identify highly with their own group can also identify highly with their competing groups as a method to maintain the status quo of their social system. It is possible that when navigating political events aiming to change the national status quo, such psychological mechanisms can be valuable. But this is just one theorisation. Further research

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

and considerations can build from this thesis as such questions are not able to be addressed by the quantitative data presented. The qualitative data begins to account for these sampling limitations by presenting a more diverse sample in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and occupation (see Appendix 5 for a breakdown of this).

4.5 Research philosophy

Due to the mixed methodological nature of this thesis, it is imperative to understand the research paradigm within which this thesis is based. Therefore, I will briefly discuss where the design of this thesis sits in the debates on ontological, epistemological, and methodological approaches to research. This is important as despite the intention to remain impartial, research is designed and interpreted by the researcher, therefore, understanding the philosophical research beliefs upon which the project is developed will aid in understanding the implications of the conclusions that can be drawn from this research.

To begin with, ontological approaches to research focus on understanding experiences of reality (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). Whereas epistemological approaches to research focus on understanding how this reality is known and so the relationship between the researcher and the social phenomenon being investigated (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). Therefore, whilst the design is aimed at understanding the experiences of reality for voters in political events, and so takes an ontological stance, in this thesis, epistemological considerations are also outlined due to the choices of analysis. Specifically, the choice of using reflexive thematic analysis (see section 3.6.3 below) as a method to interpret the qualitative data requires an epistemological discussion. Therefore, this thesis is mixed in terms of research design, choice of methodology and the philosophical approach taken to examine the data to draw conclusions about belonging to the two political events. This philosophical understanding is important as it outlines not only the aims to understand more about the social phenomenon of identity formation and group

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

belonging in the context of political groups, but it also outlines how the experiences and interpretations of the research may act as an extraneous factor in the conclusions that are drawn from this investigation. The implications of such will be outlined in my general discussion (Chapter 7).

4.6 Analysis plan

I have put forward eight hypotheses and test these hypotheses with the data from the quantitative surveys and focus group data. I present how I test each hypothesis.

4.6.1 Intergroup perceptions of identity

I predicted that Republican and Democrat identifiers in the US Election will show significantly greater difference in intergroup identification scores than Leave and Remain identifiers in the EU Referendum of the UK (H1). To test this, I used measures of identification with one's own group and identification with one's competing group (Postmes, et al., 2013), to compare participants' scores of identification between the groups across the political events. I conducted a mixed univariate analysis of variance to assess differences in the identification scores that voters gave for political groups. This was to compare participants identification scores for the group they voted for with identification scores for the competing group in the political competition. I also predicted Republican and Democrat identifiers will show evidence of being identity driven, through expression of belonging whilst Leave and Remain identifiers will show evidence of being task driven. To test this, I drew upon the evidence presented from the intergroup identification comparison in the survey to argue that the US is identity driven and the UK is task driven. Then, I examined the themes of '*group identity*', and '*motivations for group belonging*' from the focus group data to unpack what is driving the decision making of these group members.

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

4.6.2 *Positive distinctiveness between competing political groups*

H3 predicted that different value clusters would be predictive of identification with one's own group across the Campaign groups. H4 predicted that different value clusters would be predictive of identification with one's competing groups across the Campaign groups. To test this, I used measures of identification (Postmes, et al., 2013) with one's own group and perceptions of values (Rokeach, 1973) attributed to one's own group. This was to see if values are predictive of identification with one's competing group and perceptions of values attributed to one's competing group to see if values are predictive of identification. In one regression, the DV was ingroup identification and IVs the ingroup value clusters to examine changes in identification against the different value clusters. In the second regression, the DV was outgroup identification and the IVs the ingroup value clusters to examine changes in outgroup identification against the different value clusters. The goal of these regressions are to assess the structure of the group identity and to do this, I aim to assess which values are predictive of higher intergroup identification. Again, I used the qualitative data to follow up on the hypothesis driven quantitative findings, to unpack what the quantitative data means. Therefore, I examined themes of '*group core values*' and '*group identity*' from the focus groups, to assess how well values represent the foundations of group identity across these groups and what such a relationship impacts. Finally, to examine any potential differences in age, gender or education, the sociodemographic variables of age, gender and education were included as additional IVs in both multiple regressions. Age is a scale item, I included a dummy variable for Female and higher education (see section 4.2.4.8 for more information on this coding).

4.6.3 Perceptions of intergroup differences

I predicted that the within group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show significant differences. I also predicted that the

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

between group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show no significant differences. I conducted a mixed univariate analysis of variance to test the scores each group (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain) assigns to their own and competing group on the four value cluster. The choice of an ANOVA was to assess perceptions of differences that exist between the competing groups to see if these were real intergroup differences or based more on the expectation of intergroup difference. Further, I used the qualitative data to follow up on the hypothesis driven quantitative findings, to unpack what the quantitative data means. Therefore, I examined the themes of '*intergroup bias perceptions*' and '*group core values*' from the focus groups to unpack whether intergroup differences or biases are drivers of how the groups are perceiving one another.

4.6.4 Identity Embeddedness

I predicted that Republicans and Democrats would show greater similarity in their own and group identities than the Leave and Remain groups. I conducted a mixed multivariate analysis of variance. The within subjects dependent variables were the value score across the four value clusters. The between subjects grouping variables were Campaign (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain) and Belonging (Ingroup value ratings / Self value ratings). The aim of this analysis was to examine the difference in perceptions of group and self value ratings of participants to understand whether voters have embedded their political group identities into their self-concept. This was conducted separately to the above analysis as they are addressing two different themes of hypotheses, the previous comparing ingroup to outgroup value ratings and this analysis, ingroup to self value ratings. Whilst these could have been conducted together, I believe two separate analyses provide more clarity in testing the separate hypotheses. Finally, I used the qualitative data to follow up on the hypothesis driven quantitative findings, to unpack what the quantitative data means. Therefore, I examined

CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

themes of '*group identity and motivations for group belonging*' from the focus group to unpack whether voters see their group identities as a part of their personal identities.

5. CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Surveys

In this chapter, I examine patterns of intergroup identification and intergroup value perceptions in the European Union Referendum held in the UK and US Presidential Election of 2016 evident through the survey data. Here I provide tests of my eight hypotheses.

5.1. Hypotheses 1 & 2: Intergroup identification perceptions

At the end of Chapter 3, I predicted that Republican and Democrat identifiers in the US Election will show significantly greater difference in intergroup identification scores than Leave and Remain identifiers in the EU Referendum of the UK (H1). This is because the US groups have had time to establish their group identities in the context of intergroup political competition. Therefore, finding a significant difference in intergroup identification would suggest differences in identification establishment and therefore differences in the potential for activation of intergroup bias. The aim of this analysis was to understand the activation of group dynamic processes in the US Presidential election and in the UK-EU Referendum.

To test this hypothesis (H1), I conducted a mixed univariate analysis of variance to assess differences in the identification scores that voters gave for political groups. I compared participants' identification scores for the group they voted for with identification scores for the competing group in the political competition. This within-participants factor was referred to as Competition (Own voting group / Competing voting group). Identification scores for the participants' own voting groups and the competing voting group were compared across all of the political campaign groups examined in this thesis. This between-participants factor was referred to as Campaign (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain). The following covariates were also included: Age (in years), Gender (Male / Female / Not revealed) and Educational level (University education / No university education).

Table 5.1 shows the participants' mean identification scores for their own voting group and for their competing group dividing up according to the campaign groups which the participants belonged to. The salient patterns that are apparent in the mean scores of ingroup identification show that Remainers ($m = 3.78$) and Republicans ($m = 3.42$) showed higher scores than Leavers ($m = 3.24$) and Democrats ($m = 3.20$). Republicans ($m = 2.13$) and Democrats ($m = 2.20$) had lower scores of outgroup identification than Leavers ($m = 2.91$) and Remainers ($m = 2.42$).

Table 5.1 – Mean identification scores for participants' voting group vs the competing group across different campaign groups

<i>Campaign</i>	<i>Identification with own group m (sd)</i>	<i>Identification with competing group m (sd)</i>
<i>Republican</i>	<i>3.42 (1.231)</i>	<i>2.13 (1.114)</i>
<i>Democrat</i>	<i>3.20 (1.263)</i>	<i>2.20 (1.269)</i>
<i>Leave</i>	<i>3.24 (1.219)</i>	<i>2.91 (1.076)</i>
<i>Remain</i>	<i>3.78 (1.147)</i>	<i>2.42 (1.114)</i>

The ANOVA showed a main effect of Competition ($F(1, 1160) = 18.336, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .016, \lambda = .984$). There was also a main effect of Campaign ($F(3, 1160) = 28.694, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .069$). There was no effect of any of the covariates: Age ($p = .897$); Gender ($p = .862$); or Education ($p = .513$), nor did any of the covariates interact with the independent variables (Competition * Age ($p = .916, \lambda = 1.000$), Competition * Gender ($p = .739, \lambda = 1.000$); nor Competition * Education ($p = .676, \lambda = 1.000$). There was a significant interaction of Competition with Campaign ($F(3, 1160) = 15.873, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .039, \lambda = .961$).

To explore this interaction of Competition with Campaign, I created the variable Identification Distance (Identification with own group - Identification with competing group)

to test whether the difference between intergroup Identification scores differed between Campaign groups, see Figure 1.




Figure 5.1: Comparing identification distance across the campaign group contrasts

I conducted an ANOVA with Identification distance as the dependent variable and campaign group as the independent variable. The model was significant at $F(3, 1211) = 14.604, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .035$. Post hoc contrasts using a family-wise Bonferroni type 1 error correction revealed significant differences between the mean Identification Distance scores of one's own and competing group¹⁰ between the Republican and Leave campaign groups ($m_{\text{difference identification distance}} = .8940, p < .001$); Democrat and Leave campaign groups ($m_{\text{difference identification distance}} =$

¹⁰ Note, a positive score indicates Voting group (I) indicated in Table X shows a larger score of Identification Distance than Voting group (J), this means the difference between scores of identification with own group and competing group is bigger in I than J. A negative score indicates Voting group (I) shows a smaller score of Identification Distance than Voting group (J), this means the difference between scores of identification with own group and competing group is smaller in I than J.

.6241, $p = .001$); and Leave and Remain campaign groups ($m_{\text{difference identification distance}} = -.9909$, $p < .001$). There were no significant differences in the scores of intergroup identification comparison between the Republicans and Democrats ($m_{\text{difference identification distance}} = .2699$, $p = .584$) or between the Republicans and Remainers ($m_{\text{difference identification distance}} = -.0969$, $p = 1.000$) or between the Democrats and Remainers ($m_{\text{difference identification distance}} = -.3668$, $p = .117$).

Table 5.2 – Post hoc contrasts with Bonferroni correction comparing identification between political groups

Identification difference group contrasts (I)	Campaign (J)	Mean Difference of Identification Distance (I-J)	p
Republican	Democrat	.2699	.584
	Leave	.8940**	.000
	Remain	-.0969	1.000
Democrat	Leave	.6241*	.001
	Remain	-.3668	.117
Leave	Remain	-.9909**	.000

** indicates $p < .001$, * indicates $p < .005$

The posthoc contrasts with Bonferroni correction were utilised to assess in which voting groups the difference in intergroup identification lies. The analysis revealed there were no differences in the comparison of intergroup identification between the Republicans and Democrats, nor with the US groups and the Remain campaign group. However, there are statistically significant differences between the Leave campaign group and all other voting groups. The similarity between identification with one's own group and with one's competing group was significantly lower in the Leave group as compared to all other groups.

5.1.2 Discussion

To begin with, in line with expectations from the literature, on outgroup identification, Republicans ($m = 2.13$) and Democrats ($m = 2.20$) had lower scores than Leavers ($m = 2.91$) and Remainers ($m = 2.42$). I propose that this is evidence that the UK-EU groups are at a different stage of identity formation than the US groups, who show lower identification with

their competing groups. This is because the Republicans and Democrats are established identities which suggests they are identity driven groups that have had longer for intergroup distinction to maintain their esteem. Yet, as the Leave and Remain groups have not had that time and space to establish the identity of the group past the purpose that drove the formation of the group, they are classified as task-driven groups. The outgroup identification scores suggest this argument has some traction. Yet, without further investigation, it is not possible to fully assess my hypothesis in which I propose the UK groups are acting as newly-formed and the US as established, with these findings alone. Therefore, to examine what motivates perceptions of intergroup competition in these political events and to infer the establishment of the group, I propose H2 (to be addressed in Chapter 6).

On scores of ingroup identification, Remainers ($m = 3.78$) and Republicans ($m = 3.42$) showed significantly higher scores than Leavers ($m = 3.24$) and Democrats ($m = 3.20$). This suggests that something other than identity formation and type of competition is driving differences between identification with one's group because the Remain group are classified as newly-formed but the Republican as established, yet they show the same patterns of identification perceptions. However, that the Remainers showed much higher identification with their own group than the Leavers, is consistent with the social change belief hypothesis. The Remain group aimed to maintain the social system by staying as members of the EU, and therefore their task was to protect the status quo (Jost et al., 2004). Therefore, their identification was driven not only by how they identified with "Remain" as a voting categorisation, but also with the national identity as a driving motivator of maintaining the status quo. Again, further investigation is required to assess the likelihood of this claim, and so this will be picked up in Chapter 6 with the focus group data.

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

A gap remains in what has been learnt so far, this gap is that little is known about what the identity structure of the groups look like. Therefore, a further discussion to consider comes from the moral foundations theory (Haidt et al., 2009). MFT suggests that differences in the value systems of more conservative and more liberal voters may motivate their group identity. This is because the extent to which they are embedding their goals and values of their political group into their own personal identities is a driver of how responsible they feel for the outcomes of their group. They argued that conservative voters are group focused and so are likely to highly embed their personal identity into the status and position of their group identity. They also argued that liberal voters are individually focused and so base their group identity on the responsibility of the individual following the values of the group rather than on the status of the group. This could indicate why the Republicans, being historically more conservative (Haidt et al., 2009), are showing higher scores of identification with their own group, than the Democrats, who are historically more liberal (Haidt et al., 2009). It also motivates the questions as to whether UK-EU groups fall into the same structure of liberal and conservative and how much the group identity is embedded into the personal identity of the group members. This is something I assess later, through the comparison of perceptions of the value foundations driving one's group to the value foundations one aligns to themselves (see Section 4.4).

Applying the understanding discussed from the MFT to the EU Referendum groups, we could argue that the Remain group are representing moral foundation patterns akin to the Republican campaign in how they are identifying with their group, in that they are basing their identity not only on how much they represent the foundations of the group but also on the position of the group in relation to their competition. Further, liberals show patterns of high ingroup identification, and greater identification with one's competing group as compared to more conservative groups. This is evident in the patterns of intergroup identification as displayed by the Leave campaign. The question arises then, is the Leave campaign showing

liberal tendencies or is it their belief in how they represent the superordinate identity and goals of the nation that is driving higher outgroup identification? The next step is to assess what is building these group identities, thus I next examine which values are associated with identification with these different competing groups.

5.2 Hypotheses 3 & 4: Values linked to identity

At the end of Chapter 3, I predicted that different value clusters would be predictive of identification with one's own and one's competing groups across the Campaign groups (H3 & 4). This is because according to moral foundations theory, more liberal leaning groups have individually focused moral foundations and so value structures than more conservative leaning groups, who focus on the group as well as the individual. As there is a plethora of past literature, the link between values and identification is predictable in the US groups, but exploratory in the UK groups as they had not yet established clear liberal/conservative boundary affiliation. This section examines not which values are different between the groups, but the perceptions of differences held within and between the groups. The aim of this section was to understand perceptions of group structure in the US Presidential Election and in the UK-EU Referendum by examining the link between social values and group identification.

5.2.1 Correlations

The correlations between intergroup identification and perceptions of the value clusters in the Republican group are displayed in Table 5.5. We can see that Identification with one's own group is positively correlated with scores of ingroup social, fairness/morality, self and life aspiration values and negatively with the same clusters of outgroup values. Identification with one's competing group is negatively correlated with all ingroup value clusters and positively with all outgroup value clusters (H5 & H6).

Table 5.3 – Republican correlations identification and value clusters

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Identification own group									
2. Identification competing group	-.488**								
3. Ingroup Social Focus Value	.657**	-.467**							
4. Ingroup Fairness/Morality Value	.715**	-.518**	.941**						
5. Ingroup Self-Focus Value	.701**	-.547**	.934**	.945**					
6. Ingroup Life Aspirations Value	.641**	-.390**	.815**	.823**	.837**				
7. Outgroup Social Focus Value	-.234**	.432**	-.024	-0.073	-0.075	-.063			
8. Outgroup Fairness/Morality Value	-.218**	.425**	-.032	-0.065	-0.073	-.027	.928**		
9. Outgroup Self-Focus Value	-.247**	.530**	-.069	-.119*	-.153*	-.078	.930**	.912**	
10. Outgroup Life Aspirations Value	-.183**	.400**	-.017	-.057	-.075	-.032	.792**	.803**	.804**

Notes: ** indicates significance at $p < 0.01$ level (2-tailed); intergroup value perceptions is ingroup value rating – minus outgroup value rating, identification distance perception is ingroup – outgroup identification. The ‘bold’ correlations indicate those of importance for the analysis.

The correlations between intergroup identification and intergroup perceptions of the value clusters in the Democrat group are displayed in Table 5.6. Identification with one’s own group is positively correlated with scores of social, fairness/morality, self and life aspiration values but not correlated with scores of outgroup value clusters. Identification with one’s competing group is positively correlated with outgroup social, fairness/morality, self and life aspiration values but not correlated with ingroup value clusters. This suggests that Democrats show a link between values and group identity only when they are identifying with the group. Democrats align value structures only to groups they identify with.

Table 5.4 – Democrat correlations identification and value clusters

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Identification own group									
2. Identification competing group	-.428**								
3. Ingroup Social Focus Value	.377**	0.005							
4. Ingroup Fairness/Morality Value	.405**	-0.016	.941**						
5. Ingroup Self-Focus Value	.407**	-0.035	.920**	.924**					
6. Ingroup Life Aspirations Value	.397**	-0.033	.768**	.792**	.768**				
7. Outgroup Social Focus Value	.068	.294**	.191**	.157**	0.106	.164**			
8. Outgroup Fairness/Morality Value	.069	.344**	.182**	.130*	0.084	.179**	.919**		
9. Outgroup Self-Focus Value	.062	.281**	.182**	.141*	0.093	.181**	.928**	.930**	
10. Outgroup Life Aspirations Value	.000	.215**	.130*	0.109	.123*	.125*	.701**	.723**	.749**

Notes: ** indicates significance at $p < 0.01$ level (2-tailed); intergroup value perceptions is ingroup value rating – minus outgroup value rating, identification distance perception is ingroup identification – outgroup identification. The ‘bold’ correlations indicate those of importance for the analysis.

The correlations between intergroup identification and intergroup perceptions of the value clusters in the Leave group can be found in Table 5.7. Like the Democrat scores, in Leave group member perceptions, identification with one’s own group is positively correlated with scores of ingroup values but not correlated with scores of outgroup values. Identification with one’s competing group is positively correlated with outgroup values but not correlated with ingroup values. Yet, there is no correlational relationship between identification with one’s competing group and outgroup life aspirations value. This again, shows partial support for H5 & H6 showing that Leave participants had little pattern in their perceptions of identification and value structure of their competing group other than that they do not match the ingroup.

Table 5.5 – Leave correlations identification and value clusters

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Identification own group									
2. Identification competing group	-0.282**								
3. Ingroup Social Focus Value	.461**	-0.093							
4. Ingroup Fairness/Morality Value	.509**	-.133*	.896**						
5. Ingroup Self-Focus Value	.503**	-0.099	.899**	.897**					
6. Ingroup Life Aspirations Value	.276**	0.075	.576**	.583**	.567**				
7. Outgroup Social Focus Value	0.08	.219**	.409**	.353**	.337**	.302**			
8. Outgroup Fairness/Morality Value	0.055	.188**	.371**	.282**	.298**	.283**	.881**		
9. Outgroup Self-Focus Value	0.028	.274**	.334**	.263**	.272**	.270**	.918**	.895**	
10. Outgroup Life Aspirations Value	0.062	0.088	.320**	.303**	.290**	.260**	.650**	.628**	.691**

Notes: ** indicates significance at $p < 0.01$ level (2-tailed); intergroup value perceptions is ingroup value rating – minus outgroup value rating, identification distance perception is ingroup identification – outgroup identification. The ‘bold’ correlations indicate those of importance for the analysis.

The correlations between intergroup identification and intergroup perceptions of the value clusters can be found in Table 5.8. Like the Republicans scores, identification with one’s own group is positively correlated with scores of ingroup values and correlated negatively with scores of outgroup values. Identification with one’s competing group is positively with outgroup values but negatively correlated with ingroup values. All except, outgroup life aspirations. This again, shows support for H5 and H6.

Table 5.6 – Remain correlations identification and value clusters

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Identification own group									
2. Identification competing group	-.387**								
3. Ingroup Social Focus Value	.414**	-.188**							
4. Ingroup Fairness/Morality Value	.502**	-.253**	.904**						
5. Ingroup Self-Focus Value	.492**	-.215**	.918**	.936**					
6. Ingroup Life Aspirations Value	.343**	-0.032	.705**	.685**	.703**				
7. Outgroup Social Focus Value	-.195**	.471**	.173**	0.1	.144**	.230**			
8. Outgroup Fairness/Morality Value	-.275**	.506**	.160**	0.045	0.101	.233**	.899**		
9. Outgroup Self-Focus Value	-.237**	.479**	.118*	0.033	.107*	.190**	.908**	.913**	
10. Outgroup Life Aspirations Value	-0.029	.322**	0.085	0.091	.111*	.174**	.639**	.624**	.673**

Notes: ** indicates significance at $p < 0.01$ level (2-tailed); intergroup value perceptions is ingroup value rating – minus outgroup value rating, identification distance perception is ingroup identification – outgroup identification. The 'bold' correlations indicate those of importance for the analysis.

5.2.2 Predicting identification from values

To address the extent to which value perceptions are predictive of group identification (H5 & H6), I conducted multiple linear regressions to predict identification with one's own group from the ingroup value clusters. Here is the regression model equation:

$$\text{Identification with one's own group} = \text{Ingroup Social Focus Value Cluster} + \text{Ingroup Fairness/Morality Value Cluster} + \text{Ingroup Self-Focus Value Cluster} + \text{Ingroup Life Aspirations Value Cluster} + \text{Age} + \text{Gender} + \text{Education} + \text{error}$$

I conducted multiple linear regressions to predict identification with one's competing group from the outgroup value clusters. Here is the regression model equation:

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

Identification with one's competing group = Outgroup Social Focus Value Cluster + Outgroup Fairness/Morality Value Cluster + Outgroup Self-Focus Value Cluster + Outgroup Life Aspirations Value Cluster + Age + Gender + Education + error

I conducted the regression analyses to test whether value clusters are predictive of identification with one's own and competing groups (H5 & H6). Table 5.11 below shows the beta coefficients, test statistics and probability levels of each value cluster as predictors of group identification. Here are the regression equations for each campaign group:

Republican: On predicting identification with one's own group, from ingroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 252) = 41.449, p < .001$, the model explained .542 of the variance. On predicting identification with one's competing group, from outgroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 253) = 24.778, p < .001$, the model explained .414 of the variance. The variance explained from the ingroup regression model and from the outgroup regression model are similar (.542, .414 respectively). In line with moral foundations theory (Haidt et al., 2009), the Republicans have shown that they link identification to perceptions of the group's values.

Democrat: On predicting identification with one's own group, from ingroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 267) = 10.361, p < .001$, the model explained .218 of the variance. On predicting identification with one's competing group, from outgroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 264) = 6.346, p < .001$, the model explained .147 of the variance. Here, the variance explained from the ingroup regression model and from the outgroup regression model are lower than the Republican group (.218, .147 respectively). What this suggests is that values as a structure of assessing

identification with the group is less important in the Democrats than the Republicans. It suggests there are other factors motivating group belonging and identification.

Leave: On predicting identification with one's own group, from ingroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 242) = 15.123, p < .001$, the model explained .311 of the variance. On predicting identification with one's competing group, from outgroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 243) = 4.781, p < .001$, the model explained .124 of the variance. The variance explained for the ingroup regression is much higher than that which explains the outgroup regression (.311, .124 respectively). This suggests that Leave voters show a stronger association between value scores with identifying with their own group than they do of perceptions of the outgroup's values and identifying with the outgroup. Plainly, values are a smaller factor in what causes identification with the competing group, than what causes identification with one's own group in the Leave campaign.

Remain: On predicting identification with one's own group, from ingroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 300) = 16.978, p < .001$, the model explained .289 of the variance. On predicting identification with one's competing group, from outgroup value perceptions, the regression model was significant at $F(7, 307) = 16.7651, p < .001$, the model explained .281 of the variance. Like the Republican pattern, the Remain group have a variance explained from the ingroup regression model and from the outgroup regression model are similar (.289, .281 respectively). This suggests that they link identification to perceptions of the group's values. Yet, that the variance explained are low, indicates that there are other factors that Remainders are using to inform their group identification.

Table 5.7: Coefficient values for the regression models predicting ingroup and then outgroup identification from the four value clusters by voting group

<i>Voting Group</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Ingroup</i>		<i>Outgroup</i>	
		<i>Unstandardised beta (std error)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Unstandardised beta (std error)</i>	<i>p</i>
Republican	Social Focus	-.365 (.177)	.041	-.386 (.200)	.055
	Fairness/Morality	.584 (.199)	.004	-.219 (.190)	.249
	Self-Focus	.540 (.192)	.005	1.092 (.172)	.000
	Life Aspirations	.254 (.112)	.024	-.396 (.065)	.000
	Age	-.002 (.005)	.698	.002 (.006)	.706
	Female	.013 (.117)	.912	-.008 (.122)	.948
	HigherEducation	.142 (.101)	.161	.218 (.106)	.041
	N	253		254	
	Adj. R ²	.542		.414	
Democrat	Social Focus	-.501 (.265)	.060	-.023 (.235)	.922
	Fairness/Morality	.259 (.288)	.370	.839 (.249)	.001
	Self-Focus	.576 (.233)	.014	-.295 (.255)	.248
	Life Aspirations	.400 (.149)	.008	-.178 (.093)	.057
	Age	-.001 (.007)	.914	-.001 (.008)	.883
	Female	-.057 (.142)	.688	.100 (.151)	.507
	HigherEducation	.114 (.138)	.407	.016 (.147)	.915
	N	268		265	
	Adj. R ²	.218		.147	
Leave	Social Focus	-.006 (.205)	.978	-.198 (.203)	.328
	Fairness/Morality	.498 (.206)	.016	-.307 (.191)	.109
	Self-Focus	.320 (.204)	.118	.802 (.216)	.000
	Life Aspirations	-.027 (.111)	.811	.020 (.091)	.826
	Age	.017 (.007)	.013	-.007 (.007)	.283
	Female	-.086 (.140)	.542	-.126 (.138)	.363
	HigherEducation	-.194 (.077)	.012	.126 (.073)	.088
	N	243		244	

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

	Adj. R ²	.311		.124	
Remain	Social Focus	-.501 (.172)	.004	.075 (.165)	.651
	Fairness/Morality	.580 (.204)	.005	.510 (.182)	.005
	Self-Focus	.610 (.218)	.005	.133 (.184)	.469
	Life Aspirations	.001 (.101)	.991	-.194 (.068)	.005
	Age	.008 (.006)	.193	.012 (.005)	.024
	Female	.009 (.114)	.935	-.056 (.108)	.600
	HigherEducation	.054 (.065)	.413	-.078 (.062)	.208
	N	301		308	
	Adj. R ²	.289		.281	

Notes: The ‘bold’ indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ level (2-tailed). Note that age is a scale variable, but Gender and Education were coded as dummy variables. Age is a scale variable. Female is a dummy for female participants. HigherEducation is a dummy with 1 for higher education.

As the table shows, for the Republican participants ingroup social focus ($\beta = -.365$); ingroup fairness/morality ($\beta = .584$); ingroup self-focus ($\beta = .540$); and ingroup life aspirations ($\beta = .254$) were significant predictors of ingroup identification. Neither Age, Gender nor education were significant predictors. What this means is that higher value scores for the ingroup results in higher ingroup identification across the fairness/morality, self-focus and life aspiration clusters but a lower value score in social focus results in higher ingroup identification. Again, in line with moral foundations theory (Haidt et al., 2009), this suggests that social focus is not a part of what builds the identity of the Republican group.

For the Republican participants, outgroup self-focus ($\beta = -.334$) and outgroup life aspirations ($\beta = -.396$) were significant predictors of outgroup identification. Outgroup social focus; and outgroup fairness/morality were not significant predictors. Neither Age nor Gender were significant predictors, but education was a significant predictor ($\beta = .218$). Therefore, in the Republican group, two of the value clusters are predictive of identification with one’s

competing group. What this means is that the more one identifies with their competing group, the lower they rate the scores of the self focus value cluster of their competing group and life aspirations value cluster of their competing group. This indicates that Republican participants are more likely to identify with Democrats if the outgroup is perceived as less self focused and less driven by life aspirations.

Referring to Table 5.9, the Democrat participants show ingroup self-focus ($\beta = .576$); and ingroup life aspirations ($\beta = .400$) were significant predictors of ingroup identification. But ingroup social focus and ingroup fairness/morality were not significant predictors. Neither Age, Gender nor education were significant predictors. What this means is that higher scores of self-focus and life aspiration value clusters is predictive of a higher ingroup identification. Interestingly, this matches the value perceptions that drive outgroup identification in the Republican group.

Turning to Democrat participants' views of the outgroup, the regressions outlined in the table show that outgroup fairness/morality ($\beta = .839$) was a significant predictor of outgroup identification. Outgroup social focus; outgroup self-focus and outgroup life aspirations were not significant predictors. Neither Age, Gender nor education were significant predictors. Only fairness/morality was predictive of identification with competing group. This shows those who identify with the competing group are more likely to see them as fair/moral.

Turning next to the Leave participants' views of the ingroup, ingroup fairness/morality ($\beta = .498$) was a significant predictor of ingroup identification. But ingroup social focus; ingroup self-focus and ingroup life aspirations were not significant predictors. Here, Age ($\beta = .017$) and education ($\beta = -.194$) were significant predictors, Gender was not. What this means is that the ingroup members identify more highly with their group if they score the group as higher in scores of fairness/morality.

Turning to the Leave perceptions of the outgroup, outgroup self-focus ($\beta = .802$) was a significant predictor of outgroup identification. Outgroup social focus; outgroup fairness/morality and outgroup life aspirations were not significant predictors. Neither Age, Gender nor education were significant predictors. What this means is that Leave participants that rated Remain participants as self-focused were more likely to identify with the Remain group.

Finally, turning to the Remain participants' views of the ingroup, ingroup social focus ($\beta = -.501$); ingroup fairness/morality ($\beta = .580$) and ingroup self-focus ($\beta = .610$) were significant predictors of ingroup identification. But ingroup life aspirations was not a significant predictor. Neither Age, Gender nor education were significant predictors. This means that participants who rated their own group as less socially focused but more focused on fairness/morality and self-focused identified more highly with their own group.

Turning to the Remain participants' perceptions of the outgroup, outgroup fairness/morality ($\beta = .510$) and outgroup life aspirations ($\beta = -.194$) were significant predictors of outgroup identification. Outgroup social focus; and outgroup self-focus were not significant predictors. Neither Gender nor education were significant predictors but Age was a significant predictor ($\beta = .012$). Remain voters who were likely to identify with their competing group more highly, saw them as fair/moral.

5.2.2 Discussion

5.2.2.1 Established groups

As expected (Haidt et al., 2009), among Republicans we can see all value clusters (Social, Fairness/morality, Self, Life aspirations), were predictive of identification with one's own group. This means a lower social focus ($\beta = -.365$), higher Fairness/morality ($\beta = .584$), higher Self focus ($\beta = .540$) and higher Life aspiration score ($\beta = .254$) is predictive of Republican's

identification with the Republican group. This tells us that Republicans place the value on the group if they perceive the group to be less socially focused, but more focused on Fairness/morality, Self and Life aspirations.

Next, a negative score of Self-focus values ($\beta = -.334$) and Life aspirations values ($\beta = -.396$) were predictive of Identification with one's competing group. This means Republicans in this sample are more likely to show identification with their competing group if they perceive them as less Self focused and less driven by Life aspirations in their value systems. What this means is that Republicans are less likely to identify with Democrats that are driven by individual focused values. This is interesting because in the moral foundations literature (Haidt et al., 2009), Democrats are driven by a focus on the individual as the locus of morality. Therefore, this suggests, the Republican participants are less likely to identify with Democrats that are more representative of how Democrats are viewed by both campaign groups. Therefore, in line with social identity theory on groups in competition, the Republicans do not identify with Democrats that they perceive to think like Democrats. So, they disregard those of the outgroup that most represent the outgroup.

Again, aligned with moral foundations theory (Haidt et al., 2009), among Democrats self-values ($\beta = .576$) and life aspirations ($\beta = .400$) were positively predictive of identification with one's own group (H5). This is in line with the Republican participants' perceptions of the group and shows support for the literature that has examined the value focus of Democrat campaign group members, in that they are individual-focus driven. Next, Democrats who saw their competing group as more in line with fairness/morality values were more likely to identify with the competing group more highly (H6). What the relationship between outgroup fairness/morality and outgroup identification suggests is that perceptions of the outgroup are dependent not on matching ingroup values but on which values are driving the competing group. If a Democrat sees a Republican as fair/moral, they are likely to identify more with

them. What is interesting here is that fairness/morality is not something that the Democrats use to judge ingroup members or as a measure of the structure of the group, but they rate their outgroup by perceptions of fairness. It suggests the Democrats hold a different standard to their competing group as they do to themselves. It could be that they expect their own group members to be fair/moral and so do not need to judge group members on this value system, or it could be that they see the outgroup as unfair/immoral and so identify with those who seem less so. There is not the scope to answer this with this data but I will examine this from the data obtained in Study 2 (focus groups).

5.2.2.2 Newly-created groups

The Leave and Remain voting groups of the UK-EU Referendum have not been examined in terms of the specific value systems that are motivating choice and behaviour within these groups, or structuring identity of these groups. This means that from the existing literature, we are limited in our understanding of which values are assigned to individuals who are categorised as Leave or as Remain. Here, I present the value structures that are associated with intergroup identification in voters that belong to these categories.

In the Leave group, fairness/morality ($\beta = .498$) was a positive predictor of identification with one's own group (H5). This suggests the Leave group identity is driven by perceptions of fairness/morality within the Leave group. Yet, outgroup self-focus ($\beta = .802$) was a predictor of identification with the competing group for the Leavers (H6). This means Leavers are likely to identify more with Remainers if they perceive them as self-focused. In line with positive distinctiveness (Brewer, 1993, Brewer & Roccas, 2001), this suggests that the Leave participants are using different value systems to motivate identification with the ingroup and with the outgroup, therefore they are acting as expected of groups in competition.

In the Remain group, social focus ($\beta = -.501$), fairness/morality ($\beta = .580$) and self-focus ($\beta = .610$), were predictors of identification with one's own group (H5). This suggests

that the Remain group identity is predictable from lower social focus, higher fairness/morality and higher self-focus values. Here, there is some similarity with the competing Leave group in that fairness/morality are important predictors of ingroup identification. Yet, drawing upon understanding presented in moral foundations theory (Haidt, et al., 2009), a low social focus and high self focus, implies an individual focus on morality rather than group focus. Therefore, the Remain campaign, like the Democrats are individual-focus driven in their moral foundations, rather than group driven. This suggests Remainers are driven more by how much they as individual group voters represent the identity and values of the group rather than how see regard themselves in comparison to their competing group. A further point to mention is that the Leave group are likely to identify with Remainers who show high value scores of self-focus. This suggests the Leave perceptions of Remainers are limited in focusing on self values rather than a mixture of the social, fairness/morality, self value interaction that the Remainers suggest form the Remainer identity. This suggests there is a lack of understanding from the Leave campaign of the structure and identity of the Remain campaign, or that the Leave campaign only identify with a part of the structure and identity of the Remain campaign, the focus group data will be used to investigate this discussion further.

Finally, Remainers identification with the outgroup is predicted by fairness/morality ($\beta = .510$) and life aspirations ($\beta = -.194$). Remainers are likely to identify with Leavers if they perceive them as more fair/moral but less focused on life aspirations. The Remainers show an understanding of the value system driving the Leave identity and interestingly identify with Leavers who are more representative of the identity of the Leave group. This intergroup component raises some interesting questions. This suggests a context within which the Remainers are accepting of the identity of Leavers. Is it that the UK-EU groups have not yet established their group identity and are still driven by previous superordinate identities? A further point to consider here is that Fairness/morality is also a driver of the Remain identity,

and so, if their competing group adopts those same values, it is possible that the outgroup is not considered as a true outgroup. Again, this data does not have the scope to answer which is the case, so this will be examined further in Study 2 (focus groups).

5.2.2.3 Comparing established and newly-formed political identities

In the examination of the findings above, we can see some patterns are starting to form. There is support for the moral foundations theory in the value systems driving intergroup identification as presented in the Republican and Democrat groups. This is because there is an individual focus of group belonging and morality in the value systems of the Democrats and an individual and group focus of group belonging and morality in the value systems of the Republicans. This is in line with the literature. We also see elements of intergroup judgement in the US groups. In this data, the Democrats do not associate fairness/morality with their ingroup identity, but do associate higher levels of fairness/morality with the extent to which they will identify with the outgroup (i.e. the Republicans). This supports moral foundations theory in that Democrats are theorised to structure their identity based on how much each member represents the identity of the group rather than how well the group stands against their competitors. This intergroup dynamic is well documented in the literature despite the lack of measurement of intergroup value perceptions and how this matches to intergroup identification (Haidt et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2009). It is possible to assess as these are groups with established identities.

Turning to the UK-EU groups, Leavers and Remainers agree on a self-focus value system as driving the Remain identity. Yet this suggests Leavers are identifying more with Remainers when they more highly represent this aspect of the value structure of the group. This goes against the idea that intergroup competitive contexts activate intergroup disparity as outlined in the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This is a similar pattern displayed by the Remainers. Remainers are more likely to identify with Leavers that score highly on

fairness/morality, a significant predictor of Leave identification with the Leave group. An explanation for this is that the groups belonging to the UK-EU Referendum are in the process of identity formation. It suggests these groups sit somewhere between forming a group identity around the status and outcome of a political competition and shifting from belonging to wider political superordinate identities. In this section, I present evidence that the established identities of the US Election show a different understanding of the intergroup value - identity interaction to the UK-EU groups. Now it is time to see how this translates to perceptions of intergroup differences.

5.3. Hypotheses 5 & 6: Perceptions of intergroup differences

At the end of Chapter 3, I predicted that the within group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show significant differences (H5). These perceptions of significant intergroup differences will be visible because competing groups like to remain positively distinctive from one another in order to maintain the perceived differences between often comparable groups, this gives form to intergroup bias. A further prediction was the between group comparisons of intergroup value score ratings across the different value clusters in the US groups (Republicans and Democrats) and in the UK-EU groups (Leavers and Remainers) will show no significant differences (H6). This is because they belong to the same culture and national identity contexts and are being compared across the same dimensions of values, and so there is likely to be intergroup similarity. That is to see if there are greater perceptions in differences of value ratings than there are differences of value ratings.

I conducted a mixed univariate analysis of variance to test the scores each group (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain) assigns to their own and competing group on the four value clusters. I examined ingroup perceptions of the ingroup, and to also assess ingroup perceptions of the outgroup. The dependent variable was Value cluster score. I compared

participants' values of their own voting group and for their competing voting group along the four value clusters. The within-subjects variable was Competition (Ingroup values / Outgroup values). I examined whether these ratings of differences between the values varied according to political campaign groups. The between-subjects independent variable was Campaign (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain). The following covariates were also included: Age (in years), Gender (Male / Female / Not revealed) and Educational level (University education / No university education). Table 5.3 shows the average value rating for the ingroup and for the outgroup for each value cluster in each campaign group.

Table 5.8 – Mean scores for intergroup value cluster ratings by political event

	Value Cluster	Average Ingroup Value Rating	Average Outgroup Value Rating
Campaign		<i>m (sd)</i>	<i>m (sd)</i>
Republican	Social focus	3.53 (.98)	3.08 (.90)
	Fairness/morality	3.43 (.93)	3.14 (.84)
	Self-focus	3.75 (.96)	3.03 (.95)
	Life aspirations	3.73 (.89)	3.18 (.91)
Democrat	Social focus	3.60 (.86)	2.67 (.92)
	Fairness/morality	3.63 (.80)	2.60 (.89)
	Self-focus	3.72 (.87)	2.81 (.92)
	Life aspirations	3.54 (.80)	3.22 (.96)
Leave	Social focus	3.05 (.87)	2.76 (.87)
	Fairness/morality	2.93 (.85)	2.88 (.85)
	Self-focus	3.26 (.86)	2.89 (.86)
	Life aspirations	3.39 (.74)	3.08 (.91)
Remain	Social focus	3.02 (.91)	2.49 (.85)
	Fairness/morality	3.01 (.87)	2.37 (.84)
	Self-focus	3.23 (.88)	2.58 (.86)
	Life aspirations	3.21 (.84)	3.04 (.92)

The findings show no main effect of Value cluster ($F(3, 6570) = 2.214, p = .084, \eta_p^2 = .001$).

There was a main effect of Competition ($F(1, 2190) = 218.731, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .091$). There

was a main effect of Campaign ($F(3, 2190) = 40.408, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .052$). Regarding the

covariates, there was a main effect of Age ($F(1, 2190) = 9.423, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .004$) and Gender

($F(1, 2190) = 4.957, p = .026, \eta_p^2 = .002$). There was no main effect of Educational level ($p = .486$).

There was a significant interaction of Values * Age ($F(3, 6570) = 17.589, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .008$). There was no significant interaction of Values * Gender ($p = .352$); nor Values * Education ($p = .358$). There was a significant interaction of Value clusters * Campaign ($F(9, 6570) = 9.325, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .013$). There was a significant interaction of Value clusters * Competition ($F(3, 6570) = 69.718, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .031$). There was a significant interaction of Campaign * Competition ($F(3, 2190) = 9.803, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .013$). Finally, there was a significant interaction effect of Value clusters * Campaign * Competition ($F(9, 6570) = 47.203, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .061$).

I conducted posthoc t-tests to explore the interaction of Value clusters * Campaign * Competition. Table 5.6 below presents the between group (ingroup vs outgroup for each voting group) and within group (ingroup vs ingroup; outgroup vs outgroup) comparisons. Table 5.4 outlines the comparison of the value cluster scores (Social-focus / Fairness & morality / Self-focus / Life aspirations) across Campaign and intergroup value rating (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain; ingroup values / outgroup values).

Table 5.9 – Mean difference in Value Ratings between political groups from post-hoc t-tests

		<i>Social-focus</i>		<i>Fairness/ morality</i>		<i>Self-focus</i>		<i>Life aspirations</i>	
<i>Campaign Value (I)</i>	<i>Campaign Value (J)</i>	<i>Mean Difference (I-J)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Mean Difference (I-J)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Mean Difference (I-J)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Mean Difference (I-J)</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Republican Ingroup</i>	<i>Republican Outgroup</i>	.4783**	.000	.3074**	.000	.7375**	.000	.5896**	.000
<i>Democrat Ingroup</i>	<i>Democrat Outgroup</i>	.9135**	.000	1.0172**	.000	.8913**	.000	.3225**	.000
<i>Republican Ingroup</i>	<i>Democrat Ingroup</i>	-.0711	.352	-.2032*	.005	.0476	.536	.1936*	.005
<i>Republican Outgroup</i>	<i>Democrat Outgroup</i>	.3700**	.000	.5066**	.000	.2014*	.010	-.0734	.346

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

<i>Leave Ingroup</i>	<i>Leave Outgroup</i>	.3025**	.000	.0810	.272	.3788**	.000	.3180**	.000
<i>Remain Ingroup</i>	<i>Remain Outgroup</i>	.5147**	.000	.7129**	.000	.6471**	.000	.1674*	.012
<i>Leave Ingroup</i>	<i>Remain Ingroup</i>	.0351	.625	-.1544*	.030	.0141	.842	.1560*	.016
<i>Leave Outgroup</i>	<i>Remain Outgroup</i>	.2473**	.000	.4775**	.000	.2823**	.000	.0054	.942

Note: ** indicates $p < .001$, * indicates $p < .005$. See appendix 4 for the table containing the t-test values and significance levels.

It is visible that there are significant differences across most Campaign * Competition interactions across the different value clusters, when looking at how these voters compared themselves with their competing group. Yet, there was no statistically significant difference between the average value rating scores when ingroup value ratings is compared to ingroup value ratings for the value clusters of Fairness/morality and Life aspirations across both the US and UK political events. For instance, a Republican voter rating Republican Fairness/morality values (Republican ingroup value ratings) is not significantly different from a Democrat voter rating Democrat Fairness/morality values (Democrat ingroup value ratings). Equally, a Leave voter rating Leave Fairness/morality values (Leave ingroup value ratings) is not significantly different from a Remain voter rating Remain Fairness/morality values (Remain ingroup value ratings).

5.3.1 Discussion

The analysis revealed that there were significant differences in between the campaign groups for within group value ratings (H5). Each voting group viewed their own group values as significantly higher than their competitors across the value clusters. There were no significant differences between the value clusters participants assigned to their own group as compared across the competing groups for the Self and Social values (H5). This is expected, as group members will show favour to their own group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Yet when ingroup to

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

ingroup values are compared (between group), we see differences in Fairness/morality and Life aspirations. With the Democrats and Remainers scoring higher on Fairness/morality but the Republicans and Leavers scoring higher on Life aspirations (Bartels, 2000; Green et al., 2004; Caprara & Schwartz, 2006; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 2010; Vecchione et al., 2019).

What is interesting about these findings is that for some values, there is a perceived intergroup difference (Social and Self values), but for others, there is a difference in value rating scores, but that those who scored lower in these still assumed they would score higher than their competitors. This is true of the UK and US groups, which suggests this process occurs at the onset of competition rather than is built through the continued establishment of group identity. It also shows support for the narratives in the literature that centre on the importance of morality and perceptions of fairness as being main motivators of these two political events.

A point that requires consideration is that Age and Gender are significant predictors of value rating scores, with below the mean age participants scoring higher ($m_{\text{belowaverageage}} = 3.33$, $m_{\text{aboveaverageage}} = 3.24$) and males scoring higher ($m_{\text{male}} = 3.28$, $m_{\text{female}} = 3.37$). There was a significant interaction effect between Age and Value cluster, but no such interaction with Gender. Specifically, those below the mean age scored higher on values across all clusters than those above the mean age (Above mean age: Social-focus $m = 3.17$; Fairness/morality $m = 3.12$; Self-focus $m = 3.35$; Life aspirations $m = 3.31$; below mean age: Social-focus $m = 3.27$; Fairness/morality $m = 3.26$; Self-focus $m = 3.41$; Life aspirations $m = 3.38$). One reason for this finding as suggested by Schwartz (2006), is that different ‘cohorts’ have access to different resources and so different priorities driving value affiliation. This is something to be mindful of when utilising the conclusions drawn from this analysis. The focus groups presented in the

next chapter aim to assess these perceptions by evaluating meaning behind the values group members are associating with their own and competing groups. In addition, females tend to score more highly on value perceptions than males. Whilst this has been assessed in the literature (Struch et al., 2002), there have been no consistent conclusions on gender differences in value systems, therefore this finding should be considered and addressed further in future research. Additional research should assess age and gender differences in value rated scores and whether this impacts measurement of intergroup bias. Whilst socio-demographic differences were not the focus of this thesis, nor does this thesis have the scope to examine these themes, it is important to note that they may play a moderating role that requires further testing.

The next step is to assess how the identity of the group is linked to the personal identities of the individual group members. How do members perceive they belong and so are similar to the identity of the group?

5.4 Hypotheses 7 & 8: Perceptions of belonging to the political group

At the end of Chapter 3, I predicted that Republicans and Democrats would show greater similarity in their own and group identities than the Leave and Remain groups. This is following the argument that values structure the foundation and motivations of a group identity and social identification of groups includes the process of incorporating the identity of the group into the group member's self concept so that they can draw their esteem from belonging to the group (Turner., et al, 1987). The aim of this analysis was to examine the difference in perceptions of group and self value ratings of participants to understand whether voters have embedded their political group identities into their self-concept.

To test these hypotheses, I conducted a mixed multivariate analysis of variance. The within subjects dependent variables were the value score across the four value clusters. The

between subjects grouping variables were Campaign (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain) and Belonging (Ingroup value ratings / Self value ratings).

The analysis shows a main effect of Value cluster ($F(3, 2195) = 317.412, p = .024, \eta_p^2 = .004$), a main effect of Belonging ($F(1, 2195) = 110.497, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .048$) and a main effect of Campaign ($F(3, 2195) = 38.587, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .050$). There was a main effect of Age ($F(1, 2195) = 12.649, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .006$) and Gender ($F(1, 2195) = 19.519, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .009$).

There was an interaction of Age * Value cluster $F(3, 6585) = 9.072, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .004$. There was an interaction of Gender * Value cluster $F(3, 6585) = 3.111, p < .025, \eta_p^2 = .001$. There was an interaction of Campaign * Belonging ($F(3, 2195) = 7.135, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .010$). There was an interaction of Campaign * Value cluster $F(9, 6585) = 18.692, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .025$. There was an interaction of Belonging * Value cluster $F(3, 6585) = 145.546, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .062$. There was an interaction of Campaign * Belonging * Value cluster ($F(9, 6585) = 6.299, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .009$).

The mean scores of the Value clusters were different from one another regardless of Campaign and Value group. Regardless of value cluster, the mean scores of values were different between group and self value ratings. Therefore, there is a significant difference in the interaction between the clusters and the Campaign/Value group. What this means is that across the different voting groups there are significant differences in how participants rated their own values and their groups values and that this pattern is different across different value clusters.

Therefore, to examine the interaction of Campaign * Belonging * Value cluster, I wanted to find out which Value clusters within each Campaign showed difference between their self and own group value ratings (Belonging). Table 5.10 outlines the post hoc contrasts using a family-wise Bonferroni type 1 error correction. The analysis revealed significant

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

differences in Belonging across the Republicans, Leavers and Remainers across the Social, Fairness/morality and Self value clusters. There was no significant difference in the scores of the Democrats across the Social, Fairness/morality and Life aspirations, but they did show that the self was rated higher in Self values than the group.

Table 5.10 - Means and post hoc Bonferroni comparing value scores between political and value cluster comparisons between the group and self

		Ingroup	Self	
	Voting Group	<i>m (sd)</i>	<i>m (sd)</i>	<i>p</i>
Social Focus Value Cluster	Republican	3.52 (.992)	3.86 (.782)	.000
	Democrat	3.59 (.869)	3.79 (.753)	.149
	Leave	3.06 (.864)	3.64 (.758)	.000
	Remain	3.03 (.913)	3.68 (.745)	.000
Fairness/Morality Value Cluster	Republican	3.42 (.943)	3.86 (.737)	.000
	Democrat	3.63 (.806)	3.79 (.686)	.443
	Leave	2.95 (.849)	3.56 (.740)	.000
	Remain	3.10 (.872)	3.66 (.698)	.000
Self-Focus Value Cluster	Republican	3.73 (.977)	4.07 (.745)	.000
	Democrat	3.71 (.876)	3.94 (.707)	.026
	Leave	3.27 (.856)	3.77 (.743)	.000
	Remain	3.24 (.884)	3.84 (.719)	.000
Life Aspirations Value Cluster	Republican	3.72 (.909)	3.74 (.888)	1.000
	Democrat	3.54 (.798)	3.52 (.899)	1.000
	Leave	3.39 (.749)	3.45 (.869)	1.000
	Remain	3.22 (.840)	3.45 (.904)	.013

As expected (H7), the Democrats show no significant difference between the group and self ratings, this pattern was true of three of the value clusters: social focus ($p = .149$); fairness/morality ($p = .443$); and life aspirations ($p = 1.000$). Democrats rated the self focus cluster as higher for themselves than for their group. Surprisingly, the Republicans show a

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

significant difference between all value ratings comparing themselves and their ingroup, except for life aspirations ($p = 1.000$), this shows only limited support for H7. The Remain group shows a statistically significant difference in scores between group and self across all value clusters (H8). The Leave group also shows a statistically significant difference in scores between group and self ratings in all except for the life aspirations cluster ($p = 1.000$) similar to the Republicans. The Leave and Remain groups, as expected (H8) show statistically significant differences between the group value ratings and self value ratings. This is indicative of a lack of identity embeddedness as they are newly-formed voting groups. The Democrats show greater similarity in scores of ingroup and self value ratings (H7), this is expected of established group identities. Unexpectedly, the Republican group showed significant differences between their scores of ingroup and self value ratings, this mirrors patterns of the newly-created UK-EU groups, the implications of this are debated next.

5.4.1 Discussion

Broadly, the analysis shows that among Republicans, Leavers and Remainers, the ratings of their own values were higher than their group values, but that there was no such difference for Democrats. I argue that the Democrats showing similarity in the values they attribute to themselves versus the values they attribute to their group is evidence that they show a similarity in their self and group identities, as values structure the identity of the group (Turner et al., 1987). This is because the extent to which the group and self-values are rated similarly acts a proxy for how much the identity of the group member is linked to their perception of the structure of the identity of the group.

The Republican's value ratings of their own group and self were significantly different across the Social focus cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.52$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.86$, $p < .001$); Fairness/morality cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.42$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.86$, $p < .001$); and Self-focus cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.73$, $m_{\text{self}} = 4.07$, $p <$

.001). This goes against H7, predicting that established groups will show lower variance between how they rate their own values and the values of their ingroup. The analysis shows that across the value clusters that had significantly different mean scores for self and group ratings, the Republicans scored higher in their self ratings than group ratings. Due to the position of the group, being that they were under a Democrat presidency and so presently the lower status group, it makes sense that the Republicans have a distance between how they are rating themselves and the group to which they belong. As they were the lower status group at the time of data collection, I argue that these findings support that positive distinctiveness was activated and so Republican's showed a distance between their self and group value perceptions. To test this further, the focus group data will explore feelings of belonging and how that has changed because the Republican presidency occurred.

The Democrat's value ratings of their own group and self were significantly different across the Self-focus cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.71$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.94$, $p = .026$) but no other value clusters. This was in line with the expectations set up by H7, that established groups will show lower variance between self and group value ratings. The Democrats rated Self-focused values as higher for the self than for the group and Self-focused values was a main predictor of ingroup identification. This is in line with moral foundations theory (Haidt et al., 2009), that more liberal groups draw upon how well they represent the group identity for their sense of belonging, morality and esteem gained from being a part of the group. Here we see the Democrats showing this pattern. The Democrats were the high status group, being the group in power at the time of the elections/data collection, and therefore it was safe to embed one's group identity into one's self concept.

The Leaver's value ratings of their own group and self were significantly different across the Social focus cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.06$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.64$, $p < .001$); Fairness/morality cluster

CHAPTER 5 - STUDY 1: Quantitative Analysis

($m_{\text{group}} = 2.95$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.56$, $p < .001$); and Self-focus cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.27$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.77$, $p < .001$). The Remainer's value ratings of their own group and self, showed the same pattern and were significantly different across the Social focus cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.03$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.68$, $p < .001$); Fairness/morality cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.10$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.66$, $p < .001$); Self-focus cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.24$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.84$, $p < .001$); and Life aspirations cluster ($m_{\text{group}} = 3.22$, $m_{\text{self}} = 3.45$, $p = .013$). The analysis has revealed that, like the Republicans, the Leave and Remain groups are showing higher self value ratings than group value ratings. In this instance, I argue that the variance between self and group rated values is because of the newly-established nature of the Leave and Remain groups. It takes time for a group identity to become a part of a group member's self-concept and as the Leave and Remain groups are newly formed, they have not as yet developed so that the political group identity is a main source of their esteem and so self values are rated as higher than group values. Again, the focus group study will shed light on the motivations behind group belonging and identity embeddedness.

6. CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Focus groups

This chapter seeks to examine questions that remain or are driven by the survey data presented in the previous chapter. The aim is to understand more about the role of identity and how group members think about their political identities. Yet, due to the chosen research design, an additional level of group identity that must be considered is the identity the participants formed by being a part of their respective focus groups. A group forms when two or more people share similar goals, values, or characteristics. In this case, many of the participants shared some or all those qualities. Therefore, the identity of the political group must be considered within the identity of the focus group. It is important to note that some focus groups showed a more cohesive group identity than others when the data was being collected. The Remainers and Democrats showed more entitativity than the Leavers, but the Republicans were the least connected. In this chapter, I present the deductive thematic analysis of focus group data generated from each voting group to outline what the participants thought about their political group identity and belonging at the time of data collection, whilst considering the context of their focus group identity.

Table 6.1 – Outlining the themes of the focus group data

Theme	Subtheme
1. Intergroup perceptions of identity	Task-driven group identities
	Identity-focused group identities
2. Group values and motivations of group identity	Motivations for group identity
	Perceptions of group values
3. Perceptions of intergroup differences	The role of competition
	Emotions as drivers of intergroup differences
	Change over time
4. Belonging	Experiences of bias and prejudice
	Disassociation

Table 6.1 outlines the main themes that provide context and meaning behind the research questions asked in the previous chapter. We begin with *intergroup perceptions of identity*, showing a task-driven focus with evidence from the Leavers, Remainers and Republicans, and identity-driven focus with evidence from the Leavers, Remainers and Democrats. Next, *group values and motivations of group identity* explores national identity and representation and perceptions of intergroup values across all groups. Then, *perceptions of intergroup differences* covers evidence from the Republicans and Leavers on the role of competition, and all voting groups on representation and emotional conflicts. Finally, *belonging* covers the impact of the vote as evidenced through Remainder and Leaver experiences of bias and prejudice, and disassociation as covered by evidence from the Democrats and Remainers.

6.1 Intergroup perceptions of identity

The survey data showed lower scores of outgroup identification, which provided evidence that Republicans and Democrats were more established in their identity formation and so identity-driven, as compared to the Leavers and Remainers who are task-driven. Yet, higher scores of ingroup identification however were present in the Republicans and Remainers than their competitors, the Democrats and Leavers. I argued that Remainers as newly formed groups motivated to maintain the status quo motivated their ingroup identity as much as their political stance on the debate. I argued that the Democrats score is because they are driven more by how much they represent the identity of the group than the status of the group. Therefore, the focus of this section is to examine the key question of whether Republican and Democrat identifiers show evidence of being identity driven whilst, Leave and Remain identifiers task driven in motivations behind group belonging. The aim of the focus group data is to provide more in-depth evidence to test my hypotheses.

6.1.1 Task-driven group identities

In the accounts of the participants, there was evidence for the group being **task driven** in the Leave, Remain and interestingly, the Republican groups in their intentions behind identifying with their own group. In response to being asked why they voted as they did, two Leavers responded as follows:

Lewis – Leaver

It's about my intention to help regenerate high paid well, high, high skilled well-paid jobs so that young people have got a future, so that they can have interesting lives. They won't become criminals, as a result they'll have interesting lives, they'll contribute to the community, and we'll have more taxes to pay for things like the NHS. That is why I voted.

Andrew – Leaver

I decided to vote for Leave because for me I see voting as an action of privilege given to me to input my own little opinion or desire. So, I see it as opportunity to speak out an action which I will use to express my feelings, my interest. So that it will go a long way. I see it as an opportunity for me to speak out through voting. So, I believe my voting may be little, but I believe it counts, it can change, and can also improve the way things are done, so I'm always after change. The change is the cost of change, so I believe we are, we all need to be involved so that's to bring change into the system and to make it more valuable.

In the above extracts, voting decision is based on specific outcomes and driven by a want to make positive changes to society and contribute to the community. Both Lewis and Andrew stated they belonged to the Leave campaign to or to make a change in society for the better. They were both driven by the task of the vote, either the act of voting or the potential outcomes the vote may have. This is important as it shows that the Leavers in this instance agree that the

task of voting is driving their reason for categorising themselves as Leavers. This provides evidence that they are driven by the **task** of the group rather than belonging to the group. Similarly, the idea of the task of voting was visible in the discussion in the Remain group:

Vijay – Remainer

I'm married to an EU citizen, and travelled extensively in Europe, and my feeling was that the EU was a large force for good in terms of uniting people bringing together, ideas and also very importantly trade as well. And I think I thought it was very important that Britain be part of a larger organization, not isolated, in this little corner of Europe. And I just thought it was a big, big mistake to sort of turn your back on a huge trading partner, and also big cultural and social influence.

Yolanda – Remainer

I voted remain obviously, because I believed in the peace process which is the original reason why the EU was actually formed, so that we wouldn't go to war again. But I think more importantly, for me I know there's been a lot of talk about the freedom of movement, but for me it was far more the the trading between the countries...

Vijay's reasoning was to allow for travel and trade, he touched upon themes of culture and unity. Finally, Yolanda's response was that she voted for leave to maintain the UK's place in the peace process of connection. Each of these participants show a slightly different focus on why they voted for Remain, yet each showed agreement for their peer's responses. Each reason for categorising themselves as Remain was acting from purpose rather than personal identification with the group category, despite showing an emotional connection to their reasons. This is important as it shows that Remainers agree that their reasons for voting as based around preventing a change to the current system. Whilst this suggests they are task-focused in their group identity, it also shows that they see the benefits of the current system.

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

This provides evidence for the complexity of political identity as a motivator for political decision making and action.

An unexpected theme that came from a participant in the Republican focus group, was on how politics should be task-focused but has shifted to being identity-focused instead:

Roger - Republican

And I think whatever party stands for the constitution and follows that to a tee whether it's those two or the Libertarian Party and other party, perhaps, I think it's a good thing at the end of the day is kind of what who follows the Constitution and the closest and to me that's the one that counts.

...it was meant to be hey you go do you. And then after you make something of yourself and then you go and sacrifice for your country right you know your service your country, but that the whole idea of a career politician was never really meant to be in the founding fathers paperwork

Roger talks about how the identity of the group should be focused on the core of the task that is driving political action, to follow the rules set by the nation that the voting is occurring within. Roger outlines that the party that is important is that which aligns with the “*constitution*”. This suggests for Roger, political alliance is not party identity driven but national identity driven. What Roger outlines is that US politics has shifted from being politically task-focused to being about the leader and the representation of that leader. Roger talks about how there has been a change in the political system that was not intended. This hints at the “party over policy” changes in the political system expressed by Cohen (2003), in that the political system focuses on the representation and merits of the leader rather than how well they will serve the people. This is supportive of the literature in that there was a motivation of national identity cross cutting the 2016 US Presidential election (Restad, 2020). Roger talks about how political parties should represent the national identity and the party that best

represents that identity is the party that Roger will align with. Whilst this is indicative of the important role that identity plays, it separates the multiple identities that are driving political group action, the political group affiliation, the national identity, and the personal identity of the individual. This also provides an insight into the different processes behind identity driven groups, it shows feelings of belonging but also how group identity impacts personal identity too, which is something we must consider in the examination of identity-focused group identities.

To address H2, we have Leaver's and Remainder's within the EU Referendum whose voting motivations were task-focused. We also have a Republican voter's perception that voters should be driven by how well the group represents the national identity. This potentially outlines the steps it takes to shift from being task-focused to identity-focused. If political groups are created with the aim of being focused on a task, as suggested here, the movement towards identity focus is the individual voters' perception of how well the group matches their ideas of the national identity to which they belong to. It is the task of further research to examine if this view is prevalent in other voters and in other events to provide evidence for this identity shift process. This section has evidence that identity in politics is multi-levelled, and so looking at the interaction between personal and national identity will aid our understanding of political identity and whether it is driven by political tasks or identification with political groups.

6.1.2 Identity-focused group identities

It was expected that the Leavers and Remainders are to show task-focused motivations for voting and the Republicans and Democratic participants to show identity-focused motivations for voting. In this section, evidence is presented from the Remainders and Leavers that the Remainders have become identity-focused, and evidence from the Democrats of the identity-focused nature of their Republican competitors. We begin with the Remainders:

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

Joe – Remainer

I think that when I voted remain, when the original campaign was going on, I didn't know very much about the EU at all and my feelings at the time were: why would I change what I was quite ignorant about, why not keep it the same...

Melanie – Remainer

It felt very much like I was voting for something that I that I knew that was the norm to me to try and vote against something that I didn't know anything about, I don't know that kind of really left me with a lot of uncertainty so that wasn't something that was going to appeal to me

Arwen – Remainer

It (Brexit) just seems to be taking away quite a lot of our freedoms which we didn't really understand, and it just went across the historical reasons that I saw that we had it so it just didn't seem to make sense to me.

The extracts above show a conversation from the Remain focus group on what motivated their voting choice. Joe based his vote on his lack of knowledge of the context. Melanie based her vote on what choice would reduce uncertainty of the unknown. Melanie talks about being driven by what she is familiar with and with what the norm in society was at the time. This sentiment was agreed by other Remain participants in the group. Further, Arwen talks about both the personal freedoms and historical significance of belonging to the EU. Here, we have themes of being driven by sticking to what is known, personal impacts and historical societal significance. Whilst the task of the vote is driving the group, there seems evidence that these voters were driven by what would affect them personally and what feeds into their identities or what they value in a society. This evidence supports that identity is playing a role in the decision making of the Remain voting participants. To further this point, there were comments on the restructuring of the Remain focus:

Vijay - Remain

... there is no remain campaign anymore. It's a rejoin campaign. And that's what it will be focused on

Vijay outlines the shift in the focus of the Remain campaign to a “Rejoin” campaign. This suggests the Remain group have either shifted to an identity driven group motivation or that they have found a new task upon which to focus the drive of their group, which creates further intragroup exposure and establishment so will result in an identity focus. Vijay’s statement was met with agreement from all present in this focus group. This suggests the context of the focus group created a group identity but also that the Remainers agreed of the shift in the focus of the Remain group. Considering the evidence presented by the previous chapter, with the Remain intergroup identification patterns mirroring those of the established Republican group, the evidence supports that the Remain group are more identity driven than the Leave. The shift in identity of the Remain group was also identified in a discussion between two Leave voters:

Lewis – Leaver

What I've found is, we've almost witnessed the hardening of the remain campaign, they've, they've almost developed into. They've diminished, they've, they've actually reduced they've almost condensed themselves. But have we witnessing a very hard core, it's very hard core very opinionized body of people.

Ellie - Leaver

... maybe some people would swing but I think most people would just stick because I think there's a lot of pride attached to people so people are very set in their ways because it was so divisive so I'm not sure many people would, would have the guts to to change their mind now.

Lewis’s comments on the evolution of the Remain campaign mirror what has been said about a shift towards an identity driven focus of the group. Lewis talked about a “hardcore” of the

Remain campaign that are opinionized. Lewis implies some Remain voters are immovable in their identification with the Remain campaign. This is further supported by Ellie's follow up point that Remainers would let their emotions of pride and fear maintain their attachment to the Remain identity. Again, this is a potential motivation behind the identity driven focus of the Remain campaign, as perceived by both Remain and Leave participants in their respective focus groups. It also advocates for research to assess the role of intergroup perceptions in such contexts as they provide clues as to how group identity is structured.

This interpretation of the identity-focus of their competing group is also displayed in multiple extracts from a Democratic participant. This is interesting as the literature has treated the Democrat and Leave campaigns as liberal and conservative, respectively, this suggests that opposing value structures (Haidt, et al., 2009) is only one element structuring the identity of the group. Here is the extract where a Democratic participant outlined the identity focus of the Republican group:

Benjamin – Democrat

I think people were just exhausted with the status quo. Right. And I think that, you know, set up a situation where, you know, they're like well let's try something new, it didn't really matter what it was. Particularly people in like middle America and things like that they, you know, a lot of these politicians, I do think that they get they ignore. You know, poor communities farming communities, things like that and you know if you go and look at some of like Trump speeches what he would, you know, you know the clips are the parts where he sounds like an idiot, usually sounds like an idiot, but if you go and listen to some of the speeches basically what he says is I will make your life better. I will get you a job right and that's, that's their one issue that's the thing they would care about okay you get me a job I can feed my family and we can eat like, that's it.

...

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

I think the big thing that Trump did with a lot of these poorer communities like you know, would be good like I'm going to make your life better. I'm going to talk. I'm going to do something for you that you care about, that everyone else, you know is ignoring, essentially

...

And I think the answer is yeah they definitely would right they do a lot a lot of people are going to vote the same way that they voted in 2016, and 2020, and in 2024 I think that there's gonna be a very very close presidential race again

Benjamin shared an opinion throughout his responses that many of the Republicans who voted for the Republican leader had voted Republican in the past and would do in the future. This suggests loyalty to the group and is evidence of the perceptions of the identity driven nature of the Republican voters. Another narrative identified by Benjamin is that Trump targeted voters who felt unheard and promised them a better life. This targets the personal needs and so personal identities of the voters and encourages identification with a party leader and so identification with the group. This suggests that the Democrats see the Republicans as identity driven. It provides evidence for the identity-driven nature of the Republican group, but also shows that the Democrats are thinking in terms of group belonging.

To summarise, the Democrats perceived the Republicans as identity driven. There is evidence that the Remain campaign was or has become identity driven too. This is supportive of the patterns of intergroup identifications scores examined in Chapter 5, Section 5.1. The Remain campaign's identity focus was perceived by both Remain participants, in their notion of restructuring the Remain campaign ("*Rejoin*"), and by Leave participants, in their perceptions of the motivations of continued support for the Remain campaign. There is evidence that the Leave campaign was task driven, as displayed through the motivations of voting being to better society and to practice the right to vote. An important point to take from

the analysis of this section is that task/identity focus is not only perceived by ingroup members but also by the competing group too. This has the potential to interact with the perceptions of the group members that can successfully derive the focus and motivations of their competing group.

6.2 Group values and motivations of group identity

In the previous chapter, different value clusters were predictive of identification with one's own and one's competing groups across the Campaign groups. As expected, Republicans placed the value on the group if they perceive the group to be less socially focused, but more focused on Fairness/morality, Self and Life aspirations. Among Democrats', self-values and life aspirations were positively predictive of identification with one's own group. Democrats identified with Republicans if they perceived them as fair/moral.

In the Leave group, fairness/morality was a positive predictor of identification with one's own group. Leavers were likely to identify more with Remainers if they perceive them as self-focused. In line with positive distinctiveness (Brewer, 1993, Brewer & Roccas, 2001), this suggests that the Leave participants are using different value systems to motivate identification with the ingroup and with the outgroup, therefore they are acting as expected of groups in competition, and in line with the patterns displayed by the Democrats. The Remain group identity is predictable from lower social focus, higher fairness/morality and higher self-focus values. This suggests Remainers (like the Democrats) are driven more by how much they as individual group voters represent the identity and values of the group rather than how see regard themselves in comparison to their competing group. But how do these values link to perceptions of group identity and motivations for voting?

6.2.1 Motivations for group identification and formation

How represented a person feels helps to explain the perceptions of values held by the groups and the motivations for joining the political groups. Interestingly, this was a theme that was

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

identified by all voting groups, regardless of how long they had existed. We begin with Leavers and their views on how represented they felt as a motivation for voting.

Lewis - Leaver

That's why we voted out because we wanted the recovery. For 20 years we watched the decline of this country we could remember where it was for 20 years we were saying please stop please stop nobody listened to us.

Ellie - Leaver

Yeah, I didn't agree with the feeling of the sort of merging together and the conglomeration of so many countries and Cultures. It felt a little bit like there was this sort of overlord power that sort of merges them all together into one thing instead of seeing the, you know, diversity of the people who live there, their needs, their way of life. It sort of being decided by one big separate organization.

Lewis - Leaver

Those who voted to leave the EU, they saw something beyond sticking together.

The conversation between Lewis and Ellie outline reasons why they voted for Leave. Within these reasons, they outline not feeling represented by the national identity with the way that it was structured before the vote. Lewis talked about the decline of the UK and feeling unheard when these issues were raised. Ellie talked about the EU being an “*overlord power*” and not representing the diversity of the cultures within. Here, the Leave participants have expressed dissatisfaction with the way in which their national identity was being represented. Interestingly, a lack of representation was a driver of creating the Leave identity before the vote, yet, the next extracts express how a lack of representation after the vote has become a motivator to assess the national identity and to assess how the nation is now perceived from the perspective of the Remain campaign focus group:

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

Melanie – Remainer

... that the EU was a large force for good in terms of uniting people bringing together ideas and also very importantly trade as well. And I think I thought it was very important that Britain be part of a larger organization not isolated, in this little corner of Europe.

...this build up that's been going on in the background and it's been fuelled by like our politicians and by these campaigns where people have felt that there was something to be to be gained back control of.

Yolanda - Remainer

What I think is is really important now is, what is worth showing, is the lack of people in this country, to do the jobs that we need people to do. Obviously British people aren't prepared to pick crops, and we need people from Europe to come across and to do those jobs. And now we're suffering because we haven't got the people to do those kind of jobs.

But now, UK is seen as an untrustworthy insula. And also, not, not to be trusted. But, sort of, not someone willing to play the team game for the greater good.

Melanie outlines the importance of connection and collectiveness and that the narratives presented by the politicians was to suggest that this connection was a loss of control for the UK to regain. Similarly, Yolanda notes that the UK is now seen as untrustworthy and not a part of the team despite the needs we have for the connection to Europe. This dissatisfaction expressed at how the national identity is being represented, came from the outcome of the vote. This is evidence that representation is an important motivator of political choice as well as an important motivator of group structure and identity formation. It also creates a new focus in the literature, and that is the differences between feeling represented before and after a political shift and the impact this has on identity perceptions. This shared experience of feeling

unrepresented, begins to explain why in the previous chapter, there is evidence that Remainders identified with Leavers who most represented the Leave values. That value of fairness/morality seems linked to feelings of representation and is a relationship for further research to begin to examine as it links directly to intergroup perceptions and political behavioural choices.

Turning to the US participants discussions of representation linked directly to defining the American identity. Below are extracts taken from the Democratic focus group and the Republican focus group. They are presented together as they are both centred on defining the American identity. Presenting them as such, shows the contrast in the definitions of the American identity, and how someone will always feel unrepresented when both sides have different definitions for the superordinate identity they both belong to.

Benjamin - Democrat

I don't know that there is a singular American Identity. You know, the United States is a really unique country, in the context of its size and sort of how its organized right you know it's sort of like saying like what's the European identity. Right. and it's like, well, there's a lot of different ones right it depends on where you are in the country. It depends, you know there's a lot of variation on that sort of thing... I mean I think that the democratic ideals tend to align more with it I think the American Identity should be. Right. And, like, I think, you know, if you kind of look back at our history with rose coloured glasses anyways. You know this idea of you know it being an immigrant nation and a melting pot and that kind of thing. You know that the notion of, you know, encouraging and fostering and diversity i think is a is a noble pursuit and I think it's one that the democratic Party does a better job of in general... Yeah, I don't know, I don't I don't know because I think it's just to variable across the country to say that there's an American Identity.

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

Roger – Republican

When you define the American identity, you're talking about the constitution. That's what you're talking about the Bill of Rights declaration Independence, the Constitution, that's talking about that. So, when it comes to freedom and liberty which I think the American constitution is really good, the Magna Carta back in the day was very good at restricting unlimited power that Kings have back then. So, I think anything that goes that way that gets people freedoms a good thing...

From the extracts from Benjamin (Democrat) and Roger (Republican), we can see variation in what defines the American identity. Benjamin talked about a multicultural “*melting pot*” nation, whereas Roger talked about laws and social structures that are at the basis of the American socio-economic and political systems. From one perspective America is about acceptance and diversity, yet from the other it is about “*freedom and liberty*”. The differences in how voters of competing campaigns are defining national identity sheds light on some of the reasons why two groups belonging to the same political debates and systems are not feeling represented by their nation, depending on the political stance it is presently taking.

This same difference in perceptions of national identity and national values is present in the EU Referendum focus groups too. Here, we have extracts from the Remain focus group and from the Leave focus group. Again, these are paired together to show the difference in perceptions of national values.

Joe - Remainer

So, I think that there are British values that we like to think of ourselves as having as a foundation. And one of them is it honesty that were, we had a reputation for being very honest, very forthright people. And I think that's just gone completely now. And I think that the, the fact that that both sides of the debate, said things that weren't true... But other things I consider to be British values, the rule of law, which is like a huge thing

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

we we give our word. And we stick to it. And the campaigning kind of showed, where that wasn't true. And then, when Theresa May was pushing Brexit through without any idea what it meant from our point of view. And then Boris Johnson followed up with Just trying to force this terrible deal through by trying to overturn the rule of law in this country and it did us no favours.

Lewis - Leaver

There's a lot of people who are anti English, and they stopped to say well, British identity is multicultural it's, it's, modern way of thinking it's globalized it's it's a it's a new way of thinking, they don't, they're very involved, actively involved in cancel culture. And they're cancelling English identity, whereas the People who voted Leaves wanted to preserve English Identity...identity is a healthy thing. People are different, by denying people identity all you're doing is putting real human emotions into a pressure cooker, trying to suppress it.

Interestingly, both participants belonging to competing groups have this idea of **preservation** of English identity. Joe identifies the values of “*honesty*” and “*rule of law*” as representative of the English identity, stating that these have been disregarded by political leaders and so has resulted in the outcome that does not represent his views. Lewis identifies what English culture is not, by stating it is not “*multicultural*” or “*globalised*”, and that the Leave campaign aimed to preserve the English identity rather than suppress it. Lewis supports the diversity of identity and suggests it is a positive thing and talks about the preservation of English identity that is separate to globalisation and multiculturalism. Further, Lewis implies that the suppression of English identity is creating an emotional response that will cause a reaction and that there needs to be an acceptance that people are different and don’t all represent the English culture.

Whilst Joe talks about how the British values are not met by present leadership, Lewis talks about how the definition of British identity was not representative of his views. This

implies they are using different methods to define the structure of identity. For Joe, national identity is driven by representation of the national values, but for Lewis, national identity is driven by feeling represented by how the national identity is defined. This is further evidence of the Remain group becoming identity driven, as specific values are more closely linked to the identity that the group is aiming to represent. It is also evidence that the Leave group are driven by wanting to feel represented by a nation they feel has changed.

Therefore, we have Republicans and Leavers that focus national identity around freedom and not multiculturalism, and we have Democrats and Remainers that focus national identity on the acceptance of diversity and multiculturalism. This is concurrent with themes within the literature that have compared these two political events (Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

6.2.2 Perceptions of group values

When asked about their own group values, participants outlined the many motivations listed above that structure the identity and focus of their group. Yet, when asked about the values held by their competing group, there are many examples of negative perceptions. Below is a compilation of views of the values that participants held of their competing group:

Table 6.2 – Compilation of values attributed to one's competing group

Campaign	Compilation of views of their competitors
<i>Leaver views of Remainers</i>	<i>Selfish, greedy, narrowminded, false high and mightiness, feel they are more inclusive and respecting, entitled, naïve, oblivious to the reality of life, short sighted, deeply bitter, anti-english and cancel culture of English identity.</i>
<i>Remainer views of Leavers</i>	<i>Leavers are cruel, majority seem less educated, absolutely ridiculous, bad education, backward looking, racist.</i>
<i>Democratic views of Republicans</i>	<i>Morally bad at the time, ignorant gullible, integrity in a minority of Republicans, negative perception towards Trump supporters</i>
<i>Republican view of Democrats</i>	<i>Just from a feeling standpoint, I don't like to use the word entitlements,</i>

The extracts presented in the table are the moments in the focus groups that the participants were outlining their views on the values held by members of their competing groups. Almost

all of these values or opinions towards the competing group have negative connotations and indicate negative bias. The Leave participants viewed Remainers as “*narrow-minded*” and “*anti-English*”, whilst the Remain participants viewed Leavers as “*uneducated*” and “*racist*”. There are themes of a lack of insight/perspective, and of national identity and what that means. Interestingly, such ideas were mirrored in the US groups too. The Democrat participants saw Republicans as “*ignorant*” and “*morally bad*”, whilst the Republican participants viewed the Democrats as “*entitled*” and using their vote for personal gain. What is interesting is that the competing groups tend to mirror their perceptions of one another. For instance, “*anti-English*” and “*racist*” are both prejudice-based biases. Therefore, there is a link between perceived values of the group and the identity of the group at an intergroup level. This ingroup favour is known as the process of positive distinctiveness, which is a method used to maintain distinction between competing groups that can be classified as similar. The similarity in the intergroup value perceptions is evidence that this method of positive distinctiveness is activated.

To expand RQ2, that is, to assess how the values represent the identity of the group and what this looks like to the members of these groups, we see evidence here that bias in value perceptions is visible across all groups but that the groups’ definitions of national identity show a conservative and liberal split. The Republicans and Leavers defined a nationalistic national identity, and the Democrats and Remainers a multicultural national identity. This supports findings from the previous chapter in that bias is present in all groups but that these different group perceptions of representation of national identity are also driving identification.

6.3 Perceptions of intergroup differences

In the survey data each voting group viewed their own group values as significantly higher than their competitors across the value clusters. Yet, there were no significant differences between the value clusters participants assigned to their own group as compared across the competing groups for the Self and Social values, in accordance with ingroup favour (Tajfel & Turner,

1979). The Democrats and Remainers scored higher on Fairness/morality but the Republicans and Leavers scored higher on Life aspirations. As there are perceived intergroup difference for some values (Social and Self values) but differences in value rating scores for others, I argue that because there are some intergroup differences, there are perceptions of intergroup differences where there are none. This was true of both the UK and US groups, which suggests this process occurs at the onset of competition rather than is built through the continued establishment of group identity. Therefore, the focus of this section is to understand perceptions of intergroup differences to see where the differences lie and where intergroup **differences** become drivers of how the groups are perceiving one another. This builds upon the variations in the definitions of national identity as being a driver of intergroup difference by asking the participants their thoughts on what biases lie between the groups.

6.3.1 The role of competition

Participants were asked what they thought about their competing group. A theme that came out of that was the role of competition. Below we have an extract from a Republican and one from a Leaver presented together. With the similarities on views of national identity, Republican and Leave were paired together in this instance to show that perceptions of competition differ between those of similar views. One reason for this is the establishment of the US group versus newly created context of the EU-UK group. Here are the two extracts:

Jack – Republican

You really don't expect rivalry to be on good terms when it comes to politics. So, the relationship currently has really changed from the way it used to be in 2016, yes they had ideas, but right now the democrats are really trying to outdo what the Republicans had then.

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

Mohammed – Leaver

Those who wanted to leave where happy voting leave, those who wanted to stay were happy voting remain. Well, I see no reason why people to be malice between both parties, they vote for the betterness of us, the betterness for England

Jack from the Republican group states that **bias is expected**, as this is the nature of political competition. Yet, Mohammed from the Leave campaign states that there is **no reason** for negative bias or perceptions between competing groups as both are motivated to better the system they are in. This interesting dichotomy with how the nature of the political system comes from members of the same group. This suggests there is variation within the group with how competition is viewed. It is important to note that the focus group participants were all high identifiers, as measured by Huddy's partisanship identity measure, so differences in identification with the political group identity is controlled for. The explanation I present is that the US group is used to the nature of competition as they are established groups born in and developed in competition contexts, whereas the UK group is a newly created political category.

Despite the various views of the role of competition, participants had interesting ideas as to how their competing groups represented the identity of the country. Again, we turn to the Leave focus group:

Lewis - Leaver

And it was extraordinary how the, the office was split 5050. It really was so divided. And it was people from all backgrounds all areas. So it was no there was no, not discrepancy what's the word discrimination between leave and remain voters, they were all areas there was no way of telling who was who,

Ellie - Leaver

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

I think the question struck me because I think both sides probably believe that they are representative of it. I think we both think that we're that we're doing that that we're both the right sort of group of people to represent that. But I agree that there's some sort of double standards in that, there's something wrong with saying that you want to maintain English identity it's seen as somehow racist again and that, to, to, to want to promote English identity means that you must want to I don't know that you don't like other cultural identities you don't think they are equal you don't think there is valuable. When like I said at the beginning, I feel like the EU didn't represent a diversity of identities, it was trying to create one overall European and more identities, instead of allowing each one to be their own to have their own decision making over what suits them.

Lewis outlines that in his experience, there were little differences or way to determine who belongs to either side based on any personal or background information. This suggests that there is a similarity across those belonging to both groups. Yet Ellie, outlines that each side believes they are right and so she has been treated unfairly because of belonging to the Leave campaign. Ellie states that both sides believe they are representative of the national identity and are right in their views. This supports that the Leave group displayed that the role of competition had less of an impact on their political choices. This is supported by Lewis's claim that there are no differences between those who belong to each group. It feeds into the newly-created task nature of the group, because of the various motivations people had for their vote and the variety of backgrounds of those Lewis had come across that voted either way in the election. Yet, Ellie's claim reflects a true difference in the perspectives and values driving the competing political groups and so suggests that differences may be a result of how the individual is treated for being a member of their group. Ellie then goes on to outline her perceptions of a double standard in that a strive to maintain the English identity is met with

negative connotations, but the European identity is not met with the same conditions. This starts to draw upon the value of fairness and justice.

Yet, the same participant also attempts to express an understanding of the motivations of their competing group:

Ellie – Leaver

I felt that there was an element of just a fear of change. I felt like changes come up a lot in this and I think that there were, I didn't feel like there was any particularly strong arguments for it. It was just probably easier than going through that change. And it was a bumpy ride trying to get it to go through and I just guess they didn't want to face up to that so it was easier to carry on with the status quo which is probably partly why a lot of the remain voters were younger people is that they hadn't lived in a time with it being any different and so changes, always scary and I guess it's just easier to stick with what we knew which day to day doesn't feel like it affects much. And so, sort of like narrow, a sort of narrow focus on well my day to day life isn't affected by the EU and therefore we should stick with it rather than looking at this sort of wider impacts of it.

Ellie has outlined that a “*fear of change*” is a motivator for the Remain campaign and states her opinion that this was not a strong enough motivation for their Referendum stance. This ties in that emotions are a driver of political choice. Ellie also outlines that a lack of exposure to contexts outside of the societal structure as well as a limitation in perceptions of political issues explain the Remain response. Whilst this is a possibility, it is also evidence of a bias towards the Remainers. This is because, Ellie is grouping Remain voters into the same category and thus implying a similarity in their motivations and emotions. This is evidence of the perception of homogeneity of the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), thus evidence of intergroup bias

perceptions. Interestingly, the Remain campaign outline they wish to maintain the status quo, whereas the Leave campaign perceive that as a fear of change.

The quantitative data presented in the last chapter suggested that perceptions of intergroup differences were stronger than the differences that exist between the groups. Paired with these extracts, it suggests that participants are aware of the bias that exists between competing groups but some feel that the bias is justified due to the intergroup differences that exist too. This is an avenue for future research to examine.

6.3.2 Emotions as a drivers of intergroup differences

All participants expressed strong emotions either to the outcome of their respective political events or how they have been treated within these political competitions. Emotions have played a role in motivating stronger affiliation and identification, and Joe begins to explain why:

Joe - Remainer

Identifying as either Leave or Remain has forced complex identities into one of two simplified boxes and that causes the loss of nuance. Essentially, I feel like Brexit has contributed greatly to polarization in part because identity has been oversimplified and reduced to choosing between one of two opposites.

Joe states that the Brexit debate was an oversimplification of identity, which caused polarisation. He claims that a polarised approach reduced the opportunity to exist on a political spectrum and that this created tension. This implies that through striving to feel represented and to feel a sense of belonging, the forced definition of the UK-EU Referendum groups caused greater competition and bias. This is because emotions are triggered when political voters do not feel represented (Capelos, Chrona, Salmela, & Bee, 2021).

A further point to the role of emotions comes from the mismatch between the expectations voters have of their social networks and the reality that those close to them had voted for the competing group. This was evidenced in both the Remain and Democrat groups:

Carl – Remainer

I think when I refer to the emotions, it was generally with family members or those that I had those really emotive conflicts with I suppose and family members who I respected greatly and I thought had quite rational views in general. But these people came out with arguments that were based on what I believe to be at the time, I believed to be untruths. However, they were not proven to be untrue at the time, I mean now we know that there were literally just outright lies however. So I had some quite upsetting emotions with members of my family that I really, I really did feel quite strongly towards and still do obviously. However, the that conflict was, it ceased to be about being able to discuss logically and discuss about facts and wasn't able to have that discussion because anytime I had that discussion, it caused further upset and if I won the argument, I, I lost because I'd upset family member.

Henry – Democrat

I was pretty angry with my friends were voting Trump like getting in big fights on Facebook and everything.

Carl expressed emotional conflicts with his social network. He outlined how those he “respected” held different views to him which he labelled as irrational. He talked about how his family believed untruths. He also expressed there was no “winning” in this situation. From Carl, we have a situation presented where there is the expectation of those in his social networks belong to the same political groups as him. What Carl expresses is a betrayal from a group member. Those who belong to the same social groups, there is an assumption that they hold the same value systems and motivations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If that is questioned, then there is an emotive response, as expressed by Carl. This is also mirrored by Henry’s comments from the Democrat group. They both expressed anger towards those belonging to their networks that voted differently to them. This anger can create a context whereby the anger

towards expected ingroup members becoming outgroup members and the complex crosscutting of multiple identities, creates a simple ingroup versus outgroup bias to mediate the emotion that comes from such situations (Weeks, 2015). That this is expressed in both a US and UK group is supportive of H2.

6.3.3 Change over time

Change over time outlines how the perceptions of intergroup differences varied over time. Across Democratic, Leaver and Remainer extracts, we see the development of understanding and acceptance as time has passed. This supports the previous theme of emotions as a driver of intergroup difference perceptions. Yet each group showed a slightly different explanation for why time has impacted their perceptions. From the Democrats:

Benjamin – Democrat

My feelings have fluctuated pretty substantially over the years and I think part of the issue is that I don't think that you know all Trump voters are a monolith. And that I think there are different reasons why different people voted for Trump

Henry - Democrat

At the time I thought they were all morally quite bad. Now I'm over it. And I think they're. It's like, yeah, I think they're fine it's like people I love very much people I think are very cool vote for Trump. Hell in 2020. So, it's just like, I can't. I don't know, I just don't care like I was talking about enduring to it over time, and it may be, what that amounted to was my having firm moral opinions at the time. And then just kind of having those opinions, or just that kind of Outlook, kind of we call it like, just like become diffused and like, I'm just more relativistic now and I don't really give a damn.

Benjamin - Democrat

I think people have become desensitised, they're just so you know it was outrageous and it you know surprising that at least to some people right. And over time, it's just like

you kind of just, it just keeps happening over and over and over and over again it's. You can't it's very difficult to maintain that energy of being that angry for so long.

This interaction between Benjamin and Henry expresses a change in perceptions of the outgroup as time had passed and emotions had eased. Benjamin talks about a realisation of the heterogeneity of the outgroup and both participants discuss the desensitisation to the emotion triggered by the political outcomes. Therefore, their agreed explanation for their change in perceptions is that they have over exhausted the strong emotions that came from intergroup competition and numbed themselves to that experience. The Leavers also agreed that feelings became weaker:

Ellie - Leaver

...both sides people have calmed down a little bit, I think both sides feel less strongly just because it's not the hot topic anymore I think right after it and during it, it felt really intense.

Here, Ellie outlines how the height of competition was when the feelings about the campaigns of the EU Referendum were strongest. One explanation for this is that during the competition is when the political identities are most important and so esteem is drawn from them. Once the competition passes, group members find other sources upon which to base their esteem, unless the political campaign continues.

Taken together, the extracts support that these voting groups are acting as expected from social groups in competition over resources (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), that there are true intergroup differences in the goals of the groups, but that there are biases in how the groups, their goals and their group members are perceived. This section provides evidence that intergroup biases played a role in these political events, driving views of competing group members and so driving intergroup interaction and motivating group identification and group belonging.

6.4 Belonging

In the previous chapter, the analysis showed that among the Leavers and Remainers, the ratings of their own values were higher than their group values. However, the analysis also revealed that the Republicans rated their own values higher than their group values but there was no significant difference in the Democrat ratings. I argue that the Democrats showing similarity in their self and group value ratings is evidence that they show a similarity in their self and group identities, as values structure the identity of the group (Turner et al., 1987). This is because the extent to which the group and self-values are rated similarly, acts a proxy for how much the identity of the group member is linked to their perception of the structure of the identity of the group. Moreover, I argued that as the US were under a Democrat presidency and so at the time, were the higher status group, the Republicans had distanced themselves between how they are rating themselves and how they are rating the group to which they belong. As the Republicans were the lower status group at the time of data collection, I argue that these findings support that positive distinctiveness was activated and so Republican's showed a distance between their self and group value perceptions. To assess what voters' perceptions are of they feel they belonging in the group identity, I examined how integrated participants felt their voting groups were with their personal identities or self-concept by asking about their personal experiences and feelings of belonging to their voting group.

6.4.1 Experiences of bias and prejudice

Bias and prejudice has been touched upon as a product of intergroup competition, and as an outcome of competition. Yet, there are elements of the participants personal identities that they believed were the target of bias and prejudice because of the outcome of the vote and because of the group that they belonged to. Another interesting theme that links to how well the group

identities linked to the personal identities of the participant is presented by a Remain voter, Melanie:

Melanie - Remainer

For me, as someone who didn't vote for this, I feel like, very upset that I'm having to kind of be subjected to this and this is not what I asked for, but, you know, democracy won and therefore that that's the decision

...

I think for me, it felt very vindicated. It felt very cruel, it felt very marginalizing and, and I guess for me as a black woman in the UK I felt very much like, I don't know, I definitely felt a sense of wow there is something a bit deeper rooted in what some of these decisions and what some of the, what some of the views that are coming out what they were kind of like wrapped up in, and I don't know for me, I really. Some of the reasons and the, the examples that were given I think for me, definitely made me feel a little bit uncomfortable at the time and it just yeah like I said it made me, it made me question actually live with that was a bit of a deeper issue at play then in some of the in some of the views and reasons and rationale that people were trying to justify why this was a really good thing to do and it just made me a little bit cautious.

...

I think I will I always grew up thinking that we did live in a multicultural society that respected that and the respect to the differences and you know and and that flavor that that that diversity of the UK had I thought it was something that was really valued, whether my views are biased because I am from an ethnic minority so actually that's part of my culture and that's obviously fundamentally grounded in the fact that I'm from the UK and I've grown up in there. I think the difficulty for me and wherever, where I've been realized that actually maybe my views were misaligned with the majority so

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

to speak of those that have voted to leave was that we were now subjected to this new way, like is that what people think but then it was actually people always think this way or how society just changed where we've kind of got this.

This extract from the Remain focus group outlines how Melanie felt the outcome of the vote did not represent her views. Melanie's response outlines a mismatch between her personal identity and the wider accepted national vote. This extract from Melanie was met with agreement from all the Remain participants. Her account of her personal experiences and feelings from the outcome of the vote identify themes of ethnic identity, systemic racism, and questioning feelings of belonging. Melanie talks about how the outcome led to her questioning how well she fit into the new definition of the British identity and talked about how there may have been deeper rooted or systemic issues that motivated the mentality that led to the UK leaving the EU. Melanie's perception of feeling less represented by the new culture of the UK as well as the divide in society was also discussed from the perspective of a Leave voter.

Lewis - Leaver

So, it's like the education system at a very young age is failing 50%. As a result, you have actually the People who failed, go out into the real life, they faced life head on. It's a hard life but they learn to survive very quickly, but they also gain other skills and insights and they're pretty much probably a lot of the, the, the people who voted leave, the academic side the people who just seem to sail on through. They don't have that same life awareness, they don't have that same reality that same intuition of what is really going on. So I think you might find that division starts.

In the extract above Lewis suggests that systemic bias is a driver of political divide. In his experience there is a clear socio-economic and socio-cultural difference in those who are Leave voters and those who are Remain voters. This is interesting as his points presented at the start

of this section suggest there was no categorisation of who fit into which campaign group. This is evident of either a bias or confusion in distinguishing the two competing group identities.

Lewis – Leaver

Now, during the whole remain campaign debate, or the whole Brexit debate. I was saying things like that. And the answer was, oh you're just racist. Well, if I'm a racist, look at the result exactly what I said would happen happened.

Ellie's – Leaver

I definitely agree that's what I got a lot with and that I must be racist as a Leave voter.

Lewis and Ellie had been labelled as “*racist*” for their voting choice. The Leave participant extracts paired with the Remainer’s suggests that racial identity as well as national identity is integrating into the interaction between group and personal identities of the UK-EU Referendum groups. This has allowed the identification of various factors that are mediating the relationship between personal and group identity. All participant extracts have tied racial identity to the debate, and all feel targeted because of their perceptions of how race links to the political debate. To relate this to RQ4, **racial identity** is an element of personal identity that is being linked to group belonging in the case of the EU Referendum. There were also experiences of ageism and sexism:

Arwen – Remainer

And it was a sort of like, if he can't beat me in an argument, he'd so be like well you know you're just this young girl in the family, it became sort of, like, it hit on to sexism as well and like you haven't live the life as long as me just because I am younger and it came down to, sort of, I wouldn't say bullying it didn't go as far as hot but it was sort of like well I'm going to pick it up as a person, rather than your arguments.

Here, Arwen expressed how debates on Brexit turned into attacks on her personal characteristics, such as being a “*young girl*”. Arwen has outlined her experience of bias from

those who disagreed with her point of view. That aspects of her personal identity were the target of this bias is evidence that belonging to the political voting group became intertwined with the personal identity of the group members. For Arwen her personal identity was the target because of the group she belonged to and that she was defending her choice of affiliation, for the instigator of the bias, they used personal identity to target her because they felt their political group was under question. This is evident of social groups and the interactions of those that belong to them (Abram & Hogg, 1988).

6.4.2 Disassociation

An interesting theme to come from questions about how the personal identity of the voters linked to the identity of the political voting groups is the idea of disassociation. Disassociation in this context, defines the disconnection between one's own experiences and the wider context of what is going on. We see this theme arise in the US Democrat group with the suggestion that there are voters who are driven by a single issue and ignore the other points made by the leader/group.

Benjamin – Democrat

I think people will, because I think they I think there are a lot of people who are one issue voters who really care about one thing and it doesn't matter how bad the other things are essentially

Benjamin identifies an importance concept in identity politics, and that is “*issues voters*”. Issues voters are those who vote for candidates based on the stance proposed on a specific issue that they hold as important to them (Congleton, 1991; Mudde, 1999). Benjamin is proposing an explanation for why people may have voted for the opposition. His view that voters of the other group voted for what would personally affect or impact them and ignored the stance of the candidate on other issues suggests a narrow focus of Republican voters. Interestingly, research presented by Jaffe (2018) looking into why the specific demographic group of “white-

women” voted for Trump, identified that the single-issue, that single-issue voters vote for, is different amongst even the same socio-demographic categories. What this tells us is that there is a link between the personal identities of voters and the issues they take their stance on. Benjamin suggests that a self-focus explains the voting choice of the competitors, yet the quantitative data in the last Chapter shows a self-focus is affiliated with Democrats rather than Republicans. Issues-voting creates the context where individuals are looking for leaders who hold the same view on their most important social issues to meet their own personal needs. This leads to identification with the leader on that specific stance and so identification with the group and their definitions of the group.

This disassociation linked to social issues is evident in the UK-EU groups, albeit from a slightly different perspective:

Arwen - Remainer

... the family that I have there are quite poor, and they do have quite a few immigrants who live with them and they get on really well with them I don't think they were making the association between people they knew, and the word immigrant as a whole. And, but then seeing each individual problem but not putting them all together.

Arwen outlines the social issue of “immigration” and the disconnection many made between “immigrants” they know and “immigrants” in the political narrative presented around the UK-EU Referendum. Whilst this brings in a complex debate of bias and race, what should be taken away from this extract is that there is a perception of disassociation of Leave voters from the experiences and the expectations of those categorised as “immigrants”. Like the differences presented in section 6.3 between real and perceived intergroup differences, there is a difference between the real and imagined presence of immigrants. This suggests there is an interaction between bias and social issues and how they might affect each individual voter. Like with the US group above, this is evidence of feelings of belonging, because the voters are linking their

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

personal identities with the views of the group. Further, it links to emotion driven political decision making (Capelos, Chrona, Salmela, & Bee, 2021) in that fear driven perceptions of an outgroup has determined group belonging.

A final point to note is the effect that existing within these campaigns themselves has done for the group identity of the voters. With the Remain campaign signifying the importance of the restructuring into a “rejoin” campaign, and Leave striving for the Brexit they intended, we also have similar sentiments expressed in the US groups:

Olivia - Democrat

We are clearly a divided nation. I think this relationship is the same throughout the world between Liberal Progressive Socialist's and Conservative Religious Bigots. How has it changed, maybe the divide grew a little, yes. I think Donald Trump made me a more determined Democrat.

The Democrat, Olivia, outlines how her disdain towards the opposition leader made her identify more strongly with her own group. This is evidence of identity embeddedness as the consolidation of her identity was directly linked to the perceptions of the other group, albeit their leader and what they stand for. Olivia also outlines how there is a politically driven divide in the nation and expresses that this difference exists across all that belong to these categories.

To expand RQ4, to assess what voters’ perceptions are of how embedded they feel they are into the group identity, I examined how integrated participants felt their voting groups were with their personal identities or self-concept. There is evidence presented by the voters of all voting groups that the personal and group identities are linked, but this link is explored in many ways. A lack of representation signifies a mismatch between the personal identities, drivers and aims of the voters and the identity and outcome and status of the voting groups.

Themes of racial identity, culture and prejudice and racism were also apparent. Participants talked of feeling, again, less represented by the structure of the culture of the nation

CHAPTER 6 - STUDY 2: Qualitative Analysis

either pre or post vote, thus evidencing the link between personal and political identity. Participants also talked about experiences of prejudice in judgment or being targeted for their personal characteristics when discussing the political debates. This is evidence that personal identity not only links to the political identity, but it is used to target the outgroup members to confirm the views of one's own group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Finally, there was a theme of disassociation between the reality and expectations of interaction with social issues, such as immigration. This is evidence of an existing bias, of an activation of personal identity protective techniques and of an ingroup/outgroup mentality.

The purpose of this chapter was to add and expand the understanding provided from the survey analysis. The research aim was to examine how voters in the UK-EU referendum and the USA elections make sense of their political choices and what the role of their perceived group identity is and impact of their perceptions of intergroup difference. To do this I assessed the structure of the identity of the group, collecting evidence to support the arguments that established political voting groups are more likely to be identity driven than newly-created groups that are task-focused. I assessed the perceptions of intergroup differences and how their perceptions of the values held by the groups linked to their identification with the groups. The link between values and identity was used as a tool to determine if individuals who identify as members of these groups activated mechanisms of intergroup distinction to defend the status of their group identity and their esteem from belonging to such groups as well as to determine which motivators structure the goals and identity of the group. Finally, I assessed the link between the personal identity of group members and the political identity of the group, talking about experiences of bias and dissociation between personal and group identities. This link between personal and political identities facilitates our understanding of what is important to group members and what motivates the strength of their political identities. The implications of this will be discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 7 - Discussion).

7. CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

The aim of this thesis was to examine the role of group identity in the USA Presidential Election and EU Referendum held in the UK in 2016. This was to answer questions as to how voters in the UK-EU referendum and the USA elections make sense of their political choices, and the role of their perceived group identity on their perceptions of intergroup differences. To do this, I used a mixed method research design to examine the perceptions of those who voted in these political events. Study 1 comprised of 5 independent surveys, assessing perceptions of intergroup identification and social values. In Study 1, the established Republican and Democratic groups of the US Election were compared to the newly created Leave and Remain of the UK-EU Referendum. Study 2 comprised of four focus groups assessing themes of identity, bias and motivations behind group belonging, in each of the voting groups. In this chapter, I examine the key findings of the two studies and implications that these findings have on our understanding of the USA Election and EU Referendum held in the UK in 2016.

7.1 Key findings

7.1.1 Identity driven versus task driven

One of the key aims underlying this thesis was to examine the voting groups to see if there is evidence that the established US groups acted in line with what is expected of identity driven groups (Lickel., et al., 2001), and the newly created UK-EU groups acted in line with what is expected of task driven groups (Lickel., et al., 2001). To examine this aim, I draw upon the comparison of the patterns of identification from the surveys, and group perceptions from the focus groups. The US groups showed lower scores of identification with their competing group than the UK groups. What this pattern suggests is that the UK groups were identifying with their competing groups more strongly than the US groups (H1, H2). Next, I expected to see

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

higher levels of identification with one's own voting groups in the US groups than the UK groups. Yet, the findings were mixed, and I found that Republicans and Remainers showed higher scores of identification with their own group, than the Democrats and Leavers.

As evidenced in the focus groups, the Leave group were intending to shift back to the original political affiliation groups, in line with the high outgroup and lower ingroup identification scores as compared to the other groups, this shows support for the task-focused nature of the Leave group (Lickel et al., 2001). Remain ingroup identification scores were higher than the Leave ingroup identification scores. This suggests the Remain group may have been identity driven in the lead up to the vote, supported by the focus group data sharing that their goal was to maintain the status quo of the national identity. Moreover, in the focus group data, Remainers shared they were shifting in the focus of the Remain campaign to “*the rejoin campaign*”, this suggests they are shifting into identity establishment from being task driven. Thus, the Remain group were reformulating their identity to consolidate the loss of the intergroup competition and group status reduction (Abrams & Hogg, 1998), which is evidence that they were shifting from a task-focused motivation (to maintain the status quo) to an identity-focused motivation (to react to the loss of the vote).

Next, if we look at motivations presented in the US groups for voting, we have Republicans who want to feel heard and represent the constitution as a definition of the national identity. We also see Democrats as working to represent the national identity as supporting the social movements that stem from the acceptance of multiculturalism and diversity. The Democrats suggest identity driven motivations of those voting in the US Elections supporting that despite their lower identification scores as compared to the other voting groups, they are identity driven groups. Democrats were also suggestive of the importance of representing the group they belonged to, but the Republicans focus on whether they felt the group is

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

representing them. In the focus group, Democratic participants also suggested that the Republicans were trying to change the status quo of the nation motivated to feel their needs are met and that they are represented by those in power.

Taken together, the findings from the surveys and focus groups show evidence that the Leavers were task-focused, the Remainers were shifting to being identity-focused, the Republicans were identity-focused but discuss how politics was set up to be task-focused and has shifted to an identity-focus, the Democrats seemed task-focused but showed evidence of being identity driven. This both confirms expectations from the previous literature with regards to the US groups but also advances our understanding of the process of identity formation. From the previous literature, we understand the importance of the globalisation narratives in the literature that is theorised to have led to the rise of populism, which in turn has been hypothesized to have motivated these two political events (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Vyver et al., 2018; Stewart et al., 2019). A key finding from the focus groups in this thesis was that identity is more complex than just considering the identity of the group. To be identity driven can mean to be driven by one's personal needs, and so their personal identity. It can also mean the group identity, feelings of belonging to the political party group affiliation. Finally, it can mean the wider national identity, and feelings of representation. This is important as it provides support to the complex nature of the role that identity plays in driving perceptions within political competition. It means future research pathways examining the role of identity, should consider personal, group and national identity.

7.1.2 Values linked to identity

I examined the link between group identity and value perceptions. This was to investigate how values are associated with group identity with one's own and one's competing group. Again, I wanted to test if this was different in newly created versus established political group identities

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

to assess if group purpose is a moderator of the relationship between values and identity. To test this, I looked at which value clusters were predictive of identification with one's own group and one's competing group. I found that perceptions of ingroup values predicted ingroup identification (H5) and that perceptions of outgroup values predicted outgroup identification (H6) across the voting groups, however which value clusters predicted identification scores varied between the groups.

For Republicans, value clusters of social, fairness/morality, life aspirations and negative self focus, were linked to identification as a Republican group member. This suggests that Republicans structure their identity around values centred on social, fairness and life aspirations but not around a self-focus. Moreover, negative scores of social values and positive scores of self values linked to the Republican's identification with Democrats. This is contingent of the moral foundations literature (Haidt, et al., 2009), in that more conservative campaigns are likely to draw their morality and so value systems from the status and position of the group, as there is a social/group focus to their values.

For Democrats, self values and life aspiration values were positively associated with identification as a Democratic group member, but those who saw the Republican's as fair/moral identified more highly with their competing group. The Democratic focus group participants outlined their perceptions of the structure of the Republican group and the motivations of its members (including, "*they are not homogeneous*"). This supports the inclusive mentality of Democrats, suggesting their lack of focus of their perceptions on the outgroup is because they do not see the outgroup as homogenous. This explains why they identify with Republicans who represent the same values they as Democrats hold as important. As expected from moral foundations theory, this tells us that Republicans are driven by the status of the group, and Democrats by how they as individuals represent the aims of the group.

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

For the Leavers, only fairness/morality was a predictor of identification as a Leave group member, but self-focus was a predictor of their identification with Remainers. The Leave participants focused on their motivations of changing the status quo of the nation and painted the Remainers as “*anti-English*” and as wishing to promote an unrepresentative structure of the national identity. This is evident of an “*us versus them*” mentality as presented by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The Leaver’s stance to change the status quo to preserve the national identity meant the focus was on the task of the ingroup rather than on the structure or status of the outgroup. For the Remainers, negative social focus, and positive fairness/morality and self-focus were predictive of identification as a Remain group member, and fairness/morality perceptions of Leavers resulted in higher identification with Leavers. Interestingly, the Remainers more highly identify with their Leave group if they see the group as having higher Fairness/Morality. This means Remainers are identifying with Leavers who more clearly represent the values of the Leave group.

This last finding is interesting and unexpected from a social group perspective, especially considering the activation of intergroup competition and the establishment of the Remain identity being motivated by the competition loss as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, a question to raise here is what each side of the debate considers as Fairness/morality. One possible explanation is that the groups define Fairness/morality as a value cluster from different approaches based on their own views of what represents the national identity. Drawing upon themes from the focus group, Remainers and Leavers both associated negative values with their competing group, but interestingly, these were often comparable judgements to one another. Whilst the Leave group described Remainers as “*anti-English*”, Remainers described Leavers as “*racist*”. Similarly, whilst the Leave group described Remainers as “*narrow minded*”, Remainers described Leavers as “*uneducated*”. Whilst this

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

does not address the value of fairness directly, it tells us that these groups are making judgements from their variation perspectives on similar dimensions.

A second explanation of the above comes from examining the same pattern in the US Election focus groups, this is outlined next. In the US focus groups, the Republicans identified with the Democrats based on their perceptions of the Democratic group's self values scores, this is a value cluster important to the Democrats when considering the Democratic identity. Yet, delving into the meaning of this, on the one hand, Republicans are viewing the Democrats as selfish ("*entitled*" or "*self focused*"), but on the other Democrats explain their self focus as how representative they are of the identity of the Democrat group. Therefore, the focus groups outline that whilst the Democrats are looking for fair treatment of everyone, the Republicans are asking whether they as individuals are treated fairly in line with the American constitution. Therefore, the definition of the value that structures the group identity is an important factor to also consider. As this may vary depending on the group that is being asked to define it.

Taken together, the findings from the surveys and focus groups suggest that group purpose interacts with the foundations and drivers that structure the group to determine how these groups perceive their own and competing group. I found that intergroup perceptions vary, depending upon the purpose/focus of the group (Lickel, et al., 2001) and the foundational structures of the group (Haidt, et al., 2009) as well as how that group is deriving meaning from the values that structure it.

7.1.3 Perceptions of intergroup differences

Another key aim was to examine the extent to which members belonging to the USA Presidential Election and EU Referendum held in the UK in 2016 perceive greater intergroup differences between themselves and their competing group than there are differences. I wanted

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

to test if this was different in newly created versus established political group identities to theorise as to whether group purpose is a moderator of perceptions of intergroup differences. To test this, I assessed whether perceptions of value scores attributed to the ingroup and to the outgroup were the same or different across the voting groups. This was to investigate if greater intergroup differences than there are, is perceived within the voting groups.

The survey analysis revealed a main effect of Campaign, suggesting scores of value clusters differed across the voting groups (H5). It also revealed an interaction effect of Campaign and Competition, which suggests there are greater perceptions of differences in value scores than there are intergroup differences (H6). This is visible across all voting groups (Goren, 2005). Specifically, Social and Self-focus value clusters were not significantly different when compared between Republicans and Democrats on their perceptions of their own group, i.e., Republicans' view of Republicans and Democrats' views of Democrats. But on the same comparison of own group perceptions, Fairness/morality and Life aspirations were different. When compared at an intergroup perception level there were significant differences across all value clusters scores. This means there are intergroup differences in value systems, with Democrats scoring more highly on Fairness/morality and lowly on Life aspirations. The same pattern was found of the UK groups. Remainers scored higher on Fairness/morality values and Leavers higher on Life aspiration values. This means that there are greater perceived differences between the groups, as group members scored their values to be different to their competing group even on value clusters where there are no real differences. This is true of newly-created and established political groups.

Drawing upon the focus group data, we can bring in the themes of bias and discrimination that all voting groups felt. With the personal categorisations of Remain voters under siege (race, age, gender identity), the labels of the Leave voters as “racist”, the view of

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

Democrats as “selfish” and of Republicans as “narrow-minded”, bias and prejudice ran through these events. This is supportive that bias is an outcome of political competition and so is active within such events. This can be explained by self-categorisation theory, in that simply categorising oneself into a group is enough to begin the process of bias (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This is because, as one’s esteem becomes linked to the status of the group, they strive for the group to be better, or to be seen as better. Comparing groups within this process upon a similar set of values activates the need for positive distinctiveness between groups. This is because groups are driven by the need to see themselves as more worthwhile than their competing counterpart. Therefore, what we see here is that in the process of Republicans and Democrats and then Leavers and Remainers assessing their own and competing group on the values held, there is the activation of bias perceptions. These groups are activating a need to be distinct from their competition and so are perceiving greater intergroup differences than there actually are. This pattern was more strongly seen in the established US groups than the newly-formed UK groups, yet is activated across all groups.

Taken together, the findings from the surveys and focus groups show evidence that perceptions of intergroup differences arguably are a factor motivating the intergroup bias and discrimination experienced and explained by the focus group participants. It also suggests that perceptions of intergroup differences is a factor of political competition, regardless of how longstanding that competition may be. This is supportive of the application of social identity theory to models examining intergroup differences between political groups. Further, this adds a novel understanding to research that aims to assess partisanship and intergroup differences, by suggesting perceptions of differences is an underlying mechanism that is driving the decisions and feelings of members of these voting groups (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Holden, 2017; Wilson, 2017).

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

7.1.4 Perceptions of belonging to the political group

The final key aim was to examine feelings of belonging to the political groups. The purpose of this was to investigate whether, in line with social identity theory, the identity of the group had become integrated with the identity of the individual. This was to provide an explanation as to why one's personal identity was activated when discussing their political groups. To do this, I assessed the similarity of the self and own group value ratings in the surveys and asked questions about belonging in the focus groups. I found that the Republicans, Leavers and Remainers all showed higher scores of their own values rather than the group (H8, H9), but the Democrats showed no difference between scores of their group and self rated values. On the surface, what this suggests is that the Democrats are embedded into their group identity but that the Republicans, acting much like newly formed UK-EU groups show a non-significant association between their self values and the values of the group. Yet, this pattern fits in with the narrative presented earlier from the moral foundations theory that Republicans draw their esteem from the status and position of the group (Haidt, et al., 2009) and so, how much their values match the group values cannot alone explain embeddedness for this group.

To examine this further, the focus group data showed a demand for representation was a theme across the Republican, Leave and Remain groups. For the Leavers and Republicans, they were motivated by a want to feel more represented by the national identity and political leaders and voted in line with this motivation. For the Remainers, they talked about how the outcome of the vote meant they felt less represented by the new direction and definition of the national identity of the UK, a motivation that pushed for the definition of the Remain group, driving a shift into identity establishment. Whilst this can be explained by the Remain and Leave groups being newly-created, as they have not had enough time to integrate their group and personal identity values, the established Republican group showing the same pattern counters this. Yet, considering the context that Republicans were not the group in power,

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

perhaps here then, the Republicans had separated their personal from group identity to deal with the lower status of their group. An alternative view is provided through positive distinction theory, which outlines how to continue to draw esteem from one's group even if that group are not the group in power. The theory suggests one's personal esteem can be protected if they compare their group upon factors other than the group status.

Taken together, the findings from the survey and focus groups show the Democrats have embedded their personal and group identities as represented by their scored value similarity and definitions of the national identity as a "*melting pot*" accepting of all. This supports the narrative presented by the moral foundations theory that Democrats draw their esteem from how well they as individual group members represent the identity of the group. My findings suggest the Republicans show less feelings of belonging. But upon further inspection, this is explained by their group status prior to the vote (when the data was collected), their aims to change the status quo, their choice of a non-politician as group leader and their feelings of a lack of representation by the national identity that was being structured by the Democratic leader at the time. My findings also show evidence that newly-created groups, whilst showing evidence of group belonging, need to become more established in order to embed their group and personal identities. This is further support that the UK-EU groups act as newly created and began as task-focused, and that the US groups are established. Thus feelings of belonging are impacted by the purpose of the group.

7.1.5 Summary of key findings

Comparing the two Cases of the UK-EU Referendum and the US Election of 2016 expands our understanding of the process of identity formation in these contests, how that identity impact intergroup perceptions, and how intergroup perceptions impact group decision making. The findings show evidence that Leavers are task-focused, the Remainers are shifting to being identity-focused, and both the Republicans and Democrats are identity-focused. The findings

also show group purpose interacts with the foundations and drivers that structure the group to determine how these groups are linking values that structure the groups to the extent to which they are identifying with their own and competing groups. The findings show evidence that competing political groups are similar in the values they see as important for their group, but because of this, they perceive greater intergroup differences than there are. This was across all groups regardless of their focus or establishment, suggesting group categorisation alone is enough to elicit this bias. Finally, the findings show that Democrats have integrated their personal and group identities, Republicans, as the group aiming to shift the status quo at the time, and with their feelings of being unheard and unrepresented by the national identity of the time, had not linked their personal and group values at the time of the elections, and the Leave and Remain group had not yet integrated their personal and group identities as they had not had that time to establish and build that link. These impact intergroup perceptions and the activation of mechanisms of social groups dynamics, for instance, the potential to restructure the focus of the identity of the group, perceptions of greater intergroup differences than there are, differences in how one identifies with those they are in competition with, and how much group members feel they belong and represent, as well as are represented, by the group.

7.2 My contribution

Other studies have examined the role of identity in models explaining political decision making and behaviour (Monroe et al., 2000; Huddy, 2001). Yet, whilst the understanding of social identity has been applied to political contexts, few studies have examined this at the level of political intergroup contexts (Huddy, 2001), whilst in the heightened state of group competition, within groups belonging to different types of political competition. The design of my thesis was to examine not only group member's perceptions of their own group, but also to assess their perceptions of their competing group. This is novel in the body of literature that has assessed these the UK-EU Referendum and US Election of 2016 because it adds a

previously un-investigated perspective from which to view the Republicans, Democrats, and the Leavers and Remainers, that is the intergroup perspective. I take this further by delving deeper into the meaning and understanding of this intergroup perspective held by high identifiers of political voting group members to provide evidence to my argument that identity is complex and should be considered at its multiple levels when we investigate political groups.

7.2.1 My contribution to Political Psychology

This thesis supplements the existing research in the field of political psychology. It confirms the important role of identity in present day politics (Cohen, 2003; Haidt et al., 2009; Vyver et al., 2018), by testing complex groups with complex identities in the contexts of the US Election and EU Referendum held in the UK. The findings in this thesis have also expanded upon models in the political psychology literature by integrating an intergroup perspective into the models comparing competing political groups. For instance, the understanding from moral foundations theory is that the values of the group will differ between different types of political groups. My thesis suggests that whilst partisanship is important, the establishment of the identity of the groups in question may also impact how foundational values are internalised by the group and are visible at an intergroup level. This finding creates the opportunity to develop new models, such that measure differences between partisan groups as moderated by intergroup identification and bias perceptions of the group. Now that we see a link between motivations and decision making and intergroup perceptions, future research can examine the impact that these perceptions of intergroup differences has on predicting behaviour in a political context. Furthermore, past literature (e.g. Abramowitz & Webster, 2016; Ashcroft & Bevir, 2016; Hobolt, 2016) has mostly examined the impact of national identification on voting decisions and behaviour rather than comparing perceptions of voting motivation and group belonging between competing voting groups. In line with the literature, the focus groups in this thesis have raised that the lack of feeling represented is a common theme across these

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

groups. Therefore, what this thesis adds is that the goals of the group are impacting their perceptions of belonging and feelings of representation, which in turn affects their intergroup perceptions too.

7.2.2 My contribution to Social Identity Theory

This thesis provides the opportunity to test theory that is widely used from within the social psychology literature in arguably complex groups with complex identities (Huddy, 2001). This allows for the validity and reliability of this highly applied model to be tested in the context of two similar political events across groups with different identity structures and group aims (Hornsey, 2008). The findings presented in this thesis align with past literature in that there are intergroup differences between political groups but also shows evidence that bias is also driving these difference perceptions. By applying Lickel et al.'s work to differing political contests, there is evidence for the important role that the context of the identity plays not only in intergroup perceptions of social groups, but also intergroup perceptions of political groups held by the group members themselves.

Social identity theory posits that ingroup members strive to increase status and esteem of the group at the detriment or disregard of the outgroup. I found that this pattern is visible in the Republican and Remain groups but not as strongly in the Democrat and Leave groups. Therefore, my findings show that in political groups, perceptions of identification towards one's own and one's competing group interacts with the focus of the group (how established the identity of the group is determined by if it is identity-focused or task-focused; Lickel et al., 2001), and the type of political competition (if it is a cyclic or singular event), as well as the foundational structures that build the group and goals of the group. This shows support to extend the social identity theory when it is applied as a tool to understand the group dynamics of political competing groups. Therefore, future research in the area should include controls

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

for context of group type and purpose (Lickel et al., 2000, 2001) and group foundations/motivations when assessing intergroup differences and how they impact perceptions of belonging and identification with political groups.

7.2.3 My contribution to understanding contemporary political events

This thesis examined the additional role of group identity as an explanatory factor of the political events of the UK-EU Referendum and the US Presidential Election of 2016, viewing this through intergroup perceptions of voting group members. This is motivated to understand the role that group identity plays in political contexts and to outline the importance of the process of identity formation in these contexts. The findings of this thesis suggest that there is an interaction with the purpose/focus of the group (Lickel, et al., 2001) and the foundational structures of the group (Haidt, et al., 2009) as well as how that group is deriving meaning from the values that structure it. These impact intergroup perceptions and the activation of mechanisms of social groups dynamics, for instance, the potential to restructure the focus of the identity of the group, perceptions of greater intergroup differences than there are, differences in how one identifies with those they are in competition with, and how much group members feel they belong and represent, as well as are represented, by the group. Below I discuss the implications of this for each of the political events that have focused this thesis and how this can be carried forward to policy recommendations.

7.2.3.1 The US Presidential Election as an example of established political identities

The findings in this thesis support that established groups (i.e., Republicans and Democrats) are identity-focused (Lickel et al., 2001) but that this can manifest in different ways depending on the structure of the group. With the Republicans we saw higher ingroup and lower outgroup identification as compared to the Democrats. But from past literature, we understand that Republicans can draw their esteem and so feelings of group belonging and identification from

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

the status of the group, whereas Democrats tend to draw esteem from how well they represent the values and identity of their group, which is supported in this thesis. This is further supported by the finding that Democrats show a greater match between their own and group values, more so than Republicans did. Therefore, the findings of this thesis are supportive of the merger between the group purpose and moral foundations literature. The implications of this are that we can understand more about what motivates political decision making and behaviour from an identity perspective that accounts for the structure and goals of the group.

Consequently, there are several themes to address that might help to build towards bridging partisanship divides. Firstly, the findings in this thesis provides evidence towards the hypothesis that Democrats hold how well they represent the values of their group as most important, whereas the Republicans hold how well they feel represented by the national identity. It suggests that one pathway to mediating the political divide in the USA is to develop dual pathways to ensuring feelings of representation. Applying this to political debates, leaders need to outline not only how they represent the values of the group, but also how they will represent the people they will lead to address the needs of both Democrats and Republicans, rather than to gain favour with their own group. Another key point to address is the different perspectives from which these groups are viewing the national identity. Republicans have based their group identity upon how well they represent the constitution. Democrats have based their group identity on acceptance of diverse cultures into their group. This becomes a further narrative to tackle that is encouraging the divide.

In this thesis, I have shown there are greater perceptions of intergroup differences in the values held as important for Democrats and for Republicans than there are differences in the values of importance to each of these groups. One way we can apply this is to work to get these groups to understand the importance of one another's perspective. But we must also

address the increased perceptions of intergroup differences, this can be done through intergroup contact, collaboration and cohesion (Turner et al., 1987). Therefore, there are changes that can be made at a leadership level, at a group level and at an individual perception level to begin to bridge the divides in USA politics.

7.2.3.2 The UK- EU Referendum as an example of newly-created political identities

I found that newly created groups (i.e., Leave and Remain) are task-focused (Lickel et al., 2001), but a shift in the status quo causing a shift in the status of a group can motivate the shift from task to identity focus. With the Leavers we saw lower ingroup identity and higher outgroup identity as compared to the Remainers. Drawing upon the group purpose debate (Lickel et al., 2001), this is explained as the Leave group maintaining a focus on the task and so identifying more with the goals of the group rather than with the identity of the group. It also explains how the loss for the Remain campaign, and the drive to maintain the status quo of the national identity was motivation to establish the group identity enough that group members were identifying more with the identity of the group. This is evidenced through the homogeneous views of the Leave campaign as expressed by the Remain participants. It is also evidenced through the lack of similarity between the self and group value ratings of both Leavers and Remainers, indicating they had not yet integrated their personal and group identities.

A further theme to address is that despite the newly created nature of the Leave and Remain groups, like the US groups, they also showed perceptions of greater intergroup differences between values of importance for each group, than there were measured differences in these values. This suggests group categorisation alone, without identity establishment, can elicit perceptions of intergroup differences, and so provides one explanation for intergroup bias held between political voting groups. A hypothesis to examine then, is whether these groups

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

are competing to stay distinct and so have embedded that into the conditions or structure of their identity. One way to bridge the political divide then is to understand more about the processes of identity establishment that are shifting the goals from political action to defending the self-esteem one derives from their political stance, and perhaps compare this to other such single-event political competitions in other nations too.

7.3 Strengths and limitations

7.3.1 Strengths

A strength of my thesis is that the psychological impact of group belonging exists prior to the research at hand. As the design of my thesis is that group members self-select into groups, the effects of group belonging do not need to be imagined or built by the researcher. Although past research has been able to create competitive contexts (for example, Sherif (1961) and his competing summer camp groups), it is valuable to test competition in more natural and real-life settings. It is valuable because this thesis is questioning the ecological validity of classifying the voting categories of the UK- EU Referendum as established voting groups, which in turn asks whether groups at the beginning of their identity consolidation can be compared to groups that are established. It is valuable to assess this in settings that are naturally occurring to assess the diversity of the models drawn upon in this thesis.

Further, in this thesis I argue for the important role that group context and intergroup context is playing on perceptions of intergroup identity in political events. By assessing group members across changes in the context of the political competition, I have been able to assess how these changes are affecting perceptions of political identity too. The complexity of these considerations (Huddy, 2001) creates a strength in the design of this research. It allows us to triangulate data across time and space to examine the impact that complex environments may

have on identity creation and maintenance in political groups at an intragroup and intergroup level.

Another strength is the real time collection of data surrounding these two political events as well as the reflection that is possible with the lapse of time between the survey data collection and the conducted focus groups. In the surveys, data collection occurred within a day or two for each independent sample. This is due to the utilisation of online platforms to collect data and pre-planned dates of data collection surrounding changes in the political competitions. Yet, the context of the competition did not change between participants collected at a single time point. An advantage to this is that groups are being examined in a heightened state of competition. Therefore, the variables being examined reflect a truer measure of the perceptions of the participants as the events were occurring (Weigold et al., 2013). This strengthens the ecological validity of the data collected in this thesis (Langdrige & Hagger-Johnson, 2009). The focus groups on the other hand were all conducted in the month of October in 2021 (4 years after the political votes occurred). This allowed for reflection of group members on the experiences and perceptions of belonging and motivations behind political group formation and behaviour. This is because the state of emotion that was concurrent within the political competition will have changed after it, allowing for retrospective clarity.

7.3.2 Limitations

A key limitation of this thesis is the representativeness of the sample. The survey data specifically shows a bias in that there is a noticeable peak in the ages between 20 and 59. This means younger and older voters are less represented in the survey sample. There were several considerations to mitigate the effects of this. Firstly, I considered adding a sample of the older population. I did not do this in my study because that would involve this information being collected after the points of data collection for this thesis. As the context of the competition

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

was constantly changing with each new piece of information, and this thesis shows that the context of the competition is important. This would have a high impact on perceptions and potentially trigger social desirability issues. This falls under a widely spread issue in research, in that sometimes there are interesting questions that occur after data collection, especially in quickly moving and ever-changing political contexts.

The steps I decided to take to mitigate this problem were twofold. The first step was to add socio-demographic variables as control variables in the statistical models to identify relationships between variables under investigation that were affected by age differences within the sample. I did not find differences in age and gender on scores of social identity, but I did find differences in scores of social values. Specifically, what I found is older participants had higher ratings of value scores. What this means is that there may be differences in how values are representing the identities of older participants or of how values link to perceptions of intergroup identification. Therefore, this is an important point to consider when using such information for future avenues of research and understanding. My word of caution here is that with no older participants to compare them to, it is risky to apply the conclusions from this thesis to the full general population. The second step was to ensure the focus group data had a spread of participants that fit into multiple socio-demographic categories. This is to ensure that the opinions and experiences of those that fit into the categories of older subsections of the population were included in my examination of the concepts of interest.

Another thing to note is that research has been conducted on the political events in question that has examined age as a predictor of voting (Inglehart & Norris, 2016), finding it to be less important than other variables such as values and identification with political cause. Applied to the EU Referendum held in the UK, the research examining the impact of age as a voting predictor could suggest that there may be little difference in between various aged

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

voters, or that the variables of interest hold stronger relationships to voting group identity. The empirical literature that has explored the role of age in the political events of interest in this thesis, paired with the changing nature of the political competition described above, motivated my decision not to collect additional data, post original data collection. I believe that doing so would create a separation in the responses of that which was collected and that which would be collected, that would be difficult to differentiate as to whether any effects found were due to age differences or changes to the status of the group. It does not get rid of the limitation of the generalisability issue in this data. Therefore, caution should be applied to conclusions drawn from the evidence I present in this thesis. Acknowledging this creates the opportunity to learn from the limitations of this thesis for all future avenues of research in this context and in others.

Another limitation to consider is that I used a single item measure of social identity in the survey. I did this because there is evidence that many variables, including identification, can be reliably measured using single item measures. Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007) suggested that there was no difference between single item and multiple item measures of the same variable. I recognise however that my measure could be improved. Typically, studies employ longer scales to measure identification (Postmes et al., 2013). However, these longer scales often pick up on multiple components of the broader concept it is measuring. Yet, Postmes et al (2013) looked at the correlations between the different dimensions of social identity (self-definition, self-investment, centrality, solidarity, satisfaction, self-stereotyping and homogeneity), taken from Leach et al's (2008) multi-item measure of social identity. They concluded that the overlap in the dimensions of social identity created a context where single item measures reliably pick up on the social identity despite the existence of multiple dimensions. Moreover, to account for this, I used a multi-item measure in the focus groups.

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

A further consideration is the movement that occurred between groups as the status of the competition changed between the independent times points of data collection for this thesis. This is because I categorised people based on which group they intended to vote for at the time of data collection (Republican / Democrat / Leave / Remain). This means there was the potential for movement between groups. For instance, there are those who self-categorised as Republicans at the Primary Election that voted for Clinton, and Democrats that voted for Trump at the General Election (Carstens, 2017). Similarly, in the UK- EU Referendum, once the outcome of the event was known, there was need for re-evaluation of the purpose of the voting groups. The Leave campaign aimed to defend their position and the Remain campaign positioned themselves to reject the manifestation of the Leave “win” (Vyver et al., 2018) seeing many opportunities to change or strengthen political stances. The complexity of the identity changes that may have occurred in these groups show support for collating the data from different time points to show that despite such variability in intergroup competition, these groups are identifying in ways that are expected of social groups.

Furthermore, the political environment has changed since the quantitative data collection in 2016/2017 and the qualitative data collection in 2021. Therefore, it is important to consider which changes may have an effect. Since the initial phases of data collection which occurred during and shortly after the political events that focus this thesis, both political outcomes have come to pass. Trump completed his 4-year run in office and the UK left the EU. That alone creates status shifts in the groups that might impact how people are feeling about belonging to the group. The implications of this are that the groups may not be in the same status position as they were when the previous data was collected and so may identify more highly or lowly with that political identity. The method I have adopted to account for this, is to use Huddy et al.’s (Huddy et al., 2015) expressive partisanship identity scale as a condition of

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

participant selection criteria to ensure that those who take part are still highly identifying to their political group identity.

In addition to this, there have been politically driven social movements that have occurred since the 2016 vote. The context of the Covid-19 pandemic has seen an increased reliance on healthcare services amongst many socio-economic changes. The protests triggered by the death of George Floyd centring on ‘Black Lives Matters’ saw a rise in awareness of the systemic racial inequalities that exist in our cultural and socio-political worlds. The ‘Take Back The Night’ movement that occurred in 2021 to stand against sexual and domestic violence gave light to the gender inequalities and increased prevalence of violence during the context of Covid-19. These social movements created awareness, and for some, created change. These social movements also link to many of the same narratives discussed to have impacted the voting behaviour of those who took part in the UK- EU Referendum vote and US Election vote in 2016 (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Holden, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Kaufmann, 2016; Bor, 2017; Crandall et al., 2018; Liberini et al., 2017; Major et al., 2018; Pettigrew, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2018).

The point here is that these events may have created political shifts, if not at a macro-level, then at least in terms of the perspectives of potential voters. Therefore, it is important to consider that changes in the political environment that have occurred between 2016 and 2021, might have knowingly or unknowingly have impacted the identity of the groups and group members that belonged to those political events. Whilst I do ask questions on how the identity of these groups change over time as a part of the focus group schedule, it is important to account for the impact of such social changes. Again, utilising Huddy’s partisanship identity scale to ensure that those who take part are still highly identifying to their political group identity was adopted to account for this. Asking questions about change and focusing on high identifiers provides awareness of this outlined bias but does not fully eradicate the risk of perspective

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

changes that have occurred between the quantitative and qualitative data collection. Readers should be mindful of this when accessing the findings and conclusions drawn from this thesis.

7.3.3 Personal considerations and reflections

This section is dedicated to outlining the ways in which I as the researcher may have impacted the themes and conclusions drawn from this project, and any accountancies made for such. This information is to be considered alongside the main findings of this thesis, especially if such findings are to be applied.

Taking political biases first, we can note that I was a voter in one of these political events. This means I belong to one of the groups that I am assessing the identity within. I have strived to separate myself as a researcher from that identity as I am assessing said group as well as the competing one. Yet, it is possible that some biases in the application of theories to understand the patterns of analysis and findings might impact the conclusions I have drawn from this research. However, such inferences have been reviewed by my research team. It is also possible that biases in my interpretations of the qualitative themes might occur, however the accountancies listed above aim to eradicate the potential of this. Additionally, I created the focus group schedule based on my interpretation of the findings and themes I have identified in the literature and stuck to this schedule across all focus groups I conducted. Similarly, it had been checked by my research team and a qualitative research expert that the questions are not leading nor biased in the favour of any of the groups.

Another point to consider is that I visibly belong to an ethnic minority group. As racism and immigration centred many of the political debates that constructed these events (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Whitehead et al., 2018), it is important to consider the impact that my presence may have on those who are talking about their motivations behind voting. Whilst the quantitative data is anonymous, the participants in the focus groups will have seen me as the researcher and facilitator of the focus groups. This could elicit a social desirability or

participant bias. Similarly, my gender identity was also perceptible to the participants in the focus groups, which might also have an impact on opinions shared, as well as assumptions about my age. Another consideration is that I am British, and I have a British accent, this might bring comfort to those questioned about the EU-Referendum but may categorise me as an “outsider” or non-group member to those in the US election groups, thus impacting what is shared within the focus groups. One method to address this is to use additional facilitators belonging to multiple socio-demographic categories to test whether this bias exists however, the limited timeframe of the research collection for the duration of this project will not allow for such adjustments. Therefore, I consider those reading the themes to be mindful of the triggers or restrictions of the data that may be presented in this case. As there are themes in the past literature on this topic, it is important to consider the potential for these biases in information and opinions shared in the focus groups. It may mean that certain themes and explanations for patterns of decision-making and behaviour are hidden, or that some are focused on more prevalently. Either way, this research alone does not provide the full model to explain the political events of 2016 that have focused this thesis.

7.4 Future Avenues of Research

One potential research pathway is to evaluate the establishment of a political group identity before understanding how political identities can impact political decision making and behaviour. One can examine group establishment by measuring the strength of identification (Huddy et al., 2015) and duration of existence of competing group identities as a precursor to focusing on intergroup differences. From another perspective, one can examine various political groups from an array of cultural contexts, varying from groups that are established in the social system to those that are created motivated by social action to drive social change amongst other countries and different political systems. This is to test whether culture interacts with identity establishment to impact intergroup bias perceptions. Assessing cultural

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

differences will extend our understanding of the process of political group identity development so that the impact of such identification can be investigated further to include how the group identity impacts political decision making and behaviour.

Another research pathway is to consider intergroup bias processes when attempting to understand the implications of perceptions of intergroup differences and the effects these perceptions have on group behaviour and intergroup communication and harmony. One of the main takeaway messages from this thesis is that bias is a factor interacting with perceptions of political group members in these two political events. Participants have experienced bias and participants perceived greater intergroup difference than there actually is, suggesting they are activating bias processes too. This needs to be added to the literature that is examining what motivates people to vote for one group over another. Intergroup bias should be controlled for when assessing intergroup differences.

Further, we can assess what is motivating belonging to political groups and how that impacts intergroup perceptions. Hobolt (2016) raised the point that the result of the UK- EU Referendum could be motivated by one or both of two reasons, the first reflecting true beliefs towards membership of the European Union, and the second reflecting a dissatisfaction with the current government, a way for the people to re-establish the link between the identity of the group and those that lead the group. This discussion is reflected in the themes presented by the qualitative findings in this thesis and suggests two social identity pathways. The first is a vote between two identities representing two separate value structures, and the second is a social group fighting against the way in which the group's identity is currently represented. This could be done by measuring identification in a survey, from the perspective of the group identity and identification with the aims of the group, i.e., to promote the ingroup leader or to change the social system. Controlling for this support will allow us to test whether there are differences in

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

identification perceptions between those who vote for the aims and policies of their own group and those who are willing to vote for the aims of their competing group.

Another important point that was raised in the discussion of the findings is that concepts driving motivation for political group belonging can be interpreted in different ways. Earlier, I discussed how the values of Fairness/Morality could be interpreted differently between the Remain and Leave campaign groups, this was supported by the focus group data that showed the groups were often on different sides of the same coin when it came to judging the motivations and values of each other. Therefore, future research should consider how different groups are defining key motivators of group belonging and political group action, such as values that are driving the group, as well as the national identity and feeling represented. To do this, one can examine first how group members are defining national identity, and representation, as well as values that are important to the group, this is to derive meaning behind the answers given. Then, these concepts can be tested to assess intergroup differences in understanding as well as perceptions on the key variables. This is all to assess if cognitively, there are differences in understanding of the main drivers motivating these groups.

The idea of considering cognition also stems from the examination of the concept of “*issues voting*” that was risen in the focus groups of this thesis. The focus groups data showed that the Leave and Republican groups show a preference for a focus on individual issues, arguably presenting a more analytic cognitive style. That is, they focused on single issues they wanted to resolve with their vote when asked why they voted as they did. Whereas the Remain and Democratic focus groups showed a preference for viewing the “*whole picture*”, indicative of holistic cognitive techniques. That is, they focused on broad constructs of connection and collective to define their motivations behind their vote. From within cross-cultural psychology, this concept is known as global vs local processing (Nisbett, 2004). It raises the question as to

whether there is a link between more global cognitive processing styles and collective focus and more liberal thinking. Perhaps the values of the individual and the group that structure the identity of the group are supplemented by how these group members are thinking about the link between the group identity and group aims. Perhaps there is a local and global processing focus that is mediating the relationship between political identity and political belonging and political behaviour. To assess this, one could examine how cognitive thinking styles link to voting motivations and bias activation, to create a model of understanding as to why voters vote as they do and how this is impacted by group identity and group belonging.

7.5 General Conclusion

Group identification can be a powerful and motivating tool for understanding human interaction. From this thesis, we understand that identity can shift from being task-focused to identity-focused, that being identity-focused can look different depending on the foundational structure of the group, that regardless of group establishment, group categorisation alone is enough to perceive greater intergroup differences than those that are empirically measurable and that all of this interacts to determine the integration of political group and personal identities. This creates a context whereby, despite the outcomes of the political events coming to pass, the group identities belonging to either side of the political competition are still at war.

The contexts of political competition are important determiners of the ways political groups interact and the way these groups behave. If groups are acting in accordance with social groups, then strategies to reduce conflict and instigate cohesion can be socially based. However, if such groups are driven solely by the purpose of the group, then approaches can assess the focus of campaigns and political interaction with values. Finally, if groups are acting in line with the nature of the political competition set up by the political voting system, then political movements can be made to understand and shift the way voters are interacting with

CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION

the system. It is the task of future research to begin to bridge this divide between research and real-world experience so that we might begin to answer such remaining questions.

To conclude, this thesis has provided an insight into the intergroup perceptions of identity and identity structure in the groups belonging to the UK-EU referendum and the USA elections, showing group identity perceptions have an impact on intergroup differences and voting group identity consolidation. These are important factors affecting assessments of intergroup differences and perceptions.

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9. APPENDICES

Table contents

Table A1 – means and sd for age between time point and voting group for the US Election	pg 166
Table A2 – frequencies for gender by time point for the US Election	pg 166
Table A3 – frequencies for ethnicity by time point for the US Election	pg 166
Table A4 – Age totals and percentages in US General Population and Sample Time points	pg 167
Table A5 – Gender percentages in US General Population and Sample Time points	pg 168
Table A6 – Ethnicity totals and percentages in US General Population and Sample Timepoints	pg 168
Table B1 – means and standard deviations for age between time point and voting group for the UK- EU Referendum	pg 170
Table B2 – frequencies for gender by time point for the UK- EU Referendum	pg 170
Table B3 – frequencies of ethnicity by time point for the UK- EU Referendum	pg 170
Table B4 – Age totals and percentages in UK General Population and Sample Time points	pg 171
Table B5 – Gender percentages in UK General Population and Sample Time points	pg 172
Table B6 – Ethnicity totals and percentages in UK General Population and Sample Timepoints	pg 172
Table D1 – Post hoc t-tests comparing Value Ratings between political groups	pg 177
Table E1 - Focus group participant information	pg 180

Appendix 1 - Case 1 – the United States Presidential Election

In this section I ran a series of analyses to assess the representativeness of the US sample. I have outlined below how at each point of data collection the sample is not representative of the general population, yet, by compiling the data together results in a more representative sample.

In the US, 93.3% of participants at time 1 and 89.9% at time 2 were under the age of 50 years old. The gender balance was equal at time 1 and had 10% more men at time 2. The majority of the participants were white (71.88%).

To assess whether the samples were comparable across different time points of data collection, I conducted a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA), with age as the dependent variable and time point and voting group as fixed factors. There was a main effect of Time point $F(1, 597) = 9.939, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .016$, and a main effect of Voting group $F(1, 597) = 13.180, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .022$, but no interaction effect of Time point and Voting group $p = .524$. I also ran a Levene's test to check the homogeneity of variances in age at each Time point, $F(3, 597) = 3.831, p = .010$, therefore the variances of Age between Time points are not equal. The average age varied at each time point and between voting groups but not at the intersection of the two. This variation in age suggests that age should be controlled for in the analysis to ensure that it is not an influencing factor of the patterns found in the main analysis.

Next, again for the US election, chi squared tests were conducted to assess whether there are differences between gender and between ethnicity at the different time points. There is a significant relationship between gender and time point $\chi^2(1, 600) = 5.269, p = .022$.

There is a significant relationship between ethnicity and time point $\chi^2(9, 596) = 37.092, p < .001$. The data at the different time points is not comparable to one another. Doing cross time point comparison would not produce reliable conclusions.

Table A1 – means and sd for age between time point and voting group for the US Election

Time point	Voting Group	m (sd)
Time 1	Democrat	29.97 (8.196)
	Republican	33.69 (10.890)
	Total	31.59 (9.612)
Time 2	Democrat	33.28 (10.069)
	Republican	35.89 (10.293)
	Total	34.66 (10.259)
Total	Democrat	32.06 (9.544)
	Republican	35.26 (10.495)
	Total	33.66 (10.147)

Table A2 – frequencies for gender by time point for the US Election

		Time point		
		Time 1	Time 2	Total
Gender	Male	98	242	340
	Female	98	162	260
Total		196	404	600

Table A3 – frequencies for ethnicity by time point for the US Election

		Time point		Total
		Time 1	Time 2	
Ethnicity	Caucasian	127	300	427
	Black	12	22	34
	Hispanic	28	19	47
	Asian	15	47	62
	White/Latina	1	0	1
	Biracial	3	0	3
	European	2	3	5
	Native American	2	8	10
	Mexican	4	0	4
	Mixed	0	1	1
Total		194	400	594

I compared sociodemographic details from the most recent US census data at the time of data collection, and the demographic information from within my data set. I did this to assess how representative my sample was of the general population it aims to represent. Notably, when compared to the census data from the general population, the percentage of people belonging to each ethnicity group has some variation. For example, whilst the general population of the US had 72% of a White ethnicity, the sample had 66% at time 1 and 75% at time 2. Additionally, the general census showed 12.66% of the population was Black, compared to the lower percentages in the sample (T1 = 6.20% and T2 = 5.50%). Moreover, US census outlined 49% of the population was male and 51% female. At Time 1 for US Election (Case 1), the sample was 50% female and 50% male. But at Time 2 for Case 1, the sample was 59.50% male and 40.10% female. Appendix 1 displays the breakdown of means used to conduct these tests.

Table A4 – Age totals and percentages in US General Population and Sample Time points

AGE	US GEN POP		US T1		US T2	
	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Total	323,127,513		196		405	
15 to 19 years	21,129,999	6.54%	2	1%	1	0.20%
20 to 24 years	22,381,028	6.93%	42	21.50%	37	10.20%
25 to 29 years	22,890,884	7.08%	63	31.10%	83	27.90%
30 to 34 years	21,786,359	6.74%	33	16.90%	107	26.70%
35 to 39 years	20,773,905	6.43%	24	12.30%	49	12.10%
40 to 44 years	19,696,251	6.10%	13	6.60%	26	6.40%
45 to 49 years	20,947,623	6.48%	5	2.50%	29	7.20%
50 to 54 years	21,839,056	6.76%	5	2.50%	18	4.50%
55 to 59 years	21,980,108	6.80%	4	2%	12	2.90%
60 to 64 years	19,483,036	6.03%	4	2%	9	2.10%
65 to 69 years	16,820,083	5.21%	1	0.50%	3	0.70%
70 to 74 years	11,810,247	3.65%	0	0%	1	0.20%
75 to 79 years	8,367,895	2.59%	0	0%	0	0%
80 to 84 years	5,865,639	1.82%	0	0%	0	0%
85 years and over	6,380,331	1.97%	0	0%	0	0%

Table A5 – Gender percentages in US General Population and Sample Time points

GENDER	US GEN POP		US T1		US T2	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
	49%	51%	50%	50%	59.50%	40.10%

Table A6 – Ethnicity totals and percentages in US General Population and Sample Timepoints

Ethnicity	US GEN POP		US T1		US T2	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
White alone	234,644,039	72.62%	127	65.50%	300	75%
Black or African American alone	40,893,369	12.66%	12	6.20%	22	5.50%
American Indian and Alaska Native alone	2,676,399	0.83%	2	1%	8	2.00%
Asian alone	17,556,935	5.43%	15	7.70%	47	11.80%
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone	595,986	0.18%				
Some other race alone	16,334,352	5.06%	34	17.50%	22	5.60%
Two or more races:	10,426,435	3.23%	4	2.00%	1	0.30%
Two races including Some other race	1,543,301	0.48%				
Two races excluding Some other race, and three or more races	8,883,134	2.75%				

Appendix 2 – Case 2 – the European Union Referendum in the UK

In this section I ran a series of analyses to assess the representativeness of the UK sample. I have outlined below how at each individual time point of data collection, the sample is not representative of the general population. Yet, I also outlined that compiling the data together results in a more representative sample.

In the UK sample, 93.3% of participants at Time 1, 89.3% at Time 2 and 90.5% of participants at Time 3 were under the age of 50 years old. There were more men in the sample collected at time 1 (65.77%) and time 2 (77.65%), but more women at time 3 (57.11%). The majority of the participants were white (88.39%).

I conducted a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA), with age as the dependent variable and time point and voting group as fixed factors. There was a main effect of time point $F(2, 607) = 4.202, p = .015, \eta_p^2 = .014$, there was no main effect of voting group, $p = .834$, and no significant effect of time point and voting group, $p = .480$. Post hoc comparison revealed that the significant differences were between time 1 and time 3 ages $p = .022$, suggesting these two time points are less comparable. I also ran a Levene's test to check the homogeneity of variances in age at each time point, $p = .283$, therefore the variances between time point of age are equal. The spread of the age does not differ too much at each time point.

Chi squared tests were conducted to assess whether there are differences between gender and between ethnicity at the different time points. There is a significant relationship between gender and time point $\chi^2(4, 614) = 47.151, p < .001$. There was no significant relationship between ethnicity and time point $p = .209$. Appendix 2 displays the breakdown of means used to conduct these tests. Given this variation of gender, there are considerable difficulties in interpreting effects of time point. Given this, I decided to compile the time points of data collection into one single data set.

Table B1 – means and standard deviations for age between time point and voting group for the UK- EU Referendum

Time Point	Voting Group	m (sd)
Time 1	Leave	30.97 (8.652)
	Remain	30.59 (10.500)
	Total	30.78 (9.602)
Time 2	Leave	32.88 (10.037)
	Remain	34.90 (11.038)
	Total	33.88 (10.528)
Time 3	Leave	34.01 (10.877)
	Remain	33.00 (10.201)
	Total	33.42 (10.482)
Total	Leave	33.01 (10.236)
	Remain	32.70 (10.419)
	Total	32.84 (10.331)

Table B2 – frequencies for gender by time point for the UK- EU Referendum

		Time Point			Total
		Time 1	Time 2	Time 3	
Gender	Male	98	66	162	326
	Female	51	19	217	287
	Prefer not to say	0	0	1	1
Total		149	85	380	614

Table B3 – frequencies of ethnicity by time point for the UK- EU Referendum

		Time Point			Total
		Time 1	Time 2	Time 3	
Ethnicity	Caucasian	127	73	341	541
	Black	6	4	5	15
	Asian	14	4	20	38
	Biracial	0	0	7	7
	European	2	1	3	6
	Chinese	0	1	3	4
	Prefer not to say	0	0	1	1
Total		149	83	380	612

Moreover, I compared the sociodemographic details from the most recent UK census data at the time of data collection, and the demographic information from within my data set.

Notably, when compared to the census data from the general population, the percentage of people belonging to each ethnicity group has some variation. The general population of the UK had 80% White population according to the census. But the sample varied from being similar to less representative of that group ($T_1 = 55\%$, $T_2 = 88\%$, $T_3 = 89\%$). In addition, the sample of this thesis sometimes had great numbers of ethnic minority group members than the general population of the UK. For example, the population then consisted of 1.50% of Asians, but the sample was much more at each time point of data collection ($T_1 = 9.4\%$, $T_2 = 4.8\%$, $T_3 = 5.3\%$). The similarity is also apparent with the gender distribution between the general population and some of the time points of data collection. The UK census of 2011 outlined that like the US, 49% of the population was male and 51% female. At Time 1 and 2 for Case 2, there were more males than females (T_1 male = 65.80%, T_2 males = 77.60%) but more females than males at Time 3 (T_3 female = 57.10%).

Table B4 – Age totals and percentages in UK General Population and Sample Time points

AGE	UK Gen Pop		UK T1		UK T2		UK T3	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
All ages	56,075,912		150		88		390	
Age 18 to 19	1,460,156	2.60%	10	6.70%	3	3.60%	15	4.00%
Age 20 to 24	3,807,245	6.79%	32	21.30%	12	14.40%	62	16.40%
Age 25 to 29	3,836,609	6.84%	37	24.80%	17	20.40%	88	23.30%
Age 30 to 34	3,683,915	6.57%	27	18.00%	19	22.80%	71	17.80%
Age 35 to 39	3,732,161	6.66%	16	10.70%	14	16.70%	48	12.70%
Age 40 to 44	4,099,089	7.31%	15	10.00%	5	6.00%	38	10.10%
Age 45 to 49	4,100,526	7.31%	3	2.00%	4	4.80%	22	5.90%
Age 50 to 54	3,601,694	6.42%	5	3.30%	6	7.20%	18	4.80%
Age 55 to 59	3,183,915	5.68%	5	3.40%	3	3.60%	8	2.10%
Age 60 to 64	3,377,162	6.02%	0	0.00%	1	1.20%	8	2.10%
Age 65 to 69	2,674,161	4.77%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	2	0.60%
Age 70 to 74	2,178,672	3.89%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Age 75 to 79	1,777,547	3.17%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Age 80 to 84	1,338,005	2.39%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%

Age 85 and over	1,254,688	2.24%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
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Table B5 – Gender percentages in UK General Population and Sample Time points

GENDER	US GEN POP		UK T1		UK T2		UK T3	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
	49%	51%	65.80%	34.20%	77.60%	22.40%	42.60%	57.10%

Table B6 – Ethnicity totals and percentages in UK General Population and Sample Timepoints

Ethnicity	UK Gen Pop		UK T1		UK T2		UK T3	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
White - British	45134686	80.50%	127	55.20%	73	88%	341	89.70%
White - Irish	531087	0.90%						
White - Gypsy or Irish Traveller	57680	0.10%						
White - Any other	2485942	4.40%	2	1.30%	1	1.20%	3	0.80%
Mixed - White and Black Caribbean	426715	0.80%						
Mixed - White and Black African	165974	0.30%						
Mixed - White and Asian	341727	0.60%					7	1.80%
Mixed - Any other	289984	0.50%						
Asian - Indian	1412958	2.50%						
Asian - Pakistani	1124511	2%						
Asian - Bangladeshi	447201	0.80%						
Asian - Chinese	393141	0.70%			1	1.20%	3	0.80%
Asian - Any other	835720	1.50%	14	9.40%	4	4.80%	20	5.30%
Black - African	989628	1.80%						
Black - Caribbean	594825	1.10%						
Black - Any other	280437	0.50%	6	4.00%	4	4.80%	5	1.30%
Other - Arab	230600	0.40%						
Other - Any other	333096	0.60%						

Appendix 3 – Questionnaire

Here is the setup of the questionnaire that participants were presented with. The survey varied depending on which voting group the participant self-selected into. This could have been Republican or Democrat for those in the US Election case, or Leave or Remain for those in the UK- EU Referendum case.

The below questionnaire is an example of one filled out by a self-identified Democrat in the US Election.

Here is the questionnaire:

To what extent did you identify with other Democrats?

Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Moderately	Very Much
1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

To what extent did you identify with Republicans?

Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Moderately	Very Much
1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

There is a list of social values below. To what extent do you feel that Democrats embody these values? Use the scale to indicate your response from 1 being not at all and 5 being very much.

Value	1 – not at all	2	3	4	5 – very much
A Comfortable Life	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
An Exciting Life	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A Sense Of Accomplishment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A World At Peace	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A World Of Beauty	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Equality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Family Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Freedom	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Happiness	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Inner Harmony	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mature Love	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Pleasure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Salvation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self-Respect	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social Recognition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
True Friendship	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wisdom	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ambitious	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Broadminded	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capable	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cheerful	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clean	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Courageous	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

APPENDICES

Forgiving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Helpful	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Honest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Imaginative	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Independent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Intellectual	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Logical	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Loving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Obedient	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Polite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Responsible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self-Controlled	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

There is a list of social values below. To what extent do you feel that Republicans embody these values? Use the scale to indicate your response from 1 being not at all and 5 being very much.

Value	1 – not at all	2	3	4	5 – very much
A Comfortable Life	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
An Exciting Life	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A Sense Of Accomplishment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A World At Peace	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A World Of Beauty	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Equality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Family Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Freedom	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Happiness	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Inner Harmony	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mature Love	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

APPENDICES

National Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Pleasure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Salvation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self-Respect	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social Recognition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
True Friendship	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wisdom	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ambitious	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Broadminded	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capable	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cheerful	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clean	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Courageous	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Forgiving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Helpful	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Honest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Imaginative	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Independent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Intellectual	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Logical	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Loving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Obedient	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Polite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Responsible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self-Controlled	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

There is a list of social values below. To what extent do you feel that you yourself embody these values? Use the scale to indicate your response from 1 being not at all and 5 being very much.

Value	1 – not at all	2	3	4	5 – very much
A Comfortable Life	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
An Exciting Life	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A Sense Of Accomplishment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A World At Peace	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A World Of Beauty	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Equality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Family Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Freedom	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Happiness	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Inner Harmony	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mature Love	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Pleasure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Salvation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self-Respect	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social Recognition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
True Friendship	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wisdom	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ambitious	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Broadminded	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capable	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cheerful	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Clean	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Courageous	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Forgiving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Helpful	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Honest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Imaginative	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Independent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Intellectual	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Logical	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Loving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Obedient	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Polite	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Responsible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self-Controlled	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Age _____

Gender Male Female Other _____ Prefer not to say (coded into female 1, male 0)

Education _____ (coded into higher education 1, lower than that 0)

Appendix 4

Table D1 – Post hoc t-tests comparing Value Ratings between political groups

		<i>Social-focus</i>		<i>Fairness/ morality</i>		<i>Self-focus</i>		<i>Life aspirations</i>	
<i>Campaign Value</i>	<i>Campaign Value</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Republican Ingroup</i>	<i>Republican Outgroup</i>	6.086 (581)	.000	4.134 (578)	.000	9.179 (567)	.000	7.842 (585)	.000
<i>Democrat Ingroup</i>	<i>Democrat Outgroup</i>	12.525 (591)	.000	14.442 (589)	.000	11.956 (586)	.000	4.453 (598)	.000

<i>Republican Ingroup</i>	<i>Democrat Ingroup</i>	-2.811 (583)	.352	-2.811 (583)	.005	.619 (577)	.536	2.789 (591)	.005
<i>Republican Outgroup</i>	<i>Democrat Outgroup</i>	4.888 (585)	.000	6.987 (548)	.000	2.580 (576)	.010	-2.943 (592)	.346
<i>Leave Ingroup</i>	<i>Leave Outgroup</i>	4.107 (539)	.000	1.099 (528)	.272	5.095 (529)	.000	4.440 (545)	.000
<i>Remain Ingroup</i>	<i>Remain Outgroup</i>	7.661 (681)	.000	10.828 (669)	.000	9.735 (680)	.000	2.529 (688)	.012
<i>Leave Ingroup</i>	<i>Remain Ingroup</i>	.488 (610)	.625	-2.181 (594)	.030	.200 (603)	.842	2.410 (616)	.016
<i>Leave Outgroup</i>	<i>Remain Outgroup</i>	3.557 (610)	.000	6.920 (603)	.000	3.991 (606)	.000	.073 (617)	.942

Note: ** indicates $p < .001$, * indicates $p < .005$

Appendix 5 – focus group information

Recruitment advertisement

We are interested in your views on the political group identities of the EU Referendum held in the UK and the US Election of 2016. If you voted in either of these, and are interested in partaking in a focus group with other members of your voting group, to share your thoughts and ideas for a wider research project, please reach out to

Participant information sheet and Consent form

This study explores perceptions of political identity and motivations to vote in the (US Election/EU Referendum). As a part of the study, you will be asked a series of questions pertaining to the political group you aligned yourself with in the 2016 (UK/US) vote. You will be asked questions about the motivations behind the choice you made, about your beliefs of what the identity of the group consists of, continued support and expectations, as well as your thoughts on bias between political voting groups in competition and the role that the leaders of these groups played. The focus group will consist of up to 10 voters that voted for the same political campaign, this means you will engage only with those who belong to the same voting group as yourself. All responses will be kept confidential, and shall be stored securely in

accordance with University procedures for up to 10 years. The aggregate information will be used as the basis for reporting in scientific/academic writing.

Participation in this research is voluntary, which means that if for any reason you wish to withdrawal from the study, you can do so without penalty. Anyone who wishes to withdraw within two weeks may do so, and every effort will be made to remove their contributions, however, this may not be wholly possible due to the nature of focus group discussions. Finally, if you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact Dr. Tereza Capelos, the academic supervisor for this project.

This focus group is estimated to take approximately an hour.

I have read and understand the above explanation of the research.

- I have had the opportunity to ask any questions that I might have. (If you would like to discuss this further, please contact me, and I will review the information with you.)
- I agree to take part in the above project and I have been informed that I am free to withdraw at any time.

Signed:

Dated:

Debrief

Now that you have completed the focus group, I would like to tell you more about what this information links to and how it feeds into the wider research project. I am writing a PhD thesis focusing on the role of identity in the political events of the EU Referendum held in the UK and the US Election held in 2016. Specifically, I want to extend the current understanding in the literature by exploring what such identities consist of as understood by those who belong to such groups. This understanding will be paired with a quantitative analysis looking at

differences in scores of intergroup identification and social value perceptions to look at where the differences lie between the voting groups and between the voting events.

As outlined in the informed consent, your responses will be kept confidentially in accordance with the university's procedures for 10 years. Information will only be reported in aggregate form, in any academic paper in which it may be cited (including student thesis), so no identifying information would ever be reported about any individual participant. Participation in this research is voluntary, which means that if for any reason you wish to withdrawal from the study, you can do so without penalty. Anyone who wishes to withdraw within two weeks may do so, and every effort will be made to remove their contributions, however, this may not be wholly possible due to the nature of focus group discussions. Finally, any additional questions -- please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Tereza Capelos, the academic supervisor for this project.

Lastly, I would like to give you the opportunity to share any final ideas or suggestions or questions you might have. Thank you again.

Table E1 - Focus group participant information:

Participant	Age	Gender	Ethnicity	Occupation
Remainer 1	50	Male	White	Technical Specialist
Remainer 2	66	Female	British	Author, Administrative Assistant
Remainer 3	27	Female	White British	PhD researcher
Remainer 4	46	Male	Indian	IT Professional
Remainer 5	30	Male	White	Postdoctoral Researcher
Remainer 6	28	Male	White British	Lecturer
Remainer 7	34	Female	Black British Caribbean	Trainee clinical psychologist
Remainer 8	27	Female	White	Trainee Forensic Psychologist
Leaver 1	39	Male	Cornish	M n ng

Leaver 2	35	Male	African	Accountant
Leaver 3	35	Male	Black Brit	Software eng neer
Leaver 4	25	Male	los angeles	IT
Leaver 5	24	Female	White British	PG Student
Leaver 6	61	Male	British	Energy Consultant
Leaver 7	28	Male	Black	Teacher
Leaver 8	25	Male	Black	Automotive
Republican 1	39	male	white	self
Republican 2	29	Male	Mixed	Barber
Republican 3	25	Male	White	Store attendant
Republican 4	22	Male	Mixed	Chef
Republican 5	25	Male	African American	Teacher
Democrat 1	32	Female	White	Sales
Democrat 2	25	Man	Black	Driver
Democrat 3	25	Man	Black	Information technology
Democrat 4	34	M	White	PhD candidate
Democrat 5	34	female	white	administrative assistant
Democrat 6	33	Non-b nary	White	Full time caregiver

Focus group schedule

Group identity focus groups questions:

- Tell me about your views and feelings on the (OWN) *Leave/Remain/Republican/Democrat* campaign.
- Tell me about your views and feelings on the (COMPETING) *Leave/Remain/Republican/Democrat* campaign
- Why did you vote for the campaign that you voted for? Would you vote for the same campaign now?

Prompts: Do you think that people voted for a particular campaign group in 2016, would vote the same now? Why? Do you think their identification with that group has changed? Do you think their values still align with that group?

- What do you think people felt then, and feel now about the outcome of the political event?
- Do you belong to any social groups that you think might have influenced your voting choices? How so?
- How would you define the UK/US identity?
- How do you think the (OWN) *Leave/Remain/Republican/Democrat* campaign aligns with the UK/US identity?
- How do you think the (COMPETING) *Leave/Remain/Republican/Democrat* campaign aligns with the UK/US identity?

Intergroup bias focus group questions:

- What are your views about those who voted for the (OWN) *Leave/Remain/Republican/Democrat* campaign?
 - Who do you think these voters are?
 - Why do you think people voted for this campaign?
- What are your views about those who voted for the (COMPETING) *Leave/Remain/Republican/ Democrat* campaign?
 - Who do you think these voters are?
 - Why do you think people voted for this campaign?
- What are your perceptions of the relationships between those who voted for the *Leave/Remain OR Republican/Democrat* campaigns?

Prompt: Do you think they are or can be from the same social circles?

- What do you think the differences might be between those who voted for *Leave/Remain OR Republican/Democrat campaign?
- What do you think the similarities might be between those who voted for *Leave/Remain OR Republican/Democrat campaign?

Social values focus group questions:

- What values do you think the (OWN) *Leave/Remain/Republican/Democrat* have?
- What values do you think the (COMPETING) *Leave/Remain/Republican/ Democrat* have?
- How do you think the values held by each group align with the aims of the nation?

Focus group analysis codes

Here are the predetermined codes based on expectations from the literature:

- THEME: Group identity and motivations for group belonging (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Turner, 1987; Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Huddy, 2001; Lickel, 2001)
 - Codes for Identity: “us”; “we”; “our group”; “them”; “their group”; others in social circles voted the same; “group”; “represent”; “identify”
 - Codes for Motivations: “immigration”; an indication of national identity, e.g., “make Britain great”; “control...” of resources and finances; “borders”; “sovereign state”; others in social circles voted the same; maintain status quo; “restore”
- THEME: Intergroup difference perceptions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Jost, 2004)
 - Codes for bias: “ingroup is different to outgroup”; “different values”; “different perspectives or way of thinking”; “different goals”; “we are right/they are wrong”; “we are better”; “we are justified”; “we don’t get along”; “we are different”
- THEME: Group core values (Rokeach, 1973; Gecas, 2000; Hitlin, 2003; Goren, 2005; Haidt et al, 2009)
 - Codes for values: expected listing of various values; “equality”; “freedom”;
- THEME: National identification and how that aligns with political group identity (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016)
 - Codes for national identity: “British”; “English”; “American Values/Identity”; “Represented”
- THEME: Identification change over time (Lickel, 2001)

- Codes for identity change: “vote the same/different”; “weaker identity now competition has passed”; “no longer care/relevant”; “still present and important”

From these codes I was able to construct a thematic network that assessed the questions and hypotheses remaining after examination of the quantitative survey data. The analysis plan and specific codes drawn upon are outlined in the next section.

Codes of meaning table:

Democrats	Republicans	Remain	Leave
Easy/obvious choice	America is a Republic	Didn't know much about the campaign	Disagree with feeling of merging together, conglomeration of countries and cultures
Sensible option	Elect those to vote for us	Ignorance encouraged to stay	Overlord power
No other options	America as a democrat representative republic	Now know more	Not seeing diversity
Alignment of personal and part views	Freedom, accountability, transparency	Brexit as a disaster and disruptive	One big separate organisation
Personal liberal views	Government by and for people	Social connection to Europe	Bring change
Clinton too moderate	Trump fresh agenda, fresh eyes	Travelled in Europe	Be in charge
Clinton had qualifications and knowledge and capacity	Trump business history over political	Eu large force for good	Development, expansion, beneficial
More agreement with Clinton than Trump	Good come from Trump presidency	Eu united people, bring together ideas	Voting as privilege
Environmental issues ignored by	Government keep safe and	Trade	Input my own opinion

Republicans - active denial	economy good and get out of our way		
Lying as a part of Republican platform	Always voted Republican	Importance of collective and not isolation	Opportunity to speak
Lie about issues to suit needs	Proud Republican	Brexit big mistake	Express my feelings
Proud Democrat	Admired Republican	Turn back on trading and cultural and social influence	Voting can improve how things are done
Views relaxed over time	Trump as a visionary	Believe in the peace process – reason EU was formed	Change is the cost of change
Was angry	Trump convincing campaign	Freedom of movement	Bring change to the system
Social media fights	Republican less taxes, economic freedom, less regulations	Country trading	Make the system more valuable
Fights with friends	Republican ideas and agenda	Seeing the effects now	Brexit has its pros and cons
Really upset	Republican equality	Empty shelves	Room for expansion, room for development
Inert – disconnected to it	Republican because did not vote for	Know more now than then	Need for change

	Democratic candidate		
Regard for Trump voting friends	Other group has own reasons	Known more could have fought more	Voting would help us
Mixed feelings	Other group proud or love leader	Disaster	Economic advantages
Upset and angry	Right to own choices	Sense of community	Political freedom
Attempt to understand other side perspective	Republican manifesto more convincing	Felt safe	Role in the single market
Difficult to understand other side	They found own manifesto more convincing	Was the norm	Change
Feelings have fluctuated.	Democrats proud of leader	Didn't want to vote for something knew little about	Development expansion of infrastructure
Trump voters are not a monolith	Free country	Uncertainty	Impact on policy making
Different reasons voted for Trump	Right to vote	Travel	No strong feelings towards Remainers
Racist Trump voters	Right to disagree	Trade	Remainer misconceptions about Leave
Difficulty with racism being a section of party identity	Agree to disagree	Unknown effects too	Leave vote rarely to do with race

Change in republican identity	Personal preference	Had a bad education	Leave more thoughtful, political, economic
Identity politics	Issues voter – where leader stands on the issues	Eu was important	Feel misunderstood by Remainers
Civil rights	Candidates not likeable but good on issues.	Knew what it meant and why it was around	Interesting experience with Remainers
Not support leaders who do not support rights for others	Right to own choices	Illogical to move away	Remainers were young people
Nothing against Trump voters	Scandal around Clinton	Working with people from the EU	Perception of young people as liberal
Individual right to own choices	Popular vote versus electoral college	Easy to visit and work in different countries	Didn't fit into that
Angry about support for Trump	Decision based on how she would benefit them	Taking away our freedoms	Feeling isolated at university
Trump making “fucked up” decisions	Want for freedom	Britain is small	No disrespect to the opposition vote
Tried to understand other side	Not good feelings towards Clinton	Good idea for countries to join	Disagree with opposition

Rights to vote	Scandals around the Clintons	Trade	Difficult to engage
Not bad feelings	Don't like politicians telling what they can or can't do	Engage with culture	Remainers annoyed they didn't get the results
Act as a democrat	Politicians think they know better	Travel	Calm because I got the result
Strangers elicit more anger	Clinton authoritarian streak	Voted for children's freedom of movement	Felt aggression from Remainers
Personal relations attempts to understand	"This was or no way"	Passage of people is sensible	Understand why it is frustrating for them
Republican belief in delivery of Trump	Career politicians not intended	Freedom of movement	Remainers unable to accept the vote
Do not research	Make something of yourself, sacrifice for country, service for country	Travel around Europe	Remainers trying to undermine the vote
Believe Trump's speeches	Trump "liked him or they didn't"	Cross boundaries	Confusion
Ignorant and gullible people	Voters from feelings rather than issues	Trade	Shocking they didn't accept it

Realised the error	Self-serving Clinton supporters	Less people in this country doing certain jobs	Remainers behaving as facists
Relationship between sides is bad	Republicans fair opportunity and outcomes	Need those from Europe who want to do those jobs	Remainers had good intentions
Divided nation	A fair change	Vindicated	Bring good change/positive change
Liberal versus conservative same globally	Republican doing better than Democrats	Cruel	Government didn't deliver Brexit we voted for
Divide grew	Politicians in cahoots together	Marginalising	Government bowed to other side
Trump made stronger democrat supporter	Bipartisanship on big issues: national debt, foreign wars, big bills, foreign policy	As a black woman in the UK	Government compromised
Divide in the Republican party	Both sides paid by special interests	Something deeper rooted	Government sell out
Integrity in minority of republicans	Differences between party are on social issues and privacy, personal liberties	Felt uncomfortable	Belong to fishing community
Personal relations attempts to understand	Politicians the same so voted for a non-politician	Question deeper issues during Brexit	Government appeased the Remain campaign

Failure of Trump	Don't want career politicians	Dishonesty	Bring Trump back
No bad intentions towards Trump voters	Partisanship depends on the issue	Fear mongering	Saw something beyond sticking together
Negative perception of Trump voters	Changed relationship between groups	A lot of lies	Wanted recovery
Trump economic failure	Rivalry expected on bad terms	The bus as an example of how lies were put forward and retracted	Walked the decline of this country
Trump not a leader	Change in relationship	People were misguided	Nobody listened
Trump should not be a political option	Democrats trying to outdo Republicans	People believed what they were told	Stop cheap labour
Morally bad at the time	American identity as the constitution – Bill of rights, declaration of independence, the constitution	Brexit as a means to share prejudices	Support our industries
Firm moral opinions at the time	Freedom, liberty	Brexit to send message to government	Nobody was listening

Feelings changed and indifferent now	Restricting unlimited power	Brexit voted by those who felt left out	Influx of cheap labour
Personal network voted for Trump	More than a two party system	Leavers in family	“You’re just racist”
Inertia over time	Special interest	Racist voters	Happened how I said it would
Diffused feelings as a consequence of Trump	Whichever party stands for the constitution	Voters belief in promises made	“I must be racist”
Relaxed attitudes and less judgement now	People that get into politics and people that are in politics	Leavers didn’t want immigrants	Remainer false high and mightiness
Didn’t have the energy	Career politicians	We rely on immigration	Remainers feel they are more inclusive and respectful
Desensitisation of people	Self-interest politicians	Not all Brexiters are racist but all racist are Brexiters	Remainers didn’t speak up
Outraged at the time	Constitution picked at for own goals	Try not to be hostile	Sacred EU
Cyclic nature of politics	Free for the little guy	Teach PM a lesson	EU wasn’t so inclusive and liberal anymore
Difficult to maintain angry/energy	Freedom for people	Thought remain would win	Remainers confused
Republicans are not a monolith	Interest for self or of people they represent	People now regret their vote	Remainers bitter, angry, anti-England

Racist Republicans	Both trying to align to American identity	Campaign founded on lies	Role of the media
Voters of Trump fed up with politics	“politics is a way of discussing”	Government deregulating the banks	Double standards, hypocrisy
Trump as not a politician	Don’t know who will win	Very frustrated	Anti-English agenda
Trump appearing more successful (lies)	Trump over Clinton	Deal to appease both sides	Nothing to do with Brexit or Europe
Voters exhausted with the status quo	Different opponent this time around (2020)	Looking for a win win situation	Deeply bitter, anti-English
Try something new	Clinton less popular	Doesn’t like conservatives	Role of academic environments
Trump targeting poorer communities	Biden had a different campaign to Clinton	Stigma around elderly	Academics protesting Vietnam war
Trump sounding like an idiot	Maintained belief in candidate	Engaged with social media	Civil battles impact world wars
Trump promising to make lives better	Republicans may win	Assumption that elderly voted Leave	Academics against war
Trump promises for jobs	Role of the pandemic	Don’t want to go back to the Empire	If we can deliver what we foresee

Trump making things worse	Vote based on manifesto achievements	Racism	Better jobs, employment, hospitals, NHS
Trump voters having nothing to lose by voting differently	Opinions change	Misinformation	Remainers switching vote
Clinton as a mainstream politician	People change	Freedom of movement	Remainers starting to see
Politician versus Non politician narrative	Change based on puzzle at the time	Stopped social media Brexit engagement	Remainers were short sighted
Racist and bigot Trump supporters	Quality of the people vying for the seat	Hope young people will vote to put us back into the EU	Impact of uncertainty on Remainers
Religious conservative group	What leaders have that will influence voters	Mistrust for the government since Brexit	Remainers comfortable as they were
Hot button issues overlap with views	Self interest of voters	More fact checking now	Outcome was not as negative as Remainers anticipated
Poor with little experience of diversity	Generational voters	Voted for what they thought would happen	People have calmed down
Poor don't care about diversity – not relevant to them	Better system than some other countries	Strange opinions	Both sides feel less strongly

Politician answering the ignored	Democratic society	Attitude towards the truth has changed	It felt intense at the time
Importance of race issues from a moral and ethical standpoint	Power of making a choice	Mistrust the government	Hot topic implications
Promises to make life better	“blessing and not a curse”	Facts are less trustable	Bored of talking about it
Polarisation of Americans		Can’t see improvement	Happy to discuss Brexit
Anger at two party system and America		Engaged with the debate	Happy with choice
No singular American identity		Gave up engaging	Move on now
US unique in size and organisation.		Had one intelligence conversation with a Leaver	Voters happy voting as they did
Lots of different identities.		Some genuine reasons	No reason for malice between both parties
Democratic ideals align with what American identity should be		It’s either factors or emotions, and emotions for some people, seem to win out	All vote for the betterness of us and England
Immigrant nation		Nationalism has been gearing up	Felt different from one another

Melting pot		Undercurrent of racism	Leave voters changing opinion
Encouraging and fostering diversity noble pursuit		Nostalgic for something	People will come together
Democrat is better at diversity		Really backward looking	Witnessed the hardening of the Remain campaign
Immigrants discriminated		Idyllic Britain	Remainers diminished, reduced, condensed
American identity is variable across the country		Leavers felt Britain changed too much in their lifetime	Hardcore opinionized body of people
Trump will win again		Misinformation	Media and Government appeases
Unimpressed by Biden (Present Democratic leader)		Surprise people believed it	Shocked with things happening
No other choice but Biden		Tax avoidance	Negative things said by the other side
Unimpressed by Biden		Protect London	Concerned
Biden disenchanted his voters		Not wanting to be tied to EU rules	Similar mistakes to before WW2
Disappointment in Biden may encourage non-voters		Protest vote	Body of people are not the majority

Biden in the norm of Democratic politicians		Assumed Remain would win	Remainers losing credibility
People would vote the same		Leavers all about people	Remainers clutching at straws
Very close presidential race		Immigration	The role of class
Hope Trump doesn't win		Letting people into our country	Anti-English
Unimpressed by Biden		Overrun by people	Opposition say British identity is multicultural, globalised, new way of thinking
Disappointment in biden may encourage non-voters		Absolutely ridiculous	Opposition involved in cancel culture
One issue voters		Gave up trying	Cancelling English identity
Ignoring other issues if one issue is met		Couldn't talk to them rationally	Leavers want to preserve English identity
Voting to not let someone have power rather than intended leader		Didn't have negative opinions then	Good to preserve individual country identities
Changing of minds voting Trump out of office		Nigel Farage	Other national can be proud of their identity
A leader who understands		Agitating for a position seems bizarre	Remainers endorse identity of other places

Raised hopes by Biden		Present Brexiters are deluded	Remainers involved in cancel culture of English identity
Belief in Biden doing better than Trump		Haven't had the full effects of Brexit	Remainers undermine anything nationalistic
Biden worse than Trump		People who still think it is going great	Both sides believe they represent British identity
Disappointment from Biden		Ideology	Both think they are the right group to represent British identity
Biden has been disappointing		They didn't vote on facts	Double standard
Biden not worse than Trump		We voted on facts, logically, rationally	Perception of wrong to preserve the English identity
Biden has basic level of competence		Leavers as very emotional	Preservation of English identity seen as racist
Crises on Trump administration		Nostalgic	Promoting English identity perceived as a dislike of other cultural identities/inequality
Biden is uninspiring and disappointing		Chalk and cheese	Eu does not represent diversity of identities
Did not believe Trump would deliver		Totally different standpoints	EU is one overall European identity
Believed Biden would deliver		Feel compassion	Double standard
Didn't believe Trump would win		Socio-economic Leavers	Scottish not considered racist or nationalistic

Low expectations for Trump		Majority seem less educated	English people want own country, considered as wrong
Biden underperforming		Just not interested	English identity just as valuable as everyone else's
Biden failing compared to Trump		Brexit ignited interest in politics	Remain believe they represent British identity for different reasons
More open for voting for Trump		Try to feel compassion for people	Fear of domination
Biden has not delivered		"Gammons"	Fear of order
Neutral media platform		Wont get them on side	EU not a good reputation
		They are juxtaposed	English people trying to preserve English culture
		Felt a lot of anger	Fear of being dominated by one another
		People propagating lies	Differences inspire
		Views towards Leavers has changed	Ensure development
		They were lied to by people they should be able to trust	Pride causing separation
		False information	Identity is healthy
		They trusted the government	People are denying identity

		Personal and ideological reasons	Human emotions into a pressure cooker
		Logical argument cant work here	Supressing identity and emotions
		Lot of dissonance – we have cause this and I am not a bad person	Accept that people are different
		Gone from anger and perception of Leavers as liars, to they were misled	Wrong to supress differences
		All have to deal with the consequences	Individual countries are good
		Very angry	Africa as an example of individual countries together
		Comparison of family not moving out of the valleys and going away to university	Celebrate in different ways
		More opinions are changing	Europe could work well under a common group
		Present issues not looked at in the context of Brexit	Europe got too greedy and too controlling

		Dissonance between familiar immigrants and strangers coming over	Europe saying you are all the same
		See individual problems but not the whole picture	British not accepting that sameness
		Retrospective knowledge, could have made better arguments	Remain votes and free movement
		Didn't think it was going to happen	Getting a visa is not that much different
		Responsibility put on Remain voters	Remainers like the idea of freedom
		Feel guilty	Remainers are selfish and greedy
		Could have made more compelling arguments	Remainers not happy with England as their only space
		Not my job, as a member of the public	Remainers are entitled
		Politicians role to made arguments	Remainers as well off and in debt
		Cameron hated by country and aligned with Remain	Remainers like the idea of wealth

		Cameron's choice made remain voters look complicit	Remainers are naïve, oblivious to reality of life
		Not much hope of reconciliation	Fear of change
		Live in Slovakia now	No strong arguments for Remaining – easier than change
		Constant litany of lies	Remainers carry on with status quo
		Willing to lap it up	Remain voters were young, used to EU, didn't know different
		Despair	Remainer narrow focus
		No single British identity	Day to day not affected so stay the same
		Many identities	Stuck with what they knew
		Cross over aspects between identities	Fear of change
		Forced complex identities into two simplified boxes	Role of climate change
		Brexit contributed to polarisation	Climate change believers don't understand economics
		Identity has been oversimplified and reduced to two opposites	Belief fight of climate change resolved in EU
		Sense of bereavement	Separate might do bit for climate change

		Loss at not being a part of Europe	Remainers fear of being minority
		Great sense of anger	Remainer fear of being controlled
		Listened to the lies	Leavers ideology/mindset of being deprived
		Remainers weren't given ammunition	Leaver fear of culture/origin no longer existing
		Not given facts to enable them to counter	Leavers want to sustain culture and origin
		Wasn't enough information	Leavers don't want to be feared or controlled
		Come to accept the will	Would vote the same
		Leavers no longer speak to	Foresight proved correct
		Never reconcile differences	Fishermen struggling
		Arguing became fruitless frustrating and annoying	Nobody in London has a clue
		Negative opinions from both sides	Disconnect from what is "really going on"
		Second referendum to do process legally and properly	Now more people would have better arguments

		Few people to make a lot of money	Accused of being racist
		Patriarchal	Don't think Remainers would switch
		This is for our country	Remainers as narrowminded
		Honour the UK	Remainers pride would be ruined by switching
		Emotional responses	EU slow dissemination of Covid vaccines
		Position that EU is taking away from them	If EU had individual country power, better experience of Covid
		Retain our dignity	Able to make own decisions
		Collectivist	Swinger voters
		This is our pack	More people would stick with vote because of pride
		Diluting the empire	Set in ways because of divisive event
		Emotional reactions to competing family voters	Few people would have guts to change mind
		Emotive conflicts	People would change vote
		Family members who I respected greatly	People would not change
		Family I thought were rationale	Voting would change
		Lies	Leavers broken promises might change their minds

		Causing upset	Many things promised and many lies
		If I won, I lost by upsetting family	Realisation that things told could not be delivered
		Not going to convince someone	Leave voters would switch because of lies
		Hardcore people	Less Remainers would switch vote
		No chance of reconcile with hardcore	No Leavers would change
		More ambivalent now	Leavers regret the decision
		Brexit became a cult	Leavers should have voted remain
		Don't want to admit they were wrong	No leavers regret vote
		Hardcore of Brexiters	Leavers had reasons why they voted
		Vision of Britain as in the 50s	Experiences since vote has enforced vote
		More polarised	Wish not to have shared voting choice
		It'll get worse	Backlash for voting choice
		Absence of facts leaves emotions	People wanted to argue
		Picked on person when they can't win argument	Vote the same but not share voting choice
		Themes of sexism and ageism	Split 5050

		Politicians can't be trusted	Divded
		EU is an extra layer of politicians	People from all backgrounds
		Laws in this country	No clear socio-economic categories belonging to each side
		Very emotive	What caused people to think this way
		No trust for government that they voted for	Fear of consequences for sharing views
		They got angry	Left wing incited fear in sharing opinion
		Rank hypocrisy	Feel intimidated
		Irreconcilable differences	Role of the police
		Remain is all embracing representative of UK identity	Bias in the police
		Multicultural country	Police brutality and violent
		How does the rest of the world see us	Fear
		Don't have the same standing	Decline of England
		We seem totally intolerant	England used to be a positive place
		We were major players	West decline

		We were well respected and highly regarded	Brexit vote a way to stand up to decline
		That has changed	Brexit a way to stand up to left win ideology
		Totally irreconcilable	Western world in a confused place
		Thought we lived in a multicultural society	“Brexit was a tool”
		Thought we respected differences and diversity of the UK	Brexit used to voice opinions of the silenced
		My views may be biased as an ethnic minority	Brexit was not about Europe, it was to stand up against left wing ideology
		Part of my culture is grounded in the UK	Trump elected
		Questioning if views are misaligned with the majority	Want to stand up for themselves
		Subjected to this new way	Want to be listened to
		Build up fuelled by politicians	Past left wing as inconsiderate and narrow minded
		People felt something needed	Left wing not accepting or compromising

		to be gained control of	
		Strong commitment to patriotism	Left wing caused the division
		that's what I've always been a part of or is this the way that it is now	Want to improve lives
		Uncertain feeling	Poverty
		Lots of different identities	Create high skilled paid interesting jobs
		UK seen as an untrustworthy insula	Importance of a wealth generator
		Not willing to play the team game for the greater good	Role of the mine
		Disappointment	England was letting go of wealth generators
		Pity towards the UK	Open the coal mines, generate wealth
		Others tried to warn us	Fed up with left wing
		Left with own consequences to deal with	Fed up with not listening
		Other countries will not go out of	Voted against the other side

		their way to help now	
		British values as foundations	Intention to generate better jobs for young people to prosper, not become criminals, contribute to community
		Honesty – reputation for being honest	Countries need to be individual
		Both sides said things that weren't true	Need to invest in other countries
		Rule of law – we give our word and stick to it	Need to build schools, hospitals
		Boris trying to force a deal and overturn rule of law	Wasting money on offshore wind
		Lack of trust towards politicians	Climate emergency but people are dying
		People are reflective in hindsight	Spend climate change money on what we need
		Starting to see the impact of us leaving	Help other countries have higher living standard
		Different crises	West are wealthy – help others
		People sticking to decision	Create fertilizer for struggling countries

		Thought it was the right thing to do	Furious
		Cant back down	Wasting money
		Remoaners	Help people
		Now the way of living	Coal is polluting but it is cheap
		Distrust for politicians	Stabilise ourselves then help others
		Left our support system	Nuclear power not wind power
		Leavers wont admit we are affected	Universities do not engage with people like me
		Didn't vote for this	Mining ousted by university
		Subjected to this	University engagement in real world needed
		Democracy won	University no engagement with people in industry
		Would make the same choice	Universities do not understand
		Hardcore of people who wont change their mind	Academic system failing nation
		Don't want to be made a fool of	Academia not engaging all people
		No one to lead the Remain people	Academic designed for academics
		No figurehead	Practical people kicked out of academia

		Leave did well with leader and on social media	Kicked out go and learn to work, get involved
		Social media reinforced views	Education for academics not practical
		Echo chamber	Academia failing practical strengths
		Stick to our own kind	Failed from academic face life head on, live in the “real world”
		Still too raw	Gain skills outside of academia
		Would still be close	Leave voters left academia
		Change the laws on referendums	Education system is where the divide starts
		Yes/No vote is not suitable	END OF LEAVE
		People don't understand the machinations	Poll in Remains favour is hopeful
		Revote would be too close	More power over us now than before
		Rejoin not Remain campaign now	Media buried results
		Adhering to EU laws would be twisted	Narrative of rejoin means conforming to EU
		Persuade people to stay out	We are joining EU now, not making it
		Huge pity	U turn of PM

		EU and UK stronger together	Britain helped draft many laws
		Tories to get Brexit done	Brexit changed the course of life
		People were sick of it	Moved out of the UK
		I loved it	Impact on personal situation
		Revote now would be met with rolled eyes	Moved to Europe
		Revote after time would show what was lost	Don't like this country
		Government blames covid for many Brexit issues	Wish to immigrate
		Narrative spread by government is an easy one	Young people take us back into the EU
		Government play on an emotional connection to the facts	We will get a worse deal – frustrating
		People still on the fence	Threw away the good deal
		Revote would be close	Angry
		UK not looked good	I feel more European and I do British

		Connection to Europe is lost	Wife is half German
		Wanted what was best for the country	

Thematic model:

