

THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS
ACROSS EUROPE:
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL OVERVIEW

by

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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May 2022

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to strengthen the state of European-level knowledge on the integration and well-being of immigrants and their descendants via helping to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of four key areas: (1) the concept of integration; (2) the multidimensionality of integration; (3) The relevance of immigrant parentage for the second generation; and (4) the role of the host country context in immigrant integration patterns. I address each of these four main knowledge gaps via four individual yet interconnected analyses. These consist, respectively, of a wide-ranging conceptual review and three quantitative studies using recent cross-European data (European Social Survey, 2012-2018) for a set of multidimensional analyses (observing indicators of economic, political, and social inclusion, as well as health and well-being). The first study examines the multidimensionality of integration via a factor analysis of 18 integration-related outcomes for first- and second-generation racial/ethnic minority immigrants across Europe (ESS7; N=1,066). The second study compares outcomes of second-generation immigrants and native-parentage natives along multiple dimensions, with a systematic analysis of parental class background, gender, and ethnic/racial minority status both alongside and intersected with migration background (ESS 6-9, N=130,117). The third study explores the linkages between individual immigrants' outcomes and host country's macro-level characteristics through a wide range of models (ESS6-9, N₁=9,175, N₂=72 country-year contexts). Findings overall highlight, first, the complexity of integration concepts; second, the variation in integration outcomes across different dimensions; third, the continued and complex associations of immigrant parentage, including a relative second-generation advantage within otherwise vulnerable groups; and fourth, the relevance of several host country features for immigrant integration, including economic conditions, attitudes towards immigrants, and migrant integration policies. The thesis thus makes several original contributions helping to broaden the body of empirical evidence on first- and second-generation multidimensional integration in Europe, along with some informative conceptual and methodological insights. With its cross-European, multidimensional, wide-ranging scope, the thesis helps fill conceptual and empirical gaps and inconsistencies within a so far rich but fragmented body of integration literature, thus helping to advance the field towards a broader, more comprehensive understanding of immigrant integration at a European level.

To Zachary

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Global Challenges Scholarship at the University of Birmingham. I would like to extend my gratitude to them for funding the entirety of this project.

This thesis is the culmination of a long and winding road, through which I have been supported by many wonderful people.

I would like to start by thanking my lead supervisor, Laurence Lessard-Phillips, who has given me unending and invaluable support, assistance, wisdom, and reassurance throughout this process. Thank you so much for all your work, professional and emotional, in helping me get here. I am immensely grateful to my whole team of unfailingly kind and encouraging supervisors – Laurence Lessard-Phillips, Ingrid Storm, Miguel Ribeiro Da Silva Taborda Ramos, Zhaoya Gong, and Nando Sigona – for all their guidance, brilliant advice, and positivity throughout these past few years. Laurence and Zhaoya, thank you for choosing me for this PhD project; it has been a joy to work together since our first Skype interview in 2018. Miguel and Nando, thank you for stepping in and joining the supervisory team and for your helpful feedback and encouragement. Laurence and Ingrid, thank you for being such dedicated supervisors even in the midst of new parenthood. Merci to young Nathan for his delightful cameos during virtual supervision meetings.

My journey as a researcher has been aided by numerous generous colleagues and mentors over the years. I will always be grateful to my mentors in Maastricht, Melissa Siegel and Özge Bilgili, who have taught me so much and gave me invaluable opportunities for growth as a young researcher. Our work together was a formative experience and continues to influence and inspire me to this day. On that note, I am also grateful to Michaela Vanore and Craig Loschmann. Many thanks to Phil Kasinitz and all the brilliant scholars at the CUNY Graduate Center for so kindly hosting me during my visit; it was a privilege to learn from you, and I had a wonderful time. Thank you also to Jenny Phillimore and all other brilliant scholars, at the University of Birmingham and beyond, who have engaged with my research. This includes journal editors and anonymous reviewers at IMR, ESR, and AJS, who have provided very useful critical feedback on manuscript from this thesis and thus

have helped improve this work. For the foundations of my interest in sociological research I have the wonderful community and teachers of Széchenyi István Szakkollégium (SZISZ) to thank. Special thanks to Orsolya Reich and Aliz McLean, who are among the several brilliant women who have inspired me to pursue academic research.

I cannot overstate the importance of support and encouragement I have received from friends and family near and far, from Budapest to Maastricht to Birmingham to New York to Bristol. A special thank you to Rafiyah Khan for being in the trenches with me, especially these last few months. Thank you to Andy Jolly, who has so kindly helped us during our many moves within the UK. Thank you to Emily Mathis-Corona for our two-person book club that kept me reading beyond academic papers. Thank you to Rebeka Balogh and Don Chapman for your friendship and occasional company in the valley of PhD despair. Thank you to Csilla Mayer for much-needed yoga and G&T breaks and for always being close, no matter how far. Heartfelt thanks also to our kitten Merlin for always reminding me, in no uncertain terms, when it was time to stop working and start eating.

Thank you to my family for a lifetime of love and support. They have inspired me throughout this PhD. Thank you to my father, who is a model of ambition and resilience. Thank you to my mother for her sense of compassion, on a personal and societal level. I am especially grateful to my parents and to my brother Zsiga for sharing with me, from a young age, the joy of intellectual curiosity. The three of you have taught me how to think.

Finally, thank you my husband, Zachary, who is always in my corner. From our early days of dating through to the end of this PhD, you have always supported my goals as ours. Through sacrifices big and small, six international moves, copious late nights, moments of self-doubt, and what felt like a never-ending final stretch, you have been an unwavering source of strength and confidence. It means the world to have you by my side. This is for you.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED

AME	Average marginal effects
CI	Confidence interval
Coef.	Coefficient
ESS	European Social Survey; ESS6 (or 7, 8, 9) Round/wave 6 (etc.) of the ESS
EU	European Union
EU/EEA	European Economic Area incl. EU (EU countries and Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway)
EU/EFTA	EU and European Free Trade Association (EU countries and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland)
EU28	EU28 Member States as of 2013-2019 (including UK)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HH	Household
ISEI	International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status
LFS	Labour Force Survey
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
OLS	Ordinary least squares
Ref.	Reference category
RQ	Research question
SAT	Segmented assimilation theory
SES	Socioeconomic status
TCN	Third-country national

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introductory remarks

Ensuring that migrants and EU citizens with a migrant background can fully participate and contribute is key to the future well-being, prosperity and cohesion of European societies

Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027,
European Commission (2020a, 24)

As of 2020, circa 12.8% of the population within the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) was foreign-born, representing about 66.2 million residents (OECD 2021a). For comparison, in 2000, this share was around 7.3% (UNDESA 2019). Further, native-born descendants of immigrants – the so-called ‘second generation’ – represented ca. 7.4% of the population within the EU28 in 2017, from 5.2% in 2008 (OECD/EU 2019). Both figures have been increasing steadily over the past two decades, and are expected to continue doing so (OECD 2021a). As immigrants and their descendants come to represent a growing segment of Europe’s population, ensuring their acceptance and inclusion as full members of society – in other words, their integration (Penninx 2019; Alba and Foner 2015) – represents an increasingly salient challenge for European states seeking to build fair and cohesive societies.

In fact, over the past two decades the European Union (EU) has been gradually increasing efforts to coordinate immigrant integration measures at the EU level (European Commission 2020a; Geddes and Scholten 2015; Van Wolleghem 2019). Drawing on ‘persisting challenges in relation to employment, education, access to basic services and the social inclusion of migrants’, the European Commission’s (2020a, 3) recent Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 further escalates earlier efforts. These expanding efforts no longer target only third-country nationals but also naturalised third-country

nationals and their native-born descendants. A key element of this recent Action Plan is a call for increased and improved evidence base to monitor integration across Europe:

[...] a number of knowledge gaps remain that prevent effective evidence-based integration policies from being developed. While most Member States regularly monitor integration, they rarely rely on EU agreed indicators and the potential for international comparison is under-used (European Commission 2020a, 24).

The aim of this thesis is to strengthen the state of European-level knowledge and scholarship on immigrant integration and inclusion. Specifically, I seek to address what I view as some key gaps in comprehensiveness and consistency that currently hold back the theoretical advancement and policy usefulness of an otherwise rich European literature on first- and second-generation immigrant integration. My research thus has a two-fold purpose, seeking both to improve the European-level evidence base for policy as well as the advancing the broader European theoretical discussion on the integration of immigrants and their descendants. I elaborate on the latter below.

Traditionally, the scholarly field of immigrant integration research has been dominated by the US literature (Thomson and Crul 2007; J. Schneider and Crul 2010). Following a relatively later start, however, the past two decades have seen European integration scholarship come into its own as well, often building on conceptual and theoretical ideas developed in the North American context but revising and further evolving those in light of the complexity found within European contexts (e.g., Esser 2004a; 2010; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Vertovec 2007; Crul and Schneider 2010). Indeed, my own research is strongly influenced by the so-called ‘grand theories of assimilation’ originated the US context (Crul 2016, 2326; Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993). One theoretical perspective that has been particularly influential to my thinking throughout the development this dissertation was Portes and colleagues’ segmented assimilation theory

(Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a). While by no means the only theory involved in this research (as later chapters will demonstrate), it is one that has overarching implications and was a key starting point to my research; therefore, I present its key insights briefly below.

Formulated in the US context of the 1990s, segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993; Gans 1992b) sought to explain the varying integration trajectories of first- and second-generation from the ‘new’ post-1965 immigrant inflows to the US, which often seem to differ, at least temporarily, from the traditionally expected path of acculturation and economic assimilation into the local dominant middle class.¹ Portes and Zhou (1993) highlighted several key factors to explain this divergence, and, in doing so, brought multiple seminal insights concerning the complexity of intergenerational integration processes. They noted, for example, that the class background and ethnic/racial status (e.g., being non-white) of immigrant groups would be fundamental to their integration experience. In relation to this, Portes and colleagues (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993) also underscored the role of the host country as a context of reception in shaping integration opportunities, citing a number of potentially influential factors including structural features of the labour market, the support or hostility of government policies, the attitudes of receiving society members, and pre-existing co-ethnic communities. Further, Portes and Zhou (1993) noted that there are multiple paths of integration that immigrants and their descendants might follow, beyond the traditionally expected path of acculturation and economic assimilation into the local dominant middle class.

¹ Observed, within the classical literature, for earlier European immigrants (Alba and Nee 2003).

Crucially, they noted that the two forms of integration – economic and sociocultural – do not necessarily go hand in hand, and may show distinct paths of development (e.g., with economic assimilation happening without full acculturation) (Portes and Zhou 1993). This assertion is conceptually significant for two reasons: first, it underscores the multidimensional nature of integration; second, it encourages a critical evaluation of how integration is defined (e.g., who we consider ‘integrated’, on what basis, etc.).² The empirical prevalence of the alternative integration paths and specific mechanisms outlined by SAT, have been much debated, both in the US and European context (Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a; Waters et al. 2010; Haller, Portes, and Lynch 2011b; Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011; Haller, Portes, and Lynch 2011a; Vermeulen 2010; Thomson and Crul 2007; Crul 2016; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Drouhot and Nee 2019). These (valid) debates notwithstanding, I view the above-highlighted fundamental ideas as constituting key advancements in the way we think about immigrant integration in modern scholarship.

Furthermore, the past two decades have seen European integration scholarship come into its own as well, often building on conceptual and theoretical ideas developed in the North American context but revising and further evolving those in light of the complexity found within European contexts (e.g., Esser 2004a; 2010; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Vertovec 2007; Crul and Schneider 2010). Indeed – linking back to the above points – European, as well as transatlantic, scholarship has made substantial contributions to debates around the concept of integration (e.g., Joppke and Morawska 2003; Penninx 2005; Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016; 2021), multidimensional approaches to the study of integration (e.g., Heckmann 2006; Ager and Strang 2008; Bean

² See Chapter 3 for more detailed discussions.

et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017), dynamics of second-generation integration, including the applicability of SAT (e.g. Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Vermeulen 2010; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Phalet and Heath 2010; Heath and Schneider 2021; Luthra 2013a), and the role of the national context in integration (Thomson and Crul 2007; e.g., Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara 2012; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007).

Altogether, the increasingly rich European conceptual and empirical literature on immigrant integration has thus produced abundant arguments and evidence on numerous key questions of integration. However, I find that the usefulness of this literature – especially from a cross-European perspective – is currently held back by its fragmented nature. First, there is a lack of consistency in the varying conceptualisations and definitions of integration (more on this below). Second, individual studies tend to have a fairly narrow focus in terms of facets (dimensions) of integration, immigrant populations, and geographical contexts observed at once; combined with inconsistencies in methods, data, and indicators used, this makes it difficult to synthesise existing empirical research across specific areas of study and contexts. Further, although there are regular reports from organizations such as Eurostat (or the European Commission) and the OECD that do have such a broad scope, these tend to be limited in depth, offering a mostly descriptive perspective (OECD/EU 2019).

Drawing on the above observations – elaborated in further detail below – this thesis seeks to help bridge some key comprehensiveness gaps in the existing knowledge on the integration and well-being of immigrant and immigrant-background individuals across Europe. To achieve this, I bring together a rich, but at often fragmented theoretical and empirical literature on immigrant integration in Europe and expand on it with a set of new, wide-ranging analyses. I am interested in four areas in particular:

- The concept of migrant integration
- The multidimensionality of integration
- The relevance of immigrant parentage for the second generation
- The links between host country contextual characteristics and immigrant integration.

I view these four topics – or gaps in knowledge – as fundamentally related and thus overlapping, yet also, distinct enough to warrant independent analyses. The alternative format of this thesis, consisting of one conceptual review and three empirical papers in journal-article format, allows me to develop analyses that both related and distinct: they share a guiding vision and thus similarities in approach (the cross-European scope, the data source, the multidimensional approach) in line with the overarching aim of comprehensiveness; yet, this format also allows for a degree of independence between studies that I found necessary so that each can serve the specific research question at hand with the most fitting design and approach. The discussion in the last chapter of the dissertation will then bring together the knowledge generated by these studies. In the following section, I expand on each of the above-mentioned knowledge gaps and present the research questions guiding my four respective main chapters. For reference, a separate section at the end of this chapter clarifies some main terms and definitions used in the text of this dissertation. (*Note:* some of these are preliminary definitions, to be examined and specified further in Chapters 3 [Concepts] Chapter 4 [Methodology], and/or the individual papers presented in Chapters 5-7).

1.2 Knowledge gaps and research questions

1.2.1 The concept of migrant integration

First of all, there is no real consensus on what migrant integration is, exactly. From terminology to definitions and conceptual frameworks, approaches to migrant integration (or migrant assimilation, incorporation, adaptation, etc.) have varied widely across time, geographical contexts, theoretical strands, and individual scholars (Kivisto 2005). Part of what makes it so difficult to reach a consensus on integration is the inherent subjectivity and normativity of the concept: most definitions of integration describe what integration *is* at the same time prescribing what it *should be*. As Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003, 7) write,

the term integration bundles analytic concepts together with normative notions or idealised projections of society, which are weighted with very different emotional and attitudinal valences in different groups and contexts.

This means that understandings of integration are highly influenced by the surrounding historical, social, and political context. Both integration and assimilation – to cite the two most prominent terms – have been defined and redefined time and again to better fit with evolving perspectives on society and immigrants' place in them; as a result, the two have been referred to as synonyms, with integration being the preferred term in Europe (J. Schneider and Crul 2010), opposing models (Berry 1997), or altogether different types of processes (Esser 2004b). A similar divergence of approaches characterises the whole set of assumptions that make up a concept of integration – for instance, if a process of adaptation is involved, who is adapting to whom? In what way(s)? When is integration 'done', and what does that end-state look like? What degree of remaining difference is no longer considered a problem? Differences in assumptions concerning these points, especially when unacknowledged, have long been a hindrance to the study of integration, as it often results in scholars talking past one another (Kivisto 2005; Gans 1997). This incoherence also

obstructs the effective measurement and evaluation of integration, which in turn makes it difficult to develop adequate policy measures to facilitate integration (European Commission 2020a).

My first aim is therefore to help advance the field towards a more consistent and coherent conceptual approach to immigrant integration. In service of this aim, my first research question is the following:

- *Research question 1: How should immigrant integration be defined?*

To investigate this question in depth, Chapter 3 sets out to provide a comprehensive overview conceptual overview, bridging definitional divides and helping to understand the variety of conceptual approaches and their implications – and, in doing so, set the foundation for a thoughtful and consistent conceptualisation of integration in my research in this dissertation. To achieve this, in Chapter 3 I conduct an extensive literature review around the concept of integration. Specifically, I review the evolution and debates around conceptualisations of immigrant integration and associated terms (e.g., assimilation) in sociological and related literature, from the early days of the field to the present day. In an effort to provide a systematic overview, I identify five key conceptual ‘building blocks’ of integration definitions and analyse existing conceptualisations along them. These are: (1a) the term used and (1b) its attached definition; (2) the areas of life (dimensions) and (3) actors considered part of the process; (4) the ‘reference group’ against whom integration or assimilation is measured; and, (5) the endpoint (or goal) of integration, or what completed ‘integration’ (or ‘assimilation’) looks like. This entails the following sub-questions concerning the definition of integration (from the perspective of integration research):

- *Research question 1a: What term should we use?*

- *Research question 1b*: Integration in what sense? What are the different dimensions of integration?
- *Research question 1c*: Who are the actors of integration?
- *Research question 1d*: Who is the reference group for integration?
- *Research question 1e*: What is the definitional endpoint of integration? What does ‘completed’ integration look like?

In examining these questions, my objective is to highlight the variety of conceptual positions involved in the process of defining integration, provide a useful systematic comparison and synthesis of prior approaches and debates, and ultimately use insights from that overview to develop my own conceptual framework of integration to use in the empirical studies making up the remainder of the dissertation.

Building on the insights of this review, my concept of integration is centred on the societal inclusion and equality of immigrants and their descendants. This process involves multiple actors (including immigrants as well as host society, at different levels), and multiple dimensions. Integration, by my definition, does not necessarily involve sociocultural assimilation. Instead, I focus on the socioeconomic integration, civic/political/institutional inclusion, social inclusion, and well-being of immigrants and their descendants, seeking the disappearance of penalties tied to migration background in these domains. My conceptual review also underscores the importance of considering the internal diversity (e.g., in terms of race/ethnicity, socioeconomic background) of both immigrants and non-immigrants when comparing these populations and evaluating integration.

1.2.2 The multidimensionality of integration

Building on insights and points raised in the above conceptual review, my second aim is to go into further depth concerning the aspect of multidimensionality in particular. Immigrant integration is nowadays widely recognized to be a multidimensional phenomenon (Spencer and Charsley 2016; 2021; OECD/EU 2019; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019; Penninx 2005; 2019; Bean et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Sobolewska, Galandini, and Lessard-Phillips 2017). Yet – as is the case with the concept of integration generally – while numerous frameworks have been offered,³ there is still no definitional consensus on what those dimensions are, or even what exactly multidimensionality entails. Is integration primarily a process of structural (economic) assimilation (Massey 1981)? Or structural *and* sociocultural adaptation (Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Zhou 1993)? Or should we look at an even wider range of areas of life to capture the state of integration (e.g., Gordon 1964; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019)? In sum, my second research question is:

- *Research Question 2a:* What does the multidimensionality of integration entail?

Beyond pragmatic benchmarking purposes such as providing a richer assessment of the state of integration for policymakers (e.g., Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019), the question of dimensionality also holds theoretical implications concerning the mechanisms of integration. For instance, the idea that multiple domains of integration (e.g., structural, sociocultural) need to be observed for an accurate portrayal of integration is rooted in the notion that sub-processes of integration do not necessarily develop in tandem across those domains, as was once assumed (Portes and Zhou 1993; Lessard-Phillips 2017;

³ See, e.g., Gordon (1964); Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003); Esser (2004b); Penninx (2005); Heckmann, (2006); Crul et al. (2012); Bean et al. (2012); Spencer and Charsley (2016); Lessard-Phillips (2017); Ndofor-Tah et al., (2019); OECD/EU (2019).

Lessard-Phillips and Fajth forthcoming). As such, the question of dimensionality is intertwined with the question of how closely different sub-processes of integration are related.

Still, few of the many proposed multidimensional frameworks offered engage critically with this notion in their logic of categorisation. In fact, this lack of a consistent underlying logic may help explain the wide divergence in multidimensional frameworks. In recent years, a few studies have begun examining the question empirically, outlining multidimensional frameworks based on using quantitative analyses of outcome patterns across different indicators of integration (Bean et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017; see also Harder et al. 2018). These have highlighted some key findings, but were somewhat limited in scope (i.e., generational, geographical, dimensional coverage). Motivated by the objective of building towards a more consistent use of integration dimensions and a more solid empirical basis for dimensional categorisations in integration studies, I thus also pose the following question:

- *Research Question 2b*: What kind of dimensional pattern do we see in the integration outcomes of European immigrant and immigrant-background minorities?

Building on insights from an extensive review of prior conceptualisations of integration dimensions, the first empirical paper (Chapter 5) seeks to answer this question by providing a more comprehensive empirical analysis of integration dimensions than prior works, involving a wider range of indicators, using data from across Europe (European Social Survey 2012; 2014a; 2016; 2018d), and looking at outcomes of both first- and second-generation immigrants (though focusing on racial/ethnic minority respondents – a limitation necessary due to data limitations, explained further in *Methodology* [Chapter 4]). Findings

from this study highlight that grouping integration dimensions based on empirical outcome patterns can indeed lead to different dimensional categorisation than a purely thematic or conceptually driven approach. The five ‘empirical’ dimensions (economic/structural integration; health; subjective well-being; cultural assimilation and civic/political integration; and minority socialization) highlight the distinct yet connected nature of these different aspects and challenge classical assumptions such as cultural assimilation and economic integration being strongly interlinked (in line with Portes and Zhou 1993; cf. Ruud Koopmans 2016). Ultimately, the paper – co-authored with my supervisor Dr Laurence Lessard-Phillips – advances a more critical way of thinking about integration’s multidimensionality.⁴

1.2.3 The situation of the second generation: does immigrant background still matter?

Next, the situation of the second-generation immigrant population is particularly interesting as an indicator of the success – or challenges – of immigrant integration processes at the European level. It is generally held that, for people who immigrated as adults, the potential to ‘catch up’ with native-background natives is inherently limited (by the disruption of migration, foreign qualifications, language limitations, lack of cultural and social capital, etc.); in this sense, some degree of native-migrant disparities may be inevitable (Penninx 2005; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008). However, the generation that was born and/or raised in the host country since a young age, should, theoretically, have the same life chances as their native-background peers – and, if they do not, that can be an important signal of

⁴ Note: the paper presented in Chapter 5 was published as a co-authored journal article. While a first version of the paper picked up roughly where the related Chapter 3 section left off (with relatively little overlap), requests for additional engagement with the theoretical/conceptual literature in the process of peer review (to strengthen the paper as a standalone piece), have led to some overlaps in content with Chapter 3.

structural obstacles to integration (Penninx 2005; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012). In other words,

the litmus test for integration, and for the success or failure of policies in this field, is the status and success of the second generation. (Penninx 2005, 143).

Indeed, understanding mechanisms and patterns of second-generation integration has been at the forefront of international theoretical debates around immigrant assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a; Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011; Esser 2004a; Crul and Schneider 2010). Within Europe, as some major cohorts of second-generation immigrants (e.g., the children of the post-war guestworker inflows) have started reaching adulthood over the past decade, a growing body of literature has sought to assess their integration and relative situation in European societies (Alba and Foner 2015; e.g. Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Vermeulen 2010; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Heath and Schneider 2021; Luthra 2013a; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Phalet and Heath 2010; Drouhot and Nee 2019). Nevertheless, I find that despite an increasing number of studies, the fundamental question of whether second-generation members of European societies are still held back by their immigrant background remains difficult to gauge.

I identify multiple challenges in this regard. First of all, while concepts of integration are increasingly multidimensional (as established earlier), the existing European second-generation literature exhibits an overwhelming focus on economic aspects, with relatively thinner knowledge on other key aspects of inclusion and well-being;⁵ moreover, studies applying a multidimensional frame of analysis are exceedingly rare (see Heath, Rethon, and

⁵ Note that studies on the sociocultural assimilation of the second generation fall outside the scope of interest here, given my earlier-outlined concept of integration.

Kilpi 2008; and Drouhot and Nee 2019 for reviews of the rich literature on the economic aspects; see André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; André and Dronkers 2017; Safi 2010; and Gkiouleka and Huijts 2020 for some rare examples of cross-European studies on other dimensions; and see Bean et al. 2012; Heath and Schneider 2021; Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017; Fajth and Bilgili 2018 for some rare multidimensional studies). Second, most studies tend to have a fairly narrow scope, typically observing one dimension of integration at a time, within a given (typically north-western European) country context, often focusing on one or a few particular ethnic groups (see, e.g., reviews by Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Drouhot and Nee 2019). While understandable, and often necessary, these restrictions result in a somewhat fragmented evidence base that is difficult to synthesise due to discrepancies in data, measures, methods, and contexts across studies.

Third, disentangling the role of migration background from other confounding factors – especially racial/ethnic minority background and class background – remains a fundamental challenge. First of all, the distinction between ethnic/racial effects and migration background is often unclear, partly because the focus is so often on second-generation individuals from racialised minorities (see, e.g., Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Drouhot and Nee 2019). Second, some emerging evidence suggests that key background factors such class background, ethnic/racial minority status, and gender may work differently for children of immigrants than for their native-background peers (Heath and Brinbaum 2014; Li 2018; Platt 2007; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Fleischmann and Kristen 2014; Zuccotti 2015). Nevertheless, evidence on these dynamics is still far from conclusive, even for the relatively widely studied socioeconomic domain (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; cf. Drouhot and Nee 2019). Indeed, the question of migration background vis-à-vis other background factors is similarly pertinent for other aspects of societal

inclusion and well-being, where prior evidence is altogether thinner (André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Thorkelson 2015; André and Dronkers 2017; OECD/EU 2019; Gkiouleka and Huijts 2020; Safi 2010; Stevens et al. 2015).

Drawing on the above gaps in knowledge, my second research question is,

- *Research question 3:* Does migration background make a difference in the outcomes of the native-born offspring of immigrants in Europe?

The second paper seeks to address this question with a wide-ranging comparative study of second-generation and native-parentage native adults across Europe. Specifically, the study pools data from the European Social Survey (2012; 2014a; 2016; 2018d) on second-generation immigrants of any origin (non-EU *and* EU-origin, low *and* high class background, etc.) from all over Europe (not only north-western Europe) and compares their outcomes to those of native-parentage peers across a wide range of domains (including economic as well as political, social, and health- and well-being-related outcomes). Importantly, it does so in three steps: first, looking at overall differences between second-generation and native-parentage respondents; second, controlling for background factors of ethnic/racial minority status, gender, and parental class background; and third, including a comparative analysis of subgroups at the intersection of migration background and, respectively, ethnic/racial background, class background, and gender. In doing so, it allows to gain a more comprehensive picture of second-generation and native-background disparities at the European level, while also helping to disentangle the effects of migration background from other relevant background factors and examining how the implications of the latter may differ for children of immigrants versus children of natives.

The findings of this study suggest that for second-generation immigrants across Europe, foreign parentage is associated with a mix of advantages, null-effects, and disadvantages, depending on the dimension examined. Although class background and ethnic/racial minority status are key determinants, for the most part they do not ‘explain away’ second-generation differences. Further, subgroup analyses reveal a relative second-generation advantage within otherwise disadvantaged (i.e., low class background and ethnic/racial minority) groups.

1.2.4 The role of host country characteristics

The third knowledge gap I seek to address concerns the role of host country characteristics in migrant integration. Integration scholarship has long held an interest in the role of the host country context in immigrants’ and their descendants’ integration (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Foner 2015; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016). European cross-national comparative research in particular has been instrumental in starting to explore the implications of different national contexts for integration (Thomson and Crul 2007), and the associated literature has been growing in recent years. Studies on structural factors influential for first-generation immigrants’ employment and second-generation immigrants’ education, for instance, are becoming clearer (e.g., Ballarino and Panichella 2015; Bisin et al. 2011; Borgna and Contini 2014; Griga and Hadjar 2014).

Nevertheless, especially from a multidimensional perspective of integration, our understanding of contextual effects is still far from complete. On the one hand, several specific associations between host country characteristics concerning the role of the host country context – which characteristics affect which aspect of integration, and how – remain

unclear (see below). On the other hand, I note the lack of an overarching conceptual model specifying the varied ways in which the host country context may influence integration. From an empirical perspective, this is partly due to a lack of comparability among existing studies, due, for example, to inconsistencies in indicators, populations of interest, contexts included, and data and methods used. The aim of this paper is to help build towards such a comprehensive overview, by (a) reviewing existing knowledge on sources of cross-national variation in immigrant integration outcomes, (b) outlining an initial conceptual model summarising some key factors emerging from the existing literature, with an associated set of research questions, and (c) providing a uniquely wide-ranging test of associations between characteristics at the level host country and individual immigrant integration outcomes. In sum, the third paper is driven by the following underlying question:

- *Research question 4:* How are immigrant integration outcomes linked to the contextual characteristics of the host country?

Consulting a broad range of related theoretical and empirical works and reviews (e.g., Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993; Waldinger and Catron 2016; Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018; Alba and Nee 2003; Reitz 2002; Spencer and Charsley 2016; Penninx 2005; Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas 2016; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015), I identify four types of potential sources of cross-national differences in immigrant integration patterns. These are: (1) compositional differences in immigrant populations' background characteristics; (2) economic conditions and structural characteristics of the host country (3) the country's relationship to migration and immigrants in general (attitudes, pre-existing immigrant minorities); and (4) immigrant

integration policies.⁶ As I discuss in an extensive literature review within the paper (Chapter 7), each of these factors warrants some further examination as existing evidence is either inconclusive or altogether sparse, especially from a multidimensional and cross-European perspective.

To address the above research question, I thus exploit the variety of institutional, structural, and other contextual characteristics found across European countries and build a dataset combining macro-level indicators for 19 countries across four waves (72 country-years) with individual data on immigrants residing in those contexts (from the European Social Survey (2012; 2014a; 2016; 2018d)). To achieve the desired breadth of analysis, I examine multiple dimensions of integration (economic, political, social, health and well-being), for first-generation (i.e., foreign-born) migrants from any origins, as well as second-generation migrants in a supplementary analysis. In a first step, I assess the presence of cross-national variation in immigrants' integration-related outcomes while controlling for relevant background characteristics of immigrants and native averages on the given outcomes. I then proceed to examine my research questions through separate models for each outcome and factor of interest. These questions include whether more favourable economic indicators, a larger immigrant stock, warmer attitudes towards immigrants, and more liberal integration policies, among other factors, are associated with better outcomes for immigrants (in terms of occupational attainment, political engagement, health, life satisfaction, and perceived in-group discrimination). Findings offer some general support for these ideas, though with some exceptions and important differences across specific

⁶ The local (sub-national) aspect of integration has also (rightly) received increasing attention in recent years within the contextual-effects literature (see, e.g., literature on superdiversity Schneider and Crul 2012; Scholten and Penninx 2016; or the 'local turn' in migrant integration policies Vertovec 2007). Due to scope limitations, however, I do not include that level of analysis in this study. The same applies for detailed origin country and transnational factors (Aleksynska 2011; Spencer and Charsley 2016).

factors and outcomes. Through its insights, the paper ultimately helps advance towards a more comprehensive understanding of host country effects, particularly what may explain differences in integration patterns observed across Europe, and thus what host countries more generally can do to facilitate (or not obstruct) the integration of their immigrant populations.

1.3 Summary of aims and contributions

To summarise, with the research in this thesis I aim to contribute to our understanding of immigrant integration in Europe with a conceptual overview and three original studies, each of which help to bridge some of key comprehensiveness gaps within the broader European literature on immigrant integration. In doing so, my research seeks to inform ongoing conceptual and theoretical discussions around the integration of immigrants and their descendants. Specifically, the conceptual chapter and the first empirical paper contribute towards the development of more coherent and meaningful conceptual approaches to integration, with a particular attention to the aspect of multidimensionality. The second empirical paper then examines the fundamental question of how meaningful immigrant background is past the first generation, with a systematic consideration of class background, gender, and ethnic/racial minority status and how these other background factors may explain, add on to, or complicate outcome differences associated with second-generation (vs. native-parentage) status. The study thus provides a much needed, broad yet consistent analysis of the implications of immigrant parentage and other background factors for second-generation immigrants in Europe. Finally, the third paper provides a long-overdue, wide-ranging analysis of the links between host country characteristics and immigrant integration patterns – an examination for which Europe, with its diverse set of country

contexts, offers an excellent case study. Overall, the cross-European, multidimensional, broad-scope nature of the analyses helps build towards a more comprehensive, birds-eye-view understanding of immigrant integration in Europe.

1.4 Outline of thesis structure

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter provides some key background information on immigration in Europe to contextualise the research in this thesis (Chapter 2). In line with the first research question and as a foundation for my subsequent studies, Chapter 3 provides an in-depth literature review on the concept of integration and outlines my own conceptualisation of integration. Chapter 4 presents my methodological approach to the empirical studies, offering an overarching discussion of the methodological choices taken in the three empirical papers as well as further detail on particular methods in each paper (providing additional detail that the journal article length restrictions often prevented in the individual papers). This is followed by the three empirical papers in Chapters 5 to 7. These investigate, respectively, the dimensions of integration (Chapter 5), the integration of the second generation (Chapter 6), and the role of host country characteristics for integration (Chapter 7). Following the typical structure of academic journal articles, they each include introduction, literature review, data and methods, results, and discussion and conclusion sections. In conclusion, the final Chapter 8 brings together the knowledge generated by the individual studies in research of the thesis into an overall discussion, outlining answers to research questions and broader implications, along with limitations, directions for future research, and concluding remarks.

1.5 Clarifying some key terms and definitions

1.5.1 Immigrants, natives, and related terms (incl. immigrant generations)

Definitions of immigrants can vary, depending, for example, on how naturalized citizens, foreign-born people who immigrated as children, and native-born children of immigrants are categorised (Anderson and Blinder 2019). Origin can also matter – for instance, EU documents and reports’ definition of immigrants often excludes mobile EU citizens (e.g. European Commission 2020a). Generally speaking, international migration scholars and demographers tend to define immigrants based on foreign country of birth rather than foreign citizenship, which is changeable, though the latter is sometimes used when country of birth information is missing (UNDESA 2020; Rumbaut 2006; Willekens et al. 2016). Following this logic, I base my identification on country of birth. Further, to add nuance to the foreign- vs. native-born distinction, it is common practice in migration scholarship to differentiate among migrant⁷ ‘generations’ based on country of birth information of the individual and their parents (and/or grandparents) and time of immigration to the current country of residence (Rumbaut 2006).

The level of detail in this regard can vary.⁸ Studies interested chiefly in first-generation immigrants may only distinguish between ‘immigrants’ and ‘natives’ meaning foreign-born

⁷ Note: I use the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘immigrant’ interchangeably in this dissertation, though I mainly rely on the latter.

⁸ At the most detail level, migration scholars (see, e.g., Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017, 27–28; Rumbaut 2006) distinguishes between the following generations of immigrants:

- 1st generation: foreign-born residents migrated to the host country as adults (age 18 and over);
- 1.25 generation: foreign-born residents migrated to the host country as teenagers (ages 13–17);
- 1.5 generation: foreign-born residents migrated to the host country as older children (ages 6–12);
- 1.75 generation: foreign-born residents migrated as young children (ages 0–5);
- 2nd generation: residents born in the host country to two foreign-born parents;
- 2.5 generation: residents born in the host country to one foreign- and one native-born parent;
- 3rd generation: residents born in the host country to native-born parents, with one or more foreign-born grandparents; and
- 4th generation: individuals with parents and grandparents born in the host country.

and native-born (of any background), respectively (see, e.g., Eurostat 2017). Further, literature interested in intergenerational processes of integration and/or the situation of children of immigrants tends to distinguish between three major generational groups: the first (i.e., foreign-born) generation, the second generation (their native-born offspring) and the ‘3+’ generation (natives with native-born parents) (Eurostat 2016; Pew Research Center 2013). The way these broader generational categories are defined can vary.

One example is where the ‘1.5’ generation – immigrants who were born abroad but arrived as young children – falls (Myers, Gao, and Emeka 2009). Though administratively foreign-born, members of the 1.5 generation have spent their formative years, including their schooling, in the host country. In light of this, their integration opportunities are often viewed as more comparable to that of the second generation than that of foreign-born residents who migrated as adults, for example (Myers, Gao, and Emeka 2009). Therefore, though some studies set examine the 1.5 generation as its own category, many consider members of the 1.5-generation as part of the ‘de facto’ (or ‘broad’) second generation, essentially viewing them as ‘late arriving members’ of it (Myers, Gao, and Emeka 2009, 210; Waters 2014; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a; Bean et al. 2012).

Further, within the second generation, it makes theoretical sense to distinguish between children of one native and one foreign-born and children of two foreign-born parents, as the presence of even one native-born parent can make a considerable difference in terms of local cultural, social, and human capital, for example (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Lessard-Phillips and Li 2017; OECD/EU 2019; Pichler 2011). In practice, analyses of

Typically, however, the generational distinction is simplified into a few main categories (as discussed in the following).

second-generation immigrants make this distinction fairly rarely, for the practical reason that second-generation samples large enough to allow for such a distinction and retain sample sizes sufficient for robust quantitative analyses are difficult to come by. (The same can be said for investigating the ‘1.5’ generation separately.) All in all, unless otherwise noted, I rely on the following terms and definitions:

- *Natives*: native-born residents (regardless of parentage)
- *Immigrants*: foreign-born residents (immigrated at any age, unless otherwise noted)
- *First-generation immigrants*: foreign-born residents; excluding the 1.5 generation, if so specified (‘narrow’ definition of first gen.; used, e.g., in my empirical analyses)⁹
 - Also referred to as: *immigrants*, or *immigrant populations/groups/minorities*
- *‘1.5’ generation immigrants*: foreign-born residents who immigrated as young children; I use the common cut-off of age 12 or younger in my analyses (e.g. Kasinitz et al. 2008)
- *Second-generation immigrants*:¹⁰ native-born residents with one or two immigrant parents; includes ‘1.5’ generation if so specified (broad definition of second generation, e.g., ‘*second generation (incl. 1.5)*’)
 - Also referred to as: *the second generation*; *immigrant-parentage natives*, *immigrant-background natives*, or *immigrant-background* or *immigrant-origin populations/groups/ minorities*
- *‘3+’ generation*: residents born in the host country to two native-born parents


⁹ Operationalisation specific to empirical analyses discussed in further detail in Methodology section.

¹⁰ Though I do keep the term ‘second-generation immigrants’ in this dissertation for continuity with earlier literature, I aim to minimise the use of the term ‘immigrants’ as much as possible when referring to this population (and do not include them in the standalone ‘immigrants’ term) seeing as they are actually natives, and continued reference to these groups as ‘immigrants’ has justly been criticised as an exclusionary practice (see, e.g., Favell 2016).

- Also referred to as: *native-background* or *native-parentage natives*
- *Immigrant and immigrant-background populations/groups/minorities*: first- and second-generation immigrants, jointly (typically vs. native-background natives)
 - Also referred to as: *immigrant and immigrant-origin populations/groups/minorities; immigrants and their (immediate) descendants*

Figure 1.1 below illustrates the logic of the above categorisation, including the split into ‘natives’ and ‘immigrants’ based on country of birth, and further breakdowns within them. Within this graph, the joint immigrant and immigrant-background population as defined above includes the segment covered by the yellow and the green circles jointly.

Figure 1.1. Illustration of logic of immigrant/native categories in terminology used



Note: author's own illustration.

1.5.2 Integration

There is no standard definition of migrant integration; in fact, even the term itself is contested (Kivisto 2005; Spencer and Charsley 2021). I undertake an extensive review and discussion around the definition of integration (and related alternative terms) in Chapter 3; in the meantime, I simply define integration as immigrants' and their descendants' acceptance and inclusion as full members of society (Penninx 2019; Alba and Foner 2015).

1.5.3 Social inclusion and inequality

The concept of social inclusion (or exclusion) is strongly related to immigrant integration, and is often mentioned in policy-oriented integration research or initiatives (OECD 2012; European Commission 2020b). Used perhaps most prominently in the field of international development, social inclusion is typically defined in terms of removing barriers to equal participation in society for groups (defined by ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship status, occupation etc.); social exclusion thus refers to the stigmatisation, structural exclusion, and/or discrimination that prevents certain members of society from fully participating in political, economic, and social life (World Bank n.d.; UNDESA 2016, 20). The concept is thus strongly related to inequality, especially inequality of opportunity (see, e.g., Platt 2019). More narrowly, 'social inclusion' (or exclusion) can also refer to the specifically social aspect of societal inclusion/exclusion, measured for example via discrimination and other forms of differentiation (or lack thereof); in this case, it is often mentioned alongside other types of inclusion/exclusion, such as political (Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

A related concept is that of *inequality*. Like integration, *inequality* has varied definitions and understandings. As Platt writes,

Inequalities can be distinguished in terms of whether they are inequalities of opportunity, inequalities of outcome, inequalities of access or inequalities in entitlement, and they are also differentiated as to whether they are characterised as just or unjust, avoidable or unavoidable, ‘natural’ or artificially sustained (2019, 3).

Further, a common differentiation is between vertical vs. horizontal inequalities in society. Vertical inequalities refer to inequalities among individuals or households, while horizontal inequalities refer to inequalities among groups defined, for example by ethnicity, religion, or race (Stewart, Brown, and Cobham 2009). For the purpose of immigrant integration research, the type of inequality that is of most interest is that between groups (i.e., horizontal), though as I will elaborate later on (Chapter 3), understanding the latter involves a consideration of both. The differentiation between the prior types of inequality as it concerns immigrants and their descendants – inequality of opportunity vs. outcomes, it being just or unjust, avoidable or unavoidable – is far from straightforward, as I discuss further in Chapter 3. Generally speaking, I am interested in (in)equality of opportunity, drawing on the idea, as outlined also above, that links societal inclusion with equality of opportunity, referring to the basic idea that belonging to a certain group (including immigrant background) should not be a basis for structural exclusion, discrimination, and any other barriers to equal access to participation in society. That said, though like most studies on integration (e.g., OECD/EU 2019; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; see also Schinkel 2018; Favell 2016), I am chiefly able to infer about the state of (in)equality of opportunity via (in)equality of outcomes, net of relevant compositional effects (as far as data allows to account for these). (A longer discussion of these issues follows in Chapter 3.)

1.5.4 Europe, EU, EU/EEA etc.

My geographical focus in this thesis is Europe, which I define beyond the ‘narrow’ EU28 bloc to include some further European countries to the extent possible. Generally, this means

including EEA or EFTA countries, especially Norway and Switzerland, but in the case of Paper 2 (where sample sizes allowed this) also some south-east European countries (e.g., Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro; but not Turkey, for example). Throughout the thesis, I use the ‘old’ (2013-2019) EU28 aggregation as opposed to the new EU27(2020) one, because my data was collected in the pre-Brexit context. The acronym EU/EEA refers to EU28 countries (as of 2020) and EEA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). When I mention ‘European’ literature I generally refer to works within the broader European context (including as well as beyond the EU28 bloc), though the majority of European literature does focus on Western Europe.

2

BACKGROUND: IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

2.1 Introduction

To offer some additional background information on the populations and contexts explored in this thesis, this section provides an overview of Europe's immigrant and immigrant-background population, including the history of these flows, the different host country contexts, a brief presentation of diverging policy responses, and some key present-day characteristics of immigrant minorities across Europe.

2.2 The origins of Europe's immigrant population: a brief history of immigration since 1945

To understand the present-day context of immigration and immigrant integration in Europe, it is helpful to review the continent's modern history with immigration. While migration has always been present, the origins of today's first- and second-generation immigrant populations in Europe can largely be traced back to the post-World-War-II era and the demographic transitions, economic transformations, and historical events that followed (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Van Mol and de Valk 2016). Looking back on this history, de Haas, Castles, and Miller (2019, 117, 118–42) distinguish four main phases: migration in the post-war boom (1945–1973); settlement and the growth of dual labour markets (1973–1989); migration during neoliberal globalization (1989–2008); and 'destination Europe' (migration after 2008). I discuss these in turn.

In the economic boom of the post-war era, North-Western Europe became a global migration destination, resulting in new, ethnically distinct immigrant communities in these countries (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008; Van Mol and de Valk 2016). Between 1945 and early the 1970s, Western European governments and large companies began major recruitment efforts of foreign workers from the European periphery

to assist reconstruction efforts and the expansion of industrial production, as their increasingly well-educated native workforces were moving up into white-collar work (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Van Mol and de Valk 2016). The so-called ‘guestworker’ programs of Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland (also, to some extent, Britain) attracted manual labourers, first from Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal), and then, from the 1960s, Turkey, Morocco, and Yugoslavia (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008). Partly as a result of decolonization, the former imperial powers (Britain, France, and the Netherlands) then saw additional inflows of labour migration, and repatriation of former colonial settlers, from their (former) colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean (ibid.). Meanwhile, the northern countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden also received labour migrants, from Turkey, India and Pakistan, as well as intra-regional movements (especially from Norway, Denmark, and Finland to Sweden) as a result of a free Nordic labour market from 1954 (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008).

The next phase (1973–1989) saw a global economic restructuring and the growth of dual labour markets in the 1970s and 1980s, accelerated in part by the Oil Shock of 1973 and the following recessions (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019). As emphasised by de Haas and colleagues (2019), the ongoing shift from industry to services in North-Western European economies meant a reduction of industrial jobs in these countries. When the impetus for labour inflows stopped, many guestworkers did not return home but rather settled down and were joined by their families, resulting in a continued inflow of largely lower-skilled family migration to Western Europe (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Van Mol and de Valk 2016). For the above-mentioned North-Western European nations, this period involved coming to terms with their reluctant

status as a countries of immigration, as new attempts to restrict mobility only served to turning formerly temporary or circular inflows into permanent ones when earlier labour migrants decided to settle and have their families join them (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Martin and Miller 1980). By the 1980s, as these groups had settled and developed into established and visible communities, public and policy debates around their ‘integration’ rose to increasing prominence, along with different ‘models’ of integration policy regimes. (I discuss these further in a following section.)

Meanwhile, increasing quality of life and employment opportunities during this time in Southern Europe spurred a major return migration to these countries, with the number of Greek, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Yugoslavian immigrants in Europe decreasing, while the number of Turks and North African immigrants increased (Van Mol and de Valk 2016). Partly due to immigration restrictions in North-Western Europe, Southern European countries also started experiencing migration inflows: from the mid-1980s and increasingly throughout the 1990s, Italy, Spain, Greece, and to some extent, Portugal, transformed into countries of immigration, with migrant workers from North Africa, Latin America, Asia (and, post-1989, Eastern Europe), taking up low-skilled jobs, often as part of the substantial informal economies operating in these countries (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Fokkema and de Haas 2011; Van Mol and de Valk 2016). Behind the Iron Curtain, Central and Eastern Europe also recruited migrant workers, from fellow communist countries, within the bloc and other parts of the world, such as Cuba, Vietnam, China, Angola, and others (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019).

Also during this period, new neo-liberal economic policies of deregulation and decreased welfare state contributed to the development of dual labour markets, characterised

by a split between stable, formal and well-paid jobs in the primary labour market and precarious, poorly paid, and often informal jobs in the secondary labour market (Piore 1979; Constant and Massey 2005; de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019). As economies picked up again in the mid-1980s, demand for migrant workers increased again, this time at diverse skill levels (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008).

The following period, between 1989 and 2008, saw the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the following disintegration of multinational federal states and processes of neoliberal globalization, as well as the growing integration of the European Union, including the creation of the Schengen zone of free movement in 1992 and the following EU enlargements in 1995, 2004, and 2007¹¹ (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019). As Van Mol and de Valk (2016) note, as the European market became unified, movements *within* the EU were actively supported, while entrance *into* the EU became progressively restricted and politicised. Stricter immigration controls, they add, went hand in hand with an increase in irregular migration. Overall, countries of origin and migration motives continued to diversify (Van Mol and de Valk 2016).

The dissolution of Yugoslavia in throughout the 1990s also led to a large increase in refugee movements, chiefly to Germany and north-western Europe, but also Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; see also Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005). Overall, the 1990s saw a growth in East to West migration within Europe and intra-European mobility in general (including also ‘ethnic migration’ from bordering

¹¹ Which led to the inclusion of most of Central-Eastern and Southeastern Europe into the bloc, i.e., the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovakia (2004); Bulgaria and Romania (2007).

countries) (ibid.).¹² Although the events of the 1990s and the EU enlargement rounds of the 2000s alike did lead to a substantial increase East to West labour migration (with a considerable presence of, for example, Polish workers in the UK and Germany, Romanians in Spain and Italy), de Haas and colleagues (2019) note that these flows for the most part did not reach the expected –sometimes feared– levels. Following early surges, movements often remained temporary and circular, complementing, rather than replacing, non-European immigration.¹³

In fact, non-EU immigration also continued to increase throughout the 2000s, with increasing diversity as regions of origin came to include Latin America, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa; their education levels became more varied, as well, with migration from higher-skilled workers and students from Asia, for example, increasing steadily (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; OECD 2010). Southern Europe was also a major recipient of this new immigration, with irregular migration becoming a strong presence, and finding employment in the informal economy, as mentioned above (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019). An important demographic development during this time was an increasing recognition of the aging native population in many European societies, as lowered fertility rates paired with the baby boomer generation reaching retirement age, predicting a growing need for labour migration (OECD 2010). Further, Van Mol and de Valk (2016) note increasing attempts by many European countries to attract highly skilled migrants, including student migration, often from outside the EU.

¹² Central-Eastern European states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic continued to attract some immigration, often from countries further East.

¹³ De Haas and colleagues (2019) highlight the large-scale settlement of Polish workers in the UK as an important exception.

The last phase outlined by de Haas and colleagues (2019) started with a slump in migration after the Great Recession of 2007-08. Nevertheless, they note, this did not lead to large-scale increase in return migration among non-EU migrants (echoing the post-1973 settlement of guestworkers). Southern European countries, Ireland, and some Eastern European countries¹⁴ that were hit the hardest saw decreases in immigration and increases in emigration, as unemployment soared among natives as well as foreigners (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; OECD 2010; OECD/EU 2019). Still, the new intra-European migrants were often highly skilled and not filling the continued need for low-skilled jobs, thus leading to a continued position for non-European migrant workers (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019). Once economic growth resumed in the 2010s, immigration in countries such as Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Scandinavia continued to grow, driven in part by increased refugee and asylum seeker inflows, especially around 2015 (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019; OECD/EU 2019).

To summarise, this overview of modern European immigration history distinguished between four main phases (drawing on Van Mol and de Valk 2016; and de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019). The period from the 1950s to the early 1970s was characterised by an era of post-war economic boom in North-West Europe which led to a demand in (temporary) labour migration from Southern Europe as well as Turkey, North Africa, and (former) colonies. The oil crisis of 1973 marks the start of the second period, which led so much to a stop of immigration as much as a transformation in the type of migration. As the earlier demand for foreign workers came to a stop, guestworkers and other (presumed) temporary labour immigration turned long-term and was paired with an increase in family migration.

¹⁴ The exception being Poland, which has shown signs of transitioning to a net immigration country

That said, by the mid-1980s Southern Europe saw an increase in return migration as well as immigration from outside the EU (North Africa, Latin-America, Asia). The next period, starting from the early 1990s, saw the end of the Cold War, a rise in humanitarian migration, and increasing EU integration. These processes led to an increase in East-to-West migration within Europe and intra-EU migration in general, while the increasing regulation of non-EU immigration has been associated with highly skilled and student immigration but also an increase in irregular immigration from outside Europe. The past decade, including the post-2008 period, has seen an increase in highly skilled migration from Southern and Eastern Europe to North-West Europe, and some major humanitarian inflows.

Overall, the past decades have seen continuing diversification of migrant populations across Europe, in terms of countries of origin, destinations, migration motivations, skill levels, and demographics. In fact, an emerging scholarship has been paying attention to the so-called *superdiversity* of migrant populations, especially in major European cities such as London, Amsterdam, or Brussels, but also as a global phenomenon (Vertovec 2007; Crul 2015). The notion of superdiversity does not merely refer to more diversity, but rather more complex patterns of diversity, manifesting in multiple, interacting forms:

The changing configurations not only entail the movement of people from more varied national, ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds, but also the ways that shifts concerning these categories or attributes coincide with a worldwide diversification of movement flows through specific migration channels (such as work permit programmes, mobilities created by EU enlargement, ever-changing refugee and ‘mixed migration’ flows, undocumented movements, student migration, family reunion, and so on); the changing compositions of various migration channels themselves entail ongoing differentiations of legal statuses (conditions, rights and restrictions), diverging patterns of gender and age, and variance in migrants’ human capital (education, work skills and experience) (Meissner and Vertovec 2015, 542).

Next, I briefly describe Europe’s present-day immigrant and immigrant-background populations in terms of their origin, residence, and main demographic characteristics, based on recent statistics.


2.3 A profile of Europe's immigrant and immigrant-background population

As mentioned in the *Introduction*, immigrant populations – defined as foreign-born residents – represent a steadily growing segment of European societies, both in the absolute and relative sense (see Figures 2.1-2.2) (OECD 2021c; Eurostat 2021b).^{15, 16} As of 2020, there were an estimated 66.2 million foreign-born residents living in EU/EEA region (OECD 2021c); between 2011 and 2020, immigrants represented an average ca. 11.2% of the population in the EU/EEA region (Eurostat 2021b). The majority of these immigrants (64%) were born outside the EU28, though intra-EU movers also represent a considerable share (about 36%) – a ratio that has stayed remarkably steady, as shown in Figure 2.2 (Eurostat 2021b). The EU/non-EU distinction is a very common one in EU immigration statistics and policy: official immigration statistics provided by the EU tend to use ‘EU’ and ‘non-EU’ origin as the main differentiation within immigrant flows and stocks; further, EU policy efforts and thus EU-commissioned statistics on integration primarily focus on third-country nationals (non-EU origin). I follow this EU/non-EU distinction in this section as I am relying, for simplicity, on aggregate statistics as provided by the EU, OECD, and similar sources, even if it is not (exactly) the differentiation I use in my later analyses (see *Methodology* chapter for details).

¹⁵ In this section, my focus is on characterising the main trends (generally led by the main immigrant-hosting countries) and thus I follow the typical aggregation of EU/EEA or EU/EFTA countries, or, when that is not available, EU28 or the closest approximate aggregation. I keep the EU28 aggregation as opposed to the new EU27 (2020) as my data was collected in the pre-Brexit context.


¹⁶ For brevity, in most of this section I use EU28 or EU/EEA aggregates (with the exception of Figure 2.4); for more detailed statistics, refer to OECD (OECD 2021b; OECD/EU 2019) and Eurostat (2015; 2021b).

Figure 2.1. Foreign-born population stocks in EU/EFTA, 2000-20 (millions)



Source: OECD (2021c)

Figure 2.2. Foreign-born population (EU/non-EU) stocks as share of population in EU/EEA, 2014-2020




Source: Eurostat (2021b)

Compared to statistics on first-generation immigrants (both foreign-born residents and foreign nationals, especially third-country-nationals), estimates on second-generation immigrants, that is, native-born Europeans with immigrant background, are fairly scarce (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). The last comprehensive estimate by the OECD and Eurostat on native-born immediate descendants of immigrants is from 2018; according to this residents with one or two immigrant parents together represented about 7.4% of the

EU28's population (OECD/EU 2019). Together, immigrant and immigrant-background residents represented ca. 18% of the population in the EU28 bloc (OECD/EU 2019). Concerning their demographic characteristics, 2014 EU-level estimates suggested a largely balanced gender ratio among the second-generation and slightly more women among first-generation immigrants (46.3% males to 53.3% women) (Eurostat 2017). Estimates also indicated a similar median age (around 40 years) between first-generation immigrants and native-background natives, while the second generation had a considerably lower median age, especially those of non-EU origin (32.3 years) (Eurostat 2017).¹⁷


Figure 2.3. Age distribution by migration background, EU (2014; percentages)



Source: Eurostat (2017) (based on LFS 2014 ad hoc module)

¹⁷ Note: the LFS is conducted on the working-age population, i.e., 15 to 64 years.

Figure 2.4. Immigrant and immigrant-background population across Europe, as share of total population (2017 or latest available year)



Source: Adapted from OECD/EU (2019, 19) (figure adapted to Europe using linked data in the publication)

As Figure 2.4 shows, the prevalence of immigrants and their descendants varies widely across the continent, reflecting the divergent past and recent trends of immigration described earlier. According to estimates from the 2014 ad-hoc module of immigrants and their descendants of the Labour Force Survey (2014 LFS AHM), most of Europe's immigrant population (including immigrants *and* their immediate descendants) resided in one of five main countries: Germany (21%), the UK (19%) France (19%), Italy (11%), and Spain (10%) (Eurostat 2017). Among these, Spain and Italy mostly hosted first-generation immigrants, while France mostly had second-generation immigrants (in fact being the main host of the latter). Germany and the UK were the largest hosts of first-generation immigrants, with a fairly balanced ratio of first- and second-generation immigrant stocks each (Eurostat 2017).

To give an idea on the main types of immigrant populations prevalent across different European regions and countries, in Table 2.1 below I reproduce a recent categorisation by the OECD/EU (2019). This connects strongly to the historical immigration processes described previously: Western Europe, especially Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands show the legacy of guestworker inflows, while a few other countries (e.g., the UK) have also received many highly skilled immigrants in recent years. The immigrant populations of Nordic countries (some of which, e.g., Sweden have also been long-standing destination countries), have been shaped by a considerable inflow of humanitarian immigrants in recent years. Most of Southern Europe constitutes recent countries of immigration, largely attracting lower-skilled labour immigrants. The immigrant and immigrant-background population Central and Eastern Europe, meanwhile, is in large part a product of historical border changes and national minorities, with a relatively small (though, in some cases, growing) ‘truly’ foreign immigrant population.

Table 2.1. Categories of European countries by immigrant populations

Experience with immigration / main type of immigrant population		Countries	Geographical region
Long-standing destination countries	Many recent and highly educated immigrants	Luxembourg, Switzerland, United Kingdom	Western Europe
	Longstanding lower-educated immigrants	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands	
Destinations with significant recent and humanitarian migration		Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden	Northern Europe
New destinations with many labour immigrants	Many low-educated immigrants before the crisis	Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain	Southern Europe (and Iceland, Ireland)
	Recent highly educated immigrants	Iceland, Ireland, Malta	
Countries with immigrant population shaped by border changes and/or by national minorities		Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia	Central and Eastern Europe (incl. Baltic and Balkans)
Emerging destinations with small immigrant populations (and growing return populations)		Bulgaria, Romania	

Source: adapted (with some edits) from OECD/EU 2019, p. 26.

Going into further detail concerning the first generation, Table 2.2 below lists the top three countries of origin for immigrant stocks in different European countries, alongside the main reasons for immigration indicated among immigrant respondents of the survey (based on 2014 LFS AHM data). As shown here, countries vary widely in both the origin and the reason for immigration of their immigrant populations. The latter is meaningful for integration because is linked to demographic characteristics, skill levels, and other types of selectivity of immigrant populations (see, e.g., Constant and Zimmermann 2005; Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015). For instance, we may expect labour or student immigrants to successfully integrate into the labour market, due both to selectivity (in terms of skill/education) and motivation. Family and humanitarian migrants may also end up integrating very successfully into the labour market, but they do not represent a specifically ‘pre-selected’ population in those terms. For third country nationals, their security of long-term residence and rights during residence may depend on their type of residence permit, that is, the legal channel through which they immigrated into the country,¹⁸ affecting their participation in host society (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Corrigan 2015). Looking at first-generation immigrants at the overall EU level from 2014, the main reported reason for migration were primarily family reasons (49.5%), followed by work (29.2%), education (5.5%), and international protection or asylum (5.1%). For women, family reasons were by far the most prevalent, indicated by over half of respondents, while for men, work reasons were nearly as common (Eurostat 2017).

¹⁸ Which, it should be noted, can differ from their actual (main) motivation for immigration and/or long-term settlement, which may also be multifaceted and change over time (Van Mol and de Valk 2016).

Table 2.2. Characteristics of migrants across Europe: top 3 countries of birth and reasons for immigration of foreign-born residents, 2014 (LFS 2014 ad-hoc module)

Residence/ reporting country	Top 3 main countries of birth of foreign-born residents			Main reasons for immigration (%)			
	1st	2nd	3rd	Family reason	Work	Education	International protection or asylum
Belgium	Morocco	France	Netherlands	52.2	20.8	5.2	9.5
Bulgaria	:	:	:	56.8	:	:	:
Czech Republic	Slovakia	Ukraine	Vietnam	50.2	37.2	6.4	0.7
Germany	Turkey	Poland	Russia	43.7	21.7	4.7	8.7
Estonia	Russia	Ukraine	Belarus	81.7	13.7	3.4	:
Greece	Albania	Georgia	Bulgaria	24.4	46.3	1.1	0.2
Spain	Morocco	Romania	Ecuador	43.7	44.1	2.5	0.5
France	Algeria	Morocco	Portugal	66.7	14.8	9.6	4.4
Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbia	Germany	62.6	16.4	4.6	14.9
Italy	Romania	Albania	Morocco	47.5	48.3	2.3	0.5
Cyprus	United Kingdom	Romania	Greece	36.8	54.5	1.8	1.5
Latvia	Russia	Belarus	Ukraine	76.3	8.7	7.7	:
Lithuania	Russia	Belarus	Ukraine	70.9	19.6	:	:
Luxembourg	France	Portugal	Belgium	45.1	44.2	:	:
Hungary	Romania	Ukraine	Serbia	43.9	35.4	5.4	:
Malta	United Kingdom	Australia	Canada	32.9	:	6.1	:
Austria	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Germany	Turkey	54.9	24.7	7	9.9
Poland	Russia	Belarus	Germany	48.9	23.6	15.9	:
Portugal	Angola	France	Brazil	71.1	13.5	3.8	2.3
Slovenia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatia	Serbia	50.5	38.9	5.1	2.8
Slovakia	Czech Republic	Ukraine	:	88.5	:	:	:
Finland	Form. Soviet Union (pre-1991)	Sweden	Estonia	58.1	14.7	7.8	8.5
Sweden	Iraq	Serbia	Iran	55.6	9.6	5.3	20.6
United Kingdom	Poland	India	Pakistan	45.6	30.4	14.1	4.6

Source: adapted from Eurostat (2017) (based on LFS 2014 ad hoc module)

Note: Data not available for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Romania; : not available

2.4 Integration policy regimes

A further factor shaping the past and present of immigrant- and immigrant-background members of European societies is the way in which receiving countries have addressed their integration, if at all. Although analyses of integration policies fall beyond the scope of the research in my thesis – except, to some extent, in Paper 3 (Chapter 7) – I find it useful to briefly discuss some of the main policy approaches taken across the continent, as they form an important backdrop to the phenomenon of integration in Europe and can thus help contextualise my research and findings. As an introductory note, a useful framework through which to understand the diversity of policy approaches comes from Penninx (2005). Penninx identifies four areas of integration policy: the legal/political, socioeconomic, and cultural/religious dimensions; within each, he argues, integration policy (or policies relevant to integration) can be inclusive (e.g., providing citizenship/legal rights; equal access to the labour market/economic participation; and equal cultural/religious rights), or exclusive (denying equal access and rights). In practice, countries tend to adopt a variation of more and less inclusive policies in different regards.

The different history and nature of immigration across the continent, as discussed earlier, combined with varied citizenship, labour market, and welfare regimes has resulted in a range of different integration policy approaches (Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1997; Castles 1995; Freeman 2004; Penninx 2005; Bean et al. 2012). The development of integration policies – or lack thereof – in North-Western Europe was shaped by the history of colonial immigration and guestworker programs, as well as different models of citizenship and nationhood among them (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016; Hollifield 1997; Castles 1995). Based on these, scholars have posited different types of ‘integration regimes’, or

national models (typically focusing on the North-Western European ‘traditional’ countries of immigration) (e.g., Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1997; Castles 1995; Freeman 2004; Penninx 2005; Bean et al. 2012). Though the validity of such models has been challenged (Bean et al. 2012; Doornik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016; Freeman 2004), I find them useful here as a basic overview. In Table 2.3 (next page), I present a rough synthesis of the main outlined regime types based on some seminal literature in this regard (e.g., Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1997; Castles 1995; Freeman 2004; Penninx 2005; Bean et al. 2012).

Focusing on the North-Western Europe, categorisations tend to distinguish between Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; France; the UK; and Sweden as representing four different approaches. The Netherlands varies in categorisation, also due to changes over time. Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (as well as early policies of the Netherlands) represent what Hollifield (1997) calls the ‘guest worker model’, with overlaps in what Castles (1995) calls ‘differential exclusion’ and Freeman (2004) the ‘third syndrome’ of approaches. As their main inflows were represented by ‘guest workers’, immigrants were merely seen temporary labour providers in society, making their cultural and political integration unnecessary. Immigrants were given access to the labour market, but only on a temporary basis; permanent settlement was discouraged. In line with this, access to citizenship was difficult, and often based on ancestry rather than the person’s place of birth (*jus sanguinis*).

Table 2.3. A summary of integration regime categorisations (North-Western European countries, 1980–early 2000s)

Name of policy approach/regime	Description	Countries used as examples ¹	Other features ²
Guest worker model (Hollifield 1997)	Migrants seen as temporary labour-providers – permanent settlement discouraged, access to citizenship difficult (just sanguinis); access to labour market provided, but only temporarily; cultural and political integration not seen as necessary to address (given the temporary nature)	Germany, Austria, Switzerland	Coordinated market economies, corporatist/conservative welfare systems;
Differential exclusion (Castles 1995)			
'Third syndrome' (Freeman 2004)			
Exclusionist (Penninx 2005)		Netherlands (until 1980)	'Hybrid' (soc. democratic/conservative) welfare state
Assimilation model (Hollifield 1997)	Migrants accepted as permanent members of society and given legal/citizenship rights (jus soli). However, no tolerance for cultural pluralism	France	Conservative welfare state
Assimilation (Castles 1997)			
Legal/political inclusion (but other exclusion) (Penninx 2005)			
Ethnic minorities model (Hollifield 1997)	Migration accepted as permanent, and citizenship rights fairly easy (e.g. for colonial immigrants); however, migrants are defined by their ethnic/migrant origin; cultural pluralism allowed, but as separate communities; inclusion in the legal/political sense does not entail equality	UK/Britain	Liberal welfare state
Legal/political inclusion (but other exclusion) (Penninx 2005)			
Assimilation (Castles 1997)		(Netherlands)	
Pluralist (multicultural/integrationist) approaches (Castles 1995)	Moderately open immigration and citizenship regimes, uneasy embrace of multiculturalism; mixed approach, incorporating some pluralist elements; contradictions between goals and policies	Sweden	Coordinated market economies, social democratic or corporatist welfare states
Second syndrome' (Freeman 2004)		(Netherlands)	

Source: author's summary/adaptation based on Hollifield (1997), Castles (1995), Freeman (2004), Penninx (2005), Brubaker (1992), Bean et al. (2012), Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003); ¹ Note these are based on policy contexts at the time; ² Based on Freeman (2004) and Kammer et al. (2012).

By comparison, the models of France and the UK were more accepting of migrants as permanent members of society, constituting models that were more inclusive from a legal/political perspective (Penninx 2005), though neither represented a fully inclusive or egalitarian logic – Castles (1995) categorises both under the ‘assimilation’ model. Hollifield (1997) sees the two as distinct. France represents the ‘assimilation model’, where immigrants are accepted into the state and native-born children of immigrants are automatically provided citizenship (*jus soli*). However, immigrants are also expected to fully assimilate, adopting host society’s cultural norms and not form socio-culturally distinct communities (Hollifield 1997; Doornik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016). In this model, civic inclusion thus comes at the cost of low (or no) tolerance for cultural pluralism. The UK model, which was shaped primarily by colonial migration (as was, in part, the Dutch model), was similar in that citizenship was provided fairly easily, especially for (post-)colonial immigrants. However, Hollifield (1997) calls this the ‘ethnic minorities model’ as migrants continue to be defined – even several generations in – by their ethnic/migrant origin. Unlike in the case of France, cultural pluralism is allowed, but in the form of separate ‘minority’ communities (Hollifield 1997; Doornik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016). Meanwhile, Sweden was seen as exemplifying a relatively more tolerant, pluralist (or multicultural) model (Castles 1995; Freeman 2004). Some also categorise the Netherlands, post-1980, as representing this approach (e.g., Freeman 2004). Still, even this model was mixed in its inclusiveness, combining a moderately open immigration and citizenship regime with an apprehensive embrace of multiculturalism in formal policies (Castles 1995; Freeman 2004).

Beyond targeted integration policies, Doornik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016) note key differences to in these countries’ welfare regimes and immigrants’ access to them. For instance, while Scandinavian countries tend to cover the whole population (and the

Netherlands, Spain and the UK offer universal coverage in some areas of welfare), conservative-corporatist welfare states like Germany, France, and the Benelux tend to exclude some migrant categories from benefits (ibid.). Countries' approaches have also changed in some ways, with naturalisation becoming somewhat easier in some formerly more restrictive countries (e.g., Germany), while others, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have introduced mandatory integration courses (which have since become more widely adopted in Western Europe), enforcing some forms of cultural assimilation (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016).

On a further note, in addition to the national level, local authorities and local actors have long played a key role in formulating and especially implementing integration policies (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016; Scholten and Penninx 2016). As Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016) note, even in countries with highly centralised systems such as the Netherlands or Sweden, local actors have influenced integration processes substantially, often operating from a more pragmatic perspective.¹⁹

Turning to other regions of Europe, in Southern and Central and Eastern European countries integration policies have generally represented a later and more limited concern, in line with their delayed and/or more limited experiences of immigration compared to the 'classical' immigration countries of North-Western Europe. Concerning the then-new countries of immigration of Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016) note an early labour-oriented approach similar to North-Western European countries' early guestworker model, followed by a bottom-up development of policies originating from local-level initiatives in the 1990s and then somewhat more coordinated

¹⁹ For an in-depth discussion of multilevel integration governance, see Scholten and Penninx (2016).

national frameworks in the early 2000s (especially in Greece and Portugal). Further, EU initiatives and support played a notable role in developing local integration programmes, in cooperation with local level organisations (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016). While inclusive in legal terms and in terms of access to basic rights, these countries tend to have fairly restrictive citizenship policies (ibid.). As the latter were paired with no formal assimilation or multiculturalism policy, in the mid-2000s Freeman (2004) warned that the approach end up as a model of *de facto* differential exclusion, with the relatively high share of undocumented immigrants in these countries constituting a particularly vulnerable population. Overall, Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016) conclude that integration in these countries is often less mediated by explicit policies and more by local networks' support and immigrants' agency as they often manage to get by regardless of legal status.

In Central and Eastern Europe, with an overall more limited experience of immigration and much of the foreign-born population being ethnically familiar, the design of integration policies has not been a priority. In fact, Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016) assert that, in countries like Hungary, Czechia and Poland, the development of integration policies has largely been a top-down process driven by the EU. While some countries (e.g., Czechia) have taken active steps such as changing naturalisation laws to facilitate legal inclusion, others (e.g., Poland) have relied explicitly and almost exclusively on EU funds to develop programmes; overall, national integration policies remain limited (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016).

Overall, as of the mid-2010s Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016) note a trend of convergence in integration regimes across Europe, with some North-Western European countries' initial multiculturalist approach turning more assimilationist over time, and vice-

versa, shifts from exclusion to openness in others. In Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, national integration policies remained limited, largely driven by local initiatives and/or EU funds and initiatives. Concerning the situation in recent years, a recent evaluation of migrant integration policies in several countries, including most European countries, from the MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) project²⁰ (Huddleston et al. 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020) show the legacy of the above-described approaches as well as notable changes in policy.

Specifically, the latest MIPEX evaluation (Solano and Huddleston 2020) asserts that policies supporting equal opportunities for immigrants are generally favourable in Western Europe (EU15). Sweden, Finland, Portugal, Belgium, Ireland, and Spain in particular are highlighted as some of the most inclusive policy contexts, representing a ‘comprehensive’ approach to integration. At the same time, most North-Western European countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK) and Italy remain fairly restrictive in terms of long-term settlement policies for of immigrants and their families. Moreover, Denmark, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and, especially, Norway and Denmark, introduced more restrictive policies between 2014 and 2019 (Solano and Huddleston 2020). Ireland, on the other hand, developed a new, more inclusive policy framework in the past few years (ibid.). Other recent developments include more targeted support in Austria and Germany, and dual nationality for the second generation in Germany (ibid.). Southern European countries seem mixed in their approaches over the past decade: Spain, and, especially, Portugal have become examples of inclusive policy contexts, while Italy places the higher end of the ‘halfway favourable’ policy contexts, and Greece on its lower end

²⁰ Also used in the study presented in Chapter 7 of this dissertation (Paper 3).

(Huddleston et al. 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020). In the emerging destination countries that still have small number of immigrants yet strong anti-immigration attitudes, such as the Baltics, Balkans, and Central and Eastern Europe, migrants face considerable challenges, with little policy support (if not obstruction) of integration (Solano and Huddleston 2020). That said – and further underscoring the role of the EU in these countries integration policies – between 2014 and 2019 Bulgaria has implemented EU laws and Czechia and Poland adopted EU-required anti-discrimination laws, as well as domestic citizenship reforms (ibid.).

On a further note concerning the role of the EU, though its formal competence on issues of migrant integration entered into effect in 2010 with the Lisbon treaty, its influence has been present since the early 2000s (Van Wolleghem 2019). This influence has typically been exercised via ‘soft’ instruments, in a patchwork of tools involving conceptual frameworks, networks of officials, benchmarks and funding opportunities (ibid.). Van Wolleghem notes a clear effort on the part of the EU to generate convergence in integration policies starting with the 2007-2013 Multiannual Financial Framework in particular. Though the size of funds has since grown substantially, analysing more recent frameworks, Van Wolleghem (2019) asserts that the substantive policy objective has given way to prioritising a greater degree in EU procedural control in the management of integration-related funds. Still, the EU’s continued efforts to encourage the development of integration policies and support coherence among them, remains clear, for example, in the 2021-2027 Action Plan (European Commission 2020b).

How is Europe’s immigrant and immigrant-background population doing, then? As a first, bird’s-eye view into the situation of immigrants and their descendants in Europe, in the

following I briefly outline some aggregate social indicators based on the OECD and EU's (2019) joint *Settling In 2018* report, the most recent and wide-ranging collection of first- and second-generation descriptive statistics at the EU level. (The same points about EU/non-EU classification, etc., apply to these statistics as the ones shared in the prior descriptive section on demographics.)

2.5 The situation of immigrants and their descendants in Europe: some basic indicators


Starting with the situation of first-generation (foreign-born) immigrants, as shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, the OECD and EU (2019) report considerable immigrant-native disparities in several areas. According to the statistics in Figure 2.5, 2014 LFS AHM data estimates over two-thirds of foreign-born residents across the EU to speak the language of the host country fluently (OECD/EU 2019). As of 2017, the share of the highly educated was similar (under 30%) among natives and foreign-born residents, but a higher share (by over 10%) of the foreign-born had low education levels (a trend driven by non-EU-born migrants) (Eurostat 2017; OECD/EU 2019).

The unemployment rate was higher among the foreign-born than the native-born, both among low-educated and high-educated groups; again, the trend was driven by those born outside the EU (Eurostat 2017; OECD/EU 2019). Overqualification rates were also much higher (about 10%) among the foreign-born (OECD/EU 2019). That said, the overall economic participation rate was similar for immigrants and native-background natives, achieved by higher rates of self-employment among immigrants (OECD/EU 2019). Immigrants also tend to be poorer, especially those of non-EU origin (OECD/EU 2019). As of 2015, the foreign-born overall had a nearly 13% higher rate of relative poverty, as well

as higher rates of living in overcrowded housing (Figure 2.6) (OECD/EU 2019). The median income as of 2015 (in constant prices based on 2014 PPP) for the population aged 16 and over was nearly 1400 EUR lower, on average, for foreign-born EU residents compared to the native-born population (with an even bigger gap for non-EU-born immigrants) (OECD/EU 2019).

Concerning the aspect of health, similar shares of the foreign-born reported good health status, as was the case with unmet medical needs (as of 2016) (OECD/EU 2019). Even among similarly eligible residents, a lower share of the foreign-born reported having participated in the most recent election (2008-16) (OECD/EU 2019). Similarly high shares of foreign- and native-born residents reported feeling close to their country of residence in 2014 (OECD/EU 2019). However, a total of over 13% of immigrants reported belonging to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of race, ethnicity, or nationality (OECD/EU 2019). As shown in Figure 2.7, rates of perceived discrimination were particularly high among male, African (especially Sub-Saharan African), Asian, low-educated, and unemployed immigrants (OECD/EU 2019).


Figure 2.5 Skills and labour market participation by migration status, percentages (EU28, ages 15-64, 2017 or latest available year)



Source: OECD/EU 2019 (adapted from publication with the help of the linked data sheets).

Notes: Aggregates as in OECD/EU (2019). 'Advanced language skills' aggregate of 25 EU countries.


Figure 2.6. Social indicators by migration background, percentages (EU28, ages 16 and above, 2016 or latest available year)



Source: OECD/EU 2019 (adapted from publication with the help of the linked data sheets).


Notes: Aggregates as in OECD/EU (2019). 'Voted in most recent election' based on population with the host country's nationality aged 18 and above, 2008-16.

Figure 2.7. Perceptions of discrimination among immigrants in the EU, percentages (2008-2016)



Source: OECD/EU 2019 (adapted data from datasets linked in publication).

Figure 2.8 Social indicators by migration background, percentages (ages 15-34, EU28, 2017 or latest available year)



Source: OECD/EU 2019 (adapted data from datasets linked in publication).

Turning to the second generation, the OECD and EU's report focuses on young people – 15- to 34-year-olds – with a migration background (OECD/EU 2019); comprehensive reports on the European second-generation population (including older cohorts) remain scarce. As shown in Figure 2.8, the OECD and EU's (2019) statistics suggest that children of immigrants, on average, tend to have lower educational attainment than their peers of native parentage, though disaggregated statistics (Eurostat 2017) reveal that this is only true for those with a non-EU background, while children of EU immigrants, on average, tend to be higher-educated than children of natives. (Also, keep in mind that these statistics are limited to the currently young cohort.) As of 2017, the rate of early school leavers was higher among youth with a migrant background, especially the foreign-born who arrived as children (i.e., the 1.5 generation) (OECD/EU 2019).

The shares of young adults who were not in employment, formal education or training (NEET) was somewhat lower for native-born children of immigrants (especially focusing on the low-educated), and somewhat higher, again, among foreign-born who arrived as children (OECD/EU 2019). Unemployment rates were higher among youth with a migration background, especially the foreign-born among them (OECD/EU 2019). Unlike for the first generation discussed above, the overqualification rates of youth with a migration background (including, though to a lesser extent, the foreign-born who arrived as children) were similar to those of native-parentage natives (OECD/EU 2019). Finally, the second-generation immigrants were more likely to report feeling discriminated against than their native-parentage peers, and were considerably less likely to participate in political elections (OECD/EU 2019).

All in all, these figures suggest that there are some considerable immigrant-native gaps at the European level, though the extent of those gaps depends strongly on the outcome observed as well as the origin of immigrants, with non-EU origin immigrants generally at a disadvantage (Eurostat 2017; OECD/EU 2019). Second-generation youth is generally closer to native averages than the first generation, though gaps still remain, especially for youth of non-EU background (Eurostat 2017; OECD/EU 2019). Overall, I view these figures as underscoring the continued relevance of studying integration, both for first- and second-generation immigrants. I note, for instance, a variation of patterns across different indicators that underlines the relevance of assessing integration from a systematically multidimensional perspective. I apply such a multidimensional approach throughout my three empirical studies, with a pointed examination of the structure of multidimensionality (and the links between different indicators) in the first empirical paper.

Further, the disparities shown by EU/non-EU origin even for the native-born generation – which should, ideally, no longer be suffering the disruptions associated with international migration – make a case for further examination. Are these inequalities an extension of EU/non-EU socioeconomic disparities observable for the migrant generation? Or are they due the racialised status of non-European-background members of the second generation? I explore these and other questions relating to second-generation immigrants' integration – including young *and* older cohorts – in the second empirical paper. Finally, though for length concerns I did not delve into country differences in these gaps, the above reports (Eurostat 2017; OECD/EU 2019) also show considerable variation in native-migrant(-background) disparities across different countries. Are these merely due to differences in the composition of immigrant(-background) groups, or are they also due to structural or institutional differences across countries – such as the variety in approaches to

integration policies described earlier? I examine these questions in my third empirical paper. All in all, I note some intriguing patterns within recent aggregate statistics, which, in combination with gaps within the existing scholarly literature (reviewed briefly in the *Introduction*, and more extensively in the individual papers) provide the basis for my upcoming analyses.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter provided some background information on the history of immigration and integration in Europe, to help contextualise present-day situation of immigrant(-background) populations across the continent. The first section provided an overview of immigration history since 1945 to recent decades, highlighting the diverging experiences with immigration across the different regions of Europe. It described the origins of present-day first- and second-generation immigrant groups in North-Western Europe, along with the more recent inflows to Southern Europe, and to some extent, Central and Eastern Europe. In conclusion, it noted a decades-long process of increasing diversification among immigrant and immigrant-background populations across Europe in terms of countries of origin, destinations, migration motivations, skill levels, and demographics. This diversity was further illustrated in a brief section presenting demographic and other descriptive statistics of first- and second-generation immigrant populations across Europe. To provide further background on the integration context faced by these groups, I then provided an overview of the different approaches to integration policy among European countries, from the ‘guestworker’ era to recent years. I concluded with a brief overview of recent integration-related statistics for first- and second-generation immigrants at the European level. These highlighted how the disadvantages, if any, faced by first- and second-generation immigrants

compared to native-background natives vary depending on the outcome examined, the origin of immigrants, and the destination country. These questions raised by these complex patterns, in combination with the existing scholarship on first- and second-generation immigrant integration in Europe – elaborated in the coming chapters – were the starting point for the empirical studies conducted within this dissertation. Having established the empirical context of my analysis, in the next chapter I turn to a conceptual contextualisation of my research, performing an in-depth review of the concept of integration to set the basis for my own conceptual approach in the empirical studies that follow.

3 THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the concept of integration and outlines my own conceptual approach to the study of integration. In the first of two main sections, I start by presenting the challenge of defining integration and go on to highlight the many different conceptual approaches and their points of difference via an extensive analysis of prior conceptualisations of integration. In doing so, I review a vast body of literature, from the early days of immigrant integration (or ‘assimilation’) research in the US context to contemporary European approaches. The first main section concludes by gathering insights concerning how integration may – and should be – conceptualised. Drawing on these insights, in the second main section I then develop and present my own conceptual position, which shapes the way in which I study integration in the empirical chapters of this dissertation. Within the broader structure of the dissertation, this chapter outlines the conceptual framework underlying my empirical analyses, while the next chapter (*Methodology*) presents its practical application in terms of the methodological approach, analytical strategy, operationalisation, measures, and methods used in the individual studies.

3.2 A review of the literature

3.2.1 Introduction: the challenge of defining integration

A major conceptual challenge for integration research is that there is no single, ‘standard’ definition of immigrant integration (Kivisto 2005). To begin with, terminology is inconsistent: some talk of *integration*, others of *assimilation*, and others again of *incorporation*, *adaptation*, or other terms (see, e.g., Ager and Strang 2008; Alba and Foner 2015; Alba and Nee 2003; Bean et al. 2012; Bernard 1956; Berry 1997; Esser 2004b; Gordon 1964; Kivisto 2005; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Portes and Böröcz 1989; J. Schneider and Crul

2010; Spencer and Charsley 2016). More importantly, each term has spurred a wide array of definitions and uses, often with substantial differences in meaning and thus – as I explore in this chapter – different conceptual, theoretical, and operationalisation-related implications. For reference, Appendix Table 1 provides a list of prominent definitions attached to assimilation, integration, and some further alternative or related terms. (Some of these definitions are discussed in the following sections, while others are provided as further examples to illustrate the varied interpretations of the given term.) For the sake of simplicity, following (most of) the European tradition (Crul and Schneider 2010; Spencer and Charsley 2016) within this literature review I use the term integration when talking about the process generally, but refer to the original term used – e.g. assimilation, or another alternative – when citing other works.

To help make sense of this wide array of integration (and related) concepts, I identify a set of key questions along which we may identify fundamental differences (or similarities) across approaches and thus more clearly outline the spectrum of conceptual positions. A first point of difference, as just mentioned, concerns terminology: what term should be used? (And why?) Then, turning to ‘content’, a fundamental question is, integration in what sense? What are the main areas of a migrant’s life in which the process integration process takes place? Or, from an analytical perspective: how many, and which different domains should be considered in the measurement of integration? These are the questions of *dimensionality*. A third question concerns the *actors* of integration: who is making integration happen? Or, more broadly, who is involved in the integration process, and to what extent? Fourth, if we think of integration as a process of adaptation, what is the reference point, or reference group, against which or whom progress is measured? Who sets the ideal for ‘integrated’?

Finally, if integration is a process, what is the endpoint of that process? What does the end-state of ‘completed’ integration look like?

Implicit inconsistencies in conceptualisations of integration (or assimilation, etc.) have long held back the productivity of debates around integration (Kivisto 2005; Gans 1997). A clear position on these questions is key for any analytically useful – and comparable – conceptual framework of integration. As a contribution towards broader conceptual clarity across the field, as well as to build a foundation for my own conceptual approach to integration, in the following I undertake a broad analytical review of the concept of integration (assimilation, etc.). Considering definitions from the early day of the field to recent works, I focus my attention to the evolution and divergence of approaches as reflected within the above key conceptual elements. To illustrate the early development process of the concept, I first present seminal early conceptualisations as one, though with an attention to the above conceptual elements within them. Then, as conceptualisations become more sophisticated and varied, I discuss the evolution and diversity of approaches separately for each conceptual element (first for the more modern literature in the US, and then for Europe). In the final section of the chapter, I then use insights from this analytical review to outline my own conceptual framework for the study of integration.

3.2.2 The foundations of the concept of assimilation (early to mid-20th century US scholarship)

The origins of integration research are commonly associated with the early days of American sociological scholarship, featuring most prominently the work of Robert Park and his colleagues at the University of Chicago in the first half of the 20th century who examined predominantly the settlement of European-origin immigrant groups (Kivisto 2005). In later decades, classical works of assimilation theory garnered an ‘anti-pluralist or even

imperialistic' (Gans 1992a, 48) reputation for conceptualising assimilation – the prevalent term at the time – as a one-way process of conformity on behalf of the migrant, stipulating 'the erasure of all signs of ethnic origins' (Alba and Nee 1997, 828) in favour of the host's culture. Revisiting some of these original works, however, I do not find this account to be entirely accurate. Consider, for instance, Park's following definitions of assimilation, both widely used references to classical assimilation theory:

Assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life (Park and Burgess 1921, 735).

In the United States an immigrant is ordinarily considered assimilated as soon as he has acquired the language and the social ritual of the native community and can participate, without encountering prejudice, in the common life, economic and political. (Park, 1930, p. 281 as cited in Gordon 1964, 63).

Upon a close reading, the first definition is actually neutral regarding the directionality of the process (i.e., who conforms to whom), while the second does imply a process of one-way adaptation, but still does not stipulate origin-culture erasure. Both definitions (Park and Burgess 1921, 735; Park 1930, 281) specify dimensions involved in the process of assimilation, namely culture and identity (as often called in later frameworks), as well as language (another aspect of culture), economic and political life, and the lack of prejudice. Especially noteworthy is the latter, as it effectively casts the host society as a necessary actor in the achievement of assimilation. Taken together, the end-goal of assimilation seems to be one of inclusion, a shared participation in cultural, economic, and political life, without unequal treatment. Upon closer examination, Park's concept of assimilation thus seems fairly inclusive.

That said, there are some examples of early assimilation definitions is consistent with classical assimilation theory's later reputation. One example is the very early conceptualisation of Mayo-Smith (1894, 670), who saw assimilation as a 'natural and almost inevitable' process of the immigrants transforming themselves to fit into host society (Kivisto 2005). A similar, later example is Fairchild's definition:

In essence, assimilation is the substitution of one nationality pattern for another. Ordinarily, the modifications must be made by the weaker or numerically inferior group. (Fairchild 1944, 84 as cited in Gordon 1964, 64)

Both conceptualisations are entirely focused on the domain of culture. The responsibility for assimilation lies solely with the immigrant group, with the majority (i.e., native/host society) group constituting the point of reference. Assimilation is completed when ethnic culture has been fully erased and replaced by the majority society culture, which has not been altered in the process.

Perhaps the most prominent representation of 'the ethnocentric tendency in classical American assimilation' (Alba and Nee 1997, 827) is often associated with mid-century theorists Warner and Srole (1945). In their 1945 book, Warner and Srole do not outline an explicit definition of assimilation; however, in their outline of the assimilation process they equate full assimilation with the ability to 'disappear' into white Anglo-Saxon society (Warner and Srole 1945, 2, 289). Further, Warner and Srole (1945, 288–92) present a 'Scale of subordination and assimilation' outlining racial and ethnic distance to white Anglo-Saxon society, followed by a prediction of the time necessary for assimilation based on those distances, under the assumption of gradual intergenerational change (and intermarriage). With its explicit racial categorisation and mentions of non-whites' subordinate status, the work lends itself for interpretation as a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) manifesto of

ethnocentric assimilation. However, I posit that a close reading of the work suggests that this interpretation confuses an effort at descriptive social analysis with social/political ideology. An alternative – and I believe, more accurate – interpretation of the text is that Warner and Srole’s definition of assimilation is ‘full acceptance in the host society’ (1945, 285). Warner and Srole seem to view visible racial traits as insurmountable obstacles to this goal, not due to some innate inferiority but due to the strength of racial prejudice in American society of their time. Cultural and racial ‘disappearance’ is thus not an idealised goal but rather a potential pre-requisite for social acceptance depending on the contemporary societal context. In fact, they note that the assimilation of the most looked-down-upon groups may be sped up with the gradual change of the ‘American social order’ of the time (Warner and Srole 1945, 292).^{21,22}

The concept of assimilation as a one-way process of increasing cultural conformity was challenged in the late 1950s. American sociologists such as Fichter (1957, as cited in Gordon 1964), Bernard (1956, as cited in Gordon 1964) and Borrie (1959, as cited in Gordon 1964), for instance, speak of a process of reciprocal change in which ethnic culture retention is not antithetical to successful adaptation. In his definition of assimilation Fichter stresses that both parties will mutually ‘accept and perform one another’s patterns of behaviour,’

²¹ A common narrative is that, as American society became more diverse by the second half of the century, the notion of ‘mainstream’ society changed and tolerated more physical and cultural divergence from the former WASP norm (Alba and Nee 2003). It could also be argued, however, given the continued evidence of racial inequality and prejudice towards non-white immigrant-origin groups in contemporary American society (e.g. Lee et al. 2019; see also Alba 2005), that Warner and Srole (1945) were rightly pessimistic and full assimilation (in the sense of full acceptance by the dominant segment of society) has not been realised to this day.

²² It should also be noted that the domain of biological differences and convergence (or amalgamation) between ethnic minorities and majority societies was a topic of focus in several early assimilation works, in particular works borrowing from or intersecting with the field of anthropology (a common occurrence in the early days of sociology). I do not discuss this domain in detail as the biological perspective disappeared quite early in assimilation research. One associated topic that survived to this day is the examination of intermarriage, but already in the time of Gordon (1964) this was of interest mainly as an indicator of attitudes and social inclusion, not biological amalgamation. (Although it could be argued that such indicators are merely measures of amalgamation by a different name.)

though noting the possibility that one party ‘may be much more affected than the other’ (1957, p. 229 as cited in Gordon 1964, 65). Bernard, on the other hand, rejects the notion of assimilation altogether and instead endorses the concept of *integration*:

The fact of the matter is that the United States has not assimilated the newcomer nor absorbed him. Our immigrant stock and our so-called ‘native’ stock have each integrated with the other. That is to say that each element has been changed by association with the other, without complete loss of its own cultural identity. [...] [T]he parts, while affected by interaction with each other, nevertheless remain complementary but individual. [...] It will be apparent that this concept of integration rests upon a belief in the importance of cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity. It recognizes the rights of groups and individuals to be different so long as the differences do not lead to domination or disunity. (Bernard, 1956, p. 2, as cited in Gordon 1964, 68)

The above definition is, to my knowledge, the first explicit differentiation between immigrant *assimilation* and *integration*. For Bernard (1956), assimilation thus represents a one-way process of adaptation via increasing conformity on behalf of the migrant group, while the alternative of integration represents a two-way process of mutual adaptation which also allows for a retention of cultural differences.^{23,24} The notion of the reference group is less clear-cut than earlier, as both parties change in reference to the other. Regarding dimensionality, most of these early frameworks remain primarily focused on culture, with only a vague reference to the social and/or political element (claiming ‘unity’).

The first explicit summary and categorisation of different aspects of assimilation (here used again in the broad sense) dimensions comes from Gordon, whose seminal 1964 book offers a systematic overview of assimilation and related concepts in the early literature. Recognizing the lack of consistency in prior approaches to assimilation, Gordon (1964, 71) sets out to provide a consistent conceptual framework of assimilation to enable sound

²³ This differentiation is mirrored in Berry’s influential 1997 framework (discussed later on).

²⁴ Note that what Bernard here calls ‘integration’ is not necessarily radically different from other authors’ concepts of assimilation, as outlined above.

analysis on the one hand, and outline the different outcome possible scenarios ('ideal types') on the other hand, thereby distinguishing conceptual and empirical inquiries from policy goals.

Table 3.1. Gordon's assimilation variables

Subprocess or condition	Type or stage of assimilation	Special term
Change of cultural patterns to those of host society	Cultural or behavioural assimilation	Acculturation
Large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions of host society, on a primary group level	Structural assimilation	None
Large-scale intermarriage	Marital assimilation	Amalgamation
Development of sense of peoplehood based exclusively on host society	Identificational assimilation	None
Absence of prejudice	Attitude receptional assimilation	None
Absence of discrimination	Behavior receptional assimilation	None
Absence of value and power conflict	Civic assimilation	None

Source: Gordon, 1964, p. 71

As presented in Table 3.1 above, Gordon (1964, 71) outlines seven types (or 'stages') of assimilation. These are: *cultural or behavioural assimilation* (also called acculturation), *structural assimilation* (referring to inclusion in formal social groups and institutions of the host society, presumably including work), *marital assimilation* (i.e., intermarriage), *identificational assimilation*, *attitude receptional assimilation* (absence of prejudice), *behavior receptional assimilation* (absence of discrimination), and *civic assimilation* (absence of value or power conflict). Though Gordon presents these seven types of assimilation as potentially representing consecutive stages of assimilation – each assigned a pre-requisite process or condition to be considered fully realised, as outlined in Table 3.1 – Gordon acknowledges the possibility of a different order, noting also that in reality most processes are not fully missing or fully completed but somewhere in between, varying amongst themselves in their degree of completion. That said, Gordon underscores structural

assimilation as the most crucial aspect: ‘once structural assimilation has occurred [...] all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow [...] Structural assimilation, then, rather than acculturation, is [...] the keystone in the arch of assimilation’ (Gordon 1964, 80–81; see also Kivisto 2005).

Gordon (1964, 71) conceptually defines completed assimilation as the absence of value and power conflict; consequently, he outlines three possible scenarios for the way in which this might be realised: *Anglo-conformity*, *the melting pot*, and *cultural pluralism*. *Anglo-conformity* entails full adaptation to core society (at the time meaning WASP) culture and identity. In the *melting pot* scenario, the meeting of the minority and the majority ethnic group creates a new, shared identity and culture, which incorporates elements from both parties. Both *Anglo-conformity* and the *melting pot* involve social mixing (defined by Gordon as structural assimilation). Finally, in *cultural pluralism* both parties have maintained their respective identities and cultures, and socialise separately in their own subgroups. From a conceptual perspective, these three ‘ideal types’ of assimilation are presented as equally valid.

In many aspects, Gordon’s (1964) framework is a milestone in the evolution of assimilation concepts: it highlights and distinguishes most of the integration dimensions discussed to this day (as I will discuss later), it considers the possibility of both a one-way and a two-way adaptation process, and its vision of completed assimilation is tied to a conflict-free society as a whole. The varied possible outcomes he presents encompass both ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’, in the sense above defined by Bernard (1956). Nevertheless, an important shortcoming of this framework is its simplistic notion of ‘core society’ (which does, in this case, largely constitute the reference group for assimilation): Gordon seems to

assume a homogenous native population, when in fact American society was already comprised by diverse ethnic, racial and socio-economic groups in his time (Alba and Nee 1997). Further, despite his outlining of different options for what assimilation might look like, in his description on the processes describing each type or stage of assimilation (Table 3.1) Gordon (1964) seems to endorse the scenario of Anglo-conformity in particular, though this might be because he considered this the more likely trajectory, or at least the most popular one in contemporary scholarship and political thinking.

In summary, whether the ‘classical’ concept of assimilation entails an ethnocentric, ‘assimilationist’ perspective depends strongly on the classical works considered and their interpretation. Overall, I conclude that such a reputation is not entirely warranted: though approaches simplistically equating assimilation with a one-way process of increasing cultural conformity did exist, there were also more nuanced perspectives that considered multiple facets of integration, and multiple potential end-states, not necessarily involving one-way conformity. I also note an early emphasis on the role of host society (or ‘natives’) in the acceptance of newcomers, although the status of host (‘core’) society as the reference group for assimilation is indeed unquestioned. It is important to note – and this is true for later scholarship as well – that different interpretations of particular works can also stem from a conflation of descriptive sociology and political ideals; as noted by Kivisto (2005, 4), ‘Discourses on assimilation as a fact and as an ideal are often intermingled, so that what is in fact the case and what might or might not be desired are difficult to analytically distinguish’. Indeed, as Gans asserted, opposing positions in the assimilation scholarship often ‘differ less in empirical reality than in debate’ (1997, 876).

3.2.3 Assimilation revised: North American research on the ‘new’ (post-1965) immigrants

As Kivisto (2005) and Alba and Nee (1997; see also Glazer 1993; Gans 1997; 1992b) write, after 1965, the arrival of a more diverse (non-European) immigrant population, combined with a socio-political atmosphere of ethnic revival and the civil rights movement within the US, resulted in a critical stance against classical assimilation theory and what became seen as its ethnocentric, Anglo-conformist perspective on assimilation (discussed above). Later decades, especially the 1990s, saw a breadth of new assimilation scholarship seeking to address the shortcomings of classical assimilation theory. Whether with slight revisions (Alba and Nee 1997; 2003; see also Barkan 1995) or alternative frameworks (Portes and Zhou 1993), these new works brought a set of conceptually relevant changes and contributions.

Terminology

For one, given its associations with forced assimilation movements, the term ‘assimilation’ became unpopular for a while in the public realm (Glazer 1993; Brubaker 2001; Kivisto 2005), and alternatives such as integration and incorporation entered some mainstream literature (e.g. Massey 1981; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). That said, within the specialised US scholarship the use of ‘assimilation’ never really went away, and even saw a ‘rehabilitation’ by a new body of scholarship (Waters and Jiménez 2005, 107) that sought to revive classical assimilation theory by incorporating some updates and revisions, thereby proposing a ‘new assimilation theory’ (Alba and Nee 1997; 2003; see also Barkan 1995).

As is often the case in integration research, during this time multiple different understandings and uses of assimilation and integration emerged within North American scholarship: some scholars using the two terms almost interchangeably (e.g. Massey 1981);

others defining integration as a specific, still-limited stage of assimilation (Barkan 1995); some discussing assimilation as essentially the economic counterpart to acculturation (Gans 1992b; 1997); and still others defining integration and assimilation as opposing models of acculturation, with regards to ethnic retention (most famously, Canadian social psychologist Berry 1997).²⁵

Dimensions of assimilation

Second, scholars conducting empirical analyses of ‘new’ post-1965 immigrant communities started noting a divergence between the sociocultural and socioeconomic realms of assimilation. Observing the assimilation patterns on the native-born offspring of immigrants, Portes and Zhou (1993; see also Gans 1992b) noticed that socioeconomic success (in terms of gaining access to the middle-class) was not necessarily tied to sociocultural acculturation. Specifically, a stronger replacement of ethnic culture and community ties with local ‘native’ culture and social ties could be associated with socioeconomic decline, while a strong ethnic retention would coexist with (and could even facilitate) socioeconomic success (Portes and Zhou 1993). As argued by Gans (1997), this potential incongruence highlights the need to observe assimilation processes in the economic and sociocultural in their own right, as potentially related but fundamentally distinct dimensions.

Beyond the latter idea, I find that US assimilation scholarship after Gordon (1964) shows relatively little direct conceptual engagement with assimilation/integration’s dimensionality. Nevertheless, taken together, the large body of empirical work produced

²⁵ In his framework of acculturation strategies, Berry (1997, 10) outlines integration and assimilation as two alternative strategies for acculturating migrants: in integration, migrants learn the dominant culture and participate in ‘larger society’ while simultaneously retaining ethnic culture and identity; in the case of assimilation, ethnic culture and identity get ‘shed’ in favour of host/majority society culture and identity (Berry 1997, 28).

post-1965 does offer insight (even if implicitly) into what scholars viewed as the different facets of assimilation. For instance, in a 1981 comprehensive review of American assimilation research at the time (on the ‘new immigrants’ settled post-1965) Massey (1981, 63) summarises findings along six ‘dimensions’ (or ‘facets’) of assimilation: familism,²⁶ fertility, residential segregation, political participation, intermarriage, and social mobility. Ultimately, however, Massey (1981) underscores the latter as the most important aspect, positing that all other criteria of assimilation tend to increase with social class. Indeed, he goes on to define assimilation as ‘fundamentally a process of social mobility’ (Massey 1981, 72). This strong emphasis on the economic aspect of assimilation – with other, e.g., spatial and sociocultural manifestations of assimilation appearing of interest to the authors mainly for their connection with economic assimilation – is characteristic of the ‘grand assimilation theories’ formulated in the 1990s and early 2000s US context – to borrow Crul’s (2015, 54) term referring to segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993) and new assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 1997).

That said, beyond the ‘grand theories’ of assimilation, specific empirical studies actually considered quite a broader set of integration dimensions, though typically focusing on one dimension at a time. In a 2005 review of the previous decades’ empirical research, Waters and Jimenez (2005, 107) list the ‘standard measures of immigrant assimilation’ as including:

- (a) socioeconomic status (SES), defined as educational attainment, occupational specialization, and parity in earnings; (b) spatial concentration, defined in terms of dissimilarity in spatial distribution and of suburbanization; (c) language assimilation, defined in terms of English language ability and loss of mother tongue; and (d) inter-marriage, defined by race or Hispanic origin, and only

²⁶ Referring to a strong collectivist perspective oriented towards the family (common among particular immigrant communities), as opposed to the (supposedly more ‘American’) individualistic values (Massey 1981).

occasionally by ethnicity and generation (Waters and Jiménez 2005, 107–8; see also Bean and Stevens 2003).

Assimilation, in this view, may be via measured immigrants' and their children similarity to 'other Americans' (Waters and Jiménez 2005, 106) within each of these dimensions, and altogether across these dimensions.

Further, a notable exception from the post-Gordon US literature that does tackle the question of dimensionality head-on is Williams and Ortega's 1990 study, which performs an empirical test of Gordon's typology (using factor analysis) on a Nebraskan dataset from 1978. Williams and Ortega (1990) find that given the closely related nature of certain outcomes, the classic seven types of assimilation may in fact be narrowed down to three: structural assimilation (including marital assimilation), cultural assimilation (including identificational and civic assimilation), and receptional assimilation (prejudice and discrimination, but can also include marital assimilation). These results underscore the role of empirical tests of conceptual assumptions about integration's dimensionality (an emerging topic of interest, as I discuss further later on).²⁷

Actors involved

Another conceptual improvement on classical assimilation theory was a more extended view of the actors involved in the process of integration beyond the immigrant group or individual (Barkan 1995; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Barkan (1995, 40), for instance, conceptualises assimilation as a 'two-way process', though the role of the 'dominant' society is considered

²⁷ Another rare engagement with dimensionality within (partly) US scholarship is the recent transatlantic effort by Harder and colleagues' (2018) at developing a multidimensional measure, discussed in the next section (which discusses European and recent transatlantic literature).

merely in terms of attitudes and discrimination.²⁸ In Portes and Rumbaut's (1990, 91; see also Portes and Zhou 1993) *Modes of incorporation* framework, the actors shaping migrants' integration trajectory additionally include the state (i.e., government policy), and the pre-existing co-ethnic community in the destination country.

Reference group for assimilation

Concerning of the reference group for assimilation, much of this newer literature (e.g., Alba and Nee 2003) still defines assimilation as taking place in reference to a native 'mainstream' society, although the concept of mainstream society is more flexible than in classical approaches. Specifically, in their 2003 book 'Remaking the mainstream,' Alba and Nee define their concept of 'mainstream' as 'that part of the society within which ethnic and racial origins have at most minor impacts on life chances or opportunities. [...] we do not limit the mainstream to the middle class: it contains a working class and even some who are poor, not just affluent suburbanites' (2003, 12). Importantly, they define the mainstream (earlier also called 'core society') as changing over time in line with demographic and socio-political processes, noting how the concept of mainstream American ethnicity changed over time, from WASPs to include Catholics and Jews, and they predict that the mainstream will no longer necessarily be only white groups, including, for example, Asian and Hispanic ethnicities. (The accuracy of this prediction is a different question.)

Conversely, a key novelty in Portes and Zhou's (1993) theory of segmented assimilation was its recognition of the fact that the native groups that some immigrant communities encounter – and that thus represent the reference group for assimilation to them – are not from the white American middle-class but the local (often non-white) underclass

²⁸ As evidenced above, this is not a new idea, though such a conceptualisation so explicitly positioning dominant society as a key actor is noteworthy (cf. Gordon 1964).

– in other words, not the ‘mainstream’. Ultimately, this represents an important challenge to the notion of ‘host’ or ‘majority’ society as an obvious benchmark for assimilation; as underscored by Kasinitz and colleagues’ (2008, 15) often-cited questions ‘Assimilation into what? And progress compared to whom?’ host society itself is fragmented and heterogenous, and defining the reference group is a highly subjective (and inherently normative) choice.

End-state of assimilation

Concerning the ‘end-state’ of assimilation, conceptualisations likewise vary across this body of literature. From the perspective of new assimilation theory, Alba and Nee (1997, 863), define the endpoint of assimilation as homogeneity, namely ‘the disappearance [...] of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it.’ Barkan (1995) mentions a bidirectional process in which both hosts and newcomers are affected, though likely to different degrees, while Alba and Nee are purposefully ‘agnostic about whether the changes wrought by assimilation are one-sided or more mutual. Indeed, there should be no definitional prescription on this point’, they argue (1997, 863).

Other frameworks questioned the inevitability of cultural homogeneity altogether. Gans (1992a; 1997) posits a ‘bumpy’ instead of ‘straight’ line of intergenerational acculturation, with potential revivals of a mostly symbolic ethnic identity. Meanwhile, Portes and colleagues (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a) stress the possibility of delayed acculturation for the second generation, though they still expect full acculturation by the third generation. As mentioned, in Portes and Zhou’s (1993) framework of ‘segmented’ assimilation, economic assimilation to a disadvantaged segment of native society is an exhibit of ‘assimilation’ nonetheless; in this sense, their concept of assimilation is remarkably flexible.

A further theoretical strand emerging during this period – relevant especially to the question of end-states – were *multiculturalism* and related frameworks, largely from Canada (as noted by Kivisto 2005). One influential related framework comes from the Canadian social psychologist Berry (1997, 10), who outlines integration and assimilation as two alternative strategies for acculturating migrants. In *integration*, migrants learn the dominant culture and participate in ‘larger society’ while simultaneously retaining ethnic culture and identity; at the societal level, the integration of ethnocultural groups results in the state of *multiculturalism* (Berry 2001; 2011; Berry and Ward 2016). In the case of *assimilation*, ethnic culture and identity get ‘shed’ in favour of host/majority society culture and identity (Berry 1997, 28; 2001; 2011). Generally speaking, in the framework of multiculturalism the end-state of integration allows for a considerable degree of ethnic retention on the part of immigrant and immigrant-background minorities, as long as there is a common life across overall society, sharing ideals of justice, tolerance, solidarity, and loyalty (Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2006; Kivisto 2005; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008).

Summary

In summary, the more modern North American theoretical literature brought further complexity to the concept of assimilation in a number of respects. Firstly, the term of assimilation met some controversy, though it never entirely went out of use. By the early 2000s, the diverse definitions attached to the term made assimilation, if not exactly a neutral term, then at one least flexible to more progressive interpretations. Second, the separation of the sociocultural and structural dimensions of integration helped set the stage for multidimensional frameworks of integration, even if the focus often stayed on those two dimensions (especially the economic). Third, host society became conceptualised as more of an active participant of the process. Fourth, the notion of an obvious, homogenous native

mainstream as the reference group for assimilation was challenged, with some noting that local groups outside the white middle-class mainstream may also serve as reference group, while others broadened the concept of the mainstream to allow for greater diversity. Finally, the notion of cultural homogeneity (in the image of the host society ‘standard’) as the inevitable endpoint of assimilation came under fire, with perspectives envisioning, alternatively, a two-way process of adaptation, no prescription in this regard, or even an acceptance of enduring cultural diversity. In the following section, I review approaches to the concept of integration from the European (and, in some cases, trans-Atlantic) migration scholarship from the late 20th century to recent years.

3.2.4 European conceptualisations of integration

Following a relatively later start, largely emerging in the 1980s (Bilgili 2014; Esser 2004a), by the late 1990s and early 2000s European integration scholarship was outlining its own conceptualisations of immigrant integration (Esser 2004a; Penninx 2005; Heckmann 2006; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Favell 2001; Crul and Vermeulen 2003). An interesting feature of the European scholarly perspective on integration is that, on the one hand, it builds on the previously established – and at that point, internationally dominant – American assimilation scholarship (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993; cf. Thomson and Crul 2007). On the other hand, European scholarship adapts and expands on those earlier approaches following (perceived) key differences between the European and US context (e.g., Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Esser 2004a; Heckmann 2006). Importantly, those differences in migration history and structural characteristics have, in turn, shaped the nature of knowledge production in each context (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009; Bilgili 2014).

Observing one receiving country with multiple immigrant groups, many of them dating several generations, US scholarship sought to develop holistic theories to explain integration (Bilgili 2014). Meanwhile, early European immigration and integration research came primarily within a few major Western European nation-states (e.g., United Kingdom, Sweden, France and the Netherlands), each dealing with their own experience of immigration (see also Brubaker 2001).²⁹ Much of this early literature was split across disciplines and reflected national concerns and perspectives of the time, producing an overall fragmented body of research. As noted by Bilgili (2014), the implementation of major European Union research initiatives such as the European Commission's 6th Framework Programme for research (2002-2006) marked the start of more advanced – i.e., large-scale, multidisciplinary, and nationally comparative – European research.³⁰ In fact, another interesting feature European scholarship (exhibited by several of the conceptual contributions I highlight in the following) is that some of the broader conceptual frameworks of integration were developed not strictly within academic circles but in policy reports (see, e.g., Penninx 2005; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Heckmann 2006; Ager and Strang 2008). This 'grey literature' (which was nevertheless largely developed by prominent academics) often features a strong connection with integration policy and an emphasis on measuring and evaluating integration; though less theoretically ambitious (cf. Esser 2004a), it is very useful in its clear outlining of conceptual elements (e.g., actors, dimensions, benchmarks for integration etc.).

In the following, I demonstrate the different and evolving perspectives on the above-discussed elements of integration concepts as displayed in some key frameworks from the

²⁹ See also Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) on the pitfalls of methodological nationalism.

³⁰ See Geddes and Scholten (2015) for a detailed discussion of the development of EU-level research-policy infrastructure; also, refer to the discussion in the first section of the Introduction.

European literature (including policy reports and academic scholarship) in the past two decades. I begin by briefly presenting the reviewed works.

Presenting the literature

One of the earliest conceptual frameworks I consider forms part of the early initiatives for EU-level integration policy and research mentioned in the introduction. In this 2003 report for the European Commission, Entzinger and Biezeveld build on a vast body of prior literature to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework on integration to facilitate benchmarking for immigrant immigration for policymakers. A more academically inclined conceptual framework from this era originates from Esser's (2004b), whose framework has been highly influential in later European approaches to dimensionality; examples include the TIES project (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012), as well as policy reports (Heckmann 2006; Bosswick and Heckmann 2006) (discussed below).

Another, distinctly policy-focused conceptual framework of integration comes from Penninx, originally outlined as part of a United Nations report (2005), though later expanded on it in academic publications, as well (see also Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016; Penninx 2019). In another major policy report published around this time, Heckmann (2006; see also Bosswick and Heckmann 2006) brings together Esser's (2004b) and other scholars' concepts and his to develop a 'common analytical and conceptual frame' to facilitate European-level approaches migrant integration (Heckmann 2006, 6). Another influential framework, concerning especially conceptualisations of integration *dimensions*, comes from Ager and Strang (2008), who originally developed their framework as part of a study on local refugee integration commissioned by the UK Home Office in 2002. The framework

was recently republished as the *Home Office Indicators of Integration framework 2019* (Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019).

Between 2007 and 2008, the aforementioned TIES project (The Integration of the European Second Generation) investigated the second generation of Turkish, Moroccan, and former Yugoslavian descent in fifteen cities in eight European countries (Groenewold and Lessard-Phillips 2012). As the first major cross-European survey on the second generation, it is the source for some further key European integration literature, including Crul and Schneider's (2010) *comparative integration context theory*, their (co-edited) book assessing the situation of the second generation (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012), as well as Bean and colleagues' (2012) and Alba and Foner's (2015) transatlantic analyses of second-generation integration.

In 2012, the OECD started a series of major international reports on immigrant integration indicators across OECD countries. The initial 2012 report was somewhat expanded in a 2015 and then a 2018 version, as part of a series titled *Settling in* (OECD 2012; OECD/EU 2015; 2019). The 2015 and 2018 reports were published in collaboration with the European Union and provide the most extensive cross-European reports on migrants' integration-related outcomes in recent years. While it is not the report's goal to make conceptual advances, I find its approach to integration relevant to consider as it represents what may be the most 'mainstream' publication in the topic, with a strong connection to the policy sphere. Furthermore, the report's topical coverage and structure mirrors (and likely influences) what is available in terms of cross-national integration data.

Returning to the more scholarly literature, in a 2016 paper (and 2021 follow-up), Spencer and Charsley build on prior European conceptual debates around integration to

develop their own, ‘more systematic and nuanced’ (2016, 4) analytical framework. Further, I consider the recent conceptual debate around a strongly critical piece on the concept of integration by Schinkel (2018; 2019) and its varied responses from fellow European scholars (Favell 2019; Hadj Abdou 2019; Penninx 2019; Meissner 2019).

Finally, I consider a few, relatively recent works engaging with the question of integration’s dimensionality with empirical tests. These include a transatlantic analysis by Bean and colleagues (2012), a UK study by Lessard-Phillips (2017), and a recent transatlantic effort by Harder and colleagues (2018) to develop a multidimensional index of integration. While the latter is emphatically more practically than conceptually focused – based on survey results and meant to serve as a survey instrument – I find it noteworthy as it represents a rare empirical effort to achieve more coherence in approaches to integration’s dimensionality.

Terminology

Starting with the question of terminology, European scholarship tends to talk primarily of ‘integration’. As discussed by Brubaker (2001) and Heckmann (2006), ‘*assimilation*’ had particularly unpleasant ethnocentric connotations in Europe (particularly for Germany and France), as it echoed historical efforts of forced national homogenisation. Therefore, European literature has mostly relied on the term *integration*, typically implying a standpoint that is – at least in principle – not ethnocentric (Schunck 2014). As modern definitions of *assimilation* have become more inclusive, as well (e.g. Esser 2004a), in many cases uses of the *integration* term in Europe have been, in practice, synonymous with the concept of

assimilation in the US context (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006; J. Schneider and Crul 2010).³¹

In recent years, *integration* has also met some critiques in the European literature, with some calling into question the (relative) neutrality and inclusivity once associated with the term (e.g. Favell 2010; Rytter 2010; Schinkel 2011; 2018). As mentioned earlier, this had led some to use *integration* merely as a placemat term (e.g. Ager and Strang 2008; Spencer and Charsley 2016). Spencer and Charsley (2016), for instance begin by acknowledging prior critiques of the term ‘integration’, but keep using it for continuity with related literature while revising its conceptual elements. Others seek out alternative terms such as *incorporation* or *adaptation*. *Incorporation*, for instance, has been used as an alternative terminological option on both sides of the Atlantic for quite some time (e.g. Portes and Böröcz 1989; Zolberg and Woon 1999; Freeman 2004; Barkan, Diner, and Kraut 2008; Bean et al. 2012), although the term has remained less mainstream than *integration* or *assimilation* – which is perhaps why it is still considered fairly free from ideological-political connotations (Kivisto 2005). The case is similar for *adaptation*, whose definition by Lessard-Phillips (2009; 2017)³² calls to mind early definitions of *integration* (see Bernard, 1956, as cited in Gordon 1964, 68).

In even more recent conceptual work, Spencer and Charsley (2021), while acknowledging real integration concepts in past research, share Penninx’s (2019) views that

³¹ An exception to this trend is Esser’s (2004b; 2004a) conceptualisation, which differentiates between integration at the group level (which he calls *system* or *social integration* and refers to the disappearance of structural inequalities) and at the level of the individual actor, whose one-sided efforts to adapt to host society – following from Berry’s (1997) matrix of acculturation strategies – are considered a special case of social integration called *individual assimilation*.

³² Lessard-Phillips defines adaptation as ‘a dynamic process of adjustment to a new society, which involves both the migrants and their descendants and the people and the institutions of the host country working through their differences, and whose outcomes can be either positive or negative and can span [many] dimensions.’ (2009, 4)

certain critiques of integration (such as Schinkel's [2018], above) conflate public and academic uses of the integration concept, often focusing on exclusionary uses of the integration concept in the public and policy realm while overlooking some contemporary academic conceptual advances and efforts at developing more robust models for empirical application. Spencer and Charsley (2021) go on to identify common critiques of integration concepts, which include normativity in definitions of integration, negative 'othering' of migrants (with an undue focus on their background characteristics), an outdated idealised image of the host society, and a narrow focus on migrants in the factors shaping integration processes. In fact, these relate closely to the conceptual aspects of reference group, actors, and end-state of integration that I examine in this review. In the following, I discuss how they – and other scholars – approach these conceptual elements, along with the question of dimensionality.

Dimensions

As I demonstrate in the following, the multidimensionality of integration has often been recognised in the European analytical frameworks for integration, but with considerable variation when it comes to specific dimensions. Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) outline four domains of integration. They begin by distinguishing between *structural* (later called *socio-economic*) and *cultural* dimensions. As they turn to discuss integration from a policy perspective, they set apart the *legal-political* dimension. Next, a recognition of the two-sided nature of the integration process leads them to distinguish a fourth domain: *attitudes of recipient societies* (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). The resulting four-dimensional framework, including indicators, is shown in Table 3.2 below. While Entzinger and Biezeveld's (2003) typology of dimensions has considerable overlap with Gordon's (1964) seminal framework from the classical US literature, there are also some notable differences.

For instance, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) show a strong focus on the labour market aspect in the structural domain (now called socio-economic), which now also includes issues relating to housing quality and residential patterns. Meanwhile, inclusion in the form of social relations is seen as part of ‘cultural’ integration, as is intermarriage and national identity. Interestingly, differences in criminality rates are also considered a cultural aspect, although the authors acknowledge their strong overlap with the socio-economic sphere. The legal and political dimension, covering civic rights as well as political and civic participation, appears fairly equivalent to Gordon’s (1964) civic domain. The final domain of attitudes also includes the aspect of discrimination, along with some modern additions (media representation and diversity policies). Overall, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) also stress the blurriness of distinctions between spheres and the interrelated nature of outcomes across dimensions.

Table 3.2. Indicators by dimensions in the work of Entzinger & Biezeveld

Socio-economic integration	Cultural integration	Legal and political integration	Attitudes of recipient countries
Employment	Attitude towards basic rules and norms of the host country	Numbers of migrants naturalised annually or who obtain a secure residence status	Reported cases of discrimination
Income level	Frequency of contacts with host country and country of origin	Numbers of migrants with dual citizenship	Perceptions of migrants by the host society
Social security	Choice of spouse	Participation in politics	Incidence and effects of diversity policies
Level of education	Language skills	Participation in civil society	Role of media
Housing and segregation	Delinquency		

Source: Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003, 32–37)

Following a twofold concept of societal-level integration and individual assimilation, Esser (2004b) draws up a parallel set of domains (see Table 3.3 below). A significant innovation of this framework is the proposition of the social (interactive) aspect as its own

dimension, separate from the cultural dimension (cf. Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). In contrast with Gordon's (1964) original use of the term, Esser (2004b, 46–47) uses the term 'structural integration' to refer to socio-economic status and civic rights – as do many others in the modern literature (e.g., Heckmann 2006; Fokkema and de Haas 2011).

Table 3.3. Esser's (2004b) dimensions of integration/assimilation

Social integration		Individual assimilation	
Placement	Rights, labour market, education	Structural assimilation	Educational qualifications, labour market position
Interaction	Relationships, social networks	Social assimilation	Contacts with natives, especially intermarriage
Identification	Loyalty to the system	Emotional assimilation	Identification with host country
Culture	Acquisition of knowledge, skills and cultural models, esp. language	Cultural assimilation	Language acquisition

Source: Esser (2004b, 46–47)

Approaching integration from the perspective of host country policies, Penninx (2005, 141) outlines three dimensions: the legal/political, the socio-economic and the cultural/religious (Table 3.4). An interesting feature of this framework is that it outlines their indicators from the perspective of what inclusion and acceptance by receiving society would look like, in terms of equality of rights provided via public policy.

Table 3.4. Penninx's (2005) dimensions of integration (from a policy perspective)

Legal/political	Socioeconomic	Cultural/religious
Secure residence rights	Economic and social rights equal to natives	Rights to self-organisation and meeting as a group
Formal political rights and duties	Access to work and work-related benefits	Equal recognition, acceptance, and treatment as a group
Opportunities for informal political participation	Access to social security provisions	Access to group facilities

Source: Penninx (2005, 139)

As mentioned, Heckmann (2006) essentially adapts Esser's (2004b) four-dimensional integration framework, with a few revisions. A first one is in terminology: Heckmann (2006)

talks of *structural integration*, *interactive integration*, *identificational integration*, and *cultural integration* but defines them in line with Esser (2004b). Second, Heckmann (2006) adds of two dimensions, *time* and *space*, which are seen as intersecting and interaction with the previous ones – although in essence, Heckmann’s (2006) *spatial* element may also be summed up as an additional domain covering housing quality and residential patterns. Third, although the aspects of *prejudice* and *discrimination* are acknowledged, these are presented not as dimensions, but as ‘barriers to social integration’ (Heckmann 2006, 19) in a separate part of the framework. Heckmann’s framework is detailed in Table 3.5 below, showing the suggested indicators for each dimension.

Table 3.5. Heckmann’s (2006) dimensions of integration and associated indicators

Structural integration	Cultural integration	Interactive integration	Identificative integration
Economy: labour market, ethnic entrepreneurship	Language competences	Friendships	Subjective feeling of belonging to collectivities
Education and vocational/professional training	Values, norms	Marriages, partnerships	Identificational policies of immigration country
Citizenship	Role models, for instance gender roles	Membership in private organizations of receiving society	
Housing	Religion		
Policies of structural integration	Mutual acculturation: change of culture of receiving society		
	Policies of cultural integration		

Source: (Heckmann 2006, 24)

Ager and Strang’s (2008) conceptual framework takes a somewhat different approach, outlining four main domains: *foundations* (comprising rights and citizenship as a basis for integration),³³ *facilitators* (such as language, cultural knowledge and safety, which help to

³³ As Spencer and Charsley (2021) correctly point out, Ager and Strang’s (2008) definition of ‘rights and citizenship’ as the foundation for integration reflects their refugee-focused perspective – ‘Whilst few would

overcome barriers to integration), *social connections* (bridges, bonds and links), and *means and markers* (outcomes in employment, housing, education and health, which are both mechanisms and indicators of integration) (Ager and Strang 2008, 170; see also Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019). Compared to the above-discussed frameworks, Ager and Strang's (2008) framework also contains some new elements such as health, housing, and safety and stability. This difference is easily attributable to the original study's focus on the vulnerable refugee population, though the element of health, for example (or housing), is becoming common in general immigrant integration reports, as well (e.g., OECD/EU 2019, discussed below).

In a recent transatlantic effort, Harder and colleagues (2018) consult a vast number of existing surveys, some prior theoretical literature, and multiple rounds of pilot surveys to develop a multidimensional survey instrument to measure integration (the Immigration Policy Lab [IPL] Integration Index). This index distinguishes between six dimensions of integration: *psychological* (feeling of connection to country, sense of belonging, wish to continue living in the country); *economic* (employment, employment satisfaction, financial security); *political* (understanding of country's political issues, political engagement); *social* (social ties and interactions with natives, participation in native organisations); *linguistic* (fluency in host country language), and *navigational* (ability to navigate the host country's labour market, political system, and social institutions) (Harder et al. 2018, 11484).

The OECD's *Settling In* series (OECD 2012; OECD/EU 2015; 2019) also follows a multidimensional approach to evaluating integration. The latest report in particular stresses

argue that lack of rights can impede integration processes, viewing them as pre-conditions may not be analytically correct' (Spencer and Charsley 2021, 13).

that ‘[the] effective integration of migrants is not an economic process alone. It also has numerous social, educational, spatial, and other facets’ (OECD/EU 2019, 23). *Settling In 2018* (OECD/EU 2019) outlines three main domains of indicators, each with a range of indicators, as shown in Table 3.6 below.

Table 3.6. Integration indicators in ‘Settling in 2018’ (OECD/EU 2019)

Skills and the labour market	Living conditions	Civic engagement and social indicators
Educational attainment and performance	Income indicators & poverty rate	Naturalisation rate
Language proficiency	Housing quality	Political participation
Labour market participation and job characteristics	Residential characteristics (ethnic concentration etc.)	Attitudes towards immigrants
Overqualification rate	Health indicators (incl. whether medical needs are met)	Values (gender attitudes)
		Discrimination and harassment
		Social isolation (children)
		Native-migrant interactions
		Life satisfaction
		Sense of belonging

Source: adapted from OECD/EU 2019

First of all, there is a strong focus on migrants as labour market actors, indicated by the separate dimension *skills and the labour market*. The rest of the indicators that would typically fall under the structural (or socio-economic) domain are here grouped as *living conditions*. These include not only income and spatial integration, but also health indicators along with a proxy for access (or lack thereof) to healthcare, which is not just a measure for well-being but also an indicator of institutional embeddedness. The third category groups indicators of what has previously been called civic/political integration, social integration, prejudice and discrimination, culture, identity, and subjective well-being, all under the umbrella domain of *civic engagement and social integration*. The list of indicators in the *civic engagement and social integration* domain is remarkably extensive, and the authors

make no claim that indicators in one domain are fundamentally linked in their development (OECD/EU 2019). Yet, the aggregation of such a wide range of topics does reflect a less in-depth engagement with these areas (compared to the topic of employment, for instance) and may signal an overall lower priority for these topics within the focus of the framework. Ultimately, as is common in earlier literature – recall Massey’s (1981) claim, for example, equating assimilation with social mobility – within a multidimensional approach, this major report (OECD/EU 2019) thus still views the economic domain as the most important (or most reflective of the overall state of integration).

As part of their suggested conceptual framework, Spencer and Charsley (2016; 2021) bring together prior formulations (Ager and Strang 2008; Entzinger 2000; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003; Spencer 2011) to outline five main domains of integration. As shown in Table 3.7 below, these are: structural integration, social integration, cultural integration, civic and political participation, and identity. One may note that their indicators are not too dissimilar from the OECD/EU (2019) indicators outlined above, with the exception of stressing the mutual aspect of adaptation more (and an overall more abstract formulation of these indicators). Spencer and Charsley (2016; 2021) also make a disclaimer that this categorisation of dimensions serves as a heuristic device, to distinguish key areas while keeping the number of domains manageable for analyses; in reality, they stress, the separation between areas may be less straightforward.³⁴

Table 3.7. Domains of integration in Spencer and Charsley (2016; 2021)

Domain	Description
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³⁴ In a recent multidimensional empirical analysis of immigrant integration in Europe, Heath and Schneider (2021) build on prior literature and distinguish between five dimensions: structural (socioeconomic), cultural, social, political, and civic integration (including identification with the host country). Though the categorisation is somewhat different, in terms the overall indicators largely fall in line with the above frameworks.

Structural	Participation in the labour and housing market, education, and health systems
Social	Social interaction, relationships and networks
Cultural	Changing values, attitudes, behaviour and lifestyle (of all involved parties)
Civic and political participation	Participation in community life and the democratic process
Identity	Processes through which individuals of differing backgrounds may develop a shared identity and sense of belonging with the place, nation, communities and people among whom they live

Source: Spencer and Charsley (2016, 4–5; 2021, 16)

In fact, the question of how different dimensions of integration may most accurately be conceptualised has inspired some to investigate the question empirically. Bean, Brown, Bachmeier, Fokkema, and Lessard-Phillips (2012, 183) begin by outlining what they see as the four most typical dimensions of integration (in their terminology, ‘incorporation’) in the literature: economic, sociocultural, spatial, and political domains. The distinction between the economic and sociocultural incorporation has a fairly well-established empirical basis (as discussed above; e.g., Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Bean et al. 2012). However, as Bean and colleagues note (2012, 183), the four categories are otherwise largely outlined based on ‘face value’, mirroring the distinction between the academic disciplines of economics, sociology/anthropology, geography, and political science. As they review, the empirical basis for this particular distinction, while not absent, is not conclusive.

Bean and colleagues (2012) thus start with four conceptual dimensions of immigrant incorporation (economic, sociocultural, spatial, and political), to be adjusted according to the empirical reality, which they view as context-dependent. The authors use data on second-generation immigrants from two American cities and 11 European cities, featuring places considered ‘more’ and ‘less’ inclusive in their immigrant integration policies (Bean et al. 2012, 182). Bean and colleagues (2012, 193) consider indicators to constitute one dimension

if their outcomes are strongly linked to one another (i.e., they ‘co-vary’, or move together), while diverging outcome patterns indicate (somewhat) separate dimensions. In line with their hypotheses, Bean and colleagues (2012) find that more inclusive contexts are associated with more disparate dimensions (four, mirroring the four conceptual dimensions, in American contexts; three, with the economic and political dimensions merging, in European contexts), while in less inclusive contexts, dimensions tend to bundle together, resulting in fewer distinct dimensions (three, economic/political, spatial, and sociocultural/linguistic, dimensions in the American case; two, economic/political/spatial and sociocultural/linguistic, dimensions in the European cases). In another empirical test of multi-dimensionality (and following a similar methodology), Lessard-Phillips (2017) explores the structure of dimensionality in the adaptation of ethnic minorities through the case study of Britain. Lessard-Phillips’s (2017) results suggest a four-dimensional structure, consisting of a cultural, a spatial, and a socio-economic domain, as well as one focused on political identity.³⁵

Summary of dimensions and indicators outlined across the literature

All in all, in my review of different European typologies of integration dimensions from the past two decades I notice an interesting continuity with Gordon’s (1964) original set of domains: the areas included generally cover culture (with or without religion, but almost always including language), identity, intermarriage and other social interactions, institutional ties, civic/political inclusion and – somewhat less commonly – prejudice and/or discrimination. Topics relating to the socioeconomic status and work, only peripherally present in Gordon’s original framework, have seen the largest growth in topical coverage,

³⁵ This is roughly in line with Bean et al.’s (2012) results for the more inclusive contexts, except that Lessard-Phillips’ (2017) cultural domain includes social indicators such as friendships and marriage, which were not considered in the earlier study.

with modern conceptualisations spanning a variety of topics relating to socio-economic status (employment, income, education) (e.g., Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Heckmann 2006; OECD/EU 2019), housing and residential characteristics, and, most recently, health and subjective well-being (Ager and Strang 2008; OECD/EU 2019).³⁶

Beyond topical coverage, multidimensional integration frameworks also differ in way in which they group or separate particular topics to outline individual dimensions. For some, such as Bean and colleagues (2012), dimensions are distinguished based on particular areas of integration following a distinct development paths (empirically observable through divergent outcome patterns). In this case, the (dis)aggregation structure carries theoretical meaning; in other cases (e.g. OECD/EU 2019), grouping domains seems to be a question of convenience and/or intuitive topical overlap. Still, even following a similar ‘logic’ of distinction, approaches can vary considerably. Accordingly, the total number of dimensions outlined varies widely across frameworks.

Across frameworks, domains of culture (language, religion, values and/or customs), identity, and social relations (interaction, friendship, intermarriage) may be outlined as distinct categories, or nested in some way. Likewise, areas of work, income, education, housing, residential characteristics, and civic/political participation vary in their categorisations: some frameworks group (most of) them under an umbrella structural or socio-economic domain, while others separate the spatial (housing and/or residential characteristics) and/or the civic/political (and/or institutional) (citizenship, rights, political participation) domains. Prejudice and discrimination, separate areas in Gordon’s original

³⁶ For a helpful visualisation of the overlaps and differences in outlined dimensions across different frameworks, refer to Table 1 in Paper 1 (Chapter 5; omitted here to avoid issues of self-plagiarism).

1964 framework, nowadays commonly form one dimension (whether it incorporates only one or both elements). As also noted by Lessard-Phillips (2017), areas such as health, subjective well-being and related topics are fairly new additions and therefore do not follow a typical pattern of categorisation yet.

In the following I outline a comprehensive (if arguably still not exhaustive) list of integration dimensions and indicators, based the reviewed literature discussed above (chiefly, Bean et al. 2012; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Esser 2004b; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Gordon 1964; Heckmann 2006; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019; OECD/EU 2019; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016). This framework, presented in Table 3.8 (below), differentiates between 8 major dimensions: culture, identity, social life, economic, spatial, health and well-being, and civic and political integration. As explained earlier, most of these domains are fairly common. Informed by more recent approaches, however, I add a distinct dimension focused on health and detach the spatial dimension from the economic.³⁷ The purpose of this framework is not, at this stage, to serve as an endorsed analytical framework, but rather to serve as a comprehensive collection of commonly used dimensions and indicators across the literature.

³⁷ It has been shown that ethnic segregation patterns may persist beyond the socio-economic gap (Balakrishnan and Hou 1999); while some degree of variation across subtopics of a single dimension would not be uncommon, I expect the spatial domain's path to be distinctive enough for its separation to be helpful.

Table 3.8. A summary of common dimensions of integration from the related literature

Broader theme/ dimension	Theme/dimension	Common sub-dimensions/indicators
Sociocultural	Culture	Language (proficiency, use) Cultural capital, values/attitudes
	Identity	Sense of belonging; identities
	Social life	Social mixing: interactions, acquaintances, friendships, intermarriage with native majority (<i>per se</i> , or vs. minority socialisation); Social ties in general (social capital vs. social isolation); Membership in clubs/associations (majority/ethnic/any); Social cohesion
	Discrimination and prejudice	Experiences/perceptions of discrimination Attitudes and behaviour of majority population
Structural	Economic	Human capital (education) Income/Socio-economic status Labour market position (employment, occupation, overqualification)
	Civic/political/institutional	Citizenship, political participation and representation, institutional inclusion
	Spatial	Housing quality Residential segregation/concentration (ethnic or socioeconomic)
Other	Health and well-being	Physical health, mental health, subjective well-being, access to healthcare

Source: own collection, following Bean et al. (2012); Crul et al. (2012); Esser (2004b); Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003); Gordon (1964); Heckmann, (2006); Ndofor-Tah et al., (2019); OECD/EU (2019); Penninx (2005); Spencer and Charsley (2016).

Within this summary framework, the cultural domain includes issues of language and familiarity with the cultural capital (e.g., traditions, customs, modes of everyday behaviour) relevant to life in the host country, along with values and attitudes (e.g., in relation to gender norms, or tolerance of diversity). The identificational domain typically looks at sense of belonging to certain collective entities; this may be a nation, but also an ethnic group, city, or other communities around which identities are formed. The domain of social life encompasses social ties in all forms, such as interactions, friendships, and marriage, as well as formal social participation in clubs and associations, for example. It can also include measures of social cohesion, such as generalised trust. The economic sphere refers to questions of education (including skills), work (employment, self-employment, level of occupation, overqualification), and wealth (usually measured through income).

The combined domain of discrimination and prejudice encompasses perceptions and attitudes towards immigrant and immigrant-background minorities as well as their treatment and equality of opportunity (on the basis of migrant background, although that will inevitably intersect with other social categories). The civic/political/institutional domain is concerned with issues of citizenship (naturalisation), civic and political participation (e.g., voting, activism), as well as representation in positions of power and involvement in decision-making processes. It can also include relationships to institutions in the host country (e.g., trust, access, participation). The spatial domain can include both issues of residential segregation/concentration and quality of housing (which is related to both wealth and residential patterns). The health domain encompasses both physical and mental health, as well as subjective measures of general well-being (e.g., life satisfaction).

Actors

Having established the numerous spheres in which integration takes place, a next conceptual question concerns the *actors* involved in the process and the respective roles they play in the process.

Penninx (2005) outlines the two key actors of integration: immigrants and the receiving society. The success of the integration process is determined by the interaction of the two actors, but their dynamic is an unequal one, Penninx argues, as receiving society holds much more political power and recourses; ‘its institutional structure and its reaction to newcomers are therefore much more decisive for the outcome of the process’ (Penninx 2005, 142).

Heckmann’s (2006) definition of integration strongly evokes that of Penninx (2005), portraying integration as an interactive process between the two actors of migrants and the receiving society, and noting that receiving society has much more power and prestige (see Appendix Table 1 for full definition). Heckmann, however, is more specific (and, arguably, prescriptive) concerning the expected roles of each actor: for migrants, the process of integration involves learning the new culture, acquire rights, position, and statuses, build social ties to host society members, and form feelings of belonging and identification to host society; the receiving society is expected to learn how to interact with newcomers and adapt its institutions to their needs (2006, 18).

In an updated version of Penninx’s (2005) above framework, Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016; see also Penninx 2019) expand on their notion of the two parties involved in integration (immigrants and receiving society), by outlining three levels within each: the level of the individual immigrants or natives; the collective/group of immigrants or natives,

and institutions of immigrants or receiving society. Integration processes can take place and be measured on all three levels; the total six type of actors (three levels on both sides) are each involved in the process of integration, interacting with one another across the three dimensions outlined (legal/political, socio-economic, cultural/religious) (Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas 2016; Penninx 2019).

Meanwhile, Spencer and Charsley (2016) combines actors and roles – drawing on the notion of ‘facilitators’ from Ager and Strang (2008) and ‘barriers’ from Heckmann (2006) – into what the authors call ‘effectors’ of integration. These are: the individuals; families and social networks; opportunity structures in society; policy interventions; and transnational effectors (Spencer and Charsley 2016, 7). Somewhat similarly to Penninx (2005), Spencer and Charsley (2016) also identify different contextual levels involved in the process of integration: for them, these are the local, national, and transnational levels.

In these frameworks, in addition to individual migrants and individual host society members, the host state thus also becomes a key actor, influencing the integration process via policies and structural features in the host country. Likewise, the co-ethnic community, and families and social networks more broadly, potentially even at the transnational level, can play a key role (as can native-background or other immigrant neighbours, organisations, etc.).

Reference group

Some European scholars have long been critical of the notion of the host society as the ideal reference group for integration. Joppke and Morawska (2003), for instance, write:

The ubiquitous notion of ‘integrating’ immigrants [...] rests on the premise of an already integrated, bounded society, which faces the risk of disintegration and

unbinding due to immigration. The underlying picture is that of a society composed of domestic individuals and groups (as the antipode to ‘immigrants’), which are ‘integrated’ normatively by a consensus and organizationally by a state. Postclassical sociology [...] has shown that such a ‘society’ does nowhere exist, except in the imagination of some (especially political) actors (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 3).

In *comparative integration context theory*, Crul and Schneider (2010) build on the ideas of a ‘re-made mainstream’ (Alba and Nee 2003) and the importance of the local social context for second generation integration (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a; Kasinitz et al. 2008) to argue that, in the context of the multi-ethnic European metropolis, second-generation minorities are no longer outsiders but part of the mainstream – possibly more so than some non-urban native-background individuals. Indeed, Crul and Schneider (2010) posit that in some super-diverse European cities, ethnic minorities’ socio-economic diversity now mirrors that of the native-background population, and thus, characteristics such as education level, socio-economic status and urban/rural origin may become more meaningful identifiers than ethnic background.

‘Reconsidering the mainstream’ thus may radically shift the focus on which group is more or less ‘assimilated’ or ‘integrated’. Children of native-born parents with no connections outside their own group may find themselves outside the multicultural ‘mainstream’ (Crul and Schneider 2010, 1257).

Crul and Schneider’s (2010) concept of integration is thus no longer based on convergence to the ethnic majority but to a diverse ‘mainstream’, involving residents regardless of ethnicity. This perspective is informed by the emerging body of literature on super-diversity (Vertovec 2007), but whereas Crul and Schneider (2010) observe a changed mainstream, super-diversity approaches see the disappearance of a mainstream altogether, suggesting that as a result of socio-cultural and demographic complexity, ‘in many areas

there is no coherent majority culture’ (Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore 2018, 180).³⁸

In light of this new complexity, Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore (2018) advocate for integration research that applies an intersectional and multidimensional lens.

Indeed, Spencer and Charsley (2016; 2021) seek to define integration ‘without reference to any normative goal’ (2021, 15), without ‘othering’ either side. Opposing a one-directional notion of integration, they propose the following definition of integration:

Processes of interaction, personal and social change among individuals and institutions across structural, social, cultural and civic spheres and in relation to identity; processes which are multi-directional and have spatial, transnational and temporal dimensions. (Spencer and Charsley 2021, 16).

Some quantitative studies similarly omit the using native (or majority, etc.) benchmarks, but still, for pragmatic reasons, incorporate normative decisions about what constitutes a more favourable outcome. The idea in this case is to conceptualise integration (and thus its measures) in a way that does not involve similarity to natives as the benchmark for integration but rather other, generally positive outcomes indicating success and overall well-being in the host country (e.g. Harder et al. 2018; see also Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017). That said, even without the native-comparison benchmark some measures, such as the host country language one’s main language, or interethnic socialisation (Harder et al. 2018; see also Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017) can still be argued to be culturally normative. (This discussion on benchmarking also relates to the question of conceptualised end-states of integration, discussed in the next section.)

³⁸ It is in a recognition of this new complexity in modern societies Vertovec that proposes the concept of *super-diversity*: ‘it is not enough to see diversity only in terms of ethnicity, [but also] immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements and restrictions of rights, divergent labour market experiences, discrete gender and age profiles, patterns of spatial distribution, and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents’ (Vertovec 2007, 1025).

Notwithstanding all the above-outlined refinements, the concept of integration remains subject to critique. Just a few years ago, a debate has (re-)emerged in response to an extensive provocative piece by Schinkel (2018),³⁹ critiquing the study of integration in general, and specific elements such as the concept of integrating migrant and migrant-background individuals into some pre-existing ‘society’. This critique is not exactly new, as demonstrated above (Joppke and Morawska 2003) and noted by Hady Abdou (2019) in her response to Schinkel’s paper.

Schinkel (2018) goes on to outline two further problems with comparing ‘immigrant-background’ groups or individuals to a ‘native’ or ‘mainstream’ population as a measure of integration. First of all, the ‘native’ categorisation becomes exclusionary when several generations in, de facto native-born descendants of immigrants are defined in opposition to this category, continuing to be identified by their ‘migrant background’. As supported by Favell (2016; see also 2019), this is a typically the case for non-white minorities, in which case this becomes a thinly veiled race-based exclusion from ‘native’ (i.e., ‘integrated’) society.⁴⁰ The exclusion, following Schinkel’s (2018) reasoning, also extends to the category of the ‘mainstream’ population, when any changes in the aggregate characteristics of the resident population (resulting from the presence of minorities) are not considered societal changes but an evidence of lack of integration on the part of immigrant and immigrant-background minorities. (Examples of this could include religiosity, but also crime, poverty etc.) In fact, Schinkel (2018, 5) continues, by attributing any problems (e.g., unemployment, incarceration, homophobia) that occur for immigrant and immigrant-background minorities

³⁹ See also Rytter (2019) and Favell (2019).

⁴⁰ See also Lessard-Phillips, Galandini, de Valk, & Fibbi (2017) on the exclusionary potential of the ‘native’ category.

as a sign of insufficient ‘integration’, this approach assumes that ‘integrated’ society itself is free from such problems.

While largely agreeing with the problematic nature of the approaches cited by Schinkel (2018), Meissner (2019) and Penninx (2019) also note that his sweeping critique does not actually fit with the actual state-of-the-art of integration literature, as several recent works have taken into account these, in fact, rather longstanding, concerns and have been working on conceptual and methodological improvements to address them. Penninx cites his ‘intentionally open’ (2019, 5) definition of integration based on societal acceptance (discussed above) and his two-actor, multi-level, multi-dimensional analytical framework from his work with Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) (outlined earlier in this chapter). Meissner (2019), meanwhile, defends the methodological approach of superdiversity, which, with its intersectional understanding of diversity and its attention to context, she argues, is in fact an effort to move beyond the societal binaries and assumptions of ethnic groups’ cohesiveness criticised by Schinkel (2018).

What Schinkel’s above critique also seems to overlook, in my view, is the increasing effort on the part of studies on immigrant(-origin) groups’ inequality to disentangle effects of class background and ethnicity (or race, religion, etc.) from migration background, even if there is undoubtedly further scope to examine the intersections of ethnic/racial minority vs. majority status and migrant vs. native background in inequality dynamics (Gkiouleka and Huijts 2020; Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Heath and Brinbaum 2014; Heath and Schneider 2021; Lessard-Phillips and Li 2017; Groenewold and Lessard-Phillips 2012; Li 2018; Luthra 2013b; Platt 2007). Even the largely descriptive OECD/EU *Settling in* report uses ‘natives’ as the benchmark for comparison, but defines

integration as '[The] ability of immigrants to achieve the same social and economic outcomes as natives *taking into account their characteristics*' (2019, 17; italics added), meaning, for example, gender or educational level. Most of the studies cited above make even more sophisticated efforts to compare 'like with like'. In such studies, the argument is not that if persisting disadvantages are revealed to be merely tied to class background or race/ethnicity, they do not matter, but rather, that a clear (or at least clearer) understanding of the factors tied to disadvantage is essential in accurate policy responses. Indeed, disentangling these factors from one another is a key to avoid essentialising ethnicity, race, religion in inequality-related research (see also Anthias 2013; Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018).⁴¹ I return to these points on the additional section on inequality and intersectionality below.

On an additional note concerning the question of the reference group, it is worth keeping in mind that the native, majority, or mainstream (however those terms may be defined) are not the only options for benchmarking the relative well-being or 'progress' of migrant minorities. Regarding second-generation youths, Lessard-Phillips and colleagues (2017) note two alternatives to using native-parentage peers as a benchmark, given its problematic aspects: one is to compare them to the migrant generation, which could mean the immigrant parents but also first-generation youths who migrated as children. Another alternative is to use the cohorts residing in the origin countries as a benchmark (a less explored, but interesting option) (Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017).

⁴¹ This also ties into the above arguments (Crul and Schneider 2010, 1257) to 'reconsider the mainstream' and migrant origin as necessarily a position of disadvantage relative to natives.

Endpoint/end-state of integration

Much like the question of the reference group, the conceptual question of how the endpoint (or end-state) of integration is defined is particularly normative, and thus difficult to disentangle from debates of political ideology – especially concerning the socio-cultural dimension of integration. Across the reviewed works, I note three main approaches.

First, responding to critiques to traditional end-state concepts (e.g. the classical assimilation approaches discussed earlier), one approach is to avoid conceptualising an end-state altogether. Ager and Strang (2008), for instance, note that while favourable outcomes in the ‘means and markers’ of integration they outline (i.e., good employment, housing, education, health) are indicators of integration progress, thresholds for ‘completion’ may vary; they thus do not outline a defined end-state.

Spencer and Charsley (2016) are even more resolutely opposed to the notion of an end-state of integration. They base their opposition on a number of arguments. On the one hand, citing Phillimore (2012), they assert that integration does not necessarily proceed in one direction, and that ‘progress’ – which Spencer and Charsley (2016) also qualify as a normative term – may reverse over time. As they write in their 2016 paper,

There is thus no integration ‘end-state’, no ‘integrated society’ but rather an ever evolving process. Outcomes measured at any one time are a snap-shot, not a permanent feature (Spencer and Charsley 2016, 4).

Taking this idea further, in their 2021 revision

The focus [...] is entirely on process. There is no concept of an end state, an ‘integrated society’. The opposite of integration, is not disintegration, but the absence of processes of interaction, personal and social change. No judgement is made on the consequences of integration processes, nor lack of them (Spencer and Charsley 2021, 16).

Spencer and Charsley (2016) also tie into the growing literature of transnationalism (Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006), which stresses the relevance of migrants' continuing ties to their origin country. These social, cultural, and economic ties may be present well after the first, migrant generation, and, scholars of transnationalism stress, are not antithetical to integration in the host country (see e.g. Bilgili 2014; Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006). This notion of ethnic/origin culture retention and host country acculturation co-existing instead of necessarily involving a zero-sum trade-off falls in line with the literature of multiculturalism mentioned earlier (Kymlicka 2012; Wright and Bloemraad 2012; cf. Esser 2010).

Second, a different type of approach does define integration based on an ideal end-state, but – instead of the typical criteria of similarity and adaptation expected from immigrants – that end-state is a deliberately 'open' idea of acceptance and inclusion. This is the strategy of Penninx who defines integration as 'the process of becoming an accepted part of society' (2005, 141).⁴² Going into further detail, Penninx (2005) describes his three dimensions of integration (legal/political, socioeconomic, cultural/religious) from the perspective of what inclusion by receiving society would look like, in terms of equality of rights provided via public policy. Likewise, Heckmann defines integration as 'a generations lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society' (2006, 18).

In a somewhat similar third approach, the end-state is defined in terms of societal equality, and, often, social inclusion. This conceptualisation is particularly common in

⁴² Penninx's (2005) notion of societal acceptance as the end-state of integration has a long history – note how it echoes the conceptualisations of Warner and Srole (1945) and Gordon (1964) presented earlier.

perspectives focused primarily on the socioeconomic domain. Esser, for instance, envisions completed group-level integration as the disappearance of structural inequalities, or ‘between-group variances in education, occupations, and income between ethnic groups’ (2004a, 1131).⁴³ Very similarly, as mentioned above, in *Settling In* 2018, the OECD and EU define integration as immigrants having ‘the same social and economic outcomes’ as comparable ‘natives’ (OECD/EU 2019, 17). A broader but similar perspective is reflected in Alba and Foner’s (2015) approach, which defines the goal of integration as immigrants and their children becoming ‘full members’ of the societies in which they live:

Full membership means having the same educational and work opportunities as long-term native-born citizens, and the same chances to better their own and their children's lot. It also means having a sense of dignity and belonging that comes with acceptance and inclusion in a broad range of institutions. (Alba and Foner 2015, 1–2)^{44, 45}

As evidenced by the latter examples as well as discussions concerning the issue of the reference group, the concept of integration is strongly related to the concepts of *inequality* and *social inclusion*, especially in some contemporary approaches. I thus briefly look into these concepts further before moving on to my own conceptual approach of integration.

3.2.5 Insights from the study of social inclusion and inequality

As defined earlier (*Introduction*), the study of social (societal) inclusion or exclusion is largely concerned with ensuring that no group in society is prevented from fully participating in the social, political and economic life of the country (World Bank n.d.; UNDESA 2016,

⁴³ For examples of the empirical literature reflecting this approach, see Heath et al. (2008) or Fleischmann and Dronkers (2007), or Algan et al. (2010).

⁴⁴ This seems, in essence, a revised version of Alba and Nee’s 1997 definition of assimilation (discussed earlier).

⁴⁵ Also somewhat similar is Harder and colleagues’ (2018, 11488; referencing Kymlicka 1995; 2012) definition of integration as ‘the degree to which immigrants have the knowledge and capacity to build a successful, fulfilling life in the host society’, though this omits natives altogether.

20). The concept of social exclusion is strongly linked to the concept of inequality, which can both be a cause and result of the former (UNDESA 2016). Traditionally, sociological interest in inequality largely concerned the economic domain (including general ‘life chances’, social mobility, wealth, and socioeconomic status, etc.); however, interest in inequalities has increasingly encompasses varied domains of life (Platt 2019). While views on the desirability (and feasibility) of full societal equality of outcomes vary, the sentiment that individuals across society should enjoy equal opportunities is a fairly prevalent one (Sawhill 1999). For Platt, equality of opportunity is ‘the freedom to pursue success, achievement or individual goals unimpeded by artificial constraints’ (2019, 8). This does not necessarily imply absolute equality (i.e., equality of outcomes) across society; the point is that certain background characteristics should be irrelevant to individual’s chances to prosper in society (Platt 2019). Depending on the outcome examined, such characteristics might include gender, age, disability, ethnicity, class background, or migration background, for example. Assuming an equal distribution of talent and ability across the population, systematic differences in outcomes across social groups (as defined, e.g., by the above characteristics) are unfair and thus unjustified (Platt 2019).

Examining differences across social groups, Platt (2019) calls attention to other relevant background characteristics that, distributed unequally between the examined groups – and thus resulting in what are also called ‘compositional’ or ‘selectivity’ effects – may be driving the inequalities and thus could reduce or even explain away the observed differences in outcomes (see, e.g., Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Feliciano 2020; van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019). Common examples of this (examining, e.g., occupational attainment) may include age, qualifications, and other characteristics. Here the notions of absolute versus relative inequality – or gross versus net penalty/premium – become relevant, referring to

differences in ‘overall’ group averages versus differences after accounting for relevant explanatory factors to make cases ‘comparable’ (Platt 2019; Phalet and Heath 2010). What is meant by the latter is that analyses of social inequalities often seek to compare individuals across groups that, with the exception of the outcome of interest, are otherwise similar in terms of other potentially relevant characteristics, thus leaving social group membership (e.g., ethnicity) as the sole remaining explanation for the observed difference, confirming an ‘unjust’ source of inequality (Platt 2019; Phalet and Heath 2010). Still, this strategy has its own caveats, as Platt (2019) notes: for instance, that the factors that made group members dissimilar in the first place might themselves be relevant to the analysis (e.g., differences in educational attainment); furthermore, individuals across and within groups may be so different, in so many regards, that the objective of full comparability is a futile one.

Further on the topic of selectivity, it is important to note that most immigrant integration research conducted in a given country excludes, by default, those immigrants who have left, either to return to their country of origin or onward to another destination. It seems likely that the decision to leave – or stay – would at least be somewhat related to the success of integration, resulting in a positively selected ‘stayee’ population of immigrants, whether in terms of sociocultural integration, structural integration, or both. Concerning sociocultural integration, there is some evidence that the likelihood of return or onward migration is influenced by the strength of the immigrant’s attachment to the host country: having invested more into cultural assimilation (e.g. language fluency), identifying more strongly with the host country, or having married a native of the host country, for example, seem to lower the likelihood of leaving (Adda, Dustmann, and Görlach 2021; Constant and Massey 2003; Della Puppa, Montagna, and Kofman 2021; Morad and Sacchetto 2020). That said, it is worth noting that causality here may well be the other way around, with migrants

who have intentions to leave being less likely to invest in sociocultural integration than those who plan to stay.

Turning to structural integration, the picture is more mixed. Neoclassical migration theories saw return migration as a sign that the income-maximising project of labour migration had failed (Cassarino 2004). Indeed, an influential early study by Constant and Massey (2003) found evidence of returnees being negatively selected in terms of labour market success in the host country; however, they did not find that selective emigration to significantly distort cross-sectional estimates of earnings. Furthermore, later theories such as the *new economics of labour migration* came to view return as a potentially planned final step within the broader migratory project, afforded by the achievement of socioeconomic advancement during migratory project (Cassarino 2004; Stark 1991). Additionally, migration is known to be a resource-intensive process, meaning that socioeconomically more successful individuals may have the capability to migrate while those with the least resources may not (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2019); this could well apply to immigrants who wish to re-migrate, as well, with the most marginalized (and least structurally integrated) immigrants being less able to leave even if they want to. In fact, multiple studies have found re-migrants to be positively selected, in socioeconomic terms, within the broader immigrant population (e.g., Esteva and Alberto 2013; Gundel and Peters 2008; Nekby 2006). Some find a mix of positive and negative socioeconomic selection across different origin groups (Esteva and Alberto 2013). Finally, acquiring citizenship has been found to lower the likelihood of return, but – at least within Europe – facilitate and thus increase the likelihood of onward migration (Caron 2020).

Studying migrant integration, and thus inequalities by migration status, raises some further questions regarding what degree of equality in outcomes can be reasonably expected. Migration itself is a notoriously disruptive process (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). When it comes to social networks, linguistic ability, location-specific cultural capital and practical knowledge, and applicability of credentials and experience, first-generation migrants are likely to have some natural disadvantages compared to natives (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008; Penninx 2005). Some of these disadvantages can be overcome over time, but others are unlikely to fully vanish within the immigrant generation (Penninx 2005). Considering this, disadvantages tied to first-generation status may be less indicative of inequality of opportunity and more tied to the disruptions of international migration per se (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). Still, this does not mean that any degree of disadvantage among first-generation migrants should be accepted as unavoidable; in fact, reducing such disadvantages – from access to institutions to equal treatment – is a key goal of integration policies (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021; Feliciano 2020; European Commission 2020b). Meanwhile, for the native-born offspring of immigrants (the ‘second generation’), many of the above disruptions do not apply, and thus it is questionable whether penalties tied to migration background should be expected at all, once relevant background factors (e.g., parental human capital) are taken into account (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). In other words, equality with native-background natives should, theoretically, be attainable for second-generation immigrants. (A fuller discussion of this follows in Paper 2.)

Intersectionality

Looking deeper into the question of inequalities across groups also raises the question of what happens as different analytical categories intersect. Originating from feminist theory,

the analytical lens of intersectionality (Anthias 2013; Crenshaw 1991; Davis 2008; McCall 2005; Yuval-Davis 2007) has been increasingly adopted in broader sociology, policy, and the public sphere as a tool to understand the complex dynamics of structural inequalities (Platt 2019). For Davis,

‘Intersectionality’ refers to the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power (Davis 2008, 68).

In reality, the idea of intersectionality encompasses a multitude of perspectives and theoretical debates, even within feminist scholarship (McCall 2005). McCall (2005, 1773) highlights three main approaches, focusing, respectively, on anticategorical, intracategorical and intercategorical complexity. Intracategorical approaches, McCall (2005, 1780) writes, inaugurated the intersectional analytical lens by calling attention to the overlooked experiences of subordinated groups within the ‘finer intersections of categories’, typically focusing on Black American women. An important aspect of this newly revealed complexity was that the intersecting axes of subordination may add on to one another, but may also be in conflict with one another, leading to various outcomes (McCall 2005). McCall (2005) characterises these approaches as primarily focused on narratives, providing in-depth information on specific cases; while making important contribution, their single-case focus has limited power to outline broader structural dynamics.

Anticategorical approaches, which McCall (2005) associates with feminist poststructuralists, focus on challenges to assumptions about the validity of social categories, critiqued as inherently simplistic. Notwithstanding the important conceptual benefits of a healthy skepticism towards social categories and an awareness of essentialist tendencies,

pragmatically speaking, a complete refutation of social categories makes analytical engagement challenging (Platt 2019; McCall 2005; Alexander and Mohanty 1997).⁴⁶

Combining insights from the two prior approaches, McCall (2005) endorses the intercategorical approach. The intercategorical perspective emphasises the complexity of relationships across analytical categories, involving multiple social groups. Instead of zooming in on a highly specialised category, intercategorical approaches have a multigroup subject, applying a systematically comparative method. For McCall,

[Multigroup] studies analyze the intersection of the full set of dimensions of multiple categories and thus examine both advantage and disadvantage explicitly and simultaneously. It is not the intersection of race, class, and gender in a single social group that is of interest but the relationships among the social groups defined by the entire set of groups constituting each category. (2005, 1786–87).

Recent years have seen increasing calls for the adoption of intersectionality in the study of migrant integration (Anthias 2013; Bürkner 2012; Cheung and Phillimore 2017; Yuval-Davis 2007). As argued by Bürkner (2012), applying the intersectional analytical frame to has the potential to

help liberate migration studies from conceptual limitations caused by pre-fixed categories, such as ‘ethnic community’ and ‘marginalised subgroups’; instead, [a] refined analysis of cross-cutting structural categories (...) will generate more precise and realistic evidence of changing modes of inequalities among migrants, as well as between migrants and majorities (Bürkner 2012, 192).

In fact, the logic of intersectionality – and, specifically, the intercategorical perspective above – does not fall far from established theories of integration. Segmented assimilation theory (SAT) (Portes and Zhou 1993), for instance, recognises that while ethnic

⁴⁶ In the words of Alexander and Mohanty, ‘postmodernist discourse attempts to move beyond essentialism by pluralizing and dissolving the stability and analytic utility of the categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality . . . but the relations of domination and subordination that are named and articulated through the processes of racism and racialization still exist, and they still require analytic and political specification and engagement’ (1997, xvii).

divisions often correlate with class divisions, the two cannot be equated: different classes are represented within both migrant minority and native majority groups, and different ethnicities are represented within social classes. This heterogeneity has important theoretical implications, as it means that migrant-to-native assimilation will not always involve the socio-economic advancement of migrants (Portes and Zhou 1993). To cite a different example, multiple empirical integration studies have pointed to a phenomenon of migrant-background young people from disadvantaged backgrounds showing a greater upward social mobility than their native-background counterparts (Li 2018; Kasinitz 2008; Crul, Keskiner, and Lelie 2017), pointing to complex dynamics between intersecting categories of social class and migrant background.

These perspectives thus not only reinforce above-mentioned ideas concerning the internal heterogeneity of both immigrants and ‘native society’ (however defined), but provide a framework for how to deal with that complexity analytically. Practically speaking, this means on the one hand, disentangling the effect of migration background from other relevant potential sources of disadvantage (e.g., race/ethnicity, class, gender); and, on the other hand, examining immigrant- and native-background groups from a systematically comparative perspective, with an attention to other cross-cutting social categories and the resulting complex patterns of advantage and disadvantage. (I elaborate on my own application of these insights in the following section and the next chapter, *Methodology*.)

3.2.6 Conclusion

This literature review provided an extensive review of conceptualisation of integration and associated terms (e.g., assimilation) in sociological and related literature, from the early days of the field, within the US scholarship, to recent contributions and debates from the

European (and transatlantic) scholarship. To provide this overview and identify trends and alternative perspectives, I compared and contrasted conceptualisations of integration (or assimilation, etc.) focusing on their different approaches to a set of key conceptual questions: terminology, integration dimensions, actors of integration, and the reference group and end-state of integration.

My takeaways are the following. Starting from the question of terminology, I found inconsistent – and at times contradicting – definitions attached to both the term assimilation and the term integration (and other terms, which I found were often not fundamentally different than certain definitions of the latter).⁴⁷ This leaves me with the impression that the term used, per se, does not matter as much as the attached definition and conceptual framework. The real differences, and thus advances, I believe, can be found by focusing on content – that is, the other conceptual elements outlined. In terms of dimensions, I note a variety of multidimensional approaches especially in the European literature, with an increasing degree of complexity and range of areas included. I thus set out to gather and synthesise various dimensions (and attached indicators) from across this literature, for the purpose of having a comprehensive list to use as reference when deciding on a multidimensional approach. I also note an emerging literature seeking to investigate the structure of integration's multidimensionality more critically.

In terms of actors, recent frameworks on the hand incorporate the receiving society 'side' as an active participant and responsible party of integration; on the other hand, they consider multiple levels within each side, from the individual to the community to the

⁴⁷ Comparing, for example, Penninx's (2005, 141) vs. Schinkel's (2018) 'integration'; or Berry's (1997, 10) vs. Alba and Nee's (1997, 863) 'assimilation'; or Alba and Nee's (1997, 863) 'assimilation' vs. Alba and Foner's (2015, 1–2) 'integration'.

organisational/state level (especially in the case of the host society). In terms of the reference group, I also note an increasing degree of complexity, with many challenging the notion of using the native-background population as a reference group to measure integration, while others argue for a more nuanced consideration of the internal diversity of both migrant(-origin) groups and the receiving society.

Finally, when it comes to the (definitional) end-state of integration, I note diverging approaches. Some frameworks, noting for example the potentially non-linear nature of integration processes and avoiding a prescriptive notion of societal homogeneity, do not define an end-state of integration at all. Others define a state of institutional and societal inclusion of immigrants and their descendants on behalf of the receiving country. A similar common approach, prominent especially among quantitative studies focused on socioeconomic outcomes, defines completed integration as the disappearance of inequalities tied to migration status, at times combined with social inclusion. The recurring notions of inequality in the literature lead me to consider that concept in some further depth. That discussion ultimately underscores calls for intersectional approaches (especially comparative intracategorical approaches) to the study of inequalities tied to migrant status or migration background.

3.3 Own conceptual framework of integration

3.3.1 Introduction

Building on insights from this extensive review, in the next chapter I outline my own conceptual approach to integration, which underlies the subsequent empirical analyses. I outline my conceptual framework focusing on the earlier-highlighted conceptual building blocks, namely: terminology, definition, dimensions, actors, reference group and endpoint of integration.

3.3.2 Terminology and general definitions

As argued in the literature review above, I find the specifics of the definition and conceptual approach to be more meaningful and important than the choice of terminology. Therefore, I settle on the continued use of *integration* for consistency with prior European literature and focus on developing a definition and conceptual framework that are informed by the aforementioned debates and advancements.

As discussed earlier (see also Appendix Table 1), definitions of integration are manifold, and can vary not only across authors but also the particular angle or focus of the research in question (compare, e.g., Alba and Nee 1997; Alba and Foner 2015). Accordingly, my own definition and conceptualisation of integration varies slightly across the three papers in line with their individual aims and focus (see Table 3.9 below). That said, all three definitions share a core notion of equality and inclusion as the purpose of integration. (More on this later.) To broadly define these notions before I proceed with a more detailed elaboration, by equality I generally mean the disappearance of unreasonable disadvantages tied to migration background per se in socioeconomic and social positions, as well as in terms of general well-being (Alba and Foner 2015; Esser 2004b; OECD/EU 2019; Platt

2019). By inclusion I mean equality of rights and equal access and inclusion in institutions as native-background members of the population, as well as general social acceptance (Penninx 2005). Socio-cultural conformity or homogeneity is deliberately not part of this definition, which I instead consider assimilation, though I do acknowledge that host-society-specific social and cultural capital (including language skills) may facilitate the achievement of the above states of integration (Ager and Strang 2008; Harder et al. 2018). A more detailed discussion follows in the sections below, along with a final, more thorough definition of integration at the end of the section.

Table 3.9. Definitions of integration in the three empirical papers

	Paper 1	Paper 2	Paper 3
<i>Aim</i>	Examine the structure of relationships among integration-related indicators	Assess integration-relevant outcome disparities tied to second-generation status	Assess variation of integration-related outcomes across country contexts, and their linkages to country characteristics
<i>Population of interest</i>	1 st and 2 nd generation	2 nd generation	1 st generation (2 nd gen. in supplementary analyses)
<i>Reference gr.</i>	none	3+ gen.	3+ gen.
<i>Definition of integration</i>	<i>‘a notion of equality, inclusion, and acceptance in broader society’</i>	<i>‘equality with native-parentage natives in terms of life chances, social and institutional inclusion, and overall well-being’</i>	<i>‘the disappearance of systematic inequalities and social exclusion tied to migration background’</i>

Source: author’s summary from individual papers in Chapters 5-7.

3.3.3 Dimensions

My review of approaches to integration’s dimensionality informs my approach through the following key takeaways. First is the core idea that the process integration touches upon multiple areas of life. Second, sub-processes of integration in different areas of life do not necessarily develop in sync, or even in the same direction – the state of integration in one regard (e.g., employment) cannot necessarily be predict the state of integration in another

regard (e.g., identity). Integration, in its multifaceted complexity, is thus best captured using a multidimensional framework of analysis.

That said, particular dimensions of integration, as demonstrated, can be conceptualised and operationalised in a multitude of ways. A main reason why it is difficult to settle on a single multidimensional framework within the field is because the specific dimensions considered depend highly on the idea of ‘integration’ being measured (which may or may not, for example, involve cultural similarity to a ‘native mainstream’, as discussed), and, pragmatically, the data available. Arguably more important than the coverage of specific aspects, however, is an awareness of multidimensionality itself, even when the scope of a given analysis is limited to one or a few aspects. In practice, this means being careful with assumptions about what the ‘state’ of integration in one area means for integration in other areas.

In line with this, one of my takeaways from the above literature review is that it would be conceptually useful to have more empirical evidence on how processes in different domains of integration relate to one another. Further, it would be useful to have more multidimensional assessments of integration, as a simultaneous assessment of multiple aspects of integration (for the same population, with the same data) can tell us about the multifaceted nature of the process more effectively than a disjointed set of narrower studies. I conduct the studies in this thesis in this spirit: although I am not able to account for every aspect outlined in the ‘comprehensive’ set of dimensions outlined in the prior section (Table 3.8) – nor does every aspect mentioned there fall in line with my own conceptualisation of integration – I aim to represent a diverse set of integration-related outcomes in each study. Below (Table 3.10), I outline the dimensions observed in each of my three empirical studies,

in broad terms (operationalisation details follow in the Methodology chapter [Chapter 4] and individual papers [Chapters 5-7]).

As shown in Table 3.10 (see next page), overall, I measure four broader themes: economic integration/socioeconomic status (SES), civic/political/institutional inclusion, social inclusion and well-being, health and subjective well-being, and sociocultural assimilation (Paper 1 only).⁴⁸ Although sociocultural assimilation is not an element in my own definition of integration, Paper 1 includes measures of it because the purpose there is to test common assumptions across the broader literature, which often involve the relationship between sociocultural assimilation and other aspects of integration (see Paper 1/Chapter 5 for more detail).

The remaining dimensions of integration and their indicators are more focused on immigrant(-background) populations' well-being and inclusion, in line with my own concept of integration. Indeed, the analyses of Papers 2 and 3, which contain evaluations of integration (*who* is doing better/worse and *where* are migrants doing better/worse), focus solely on indicators for these dimensions. To capture well-being and inclusion, this set of dimensions and indicators combines established socioeconomic or structural integration measures with measures adopted from the well-being and social exclusion literature (following a relatively recent trend in the integration literature discussed earlier). Examples of the latter include indicators on health and subjective well-being, financial circumstances, and social well-being (as opposed to social isolation) (Linton, Dieppe, and Medina-Lara 2016; Omtzigt 2009).

⁴⁸ Additionally, the set of indicators observed is somewhat limited by the variables available in my chosen data source, the European Social Survey (more on this in *Chapter 4: Methodology*).

Table 3.10. Dimensions and aspects measured in the three empirical studies

Broader theme/ dimension¹	Theme/dimension	Paper 1 (First and second generation)	Paper 2 (Second generation)	Paper 3 (First generation + second) ⁴
<i>Economic integration/SES</i>	Economic	Highest level of education Household income (national decile) Subjective household income Occupational status/SES	Highest level of education Occupational status/SES	Occupational status/SES
<i>Civic/political/ institutional inclusion</i>	Civic/political	Citizenship Political engagement (electoral/non-electoral activity)	Political engagement	Political engagement
<i>Social inclusion and well-being</i>	Social well-being	General socialisation	-	-
	Discrimination and prejudice	Discrimination ³	Discrimination ³	Discrimination ³
<i>Health and subjective well- being</i>	Health and well-being	General physical health ³ Mental health ³ Life satisfaction	Health ³ Life satisfaction ³	Health ³ Life satisfaction
<i>Sociocultural assimilation</i>	Culture	Language use in the home	-	-
	Identity	Feeling of closeness to host country	-	-
	Social assimilation	Minority socialisation ²	-	-
	Spatial	Minority presence in neighborhood ^{2,3}	-	-

¹Note: reformulated vs. Table 3.8's sociocultural/structural split; ²Reverse measure; ³Perceived/self-assessed; ⁴Second gen. studied in supplementary analysis

Concerning specific indicators, a key difference between papers is the target population under the lens, which affects which outcome may be most relevant. For instance, Paper 2 focuses on the second generation, which makes educational attainment, for example, more relevant than for Paper 3, which focuses primarily on first-generation immigrants (though Paper 3 does include a supplementary analysis of the second generation). Other than these reasons, most of the reduction in the number of indicators from Paper 1 to Papers 2 and 3 in the domains outside of sociocultural assimilation is due to practical reasons, such as to simplify a methodologically complicated analysis, or due to missing data on variables. (A more detailed discussion of the measures used follows in the Methodology chapter.)

3.3.4 Actors

Drawing on the insights from the reviewed literature, in my own conceptualisation, the process integration involves a varied set of actors, including: the migrant(-origin) individual or group, the family and close social network (if looking at the individual), the (pre-existing) co-ethnic community, other migrant communities and different ethnic and socio-economic segments of the native-background population, as well as state and other institutional actors (NGOs, clubs and associations, faith-based organisations. etc.). That said, I am not able to account for this full range of actors in my empirical analyses, nor is an analysis of actors' effects included in the scope – except, to some extent for Paper 3 which is interest in host country factors' effects (and thus, by extension, the role of host country state, institutions, individuals etc.). Nevertheless, the knowledge of this complexity informs my understanding of integration mechanisms and thus my approach and interpretation of findings.

3.3.5 Reference group (and comparing ‘groups’ in general)

Learning from the earlier-outlined conceptual discussions, my understanding of integration also features an awareness of the considerable diversity within each category of both native and immigrant(-background) individuals and communities mentioned, for example along intersections of socio-economic status, ethnicity, religion, political views etc. (Bürkner 2012; Cederberg 2012; Crul and Schneider 2010; Grzymala-Kazłowska and Phillimore 2018; Vertovec 2007; Wessendorf 2018). Although I am not always able to fully engage with and account for this complexity in my empirical models (due, for example, to limits of data and methodological complexity), it does inform my approach to integration and interpretation of results. Specifically, building on the insights and recommendations highlighted in the discussion on inequality and intersectionality (see end of previous section), Paper 2 in particular examines what happens at the intersections of migration status (i.e., second-generation migrant versus native-background native) with social categories of gender, class, and racial/ethnic background. This strategy allows for a systematic (inter- and intra-group) comparative analysis of immigrant- and native-background groups, incorporating the cross-cutting effects of other relevant social categories, and the complex patterns of advantage and disadvantage in which their specific interactions might result.

Further, on the note of inter-group complexity, from the prior conceptual discussion I also gather need for a degree of scepticism concerning common categorisations such as ‘immigrant’, ‘native’, ‘ethnic group’, and others. Indeed, while aggregating populations on basis of shared ethnicity, religion, and/or migrant status can shed light on some significant structural factors and group dynamics, treating these groups as uniform entities can run the risk of essentialising these categories (Anthias 2013; Semati 2011; Verkuyten 2003). People of one country of origin (or ethnicity, religion, migrant status etc.) may be far from

identifying as one ‘community’ given either internal fragmentations along factors (e.g. socio-economic status) that may in fact carry greater weight than a shared country of origin.⁴⁹ In fact, as Waldinger and Catron (2016; see also Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018) note in their critique of the modes of incorporation framework (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 1990), differentiating migrant groups primarily based on their nationality (as a proxy for a set of associated background characteristics) risks conflating features. The practice of using ‘names’ (i.e., particular nationalities, ethnicities, countries, or country groups) instead of ‘variables’ (i.e., the relevant characteristics), as they call it (Waldinger and Catron 2016, 48), risks overlooking diversity in relevant characteristics within national origin groups and, vice versa, similarities in relevant characteristics across national groups.

Accordingly, especially since much of European research (especially on the second generation) has focused on particular national origin groups,⁵⁰ in this research I deliberately focus on directly relevant background characteristics (‘variables’) instead of national origin categorisations (‘names’), both when analysing immigrant vs. native individuals⁵¹ (e.g., Paper 2) and when analysing host country contexts (Paper 3). (See Methodology for further details on research design.)

⁴⁹ Refer to Schinkel (2018) for a detailed critique of ‘grouping’ practices in integration research; see also Crul and Schneider (2010)

⁵⁰ e.g., Turkish, Moroccan, and other Muslim-majority countries and/or non-white groups (see, e.g., Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Alba and Foner 2015; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008, 214; Drouhot and Nee 2019).

⁵¹ Beyond the immigrant or second-generation vs. native-parentage native categorisation, which is relevant to my research question seeking to identify effects tied to immigrant background after controlling for other presumably relevant characteristics. In fact, if the latter turn out to be more meaningful than immigrant background per se, that might further challenge the relevance of categorisation by immigrant background status.

3.3.6 The endpoint, or end-state of integration

From the earlier-outlined approaches to definitional endpoint of integration – if any – as mentioned in definitional discussion above, I do define an endpoint, for which I follow chiefly the approaches focused on equality and social inclusion. While taking the discussed points about the nonlinearity of the process and critical takes on the notion of an ‘integrated’ society, I maintain that inequality and social exclusion tied specifically to migration background are real potential issues faced by immigrants and their descendants (while not negating the relevance of other existing issues in the host society) and thus see the minimisation such inequality and exclusion as an state worth pursuing – even if that state might regress and thus may not be a real endpoint in the empirical sense. From a practical perspective, as well, in conducting quantitative analysis on integration (especially one focused on inequalities) I find it logically necessary to have at least a definitional notion of ‘achieved’ integration (likewise for the issue of the reference group).

Overall, in this research I thus consider definitional endpoint of integration as a state of social acceptance and social and institutional inclusion for immigrant and immigrant-background minorities, in which they enjoy comparable life chances and well-being to their native-parentage native peers. This conceptual end-state thus involves the disappearance of a migrant(-background) penalty in the host society in economic, social, and general well-being terms. By penalty here I mean a relative disadvantage (vs. native-background peers) remaining after controlling for relevant background characteristics.⁵²

⁵²The specific background characteristics are discussed further in Methodology and the individual papers. Note that this is similar though not entirely equivalent to Heath’s (see, e.g. Phalet and Heath 2010, 1825) use of ‘ethnic penalty’ (which focuses on economic outcomes and controls primarily for own human capital).

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided a comprehensive overview of the concept of immigrant integration. The first main section of the chapter provided an overview of the different conceptual approaches to integration as they evolved and varied over time and across contexts and schools of thought. Looking at different conceptualisations and definitions comparatively, I identified five main conceptual elements along which approaches tend to differ: terminology chosen, and how the dimensions, actors, reference group, and the endpoint or end-state of integration is defined. The main insights from this review as they concern each of these elements were summarised in section 3.2.6.

Building on those insights, in the second main section of this chapter I then outlined my own definition and conceptual approach to integration. My concept of integration is centred on the societal inclusion and equality of immigrants and their descendants, which does not necessarily involve, by my definition, sociocultural assimilation. Importantly, I conceptualise integration as a multidimensional phenomenon, involving the socioeconomic integration, civic/political/institutional inclusion, social inclusion and well-being, and health and subjective well-being. I also conceptualise integration as a process involving multiple actors at different levels. I view the definitional end-state, that is, the ideal goal of integration a state of social acceptance and social and institutional inclusion for immigrant and immigrant-background minorities, in which they enjoy comparable life chances and well-being to their native-parentage native peers. This involves the disappearance of a migrant(-background) penalty in the host society in economic, social, and general well-being terms (i.e., the above dimensions outlined). I also briefly presented how these conceptual positions shape and/or manifest in the three empirical studies that follow.

The following Chapter 4 discusses my Methodology for the empirical papers (presented in Chapters 5-7). In this next chapter, I go into more specific detail concerning operationalisation and other practical decisions, thus providing the bridge from my conceptual approach – developed and outlined above – to the three major empirical analyses that comprise the core of this dissertation.

4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Building on the conceptual positions discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter outlines the methodology followed in the empirical studies of this thesis. It begins with a discussion of the philosophical position taken in this research, which shapes the overall methodological approach. It then outlines and explains decisions taken concerning data used, the operationalisation of the concepts of interest (identified in the previous chapter), and methods of analysis. It concludes with a discussion of ethics concerning this research.

4.2 The philosophical stance of the research

My concept of integration and the design of this research are shaped by my ontological and epistemological positions. With some simplification, questions of ontology in social research concern the underlying belief regarding the existence of a real and objectively observable world, while epistemology asks what *can* be known about the social phenomenon under study, and *how* this knowledge may be acquired (Della Porta and Keating 2008; Matthews and Ross 2010; Gray 2013). Questions of methodology, then, concern the technical tools used to acquire that knowledge (Della Porta and Keating 2008; Matthews and Ross 2010). In the following section, I elaborate on my ontological and epistemological positions to help place my research within the broader field and draw the path from concepts to methodology.

Beginning with ontology, Matthews and Ross (2010) present objectivism and constructivism as two contrasting positions: objectivism believes in the existence of a ‘real’ and objectively observable world and thus focuses on natural laws, while constructivism rejects the above belief, focusing instead on the (continually changing) subjective meanings

attributed to social phenomena. Taking ontology and epistemology together, Della Porta and Keating (2008; cf. Gray 2013) contrast ‘positivist’ (including neo- and post-positivist) approaches and interpretivist (including constructivist) to humanist approaches. Broadly speaking, this represents a spectrum from a view of social reality as purely objective to purely subjective; from empirically observable (natural) causal laws to only empathetic knowledge, constructed and abstract (Della Porta and Keating 2008). Within my research, there is an inherent tension between objectivity and subjectivity (Della Porta and Keating 2008). This tension stems from the fact that I seek to reconcile a positivist aim to understand social phenomena via measurable empirical data and with the inherent subjectivity of the very concept of migrant integration – an idea intrinsically linked to normative judgments and human ideas about society, as discussed in the conceptual chapters above (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003, 7; Bilgili 2014, 32). I therefore draw upon both ontological perspectives in my research.

Further, from an epistemological perspective, I identify most closely with the position of critical realism (Matthews and Ross 2010; Sayer 1999; Gray 2013). As defined by Matthews and Ross,

[Critical realism] prioritises identifying structures or mechanisms that result in inequality or injustice and thus offers the opportunity for social change by changing or negating the structural mechanisms that are identified as having these impacts. This position does not fit neatly into an objectivist or a constructivist ontological position as it focuses on the identification of knowledge that is real but unobservable other than in the effects it has (Matthews and Ross 2010, 29).

What makes the approach *critical*, then, is its objective to not simply gain knowledge but improve existing social systems (Matthews and Ross 2010; Sayer 1999). In line with this, my research seeks to improve knowledge on migrant minorities’ inclusion and well-

being, investigating underlying mechanisms and associations with the ultimate purpose of minimising disadvantage tied to migration background in Europe.

As explained by Della Porta and Keating (2008), critical realism takes a post-positivist approach to social sciences, looking not for universal causal laws, but *probabilistic* laws. Recognising the influential role of context and the associated variability and unpredictability, critical realists thus do not expect to find ‘formal associations’ but rather seek to identify ‘substantial connections’ among social phenomena (Sayer 1999, 27). Critical realism shares elements of both positivism and interpretivism (Sayer 1999), maintaining that while social science can seek causal explanations (observing what can be measured and counted), it also must involve interpretive understanding, as social phenomena as intrinsically meaningful (concept-dependent). In line with these perspectives, I am aware that the results of my research will not represent universal laws concerning the structure, state, and mechanisms of integration, for example, but merely associational findings, statistical estimates subject to probability and with limited generalisability to different contexts and populations. In other words, I am trying to gain the best approximate knowledge on my questions while constrained imperfect data, methods, and the inherent subjectivity of the subject matter (integration and its examined indicators) and the social science research process in general.

In terms of methodology, in line with critical realist epistemology (Della Porta and Keating 2008), in my studies I largely follow a post-positivist methodology, falling closest to the *hypothetico-deductive* (deductive-empirical) method. As an approximation of the natural method, in lieu of experiments in social sciences, tests are typically conducted via statistical analyses on large quantitative datasets, operationalising concepts and phenomena

of interest into variables (dependent and independent). I use the European Social Survey, as discussed later in this chapter (along with my operationalisation). Traditionally, the logic of this method is to start with a theory, generate hypotheses (expectations) based on that, and test them empirically through (typically quantitative, sometimes qualitative) data (Della Porta and Keating 2008). My approach diverges somewhat from this template; namely, in the second and third studies (Chapters 6 and 7), I do rely on theory, but, due in part to sufficient theoretical (or empirical) basis to set up clear expectations, these are kept slightly more ‘open’ and formulated as questions instead of hypotheses. Meanwhile, the first study (Chapter 5) takes a more exploratory approach and combines positivist and interpretivist elements. On the one hand, as in the other studies I outline some general expectations based on theory and previous empirical evidence, which I proceed to test against the results of a quantitative empirical study (using factor analysis); on the other hand, I use an interpretivist approach to assign theoretical meaning to the results of that study factor analysis (i.e., identify the ‘dimensions’ of integration based on the emerging factors – more on this below).

While the post-positivist elements in my approach seek to approximate the natural method’s objectivity and empiricism, I remain aware of the inherent subjectivity and meaning-dependent nature of much of my research. First, as discussed in the conceptual chapter, the concept of integration is inherently subjective and normative, and subject to continued challenge and reinterpretation; Second, there is the subjectivity of my operationalisation process (choosing ‘measures’); third, the subjectivity of several of the concepts measured in the data (e.g., life satisfaction, identities, self-assessed health, etc.); fourth, the subjectivity of the benchmarking process (e.g. comparing immigrant minorities to native-background natives); and finally, the subjectivity my own interpretation of the results into findings relevant to the ‘real world’. I keep these subjective or interpretivist

influences in mind as I discuss my findings and conclusions throughout and especially in the concluding chapter of this research.

4.3 Data, Measures, and Methods

Having discussed the philosophical position of this research, I now proceed to discuss the specifics of how the research is conducted. I begin with a recap of the research aims and questions, after which I identify the (sub-)populations of interest and discuss the choice of data, measures, and methods used to address them.

As discussed in the introduction, the research aims to fill a set of remaining comprehensiveness gaps in the existing knowledge on the integration and well-being of immigrant and immigrant-background individuals across Europe. Having addressed the first question concerning the concept of integration in the previous two chapters, the remaining chapters are centred around the following three questions:

- *RQ2*: What kind of dimensional pattern do we see in the integration outcomes of European immigrant and immigrant-background minorities?
- *RQ3*: Does migration background make a difference in the outcomes of the native-born offspring of immigrants in Europe?
- *RQ4*: How are immigrant integration outcomes linked to the contextual characteristics of the host country?

Importantly, in line with above aim of comprehensiveness – and my conceptual discussions outlined in the previous chapter – I seek to investigate these questions from a multidimensional, cross-European point of view, involving migrant groups from varied backgrounds. By this I mean exploring both migrant generations, as far as feasible (for RQ2

and RQ4), and including not just the most-often examined migrant minorities (typically non-white, often Muslim and/or socioeconomically disadvantaged) but first- and second-generation immigrants from any national origin and varied socioeconomic backgrounds. Likewise, when included, I am interested in the native-background population in its full diversity, including any ethnic/racial/religious and socioeconomic background (not just the white/ethnic majority/Christian and/or middle-class ‘mainstream’).⁵³ Further in line with my aim of comprehensiveness, I examine these questions with a set of quantitative analyses that can cover and capture dynamics across a wide range of geographical contexts and populations.

Specifically, to address RQ2, in Paper 1 I investigate the dimensionality of integration by analysing outcome patterns for a wide range of typical integration-related indicators for first- and second-generation immigrants across Europe. To address RQ3, in Paper 2 I investigate second-generation versus native-background disparities across Europe, with a consideration of the cross-cutting factors of class, gender, and ethnic/racial minority status, and the complex patterns of disadvantage that might emerge at the intersections of migration background and these other background factors. To address RQ4, in Paper 3 I then investigate the links between host country characteristics and cross-European immigrant integration patterns.

In the following, I discuss specific choices concerning data, measures and methods used in these analyses, beginning by outlining, with greater precision than earlier, the population of interest in my studies.


⁵³ More details on choices regarding comparisons with native-background natives in the specific papers follow.

4.3.1 Defining the populations of interest

Figure 4.1 below illustrates my logic in identifying and categorising the groups of interest in my empirical analyses, following up on the definitional practices mentioned in the *Definitions* section of the *Introduction* chapter. Essentially, concerning migrant status or background, I distinguish between three groups:

- 1) *first-generation immigrants*, also just called ‘immigrants’, by which I refer to foreign-born residents (settled for at least 5 years) who immigrated after the age of 12;
- 2) *the (broad) second-generation*, which, unless otherwise specified, includes members of the 1.5 generation (foreign-born arrived before or at age of 12) alongside the second generation (i.e., native-born with at least one immigrant parent);
- 3) ‘*native-background natives*’, comprised of the ‘third generation’ and higher, that is, the native-parentage native-born population.

Figure 4.1. Categorisation of immigrant generations used in analyses



Source: author's own illustration of categorisation used.

I decide to exclude recent arrivals (i.e., foreign-born immigrated less than 5 years prior) from the first generation (and the analyses altogether) as these immigrants would still be in the early stages of settlement and therefore their outcomes may be premature to interpret as indicators of the 'success' of their integration (or lack thereof). Nor are their outcomes really comparable to those who have been settled for several years, and, since breaking up the immigrant sample by years-of-arrival categories would result in too-small samples for robust analyses, I decide to omit this group since my main interest is in long-term integration anyway.

As mentioned earlier (*Introduction*), I set the cut-off between first and '1.5' generation at age 12 following common practice in the second-generation literature, based on the end of primary-school-age or 'middle childhood' (pre-adolescence) (Rumbaut 2006; Lessard-

Phillips et al. 2017). As also mentioned, although distinguishing between second-generation members with one native and one foreign-born vs. two foreign-born parents, as well as members of the ‘1.5’ generation, would be ideal for full accuracy, for pragmatic (sample size feasibility) reasons I find it necessary to treat these groups as a single category in my studies.

4.3.2 Data

The data needed for this research

Examining the above-outlined questions in satisfactory depth and breadth via the outlined studies required a recent dataset with the following characteristics:

- a) a large enough immigrant and immigrant-background sample to allow for complex analyses, achieved either through targeted sampling of immigrant minorities (of any origin, not focusing on a few selected nationalities/ethnicities), or a large-enough random sample of the general population to capture a fair representation of immigrant-background groups; importantly, immigrant-background respondents need to be identified or identifiable as such through country-of-birth information on the respondent as well as their parents;
- b) a wide coverage of European countries, not limited to a few western or northern European countries but a more diverse regional representation, with at least a few southern and eastern European countries; and
- c) thematic coverage of relevant background factors including, beyond basic demographics, at least some information on ethnic/racial minority status and religion, as well as parental class/human capital) and integration-related outcomes of

interest, including education, labour market position, political participation, health and subjective well-being, and social inclusion.

Given the above criteria, I decide to rely on the strengths of existing large-scale European datasets. Specifically, I view the European Social Survey (ESS) the best currently available data source for my research. I expand on this below.

About the European Social Survey (ESS)

The ESS is an academically-driven, multi-country repeated cross-sectional survey (European Social Survey 2018c). Since its first wave in 2002, it has been conducted every two years in a total of 35 countries, though not every country participated in every wave. The aims of the ESS include monitoring public attitudes and relations to institutions, advancing and consolidating cross-national survey measurement in Europe, and developing a series of European social indicators (European Social Survey 2018c). Accordingly, the survey is conducted following a rigorous harmonised methodology across participating countries and covers a variety of topics (from demographic and socioeconomic information to politics, social exclusion, language, identity, health, well-being, and others). Each country sample seeks to be representative of all individuals aged 15 and over resident within private households in the given country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status. Respondents are selected by strict random probability methods at every stage. The data is collected in a face-to-face interview, typically in the main language of the country but translations need to be available for any other minority language that is spoken as a first language by at least 5% of the given country's population (European Social Survey 2021c).

Limitations of the ESS

Despite its aim to be generally representative, much like other surveys without a targeted immigrant or immigrant-background oversample, the ESS is bound to underrepresent migrant populations (Heath and Schneider 2021). Migrants generally constitute a ‘hard to survey’ segment of the population (Steiner and Landös 2019), given their higher rates of mobility, vulnerability, and non-fluency in the language in which the survey is conducted. Further, when not specifically targeted, less-populous migrant groups have a small chance to be captured in a random sampling of the general population (this tends to be an issue especially in countries where migrant populations tend to be low in numbers to begin with, such as Eastern European countries).⁵⁴ All in all, using ESS samples for the study of immigrant- and immigrant-background populations, one should expect immigrants less fluent in the main language, immigrants in a vulnerable position (including irregular status), as well as less-prominent immigrant groups to be underrepresented (cf. Andreß and Careja 2018; Steiner and Landös 2019 for further discussions on the topic). Indeed, even when pooling datasets across countries and years, the first- and second-generation sample size can be limiting.

Beyond the issue of representativity, further limitations of the ESS for the purposes of this research include shortcomings in the measurement of race and ethnicity (and/or ethno-racial minority status in a given country context) and some sociocultural aspects of integration and assimilation such as inter- and intra-ethnic mixing, neighbourhood composition, identity, and sense of belonging, to name a few. I will return to these in the section on Measures below.

⁵⁴ Similar – and overlapping – arguments have been made for ethnic and racial minorities’ sampling in the ESS (see European Commission 2017).

A note on other potential data sources

I chose the ESS as the data source for my research following much deliberation and comparison with the pros and cons of other major cross-European social surveys. Some examples include the Labour Force Survey's 2014 ad-hoc module 'The labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants' (LFS 2014 AHM), EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC), the Eurobarometer, or the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS) (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017) (European Commission 2017). Below, I briefly present the comparative strengths and weaknesses of these alternatives.

Compared to the ESS, the LFS 2014 AHM had the considerable advantage of a targeted first- and second-generation migrant sample (Eurostat 2015). However, being focused on the economic aspect, its topical coverage was much less wide-ranging than the ESS (missing some variables of interest on political participation, discrimination, socialisation), a fundamental shortcoming given the multidimensional scope of my research. Further, while the LFS 2014 AHM microdata covers a wide range of European countries, it is missing some important migrant-hosting countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland (Eurostat 2015).

Another key cross-European survey, EU-SILC (EU statistics on income and living conditions), monitors poverty and social inclusion at the individual and household level (Eurostat 2021a). While it does cover some key topic of interest, similarly to the LFS 2014 AHM it is ultimately too narrowly focused on economic outcomes for my research.⁵⁵ Importantly, EU-SILC only allows to identify second-generation migrants if they are living

⁵⁵ The same applies to the European Working Conditions Survey (Eurofound 2016).

with their parents (parental country of birth is not asked specifically but can be available if parents are within the household) (Eurostat 2021a).

The Eurobarometer is another repeated cross-European survey that allows to identify first- and second-generation migrants and observes outcomes quite a wide range of areas of life (European Commission 2018); however, it does not provide data on age of arrival, meaning the 1.5 generation cannot be identified,⁵⁶ and lacks several variables relevant to my research (e.g., on race and ethnicity, religion, identity, health). Some other multi-country European surveys, such as EU-MIDIS I-II (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017) and SICIIS (Six-Country Immigrant Integration Comparative Survey) (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2013) do focus on migrants and migrant-background minorities and their integration, but their population focus is limited to particular ethno-racial minorities. Given the comprehensive aims of this research, having data on migrant groups from any ethnic/racial background was an important criterion (in fact, Paper 2 contrasts second-generation migrants who are ethno-racial minorities vs. those who are not). As mentioned, large (migrant) sample sizes and broad European coverage was also important, discounting some other minor migrant surveys (see, e.g., Steiner and Landös 2019, 43–49 for a list).

There are also some multi-country surveys focusing specifically on the second generation. These include CILS4EU (2009-2013), EDUMIGROM (2008-2009), EFFNATIS (1998-2000), GEITONIES (2009-2010), LOCALMULTIDEM (2004-2008), and TIES (2006-2008) (Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017). Of these, CILS4EU and EDUMIGROM are ruled out because they focused on minors, while my focus is on adults (of varied ages). Data from EFFNATIS is relatively old and focuses on a few particular

⁵⁶ This is also the case for the European Quality of Life Survey (Eurofound 2017).

ethnicities, a small age cohort (16-25), and only a few country contexts. GEITONIES is advantageous in some regards (e.g., it features adults and is not limited to particular ethnic groups), but its geographical scope of six countries (a city in each) is still narrower than I would like. (The data is also a decade old.) Though its coverage is wider, the overall case is similar for LOCALMULTIDEM data, which is also over a decade old at this point. Similarly, TIES's scope is a bit narrower than I would like, as it focuses on ages 18-35 and features data from seven countries, largely focusing on three origin groups (Turkish, Moroccan, and former Yugoslav) (for further details, see the full review by Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017).

Finally, I also considered using national data sources such as the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP 2019) or the UK's Understanding Society (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research 2021). Advantages of these datasets include a considerable depth within the national level as well as their longitudinal design which could allow to observe processes over time. However, a key drawback of this option is that only a few European countries produce such rich data sources, which would thus leave the geographical coverage of the study to the already most-researched western and northern European countries. Further such national surveys can be difficult to harmonise as they each observe somewhat different variables, to name just one aspect. Considering my multidimensional aim (which would require consistency across a wide range of indicators), cross-European aim (which would require harmonisation across a large number of national data sources), and overall aim of producing a large-scale but consistent body of evidence with each paper (given that the rich but fragmented nature of the existing evidence base), the lack of harmonisation presents a major drawback. In light of these considerations, I

ultimately decided that discrete national sources would not be the best fit for my priorities in this research project.

Considering the sum of the above strengths and weaknesses, the ESS ultimately stood out as the best available data source for the purposes of this research (at the time of writing). Notwithstanding some limitations as mentioned above, its wide geographical and population coverage and inclusion of relevant variables in line with criteria (a) to (c) above made it the best fit for my research objectives. Aiming to keep the data as recent as possible while also achieving a large enough sample size for robust analyses on the migrant- and migrant-background subsamples, I focus on data from the four most recent waves (ESS6-9), collected between 2012/13 and 2018/19.

The datasets used in this research

As mentioned, I generally aim to include a wide coverage of European countries (EU/EFTA, and, where feasible, Western Balkans countries). Beyond this general aim, the country coverage within the dataset of each paper is a function of (1) which countries participated in which waves and (2) their respective sample sizes for the population under focus in the specific study. Table 4.1 (next page) shows which countries participated in each wave (ESS6-9), and which countries' datasets are included in the specific studies. A total 17 EU/EFTA countries, highlighted in the table below (Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK). were represented in all three studies.

Table 4.1. Countries in ESS6-9 by wave and inclusion of country samples in Papers 1-3

	Round 6 [2012]	Round 7 [2014]	Round 8 [2016]	Round 9 [2018]	Paper 1	Paper 2	Paper 3
Albania	•			•		x	
Austria		•	•	•	x	x	x
Belgium	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Bulgaria	•			•		x	
Croatia				•		x	
Cyprus	•			•		x	
Czechia	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Denmark	•	•		•	x	x	x
Estonia	•	•	•	•		x	x
Finland	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
France	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Germany	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Greece							
Hungary	•	•	•	•	x	x	
Ireland	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Italy	•		•	•		x	x
Kosovo	•					x	
Latvia		•		•		x	
Lithuania	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Luxembourg							
Montenegro				•		x	
Netherlands	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Norway	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Poland	•	•	•	•	x	x	
Portugal	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Romania				•			
Serbia				•		x	
Slovakia	•			•		x	
Slovenia	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Spain	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Sweden	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
Switzerland	•	•	•	•	x	x	x
UK	•	•	•	•	x	x	x

Notes: Dots denote ESS data availability for given country/wave; X-s denote country samples' inclusion in particular papers. Highlighted countries are included in all three papers. Paper 1 only includes data from ESS Round 7, and only on ethnic/racial/minority first-generation respondents. Paper 2 datasets exclude first-generation respondents. Exclusion of particular country samples in some papers may be due to small sample sizes for subpopulation of interest. ESS9 data for Romania was not yet released at the time the studies were conducted. ESS data was available for some waves for Russia, Ukraine, Israel, and Iceland, but these countries fell outside the geographical scope of interest.

Each of the studies followed different priorities, which affected the choice of datasets and subsamples. For Paper 1, the priority was to capture as many commonly examined facets of integration as possible, including indicators of sociocultural assimilation (see *Conceptual* chapters). Following this aim, Paper 1 uses only the seventh wave of the ESS (ESS7),

collected in 2014/2015, and focuses on first- and second-generation respondents who are also ethnic/racial minorities in their respective countries of residence (N=1,066; data from 19 EU/EFTA countries). This is necessary because ESS wave 7, which includes a special immigration survey experiment, includes some variables that could be used, for ethnic/racial minority respondents, as (inverse) measures of social assimilation (more on this in *Measures*).

Paper 2 and Paper 3 both rely on a pooled version of ESS waves 6 through to 9, including immigrants of any ethnic/racial background. Still, their focus is somewhat different. Paper 2 focuses on second-generation and native-background respondents (who serve as the reference group). In this study, broad geographical coverage is particularly important, both to achieve large-enough second-generation sample sizes for detailed analyses and to achieve a more comprehensive cross-European analysis. Therefore, datasets from a total of 30 countries including EU/EFTA and Western Balkans countries are included (N=128,067).

In Paper 3, the focus shifts to include host country characteristics. While a wide geographical coverage is still also aimed for, it is also important that the country-level contextual indicators of interest are available for all included countries (discussed below). As part of this is a multilevel analysis,⁵⁷ it is also important that each contextual unit (i.e., country-wave unit – more on this below) has a sufficient sample size for the populations of interest. A total 19 EU/EFTA countries' datasets meet these criteria. Paper 3 focuses primarily on first-generation respondents (N=9,175), though its supplementary analyses

⁵⁷ As I discuss later on, originally (and thus at the stage of data cleaning) the entire paper relied on multilevel analysis, making level-2 sample sizes particularly important.

include second-generation respondents (N=12,673); further, the average outcomes of native-background respondents within the same country-year context serve as control variables within the study's analyses. To incorporate information on host country characteristics, I expand the ESS6-9 dataset containing individual-level data with contextual data at the country-year level (N₂=72) from various sources. Specifically, I gather macroeconomic and other relevant social and policy indicators from the supplementary 'multilevel data tool' from ESS (European Social Survey 2021a), OECD Data (OECD 2020; 2021a), the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World 2019 report (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2020), the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2022) Gallup's 2017 Migrant Acceptance Index (Gallup 2017), and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) project (Huddleston et al. 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020).⁵⁸

Considering the already rich body of country-specific literature on integration, my research deliberately applies a cross-European frame of analysis in an effort to move beyond the national frame and reach theoretical and empirical insights applicable at a more general level (Scholten and Penninx 2016). Therefore, none of my studies delve into analyses of specific countries. Paper 1 and Paper 2 use data that is aggregated across countries, and even Paper 3 focuses country characteristics, not particular countries (more on this later). Finally, it is important to note that due to the cross-sectional (even if repeated) nature of the data and the methods used (outlined below), throughout my studies I am able to assert associational but not necessarily causal relationships between variables. (Results and conclusions are discussed accordingly.)

⁵⁸ See Paper 3/Chapter 7 for further details on these measures and data sources.

4.3.3 Measures and operationalisation

Integration outcomes (dependent variables)

As outlined in my conceptual framework of integration, in my research I measure integration via the following aspects: social inclusion and well-being, economic integration/socioeconomic status, civic/political/institutional inclusion, and health and subjective well-being. In addition, in Paper 1 I also measure socio-cultural (including spatial) assimilation. I discuss my measures for these in turn. Table 4.2, on the following page, offers a comprehensive overview of these measures. As the table shows, I use a very wide range of variables across my three studies; to avoid excessive detail, I keep their discussion here to the main operationalisation decisions and summarise the main information in the table, but further information on specific variables is available within the respective papers (Chapters 5-7).

Table 4.2. Measures of integration used in empirical papers

Integration dimension/aspect		Variable	(range/categories)	Paper			Original ESS variables used
				1	2	3	
Socio-economic	Education	<i>Highest level of education/Educational attainment</i>	(1 'Less than lower secondary' – 7 'MA/MSc level')				<i>Highest level of education, ES - ISCED</i> (as in ESS)
			(1 'Up to lower secondary' – 3 'Tertiary')				<i>Highest level of education, ES - ISCED</i> (Simplified)
	Occupational attainment	<i>ISEI score/ Occupational status</i>	(10–89)				<i>Occupation, ISCO08</i> (ISEI scores generated from ISCO08 categories)
	Income	<i>Household's total net income, all sources (national decile)</i>	(1–10)				<i>Household's total net income, all sources</i> (as in ESS)
		<i>Feeling about household income</i>	(1 'Very difficult' – 4 'Living comfortably')				<i>Feeling about household's income nowadays</i> (as in ESS)
Civic/political/institutional	Political engagement	<i>Politically engaged</i>	(Yes/No)				<i>Voted last national election; Signed petition last 12 months; Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months; Boycotted certain products last 12 months</i> (=1 for 'Yes' if indicated 'Yes' on any of the above)
	Citizenship	<i>Citizen of country</i>	(Yes/No)				<i>Citizen of country</i> (Recoded to dummy format)
Social inclusion and well-being	General socialisation/ social well-being	<i>Take part in social activities relative to age peers</i>	(1 'Much less...' – 5 'Much more than most')				<i>Take part in social activities compared to others of same age</i>
		<i>Close friends</i>	(0 'None' – 6 'Ten or more')				<i>How many people with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters</i>
	Discrimination/ acceptance	<i>In-group discrimination (minority-specific)</i>	(Yes/No)				<i>Discrimination of respondent's group, on basis of Colour or race; Nationality; Ethnic group, Religion</i> (=1 for 'Yes' if indicated 'Yes' on any of the above)
		<i>Social acceptance</i>	(Yes / No)				<i>Member of a group discriminated against in this country</i> (Reverse coded; =1 for 'Yes' to Social acceptance if no feeling of in-group discrimination reported)
Health and subjective well-being	Physical health	<i>Subjective general health</i>	(1 'Very bad' – 5 'Very good')				<i>Subjective general health</i> (Reversed coding)
			(1 '(Very) bad' – 3 '(Very) good')				<i>Subjective general health</i> (Reversed and simplified)
			(0: '(Very) poor health'; 1: 'Fair to very good health')				<i>Subjective general health</i> (Recoded to binary; =1 for 'fair', 'good', or 'very good' health)
	General mental/ physical well-being	<i>Mental/physical fitness</i>	(1 'Hampered a lot in daily activities' – 3 'Not hampered')				<i>Hampered in daily activities by illness/disability/infirmity/mental problem</i> (Reversed coding)
	Mental health	<i>Mental health</i>	(1 'Depressed (almost) all the time' – 4 '... none of the time')				<i>Felt depressed, how often past week</i> (Reversed coding)
	Subjective well-being	<i>Life satisfaction</i>	(0: 'Extremely dissatisfied' – 10: 'Extremely satisfied')				<i>How satisfied with life as a whole</i> (as in ESS)

			(0: 'Low/not very high' / 1: 'High life satisfaction')		How satisfied with life as a whole (recoded as binary; =1 for 'High life satisfaction' for scores 8 or above)
<i>Sociocultural assimilation</i>					
Social	Minority socialisation	<i>Minority race or ethnic group: contact, how often</i>	(1 'Never' – 7 'Every day')		<i>Different race or ethnic group contact, how often</i>
		<i>Minority race or ethnic group: have any close friends</i>	(0 'No, none' – 2 'Yes, several')		<i>Different race or ethnic group have any close friends (Reversed coding)</i>
Social/Spatial	Spatial assimilation	<i>People of minority race/ethnic group in current living area</i>	(1 'Almost nobody' – 3 'Many')		<i>People of minority race/ethnic group in current living area (Reversed coding)</i>
Identity	Sense of belonging	<i>Feel close to country</i>	(0 'Not close at all' – 4 'Very close')		<i>Feel close to country (Reversed coding)</i>
Culture	Linguistic assimilation	<i>Use an official national language of the country in the home (1st)</i>	(Yes/No)		<i>Language most often spoken at home: first mentioned (=1 for 'Yes' if language is an official national of the survey country)</i>

Source: author's summary of constructed and original variables from ESS6-9 (European Social Survey 2012; 2014b; 2016; 2018d).

Economic integration/socioeconomic status

I measure integration in the socioeconomic realm via outcomes of education, occupational status, and income. For education, I observe the highest level of education. As an ‘outcome’ of integration, this is relevant mainly for the second generation, whose schooling is often considered an early indicator of socioeconomic/structural integration (one that will influence other forms of socioeconomic integration, as well) (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Griga and Hadjar 2014; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Lessard-Phillips and Li 2017; OECD/EU 2019). I focus on completed education as opposed to other common indicators such as school performance (e.g. Borgna and Contini 2014) because I focus on the adult second generation, with full-time students excluded from the sample. Information on the highest level of completed education is provided in the ESS with cross-nationally harmonised ES-ISCED codes (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b). As Paper 3 is more focused on first generation immigrants, I do not observe this outcome there.

Concerning labour market integration, I focus on occupational status in part because this is a less researched area than labour market participation (or unemployment), which is already researched quite extensively for both first- and second-generation immigrants in Europe (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Ho and Turk-Ariss 2018; Pichler 2011; Bisin et al. 2011; OECD/EU 2019). I also find this a particularly interesting indicator because it speaks to socioeconomic status, and – when controlling for parental SES – intergenerational mobility. I measure occupational status in all three studies, considering it a key measure of economic integration for both first- and second-generation immigrants. I develop my measure of occupational status using ESS data on the ISCO-08 code of the respondent’s occupation (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b), transformed into the

International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, de Graaf, and Treiman 1992; Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996) with the help of Jann's (2019) *Iscoegen* Stata module.⁵⁹ The ISEI converts occupational information into a continuous score based on the average education and income of occupational groups, with higher values reflecting better socio-economic standing. The principle behind the construction of ISEI was to maximise the role of occupation as the intervening mechanism linking education and income (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). While I have considered other common measures of status, such as Erikson and Goldthorpe's (1992) class categories (EGP), I ultimately decided on ISEI because it provided a greater level of differentiation that might allow to capture more nuanced differences between groups, and a continuous score (ranging from 16 to 90) as opposed to a categorical form, which also made calculations easier. It also seems to be a more precise measure of occupational prestige and attached socio-economic status, based on prior evidence that finds it to be systematically superior to EGP in explaining educational attainment and occupational attainment, while similarly good in explaining income attainment (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). A shortcoming of the ISEI score is that it was constructed using only male data, though its authors argue that this does not mean its use should be restricted to male samples (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Overall, ISEI is widely used in integration research focused on occupational status (e.g., Fokkema and de Haas 2011; Luthra 2013a; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021).⁶⁰

Disparities in household income are also a common measure of inequality and/or obstacles to integration for the immigrant population (e.g., OECD/EU 2019). Concerning

⁵⁹ In case of Paper 1 and 2, if they have ever been employed; in the case of Paper 3, if they are currently employed.

⁶⁰ Some other indicators, such as rate of overqualification, would have been interesting to observe but ultimately did not make the cut as the included variables were seen as more important (overqualification indicators would also have been more complicated to construct, as there is no direct measure for it in ESS).

income, the ESS includes a measure of total net household income (from all sources, self-reported) converted into national deciles, as well as a measure ‘subjective’ income, namely how the respondent feels about their income nowadays (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b). I found both measures relevant to economic integration, considering one an indicator of (more) objective household income level – also a relative income position indicator, as it is provided in national decile position – and the other an indicator of subjective socioeconomic/financial situation, therefore also interesting as an indicator of subjective well-being. The main drawback of these measures, especially self-reported household income, is the relatively low response rate. In Paper 2, for instance, this information would have been missing for 17% of respondents in my non-complete-case ESS6-9 sample (N=143,815), so given potential issues with data missing not-at-random, I ultimately decided to leave out income variables for Paper 2 and Paper 3 (where the same issue applied).

Civic/political/institutional inclusion

I measure civic, political, and institutional inclusion in terms of citizenship (of the country in which the respondent was surveyed) and political engagement.⁶¹ I observe citizenship information it is provided in the ESS (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b), including it in Paper 1 but not Paper 2 nor Paper 3. Citizenship was of interest in Paper 1 especially because of its potential links to other aspects of integration. Within the sample used in Paper 2, rates of citizenship were at 90% within the second-generation sample and even higher among particular subgroups; I thus decided to focus on integration aspects with

⁶¹ Variables related to trust in institutions (e.g. government, politicians) were considered (and trust in police was included in an earlier version of Paper 2), but these were ultimately cut in favour of other variables considered more important for the analyses (and also considering issues with response rates for some variables, which would have reduced complete-case sample sizes further).

greater variability in outcomes. For Paper 3, citizenship would have been a peculiar outcome variable as naturalisation is so strongly tied to national regulations (both on the side of the host country and the origin country, which may not allow double citizenship). While the openness of access to citizenship policies was included among my independent variables, I did not have a strong theoretical expectation for links between citizenship acquisition and the other contextual factors examined. Ultimately, in this study I had to keep the number of dependent variables relatively low due to an already high number of independent variables of interest (requiring separate models), and thus decided to focus on political engagement instead. All this is not to discount citizenship acquisition/naturalisation as a relevant issue in first- and second-generation integration research; in fact, the topic has garnered a growing cross-European literature (e.g., Bauböck et al. 2013; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Heath and Schneider 2021; Vink 2021; Peters and Vink 2016), which is also why I decided to focus on some less-examined aspects.

I measure political engagement in binary terms (for simplicity), considering respondents – whether first- second-generation, or ‘3+’ generation – to be engaged in politics if they have voted in the last national election or have taken part in any nonelectoral activity in the 12 months prior. I include the latter so that respondents who are not eligible to vote (e.g., they do not hold citizenship) will still be counted as politically engaged if they participated in other ways.⁶² Though the joint (electoral/nonelectoral) and binary form of the variable is no doubt somewhat simplistic, I consider this an important indicator of civic/political integration, as it taps into migrants’ and their descendants’ access to politics

⁶² European countries also vary in their voting legislation in terms of what kind of non-citizens may be able to vote in national elections (Huddleston et al. 2015), which could further confuse results concerning strictly electoral participation. On that note, Paper 3 does include measures for countries’ openness in terms of access to citizenship and political participation for immigrants through MIPEX measures (see Paper 3 and/or Methods discussion below for more details).

and whether they feel that it is worth voicing their political opinion in the country, or, conversely, feel alienated by political events in the country, and (at least somewhat) measures their degree of involvement and activity in political processes. I therefore include this indicator in all three papers.

Social inclusion and well-being

Turning to social integration, observe measures of perceived discrimination (the available variable in ESS asks about perceived in-group discrimination) in all three papers as a key indicator of social inclusion/exclusion of immigrants and their descendants (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b). A limitation of this variable (in addition to its subjectivity) is that it does not ask about actual experiences of discrimination, nor in what context that discrimination occurs (see, e.g. Esses 2021 for a fuller range of potential aspects to consider). Still, I consider the form present in ESS as a useful indicator for my purposes.

In the case of Paper 1, as a measure of social well-being I also observe some deliberately ‘neutral’ (not interethnic mixing-related) measures of socialisation, namely regular socialising (as compared to age peers) and close friends (i.e., intimate discussants) (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b). This follows from my concept of integration, which – as outlined in the previous chapter – is focused on equality, inclusion, and well-being of immigrants and their descendants rather than their prioritisation of native-background social ties over co-ethnic ties (which I consider *social assimilation*, as discussed below). In other words, with variables assessing regular socialising and the presence of close ties, I seek to observe whether immigrants are socially well-adjusted as opposed being socially excluded, which may indicate a lack of social cohesion and potential social marginalisation of immigrants and/or their descendants (see, e.g. Béatrice d’Hombres et al.

2018). These variables were not included in Papers 2 and 3 to prioritise other variables (although an earlier version of Paper 2 included a measure of regular socialising).

Health and subjective well-being

Concerning health and subjective well-being, across my studies I consider (self-reported) physical health, mental health, being hampered by mental/physical condition, and life satisfaction (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b). As usual, Paper 1 involves the widest range of indicators, while Papers 2 and 3 focus on two indicators that I consider the most effective: general physical health and life satisfaction.

Concerning general physical health, the subjective nature of the indicator is an important shortcoming; further, the question of whether immigrants (and thus, perhaps, their descendants) are positively – or negatively – selected along health is a key potential source of selection bias to consider (Domnich et al. 2012; Feliciano 2020). In this regard, it is worth noting that research has suggested that the ‘immigrant health paradox’ observed in the US context – which posits that immigrants are positively selected in terms of health, due to the physical and mental demands of migration – is not necessarily applicable to the European context (Domnich et al. 2012). Second, even when present, the initial health advantage tends to diminish over time (Francesca and Petretto 2019; Rechel et al. 2013; Domnich et al. 2012; Lubbers and Gijsberts 2019). As discussed by Francesca and Petretto (2019; see also Rechel et al. 2013; Lubbers and Gijsberts 2019) migrants can face a set of particular health challenges, including social exclusion, worse living conditions, barriers to healthcare access, overrepresentation in jobs associated with worse occupational health. Together, these factors can lead to an ‘exhausted migrant effect’, cancelling out the initial ‘healthy migrant effect’ and possibly even resulting in a health disadvantage, at times even for the second generation

(Francesca and Petretto 2019; Rechel et al. 2013; see also Gkiouleka and Huijts 2020). In sum, while the issue of selectivity should not be discounted, health inequalities can indeed indicate difficulties in integration.⁶³ Importantly, immigrants may also have limited access to healthcare or health insurance (e.g. Bean et al. 2012; Domnich et al. 2012; Riza et al. 2020; Walkden et al. 2018). Indeed, an indicator on immigrants' and their descendants' access to (and quality/use of) healthcare would be highly relevant; unfortunately, such a variable is not currently available in ESS.

While there is no standard definition of subjective well-being, the concept typically concerns how people evaluate their lives (Hadjar and Backes 2013; Linton, Dieppe, and Medina-Lara 2016; Safi 2010; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018). Life satisfaction is thus a common – though not the only – measure (ibid.). Life satisfaction has also been shown to strongly correlate with other potential measures of subjective well-being, such as happiness (Hendriks and Bartram 2016). I consider life satisfaction to be an important measure of integration as it may capture an array of conditions and successes or disappointments in immigrants and their descendants' lives that might otherwise overlooked by more 'traditional' indicators (e.g., socio-economic status, cultural assimilation etc.). I therefore include a measure of life satisfaction, based on the ESS variable 'how satisfied with life as a whole' (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b) in all three papers.

Sociocultural assimilation

Finally, Paper 1 includes a set of measures for sociocultural assimilation. While all of the above-discussed variables (or source variables) are available in the main questionnaire of all

⁶³ Especially in the long term – which is another reason why, in my analyses, I focus on immigrants who have been settled for over five years.

four ESS rounds used (ESS6-9) (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b), measures of social and spatial assimilation were more difficult to come by. In fact, most waves of the ESS do not include typical measures of these, such as questions on social mixing or inter- and intra-ethnic contact. ESS7, which includes an experimental module focused on immigration, is the only wave with at least some approximate measures of social mixing – even if from the perspective of the ‘majority’ population. The three relevant questions assess frequency of socialisation with ethnic minorities, friendship with ethnic minorities, and their presence in the respondent’s living area (European Social Survey 2018b). Though still not direct measures of migrant-native (or migrant- and native-background) socialisation, at least for those first- and second-generation immigrants who are ethnic/racial minorities, these questions may indicate the degree of in-group socialisation. As such, it can be used as an inverse measure of social assimilation in terms of social mixing with majority members, under the (somewhat debatable) assumption that those with mixing more with fellow minorities, including the character of their neighbourhood, will be mixing relatively less with majority members (Heath and Schneider 2021; Fajth and Bilgili 2018; cf. Bilgili 2014). While this is admittedly an imperfect measure, it is still a meaningful and important one for my analysis in Paper 1. To be able to use these measures, I thus restrict my sample for this study to ESS7 and ethnic/racial minority respondents.

I also look at identificational assimilation, measured by how ‘close’ the respondent feels to the country (asked in ESS7). This may be considered a proxy for sense of belonging, though it arguably measures national ‘loyalty’ more than it does ‘belonging’ in the sense of feeling settled and socially included in the host country. The ‘loyalty’ approach works for measuring identificational assimilation, which is my objective in Paper 1. However, I do not

include this variable and its alternate version from later waves ('how attached' to the country) in the other papers.⁶⁴ As a final aspect of sociocultural assimilation in Paper 1, I consider cultural, specifically, linguistic assimilation. This is measured by the respondent using the (or an) official language of the country in their home; specifically, as the first language mentioned as being 'most often spoken at home' (European Social Survey 2018b). ESS only asks to specify the language; I recode the specified languages into being an official language of the host country or not manually for each country. An even stronger measure of linguistic assimilation would be to count those who *only* spoke the language of the host country in the home; however, I consider this unrealistic given that half of my sample in this study consisted of first-generation immigrants (not to mention very strongly assimilationist). On the other hand, for a somewhat 'weaker' measure I could also include those who mentioned the official language as a second language spoken in the home. I settled for the 'medium' strength option of the official language being not as the only, but the first language spoken in the home (still indicated by the majority of respondents).

Notes on key constructed independent variables

Ethnic/racial background

As mentioned earlier, ESS data is somewhat limited when it comes to identifying race and ethnicity of respondents. In my research, I am interested specifically in whether a respondent may be considered part of a racialised minority group in his or her country of residence, as I expect this to be associated with a set of disadvantages tied to discrimination and social exclusion (Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmermann 2010; Gans 2017; European Union Agency

⁶⁴ Not least because of inconsistency in questions and their coding across survey waves: ESS6 has no comparable question, ESS7 asks about feeling close to country (with 5 answer-options), while ESS8-9 asks about attachment to country (with 11 answer-options) (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b).

for Fundamental Rights 2017; Heath and Schneider 2021). Importantly, I consider this to be a different though intersecting factor with immigrant status: not all racialised minorities have a migration background (e.g., long-established Roma minorities), and not all immigrants and their descendants are racialised (e.g., white/‘Western’ immigrants) (André and Dronkers 2017; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017; Esses 2021; OECD/EU 2019). Which groups are racialised, and to what extent, also varies across European country contexts, though it seems generally safe to assume that groups of non-European/non-white ancestry will suffer from some degree of social exclusion (André and Dronkers 2017; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2017; Esses 2021; OECD/EU 2019). Beyond ancestry or skin colour, it has been argued Muslims (and ethnicities associated with Islam) also constitute a racialised minority across Europe (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Garner and Selod 2015; Drouhot and Nee 2019).

For the purpose of my studies, I am not so much interested in the implications of particular ethnic group membership as in the implications of ethno-racial minority vs. majority status in general. While viewing this issue as a binary is undoubtedly a simplification, I consider it a useful one in this case as my goal is not to attribute differences in outcomes to particular national origins, for example, but to capture the implications of being a member of a group that is ‘othered’ on the basis of their ethno-racial associations – whether in combination with, or regardless of migration background. I also find it a useful simplification for practical reasons, as it allows me to at least somewhat account for the latter phenomenon and/or observe its associations ‘overall’, as opposed to having to consider several ethnic groups individually in some already complex analyses (and result in small ‘ethnic’ sub-samples). Further, a detailed analysis of particular ancestry associations, per se

and in interaction with migration status, using ESS data, has very recently been published by Heath and Schneider (2021).

Creating a racial/ethnic minority/majority distinction within the ESS data was not a straightforward task. Until Round 7, the European Social Survey did not collect specific ethnicity data, only the question ‘Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]?’ (European Social Survey 2018a). Beyond lack of specificity, this question is not ideal for capturing ethno-racial minority status (in the sense of being a ‘visible’ or racialised minority) for a number of reasons. First, ‘a minority ethnic group’ may be interpreted as referring specifically to historical minority groups. Second, the individual may not identify with the local majority ethnicity but also not with any specific ‘minority group’. Third, phrased in terms of ‘belonging’ the question may refer more to personal identity than how the individual is perceived and thus treated in society (i.e., as a member of the local ethnic majority versus a minority individual), which is of more relevance to my research.

Another proxy for race/ethnicity that is available in all waves of ESS can be the variable on discrimination (‘member of a group discriminated against in this country: colour/race, nationality, religion, language and ethnic group’), which is relevant to capture racialised minorities, but is limited to the experience or perception of in-group discrimination (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b). Further, the ESS asks respondents their religion, which makes it possible to identify Muslim respondents, for instance (ibid.).

Since Round 7, ESS has introduced a measure of ethnic ancestry using the European Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups (S. L. Schneider and Heath 2016; Heath, Schneider, and Butt 2016). This is a major improvement in terms of data on ethno-

racial background within ESS. The one issue with these variables (first and second ancestry) for the purposes of my research is the almost too-high specificity of categories, which would require either a very detailed manual recoding (over 200 unique categories for each, within my pooled ESS7-9 sample), or relying on major categories (by the first two digits of the code that change by sub-continent) to classify respondents into – presumable – ethno-racial minorities or majorities in their respective European countries of residence. Overall, both options still involve a high degree of subjectivity and some generalising assumptions, as my categorisations also demonstrate.

To identify ethnic/racial minorities (and majorities), as accurately as possible, I relied on all four of the above types of variables. Specifically, I categorised respondents ethnic/racial minorities if they indicated any of the following:

- a) belonging to a minority ethnic group in the survey country
- b) being members of a group that is discriminated against on the basis of colour, race, or ethnicity⁶⁵
- c) African, Asian, Middle Eastern, or Caribbean⁶⁶ as first or second ancestry.

Those respondents to whom none of these applied (i.e., did not indicate belonging to minorities or their group being discriminated on the above grounds, and indicated only European, North American, Australian, or Latin American ancestries, if any), were categorised as (likely) belonging to the ethnic/racial majority. Further, based on above-mentioned arguments about the racialised status of Muslims in Europe, in Papers 2 and 3 a revised version of the variable (developed in later stages of the research and thus not used in Paper 1) also categorises respondents who indicated ‘belonging to’ – ESS’s wording

⁶⁵ Alternative version of variable excluding this component was used in models where outcome examined was discrimination

⁶⁶ ESS codes 20,000-59,000; 70,000-79,000

(European Social Survey 2018b, 94) – the Muslim faith as ‘ethnic/racial minority (incl. Muslim)’. Overall, while the above constructed measure (with and without the inclusion of Muslim respondents) is no doubt still an imperfect flag for racialised minority status, I believe it has a reasonably good chance – considering data limitations– of capturing at least a fair share of racialised respondents.⁶⁷

Parental socioeconomic status

Another key background factor of interest to my analyses – especially Paper 2, but also Paper 3 – was parental class background. As highlighted by Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi (2008, 220) in their review of second-generation educational and occupational attainment in Western Europe, the role of ‘class origins’ is a key question in properly understanding the situation of the second generation (see also Drouhot and Nee 2019). One key issue is parental selectivity in terms of human capital and/or socioeconomic status. As discussed in the *Background* chapter, a large part of the parental immigrant generation of today’s second-generation population came with low levels of human capital. In fact, it has thus been suggested that

The overall trends in the second generation’s labor market outcomes are social reproduction in existing structures of inequality and moderate social mobility given prior family socioeconomic status, which is generally low due to the social origins of many immigrant families who first came through the guest worker programs. (Drouhot and Nee 2019, 183)

While this may be the general trend, there is also evidence to suggest a more complicated dynamic. A key question, for instance, is whether class origins may work

⁶⁷ Counting the total five source variables (belonging to minority group; discriminated by colour/race; discriminated by ethnicity; first ancestry; second ancestry) among the respondents identified as ethnic/racial minorities, ca. 78% matched one variable, 16% matched two variables, 5% matched three, 0.6% matched four, and 0.04% matched all five variables (considering the pooled ESS6-9 dataset used in Paper 2, before reducing sample to complete cases; N= 143,815).

differently for second-generation members than they do for natives. Heath and colleagues (2008) highlight this as a yet relatively unexplored element of the second-generation socioeconomic achievement model. Evidence from both sides of the Atlantic has suggested that intergenerational mobility patterns may differ for children of immigrants (and/or ethnic minorities) compared their native-parentage and/or majority peers (e.g., Crul et al. 2017; Dronkers and Fleischmann 2010; Fernández-Kelly 2008; Heath and Brinbaum 2014; Li 2018; Pichler 2011; Platt 2007; Zuccotti 2015). This phenomenon is of key interest to Paper 2 (though it should be noted that it is not a specialised social mobility study). In Paper 3, parental class background is included simply as a key control for compositional effect – that is, to isolate differences in ‘starting points’ among respondents from differences in integration trajectories.

Strategies to account for class background may include parents’ highest educational level (mother, father, or both), a composite socioeconomic status (SES) or class score, their occupational status (e.g., occupational prestige or class/SES associated with occupation), parental earnings, household income, other measures of household wealth (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Hermansen 2016; Lessard-Phillips and Li 2017; Li 2018; Platt 2007; Torche 2015; Zuccotti 2015). When such data is available, intergenerational mobility studies on immigrants and their descendants may consider the parent’s educational level, socioeconomic status, or class position as it was in the origin country, which may have been higher, both in absolute and relative terms, than in the destination country (Ichou 2014; Fernández-Kelly 2008). Socioeconomic background information collected in the recent waves of the ESS include mother’s and father’s highest level of education (harmonised into ES-ISCED categories), as well as mother’s and father’s employment status and occupation when the respondent was aged 14 (European Social Survey 2018a; 2018b; 2020; 2021b).

In the case of second-generation respondents, parental occupation can be largely assumed to refer to occupation in the host country (since all included respondents would have immigrated before age 14), unless the parent was not living with them in the destination country. Parental educational degrees may have been completed in either country, though one could assume that the majority of foreign-born parents would have completed their education in their country of birth. In the case of first-generation respondents (immigrated after the age of 12), it seems fairly safe to assume that most of this information pertains to parents' education completed in, and occupation in the origin country. Considering how educational qualifications and occupation, as noted above, may have different status implications in the origin vs. destination countries, my use of these variables as equivalent indicators of parental class background among first-, second- and third-generation-and-higher respondents is an acknowledged, but necessary simplification given the limitations of the data.

For my analyses in Papers 2 and 3, I sought an indicator of parental socioeconomic/class status that was simple⁶⁸ but would capture the respondent's socioeconomic background (or 'social origins') as effectively as possible. For this, I focused on information on parental occupation when the respondent was 14, prioritising the parent whose occupation had the higher associated skill level or SES, or if one was missing, than the one available. In cases where both were missing, to avoid reducing my samples, I relied on the variable on parental education level, again prioritising the higher one between the two. I recoded the original nine categories of occupations into three categories indicating –

⁶⁸ This was important especially for Paper 2, which would use this variable in interaction effects (seeking results should still be relatively easy to interpret).

with some simplification – low, medium, and high socioeconomic status associated with the occupation.⁶⁹

- Low: ‘farm workers’, ‘unskilled workers’, and ‘semi-skilled workers’ (codes 7-9)
- Medium: ‘skilled workers’, ‘service’, ‘sales’ and ‘clerical occupations’ (codes 3-6)
- High: ‘higher administrator’, ‘professional and technical occupations’ (codes 1-2)

In the remaining ca. 6% of cases where educational information (where available) was used as a proxy due to missing occupational information for both parents, the coding logic was the following: low parental SES in the case of ‘up to lower secondary’ education, medium parental SES for ‘upper secondary or vocational’ education’ and high parental SES for ‘tertiary’ education. While this is undoubtedly a somewhat imprecise approximation of the above categories, I do not expect this to be a major source of bias as the proxy was only used for a small percentage of cases. In fact, the relative frequency of categories in the ‘final’ parental SES variable (14% high, 42% medium, 41% low)⁷⁰ is not much different from that of the parental occupation source variable (16% high, 44% medium, 40% low).⁷¹

A note on benchmarking

A further key measurement choice concerns the inclusion of native-background natives’ outcomes as a benchmark. In this regard, cross-national studies of immigrant integration tend to follow one of four strategies: (a) omit natives altogether, observing and interpreting migrants’ outcomes in terms of absolute levels (as opposed to relative to natives) (e.g., Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018); (b) run parallel analyses for the native and immigrant

⁶⁹ The categorization is my own, but it was decided after consulting some prior discussions of common occupation-to-class categorisations, in general (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996) and using ESS data (Leiulfsrud, Bison, and Jensberg 2005).

⁷⁰ 1.5% of cases missing in the non-complete-case dataset (N= 143,815).

⁷¹ Percentages calculated among non-missing cases (N= 143,815); overall, 7.5% were missing cases.

subsample (e.g., Pichler 2011); (c) include natives as the reference group, that is, the reference category in the regression models (e.g., Blom, Huijts, and Kraaykamp 2016; Hadjar and Backes 2013; Tyrberg 2020); or (d) account for natives' average scores by including them as a control variable in the regression models (e.g., Just and Anderson 2014; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021).

I follow strategy (a) in Paper 1, largely because it is the most feasible option with the method used (factor analysis, discussed later) and because this particular study is less concerned with migrant-native inequalities and more with the structure of outcome patterns among a set of integration-related indicators, which is well observable looking at absolute outcomes, too.⁷² Paper 2, on the other hand, is focused on the presence and size of outcome *gaps* between second-generation and native-parentage groups. Strategy (c) – including natives as the reference category – stands out as the best option in this case as it allows to measure the effect of covariates on the size and significance of second-generation status (vs. 3+ gen. status) associations, thereby offering the most precise measure of group disparities. Following from my inequality-centred definition of integration, strategy (c) was also attractive for Paper 3; however, given the large number of contextual factors examined (and the originally multilevel design of the study) this option was found to add an unproductive level of complexity to the analyses (discussed further below). Therefore, I found strategy (d), controlling for native-background natives' averages to be more favourable.

4.3.4 Methods (by study)

This section expands on the methods used within each study. While it can serve an overview of the methods and analytical strategies used in the three papers altogether, its chief purpose

⁷² This is also the strategy followed by a similar prior study (Lessard-Phillips 2017).

to complement the methods sections of the individual papers by provide additional information on the methods and methodological choices that could not be elaborated within the papers due to journal length restrictions (or would not have been appropriate for a specialised journal article). This also means that each sub-section is shaped by what is and is not already included in the associated empirical chapter, which may result in some slight discrepancies in the extent and type of details discussed.

Paper 1: Multidimensionality in the integration of first- and second-generation migrants in Europe: a conceptual and empirical investigation

Paper 1 conducts an empirical test of migrant integration's multidimensional nature with the method of factor analysis. Factor analysis is a measurement model approach popular, for example, in the field of psychology, where most concepts (for example, intelligence) cannot be observed directly and thus constitute 'latent' concepts that need to be inferred from several observed indicators (Fischer and Karl 2019). In such cases, factor analysis and related methods (including confirmatory factor analysis, exploratory factor analysis, and principal component analysis) are often used to develop scales and test the validity of particular variables ('items') as measures of an underlying concept ('factor'). The principle behind factor analysis is the idea that patterns of covariation between observed items may be explained by an underlying factor they share a relation to (e.g., they all relate to a certain form of intelligence, to keep with the earlier example). By this same logic, factor analysis can be used to infer the presence of one or more latent (underlying) factors in the data based on the underlying structure of associations (i.e., correlation patterns) between a set of items – in other words, 'do these measures reflect a single underlying construct, or do different subsets of measures represent a few different constructs?' (Fabrigar and Wegener 2012, 1). During the analysis, the theoretical interpretation of a factor is inferred from the group of

items that have the highest factor-loading scores on it (indicating a strong relationship between the item and factor) (Acock 2008). In sum, factor analysis can serve as an exploration tool to better understand the structure of associations in the data, see whether the given items represent a single coherent factor, or multiple (potentially related, or unrelated) factors, and assign theoretical meaning to those factors.

Factor analysis therefore represents a helpful tool to better understand the (multi-)dimensional structure of a complex, multifaceted phenomenon such as immigrant integration. In fact, a few prior studies (Bean et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017; J. A. Williams and Ortega 1990) have applied factor analysis and related methods (PCA) to explore the dimensionality of integration-related outcomes. Together with my supervisor and co-author Dr. Lessard-Phillips, in Paper 1 we conduct factor analyses on a set of 18 integration-related indicators to learn more about the underlying structure of associations among those indicators and to identify some distinct dimensions of immigrant integration. We choose a factor analysis approach over principal component analysis (PCA) as the goal of our analysis is not really to reduce the data but to understand the pattern of correlation among variables and thereby identify the latent dimensions represented in the variables.⁷³ Since we are interested in any potential configuration of integration dimensions, we choose the method of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) over confirmatory factor analysis. EFA is often used for a first estimation of a factor structure as it considers correlations between all items and maintains the possibility of a relationship between any item and factor (Mooi, Sarstedt, and Mooi-Reci 2018; Fischer and Karl 2019). Our factor analysis indicates the number of distinct underlying factors (dimensions) within our set of indicators and outlines

⁷³ As summarised by Mooi and colleagues (2018, 266), ‘While the PCA’s objective is to reproduce a data structure, as well as possible only using a few factors, factor analysis aims to explain the variables’ correlations by means of factors’.

a pattern among those indicators along particular factors. Based on this pattern, we identify an empirically-driven multidimensional structure of integration, with dimensional categories that differs in some interesting regards from the largely conceptually or thematically-driven integration dimensions prominent in prior literature. Additional analyses also check for discrepancies in factor structure between first- and second-generation subsamples, and countries with more versus less inclusive migrant integration. The data cleaning and most of the analysis are conducted in Stata (16-17), with some elements conducted in R (namely, the invariance testing; I also double-check the factor solutions calculated in Stata with R). I explain these steps in more detail below.⁷⁴

Specifically, the analysis consists of the following steps: first, we produce a weighted correlation matrix for the indicators of interest. The weights applied to the data are the ESS-recommended ‘analytical weights’ that correct for differential selection probabilities within each country as specified by sample design, for nonresponse, for noncoverage, and for sampling error, while also taking into account differences in population size across countries (Kaminska 2020). The analytical weights are included in ESS from Round 9, or can be easily computed as the product of population size weights and post-stratified design weights provided in earlier rounds – which is what we did for this Round 7 data. Given the mix of binary, ordinal and continuous variables among our items we produce the correlation matrix using the *polychoric* module in Stata by Kolenikov and Angeles (2004). We used *polychoric* as opposed to just the default Pearson moment correlation in Stata as the latter is ideal for continuous variables only, while *polychoric* estimates a mix of polychoric correlations (for ordinal/binary variables), polyserial correlations (for ordinal and continuous), biserial

⁷⁴ The major steps are outlined in the paper, but some detail was cut to fit with journal wordcount; the text below thus provides a fuller explanation and justification of methods.

correlations (for binary and continuous), and/or Pearson moment correlations (for continuous), depending on variables in question, thus providing more accurate estimates for correlations among a set of variables that are not solely continuous (Kolenikov and Angeles 2004).

Based on the resulting correlation matrix, we run an initial extraction of factors using the principal-factors (PF) method to get a first look at the factor structure. Preliminary analyses supported the suitability of our data for factor analysis: our sample size ($N=1,066$) is well above the recommended minimum of 300 observations (in case of low communalities) (MacCallum et al. 1999); our overall KMO statistic (Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin statistic, the measure of sampling adequacy, MSA) is 0.68, which, while not indicating a very high level of correlation among variables, is well above the typical acceptability threshold of 0.50 (as are almost all individual MSAs) (Mooi, Sarstedt, and Mooi-Reci 2018). That said, since the goal of this analysis is not the traditional one of using the computed factor scores in lieu of the original, e.g., in a regression analysis; instead, the goal is to explore the very pattern of correlations: therefore, even a weak revealed set of correlations is not a ‘wrong’ result for our purposes – it would be merely highlighting a weak interrelationship between some integration-related indicators (a valid finding in itself, for our purposes).

Next, we identify the number of underlying dimensions in our data – i.e. whether the items represent a single dimension or more – using Horn’s (1965) parallel analysis,⁷⁵ which is commonly considered the best method for determining the number of factors to retain (Ledesma and Valero-Mora 2007; Mooi, Sarstedt, and Mooi-Reci 2018). Next, we run a

⁷⁵ Performed with the *paran* program in Stata (Dinno 2015).

principal factor analysis specifying the number of dimensions (factors) identified in the previous step. The resulting loading matrix is rotated using orthogonal varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation to help achieve a more distinct and thus interpretable matrix of factor loadings.⁷⁶ We rely on the resulting table of factor loadings to assign items to factors and interpret the dimensions, based on which items load highly on it; we also observe distinctions and associations between dimensions based, for example, on cross-loading items (items loading highly on more than one factor).

In an additional step, we check whether the factor structure is the same for the second-generation group as it is for first-generation group, as well as in more and less inclusive country contexts in terms of migrant integration policy (refer to Paper 1 for details). To achieve this, we apply the three-step ‘Procrustes rotation’ method outlined by Fischer and Karl (2019, 13–15). In the first step, we repeat the above methods of factor analysis in R for the two subgroups (second-generation and native-parentage). In the second step, using the R function *prost* (see Fischer and Karl 2019), we apply a Procrustes rotation that makes the two factor structures comparable. In the final step, we then measure the degree of similarity with Tucker’s coefficient of agreement (or Tucker’s phi). It should be noted that these additional analyses are performed on relatively small samples ($440 < N < 620$) and thus be considered merely as robustness checks to the main analysis.

Paper 2: Does immigrant parentage matter? A multidimensional analysis of second-generation immigrants’ inclusion and well-being across Europe

Paper 2 examines disparities in outcomes between second-generation and native-background Europeans with a set of multivariate regression models. Multivariate regression

⁷⁶ The varimax orthogonal rotation is a popular method of rotation that maximises the variance of the squared loadings within factors (Kaiser 1958).

models allow to estimate the effect of a change or difference⁷⁷ in independent variable X_{1i} on dependent variable Y_i , while holding other regressors (independent variables X_{2i} , X_{3i} , etc.) constant (Stock and Watson 2015, 235). In the case of this paper, I am interested in calculated the difference in an integration-related outcome (e.g. income) associated with the respondent being a second-generation immigrant as opposed to a native-parentage native, if other background characteristics (e.g., age, gender, class background, etc.) are kept equal. In equation form, the multiple regression model may be described as:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \dots + \beta_k X_{ki} + u_i, i = 1, \dots, n,$$

where

- Y_i is the i^{th} observation on the dependent variable (in a sample with n observations)
- $X_{1i}, X_{2i}, \dots, X_{ki}$ are the i^{th} observations on each of the k regressors (independent variables, or predictors)
- u_i is the error term, i.e., the deviation of a particular observation from the prediction (due to additional, unobserved influencing factors)
- β_1 is the (slope) coefficient of independent variable X_1 ; it shows the estimated change in Y_i from a one-unit change in X_i , keeping X_{2i}, \dots, X_{ki} constant (likewise for β_2 and x_2 , etc.)
- β_0 is the intercept; this is the expected value of the dependent variable when all independent variables equal zero, or are at their reference categories (Stock and Watson 2015, 238).

⁷⁷ Difference in category (category A vs. B), in case of categorical variables.

A regression model may have one or more independent variables of interest; independent variables that are not the focus but are merely included to account for relevant differences in composition between the two populations of interest, for example (i.e., to keep ‘all else equal’), are often referred to as control variables. Based on the form of the dependent variable (e.g. continuous, ordinal, categorical, dichotomous), different methods of estimation are typically used.

As outlined earlier in Table 4.2, my dependent variables in this study include continuous (*ISEI*, *Life satisfaction*), ordinal (*Education*, *Health*), and dichotomous variables (*Political engagement*, *Social acceptance*). Accordingly, I rely on, respectively, ordinary least squares (OLS), ordered logistic (ordered logit), and logistic (logit) estimators (Stock and Watson 2015).

OLS is the typical estimator used for continuous variables (Stock and Watson 2015). OLS is a linear method of estimation that seeks to find the best fit for data by minimising the sum of squared errors in the linear prediction. OLS results can be interpreted in line with the equation above. In the case of binary dependent variables, the variable can only take on values 0 and 1; in this case, the approach changes from predicting the actual value – or change in value – to predicting the probability – or change in probability – of a positive outcome ($Y=1$), given a change in a regressor (Stock and Watson 2015). Probit and logit (or logistic) regressions are nonlinear regression models designed specifically for binary dependent variables, accounting for the fact that predicted values will be between 0 and 1. The two estimators are essentially similar (ibid.); I rely on logit following common practice in the field (e.g. André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Lessard-Phillips and Li 2017; Pichler 2011; cf. Heath and Schneider 2021). The *logit*

command in Stata (which I use for my binary outcome models), fits a logit model for a binary response using maximum likelihood estimation. As the coefficients estimated in logit models can be difficult to interpret directly, I also present the results of these models in average marginal effects and/or predicted probabilities (C. Mood 2010).

In the case of ordinal (i.e., ordered categorical) dependent variables, Williams (2021, 1) outlines three common approaches. First, when the dependent variable has more than 5 categories, it is common to treat it as continuous, thus relying on the simple (to use and interpret) OLS regression method. Indeed, I generally use this method for ordinal variables that include 10 or more categories – here, *Life satisfaction* – which is also coded (and answered in the survey) as a numerical score, making it even more intuitively analogous to a continuous variable. A second method is to ignore the ordinality of the variable and treat the categories as nominal, for example via a multinomial logit model. While this produced unbiased estimates, it ignores useful information about the variable and is inefficient, as it calculates a separate parameter for each outcome (especially in my case of 10+ outcomes per variable above, this would be very inefficient). It also often leads to insignificant results. A third option is to assume the ordinal scale on which the variable is measured represents a rough measurement of an underlying interval or ratio scale; in this case, an ordered logit – also called proportional odds model – can be used. I rely on this model, with the *ologit* command in Stata, for my dependent variables *Education* and *Health*, which each have three ordered categories.

In the ordered logit model, Y can essentially be thought of as a collapsed version of a latent continuous variable Y^* . Variable Y^* has various threshold points (cut points, corresponding to the number of categories in Y); the value of Y depends on whether or not

a particular threshold has been crossed. The model essentially estimates the probability that the unobserved variable Y^* falls within the given threshold limits (R. Williams 2021). In ordered logit, the coefficients (β) are thus estimated together with the cut points, which take the place of the intercept term. A key assumption of the ordered logit (ologit) model is that the relationship between independent and dependent variables (the slope coefficient/value of β) will be consistent across different values of Y ; this is called the proportional odds assumption. A common way to check for this is to perform Wald tests (R. Williams 2021). I performed Wald tests for all 3 ordered logit models used and found that none violated the proportional odds assumption.

For each of my dependent variables – regardless of the type of estimator used – my analysis consists of three steps. The first is a base regression model that relies on second-generation status (vs. native-parentage status) as the sole explanatory variable, along with some basic controls (age, age squared,⁷⁸ and ESS round). The second model is somewhat expanded, adding independent variables on three more key background factors: ethnic/racial minority (vs. majority) status, gender (female vs. male), and parental socio-economic status (low and high vs. medium). A third set of models then examines what happens at the intersection of second-generation status and the other background factors, with three sets of models similar to the previous model but calculated separately for each subgroup defined by the intersection of second-generation status and one of the three other background factors (see Paper 2 for more details).⁷⁹ To help interpret these results, I provide figures visualising (a) the average marginal effect associated with covariates for the first two sets of models,

⁷⁸ It is commonly assumed, especially when observing labour market outcomes, that the marginal effect of age (in terms of an additional year of age) diminishes as people get older (e.g. Ho and Turk-Ariss 2018); therefore, age is often modelled in non-linear terms.

⁷⁹ In the case of second-generation status and class, an additional analysis involving an interaction effect between the two is also conducted.

and (b) the contrast (if any) in predicted probabilities/values on outcomes for the different subgroups in the third set of models (e.g., second-generation and native-parentage respondents who are, and who are not, ethnic/racial minorities).

All models use cluster-robust standard errors, identifying clusters by countries, to account for the nested nature of the data (that is, the fact that observations from the same country are likely to be more similar to one another) (Angrist and Pischke 2009). All data cleaning and calculations are conducted in Stata 16-17. As mentioned, as a limitation of the cross-sectional nature of the data and the study design, I am able to assert associational but not necessarily causal relationships between variables. (As is the case for all three papers.) I discuss my interpretations of findings accordingly, with an attention to the different potential explanations for my results. Further details and limitations are discussed in the paper.

Paper 3: The role of host country characteristics in immigrant integration: A cross-European analysis

Paper 3 examines the relationship between macro-level factors within the host country and individual migrants' integration-related outcomes with multivariate regression models.⁸⁰ The areas of integration of interest to this study are similar to those in Paper 2, with the omission of education since the analysis focuses on first- as opposed to second-generation immigrants (education thus not being an indicator of integration achieved in the

⁸⁰ Note: an earlier version of this paper relied on multilevel (hierarchical) models, but, in light of issues with the reliability of multilevel models in case of relatively few level-2 – i.e., country – units, this choice has been revised to use 'conventional' models with clustered standard errors instead (though keeping a multilevel specification for a first, base analysis of cross-contextual variation. These methodological choices are outlined in further detail in Chapter 7/Paper 3. As mentioned in an earlier footnote in this chapter (in the discussion of country samples), the original modelling strategy influenced some early decisions, e.g, concerning data cleaning and avoiding some further choices that would have added additional complexity, such as using cross-level interaction effects, or further outcome variables. Since the analysis does remain fairly complex (e.g., involving a very wide range of contextual factors), I retained these choices in the following despite no longer using a multilevel specification in the main models of this study.

host country for most respondents). My five dependent variables in this case are therefore *ISEI (Occupational status)*, *Political engagement*, *Health*, *Life satisfaction*, and *Social acceptance*. For further simplification given the particularly broad scope of this paper, *Health* and *Life satisfaction* are recoded from ordinal into binary form (indicating, respectively, *Fair/good health* and *High life satisfaction*). I rely on OLS models for the continuous outcome variable (ISEI), and logit models for the remaining binary variables (see earlier Table 4.2 and Paper 3 for details on these variables).

My analytical strategy is the following. As a preliminary step, for each outcome I first estimate a ‘base’ multilevel model, which includes the individual-level (level-1) controls (e.g., gender, age, education, ethnic/racial minority status, parental SES) and the native average on the outcome (within the country-year context), allowing for the intercept to vary across country-wave contexts (random effects). This set of models shows how much the intercept varies across country-wave contexts ‘in general’ (before accounting for host country characteristics), addressing my first research question in the paper. Then, I switch to a ‘conventional’ (non-multilevel) specification and include each host country characteristic of interest into the model, one at a time. (Model specification decisions, as mentioned in the above footnote, are detailed in the Paper.) I explore the rest of my research questions, which concern associations between particular host country characteristics and outcomes (see Paper 3), by examining the significance of each contextual variable’s regression coefficient through these models. As in the prior two studies, it is important to note that the nature of the relationships asserted is associational, and not necessarily causal. As in those studies, I interpret my findings keeping this in mind.

As mentioned earlier, the method of benchmarking to natives is slightly different in this study than the one in Paper 2. I did consider using the same method of using natives as the reference group in the regressions; indeed, an advantage of this option is that it would allow to measure the effect of covariates on the size and significance of the migrant status (vs. native), thereby offering the most precise measure of immigrant vs. native-background *disparities*. However, since in this study I am interested in how certain contextual factors affect migrants in particular (or, to be exact, the migrant-native gap), this would have meant interacting every contextual covariate with migrant status. I did try out this approach in preliminary analyses, but given the number of covariates of interest and the added complications of cross-level interaction in each case (especially in the original multilevel specification), I found that this complicated the analysis and the interpretability of results to an unproductive extent, driving me to seek a more parsimonious alternative. Further, since the regressions are performed on a joint migrant-native sample, this way, results on variance composition (in the first step of the analysis) would show not the across-context variation in integration, or migrants' outcomes in particular, but the across-context variation in the joint migrant-native sample's outcomes, which is not the intended focus of this analysis. I ultimately thus decided to control for native averages on the given outcome, within the country-wave context. This is a fairly common approach, used for example in similar studies by Just and Anderson (2014) or Platt and colleagues (2021).

Given the contextual focus of this study, I find it important to make a note on what has been called the issue of 'methodological nationalism' in integration research (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 302), that is, a critique of a tendency in integration studies to rely too strongly on a national lens, and overuse national frameworks (see also Schinkel 2019; Favell 2019; Hadj Abdou 2019; Scholten and Penninx 2016 for a broader discourse). This

critique makes a case for both sub-national and cross-national approaches in integration analyses (Scholten and Penninx 2016). The cross-European frame of analysis within this study (and the dissertation research as a whole) is essentially an effort to move beyond the national frame to a broader regional level (see also Scholten and Penninx 2016). That said, recognizing the need to move beyond a strictly national lens in the study of integration does not automatically imply that the national unit is meaningless (cf. Alba and Foner 2016; Hadj Abdou 2019; Penninx 2019). Indeed, the country level is an important unit within my analysis. ESS data is collected at the national level, and I identify the host context in terms of the country(-wave) context, using contextual variables that are, for the most part, country-year specific. That said, I do not use national categorisations, or rely on country names as variables, to paraphrase Luthra and colleagues (2018, 925); rather, I focus on countries' contextual features as measured via variables (which may differ, or not, across particular countries). This approach yields more generalisable explanations for differences and similarities observed among countries (or, in this case, countries at a given point in time) than national frameworks might (Scholten and Penninx 2016, 93).

Nevertheless, an important limitation of this study is that it does not have the scope (or sample sizes) to include levels of analysis at the more local level. An emerging (especially qualitative, but also quantitative) literature on focusing on local-level effects is making a compelling case for the importance of regional, city, and neighbourhood-level features on migrant's integration experiences (Hadj Abdou 2019; Scholten and Penninx 2016; for examples, see Bean et al. 2012; Crul 2015; Grzymala-Kazlowska and Phillimore 2018; Fleischmann et al. 2011). In this study, among contextual determinants within the host environment, I am only able to focus on factors the country level, for two reasons. First, given the large-scale aim and already complex and wide-ranging nature of this study, the

incorporation of local-level effects would make the scope too broad for a single study. Second, more analyses at a more disaggregated contextual level are unfeasible due to sample size limitations, as my ESS sample often present small-N problems even at the country level (despite pooling across waves). Given the availability of appropriate data, I would strongly encourage the development of a study incorporating an additional, smaller level of contextual analysis in future studies.

4.4 Ethical considerations

This research received ethical approval from the University of Birmingham. Within this ethical review process, for a research project such as mine – using secondary quantitative data – some of the main points to consider include confidentiality and anonymity, potential risks to individuals, the environment and society (and how those risks, if present, are mitigated), and the significance and benefits of the research. I discuss these in turn.

Starting with issues concerning confidentiality and anonymity, my research consists of quantitative studies analysing publicly available, anonymised secondary survey data. Specifically, as discussed, I use data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a major cross-European survey whose data collection and handling procedures are meticulously regulated and harmonised across participating national institutions. The ESS European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC) subscribes to the Declaration on Professional Ethics of the International Statistical Institute (ISI 2010).⁸¹ ESS data is designed to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of this data and prevent identification of respondents, who are provided a ‘privacy notice’ (essentially a consent form) prior to participating (ESS ERIC, n.d.). ESS ERIC collects data from respondents on the lawful bases used that ‘it is undertaken as a task in the public interest and necessary for research and archiving purposes, in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation and national laws’ (ESS ERIC, n.d., sec. 9).⁸² In accordance with data protection regulations in participating countries, ESS only makes anonymous data available to users (ESS ERIC, n.d.).

⁸¹ These ethical principles include: pursuing objectivity; clarifying objectives and roles; assessing alternatives impartially; avoiding conflicting interests; avoiding pre-empted outcomes; guarding privileged information; exposing and reviewing methods and findings; communicating ethical principles; bearing responsibility for the integrity of the discipline; and protecting the interests of subjects (ISI 2010, 6–7).

⁸² For further details on ESS regulations, procedures etc., refer to the ESS website: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/index.html>

The secondary data used in this thesis was therefore already made anonymous and confidential by the national institutions that led and/or implemented data collection and has been subjected to ethical and safety regulations of the ESS prior to its release. ESS uses respondent ID numbers at the individual level, but direct or indirect identification of the respondents is made impossible. Following common practices for good research, I avoid any use of the data that may endanger the anonymity of participants (such as publishing small counts or detailed geographical disaggregations of the data), or may be misleading (e.g., publishing statistics based on small counts).⁸³ The topics included in the study can be somewhat personal (e.g., income, national origin, attitudes etc.), but are not particularly sensitive; anonymisation should therefore be sufficient in preventing any potential negative consequences for participants of the original surveys.

Generally speaking, given the nature of the research (a quantitative study on pre-existing open-access anonymous social survey data), the research did not pose particular risks to individuals involved in the research, nor the larger environment or society. That said, some of the populations researched – such as migrant-origin individuals, or ethnic/racial/religious minorities – might be considered vulnerable, as they constitute groups that may be subject to prejudice and discrimination and are typically within the less powerful segments of society (even though the focus is not on minors, refugees, or any other particularly vulnerable subgroups). In line with the overall emancipatory aim of this research, I put considerable thought (see Chapter 2) into relying on a concept of integration that does not reinforce exclusionary or oppressive perspectives towards immigrant and immigrant-background minorities, and instead centres their societal inclusion, equality, and

⁸³ In fact, I generally seek to achieve the highest level of accuracy and robustness of my results as far as my data and personal capabilities allow.

well-being. Furthermore, I pay particular attention not to formulate findings in a way that would lend itself to being used as political ammunition against migrant-origin and ethnic minorities.

Against these relatively mild risks, I believe the research in this thesis holds significance for European societies and can benefit migrant-origin populations by helping to develop a deeper and broader understanding of integration processes. Specifically, in line with needs outlined by European Commission (2020a) it helps develop a more coherent definition and conceptual approach to integration, not to mention a broader cross-European view on the situation of immigrants and their descendants; by applying its multidimensional perspective, it is particularly apt at highlighting potentially overlooked areas in which migrants and their descendants may need more support, as well as areas where they may be performing better than public narratives would have us expect. In particular, Paper 2 looks at the intersections of migrant- vs. native-parentage status and some other potential sources of disadvantage such as low class background, female gender, and racial/ethnic minority status; this can help better identify sources of disadvantage in European societies and thus facilitate accurate policy targeting. Paper 3 then looks into the potential positive and negative associations of a wide array of country characteristics, including policy, with migrants' integration and well-being related outcomes; this also holds potential for key insights that could help governments address the needs of immigrant minorities more effectively.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the various methodological considerations and decisions involved in making the connection from the aims, research questions and conceptual framework outlined in the prior chapters to the empirical analysis conducted in the studies forming the second half of the thesis. The first section outlined the philosophical stance of the research, which I identified as a critical realist perspective, relying primarily on a post-positivist (deductive-empirical) methodological approach, though with elements of interpretivism, especially in the first study. Overall, the research is characterised by a mix of objectivism and subjectivism, inevitable given the number of necessarily subjective interpretations throughout the research – starting with the very concept of integration.

Next, I outlined the data, measures, and methods selected to address the three remaining research questions in this dissertation (RQ2-RQ4). Table 4.3 below offers an overview of these, by study. All of these choices, starting with the choice of dataset, were shaped by the research questions and aims outlined in the Introduction, as well as the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter. I discussed my choice of using data from the European Social Survey (waves 6 through to 9, 2012-2018), the characteristics of this data source as well as the specific subsamples I use in each of my studies (see Table 4.3). Moving on to *Measures and operationalisation*, I presented my measures of integration – the dependent variables in my studies – by main themes/dimensions observed, including a comparative overview table of the variables used in each study and their source ESS variables. Further, I discussed how I constructed some independent variables that were key to my studies but had no direct measure in ESS, namely concerning migrant generation (earlier in the section, before data), ethnic/racial background, and parental class/SES

background. I also discussed my choice of benchmarking in the measurement of integration in each study (i.e., if and how a native-background reference group is used; see Table 4.3).

I then proceeded to outline the *Methods* used in the individual studies, focusing on explaining methodological details and reasoning that could not necessarily be elaborated in the text of empirical papers given their journal-article format (again, see Table 4.3 for a summary overview). Lastly, I discussed the ethical considerations of the research.

Taken together, the last three chapters have outlined the background, conceptual framework, and methodological choices behind the three empirical studies (Papers 1, 2 and 3) of this dissertation. The following three chapters (Chapters 5-7) reproduce each empirical paper in its most recent form – that is, as a published or manuscript version of an academic journal article. The three chapters are then followed by an overarching discussion and conclusion to the dissertation (Chapter 8).

Table 4.3. Summary overview of papers (focus, data, measures, methods etc.)

		Paper 1	Paper 2	Paper 3
Focus		Dimensionality of integration	Second-gen vs. native-parentage disparities	Host country characteristics vs. individual integration outcomes
Data	ESS wave/years	ESS7 (2014-15)	ESS6-9 (2012-2018)	ESS6-9 (2012-2018)
	Sample size	N = 1,066 (first & second gen jointly)	N=130,117; of which second gen. N = 12,149	First gen: N=9,175; Second gen N=12,673; Country-year contexts N= 72
	Countries	19 (AT; BE; CH; CZ; DE; DK; ES; FI; FR; GB/UK; HU; IE; IT; LT; NL; NO; PT; SE; SI)	30 (AL; AT; BE; BG; CH; CY; CZ; DE; DK; EE; ES; FI; FR; GB/UK; HU; HR; IE; IT; LT; LV; ME; NL; NO; PL; PT; RS; SE; SK; SI; XK)	19 (AT; BE; CH; CZ; DE; DK; EE; ES; FI; FR; GB/UK; IE; IT; LT; NL; NO; PT; SE; SI)
Population	1st gen	Yes (ethnic/racial minorities)	-	Yes
	2nd gen	Yes (ethnic/racial minorities)	Yes	Yes (supplementary analysis)
	3+ gen	-	Ref. (Reference group in regressions)	Ref. (average by context controlled for)
Integration dimensions considered		Socio-economic; Political/civic; Social inclusion and well-being; Health- and subjective well-being; Identity; Socio-cultural assimilation	Socio-economic; Political/civic; Social inclusion; Health- and subjective well-being	Socio-economic; Political/civic; Social inclusion; Health- and subjective well-being
Independent variables of interest		-	Second gen status; gender, parental SES, ethnic/racial minority status	Indiv. level (similar as Paper 2) + Context level characteristics (macroeconomic; migration-specific; migrant integration policies)
Method		Factor analysis	Regression analysis	Regression analysis

5 EMPIRICAL PAPER 1: MULTIDIMENSIONALITY IN THE INTEGRATION OF FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANTS IN EUROPE: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The following pages reproduce an article that was recently accepted and published in the
International Migration Review.

Note: the manuscript follows the formatting and language guidelines of the journal. The manuscript was first submitted in June 2020 and went through multiple rounds of revisions and resubmissions before being accepted. The first of these revisions involved some substantial changes made in light of reviewers' comments, most importantly a greater incorporation of theory and prior conceptual frameworks, paired with a somewhat lessened emphasis on the empirical study (given its limitations). Though I tried to minimise overlaps between Chapter 3's discussions on dimensionality and the theoretical section of this paper as far as possible without sacrificing the overall narrative thread, some degree of repetition undoubtedly remains.

The article is co-authored with my supervisor Dr. Laurence Lessard Phillips (LLP). Author contributions: LLP conceptualised the original idea behind the paper and the analytical approach; these were then developed further jointly with Veronika Fajth (VF). VF authored the theoretical background and literature review, performed data cleaning, and calculations, interpreted results and wrote up the original manuscript and performed most revisions. LLP provided methodological support, provided guidance and advice with interpretation, and provided assistance with writing-up and revisions.



Multidimensionality in the Integration of First- and Second-Generation Migrants in Europe: A Conceptual and Empirical Investigation


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Abstract

Immigrant integration scholarship increasingly discusses integration as a multidimensional process. Yet there is considerable inconsistency in how that multidimensionality is conceptualized. This article posits that there are two different logical approaches by which multidimensional frameworks of integration tend to outline their dimensions: the “thematic” (or conceptually driven) approach and the “empirical” approach. We contend that these two approaches lead to differently structured multidimensional frameworks of immigrant integration. To demonstrate these points, we, first, review different conceptualizations and approaches to multidimensionality in prior immigrant integration research, focusing largely on Europe. Through a synthesis of these prior approaches, we outline eight thematic dimensions of integration prevalent in the existing literature. Second, we conduct an original study with cross-European data on first- and second-generation migrants (ESS7 2014-15, $N = 1,066$) to outline a multidimensional framework based on empirical patterns of co-variation (or distinction) among integration-related outcomes. Our factor analysis of 18 common indicators of integration reveals five main dimensions of integration, with some items relating strongly to more than one dimension.

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These five “empirical” dimensions (economic/structural integration; health; subjective well-being; cultural assimilation and civic/political integration; and minority socialization) differ from the eight typical “thematic” dimensions identified in existing scholarship in key respects, which we discuss alongside potential connections between integration aspects as suggested by our findings (e.g., between economic and civic/political or between civic/political and cultural aspects). Overall, our article advances migration studies by helping us think more critically about the multidimensionality of immigrant integration and contributes to an emerging literature on integration’s multidimensionality.

Introduction

Over the past decade, immigrants and their descendants have come to represent a growing population across European countries (OECD/EU 2019; OECD 2021). Migration scholars and policymakers routinely stress the importance of successfully integrating these immigrant groups for the future of European societies (Alba and Foner 2015; OECD/EU 2019; European Commission 2020; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). Indeed, immigrant integration receives considerable attention in political rhetoric and media headlines across Europe—an attention focused overwhelmingly on immigrants’ cultural assimilation (e.g., Ruthven 2017; Boffey 2020; Burnett 2021; Rosman 2021). Yet research from Western Europe suggests that the general public views immigrant integration as a more multifaceted process also involving social, economic, and political aspects, for instance (Sobolewska, Galandini, and Lessard-Phillips 2017). Rhetoric aside, European countries’ integration policies tend to target immigrant inclusion and integration in multiple domains, even if levels of governmental involvement can be uneven across different dimensions (Solano and Huddleston 2020). Indeed, defining immigrant integration as a multidimensional phenomenon has become common in academic and policy literatures on immigrant integration in Europe (e.g., Grzymala-Kazłowska and Phillimore 2018; Ndofo-Tah et al. 2019; OECD/EU 2019), and multidimensional frameworks of integration abound (e.g., Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Esser 2004a; Heckmann 2006; Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016; Ndofo-Tah et al. 2019).

Still, multidimensional immigrant integration continues to be a slippery concept, as there is no ‘standard’ multidimensional framework of integration (Lessard-Phillips 2017; Harder et al. 2018). This lack of *consensus* results in a lack of *consistency* in how immigrant integration is conceptualized and measured in an otherwise-rich body of European literature on immigrant integration (e.g., Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Esser 2004a; Heckmann 2006; Bean et al. 2012; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Alba and Foner 2015; Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016; Ndofo-Tah et al. 2019). Beyond issues of consistency, questions

concerning how different dimensions of integration relate to one another also tie into long-standing theoretical assumptions and debates on the nature and specifics of the process of immigrant integration itself (Gordon 1964; Gans 1992b; Portes and Zhou 1993). Ultimately, we believe that a critical appraisal of immigrant integration's (multi)dimensionality is essential to developing more coherent and robust frameworks for the study of immigrant integration in Europe and beyond.

With this article, our aim is not to outline a single "correct" multidimensional framework of integration but, rather, to strengthen the conceptual and empirical basis behind these frameworks. Following this aim, we structure this article around three objectives. First, we provide an overview of different conceptualizations of immigrant integration dimensions identified in the existing literature and the vast range of domains upon which these different frameworks touch. Through a closer look at various taxonomies of integration dimensions, we identify what we see as major common themes. Second, we review perspectives on how different aspects of immigrant integration may relate to one another, based on prior theoretical and empirical research, placing particular emphasis on works from or about Europe. This section underscores the relevance of multidimensional integration frameworks that engage with the empirically observable concurrence and divergence of integration processes across different domains of integration. Third, noting shortcomings in that empirical knowledge base, we conduct an empirical exploration of inter- (and intra-) dimensional linkages between various indicators of integration, using European survey data on first- and second-generation immigrants. Together, we believe these elements help us move toward more consistent and nuanced multidimensional approaches in the study of immigrant integration.

I. Dimensionality in Immigrant Integration: A Conceptual Overview

We view the question of dimensionality as an intrinsic element of any concept of immigrant integration. Our own definition of integration, for instance, is centered on a notion of equality, inclusion, and acceptance in broader society for migrant-background residents¹ (Heckmann 2006; Alba and Foner 2015; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016). Yet, to be analytically useful, a definition of integration must also be specific about the domains to which this notion applies, as well as the indicators and benchmarks used to measure progress toward it. It is vis-à-vis these conceptual elements that defining integration becomes particularly contentious.

¹The term "migrant background population" refers to first and second generation migrants. As native born children of immigrants, second generation individuals are not really migrants, but they are of interest to the study of immigrant integration, as their foreign parentage tends to affect their position in society (Alba and Foner 2015). Keeping this point in mind, we occasionally use the term 'second generation migrants' for simplicity's sake.

As several critics have pointed out (Spencer and Charsley 2016; Schinkel 2018; Favell 2019; Hadj Abdou 2019), depending on the choice of indicators and benchmarks, integration concepts can effectively be just as exclusionary and ethnocentric as the assimilation concepts they were originally meant to replace as more inclusive and pluralist alternatives.² This inevitable subjectivity and normative potential are partly why we see such variation among approaches to dimensionality in integration research. In what follows, we provide an overview of the most common indicators of immigrant integration and their categorization into dimensions. The section concludes with our attempt at a comprehensive multidimensional framework, drawn from a synthesis of prior conceptualizations.

Starting at the most fundamental level, immigrant integration literature tends to differentiate between two main dimensions of integration: the sociocultural and the structural (e.g., Fokkema and de Haas 2011). Though terms and definitions of these dimensions vary, the core logic of this dichotomy is fairly consistent within immigrant integration scholarship, following a distinction between processes of acculturation and of socioeconomic assimilation that was popularized by the “grand theories of assimilation” (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 2003; Crul 2016, 2). Moving beyond this basic dichotomy to more detailed breakdowns of immigrant integration dimensions, we note a variety of approaches. In Table 1, we contrast some of the most prominent attempts at multidimensional frameworks in recent European literature, along with Gordon’s (1964) seminal first framework, whose influence remains apparent in many modern approaches (e.g., Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Esser 2004a; Penninx 2005; Heckmann 2006; Spencer and Charsley 2016). As Table 1 shows, conceptualized dimensions of immigrant integration have varied in both terminology and content—that is, the specific aspects or indicators encompassed by each dimension. Indeed, once we look at the specific aspects or indicators included in each framework, common themes and outliers start to emerge. The rest of this section discusses these themes in turn.

The broad realm of immigrant sociocultural integration is arguably the most subjective and contested dimension of integration, where the conflict between assimilationist and pluralist or multicultural approaches plays out (Kivisto 2005). We see this duality in all the sociocultural dimension’s major areas, starting with the cultural domain. In the classical assimilation-oriented perspective, *cultural* integration is essentially synonymous with immigrants’ cultural conformity, with the immigrant group changing its “cultural patterns to those of host society” (Gordon 1964, 71). To this day, commonly considered facets of cultural integration include *language*, *religion* (e.g., Warner and Srole 1945; Heckmann 2006; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012),

²In this article, we define assimilation as a notion of one way adaptation through which the migrant background individual or group becomes increasingly similar and close to the ‘main stream’ (or majority, native, etc.) population (Berry 2001; Heckmann 2006).

Table 1. A Comparison of Prior Categorizations of Integration Dimensions, Including Attached Aspects/Indicators.

Dimensions							Aspects/Indicators			
Socio-cultural	Discrimination	Attitudes towards immigrants	Legal and political	Structural	Political	Civic and political participation	Health	Living conditions	Health and well-being	
	Prejudice						Safety and stability	Civic engagement and social indicators	Discrimination Attitudes towards migrants Civic rights	
Structural	Civic life						Rights and citizenship		Civic rights political participation	
Socio-cultural	Structure	Socio-economic	(Spatial)		Spatial	Structural	Housing	Living conditions	Residential patterns Housing quality Income / SES	
			Structural	Structural	Economic	Structural	Education Employment Links to institutions	Skills and the labor market Living conditions	Education Work Institutions	
		Intermarriage	Cultural	Interactive integration	Social relations	(Socio-)cultural	Social	Social bridges Bonds	Civic engagement and social integration	Social ties Intermarriage Identity Language & culture
		Identity		Identificational	Identity		Identity			
	Culture		Cultural	Culture and religion		Cultural	Language and cultural knowledge			
Authors	Gordon (1964)	Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) (Penninx 2005)	Heckmann (2006) (building on Esser 2004a)	Crul, Schneider and Lelie (2012)	Bean et.al. (2012) Lessard-Phillips (2017)	Spencer and Charsley (2016)	Ndofor-Tah et al. (2019) (Ager and Strang 2008)	OECD/EU (2019)		

norms, attitudes, and values (e.g., Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Heckmann 2006; OECD/EU 2019). From a less normative and more functional perspective, instead of the above aspects, we may consider the acquisition of *cultural knowledge* as a competency necessary for immigrants and their descendants to ‘get by’ in broader society (Ager and Strang 2008). Similarly, frameworks might focus on *language fluency* (i.e., the ability to communicate effectively in the host country’s primary language(s)) (Heckmann 2006; Ager and Strang 2008) or, from a more assimilationist perspective, the *dominant use* of the host-country language over the ‘origin’ language in places like the home (Alba and Nee 2003; Lessard-Phillips 2017).

The aspect of *identity* has also been present in frameworks since the earliest conceptualizations of immigrant integration (Park and Burgess 1921; Gordon 1964). Building on classical assimilation perspectives that viewed (national, ethnic, etc.) identity as a matter of competing loyalties (*ibid.*), identificational integration is often understood as the replacement of minority (or origin) identity with some form of majority-society identity (e.g., Esser 2010). More recent pluralist perspectives, on the other hand, reject a zero-sum view of identity (Platt 2014, 47) and maintain that minority and majority identities can coexist nested within each other (Berry 2001). Moreover, we note a growing practice of observing *sense of belonging* (Heckmann 2006; Schneider et al. 2012; OECD/EU 2019), as opposed to national identity, reflecting a shift in focus from immigrant “loyalty” to immigrant inclusion in the host society.

Social integration has traditionally been thought of as a move from the co-ethnic community into “mainstream” society, however defined (Gordon 1964; Gans 1997; Esser 2010). Informed by this perspective, immigrant integration researchers often measure social integration via indicators of social mixing such as interactions and social relationships with members of the majority society and membership in “majority-society” organizations (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Esser 2004a; Heckmann 2006). *Intermarriage* was once seen as the ultimate indicator of social mixing and, thus, social integration, both signaling and perpetuating the lessening of social distance between groups (Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964). Intermarriage remains a popular immigrant integration indicator in contemporary integration literature (Alba and Nee 2003; Heckmann 2006; Hamel et al. 2012; Alba and Foner 2015), though its validity as “the ultimate litmus test of integration” has been contested by some scholars (Song 2009, 331). In social mixing-focused approaches to social integration, “majority” socialization is often measured *relative* to co-ethnic socialization, making the latter a negative measure of social integration (e.g., Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Chiswick and Wang 2016; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Fajth and Bilgili 2018). Conversely, some recent frameworks present co-ethnic relationships (“social bonds”) as complementary to majority ties (“social bridges”) in their role in immigrant integration (Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019). Others consider aspects of local social capital (or social isolation) in general, without an ethnic distinction (OECD/EU 2019; Lessard-Phillips, Fajth, and Fernández-Reino 2020).

Another critique of social-mixing measures argues that the traditional focus on the social lives of immigrants, as opposed to natives,³ effectively blames immigrants for patterns of social exclusion enacted by natives (Schinkel 2018). Indeed, the diversity of majority-society members' socialization patterns can also be considered an indicator of immigrant integration (Huijts, Kraaykamp, and Scheepers 2014; OECD/EU 2019; Lessard-Phillips, Fajth, and Fernández-Reino 2020).

Another way to involve the side of "majority" society in studies of immigrant integration is to look at the openness of their *attitudes* and the prevalence of their *discrimination* toward immigrant(-background) groups (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; OECD/EU 2019). The notion of host-society attitudes and behavior as benchmarks of social integration appears in the literature as early as Gordon (1964) but is surprisingly uncommon in later frameworks (e.g., Esser 2004a; Heckmann 2006; Bean et al. 2012; Spencer and Charsley 2016), many of which consider discrimination only as a potential obstacle to immigrant integration, not as an indicator of its state. Once again, the relative rarity of including native attitudes and behavior toward immigrants as a measure of immigrant integration reflects the tendency to consider the degree of integration a characteristic of immigrants, not society as a whole (c.f., Schinkel 2018).

Moving to the structural realm, the main dimension of interest tends to be *economic integration* (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993; Waters and Jiménez 2005; Fokkema and de Haas 2011; Koopmans 2016; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Heath and Schneider 2021). Broadly speaking, economic integration encompasses immigrants' and/or their descendants' socioeconomic position (e.g., income, poverty indicators), labor market characteristics (e.g., unemployment, occupational skill level, educational attainment), and other aspects of living conditions (e.g., housing) (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Ndofo-Tah et al. 2019; OECD/EU 2019; Heath and Schneider 2021). While less contentious than the sociocultural aspect, notions of economic integration or assimilation have also drawn criticism and evolved over time (see Klarenbeek 2019; Alba and Foner 2015 for recent debates). In the early assimilation literature, the expectation was that immigrants would enter an imagined "mainstream" constituted by the white middle class, and this research often overlooked the fact that host society itself was socioeconomically fragmented (Portes and Zhou 1993). Still, even the present practice (e.g., Alba and Foner 2015; OECD/EU 2019) of comparing "group averages" between immigrant and non-immigrant groups can be misleading when relevant compositional factors (e.g., class background, education) are not taken into account (c.f., Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008). Alternative indicators such as inter- or intra-generational social mobility

³In this article, we define "natives" as native born residents without a recent migration back ground (i.e., both parents were also native born residents of the given country) (Lessard Phillips et al. 2017).

or rates of overqualification, for example, can help with comparability (Hermansen 2016; Li and Heath 2016; OECD/EU 2019).

Another key dimension of immigrant structural integration is *civic-political integration* (e.g., Bean et al. 2012; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Integration in the political sphere typically refers to immigrants' acquisition of political and civic rights, as well as participation in political processes and institutions (Penninx 2005; Bean et al. 2012; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Common indicators include rates of citizenship/naturalization (which may determine access to political participation), electoral and non-electoral participation in politics, and activity and membership in political associations and civil society (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Heckmann 2006; Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019; OECD/EU 2019).

Spatial integration typically refers to residential patterns, particularly the residential segregation or concentration of immigrant minorities, and sometimes includes socioeconomic segregation and/or housing quality (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Heckmann 2006; Bean et al. 2012). We note that much of the interest in spatial integration involves its links to other aspects of immigrant integration: on the one hand, residential segregation may be a result of broader processes of socioeconomic inequality and discrimination, as well as general social distance, and residential characteristics themselves may influence socioeconomic opportunities and socialization patterns (Bolt, Özüekren, and Phillips 2010; Bean et al. 2012; Fajth and Bilgili 2018). On the other hand, residential concentration can sometimes be a preferred strategy of immigrant minorities, due to factors such as hostility from majority residents and the benefits of an "immigrant enclave" (e.g., access to community support and the ethnic economy) (Logan, Zhang, and Alba 2002; Fajth and Bilgili 2018). Depending on the perspective, spatial integration may, therefore, be considered a relevant aspect of integration *per se*, a reflection of integration in other dimensions, or neither (if it is considered neither an expression nor a prerequisite for successful integration).

Beyond the long-established areas of integration listed above, we note some emerging areas in the literature, which typically address other aspects of well-being. The area of health, for instance, encompassing health outcomes and access to health-care, has started to appear in recent immigrant integration frameworks (Ager and Strang 2008; Bean et al. 2012; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019; OECD/EU 2019; Solano and Huddleston 2020). As analyzes of the COVID-19 pandemic shed light on the increased health vulnerability of immigrants and ethnic minorities (Guadagno 2020), this area's salience will likely continue to grow in the future. Beyond physical health, measures related to mental health and subjective well-being (e.g., life satisfaction) are also increasingly present in frameworks and empirical studies of immigrant integration, especially those using a well-being centered concept of integration (Safi 2010; Levecque and Van Rossem 2015; La Parra-Casado, Stornes, and Solheim 2017; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019; Gkiouleka and Huijts 2020). All in all, immigrants'

mental and physical well-being is becoming increasingly established as dimension of immigrant integration.

To summarize, beyond the basic sociocultural structural dichotomy, we identify eight themes within the existing conceptual and empirical literature on migrant integration: culture, social life, identity, discrimination, economic, civic-political, spatial integration, and health and well-being. Table 2 summarizes these main (thematic) dimensions, along with commonly considered aspects within each dimension.⁴

On a final note, we gather that characteristics such as generational status, age, gender, race and ethnicity, and reason for migration (to name a few) can also influence the salience of particular domains of immigrant integration. Achieving progress in some indicators of integration (e.g., obtaining fluency in the host country's language or gaining citizenship) may be a long process for first-generation immigrants, while much easier to achieve, if not automatic, for their native-born children (Penninx 2005). Due to such intergenerational differences in starting points, indicators within particular domains may carry different meaning as markers of the

Table 2. A Summary of Common Integration Dimensions and Related Indicators.

#	Dimension (theme)	Common sub dimensions/aspects observed
1	Culture	Language (proficiency, use ^a), cultural knowledge, values/attitudes ^a
2	Identity	Sense of belonging; identities
3	Social	Social mixing ^a – interactions, acquaintances, friendships between migrant(background) and majority population; intermarriage Social ties (social capital/social isolation) in general Membership in organizations (majority ^a /ethnic/any)
4	Discrimination and prejudice	Experiences/perceptions of discrimination Attitudes and behavior of majority population
5	Economic	Education, income/SES, labour market position (employment, occupation, overqualification)
6	Civic/political	Citizenship, political participation and representation, institutional inclusion
7	Spatial	Housing quality, residential segregation/concentration (ethnic ^a /socio economic)
8	Health and well being	Physical health, mental health, subjective well being

^aIndicates aspects potentially reflecting a more assimilationist approach.

⁴For the sake of a comprehensive overview, Table 2 also includes indicators reflecting more assimilationist approaches, not necessarily in line more pluralist definitions of integration (such as our own). Should this table be used for reference when analyzing integration, we recommend keeping in mind the above discussed critiques pertaining to particular aspects.

integration process for different generations of immigrants. Labor market outcomes may have different relevance for individuals in different age groups or between male and female immigrants (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007); likewise, the domain of discrimination may hold particular relevance for immigrants who belong to a racialized group in the host society, as may the feeling of safety for refugee populations (Ager and Strang 2008). Though some of the above-cited integration frameworks are specific to, for example, the second generation (Bean et al. 2012) or refugee populations (Ager and Strang 2008), most do not distinguish by generational status or other background factors. This specificity is worth keeping in mind when using existing multidimensional frameworks or developing new ones.

II. Relationships Between Dimensions

Looking at the broader immigrant integration literature, we notice that there are, in fact, two different approaches to delineating integration dimensions (even if they are sometimes combined) (see Heckmann 2006 or Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003 vs. Bean et al. 2012 or Lessard-Phillips 2017). First is what we call the “thematic” logic. Most of the above-discussed frameworks seem to follow this logic, outlining their integration dimensions along the lines of some intuitive themes (i.e., what we think of as different domains) that, at times, correspond to academic disciplines (e.g., economics, sociology, political science, geography) or policy areas (e.g., labor market, legal/civic, cultural) (Penninx 2005; Bean et al. 2012). The second motivation to distinguish between different dimensions of integration may come from the empirically observed divergence between some integration-related processes and outcomes. We call this distinction between dimensions the “empirical” multidimensionality of immigrant integration. Indeed, the recognition that immigrants may not be integrating uniformly across different domains (i.e., one may learn the language but not have a job, and vice versa) has played an important role in the move from unidimensional to multidimensional perspectives in integration research (Lessard-Phillips 2017). From a methodological perspective, if immigrant integration consisted of uniformly developing, fully connected processes and outcomes, there would not be a need for multidimensional frameworks; by observing one aspect, we could draw conclusions about the state of immigrant integration as a whole. Conversely, the more independently different facets of immigrant integration develop, the greater the degree of complexity and nuance that is required in multidimensional analytical frameworks. In other words, the question of how, and whether, different facets of immigrant integration are empirically linked is fundamental to how we conceptualize integration’s dimensionality and, therefore, critical to consider in more depth. In this section, we review knowledge on the linkages between (and within) dimensions of immigrant integration from the prior theoretical and empirical literature.

Returning to the basic dichotomy of sociocultural and structural integration and following different theoretical strands within integration research, we identify four

hypothesized scenarios concerning how different dimensions of immigrant integration relate to one another. The first scenario, characteristic of what was later named “*straight-line*” *assimilation* theory (Warner and Srole 1945; Gans 1992a), envisions a uniform process developing across generations in which sociocultural and structural aspects of the integration progress are in sync, being strongly and positively related. A second, revised version of the first scenario acknowledges the possibility of one area lagging behind another, although it still views the sociocultural and structural dimensions of integration as fundamentally linked (e.g., language fluency, social/residential mixing, socioeconomic advancement, etc.) (Alba and Nee 1997; 2003; Gans 1997). The perspective of *new assimilation theory*, for instance, notes potential delays and divergence across groups but still largely envisions an overall trend of assimilation in both regards (Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Gans 1997; Waters and Jiménez 2005; Bean et al. 2012). In line with this perspective, several European studies (e.g., Bisin et al. 2011; Fokkema and de Haas 2011; Chiswick and Wang 2016; Koopmans 2016; Mendoza, Bertran, and Pàmies 2021) find a positive link between sociocultural and economic integration, suggesting at least a common co-occurrence, if not necessarily a causal relationship.

The perspective of *segmented assimilation* (Gans 1992b; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009), on the other hand, outlines three possible paths for the second generation: one of joint acculturation *and* economic integration (in line with the former perspectives); one of limited acculturation but successful economic integration; and one of strong acculturation but at the cost of unsuccessful economic integration. Moreover, a *multicultural* perspective posits that in tolerant societies, the lack of sociocultural assimilation on the part of immigrants should not necessarily thwart their structural integration (Bean et al. 2012; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). These frameworks lead us to the third and fourth scenarios: one in which sociocultural and structural integration are not related (and, thus, may develop independently of each other) and one in which sociocultural and structural integration have a *negative* relationship in which progress in one area results in a trade-off with another (e.g., Aparicio 2007; Maxwell 2012; 2013).

Further, there may be divergence *within* the major dimensions of sociocultural and structural immigrant integration. As mentioned earlier, multicultural frameworks have long argued that in aspects of sociocultural integration such as language, culture, identity, and socialization patterns, ethnic cultural retention and host-country acculturation are not mutually exclusive and that multiple adaptation scenarios are possible (Berry 2001; Bean et al. 2012). As emphasized by Bean et al. (2012), post-industrial perspectives have also shed light on the fluidity of sociocultural identities, processes, and outcomes, building on the notion that “advanced societies increasingly do *not* require that given ethnoracial identities, sexual orientations, marital statuses, religious preferences and family behaviors bundle closely together” (Soysal 1994; citing Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2006; see also Nguyen and Benet-Martínez 2010; Bean et al. 2012, 184). Empirical findings from the superdiversity (Crul 2016) and transnationalism literatures (Bilgili 2014) offer further evidence of

heterogeneity within immigrant integration's sociocultural dimension. Immigrant integration research from recent decades also suggests that the connection between economic mobility and spatial (residential) integration is less straightforward than assumed (Musterd et al. 2008; Bolt, Özüekren, and Phillips 2010; Murdie and Ghosh 2010; Fajth and Bilgili 2018), as is the relationship between citizenship status and labor market integration (Peters and Vink 2016). Economic marginalization may both motivate and alienate immigrants from participating in the political process (Bean et al. 2012; Heath et al. 2013; Maxwell 2013). Even *within* the economic domain, aspects of education, employment, or occupational status may each paint a different picture of second-generation integration (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). Finally, little is known about how closely we might expect newer sub-areas of integration, such as health and subjective well-being, to bundle with structural or sociocultural integration dimensions, although there is some evidence of linkages between health and life satisfaction with socioeconomic status (Gkiouleka and Huijts 2020) and discrimination (Safi 2010), for example.⁵

We are aware of two papers that attempt an overarching empirical assessment of multidimensionality in integration-related outcome patterns. Bean et al. (2012) compare how closely different indicators of incorporation for the second generation bundle together in 13 US and European cities with “more” versus “less inclusionary” policy environments, using factor analysis methods. In the more inclusive contexts, they find three distinct dimensions of integration: economic/political, spatial, and sociocultural/linguistic. In the less inclusive contexts, they find only two distinct dimensions of integration: economic/political/spatial and sociocultural/linguistic (a distinction that echoes the classic dichotomy discussed above). Using similar methods, Lessard-Phillips (2017) looks at outcome patterns of immigrant and immigrant-background ethno-racial minorities in Britain across a range of typical adaptation indicators and finds that integration-related outcomes may be grouped into four distinct dimensions: spatial, socioeconomic, political, and sociocultural adaptation. Moreover, outcomes across these four dimensions do not follow one universal pattern but, rather, four types of configurations based on specific, mostly cultural trade-offs; importantly, specific configurations are characteristic of particular ethnic and generational groups, suggesting that dimensions of integration may not relate to one another the same way for all groups (Lessard-Phillips 2017).

In conclusion, since the early days of immigrant integration and assimilation research, integration scholars have come to view immigrant integration as a multifaceted phenomenon that is best understood as consisting of multiple, potentially distinct dimensions. Our review highlighted that while this multidimensional feature of integration is widely recognized, categorizations and definitions of those multiple

⁵ As in the case of economic integration, potential selectivity effects are important to keep in mind when analyzing health outcomes, especially for first generation migrants (Feliciano 2020).

dimensions vary considerably across the literature. In an effort to synthesize these different approaches, we reviewed and identified eight main themes of integration dimensions drawn from multidimensional conceptual frameworks on integration.

Theory concerning whether and how these dimensions of integration are connected is mixed, but recent discourses largely emphasize the possibility of divergence, both across and within broad thematic categories, as we outline below. Focusing on Europe, empirical evidence on the matter is limited, as the majority of existing studies tend to have a narrow scope in terms of areas considered, origin groups, and/or geographical context (e.g., Musterd et al. 2008; Safi 2010; Lancee and Hartung 2012; Maxwell 2012; Cheung and Phillimore 2014; Chiswick and Wang 2016; Koopmans 2016; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Fajth and Bilgili 2018; see also Heath, Rethon and Kilpi 2008), making it difficult to compare or synthesize their findings. This gap in generalizability is especially pertinent as the few existing cross-dimensional analyzes suggest that patterns of bundling and divergence among integration dimensions can differ across policy contexts (Bean et al. 2012), ethnic groups, and immigrant generations (Lessard-Phillips 2017).

To strengthen the empirical evidence base underlying dimensional typologies of immigrant integration and to examine potential differences between thematically and empirically derived dimensional distinctions, further evidence is needed. Specifically, we note the need for a comprehensive examination of the system of interrelationships among a broad-ranging set of integration dimensions, with attention to divergences across contexts and groups, ideally with a cross-country scope. While the lack of appropriate data prevents us from undertaking a truly comprehensive analysis at this point, in the second half of this article, we attempt to empirically examine the structure of linkages between a multidimensional set of integration-related outcomes on available cross-European data. Though admittedly limited, this initial analysis yields some noteworthy new findings and hopefully paves the way for future, more widely representative analyzes of cross-dimensional linkages in immigrant integration.

III. An Empirical Exploration of Multidimensionality

Data & Methods

We set out to explore how different aspects and dimensions of integration for first- and second-generation immigrants in Europe relate to one another, relying on data from the European Social Survey Round 7 (ESS7, ed. 2.2) (European Social Survey 2018).⁶ The ESS is a biannual cross-sectional survey measuring social indicators among the resident population in countries across Europe. ESS7 is the best currently available dataset for our purposes in terms of first- and second-generation

⁶<https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>

sample size (and the identifiability of these populations), geographical scope, and broad thematic coverage. Nevertheless, it has some limitations, chief among them that it is not fully representative of immigrant-background populations, which are only included via random sampling.⁷ We focus on Round 7, conducted in 2014 and 2015, because it features the broadest coverage of the domains in which we are interested.

We limit our sample to first- and second-generation immigrants, identified as foreign-born respondents and native-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent. Since integration outcomes might take some years to develop, we exclude immigrants who have been in the country for less than five years. Driven by our aim to achieve wide coverage of commonly studied aspects, we limit our sample to respondents who are ethnic/racial minorities in their respective countries of residence so that we can use ESS variables on minority socialization and neighborhood presence as inverse measures of social and spatial assimilation (see Online Appendix Table A3 for variable construction details). We also exclude respondents under 18, full-time students, and respondents with missing observations on key variables. Our final sample includes 1,066 respondents in a total of 19 European countries (Online Appendix Table A1; see Online Appendix Tables A8.1 8.2 for origin-country breakdown). All our analyses apply the post-stratification and population size weights included in the ESS.

Though our coverage of aspects and dimensions of immigrant integration is far from exhaustive, we include one or a few typical indicators for each of the eight main thematic dimensions outlined, as shown in Table 3. Some indicators are consistent with the approach of *assimilation*, which is not equivalent to our own concept of integration. We include them because our goal is not to measure integration per se, but to test common theoretical conceptual assumptions about the interconnection of aspects and dimensions of integration. Such assumptions, as discussed above, have often been conceptualized from the perspective of assimilation. Specifically, our 18 variables measure linguistic assimilation (within the domain of cultural integration); sense of belonging (within the domain of identity); minority socialization as an inverse measure of social assimilation and general socialization (within the domain of social integration); education, income, and socioeconomic status (ISEI),⁸ based on occupational status (within the domain of economic integration);

⁷ As a result, less prominent groups may not be captured; underrepresentation is particularly common in samples from countries without large migrant background populations (e.g., most Eastern European countries).

⁸ The ISEI, or Standard International Socio Economic index, is an internationally comparable index of socioeconomic status associated occupational status (with higher scores indicating more prestigious status). As outlined in Online Appendix Table A3, we constructed this variable based on occupational information (ISCO 08) available in ESS, using the *iscogen* Stata package (Jann 2019).

Table 3. Indicators Used in Analysis, by Thematic Dimensions.

#	Dimension (theme)	Common sub-dimensions/aspects observed (measured aspects underlined>	Indicators used in analysis
1	Culture	Language (proficiency, use), cultural knowledge, values/attitudes	Official language of the country used in the home
2	Identity	Sense of belonging; identities	Feel close to country
3	Social	Social mixing interactions, acquaintances, friendships between migrant(-background) and majority population, intermarriage (vs. minority socialization) Social ties (social capital/social isolation) in general	Frequent contact with ethnic/racial minority individuals Friendship(s) with ethnic/racial minority members Regular socializing (taking part in social activities compared to age peers) Close relationships/friendships (intimate discussants)
4	Discrimination and prejudice	Membership in organizations (majority/ethnic/any) Experiences/perceptions of discrimination Attitudes and behavior of majority population	Perceived in-group discrimination (on the basis of nationality, race, or ethnicity)
5	Economic	Education Income/SES Labour market position (employment, occupation, overqualification)	Highest level of education Household income (decile) Feeling about household income International socioeconomic index (socioeconomic status associated with occupation) [ISEI score]
6	Civic/political	Citizenship Political participation and representation Institutional inclusion	Citizenship Politically engaged (electoral/nonelectoral activity)
7	Spatial	Housing quality, residential segregation/concentration (ethnic/ socio-economic)	People of minority race/ethnic group in current living area (perceived)
8	Health and well-being	Physical health, mental health, subjective well-being	(Subjective) general health Physical/mental fitness (hampered by mental/physical health problems, reverse coding) Mental health (depression, reverse coding) life satisfaction

minority residential concentration as an inverse measure of spatial assimilation (within the domain of spatial integration); and measures of physical health, mental health, and life satisfaction (within the domain of health and well-being). For more details on variable construction, see Online Appendix Table A3. For simplicity's sake and in keeping with earlier practice by Bean et al. (2012) and Lessard-Phillips (2017), we code our indicators on socioeconomic status and different aspects of well-being such that higher scores imply more favorable outcomes, which, in this case, we interpret as positive from the perspective of immigrant integration (for summary statistics, see Online Appendix Table A2).

We examine outcome patterns across this set of variables with the method of factor analysis. Factor analysis uses the correlation matrix of a set of variables ("items") to obtain a reduced set of latent constructs ("common factors") that account for the pattern of variation observed among the variables (Allen 1973; Fabrigar and Wegener 2012). We rely on *exploratory factor analysis* in particular, as this method maintains the possibility of a relationship between any item and factor (Mooi, Sarstedt, and Mooi-Reci 2018). The theoretical interpretation of a factor is inferred from the cluster of items that load most highly on it, indicating a strong relationship (Acocck 2008). Following in the footsteps of Bean et al. (2012) and Lessard-Phillips (2017), we use factor analysis to learn more about the underlying structure of associations among the variables and to identify some distinct dimensions of immigrant integration.

Proceeding with the analysis, we, first, produce a (weighted) correlation matrix for our items, using the *polychoric* command in Stata by Kolenikov and Angeles (2004). Based on this matrix, we, then, identify the number of underlying dimensions in our data, using Horn's (1965) parallel analysis (Mooi, Sarstedt, and Mooi-Reci 2018). Once the number of dimensions is determined, we run a principal factor analysis, rotating results for interpretability. We use the resulting table of factor loadings to interpret the dimensions and observe association patterns. Additionally, we are interested in whether the revealed structure of associations between areas is fundamentally different across generational lines (e.g., first- vs. second-generation immigrants) and in more versus less inclusive policy contexts.⁹ To examine these potential discrepancies in association patterns, we perform a set of additional separate analyses for first- and second-generation subsamples, as well as more and less inclusive contexts. Due to smaller subsample sizes, these results should be interpreted with caution and serve mainly as a robustness check.

⁹To distinguish between more and less inclusive policy contexts, we utilize the latest MIPEX (Migration Policy Index, Solano and Huddleston 2020) scores and split our sample into two groups: respondents in "high" (>56) and "lower" (≤56) MIPEX score countries. First and second generation migrants are defined as above, with the distinction that "1.5 generation" immigrants (arrived before the age of 12) are classified as second generation (similarly to Bean et al. 2012). See Online Appendix Table A3 for details.

Table 4. Factor Loadings from Factor Analysis on Overall Sample (Factor Analysis with PF Method, 5 Factor Solution, Kaiser Varimax Rotation; N = 1,066).

Interpretation of factor	<i>Economic/ structural integration</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Subjective well being, incl. social</i>	<i>Cultural assimil. & civic/ political integration</i>	<i>Minority sociali zation</i>	
Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Unique ness
Highest level of education	0.75	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.01	0.41
ISEI (Occupational status)	0.71	0.04	0.07	0.16	-0.05	0.46
Household income	0.59	0.17	0.25	0.09	0.01	0.55
Feeling about hh. income	0.42	0.27	0.45	0.01	-0.14	0.52
General health	0.12	0.69	0.20	0.06	0.00	0.47
Physical/mental fitness	0.05	0.71	-0.03	0.08	0.05	0.49
Mental health	0.14	0.38	0.46	-0.03	-0.04	0.63
Life satisfaction	0.13	0.21	0.52	-0.06	-0.02	0.66
Regular socializing	0.02	0.01	0.43	0.15	0.04	0.79
Close friends	0.19	-0.13	0.41	-0.02	0.09	0.77
Use host language at home	0.17	0.12	-0.14	0.59	-0.18	0.56
Feel close to country	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.50	-0.02	0.75
Citizen of country	0.33	0.05	0.16	0.52	-0.08	0.59
Political engagement	0.39	-0.06	0.12	0.42	0.19	0.62
Friendship with minorities	0.09	0.04	0.16	-0.14	0.57	0.62
Contact with minorities	0.04	0.11	0.15	-0.02	0.51	0.70
Minorities in living area	-0.16	-0.06	-0.08	-0.02	0.48	0.73
In group discrimination	0.01	-0.04	-0.14	0.02	0.26	0.91

Note: Loadings > 0.3 highlighted and bold (except for cross-loadings).

Results

As outlined above, we, first, produced a correlation matrix for our 18 items on the overall sample ($N = 1,066$) (available upon request). A subsequent parallel analysis suggested five main underlying dimensions among our items.¹⁰ Therefore, we performed a principal-factor analysis specifying five factors to be retained; the factor loadings for each of our 18 items are presented in Table 4 (varimax-rotated solution with Kaiser normalization; items are ordered by strength of loading for main associated factors, with loading values over 0.3 considered high).

The pattern of factor loadings in Table 4 suggests five fairly distinct dimensions of immigrant integration. The first factor seems to capture economic or structural integration, with highly loading items including *education*, *ISEI/occupational status*, *household income*, *feeling about household income*, *political engagement*, and *citizenship*. The second factor focuses on aspects of health (*general health*, *mental/physical fitness*, and *mental health* load highly), while a separate third factor gathers items related to subjective well-being, including the social aspect (*life satisfaction*, *mental health*, *feeling about household income*, *taking part in social activities*, and *close friendships*). The fourth factor seems to represent a joint dimension of cultural assimilation and civic/political integration (*use official language at home*, *citizenship*, *feel close to country*, and *political engagement*), distinct from a fifth factor that focuses on minority socialization (*friendship with minorities*, *everyday contact with minorities*, *minorities in living area*, and, less strongly, *perceived in-group discrimination*).

Several of the aspects examined relate strongly to more than one dimension, suggesting potential overlaps across integration dimensions. Aspects of civic-political integration, for example, cross-loads on the economic/structural dimension, while the subjective well-being dimension has highly loading items in common with the economic dimension (*feeling about income*) and health dimension (*mental health*). Importantly, no item with a strong positive correlation to one factor has a strong negative correlation to another. Turning to the ways in which aspects are *not* connected, the perception of *in-group discrimination* shows a strikingly high uniqueness value (0.91), indicating that the item does not relate very strongly to any factor identified and is quite distinct in its variation. We also note weak correlations, for example, between aspects of minority socialization and economic integration.

An additional look at how the results of such an analysis diverge for particular subgroups in our sample revealed largely similar factor structures to the one above, save for a few notable discrepancies mostly concerning the civic/political/cultural and subjective

¹⁰Using the *paran* command in Stata (Dinno 2015), Horn's Parallel Analysis for principal components (with 540 iterations, using the p95 estimate) indicated five components/factors with an adjusted eigenvalue greater than one.

well-being dimensions.¹¹ (See Online Appendix Tables A4-A7 for factor loadings.) For instance, in the second-generation subsample, items of minority socialization cross-loaded, in the opposite direction, on the cultural assimilation dimension; moreover, the civic/political aspects loaded, not with the cultural aspects, but primarily on the economic/structural dimension. The first-generation subsample showed a similar factor structure to the joint-sample one. Turning to the country-group breakdown, two observations stand out. First, for the subgroup of respondents in “High MIPEx score” countries, cultural (linguistic and identificational) integration fell into the economic/structural dimension. Second, for the “Lower MIPEx score” countries, in-group discrimination had a strong negative correlation with the subjective well-being dimension (which includes social well-being). Nevertheless, these latter results should be interpreted with caution, given the smaller ($N \approx 500$) sample sizes of these analyses.

Discussion and Conclusions

This article set out to help develop a more consistent and nuanced incorporation of multidimensionality into the study of immigrant integration. To do so, it (1) provided an overview of the different conceptualizations of immigrant integration dimensions and related indicators in the prior immigrant integration literature and (2) shed light on inter- and intra-dimensional linkages from the existing literature, as well as through (3) an original study on European survey data. In the following, we summarize the main takeaways from each of our article’s three sections.

The first section gave an overview of prior conceptual frameworks of immigrant integration to catalog and summarize the different dimensions and related aspects of integration. Starting from the basic dichotomy of sociocultural and structural dimensions, we proceeded to identify eight main (thematic) dimensions of integration emerging from the immigrant integration literature – *culture, identity, social integration, discrimination and prejudice, economic integration, civic/political integration, spatial integration, and health and well-being* – which we discussed, along with some of their most frequently observed aspects. We concluded with a table summarizing the most common dimensions and aspects of immigrant integration, which may be used for reference, as a conceptual framework in its own right, or as a starting point for more sophisticated future frameworks.

The second section looked into potential relationships between the above dimensions. Reviewing prior theoretical and empirical works, we identified four potential scenarios, with dimensions progressing (a) jointly, in sync; (b) generally in the same direction, though not necessarily simultaneously; (c) independently from one

¹¹ Invariance checks conducted with the Procrustes rotation method (Fischer and Karl 2019) confirmed that in both cases, factor incongruence between the two groups’ solutions emerges for two factors, roughly representing the civic/political/cultural and subjective well-being dimensions. (Detailed results available upon request.)

another; or (d) in opposite directions, in a trade-off dynamic. Concerning the relationship between sociocultural and structural integration, more recent theories and empirical works have emphasized the possibility of divergence, not only between these two main domains, but also within them. Though empirical evidence on the matter is still fragmented, it is becoming clear that immigrant integration outcomes may vary in complex ways across thematic dimensions (e.g., economic, spatial, cultural, social etc.) and even within them (e.g., education, occupational status). Further complicating the picture, the available evidence on multidimensionality suggests that the way in which dimensions of immigrant integration relate to one another may differ across ethnic groups, immigrant generations, and policy contexts (Bean et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017).

In reviewing different typologies of immigrant integration dimensions, we also noted two different logical approaches to multidimensionality: the “thematic” logic (in which integration dimensions are categorized by themes, e.g., based on different domains) and the “empirical” logic (in which different dimensions have an empirically observed divergence in outcomes). Our review of linkages across and within thematic dimensions of immigrant integration underscored the conceptual relevance of these relationships for multidimensional frameworks while also highlighting shortcomings in the related empirical knowledge base.

This article’s third section presented an original empirical exploration of how different aspects of immigrant integration bundle together or diverge, aiming for broader thematic and geographical coverage compared to earlier studies, though facing our own set of limitations (discussed below). In a case study of Europe, we conducted a factor analysis of 18 indicators on varied domains from the eight thematic dimensions outlined above, using ESS7 data from first- and second-generation respondents across 19 countries, all of them ethnic/racial minorities in their respective societies (we exclude recent immigrants). An analysis of the correlation matrix of our 18 indicators revealed five underlying dimensions: (1) economic or structural integration; (2) health; (3) subjective well-being, including social well-being; (4) cultural assimilation and civic/political integration; and (5) minority socialization.

Comparing this empirically based five-dimensional integration framework to the eight thematic dimensions derived from the prior literature and outlined above, we note some interesting differences and similarities. For instance, drawing on earlier discussions, we might have expected aspects under the broad “sociocultural” theme to bundle together (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993; Fokkema and de Haas 2011). However, in our empirical analysis we found the items of cultural (linguistic) assimilation and identificational integration *not* to bundle with the social aspects. Instead, items of cultural and identificational assimilation bundled with aspects of civic and political integration. Our analysis points to an interesting potential connection between acculturation and political integration, which is worth further examination. Civic and political integration items also cross-loaded with economic aspects on the structural/economic dimension, an association consistent with some prior

integration frameworks joining economic and civic/political integration aspects into a single “structural” dimension of immigrant integration (e.g., Heckmann 2006).

Furthermore, our items relating to immigrants’ socialization patterns (minority socialization and general socializing) fell into two separate dimensions. Our social assimilation measures (minority socialization) formed a distinct dimension, joined by spatial integration. This finding is consistent with prior approaches in the integration literature (e.g., Alba and Nee 2003; Esser 2004b) that discuss social and residential mixing or, conversely, embeddedness in co-ethnic social networks and neighborhoods as going hand in hand (often discussed in terms of the “ethnic enclave”). Interestingly, we found discrimination to be quite distinct from other aspects in general, although it showed some connection to the minority socialization dimension of integration. *General* socialization, meanwhile, fell under the dimension of subjective well-being, which, in turn, was separate from the dimension of (physical) health. Given the less-established status of health and subjective well-being aspects among immigrant integration frameworks, these results offer some interesting initial evidence on their position within the broader multidimensional structure of immigrant integration.

As an interesting side note, the fact that the item of citizenship in particular appeared in dimensions alongside economic/structural integration indicators, as well as aspects of acculturation, may be interpreted as support for earlier research showing citizenship’s wide-ranging effects as a facilitator, or even foundation, of integration (Ager and Strang 2008; Vink 2021). That said, citizenship’s linkages to cultural and structural were likely also driven by the fact that in several European countries, a high level of integration (in terms of employment, education, language, etc.) is a *prerequisite* for immigrants seeking to naturalize (Bauböck et al. 2013).

An additional analysis of subgroups by generational status and policy contexts revealed largely similar structures, though with some differences in the spheres of cultural-political integration and subjective well-being. Most notably, when looking only at the second generation, we observe a joint “sociocultural assimilation” dimension in which minority socialization related negatively to cultural assimilation (in terms of language and identity, but not for the first generation, whose patterns mirrored those of the joint sample). Yet these results were conducted on relatively small subsamples ($N < 500$, in the latter case) and should, thus, be interpreted with caution.

Though our results are not directly comparable to prior cross-dimensional analyzes by Bean et al. (2012) and Lessard-Phillips (2017), since we use a different (and generally broader) set of indicators, we do see some noteworthy differences and overlaps. First, our main results do not suggest a distinct spatial dimension, which could be due to the limitations of our spatial assimilation measure (which is subjective and not very specific). Political engagement loaded highly with the economic dimension in our results, echoing Lessard-Phillips’s results (2017) and Bean et al. (2012) results for Europe. Similar to findings in Lessard-Phillips (2017), identificational integration was tied to civic-political integration in our

results, although linguistic and social assimilation only formed part of the same dimension for our second-generation subsample.

Concerning the hypothesized cross-dimensional linkage types discussed in our review, our main results largely point to positively, though not necessarily very strongly, connected dimensions (e.g., the economic/structural and cultural/civic-political domains and the economic/structural, health, and subjective well-being domains), as well as some relatively independent dimensions of integration (e.g., social (non-)assimilation and economic integration). Importantly, we do not find evidence suggesting any strong trade-off dynamics between different aspects of immigrant integration. All in all, then, the findings of our brief empirical analysis join an emerging literature in underscoring the possibility of divergence across and within main thematic dimensions of immigrant integration (e.g., between the economic and cultural domains or within the broad socio-cultural domain).

Our empirical results' robustness and generalizability are limited by the already-mentioned sampling shortcomings, missing data, and the nature of some variables that required us to restrict our sample to ethnic/racial minorities to make them meaningful measures (in fact, our constructed ethnic/racial minority variable may itself be a source of imprecision). Future studies could take this line of investigation into more robust territory, given key data availability improvements. Such improvements may include, for example, a more populous and representative first- and second-generation immigrant sample, a wider coverage of European contexts, and more pointed variables on social mixing and residential integration. Data permitting, research identifying and confirming *causal* relationships between different dimensions and aspects of integration would be particularly relevant.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical investigation presented in this article contributed much-needed evidence concerning the structure of cross-dimensional linkages within a multidimensional framework of immigrant integration. It is the first empirical examination of multidimensionality featuring a cross-European scope, first- and second-generation immigrants, and a wide-ranging set of indicators reflecting recent multidimensional frameworks. Our empirical investigation highlighted that thematic and empirical approaches to outlining integration dimensions lead to somewhat differently structured multidimensional frameworks, underscoring the need for critical consideration of the empirical basis when applying a multidimensional lens to immigrant integration. Together with our comprehensive overview of (multi)dimensionality and related concerns in integration research, this article makes key contributions toward the development of a more consistent and nuanced multidimensional approach to integration research and paves the way for future research seeking to improve understandings of immigrant integration.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Dr. Ingrid Storm, Dr. Zhaoya Gong, Dr. Miguel Ribeiro Ramos, and three anonymous reviewers as well as Dr. Jamie Winders for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We would also like to thank Dr. Johannes Karl and Dr. Roland Fischer

for their helpful methodological assistance for group invariance testing in R. Finally, this research would not have been possible without the generous support of the Global Challenges Scholarship at the University of Birmingham.


Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the University of Birmingham.

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Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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6 EMPIRICAL PAPER 2:
DOES IMMIGRANT PARENTAGE MATTER?
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF SECOND-
GENERATION IMMIGRANTS' INCLUSION AND WELL-
BEING ACROSS EUROPE

The following pages reproduce a revised version of a manuscript planned to be (re-)submitted for publication at an academic journal. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2021 Virtual Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association.

Note: the manuscript follows the formatting and language guidelines of the journal to which it was originally submitted.

Does immigrant parentage matter? A multidimensional analysis of second-generation immigrants' inclusion and well-being across Europe

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Abstract

Does migration background make a difference in the outcomes of the native-born offspring of immigrants in Europe? This article brings some key new evidence to this question by examining second-generation immigrant integration from a multidimensional perspective, on a cross-European scale. Using a pooled ESS sample (ESS6-9, 30 European countries, N=130,117), the study compares outcomes of second-generation immigrants and native-parentage natives along indicators of economic, political, and social inclusion, as well as health and subjective well-being. Importantly, it features a systematic analysis of parental class background, gender, and ethnic/racial minority status, examining how these factors may (a) explain, (b) add on to, and/or (c) intersect with the effects of second-generation status. Findings reveal a mix of advantages, null-effects, and disadvantages associated with having immigrant parents. While class background and ethnic/racial minority status are found to be key determinants, they do not, for the most part, 'explain away' second-generation differences. Importantly, subgroup analyses reveal a second-generation (vs. native-parentage) advantage within low parental SES and ethnic/racial minority subgroups, pointing to a potential positive effect associated with migration background within disadvantaged groups.

Keywords

migrant integration, second-generation immigrants, inequality, intergenerational mobility, multidimensional integration, intersectionality

Acknowledgments

I thank Laurence Lessard-Phillips, Ingrid Storm, Miguel Ribeiro Ramos and Zhaoya Gong for their guidance and helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research would not have been possible without the generous support of the Global Challenges Scholarship at the University of Birmingham.

Funder information

This work was supported by the Global Challenges Scholarship at the University of Birmingham.

Disclosure statement

The author reports that there are no competing interests to declare.

Introduction

The situation of the second generation is often considered the real litmus test of immigrant integration (Alba & Foner, 2015; Penninx, 2005). Across Europe, second-generation immigrants comprise a substantial and growing population segment of the population, most recently estimated to represent 35 million individuals in the EU28 (OECD/EU 2019). Born and raised in the destination country, they should, ideally, enjoy comparable life chances to their native-parentage peers. Is this the case? Despite a growing empirical literature on the second generation in Europe (Alba & Foner, 2015; Crul et al., 2012; Drouhot & Nee, 2019; Heath et al., 2008), the question of whether immigrant background constitutes an obstacle to their equal participation in European societies remains difficult to answer.

One key challenge, I argue, is to disentangle the role of migration background from other confounding factors – especially racial/ethnic minority background and class background – in second-generation Europeans' outcomes. Concerning the presence of second-generation vs. native-background economic disparities net of class background, cross-European findings are mixed and often difficult to synthesize due to discrepancies in outcomes observed, populations and contexts under study, not to mention samples and methods (Drouhot & Nee, 2019; Heath et al., 2008). Further, the distinction between ethnic/racial effects and migration background is often unclear, partly because the focus is so often on second-generation individuals from racialised minorities (ibid.). Importantly, there is some international evidence suggesting that class background, ethnic/racial minority status, and even gender may matter differently for children of immigrants than their native-background peers (Fleischmann & Kristen, 2014; Heath & Brinbaum, 2014; Kasinitz et al., 2008; Li, 2018; Platt, 2007; Zuccotti, 2015). However, a more widely representative and consistent examination is needed to ascertain these dynamics at a cross-European scale. Looking at a broader range of integration-related aspects, the case is somewhat similar for other aspects of societal inclusion and well-being of second-

generation immigrants (André et al., 2014; André & Dronkers, 2017; Gkiouleka & Huijts, 2020; OECD/EU, 2019; Safi, 2010; Stevens et al., 2015; Thorkelson, 2015), though comparative evidence from this perspective (i.e., investigating the migrant-background gap vis-à-vis other background factors) is overall thinner.

This paper improves on the existing European knowledge base on second-generation integration in two key respects. First, it is unusually broad in its coverage and scope: it covers 30 countries across Europe (including but not limited to Western Europe), featuring second-generation respondents of varied ethnic/national and class backgrounds *and* native-parentage natives of varied ethnic/racial and class backgrounds. Following a multidimensional concept of integration, it also widens the range of examined outcomes beyond the most-often studied economic domain to simultaneously examine further key aspects of inclusion and well-being (i.e., political inclusion, social inclusion, health, and subjective well-being), examining a total of six outcomes across four main dimensions of integration. A second asset of the study its consistency: it relies on one coherent cross-European sample (ESS6-9, 2012-2018; N=128,067) and compares various outcomes of second-generation and native-background Europeans with a consistent analytical approach, considering migration background both alongside and intersecting with factors of class background, gender, and ethnic/racial minority status. This approach yields a set of key new insights on second-generation advantages and disadvantages, bringing us one step closer to understanding the complex phenomenon of second-generation immigrant integration.

The next section outlines my conceptual approach, the theoretical foundations of the study, and reviews the relevant empirical literature. I then outline my research questions and the study's data and methods, followed by results and a discussion of findings.

Concepts and theory

Conceptualising integration

For the purposes of this paper, my definition of second-generation immigrant integration is centred on equality with native-parentage natives in terms of life chances, social and institutional inclusion, and overall well-being (following Alba & Foner, 2015, pp. 1–2). Put plainly, I am interested in how well second-generation members are doing compared to native-background peers – and whether migration background, per se, differentiates second-generation members' outcomes from those of their peers.

In line with contemporary conceptual frameworks (see Fajth & Lessard-Phillips 2022, for a review), I view integration as a multidimensional phenomenon, best captured via a simultaneous observation of outcomes across multiple different areas of life. Though categorisations vary, common integration dimensions include social, cultural, and identificational assimilation, economic, civic/political/institutional integration, and discrimination (or social acceptance) (Gordon, 1964; Heckmann, 2006; Spencer & Charsley, 2016). Given that my concept of integration in this study is focused on the inclusion and well-being of immigrant-background individuals, rather than sociocultural similarity and/or closeness to natives, the first three ('assimilation') aspects fall outside the scope of this paper. At the same time, I draw on a growing interest within recent integration scholarship in aspects of health, well-being, and social inclusion (e.g., La Parra-Casado et al., 2017; Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019; OECD/EU, 2019), including these aspects in my analytical framework. I sum, I thus observe integration across four main dimensions: (1) economic integration; (2) political/institutional inclusion; (3) social inclusion; and (4) health and subjective well-being. (Specific indicators to be discussed in *Data and methods*.)

Theoretical overview: the implications of migration background for the second generation

Theoretical expectations for the second generation's integration have grown more nuanced since the early days of the field, but continue to be a subject of debate. Classical – or 'straight-line' (Gans, 1992) – assimilation theory, drawing on the experiences of early-twentieth-century European immigrants to the United States, envisioned a relatively straightforward process of increasing assimilation over time and, especially, across immigrant generations (e.g. Warner & Srole, 1945). Conversely, scholars of the more diverse, post-1965 'new immigration' in the US questioned the universal applicability of straight-line assimilation the experiences and prospects of the new second generation, for whom traditional pathways to assimilation were often blocked by discrimination (among other factors), and thus formulated alternative theoretical frameworks such as the ethnic/racial disadvantage model (Glazer & Moynihan, 1963) and segmented assimilation theory (SAT) (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Portes et al., 2009). Beyond underscoring the relevance of ethnic/racial and class background in the integration opportunities and trajectories of second-generation immigrants, a key novelty of SAT (ibid.) was that it made a case for more nuanced comparisons by stressing the racially and socioeconomically stratified character of the immigrant *as well as* the native population, in contrast with classical perspectives that assumed an idealised 'native mainstream' (often synonymous with white and middle-class) as the benchmark for integration (Alba & Nee, 2003; see also Crul & Schneider, 2010).

Where does this leave us concerning the relevance of migration background in the outcomes of the second generation? I note three main scenarios. In the first, continued disparities observed for the second generation, if any, are merely an extension of disparities stemming from social (class) origins and ethnoracial minority status¹ in host society (e.g., Drouhot &

¹ Which, in Europe, is often argued to include Muslim faith (Drouhot & Nee, 2019; Zolberg & Woon, 1999).

Nee, 2019; see also Favell, 2016; Zuccotti, 2015). In this case, for those born in the host country, migration background *per se* is thus no longer a significant source of disadvantage for the second generation – a perspective that echoes revised versions of straight-line assimilation theory (Alba & Nee, 2003).

An alternative scenario is that migration background continues make a difference for the second generation, beyond class origin and ethnoracial background. Why would this be? Studies on the aspect of education, among others, have highlighted a range of influential background factors specific to children of immigrant parents, such as immigrant parents' relative lack of host-country-specific knowledge (e.g., of the educational system, but also social norms, etc.), language fluency, cultural and social capital (Griga & Hadjar, 2014; Heath et al., 2008; Heath & Brinbaum, 2014). Immigrant ethnic residential segregation can also be a factor, though the effects of this are less clear (Heath et al., 2008). On the positive side, it is often argued that immigrant parents are self-selected in terms of drive to succeed and thus hold high aspirations for their children, a phenomenon also called 'immigrant optimism' (Heath & Brinbaum, 2014; Kao & Tienda, 1995; Li, 2018). Immigrants' co-ethnic communities and 'ethnic capital' may also play a supportive role (Modood, 2004; Portes & Zhou, 1993).²

While these factors are typically formulated focusing on educational and/or labour market outcomes, their effects may extend well beyond the socioeconomic domain. For one, outcomes in the socioeconomic domain are likely to share linkages to other aspects of inclusion and well-being (Bean et al., 2012; Fajth & Lessard-Phillips, 2022). Moreover, there is reason to expect differences tied to migration background for each of the dimensions outlined above. For

² On the topic of selectivity, there is also evidence suggesting that immigrant parents' 'true' class background may be higher than their host-country SES, or even educational level may suggest (with relative educational position within the origin country society being more important) (Feliciano & Lanuza, 2017; Fernández-Kelly, 2008).

instance, even if the majority of second-generation immigrants hold citizenship and thus voting rights in the host country, migration background may continue to have an effect on political participation and institutional trust via institutional and social hostility, as well as family socialisation (André et al., 2014; Thorkelson, 2015).³ Acculturation challenges and experiences of social hostility or outright discrimination due to migration background, whether in childhood or later, may lead to social exclusion and/or isolation, lower mental health and/or subjective well-being, and even lower health among second-generation immigrants (Huijts & Kraaykamp, 2012; La Parra-Casado et al., 2017; Mood et al., 2016; OECD/EU, 2019; Raabe, 2019; Safi, 2010). At the same time, there is also evidence suggesting particular second-generation resilience, for example, with regards to mental health (Mood et al., 2016).

Importantly, via some of the above mechanisms, migrant background may not only constitute ‘additional’ effects but be associated with fundamentally *different* class and ethnoracial background effects. There is considerable evidence, for instance, suggesting intergenerational social reproduction processes to differ for second-generation minorities compared to their native-parentage peers (Alba & Nee, 2003; Kasinitz et al., 2008; Li, 2018; Platt, 2007; Zuccotti, 2015). This can result in a relative second-generation advantage within lower-class-background and/or ethnoracial minority groups in host society (Hermansen, 2016; Kasinitz et al., 2008; Li, 2018; Urban, 2012), a phenomenon also called the ‘immigrant paradox’ or ‘superachievement’ in the US literature (Feliciano & Lanuza, 2017; see also Crul et al., 2017). Some suggests that the phenomenon goes both ways, with the positive effects of higher parental class background also being relatively weaker for second-generation immigrants compared to their native-parentage peers (Lessard-Phillips & Li, 2017; Platt, 2007; Urban, 2012; Zuccotti,

³ For instance, immigrant parents may have different trust in institutions and the political process due to conditions in the origin country, and may be less familiar with local politics than most native-born parents (ibid.)

2015). The idea of a relative second-generation advantage among ethnic/racial minorities (e.g., Kasinitz et al., 2008) warrants further examination, as, especially in Europe, relevant studies often limit the ethnoracial minority status to the second generation, and ‘white’ status to native-background individuals (e.g. Li, 2018; Zuccotti, 2015). Further, there is also some evidence suggesting that the implications of second-generation status may be gendered, though from the exiting European literature this is difficult to clearly delineate from ethnic group effects (Crul et al., 2012; Feliciano & Rumbaut, 2005; Fleischmann & Kristen, 2014; Heath et al., 2008).

This third scenario ties recent arguments for the adoption of an ‘intersectional’ lens within integration studies (Anthias, 2013; Bürkner, 2012). Originating from feminist theory, the analytical lens of intersectionality encompasses a multitude of perspectives (see McCall, 2005 for a discussion); most helpful to my purpose here is the *intercategorical approach*. As outlined by McCall (2005), intercategorical approaches emphasize the complexity of relationships across analytical categories, with an awareness that intersecting axes of subordination may add on to another, but may also be in conflict with one another, leading to complex patterns of advantage and disadvantage (McCall, 2005). Intercategorical approaches thus involve multiple social groups, examined with a systematically comparative method (McCall, 2005). I find the perspective lends itself well to the study of second-generation integration in terms of inequality vis-à-vis native-background natives. For instance, segmented assimilation theory’s (Portes & Zhou, 1993) emphasis on the diversity of class and ethnoracial statuses within both the immigrant- and the native-background population underscores the intersecting nature of analytical categories, while the above-discussed cases of second-generation ‘superachievement’ (or ‘immigrant paradox’) within lower-class or ethnoracial minority groups (e.g., Kasinitz et al., 2008) may constitute axes of subordination being in conflict instead of adding on to one another.

Empirical literature review

Cross-European evidence on the above-discussed dynamics has not been conclusive thus far. On the one hand, there is considerable evidence for the importance of parental class background and ethnoracial background in driving second-generation vs. native-parentage gaps in education and occupational attainment (Crul et al., 2012; Drouhot & Nee, 2019; Heath et al., 2008; OECD/EU, 2019; Pichler, 2011). Results are conflicting, however, on whether a second-generation gap remains *after* accounting for class background (Aleksynska & Algan, 2010; Connor & Koenig, 2013; Dronkers & Fleischmann, 2010; Drouhot & Nee, 2019; Heath et al., 2008; Heath & Cheung, 2007; Krause et al., 2015; Zuccotti, 2015). Further, there is some evidence suggesting that parental class background may matter less – both in a negative and positive sense – for second-generation (and/or ethnic/racial minority) individuals than for native-background (and/or majority ethnic) individuals (Dronkers & Fleischmann, 2010; Heath & Brinbaum, 2014; Lessard-Phillips et al., 2012; Zuccotti, 2015). However, more large-scale evidence, and with a clearer distinction between the factors of ethnoracial minority/majority status and migration background, is needed.

In fact, the latter distinction is generally a problematic one. Existing cross-European studies typically focus on differences by particular ethnic/national origin groups *within* the second generation, but not comparatively to native-parentage natives (but see Heath & Schneider, 2021). This prevalent approach can highlight some relatively disadvantaged groups within the second generation (typically identified as non-European, Muslim, or less-developed-country origin groups) (Drouhot & Nee, 2019; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017; Heath et al., 2008). It does not, however, allow to gauge the relative importance of ethnoracial background versus migration background, per se, or whether the latter remains relevant net of racialised minority status. Nor do such approaches allow to identify potential differences in the implications of

ethnic/racial minority status for second-generation versus native-parentage Europeans.⁴ Similarly, there is some evidence of a differential in gender gap between second-generation and native-background Europeans for both education and labour market outcomes (Fleischmann & Kristen, 2014; OECD/EU, 2019; Pichler, 2011), but it is unclear to what extent this is driven by particular origin groups (Crul et al., 2012)⁵ or is, in fact, a difference tied to migration background.

The case is largely similar for the non-economic domains of interest in this study, though cross-European literature on second-generation vs. native-parentage gaps in these regards is also generally more limited. First of all, there is some cross-European evidence to suggest disparities tied to second-generation (vs. native-parentage) status in political engagement (Aleksynska & Algan, 2010; Maxwell, 2010; OECD/EU, 2019; Schneider & Crul, 2012; Thorkelson, 2015), social inclusion/exclusion (including discrimination) (Aleksynska & Algan, 2010; André & Dronkers, 2017; OECD/EU, 2019; Raabe, 2019), health (Gkiouleka & Huijts, 2020; La Parra-Casado et al., 2017), and subjective well-being (Levecque & Rossem, 2015; Safi, 2010; Stevens et al., 2015), though overall this evidence is far from conclusive. Socioeconomic background, gender, and ethno-racial minority status (and associated discrimination) are known to affect outcomes in these areas, as well (André et al., 2014; André & Dronkers, 2017; Bean et al., 2012; La Parra-Casado et al., 2017; Safi, 2010), though the prevalence of compositional, additional, and/or moderating effects of migration background vis-à-vis the former is not yet clear. Some studies on political participation and discrimination have found disadvantages tied to ethnic/racial minority (e.g., non-EU parentage and Muslim)

⁴ In a recent study Heath and Schneider (2021) offer an important comparative study involving ancestry and migration background/generational status, but their focus is on intergenerational progress vs. the first generation.

⁵ Several studies focus on the pronounced disadvantage of Muslim (especially Turkish and Moroccan) second generation women in particular (e.g., Koopmans, 2016; Lessard-Phillips et al., 2012).

status *within* the second generation (André et al., 2014; André & Dronkers, 2017; OECD/EU, 2019; Thorkelson, 2015). There is also some initial evidence suggesting that the second-generation vs. native parentage *gap* may depend on gender, parental SES, or EU vs. non-EU parental origin (see, e.g., Gkiouleka & Huijts, 2020 on health; or Stevens et al., 2015; Levecque & Rossem, 2015 on subjective well-being). Overall, as in the case of economic outcomes, more systematically comparative studies – ideally incorporating an intercategorical analytical approach (McCall, 2005) – are needed to gauge the extent to which second-generation gaps, if any, persist net of class background and ethnic/racial minority status, as well as the potential divergence in the effects of those factors (and gender) by migration status.

Research questions

Drawing on the earlier theoretical discussions and the empirical knowledge gaps outlined above, I thus examine the integration of second-generation immigrants in Europe via the following research questions:

1. Is migration background – in terms of second-generation vs. native-parentage native status – associated with significant differences in the outcomes examined?
 - a) Overall (or only controlling for basic demographic characteristics)
 - b) Controlling for ethnic/racial minority status and parental class background
2. How strong a determinant is second-generation (vs. native-parentage) status for the examined outcomes, compared to other background factors such as ethnic/racial minority status, gender, and class background?
3. What happens at the intersections of migration background and ethnic/racial minority status, gender, and class background?
 - How does the situation (i.e., the outcomes) of particular subgroups compare?

Data & methods

Data

To examine the above questions in from a cross-European and multidimensional perspective required a dataset with a broad thematic scope, detailed demographic information (including parental migration background), and a wide-ranging coverage of European countries and populations (not limited to a few select ethnic groups). Following these criteria, the European Social Survey (ESS) stood out as the best available dataset. ESS is a biannual cross-national survey on social indicators for the European population (European Social Survey, 2021). ESS data are collected from strict random probability samples of the population aged 15 and over in participating countries, following a harmonised methodology. Despite its strengths, the ESS has some shortcomings in its representativity of immigrant minorities, especially concerning smaller and/or more marginalised groups (Heath & Schneider, 2021), which thus might be underrepresented in my sample.

To gain a sufficiently large sample of second-generation respondents (included in ESS via random selection), I pooled data from the four latest rounds (waves 6-9), collected between 2012 and 2018 (European Social Survey, 2020). I included datasets from all over Europe, for a total of 30 countries represented in at least one wave (see Appendix Table A1 for sample breakdown). Given my focus on second-generation versus native-background European adults, my sample excludes foreign-born respondents (first-generation immigrants) save for those who immigrated before the age of 12 (the ‘1.5’ generation),⁶ respondents under the age of 18, and full-time students. Aiming to use the same sample across models for comparability purposes, I excluded observations with missing information on key variables. One such variable was occupational status, therefore the sample excludes respondents who have never been in paid

⁶ I set the cut-off at age 12 following common practice (e.g., Kasinitz et al., 2008).

work. I deemed listwise deletion generally acceptable as for most variables, only about 1-2% of observations were missing. My final sample includes 130,117 respondents across Europe, of which 12,149 are members of the second generation.

Measures

Dependent variables

As established earlier, I observe integration via second-generation vs. native-parentage disparities across four main dimensions: economic integration, political inclusion, social inclusion, and health and subjective well-being. Each of these dimensions comprise complex concepts that may be measured in a multitude of ways. Within the scope of this analysis, I am able to include 1-2 indicators per dimension, resulting in a total of 6 dependent variables. All variables used in the study are outlined in Table 1, including their means or relative frequencies by generational status.

With regards to *economic integration*, I observe two aspects. First, I examine *Educational attainment*, in terms of highest qualification achieved. Second, I measure occupational attainment and socioeconomic status (SES) via the International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996; Jann, 2019), which converts occupational information into a continuous score based on the average education and income of occupational groups, with higher values reflecting more better socio-economic standing. For example, ISEI scores 18 for a farm worker, 45 for a sales worker, and 68 for a high-level manager (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996, p. 214).⁷ For consistency, as shown in Table 1 (refer to end of subsection), each variable (here and later on) is coded so that higher values correspond to higher or more ‘positive’ outcomes (see Appendix Table A2 for coding details).

⁷ I focus on gaps in occupational status over employment as the latter is already studied relatively often (Heath et al., 2008).

Within *political and institutional inclusion*, I look at *Political engagement*, which I measure with a binary variable indicating whether the respondent had taken part in any political activities in the past year. (Considering that not all second-generation members may hold citizenship and thus full voting rights in their country of residence, I consider electoral and non-electoral activities equally.) To assess *social inclusion*, I look at whether the respondent feels part of a group that is discriminated against to assess *Social acceptance* (also a binary measure). Finally, I examine *health and subjective well-being* via self-assessed general *Health* (an ordinal scale) and *Life satisfaction* (indicated as a score from 0 to 10).

Independent variables

To keep the analysis to a manageable level of complexity and to prevent (sub)samples from getting too small, I constructed (or kept) my four main independent variables in binary form. (Below are brief descriptions; please see Appendix Table A2 for details on coding procedure.)

The first independent variable is *migration background*, which scores 1 for second-generation members, defined as native-born residents with at least one foreign-born parent, or foreign-born residents who immigrated as young children (age 12 or younger; the ‘1.5 generation’).

The base category (0) is ‘native-parentage natives’, referring to native-born residents whose parents are both natives (‘3+’ generation). To identify *ethnic and/or racial minority* respondents, in lieu of a straightforward measure in ESS I built a binary variable from related available variables available, seeking to identify members of ‘visible’ or racialised minorities.

I categorised respondents as ethnic/racial minorities if they either: (a) identified as member of an ethnic minority group in the country, (b) indicated non-European first or second ancestry, (c) perceived in-group discrimination based on race or ethnicity, and/or (d) indicated ever belonging to the Muslim faith (included in consideration of the racialised status of Muslim

minorities in Europe (Zolberg & Woon, 1999; Drouhot & Nee 2019))⁸. The ‘*gender*’ variable identifies *female* (1) versus male (0) sex. For a simple measure of class background I constructed a set of binary variables indicating *Low*, *Medium*, and *High parental socioeconomic status (SES)* (or ‘class background’), based on information about the occupation of parents (highest/non-missing) when the respondent was aged 14, or their educational level if the former was not available for either parent.

Further control variables include *age* (categorized into five groups), *ESS round*, and *region*, which groups survey countries into four main groups to account for some major regional differences in geographic and political-economic context, as well as immigration history. Specifically, though named for major geographic areas, my classification of regions follows some main historical-cultural divisions (see Delanty 2012 for a longer discussion and a more detailed classification) and the OECD/EU’s *Classification of OECD and EU countries as immigrant destinations according to key characteristics of the foreign-born population* (2019, 26; see also Van Mol and de Valk 2016 for a longer discussion).⁹ The four regions I distinguish are as follows. First, I distinguish Western European countries within my pooled sample (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, France, UK, Ireland and Switzerland); these are generally classified as ‘Longstanding destinations’ of immigration by the OECD/EU.¹⁰ A second category covers Scandinavian/Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and

⁸ This is, of course, a very simplified measure, but such a simplification was necessary to keep the analysis manageable and (sub)sample sizes workable. For a more detailed investigation of ethnicity as it relates to similar outcomes, see Heath and Schneider (2021).

⁹ See also Chapter 2 of this dissertation for further discussion of immigration/integration histories across Europe (and sources such as Van Mol and de Valk 2016). As discussed in more detail by Delanty (2012), though regional classifications of Europe are often used, there is no consensus on the specific regions and included countries; my own classification of regions combines the often-used general north-south-east-west logic with the mentioned categorization by history and type of immigrant inflows in each country (OECD/EU 2019), which is a key differentiator in this case.

¹⁰ The one exception is Ireland, which I chose to include here (as opposed to alongside Mediterranean countries, per the OECD/EU classification) for geographical/historical-cultural coherence (Delanty 2012).

Finland), classified as ‘Destinations with recent and significant humanitarian migration’ by the OECD/EU. Third, I distinguish countries from the Southern Europe/Mediterranean region (Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus), which the OECD/EU describes as ‘New destinations with many labor immigrants’. Finally, I distinguish the broad region of Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Kosovo), which covers the OECD/EU classification of ‘Countries with immigrant populations shaped by border changes and/or by national minorities’, but also additional (non-EU/OECD) countries from the former Eastern bloc that may be characterized similarly (Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004).

Table 1. Summary of variables used in the analyses by migration background/generational status

		Migration background			
	Range/ values	Native-par./ 3+ gen	Second generation	Diff. in means	Obs. (joint sample)
		% / Mean	% / Mean		
<i>Economic integration</i>					
Educational attainment					
Up to lower secondary	0/1	24.15	16.82	***	30,534
Secondary/vocational [ref.]	0/1	52.07	56.64	***	68,310
Tertiary	0/1	23.78	26.54	***	31,273
ISEI (occupational status)	10-89	42.33	43.56	***	130,117
<i>Political/institutional inclusion</i>					
Political engagement (1=Yes)	0/1	84.06	76.76	***	108,489
<i>Social inclusion</i>					
Social acceptance (1= Yes)	0/1	94.32	86.25	***	121,749
<i>Health and subj. well-being</i>					
Health					
(Very) bad	0/1	7.97	8.39	n.s.	10,421
Fair (ref.)	0/1	27.56	27.25	n.s.	35,821
(Very) good	0/1	64.47	64.37	n.s.	83,875
Life satisfaction	0-10	7.03	6.93	***	130,117
<i>Independent variables</i>					
Migration status/Gen. status					
Native-parentage/3+ gen. [ref.]	0/1				117,968
Second generation	0/1				12,149
Age group					
under 26 [ref.]	0/1	4.88	8.03	***	6,737
26-35	0/1	13.78	18.35	***	18,484
36-45	0/1	17.01	18.65	***	22,337
46-60	0/1	29.12	28.85	n.s.	37,856
60 and over	0/1	35.20	26.12	***	44,703
Gender					
Male [ref.]	0/1	47.85	47.20		62,184
Female (=1)	0/1	52.15	52.80		67,933
Ethnic/racial minority status					
Ethnic/racial minority	0/1	96.36	76.42	***	122,960
Ethnic/racial majority [ref.]	0/1	3.64	23.58		7,157
Parental SES/class backgr.					
Low	0/1	41.28	33.34	***	52,747
Medium [ref.]	0/1	43.87	46.32	***	57,375
High	0/1	14.86	20.33	***	19,995
Region					
Western Europe [ref.]	0/1	36.66	49.50	***	49,263
Scandinavia/Nordic countries	0/1	15.18	9.64		19,080
Southern Europe/Mediterr.	0/1	12.62	3.73		15,335
Eastern Europe	0/1	35.54	37.13		46,439
ESS round					
6 (2012/13) [ref.]	0/1	27.49	23.89	***	35,337
7 (2014/15)	0/1	22.04	24.12		28,932
8 (2016/17)	0/1	22.81	22.85		29,687
9 (2018/19)	0/1	27.65	29.15		36,161
N		117,968	12,149		130,117

Source: ESS6-9, author's subset of original sample. Comparison of means performed with two-sample t tests with unequal variances (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; n.s.: not significant).

Descriptive statistics

A first look comparing the distribution of the outcomes of interest between second-generation and native-parentage native respondents within my sample confirms some notable differences, highlighting advantages as well as disadvantages by migration background. Table 1 (above) shows relative frequencies and means across different variables for the two groups, including whether differences are statistically significant (based on t-tests). As shown here, the second-generation sample is overall more highly educated, with a lower share of respondents with less-than-lower-secondary education (17% vs. 24%) and a higher share of tertiary-educated respondents (27% vs. 24% for native-parentage respondents). The second-generation sample also has somewhat higher average occupational status, with a mean ISEI score of 44 versus 42 for the native-parentage sample. However, the second-generation sample also has a considerably lower share of respondents who are politically engaged (77% vs 84%), and who feel socially accepted (in that they do not report feelings of in-group discrimination; 86% vs 94%). The two groups seem similar in terms of average self-reported general health, but the second-generation sample has a somewhat lower average life satisfaction score (6.93 vs. 7.03).

Comparing the distribution of independent variables, however, we also see that the two groups differ in their composition regarding some key demographic and background characteristics. For one, they differ in their age distribution, with the second generation having a higher representation of younger cohorts (especially the youngest, under-26 group) and a lower share of the older (60-plus) cohort; the gender distribution is similar. As may be expected, the two samples also differ in their regional representation: although the overall ‘ranking’ of subsample shares by region is the same, the distributions are varied; for instance, the relative prevalence of subsamples collected in Western Europe is much stronger within the second-generation sample (while the opposite is true for subsamples from Southern Europe).

Turning to other key background characteristics, the second-generation sample has a much higher share of ethnic/racial minority respondents than the native-parentage sample (24% vs 4%, respectively). Further, the second-generation sample seems positively selected in terms of class background compared to the native-parentage sample, with a relatively smaller share of respondents with low parental SES (33% vs. 41%) and a higher share of respondents with high parental SES (20% vs. 15%). The latter is unexpected considering common accounts of a European second generation with modest class origins (see, e.g., Drouhot & Nee 2019 for a review), although it should be noted that those often focus on a young and/or non-white section of the second generation, typically in Western Europe. Indeed, a further look into class background distribution by age groups shows that the second-generation class background advantage is smaller (or even reversed) for the younger cohorts and increases gradually across age cohorts. Further, a disaggregation by region shows some positive second-generation class selection to persist across all regional samples, albeit barely so for Western Europe, originating, instead, largely from samples from Scandinavian and Southern European countries. Interestingly, a disaggregation by ethnic/racial minority status shows a parental-SES-wise positively selected second-generation among both groups but *especially* among ethnic/racial minorities.


Table 2. Perc. distribution of parental SES for native-parentage and second-generation samples, by other factors

	Native-parentage natives (3+ gen)				Second generation				Difference (p.p.) (2 nd gen – 3+ g)	
	Low	Med.	High	Total	Low	Med.	High	Total	Low	High
Age group										
under 26	23.3%	57.5%	19.2%	100%	26.7%	54.1%	19.2%	100%	3.4	0.0
26-35	23.8%	53.5%	22.8%	100%	25.0%	50.6%	24.4%	100%	1.3	1.6
36-45	29.7%	50.3%	20.0%	100%	27.5%	47.7%	24.8%	100%	-2.2	4.8
46-60	41.3%	44.3%	14.4%	100%	34.0%	45.8%	20.2%	100%	-7.3	5.7
Over 60	56.2%	34.8%	9.0%	100%	44.7%	40.5%	14.8%	100%	-11.5	5.8
Region										
Western E	33.3%	50.3%	16.5%	100%	33.7%	47.3%	19.1%	100%	0.4	2.6
Scandinavian	35.3%	43.5%	21.2%	100%	23.8%	44.6%	31.6%	100%	-11.5	10.4
Southern E	52.3%	39.4%	8.3%	100%	36.0%	43.5%	20.5%	100%	-16.3	12.2
Eastern E	48.2%	39.0%	12.8%	100%	35.1%	45.8%	19.1%	100%	-13.1	6.3
Ethnic/racial minority status							100%			
E/R majority	40.7%	44.3%	15.0%	100%	32.1%	47.1%	20.8%	100%	-8.6	5.8
E/R minority	56.5%	32.0%	11.5%	100%	37.5%	43.7%	18.9%	100%	-19.0	7.4

Source: ESS6-9, author's subset of original sample.

In addition, as illustrated in Figure 1 below, I find that age distributions differ substantially between ethnic/racial majority and minority populations in my sample, especially for the second-generation ethnic/racial minority subsample, which skews particularly young compared to the other three respective subgroups. Appendix Table A3 shows an additional breakdown of the main ancestry groups represented within second-generation vs. native-parentage ethnic/racial minority subgroups, and low vs. high parental SES subgroups (where any were indicated – ancestry variables had high shares of missing responses). Among both native-parentage and second-generation ethnic/racial minority groups (although with generally higher shares among the latter), some of the main non-European ancestries indicated are MENA/Central Asian (including Turkish), South and South-East Asian, Sub-Saharan African, and Caribbean (in descending order). Further, the low-class-background second-generation group had a notable (11%) representation of MENA/Central Asian ancestry respondents (again, note that these figures exclude high numbers of missing observations in each case; see Table A3 for details).

Figure 1. Age distribution of subgroups by migration background and ethnic/racial minority status



Whether the above sample characteristics are accurate reflections of overall second-generation vs native-parentage dynamics across Europe (which are rarely assessed at such a broad level) or due to sampling shortcomings within the ESS that (as mentioned) might exclude some

vulnerable second-generation groups, all in all for the purpose of this study these insights confirm the necessity of accounting for these differences in background characteristics when assessing second-generation vs. native-parentage outcome gaps, and explore the implications of these background characteristics as they relate to those gaps in further detail. Accordingly, my analytical strategy proceeds as follows.

Analytical strategy

In line with my research questions and in light of the above, I approach my research questions in three steps. First, to assess whether migration background is associated with disparities in outcomes overall (RQ1a), I examine each outcome of interest with a base regression model (Model A) that relies on second-generation status (with native-parentage native status as the reference category) as the sole explanatory variable, although with some basic controls (age, gender, region, and ESS round). Second, I seek to examine whether differences, if any, associated with second-generation status still stand after accounting for some further key background characteristics (RQ1b); moreover, I want to see how the (statistical) effects of migration background and other key factors compare to one another (RQ2). For this, in Model B I expand on the above base regression model with two additional independent variables: ethnic/racial minority status, and parental SES (gender already being included). Finally, I am interested in what happens at the intersection of second-generation status and the other background factors (RQ3). I examine this with three sets of additional models (Models C, D, and E), which calculate Model B for particular subgroups, identified by migration status (i.e., second-generation vs native-parentage status) and, respectively, ethnic/racial majority vs minority status, low vs high parental SES, and male versus female gender.¹¹

¹¹ Compared to the original Models B, these models exclude, in each case, the independent variables used in the specification of subgroups.

The above approach yields five main regression models (Models A, B, C, D, and E) for each of the six outcomes examined, denoted as Models 1A-E through 6A-E.¹² Depending on the type of dependent variable, I use logistic (binary variables), ordered logistic (ordinal variables), or ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (continuous variables and ordinal variables with 10 or more categories).¹³ All regression models rely on the use the same main sample ($N=130,117$), which is split up four ways in the case of the subgroup analyses. Results for Models A-B are presented in regression tables and illustrated with graphs displaying average marginal effects to facilitate the comparison of effects associated with particular factors, while results of Models C-E are presented in terms of predicted-probabilities and predicted values, listed in a table and illustrated in graphs, to help compare outcomes across subgroups. (All full regression tables are available in the Appendix.)

Results

Economic integration/well-being

According to the ordered logistic regression results shown in Table 3 (Models 1A & 1B), second-generation respondents tend to have higher levels of *educational attainment*, an association that holds (in fact, goes from significant at the 10% to the 5% significance level) across models 1A and 1B. As shown in Figure 2 (and Appendix Table A4), Model B estimates that a second-generation respondent is, on average, 2 percentage points more likely to have tertiary education compared to an otherwise similar (in terms of our independent variables) respondent of native parentage. Ethnic/racial minority status is associated with a disadvantage of about 5 percentage points, while gender is only marginally significant. Parental

¹² Note that Models 1-6A-E are calculated, in each case, for a total of six subgroups.

¹³ Ordered logit versions of these models (trust, life satisfaction, and household income variables), performed as robustness checks, produced similar results. Wald tests were conducted for all 3 ordered logit models used; none violated the proportional odds assumption.

socioeconomic status makes the biggest difference: all else kept equal, high (vs. medium) parental SES is associated with an average 19-percentage-point higher probability of having a tertiary degree.

The initial second-generation advantage in *Occupational status* (ISEI) goes from marginally significant in Model 2A to lose its significance in Model 2B once all background factors are accounted for (see Table 3 and Figure 3, Models 2A-B; also Appendix Table A4). Other background factors, however, have a strong relationship to ISEI. Ethnic/racial minority status, being a woman, and having low parental SES are all associated with lower ISEI scores (about -3, -2, and -7 points, respectively) , while high parental SES is associated with a higher ISEI score (the largest difference, an average +9 points).

Table 3. Regression results (Models A & B)

	<i>Economic integration</i>				<i>Political inclusion</i>		<i>Social inclusion</i>		<i>Health and subjective well-being</i>			
	Educational attainment		ISEI (occupation)		Political engagement		Social acceptance		Health		Life satisfaction	
	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B	Model 4A	Model 4B	Model 5A	Model 5B	Model 6A	Model 6B
	<i>Ordered logit</i>		<i>OLS</i>		<i>OLS</i>		<i>Ordered logit</i>		<i>Logit</i>		<i>OLS</i>	
	b/se		b/se		b/se		b/se		b/se		b/se	
Second generation (ref.: 3+ generation)	0.127 ⁺ (0.069)	0.124* (0.056)	0.814 ⁺ (0.479)	0.618 (0.446)	-0.415*** (0.111)	-0.449*** (0.101)	-0.926*** (0.118)	-0.270** (0.098)	-0.209*** (0.064)	-0.185** (0.064)	-0.146* (0.066)	-0.029 (0.066)
Female (ref.: male)	0.083 (0.067)	0.079 (0.073)	-2.872*** (0.400)	-2.918*** (0.392)	-0.044 (0.040)	-0.046 (0.040)	-0.067 (0.048)	-0.105* (0.048)	-0.179*** (0.030)	-0.184*** (0.031)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.032)
Ethnic/racial minority (ref.: ethnic/racial majority)		-0.344 ⁺ (0.178)		-2.251* (0.929)		-0.018 (0.176)		-2.165*** (0.149)		-0.298*** (0.061)		-0.695*** (0.121)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)												
Low parental SES		-0.977*** (0.051)		-7.656*** (0.303)		-0.302*** (0.041)		0.025 (0.051)		-0.272*** (0.056)		-0.305*** (0.057)
High parental SES		1.265*** (0.049)		8.959*** (0.309)		0.589*** (0.044)		-0.248*** (0.053)		0.258*** (0.031)		0.167*** (0.038)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant/cuts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²			0.040	0.150							0.092	0.104
Pseudo R ²	0.056	0.121			0.070	0.081	0.021	0.085	0.086	0.090		

Notes: All models additionally control for age group, geographical region, and ESS wave. Model 4B uses an altered version of the ethnic/racial minority variable (as discussed). Standard errors clustered by country for all models. (Standard errors in parentheses.) $N = 130,117$ across all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ⁺ $p < 0.10$.

Figure 2. AMEs from Models 1A-B




Figure 3. AMEs from Models 2A-B




Figure 4. AMEs from Models 3A-B




Figure 5. AMEs from Models 4A-B




Figure 6. AMEs from Models 5A-B





Figure 7. AMEs from Models 6A-B



Political inclusion and social inclusion

Models 3A and 3B (Table 3, above; and Appendix Table A5) find second-generation status to be associated with a lower probability of political engagement, both before and after accounting for other background characteristics (Figure 4). Specifically, a second-generation respondent's probability of being politically engaged is, on average, 6 percentage points lower than that of an otherwise similar native-parentage peer. Ethnic/racial minority status and female gender are not associated with significant differences. Parental socioeconomic status, however, is a strong predictor, with an average negative 4 percentage-point difference associated with low parental SES, and a nearly 8 percentage-point difference associated with high parental SES, all else kept equal.

Model 4A (Table 3; and Appendix Table A5) finds second-generation status to be associated with a lower probability of feeling socially accepted (with an AME of about 5.5 percentage points). Once other background characteristics are accounted for (Model 4B), this second-generation disadvantage remains significant but shrinks to an average 1.5-percentage-point gap in the probability of feeling socially accepted (Figure 5). Having high parental SES is associated with a similar-size negative difference, while being an ethnic/racial minority is associated with an average 12-percentage-point negative difference, all else kept equal.¹⁴ This suggests that much, though not all, of the initial gap was driven by the second-generation sample's higher share of ethnic/racial minorities and higher class background respondents.

Health and subjective well-being

In contrast with descriptive results, Model 5A (Table 3, above; and Appendix Table A5) finds second-generation status to be associated with lower levels of self-reported health, a link that

¹⁴ To prevent endogeneity issues, Models 9B-E are calculated using an adjusted version of the ethnic/racial minority status variable constructed without the racial or ethnic discrimination component.

slightly weakens, but remains significant, after accounting for class background and ethnic/racial minority status (Model 5B). For instance, as illustrated in Figure 6, the predicted probability of reporting good or very good health is 3.6 percentage points lower, on average, for a second-generation respondent than for an otherwise similar native-parentage respondent. Gender has a similar effect, while ethnic/racial minority status and class background have somewhat stronger (statistical) effects. The largest average difference in probability of reporting (very) good health is associated with ethnic/racial minority status (ca. –6 percentage points), followed by low and high parental SES (ca. 5 percentage point each, in opposing directions).

In the case of *Life satisfaction*, the initially observed disadvantage associated with second-generation status (Model 6A) loses its significance once class background and ethnic/racial minority status are accounted for (Model 6B) (Table 3). According to Figure 7, ethnic/racial minority status is associated with the largest difference in predicted life satisfaction scores (ca. -0.7 points), followed by low and high parental SES. (Gender is not significant.)¹⁵

Subgroup analyses

Turning to compare outcomes across subgroups defined by the intersection of migration status and the above background factors (see Models C, D, E in Table 4, end of section, for full list of predicted probabilities/values; see Appendix A6-A14 for full regression tables), I begin with subgroups by ethnic/racial minority status and continue with subgroups by low vs high class background. By and large, I do not find striking discrepancies in my subgroup analyses by gender (i.e., gender dynamics seem fairly similar by migration status, and vice versa), so for

¹⁵ While models originally do not control for educational attainment to keep the list of independent variables fully consistent across models, an alternative version of Models 2B-6B were run controlling for educational attainment, as a robustness check. Interestingly, this does not lead to substantial changes in the results. Regression tables for these alternative models are available in Appendix Table A15.

brevity I do not discuss their results in further detail here; average predicted probabilities and values for these subgroups are presented in Table 3 alongside results for other subgroups, and figures illustrating these are in the Appendix (Figures A1-A6).

Migration background and ethnic/racial minority vs. majority status

Figures 8 to 13 show how average predicted outcomes vary for the four subgroups defined by the intersection of migration background and ethnic/racial minority status. Starting with educational attainment, Figure 8 shows ethnic racial majority and minority second-generation subsamples as having a similar and relatively high predicted level of educational attainment. Meanwhile, I note a larger difference between majority and minority members of native parentage – specifically, the native-parentage ethnic/racial minority group stands out as having the lowest predicted educational attainment, on average, of the four groups (while the other three are fairly similar). Turning to occupational status (ISEI), I note a similar dynamic, with the native-parentage ethnic/racial minority group standing out as having the lowest average predicted ISEI, while the native-parentage majority group and the second-generation ethnic/racial minority group have similar average predicted scores. Interestingly, the second-generation ethnic/racial majority group has the highest average predicted score of all. Altogether, this adds some nuance to the apparent null-result for found in Model 2B (and the initial second-generation advantage found).

In the case of *Political engagement* and *Social acceptance*, the second-generation ethnic/racial minority group becomes the one with the lowest average predicted probability of these outcomes. This is especially apparent in the case of political engagement, where the three other groups have comparable average predicted probabilities of 0.8 or over, while the minority second-generation group's is 0.68 (this also means the majority/minority gap in this regard is markedly wider within the second generation, as apparent in Figure 10). When it comes to

social acceptance (Figure 11), the minority/majority gap is overall quite wide (in line with earlier regression results), but especially so between second-generation groups (0.64 vs 0.93, i.e., nearly 30 percentage points). That said, there is also a slight second-generation disadvantage between the majority groups.

Turning to *Health* and *Life satisfaction*, I once again find the native-parentage ethnic/racial minority group to be the worst-off in terms of average predicted outcomes. In the case of health, the other three groups have similar average predicted outcomes (e.g., probability of around 0.65 of reporting good health, vs. .57 for the native-parentage minority group). In the case of life satisfaction, both minority groups are relatively worse-off, but the native-parentage minority group is especially so (with an average predicted score of 5.8 vs. 6.6 for the second-generation minority group, and ca. 7 for both majority groups).

Figure 8. Average predicted probabilities, Model 1C




Figure 9. Average predicted values, Model 2C




Figure 10. Average predicted probabilities, Model 3C




Figure 11. Average predicted probabilities, Model 4C





Figure 12. Average predicted probabilities, Model 5C. **Figure 13.** Average predicted values, Model 6C



Migration background and low vs. high parental SES (class background)

Figures 14-19 (and the middle columns of Table 4) show how average predicted outcomes vary across subgroups defined by the intersection of migration background and class background (focusing on low and high parental SES). Looking at *Educational attainment* and *Occupational status (ISEI)* (Figures 14-15), the class-background divide is the most apparent one, but within that there are some interesting patterns again: namely, comparing high-parental-SES groups, the second generation seems at a slight disadvantage (especially for ISEI), but comparing low-parental-SES groups, I note a second-generation advantage (notable especially for probability of low educational attainment and ISEI).

To better understand the above phenomenon, I take a further look into the relationship between parental SES and economic outcomes for native-parentage natives and second-generation members. First, I go back to examine their percentage distributions (based on raw counts). As illustrated in Figures 20 and 21 (end of section), the patterns show here further suggest that class background may play a different role for second-generation and native-parentage respondents. Specifically, both figures show a pattern of relative second-generation advantage among low-parental-SES groups but a native-parentage advantage within the high-parental-SES segment. For instance, Figure 20 shows that a relatively higher share of low-class-

background second-generation members attain secondary and tertiary education compared to their low-class-background peers of native parentage (of whom a relatively larger ratio does not make it past lower secondary level of education). Similarly, a higher share of native-parentage natives with medium parental SES remain in the lower-educated segment compared to similar-background second-generation members. However, comparing high-class-background groups, second-generation members with high parental SES seem relatively less likely to complete tertiary education than their native parentage peers. A similar (though very moderate) non-linear pattern appears when comparing mean ISEI scores (Figure 21).

To explore this phenomenon further, I check how the average marginal effects associated with low and high class background vary in regression models for native-parentage and second-generation (analogous to earlier Models B, but calculated separately for the two groups). Results from these, presented in Figure 22 below (see Appendix Table A16 for regression table), largely support the above pattern, suggesting, for the second generation, a more moderate negative effect of low class background as well as a more moderate positive effect of high class background – although confidence intervals do often overlap (due to large SEs). Therefore, as an additional check, I also conduct a version of Model B that specifies interaction effects between second-generation status and parental SES. The results of these models are shown in Appendix Table A16. Alongside negative main effects on economic outcomes for low parental SES (and vice versa for high parental SES), these models confirm the presence of a significant positive interaction effect for second-generation status combined with low parental SES for both educational attainment and ISEI, along with a negative interaction effect for second-generation status combined with high parental SES. In other words, both the negative implications of low parental SES and the positive implications of high parental SES are reduced, on average, for the second generation.

In the case of *Political engagement* (Figure 16), second-generation status and low-class background are both associated with disadvantages, but the two factors combined seem to result in a particularly low average predicted probability of political engagement for the low-class-background second-generation group (0.72 vs 0.81 and 0.84 for the low-class-background native-parentage group and high-class-background second-generation group, respectively, and 0.91 for the high-class-background native-parentage group).

In the case of *Social acceptance*, the estimated average probabilities are largely in line with those from the earlier regression (Model 4B), with no major additional discrepancies apparent; the case is similar for *Life satisfaction* (Figures 17 and 19). Lastly, turning to *Health*, a result that stands out is the high-class-background second-generation group's average predicted probability of indicating good health, which is considerably higher (at 0.74) than the other three groups' (at around 0.55) (Figure 18).¹⁶

¹⁶ My supplementary examination of interaction-effect models (Appendix Table A16) also suggests a positive interaction effect between second-generation status and high parental SES (though only significant at the 10% level).

Figure 14. Average predicted probabilities, Model 1D




Figure 15. Average predicted values, Model 2D




Figure 16. Average predicted probabilities, Model 3D




Figure 17. Average predicted probabilities, Model 4D




Figure 18. Average predicted probabilities, Model 5D.




Figure 19. Average predicted values, Model 6D




Figure 20. Educational attainment by parental SES for native-parentage vs second-generation respondents




Figure 21. Mean ISEI score by parental SES for native-parentage vs. second-generation respondents




Figure 22. AMEs associated with low and high parental SES for economic outcomes, by migration background (separate models)




Table 3. Average predicted probabilities/values for subgroups

	Models C Subgroups by ethnic/racial minority status				Models D Subgroups by class background (parental SES)				Models E Subgroups by gender			
	Native- parentage E/R majority	Second- generation E/R majority	Native- parentage E/R minority	Second- generation E/R minority	Native- parentage with low par. SES	Second- generation with low par. SES	Native- parentage with high par. SES	Second- generation with high par. SES	Native- parentage male	Second- generation male	Native- parentage female	Second- generation female
Education												
<i>Up to low. sec.</i>												
Mean pr. prob.	0.242	0.168	0.341	0.172	0.403	0.291	0.049	0.050	0.244	0.166	0.247	0.172
SE	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.014)
<i>Tertiary</i>												
Mean pr. prob.	0.237	0.264	0.170	0.268	0.107	0.121	0.564	0.542	0.220	0.257	0.248	0.272
SE	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.014)
ISEI												
Mean pr. value	42.518	44.049	37.360	41.995	36.194	37.615	53.602	52.385	43.862	45.337	40.925	41.980
SE	(0.300)	(0.339)	(1.221)	(0.491)	(0.319)	(0.387)	(0.343)	(0.591)	(0.364)	(0.446)	(0.323)	(0.347)
Political eng.												
Mean pr. prob.	0.842	0.797	0.812	0.673	0.813	0.717	0.907	0.845	0.847	0.763	0.835	0.772
SE	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Social accept.												
Mean pr. prob.	0.952	0.932	0.708	0.637	0.946	0.863	0.929	0.845	0.946	0.856	0.941	0.868
SE	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.031)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)
N	113678	9289	4290	2860								
Health												
<i>Poor</i>												
Mean pr. prob.	0.078	0.084	0.117	0.081	0.113	0.111	0.085	0.090	0.070	0.076	0.087	0.089
SE	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)
<i>Good</i>												
Mean pr. prob.	0.648	0.644	0.571	0.649	0.546	0.563	0.623	0.620	0.668	0.667	0.623	0.625
SE	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Life satisfaction												
Mean pr. value	7.078	7.025	5.795	6.610	6.694	6.622	6.956	6.843	7.074	6.931	6.993	6.923
SE	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.230)	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.131)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.089)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.100)
N	11,3676	9,284	4,292	2,865	48,696	4,051	10,0443	9,679	5,6450	5,734	61,518	6,415

Note: Predicted probabilities were produced by logistic regression models, which included independent variables and controls as in Models B except for migrant status and, in each case, the additional variable on which disaggregation is based (ethnic/racial minority status, parental SES, or gender). See Appendix (Tables A6-A14) for full regression tables.

Discussion and conclusions

This paper has compared second-generation and native-parentage Europeans to gauge the state of the former's integration by testing whether migration background, compared to, and in combination with, other background factors is associated with any key differences in social inclusion and well-being. Relying on pooled cross-European data, the study engaged in a simultaneous examination of economic, political, social, and well-being related dimensions of integration, proving a rarely wide-ranging yet consistent body of evidence on second-generation integration in Europe. In doing so, it contributes a long-needed systematic analysis to help address the challenge of disentangling the effect of migration background, if any, from the potential confounders of parental class background and ethnic/racial minority status in the comparative outcomes of second-generation immigrants in Europe. Further, part of this challenge is also to gain a clearer understanding of how the implications of class background, ethnic/racial minority status, and gender, may differ for second-generation immigrants versus native-parentage peers. In the following, I summarize the findings of this wide-ranging study as they relate to each research question – Table 4, below, provides an overview to aid this – after which I discuss potential explanations, implications, and limitations, along with the final takeaways and recommendations for future research.

Table 5. Overview of findings

Relevant research question		RQ1			RQ2	RQ3
		(a)	(b)	(a) vs. (b)		
Model		Model A	Model B	Model A vs B	Model B	Models C, D E
		Difference associated with second gen. status		Changes from accounting for E/R background, gender, parental SES	Comparison of AME size among significant variables	Comparison of avg. predicted outcomes across subgroups
Economic integration						
(1)	Educational attainment	0/+	+	Second-gen. advantage becomes significant at 5% level	pSES > E/R > 2gen	G2 maj \approx G2 min > G3 maj > G3 min; High pSES G3 \approx High pSES G2 >> >> Low pSES G2 > Low pSES G3
(2)	ISEI (occupational status)	0/+	0	Second-gen. advantage loses (marginal) significance	pSES > fem \approx E/R	G2 maj > G3 maj \approx G2 min > G3 min High pSES G3 > High pSES G2 >> >> Low pSES G2 > Low pSES G3
Political/institutional inclusion						
(5)	Political engagement	-	-	Second-gen. disadvantage increases slightly	pSES > 2gen	G3 maj > G2 maj \approx G3 min >> G2 min; High pSES G3 > High pSES G2 > > Low pSES G2 >> Low pSES G3
Social inclusion						
(9)	Social acceptance	-	-	Second-gen. disadvantage shrinks considerably	E/R > 2gen > pSES > fem	G3 maj > G2 maj >> G3 min > G2 min; Low pSES G3 > High pSES G3 > > Low pSES G2 > High pSES G2
Health & subjective well-being						
(10)	Health	-	-	Second-gen. disadvantage shrinks	pSES \approx E/R > 2gen \approx fem	G3 maj \approx G2 maj \approx G2 min > G3 min; High pSES G2 > Low pSES G2 \approx \approx High pSES G3 \approx Low pSES G3
(11)	Life satisfaction	-	0	Second-gen. disadvantage loses significance	E/R > pSES	G3 maj \approx G2 maj > G2 min > G3 min; High pSES G3 > High pSES G2 > > Low pSES G2 \approx Low pSES G3

Notes on signs and abbreviations used: '+': advantage for second gen., '-': disadvantage for second gen., '0': no difference/null effect; '0/+' marginally significant ($p < 0.10$) second-generation advantage. pSES: parental SES; E/R: ethnic/racial minority status; 2gen: second-generation status; fem: gender (female); G2: second generation; G3: 3+ generation/native-parentage; min: ethnic/racial minority; maj: ethnic/racial majority

First of all (RQ1), I was interested in assessing the general presence of advantages or disadvantages tied to migrant parentage, observed via potential outcome disparities between second-generation Europeans and their native-parentage peers. Initial descriptive statistics suggested that at a cross-European level, migrant parentage – i.e., second-generation status – may be associated with a relative advantage in economic outcomes (higher educational attainment and occupational status), but a disadvantage when it comes to political engagement, social acceptance, and life satisfaction. (The distribution of health outcomes showed no significant differences between the two groups at this point.) After controlling for basic demographic factors (age, gender) and sample characteristics (ESS wave and survey country region; clustering standard errors by country) in our base regressions, the second-generation's economic advantage became only marginally significant ($p < 0.1$), while all other, non-economic outcomes (including health) now indicated a significant ($p < 0.05$) disadvantage associated with migrant parentage (RQ1a).

Next, following from common arguments of compositional effects in the outcomes of the second generation (see e.g. Drouhot & Nee, 2019), I was interested in to examine whether the migrant-parentage outcome differences found in the models above may actually be driven by other, co-occurring background factors (RQ1b), such as ethnic/racial minority status – relatively more common among second-generation Europeans – and class-background composition. Interestingly, the latter, which I approximated via parental SES, was actually higher, on average, for the second-generation group within my sample. A closer look revealed that this was particularly true for the ethnic/racial minority subset of my sample. Furthermore, the overall trend was driven primarily by older cohorts, while younger cohorts, and samples from the region I defined as Western Europe (vs. Nordic countries, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe), formed an exception. After controlling for ethnic/racial minority status and parental SES, the second-generation's relative educational advantage became even clearer,

while its disadvantage in social acceptance and health shrank, but remained significant. The second-generation disadvantage found for political engagement became slightly stronger, while differences in occupational status and life satisfaction were no longer found to be significant.

I was also interested in the relative importance of each background factor in driving outcome differences (RQ2). In terms of average marginal effect magnitudes among the four background factors of interest, parental SES was the strongest predictor for economic outcomes. Ethnic/racial status was the strongest predictor for social acceptance, life satisfaction, and health (closely followed by parental SES). Second generation status was the strongest predictor for political engagement, the second-strongest for social acceptance, and the third-strongest for education (and not significant elsewhere). Overall, accounting for other key background factors added important nuance to the initial picture, as some migrant-parentage-disparities disappeared, and, even where the association remained significant, other factors – namely, class background and ethnic/racial minority status – were often found to be stronger predictors. Nevertheless, even beside these effects, migration background maintained some significant implications in each of the four main dimensions examined (RQ1b).

Lastly, I turned to understand these associations in further detail by examining outcomes at the intersection of migration background and the above background factors (ethnic/racial minority status, class background, and gender) (RQ3). To this end, I conducted separate regressions for each subgroup defined by the combination of those categories and compared their average predicted outcomes. By highlighting some interesting intra- and inter-categorical patterns, these analyses helped to understand and add further nuance to the above main results. Most notable was a pattern of particular (i.e., disproportionate) disadvantage for the native-parentage ethnic/racial minority subgroup – not only relative to their native-parentage majority

counterparts, but also both second-generation subgroups – in the economic, as well as the health and subjective well-being dimensions. In all four related outcomes, the native-parentage ethnic/racial minority subgroup has the least favorable average predicted outcomes of the four subgroups. By comparison, the second-generation ethnic/racial minority subgroup's outcomes were often close to those of the second-generation majority-members', especially in the case of education and health. In the case of average predicted occupational status and life satisfaction, I did find a minority-majority gap within the second generation, but these gaps still tended to be more moderate than those observable between the minority and majority native-parentage groups. Two important exceptions to this were for the outcomes of political engagement and social acceptance, in which cases second-generation groups were generally worse off (in line with results from Models B), but the ethnic/racial minority second-generation group especially so.

Furthermore, I found an analogous pattern when looking at economic outcomes (education and ISEI) for subgroups defined by intersecting categories of migration background and class background: while economic outcomes of groups with low parental SES were generally predicted to be lower (compared to groups with high parental SES), the gap in average predicted outcomes between low- versus high-class-background second-generation members tended to be smaller than those between low- versus high-class-background native-parentage natives. Ranked by their average predicted outcomes, high-parental-SES native-parentage natives would come first, followed by high- and then low-parental-SES second-generation members, while the low-parental-SES native-parentage natives would come last. An additional exploration of descriptive statistics further highlighted a nonlinear association, in which second-generation members have relatively better economic outcomes, on average, within the lower-parental-SES segment, but that difference reduces in the 'medium'-parental-SES segment and turns into a second-generation *disadvantage* within the high-parental-SES

segment. Further supplementary analyses, including, first, examining marginal effects of class background on economic outcomes separately for second-generation and native-parentage samples, and second, an alternative version of models including interaction effects between second generation status parental SES, offered some further support to the idea of relatively more modest parental SES effects for second-generation members (especially in the case of ISEI).

Taken together with the results concerning subgroups defined by ethnic/racial minority status and migration background, these findings may be interpreted as signaling a particular penalty effect for disadvantaged native-parentage groups, or vice versa, a curious phenomenon of ‘alleviated’ disadvantage for second-generation peers of ostensibly comparable backgrounds. This are key findings as they provide new broad-scale European evidence to so far smaller-scale (or US-based) accounts of differing intergenerational social reproduction processes among second-generation immigrants (Alba & Nee, 2003; Kasinitz et al., 2008; Li, 2018; Platt, 2007; Zuccotti, 2015). On the one hand, the pattern of relative second-generation advantage among lower-class-background groups echoes the phenomenon second-generation ‘superachievement’ discussed earlier (Crul et al., 2017; Feliciano & Lanuza, 2017; Lessard-Phillips & Li, 2017). On the other hand, my results for occupational status in particular suggest a broader dynamic in which second-generation members may be relatively less held back by modest social origins, but, may not be able to utilize their high parental SES to the same degree as their privileged native-parentage peers. This falls in line with results from prior country studies (e.g., UK and Sweden) finding a two-sided phenomenon in which both positive and negative implications of class background are weaker for second-generation immigrants (Lessard-Phillips & Li, 2017; Platt, 2007; Urban, 2012; Zuccotti, 2015).

As discussed earlier, these phenomena could be explained by various mechanisms, from parental selectivity (including ‘true’ class background as well as motivation) to a protective immigrant community or other beneficial factors (Feliciano, 2020; Kao & Tienda, 1995; Portes et al., 2009). An underestimation of immigrant parents’ ‘true’ class origins (due, for example to having to work jobs they were overqualified for, and my measure of class being largely based on job title) could be driving the results of (apparent) lower-class-background ‘superachievement’ among the second generation, but it would not explain the pattern stopping (or even flipping) at the higher parental SES levels, unless the problem of immigrant-parent overqualification is no longer present there. A similar argument could be made for immigrant (parents’) selectivity along motivation. Another important potential selectivity issue concerns the aforementioned imperfect representativity of immigrant-background minorities in ESS, due to which my second-generation sample might underrepresent the most marginalized second-generation groups (e.g. even within the lower-parental-SES group).

On a different note, the pronounced pattern of disadvantage found for native-parentage minorities (and low-parental-SES native-parentage natives) calls to mind segmented assimilation theory’s (US-context-based) emphasis on established, but all the more so, long-disenfranchised native-parentage minority groups in the receiving country context – compared to whom second-generation youths may be a relative advantage (e.g., still having more optimism, immigrant-community resources, etc.) (Portes & Zhou, 1993; see also Kasinitz et al. 2008). Exploring what makes this minority segment of the native-parentage European populations examined in my study so disadvantaged (especially relative to second-generation minorities) would be another question worth exploring further.

Overall, the new evidence provided by this paper on the prevalence of the ‘superachievement’ phenomenon and diverging class and minority-status effects for the second generation in

Europe makes a strong case for further examinations of the underlying mechanisms at play in future research. A key limitation of this study is the fact that I am only able to make associational, and not causal, claims. Further, the large and complex scope of the study, along with sample size concerns (and variable limitations), meant that I had to rely on simplified class and ethnic/racial categorisations and a cross-nationally aggregated analysis, though calculations did account, to some extent, for the cross-national nature of data and the resulting variation (controlling for main regions and clustering standard errors by country). While the broad scope of this study brought its own contributions – chief among them providing a wide-ranging, systematic set of analyses targeting strongly related questions typically addressed in disparate studies – these further complexities would be worth examining in future studies, data permitting.

Interestingly, I did not find much evidence of differing gender effects by migration background; in this regard, more specific analyses, involving interactions with ethnicity (where sample sizes allow for robust intra-group comparisons), may prove more fruitful (Fleischmann & Kristen, 2014). Nevertheless, from an analytical and methodological perspective, the insights gained from this comparative subgroup analyses in this paper affirm the benefits of applying intersectional, especially intercategorical perspectives to the study of migrant integration (ideally with more sophisticated measures of racialisation) (Bürkner, 2012; McCall, 2005).

All in all, my findings overall suggest that migration background continues to be a relevant source of difference – though to varying degrees and in varied ways – in the lives of second-generation immigrants in Europe (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Heath & Schneider, 2021). My attempt to delineate, as far as possible here, implications of migrant parentage from those of other key background factors, especially class background and racialized/ethnic minority status, confirmed the multiple ways in which second-generation status may be associated outcome

disparities. Namely, returning to the original ‘scenarios’ outlined, I find that second-generation disparities are, to some extent, extensions of disparities stemming from social origins and ethnoracial minority status in society; however, in most cases I also find second-generation status effects beyond those attributable to class background and ethnoracial minority status. Further, I find that, depending on the outcome, migrant parentage may not only make a difference in its own right but through differentiated implications of class and ethno-racial minority status.

Indeed, the multidimensional scope of the analysis helps to reveal a complex pattern of relative advantages and disadvantages tied to migration background, which I broadly interpret, as outlined above, as a divide between economic and non-economic aspects of integration and inclusion/well-being (with persisting disadvantages apparent especially for political and social inclusion). This discrepancy I find both across and within dimensions is theoretically meaningful as it provides further, large-scale European evidence reinforcing arguments stressing the potential divergence of integration processes different areas of life (not just for the first, but also the second generation) (Bean et al., 2012; Fajth & Lessard-Phillips, forthcoming; Lessard-Phillips, 2017). As such, it further underscores the need for multidimensional analytical frameworks to accurately assess integration (Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019; Penninx, 2005; Spencer & Charsley, 2016), whether from a scholarly or policy-oriented perspective.

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7 EMPIRICAL PAPER 3: THE ROLE OF HOST COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS IN IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: A CROSS-EUROPEAN ANALYSIS

The following pages present the updated version of a manuscript planned to be (re-)submitted, potentially in a shortened or partial version, to an academic journal. An earlier versions of this paper was presented at the ESS Budapest 2022 Conference in Budapest and at the IRiS 10th Anniversary Conference at the University of Birmingham (virtually).

Note: the manuscript follows the formatting guidelines of the journal to which it was originally submitted.

Title

The role of host country characteristics in immigrant integration: A cross-European analysis¹

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Abstract

Although it is generally accepted that the host country context plays a role in immigrants' integration, the specifics of this dynamic are less established. Exploiting the variety of institutional and contextual differences within Europe, this article conducts a wide-ranging quantitative analysis of the links between host country characteristics and individual immigrant integration outcomes. Combining individual data on immigrants in 19 European countries from the European Social Survey (2014-18) with macro-level indicators on 72 country-year contexts, the study examines whether more favourable economic indicators, a larger immigrant stock, warmer attitudes towards immigrants, and more liberal integration policies, among other factors, are associated with better outcomes for immigrants (in terms of occupational attainment, political engagement, health, life satisfaction, and perceived in-group discrimination). Findings offer some general support for these notions, though with important differences across specific factors and outcomes. The article helps fill in prior evidence gaps and advances the study of migrant integration by offering a unique comparative overview of how specific host country factors relate to different dimensions of integration.

¹ I would like to thank Laurence Lessard-Phillips, Nando Sigona, Miguel Ribeiro Ramos, Ingrid Storm and Zhaoya Gong for their valuable suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank four prior anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper. This research was made possible by the generous support of the Global Challenges Scholarship at the University of Birmingham. Direct correspondence to Veronika Strain-Fajth, email: [REDACTED]

The role of host country characteristics in immigrant integration: A cross-European analysis

Introduction

International comparisons consistently suggest that immigrants fare better in some countries than in others (OECD/EU 2019). Why is this? Differences in the composition of immigrant populations undoubtedly play a role, but do not seem to explain the full picture (Crul and Schneider 2012; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012; Pichler 2011; Kogan et al. 2018). Immigrant integration and assimilation scholarship has long been interested in the role that the host country context may play in the integration trajectories of immigrants and their descendants (e.g. Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Waldinger and Catron 2016). Europe, with its variety of institutional arrangements, economic characteristics, migration histories, and policy approaches, forms a particularly interesting context in which to examine this question (Thomson and Crul 2007; OECD/EU 2019). Indeed, recent years have seen a growing body of comparative studies investigating the effects of structural factors on immigrant integration across European contexts (Bean et al. 2012; Koopmans 2013; Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Drouhot and Nee 2019; van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021).

Yet, despite a growing body of specialized literature, a comprehensive conceptual or empirical overview of the role of the host country context in immigrant integration remains lacking. This is due to a number of factors, including the fragmented nature of the existing evidence base, conflicting findings, and/or a lack of evidence altogether. Most existing studies tend to focus on a single aspect of integration at a time, with an overwhelming focus on indicators of socioeconomic integration such as employment (for the first generation) or

education (for the second generation) (e.g., Ballarino and Panichella 2015; Bisin et al. 2011; Borgna and Contini 2014; Griga and Hadjar 2014). Further, existing evidence within *and* across different aspects of integration is often difficult to aggregate, due to discrepancies in methodology, population focus, and geographical focus (not to mention an overwhelming focus on Western Europe) (cf., e.g., Pichler 2011; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). Altogether, this results in a fragmented body of knowledge that makes it difficult to assess the relationship between host country characteristics and immigrant integration from a multidimensional perspective. Moreover, the key question of whether more inclusive immigrant integration policies are linked to better immigrant integration outcomes has not yet been clearly answered by the existing European evidence base (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Koopmans 2013).

The aim of this paper is to help build towards a comprehensive overview of the varied ways in which macro-level characteristics of the host country may shape integration opportunities. Following up on these gaps and shortcomings, with this paper I seek to improve on the existing European empirical evidence on host country effects in three ways. First, building on a multidimensional concept of immigrant integration centred on inequality and inclusion, my analysis extends to multiple outcomes at once, thus providing comparable evidence on a wide range of dimensions, including economic, political, social, and well-being-related aspects of integration. In doing so, I focus on outcomes on which existing evidence is so far thin and/or inconclusive, including immigrants' occupational attainment, political participation, social acceptance (perceived discrimination), health, and subjective well-being. Second, my analyses incorporate a wide range of structural factors and other host country characteristics outlined as relevant by prior literature, with a particular attention to migrant integration policy. Third, my analysis covers a diverse but consistent set of 19

countries, going beyond the typical northwestern European focus. Further, though my focus is primarily on first-generation immigrants, in supplementary analyses I include a look at second-generation immigrants and a breakdown of EU vs. non-EU origin first-generation immigrants.

In summary, understanding the effect of different contextual factors on the outcomes of immigrants and their descendants has so far remained a key missing piece of the integration puzzle. This paper makes several useful contributions to advance knowledge in this regard. To begin with, the first half of the paper provides a long-needed cross-dimensional synthesis of European integration literature on host country effects. Then, it expands on that literature with a wide-ranging new analysis. Through the approach described above, it provides comparable evidence concerning several key contextual features of host country – including economic conditions, attitudes towards migrants, prevalence of immigrants in the population, and the inclusiveness of policies for immigrant integration – as they relate to individual immigrants’ equality and inclusion in economic, political, and social life, as well as their health and well-being. In doing so, the analyses in this paper allow to identify some key contextual factors for each dimension of integration examined, and, vice versa, show how specific factors relate to various aspects of migrant integration. Moreover, my results contribute to an otherwise inconclusive or limited evidence base for some areas.

In the following section, I outline my concept of integration, review prior knowledge on the individual and structural factors shaping immigrant integration, and formulate my research questions. I then present the data and methods used for the analysis, followed by results. Lastly, I discuss findings and conclusions.

Concepts, theory and prior literature

Concept of integration

In this paper, I define integration as the disappearance of systematic inequalities and social exclusion tied to migration background (Alba and Foner 2015; OECD/EU 2019). In line with recent conceptualisations (Bean et al. 2012; Grzymala-Kazłowska and Phillimore 2018; Harder et al. 2018; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019; Spencer and Charsley 2016), I view integration as a multifaceted phenomenon best assessed via multiple dimensions, including the socio-economic sphere but also other, non-economic areas of life, such as the political/institutional domain, social inclusion, or health- and well-being. This multidimensional framework deliberately leaves out some common aspects of integration that are more focused on immigrants' acculturation and/or social assimilation (e.g., cultural assimilation, national identity, etc.) than their inclusion and equality within host society, as I do not consider these as essential prerequisites of integration by my definition (see also Spencer and Charsley 2016; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016).

Specifically, in this study I am interested in immigrants' occupational status, political participation, health, and subjective well-being (relative to native-background populations in the same country contexts), as well as immigrants' perceived level of social acceptance within the host country. In line with my inclusion-focused concept of integration, I interpret 'better' or 'more advanced' integration as a higher degree of inclusion in host society, meaning a smaller migrant-native gap or a relatively higher likelihood of a favourable outcome for the immigrant (on aspects relating to individuals' well-being, or their participation in society). I view integration as relevant to first-generation (i.e., foreign-born) immigrants as well as their second-generation descendants, though noting, of course, their

processes are not equivalent (Penninx 2005). The primary focus of this paper is on the first generation, though some attention is also given to the second generation's integration.

It should be noted that among integration studies focused on contextual effects, some observe how contextual factors affect immigrants' outcomes in general (i.e., in the absolute sense) (e.g., Bisin et al. 2011; Pichler 2011), while others focus on how they affect immigrants' relative outcomes, or immigrant-native² gaps (e.g., Blom, Huijts, and Kraaykamp 2016; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). Following from my concept of integration, I am primarily interested in immigrants' relative outcomes,³ as indicated by the size of the migrant-native gap in different contexts, or the cross-national variation in immigrants' outcomes while controlling for differences in natives' averages across those same contexts (unless the outcome in question is inherently relational, e.g., social acceptance or discrimination by majority society).

Sources of cross-national variation in immigrant integration

What factors can explain the variation in immigrant integration patterns across different country contexts? To start with, the literature tends to distinguish between 'origin' effects and/or compositional factors on the one hand, and 'destination' effects or host country contextual factors on the other (e.g., van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004; Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018). (I follow the latter terminology.) Put simply, the 'origin' and/or compositional-effects argument explains differences in integration patterns across countries can be traced back to the countries of origin and/or other relevant background traits of the immigrant population

² For the purposes of this paper, by 'natives' I refer native-background native residents of a country, distinct from members of the second generation (i.e., native-born children of one or two immigrant parents, including foreign-born residents who immigrated as young children); see also 'Measures' section.

³ That said, for reasons of scarcity, my literature review includes studies from both camps.

in a given country (Damelang, Ebensperger, and Stumpf 2021; Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007). ‘Destination’ or contextual explanations, on the other hand, focus on how structural and societal traits of the host country environment that may shape the integration opportunities and experience of immigrants and their descendants (Griga and Hadjar 2014; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). I elaborate on each of these ideas below.

Immigrants’ background characteristics (compositional and/or origin effects)

First of all, countries differ widely in the (pre-migration) characteristics of the immigrants they attract or allow in (OECD/EU 2019). As a result, some countries’ immigrant populations are inherently better positioned to reach (or even surpass) native-level education levels, living standards, etc. (Feliciano 2020). Isolating the portion of cross-national variation in immigrants’ integration-related outcomes that is due to such compositional effects is thus a key preliminary step before attributing effects to the host country environment (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019; see also Feliciano 2020). Individual-level characteristics driving selection or composition effects can range from immigrants’ basic sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender etc.) and human capital, or socioeconomic background, to aspects such as mental and physical health, norms and values, cultural capital, talent, motivation, resilience, et cetera (Feliciano 2020; Polavieja, Fernández-Reino, and Ramos 2018).

Selectivity in the skill (or educational) levels of the immigrant generation are often used to explain the cross-national variation in the socioeconomic integration the first-generation as well as the second-generation (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Drouhot and Nee 2019; OECD/EU 2019). For example, children of the major ‘guestworker’ cohorts of

the post-war era in North-Western Europe are often as having faced considerable disadvantage due to their parents' low human capital levels (Heath, ROTHON, and Kilpi 2008; Drouhot and Nee 2019). Further, a common argument holds that immigrants may be positively selected along qualities such as motivation or resilience, driving a differential in socioeconomic outcomes net of human capital (Feliciano 2020; Borjas 1987; Chiswick 1999). The extent of such selectivity may be linked to reason for migration (with self-selection applying mostly to economic migrants) and the selectivity of countries' immigration policies (Chiswick 1999; Heath, ROTHON, and Kilpi 2008). However, once these factors and immigrants' skill levels have been accounted for, there is arguably little reason to expect that immigrants' motivation, resilience, et cetera, would vary systematically across countries. Moreover, a recent examination (Polavieja, Fernández-Reino, and Ramos 2018) has challenged the significance of motivational selection effects among immigrants in Europe.

On a related note, 'culture' and other, hard to observe qualities assumed to vary by ethnic or national origin, have often been approximated by using national origin (or ethnicity) essentially as an explanatory factor (Drouhot and Nee 2019; Pichler 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). A critique of these practices is that they can easily end up essentialising national origin or ethnicity (Anthias 2013; Semati 2011; Verkuyten 2003), as well as conflating explanatory factors (Waldinger and Catron 2016; see also Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018). Instead of national (or ethnic) composition then, an analytically clearer approach is to focus, as far as possible, on the relevant background factors directly and individually (e.g., education levels, legal status, racialised status, etc. of the immigrants, or macro-level indicators of the origin country thought relevant) (Waldinger and Catron 2016;

Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018; see Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012 for an example of the latter approach).

On the aspect of health, there is reason to expect that health disparities observed for immigrants across Europe may not merely be reflecting selectivity effects. First of all, the validity of the ‘immigrant health paradox’ observed in the US context – which posits that immigrants tend to be positively selected on health due to the strenuous nature of the migration process – has been challenged for the European context (Domnich et al. 2012). Much of immigration to European countries – especially the movement of mobile European citizens – is a relatively less demanding endeavour (and does not involve, in the latter case, health screenings). Further, as discussed by Francesca and Petretto (2019; see also Rechel et al. 2013), although migrants are often initially healthier due to selection effects, once in the host country they tend to face particular health challenges and may acculturate to less healthy lifestyles. A combination of factors such as social exclusion, worse living conditions, barriers to healthcare access, overrepresentation in jobs associated with worse occupational health can all lead to what has been called the ‘exhausted migrant effect’, cancelling out the initial ‘healthy migrant effect’ and potentially even leading to a health disadvantage, at times observable even for the second generation (Rechel et al. 2013; see also Gkiouleka and Huijts 2020). Though controlling for socioeconomic status may reduce or even cancel the migrant-native health gap in empirical studies, health inequality researchers argue that lower SES itself is partly driven by social exclusion processes tied to migration, and thus should not be viewed as a confounding factor (Francesca and Petretto 2019; Rechel et al. 2013).

All in all, the composition of different countries' immigrant population with regards to key background factor is thus bound to be an important source of cross-national variation in integration patterns. Nevertheless, the takeaway from existing cross-European literature aiming to isolate compositional (or origin) effects from destination country effects seems to be that compositional effects alone do not explain the full extent of cross-national variation in immigrants' integration outcomes, suggesting an influential role for the host country context, as well (André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; André and Dronkers 2017; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018; Pichler 2011). I elaborate on the role of the host country context in the following. Meanwhile, as a starting point for my analysis, my first question is the following:

- *RQ1: Do immigrants' integration-related outcomes vary significantly across country contexts, accounting for compositional effects?*

Characteristics of the host country context

European integration scholarship, with its penchant for comparative cross-national research, has been instrumental in drawing attention to the national context as a key factor of integration within the international theoretical debate (Thomson and Crul 2007). On a preliminary note, it should be noted that the host country context encompasses a number of sub-contexts, such as the neighbourhood, the city, and other localities. Indeed, the local aspect of integration has (rightly) received increasing attention in recent years within the contextual-effects literature: examples include emerging literature on superdiversity and the 'local turn' in migrant integration policies (Schneider and Crul 2012; Scholten and Penninx

2016; Vertovec 2007).⁴ Recognising the importance of the local (and the transnational)⁵ context, however, need not deny the continued relevance of the country-level context (Hadj Abdou 2019). Across Europe, the nation-state continues to determine differences in a wide range of areas, including, for instance, national laws concerning immigration, citizenship regimes, national policies relevant to integration, institutional arrangements on the labour market, healthcare system, welfare system, etc., not to mention history of immigration, colonial or other relevant history, and national identity (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Brubaker 1992; Huddleston et al. 2015; Kammer, Niehues, and Peichl 2012; Scholten and Penninx 2016; Penninx 2005). Further, as I discuss below, there are still numerous open questions concerning the implications of national-level contextual differences for integration. In this paper I thus focus on shedding further light on the role of country-level contextual factors.

Theoretical arguments as to how the host country's structural characteristics may influence the integration trajectories of immigrants and their descendants are numerous, ranging from historical and cultural to institutional factors, from history with immigration to labour market institutions – offering, in the words of Heath and colleagues, “a longer list of potential explanations than we have countries” (2008, 228). In lieu of an existing overarching conceptual framework on these dynamics, I focus on some of the most prominent factors within in the contextual-effects scholarship. Drawing on a vast review of prior literature – including general conceptual frameworks of integration (Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016), Portes and colleagues' ‘modes of incorporation’ framework (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993; see also

⁴ See also Scholten and Penninx (2016) on multi-level governance.

⁵ Referring to the simultaneous embeddedness of immigrants and their descendants in countries of origin and destination (see, e.g., Spencer and Charsley 2016; Bilgili 2014).

Waldinger and Catron 2016; Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018), multiculturalism literature (Reitz 2002), and reviews of the existing empirical evidence (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008) – I identify a few main types of host country contextual factors relevant to integration. These are: economic and structural characteristics of the host country; prior presence of immigrants in the host country; attitudes towards immigrants within the host country; and policies targeting (or relevant to) immigrant integration. I expand on each of these below.

Economic and structural characteristics of the host country

Starting with economic conditions, the general theoretical argument suggests that immigrants and their descendants are more likely to integrate successfully among more favourable economic conditions, and, conversely, in conditions of relative scarcity and shrinking opportunities, immigrant minorities tend to be particularly disadvantaged (Alba and Nee 1997; Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Chaloff, Dumont, and Liebig 2012; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Portes and Zhou 1993). Heath and colleagues, for instance, stress the ‘hypercyclical’ nature of ethnic minority unemployment, meaning in times of economic recession, minority ethnic groups tend to have disproportionately high unemployment rates (Li and Heath 2008; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008). Along a similar line of reasoning, Heath and colleagues (2008) note that ethnic penalties may be expected larger in labour markets with overall higher unemployment, and generally more unequal societies. Indeed, the global recession (2008-09) has shown immigrant workers in general to be particularly vulnerable to economic downturns: likely due to a combination of factors such as their concentration in more volatile sectors, lower levels of seniority in the job, and less secure contracts, immigrant workers were often the first to go; it also became relatively more difficult for them to get hired (Chaloff, Dumont, and Liebig 2012).

Reviewing existing cross-European empirical evidence, the positive associations of more favourable economic conditions within the host country are generally supported concerning immigrants' employment (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). Looking at occupational status, the dynamic largely seems to apply as well, though the evidence is somewhat less consistent (and scarcer). Economic inequality (typically measured with the Gini coefficient), has often been associated with larger occupational penalties for first- and second-generation immigrants (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008); moreover, in a study of 28 countries, Pichler (2011) finds negative association between a country's unemployment rates and the occupational status of first-generation immigrants (but see also Corrigan 2015).

While arguments concerning the effects of economic conditions within the host country for immigrants are primarily formulated with regards to their labour market position, it seems reasonable to expect a connection to other aspects of immigrants' social inclusion and well-being, not least due to the interrelated nature of different aspects of integration (André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018; Vogt Isaksen 2019; Fajth and Lessard-Phillips 2022; Ager and Strang 2008). For instance, André and colleagues' (2014) cross-European study finds a positive link between the host country's GDP per capita and immigrants' electoral participation (similar to Aleksynska 2011). Just and Anderson (2014) do not confirm this effect, but they do find higher rates of unemployment to affect immigrants' political participation negatively via its negative connection to attitudes towards immigrants (more on attitudes later). GDP per capita seems positively associated with the life satisfaction of immigrants in general (Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018), but some find the positive effect of GDP per capita to be weaker for immigrants (first- and second-

generation) than for natives, thus resulting in a larger native-immigrant gap (Hadjar and Backes 2013). Similarly, there is some evidence inequality might be associated with generally lower subjective well-being among immigrants (Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018), though its effects on the immigrant-native *gap* need to be explored further. In light of the above arguments and evidence (or lack thereof), I thus pose the following question:

- *RQ2a: Do immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in countries with more favourable economic indicators?*

In the case of immigrants' occupational attainment, institutional arrangements concerning the labour market also constitute a key factor. One popular argument posits that while flexible (vs. rigid, i.e., more strongly regulated) labour markets can make it easier for immigrants to get a job (Bisin et al. 2011), they may be detrimental to occupational status, as they may offer immigrant workers less protection from discrimination in hiring and work (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; see also Ballarino and Panichella 2015). Others, however, have argued that rigid labour markets may end up penalising 'outsiders' such as immigrant(-background) individuals especially strongly (e.g. Corrigan 2015); in fact, several cross-national studies have found rigid labour markets to be associated with lower occupational status for (TCN) first-generation immigrants (Corrigan 2015; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021; cf. Pichler 2011).⁶ The dynamic also seems to apply to second-generation minorities (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007). I therefore also pose the following question:

⁶ Pichler (2011) does not find a significant effect of employment protections for first-generation immigrants, but Platt and colleagues (2021) suggest that this might have been due to his joint inclusion of EU and non-EU immigrants (and binary measure of occupational attainment).

- *RQ2b: Do immigrants tend to have higher occupational status in countries with more flexible labour markets?*

Another often-examined structural feature concerns the welfare system of the host country (e.g., Koopmans 2010; Levecque and Rossem 2015). As argued by Koopmans (2010), a more generous welfare state may be associated with lower socioeconomic status among immigrants. A first reason for this is a negative selection effect, in which immigrants with weaker labour market prospects may gravitate towards destinations with a more secure social safety net (whereas this may be less of a factor for immigrants in a stronger labour market position) (ibid.). A second reason is that less generous welfare provisions may offer more of a motivation for immigrants to make efforts towards improving their labour market positions (ibid.). While there is empirical support for these claims (Koopmans 2010; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021), there are also some challenges to the validity of the ‘welfare-magnet’ hypothesis (e.g., Ponze 2019). I am therefore also interested to check:

- *RQ2c: Do immigrants tend to have higher occupational status in countries with higher social expenditure levels?*

Turning to health and well-being, a particularly relevant institutional feature may be the level of health expenditure, which varies widely among European countries (Eurostat 2021b). Studies have suggested that countries with relatively high social spending, including health expenditures, tend to have smaller health inequalities (along socioeconomic status) (de Breij, Huisman, and Deeg 2020). It would be worth exploring whether this dynamic applies to immigrant minorities, as well. One study by Blom and colleagues (2016) finds that healthcare expenditures may favour natives more than recent non-Western immigrants,

ultimately increasing the native-migrant gap in health and well-being for this group, though not for other groups of immigrants. Further evidence could help clarify this dynamic. I therefore also ask:

- *RQ2d: Do immigrants tend to have better health and subjective well-being levels in countries with higher health expenditure levels?*

Concerning other area-specific institutional arrangements, André and colleagues (2014) argue that a host country's political system is likely to shape immigrants' political participation; for instance, immigrants may be more motivated to vote in countries with a higher democratic quality and more inclusive political systems. That said, their study does not find evidence for selected political and institutional features to significantly affect immigrants' electoral participation (see also Blais 2006). To explore this question further, I ask:

- *RQ2e: Do immigrants have a higher propensity to be politically engaged in countries with more democratic or inclusive political systems?*

Migration-related characteristics of the host country

The host country's relationship to diversity – including public attitudes towards immigrants as well as pre-existing immigrant minorities – has also been hypothesised to influence integration (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Indeed, European countries vary widely in terms of their experience with immigration and their attitudes towards immigrants (Papadopoulos 2011; OECD/EU 2019; Messing and Ságvári 2019).

Starting with the former aspect, one line of reasoning holds that countries with larger immigrant stocks might be more experienced in dealing with diversity and newcomers'

needs, and thus better equipped to do so (Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015; Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara 2012). Further, the presence of fellow immigrant minorities is likely to be meaningful, especially in the case of co-ethnics. Comparative integration context theory (Crul and Schneider 2010), for instance, has underlined how in areas with high levels of diversity, immigrants and their descendants may be more readily accepted as part of the ‘mainstream’. Another way in which larger immigrant presence might create a more favourable environment for integration is through a larger representation of immigrants in the electorate, which has may incentivise mainstream parties to adopt inclusive policies (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). The role of the co-ethnic community in immigrant integration is in itself complex topic, with debates around the extent to which such communities might facilitate or hinder integration, help overcome or maintain migrant-native inequalities (Portes and Manning 1986; Portes and Zhou 1993; see also Fajth and Bilgili 2018 for a discussion). European empirical evidence on how the overall presence of immigrants within the host country relates to my immigrant integration outcomes of interest is limited so far. Fleischmann and Dronkers (2007) find no significant link between a host country’s net migration rate and immigrants’ socioeconomic status attainment. (I am not aware of studies examining the effect of the size of the resident migrant population in this regard.) Nor has the often-hypothesised positive link between a country’s ratio of foreign-born residents and the political participation of its immigrants been confirmed (André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Just and Anderson 2014; Tyrberg 2020). Huijts and Kraaykamp (2012; see also Walkden et al. 2018) find a negative relationship between relative co-ethnic group size and health outcomes for the first generation, though not for the second. In sum, I pose the following question:

- *RQ3a: Do immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in countries with larger stocks of immigrants?*

The argument on how public attitudes may influence integration is more straightforward. The openness or prejudice of host society members towards newcomers has long been considered key determinant of immigrants' inclusion and integration (Gordon 1964; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Alba and Nee 2003). Negative attitudes towards immigrants can manifest in prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants in interpersonal and institutional settings, with consequences for immigrants ranging from feelings of social exclusion to unemployment, underemployment, and other barriers to equal participation in host society (Esses 2021). Further, as anti-immigrant political parties gain support, they can oppose inclusive policies that expand migrants' rights (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012; see also Callens 2015 on the link between public opinion and integration policies).

Prior cross-European evidence on the relationship between social attitudes in the host country and my integration outcomes of interest is mixed. Anti-immigrant attitudes (along with discrimination) seem to negatively affect occupational status of immigrants and their descendants, especially third-country nationals (Corrigan 2015) and Muslims (Drouhot and Nee 2019). That said, most existing European evidence focuses on the detrimental effects to employment, with relatively less information on occupational status (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). There also seems to be a link between attitudes towards immigrants and immigrants' political engagement, though its direction is not clear. Some prior evidence points to higher electoral or non-electoral political participation among immigrants in countries with more pro-immigrant opinion climates (and vice versa for more anti-

immigrant climates) (Just and Anderson 2014; Tyrberg 2020; cf. Voicu and Comşa 2014).⁷ Huijts and Kraaykamp (2012) find mean anti-immigrant attitudes in a country to be (negatively) connected with first-generation immigrants' self-rated health. Attitudes towards immigrants have also been suggested to affect the life satisfaction of immigrants, though evidence is mixed (Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018; cf. Hadjar and Backes 2013).⁸ Perhaps because the link is taken for granted, there is surprisingly little literature empirically testing how closely anti-immigrant attitudes and perceived discrimination among immigrants are actually connected; the one (US-based) study that Esses (2021) highlights in a recent review challenges the notion of a one-to-one relationship between the two (Hopkins et al. 2016). (I find no European studies on the matter.)

Seeking to clarify these questions, I thus ask:

- *RQ3b: Do immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in countries with more positive attitudes towards immigrants?*

Migrant integration policies

Finally, I consider migrant integration policies – by which I mean policies relevant to immigrants' integration. A country's integration policies are often characterized in terms of their inclusiveness *versus* exclusiveness (Penninx 2005). Reviewing the variety of policy approaches to integration across Europe, Penninx (2005), differentiates between approaches along three key questions: (1) whether immigrants are included as full members of the

⁷ One might also expect the strength of anti-immigrant (and/or far-right) political parties in a country to influence (first- and second-generation) immigrants' political engagement; cross-national studies, however, have failed to find a clear or significant relationship between the two (André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Thorkelson 2015; Tyrberg 2020).

⁸ Safi (2010) and Levecque & van Rossem (2015) also find evidence for perceived discrimination (measured at the level of the individual immigrant) to influence for life satisfaction and depression, respectively.

political community (residence rights, citizenship, political/civic rights); (2) whether they hold equal social and economic rights as national citizens (including employment, benefits, etc.); and (3) whether they hold equal cultural and religious rights. The basic premise in this case is that exclusionary policies have negative effects on integration processes, while inclusionary policies have a positive effect (Penninx 2005). Indeed, this view is shared by much of integration scholarship (see e.g. Bean et al. 2012; Kymlicka 2012; Reitz 2002; Wright and Bloemraad 2012), even if the meaning of inclusionary policies can differ; multiculturalist theorists, for instance, stress that liberal policies should not merely be neutral but actively accommodate diversity to effectively support social equality (see Bloemraad and Wright 2014 for a discussion). Some, however, worry that multiculturalist policies can result in the sociocultural segregation of immigrant minorities, hurting their sociocultural integration (e.g., Koopmans 2010). In practice, the impact of migrant integration policies is difficult to assess (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015), due to a lack of experimental-quality data and issues such as endogeneity in the case of analyses using cross-sectional data. Indeed, as I elaborate below, the existing cross-European empirical evidence on the relationship between migrant integration policy environment and immigrants' integration (along my outcomes of interest) is mixed.

Multiple categorisations and indices measuring the inclusiveness of countries' policy regimes towards migrants have been developed (see Goodman 2015 for a review). One popular measure – used in much of the literature mentioned in the following as well as my own study – is the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston et al. 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020). MIPEX is a tool developed to evaluate and compare policies aiming to promote the integration of migrants, with a broad coverage of European countries. Each version of MIPEX (updated every few years since 2004) provides benchmarks for 167

policy indicators across 8 main areas: *Labour Market Mobility*, *Family Reunion*, *Education*, *Political Participation*, *Long-term Residence*, *Access to Nationality*, *Anti-discrimination* and *Health* (introduced in the 2015 version) (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Huddleston et al. 2015). Indicators in MIPEX are selected and scored by experts and are peer reviewed; national policies are measured on a 1-3 scale, with 3 indicating the highest standards for equal treatment. MIPEX offers aggregated scores for 8 main areas as well as ‘overall’ for the country. The latter are often used as a measure for the overall inclusiveness of a policy context, though the makers of MIPEX themselves have noted limitations of this approach and recommended more area-specific approaches for more accurate and meaningful analyses (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Ruedin 2015).

Beginning with the socioeconomic facet of integration, existing studies have not confirmed a clear link between a country’s overall MIPEX score and the *labour market integration* of its migrant population (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; see also Algan et al. 2010).⁹ Bilgili and colleagues’ (2015) review also finds no convincing evidence of a link between the inclusiveness of national integration policies specifically targeting *labour market mobility* and immigrants’ labour market integration (see also Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). However, there is some evidence that more favourable *naturalisation policies* and stronger *anti-discrimination policies* in a country may be associated with higher occupational and general socioeconomic status for immigrants – especially third-country

⁹ A notable exception is the study of Bean and colleagues (2012), who, using their own dichotomy of ‘more’ versus ‘less’ inclusive European cities, do find some evidence of a tendency toward higher scores in ‘more inclusive’ cities on the ‘Economic/political’ integration dimension (which includes occupational prestige and political engagement), albeit focusing on second-generation respondents.

nationals (Corrigan 2015; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021; cf. Pichler 2011).¹⁰

Concerning the *political* domain, Thorkelson (2015) finds that in countries with a higher overall MIPEX score, both natives and immigrants are more likely to vote and participate in electoral or non-electoral activities, though it is unclear what this means for their relative rates of participation (see also Just and Anderson 2014). Conversely, André and colleagues (2014) do not find a significant effect of a country's MIPEX score on immigrants' electoral participation, nor does Thorkelson (2015) when using the Migrant Multiculturalism Policy Index (another measure for the inclusivity of policy contexts). Concerning more specific policy areas, there is some evidence of more policies targeting immigrants' *political participation* (as measured via the MIPEX strand) having a positive effect on civic participation for specific groups of immigrants (those from developed countries, non-Muslims, and more recent immigrants) (Aleksynska 2011), though a general effect is unclear (Voicu and Comşa 2014). Immigrants seem more likely to participate in politics and mainstream civic society in countries with easier *access to citizenship* (Maxwell 2010; cf. Aleksynska 2011). This makes intuitive sense given the citizenship requirement for some forms of political participation such as voting in national elections, but it is unclear whether there is an effect beyond that (Aleksynska 2011; Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Prokic-Breuer et al. 2012).

¹⁰ Pichler (2011) finds no significant effects on first-generation immigrants' occupational attainment for any of the six integration policy areas he examines using MIPEX strand scores (labour market access, family reunion, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination), but his results may be confounded by the EU immigrants present in his sample (as they are often not the target population of these policies).

Concerning *health*, Malmusi (2015) finds the self-reported health of settled third-country nationals (TCNs) to be better in multicultural countries compared to exclusionist and assimilationist countries, using a categorisation based on MIPEX 2007. Moreover, he finds the highest and most persistent health inequalities between TCNs and natives in exclusionist countries. Giannoni and colleagues (2016) find similar results in countries with a high number of problematic integration policies (scores under 50 in MIPEX 2010).¹¹ Blom and colleagues (2016) find the presence of policies aimed at improving immigrants' health to be associated with only a marginally smaller gap (vs. natives) for (recent, non-Western) immigrants. Walkden and colleagues (2018) focus on frailty of older-age immigrants across Europe and find that the link between migrant status and frailty is stronger in countries whose healthcare systems and health policies are less inclusive for immigrants (as measured via MIPEX 2015). (Their longitudinal study also finds no evidence of a 'healthy migrant' effect outside of Southern Europe.) *Access to citizenship* and *long-term residence* policies also seem to matter, as citizenship (Walkden et al. 2018) and the security of legal status (Riza et al. 2020) have been found to affect health outcomes; a recent systematic review (Juárez et al. 2019) also finds that restrictive policies in the integration phase – especially concerning welfare eligibility and documentation requirements – are associated with increased odds of poor self-rated health and mortality among immigrants.

Concerning subjective well-being, Hadjar and Backes (2013) find some evidence for a relatively smaller immigrant-native gap in subjective well-being in countries with high (vs. low) overall MIPEX scores, though other cross-national studies (focusing on life satisfaction and depression, respectively) do not find such a link (Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018;

¹¹ Both these analyses used versions of MIPEX that did not yet include a health strand.

Levecque and Rossem 2015). Further, Blom and colleagues (2016) find that the subjective well-being of established first-generation immigrants, relative to natives, tends to be better in countries with health policies targeting immigrants.

I do not find prior studies examining whether overall inclusiveness in migrant integration policies relates to *perceived discrimination* levels among immigrants, though Callens's review (2015) underscores a link between attitudes towards immigrants (and/or feelings of threat) among the general population and more exclusionary integration policies (as measured by MIPEX), which points to a potential connection. André and Dronkers (2017) find some evidence of lower perceived in-group discrimination among (first- and second-generation) immigrants in countries with more inclusive *family reunion* policies (as measured by MIPEX), and the opposite for countries with inclusive *labour market access* policies; however, effects disappear once individual background factors are controlled for. Interestingly, they do not find significant associations for *long-term residence*, *access to citizenship* or *anti-discrimination* policies.

This review reveals that, first, it is still not clear whether the 'overall' openness or inclusivity of migrant integration policies in a given country is really meaningful for different integration outcomes: though no studies (to my knowledge) find a negative effect of inclusive integration policies on my outcomes of interest, existing cross-European studies do not clearly confirm a significant positive effect, either.¹² Second, studies analysing 'inclusiveness' in specific policy areas find some interesting connections, not only between the nominally 'matching' areas (e.g., 'political participation' policies vs. immigrant political

¹² These null results fall in line with an earlier review by Koopmans (2013), who sees some evidence of a negative link between multicultural policies and socio-cultural assimilation, but not other domains.

engagement, etc.) but also highlighting areas in which inclusive policies may have effects reaching across multiple domains (e.g., access to citizenship). Still, as mentioned, findings from different studies are often contradictory or difficult to compare due to differences in measures, definitions and population focus (e.g., migrant generation, EU/non-EU origin, recent/settled immigrants, etc.). This makes the case for a single, consistent study of the overall as well as more specific integration policy area as they relate to outcomes across multiple domains.

Considering the measurement challenges mentioned above and shortcomings in appropriate (experimental) data at the time of writing, a large-scale assessment of causal impacts of these policies remains beyond reach. Nevertheless, having at least a comprehensive assessment of associational links between national integration policy contexts and related integration outcome patterns will be a useful starting point given the limitations of existing evidence as highlighted above (see also Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015). Overall, I ask the following question:

- *RQ4: Do immigrants have better integration outcomes in countries with more inclusive migrant integration policies?*

Summary

Before delving into the methods and findings of my empirical analysis, Table 1 below summarises my research questions, while Figure 1 (following page) provides a visual illustration of my conceptual model, summarising the ideas outlined above and providing the analytical framework of this study.


Table 1
Summary of research questions

RQ 1	Do immigrants' integration-related outcomes vary significantly across country contexts, net of compositional effects?
RQ 2a	Do immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in countries with more favourable economic indicators?
RQ 2b	Do immigrants tend to have higher occupational status in countries with more flexible labour markets?
RQ 2c	Do immigrants tend to have higher occupational status in countries with higher social expenditure levels?
RQ 2d	Do immigrants tend to have better health and subjective well-being levels in countries with health expenditure levels?
RQ 2e	Do immigrants have a higher propensity to be politically engaged in countries with more democratic or inclusive political systems?
RQ 3a	Do immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in countries with larger stocks of immigrants?
RQ 3b	Do immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in countries with more positive attitudes towards immigrants?
RQ 4	Do immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in countries with more inclusive migrant integration policies?

More specifically, Figure 1 illustrates the combination of compositional and host country factors hypothesised to drive the observed cross-national variation in immigrants' integration outcomes, highlighting the main factors discussed in the above review (and specified in my research questions). As also noted in the figure, the set of factors (and outcomes) considered in this framework – and the analysis that follows – by no means exhaustive, given limitations in scope as well as measures available to this study. Nevertheless, the figure offers a broad overview, outlining at least a few key contextual factors at play. Likewise, the following analysis, while by no means exhaustive, offers an unusually wide-ranging test of contextual factors and integration outcomes analysed within a single, coherent study.

Figure 1

Conceptual model: sources of cross-national variation in immigrants' integration across host country contexts



Source: author's illustration (own synthesis, building on ideas, theories, and prior findings outlined above)

Data and methods

Data

To address the above questions, I rely on a pooled dataset using the four most recent waves of the European Social Survey (ESS6–9) (European Social Survey 2020). The ESS is a large-scale repeated cross-sectional social survey conducted biannually in over 30 countries. Its unique strengths include cross-European coverage, rigorous harmonised methodology, relatively large sample sizes, and detailed demographic and other social indicators (allowing to identify migration status, for example). In light of these advantages, I find the ESS to be best available data source for this kind of multidimensional comparative study on immigrant integration across Europe (for a discussion, see also Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Pichler 2011). That said, a limitation of the ESS is that it does not specifically target immigrant populations, and, as a result, it has some known representativity issues especially concerning smaller populations (see also Heath and Schneider 2021). This means that some smaller and/or more vulnerable immigrant groups may be underrepresented in my data and findings. For this study, I rely on data collected between 2012 and 2018 on the population aged 18 and over across 19 countries (Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK),¹³ for a total 72 country-year (or -wave) contexts (not all countries participated in all four waves, see Appendix Table A2).¹⁴

¹³ Countries with small ($N < 150$) samples of first-generation migrants were excluded (this mostly applies to Eastern and Southeast European countries).

¹⁴ This sample was achieved after omitting a further 2.5% of observations due to missing data on key variables such migration status, age, gender, and the dependent variables (except for ISEI; variables discussed below). For other independent variables, missing observations were included as a separate category (not reported in main tables).

I draw on country of birth (and year of birth/year of arrival) information in ESS to classify respondents into three groups: (1) native-parentage natives, or the ‘third- and higher’ generation, that is, native-born residents of the given country born to two native-born parents (I will refer to this group as ‘natives’ for short); (2) second-generation ‘migrants’, that is native-born residents with one or two foreign-born parents; following common practice (e.g. Bean et al. 2012), I also include the so-called ‘1.5’ generation in this group (foreign-born residents who immigrated before the age of 12); (3) first-generation immigrants, encompassing foreign-born residents who arrived at or after age 12 (omitting recent immigrants arrived less than five years before the time of survey). My analyses focus on the first immigrant generation, though the second generation is also examined in supplementary analyses; observations from the ‘native’ subsample are only used to account for natives’ outcome patterns in the same contexts. (In line with my relative approach to integration measurement – see *Concept of integration* – I control for natives’ averages within the same context; discussed also below). The overall sample includes 9,175 first-generation respondents (and 12,673 second-generation respondents). The exception is the set of models for occupational status (ISEI, see below), which rely on a subset of the sample to include to focus on individuals who are in full-time work (N=4,929; see Table 4). Individuals in all samples are nested in 19 countries and 72 country-wave, or country-year, units. Country-specific sample sizes are presented in Appendix Table A2.

Measures

Dependent variables

As discussed earlier, I measure immigrant integration via multiple areas of life, including the economic and political domains, health and well-being, and social inclusion. Specifically, I observe respondents’ occupational status (as a proxy for labour market

integration and socioeconomic status), political engagement, general health, life satisfaction, and perceived in-group discrimination. As outlined in Table 4 (see end of this subsection), occupational status is operationalised by converting employed respondents' job characteristics into the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI, Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996; using the 'iscogen' Stata package by Jann 2019), a continuous measure for which higher scores indicate higher occupational prestige (and thus success in the labour market). All other dependent variables are coded in binary form, indicating, respectively: being political engaged, reporting fair to good health, a high level of life satisfaction, and perceived (in-group) social acceptance (i.e., not perceiving discrimination towards one's own group). For all variables, a higher or '1' value indicates more advanced integration (in line with the earlier conceptual discussion). (See Appendix Table A1 for details on variable construction for variables listed above and in the following.) Table 2 below shows summary statistics for these dependent variables.

Table 2
Summary statistics for dependent variables (first-generation immigrants)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
ISEI	4,929	40.83	17.94	10	89
Political engagement	9,175	0.54	0.50	0	1
Fair/good health	9,175	0.91	0.29	0	1
High life satisfaction	9,175	0.51	0.50	0	1
Social acceptance	9,175	0.84	0.37	0	1

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (author's subset of data for first-generation immigrants).

Individual background variables

Following from the composition/selectivity considerations discussed earlier and following prior studies (André and Dronkers 2017; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008; La Parra-Casado, Stornes, and Solheim 2017; Tyrberg 2020; Bisin et al. 2011; Fleischmann and Dronkers

2007; Pichler 2011), my models control for a set of individual background factors to isolate compositional effects as far as possible with the current data. As listed in Table 4, these individual-level factors are: age, gender, educational attainment, parental class background, ethno-racial minority status (including being a Muslim),¹⁵ EU vs. non-EU country of birth, and urban or rural domicile (urban or rural). Summary statistics for individual background variables are shown in Appendix Table A3 (both first and second generation).

Host country contextual factors

In line with the themes identified in the literature review, I include a wide range of host country characteristics (listed in Table 5 below). I describe these below, along with some of their main descriptive statistics (before standardisation); relevant tables and figures are at the end of the subsection.

To characterise the general economic situation within a host country, I observe general wealth/economic performance, inequality, and unemployment, measured with, respectively, GDP per capita (gross domestic product, per capita, at current US Dollars), the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income, and the long-term unemployment (12+ months) share among the active population, for the country in a given year (always matching the closest available year to the survey year of the individual data). All three measures are available through European Social Survey's (2020) multilevel data portal. Table 3 below shows the overall averages, across the 72 country-year contexts, for these (and all other) contextual measures, while Table A5 in the Appendix shows more detailed country averages (across years) for each. As shown in these tables, all three macroeconomic indicators vary

¹⁵ As the purpose of this variable is to capture racialized status in host societies, Muslims are included alongside other ethnic/racial minorities, drawing on longstanding discussions of the racialized status of Muslim minorities in Europe (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Drouhot and Nee 2019).

quite widely across contexts, especially GDP per capita and unemployment rates (Figures 2 and 3 below). Looking at country averages among the country-year contexts observed (Table A5 and Figure 2), average GDP per capita is highest for Norway (86 thousand USD) and lowest for Lithuania (15 thousand USD), while the overall average is ca. 43 thousand USD. Country averages for the Gini coefficient range from 24% in Slovenia and Norway (most equal) to around 35% in Lithuania and Spain (most unequal), with an overall average of 29%. As shown in Figure 3, Norway also has the lowest average unemployment rate (1%), while Spain has the highest, at 10%; the overall average is at 3.5%.

Turning to characteristics of the labour market, I measure the rigidity vs. flexibility of labour market regulations with the measure provided by the Fraser institute (Gwartney et al. 2020), which, based on the degree of hiring regulations and minimum wage, assigns scores ranging from 0 for countries with the most rigid labour market regulations to 10 for the ones with most ‘freedom’, that is, flexible regulations (see Appendix Table A1 for further construction details on selected measure). According to country averages on this measure, Norway has the least highly regulated labour market (4.8), while the UK’s is the most ‘flexible’ (8.28) (Appendix Table A5); the average score across all contexts is 6.7.

Next, to measure welfare expenditure levels I rely on the OECD’s (2022) measure, which provides total public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP in a given country and year. The average across contexts for this is 23%, with country averages ranging from 16% in Lithuania and Switzerland to 35% in France (Appendix Table A5 and Figure 4 below). I use a similar measure for health care expenditures in a country, relying on the variable (Health care expenditure, % of GDP) provided alongside the ESS (European Social

Survey 2020). Relative health expenditure levels average at 9.5% of the GDP, with lowest country averages in Estonia (6%) and highest in Switzerland (12%) (Figure 4).

For indicators on characteristics of the political system (namely, how democratic and inclusive it is), I rely on the V-Dem project's (Coppedge et al. 2022): the Electoral democracy index, Equal access index, and Exclusion by Socioeconomic group (SES)¹⁶ measure (for relevant country-years). All three score 0 to 1 (indicating most equal/democratic for the former two, and most exclusion for the latter). Figure 5 illustrates country averages on the three measures. The overall averages are 0.88 and 0.89 for the Electoral democracy and Equal access indices, respectively, and 0.05 for the Exclusion by SES measure.

For a measure of a country's immigrant stock size, I rely on the OECD's (2021) Percentage of foreign-born in population measure (for relevant country-years). Figure 6 (and Appendix Table A5) shows how country (averages) vary in this regard, from 5% in Lithuania to 28% in Switzerland; the overall average across contexts is 13% (Table 3). For a measure of attitude towards immigrants, I rely on Gallup's (2017) Migrant Acceptance Index, a composite index that ranges from 0 to 9 (for most accepting; see Appendix A1 for details). The overall average across contexts is a score of 6, with the lowest score in Czechia (2.3) and the highest in Sweden (7.9) (Figure 6).

Lastly, I measure the inclusiveness of a country's migrant integration policies with the scores provided by the aforementioned MIPEX project (Huddleston et al. 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020), matching 2014 scores to ESS rounds 6-8, and 2019 scores to round

¹⁶ I take a closer look at exclusion by socioeconomic group in particular since immigrants tend to be overrepresented in poorer segments of European societies (OECD/EU 2019).

9 data. As an indicator of overall inclusivity, I rely on the ‘overall’ score (an average of all strands, including health). This averages around 59 across contexts, varying quite widely across different countries: as shown in Figure 7, country averages range from 34 for Lithuania to 86.8 for Sweden. Further, I also include disaggregated strand-specific scores, namely for Labour market mobility, Family reunion, Political participation, Permanent residence, Citizenship, Anti-discrimination, and Health-related policies. Table 3 (and Appendix Table A6) list summary statistics for these indicators.

On a final note, as a control concerning the country-year context, I account for natives’ (3+ generation) averages on the given outcome of interest (calculated by country-year); the exception to this are the models for the outcome of social acceptance (based on perceived in-group discrimination), which I consider an inherently relational indicator of (social) integration. Summary statistics for these variables are available in Appendix Table A4.


Table 3
Summary statistics for contextual variables (country-year context)

Variable	Across country-years			
	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Host country characteristics				
GDP per capita, thousand USD	42.55	20.56	14.11	101.8
Gini coefficient (%)	29.17	3.69	22.5	37.6
Unemployment rate (%)	3.53	2.55	0.6	12.9
Labour market reg./flexibility (0-10)	6.68	1.04	4.38	8.43
Public social expenditure (%GDP)	23.20	5.06	13.59	32.03
Health care expenditure (% GDP)	9.46	1.6	5.83	12.25
Electoral democracy index (0-1)	0.88	0.02	0.82	0.93
Equal access index (0-1)	0.89	0.05	0.79	0.98
Exclusion by SES index (0-1)	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.18
% Foreign-born in population	13.07	5.24	4.5	29.5
Migrant Acceptance Index (0-9)	6.1	1.82	2.26	7.92
Migrant integration policy				
MIPEX 2014/19 (0-100)	58.89	13.75	33	87
MIPEX 2014/19 – Strand-specific scores				
Labour Market Mobility	61.91	20.63	20.0	94.4
Family Reunion	53.31	16.59	26.0	87.1
Political participation	50.35	25.92	5.0	95.0
Permanent residence	65.44	14.89	47.9	96.0
Citizenship	48.17	22.89	13.0	85.5
Anti-discrimination	74.78	19.71	38.0	100.0
Health	63.59	18.16	23.0	85.4

Note: N = 72 country-year clusters, nested in 19 countries. All values before standardisation. *Sources:* European Social Survey (2020), Fraser institute (Gwartney et al., 2020), OECD (2020; 2021), Coppedge et al. (2022), Gallup (2017), MIPEX (Huddleston et al. 2015; 2020) (see Table 4 for details.)


Figure 2

GDP per capita, thousand USD (country averages across years 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017)




Source: European Social Survey (2020)

Figure 3
Unemployment rate (2012/14/16/17 avg.)




Source: European Social Survey (2020)

Figure 4
Public social expenditure (2012/14/16/18 avg.) and Healthcare expenditure (2012/14/16 avg.)




Source: OECD (2020), European Social Survey (2020)

Figure 5
V-Dem indices for electoral democracy, equal access, and exclusion by SES (2012/14/16/18 avg.)




Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2022)

Figure 6
Percentage of foreign-born stock (2012/14/16/18 avg.) and Migrant Acceptance Index (2017)



Source: OECD (2021), Gallup (2017)

Figure 7
MIPEX Overall score (incl. Health) (2014/19 avg.)



Source: MIPEX (Huddleston et al., 2015; 2020)

Table 4**Measures (1/2): Individual-level variables**

Area/Indicator of interest	Measure used		
	Variable name	Type	Values/categories
Dependent variables			
Economic integration			
Occupational status (& SES)	International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI)	Continuous	Higher score: more prestigious occupation (current)
Political integration			
Political engagement/activity	Political engagement	Binary	0: not engaged in politics; 1: politically engaged
Health and subjective well-being			
General health	Fair/good health	Binary	0: poor or very poor self-reported health; 1: fair to very good health
Life satisfaction	High life satisfaction	Binary	0: not very high/low life satisfaction; 1: high life satisfaction
Social acceptance/discrimination			
(No) perceived in-group discrimination	Social acceptance (No in-group discrimination)	Binary	0: identifies as member of a discriminated group; 1: does not identify as member of a discriminated group
Independent variables			
Migration status/ background	Migration status/background	Categorical	0: third generation and higher ('native') [ref.]; 1: second generation (incl. 1.5); 2: first generation
Gender	Female	Binary	0: male [ref.]; 1: female
Age	Age	Continuous	Years
Socio-economic/class background	Parental socio-economic status (SES)	Categorical	1: lower-skilled; 2: medium-skilled [ref.]; 3: high-skilled
Education level	Highest educational attainment	Categorical	1: up to lower secondary; 2: secondary or vocational [ref.]; 3: tertiary
Racialised minority status	Ethnic minority (incl. Muslim)	Binary	0: majority member (i.e. not a minority in the following sense) [ref.]; 1: ethno-racial minority and/or of Muslim faith
Area of origin/country of birth	First-generation: EU27+/TCN	Binary	0: third-country national (TCN) [ref.]; 1: EU27+
Urban/rural domicile	Domicile	Categorical	1: big city (area); 2: town or small city [ref.]; 3: countryside

Table 5
Measures (2/2): Contextual variables

Area/Indicator of interest	Measure used		
	Variable name	Values (all continuous)	Source
Host country characteristics			
General wealth/economic performance	GDP per capita	[Country-year] GDP (gross domestic product) per capita at current prices, US Dollars (2012, 2014, 2016, 2017) ^a	ESS
Inequality	Gini coefficient	[Country-year] Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (%) (0: perfect equality; 1: perfect inequality) (2012, 2014, 2016, 2017) ^a	ESS
Level of unemployment	Unemployment rate	[Country-year] Long-term Unemployment (12 months and more), % of active population (2012, 2014, 2016, 2017) ^a	ESS
Labour market type (rigid/flexible)	Labour market regulations/flexibility	[Country-year] Labour market flexibility; (0: least freedom [most rigid regulations]; 10: most freedom) (2012, 2014, 2016, 2017) ^a	Fraser institute
Welfare expenditure	Public social expenditure (%GDP)	[Country-year] Public social spending, % of GDP (2012,2014,2016,2018) ^a	OECD
Expenditure on health care	Health care expenditure (% GDP)	[Country-year] Health care expenditure, % of GDP (2012,2014,2016) ^a	ESS
Quality of political system	Electoral democracy index Equal access index Exclusion by SES index	[Country-year] Composite indices measuring, respectively, the achievement of electoral democracy; equal in access to political power; and unequal access to public services across socio-economic groups	V-Dem
Size/prevalence of immigrant population	% Foreign-born (stock)	[Country-year] % foreign-born residents in total population (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018) ^a	OECD
Attitudes towards migrants	Migrant Acceptance Index	[Country] composite acceptance score based on population attitudes (0: least accepting; 9 most accepting) (2017)	Gallup
Native levels on outcomes of interest	Native average on [dependent variable]	[Country-wave] Average score for ISEI, the ratio of Y=1 responses among natives for the other (binary) dependent variables	ESS
Migrant integration policy			
Overall inclusiveness of migrant integration policy	MIPEX 2014/19 overall score	[Country] Average score on all MIPEX strands, including health (2014 used for waves 6, 7, 8; 2019 for wave 9)	MIPEX
Inclusiveness of migration policies in particular areas	MIPEX Labour market mobility MIPEX Family reunion MIPEX Political participation MIPEX Permanent residence MIPEX Citizenship MIPEX Anti-discrimination MIPEX Health	[Country] Average score on respective strand in MIPEX (2014 used for waves 6, 7, 8; 2019 for wave 9)	MIPEX

Sources: European Social Survey (2020), Fraser institute (Gwartney et al. 2020), OECD (2020; 2021), Coppedge et al. (2022), Gallup (2017), MIPEX 2014; 2019 (Huddleston et al., 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020). ^aYears selected to match individual-level ESS data from waves 6 (2012), 7 (2014), 8 (2016), and 9 (2018, or latest available year).

Methods

I address my research questions concerning the relationship between different contextual factors and individual immigrants' integration-related outcomes via a set of regression analyses on the above-described pooled ESS dataset. For the calculation of contextual effects on individual outcomes, I have considered various multilevel and non-multilevel model specifications. Ultimately, following arguments outlined by Platt and colleagues (2021; building on Bryan and Jenkins 2016; Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016; Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis, and Pelzer 2010) in a comparable study, I decide against a multilevel specification for my main models. I elaborate on this decision in a separate subsection below.

The analysis proceeds as follows. As a preliminary step, a first set of 'base' models includes the individual-level controls and the native average (by country-wave) on the given dependent variable (except for social acceptance, as mentioned above), while allowing for random effects, that is, for the constant to vary across country-year units.¹⁷ This provides a base measure of the variation of the intercept at the country-year level (Bryan and Jenkins 2016), while controlling for individual background factors and native averages. In other words, it shows how much immigrants' integration-related outcomes vary across host country contexts to begin with, thus helping to answer research question 1.

Then, in the main models that follow, I examine each outcome with a set of conventional (non-multilevel) regression models with clustered standard errors, featuring one contextual variable of interest at a time along with the above-listed controls. Occupational status (ISEI) is predicted with ordinary least square (OLS) regressions, while

¹⁷ Preceded by an 'empty' multilevel model to measure the cross-context variation of the intercept without any variables.

all other (binary) outcomes are predicted with logistic regressions. Contextual variables are standardised, and results are presented in average marginal effects (AMEs). Answers to research questions 2-4 are evaluated based on the significance of each contextual variable's regression coefficient.

Model specification rationale and supplementary analyses

My choice for 'conventional' versus multilevel models is primarily due to the relatively small number of countries in my dataset – a common issue for cross-European comparative studies (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). As explained by Bryan and Jenkins (2016), to avoid biased estimates, a multilevel model specification requires a large number of level-2 units (in this case, countries or country-years), and a large number of observations by level-2 units. As also highlighted by others (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016; Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis, and Pelzer 2010), multilevel models with data sampled across a relatively small number of countries at repeated points in time are particularly vulnerable to issues of model misspecification and to outliers driving the results. In the case of this study, even with my relatively large pooled ESS sample, number of countries is too small (N=19) to rely on them as level-2 units. Alternatively, if level 2 is identified as country-year units (N=72), then, ideally, the nested structure should be modelled by specifying 'country' as level 3 (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016), but then the number of these units is once again fairly small; further, the number of observations by country-year units may become too small for robust estimates. In a similar cross-European study, Platt and colleagues also note that the assumption that the countries considered are "a random sample from an overall population" is tenuous (2021, 15–16).

In light of these problems, I thus settle on a simpler specification, pooling the data for individuals across all country-wave samples and using cluster-robust standard errors for my main estimation of contextual effects (see Bryan and Jenkins 2016, 2–3). As noted by Bryan and Jenkins (2016), a danger of simply pooling the data across contexts is that disregarding the nesting of observations within countries (and a probable degree of similarity, thus correlation, among individuals within a country) will lead to an underestimation of standard errors (see also Angrist and Pischke 2009). By clustering my standard errors at the country-year level, I therefore account for the fact that in my pooled dataset, observations may be more similar within countries in a particular (survey) year. (In fact, the contextual factors observed also mostly vary across not just countries but years.)¹⁸ The exception to the strategy above is an initial, preliminary set of (almost) ‘empty’ multilevel models in which I examine the overall level of cross-contextual variation in outcomes (as outlined above). My ‘main’ modelling strategy chosen does have its own shortcomings, including the fact that clustered standard errors control for but do not explicitly model within-country-year correlation, which Bryan and Jenkins (2016) deem a conservative strategy.¹⁹

Critiques of prior studies in the topic (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021) have noted the need to distinguish by the origin of immigrants, as integration policies, for example may only target third-country national immigrants (not to mention how EU immigrants may face much fewer barriers to integration to begin with). While my sample sizes do not allow a robust observation of specific origin groups, in addition to controlling for EU/non-EU origin in my main models I include a supplementary

¹⁸ Note: an alternative version of these models clustering standard errors by country (presented in Appendix Table A12) yielded similar results, only with slightly larger standard errors.

¹⁹ That said, early calculations of my main models that relied on a multilevel specification, with country-year context as level-2, yielded similar results (not shown, but available upon request).

analysis of EU/EEA vs. TCN-origin subsamples within the first generation as a further robustness check. Interaction-effect models (interacting EU/non-EU origin with the contextual factor of interest) are used to test for coefficient differences across the two groups. Finally, I conduct supplementary analyses (repeating the main models) for the second generation to contribute to a relatively sparse body of European evidence on how the same contextual factors affect different migrant generations (cf. e.g. Pichler 2011; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021).

Results

As a starting point, the intra-class correlation (ICC) calculated from a set of ‘empty’ multilevel models (i.e., just the intercept without predictors) suggests that differences between the country-wave (level-2) contexts in which immigrants live account for 4.9% of the variation in their occupational status, 9.6% of their variation in political engagement, 14.5% of their variation in fair/good health status, 9.1% of their variation in high life satisfaction, and 5.7% of their variation in perceived social acceptance.²⁰ This between-country-wave variation is due to differences in both composition and context.

Table 6 shows the results of the ‘base’ multilevel models that seek to assess remaining cross-contextual variation after accounting for differences in composition and contextual differences concerning native averages (RQ1). As shown here, a varying, but generally large portion of the observed variation across contexts is explained by the immigrant population’s individual characteristics and native averages on the given outcome within the (country-

²⁰ The intra-class correlation is calculated according to the following equation: $ICC = \tau_0 / (\tau_0 + \sigma^2)$, or $ICC = \tau_0 / (\tau_0 + \pi^2/3)$ in the case of a logistic model. (The logistic distribution for the level 1 residual implies a variance of $\pi^2/3 \approx 3.29$ [Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009, p.878]). ICC values deemed significant vary widely across disciplines, but the values I find fall within the common range (5–20%), in educational research, for example (Aguinis, Gottfredson, and Culpepper 2013; Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009).

year) context. Specifically, the share of cross-contextual variation explained by these factors is highest for life satisfaction and political engagement and social acceptance. Still, though considerably reduced, the unaccounted country-wave-level variance remains substantial for most outcomes (significantly different from zero [$p < 0.05$] for all outcomes). This suggests an affirmative answer to RQ1.

Table 6
Base models (multilevel)

	ISEI	Political engagement	Fair/good health	High life satisfaction	Social acceptance
	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>
Female (ref.: Male)	-4.755*** (0.411)	0.030** (0.010)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.020* (0.010)	-0.009 (0.007)
Age	0.084*** (0.020)	0.007*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)					
Low SES	-3.390*** (0.493)	-0.068*** (0.012)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.035** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.009)
High SES	2.987*** (0.541)	0.044** (0.014)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.010)
Highest educational attainm. (ref.: upper secondary)					
Up to lower secondary	-5.933*** (0.569)	-0.081*** (0.013)	-0.039*** (0.008)	-0.032* (0.013)	-0.005 (0.009)
Tertiary	16.481*** (0.495)	0.088*** (0.012)	0.020** (0.007)	0.045*** (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)
Ethnic minority (incl. Muslim) (ref.: majority)	-1.323** (0.465)	-0.032** (0.011)	-0.017* (0.007)	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.193*** (0.011)
Domicile (ref.: town/small city)					
Big city (area)	0.737 (0.475)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.020+ (0.012)	-0.024** (0.009)
Countryside	-0.627 (0.556)	0.013 (0.013)	0.013+ (0.008)	0.041** (0.014)	0.000 (0.010)
TCN origin (ref.: EU27+)	-2.919*** (0.500)	0.045*** (0.013)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.018 (0.013)	0.010 (0.010)
Native average on dep. var. (by country-wave)	0.297** (0.110)	0.808*** (0.153)	0.576*** (0.168)	0.751*** (0.043)	
Var(constant[country-wave])) [Level-2 Var.]	3.543***	0.256***	0.182**	0.024*	0.128***
Perc. of Level-2 Var. explained (vs. 'empty' model)	77.6%	26.6%	67.4%	92.7%	36.0%
N_1	4929	9175	9175	9175	9175
N_2	72	72	72	72	72

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (first-generation immigrant sample). *Notes:* Base models including Level-1 predictors (controls) and native averages only; average marginal effects. Average marginal effects shown, with standard errors in parentheses. 'Missing' categories included but not presented. Var(Constant[country-wave])): remaining variation of the constant across country-waves. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.1$.

Having established that immigrants' observed integration outcomes tend to vary across host country contexts, net of basic compositional effects and native averages, I now turn to examine relationships between specific host country characteristics and immigrant integration outcomes, in line with RQs 2-4. As outlined in *Methods*, to ensure robust estimates at this stage I forego the multilevel specification and rely on conventional regressions with standard errors clustered by the country-year context units, estimating distinct regression models for each outcome and contextual-factor combination of interest. Table 7 summarises the results of these models, focusing, for space considerations, on the estimated average marginal effects of each contextual factor of interest for a given outcome. While not shown here, all models include the individual-level predictors from previous analyses along with native averages on the given outcome (except for *Social acceptance* models). (Full regression tables for individual models are available upon request.) I first discuss results in the order of the research questions (i.e., by contextual factors), focusing on the significance of coefficients. Then, I briefly summarise the main findings by outcomes, illustrating main associations in the panel of graphs comprising Figure 8.

Starting with economic and structural characteristics of the host country (*RQ2a-c*), my findings are as follows. First, I find that higher GDP per capita in the host country context is associated, on average, with higher occupational status (ISEI) and a higher probability of perceived social acceptance among immigrants, all else kept equal. (Links to other outcomes are not statistically significant.) Moreover, higher levels of income inequality (Gini coefficient) in the host country are associated, on average, with a lower probability of political engagement, high life satisfaction, or perceived social acceptance among immigrants, but a higher probability of their reporting fair to good (as opposed to poor) general health.

Table 7
Results from main regression models including contextual factors

	ISEI	Political engagement	Fair/good health	High life satisfaction	Social acceptance
	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>
Economic and structural char.s					
GDP per capita	1.230** (0.372)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.005 (0.009)	0.012 (0.010)	0.032*** (0.005)
Gini coefficient	-0.111 (0.319)	-0.038** (0.012)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.018** (0.006)
Unemployment rate	-0.991** (0.365)	-0.025* (0.011)	0.012* (0.005)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.018** (0.006)
Flexibility of labour market	0.842** (0.270)				
Public social expenditure	-1.226*** (0.332)				
Health expenditure			0.016*** (0.004)	0.025** (0.008)	
Electoral democracy index		-0.016 (0.018)			
Equal access index		0.001 (0.020)			
Exclusion by SES index		0.057*** (0.009)			
Other migration-related char.s					
Perc. of foreign-born (stock)	1.279*** (0.228)	-0.036*** (0.009)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.017*** (0.005)
Migrant acceptance index	0.148 (0.286)	0.048* (0.021)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.006)
Migrant integration policy					
MIPEX 2014/19 overall score	-0.740* (0.294)	0.044** (0.014)	0.011* (0.005)	0.022*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
MIPEX Labour market mob.	-0.536+ (0.289)			0.007 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)
MIPEX Family reunion	-0.749* (0.283)			0.013+ (0.008)	-0.004 (0.006)
MIPEX Political participation		0.016 (0.016)		0.021** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.006)
MIPEX Permanent residence	-1.262*** (0.296)	0.005 (0.014)	0.002 (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)
MIPEX Citizenship	-0.240 (0.368)	0.053*** (0.015)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)
MIPEX Anti-discrimination	-0.635 (0.383)	0.061*** (0.011)	0.012* (0.005)	0.023*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)
MIPEX Health			0.024*** (0.004)	0.020* (0.009)	
N	4929	9175	9175	9175	9175

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (first-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: AME: average marginal effect. SE: standard error. Each row refers to a separate model (which includes the indicated contextual variable of interest). Each model includes the same control variables as the 'base' models (shown in Table 6). Full individual tables available upon request. ***p <0.001; **p <0.01; *p <0.05; +p <0.1.

In host country contexts where unemployment is higher, immigrants tend to have lower ISEI and are less likely to be politically engaged or feel socially accepted. However, both income inequality and unemployment are associated with higher probability of fair/good (as opposed to poor) general health among immigrants. In response to RQ2a, my results thus largely suggest a positive (or non-negative) relationship between more favourable economic indicators and immigrants' integration outcomes, with the exception of the *health* dimension, where the relationship is negative (or at least non-positive).

Concerning other factors potentially relevant to immigrants' occupational status, I find that a lower degree of regulation within the labour market of the host country (i.e., a higher degree of flexibility) is associated, on average, with higher occupational status among immigrants (RQ2b). Further, I find a negative link between the level of public social expenditure (relative to GDP) in the host country and immigrants' occupational status (RQ2c). However, looking at health expenditure in particular, my results indicate a positive link, on average, between health expenditure levels (relative to GDP) in the host country and immigrants' reported health and subjective well-being (life satisfaction) of immigrants (RQ2d). Next, turning to political-system characteristics of the host country as they relate to immigrants' political engagement (RQ2e), I do not find a significant association for the electoral democracy index nor the equal access index, only an (unexpected) positive relationship between lack of inclusiveness by socioeconomic groups and immigrants' probability political engagement.

Considering migration-related contextual characteristics (RQ3a-b), I find that a higher rate foreign-born residents within the host country population is associated with higher occupational status and higher probability of perceived social acceptance among

immigrants, but a lower probability of political engagement (RQ3a). (No significant association, on average, with immigrants' life satisfaction.) Further, I find more positive attitudes towards immigrants in the host country (RQ3b) to be associated with a higher probability of immigrants indicating political engagement, fair/good health, and perceptions of social acceptance. (No significant relationship is found with occupational status.)

Next, I look at how the inclusivity of migrant integration policies in the host country relate to integration outcomes (RQ4). Starting with the overall MIPEx score, I find that a generally higher degree of inclusivity in the host country's integration-related policies is associated with a higher probability of political engagement, fair/good health, and high life satisfaction among immigrants, but lower occupational status. (No significant relationship is found with perceived social acceptance.) Unpacking these general links by looking into more specific policy areas, I find the following. More inclusive labour market mobility policies show a negative (though only marginally significant) relationship with immigrants' occupational status. More inclusive family reunion policies show a negative link with occupational status, but a (marginally significant) positive link with immigrants' life satisfaction. The MIPEx score for political participation policies does not show a significant link with immigrants' probability of political engagement, but it does show a positive link to probabilities of high life satisfaction and social acceptance (curiously, it is the only MIPEx strand to show a significant link to the latter).

A higher MIPEx score on permanent residence policies of the host country shows a negative relationship with immigrants' occupational status. (No significant links to other outcomes.) More inclusive *access to citizenship* policies are associated with higher probabilities of political engagement, fair/good health, and high life satisfaction among

immigrants. Likewise, a higher MIPEX score on anti-discrimination policies within the host country is linked to higher probabilities of political engagement, fair/good health, and high life satisfaction. Finally, more inclusive health policies in a host country are associated with higher probabilities of fair/good health and high life satisfaction among immigrants. All in all, my results concerning the inclusiveness of migrant integration policies within the host country (RQ4) point to several positive (or at least non-negative) associations with immigrants' integration-related outcomes, with the exception of occupational status, in which case higher MIPEX scores overall and in multiple strands tend to be associated with lower occupational status among immigrants.


Summary: main factors by outcomes and illustration of effects

I now proceed to summarise the main associations found by outcomes, with covariates' average marginal effects plotted (with 95% confidence intervals) in the graphs of Figure 2. As shown here, my results suggest that immigrants tends to have higher occupational status in host country contexts where GDP per capita is higher, the unemployment rate is lower, labour market regulations are more flexible, and the share of the foreign-born population is higher. Higher levels of public social expenditure in the country and more inclusive migrant integration policies (especially permanent residence policies) are linked with lower occupational status among immigrants in that country, on average. Further, I find that immigrants are more likely, on average, to be politically active in country contexts with lower inequality, a smaller relative foreign-born stock, warmer attitudes towards immigrants, and more inclusive migrant integration policies, especially access to citizenship policies.

I find that immigrants are more likely, on average, to report fair to good health in host country contexts with a higher level of relative health expenditure, warmer attitudes towards immigrants, and generally more inclusive migrant integration policies – especially health policies. Meanwhile, immigrants are more likely, on average, to report high life satisfaction in country contexts with lower inequality, and – as in the case of health – higher levels of health expenditure, warmer attitudes towards immigrants, and generally more inclusive migrant integration policies. Finally, immigrants are more likely to report social acceptance (in the sense of not indicating in-group discrimination) in host country contexts with generally more favourable economic indicators, a larger relative immigrant stock, and warmer attitudes towards immigrants.

Figure 8

Illustration of AMEs with 95% CIs for selected models/covariates



Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (first-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: Adjusted predictions with 95% confidence intervals, using selected values of highlighted contextual variables; all other covariates set at the mean. 'Pr(Y)': predicted probability of Y dependent variable being 1.

Supplementary analyses

Results from supplementary analyses of subsamples by ‘EU27+’ vs. third-country national (TCN) origin (i.e., country of birth) of respondents are presented in Appendix Tables A7-A9. These tables display three columns for each outcome, showing, respectively, AMEs of covariates calculated for the EU27+ origin subsample and the TCN origin subsample, as well as the coefficient calculated for the interaction variable between the given covariate and the TCN-origin dummy variable. The purpose of the latter is to provide a test for the significance of coefficient differences found between the subsample analyses. A few associations stand out. The positive link between less-regulated labour markets and occupational status seems to be driven by the TCN origin respondents. The negative links between economic indicators and political engagement appear to be driven by EU27+ origin respondents. The positive link between a political system’s exclusion by SES groups and immigrants’ political engagement seems driven by TCN origin respondents, as is the link with access to citizenship policies. The positive link between immigrants’ life satisfaction and warmer attitudes towards migrants, as well as the strength of anti-discrimination policies, is particularly strong for TNC origin respondents. Further, I find a negative relationship between overall MIPEX score and health outcomes for the TCN subsample, which seems to be driven by the strand measuring inclusivity access to permanent residence policies. Overall, however, it should be noted that these results are generally weaker due to smaller sample sizes (especially for the EU27+ group) and should therefore be interpreted with caution.

In the supplementary set of analyses conducted for the second generation (see Appendix Tables A10-A11), I find several interesting findings indicating significant links between host country characteristics and second-generation outcomes. First of all, base

models still indicate a significant degree of unexplained variation across country-wave contexts for all outcomes. More favourable economic indicators remain positively linked to second-generation immigrants' occupational status. Inequality remains negatively linked to probabilities of political engagement and high life satisfaction among the second generation. Relative health expenditure levels remain positively linked to health and, especially, life satisfaction. Interestingly, I find more significant associations between political engagement and my measures of the quality of the political system, and they still mostly indicate a negative relationship, with second-generation members tending to show relatively higher likelihoods of political activity in countries that are less democratic and have a higher political exclusion by SES. (Although the equal access index shows a marginally significant positive relationship.) Associations for the relative size of the immigrant stock are similar to those of the first generation, except for health and life satisfaction, which, for the second generation show significant positive and negative links, respectively. In another interesting finding, warmer attitudes towards migrants have positive associations for almost all outcomes, including occupational status, but not social acceptance. Migrant integration policies' inclusiveness only shows significant (positive) links for second-generation members' probability of political engagement and high life satisfaction (marginally significant). Strand-specific associations are largely similar to those found for the first generation, though with some losing significance.

Interestingly, the share of immigrants in the host country seems to matter even more than in the case of the first generation: a relatively stronger foreign-born presence is positively related to occupational status, health, and social acceptance, and negatively to political engagement and life satisfaction. Attitudes towards immigrants also seem to matter for the second generation, with more acceptance being positively related to their

occupational status, health, and life satisfaction. Overall, compared with the first generation, I find considerably fewer significant effects for immigrant integration: the overall MIPEX score shows no significant relationship to outcomes for the second generation, although particular strand-outcome relationships do reach statistical significance.

Discussion

Building on prior knowledge and frameworks, my analysis of host country characteristics' links to immigrant integration outcomes sought to address gaps and remaining questions from the existing cross-European literature, and to help build towards a more comprehensive understanding of this question. As a preliminary step, I first sought to substantiate the presence of significant cross-European differences in immigrants' outcomes beyond compositional effects and 'general' (whole-population) cross-European variation in the selected social indicators (*RQ1*). Indeed, I found immigrants' integration-related outcomes to vary significantly across country(-year) contexts even after accounting for relevant individual-level background characteristics of immigrants and native averages in the given country context.

Though my findings are strictly associational and cannot claim to assess causality, considering the isolation of (at least *some*) compositional effects and 'general' cross-national variation in the observed indicators (as observed via natives), these findings offer compelling evidence for a relationship between the host country context and immigrants' integration across various dimensions. As such, my study falls in line with a set of conceptual frameworks suggesting a significant role for host country context in integration (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993; Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016; Reitz 2002), and joins

a growing empirical literature (André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; André and Dronkers 2017; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018; Pichler 2011) arguing that cross-European variation in immigrant integration patterns cannot be solely attributed to compositional effects but also differences in national contexts, which have the potential to shape integration opportunities across different domains. Importantly, my study strengthens this body of work by covering multiple dimensions of integration at once, advancing towards a more comprehensive evidence base with the findings outlined below.

Having confirmed the presence of cross-contextual differences in immigrant integration patterns, my next objective was to investigate how particular characteristics of those host country contexts – considering economic, institutional, and migration-related features as well as the inclusivity of migrant integration policy – relate to specific integration outcomes. Here, I broadly asked whether immigrants tend to have better integration outcomes in country contexts that (*RQ2a*) have more favourable economic indicators, (*RQ2c-e*) more supportive institutional arrangements in specific areas, (*RQ3a-b*) are more accustomed to migration, and (*RQ4*) have more inclusive migrant integration policies.

In seeking to interpret and explain cross-sectional results concerning the role of contextual characteristics for individual outcomes, there are generally three main options to consider: (a) a casual contextual effect; (b) a selectivity effect; and (c) other cases of endogeneity (e.g., Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018; Pichler 2011). A causal contextual effect is the type of dynamic I am most interested in here, but one that is not possible to assert definitively due to the cross-sectional nature and the design of this study (Angrist and Pischke 2009). A selectivity effect is particularly important

to consider in the case of economic and health outcomes of immigrants (Feliciano 2020), as data may not be able to capture (and thus offer the opportunity to isolate) the fact that immigrants who, for example, have less favourable career prospects or are less healthy to begin with may be more drawn to particular contexts, for example ones that are less competitive or challenging, or offer more of a safety net (as also discussed in the literature section of this paper). That said, potential economic selectivity effects in this study are somewhat alleviated by the controls included for the individual's education level as well as for parental class background (ibid.). Finally, as another case of endogeneity, especially in the case of public policies it is possible that causality goes the other way: as Bisin and colleagues (2011) note for the case of labour market integration, for example, the countries most inclined to adopt targeted measures may be those that have a more severe labour market integration problem to begin with. Therefore, the presence of labour market inclusion policies in a context will not necessarily be tied to a comparative advantage in immigrant labour market outcomes (as confirmed by Grubanov-Boskovic et al. 2017); a similar argument could arguably be made for measures addressing anti-discrimination and political participation. In the following, I discuss potential interpretations of my results accordingly.

The idea that better economic indicators – i.e., higher GDP per capita, lower unemployment and lower inequality – are associated with better integration outcomes for immigrants (RQ2a) is supported for several, though not all factor-outcome combinations. Namely, a positive link is supported for all three economic indicators concerning immigrants' feeling of social inclusion (in-group social acceptance). The presence of a positive relationship is partly supported (i.e., a mix of positive and null results) for immigrants' economic integration (occupational status), political integration (political

engagement), and subjective well-being (life satisfaction), and partly countered (i.e., a mix of negative and null results) in the case of health.

Concerning immigrants' economic, political, social inclusion and well-being, my results thus fall in line with the idea that immigrants' social and structural inclusion opportunities may be influenced by the economic conditions of the host country context. Such a positive association for times of economic prosperity – access to the 'mainstream' for immigrant and ethnic/racial minorities – was suggested by Alba and Nee (2003) in the US context, while, vice versa, as analyses of the last recession have observed (e.g., Chaloff, Dumont, and Liebig 2012; Vogt Isaksen 2019), economically adverse contexts may exacerbate social and social exclusion of immigrants. My findings offer further, wide-ranging evidence for these ideas – observing several contexts, multiple indicators of economic performance, and multiple outcomes relating to the social and structural inclusion of immigrants.

In light of the above argument, the positive relationship found between immigrants' health unemployment rates and/or income inequality level within the host country may seem counterintuitive at first, but could in fact be explained as reflecting a selection effect, in which these relatively 'tougher' conditions discourage less-healthy immigrants from settling or drive them to leave. While health status prior to migration is unfortunately not available in ESS data, so such selectivity cannot be definitely confirmed, in light of the associations found, it is an interesting potential dynamic to consider as it would mean that the occurrence of 'healthy migrant' and/or the 'salmon bias' phenomena observed in some migration literature (see Blom, Huijts, and Kraaykamp 2016; Feliciano 2020) may be in part moderated by the economic conditions of the destination country.

I also find that more flexible – i.e., less regulated – national labour markets are associated with higher occupational status among immigrants (again, controlling for education and parental class background, natives' average ISEI, etc.). This finding falls in line with recent prior results by Platt, Polavieja, and Radl (2021; cf. Pichler 2011), and lends support to the argument that more rigid or regulated labour markets may lead to particularly strong migrant-status penalties (*RQ2b*). Further research is necessary to ascertain why this happens; one potential mechanism, suggested in earlier literature (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015), posits that an increased perceived risk in hiring in more strongly regulated labour markets (due, e.g., to costlier firing) among employers may lead to overqualification in immigrant employment. That said, some degree of self-selection is also a possible explanation, in that immigrants with less robust career prospects may be more drawn to labour markets providing greater security for employees (see Koopmans 2010).

In fact, I also find that the general level of welfare provision in a country (approximated here via relative public social expenditure) also relates negatively to immigrants' occupational status (*RQ2c*). As outlined in the literature review, this could be due to multiple mechanisms, from a selectivity effect similar to the one mentioned above – in which immigrants with weaker career prospects seek host contexts with more of a social safety net – to a negative causal effect of the option of welfare support on the career-advancement investment on part of the immigrant (Koopmans 2010; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). In the availability of longitudinal information on immigrants' occupational status, ideally prior to and at different stages post-immigration, future studies could help clarify the mechanisms behind this association.

I find that generally higher health expenditure levels (relative to the country's GDP) are positively associated with the health and subjective well-being of immigrants (*RQ2d*). This contrasts with earlier results by Blom and colleagues (2016), thus challenging the notion that immigrants do not reap comparable benefits from healthcare expenditures. Indeed, my results suggest that immigrants may benefit particularly when expenditure levels are high, and – in what seems more likely given typical patterns of immigrant exclusion, including in the area of health (e.g., Bilgili et al. 2015) – they may suffer particularly strongly when they are low. Overall, the exact mechanisms and potential non-linearity of this relationship warrant further study.

Concerning the quality of political institutions in the host country as they relate to immigrants' political engagement (*RQ2e*), I do not find evidence for a significant link between how democratic a country's political institutions are, or how generally egalitarian its access to politics and immigrants' political inclusion (as far as my measures are concerned); as such, my findings echo those of Blais (2016). That said, I do find a higher level of political exclusion by socioeconomic group to be associated with higher probability of immigrants' political engagement. In this case, the effect could arguably be one of stronger intentions to vote being motivated by a more exclusionary system (Tyrberg 2020; André et al. 2014).

Turning to migration-related characteristics, my results suggest wide-ranging associations for attitudes towards immigrants in the host country (*RQ3b*). (Occupational status is the one exception with which the link is not significant.) Specifically, I find that a higher level of acceptance towards immigrants in a country is positively linked not only to individual immigrants' perceived social acceptance (i.e., a lower likelihood of perceived in-

group discrimination) but also their health and subjective well-being. These are some noteworthy findings for a still-growing area of integration research (Hadjar and Backes 2013; Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018). Moreover, in countries where foreign-born residents are more prevalent (*RQ3a*), immigrants tend to have better occupational status and are more likely to feel that their in-group is accepted in society (cf. Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007). At the same time, I find that immigrants are less likely to be engaged in politics in such contexts (cf. André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Just and Anderson 2014; Tyrberg 2020). The relative size of the immigrant stock thus showed mixed associations (*RQ3a*). Future research relying on data with reliable information on the size of immigrant individuals' co-ethnic groups (as opposed to just general immigrant stocks, to which I was limited), may help understand these associations more clearly.

Lastly, I look at policies relating to immigrant integration (*RQ4*). Using MIPEX (2014/2019) as a measure of the overall inclusivity of migrant integration policies in a country, I find generally more inclusive policy environments to be linked to better integration outcomes concerning immigrants' political engagement, health, and life satisfaction (cf. Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Thorkelson 2015; Just and Anderson 2014; André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Malmusi 2015; Giannoni, Franzini, and Masiero 2016; Juárez et al. 2019; Hadjar and Backes 2013; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018). However, I find a *negative* association for occupational status (cf. Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015). Perhaps surprisingly, I do not see an overall link concerning feelings of in-group social acceptance.

Looking to interpret these general associations, strand-specific results can offer some additional insight. For instance, the negative association for occupational status seem driven

by more liberal labour market mobility, family reunion, and permanent residence policies. Higher MIPEX scores on these components reflect immigration policies that are relatively less restrictive and selective along labour market skills and income; for instance, for labour market mobility, a higher score means policies that allow for easier mobility for workers and are less likely to restrict access to immigrants (especially third-country-nationals) with the strongest career prospects and higher income (Huddleston et al. 2015). For family reunion policies, this means allowing family migrants more easily, with fewer eligibility requirements tied to socioeconomic position (*ibid.*). Likewise, immigrants may gain access to permanent residence may not only be accessible to those with more means (*ibid.*). Taken together, this set of findings thus seems likely to reflect dynamic of immigrant selectivity alongside socioeconomic position or income, as moderated by permissiveness or openness of immigration and residence policies in the host countries. That said, concerning labour market mobility policies the association found (which supplementary analyses shown to be driven by third-country nationals) could also reflect an endogeneity effect, in which – as mentioned above – countries with more problems in their immigrants’ labour market integration are developing policies to alleviate the issue (Bisin et al. 2011; Grubanov-Boskovic et al. 2017).

Turning to other outcomes, the overall MIPEX score’s positive association with political engagement seems driven by policies allowing easier access to citizenship and anti-discrimination policies. The former is not surprising considering access to voting rights and the electoral participation component of my measure of political engagement, but is nevertheless a useful empirical confirmation of the link (Bilgili et al. 2015). The link with anti-discrimination policies is interesting in that it could signal effective more protection from discrimination (including on ethnic/origin grounds) in political participation, or more

motivation to participate in a system where there is more potential for addressing exclusion and unfair treatment (Huddleston et al. 2015). The positive association with health seems driven by the inclusiveness of health policies (Walkden et al. 2018; cf. Blom, Huijts, and Kraaykamp 2016), anti-discrimination, and access to citizenship policies. The latter result is interesting in that it may be interpreted in line with arguments about the wide-ranging potential of access to citizenship for immigrants' broader inclusion and well-being (Bauböck et al. 2013). Next, the positive association between migrant integration policies and immigrants' life satisfaction relates to more inclusive policies in a wide range of areas, including family reunion, political participation, access to citizenship, anti-discrimination policies, and health-related policies. This finding is particularly interesting as it suggests wide-ranging implications of more inclusive policies in various areas and immigrants' subjective well-being, which is still a relatively less-studied aspect of immigrant integration (Kogan et al. 2018; Safi 2010). By and large, my results therefore suggest that immigrants tend to be more likely to engage in politics, have good health, and high life satisfaction in countries with more inclusive or liberal policies relating to immigrant integration (Bean et al. 2012; Kymlicka 2012; Reitz 2002; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

Conclusion

This paper joins a growing body of comparative empirical literature seeking to understand the role of host country characteristics in the varied migration integration patterns across Europe. Identifying some key gaps and unresolved questions in the existing evidence base, I offer a wide-ranging cross-European study that considers a multitude of theoretically relevant host country characteristics and assess their relationship to multiple different dimensions of integration. The fact that these varied connections are examined with a consistent use of definitions, methods, population, and geographical focus is a key

contribution to a literature whose fragmented nature has so far made it difficult to achieve a comprehensive evidence base.

I used a pooled dataset from the European Social Survey's four most recent waves, containing data on a total of 9,175 adult first-generation immigrants across 19 European countries (72 country-year contexts). Taking a multidimensional approach to integration, I focused on immigrants' occupational status, political engagement, general health, life satisfaction, and perceived (in-group) social acceptance. I complemented this individual-level dataset with data on country characteristics (for four survey years, given the time-variant nature of several host country characteristics) from various sources (ESS, OECD, Gallup, MIPEX etc.). I then proceeded to examine immigrants' integration-related outcomes with a set of regression analyses. First, I checked whether immigrants' outcomes really do vary significantly across contexts, once relevant individual background factors (and native averages in the given context) are taken into account. My results on remaining country-level variances suggested that they do. I then proceeded to examine three sets of questions concerning the role, of, respectively, economic and institutional factors, relation to immigration, and policies related to immigrant integration (for a total of 19 contextual factors, nine of which examined for all outcomes).

Generally speaking, my findings suggest that the economic conditions of the host country relate to immigrant integration patterns across multiple domains; specifically, immigrants generally seem to fare better in host country contexts characterised by better macroeconomic conditions (controlling for native averages), though not every indicator-outcome association is significant. The aspect of health is the exception to this, which could reflect an immigrant health selectivity effect tied to economic conditions, though this will

need to be explored further to confirm the presence of a causal link. I find more flexible labour market regulations to be associated with higher occupational status among immigrants, which may be further evidence that immigrant workers are particularly penalised in highly regulated labour markets (Platt et al. 2021; Bilgili et al. 2015). Further, higher levels of welfare expenditure are associated with lower occupational status among immigrants (Koopmans 2010; Platt et al. 2021), although higher levels of health expenditure (relative to GDP) are associated with better immigrant health and subjective well-being (cf. Blom et al 2016). The size of the immigrant stock and, especially, warmer attitudes towards immigrants in the host country context have mostly positive links to outcomes.

Finally, in line with the theoretical literature of multiculturalism (e.g., Bean et al. 2012; Kymlicka 2012; Reitz 2002; Wright and Bloemraad 2012), my findings largely suggest that immigrants have better integration outcomes in countries with overall more liberal/inclusive migrant integration policies – as far as non-economic outcomes are concerned. Indeed, I find a negative link between more liberal policies and immigrants’ occupational status. As discussed, since this specifically concerns more liberal labour market mobility, family reunion, and permanent residence policies, I view this as a likely reflection of a selectivity effect for socioeconomically better-positioned immigrants in countries with more restrictive immigration regimes (although I cannot assert casual links due to my cross-sectional research design). The analysis also revealed further interesting connections between more specific policy areas and outcomes. Moreover, supplementary analyses were performed with the (first-generation) immigrant sample broken down by origin (by EU27+ vs. third-country national), as well as considering second-generation respondents from the same ESS sample (which included the ‘1.5’ generation), offering further insights and highlighting some additional future avenues for research.

Nevertheless, the study is not without its limitations. For one, my ESS sample did not have the information and/or sample sizes to allow for detailed breakdowns by origin country or reason for migration. Given the already wide-ranging nature of my investigation, I also did not have the scope to incorporate macro-level characteristics of specific origin countries in my analysis. These would be meaningful aspects to consider in future studies. I also did not have the space nor sample sizes to delve into a sub-national level of analysis, which remains an important level of contextual factors to consider in future studies. Though I aimed to include a diverse set of integration facets in my study, numerous further outcomes warrant attention in future studies (e.g., social integration, spatial integration, sense of belonging, income, etc.). Finally, as mentioned, the cross-sectional nature of my data meant that I could not assess causal mechanisms (nor did I have the scope for a ‘proper’ impact evaluation of specific policies); pending the availability of appropriate data in the future, this would be an important next step to take in future research. These shortcomings notwithstanding, this study advances the existing comparative integration literature by providing a wide range of findings concerning relationships between specific host country characteristics and immigrant integration outcomes, highlighting some important connections. Its key innovation is it does so from a multidimensional, cross-European perspective, contributing some much-needed comparable evidence on a key puzzle of integration research.

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8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

To conclude the thesis, this chapter provides a summary of the thesis: it begins with a recapitulation of the research aims, research questions, and the related analyses within the thesis. It then discusses the main findings for each research question. This is followed by an overall summary of the contributions and implications of the thesis, limitations and recommendations for future research, and some final remarks.

8.2 Revisiting the aims and research questions of the research

This thesis aimed to strengthen the state of European-level knowledge on the integration and well-being of immigrants and their descendants. Specifically, I sought to advance towards a more comprehensive understanding of integration by focusing on four aspects in particular: (1) the concept of integration; (2) the multidimensionality of integration; (3) the relevance of immigrant parentage for the second generation; and (3) the links between host country contextual characteristics and immigrant integration. I briefly elaborate on each of these aspects and the associated research questions below.

First, I sought to address the fundamental issue of a lack of consistent conceptualisations of integration – an objective pertinent for the broader field, from theory to policy, as well as for my own empirical research within this thesis. My first research question was therefore the following:

- *Research Question 1:* How should immigrant integration be conceptualised?

Second, I sought delve deeper into the conceptual aspect of multidimensionality in particular. The evolution of multidimensional perspectives within immigrant integration

research were already examined in the extensive review of Chapter 2.⁸⁴ However, a number of factors made the issue of multidimensionality particularly interesting: its increasing, yet inconsistent mentions and applications within the field, its connection to essential theoretical questions concerning the relationship between different aspects of integration, as well as its still-thin empirical basis led me to ask the following questions:

- *Research Question 2a*: What does the multidimensionality of integration entail?
- *Research Question 2b*: What kind of dimensional pattern do we see in the integration outcomes of European immigrant and immigrant-background minorities?

Third, I noted some key knowledge gaps regarding the situation of the second generation, whose outcomes are often considered as the ultimate marker of integration's success or failure. Indeed, the prospects and dynamics of second-generation integration have been much debated (in Europe and beyond); however, I noted that the overall picture, especially from a multidimensional perspective, remains unclear. A particular source of unclarity I noted is the difficulty in disentangling the effects of migration background, per se, from those of class and ethnic/racial background, especially as these may interact with one another. My third research question was therefore the following:

- *Research question 3*: Does migration background make a difference in the outcomes of the native-born offspring of immigrants in Europe?

Fourth and last, I sought to broaden the evidence base on the links between host country characteristics and immigrants' integration patterns. The role of the host country in

⁸⁴ Paper 1, presented in Chapter 5, was published as a peer-reviewed journal article, co-authored with my supervisor Dr. Lessard-Phillips. While a first version of the paper picked up roughly where the related Chapter 3 section left off, in the process of peer review we were asked to add further detailed engagement with the theoretical/conceptual literature, leading to some repetition of the literature review in Chapter 3.

shaping integration opportunities is theoretically (though often not very specifically) acknowledged, and contextual-effects literature has been growing in recent years, with several European comparative studies. Nevertheless, I noted remaining shortcomings that, once again, make it difficult to gauge the broader picture, whether regarding the overall relevance of the host country context, the range of different contextual factors relevant to a particular aspect of integration, or, vice versa, how a particular factor may relate to integration from a multidimensional perspective. I saw these shortcomings as being due to a combination of narrow-scope individual studies and incomparability across studies (much as in the case above), as well as the lack of an overarching conceptual framework. Overall, I thus asked:

- *Research question 4:* How are immigrant integration outcomes linked to the contextual characteristics of the host country?

8.2.1 How these research questions were addressed

I addressed each of the above four main questions via four individual yet interconnected analyses. These consisted, respectively, of a wide-ranging conceptual review (Chapter 3) and three quantitative studies (Chapters 5-7) using recent cross-European data (European Social Survey, 2012-2018) for a set of multidimensional analyses. Specifically, Chapter 3 addressed RQ1 with a wide-ranging analytical review of prior conceptual approaches to integration (including assimilation), highlighting the evolution of perspectives as well as continuing debates within the field. I focused my analysis on the conceptual aspects of terminology, (multi)dimensionality, actors, reference group, and endpoint. Through this review, I also developed my own conceptual position and understanding of integration, which shaped my approach within the subsequent empirical analyses.

The first empirical paper (Chapter 5) addressed RQ2a-b by examining the issue of multidimensionality in immigrant integration first conceptually and then empirically through an original analysis of European Social Survey (ESS7) data. This analysis relied on a factor analysis of 18 integration-related outcomes for ethnic/racial minority first- and second-generation immigrants to identify the underlying dimensional structure among those outcomes. In additional checks, it also tested for differences in structure between first and second generations and countries with more vs. less ‘inclusive’ integration policy contexts.

The second empirical paper (Chapter 6) examined RQ3 through a comparative analysis of second-generation and native-background individuals’ outcomes across multiple areas of life. Specifically, in line with the multidimensional concept of integration developed in Chapter 3, I assessed the integration of second-generation immigrants in Europe by examining their socio-economic situation, political and social inclusion, and their health and well-being, as compared to their native-parentage peers. Following up on points raised in Chapter 3’s section on inequality (and disparities highlighted in Chapter 2), the study incorporated a systematic consideration of class, gender, and ethnic/racial background, and how these factors may (a) explain, (b) add on to, and/or (c) intersect with the effects of second-generation status.

In line with RQ4, the third empirical paper (Chapter 7) then turned the focus to the role of the host country in immigrant integration. Based on a broad review of related literature, I identified a set of key host country contextual factors for integration and outlined an overarching conceptual model. Combining pooled individual ESS6-9 data on immigrants from 19 European countries with macro-level indicators on the respective 72 country-year contexts, I then used a wide range of regression models to test whether more favourable

economic indicators, a larger immigrant stock, warmer attitudes towards immigrants, and more liberal integration policies, among other factors, are associated with better integration-related outcomes for immigrants. Like the previous studies, Paper 3 featured a multidimensional scope, looking at occupational attainment, political engagement, health, life satisfaction, and perceived in-group discrimination. The study primarily focused on the first generation, thought to be most directly affected by contextual factors such as immigrant integration policy. That said, potential (direct or indirect) associations for the second generation were also of interest, and were thus examined in a set of supplementary analyses (along with an additional separate analysis for EU vs. non-EU origin immigrants). In the following, I discuss findings from the above analyses as answers to my research questions.

8.3 Answering research questions and discussing findings

RQ1: How should immigrant integration be conceptualised?

Generally speaking, the inherent subjectivity of the concept of immigrant integration (and related terms) makes it difficult to identify a single ‘correct’ definition of integration. Since the early days of the field, there has been a notable evolution in conceptualisations of integration within the broader scholarship, with conceptual approaches seeking to become less exclusionary and better reflect immigrants’ lived experience of integration (Gordon 1964; Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997; Penninx 2019; Spencer and Charsley 2021). That said, in my view some points of debate are so strongly tied to subjective judgments that some differences in approaches are bound to remain; indeed, the conceptual definition of integration depends on the perspective and focus of the research (or policy) in question. For instance, given my own emancipatory goal within this research, my concept of integration is centred primarily on social inclusion and equality.

Nonetheless, I believe that it is important to aim for coherence and conceptual clarity within the field; even if definitions and specific conceptual framework continue to differ, they should at least be as clear as possible concerning their assumptions and interpretations. Reviewing various approaches, I identified five key conceptual ‘building blocks’ of integration (assimilation, etc.) concepts: (1) terminology, (2) dimensions of integration, (3) actors of integration, (4) the question of the reference group, and (5) the definitional endpoint of integration (or the theorised end-state of integration). I argue that to be conceptually clear and enable the comparability and dialogue across theoretical and empirical works on integration, any definition of integration should specify its stance concerning these five aspects. Based on these, I thus posed five further sub-questions; below, I discuss my takeaways for each and the position I reach for my own conceptualisation.

RQ1a: What term should we use?

Concerning terminology, in reviewing definitions and critiques of different terms (integration, assimilation, incorporation, adaptation, etc.), I found widely varying understandings of the same term and overlapping meanings between different terms.⁸⁵ This inconsistency ultimately that left me questioning the productivity of debating terms, turning instead to compare and contrast conceptualisations along their content. For my own conceptualisation, I settled on the term ‘integration’ for continuity with prior European scholarship, which I view as a potentially inclusive term, depending on its definition and use (as is the case for other, alternative terms). As mentioned, my own definition of integration is centred on equality and inclusion within host society; I outline its specifics below.

⁸⁵ See Chapters 3.2.3, 3.2.4., 3.3.2, and Appendix Table 1 for specifics.

RQ1b: Integration in what sense? What are the different dimensions of integration?

Through a wide-ranging review of prior perspectives on integration's dimensionality and prior dimensions outlined in proposed analytical frameworks (e.g., Bean et al. 2012; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2012; Esser 2004b; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Gordon 1964; Heckmann 2006; Lessard-Phillips 2017; Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019; OECD/EU 2019; Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016), I ultimately found that the question of multidimensionality – as the concept of integration in general – is a highly subjective one, inherently reflecting normative positions concerning the ways in which immigrants are expected to 'catch up with', or come to resemble, the native-background population (if at all). While expectations of socio-economic/structural equality are generally (though not universally) considered to be fairly inclusive, such expectations can easily become ethnocentric or exclusionary when it comes to sociocultural aspects (think, e.g., demands of one-way socio-cultural assimilation and origin culture abandonment from immigrants).

Overall, especially among European works I noted an increasing acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of integration, and a growing array of dimensions considered. While some frameworks still involve some expectation of sociocultural assimilation, several have made pointed efforts to focus on aspects that measure inclusion and well-being of the immigrant in their new society (rather than sociocultural homogeneity) (e.g., Penninx 2005; Heckmann 2006). I also noted – and in the following paper (Chapter 5), expanded on – an emerging strand of literature that takes a more critical look at how indicators or aspects of integration are categorised into 'dimensions', and tests the extent of multidimensionality empirically (Bean et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017).

I concluded by gathering and synthesising the various multidimensional frameworks of integration into a summary table (Table 3.8) of the most commonly conceptualised dimensions (or areas/themes) of integration along with associated indicators. These main identified dimensions include culture, identity, social life (including social mixing and general socialisation), discrimination and prejudice (within the broad sociocultural realm); economic, civic/political/institutional, and spatial domains (within the broad structural realm), as well as the newer domain of health and subjective well-being. This summary of dimensions can be used as a starting point or reference for researchers or policymakers seeking to apply a multidimensional approach; the dimensions and indicators will both express and be shaped by their own concept of integration. Indeed, I relied on this collection of dimensions and indicators when developing my own multidimensional approach. In line with my equality- and inclusion- concept of integration, in the empirical papers that follow I measured integration within the economic and civic/political/institutional domains, along with general socialisation, discrimination, and health and subjective well-being.

RQ1c: Who are the actors of integration?

Concerning the conceptual approaches to *actors* of integration, I noted an evolution from an exclusive or strong focus on the immigrant as the party performing and responsible for the success of integration, with the host society taking on a largely passive role via prejudice/discrimination or acceptance (e.g. Warner and Srole 1945; Barkan 1995), to more complex and two-sided conceptualisations (e.g. Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016). Specifically, recent frameworks not only incorporate the receiving society ‘side’ as an active participant and responsible party of integration, but consider multiple levels within each side, from the individual to the community to the

organisational/state level (especially in the case of the host society) (e.g. Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016). My own understanding is informed by the latter approaches.

RQ1d: Who is the reference group for integration?

In terms of the reference group, I also noted a trend of increasing degree of complexity, compared to classical notions of a homogenous and ‘obvious’ native mainstream benchmark (Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964; cf. Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 2003). In recent works, I found that some critical approaches altogether reject the notion of using the native-background population as a reference group to measure integration (Schinkel 2018; Spencer and Charsley 2016), while others argue for a more nuanced consideration of the internal heterogeneity of immigrant(-origin) groups and host society (e.g. Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a; Vertovec 2007; Crul and Schneider 2010; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). While seeing value both arguments, I found the latter approach more practically useful for my own analyses, which follow my equality-centred concept of integration (making the use of a reference group analytically necessary).

RQ1e: What is the definitional endpoint of integration? What does ‘completed’ integration look like?

Turning to the definitional endpoint of integration, I once again noted continued diverging approaches; this is not surprising considering that this aspect is perhaps the one most ‘ideological’ one (potentially reflecting political goals). Most traditional approaches (and still some to this day), envisioned completed integration as immigrants and/or their descendants having ‘blended into’ mainstream society in social and cultural terms, most of their members having joined the middle class (as noted, e.g., by Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997). By contrast, some modern frameworks, stressing the potentially non-linear nature of integration processes and seeking to avoid a prescriptive notion of societal

homogeneity, do not define an end-state of integration at all (Spencer and Charsley 2016). Others define a state of institutional and societal inclusion of immigrants and their descendants on behalf of the receiving country (not necessarily involving cultural assimilation) (Penninx 2005; Heckmann 2006). A similar approach defines completed integration as the disappearance of inequalities tied to migration status, often in combination with social inclusion (Esser 2004b; Alba and Foner 2015; OECD/EU 2019). The recurring notions of inequality in the literature also led me to consider the concept of inequality in some further depth (Platt 2019; McCall 2005). That discussion ultimately highlighted a need for intersectional (e.g., intergroup) approaches in the study of migrant-native inequalities – tying into above discussions underscoring the internal complexity of both immigrant- and non-immigrant groups (McCall 2005; Bürkner 2012).

For the purpose of this research, I found analytically necessary to specify a definitional endpoint of integration, even if I do not consider it an empirically inevitable, or, once achieved, irreversible end-state. In line with the latter ideas, I conceptualised the endpoint of integration as *a state of social acceptance and social and institutional inclusion for immigrant minorities, in which they enjoy comparable life chances and well-being to their native(-background) peers*. This conceptual end-state thus involves the disappearance of a migrant(-background) penalty within host society in economic, social, and general well-being terms (i.e., the above-outlined multiple dimensions of integration). I apply suggestions from the above inequality and intersectionality-related literature in Paper 2 in particular, which features a systematic intergroup comparison of second-generation and native-background individuals considering multiple potentially overlapping or conflicting axes of inequality.

Overall, I thus found some general trends of increasing nuance and complexity among conceptualisations of integration, although several contemporary approaches also diverge from one another, and I find some advancements more empirically applicable – at least for a quantitative analysis of integration – than others. As highlighted above, the reviewed conceptual arguments and developments shaped my own approach to integration in the empirical studies that followed, whether directly (e.g., definition, dimensions observed) or indirectly (general analytical approach, interpretation, etc.).

RQ2a: What does the multidimensionality of integration entail?

In the simplest approach, the multidimensionality of integration refers to the fact that integration is a complex process that takes place across multiple areas of life (or, put differently, involves multiple domains). From this perspective, different dimensions of integration are typically outlined on a thematic basis, categorised corresponding to academic disciplines or policy areas, for example (Bean et al. 2012). From a somewhat more critical perspective, the notion of integration's multidimensionality is rooted in the observation that different facets of integration do not necessarily advance in unison, but along distinct trajectories; indeed, they might progress (a) jointly, in sync; (b) generally in the same direction, though not necessarily simultaneously; (c) independently from one another; or even (d) or in opposite directions, in a trade-off dynamic to one another. This potential divergence, then, is what makes a multidimensional frame of analysis necessary for an accurate assessment of the state of integration. In this latter understanding then, the dimensional framework outlined holds some theoretical implications with regards to the way in which particular aspects of integration relate to one another. (For instance, two indicators form part of the same dimension if they tend to progress jointly, and form separate dimensions if they do not necessarily develop together or even in the same direction.) I call

this latter the ‘empirical’ approach to outlining integration dimensions, as the logic of categorisation is based on empirical outcome patterns (Bean et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017; also, Portes and Zhou 1993). The ‘empirical’ approach while rarer, is becoming more common in some recent literature, as I discuss. In practice, the two perspectives may also overlap; the two approaches are often combined (as they are in my subsequent second and third papers).

RQ2b: What kind of dimensional pattern do we see in the integration outcomes of European immigrant and immigrant-background minorities?

I observed 18 integration-related outcomes for first- and second-generation immigrants in Europe (focusing on ethnic/racial minorities).⁸⁶ Following common thematic categorisations, these indicators would be categorised into eight typical main dimensions: culture, identity, social, discrimination and prejudice, economic, civic/political, spatial, health and well-being (drawing on the ‘summary table’ of common integration dimensions outlined in Chapter 3, [Table 3.8; see also Table 3.10]). An empirical approach, i.e., an analysis of the correlation matrix of the 18 indicators, however, suggested five underlying dimensions: (1) economic or structural integration (with civic/political integration cross-loading); (2) health; (3) subjective well-being, including social well-being/general socialisation; (4) cultural (linguistic, identificational) assimilation and civic/political integration; and (5) minority socialisation.

Differences between the ‘thematic’ and ‘empirical’ grouping patterns then include a separation of the ‘sociocultural’ indicators into a cultural assimilation and a social assimilation, challenging common assumptions of the two being intrinsically connected

⁸⁶ See Paper 1 (Chapter 5), Table 3 or Table 4 for a list.

aspects (e.g., Ruud Koopmans 2016). (Although the two did form a joint dimension for the second-generation subsample.) Cultural assimilation items seem most strongly related to civic/political integration items, which could point to causal mechanisms going either way (or both ways) (Lessard-Phillips et al. 2017; Vink 2021; Ager and Strang 2008; Bauböck et al. 2013). Results also highlight a connection between economic and civic/political aspects of integration, reinforcing a common association of the two within what is often called the ‘structural’ dimension integration (Bean et al. 2012; Lessard-Phillips 2017). Social assimilation and spatial assimilation (more specifically, minority socialisation and living in minority neighbourhoods) form a joint dimension, in line with literature highlighting links between social and residential mixing (or lack thereof) (e.g., Bolt, Özüekren, and Phillips 2010; Fajth and Bilgili 2018; Esser 2004a). The relatively newer aspects of subjective well-being (including general socialisation) and health each seem distinct from the other three domains. The item of discrimination is also remarkably distinct.

The findings do not point to a significant trade-off, or opposite dynamics of development in any areas. However, they do offer support to the notion that integration in certain domains may advance quite distinctly from integration in others, overall reinforcing the idea that integration does not necessarily progress jointly and uniformly across all areas of life (Lessard-Phillips 2017). From a practical perspective, this means that evidence of equality or inclusion in one aspect (e.g., socioeconomic) will not necessarily imply equality or inclusion in other aspects (e.g., subjective well-being, discrimination). Conversely, lack of social or cultural assimilation does equate to lack of economic integration. These observations fall in line the basic idea of there being multiple paths to integration, and sociocultural assimilation not necessarily being a prerequisite for immigrants or their descendants’ successful adjustment in other aspects (e.g., economic, subjective well-being,

etc.). As such, it echoes observations from segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a) as well as multiculturalist frameworks (e.g. Kymlicka 2012; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).

From the perspective of my research, these findings overall corroborate the necessity of using a multidimensional lens in the measurement of integration, with distinct indicators for each main dimension sought to observe. Indeed, both subsequent papers observe indicators for multiple (thematic) dimensions of integration, namely economic integration, political/ institutional inclusion, social inclusion and well-being, and health and subjective well-being (see Table 3.10 in Chapter 3 for an overview).

RQ3: Does migration background make a difference in the outcomes of the native-born offspring of immigrants in Europe?

Comparing second-generation and native-parentage native Europeans, my results suggest that migration background is associated with a mixed pattern of relative advantages, disadvantages, and parity, depending on the outcome and subgroup examined. I expand on this below.

First of all, my multidimensional frame of analysis revealed that the extent and direction of a second-generation gap varies across dimensions. Looking at socioeconomic outcomes (education, and ISEI/occupation) the second generation seems to be doing as well as, if not better, than native-parentage peers, on average. Looking at non-economic dimensions, however, I find a general pattern of second-generation disadvantage, specifically in political engagement, social acceptance (in-group discrimination), health, and life satisfaction.

The other background factors examined – class background, gender, and ethnic/racial minority status – also played an important role. For economic outcomes, once class background and ethnic/racial minority/majority status are accounted for, the significance of the second-generation’s educational advantage is even clearer. (The second-generation advantage in occupational status loses its initial marginal significance.) As for the second-generation disadvantage in non-economic outcomes, accounting for class background and ethnic/racial status only ‘explains away’ the gap for life satisfaction, while for social acceptance and health, the gap is reduced but remains significant, and for political engagement, it actually increases in size.

Comparing average marginal effect sizes, I generally find class background (especially for socioeconomic outcomes) and ethnic/racial minority status (especially for non-economic outcomes) to be relatively stronger determinants than second-generation status (immigrant parentage), *per se*. That said, as outlined above, for the most part accounting for these background factors did not, ‘explain away’ second-generation disadvantages found – a finding in contrast with arguments viewing second-generation disparities as fundamentally driven by compositional effects in these regards (cf., e.g., Drouhot and Nee 2019).

Furthermore, comparing second-generation and native-parentage natives through cross-cutting categories of parental SES, gender, and ethnic/racial background revealed some interesting patterns of second-generation advantage. By and large, these subgroup analyses suggest that within otherwise disadvantaged groups, such as ethnic/racial minorities and individuals from lower class backgrounds, second-generation respondents tend to be relatively better off than their native-parentage peers. The exception to this pattern

is social acceptance, and, especially, political engagement, in which case minority second-generation respondents show a pronounced disadvantage. Results did not suggest gendered second-generation status disparities. (Or, put differently, gender differences did not vary significantly by migration background.)

All in all, findings paint an encouraging though mixed picture of second-generation integration at the European level (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008; Drouhot and Nee 2019; Heath and Schneider 2021). Importantly, the findings of this study join some earlier evidence from country studies suggesting that children of immigrants may, in some cases, be relatively less held back by low class background and/or ethnic/racial minority status than their native-background peers (Li 2018; Kasinitz 2008; Crul, Keskiner, and Lelie 2017). There are multiple potential explanations for this, including parental selectivity (e.g., along motivation) (Feliciano 2020), immigrant or second-generation resilience (Carina Mood, Jonsson, and Låftman 2016), ‘hidden’ middle class background among parents (Fernández-Kelly 2008), and/or co-ethnic community support (Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009a). Overall, key insights reached through subgroup analyses validated – and made the case for further applications of – an intersectional lens to the study of second-generation integration to highlight complex patterns of advantage and disadvantage (Anthias 2013; Bürkner 2012; Cheung and Phillimore 2017; Yuval-Davis 2007; Platt 2019; McCall 2005).

RQ4: How are immigrant integration outcomes linked to the contextual characteristics of the host country?

In lieu of an existing overarching conceptual or theoretical framework on the matter – especially from a multidimensional integration perspective – I turned to the broader contextual-effects literature (i.e., concerning specific factors and/or immigrant integration outcomes) to identify some main host country contextual factors of interest. Roughly

grouped, these are: (a) economic conditions and structural characteristics of the country, (b) host society's relationship with immigrants and immigration in general (attitudes, pre-existing immigrant minorities), and (c) immigrant integration policies. Before attributing differences to these factors, however, comparative studies must rule out compositional effects as the source of cross-national variation in immigrant integration patterns. Moreover, this is undoubtedly still far from an exhaustive list of relevant factors; nevertheless, I considered it useful as a starting conceptual framework for a broader analysis of the links host country contextual factors and immigrant integration outcome patterns. Building further towards such a comprehensive framework of contextual effects – perhaps incorporating factors the sub-national level, which fell outside my scope in this research – would be a useful avenue of future research and conceptual work, in my opinion. I expand on my findings for the each of the above groups of factors below.

Do immigrants' integration-related outcomes vary significantly across country contexts, net of compositional effects?

My findings suggest that different country(-year) contexts are indeed associated with differences in the integration-related outcomes of first- and second-generation immigrants. Indeed, I found immigrants and their descendants' outcomes to vary substantially across country-year contexts even after accounting for differences in the sociodemographic composition of immigrant groups and natives' outcome averages across those country-year contexts. These results offer broad empirical support for the relevance of the host country context for the success of immigrant integration, as suggested by multiple conceptual frameworks (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes and Zhou 1993; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016; Spencer and Charsley 2016; Reitz 2002).

Economic conditions and other structural characteristics

By and large, my findings suggest that better macroeconomic conditions (higher GDP per capita, lower inequality, lower unemployment rate) are indeed linked to better integration outcomes for immigrants. This association is consistent with Alba and Nee's (2003) assertion (from the historical US context) that economically more favourable contexts offer broader opportunity for the structural and social inclusion of immigrant and immigrant-origin groups. It is also consistent with observations that in times of economic troubles or scarcity may be felt particularly strongly by immigrants (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Chaloff, Dumont, and Liebig 2012; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008).

The one exception to the above pattern are my results for immigrants' health, which show the opposite association. As discussed in the paper, a possible interpretation of this finding is as an indication of a negative link between economic conditions within the country-year context and the health selectivity of immigrants, in which the occurrence of the 'healthy migrant' and/or the 'salmon bias' (i.e., the return migration of less healthy immigrants) are mediated by the economic conditions of the host country (Blom, Huijts, and Kraaykamp 2016; Feliciano 2020). The validity of this hypothesis would be worth examining further with data that tracks health status prior to and following migration (as mine was limited to the latter). Findings also suggest that the relative health expenditure level (% of GDP) of the host country is positively related to immigrants' health and subjective well-being (cf. Blom, Huijts, and Kraaykamp 2016). Similarly to the economic argument this could be due, for example, to a pronounced immigrant disadvantage in environments of generally scarcer or lower-quality healthcare access (ibid.), though further analyses will be needed to assert such causal mechanisms.

My findings also lend support to the notion that more rigid or strongly regulated labour markets may end up penalising immigrant workers – specifically, third-country nationals – in terms of their occupational status (Corrigan 2015; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). While further research is necessary to assert the specific mechanisms at play, one compelling argument cites that in more regulated labour markets where firing is more complicated or costly for employers, employers may be more risk-averse when hiring (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007); this phenomenon penalises immigrant applicants whose skillset may be perceived as more difficult to correctly evaluate due to foreign experience and/or qualifications, ultimately driving up their rates of overqualification (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015). Further, I find a negative relationship between higher relative welfare expenditures in the host country and immigrants’ occupational status (Koopmans 2010; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Platt, Polavieja, and Radl 2021). As discussed in the paper, possible explanations for this may include selectivity or causal effects (ibid.); further analyses with more detailed and longitudinal information on immigrants’ career trajectories could help clarify this.

Public attitudes and general presence of immigrants in the country

In an important contribution to a so far relatively thin literature on the linkages between public attitudes towards immigrants in the host country and immigrants’ outcomes, my findings suggest a positive link between warmer attitudes and immigrants’ perception of social acceptance, life satisfaction, health, and probability of political engagement (Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018; Huijts and Kraaykamp 2012; Esses 2021). I also find that immigrants tend to have higher occupational status and are more likely to feel their in-group accepted in society in host countries with a larger relative presence of immigrants within the population (cf. Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007).

At the same time, I find that immigrants were found less likely to be politically engaged context with a higher share of immigrants (André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Just and Anderson 2014; Tyrberg 2020). I also examine a set of contextual factors measuring the democratic and inclusive character of political institutions within the host country, and find that higher degree of exclusion by socioeconomic groups is associated with higher probability of immigrants' political participation; this could potentially be interpreted as a mobilising effect of institutional exclusion (Tyrberg 2020; cf. André, Dronkers, and Need 2014), but further research would be needed to understand the source of these linkages better.

Immigrant integration policies

Finally, I find that an overall more inclusive policy environment, as measured by MIPEX 2014 and 2020 (Huddleston et al. 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020), is linked to more favourable outcomes for immigrants in the domains of political engagement, health, and life satisfaction (Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015; Thorkelson 2015; Just and Anderson 2014; André, Dronkers, and Need 2014; Malmusi 2015; Giannoni, Franzini, and Masiero 2016; Juárez et al. 2019; Hadjar and Backes 2013; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2018). For most outcomes – political engagement, health, subjective well-being, and social acceptance – more 'inclusive' policies within particular policy areas had generally nonnegative associations, as well. Among these, I found the most wide-ranging positive associations for more inclusive access to citizenship policies and stronger antidiscrimination policies.

Conversely, I find that immigrants tend to have relatively lower occupational status in more 'inclusive' policy contexts (cf. Bilgili, Huddleston, and Joki 2015). A look into specific policy strands reveals this negative association to be driven by more liberal immigration

policies in particular, including family reunion policies, permanent residence policies, and labour market mobility policies. Taken together, I interpret this to signal a likely reflection of a selectivity effect, in which immigration policies that are generally less and more likely to tie access to socioeconomic status (Huddleston et al. 2015) will end up, unsurprisingly, with an immigrant population that is positively selected along occupational status (Feliciano 2020). Beyond selection effects, the possibility of reverse causality is also important to consider, as worse outcomes (e.g., common labour market participation problems among immigrants, or discrimination) may have been the impetus for the development of stronger targeted policies (Bisin et al. 2011; Grubanov-Boskovic, Natale, and Scipioni 2017). Longitudinal data, and a more scope for an in-depth examination of policy implementation and before-and-after comparisons would be useful to examine this more thoroughly in future studies.

8.4 Conclusions and broader implications

The European Commission's 2021-2027 Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion underscored the need for more EU-level indicators and cross-nationally comparative evidence for the development of effective integration policies across the region. Likewise, I noted some gaps and inconsistencies holding back the potential for broader insights of an otherwise increasingly rich European conceptual and empirical scholarship on first- and second-generation immigrant integration. Accordingly, an overarching theme across the research in this thesis was the effort towards for consistency and comprehensiveness, achieved through wide-ranging but coherent analyses. The intentionally broad scope within my individual immigrant integration studies – cross-European, multidimensional, not limited to select ethnic groups – served to bridge some gaps by producing comparable and

thus more broadly generalisable findings across a broad set of domains, groups, and country contexts. Specifically, with the findings outlined in the previous section my research contributes towards (1) greater coherence and a more analytical perspective in conceptualising integration, including, in particular, (2) the multidimensionality of integration; (3) a more nuanced understanding of the integration situation of Europe's second-generation population; and (4) a broader perspective on the sources of cross-national variation in immigrant integration patterns across Europe. Put simply, the strength of this research lies in shedding light on the bigger picture and connecting the dots to understand systematic patterns.

A first takeaway from my research is the importance of coherent and thoughtful conceptualisations when defining integration. From a theoretical perspective, definitional and conceptual inconsistencies have often held back the productivity of debates, as unacknowledged differences in fundamental conceptual/definitional positions result in parties talking past one another (Gans 1997; Kivisto 2005; Esser 2010).⁸⁷ Specifically, I have raised the importance of clarifying conceptual positions – and making thoughtful choices – concerning questions around terminology, and the dimensions, actors, reference group, and the conceptual endpoint of integration. Further conceptual elements may be added to this list; indeed, my analytical overview of integration concepts may merely serve a starting roadmap for further, increasingly nuanced comparative analyses of integration concepts. My main argument lies in the importance of using deliberate and clearly specified

⁸⁷ See, e.g., debates between Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters (2011) vs. Haller, Portes, and Lynch (2011a; 2011b); Favell (2016) vs. Alba and Foner (2015; 2016); or Schinkel (2018) vs. Penninx (2019) – to mention just a few.

conceptual approaches to integration – whether in theoretical, empirical, or policy-related work – to aid the clarity and comparability of this increasingly rich body of work.

In a related second takeaway, my research repeatedly affirms the multidimensional nature of integration. It presented the ample theoretical basis for this, provided empirical evidence supporting the multidimensional structure of various integration-related outcomes, and showed how various integration-related dynamics, from links to immigrants' individual background factors to host country characteristics, vary across different dimensions of integration. Like the point above, this has varied implications: from a theoretical perspective, it accentuates the complex relationship between integration processes in different areas of life, calling for further examination of particular inter- and intra-dimensional mechanisms. It also challenges assumptions of simple or automatic 'spill-over' effect from one area of integration (e.g., economic advancement) to all other areas (cf. Massey 1981); likewise, it challenges some traditional notions such as ethnic retention in sociocultural aspects being antithetical to integration in other areas (expanding on points raised by Portes and Zhou 1993). This is a key takeaway for policy as it underlines the usefulness of multidimensional assessments of integration, and, potentially, the need for integration support to target a wide range of domains, with an attention to potentially diverging needs among them (expanding on points made by Penninx 2005; see also Huddleston et al. 2015).

A third takeaway concerns the complex role of migration background in the outcomes of the second generation, as suggested by my findings. Two findings stand out here. First, the distinction in patterns between economic and non-economic aspects of second-generation inclusion and well-being, which echo the above points on inter- (and intra-)dimensional variation but also call attention, to some meaningful 'remaining' issues for the

second-generation integration beyond the widely studied (and theorised) aspect of economic integration. This warrants further scholarly as well as policy attention to these areas. (My study highlights political participation, life satisfaction, health, and discrimination, but further non-economic nor cultural aspects would be worth examining, as well.)

A second important finding is the phenomenon of relative second-generation advantage within otherwise disadvantaged (low class background and/or ethnic/racial minority) groups. This has particular theoretical significance as it contributes broader European evidence on the potential phenomenon of second-generation ‘superachievement’ (Feliciano and Lanuza 2017; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller 2009b; Kasinitz 2008; Crul et al. 2017), in which children of immigrants may be able to overcome modest circumstances and other obstacles particularly well. As discussed in more extensively in Paper 2, there could be numerous potential explanatory mechanisms at play behind these patterns, from parental selectivity (along difficult-to-observe traits) to supportive co-ethnic communities – or simply a very deeply disillusioned or marginalised third generation or native-background community by comparison. The latter point that relates back to segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993) and other discussions on selectivity (e.g., Drouhot and Nee 2019; Feliciano 2020; Feliciano and Lanuza 2017), as well as on supporting mechanisms for second-generation success (e.g., Crul et al. 2017). Therefore, from a policy perspective, as well, these underlying mechanisms represent a pertinent area of future research – whether to identify sources of particular native-background disadvantage (and thus also need for targeted support) or sources second-generation resilience (potentially learning from those to support other vulnerable groups).

From an additional methodological perspective, my findings above underscore the need to disentangle key background factors – such as migration background, class background, ethnic minority status, gender, but also, potentially, others – from one another. This is necessary both to clearly identify sources of disparities and because, as my findings suggest, the implications of particular background factors may differ for people with and without a migration background. As such, a more systematic consideration of background factor can reveal complex patterns of advantage and disadvantage (and underlying mechanisms) that may otherwise be overlooked.

The fourth main takeaway concerns the role of that the host country can play in immigrants' integration. Generally speaking, my results offer some broad evidence for immigrants being more disadvantaged in economically difficult times and contexts, a phenomenon also widely observed in recent times in relation to the COVID-19 crisis (MPI 2021; OECD 2021b). In light of my results, the inclusiveness of integration policies and the general population's attitudes towards immigrants may also help make host country contexts more conducive to immigrants' successful integration in non-economic dimensions, although further research will be necessary to assert causal mechanisms. Above all, my research on host country context as it relates to immigrant integration represented a rare attempt at studying this question from an overarching perspective, offering an initial suggestion for a broader conceptual framework bringing together knowledge from more specialised literatures.

The latter point links back to my initial argument about the usefulness of wider-scale studies on immigrant integration. As evidenced in the above points, my cross-European, multidimensional, generally broad-scope research provided a number of useful insights;

research in this vein represents a necessary complement to the ample existing specialised literature, so that both specific and more general dynamics can be gleaned.

In light of the contributions highlighted above, I believe that the research in this thesis advances theoretical thought on integration and provides useful insights for future studies of integration and for a policy audience. Still, as mentioned, it is not without its limitations. On a last note, below I briefly recapitulate some main limitations and directions for future research.⁸⁸

8.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research

A main limitation of my research is that the empirical studies were able to test statistical associations, but not causal mechanisms. Second, the robustness of the analyses, as well as their depth, was somewhat limited by sample sizes. The pooled ESS sample provided a relatively large first- and second-generation immigrant samples as far as European, especially cross-European, sources go, not to mention its broad geographical coverage and fair integration-relevant coverage among its variables. Nevertheless, the lack of a targeted immigrant- and immigrant-background sample resulted in some sample size limitations. For instance, I was not able to look separately at ‘1.5’ or ‘2.5’ generation immigrant subsamples, and when I did look into subsamples (e.g., by generation and country groups in Paper 1, or by EU27+ vs. TCN origin in Paper 3), the smaller sample sizes meant that the results of these supplementary analyses were not very robust. Combined with sample size limitations, the intentionally broad scope of the studies also required some trade-offs in depth; for instance, I was not able to examine detailed origin groups beyond the binary ethnic/racial

⁸⁸ Please see the individual papers for a fuller discussion of limitations within each.

minority/majority distinction, which itself had its shortcomings. That said, this also served a somewhat different role, i.e., more focused on racialised group membership regardless of migrant origin, compared the typical origin/ethnic group categories (which can treat certain origins/ethnic group memberships as explanations in and of themselves) – see related discussion in Chapter 4 (Methodology). Similarly, both due to sample size limitations and scope feasibility, Paper 3 could not venture into sub-national levels of analysis. As mentioned in Paper 2, my second-generation sample had surprisingly high parental SES levels, on average, compared to the native-background sample; this could point to a representativity problem of vulnerable migrant-background populations within the ESS.

The findings and limitations of the research in this thesis point to some interesting avenues to explore in future research. As mentioned, the thesis strengthened the case for applying a nuanced multidimensional lens to the study of integration; in fact, it challenged the assumptions of homogeneity even within what may seem thematically consistent domains. Given the availability of appropriate data, several aspects touched upon in this research warrant further, closer investigation. These include, first, conducting additional and possibly more robust tests of the relationship between different aspects of integration. Second, comparisons of second-generation vs. native-background outcomes across even more subcategories of race, ethnicity, and class, and, data permitting, additional intersections between class, gender, and ethnicity categories could add further nuance to the dynamics found in the second paper. A disaggregation by countries (or at least country groups) may also yield further insights. Third, looking into contextual effects into further detail with sub-national analyses and, especially, more specialised evaluations of the effects of integration policies, could contribute to some aspects in which the evidence base remains thin. Above all, all of these areas of research would very strongly benefit from analyses able

to assert causal mechanisms; to enable this, good quality longitudinal data on integration, or even mixed methods projects complementing quantitative associations found with qualitative inquiries into the specific mechanisms at play would be particularly helpful.

8.6 Final remarks

Following from the fundamental European values of equality, solidarity, and human dignity, ensuring the fair and equitable inclusion of immigrants and their descendants in European societies is a moral imperative. However, the practical realisation of that goal is far from a straightforward task, starting from a thorough understanding of the integration process and the factors influencing it. Indeed, as the questions raised in this thesis have also demonstrated despite a rich and growing scholarly and policy literature on immigrant integration, several policy-relevant knowledge gaps remain. The research in this thesis has aimed to help fill some of these gaps, particularly those that prevent a comprehensive overview of integration-related knowledge at a cross-European level. As outlined above, it has made several useful contributions, helping to broaden the body of empirical evidence on first- and second-generation multidimensional integration in Europe, along with some informative conceptual and methodological insights. That said the research did face some limitations, often due to the shortcomings of the currently available cross-European data on first- and second-generation immigrants. The individual papers and this concluding chapter have also outlined practical lines along which future research could further advance the discussion raised by this research.

Looking to the future of European societies, the challenge of immigrant integration remains as salient and complex as ever. The last of the data used in my studies was collected in 2018, the year I started writing this thesis. In the time since, the presence of immigrants

and their descendants in European societies has continued to grow, paired with a continued diversification of immigration inflows (OECD/EU 2019; OECD 2021a; 2021b; Santamaria, Tintori, and Vespe 2021). Across Europe, Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant far-right parties have continued to rise (BBC 2019; Henley 2022). The COVID-19 crisis has temporarily decreased migration, but has also been particularly hard on immigrants and migrant-background minorities across Europe, highlighting existing inequalities in access to healthcare and immigrants' vulnerable position in the labour market (MPI 2021; OECD 2021b). Since the Taliban's takeover in 2021, a growing number of Afghans have sought refuge in Europe (Hoffmann 2022). Just in the final months of writing this thesis, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced over 5 million Ukrainians refugees to flee, mostly to neighbouring countries in Europe; most of these have had relatively little experience with immigrant integration thus far (UNHCR 2022). Amid long-standing and new challenges, continuing to improve our understanding of immigrant integration remains a crucial objective for European research.

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⁸⁹ Note: this list includes works cited in Chapters 1-4 and Chapter 8. For works cited within the publication-style papers (Chapters 5-7), please refer to the individual references sections included within them.

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10 APPENDICES

10.1 Appendix to Chapter 3

Table 10.1. Definitions of integration (some prominent examples)

Author(s)	Year	Geographical context	Term(s) defined	Definition
Park & Burgess	1921	US	Assimilation	<i>'Assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.'</i> (Park and Burgess 1921, 735)
Park	1930	US	Assimilation	<i>'In the United States an immigrant is ordinarily considered assimilated as soon as he has acquired the language and the social ritual of the native community and can participate, without encountering prejudice, in the common life, economic and political.'</i> (Park, 1930, p. 281 as cited in Gordon 1964, 63).
Fairchild	1944	US	Assimilation	<i>'In essence, assimilation is the substitution of one nationality pattern for another. Ordinarily, the modifications must be made by the weaker or numerically inferior group.'</i> (Fairchild, 1944, p. 84 as cited in Gordon, 1964, p. 64)
Warner & Srole	1945	US	Assimilation	Assimilation is implicitly defined as both the ability to <i>'disappear'</i> into white Anglo-Saxon society (1945, pp. 2, 289) and as <i>'full acceptance in the host society'</i> (1945, p. 285). Upon a closer reading, the latter (acceptance) may be interpreted as the dominant definition, for which the former (invisibility) is seen as a necessary prerequisite, given the rigid racial hierarchies of American society at the time.
Bernard	1956	US	Integration (& assimilation)	<i>'The fact of the matter is that the United States has not assimilated the newcomer nor absorbed him. Our immigrant stock and our so-called 'native' stock have each integrated with the other. That is to say that each element has been changed by association with the other, without complete loss of its own cultural identity. [...] [T]he parts, while affected by interaction with each other, nevertheless remain complementary but individual. [...]</i> <i>It will be apparent that this concept of integration rests upon a belief in the importance of cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity. It recognizes the rights of groups and individuals to be different so long as the differences do not lead to domination or disunity.'</i> (Bernard, 1956, p. 2, as cited in Gordon, 1964, p. 68)
Fichter	1957	US	Assimilation	<i>'a social process through which two or more persons or groups accept and perform one another's patterns of behavior. We commonly talk about a person, or a minority category, being assimilated into a group or a society, but here again this must not be interpreted as a 'one-sided' process. It is a relation of interaction in</i>

				<i>which both parties behave reciprocally even though one may be much more affected than the other.' (1957, p. 229, as cited in Gordon 1964, 65)</i>
Alba & Nee	1997	US	Assimilation	<i>'[I]n the most general terms, assimilation can be defined as the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it. This definition does not assume that one of these groups must be the ethnic majority; assimilation can involve minority groups only, in which case the ethnic boundary between the majority and the merged minority groups presumably remains intact. [...] Nevertheless, the type of assimilation that is of greater interest does involve the majority group. [...] By intent, our definition is agnostic about whether the changes wrought by assimilation are one-sided or more mutual. Indeed, there should be no definitional prescription on this point.'</i> (1997, 863)
Berry	1997	Canada	Integration & assimilation (as sub-categories of acculturation)	<i>'From the point of view of non-dominant groups, when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. [...] When there is an interest in both maintaining one's original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, Integration is the option; here, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking to participate as an integral part of the larger social network.'</i> (1997, 9)
Esser	2004	Europe	Integration & assimilation	<p><i>'Every theory about the (intergenerational) integration of migrants refers to three different but interdependent aspects. The first is the social integration of immigrants into a social system as individual actors, for instance inclusion in the labor market of the host society, as a member of an ethnic community, or as part of a transnational network. The second aspect is the emergence of certain social structures, especially with regard to patterns of social inequality and social differentiation.[...] The third aspect is, following a distinction by David Lockwood (1964), related to the societal integration of a whole society (or a broader, perhaps transnational system) with regard to certain structural cleavages and (latent or open) conflicts.</i></p> <p><i>Assimilation can [...] have two meanings. First, it refers to the (process of) social integration or the inclusion of individual immigrants into the various subsystems of the host society and/or their (increasing) similarity to individual actors in comparable segments of the native population, e.g. by the adoption of certain cultural traits, the placement in the native (primary) labor market, intermarriage, or even emotional identification with the host society or parts of its subculture(s). We call this individual assimilation.</i></p> <p><i>Second, assimilation refers to a specific pattern of the social structure of society [...] With regard to social inequality, assimilation designates the (process of an) increasing similarity in the distribution of certain characteristics between ethnic groups as aggregates, for instance the complete disappearance of between-group variances in education, occupations, and income between ethnic groups. [...] Note that this process of assimilation can take place via changes on both sides, and by processes of so-called pluralistic assimilation. It only means that the distributions of certain characteristics are becoming similar between ethnic groups, regardless of the direction, place, or initiator of this process. With regard to social differentiation, assimilation refers to the (process of) decrease of the ethnic institutionalization and ethnic coding of societal (sub)systems (and not just aggregates of populations), like, for instance, the dissolution of institutionally complete ethnic communities and/or the decline of ethnic boundaries and collective feelings of social distances and identifications.'</i> (2004a, 1129–31)</p>

Penninx	2005	Europe	Integration	<i>'the process of becoming an accepted part of society' (2005, 141)</i>
Heckmann	2006	Europe	Integration	<p><i>'System integration is integration of social systems via institutions and organisations, via the state, the legal system, markets, corporate actors or money. It is a mostly anonymous form of integration. Social integration stands for the inclusion of new individual actors in a system, for the creation of mutual relationships among actors and for their attitudes to the social system as a whole. [...] Integration of migrants into a receiving society should be understood as a special case of social integration for which the concepts of placement, cultururation, interaction and identification can be applied.'</i> (2006, pp. 9-10, building on Lockwood, 1964, and Esser, 2000)</p> <p><i>'Integration as social integration can be defined as a generations lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society. For the migrants integration refers to a process of learning a new culture, an acquisition of rights, access to positions and statuses, a building of personal relations to members of the receiving society and a formation of feelings of belonging and identification towards the immigration society. Integration is an interactive process between migrants and the receiving society. The receiving society has to learn new ways of interacting with the newcomers and adapt its institutions to their needs. In this process, however, the receiving society has much more power and prestige.'</i> (2006, 18)</p>
Barkan, Diner & Kraut	2008	US	Incorporation	<i>'Scholars tend to use the term incorporation to describe those actions taken by individual migrants and their families to bring them closer to the host society. [...] Incorporation involves individuals engaging in ever-widening circles of contact and interaction with the host society [...]. If this process of incorporation proceeds without substantial resistance, it will eventually include membership in nonethnic organizations, citizenship and suffrage, and possibly social interactions that transcend group boundaries, such as dating and out-marriage.'</i> (2008, 15)
Lessard-Phillips	2009	Europe	Adaptation	<i>'a dynamic process of adjustment to a new society, which involves both the migrants and their descendants and the people and the institutions of the host country working through their differences, and whose outcomes can be either positive or negative and can span [many] dimensions.'</i> (Lessard-Phillips 2009, 4)
Alba & Foner	2015	US & Europe	Integration	<i>'[...] integrate immigrants and their children so that they become full members of the societies where they now live. Full membership means having the same educational and work opportunities as long-term native-born citizens, and the same chances to better their own and their children's lot. It also means having a sense of dignity and belonging that comes with acceptance and inclusion in a broad range of institutions. (Alba and Foner 2015, 1–2)</i>
Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas	2016	Europe	Integration (& others)	<i>'The term integration refers to the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration' (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016, 11). 'While concepts such as adaptation, acculturation, and assimilation have tended to be focused on the cultural dimension of immigrants' settlement,</i>

others, such as accommodation, incorporation, and inclusion/exclusion, have shifted the focus to the host society and concentrated on the legal-political and socio-economic dimensions. ' (ibid., p. 12)

IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre	2019	World	Integration	<i>'The process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups....[Integration] refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies...[and implies] consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose.'</i> (IOM GMDAC 2019, para. 4 citing IOM 2011)
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Note: a large part of even the most influential empirical literature does not specify a definition of integration/assimilation. In some cases an approximate definition may be inferred from the text or variables used; in other cases, authors rely on earlier definitions – however, I do not consider either case to be noteworthy as advancing the definitional debate.

10.2 Appendix to Chapter 5 (Paper 1)

Online Appendix Table A1. Sample breakdown by background characteristics

Background variables	Range	Weighted %/ mean estimate	Unweighted freq./obs.
Migration status	0/1		1,066
Second generation (incl. 1.5)	0	45.93%	446
First generation (excl. 1.5 & recent arrivals)	1	54.07%	620
Gender	0/1		1,066
Female	1	48.44%	573
Male	0	51.56%	493
Age	18-114	42.31	1,066
Country			1,066
AT (Austria)		2.32%	73
BE (Belgium)		4.42%	106
CH (Switzerland)		2.85%	85
CZ (Czechia)		0.14%	7
DE (Germany)		21.89%	103
DK (Denmark)		0.69%	32
ES (Spain)		3.74%	25
FI (Finland)		0.30%	17
FR (France)		30.89%	133
GB (United Kingdom)		19.37%	95
HU (Hungary)		0.18%	6
IE (Ireland)		0.62%	54
LT (Lithuania)		0.37%	39
NL (Netherlands)		6.58%	124
NO (Norway)		0.92%	43
PL (Poland)		0.56%	3
PT (Portugal)		1.40%	31
SE (Sweden)		2.58%	74
SI (Slovenia)		0.18%	16
MIPEX score for country	37-86	57.95	1,066
High' MIPEX score (>56)		42.41%	577
Lower' MIPEX score (=< 56)		57.59%	489

Online Appendix Table A2. Variables used in the analysis: range/category codes and weighted percentages or mean estimates

Variables and categories	Range/ code	Weighted %/mean estimate
Use an official national language of the country in the home (1st) (=1/Yes)	0/1	63.33%
Feel close to country	0-3	
Not close at all	0	1.17%
Not very close	1	6.93%
Close	2	46.12%
Very close	3	45.77%
Minority race or ethnic group: contact, how often	1-7	
Never	1	1.07%
Less than once a month	2	4.35%
Once a month	3	3.23%
Several times a month	4	11.93%
Once a week	5	6.73%
Several times a week	6	20.45%
Every day	7	52.24%
Minority race or ethnic group: have any close friends	0-2	
No, none at all	0	10.56%
Yes, a few	1	38.04%
Yes, several	2	51.40%
Take part in social activities relative to age peers	1-5	
Much less than most	1	8.10%
Less than most	2	29.46%
About the same	3	46.74%
More than most	4	11.96%
Much more than most	5	3.75%
Close friends	0-6	
None	0	5.02%
1	1	15.50%
2	2	23.22%
3	3	21.29%
4-6	4	23.07%
7-9	5	5.13%
10 or more	6	6.76%
In-group discrimination on basis of race, nationality, or ethnicity (= 1/ Yes)	0/1	31.94%
Minorities in living area	1-3	
Almost nobody minority race/ethnic group	1	13.80%
Some minority race/ethnic group	2	46.31%
Many minority race/ethnic group	3	39.89%
Highest level of education, ES - ISCED	1-7	
ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary	1	14.93%
ES-ISCED II, lower secondary	2	14.26%
ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary	3	18.44%
ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary	4	11.35%
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree	5	17.55%
ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education, BA level	6	8.79%
ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level	7	14.68%
ISEI score (International Socioeconomic Index/Occupational status)	10-89	39.33
Household's total net income, all sources (national decile)	1-10	5.01
Feeling about household income	1-4	
Very difficult on present income	1	6.45%
Difficult on present income	2	28.09%
Coping on present income	3	42.04%
Living comfortably on present income	4	23.42%
Citizen of country (= 1/ Yes)	0/1	65.56%
Politically engaged/active (= 1/ Yes)	0/1	68.24%

Life satisfaction (0: Extremely dissatisfied ... 10: Extremely satisfied)	0–10	6.54
Subjective general health	1–5	
Very bad	1	0.81%
Bad	2	5.76%
Fair	3	23.35%
Good	4	49.52%
Very good	5	20.55%
Mental/physical fitness (Hampered in daily activities? / reverse coding)	1–3	
Yes a lot	1	5.33%
Yes to some extent	2	17.20%
No	3	77.47%
Mental health (Felt depressed past week? / reverse coding)	1–4	
All or almost all of the time	1	2.08%
Most of the time	2	6.50%
Some of the time	3	32.25%
None or almost none of the time	4	59.18%

Online Appendix Table A3. Coding logic for variables used in analysis (vs original ESS variables)

Variables used	Original ESS variables used (original labels)	Coding logic (if any substantial changes made)
Migration status	<i>Born in country; Country of birth, mother; Country of birth, father; What year you first came to live in country; Year of birth</i>	Second generation (incl. 1.5): born in country & mother and/or father born in different country (1.5 generation: if not born in country but arrived at or before age 12) 'First generation': not born in country & arrived after age of 12 (note: those arrived <5 years before survey year excluded)
Ethnic/racial minority	<i>Belong to minority ethnic group in country; First Ancestry; Second Ancestry; Discrimination of respondent's group: colour or race; ethnic group;</i>	Classified as ethnic/racial minority if any of the following apply: belong to minority ethnic group in country; first or second ancestry is African, Asian or Middle-Eastern; indicated yes on belonging to a group that is discriminated against on grounds of race/skin color or ethnicity
MIPEX category	Generated from manual import of MIPEX 2020# scores	High MIPEX country if score >56 (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden) Lower MIPEX country if score ≤ 56 (Austria, Switzerland, Czechia, Denmark, France, UK, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia)
Use an official national language of the country in the home (1st) (=1/Yes)	Language most often spoken at home: first mentioned	=1 (for Yes) if language is an official national of the survey country
Feel close to country	- (same)	(Recoded to ascending logic)
Minority race or ethnic group: contact, how often	<i>Different race or ethnic group: contact, how often</i>	-
Minority race or ethnic group: have any close friends	<i>Different race or ethnic group: have any close friends</i>	-
People of minority race/ethnic group in current living area	- (same)	-
Highest level of education	Highest level of education, ES - ISCED	-
ISEI (Occupation socio-economic status score)	<i>Occupation, ISCO08</i>	Used <i>iscogen</i> package (Ben Jann, 2019) to generate International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et al. 1992) scores from ISCO08 occupational categories
Household's total net income, all sources (national decile)	<i>Household's total net income, all sources</i>	-
Feeling about household income	<i>Feeling about household's income nowadays</i>	(Recoded to ascending logic)

Take part in social activities relative to age peers	<i>Take part in social activities compared to others of same age</i>	-
Close friends	<i>How many people with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters</i>	-
Life satisfaction	<i>How satisfied with life as a whole</i>	-
Subjective general health	<i>Subjective general health</i>	(Recoded to ascending logic)
Mental/physical fitness (Not hampered in daily activities, reverse coding)	<i>Hampered in daily activities by illness/disability/infirmity/mental problem</i>	(Recoded to ascending logic)
Mental health (depression, reverse coding)	<i>Felt depressed, how often past week (reverse coding)</i>	(Recoded to ascending logic)
Citizen of country	- (same)	-
Politically engaged/active	<i>Voted last national election; Signed petition last 12 months; Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months; Boycotted certain products last 12 months</i>	=1 (for Yes) if indicated 'Yes' on any
In-group discrimination on basis of race, nationality, religion, language, or ethnicity	<i>Discrimination of respondent's group: colour or race; nationality; religion; language; ethnic group</i>	=1 (for Yes) if indicated 'Yes' on any

Online Appendix Table A4. Factor loadings from factor analysis (FA) for second-generation (incl. 1.5) subsample (N=446)

Interpretation of factor	<i>Economic/ structural integration</i>	<i>Health & well-being</i>	<i>Minority sociali- zation</i>	<i>Cultural (non) assimi- lation</i>	<i>Subjective well-being, incl. social</i>	Unique- ness
Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	
Highest level of education	0.72	0.17	-0.05	0.00	0.18	0.41
ISEI (Occupational status)	0.73	0.06	-0.07	-0.07	-0.01	0.45
Household income	0.56	0.34	-0.19	0.18	-0.14	0.48
Feeling about hh. income	0.35	0.51	-0.20	0.26	0.05	0.50
General health	0.10	0.64	-0.04	-0.12	0.36	0.43
Physical/mental fitness	0.01	0.67	0.18	-0.02	-0.04	0.51
Mental health	0.24	0.46	-0.05	0.05	0.35	0.61
Life satisfaction	0.17	0.39	-0.01	0.27	0.21	0.71
Regular socializing	-0.06	0.18	0.02	0.03	0.44	0.77
Close friends	0.12	0.04	0.00	0.19	0.43	0.76
Use host language at home	0.36	-0.04	-0.18	-0.55	0.10	0.52
Feel close to country	0.04	0.03	0.10	-0.47	-0.17	0.74
Citizen of country	0.53	-0.05	-0.37	-0.14	0.46	0.34
Political engagement	0.42	0.11	0.29	-0.11	0.08	0.72
Contact with minorities	0.10	0.14	0.36	0.35	0.12	0.70
Friendship with minorities	0.18	0.14	0.48	0.35	0.04	0.59
Minorities in living area	-0.12	-0.10	0.57	-0.12	0.04	0.64
In-group discrimination	-0.09	-0.01	0.25	0.02	-0.09	0.92

Note: PF method, 5 factor solution, Kaiser varimax rotation; Loadings > 0.3 highlighted and bold (except for cross-loadings)

Online Appendix Table A5. Factor loadings from FA for first-generation subsample (N=620)

Interpretation of factor	<i>Economic/ structural integration</i>	<i>Subjective well-being, incl. social</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Minority sociali- zation</i>	<i>Cultural assim. & civic/ political integration</i>	Unique- ness
Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	
Highest level of education	0.78	0.06	0.03	-0.03	0.15	0.37
ISEI (Occupational status)	0.72	0.11	0.03	-0.08	0.19	0.43
Household income	0.56	0.28	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.56
Feeling about hh. income	0.43	0.56	0.13	-0.15	-0.01	0.46
General health	0.10	0.25	0.70	0.05	0.03	0.43
Physical/mental fitness	0.04	-0.01	0.79	-0.02	0.06	0.37
Mental health	0.07	0.58	0.28	0.02	0.04	0.58
Life satisfaction	0.07	0.61	0.06	-0.04	0.01	0.61
Regular socializing	0.12	0.35	-0.10	0.05	0.17	0.82
Close friends	0.27	0.34	-0.25	0.11	0.03	0.74
Use host language at home	0.06	-0.20	0.23	-0.25	0.45	0.63
Feel close to country	0.01	0.11	0.03	-0.04	0.50	0.74
Citizen of country	0.21	0.10	0.05	-0.04	0.51	0.68
Political engagement	0.35	0.06	-0.14	0.12	0.53	0.56
Contact with minorities	0.01	0.05	0.11	0.56	0.06	0.67
Friendship with minorities	0.04	0.09	-0.03	0.59	-0.07	0.63
Minorities in living area	-0.10	-0.12	-0.04	0.53	-0.05	0.69
In-group discrimination	0.12	-0.22	-0.09	0.25	-0.09	0.86

Note: PF method, 5 factor solution, Kaiser varimax rotation; Loadings > 0.3 highlighted and bold (except for cross-loadings)

Online Appendix Table A6. Factor loadings from FA for subsample with respondents in High MIPEx score countries (N=577)

Interpretation of factor	<i>Economic/ cultural integration</i>	<i>Subjective well-being, incl. social</i>	<i>Minority sociali- zation</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Civic/ political integration</i>	Unique- ness
Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	
Highest level of education	0.68	0.19	-0.13	0.08	0.01	0.47
ISEI (Occupational status)	0.63	0.21	-0.05	0.04	0.19	0.52
Household income	0.45	0.35	0.04	0.23	0.07	0.61
Feeling about hh. income	0.30	0.59	-0.13	0.19	0.13	0.49
General health	0.08	0.26	-0.04	0.66	0.01	0.49
Physical/mental fitness	0.03	-0.02	0.06	0.66	0.04	0.55
Mental health	-0.09	0.57	-0.03	0.27	0.05	0.59
Life satisfaction	0.27	0.50	-0.06	0.12	-0.20	0.62
Regular socializing	0.06	0.44	0.11	-0.02	0.09	0.78
Close friends	0.07	0.38	0.05	-0.11	0.24	0.78
Use host language at home	0.50	-0.29	-0.20	0.11	0.22	0.56
Feel close to country	0.31	0.03	-0.03	-0.05	0.03	0.90
Citizen of country	0.33	0.05	-0.31	0.07	0.52	0.52
Political engagement	0.14	0.19	-0.05	0.07	0.66	0.50
Contact with minorities	0.05	0.05	0.62	0.17	0.01	0.58
Friendship with minorities	-0.08	0.06	0.55	0.04	-0.07	0.67
Minorities in living area	-0.15	-0.05	0.46	-0.14	-0.09	0.73
In-group discrimination	-0.22	-0.04	0.26	-0.15	0.20	0.82

Note: PF method, 5 factor solution, Kaiser varimax rotation; Loadings > 0.3 highlighted and bold (except for cross-loadings)

Online Appendix Table A7. Factor loadings from FA for subsample with respondents in Lower MIPEx score countries (N=489)

Interpretation of factor	<i>Economic/ structural integration</i>	<i>Health & well-being</i>	<i>Minority sociali- zation</i>	<i>Subjective well-being, incl. social</i>	<i>Cultural assim. & civic/ political integration</i>	Unique- ness
Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	
Highest level of education	0.84	0.11	0.08	0.03	-0.04	0.28
ISEI (Occupational status)	0.75	0.07	-0.05	0.01	0.05	0.42
Household income	0.64	0.19	0.02	0.21	0.06	0.51
Feeling about hh. income	0.40	0.40	-0.06	0.39	-0.05	0.53
General health	0.12	0.75	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.42
Physical/mental fitness	0.00	0.79	0.03	-0.07	0.11	0.36
Mental health	0.16	0.47	0.05	0.45	-0.03	0.55
Life satisfaction	0.13	0.27	0.16	0.47	-0.20	0.62
Regular socializing	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.39	0.19	0.81
Close friends	0.27	-0.05	0.17	0.36	-0.03	0.77
Use host language at home	0.17	0.14	-0.23	-0.03	0.65	0.48
Feel close to country	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.02	0.64	0.59
Citizen of country	0.42	0.05	0.06	0.28	0.38	0.60
Political engagement	0.55	-0.13	0.35	-0.06	0.32	0.46
Contact with minorities	0.04	0.06	0.53	0.19	-0.04	0.68
Friendship with minorities	0.21	0.08	0.67	0.05	-0.14	0.47
Minorities in living area	-0.15	-0.02	0.48	-0.27	0.09	0.66
In-group discrimination	0.07	0.03	0.17	-0.32	0.00	0.86

Note: PF method, 5 factor solution, Kaiser varimax rotation; Loadings > 0.3 highlighted and bold (except for cross-loadings)

Online Appendix Table A8.1. Countries/regions of origin 1: Country of birth for foreign-born respondents

Country/region of birth (if foreign-born)	Obs.	% (unweighted)
Turkey	68	8.6%
Morocco	48	6.0%
Poland	47	5.9%
Iran	30	3.8%
Algeria	26	3.3%
India	26	3.3%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	25	3.1%
Russia	18	2.3%
Pakistan	17	2.1%
Iraq	14	1.8%
Indonesia	13	1.6%
Croatia	12	1.5%
Romania	12	1.5%
Suriname	12	1.5%
South Africa	11	1.4%
Angola	10	1.3%
Kazakhstan	10	1.3%
China	10	1.3%
Kosovo	10	1.3%
Tunisia	10	1.3%
Other, Africa	88	11.1%
Other, EU	60	7.6%
Other, Europe (non-EU)	53	6.7%
Other, Central and South America	26	3.3%
Other, Central Asia	22	2.8%
Other, Caribbean	21	2.6%
Other, Southeast Asia	20	2.5%
Other, MENA	19	2.4%
Other, East Asia	13	1.6%
Other, South Asia	12	1.5%
Other, North America	3	0.4%
N/A	28	3.5%
<i>Total foreign-born respondents</i>	<i>794</i>	<i>100.0%</i>

Note: countries with fewer than 10 obs. aggregated into regions

Online Appendix Table A8.2. Countries/regions of origin 2: Parental country/region of birth for second-generation respondents (native-born with foreign-born mother and/or father)

Country/region of birth: foreign-born fathers	Obs.	% (unweighted)
Turkey	42	17.5%
Morocco	36	15.0%
Algeria	17	7.1%
India	10	4.2%
Indonesia	10	4.2%
Russia	7	2.9%
Suriname	7	2.9%
Tunisia	7	2.9%
Italy	6	2.5%
Jamaica	6	2.5%
Pakistan	6	2.5%
Other, EU	26	10.8%
Other, Europe (non-EU)	21	8.8%
Other, Africa	8	3.3%
Other, MENA	7	2.9%
Other, Southeast Asia	7	2.9%
Other, Caribbean	5	2.1%
Other, North America	2	0.8%
Other, Central Asia	1	0.4%
Other, East Asia	1	0.4%
N/A	8	3.3%
<i>Total respondents with foreign-born fathers</i>	<i>240</i>	<i>100.0%</i>
Country/region of birth: foreign-born mothers		
Turkey	38	19.4%
Morocco	31	15.8%
Indonesia	10	5.1%
Algeria	10	5.1%
India	8	4.1%
Other, East Asia	29	14.8%
Other, Europe (non-EU)	14	7.1%
Other, South America	10	5.1%
Other, MENA	9	4.6%
Other, Caribbean	8	4.1%
Other, Southeast Asia	8	4.1%
Other, Africa	7	3.6%
Other, East Asia	6	3.1%
Other, North America	1	0.5%
N/A	7	3.6%
<i>Total respondents with foreign-born mothers</i>	<i>196</i>	<i>100.0%</i>

Note: countries with 5 or fewer obs aggregated into regions

10.3 Appendix to Chapter 6 (Paper 2)

Supplementary tables and figures

Title of manuscript: Does immigrant parentage matter? A multidimensional analysis of second-generation immigrants' inclusion and well-being across Europe

Appendix

Table A1. Sample breakdown by country and wave

Country	Unweighted frequencies (number of obs.)					% of pooled sample
	ESS round					
	6	7	8	9	Total	
Albania	727	0	0	0	727	0.56%
Austria	0	1,413	1,675	2,062	5,150	3.96%
Belgium	1,404	1,323	1,291	1,314	5,332	4.10%
Bulgaria	2,046	0	0	1,770	3,816	2.93%
Croatia	0	0	0	1,367	1,367	1.05%
Cyprus	808	0	0	595	1,403	1.08%
Czechia	1,429	1,721	1,924	1,982	7,056	5.42%
Denmark	1,266	1,187	0	0	2,453	1.89%
Estonia	1,700	1,472	1,608	1,537	6,317	4.85%
Finland	1,861	1,785	1,570	1,490	6,706	5.15%
France	1,608	1,476	1,625	1,553	6,262	4.81%
Germany	2,279	2,394	2,235	1,807	8,715	6.70%
Hungary	1,578	1,317	1,179	1,332	5,406	4.15%
Ireland	1,933	1,718	1,978	1,604	7,233	5.56%
Italy	609	0	1,616	1,792	4,017	3.09%
Kosovo	567	0	0	0	567	0.44%
Latvia	0	0	0	786	786	0.60%
Lithuania	1,598	1,666	1,672	1,540	6,476	4.98%
Montenegro	0	0	0	779	779	0.60%
Netherlands	1,552	1,598	1,401	1,312	5,863	4.51%
Norway	1,251	1,095	1,195	1,084	4,625	3.55%
Poland	1,576	1,327	1,423	1,191	5,517	4.24%
Portugal	1,667	983	1,052	826	4,528	3.48%
Serbia	0	0	0	1,377	1,377	1.06%
Slovakia	1,536	0	0	956	2,492	1.92%
Slovenia	908	874	996	978	3,756	2.89%
Spain	1,262	1,459	1,477	1,189	5,387	4.14%
Sweden	1,448	1,383	1,263	1,202	5,296	4.07%
Switzerland	1035	1017	1020	998	4,070	3.13%
United Kingdom	1,689	1,724	1,487	1,738	6,638	5.10%
Total	35,337	28,932	29,687	36,161	130,117	100%

Source: ESS rounds 6 (ed. 2.4), 7 (ed. 2.2), 8 (ed. 2.1), and 9 (ed. 2.0) excluding Iceland, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine. Note: data not weighted.

Table A2. Coding logic and more detailed value labels for dependent and independent variables used in analysis

Variables	(Re)coding logic and value labels	Code
Dependent variables		
Educational attainment	<i>Based on: Highest level of education ES- ISCED</i>	
Up to lower secondary	ES-ISCED I (less than lower secondary), OR ES-ISCED II (lower secondary)	1
Secondary or vocational	ES-ISCED IIIb (lower tier upper secondary), OR ES-ISCED IIIa (upper tier upper secondary), OR ES-ISCED IV (advanced vocational, sub-degree)	2
Tertiary	ES-ISCED V1 (lower tertiary education, BA level), OR ES-ISCED V2 (higher tertiary education, >= MA level)	3
ISEI score (Occupation)	<i>Based on: occupational information, converted into a continuous score (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996)</i>	(continuous)
Political engagement	<i>Based on: voting and other forms of political participation</i>	
Yes	Respondent has: voted in the last election, AND/OR participated in ANY of the following non-electoral political activities in the past 12 months: signed a petition, participated in a demonstration, or boycotted a product	1
No	Has done none of the above	0
Social acceptance	<i>Based on: feelings of in-group discrimination</i>	
Yes	No feelings of in-group discrimination indicated	1
No	Feels part of a group that is discriminated against in [country] (in-group discrimination)	0
Health	<i>Based on: subjective general health (recoded)</i>	
(Very) bad	Bad or very bad	1
Fair	Fair	2
(Very) good	Good or very good	3
Life satisfaction	<i>(as in ESS)</i>	
	Extremely dissatisfied	0
	[no label]	1 ... 9
	Extremely satisfied	10
Independent variables		
Generational status	<i>Based on: country of birth, mother's and father's country of birth; age at arrival variables</i>	
Second generation	Respondent born in country of residence; at least one parent foreign-born, OR born abroad but arrived to country at age of 12 or younger	1
Native-parentage / 3+ generation	Respondent & both their parents born in respondents' country of residence	0
Ethnic/racial background	<i>Based on: belonging to minority ethnic group; first and second ancestry; in-group discrimination; religion</i>	
	(a) belongs to a minority ethnic group in the given country; OR	
Ethnic/racial minority	(b) first or second ancestry non-European (i.e. African, Asian, Caribbean or Latin-American or Middle-Eastern); OR	
	(c-d) belongs to a group that suffers discrimination on the basis of colour, race, or ethnicity (self-assessed); OR	
	(e) belongs (or has ever belonged to) to Islam religion	1
Ethnic/racial majority	None of the above apply	0
Ethnic/racial background *	<i>Alternative version (used for Social acceptance models) does not rely on in-group discrimination variable (otherwise, same as above)</i>	

Ethnic/racial minority	(a) belongs to a minority ethnic group in the given country; OR (b) first or second ancestry non-European (i.e. African, Asian, Caribbean or Latin-American or Middle-Eastern); OR (c) belongs (or has ever belonged to) to Islam religion	1
Ethnic/racial majority	None of the above apply	0
Gender	<i>(as in ESS)</i>	
Female	-	1
Male	-	0
Parental SES	<i>Based on: parents' occupation or education when respondent was 14 (uses highest/nonmissing occupational skill level between two parents; uses educational attainment if no occupation skill information available for either parent)</i>	
Low	'semi-skilled and unskilled workers, farm workers'; 'up to lower secondary' education	1 (0 otherwise)
Medium	'clerical, sales and service occupations, skilled workers'; 'secondary or vocational' education	1 (0 otherwise)
High	'professional, technical, and higher administrator occupations'; 'tertiary' education	1 (0 otherwise)
Age group	<i>(recoded into groups from continuous ESS version)</i>	
Under 26		1 (0 otherwise)
26-35		1 (0 otherwise)
36-45		1 (0 otherwise)
46-60		1 (0 otherwise)
Over 60		1 (0 otherwise)
Region	<i>Recoded version of country (survey country) identifier</i>	
Western Europe	Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands	1 (0 otherwise)
Scandinavia/Nordic countries	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden	1 (0 otherwise)
Southern Europe/Mediterranean	Spain, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus	1 (0 otherwise)
Eastern Europe	Albania, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Kosovo	1 (0 otherwise)

Table A3. Representation of main ancestries represented within particular subgroups (where any indicated)

Ancestry (first/second, prioritizing non- European, if any)	Ethnic/racial minorities				High parental SES				Low parental SES			
	Freq.	3+ gen % among non-missing	Freq.	2 nd gen % among non-missing	Freq.	3+ gen % among non-missing	Freq.	2 nd gen % among non-missing	Freq.	3+ gen % among non-missing	Freq.	2 nd gen % among non-missing
European	2045	83.3%	1104	50.6%	12,809	99.4%	1,607	87.1%	34,315	99.4%	2,539	84.0%
MENA/Central Asian	223	9.1%	603	27.7%	22	0.2%	70	3.8%	143	0.4%	332	11.0%
South and South-East Asian	47	1.9%	208	9.5%	10	0.1%	38	2.1%	11	0.0%	22	0.7%
Sub-Saharan African	50	2.0%	119	5.5%	13	0.1%	52	2.8%	8	0.0%	63	2.1%
Caribbean	67	2.7%	85	3.9%	4	0.0%	10	0.5%	4	0.0%	8	0.3%
East Asian	17	0.7%	35	1.6%	10	0.1%	28	1.5%	28	0.1%	26	0.9%
Latin American	4	0.2%	21	1.0%	11	0.1%	18	1.0%	15	0.0%	26	0.9%
North American and Australian	1	0.0%	5	0.2%	4	0.0%	22	1.2%	5	0.0%	5	0.2%
Total N	4,292 (incl. missing)	2,454 (excl. missing)	2,865 (incl. missing)	2,180 (excl. missing)	17,525 (incl. missing)	12,883 (excl. missing)	2,470 (incl. missing)	1,845 (excl. missing)	48,696 (incl. missing)	34,529 (excl. missing)	4,051 (incl. missing)	3,021 (excl. missing)

Source: ESS6-9, calculations based on author's subset of data. Abbreviations used: '3+ gen': Native-parentage natives (3rd generation and above); 2nd gen: second-generation

Table A4. Results of regression models 1-3 A&B, average marginal effects (1/2)

	Up to lower secondary		Educational attainment Upper secondary/voc.		Tertiary		ISEI (occupation)		Political engagement	
	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B
Second generation (ref.: 3+ generation)	-0.021+ (0.012)	-0.019* (0.009)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.019* (0.008)	0.814+ (0.479)	0.618 (0.446)	-0.054*** (0.014)	-0.058*** (0.013)
Female (ref.: male)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.012 (0.011)	-2.872*** (0.400)	-2.918*** (0.392)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
Ethnic/racial minority (ref.: ethnic/racial majority)		0.054* (0.027)		-0.002 (0.003)		-0.052+ (0.027)		-2.251* (0.929)		-0.002 (0.023)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)										
Low parental SES		0.152*** (0.009)		-0.006 (0.008)		-0.147*** (0.009)		-7.656*** (0.303)		-0.039*** (0.005)
High parental SES		-0.197*** (0.012)		0.007 (0.010)		0.190*** (0.007)		8.959*** (0.309)		0.076*** (0.007)
Age group (ref: under 26)										
26-35	-0.109*** (0.010)	-0.116*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.050*** (0.007)	0.132*** (0.012)	7.529*** (0.368)	7.046*** (0.394)	0.140*** (0.011)	0.138*** (0.011)
36-45	-0.088*** (0.012)	-0.101*** (0.014)	0.010*** (0.001)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.006)	0.109*** (0.014)	7.733*** (0.553)	7.844*** (0.567)	0.185*** (0.014)	0.190*** (0.015)
46-60	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.052** (0.019)	0.046*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.048** (0.017)	5.181*** (0.610)	6.665*** (0.607)	0.207*** (0.014)	0.221*** (0.016)
Over 60	0.130*** (0.030)	0.056* (0.027)	0.121*** (0.008)	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.039*** (0.011)	-0.039* (0.019)	3.626*** (0.594)	6.723*** (0.546)	0.221*** (0.018)	0.242*** (0.020)
ESS round (ref.: 6)										
Round 7	-0.018* (0.008)	-0.013+ (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.011+ (0.006)	0.688+ (0.340)	0.469 (0.297)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.015+ (0.008)
Round 8	-0.037** (0.012)	-0.031** (0.011)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.028** (0.011)	1.056* (0.457)	0.721+ (0.424)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)
Round 9	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.047*** (0.010)	-0.010*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.045*** (0.009)	1.524** (0.458)	0.983* (0.401)	0.020+ (0.012)	0.017 (0.012)
Region (ref: Western Europe)										
Scandinavia/Nordic	-0.067** (0.025)	-0.062** (0.022)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.019* (0.007)	0.067** (0.023)	1.397 (1.306)	0.900 (0.863)	0.069*** (0.020)	0.068*** (0.020)
Southern Europe/Med.	0.207*** (0.047)	0.150*** (0.041)	0.037* (0.015)	-0.050** (0.019)	-0.074** (0.025)	-0.101*** (0.024)	-4.629*** (1.062)	-2.542** (0.834)	-0.042 (0.028)	-0.031 (0.027)
Eastern Europe	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.035 (0.023)	0.050*** (0.011)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.035 (0.023)	-3.747** (1.067)	-2.254** (0.700)	-0.138*** (0.021)	-0.130*** (0.022)
N	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117

Notes: Average marginal effects, with standard errors shown in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by country for all models. N = 130,117 across all models.

Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A5. Results of regression models 4-6 A&B, average marginal effects (2/2)

	Social acceptance		(Very) poor		Health Fair		(Very) good		Life satisfaction	
	Model 4A	Model 4B	Model 5A	Model 5B	Model 5A	Model 5B	Model 5A	Model 5B	Model 6A	Model 6B
Second generation (ref.: 3+ generation)	-0.055*** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.013** (0.004)	0.021+ (0.011)	0.024** (0.008)	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.036** (0.012)	-0.146* (0.066)	-0.029 (0.066)
Female (ref.: male)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.014 (0.011)	0.024*** (0.004)	-0.036*** (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.006)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.032)
Ethnic/racial minority (ref.: ethnic/racial majority)		-0.121*** (0.011)		0.021*** (0.004)		0.038*** (0.008)		-0.059*** (0.011)		-0.695*** (0.121)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)										
Low parental SES		0.001 (0.003)		0.019*** (0.004)		0.035*** (0.007)		-0.054*** (0.010)		-0.305*** (0.057)
High parental SES		-0.014*** (0.003)		-0.018*** (0.003)		-0.033*** (0.004)		0.051*** (0.007)		0.167*** (0.038)
Age group (ref: under 26)										
26-35	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.005+ (0.003)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.159*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.020 (0.040)	-0.003 (0.039)
36-45	0.002 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.043*** (0.007)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.118*** (0.016)	0.045*** (0.007)	-0.053*** (0.008)	-0.055*** (0.008)	-0.145* (0.053)	-0.155** (0.050)
46-60	0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.155*** (0.014)	0.045*** (0.003)	0.021 (0.020)	0.151*** (0.013)	-0.201*** (0.015)	-0.196*** (0.015)	-0.417*** (0.081)	-0.389*** (0.076)
Over 60	0.025** (0.008)	0.009 (0.007)	0.277*** (0.024)	0.115*** (0.007)	-0.091*** (0.021)	0.266*** (0.023)	-0.398*** (0.030)	-0.381*** (0.028)	-0.328* (0.125)	-0.254* (0.115)
ESS round (ref.: 6)										
Round 7	0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.016* (0.007)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.142 (0.103)	0.120 (0.096)
Round 8	0.002 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.036** (0.011)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.011 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.317* (0.117)	0.291* (0.109)
Round 9	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.003)	0.058*** (0.011)	-0.016** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.025** (0.009)	0.352*** (0.092)	0.325*** (0.088)
Region (ref: Western Europe)										
Scandinavia/Nordic	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.008 (0.011)	0.085** (0.029)	-0.020 (0.027)	0.029 (0.039)	0.028 (0.038)	0.703*** (0.187)	0.688*** (0.182)
Southern Europe/Med.	0.013 (0.016)	0.010 (0.016)	0.073** (0.028)	0.032* (0.015)	-0.134*** (0.027)	0.064* (0.029)	-0.110** (0.043)	-0.096* (0.043)	-0.678* (0.305)	-0.614* (0.296)
Eastern Europe	0.003 (0.014)	0.013 (0.012)	0.091*** (0.023)	0.045*** (0.011)	0.006 (0.027)	0.082*** (0.024)	-0.140*** (0.034)	-0.127*** (0.035)	-1.075*** (0.255)	-0.995*** (0.236)
N	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117	130117

Notes: Average marginal effects, with standard errors shown in parentheses. Model 4B Social acceptance model uses an alternative version of the ethnic/racial minority variable (see Table A2). Standard errors clustered by country for all models. N = 130,117 across all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A6. Results of regression models 1-2 C: subgroups by migration status and ethnic/racial minority status (1/3)

	Educational attainment				ISEI			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	ethnic/racial majority		ethnic/racial minority		ethnic/racial majority		ethnic/racial minority	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Parental SES (ref.: medium)								
Low parental SES	-0.972*** (0.052)	-0.907*** (0.050)	-1.278*** (0.139)	-0.691*** (0.087)	-7.731*** (0.314)	-6.429*** (0.597)	-9.040*** (0.910)	-6.298*** (0.462)
High parental SES	1.280*** (0.048)	1.235*** (0.080)	1.063*** (0.109)	1.200*** (0.164)	9.088*** (0.324)	8.144*** (0.455)	8.669*** (1.026)	8.285*** (1.211)
Gender (Female=1)	0.083 (0.074)	-0.033 (0.098)	-0.063 (0.150)	0.384*** (0.109)	-2.859*** (0.425)	-3.449*** (0.564)	-4.066*** (0.937)	-2.212* (0.928)
Age group (ref.: < 26)								
26-35	0.771*** (0.082)	1.238*** (0.138)	0.536*** (0.123)	1.007*** (0.115)	7.108*** (0.405)	8.412*** (0.935)	4.364*** (1.080)	6.577*** (1.245)
36-45	0.657*** (0.103)	1.072*** (0.152)	0.400** (0.154)	0.831*** (0.121)	7.993*** (0.591)	9.226*** (0.781)	4.341*** (1.043)	6.959*** (1.266)
46-60	0.285* (0.122)	0.764*** (0.170)	0.292* (0.146)	0.447** (0.150)	6.755*** (0.625)	7.850*** (0.829)	5.744*** (0.942)	5.241*** (1.393)
Over 60	-0.372** (0.141)	0.347+ (0.205)	-0.075 (0.218)	0.441** (0.158)	6.738*** (0.592)	8.565*** (0.928)	6.691*** (1.319)	7.198*** (1.803)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	0.068 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.049)	0.358+ (0.195)	0.122 (0.135)	0.548+ (0.304)	-0.447 (0.359)	-0.644 (1.536)	0.391 (1.115)
Round 8	0.186* (0.075)	0.066 (0.057)	0.357 (0.249)	0.260* (0.124)	0.811+ (0.421)	0.029 (0.628)	-0.472 (1.554)	-0.802 (0.629)
Round 9	0.309*** (0.059)	0.254*** (0.068)	0.165 (0.199)	0.182 (0.129)	1.103* (0.420)	0.488 (0.438)	-0.802 (1.304)	-0.176 (0.625)
Region (ref.: W. Eur)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.437** (0.148)	0.192 (0.119)	0.503*** (0.104)	0.461+ (0.241)	1.038 (0.866)	-0.165 (1.235)	1.733+ (0.952)	-0.204 (1.634)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.831*** (0.224)	-0.305 (0.262)	-0.855*** (0.197)	-0.410 (0.446)	-2.438* (0.893)	-3.161*** (0.800)	-2.345 (1.439)	-0.022 (2.341)
Eastern Europe	0.255 (0.164)	0.063 (0.119)	-0.071 (0.220)	0.325+ (0.174)	-1.919* (0.762)	-3.915*** (0.658)	-4.360** (1.475)	-4.132*** (1.127)
Constant					39.313*** (0.830)	39.870*** (1.087)	41.764*** (1.780)	40.171*** (1.176)
cut1	-1.205*** (0.170)	-1.063*** (0.105)	-1.143*** (0.271)	-0.704** (0.250)				
cut2	1.627*** (0.147)	1.985*** (0.156)	1.566*** (0.268)	2.222*** (0.279)				
N	113676	9284	4292	2865	113676	9284	4292	2865
Adjusted R-squared					0.149	0.136	0.173	0.124

Pseudo R-squared	0.124	0.095	0.109	0.084
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*Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.*

Table A7. Results of regression models 3-4 C: subgroups by migration status and ethnic/racial minority status (2/3)

	Political engagement				Social acceptance			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial minority	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial minority	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial minority	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial minority
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Parental SES (ref.: medium)								
Low parental SES	-0.299*** (0.044)	-0.495*** (0.088)	-0.334** (0.116)	-0.169 (0.104)	0.041 (0.066)	0.187* (0.087)	-0.180 (0.170)	-0.061 (0.116)
High parental SES	0.611*** (0.054)	0.470*** (0.066)	0.694*** (0.135)	0.547*** (0.107)	-0.275*** (0.066)	-0.301** (0.111)	-0.006 (0.110)	-0.163 (0.103)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.050 (0.034)	0.011 (0.097)	-0.216* (0.085)	0.261** (0.099)	-0.171** (0.056)	-0.052 (0.092)	0.053 (0.111)	0.179+ (0.104)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	0.761*** (0.049)	0.767*** (0.098)	0.516*** (0.126)	0.486*** (0.144)	-0.070 (0.067)	-0.031 (0.194)	-0.015 (0.114)	-0.159 (0.127)
36-45	1.115*** (0.057)	1.012*** (0.139)	0.898*** (0.127)	0.740** (0.246)	-0.077 (0.069)	-0.010 (0.169)	0.040 (0.117)	-0.287 (0.197)
46-60	1.350*** (0.056)	1.377*** (0.095)	1.135*** (0.122)	0.795** (0.284)	-0.109 (0.087)	0.017 (0.208)	0.120 (0.137)	-0.052 (0.249)
Over 60	1.519*** (0.090)	1.710*** (0.149)	1.360*** (0.160)	1.032*** (0.261)	0.148 (0.161)	0.272 (0.252)	0.554** (0.193)	0.312 (0.243)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	-0.077 (0.069)	-0.034 (0.091)	-0.527* (0.264)	-0.293* (0.120)	0.035 (0.067)	-0.263* (0.112)	-0.370 (0.300)	0.118 (0.116)
Round 8	-0.023 (0.088)	0.000 (0.097)	-0.885*** (0.233)	-0.082 (0.125)	-0.013 (0.081)	-0.167 (0.147)	-0.324 (0.310)	0.229+ (0.119)
Round 9	0.173+ (0.094)	0.132 (0.126)	-0.166 (0.314)	0.038 (0.143)	-0.042 (0.114)	-0.145 (0.165)	-0.315 (0.308)	0.175 (0.179)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.857** (0.310)	1.071** (0.393)	0.869* (0.423)	1.215*** (0.362)	-0.241 (0.253)	0.083 (0.227)	0.337 (0.272)	0.024 (0.118)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.250 (0.220)	-0.364 (0.337)	-0.199 (0.270)	-1.010*** (0.306)	0.130 (0.307)	-0.245 (0.238)	0.866** (0.274)	0.823** (0.282)
Eastern Europe	-0.940*** (0.170)	-0.723*** (0.211)	-0.638* (0.277)	-1.156*** (0.239)	0.216 (0.236)	-0.036 (0.246)	0.888** (0.327)	0.053 (0.101)
Constant	0.893*** (0.160)	0.477* (0.214)	1.471*** (0.379)	0.500+ (0.279)	3.086*** (0.207)	2.749*** (0.228)	0.308 (0.391)	0.431* (0.205)
N	113676	9284	4292	2865	113678	9289	4290	2860
Pseudo R-squared	0.080	0.073	0.057	0.078	0.007	0.008	0.037	0.013

Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Social acceptance model uses an alternative version of the ethnic/racial minority variable (see Table A2)

Table A8. Results of regression models 5-6 C: subgroups by migration status and ethnic/racial minority status (3/3)

	Health				Life satisfaction			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial minority	ethnic/racial minority	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial majority	ethnic/racial minority	ethnic/racial minority
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Parental SES (ref.: medium)								
Low parental SES	-0.282*** (0.061)	-0.227*** (0.062)	-0.314*** (0.080)	-0.192* (0.088)	-0.289*** (0.059)	-0.311*** (0.073)	-0.722** (0.206)	-0.214* (0.097)
High parental SES	0.246*** (0.034)	0.361*** (0.072)	0.178 (0.124)	0.383* (0.169)	0.167*** (0.040)	0.185* (0.068)	0.020 (0.176)	0.292** (0.101)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.182*** (0.032)	-0.074 (0.047)	-0.397*** (0.078)	-0.218* (0.085)	-0.029 (0.031)	0.047 (0.048)	-0.159 (0.130)	0.096 (0.112)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	0.024 (0.063)	-0.002 (0.089)	-0.071 (0.206)	0.014 (0.115)	0.022 (0.037)	-0.023 (0.098)	-0.292* (0.123)	-0.076 (0.105)
36-45	-0.366*** (0.084)	-0.280* (0.110)	-0.549** (0.206)	-0.470*** (0.137)	-0.121* (0.049)	-0.053 (0.116)	-0.610*** (0.125)	-0.432* (0.169)
46-60	-1.094*** (0.120)	-0.998*** (0.112)	-1.265*** (0.260)	-1.343*** (0.178)	-0.342*** (0.070)	-0.360* (0.176)	-0.875*** (0.094)	-0.952*** (0.229)
Over 60	-1.895*** (0.190)	-1.634*** (0.162)	-2.129*** (0.286)	-2.042*** (0.286)	-0.218+ (0.113)	-0.220 (0.187)	-0.525** (0.160)	-0.877** (0.275)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	0.029 (0.038)	0.083 (0.082)	-0.296* (0.129)	-0.001 (0.069)	0.095 (0.093)	0.150+ (0.077)	0.324 (0.296)	0.206 (0.154)
Round 8	0.049 (0.041)	0.095 (0.067)	-0.149 (0.137)	-0.101 (0.078)	0.264* (0.109)	0.333** (0.109)	0.531+ (0.288)	0.426* (0.200)
Round 9	0.133** (0.045)	0.223** (0.081)	-0.043 (0.179)	0.025 (0.129)	0.291** (0.088)	0.418*** (0.110)	0.576* (0.266)	0.616** (0.216)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.159 (0.210)	0.213 (0.205)	0.223 (0.181)	-0.161 (0.148)	0.685*** (0.178)	0.652** (0.198)	1.271*** (0.305)	0.082 (0.239)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.490* (0.226)	-0.321 (0.278)	-0.210 (0.217)	0.279 (0.293)	-0.632* (0.300)	-0.497+ (0.284)	-0.224 (0.388)	-0.474* (0.223)
Eastern Europe	-0.624*** (0.189)	-0.768*** (0.212)	-0.376* (0.183)	-0.725*** (0.146)	-0.993*** (0.240)	-0.863*** (0.215)	-0.963** (0.315)	-0.857** (0.266)
Constant					7.533*** (0.165)	7.285*** (0.188)	7.172*** (0.291)	7.056*** (0.262)
cut1	-4.195*** (0.297)	-3.724*** (0.316)	-4.095*** (0.373)	-3.908*** (0.247)				
cut2	-2.138*** (0.261)	-1.737*** (0.265)	-2.120*** (0.329)	-1.798*** (0.174)				
N	113676	9284	4292	2865	113676	9284	4292	2865
Adjusted R-squared					0.096	0.070	0.109	0.093

Pseudo R-squared	0.090	0.085	0.097	0.115
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*Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.*

Table A9. Results of regression models 1-2 D: subgroups by migration status and low vs. high parental SES (class background) (1/3)

	Educational attainment				ISEI			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	with low class background	with low class background	with high class background	with high class background	with low class background	with low class background	with high class background	with high class background
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Ethnic/ racial minority	-0.744* (0.345)	-0.017 (0.159)	-0.340* (0.140)	0.021 (0.111)	-3.669+ (1.819)	-1.497** (0.510)	-2.326* (0.875)	-0.854 (1.107)
Gender (Female=1)	0.012 (0.090)	0.054 (0.119)	0.165* (0.074)	0.150 (0.097)	-3.242*** (0.675)	-3.515*** (0.474)	-2.281*** (0.421)	-1.529+ (0.792)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	0.378*** (0.075)	0.886*** (0.159)	1.351*** (0.139)	1.609*** (0.215)	4.355*** (0.442)	5.988*** (1.146)	10.719*** (0.909)	12.151*** (1.433)
36-45	0.244* (0.104)	0.611*** (0.125)	1.254*** (0.148)	1.542*** (0.280)	4.647*** (0.510)	5.501*** (0.932)	11.584*** (1.090)	12.545*** (1.907)
46-60	-0.156 (0.130)	0.208 (0.186)	0.868*** (0.144)	1.188*** (0.206)	3.148*** (0.551)	4.498*** (1.056)	10.810*** (1.031)	11.237*** (1.933)
Over 60	-1.006*** (0.137)	-0.352+ (0.188)	0.596*** (0.155)	1.070*** (0.240)	2.434*** (0.577)	4.642*** (1.047)	11.369*** (1.038)	12.030*** (2.185)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	0.087 (0.064)	0.109 (0.080)	0.037 (0.047)	-0.289** (0.104)	0.486 (0.332)	0.319 (0.482)	1.069+ (0.568)	-1.952+ (1.014)
Round 8	0.191+ (0.098)	0.241* (0.094)	0.130* (0.063)	-0.129 (0.149)	0.713 (0.551)	0.525 (1.070)	1.175* (0.529)	-2.003* (0.855)
Round 9	0.355*** (0.084)	0.308** (0.106)	0.206*** (0.057)	0.014 (0.118)	0.869+ (0.473)	0.892 (0.783)	1.735*** (0.428)	-1.392 (0.977)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.561** (0.178)	0.493* (0.214)	0.252+ (0.134)	-0.016 (0.192)	1.859 (1.111)	0.401 (0.907)	0.166 (0.876)	-0.070 (2.372)
Southern Europe/Med.	-1.233*** (0.270)	-0.854** (0.272)	0.229* (0.109)	0.330 (0.538)	-3.743** (1.041)	-4.382*** (0.993)	0.798 (1.415)	1.737 (4.075)
Eastern Europe	0.277 (0.231)	0.317+ (0.178)	0.156 (0.160)	-0.208 (0.138)	-2.391** (0.748)	-4.319*** (0.856)	-0.992 (0.831)	-3.681** (1.131)
Constant					35.928*** (0.949)	36.669*** (0.959)	43.672*** (1.067)	44.896*** (1.755)
cut1	-0.780*** (0.186)	-0.467+ (0.267)	-1.812*** (0.188)	-1.883*** (0.259)				
cut2	1.986*** (0.194)	2.543*** (0.216)	0.974*** (0.172)	1.005*** (0.243)				
N	48696	4051	17525	2470	48696	4051	17525	2470
Adjusted R-squared					0.032	0.041	0.036	0.045
Pseudo R-squared	0.071	0.031	0.026	0.030				

Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A10. Results of regression models 3-4 D: subgroups by migration status and low vs. high parental SES (class background) (2/3)

	Political engagement				Social acceptance			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	with low class background	with low class background	with high class background	with high class background	with low class background	with low class background	with high class background	with high class background
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Ethnic/ racial minority	0.251 (0.178)	-0.208 (0.196)	0.296 (0.280)	-0.533** (0.189)	-2.203*** (0.301)	-2.154*** (0.161)	-2.203*** (0.301)	-2.154*** (0.161)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.075* (0.034)	-0.050 (0.095)	-0.068 (0.097)	0.141 (0.141)	-0.021 (0.054)	0.316*** (0.074)	-0.021 (0.054)	0.316*** (0.074)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	0.663*** (0.082)	0.545*** (0.156)	0.904*** (0.117)	1.067*** (0.185)	-0.098 (0.125)	-0.217 (0.187)	-0.098 (0.125)	-0.217 (0.187)
36-45	1.016*** (0.064)	0.910*** (0.186)	1.189*** (0.130)	1.123*** (0.293)	-0.072 (0.144)	-0.138 (0.158)	-0.072 (0.144)	-0.138 (0.158)
46-60	1.279*** (0.082)	1.148*** (0.182)	1.407*** (0.135)	1.421*** (0.242)	-0.119 (0.129)	-0.043 (0.240)	-0.119 (0.129)	-0.043 (0.240)
Over 60	1.395*** (0.134)	1.614*** (0.224)	1.521*** (0.142)	1.436*** (0.214)	0.143 (0.217)	0.337 (0.297)	0.143 (0.217)	0.337 (0.297)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	-0.068 (0.077)	-0.198* (0.092)	-0.013 (0.106)	0.159 (0.214)	-0.106 (0.085)	-0.181 (0.160)	-0.106 (0.085)	-0.181 (0.160)
Round 8	-0.071 (0.091)	-0.051 (0.090)	-0.052 (0.131)	-0.079 (0.142)	-0.120 (0.110)	0.085 (0.119)	-0.120 (0.110)	0.085 (0.119)
Round 9	0.167 (0.102)	-0.008 (0.147)	0.113 (0.134)	0.131 (0.163)	-0.059 (0.166)	0.031 (0.158)	-0.059 (0.166)	0.031 (0.158)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.696** (0.259)	0.902** (0.308)	1.119*** (0.294)	0.831* (0.373)	-0.244 (0.284)	0.311+ (0.181)	-0.244 (0.284)	0.311+ (0.181)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.281 (0.205)	-0.721 (0.519)	-0.282 (0.247)	-0.568*** (0.152)	0.374 (0.279)	0.492* (0.211)	0.374 (0.279)	0.492* (0.211)
Eastern Europe	-0.863*** (0.160)	-0.831*** (0.202)	-1.191*** (0.221)	-1.088*** (0.175)	0.152 (0.267)	0.023 (0.159)	0.152 (0.267)	0.023 (0.159)
Constant	0.687*** (0.182)	0.337 (0.281)	1.569*** (0.220)	0.992*** (0.277)	3.104*** (0.238)	2.589*** (0.275)	3.104*** (0.238)	2.589*** (0.275)
N	48696	4051	17525	2470	48696	4051	48696	4051
Adjusted R-squared								
Pseudo R-squared	0.055	0.065	0.098	0.089	0.072	0.184	0.072	0.184

Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Social acceptance model uses an alternative version of the ethnic/racial minority variable (see Table A2)

Table A11. Results of regression models 5-6 D: subgroups by migration status and low vs. high parental SES (class background) (3/3)

	Health				Life satisfaction			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	with low class background	with low class background	with high class background	with high class background	with low class background	with low class background	with high class background	with high class background
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Ethnic/ racial minority	-0.208*	-0.349***	-0.367***	-0.309*	-0.921***	-0.468**	-0.758***	-0.395***
	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.138)	(0.238)	(0.129)	(0.164)	(0.095)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.222***	0.011	-0.144**	-0.137+	-0.032	0.136	0.017	0.075
	(0.040)	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.077)	(0.046)	(0.081)	(0.029)	(0.090)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	-0.119	-0.336*	0.187	0.182	-0.011	0.068	0.025	-0.152
	(0.094)	(0.159)	(0.115)	(0.200)	(0.074)	(0.154)	(0.079)	(0.189)
36-45	-0.591***	-0.400**	-0.080	-0.322	-0.178*	-0.112	-0.108	-0.284
	(0.108)	(0.147)	(0.129)	(0.230)	(0.080)	(0.162)	(0.079)	(0.197)
46-60	-1.436***	-1.372***	-0.734***	-0.730**	-0.415***	-0.607*	-0.356**	-0.364
	(0.157)	(0.098)	(0.158)	(0.235)	(0.081)	(0.241)	(0.101)	(0.230)
Over 60	-2.359***	-2.100***	-1.347***	-1.385***	-0.344*	-0.442	-0.179	-0.134
	(0.221)	(0.161)	(0.194)	(0.260)	(0.125)	(0.271)	(0.116)	(0.283)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	0.005	0.161*	-0.028	-0.085	0.087	0.195	0.092	0.155
	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.063)	(0.120)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.096)	(0.105)
Round 8	0.025	0.111	0.068	-0.026	0.313*	0.430**	0.175	0.297*
	(0.047)	(0.091)	(0.071)	(0.100)	(0.136)	(0.147)	(0.121)	(0.124)
Round 9	0.143**	0.330***	0.093+	-0.077	0.346**	0.488***	0.223*	0.259
	(0.053)	(0.091)	(0.056)	(0.127)	(0.110)	(0.122)	(0.099)	(0.169)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.035	0.292	0.313+	-0.008	0.891***	0.714*	0.456*	0.478*
	(0.237)	(0.202)	(0.179)	(0.209)	(0.208)	(0.274)	(0.181)	(0.204)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.775***	-0.474	-0.287	-0.160	-0.708+	-0.478	-0.544**	-0.431
	(0.225)	(0.299)	(0.217)	(0.330)	(0.349)	(0.309)	(0.193)	(0.261)
Eastern Europe	-0.967***	-0.839***	-0.277	-0.759**	-1.280***	-0.931**	-0.668**	-0.776**
	(0.185)	(0.171)	(0.182)	(0.254)	(0.296)	(0.289)	(0.195)	(0.216)
Constant					7.411***	7.064***	7.654***	7.567***
					(0.206)	(0.243)	(0.160)	(0.180)
cut1	-4.578***	-3.882***	-3.835***	-4.057***				
	(0.312)	(0.217)	(0.232)	(0.340)				
cut2	-2.472***	-1.807***	-1.859***	-2.132***				
	(0.280)	(0.158)	(0.203)	(0.288)				
N	48696	4051	17525	2470	48696	4051	17525	2470
Adjusted R-squared					0.123	0.069	0.062	0.058
Pseudo R-squared	0.093	0.098	0.049	0.061				

Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A12. Results of regression models 1-2 E: subgroups by migration status and gender (1/3)

	Educational attainment				ISEI			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	male		female		male		female	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Ethnic/ racial minority	-0.387+ (0.211)	-0.142 (0.141)	-0.612* (0.287)	0.138+ (0.079)	-1.702 (1.029)	-1.149+ (0.602)	-4.119* (1.710)	-0.833 (0.913)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)								
Low parental SES	-1.018*** (0.059)	-0.917*** (0.080)	-0.964*** (0.064)	-0.820*** (0.050)	-7.924*** (0.447)	-6.569*** (0.474)	-7.653*** (0.467)	-6.198*** (0.638)
High parental SES	1.283*** (0.049)	1.195*** (0.072)	1.288*** (0.053)	1.291*** (0.099)	8.954*** (0.364)	7.115*** (0.609)	9.235*** (0.346)	9.184*** (0.613)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	0.811*** (0.080)	1.078*** (0.108)	0.689*** (0.096)	1.220*** (0.136)	7.021*** (0.452)	7.765*** (1.131)	6.725*** (0.452)	7.316*** (1.028)
36-45	0.767*** (0.103)	1.082*** (0.102)	0.496*** (0.113)	0.875*** (0.156)	8.357*** (0.625)	9.898*** (0.933)	7.090*** (0.700)	6.569*** (1.242)
46-60	0.518*** (0.126)	0.748*** (0.164)	0.027 (0.125)	0.588*** (0.152)	7.772*** (0.644)	7.989*** (0.779)	5.475*** (0.690)	5.609*** (1.250)
Over 60	0.087 (0.150)	0.704*** (0.208)	-0.822*** (0.134)	-0.043 (0.182)	9.124*** (0.632)	10.468*** (1.082)	4.197*** (0.655)	5.211*** (1.211)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	0.063 (0.052)	-0.035 (0.078)	0.092+ (0.049)	0.047 (0.071)	0.428 (0.408)	-0.464 (0.518)	0.566+ (0.301)	-0.005 (0.573)
Round 8	0.133+ (0.078)	0.042 (0.061)	0.256*** (0.076)	0.161* (0.078)	0.419 (0.422)	-0.242 (0.787)	1.118* (0.489)	-0.048 (0.614)
Round 9	0.285*** (0.059)	0.246** (0.078)	0.330*** (0.067)	0.210* (0.082)	0.954* (0.441)	0.157 (0.560)	1.083* (0.459)	0.558 (0.558)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.205 (0.177)	0.136 (0.145)	0.685*** (0.138)	0.358** (0.110)	0.912 (1.077)	-0.040 (1.619)	1.215 (0.795)	-0.284 (0.993)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.998*** (0.246)	-0.613* (0.275)	-0.669** (0.219)	-0.077 (0.213)	-1.905* (0.881)	-2.637** (0.793)	-2.952* (1.238)	-2.240 (1.694)
Eastern Europe	0.061 (0.187)	-0.179 (0.132)	0.427* (0.168)	0.401** (0.127)	-3.133** (0.962)	-5.328*** (0.897)	-0.900 (0.779)	-2.687*** (0.698)
Constant					38.719*** (0.814)	40.143*** (1.128)	37.483*** (0.866)	37.896*** (1.013)
cut1	-1.142*** (0.166)	-1.129*** (0.122)	-1.398*** (0.171)	-1.001*** (0.127)				
cut2	1.742*** (0.147)	1.937*** (0.142)	1.407*** (0.172)	2.005*** (0.171)				
N	56450	5734	61518	6415	56450	5734	61518	6415
Adjusted R-squared					0.150	0.139	0.150	0.123

Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.088 0.141 0.104

Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Figure A1




Figure A2




Figure A3




Figure A4




Table A13. Results of regression models 3-4 E: subgroups by migration status and gender (2/3)

	Political engagement				Social acceptance			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	male		female		male		female	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Ethnic/ racial minority	0.356* (0.182)	-0.544** (0.183)	0.142 (0.169)	-0.330 (0.203)	-2.298*** (0.239)	-2.128*** (0.109)	-2.175*** (0.197)	-1.899*** (0.108)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)								
Low parental SES	-0.321*** (0.045)	-0.251* (0.126)	-0.274*** (0.045)	-0.456*** (0.096)	-0.021 (0.064)	-0.143 (0.120)	0.054 (0.059)	0.199** (0.075)
High parental SES	0.649*** (0.055)	0.495*** (0.083)	0.582*** (0.074)	0.459*** (0.096)	-0.140* (0.071)	-0.283+ (0.150)	-0.329*** (0.086)	-0.188+ (0.110)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	0.699*** (0.059)	0.576*** (0.118)	0.785*** (0.050)	0.711*** (0.117)	-0.031 (0.087)	0.051 (0.117)	-0.092 (0.088)	-0.292* (0.146)
36-45	1.073*** (0.065)	0.688*** (0.143)	1.127*** (0.071)	1.036*** (0.212)	0.008 (0.080)	-0.240+ (0.125)	-0.114 (0.090)	-0.129 (0.167)
46-60	1.318*** (0.063)	0.942*** (0.196)	1.352*** (0.063)	1.301*** (0.157)	-0.059 (0.069)	0.045 (0.132)	-0.080 (0.103)	-0.099 (0.250)
Over 60	1.631*** (0.087)	1.452*** (0.237)	1.408*** (0.098)	1.482*** (0.199)	0.191 (0.135)	0.227 (0.219)	0.222 (0.160)	0.293 (0.219)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	-0.099 (0.067)	-0.045 (0.118)	-0.104 (0.074)	-0.168* (0.083)	-0.108 (0.087)	-0.246* (0.121)	0.030 (0.084)	0.119 (0.128)
Round 8	-0.089 (0.081)	0.036 (0.085)	-0.033 (0.099)	-0.075 (0.076)	-0.054 (0.083)	0.032 (0.113)	-0.084 (0.094)	0.074 (0.095)
Round 9	0.107 (0.092)	0.097 (0.131)	0.187+ (0.108)	0.141 (0.132)	-0.128 (0.122)	0.066 (0.176)	-0.084 (0.125)	-0.003 (0.119)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.699* (0.308)	0.938* (0.422)	1.048*** (0.308)	1.290*** (0.281)	-0.019 (0.276)	0.112 (0.172)	-0.346 (0.250)	0.001 (0.195)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.185 (0.199)	-0.658* (0.300)	-0.309 (0.239)	-0.523 (0.351)	0.204 (0.281)	0.189 (0.237)	0.174 (0.321)	0.409 (0.455)
Eastern Europe	-0.912*** (0.163)	-0.974*** (0.251)	-0.933*** (0.180)	-0.790*** (0.196)	0.261 (0.228)	-0.064 (0.174)	0.339 (0.247)	0.093 (0.144)
Constant	0.922*** (0.153)	0.811** (0.311)	0.860*** (0.168)	0.644* (0.271)	3.036*** (0.204)	2.752*** (0.231)	2.910*** (0.229)	2.515*** (0.254)
N	56450	5734	61518	6415	56450	5734	61518	6415
Pseudo R-squared	0.081	0.090	0.077	0.079	0.063	0.164	0.054	0.133

Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. Social acceptance model uses an alternative version of the ethnic/racial minority variable (see Table A2)

Table A14. Results of regression models 5-6 E: subgroups by migration status and gender (3/3)

	Health				Life satisfaction			
	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen	3+ gen	2nd gen
	male		female		male		female	
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Ethnic/ racial minority	-0.160 (0.099)	-0.254** (0.096)	-0.396*** (0.065)	-0.367*** (0.075)	-0.772*** (0.133)	-0.460*** (0.103)	-0.909*** (0.204)	-0.447*** (0.089)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)								
Low parental SES	-0.265*** (0.061)	-0.314*** (0.069)	-0.294*** (0.062)	-0.128+ (0.075)	-0.328*** (0.063)	-0.354*** (0.071)	-0.286*** (0.060)	-0.206* (0.086)
High parental SES	0.235*** (0.043)	0.326*** (0.084)	0.250*** (0.041)	0.385*** (0.068)	0.140** (0.046)	0.156* (0.061)	0.185*** (0.041)	0.250* (0.095)
Age group (ref: under 26)								
26-35	-0.042 (0.075)	-0.048 (0.135)	0.067 (0.076)	0.049 (0.128)	0.002 (0.044)	0.006 (0.114)	0.006 (0.054)	-0.121 (0.098)
36-45	-0.435*** (0.083)	-0.473*** (0.122)	-0.326*** (0.098)	-0.228+ (0.122)	-0.157* (0.060)	-0.142 (0.122)	-0.139+ (0.069)	-0.239 (0.159)
46-60	-1.162*** (0.107)	-1.277*** (0.142)	-1.055*** (0.144)	-0.939*** (0.142)	-0.359*** (0.064)	-0.490* (0.197)	-0.378*** (0.095)	-0.585** (0.166)
Over 60	-1.914*** (0.177)	-1.850*** (0.183)	-1.905*** (0.212)	-1.623*** (0.174)	-0.143 (0.094)	-0.305 (0.225)	-0.325* (0.141)	-0.463* (0.188)
ESS round (ref.: 6)								
Round 7	0.033 (0.049)	0.078 (0.089)	-0.003 (0.039)	0.069 (0.091)	0.075 (0.086)	0.158* (0.070)	0.138 (0.118)	0.180+ (0.105)
Round 8	0.020 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.047)	0.052 (0.049)	0.135 (0.103)	0.223* (0.100)	0.234+ (0.122)	0.329* (0.131)	0.476*** (0.111)
Round 9	0.081+ (0.042)	0.115 (0.090)	0.156** (0.055)	0.238* (0.100)	0.245** (0.080)	0.359* (0.144)	0.364** (0.103)	0.557*** (0.120)
Region (ref: Western Europe)								
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.155 (0.234)	0.208 (0.223)	0.170 (0.189)	0.096 (0.176)	0.660*** (0.168)	0.533* (0.200)	0.734*** (0.199)	0.560* (0.225)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.347 (0.213)	0.031 (0.313)	-0.618** (0.238)	-0.399+ (0.220)	-0.517+ (0.259)	-0.435+ (0.250)	-0.728* (0.334)	-0.580* (0.247)
Eastern Europe	-0.563** (0.198)	-0.686** (0.215)	-0.658*** (0.184)	-0.843*** (0.191)	-1.004*** (0.235)	-0.939*** (0.232)	-0.990*** (0.250)	-0.853*** (0.224)
Constant					7.558*** (0.165)	7.456*** (0.212)	7.513*** (0.169)	7.404*** (0.157)
cut1	-4.196*** (0.290)	-3.997*** (0.313)	-4.038*** (0.302)	-3.640*** (0.310)				
cut2	-2.155*** (0.261)	-2.000*** (0.229)	-1.973*** (0.256)	-1.616*** (0.261)				
N	56450	5734	61518	6415	56450	5734	61518	6415
Adjusted R-squared					0.106	0.081	0.108	0.077

Pseudo R-squared 0.082 0.093 0.096 0.090

Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. SEs clustered by country for all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Figure A5




Figure A6



Table A15. Robustness check: alternative specification of models 2B-6B, controlling for educational attainment

	ISEI (occupation) Model 2B'	Political engagement Model 3B'	Social acceptance Model 4A'	Health Model 5B'	Life satisfaction Model 6B'
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>Logit</i>	<i>Logit</i>	<i>Ordered logit</i>	<i>OLS</i>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Second generation (ref.: 3+ generation)	0.259 (0.365)	-0.485*** (0.104)	-0.272** (0.098)	-0.209** (0.068)	-0.041 (0.062)
Female (ref.: male)	-3.376*** (0.335)	-0.083* (0.035)	-0.101* (0.049)	-0.188*** (0.035)	-0.033 (0.031)
Ethnic/racial minority (ref.: ethnic/racial majority)	-1.164* (0.537)	0.060 (0.197)		-0.250*** (0.070)	-0.659*** (0.109)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)					
Low parental SES	-3.986*** (0.143)	-0.112** (0.041)	0.023 (0.048)	-0.130* (0.056)	-0.197*** (0.053)
High parental SES	3.211*** (0.192)	0.325*** (0.037)	-0.223*** (0.041)	0.080* (0.038)	0.025 (0.033)
<i>Controls</i>					
Educational attainment (ref.: up to lower secondary)					
Secondary or vocational	8.644*** (0.445)	0.592*** (0.051)	0.057 (0.094)	0.455*** (0.060)	0.326*** (0.079)
Tertiary	25.529*** (0.664)	1.408*** (0.111)	-0.043 (0.116)	0.909*** (0.060)	0.709*** (0.076)
Age group (ref: under 26)					
26-35	3.193*** (0.342)	0.585*** (0.041)	-0.072 (0.057)	-0.092+ (0.052)	-0.097* (0.040)
36-45	4.566*** (0.403)	0.980*** (0.058)	-0.090 (0.055)	-0.465*** (0.062)	-0.235*** (0.051)
46-60	4.931*** (0.528)	1.300*** (0.068)	-0.085 (0.064)	-1.158*** (0.102)	-0.429*** (0.077)
Over 60	6.908*** (0.600)	1.609*** (0.099)	0.197 (0.141)	-1.872*** (0.172)	-0.230+ (0.116)
Region (ref: Western Europe)					
Scandinavia/Nordic	-0.833 (0.548)	0.801* (0.323)	-0.171 (0.244)	0.098 (0.224)	0.641** (0.176)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.629 (0.591)	-0.125 (0.210)	0.201 (0.293)	-0.375+ (0.219)	-0.540+ (0.282)
Eastern Europe	-2.865*** (0.688)	-0.977*** (0.154)	0.243 (0.203)	-0.679** (0.207)	-1.018*** (0.242)
<i>Constant/cuts</i>	30.845*** (0.647)	0.389* (0.157)	3.003*** (0.202)	-3.820*** (0.274) -1.746*** (0.234)	7.236*** (0.176)
Adjusted R ²	0.384				0.113
Pseudo R ²		0.103	0.085	0.100	

Notes: All models additionally control for ESS wave. Model 4B uses an altered version of the ethnic/racial minority variable (as discussed). Standard errors clustered by country for all models. (Standard errors in parentheses.) N = 130,117 across all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

Table A16. Models for economic integration outcomes, separately for native-parentage and second-generation subsamples

	Education		ISEI (occupation)	
	3+ gen b/se	Second gen. b/se	3+ gen b/se	Second gen b/se
Female (ref.: male)	0.079 (0.074)	0.068 (0.098)	-2.902*** (0.418)	-3.147*** (0.439)
Ethnic/racial minority (ref.: ethnic/racial majority)	-0.496* (0.236)	0.006 (0.102)	-2.932* (1.311)	-0.975+ (0.489)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)				
Low parental SES	-0.986*** (0.053)	-0.866*** (0.050)	-7.794*** (0.319)	-6.399*** (0.494)
High parental SES	1.274*** (0.048)	1.223*** (0.076)	9.092*** (0.324)	8.143*** (0.439)
<i>Controls</i>				
Age group (ref: under 26)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
26-35	0.762*** (0.081)	1.145*** (0.107)	6.983*** (0.403)	7.645*** (0.912)
36-45	0.644*** (0.101)	0.981*** (0.113)	7.823*** (0.595)	8.331*** (0.854)
46-60	0.284* (0.120)	0.676*** (0.145)	6.698*** (0.614)	6.932*** (0.908)
Over 60	-0.363** (0.139)	0.313+ (0.179)	6.708*** (0.577)	7.833*** (0.946)
Region (ref: Western Europe)				
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.436** (0.146)	0.247* (0.121)	1.034 (0.858)	-0.156 (1.226)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.828*** (0.221)	-0.334 (0.229)	-2.429** (0.873)	-2.459* (1.067)
Eastern Europe	0.242 (0.159)	0.126 (0.109)	-1.990* (0.750)	-3.966*** (0.672)
<i>Constant/cuts</i>	-1.211*** (0.168)	-1.005*** (0.097)	39.489*** (0.823)	40.473*** (0.923)
	1.614*** (0.145)	2.002*** (0.142)		
Observations	117968	12149	117968	12149

Notes: All models additionally control for ESS wave. Standard errors clustered by country for all models. (Standard errors in parentheses.) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

Table A17. Models including interaction effects between second-generation status and parental SES

	Educational attainment	ISEI (occupation)	Political engagement	Social acceptance	Health	Life satisfaction
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Second generation (ref.: 3+ generation)	0.057 (0.057)	0.308 (0.500)	-0.394** (0.126)	-0.282* (0.114)	-0.237** (0.073)	-0.046 (0.072)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)						
Low parental SES	-1.000*** (0.055)	-7.786*** (0.320)	-0.292*** (0.042)	0.021 (0.054)	-0.280*** (0.059)	-0.308*** (0.060)
High parental SES	1.280*** (0.047)	9.092*** (0.325)	0.612*** (0.054)	-0.251*** (0.061)	0.244*** (0.034)	0.163*** (0.039)
Parental SES & Second gen. status interaction						
Second-generation status # Low parental SES	0.257*** (0.071)	1.509* (0.580)	-0.087 (0.100)	0.027 (0.083)	0.084 (0.061)	0.034 (0.068)
Second-generation status # High parental SES	-0.107 (0.069)	-0.993* (0.466)	-0.145+ (0.083)	0.016 (0.106)	0.117+ (0.061)	0.031 (0.065)
Ethnic/racial minority (ref.: ethnic/racial majority)	-0.346+ (0.177)	-2.266* (0.921)	-0.018 (0.176)	-2.165*** (0.149)	-0.298*** (0.061)	-0.695*** (0.121)
Female (ref.: male)	0.079 (0.073)	-2.921*** (0.391)	-0.046 (0.040)	-0.105* (0.048)	-0.184*** (0.031)	-0.023 (0.032)
Age group (ref: under 26)						
26-35	0.807*** (0.082)	7.046*** (0.393)	0.731*** (0.045)	-0.090 (0.055)	0.009 (0.052)	-0.004 (0.039)
36-45	0.681*** (0.098)	7.848*** (0.565)	1.076*** (0.059)	-0.105+ (0.055)	-0.380*** (0.068)	-0.155** (0.050)
46-60	0.325** (0.121)	6.676*** (0.605)	1.317*** (0.062)	-0.095 (0.067)	-1.110*** (0.108)	-0.389*** (0.076)
Over 60	-0.302* (0.143)	6.746*** (0.546)	1.505*** (0.090)	0.181 (0.138)	-1.901*** (0.179)	-0.254* (0.115)
Region (ref: Western Europe)						
Scandinavia/Nordic	0.422** (0.142)	0.911 (0.861)	0.879** (0.311)	-0.174 (0.241)	0.156 (0.206)	0.688*** (0.182)
Southern Europe/Med.	-0.817*** (0.216)	-2.508** (0.832)	-0.263 (0.221)	0.188 (0.293)	-0.483* (0.223)	-0.614* (0.296)
Eastern Europe	0.229 (0.149)	-2.233** (0.704)	-0.908*** (0.156)	0.247 (0.206)	-0.628*** (0.186)	-0.994*** (0.236)
Constant/cuts	-1.180*** (0.157)	39.607*** (0.791)	0.934*** (0.159)	3.044*** (0.204)	-4.208*** (0.290)	7.545*** (0.162)
	1.660*** (0.139)				-2.161*** (0.252)	

Notes: All models additionally control for ESS wave. Model for Social acceptance uses an altered version of the ethnic/racial minority variable (as discussed). Standard errors clustered by country for all models. (Standard errors in parentheses.) $N = 130,117$ across all models. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; + $p < 0.10$.

10.4 Appendix to Chapter 7 (Paper 3)

Appendix: Supplementary tables [Chapter 6/Empirical Paper 3]

Table A1
Construction of measures

Variable name	Type/categories	Construction/source
Dependent variables		
International Socio-economic Index (ISEI)	Continuous (higher score: more prestigious occupation)	Derived from ESS information on current occupation [ISCO-08] (for those in full-time jobs), transformed into Ganzeboom and Treiman's (1996) ISEI using <i>iscogen</i> package in Stata (Jann 2019)
Political engagement	Binary (0: not engaged in politics; 1: politically engaged)	Derived from ESS information on political activity; Respondents categorised as politically engaged if they voted in the last national election or – since not all migrant-background respondents will be eligible to vote – if they took part any non-electoral activities in the past 12 months (signed a petition, took part in a public demonstration, boycotted a product)
Fair/good health	Binary (0: poor or very poor self-reported health; 1: fair to very good health)	Recoded version of categorical ESS variable on subjective general health (original scale: 1 'Very good' to 5 'Very bad'; cut-off for binary set at 3 and below ('Very good' to 'Fair'))
High life satisfaction	Binary (0: not very high/low life satisfaction; 1: high life satisfaction)	Recoded version of categorical ESS variable on self-reported level of life satisfaction ('How satisfied are you with life as a whole?' – original scale 0 'Extremely dissatisfied' to 10 'Extremely satisfied'; cut-off for binary set at 8 and above)
Social acceptance	Binary (0: identifies as member of a discriminated group; 0: does not)	Recoded version of binary ESS variable 'Member of a group discriminated against in this country' (Yes/No)
Individual-level (Level-1) independent variables		
Migration status/background	Categorical (0: third generation and higher ('native') [ref.]; 1: second generation (incl. 1.5); 2: first generation)	Derived from ESS information on the country of birth of the respondent and their mother and father; also (if applicable) 'What year you first came to live in country' question vs. 'Year of birth'; coded as: 'Third-generation and higher' if respondent born in country and both parents born in country; 'Second-generation' if respondent born in country to one or two foreign-born parents, or born abroad (to foreign parents) but immigrated at age 12 or younger; 'First-generation' if born abroad and immigrated after the age of 12
Female	Binary (0: male [ref.]; 1: female)	Recoded version of ESS gender variable (Male/Female)
Age	Continuous (years)	As in ESS

Parental socio-economic status (SES)	Categorical (1: lower-skilled; 2: medium-skilled [ref.]; 3: high-skilled)	Derived from ESS variables on mother's and father's occupation when respondent was aged 14 (highest or nonmissing; if both missing, parents' educational attainment used as proxy); Coding logic: High-skill: higher administrator to professional and technical job; Medium-skill: clerical, sales, service occupations, skilled work; Lower-skill: semi- and unskilled work, farm work
Highest educational attainment	Categorical (1: up to lower secondary; 2: secondary or vocational [ref.]; 3: tertiary)	Recoded version of ESS variable 'Highest level of education, ES - ISCED', merging ES-ICED categories I-II, III-IV, and V
Ethnic minority (incl. Muslim)	Binary (1: ethno-racial minority and/or of Muslim faith; 0: not a minority in the above sense [ref.])	Created using ESS information on first and second ancestry, religion, and 'Belong to minority ethnic group in country?' question. Respondent is categorised as a likely racialised minority (on an ethnic, racial, or religious basis) if any of the following apply: first or second ancestry indicated as Asian, Middle Eastern, or African (incl. Caribbean); respondent reports being of Muslim faith; and/or indicates 'Yes' on the question above
Domicile	Categorical (1: big city (area); 2: town or small city [ref.]; 3: countryside)	Recoded version of ESS variable domicile (5 original categories simplified into 3)
Origin: EU27+/TCN	Binary(1: EU27+; 0: third-country national (TCN))	Created based on ESS variable on country of birth; EU27+ category includes those born in EU27 (2007) countries, or EEA countries (and Switzerland); third-country nationals are those born in any other country
Contextual (Level-2) independent variables [selected]		
Labour market regulations/flexibility	Continuous ([Country's] Labour market flexibility; (0: least freedom [most rigid regulations]; 10: most freedom)	Measure provided by the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World 2019 report (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2020), degree of labour market regulation calculated based on the degree of hiring regulations and minimum wage in different countries (and years)
Electoral democracy index	Continuous (0: low; 1: high [closest to ideal of electoral democracy])	V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index [v2x_polyarchy], composite index capturing Dahl's seven institutions of polyarchy: freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, and freedom of expression and alternative sources of information. Measure provided by V-Dem dataset v12, from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al. 2022).
Equal access index	Continuous (0: low; 1: high [closest to ideal of equality in access to power])	V-Dem Equal access index [v2xeg_eqaccess], index capturing de facto access to participation, political power, and policy influence; calculated based on indicators of power distribution by socioeconomic position, by social group, and by gender. Source as above.
Exclusion by SES index	Continuous (0: low [least democratic]; 1: high [most democratic])	V-Dem Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group [v2xpe_exlecon] measure of exclusion, i.e., individuals being denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their socioeconomic group; calculated based on indicators of power distributed by socioeconomic

		group and equality by socioeconomic group in civil liberties, access to public services, state jobs and state business opportunities. Source as above.
Migrant Acceptance Index	Continuous (0: least accepting; 9: most accepting)	Using Gallup's 2017 Migrant Acceptance Index for each country, which is a survey-based composite score of positive or negative attitude considering three hypotheticals: immigrants (a) coming living in the country, (b) becoming one's neighbour, (c) marrying a close relative. Scores can range from 0 (all three are bad things) to 9 (all three are good things)
Native average on [dependent variable]	Continuous	Average scores (on each dependent variable) calculated for subsample of 'third-generation-and-higher' respondents within each country-wave sample (average ISEI score; the ratio of Y=1 responses among natives for the other (binary) dependent variables)

Table A2
Sample breakdown by countries and waves (first-generation immigrants)

Country	Total <i>N</i>	Breakdown by ESS round			
		6	7	8	9
AT	443	0	128	135	180
BE	636	164	136	156	180
CH	1,030	222	252	288	268
CZ	134	32	29	32	41
DE	700	190	193	160	157
DK	145	69	76	0	0
EE	861	242	265	172	182
ES	580	159	121	160	140
FI	175	44	47	37	47
FR	514	106	123	138	147
GB	705	155	196	164	190
IE	894	216	177	275	226
IT	356	43	0	142	171
LT	159	43	50	32	34
NL	365	92	95	77	101
NO	410	115	57	158	80
PT	235	83	45	47	60
SE	510	123	137	102	148
SI	323	61	72	81	109
Total <i>N</i>	9,175	2,159	2,199	2,356	2,461

Source: ESS6-9, subset of data by author (first-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: unweighted observations. Country abbreviations: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CH: Switzerland; CZ: Czechia; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; GB: Great Britain; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LT: Lithuania; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia.

Table A3

Additional descriptive statistics first- and second-generation samples

	First generation			Second generation			Min	Max
	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD		
Independent variables								
Gender	9,175			12,673			0	1
Male (ref.)		0.46	0.50		0.47	0.50		
Female		0.55	0.50		0.53	0.50		
Age	9,175	50.94	15.54	12,673	45.25	17.61	18	99
Parental SES	9,175			12,673			1	3
Low SES		0.39	0.49		0.31	0.46		
Medium SES (ref.)		0.37	0.48		0.46	0.50		
High SES		0.21	0.41		0.22	0.41		
Highest educational attainment	9,175			12,673			1	3
Up to lower secondary		0.27	0.45		0.19	0.39		
Secondary or voc. (ref.)		0.44	0.50		0.56	0.50		
Tertiary		0.28	0.45		0.25	0.43		
Ethnic minority (incl. Muslim)	9,175			12,673			0	1
No (ref.)		0.56	0.50		0.74	0.44		
Yes		0.43	0.50		0.26	0.44		
Area of origin	9,175			12,673			0	1
EU27+		0.38	0.01					
TCN		0.62	0.01					
Domicile	9,175			12,673			1	3
Big city (area)		0.42	0.49		0.41	0.49		
Town or small city (ref.)		0.34	0.47		0.32	0.47		
Countryside		0.24	0.43		0.27	0.44		
Dependent variables								
ISEI				6,905	45.64	16.53	10	89
Political engagement				12,673	0.75	0.43	0	1
Fair/good health				12,673	0.93	0.26	0	1
High life satisfaction				12,673	0.50	0.50	0	1
Social acceptance				12,673	0.85	0.36	0	1

Source: ESS 6-9, author's calculations (first- and second-generation immigrant samples). Notes: Unweighted means and frequencies. Totals for *Parental SES*, *Highest educational attainment*, *Ethnic minority*, and *Area of origin* include 'Missing' categories (< 2%).

Table A4

Additional descriptive statistics: native averages on outcomes (by country-year context)

	Across country-years			
	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Native averages (3+ gen.)				
ISEI	45.46	3.02	37.00	53.19
Political engagement	0.84	0.10	0.58	0.99
Fair/good health	0.93	0.03	0.85	0.98
High life satisfaction	0.55	0.16	0.24	0.87

Note: N = 72 country-year clusters, nested in 19 countries. *Sources:* ESS6-9, author's calculations.

Table A5
Additional descriptive statistics: Contextual factors by country (1/2): Host country characteristics

	GDP per capita, thousand USD	Gini coefficient (%)	Unemployment rate (%)	Labour market reg./ flexibility	Public social expenditure (%GDP)	Healthcare expenditure (%GDP)	Electoral democracy index	Equal access index	Exclusion by SES index	% Foreign-born	Migrant Acceptance Index
	2012-2017 avg.	2012-2017 avg.	2012-2017 avg.	2012-2017 avg.	2012-2018 avg.	2012-2016 avg.	2012-2018 avg.	2012-2018 avg.	2012-2018 avg.	2012-2018 avg.	2017
AT	48.05	27.57	1.73	5.61	27.45	10.42	0.86	0.82	0.06	17.33	6.06
BE	44.22	26.18	3.8	7.32	28.88	10.13	0.89	0.93	0.06	15.93	6.16
CH	82.3	29.35	1.68	7.97	16.39	11.76	0.90	0.91	0.03	28.3	7.21
CZ	19.48	24.9	2.1	8.08	19.39	7.35	0.86	0.85	0.03	7.35	2.26
DE	44.8	29.4	1.98	6.83	25.01	11	0.89	0.95	0.01	13.65	7.09
DK	60.4	27.1	1.9	7.41	29.90	10.37	0.92	0.97	0.01	9.03	7.09
EE	18.71	33.1	3.2	6.18	16.65	6.35	0.89	0.83	0.02	15.08	2.37
ES	28.29	34.38	10.28	5.79	24.83	9.01	0.87	0.87	0.06	13.03	7.44
FI	46.62	25.55	1.98	5.33	29.53	9.44	0.88	0.94	0.02	5.83	6.58
FR	39.75	29.58	4.38	5.7	31.54	11.49	0.89	0.89	0.05	12.15	6.46
GB	42.13	31.88	1.83	8.28	21.55	9.79	0.87	0.81	0.17	12.85	6.61
IE	59.24	30.43	5.73	7.77	17.72	8.81	0.88	0.87	0.07	17.1	7.74
IT	32.97	32.73	6.27	6.82	27.65	8.95	0.87	0.93	0.05	9.73	6.49
LT	15.43	35.4	4.28	7.13	15.98	6.46	0.84	0.87	0.06	5.15	2.72
NL	49.4	26.4	2.3	7.28	17.39	10.51	0.88	0.91	0.02	12.03	7.46
NO	86.23	24.28	0.93	4.83	23.71	9.78	0.89	0.96	0.01	14.03	7.73
PT	19.85	34.1	6.6	5.91	23.88	9.13	0.89	0.89	0.13	9.7	6.65
SE	55.62	27.13	1.38	6.83	26.34	10.99	0.92	0.94	0.03	16.65	7.92
SI	22.84	24.2	4.23	6.03	22.47	8.51	0.86	0.89	0.09	11.55	4.42
Average	42.96	29.14	3.5	6.69	23.49	9.49	0.88	0.90	0.05	12.97	6.13

Sources: European Social Survey (2020), Fraser institute (Gwartney et al., 2020), OECD (2021; 2022), Gallup (2017), Coppedge et al. (2022).

Notes: '2012-2017 avg.': average from years 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017; '2012-2016 avg.': average from years 2012, 2014, 2016; '2012-2018 avg.' average from years 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018 Last row shows unweighted averages across countries. See Table A2 notes for country abbreviations.

Table A6
Additional descriptive statistics: Contextual factors by country (2/2): Migrant integration policy

	MIPEX overall score	Labour Market Mobility	Family Reunion	Political participation	MIPEX Strands			
					Permanent residence	Citizenship	Anti-discrimination	Health
					2014/19 avg.			
AT	46.0	59.0	38.7	20.0	50.0	13.0	53.0	81.0
BE	69.0	51.4	56.2	65.0	75.0	64.9	100.0	65.5
CH	50.0	63.0	40.9	55.0	48.0	25.8	38.0	83.1
CZ	47.8	53.9	63.0	10.0	50.0	36.1	64.1	55.6
DE	57.3	81.1	41.9	60.0	54.0	41.9	70.1	62.9
DK	53.0	70.0	26.0	70.0	60.0	49.0	51.0	62.0
EE	46.3	64.4	55.0	20.0	69.0	15.9	48.1	27.5
ES	57.8	66.9	68.9	55.0	75.0	23.3	59.1	73.6
FI	82.8	86.4	62.4	91.3	96.0	74.0	95.5	66.9
FR	53.8	52.0	39.3	41.3	58.1	70.0	79.0	59.6
GB	56.8	48.0	28.9	45.0	58.1	60.9	93.9	75.0
IE	60.3	22.1	48.0	73.8	50.0	79.1	87.9	80.6
IT	58.7	66.9	63.9	25.0	66.9	43.8	77.9	80.4
LT	34.0	43.7	42.9	5.0	52.0	22.0	51.0	25.0
NL	57.0	60.4	30.9	50.0	52.0	55.0	85.1	66.4
NO	71.3	85.1	58.0	80.0	85.2	50.0	64.9	75.0
PT	78.8	94.1	87.0	80.0	71.0	76.1	100.0	58.1
SE	86.8	90.9	74.1	80.0	89.9	83.1	100.0	84.6
SI	45.8	21.5	72.1	26.3	77.0	22.0	85.6	33.1
Average	58.6	62.2	52.5	50.1	65.1	47.7	73.9	64.0

Sources: MIPEX 2014 and MIPEX 2019 (Huddleston et al., 2015; Solano and Huddleston 2020)

Notes: '2014/19 avg.': average of MIPEX 2014 and MIPEX 2019. Last row shows unweighted averages across countries. See Table A2 notes for country abbreviations

Table A7
Results of robustness checks: breakdown by EU/non-EU origin (1/3)

	ISEI			Political engagement		
	EU27+ sample	TCN origin sample	Interaction effect (X*TCN)	EU27+ sample	TCN origin sample	Interaction effect (X*TCN)
Economic and structural char.s						
GDP per capita	0.085** (0.027)	0.048* (0.021)	-0.594 (0.405)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.254* (0.127)
Gini coefficient	-0.451 (0.650)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.829 (0.670)	0.020** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.193* (0.089)
Unemployment rate	-0.472 (0.662)	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.224 (0.599)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.073)
Flexibility of labour market	0.596 (0.499)	1.590*** (0.348)	1.077+ (0.606)			
Public social expenditure	-0.872 (0.533)	0.017+ (0.009)	-0.821 (0.501)			
Electoral democracy index				0.011 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.058 (0.097)
Equal access index				-0.014 (0.015)	0.019 (0.027)	0.271* (0.113)
Exclusion by SES index				0.005 (0.012)	0.084*** (0.010)	0.313*** (0.074)
Perc. of foreign-born (stock)	1.457*** (0.313)	-0.019** (0.007)	-0.196 (0.306)	0.014+ (0.007)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.164** (0.060)
Migrant acceptance index	0.482 (0.650)	-0.039* (0.018)	-0.227 (0.562)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.010)	0.520*** (0.089)
Migrant integration policy						
MIPEX 2014/19 overall score	-0.743 (0.675)	0.027 (0.022)	-0.129 (0.622)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.009)	0.280** (0.101)
MIPEX Labour market mob.	-0.220 (0.524)	0.026** (0.010)	-0.875 (0.533)			
MIPEX Family reunion	-0.042 (0.677)	0.014 (0.017)	-1.036 (0.767)			
MIPEX Political participation				0.008 (0.006)	0.003 (0.009)	0.415*** (0.092)
MIPEX Permanent residence	-1.227* (0.517)	0.015 (0.015)	-0.419 (0.502)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.008)	0.118 (0.079)
MIPEX Citizenship	-0.410 (0.588)	0.008 (0.013)	0.322 (0.488)	0.002 (0.005)	0.016+ (0.009)	0.403*** (0.079)
MIPEX Anti-discrimination	-1.126* (0.494)	0.018+ (0.010)	0.775 (0.519)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.007 (0.009)	0.416*** (0.072)
N	1804	2782	4586	3274	5325	8599

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (first-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: EU27+/TCN (third-country national) categorisation based on country of birth (see Methods for more detail). All models include the previously listed control variables. 'Interaction effect' column shows the coefficients calculated for the interaction variable of the given contextual variable and TCN-born status. Each main row refers to a separate model (which includes the indicated contextual variable of interest). Each model includes the same control variables as the 'base' models. Full individual tables available upon request. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1.

Table A8
Results of robustness checks: breakdown by EU/non-EU origin (2/3)

	Health			Life satisfaction		
	EU27+ sample	TCN origin sample	Interaction effect (X*TCN)	EU27+ sample	TCN origin sample	Interaction effect (X*TCN)
Economic and structural char.s						
GDP per capita	0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.204 (0.140)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.016 (0.050)
Gini coefficient	-0.010 (0.008)	0.220 (0.401)	-0.228 (0.142)	-0.048*** (0.012)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.031 (0.057)
Unemployment rate	-0.012* (0.006)	-1.268** (0.390)	0.149 (0.127)	-0.025+ (0.013)	0.020* (0.009)	0.109** (0.037)
Health expenditure	0.017** (0.006)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.164 (0.120)	0.018** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.084+ (0.048)
Perc. of foreign-born (stock)	0.005 (0.004)	1.237*** (0.292)	-0.222+ (0.114)	-0.059*** (0.014)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.020 (0.037)
Migrant acceptance index	0.013* (0.005)	-0.032 (0.285)	-0.152 (0.099)	0.071*** (0.020)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.161*** (0.046)
Migrant integration policy						
MIPEX 2014/19 overall score	0.002 (0.006)	-0.907*** (0.246)	0.135 (0.133)	0.055*** (0.015)	0.018** (0.007)	0.093+ (0.052)
MIPEX Labour market mob.				-0.037* (0.018)	0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.044)
MIPEX Family reunion				-0.011 (0.017)	0.004 (0.006)	0.103+ (0.057)
MIPEX Political participation				0.048* (0.019)	0.012+ (0.007)	0.136* (0.054)
MIPEX Permanent residence	-0.002 (0.005)	-1.562*** (0.331)	0.023 (0.142)	0.015 (0.017)	0.006 (0.008)	0.028 (0.043)
MIPEX Citizenship	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.184 (0.324)	0.202+ (0.115)	0.085*** (0.014)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.063 (0.046)
MIPEX Anti-discrimination	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.399 (0.436)	0.255* (0.111)	0.093*** (0.011)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.104** (0.040)
MIPEX Health	-0.002 (0.008)	0.232 (0.313)	-0.184 (0.134)	0.024 (0.025)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.121+ (0.069)
N	3264	5325	8599	3274	5325	8599

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (first-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: EU27+/TCN (third-country national) categorisation based on country of birth (see Methods for more detail). All models include the previously listed control variables. 'Interaction effect' column shows the coefficients calculated for the interaction variable of the given contextual variable and TCN-born status. Each main row refers to a separate model (which includes the indicated contextual variable of interest). Each model includes the same control variables as the 'base' models. Full individual tables available upon request. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1.

Table A9
Results of robustness checks: breakdown by EU/non-EU origin (3/3)

	Social acceptance		
	EU27+ sample	TCN origin sample	Interaction effect (X*TCN)
Economic and structural char.s			
GDP per capita	0.001** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.150 (0.096)
Gini coefficient	-0.018* (0.008)	-0.021* (0.008)	-0.030 (0.096)
Unemployment rate	0.003 (0.007)	-0.022* (0.009)	0.019 (0.076)
Perc. of foreign-born (stock)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.025** (0.008)	0.122 (0.077)
Migrant acceptance index	0.036*** (0.009)	0.020* (0.009)	0.056 (0.078)
Migrant integration policy	0.028***	0.000	-0.008
MIPEX 2014/19 overall score	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.085)
	0.008	-0.013	-0.212**
MIPEX Labour market mob.	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.076)
	0.023**	-0.003	0.025
MIPEX Family reunion	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.086)
	0.033**	0.019*	0.027
MIPEX Political participation	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.085)
	0.012	-0.007	-0.046
MIPEX Permanent residence	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.090)
	0.028***	0.003	0.076
MIPEX Citizenship	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.081)
	0.030***	-0.004	0.074
MIPEX Anti-discrimination	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.097)
N	3264	5289	8553

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (first-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: EU27+/TCN (third-country national) categorisation based on country of birth (see Methods for more detail). All models include the previously listed control variables. 'Interaction effect' column shows the coefficients calculated for the interaction variable of the given contextual variable and TCN-born status. Each main row refers to a separate model (which includes the indicated contextual variable of interest). Each model includes the same control variables as the 'base' models. Full individual tables available upon request. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1.

Table A10
Additional analyses for second-generation sample: Base models

Second generation	ISEI	Political engagement	Fair/good Health	High life satisfaction	Social acceptance
Female (ref.: Male)	-3.432*** (0.317)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.006)
Age	0.099*** (0.013)	0.005*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Parental SES (ref.: medium)					
Low SES	-3.279*** (0.388)	-0.050*** (0.009)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.007)
High SES	3.385*** (0.415)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.010 (0.007)	0.052*** (0.011)	-0.009 (0.008)
Highest educational attainm. (ref.: upper sec.)					
Up to lower secondary	-5.929*** (0.536)	-0.089*** (0.011)	-0.034*** (0.007)	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.008)
Tertiary	16.952*** (0.373)	0.118*** (0.008)	0.036*** (0.005)	0.102*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.007)
Ethnic minority (incl. Muslim) (ref.: majority)	-0.653+ (0.385)	-0.061*** (0.009)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.236*** (0.012)
Domicile (ref.: town/small city)					
Big city (area)	0.690+ (0.378)	0.014+ (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.027** (0.010)	-0.023*** (0.007)
Countryside	0.707+ (0.424)	0.010 (0.009)	0.013* (0.006)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.027*** (0.008)
Native average on dep. var. (by country-wave)	0.435*** (0.096)	1.018*** (0.077)	0.735*** (0.114)	0.804*** (0.035)	
Var(constant[country-wave]))	0.590***	0.119***	0.056*	0.021**	0.132***
N_1	6905	12673	12673	12673	12673
N_2	72	72	72	72	72

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (second-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: AME: average marginal effect. SE: standard error. 'Missing' categories included but not presented. Var(constant[country-wave])): remaining variation of the constant across country-waves. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1. EU/non-EU-country-of-birth control not included (vs first-generation model) as respondents are primarily native-born.

Table A11
Additional analyses for second-generation sample: results from main regression models

	ISEI	Political engagement	Fair/good health	High life satisfaction	Social acceptance
	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>
Economic and structural char.s					
GDP per capita	1.681*** (0.236)	0.001 (0.014)	0.008 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.008+ (0.005)
Gini coefficient	-0.775* (0.350)	-0.027** (0.010)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.014* (0.006)	-0.002 (0.005)
Unemployment rate	-0.785** (0.296)	0.002 (0.008)	0.010** (0.003)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)
Flexibility of labour market	0.775* (0.293)				
Public social expenditure	0.287 (0.364)				
Health expenditure (% GDP)			0.005+ (0.003)	0.026*** (0.006)	
Electoral democracy index		-0.027** (0.010)			
Equal access index		0.025+ (0.014)			
Exclusion by SES index		0.023** (0.008)			
Other migration-related char.s					
Perc. of foreign-born (stock)	1.024*** (0.261)	-0.038*** (0.006)	0.010*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.006)	0.015** (0.005)
Migrant acceptance index	1.390*** (0.251)	0.048** (0.016)	0.008* (0.003)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)
Migrant integration policy					
MIPEX 2014/19 overall score	0.398 (0.371)	0.034** (0.013)	0.002 (0.003)	0.012+ (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)
MIPEX Labour market mob.	0.351 (0.228)			0.000 (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)
MIPEX Family reunion	-0.467* (0.220)			0.000 (0.006)	0.011* (0.005)
MIPEX Political participation		0.028* (0.013)		0.014* (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)
MIPEX Permanent residence	-0.906*** (0.263)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)
MIPEX Citizenship	0.369 (0.350)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.004 (0.003)	0.015* (0.006)	-0.010* (0.004)
MIPEX Anti-discrimination	0.056 (0.401)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.006+ (0.003)	0.019*** (0.005)	-0.011* (0.005)
MIPEX Health			0.008* (0.003)	0.016* (0.008)	
N	6905	12673	12673	12673	12673

Source: ESS6-9, author's calculations (second-generation immigrant sample).

Notes: AME: average marginal effect. SE: standard error. Each row refers to a separate model (which includes the indicated contextual variable of interest). Each model includes the same control variables as the 'base' models. Full individual tables available upon request. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1.

Table A12

Results of robustness checks: main regression models with standard errors clustered by country

	ISEI	Political engagement	Fair/good health	High life satisfaction	Social acceptance
	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>	<i>AME/SE</i>
Economic and structural char.s					
GDP per capita	1.230* (0.566)	-0.006 (0.021)	0.005 (0.013)	0.012 (0.011)	0.032*** (0.006)
Gini coefficient	-0.111 (0.499)	-0.038+ (0.020)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.016+ (0.008)	-0.018* (0.009)
Unemployment rate	-0.991* (0.432)	-0.025 (0.016)	0.012 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.018* (0.008)
Flexibility of labour market	0.842* (0.356)				
Public social expenditure (%GDP)	-1.226* (0.488)				
Health expenditure (% GDP)			0.016** (0.005)	0.025* (0.011)	
Electoral democracy index		-0.016 (0.027)			
Equal access index		0.001 (0.033)			
Exclusion by SES index		0.057*** (0.016)			
Other migration-related char.s					
Perc. of foreign-born (stock)	1.279** (0.337)	-0.036* (0.015)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.011)	0.017* (0.007)
Migrant acceptance index	0.148 (0.401)	0.048 (0.038)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.027* (0.011)	0.021** (0.007)
Migrant integration policy					
MIPEX 2014/19 overall score	-0.740 (0.488)	0.044* (0.022)	0.011** (0.004)	0.022* (0.009)	0.003 (0.010)
MIPEX Labour market mob.	-0.536 (0.364)			0.007 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.013)
MIPEX Family reunion	-0.749+ (0.397)			0.013 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.009)
MIPEX Political participation		0.016 (0.022)		0.021* (0.010)	0.020* (0.008)
MIPEX Permanent residence	-1.262* (0.453)	0.005 (0.025)	0.002 (0.007)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)
MIPEX Citizenship	-0.240 (0.586)	0.053* (0.026)	0.014** (0.005)	0.024** (0.009)	0.004 (0.010)
MIPEX Anti-discrimination	-0.635 (0.644)	0.061** (0.021)	0.012* (0.006)	0.023* (0.009)	-0.004 (0.011)
MIPEX Health			0.024*** (0.004)	0.020 (0.014)	
N	4929	9175	9175	9175	9175