WHAT WERE THE SOURCES OF MORALE AND COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE LATE VICTORIAN ARMY CAMPAIGNING IN AFRICA?

By

LESLIE WILLIAM SHEPPERD

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ABSTRACT.

The historiography relating to the late Victorian army's Ashanti and Zulu campaigns of 1873-1874 and 1879, fully covers all the physical details of the Victorian army's campaigns and exploits. But it contains virtually no information as to how morale and motivation were generated. That is understandable in the contemporary writing because it was before psychological knowledge; but the subsequent writing is the same and there is no mention of morale or motivation as specific subjects connected with behaviour or performance. The psychological aspects of how the army fought and performed, built morale, became motivated and overcame stress and trauma is not mentioned and is completely unknown. Fear and stress can be completely disabling, and this work establishes how the soldiers coped with the negative psychological issues that were encountered in the course of duty and continued to be successful. However, reviewing the literature through a modern 'lens' using current theory and knowledge shows that references to issues that clearly were matters of morale and motivation can be found couched in the different terms and language of the time. They are open to interpretation, and this thesis uses them to build a picture of morale and motivation at the time, and in doing so, fills a gap in the understanding of the way the Victorian army worked.

The thesis concludes that some units were motivated by the older model of strict discipline, but alongside that was a version of modern unit cohesion, generated by the actions of some senior commanders, which motivated but also raised esprit de corps. Those two systems were the main drivers of morale and motivation in Ashantiland and Zululand.

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CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION.

In the 1870's the Late Victorian Army fought two major campaigns against African Kingdoms: The Anglo-Ashanti War (1873-74), and the Anglo-Zulu War (1879). There were practical differences between these campaigns, but they both represent the more technologically advanced British army in conflict with powerful indigenous opponents, both of whom were dominant in their respective geographical areas by dint of large, effective armies. The leaders of both states were powerful monarchs, considered by the British at the time to be ruthless, and utterly merciless to those whom they considered enemies. Each of the two armies outnumbered the British at the beginnings of their respective campaigns, and they both fought fiercely, skilfully, and bravely until their final defeat. These campaigns fit readily into the category of 'small wars', as described by C.E. Callwell in his book *Small Wars Their Principles and Practice* (1896) as being between disciplined regular troops, such as the British, and those the British considered to be irregular forces, such as the Ashanti or Zulu. The expression had nothing to do with sizes of armies.[1]

Of course, these events took place before there was any understanding of psychology, or of the connection between thoughts and deeds, and so matters of morale or motivation as they would be understood and defined now, were not discussed, or considered. Consequently, an important aspect of the understanding of how these armies functioned, the mind of the soldier, is missing. That is important because, whatever else in terms of skill, weapons, or tactics add to the fighting efficiency of an army, morale, and more importantly, the motivation to fight and engage with the enemy are the drivers behind fighting spirit, and they derive from the soldiers' mind. An understanding of these matters will be gained by using modern theory and knowledge to revisit events in the Victorian Army, and ask: 'What Were the sources of Morale and Combat Motivation in the Late Victorian Army campaigning in Africa?' Alongside the main question, and to widen the knowledge and understanding gained by answering it, there will be two supplementary questions: first, was there an

[1] C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars Their Principles and Practice* (Milton Keynes: Endeavour Press Ltd., 2016 [1896]), p. 11.

understanding that men could be adversely affected by mental trauma and stress, and if so, was there an accepted method available to help those affected? Secondly, can any processes or actions that are now known to be good for the generation of morale and motivation, be identified?

Methodology

The study group will include any individual who was actively involved in the fighting, reporting, or administrating of the either the Ashanti or Zulu Campaigns as a member of the British army, or as a civilian involved in any of the processes of the wars, or personally impacted by it. Other African campaigns of the period such as Abyssinia, the 9th Xhosa War, or the First Boer War, have been deliberately excluded so that this thesis can focus on a constant discrete group of people and events for this study. In terms of ethics, given the long time that has elapsed since the events under review, and the nature of the enquiry being broadly based and not personally focussed or pejorative in any way, the likelihood of an ethical issue arising today is unlikely in the extreme.

It is accepted that morale and motivation may sometimes be a specific or personal matter for an individual at a particular time or place, all groups occasionally have dissenters, and it would not be possible to identify everybody's reaction to all circumstances. Because of that, this thesis will be looking for an overall and inclusive effect in the generation of morale and motivation, that can be seen to effectively reach across entire units and is long-lived. What is meant by that, is the presence of a sense of bonding and friendship through the whole unit, that is always present, on or off duty, and not just there to focus on a particular issue. It includes a feeling of pride in the unit and the sense of a team from top to bottom, and across the unit.

The meanings of words, and language that today relate to the subjects of morale, motivation, and psychiatric matters generally, were obviously not in use during the period under review. Because of that it is necessary to identify the words that did relate to those issues at the time for two reasons: firstly, to establish that the subjects were recognised and discussed, albeit not as a specific and unified subject, and secondly to understand definitions of the words used. Starting with definitions, and using a contemporary dictionary

published in 1859, 'psychology,' was defined as 'the doctrine of the soul'.[2] Then, turning to the definition of 'soul', it referred to, amongst other things, the 'spirit' of an individual.[3] 'Spirit' was, in turn, defined as 'To animate with vigour; to excite or encourage; to convey away, as if by a spirit'.[4] A good practical example of that occurred in 1880. Ardant Du Picq was a French army officer and military theorist who was killed during the Franco Prussian war (1870-1871) and whose work was published after his death. He used 'spirit', in its French form, in describing 'esprit de corps' as the confidence, courage, and bravery found in troops who were attacking a goal or target.[5] Du Picq's description of the high spirits and confidence of the men in his example can also be seen, from an English language perspective, as a description of morale and motivation; although 'morale', as it is understood today, did not then appear in the English dictionary.

The Ashanti campaign ended almost exactly five years before the start of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Both were fought against a formidable foe, in difficult climatic and geographic circumstances, and some of the British leaders were involved in both campaigns. Also, the two armies encountered similar logistical difficulties, and although the Anglo Zulu War was a bigger and longer campaign, and there is a much larger body of writing relating to it, the Ashanti campaign is close enough in time and circumstances to be a useful comparison. By doing that, this work will be able to draw from the broader experience of the late Victorian army campaigning in Africa overall, in the period immediately following the Cardwell Reforms. Also, with the soldier of today being quite different from his or her Victorian counterpart, beliefs, religion, and social etiquette amongst other things, are not the same, and expectations are also different; and so no modern judgement of past actions or people will be made, implied, or intended. Finally, different variations in spelling have been used over time in the historiography of these two wars for names and places. This thesis will use the accepted modern spellings, but original spellings will be used where quoting original sources.

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[2] Webster, *The Universal Pronouncing and Defining Dictionary of the English Language* (London: Ward and Lock,1859), p. 358.
[3] Webster, *Dictionary,* p. 431.
[4] Webster, *Dictionary,* p. 435.
[5] Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle* (Milton Keynes: Windham Press, 2013), p. 97.

The historical record is in danger of not fully understanding the effect of psychology and the mind on performance in the Late Victorian Army simply because no connection has ever been ever made between the two subjects, either at the time or in later writing: that is simply because, as the literature review will show, nobody has asked. This thesis will argue that, allowing for societal changes, the soldier of that army was subject to the same mental processes and stresses as his predecessors and successors, and it will explore and illuminate the unspoken role of psychology in the British army, at that time.

Literature Review

The Zulu War, particularly following the defeat of British forces at Isandlwana (22 January 1879), and the defeat on the Intombe river (12 March 1879), attracted, and still attracts, a lot of attention and written comment. It was a complex campaign, and involved serious losses to the British army, which alone generated a lot of controversy. That continued debate and conversation has resulted in a large body of written work about the war and its conduct, both contemporary and later. The Ashanti War, on the other hand, was considered to have been well organised and conducted, went mainly according to plan and was a successful (and cheap) operation in terms of achieving its goals. The writing about that campaign was, and is, largely favourable and contains less argument than was the case with the Zulu War where opinions had been divided. Purely for these practical reasons, the balance of attention paid to the two campaigns in this work, will lean towards the Zulu campaign in terms of time and space.

The general workings of the late Victorian Army have been well covered in written works, and some of them have been very useful in informing this thesis. For instance, Hew Strachan's *Wellingtons Legacy. The Reform of the British Army 1830-54.* (1984), is an excellent resource for following and understanding the reforms that were being introduced over time from 1830.[6] Strachan's meticulous description of the changes and reforms being introduced over that period, especially those designed to attract a more professional recruit to the service, enable the modern eye to trace the evolution of professionalism and of esprit de corps in units, from its beginnings to the end of the Crimean War. By that time, the reform process had effectively resulted in a new army in terms of esprit de corps and

[6] Hew Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy The Reform of the British Army 1830-54* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

professionalism. Strachan's work also provides an important context for the developments that occurred in the understanding of morale and motivation in the second half of the century. The authoritative text on that, the post-Cardwell era, is Edward Spiers' *The Late Victorian Army* (1992)[7]. Another extensive and very detailed work, this covers everything from recruitment, to drill and discipline, and the workings of the Victorian Army on campaign: no practical detail is missed. The benefit of esprit de corps to the functioning of units is briefly referred to during the discussion of the Cardwell reforms, as is Cardwell's hope that elements of his reforms would develop 'ties of kindred and locality.[8] Spiers also notes that one of the reasons that strict discipline needed to be maintained was to 'sustain morale during moments of acute stress'.[9] But beyond those observations there is no in-depth discussion about morale or motivation, or their part in the way the army functioned as a whole.

The large amount of writing related to the Zulu and the Ashanti Wars contains many other works that focus on aspects of the campaigns that are helpful to this thesis, and they are included here. Nick Mansfield, in his *Soldiers as Workers* (2016) thoroughly explores class, both in society and in the army, and the way it affected the experience of officers, and enlisted men in very different ways. For instance, the disciplinary and punishment structure was far less onerous when applied to officers than to other ranks, who were frequently subject to corporal punishment.[10] In fact there was a huge difference between the two groups, with the officers seemingly continuing their social activities and sense of entitlement as a slightly more formal activity than in their civilian life. The worst punishment they could receive was to be cashiered.

Remaining with the role of the officers, Ian Beckett, in *A British Profession of Arms,* (2018) describes in detail the relationships, both personal and professional, between the commanders and senior officers deployed in the Zulu War.[11] It does show that the officers' world was a very closed space, that they were not always supportive of one another, and

[7] Edward M Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).
[8] Edward M Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 10,19.
[9] Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 71.
[10] Nick Mansfield, *Soldiers as Workers* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016).
[11] Ian F.W. Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018).

certainly not loyal in their discussions with others. Such gossip stopped when action called though, and opinions were put to one side until after the fighting was over again.

The subject of morale and motivation remains an underexplored area of research in the vast literature on the Zulu War. Mike Snook focused on investigating the battle at Isandlwana in *How Can Man Die Better. The Secrets of Isandlwana Revealed,* (2005).[12] Later, in 2011, Adrian Greaves, also investigated events at Isandlwana in, *Isandlwana: How the Zulus Humbled the British Empire* (2011). Like Mike Snook (above) he concentrates solely on an in-depth exploration of the events leading to, during and after, the British disaster of the 22 January 1879.[13] Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill, in *Zulu Victory. The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-up* (2005) also investigated Isandlwana, but from the point of view of how steps were apparently taken to conceal the truth of how the disaster unfolded.[14]

James Bancroft, in *Zulu War VCs. Victoria Crosses of the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879.* (2018) takes a different approach and has followed and described the stories of all the winners of the VC during the Zulu War.[15] Saul David wrote a very detailed history of the whole of the Anglo-Zulu War entitled *Zulu: The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879*, (2004).[16] Ian Knight did the same, encompassing the whole Zulu War, when he wrote *The National Army Book of the Zulu War,* (2004).[17] Ian Knight also wrote *Zulu Rising. The Epic Story of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift* focussing on those two events rather than the whole war.[18]

Ian Knight also wrote the *Companion to the Anglo-Zulu War* (2008) which contains a great deal of detail relating to events and individuals during the war in such a way that almost brings them to life.[19] Adrian Greaves has produced a work to, as it were, 'put flesh on the bones' of what he feels may be lesser known events of the war, in *Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War* (2012),this is a useful aid for finding details of incidents at, say, Hlobane, Inyezane or Gingindlovu, and does fill-in gaps.[20] Michael Barthorp, in his work *The Zulu War: A*

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[12] Mike Snook, *How Can Man Die Better: The Secrets of Isandlwana Revealed* (London: Frontline Books, 2010).
[13] Adrian Greaves, *Isandlwana. How the Zulus Humbled the British Empire.* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2011).
[14] Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill, *Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-Up*, New edition edition (London: Greenhill Books, 2005).
[15] James W Bancroft, *Zulu War VCs* (Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2018).
[16] Saul David, *Zulu. The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879* (London: Penguin, 2004).
[17] Ian Knight, *The National Army Museum Book of the Zulu War* (London: Pan Books, 2004).
[18] Ian Knight, *Zulu Rising: The Epic Story of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift*, 2 edition (London: Pan, 2011).
[19] Ian Knight, *Companion to the Anglo-Zulu War* (Barnsley: Pen & word, 2008).
[20] Adrian Greaves, *Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2012).

Pictorial History (1980) illustrates his narrative of events with many contemporary photographs, maps and other drawings, which add depth and a visual sense of the whole campaign.[21] Adrian Greaves and Xolani Mkhize Produced *The Zulus at War. The History, Rise, and Fall of the Tribe that Washed its Spears* (2001). This book, overall, gives a sense of who the Zulus were, their culture and social structure, in addition to their military beliefs and methods.[22] Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill follow the Zulu War from start to finish in, *Zulu Vanquished. The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom.* (2005)[23] They describe how the destruction of the Zulus was both intended and inevitable from the outset, by examining the political manoeuvrings of British politicians and officials, together with the inevitable superiority of British arms. All practical aspects of the campaigning from the politics to the weapons and tactics used is covered, yet any exploration of the effects of morale and motivation is lacking.

The older, contemporary sources for the Ashanti campaign are to be found mainly in historical records, memoirs, and autobiographies and they seem to be an accurate record of events. However, it also means that the language and terms used are very much of the time and are wont to be less acceptable today. *The Ashanti War. A Narrative, by Henry Brackenbury* (1874) was written in two volumes with the support and permission of Wolseley and is a detailed record of the preparation and conduct of the campaign.[24] Evelyn Wood also set out a thorough record of his experiences during the Ashanti War in his autobiography, *From Midshipman to Field Marshal.* (1906).[25] Wolseley did the same in *The Story of a Soldier's Life* (1903).[26] There is good evidence of Wolseley's intention to educate his officers on all aspects of Ashantiland and on the Ashanti themselves in *Fanti and Ashanti. Three papers read on Board the S.S. Ambriz on the Voyage to the Gold Coast.* (1873), and this at least shows a wider awareness of the ongoing warlike relationship between the British and the Ashanti.[27] These papers were prepared by Brackenbury on the directions of Wolseley prior to departure and contained as much information as was currently available.

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[21] Michael Barthorp, *The Zulu War , A Pictorial History*, Book Club Edition (London: Guild Publishing, 1985).
[22] Adrian Greaves and Xolani Mkhize, *The Zulus at War: The History, Rise, and Fall of the Tribe That Washed Its Spears*, Reprint edition (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2014).
[23] Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill, *Zulu Vanquished: The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom*, annotated edition edition (London: Greenhill Books, 2005).
[24] Henry Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. A Narrative*, 2 vols (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2016), II.
[25] Evelyn Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshall*, Vol. 1 (Milton Keynes: The Naval and Military Press, 2006).
[26] Garnet Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2* (Milton Keynes: Forgotten Books, 2012).

Although now it is now known that a hostile relationship existed between the British and the Ashanti from 1823 to 1900, during which time there were several major wars and engagements, although of course, Wolseley's team could not have known that the final fight was still nearly thirty years in the future.[28]

Robert B. Edgerton's writing reflects that, much broader, context and includes the politics and differences in cultures; he makes the point that the Ashanti were a very formidable foe, whom the British much admired.[29] Alan Lloyd wrote of all the Ashanti Wars, not just Wolseley's expedition, and he too makes the point that the Ashanti army was very formidable, and mentions inherent natural dangers of weather and disease for any European troops operating there.[30] His detailed narrative of life in Ashantiland and the Gold Coast during the long period of conflict is very useful in understanding the overall mood, rather than just a brief experience whilst Wolseley campaigned there.

This thesis therefore argues that the issues of morale and motivation were, and have not been, mentioned as specific subjects and part of the way the Late Victorian Army operated in any of the historiography. In all the above works, motivation is never mentioned, and where morale is mentioned, it is always part of another discussion. For instance, Bancroft mentions morale in relation to the individuals fleeing Isandlwana who paused briefly at Rorke's Drift to shout 'hysterical' warnings, saying that their morale was 'shattered'.[31]

He also says that morale amongst the men was 'still high' as they prepared for an expected attack in the early morning of 23 January, but again, there was no discussion of how or why.[32] It is the same with other writers who mention morale, or motivation almost in passing and in relation to other subjects. Referring generally to both armies, Zulu and British, Barthorp says that, in terms of 'morale, steadfastness and endurance', there was 'little to choose between the two sides' but makes no further comment on moral or motivation.[33]

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[27] Henry Brackenbury, *Fanti and Ashanti, Three Papers Read On Board The S.S. Ambriz On The Voyage To The Gold Coast* (Miami: HardPress Publishing, 2017).
[28] Stephen Manning, *Britain At War with the Asanti Nation 1823-1900* (Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2021).
[29] Robert Edgerton, *The Fall of the Asante Empire* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), p. vii.
[30] Alan Lloyd, *The Drums of Kumasi* (London: Panther Books Ltd., 1964).
[31] James W Bancroft, *Rorke's Drift: The Zulu War, 1879*, New edition edition (Staplehurst: Spellmount Publishers Ltd, 2004), p. 45.
[32] Bancroft, *Rorke's Drift*, p. 95.

Spiers says that letters written home by troops 'testify to the motivations of the authors, as well as to their morale, attitudes to death in battle, and their warrior ethos.' But once again there is no further explanation or enquiry into the reason(s) for the soldiers' comments.[34] Nowhere has an author directly addressed the subjects of morale or motivation as specific subjects and so, how, or what the men thought about what they did remains unasked and unknown. Two modern authors do seem to have touched on the way men, and thus what they do, are affected by their minds.

Edmund Yorke (2012) moves a step closer to a modern understanding of morale and motivation in the past by identifying the importance of loyalty between the men, their colleagues, and their officers as the driving force of their combat motivation as a group and gives some examples.[35] Today this can be seen as the forming of unit cohesion and Yorke is likely correct, but he leaves it there. Snook, an experienced commander of men himself, takes a step even closer to a modern understanding when he points out that, following the defence of Rorke's Drift Bromhead and Chard were very likely to have been '...in a psychological state for which today they would receive formal medical treatment, but which in the Victorian era, went unheeded, unrecognised and untreated'.[36] His comment is important to this thesis, because it makes the point that the, then unacknowledged, effects of trauma and stress were present during the Zulu campaign. At the same time, it demonstrates that a modern perspective can identify matters of stress, morale, and motivation in those far-off events: the clues are there. Snook's writing underlines the fact that it is possible to investigate and interpret the past to build a picture of morale and motivation in the Late Victorian Army.

Primary Sources.

The National Army Museum, and The National Archives, both in London, preserve a great many historic documents that are primary sources recording the events of the past. These are good, and normally reliable records as they are the original written words in the original medium and have not been edited or interpreted in any way but remain as a testament of the time they were recorded. That said, they frequently represent the 'official view', and, as

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[33] Barthorp, p. vii.
[34] Edward Spiers, *The Victorian Soldier in Africa* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 13.
[35] Edmund Yorke, *Battle Story: Rorke's Drift 1879* (Stroud: The History Press, 2012), p. 137.
[36] Mike Snook, *Like Wolves on the Fold: The Defence of Rorke's Drift* (Barnsley: Greenhill Books, 2006), p. xv.

with all records, need to be approached and examined carefully. Original documents held at The National Archives relating to the Zulu War were extremely useful to this thesis when researching Chelmsford's awareness of, and reaction to, the wave of criticism that was aimed at him by the press and others after the British defeat at the Ntombe River by showing the original correspondence by Chelmsford to the Commander in Chief at Horse Guards relating to the subject. The same was true when researching the outcome of the Court of Enquiry into that disaster, and Lieutenant Harward's Court Martial.

The records can cover large events and give an overview of perhaps an entire campaign, as do the papers of Lord Chelmsford, and include his own observations as the commanding officer. Yet at the other end of the scale, the sources can reflect a smaller, more personal incident, giving a more personal recollection of an event from the ranks. Such an item is held at The Staffordshire Regimental Museum, Lichfield in the form of sergeant Anthony Booth's letter home written in the aftermath of the battle on the Intombe River. It is a mixture of personal and professional writing that reveals the human being behind the uniform, and it clearly conveys the sense of Booth's experience. The same is the case at The Regimental Museum of the Royal Welsh, at Brecon, which holds a collection of records relating to the Zulu War, in particular a contemporary record of the events at Isandlwana and Rorke's drift, written at Rorke's Drift by Captain W.P.Symons.

There is also an extensive 'instant history' and memoir literature. These sources can give an insight into the writer's personality sometimes, as in the case of Wood's book *Winnowed Memories* (1918).[37] His work *From Midshipman to Field Marshal* published in 1906 in two parts, does the same, but also includes a great deal of information about the two campaigns which are the subject of this thesis. Similarly, Sir Garnet Wolseley's book, *The Story of a Soldiers Life* (1903) published in two volumes, is a useful resource of knowledge not just about Wolseley himself, but also about his experiences in, and opinions of the Anglo-Zulu War.[38] From the Naval point of view, the chief medical officer of the Naval Brigade in South Africa, Henry F. Norbury wrote an account of the experience of the Brigade working alongside the army at the same locations and incidents in: *The Naval Brigade in South Africa During the Kafir and Zulu Wars 1877-79* (1880). His work, written close to the events

[37] Evelyn Wood, *Winnowed Memories* (London: Forgotten Books, 2012 [1918]).
[38] Garnet Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volumes 1 & 2* (Milton Keynes: Ulan Press, 2012); Wolseley.

described, both in terms of time and distance, reflects the experiences of the ranks, and as such, sometimes shifts the focus away from the strategic, to a more personal category.

Equally personal, and relating to the Ashanti campaign, is a work by Joseph Hammond Thomas of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, entitled *A Full and Authentic Diary of the Ashanti Expedition,* (1875).[39] In the work, Thomas covers the period from his regiment leaving barracks in Ireland, and right through marching to Coomassie from the Cape, and back again, before sailing to Portsmouth. It is in the form of a diary, and so not an extensive work, but it details the progress of events day by day for an individual soldier. *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War*, (2001), edited by Greaves and Best, contains Curling's letters on the battle at Isandlwana, and his struggles with mental health in the aftermath, together with his overall opinions of the war and the leadership.[40]

Also in this category are *Lord Chelmsford's Zululand Campaign 1878-79* (1994), edited by John Laband, which contains all the contemporary messages that Chelmsford sent relating to the Zulu campaign.[41] There is also *Wolseley and Ashanti* (2009), edited by Ian F. W. Beckett, containing Wolseley's Ashanti journal, and correspondence.[42] *A Widow-Making War* (1880) edited by Howard Whitehouse, is a modern printing (1995) of the diaries and letters of Major Warren Wynne, R.E. who was responsible for the construction of the defences at Eshowe, and who kept a detailed record of the entire siege.[43] Frank Emery has published two books of collected correspondence from soldiers in Africa: *The Red Soldier. Letters from the Zulu War,* (1977), and *Marching Over Africa*, (1986).[44] Both convey a sense of the experience of the soldiers and what they were thinking, and both books have original source references. The same applies to *Rank and File, The Common Soldier at Peace and War 1642-1914,* (1962), compiled and edited by T.H. McGuffie.[45]

There are also a number of books offering the civilian point of view on military events. These include *History of the Zulu War and its Origin,* (1880), written by Frances Ellen

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[39] Joseph Hammond Thomas, *A Full and Authentic Diary of the Ashanti Expedition* (London: Forgotten Books, 2018 [1875]).
[40] *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War*, ed. by Adrian Greaves and Brian Best (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004).
[41] *Lord Chelmsford's Zululand Campaign 1878-1879*, ed. by John P.C. Laband (Stroud: Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1994).
[42] Laband.
[43] *A Widow-Making War*, ed. by Howard Whitehouse (Southampton: Paddy Griffith Associates, 1995).
[44] *Marching Over Africa: Letters from Victorian Soldiers*, ed. by Frank Emery (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 1986); Frank Emery, *The Red Soldier. Letters from the Zulu War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 1977).
[45] *Rank and File. The Common Soldier at Peace and War 1642-1914*, ed. by T.H. McGuffie (London: Hutchinson, 1964).

Colenso it covers the periods before, during, and the aftermath of the war, and provides a personal and civilian point of view of the conflict generally as well as of Chelmsford and Wolseley.[46] It also illustrates the civilian view of some British army personnel and the progress of the war. Then there is Charles L. Norris-Newman's work *In Zululand with the British Army. The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 through the First-Hand Experiences of a Special Correspondent* [47] Norris Newman was a professional writer and reporter, he attached himself to Chelmsford's staff and had a free rein to move around and report whatever he chose. His work is interesting, covers all the major battles and developments and also reports on the main players and leaders in terms of abilities and how they were perceived by others.

Other useful published primary sources are newspapers and magazines, and the following were used: The *London Daily News*, and the *Natal Mercury* contained official despatches which gave an overview of the progress of the campaign in question, and they also publish opinion pieces that give an indication of public opinion as opposed to the official view. Whether the public influenced the content of editorials, or it was round the other way is a moot point. But, given that no commercial newspaper would want to publish unpopular content, and the lack of any negative reactions or complaints: it seems that whatever opinion piece was published, it was a majority, or popular, view amongst the public.

Local papers are better sources for person opinions and situation reports, as soldiers sometimes wrote directly to them, and it was not uncommon for families receiving letters from soldiers to forward them to the local newspaper to be published. Typical resources used for this work include: *The Monmouthshire Beacon, The Cambrian, The Merthyr Express, South Wales Daily Telegraph, and the Wiltshire and Gloucestershire Standard.* Magazines which have published articles include *Frasers Magazine, The Royal Magazine, Chums Magazine, The Strand Magazine,* and *Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine.*

This thesis will argue that improvements in the conditions of army personnel prompted by the reforms started in 1830, marked the beginning of the journey to today's understanding of psychology in the military, as they progressed to the Crimean War (1853-

[46] Frances Ellen Colenso, *History of the Zulu War and Its Origin* (London: Adamant Media Corporation, 2004).
[47] Charles L Norris-Newman, *In Zululand with the British Army - The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 through the First-Hand Experiences of a Special Correspondent* (Milton Keynes: Leonaur, 1880).

1856) and beyond. The thinking of the soldiers changed as they began experiencing pride in their regiments and team building. That led to a shared sense of purpose, and importantly, largely moved the origin of morale and motivation from an external, to an internal point; there was a sense of ownership. That is why modern methods and theory can be applied to the events of the time: there is a lot of information, unconsciously recorded and preserved in the primary sources that can be interpreted by modern means to understand and paint a picture of events. There was clearly an understanding at the time, although this thesis will go back and interpret events that those present were not equipped to do. As a brief example, Lord Chelmsford referred to the victory at Rorke's Drift as the result of the 'cool determined courage displayed by the gallant garrison…'[48] But owing to the large amount of detailed literature available, modern interpretation can build a picture of the psychological processes of morale and motivation involved through the whole event, as the behaviour of those present can be understood.

What was happening in terms of changes in morale and motivation, and its potential use to improve performance, took a while to filter through to the work of military writers. In the latter half of the late nineteenth century, Britain produced a range of military commentators who were, and still are excellent sources of information; very much in touch with military matters and developments, their knowledge and advice were first class, and they used that knowledge to write practical manuals of training and field operations. For example, in *The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated*, Edward Bruce Hamley (1866), wrote a detailed and comprehensive book that was clearly intended to define the state of the art of British warfare and tactics at the time. It covered a very wide range of subjects, from military history and tactics, through advice on crossing various types of terrain and the use of maps, then examined the current tactics of the time, before going on to give guidance and advice on how to transport supplies to where they were needed. Hamley's work is practical and refers very much to the real physical world of military operations, but contains no reference to the psychological, or 'human' factors of morale or motivation at all.[49]

In another example, Callwell, a recognised expert on the small colonial wars which characterised the second half of the nineteenth century, published a paper in 1887 that

[48] National Army Museum (NAM), CP 8/40, Chelmsford Papers pp.113-114
[49] Edward Bruce Hamley, *The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated* (Milton Keynes: Andesite Press, 2015), pp. 132–49.

covered the principles of such conflicts from 1865 onward.[50] This paper won the RUSI Gold Medal Essay Prize and was enlarged and brought up to date to be published as a book in 1896. It was and is a reference book for the time and although it does talk about the role of 'moral' factors, there is no reference to the creation or management of morale or motivation in a sense that would be understood today. It may well be that addressing 'moral' factors was a precursor to the understanding of the psychological role of 'morale', but it does seem that it took time for the knowledge and ideas that had stemmed from the esprit de corps generated within regiments to become known across the army.

However, in 1869, Wolseley had laid out an understanding of the way that good, interpersonal relationships amongst all of the members of a unit, including officers, could promote morale and efficiency. He did this in his famous *Soldier's Pocket Book for Field Service* where he advocated the building of a sense of teamwork in the army as a means of fostering morale and motivation, adding that the men should also be kept physically fit enough to fight. He made it clear that officers must be 'loved as well as respected', and suggested that officer's sergeants and privates, be merged 'into the one great professional cognomen of soldier'.[51] Wolseley, perhaps because of his experience during the Crimean War, had moved the idea of esprit de corps forward, and was plainly advocating the building of relationships and teams as sources of morale and motivation in addition to what had gone before. He went on to describe what had gone before by writing that, 'We are apt to think that if the Briton is well fed, well looked after, and well led by his officers, everything he is capable of has been given a fair field, and that all will in consequence be brought out'.[52] He seemed to be saying that that was no longer enough and whilst he still wrote in support of the need for fitness and discipline, he now presented it as part of an overall approach to morale and motivation, and advocated the building of an esprit de corps or, sense of pride in units.[53]

Although both officers arrived at their conclusions independently and through their own experience, Wolseley's thoughts are extremely close to those of Ardant du Picq, and thus

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[50] C.E. Callwell, 'Lessons to Be Learnt from the Campaigns in Which British Forces Have Been Employed Since the Year 1865', *The RUSI Journal*, 156.4 (2011), pp. 108–21.
[51] Garnet Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book For Field Service*, 2nd Ed. (Charleston: Nabu Press, 2010 [1869]), p. 1.
[52] Wolseley, *Soldier's Pocket Book*, p. 5.
[53] Wolseley, *Soldier's Pocket Book*, pp. 3–5.

showed that he understood the connection of good relationships between men in active units and the forming of esprit de corps, and thus performance overall. He also gave a lot of guidance and advice about team building that is still valid today, and his comments can fairly be said to be a stepping-stone towards today's understanding of the subject.[54] In summary, it is clear, that contemporary military thinkers were writing about issues of morale and motivation, albeit with an understanding that needs to be placed in the Victorian context.

Understanding Morale, Motivation, Stress and Trauma.

However efficient and successful armies, and some leaders, have been over time, psychological injuries have been recorded since the formation of standing armies in Europe in the latter half of the seventeenth century.[55] In fact since the earliest times there had been cases of individuals being rendered casualties of war without any obvious physical injuries, and instances of the effects of the 'psychological injuries of war' have been traced back into early antiquity according to Kennedy & Zillmer (2012).[56] Wendy Holden (1998), makes the same point and illustrates it by using the case of a number of German Soldiers involved in the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century, who were rendered ineffective by 'war related illness.'[57] She neatly summed up the situation by saying that 'The effect of terrors on the minds of servicemen has been chronicled as far back as the early Greeks and in just about every conflict since'.[58] Wendy Holden's example of the German soldiers in Thirty Years War represented the first record of several members of an army, as opposed to an individual, without apparent physical injury, being reported as having become ill and unable to function. They had been affected by an illness which was subsequently given the label of 'heimweh', a word which translates into 'homesickness'.[59] But at that time, before any medical understanding, and with no remedial action available, it might have been thought of as madness, frequently thought of as a punishment or test sent from God.[60] With no

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[54] Garnet Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book For Field Service*, 2nd Ed; Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies*.
[55] John Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Cassell, 2001), pp. 88–90.
[56]Bret A. Moore, Shawn T. Mason, Bruce E, Crow, "Assessment and Management of Acute Combat Stress on the Battlefield," in *Military Psychology, Clinical and Operational Applications*, *Second Edition:* Eds. Kennedy and Zillmer, (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), p. 74.
[57] Wendy Holden, *Shell Shock* (London: Channel 4 Books, 1998), p. 8.
[58] Holden, *Shell Shock*, p. 7.
[59] Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century,* p. 8.
[60] Alan Ingram, 'Patterns of Madness in the Eighteenth Century' (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1998), pp. 1–2.

other options available, the likelihood is that soldiers mentioned by Wendy Holden were simply abandoned to their fate.[61]

Looking back over the period of realisation that a person's mind can materially affect what he or she is physically able to do, Jones and Wessely (2005) describe matters of mental health in the British Army prior to the introduction of psychology. They point out that although military psychiatry is considered to have started in World War One:

> … a significant developmental phase predated this conflict when physicians attempted to explain and treat servicemen suffering from a range of unexplained, somatic disorders, including disordered action of the heart (DAH) and psychogenic rheumatism. These arose in a context of 'palpitations' seen during the Crimean War and irritable heart described by Da Costa in the American Civil War. In addition, military doctors encountered cases where symptoms suggested a neurological cause.[62]

When Wolseley was writing in 1869, there was still no understanding or appreciation in the military of how the mind of an individual could be linked to a physical malady like 'Irritable Heart', or 'Wind Contusions'. But from the middle of the nineteenth century, the sciences of the mind and nerves, and the science of physical medicine, had joined forces to begin research that would eventually come under the new name of 'Psychology'.[63] In 1879, Wilhelm Wundt established the first experimental psychology laboratory in the University of Leipzig, and in so doing, established Psychology as an accepted science. Over time that led to the development of usable psychological tools for understanding and treating psychological issues and their effect on behaviour.[64]

Then, in 1902, Charles Horton Colley wrote *Social Organization. A Study of the Larger Mind* which, being the first study of how groups formed and operated, together with a basic understanding of how leadership developed and operated in groups, was particularly useful in understanding organisations like the army.[65] Jones and Wessely mark 1914 as the year that British military psychiatry, (the treatment aspect of psychology) began, with its first use

[61] Ingram, *Patterns of Madness*, pp. 76,78, 175–78.
[62] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, pp. 2–5.
[63] Janet Oppenheim, *Shattered Nerves* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 6–9.
[64] Bruce Alexander, *A History of Psychology in Western Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 12.

being in the treatment of soldiers suffering from shellshock. Shellshock was the term coined at the time for a somatic disorder that had similarities to a condition known, amongst other things, as 'Disordered Action of the Heart', that had been experienced during the Crimean War. British psychiatrists based in France did prove to be effective in dealing with large numbers of patients suffering from shellshock and related syndromes, and between 40% and 80% of cases returned to combat duty. In May 1917 the U.S. Surgeon General sent Major Thomas Salmon to Europe to study the French and British methods of dealing with 'War Neuroses', a generic term for combat related trauma, and to compile a report and strategy for the American contribution and for their learning.[66] There were some organisational and treatment differences, but overall, the system adopted by the Americans was that used by the French and British.[67] The government however, not apparently subscribing to a belief in shellshock or the necessity for a treatment, set up an enquiry under Lord Southborough. Jones and Wessely discuss this enquiry in *Shell Shock to PTSD*, but nothing useful was to come from it: the army would not entertain any idea of mental illness and trauma and said that the use of the expression 'shell-shock' was to be avoided in all future conflicts as it had become '...a most desirable complaint from which to suffer'.[68]

With little or no military interest, research between the wars continued in the civilian sphere and in 1927, Bartlett published theories regarding the formation and behaviour of groups, outside and inside the military.[69] This built on research conducted and published prior to the War in 1903, by Cooley who was exploring the natural tendency of Human society to form into small primary groups.[70] Then in 1929, W.B. Cannon, formulated the paradigm of the 'fight-flight reaction' as a characteristic physiological pattern of response to threat; in other words, an autonomic, protective response to threats of danger.[71] This was important because for the first time it showed that the effects of trauma were beyond the control of the individual and actually a natural protective response. These three pieces of research mark the high-water point of an understanding of human behaviour under stress,

[65] Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization, a Study of the Larger Mind* (Cornell University Library, 1909).
[66] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, p. 31.
[67] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, p. 32.
[68] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, pp. 51–55.
[69] F.C. Bartlett, *Psychology and the Soldier*, First (London: Cambridge University Press, 1927), pp.91–99.
[70] Cooley, pp. 23–28.
[71] Aaron Beck, Gary Emery, and Ruth Greenberg, *Anxiety Disorders and Phobias* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 15.

at that point and, taken together also form the basis of future and present understanding of trauma. From a military point of view, matters relating to mental health remained static between the two World Wars, the systems and personnel that had been accrued during the First World War were abandoned, and, as the Second World War approached hasty preparations were needed at the eleventh hour to be ready for the coming war.[72] Subsequently, after an uncertain start, in 1942 a Directorate of Army Psychiatry was set up as part of Army Medical Services.[73]

Between then and the end of the war, psychiatric services were available to troops wherever medical services were. The American experience was basically similar, although their experience in North Africa suffered quite a setback when the 'psychological screening' system they had put in place before the war to try to weed-out those unsuitable to be soldiers, failed completely and had to be re-designed.[74] The commanders of British troops were using the advantage they had over commanders of the past in terms of psychological help and support by taking morale, motivation and mental injury as serious considerations in the day-to-day operations of an army; and their actions show that they were doing what they could to look after the mental welfare of their men.[75] From a physical point of view, all the well-learned methods of the past were employed: good interpersonal relationships and an approachable command structure were encouraged, time was scheduled for physical training and recreation, teams trained together and as far as possible, good rations and accommodation were provided. As for mental welfare, psychologists and psychiatrists were in theatre, as close to combat zones as was safe and patients with combat stress or trauma were seen by them as swiftly as possible. The provisions certainly seem to have been as comprehensive as they could have been at the time and represent the cutting- edge of what could have been provided.

After the war, in November 1945, the Department of Army Psychiatry was set up within the Army Medical College at Millbank.[76] In America, psychologists were demobilised, but then, in 1947, obtained permanent active-duty status, and in 1949, the first military clinical

[72] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, p. 68.
[73] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, p. 78.
[74] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, p. 86.
[75] Jonathan Fennell, *Combat and Morale in the North African Camaign* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[76] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock*, p. 115.

psychology internship programmes were established.[77] Shortly afterwards, American and British psychologists were deployed during the Korean War (1950-1953). A new development appeared during this conflict in the form of Psychological Warfare where captured Western troops had been subjected to a range of inhumane physical treatments, including torture, execution, and severe malnutrition, as well as what was named 'brainwashing', and 're-education' in favour of the cause of communism.[78] The American reaction to this was to make changes in training, but more importantly, they put significant resources into the study of motivation, leadership, morale, and psychological warfare as an investment in the future.[79]

The importance of high morale and combat motivation cannot be overestimated for the following reason. Fear can and does destroy morale and cohesion, and it operates in this way: if an individual's belief in the likelihood of personal destruction or serious injury rises to a high enough level, emotional thought can overcome the rational brain and trigger the 'fight or flight' syndrome.[80] In this situation, fear overwhelms rational thought processes, and Dave Grossman, (1995) offers a very clear description of what ensues: 'When people become angry or frightened, they stop thinking with their forebrain (the mind of a human being) and start thinking with their midbrain (which is indistinguishable from the mind of an animal). *They are literally scared out of their wits*' [emphasis in original].[81] Du Picq had called this a 'contagion of fear' and he knew that unless checked, it could spread from person to person and quickly destroy cohesion in an army.[82] Marshall (1947) supported this, saying that panic, '...gathers volume like a snowball.'[83] Grossman goes on to make an important point for military personnel regarding practicing repetitive drills: 'The only thing that has any hope of influencing the midbrain is also the only thing that influences a dog: classical and operant conditioning'.[84]

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[77] Kennedy and Zillmer, *Military Psychology, Second Edition,* p. 13.
[78] Kennedy and Zillmer, *Military Psychology, Second Edition,* p.13.
[79] Kennedy and Zillmer, *Military Psychology, Second Edition*, p.14.
[80]Aaron T Beck and Gary Enfield with Ruth L Greenberg *Anxiety Disorders and Phobias: A Cognitive Perspective* (Basic Books: New York, 1985), p. 15
[81] Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Revised ed. edition (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009), p. 8.
[82] du Picq, p.88.
[83] S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*, (Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017), p. 145.
[84] Dave Grossman, *On Killing, The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1996), pp. 5–8

All perceived threats, not necessarily threats of violence, produce anxiety and all individuals have a greater or lesser resistance to that anxiety, or fear, depending upon individual traits, and experience. Anxiety is generated when an individual believes that a perceived threat will occur, and that anxiety is multiplied by the perceived seriousness of the consequences of that threat being enacted. It is, however, mitigated by the individual's perceived ability to cope with that threat, together with any other factors beyond the control of the individual which might help, known as 'rescue factors', and which, although not certain, might come in on the side of the individual against the threat. This can be expressed in the form of an equation:[85]

$$\text{Anxiety} = \frac{\text{Perceived likelihood that threat will happen x perceived cost/awfulness.}}{\text{Perceived ability to cope + perceived rescue factors.}}$$

Put simply, once an individual believes that an awful event is certain to happen to him or her and that they are not likely to be able to deal with it, the potential is there for the fight or flight syndrome to operate, and the changes in the ability to think, described above, will ensue. However, if the individual can reduce the effects shown above the line in the equation, or indeed increase the effect of that which is below the line sufficiently, then the anxiety may reduce to a manageable level. In other words, adding or increasing high morale and motivation to the 'rescue factors' below the line in the equation above, can raise the level enough to cancel out, or severely reduce the factors in the top line enough to make the difference and to enable an individual to operate.

The word 'motivation' must cover a wide range of circumstances, from deciding to join the army, to willingly engaging in potentially lethal combat, and this must have to embrace a range of emotions and commitment over varying periods of time. Logically, John A. Lynn (1996) divided 'Motivation', in relation to armies, into three sections: initial, which related to the decision to become a soldier, sustaining, which concerned remaining in the military, and combat, which is distinguished by the presence of fear.[86] This thesis will mainly be dealing with combat motivation, but occasionally, another mood and associated behaviour was in evidence, and in this thesis it will be described as 'pragmatic professionalism'. It

[85] Diana Sanders and Frank Wills, *Counselling for Anxiety Problems* (London: Sage, 2003), p. 19.
[86] Lynn, *Bayonets of the Republic,* pp. 22, 35, 36.

describes the state of mind that existed in soldiers when mood was not boosted by excitement or danger, and they simply and doggedly got on with what had to be done to support the army and its aims, even though in the presence of danger in a potentially uncomfortable environment. In modern terms it can be described as a 'default position' between other events: simply doing what had to be done. Hew Strachan (2006), wrote that it could be a result of training which, he said, '...counters the hardy perennial of life in the ranks, boredom, distinguishes the soldier from the civilian and so generates professional pride', and 'it can create unit cohesion'.[87]

High morale has certainly been a major contributor to motivation, and it does qualify as a 'rescue factor'. Commenting generally about morale and motivation, Bernd Horn and Daniel Lagacé–Roy said: 'Once the various definitions are distilled down to their components, it becomes clear that morale describes the spirit, determination, and confidence within a group to overcome challenges, dangers, and obstacles to achieve an assigned task, self-imposed goal, or situation in which they may find themselves.'[88] However, military historiography includes many situations in which morale was, or was very likely to be low, and yet units still pressed-on. This must mean that there is another form of drive for positive motivation, motivation that is not for something bad, and that is unit cohesion, which is relatively unaffected by levels of morale.

An understanding of unit cohesion began at the end of the Second World War, when research by Shils and Janowitz into motivation and cohesion in the Wehrmacht, moved the focus of the study of motivation and unit cohesion away from bigger, army-wide issues of morale and motivation, to the smaller unit, nominally of platoon or squad size, and the dynamics between the men in those smaller units, whatever their rank.[89] It was found that a relationship was formed between members of a unit that developed around mutual support, the forming of friendship, comradeship, and a social structure including recreation and training time together. The result of that was the making of friends and the beginning of an important psychological, 'social group' of individuals who had a sense of identity and of

[87] Hew Strachan, 'Training, Morale and Modern War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 41(2).0024–0094 (2006), p. 216.
[88] Bernd Horn and Daniel Lagace-Roy, -'"Morale"'-, in Bernd Horne & Robert W. Walker,(eds.), *The Military Leadership Handbook* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), p. 403
[89] E.A. Shils and M. Janowitz, 'Cohesion & Disintegration in the Wermacht in World War II', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12.2 (1948), 280–315.

belonging to their unit.[90] When a group forms amongst soldiers of the same rank, it is known as 'peer', or 'horizontal' bonding.[91] This bond has been known by other, interchangeable, names in the past, including camaraderie, brotherhood, morale, esprit, and, the will to fight. These are well-known terms, and that suggests that the effect has long been a common factor generated from within the ranks. But, for the generation of an overall sense of unit cohesion, MacIntyre says that when cohesion is not just horizontal, but also exists up and down the unit rank structure, a situation he describes as, 'vertical' cohesion', unit cohesion is boosted overall.[92]

The importance of the role of leadership to vertical cohesion cannot be stressed enough. Modern theory and practice show that, in addition to factors such as equipment and discipline; when a unit is operating with the benefit of 'vertical cohesion' the morale and effectiveness of the unit can increase. Allister MacIntyre, writing in *The Military Leadership Handbook*, said that:

> Vertical cohesion, defined as the positive bond of favourable sentiment, that soldiers have for their leaders, is the mechanism by which group objectives are articulated with the goals of the larger organisation. Vertical cohesion is fostered by exemplary leadership, which is characterized by a sense of fairness in superiors and the willingness of competent superiors to lead their soldiers into combat and share equitably in the risk of death.[93]

As to how this happens, Siebold says that the most widespread and meaningful approach to understanding cohesion 'comes from social psychology with its '…focus on bonding among group members and with their organization [sic] and military service'.[94] This is echoed by McIlveen and Gross (1998) who point out that leaders are in fact members of the group they lead.[95] That means that they have been approved of and accepted by the group, and so, seen as a member with the advantages and disadvantages that may involve. That acceptance forms the basis of the vertical cohesion in the unit, uniting the group into a whole, with the leader's performance being subject to a positive professional appraisal

[90] Horn and Walker, *The Military Leadership Handbook*, pp. 58–59.
[91] Guy L. Siebold, 'The Essence of Military Group Cohesion', *Armed Forces and Society*, 33.2 (2007), p. 287.
[92] Horn and Walker, *The Military Leadership Handbook*, p. 58
[93] Allister MacIntyre, "Cohesion", in Horn and Walker, pp. 62–63.
[94] Siebold, 'The Essence of Military Group Cohesion', p.287
[95] Rob McIlveen and Richard Gross, *Social Psychology* (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 1998), pp. 96–97.

based on the way he or she performs his or her duties as a professional, and not solely on friendship.

Altogether, there are four aspects, or types, of bonding that together comprise unit cohesion, the horizontal and vertical cohesion already described, and which when present together lead to unit cohesion, and two others. Siebold names them as: Organisational bonding, which is between personnel and their next higher organisation, for instance, company and battalion, and institutional bonding which happens between personnel and their military branch, for instance, the army. Organisational bonding coupled with institutional bonding then results in secondary group cohesion, which enables more than one group to work with others towards a common goal.[96] The forming of secondary cohesion is described by Siebold as, '…an ongoing process of social integration among the members of a primary group, with group leaders, and with the larger secondary organizations to which they belong'.[97] It is what binds small, discreet units, into a whole.

Bern Horn writing on Combat Motivation in *The Military Leadership Handbook* (2008), provides a list of factors considered necessary to encourage combat motivation in men, and 'Leadership' is at the top: he goes on to say that 'In the simplest terms, leadership is about influencing people to achieve some objective that is important to the leader, the group, and the organization.[98] The leader should be capable of undertaking the human element-lading, [sic] motivating, and inspiring, particularly during times of crisis, chaos and complexity…'[99] This is echoed by Jon Dollard, who conducted a survey in which 89 percent of combat veterans emphasized the importance of getting frequent instructions from leaders when in a tight spot; and he also found evidence that 'leaderless groups normally become inactive'.[100] Underlining that point, in stressful crisis situations involving high risk, Samuel Stouffer, wrote that, 'cool and aggressive leadership was especially important'.[101] To sum up, the process above describes the modern practical and theoretical method by which unit cohesion is achieved. The presence of unit cohesion is quite apparent at times during the Zulu War and

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[96] Siebold, 'The Essence of Military Group Cohesion', p. 287.
[97] Siebold, 'The Essence of Military Group Cohesion', p. 288.
[98] Horn and Walker, p. 74.
[99] Horn and Walker, p. 75.
[100] Bernd Horn, "Combat Motivation", Horn and Walker, pp. 82–83.
[101] Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 68.

the purpose of this thesis is to find out how it came to be, in a time before psychological knowledge.

Chapter Outline.

Chapter two will give a background to the development of morale and motivation in theory and practice through to the Ashanti and Zulu campaigns. It will do this by following the progressive improvements to conditions both within the army, and in society over time, and the effect they had on recruitment, retention, and the gradual building of morale and esprit de corps, which was a significant factor in the production of morale and motivation. Chapter three will show, in a broad sense, that unit cohesion was apparent at certain points of the Ashanti campaign, and it will seek to identify which groups and/or leaders, if any, were associated with its appearance, and if it was more than once. That in turn will establish whether there was a predictable link between a leader or unit, and the appearance of unit cohesion. If that was the case, then the leader or unit will be investigated in more depth to establish the reasons why. The Ashanti campaign was the first significant conflict that the British army was engaged in following the Cardwell reforms, and Wolseley was a keen supporter of Cardwell and his ideas. This was the first opportunity to see their ideas and reforms at work.

Chapter four will apply the same process as was used to examine the Ashanti campaign, but to the battle at Isandlwana in the Zulu War, and its aftermath. Then Chapter five will focus in detail on a smaller, discreet incident in the Zulu campaign; the battle of Rorke's Drift. Rorke's Drift was of course a victory for the British army, but that victory was very much against the odds and this chapter will argue that the role of leadership was pivotal to the victory, by raising and maintaining motivation and esprit de corps in the defending unit. Chapter five investigates the events at the siege of Eshowe in the same detailed way that Rorke's Drift was examined and will again argue that the victory was the result of the leader's ability to raise and maintain morale and esprit de corps. Eshowe took place over a longer time than Rorke's Drift, and that provided an opportunity for the various units to be bonded together as one. This chapter will explain how the process of unit cohesion took place over time in stages, purely in the hands of fate, and how those stages, and the abilities of the commander matched modern theory and best practice almost exactly.

Chapter six addresses the defeat of British forces at the Intombe river, and the victory of the relieving column for Eshowe at Gingindlovu. This chapter will argue that senior leadership failed the troops at the Intombe river, but that the characteristics of leadership were not simply conferred with a rank and were seen in the actions of Sergeant Booth. This chapter will argue that Booth's task of leadership was aided by his relationship with the men. Chelmsford's role of leadership in the relief of Eshowe, and the battle of Gingindlovu, was less about being part of a team, as Wolseley and Wood had been, but more one of intense involvement in the preparation and arrangements of every detail. He left nothing to chance and was constantly present and directing events.

Chapter seven looks closely at three officers who were in overall command during the Ashanti or Zulu Wars, to identify which of them, if any, was associated with the consistent presence of unit cohesion. Where unit cohesion was present, it is a sign that the commanders presence added vertical cohesion to the unit and would effectively bond it together as a whole. This chapter will argue that the necessary methods, personality, character, and success rates necessary for this to happen were not possessed by every commander but will identify which commanders did have the ability. Chapter eight provides the 'Conclusion', by drawing all the strands of the thesis together and identifying the process and development of the practical understanding of morale and motivation over time, and answering the questions posed at the outset.

CHAPTER TWO.

Morale and Motivation in the Victorian Army.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first will establish the wider context of understandings of morale and combat motivation. The second will trace the development of morale and motivation in the army from 1815. It will cover the Crimean War (1853-1856) during which esprit de corps was seen operating on a large scale as a driver of morale and motivation in units. The chapter will move on, through the Cardwell reforms of 1872, to the Ashanti and Zulu Wars. It will use Lynn's three categories of motivation: initial, sustaining and combat motivation.[1] This chapter also argues that there was a relationship between improvements and changes in civilian life that, when added to changes in the army, drove the increased recruitment and retention of a more suitable type of recruit as time went by. The army wanted to improve overall by attracting a better, more professional, type of recruit who would be more likely to be sober and reliable, want to progress in their career, and have a pride in what they were doing.

One of the changes in society that helped was the development of an upper, more professional, working class, in addition to the 'traditional' lower working class. That did lead to a better class of recruit who wanted the prospect of a career in the army, rather than being forced to enlist because of need. Those better recruits were more easily retained and had a sense of pride, or esprit de corps, in their unit which resulted in an increase in combat motivation amongst them. That growth of a professional class of recruit with a developing sense of esprit de corps was essential to the development of morale and motivation, and later, unit cohesion in later years.

The History of Military Morale, and Motivation.

Ilya Berkovich throws some light on the origins of the generation and management of morale and motivation when he writes that they were already present before the French Revolution. That shows that the practical necessity and advantages of keeping the line and the units together as a cohesive whole, were already recognised. There can be little doubt that at that time, the driving force behind motivation was that of discipline, 'bringing

[1] Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic*, pp. 22, 35.

together the individual wills of group members' and so, 'creating a unity of purpose in the group'.[2] Focussing on the period leading up to the French Revolution, he points to a paucity of information around motivation and morale through the eighteenth century, and in his opinion, this is the result of bias on the part of nineteenth century historians and French scholars. He believes that they consciously chose to highlight the events of the French Revolution over those of the 'Old regime' and that they: '…underscored the turning point of 1789 and the rise of the new citizen army, which replaced the 'degenerate structure of the Bourbon Monarchy'.[3] His argument is that only the negative aspects of the Old Regime have been presented, and that the army of the older society are unfailingly presented as a 'despised group on the periphery of eighteenth - century societies', and that Frederick the Great believed that obedience needed to be 'ensured by fear'.[4] He writes that the favourably biased treatment of the subject of motivation in Napoleonic revolutionary troops, means that the 'views of old-regime soldiers remain surprisingly one sided', and so gives an incorrect view of the pre-revolution situation.[5]

Having noted this bias, Berkovich set out to challenge the '…conventional view of soldiers serving in the armies of old regime Europe…', which has been, '…coloured by Frederick the Great's notorious assertion that men should fear their officers more than the enemy'.[6] He points out that the sense of esprit de corps observed in some French Revolutionary soldiers, had actually been seen before the Revolution by Frederick the Great himself, and that, despite being described as; one who '…cannot easily be suspected of having much sympathy for his men', he nevertheless encouraged the fostering of a spirit of esprit de corps within his Regiments and units.[7] Actually, Frederick's approach with regard to esprit de corps can be seen as an incremental step forward compared to the opinions and actions earlier in the eighteenth century when the common soldier was reputedly seen as 'untrustworthy and devoid of honour, best controlled with fear, and needing constant supervision.'[8] This view certainly seemed widespread and Jeremy Black writes of that period, 'It is possible to emphasise a common hierarchical model, with officers drawn from

[2] Robert Edwards, 'Discipline' in, *The Military Leadership Handbook,* Horn and Walker, p. 228.
[3] Berkovich, *Motivation in War,* p. 22.
[4] Berkovich, *Motivation in War,* p. 4.
[5] Berkovich, *Motivation in War,* p. 4.
[6] Berkovich, *Motivation in War,* p. 1.
[7] Berkovich, *Motivation in War,* p. 4.
[8] Jeremy Black, *War in the Eighteenth-Century World* (London: Palgrave, 2013), p. 196.

the social élite, who, while bound together by conventions of honour, commanded troops in a harsh, disciplinary fashion'.

A likely reason for that view may well be furnished by Duffy (1986) who points out that other armies imitated the Prussians because they were regarded as the most successful army in Europe and were noted for their application of discipline.[9] There are though, indicators that the management of the Prussian Army under Frederick the Great was more subtle than the common perception of it might have suggested. Duffy explains how the discipline was applied differently between 'natives', and foreign troops, officers were drawn from 'poor country nobility' and there was excellent pay, food and equipment; even uniforms were reissued annually. Frederick's success may after-all have been owed, at least in part, to a balanced approach between harsh discipline and the otherwise reasonable treatment of soldiers and although this may well fly in the face of the general impression of Frederick and the armies of the eighteenth century, it does once more put his comment about encouraging esprit de corps into context.

There is another pointer that an evolution in motivation was slowly taking place, and that harsh discipline, whilst still an option, was no longer the only tool available or used. Jeremy Black writes that 'Native' troops were treated differently from conscripts, saying that the experience of volunteers for armies as opposed to conscripts was '...generally less harsh...' than the experience of those conscripts.[10] There is actually a logic to this; the 'native' troops were defined as volunteers, and so, would be motivated to join and remain in the army, and need less discipline. Conscripts though, are potentially the opposite as regards motivation, are theoretically more likely to need a strict form of discipline, and therefore have a worse experience than volunteers. In another example of the measured use of discipline, Jeremy Black writes that 'Some units resorted to passive disobedience, strike action, or even mutiny, in the face of what were regarded as unreasonable conditions'.[11] It cannot be imagined that this would be allowed in the face of the enemy, but it does present a mixed picture and certainly does not relate a tale of constant brutality and subservience placed on soldiers by their officers.

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[9] Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (Ware: Wordsworth, 1998), pp. 24–25.
[10] Black, *War in the Eighteenth Century,* pp. 196–97.
[11] Black, *War in the Eighteenth Century,* pp. 196–97.

If the eighteenth century shows a slow, but definite, change of methodology in the raising and maintaining of morale and motivation, then the French Revolution (1789-1799) marks the next, major, step in that process. Lynn illustrated the changes in European armies as the result of the Revolution when he wrote 'They were not what soldiers had been before 1789 - men who turned to military service because their society and economy offered them little other alternative.'[12] Importantly here, Lynn shows the relationship between a society and its army and how the two were now linked by the changes wrought during the Revolution. Although the Revolution was a major change for society, from the point of view of military motivation, change was still a process, and the older, harsh disciplinary methods did not disappear overnight; the lingering of the old methods was still to be seen in the French Army after the Revolution. Berkovich said of that army 'Its members included genuine volunteers spurred by patriotism and ideology, but also numerous reluctant recruits produced by mass levies and conscription laws', adding, 'Some recruits marched to the front inspired by patriotism, but their columns were often overshadowed by detachments of the '*Gendarmerie.*'[13] With the Gendarmerie being the revolutionary successor of the old regime Military Police this is more evidence that the older practices lingered on for a while and that change was incremental rather than overnight.

During the late eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, and up to the battle of Waterloo in 1815, Wellington's armies frequently campaigned in Europe as one of the 'Old Regime' armies and his opinion was that strict obedience and discipline were the only ways to ensure that the soldier could fight successfully.[14] These examples serve to make the case well: in 1801, a British soldier in Barracks in England, talking about flogging, wrote that, '...there was scarce a day in which we did not see one or more of the soldiers get from three to seven hundred lashes.'[15] Still with the British Army, but in 1808 as the army retreated towards Vigo following the defeat at Corunna, Rifleman Harris recorded that the commander, Crauford, halted the army so he could administer corporal punishment in the form of lashes, 'even though the French are at our heels', the soldier, seemingly accepting of

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[12] Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic,* p. 43.
[13] Berkovich, *Motivation in War,* p. 2.
[14] Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *The Armies of Wellington* (London: Cassell, 1998), p. 66.
[15] Harris, "Discipline in Peace and War," in McGuffie, p. 96.

Crauford's logic records that 'This was indeed no time to be lax in discipline and the general [sic] knew it.[16]

At a lower level in Wellington's army though, the presence of esprit de corps, seemingly produced within the ranks, was evident, and linked to good morale and motivation, with an example taking place during the Peninsular war in 1811, at Barrossa. On this occasion, men who had become disengaged from a battle and who could have escaped the field, re-joined the fight, having formed themselves into makeshift groups, without instruction and without officers. This does not give the appearance of troops lacking in motivation or initiative, and then, having captured an enemy fieldpiece, one of these makeshift groups used a 'chunk of chalky earth' to write '28th Grenadiers' on its barrel.[17] That action bears the hallmarks of an expression of pride in achievement and a show of esprit de *c*orps, and it certainly points to a source of motivation *within* the fighting troops rather than one externally imposed, although there is nothing to suggest that Wellington was aware of it.

The British Army: 1815-1872

During the period between the Battle of Waterloo and the Crimean War, (1853-1856), major budget cuts reduced army manpower and resources by a significant amount, and subsequently those reductions were responsible for the 'disastrous consequences' which followed during the first winter of the Crimean War.[18] Those shortages of transport and equipment led to the soldiers in the Crimea having to live and fight through the first bitter winter in very difficult conditions, with no specialist cold-weather equipment, a lack of rations and increasing levels of disease.[19] Yet, and to their credit, no difficulties were experienced with discipline or motivation, and the troops performed to the best of their abilities. There were, though, cases recorded of soldiers being rendered unfit for duty, not through physical illness or injury, but as the result of something that had happened in their minds.[20]

Hew Strachan (1984) says, in the introduction to *The Reform of the British Army* 1830-1854) that military history has tended to position the Crimean War [1853-1856] as a

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[16] McGuffie, Rank and File, pp. 97-100.
[17] Haythornthwaite, *Armies of Wellington,* p. 272.
[18] Brian Bond, *Victorian Military Campaigns* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), p. 11.
[19] Andrew Lambert and Stephen Badsey, *The Crimean War* (Stroud: Bramley Books, 1994), pp. 146–47.
[20] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock to PTSD,* pp. 3–4.

'watershed between old fashioned methods … and modern twentieth century warfare' and that in doing so, the improvements made to the army in the previous twenty or so years are ignored'.[21] He summed it up neatly in one line, saying, 'The image is an easy one. A long post-Waterloo sleep and in a rough awakening in the Crimea and a round of reforms follows.'[22] His point is that an understanding of the need for reform and improvements in the army had been recognised long before the Crimean War, and that actions to address them had started as early as 1830, not the end of the Crimean War. There was a realisation of the need for reform about fifteen years after the battle of Waterloo, according to Luvaas (1964). He described the army as being '…in decay', and having significantly deteriorated since Waterloo, to a point where it was riven with problems including excess drinking, desertion, and indiscipline.[23]

The developing problems with the army were not caused by any sort of action, but rather, inaction after Waterloo. The practice of the use of discipline as the main means of instilling motivation into the troops had carried on, and one of the major obstacles to reform was seen to be the Duke of Wellington, and a group of supporters who shared his political and conservative views. Wellington and his views, politics, and conservatism dominated discussion about reform in the period leading up to the Crimean War, to the exclusion of what *was* being done and continued to a large extent afterwards. An example is provided by an article in *The Naval and Military Gazette,* in its yearly review of 1844:

> in no year … have we had fewer changes to remark on … the Duke of Wellington has ever been in the Army disposed to a conservative system … Whenever his Grace issues orders to the army, we observe that they are generally to enforce the existing regulations or to restore a lapsed discipline; but reform in its usual sense never comes under his consideration … We somewhat regret that his Grace is not a Military Reformer-for there *is* much to reform.[24]

Although perhaps considered by some as a somewhat dated author, Luvaas' comments about the army and the need for reforms being recognised in the 1830s are underlined by

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[21] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy The Reform of the British Army 1830-54*, sec. Introduction.
[22] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, sec. Introduction.
[23] Jay Luvaas, *The Education of an Army* (London: Cassell, 1964), pp. 3–5.
[24] Editor, 'To Readers and Correspondents', *The Naval and Military Gazette*, 4 January 1845, issue 626 sec. Letters, p. 8.

Strachan's comments about changes being made before the Crimean war, and the reasons why. He (Luvaas) shows why the army could not continue in the way it was, and that it needed reforms if it were once again to become a professional organisation. It is difficult to define the meaning of the word 'professional', but Samuel P. Huntington (1957) wrote that professionalism is made from three things: Expertise, responsibility and 'corporateness'. Expertise means having expert skills, responsibility means performing a service for others, and 'corporateness', means a sense of group or team identity.[25]

Expertise, and responsibility, were addressed when the army introduced literacy classes as a means of improving the men and to attract recruits. They also introduced promotion examinations which could be sat by suitable candidates who had completed the literacy classes, and that move handed the individual the chances of improvement and an element of control in their progression. The learning process meant that the individual acquired extra skills as they studied and learned more.[26] Another opportunity for self-advancement came with the top-level examinations, which could now enable suitable candidates to be promoted to Subaltern rank, and then a whole range of expertise in the form of military subjects would be learned. These included languages, tactics, military drawing, and the study of fortifications as some of the things that it was felt a young officer should know about.[27] The third element of Huntington's model is 'corporateness', or a sense of belonging, and working towards a goal together, and that would have been found in esprit de corps, the pride in the unit and the need not to let it down, because esprit de corps has been linked to professionalism.[28]

Wellington was Commander-in-Chief from 1827-1828, and then again from 1842-1852, and in the intervening period, Lord Hill a former divisional commander who had worked under Wellington, held the post, and was viewed as very much under the influence of Wellington, often relying on him for advice and guidance.[29] However, a large part of the military forces of Great Britain already lay outside the Horse Guard's control. The Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, were answerable to the Master General of the Ordnance,

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[25] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 8–10.
[26] Allan Ramsay Skelley, *The Victorian Army at Home* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977), p. 94,95,311.
[27] Huntington, *The soldier and the State*, p. 18.
[28] Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 15.
[29] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 6.

and a vast semi-military force of yeomanry and militia was controlled by the Home Secretary, with the Commander-in-Chief merely providing inspecting officers.[30]

That meant that although Wellington's conservative presence undoubtedly did put a brake on some reforms, there was still room to make changes, and younger, reforming officers did introduce improvements and changes over time: they included improvements to rations and accommodation, together with some changes and revisions in discipline and punishments.[31] These measures were relatively simple to start with and were aimed at the soldiers' basic needs, but they were significant from a different perspective as they marked a point at which the basic soldier's needs were being both recognised, and addressed. That in turn shows a developing relationship between the upper levels of the army and the common soldier, in which the soldier was being regarded as a human being with wants and needs, and as someone who can potentially be developed. It would be surprising if this development did not improve morale.

If, in the period leading up to the Crimean War the soldiers' experience was beginning to show early signs of improvement, the same could not be said of the lives of lower-class civilians, from whose ranks the army invariably recruited, and their lives were said to be 'nasty, brutish and short'.[32] Wages had improved somewhat from about 1820, but that did not really compensate for 'The upheaval involved in migration and new forms of work, the terrible overcrowding and miserable sanitary conditions, and, most notably, high levels of mortality persisted through the first three quarters of the century.'[33] To these people, the one -and-a-half pounds of bread, plus a pound of meat per person per day that soldiers and their families were eating, was far more that the average member of the civilian population could ever hope to enjoy.[34] Given those circumstances, it is no surprise that to some people, joining the army was seen as a better option than suffering the privations of civilian life. That was despite the generally low regard of the army held in society and a genuine fear of the fierce discipline imposed on soldiers; in particular, flogging.[35] Nevertheless, for those who were really struggling in the lower working class there may not have been a realistic choice;

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[30] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 9.
[31] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, chap. 2.
[32] David Nalson, *The Victorian Soldier* (Princes Risborough: Shire, 2004), p. 3.
[33] Wally Seccombe, *Weathering the Storm* (London: Verso, 1993), pp.71-80; Edward Royle, *Modern Britain. A Social History. Second Edition* (London: Hodder Education, 1997), p.174.
[34] Nalson, *The Victorian Soldier*, p. 3.

the army was a better option than their lot in civilian life, and they joined simply for the food. [36]

Others, described as 'idle characters', joined because they thought that soldiers had an easy life, or because they were, 'bad characters and criminals, the discontented and restless... and because, at the end of the day, the army provided the state's only welfare service'.[37] This situation was neatly summed-up by Farwell quoting Daniel Defoe: 'The poor starve, thieve, or turn soldier'.[38] This class, or type of recruit though, represented a potential problem for the army in terms of morale and motivation, because as we now know, motivation is goal-centred and it propels a person towards a desired outcome.[39] Consequently, if an individual's actions in joining the army were centred around a goal of escaping poverty rather than a positive view of joining, then once he had joined, his goal was achieved, and motivation would cease. There would be a high probability that the individual would desert at some point suitable to himself.

In fact, men did desert to 'seek better work', to 'evade capture and punishment' and to financially support dependents.[40] Others deserted after having been recruited through 'deception and trickery' and by dishonest recruiters; over time simple common sense told commanding officers that these men would make reluctant soldiers, but there was no choice, owing to the numbers needed.[41] The army did want to raise the standard of those joining by recruiting what it described as 'better men', but again, the generally poor view of the army held by the public meant that most men who had a viable alternative, chose not to join.[42] Strachan describes that throughout the nineteenth century there was a 'a fundamental division of approach as to where the emphasis in reforming other ranks' conditions of service should lie.'[43] Briefly, this was an argument between those who believed

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[35] Nalson, *The Victorian Soldier*, p. 4; T.H. McGuffie, ed., *Rank and File. The Common Soldier at Peace and War 1642-1914* (London: Hutchinson, 1964), p. 97.
[36] Byron Farwell, *For Queen and Country: Social History of the Victorian and Edwardian Army* (London: Viking, 1981), p. 84.
[37] Farwell, *Queen and Country,* pp. 83–85.
[38] Farwell, *Queen and Country,* p. 85.
[39] Herbert L. Petri and John M. Govern, *Motivation. Theory, Research and Applications*, (London: Wadsworth, 2004), p. 207.
[40] Nick Mansfield, *Soldiers as Workers* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016), p. 186.
[41] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 55.
[42] Nalson, *The Victorian Soldier*, p. 4.
[43] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 50.

that improving conditions in the army would attract better recruits, and those who believed that whoever was recruited should be moulded into what was needed, within the army.[44]

There was no clear winner between the two points of view and, over time, a combination of the two can be discerned: a combination of spirit and encouragement, backed up by discipline. There would have been many reasons why a person would join the Victorian army, but there were probably as many reasons why they may leave again, and the retention of men after they had joined was another problem. Strachan records that in 1846 the strength of the army was 148,760, with the number of deserters at 6,512, or 4.38% of the army strength.[45] Expressed as a percentage that is not a large number, but when looked at as nearly 150,000 men, it is a significant loss of strength. As time went by, what really helped in retention, as well as in recruitment, was the development of esprit de corps. The shared dangers of colonial service had developed a bond between the officers and the men, and that showed in the development of esprit de corps.[46] What that meant in practice, was what would now be recognised as the development of lateral cohesion; comradeship, with all the benefits of belonging, duty to one's colleagues and unit, and the pride of doing things well. French (2005) says of it, 'it is a powerful bond that is intrinsically linked to the Regimental system used in the army'.[47]

The regiment, as a homogenous organisation was key to the forming of esprit de corps, and Farwell's comment that: 'A regiment was more a community than bureaucratic sub-unit...'[48], underlines the creation of bonds and cohesion and conveys a sense of belonging and of something shared. Together with regimental identifiers, like flags, battle honours and uniforms it indicates a unique and discreet body to which all contributed as well as shared. All these things, over time become part of tradition and, as Strachan says, 'Tradition leads to esprit de corps'.[49] The individual regiment was particularly important to the army overall, and Mansfield (2016) wrote that, 'The regiment was the building block of the British army and generated intense loyalty, often over centuries.'[50] On occasion though, that loyalty,

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[44] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 50.
[45] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 182.
[46] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 79.
[47] David French, *Military Identities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 1–2.
[48] Farwell, *For Queen and Country*, p. 25.
[49] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy The Reform of the British Army 1830-54*, p. 269.
[50] Mansfield, *Soldiers as Workers*, p. 8.

inward looking and focussed on the community of the regiment, could make it more difficult for a regiment to work with others. This was because, as Mansfield says that 'the nineteenth century army was a collection of autonomous regiments, still regarded as the Colonel's property, which often made it dysfunctional on campaign.'[51]

By the eve of the Crimean War the soldier's situation had improved because of the changes made to his length of service, pensions, and a lessening in the use of flogging. But perhaps the most important change was access to education, which could potentially open a path to promotion and a career. These changes and improvements had not happened overnight but were the result of the lengthy and sometimes complex process set in train in 1830.[52] Generally, the changes were seen as improvements, and the Duke of Cambridge said of them, 'the change in the men, even in my short experience, is very striking'.[53] More practical proof of the improved mood amongst the men, is probably reflected by the reduction in desertion figures from 3,527 in 1841, to 1,500 in 1850.[54] Another approving opinion of the changes in the men came from a man named J.H. Stocqueler. Stocqueler was a journalist, thought to be the editor of the *United Services Gazette,* and previously editor of the *Calcutta Englishman* whilst in India, who was a noted critic of 'Horseguards'.[55] He was a supporter of reforms, and had 'proved his good faith by concerning himself with military education'.[56] In other words, he did not just moan and criticise but actually suggested potential improvements, and helped with training and education. It must have been a relief for him to say that 'The position of the soldier is now much improved …with the improvement of his condition, a corresponding improvement in the character of the soldier has taken place'.[57]

These changes though, did not result in an increase in the quality of recruits, probably because the public at large were not yet aware of them. As Strachan put it, 'To the outsider, a military career might appear no more beguiling in 1854 than it had in 1830, and thus the better class of recruit be not nearer enlistment'.[58] Added to that, the lack of change in the

[51] Mansfield, *Soldiers as Workers*, p. 8.
[52] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, chaps. 2–3.
[53] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 103.
[54] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 103.
[55] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy* pp. 24, 46 note 94.
[56] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 24.
[57] J.H. Stocqueler, *The Military Encyclopaedia* (London: Wm. H. Allen & Co., 1853), pp. 261–62.

quality of recruits may well have been due to changes in society, as the class structure evolved over time. The working class was dividing, with a new 'upper working class' developing that was actually turning into a 'middle class'. Skilled workers, artisans, or those with a trade had much better chances of well-paid employment along with a much better social life and as such, were not likely to want to become a soldier. The lower working class of unskilled labourers remained very much as they had always been in terms of unemployment, drink and violence and it seems as if they were still more likely to join the army, as a last resort, than other classes. [59]

That may well explain why those who joined out of need rather than desire, were much more likely to desert early on. The figures for 1846-1847 support this, with the greatest number of deserters being amongst new recruits thought to be regretting their decision to join: of 1,757 deserters in that period, 1,177 were recruits and only 212 were men of five years' service or over.[60] Obviously not all lower working class workers deserted, but essentially, what this leaves is a group of people between those who joined out of sheer necessity, and those who were doing well in civilian life with no thoughts of joining the army. That group joined because they were motivated to, it was a free choice, and they were much more likely to remain and to be absorbed into the regimental 'family' as a result. They are not specifically mentioned in the historiography, but it can be argued that they were the central strength of the army and, in a sense, the 'better type' of recruit that had been sought.

Any war will severely test an army, its systems, morale, and motivation. For the British army campaigning in the Crimea between 1853-1856, the test was made more severe because of a major failing of the army support structure to provide sufficient and appropriate supplies for a campaign in a severe winter. The shortages included clothing, enough transport, or sufficient medical supplies to deal with the severe illness and disease that were encountered.[61] The resulting conditions in which men had to live and work were described by a soldier of the 17th Regiment of Foot, Robert Parsons, who recorded a vivid

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[58] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 103.
[59] Andrew August, *The British Working Class 1832-1940.* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), chap. 3; Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 337–39.
[60] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 57.
[61] Lambert and Badsey, *The Crimean War,* pp. 145–65.

first-hand experience during the first winter. He described how the nineteen members of his tent were reduced to eight over three months, not through enemy action but through exhaustion and disease: he wrote that in the morning it was not unusual to see the bodies of two or three men, who had died in the night, taken from the tent.[62]

Taken together, the weather and conditions, added to the knowledge that the authorities had failed to supply the necessary kit and equipment, even basic food and medicines can only have lowered morale further. Especially for soldiers who, a short time previously, were in Malta awaiting deployment to the Crimea, and who were described as, in 'the best possible spirits', whilst living in healthy encampments.[63] Morale was certainly not high and newspaper reporter William Russell, commenting on the outbreak of Cholera in the fleet, recorded that, 'The depression of the army is increased by this event, and it is doubtful if they would exhibit the same "pluck" [sic] now that they were so full of a month ago'.[64]

Russell's comment and use of language are worthy of closer attention for the meaning that they convey besides the obvious. Firstly, he says that depression in the army had 'increased', not that it had been seen for the first time, and in doing so he confirms an existing low mood, not a new phenomenon. But that is not all, Russell's comments are illuminating from another perspective as well, because if 'mood' or 'morale' is substituted for 'depression', and 'motivation', for 'pluck', then he shows a basic, if unconscious, practical understanding of what we now see as the dynamic mental link between morale and motivation. In effect he was saying that happy troops were more motivated than those who were depressed. His apparently unconscious acceptance of that connection indicates that it was generally accepted knowledge amongst those he circulated with. If so, this would show an important awareness of the psychological aspects of the soldiers' performance.

Given that there was a depressed mood, a fall-off in performance might well have been expected, but the army continued to function, and on 25 October 1854 there was a major demonstration of motivation and bravery with the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava.[65] There was no sign that the troops' mood had impacted on motivation; no increase in

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[62]Robert Browning Parsons, "Enlistment, 1853:destination,1854,Balaclava [sic]", T.H. McGuffie, (ed.) *Rank and File. The Common Soldier at Peace and War 1642-1914*, pp. 49–50.
[63] Lambert and Badsey, *The Crimean War*, pp. 17–18.
[64] Lambert and Badsey, *The Crimean War*, pp. 31,32.
[65] J.W. Weightman, "A 17th Lancer at Balaclava [sic],"McGuffie, (ed.) *Rank and File*, p. 381.

desertion rates which are recognised factor in low mood or morale, and it was even said that such numbers as were recorded may well have been exaggerated.[66] There was obviously still a source of motivation, and it came from within the regiments, and from the individual soldiers of those regiments, in other words, esprit de corps. This was generated in part through the presence of robust discipline, which itself derived from a high degree of mutual respect between officers and men, and in part because the 'regimental family' created, nurtured, and strengthened esprit de corps.[67]

For the individual, being part of a 'regimental family', meant that he represented it, and became subject to its rules and mores. That meant that he had a value, or worth and was then subject to positive and negative psychological drivers, for instance, pride or shame, and that motivated him to align his behaviour to accepted regimental norms.[68] As for the high degree of mutual respect between soldiers and officers, this may in part have been due to changes in society and the development of an upper working class, who were no longer seen as 'scum'; the old perception of soldiers being 'ruffians led by Gents', had also gone.[69] These changes were further reflected in the army's recruiting process, where, as the improved conditions of service attracted the 'better' class of recruit, who was then trained to fulfil a role, the older approach of using discipline alone to produce obedience in recruits, was steadily being replaced.[70] By the end of the Crimean War, it was clear that there was a consistent source of esprit de corps amongst the soldiers and their regiments. The way that the regimental 'family' supported and related to the soldier engendered a sense of personal pride and duty in him as well as his comrades. Today this sense of belonging would be seen as underlying esprit de corps, as well as morale and motivation. Earlier, Russell's comments had showed that he was aware of the connection, when he said he thought troops with lowered mood would have less motivation than, for want of a better word, 'happier' troops. The existence of regimental esprit de corps shows that there are other positive drivers of motivation apart from a good mood, however, both prove a psychological link between the mind of the soldier, and action. This was important bearing in mind Wolseley's comment, quoted earlier that for a soldier to display spirit, or motivation, all that was needed was,

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[66] Lambert and Badsey, *The Crimean War*, p. 160.
[67] John Philip Jones, (ed.) *Queen Victoria's Paladins* (Bloomington: Random House, 2018), pp. 21–22.
[68] Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic*, p. 21–36.
[69] Mansfield, *Soldiers as Workers*, pp. 27–31.
[70] Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy*, p. 50.

'food, rest, efficient equipment, proper medical care and regular mail', in other words, all his physical needs catered for.[71] But it was now apparent that the soldier's mind was a major and positive contributor to his performance, unfortunately, the opposite effects of that, combat stress, trauma and related illness and disability, were yet to be recognised.

Whilst the processes taking place withing the regiments were producing sufficient morale and motivation to encourage soldiers to join, remain and to fight, it was never going to be enough to help those individuals who fell prey to combat stress reaction over time. Doctors, who had no idea of the link between stress and physical reactions were presented with cases of physical incapacity with no apparent physical cause.[72] Psychology was still seen as a branch of philosophy, and was defined in a contemporary dictionary as, 'The Doctrine of the Soul; a discourse or treatise on the soul'.[73] The result of that was that doctors could only seek physical cures for what they could only see as physical conditions, which they tended to group under the headings like 'wind contusions, nostalgia or irritable heart', amongst others.[74]

Five years after the Crimean war, during the American Civil War (1861-1865), the potential harm that mental wounds could cause to morale and motivation were demonstrated again when large numbers of troops suffering from combat stress, were rendered unfit for combat.[75] In the United States the same type of mental breakdowns became known as 'mind wounds' and there was still no treatment available.'[76] In fact, in the Union Army there was no understanding and even less sympathy for sufferers of 'mind wounds', and Wendy Holden (1998), wrote that:

> The Union Army had no label for the condition that could explain or legitimize the puzzling behaviour of some of its men. No category short of lunacy could account for their symptoms, and many were either sent to an asylum for the rest

[71] Lynn, *Bayonets of the Republic*, p. 29.
[72] Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, *Shell Shock to PTSD*, 1st edition (Hove: Routledge, 2015), p. 4.
[73] Webster, *Webster's Dictionary*, p. 358.
[74] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock to PTSD*, p. 2.
[75] Kennedy and Eric A Zillmer, eds., *Military Psychology, Second Edition: Clinical and Operational Applications*, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), p. 2.
[76] Wendy Holden, *Shell Shock* (London: Channel 4 Books, 1998), p. 9.

> of their natural lives, dispatched on the journey home where – left to fend for themselves-they died of hunger or exposure, or were hanged as malingerers.[77]

That attitude to the unfortunate so-called 'malingerers' was not confined to the army, as an article published in 1864 by *The American Journal of Medical Science*, accused many of the victims of mental trauma of malingering or making up symptoms to escape duty.[78] As a matter of fact, though, outside of military circles, Surgeon William Hammond had recognised and been trying to understand and treat mind wounds since 1860. Whether he was aware of the British experience in the Crimea seems likely but is not known, it is obvious however that there was still no standardised treatment available. Hammond referred to the condition as 'nostalgia' owing to the unhappy characteristic of the sufferer continually reliving horrible events; but there was nothing to offer the casualties of the Civil War.[79] He was in the same position as the British had been about five years earlier. Treatment was essentially experimental in its nature then as well, and one British Doctor treating a patient for 'Crimean Fever', advised him to, 'take the air of Hampstead Heath', in what has the sense of an educated professional guess; the patient did so, and it led to a steady recovery.[80]

In 1862, Wolseley had spent a month with the Southern, or Confederate, army of Robert E. Lee, during the American Civil War, where he had seen, and commented at length on the good leadership, confidence, and high morale of the troops he had seen, even when they were lacking in material needs. It must be said that Wolseley was an ardent supporter of Lee, his army, and his cause, and his comments were positive, returning to the importance of high morale being necessary for a successful army.[81] He made no mention of 'nostalgia' and the casualties caused by mental wounds, but he may not have been aware of such matters, and it was relatively early in the war. As time passed after the Crimean War, the importance of esprit de corps, and how it was generated was not forgotten. In 1869 Garnet Wolseley published *The Soldier's Pocketbook for Field Service*, which was a wide ranging and comprehensive book of instructions and advice, to an army-wide audience.[82] In a section

[77] Holden, *Shell Shock*, p. 9.
[78] Holden, *Shell Shock*, p. 9.
[79] Holden, *Shell Shock*, p. 9.
[80] Jones and Wessely, *Shell Shock to PTSD*, p. 4.
[81] James A. Rawley, ed., *The American Civil War: The Writings of Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley. An English View* (Mechanicsburgh: Stackpole Books, 2002), pp.3 4–39.

giving advice to young officers, Wolseley emphasised the importance of good relationships between themselves, but also, between officers and their men, to produce esprit de corps in a unit.[83] Those comments show that Wolseley understood the importance of interpersonal relationships to esprit de corps, but more importantly, he was unconsciously describing lateral and vertical cohesion; in today's terms, unit cohesion. In the absence of modern theory that can only have come from personal observation and experience, he was writing about 'what works' and said that '…there is a necessity that exists for watching over the morale of our men.[84] The *Pocketbook* was to become a 'standard authority' in the army.[85]

Ardant du Picq was a contemporary of Wolseley, and he too was writing about morale, motivation, and esprit de corps in regiments.[86] Du Picq was writing about the French army, whilst, of course, Wolseley was writing of the British army, but both were European armies, and both had fought on the same side in the Crimea with similar tactics and weapons, and so they had a lot in common. Wolseley and Du Picq had both commanded troops at the siege of Sebastopol, and so had shared the same experience, although there is no evidence that they had met whilst there. Whilst Wolseley's writing perhaps echoes his experience with regiments in the Crimea, Du Picq's interest was always more about the conduct and motivation of smaller numbers of troops at the moment of contact with the enemy rather than big formations. He believed that troops who had socialised together in smaller groups would perform better because of that socialisation.[87] In fact though, these two perspectives are complementary: Wolseley's experience of the dynamics of esprit de corps in the regiment, matched Du Picqs understanding of the dynamics in smaller groups that form regiments. Both gave a good overall view of esprit de corps in regiments from the bottom up. Both recognised the importance of an appropriate level of relating and of socialising within units, for the generation of esprit de corps and motivation.

Wolseley's publication was a major step forward in the understanding and administration of morale and motivation in the British army. But whether, or how much it may have been

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[82] Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book.*
[83] Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book,* p. 3.
[84] Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book,* p. 5.
[85] Charles Rathbone Low, *A Memoir of Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley*, vol. 1 (Marrickville: Wentworth Press, 2019), pp. 279–80.
[86] du Picq. *Battle Studies.*
[87] Roger J. Spiller, *Battle Studies. Ardant Du Picq* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2017), pp. xiv–xv.

influenced by Du Picq's work, which has essentially the same conclusions, cannot be known. Nor can it be known whether Wolseley ever saw DuPicq's work, but it was available in Europe from 1865. That year, Du Picq had started writing papers that he planned to combine into a book, *Etudes Sur Le Combat*, later, and they were certainly distributed, at least amongst colleagues, but how wide an audience they reached is not known.[88] Du Picq died in 1870 before he could publish his completed work but a number of his manuscripts and papers were assembled and published by family and friends in 1880.[89] Wolseley used a quote from Plutarch in his *Pocket Book,* saying, 'The Greatest talent of a General is to secure obedience through the affection he inspires' and Wolseley sums that up as, 'In fact, if you want to win battles, make yourself loved by those who serve under you'.[90] Plutarch's quote plainly gives Wolseley's comments depth, and so it is likely that Wolseley's work marked the state of knowledge on the subjects of morale and motivation in the British army of 1869.

Following Wolseley's publication, the next changes to the British army that had an impact of morale and motivation were those made by Edward Cardwell, who was Secretary of State for war between 1868 and 1874.[91] Between 1868 and 1872 Cardwell saw three important Acts through Parliament, all of which were intended to modernise and streamline the army and its organisation, which was said to have become disparate, dated, and 'an anachronism', into an efficient organisation ready for a new age.[92] Cardwell's reforms amounted to a complete reorganisation of service conditions and included changes to length of service, the saving of money and the abolition of the purchasing of commissions, and they received great opposition before becoming law.[93]

It was thought that the introduction of the linked battalion system would help to improve morale, and thus, recruitment. The reasoning being that soldiers would now work with others from the same geographical location and using the same dialect from the beginning of their service and therefore should find it easier to settle in, and then, hopefully, form friendships and a sense of cohesion. That fits well with what Wolseley and DucPicq had

[88] Spiller, *Battle Studies.* pp. xiv–xv.
[89] du Picq, *Battle Studies, Ancient and Modern.*
[90] Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book For Field Service*, p. 3.
[91] Luvvas, *The Education of an Army*, p. 99.
[92] Farwell, *For Queen and Country*, p. 155.
[93] Farwell, *For Queen and Country*, pp. 155–61; Edward M Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp .9–10.

mooted regarding group relationships and morale, but the process of change to the new conditions and reforms were not always welcomed: Bond (1967) relates that 'the young, inexperienced, short-service soldiers proved physically incapable of enduring the rigours of a campaign', and they were 'blamed, sometimes unfairly, for disasters such as Isandlwana and Majuba.'[94]

Cardwell's attention to morale illustrates an understanding of its importance to the operating of the army, together with the necessity to satisfy the soldier's physical needs for food, equipment, and accommodation. This thesis will argue, that by the time of the campaigns in South Africa between 1873 and 1879, and largely due to the work of Wolseley, and Cardwell in the United Kingdom, perceptions of morale and motivation in the British army had moved on from being simply a case of satisfying the troops' physical needs. Du Picq's work in France was independently following the same lines and coming to the same conclusions. It was now recognised that spirit, or esprit de corps, was a major factor in the generation of morale and attitudes in soldiers, and that when encouraged, it could considerably improve performance.[95] Du Picq and Wolseley are important to that development, and to this thesis as their written work represents the beginning of an official recognition of psychological needs, in the British army.

However, to focus on morale and motivation, about 'half a century earlier', Lord Palmerston, in terms redolent of the society of his time, had said:

> I believe there is a great disinclination on the part of the lower orders to enlist for general service, they like to know that they are to be in a certain regiment, connected, perhaps with their own and county and their own friends, and with officers who have established a connection with that district.[96]

Cardwell also believed that men who had a connection, or relationship, were more likely to come together and generate esprit de corps if they had a shared factor, such as location of origin: he felt that the 'fostering of local connections' would lead to the army attracting a greater number of men, of better class than was currently the case.[97] Cardwell was in a

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[94] Ian Hamilton, *Listening for the Drums* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1944), pp. 130–42.
[95] Berkovich; du Picq; Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book For Field Service.* (Note: Du Picq was not published as a complete work until 1880, but the content of the work was written as pamphlets and papers from 1865 and so would have been available: source Du Picq, p.xvi).
[96] Farwell, pp. 159–60.

position to do something about what seems to have been a long-standing opinion, and his introduction of the Localisation Act, and the subsequent General Order 32 in April 1873, was entirely logical and done for practical reasons.

Cardwell's intention was to address the problem of finding drafts for units overseas, without destroying regimental esprit de corps by cross-posting men from one regiment into another. All line regiments were to have two battalions, one remaining at the localised home base in the United Kingdom, whilst the other was posted overseas; replacements needed for the overseas battalion would be drafted from the battalion at the home base, and this gave soldiers the psychological comfort of knowing that they would be soldiering amongst friends.[98] Cardwell's actions obviously showed an awareness of regimental esprit de corps, and its importance to the army, which is significant enough, but it was apparently also the first political attempt to 'manage' it.

What this chapter has shown, is that there was a distinct link between treating men well and their subsequent performance. As improvements in the way the army treated recruits and established soldiers increased, so did the production of morale and combat motivation, along with recruiting, the quality of recruits, and retention. It has also shown that changes in society like better living condition and changes to the social structure worked in parallel with the changes in the army, and that they had a major effect on the improvement of the quality of recruits. By the time of the Cardwell reforms, although the process was not complete, the army was on a much better footing in terms of recruiting and retention; and the value of esprit de corps to motivation had been identified and appreciated. The next chapter will look at British troops in action during the Ashanti campaign, to establish how esprit de corps affected morale and motivation in the field. This was the first substantial campaigns after the Cardwell reforms, and an opportunity to see what worked to improve performance and esprit de corps, and what did not. In fact, given that Wolseley enthusiastically backed reform in the army, it is more than likely that he saw the Ashanti campaign as a chance to prove that the reforms worked.

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[97]Hansard.parliament.UK., HL Deb. 20 June 1873, Series three, Vol. 216, column 1218.
[98]HL Deb. 22 February 1872, Series three, Volume209, Columns 893-906.

CHAPTER THREE.

Morale and Motivation in the Ashanti Campaign

The Ashanti campaign provides the first opportunity to see morale and motivation in operation in an active campaign since the Cardwell reforms and the publication of Wolseley and Du Picq's works. The campaign, the officers and the troops will be closely examined through the lens of modern theory and understanding, to find out what was said or done to produce morale or motivation in a form that is recognisable today. Leadership is known to be very important to the forming of morale and motivation today, and so Wolseley's role will receive a deeper analysis later, in chapter seven, along with other senior officers.

This chapter will be concerned mainly with the third part of John Lynn's model, combat motivation, and, although not part of Lynn's definition, that can be split into a further two sections here for convenience in this. The first part, preparation, falls between the news of the deployment being announced and the arrival in theatre before combat, and the second, the action stage, begins when the campaign starts, and ends upon its successful completion. In the period under review, owing mainly to the slow speed of transport, the preparation period extended to periods of weeks or even months which gave time for planning and reflection, but the second was much more immediate and concrete in its nature, being driven by moment-to-moment events and decisions amid present danger.

Where and when the planning stage, and its expectations, meets the realities of the second stage, there exists an obvious point for the elevation or depression of morale. Obviously, the more effective and practically useful the preparation stage was, the better would be the benefits in the action stage, and this in turn meant that the one person who could have a major effect on the entire process was the leader or commander of the campaign because the leader alone reached across both stages of the enterprise. Looking back at historic campaigns, and the victories and defeats that define them, those events also mark the extremes of the emotional highs and lows of action and combat, and as such they are important. But notwithstanding that importance, there is a danger of forgetting the hinterland of emotions and motivation between the major events, where soldiers laboured hard on the practical essentials of a campaign, such as travelling, defence building, marching, and carrying loads in all sorts of conditions. Unlike being in barracks at home,

once in an active theatre of operations there was a constant threat of attack and danger, making relaxation impossible. Then if foul weather, sickness, lack of food and equipment were added to the constant threat of attack, the environment of the soldier of the period, can be appreciated, along with his likely mood. A significant amount of time during any campaign consisted of this type of work and the soldiers' role during these periods, between major events, can be described as the default, non-fighting duty in the army whilst on active service. It can only have been performed by individuals exercising motivation and application, and for the purposes of this chapter, it will be termed 'professional pragmatism'; a point when troops 'defaulted' to performing the routine functions of an army in an active theatre, under threat and often in difficult circumstances.

This thesis will follow a chronological route through the Ashanti and Zulu wars starting with the Ashanti War of 1873-1874. The area of West Africa today known as Ghana was known as the Gold Coast during the period of the Ashanti War and it was a Dutch protectorate until 1867 after which the area became a British Colonial responsibility. The Dutch had had a difficult and uneasy relationship with the Ashanti who were not given to being easily managed or controlled and who frequently waged war on neighbouring peoples.[1] They were described, in the language of the time, by Winwood Reade (1874), as 'A nation of savages,' and by Brackenbury (1874), also in language very much of the time, as a '…warlike, powerful, disciplined though barbarous race, noted for their treachery…'. In that period, their reputation was not good.[2]

The transition from a Dutch to a British Protectorate was itself not straightforward, a dispute relating to periodic payments that the Dutch had paid to the Ashanti over time held up the transfer because the Ashanti claimed that regular payments made to them by the Dutch had been rent for their residence, and the Dutch said that the money was simply a form of gift.[3] After a while, the dispute appeared to have been settled but the Ashanti did not think so; they began to manoeuvre against the British and on 22 January 1873, the Ashanti King sent forth 60,000 Ashanti warriors in three armies from Ashantiland and began to attack territories under British protection.[4]

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[1] Henry Brackenbury, *Fanti and Ashanti, Three Papers Read On Board The S.S. Ambriz On The Voyage To The Gold Coast* (Miami: HardPress Publishing, 2017 [1873]), pts 1, 2.
[2] Winwood Reade, *The Ashantee Campaign* (Milton Keynes: Leonaur Books, 2012), p. 186; Henry Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. A Narrative*, vol 1 (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2016), p. 1.
[3] Reade, *The Ashantee Campaign* p. 48,49.

The name of the Ashanti King has been subject to a number of spellings over time, including Calcallee, Karikari, and Calcalli, but for simplicity the most recent spelling, Kofi Karikari will be used in this work.[5] There was no doubt that Karikari was throwing down a direct gauntlet to British Rule, when at the outset, he had declared his intentions as to 'take the fort at Elmina, which belonged to him, from the British', and to take back control of the people called Assins, whom he regarded as subjects.[6] In effect, and in a brazen statement of confidence, he was giving the British a stark choice of either intervening, or letting him run amok across the Protectorate. The Protectorate was an extensive area and up to a dozen distinctly different indigenous societies apart from the Ashanti lived there as autonomous peoples in their own territories. Two of the better-known groups were the 'Fantee', and the 'Denkira', others included the Assin, and the Abrah; they were all previous victims of Ashanti invasion and abduction for slavery, and they were now likely to be attacked again unless Britain intervened.[7] The British Government heard news of this invasion in May, and, after a lengthy period of consideration, Colonel Wolseley, was despatched by Secretary of War Cardwell to assess and deal with the situation. He arrived on 2 October 1873 and lost no time starting his planning and preparations.[8] Wolseley could see very quickly that local resources would not be enough to deal with the situation, fortunately, he had arranged to be given troops from Britain on the condition that they were necessary, and now he set about arranging their deployment.[9]

At the end of the preparation period, a posting to the Gold Coast entailed being confined to a ship for a voyage of about three weeks duration, which was sometimes a good experience and at other times a bad one. As might be expected, the voyage could be affected by weather, the general state of the ship or conditions aboard, and there are surviving accounts of both experiences. Wolseley travelled to the Gold Coast on the Steamship *Ambriz,* which he described as '...the most abominable and unhealthy craft I ever made a voyage in', blaming the smells of bilge water and new paint along with poor food.

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[4] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. Vol. 1*, pp. 50–51.
[5] WIlliam Laird Clowes, *On Sea & Land. Small Wars, Minor Actions and Naval Brigades* (Milton Keynes: Leonaur, 2018), p. 178; Edward Spiers, *The Victorian Soldier in Africa* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 21; Arthur Bleby, *The Victorian Naval Brigades* (Caithness: Whittles Publishing, 2006), p. 50.
[6] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War* Vol 1, p. 56.
[7] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War* Vol 1, p. 55.
[8] Bleby, *The Victorian Naval Brigades,* p.5 5,56.
[9]Bleby, *The Victorian Naval Brigades* p. 55.

But he did subsequently say that the experience did not decrease his morale or enthusiasm for his task.[10] He was not alone in his opinion about the *Ambriz* though, which was shared by both Evelyn Wood, and Brackenbury who sailed with him.[11] In another instance of the voyage out, not on the *Ambriz* this time, an officer of the Rifle Brigade, sailing in late November, described a mixed experience, with his voyage being rough at the beginning, but changing to fine weather after a few days, when things greatly improved for the rest of the journey.[12] The experience of the journey certainly seemed to have been a matter of luck.

The time on the *Ambriz* was not wasted though, as Wolseley had arranged for Brackenbury to prepare a series of three lectures to be given to the officers travelling with them.[13] These were given by Brackenbury, and Captain G.L. Huyishe of the Rifle Brigade, and were designed to give the officers going to Ashantiland a history of the various peoples and the topography of the area. The first of the lectures was entitled 'Fanti and Ashanti', and covered the relationships between the Ashanti, Fanti and other groups who had been in contact or at war with each other since 1807, when the British were first involved. The second lecture continued in the same vein but focussed more on the involvement of British forces helping groups, 'The Protected Tribes', against the Ashanti. The third one concerned 'The Topography of Ashanti and the Protectorate of the Gold Coast': it was a detailed description of the landscape and of the climate, as well as a comprehensive history of the Ashanti.[14]

Wolseley landed on the Gold Coast on 2 October 1873,and his mission was to raise local troops to work under the command of the officers who had accompanied him, and then to deal with the Ashanti problem.[15] He had been told in London that he would be required to assess whether the native troops would be sufficient, or whether British troops would be needed to conclude the matter, but privately he had always believed that the mission would need British troops to finish it successfully.[16] Wolseley had made a plan before his arrival at the Gold Coast, and that was to use locally raised soldiers to prepare the way for the British

[10] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 1*, p. 276.
[11] Leigh Maxwell, *The Ashanti Ring* (London: Leo Cooper, 1985), p. 21; Brackenbury, Vol 1, p. 144.
[12] Thomas, p. 1,2.
[13] Garnet Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2* (Milton Keynes: Forgotten Books, 2012 [1904]), p. 278.
[14] Brackenbury. *Fanti and Ashanti.*
[15] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 270.
[16] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, pp. 270, 292.

troops, by clearing the Ashanti out from the protectorate, which resulted in much fighting, and to start building a road towards Coomassie ready for the British troops when they arrived.[17] Evidently this was to save the British troops for the most serious part of the campaign, and to limit their time in the unhealthy climate. The time at which the troops called for by Wolseley arrived marked the point between the preparation and action stages, and a potential shift in threat level. But neither the journey, nor the prospect of starting the campaigning had affected the troops' morale or motivation. The comments of two soldiers showed that: one who had a good experience, and one who had a bad one. On arrival they quickly put the experience behind them as it no longer mattered, because both were 'bitterly frustrated by the delay in disembarkation' on arrival 'irrespective of their journey'.[18] They were obviously well motivated and ready to go.

The troops on the way to the Gold Coast knew it to be hot, humid, and densely forested, a home to plagues of mosquitoes carrying malaria, and that it had long been called 'the white man's grave.'[19] Wolseley was also aware of that and in fact the whole army knew of the unhealthy reputation of the area. The 23rd Regiment of Foot reportedly showed 'much reluctance to undertake any expedition into what was notoriously one of the most unhealthy climates in the world' when preparing for the expedition.[20] In another example, Stephen Manning (2007) records that an officer scheduled to go, asked a friend with experience of the Gold Coast for advice on what kit to take and was told, 'A coffin. It is all you will require'.[21] A stark statement indeed but whether or not the last comment was meant to be serious or ironic humour, this plainly underlines an understanding in the army generally, that the area of the Gold Coast was seriously dangerous to the health of Europeans. In fact, Wolseley himself also received a reply about taking coffins when enquiring of a traveller what sort of kit to take.[22] There is no evidence however, that those comments, or any others, significantly affected anybody.

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[17] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 296.
[18] G.H. Gilham, "With Wolseley in Ashanti," in E. Milton Small (ed.), *Told from the Ranks* (London: Andrew Melrose, 1877). pp. 76-86; Editor, "The Ashantee War", *Brechin Advertiser, Issue 1315,* 13 January 1874. 'Latest News', P. 4.
[19] John Philip Jones, *Queen Victoria's Paladins* (Bloomington: Random House, 2018), p. 152.
[20] Michael Glover, *That Astonishing Infantry. The History of the Royal Welch Fusiliers* (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 83.
[21] Stephen Manning, *Evelyn Wood Pillar of Empire* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007), p. 69.
[22] Garnet Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 274.

Another element of concern would have been the Ashanti tribe and its reputation as a very competent and capable fighting force. They were already recognised as a formidable enemy, being described as 'plucky', and 'no mean enemy in the bush', but also, they campaigned in large bodies numbering in the tens of thousands.[23] They had a great many firearms in the form of a plentiful supply of muzzle-loading muskets which were reckoned to be effective up to about fifty yards. Already outdated, these were Flintlocks, and the relatively short effective range was largely due to the type of projectile being fired, an assortment of small stones, pieces of metal and other small objects were fired as frequently as the standard round, presumably owing to a shortage of the correct rounds.[24] Wolseley had of course seen and experienced the Ashanti at war, including their use of weapons, during the time he spent between landing on the Gold Coast and the commencement of the main campaign at the beginning of 1874.[25] This knowledge was invaluable to him when he was preparing for the main campaign.

That planning was very detailed and intensive, and based around the building of a road from the coast to the Prah River on the border of Ashanti territory which would aid the troops in their advance.[26] Everything Wolseley was doing was geared towards the successful and speedy conclusion of the campaign, so that it would be finished in what was known to be the 'healthiest' part of the year.[27] It made complete sense for purely practical reasons to avoid the more illness-prone months, but it also made sense in improving conditions for the troops, and that fitted with other steps that Wolseley had taken to help the soldier in his work. The first of these related to weapons and comprised of: 'cut down Snider rifles for convenient use in the bush', together with 'sword bayonets with one edge sharpened for cutting, with the back of the blade toothed to act as a saw'.[28]

Being both a weapon and a tool, the altered bayonet was a well suited for use in the jungle.[29] As for firearms, the Snider rifle gave the troops a definite advantage over the muskets of the Ashanti, it was longer ranged and much more wieldy in dense bush, in fact it

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[23] Henry Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. A Narrative*, Vol. 1, (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2016 [1874]), pp. 22,154,155.
[24] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 301.
[25] Bleby, *The Victorian Naval Brigades*, pp.55–61; Alan Lloyd, *The Drums of Kumasi* (London: Panther Books Ltd., 1964), pp. 85–88.
[26] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 314.
[27] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 313.
[28] Bleby, *The Victorian Naval Brigades*, p. 55.
[29] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War* Vol 1, Vol.1, pp. 126–27.

was later described as 'the battle-winning factor in the dark jungles of the Ashanti in 1874'.[30] The longer version of the Snider rifle was in general use in the British Army at the time, but the issue of the much more practical, 'cut down' version surely underlines Wolseley's forethought and thoroughness at the organisation stage, and it was doubtless appreciated by the troops.

The modified sword bayonet and the Snider rifle were part of a package which included the design and issue of a special tropical uniform, including hat and boots, to all the army personnel engaged in the operation on the principle that, 'Every detail of kit was considered, and practical efficiency was the sole object aimed at in every item.' [31] Wolseley had experience of how uncomfortable standard uniform was in tropical climates from his own experience as a subaltern fighting in sweltering heat whilst wearing the traditional uniform in Burma about twenty years earlier.[32] The idea of the 'tropical' uniform was Wolseley's initiative, and although issued in the interests of efficiency, it also served as a practical example of a leader trying to make life better for his men, as he had written in *The Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field Service*.[33] The troops sent to undertake the campaign with Wolseley were taken from three Regiments: 2nd Battalion the Rifle Brigade, the Royal Welch Fusiliers and the 42nd Highlanders. They arrived in three different ships on 11, 13 and 17 December; according to Alan Lloyd in *The Drums of Kumasi*, Wolseley had not been notified of the troops' embarkation and departure, and that these arrivals were a complete surprise to him.[34] But on the other hand, Stephen Manning (2007) says that Wolseley had been advised that the troops should be expected in early December.[35]

In fact, Brackenbury's account throws some light on this: when the transport ship, *Himalaya* arrived on the 9 December with the Rifle Brigade, it also brought news that Wolseley's requested third battalion had been allowed and despatched, and that it would be comprised of the 42nd Highlanders, which was news to Wolseley. Then, later, when the *Sarmatian* arrived with the 42nd Highlanders, it also brought with it a memo in which it can be seen that Wolseley had been informed beforehand, probably in November, of a likely

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[30] Donald Featherstone, *Weapons and Equipment of the Victorian Soldier* (Poole: Blandford Press, 1978), p. 124.
[31] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. A Narrative*, Vol.1, pp. 126–27.
[32] Alan Lloyd, *The Drums of Kumasi*, (London: Panther Books, 1964) p .95.
[33] Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book for Field Service*, 2nd Ed. pp. 2–4.
[34] Lloyd, *The Drums of Kumasi*, p. 95.
[35] Manning, *Evelyn Wood Pillar of Empire* p. 75.

time of arrival for the first two troopships, but of course he was not aware at that stage of the position regarding the third battalion.[36] It is entirely likely that this is where the confusion between the two accounts arose, but the facts show that the main bulk of troops were expected, and Lloyd's account, for whatever reason, is only partially correct. As for Wolseley, he simply recorded that all three ships had landed by 'the middle of December, 1873…' and Brackenbury wrote that Wolseley had originally intended to keep one battalion as sea as a floating reserve, before changing his mind.[37]

Either way, the decision to send the troops to wait out at sea had already been made, as Wolseley had earlier promised that none of them would be landed until they could march up country and start the campaign, which transpired to be on the 31 December, when preparations were ready.[38] Meanwhile, Wolseley did not want the troops to waste their time whilst waiting, or to become idle. He wanted them to remain very much part of the ongoing preparations and organisation ready for the 'off', and he did this by sending documents, memos and information sheets to them that included orders, advice and guidance about the Ashanti and the general area of the campaign.[39] In effect, although the troops were actually at sea, Wolseley treated them just the same as an army encamped locally on land: maintaining a disciplined and organised force ready to go when ordered and considered as a whole.

The morale and motivation in the troops arriving at the Gold Coast was good, Spiers (2004) described the men of the 42nd Highlanders on arrival as being in 'good heart' following a mainly useful and not unpleasant voyage during which they had all got to know one another and practiced with their kit.[40] They were ready to get ashore and get on with their work, and the frustration experienced by some at having to wait was such that some commissioned and non-commissioned officers were keen enough to apply to go ashore and take up any appointment on land; but in the end, they were all refused.[41] The frustration continued during the enforced wait, a period which was described by one as 'the weariest and dullest days of it', which suggests boredom rather than anxiety.[42] But others had a

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[36] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. A Narrative*, Vol.1, pp. 345–47.
[37] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 313; Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War,* Vol 1, pp. 354–56.
[38] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 314.
[39] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War,* Vol.1, pp. 361–67.
[40] Edward Spiers, p. 23.
[41] Editor,"Letters from the Troops", *Brechin Advertiser, Issue 1315*, 13 January 1874. P. 2.
[42] Spiers, *The Victorian Soldier in Africa*, p. 23.

better experience and Joseph Hammond Thomas, with the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade describes the weather as 'delightful' and speaks of sleeping on deck, whilst time was spent in practicing with new kit and fishing for sharks, before returning to disembark.[43] There is nothing to suggest anxiety or a reluctance to get on with the job in hand: there are no negative comments regarding the coming campaign whatsoever, morale was stable, and motivation was high. It can be accurately described as a mood of pragmatic professionalism.

That mood was evident during disembarkation in the early hours of 1 January 1874 and beyond, as the troops marched along the pre-prepared path towards Ashanti territory towards what was, as had been predicted, a hard fight against a committed and skilful foe. The territory, as well as the Ashanti, was proving difficult, and a private of the Rifle Brigade described the experience of fighting in the dense bush, as like 'being in a net', before going on to describe casualties being taken.[44] Despite the difficulties encountered though, morale and motivation remained firm, and an example of that occurred on 21 January when a Black Watch non-commissioned officer came across a group of about forty wounded and sick soldiers and sailors, who, he said, were so against being sent back to the coast, that they 'say they are better than they really are' rather than be separated from their comrades.[45] That experience was not an isolated incident and Winwood Reade in *The Ashantee [sic] Campaign*, underlined that when he related other examples of wounded or sick men asking to be allowed to rest for a short time and then to go on, rather than be returned to the rear.[46]

These incidents were a good demonstration of morale and motivation present in the British troops as they steadily progressed from the Prah river, deeper into Ashanti territory, away from the prepared roads and facilities that Wolseley had arranged for them, and discovered the serious danger posed by the Ashanti army who were very capable indeed. The threat posed to the British by the Ashanti forces was illustrated at the first major engagement of the advance, at the battle of Amoaful, on 31 January 1874, where both main armies met.[47] Stephen Manning, in *Britain at War with the Asanti Nation: The White Man's Grave* (2021) gives a very detailed account of this battle and shows that Wolseley knew that

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[43] Thomas, *A Full and Authentic Diary of the Ashanti Expedition* p. 6,7.
[44] Geo. H. Gilham, "With Wolseley in Ashanti", in, *Told From The Ranks*, ed. by E. Milton Small (Norderstedt: Hansebooks, 2020), p. 76.
[45]'Diary of a Non-Commissioned Officer of the 42d Regiment', *Kinross-shire Advertiser, 28 March 1874, p. 3.*
[46] Reade, *The Ashantee Campaign* p. 189.
[47] Manning, *Britain at War with the Asante Nation 1823-1900*, p. 90.

the fight would be unlike any other previously experienced by the British forces. The evening before he 'called together all his battalion and regimental officers and outlined his plan of attack' and described the usual Ashanti method of trying to outflank their enemy.[48] He also impressed upon the officers that the Ashanti were a 'formidable enemy who would use drums, horns and screams to try and intimidate the troops and that to prevail the British needed to be brave, confident and highly disciplined'.[49]

It certainly was different, and as Manning says: 'This was no battle of structured and defined troop movements, but rather one of noise and confusion.'[50] The reporter George Henty, who was accompanying the expedition as an official reporter for *The Standard*, left this description of the battle: '...there was no manoeuvring, no brilliant charges, no general concentration of troops; but [the battle] which consisted simply of five hours of lying down, of creeping through the bush of gaining ground foot by foot, and of pouring a ceaseless fire into every bush in front which might contain an invisible foe'.[51] Yet despite the challenge of fighting the Ashanti on their own ground, British morale, and certainly motivation, remained high and there were no cases where the British forces faltered right to the occupation of Kumasi on 4 February 1874, despite fierce Ashanti resistance.[52] A particular example of high morale and motivation occurred on 2 February when Wolseley and his troops were within about twelve miles of his final goal of Kumasi. This happened when it transpired that there were four days' supply of food available for the troops, and Wolseley estimated that six days' rations would be required to complete the mission. Wolseley addressed the troops; he did not simply order them to continue with the four days' rations, he 'appealed' to them, and they unanimously voted to make the rations last for the six days.[53] In fact, Brackenbury said that the troops all responded 'most willingly and cheerfully' to the request.[54] That incident very clearly showed that there was a good level of morale and motivation within the troops, and it also indicated a high level of confidence in Wolseley.

Wolseley had gone to a lot of trouble to source and obtain the right equipment for the campaign and he had done the same with the collecting of information that had been

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[48] Manning, *Britain at War with the Asante Nation 1823-1900*, p. 90.
[49] Manning, *Britain at War with the Asante Nation 1823-1900*, p. 91.
[50] Manning, *Britain at War with the Asante Nation 1823-1900*, p. 93.
[51] F.W. Beckett (ed.), *Wolseley and Ashanti*, (Stroud: Army Records Society, 2009), p. 309.
[52] Manning, *Britain at War with the Asante Nation 1823-1900*, pp. 95–101.
[53] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 1*, pp. 347–48.
[54] Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War.* Vol. 2, pp. 197–98.

shared with his officers on the outward voyage.[55] That this attention to detail and methodology was successful is shown by tracing the levels of morale and motivation through the campaign. At disembarkation, their mood appeared to have been one of professional pragmatism; not depressed and not elevated, and then, significantly, as matters progressed, there were cues to the development of a group identity with instances of injured men wanting to stay with their colleagues. Finally, as Brackenbury wrote, the men 'most willingly and cheerfully' accepted extending their rations to reach Kumasi. These are not men with low morale or motivation and those factors are obviously higher than when the campaign started.

Wolseley was very much in favour of reform in the army, and he was an ally as well as a friend of Cardwell, whom he supported and warmly praised, whilst criticising a system that would allow promotion because of wealth rather than ability.[56] The Ashanti Campaign was the first major trial of the army after the extensive reforms introduced by Cardwell, and in the final analysis, both the campaign and the reforms were seen as successes and a major break with the past. Wolseley would have been hoping for that outcome, as he believed that 'reform was absolutely necessary if our army was to be converted into an efficient fighting force'.[57] He also knew that there was a powerful opposition to the introduction of reforms, based largely amongst the old school senior officers in the War Office, and it had been said to him that expressing his views in open War Office discussions was looked-upon as 'a species of high treason' by that group.[58] But the fact remains that the Cardwell reforms can be seen as the start of a process of positive change or put another way: evolution rather than revolution. It would take time for the old system to disappear.

The Ashanti were a very serious and dangerous foe who were also experienced in fighting the British. The factors which served the British forces well in this conflict were based around skills and practices that aided and supported the troops, and helped them to feel valued, thus raising morale.

These measures included preparing the ground, roads, and welfare for the men before they had even arrived, it also included attention being given to uniforms and equipment, and all the information they could have needed was also provided. By the end of the

[55] Brackenbury. *Fanti and Ashanti.* Three Papers Read on Board the S.S. *Ambriz.*
[56] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, pp. 271–73.
[57] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 248.
[58] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 248.

campaign the influence of leadership is also being highlighted and a sense of teamwork, even esprit de corps, is visible. The next chapter will examine the Anglo-Zulu War, taking each battle as a separate incident. It will identify any repetitions of those factors that raised morale and a sense of teamwork in the Ashanti War, to begin to understand how morale and motivation were raised in the Late Victorian Army overall.

Chapter Four

ISANDLWANA AND ITS AFTERMATH

The beginnings of the Zulu Campaign were complex in their nature and related to arguments over territorial boundaries and future British plans for South Africa that could not take place whilst the Zulu Army existed. Briefly, there was an intention by the British to form a confederation of the Southern African States, and that intention was being frustrated by tensions and occasional aggression between some of those states, because of a perceived threat in the form of the Zulu Kingdom and Army.[1] Sir Bartle Frere, the British Governor of the Cape, and high commissioner for Native Affairs in South Africa, was acutely aware of this situation, and at the same time, extremely keen to move the process forward, at times even acting in the absence of orders from the Government: Frere knew that for the process to move forward the Zulu Army needed to be removed as a factor, and then, an opportunity presented itself to him, when in July of 1878, the brothers and sons of a Zulu Chief, Sihayo, pursued his 'errant wives' just across the border from Zululand into Natal and murdered them for the 'crime' of unfaithfulness.[2]

This event provided Frere with an opportunity to confront the Zulu Chief and so he sent an ultimatum containing, amongst other things, demands for fines and surrender of certain personnel, and the disbandment of the *Amabutho* system, basically, the Zulu Army, which he must have known would be totally unacceptable.[3] It was unacceptable, ultimately Cetswayo, chief of the Zulu Kingdom, could not accede to his demands and as 1878 drew to its end, war became inevitable. Chelmsford's letters, firstly as Lieutenant Colonel Thesiger then from October, as Lord Chelmsford, show that he was in close contact with Frere and was aware of every step that led up to the start of the war. His morale was high and he made considerable preparations for the coming fight, in terms of kit and equipment, supplies and in the briefing of personnel.[4] Speaking of his intentions, he wrote that he would strive to show the Zulu Army how 'hopelessly inferior they are to us in fighting power…' and, in a comment which does show some understanding of the Zulu army, he added' 'altho'

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[1] Major Ashe and Capt. E.V. Wyatt-Edgell, *The Story of the Zulu Campaign,* (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press Ltd, 1994), pp. 11–13.

[2] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, T*he Story of the Zulu Campaign,* pp. 18–19.

[3] Saul David, *Zulu. The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879* (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. xxxi.

[4] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, T*he Story of the Zulu Campaign,* pp. 25–26.

numerically stronger' [sic].[5] He wrote again on this theme in a letter to Sir Bartle Frere on 1 January 1879, expressing his confidence in those 'under my command', saying that he hoped that he would have the opportunity to settle the Zulu question 'once and for all', whilst at the same time displaying a condescending lack of regard for the Zulu people with this comment, made in the language of the time: '…for a savage, as for a child, timely severity is greater kindness than mistaken leniency'.[6] Morale and motivation seem good, both for Chelmsford and his troops and there is no indication otherwise.

On 11 January Chelmsford's three columns, (number one under Pearson in the East, Chelmsford leading column three in the centre and Wood's number four column on Chelmsford's left flank, coming down from the North-West at Utrecht), crossed the border into Zululand. Columns two and five did not take part in the invasion and remained to guard borders. Chelmsford crossed at Rorke's Drift and immediately encountered a problem with roads and transport generally. Roads were primitive dirt tracks if they existed at all and heavy rains made them all but impassable: in fact bad transport and roads were such a constant feature of the campaign that they were the subject of a report to the War Office.[7] But for the time being, Chelmsford's soldiers were faced with repairing, rebuilding and draining roads before they could travel, it was heavy work and it took the column nine days to march the dozen or so miles from Rorke's Drift to the camp at Isandlwana.[8]

One of those travelling in Chelmsford's column, Lieutenant Henry Curling R.A. was clearly in a very positive mood. On 18 January, he wrote a letter to his mother in which he said, 'I cannot tell you how glad we are to swap camp life for a campaign', that comment conveys a sense of good morale and motivation, and the use of the term 'we', suggests he is speaking also for others.[9] He wrote again, probably in mid-February, to relate his thoughts and experiences in the camp at Isandlwana on the morning of the attack, 22 January. The positive attitude and mood felt on his journey, had overlapped into that morning, and he recalled that when he noted seeing groups of Zulus in the area that, 'We congratulated ourselves on the chance of our being attacked and hoped that our small numbers might induce the Zulus to come on'… 'Not one of us dreamt that there was the least danger and all

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[5] Sir Theophilus Shepstone Papers, Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, *Lord Chelmsford,* p. 42.
[6] National Army Museum London, (NAM) C.P.27. Chelmsford Papers,
[7] TNA, W.O.107/10. Transport in Zululand and Natal,
[8] NAM C.P.27. Chelmsford Papers, pp. 73-74.
[9] Adrian Greaves and Brian Best, Eds. *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War*, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004), pp. 87–88.

we hoped for was the fight might come off before the General returned'.[10] Curling again seemed to be speaking for his colleagues as well as himself.

The circumstances surrounding the major defeat of an unsuspecting and unprepared British camp, that was overrun by a Zulu force of far superior numbers at Isandlwana later that day, has been written about in many general works on the Zulu War. But there are two excellent and detailed accounts that reward reading: Greaves, (2011) and Snook (2010), both of which, in a general more than a specific sense, leave the impression that Chelmsford's high morale and confidence may well have become overconfidence.[11] Curling only escaped with his life by a matter of seconds, and inches. He wrote home again, probably on 23 January, sending a brief note to tell his family that he had survived, and then again on 2 February in which he describes his experience of the attack in detail, as well as his incredibly narrow escape.[12] A few hours after Curling's escape, the last demonstration of enthusiastic morale and motivation for the foreseeable future was seen, when Chelmsford's column cheered him as they set off back to Isandlwana, for what they thought would be a fight to liberate the camp.[13]

Once the reality of what had happened at the camp became clear to Chelmsford, he made a decision to move on early the next day before full light, citing, amongst other more tactical reasons, the fact that the darkness had hidden to some extent, the 'full extent of the disaster': in a letter to the Duke of Cambridge dated 1 February 1879, he went on to say that he felt that there 'was much to lose and nothing to gain by delaying the march', and so, did not hesitate.[14] This action can be interpreted as Chelmsford trying to preserve what positive thoughts and morale that his troops possessed, but the repercussions of what had happened would extend further than the military. The civilian population feared that all of Natal had been thrown open to a Zulu invasion and, as Chelmsford described it, 'A panic is spreading over the Colony which is difficult to delay'. Some people set up defences or gathered for safety in laagers, other moved out of Natal, but the defeat at Isandlwana had a powerful civilian reaction.[15]

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[10] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War*, p. 89.

[11] Greaves, *Isandlwana. How the Zulus Humbled the British Empire.*; Snook, *How Can Man Die Better.*

[12] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War* pp. 90, 91–101.

[13] Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill, *Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-Up*, New edition (London: Greenhill Books, 2005), p. 226.

[14] Francis Ellen Colenso, *History of the Zulu War and its Origin*, (Elibron Classics: Milton Keynes, 2004 [1880]) p. 293

There was no knowledge of what would now be recognised as psychiatric trauma after an event like Isandlwana, or any idea of treatment and that lack of knowledge is probably the reason for the lack of writing on mental health in the historiography, but there is evidence that individuals were as susceptible then as they are now to stress and trauma in combat. Adrian Greaves (2011) has written that 'a number of soldiers' did fall victim to stress and anxiety after the major trauma of Isandlwana, before going on to say that 'such soldiers were gathered into groups and, often in handcuffs, repatriated to Britain for distribution to mental homes or to the care of their families'. He goes on to describe such a case that ended well, but the point is well made that psychiatric wounds did occur at that time.[16]

But an individual does not have to have a complete breakdown to suffer psychological injury, and a case in point is that of Henry Curling, who had sent home an account of his experiences including details of his narrow escape from death. That account was a vivid description of events that could well have been expected to have led to trauma, and there were three other sources suggesting that Curling did suffer psychological damage as the result of his Isandlwana experience: his own letters, the subsequent events in his life and his behaviour, and the observations and comments of others. Rumours circulated that Curling had suffered a 'breakdown', probably short for 'mental breakdown,' there was no definition, but it does suggest a disastrous loss of the ability to function, similar perhaps to that seen in the soldiers who were repatriated, although Curling was not considered for repatriation.[17] Over a period of months Curling underwent a series of events which, taken together and viewed from a modern perspective, do indicate a trauma response. To start with, about a week after the event, whilst at the inquiry into Isandlwana, Lieutenant Colonel Harness, Curling's superior, said of Curling, that '…his nerves were a good deal shaken'.[18] Then, Curling's letters home to 'Mama' between about mid-February and the middle of April all contain evidence of somebody who is returning to something like their normal self, some are in 'shaky writing', others apologise for scaring the recipient, and one says 'when I was ill I wrote such a stupid letter, I must have been off my nut when I wrote it'.[19]

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[15] NAM, London, C.P. 8/29, Chelmsford Papers.
[16] Greaves, *Isandlwana. How the Zulus Humbled the British Empire.*, p. 143.
[17] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War,* p. 111.
[18] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War,* p. 111.
[19] Sonia Clark, *The Invasion of Zululand, 1879,* (Johannesburg: Brentwood Press, 1979), p.102, Greaves and Best, pp. 114–20.

Curling had blamed his fever for the unusual content of his letters, as he was said to have contracted Enteric Fever whilst at Helpmakaar and was hospitalised for several weeks, during which time the rumours regarding him having had a 'breakdown' began to circulate.[20] Colonel Harness, Curling's C.O. obviously did believe that Curling had had a 'breakdown', and he wrote the following to his (Harness's) sister:

> You will think me still more ill-natured when I tell you that (Curling) who escaped from Isandula [sic] has gone away ill and the Doctor where he has gone to says, "there is nothing the matter with him". Poor fellow, I am afraid his nerves were a good deal shaken on 22nd January but what is to be done now? The Colonel here, Colonel Glyn, has ordered him to be sent back as soon as convenient…[21]

Of course, it is not possible now to know whether Curling did or did not have Enteric Fever, or whether Harness's thoughts about a breakdown were true, but Curling's letters speak for themselves. Whether or not he was evacuated to hospital for fever, or another reason cannot now be known, but either way, he was not well and, to the modern eye the evidence points to a reaction to a traumatic event.

He was not alone, and Harness, and his friend Lieutenant Colonel John Russell, were both said to have suffered 'a loss of interest in their commands' to a greater or lesser extent for a period of several weeks.[22] Interestingly, and although the psychological and physical responses to a serious traumatic event can be very complex for a variety of reasons, the responses displayed by Harness and Russell fit well under the broad heading of 'Disassociation,' and they cannot have been alone.[23] It does seem though, that unless an individual reached the level of a 'breakdown', that there could be no diagnosis or help, and the situation was arguably worse for officers who were expected to suffer in silence.

Greaves and Best say that Curling, as a public-school boy and a gentleman, needed to 'display a stiff upper lip and keep his emotions in check.' They reference Norman Dixon in, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, (1994) in which, the duty, and social expectations of an officer of the time are laid out and explored.[24] It is likely that Curling's example demonstrated that those 'duties and expectations' were a practical expression of

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[20] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War* p. 111.
[21] Clark, *The Invasion of Zululand, 1879,* p. 114.
[22] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War* p. 112.
[23] Williams and Poijula, *The PTSD Workbook*, p. 4.
[24] Norman Dixon, *On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence*, New Ed. (London: Pimlico, 1994), p. 222-223.

the beliefs of Muscular Christianity, in part defined as a '...hearty or strong-minded Christianity which braces a believer to fight the battle of life bravely and manfully'.[25] In practice, it had prescribed the way a 'man' should behave in order to be considered a 'gentleman' and so avoid isolation in society, by placing 'vigorous and masculine physical activity at the centre of a character-building outlook'.[26] It can be seen how Curling's behaviour could have been driven by it, and on a bigger scale, it may have been seen as a partial justification of Colonialism, as its interpretation of the teachings of the Church, was said to have 'justified and maintained the principles of the British Empire'.[27] Ultimately though, certainly in the case of individuals like Curling, it failed, as it had a negative effect on the psychological health of officers, by compelling them to behave as if nothing were wrong, rather than risk breaking the code of honour and seek help.[28]

For the troops manning Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar in the first weeks following events at Isandlwana, life was extremely uncomfortable. Physically because of continuous bad weather, lack of kit and the spreading of illness, and psychologically because of the ever-present fear of another Zulu attack. In his letters home, Curling paints a depressing picture of abject misery, encompassing overcrowding, knee-deep mud, continuous rain and the fear of sickness spreading: there is an unmistakable sense of hopelessness, and Curling described himself as beginning to think that '...the authorities do not seem to know what to do.'[29] There can have been precious little positive morale to drive motivation in the circumstances, and yet there was enough for the men to reorganise and fortify the camps against a possible, even expected, attack. That was most likely due to an anxiety response to the fear of threat, high enough to motivate but not high enough to immobilise an individual, and one of the useful and protective aspects of a potentially negative emotion.[30] That example also shows that motivation can be driven by a range of emotions, both positive and negative, and is not always linked with high morale. During the ensuing days and weeks, the

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[25] Adrian Room, ed., *Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase & Fable*, Millenium Edition (London: Cassell & Co., 2001), p. 802.
[26] Tony Collins, *How Football Began* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), p. 18.
[27] Collins, *Football*, p. 18.
[28] Dixon, pp. *Psychology of Military Incompetence,*197, 288–301.
[29] Greaves and Best, p. 110.
[30] Aaron Beck, and Ruth Greenberg, *Anxiety Disorders and Phobias: A Cognitive Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 37–43.

troops established routines by which to function and defaulted to a position of 'pragmatic professionalism' whilst awaiting directions.

In the month following Isandlwana, Chelmsford was a busy man, and between 22 January and 23 February, whilst based in Durban, he wrote and sent sixteen reports, messages, and memos, to Bartle Frere, The War Office, Evelyn wood, and Pearson. These messages were lengthy and detailed, and revolved around understanding and explaining what had happened at Isandlwana, and addressed detailed planning for recovering, reinforcing, and restarting the campaign.[31] Amidst that though, some of Chelmsford's correspondence can be read as meaning that he wanted to be relieved of his command. For instance, on the 1 February, in a message to The Duke of Cambridge at the War Office, Chelmsford, amongst other things, requested that an officer of the Rank of Major General be sent out to '…succeed me, not only in Commanding the Forces, but also as Lt Governor & High Commissioner should anything happen to Sir B. Frere.'[32] About a week later, 9 February, he wrote again to the War Office and returned to the same theme, adding that he was, not for the first time, suffering from the strain of 'prolonged anxiety & exertion, physical and mental…' but that it was worse on this occasion than previously.[33] It is easy to see how these two letters could be taken to mean that Chelmsford wanted to be relieved of his command, in fact his second letter, with its reference to 'prolonged strain', could be taken as evidence of increased anxiety, in turn suggesting a growing urgency.

Evelyn Wood however, had had correspondence and conversation with Chelmsford in the last week of January, just a week or so before Chelmsford's second message, and reports nothing untoward whatsoever about Chelmsford or his manner, in fact Wood refers to a 'considerate note', being received from him.[34] Added to that, whilst it is possible to read a sense of urgency into Chelmsford's second letter, there could be many reasons for that, and it is rational, ending with an expressed desire to carry on with his duties and with no reference, overt or implied, to him wanting to be relieved of his command.

Going back to his first reference to the posting of a Major General, in the message of 1 February, it was but one message amongst a broader range of subjects and appears 'matter

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[31]Sir Evelyn Wood Collection, Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg, W.C. 11/2/2; NAM London, C.P. 28, *Lord Chelmsford*, pp.120-121.
[32]NAM, London, Chelmsford Papers, C.P. 28.
[33] NAM, London, Chelmsford Papers, 6807/386.
[34] Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshal*, Vol. 1 (Milton Keynes: The Naval and Military Press, 2006), p. 33.

of fact', calm and rational, with no reference to his own immediate replacement. He seemed to be simply planning a succession for when he, and, it seems, Bartle Frere, had finished their current commitments and were ready to leave. So, when the two messages are viewed together, and considering the closing comments of his second letter about wanting to carry on with his duties, thoughts of the future, coupled with a heartfelt desire for practical support and assistance, was the simplest and most logical explanation. He did not want to be immediately replaced.

A period of relative inactivity which was to last nearly two months commenced in the aftermath of Isandlwana; Evelyn Wood was securely based at Kambula and felt that he could defeat any Zulu threat, Pearson was in a 'strongly entrenched position', with supplies until the end of the month at Eshowe, and in no immediate danger, and the troops of number three column waited at Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar.[35] The period of inactivity for those holding positions in Zululand was to stretch to nearly two months during which supplies and replacements amounting to over 10,000 officers and men together with equipment including medics, gunners and cavalry arrived in response to Chelmsford's request for reinforcements.[36] The period between the tragedy of Isandlwana, and news of movement, situation updates or any future plans, was very tense and difficult for those who were waiting with absolutely no idea of what was going to happen next, and fearful of attack. To start with, that tension, along with a degree of frustration, must have been shared by Chelmsford, who revealed the lack of any reliable intelligence regarding Zulu intentions in two of his letters, sent just two days apart. On 1 February Chelmsford explained the lack of Zulu activity since the battle at Isandlwana as likely being down to their own severe losses, and on 3 February he said that, along the Natal Border 'everyone nearby expects a raid to be made, and that, 'Greytown and PMBurg [sic] are forming extra defences'.[37]

The lack of information and the inevitable anxiety it caused, when added to the bad weather and sickness soldiers were experiencing whilst waiting to find out what was going to happen next, would undoubtedly have impacted badly on morale.[38] Nothing was done to

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[35] Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshal,* Vol. 2 (The Naval and Military Press, 2006), p. 33.
[36] War Office Intelligence Branch and Intelligence Branch Staff War Office, *Official Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879*, Facsimile of 1881 ed edition (London: Greenhill Books, 1881), sec. Appendix B.
[37] Sir Evelyn Wood Collection, Natal Archives Depot, Pietermaritzburg.

address that, nor did it seem to have been considered by senior officers as a specific subject at any point, but there was no hint of a breakdown in discipline or any cessation in the necessary day to day work amongst the troops. It seems likely that the men expected to have to cope on their own and defaulted to a position of pragmatic professionalism despite the lowered morale. The unhappiness and low morale among the troops translated into an intense dislike of the leadership, mainly in the form of Chelmsford on whom they blamed their situation. For instance, a letter home from an unnamed gunner from N Battery, 6th Brigade, Royal Artillery was published in the *Aberystwyth Observer* on 26 July 1879 in which the author wrote: 'Lord Chelmsford is most unpopular amongst the men, who look on him as a very inferior General-and so he is, for now he is as over cautious as he was before over rash, and the delays in advancing are most vexatious'.[39] However, it was not to be long before the dynamics changed as preparations were made for the relief of Eshowe.

In summary, it is apparent that Chelmsford was not seen by his troops as an asset, particularly following events at Isandlwana, rather, he was disliked by many of his men and did not inspire confidence, either professionally or in terms of the troops' welfare. That may well underline the importance of leadership to a sense of morale, motivation, and esprit de corps; there was certainly no sense of unity.

Both the Ashanti and Zulu campaigns have shown the importance of the relationship between the leaders and their men to the production of morale and motivation, and to esprit de corps.

The next chapter will explore this further by looking in depth at a single, discreet incident in the war, the battle at Rorke's Drift. That gives an opportunity to look at a specific incident, and personnel, from start to finish, and enables a more in-depth and detailed look at the dynamics and relationship between leaders and their men, and the chance to identify any factors affecting the production of morale, motivation and esprit de corps.

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[38] "The Zulu War", *Petersfield Express*, 25, March 1879, p. 3.

[39] "The Zulu War, Letter from the Front", *The Aberystwyth Observer*, no. 1100, 26 July 1879, p. 4.

CHAPTER FIVE.

Leadership, Motivation and Unit Cohesion at Rorke's Drift

From the receipt of the news of a likely attack, to preparations being completed as far as possible, the garrison at Rorke's Drift presents a picture of a homogenous group and its leaders. Firstly, receiving and absorbing devastatingly bad news, then organising and discussing options before, very quickly, arriving at a mutually acceptable plan to move forwards, before implementing that plan. There were no signs of serious dissent, no signs of conflict or of discipline having to be enforced, rather, everybody worked collaboratively to problem-solve and establish a way forward rationally using the resources available to them, both personal and practical. This would only have been possible because of the nature of the group, their interpersonal relationships, and their leadership; a situation that could be described as the presence of good esprit de corps, with all that entails.

From a modern point of view, what was done and how it was done represents a form of 'Unit Cohesion' in action. This psychological process, or effect, is explored and explained in detail by Allister MacIntyre in *The Military Leadership Handbook*, (2008).[1] But essentially, Unit Cohesion is a 'basic bond or uniting force' generated by interpersonal relationships that acts on members to remain in a group and to stick together in pursuit of goals and objectives', and its hallmarks are mutual support and a shared agenda.[2] When operating between peers, it is called 'horizontal cohesion and, when between subordinates and their superiors, it is called 'vertical cohesion'. [3] Ideally both types are present and that results in unit cohesion across the entire unit. MacIntyre argued that '...a powerful tool for controlling fear is strong group cohesion or primary group relationships', and that '...the greatest fear felt by most combat soldiers is the fear of letting down their comrades'. It is from here that the bonding stems.[4]

The battle at Rorke's Drift started in the late afternoon 22 January 1879 and lasted over twelve hours until after dawn on 23 January when the Zulu army retired. It was fought

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[1] Allister MacIntyre, 'Cohesion' in Horn and Walker (eds.), *The Military Leadership Handbook*, (Kingston, Ont: Dundurn Group, 2008), chap. 4.
[2] Horn and Walker, *Military Leadership*, p. 62.
[3] Horn and Walker, *Military Leadership*, p. 60.
[4] Horn and Walker, *Military Leadership*, p. 62.

between forces of vastly different sizes, with the British defenders, who numbered between 100 and 120 men, facing an attacking Zulu force of up to 4,000 warriors. The subsequent British victory was a considerable feat of arms, and it has been written about extensively, both at the time and subsequently. In fact, the physical process of the battle, its protagonists and material details along with reports of the prodigious courage and effort on both sides are well known.[5] What is not known is how the psychological aspects of morale and motivation contributed to the victory. That question will be answered by approaching the subjects of morale and motivation in a deeper, and much more focussed way than the broader perspective, spread over entire campaigns, used in the previous chapter. This will identify the sources of morale and motivation, and what overall kept the group together as a cohesive fighting force, throughout the battle.

The battle at Rorke's Drift is important for this thesis because it formed a singular and discrete event in the process of the Anglo Zulu Campaign. In part that is because it was set in a concentrated time and space, with a very clear start and a very clear ending. But also, because the relatively small numbers of British officers and main characters can be followed throughout the length of the engagement, thus giving the opportunity to understand what was being decided, thought, and said, as the battle progressed. That provides a unique opportunity to understand what happened in a human and interpersonal sense within the British forces as they defended their small, hastily fortified position against a far superior number of brave and determined Zulu forces in the shadow of the British defeat at Isandlwana that morning. The odds, it is fair to say, were stacked against them and this chapter will argue that a combination of leadership and a bond of cohesion that developed amongst the troops, enabled them to win the day.

The language of the time, when referring to an event like the battle at Rorke's Drift, used words like 'pluck', or perhaps 'bravery' or esprit de corps' although there would have been no understanding of the underlying psychological processes involved in producing those characteristics. But those words were valid and understood at the time, and they still are when they, and the actions they refer to, are interpreted by the modern understanding of

[5] See for instance: Lt. J.R.M. Chard, 'An Account of the Defence of Rorke's Drift. Compiled at the Personal Request of H.M. Queen Victoria at Windsor Castle, February 21st 1880.' (The Royal Archives Windsor, 1880); William Penn Symons, *Rorke's Drift Diary* (London: Unicorn Publishing Group, 2018); Jones and Lee Stevenson, *Rorke's Drift - By Those Who Were There* (Brighton: Lee Stevenson Publishing, 2004); Bancroft, *Rorke's Drift*.

morale and motivation. That understanding recognises that certain aspects of a leader's manner, methodology and even personality can have a great impact on the development and maintenance of high morale, cohesion, and good motivation amongst their men. In arguing that those factors were present in 1879, and that they resulted from the leadership and the high level of esprit de corps present in the unit; this chapter will also argue that those factors were a major reason for the successful defence of Rorke's Drift. Events will be followed from the point where news of the developing threat reached Rorke's Drift and will end with the withdrawal of Zulu forces on the morning of 23 January 1879. A chronological method of working through events in this battle has been used because it allows readers to follow matters logically, preserves context, and shows any developments that resulted from experience. The same approach is used through the whole thesis, both in terms of the development of the campaign, and in the individual chapters.

Prior to the events of the afternoon of 22 January 1879 the day at Rorke's Drift was very quiet and routine. Private Henry Hook describes the base prior to the arrival of news of Isandlwana as very quiet, with tea being made and the men all 'knocking about'.[6] In the late morning, the Commanding Officer, Major Spalding went to Helpmakaar to expedite the arrival of two companies of the 24th who had been due at Rorke's Drift the previous day to begin the building of fortifications. That left two officers at Rorke's Drift, Lieutenant John Chard R.E., and Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead, 2/24th, but as Chard was senior in service, overall command devolved upon him. At about 15:15 Chard, working on the ponts at the Drift, and Bromhead who was inside Rorke's Drift, both learned of the disaster at Isandlwana from separate messengers, in the form of horsemen who had managed to escape in time.[7]

The messenger who reached Chard was Lieutenant Adendorff of Lonsdale's Regiment, and Chard found it hard to believe the tale that Adendorff related, even suggesting that he had left before the conclusion of the fight and so could not know the final outcome of the battle.[8] Bromhead was in the post when the news reached him, in the form of a written

[6] Henry Hook, 'Survivors' Tales of Great Events', in *The Royal Magazine,* February 1905. pp. 339-348.
[7] Penn Symons, *Rorke's Drift Diary*, pp. 33–45.
[8] The Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, Berkshire, Handwritten Account of the defence of Rorke's Drift by Capt. & Bvt. Major JRM Chard, V.C., R.E., dated February 21st, 1880 [sic]. Note: Adendorff voluntarily went into the post with Chard and remained throughout the battle.

message from Captain Allan Gardner of the 14th Hussars. The message confirmed the defeat at Isandlwana, warned that a Zulu force was on its way to attack Rorke's Drift, and told Bromhead to hold the post at all costs.[9] Bromhead immediately despatched a message to Chard, working on the ponts, recalling him urgently. The sense of disbelief was not confined to Chard but was obviously felt in a more general sense within the post: Private John Walters, a hospital orderly, wrote that 'We would hardly believe this at first but very soon would have reason to understand it was only too true.'[10] Hook's recollections reflect Walter's observations, and he wrote that 'For some little time we were all stunned, then everything changed from perfect quietness to intense excitement and energy'.[11]

Events were moving very quickly and an impromptu open meeting, or rather, conversation, developed amongst those present or nearby. Hook was present at the meeting and wrote about it later. His is indeed a very useful record and not only gives a guide to what was discussed but also, up to a point, who was there. He says that at the outset, 'there was a general feeling that the only safe thing to do was to retire and try to join the troops at Helpmakaar'.[12] Preparation in the form of getting a couple of wagons ready actually commenced; until Acting Commissary Dalton, a very experienced retired army Sergeant, pointed out that they would easily be outrun by the Zulu forces, and forced to fight in the open, and that the best option was to fortify the Post for defence.[13]

Hook was not the only one to comment on Dalton's intervention. Firstly, the Padre for the post, Reverend Smith, wrote that:

> ...a praiseworthy effort was made to remove the worst cases in hospital to a place of safety: two wagons were brought up, after some delay, and the patients were being brought out when it was found that the Zulus were so close upon us

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[9]South Wales Borderers Museum, Brecon. The Battle of Isandhlwana [sic] and The Defence of Rorke's Drift. By Capt. W. P. Symons 2-24th Regiment. Written at Rorke's Drift February, March and April 1879.

[10] Waters, 'The Massacre at Rorke's Drift. Narratives by Survivors.' in *The Cambrian,* 13 June 1879, Vol. 76 No, 3930. P. 3.

[11] Hitch, 'The Massacre at Rorke's Drift. Narratives by Survivors.' in *The Cambrian,* 13 June 1879, Vol. 76 No, 3930. P. 3.

[10] Henry Hook, *The Royal Magazine*, February 1905, p. 126.

[11]Hook, *Royal Magazine*, February 1905. p. 126.

[13] The Rev. George Smith, 'The Defence of Rorke's Drift January 22nd, 1879 (By an Eye-Witness)', in, *'The Natal Mercury'*, 7 April 1879.

[13] Frederick Hitch, 'Chums Magazine', 11 March 1908. (no title available).

[13] Lt. J.R.M. Chard, *An Account of the Defence of Rorke's Drift.* (The Royal Archives Windsor, 1880).

> that any attempt to take them away in ox wagons would only result in them falling into the enemies' hands.[14]

With the idea of retreat thus abandoned, and the decision made to stay and to fortify, work started immediately, with Dalton directing the physical preparations and Bromhead 'telling off' the men to their various duties.[15] It was at this point, after the 'meeting' had broken up and defensive preparations were under way, that Chard arrived at the post from the ponts, sought out Bromhead and once briefed, agreed to all that was being done and then took an active part in the design and construction of the defences; particularly in shortening the defensive boundary when the N.N.C deserted.[16]

Regarding Chard's whereabouts during the meeting, there is a discrepancy between two of Hook's accounts given to different magazines. His earlier recollection, as given to the *Strand Magazine* in 1891, agrees with other original narratives in that it says that Chard arrived after the meeting was over, but in his account rendered to the *Royal Magazine,* in 1905, he has Bromhead and Chard working together to prepare the planned withdrawal.[17] There is no doubt that Chard returned after the meeting: his own account, and several witnesses all say that the meeting was over when he returned.[18] This point is worth noting as it may cast doubts over the rest of Hook's recollections, but all the rest of his account is supported by other sources and his 1905 recollection of Chard's movements was made 36 years after the event, shortly before his death, and so was most likely to have been a mistake in his recollection.

Bromhead's impromptu meeting had taken less time than it took for his message to reach Chard at the ponts, said to be about a quarter of a mile away, and for Chard to immediately return; a period that cannot have been more than a few minutes, and yet major decisions were discussed and agreed. Who was at the meeting, what was said, how it was conducted, what the dynamics were and how it was all managed so quickly, even taking into account

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[14] The Rev. George Smith, "The Defence of Rorke's Drift January 22nd, 1879 (By an Eye-Witness)" *'The Natal Mercury'*, 7 April 1879.
[15] William M. Lummis, *Padre George Smith of Rorke's Drift* (Norwich: Wensum Books, 1978), pp. 49–50.
[16] The Royal Archives Windsor, RA VIC/MAIN/O/46, Lt. J.R.M. Chard, *An Account of the Defence of Rorke's Drift.*
[17] Henry Hook, 'The Strand Magazine', 1891, pp. 339–48; 'The Royal Magazine', February 1905.
[18] James Henry Reynolds, 'The Army Medical Department Annual Report. Appendix V For 1878'; Henry Harford, *The Zulu War Journal of Colonel Henry Harford C.B*, First Edition (Pietermaritzburg: F. Warne, 1978), p. 40. (Original manuscript in The Local History Museum, Durban).

the pressing issue, was of pivotal importance to the successful defence which followed, and it deserves a detailed analysis. Unsurprisingly, a conversation about what should be done was kindled amongst those present when Bromhead received the news of Isandlwana and it obviously became common knowledge: Hook's recollection that there had been a *general* feeling of support for a retreat to Helpmakaar certainly indicates that a group of people were aware, and not just a select few, and the early attempts to organise transport must have ensured that most, if not all of those in the Post, were aware of what was going on.

As the conversation and planning developed it remained rational and consensual and the best example is provided by the changing of the plan from one of retreat to one of defence. The major influence in that change of plan was without doubt the individual who had put it forward, Acting Commissary Dalton, when he pointed out that the Zulus would easily outrun and overwhelm the garrison if they left the post. Dalton had served as a very well-respected sergeant in the 85th regiment and had joined the commissariat after retiring from the army. He had experience of fighting in Africa and had first-hand experience of overseeing a supply depot under threat of attack by the Xhosa whilst in their territory at Ibeka on the frontier, about eighteen months previously.[19] On that occasion the garrison had fortified the post and the Xhosa did not launch a direct attack. What effect fortifying the post had on that decision cannot be known, but Dalton's experience and overall credibility were known amongst those at Rorke's Drift, and the sense of his logic and suggestions were immediately obvious.

The record shows that the meeting was not structured or controlled in a formal sense. It was an inclusive discussion involving a mixture of ranks and roles, that developed a plan through a natural evolution of opinions and ideas. All those present were part of, and privy to, the final decision which meant that they all had ownership of it, albeit it carried Bromhead's imprimatur. This is significant not least because it illustrates the respect and relationships between those present, but also the level of esprit de corps in the unit. Modern theory would hold that such a high level of esprit de corps would be, at least in part, due to the actions and methods of the commander, and so it is worth examining the actions of Bromhead and Chard.

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[19] South Wales Borderers Regimental Museum, Brecon. The Battle of Isandhlwana [*sic*] and The Defence of Rorke's Drift 1879. By Capt. W.P.Symons 2-24th Regiment. Written at Rorke's Drift February, March and April 1879.

At first look, neither Bromhead, nor Chard seem to have been well regarded, either personally or professionally within the officer class. Wolseley, after he had presented them with their Victoria Crosses, described the experience thus: '…two duller, more stupid, more uninteresting even or less like gentlemen it has not been my luck to meet for a long time…'[20] Curling expressed a similarly low opinion in a letter home dated 28 April 1879, writing that: 'it is very amusing to read the accounts of Chard and Bromhead. They are about the most common-place men in the British Army. Chard is a most insignificant man in appearance and is only about 5 feet 2 or 3 in height. Is it not curious how some men are forced into notoriety?'[21] Nothing in those comments has anything useful to say about Chard's or Bromhead's professional abilities. In fact, they amount to personal abuse, and at the same time illustrate a 'them and us' society within the ranks of army officers. Chard and Bromhead were perceived as different, not part of the social 'clique'; and Wolseley's comment about them being '…less like gentlemen', a strong insult at the time, really emphasises that point.

Focussing now on Bromhead, as he had the major leadership input at the beginning of events, Wolseley's and Curling's opinions and comments do not throw any light on his professional abilities or working relationships in his unit which were obviously good. His character and personality may have been quiet, but it seems that he was a modest man, and not unconfident or incompetent. In his reply to an address and presentation of an inscribed sword to him to celebrate his role at Rorke's Drift, in Lincoln on 25 June 1880, Bromhead actually referred to his own lack of vanity, and ensured that all of the others present at the siege were also mentioned and remembered.[22] Further to that, in a radio broadcast in 1936, the then Lieutenant Colonel Frank Bourne, referred back to the days before the Zulu War when he was a Colour Sergeant working under Bromhead.[23] During that broadcast he said that the unit were 'a very happy family', and that 'You can't live in tents, and on mother earth, for two years on active service without knowing your men intimately'.[24] The unit sounded very much a whole, and from a modern perspective, Bourne's remarks clearly

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[20]Adrian Preston, Ed., *The South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley 1879-1880,* (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1973), p. 359

[21] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters,* p. 122.

[22] 'Public Reception to Major Bromhead at Lincoln', *Nottinghamshire Guardian* (Nottingham, 2 July 1880), 1832 edition, section News, p. 11

[23] Frank Bourne, 'I Was There', *Derbyshire Times and Chesterfield Herald* (Derbyshire, 18 December 1936), edition 7438, section Weekend Radio, p. 20.

indicate the presence of lateral cohesion in the unit, but also indicate that Bromhead was seen as part of the whole. Looking again at the meeting at the outset of events and viewing it through modern eyes, Bromhead's manner would have fitted perfectly with the way it unfolded. It was facilitated and not overtly directed, but with no loss of respect: his agreement and decision were final, even if obvious. For that specific time, and that specific place, Bromhead was exactly the right man for the job.

Bromhead was and had been aware of the tactical vulnerability of Rorke's Drift even before leaving Helpmakaar. Captain Penn-Symons who recorded his notes in the days following the battle, includes with his main manuscript a separate note, in which he says that Bromhead, realising the vulnerability of Rorke's Drift to attack, had twice asked for permission to fortify the base before he had left Helpmakaar to take over security with his Company of 2/24th on 10 January. He was refused permission by Chelmsford's staff, because others had already been detailed to construct defences for the post, but this does show a tactical awareness on his part.[25] He was not alone in those considerations though, and the reason that Major Spalding was absent on the afternoon of the attack was because he had gone to Helpmakaar to expedite matters.[26]

Bromhead though, was not content to wait for things to officially proceed and decided to go ahead and make some preparations for defence anyway. That was known because Captain Henry Hallam Parr, 1st /13 Somerset Light Infantry, who arrived at the post the morning following the battle on 23 January wrote that, on hearing news of Isandlwana, 'they [Chard and Bromhead] began at once hurriedly strengthening the position which Bromhead had already begun to place in a state of defence'.[27] In his original writing, Hallam Parr, did not give a source for that information. But fortunately, although much later, he clarified his comment in an account related to a newspaper in 1897, where he wrote that Bromhead had personally told him on the morning of 23 January, that he [Bromhead] was 'so persuaded of the danger' that, 'he had made up his mind what to do if occasion should

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[24] Jones and Stevenson, p. 102.
[25] South Wales Borderers Regimental Museum, Brecon. The Battle of Isandhlwana [*sic*] and The Defence of Rorke's Drift 1879. By Capt. W.P.Symons 2-24th Regiment. Written at Rorke's Drift February, March and April 1879.
[26] TNA. WO32/7737. Lt. J.R.M. Chard, First official report of the Defence of Rorke's Drift.
[27] Henry Hallam Parr, *A Sketch of the Kafir & Zulu Wars Guadana to Isandhlwana* (Uckfield: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2005), p. 237.

arise'.[28] That confirms that Bromhead had made plans up to the point of knowing what to do, with what, and when, whilst stopping short of actual physical preparations; and it is implausible that Bromhead, being aware of Dalton's previous experience, would not have included him in that planning. It would certainly explain how Bromhead and Dalton were working separately on different aspects of the defence so soon after the meeting if both knew their respective roles already. Any saving of time during the preparation period helped in the progress of the improvised defences which were to prove so important in keeping the Zulu out of the post later.

It is plain that Chard, and Bromhead in particular, were very much part of the group generally, and the conduct of the meeting had proved that Bromhead's manner, personality and character, the factors criticized by his peers and other senior ranks, were actually responsible for him having earned '…the positive bond, of favourable sentiments, that soldiers have for their leaders'.[29] With the cooperation shown thus far, there was nothing to suggest that the unit was not already bound together by lateral cohesion and a united spirit, but, the implied approval of Bromhead's leadership then added vertical cohesion to the mix. Modern theory tells us that adding vertical cohesion to the unit at that point, would have undoubtedly had a positive impact on leadership, and on the building of a team throughout the whole unit.

But, notwithstanding that, as Grossman argued, if levels of stress and fear increase rise high enough then individuals who are angry or frightened may 'stop thinking with their forebrain (the mind of a human being) and start thinking with their midbrain (which is indistinguishable from the mind of an animal). *They are literally scared out of their wits*' [original emphasis].[30] However, the overall effect can be lessened by so-called 'rescue factors'. Rescue factors are potential events or circumstances that, should they occur, would ameliorate the feared event to some extent, thus slowing or even preventing a loss of rationality altogether.[31] They work simply by reducing the likelihood, or bad consequences of the anticipated event; and so it will be useful here to set levels for morale and motivation

[28] William Penn Symons, 'The Victoria Cross…From Rorke's Drift to the British Museum', *The Morning Leader* (London, 11 November 1897), p. 11.
[29] Allister MacIntyre. "Cohesion". *Military Leadership*, p. 62.
[30] Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Revised edition (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009), p. xiii.
[31] Sanders and Wills, *Counselling for Anxiety Problems,* p. 19.

as benchmarks at the outset, so as to be able to follow and identify events or other factors that affected the, for want of a better phrase, 'fear factor' amongst the defenders of Rorke's Drift as time went by.

The motivation to complete the defences as far as possible would obviously have been high, and, as Penn Symons related, there was '...a short hour for preparation', but of course the defenders could not have known that.[32] There were though, several 'rescue factors' present. To start with, there was no certainty of an attack: there was a strong possibility, but Dalton's previous experience had shown that it was not inevitable. Added to that was a certain level of disbelief that all of Chelmsford's forces had been destroyed and would not be able to help, plus, Spalding was expected to return to the post with two more companies of the 24th. Added to those potentially helpful factors, the post was well-supplied with food and ammunition, and even if there was to be an attack, the Zulu numbers may well have been small.

Morale was plainly at a level that would keep the troops engaged in their tasks and preparing for what may or may not happen and that is supported by the fact that there were several 'spare' horses available to be used in the post before the attack began. The Reverend George Smith reported seeing four of 'our horses' tethered to tree shortly after the Zulu attack commenced. He noted that they had been killed but it is not known whether that was before or after the attack started.[33] Then, on the next morning, 23 January, G. Hamilton-Browne, an officer of the N.N.C. reported that 'a few dead horses lay about, either killed by the *Assegai* or the bullets of the defenders, and I wondered why they had not been driven away before the fighting began.'[34] It is likely that, at least some of the horses mentioned by Hamilton-Browne, were the same as those Smith referred to; Hamilton-Browne surmises that they were killed during the fighting, and does not suggest that they were killed by the defenders before the action started. In that case, with all the confusion during the preparations for defence and, with riders coming and going to and from the post, it would have been entirely possible for an individual so inclined to have mounted one of

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[32] South Wales Borderers Regimental Museum, Brecon. The Battle of Isandhlwana [*sic*] and The Defence of Rorke's Drift 1879. By Capt. W.P.Symons 2-24th Regiment. Written at Rorke's Drift February, March, and April 1879.

[33]" The Defence of Rorke's Drift January 22nd, 1879", *The Natal Mercury* (Natal, 7 April 1879): *Royal Army Chaplains Department Journal,* July 1936

[34] G Hamilton-Browne, *A Lost Legionary in South Africa: The Recollections of an Officer of the Natal Native Contingent During the Zulu War, 1879* (Milton Keynes: Leonaur, 1879), p. 112.

the horses and galloped away with the others. Roughly an hour after the warning to hold the post at all costs against an anticipated Zulu attack had been received, any doubt as to whether or not an attack would actually take place evaporated as an oncoming mass of several thousand Zulu warriors was seen running towards it.

Then, in the short period before their onslaught hit the post and the attack really started, another notable event took place when Corporal Anderson of the Natal Native Contingent (N.N.C.) was shot dead by soldiers of 2/24th. The circumstances of Anderson's death are important to this work for two reasons. Firstly, it amounted to a serious crime, but was never officially reported or investigated which means that it has never been explained or closed. Secondly, given the context of the moment, it gives a powerful insight into the presence and operation of powerful group dynamics driving the behaviour of those involved.

Anderson, with two other corporals, Doughty and Wilson were with the Company of 2/3rd. N.N.C. that had been assigned to help protect the post and who had been usefully employed in the preparation of its makeshift defences until moments before the attack.[35] A fourth corporal, Scammell, was attached to the same unit but was a patient in the post hospital, along with yet another corporal, Scheiss, who was an N.N.C member but not of the same unit.[36] After the incident with Anderson, Scheiss and Scammell both stayed and fought in the defence of the post; Scammell was very seriously injured by a gunshot wound.[37] Scheiss was more fortunate: having 'fought like a tiger' during the defence, he was awarded the Victoria Cross.[38] But, to return to events before the Zulu attack took place, as the news of a definite and imminent Zulu attack went round the post, the N.N.C. deserted as a body and began to run away in what was seen as an act of desertion. Their officer, Captain Stephenson, who was mounted, went after them, ostensibly to bring them back, but continued to ride away never to return to the fray. Anderson also went with the group. Both Hook and Hitch left accounts of the incident and its aftermath, written some years later, and Padre Smith wrote two accounts, one almost immediately on 23 January 1879, and another

[35] Frederick Hitch, "*Chums*" 11 March 1908
[36] D. Blair Brown, *Surgical Experiences in the Zulu and Transvaal Wars, 1879 and 1881* (Milton Keynes: Trieste Publishing, 1883), pp. 35–36, 73.
[37] The Reverend George Smith, "The Defence of Rorke's Drift", *The Natal Mercury,* 7 April 1879
[38] *Zulu War Journal. Col. Henry Harford, C.B.*, ed. by Daphne Child (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter (Pty)) Ltd, 1978), p. 15.

later, on 16 July 1879 which varies from his earlier account.[39] These accounts are the only detailed record of circumstances surrounding this incident, and a thorough and detailed examination of the facts will be employed to bring understanding and closure to the matter of Anderson's death at the hands of his colleagues. It should be added that the focus of this work is clarification of facts and understanding, there is no intention whatsoever to apportion blame or to criticise or judge those present in such a perilous situation at this great distance in time.

Sometime after the event, Hook and Hitch both admitted to the shooting of Anderson in interviews they gave to the press, Hook related his story twice in fact, once to the *Strand Magazine* in 1891, and again in '*The Royal Magazine*' in February 1904.[40] There is no significant difference between his two accounts, but his description of the manner of the N.N.C.'s deserting differs slightly from Hitch's, in what may be an important detail as regards the shooting of N.N.C. Corporal Anderson when he says that the N.N.C 'bolted towards Helpmakaar. ' Hitch's account was published later, in 1908 in '*Chums*' magazine. Hitch's recollection contains more detail and paints a picture of a more gradual desertion taking place over a short but noticeable time. He says that just before the barricades were completed, the N.N.C began to 'funk it'. When they found out that the attack was definitely going to happen '...they commenced to sneak away. We tried to rally them, but it was of no use'. He goes on to say, 'Then their captain went after them with the intention of bringing them back; but he disappeared too.' It was very soon after this that Anderson was shot, and Hitch recalled, that, 'Just to show these back [sic] gentlemen what we thought of them, some of us, including myself, sent a few shots after them, which brought down dead one of their white non-commissioned officers'.[41]

Hook also recalls firing after the retreating N.N.C. as they had 'bolted towards Helpmakaar, saying, '-and what was worse, their officer and a European Sergeant went with them. To see them deserting like that was too much for some of us, and we fired after them. The sergeant was struck and killed'. The 'sergeant' that Hook and Hitch both refer to was of

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[39] William M. Lummis, *Padre George Smith of Rorke's Drift* (Norwich: Wensum Books, 1978), p. 51.; A letter written by the reverend Smith with regard to the death of Corporal W. Anderson, N.N.C.; [NAB ref 3012/1879, Kwa Zulu Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg].

[40] Henry Hook, "V.C.'s" in *The Strand Magazine,* Vol. 1, January to June 1891 pp. 551-554; *"The Royal Magazine."* February 1905.

[41] Frederick Hitch, *"Chums"* 11 March 1908.

course Corporal Anderson. Both Hook and Hitch took the trouble to note that Anderson was 'European' or 'white'; whether or not this was of note, other than simply as a means of distinguishing him from the rest of the N.N.C. is not clear, but it is noticeable. It also prompts a question of why only Anderson was hit: if he was running with a large group of over a hundred, and if, as Hitch recalled, 'some of us sent a few shots after them', obviously meaning multiple rifle rounds; why were there no other reports of casualties?[42] Hitch also said that Stephenson 'went after them', suggesting a process, albeit very short, during which the N.N.C. first slowly retired and then ran as a strung-out group rather than a single block of people as indicated by Hook's recollection.

In an unsupported statement, Padre Smith subsequently wrote that Anderson had been at the Hospital, when the N.N.C. started running.[43] This was not entirely unlikely seeing that two of his colleagues were patients there. If this were the case, he would have been a few moments behind the rest of the group, and it might simply be that he made an easier target simply for being closer to the shooters. Another possibility, given that he was readily identifiable by his appearance, was of course that he was deliberately targeted. It is simply not known. Padre Smith wrote two versions of the affair concerning Anderson. Recounting the event in his diary, Smith wrote:

> The garden must have been occupied, for one unfortunate Contingent Corporal, whose heart must have failed him when he saw the enemy and heard the firing, got over the parapet and tried to make his escape on foot, but a bullet from the garden struck him, and he fell dead within a hundred and fifty yards of our front wall. [44]

Later, writing in a letter in July 1879, Smith's story had changed to something less detailed about the actual shooting, but more about the aftermath, and seemingly providing closure of the matter, he said:

> W. Anderson was killed just outside the laager at Rorke's Drift, at the commencement of the Zulu attack on Jany. 22nd. I buried him on Jany.23rd & was told, concerning him, that he was a Corporal in the Natal Native Contingent who

[42] Hitch, "*Chums*"
[43] Lummis, *Padre George Smith* pp. 50–51.
[44] Lummis, *Padre George Smith*, p. 51.

> had been left in Hospital; that he had been engaged in working the surf boats at East London & had also been a performer on the wire slack rope.
>
> He was shot through the head, by the natives who had gained possession of the garden on our front, his body was otherwise untouched. [45]

Smith's first account agrees with hook and Hitch's in that Anderson was deserting after a failure of courage and adds that he was hit by a shot fired from the garden, Smith clearly had some knowledge of the subject to have learned about Anderson's presumed desertion, suggesting some conversation about the incident. The origins of his comment about a 'shot from the garden' are unknown, but by the time of his July account he says that the fatal shot had been fired by a Zulu in the garden. Whether or not discussion had taken place between Smith and those concerned in the incident, is not known but Smith had unfortunately misunderstood, or been misinformed: an examination of the timing of events shows that warriors could not have been in the garden at the point when Anderson was shot.

Hitch's account says that after Anderson had been shot, he (Hitch) had been told by Bromhead to climb onto the Church roof in the post to try to spot the Zulu force and to estimate its numbers. He saw the Zulu force running to form-up for the attack, and noticed that, 'They seemed to work on a pivot, the pivot being only about three hundred yards distant when the final advance began; so that, in order to attack us on all sides at once, the other end of their line had come on at a tremendous pace', he then dropped back into the laager as soon as he saw the attack start.[46] There was and is no evidence whatsoever of a Zulu presence in the post prior to the attack, and so the first time a Zulu warrior got into the garden, was as the attack that Hitch saw, hit home. Anderson had been dead for several minutes by then, killed whilst the Zulu army was at least some three hundred yards away. Whilst Hook and Hitch's much later confessions confirm Anderson's true fate, the physical facts surrounding the event also show that, for unknown reasons, Smith's account was inaccurate.

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[45] A letter written by the reverend Smith with regard to the death of Corporal W. Anderson, N.N.C.; [NAB ref 3012/1879, Kwa Zulu Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg].

[46] M.B. Savage, 'Intombi River Drift, March 1879: A Contemporary Letter Written by Major Charles Tucker.', *Society for Army Historical Research*, 1944, pp. 180–86.

The circumstances and manner of Anderson's departure could very easily have led Hook, Hitch and some others to believe that he (Anderson) was deserting, and that in turn prompted them to fire after him, there is though, no actual proof of his intentions or of what he was thinking when he ran, along with Stephenson and the other troops. It was an understandable assumption that he was simply running away, and that is a possibility, but others spring to mind. For instance, he may have been confused or to have simply wanted to retain contact with his officer and colleagues; Stephenson, being mounted, would have been ahead and his intentions were not known at that point. Whilst desertion remains a possibility, it is not an indisputable fact. In fact, Anderson's death in those circumstances, without an order or other authority, amounts to the crime of Unlawful Killing, or Manslaughter.[47] The original offence occurred under the *Queen's Regulations and Orders for The Army*, but from July 1879, the *Queen's Regulations* were gradually replaced in a process including other statutes and regulations until, in 1880 the predecessor of today's *Manual of Military Law* replaced them. The capital offence of manslaughter and the potential punishment remained the same under both sets of regulations.

Both Hook's and Hitch's comments had an annoyed and emotional quality about them; understandably they disapproved of the actions of the N.N.C., as well as with Stephenson and Anderson going with the troops. The firing of shots after them seems to have been very much part of that anger, as if there was an inherent right of the firers to administer punishment to those who broke the rules. If that was the case, then it may well indicate the existence of a 'primary group'. Cooley (1909) explained the way Primary groups are formed, in detail:

> By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self; for many purposes at least is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of

[47] Webster, *Webster's Dictionary*, p. 266; G.A. Wetherall, *The Queen's Regulations and Orders for The Army* (Milton Keynes: Franklin Classics, 2018 [1859]), p. 227; War Office, *Manual of Military Law: War Office 1907* (Milton Keynes: Nabu Press, 2010 [1907]), pp. iii, 15–24.

sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling[48]

F.C. Bartlett, writing in *Psychology and the Soldier* (1927) explained how military primary groups who were pursuing agreed goals, and then encountered difficulties which might have prevented them from achieving those goals might well react. He found that they were likely to adopt a kind of defensive subconscious behaviour and that leadership may pass from those who are recognised as the usual leaders, to another member of the group who, for the time being, has the ability to deal with the crisis: the group as a whole will not accept nonconformity or independent action. He goes on to say that such examples of nonconformity are apt to be dealt with 'in a most summary manner' and that such behaviour in the group 'awaken furious opposition'.[49]

Bartlett goes on to explain that these effects may well be caused because a fighting force or group involved in warfare necessarily becomes a more primitive type of group, owing to its environment and the presence of danger, and, as such, when enforcing its own discipline and social standards, resorts to the use of 'relatively primitive methods' to protect itself and effect its purpose.[50] A practical example of that is what happened when the N.N.C., who had been seen as part of the group defending Rorke's Drift, broke the rules of the group and fled; leading directly to the actions of those who fired after them.

To sum up, the Shooting of Anderson was the result of a powerful emotional and psychological response over which the firers had little or no control, and Anderson himself may well have simply been unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, at the end of a set of unfortunate circumstances. However, there was certainly a powerful sense of group identity and cohesion amongst the defenders and that was generating a strong sense of motivation. On this occasion, that motivation led to the death of Anderson, and this was probably due to an absence of leadership, as the group unconsciously began to act independently for its own, rather than group goals; leadership was vital to the positive use of motivation.[51] Finally, the fact that the incident was never officially reported, coupled

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[48]Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization, a Study of the Larger Mind* (Cornell University Library, 1909), p. 23.

[49] F.C. Bartlett. M.A. *Psychology and the Soldier*, (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1927) pp. 98-99.

[50] Bartlett. *Psychology and the Soldier*, p. 126

with Hook and Hitch's open admission and discussions later, suggests that the affair was not seen so much as a crime, but as Anderson's just deserts.

The fact that the potential attack was now a reality, added to the very large number of warriors in the Zulu army must have had an effect on the so-called 'anxiety equation' as it related to the defenders; the threat was now real, and it was very large. However, there was no lessening of the efforts or fighting spirit of the defenders, so, if morale had been damaged, motivation certainly had not. The soldier's ironic humour was still in evidence as the attack developed and the large number of attackers became known, when a Private Morris was heard to say, 'Oh if that's all there are we can manage that lot all right'.[52]

From this point on the resolve, motivation, morale, and skill of the defenders was to be tested to the limit through the night and beyond. As the events of the night progressed, expectations, and thus morale and motivation would have also changed as a result. Those changes can be tracked by following events through the night to provide a running assessment, and to see how they might have affected the anxiety equation, and so it will be useful to have a measure of good and bad factors at the outset, as a starting level and reference point, starting with the negative because the attack was no longer a possibility, it was happening, and the numbers attacking were at first sight, overwhelmingly large. Added to that, with the desertion of the native troops, the number of defenders was only a third of what it had been, thus making the ratio of attackers to defenders something of the order of thirty to one. Finally, there was now definitely no option to retreat.

On the opposite side of the equation, the barricades had been adjusted to allow for lesser numbers of defenders, there was a plentiful supply of ammunition, and there was still a lot of confidence in the officers, weapons, and drills. Additionally, reinforcements were expected from Helpmakaar with Spalding, Hitch wrote that they were anxiously awaited and so those hopes were likely to have formed part of the calculation individuals made on the chances of survival or success.[53] Further to that, Chard's later writing shows that he believed it possible that at least some of Chelmsford's forces were still active in groups and it would be unsurprising if he thought they might come to his assistance. The evidence for this is in his account prepared for and delivered to Queen Victoria on 21 February 1880. Referring to

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[51] Allister MacIntyre, "Cohesion", in Horn and Walker, pp. 62–63.
[52] Frederick Hitch, *"Chums"*, 11 March 1908,
[53] Frederick Hitch. *"Chums"*, 11 March 1908

the early morning of the 23rd and the apparent withdrawal of the Zulu forces, he says: '... and I myself did not know that the part of the column with Lord Chelmsford had taken any part in the action at Isandlwana, or whether on the camp being taken he had fallen back on Helpmakaar'.[54] Therefore, for Chard, the slight potential that Chelmsford's column, or parts of it, might appear, either from Helpmakaar or elsewhere may well have remained alive, although whether or not he shared his thoughts with the rest of the defenders is not known.

It would be understandable, given the events of Isandlwana earlier in the day, and the huge disparity in the size of the two forces, if a casual observer concluded that the siege would end in a defeat for the defenders being overwhelmed by the massive size of the Zulu force alone. The possibility of a Zulu victory, won by overwhelming force of arms and numbers alone would have been clearly understood. But what was not known at the time was that it was also possible to lose the battle from a psychological point of view, with the same disastrous results. If morale and expectations declined below a certain point, thinking would shift, as Grossman described, from rational and human to something approximating that of an animal; the group would then break up, lose any sense of cohesion and joint purpose, and all would be up. Put simply, if the psychological battle was lost, so was the physical one: both factors need to be considered here, not simply force of arms.

As time went by, the attacks were relentless and the defenders continued to work as a mutually supporting team, with a particular example occurring early on with Hook leading a daring and courageous sally into the hospital that resulted in the saving of many British lives.[55] This was followed slightly later by Bromhead's example, who, on realising that a Zulu had shot Hitch, first turned and shot the Zulu and then lent Hitch his revolver as his (Hitch's) injuries prevented him from using his rifle. Bromhead also referred to Hitch as 'mate' during this event, an unusually familiar term for an officer to use when addressing a private soldier, but one that conveys a sense of concern for the injured man.[56] It is also an example of the operation of vertical cohesion, whilst demonstrating Cooley's position that cohesion is dependent on the relations between the members of a unit.

But as the attacks continued, a divergence between 'morale' and 'motivation' was occurring. This effect of low and sinking morale having no practical impact on a high

[54] Lt. J.R.M. Chard, *An Account of the Defence of Rorke's Drift.* (The Royal Archives Windsor, 1880)
[55] *The Strand Magazine.* Vol.1. January to June 1891,
[56] *Chums.* 11 March 1908,

motivation to fight had been observed and written about by Clausewitz before, where he had used the terms 'spirit' for motivation, and 'mood' for morale, to describe the same phenomenon.[57] As it progressed, comments and recollections became more fatalistic, expected outcomes were unhopeful, even depressing, and morale was without doubt low and going lower. Motivation and working as a team, however, did not diminish. As an example, returning to Hitch's comments regarding expected relief from Helpmakaar, he said: 'When the Zulus set fire to the hospital the other company of the battalion, for which we had been so anxiously waiting, appeared in sight. But they didn't [sic] march to our rescue. Seeing the hospital on fire, they came to the conclusion that we had all been annihilated, and with drooping spirits we saw our comrades turn back and retire'.[58]

Hitch's reference to 'drooping spirits' is very telling, but the soldiers still did not lessen their efforts and still the battle raged. The effect is well illustrated by the comments of Sergeant George Smith who, describing the length and the ferocity of the fighting gives a vivid description in a letter home and says, in a good indication of declining morale, 'I myself had given up all hopes of escaping.'[59] A similar description of dashed hope, lowering expectations and morale, but no mention of decreasing motivation was furnished by Private Thomas Stevens who wrote home to his parents saying, 'It was getting dark then and we expected help. We thought the General would come to us, but not so.'[60] He goes on to say that they (he and his colleagues) had resolved that they 'would die brave', a truly clear indication of extremely low morale and expectations.

Obviously, a low level of morale was not affecting the motivation and resolve of the men, and so there was no inevitable link between the two. Something was taking the place of morale and fulfilling the role of preventing the disastrous change of psychology that Grossman had written about. There were no 'rescue factors' remaining to help the psychology, and that suggests that the resolve to continue was generated internally by the men themselves, and not dependent on outside factors. The fact is that the group was remaining whole as the result of unit cohesion, produced by the nature of the relationships

[57] *Carl von Clausewitz. On War*, trans. by Howard Michael and Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 144–47.
[58] *Chums.* 11 March 1908,
[59] George Smith, "The Massacre at Rorke's Drift. Narrative by Survivors", *The Cambrian,* Vol. 76, No. 3930, 13 June 1879, p. 3.
[60] *The Merthyr Express.* April 1879,

within the group, and proving Cooley's 'We' aspect of group identity. This meant that they were all fighting for the group and so, for each other.

In conclusion, there are two ways to lose a battle such as the defence of Rorke's Drift: physically or psychologically. The defenders of Rorke's Drift were unbeaten on both counts, and this is largely due to the actions of their leader, Lieutenant Bromhead. He was technically third in command after Major Spalding and Lieutenant Chard, but fate took Spalding away to Helpmakaar to speed-up the arrival of troops for building fortifications, and Chard was working at the ponts as the news of Isandlwana reached Bromhead.

Neither Spalding nor Chard had any previous close relationship with the members of the 2/24 but Bromhead did, and his style and personality had encouraged the growth of vertical and horizontal cohesion, and a good relationship within the unit. He had free run for the first short period of time after the news arrived, and with other trusted members, set up the physical defences that were to prove so important to the victory because they prevented the normal Zulu tactic of 'swamping' the defenders, by getting amongst or behind them. He had also considered what might be needed beforehand and had prepared plans.

Chard was of a remarkably similar character to Bromhead and the two worked extremely well together as a team and with no conflict. Just before the attack took place, a clear indication of the powerful bonding forces within the unit were apparent as the N.N.C. fled, and Corporal Anderson was killed. The defenders continued to work as cohesive team, and that meant that they never allowed a gap that the Zulu forces could exploit and that, plus the rudimentary physical defences that had been erected held the Zulu army at bay and ensured victory for the defenders.

Bromhead had been in the main responsible for the creation of the unit cohesion, and the physical barriers were at least partly his responsibility, and this illustrates the importance of leadership in developing efficient, tight-knit units. It also becomes apparent that the component parts of what had been known as esprit de corps, are virtually the same as those of unit cohesion, and so, for all intents and purposes, the terms can be considered as interchangeable, barring specific circumstances.

The opportunity to study a discreet group of soldiers in a well-defined incident in terms of time and space, such as at Rorke's Drift gives a unique chance to closely examine all details, for instance the functioning of the primary group cohesion so apparent there, and the interpersonal relationships in the unit as a complete entity, a whole. When that 'whole'

is one discrete unit it is straightforward. But the theme of examining primary group cohesion and the way personnel relate is more complex in bigger units, or when different and unfamiliar units, even different branches of the armed forces, work together. The siege at Eshowe provides a good example of Army and Naval forces working together and will be the subject of the next chapter, where the way different units fitted-in and worked together will be examined.

CHAPTER SIX.

Leadership, Motivation and Unit Cohesion at Eshowe

The small group of buildings at Eshowe had been a Norwegian Missionary station until it was evacuated prior to, and because of, the looming war.[1] Its name has been spelled in several different ways over time including 'Etshowe', and 'Ekowe', amongst others. But for the purposes of this chapter, the accepted modern version 'Eshowe', will be used, as in the heading above. Where different spellings are encountered when quoting comments and statements, they will be shown as originally written, but noted as variations.[2] Chelmsford had planned to make use of the disused buildings at Eshowe as a defended staging post and store for Pearson's force, designated 'number one' column, on the route to Ulundi.[3] Pearson's was the Easternmost column of the three that comprised Chelmsford's invasion force into Zululand; and Eshowe was intended to perform the same function for number one column, as Rorke's Drift was for Glyn's number three column, to which Chelmsford had attached himself. The siege at Eshowe is one of the lesser studied aspects of the war, unlike Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, but this chapter will argue that it very clearly shows the development of a type of unit cohesion, and exactly how it developed.

At Eshowe, as at Rorke's Drift, British forces were kept in place by surrounding Zulu forces and as such they both offer the opportunity to study an identifiable and unchanging group of people undergoing an extremely serious experience over a well-defined time frame in a fixed location. These circumstances, plus the fact that both are well recorded means that the unfolding of actions and events together with rise and fall of morale and motivation, can be followed, and reason(s) for changes understood. The major difference between the two was duration, which gives the opportunity to study behaviour over both a short, and an extended period of time. Rorke's Drift was extremely intense, but it was over in less than a day, whilst the events at Eshowe were stretched over a much longer time:

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[1] Henry F. Norbury, *The Naval Brigade in South Africa. During the Kafir and Zulu Wars* (Milton Keynes: Leonaur, 2011 [1880]), p. 122.
[2] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade* p.122; Frances Ellen Colenso, *History of the Zulu War and Its Origin* (London: Adamant Media Corporation, 2004), p. 368.
[3] J.S. Rothwell, *Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War* (London: Greenhill Press, 1989 [1881]), p. 53.

those present were on duty for seventy-one days on site, for sixty-six of which they were aware that they were under siege by an extremely dangerous foe.[4]

The investigation into events at Eshowe will follow the same pattern as for Rorke's drift, in that modern theory and practice will be used to analyse and understand what took place over time as the siege developed. That way, a chronological narrative of the rise and fall of morale, and of motivation, will be compiled by understanding how events, both good and bad, were interpreted as time went by, and by what action resulted from them. At the end of that process, leadership, and its important effect on the conduct and outcome of the siege will be explored. Finally, this chapter will argue that the combination of good leadership, management style and an already existing spirit of lateral cohesion, led to a sense of unit cohesion and the successful conclusion of the siege.

There were approximately ten times the number of troops at Eshowe than there were at Rorke's Drift and they were not just from three different units, but also from different branches of the armed forces; two army units, the 'Buffs' and the 99th Regiment of foot, and a Naval Brigade from H.M.S. *Active* which contained a mixture of Royal Marines and sailors. This combination provides an excellent opportunity to look at army and navy performance side by side as they endured the same experiences. All of them were confined to the restricted area of the makeshift fort at Eshowe for over two months, and although not subject to a major assault they were under continuous threat and did suffer small-scale attacks and deaths. They also suffered from disease and had to endure food rationing. But at the end of the period of the siege, the garrison had remained a cohesive and focussed whole, cohesion and motivation had not failed at any point despite the hardships, and they had remained a viable force and held their ground. In addition to that, they had launched offensive operations to gather 'mealies' [maize] and to attack and burn small Kraals in the area.[5]

The assembly point for the column was at Fort Pearson, which had been constructed by the Naval Brigade from H.M.S. *Active,* who had landed 172 officers and men on 19 November 1879.[6] It was on the Natal side the Tugela River and had just, on 1 January, been

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[4] Rothwell, *Narrative*, p. 53.

[5] Howard Whitehouse (ed.) *A Widow-Making War*, (Southampton: Paddy Griffith Associates, 1995), p. 107; 'By one who was there', 'The Zulu War. With Colonel Pearson at Ekowe: By One Who Was There', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, July 1879, 1–29 (p. 15).

connected to the telegraph to Maritzburg.[7] From there all the men and equipment were ferried to a newly constructed base on the Eshowe side of the river, named Fort Tenedos. The fort was named after the ship which had supplied the naval detachment who built it, and at 06:00 on 18 January 1879, the column set out for Eshowe with the *Active's* Brigade in the lead.[8] This was not to be an uninterrupted journey though, and on the 22 January on the banks of the Inyezane river the column was ambushed by a large Zulu force, said to be between 4 to 6,000 warriors. However, a prompt and effective British response inflicted severe casualties on the Zulu force, and it withdrew.[9]

The attack at Inyezane marked the start of Pearson's engagement with the Zulu forces, which was to effectively last for the next two months; it also provided a point at which morale and motivation can be assessed. There are no specific references to levels of morale or motivation at that point, but Alexander Wilmot, a prolific writer and observer on South African affairs, later wrote, in a flowery style typical of Victorian writers, 'After the battle was over the column calmly resumed the even tenor of its way, and at night bivouacked on a high ridge distant only three miles from the battlefield.'[10] Wilmot had been born in Scotland, and arrived to settle in the Cape Colony in 1853; a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, he had worked in government and public service for some time and collected his information first-hand wherever possible.[11] His comment about the column resuming the 'even tenor of its way' helps to define mood as it describes a very even-tempered attitude on behalf of the column as a whole, with emotions being neither especially high or low.

The column reached Eshowe the day after the battle at Inyezane, on 23 January 1879, and the comments of a young soldier, Tom Cullern in a letter home to his father from Eshowe, support Wilmot's description that emotions were neither especially high nor low. After describing the Inyezane battle, he wrote: 'We are working very hard now, cutting

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[6] Norbury, *The Naval Brigad*e, p. 121.
[7] Norbury, *The Naval Brigad*e, p. 119.
[8] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade* p. 123.
[9] War Office Intelligence Branch and Intelligence Branch Staff War Office, *Official Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879*, (London: Greenhill Books, 1881), p. 23; Norbury, *The Naval Brigad*e pp. 127–29.
[10] Alexander Wilmot, *History of the Zulu War* (Doncaster: Military Publishers, 2004), p. 74.
[11] D.W. Kruger, (ed.) *Dictionary of South African Biography*, vol. 2, (Johannesburg: Tafelberg-Uitgewers, 1972), p. 849.

down wood etc., for making fortifications. It is very hard work and warm [sic]. I am glad to say I am in good health and spirits considering hardships we have to endure in the time of war'.[12] Cullern's comments are clearly realistic and show an awareness of potential difficulties, but when taken together with Wilmot's remarks, can be summed up as indicating a sense of 'professional pragmatism'; simply getting on with the job in hand.

When the column arrived at Eshowe, being unaware of the events at Isandlwana, they began fortifying the base as a store for the column which, apart from a small remaining garrison, was expected to continue on to Ulundi as part of Chelmsford's overall plan.[13] Morale and motivation were good, and during the first week the officers and men were said to have, 'set to with a will as they were very anxious to advance further into Zululand, and the sooner the fort was completed the sooner they would go.'[14] Then, on 27 January, a brief message was received from Sir Bartle Frere saying that Colonel Durnford and his column had been defeated, and on the next day, 28 January, news of the magnitude of the defeat at Isandlwana and its potential ramifications for British troops in Zululand, and for Natal, arrived.[15] Chelmsford's message emphasised the danger that Pearson's force was likely to be in, and relieved him of any orders previously issued: in short he instructed Pearson to do what he thought best, but if he (Pearson) did not believe he could hold Eshowe, to retreat and hold the line at the Tugela.[16]

Chelmsford believed that as 'there was only a force of some 50,000 Zulus between him [Pearson] and this place [Fort Pearson], ... he can force his way through if he desires to do so'.[17] However, Pearson held a meeting with his officers at which the majority at first favoured withdrawal, but after considering all the options and given the potential dangers of crossing open ground back to the Tugela, the decision was made to stay and to fortify Eshowe.[18] Reflecting on Pearson's decision at a distance in time, his inclusive but decisive leadership meant that work started immediately on defences, and Henry Norbury described in detail how the men '...set to work with alacrity to complete the earthworks; all out

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[12] Newspaper Archive of Wales, Aberystwyth, Letter from Tom Cullern to his father, *The South Wales Daily Telegraph*, 17 March 1879.
[13] Rothwell, *Narrative* p. 53.
[14] 'By one who was there', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, P.6.
[15] Rothwell, *Narrative,* p. 53.
[16] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade,* p. 134.
[17] T.N.A. WO 32/7713, Report from Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War.
[18] Howard Whitehouse, ed. *A Widow-Making War,* p. 90-91

baggage, boxes of biscuits, bags of *mealies* [sic], tents, tent bags filled with earth, and even articles of clothing, rolled up, were placed together to form temporary defences'.[19] He continues with a detailed report of the other defensive measures taken which were extensive. They consisted of major earthworks, destruction or alteration of existing buildings and the construction of smaller pits and impediments, all interlinked to construct a complete and in-depth defence network all round.[20]

Pearson had meanwhile decided, partly to make his rations stretch further, to reduce the number of personnel in the garrison by sending those who would not be directly and constantly involved with the defence back to the Tugela River bases. These movements were all completed by 30 January, at which point the garrison of Eshowe all moved within the defences; these were the people who were to remain under siege with Pearson until 3 April.[21] There were six companies of 'The Buffs', totalling 609 men. Four companies of the 99th totalling 380 men, and a Naval Brigade comprised of 174 men, besides these there was a 'staff' of seven, some Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery personnel, and some non-combatants. The total of personnel inside the defences was 1,594, of which approximately 1,200 were active soldiers. The three distinct fighting units remained under the immediate authority of their own commanders and were posted to specific sections of the perimeter which became their unit's responsibility and posting in an emergency.[22]

Pearson, a married man 45 years of age, was a very experienced officer who was no stranger to action and danger. His career had included duty during the Crimean War (1853-1856), and the Indian Revolt of 1857, and by the end of his career he had been mentioned in dispatches ten times.[23] Also, he was not an unknown quantity to at least two of the units under his command. He had commanded the 'Buffs' for a considerable time and then served as Staff Colonel in Natal until September 1878, retiring in November of the same year. As for the 99th, they were the first regiment that Pearson had joined, as a subaltern, when he entered the army in 1852.[24] His connection with the Naval Brigade from H.M.S Active was more tenuous, but on 8 November 1876, just over two years earlier, Pearson and the 2nd

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[19] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade,* p. 134.
[20] Whitehouse, *A Widow-Making War,* chap. 7.
[21] Rothwell, *Narrative,* p. 54.
[22] Whitehouse, *Widow-Making War,* chap. 7.
[23] "Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Pearson", 'OBITUARY', *The Times* (London, 4 October 1909), Obituaries, p.13.

Battalion, 3rd 'Buffs' were on their way to their South African deployment when the troop ship they were travelling on, the St Lawrence foundered on Paternoster Rocks, North of Cape Town; it was the 'Active,' which rescued Pearson and took him to Cape Town.[25]

The commander of the Royal Engineers detachment attached to the column was Captain Warren Wynne, and it fell to him to plan and construct defences for the base.[26] For this he needed a lot of manpower and he used whatever was available to help with the work. He recorded that 'Work on the Fort was in full swing, the Royal Engineers handling the complex tasks and supervising the manual labour of the infantry, sailors and NNC.'[27] The composition of the force was varied, depending on who was available, and Wynne gives details of the men employed and the hours worked for the 27 January as: No.2 Company Royal Engineers and Natal Native Pioneers for eight hours, and one company Buffs, 40 Naval Brigade and 250 Native Contingent for six hours. The same work load and lengthy number of hours was completed by the same men the next day, 28 January, when Wynne recorded working for nine and a half hours.[28] Later, as the urgency to construct defences became more pronounced, he wrote that 'I have about 300 men working daily under me…', and that he was, 'Up at 5am, and in bed at 8pm; I really am at work all day except during meals.'

Reflecting his thoughts and feelings, Wynne wrote home on 4 February including a good summary of the prevailing situation from a personal perspective:

> We may any day expect the whole Zulu force upon us, and cannot expect to be relieved for three or four weeks at least. We have about five week's rations which we are eking out, so as to last longer; and, with God's help I have no fear but that we shall hold out and withstand any number of the enemy, and that our doing so will be a very great advantage to future operations is undoubted. It has been a great strain and a source of immense anxiety to me to bear the responsibility of carrying out this large work under so many disadvantages - surrounded by quantities of bush, affording dangerous cover, all of which had to be cleared;

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24 "Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Pearson", 'OBITUARY', *The Times* (London, 4 October 1909), Obituaries, p. 13.
25 "'The Wreck of the St. Lawrence", *Bucks Herald*, 16 December 1876, edition 2341, p. 7.
26 Whitehouse, *A Widow-Making War*, p. 18. Note: Wynne was promoted Major in early April 1879 for his efforts in South Africa, a week before his death from fever on 9 April, which was his 36th Birthday.
27 Whitehouse, *A Widow-Making War*, p. 85.
28 Whitehouse, *A Widow-Making War*, p. 86,89.

> commanded on three sides by hills, and with the difficulties caused by the stoppages of work through frequent alarms of the supposed approach of the enemy. One's rest at night is interrupted nightly by these, and one has to rise and be under arms daily at 3.30 am. We are now on short rations; nevertheless, except for two days my health has been excellent...[29]

Wynne wrote very detailed letters home, and after his death at the end of the siege, his wife collated and privately published them in 1880. The book was then rediscovered and republished in 1995. Whilst of course the strictly personal comments apply only to Wynne, his more general comments could reasonably have applied to everybody in the garrison, who, no longer allowed tents, were encamped in makeshift accommodation on the ground underneath the waggons which formed part of the defensive perimeter.[30]

Then, on 7 February, a message arrived from Chelmsford ordering Pearson to withdraw half of his men to the Tugela and leave a smaller garrison in situ. This move never actually took place mainly because of the difficulty in messengers reaching either the Tugela from Eshowe or vice versa, owing to Zulu interception of them. There had been several successful exchanges about withdrawal or sending supplies or reinforcements to Eshowe, but as time passed the journey was now considered too dangerous and too unreliable. Pearson's last despatch on the matter said that he would sally out as instructed but wanted to be met by a supporting friendly force coming to meet him: the despatch failed to arrive, and the matter was not pursued.[31] During the remainder of February the work on making the defences continued, the men were now on half rations and the Zulus were seen, sometimes in quite large numbers in the surrounding area but made no attempt to launch an attack.[32] There was a thought that the groups of Zulus showing themselves might be trying to induce members of garrison to 'sally-out,' probably into an ambush, but Pearson was seen to be 'much too wise and cautious a commander to be caught in a trap of that sort'.[33] The men were very busy indeed, firstly with the defences but also in providing vedettes, patrols and

[29] Whitehouse, *A Widow-Making War*, p. 96.
[30] Rothwell, *Narrative*, p. 53.
[31] Rothwell, *Narrative*, p.55.
[32] Rothwell, *Narrative*, p. 55.
[33] 'By one who was there', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, p. 13.

with guarding the grazing animals; sometimes making small attacks on Zulus who had fired on the cattle-guard.[34]

The very real danger posed by the ever-present Zulu forces remained constant, whilst what can be described as a 'routine' had descended on the occupants of the fort. Morale was not notably high, or low, but motivation was clearly present judging by the sheer physical effort and energy spent in preparing defences. The source of that motivation may have been anything from discipline, through to simply having no choice, if a disastrous defeat were to be avoided, and doubtless the latter was the case with some individuals. However, there are no recorded cases of serious discontent, or of the threat of discipline being used; similarly, there are no records of sickness for depressive conditions, or those that could have potentially led to 'mental breakdown'.[35] This overall blend of different army regiments, together with sailors and marines was functioning as a unified and disciplined force under the overall command of Pearson, and this very strongly suggests the presence of secondary cohesion.

Fortunately, Pearson had left the units under his command alone as complete entities, and so whatever esprit de corps or cohesion they had, continued. Today it is known that doing so laid the basis for the development of secondary cohesion; from a more practical perspective, in 1870, work by Du Picq relating to the wisdom of keeping teams together for good morale had been published, whether Pearson was aware of that or not is not known, but it was the right thing to do.

Du Picq had written:

> A wise organisation insures [sic] that the personnel of combat groups changes [sic] as little as possible, so that comrades in peacetime maneuvres [sic] shall be comrades in war. From living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, above all unity.[36]

[34] Rothwell, *Narrative*, p. 56.
[35] Norbury, *The Naval Brigad*e, pp. 138–39.
[36] du Picq, *Battle Studies*, p. 96.

What Du Picq was describing amounted to esprit de corps, or, in modern terms, a practical expression of unit cohesion, before the theory was understood. It also underlines how important Pearson's decision to keep the units together was to the development of secondary cohesion.

The mixing of units and individuals started immediately after arrival, with the building of the defences at Eshowe. Wynne described the large number of men working under him as being made up of anybody who was not otherwise engaged; it was a mixture drawn from land and sea units, and they worked exceedingly long hours. Wynn's descriptions of the intensity of the work suggests a thorough mixing of all personnel, irrespective of unit of origin, and the whole group would have worked, rested, and eaten together before returning to their own units; and so, the socialisation had started. For some, friendships may have developed, others, working as an individual in a professional team towards group goals, were still likely to have developed a type of cohesion, known today as 'task related'.[37] Either way, the process of getting to know one-another was underway, and there was certainly no room for remaining alone. It is likely that these factors would have contributed to a developing sense of identity and cohesion for the whole garrison, which would have provided a sense of purpose, and of hope.

Pearson showed a concern for the welfare of the men by arranging a programme of entertainment for those within the garrison who were 'off duty.' But, albeit unknowingly, his actions also instituted a second step towards secondary cohesion. Chief Naval Medical officer, Henry F. Norbury, saw these activities and wrote:

> As much as possible was done to enliven the garrison: the bands of "the Buffs" and of the 99th played on alternate days, and for several evenings. Mr Robertson gave interesting lectures on history of the Zulus; we also had rubbers of whist in the afternoon, lawn tennis, quoits, and sometimes cricket.[38]

In addition to those arrangements, the stream which passed through the camp was widened, and a pool made within the confines of the garrison, so that the men could swim and bathe at appropriate times.[39] These arrangements were important as they allowed the

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[37] Stephen J. Zaccaro, 'Nonequivalent Associations Between Forms of Cohesiveness and Group-Related Outcomes: Evidence for Multidimensionality', *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 131.3 (1991), 387–99 (p. 388) .
[38] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade*, p. 141.

men to socialise not just in a work environment but also at a time when they could in theory, relax and talk and have an informal social interaction. Being able to meet others both 'at work' and 'at play' allowed the men the chance to get to know others not just in their official role but as a person.

The soldiers and sailors involved now had their original relationships within their own units, plus the secondary cohesion that was developing between them. Doubtless this helped to sustain them, because as February gave way to March, ill health, and disease, began to grow steadily. Norbury wrote that:

> a great deal of sickness began to be present in the fort, principally remittent fever and dysentery', in his opinion this was due in part to the unhealthy nature of the location, but also: '…the very heavy work which was required of the men under a broiling sun, when on a reduced scale of diet; the alterations of heat and cold with the thermometer standing one day at 97° and the next at 67° with fogs and rain: and lastly, exposure-men at their posts frequently lying in the mud the greater part of the night, with the rain pouring on them…[40]

Norbury's description of the conditions inside the camp paint a vivid picture of what the soldiers were undergoing, and it is hard to see how morale can have been particularly good at all. But the garrison continued to operate effectively, and as such is a good example of von Clausewitz's writing that the spirit of an army and its mood are separate emotions that are sometimes, but not always, related.[41] That could be seen on 1 March, when Pearson led a raid of 400 mixed troops, drawn from land and sea units, plus guns, seven miles to the Kraal of Dabulamanzi, the leader incidentally, of the attack on Rorke's Drift, before destroying it and returning safely to Eshowe; having had several skirmishes with Zulu forces along the way.[42] There were several of these offensive expeditions, and whatever the level of morale had been, the motivation was plain to see and the sorties would have had a positive effect on the garrison for several reasons. First and foremost, they clearly demonstrated to the Zulu forces that the members of the garrison were not, as it were 'victims; they were an active and cohesive fighting force with a high fighting spirit. They also

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[39] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade,* p. 140.
[40] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade,* p. 139.
[41] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976 [1832]), p. 147.
[42] Rothwell, *Narrative,* p. 56: Norbury, *The Naval Brigade,* p. 141.

showed that the amalgam of different units did work as a cohesive unit, and that Pearson was an effective and tactically sound leader. They also caused damage to the Zulus and would have increased spirit, and probably morale amongst the garrison troops.

As for morale, it was to receive a boost on the day following the raid on Dabulamanzi's Kraal, 2 March, when a bright spot occurred, literally and figuratively, for the men of the garrison with the realisation that lights seen flashing from the direction of the Tugela, were Morse Code signals sent by means of a Heliograph.[43] Making contact with friendly forces, to a team that had been '...shut up in a savage country without knowing what might be our future fate,' had a major impact on morale when '...at length it dawned on us that it was Tugela talking to us. Great was our joy!'[44] Continuing, the writer gives a rare insight into the mental state and mood of the garrison members before receiving the signals, and the effect that the signals had: 'Faces that had for long borne an anxious and desponding [sic] look, assumed a more hopeful aspect; new energy, new life, seemed to be instilled in us, as we found all was not over'...'we had friends still at Tugela who would come to our aid.'[45]

There was another cheering element in the opening of communications with the Tugela River, and that was that it re-established the third tier of connection for the individual units: their institutional bonding, or that between the primary and secondary units and their ultimate authority, in this case the Army and the Navy, although the heliograph contact could, of course, only be used when weather conditions were favourable. But even with interruptions, it was important not only because local information could be exchanged, but it also allowed contact with Chelmsford's headquarters by means of the telegraph at Fort Pearson. Life in the garrison continued as it had previously whilst working towards being relieved, with the only upset being a false alarm of a relief being mounted in mid-March that did not go ahead.[46] The conditions continued to worsen, rations were once again reduced in quantity and quality, and sickness markedly increased, with the next high point being the arrival of the first runner for many weeks, with a message informing Pearson that the relief column would start on 29 March, presaging the relief of the garrison on 3 April.[47]

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[43] Whitehouse, (ed.) *A Widow-Making War*, p. 126.
[44] 'By one who was there', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, p. 16.
[45] 'By one who was there', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, p. 16.
[46] Norbury, *The Naval Brigade*, pp. 142-143.
[47] Rothwell, *Narrative*, p. 57.

The contact with the Tugela had injected a sense of hope into the men, and that in turn had boosted the levels of morale and motivation in them. The presence of anxiety, and of some aspects of depression, are evident in the above account and are to be expected, but they never reached a level depressive enough to interfere with day-to-day duty during the length of the siege, no matter how difficult things became.[48] The first month or so had been difficult indeed, and the second month was just as wretched in terms of physical conditions, illness, and danger, but had an element of hope brought by the heliograph contact, which may have lifted morale to some extent. However, at no point during the entire process was motivation and the ability to operate as an effective team compromised.

Another factor affecting morale and motivation in a unit is of course, leadership, and Pearson's actions did, to quite some extent, reflect what is today considered as good practice in a leader, and it is more than likely that he had a positive effect on unit cohesion. For example, in the meeting held to decide whether to return to the Tugela, Pearson listened to the arguments and weighed them up before going against the majority and making a command decision to stay. From a modern perspective, that showed that he was 'able to effectively put into use both personal and legitimate power', a quite formal description of a desirable quality in a leader.[49] However, in simpler terms, it means that, not only was Pearson, as an individual, willing to seek a collaborative and agreed course of action, but when it came to a decision, he did not hesitate to use his military authority to make what he considered to be the best tactical choice. Pearson's later actions also give the impression of an individual who was a member, as well as the leader of a team, by sharing in the work and dangers. For example, he personally led the raids on local Kraals which were operations involving personal risk. Especially important was his leadership of the raid on Dabulamanzi's Kraal, a large and well-defended target seven miles distant from Eshowe, during which the column was fired on by Zulus occupying the bush through which the path went.[50] Those actions, leading from the front, as well as 'sharing dangers and hardships' were very likely to have enhanced Pearson's reputations with the troops, and when all is taken together, would have shown him to have had 'consistent competency' as a leader, in the terms of modern theory.[51]

[48]Beck, Emery, and Greenberg, *Anxiety Disorders and Phobias,* pp. 103–5.
[49] MacIntyre, *Military Leadership,* p. 66.
[50] Rothwell, *Narrative,* p. 56.

Pearson's achievement of maintaining an operational and disciplined base operating for two months or so whilst under siege, cannot be described as a victory in the same way as, say, Rorke's Drift was. After all, it needed Chelmsford's rescue column to end the siege. Yet it was a victory in the sense that the garrison remained united and survived for an extended period to fight another day. The evidence shows that Pearson was a good military leader, using sound planning and established chains of command, already part of the individual units, to communicate with the troops under his command. He seems to have been generally approved of, and the relationship that Pearson had with the men suggests that he unknowingly provided the vertical cohesion that led to an overall sense of unit cohesion. This chapter argued that a type of unit cohesion formed at Eshowe as the result of a combination of lateral and vertical cohesion under the hands of a capable leader. It has demonstrated that unit cohesion did develop and that the type of leadership and the evolution of events during the siege lent themselves to that development before the advent of theory. Given that leadership is so important in the generation of motivation and cohesion, the next chapter will look at the function of leadership and its effect on performance, at the battles of the Intombe river and Gingindlovu. The engagement at the Intombe river was the last battle in what can be considered the first phase of the campaign, with the battle at Gingindlovu being the first battle of the second invasion, by which time many fresh troops had arrived in the relief force.

[51] MacIntyre, *Military Leadership*, p. 66.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

Morale, Motivation and Leadership at the Battles of the Intombe River, and Gingindlovu.

This chapter will start by examining the circumstances surrounding the events at the Intombe River on 12 March 1879 when a British camp was overrun by a Zulu army and seventy or so British soldiers were killed. As with Eshowe, not a great deal of attention is paid to this battle in books about the Zulu War, with much more attention being paid to the well-known conflicts at Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. For instance, Barthorp's *The Zulu War* devotes four pages out of 171 to the battle at the Intombe River; Greaves and Mkhize devote three pages out of 208 in *Zulus at War* to the subject, and Saul David, in *Zulu* uses just five pages out of 391.[1] In terms of understanding what went right and what went wrong in the Zulu War, the battle on the Intombe river, described by Ashe And Wyatt-Edgell (1880) as '...though less in magnitude, is in many points similar to the Isandhlwana [sic] disaster', deserves to be better understood.[2] If only because Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell were right about the similarities: on both occasions the army were completely unprepared, despite being in an active theatre; both involved very heavy losses of men and material, and both revealed serious faults in leadership. On the face of it, nothing appeared to have been learned from Isandlwana, and so it is important to understand what effect, if any, the loss of the battle and the reaction of the public and the army had on Chelmsford's future planning and actions.

The chapter will then move to the next engagement, about three weeks later at Gingindlovu, and attention will be paid to the thoroughness of preparations in terms of manpower, kit and equipment, defences, and overall planning. The actions of leaders, at the outset, and as events unfolded, will be followed to show how seriously they were taking the threat posed by the Zulus, as compared to the case prior to the battle on the Intombe river. Because of the importance of leadership to morale and motivation in campaigns, any

[1] Michael Barthorp, *The Zulu War , A Pictorial History*, Book Club Edition (London: Guild Publishing, 1985); Adrian Greaves and Xolani Mkhize, *The Zulus at War: The History, Rise, and Fall of the Tribe That Washed Its Spears*, Reprint edition (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2014); Saul David, *Zulu. The Heroism and Tragedy of the Zulu War of 1879* (London: Penguin, 2004).

[2] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, p. 103.

practical changes or improvements made by leaders because of the defeat at the Intombi river, would likely have been reflected in improved morale and motivation amongst the troops, and so those levels will be noted. This chapter is balanced more towards the Intombe river battle than the fight at Gingindlovu, and that reflects the quite different levels of controversy attached to the events. This chapter will argue that the disaster at the Intombe river was due to failures in leadership and that extensive measures were taken, by leaders, to ensure that the engagement at Gingindlovu did not suffer the same fate. That said, the examination of facts and decisions from a far-off battle, such as the Intombe river is solely in the pursuit of understanding; there is no intention whatsoever of judging any individual or their actions.

Firstly, it is useful to note the various spellings used when addressing these battles. The site of the action on the Intombe River is sometimes just written as the battle of 'Intombe' or, in a different spelling, 'Ntombe'. But for the purposes of this chapter, the spelling used will be as in the title: the battle of the Intombe River. Similarly, the location at Gingindlovu is subject to many different spellings throughout the historiography, including Gingilovu and Ngingindhlovu; but for consistency, the spelling 'Gingindlovu' will be used in this chapter.[3] Where original comments or quotes use different spellings though, the original will be used.

On the evening of 11 March 1879, a wagon train, pulled by oxen was stopped and camped for the night at the Intombe river. The convoy had left Derby, 38 miles north of the river, heading for Luneberg, four miles south of the river, several days before, and had suffered considerable difficulty making progress in continuous heavy rain; the going was extremely muddy and soft and the cumbersome wagons were prone to becoming stuck. Some of the wagons had been man-handled across the swollen river, but now it was running in full spate and it was no longer possible to get wagons across. That left the majority on the north side, and they were formed into a makeshift laager for the coming night, whilst awaiting an opportunity to cross the river.[4]

The convoy was under the command of Captain Moriarty of the 80th Regiment of Foot, assisted by his Subaltern, Lieutenant H. Harward, and 105 other ranks. Harward and 35 of

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[3] Norris-Newman, p. 149; Colenso, p. viii.
[4] M.B. Savage, *'Intombi River Drift, March 1879: A Contemporary Letter Written by Major Charles Tucker.'*, *Society for Army Historical Research*, 1944, p. 183.

the men were on the south side, with the wagons that had been able to cross, leaving Moriarty and 70 men in the laager on the north bank, the men were exhausted and had been wet for several days. Major Charles Tucker, the Officer-in-Command of the base at Luneberg, was with Moriarty and the disjointed convoy on 11 March, and he recorded his critical thoughts about the viability of the defensive laager on the north bank, in a letter home written on 19 March 1879:

> I didn't at all like the construction, first because the base did not quite rest upon the river, and secondly, the desselbooms (poles) [original parenthesis] of the wagons were not run under one another or outside the wagon in front of it, as I have always laagered my wagons, but the desselbooms were tied to the back of the wagon in front, and up against the desselbooms were placed bags of mealies, thus leaving a gap about two to three feet high between the wagons. I cannot consider this any protection whatever in the event of the Zulus attacking in numbers as they are sure to do; they can very easily pull themselves over this.[5]

He also noted that the cargo of ammunition carried by the convoy was placed in the centre of the laager amongst all the cattle in such a way as to be inaccessible if needed urgently. However, he then went on to show an understanding of how the less than perfect defences had come about, in comments that effectively exonerated Moriarty from any responsibility for what followed.

> ...but there is every excuse for the laager not being properly constructed. He [Moriarty] was short of oxen and in the fearful weather he had experienced it was almost impossible for the men to have placed them properly, and when they made the laager the water was up to its base, which under ordinary circumstances would have been a very good defence.[6]

Whether or not Tucker discussed this matter with Moriarty, especially given his comment about the Zulus 'attacking in numbers; as they are sure to do', is not recorded. Tucker returned to Luneberg and night fell. Harward was with thirty or so men with two or three

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[5] Savage, Intombe River Drift, p. 183. Note: Regarding Tucker's last sentence, it is not possible to know whether he actually expected the Zulus to attack or was just referring to their habit of using 'large numbers' in an attack.
[6] Savage, *Intombe River Drift*, p. 183.

wagons on the south, Luneberg, side of the river, and the other seventy or so men were on the north side with Moriarty in the improvised laager.

Tucker's account of the night gleaned from Harward and others immediately after the event says that Moriarty had two sentries on lookout, about fifteen or twenty yards away from his tent. The vision of the sentries was restricted to about fifty yards owing to the lay of the land and the prevailing rainy and misty weather. Then, at 03.30 or thereabouts a shot was heard in the distance, Tucker went on: 'The alarm was given and the men turned out; but Moriarty, thinking it was nothing, told the men to turn in again, but cautioned the sentries to be on alert'.[7] As for morale and motivation, there is no specific mention of the mood amongst the troops, but given the physical circumstances it is fair to say that they may well have lowered the mood. As to motivation, they were a disciplined group obeying orders and did not really have much choice: but there is no mention of fear of attack, until, that is, the 03.30 alert. Again though, there is no specific mention of anxiety afterwards: that the men returned to their rest certainly does not betray any concept of imminent danger.

Harward's account is broadly similar to Tucker's, but given that he was on the opposite bank he cannot have known of Moriarty's actions following the alarm at the time, and so does not mention them; he wrote that:

> Being awake during the night I heard a shot fired in the distance. I got up and ordered the sentry to rouse the detachment on the side of the Intombe Drift nearest Luneberg, and to apprise Captain Moriarty, and ask for his orders; these were that the escort should remain under arms. I afterwards found out that this shot was fired about 4 A.M.[8]

He describes waiting in his tent until, after about an hour had passed, he heard a shout of 'Guard, turn out!' and then goes on to describe seeing the camp opposite being overrun whilst his men kept-up a fire on the attacking Zulus. They also tried to cover the few surviving soldiers who, having leaped into the river, were being pursued across to the south bank, where hand-to-hand fighting was taking place. He wrote that, 'I endeavoured to rally my men, but they were too much scattered, and finding re formation [sic] impossible, I

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[7] Savage, *Intombe River Drift*, p. 183.
[8] H.H. Harward, 'Luneberg, March 12, 1879', *Second Supplement to The London Gazette*, No. 24712, pp. 2929–30.

mounted my horse and galloped into Luneberg at utmost speed and reported all that had taken place.'[9]

In a letter home, Sergeant Anthony Booth of the 80th. who was working under Harward, wrote an account of his experiences during events on the Intombe river, which tallies with Harward's account in all practical respects, up to the point where Harward rode off to Luneberg leaving Booth in command of the remaining troops. Booth, wrote that he had been aware that the camp was but a short distance from the base of a notorious Zulu ally, Mbelini and his estimated 4,000 warriors, and so an attack may not have been entirely unexpected.[10] In fact wagon drivers attached to the convoy had reported on 11 March, that 'Umbelini's people were gathering in the neighbourhood' which might also explain Tucker's comment about the Zulus 'attacking in numbers' when he was examining the defences.[11]

Booth was clearly not aware of Harward's intention to ride to Luneberg until it happened, and his record of it in a letter home is very pragmatic: he simply wrote 'I commanded the party on this side as *Lieut.*[sic] Harward saddled his horse and galloped away, leaving us to do the best we could.'[12] Booth's party continued to support the men trying to escape the Zulus by swimming across the river. But the Zulus were now swimming across as well, chasing the soldiers, and hand-to-hand fighting was increasing on the bank; the situation was deteriorating, and it was time to withdraw. Du Picq, had written about just such a situation, saying that: 'if a withdrawal is forced, the army is discouraged and takes flight', and as the chances of success against the overwhelming Zulu numbers faded, flight must have been a distinct possibility.[13] Given the overwhelming numbers of Zulus, on both sides of the river, straightforward flight, simply running away, would almost certainly have ended in the pursuit and death of the fugitive. But Booth and his troops stood firm as a disciplined presence and offered those men falling-back a more orderly route from the river back towards Luneberg.

The main reason there was not a rout at that point, was Booth's leadership. He represented a fixed and known presence to the troops amid chaos and he was clear and in

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[9] Harwood, *Second Supplement to The London Gazette*, p. 2929.
[10] Anthony Booth, 'Letter from Sergeant Booth' (Luneberg, 14 March1879), The Staffordshire Regimental Museum, Lichfield, Bay 6. Shelf 2. Archive Box 5. File 4.
[11] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *The Story of the Zulu Campaign*, p. 104.
[12] Anthony Booth, 'Letter from Sergeant Booth'
[13] du Picq, *Battle Studies*, p. 118.

command and had a coherent plan. In fact, Booth was the only leader left operating out of the whole unit, since Harward's departure. Clearly a brave man, how he maintained his own composure is not known, but his description of events in his letter home is entirely rational and unemotional, giving the impression of a disciplined man applying himself to doing his duty and remaining in control of himself. It is likely that Booth's presence and actions brought discipline to bear on the wider situation just when it was needed, and the following two quotations from Montgomery support that assertion in principle: firstly 'Discipline helps men to display fortitude in the face of fatigue and discomfort, while at the same time it helps them to conquer fear', and, secondly, 'Discipline implies a conception of duty'.[14]

The men and Booth would have known each other, and obeying orders and directions from him would have been routine and an expression of duty and discipline. Part of the reason for this would have been training and repetitious drills, and Montgomery, further to his earlier comments, had written that he felt training played a big part in the learning process.[15] Making the point more recently, Grossman, wrote, 'Today we understand the enormous power of drill to condition and program [sic] a soldier...'[16] Underlining that point, J. Glenn Gray wrote in 1959 that '...while soldiers may become exhausted and enter into a dazed condition in which all sharpness of consciousness is lost, they can still function like cells in a military organism doing what is expected of them because it has become automatic'.[17] Booth being in command was, without doubt, critical to the outcome.

Booth's group numbered about eight men and was the only effective force still resisting.[18] Whilst they remained on the south bank of the river they sent stragglers and survivors towards Luneberg until the last of the swimming survivors reach the bank; then realising that more Zulus were crossing up river and trying to outflank him, Booth ordered a fighting retreat.[19] By the time they reached Luneberg, the group had swelled to about thirty according to Lieutenant Daubeney of the 80th, who saw them arrive along with various stragglers.[20] The reason for the increase in numbers was individual stragglers joining the retreating group as it progressed; and Josiah Sussons of No. 1 Company, Transvaal Rifle

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[14] Montgomery of Alamein, *Morale in Battle: Analysis* (Germany: British Army of the Rhine, 1946), p. 14.
[15] Montgomery of Alamein, *Morale in Battle*, pp. 12–15.
[16] Grossman, *On Killing*, p. 17.
[17] J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors* (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1970 [1959]), p. 103.
[18] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *The Zulu Campaign*, p.106.
[19] Rothwell, *Field Operations*, pp. 70–71.

Volunteers, one of the very few who escaped the attack on the Derby side of the river, describes catching-up with Booth whilst being chased:

> Getting further on I fell in with Sergeant Booth and about a dozen men who were keeping up a retreating fire, and fighting very pluckily. I rested for a few minutes with them, during which time I espied the Zulus coming round the hill to intercept us. I informed Sergeant Booth of this and he kept up a steady fire on them, and made the enemy retire back into the hills. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Sergeant Booth on this occasion; he fought most pluckily, and lost four of his small band here.[21]

The band of four men who ran and were subsequently caught and killed by the Zulus are most likely the same band mentioned by Tucker in his letter home from Luneberg: the incident certainly emphasises the effectiveness of Booth's defence.[22] Later, in February 1880, Booth was awarded the Victoria Cross for his part in this action.[23]

There was a Court of Enquiry into the affair, and on 31 March, Colonel William Bellairs', who was on Chelmsford's staff, sent a report to the Secretary of State for War in which he described the findings of the enquiry, and Colonel Wood's covering report. Bellairs' despatch said that: 'This disaster resulted from a complete neglect of the orders specially drawn up and promulgated with a view of preventing the possibility of such a surprise'.[24] The responsibility thus lay with the officer in command of the wagon convoy, Captain David Moriarty, but he of course, had paid the price, as he had lost his life early in the attack.

Harward's decision to leave the group fighting on the Intombe river led to him appearing before a Court Martial at Pietermaritzburg on 20 February 1880, with Colonel Alexander of the King's Dragoon Guards as president of the court. There were two charges preferred against Harward, 'misbehaviour before the enemy' relating to his riding away and, 'conduct to the prejudice of good conduct and military discipline' which revolved around not taking the necessary precautions for the safety of his men.[25] Harward refuted allegations of

[20] Lieutenant Daubeney, 'The Zulu War', *Wilts and Gloucestershire Standard* (Gloucester, 26 April 1879), edition 2194, section News, p. 2.
[21] Wilmot, *History of the Zulu War*, pp. 102–4.
[22] Savage, *Intombe River Drift*, p. 184.
[23] 'War Office, February 23, 1880', *The London Gazette*, No. 24814, p. 832.
[24] T.N.A. W.O.32/7723. Colonel Bellairs' report to the Secretary of State for War.

misbehaviour and instead 'rather claimed credit for having acted with good judgement and for the interests of the party'. He said that he had believed his to be the only available horse and that he did not think anyone else could ride, and that he had given a command to 'one of the men' to fall back on the mission station some 400 yards distant, and that he was going to Luneberg for reinforcements.[26]

Apart from there being no mention of Harward's intention to leave the Intombe river battle in Booth's letter home, there is also no mention that any orders or instructions were received from him.[27] Whilst Booth did appear at the Court Martial, there is no recorded comment regarding Harward's departure by him and his only comments were to say that he:

> ...did not think that if Lieutenant Harward had remained more effectual help would have been given to those on the Luneberg side or those escaping from the Derby side, or that the retreat would have been more orderly or soldier-like. He could not say if his [Harward's] departure influenced the men in leaving.[28]

Obviously, Booth never received Harward's instruction but with the melee on the riverbank there was a chance that a spoken word or order may have been lost, and no evidence of it remains. Finally, the Court Martial acquitted Harward of both charges, but that did not represent a closure of the issue for him.

Chelmsford found himself unable to confirm the findings of the Court Martial when the papers were sent to him because in acquitting Harward of 'misbehaviour' when he rode away from his unit, they had also cleared him of any element of cowardice attached to that act.[29] Chelmsford was concerned that approving the court's decisions could be taken to mean a tacit acceptance: '...that a regimental officer who is the only officer present with a party of soldiers actively and seriously engaged with the enemy can, under any pretext whatever, be justified in deserting them, and by so doing abandoning them to their fate...'[30] Chelmsford wrote a minute to the court result

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[25] 'The Court-Martial on Lieutenant Harward', *Naval and Military Gazette*, 28 April 1880, edition 2471, section, news, p. 335.
[26] Court Martial on Lieutenant Harward
[27] Anthony Booth, 'Letter from Sergeant Booth' (Luneberg, 14 March1879), The Staffordshire Regimental Museum, Lichfield, Bay 6. Shelf 2. Archive Box 5. File 4.
[28] *Naval and Military Gazette*, p. 335.
[29] Rothwell, *Field Operations*, p. 71.

simply saying 'Disapproved and not confirmed. Lieutenant . . . . [sic] to be released from arrest and to return to his duty'.[31]

Chelmsford wrote a lot more by way of explanation, and his main thrust revolved around the traditions of the army and the trust that developed between officers and their men; to the modern eye, a point of view with obvious connections to morale and motivation, particularly as regards the generation of vertical cohesion. At Horse Guards, His Royal Highness, The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, The Duke of Cambridge, wholeheartedly approved of and supported Chelmsford's actions and rationale, saying, amongst other things, '…I feel it necessary to mark officially my emphatic dissent from the theory upon which the verdict has been founded'.[32] His comments supported and actually amplified those of Chelmsford, and on 13 May 1880 a special General Order, G.O.70, was issued in which the issues surrounding Harward's acquittal and Chelmsford's actions were described, and it was ordered that: 'This General Order will be, by his Royal Highness's command, read at the head of every regiment in Her Majesty's service.[33] Harward resigned his commission on 11 May 1880.

It was not just the Court Martial that caused difficulties after the affair on the Intombe river. The court of public opinion was unhappy with the way events had unfolded and was critical of both the leadership of the British army, and the conduct of the campaign against the Zulu army in general. The tactical shortcomings that had led, or at least contributed, to the defeat on the Intombe river were widely known, the details having been learned from survivors according to Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell.[34] The camp was only four miles from the stronghold of Mbelini, an ally of Cetshwayo, who had 'of late, given much trouble', and so Moriarty was under orders to 'neglect no precaution' and above all, to 'laager his waggons and keep an incessant and vigilant look-out'.[35] In the event though, survivors described the waggons as being 'parked, but in a somewhat loose and careless fashion', that, 'no earthworks were thrown up around the camp', and that:

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[30] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign,* pp. 107–9.
[31] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign,* p. 108.
[32] Rothwell, *Field Operations,* p. 71.
[33] Rothwell, *Field Operations,* pp.70–71.
[34] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign,* p. 104.
[35] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign,* p. 104.

> On the 11th it was reported by the native waggon-drivers that Umbelini's [sic] people were gathering in the neighbourhood. The camp was pitched in a most dangerous position, with its face towards some high ground, covered here and there with dense bush while its rear was resting on the swollen river ... No particular precautions appear to have been taken, with the exception of a sentry being posted about fifteen paces from the front of the camp on the Derby side. When first warned by the drivers, Moriarty ordered the men to stand to their arms, but only for a short time. On the morning of the 12th, at four o'clock a shot was heard from the unfortunate sentry, who had barely time to call "Guard, turn out!" when dense masses of the savages were seen not more than 200 yards from the camp.[36]

In a short and somewhat pointed summary, Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell concluded by saying that 'The camp was evidently wrongly placed and was clearly taken by surprise'.[37]

British newspapers of the time received their news from South Africa from a common source, sometimes referred to as 'The Natal correspondent of the Cape Argus,' at other times, less specifically, but still always a 'correspondent' at 'The Cape' and no author's name is appended. For the purposes of the Intombe incident they will be treated as the same source as the content is the same, verbatim. That meant that a variety of newspapers published the very same report across the United Kingdom and around the world; more often than not attributed to a 'Cape Correspondent' and the following report on the Intombe disaster, is an example of that practice:

> Great consternation exists among military men, and on Lord Chelmsford, for whom a great deal of personal sympathy is manifested, the effect has been particularly marked. From the little that has been so far gathered of the circumstances, it appears only too clear that the disaster is the result of more blundering, a contempt of the enemy, and ignorance of his whereabouts, and a neglect of the most ordinary precautions. It is regarded here as a most singular coincidence that this fresh catastrophe should have occurred on the day of humiliation; and amongst all classes it is regarded in the light of retributive

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[36] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign*, pp. 104–5.
[37] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign* p. 106.'

justice to which we were laid open by the scornful reception which Cetswayo's recent overtures for peace were subjected...[38]

The opinion peace in the London newspaper *The Examiner* was, whilst taking care to be respectful of those who had died, excoriating in its criticism of the management of the column and the camp on the Intombe river. It contended, amongst other things, that 'The men on the further and more exposed side, went to sleep in their waggons - not laagered behind them – and chose for their repose a hollow place surrounded with high grass, so that it was impossible keep any look – out for the enemy'.[39] Further on, the heavy criticism became sarcastic in its nature with this, 'Umbeline [sic] would have deserved to be assegaied by his own men if he had not taken advantage of these astounding tactics.[40]

The criticism was not restricted just to the column and its commander, but goes on to blame the overall army leadership, clearly meaning Chelmsford as well by saying that, '...nothing is so contagious as military misconduct in high places. The incomprehensible weakness of the head in South Africa would seem to have paralysed or to have infected the members and Heaven only knows what further bad results may come from the process.[41] The editorial links Intombe with Isandula [sic] and illuistrates the level of public dissatisfaction by writing that any more repetitions of such tragic events would likely lead to serious consequences for the government.[42] The mood of the press and the public was clear, and there was a desire for a change of leadership at the top. Finally, the historical writer of 'popular' books James Grant, reflected the mood of the time when, in 1884, he wrote of the Intombe affair: 'meanwhile, Colour-Sergeant Booth, [sic] of the 80th, did what Harward should have done. He rallied the few men who survived on the south bank of the river and covered the retreat of fifty soldiers and others.[43]

It is reasonable to accept that the South African and British newspapers were reflecting the view of a significant proportion of their respective readerships; and the mood was one of

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[38] "The Disaster on the Intombe River," *London Daily News* (London, 18 April 1879), edition 10,295, p. 5; "The Zulu War", *Sunderland Daily Echo* (Sunderland, 19 April 1879), edition 1741, p. 3; "The Natal Correspondent of the Cape Argus", *The Lichfield Mercury*, (Lichfield, 25 April 1879), edition 83, p. 2.
[39] 'Blundering Again', *The Examiner*, London, No. 3715, 12 April 1879 p. 453
[40] 'Blundering Again', *The Examiner*, p. 453.
[41] 'Blundering Again', *The Examiner*, p. 454.
[42] 'Blundering Again', *The Examiner*, p. 454.
[43] James Grant, *British Battles on Land and Sea*, vol. 4 (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1894), p. 244.

low confidence in, and low expectations of the British army, their mission, and their leadership. If this were duplicated in the military, it would be described as low morale and motivation, and it *was* also to be found in the army. After the war, in 1880, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Harness of the 5th Brigade Royal Artillery, wrote what amounted to a hagiography relating to Chelmsford; in it, apart from defending Chelmsford's actions, he links the defeats at Isandlwana and Intombe and describes the mood of the men following those events.

> There is no doubt that the natural feeling of both officers and men, after Isandlwana, was one of caution; there also prevailed a feeling of determination that on no occasion should they be found unprepared. Those feelings were strengthened by the disaster which befel [sic] a company of the 80th Regiment near the Intombi [sic] River; and the reinforcements on their arrival from England, found the troops they had been sent out to assist, and with whom they were to work side by side, strongly under the influence of these feelings, which were probably at first regarded as extreme, and exaggerated by the new comers, but which were certainly very generally shared by them eventually...[44]

What Harness failed to note was that the low mood amongst the troops was a direct result of the events at Isandlwana and the Intombe River, for which Chelmsford himself, as commander-in-chief was largely blamed; or the consequences of that low mood and confidence as it spread to the relieving troops. Comments in the 'Opinion in the Weekly Reviews' section of the *Pall Mall Gazette* are quite damning in respect of Chelmsford's performance and capabilities, referring to him as a 'well-meaning blunderer' and saying that he was 'placed in a position to which he was unequal' and was 'by nature unadapted to independent command'.[45] The overall sense of the comments was that Chelmsford was a capable commander up to a level, but not as commander-in-chief and that he should be replaced. Chelmsford was aware of the criticism of the press, having said in a report dated 2 March 1879 referring to Isandlwana, that 'a portion' of the colonial press believed him to be

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[44] Lt. Col. Arthur Harness, "The Zulu Campaign. From a Military Point of View", *Fraser's Magazine,* April 1880, Vol.21, Issue 604, pp. 477-488.
[45] 'Lord Chelmsford's Despatch', *Pall Mall Gazette* (London, 8 March 1879), edition, 4382 section, Opinion in the Weekly Reviews, p. 3.

responsible for the loss of the camp; he also said that he would decline to comment on those comments.[46]

But Chelmsford was not an unemotional man, nor proof against depression or anxiety as was made clear in a message to the Secretary of State for War dated 9 February 1879. In the message, as well as requesting that an officer of the rank of Major General be sent out to Zululand to help and support him, he referred to the 'effects of mental and physical exertion' and said that 'what I felt then I feel still more now'.[47] A fair assumption would be that he was feeling overstretched and stressed, yet there was no more mention of that, and Chelmsford kept his own counsel until the end of the war when he vigorously defended his actions.

There is no doubt that the battles at Isandlwana and Intombe were generators of low morale and motivation in both the army and the population at large. The issue with the military would ideally need to be addressed before the campaign continued, as for the public mood, distant from the close company of soldiers, and not subject to discipline, it is likely that considerable change and success would need to be seen before any significant improvement was seen. There is nothing in the literature that indicates that Chelmsford acknowledged the situation, or of any ideas or plans for improving things regarding morale and motivation, but what was definitely not needed was another major defeat that could be laid at his door. This chapter will now look at the preparations for, and the process of the battle at Gingindlovu, which was the next major clash between the British army and the Zulus and will argue that Chelmsford had indeed understood the mood and was going to take the opportunity to ensure a successful mission.

The reinforcements requested by Chelmsford after Isandlwana had been steadily arriving, and by 20 March he considered that he had enough to undertake the relief of Eshowe.[48] In a potential sign of change, Chelmsford had decided to take personal command of the column, which was assembling on the Lower Tugela near Fort Pearson, and assumed command on the 23 March, with the column commencing its mission on 29 March.[49] He said that his reason for taking command was that there was no other senior officer available because those sent from England in response to his requests had not arrived.[50] But from the start,

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[46] T.N.A. W.O. 32/7713. Lord Chelmsford message to secretary of State for War.
[47] T.N.A. W.O. 32/7709. Lord Chelmsford message to Secretary of State for War.
[48] Rothwell, *Field Operations*, p. 63.
[49] Rothwell, *Field Operations*, p. 63.

Chelmsford can be seen to have taken his leadership role seriously, and this was certainly a chance to show what he could do. His thoroughness was remembered by Captain Edward Hutton of the 3/60th Rifles who recalled arriving with his regiment on the Tugela on 27 March and being briefed by Chelmsford upon their arrival:

> On the afternoon of our arrival Lord Chelmsford told us to forget the drill to which we had become accustomed, and to adhere strictly to solid formations such as square and echelon movements; the enemy was to be treated as cavalry. The impression left upon our minds was that the Zulus were very formidable foes, and we soon found that this unfortunate sentiment prevailed on all sides, and that hesitation and vacillation were the natural result. Our men, especially the young soldiers, were not slow to share the general feeling of uneasiness which the disasters at Isandhlwana [sic] and elsewhere had caused.[51]

Hutton's comments show two things, firstly that Chelmsford was taking a 'hands-on' approach to command and did understand the level of threat posed by the Zulus and wanted others to know; secondly and very clearly, they show the negative effect that the Zulu victories had had on morale.

On the morning of 30 March, the column set forth, it was a formidable force, consisting of about 3,390 white troops, which were a mixture of land, and sea forces, and about 2,280 of the 4th and 5th Battalions of the Natal Native Contingent: they took with them two x nine pounder guns, four x 24 pounder rocket tubes and two Gatling guns.[52] The first day's march ended at the Inyoni river, where, '…not unmindful of the neglect which had proved so disastrous at Isandwhlana [sic], a proper *laager* was formed and entrenched.[53] Adding to that, Frances Ellen Colenso, also commented about the camps that were made on the journey to Gingindlovu, by saying, '*Now,* [original emphasis] profiting by bitter experience, every precaution was taken, and an entrenched waggon-laager formed before nightfall at each halting-place.'[54] Both her quote and that of Norris-Newman taken together, convey a deeply negative judgement of the way the campaign had been conducted thus far, although

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[50] T.N.A. WO 32/7722. Message from Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War; WO.7732. Chelmsford request for Field Officers.
[51] Edward Hutton, 'Some Recollections of the Zulu War, Extracted from the Unpublished Reminiscences of the Late Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hutton', *The Army Quarterly*, No. XVI, 1928, pp. 65–80.
[52] Rothwell, *Field Operations*, p. 63.
[53] Norris-Newman, *In Zululand*, p. 149.

it is fair to say that they were not strictly neutral observers: Colenso had never supported the invasion.[55]

The sense of caution being exercised by the column in its setting-up of properly defended camps was also apparent whilst on the march, and Norris-Newman described the measures taken, which included the crossing of rivers in order of battle, together with steps being taken to ensure that the wagons were kept closed-up together and did not straggle.[56] The campsite at Gingindlovu was reached just after noon on 1 April, and fortified to a very high standard; a detailed plan was instituted for the physical defences as well as for the troops regarding their postings and duties, and Chelmsford was alert and active during the night:

> At two a.m. Lord Chelmsford, with two of his personal staff, went quietly round. This tour of inspection lasted till three o'clock, as here and there trifling details had to be changed and plans to be explained to the various officers who held the most important points of defence and danger.[57]

The next morning, 2 April, at about 06.00 a large Zulu force, estimated at up to 11,000 warriors launched an attack on the camp and a very fierce fight ensued, until about 07.30 when the Zulus withdrew, thoroughly defeated; they were chased by mounted troops who slew a great many of them during the retreat.[58] As for Chelmsford's role during the fighting, Alexander Wilmot wrote that, 'During the action, Lord Chelmsford went round the trenches, encouraging the men, and telling them to fire steadily and low. The general himself was not mounted but, the members of his staff were.'[59] Later in the day, Chelmsford was able to lead a force forward to link-up with Pearson, and so to end the siege of Eshowe.

This chapter has shown that, in the period following the battle at Intombe river there was widespread dissatisfaction with the conduct and management of the Anglo-Zulu campaign. Coming, as it did, in the wake of the Isandlwana disaster, and being similar to it, the Intombe incident had shown serious shortcomings in management and leadership; as well as a lack of ability to take the Zulu threat seriously, or to show any ability to evolve to meet it. The

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[54] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War*, p. 382.
[55] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War*, pp. 1–7, 488–91.
[56] Norris-Newman, *In Zululand*, pp. 150–52.
[57] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign*, p. 164.
[58] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign*, pp. 166–71.
[59] Wilmot, *History of the Zulu War*, p. 110.

comments in the press and by individuals all show negative perceptions of how the war was being prosecuted, and the lack of confidence in Chelmsford's leadership, was noticeably clear, and had spread to some of the British troops themselves.

Although not outwardly acknowledging that opinion, Chelmsford's close personal approach to the relief of Eshowe and his management of all aspects of preparation and performance shows an intention to put matters right, take the enemy seriously, and to change things going forward: after all, the expedition to Eshowe presaged the second invasion of Zululand. This chapter argues that it was at least in part because of the wave of negative perceptions of both him and his army after Intombe, that he did so, and as such, that period can be seen as a major turning point in the whole war. The British lost no further battles after Intombe. Chelmsford's actions, in giving good briefings and being close to the fighting and the troops were those of a leader taking full command and control, and so changing things for the better in a 'hands-on' way.

The chapters preceding this have highlighted the pivotal role of leadership in facilitating the growth of vertical cohesion. The presence of vertical cohesion, in turn, led to a sense of overall unit cohesion where all the members of a unit were pro-actively acting for the benefit of that unit, or team. This chapter is different in that although it describes a successful operation, that result was arrived at by a different form of leadership. The next chapter will look at the leaders in the Ashanti and Zulu wars to explore how aspects of leadership, personality and/or command sometimes led to the existence of unit cohesion, and sometimes did not, in a time before any knowledge of psychology or theory existed on the subject.

CHAPTER EIGHT.

Leadership and Unit Cohesion in the Zulu and Ashanti Wars.

The preceding chapters worked through the progress of the Zulu War and its various battles in a chronological order. During some of the battles, but not others, unmistakable signs of unit cohesion have been visible. That cannot have been intentional as, at the time under review, there was no theory or understanding of the psychology like that which underpins the subject today, although doubtless the influence of leadership, and of certain leaders,

had been noted: current theory holds that leadership is pivotal in the production of esprit de corps and unit cohesion and this thesis argues that it was just as important then as it is now. But it cannot be a product of taught theory and so is likely to be a unique circumstance existing between leader and men, that mimics current theory. The importance of keeping the integrity of the line and of keeping the unit together had always been recognised, and was achieved by use of discipline, but now it seemed there was another method evolving and working alongside that of discipline.

This chapter will revisit the instances where unit cohesion was evident and correlate those instances with the leader at the time to identify anyone who habitually generated it wherever they were. The relationship between the men and their leaders is important to modern practice, and so the leaders who were associated with success then, will be examined as to their men's opinion of them, and their professional and interpersonal skills. That would fit with modern understanding that what a successful leader brings to a group is vertical cohesion, which unites the entire unit, with the leader being accepted as a member of the group as well as leader.

Therefore, this thesis will argue that, when it did appear, unit cohesion was due to some feature or characteristic attaching to a particular form of leadership or leader. To do that it will look at three senior commanders as case studies: Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, and Colonel Evelyn Wood. Their performance throughout the African campaigns will be examined, particularly the events and battles that they were personally involved with as commanders, to identify those who were commonly associated with the production of unit cohesion and to establish how that happened.

The chosen leaders were largely autonomous, commanded large numbers of men and material, and they were ideally placed to foster a sense of cohesion. Wolseley and Chelmsford were in command of entire campaigns, and Wood's column was the only substantial British fighting force operating freely in Zululand between the defeat at Isandlwana and the relief of Eshowe, which meant that they were all active during the period under review. Colonel Pearson of course also commanded a column but was invested at Eshowe for two months and so missed the period leading up to the second invasion: his performance is already recorded and so he will not be included here. For clarity, the three senior officers in question will be looked at in chronological order, starting with the events

of the Ashanti campaign, then moving on to the campaign in Zululand. Firstly, Wolseley in his role as commander in chief of the Ashanti campaign, and Wood who was serving under Wolseley in Ashantiland, then Wood's role in the Zulu campaign. Following them will be Chelmsford, in his role of supreme commander in the Zulu campaign, and his relationship with Wood, before returning to Wolseley, who of course, commanded the last part of the campaign.

Wolseley's performance as officer in command of the Ashanti campaign started with a thorough attention to detail, both in the collection of information, and in the organisation of practical arrangements of all descriptions. For instance, he had arranged for Sir Henry Brackenbury to prepare three papers, covering the physical geography of the location, the history of the area and the tribes within it, as well as information on climate and health concerns; all considered useful for those to be campaigning there, for presentation to the officers travelling to the Gold Coast with Wolseley, on the S.S. *Ambriz.* Brackenbury seems to have agreed with Wolseley in the preparation of the papers as he wrote, in the context of large European campaigns, 'I am well aware that these details may seem trivial to those accustomed to studying the great wars of the Continent. But the wars of England are generally little wars; and it is by the study of details as well as of great principles that success in war, great or small, is obtained'.[1]

That attention to organisation and detail was something that Wolseley was to become noted for, and later in the century, the expression 'All Sir Garnet' was in general use; and *Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase & Fable'* says this of it, 'Originally an army phrase of the late nineteenth century, meaning 'everything is as it should be'. It originally referred to the successful military expeditions of Sir Garnet Wolseley….'[2] The other thing that Wolseley became noted for, was the habit of surrounding himself with officers of whom he had a high professional opinion and liked to work with, and he wrote that, 'I had long been in the habit of keeping a list of the best and ablest soldiers I knew, and was always on the lookout for those who could safely be entrusted with any special military piece of work'.[3] This group

[1] Henry Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. A Narrative*, vol. 2, pp. viii, 113–14; Henry Brackenbury, *Fanti and Ashanti, Three Papers Read On Board The S.S. Ambriz On The Voyage To The Gold Coast* .
[2]Adrian Room, ed., *Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase & Fable*, Millennium Edition (London: Cassell & Co., 2001), p. 25.
[3] Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life, Volume 2*, p. 201.

was sometimes known as the 'Ashanti', and sometimes, the 'Wolseley' ring but both referred to the same team. Strachan described the forming of the ring, consisting of thirty-six officers, for the Ashanti campaign, and how it had formed the core of officers that Wolseley drew on when choosing who would go to South Africa with him in 1879; Strachan goes on to describe the ending of the 'ring', around the turn of the nineteenth century, but it did carry over from the Ashanti to the Zulu campaign.[4] Wolseley's thoroughness and his careful preparations and dissemination of information and knowledge to all ranks could be said to have reflected a sense of inclusivity; and current theory recognises that the relationship between leaders and followers is a key aspect in the generation of unit cohesion.[5] In fact, there was evidence of that inclusivity, both on Wolseley's part and in the response of the men, when he had asked them to embark on a march of six days on four days' rations to 'Comassie' [sic] and they supported him, and willingly accepted.[6] Whilst this did show good morale, just as importantly, it was an acknowledgement of Wolseley's leadership role, his right to identify goals, and to direct the group towards them, a sign of vertical cohesion in the group.

That was important because it showed that however positive the opinion of the men was towards Wolseley as being part of the team, it was entirely professional, and no interpersonal boundaries had been crossed. Although they appreciated his methods and performance, they were still appropriately socially distanced, and that is a key factor in vertical cohesion. Overall, Wolseley's characteristics and methods of leadership matched modern theory surrounding leadership and vertical cohesion to a considerable extent, including him suffering a serious bout of fever which certainly demonstrated that he was not living in privileged conditions, but sharing the hardships of the others.[7] Evelyn Wood, then a Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel, a member of 'the ring', had worked closely with Wolseley in Ashantiland, and they were to meet again in Zululand in 1879 when he (Wolseley) took over command from Chelmsford).[8]

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[4] Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*, p. 103.: Leigh Maxwell, *The Ashanti Ring,* (London: Leo Cooper, 1985), pp.1-3.
[5] Wm. Darryl Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2012), p. 11.
[6] Henry Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War. A Narrative*, vol. 2 pp. 197–98.
[7] Henderson, *Cohesion*, pp. 114–15.
[8] Evelyn Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshall [sic]*, Vol. 2 (The Naval and Military Press, 2006), pp. 81–83.

Given the nature of 'the ring' and the social and professional dynamics inherent in it, which must, almost by definition, have included Wolseley's preferences, it would be surprising if there were not some commonalities of ideas and methods amongst the members. Wood's practice of sharing the dangers and conditions of the men, together with his thoughtfulness for their welfare, was certainly redolent of Wolseley's methods. His valour, and preference for being in the thick of the fighting was noted by Henry Brackenbury in his narrative of the Ashanti War (1874), when he wrote, 'He himself [Wood] always standing up in the very midst of the fight, had set a rare example, as he always does to all those under his command;...'[9] This was about Wood being involved in heavy fighting as the British forces advanced into Ashanti land, during which he was shot in the chest, 'a wound which incapacitated him from duty for a few days'.[10] Others rushed to help him and there was talk of carrying him to safety. He refused to be carried, and when a colleague said to him, 'No you have been wounded there...Let me carry you back,' Wood replied that he believed himself to be, 'perfectly able to walk alone', and asked the individual to stop and ensure that the advance continued.[11] Wood's wound, inflicted by a nail-head used instead of a proper bullet, caused a distinct difference of opinion amongst the medics as to whether or not it would be fatal, but he was satisfied that he would survive, and did so.[12] Wood's commitment, and focus on the mission, are clearly demonstrated in this incident, and it presents a very professional view of him.

Sometime later, after Coomassie was taken, Wood showed a different side of his character: his concern for the welfare and wellbeing of his men, whilst conducting a convoy of sick and wounded to the coast. On 5 February 1874, he and an escort, left Coomassie to take a two-mile-long convoy of sick and wounded Europeans to the coast; those who were not able to walk were carried in long cots mounted on bamboo poles and each carried by eight men. Progress was not speedy and occasionally, the convoy stopped for a rest.[13] Wood described what happened during one of these breaks when the convoy stopped for a rest after a considerable time on the road:

[9] Brackenbury, *A Narrative,* vol. 2, p. 181.
[10] Brackenbury, *A Narrative,* vol. 2, p. 170.
[11] Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshall*, pp. 275–77.
[12] Wood, *Midshipman to Field Marshall,* Vol 1, pp. 276–77.
[13] Wood, *Midshipman to Field Marshall,* Vol 1, p. 281.

When Sir Garnett [sic] went forward to the Ordah River, the troops accepted cheerfully four days' rations for six, and thus it came about that on the evening we arrived at Ordasu…except a small bit of biscuit, the wounded had no rations of any kind. Just as we had lifted the cots of the wounded off the ground and placed them on tripods of bamboos, an impending storm broke, the heavens opening, rain fell as it does only in the tropics, and within ten minutes there were 10 inches of water on the ground.

I had 1/2lb. of tea and some sugar, which my servant carried in a haversack, and, assisted by Furse of the 42nd, after infinite trouble, I made a fire over a projecting root of a big Banyan tree. In turn we held an umbrella to shelter our fire from the rain, and finally had the satisfaction of raising the water to boiling-point, [sic] and into it I put all my tea and sugar. When we had handed round the last pannikin, I said I would have given a sovereign for a tin of tea, and Furze remarked, 'I would have gladly given two'.[14]

That act of kindness by Wood was bound to have been appreciated by the troops and to have added to a positive appraisal of him, a necessary condition for the generation of vertical cohesion which would in turn have enhanced any sense of cohesion.

Later, in 1879, Wood served under Lord Chelmsford in Zululand, as part of Chelmsford's plan to invade Zululand and to capture Cetswayo. Wood, now a substantive Lieutenant-Colonel, was put in charge of number 4 column, operating on the left of Chelmsford who was with number 3 column. Following the tragic events at Isandlwana and the almost simultaneous investment of Pearson and his column at Eshowe, Wood's column became the only one still freely operating in Zululand, although he was, on occasion, in touch with Chelmsford. His management and leadership methods seem to have been the same as they had been in Ashantiland, and again focussed on his commitment to the task in hand, sharing of risk and hardships, and his thoughtful behaviour towards the welfare of the men.

He set up a camp protected by earthworks at Kambula, from which offensive patrols were mounted. Frances Colenso wrote this about the camp: 'Colonel Wood was up with the first in the early morning, and often out with the patrols who daily scouted the country round for

[14] Wood, *Midshipman to Field Marshall,* Vol 1, pp. 281–281.

miles... a very strict but kind commander who had the full confidence and goodwill of his troops'.[15] She went on to explain that sports and games were arranged for the men, that a band played in the evening and that, 'the singing and laughter in camp showed that all were in excellent spirits'.[16] Wood was even having bread baked for the troops, although it was not always well received owing to its recipe, said by one soldier to consist of 'mealies, and half of it sand'.[17]

Wood was also popular with his men for his professional ability, another prerequisite for the generation of vertical cohesion. On 7 March 1879, a letter was published in the *Pall Mall Gazette* signed simply 'X', praising his ability as a leader. The depth of knowledge and detail about Wood and the movements of No. 4 column thus far, indicate that the writer was somebody close to Wood with personal knowledge and experience.[18] The letter was strongly supportive of Wood and noticeably less so regarding Chelmsford, and although it does not name him (Chelmsford) the writer does clearly insinuate that Wood would be more suited to running the campaign than the then current incumbent. The author said:

> I think it at least justifiable to point out that the handling of No. 4 Column of Lord Chelmsford's force contrasts strongly with that of No, 3. It is to be regretted that its commander, Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., is not sufficiently forward in army rank to take an even more important command than he now holds... Colonel Wood has his Ashanti experiences to start upon, and few understand savage warfare better than he.[19]

Wood and Chelmsford seem to have had an amicable and good working relationship, and Wood wrote of a three-hour meeting during which: 'After we had discussed the many affairs in which we had been interested since we met three months earlier, he pressed me, in the name of the High Commissioner, to accept the office of Resident of Zululand. I urged that the resident ought to speak the language, and that, moreover, I was too fond of soldiering to leave the 90th Light Infantry for political employment.'[20] However, Chelmsford's offer

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[15] Frances Ellen Colenso, *History of the Zulu War and Its Origin*, (London: Adamant Media Corporation, 2004 [1880]), p. 349.
[16] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War*, p. 349.
[17] Alfred Davies, 'Correspondence', *The Brecon County Times* (Brecon, 29 March 1879), edition XIII, section Correspondence, p. 5.
[18] 'X', 'The War in Zululand-Colonel Wood's Column', *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 7 March 1879, p. 4.
[19] 'X'. 'The War in Zululand, p. 4.

certainly indicated the high esteem in which he held Wood, and he subsequently consulted Wood for tactical advice during the campaign.[21] But, oddly enough, the single failure in combat of Wood's forces during the campaign, which resulted in losses and a very hasty withdrawal, the battle of Hlobane mountain (28 March 1879), was directly due to an intervention by Chelmsford. Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell wrote an account of how Pearson had warned Chelmsford that 35,000 Zulus were waiting to ambush him between the Tugela and 'Ekowe' on his way to relieve Eshowe. That resulted in Chelmsford ordering Wood to create a diversion from his (Chelmsford's) force, by attacking the Zulu flank.[22] That is why the battle of Hlobane mountain took place.

Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell described how on 28 March, Wood left his entrenched camp and assailed the Zulu stronghold as instructed where his forces received a 'decided check', although they did achieve the purpose of distracting some Zulu forces from Chelmsford's column.[23] In another consequence of the action, the Zulu forces pursued Wood's forces back to his fortified position at Kambula, where they attacked on 29 March and were soundly defeated.[24] There was a postscript to these events though, recorded by Wood, who wrote that 'I heard from Lord Chelmsford, who said he observed in my official report on my attack on the Inhoblane [Hlobane mountain] that I had made no reference to his having induced it; and, while thanking him for his generosity, I replied that I considered I was bound to help him…' Wood goes on to say that he considered the mission was actually feasible and only went awry due to a coincidental encountering of the main Zulu army.[25]

The very fact that Chelmsford bothered to mention the matter makes it worthy of note. It conveys a discreet sense of gratitude and suggests that Chelmsford was only too aware that he was receiving an awfully bad press and was being blamed for Isandlwana, as well as for events on the Intombe river, and that one more negative report was the last thing he needed. Given their good previous working relationship, it was perhaps an expression of thanks from one colleague to another, and if that is the case, it underlines the mutual respect present. As for Wood, his methods, results, and positive feedback from subordinates

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[20] Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshall.*, p. 29.
[21] Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshall.*, p. 73.
[22] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign*, p.132.
[23] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign*, p. 132.
[24] Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshall*, pp. 51–69.
[25] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *Story of the Zulu Campaign*, p. 67.

and colleagues alike, show that he had become a positive figure to his men, and as such, would have been a factor in the generation of vertical cohesion.

During March 1879, in the wake of the losses at Isandlwana and the Intombe river, and with Pearson and his column invested at Eshowe, Chelmsford's reputation in South Africa was at its lowest ebb, and criticism at its height. Both Isandlwana and the Intombe river defeats were due to the same cause; a failure to properly prepare and to embrace the reality of the present threat. The camp at Isandlwana was subsequently said to have been '...in no respect ready for defence', and the events at the Intombe river speak for themselves.[26] Frances Ellen Colenso, in what amounts to an attack on Chelmsford and his professionalism, ultimately held him responsible for the disaster at Isandlwana, for not making the proper arrangements for the defence of the camp and dismissed Chelmsford's version.[27] It is fair to say that, overall, Colenso's work generally has a bias towards the Zulu cause and against the war. However, whatever the circumstances, and remembering that the column at the Intombe river *were* under orders regarding defence and the potential for attack: as Commander in Chief, the responsibility ultimately did rest on Chelmsford.

Despite the obvious failings of the campaign thus far, and the disastrous losses suffered by Chelmsford's forces, it would be wrong to suggest that he was universally disliked, and that is made clear by some of the soldiers under his command. After Isandlwana, Sergeant Evan Jones of 2/24th wrote a letter home in which he outlined Chelmsford's actions and the general criticism of them in the press, and then wrote:

> Now, my opinion is this, Lord Chelmsford did what any man would have done, viz., he went out to fight the enemy where he knew he could find him, (in his front) ... but whatever anyone may say, I shall always remain convinced that he did everything for the best. We, the 24th, ought to know what he is made of. There is not a man in the 24th that would not fight and most willingly die for him.[28]

In a different letter sent home, this time by Private Joseph Morgan, 2/24th he appears to blame the authorities in London for the defeat at Isandlwana rather than Chelmsford,

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[26] Rothwell, *Field Operations,* p. 36.
[27] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War,* pp. 293–98.
[28] Evan Jones, 'The Zulu War', *The Aberdare Times,* (Aberdare, 13 September 1879), Ed. 965, Letters, p. 4.

writing that, 'Before the war began the General sent home for more troops, but he was told he had enough, and now they find out their mistake, that the Zulus are a stronger and more powerful race of people than they thought.'[29] How widely held that belief was in the unit, if at all, cannot be known, and the writer may be confusing the sending of reinforcements after Isandlwana, but it does show a favourable, even sympathetic, attitude towards Chelmsford. Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell wrote of another instance of loyalty to Chelmsford, this time from the troops at Gingindlovu as he checked the defences prior the Zulu attack. They wrote: 'Lord Chelmsford professed himself extremely satisfied at the manner in which all his arrangements had been worked out, and the low murmur of gratification, which even discipline could not suppress, showed how much his men were devoted to their chief'.[30]

Those supportive comments were entirely from the military family though. None were forthcoming from the press or the public, and this really shows that Chelmsford was better thought of by those he commanded, and when personally present, than the civilian population who had been, and still were deeply unimpressed at this stage. It is not unlikely that the military had a better understanding of what had happened thus far by virtue of 'insider knowledge', and the civilians had not. Chelmsford could not have been unaware of the bad press adhering to him, yet just pressed-on, and it appears that he had decided to continue, to successfully complete his mission, and to let the opinions of others change as a result, or not.

Chelmsford was tactically experienced and sound, and his attention to detail, planning, and physical execution of the mission to relieve Eshowe, particularly the battle at Gingindlovu, dispelled any doubt or criticism in that regard: when it came to it, he knew what he was doing. So, looking back over the campaign, his problems had revolved around multi-tasking and delegation, and this suggests that the issue probably stems from his methods, conduct and personality. He was a good commander when it came to being present and leading or motivating troops and had a good working relationship with whichever group that he was currently with. It was when he was not present or personally speaking to people that his influence, or effect, dissipated. He can be described in modern

[29] Joseph Morgan, 'Letters', *The Aberdare Times,* (Aberdare, 29 March 1879), Ed. 941, p. 4.
[30] Ashe and Wyatt-Edgell, *The Zulu Campaign,* p. 165.

parlance as 'task-focussed', or a 'Hands-on' leader, dealing with what was in front of him 100%.

Looking then at leadership methods and skills, there is no evidence to suggest that Chelmsford saw himself as part of a bigger team, but as a commander, it is likely then, that he would be seen as distant, not part of a homogeneous group or system and so would miss the potential benefits of being part of a group where all members are working for the team.[31] There is no way that Chelmsford could have created the conditions necessary for vertical cohesion to appear and so, also, no chance for a unified sense of unit cohesion to exist. He would have been working very much in a 'here and now' or 'top down' environment, and that would explain his apparent lack of ability to communicate beyond the moment or matter in hand. From the residents' point of view of Chelmsford's tenure in Zululand, Frances Ellen Colenso, wrote that she had hoped that Chelmsford would be recalled to England since the aftermath of the defeat at Isandlwana, and that the general hope and expectation in the community was that : 'the sprightly Sir Garnet Wolseley and his "brilliant staff" would once more grace the shores of Natal.[32] Colenso's wish, was to come true, as the ruminations were correct, and a despatch announcing that Wolseley was being sent and Chelmsford recalled arrived in mid-June, with Wolseley landing at Durban on 28 June.[33]

Between Isandlwana and before the second invasion began, Chelmsford, despite the approval of some, was also out of favour with a lot of his own troops who blamed the defeat at Isandlwana on him. Curling illustrated that lack of confidence well in a letter home on 28 April, prior to the second invasion, by writing: 'I am sorry to say that our column is still to be commanded by the General [*Lord Chelmsford]*. I think these disasters have quite upset his judgement or rather that of his staff and one does not feel half so comfortable under his command as with a man like Col. Wood with his veteran regiments...' [34] A second letter shows an awareness of the general feeling towards Chelmsford. Lieutenant C.A. Commeline, an artillery officer, wrote a letter home that was published in a local Gloucester newspaper, *The Citizen,* on the 24 May 1879; in which he says that newspaper clippings he had seen

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[31] Rob McIlveen and Richard Gross, *Social Psychology*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1998,) p. 96.
[32] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War,* p. 455.
[33] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War,* p. 455.
[34] Greaves and Best, *The Curling Letters of the Zulu War,* p. 126.

revealed that: 'The general opinion of the public at home about his conduct of the war seems by no means favourable to him,' and goes on to say 'I do not see how he can remove the unfavourable impression that has been created'.[35]

But that view seemed to have softened somewhat as the second invasion was under way and Colenso's reporting of the thinking and opinions of people regarding Chelmsford's imminent recall show a change of tenor, away from strict criticism and even towards what seems to be pity. She wrote, 'No one quite knew what Lord Chelmsford was about, but everyone understood that he would try and end the war before he was superseded; and the general feeling in the colony was certainly one of hope that "poor Lord Chelmsford" might get a chance, win a battle, and have his bonfire in the enemy's city of straw.'[36] Implicit in those comments is a sense of not blaming Chelmsford as a person, but the situation he was in, and that was largely caused by his own personality: it is as if they thought that 'he meant well'. Colenso's first line about no-one knowing what Chelmsford was about, underlines that and illustrates again the lack of knowledge or understanding of him outside army circles, which had posed such a problem for him.

The reason that nobody seemed to really 'know' Chelmsford was at least in part because he said nothing in response to the criticism that was aimed at him. His strategy of saying nothing can be seen as either, not wanting to compromise his absolute command and control by debating, or, as a form of denial. Subsequent events support denial as he really believed that he had done very well, given that no European army had ever experienced the power and abilities of the Zulus at war or campaigned over their difficult and unknown terrain; he was the first. Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Harness who had commanded artillery throughout the Zulu War, was a supporter of Chelmsford, and he laid out that defence of Chelmsford's performance in a magazine article in 1880.[37] But Harness's article, also makes the opposite case: knowing he was the first actually made it even more important that preparation and the gathering of intelligence and information should have been thoroughly carried out, along with thorough reconnaissance on the ground. Later, in a House of Lords debate in 1880, this point was made to Chelmsford, very forcefully by Lord Strathnairn, himself a military man, who heavily criticized, amongst other things, the siting

[35] "Letter from Lieutenant Commeline", *Gloucester Citizen,* no. 953, 24 May 1879, P4.
[36] Colenso, *History of the Zulu War,* p. 461.
[37] Arthur Harness, 'The Zulu Campaign. From a Military Point of View', *Fraser's Magazine*, April 1880, pp. 477–88.

of the camp at Isandlwana, lack of reconnaissance, and underestimating the Zulus. Chelmsford did not actively defend the specific points but challenged Strathnairn's procedures and sources of information.[38]

After Wolseley's arrival in Zululand, Chelmsford was of course aware of his purpose in South Africa and wanted to successfully end the war before Wolseley was able to relieve him, and on 4 July, Chelmsford's forces comprehensively defeated the Zulu army at Ulundi, the final battle of the war, ending the campaign except for the capture of Cetswayo, and the necessary negotiations to follow. Having received the news of the victory whilst at Fort Pearson on 6 July, Wolseley, in a generous gesture, sent a congratulatory telegraph to Chelmsford, which he received on 8 July.[39] A week or so later, on 15 July 1879, whilst travelling in Zululand with different groups, Chelmsford and Wolseley happened to meet one another and the nature of the relationship between them can be gauged from Wolseley's diary recollection of it:

> I cannot say that my meeting with Chelmsford was a pleasant one. He has persistently ignored my military authority over him, although I have told him I have a commission giving me command of the Troops [sic] in South Africa. However, I try to make every allowance for him for his feelings must be unpleasant finding a superior officer sent to supercede [sic] him.[40]

Wolseley went on to say about Chelmsford, that he had '... the poorest opinion of his ability as a general or a public servant' and added that, 'In war he can never again be employed although I have no doubt the Horse Gds. [sic) will cover him with Honours & give him Aldershot or some equally good place'.[41]

That last comment may well have been of note to Adrian Preston, the editor of Wolseley's diaries, who makes what amounts to a personal character attack against Wolseley by saying that his comments and actions were substantially geared towards his own professional and personal advancement and promotion, along with the denigration of those he saw as enemies.[42] Preston contends that Wolseley's comments are not dispassionate observations,

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[38] House of Lords Debate. 2 September 1880. Vol. 256, Col. 1025-35.

[39] Rothwell, *Narrative of Field Operations,* pp. 117–18.

[40] Adrian Preston, *Sir Garnet Wolseley's South African Journal 1879-80* (Capetown: A.A. Balkema, 1973), p. 56.

[41] Preston, *Sir Garnet Wolseley's South African Journal 1879 - 80*, p. 61.

and amount to a personal character attack that should be taken into account when evaluating his comments regarding Wolseley.[43]

Preston's comments do give rise to some doubt that Wolseley's comments were always driven by facts, and not skewed by his personal agenda. But as there is no evidence that the thoughts Wolseley committed to his diary are anything other than his honest opinions in this case, for the purposes of this work they will be taken as such. Later, Chelmsford resigned and left to return home. But even then, the animosity between him and Wolseley surfaced in his resignation letter, where he wrote that he felt forced to resign by Wolseley who had effectively demoted him and put him in an untenable position. Chelmsford's comments also show that he felt there were no grounds whatsoever for him to have resigned and that he had done a good job.[44] He departed, leaving Wolseley to arrange the capture of Cetswayo, which took place on 29 August. Following that, a political settlement was discussed and agreed for the future, and on 2 September the evacuation of Zululand by British troops was commenced. Wolseley and his staff remained at Ulundi, where they had an encampment, until 4 September, when they left for Utrecht and with that, the campaign was over.

What stands out from this chapter is that Wolseley and Wood were both highly successful and were liked by their men, and that Chelmsford, although successful after a bad start, never had the same kind of relationship with his men and was positively disliked by the public and press in South Africa during the Zulu war. Now of course, with the benefit of modern knowledge, there is an understanding of the psychological processes that engendered unit cohesion, albeit in a less sophisticated form than now. The modern theory and methods are now taught to today's leaders to develop unit cohesion, but the lists coincide to some extent with personal qualities and characteristics that have always been possessed by and liked in some people. These traits revolve around communicating and relating to others, and, in a broader sense, personality; formed in turn by societal and familial factors. Because of these factors, some in the past have naturally been able to develop appropriate interpersonal bonds with subordinates and others, due to *who* they were in terms of those personalities and traits.

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[42] Preston, *Sir Garnet Wolseley's South African Journal 1879 - 80*, pp. 1–3.
[43] Preston, *Sir Garnet Wolseley's South African Journal 1879 - 80*, p. VII.
[44] T.N.A. WO 32/7770. Message from Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War.

Wolseley fell into that category and his writing in *The Soldier's Pocketbook for Field Service* showed that he was, in effect, practicing what he preached. In the section on 'Advice to Officers on Service', he devoted a lot of space to explain in detail how to form a relationship with the troops to get the best performance from them. Typical of that advice was how the officer should, 'sympathise with their likes and dislikes' and 'listen attentively to their grievances' until they saw him as a friend, and he finished by saying that 'if you want to win battles, make yourself loved by those who serve under you'.[45] Wood was selected by Wolseley as suitable to work with and, perhaps unsurprisingly, demonstrated the same sort of style of command and leadership as he [Wolseley] did.

Whilst there is no doubt that Wood was a strict commander when he needed to be, a brief insight into his personality may be gleaned from the first chapter of his book *Winnowed Memories,* in a sub-section entitled 'The Champion Liar'. There, he started by recounting a story of many years previously at school when he was found to have cheated, how he had dealt with it, and how it had taught him not to tell lies. Disclosing that, showed that he was prepared to accept his own faults, to be the 'butt' of the joke and to be laughed at, whilst understanding and dealing kindly with the faults in others he had met along the way: in modern terms, it showed a sense of humanity.[46]

On the other hand, Chelmsford, although a good hands-on commander, because of who and how he was, remained more psychologically and socially insular and distant, or formal. There is nothing to suggest that he was using the sort of information and advice in Wolseley's book regarding building a relationship with his men, either intentionally or by chance, and he clearly had a different relationship with his men and the public to that of Wolseley or Wood.

The evidence shows that Wolseley and Wood were well thought of generally as well as by their men, both as people and as leaders. They were associated with success and their presence in a unit unknowingly brought with it vertical cohesion, which allowed a sense of unit cohesion to develop. Chelmsford had a different kind of relationship with his troops which appears to have been based on a strictly professional basis, with no sense of 'self' or

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[45] Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book For Field Service*, pp. 1–3; Evelyn Wood, *Winnowed Memories* (London: Forgotten Books, 2012 [1917]), chap.1.
[46] Wood, *Winnowed Memories*, p. 3.

humanity straying into his interactions with his men. He bore the responsibility of the two major defeats, at Isandlwana and the Intombe river, and had a lot of ground to make up to recover his reputation. Public as well as military opinion of him was divided and largely unsupportive which may not have been unexpected given the previous defeats he had presided over. However, he was successful in arranging and prosecuting the battle of Gingindlovu, as well as the relief of Eshowe.

The way he achieved those victories was by paying very close personal attention to all the details and arrangements, and by strict instructions, right down to the last detail, for the personnel involved. It is Chelmsford's way of working that illustrates the difference between him and those who benefited from the presence of unit cohesion that may well explain his earlier lack of success. Whereas he worked by close supervision and a close physical presence, perhaps paying less attention to the details of events elsewhere, the commander of a unit possessing unit cohesion had the benefit of all the personnel of that unit always working for the good of all whether the commander was present or not. Effectively, the commander, is seen as another member of the team.

Finally, looking at how aspects of the modern methodology of unit cohesion could have appeared in the past, the likelihood is that some aspects of personality and interpersonal skills when dealing with men, present in people like Wood and Wolseley, closely resembled or even mirrored the taught skills of today. It is also possible that the softening of the boundaries between classes that had taken place between about 1850 and the mid-1870s helped in communicating and sharing information.[47] That in turn led to the presence of vertical cohesion amongst their men, and so, to unit cohesion. Both Wolseley and Wood were well liked by their men, although there was no compromise on discipline. On the other hand, Chelmsford's men worked constantly under the orders of their leader with no room for initiative, and there was no interaction other than the receiving of orders.

This thesis has proved that the emergence of unit cohesion resulted from the interpersonal and professional relationships between the commanders and their men. That would certainly explain why unit cohesion was present in some situations, but not in others as its presence would have depended on who the commander was: men who felt valued and

[47] Lawrence James, *The Middle Class. A History.* (London: Little, Brown, 2006), pp. 274–75.

part of a team would also have felt a sense of responsibility to the rest of the team, unlike those who were treated as 'units'. There was no precursor of current theory, other than that which occurred spontaneously between some groups and their leaders. But modern theory can be used to look back at the army and its campaigns, to identify factors, when they did occur, that are now considered necessary for unit cohesion to be produced, and thus help in our understanding of the past.

CHAPTER NINE.

Conclusion.

This thesis began with the assertion that we lack a complete understanding of how the Late Victorian army functioned from a psychological point of view. That is because there is no reference to the effects of morale and motivation on the performance of the army in any of the historiography. This thesis fills that gap by describing how morale and motivation developed in the organisation over time. It covers the period from 1830 to 1879 but focusses on the Ashanti and Zulu Wars as case studies. The events and developments during that period were well recorded and, to the modern eye, contain a myriad of cues to the underlying psychology that were obviously not recognised at the time.

This thesis has revisited the narratives of the past to build a picture of the gradual development and working of morale and motivation over time. Looking at primary sources, such as official records, memoirs, and witness statements through the lens of modern knowledge, has provided the missing understanding of the psychological aspect of the working of the Late Victorian army. The story starts in 1830, with the first attempts to improve the quality of recruits. It moves through the development of a more professional class of soldier, and on to the development of esprit de corps: ending with the Zulu war of 1879. It examines the existence of unit cohesion in the Late Victorian Army, how that was produced, and the importance of leadership to unit cohesion, morale, and motivation.

The first question really, is why were reforms needed? As Chapter two argued, in the period between Waterloo in 1815, and 1830, the army had experienced a loss of focus and become a disparate group of entities with no overall sense of 'self'. All through the Peninsular campaign and the battle of Waterloo, the army had a focus, a sense of purpose, and a reason to act as a disciplined whole. Wellington himself had noted the worth of his soldiers when he had followed his famous 'scum of the earth' comment about them by saying, 'it is really wonderful that we should have made them the fine fellows they are'.[1] But after Waterloo, that focus was lost and during the next fifteen years, until the need for

[1] Michael Glover, *Wellington's Army In the Peninsula 1808-1814* (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1977), p. 24.

thorough reforms was taken seriously in 1830, the men had relapsed into the bad habits, particularly drunkenness, which also characterised the working class in civil society at the time. The sense of 'regard for the honour and interests of the body to which one belongs ... team spirit,' that comprised esprit de corps, had been lost.[2]

Those seeking and driving reforms had no knowledge of the psychology surrounding morale and motivation, and its generation of course, but they did know that 'spirit' and professionalism were missing from the army, and that their lack could seriously impair the performance of the army if called upon to act. In a move that has a sense of 'starting again' about it, it was decided that a better type of recruit was needed, and that, with new blood, esprit de corps would begin to develop. But there was a problem in that the pool from which they recruited was not actually an improvement. The 'better type' of person they wanted did not want to join the army, seeing it as a backward step, and those who did, frequently did so as a last resort, or for the wrong reasons, and often deserted. As a rule, only the lower working class seemed to want to join, and that was frequently to alleviate hardship in civilian life.[3]

There was an ongoing argument in the military establishment about the best way to increase professionalism. It revolved around whether a better type of recruit should be sought, or those who joined anyway should somehow be shaped into what was wanted. But the reformers stayed with the strategy of attracting a better type of recruit and tried to make the army more attractive by making some small improvements to conditions of service. They included improvements to food, and accommodation, and it was hoped that they would make army life seem a better option. These changes to physical circumstances did not result in a noticeable improvement in recruitment and retention, but they unconsciously began a process that did, in time, lead to the desired improvement. That came about because over time, as terms and conditions of army service continued to get better, there were also beneficial changes in society, and a new middle class, and upper working class, who had professional skills emerged.

[2] *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, ed. by William R. Trumble and others, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 859.
[3] Haythornthwaite, *The Armies of Wellington*, p. 44.

That meant that gradually, the army became a viable and respectable option to working in the civilian world. That was important, as the improved image of the army meant that it gained and retained recruits who had options but had consciously decided to be part of it. That led to a shared feeling of belonging, or camaraderie, which was the genesis of the creation of a sense of esprit de corps in the army, and that in turn became a generator of morale and motivation.

By the time of the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the spirit and presence of esprit de corps was widespread within individual regiments, and members of those regiments displayed and felt an intense pride in their own regimental colours, history, and comrades. It also produced a powerful motivation not to let the regiment down and to support colleagues, and that in turn drove individuals to perform to their best. That was a strong expression of esprit de corps, and unsurprisingly, it became synonymous with morale and motivation. Looking back at the practical effect of esprit de corps through modern eyes, there is a strong correlation between it and the current concept of horizontal motivation, where personnel form a close bond across the unit with others of the same, or similar non-commissioned rank.[4] Those in overall command of the regiment exercised absolute control and discipline but remained outside of this grouping from a practical point of view. There was a strict class system operating in the army and that would have prevented any association between commanders and other ranks at that time.[5]

Then, during the period between the ending of the Crimean war and the beginning of the Ashanti campaign (1873-1874), the importance of the relationship between officers and their men to a sense of cohesion and 'togetherness' in units, in addition to the bonding between other ranks, was noticed. Garnet Wolseley in Britain, and Ardant du Picq in France, both of whom had seen esprit de corps in operation in the Crimea, knew that the type of relationship that soldiers had with their superiors could, when added to esprit de corps, encourage the growth of a sense of camaraderie, or cohesion in individuals and in units.[6] For Wolseley this must have been a confirmation of what he knew that Plutarch had written in ancient times: that if a General wanted to win battles, then he should make himself loved by those who served under him. Wolseley very much confirmed his observations and belief in

[4] Allister MacIntyre, 'Cohesion', in *The Military Leadership Handbook*, Horn and Walker (eds.), pp. 57–64.
[5] Mansfield, *Soldiers as Workers,* p. 28.
[6] du Picq, *Battle Studies;* Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book For Field Service.* p. 3.

Plutarch's remark, by paraphrasing it in his *Soldier's Pocket Book*, by advising officers that to be successful, they must try to be liked by their men.[7] In modern theory, the type of relationship a commander has with subordinates in a unit can generate vertical cohesion, and is considered critical to the creation of morale, motivation, and cohesion within that unit. Wolseley's comments represent the first time that this was noted and written down.

In 1872, Wolseley led the Ashanti expedition in the first major campaign for the British army since the introduction of the Cardwell reforms. Cardwell and Wolseley were good friends who both believed in the need for army reform, and so the Ashanti campaign could be seen as a test for those joint reforms. As chapter three argued, Wolseley meticulously planned the expedition and, focussing on the needs of the soldiers to be deployed, he countered the dangers posed by the unhealthy environment by planning the expedition for the safest time of the year in terms of climate. He also assessed the threat posed by the Ashanti army and took them seriously as a fighting force, and ensured that all preparations on scene, such as trackways and accommodations that could be, were prepared before the British troops landed. He also spent a great deal of time in ensuring that the troops' weapons and clothing were the most suitable available.

From the British point of view the campaign was an undoubted success that could also be seen as an endorsement of Wolseley and Cardwell's reforms at work. Wolseley was a popular leader who built a good working relationship with the men and that was really demonstrated in the last days of the advance to Amoaful. Wolseley wanted to go forward to take the Ashanti capital and thus victory, and he estimated that the task would take six days, but there were only four days' rations remaining. The men were aware of that, but when Wolseley asked them to follow him on the mission, they willingly volunteered to do so. There was no order to march, and yet the troops were willing to accompany and support him, clearly Wolseley had their loyalty and was seen as part of a team for that to have happened. Looking back at that incident through modern eyes, it fits well with what would be recognised today as 'unit cohesion'.

Unit cohesion occurs when a commander possesses certain personal and professional attributes which lead to his or her acceptance by members of the unit as one of them, albeit

[7] Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket Book For Field Service*, p. 3.

in command. It means the unit is bonded together from top to bottom as well as from side to side, and that all the members are working for the benefit of the whole. Those skills and techniques are taught to military leaders today, but they obviously were not in the nineteenth century. However, given that unit cohesion is closely connected to a particular kind of leadership, this thesis argues that Wolseley's actions and comments were responsible for it. Wolseley was, as it were, practising what he preached, by taking his own advice written for officers in his *Soldier's Pocket Book*, regarding being liked by his men, and he may have been helped in this by the gradual softening of the strict lines between classes that were taking place in society at the time.[8] His capabilities as a commander, and his relationship with the troops when combined with his general character and manner of dealing with people, distinctly showed some, or all, of the skills and characteristics deemed necessary to produce unit cohesion today; it, or something like it, was produced then.

The Zulu War comprised several major engagements under different commanders and was approximately six months in length as opposed to approximately one month and one overall commander for the Ashanti campaign. This gives the opportunity to review and compare the differing command styles, and to establish where and how morale and motivation were generated. Chapter four shows, unfortunately, that the campaign began with the major defeat of British forces left encamped at Isandlwana on 22 January whilst Chelmsford had moved on with the rest of the column to seek the main Zulu force. The men at Isandlwana were simply overwhelmed by far superior numbers of Zulus, resulting in what was effectively a massacre, no threat assessment had been made for the camp, no reconnaissance of the surrounding area took place, nor any fortification measures put in place. All British plans for the invasion of Zululand were rendered useless and Chelmsford with the remnants of his force, left Zululand and went into Natal. The British were forced onto the defensive, effectively leaving the Zulus to take the initiative. That initiative materialised later the same day in the form of an attack on Rorke's Drift, defended by between 100 and 120 soldiers, by approximately 4,000 Zulu warriors who had been at Isandlwana earlier in the day. The chapter also describes the experiences of some who managed to escape the slaughter at Isandlwana, and the effects of psychological trauma as

[8] James, Lawrence, *The Middle Class, A History,* (London: Little, Brown, 2006), pp. 274–75.

they appeared after the event. It also describes the awful physical and mental conditions that soldiers had to exist in between Isandlwana and the second invasion.

Chapter Five argued that the battle at Rorke's Drift, 22-23 January 1879, was an action where there was definite evidence of vertical and unit cohesion operating, resulting in unit cohesion and significantly contributing to the successful outcome of the battle. The post was commanded during the battle by Lt. Chard, Royal Engineers, and Lt. Bromhead of the2/24th, and when the news of the defeat at Isandlwana, and of the impending attack arrived, there was just enough time left for some basic improvised defences to be constructed and a plan of sorts to be made before the Zulu assault hit them. The defenders stayed united and fought through the night until the next morning, when the Zulu forces withdrew, possibly having seen Chelmsford's returning column approaching. The odds had been very much against the defenders, and had they broken ranks or run, they can be no doubt that they would have been defeated and killed. But they stayed together as a cohesive unit during the night, conducting themselves rationally and, however low morale went, did not panic. The evidence shows that the reason for the unit staying together in what must have been a terrifying situation, was the presence of a strong sense of unit cohesion.

Chard and Bromhead had the same rank, but Chard's service was longer and so command technically fell to him. But Bromhead, though technically second in command was a long-serving member of the unit, and as such would have had been accepted not just as one of the team but as the leader, and that would have ensured the presence of vertical cohesion. But as fortune had it, an impromptu meeting was held in the time it took for Chard to arrive from the ponts and a plan was decided upon by all present and set in motion. It was really a case of vertical cohesion driving unit cohesion in action. That unit cohesion was enough to hold the men together and to prevent a loss of rational thought or panic which would doubtless have led to a massacre. Chard, on assuming command, accepted what had been decided and worked with it constructively. He and Bromhead had a good working relationship and worked well together, and Chard was accepted by the men.

Then, on 23 January, as the battle at Rorke's Drift ended, the siege at Eshowe, which was to last until 3 April, began. As chapter six showed, this was another case in which the evidence points to good leadership leading to unit cohesion which, in turn, maintained morale and motivation. It was an altogether different proposition to Rorke's Drift, and not

only because it was two months long: there were ten times the number of troops present, and they were not just from different regiments, but a mixture of the army and a Naval Battalion. Forming these troops into what was effectively a single fighting force would have been difficult for any leader, but Pearson did have a slight advantage in that he was not unknown to some of the army personnel whose regiments he had previously served in, and over time his combination of personal characteristics and military skills brought the separate units at Eshowe together. How that happened and the way in which primary, and secondary cohesion naturally formed in and between the units through interpersonal contact in work and off-duty activities as time went by, shows how. In fact, when following those developments at Eshowe, they so closely match modern theory that it is necessary to remember that the process was not planned.

The next engagement in the Zulu War was not another example of good leadership, but rather the failure of leadership, and its consequences. On 12 March at the Intombe River, a cumbersome ox-drawn waggon convoy heading to Luneberg, was bogged down whilst trying to cross the swollen river and had to make camp for the night. There, in the early hours of the morning, they were attacked by a large Zulu force and overwhelmed with the loss of over sixty soldiers.[9] Zulu forces were believed to be in the area, but no threat assessment had been carried out, and no serious defences had been put in place. As the result of that, the camp was caught unawares when the attack did come in the early hours of the morning whilst most men slept in their tents. The camp was completely overwhelmed and Captain Moriarty, in command of the convoy was one of the first killed in the attack. In the end though, Chelmsford was blamed for the disaster, as he had been for Isandlwana, because as Commander in Chief, it was ultimately his responsibility to ensure that things were done 'by the book', and the event shared similarities around lack of preparation with Isandlwana, which was also his responsibility.

The next engagement was the Battle of Hlobane on 28 March1879, under the leadership of Colonel Evelyn Wood who had been in command of the left, or Westernmost column under Chelmsford's original plan, and who had been operating as the only independent British force in Zululand since Isandlwana. Wood was a member of the Ashanti ring and had fought throughout the Ashanti campaign under Wolseley's command, gaining an excellent

[9] Rothwell, *Narrative of Field Operations*, p. 70.

reputation amongst the troops as he did so. Chelmsford had ordered Wood to attack the Zulus at Hlobane as a form of distraction from his (Chelmsford's) newly reinforced column that was about to advance to relieve Eshowe. But unfortunately for Wood, as the attack progressed a huge Zulu army appeared, and Wood was forced to withdraw, suffering considerable losses of personnel in the process.

Wood and his force retired into his pre-prepared position at Kambula, and the next day, 29 March 1879, the main Zulu army, who had been at Hlobane the previous day, attacked it. But Wood's preparations and defences were first class, and his men defeated the numerically superior Zulu force comprehensively. Wood was well liked by his men, and it appears that the defeat and retreat from Hlobane on the previous day, had not diminished their confidence in him as their leader at Kambula, where they fought under his orders, as a team.

Three days later, on 2 April 1879, Zulu forces attacked Chelmsford's force at Gingindlovu, where it had encamped the previous evening whilst on its way to relieve Eshowe: a mission that also signalled the start of the second invasion. Chelmsford had taken personal command of that column and his preparation and attention to detail had been incredibly detailed from the start. He had met and briefed the relieving troops sent from home and had paid close personal attention to every aspect of the operation as the column moved towards Eshowe. The same can be said for the setting up of a well defended camp at Gingindlovu. As well as formidable earthworks and a laager of wagons, it was well-armed with an overwhelming firepower, including the Naval Battalion's Gatlings and breach-loaders.

With the camp built and the defences set, Chelmsford's attention to detail continued, and he was seen to be active during the night, moving around the camp giving instructions and directions to individuals and groups. When the expected Zulu attack came the morning of 2 April, all of Chelmsford's preparations paid off and his forces won a decisive victory. The Zulu forces withdrew after just an hour and a half and suffered great losses. Later, Chelmsford commanded at the battle of Ulundi on 4 July 1879, using the same tactics of constant preparedness. The British troops marched into the fight in combat readiness, in a 'square', again with overwhelming firepower, and once again decisively defeating the Zulu army, in what was the final battle of the war.

There were two distinct ways that morale and motivation were generated, and they were linked to two types of leadership. One was arguably an older method of working under a sometimes harsh discipline and very close supervision, where everything depended on orders and the avoidance of punishment. The other was, in a sense, accidentally produced. Some of the leaders serendipitously managed to display characteristics and unconscious skills that are taught to leaders in training today: and that resulted in the production of unit cohesion.[10]

Only some of the commanding officers in the Ashanti and Zulu campaigns had the innate ability to generate unit cohesion. Wood and Wolseley plainly could, and they were successful as commanders: they could give an order to a section of men and be assured that it would be dealt with properly. However, Chelmsford's success derived from a different source, that of discipline. As at Gingindlovu, he needed to be physically present both at the detailed planning stage and during the action. He concerned himself with every detail and constantly gave instructions to individuals; in short, his effectiveness depended on his physical presence, and when he was not present, as at Isandlwana or Intombe, things were sometimes not done.

Those findings contain the answer to the main question posed at the beginning of this thesis: 'What were the sources of morale and combat motivation in the Late Victorian Army campaigning in Africa?' There were two sources: Firstly, a system of unquestioning discipline and of duty, perhaps resonant of an earlier time, coupled with strict obedience to orders, and a fear of punishment for disobedience. Secondly, a sense of unit cohesion and belonging, including a sense of obligation to the unit; still working within a structured and tightly disciplined environment with a sense of duty and obedience, but with motivation generated from within, not imposed from without. Both systems were dependent on leadership, and which system an individual encountered would of course be dependent on who his commanding officer was. However, these first recorded instances of unit cohesion in practice, mark the point of the beginning of the development of unit cohesion as it operates and is understood today. Strict discipline still had a place within all units, but the advantage of unit cohesion as a motivator was that it was driven by positive factors from within the soldier. A member of the team would be motivated to act on his initiative, without direct

[10] Robert W Walker, 'Character' *The Military Leadership Handbook*, pp. 51–53.

orders if necessary, and the reward would be in the act itself. He was doing it for the group. Under the discipline model, there would be no personal emotional reward in 'doing the right thing', action would be either taken, or not, to avoid punishment, or, maybe to attract praise to 'self'; the first action being driven by negative thoughts, and the second having no consideration for the wider unit.

There were also two supplementary questions, firstly 'Was there an understanding that men could be adversely affected by mental trauma and stress, and if so, was there an accepted method available to help those affected?' There was no understanding of mental injury of illness; those who did lose the ability to operate or continue through some unseen injury, now known or believed to be trauma or stress, were taken from the front line, and shipped home where they were given into the care of their families or left to their own devices. The second question was, 'Can any processes or actions that are now known to be good for the generation morale and motivation, be identified?' Esprit de corps certainly had its place. Born of a pride in the regiment and its achievements, it did raise spirits, or motivation, by placing a sense of duty on each individual to do their best for the unit; this can be seen as a form of competition, which is why it drove motivation.

However, it does not deal with the consequences of perceived failure and its potentially divisive aspects. Where unit cohesion is present success or failure is born by the whole unit. Everyone would be striving their best as a team, as they pursued identified group goals and they would not want to fail. But if failure did occur, it would be a group failure and something for the group to debrief and understand afterwards. However, if any individual did feel a personal sense of failure, it would still be hard to bear, but they would not be alone and isolated. They would have an opportunity to explore and understand events within a larger group and, to use more modern terminology, that would provide a learning and healing environment, which would address morale as well as motivation.

Finally, this thesis has shown that an effect remarkably like that of today's unit cohesion, was sometimes present amongst units of the Late Victorian Army campaigning in Africa, and that it increased morale and motivation amongst the troops who experienced it. Robert W. Walker writing in *The Military Leadership Handbook*, (2008) says, from a modern perspective, that 'character' is a very important factor in leadership: he defines it as, 'a cluster of capacities and effects,' and names integrity, competence, respect and inspiration

as four essential qualities that should be possessed by a leader.[11] This thesis argues that, given that unit cohesion is largely the product of good leadership, and that a factor in that was the character of the leader, it is reasonable to assume that some of the officers in South Africa may already have possessed all or some those qualities as a natural part of their character. That in turn would have improved their relationship with the troops, thus allowing the production of a form of unit cohesion to develop before any later knowledge or theory was available. But of course, the ability to initiate the presence of unit cohesion, was not necessarily the preserve of senior officers; although they were chosen for this work as they were high-profile and their actions well recorded, but leaders from the lower ranks were equally capable of fostering unit cohesion, as Lt. Bromhead showed at Rorke's Drift, and Sergeant Booth at the Intombe River.

This conclusion proves that psychological processes were at work on the presence of morale and motivation in the Late Victorian Army, and that what is now known as unit cohesion, was also sometimes present, apparently attached to particular leaders. These findings suggest further areas of research that might add a lot more to our understanding of the way the nineteenth century army functioned from a psychological, rather than purely practical point of view.

Areas that might reward research include looking for other times and places where the combination of factors that led to the appearance of unit cohesion in Ashantiland and Zululand can be detected elsewhere in British military history. This may well be best accomplished by looking at commanders and their performance and reputation, or perhaps, victories that were considered very much against the odds. Another question to ask is whether it was just a feature of British, or indeed, Western societies? Also, was this just something that was only found in the army, or could the effect be found in the Royal Navy as well? This is not an extensive list but answering these questions could well fill a gap in current knowledge by revealing the extent of the presence of unit cohesion across the army as a whole, it's effect on morale and motivation, when it was first identified, and any effects it may have had on the operations of the army.

[11] Robert W. Walker, 'Character', in *The Military Leadership Handbook*, Horn and Walker, p. 52.

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