



UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

**LOW-LEVERAGE STATES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: A COMPARATIVE
CASE STUDY OF NORWAY AND QATAR**

by

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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June 2022

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ABSTRACT

Although there has been considerable research on various aspects of international mediation, few studies have specifically addressed the issue of low-leverage states and their potential as mediators. Low-leverage states do not fit neatly into the traditional categories of “pure” or “power” mediators because of their unique status as states who often have an interest in the conflict and yet lack the same level of leverage possessed by powerful states to use in their mediation.

Through their engagement in the international arena, low-leverage-states adopt different approaches to international mediation. This thesis contributes to the existing knowledge and the understanding of the scholarly literature by presenting two different approaches for low-leverage states in international mediation: norm-driven mediation and interest-driven mediation. Those two approaches to mediation are represented by Qatar and Norway. While Norway represents norm-based mediation, Qatar represents interest-based mediation. To find out the reasons behind the different types of engagement by low-leverage states in international mediation, this thesis answered the following main research question: Why do low-leverage states engage differently in international mediation? In addition, the following sub-questions were asked: What are the motivations and the capabilities of interest-based low-leverage mediators? What are the motivations and the capabilities of norm-based low-leverage mediators? Those questions were answered through a qualitative comparative case study of Qatar and Norway. This thesis makes a significant contribution to our knowledge by drawing on more than 30 semi-structured

interviews with elite representatives, including diplomats, political leaders and politicians from different countries such as Norway, Israel, Qatar, Sudan, South Sudan, Darfur, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.

Keywords: low-leverage-states, international mediation, mediation strategy, power mediation, pure mediation, impartiality, norm-based mediation, power-based mediation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Dr Asaf Siniver and Dr Stefan Wolff for the continuous support of my PhD studies - for their patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. Their guidance helped me throughout the research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having better supervisors and mentors for my PhD thesis. Thank you for always being there to support me. I would like also to express my sincere thanks to the Norwegian loan Fund "Lånekassen" for funding my study. I am thankful to Stig Jarle Hansen for supporting my study.

I am grateful to the Qatari minister of Foreign Affairs, His excellence Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Mr Jaber Al-Harmi for his help and support. Without his support, I would not be here. I am incredibly grateful to Mr Khaled Mishaal for being supportive. I would like to express my sincere thanks to all the people who accepted to be participants in my thesis.

I would like to thank my little man, my son Omar, for being supportive and for motivating me. I still remember his encouraging words: *Mum, do not give up - you are almost there!*

Thanks to my best friend Kira for being my friend and for being there whenever I need help. Last, but not the least, I would like to thank my husband Tarek Eslim for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this thesis and my life in general.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This thesis examines the role of low-leverage states as mediators in international conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of conflicts have provided opportunities for mediation (Bercovitch, 2011b). At the same time, mediation by low-leverage states has grown significantly (Egeland, 1998; Goetschel, 2013a). Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Vatican City, South Africa, Switzerland, and Qatar are examples of low-leverage states that have been involved in a disproportionate number of international mediations (Slim, 1992). However, few studies on international mediation have focused on the mediation conducted by those states (Schulz, 2016; Slim, 1992). This thesis considers Norway and Qatar as examples of case studies. Norway and Qatar are both low-leverage states. However, they are engaged in international mediation in different ways. While Norway is a norm-based mediator, Qatar is an interest-based mediator.

To understand the ways low-leverage states engage themselves in international mediation, this thesis sought to answer the following main research question: Why do low-leverage states engage differently in international mediation? In addition are the following sub-questions: What are the motivations and the capabilities of interest-based low-leverage mediators? What are the motivations and the capabilities of norm-based low-leverage mediators?

The research questions are answered through a qualitative comparative case study of two low-leverage states, Norway and Qatar.

International mediation scholars (Smith, 1994; Svensson, 2007b; Zartman & Touval, 1985; Zartman & Touval, 1996) suggest two categories of mediators: pure mediators and power mediators. A power mediator has both interest and leverage to push the disputants towards embracing a compromise (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). A typical pure mediator lacks both leverage and specific interest in the conflict (Svensson, 2007b). While scholars have focussed on the power mediator who possesses considerable leverage and the pure mediator who lacks it, there have been fewer studies of the mediators who possess limited leverage and are represented by low-leverage states. Low-leverage states do not fit neatly into the categories of “pure” or “power” mediators because of their unique status as being full states who often have an interest in the conflict (Zartman & Touval, 1996) and yet lack the same level of leverage possessed by many larger states to use in their mediation (Slim, 1992).

The mediators are classified into two categories based on interest: Norm-based mediators and interest-based mediators. The norm-based mediation means that the mediator is unlikely to have a vested interest in the conflict or the mediation outcomes. Additionally, the mediator is driven by norms and values and aims at promoting international peace and ending the conflict. Those mediators lack specific interest in the mediation process and are driven by liberal normative motivation (Leira, 2013).

In direct contrast to norm-based mediation is interest based-mediation. Interest-based mediators usually engage themselves in mediation due to interest-based motives. These interests may take the form of either a security strategy or a way of increasing status (Leira, 2013). This is not to say that interest-

driven mediation is better than normative-driven mediation or vice versa, but it is important to note that each of them possesses unique tools in international mediation, given their different sources of motivation.

This thesis seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge and increase understanding of the scholarly literature in different ways. First, it discusses low-leverage states in international mediation, a topic that is insufficiently covered in the current literature. Taking this a step further, their location is placed on the spectrum of leverage. Secondly, the behaviour of low-leverage states in international mediation is explored, where they have a limited level of influence and behave in a certain way. Thirdly, the research explored which strategy/ies low-leverage states employed in their mediation process.

This research contributes to the existing knowledge by evoking two types of mediation approaches by low-leverage states. The approaches are interest-driven and norms-driven, represented by Norway and Qatar, respectively. Focusing on two specific low-leverage state mediators with different approaches, Qatar and Norway, the thesis aims to examine those two approaches: a norm-driven approach and an interest-driven approach.

Two cases represent Norway's mediation experience: its mediation leading up to the Oslo Accord 1993 and its mediation role in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan 2005. Two cases also represent the Qatari mediation experience: the Qatari mediation in The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) 2011 and Qatar's mediation role in reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, which was accumulated by the Fatah- Hamas Doha Agreement

or what is known as “The Doha Palestinian Unity Agreement”.

The context of the study and problem statement

Since the end of the Cold War, low-leverage states have played a more active role in international relations than in the past, especially in security affairs and promoting peace (Steinmetz, 2016). By the end of the Cold War, the increasing number of ethnic and internal conflicts was parallel to the growing role of low-leverage states in international mediation and provided opportunities for mediation (Bercovitch, 2011b; Goetschel, 2013b). The specific problem of interest was that the role of low-leverage states in mediation had not been given adequate attention in the literature. International mediation literature has conceived of mediators as being either “pure” or “power” mediators (Smith, 1994). However, low-leverage states do not fit easily into this dichotomy because their position straddles the line between these categories.

The low-leverage state cannot match the influence of a power mediator as it does not have the same level of leverage as the powerful mediators. Despite this, it is still a state with some degree of leverage (economic means) and additional leverage resulting from its ties to the powerful states. Additionally, like other states in mediation, the low-leverage state usually has an interest in the mediation outcomes (Zartman & Touval, 1996), meaning that it may not be entirely a pure mediator (Böhmeit, 2015).

Thus, more research is needed to understand the drive for low-leverage states to act as mediators in conflicts. In addition, the tools and strategies that the low-leverage states employ in their mediation can be better understood. This

is compounded by the fact that success in international mediation is challenging to define and can be considered in many ways (Bercovitch, 2011b; Folberg & Taylor, 1986; Kelman, Bercovitch, & Rubin, 1992; Kleiboer, 1996; Lall, 2014; Mitchell, 1988; Moore, 2014; Vuković, 2014). Therefore, the problem requires a better understanding of low-leverage state motivation for filling the role of mediator in conflicts to appreciate their approach to international mediation.

Intended Research Contribution

The intended contribution of the thesis findings is to present two different approaches of international mediation adopted by low-leverage states: a norm-driven mediation approach and an interest-driven mediation approach, represented by Norway and Qatar, respectively. Few scholars beyond Slim (1992) and Eriksson (2015) have directly studied low-leverage states as mediators, even though low-leverage state mediation has grown in prominence since the end of the Cold War (Goetschel, 2013b). Therefore, this represents a broad gap in the current literature, which this thesis will fill.

However, even beyond serving to fill this gap, this thesis helps answer several calls for research in the literature. Firstly (Kelleher, 2006) calls for further studies on the Norwegian approach to mediation, as he mentions that it is worth studying. This thesis answers the call of both Bercovitch and Fretter for the need to use real-world cases and compare mediation processes to effectively study mediation (Bercovitch, 2011b; Bercovitch & Fretter, 2007). Additionally, this thesis is further based on Svensson's research on pure mediators and

power mediators. Svensson was adamant about the lack of progress in the debate on power mediators and pure mediators (Svensson, 2007b).

Furthermore, this thesis explores an aspect Bercovitch, and Houston (2000) ignored. They mention that communication facilitation strategies led the mediators to be passive in the mediation process and restricted their role to merely channelling information to the disputants due to a lack of leverage or any means to influence the negotiations (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000). Bercovitch and Houston did not mention the case of low-leverage states who possess limited leverage and choose to be either a facilitator, such as Norway or a manipulator, such as Qatar.

The overall structure of the thesis takes the form of eight chapters, including this introductory chapter which includes the research methodology. Chapter two covers the literature review and the conceptual framework. Chapter three offers a comprehensive background on Norway and Qatar in international mediation. Chapter four covers the first case study: Norway and the Oslo Accords 1993. Chapter five discusses the second case study: Norway's role in the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Chapter six presents case study three: The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) in 2011. Chapter seven handles the fourth case study: the Fatah-Hamas Doha Agreement in 2012. The final chapter draws upon the entire thesis. It consists of two parts: research findings and conclusion.

Methodology

The methodology for this thesis is a qualitative comparative case study. Qualitative research is a descriptive, exploratory approach to research that takes a holistic, subjective approach to explore a phenomenon (Cho & Trent, 2006). Rather than taking a phenomenon out of its context and studying it in a purely abstract sense, the qualitative approach allows the researcher to study it in its native context and thereby more fully understand it (Creswell, 1994; Ravitch & Carl, 2015).

The type of research question determines the research method (Thomas, 2017; Yin, 2017). "How and why" questions indicate that the study is qualitative. Based on the main research question, "Why do low-leverage states differently engage in international mediation?" it can be established that this is a qualitative, exploratory case study (Thomas, 2017; Yin, 2017). Therefore, comparing qualitative and quantitative methods is not necessary for this thesis (Ravitch & Carl, 2015). Rather than building a model entirely based on existing theory, qualitative research allows the researcher to ask open-ended questions that elicit participants' fuller range of responses (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). This makes qualitative research apt for understanding problems about which little is known or poorly understood problems (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015).

The specific research design chosen is a qualitative, multiple-case study, a case study method involving case analysis and a comparison of a small number of cases (Bennett & George, 2004). A case study is preferred when the researcher examines a contemporary issue for which he/she cannot manipulate

the appropriate behaviour and when “how and why” questions are central to the research (Dooley, 2002; Stake, 1995, 2013; Yin, 2017). Thus, the case study is preferred in this thesis because it handles such a contemporary issue: the engagement of low-leverage states in international mediation. Additionally, in this research, the researcher has no control over behavioural events and the most critical aspects that the research question addressed is “why” questions, such as: Why do low-leverage states engage differently in international mediation?

The case study approach is a robust qualitative design that focuses on looking at the phenomenon being studied in a specific case and drawing useful conclusions about the phenomenon (Yin, 2013). Out of the qualitative methods, the case study approach is especially suited to studying context problems because of its depth. Case studies draw data from multiple sources and comparatively analyse these data to create a more accurate depiction of the case under study (Hartley, 2004). Finally, a case study is a powerful tool to identify new variables and generate new hypotheses (George and Bennett 2005, p. 20).

This thesis employs a multiple-case study (Yin, 2017) or case study method (George & Bennett, 2005). In this approach, a researcher analyses two or more cases individually and then carries out cross-case comparisons to see how the cases are similar and how they differ (George and Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2014). Although a single-case study is more easily carried out, it does not give as much contextual information as a multiple-case study. This type of analysis offers more profound insight into contextual factors so long as the two or more

cases are meaningfully different in context. Additionally, a multiple-case study is more robust than a single-case study, and the evidence from a multiple-case study is powerful and more compelling than from a single-case study (Herriott & Firestone, 1983).

Accordingly, the current thesis used a multiple-case study approach that considered four cases for two low-leverage state mediators representing Qatar and Norway. Therefore, cross-case analysis of these four instances allowed the researcher to draw meaningful conclusions about how the two approaches were different. The case study approach is not without its pitfalls; the main criticism of case study research is the lack of generalization.

It is not easy to generalize from one (single-case study) or two or a few cases, multiple-case study (George & Bennett, 2005; Thomas, 2017; Yin, 2013). To bridge this gap, one should distinguish between statistical generalization and analytical generalization. Statistical generalization is used in quantitative studies which contain many subjects, and it is easy in those cases to generalize the findings to the population. Although analytical generalization is specific to case studies, a case study does not represent a sample; case studies are not “sampling units”, and their numbers are too small to represent any larger population, so the goal is to expand and generalize theories (Thomas, 2017; Yin, 2013, 2017).

Research Design

Research design links the research questions to the research conclusions.

This linkage goes through data collection and data analysis. The research design should address the research objective, the research question/s, relevant propositions or hypotheses (if available), the unit of analysis, case selection and finally the criteria to interpret the findings (George & Bennett, 2005; Stake, 2013; Yin, 2014; Yin, 2017).

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The research objective can be one of the following: theoretical\ configuration idiographic, disciplined configurative, heuristic, theory testing or building studies (George & Bennett, 2005). The objective of this particular study is a heuristic one. The heuristic case study identifies new variables and hypotheses. Outliers or deviant cases are helpful for the heuristic purpose. The heuristic objective in this thesis presents two different approaches of mediation; the interest-driven mediation approach and the norm-driven mediation approach. It should be kept in mind that this thesis focuses on specific aspects of each case study which are considered parameters of the cases to be employed in the data analysis. This research design includes specific questions to cover those

aspects or parameters that reflect the research objective and apply them to each case to standardise data collection and a systematic comparison (George & Bennett, 2005). The main parameters for this thesis are motivation, leverage (capabilities), impartiality/biased, and finally, the implications of being a pure or power mediator.

The second component of the research design is the research question. As mentioned above, the primary research question is, why do low-leverage states engage differently in international mediation? The sub-research questions are: What are the motivations and the capabilities of interest-based low-leverage mediators? What are the motivations and the capabilities of norm-based low-leverage mediators?

A comparative case study research methodology is used to answer the main research question and sub-research questions. A case study has two fundamental parts: the subject and the object. The subject is the case itself, and the object is the analytical frame (Thomas, 2017).

Based on the research question, this exploratory study presents two different approaches to international mediation; interest-driven mediation and norm-driven mediation, represented by Qatar and Norway, respectively. The subjects in this thesis are Norway, and two cases of mediation represent Qatar international mediation each of them. The objects or the analytical frames of this thesis are the interest-driven mediation approach and norm-driven mediation approach.

The case selection is based on the preference of the researcher, who selects the cases based on their relevance to the research objective: a heuristic case study intended to identify new variables or parameters. Usually, there are three reasons to choose a specific case study. Firstly, a case may be chosen based on pre-existing local knowledge. In this instance, the researcher already knew much about the case and needed to understand some specific features better. Secondly, a case may be chosen because it is a key case study, well known, and is a good representative example. Finally, the case may be an interesting outlier case study because it departs from the norm (Thomas, 2017).

There are many options of countries to be used as case studies for this thesis. For example, there is the opportunity to use Norway and Qatar and Sweden and Oman. It is known that Sweden and Norway are similar in their international mediation. Both of them are Scandinavian countries that adopt a norm-driven mediation approach. In this thesis, Norway is preferred over Sweden because Norway is better known than Sweden in the international mediation field due to its mediation in the most famous conflict, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Oman is also known for its role as a Middle East mediator. Oman succeeded in bringing the USA and Iran together for historic talks. However, the researcher chooses Qatar over Oman because Oman adopts a mediation approach similar to the Norwegian approach. Qatar is different from Norway. Qatar uses its financial resources as an incentive in the mediation process.

In this thesis, Norway and Qatar are each chosen for different reasons. Norway is chosen because Norway represents the most typical of the low-leverage norm-driven mediation approach. Qatar is chosen because it behaves

differently than Norway, despite sharing the same low-leverage status. Qatar represents a different approach in mediation: the interest-driven mediation approach.

Beyond being low-leverage states, however, marked differences emerge when looking at their mediation experiences, resulting from different approaches adopted by each. On the one hand, Norway's mediation approach is based on a combination of impartiality, confidentiality, consistency, and collaboration between its foreign ministry and nongovernmental organizations (Lieberfeld, 1995). Additionally, the Norwegian model represents international mediation's moral and humanitarian image (Höglund & Svensson, 2009). Norway represents a typical normative ideal of a low-stakes mediator representing and promoting liberal Western values (Wivel, 2013), and its mediation promotes peace globally (Leira, 2013). On the other hand, Qatari officials rely on personal contacts for mediation and the Qatari wealth to pay for the disputants to keep talks going. Qatar is regarded as a prominent mediation authority in the Middle East, conducive to Qatari investment (Barakat, 2014).

It is not only the mediators who matter in the selection of the case studies but also the conflicts. Four cases featuring conflict are selected for this research.

The first case is Norway's mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis, culminating in the Oslo Accord of 1993. The second case is Norway's mediation which led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan) in 2005. The third case is Qatar's mediation in Sudan (Darfur), culminating in the Doha

Agreements in 2010. The fourth case is Qatar's mediation between Hamas and Fateh (2008).

Those conflicts are selected due to their significance. For example, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is considered one of the most protracted conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries. The Sudan-South Sudan conflict is significant because it witnessed the genocide of millions of lives. In the same vein, the Darfur conflict is considered a humanitarian crisis. Many people were killed and displaced. Lastly, the Hamas-Fatah conflict is essential due to its connection to the Israeli-Palestinian peace relations.

Furthermore, the case of Norway's mediation in the Oslo accords is selected because it is different from its mediation between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. While in the case of Oslo Accords, Norway was the sole mediator, Norway was among the Troika in the case of its mediation between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM. In the same vein, the case of Qatar's mediation in Darfur's conflict is selected because Qatar was not a sole mediator – Qatar was among a group of mediators that included the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU). The case of the Qatari mediation between Hamas and Fatah is selected to represent an example of Qatari as a sole mediator.

To study low-leverage state mediation, the unit of analysis is the phenomenon of low-leverage states' international mediation. To conduct the case studies described in this thesis, a structured, focused comparison method is used. It is structured because the researcher created questions that reflect the research

objectives and applied those questions to each case to standardise the data collection and make a systematic comparison. It is focused on those only specific aspects of the cases are examined. The cases are undertaken with a specific research objective in mind (George & Bennett, 2005; Stake, 1995, 2013; Yin, 2014 and 2017).

Data Collection

To collect data for any case study research, a researcher should follow the case study protocol, use multiple data sources (evidence), create a case study database, and maintain a chain of evidence (Yin, 2014). For data collection in case studies, there is no statistical sampling where the sample should represent the population. In the case of studies, the data are collected on the basis of theoretical sampling, which aims to deeply understand the cases and facilitate theory development (Stake, 1995, 2013; Yin, 2014 and 2017). The common theoretical sampling approach is to select the extreme case pair (e.g. good vs bad). The case study method is more effective when the researcher writes general questions for each case to standardise the data requirements. As a result, it is easier to compare the results from all cases. Unless the researcher asks the same questions of each case, the results cannot be compared and systematically analysed (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2014).

Relevant data for a case study may be collected through interviews, participant observation, direct observation, physical artefact collection, document collection, and archival records (Thomas, 2017; Yin, 2013). At least three sources of data should inform a case study to allow for good triangulation of

data (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2013). This thesis uses the following three data sources: interviews with officials and diplomats representing the disputants and the mediators, document collection, and archival records.

This thesis significantly contributes to our knowledge of these case studies by drawing on more than 30 semi-structured interviews. Those interviews were conducted with elite representatives, including diplomats, political leaders and politicians from different countries like Norway, Israel, Qatar, Sudan, South Sudan, Darfur, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. For example, Khaled Mishaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, Hussam Badran (Hamas). From Fatah, Azzam Alahmad and Mohamad Abu-Khoush. From Norway, Jan Egeland, the Norwegian ex-foreign minister and Hilde Johnson, the Norwegian ex-minister of development. From Israel, Yossi Beilin and Yoel Singer. From Qatar, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lowlowa Al-Khater), and the ex-ambassador of Qatar to Sudan. from Sudan, Altigani Sissi and Hassn Omar. From South Sudan, Pagan Amom. Additionally, General Sumbeiywo, the ex-head of IGAD.

According to the snowballing method, these interviewees were found where the interviewees recruited other participants or interviewees. While some interviews took thirty minutes, others took up to two hours. Some interviews were face to face interviews in Qatar. Most of the interviews were techno-based interviews conducted via the phone or Skype. The techno-based interviews were chosen due to either finance limitations or security limitations. For example, interviews in Sudan, South Sudan, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel raised security concerns. It was considered that enough data had been

collected in the interviews when the interviewees started to repeat each other or when the issue was clear. These semi-structured interviews were valuable and greatly enriched the thesis.

Interviews are one of the most important sources of evidence in case study data collection-(Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998). Interviews can be unstructured or semi-structured (Thomas, 2017). Using unstructured interviews may generate rich data and uncover unexpected evidence by utilizing open-ended questions (Daymon & Holloway, 2010). However, this thesis utilised semi-structured interviews as the primary source of data collection.

Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to effectively understand the participants' perspectives (Daymon & Holloway, 2010). Semi-structured interviews represent a compromise between open-endedness and topic orientation (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). That is to say, they have some degree of structure, being prepared in advance by the researcher so as to ensure that the data collected can answer the research questions. However, they are only semi-structured in that this guide does not serve as a script for the interviews so much as a list of topics to cover. The researcher remains free to include additional probing questions if something is unclear, ask follow-up questions if there seems to be more of interest to be said about a topic or diverge if a relevant digression suggests itself in the course of the interview (Turner 2010).

Thus, these interviews are a flexible approach to collecting data that is assured to answer the research questions while at the same time staying true to the open-ended, exploratory spirit of qualitative inquiry. In order to ensure the

quality of the data collected by the interview, a researcher should follow the case study protocol (Yin, 2014). A copy of the case study protocol for this thesis is included as an appendix. The researcher prepared questions that covered the main aspects reflecting the research objective in the interviews. Those questions were then applied to each case to ensure standardization and systematic comparison of data collection.

Qualitative research does not aim for specific sample sizes (Mason, 2010). The researcher interviewed the officials and diplomats from each of the mediating nations and each of the disputing nations who participated in the mediation cases. Although in-person interviewing is ideal, budget and security concerns dictated that some interviews had to be carried out over Skype or by phone.

The second source of data collection for this study was document collection. This entailed the compilation of documents relevant to the mediation attempts, such as declassified diplomatic communications between the relevant parties, transcripts of negotiations, etc. These were requested from the relevant parties in photocopy or digital form or found through public resources such as government websites. If these were not made available to the researcher, then what data can be obtained from publicly available sources were included, and the analysis was carried out with a clear caveat in the results noting which sources refused to provide which documentation.

When reviewing policy and process documents, a researcher should be aware that they do not always reflect reality accurately because they are out of date

(Yin, 2014). An example of those documents in this study is the declassified diplomatic communication between Yasir Arafat and the Norwegian government.

The third data source used for this research were archival records such as correspondence letters, diaries, minutes, annual reports, etc. It is claimed that archival records are more reliable than other documents because people use them for record-keeping (Baskarada, 2014). Collecting these data resulted in a careful review of scholarly literature and news coverage of the mediation attempts. These data served to add additional context and grounding for the study and offer an objective metric against which to measure the participants' perceptions.

Data Analysis

Data analysis was carried out in three stages. First, qualitative thematic analysis was carried out on each individual data set. Secondly, case study triangulation was applied within each case. Finally, a cross-case analysis was carried out across the four cases. Thematic analysis followed the six-step approach outlined by Clarke and Braun (2013). This process was applied to each data set and explained below.

First, the researcher carefully read and familiarised herself with the data to ensure a firm grounding. Secondly, the researcher assigned codes to the data. This was done using a codebook. Based on a careful review of the existing literature and the general topics it suggested would occur in a study of international mediation, the researcher developed an initial codebook before starting.

This initial codebook consisted of all the codes the researcher expected to encounter in the data but was expanded to add new codes as necessary. Codes represented unique ideas in the data, such as "motivation" or "leverage". Once codes had been assigned, the researcher moved on to the third stage, searching for themes in the data. An example of a theme might be "the state leverage in mediation". Once themes were found, the fourth stage consisted of exclusively comparing those themes against the data to ensure accurate reflection. Then, in the fifth stage, the researcher ensured all themes were unique and well defined. In the sixth and final stage, the researcher prepared the themes in a report that lists them and their significance, contextualizing the results in the problem's specifics and the general literature (Clarke and Braun, 2013).

Thematic data analysis is the preferred approach to data analysis in qualitative case studies. It provides a comprehensive way to compile the results of qualitative work. Unlike other qualitative methods such as phenomenology, a case study does not have strong philosophical underpinnings (Stake, 2013). Another competing analysis model is process tracing (Collier, 2011). Process tracing focuses on tracing out the causal "threads" in qualitative data through multiple data sources, and in this regard, it is similar to the triangulation approach as described below. However, one common problem the process tracing approach faces, similar to the issues described above concerning quantitative research, is that missing variables in the process tracing can misdirect the research (Collier, 2011). By contrast, the thematic analysis focuses primarily on exploring what information is in the data (Braun and Terry, 2013). Thus,

while it does not have the causal-inferential power of process tracing, it is superior for the not-yet-widely-researched field of small state mediation.

Once the data from each data set had been analysed through thematic analysis, the researcher applied case study triangulation (Yin, 2013). Triangulation represents the process of comparatively analysing the datasets within each case, noting their similarities and differences and reporting these. Places in which the data corroborate one another suggest firm conclusions. At the same time, those in which they differ are of interest due to potential differences in perceptions. Where the datasets disagree, the researcher would theorise potential reasons for this disagreement based on the data and the relevant literature.

For example, suppose the interviews in the current study had suggested that one of the two nations understudies, say Norway, had used a power-based mediation approach. However, the actual documents and transcripts on record suggested that its mediation approach was more like that of a pure mediator. In that case, the researcher might have theorised that this discrepancy resulted from the interviewed participants' desire to project their home country in a more positive light. On the other hand, if the interviews had suggested that Qatar used a leverage-based approach and the final written agreements include provisions for economic rewards to the disputants, then the two sources would be deemed to agree and strongly support that Qatar acted as a power-based mediator.

The final level of analysis was between cases (Yin, 2013). This type of analysis is similar to triangulation but with a greater emphasis on the differences and the reasons. Differences provide essential information if they can be linked to contextual factors. In the current study, understanding how the specific contextual factors in the four cases under study contributed to their differing outcomes provided meaningful insight into the factors determining the success of low-leverage state mediation in international conflicts (George and Bennett, 2005).

Reliability and Validity

Issues of reliability and validity are essential considerations in research to ensure that the effort is not wasted and the results are meaningful. In qualitative research, reliability refers to the credibility or the researcher's measures to ensure that she/he has represented reality accurately (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). Because qualitative studies are so deeply grounded in the subjective, they will almost be replicable in the same way as quantitative research is. Therefore, this notion of reliability is a poor match. Instead, qualitative research assures reliability by ensuring that the findings reported accurately reflect the actual data (Cho and Trent, 2006).

Toward this end, the researcher took great care in every analysis step to ensure that the data supported all themes and conclusions drawn from themes. This was proved through the liberal use of direct quotations from the data to support all claims made. For example, if a theme emerged indicating that low-leverage states acted as pure mediators, then this theme was supported by

multiple quotes from the data, allowing the researcher to convincingly illustrate that this theme did emerge from the results rather than being a misrepresented assumption.

Validity is a twofold problem; it must be considered in terms of internal and external validity. Internal validity is not applicable in this study because it is an exploratory case study rather than an explanatory case study. Internal validity is applied in explanatory case studies. An explanatory case study examines how and why the event “x” led to event “y” (Yin, 2014).

External validity deals with how well the results apply to a wider context. This type of validity is called transferability in qualitative research (Cho and Trent, 2006). Although qualitative research does not expressly seek to create transferable findings like quantitative research does (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015), the current research's contextual nature allows for a strong understanding of the similar circumstances to which the results apply. Because case studies, and especially multiple-case studies, seek to capture the underlying context of a phenomenon in addition to the phenomenon itself (Yin, 2013), they provide enough data on the relevant circumstances that a reader—such as a future researcher seeking to apply the results of the study—can reasonably determine whether the two situations are similar enough that the findings can be applied. Additionally, this strong depiction of context will allow future researchers to determine where the findings do not apply and accordingly choose different contexts to explore in future studies. External validity is relevant to this study despite its qualitative nature because the topic has not been given much prior attention in the literature (Yin, 2013). Accordingly, the findings of this thesis are

reported in such a way as to ensure that future researchers can determine how and when they apply when employing or expanding upon the theory developed herein.

In sum, in this thesis, the data were collected following case study protocol, using multiple sources of evidence from at least three sources: semi-structured interviews, document collection and finally, archival records such as correspondence, letters, diaries, minutes and annual reports. The interviews took place with officials and diplomats representing the mediators and the disputants. Semi-structured interviews were the primary source of data. The researcher prepared an interview schedule for with questions that covered the main aspects reflecting the research aims and research questions. Those questions were applied to each case to ensure standardization and systematic comparison of data collection. Data analysis was carried out in three stages: a qualitative thematic analysis was carried out on each case; secondly, case study triangulation was applied within each case; and finally, a cross-case analysis was carried out across the four cases.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Literature Review

According to the research questions, the literature review section covers the following subjects: Definitions of international mediation and low-leverage states; secondly, the motivation of the states; thirdly, the behaviour of the states which are engaged in international mediation —whether power mediators or pure mediators; fourthly, the strategies the states usually follow in international mediation —facilitation, formulation, or manipulation strategies; and finally, the necessity of the state to be an impartial or biased mediator.

Definitions of international mediation and low-leverage states

In understanding the role of low-leverage states in international mediation, it is first essential to understand the terms low-leverage states, small states, and international mediation.

There is no agreement among the scholars on the definition of “international mediation” (Bingham, 1986; Kleiboer, 1996; Moore, 2014; L. Singer, 2018; Sisk, 1996). There is also no agreement on the definition of “small states” (Archer & Nugent, 2002; Hey, 2004; Maass, 2009). Different scholars define international mediation in different ways. This thesis focuses on the following scholars’ definitions of international mediation because those scholars cover different aspects, characteristics and types of international mediation. Some scholars, such as Moore, focus on mediation as a voluntary process. They focus on the voluntary aspect of the mediation process where the disputants voluntarily ask for mediation. For example, Moore (2014) states that mediation is

the process of voluntarily interceding between two parties who cannot resolve their differences on their own.

Other scholars take a different approach and describe mediation as a coercive process. One example of those scholars is Sisk (1996), who defines mediation as either a mediator wanting to stop the violence at all costs or a multitude of would-be mediators pulling at the situation in different or even opposite directions (Sisk, 1996). Other scholars choose to focus on neutrality in the mediation process, such as Bingham (1986).

Some scholars introduce a comprehensive definition of international mediation. An example of those scholars is Bercovitch (1992, p.7), who defines mediation as “related to but distinct from the parties’ efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect, or influence their perceptions or behaviour, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch,1992, p.7).

This definition is broad and therefore allows for incorporating many other approaches. However, comprehension is not needed to define mediation in this thesis because, in this case, the mediator is a low-leverage state that does not offer mediation but waits for an invitation from the disputants to intermedicate (Bercovitch, 2011b).

This thesis also excludes Sisk’s (1996) definition, which describes the mediator as a power mediator who uses a manipulative strategy, because this does not match the focus of this thesis, in which the mediators are low-leverage

states who do not have the same level of leverage as a powerful mediator.

Based on this discussion and for this research, which focuses on low-leverage state mediation, this thesis has developed the following definition:

Based on the purpose of this thesis which focuses on low-leverage states as mediators, international mediation is defined as an instrument of conflict resolution where the needy disputants seek the assistance of low-leverage states voluntarily to be a mediator. The low leverage state plays a role of an impartial, mutually accepted mediator to reach a settlement. Due to its lower leverage, the low leverage state is supposed to behave as a pure mediator who cannot manipulate the disputants.

Definition low-leverage states

In international relations, there is no commonly accepted way to distinguish small states from large states among scholars (Archer & Nugent, 2002; Hanf & Soetendorp, 2014; Hey, 2004; Lee & Smith, 2008; Magnette & Nicolaïdis, 2005; Neumann, 2004; Thorhallsson, 2017; Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006).

Based on their economic power, states could be classified into large and small states. This classification matches the negotiations on distributional effects (Braveboy-Wagner, 2003; Hey, 2004; Katzenstein, 1985; Steinberg, 2002). In the negotiations on armed conflict or security issues, the states may be classified into small states or major powers. This classification is based on the military capacity of the states (Keohane, 1969; Rickli, 2008; Rothstein, 1968), or population (Baillie, 1998).

Indeed, the scholarship offers two approaches to defining small states: the quantitative and the qualitative approaches (Archer & Nugent, 2002; Lee & Smith, 2008). The quantitative approach classifies the states according to absolute criteria such as population, geographical size, gross domestic product (GDP), and military power (Archer & Nugent, 2002). The qualitative approach instead examines descriptive factors such as the state's relations to its environment and the degree to which the state can influence international affairs (Hey, 2003, 2004; Keohane, 1969), as well as by the power exercised in its external environment (Wivel & Mouritzen, 2004).

Considering only the quantitative definition is problematic. For example, one natural quantitative measure might be a country's GDP because this is a quantitative measure that incorporates an easy measure of size based on wealth. For example, Qatar's GDP is estimated at USD 404.109 billion in terms of purchasing power parity, making it the 47th highest GDP in the world and, at USD 145,894 per capita GDP, the highest per capita in the world (IMF, 2017). However, in terms of actual geographic size, another obvious quantitative measure of state size, Qatar is a mere 11,581 square kilometres, making it 159th out of 199 countries in terms of geographic size (IMF, 2017). Therefore, with two such starkly opposed quantitative size measures, is Qatar a small state or a large state?

However, in international mediation, the actual size of the state is not the appropriate criterion to determine the weight of the state as a mediator, nor is it the proper criterion to distinguish between states as mediators. Moreover, using the quantitative or the qualitative approach to determine the performance

of a state in international mediation may not be appropriate. In order to determine the smallness or largeness of a state in international mediation, Panke (2012) helps resolve this issue by suggesting that one consider size as a relational context. To determine whether a state is small or big in any field, one should characterise one actor relative to another in a specific context (Panke, 2012).

Based on the context of international mediation, states could be classified according to each state's leverage. The leverage is the ability of the mediator to move one or both of the disputants in an intended direction and can be utilised to force them into accepting the proposed agreement (Zartman & Touval, 1996). In other words, low-leverage states in international mediation are the states who do not have leverage. However, they have less influence on the disputants than the power mediators. Thus, there is a positive relationship between the state's leverage and its influence or power. The more leverage the state has the more it is able to move one or both of the disputants in an intended direction. Low-leverage states have more difficulties than power states. In this sense, low-leverage states face more difficulties in using bargaining strategies such as concession or threat. They are also supposed to be limited in affecting the mediation process or outcomes.

Low-leverage states in international mediation are the states that have limited leverage compared to the superpower mediators. The superpowers are privileged as major actors with access to unlimited economic resources and hard power capabilities and strategies (Stokke, 2012). In contrast, the low-leverage states do not have the ability to force the disputants to reach an agreement

because they usually lack the stick. In other words, they do not have the capacity to exert pressure on the disputants to sign an agreement. However, they have the carrots represented in their economic resources. They may use their economic resources as incentives to encourage the disputants to reach an agreement. In other words, they can reward the disputants to encourage them to reach an agreement but cannot punish or threaten the disputants to force them to an agreement. In addition, they mostly rely on trust-based leverage, which is represented in historical and cultural ties with the disputants. Moreover, in their mediation, they usually need the backing of an international key factor as they have limited influence in the international arena.

Low-leverage states do have economic resources -their motivations and the way they use their economic resources in the mediation process determines whether the low-leverage states are norm-based mediators or interest-based mediators.

They have a limited supply of resources to encourage or discourage certain behaviours and move parties towards an agreement (Beardsley, 2009). Low-leverage states are limited in their leverage, which is often an essential tool in international mediation (Zartman & Touval,1996). However, this does not necessarily mean that they are ineffective international mediators.

There is a diverse set of approaches to classifying the mediator's sources of leverage. For example, Zartman and Touval (1996) classify the mediator's sources of leverage into five categories: persuasion, extraction, termination, deprivation, and gratification (Zartman and Touval, 1996). Where, (1)

persuasion is the ability of the mediator to convince the disputants that the resolution is necessary. Persuasion refers to a form of facilitation in mediation. (2) Extraction is the ability of the mediator to extract an attractive proposal to present to each disputant. (3) Termination is the ability of the mediator to withdraw from the mediation process or the ability of the mediator to walk away. This source of power depends on the parties' desire for the mediator to engage. The leverage or power of this resource would be undermined if the mediator were to want the mediation process to continue more than the disputants. (4) Deprivation is the ability of the mediator to refrain from granting resources to the disputants. Deprivation typically involves the shifting of resources from one party to the other. (5) Gratification is the ability of the mediator to provide incentives to the disputants to encourage them to reach and accept the agreement (Zartman, Touval, Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2007; Zartman & Touval,1996).

For persuasion, Zartman and Touval (1996) assert that the need of the disputant to reach conflict resolution is considered leverage for the mediator. It is considered leverage because it strengthens the mediator's position (Zartman & Touval, 1996). The ability of the mediator to persuade the disputants would increase when the disputants badly need a solution. The need of the disputants is increased by changes in local, regional and international circumstances. For example, the PLO requested Norwegian mediation after the Iraqi crisis because the PLO had financial and political problems because of its supporting Iraq in Kuwait's invasion. Moreover, by that time, the world had already witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus producing a unipolar

arena with the USA as the only remaining superpower or hegemon country. The change in the regional and international context weakened the PLO's position and left it more in need of peace with Israel (Lieberfeld, 2008). In the same fashion, the leverage resources could be negative sanctions or positive incentives (Kleiboer, 1996; Touval & Zartman, 1985). Leverage resources could also be material, such as economic aid, or immaterial, such as psychological pressure (Siniver, 2006).

Differently, Reid suggests that leverage consists of two different fundamental components: capability and credibility. By capability leverage, Reid means the extent to which the mediator uses material strength (economic resources) to coerce a conflict settlement. While capability leverage is reliant on coercion, credibility leverage does not. Credibility leverage relies on contextual knowledge, information, historical relations with the disputants, and cultural relations of the disputants (Reid, 2017). In the same vein, Princen (2014) considers information and interest as intangible forms of leverage. Additionally, Beardsley (2008) classifies leverage into tangible and intangible leverage. Where tangible leverage refers to material resources, intangible leverage refers to the ability of the mediator to use the prestige and make promises that will be believed (Beardsley, 2008).

Based on the above discussion, this thesis classifies leverage into two broad groups: trust-based leverage and power-based leverage.

Trust-based leverage is not a coercive tool in mediation. Under the umbrella of trust-based leverage, the credibility of Reid's can be included (Reid, 2017).

The persuasion and extraction categories of Zartman and Touval are considered tools of trust-based leverage (Zartman and Touval, 1996). Additionally, the intangible leverage of Beardsley is considered a type of trust-based leverage (Beardsley, 2008). Trust-based leverage is reliant on the previous relationship of the mediator with the disputants (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000), that is to say, the relationship or alliance between the mediator and the parties, such as bonds, shared history and values and common interest.

These relationships help in establishing familiarity, understanding, trust and acceptability of the mediator (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Carnevale & Peggnetter, 1985). This relationship is often represented as historical ties, cultural ties, and personal ties. Historical ties could be a colonial legacy, a previous mediation attempt, or humanitarian aid. Cultural ties could consist of ethnic ties or a shared religious identity. Meanwhile, personal ties are often a by-product of NGO networking (through humanitarian aid and research) or could refer to high-profile personal ties in personal diplomacy, such as the case of Qatar.

Power-based leverage is represented in usage any pressure or coercion on the disputants to reach an agreement. Under this type of leverage, the three categories of Zartman and Touval, termination, deprivation, and gratification, are included (Zartman and Touval, 1996). The exploitation of the need of the disputants is considered power-based leverage (Zartman and Touval, 1996). Siniver's (2006) classification of leverage, material (economic aid) or immaterial (psychological pressure), is considered power-based leverage. The capability leverage of Reid (2017) is included in power-based leverage. The

negative and positive sanctions (Kleibor, 1996) are considered power-based leverage.

In general, the power-based leverage is represented in three types of might: the economic might of the state, its military power and the international political influence. Through the power-based leverage, the mediator can use deprivation and gratification as tools in mediation, in other words, the “stick-and-carrot” policy. In order to measure leverage, these two types of leverage should be operationalised. Power leverage is operationalised in terms of the mediator’s economic power, military power, and international influence. The economic power could be measured by using the state’s gross domestic product (GDP) as an indicator (Reid, 2017). Trust-based leverage is a function of historical ties, cultural and personal ties.

Based on the type of leverage, the states in the context of international mediation are divided into high-leverage states or power states and low-leverage states. High-leverage states have a high level of economic, military, and political power and do not need to be backed by an international key factor, and they use deprivation and gratification as tools in their mediation.

Compared to high-leverage or power states, low-leverage states have less economic, diplomatic and military leverage to help facilitate the mediation process. Their mediation usually relies on trust-based mediation and the disputants’ need for mediation. Finally, low-leverage states use enticement tools and not threat tools in the mediation process. In other words, the low-leverage states lack the stick. However, they may own limited carrots.

Qatar and Norway are examples of low-leverage states. Norway and Qatar have power-based leverage, represented in their economic power, limited international influence, and military might. However, this power-based leverage is not enough to behave as a power mediator such as the USA, for example. As low-leverage states, both Norway and Qatar are supposed to rely on trust-based leverage. In Norway's mediation of the Oslo Accord 1993, and the CPA (2005), Norway exhibited trust-based leverage. The backbone of this trust-based leverage is Norwegian NGOs and Norwegian Humanitarian aid. Those NGOs played an essential role in the Norwegian historical relation between Norway and Palestinians, Israelis, and the Sudanese. Likewise, Qatar's trust-based leverage can be seen in its mediation between Fatah and Hamas and in the Sudanese conflict. Qatar shares a cultural tie with both the Palestinians and the Sudanese. Those cultural ties are based on the religion of Islam, and a shared ethnic group; Palestinians, Sudanese and the Qatari are all Arabs. However, Qatari finance plays a different role in the Qatari International mediation. However, not every Arab country can be a mediator because sharing cultural and religious ties is not enough to be a mediator. The credibility of the mediator is important, the historical experience of the mediator (Egypt), the neutrality of the country (Oman), being a regional hegemon (Saudi Arabia) or strong finance coupled with being under threat (Qatar). However, the religious and cultural ties make the mediator role easier.

In brief, the type of leverage, power-based leverage or trust-based leverage, the mediator used is reflected in the type of mediation strategy the mediator utilizes in the mediation process.

In conclusion, low-leverage states are the states which are small in terms of some aspects such as the size of population or the area and have disproportionate strengths in other aspects such as economic resources. Those disproportionate strengths are considered leverage for those states but not the same leverage level of the power states. By shaping their standing in international relations, they determine their size.

Facilitation, formulation, and manipulation strategies

A mediation strategy is an approach or plan that the mediator uses to resolve a conflict (Bercovitch et al., 1991). International mediation scholars such as Bercovitch, Zartman, Touval, and others (Beardsley *et al.* (2006); Bercovitch (1992) & (2002); Bercovitch and Gartner (2009); Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (1985); Wilkenfeld *et al.* (2003), classify the mediation strategy into three types: facilitation, formulation and manipulation strategy. This classification is based on the mediator's behaviour in the mediation process. The mediator's behaviour in the mediation process depends upon the resources available to them within the context of the dispute (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000). In other words, the amount and type of leverage a mediator possesses are often reflected in the type of strategy the mediator employs in the mediation process. Mediation strategies can be classified according to the degree of mediator intervention in the mediation process, and this intervention can range from passive to active. Additionally, the classification of mediation strategies is based on the degree of coercion force the mediator practices on the disputants.

Consequently, the mediation strategies range from the least to the most coercive. Thus, the mediation literature has focused on three main styles of mediation strategies: facilitation strategies, formulation strategies, and manipulation strategies (Beardsley et al., 2006; Bercovitch, 1997; Carnevale, 1986; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2007; Quinn, Wilkenfeld, Eralp, Asal, & Mclauchlin, 2013; Touval & Zartman, 1985; Wilkenfeld, Young, Quinn, & Asal, 2007; Zartman, 2007).

Facilitation strategies represent a low level of intervention in which the mediator plays a passive role, akin to a communication channel, and has little control over the mediation process (Bercovitch, 1997, 2011b; Hopmann, 1996; Touval & Zartman, 1985; Zartman & Touval, 1996). The mediator ensures continued discussion between the disputants (Keashly & Fisher, 1996). By contrast, formulation strategies represent a more active mediator role. A mediator using such a strategy has more formal control over the mediation process and can make decisions about issues such as the mediation environment, the meeting type and frequency, the meeting agenda, and the distribution of information and resources (Bercovitch et al., 1991; Bercovitch, 2011). A mediator who acts as a formulator can propose a new solution or alternative to the disputants (Beardsley et al., 2006; Bercovitch, 2011b; Hopmann, 1996; Touval & Zartman, 1985; Zartman & Touval, 1996). Formulators try to convince the disputants that unilateral solutions are less beneficial than negotiation (Zartman & Touval, 2001).

However, the most active mediator and the most coercive mediator is the mediator who uses manipulation strategies. When using these strategies, the

mediator affects the content and the substance of the mediation. The mediator is able to exert different forms of pressure on the disputants, such as sticks and carrots (rewards and punishments). The mediator can even issue new proposals and guide the disputants towards signing an agreement (Beardsley et al., 2006; Bercovitch, 2011b; Bercovitch et al., 1991; Foster, 2011; Kleiboer, 1996). The mediator using the manipulation strategy takes advantage of leverage to influence the mediation process (Touval & Zartman, 1985). Manipulative mediators may offer carrots (compensation) to disputants to incentivise peace. The mediator presents a more attractive option to the disputants by adding benefits or carrots to the proposed solutions (Carnevale, 1986; Zartman & Touval, 1996). Those carrots may include direct compensation, favourable economic policies to the disputants, or diplomatic concessions (Beardsley et al., 2006). Manipulative mediators may use sticks (pressure) to increase the cost of non-agreement. Those sticks may come in several forms, such as economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, or even the threat of direct military intervention (Carnevale, 1986).

Using sticks is contradictory to the definitions of mediation for the scholars who consider mediation a voluntary process for the disputants (Bercovitch, 2011b; Bingham, 1986; Kleiboer, 1996; Moore, 2014; L. Singer, 2018; Sisk, 1996). Skjelsbael (1991) considers this to be coercive mediation. The mediator's usage of rewards and punishment is far removed from the true essence of mediation, which promotes persuasion as opposed to coercion (Skjelsbaek, 1991).

Scholarly opinion is divided as to which of these types of strategies is most effective (Bercovitch et al., 1991; Kochan & Jick, 1978; A. Smith & Stam, 2003). For the manipulative mediator who has the leverage to extend rewards and punishments, the mediator can employ the facilitative strategy in order to bring the disputants together and employ the formulation strategy to formulate a proposal. Mediators who lack resources or leverage employ facilitation and formulation strategies (Beardsley et al., 2006).

To reconcile the scholars' divisions, Beardsley et al. (2006) link the crisis outcomes and the mediation strategy employed in the mediation process. They find that facilitative mediation efficiently resolves commitment problems and reduces tension in post-crisis. Mediators focus more on the facilitation strategy to secure a more lasting resolution for the dispute. The most durable agreements are achieved by less intrusion by an external third party. Manipulative mediation is efficient in the case of formal agreements because the mediator uses the carrots and sticks policy (Beardsley et al., 2006).

In sum, there is a linkage between the leverage and the strategy the mediator uses in the mediation process. The manipulative mediator who has leverage is able to create rewards and enforce punishments. This mediator can use the facilitative strategy to bring the disputants together and employ the formulation strategy to formulate a proposal. Meanwhile, the mediator who lacks leverage employs facilitation and formative strategies. Considering the low-leverage state in international mediation and its definition, which strategy does the low-leverage state use as a tool in the mediation process? Is it facilitation,

formulation, or manipulation? This research seeks to fill this gap by answering those questions.

Mediator motivation and the mediation interest

This section addresses the “why” question: “Why does the mediator engage differently in international mediation?” In response, the mediator’s motivation or interest in international mediation is now discussed. Being an interest-based mediator or norm-based mediator is a debated issue among scholars. Scholars such as Zartman and Touval strongly believe that mediators have an interest in mediation. Other scholars such as Björkdahl (2013) and Bandarage (2011) believe in norm-based mediation and assert that international mediation is guided by idealism and normative conceptions.

According to Zartman, the mediators do have an interest in the conflict’s outcomes; otherwise, they would not willingly engage in mediation. He suggests that this applies to all types of mediators: superpowers, international organizations, and small states or small powers (Zartman & Touval, 1996). Furthermore, he explains that mediators, in general, are involved in mediation because they have their own interests. Consequently, mediators are engaged in mediation for different reasons, sometimes to avoid conflict, which could jeopardise their relationship with the disputants. Other times, states are involved in mediation to maintain their reputation as effective mediators, which is self-interested (Zartman, 2009). Touval (1982) agrees with Zartman when asserting that mediators are motivated by self-interest (Touval, 1982).

Important to note that Touval and Zartman further distinguish between the two types of self-interest motivation: defensive and expansionist motives (Touval, 1992; Touval & Zartman, 1985). On the one hand, the defensive motive occurs when the conflict between two disputants threatens the mediator's interest, such as when the conflict between two states disturbs the regional balance. On the other hand, expansionist motives occur when the mediator aims to increase their resources and power (Spiegel, 1985). By the same token, low-leverage states are also motivated by self-interest. Such interests include the mediator's security and prestige or international standing (Zartman & Touval, 1996). When Zartman and Touval view self-interest as motivation in international mediation, they build their claim on the rational-actor approach, using cost-benefit considerations. Overall, there seems to be some evidence to indicate that actors make decisions based on belief, ideology, and culture (Chai, 2001). Additionally, it is essential to represent the social constructivists' view of international politics, which asserts that international politics is socially built based on social norms and values. (Fierke, 2015). This explains the existence of value-driven interest, or norm-driven motivation, which is the driving factor behind the international mediation of some low-leverage states.

Norms identify and establish the appropriate behaviour for an actor (Björkdahl, 2013). The aforementioned states' international mediation is guided by idealism and normative conceptions (Bandarage, 2011). The motivation of those states who adopt normative-driven mediation is to help the poor around the world, enhance gender equality, promote international peace (Björkdahl, 2013), and make the world a better place (Leira, 2013). States with norm-

driven motivation adopt universal norms and work for the common good of the international community (Björkdahl, 2013; Ingebritsen, 2006). They act as norm agents and share specific characteristics such as domestic democracy, a strong human rights record, provision of development assistance, and promotion of human rights and international peace (Brysk, 2009). They play the role of norm entrepreneurs by constructing and advocating new international norms. Norm entrepreneurship is a diplomatic strategy capable of influencing the world (Björkdahl, 2013).

In like manner, some scholars argue that, in their mediation, low-leverage states are motivated either by self-interest or by norm-driven motivation. Interests are the objectives and the outcomes that a state seeks to achieve or the state's preferences among the possible range of alternative outcomes (Jesse & Dreyer, 2016; Jesse & Williams, 2010). Indeed, Beardsley explains that interest could be public or private. The private interest is represented as a reduction of the spill-over effects which directly affect the mediator, while the public interest is represented by the stability of the international system (Beardsley, 2011).

As can be seen and based on the argument of Beardsley (2011), when the mediator's interest is public and represented by the stability of the international system, it means that the mediation is a norm-driven mediation. A private mediator has self-interested motivation. Notably, mediators are engaged in a mediation process when their private interests are at risk (Greig & Regan, 2008). Obviously, mediators who lack interest in the conflict do not exist, which is not in line with the findings of (Svensson, 2007b), who states that a power

mediator has an interest in the conflict while a pure mediator does not. Duursam (2014) reconciles this gap by distinguishing between two kinds of interest: self-driven interest and value-driven interest.

In sum, the motivations of low-leverage states, in their international mediation, are driven by two types: interest-driven motivation and norms-driven motivation. However, as shown above, it is essential to consider distinguishing between those types of mediation as a spectrum, not a dichotomy division.

Power and pure mediation

While scholars focus on the power mediator who possesses considerable leverage and usually has an interest in the mediation outcome, they ignore the mediators who possess limited leverage and are represented by low-leverage states. A power mediator is a mediator who uses its resources to push the disputants towards its preferred direction in order to ensure its interest when the mediation outcome is reached (Harris & Reilly, 1998; Kleiboer, 2002; Svensson, 2007b; Zartman & Touval, 1996). Meanwhile, the pure mediator usually lacks resources to be used in international mediation and has no specific interest in the conflict (Svensson, 2007b). The pure mediator uses persuasion to facilitate negotiation between the disputants (Fisher & Keashly, 1991) and builds social ties between the disputants while enhancing a communication channel (Svensson, 2007b).

Touval (1982) considers one type of mediator, the power mediator, who makes suggestions to the disputants while seeking to influence them by

offering them incentives and exerting pressure. The mediator needs resources or leverage to offer incentives or exert pressure on the disputants (Smith, 1994).

Leverage or power is the criterion used to distinguish between pure and power mediators. Leverage is the ability of the mediator to put pressure on one or both of the disputants to make them accept the proposed agreement (Fisher, 2016; Kleiboer, 1996; Svensson, 2007b; Zartman & Touval, 2001; Zartman & Touval, 1996).

Scholars debate the effect of leverage on mediation success. Some scholars believe in the necessity of leverage for mediation success (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991; Kleiboer, 1996; Smith, 1994; Smith, 1985; Touval, 1992). Other scholars claim that mediators who lack leverage or power may still facilitate mediation success (Slim, 1992; Yarrow, 1978). Slim (1992), for example, argues that small states are acceptable mediators because they are not threatening to others. She argues that for the powerful party, a small state can provide a face-saver without threatening the general bargaining position of the powerful party. A smaller state can appear more sympathetic for the weaker party as it understands what it means to negotiate from a weak point (Slim, 1992). One way to reconcile these differences is that power or leverage may be necessary for the powerful mediator, but the impartiality of the less powerful mediator is the main reason he or she is acceptable to disputants (Siniver, 2006).

Although international mediation scholars have debated the impact of leverage, they agree that too much leverage is a real risk when less would suffice. Not only does the burden on the third-party increase, which often follows threats and promises, but too much leverage can prove detrimental to the long-term stability of peace. When third parties are overburdened in their approach, they create artificial incentives for agreements that are unlikely to be sustainable over time (Beardsley, 2008, 2011; Beardsley & Lo, 2014; Böhmelt, 2011; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2001a and 2001b; Gurses, Rost, & McLeod, 2008; Walter, 2002; Werner & Yuen, 2005). Thus, the mediator's promise of compensation for the disputants' concessions cannot be controlled (Kleiboer, 1996). Additionally, the disputants may become dependent on the mediator for future incentives in the long run.

It is probable that mediated settlements that arise from extreme usage of leverage will not last very long because the agreement was built on the mediator's compliance and not on the changing perceptions and attitudes of the disputants (Kelman, 1958). In other words, mediators can have a significant impact when they are able to use leverage to stop persistent violence in the short term, especially when they can maintain this leverage over time. Furthermore, mediators can increase their effectiveness by using lighter tactics to help the disputants get over the main barriers to permanent settlements. However, the mediator may sacrifice long-term goals for short-term success (Beardsley, 2013).

Examining the effect of the mediator types on mediation outcomes, mediation scholars disagree on which type of mediator is the most effective peacemaker

(Beardsley et. al. 2006; Carnevale, 2002; Kleiboer, 1996 and 2002). For example, Kleiboer (2002) suggests that a powerful mediator is more effective in conflict settlement than conflict resolution. Conflict settlement implies termination of the conflict without dealing with the underlying causes of the conflict. If the underlying causes still exist, the conflict may arise again. Conflict resolution, instead, addresses the underlying roots of the conflicts, which means that the dispute will not arise again (Kleiboer, 2002). In contrast to Kleiboer, Beardsley et al. (2006) claim that less intrusive tactics in mediation may lead to a more durable peace than more intrusive tactics, such as those used by a powerful mediator.

Svensson (2007) reconciles this gap by suggesting that the power mediator and pure mediator are complementary and not contradictory. The pure mediator and power mediator have different qualities, so they make different contributions to the mediation and the mediation outcomes. Whereas the pure mediator can offer a safe environment for the disputants to address their conflict's central and sensitive issues, the power mediator can use the carrot (rewards) and sticks (punishments) to get the disputants to reach an agreement. In conclusion, combining the pure and the power mediator should enhance the mediation's success (Svensson, 2007a).

However, dividing mediators into power mediators and pure mediators based on leverage may not be accurate. While scholars focus on the power mediator who possesses considerable leverage and the pure mediator who lacks it, they ignore the mediators who possess limited leverage and are represented by low-leverage states. Based on the definition of low-leverage states and the

discussion above, the pure mediator usually lacks leverage to be used in international mediation and has no interest in the conflict (Svensson, 2007b). Additionally, the pure mediator uses persuasion to facilitate negotiation between the disputants (Fisher & Keashly, 1991) and builds social ties between the disputants while enhancing a communication channel between them (Svensson, 2007b). While the power mediator makes suggestions to the disputants while seeking to influence them by offering them incentives and exerting pressure by using their leverage (Smith, 1994; Touval, 1982). The mediator needs resources or leverage to offer incentives or exert pressure on the disputants (Smith, 1994). In the end, it is worth mentioning that acting as a power mediator or a pure mediator is connected to the strategy the mediator uses as a tool in the mediation process.

Impartiality and bias in mediation

In international mediation, the mediator could be impartial or biased towards one of the disputants. Impartiality is a question of the perception of the disputants (Touval, 1975b). Impartiality requires the mediator to remain unbiased towards all parties in the dispute and towards the interest and options for settlement (Gerami, 2009). For mediators to be impartial, they must deal with all parties in the same manner, both in terms of procedure and substance (Carnevale & Arad, 1996).

The advantages of impartial mediators or biased mediators have often been debated. Some see impartiality as essential to mediation success (Acland, 1993; Beber, 2012; Foster, 2011; Skjelsbaek, 1991; Young, 2015). From this

perspective, impartiality is the basis for building personal trust and confidence in the mediator, which, in turn, leads to the acceptability of the mediator, which many argue is key for mediation success (Kleiboer, 1996).

However, there is a contrasting belief that mediator impartiality is not needed for mediation success. Those who take this view assert that the mediator's influence and willingness to protect the parties' interests are the main reasons behind the acceptance of the mediator, not impartiality. Conversely, the mediator's bias towards one of the adversaries is the reason behind the acceptability of the mediator by the disputants. From this perspective, it is the mediator's leverage and not impartiality that leads to mediation success (Bercovitch et al., 1991; Kleiboer, 1996, 1998; Siniver, 2006; Smith, 1985; Touval, 1975b, 1982; Touval & Zartman, 1985).

To bridge this gap, a third position recommends distinguishing between two types of mediators: low power or low stakes mediators (pure mediators) and high power or high stakes mediators, power mediators (Smith, 1994). Smith (1994) asserts that the debate over impartiality is a pointless chimera. Both sides use valid arguments to defend their point of view, and each side is based on its definition of mediation, whether it be pure mediation or power mediation. Both power and pure mediators are effective under certain situations, and both face specific obstacles. Therefore, the question of impartiality represents a non-debate. (Smith, 1994).

The pure mediator and the power mediator operate in an entirely different world from each other. The necessity of impartiality depends on whether the

mediator is a pure or power mediator. For the power mediator, impartiality is not necessary. In power mediation, the disputants have no choice but to accept the mediators who are equipped with the resources to induce an agreement, so in this case, Bercovitch and Touval and their team are correct. However, impartiality is crucial for pure mediators who rely on impartiality to build trust between themselves and the disputants. They do not need to boast about the power mediators' resources (Smith, 1994).

Some scholars such as Kleiboer (1996), Assefa (1987), Princen (2014), and Slim (1992) agree with Smith (1994) as they assert that there is a relationship between leverage and the (im)partiality of the mediator. Power mediators do not necessarily need to be impartial to be successful mediators because they compensate for this with leverage. On the other hand, the pure mediator needs impartiality to be accepted by the disputants (Assefa, 1987; Princen, 2014; Slim, 1992).

By linking whether the mediator is impartial or biased with leverage, the literature assesses that the power mediator does not necessarily need to be impartial, and the pure mediator should be impartial in order to be accepted by the disputants. Given the limited leverage that the low-leverage states have, this assessment left a gap in the literature by not answering the question: Should low-leverage states be impartial, or is this not always necessary? This research seeks to bridge this gap.

In conclusion, the literature distinguishes two types of mediators based on leverage: powerful mediators and pure mediators. While the powerful mediator

has leverage, the pure mediator lacks leverage. The sources of leverage may be classified into five sources: persuasion, extraction, termination, deprivation, and gratification. In like manner, the mediation strategies could be classified into three strategies: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation.

By linking the mediator's (im)partiality with leverage, the power mediator does not necessarily need to be impartial, and the pure mediator should be impartial in order to be accepted by the disputants. Reviewing the literature, it is concluded that leverage is the criterion to determine whether a mediator has power or is pure in nature. While the pure mediator usually lacks leverage to be used in international mediation and has no interest in the conflict, the power mediator has leverage and uses it to influence the disputants towards a pacific agreement by offering them incentives and exerting pressure by using their leverage. Being a power or pure mediator reflects on the mediation strategy and impartiality as well. While the power mediator tends to employ a manipulative strategy in the mediation process, the pure mediator employs facilitation or formulation strategy due to their lack of leverage. Moreover, the power mediator does not necessarily need to be impartial mediator. However, impartiality is an essential criterion for the pure mediator to be accepted by the disputants.

In its international mediation engagement, low-leverage states do not fit neatly into the categories of "pure" or "power" mediators because of their unique status as states that often have an interest in the conflict and yet have limited leverage compared to the leverage possessed by many larger states.

Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework consists of two sections. The first section discusses the relationship between power, leverage, and strategy. The second section discusses the difference between norm-based mediation and interest-based mediation and the expected behaviour of the two types of low-leverage states mediators, Qatar and Norway.

Power, leverage, and strategy in international mediation

Power, leverage, and strategy are three components in international mediation which are connected. As mentioned in the literature review, there are three types of strategies used in international mediation: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation strategy (Beardsley et al., 2006; Bercovitch and Rubin, 1994; Touval and Zartman, 1985),

The three strategies are classified based on the degree of the mediator intervention in the negotiations. In the facilitation strategy, the mediator plays a role of a communication host for the two parties, with no substantive contribution to the negotiations. The mediator usually does not attend the negotiations. The second type of strategy is the formulation strategy. In this strategy, the mediator is more involved in the mediation. The formulator can contribute to the negotiations by introducing substantive suggestions or proposals when appropriate or upon the parties' request. The third type of mediation strategy is the manipulation strategy which is the coercive strategy. In this strategy, the mediator uses his power or leverage for guiding the negotiations. The manipulator has a range of tools to manipulate the disputants. In the manipulation strategy,

the mediator can pressure the disputants, promise resources, and even threaten to withdraw from the process. The mediator can reward or punish the disputants. The mediator can offer an incentive to encourage the disputants to reach an agreement. The mediator can practice psychological pressure on the disputants to explain to them the cost of a non-agreement would be (Eriksson, 2019). The choice of strategy is based on how much leverage, the capabilities, and sources of power the mediator has (Bercovitch, 1992). The source of power is represented in the military, economic, and political resources. Those resources are necessary for the manipulator to generate leverage to affect the disputants in the mediation process and the mediation outcomes (Kleiboer, 1996; Heemsbergen and Siniver, 2011). The mediator's type of strategy in the mediation process determines whether the mediator is a pure mediator (Aggestam, 2002) or a power mediator (Aggestam, 2002) or a power mediator (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000).

Norm-based mediation and interest-based mediation

Several components of the international mediation process contribute to determining whether the type of mediation is either norm-based mediation or interest-based mediation. These include motivation or interest, usage of resources, the mediation strategy, the mediator's impartiality and finally, whether the mediator can be classified as either a pure or power mediator.

The motivation of the low-leverage state is the critical factor determining which type of mediation is practised; norm-based mediation or interest-based mediation. Before discussing the motivation or interest of both norm-based

mediators and interest-based mediators, it is necessary to mention that states usually engage themselves in international mediation on the basis of interest; otherwise, they will not be involved in mediation (Zartman & Touval, 1996).

This is applied to norm-based mediators such as Norway and Sweden. Such states engaged themselves in international mediation to promote their international standing and influence in international politics (Stokke, 2012).

When norm-based states utilize international mediation as a foreign policy tool, they gear towards survival by seeking status in the international community. However, they adhere to norms as an essential part of their international mediation and balance its interest and the norms. Stokke (2012) argues that Norway involves itself in international mediation to secure itself by increasing its influence in international relations and strengthening its standing in the international community (Stokke, 2012). As a low-leverage state located in Northern Europe, Norway makes it vulnerable. The vulnerability of Norway affects its security and economic development (Stokke, 2012).

Moreover, the mediator is driven by norms and values. The mediation mentioned above is motivated by idealism and normative conceptions. The aim of the low-leverage state, in this case, is to promote international peace and end conflicts. Consequently, the mediators with norm-driven motivation adopt universal norms and work for the common good of the international community.

In direct contrast to norm-based mediation is interest based-mediation. Interest-based low-leverage states are engaged in mediations due to interests like investment, security, prestige, or international standing. For Example, Qatar

engages itself in international mediations for security reasons. The geostrategic location of Qatar makes Qatar vulnerable. Qatar is a buffer state between two regional hegemon countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Based on this, Qatar lives with a degree of looming threat (Fazal, 2011; Jesse & Dreyer, 2016). Consequently, Qatar involves itself in international mediation on a security basis. Qatar believes that being an international mediator would increase its international status and influence in the international community, and by this way, Qatar could secure itself (Khatib, 2013a). Furthermore, Qatar considers its international mediation as a tool for expanding its future investment and protecting its current investment (Khatib, 2013; Barakat, 2014).

Although both Norway and Qatar involve themselves in international mediation based on security reasons, each behaves differently in international mediation. The difference between Qatar and Norway is that the Norwegian engagement in international mediation is motivated by idealism and realism with the absence of significant difference between them (Stokke, 2012). This means that the Norwegians are motivated by both the norms and their interest, which is represented by achieving status in the international arena and securing themselves. In other words, as Stokke(2012) mentions that Norway has achieved a balance between its interest and its norms, idealism and realism. In its engagement in international mediation, Norway adheres to the norms of its international mediation. However, it achieves its interest. In a similar vein, Eriksson confirms that the adherence to international law and encouraging peaceful resolutions for disputes would strengthen the security of small states such as

Sweden, and at the same time, strengthen international peace and security. (Eriksson, 2015).

In a different vein, interest-based mediators fail to balance their interests and the norms of morality. As a result, those mediators mainly engaged themselves in peace to achieve their interests. For example, Qatar has failed to balance morality or norms and its interest, represented in investment in the disputant's territories. However, the Qatari claim that their mediation is based on morality and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Qatar is motivated by a combination of survival strategies and international status or prestige (Kamrava, 2011) and in addition to its investment interest (Khatib, 2013). In brief, the point of departure for Norway and Qatar in international mediation is their interest and norms-based motivation. While Norway succeeds in balancing achieving its interest and being a norm entrepreneur, Qatar fails to balance the morality and norms and likely prefers to go with its interest.

The motivation of the low-leverage state is reflected in the way low-leverage states norm-based mediator and low-leverage interest-based mediator employs their resources (usage of resources). Both use those resources in a different ways. For example, norm-based mediators use their economic resources as humanitarian aids to help the disputants. Offering those aids to the disputants contribute to building trust between Norway and the disputants. In contrast, the interest-based mediator uses its economic resources to incentivise the disputants to reach an agreement. How the mediator uses the resources is an essential factor in determining the mediator's type of strategy in the mediation process. For the mediation strategy, the norm-based low-

leverage states are expected to adopt a facilitation strategy in harmony with the balance between the norms and interest motivation. They do not seek to affect the parties or even interfere in the mediation process; they play a facilitation role rather than manipulation. They choose the facilitation strategies because they represent a low level of intervention in which the mediator plays a passive role, akin to a communication channel, and has little control over the mediation process. The norm-based low-leverage states aim to ensure continued discussion between the disputants by using a facilitation strategy. In the same vein, norm-based mediators are expected to adopt impartiality as a tool of equity in their mediation. For a mediator to be impartial, he/she must deal with all parties in a similar manner, both in terms of procedure and in terms of substance. It is expected that the norm-based low-leverage state will remain unbiased towards all parties in the dispute and the interest and options for settlement. For norm-based low-leverage states, impartiality is expected to be the basis for them to build personal trust and confidence in them, which leads to their acceptability, which is crucial for their success.

Finally, the norm-based low-leverage states are expected to be classified as pure mediators who use persuasion to facilitate negotiation between the disputants and build social ties while enhancing a communication channel between them.

As an example of a norm-based low-leverage state mediator, Norway chooses to be a norm entrepreneur, which simultaneously contributes foreign aid to the impoverished on a global scale and seeks to enhance international peace and security. Its foreign policy is one of peace. As a norm-based mediator, Norway

would instead employ the facilitation strategy in its international mediation and would not seek to manipulate the disputants towards an intended direction. It is expected that impartiality is a crucial factor for Norway. In contrast, interest-based low-leverage states' mediators are expected to adopt a strategy of manipulation where the mediators affect the content and the substance of the mediation. Additionally, the mediator is able to offer incentives or carrots (rewards). The interest-based low-leverage state mediators are expected to issue new proposals and guide the disputants towards signing an agreement.

It is expected that impartiality is not necessary for interest-based low-leverage states mediators. It is expected that they believe that their influence and willingness to protect the parties' interests are the main reasons behind their acceptance as mediators, not their impartiality. It is expected that they believe that the mediator's leverage and not impartiality leads to mediation success. Finally, interest-based low-leverage states mediators are expected to be classified as power mediators who use their resources to push the disputants towards their preferred direction to ensure their interest in the mediation outcome is reached.

As an interest-based low-leverage state mediator, Qatar's interest is to increase its security and seek to be a leading actor in the Middle East and promote a business environment conducive to Qatari investments. Despite being a low-leverage state, Qatar can incentivise the disputants towards signing an agreement (Kamrava, 2011). Manipulation strategies like this are commonplace in Qatari international mediation. Qatar deployed financial leverage to encourage the conflict parties in Darfur and Yemen to accept a solution, which

means that Qatar brought its pure position in mediation into question as financial leverage is a feature of a power mediator such as the USA (Barakat, 2014). It is expected that it is leverage, not impartiality, which is necessary for the power mediator.

Based on the literature review and the above discussion, it is expected that the norm-based- low-leverage states make a balance between their interest in mediation and their norms, be impartial mediators, adopt facilitation strategy. In addition, they behave as pure mediators, not power ones. Conversely, interest-based low-leverage states mediators are expected to have an interest in the mediation, and they lack the balance between their interests and the norms of morality. Furthermore, they use a manipulation strategy to achieve their interest. For them, impartiality is not a necessary component. Since they are states with low leverage, it is assumed that they cannot play the role of a powerful mediator. At the same time, they cannot be pure mediators because they engage themselves in mediation based on their interests.

However, the actual findings of this thesis are slightly different from the expected ones. It is found that norm-based mediators keep the balance between their interests and norms in the mediation. However, they are not impartial, and they adopt a manipulation strategy, not a facilitation one, as expected. In contrast, the interest-based low-leverage states do have an interest in mediation. They lack the balance between their interest/s and morality or norms in the mediation. While they do behave as impartial mediators, employing manipulation strategy and acting as power mediators.

In general, classifying low-leverage states into norm-based mediators and interest-based mediators should not be considered a rigid dichotomy or binary division. In other words, it is not a binary classification; it should be considered a spectrum classification. In other words, there is always an overlap area between the two types of mediators. Based on the literature, the following table briefs the expected difference between the two cases of low-leverage states in mediation: the norm-based mediator and the interest-based mediator.

Table (1): Norm-based mediators versus interest-based mediators (expected behaviour)

	Low-leverage norm-based mediators	Low-leverage-interest-based mediators
Interest/ motivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - norm entrepreneur. - Self-interest (security/ gain status in international community/ increase influence in International Relations). 	Self-interest (Investment, security/ gain status in international community/ increase influence in International Relations)

Balance between norms and interests	Make balance between norms and interests.	No balance between their interests and norms or morality.
Strategy	Facilitation strategy	A spectrum of facilitation, formulation, and manipulation.
Impartiality	Impartial mediator	Not necessary to be impartial
Being power or pure mediators	Pure mediator	Power mediator

CHAPTER THREE: NORWAY VERSUS QATAR IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

Introduction

Different low-leverage states have different motivations and models or approaches to international mediation and do not continuously pursue similar foreign policy goals when using international mediation as a foreign policy tool (Gigleux, 2016). Regarding international mediation motivation and approaches, low-leverage states can be divided into two approaches. The first approach views low-leverage states as interest-based motivation, with their interest in mind. The second approach views them as norm entrepreneurs or norm-based mediators (Hansen, 2013).

Norway and Qatar are examples of low-leverage states in international mediation; each has developed its niche diplomacy, where niche diplomacy refers to a popular approach any state has developed to obtain the best returns and the widest international recognition and attention (Lakatos, 2017). Norway is considered to be an example of a norm entrepreneur because of its foreign policy and international mediation approach, which is norm-driven, wherein Norway plays a role as a facilitator mediator who has no interest in the mediation outcomes except peace promotion all around the world (Bandarage, 2011; Leira, 2013; Waage, 2005) or it succeeds to make a balance between its interest and norms (Stokke, 2012). In contrast, Qatar's form of international mediation is interest-driven mediation (Hansen, 2013; Kamrava, 2011, 2015; Khatib, 2013b; Peterson, 2006b).

This chapter is an essential part of this thesis because it shows the expected behaviour of the two different types of mediation of low-leverage states: norm-based mediation and interest-based mediation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is

expected that a norm-based mediator is an impartial mediator who employs facilitation strategy and plays the role of a pure mediator. Besides, an interest-based mediator is expected to be a manipulative mediator who does not pay much attention to impartiality and is expected to be a pure mediator.

Studying four cases of Norway and Qatar mediation proves a difference between expectation and reality. The four cases illustrate that a norm-based state and low-leverage state may act as a manipulator who is not necessarily an impartial mediator. Besides, the interest-based mediator sticks to impartiality, behaving like a power mediator who manipulates the disputants to reach an agreement. To shed light on those two approaches in international mediation, this chapter focuses on the track records of both Norway and Qatar in international mediation.

Norway in international mediation

Despite being low-leverage in international mediation, Norway has its hallmark style on the international stage. The former US president, Barack Obama, described Norway as a country that punches above its weight, referring to its peace-making abilities, when he met with the Norwegian prime minister Jens Stoltenberg in 2011 at the White House (Jakubec, 2015).

The Oslo Accords first established Norway's reputation as a peace-mediator in 1993. Its role in the secret negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was a milestone for Norwegian diplomacy and international peace (Jones, 1999). The unprecedented success that Norway achieved through the Oslo Accords has laid the foundations for many requests to assist in conflict resolution, from Kashmir to Kurdistan and from Cyprus to Guatemala (Kelleher &

Taulbee, 2006). The Guatemalan Peace Agreement of 1996, for example, further bolstered Norway's reputation as an international peace mediator and facilitator. Building the roads to peace has since remained the overarching goal of Norwegian foreign policy (Jakubec, 2015). A Norwegian governmental White Paper officially confirmed this, which affirms the priority of peace work in Norwegian foreign policy. This peace work was to be carried out primarily through political commitment and development efforts and affirms that Norway should be a proactive and creative state, making a real difference and impact in the international arena (Jakobsen, 2012). Based on this, Norway has been engaged in many peace processes since 1993, including those of Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan (Fabra-Mata, 2014).

Norway has several advantages that enable it to function as a trusted mediator in international disputes. Norway lacks a colonial past, which often sources bias and self-interest in international mediation for other countries. As it turns out, Norway has not done much harm to anyone since the days of the Vikings (Ford, 2000). Due to lacking any history of colonialism, Norway has been able to represent itself as a credible neutral mediator in conflict resolution (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). Bandarage (2011) claims that Norway's involvement in peace reconciliations is not motivated by any self-interest, political, economic or otherwise, which in turn reinforces Norway's credible position in the international community as an impartial and trusted mediator (Bandarage, 2011). Additionally, Norway's low level of leverage prevents it from pursuing power mediators. Consequently, it is vital for Norway as a mediator to maintain safe and friendly relations with its international counterparts, as Norway has low leverage to reach and implement agreements. Thus, it needs key international actors on

side (Sørbø, Goodhand, Klem, Nissen, & Selbervik, 2011). It is not surprising, therefore, that Norway has good, stable and close relations with many key international actors, such as the USA and EU (Bandarage, 2011).

However, one consideration is Norway's powerhouse economy, built on oil and natural gas. Indeed, it was only after the discovery of oil in 1970 that Norway became one of the richest countries in the world (UNDP, 2016). Today, Norway has the 40th largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) globally and the 11th largest GDP per capita (The World Bank, 2018). Being an oil-rich country enables Norway to follow its peace initiatives (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). Meanwhile, Norway is considered a leading donor of international development assistance, with 1.06% of its Gross National Income (GNI) directed towards development aid, which means it sits as the second-most generous country after Sweden.

Moreover, Norway is the third-largest contributor to the United Nations after the USA and the UK. For example, in 2018, it increased its contribution to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) from NOK 380 million to NOK 420 million (approximately \$52 million) a year for the next four years (UNDP, 2016). Norway also provides bilateral aid via its NGOs to many countries in the Middle East and Africa. Norway's generous development assistance through its NGOs and its international role in promoting international norms, in addition to its prominent engagement in the UN, all play an important role in maintaining Norway's reputation as a committed international peace actor (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

Furthermore, Norway has developed its model in international mediation. This model was invented by Jan Egeland, the Norwegian diplomat who supervised the

backchannel for the Oslo Accords negotiations. Egeland was affected by his work with INGOs like Amnesty International and the Red Cross before joining the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as an advisor and as state secretary. His NGO background provided him later with the contacts and credibility needed to establish informal cooperation between the MFA and NGOs, which became the institutional basis of the Norwegian model (Jakobsen, 2012).

Norway has succeeded in developing its niche in mediation different from the power politics paradigm of other international actors who have sought to dominate the international political arena, such as the USA. Norway's successful mediation in international disputes proves that a state such as Norway, with a good international record, could assist disputants in resolving their conflicts (Moolakkattu, 2005).

Reviewing the literature shows that seven core features characterise Norway's international mediation model: norm-driven motivation, Track One and a Half Diplomacy, secret diplomacy, impartiality, facilitation strategy, backing by an international key factor and the Norwegian leverage.

Norm-based motivation

The first feature of Norwegian international mediation is the Norwegian motivation in international mediation. The Norwegian motivation is described as a norm-based motivation. The literature describes Norway as a moral entrepreneur or norm entrepreneur (Leira, 2013). In order to understand the significance of norm-based motivation, it is essential to understand the meaning and the background of the following two concepts: norms and norm entrepreneurs.

By the end of the Cold War, there were calls to evaluate the way people thought about power in international politics and how states should interact in the international community. By that time, many states had already developed practices and standards of acceptable behaviour, or norms, which reflected the states' interest and identity (Ingebritsen, 2002). Norms do not emerge from thin air. They are built over time by agents—individuals or states—who have strong ideas and beliefs regarding appropriate behaviour in their community. Scandinavian countries are good examples of norm entrepreneurs (Ingebritsen, 2002).

Norms are defined as collective thought about proper behaviour for a given identity. Norms are intersubjective understandings that constitute actors' interests and identities and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behaviour ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations (Björkdahl, 2002).

While norms are the identification and stipulation of the appropriate behaviour for an actor with a certain identity (Björkdahl, 2013), the Norm entrepreneurship is the ability to identify or create opportunities to alter the existing behaviour of others in the direction of the new norm (Björkdahl, 2002). In other words, norm entrepreneurs have strong ideas about appropriate behaviour in their community and set out to alter the behaviour of other communities (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Indeed, a state is considered to be a norm entrepreneur when it has a solid commitment to a particular normative idea or behaviour and is characterised by a strong willingness to change the behaviour of others by promoting this idea (Björkdahl, 2013). Accordingly, Norwegians in their foreign policy and international mediation are guided by idealism and normative concepts. Indeed, this is the reason why many call Norway a moral entrepreneur or norm entrepreneur (Bandarage, 2011). Norway has developed a

national consensus that is built around social-democratic norms that stress international concerns for those around the world who are oppressed (Helgesen, 2003). Consequently, norm entrepreneurship is a diplomatic strategy that involves setting normative standards in the international community in effort to change it (Björkdahl, 2013). According to norm entrepreneurship strategy, low-leverage states such as Norway build their national identity based on universal norms and introduce themselves as good stewards, working for the common good of the international community (Ingebritsen, 2002). These states are agents of normative change around the world. They play this role by providing developmental assistance, offering humanitarian aid and through the promotion of democracy, international peace, and human rights (Björkdahl, 2013; Brysk, 2005).

Acting as a norm entrepreneur, Norway contributes foreign aid to the poor around the world, seeks to enhance gender equality and the role of women, and endeavours to promote peace by pursuing security and mediation in conflicts (Björkdahl, 2013). Thus, Norwegian foreign policy is a foreign policy of peace, designed to make the world a better place (Leira, 2013).

In a different vein, low-leverage states sometimes engage in international mediation for reasons other than humanitarian reasons. The low-leverage states sometimes engage themselves in international mediation for their interest. This interest may be represented in improving their status in the international community by extending their international influence and power. Additionally, international mediation may increase the usefulness of low-leverage states and help them to become more independent concerning their more vital allies (Touval & Zartman, 2007; Zartman & Touval, 1996). Accordingly, It is argued that Norway is engaged in international

mediation not only to promote peace, better organise the international community and increase international justice and international cooperation but also to protect Norway's interests in other areas of the world (Henriksen Waage, 2007). This is truly applied to Norway mediation. However, Norway succeeded in balancing its interest and its norms. For low-leverage states, becoming norm entrepreneurs presents the opportunity to influence world politics and to achieve its interest (Björkdahl, 2002). Their motivation is also usually directed by altruism and ideational commitment (Goertz and Diehl 1992; Jacobsen 1995: 291; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898). Altruistic motivations are meant to promote or defend values, ideas, or norms, and seek to contribute to the realization of these values or norms in practice (Elgström 1982: 33). Ideational commitment, for example, may motivate norm entrepreneurs to promote certain norms because of the moral and ethical values that underpin them (a moral commitment to something that is perceived as ethically right). The norm entrepreneurs create their niche in international politics, and the norms they promote are for the international community's benefit. They usually take the lead in a specific issue and adopt strategies to influence the world and make it a better place to live. Furthermore, they are usually perceived as impartial, and few suspect them of pursuing a self-interest (Björkdahl, 2002). For low-leverage states, their peace policy is affected by their ideas about peace. Their engagement in peace activities is related to the state identity and the values that the state upholds (Wivel, 2013).

Norway's identity is dominated by a so-called "liberal Norwegian peace identity" (Leira, 2013). In order to conduct humanitarian activity and peace work, Norway shares its resources with others. It aims to bolster the liberal approach to the world. The Norwegians view making a difference not as an option but as an obligation.

Additionally, they are convinced that such actions are essential for the creation of a better world and believe that they have an essential role to play in the process (Leira, 2013). However, Norway is a developed country that seeks to adopt the World Bank model of “private sector development” to expand upon its economic opportunities. The profits gained from the Norwegian gas and oil companies working in Africa, for example, amount to more than what Norway pays to Africa in humanitarian aid (Curtis, 2010). In the same fashion, Norway conducts peace activities in Sri Lanka, where some view its role as both a peace facilitator and economic investor as a conflict of interest (NORAD, 2002).

Despite, the Norwegian claim that they are a peaceful nation (Leira, 2013), its leading role in exporting arms contradicts this claim. Norway was the 10th largest exporter of the weapons (The Nordic Pace, 2017). However, Norwegian officials advise that the policy is to refrain from exporting Norwegian weapons to countries at war, or countries where there is a threat of war or any environment with conditions favourable for civil war (Bandarage, 2011). However, Norway has routinely exported its weapons to countries that fit this description, such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Arab Emirates, all of which are involved in the war in Yemen (The Nordic Pace, 2017). Accordingly, this creates a blatant conflict of interest for Norway’s international peace-making initiatives.

Track One and a Half Diplomacy

The second feature of the Norwegian international mediation is the Track One and a Half Diplomacy. The Track One and a Half Diplomacy is a “hybrid diplomacy” because it is a cross-fertilization of Track One and Track Two (Mapendere, 2005). It is

essential to know the meaning of Track One Diplomacy and Track Two Diplomacy.

Track One Diplomacy refers to the direct involvement of official representatives from governments in diplomatic activities. It is carried out by diplomats, high-ranking government officials, and heads of state, and it aims at influencing political power structures. Additionally, It is usually considered to be the primary peace-making tool of a state's foreign policy (Mapendere, 2005).

Track Two Diplomacy refers to the involvement of unofficial representatives such as NGOs. It takes the form of informal interaction between members of nations to develop strategies, influences public opinion and organises human and material resources to assist in conflict resolution. It is a complement to Track One Diplomacy and serves as a bridge to negotiations (Jones, 2015; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006; Mapendere, 2000, 2005; Montville, 1991; Nan, 2005; Richmond, 2000; Volkan, 1991).

Scholars of conflict resolution argue that Track One Diplomacy and Track two Diplomacy do not accurately reflect the full range of peace-making activities carried out by retired politicians, religious leaders, and by organizations such as The Carter Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council (Nan, 2005). For this reason, those scholars have developed a new category known as Track One and a Half Diplomacy (Mapendere, 2005). Track One and a Half Diplomacy consists of a public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments, or political entities such as popular armed movements and nonofficial facilitators or mediators, to change the attitudes of the parties involved (Mapendere, 2000). In other words, One and a Half Diplomacy is an initiative that involves a combination of unofficial facilitators and official representatives from the conflict in question (Nan, 2005). Therefore,

the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a Half from Track One is that the third party is not an official representative of any government. As mentioned, Track One conflict resolution efforts are facilitated by government representatives or representatives of political institutions. For example, President Clinton's Camp David mediation between Yasir Arafat and Ehud Barak is purely Track One Diplomacy, while Former Finnish Prime Minister Martti Ahtisaari's mediation in Aceh is Track One and a Half Diplomacy.

Involving Track Two Diplomacy gave the disputants a space to freely negotiate and be formal under the pressure of the Track one Diplomacy. It creates the workshop-based approach, and it improves the underlying relationships between the disputants (Jones, 2015).

Similarly, the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a Half from Track Two is the parties involved in the process. In Track Two Diplomacy, the parties involved in the conflict resolution process are not official representatives of the conflicting sides. This is not the case for Track One and a Half, where the parties involved in the conflict resolution process are official representatives of the conflicting parties.

The Norwegian approach to international mediation is conducted by Norwegian officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the cooperation of the Norwegian NGOs. The Norwegian NGOs personnel help facilitate the communication channel between the disputants and the Norwegian officials. Track One and a Half Diplomacy is represented in the strong relations and cooperation between the government and the Norwegian NGOs (including development and research organizations). There is a mutual dependency between the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs

whereby the Norwegian government depends on NGOs for the execution of its foreign policy, especially in the field of international mediation, and Norwegian NGOs depend on the Norwegian government for funding (Larssen, 2009). Norway's long-standing peace tradition, the close connection between the state and the NGOs, and available funds all enable Norway to conduct its foreign policy of peace and mediation (Leira, 2013).

Thus, the facilitator is not an ordinary citizen, One and a Half Diplomacy. Considering this, it is evident that Norwegian international mediation is a case of Track One and a Half diplomacy. This is confirmed by Kelleher and Taulbee (2006), who suggest that the relation between the Norwegian government and NGOs in international mediation can be defined as Track One and a Half Diplomacy (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

The Norwegian approach to peace-making is based on the Norwegian NGOs or research organisations' field experience and local connections. Examples of those NGOs are: the Institute for Labour and Social Research, FAFO, in the Middle East, Norwegian People's Aid and Norwegian Church Aid in Sudan (Bersagel, 2008; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006; Nissen & Waage, 2015). Norway integrates its academic and NGO expertise with the knowledge and resources of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kelleher, 2006). The Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs, represented in academic and humanitarian organizations, work in a harmonious symbiosis in any mediation process in which Norway is engaged.

The cooperation between the Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian government may take different forms or roles. First, the Norwegian NGOs can accomplish several things which a government would not attempt, such as using deniability and disguise

to cover up secret negotiations between the disputants (Bandarage, 2011). Second, with the help of the Norwegian NGOs and via their wide network built by work on the ground, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates the right time to intervene in any conflict reconciliation (Bandarage, 2011). Third, the Norwegian NGOs have earned a valuable reputation on account of their several decades of experience in various countries. Fourth, the Norwegian officers and peace facilitators tap into the experience and contacts of these NGOs in their peace activities (Hanssen-Bauer, 2005). Fifth, the government depends on NGOs to initiate and facilitate the negotiation processes. The Norwegian initiative, therefore, draws upon the blending of government resources and the experience of the Norwegian NGOs (Egeland, 1999). Finally, these NGOs are active in the area of the conflict and provide an essential channel for trust-building between Norway and the disputants (Bertram, 1995).

Norwegian NGO personnel play an essential role in trust-building for mediation efforts by playing a two-pronged role in mediation. Firstly, they offer vital knowledge and information about the local people in the countries they serve, including crucial contact channels in those countries. Secondly, they contribute to building Norwegian public opinion favouring the targeted initiative.

In brief, the Norwegian government supports NGO peace work as a way to facilitate the mediation process (Egeland, 1999; Walraven, 1999). The NGOs also benefit from Norway's image as a peace mediator (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). Thus, NGOs have significant influence because of their close relationship with government officials in Norway and disputant countries. As a result, they are often responsible for bringing disputants together by building trust (Bandarage, 2011).

Going beyond an idealization of the role of Norwegian NGOs in the Norwegian model, how they play a role in the development and representing them as a virtuous force in promoting international peace, Goonatilake (2004, 2006) criticises the role that Norwegian NGOs play in Sri Lanka. Goonatilake accuses Norway of using its NGOs to manipulate politicians and political institutions to promote Norwegian investment at the expense of Sri Lankan sovereignty. Thus, whether Goonatilake's claim is accurate or not, it does not negate the prominent role of Norwegian NGOs in promoting international peace by creating relations between the disputants and the Norwegian government. It also reflects on the desire of disputants to ask Norway to be a mediator. Sri Lanka itself is a strong example. The Prime Minister, Wickremesinghe, wrote to the Norwegian government in 2001, asking it to continue its mediation efforts in Sri Lanka. By involving the Norwegian NGOs in peace efforts as non-state actors, it helped the mediation to proceed in secret (Sørbø et al., 2011).

Secret Diplomacy

The third feature of the Norwegian model of international mediation is secret diplomacy. Secret diplomacy is distinguished by performing mediation or negotiations away from the media and the public (Bjola, 2014; Gilboa, 1998). In secret diplomacy, the public is kept away from the diplomatic events, and its only officials a high level of discretion are involved in the negotiations (Gilboa, 1998; Pruitt, 2008). Indeed, Norwegian peacemakers prefer to work behind the scenes and away from the media and critics (MFA, 2020).

Secret diplomacy has both advantages and disadvantages. Among many advantages is what the Norwegians themselves think about secret diplomacy. The

Norwegians believe that isolation helps disputants focussed on finding common ground between their respective positions (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). Thus, Oslo meetings were held privately, which helped build trust and increase the chances of an agreement being reached. Pruitt (1997) argues that Norway's logic is that secret and private mediation encourages informal interpersonal contacts between disputants and eliminates the prying eyes of journalists (Pruitt, 1997).

Secret diplomacy has other key advantages, such as unlocking peace negotiations by providing a suitable environment for constructive negotiations and by preventing the spoilers from ruining the negotiations (Eban, 1983). It is an opportunity to save face and ensure the security of the negotiations (Gilboa, 1998). Without secret diplomacy, there would not have been agreements. This is the case with the Oslo Accord of 1993 since neither Israel nor the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would negotiate openly due to each leadership's internal political constraints (Lieberfeld, 2008). According to Qurei (2006), for Israelis, when the Oslo channel started, it was illegal to contact the PLO according to Israeli law. This was changed later in the Israeli Knesset. He adds that for the Palestinians, the PLO was concerned with the internal reaction among the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the diaspora (Qurei, 2006).

Bjola suggests that secret diplomacy is beneficial in terms of normalising relationships with former adversaries, especially for protracted disputes (Bjola, 2014). The Palestinian–Israeli conflict was a case of negotiations between two old enemies. Qurei (2006) confirms that neither of the two parties felt comfortable in the first round of the negotiation. The Norwegian facilitation role helped both sides to contact each other more appropriately. It was secret diplomacy that helped the Oslo negotiation to

continue without the interruption of unwanted political events such as those that had occurred in the Washington negotiations(Qurei, 2006).

Despite the advantages of secret diplomacy, it is still considered a violation of the obligation of elected leaders to represent the public and stand accountable for their decisions. This requires that affairs of domestic concern be determined not by a group of leaders in the secret conclave but rather open to public debate (Bjola, 2014; Lieberfeld, 2008). Despite the claim that secret diplomacy is a factor behind achieving agreement, evidence suggests that such agreements are short-lived. Agreements accumulated under public scrutiny and with public transparency have a better chance of successful implementation (Bjola, 2014). Additionally, secret mediation contributes to the creation of an environment of distrust between the people and their leaders (Bjola, 2014).

The Norwegian Impartiality

The fourth feature of the Norwegian model in international mediation is the impartiality of the Norwegians in their mediation. While Kydd (2003), Zartman and Touval (2007), Svensson (2007) argue that a biased mediator is often effective, Kleiboer asserts that impartiality is the basis for building personal trust and confidence in the mediator, which in turn leads to them being accepted, which is key for mediation success (Kleiboer,1996). Slim (1992) confirms that mediators are more effective when they are impartial and when they lack interest of their own in resolving the dispute (Slim, 1992) Accordingly, Norway, as a low-leverage state, being biased may negatively affect Norway's presence in mediation. Ford (2000) claims that a pivotal

strength of the Norwegian model is that Norwegians do not have stakes or strategic interests that affect their impartiality in mediation (Ford, 2000).

Norway's image as an impartial mediator came from its long commitment and advocacy for addressing the problems of developing countries (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). This was especially evident during anti-colonial revolutions, where Norway often supported proposals such as the new international economic order (Egeland, 1988). Additionally, despite being a member of NATO, Norway permits only its own troops within its territory and denies bases and garrisons to other member countries. Naturally, this reinforces its image of independence and neutrality (Holst, 1983). However, Norwegian impartiality was brought into question in the Sri Lanka mediation. Höglund & Svensson (2009) claim that Norway was accused of being biased towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE (Höglund & Svensson, 2009). The accusation of Norway by being biased towards LTTE may refer to the fact that Norway was one of the few who had public contact with LTTE. Norway was playing a facilitator who should see the parties in an equal term. However, the President of Sri-Lanka did not want the LTTE to be in equal status to the Sri-Lankan government (Moolakkattu, 2005).

In sum, Norway behaves as an impartial mediator, and the Norwegian impartiality is considered Norway's point of strength and the key success in Norwegian international mediation.

Facilitation strategy

The fifth feature of the Norwegian international mediation model is using of a facilitation strategy. As a state with low leverage in the international mediation arena,

Norway plays the role of a facilitator rather than a manipulator. While a manipulative mediator uses its resources to push parties in its preferred direction and exercises its leverage over the parties in order to make them comply, the facilitator works on gaining the confidence of the parties, building social ties among them and enhancing communication between them (Svensson, 2007b).

The Norwegian mission in mediation is to promote mutual understanding between parties, acting as a channel of communication that allows the disputants to find common ground between their respective positions. They endeavour to bring the parties together and keep them together, usually taking a more active role only when they approve it. Kelleher & Taulbee (2006) argue that the fact that Norway has the carrots, in this case, economic resources, to use as incentives to reward disputants, but no stick with which to threaten them greatly contributes to its role as an active facilitator (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). In the same vein, Ingebritsen (2006) confirms that Norway is an activist facilitator. Ingebritsen states that the Norwegians try to implore, convince, propose, suggest, prod, and ultimately help. However, Kelleher and Taulbee (2006) may be inaccurate in their description of Norway as a mediator equipped with carrots but no stick. Norway does have a stick, which is represented as the withholding of aid. Despite this, Norway chooses not to use this tool due to normative considerations. Norway rarely undertakes a mission where it serves as the sole facilitator. Instead, it usually plays a complementary or support role. Examples include the United Nations involvement in Guatemala. While lacking significant means to make effective threats, Norway cannot guarantee settlement without the participation of others (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

As mentioned above, Norway mediation is suitable for bringing parties to the negotiation table; however, it needs harder leverage to reach and implement the settlement. And to do that, Norway needs to build links with other powerful actors and coalitions (Sørbø et al., 2011). In other words, Norway needs the backing of an international key factor.

Backing by an international key factor

An international key factor backs Norwegian international mediation's sixth feature. This international key factor could be a powerful state such as the USA or an international organization like the UN. Grøn & Wivel (2011) argue that low-leverage states are unable to affect international peace without allying and cooperating with other states who possess more significant influence (Grøn & Wivel, 2011). Sørbø et al. confirm that Norway, as a low-leverage state, cannot accumulate peace agreements without the backing of an international key factor such as the USA or UN. The Norwegians are aware that they would not achieve peace without such support. With the backing of an international key factor, Norway can borrow leverage to compensate for its relatively limited leverage (Sørbø et al., 2011).

Qurei (2006) presents the Oslo backchannel as an example. He explains that Norway was backed by the USA, which was not informed about the secret channel until May 1993 at the request of Israel. However, the moment the negotiations took a formal position, Norway informed the USA about the secret channel between the PLO and Israel, assuring the USA that the channel was not an alternative to the talks in Washington but rather complementary support for it (Qurei, 2006). Similarly, Corbin (1994) and Makovsky (2018) assert that Norway is always concerned about being a

friend to the USA, so in the Oslo secret backchannel, Norway was hesitant about keeping the United States in the dark. The Norwegians believed there could be no peace in the Middle East without the USA's approval. They add that after the negotiations became more official by including Israeli officials, the Norwegians updated the Americans of the Oslo negotiations (Corbin, 1994b; Makovsky, 2018). Corbin mentions the importance of the US in the Oslo agreement; she asserts that American approval of the Oslo agreement would grant international credibility for the agreement and assurance that the Americans would be committed to the agreement and use their leverage to implement the agreement (Corbin, 1994b). Differently, Norway was not alone in the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the rebels in South Sudan. Norway was part of a Troika, which included Norway, the USA and the UK as external observers in support of the mediation efforts of IGAD (Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

The Norwegian leverage

The seventh feature of Norwegian international mediation is Norwegian leverage. Norway's leverage in international mediation can be categorized as trust-based leverage and the disputants' need-based leverage. Thanks to the Norwegian One and Half diplomacy, the Norwegian became a mediator who could gain the trust of the disputants. Regarding trust-based leverage, the Norwegians build trust between themselves and the disputants via Norwegian NGOs that are considered to be the backbone of Norwegian trust-based leverage. The Norwegian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) include development organizations and research-oriented NGOs. As mentioned above, the Norwegian government depends on NGO personnel

who have experience with the local community experiencing conflict. Indeed, NGOs help Norwegian diplomats access appropriate communication channels and help build trust and confidence between Norway as mediators and the disputants. Additionally, the resources Norway has at its disposal for humanitarian aid via its NGOs is considered as leverage that Norway uses in its international mediation (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

FAFO is one example of a Norwegian NGO which played an essential role in the Norwegian historical relations between Norway and the Palestinians and Israelis (Corbin, 1994; Qurei, 2006). Likewise, the Norwegian Church Aida (NCA) and the Norwegian People Aid (NPA) played a distinguished role in the mediation success in the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A conflict (Nan, 2005). The power of those NGOs lies in their persuasive ability. The principal element of mediation leverage is the mediator's ability to persuade the disputants of the necessity for mediation to reach conflict resolution. According to Zartman and Touval, the mediator's persuasion ability is dependent upon the need of the disputants for a resolution to their conflict which cannot be achieved otherwise (Zartman & Touval, 1996). As for the mediator's persuasion ability, they should be able to convince the disputants of the attractiveness of the proposed conciliation using their communication channels.

In this capacity, Norway fills the role of facilitator. The mediator's persuasion ability depends on the sincere need of the disputants for a solution (Zartman & Touval, 1996). For the disputants to need a solution and seek mediation, they should first recognise that they have reached a mutually destructive stalemate where both of them can no longer stand the situation (Zartman & Touval, 1996), meaning the

conflict should already have reached the escalatory phase in the conflict cycle (Siniver, 2006). The need of the disputants is further encouraged by the local, regional and/or international context.

For example, in the Oslo negotiations, the Gulf war negatively affected the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) position as it was facing severe financial and political difficulties. At the same time, the PLO saw an opportunity to negotiate in the Israeli labour party. Those circumstances helped increase the PLO's willingness to be mediated, and they asked Norway to be a mediator. On the Israeli side, the Palestinian's first intifada and Hamas' domination of Palestine was a concern for Israel (Lieberfeld, 2008).

Qatar in international mediation

Since the mid- 2000s, Qatar has emerged itself as a peace mediator in regional conflicts, notably in the Middle East and Africa. Qatar proves that geographical size poses no barrier. Qatar succeeded in creating a distinct niche for itself in the regional and international community. Qatar has endeavoured to brand itself as an impartial peace maker across the Middle East and Africa and within the larger international arena. The most notable conflicts that Qatar has been involved in as a mediator include Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Palestine and finally, the border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea.

Qatar's success is derived from a carefully combined mixture of diplomacy, marketing, domestic politics, regional diplomacy, and through the strategic use of its sovereign wealth fund (Kamrava, 2015). To better understand Qatar's motivations and

aptitudes, which enable it to be a successful mediator, it is first necessary to study the background of Qatar and the reason behind Qatar's niche in international mediation.

Two essential factors enhance Qatar to be a mediator: the Qatari wealth and the location of Qatar. Qatar is an inordinately wealthy country with an exceedingly small population. It has the highest growth rate in its real gross domestic product compared to any other country in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the larger Middle East (Kamrava, 2015; Khatib, 2013a). This has enabled ruling elites to ensure socio-economic security for their citizenry and has mitigated potential political dissatisfaction. Much of this wealth derives from Qatar having strategically positioned itself as the world's largest supplier of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), thus making its per capita income the highest in the world (Kamrava, 2011). Qatar reached these high living standards after enacting many changes since its independence in 1971. Since then, its foreign policy has been directed at keeping a balance between itself and foreign players in order to obtain external protection (Barakat, 2014).

Considering the location of Qatar, Qatar is located between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the region's two competing hegemonies, thus giving it the status of a buffer state. Its position between two large, belligerent states naturally creates a lingering threat for Qatar (Fazal, 2011). This explains why Qatar between 1972 and 1995 relied on Saudi Arabia for a security guarantee to protect it from potential spill-over from the Islamic revolution in Iran (Kaussler, 2015b). Theoretically, to protect themselves against hegemony following the Cold War, small states had the choice to either follow the bandwagon approach or the balancing approach. The balancing approach is

represented by the political, economic, and military gathering of a group of states to face the hegemon country's power. The bandwagon approach is a strategy in which the small state realises that the cost of opposing an adversary is greater than the cost of cooperating with them and, therefore, resolves to join the hegemon country.

As mentioned above, these perspectives were dominant immediately following the Cold War and are based on the assumption that small states rely on their neighbours for survival (Ghimire, 2017). As mentioned, this was applicable to Qatari foreign policy in the period between 1972 and 1995, at which time Qatar relied upon Saudi Arabia for protection and stability (Cooper & Momani, 2011).

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and tension with Saudi Arabia and its opposition to any autonomy in Qatari policy, both exposed the vulnerability of Qatar (Kamrava, 2015). Indeed, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait put its dependence on Saudi Arabia for security into question. Consequently, this sparked a search for a new defence alliance for Qatar (Barakat, 2014).

In 1995, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani became the new Qatari Emir. He shifted Qatar's foreign policy agenda away from the Saudi hegemony in the region. Furthermore, Qatar's geographical positioning between two competing countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran, has continuously forced Qatar to seek external protection. That is why Qatar in 1991 signed a military cooperation agreement with the USA (Khatib, 2013a). The agreement was developed in 2003 and included the creation of the Al Udeid military base, now considered to be one of the foremost overseas military bases in the Middle East, housing military personnel from the USA, UK, and various other allies (Kamrava, 2015). In making this alliance, Qatar guaranteed its security externally.

Since the year 1995, Emir Hamad has ushered in unprecedented reforms in politics, media and economy, during which he helped Qatar to grow into a regional leader, with the creation of the Al-Jazeera channel and through its mediation in regional conflicts (Barakat, 2014). Qatar's fast economic development has contributed to the emergence of Qatar as a distinct diplomatic power broker (Mohammadzadeh, 2017).

The regional changes in the 1990s also helped Emir Hamad bin Khalifa to make fundamental changes to Qatar and its foreign policy. The ending of the Iran-Iraq war was an opportunity to develop its North Field gas in Gulf waters. This, in turn, paved the way for Qatar to become the world's largest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exporter by 2006, which has reflected upon Qatari foreign policy and its role as an international mediator (Khatib, 2013b). Being the world's largest LNG exporter provides Qatar with vast financial resources available to be used as financial incentives for peace and for hosting mediation talks (Kamrava, 2011).

Internally, the Qatar case exemplifies the importance of internal stability in international mediation, as Qatar did not get caught up in the Arab Spring revolutions that spread across the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-2011 (CIA, 2018). It can be argued that this stability is due in part to its vast wealth, advanced healthcare and educational system and developed infrastructure (Khatib, 2013b). Under Emir Hamad, Qatar succeeded in developing strong state institutions while maintaining strong social cohesion. Qatari domestic stability gives it the time and freedom to focus on and engage in international mediation (Barakat, 2014).

With regard to the connection between internal stability and mediation, the study suggests that the relationship between internal stability and mediation has a strong

positive correlation. In the context of leverage, incentives are one source of leverage to be used in mediation (Zartman and Touval, 1996). These incentives are based mainly on the economic resources of the state mediator and thus are logically tied to economic growth, which in turn requires political or internal stability (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Lindner & Strulik, 2004). Political instability, on the other hand, reduces economic growth (Alesina, Özler, Roubini, & Swagel, 1996; Huntington, 2006). Therefore, Qatari internal stability helps Qatar develop its economy and enjoy abundant economic resources and economic surpluses, which can be used as leverage for international mediation.

For Qatar, international mediation and the promotion of international peace is a core element of Qatari foreign policy. Qatari prioritises international peace and security and states that its foreign policy aims are to strengthen international peace and security by using peaceful resolutions (Nuruzzaman, 2015). International mediation was even officially included in the Qatari national constitution in 2003 and part of its foreign policy. In the Qatari constitution of 2003, article 7 states that "The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of maintaining international peace and security by encouraging the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and supporting the people's right to self-determination and non-interference in internal affairs of the State, and cooperation with peace-loving nations" (The Qatari constitution, 2003, p. 2). The constitution suggests that its motivation for mediation is to strengthen international peace and security, which can be seen as a moral motivation. This is in line with Barakat's (2014) perspective which points to the moral and religious motivation of Qatar's mediation ambitions and cites the usage of verses from the Holy Quran to justify the claim (Barakat, 2014). In contrast, Khatib (2013) and Kamrava

(2011) assert that Qatari mediation is guided by self-interested motivation in order to protect Qatar from regional rivals.

Qatar mediation is often heavily influenced by Qatar's regional rivals. For example, throughout Qatari mediation in Yemen, Saudi Arabia was able to undermine Qatari's mediation strategy (Hansen, 2013), which is one of several concerns related to Qatar's efforts in international mediation. Saudi Arabia shares a long and porous border with Yemen. The country has followed the Houthi rebellion in Yemen with great interest and has, on several occasions, launched bloody assaults against the Houthis to defeat them. So naturally, Saudi Arabia disapproved of Qatari mediation in Yemen. Instead, they went to great lengths to undermine Qatari mediation efforts by pouring money into the Yemeni military and their allied tribes while simultaneously portraying Qatari mediation efforts as a proxy initiative of Iran. Additionally, in August 2010, during the Qatari mediation in Yemen, Saudi King Abdullah asked the Yemeni president to add a condition granting the Saudis the right to be against any agreement with the Houthis(Hansen, 2013).

Kamrava (2015) asserts that Qatar, in its international mediation, bucks the trend of a low-leverage state by succeeding diplomatically and emerging as a regional powerhouse, going well beyond merely ensuring its survival and security (Kamrava, 2015). Qatar is one of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states which had the courage to involve themselves as mediators. Thus, the mediation role was restricted to the major regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Kamrava, 2011).

Some scholars claim that Qatar, through its mediation in Sudan, has challenged Egypt, which considers Sudan to be its backyard (Sudan Tribune, 2011b).The same

is true for Saudi Arabia's role in Yemen, during which it was wary of Qatari violation of Saudi influence there. Indeed, that is why the Saudi government undermined Qatari's attempts at mediation in Yemen (Hansen, 2013). Jasem (2012) confirms that throughout its international mediation, Qatar has never attempted to challenge the traditional leadership roles in the Middle East, including those held by Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Jasem, 2012).

The following section reviews the Qatari approach to international mediation. This approach consists of seven features represented in interest-based motivation, business diplomacy, public Diplomacy, Qatar impartiality, Personal Diplomacy, manipulation strategy, and Qatari leverage.

Interest-based motivation

Qatar's international mediation is driven by interest-based motivation. The Qatari policy seeks to ensure the survival of the state, Qatar's security and the achievement of international prestige (Kamrava, 2011, 2015). Survival strategy is essential in the case of Qatar, seeing as it is a buffer state located between two larger belligerent states, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Based on its location, Qatar is more likely than other states to experience state extinction and lives with a constant degree of the looming threat (Fazal, 2011; Jesse & Dreyer, 2016). Qatar is determined to maintain its security and stability, but its location is challenging for a small state with such unlimited ambition in its foreign policy. It finds itself on the Arabian Peninsula, defined by different political and military rivalries. By aiming to increase its international profile, Qatar aims to protect itself from the dangers of small state vulnerability (Cooper & Momani, 2011) and avoid what happened to Kuwait in 1990 (Rickli, 2016; Roberts, 2012).

Based on the need for security, some countries may involve themselves in international mediation either to avoid the danger of spill-over of nearby conflicts or to protect their own interests (Kamrava, 2011). Blanford (2008) shows that Qatar engages in mediation between disputants who are allies of Iran, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. Qatar has attempted to mediate between the Houthis and the Yemeni government and between Hezbollah and the Lebanese 14 March Movement (Blanford, 2008). Khatib (2013) illustrates that Iran plays an essential role in those conflicts, as it is a prominent supporter of Hezbollah and maintains strong relations with the Houthis in Yemen, all of which affects Gulf security. Qatar is doing its best to prevent the conflict from spilling over while at the same time maintaining a cordial relationship with Iran, with whom it shares the world's largest oilfield (Khatib, 2013a).

Qatari security is connected to the branding of Qatar as an international mediator.

Qatari international mediation efforts are usually based on branding Qatar. Qatar aims to portray its image as a regional power, introducing itself as an impartial mediator seeking peace and stability in the Middle East and the international community. Qatar in international mediation is exercising leverage on the international community to establish itself as a recognised brand and introduce itself as an international ally of the West (Peterson, 2006b; Roberts, 2012; Urichsen, 2014).

Qatar gains unique benefits by representing itself as an international ally of the West. Qatar has achieved the security it needs to protect itself in the unstable region by hosting the al-Udeied US airbase (Khatib, 2013b; Peterson, 2006b; Roberts, 2012). By being an international ally of the West, Qatar presents itself as a modern,

business-oriented state with the ability to compete in the international community (Roberts, 2012).

However, the Qatari mediation is not without fanfare, as this fanfare is important to Qatar in branding itself as a peace broker (Kamrava, 2011). Dickinson (2012) claims that the short-term result is that Qatar is able to fulfil its goals of branding itself as a peacemaker rather than focusing on achieving lasting peace in the countries it has targeted for international mediation. Dickson states that this explains Qatar's inability to ensure that agreements are implemented, as it lacks the diplomatic corps needed to sustain peace efforts after the agreement is reached. Dickinson bases his analysis on several cases representing the Qatari mediation experience to prove this. For example, Qatari mediation between the Yemeni government and Houthis in 2007 did not lead to a truce between the two sides. Likewise, the Doha agreements in 2008 involving Lebanon did not reduce violence and instability or even decrease tension between the rivals and did not offer peace to the country. Additionally, Qatari mediation between Hamas and Fatah in 2012 also did not lead to a long-run change or conciliation between the two parties(Dickinson, 2012).

Based on those examples, Dickinson (2012) claims that Qatari mediation did not change much in the conflicts where it was engaged. However, Dickinson's argument can be refuted by the fact that Qatar has objectively had significant success in its conflict mediation, though those successes have not necessarily brought closure in the form of conflict resolution. Mediation in conflicts, whereby disputants pledge to resolve the conflict, in practice does not necessarily lead to the resolution of the conflict (Kamrava, 2011). Moreover, international mediation contributes to the strengthening of the soft power of Qatar, which in turn contributes to the legitimacy and status of

Qatar in the international arena. That, in turn, furthers Qatari influence and security (Minich, 2015).

Generally, the Qatari foreign policy should not be understood only, in terms, of the Qataris' quest for security; rather, Qatari foreign policy should also be understood as status-driven. Mohammadzadeh (2017) confirms that Qatar is seeking to increase its influence in the international community. Qatar's ambition is to initiate the shaping of political change. That is seen demonstrated in Qatari foreign policy towards the Arab Spring as Qatar financially supported the rebels in Egypt, Libya and Syria (Mohammadzadeh, 2017). Ennis & Momani (2013) explain that the Qataris aim to extend their influence and become the leading player in Middle East politics, competing in mediation with Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally played the lead role in regional conflicts. Lacking neutrality in its intervention and mediation of regional conflicts and being biased towards the Lebanese March 14 movement in the Lebanese civil war, Saudi Arabia has opened the door for Qatar to fill the gap. Ennis & Momani (2013) claim that Qatar has seized this opportunity to successfully situate itself as an alternative to Saudi mediation in the Middle East and regional politics (Ennis & Momani, 2013). However, Al Qassemi (2011) confirms that Qatar has been careful not to cross the line regarding its relationship with Saudi Arabia and is careful not to oppose Saudi foreign policy, even regarding its domestic policy. Accordingly, Qatar supported the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) under Saudi leadership in the Arab Spring when the decision was made to quell the rebellion in the Bahraini uprising of 2011. Qatar also lent support during the Yemeni uprising when the GCC suggested moderating the transition trajectory in Yemen and seeking negotiation instead of overthrowing the regime of its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. He adds that in 2008

Qatari-Saudi relations were settled, and a rapprochement was reached. Al Qassemi argues that the settled relation was encouraged by the realpolitik of Qatar and an awareness of its limited influence in the Gulf area (Al Qassemi, 2011). In the same manner, Khatib (2013) illustrates that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar continued to oscillate between tension and cooperation until the Arab Spring in 2011 when the two countries shared the same instability concerns and feared chaos spreading into their own territories, which has been pushing them towards cooperation, although in some cases they still confront one another (Khatib, 2013a).

However, during the Arab Spring, Qatar moved away from its traditional foreign policy role as a mediator to embrace change in the Middle East and North Africa and support transitioning states. The Arab Spring era put Qatar's foreign policy into question, viewing it as an overreached policy. Qatar's new leadership, which came to power in June 2013, adapted by reverting to a more pragmatic foreign policy and addressing the fallout from its support for the Islamist movements in the region (Urighsen, 2014). The recent outbreak of diplomatic and political turmoil in June 2017 between key Gulf countries—namely Qatar on the one side and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain supported by Egypt on the other—is the most serious since the formation of the GCC in 1981. One of the key accusations that have been levelled against Qatar by the other three fellow GCC countries is its alleged support for terrorism and its support for Islamist groups in the region, including in Libya (El-Gamaty, 2017).

In sum, all of the motivation sources discussed above fall under the umbrella of interest-based motivation. Through its international mediation, Qatar seeks to secure itself and brand itself as a peace broker.

Business Diplomacy

The second feature of the Qatari international mediation approach is business diplomacy. Business diplomacy helps to establish sustained, positive relations between the top executives or their representatives in one country and the foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders in other countries, aiming to build and sustain legitimacy in a foreign business environment (Wolters, 2012; Kesteley et al., 2014).

In Qatar, business diplomacy plays a significant role in Qatari international mediation. Qatar uses business to drive diplomacy and, conversely, uses its diplomacy to protect its business interests (Gulbrandsen, 2010). Qatar uses its financial capacity to drive its diplomacy, which can be seen reflected in its international mediation policy (Group, 2009). In Qatar, there is no significant distinction between the income of the state and the income of the rulers in Qatar (Rathmell & Schulze, 2000). Indeed, business in Qatar is politics. Qatari international investment operates through its sovereign wealth fund (SWF), also known as a sovereign investment fund, a state-owned investment fund that invests in assets such as real estate (Kern, 2007). Furthermore, the Qatari economic system is characterised by state capitalism, where the state undertakes economic activities and deals with the means of production through the management of state-owned business enterprises. State capitalism helps the reshaping of international politics and the international economy by transferring large economic power to the central authority of the state (Bremmer, 2009).

For example, in addition to his ministerial positions, Sheikh Hamad is a member of the Supreme Council for the Investment of the Reserves of the State and the Ruling

Family Council. He is also vice-chairman and CEO of the sovereign-wealth fund Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), and chair its direct investment arm, Qatar Holding. Furthermore, he is the chairman of QIA's wholly-owned real estate arm, Qatari Diar, while also sitting on the board of Qatar Energy and Water Company (Kerr, 2008). Through business diplomacy, Qatar uses foreign policy to protect its investments. For example, Qatar started investment in Yemen's real estate sector in 2000 based on cooperation between a Yemeni government company (Shibam Holding) and Qatari Diar (a real estate company controlled by Shaik Hamad). At the time of Qatari mediation in Yemen, Qatari Diar announced a \$600 million project. In addition to this, several Qatari banks are active in Yemen (Group, 2009).

The same is true in Sudan, where Sheikh Hamad embraced his real estate ambitions to secure Qatar's business interests. Qatari Diar has \$400 million worth of residential and hotel projects in Khartoum. In addition, the banks have a very central presence. In Sudan, for example, one can point to the Qatar National Bank Al-Islami, which is entirely owned by Qatar National Bank (QNB). QNB opened its first branches outside Qatar in Khartoum around the time when Doha became involved with the Darfur peace process (Group, 2009). Qatar pledged a USD 2 billion investment to neutralise potential Libyan spoilers in Libya. Likewise, in South Lebanon, Qatar granted USD 300 million for reconstruction (Minich, 2015).

Finally, Qatar is concerned about energy security as the world's leading LNG exporter. With a large and increasing portion of its exports going to Europe through the Suez Canal, Qatar is particularly concerned about the security situation in the Gulf of Aden, Bab Al-Mandab, and the Red Sea, which may explain Doha's activist foreign

policy around the Horn of Africa, mediation in Sudan and Yemen, cultivation of good relations with Eritrea, and its long-standing interest in Somali stability (Gulbrandsen, 2010). Indeed, financial investment is a Qatari tool for international mediation (Kamrava, 2011). Additionally, success in international mediation is significant for Qatari investment (Kesteley, Riordan, & Ruël, 2014). For example, the success of Qatari mediation in Darfur offers the chance for Qatar to invest in Darfur and Sudan in general.

Qatar, with its enormous financial resources, can finance its mediation efforts both during the talks and after reaching agreements (Kamrava, 2011). It is essential to mention that Qatari business diplomacy in Qatari international mediation is coupled with their public diplomacy. Qatar uses investment to facilitate international mediation and vice versa; Qatar uses international mediation to protect its existing investment.

Public Diplomacy

The third feature of the Qatari mediation approach is public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, also called people diplomacy, refers to an international actor's attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public (Cull, 2009; Nye, 2010). In other words, public diplomacy is the ability to affect others to obtain the desired outcome. Furthermore, it is a tool government uses to mobilize and attract the public to other countries rather than the institutions that govern them. Broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports and arranging exchanges are tools of public diplomacy used to attract the attention of the public in other countries (Nye Jr, 2008). Public diplomacy includes any government-sponsored effort that aims to communicate directly to a foreign public.

Munro (2019) suggests two types of public diplomacy. The first one refers to branding where the government seeks to improve its image at the international level. Branding is intended to affect the foreign public's long-term perception. The second type of public diplomacy refers to political advocacy to facilitate rapid results. It is used to provide foreign support for immediate policy objectives (Munro, 2019). Public diplomacy is essential for small states. Peterson (2006) confirms that a small state under threat of absorption from its neighbours may develop a unique niche in any field that benefits the regional and international community by using public diplomacy. The small state can demonstrate to foreigners that it is more valuable or useful as an independent state rather than an absorbed one (Peterson, 2006a).

Qatar is an example; Qatar succeeded in developing its niche in international mediation to promote international peace and security and utilised public diplomacy to brand its niche. Qatar utilised its Aljazeera satellite channel as a tool of its public diplomacy to brand its niche in international mediation, which was established in 1996. Technically it is privately owned; however, the royal family financially support it. Aljazeera has traditionally offered 24-hour broadcasting news in Arabic throughout the Middle East and since 2006, through the Aljazeera English Channel, has also offered the same service to the international community (Cooper & Momani, 2011).

Thus, Aljazeera has adopted two internal and external roles in nature. The internal aspect focuses on discussing controversial topics in the Arab and Muslim public environment. Meanwhile, the external role focuses on representing the Arab and Muslim perspectives on regional and international events to the world (Powers & Gilboa, 2007). Aljazeera plays a vital role in Qatari international mediation, where it helps Qatar to maintain lines of communication with different actors and serves as a bridge

between parties in mediation (Barakat, 2014). For example, when Israel attacked Lebanon in the war of 2006, Aljazeera championed Hezbollah, then Qatar went in to mediate in Lebanon (Hammond, 2014). This sort of media coverage is a staple feature of Qatari international mediation, despite some scholars' view that secrecy is one of the vital elements of any mediation effort.

Pulliam (2013) asserts that the most successful mediation is the one that is conducted in secret (Pulliam, 2013). Furthermore, Barston (2014) and Lieberfeld (2008) argue that the leaking of elements of secret negotiations creates difficulties because concessions made by one party are exposed, thus weakening its position. They add that in such instances, the credibility of the mediator may be put into question, or the media may present a misunderstanding of the negotiations (Barston, 2014; Lieberfeld, 2008). While publicity of the mediation increases Qatar's international profile, too much media focus on the mediation process may draw attention away from the developing mechanisms and long-term involvement in the conflict (Barakat, 2015).

While secrecy is the central pillar of the Norwegian international mediation, the Qatari international mediation approach is based on media coverage through the Aljazeera satellite channel. Qatar's mediation efforts have taken place in the spotlight of the media, where the local and regional media outlets are involved (Barakat, 2014). The Qatari diplomats often offer interviews to the media while the mediation process is still underway. Those diplomats usually portray the country's role in incredibly favourable, glowing terms. After the end of the mediation process, keenly recognizing the value of the advertising of their mediation efforts, Qatari leaders continue to refer to the Qatari mediation efforts as significant accomplishments, mentioning their

importance for regional stability. There is plenty available on Aljazeera and Qatar in the context of regional security/politics resources on mediation cases; this is Qatar's way of portraying what is referred to as niche diplomacy (Kamrava, 2011).

Qatar's impartiality

The fourth core feature of the Qatari mediation is Qatar's impartiality in mediation.

Qatar's preferred foreign policy method in international mediation is a tactic that avoids it having to take sides and thus allows it to maintain its position of "neutrality" and its status as "everyone's friend" (Khatib, 2013b).

Barakat (2014) and Kamrava (2011) confirms that Qatar is an impartial mediator with stability and experience in international mediation and attaining peace (Barakat, 2014; Kamrava, 2011). In 1995, the Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani founded Qatari modern foreign policy. Three principal elements mark this foreign policy: pulling Qatar from being dependent on Saudi Arabia, making Qatar a peace mediator in the Middle East region, and finally, adopting high-profile diplomatic relations with all allies and avoiding conflict with adversaries. The Emir adopted those three elements in order to keep Qatar safe and secure (Nuruzzaman, 2015).

Regarding international mediation, Nuruzzaman (2015) assures that Qatar from the first moment adopted impartiality by implementing a strategy of "get to know all and act" (Nuruzzaman, 2015). Mitchell (2008) asserts that impartiality has always been a crucial component of Qatari international mediation (Mitchell 2008). Qatar builds relationships with all parties and invests those relations in mediation.

Considering the Qatari impartiality, one should consider two periods of time. From the year 2003 to the year 2011, when the Arab Spring began, Qatar proved its

impartiality as a mediator. However, throughout the years 2011 and 2012, amid the Arab Spring, Qatar took an aggressive stance against the violent oppression of protestors in Libya and Syria and supported the protestors against these two political regimes. The tools they used to support the rebels in these countries ranged from campaign contributions to the direct provision of weapons. It was a swift departure from Qatar's traditional role in international mediation as an impartial mediator (Barakat, 2012). In June 2013, the Qatari Sheikh Hamad announced the immediate transition of power to his son Emir Tamim. This may have been an admissions of error in Qatar's biased intervention in Syria and Libya and a return to Qatar's previous role as an impartial mediator (Hammond, 2014). The new Emir, Sheikh Tamim, seeks to restore the Qatari reputation as an impartial mediator (Minich, 2015).

This impartiality is upheld as Qatar's strong point. However, Qatari impartiality is not without critics, namely regional power such as Saudi Arabia. For example, Saudi Arabia has routinely criticised Qatar for its mediation in Yemen and has accused the country of bias towards Iran (Barakat, 2012). Kamrava (2011) presents an example of Qatari impartiality. He shows that in its mediation of the Darfur conflict, Qatar invited both disputants to negotiations in Doha, and before this step, the country's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs himself went to Darfur to witness the reality of the situation there. Those behaviours helped establish Qatar's unbiased image (Kamrava, 2011).

Barakat (2012) and Mitchell (2008) each have considered Qatar to be a neutral and impartial mediator (Barakat, 2012 ; C. Mitchell, 2003). Moreover, Barakat (2012) suggests that the impartiality of Qatar attracted the disputants to accept Qatar as a mediator in the first place. He adds that Qatar has diverse relations with many different

actors in the Middle East and the wider international community. Those relations led the disputants to trust Qatar and prefer it as an impartial mediator. He presents Lebanon as an example. He confirms that Qatar succeeded as a mediator in Lebanon and was a better choice for Hezbollah than Saudi Arabia and Egypt, neither of whom had any previous relationship with Hezbollah and would have almost certainly not been an impartial mediator (Barakat, 2012).

Some may claim that Qatar was not an impartial mediator due to hosting people at Aljazeera channel or Qatar hosting people, such as Muslim brothers affiliates, on the Qatari state. For example, on September 15th, 2004, the Aljazeera channel hosted Mohamed Al-Awa, the Muslim Ulama Secretary-General, on “bila hudod” (without borders). In the interview, which Ahmad Mansour conducted, Al-Away denied the Darfur Holocaust and blamed the rebels for the events taking place in Darfur. Many understood from this interview that Qatar, in this case, represented by the Aljazeera channel, was biased towards the AL Bashir government (Mahmoud, 2004). This argument could easily be refuted by reviewing Aljazeera satellite channel during and before the Qatari mediation in Sudan. One can see that Aljazeera conducted numerous programs and interviewed many people from Darfur, focusing on their suffering. Those people included the rebel leaders as well as the citizens of Darfur. That indicates that Aljazeera was eager to show both opinions. That helps to reject the allegation that Qatar was biased towards the Government of Sudan.

For the Muslim brotherhood affiliations, some may claim that Qatar is known for its support of the Muslim brotherhood. They present a key representative of the brotherhood, Yousuf Al-Qaradawi, as an example. Roberts (2012) claims that Yousuf Al-

Qaradawi has been settled in Qatar for many years and is an influential factor in Qatari personal politics (Roberts, 2012). Pulliam (2013) illustrates that Qatar's hosting of several Muslim Brotherhood leaders made it liable to accusations of bias in any mediation involving the Muslim brotherhood (Pulliam, 2013). However, the Qatari biased toward Muslim brotherhood may be not accurate. Qatar hosted a variety of exiles in addition to the Muslim brotherhood. Qatar hosted the Hamas leader, Khaled Mishaal, the Indian artist, M.F. Husain, and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al Hadithi. In addition, they hosted many of Saddam Hussain's family, the former president of Mauritania, Abbasi Madani, former FIS leaders in Algeria, prominent Libyan cleric Ali Al Sallabi, and former Knesset member Azmi Bishara. This diverse collection indicates a Qatari tolerance for exiles of all backgrounds (Roberts, 2014).

In sum, impartiality is a significant component in Qatari mediation. Qatar works hard to keep equal relations with all parties and invests this relation in any future mediation. Those relations are a by-product of Qatari personal diplomacy.

Personal diplomacy

The fifth main feature of Qatari mediation is personal Diplomacy. Personal Diplomacy means that the head of state/president or Foreign Minister decides to embark on diplomatic visits or meetings alone, rather than using an ambassador (Larres, 2002; Marsh, 2017). Qatar's impartiality combined with Qatari personal diplomacy is a potent combination that constitutes the country's trust-based leverage. Thanks to Personal Diplomacy in which the Emir and the Qatari foreign minister play the main role, Qatar usually succeeds in bringing disputants to the negotiation table and is often credited with the signing of a deal (Kamrava, 2011).

The Qatari mediation is based on the personal Diplomacy. For example, before the Qatari mediation in Darfur, the Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Mahmoud, contacted conflict stakeholders, such as the USA (Blanchard, 2011). In the Qatari mediation in Lebanon, Hezbollah agreed on the terms of the agreement only after the Qatari Emir telephoned the Syrian president (Minich, 2015).

Understanding the role of personal diplomacy is helpful to understand The Qatari tribal monarchy's structure and history. Qatar has been led by the Al Thani family since 1825, with a few rival families such as the Al Attiyah. The Qatari tribal monarchy's structure is divided into rulers, movers, spacers, and tellers. The rulers are the Emirs, the central and sovereign person behind Qatari political decisions. The second group is the movers. The movers consist of individuals capable of strongly and directly influencing the Emir's political decisions. A mover example is Mozah bint Nasser Al Missned, the second wife of the previous Emir Hamad bin Khalifa and the current Emir Tamim bin Hamad. The third group is spacers, members of the large, powerful families which are given space for relevant foreign policy decision making within a quite narrow subfield of foreign policy, an example being the first chairperson of Aljazeera Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani. The last group is the tellers, individuals with access to the movers or the Emir. They do this via informal networks, such as the so-called Wasta, or through business associations, sport and media organizations and friends and families. This group can focus on issues of interest to the movers and rulers. The Department of Foreign Affairs in Qatar is considered to be no more than a logistics institution with a limited influence on politics. Its main role is as a tool to enhance the ruler's efforts (Hansen, 2013).

Considering Qatar's international mediation, it is based on an elite with intense personal engagement. This elite consists broadly of the Emir, the prime minister and the foreign minister (Barakat, 2014). Those three persons are responsible and are mainly involved in the mediation process. The Emir is the crucial person in this structure who advances the mediation process. The Emir and the foreign policy officials have often acted as well-intentioned and well-informed mediators intending to turn an intractable dispute into a win-win scenario (Ulrichsen, 2014). They both rely on a combination of instinct, charisma and wealth to push through an agreement (Barakat, 2012). They also use this combination to form new networks. They depend heavily on these networks and know many officials in Western and Eastern countries on a very personal level (Dickinson, 2012a). This network is unique in that it is based on a form of nepotism, that is, the Wasta network, the religious organizations and family ties that exist inside the decision making elites and structures (Ulrichsen, 2014).

Considering Norway's international mediation, it is based on the combined efforts of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian NGOs, used primarily for networking (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). Unlike Norwegian international mediation, Qatari international mediation efforts are personal and based on the elite's decision-making structure. Qatar's role in international mediation is based on a combination of its financial resources and its personal involvement with the world's heads of state (Kamrava, 2011).

However, Qatari personal diplomacy is a source of strength and weakness in Qatari mediation. The strength can be seen in focusing on the elite; Qatari international mediation is characterised by the ability to act quickly, the availability of money, and the modest size of the decision-maker structure (Kamrava, 2011). Additionally, the

strength can also be seen in the Emir and the well-informed elite of Qatari, which has been remarkably effective in international mediation and has often succeeded in bringing the disputants to the negotiation table to move forward with peace talks. Qatari personal diplomacy helps in establishing trust, managing partners, facilitating negotiations, managing the potential spoilers, as in the case of Lebanon and Syria (Roberts, 2011) However, the weakness of this personal diplomacy and its personalization of the mediation process lies in having this decision maker structure that might not necessarily contribute to international mediation success. Based on this structure, Qatar might succeed at bringing disputants to the negotiation table and even get them to sign a deal, but they may fail to sustain the process to completion (Kamrava, 2011).

Additionally, the weakness of this personal diplomacy and its personalization of the mediation process lies in the lack of formally trained personnel. This reflects negatively on the mediation process and is seen reflected as a decrease in the contextual knowledge of the conflict. Qatar has been criticized for its lack of knowledge regarding best-practice strategies in mediation, post-settlement implementation and cease-fire monitoring (Roberts, 2011). Personal diplomacy, in some instances, hindered the cultivation efforts of deeper institutional expertise in mediation strategies (Roberts, 2011).

The centralization of the decision making in the hands of the Emir and his elite negatively affects Qatari mediation. It leads to quick reactions and decisions regarding Qatari international mediation and, additionally, an absence of a foreign policy infrastructure and a lack of professional capacity to follow up mediation efforts and implementation(Khatib, 2013b).

Personal diplomacy is not without its shortfalls, especially on the implementation level and the follow-up mechanism (Kamrava, 2011). The lack of an elective follow-up mechanism for monitoring implementation is a key concern because it leads to a breakdown of Qatari efforts in international mediation.

For example, Yemeni members of the implementation committee met with rebel leaders but made little progress because they operated in a vacuum. There were no regular contacts between signatories and Qatari officials and no formal mechanism to address agreements (Group, 2011). Qatar needs professional personnel who can translate the Qatari success in mediation to long term policies that support Qatari mediation on the ground (Kamrava, 2011). Minich (2015) recommends that personal diplomacy be preserved but enhanced by a trained diplomatic apparatus experienced and knowledgeable administrators who can provide the resources needed for conflict resolution (Minich, 2015).

Roberts (2011) explains that the transition of power to Sheikh Tamim created a large vacuum: namely, the two critical roles in Qatari mediation that were previously filled by Emir Hamad and the Qatari ex-foreign minister, Bin Jassim Al Thani. Qatari mediation had heavily relied on them (Roberts, 2011).

In sum, Qatari personal diplomacy is a source of both strength and weakness in Qatari mediation. However, it is considered a distinct and essential feature of Qatari mediation and is the key to success for Qatar in international mediation.

A manipulation strategy

Another prominent characteristic of Qatari mediation is the usage of a manipulation strategy. For the manipulative mediator to make a promise or threat, the mediator

must first bring the disputants together using a facilitation strategy and /or structuring a proposal using a formulation strategy. By using the facilitation strategy, the mediator contacts the disputants, gains their confidence, transmits messages between the disputants and allows the interest of all disputants to be discussed. While in formulation strategy, the mediator helps formulate a framework for an acceptable outcome and makes sustentative suggestions and proposals. On the other hand, the manipulative mediator holds the disputants at the negotiation table, presses the parties, threatens the withdrawal of resources, and finally threatens with punishment and mediation withdrawal. Additionally, employing the manipulation strategy, the mediator has the ability to use a vast arsenal of incentives and ultimatums to change the way the issues are framed and affect the perspective of the disputants towards those issues. The choice of strategy is dependent upon the resources the mediator possesses (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000).

Qatar utilises its oil and gas financial power in international mediation. For example, Qatar used its wealth in Darfur negotiations to encourage the disputants to sign an agreement (Roberts, 2015). Qatar has thus far practised power-based mediation. Its interventions heavily depend on Qatari's capacity to wield its vast financial resources to offer incentives for conflicting parties to come to an agreement, which indicates that Qatari mediation is more advanced than pure mediation (Moran, 2009). Indeed, the promise of future investment and development is a genuine component in the Qatari mediation approach.

By introducing incentives to the disputants to incentivise peace, the mediator presents a more attractive option (Carnevale, 1986; Zartman and Touval, 1996; Beardsley et al., 2006). According to the theory of international mediation, Qatar is

employing the manipulation strategy in international mediation by introducing those incentives to the disputants. It is worth mentioning that the manipulation strategy allows the mediator to employ the carrots (incentives) to promote the disputants to reach an agreement (Beardsley et al., 2006) and the stick (pressing) in order to increase the costs of non-agreement (Carnevale, 1986).

From its mediation in Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen, it can be concluded that Qatar seems to have developed its strategy based around facilitation, formulation and manipulation strategy. The Qatari manipulation takes the form of incentives. In other words, Qatar's strategy is manipulative in the sense of offering rewards and promising financial benefits to disputants in return for resolving the conflict (Kamrava, 2011; Urichsen, 2014). For example, Qatar pledged USD 300 million for construction in Lebanon to promote a power-sharing agreement between Hezbollah and the government of Fouad Siniora. For this reason, some scholars have labelled Qatari engagement in international mediation as chequebook diplomacy (Rabi, 2009).

However, using incentives as carrots helps bring the parties to the negotiation table and reach an initial agreement. However, this effect is typically limited to the short run. In granting incentives, the mediator causes the disputants to focus on short-term gains rather than addressing the underlying roots of the conflict (Barakat, 2012). Indeed, the Qatari mediators work based on their framework by adopting a strategy that involves manipulating financial leverage as incentives for the disputants to encourage them to agree.

The Qatari Leverage

One of the main components of the Qatari mediation approach is its leverage. Qatari leverage in international mediation can be broken into three categories: the Qatari economic resources or incentives, personal diplomacy, and the cultural and religious ties between Qatar and the disputants.

Qatar's wealth is considered power-based leverage and is heavily used in Qatar's international mediation (Kamrava, 2011). Indeed, the primary source of Qatari power-based leverage is represented in its material incentives to the disputants if they reach an agreement (Kamrava, 2011). Qatar has conducted huge investments in infrastructural development projects in the countries where it has played the role of mediator. For example, Qatar is one of Southern Lebanon and Sudan (Kamrava, 2011). In practice, the Qatari experience in mediation proves that the power of rewards or incentives plays a significant role in its mediation success (Minich, 2015). Unlike most low-leverage state mediators, Qatar is able to invest its financial power to bring parties to an agreement (Minich, 2015).

Given its position as the state with the highest GDP per capita in the world, its massive financial resources help Qatar to finance its peace talks and peace agreements (Ulrichsen, 2012; Ulrichsen, 2014). Due to its enormous wealth, Qatar as a mediator focuses on providing material incentives in its mediation. Incentives are among five types of leverage resources distinguished by Zartman and Touval. As mentioned above, those five sources are represented in persuasion, extraction, termination, deprivation, and gratification (Bien et al., 2000).

The material incentives that the disputants receive from the mediator can result in different outcomes (Böhmelt, 2010; Schrodt & Gerner, 2004). Those material incentives could take one of two forms: either direct cash payments or investments in infrastructure projects, both of which are associated with conflict settlement (Kamrava, 2011). Qatar has heavily invested in the countries in which it has played the role of mediator. For example, Qatar made 2 billion USD investments for the Darfur region and pledged 500 million USD in reconstruction aid in the Saada Province. Additionally, it provided 300 million USD for reconstruction in Lebanon (Minich, 2015). Additionally, the Qatari security arrangement with the United States provides Qatar with greater autonomy in its foreign policy, which is considered another source of Qatari power-based leverage (Krane & Wright, 2014).

Qatar deploys its immense wealth or economic resources combined with its Personal Diplomacy. Qatar's Personal diplomacy is also considered a source of leverage, creating a potent combination. Personal diplomacy, represented in the Emir and the Qatari foreign minister, usually plays a significant role in Qatari mediation. By using personal diplomacy, Qatar usually brings the disputants to the negotiation table, and personal diplomacy encourages the disputants to sign a deal (Kamrava, 2011). However, Qatari wealth and Personal Diplomacy are not the only sources of Qatari leverage in international mediation. Sharing cultural and religious ties is a type of leverage that Qatar has in its international mediation arsenal. The cultural and religious ties are considered leverage, which helps build trust between Qatar as a mediator and the disputants. Notably, most Qatari mediation attempts have dealt with regional, Muslim and Arab societies. Qatar's leverage is based on Qatar's cultural and religious traditions, and the disputants share. In terms of mediation in Arab and Muslim

societies, Qatar has an advantage over any western mediator. In its mediation in regional conflicts, Qatar is able to use a culturally appropriate framework and avoid using an imported "one-size-fits-all" approach that may not match the culture and norms of the disputants (Mac Ginty, 2008a). Cultural ties are considered leverage for Qatar because the disputants are sure that Qatar understands their needs well. Those cultural ties strengthen the position of Qatar as a mediator. For example, Qatar used those cultural ties to be a mediator in the Darfur conflict. Qatar proved to the Darfuris that Qatari would be an honest and credible mediator who would not oppose them. Leverage from the cultural and religious ties can be seen in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas and the Sudanese conflict. Qatar shares a cultural tie with both the Palestinians and the Sudanese. Those cultural ties are based primarily on Islam's religion and a shared ethnic group; Palestinians, Sudanese and the Qatari are all predominantly Arabs.

In summary, Norway and Qatar are wealthy countries with low leverage for international mediation. There is, however, a distinct difference between the Norwegian model of international mediation and the Qatari approach in international mediation. Unlike Norwegian international mediation, which is normative, Qatari mediation is interest-motivated and directed at gaining international prestige to enhance the country's regional standing. Additionally, Qatar uses its international mediation attempts to strengthen its regional position. Equally important, the building block of the Norwegian mediation is Track One and a Half Diplomacy. One and a Half Diplomacy is represented in the strong relations between its NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and uses its NGOs as a tool to build trust with disputants, make connections among the local community and initiate the international mediation process. In contrast, the

building blocks of Qatari international mediation are its finance and personal diplomacy. Qatari diplomacy in international mediation is sometimes referred to as the “cheque book” approach because it relies on its considerable financial resources to obtain a final peace agreement (Kamrava, 2011; Rabi, 2009). Qatari networking is based on the “Wasta-network, and family ties within the decision making elite (Urichsen, 2014).

Based on the above discussion, it was expected that the research would show that Norway is a norm-based mediator acting as a pure mediator, employing a facilitation strategy, and known for its impartiality in international mediation. On the other hand, the research was expected to show that Qatar is an interest-based mediator that acts as a power mediator employing a manipulation strategy and not paying attention to impartiality. This study challenged those expectations and found different facts about Norway's and Qatar's behaviour in international mediation. The following four chapters illustrate the actual findings of the Qatari approach and the Norwegian approach in international mediation.

CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY ONE: NORWAY AND THE OSLO ACCORD 1993

Introduction

On 13 September 1993, the World witnessed the signing of the Oslo Accord, the product of a series of secret negotiation rounds in Oslo between Israeli representatives and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) representatives, with the presence of Norway as a mediator. Both sides had managed to agree on a Declaration of Principles calling. It includes mutual recognition of Israel as a state and the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people (Waage, 2005). The need of both the Israelis and Palestinians for a solution prompted Norway's mission to bring the parties together at the negotiating table. The international, regional, and local changes determined the specific time for Norway to become a mediator. On the Israeli side, they desired to find an alternative to suppress the Palestinian Intifada and help Israel to avoid further criticism by the international community for its deterrent and bone-cracking policy against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Waage, 2005). On the Palestinian side, the political, economic and financial weakness of Yasir Arafat and the PLO helped Norway in particular to become a mediator. Additionally, the Norwegian Track One and a Half diplomacy was leveraged to build trust between Norway and the two parties and became the main reason for the disputants to accept Norway as a mediator.

Specifically, Norway's leverage in mediation between the Israelis and the PLO resulted from the trust and confidence built on the personal relations between FAFO and the disputants. In the past, scholars have argued that Norway had neither a carrot nor a stick to use as leverage and push the disputants towards an agreement.

Also, the literature shows that Norway usually employs a facilitation strategy in its mediation that is coupled with its impartiality (Ingebritsen, 2006; Kelleher & Tabulbee, 2006; Ford, 2000). However, this new research has revealed a different profile from the known image of Norway as an impartial mediator who employed the facilitation strategy.

Overall, the main argument in this case study is that the Norwegian mediation between the Israelis and the PLO, two disputants who have power disparity, brings both the Norwegian facilitation role and the Norwegian impartiality into question. This case study shows that Norway used a facilitation strategy and a manipulation strategy.

Norway played the role of facilitator until May 1993 and from that time on has acted as a manipulator and a power mediator by pressing the weaker party (the Palestinians) towards achieving agreement, exploiting the desperate need of the PLO for any solution. . In its mediation between the strong Israeli side and the weak PLO, Norway played a manipulative role, taking advantage of Arafat and the PLO's weakness and practising psychological pressure on Yasir Arafat and PLO. Accordingly, Norway acted as a power mediator, practising a manipulation strategy on the PLO. At the same time, Norway itself was manipulated by the stronger disputant, the Israelis. Israel took advantage of the eagerness of Norway to reach an agreement and achieve the status of peacemaker on the international political map. Additionally, the power disparity between the Israelis and the PLO did not help Norway be an impartial mediator. As a lower-leverage state, Norway failed to properly manage the power disparity between the Israelis and the PLO.

In sum, the role of Norway in the Oslo-backed channel was a complicated one. In its mediation between the strong Israeli side and the weak PLO, Norway played a

manipulative role, taking advantage of the weakness of Arafat and the PLO. Additionally, Norway was not an impartial mediator in its role in Oslo secret channel. Those arguments are explored in this chapter, divided into three main parts: a brief about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Oslo backchannel, and the Norwegian international mediation approach in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

This section is not a detailed historical analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the tale of Palestinian-Israeli hostilities is beyond the scope of this thesis. For this thesis, only a brief description of the conflict is provided, focusing mainly on the circumstances that led to the Oslo Accord. The purpose of this section is to direct the reader's attention to those situations which put the two disputants in need of a solution and encourage both of them to accept Norway, a low-leverage state, to act as mediator. Without a doubt, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been one of the most complex conflicts in the world for several decades (Tessler, 2009). The conflict is a struggle between two distinct ethnic groups with competing claims on the same land and a conflict of national identity and self-determination (Gerner, 2018). Both the Palestinians and the Israelis put forth strong arguments based on history and religion to support their claims as both have deep roots in the region (Pfeffer, 2014). However, each of them denies the other's right to the land and has been caught in a cycle of denial for many years (Elon, 2015; Halevi, 2018).

The conflict's roots date back to the late 19th century and the Jewish migration to Palestine. This immigration was strengthened in 1917 when the British Foreign Minister, Balfour, announced the Balfour Declaration, in which he pledged British support

for the Jews in establishing their Jewish national home in Palestine, a territory which would remain under the British Mandate until 1922. The declaration would later support and increase the Jewish immigration to Palestine after the extermination of six million Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War (Helmreich, 2017).

Then, on 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution to partition Palestine into two states: a Jewish state and an Arab state.

Straightaway, the Arab leaders opposed the resolution. Eventually, Israel was announced as a state on 15 May 1948 (Farsakh, 2017). However, the Jewish entity in Palestine on 15 May 1948 was not a fragile infant but rather a modern, western industrial society. Israel was a state in every meaning of the word, even before declaring itself as a state in 1948 (Alkhaldi, 2010). Nearly two decades later, in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Israel took over the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (Schulze, 2013).

For this reason, the Palestinians have found themselves in a never-ending struggle to return to their occupied land. Accordingly, and to serve this purpose more effectively, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and National Council (PNC) as the PLO's supreme body, were formed in 1964 to lead the Palestinian struggle against Israel. The largest faction in PLO emerged as Fatah, which Yasir Arafat headed (Shemesh, 2012). Ever since the Camp David agreement between the Egyptians and the Israelis in 1978, there have been several efforts from the Palestinian side to create a Palestinian state. However, the Israelis would never give a state to the Palestinians on the occupied land of 1967(Anziska, 2018).

Towards Oslo back channel

By the late 1980s and leading into the early 90s, there occurred important changes in the international context, the regional context, the Israeli national context, and the Palestinian national context (Pruitt, 1997). Firstly, on the international level, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, resulting in a new unipolar world order with the USA as a hegemon country. This allowed the United States to be the sole player in the world, including the Middle East (Dougherty, 2001). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 1991 Gulf war strengthened US influence in the Middle East and deeply affected the regional players (Aruri, 2003). In the meantime, Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli prime minister, understood the importance of US support to absorb immigrants who came from the former Soviet Union. The Americans were aware of the importance of timing in launching a peace conference. Given the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA planned to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by launching the Madrid peace conference at the end of October 1991, which later was moved to Washington. The negotiations in the Madrid conference took two tracks: a bilateral track and a multilateral track. The bilateral track was between Israel, the Palestinian-Jordanian (joint delegation), Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile, the multilateral track dealt with five common issues that concerned all parties: water, the environment, arms control, refugees, and economic development (Bercovitch, 2011b).

The PLO was excluded from those talks, and the Palestinian delegation was represented by residents of the Gaza strip and West Bank. Moreover, the Palestinian delegation was not independent; it was under the Jordanian umbrella. However, the Palestinian delegation was in direct contact with PLO in Tunisia. The failure of the Madrid peace conference and Washington talks was a motivation for the Israelis and the

Palestinians to initiate a secret channel of talks and was the inspiration for Norway to sponsor those secret negotiations (Bercovitch, 2011a; Shlaim, 2005).

The second event, which paved the way to the Oslo secret channel, was on the regional level in the Middle East. It was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf war in 1990-1991. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and PLO's support of Saddam Hussain weakened the PLO's position and severed its access to financial resources which it is used to receive from Arab countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Bruck, 1996; Lundberg, 1996; Makovsky, 2018; Peres & Landau, 1995; Pruitt, 1997). Yasir Arafat was weakened by lending support to Saddam Hussein against the United States-led coalition. The Gulf War weakened the PLO and made it ready to make peace through a third party who could easily approach the Israelis (Egeland, 2008). Arafat's support for Saddam Husain had left the PLO without the economic and diplomatic leverage that it used to enjoy from Arab countries. This support deprived the PLO of its political backing and cost the PLO much of its financial resources. Moreover, it marginalised the PLO and isolated it (Qurei, 2006).

The Gulf war demolished the Arab consensus on Palestine; consequently, the Palestinian question was removed from the top of the official Arab agenda (Aruri, 2003). Furthermore, Kuwait, the Gulf countries, and Egypt joined USA and Israel in a campaign aiming to demonize Arafat and delegitimize the PLO. Conversely, the Gulf War strengthened Israel and imposed its diplomatic framework in any expected negotiations. Moreover, after the Gulf War, Israel was convinced that the Arab recognition of Israel as a state was a precondition to any negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Aruri, 2003).

Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi war were a window of opportunity for peace in the Middle East (Aruri, 2003). On the national level, the first Palestinian intifada has widened this window. The Palestinian first intifada (Arabic for uprising) took place in December 1987 across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This intifada witnessed a growing influence of the Hamas movement, which posed a threat to both Israel and Yasir Arafat. Likewise, Israel was concerned that Hamas would cooperate with militant Iran and create a serious military threat for Israel (Makovsky,2018;Rabin,1993). Similarly, Arafat's concern was that Hamas would become an alternative leadership to the PLO (Corbin, 1994b). The PLO lost much support to Hamas in the Gaza strip and West Bank during the first Intifada (Agha, Feldman, Khalidi, & Schiff, 2003; Qurei, 2006).

Indeed, the first Intifada in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank returned the Palestinian question to the forefront of the Arab and international agenda (Qurei, 2006). It is considered a significant leap in paving the way to the Oslo agreement. Additionally, it provided prestige and political influence on the internal leadership in Gaza Strip and West Bank, such as Haider Abdel Shafi and Hanan Ashrawi. However, the founding of Hamas during the Intifada created a challenge for the PLO, who was politically and financially suffering in the wake of the Gulf war, because of support to the toppled Saddam Hussain by Yasir Arafat.

More importantly, Intifada boosted the need for the Palestinian leadership for negotiations. Additionally, the Jordanian departure from the Palestinian scene in July 1988 forced the Americans and the Israelis to deal directly with the Palestinian leadership (Hirschfeld, 2014). It was clear that any negotiations should be coordinated with PLO,

whether through the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, through the US-PLO dialogue, or the Egyptians (Hirschfeld, 2014).

Similarly, during the First Palestinian Intifada, Israel faced international condemnation for its crackdown on the Palestinians. As a result, Israel was under pressure, realizing that it was time to initiate secret peace talks with the PLO. Additionally, Israeli leadership thought that the PLO leaders would control the Palestinian intifada better than the Israeli army and could relieve Israel of the occupation burden, which would pave the way to normalizing the relations with Arab countries, which could not materialize without the agreement of the Palestinians (Brynjar, 1998; Waage, 2000). Moreover, Israel realised the extent to which Arafat was weakened in the wake of the Gulf War, knowing that Arafat would enter the negotiations with very few options and less influence. Israel wanted to capitalise on this weakness. This may help explain why Israel avoided talks with Arafat in 1979 (Brynjar, 1998; Waage, 2000).

As has been noted, these substantial changes in circumstances on three levels— national, regional, and international— created an environment in which a low-leverage state such as Norway could take advantage and fill the role of mediator in this complex conflict. According to the Palestinian perspective, the Norwegian setting would bring the marginalised PLO back to centre stage and would give Arafat complete and direct control over the Palestinian side in the negotiations (Ashrawi, 1996; Mahmud'Abbas, 1995; Qurei, 2006). It is worth mentioning that Arafat asked the Norwegian government several times during the 1980s to convey a message to Israel's foreign minister, suggesting Norway as a negotiation place, but Israel refused due to its conviction to not talk directly to the PLO (Pruitt, 2008).

In hopes of paving the way to negotiations with Israel, Yasir Arafat announced in 1988 that the PLO accepted the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. This announcement was understood as an indirect recognition of Israel because it granted secure and recognised boundaries to Israel (Pruitt, 2008). Simultaneously, a new Israeli government was formed in November 1988. It was a national unity government headed by Yizhak Shamir. Peres filled the role of finance minister, and Rabin served as defence minister (Hirschfeld, 2014). Rabin's previous experience had taught him that treating the Palestinian people with violence led nowhere, and he recognised that the time was ready for peace. His immediate priority was to put an end to the intifada. Rabin's thought was strengthened by the end of the war between Iraq and Iran in 1988 as he was afraid that Iran and Pakistan would develop a nuclear weapon capability, which could undermine the Israeli deterrence power. For this reason, he was determined to make peace with both the PLO and Syria (Hirschfeld, 2014). Making peace was not only in the mind of Rabin but was also a dream for Shimon Peres (Hirschfeld, 2014).

Indeed, peace in the Middle East was a dream of Shimon Peres and his small team, Yossi Beilin (the deputy of Shimon Peres), Uri Savir (Director General of the Israeli foreign ministry), and Avi Gil (Director General of the Israeli foreign ministry). The defeat of the Likud government in the Israeli Knesset in the summer of 1992 gave a chance for Peres's dream to come true (Peres & Landau, 1995). The Israeli Labour party had come to power in 1992, and its leaders were aware of the PLO's severe political and financial weakness, especially after losing the support of Saddam Hussein and the Gulf funding (Ashrawi, 1996; Bentsur, 2001; Corbin, 1994b; Haykal, 1996; Murphy, 1999; Peres & Landau, 1995; Savir, 2010; Stein, 2005).

Contributing to the situation, the PLO broke off the Washington talks in mid-December 1992. This action was in response to Israel's expulsion of more than 400 Hamas affiliates to Lebanon (Hirschfeld, 2014). The PLO was feeling the pressure, as they were excluded from the bilateral negotiation in Washington, and they were afraid of losing their primacy over Hamas (Beilin & Simpson, 1999).

Rabin and Peres strained to find any way to convince Arafat to support the negotiations in Washington fully. The Israelis were aware that their recognition of the PLO would help the PLO gain acceptance at an international level and help it to regain its legitimacy. Israel was also aware of the importance of this card and was sure that it could play it to reach the desired conclusion in an agreement (Hirschfeld, 2014).

It should be noted that most American initiatives were based on obligating the participants to accept the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (Hirschfeld, 2014), which was considered a concession Israel wanted to avoid. This was the reason for Israel's preference for a low-leverage state such as Norway to be a mediator. In the same direction, the PLO had chosen Norway as neither possessing political ambition nor significant influence and therefore not likely to arouse American sensibility (Abbas, 1995). Additionally, Yasir Arafat's suggestion of Norway as a mediator was due to the strong relationship between Norway and Israel, the strong ties between Norway and the US, Norway's ties to the EU (Waage, 2007).

In brief, From the Palestinian perspective, the Norwegian mediation would bring the marginalised PLO back to centre stage and would give Arafat complete and direct control over the Palestinian side in the negotiations (Ashrawi, 1996; Lieberfeld, 2008; Abbas, 1995). From the Israeli perspective, Israeli engagement in the negotiation with the PLO would prevent Hamas domination of the Palestinian state (Beilin &

Simpson, 1999). Under those circumstances, early in December 1992, Ashrawi and Hussaini, with the help of the Norwegians, arranged a meeting between Hirschfeld and the head of the Palestinian delegation, Abu Alaa, in London, where the negotiations took place that day (Hirschfeld, 2014).

In sum, the changes of the circumstances on the international level, regional level, Israeli national level and the Palestinian national level paved the way to Oslo's secret channel.

The Norwegian role in the Oslo secret negotiations

First, it is essential to mention the development of the relationship between Norway and the Israelis on one side and between Norway and the Palestinians on the other. It is equally important to consider that Norway has been a religious country rooted in conservative Christianity. Norway has a state church, the Evangelical Luther Church. The Norwegian generations were raised on tales of the Bible which portrayed Palestine in their mind the land of the Jews, not the land of the Arabs (Waage, 2000). The Norwegian Christian community used to see Israel through the eyes of religion and marked its existence as fulfilling the prophecies of old. Moreover, on the political level and in the eyes of the Norwegian labour party, Israel used to be seen as evidence that the socialist paradise had come true. This may explain the Norwegian's initial support of Israel when it was established in 1948.

Indeed, the relationship between the Israelis and the Norwegians began with establishing the Israeli state. Norway felt sympathy for the Jewish people who had suffered so terribly during the German Nazi era. At that time, the UN's Norwegian delegation-supported creating a new Jewish state. Accordingly, the

Norwegian labour government established strong ties with their Israeli counterparts (Waage, 2000).

The Norwegians had operated in this capacity even before the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. Norwegian politicians, particularly from the labour movement and Christian circles, fostered friendly relations with Israeli colleagues and counterparts. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions had also cooperated closely with the Israeli trade union movement, Histadrut (Yossi Beilin & Simpson, 1999; Corbin, 1994b; A. Elon, 1993; Pruitt, 1997). This support of Israel lasted throughout the 1960s. However, these amiable relations were not the same after 1967 when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Egeland, 2008). In the war of 1967, the Norwegians began to view Israel differently, as a strong country, not the victim of Arab aggression. Indeed, two main factors made the Norwegians change their image about Israel and feel sympathy towards the Palestinians: the war of 1967 and the Norwegian peacekeeping forces serving in Lebanon in 1978 (Egeland, 2008). After the war of 1967, Norway decided to take a balanced position to the Middle East conflict (Qurei, 2006).

The image of Israel in Norway began to change in 1978 as thousands of Norwegian peacekeeping forces served in Lebanon, and Norwegian journalists and politicians began to form negative views on Israel (Damen, 2013; Pace, 2018). They all contributed to a gradual shift in the position of Norway towards one of Palestinian sympathy (Egeland, 2008). Since that time, Norwegian-Israeli relations have fluctuated continuously (Pace, 2018). Notably, the Norwegian sympathy towards the Palestinians began to increase. In that period, the

Norwegian-Palestinian relationship began to take root (Corbin, 1994a; Mahmud'Abbas, 1995).

Through the 1970s and the 1980s, the Norwegian labour governments started to build a relationship with the PLO (Egeland, 2008). Indeed, the relations between the Norwegians and the Palestinians started in the 1970s, when many Norwegian solidarity groups were established to support the Palestinian cause. In this atmosphere, Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund met unofficially with the chairperson of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, in Tunis in December 1982. Consequently, the PLO opened a representative office in Oslo (Corbin, 1994a; Mahmud'Abbas, 1995). Additionally, for the first time, Norway started to consider the Palestinian refugee question as a political question and not a humanitarian one. Additionally, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to recognise refugees as Palestinians, as opposed to Arab refugees (Waage, 2000). This indicates that the Palestinian issue was considered independently and not as an Arab issue. Accordingly, Norway supported the UN resolution in 1974 that enabled Yasir Arafat to address the UN General Assembly (Yossi Beilin & Simpson, 1999; Qurei, 2006).

In 1987, Stoltenberg, the Foreign Minister of Norway, established a Norwegian group whose aim was to stimulate peace mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. This group included Jan Egeland, Mona Juul, Terje Larsen, and Marianne Heiberg, the wife of Johan Holst (Yossi Beilin & Simpson, 1999; Qurei, 2006). These individuals contributed to building confidence between the two opposing parties. This confidence was the building block in the Norwegian mediation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Norway's

close relations with the Israeli side made Norway an intriguing mediation prospect for the PLO. Along the same lines, the Norwegian's direct contact with Yasir Arafat helped to offer Israel a backchannel to negotiate with the PLO in the Oslo secret channel (Mahmud Abbas, 1995; Makovsky, 2018).

The story of the Oslo secret channel began in 1992 when Terje Rød Larsen, the director of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science, FAFO, and his wife Mona Jull, a Norwegian diplomat, welcomed a delegation of Palestinians from Tunis led by Abu Ala, Arafat's senior economic adviser. Abu Ala raised the issue of a possible dialogue with Terje Larsen (Waage, 2000). In the meantime and after talking for hours with Abu Ala, Larsen was convinced that FAFO might facilitate an Israeli–Palestinian meeting (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

In the same year, Larsen met Yossi Beilin, who knew him through Larsen's research project in Gaza and the West Bank to examine Palestinian living conditions. In that meeting, Larsen raised the possibility of a Norwegian mediation role between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Beilin, in his turn, promised to be an operator for peace in case the labour party won the election in June 1992 (Aggestam, 1996; Corbin, 1994a; A. Elon, 1993; Mahmud'Abbas, 1995; Makovsky, 2018; Peres & Landau, 1995).

On 19 June 1992, there was a meeting in East Jerusalem between Larsen, Faisal Husseini, Yossi Beilin and Yair Hirschfeld. However, this meeting led nowhere (Qurei, 2006). Later, on September 10, 1992, by permission of the Norwegian Prime Minister Stoltenberg, Egeland met with Yossi Beilin, who became the deputy foreign minister in the new Israeli government. In the

presence of Larsen, Mona Jull, Shlomo Gur and Hirschfeld, they discussed the possibility of secret talks in Oslo and assured the Israelis that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would stand behind FAFO in sponsoring the secret talks. The meeting was so secretive that even the Norwegian ambassador did not know about it (Egeland, 2008).

Beilin was not ready for direct contact with the PLO at that time. As a result, he suggested his friend, professor Yair Hirschfeld. Accordingly, Jull and Larsen arranged appointments between Abu-ala and Hirschfeld, while Beilin had already met Faisal Alhussaini in Jerusalem (Beilin & Simpson, 1999). Larsen arranged a meeting between Abu Ala and Yair Hirschfeld in London. In that meeting, Hirschfeld assured Abu Ala that he only represented himself and not the Israeli government (Qurei, 2006). Having encouraged Beilein, two weeks later, Larsen Travelled to Tunis. Beilin was hoping to know Larsen's evaluation of the people in Tunis. Larsen met Yasir Arafat, who was disappointed after the defeat of the Swedish socialist government in the poll, a government that would have sympathised with the PLO. Arafat himself told Larsen that Norway should take over the Swedish role. By this, he was referring to the role of go-between. Moreover, Arafat asked Larsen to convey this message to the Norwegian government. Arafat was aware that the Norwegian socialist government had run a balanced policy in the Middle East and was trusted by both sides (Corbin, 1994b; Qurei, 2006).

Larsen concluded that the PLO was the only body that could negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. When he went back to Oslo he, Jull and Egeland phoned Beilin to advise him to go further with the London meetings and to

create a secret channel in Oslo (Corbin, 1994b). They feared that direct official contact with the PLO would contravene Israeli law, which at that time prevented any official contact with the PLO (Egeland, 2008). For this reason, Yossi Beilin suggested that two Israeli academics initiate the negotiation with PLO. Those academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, were already in contact with Abu Ala and Hassan Asfour (Beilin & Simpson, 1999; Mahmud'Abbas, 1995; Peres & Landau, 1995; Waage, 2005). Consequently, a secret channel between Israel and the PLO was agreed upon. It would be initiated in Norway under FAFO's auspices, while FAFO, the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science, offered a cover of plausible deniability (Qurei, 2006). The FAFO project in Gaza and West Bank was to serve as a cover for the secret talks. This suggestion was supported by Foreign Minister Stoltenberg (Egeland, 2008). As a result, the Oslo back channel opened in January 1993, with the two Israeli academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, on the Israeli side and the PLO's representatives, Abu Ala', Hassan Asfour, Maher Kurd and Mohammed Abu Koush, on the Palestinian side. Though the Palestinian participants were all PLO officials, the talks at this stage were entirely informal, aiming to build a bridge, create informal political contacts, and find out if anything could be done to break the stalemate in Washington's negotiations. The only Israeli official aware of the meetings was Beilin, who was deeply involved from the beginning and watched progress closely, with Peres and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin informed only after the first round. The Norwegian government had approved and eagerly backed the

talks. Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Egeland and Mona Juul briefly attended the first meeting (Waage, 2005).

Ultimately, the culmination of the first phase of the secret meetings in Norway was drafting the Sarpsborg Declaration of Principles (DoP), completed in March 1993. Eventually, by the end of August 1993, the Accord formulated the principles of peace. Later, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP) was signed at the White House in the presence of leaders from all around the world (Beilin & Simpson, 1999).

The Norwegian approach in the mediation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

The Norwegian motivation

In its mediation between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Norway succeeded in building its international mediation model's fundamental pillars or features, which paved the way for further attempts at international mediation. The following section will discuss this case further by looking at Norwegian motivation, Norwegian leverage, Norwegian strategy, Norwegian impartiality, and finally, whether Norway was a pure or power mediator.

As mentioned in chapter three, the Norwegian aim in international mediation has been to set normative standards in the international community (Björkdahl, 2013). As mentioned in the previous chapters, Norway, like any other state-mediators, Norway does have an interest in international mediation. This interest is presented in having influential status in the international community or international relations. At the same time, Norway was seeking to

promote peace in the international arena is one of the normative standards that Norway has developed to make the world a better place. For those reasons, Norway has been engaged in international mediation. However, Norway succeeded in balancing its interest and its norms. According to this vision, it has been supposed that the Norwegians have no direct and specific self-interest in their attempts at international mediation. Generally, Norway has an interest in the mediation itself, which is presenting in increasing its status and being influential in the international arena, using its norms as a tool in international mediation. Norway is distinguished by its norms, which is why it uses them in international mediation. Accordingly, Norwegian mediation has been characterised as norm-based. According to Hellmüller et al. (2015), the mission of a norm-based mediator is not only to bring violent conflicts to an end but also to integrate values, human rights, justice, and other norms into their overall strategy (Hellmüller, Federer, & Zeller, 2015).

Norway was willing to promote its image as an international peacemaker, taking advantage of having a positive reputation with no colonial past (Waage, 2007). In their mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the Norwegians seized the opportunity when the PLO asked them to mediate and make peace between the two disputants (Qurei, 2006). However, it is important to confirm that Norway's engagement in international mediation has always been important for Norway's self-perception, as its engagements in international mediation promote the Norwegian national image of moral power and norm entrepreneur. Indeed most Norwegians believe in the necessity of the Norwegian role to promote international peace (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). Through

its international mediation, Norway can promote peace and gain a reputation as a peacemaker (Höglund & Svensson, 2009).

Opinions differ on the issue of Norwegian motivation in its mediation in Oslo's secret channel. There are three arguments related to their motivation at that time. The first argument asserts that Norway had no interest in its mediation beyond promoting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Mahmoud Abbas (1995) asserts that the Norwegians' negotiation process cannot be explained by a desire for political credit or even international reputation. He adds that their hard work and worries reflect an inner motivation and genuine desire to bring about peace in the Middle East. Therefore, he says, they feel disappointed when the negotiations reach a deadlock (Mahmud Abbas, 1995). In the same vein, Singer suggests that Norway has no interest in the mediation between the Israelis and the PLO. He explains that Norway is a small country far away from the Middle East. Additionally, Norway has no Jewish lobby. The Norwegians are neither Muslims, nor Jewish nor Arabs (interview with Singer, 2019).

The second argument is represented in what Hassan Asfour says. Hassan Asfour, one of the principal Palestinian negotiators in Oslo, has a different opinion than both Abbas and Singer. Asfour asserts that Norway had interests in the mediation between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the negotiations that led to the Oslo Accord in 1993. He argues that the Norwegian status in the international community changed after the Oslo agreement. Its position at the international, Arab and Palestinian levels was not the same before and

after the Oslo agreement. After the Oslo agreement, many Norwegians occupied high-ranked positions in international organizations such as the UN, thanks to the Oslo agreement. Most of the Norwegians who participated in the mediations occupied high-ranking positions at the international level. “Anyone who says something different than this, he is wrong”, Asfour says (interview with Asfour, 2018).

Hassan Asfour did not mean that Norway had received direct benefits at the economic level. However, he claims that Norway did receive benefits on the political level, which reflects on the economic level. He says, “On the political level, the world witnessed how a small state like Norway was able to resolve one of the world’s most complicated conflicts in political history” (interview with Asfour, 2018). Asfour assures that Norway was rewarded for being a mediator between the Palestinians and the Israelis” based on this, Norway was rewarded for its relations with the Arab world. All of this reflects on its economic interests as it helps Norway to open up new economic horizons”, Asfour says (interview with Asfour, 2018).

Any country in the world, especially the size of Norway, is generally looking for ways to be visible in the international arena, reflecting on its relations with other countries. This might help the country build stronger economic relations. It is not only Hassan Asfour who confirms that Norway benefitted from its mediation in the Oslo secret negotiation, but also the Norwegian professor Hilde Waage. Waage agrees with Hassan Asfour by asserting that Norway was seeking a visible place in the international arena. Waage says,” for Norway,

and it was very essential to gain visibility on the international stage and show that small Norway could do something” (interview with Waage, 2019).

The third argument stands between the first argument and the second one.

This argument is contradicted. An example of this argument is represented in what Mohammad Abu-Koush says. Mohammad Abu-Koush is one of the principal Palestinian negotiators in the Oslo secret channel. Unintentionally, he puts himself in a contradictory position when describing the Norwegian motivation in the Oslo secret channel. On the one hand, he asserts that “Norway was eager to reach a peace agreement between the Israelis and the PLO because this would put Norway on the international map as a peacemaker” (interview with Abu-Koush, 2019). On the other hand, he was assured that the Norwegians have no interest in their involvement in the Oslo secret channel. He says, “the Norwegians were interested in nothing” (interview with Abu-Koush, 2019).

Based on the three arguments, it is concluded that the results of the interviews for this case study agree with what this thesis finds. As mentioned, Norway does have an interest in international mediation “increase international status or influence” while it plays the role of norm entrepreneur. This thesis agrees with Abbas when he describes the Norwegians hard work in their negotiation as not a desire for political credit but a desire to bring peace in the Middle East. It is expected that the Norwegians do their best to achieve agreement between the Palestinians and the Israeli to achieve their ultimate interest, “Increasing international status”. There is no contradiction between what Abbas says and what this thesis finds.

In the same vein, what Singer says contradicts what this thesis finds. Singer justifies his claim that “Norway has no interest in mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis”. He justifies his claim by presenting some important facts such as Norway is away from the Middle East, no Jewish lobby in Norway, and finally, Norway is not a Muslim country. Unfortunately, Singer’s justifications are not enough to prove that Norway has no interest in the mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. On the one hand, Singer is right that Norway does not have a specific interest when in specific mediation this conflict. However, Norway ambition was to be influential status in the international arena. No other conflict can serve Norway ambition more than the protracted conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Hassan Asfour and Hilde Waage were so straight when asserting that Norway has an interest in international mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. However, this does not mean that Norwegian mediation was not a norm-based mediation. The Norwegians involved themselves in the mediation process to promote peace between the two parties and norm entrepreneurs in the international community.

In brief, Norway is a state that is actively working to promote peace in the international community and that by doing so, it is making the world a better place to live. However, as a low-leverage state, Norway was eager to find its place in the international arena. By mediation, a dispute as famous as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the world’s most famous conflicts, especially after signing the Oslo agreement, Norway proved itself on the international political stage as a peacemaker.

The Norwegian leverage

The Norwegian leverage is represented in four elements: the Norwegian Track One and a Half diplomacy, the extensive personal contacts on both the Palestinian and the Israeli side that FAFO, the Norwegian economic resources have developed, and finally, the needs of the disputants. Those elements are overlapped connected, and it is not easy to study them separately. The Norwegian model in international mediation is characterised by Track One and a Half Diplomacy. This is displayed clearly in Norway's mediation in the Oslo secret channel. Norwegian NGOs played a unique role, fronted by the Institute for Applied Science (FAFO) in cooperation with the Norwegian government, represented by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Track One and a Half Diplomacy was the key to success in the Oslo secret channel. The Oslo secret channel was initiated through a project. This project focused on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The project was conducted by FAFO and was funded by the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs (Qurei, 2006). Thus, FAFO came to play an essential role in the Oslo Accords. The mediation between the Palestinians and Israelis was facilitated by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FAFO. It was a combination of formal and informal mediation processes (Aggestam, 2002). Formally, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the financial resources and the logistical aid for the meetings and, informally, FAFO provided the flexibility and the needed environment of secrecy for the talks to occur and helped in building trust and confidence between the two negotiated teams (Egeland, 1999). More importantly, the purpose of the participation of FAFO was that it provided the

deniability element, which was necessary for the early stages of the negotiations (Siniver, 2006).

The Norwegian NGO's role was not restricted to initiating the Oslo secret channel. Through Track One and a Half diplomacy, Terje Larsen, with the cooperation of the Norwegian ministry, facilitated the negotiations process between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Larsen, 2019).

FAFO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs extended until signing the Oslo Accords in 1993. Both FAFO and the Ministry played an essential role in upgrading the level of the negotiations from non-official (academic) to an official. Through April and May 1993, Terje and Mona Jull made hundreds of telephone calls to Jerusalem and Tunis informing them of the other sides' questions, worries and propositions until Israel finally agreed to upgrade the talks to the official level with a guarantee from Norway to keep the talks secret (Egeland, 2008). By using Track One and a Half Diplomacy, the Norwegians succeeded in convincing the Israelis to upgrade their representation in the Oslo secret negotiations. In June 1993, the official negotiations kicked off with the joining of Joel Singer, who was appointed as a legal advisor for the Israeli foreign ministry and was Rabin's man in the Oslo negotiations (interview with Gur, 2019 and interview with Singer, 2019).

Through Track One and a Half diplomacy, Terje Larsen with the cooperation of the Norwegian ministry facilitated the negotiations process between the Israelis and the Palestinians

The second source of the Norwegian leverage in the Oslo secret channel is the extensive personal contacts on the Palestinian and the Israeli sides that

FAFO has developed. FAFO was instrumental in building strong relations with the Israelis on one side and the PLO on the other. FAFO effectively facilitated the mediation process between both sides, led by Terje Larsen, who worked as director of FAFO and initiated the Oslo backchannel. Larsen developed extensive personal contacts on both the Palestinian and the Israeli side (Bandarage, 2011).

Through the aforementioned project, Larsen succeeded in setting up a web of communication both with the Israelis and the Palestinians, which resulted in the creation of the Oslo channel (Qurei, 2006). Singer mentions the important role of Terje Larsen: "Terje Larsen was the one who attracted the Norwegian government to the possibility of mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Terje Larsen got the Norwegian foreign minister involved indirectly in the secret talks", Singer says (interview with Singer, 2019).

Terje Larsen asserts that he was not representing Norway when he started contacting the Palestinian and Israeli leaders. While representing FAFO, he worked closely with Palestinians such as Faisal Hussaini Fathi Arafat and Israeli leaders such as Yossi Beilin. He worked with both sides via FAFO's project to improve living conditions in the Palestinian territories. FAFO, led by Terje Larsen, succeeded to develop extensive personal contacts on both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides (Larsen, 2019; Singer, 2019; Gur, 2019).

Terje Larsen started the secret talks between Yossi Beilin and Faisal Hussaini, and they were facilitated by FAFO, according to Larsen (interview with Larsen, 2019). He adds, "at the outset it was not the foreign ministry which initiated

the talks; it was basically myself and my capacity as the director of FAFO”(interview with Larsen, 2019).

While the extent of the personal contacts on both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides was considered a source of leverage for Norway in its mediation, the Oslo secret channel. However, there is no consensus on the positive impact of those relations. The Israelis consider those relations as a strong point. Yoel Singer, the Israeli negotiator, states that “the Norwegian closed relation with both sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis, is considered a very strong contribution to the Norwegian mediations”, Singer says. He adds, “they were neither considered to be pro- Israelis nor pro-Palestinians, they were friendly to both sides, and they were able to simply serve in a way that was quite objectively sympathetic to both sides” (interview with Singer, 2019).

Singer explains that “based on those personal relations developed by FAFO, a trust was created between the Norwegians with Palestinians and the Israelis. The trust is considered part of Norway's leverage in its mediation between the Israelis and the PLO (interview with Singer, 2019). Using similar words, Yossi Beilin, the deputy of the Israeli foreign minister, describes Norwegian relations with both sides. Beilin confirms that the Norwegian leverage is reflected in their relations with both sides, the Israeli and the Palestinian. The Norwegian readiness and the Norwegian initiative to help in peace-making are the main factors that enabled Norway to succeed in mediation between the Israelis and the PLO in the Oslo secret channel (interview with Beilin, 2019).

In contrast, a senior Palestinian officer considers the close relationship between the Israelis and the Norwegians to be the main reason Norway was biased toward Israel (interview with a senior Palestinian official, 2019).

The third kind of leverage that the Norwegians possess is their economic resources. Norway has little influence on world politics and has limited military power, being a loyal member of NATO with close relations with the USA (Waage, 2007). However, Norway is a rich country with a strong economy based on fish, oil, and a budget surplus, and it is known for the generous donations and humanitarian aid that it grants as economic assistance to developing countries (Waage, 2007). Norway chose to utilise its economic resources to promote peace in the international arena by two ways. The first by funding project conducted by the Norwegian NGOs in the disputants' countries. Second, by funding the mediation cost such as meetings of the disputants.

Norwegian finance is considered leverage for Norway's international mediation in the Oslo secret negotiations. Norway promised Yaser Arafat and the PLO to contribute the money needed to build the Palestinian entity (interview with Waage, 2019). Likewise, in the Oslo back channel, Norway covered all the expenses and costs of hosting the Oslo secret negotiations; the flights, the hotels and even paid salaries for the two Israeli academics, listing their names on the FAFO payroll for deniability.

The fourth type of leverage is need-based leverage. As Zartman asserts, the need of the disputant can become leverage to the mediator (Zartman, 1996).

Though Israel rejected Norwegian mediation when Arafat originally suggested it in 1979, they agreed in 1992, when Abu Alaa raised the issue of possible

Norwegian involvement with Terje Larsen (Waage, 2002, 2005). Israelis and Palestinians changed their minds and agreed to negotiate and seek a solution for their conflict as both sides needed an end to the hostilities. Both sides needed a solution, which explains their acceptance of Norway as a mediator. This desperate need for a solution is considered leverage for Norway, a low-leverage state.

For the Palestinians, the political and economic weakness of Yasser Arafat and the PLO after supporting Saddam Hussain and the PLO urgently needed a solution that would help it regain its legitimacy in the international political stage. The year 1992 was the right time to clinch a deal with the PLO because of the political and financial difficulties it faced at the time (Peres & Landau, 1995).

Arafat found out that the Norwegian mediation would bring the marginalised PLO back to centre stage and give him complete and direct control over the Palestinian side in the negotiations—(Ashrawi, 1996; Lieberfeld, 2008; Mahmud'Abbas, 1995).

Israel needed the Norwegian mediation to avoid the pressure from Washington negotiations based on the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Additionally, engaging the PLO in the negotiations would prevent Hamas domination of the Palestinian cause (Beilin & Simpson, 1999). Israel also needed Yasir Arafat to save the face of Israel in front of the international community by controlling the Intifada and resistance movement, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The changes in the local, regional, and international contexts proved that the

window of opportunity was there and created the right environment for the Oslo channel at that time, the time was ripe for clinching a deal.

Mediation Strategy

Norway introduces itself as a facilitator mediator, employing a facilitation strategy in international mediation. As a low-leverage norm-based mediator, it is expected that Norway would employ a facilitation strategy. The Norwegian role was built on procedural and communicative strategies and not on manipulation due to limited Norwegian leverage over the two parties (Siniver, 2006). The Norwegian role in the secret channel was to play the role of bringing the parties together, promoting trust, and explaining difficulties the parties faced, but not taking a position on the substance of the talks or suggesting a route that the talks should follow (Corbin, 1994b).

While there is evidence supporting the claim that the Norwegian role is a facilitation one, there is enough evidence to prove that Norway was a manipulator and used a manipulation strategy. It is essential to assert that Norway used a spectrum of the three mediation strategies, facilitation, formulation, manipulation, in different stages of the mediation processes. Indeed, Norway played the role of a facilitator at the first phase of the negotiations. However, Norway acted as a manipulator in the second phase of the negotiations.

The turning point in the Norwegian position began in May 1993, when Johan Holst was appointed as a new Norwegian Foreign Minister and decided to play an active role in the negotiations (Waage, 2005). According to the senior Palestinian official, it is seldom highlighted in writings about the Oslo talks is that

the original 'deal' that the Palestinians had negotiated throughout the first five months had been an entirely different arrangement of what ended up in August as the Declaration of Principles. During the first five months, the Oslo track The negotiations were supported by Shimon Peres, the foreign minister. The prime minister, Isaac Rabin, was informed but refrained from extending his support, as he had continued to prefer the ongoing bilateral negotiations in Washington. Only after Rabin lost confidence in the possibility of achieving a deal with the Washington Palestinian team did he join Peres in supporting the Oslo talk and sent his representative, Mr Joel Singer, to Oslo in early June.

During the months that preceded June, the deal had been the creation of a PISGA: the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, a one-level council of 33 members representing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, that with run the PISGA throughout the five-year interim period, the PLO leadership and institutions and organs would remain situated and active in Tunisia and other Arab countries throughout the interim period and up until the conclusion of the negotiations on the permanent status issues. When Singer, Rabin's representative, joined the talks in early June, he practically took over the Israeli negotiating team, scraped and cancelled the various documents on the PISGA, and presented a new deal: that Arafat, the leadership, the PLO and its institutions would enter the oPt and run the autonomy, with new institutional and security arrangement for this new deal. Singer gave the Palestinian team dozens of questions on which he requested answers from Arafat interview with a Palestinian Senior official, 2020).

Based on these changes in the Norwegian position, the secret negotiations could be divided into two stages. The first stage extended from the beginning of the negotiations to May 1993, when the Norwegians employed the facilitation strategy. The second stage took place in May 1993, when Norway used a manipulation strategy. This change in the Norwegian position was confirmed by Shlomo Gur, the Shimon Peres office manager. According to Gur, the Norwegian role changed in May 1993 and shifted to one of active mediation when the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Holst, joined the negotiations as a direct participant (interview with Gur, 2019).

The Norwegian used the facilitation strategy to relieve the tension between the two sides. They did this notably when they reached a deadlock, leaving them to talk together, while the Norwegians would trail behind without interfering in their talks. The Norwegian's role in the negotiations was to offer a friendly environment between the two disputants and to reconcile the different points of view for both sides (Mahmud'Abbas, 1995). Additionally, the Norwegians worked hard to clear the obstacles and misunderstandings that existed between the two parties (Jones, 1999). The meetings were informal to permit the exchange of information between the disputants (Corbin, 1994a; Makovsky, 2018; Pruitt, 1997).

The Norwegian facilitation strategy is also presented in Norway's role consisted in getting the parties together, booking flights and places, offering a friendly environment for the negotiations, and keeping the negotiations secret (Waage, 2007). At the beginning of the negotiations, the Norwegian primary mission was to facilitate the travel and meetings of the two parties to bring

them together (Beilin & Simpson, 1999). The Norwegians were keen to develop confidence between the Palestinian and the Israeli teams and encourage personal relationships. For example, the Norwegians encouraged the parties to eat together at the same table with the Norwegian team. The Norwegians did their best to create a human relationship between the two parties by offering opportunities for personal and non-official talks outside the formal context. As a facilitator, the Norwegian team did not directly engage in the negotiations or talks between the disputants most of the time. Mostly the team's role was restricted to initiating the meetings, leaving the two parties to talk in private, giving advice and offering the best atmosphere for the meetings (Qurei, 2006). To emphasise the facilitation role of Norway, some interviewees even avoided the usage of the word "mediation" when describing the Norwegian role in the Oslo back channel and insisted on instead calling it "facilitation" (interview with Abu-Koush, 2019; Y. Singer, 2019).

Joel Singer claims that the Norwegian role was that of a facilitator and no more than a facilitator. He explains that the Norwegians were not even in the room during negotiations; their role was limited to providing accommodation, finding venues for the meetings, and providing security for the negotiators. Additionally, they did all they could to offer a stress-free environment for the negotiators: "they were not involved in any real mediation in the sense of ok, this is the draft we propose to you, we will go now from one side to the other, we will come back with other's views. I did not even give them a copy of the draft. They were not able to participate in any issue related to drafting" (interview with Singer, 2019). Singer explains that their role was to encourage the two

teams not to give up with phrases like “do not let it break down, we are almost there”. The Norwegians offered atmospheric support, but not really mediation in the normal sense, Singer says. Singer explains that the Norwegian style of mediation was different from the mediation of the USA, who usually presented the draft for an agreement and asked the negotiators to give their comments. Singer asserts that “nothing like this happened with the Norwegians” (interview with Singer, 2019).

Singer shows that Norway had no way of exerting pressure on either side. He says “unlike superpowers like the United States or even regional powers like Egypt which also mediated between the Israelis and the PLO in various phases of the negotiations, Norway is a small nation far away; they have no stick, no carrots”, Singer says, (interview with Singer, 2019).

Shlomo Gur stated that Norway’s role was not mediation but facilitation (interview with Gur, 2019). Gur meant that Norway’s role was to bring the two parties together, facilitate discussions, and finance the meetings (interview with Gur, 2019). Gur built up his claim that Norway was a facilitator, not a mediator (manipulator), on the fact that the Norwegians, Mona Juul and Terje Larsen, were not in the meeting room when the two parties met (interview with Gur, 2019). Gur talks about the first stage of the negotiations before Holst joined the negotiations in May 1993. At that stage, Norway was using a facilitation strategy.

Most people who have been interviewed in this study defend Norway’s role in the Oslo secret channel as being that of a facilitator, not a mediator. The

interviewees might not have been aware that facilitation is one strategy out of the three mediation strategies. Reviewing what they said, it is clear that they refer to an approach in which the mediator deploys manipulation strategy in his mediation. In literary terms, facilitation is a type of mediation.

In the same vein, Yossi Beilin asserts that “the Norwegians did not interfere in the content of the negotiations. However, they did whatever they could do in order to assure that the negotiations continued by telling each party do not give up, you have to talk again, you have to get back to the negotiation table etc”, Beilin says (interview with Beilin, 2019).

Beilin assures that The Norwegians did whatever they could to ensure that the atmosphere was friendly and conducive to an agreement. Beilin explains that the Norwegian role was represented in financial terms and preparing the agreements' technicalities that could not be dismissed. Beilin adds, "one should not get caught in a limbo between the role of a facilitator and the role of a mediator. Carter was a mediator in the talks between Israel and Egypt, but Norway was not a mediator between Israel and the PLO" (interview with Beilin, 2019).

Mohammad Abu Koush, a Palestinian negotiation member in Oslo secret channel, agrees that the Norwegian role in Oslo secret channel was that of a facilitator: “Norway was an excellent facilitator”, he says (interview with Abu-Koush, 2019). With those words, Abu-Koush describes the Norwegian role in Oslo secret channel. He built his claim on the fact that there were no Norwegians in the meeting rooms, and the role of Norway was to convey messages between

the Israelis and the PLO representatives. Indeed, this is the role of facilitation which Norway role at the first stage of the negotiations.

There is no doubt that those interviewees are right when they claim that the Norwegians played the role of facilitator. However, it is important to mention that this role changed after May 1993. Since May 1993, it started the second phase of Norwegian mediation where Norway started to play the role of manipulator.

In the second phase, Johan Holst, the Norwegian new foreign minister had the clear intention of playing an active and direct role in the negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO. He ,himself, attended the fifth round of talks from the 8th to 9th of May 1993, even before the Israelis upgraded their representation in the negotiations (Waage, 2005). In this phase, Holst decided to make the Oslo channel the main official channel of negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO (interview with Waaage, 2019). In the second stage, Norway gave away its facilitation role and played a new role that exceeded facilitation.

Shlomo Gur, an Israeli official, mentioned Norway's pressure in the secret negotiations to reach an agreement. However, he asserts that "Norway was pushing both sides to reach an agreement, and this was in the later stages of the negotiations" Gur says (interview with Gur, 2019).

Norway psychologically manipulated Yasir Arafat because Norway was aware of the weakness of Yasir Arafat, because of his huge mistake in supporting Saddam Hussain. Arafat felt isolated in the Arab World and many Palestinians had been expelled from the Arab States, mainly the Gulf. This is affirmed by

Beilin who says, “Arafat lost his financial support. In order to get back to the Arab world and in order to open the door to the United States, he agreed to think on what he had not agreed to before” (interview with Beilin, 2019).

It is worth mentioning two things about the Norwegian manipulation. Firstly, Norway manipulated Yasir Arafat (the weak side), not Israel (The strong side). Secondly, Norwegian manipulation had two forms; material manipulation and immaterial manipulation. The material manipulation is represented in Norway's financial support to help the PLO collect after reaching an agreement. The immaterial manipulation is represented in the psychological manipulation of Yasir Arafat.

Some examples could prove the Norwegian manipulation of Yasir Arafat. One of the critical issues was the extra corridor. Yasir Arafat demanded an extra corridor to connect Gaza with the West Bank. However, Holst had a different opinion.

Waage (2019) assures that in the second phase, the Norwegians psychologically manipulated the weakness of Yasir Arafat, putting pressure on him to accept things that he could not have accepted in a normal situation, such as taking the idea of the extra corridor off the table and being content only with the idea of safe passage. Waage explains that in that meeting, Holst told Arafat that Israel would never accept it, even if it were simply a promise of safe passage (interview with Waage, 2019). The trip that Holst made by visiting Tunisia to meet Yasir Arafat was an exception to the facilitation role of the Norwegian mediation. Their goal was to create peace between the Israelis and the

Palestinians and to create a new international role for Norway. Waage asserts that Holst warned Yasir Arafat that the talks might collapse in that meeting. Holst stressed the danger of the talks collapsing, warning Yasir Arafat that the PLO could never hope to achieve a better agreement than the one on the table (interview Waage, 2019). While the Norwegians manipulated Yasir Arafat, they were extremely helpful to the Israelis by putting pressure on Arafat (Waage, 2019).

Singer, who claims that Norway was a facilitator, mentions “the extra corridor issue” as an exceptional case of the Norwegian facilitation role. He clarifies that Norway at that time exceeded the role of facilitator. He adds that, at that time, the trip of the Norwegian foreign minister, Holst, to convince Yasir Arafat to forget this demand because it would spoil the negotiations. Singer asserts that the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs clearly said to Yasir Arafat: “You cannot raise this demand; it does not belong to you” (interview with Singer, 2019).

Holst succeeded in convincing Arafat to give up his demand for the “extra corridor or “kissing point” as Arafat called it. Holst was fully aware of the fact that this idea was unacceptable to Israel as such a condition would effectively cut Israel into two parts (interview with Gur, 2019).

Holst himself admitted that he pressed Yasir Arafat. This is found in. alter from Holst to the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on 16 July 1993. This document is one of many documents related to Oslo negotiations that were lost from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive. In the letter, Holst

wrote, “I challenged him in this connection to explain his approach of the Jericho-issue and the question of links and access between Gaza and the Jericho-pocket... when I pressed him on the issue, that he was not proposing any corridor controlled by the PLO or an international authority through Israel” (Holst, 1993).

Moreover, Yasir Arafat was threatened by Holst, according to a senior Palestinian official who was very close to Arafat at that time. The senior Palestinian official explains that the Norwegian foreign minister, Holst, conveyed a threat message to Yasir Arafat: "the PLO's continued presence in Tunisia is not sustainable due to international pressure if the deal is not concluded, the senior Palestinian official says. He adds that Holst's messages were balanced with promises of support. However, the threat of evicting the PLO from Tunisia was an important part of the objective of Holst's meeting with Arafat, according to the senior Palestinian official. He adds Arafat answered that Cairo would be a reasonable substitute as a host of the PLO headquarters, and Holst's answer was that Arafat should feel certain that even that possibility had been taken care of, according to the senior Palestinian official (interview with a senior Palestinian official, 2020). The senior Palestinian official assures that Norway could not do that without backing from the USA (interview with a Palestinian Senior official, 2020).

In this interview, the senior Palestinian official mentions the second type of Norwegian manipulation of Yasir Arafat, the material manipulation; the second kind of manipulation the weak Yasir Arafat by promising him a large amount of

money from Norway and the International community in case an agreement would be achieved.

Norway manipulated the bankrupt Yasir Arafat by promising to raise large amounts of money for development and aid, only if he would accept. Waage, the Norwegian professor, assures this. According to Waage, "the main goal of the Norwegians' promise to help the Palestinians build and develop their institutions was to build what could become a state in the future. She adds Norway was able to pump in significant amounts of Norwegian kroner to fund such projects ... money from Norway and help to obtain more money from other funders "(interview with Waage, 2019). Indeed, this is what happened in reality. With the aid of donors, Norway secured money for the new Palestinian entity.

The way the Norwegians dealt with Arafat is inconsistent with the role of a mere facilitator. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Holst, was very much aware of the PLO and Arafat's need for a solution, and he used this need. Holst manipulated Yasir Arafat and the PLO. This fact would never be admitted by the Norwegians, the Palestinians, or the Israelis. The Norwegians would deny practising any manipulation on the Palestinian side.

This would ruin the Norwegian reputation as a norm-based mediator an honest peace broker. Norway would avoid any criticism of its peace-building efforts, on which lots of money were spent.

In sum, the Norwegian intervention between the Israelis and the PLO could be divided into two phases. Phase one extends from the beginning of the

negotiations in December 1992 until May 1993. In the first phase, the Norwegians played the role of facilitator between the two disputants. The second phase started at the beginning of May 1993 and led up to the initial agreement in August 1993. In this phase, the Norwegian role shifted from facilitation to manipulation. It would appear that Norway first took a facilitation strategy approach, and later switched to a manipulation strategy after the Foreign Minister, Holst, joined the mediation process. The same thing can be said for Norwegian impartiality.

Impartiality/ bias

Being an impartial mediator or biased mediator is a debatable issue. While some argue that Norway was biased toward Israel, others argue that Norway was an impartial mediator. Both sides use the historical relationship between Norway and Israel as evidence to support their claim.

The historical relationship between Norway and Israel, the power disparity between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and how Norway managed it brings into question Norwegian impartiality. However, the historical relations between Norway and Israel was one of the many reasons that encouraged Arafat to suggest for the first time in 1979 (Waage, 2007).

Based on those relations, Norway was accused of being biased toward Israel in the Oslo secret negotiations. However, it should also be mentioned that the Israeli-Norwegians relations changed much in the 1990s due to the Israeli security concerns and the way they dealt with the Palestinians during the First Intifada (Waage, 2007).

Indeed, the Norwegian mediation between the Israelis and the Palestinians can be divided into two phases regarding impartiality. The first phase was from December 1992 until May 1993, when the Norwegians were an impartial mediator. The second phase was from May 1993 until signing the agreement, when the Norwegians switched their role and gave away their impartiality by becoming biased toward the Israeli side.

Despite of those historical relations between the Israelis and the Norwegians, the Israelis deny that those relations made Norway biased towards Israel, Singer claims that “The Norwegians were not being biased towards Israel” (interview with Singer, 2019). Singer considers those relationships as being a strong point in the Norwegian mediations. “They were neither considered to be pro- Israelis nor pro-Palestinians, they were friendly to both sides, and they were able to simply serve in a way that was quite objectively sympathetic to both sides”, Singer says (interview with Singer, 2019). Corbin supports the Israeli claim and provides assurances that the Norwegians in the Oslo secret channel used their unbiased stance to stay afloat in their difficult position (Corbin, 1994b).

Similarly, Beilin denies that Norway was biased to either the Israeli or the Palestinian side: “I do not think that the Norwegians were involved in supporting the demands of either the Palestinians or the Israelis. They were not in the room at all.” He adds that the Norwegians had warm amiable feelings for both the Israelis and the Palestinians and did not approach the two disputants with different attitudes (interview with Beilin, 2019). Beilin was right when he said that Norway was not biased toward Israel. However, this is only true in the

second phase before the Joining of Holst. Holst was in the meeting room. According to Waage, Holst had to embrace the Israeli position; otherwise, it would be no deal (Waage, 2019).

On the Palestinian side, there is no consensus on the issue of Norwegian impartiality. Mohammad Abu-Koush, one of the principal Palestinian negotiators in Oslo, claims that Norway was an impartial facilitator; he says, "The Norwegians were not biased to Israel." Abu-Koush built his argument on the fact that the Norwegians did have a good relationship with Israel but did not support the occupation (interview with Abu-Koush, 2019). However, his justification needs to be more validated. Not supporting occupation is one issue, and being impartial in mediation is different.

In a different vein, a senior Palestinian official who was closed to Yasir Arafat, confirms that Norway was biased towards Israel: "Norway's close relations with Israel did play a significant role in the biased attitude it took. The senior officer expected that Norway would play a role of an unbiased mediator. However, he offers assurances that throughout the process, Norway acted as a support team for the Israeli negotiating team (interview with a senior Palestinian official, 2019). The senior official confirms the biased of Norway towards Israel by asserting that the Palestinians were negotiating two teams on the same issue. He says, "In fact, it turned out that we were negotiating with two teams, the Israeli and the Norwegian, selling us the same goods". The Palestinian officer means that the Norwegians were biased toward the Israelis, and both have the same tongue (interview with a senior Palestinian officer, 2019).

As expected, the Norwegian representatives describe themselves as impartial mediators on the Norwegian side. They claim that they were impartial to both parties. The Norwegians built their claim on how Norway dealt with the two parties, treating them equally by providing them with the same services, the same accommodation etc. Larsen says, “I picked up the Palestinian and the Israeli delegation members at the airport personally, and some of my staff picked up the others. We started with the Palestinians and then the Israelis and then the Palestinians again and we accommodated them...we always used exactly the same hotel rooms, exactly the same food, exactly the same services etc...” (interview with Larsen, 2019).

In a different vein, a Norwegian scholar, Hilde Waage, claims that the Israeli foreign minister used the Norwegian foreign minister as a tool in the negotiations, assuming with good reason that the Norwegians would present the Israeli point of view to Arafat (interview with Waage, 2019).

Waage goes further on the claims of Norwegian partiality and explains that the Norwegians agreed with everything that Israel did and that without doing so, there would have been no agreement. “Norway very strongly wanted to play a role, and in order to do so, Norway had to be completely 100 percent sided with Israel” (interview with Waage, 2019). She explains that this is not an issue of being biased towards Israel. She says that it is a cynical calculation of the best interests of Norway, and this is how to be a weak mediator like Norway. She adds that the Norwegians could have told the Israelis: “Sorry, this is not the way we do it as a moral country”. She explains that the Norwegians could have explored other choices. She asserts that Arafat was in a hurry and he

wanted peace, and the Norwegians were more willing to accept compromises and take up a biased role based on Israeli demands (interview with Waage, 2019).

However, Waage asserts that Norway was an impartial mediator when Norway hosted the two disputants in the same hotel and dealt with each in the same way and without discrimination (Waage, 2005). Waage Explains that the turning point in Norwegian impartiality happened when Johan Holst became the Foreign Minister of Norway in May 1993. Holst decided to take a direct and active role in the mediation from the first moment. He was eager to reach an agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Waage, 2019). The way that Holst worked with the Palestinian side to give on specific issues may bring Norway's impartiality into question (Waage, 2005).

In the second phase of the negotiation rounds, when the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Holst, joined the negotiations, he played the role of a critical person with complete political responsibility. He travelled to see Arafat in Tunis and carried the message of Arafat to the Israeli party, showing them the degree to which Arafat needed any solution to avoid being marginalised. Holst spoke to Arafat in a firm voice, advising him to take the chance or lose the opportunity forever. He succeeded in convincing him that the PLO would never achieve a better deal than what was on the table (Waage, 2007).

Waage argues that Norway was pursuing the agenda of Israel and thus was a biased and partial mediator. She explains that superficially, Norway treated

the two parties in equal ways. “However, this was limited to food, cars, and hotels,” Waage says.

It sounds as though Hilde Waage is not the only person who asserts that Norway took the position of Israel. Shlomo Gur, the Israeli official who worked as Shimon Peres’s office head, also shares Waage’s opinion. Shlomo Gur demonstrates that the Norwegians not only agreed with Israel but were ready to do everything to reach an agreement. Gur represents the mutual recognition agreement as an example that Norway agrees with the Israeli position. Israel suggested that the PLO must recognize Israel as a state, so Norway took this position because, without the mutual recognition, there would be no agreement (interview with Gur, 2019). Waage refers to the Norwegian bias towards Israel to the power disparity between the disputants. She asserts that the two parties are in a power asymmetry. Norway did its best to let the Palestinian party feel equal to the Israelis. They did what they could to ensure a symmetrical process by offering the two disputants the same hotels, same cars, same time, and even the same food (Waage, 2007). However, the power disparity encouraged Norway to play the role of partial mediator favouring the stronger party, Israel. Norway was a low-leverage mediator, mediating between two parties with unequal power. Beilin asserts that Israel was the stronger state, while the PLO was still politically and financially weak from the aftermath of the First Gulf war in 1991 (interview with Beilin, 2019). The strength of Israel forced Norway to play the role of partial mediator towards Israel unwillingly. Waage argues that if the mediator is weak in a situation

where one disputant is significantly weaker than the other, then the mediator must stand with the stronger party (interview with Waage, 2019).

Waage adds that the Norwegians were well aware of the power disparity between the two disputants—the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan Holst, was very discerning and perfectly understood that to reach an agreement, they would need to be biased towards the Israelis as they were the stronger party. She assures Holst went all-in on the Israeli side to reach an agreement; Waage explains this was not because Holst likes Israel but simply because this is the approach to use when you are a small mediator dealing with disputants power disparity. Thus, the Norwegians were extremely cooperative with the Israelis, and the whole game became focused on persuading the weaker Palestinians (interview with Waage, 2019).

Norway was biased toward the stronger party, the Israelis. Norway is aware that the one who controls the process is Israel, the one who can stop and end the negotiation is Israel because it is the strong party. Norway wanted to reach an agreement. The only way to reach an agreement is to do what Israel asked and adopt the Israeli position. In other words, to be biased towards Israel.

Norway adopted the position of Israel and worked according to the Israeli interest. Indeed, Norway is not the only side that worked for the interests of Israel. Arafat himself worked for the interests of Israel. According to the “memo” from Johan Holst to Shimon Peres on 16 July 1993, Arafat and Norway were working according to the interests of Israel. Arafat chose Jericho because it did not compromise recent settlements and because it would enable Arafat to

add a major Palestinian camp, making Arafat's mission to control the Intifada easier. Arafat considered the Israeli interests and sensitivities regarding the Intifada and the settlement (Hølst,1993).

Indeed, it is not always correct that the mediator must stand with the stronger party where one disputant is significantly weaker than the other. It could go either way. It depends on the situation. In the Oslo secret negotiations, Norway supported the strong party (Israel) to reach an agreement. However, the Norwegian mediation in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan shows that Norway supported the weak party, the SPLM, who represented South Sudan to reach an agreement.

In sum, Norway played the role of impartial mediator in the first phase. However, when Holst became the Norwegian Foreign Minister in the second phase, Norway gave away its impartiality. In this second phase, Norway adopted Israeli's vision and built agreements based on what Israel would allow. By adopting the Israeli point of view, Norway was not only biased towards Israel but was utterly supportive of Israel. The Norwegian behaviour in this instance could be attributed primarily to the power disparity between Israel as a strong state and the PLO with weak Arafat.

CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY TWO: NORWAY'S ROLE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA) IN SUDAN 2005

Introduction

Since its independence in 1956 from Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule, Sudan has witnessed different internal conflicts and civil wars (Johnson & Matthews, 2005). One of those wars was the civil war in southern Sudan and was essentially a civil war between the North (the government of Sudan) and South Sudan (1983–2005). There has been much debate around the reasons behind this war. However, the first commonly accepted reason is the development disparity between the North and the south (Johnson & Matthews, 2005; Kaldor, 2013; Natsios, 2012). As seen by the southern Sudanese, the second reason for civil war is ethnicity and religion (Deng, 2011; Natsios, 2012).

The North-South civil war ended in 2005 with the accumulation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which is the case study for Norwegian mediation and the discussion topic of this chapter. On 9 January 2005, the civil war between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was ended by signing the CPA in Kenya. Some variant actors played a role in the mediation process that led to the signing of the CPA, including both regional and international mediators. The regional mediators were from the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia, who together constituted the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). On the other hand, the international mediators included the USA, the UK, and Norway (Rolandsen, 2005; Taulbee, Kelleher, & Grosvenor, 2014; Zambakari, 2013). Unlike its role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,

where Norway was a sole mediator, Norway in the Sudanese conflict acted not alone but alongside the UK and USA, who together constituted the Troika (Katete, 2010; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

Norway is one of the several countries which contributed to South Sudan's birth. Norway's role was an important one, as Norway acted not only as a facilitator in the peace process but also Norway was an active mediator who funded the peace process and actively participated and supervised separate talks while negotiating the disputants. The Norwegian facilitation role in the mediation process was a by-product of the Norwegian Track One and a Half Diplomacy, in which Norway's mediation efforts are based on the unique cooperation between the Norwegian government and the Norwegian NGOs.

At the time of the Sudan negotiations, the Norwegian government was represented by the Norwegian development minister, Hilde Johnson, who was the primary mediator of the CPA of 2005 (DW, 2014). Two prominent Norwegian NGOs represented the Norwegian NGOs dedicated to the peace efforts: the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). Both operated as development NGOs and worked in both Sudan and South Sudan, offering humanitarian aid to the people in need in those areas. Via these two organizations, the Norwegians succeeded in developing personal relations with the government of Sudan and the rebels in South Sudan. Norway then used those relations to mediate between Sudan and South Sudan. Norway worked secretly behind the scenes, making efforts to talk with officials and unofficial stakeholders from different layers in Sudan and South Sudan, and

contributed to the facilitation of negotiations between the disputants in support of US, UK and Kenya-led IGAD efforts.

In its mediation between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Norway had not been fair in the sense of impartiality. The key argument in this chapter is that Norway manipulated both sides in its mediation between the government of Sudan and the SPLM. While in Oslo secret negotiations, Norway adopted the position of the strong party, Israel, in the mediation of the Sudanese conflict, Norway adopted the position of the weak party, the SPLM, and in doing so, forfeited its impartiality. As mentioned, in its mediation in the Sudanese conflict, Norway was among the Troika and so was able to adopt a mediation policy that borrowed leverage from the USA and knowledge from the UK. This stronger, more informed policy was the definitive reason behind the success of the CPA. The three countries constituted a perfect mediation combination of the US carrots and sticks, the Norwegian trust and confidence and the British knowledge of the conflict.

This chapter discusses key subjects to shed light on the Norwegian mediation role in the Sudanese conflict. It includes a brief on the conflict between South Sudan and Northern Sudan, looks at Norway's role in the mediation of said conflict and finally analyses the Norwegian mediation approach.

The conflict between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM (in South Sudan)

South Sudan was announced as an independent state in 2011, and this independence came after many years of civil war and several attempts at mediation which culminated with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 (Johnson &

Matthews, 2005). It is important to mention some facts about these two regions. First, the people of northern Sudan are Arab and Muslim, while the people of South Sudan are non-Arab and predominantly Christian. For this reason, the outside world often perceived the conflict as one between the religious views of Christianity and Islam. The southern tribes were decidedly against the policies of forced Arabization and Islamization that the Khartoum government applied to them (Natsios, 2012). Secondly, Sudan has vast natural resources, most of them in South Sudan. Those natural resources include oil and valuable minerals (Natsios, 2012). Indeed, 75% of Sudanese production oil is in South Sudan. Copious quantities of gold, diamond, uranium, copper, and coltan are found in South Sudan. Additionally, South Sudanese wealth is represented in its fertile soils and plentiful rainfall. Due to these ideal agricultural conditions, it is argued that all of Africa and even the Arab world could be fed by farming Southern Sudan (Johnson & Matthews, 2005; Natsios, 2012).

Third, during the British-Egypt rule in Sudan, Britain isolated the south to protect the region from slave traders. Unfortunately, this isolation also resulted in sluggish development in the south and created development disparity between the north and the south (Natsios, 2012). Since that time, the south has largely been ignored by the north. Fourth, the North-South civil war can be divided into two civil wars: from 1956 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005. Fifth, the southern tribes struggled to form a multi-religious and multi-ethnic southern independent state (Natsios, 2012).

To better understand the civil war in South Sudan, it is essential first to look at the history of Sudan and South Sudan in particular. Towards the end of the 19th century, the British occupied Egypt and Sudan. In 1899, the British agreed with Egypt called

the Anglo- Egyptian Condominium, in which it was agreed that Britain would control Sudan (Hanssen, 2017). The country's southern region suffered neglect and marginalisation with minimal infrastructure and investment under the Anglo-Egyptian regime. Moreover, the people of the South were seen as second class citizens (Johnson, 2016). Much to their delight, Egypt and Britain promised to grant Southerners self-determination at the end of World War II. However, this promise was broken by the Northern Sudanese with Egyptian connivance(Johnson, 2016). It was not until 1956 that Sudan gained its independence from British occupation. However, the Southern Sudanese wanted self-determination (Hanssen, 2017).

The outbreak of civil war between the northern and southern Sudanese took place before the independence of the Republic of Sudan in 1956. The outbreak took place in 1954. Between October 18th and the 21st, 1954, southern leaders organised a conference in Juba to vote for independence from Egypt. The conference proposed an autonomous South within Sudan or a form of self-determination leading to possible independence (Natsios, 2012). However, the conference failed (Johnson, 2016). This was followed by northerner domination of the posts left vacant by the departing British in South Sudan. This action resulted in an outburst of anger among the southerners. In July 1955, riots erupted in Yambio, which required police intervention in the chaos -fired into the crowd, killing eight people (Natsios, 2012).

One month later, on 18 August 1955, another riot broke out in Torit, in which southern protestors killed northern officers. Administrators and merchants, along with their families, were also counted among the victims (Johnson, 2003). More than 300

persons were killed (Johnson & Matthews, 2005; Natsios, 2012). Matters quickly escalated into a full-on civil war (Rolandsen & Leonardi, 2014).

On January 1, 1956, the British left Sudan, leaving an independent but unstable Sudanese state with an inexperienced government. However, the British departure and ensuing independence of Sudan did not bring with it the independence of South Sudan but rather substituted one coloniser with another (Lagu, 2006; Natsios, 2012). In 1962, the Sudanese military government led by Abbud restricted the activities of Christian missionaries in South Sudan. From 1969 to 1985, power in Sudan shifted to the government of Colonel al-Numeri. At the beginning of his rule, he promised to resolve the southern Sudan Civil war through political negotiations and not military intervention as, in any case, the military solution would not go well for him (Natsios, 2012).

As Joseph Lagu in South Sudan had succeeded in forming an armed force that matched the North, the outcome of the continued conflict was unsure. Lagu had unified military command under his leadership with 13,000 southern troops equipped with Israeli training and weapons. In January 1971, from Addis Ababa, al-Numeri declared a unilateral cease-fire in Southern Sudan. After this declaration, both parties reached an agreement in February 1972 in Addis Ababa. which was signed by Lagu for the South and Mansur Khalid for the North (Natsios, 2012). The agreement provided for a Sudanese federal state where a legislative assembly and a council of ministers from the south would govern South Sudan. However, the southern government would be appointed by president Numeri (Natsios, 2012).

The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement granted self-government but not self-determination, and, in that respect, it was a fragile agreement in many Southerners' eyes. Moreover, it was a superficial document with no guarantors or international mechanisms to ensure its implementation (Johnson, 2016). Despite of the weakness of the Addis Ababa agreement, it did lead to stability in the region until 1983 (Natsios, 2012). The defects of the Addis Ababa agreement led to its collapse and contributed to a resumption of the civil war in 1983 (Johnson, 2016). On June 5, 1983, considering many attempts to overthrow him, president Numeiri abandoned his position as a socialist to embrace Islamic thought. Accordingly, he announced the death of the Addis Ababa agreement by breaking the south into three provinces with different capitals, replacing the southern Regional Assembly in Juba with three much weaker legislative bodies with no independent authority, eliminating the southern army units, and cancelling the status of English as the official language by substituting it with Arabic. Moreover, he imposed the Islamic Sharia law on all Sudanese people, including those in the south (Johnson, 2016).

This set the second civil war (Natsios, 2012). In reaction to Numayri's violation of the Addis Ababa agreement, on 31 July 1983, Garang, a prominent Marxist southern leader, created both the unified Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as its civilian arm (Natsios, 2012).

Through the SPLM/A, Garang defended the demand and vision of justice and equality for all the Sudanese without discrimination based on religion, language, or ethnic group. He advocated a "New Sudan" where all Sudanese, including the marginalised, would live in a safe country characterised by rightful representation in government, a

country based on multi-religious and multi-ethnic traditions, a country that would respect diversity and serve more than just the elite and privileged (Johnson, 2016). The ultimate goal of Garang was “the right to self-determination.” He believed that there should be a referendum in which the South should decide for themselves whether to be independent or to be a part of a united Sudan (Johnson, 2016).

SPLA was trained and funded by Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. Garang was in control of most of the South by the end of 1985 (Natsios, 2012). On 6 April 1985, the Sudanese Minister of Defence, Major General Siwar al-Dhahab, announced that the military had taken control of the government, ousting Numeiri. This was followed by a new democratically elected coalition government, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Ummah Party, which had received the largest number of seats in the National Assembly. Unfortunately, Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government proved to be no better to the Southerners than Numayri’s government had been. The new government moved to destroy the Southern culture and pursued the policy of forced Arabization and Islamization (Johnson & Matthews, 2005; Natsios, 2012; Rolandsen, 2005; Rolandsen, 2011).

On June 30, 1989, a new military coup led by Brigadier Omar al-Bashir successfully ousted Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government (Johnson & Matthews, 2005; Natsios, 2012; Rolandsen, 2005). At the beginning of the year 2002, the civil war between the Muslim-dominated government and the rebels of Southern Sudan reached its peak. The Sudan People’s Liberation (SPLM) led and represented the rebel groups (Johnson & Matthews, 2005; Natsios, 2012).

In April 2002, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which had been created in 1996 to strengthen regional cooperation, initiated a mediation to

resolve the conflict of North/South Sudan. IGAD's initiative was led by Kenya and was diplomatically and financially supported by the Troika: USA, UK, and Norway. As a result of these joint efforts, a framework for conflict resolution was formulated, which suggested self-determination in South Sudan. The framework culminated in the signing of the Machakos Protocol in July 2002. The Sudanese government in the North and the Sudan People's Liberation (SPLM) signed the protocol. It formed the basis for talks which led to the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) of 2005, which covered several issues such as power-sharing, security issues, and wealth sharing (Johnson & Matthews, 2005).

Towards the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Norway's role

It is essential to mention that the peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the representatives of South Sudan (SPLM/A) were mediated by the IGAD with the support of a Troika (Norway, UK, USA), which was to be its driving force. The role of the Troika included funding the negotiation secretariat, providing mediation experts to assist in the talks, and supporting the primary mediator, the IGAD Special Envoy, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo (Johnson, 2016). However, Norway has played an essential role in the mediation between the government of Sudan and the rebels in South Sudan. The Norwegian role will be discussed in two sections; the first is the Norwegian NGOs' role in the mediation and Norway's role in the mediation process.

The Norwegian NGOs pave the way to the Norwegian international mediation:

Norway has a historical link to the people of South Sudan, thanks to two of the Norwegian NGOs: the Norwegian People Aid (NPA) and the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Those two NGOs had worked in South Sudan and Sudan since the 1970s. In both cases, the organizations had close contact with governmental authorities— the NPA with the Southern Sudan Authority, the NPA was only working actively in the SPLMA controlled area, and the NCA was working with the Sudanese government (Johnson, 2019). Therefore, the relationship between the NPA and the government of Sudan suffered because the Government of Sudan thought that the NPA supported the rebels in South Sudan, the SPLM (Amum, 2019). Indeed, the NPA supported the people behind the SPLM line in the SPLM-controlled areas, constituting 30% of the South Sudan territory (Amum, 2019).

Norway's funding for South Sudan goes as aid through two kinds of organizations; Norwegian NGOs such as the NCA and NPA, and international organizations such as Save the Children, Red Cross, United Nations, and the World Bank (Tvedt, 1994; Tvedt & Badal, 1994). However, most Norwegian funding to South Sudan went through NCA and NPA. The NCA has developed many sectors in South Sudan, such as education, health, agriculture, and construction. It repaired and built new roads, established primary health centres and created primary and secondary schools. Additionally, the organization drilled many wells in South Sudan (Tvedt, 1994; Tvedt & Badal, 1994). In the same manner, the NPA provided humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people in parts of South Sudan under the SPLM/A (Kaiya, 2016; Shanmugaratnam, 2008; Shanmugaratnam et al., 2002). Furthermore, the NPA developed different sectors in South Sudan, such as the health sector, food security

sector, and educational sector (Copnall, 2014; Ø. Rolandsen, 2005; Shanmugaratnam, Mamer, & Kenyi, 2002).

For the Norwegians to be mediators, they first had to make two essential connections: the SPLM and the Government of Sudan. The Norwegians succeeded to make those two connections through NPA and NCA. The NPA had been working with the humanitarian arm of the SPLM, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. NPA worked only in the areas which SPLM controlled. Consequently, it succeeded in developing credibility with the southerners. The second connection was the NCA which had worked in the government-controlled area and the rebel-controlled area. Furthermore, it had access to the SPLM/A leadership and the Sudanese government (Johnson, 2011).

Because Norway's contacts originated in their historical links to these NGOs, the relationship between Norway and the leadership of SPLM gained significant credibility. This credibility was the basis for Norway's role; there would not have been a Norwegian mediation (Johnson, 2019). Additionally, the NPA and the NCA personnel knew the Sudanese people at all levels from top to bottom. They were in touch with the local people in Sudan and South Sudan. The Norwegians, via their NGOs, succeeded in building trust and strong relations with the Sudanese government, the opposition, the rebels, and the local communities (Kelleher, 2006). This trust enabled the Sudanese to perceive Norway as a mediator who had no interest in the conflict, thus easing the process of mediator acceptance. Additionally, Norwegian humanitarian aid and development work in Sudan enabled the Sudanese to see Norway as credible (Kelleher, 2006).

The Norwegian NGOs do things the Norwegian government cannot do alone. For example, in many conflicts, the Norwegian government cannot alone offer humanitarian aid, the promotion of human rights and peace prevention. These are considered sensitive issues, and thus, the Norwegian government opts to conduct these activities via its NGOs (Bandarage, 2011).

However, Norway is dependent on its NGOs for peace-making and has often been criticised by those who view its NGOs to disguise the interest of the state. In other words, the Norwegian government involves its NGOs to achieve a specific interest. For example, Goonatilake claims that Norway created a new form of colonialism called “NGOs colonialism” by establishing a new independent class of local people capable of making a stand against the sovereignty and serving the external donor as opposed to the local actors (Goonatilake, 2005).

The argument goes further, accusing certain church-based Norwegian NGOs such as NCA of focusing on areas where Christians are a minority to change the cultural domination, much as it has in South Sudan (Bandarage, 2011). The Norwegian NCA facilitated the secessionism of those minorities from society (Bandarage, 2011). Often in doing so, the Norwegians, the “potent small power”, serve the interest of the US, “the impotent superpower” (White, 2005).

Indeed, with the cooperation of the Norwegian government, NCA made continuous efforts to influence the two parties (Bandarage, 2011). For example, Halvor Aschjem from NCA, using his personal relationship with the Sudanese government and SPLM, invited both representatives of the Sudanese government and rebel representatives to his farm in Norway (Kelleher, 2006). Additionally, the Norwegian Minister of

Development, Hilde Johnson, was also directly involved in the negotiations between the Sudanese government and rebel leadership (Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

The Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs in Sudan and South Sudan work together to end the conflict. The role of the NPA and the NCA in the development of Sudan and South Sudan was the basis of Norway's positioning with the Norwegian government in Sudan and South Sudan (Johnson, 2016).

Norway, Troika, IGAD in the mediation process

Despite being a part of the Troika and not the primary mediator, Norway has played a prominent role in the mediation between the government of Sudan and South Sudan.

The Norwegian mediation idea was laid out in the first meeting held by Hilde F. Johnson, the Norwegian minister for Human Rights and International Development, with Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Sudan's Foreign Minister. The meeting took place in Rome in the autumn of 1997. Both ministers were on a mission to attend the meeting of IGAD and the international support group in the context of the IGAD partner's forum. During the meeting, Ali Osman Taha emphasised the necessity of direct talks with SPLM/A (Johnson, 2011).

Hilde Johnson chaired the Troika team and managed the support efforts. She used her relations with all parties; the Sudanese government, the rebels in South Sudan (or freedom fighters as she preferred to call them) and the primary mediator and IGAD representative, General Sumbeiywo (Johnson, 2016). She also used her close relations with the British Minister for International Development and the US envoy to

Sudan. Leveraging this impressive network was instrumental in achieving the CPA (Johnson, 2016).

In 1989 Bashir and Garang met in the state House Nakoura, refusing to shake hands. They were convinced that peace was not on the agenda at that time. Then, in 1994, the Sudanese government and SPLM/A signed a declaration of principles (DOP) which constituted the basis of the conflict resolution between the two parties. The DOP asserted that the law must guarantee social and political life equality for all Sudanese. While SPLM/A appended its signature on 20 May 1994, the government of Sudan did not append its signature until 1997.

Later, in July 1997, the two parties met again at the statehouse in Nairobi to discuss the possibility of peace in Sudan. This time the two parties were convinced that fighting would lead nowhere and that only negotiations could bring about peace and stability in the region (Waihenya, 2006). Kenya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia were also adversely affected by the conflict in Sudan. They had to host the millions of displaced Sudanese who crossed their borders (Waihenya, 2006). Ultimately, they agreed to establish the IGAD peace process in Sudan. Kenya appointed General Sumbeiywo as its special envoy to the Sudan Peace process (Waihenya, 2006).

However, there was little progress except for the agreed declaration of principles in 1997, which would become the basis for any further negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. In the mid-1990s, IGAD partners' forum had grown to include the allies of Sudan, including Norway and the Netherlands. The main goal of this forum was to support IGAD and the declaration of principles. Egypt and Libya tried to undermine the efforts of IGAD by announcing a joint Libyan-

Egyptian initiative with points similar to the declaration of principles but differing on the matter of self-determination (Johnson, 2011). By the time of negotiations, the international context had changed, and it was the time that the Sudanese conflict had reached the moment of ripe. The September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA brought the Sudanese government to the negotiation table. Additionally, the Sudanese debt, at that time, had reached \$22 billion (Johnson, 2011). However, in 2003, the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) had halted.

Consequently, on 31 August 2003, Ali Osman Taha phoned Hilde Johnson, telling her about the halt of the negotiations, and he recommended negotiating on a higher level and requested that she arrange a secret meeting between himself and John Garang in Nairobi as he was going to attend the funeral of the Kenyan vice president. Osman Taha insisted on keeping this confidential. This meeting was the beginning of a long series of meetings that lasted for more than six months and culminated in Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). IGAD was involved in those meetings (Johnson, 2016).

The establishment of the Troika was based on the cooperative work between Hilde Johnson, the Norwegian Minister for International Development, and Clare Short, the UK Secretary State for International Development. They both had worked together on several development issues in Africa since 1997. The three pillars of the Troika, the UK, USA, and Norway, were collaborating closely, serving as the main organisers of leverage and international strategies coordinators. Norway's involvement with the mediation process was carried out by its official and unofficial actors (Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian

NGO's personnel cooperated to support the mediation efforts of the US, the UK, and Kenya led IGAD (Kelleher, 2006). They supported IGAD by offering it consultation, knowledge, and finance to cover the cost of mediation. Norway was one of the lead international observers in the mediation process and a valuable partner of IGAD. Usually, Norway occupied the position of chair or co-chair in the IGAD Forum (Kelleher, 2006).

The rationale of the Troika was to form a small team of countries with strong relations on both sides of Sudan, Sudan and South Sudan. The UK has a long colonial history with Sudan, and as such, the British had extensive knowledge of the country and deep contacts with important persons in Khartoum. It was also crucial to involve the USA in any solution in Sudan as no mediation effort would have likely succeeded without them. The USA is a prime example of a powerful country; they have the sticks and the carrots at their disposal. These sticks and carrots were essential for the success of the Troika. For example, The September 11 attacks had an impact on the Sudanese government and encouraged them to make peace in the south of Sudan. The Sudanese government was convinced that cooperation with the USA against terrorism and making peace with the south would improve their relations with the Americans, and they were keen to end their isolation. However, the USA alone could not have succeeded without the cooperation and advice of the UK and Norway (Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

It was essential to involve Norway in the mediation because Norway, via its NGOs, had close relations with the Southerners. NPA and NCA had worked for decades in Southern Sudan. The presence of Norway in the Troika gave South Sudan the confidence to accept the Troika and move forward with peace efforts (Johnson, 2011).

The Norwegian team included extensive experience and long-standing contacts in Southern Sudan. Johnson was a co-chair on the Sudan committee at the IGAD partner forum and contacted the Kenyan government and general Sumbeiywo. In March 2002, IGAD, represented by Sumbeiywo, consulted with the parties. Prior to the first summit of IGAD, General Sumbeiywo drafted a paper entitled “One country, two systems”, which left out the critical issue of self-determination. At that moment, the Troika decided to intervene with a significant push in the negotiations. In late April 2002, the Troika met in New York to determine their role in the mediation. They decided to send their envoys as observers to the negotiations and technical experts to fill support roles in the mediation. Additionally, they resolved to work behind the scenes to influence the parties to reach an agreement. General Sumbeiywo cooperated with the Troika and consulted the observers daily.

On July 16, 2002, Johnson met in Oslo with Jack Danforth, the American special envoy to Sudan. She told him about the tensions in the negotiations, confirming to him that the SPLM/A was losing confidence in the talks and had begun to express dismay. She referred to the paper of Sumbeiywo, where self-determination was formulated within the context of a united Sudan and not following the IGAD Declaration of principles (Johnson, 2011).

Johnson adopted the SPLM position. Furthermore, Norway could, to a degree, control the decision of the Troika members through Hilde’s relations with Clare Short and Jack Danforth and could turn their opinion in support of SPLM/A.

It is worth considering the background of Hilde Johnson, the daughter of a missionary family in Tanzania, where she was born. In addition, she was aware of the history of

South Sudan and the self-determination that had taken root shortly after World War II. Johnson assures that many southerners believed that the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 collapsed because it was weak regarding specific issues such as self-determination, security issues and international guarantees (Johnson, 2011). For example, the previous Sudanese governments accepted self-determination in the Khartoum peace agreement of 1997. Additionally, self-determination was mentioned in the constitution (Johnson, 2011).

Norway was the prominent director in the negotiations. When the negotiation reached a deadlock, Johnson called the Norwegian representative in the Troika, instructing him to discuss the situation with the other members to change the course of their approach to gaining agreement with Sumbeiywo. Following this Norwegian intervention, the chief mediator, Sumbeiywo, promptly changed the course of the negotiations and decided to put the matter of self-determination in the south to a referendum (Johnson, 2011).

Norway borrowed leverage from the USA in the Troika to increase pressure on the issue of self-determination. President Bush at that time took a stance of support for the southern cause. On 20 July 2002, the negotiations endorsed the Machakos protocol.

The comprehensive peace agreement would not have been negotiated and reached without this protocol. The protocol contained details related to the referendum, self-determination, approach to religion and the state and information on the transition period (Johnson, 2011). The Machakos Protocol granted Southern Sudan the right to exercise self-determination while Sudan was guaranteed an Islamist character under

Sharia Law. However, the negotiations nearly collapsed on September 1st, 2002, following the SPLA attack at Torit. The SPLA, in turn, claimed that Khartoum provoked them and attacked them first. At that time, the primary Troika role was focused on achieving a cessation of hostilities. Finally, in October, the disputants were back at the negotiation table.

However, the negotiations nearly collapsed again in July 2003 when the Sudanese government proposed the Nakuru draft to resolve the remaining issues to avoid the IGAD process. Nakuru draft is a draft framework for resolving the outstanding Issues Arising out of the Elaborations of the Machakos Protocol (Reeves, 2003). Ali Osman Taha saved the position and asked Hilde Johnson to contact Garang, the SPLM/A representative, to convince him to have direct talks in Nairobi. Again, Norway succeeded in helping to bring the two leaders, Osman Taha and Garang, together. They negotiated directly and intensely for the next 18 months, starting on 31 August 2002 and ending on January 2004. Finally, those negotiations resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi (Johnson, 2016). For six years, a sharing of power between the NCP and the SPLM was achieved. Thanks to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with a referendum on self-determination for the South to follow. The CPA suggested that John Garang be considered for first vice-president, with Ali Osman to be the second. Additionally, a specific formula was applied to central and state governments (Flint & De Waal, 2008).

The Norwegian mediation approach in the mediation of South Sudan/ Sudan conflict

As mentioned in the methodology chapter, Norway's mediation in the Oslo accords is different from its mediation between Sudan and South Sudan. In the Oslo Accords, Norway was the sole mediator. However, in the mediation between Sudan and South Sudan, Norway was among the Troika —Norway, the UK and the USA. The three external mediators coordinated their peace efforts at a very high political level with high leverage (Prendergast et al., 2002). Norway's mediation role in the Sudanese conflict was to ease the mediation process and support IGAD peace efforts. Relying on its track record of collaborative development projects and deploying its extensive field experience, Norway was able to add much to the peace efforts in the Sudanese conflict (International Crisis Group, 2002b). The existence of an international key player, such as the USA, provided Norway with the influence, support and leverage needed in the mediation process (International Crisis Group, 2002b; Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

The main argument, in this case, is that in the mediation of the negotiations that led to CPA, Norway was not an impartial mediator to achieve this goal and end the long-running conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. Additionally, Norway used a variety of mediation strategies, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. The following section will focus on the Norwegian motivation for mediation, the mediation strategy, and Norwegian impartiality.

The Norwegian motivation

In its mediation between the government of Sudan and the rebels in South Sudan, Norway had no specific interest except for humanitarian concern and ending a long-running conflict that had claimed many lives. However, there is debate around the Norwegian motivation in the mediation between Sudan and South Sudan. Some evidence supports that Norway had no interest and was a norm-based mediator. For example, Neumann shows that Norway's motivation to mediate the Sudanese conflict is norm-based (Neumann, 2004). In the same vein, Egeland and Ingebritsen demonstrate that Norway is a norm entrepreneur who intervenes in mediation primarily to spread democratic concepts and help people around the world to live better lives (Egeland, 1988; Ingebritsen, 2002). Similarly, International Crisis Group reports affirm that Norway has no self-interest in Sudan and that Norwegians have no investment in the oil industry in Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2002a).

Kelleher (2006) and Prendergast et al.(2002) explain that Norway was a non-threatening mediator who had no direct interest in Sudan and that this is the reason why they were perceived as a very acceptable mediator for the Sudanese disputants in both the north and the south (Kelleher, 2006; Prendergast et al., 2002). Likewise, Hilde Johnson, the primary mediator in the Sudanese conflict, asserts that Norway's efforts to resolve the conflict in South Sudan amounted to a humanitarian issue. She explains that Norway started to consider involvement in South Sudan because of its long-entrenched conflict and the human price. She confirms that the South Sudan war is the longest civil war in Africa, so far, two million people have been killed, and four million people have been displaced (interview with Johnson, 2019). In the same

vein, Sumbeiywo, the IGAD representative, points out that Norway had no specific interest in the Sudan/South Sudan conflict. He suggests that Norway's interest is solely in stopping the war (interview with Sumbeiywo, 2019). Pagan Amum, South Sudan's representative, asserts that Norway has no intrinsic motivation. He claims that Norway's sole agenda in South Sudan is pursuing peace (interview with Amum, 2019).

Similarly, Kjell Hødnebo, a Norwegian mediator in Sudan/South Sudan, shows that Norway has no national interest in either of those areas. He demonstrates that the Norwegians are interested in stopping the war, returning people to a peaceful land, and helping them. He adds that the Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian government agree. Many people in the Norwegian government began their careers in NGOs, so they are activists in Norwegian foreign policy and share the same views (interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

Other evidence suggests that Norway did have an interest in the mediation between Sudan and South Sudan. Challenging the Norwegian norm entrepreneur image, Kelleher (2006) discovers that the Norwegians articulate an interest-based rationale for their conflict resolution policy and that Norway's peace efforts in Sudan had other motivations in addition to humanitarian impulses – oil interests and business interests. Norway's reputation makes it easier for Norwegian business people to work in Africa (Kelleher, 2006). Krøvel (2011) claims that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs exploits the image of Norway as a peace mediator to raise the standing of Norway in the international arena and uses it as soft power to pursue Norwegian interests, including trade negotiations (Krøvel, 2011).

The claim that Norway has a specific interest, such as oil, could be refuted by evidence from the representative of the Government of Sudan, Hassan Omar. He demonstrates that neither oil nor the desire to support the marginalised was the main factor in Norway's desire to mediate (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). While Hassan Omar negates the Norwegian oil interest in Sudan/South Sudan, he introduces another interest of the Norwegians in Sudan/South Sudan, which is "supporting the Southern Sudanese Christian population to acquire political gains" (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). Hassan Omar is not Christian. He is a Muslim Sudanese; when he mentioned that Norway supports Christians, he means that Norway supports Christians because the majority of South Sudan are Christians. He would like to say that Norway was biased toward the SPLM in South Sudan because they are Christians and the Christians in the world support each other.

Indeed, the representatives of the Sudanese government are sure that Norway has a vested interest but, this interest is not in Sudan's oil industry. On the contrary, they believe that Norway's mediation has a religious rather than economic bias and is under the influence of the Norwegian church, as most of the people in South Sudan are Christians.

In the same vein, Abdelrahman Elkalifa, the representative of the government of Sudan, confirmed that Norway's interest in the mediation in Sudanese conflict is not in the oil industry. However, he also asserts that Norway's engagement in the Sudanese mediation is on a religious basis: "I do not believe that Norway's involvement was due to its interests in the oil industry. This could be valid for the USA, but not Norway, the involvement of which was based on religion" (interview with Elkalifa, 2019).

Elkhalifa confirms that the cliché that the South of Sudan was a marginalised, oppressed Christian area is misleading and untrue. He says, “The rebel leaders who spent most of their life abroad were shocked to see how underdeveloped the far north was and questioned if it were only for marginalisation, oppression and Christianity why were they forcefully fighting after separation...unfortunately, the hypocrite western circles wanted to eclipse the negative British role and the missionaries who spread hatred against Islam intending to block the spread of Islam way south of the Sahara”(interview with Elkhalifa, 2019). Hassan Omar’s perspective is not far from that of Elkhalifa, as he asserts that Norway’s involvement was motivated by religious reasons based on Christianity (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

Hassan Omar (2019) confirms that the Government of Sudan was portrayed as a perpetrator of heinous atrocities in Norway while the SPLM was always portrayed as the victim. He explains that this interpretation of the situation is in many instances declared even to the Government of Sudan (GOS) team so that they were not in a state of self-deceit and under the assumption of even-handed behaviour from the part of the Troika, including Norway (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). Moreover, Hassan Omar asserts that this difference was the main factor that shaped the Norwegian team’s perspective because they were there under pressure from Christian NGOs (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). Pagan Amum, the representative of South Sudan, disagrees with Hassan Omar by arguing that Norway does not place religion as the core issue of its mediation. He adds that Norway saw the conflict in Sudan at that time as a political problem and their goal was to bring the two parties together (interview with Amum, 2019).

Hilde Jonson denies that the Norwegian mediation in Sudan has anything to do with religion. Instead, she asserts that Norway merely helped people who were suffering (interview with Johnson, 2019). She introduces the fact that many of the residents of South Sudan were Muslims, not Christian. One of the representatives of South Sudan in the negotiations was Yasir Arman, a political figure in SPLM and also a Muslim (interview with Johnson, 2019).

In sum, while there is enough evidence that Norway has no specific interest in the mediation of the conflict between the government of Sudan and South Sudan, there is a mixture of evidence to support the claim that Norway has national or state interest in the mediation of the Sudanese conflict (GOS/ South Sudan). Moreover, it is undoubtedly true that Norway has no economic interest in Sudan or South Sudan.

Based on the previous debate, Norway likely had no interest in mediation between South Sudan and Sudan. Norway aimed to end the war and save millions of lives in South Sudan of people who had suffered from oppression, discrimination, and war for decades. Norway was a normative-based mediator who had no interest except for promoting peace. In order to achieve its goal to promote peace and end the war in South Sudan, Norway used its leverage.

The Norwegian leverage

Norway's leverage in its international mediation of the North-South Sudan peace process has three sources: Track One and a Half Diplomacy, the Norwegian economic resources, and a mediator among Troika. The first source of Norwegian leverage is Track One and a Half Diplomacy. The Norwegian officials (the Norwegian government) and unofficial actors (Norwegian NGOs) cooperate and work closely with each

other to coordinate joint efforts and activities in the name of peace-making (Kelleher, 2006). Norwegian capabilities can be seen reflected in their field experience. This is especially true of Norwegian NGOs personnel and their grassroots relations with the people and Sudanese leaders. Norway depends on its NGOs for their contacts and experience to pursue their peace agenda and ease their mission in international mediation. Norwegian NGO representatives have intensive international experience as they have dealt extensively with events in the region and have important contacts with relevant actors. Norwegian officials can use these experts when making important decisions for any international mediation attempt (Kelleher, 2006). In the case of the north-south Sudan conflict, it is not only the Norwegians who depend on the field experience of Norwegian NGOs but also their American and British counterparts (Kelleher, 2006). Regarding Sudan, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian government has conducted various humanitarian activities and has supplied significant funds to South Sudan. As mentioned, Norway's fund for South Sudan goes through the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) (Tvedt, 1994; Tvedt & Badal, 1994).

The Norwegian persuasion ability results from the confidence that Norway succeeded in building the southern and northern Sudanese people. This confidence came from Norway's strong and lasting relations with the Sudanese rebels in the south and the Sudanese government in the North. Generous Norwegian humanitarian aid was instrumental in developing these relations in each region. This was carried out via the cooperation of Norwegian officials and nonofficial representatives in Sudan, Track One and Track Two Diplomacy (Government / NGOs). The second source of Norwegian leverage is Norwegian economic resources. As a persuasion

tactic, Norway spent considerable amounts to fund the meetings and travel costs for the disputants (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). The long-standing humanitarian aid and the confidence between Norway and the Sudanese made Norway an acceptable mediator for both disputants in the conflict (Prendergast et al., 2002).

Finally, being a mediator among Troika is considered leverage to Norway. As mentioned in its mediation in the Sudanese conflict, Norway was not alone. It was in partnership with the UK and USA through the Troika and supported IGAD mediation efforts led by Kenya. Prendergast et al.(2002) assure that the Sudanese negotiations would not have reached a comprehensive agreement without this collation of multiple mediators. With its low leverage, Norway alone would not coax the disputants into an agreement. The existence of an international key factor such as the USA thus supplies the needed leverage to reach an agreement (Prendergast et al., 2002). This is particularly true in complicated, long-term peace processes such as the case of Sudan, where powerful and less powerful mediators work together to reach an agreement (International Crisis Group, 2002b). The three external mediators; Norway, the UK and the USA, coordinated their peace efforts at a very high political level and with high leverage (Prendergast et al., 2002). Norway's mediation role in the Sudanese conflict was to ease the mediation process and support IGAD peace efforts. Relying on its track record of collaborative development projects and deploying its extensive field experience, Norway was able to add much to the peace efforts in the Sudanese conflict (International Crisis Group, 2002b). The existence of an international key factor such as the USA provided Norway with the influence, support and leverage needed in the mediation process (International Crisis Group, 2002b; Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). For example, Egypt was angry and reprimanded the

Sudanese government for signing the Machakos Protocol. Egypt did not welcome any change to the international water-sharing agreement. However, in mid-August, the Americans contacted the Egyptians on the political level to calm them down. US envoy Jack Danforth travelled to Cairo and returned with reports that the situation in Egypt had improved (Johnson, 2011).

By obtaining backing from the USA for its mediation with the Sudanese government, Norway was able to become a more successful mediator (International Crisis Group, 2002a; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). Sørbø et al. (2011) assure that with its low leverage, Norway needed to borrow the clout of a superpower, such as the USA, in order to be more effective in its mediation and help the Sudanese disputants to reach an agreement (Sørbø et al., 2011).

Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo, the IGAD envoy and the primary mediator in the Sudanese conflict, asserts that the CPA could not have been reached without the combination of Norway, the UK and the USA. He explains that the conflict in South Sudan was an overly complicated issue. It required the presence of the Americans, the knowledge of the British and the trust of the Norwegian (interview with Sumbeiywo, 2019).

Norway cooperated with the US and the UK to support IGAD in its mediation between the government of Sudan and South Sudan. The Troika shares views on the conflict. However, if there is a misunderstanding between USA or UK, Norway is the one who is usually fixing the situation. For example, Norway succeeded to convince the Americans of the importance of self-determination for the people in South Sudan.

Mediation Strategy

In the mediation Sudan-South Sudan conflict, Norway used a variety of mediation strategies, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation strategy. In order to bring the parties together, Norway employed a facilitation strategy using its NGO's massive relations with the local community in both Sudan and South Sudan. However, Norway acted as a manipulator to encourage the parties to reach an agreement. In certain positions, Norway suggested proposals and played the role of the formulator.

Before discussing the Norwegian strategy in the mediation in the Sudanese conflict, it is worth mentioning that Norway was among Troika (Norway, UK, and the USA) who supported IGAD in its mediation between the disputants (interview with Johnson, 2019).

Troika played a role of manipulation in the mediation of the Sudanese conflict. Pagan Amum, the negotiator from South Sudan, confirms that-the USA brings with them their stick and carrots, the UK comes with their historical background and historical knowledge as Sudan's former coloniser, and Norway comes with the carrots alone to increase the impact of the carrots on the one hand and to reduce the negative impact of the stick on the other (interview with Amum, 2019). Hilde Johnson agrees with Pagan by asserting that the combination of the three countries in the Troika was perfect. The UK, with its close relationship with Khartoum, the USA with its carrots and stick, and Norway with its ties to Southern Sudan, made the perfect mediating team. She confirms that Norway as a sole mediator would not have succeeded in reaching the CPA without the other members of the Troika to push for peace in South Sudan (interview with Johnson, 2019).

Hassan Omar explains that Norway was not alone in its mediation in the Sudanese conflict and that the effort was a group effort. However, he asserts that although Norway may be given credit as the most active member in the Troika pushing for the promotion of peace (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

There is a divergence of views regarding Norway's strategy in the mediation between Sudan/South Sudan. There is enough evidence to prove that Norway was a facilitator. However, there is significant evidence that supports the claim that Norway behaved as a manipulator in the mediation between the Government of Sudan and South Sudan. Additionally, there some events prove that Norway was a formulator.

Based on the facilitation strategy, in intractable conflicts such as the Sudanese conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the mediator must adopt a facilitation strategy to create a communication channel between the disputants. Parties in intractable conflict have no direct communication channel and thus have no agreement on the central issues.

Bercovitch (2004) explains that the facilitation strategy helps the disputants to communicate better and creates a friendly environment (Bercovitch, 2004). According to Kelleher (2006), the Norwegians transmitted the necessary information between the disputants who were otherwise unable to say it directly to one another (Kelleher, 2006). In this framework, Kelleher explains that the Norwegians serve as a go-between, suggest innovative ideas, help the disputants to communicate, and clarify critical situations. She asserts that the Norwegians succeeded in finding a middle ground to work towards a compromise. She adds, in doing so, encouraged the negotiations to go on. A key role the mediator fills is to suggest alternatives, especially when the

negotiations are deadlocked (Kelleher, 2006). As a part of its facilitation role and specifically in deadlock situations, by aiming to keep negotiations moving, Norway on several occasions hosted representatives from both disputants in a relaxed environment away from the conflict where ideas can more easily be exchanged (Kelleher, 2006; Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006).

Johnson assures that the Norwegians played a facilitation role in their mediation between Sudan and South Sudan (interview with Johnson, 2019). By employing the facilitation strategy, Norway had capitalised on the trust it had built with the disputants through the Norwegian NGOs. The Norwegian officials and NGO practitioners engaged in the relevant negotiations with both parties. Norwegians know much about the situation in Sudan and South Sudan and usually come forward with a constructive suggestion when the negotiations reach a deadlock (Kelleher, 2006). This is what Norway offers in its mediation process. However, Norway sometimes exceeds its role as a facilitator and acts as a manipulator.

Indeed, two kinds of manipulation represent the mediation between Sudan and South Sudan. The first type of manipulation is the manipulation that the Troika practised, and the second kind is the manipulation that Norway itself practised. While the first kind of manipulation was practised on the government of Sudan, the Norwegian manipulation was practised on both sides - towards South Sudan and the Sudanese government.

According to Hassan Omar, the representative of the GOS, the Sudanese government was manipulated by the Troika. He adds that there were many differences between the three countries - Norway, the USA and the UK. However, they distributed

different roles but were largely in agreement about how to pressure the government of Sudan to accept the mediation proposals (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

He adds that the Troika practised manipulation on the government of Sudan at a time when Sudan was weak and could be easily manipulated. The terrorist attacks in Dar Alsalam, Nairobi, and the subsequent American military intervention made the Sudanese regime more flexible and accepting of the idea of negotiating a settlement (Hanssen, 2019).

However, the inclusion of the USA in mediation is a success factor. Hassan Omar asserts that the participation of the USA was essential; otherwise, it would have been unexpected for GOS to accept the Norwegian partnership knowing the Norwegian bias in favour of the SPLM (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). He explains that the Comprehensive Peace agreement in 2005 could not have been reached without the backing of the US and the UK because Norway did not have the leverage that was available to the USA, nor did it have the trust of the main party, the GOS (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

Johnson explains that the Sudanese government was aware of their need for a peace agreement with South Sudan during the negotiations. After the 9/11 attacks on New York, the Sudanese shifted their position towards peace. The main reason for shifting their position was that the Sudanese government was anxious for the USA not to label them as a regime supportive of terrorists and instead put Khartoum on the map as a country of reasonable Muslims. Khartoum understood that if they made peace with the South Sudanese, they would benefit from a bilateral relationship with the USA, which is essential for the peace process (interview with Johnson, 2019).

Kjell Hødnebo, a Norwegian diplomat, explains that the presence of the Americans via Troika is significant for the Norwegian mediation between South Sudan and Sudan. He adds that Norway kept updating the USA because Norway could not do anything without having the Americans on board. So in the mediation between Sudan and South Sudan, the Norwegians succeeded in building a special relationship with the Americans. Norway is aware that it is a small country with no power, and because of that, Norway relies on intelligent strategies. However, there were some issues on which people would not compromise. It was then that the USA came in to twist their arms. This may explain the Norwegian eagerness to involve the Americans and develop a stronger relationship with them (interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

Kjell Hødnebo explains that at that time, some Sudanese were involved in the bombing of the Twin Towers in New York in 2001. Rumours followed this: the Alshafa factory in Khartoum produced chemical weapons, resulting in the Americans being bombed. These circumstances led to no relationship between Khartoum and the Americans. Consequently, Khartoum saw these negotiations as an effort to stop or prevent American sanctions. They thought that if they were viewed as the good guys and gave the SPLM something, they would ensnare the Americans. Instead, the Americans were the big sledgehammer, as Norway had no sledgehammer. "We can be only smart, and sometimes you need a sledgehammer to twist arms when it comes to the end of some talks" (interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

While Kjell Hødnebo shows that the USA manipulated the Government of Sudan by being a sledgehammer, Abdelrahman Elkalifa, the Sudanese government representative, argues that Norway also manipulated the government of Sudan, "Norway and others offered their utmost best help to the rebels and were inclined to put some

pressure on the government of Sudan.” They were inclined to put pressure on the government delegation, but never on the other side, he added (interview with Elkhalifa, 2019). Hassan Omar assures that Norway, with the aid of the US, manipulated the Sudanese government to reach an agreement (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). Kjell Hødnebo demonstrates that mediators can exert pressure on both disputants by different means (interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

Away from pressure manipulation, Norway used gratification manipulation by promising the two parties economic and development assistance for investment in the oil sector. In the same vein, Pagan Amum, the SPLM representative in the negotiations, assures that in specific points, Norway manipulated the parties to encourage them to reach an agreement and to achieve peace (interview with Amum, 2019). Amum shows that Norway is rich; the Norwegians offer developmental and economic assistance if the parties reach peace. He explains that while the Sudanese government and the SPLM were negotiating, the Norwegians promised to help both Sudan and South Sudan develop their oil sector further and contribute to the increased recovery of their oil wells. He assures that after the signing of the agreement, Norway helped both South Sudan and the government of Sudan to recover more oil and to increase the production of oil (interview with Amum, 2019).

Furthermore, Kjell Hødnebo demonstrates that Norway promised both sides to help them build a better oil administration and, in particular, assist in negotiations with oil companies. He adds that Norway also had two representatives attending oil management courses in Norway already during the talks, including the first oil minister from the south. Hødnebo explains that a critical part of this assistance was that Norway assisted them in conducting an oil production analysis, so both sides, especially the

south, could know and trust the numbers and amount of reported production. He adds that the Norwegian oil specialist was included in the ministry in Khartoum and given full access to all the data and the oil specialist's overview of the production and the estimates of future production helped the parties plan how much production revenue could be included in future budgets. Hødnebo adds that assistance in good and proper taxation of oil companies was another topic that both sides were given courses in addition to environmental issues (interview with Hødnebo ,2020). Amin Hassan Omar, the Sudanese government's representative, confirms that during the negotiations, Norway promised to assist both sides in developing their oil sector further (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

By promising both parties help in developing the oil sector, Norway acted as a manipulator who employed incentives and offered carrots to the disputants.

Another example proves that Norway was a formulator, while Sumbeiywo, the IGAD representative, gives assurances that Norway did not impose its position on any of the parties, the government of Sudan and the SPLM (interview with Sumbeiywo,2019). Pagan Amum asserts that Norway the USA supports IGAD financially and with ideas. They were involved in discussions with the SPLM and the government of Sudan and were making proposals to the mediation process, discovering the disputant's common ground, the concessions that parties were willing to make, and the possible compromises the parties could agree on (interview with Amum, 2019). This was confirmed by Kjell Hødnebo, who shows that Norway did make a proposal to the disputants and helped them to find compromises: "Yes, of course, we did that, we were active in the negotiations," Hødnebo says (interview with Hødnebo, 2020).

Another example of the formulator role of Norway in the mediation between Sudan and South Sudan is the issue of self-determination. Hilde Johnson was aware that self-determination would be a deadlock in the negotiation. She could convince The US envoy, Danforth, to add self-determination to the negotiation substance. They are, together, asked General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, the primary mediator representing IGAD, to include the issue of self-determination in the negotiations (Johnson, 2016).

In summary, in the mediation in the Sudanese conflict, Norway used the three mediation strategies in different positions in the mediation process. Norway acted as a manipulator and a formulator, not only a facilitator mediator. The Norwegians promise to help both Sudan and South Sudan to develop their oil sector further and contribute to increasing the recovery of their oil wells can also be viewed as manipulation. This is further proven by the fact that after the signing of the agreement, Norway helped both the South of Sudan and the government of Sudan to recover more oil and increase their oil production. In addition to being a facilitator, Norway introduced proposals for the disputants.

Impartiality/ biased

A norm-based mediator is expected to be an impartial mediator. However, from the first moment, Norway took a position to support the SPLM. Furthermore, on many occasions, the Norwegians changed the position of the Troika to the benefit of the SPLM. By supporting the SPLM, the weaker party, Norway, showed that it was not an impartial mediator in the mediation between the government of Sudan (GOS) and SPLM. However, Norwegian impartiality in the Sudanese conflict remains a

debatable issue. While some argue that Norway was not an impartial mediator as Norway was biased towards the southern (SPLM), others argue that Norway was an impartial mediator.

Despite asserting the importance of the mediator's impartiality, Hilde Johnson, the primary Norwegian representative, suggests that Norway did not have to follow the mediation rules formally because IGAD was the official mediator. Because of this, Norway's role was behind the scenes. However, she demonstrates that the mediator should have credibility and not take sides but should be in a relationship with both sides at all times (interview with Johnson, 2019). While Johnson did not consider Norway as a formal mediator, Hassan Omar, the Sudanese government representative, affirms that Norway among Troika controlled the negotiations: "Although Norway was acting under a united African effort to solve the problem in South Sudan known as the IGAD initiative, and it was this initiative which brought the two parties to the table with a Kenyan mediator presiding, the Troika— including Norway were controlling the negotiations from the shadows" (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, IGAD representative and the head of the negotiations, supported the argument that the Norwegians were not biased to any party and that they approached both sides equally (interview with Sumbeiywo, 2019).

Indeed, the representatives of the Government of Sudan were not happy with the Norwegian mediation because they found out that Norway was biased toward the SPLM (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019 and Elkhalifa, 2019).

Related to the Norwegian impartiality, Hassan Omar shows that the small Norwegian team led by a former Minister and an active politician, Hilda Johnson, were posing at

the beginning as advocates of one side rather than a mediator. Although they were made aware that their bias was apparent, the answer was always justification rather than a change of behaviour (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). He confirms that Norway did not deal with both parties the same way. They did not bother to claim that the legal assistance and technical assistance to the SPLM was not disguised (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

Hødnebo, the representative of Norway in the mediation between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM, justifies the Norwegian support for the SPLM because the SPLM is the weak party (interview with Hødnebo, 2020). While Hødnebo, the representative of Norway, did not deny the Norwegian bias towards SPLM, Pagan Amum, the South Sudan representative, claims that Norway was an impartial mediator. He demonstrates that the people of South Sudan saw Norway as a committed and honest party that stood against injustice without internal interest (Amum, 2019). He asserts that Norway dealt with both parties as equal parties and that Norway chose not to have a position to support this or that party (interview with Amum, 2019). Additionally, he suggests that the government of Sudan itself accepted Norway because Norway was viewed as an impartial mediator (interview with Amum, 2019).

Pagan Amum contradicts himself when presenting an example where Norway supported the SPLM but not the Sudanese government. In the example, Norway provided John Garang, the head of SPLM, with a satellite phone. Moreover, Norway even paid the bills of that telephone which cost millions of Norwegian kroner. Norway did not do the same for the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The Norwegian diplomat, Hødnebo, and the NPA representative, Hanssen, agree with Pagan and

confirm that Norway did provide those phones to SPLM, but not the Government of Sudan. Moreover, the Norwegians paid the phone bills (interview with Amum, 2019; Hanssen, 2019 ; Hødnebø, 2019). Despite these examples, Amum continues to view Norway as impartial and supports the idea that Norway was an honest mediator and a good faith mediator (interview with Amum, 2019).

However, Amum refuses to describe this Norwegian behaviour as biased behaviour. Furthermore, he justifies the behaviour by asserting that John Garang was the principal, the negotiators needed to reach him, and it was impossible to reach him without the satellite phones because there were no telephone lines in Southern Sudan. In addition, he asserts that Norwegians saw the need for that and provided it and even paid the bills for communication alone. He adds that the Sudanese government in Khartoum did not need satellite phones because they already had their telephones (interview with Amum, 2019). Pagan Amum also defends Norwegian behaviour by asserting that “it was even facilitation of both sides as Norway treated both sides in even level” (interview with Amum, 2019).

Amum explains that the SPLM had no means of communication, and the other side had a means of communication (interview with Amum, 2019). Furthermore, he asserts that this is the Norwegian style of mediation, to bring the two parties to an equal level (interview with Amum, 2019). Similarly, Hilde Johnson justifies the necessity of satellite telephones; otherwise, how could the SPLM communicate. She claims that Norway offered satellite telephones to SPLM precisely because the SPLM lived in the bush, and they needed to communicate with their commanders in the field to consult on the security issues. Otherwise, they would have had deeper troubles. She points

out that there were no telephones at that time in South Sudan, while Khartoum had phones (interview with Johnson, 2019).

Likewise, Kjell Hødnebo, the Norwegian diplomat engaged in the mediation process, justifies the Norwegian behaviour by explaining that “when you have a government that has all resources and people who have nothing, you have to help the people who have nothing”. He adds that the Norwegians helped the SPLM because it was a pragmatic approach to keep the talks ongoing. Hødnebo says: “Our sympathy would always come down with those who are the weaker. We helped them, we assisted them, we even gave them courses so they can understand the art of mediation and how to negotiate” (interview with Hødnebo, 2019). He explains that by helping the SPLM, the weaker party, Norway is shortening the gap in power between the disputants (interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

Kjell Hødnebo refuses to call this biased: “You can call this biased, you can do that, but I would call it evening the playfield in the negotiations, so the people can meet in par and they can be equal when the talks start” (interview with Hødnebo, 2019). In international mediation, to support one party but not the other is called bias, not impartiality, no matter how many people try to justify it. This bias was confirmed by Abdelrahman Elkalifa, the Sudanese government representative. Abdelrahman Elkalifa shows that Western observers were sympathetic to the rebel movement (interview with Elkalifa, 2019). He argues that the Norwegian NGOs were missionaries and were acting in line with that (interview with Elkalifa, 2019).

Abdelrahman Elkalifa demonstrates that what the Norwegians offered was primarily and almost exclusively to the South, not the rest of Sudan, which was not their

concern. He adds that their humanitarian behaviour was earmarked for the South alone. He believes that the payment of John Garang's satellite phone bills was detrimental to the peace process and enhanced the rebel's capabilities. He affirms that Norway never did anything like this for the Sudanese government. He assures that Norway did not pay one krone to the government representatives (interview with Elkhalfifa, 2019).

The Norwegian bias towards SPLM was restricted to logistical support and included humanitarian assistance. Focusing on the humanitarian support to the South of Sudan, Norway is accused of being partial towards SPLM, not only on the humanitarian level but also at a political level (Larssen, 2009).

While Pagan Amum explains that Norway used to provide humanitarian assistance to the needy people on both sides (interview with Amum, 2019), Hassan Omar asserts that Norway did not pay a penny to the GOS team. Additionally, he argues that Norway abstained from giving any humanitarian aid to the Government of Sudan because they considered the Government to be the villain while the SPLM was not seen as an insurgency, but rather the victim, according to Hassan Omar(interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

He adds that the Norwegians were not providing only humanitarian assistance but also giving money that could provide arms and ammunitions (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). In the same manner, Abdelrahman Elkalifa shows that rich Norway employed its economic resources too much in favour of the rebels, but it did not employ such resources to the Sudanese government (interview with Elkhalfifa, 2019).

The Norwegian bias towards the SPLM was represented in the satellite phones or the humanitarian assistance and Norwegian support of political issues related to SPLM, such as self-determination and the gathering of the SPLM factions. The self-determination right for the Southern Sudanese is an issue that could bring Norwegian impartiality into question. When Hilde Johnson met Jack Danforth, the US special envoy to Sudan, Hilde Johnson was aware of the deadlock between the Sudanese government and the SPLM. The problem was the self-determination of the Southern Sudanese. Hilde succeeded in convincing Danforth of the importance of South Sudanese self-determination, and they together communicated to General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, the primary mediator representing IGAD, to include and focus on the issue of self-determination in the negotiations (Johnson, 2016).

This action could be understood as Norway was adopting the position of SPLM, which indicates that Norway relinquished its impartiality. Hilde Johnson disagrees with this opinion. She says: "This is nothing to be partial about". Furthermore, she justifies, " if you want to find a solution to a conflict, you have some basic redlines that the parties will never go beyond". She suggests that they would never sign up anything if those red lines were not there"(interview with Johnson, 2019). She recommends that the mediator should identify and understand the red lines of the parties. She considered self-determination a redline for the SPLM (interview with Johnson, 2019). She used the same argument as that of the SPLM but not those arguments put forth by the Sudanese government in Khartoum. She justified her opinion by saying that " if you do not address the redlines, you will not get agreement and you will end up into war" (interview with Johnson, 2019).

The second political issue that could be viewed as evidence of the Norwegian bias toward the SPLM, is the gathering of SPLM factions. During the negotiations, the SPLM was split into seven factions. Norway tried to unify them. Norway talked to all the factions, and the Norwegian NGOs paid for a big gathering of people to come together in a peace camp (interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

All of the above could prove that Norway was not an impartial mediator and was biased to SPLM. However, as mentioned above, Norway is always ready to justify its action and exclude itself from being biased. In rare cases, the Norwegians admit their bias. For example, Kjell Hødnebo and Halle Hanssen, Norwegian mediator and representative of NPA, admit the Norwegian partiality to the SPLM. “We were one-sided; we were overly critical to Khartoum. We supported the SPLM. We stood very firmly behind the liberation movement”(interview with Hanssen, 2019). Hødnebo confirms that Norway supported the SPLM, saying, “Norway always stands with the side of the weak party because we have been in a weak situation for 500 years”(interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

Despite his admitting to being biased, Hødnebo, still justifies the Norwegian position in the mediation process by claiming that Norway was impartial: “We tried to be even, we had meetings with both sides and tried to persuade both sides. We tried to build personal relations with both sides, the SPLM and the Sudanese government. ..So in building up personal relations with both sides, we tried to be even, and this is extremely important, especially in Africa and in the Middle East because in those countries if you are friends, you can trust people” (interview with Hødnebo, 2019).

In sum, there is strong evidence that Norway was biased towards the SPLM. Norwegian support to the SPLM is apparent. Norway supported them both financially and politically by adopting their position. Norway provided the SPLM with satellite phones but did not do so for the government of Sudan. On the political level, Norway's adoption of the position of SPLM is related to its self-determination. Self-determination was an essential demand for SPLM. Norway succeeded in convincing the members of the Troika of the importance of this demand and included it in negotiations. Additionally, Norway was working on gathering the fractions of rebels. The Norwegians justify their impartiality because they support the weak party, the SPLM.

CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDY THREE: THE DOHA DOCUMENTS FOR PEACE IN DARFUR (DDPD),2011

Introduction

The conflict in Darfur since 2003 has created a complex humanitarian reality, killing and displacing thousands of people. Meanwhile, Sudan and the Darfur civil war have witnessed several attempts at international mediation to find a solution for the conflict. Qatar was at the forefront of the initiative to mediate and find a solution for this complex conflict. The State of Qatar contributed to resolving the conflict in the Darfur region of Western Sudan. Doha sponsored the negotiations between the Sudanese disputants and hosted the interlocutors for more than two years culminating in the Convention, or so-called Doha document for Peace, which was the product of a dialogue involving hundreds of stakeholders. In May 2011, Doha hosted the celebration of the Darfur Peace Agreement, which laid the foundations for security and stability there.

Qatar's efforts at the Convention were part of a significant project that would restore stability and development to Darfur and remove the legacy of war and tragedies of migration and displacement that came with it. The agreement included establishing Darfur development Bank with a capital of \$2 billion, to which Qatar committed itself and the parties to the Convention to follow up on the implementation of the provisions of the agreement. The Qatari effort to expand regional and international interest in the Convention continued, culminating in the Doha 2013 conference for the development and reconstruction of Darfur, in which USD 3 billion were pledged in support for the region. Qatar contributed the largest share.

The main argument in this chapter is that Qatar used a range of mediation strategies, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation strategy in the mediation Darfur conflict. However, it preserved impartiality (not being biased in favour of one party) as a necessary component in the Qatari mediation. In order to illustrate this argument, this chapter sheds light on several topics: the Darfur conflict background, the Qatari role in mediation between the Sudanese disputants, and the application of Qatari mediation throughout the Darfur conflict.

Darfur – Sudan conflict

In order to understand the conflict in Darfur, it is necessary to go back and review the history and the societal structure of Darfur. Darfur is a western Sudanic society linking the desert to the savannah (Burr & Collins, 2008). It hosts a diverse range of ethnic groups and tribes (Flint & De Waal, 2008). The ruling clan in Darfur was the Keira dynasty. Darfur itself is centred in the northern mountain region known as Marrah. The states of Darfur expanded their authority to the south to include the farming communities which adopted the Fur language. All Darforians are Muslims, and Islam is a state cult in Darfur. Most Darforians follow either the Tijaniyya Sufi sect, which originates in Morocco, the Ansar of the Mahdi, or both. In the fourteenth century, the Arabs came to Darfur. They were in two groups: the first group included scholars and traders and originated from different parts of the Arab world —the east and the west, the Nile and Arabia, the Maghreb, and West Africa. The second group of Arabs, known as the Juhayna Bedouins, came from the northwest searching for grass and water.

The largest and most powerful Arab tribe is the Rizeigat, who live in south-east Darfur under the tribal authority of the Madibu family (Flint & De Waal, 2008). Darfur was an independent state or sultanate until 1916 but was then absorbed into the British Empire in January 1917 (Flint & De Waal, 2008). Darfur was gradually and peacefully absorbed into the British- Egyptian Condominium. British power affirmed the Fur, which encouraged commerce and eased agricultural activities in Darfur. However, the British paid very little attention to investment in infrastructure and public services in Darfur (Natsios, 2012). In 1956, Darfur Became a part of the Republic of Sudan (Waihenya, 2006).

By the second half of the 19th century, Darfur had suffered several periods of famine, which led to political instability and outbreaks of war with temporary periods of peace. In the mid-1960s, 1970s, and again in the mid-1980s, drought-induced famines caused political unrest that eventually reached Khartoum. When famines strike anywhere in the world, especially when the government does not have the tools to cope with famine, ethnic conflict, violent crime, and population movements of the starving are soon to follow. This often results in political unrest, violence and even civil war (Natsios, 2012). The failure of the successive Sudanese governments to deal with those famines and to respond to the human suffering they caused was the main reason behind the civil war in Darfur (Natsios, 2012). Darfur witnessed three civil wars: the first took place between 1987 and 1989 and pitted the Arab tribes against the Fur tribes. The famine of the mid-1980s paralleled this civil war.

A few days after the Al- Bashir coup in July 1989, the first peace settlement was signed between the Arabs and the Furs. The second peace agreement was signed in

December 1989. However, the two agreements were not implemented, which exacerbated bitterness toward the Khartoum government. Moreover, in 1994, Khartoum split Darfur Province into three new federal states within Sudan, which added to Fur frustration. Additionally, the neglect concerning economic development in Darfur accompanied the ongoing political discrimination of the non-Arab in Darfur. All this led to the second civil war in Darfur between 1995 and 1999. It erupted this time between the Darfuri Arabs and the Masalit tribe residing in Western Darfur. The Masalit, like the Fur, were African Muslims who saw themselves as the dominant power in Darfur. When Al-Bashir became president of Sudan, he started with the Masalit, considering them adversaries. Al-Bashir appointed a new local Arab authority in the Masalit area and gave that authority the right to appoint a sultan, who certainly should be Arab. All these tactics by Bashir led to the eruption of the second civil war in Darfur in 1999 (Kevane & Gray, 2008).

In 1999, Al-Bashir became aware of the flaw in his policy and decided to restore some form of representational balance to the council of the local government in Western Darfur by appointing an equal number of Arab and Masalit. The first two civil wars, the Arab-Fur and the Arab-Masalit conflicts happened because of the marginalisation of the non-Arab tribes and the widespread distribution of automatic weapons into the hands of the Arab militias. All this took place in a setting of chronic under-development with an encroaching northern desert (de Wall & Flint, 2005).

The third civil war erupted mainly because of a book, a black book, which was published in May 2000. The book was entitled *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan*. This book refers to research conducted by the Darforian rebel

group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The research was focused on the Sudanese elite who had ruled Sudan since 1956 and attempted to shed light on their ethnic and geographic origins. (De Waal, 2007a; Mans, 2004). The book asserts that the ruling elite is restricted to only three tribes of the Northern Nile who are the Shai-qiyya, Ja'aliyin, and Danagla. Those three tribes stand for 5.4 percent of the Sudanese population but dominate 70 percent of the political, educational, social and economic Sudanese institutions. These institutions include banks, universities, the military officer corps, the government's civil service, the police and internal security apparatus, the judiciary, corporations, and the media. That is why the book played a significant role in inflaming the anger of the non-Arab tribes in Darfur.

This anger ultimately resulted in the union of the main tribes in Darfur: The Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. Together they formed a military alliance driven by four historical issues: the marginalisation of the periphery; poverty and underdevelopment; human rights abuses by Arab supremacist groups; and the absence of democratic institutions (De Waal, 2007b; Flint, 2010; Mans, 2004). While the real beginning of the third civil war in Darfur was February 2003, it started in July 2001, when Fur and Zaghawa leaders pledged to resist the Arab movement across Darfur (De Waal, 2007a; Mans, 2004). In February 2003, the rebels in Darfur formally announced the beginning of a rebellion (Dagne, 2010; Faris, 2007). The prominent anti-government rebels in Darfur included the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/ SLA) with its broad base of support across Sudan's major ethnic groups (principally non-Arab but including some Arabs), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), whose leaders have links with Sudan's Islamist movement (De Waal, 2007b; Mans, 2004).

The Darfur civil war was not a North-South or Muslim-Christian conflict. It came about when local Muslim peoples rebelled against pro-government militias known as Janjaweed (Mans, 2004). The Janjaweed militias are a segment of Darfur's camel-herding Arab tribes; they are Arab immigrants of Chadian origin. (De Waal, 2007b; Flint, 2010; Mans, 2004). The Janjaweed have often financed themselves through robbery and pillaging (Mans, 2004). Despite this, they have enjoyed support from the government of Khartoum, with whom they have an agreement allowing them to pursue their agenda with impunity in exchange for suppressing outbreaks of rebellion (De Waal, 2007a; Mans, 2004). The Sudanese government and the Janjaweed practised systematic and large-scale destruction, targeting any life in Darfur (Nathan, 2006).

Towards the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)

The Qatari mediation was not the first mediation trial in the Darfur conflict. Since the eruption of the civil war in Darfur, there have been several attempts at mediation between the Government of Sudan in Khartoum and the rebels in Darfur. In late 2005 the seventh round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur commenced in Abuja, Nigeria, under the auspices of an African Union (AU) mediation team and the support of the UN, the UK and the USA, alongside other international partners. The talks aimed to arrange a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the main rebel movements in Darfur: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

On 5th May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) —known as the Abuja Agreement— was signed by the Government and by Minni Minawi, the leader of one of the

two SLM factions, but was rejected by JEM and Abdel Wahid al-Nur, the leader of the other SLM faction (SLM was split into two factions soon after its establishment). Thus the Agreement did not achieve peace (Nathan, 2006). The two groups which refused to sign (JEM and SLM-Wahid) continued fighting against the Sudanese Government in Khartoum, even fighting with one other in some instances resulting in the fragmentation of the group into almost 27 different rebel factions, every group claiming itself to be the representative of Darfur (Dagne, 2010). In 2008, the violence escalated to new heights, and the dispute reached a critical stage (Kamrava, 2011) which required further attempts of mediation in Darfur (Barakat, 2012). Amongst these renewed peace efforts was the Qatari mediation, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

Qatar was nominated to be the representative of the Arab League to mediate between the government of Sudan and various rebel factions. Barakat (2012) argues that this nomination was due to the long-established Qatari relief effort in Darfur via its Red Crescent Society (Barakat, 2012). However, this nomination would not have materialized without the many efforts of the country's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Ahmad bin 'Abdullah Al-Mahmud (Kamrava, 2011). In 2008, Minister Al-Mahmoud travelled to many countries around the world to meet the international officials experienced in the Darfur conflict and the conflict's stakeholders. He met with the officials from the US state department, The African Union, the United Nations, the Sudan Government, Darfur representatives and many others. His goal was to collect information about the perspectives of Darfur conflict resolution and guarantee the approval of those countries and organizations to pave the way for Qatari involvement in the mediation process. In addition, this helped to accomplish an even more important

goal; building trust between Qatar and the disputants and motivating them to accept Qatar as a mediator (Kamrava, 2011).

This is how Qatar manages to involve itself in mediation. It involves a calculated decision, made only after ensuring that the international community approves its mediation or does not disapprove (Kamrava, 2011). It is important to remember that Qatar was not alone in its mediation of the Darfur conflict. Although Qatar was the Arab league representative, other international actors were also included in the process, especially the African Union (AU) and UN mediators. AU and the UN created a Joint Mediation and Support Team (JMST) with the support of the USA (International Crisis Group, 2007). After failed mediation tries by JMST, JMST turned to Qatar, allowing it to become involved in the mediation.

In 2009, JMST and Qatar began new negotiations between the disputants (Aljazeera Channel, 2009). Qatar held a distinct role as a significant mediator (The Enough Project, 2010; Williams & Simpson, 2011) as the generous host of the negotiations with representatives from both sides. Qatar invited various parties to the talks- including Chad, Libya, Egypt, the Arab League, the African Union and the United Nations and hosted them in Doha's luxury hotels for months at a time (Barakat, 2012; Doherty, 2010; Kamrava, 2011; Roberts, 2010).

In 2009, Qatar and JMST made headway by convincing the largest rebel group in Darfur, the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM), and the Sudanese government in Khartoum to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU). In the MOU, both sides committed themselves to make peace (Jones, 2011; Kamrava, 2011; Ulrichsen, 2013). However, some Darforian rebels rejected involvement in the negotiations as

they were to take place in Qatar, an Arab country. In addition, they did not trust the Sudanese government in Khartoum. However, this vision of the rebels has changed over time (Aljazeera Channel, 2009).

In February 2010 and under Qatar's sponsorship, the Sudanese's government and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed the power share agreement in Qatar (Hancock, 2010). The agreement formulated the roadmap for further negotiations in the future and included some principles relevant to the cessation of hostilities (Dagne, 2010). However, the agreement did not include all rebel groups. In his reaction to the agreement, SLM leader Abdelwahid Nur, who refused to engage in the negotiations, asserted that the agreement was an empty promise and that the Khartoum government specialised in signing and not implementing them (Aljazeera Staff writer, 2010).

In March 2010, The Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Movement of Liberation and Justice (LJM) signed two additional documents in Doha in the same year. One was a framework agreement to resolve the Darfur conflict, while the other was an LJM ceasefire (Dagne, 2010). The Sudanese official, Ghazi Salahudin, represented the government of Sudan. Meanwhile, Al-Tigani Sessi represented the Movement of Liberation and Justice (LJM). Indeed, LJM is an umbrella group consisting of 10 rebel groups united in February 2010 under the Movement of Liberation and Justice (Hancock, 2010). The negotiations and the mediation were complex, and Qatar was the leading player in the mediation with JEM and non-JEM.

In 2011 and after two and a half years of negotiations, The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was finalised at the "All Darfur Stakeholders Conference". In

July 2011, the Sudanese government signed a protocol agreement and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). Both sides committed themselves to the Doha document resulting from the comprehensive peace process in Darfur (DDPD), which included the conflict causes and its articulation such as Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation, Compensation and Return, and Internal Dialogue among others (UNAMID, 2011).

The Qatari International mediation approach for Peace in Darfur

This section focuses on three components: Qatari motivation, a manipulation strategy, finally, impartiality.

The Qatari motivation

The point of departure for the Qatari mediation is the Qatari interest. The Qatari interest is focused on Qatari security. Security could have different forms such as food security, financial and economic security (investment), branding itself and security and stability in the Arab and Islamic region (Chacko, 2009; Minich, 2015; Roberts, 2015). The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq caused Qatar to feel insecure and inspired Qatar to strengthen itself by changing its foreign policy and taking mediation as a tool to extend its influence and, consequently, preserve its security.

Taguia, the main researcher of Aljazeera Research Center, confirms that Emir Hamad initiated a new strategy in Qatar in 1995. The Emir decided that Qatar should be independent of Saudi Arabia and have its own vision. Taguia explains that the Emir believed that relying on Saudi Arabia would not offer security to Qatar. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Emir realised that Qatar was not secure anymore.

Additionally, because of the location of Qatar between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional hegemonies encouraged the Emir to adopt an independent foreign policy to maintain the security of Qatar. Taguia confirms that mediation, in general, was one of the tools that the Emir decided to adopt in Qatari foreign policy (interview with Taguia, 2019).

In the same manner, Lulwa Al-Khater, the Qatari ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson, shows that Qatar's interest is in its security. She asserts that security for any country is one of the highest priorities. Qatari foreign policy is based on one rule, which is "no harm", Al-Khater confirms (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

Indeed, international mediation benefits Qatar and strengthens its relations with the countries where Qatar played the role of mediator. Taguia explains that through mediation, Qatar can build trust between it and other countries where Qatar plays the role of mediator, and in turn, those countries can favour Qatar. Taguia presents an example of the siege of Qatar in 2017. He illustrates that what has happened during the siege of Qatar is based on the Qatari mediation in Darfur. He explains that, during the siege, President Al Bashir refused to be biased towards Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the Qatari siege. Al Bashir appreciated the Qatari mediation and prevented Sudan from being split. Taguia assures that Qatar can secure goodwill for itself through mediation among other countries. He adds that world peace is essential for the international community. Additionally, the mediation is essential for Qatar because it introduces Qatar to the international community as a peace broker that does not support terrorism (interview with Taguia, 2019).

Some scholars show that Qatari food security is the main reason behind the Qatari mediation in the Darfur conflict. They base their suggestion on Qatar's need to import 90% of its food demands. To secure its food and in line with its strategic economic interests, Qatar has planned to establish extensive contacts with Sudan (Chacko, 2009; Minich, 2015; D. B. Roberts, 2015). Qatar began to support Sudanese agricultural projects to produce wheat, meat, vegetables, fruits and sugar (Open Briefing, 2014). Furthermore, in 2008, a joint company for agriculture investment, food industry, and animal husbandry was established by the agreement of Doha and Sudan (Farmlandgrab, 2008). The Qatari Hassad Food's agriculture company has contributed to the cultivation of 260,000 acres in the River Nile state. Additionally, the Widam Food Qatari company focuses on livestock and butchery, which exports to Qatar (Gulf Times staff writer, 2017). Farmlandgrab demonstrates that this was one of the many efforts from Doha to ensure Qatari food security (Farmlandgrab, 2008).

In response to Qatar's suggestion that a food security interest in Darfur, Taguia argues that Qatari mediation was for no specific reason. He says, "It was not based on an interest in Qatar; it is not true that Qatar mediation in Sudan was due to food security." Taguia affirms that Qatar's agriculture investment is located in Kenya, not Sudan. He adds that the Qatari investment in Sudan is not for the benefit of Qatar; it is for the benefit of the stability of Sudan, and the actual Qatari investment in Sudan is not feasible for Qatar because of the absence of stability there (interview with Taguia, 2019).

In the same manner, Al-Khater says that "it is not logical to claim that Qatar decided to be a mediator in Darfur because of economic reasons or food security." She asserts that, after considering the time, the resources, and the efforts necessary, it

would be easier for Qatar to invest in Darfur and Sudan without involving itself in mediation. She adds that there are many countries who have direct investments in Sudan through which they receive huge profits. Al-Khater states: “We have to be clear that Qatar has two types of investments: real investments where Qatar has revenue, and this is found in Europe, USA, and Asia. The other type of investment is an investment in aid and development and the Qatari investment in Darfur and Sudan is an example” (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

Lolwa Al-Khater explains that the state of Qatar views the mediation not only as a commitment to the absence of violence or the signing of a peace agreement, but also Qatar aims to achieve sustainable peace in the conflict zones. She adds that to achieve sustainable peace, Qatar believes that development should accompany mediation, and this development includes development in education and health. Additionally, economic recovery, jobs creation, and rehabilitation of infrastructure are essential goals that Qatar worked on after reaching an agreement (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

In the same vein, the ex-ambassador for Qatar in Sudan, Ali Al-Hamadi, claims that Qatar is not seeking financial or investment benefits due to its mediation. However, on the contrary, these mediations cost Qatar much money, especially in Darfur, where Qatar has pledged to provide material and economic assistance and improve people's standard of living to create a lasting and sustainable peace. He suggests that the country's strategy in mediation is based on the state's foreign policy, which focuses on several principles such as; the principle of consolidating international peace and security by encouraging the peaceful resolution of international disputes,

supporting the right of peoples to self-determination, not interfering in affairs in the interior of states, and cooperation with peace-loving nations (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019). Al-Hamadi adds that Qatar considers mediation a necessary strategy that would decrease the external threats such as terrorism and the displacement of peoples (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019).

Tigani Sisi claims that Qatar had no interest in mediation in the Darfur conflict, saying: “I have not come across any matters that indicates Qatar had any interest other than achieving peace in Darfur” (interview with Sisi, 2019). Likewise, Amin Hasan Omar, the Sudanese government’s main negotiator in the Darfur negotiations, also asserts that Qatar had no interest in the mediation in the Darfur conflict (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). It is expected that the Darfur representative and the Sudanese government’s main negotiator in the negotiations would not confirm any specific interest for Qatar in Darfur.

Reviewing the Qatari development aids and investment after signing the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), and during the years 2012 and 2013, Qatar funded Sudan in several ways, including: official development assistance (ODA)—(grants and concessional loans), state and private investment, and state and charitable humanitarian assistance. For example, in 2012-2013, Qatar invested 2 USD billion by purchasing multi-sector treasury bonds from the Central Bank of Sudan (Open Briefing, 2014).

Table 1. Diplomatic events covering development assistance from Qatar to Sudan in the period 2012-13.

Event	Date	Amount	Allocation	Type
Diplomatic visits between Sheikh Tamin and President Bashir	Feb 2012	\$2 bn	Treasury bond purchase – varied (e.g. mining, oil and agriculture)	Investment (pledged, contribution unconfirmed)
Meeting of International Mechanism for Follow up to Implementation of Doha Document for Peace in Darfur	May 2012	\$31 mn	Health centres, schools and development projects	Humanitarian assistance (pledged, contribution unconfirmed)
		\$6 mn	Regional Authority of Darfur	Humanitarian assistance (pledged, contribution unconfirmed)
Visit/inaugural ceremony	June 2012	\$208 mn	Electricity line carriers project	Investment – project finance
Nile Valley Forum	Sept 2012	\$135 mn	Tourism and antiquities	Investment – loan
Doha Conference	Apr 2013	\$500 mn	\$88 mn contributed up front	Mixed ODA and concessional loans
		\$200 mn	Darfur Development Bank capital	Concessional loans and grants

Source: Open briefing: <https://www.openbriefing.org/docs/Qatari-aid-finance-and-foreign-policy-in-Sudan.pdf>

Indeed, the Qatari fund in Sudan and Darfur was for investment and development and to elevate poverty. Parallel to the Qatari mediation in Darfur in June 2010, the Qatar Charity announced a project of USD 1 billion to improve the livelihoods of 65,000 impoverished people living within the affected area. This project contributed to decreasing the level of poverty in Darfur by funding training for farmers and the rehabilitation of the land (Dabanga, 2010).

Qatar is motivated by its security in international mediation, including its mediation in the conflict of Darfur. Indeed, This appears in the position of AL Bashir, the president

of Sudan, who did not support the siege on Qatar and did not cooperate with Saudi Arabia and UAE to cut diplomatic relations with Qatar.

In a different vein, certain scholars argue that the Qatari motivation in mediating the Darfuri conflict is based on religious and cultural considerations. Al-Hamadi explains that Qatar considers mediation efforts a "moral, cultural and religious duty" towards other peoples (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019). Indeed, in its mediation, Qatar aims to achieve the security and stability of the Arab and Islamic region. Sudan is both an Arab and Muslim country. Qatar has a record of engaging itself with Muslim countries because Islam is an integral part of Qatari identity. It supports symbolic Islamic issues as Qatar does not want to see Muslims kill each other (Hansen, 2013). First and foremost, Qatar is a firmly Muslim country where Islam covers all aspects of state affairs (Roberts, 2012). However, this does not mean that the Qatari work for peace is restricted to Arab and Muslim countries. This may be flexible and, at times, doubtful. However, it is necessary to mention that the Qatar foreign policy is built on a principle of flexibility and does have a diverse relation to various parties and countries. For Example, Qatar has relations with Hamas and with Israel (Rabi, 2009).

Qatar chose to mediate on the Darfur conflict because the Sudanese and Darfuris are Muslims. To reconcile between Muslims is a duty for the Qataris as Qatar has cultural-religious ties with the government of Sudan and Darfur. The Qataris care about peace and stability in Sudan for many considerations, such as Qatar and Sudan's cultural, Islamic, and Arab ties. In public statements, pan-Arabism and Islam emerge as crucial elements of Qatar's foreign policy (Zureik, 2018). This was confirmed by Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in 2013 when he described Qatar's

active foreign policy as such: “We are Muslims and Arab; we respect the diversity of religious schools of thought and respect all religions in our country and abroad. As Arabs, we reject dividing the Arab communities based on sectarianism or doctrine because this protects social and economic immunity and prevents its modernization and development based on citizenship regardless of religious sects or thoughts” (Kausler, 2015a, p5).

Ali Al-Hamadi, the ex-ambassador of Qatar in Sudan, argues that the security of Sudan is essential for the Qataris because Qatar has close, strong, and long-standing relations with the Sudanese people, which have been woven through their Arab, Islamic, and humanitarian ties. The Sudanese community is one of the oldest Arab communities in Qatar, and it operates in all fields. This interconnectedness has led to strong ties between the Qatari and Sudanese peoples. In addition to the privileged relations between the Qatari and Sudanese governments, everything that is happening in Sudan is felt in Qatar; hence the Qatari intervention of mediation in Darfur is not new to Qatar, as it has always supported Sudan (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019). Ali Al-Hamadi demonstrates that Qatar hosts negotiations between conflicting parties or plays a key role in their dialogue in order to maintain regional peace and security (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019). In the same manner, Lulwa Al-Khater, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, states that Qatar’s main goal is the stability of the area as a whole, and Sudan is a part of this area. The Qatari mediation in Sudan is based on humanitarian considerations and regional security and stability as well (interview with Al-Khater, 2019). In its mediation, Qatar seeks real, sustainable stability which is based on development and society building (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

Related to the claim that Qatar's involvement in the Darfur conflict was based on religious considerations, Amin Hassan Omar, the representative of the Sudanese government in the negotiations, describes this claim as nonsense. He asserts that Qatar was there because the Arab League elected five Arab countries chaired by Qatar to deal with the Darfur file, and Qatar was representing the Arab league while the joint representative was representing the UN and the AU (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). Likewise, Altigani Sisi, Darfur representative in the negotiations, states that the joint mediation has given the Doha Forum much more credibility (interview with Sisi, 2019).

The Qatari mediation efforts' history shows that most of the Qatari mediation is among Muslim or Arab countries. This is not to say that Qatar mediation is restricted to the Arab and Muslim countries. Qatar seeks to promote peace on the regional and the international level. However, Qatar may prioritize its mediation in The Middle East and Arab countries. This could be because this area has lots of conflicts, which may affect the security of Qatar in case the violence spills out. Another motivation among the Qatari motivations in international mediation is branding Qatar as a peace broker. Lyon (2008) demonstrates that state branding is a strategy to multiply and amplify the efforts of Qatari foreign policy and influence. Qatari mediation takes place in the spotlight and often in front of the local and regional media. He adds that senior Qatari diplomats even go as far as to interview with the media while the mediation is still underway, emphasizing the positive role of Qatar in a manner that is clearly aimed at branding (Lyon, 2008).

Kamrava (2011) confirms that one of the other purposes for Qatar's mediation is branding itself with the image of an experienced mediator, regional diplomatic powerhouse and an impartial peace broker (Kamrava, 2011).

The Aljazeera channel is Qatar's tool for projecting its image. In the Darfur crisis, Aljazeera covered all the events there daily (Minich, 2015). A common criticism is that Qatari's focus on branding in its mediation sometimes seems to outweigh its focus on resolving the conflict. Dickinson (2012) claims that Qatar has been more concerned with getting a deal than ensuring it is a deal that is practical and able to address the reality appropriately (Dickinson, 2012b)..

In response, Al-Khater (2019) did not agree with the branding motivation. She demonstrates that Qatar, with its wealth, can establish strong branding and public relations without being a mediator in Darfur or any other place. Qatar would be more accessible and more feasible to hire private companies for its public relation and branding campaigns. She adds that Qatar chooses mediation for the promotion of peace and stability in the area (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

In brief, Qatar engagement in mediation Darfur conflict is motivated by several motivations; Qatar security, branding Qatar as a peace broker, and finally maintaining the stability and the security of the Middle East, which is considered the security of Qatar. Paying billions of dollars to the Sudanese to achieve a peace agreement can brand Qatar. Achieving peace and helping to stop war could be a great tool and a solid message to brand Qatar in the international arena and secure Qatar.

The Qatari leverage

Qatari leverage in Darfur mediation is represented in three sources: gratification in the form of Qatari financial incentives, which Qatar promises to introduce to the Sudanese for building their infrastructure; personal diplomacy represented in the Emir and the elite; and finally, the cultural and religious ties. The first Source of the Qatari leverage is the gratification where Qatar introduced incentives for both Sudan and Darfur. Financial incentives are rewards that the mediator offers to the disputants in return for resolving their conflict. While Schrodt & Gerner (2004) assert that the financial incentives introduced to the weaker party lead to a decrease in conflict tensions (Schrodt & Gerner, 2004), Böhmelt (2010) confirms that the more incentives the mediator has at their disposal, the more likely they are to apply enforcing strategies and reach an effective outcome (Böhmelt, 2010).

Qatar uses financial resources as a leveraging tool. In the Darfur case, Qatar promised to invest a further USD 2 billion to address the chronic underdevelopment in the Darfur region and the creation of a Darfur development bank, if talks were successfully concluded (Sudan Tribune, 2011a; Walid, 2009). Although Qatar was not alone in its mediation in Darfur (the UN and AU were working alongside them), Qatar did play a distinctive role by using financial incentives. Additionally, Qatar was able to generously host the disputants in Doha along with the delegates from different parties (Chad, Libya, Egypt, the Arab League, the African Union and the United Nations) for long periods of time (Doherty, 2010; Roberts, 2010). It is worth mentioning that the Qatari investment in Darfur and Sudan, in general, is for the benefit of Sudan and

Darfur, aiming to rehabilitate the infrastructure in Darfur and Sudan in general (interview with Taguia, 2019).

It is essential to mention that Qatar used financial leverage in different stages of the mediation process. Parallel to the Qatari mediation in Darfur in June 2010, the Qatar Charity announced a project of USD 1 billion to improve the livelihoods of 65,000 impoverished people living within the affected area (Dabanga, 2010). By the end of the negotiations and to encourage the disputants to reach an agreement, Qatar promised to invest a further USD 2 billion, if talks were successfully concluded (Sudan Tribune, 2011a; Walid, 2009).

The second source of leverage is personal diplomacy. Usually, the Emir or the elites take part in the mediation process. Qatar's involvement in the Sudan conflict began with the preliminary efforts of Qatar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Ahmad bin 'Abdullah al-Mahmud, in 2008. Qatari mediation was recognised as being extremely character-driven while heavily relying on the efforts of the country's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Kamrava, 2011). Al Mahmoud contacted the people directly involved with the Sudanese government as well as the people of Darfur and the conflict stakeholders (Kamrava, 2011). As mentioned before, he travelled to all countries considered primary or second-tier stakeholders to collect information about the Darfur conflict and their preferences for resolution and seek their approval for Qatar involving itself in the mediation process alongside the UN and African Union. Moreover, he was in contact with the international humanitarian organizations on the ground in Darfur and even travelled to Darfur to acquaint himself with locals to be

more aware of the reality and gain the trust and confidence of the darforians needed for Qatar to be accepted as a mediator (Kamrava, 2011).

The mission of the Qatari minister was not easy, especially among Darforians, many of whom distrusted Arabs after their mediation experiences with Egypt and the Arab league. The general Darforian consensus was that Arabs were biased towards the Sudanese government in Khartoum. Despite these adversities, the Qatari minister succeeded in generating among Darforians a sense of goodwill towards Qatar.

Kamrava (2011) claims that Darforian representatives accepted Qatari mediation because the Qatari mediators offered a new and different perspective on the Sudanese conflict. This perspective was developed in three stages. Firstly, Al-Mahmoud secured the approval of the second-tier stakeholders. Next, Al-Mahmoud collected extensive first-hand information about the conflict, using the international humanitarian organizations on the ground as a source. He even met Darforian people and listened to their accounts of the conflict to avoid bias. Finally, the conflicted parties were invited to Doha for negotiations (Kamrava, 2011).

Personal diplomacy is a significant factor in the Qatari mediation. The Qatari personal diplomacy and the direct intervention in the mediation process by the Emir or the Minister of Foreign Affairs forced the disputants to reach an agreement significantly contributed to the Qatari mediation's success. Altigani Sisi, the main negotiator representing Darfur, asserts that the presence of Emir is a tool to promote the disputants to reach an agreement. He adds that the negotiations would not have succeeded without the Emir's efforts, determination, political will, and follow-up. Altigani says that " Emir's intervention within the Arab League of States and the UN culminated in establishing the Doha forum as the only regionally and internationally

recognised forum for negotiating the Darfur problem” (interview with Sisi, 2019). He explains that “the Emir and the prime minister played a role by using their good offices to build the trust but never to apply pressure” (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019). However, Qatar has been criticised for relying too heavily on the personal attributes of its mediators, notably the Emir and the Foreign Minister (Roberts, 2011).

The third type of Qatari leverage is cultural and religious ties. Qatar shares the same religion with Sudan's Government and the Darfuri rebels. All the parties are Muslims. Qatar shares the same culture with the Government of Sudan. Both Qatar and Sudan are Arab. The Qatari Arabic culture is an advantage because Qatar uses Arabic culture to frame a resolution for the conflict (Mac Ginty, 2008b). Unfortunately, this is not always beneficial. One of the main reasons why the rebels rejected Qatar as a mediator at the beginning was precisely because Qatar is an Arab country. The rebels had a bad experience with Arab mediators such as Egypt, who appeared to be biased towards the Sudanese government in Khartoum (Kamrava, 2011). However, Qatar succeeded in convincing the Darfuris that Qatar would play an impartial role in the mediation between them and the Government of Sudan (Kamrava, 2011). The religious ties also contributed to the ability of Qatar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to talk to the Darfuris and create an environment of trust (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019).

The mediation strategy

Qatar employed a spectrum of mediation strategies in the mediation in the Darfur conflict. Those strategies range from facilitation, formulation, and manipulation.

The facilitation strategy of Qatar is represented in offering privileges, hotels and aircraft to the disputants (Barakat, 2014), and to offer a safe environment for meetings.

AL-Hamadi, the ex- Qatari ambassador to Khartoum, assures that Qatar played the role of facilitator in its mediation in Darfur: “..and to facilitate the negotiation process between these parties” (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019).

Qatar also used the manipulation strategy, which is represented in introducing financial investment and incentives to the disputants. The financial resources are used in different stages of the mediation. Parallel to the Qatari mediation in Darfur in June 2010, the Qatar Charity announced a project of USD 1 billion to improve the livelihoods of 65,000 impoverished people living within the affected area (Dabanga, 2010).

Qatar also used incentives at the end of negotiations to encourage the disputants to reach an agreement. Qatar introduced incentives, whatever the form of those incentives, whether investments, rehabilitation infrastructure or even development aids. In the end, Qatar offered incentives for the Government of Sudan and Darfur. According to the international mediation scholarship, when the mediator offers incentives to the disputants to reach an agreement, the mediator is acting as a manipulator. This is the case of Qatar in Darfur, acting as a manipulator. The mediator may use either carrot (incentives) or a stick (pressure) to manipulate the disputants. It is not easy for a low-leverage state like Qatar to pressure the disputants as a powerful mediator would.

However, Qatar behaves differently. Qatar utilised its wealth and financial power in Darfur negotiations to encourage the disputants to sign an agreement (Roberts, 2015). Moran suggests that Qatari mediation is more advanced than power-based mediator because Qatar is based its mediation on its financial resources as incentives for the disputants to come to an agreement (Moran, 2009). Qatar promised to invest a further USD 2 billion to address chronic underdevelopment in the Darfur region provided that talks were successful and led to the closure of the conflict (Sudan Tribune, 2011a).-

Qatar was eager to be a mediator in the Darfur conflict and willing to spend enormous resources to reach this goal. Qataris were under pressure to broker a deal because Egypt waited to step in as a mediator should the Doha talks fail (The Enough Project, 2010). The Arab league named Qatar a mediator in the Darfur conflict, which provided Qatar with a regional mandate for involvement in the mediation of the Darfuri conflict (Kamrava, 2015). However, this is considered a challenge to Egypt, which considers Sudan to be its backyard (Sudan Tribune, 2011). Al-Hamadi (2019) illustrates that Qatar considers mediation a necessary strategy that would stimulate a business environment that encourages investment, raise the standard of living in these countries, and halt the bloodshed (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019).

To justify the Qatari usage of financial resources in the Darfur conflict, Taguia, the head of Aljazeera Research Center, suggests that Qatar introduced financial resources as a part of its comprehensive vision of mediation. He explains that Qatar succeeded in developing its own model in mediation, a model which is built on peacebuilding and development (interview with Taguia, 2019). He adds that the Qatari investment in Sudan is not a manipulation tool. He illustrates that those

investments are part of the mediation process to achieve sustainable peace according to the comprehensive Qatari vision of mediation. He asserts that “by mediation, Qatar offers the people new alternatives to transfer them from the war economy to the peace economy and this is important to transfer them from the context of war to the context of peace” (interview with Taguia, 2019).

Taguia rejects using the word “manipulation” when describing Qatar mediation strategy. He suggests that Qatar does not buy positions or the parties in its mediation. He adds that to reach sustainable peace, there should be a rehabilitation of the infrastructure, a recovery of the economy, and creating jobs. He says, “People in the conflict zones should realise the difference between being in peace and war. They should know the value of living in peace by enjoying a better economy and better hospitals and schools.” He explains that people should believe that their life in peace is much better than their life under war, so they will not return to a state of war...this is the Qatari strategic vision for mediation, Taguia says (interview with Taguia, 2019).

In the same vein, Lulwa Al- Khater, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, suggests that Qatar does not have a specific agenda to force the disputants to follow through with its mediation. She explains that Qatar does not manipulate the disputants to reach an agreement. Qatar behaves as a facilitator and does not intervene in the material of the mediation (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

In the same manner, In the same vein, Amin Hassan Omar, the main negotiator who represents the government of Sudan, asserts that Qatar never exerted pressure on any party (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

Sisi puts forth that Qatari money was not used as a manipulation tool to push the disputants to reach an agreement. Most importantly, the Qatari pledge came at the end of these negotiations. The money for the reconstruction and development of Darfur was a genuine effort to help speedy recovery in Darfur (interview with Sisi, 2019). Additionally, he asserts that the investment in Darfur was an expected peace dividend. The root cause of the conflict is the lack of development and investment (interview with Sisi, 2019).

In addition to the facilitation strategy and the manipulation strategy, Qatar used a formulation strategy in the mediation process in Darfur's conflict. Al-Khater (2019) demonstrates that Qatar may make some suggestions for both disputants and leave them to decide. Qatar never manipulated any party (interview with Al-Khater, 2019). Similarly, Hamadi explains that Qatar uses soft diplomatic means based on the principle of persuasion through dialogue and argument, bringing points of view closer together, and removing all barriers to an agreement between the parties concerned (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019). He adds that Qatar did not interfere in the mediation substantively, except at the request of the parties concerned, without interfering in the internal affairs of states, to bring views closer together to find sustainable solutions to disputes and differences (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019).

In sum, Qatar used a variety of mediation strategies in the mediation Darfur conflict, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. Qatar played the role of facilitator when it offered a safe environment for the disputants to meet. Qatar played the role of formulator when it suggested proposals and solutions to the disputants' problems during the mediation process. Finally, Qatar used a manipulation strategy, especially at the end of the negotiations, to encourage the disputants to sign an agreement. . By using

incentives, Qatar does have a carrot. However, Qatar does not stick to pressure the disputants to reach an agreement.

Impartiality/ partiality

The Qatari case shows how a mediator can be impartial (i.e., not favouring a particular party) whilst using manipulative strategies to push for a solution. It is an exceptional case. In the literature, there is the assumption that impartial mediators tend to be low stake, low-leverage and hence will refrain from using manipulation. One of the Qatari strengths in mediation is its impartiality.

In 2008, Qatar was a new player in international mediation. Qatar was busy introducing its approach, which is based on impartiality. In a conflict like Darfur, where the Darfuris suffered from the bias of Arabs, the Darfuris needed an impartial mediator whom they could trust. In mediating the Darfuri conflict, Qatar stood at the same distance from the two parties, the government of Sudan and the Darfuri rebels. Qatar dealt with both parties the same way. Qatar was biased neither to the government of Sudan nor the Darfuri rebels. Qatar introduced financial help to both parties. The Qatari promise to be impartial is the main reason the Darfuris accepted Qatar as a mediator. However, Qatari impartiality is a debatable issue. Some believe in the impartiality of Qatar (Barakat, 2012; Ginty 2008; Kamrava; Mitchell, 2008; Nuruzzaman, 2011). Others think that Qatar was not an impartial mediator as they claim that Qatar was biased toward the Government of Sudan (Jibril, 2010).

Nuruzzaman (2015) asserts that Qatar, in its mediation in the Darfur conflict, cannot be anything except being an impartial mediator, especially in the eyes of the Darfuris. He adds that the Darfuris would never accept the mediation if they were not sure

Qatar would be an impartial mediator. The Darfuris would not accept Qatar because it is an Arab country. He explains that the Darfuris distrusted Arabs after their mediation experiences with Egypt and the Arab league. The general Darforian consensus was that Arabs were biased towards the Sudanese government in Khartoum (Nuruz-zaman, 2015.). Nuruzzaman (2015) adds that a distinctive advantage of the Qatari foreign policy is that the Qataris talk to all parties. Qatar's involvement in the Sudan conflict began with the preliminary efforts of Qatar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Ahmad bin 'Abdullah al-Mahmud, in 2008. Al-Mahmud based the strategy on "get to know and act." Nuruzzaman confirms that this strategy is based on a deep knowledge of the conflict, gaining the confidence of the disputants, and gaining the support of stakeholders to push forward a peaceful solution (Nuruzzaman, 2015).

Building trust among the Darfuris and the Sudanese government that Qatar would be an honest peace mediator was necessary for Qatar to be accepted as a trustful mediator. The Darfuri representatives accepted Qatari mediation because the Qatari mediators offered a new and different perspective on the Sudanese conflict. Kamrava (2011) confirms that Qatar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs worked hard to change the Darfuris' perspective and gain their confidence; he succeeded in generating a sense of goodwill towards Qatar by assuring them that Qatar would be an impartial mediator whom they could trust. In order to show the Darfuris that Qatar would be an impartial mediator and would not be biased to Khartoum, Qatar took many steps. Qatar invited both disputants to negotiations in Doha, and before this step, the country's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs himself went to Darfur to witness the reality of the situation there (Kamrava, 2011).

However, some claim that Qatar was biased toward the government of Sudan. They argue that Qatar pushed forward with negotiations to save the Sudanese president,

AL Bashir, from the international criminal court (ICC) (Jibril, 2010). In answering the claim that Qatar was biased to the Sudanese Government in Khartoum and that Qatari mediation came to save President Al-Bashir from the International Justice Court, Omar Hasan Amin, the main negotiator who represented the Sudanese Government, asserts that Qatar was not the primary mediator and the leading mediator was the Joint Representative of the UN. There were no differences between the two mediators. He confirms that Qatar was an impartial mediator, and there is no way for Qatar to be anything except impartial (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

The head of the Darfuri team, Tigani Sisi himself, confirms that Qatar was an impartial mediator: “The state of Qatar’s approach to mediating between the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement was characterized by impartiality and a keenness to be of the same distance from both parties to the negotiations” (Sisi, 2019). He adds that both parties had equal access to the joint mediation facilities and experienced the same treatment regarding the time allocated for consultations. He confirms that he has not seen any bias from Qatar towards the Sudanese Government (interview with Sisi, 2019).

He explains that Qatar looked at the two parties as Muslims who have the same culture. There is no space to be biased toward any of the two parties in such a situation. Qatar built on the cultural heritage to bridge the gap between the two parties and to bring them closer (interview with Sisi, 2019).

Ali Al-Hamadi agrees with Sisi by confirming that Qatar is an impartial mediator. He explains that Qatar invests in its relationships to create trust. He explains that any mediation process depends on gaining confidence between the parties concerned,

and this trust is built only by a network of institutional and personal relationships. Also, it is reliant upon adopting positive attitudes from all the parties involved and trying to bridge the gaps and deal with the prevailing local culture, so that this relationship is based on a cultural heritage that works to bring the parties closer (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019). He says about the Qatari coordination with the parties, “ Coordination with the various parties to the crisis is coordinated with impartiality, balance and without prejudice to one party without one party gaining the trust of all parties on an equal footing, and the absence of interests of Qatar to prevail over another” (interview with Al-Hamadi, 2019). Similarly, Lolwa Al-Khater (2019) affirms that Qatar always stands at the same distance from all parties. In other words, Qatar is impartial and is not biased toward any party (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

Amin Hassan Omar, the representative of the Sudanese government in the negotiations, asserts that the negotiations in the Qatar process were a combination of consultations with the stakeholders who were not part of the conflict like civil societies represented the Internal Displace persons (IDPs) and the refugee’s civil societies. Additionally, the negotiations between the parties based on the outcomes of the consultations the stakeholders could impact the negotiations. He confirms that This was a guarantee against any bias on the part of the mediation team. Qatari impartiality shared with the Joint Representative is the main factor that made Qatar a successful mediator in the Darfur conflict (interview with Hassan Omar, 2019).

In sum, there is no evidence to prove that Qatar was not an impartial mediator. Qatar impartially deals with both parties, the Government of Sudan and the representative of Darfur.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CASE STUDY FOUR: FATAH-HAMAS DOHA AGREEMENT (2012)

Introduction

The conflict between the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hammas) is often thought to have begun in 2007, is the most prominent and intense stage of the struggle between the two sides. However, the roots of the conflict go back more than a quarter-century (Tuastad, 2013). The conflict between the two prevailed because of the differences in the ideologies adopted by the two movements. Hammas called for Islamic thought, and the military resistance of Israel, and Fatah adopted a secular ideology and maintained those negotiations with Israel as the way forward to end the Israeli occupation. The differences were exacerbated in 1993 when the PLO signed the Oslo Accords, something Hammas strongly opposed. After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, according to the Oslo agreement, a dispute broke out between Fatah and Hammas, where the latter refused to discontinue its military actions against Israel, which Fatah movement saw as a serious direct threat against its political project (Tamimi, 2009; Tuastad, 2013).

Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority's security services launched large-scale arrests against Hammas leaders, operatives, and activists between 1996 and 2000 (Tamimi, 2009). Then, in 2006, Hammas decided to enter the Palestinian parliamentary election, where it managed to win the majority of the Palestinian parliamentary seats. Fatah refused to hand over the reins of power to Hammas, while Hammas insisted on its right to rule over the Palestinian authority. This resulted in a sharp escalation in the conflict between the two movements. In June 2007, the tension reached its breaking

point, and fights broke out between Fatah and Hamas. The fighting ultimately resulted in the defeat of Fatah, and power in the Gaza Strip was taken over by Hamas (Zweiri, 2006). After 2006 there were several attempts at mediation for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Examples of those attempts are February 2007 Mecca Agreement; March 2008 Sana'a Declaration; May 2011 Cairo agreement; and the February 2012 Doha agreement (Aljazeera, 2012).

Qatar mediated the latter agreement. Qatar is one of the countries that has tried to reconcile Fatah and Hamas, and not just once, Qatar also has tried to mediate in 2006 between the two movements. The Fatah-Hamas Doha Agreement (2012), the Doha Palestinian Unity Agreement- is a case study for Qatari mediation and will be discussed in this chapter. The main argument in this chapter is that Qatar, as an interest-based mediator, used a range of different mediation strategies, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation in the mediation process. Additionally, Qatar acted as an impartial mediator in its mediation between Fatah and Hamas.

To reveal the essence of the Qatari mediation approach in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas, this chapter will first offer a brief background on the conflict between Fatah and Hamas, then expound on the role of Qatar in the conflict, and finally address the Qatari approach that was employed in the mediation process. In analysing Qatar's mediation, special attention will be paid to the Qatari motivation, the mediation strategy that Qatar adopts in the mediation, the Qatari impartiality and finally, whether Qatar is a pure mediator or power mediator.

Fatah and Hamas conflict

The dissonance between Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and Fatah (the National Liberation Movement) materialised in a full-on conflict in 2006 with Hamas's entrance into the political arena. It had won the Palestinian parliamentary election in January 2006, where it succeeded in securing 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian parliament, granting it a clear majority (Aljazeera Staff write, 2017; Klein, 2007; Kurz, Dekel, & Berti, 2018; Mishal & Sela, 2006). However, the roots of the conflict between the two parties went back to when Hamas was founded in 1987 as an armed branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Tuastad, 2013). From its inception, Hamas never recognised the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians (Tamimi, 2009). Moreover, Hamas, in its founding charter, considered PLO as a secular organization and its values incompatible with the values of Hamas, holding PLO in contempt for not bearing the Islamic nature of Palestine (Mishal & Sela, 2006).

Hamas shared a common cause with the other resistance groups in Palestine, including Fatah, in its struggle against Israel (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010; Tuastad, 2013). By signing the Oslo agreement, many members of Hamas considered Fatah as traitors. This sentiment sparked a conflict between Hamas in exile, represented by Khaled Mishaal, and Hamas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip represented by Ahmad Yasin. Ahmad Yasin refused to label Fatah as traitors and still views Yasir Arafat as a brother.

On the one hand, Ahmad Yasin was afraid of the prospect of a civil war breaking out between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza, which is what was likely to happen if Hamas

accused Fatah of betrayal (Chehab, 2007). On the other hand, Yasir Arafat was afraid that the popularity of Hamas in the streets of Palestinian would encourage people to revolt against the Oslo accord. He contacted the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to prevent such an outcome, asking them to convince Hamas to be represented in the PLO and have a specific quota at the Palestine National Council (PNC). Hamas suggested new elections for the PNC (Tamimi, 2009), believing it could get 40% of the PNC seats. Of course, Arafat did not agree to this (Tuastad, 2013). Hamas failed in securing seats in the PLO and PNC; it boycotted the Palestinian legislative council (PLC) election in 1996. However, Hamas decided to participate in the 2006 PLC election (Tamimi, 2009; Tuastad, 2013).

Surprisingly, Hamas won a majority in the election and so began its turn to run the official government of the Palestinian Authority (Kassem, 2012; Shamir & Hecht, 2014). After winning the PLC elections, Hamas initially demanded that Fatah create a national unity government. However, Hamas's proposal was rejected by Fatah, which created rising tensions between the two movements (Zweiri, 2006). Moreover, Fatah refused to hand over the reins of power to Hamas while Hamas insisted on its right to control the Palestinian authority, and thus the conflict between the two movements escalated. Unable to bring Fatah on board, Hamas's elected representatives proceeded to form a cabinet consisting only of Hamas-elected representatives and appointed Ismail Haniyeh as prime minister in March 2006 (Kurz et al., 2018; Morro, 2007).

In June 2007, after several failed attempts to reconcile the two movements, hostilities erupted in the Gaza Strip, and the political rivalry deteriorated into violent conflict. Hamas launched a military offensive (Schanzer, 2008). The civil war lasted four days,

at the end of which Hamas had effectively taken control of Gaza, including the Palestinian Authority (PA) government buildings (Kurz et al., 2018; Shamir & Hecht, 2014) and forced Fatah into exile. (Brown, 2010; Schanzer, 2008). The Palestinian president, Abbas, was sure that he had lost Gaza, so he dismissed the unity government that the Saudis had helped to create. The conquering of Gaza by Hamas was an event that people expected due to the long-lasting animosity between Fatah and Hamas (Schanzer, 2008).

While Hamas assured that this war had been a defensive one in which Hamas had only defended itself, Hamas maintained that it was forced to enter this war to protect itself from Fatah, who was accused of being a collaborator with Israel and the USA (Erlanger, 2007). Amnesty International and the Palestine Centre for Human Rights blamed both sides for the violence and asked Fatah and Hamas to cease hostilities and protect civilians (Amnsety International, 2007; Palestine Center for Human Rights, 2007).

Since that time, Hamas and Gaza Strip have undergone diplomatic and economic sanctions from Israel, the USA, and the European Union (EU), with strict movement limitations for people and goods. Meanwhile, the PA in West Bank received economic and military support from the EU and USA (World Bank, 2011). Since that time, the Palestinian Authority has been split into two fractions: Gaza Strip under Hamas Authority and West Bank under the authority of Fatah (Shamir & Hecht, 2014).

Since 2006 Fatah and Hamas have reached a series of agreements aimed at achieving Palestinian reconciliation and ending the internal division, but these agreements—which were sponsored by Arab states— have not been implemented on

account of various obstacles. The most prominent of these agreements are as follows: the Mecca Agreement 2007, the Cairo Agreement 2011, the Doha Agreement 2012 and the Shati agreement 2014 (Aljazeera Staff , 2017; Yaari & Zilber, 2014).

In 2007, Saudi Arabia mediated the two movements in negotiations culminating in the Mecca Agreement. This agreement was the basis of understandings that resulted in a unified government. Fatah and Hamas signed a reconciliation agreement on 8 February 2007 in Mecca under the patronage of the then King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdelaziz Al Saud, to stop the internal fighting in the Gaza Strip and form a government of national unity. He participated in the deliberations prior to the Mecca Agreement, meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Parliamentary member Mohammed Dahlan from the Fatah movement, and with Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and the chairman of the Political Bureau of the Hamas movement, and Khaled Mishaal from Hamas (Aljazeera Staff write, 2017; Morro, 2007). However, the agreement was short-lived, and tensions quickly escalated between the two movements. Fatah's refusal to transfer control of the PA's security forces to the interior ministry headed by Hamas was a denial of power-sharing (Aljazeera Staff write, 2017; Yaari & Zilber, 2014).

The Palestinian factions later met in Cairo on December 20, 2011, under Egyptian auspices, to discuss the mechanisms for implementing the Palestinian National Accord agreement, signed by the factions in Cairo on May 4, 2011. The Palestinian national dialogue in Cairo focused on addressing all the issues that resulted from the Palestinian division through an inclusive dialogue involving all factions, organizations and independent forces, where key committees were formed to fulfil the imperatives of reconciliation: elections, community reconciliation, The formation of a Government

of national unity, public liberties and confidence-building, the operationalization of the Legislative Council and the restructuring of the PLO to intervene with the non-represented factions, in particular, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad which were accumulated in what is known as the Cairo Agreement 2011 (Johannsen et al., 2011; Yaari & Zilber, 2014).

After the failure of the Cairo Agreement 2011, Qatar intervened in the mediation between Hamas and Fatah which ended with the signing of the Doha Agreement in 2012. Both Fatah and Hamas signed this reconciliation agreement in Doha, Qatar on February 6, 2012, with Palestinian President Abbas—on behalf of Fatah and Khaled Mishaal—on behalf of the Hamas movement—to accelerate Palestinian national reconciliation. The agreement—which was attended and sponsored by the then Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani—provided for the operationalization and development of the PLO, through the reconstitution of the Palestinian National Council in parallel with the presidential and legislative elections, and the formation of a national consensus government of independent professional competencies headed by Abbas, whose mission would be to facilitate the presidential and legislative elections and initiate the reconstruction of Gaza, and the continuation of the work of the committees formed after the Cairo Agreement (Aljazeera Staff write, 2017; Milton-Edwards, 2013; Yaari & Zilber, 2014).

Further to the 2012 Doha Agreement, the Shati agreement was signed between the two movements in April 2014. The Shati agreement is considered one of the most crucial reconciliation agreements between Fatah and Hamas. The dialogue sessions were held at the home of Ismail Haniyeh in the Shati refugee camp west of Gaza City, from where its name is derived. Following the agreement, a Palestinian

consensus government was formed, supposed to be followed by six months of elections. However, that did not happen. The parties then reaffirmed their commitment to the agreements reached in "Cairo 2011" and the "Doha Agreement of 2012" and their reference to the implementation of national reconciliation. Ismail Haniyeh –the leader of Hamas- announced from his home in the Shati refugee camp that the schism between Hamas and Fatah was over.

However, in reality, the agreement did not end the schism between the two groups (Aljazeera, 2017; Yaari & Zilber, 2014). Ehud Yaris and Neri Zilber comment on the announcement of Ismail Haniyeh that this is not the first time that Ismail Haniyeh has announced an end to the schism. They say that he has announced it several times in the last ten years. However, there is no implementation of any agreement. Additionally, many significant issues were not settled or even addressed in the agreement, such as the head of the unified government, whether it should be Mahmoud Abbas, whether it would include members of Hamas and other similar issues (Yaari & Zilber, 2014).

Regarding the subject of this research which discusses Qatari mediation, the thesis will focus on the Doha agreement between Hamas and Fatah (2012), which will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Qatar role in the mediation Fatah- Hamas.

The relationship between Qatar and the Palestinians was fostered in two ways: through its humanitarian aid and the Aljazeera satellite channel. The Qatari humanitarian aid to Palestine was deployed via the Qatari charity fully registered in the Gaza Strip and West bank in 1997. Meanwhile, Aljazeera had given favourable coverage to

the Palestinian case since its inception in 1996 (Hansen, 2013). October 2006 was the first instance of Qatari intervention in Palestinian affairs as a mediator between the feuding Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, aiming to resolve their conflict and form a united government (Myre, 2006). Qatar's intervention was in the wake of the failed Egyptian mediation trial (Hansen, 2013). Qatari mediation between the feuding Palestinian parties was conducted by Sheik Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, who shuttled between the leaders of the two movements, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh. However, the mediation yielded no progress as the core obstacle was the recognition of Israel, which Fatah accepted and Hamas did not (Hansen, 2013; Myre, 2006).

In 2008, following the Israeli attack against Gaza in December, the relationship between Hamas and Qatar was strengthened. Yousef Alqaradawi even went on a tour throughout the Middle East to support Hamas (Hansen, 2013). The year 2011 saw the outbreak of the Arab Spring, and witnessed many changes such as the collapse of the Mubarak regime and the evacuation of Hamas from Syria, in addition to the rising strength of the Egyptian brotherhood represented by Yousef Alqaradawi in Qatar (Hansen, 2013). Those changes created a new environment and opened a new window for Qatar to mediate again between Fatah and Hamas (Hansen, 2013).

In late 2011 and early 2012, Qatar pushed ahead with one of its most ambitious mediation projects: facilitating unity negotiations between the rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas (Antwi-Boateng, 2014; Barakat, 2012). The first meeting between Khaled Mishaal and Mahmoud Abbas took place in Qatar (Fromherz, 2017).

On 7 February 2012, Fatah and Hamas signed The Fatah-Hamas Doha agreement. Hamas was represented by Khaled Mishaal, while Mahmoud Abbas represented Fatah. The agreement was reached under Qatar's sponsorship in the presence of Qatar's Emir Sheikh Hamad (Ma'an staff , 2012; Sawafta, 2012). According to this agreement, Mahmoud Abbas would head a unity caretaker government and would be at the same time the president and prime minister of the future technocrat unity government (Barakat, 2012; Issacharoff & Khoury, 2012; Sawafta, 2012).

The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, condemned the agreement, ensuring the impossibility of making peace with Hamas. Moreover, he gave a choice to the Palestinian Authority in West Bank, asking them to choose between peace with Israel or peace with Hamas (Barakat, 2012; Ravid, 2012). A few days later, Abbas replied, reassuring Benjamin Netanyahu that the new interim cabinet would continue its commitment to the obligations and agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Maan staff writer, 2012). With this announcement, Abbas drew anger from Hamas, which did not recognise the existence of Israel. Despite the blockade, Doha agreement 2012 was followed by the Emir's visit to Gaza, where he promised aid and projects to the stricken Gazans (Rabbani, 2012). In the case of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah, Israel is considered a primary stakeholder, and this is due to the impossibility of excluding Israel from any solution or agreement between Fatah and Hamas. Any mediation trial results would affect Israel's security interest (Yaari & Zilber, 2014). Israel would not accept a Palestinian unity government that included Hamas's members and never count Hamas as a peace partner. This was the sentiment of Benjamin Netanyahu against the Doha agreement when he condemned the

agreement, assuring the impossibility of making peace with Hamas. Moreover (Barakat, 2012; Ravid, 2012).

Approval of Israel for any future Palestinian government is critical and could explain the reason behind the failure of so many trials at mediation between Hamas and Fatah. There are no official diplomatic relations between Qatar and Israel. However, there is contact between Israeli officials and their Qatari counterparts on a smaller scale. The Israeli position towards Qatar is a double-sided one. On the one hand, Israel did not welcome the mediation of Qatar in the Palestinian conflict. The Israeli Knesset member, Avigdor Liberman, opposed Qatar being a mediator to the conflict and opposed its participation in Gaza reconstruction, accusing Qatar of hosting Hamas's command. On the other hand, Israel needed Qatar to support the humanitarian projects in Gaza to ease the economic pressure and postpone the confrontation with Gaza (Kurz et al., 2018).

The Qatari International mediation approach in mediation between Hamas and Fatah

This section focuses on three components; the Qatari international mediation represented in Qatari motivation, mediations strategies, and impartiality.

The Qatari motivation

The Qatari interest ranges from Qatar's security to the branding of Qatar as a peace broker. This is applied to all mediation trials that Qatar has conducted without exception. The establishment of the Qatari mediation is based on the security of Qatar (interview with Taguia, 2019). However, the Qatari interest in mediation is a debatable

issue. Some scholars, such as Rabi (2009), argues that Qatar changes its foreign policy based on its national interest and changes in the geopolitical realities (Rabi, 2009). Khatib (2013) argues that Qatar involved itself in mediation for security reasons and protection (Khatib, 2013a). In the case of the Qatari mediation between Fatah and Hamas, Rabbani (2012) demonstrates that, in the case of the mediation in Palestine, Qatari interest lies in branding itself as an honest peace broker and an alternative to Egypt (Rabbani, 2012). Some scholars further assert that Qatar has no direct or specific interest in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank as they have nothing to offer to Qatar (interview with Taguia, 2019). Despite this debate about the Qatari interest in mediation between Fatah and Hamas, some evidence shows those suggestions.

For the argument that Qatar had no interest in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas, Katzman (2016) confirms that the Qatari fund is only for humanitarian and civilian projects and benefits the residents of the Gaza Strip (Katzman, 2016).

For his part, the chairman of Qatar's Gaza Reconstruction Committee Ambassador, Mohammed Al-Emadi, demonstrates that Qatar deals with Gaza as a humanitarian case due to its exceptional circumstances because two million people in the Gaza Strip live in unhumanitarian circumstances. He says, "in helping Gaza Strip, we care about justice and protecting humanity not more...we are not looking forward political gains" (interview with Emadi, 2019).

Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas is an asset added to the Qatari branding as a peace broker. Rabbani (2012) argues that Qatar involvement in the Fatah-Hamas conflict was due to branding itself as a peace mediator, which contributed to

granting Qatar a higher status in the world and portraying Qatar as a peacemaker (Rabbani, 2012). Branding Qatar is an intangible interest. However, Mosa Abu-Marzook, a Hamas representative, argues that Qatar has no tangible interest in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas. He confirms that Qatar did not get any tangible benefit from its mediation between Fatah and Hamas. He demonstrates that Qatar is not seeking to invest in Gaza Strip or West Bank. He explains that Qatar seeks to resolve international conflict peacefully and civilly, as Qatar has the skills and the capacity to do so, he assures (interview with Abu-Marzook, 2019).

In the same manner, Hossam Badran, a representative of Hamas, suggests that: Qatar decided to be a mediator between Hamas and Fatah on a humanitarian basis. He asserts that Qatar is honest and serious about helping and supporting the Palestinian people. He adds that the Qataris believe that Palestinian reconciliation is for the benefit of all Palestinians, and there would be no progress on the Palestinian level without the reconciliation. He suggests that the Qataris believe that reconciliation is the first step to getting on the right track for the Palestinians. Consequently, he identifies that Qatar has neither self-interest nor a private agenda in its mediation between Fatah and Hamas. He says, “ they do not have a specific agenda or any specific interest in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas... Qatar does not need anything from either Hamas or Fatah... There is no financial interest for the Qataris in Palestine “(interview with Badran, 2019). To confirm his point of view, he says that “on many occasions, Qatar told us more than once: If you want to hold reconciliation meetings in Doha and announce them in press conferences in Cairo, Qatar has no problem, which confirms what the Qataris care about is reconciliation”, according to Badran

(interview with Badran, 2019). Additionally, Badran argues that Qatar is motivated by its strong desire to end the division in Palestine.

Suggesting that Qatar involved itself in mediation for security reasons and protection (Khatib, 2013a), Abu-Marzook refutes this suggestion by assuring that what protects Qatar is its unique and exceptional relations with international powers such as the USA and regional powers such as Turkey and Iran. He explains that the good Qatari relations with those powers protect Qatar rather than mediation and conflict resolution (interview with Abu-Marzook, 2019). In contrast, Fatah's representative, Muneer Salama argues that Qatar has a lot to gain from emerging as a champion of Palestinian unity in the region. He claims that Qatar has an interest in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas. He demonstrates that Qatar wants to play a central political role in the region. He says, "whoever has the most money can influence decision-making, and Doha wants to play any role that gives it space to become an important hub in the Arab region." He says, "Qatar wants to be among the major political players in the region who influence the political map in the region." He identifies that Qatar has the money and owns the Muslim Brotherhood, so that's the only reason that it can play that role (interview with Salamah, 2019).

Related to Qatar's relationship with the Muslim Brothers, Walid Al-Awad, a political member of the Palestine People's Party, generalises that Qatar mediation between Fatah and Hamas aimed to support the Muslim brotherhood. He claims that Qatar initiated the mediation between Hamas and Fatah to strengthen the Muslim brotherhood, as Hamas is a part of the Muslim Brotherhood. He asserts that Qatar played the mediator role between Hamas and Fatah to instil the idea that the Egyptian

regime in Egypt is weak and unable to have a regional and international role (interview with Al-Awad, 2019).

Not to mention that the Egyptian regime was in a transition at the time of the Qatari mediation in February 2012. President Mubarak stopped being a president of Egypt in February 2011, a year before signing the Doha agreement between Fatah and Hamas. Refuting Al-Walid's argument, Khaled Mishaal, the ex-head of Hamas, suggests that Qatar had no problem with Egypt until the year 2017 when Egypt forced a siege on Qatar in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, Khaled Mishaal asserts (interview with Mishaal, 2019). Additionally, he identifies that Qatar usually does not mind help in holding the negotiations in Doha and declared it in Cairo without mentioning the Qatari role (interview with Mishaal, 2019).

The debate on the Qatari interest in mediation between Hamas and Fatah ranges between denying and confirming the Qatari direct or specific interest in Gaza Strip and West Bank. However, this debate cannot deny that Qatar was seeking to play the role of regional peace broker by promoting peace between Fatah and Hamas. Qatar indeed looks at Fatah and Hamas as Palestinian factions that should be reconciled. However, Qatar has a lot to gain from emerging as a champion of Palestinian unity in the region.

The Qatari leverage in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas

In the case of its mediation between Hamas and Fatah, Qatar has derived its leverage from three sources: its incentives which take the form of financial resources, the role of the Emir and his diplomacy and finally, the cultural and religious ties.

As for financial incentives, Qatar usually uses its enormous wealth as a tool in its mediation. Antwi-Boaten (2014) asserts that Qatar flexes its financial muscle through the mediation process by promising enormous sums for infrastructure development in return for a peace agreement (Antwi-Boateng, 2014). He confirms that Qatar is the primary source of financial assistance and development investment in the Gaza Strip. He explains that Qatar has provided Gaza with more than USD 500 million since 2012 (Milton-Edwards, 2013). Ishaq (2012) affirms that Qatar developed the opportunity to mediate between Hamas and Fatah by using its financial leverage to aid the Gaza strip (Ishaq, 2012). Badran, the representative of Hamas, argues that the money that Qatar pledged (after the agreement) to Gaza was the money that Qatar promised to pay for Gaza rehabilitation. He adds that those sums of money were the contribution of Qatar into international donations to Gaza (interview with Badran 2019). He argues that the Qatari money pledged to Gaza Strip and the West Bank could not be classified as an investment. He explains that Gaza Strip and the West Bank are not the proper places and the safe environment for the Qatari investment. He says, "Qatar helped Gaza for humanitarian considerations" (interview with Badran, 2019). Al- Khater explains that those financial resources are introduced according to the Qatari comprehensive peacebuilding approach (interview with Al-Khater, 2019).

Qatar usually uses its financial resources to remove obstacles in the negotiations. For example, during the mediation process, the Gaza employees' salaries appeared as an obstacle to signing the agreement. At that moment, Qatar offered to pay the salaries of those employees, according to Khaled Mishaal (interview with Mishaal, 2019). While Salamah asserts that the Qatari money is considered leverage to Qatar

which is used in the mediation (interview Salamah, 2019), Badran confirms that “the money that Qatar paid to Gaza is considered a duty towards the Palestinian issue, that is what the Qataris believe”, Badran says (interview with Badran, 2019). Khaled Mishaal asserts that the Qatari money is considered leverage for Qatari mediation; however, the Qatari money is not the fundamental factor. He explains that the Qatari money is not considered number one in the Qatari mediation. He assures many countries have money; however, they cannot be a successful mediator. He confirms that the eagerness of the Qataris to keep good relations with all parties is a crucial factor that helps Qatar to be a successful mediator. He says, “dealing with all parties the same way is considered leverage for Qatar and the Qatari experience with Gaza and West Bank. He adds that the smartness of the Qatari leadership in mediation is an essential factor, according to Khaled Mishaal (interview with Mishaal, 2019). Khaled Mishaal did not elaborate on” the smartness of the Qatari leaders. However, he believes that Qatari leaders’ involvement in the mediation process is fundamental in reaching an agreement.

The second source of the Qatari leverage is Qatari personal diplomacy. In the case of the mediation between Fatah and Hamas, the mediation efforts and responsibilities were divided between the Emir and Sheik Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani who are considered the decision-making structure (Hansen, 2013). The Qatari Emir and Sheik Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani succeeded in using their capacity to bring Hamas and Fatah to the negotiation table and convincing them to sign the Doha agreement. Qatari personal diplomacy represented by Emir Hamad in dealing with Fatah-Hamas’s reconciliation is a double-edged sword; on the one hand, the Emir succeeded in influencing the disputants to sign an agreement (Hansen, 2013). On the other

hand, the dependency on personal diplomacy was worrying to Hamas, according to Milton-Edwards & Farrell. Milton-Edwards & Farrell (2010) assert that Hamas was afraid that the power shift from the Emir Hamad to his son Tamim could alter Qatari support. For this reason, Hamas has located its external leadership in diverse locations throughout the Middle East, they explain (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010).

Badran (2019) explains the importance of personal diplomacy in the Qatari mediation. He says, “the involvement of the Qatari Emir in the negotiations between Fatah and Hamas supported the negotiations and contributed to removing the obstacle in the negotiations...for example, one of the obstacles in the negotiations was “the head of the coming Palestinian government”...the close relation of the Emir with Khaled Mishaal on one side and his relationship with Mahmoud Abbas on the other side, removed this obstacle”. Badran asserts that Emir suggested Mahmoud Abbas be the head of the coming government, and Khaled Mishaal agreed without reference to Hamas leaders in Gaza Strip who were not satisfied initially. However, Khaled Mishaal succeeded in convincing them of the necessity of this step to end the division, according to Badran (interview with Badran, 2019). Mishaal convincing Hamas to accept Abu Mazen as a leader is based on trust, not Qatari finance. Mishaal was confident that Hamas leaders trust. Qatari finance is not the reason because Hamas is a movement that no one can buy its positions, according to Mishaal (2019).

The third source of the Qatari leverage is the cultural and religious ties. The relationship between the Qatari elite with Mohamoud Abbas and on one side and the relationship between Hamas leaders and the Qatari elite from the other side is also considered leverage in Qatar’s mediation between Fatah and Hamas. Milton-Edwards

(2013) claims that in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas, Hamas Accepted Qatar as a mediator due to the intervention of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas's relationship with Yousef Alqaradawi, who is located in Qatar and considered almost as a spiritual leader for Hamas. Meanwhile, Fatah Accepted the Qatari mediation due to its financial needs (Milton-Edwards, 2013).

Badran and Mishaal (2019) confirm that Hamas did not need the intervention of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to convince them of reconciliation with Fatah. Hamas is already convinced of the necessity of reconciliation. Hamas needs neither the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood nor Yousef Alqaradawi to convince them to be reconciled with Fatah (Interview with Badran; Mishaal, 2019). Mishaal asserts that Hamas behaves according to its fixed principles (interview with Mishaal, 2019). He adds that Emir Hamad supports the Islamic and Arab issues, and since the mid- 1990s, the Emir decided to open the Qatari foreign policy to the region (interview with Khaled Mishaal, 2019).

Mediation Strategy/ies

According to the literature on international mediation, the three known mediation strategies are facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. The mediator is not involved in the mediation process in the facilitation strategy. The facilitator's role is to offer a safe and friendly environment for the disputants to meet and offer hotels and light tickets. Formulation strategy includes suggestion proposal and controlling the agenda of the meetings. Generally, facilitation and formulation strategies show little intervention of the mediator in the mediation process. However, the manipulation strategy is the most active and coercive. Through the manipulation mediation, the mediator can

exert different forms of pressure on the disputants, and the mediator can even issue new proposals and guide the disputants towards signing an agreement (Beardsley et al., 2006; Bercovitch, 2011b; Bercovitch et al., 1991; Foster, 2011; Kleiboer, 1996).

Manipulative mediators may offer carrots (compensation) to disputants to incentivise peace (Carnevale, 1986; Zartman & Touval, 1996). Those carrots may include direct compensation, favourable economic policies to the disputants, or diplomatic concessions (Beardsley et al., 2006).

Qatar used various strategies in the mediation between Hamas and Fatah, a manipulation strategy, facilitation and formulation strategy. By introducing its financial resources as incentives to the disputants, it is evident that Qatar acted as a manipulator mediator in its mediation between Fatah and Hamas. However, there is a debate on the mediation strategy that Qatar employed in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas.

Qatar is a low-leverage state, so it is expected to play a role in mediation different from that of a power mediator. However, some suggest that Qatar in its mediation seems to emulate the role of a superpower by manipulating the disputants to reach an agreement, using its vast financial resources (Antwi-Boateng, 2014; Barakat, 2014; Hansen, 2010). Antwi-Boateng (2014) asserts that Qatar flexes its financial muscle through the mediation process by promising enormous sums for infrastructure development in return for a peace agreement (Antwi-Boateng, 2014). He exemplifies Qatar primary source of financial assistance and development investment in the Gaza Strip (Milton-Edwards, 2013). The Qatari financial aid to Gaza created an opportunity for the Qatari mediation between Hamas and Fatah (Ishaq, 2012). Milton-Edwards (2013), Ishaq (2012) and Antwi-Boateng (2014) argue that Qatar used a

manipulation strategy by employing the Qatari money to push Hamas and Fatah to reach an agreement.

A member of Fatah Movement and an officer in Mahmoud Abbas Office, Muneer Salamah, claims that Qatar was a manipulator in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas. He mentions that Qatar manipulated Hamas by offering it economic temptations and Qatar may manipulate Fatah by putting pressure on it, blackmail or even threat (interview with Salamah, 2019). When Salamah was asked to give examples of either the economic temptations for Hamas or of threat and blackmail toward Fatah, he mentions that “ I have no real examples”, Salamah says (interview with Salamah, 2019).

Al-Emadi, the Qatari ambassador to Gaza Strip, suggests that people in the Gaza Strip suffer considerably from war and have been under siege with destroyed houses and infrastructure. He explains that sending money to the Gaza Strip does not mean that Qatar is helping Hamas. It means that Qatar is helping the two and half million people in Gaza who suffer and who need help. He assures that the money does not go to Hamas; the money goes to the Gaza Reconstruction Committee, established by the Qataris and headed by Al-Emadi, the Qatari ambassador to Gaza. Al-Emadi confirms that this committee coordinates with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah but not with Hamas. He demonstrates that Hamas does not intervene in the committee's business, and Hamas does not receive any money from Qatar. He adds that the Qatari money is used in building schools, hospitals and electricity stations in the Gaza Strip (interview with Al-Emadi, 2019). Al-emadi focuses on the receiver of the money. However, he did not ignore that Gaza received money from Qatar.

The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms sending money to Gaza. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Qatar established the Qatari National Committee for the reconstruction of Gaza in 2012. Its role is to manage projects related to Gaza and under the supervision of the Qatari Ambassador Mohammad AlEmadi. During his visit to Gaza, the Qatari Emir promised USD 407 million for Gaza reconstruction. Gaza reconstruction projects include housing and sports facilities (Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).

Lulwa Al-Khater, the spokesperson of the Qatari Foreign Ministry, argues that Qatar is not playing the role of a manipulator by using its vast financial resources. She shows that Qatar's strategy in mediation is based on the Qatar comprehensive vision of mediation and peace. Qatar believes that mediation is a tool to achieve peace. Al-Khater demonstrates that Qatar uses its vast financial resources to strengthen peace and humanitarian development in a different field, create jobs, and focus on infrastructure rehabilitation (interview with Al Khater, 2019). Al-Khater confirms the purpose of the money. Additionally, she confirms that Qatar uses vast financial resources in international mediation.

Indeed, Qatar does own the carrots to encourage the disputants to reach an agreement. Those carrots are represented in the Qatari economic resources, which Qatar introduced as incentives to Gaza and West Bank. Badran, a Hamas representative, does confirm that it is true that Qatar offers financial aid to Gaza. However, he justifies that Qatar offered those financial aids to Gaza based on the donor conference for reconstructing Gaza (interview with Badran, 2019).

Qatar helps Gaza financially before the mediation, during the mediation and even after the mediation between Fatah and Hamas. Qatar usually uses financial resources when the negotiations reach a deadlock during the mediation process. A clear example that Qatar used its economic resources as incentives in the mediation process is when a deadlock faced the disputants Hamas and Fatah because of the salaries for Gaza employees.

According to Mishaal, Qatar suggested paying the salaries for the employees in Gaza for six months. He explains that the Qataris suggested a solution for the obstacle and used their money to resolve the problems. (interview with Mishaal, 2019).

Some would argue that Qatar introduced those financial incentives based on its comprehensive model in mediation based on peacebuilding and development. They assure that Qatar's money sent to Gaza is for building schools, hospitals, roads, and the rehabilitation of the Gaza infrastructure (interview with Emadi, 2019; Taguia,2019). However, when Qatar introduced financial resources as incentives, Qatar acted as a manipulator in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas. Regardless of the reason behind offering financial incentives (carrots) to the parties, it is defined as manipulation. The other side of manipulation is practising pressure on the disputants. There is no evidence that Qatar practices any pressure (stick) on either Fatah or Hamas.

In the case of the mediation between Fatah and Hamas, the mediation efforts and responsibilities were divided between the Emir and Sheik Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani who are considered as the decision-making structure (Hansen, 2013). Badran (2019) assures that although the Qatari personnel were attended the negotiation meeting

between Fatah and Hamas, Fatah and Hamas team were meeting in Doha in a comfortable environment away from pressure-(interview with Badran, 2019). Mishaal confirms that there was no pressure from Qatar on any party. He says, "Actually the presence of the Emir personally is a message to express that Qatar is caring that the two disputants reach an agreement...Additionally, the presence of Emir Hamad was to help in solving problems that were considered an obstacle in the way of reaching an agreement", Mishaal says. The saying of Badran and Mishaal assure that Qatar used a formulation strategy during the mediation process. To confirm the formulation strategy and to prove that the Qataris proposed solution when it is required, Mishaal and Badran explain that Fatah and Hamas could not agree on the head of the government and the Emir Hamad realised the need for a suggestion to overcome that administrative issue (interview with Badran, 2019). Mishaal assures that Emir Hamad suggested that Abu Mazen be the head of the coming government. Both Hamas and Fatah freely accepted the suggestion, and it was the trademark of the Doha agreement (interview with Mishaal, 2019).

Fatah main negotiator, Azzam Al-Ahmad, affirms that Qatar used a formulation strategy during the mediation process. Al-Ahmad confirms that Qatar sometimes intervened and made suggestions to both sides individually. He says," Qatar made written suggestions to each party and asked for a written response" (interview with Al-Ahmad, 2019).

Badran assures that this does not mean that Qatar practised any pressure on either side to agree. He adds that the personal relationship between the Emir from one side and Khaled Meshaal and Abu Mazen from the other side contributed to the acceptance from both parties of the Emir's suggestion (interview with Badran, 2019).

Khaled Mishaal states that Qatar has a good relationship with Hamas and Fatah. Qatar grants both of them freedom in the negotiations, neither pressuring nor manipulating them (interview with Mishaal, 2019).

In brief, Khaled Mishaal and Hussam Badran (from Hamas) believe that Qatar never placed any pressure on Fatah or Hamas during the negotiations, and they confirm that the attendance of the Qatari personnel such as Emir or the Minister of Foreign Affairs is not considered a factor of pressure. They explain that the attendance of the Qatari personnel gives the negotiators the freedom to represent themselves. They confirm that the Qataris never used pressure as a tool in the mediation process, they say (interview with Badran,2019; Mishaal, 2019).

Hussam Badran explains that Qatar is a small country with a small population and is not a great country like the USA, so Qatar cannot pressure Hamas or Fatah. Furthermore, Qatar is not a significant enough neighbour to Palestine to practise pressure, for example, or even control the borders. He adds that the Qataris do not own the tools to pressure Hamas or Fatah. He explains that Qatar does not have the stick to pressure the disputants (interview with Badran, 2019).

The saying of Badran confirms that Qatar coerces the two parties. It agrees with the saying of Azzam Al-Ahmad. Al-Ahmad denies the occurrence of pressure on both parties. He asserts that Qatar had no pressure from Qatar on either Hamas or Fatah during the mediation process (interview with Al-Ahmad, 2019).

In sum, Qatar used a spectrum of mediation strategies during the mediation process. Those strategies are facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. Qatar used its financial resources before the mediation process, and this is Qatar's way to encourage the

disputants to accept it as a mediator. Qatar used a facilitation strategy to offer a safe environment for the disputants' meetings. When there is a deadlock, Qatar plays the role of a formulator by suggesting proposals and solutions resolve the deadlock. Qatar used its financial resources to encourage the disputants to sign an agreement. It happened when Qatar promised to pay the Gaza employees' salaries. This money is considered a financial incentive. Introducing financial incentives to the disputants to encourage them to reach an agreement is called manipulation. It proves that Qatar acted as a manipulator in its mediation between Hamas and Fatah. While Qatar acted as a manipulator in its mediation between Fatah and Hamas, Qatar did not give away its impartiality even when hosting the Hamas leader in Doha.

Impartiality/ partiality

Based on the above section, Qatar used a manipulation strategy in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas. The manipulator does not pay much attention to impartiality (Smith, 1994). The Qatari mediation can be an exceptional case. Qatar is an impartial mediator in the two case studies. In the two cases, Qatar mediated between Muslims and Arabs. Qatar preserved equal relations with all the parties. Qatar hosted the disputants in the same hotels and dealt with them equally. When Qatar introduces incentives to one party, it also incentives the other party.

While some scholars state that Qatar was an impartial mediator between Fatah and Hamas (Barakat, 2012), other scholars suggest that Qatar was biased in favour of Hamas (Hansen, 2013).

There is some evidence that Qatar was an impartial mediator between Fatah and Hamas. Impartiality is a crucial element in Qatari mediation, and the credibility of the Qatari mediation lies in its impartiality (interview with Mishaal, 2019; Taguia, 2019). Al-Ahmad confirms that he did not witness any Qatari temptation to be biased towards either Hamas or Fatah (interview with Al-Ahmad, 2019).

Qatar had good, same relations with both parties in its mediation between Fatah and Hamas. Badran says, “ Khaled Meshaal is located in Qatar and other Hamas members as well, and Fatah members including Mahmoud Abbas have a distinct relationship with the Qataris (interview with Badran, 2019). He confirms that Qatar deals with both parties without being partial to them (interview with Badran, 2019).

If the representatives of both Hamas confirm that Qatar was biased towards neither Fatah nor Hamas, this would be convincing evidence that Qatar was an impartial mediator in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas.

Qatar dealt equally with both sides despite the differences in the ideology and the political platform between Fatah and Hamas. Qatar did not deal with Fatah and Hamas based on ideological considerations. Mishaal (2019) confirms that Qatar dealt with both parties based on political rationality. He adds that the Qataris dealt with both parties as Palestinians. He explains that the negotiations between Fatah and Hamas were Palestinian-Palestinian negotiations (interview with Mishaal, 2019).

Some experts promote the idea that Qatar is biased towards Hamas (Hansen, 2013). Badran refutes this claim when he explains that those people built their claim that Qatar hosted Khaled Mishaal and other members of Hamas, which is true. He adds that this does not mean that Qatar is biased toward Hamas. Badran asserts that

Qatar hosts many different leaders from different countries and different backgrounds (interview with Badran, 2019).

The people who argue that Qatar was biased toward Hamas based their argument on several issues. They based their arguments on Emir Hamad's visit to Qatar in October 2012, the Qatari financial support to Gaza, hosting Khaled Mishaal, Aljazeera's handling Hamas news, and finally, the relations between Qatar and the Muslim brotherhood, which is represented in hosting Yousef Al-Qaradawi.

For Emir Hamad's visit to Gaza in October 2012, Muneer Salameh, Fatah's member, considers the Emir Hamad's visit to Gaza as evidence of the partiality of Qatar towards Hamas. Salameh argues that the visit of the Qatari Emir is a political message from Qatar to say that they are supporting Hamas. Additionally, he considers that the Qatari support to Gaza proves that Qatar is biased toward Hamas (interview with Salamah, 2019). Using the visit of the Qatari Emir to Gaza in 2012 as evidence that Qatar is biased toward Hamas needs to be validated.

Khaled Mishaal explains that it is rational to clarify that the reason for the visit of the Qatari Emir to Gaza and not Ramallah is because the West Bank is under Israeli occupation (interview with Mishaal, 2019). Additionally, Fatah- Hamas Doha Agreement was in February 2012, and the visit of Emir Hamad was in October 2012 after the agreement. This indicates no relationship between the Qatari impartiality and the Emir's visit to Gaza.

Some use Hamas's strong relationship with Qatar and Qatar's welcoming of Khaled Mishaal after he left Syria and settled in Doha to show that Qatar was biased toward Hamas in the negotiations. Furthermore, Qatar supports Hamas' capabilities in Gaza by paying salaries and infrastructure projects in Gaza (Kurz et al., 2018).

Stig Hansen considers the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah as a central interest in Qatari foreign policy. However, he claims that Qatar was biased in favour of Hamas. Hansen explains that Qatar entered the negotiations with a clear bias towards Hamas, which did not constitute an obstacle to the negotiations between the two movements because Qatar used the money to allay Fatah's fears and attract Fatah's goodwill (Hansen, 2013).

Hansen exemplifies that during the Qatari mediation between Hamas and Fatah, Aljazeera was biased toward Hamas and anti-Fatah. He adds that Aljazeera's previous director, Wadah Khanfar, influenced Aljazeera to cast a positive light on Hamas. Hansen presents an example to show the bias of Qatar towards Hamas. He uses the killing of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin in 2004 as an example. He confirms that Aljazeera TV producers were clad in black (Hansen, 2013).

The usage of the Aljazeera channel as a tool to describe Qatar as biased toward Hamas is not enough to prove that Qatar was biased toward Hamas in the mediation between Fatah and Hamas. Mishaal (2019) disapproves of Hansen's claim as he says, "Aljazeera sometimes presents news or programs that Hamas does not like...Aljazeera reflects events and does not makeup events...Aljazeera covered the siege of Yasser Arafat...it is not fair to say that Aljazeera is biased toward Fatah because it covers the siege of Yasser Arafat... Aljazeera hosts many of the leaders from both Fatah and Hamas," according to Mishaal (interview with Mishaal, 2019).

Regarding the Qatari relation with Muslim Brotherhood, Hansen explains that Qatar is a country with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, which seems to have replaced the old Syrian and Iranian allies of Hamas (Hansen, 2013). Hansen explains that Qatar has been the sponsor and the critical backer for the Muslim brotherhood for many

decades. He adds that Qatar has hosted leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Doha, providing them with financial support and even granting them the Qatari nationality. Yousuf Alqaradawi is an example. Al Qassemi (2011) and Khatib (2013) claim that Qatar has used the Aljazeera satellite channel as a tool to express public support for the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Qassemi, 2011; Khatib, 2013b). Minich (2015) claims that Qatar's friendly relations with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood assisted in signing the Doha Agreement in 2012 (Minich, 2015). However, this does not mean that Qatar was biased toward the Muslim Brotherhood or even Hamas. Qatar hosted many different political figures, for example, the son of Mahmoud Abbas. Hosting him does not mean Qatar is biased in favour of Mahmoud Abbas.

The evidence used above to prove that Qatar was biased toward Hamas are not enough to prove what happened inside the mediation room. None of those claims offers any evidence to show that Qatar was biased toward Hamas or either side through the mediation process and inside the negotiation rooms. One example can refute the claim that Qatar was biased toward Hamas. Mishaal (2019) and Badran (2019) assure that the two parties, Hamas and Fatah, reached a deadlock during the negotiations. They explain that the deadlock was when Fatah and Hamas could not agree on the head of the government. The Emir suggested that Abu Mazen be the head of the government, and Hamas and Fatah freely accepted the suggestion, and it was the hallmark of the Doha agreement (interview with Mishaal and Badran, 2019). If Qatar had been biased toward Hamas, Qatar would suggest that the head of the government would be from Hamas. However, Qatar did not nominate anyone from Hamas. Qatar nominated Mahmoud Abbas to be the head of the government. Qatar could have nominated someone from Hamas to be the head of the

government. Qatar could use the money to allay Fatah's fears and attract Fatah's goodwill. Qatar could pay Mahmoud Abbas to agree. However, Qatar did not do that. It proves that Qatar was impartial in mediation between Fatah and Hamas.

CHAPTER EIGHT: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

Through engagement in international mediation, different low-leverage states adopt different approaches in international mediation. Therefore, through careful analysis of some of the international mediation cases of two states, Norway and Qatar, this thesis presented two different approaches for low-leverage states in international mediation: norm-driven mediation and interest-driven mediation.

The present thesis answered the main research question: Why do low-leverage states engage differently in international mediation? In addition are the following sub-questions: What are the motivations and the capabilities of interest-based low-leverage mediators? What are the motivations and the capabilities of norm-based low-leverage mediators?

Both interest-based low-leverage and norm-based low-leverage mediators have different motivations and different capabilities. Those differences enable the low-leverage states to engage differently in international mediation, which is discussed in detail in the following section.

This chapter is laid out in four sections. The first section provides a table that summarizes the main findings of the thesis. The second section is a discussion on the Norwegian approach to international mediation followed by the Qatari approach to international mediation. The third section discusses norm-based mediation versus interest-based mediation. Finally, the conclusion.

Qatar and Norway in international mediation: a summary of the thesis findings

Table (2) a summary of the thesis findings

	Norway (Norm-based mediator)	Qatar (Interest-based mediator)
Motivation	Norm-based motivation	Interest-based motivation
Capabilities (leverage)	<p>Track One and a Half diplomacy.</p> <p>2. Personal relations between the Norwegian NGOs and the disputants (trust-building)</p> <p>3. Economic resources to cover the meetings of the disputants</p> <p>The need of the disputants.</p>	<p>1. Economic resources as incentives to the disputants after reaching an agreement.</p> <p>2. Personal Diplomacy represented in the Emir and the elite.</p> <p>3. The cultural and religious ties between Qatar and the disputants.</p>
Impartiality	Not impartial	Impartial
Mediation strategy	Facilitation+ Manipulation	Manipulation

Pure/Power mediator	<p>Have no interest in acting as a pure mediator.</p> <p>Employs manipulation strategy and acts as a power mediator.</p> <p>3. Not impartial mediator= acted as a power mediator</p>	<p>1. Have interests and act as a power mediator.</p> <p>2. Offers incentives to the disputants=acted as a power mediator.</p> <p>3. Impartial mediator= acted as a pure mediator.</p>
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Why do Qatar and Norway engage differently in international mediation?

Both Norway and Qatar are low-leverage states. However, each of them is engaged differently in international mediation. Norway engages itself as a norm-based mediator in international mediation. Meanwhile, Qatar is classified as an interest-based mediator in international mediation. The two countries behave differently because each of them has a different motivation, capabilities and backgrounds, and different utilization of their economic resources. Despite both of them being considered rich countries with vast economic resources, the employment of their resources is varied in their attempts at international mediation. Norway and Qatar employ their economic resources according to their motivations.

For the difference in motivations, the departure point is that states usually engage in international mediation based on interest; otherwise, they will not be involved in

mediation. It is applied to both norm-based mediators and interest-based mediators. Although the norm-based mediators such as Norway engage themselves in international mediation to promote their international standing and influence in international politics, they gear towards survival by seeking status in the international community. However, they adhere to norms as an essential part of their international mediation and make a balance between its interest and the norms.

In direct contrast, interest-based low-leverage states, Qatar, are mainly engaged in mediations due to interest-based motives. These interests may also include the low-leverage state's investment, security, prestige or international standing. Qatar engages itself in international mediations for security reasons. Qatar believes that being an international mediator would increase its international status and influence in the international community, and by this way, Qatar could secure itself. Accordingly, Qatar considers its international mediation as a tool for expanding its future investment and protecting its current investment. Furthermore, Qatar seeks to promote stability in the Middle East, which is based on morality.

The difference between Qatar and Norway is that Norway makes a balance between the norms and its interest and, Qatar does not make a balance between its interest and the norms of morality. As a result, Qatar engages in mediation to achieve its interest which is represented in security, branding itself, and investment in the disputant's territories.

As a norm-based-low-leverage state, Norway builds its national identity based on universal norms and introduces itself as good stewards working for the common good of the international community. For Norwegians, their peace policy is affected by their

ideas about peace. Their engagement in peace activities is related to the state identity and its values. In their foreign policy and international mediation, Norwegians are guided by normative concepts. Indeed, this is why Norway is called a moral entrepreneur or norm entrepreneur. Norway has developed a national consensus built around social-democratic norms that stress international concerns for those around the world who are oppressed. Acting as a norm entrepreneur, Norway contributes foreign aid to the poor worldwide, seeks to enhance gender equality and the role of women, and endeavours to promote peace by pursuing security and mediation in conflicts. Thus, Norwegian foreign policy is a foreign policy of peace, designed to make the world a better place.

In order to conduct humanitarian activity and peace work, Norway shares its resources with others. It aims to bolster the liberal approach to the world. Additionally, The Norwegians are convinced that such actions are essential for the creation of a better world and believe that they have an essential role to play in the process.

The motivations of both Qatar and Norway are based on their background and history. Being a colony under its neighbours for 500 years enables Norway to understand the experience of being ruled by others. So, the history of Norway reflects on its mediation type.

In the same manner, the history of Qatar, in addition to its location, affect its mediation type and its mediation drive. As an interest-based mediator, Qatar's international mediation was established based on Qatari security due to its vulnerable location between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional hegemons. Qatar had involved itself in

international mediation to protect itself from regional hegemon countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Qatari foreign policy is formulated to increase its international profile to protect itself from the dangers of small state vulnerability and avoid what happened to Kuwait in 1990. Based on its security, Qatar is working on branding itself as a peace mediator who has experience with a track record in international mediation.

For a norm-based mediator, this thesis uses Norway and its mediation in both the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Sudanese conflict as examples. It has been found that Norway had no specific, direct self-interest in both cases. Norway has no self-interest in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the Norwegian motivation was to promote peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In the same manner, Norway, in its mediation between South Sudan and Sudan, had no self-interest and the Norwegians aimed at stopping the war and bringing peace to the people of Southern Sudan who had suffered much and also the Norwegian goal was to make South Sudan a better place to live.

The motivation of the mediator is connected with the manner of using the resources or leverage. For example, norm-based mediators use their economic resources as humanitarian aids to help the disputants. Offering those aids to the disputants contribute to building trust between Norway and the disputants. In contrast, the interest-based mediator uses economic resources to incentivise the disputants to reach an agreement.

Additionally, the two states have different capabilities or leverage. However, each of them utilises its resources differently. While Norway uses its resources as

humanitarian aid to the disputants to gain their trust of the disputants, Qatar uses its financial resources as incentives to encourage the disputants to reach an agreement.

Norway's leverage is represented in its Track One and a Half diplomacy, personal relations between the Norwegian NGOs and the disputants (trust-building), and economic resources to cover the meetings of the disputants. Qatar's leverage is represented in its economic resources as incentives to the disputants after reaching an agreement, personal diplomacy, and cultural and religious ties.

Low-leverage states in international mediation: norm-based mediation versus interest-based mediation

Norm-based mediation: Norway mediation in Oslo Accord and the CPA

According to the theoretical framework, norm-based mediators are expected to be impartial. They consider impartiality an essential component for their credibility and acceptability in the mediation process and usually adopt a facilitation strategy. What is found in this thesis is different. This section focuses on Norway's mediation strategy to mediate the two conflicts and Norwegian impartiality.

The mediation strategy in Oslo Accord and the CPA

The two cases of Norwegian mediation showed that Norway used a spectrum of mediation strategies in different stages of the mediation process.

In the case of the Oslo Accord, Norway utilized a facilitation strategy at the beginning of negotiation in the first phase of the negotiations, which extended until May 1993. In this stage, a facilitation strategy is essential to create a secure environment of trust

between the Israelis and the PLO representatives. There was no possibility that Norway coerces any parties or intervenes in the mediation process. The Norwegian role was restricted by being a facilitator who conveyed messages between the two disputants. However, this behaviour changed in the second stage of the mediation process. The turning point was the involvement of the new Norwegian foreign minister, Holst. Holst decided to play an active role in the mediation between the Israelis and the PLO. Holst was eager to reach an agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In order to reach an agreement, Holst materially and immaterially manipulated Yasir Arafat. It means that Norway used a manipulation strategy in the second stage of the negotiations. The negotiations at that time reached a deadlock, and Holst realized that negotiations would collapse if he did not psychologically manipulate Yasir Arafat and explain to him the cost of non-agreement. Norway manipulated the needs of Yasir Arafat for a solution that would return him to the regional and international political stage. Additionally, Holst materially manipulated Yasir Arafat by promising him to raise funds for building the Palestinian Authority.

In the mediation of the Sudanese conflict, Norway also used a spectrum of mediation strategies that range from facilitation, formulation and manipulation.

Mostly, Norway was a facilitator who offered a safe environment for the disputants. However, on specific occasions, Norway played a role of a formulator. For example, Norway suggested including self-determination in the mediation substance. After a while of negotiations encouraging the disputants to reach an agreement, Norway promised both sides, the Government of Sudan, and the rebels in South Sudan, to help them invest in the oil industry. Norway manipulated both the Sudanese government and the representative of South Sudan. It is essential to mention that

Norway mediated through Troika in its mediation between South Sudan and Sudan. Norway was an active mediator, convincing both the USA and the UK to adopt similar positions towards the SPLM. Being a member of the Troika, Norway had a strong position by borrowing the leverage of the USA to coerce the Sudanese government.

In both the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the Sudan South Sudan conflict, Norway used a spectrum of the three mediation strategies: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. However, when Norwegians utilized those strategies, they mainly focused on facilitation. Indeed, the Norwegians started with a facilitation strategy, and they used the formulation strategy in the middle of the negotiations, but the Norwegians used the manipulation strategy to reach an agreement.

However, Norway did not use all manipulation tools because Norway is not a super-power like the USA. For example, one of the manipulation tools is threatening the disputants. Norway cannot threaten the disputants because Norway is not a super-power like the USA. Norway is a low leverage state.

This behaviour of Norway was unexpected. Norway is a norm-based mediator, which means that Norway is expected to adopt the facilitation strategy. Norway adopted the manipulation strategy in its mediation in both the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Sudanese conflict,

The Norwegian impartiality

As a norm-based mediator, Norway is expected to be impartial in its mediation. However, Norway was not always an impartial mediator in mediation between the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Sudanese conflict. Norway gave away its impartiality in certain stages of the mediation process.

In mediation Oslo Accord, Norway was impartial in the first stage of the mediation until May 1993. However, Norway started to play the role of biased mediator in the second stage of the mediation. Norway was biased toward the strong party, the Israelis. Holst was aware that there would be no agreement without achieving the Israeli demands. Consequently, Holst adopted the Israeli position and manipulated Arafat to accept the Israeli demands. For example, Arafat asked for an extra corridor to connect Gaza with the West Bank. At that time, Israel rejected it, and Norway adopted the Israeli demand and stood for it. The Norwegian practised unhidden bias toward the Israeli side by adopting the Israeli demands and position and considering them as redlines.

In its mediation between the SPLM (South -Sudan rebels) and the government of Sudan, Norway was partial to the weak side, the SPLM. The Norwegians failed to manage the power disparity equitably. It is in direct opposition to the Norwegian behaviour in mediation between strong Israel and the weak Arafat and PLO.

In sum, Norway is expected to be an impartial mediator who employs a facilitation strategy as a norm-based mediator. However, in its mediation in the Oslo Accord 1993 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan 2005, Norway was not always an impartial mediator. Norway used a spectrum of the three mediation strategies: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation.

Interest-based mediation: Qatar's mediation DDPD and Fatah- Hamas Doha Agreement.

Interest-based mediators are expected to act as manipulators, and impartiality is unnecessary for them. Studying two cases of Qatari mediation found that Qatar was a manipulator mediator and preserved a position of an impartial mediator who had significant relations with all parties on the same levels.

Mediation strategies in the Qatari mediation

In the case of the mediation Darfur conflict, Qatar used a spectrum of the three mediations strategies in different stages of the mediation process: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. Before the mediation, Qatar used its leverage to encourage the disputants to accept Qatar to be a mediator. For example, parallel to the Qatari mediation in Darfur in June 2010, the Qatar Charity announced a project of USD 1 billion to improve the livelihoods of the impoverished people living within the affected area.

Qatar used a facilitation strategy during the mediation process by offering the disputants the place for meetings, flight tickets, and hotels. At the end of the negotiations, Qatar used its leverage again and manipulated the disputants by promising them to pay lots of money to invest or rehabilitate Darfur and Sudan's infrastructure.

Qatar used a spectrum of mediation strategies, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation for mediation between Hamas and Fatah. Before the beginning of the mediation process, Qatar offered financial aid to Gaza and investment in West Bank. Qatar usually uses its leverage (finance) before mediation to encourage the disputants to

accept Qatar as a mediator. During the mediation process between Hamas and Fatah, Qatar used a facilitation strategy to offer a safe environment for the disputants to meet. Qatar sought to offer Fatah and Hamas teams a comfortable meeting environment at this stage.

When the negotiations reached a deadlock, and upon the request of the disputants, Qatar played the role of formulator and suggested proposals to resolve the deadlocks. For example, Fatah and Hamas were arguing about the head of the next government. Qatar used its formulation strategy and suggested that Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazen, be the head of the next Palestinian government. At the last stage of the negotiations, Qatar used the manipulation strategy. For example, Qatar promised to pay the salaries of the employees in Gaza to reach an agreement. For the Qatari mediation strategy, by using its vast financial resources, Qatar was expected to be playing the role of a manipulator.

Qatar's impartiality in the mediation process

The interest-based mediators are usually concerned about leverage in the mediation, and they do not give much attention to impartiality. Qatar, an interest-based mediator, gives a different example that contradicts the known ones. Qatar is not expected to act as an impartial mediator. However, Qatar shows impartiality in the two cases of mediation discussed in this thesis. Qatar deals with each party in an impartial way and without being biased toward any one party. In its mediation between Hamas and Fatah, Qatar does have a close relationship to Hamas. However, Qatar also enjoys a strong relationship with Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah). For the Qatari mediation in Darfur,

Qatar dealt with both sides as Muslims. Qatar acted as an impartial mediator in the mediation between the rebels in Darfur and the government of Sudan.

In conclusion, Both Qatar and Norway are low-leverage states who represent two different approaches to mediation and engage differently in international mediation.

In order to achieve their motivations, Norway and Qatar employed a spectrum of different mediation strategies. The difference between Norway and Qatar is that Qatar used its leverage before and at the end of the mediation process. Qatar used the leverage before the mediation to pave the way for mediation to encourage the disputant to accept it as a mediator. During the mediation process, Qatar used a facilitation strategy. At the end of the negotiations, Qatar used its leverage again and promised financial aid to manipulate the disputants to reach an agreement.

In brief, the departure point of the Qatari and the Norwegian mediation to gain international status. However, each country behaves differently in international mediation. Norway employs its norm and uses its identity as a norm entrepreneur to be a mediator. Norway uses what is skilful in it, which is norm entrepreneurship. While Norway relies on Track One and a Half diplomacy, personal relations between the Norwegian NGOs and the disputants (trust-building), it uses its economic resources to cover the meetings of the disputants.

In contrast, Qatar, skilful in money investment, relies on its economic resources as promised incentives to promote the disputants to reach an agreement. The Qataris use cultural and religious ties to deal with the disputants with impartiality. Qatar can only be impartial because most of the Qatari mediation trials are between Muslims and Arabs.

Conclusion

This thesis examines two types of low-leverage mediation; norm-based mediation and interest-based mediation represented by Norway and Qatar, respectively.

Based on the literature, norm-based low-leverage mediators should act as impartial mediators who employ a facilitation strategy. In contrast, interest-based low-leverage mediators should be manipulators who do not give much attention to impartiality.

An analysis of two case studies that represented norm-mediated mediation and two case studies that represented interest-based mediation found that norm-based low-leverage mediators use different mediation strategies, the facilitation, the formulation, and the manipulation, in different stages of the mediation process. Those mediators use the facilitation strategy at the beginning of the mediation process and use the formulation studies when required by the disputants. However, they use the manipulation strategy at the end of the mediation process to lead the disputants to sign an agreement. After many years of humanitarian assistance to the disputants, those mediators use their NGOs to build trust between them and the disputants.

Slightly different, the low-leverage-interest-based mediators also use a range of the three known mediation strategies. However, the interest-based mediators introduce their leverage, investment or aid shortly before engagement in the mediation process to encourage. They use the facilitation strategy by offering a safe environment for the disputants to meet and the logistic tools to facilitate the meetings. They use the formulation strategy when the negotiations reach a deadlock. They offer proposals to resolve the deadlocks. At the end of the mediation process and to encourage the

disputants to sign an agreement, they present a manipulation strategy by promising financial investments or aids to the disputants in case they sign an agreement. For impartiality, this thesis found out that norm-based low-leverage mediator was not always an impartial mediator. However, the interest-based mediator preserves impartiality.

This thesis introduces several significant theoretical contributions to the field. This thesis presents two types of low-leverage states in international mediation: norm-based mediators and interest-based mediators. It sheds light on the way they both behave in international mediation.

The thesis found that both Norway and Qatar use a spectrum of mediation strategies. Additionally, this thesis found out that Norway was not always an impartial mediator. Moreover, and unexpectedly, Qatar acted as an impartial mediator that preserved the same relations with all parties. The Qatari case shows how a mediator can be impartial (i.e., not favouring a particular party) whilst using manipulative strategies to push for a solution. It is unique because there is an assumption in the literature that impartial mediators tend to be a low stake, low-leverage and hence will refrain from using manipulation.

This thesis could be a beginning or guidance for further studies on low-leverage states in international mediation. This thesis assures that the mediation strategies cannot be classified according to a dichotomy division. The low-leverage states use a spectrum of those strategies. This thesis could be a tool to raise awareness of the necessity to redefine three important concepts in international mediation: impartiality, manipulation and leverage, in the context of low-leverage states. For example, the

manipulation strategy is different from the manipulation strategy for a superpower like the USA. The USA has wide options of manipulation tools that are not available to low-leverage states, such as threats. The same could be applied to impartiality. In the literature, impartiality means not to be biased (not favouring a particular party). In the thesis, Qatar was impartial because Qatar was favouring the two parties to the same degree. Those concepts were a challenge to the researcher.

In the end, this thesis could be a guideline for the decision-makers in Norway and Qatar to focus on the advantages and disadvantages of their mediation and avoid the shortcomings in any future mediation trials.

In general, Both Qatar and Norway do not represent enough cases to study the behaviour of low-leverage states in international mediation. In order to find out more about the behaviour of low-leverage states in international mediation and whether they are norm-based mediators or interest-based mediators, it is recommended that there should be more studies that include other such cases. In order to deeply understand the interest-based mediator such as Qatar, it is recommended to include the Qatari mediation between USA and Taliban in any future study or any other mediation case that took place after 2013. The two cases of the Qatari mediation in this thesis are before 2013, which was in the age of Emir Hamad, the father. The current Emir, Tamim, became Emir in 2013. Although he conforms to follow his father steps, there may be differences in the Qatari mediation in the era of Emir Tamim. The same for the Norwegian mediation, it should be further studies that include the Norwegian latest mediation trials.

In order to conduct this thesis, some obstacles were faced in this thesis. Those obstacles are represented by finance shortages, security concerns, difficulties in reaching the expected participants, and sometimes refusal by participants to be interviewed. The interviews represented the primary data for this thesis and required travel to be completed, and the researcher needed to conduct plenty of interviews. However, travel was sometimes not possible due to financial shortages and security issues. For example, travelling to places such as Sudan, South Sudan and Palestinian Authority was not recommended due to security issues as those places are considered not safe places. However, the researcher managed to overcome those obstacles by conducting most interviews via telephone or the internet. The University of Birmingham allowed the researcher to use the University telephones for interviewing the participants in the USA, Israel, Sudan, and Palestinian Authority.

Another obstacle is represented in the difficulties in interviewing some of the nominated participants. Some of the participants refused to be interviewed due to political reasons. For the interviewees who refused to be interviewed, the researcher succeeded in finding alternatives to them and keeping the identities anonymous of the replacement interviewees.

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